Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe 9783666369124, 9783525369128

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Schriften des Hannah-Arendt-Instituts für Totalitarismusforschung Herausgegeben von Clemens Vollnhals Band 36

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe Edited by Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. ISBN 978-3-525-36912-8 Umschlagabbildung: © Patrick Moreau

© 2008, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen / www.v-r.de Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Das Werk und seine Teile sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung in anderen als den gesetzlich zugelassenen Fällen bedarf der vorherigen schriftlichen Einwilligung des Verlages. Hinweis zu § 52a UrhG: Weder das Werk noch seine Teile dürfen ohne vorherige schriftliche Einwilligung des Verlages öffentlich zugänglich gemacht werden. Dies gilt auch bei einer entsprechenden Nutzung für Lehr- und Unterrichtszwecke. Printed in Germany. Satz: Hannah-Arendt-Institut, Dresden Druck und Bindung: h Hubert & Co, Göttingen Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier.

Contents

Introduction Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau

I. Western Europe

9

13

The Disappearance of Communism in the Netherlands Gerrit Voerman

15

The PDS / Linkspartei.PDS and the Extreme Left – Decline and Renaissance of Communism in Germany Patrick Moreau

39

France – The Collapse of the House of Communism Stéphane Courtois / Dominique Andolfatto

87

Communist and Post - Communist Parties in Switzerland after 1989/1990 – A Survey Dominik Kamber

II. Northern Europe

133

139

Post - Communism and Leftist Parties in Two Scandinavian Countries after 1989 – The Cases of Denmark and Sweden Svante Ersson

141

Communism in Estonia – Party Dead but Ex - Members Well Off Toomas Alatalu

167

III. Southern Europe

191

Few but Pure and Good Members are Preferred to a Mass Party – The Portuguese Communist Party’s Continued Orthodoxy Carlos Cunha 193 The PRC – Emergence and Crisis of the Antagonistic Left Simone Bertolino

215

6

Contents

The Communist Party of Greece after the Collapse of Communism (1989–2006) – From Proletarian Internationalism to Ethno - Populism Nikos Marantzidis

245

The Communist Party of Cyprus – AKEL Andreas Stergiou

259

IV. Eastern Europe

283

Communist and Post - Communist Parties in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia Miroslav Mareš

285

Post-Communist Parties in Poland after 1989 Piotr Sula

311

A Romanian Tale – The Transition of the Communist Party from Ceauşescu to NATO Marius Oprea

329

The Socialist Party of Serbia Irena Ristić

343

Ukraine 1991–2006 – Where Have All the Communists Gone ? Abel Polese

371

Between Conformity and the Struggle for Political Survival – The Communist Parties in Belarus Rudolf A. Mark

403

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation ( CPRF ) Galina Michaleva

437

V. Transnational Cooperation and Comparison

461

Transnational Cooperation of Post - Communist Parties Rudolf van Hüllen

463

Trade Unions and Communism in Spain, France, and Italy Dominique Andolfatto

483

Contents

7

( Ex - )Communist Elites and State Capture Patrick Moreau

501

Communism and Neo - Communism in Times of “Globalization” Yolène Dilas - Rocherieux

523

Conclusion Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau

535

Appendix Bibliography Abbreviations Index List of Contributors

609 611 646 653 660

Introduction Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau The fall of the Iron Curtain, the decline of the Soviet empire, and the transformation of the political and economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe marked an epoch - making change of global historical importance. The East - West conflict had been the predominant structural model of international relations after the Second World War. Now it came to an end. The autocratic systems and controlled economies of “real existing socialism” went through processes of liberalization and democratization and frequently had to give way to the political and economic patterns of Western constitutional states. The loss of importance of communism dominated by Moscow was dramatic. It led to the assumption that the former official state parties of the Soviet Union and its satellites could be condemned to die. The parties orientated towards the “center of world revolution” in the West, too, seemed to have lost their future. But one and a half decades after the epoch - making change the situation of the formerly Moscow - oriented parties conveys a high degree of differentiation. Examples of rapid decline were numerous in the East as well as in the West. But there were many cases of a flexible adaptation to the new political and socioeconomic basic conditions. Sometimes the organizational and strategic mutation was accompanied by a rigorous “social-democratization”. But often enough basic convictions were changed only half - heartedly and superficially. Furthermore, there was no lack of examples of predominant mental continuity. The question arises to what extent some successors of the formerly Moscow - oriented parties jeopardize the political orders based on the control of powers as well as on political and economic competition. After the breakdown of “real existing socialism” this topic was researched only hesitantly and selectively.1 The success of right - wing extremist and national populist parties in several European democracies was researched much more thoroughly than the conditions for the formations at the opposite end of the political specter to be efficient.2 The situation in Eastern and Western Europe has not been assessed yet. 1 2

For an excellent overview turn to : March / Mudde, What’s Left of the Radical Left ? In: Comparative European Politics, (2005) 3, pp. 23–49. A bibliography of the relevant publications would easily amount to 100 pages. Cf. givings in the following publications : Backes / Jesse ( Eds.), Gefährdungen der Freiheit; Blaise / Moreau ( Eds.), Extrême droite et national – populisme; Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties.

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Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau

There are few publications on the topic of cross - national contributions. The research of the “communist successor parties” in Eastern Europe is emphasized. Subjects of comparative research were especially the more adaptable and versatile formations.3 Other researchers concentrate on the forces that are comparatively lethargic considering reform.4 Others tried to trace the conditions of development by comparing very successful and less successful examples.5 The volume edited by András Bozóki and John T. Ishiyama contains methodically sophisticated studies.6 It includes contributions on individual countries as well as comparative analyses. The central question is which factors can explain the survival of successors of former communist official state parties in pluralist and sometimes hostile surroundings. Thus, Herbert Kitschelt shed light on the role of historical and cultural conditioning, the “regime legacies”, and of the paths of transition connected with them. He categorized the various strategies of adaptation in this context.7 However, John T. Ishiyama’s and András Bozóki’s empirical examination of these factors did not result in a necessary connection between “regime legacies”, “paths of transition” and the development of parties.8 This type of survival strategy seems to depend on the internal ideological coherence of the respective parties. Their ideological characteristics and forms of adaptation, though, can be explained by external incentives, especially institutional features. Daniel F. Ziblatt and Nick Biziouras point out to the importance of financial resources. Satisfactory financial conditions are shown to have helped some party leaderships to free themselves from the clutch of a membership hostile to change.9 Anna M. Grzymała - Busse wrote a convincing widespread comparative study.10 She concentrates on four cases, namely adaptable ( Poland and Hungary ) and rather traditional parties ( Czech Republic and Slovakia ), and includes others selectively. This is her central thesis : Successful successor parties “redeemed the communist past” : They knew how to use their organizational and personal resources when competing with the new actors of the developing party systems. A change of political identity was all the more necessary the stronger the communist system was discredited. 3

Cf. Anderson / Camiller ( Eds.), Mapping the West European Left; Racz / Bukowski (Eds.), The Return of the Left; Curry / Urban ( Eds.), The Left Transformed. 4 Cf. Hough / Handl, The post – communist left and the European Union. In : Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 37 (2004), pp. 319–339. 5 Cf. Büyükakinci, The Neo-Communist Parties and Power. In : Eastern European Quarterly, 39 (2005) 3, pp. 367–403; Dauderstädt, The Communist Successor Parties. In : Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 21 (2005) 1, pp. 48–66; Jörs, Postsozialistische Parteien. 6 Cf. Bozóki / Ishiyama ( Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties. 7 Cf. Kitschelt, Constraints and Opportunities. In: Bozóki / Ishiyama (Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties, pp. 14–40. 8 Cf. Ishiyama, A Typology of Communist Successor Parties. In: Bozóki/Ishiyama (Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties, pp. 271–286, here p. 285; Ishiyama/Bozóki, Adaptation and Change. In: Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 17 (2001), pp. 32–51. 9 Cf. Ziblatt / Biziouras, Doomed to be Radicals ? In : Ishiyama / Bozóki ( Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties, pp. 287–302, here p. 299. 10 Cf. Grzymała – Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past.

Introduction

11

Since Gorbachev’s reforms the development of Western CPs has been the topic of several publications. The number of individual publications, though, is small. Michael Waller and Meinert Fennema’s book is the first attempt to assess and take stock even before the “annus mirabilis”.11 Daniel Bell provided a comparative analysis of the developments immediately following the change of the epochs.12 Two years later, Martin J. Bull and Paul Heywood presented a volume of studies on individual countries and comparative reflections.13 The most recent publication of this type was edited by Joan Botella and Luis Ramiro : Profound surveys of single countries assess the situation of Western European communism / post - communism at the beginning of the new millennium.14 Furthermore, some comparative studies on limited numbers of cases deserve to be mentioned. In a detailed manner Cyrille Guiat compared the PCF with the PCI which had been the most successful Western European CPs for a long time.15 Anna Bosco cooperated with Carlos Gaspar, comparing the development of the PCI with the Spanish, Portuguese, and Greek CPs. All three parties owed much of their legitimization to their resistance against authoritarian regimes but had problems with developing a constructive role in the process of establishing a democratic constitutional state.16 So far, there are hardly any publications examining the situation in Western as well as Eastern Europe. Kate Hudson’s book is an exception. She clearly sympathizes with the subjects of her research, namely those parties in the East and in the West intending to follow the new way of “democratic socialism” without making the “mistake” of complete social democratization.17 A publication by the Institute for Comparative Political Research of the Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University, Brno / Czech Republic, is more rational and reserved.18 It covers a wide scope including traditional social democratic / democratic socialist parties – especially the Danish Social Democrats and the Austrian SPÖ. Of the “Western” CPs, only the French and Greek parties were surveyed in separate contributions by the editors. Considering Western as well as Eastern Europe, this publication continues the preliminary studies. But it includes a higher number of objects. It concentrates essentially on parties emerging from formerly Moscow - oriented formations whether they did or did not change their identity. In the title of the book “Post” is put in parentheses. This is especially due to the fact that some successors of former communist single state parties have broken with their past even though they may sometimes face their heritage only reluctantly and half - heart11 12 13 14 15 16

Cf. Waller / Fennema ( Eds.), Communist Parties of Western Europe. Cf. Bell, Western European Communists. Cf. Bull / Heywood ( Eds.), West European Communist Parties. Cf. Botella / Ramiro ( Eds.), The Crisis of Communism and Party Change. Cf. Guiat, The French and Italian Communist Parties. Cf. Bosco, in collaboration with Carlos Gaspar, Four Actors in Search of a Role. In : Diamandouros / Gunther / Puhle ( Eds.), Parties, Politics, and Democracy, pp. 329–387. 17 Cf. Hudson, European Communism since 1989. 18 Cf. Kopeček ( Ed.), Trajectories of the Left.

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Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau

edly. This volume continues the results of two publications that had taken stock of the situation in Eastern and Western Europe respectively.19 It focuses on the organization and political action of the parties. Ideology, aims and objectives are included into the research among several levels of investigation.20 The contributions of this publication are essentially the results of a conference (“Taking Stock of Communist and Post - Communist Parties in Europe”) held by the Hannah Arendt Institute for the Research on Totalitarianism at the TU Dresden in cooperation with the University Paris X – Nanterre in Wałbrzych / Waldenburg, Poland, from September 15 – 18, 2005. It focused on the topics of continuity and change of formerly Moscow - oriented party communism after the end of “real existing socialism”. European countries that had been ruled by monopolist single state party CPs were investigated as well as states where organizations orientated towards state socialism nolens volens had to act within a pluralist political constellation. The consideration of both spheres was intended to inspire a comparative inspection and to further a better understanding of the role of the different formations in their respective party systems. The main strategic options of former single state parties ousted from power in a pluralizing political environment were social - democratization or anti - system opposition. Did they resemble the long - standing political dilemmas of CPs in non communist European states ? Could the “return to Europe” have conformed the conditions of political competition on the long run ? Or did specific features emerge in Central and Eastern Europe that did not have parallels in the West (like new syntheses of socialism, populism, and nationalism ) ? For personal and material reasons it was not possible to cover all European countries. Therefore, the aim was to present a broad specter of case studies from the most important greater European regions. Eastern and Western Europe were to be represented about equally. The former “fatherland of the working class”, Russia, had to be included because of its outstanding historical role even though it is geographically as much as politically and culturally only partly a European country. Turkey, on the other hand, could be excluded because its general impact on Europe is much less strong. The volume is structured according to the geographical focus. The last section covers comparisons and analyses of internationalism and the ( ex - )communist elite. The contributions have been updated and enlarged. However, experienced editors know that they cannot win their race against time. The editors thank all authors for their patience and cooperation, the sponsors for their generous support, the translators for their efforts and the staff of the Hannah Arendt Institute for their well known professionalism preparing this volume. The editors are entirely responsible for all remaining deficiencies. 19 Cf. Moreau / Courtois / Hirscher ( Eds.), Der Kommunismus in Westeuropa; Hirscher (Ed.), Kommunistische und postkommunistische Parteien. Cf. also : Courtois ( Ed.), Dictionnaire du communisme. 20 In contrast, this volume concentrates on the ideological dimension : Backes / Courtois (Eds.), “Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa”.

I. Western Europe

The Disappearance of Communism in the Netherlands Gerrit Voerman Nearly twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 practically nothing is left of Dutch Communism.1 The Communist Party of the Netherlands ( Communistische Partij van Nederland; CPN ) – one of the oldest Communist parties of the world, after the Russian Bolsheviks – dissolved itself in June 1991. In November 1990 the party had merged with Radicals and Pacifists into a new political formation called Green Left ( Groen Links). Though the dying process of the CPN was accelerated by the revolutions in Eastern Europe, the party certainly did not liquidate itself as a consequence of the collapse of “really existing socialism”. Rather, the CPN had autonomously experienced a process of renewal which already had started several years before the accession of Gorbachev as secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. Being a very orthodox party for a long time, the CPN first became de - Stalinized in the late 1970s. After 1980 this transformation entered the stage of “de - Leninization”, during which the party renounced the ideological and organisational heritage of Lenin and hardly could be called “Communist” any longer. In 1991 this process came to its logical end when the CPN dissolved itself and merged into Green Left. After the disappearance of the CPN Communism has more or less ceased to exist in Dutch politics. However, apart from the orthodox Marxist - Leninist, generally Soviet - oriented mainstream within Dutch Communism – which was traditionally embodied by the CPN, until the early 1980s – there have been several organisations which to a greater or lesser degree referred to Marx and Lenin. Usually these parties stemmed from the CPN; they were formed after a conflict in the course of which the leading role of the Soviet Union was disputed. Up to the time of writing, their organisational successors still exist, like the neo Marxist - Leninist New Communist Party ( of ) the Netherlands ( Nieuwe Communistische Partij Nederland; NCPN ); the originally Maoist Socialist Party ( Socialistische Partij; SP); the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party ( Socialistische Arbeiderspartij; SAP ) – since 2004 called Socialist Alternative Politics ( Socialistische Alternatieve Politiek; SAP ); and two other – smaller – Trotskyist organisations,

1

This contribution is a completely revised and up - dated version of Voerman, Das Gespenst des Kommunismus. In : Moreau / Lazar / Hirscher (Eds.), Der Kommunismus in Westeuropa, pp. 498–523.

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Gerrit Voerman

the International Socialists ( Internationale Socialisten), and a group around the paper Offensief. In this article the historical development of these parties and groups will be described, as well as their position within the Dutch political system in the last decade of the 20th and the first decade of the 21st century.2 Most attention will be paid to the SP. This party, which was founded in the early 1970s, started as a Maoist sect. Gradually it was able to transform itself into a radical left- wing, medium - sized party, which nowadays is threatening the position of social democracy in Dutch politics. Because of the combination of its electoral and organisational strength and its relatively radical ideological views, the SP has become a point of reference for the Trotskyist groups. Before turning to the neo - MarxistLeninist, Trotskyist and post - Maoist parties, a historical survey will be presented of the CPN, the party which formed the cradle of all the Marxist - Leninist varieties.

I.

The Communist Party of the Netherlands (1909–1991)

As the end of the CPN was not caused by the Eastern European revolution of 1989, so the beginning of the party was not the consequence of the Russian revolution of 1917, as was the case with nearly all the other Communist parties.3 The CPN existed already in 1909, albeit under another name, when revolutionary Marxists left the “reformist” Dutch social democracy. At the elections of 1918 the party got two seats in parliament. It renamed itself CPN and joined the Communist International ( Comintern ). At the beginning of the 1920s the CPN was torn by internal conflicts, in which the Comintern was involved also. Anton Pannekoek and Herman Gorter, both important Communist theoreticians, broke away from the party. They were disappointed with the political and economical direction of the Soviet Union and became the founders of the anti Leninist, left - wing trend within international Communism, called Council - Communism. The poet Gorter founded a new organisation called Communist Workers’ Party in the Netherlands ( Kommunistische Arbeiders - Partij in Nederland; KAPN ) in 1921.4 At the start the party had some 200 members; the greater part of these left after series of conflicts. After the departure of the dissidents the leadership of the CPN itself collided with Moscow, when it tried to resist the efforts of the Comintern to get a proper control on the Dutch section. In 1926 there were even two Communist parties, an “official” and a dissident one. To make matters worse, another split occurred within the official Comintern - party. In 1927 the Trotskyist wing left 2

3 4

The metamorphosis and dissolution of the CPN will not be discussed extensively, because this has been done earlier; see Voerman, Das Gespenst des Kommunismus, pp. 503–508; and idem, Premature Perestroika. In : Bell, Western European Communists and the Collapse of Communism, pp. 157–171. Voerman, De meridiaan van Moskou. Bos, Vele woningen, maar nergens een thuis.

The disappearance of Communism

17

the CPN. After some time it founded a party of its own ( see section 4), which since then was combated severely by the Moscow - oriented Communists. Under pressure of the Comintern, the official and dissident CPN merged in 1930. The fusion was staged completely by Moscow.5 It meant the start of a decade - long period of complete subordination of the CPN. This was reflected by the fact that after several party splits in the 1920s not any occurred during the next decade. Even when the line of the Comintern was changed drastically, like in 1935 and 1939, there were no attempts to break away. Apparently the more critical spirits had disappeared from the party, leaving their place to Moscow - devoted, docile apparatchiki, out - and - out supporting the Soviet Union. In this period the CPN was Stalinized : the party was tightly controlled by the party secretary Paul de Groot who was appointed by the Comintern in 1938. The first signs of dissent after nearly three decades of absolute loyalty towards Moscow came in 1956. After Khrushchev had started his policy of de - Stalinization, De Groot lukewarmly conceded that Stalin had made some mistakes, and regretted the defence of the personality cult. By this reaction he hoped to stifle the discussion in the CPN about de - Stalinization. Within the party leadership, however, there was growing resistance against the all - powerful position of party secretary De Groot. Yet the opposition failed : the dissidents left the CPN and in 1958 founded the Socialist Workers Party ( Socialistische Werkerspartij; SWP). The SWP counted some 500 members and stuck to Marxism - Leninism, democratic centralism and solidarity with the Soviet Union. However, Moscow was not pleased at all with the new party. In 1965 most members of the SWP joined the Pacifist - Socialist Party ( Pacifistisch - Socialistische Partij; PSP ). After the party schism De Groot was in line again with Moscow, but not for long. In the early 1960s the CPN started to dissociate itself from the Soviet Union because of its conflict with China. In 1963 De Groot declared his party “autonomous” within the international Communist movement. He feared that the Sino - Soviet dispute would endanger the special historical relations between his party and the pro - Chinese Indonesian Communist Party. Yet the CPN did not go over to the Beijing - camp; the emerging Maoist tendency within the party was expelled overnight ( see section 5). Partly because of its break with Moscow, the CPN became salonfähig within Dutch politics. Detente brought the party electoral growth. Under the surface, however, developments were going on which would profoundly affect the social, age and gender structure of the CPN’s membership.6 As a result of the process of “de - industrialisation”, the traditional recruiting reservoir of manual workers was drying up. During the early 1970s this tendency was camouflaged by the inflow of many students. These new members conformed ( at least initially ) to the authoritarian rules and culture of the party. They followed the party line with5 6

Voerman, From Lenin’s comrades in arms to “Dutch donkeys”. In : Rees / Thorpe, International communism and the Communist International 1919–1943, pp. 127–142. Voerman, “Away with all your Superstitions !”. In : The Journal of Communist Studies, 7 (1991) 4 ( December ), pp. 460–476.

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out any protest, even when the course changed drastically, like in the mid - 1970s when the CPN started to make serious overtures again to the Soviet Union. However, after heavy losses at parliamentary elections in 1977 when the CPN unexpectedly lost five out of its seven seats, intellectuals rebelled against the Stalinist way the party was run.7 The CPN should embrace post - materialist values such as environmental protection, feminism, democratisation and so on. After a year - long period of party strife the party adopted a completely modernized declaration of principles in 1984, in which the Leninist concept of the Communist party as the vanguard of the working class was abolished, and Leninism as an ideology was exchanged for feminism as one of the party’s theoretical keystones. Apart from this de - Leninization, a positive reference to the Soviet Union was lacking completely; instead the CPN expressed its support for movements of renewal within real - existing Socialism, such as Charta in Czechoslovakia and Solidarnosc in Poland. As a result, the orthodox wing left the CPN and founded the undiluted Marxist - Leninist, Moscow orientated party VCN ( see section 3). The renovators had scored a Pyrrhic victory, however. Having been represented in the Lower House of parliament ever since 1918, the CPN lost all its three seats in the parliamentary elections of 1986. This electoral shock gave a strong impulse to co - operation with other small left - wing parties like the pacifist PSP and the more or less ecologist Radical Political Party ( Politieke Partij Radicalen; PPR ), which were also electorally declining.8 Profoundly influenced by New Left ideas, these two parties argued that society should become more democratic and that the predominant mentality had to be changed by actions “from below”. The PSP, emanating from the peace movement during the Cold War in 1957, was in favour of extra - parliamentary activism and emphasized issues such as non - violent defence, anti - imperialism, socialization of production and workers’ self - management. The PPR, which was founded as a progressive Christian party in 1968, was more governmentally inclined and considered actions at the grass roots to be supplementary. From the early 1980s onwards the CPN was an acceptable partner for them, as a result of its de - Stalinization and ideological face - lift. Electoral co - operation got underway between Radicals, Pacifist Socialists and Communists. In 1984, the parties presented a common list at the European elections, which won 2 seats. At the national elections in 1986 a similar electoral alliance failed to materialize. Thus the three leftist parties presented separate lists at the elections – with disastrous results : the CPN lost all seats, the PSP retained only one and the PPR two. Besides, the exodus of members, which had been going on for several years, was accelerated. Therefore at the national elections in 1989, after having worked together again at the European elections in the same year, all parties crossed the Rubicon and formed 7 8

See Fennema, The end of Dutch communism ? In : Waller / Fennema (Eds.), Communist Parties in Western Europe, pp. 158–178; See Verrips, Dwars, duivels en dromend. Lucardie / van Schuur / Voerman, Verloren illusie, geslaagde fusie ?; and Voerman, The Netherlands. In : Richardson / Rootes, The Green Challenge, pp. 109–127.

The disappearance of Communism

19

an electoral alliance with one list of candidates and one electoral platform. It was joined by a small left - wing Protestant group, the Evangelical People’s Party ( Evangelische Volkspartij; EVP ). The new alliance – called “Green Left” – won 4.1 % of the popular vote and six parliamentary seats : more than its predecessors had acquired in the previous elections, but not as much as had been expected. However, the parties involved decided to build on their electoral co - operation and to accomplish a full organisational integration into Green Left. Initially, the leadership of the CPN took an ambivalent attitude towards the organisational integration which was considered to be going too fast. Later on it seemed to accept the inevitable. The party’s readiness to merge was certainly influenced by the revolutions behind the Iron Curtain at the end of 1989. Although the CPN had already years before dissociated itself from real - existing Socialism, these events poured cold water on the party : Socialism turned out not to have been a guarantor against unemployment, poverty, environmental destruction and so on but appeared to have been morally corrupt and bankrupt. Half a year after Green Left had been founded in November 1990 the CPN dissolved itself ( only a few months after PPR and PSP had done so ).

II.

Communism within Green Left fading away (1990–2006)

Within Green Left, Communism in terms of members, representatives and ideology diminished rather rapidly.9 At the national elections of 1994, the new party lost one of its six seats. Green Left leader Ina Brouwer ( who formerly had headed the CPN ) resigned because she felt responsible for the defeat. Her successor Paul Rosenmöller, a former Maoist trade union leader, attracted new voters. In 1998 the party won 7.5 % of the vote, enough for eleven seats in parliament. At the European elections of 1999 it increased its share of the vote to almost 12 %. The popularity of Green Left continued to rise until 2001, when the polls predicted sixteen seats for the party. However, in recent elections the party suffered setbacks, losing one seat in the parliamentary elections of 2002, two seats in 2003 and another seat in 2006. At the European elections in 2004 it lost two of its four seats and received only 5.1 % of the popular vote. These results were clearly disappointing, as participation in government appeared quite near at one point but now seems only a remote possibility. Yet membership grew – from 12,000 in 1995 to over 21,300 by 2007. Partly as a consequence of this rising number, the Communist portion within the Green Left membership has shrunk. According to membership surveys, in 1992 some 15 % of the members were former Communists; in 2002 only 6 %. Of course this had to do with the growing number of “new” Green Left members who had no “old” 9

This section is largely based on Lucardie / Voerman, The Organisational and Ideological Development of Green Left. In : Botella / Ramiro (Eds.), The crisis of communism and party change, pp. 155–175.

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Gerrit Voerman

party background. During this period their number rose from 20 % to almost 60 %.10 In the middle level elite the Communists were also in decline, as a survey among delegates of the Green Left congress in 1995 has demonstrated. According to this survey, the number of Communists within Green Left had diminished from 23 % in 1990 to 14 % in 1995.11 Compared to the other predecessors the Communists had declined most, which might indicate that former CPN - members were less active within the party than before or that they had simply left. This decline is reflected by the number of Members of Parliament with a Communist past. The first parliamentary caucus of Green Left had represented the three main constituents more or less in proportion of membership : two members, including the political leader, from the PPR, the largest component; two members from the PSP, which in 1989 was a bit smaller than the PPR; one from the even smaller CPN; one from the “independent members”. This balance was absent in the second caucus, elected in 1994 : one member had a Communist background, one had been a Pacifist Socialist, but the other three were “independents”. Thus the largest component, the PPR, was not represented at all anymore from 1994 to 1998; Communists were a little over - represented. When the parliamentary party expanded to 11 members in 1998 two former Communists were included. In 2002 only one was nominated again. In fact, in 2002 most of the parliamentary candidates had never belonged to any of the constituent parties. Not only quantitatively but also qualitatively the Communist contingent was on the defensive. As the name of Green Left indicates, the ideological content of the new party is rather dualistic. In the beginning it tried to compromise between a red Scylla and a green Charybdis. Of course the mixture of environmental and social demands was rather different from Communist ideology, even from its renovated variety. It seems, however, that the remaining former CPN members within Green Left were losing some of their Communist characteristics. To a certain extent they were accommodating themselves to the ideological shift in emphasis of Green Left : compared with the early 1990s, they were taking somewhat less “red” and more “green” positions in 1995. Still they were less “green” than the other components. The former Communists also placed themselves the most to the left on a (10 point ) left - right scale, although a bit less than before : 2.4 in 1995 against 1.5 in 1990.12 From the middle of the 1990s onwards, ideologically Green Left moved even further away from Communism. Though one can observe a remarkable continuity in the election programmes since 1989, significant Socialist or Communist 10 Lucardie / van Schuur, Vergrijst GroenLinks ? In : Jaarboek 2005 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, pp. 144–153. 11 Lucardie / van Schuur, De ontgroening van GroenLinks. In : Jaarboek 1995 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, pp. 247–264. 12 Voerman, “Das Gespenst des Kommunismus”, p. 511; Lucardie / van der Knoop / van Schuur / Voerman, Greening the Reds or Reddening the Greens ? In : Rüdig (Ed.), Green Politics Three, pp. 90–111.

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21

elements declined in importance. In 1989 the party called for “socialisation of the economy”, socio - economic planning and parliamentary control of banks and other financial institutions. In 1994 the demand for planning is more abstract and less specific, and in 1998, 2002, 2003 and 2006 planning is not really mentioned any more. Yet more modest demands for egalitarian social policies, increasing welfare and minimum wages, for example, have been voiced in all platforms. At the same time, ecological policies seem to gain weight and specificity. Especially the more recent programmes call for ( more ) ecotaxes on for instance energy and water. Thus one might conclude that the influence of Communist and Marxist ideology was never very strong within Green Left; and that it declined with time after 1989 – for obvious reasons, which can be summarized by the German word Zeitgeist; or in other words : the increasing dominance of liberal ideology and the collapse of the Soviet system. All in all, after more than 15 years the traces of the CPN within Green Left have nearly disappeared.

III.

Neo - Marxism - Leninism

With the transformation of the CPN from a proletarian, left - wing party into a modern, rather ecological and feminist one and its merger into Green Left, Marxism - Leninism did not fully disappear from the Dutch political landscape. The “new CPN” – abbreviated as NCPN – tried to keep orthodox Communism alive. After the CPN had adopted its renewed ideological credo the conservative wing founded the League of Communists in the Netherlands ( Verbond van Communisten in Nederland; VCN ) in November 1985. At that time it claimed to have a thousand members. An orthodox manifesto was framed, based on Marxist - Leninist principles such as the class struggle as the sole engine of history, the leading role of the Communist Party, democratic centralism, a positive evaluation of the real existing Socialist system, and an unconditional loyalty to the Soviet Union. Electorally, the party was not a success at all : in 1986 and 1989 it obtained only 0.1 % of the vote. In 1992 the VCN formed the NCPN, together with a few local branches of the CPN which had not been willing to merge into Green Left. The NCPN counted approximately some 500 members, according to its own sources – much less than the VCN. As its predecessor, the party cherished the glorious Communist past and stressed the actual relevance of orthodox Marxism - Leninism. Self - evidently, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union came as a big shock to the orthodox Communists. Although they admitted that “mistakes” had been made, these events did not really change their beliefs : in principle they regarded them as “counter - revolutionary” and as the outcome of capitalist plotting. Later the NCPN sharply criticized the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, the international position of the NCPN was very traditionalist, exclusively oriented towards congenial parties elsewhere in the world. It frequently visited orthodox Communist parties elsewhere in Europe. In No-

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vember 1997 the NCPN subscribed to the “Declaration of Leningrad”, which was drafted by 23 orthodox Communist parties in Petersburg. From 1998 onwards the party attended the International Conference of Communist and Labour Parties on a regular basis. The NCPN did not join the transnational Party of the European Left – which was founded in 2004 and consisted of Socialist, Communist and red - green parties of the member states and associated states of the European Union ( EU ) – because it believed that this organisation had renounced Marxism and was financed by Brussels. Since 2001 the NCPN – as other orthodox Communist parties – tried to link to the less uniformly organised anti - globalization movement. It had to admit, however, that this movement was partly dominated by “Trotskyists and anarchists” and that the Communists were too late. The NCPN never succeeded in obtaining a foothold within this new movement. Since its foundation the NCPN exalted the still present Communist regimes in China, North - Korea and especially Cuba. This resulted in bizarre views, like the ostentatious glorification of North - Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and his successor Kim Jong Il, or the active defence of ( former ) president of Socialist Serbia, Milosevic. According to the NCPN the United States, with NATO as its instrument, was pursuing absolute global domination, thereby trying to dominate not only Communist states such as Yugoslavia, North - Korea and Cuba but also ( Muslim ) countries like Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Of course these views strengthened the already very isolated position of the party within Dutch society. In the national elections of 1994 and 1998 the NCPN again scored no more than 0.1 % of the vote. In 2002 the party decided not to participate because it was not able to collect the necessary financial deposit. It took part in the anticipated elections of 2003, however, but again only obtained 0.1 % of the vote. The lack of perspective, but also the authoritarian way in which the leadership ran the party, contributed to several internal conflicts. In 1999 one of these clashes resulted in a schism : a few dozen members broke away and founded the Free Communist Party ( Vrije Communistische Partij; VCP), predominantly based in one town in the North - East of the Netherlands, which was the NCPN’s only stronghold. In 2006 another split occurred in this area, again reducing the party. Opposition also arose within the NCPN’s tiny youth organisation, where “libertarian Marxists” – “anarchists disguised as Communists” – were thrown out. In November the party did not run in the national elections. The NCPN’s future looks rather gloomy, as a result of the internal conflicts which crop up time and again and the aging rank and file. Besides, the party had to deal with the electoral attraction of the competing SP which was able to poach on the orthodox Communists’ preserves. Efforts to connect with the anti - globalisation movement in order to revitalise the party did not pay off. The NCPN could not longer even automatically rely on “real existing Communism”; in 2006 the party asked itself for the first time if China could be regarded as Socialist. All in all, the erosion of the foundation of the party continues; only

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the fact that the NCPN is part of an international Communist network seems to provide some kind of a perspective – in the words of Alejandro de Mello, one of the party leaders, in 2006 : “How proud I am, comrades, to be part of this [Communist] world movement”.

IV.

Trotskyism

Contemporary Trotskyism in the Netherlands is divided into three groups, all relatively small : Socialist Alternative Politics ( Socialistische Alternatieve Politiek; SAP); a group around the paper Offensief ( Offensive ), and the International Socialists ( Internationale Socialisten). From the late 1990s onwards, one after another they all started to orientate themselves towards the Socialistische Partij.

1.

Socialist Alternative Politics ( Socialistische Alternatieve Politiek)

The oldest one of the Dutch Trotskyist parties is the SAP. Its roots go back to 1927, when the Trotskyist wing split off from the CPN. Two years later the Revolutionary Socialist Party ( Revolutionair Socialistische Partij; RSP ) was founded.13 The RSP was one of the first Trotskyist parties in Europe. From 1933 until 1937 it was represented in the Dutch parliament by its leader, Henk Sneevliet. At the eve of the Second World War the Trotskyist movement – consisting of several small groups, one of which was officially recognized by the Fourth International – was in dire straits. After the liberation in 1945 the Revolutionary Communist Party ( Revolutionair Communistische Partij; RCP ) was set up, but was not able to obtain a foothold within the working class. In the early 1950s the party was dissolved and its members joined the Labour Party in order to radicalize Dutch social - democracy. At the end of the decade Labour decided to get rid of the entrists. Several Trotskyists now chose the PSP as their political shelter. There they were involved with the formation of an oppositional group called “Proletarian Left” ( Proletarisch Links), but after some time this group was forced to leave the PSP. After several conflicts and splits this group in 1974 merged with the lingering Dutch section of the Fourth International. The new party called itself International League of Communists ( Internationale Kommunistenbond; IKB ). It counted a few hundred members, mainly students.14 The party’s platform was relatively post - materialist : it included feminist issues, environmental demands and democratization beside classical left - wing Socialist desiderata such as nationalisation, planning and disarmament. In 1983 the IKB renamed itself Socialist Workers Party ( Socialistische Arbeiderspartij; SAP ). The SAP – which was also a member of the Fourth International – wanted to get rid of the term “Communist” within its name, in order to avoid being associated 13 See Eekman / Pieterson, Linkssocialisme tussen de Wereldoorlogen. 14 Denekamp et al., Ontwapenend, pp. 175–179.

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with the Soviet Union or the CPN. It aimed to develop into a revolutionary party. Electorally the SAP was not a success at all : at the national elections of 1986 and 1989 the SAP scored 0.04 % and 0.05 % respectively. The Eastern European revolutions around 1990 were enthusiastically welcomed by the SAP. After decades the Stalinist, bureaucratic regimes collapsed at last; the traditional Trotskyist criticisms with regard to the Eastern European societies and the Soviet Union seemed to be confirmed. Like the “reformed” CPN, the SAP initially thought that it would not be touched by the international Communist crisis. After some time, however, the party started to draw conclusions for its own Trotskyist ideology. The executive of the SAP had to admit that in the 1990s the October Revolution had become less important as a point of reference and that the Socialist ideological alternative had lost much of its attraction. Although the SAP still aimed to create a Leninist, revolutionary Socialist party, it resolved that it should concentrate on practical actions against the dismantling of the welfare state. It was also decided that it should no longer use the traditional Communist symbols – the hammer and sickle – in its presentation. The name of the party’s newspaper “Class struggle” was changed into a more neutral, modern one : “Unbounded” ( Grenzeloos). The SAP’s electoral appeal, however, did not grow after these reforms. At the national elections of 1994 it again received no more than 0.05 % of the vote. Since then it has not participated in parliamentary elections. At the beginning of the new century the SAP had reached a deadlock. It realised that next to Green Left and especially the expanding SP there was no room to build a meaningful organisation of its own. The SAP dropped the goal of the formation of a revolutionary - Socialist party; instead it wanted to contribute to the formation of a “broad anti - neoliberal, left alternative”. The party organisation had to be transformed into a platform for debate, and the recruitment of new members was now considered of less importance. SAP - members should become active in the anti - globalization - and other social movements. In 2004, in line with the new approach, the SAP changed its name into Socialist Alternative Politics ( Socialistische Alternatieve Politiek). A minority did not agree with this new direction. They stuck to the concept of a revolutionary party and sought a merger with the International Socialists – in vain, however, although a number of these opponents joined the International Socialists indeed as individuals. The majority, however, regarded not the congenial International Socialists but the former Maoist SP as the core of the pursued “left alternative”. A number of SAP - members joined the SP on an individual basis.

2.

Offensive ( Offensief)

The group around the revolutionary - Socialist paper Offensief ( Offensive ) is associated with the Trotskyist Committee for a Workers’ International ( CWI ) which was founded in 1974. Two years later, a few members of the youth organ-

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isation of the Dutch Labour Party joined the CWI. They remained active within the social democratic party, among others by publishing a paper that was named Offensief in 1982. As the Labour Party became more moderate, the dissatisfaction within the Offensief- group grew accordingly. In the 1990s members of Offensief participated in campaigns against the Gulf War and against racism. Gradually Offensief started to orientate itself toward the SP and appealed several times at national elections to vote for this party. Despite the SP’s shortcomings ( like parliamentarianism and ideological vagueness ) the members of Offensief decided in 1998 – after a discussion within the CWI – to join the SP. As an internal pressure group it wanted to help transform the party into a “new, pluriform workers’ party” to find support for revolutionary Socialism. The organisational structure around the paper Offensief remained unimpaired, but the members declared they would respect the democratic decision - making process within the SP. Yet Offensief was critical towards its new political home, especially since after 2002 the SP started to apply publicly for participation in a government with Labour and Green Left. Offensief – which counted some 50 members in 2006 – criticized the “rightward drift of the party leadership”.

3.

International Socialists ( Internationale Socialisten)

The youngest Trotskyist organisation in the Netherlands are the International Socialists ( IS ). This group was established in the late 1980s along the lines of the Socialist Workers Party ( SWP ) in the UK. IS Netherlands is affiliated with the International Socialist Tendency ( IST ) which is dominated by the SWP. The Dutch section is strongly oriented towards their English sister party : brochures of prominent SWP members are published in Dutch and interviews with them appear in the party newspaper. At the annual IS conference, the occasion for electing its political leadership, an SWP representative is commonly invited as a guest speaker. Whereas parties that are allied in the Fourth International, like the SAP, consider the former Soviet Union and those countries that still call themselves Socialist such as China, North Korea and Cuba as degenerate, bureaucratic workers’ states, the IS Netherlands in line with SWP ideologist Tony Cliff regards them rather as state capitalist systems in which the workers are exploited by the state. Entirely in line with the traditional Trotskyist view, the IST and its Dutch branch maintain that Stalin squandered the achievements of the 1917 October Revolution. They outright reject the suggestion that despotic Stalinism was an inevitable consequence of Leninism. In ideological respects the IS is inspired by Trotsky and Lenin. The party advocates, just as the SAP and Offensief, “bottom - up Socialism”, that is the direct and democratic control of society and the state by workers’ councils. It seeks to establish a Bolshevik vanguard party which is to marshal the most militant workers to promote their everyday interests and, on the long run, to bring about the

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revolution. As IS Netherlands feels that “a stronger revolutionary party signifies a stronger working class”, membership recruitment is an imperative. This, however, has not proved to be very successful : membership figures in the 1990s have never exceeded 100 at most.15 Insiders feel that the party’s difficulty in holding onto members is due to its authoritarian, hierarchical organisation and the demanding requirements made upon party membership. IS Netherlands members are particularly active in university towns, selling the party newspaper and engaging in regular discussion meetings on current affairs and matters of ideology. The party has never taken part in national elections since, it believes that the capitalist system cannot be changed through parliament. As a rule, IS Netherlands advises its members to vote Labour. Since its foundation IS Netherlands has campaigned against racism, sexism and homophobia. The group was also very visibly involved in protests against the Gulf War and the NATO intervention in former Yugoslavia. After demonstrations against the WTO summit in Seattle late in 1999 the IS, spurred on by the IST, focused on the “alter - globalist movement” in the Netherlands, aiming to reinforce the Marxist element. As a result, membership of the IS expanded somewhat. At the same time their conduct caused some tension within the wideranging alter - globalist movement, as anarchist groups in particular were having serious problems with what they considered IS’s attempts to control this movement. After fifteen years of activity IS Netherlands was still only a marginal group, numbering nearly 200 members at most and selling a maximum of 1,500 copies of their party newspaper,16 despite the opportunities they had to capitalize on the success of the “alter - globalist movement”. It would seem that this lack of organisational clout was a factor in their decision in November 2005 to join forces with the Socialist Party ( SP ). The IS had initially adopted a highly critical attitude towards the SP, especially when this party decided in 1999 to drop nationalization of the means of production from its manifesto. However, the two parties had moved closer to one another, or so the IS claims, in their joint collaboration in the anti - globalization movement, the protest campaigns against American military action in the Middle East and the campaign against the neoliberal policies of the Dutch government. By swelling the ranks of the SP the IS wanted to aid the SP in its endeavour to present a valid left - wing alternative to Labour and the social - liberal Green Left. “We should be part of it, both because the success of the Socialist Party is vital for the further advance of the Left in the Netherlands, and because only by being part of it can we help shape the direction in which the SP, as a radical pole of attraction, is developing”, in the words of one IS leader.17 Though the SP welcomed the IS, the party leadership 15 E - mail Pepijn Brandon, 25 August 2006; see also Griffioen, Netherlands. In : International Socialist Tendency. Discussion Bulletin (2005) 6 ( Jan.), pp. 35–37. As of 1989, the party magazine initially appeared once every two months. Since 1994 it has appeared every month, and as a tabloid since 2001. 16 E - mail Brandon, and De Socialist, October 2003. 17 Brandon, Netherlands. In : International Socialist Tendency. Discussion Bulletin (2006) 7 ( Jan.), pp. 31–32.

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was not amused by the IS’s decision to remain an independent, revolutionary organisation and demanded that IS members made up their minds.

4.

Trotskyists groups and the Socialist Party

Since the late 1990s, all the Dutch Trotskyist groups have redefined their relation to the Socialist Party ( SP ). Initially, these groups were rather sceptical towards the SP. As prototypes of future revolutionary Socialist organisations, they regarded the SP as more or less xenophobic, not clearly feminist, and to a high degree populist – in other words : less class conscious and not pure enough. Gradually the SP was considered more positively, however, not only because the party was changing its original positions and notions regarding immigrants and women but also because of its “inevitability”. The SP evolved into the dominating force on the left side of the Dutch political spectre ( electorally and otherwise ). Where the SP grew, the Trotskyist groups hardly made any progress or were even shrinking – which meant that the dream of a revolutionary Socialist organisation was further away than ever. Given this lack of perspective, it was rather naturally the SAP, Offensief and IS began to orient towards the SP. In line with the “entrist” Trotskyist tradition, Offensief and IS decided to join and to uphold their organisational forms. The SP accepted the former, but refused the latter. A number of International Socialists became SP - members on an individual basis, just like a few of SAP - members. All three groups are more or less absorbed by the SP – which implies that there is hardly any basis for Trotskyism in the Netherlands any more.

V.

Maoism

After Council Communism and Trotskyism, Maoism was the third main dissenting tendency within international Communism which induced followers in Moscow - oriented parties – and accordingly also in the CPN. In the early 1960s several pro - Mao groups were formed within the Dutch party. They considered themselves the only true Marxist - Leninists and blamed the CPN for straying from established orthodoxy and lapsing into revisionism. From the start, the Maoist opposition was much divided. When it left the CPN, each group founded a separate party. For some years these parties were competing with each other, sometimes merging, but more often splitting again. In 1970 the Communist Unity Movement of the Netherlands ( Marxist - Leninist ) ( Kommunistische Eenheidsbeweging Nederland (marxistisch - leninistisch); KENml ) pretended to unify the fragmented Dutch Maoist family, but it also failed. An intellectual and a more proletarian wing clashed with each other. In 1971 the latter left the KENml and founded a party of its own, which after a year was called Socialist Party ( Socialistische Partij; SP ). Six years later, several groups and individuals which had

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been expelled by the KENml founded the Group of Marxist - Leninists / Red Dawn ( Groep van Marxisten - Leninisten/Rode Morgen; GML / RM ), which later joined the transnational Maoist International Conference of Marxist - Leninist Parties and Organizations ( ICMLPO ). At present, GML / RM still exists, but presumably counts only a few dozen members. In its formative period the SP was totally focussed on Mao Zedong and China. It based itself on the Marxist - Leninist ideology, “enriched with Mao’s thinking”. The party championed the abolition of private ownership of the means of production. It was convinced that Socialism could not be realised by way of peaceful, gradual reform but only by a violent revolution. The SP, consequently, did not think much of the parliamentary system : parliamentary democracy was no more than a façade for the dictatorship of capital. Nor did the SP cherish any illusions about the other left - wing parties within the system: the Labour Party was little more than a reactionary party, and the CPN, instead of being the revolutionary headquarters of the proletariat, had degenerated into a peaceful parliamentary election machine. In its struggle against capitalism the SP was guided by Mao’s strategy of the “mass line”. The revolutionaries had to listen to the opinions of masses, to transform these into political demands and to mobilize the masses on the basis of these demands. The SP tried to put this Maoist concept ( which had a strong populist component ) into Dutch practice by the foundation of so - called “mass organisations”. These organisations were promoting people’s interests on clear - cut areas ( like for instance environmental protection, house - rent, housing - shortage, etc.). The SP was going to be the most important offspring of the Maoist family in the Netherlands. It was the only Maoist group that has survived until this day; all the others remained sects and disappeared in the course of the 1970s and 1980s ( the marginal GML / RM left aside ). The SP’s secret was its considerable adaptability which was related to the populist component of Mao’s concept of the “mass line”. After 1975 a transformation process started in the ideological and the organisational domain ( the latter will be discussed in the following section ). In the course of this metamorphosis the SP changed from a Maoist sect into an almost mainstream accepted radical left party.18

1.

The ideological transformation of the SP

The first phase in the metamorphosis of the SP started in the late 1970s. The Maoist principles gradually faded into the background, and the SP more or less adjusted to its Dutch environment. The party adapted to the views of what it would call “the common people” and attempted to rid itself of its sectarian image. A variety of factors were involved in this de - Maoization process. Party mem18 This part is based on : Voerman, De “Rode Jehova’s”. In : Jaarboek 1986 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, pp. 124–150; and idem, Een politieke kameleon. In : Vlaams marxistisch tijdschrift, 38 (2004) 1, pp. 48–58.

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bership growth – which was already rather modest – came to a grinding halt in the mid - 1970s. The 1977 national election results ( in which the party participated in order to use parliament for propaganda ) were also disappointing ( see table 1). Just as important, however, were changes in the foreign policy of China, which increasingly welcomed the enemies of the Soviet Union into the fold as friends of Peking. In the ideological domain, some Maoist dogmas were revised. First of all, the doctrine of violent revolution was pushed into the background, as it was assumed that it would scare people off. However, the concept of the class struggle and the party’s main goal, a Socialist society, were retained unchanged. At the same time parliament was open to re - evaluation. If the SP at first believed that this “tittle - tattling body” would be done away with once the working classes had come into power, now it was taking a more positive view of parliamentary democracy as the most democratic system that was feasible under capitalism. Of course, the system could not be expected to accept any genuine social changes, for these would only take place when the people ruled “under the command of the working classes”, according to the manifesto that had been proclaimed at the party conference in 1987. The de - Maoization of the late 1970s was followed by a break with Leninism some ten years later. In the manifesto of 1987 the party had emphatically grounded itself in Marxism - Leninism, both in an ideological sense ( dialectic and historical materialism ) and in an organisational sense ( democratic centralism, the party’s vanguard role in the struggle for Socialism ). After the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union around 1990, however, the SP trimmed its sails to the new wind. It wished to learn lessons from the collapse of “actually existing Socialism”, which, for that matter, it had always regarded with a great deal of sympathy. Its reversal of policy was also induced by the highly disappointing 1989 parliamentary election results : the national results had lagged far behind the local results ( see table 1). The non - materialization of the expected seat in the Lower House forced the party leadership to change tack : the party needed to brush up its national appeal.19 In the process of reform that was set in motion the SP’s worldview – just like its party structure ( see below ) – was “de - Leninized”. In 1991 the party conference decided that the SP’s political orientation was only to be designated by the term “Socialist”. In the new manifesto that was adopted, Handvest 2000 (Charter 2000), the SP was still setting course for a Socialist society. The number of sectors that were to be socialized was restricted to major banks and corporations. The notion of Marxism - Leninism was struck off the statutes : “The problem is that this label has now become a millstone round our necks. If the SP is to have any significance after the year 2000, we need to do something about it

19 Van der Steen, De doorbraak van de “gewone mensen” - partij. In : Jaarboek 1994 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, pp. 172–189.

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now,” said party chairman Jan Marijnissen.20 The SP’s view of society remained Marxist, however, even if this was no longer said out loud. Having taken leave of Mao and Lenin, the late 1990s ushered in the third phase in the process of ideological transformation : “desocialization”. Since its foundation the SP had aimed rigorously to terminate the capitalist system of oppression and exploitation and to change the Netherlands into a Socialist country. In the SP election programme of 1998 ( as in those of 2002, 2003 and 2006), however, the term “Socialism” would be dropped altogether. In 1999 the party drafted a new manifesto – entitled Heel de mens ( All Mankind / Heal Mankind : there’s a double meaning in Dutch ) – in which Socialism as the beckoning perspective and a future ideal for society disappeared into the background. The party now explicitly stated that Socialism was neither a blueprint for a future society nor a prophecy of salvation or a promise that all would be better beyond the horizon. The SP still considered itself to be en route to a “better world” but appeared to have abandoned the belief that Socialism was the final destination of history. Socialism was now only referred to by highly abstract and moral terms: “human dignity, equality, and solidarity between people”. Once more, this doctrinal innovation was meant to remove obstacles between the party and its grassroots support potential. According to party secretary Tiny Kox, it was meant to “reach out to people who in the past may have had good reason not to come and join us.”21 Simultaneously with this final destination, the SP also jettisoned the central tenet of Socialist ideology : public ownership of the means of production. As said above, the party had believed for a very long time that this was the only possible course to take to realise Socialism. At the end of the 1990s, however, socialization became a no - no. In Heel de mens the SP would not venture beyond saying that democratic control comes before “the kind of control that is tied to economic power and private property.” Instead of socialization, it is democratization that currently appears to have become the major ideological spearhead of the SP. This is another point where the party has undergone a change. In its early days it felt that the Netherlands was not democratic : it was not parliament but the capitalists that ruled the roost. In the new 1999 manifesto, however, the SP considered parliamentary democracy as “the most important means of expressing and implementing the will of the people.” The idea that social units like neighbourhoods or companies should be the only ones to put forward candidates for parliament, an idea the party had still endorsed around 1990, disappeared into the bottom drawer. This was not to say that the SP considered the status quo to be ideal : the party felt that the democratically legitimized government should exercise greater control over the market sector and should protect its authority in the face of the aggressive European Union ( that is why the party very actively – and with success – cam20 Trouw, 26 October 1991. 21 NRC Handelsblad, 25 September 1999.

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paigned against the European Constitution in the referendum in the Netherlands in 2005). Democratization turned into a magic potion to cure all social ills. Wherever the party formerly would have used the term “Socialist”, this was substituted by this new term in the Heel de mens manifesto : “a democratized society offers the best scope for doing justice to essential issues such as the protection of social progress and justice, health, nature and the environment.”

2.

The organisational transformation of the SP

Parallel to the ideologic evolution, the SP transformed also its organisation. In accordance with the Leninist tradition, the party was initially highly centralized and hierarchical, granting substantial authority to the party leadership. In the early 1970s student members were instructed to work in the factory in order to develop a proletarian consciousness. In addition, members were to take an active part in the life of the party, meaning they were to dedicate themselves to the mass organisations, canvas for the party magazine, participate in members’ meetings, and devote themselves to Marxist - Leninist training. At the same time their political influence was marginal. The de - Maoization process, which was partly intended to tone down the SP�