Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe 9783666369124, 9783525369128

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Schriften des Hannah-Arendt-Instituts für Totalitarismusforschung Herausgegeben von Clemens Vollnhals Band 36

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe Edited by Uwe Backes and Patrick Moreau

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. ISBN 978-3-525-36912-8 Umschlagabbildung: © Patrick Moreau

© 2008, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen / www.v-r.de Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Das Werk und seine Teile sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung in anderen als den gesetzlich zugelassenen Fällen bedarf der vorherigen schriftlichen Einwilligung des Verlages. Hinweis zu § 52a UrhG: Weder das Werk noch seine Teile dürfen ohne vorherige schriftliche Einwilligung des Verlages öffentlich zugänglich gemacht werden. Dies gilt auch bei einer entsprechenden Nutzung für Lehr- und Unterrichtszwecke. Printed in Germany. Satz: Hannah-Arendt-Institut, Dresden Druck und Bindung: h Hubert & Co, Göttingen Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier.

Contents

Introduction Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau

I. Western Europe

9

13

The Disappearance of Communism in the Netherlands Gerrit Voerman

15

The PDS / Linkspartei.PDS and the Extreme Left – Decline and Renaissance of Communism in Germany Patrick Moreau

39

France – The Collapse of the House of Communism Stéphane Courtois / Dominique Andolfatto

87

Communist and Post - Communist Parties in Switzerland after 1989/1990 – A Survey Dominik Kamber

II. Northern Europe

133

139

Post - Communism and Leftist Parties in Two Scandinavian Countries after 1989 – The Cases of Denmark and Sweden Svante Ersson

141

Communism in Estonia – Party Dead but Ex - Members Well Off Toomas Alatalu

167

III. Southern Europe

191

Few but Pure and Good Members are Preferred to a Mass Party – The Portuguese Communist Party’s Continued Orthodoxy Carlos Cunha 193 The PRC – Emergence and Crisis of the Antagonistic Left Simone Bertolino

215

6

Contents

The Communist Party of Greece after the Collapse of Communism (1989–2006) – From Proletarian Internationalism to Ethno - Populism Nikos Marantzidis

245

The Communist Party of Cyprus – AKEL Andreas Stergiou

259

IV. Eastern Europe

283

Communist and Post - Communist Parties in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia Miroslav Mareš

285

Post-Communist Parties in Poland after 1989 Piotr Sula

311

A Romanian Tale – The Transition of the Communist Party from Ceauşescu to NATO Marius Oprea

329

The Socialist Party of Serbia Irena Ristić

343

Ukraine 1991–2006 – Where Have All the Communists Gone ? Abel Polese

371

Between Conformity and the Struggle for Political Survival – The Communist Parties in Belarus Rudolf A. Mark

403

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation ( CPRF ) Galina Michaleva

437

V. Transnational Cooperation and Comparison

461

Transnational Cooperation of Post - Communist Parties Rudolf van Hüllen

463

Trade Unions and Communism in Spain, France, and Italy Dominique Andolfatto

483

Contents

7

( Ex - )Communist Elites and State Capture Patrick Moreau

501

Communism and Neo - Communism in Times of “Globalization” Yolène Dilas - Rocherieux

523

Conclusion Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau

535

Appendix Bibliography Abbreviations Index List of Contributors

609 611 646 653 660

Introduction Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau The fall of the Iron Curtain, the decline of the Soviet empire, and the transformation of the political and economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe marked an epoch - making change of global historical importance. The East - West conflict had been the predominant structural model of international relations after the Second World War. Now it came to an end. The autocratic systems and controlled economies of “real existing socialism” went through processes of liberalization and democratization and frequently had to give way to the political and economic patterns of Western constitutional states. The loss of importance of communism dominated by Moscow was dramatic. It led to the assumption that the former official state parties of the Soviet Union and its satellites could be condemned to die. The parties orientated towards the “center of world revolution” in the West, too, seemed to have lost their future. But one and a half decades after the epoch - making change the situation of the formerly Moscow - oriented parties conveys a high degree of differentiation. Examples of rapid decline were numerous in the East as well as in the West. But there were many cases of a flexible adaptation to the new political and socioeconomic basic conditions. Sometimes the organizational and strategic mutation was accompanied by a rigorous “social-democratization”. But often enough basic convictions were changed only half - heartedly and superficially. Furthermore, there was no lack of examples of predominant mental continuity. The question arises to what extent some successors of the formerly Moscow - oriented parties jeopardize the political orders based on the control of powers as well as on political and economic competition. After the breakdown of “real existing socialism” this topic was researched only hesitantly and selectively.1 The success of right - wing extremist and national populist parties in several European democracies was researched much more thoroughly than the conditions for the formations at the opposite end of the political specter to be efficient.2 The situation in Eastern and Western Europe has not been assessed yet. 1 2

For an excellent overview turn to : March / Mudde, What’s Left of the Radical Left ? In: Comparative European Politics, (2005) 3, pp. 23–49. A bibliography of the relevant publications would easily amount to 100 pages. Cf. givings in the following publications : Backes / Jesse ( Eds.), Gefährdungen der Freiheit; Blaise / Moreau ( Eds.), Extrême droite et national – populisme; Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties.

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Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau

There are few publications on the topic of cross - national contributions. The research of the “communist successor parties” in Eastern Europe is emphasized. Subjects of comparative research were especially the more adaptable and versatile formations.3 Other researchers concentrate on the forces that are comparatively lethargic considering reform.4 Others tried to trace the conditions of development by comparing very successful and less successful examples.5 The volume edited by András Bozóki and John T. Ishiyama contains methodically sophisticated studies.6 It includes contributions on individual countries as well as comparative analyses. The central question is which factors can explain the survival of successors of former communist official state parties in pluralist and sometimes hostile surroundings. Thus, Herbert Kitschelt shed light on the role of historical and cultural conditioning, the “regime legacies”, and of the paths of transition connected with them. He categorized the various strategies of adaptation in this context.7 However, John T. Ishiyama’s and András Bozóki’s empirical examination of these factors did not result in a necessary connection between “regime legacies”, “paths of transition” and the development of parties.8 This type of survival strategy seems to depend on the internal ideological coherence of the respective parties. Their ideological characteristics and forms of adaptation, though, can be explained by external incentives, especially institutional features. Daniel F. Ziblatt and Nick Biziouras point out to the importance of financial resources. Satisfactory financial conditions are shown to have helped some party leaderships to free themselves from the clutch of a membership hostile to change.9 Anna M. Grzymała - Busse wrote a convincing widespread comparative study.10 She concentrates on four cases, namely adaptable ( Poland and Hungary ) and rather traditional parties ( Czech Republic and Slovakia ), and includes others selectively. This is her central thesis : Successful successor parties “redeemed the communist past” : They knew how to use their organizational and personal resources when competing with the new actors of the developing party systems. A change of political identity was all the more necessary the stronger the communist system was discredited. 3

Cf. Anderson / Camiller ( Eds.), Mapping the West European Left; Racz / Bukowski (Eds.), The Return of the Left; Curry / Urban ( Eds.), The Left Transformed. 4 Cf. Hough / Handl, The post – communist left and the European Union. In : Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 37 (2004), pp. 319–339. 5 Cf. Büyükakinci, The Neo-Communist Parties and Power. In : Eastern European Quarterly, 39 (2005) 3, pp. 367–403; Dauderstädt, The Communist Successor Parties. In : Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 21 (2005) 1, pp. 48–66; Jörs, Postsozialistische Parteien. 6 Cf. Bozóki / Ishiyama ( Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties. 7 Cf. Kitschelt, Constraints and Opportunities. In: Bozóki / Ishiyama (Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties, pp. 14–40. 8 Cf. Ishiyama, A Typology of Communist Successor Parties. In: Bozóki/Ishiyama (Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties, pp. 271–286, here p. 285; Ishiyama/Bozóki, Adaptation and Change. In: Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 17 (2001), pp. 32–51. 9 Cf. Ziblatt / Biziouras, Doomed to be Radicals ? In : Ishiyama / Bozóki ( Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties, pp. 287–302, here p. 299. 10 Cf. Grzymała – Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past.

Introduction

11

Since Gorbachev’s reforms the development of Western CPs has been the topic of several publications. The number of individual publications, though, is small. Michael Waller and Meinert Fennema’s book is the first attempt to assess and take stock even before the “annus mirabilis”.11 Daniel Bell provided a comparative analysis of the developments immediately following the change of the epochs.12 Two years later, Martin J. Bull and Paul Heywood presented a volume of studies on individual countries and comparative reflections.13 The most recent publication of this type was edited by Joan Botella and Luis Ramiro : Profound surveys of single countries assess the situation of Western European communism / post - communism at the beginning of the new millennium.14 Furthermore, some comparative studies on limited numbers of cases deserve to be mentioned. In a detailed manner Cyrille Guiat compared the PCF with the PCI which had been the most successful Western European CPs for a long time.15 Anna Bosco cooperated with Carlos Gaspar, comparing the development of the PCI with the Spanish, Portuguese, and Greek CPs. All three parties owed much of their legitimization to their resistance against authoritarian regimes but had problems with developing a constructive role in the process of establishing a democratic constitutional state.16 So far, there are hardly any publications examining the situation in Western as well as Eastern Europe. Kate Hudson’s book is an exception. She clearly sympathizes with the subjects of her research, namely those parties in the East and in the West intending to follow the new way of “democratic socialism” without making the “mistake” of complete social democratization.17 A publication by the Institute for Comparative Political Research of the Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University, Brno / Czech Republic, is more rational and reserved.18 It covers a wide scope including traditional social democratic / democratic socialist parties – especially the Danish Social Democrats and the Austrian SPÖ. Of the “Western” CPs, only the French and Greek parties were surveyed in separate contributions by the editors. Considering Western as well as Eastern Europe, this publication continues the preliminary studies. But it includes a higher number of objects. It concentrates essentially on parties emerging from formerly Moscow - oriented formations whether they did or did not change their identity. In the title of the book “Post” is put in parentheses. This is especially due to the fact that some successors of former communist single state parties have broken with their past even though they may sometimes face their heritage only reluctantly and half - heart11 12 13 14 15 16

Cf. Waller / Fennema ( Eds.), Communist Parties of Western Europe. Cf. Bell, Western European Communists. Cf. Bull / Heywood ( Eds.), West European Communist Parties. Cf. Botella / Ramiro ( Eds.), The Crisis of Communism and Party Change. Cf. Guiat, The French and Italian Communist Parties. Cf. Bosco, in collaboration with Carlos Gaspar, Four Actors in Search of a Role. In : Diamandouros / Gunther / Puhle ( Eds.), Parties, Politics, and Democracy, pp. 329–387. 17 Cf. Hudson, European Communism since 1989. 18 Cf. Kopeček ( Ed.), Trajectories of the Left.

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Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau

edly. This volume continues the results of two publications that had taken stock of the situation in Eastern and Western Europe respectively.19 It focuses on the organization and political action of the parties. Ideology, aims and objectives are included into the research among several levels of investigation.20 The contributions of this publication are essentially the results of a conference (“Taking Stock of Communist and Post - Communist Parties in Europe”) held by the Hannah Arendt Institute for the Research on Totalitarianism at the TU Dresden in cooperation with the University Paris X – Nanterre in Wałbrzych / Waldenburg, Poland, from September 15 – 18, 2005. It focused on the topics of continuity and change of formerly Moscow - oriented party communism after the end of “real existing socialism”. European countries that had been ruled by monopolist single state party CPs were investigated as well as states where organizations orientated towards state socialism nolens volens had to act within a pluralist political constellation. The consideration of both spheres was intended to inspire a comparative inspection and to further a better understanding of the role of the different formations in their respective party systems. The main strategic options of former single state parties ousted from power in a pluralizing political environment were social - democratization or anti - system opposition. Did they resemble the long - standing political dilemmas of CPs in non communist European states ? Could the “return to Europe” have conformed the conditions of political competition on the long run ? Or did specific features emerge in Central and Eastern Europe that did not have parallels in the West (like new syntheses of socialism, populism, and nationalism ) ? For personal and material reasons it was not possible to cover all European countries. Therefore, the aim was to present a broad specter of case studies from the most important greater European regions. Eastern and Western Europe were to be represented about equally. The former “fatherland of the working class”, Russia, had to be included because of its outstanding historical role even though it is geographically as much as politically and culturally only partly a European country. Turkey, on the other hand, could be excluded because its general impact on Europe is much less strong. The volume is structured according to the geographical focus. The last section covers comparisons and analyses of internationalism and the ( ex - )communist elite. The contributions have been updated and enlarged. However, experienced editors know that they cannot win their race against time. The editors thank all authors for their patience and cooperation, the sponsors for their generous support, the translators for their efforts and the staff of the Hannah Arendt Institute for their well known professionalism preparing this volume. The editors are entirely responsible for all remaining deficiencies. 19 Cf. Moreau / Courtois / Hirscher ( Eds.), Der Kommunismus in Westeuropa; Hirscher (Ed.), Kommunistische und postkommunistische Parteien. Cf. also : Courtois ( Ed.), Dictionnaire du communisme. 20 In contrast, this volume concentrates on the ideological dimension : Backes / Courtois (Eds.), “Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa”.

I. Western Europe

The Disappearance of Communism in the Netherlands Gerrit Voerman Nearly twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 practically nothing is left of Dutch Communism.1 The Communist Party of the Netherlands ( Communistische Partij van Nederland; CPN ) – one of the oldest Communist parties of the world, after the Russian Bolsheviks – dissolved itself in June 1991. In November 1990 the party had merged with Radicals and Pacifists into a new political formation called Green Left ( Groen Links). Though the dying process of the CPN was accelerated by the revolutions in Eastern Europe, the party certainly did not liquidate itself as a consequence of the collapse of “really existing socialism”. Rather, the CPN had autonomously experienced a process of renewal which already had started several years before the accession of Gorbachev as secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985. Being a very orthodox party for a long time, the CPN first became de - Stalinized in the late 1970s. After 1980 this transformation entered the stage of “de - Leninization”, during which the party renounced the ideological and organisational heritage of Lenin and hardly could be called “Communist” any longer. In 1991 this process came to its logical end when the CPN dissolved itself and merged into Green Left. After the disappearance of the CPN Communism has more or less ceased to exist in Dutch politics. However, apart from the orthodox Marxist - Leninist, generally Soviet - oriented mainstream within Dutch Communism – which was traditionally embodied by the CPN, until the early 1980s – there have been several organisations which to a greater or lesser degree referred to Marx and Lenin. Usually these parties stemmed from the CPN; they were formed after a conflict in the course of which the leading role of the Soviet Union was disputed. Up to the time of writing, their organisational successors still exist, like the neo Marxist - Leninist New Communist Party ( of ) the Netherlands ( Nieuwe Communistische Partij Nederland; NCPN ); the originally Maoist Socialist Party ( Socialistische Partij; SP); the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party ( Socialistische Arbeiderspartij; SAP ) – since 2004 called Socialist Alternative Politics ( Socialistische Alternatieve Politiek; SAP ); and two other – smaller – Trotskyist organisations,

1

This contribution is a completely revised and up - dated version of Voerman, Das Gespenst des Kommunismus. In : Moreau / Lazar / Hirscher (Eds.), Der Kommunismus in Westeuropa, pp. 498–523.

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Gerrit Voerman

the International Socialists ( Internationale Socialisten), and a group around the paper Offensief. In this article the historical development of these parties and groups will be described, as well as their position within the Dutch political system in the last decade of the 20th and the first decade of the 21st century.2 Most attention will be paid to the SP. This party, which was founded in the early 1970s, started as a Maoist sect. Gradually it was able to transform itself into a radical left- wing, medium - sized party, which nowadays is threatening the position of social democracy in Dutch politics. Because of the combination of its electoral and organisational strength and its relatively radical ideological views, the SP has become a point of reference for the Trotskyist groups. Before turning to the neo - MarxistLeninist, Trotskyist and post - Maoist parties, a historical survey will be presented of the CPN, the party which formed the cradle of all the Marxist - Leninist varieties.

I.

The Communist Party of the Netherlands (1909–1991)

As the end of the CPN was not caused by the Eastern European revolution of 1989, so the beginning of the party was not the consequence of the Russian revolution of 1917, as was the case with nearly all the other Communist parties.3 The CPN existed already in 1909, albeit under another name, when revolutionary Marxists left the “reformist” Dutch social democracy. At the elections of 1918 the party got two seats in parliament. It renamed itself CPN and joined the Communist International ( Comintern ). At the beginning of the 1920s the CPN was torn by internal conflicts, in which the Comintern was involved also. Anton Pannekoek and Herman Gorter, both important Communist theoreticians, broke away from the party. They were disappointed with the political and economical direction of the Soviet Union and became the founders of the anti Leninist, left - wing trend within international Communism, called Council - Communism. The poet Gorter founded a new organisation called Communist Workers’ Party in the Netherlands ( Kommunistische Arbeiders - Partij in Nederland; KAPN ) in 1921.4 At the start the party had some 200 members; the greater part of these left after series of conflicts. After the departure of the dissidents the leadership of the CPN itself collided with Moscow, when it tried to resist the efforts of the Comintern to get a proper control on the Dutch section. In 1926 there were even two Communist parties, an “official” and a dissident one. To make matters worse, another split occurred within the official Comintern - party. In 1927 the Trotskyist wing left 2

3 4

The metamorphosis and dissolution of the CPN will not be discussed extensively, because this has been done earlier; see Voerman, Das Gespenst des Kommunismus, pp. 503–508; and idem, Premature Perestroika. In : Bell, Western European Communists and the Collapse of Communism, pp. 157–171. Voerman, De meridiaan van Moskou. Bos, Vele woningen, maar nergens een thuis.

The disappearance of Communism

17

the CPN. After some time it founded a party of its own ( see section 4), which since then was combated severely by the Moscow - oriented Communists. Under pressure of the Comintern, the official and dissident CPN merged in 1930. The fusion was staged completely by Moscow.5 It meant the start of a decade - long period of complete subordination of the CPN. This was reflected by the fact that after several party splits in the 1920s not any occurred during the next decade. Even when the line of the Comintern was changed drastically, like in 1935 and 1939, there were no attempts to break away. Apparently the more critical spirits had disappeared from the party, leaving their place to Moscow - devoted, docile apparatchiki, out - and - out supporting the Soviet Union. In this period the CPN was Stalinized : the party was tightly controlled by the party secretary Paul de Groot who was appointed by the Comintern in 1938. The first signs of dissent after nearly three decades of absolute loyalty towards Moscow came in 1956. After Khrushchev had started his policy of de - Stalinization, De Groot lukewarmly conceded that Stalin had made some mistakes, and regretted the defence of the personality cult. By this reaction he hoped to stifle the discussion in the CPN about de - Stalinization. Within the party leadership, however, there was growing resistance against the all - powerful position of party secretary De Groot. Yet the opposition failed : the dissidents left the CPN and in 1958 founded the Socialist Workers Party ( Socialistische Werkerspartij; SWP). The SWP counted some 500 members and stuck to Marxism - Leninism, democratic centralism and solidarity with the Soviet Union. However, Moscow was not pleased at all with the new party. In 1965 most members of the SWP joined the Pacifist - Socialist Party ( Pacifistisch - Socialistische Partij; PSP ). After the party schism De Groot was in line again with Moscow, but not for long. In the early 1960s the CPN started to dissociate itself from the Soviet Union because of its conflict with China. In 1963 De Groot declared his party “autonomous” within the international Communist movement. He feared that the Sino - Soviet dispute would endanger the special historical relations between his party and the pro - Chinese Indonesian Communist Party. Yet the CPN did not go over to the Beijing - camp; the emerging Maoist tendency within the party was expelled overnight ( see section 5). Partly because of its break with Moscow, the CPN became salonfähig within Dutch politics. Detente brought the party electoral growth. Under the surface, however, developments were going on which would profoundly affect the social, age and gender structure of the CPN’s membership.6 As a result of the process of “de - industrialisation”, the traditional recruiting reservoir of manual workers was drying up. During the early 1970s this tendency was camouflaged by the inflow of many students. These new members conformed ( at least initially ) to the authoritarian rules and culture of the party. They followed the party line with5 6

Voerman, From Lenin’s comrades in arms to “Dutch donkeys”. In : Rees / Thorpe, International communism and the Communist International 1919–1943, pp. 127–142. Voerman, “Away with all your Superstitions !”. In : The Journal of Communist Studies, 7 (1991) 4 ( December ), pp. 460–476.

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out any protest, even when the course changed drastically, like in the mid - 1970s when the CPN started to make serious overtures again to the Soviet Union. However, after heavy losses at parliamentary elections in 1977 when the CPN unexpectedly lost five out of its seven seats, intellectuals rebelled against the Stalinist way the party was run.7 The CPN should embrace post - materialist values such as environmental protection, feminism, democratisation and so on. After a year - long period of party strife the party adopted a completely modernized declaration of principles in 1984, in which the Leninist concept of the Communist party as the vanguard of the working class was abolished, and Leninism as an ideology was exchanged for feminism as one of the party’s theoretical keystones. Apart from this de - Leninization, a positive reference to the Soviet Union was lacking completely; instead the CPN expressed its support for movements of renewal within real - existing Socialism, such as Charta in Czechoslovakia and Solidarnosc in Poland. As a result, the orthodox wing left the CPN and founded the undiluted Marxist - Leninist, Moscow orientated party VCN ( see section 3). The renovators had scored a Pyrrhic victory, however. Having been represented in the Lower House of parliament ever since 1918, the CPN lost all its three seats in the parliamentary elections of 1986. This electoral shock gave a strong impulse to co - operation with other small left - wing parties like the pacifist PSP and the more or less ecologist Radical Political Party ( Politieke Partij Radicalen; PPR ), which were also electorally declining.8 Profoundly influenced by New Left ideas, these two parties argued that society should become more democratic and that the predominant mentality had to be changed by actions “from below”. The PSP, emanating from the peace movement during the Cold War in 1957, was in favour of extra - parliamentary activism and emphasized issues such as non - violent defence, anti - imperialism, socialization of production and workers’ self - management. The PPR, which was founded as a progressive Christian party in 1968, was more governmentally inclined and considered actions at the grass roots to be supplementary. From the early 1980s onwards the CPN was an acceptable partner for them, as a result of its de - Stalinization and ideological face - lift. Electoral co - operation got underway between Radicals, Pacifist Socialists and Communists. In 1984, the parties presented a common list at the European elections, which won 2 seats. At the national elections in 1986 a similar electoral alliance failed to materialize. Thus the three leftist parties presented separate lists at the elections – with disastrous results : the CPN lost all seats, the PSP retained only one and the PPR two. Besides, the exodus of members, which had been going on for several years, was accelerated. Therefore at the national elections in 1989, after having worked together again at the European elections in the same year, all parties crossed the Rubicon and formed 7 8

See Fennema, The end of Dutch communism ? In : Waller / Fennema (Eds.), Communist Parties in Western Europe, pp. 158–178; See Verrips, Dwars, duivels en dromend. Lucardie / van Schuur / Voerman, Verloren illusie, geslaagde fusie ?; and Voerman, The Netherlands. In : Richardson / Rootes, The Green Challenge, pp. 109–127.

The disappearance of Communism

19

an electoral alliance with one list of candidates and one electoral platform. It was joined by a small left - wing Protestant group, the Evangelical People’s Party ( Evangelische Volkspartij; EVP ). The new alliance – called “Green Left” – won 4.1 % of the popular vote and six parliamentary seats : more than its predecessors had acquired in the previous elections, but not as much as had been expected. However, the parties involved decided to build on their electoral co - operation and to accomplish a full organisational integration into Green Left. Initially, the leadership of the CPN took an ambivalent attitude towards the organisational integration which was considered to be going too fast. Later on it seemed to accept the inevitable. The party’s readiness to merge was certainly influenced by the revolutions behind the Iron Curtain at the end of 1989. Although the CPN had already years before dissociated itself from real - existing Socialism, these events poured cold water on the party : Socialism turned out not to have been a guarantor against unemployment, poverty, environmental destruction and so on but appeared to have been morally corrupt and bankrupt. Half a year after Green Left had been founded in November 1990 the CPN dissolved itself ( only a few months after PPR and PSP had done so ).

II.

Communism within Green Left fading away (1990–2006)

Within Green Left, Communism in terms of members, representatives and ideology diminished rather rapidly.9 At the national elections of 1994, the new party lost one of its six seats. Green Left leader Ina Brouwer ( who formerly had headed the CPN ) resigned because she felt responsible for the defeat. Her successor Paul Rosenmöller, a former Maoist trade union leader, attracted new voters. In 1998 the party won 7.5 % of the vote, enough for eleven seats in parliament. At the European elections of 1999 it increased its share of the vote to almost 12 %. The popularity of Green Left continued to rise until 2001, when the polls predicted sixteen seats for the party. However, in recent elections the party suffered setbacks, losing one seat in the parliamentary elections of 2002, two seats in 2003 and another seat in 2006. At the European elections in 2004 it lost two of its four seats and received only 5.1 % of the popular vote. These results were clearly disappointing, as participation in government appeared quite near at one point but now seems only a remote possibility. Yet membership grew – from 12,000 in 1995 to over 21,300 by 2007. Partly as a consequence of this rising number, the Communist portion within the Green Left membership has shrunk. According to membership surveys, in 1992 some 15 % of the members were former Communists; in 2002 only 6 %. Of course this had to do with the growing number of “new” Green Left members who had no “old” 9

This section is largely based on Lucardie / Voerman, The Organisational and Ideological Development of Green Left. In : Botella / Ramiro (Eds.), The crisis of communism and party change, pp. 155–175.

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Gerrit Voerman

party background. During this period their number rose from 20 % to almost 60 %.10 In the middle level elite the Communists were also in decline, as a survey among delegates of the Green Left congress in 1995 has demonstrated. According to this survey, the number of Communists within Green Left had diminished from 23 % in 1990 to 14 % in 1995.11 Compared to the other predecessors the Communists had declined most, which might indicate that former CPN - members were less active within the party than before or that they had simply left. This decline is reflected by the number of Members of Parliament with a Communist past. The first parliamentary caucus of Green Left had represented the three main constituents more or less in proportion of membership : two members, including the political leader, from the PPR, the largest component; two members from the PSP, which in 1989 was a bit smaller than the PPR; one from the even smaller CPN; one from the “independent members”. This balance was absent in the second caucus, elected in 1994 : one member had a Communist background, one had been a Pacifist Socialist, but the other three were “independents”. Thus the largest component, the PPR, was not represented at all anymore from 1994 to 1998; Communists were a little over - represented. When the parliamentary party expanded to 11 members in 1998 two former Communists were included. In 2002 only one was nominated again. In fact, in 2002 most of the parliamentary candidates had never belonged to any of the constituent parties. Not only quantitatively but also qualitatively the Communist contingent was on the defensive. As the name of Green Left indicates, the ideological content of the new party is rather dualistic. In the beginning it tried to compromise between a red Scylla and a green Charybdis. Of course the mixture of environmental and social demands was rather different from Communist ideology, even from its renovated variety. It seems, however, that the remaining former CPN members within Green Left were losing some of their Communist characteristics. To a certain extent they were accommodating themselves to the ideological shift in emphasis of Green Left : compared with the early 1990s, they were taking somewhat less “red” and more “green” positions in 1995. Still they were less “green” than the other components. The former Communists also placed themselves the most to the left on a (10 point ) left - right scale, although a bit less than before : 2.4 in 1995 against 1.5 in 1990.12 From the middle of the 1990s onwards, ideologically Green Left moved even further away from Communism. Though one can observe a remarkable continuity in the election programmes since 1989, significant Socialist or Communist 10 Lucardie / van Schuur, Vergrijst GroenLinks ? In : Jaarboek 2005 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, pp. 144–153. 11 Lucardie / van Schuur, De ontgroening van GroenLinks. In : Jaarboek 1995 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, pp. 247–264. 12 Voerman, “Das Gespenst des Kommunismus”, p. 511; Lucardie / van der Knoop / van Schuur / Voerman, Greening the Reds or Reddening the Greens ? In : Rüdig (Ed.), Green Politics Three, pp. 90–111.

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21

elements declined in importance. In 1989 the party called for “socialisation of the economy”, socio - economic planning and parliamentary control of banks and other financial institutions. In 1994 the demand for planning is more abstract and less specific, and in 1998, 2002, 2003 and 2006 planning is not really mentioned any more. Yet more modest demands for egalitarian social policies, increasing welfare and minimum wages, for example, have been voiced in all platforms. At the same time, ecological policies seem to gain weight and specificity. Especially the more recent programmes call for ( more ) ecotaxes on for instance energy and water. Thus one might conclude that the influence of Communist and Marxist ideology was never very strong within Green Left; and that it declined with time after 1989 – for obvious reasons, which can be summarized by the German word Zeitgeist; or in other words : the increasing dominance of liberal ideology and the collapse of the Soviet system. All in all, after more than 15 years the traces of the CPN within Green Left have nearly disappeared.

III.

Neo - Marxism - Leninism

With the transformation of the CPN from a proletarian, left - wing party into a modern, rather ecological and feminist one and its merger into Green Left, Marxism - Leninism did not fully disappear from the Dutch political landscape. The “new CPN” – abbreviated as NCPN – tried to keep orthodox Communism alive. After the CPN had adopted its renewed ideological credo the conservative wing founded the League of Communists in the Netherlands ( Verbond van Communisten in Nederland; VCN ) in November 1985. At that time it claimed to have a thousand members. An orthodox manifesto was framed, based on Marxist - Leninist principles such as the class struggle as the sole engine of history, the leading role of the Communist Party, democratic centralism, a positive evaluation of the real existing Socialist system, and an unconditional loyalty to the Soviet Union. Electorally, the party was not a success at all : in 1986 and 1989 it obtained only 0.1 % of the vote. In 1992 the VCN formed the NCPN, together with a few local branches of the CPN which had not been willing to merge into Green Left. The NCPN counted approximately some 500 members, according to its own sources – much less than the VCN. As its predecessor, the party cherished the glorious Communist past and stressed the actual relevance of orthodox Marxism - Leninism. Self - evidently, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union came as a big shock to the orthodox Communists. Although they admitted that “mistakes” had been made, these events did not really change their beliefs : in principle they regarded them as “counter - revolutionary” and as the outcome of capitalist plotting. Later the NCPN sharply criticized the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, the international position of the NCPN was very traditionalist, exclusively oriented towards congenial parties elsewhere in the world. It frequently visited orthodox Communist parties elsewhere in Europe. In No-

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vember 1997 the NCPN subscribed to the “Declaration of Leningrad”, which was drafted by 23 orthodox Communist parties in Petersburg. From 1998 onwards the party attended the International Conference of Communist and Labour Parties on a regular basis. The NCPN did not join the transnational Party of the European Left – which was founded in 2004 and consisted of Socialist, Communist and red - green parties of the member states and associated states of the European Union ( EU ) – because it believed that this organisation had renounced Marxism and was financed by Brussels. Since 2001 the NCPN – as other orthodox Communist parties – tried to link to the less uniformly organised anti - globalization movement. It had to admit, however, that this movement was partly dominated by “Trotskyists and anarchists” and that the Communists were too late. The NCPN never succeeded in obtaining a foothold within this new movement. Since its foundation the NCPN exalted the still present Communist regimes in China, North - Korea and especially Cuba. This resulted in bizarre views, like the ostentatious glorification of North - Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and his successor Kim Jong Il, or the active defence of ( former ) president of Socialist Serbia, Milosevic. According to the NCPN the United States, with NATO as its instrument, was pursuing absolute global domination, thereby trying to dominate not only Communist states such as Yugoslavia, North - Korea and Cuba but also ( Muslim ) countries like Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Of course these views strengthened the already very isolated position of the party within Dutch society. In the national elections of 1994 and 1998 the NCPN again scored no more than 0.1 % of the vote. In 2002 the party decided not to participate because it was not able to collect the necessary financial deposit. It took part in the anticipated elections of 2003, however, but again only obtained 0.1 % of the vote. The lack of perspective, but also the authoritarian way in which the leadership ran the party, contributed to several internal conflicts. In 1999 one of these clashes resulted in a schism : a few dozen members broke away and founded the Free Communist Party ( Vrije Communistische Partij; VCP), predominantly based in one town in the North - East of the Netherlands, which was the NCPN’s only stronghold. In 2006 another split occurred in this area, again reducing the party. Opposition also arose within the NCPN’s tiny youth organisation, where “libertarian Marxists” – “anarchists disguised as Communists” – were thrown out. In November the party did not run in the national elections. The NCPN’s future looks rather gloomy, as a result of the internal conflicts which crop up time and again and the aging rank and file. Besides, the party had to deal with the electoral attraction of the competing SP which was able to poach on the orthodox Communists’ preserves. Efforts to connect with the anti - globalisation movement in order to revitalise the party did not pay off. The NCPN could not longer even automatically rely on “real existing Communism”; in 2006 the party asked itself for the first time if China could be regarded as Socialist. All in all, the erosion of the foundation of the party continues; only

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the fact that the NCPN is part of an international Communist network seems to provide some kind of a perspective – in the words of Alejandro de Mello, one of the party leaders, in 2006 : “How proud I am, comrades, to be part of this [Communist] world movement”.

IV.

Trotskyism

Contemporary Trotskyism in the Netherlands is divided into three groups, all relatively small : Socialist Alternative Politics ( Socialistische Alternatieve Politiek; SAP); a group around the paper Offensief ( Offensive ), and the International Socialists ( Internationale Socialisten). From the late 1990s onwards, one after another they all started to orientate themselves towards the Socialistische Partij.

1.

Socialist Alternative Politics ( Socialistische Alternatieve Politiek)

The oldest one of the Dutch Trotskyist parties is the SAP. Its roots go back to 1927, when the Trotskyist wing split off from the CPN. Two years later the Revolutionary Socialist Party ( Revolutionair Socialistische Partij; RSP ) was founded.13 The RSP was one of the first Trotskyist parties in Europe. From 1933 until 1937 it was represented in the Dutch parliament by its leader, Henk Sneevliet. At the eve of the Second World War the Trotskyist movement – consisting of several small groups, one of which was officially recognized by the Fourth International – was in dire straits. After the liberation in 1945 the Revolutionary Communist Party ( Revolutionair Communistische Partij; RCP ) was set up, but was not able to obtain a foothold within the working class. In the early 1950s the party was dissolved and its members joined the Labour Party in order to radicalize Dutch social - democracy. At the end of the decade Labour decided to get rid of the entrists. Several Trotskyists now chose the PSP as their political shelter. There they were involved with the formation of an oppositional group called “Proletarian Left” ( Proletarisch Links), but after some time this group was forced to leave the PSP. After several conflicts and splits this group in 1974 merged with the lingering Dutch section of the Fourth International. The new party called itself International League of Communists ( Internationale Kommunistenbond; IKB ). It counted a few hundred members, mainly students.14 The party’s platform was relatively post - materialist : it included feminist issues, environmental demands and democratization beside classical left - wing Socialist desiderata such as nationalisation, planning and disarmament. In 1983 the IKB renamed itself Socialist Workers Party ( Socialistische Arbeiderspartij; SAP ). The SAP – which was also a member of the Fourth International – wanted to get rid of the term “Communist” within its name, in order to avoid being associated 13 See Eekman / Pieterson, Linkssocialisme tussen de Wereldoorlogen. 14 Denekamp et al., Ontwapenend, pp. 175–179.

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with the Soviet Union or the CPN. It aimed to develop into a revolutionary party. Electorally the SAP was not a success at all : at the national elections of 1986 and 1989 the SAP scored 0.04 % and 0.05 % respectively. The Eastern European revolutions around 1990 were enthusiastically welcomed by the SAP. After decades the Stalinist, bureaucratic regimes collapsed at last; the traditional Trotskyist criticisms with regard to the Eastern European societies and the Soviet Union seemed to be confirmed. Like the “reformed” CPN, the SAP initially thought that it would not be touched by the international Communist crisis. After some time, however, the party started to draw conclusions for its own Trotskyist ideology. The executive of the SAP had to admit that in the 1990s the October Revolution had become less important as a point of reference and that the Socialist ideological alternative had lost much of its attraction. Although the SAP still aimed to create a Leninist, revolutionary Socialist party, it resolved that it should concentrate on practical actions against the dismantling of the welfare state. It was also decided that it should no longer use the traditional Communist symbols – the hammer and sickle – in its presentation. The name of the party’s newspaper “Class struggle” was changed into a more neutral, modern one : “Unbounded” ( Grenzeloos). The SAP’s electoral appeal, however, did not grow after these reforms. At the national elections of 1994 it again received no more than 0.05 % of the vote. Since then it has not participated in parliamentary elections. At the beginning of the new century the SAP had reached a deadlock. It realised that next to Green Left and especially the expanding SP there was no room to build a meaningful organisation of its own. The SAP dropped the goal of the formation of a revolutionary - Socialist party; instead it wanted to contribute to the formation of a “broad anti - neoliberal, left alternative”. The party organisation had to be transformed into a platform for debate, and the recruitment of new members was now considered of less importance. SAP - members should become active in the anti - globalization - and other social movements. In 2004, in line with the new approach, the SAP changed its name into Socialist Alternative Politics ( Socialistische Alternatieve Politiek). A minority did not agree with this new direction. They stuck to the concept of a revolutionary party and sought a merger with the International Socialists – in vain, however, although a number of these opponents joined the International Socialists indeed as individuals. The majority, however, regarded not the congenial International Socialists but the former Maoist SP as the core of the pursued “left alternative”. A number of SAP - members joined the SP on an individual basis.

2.

Offensive ( Offensief)

The group around the revolutionary - Socialist paper Offensief ( Offensive ) is associated with the Trotskyist Committee for a Workers’ International ( CWI ) which was founded in 1974. Two years later, a few members of the youth organ-

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isation of the Dutch Labour Party joined the CWI. They remained active within the social democratic party, among others by publishing a paper that was named Offensief in 1982. As the Labour Party became more moderate, the dissatisfaction within the Offensief- group grew accordingly. In the 1990s members of Offensief participated in campaigns against the Gulf War and against racism. Gradually Offensief started to orientate itself toward the SP and appealed several times at national elections to vote for this party. Despite the SP’s shortcomings ( like parliamentarianism and ideological vagueness ) the members of Offensief decided in 1998 – after a discussion within the CWI – to join the SP. As an internal pressure group it wanted to help transform the party into a “new, pluriform workers’ party” to find support for revolutionary Socialism. The organisational structure around the paper Offensief remained unimpaired, but the members declared they would respect the democratic decision - making process within the SP. Yet Offensief was critical towards its new political home, especially since after 2002 the SP started to apply publicly for participation in a government with Labour and Green Left. Offensief – which counted some 50 members in 2006 – criticized the “rightward drift of the party leadership”.

3.

International Socialists ( Internationale Socialisten)

The youngest Trotskyist organisation in the Netherlands are the International Socialists ( IS ). This group was established in the late 1980s along the lines of the Socialist Workers Party ( SWP ) in the UK. IS Netherlands is affiliated with the International Socialist Tendency ( IST ) which is dominated by the SWP. The Dutch section is strongly oriented towards their English sister party : brochures of prominent SWP members are published in Dutch and interviews with them appear in the party newspaper. At the annual IS conference, the occasion for electing its political leadership, an SWP representative is commonly invited as a guest speaker. Whereas parties that are allied in the Fourth International, like the SAP, consider the former Soviet Union and those countries that still call themselves Socialist such as China, North Korea and Cuba as degenerate, bureaucratic workers’ states, the IS Netherlands in line with SWP ideologist Tony Cliff regards them rather as state capitalist systems in which the workers are exploited by the state. Entirely in line with the traditional Trotskyist view, the IST and its Dutch branch maintain that Stalin squandered the achievements of the 1917 October Revolution. They outright reject the suggestion that despotic Stalinism was an inevitable consequence of Leninism. In ideological respects the IS is inspired by Trotsky and Lenin. The party advocates, just as the SAP and Offensief, “bottom - up Socialism”, that is the direct and democratic control of society and the state by workers’ councils. It seeks to establish a Bolshevik vanguard party which is to marshal the most militant workers to promote their everyday interests and, on the long run, to bring about the

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revolution. As IS Netherlands feels that “a stronger revolutionary party signifies a stronger working class”, membership recruitment is an imperative. This, however, has not proved to be very successful : membership figures in the 1990s have never exceeded 100 at most.15 Insiders feel that the party’s difficulty in holding onto members is due to its authoritarian, hierarchical organisation and the demanding requirements made upon party membership. IS Netherlands members are particularly active in university towns, selling the party newspaper and engaging in regular discussion meetings on current affairs and matters of ideology. The party has never taken part in national elections since, it believes that the capitalist system cannot be changed through parliament. As a rule, IS Netherlands advises its members to vote Labour. Since its foundation IS Netherlands has campaigned against racism, sexism and homophobia. The group was also very visibly involved in protests against the Gulf War and the NATO intervention in former Yugoslavia. After demonstrations against the WTO summit in Seattle late in 1999 the IS, spurred on by the IST, focused on the “alter - globalist movement” in the Netherlands, aiming to reinforce the Marxist element. As a result, membership of the IS expanded somewhat. At the same time their conduct caused some tension within the wideranging alter - globalist movement, as anarchist groups in particular were having serious problems with what they considered IS’s attempts to control this movement. After fifteen years of activity IS Netherlands was still only a marginal group, numbering nearly 200 members at most and selling a maximum of 1,500 copies of their party newspaper,16 despite the opportunities they had to capitalize on the success of the “alter - globalist movement”. It would seem that this lack of organisational clout was a factor in their decision in November 2005 to join forces with the Socialist Party ( SP ). The IS had initially adopted a highly critical attitude towards the SP, especially when this party decided in 1999 to drop nationalization of the means of production from its manifesto. However, the two parties had moved closer to one another, or so the IS claims, in their joint collaboration in the anti - globalization movement, the protest campaigns against American military action in the Middle East and the campaign against the neoliberal policies of the Dutch government. By swelling the ranks of the SP the IS wanted to aid the SP in its endeavour to present a valid left - wing alternative to Labour and the social - liberal Green Left. “We should be part of it, both because the success of the Socialist Party is vital for the further advance of the Left in the Netherlands, and because only by being part of it can we help shape the direction in which the SP, as a radical pole of attraction, is developing”, in the words of one IS leader.17 Though the SP welcomed the IS, the party leadership 15 E - mail Pepijn Brandon, 25 August 2006; see also Griffioen, Netherlands. In : International Socialist Tendency. Discussion Bulletin (2005) 6 ( Jan.), pp. 35–37. As of 1989, the party magazine initially appeared once every two months. Since 1994 it has appeared every month, and as a tabloid since 2001. 16 E - mail Brandon, and De Socialist, October 2003. 17 Brandon, Netherlands. In : International Socialist Tendency. Discussion Bulletin (2006) 7 ( Jan.), pp. 31–32.

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was not amused by the IS’s decision to remain an independent, revolutionary organisation and demanded that IS members made up their minds.

4.

Trotskyists groups and the Socialist Party

Since the late 1990s, all the Dutch Trotskyist groups have redefined their relation to the Socialist Party ( SP ). Initially, these groups were rather sceptical towards the SP. As prototypes of future revolutionary Socialist organisations, they regarded the SP as more or less xenophobic, not clearly feminist, and to a high degree populist – in other words : less class conscious and not pure enough. Gradually the SP was considered more positively, however, not only because the party was changing its original positions and notions regarding immigrants and women but also because of its “inevitability”. The SP evolved into the dominating force on the left side of the Dutch political spectre ( electorally and otherwise ). Where the SP grew, the Trotskyist groups hardly made any progress or were even shrinking – which meant that the dream of a revolutionary Socialist organisation was further away than ever. Given this lack of perspective, it was rather naturally the SAP, Offensief and IS began to orient towards the SP. In line with the “entrist” Trotskyist tradition, Offensief and IS decided to join and to uphold their organisational forms. The SP accepted the former, but refused the latter. A number of International Socialists became SP - members on an individual basis, just like a few of SAP - members. All three groups are more or less absorbed by the SP – which implies that there is hardly any basis for Trotskyism in the Netherlands any more.

V.

Maoism

After Council Communism and Trotskyism, Maoism was the third main dissenting tendency within international Communism which induced followers in Moscow - oriented parties – and accordingly also in the CPN. In the early 1960s several pro - Mao groups were formed within the Dutch party. They considered themselves the only true Marxist - Leninists and blamed the CPN for straying from established orthodoxy and lapsing into revisionism. From the start, the Maoist opposition was much divided. When it left the CPN, each group founded a separate party. For some years these parties were competing with each other, sometimes merging, but more often splitting again. In 1970 the Communist Unity Movement of the Netherlands ( Marxist - Leninist ) ( Kommunistische Eenheidsbeweging Nederland (marxistisch - leninistisch); KENml ) pretended to unify the fragmented Dutch Maoist family, but it also failed. An intellectual and a more proletarian wing clashed with each other. In 1971 the latter left the KENml and founded a party of its own, which after a year was called Socialist Party ( Socialistische Partij; SP ). Six years later, several groups and individuals which had

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been expelled by the KENml founded the Group of Marxist - Leninists / Red Dawn ( Groep van Marxisten - Leninisten/Rode Morgen; GML / RM ), which later joined the transnational Maoist International Conference of Marxist - Leninist Parties and Organizations ( ICMLPO ). At present, GML / RM still exists, but presumably counts only a few dozen members. In its formative period the SP was totally focussed on Mao Zedong and China. It based itself on the Marxist - Leninist ideology, “enriched with Mao’s thinking”. The party championed the abolition of private ownership of the means of production. It was convinced that Socialism could not be realised by way of peaceful, gradual reform but only by a violent revolution. The SP, consequently, did not think much of the parliamentary system : parliamentary democracy was no more than a façade for the dictatorship of capital. Nor did the SP cherish any illusions about the other left - wing parties within the system: the Labour Party was little more than a reactionary party, and the CPN, instead of being the revolutionary headquarters of the proletariat, had degenerated into a peaceful parliamentary election machine. In its struggle against capitalism the SP was guided by Mao’s strategy of the “mass line”. The revolutionaries had to listen to the opinions of masses, to transform these into political demands and to mobilize the masses on the basis of these demands. The SP tried to put this Maoist concept ( which had a strong populist component ) into Dutch practice by the foundation of so - called “mass organisations”. These organisations were promoting people’s interests on clear - cut areas ( like for instance environmental protection, house - rent, housing - shortage, etc.). The SP was going to be the most important offspring of the Maoist family in the Netherlands. It was the only Maoist group that has survived until this day; all the others remained sects and disappeared in the course of the 1970s and 1980s ( the marginal GML / RM left aside ). The SP’s secret was its considerable adaptability which was related to the populist component of Mao’s concept of the “mass line”. After 1975 a transformation process started in the ideological and the organisational domain ( the latter will be discussed in the following section ). In the course of this metamorphosis the SP changed from a Maoist sect into an almost mainstream accepted radical left party.18

1.

The ideological transformation of the SP

The first phase in the metamorphosis of the SP started in the late 1970s. The Maoist principles gradually faded into the background, and the SP more or less adjusted to its Dutch environment. The party adapted to the views of what it would call “the common people” and attempted to rid itself of its sectarian image. A variety of factors were involved in this de - Maoization process. Party mem18 This part is based on : Voerman, De “Rode Jehova’s”. In : Jaarboek 1986 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, pp. 124–150; and idem, Een politieke kameleon. In : Vlaams marxistisch tijdschrift, 38 (2004) 1, pp. 48–58.

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bership growth – which was already rather modest – came to a grinding halt in the mid - 1970s. The 1977 national election results ( in which the party participated in order to use parliament for propaganda ) were also disappointing ( see table 1). Just as important, however, were changes in the foreign policy of China, which increasingly welcomed the enemies of the Soviet Union into the fold as friends of Peking. In the ideological domain, some Maoist dogmas were revised. First of all, the doctrine of violent revolution was pushed into the background, as it was assumed that it would scare people off. However, the concept of the class struggle and the party’s main goal, a Socialist society, were retained unchanged. At the same time parliament was open to re - evaluation. If the SP at first believed that this “tittle - tattling body” would be done away with once the working classes had come into power, now it was taking a more positive view of parliamentary democracy as the most democratic system that was feasible under capitalism. Of course, the system could not be expected to accept any genuine social changes, for these would only take place when the people ruled “under the command of the working classes”, according to the manifesto that had been proclaimed at the party conference in 1987. The de - Maoization of the late 1970s was followed by a break with Leninism some ten years later. In the manifesto of 1987 the party had emphatically grounded itself in Marxism - Leninism, both in an ideological sense ( dialectic and historical materialism ) and in an organisational sense ( democratic centralism, the party’s vanguard role in the struggle for Socialism ). After the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union around 1990, however, the SP trimmed its sails to the new wind. It wished to learn lessons from the collapse of “actually existing Socialism”, which, for that matter, it had always regarded with a great deal of sympathy. Its reversal of policy was also induced by the highly disappointing 1989 parliamentary election results : the national results had lagged far behind the local results ( see table 1). The non - materialization of the expected seat in the Lower House forced the party leadership to change tack : the party needed to brush up its national appeal.19 In the process of reform that was set in motion the SP’s worldview – just like its party structure ( see below ) – was “de - Leninized”. In 1991 the party conference decided that the SP’s political orientation was only to be designated by the term “Socialist”. In the new manifesto that was adopted, Handvest 2000 (Charter 2000), the SP was still setting course for a Socialist society. The number of sectors that were to be socialized was restricted to major banks and corporations. The notion of Marxism - Leninism was struck off the statutes : “The problem is that this label has now become a millstone round our necks. If the SP is to have any significance after the year 2000, we need to do something about it

19 Van der Steen, De doorbraak van de “gewone mensen” - partij. In : Jaarboek 1994 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, pp. 172–189.

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now,” said party chairman Jan Marijnissen.20 The SP’s view of society remained Marxist, however, even if this was no longer said out loud. Having taken leave of Mao and Lenin, the late 1990s ushered in the third phase in the process of ideological transformation : “desocialization”. Since its foundation the SP had aimed rigorously to terminate the capitalist system of oppression and exploitation and to change the Netherlands into a Socialist country. In the SP election programme of 1998 ( as in those of 2002, 2003 and 2006), however, the term “Socialism” would be dropped altogether. In 1999 the party drafted a new manifesto – entitled Heel de mens ( All Mankind / Heal Mankind : there’s a double meaning in Dutch ) – in which Socialism as the beckoning perspective and a future ideal for society disappeared into the background. The party now explicitly stated that Socialism was neither a blueprint for a future society nor a prophecy of salvation or a promise that all would be better beyond the horizon. The SP still considered itself to be en route to a “better world” but appeared to have abandoned the belief that Socialism was the final destination of history. Socialism was now only referred to by highly abstract and moral terms: “human dignity, equality, and solidarity between people”. Once more, this doctrinal innovation was meant to remove obstacles between the party and its grassroots support potential. According to party secretary Tiny Kox, it was meant to “reach out to people who in the past may have had good reason not to come and join us.”21 Simultaneously with this final destination, the SP also jettisoned the central tenet of Socialist ideology : public ownership of the means of production. As said above, the party had believed for a very long time that this was the only possible course to take to realise Socialism. At the end of the 1990s, however, socialization became a no - no. In Heel de mens the SP would not venture beyond saying that democratic control comes before “the kind of control that is tied to economic power and private property.” Instead of socialization, it is democratization that currently appears to have become the major ideological spearhead of the SP. This is another point where the party has undergone a change. In its early days it felt that the Netherlands was not democratic : it was not parliament but the capitalists that ruled the roost. In the new 1999 manifesto, however, the SP considered parliamentary democracy as “the most important means of expressing and implementing the will of the people.” The idea that social units like neighbourhoods or companies should be the only ones to put forward candidates for parliament, an idea the party had still endorsed around 1990, disappeared into the bottom drawer. This was not to say that the SP considered the status quo to be ideal : the party felt that the democratically legitimized government should exercise greater control over the market sector and should protect its authority in the face of the aggressive European Union ( that is why the party very actively – and with success – cam20 Trouw, 26 October 1991. 21 NRC Handelsblad, 25 September 1999.

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paigned against the European Constitution in the referendum in the Netherlands in 2005). Democratization turned into a magic potion to cure all social ills. Wherever the party formerly would have used the term “Socialist”, this was substituted by this new term in the Heel de mens manifesto : “a democratized society offers the best scope for doing justice to essential issues such as the protection of social progress and justice, health, nature and the environment.”

2.

The organisational transformation of the SP

Parallel to the ideologic evolution, the SP transformed also its organisation. In accordance with the Leninist tradition, the party was initially highly centralized and hierarchical, granting substantial authority to the party leadership. In the early 1970s student members were instructed to work in the factory in order to develop a proletarian consciousness. In addition, members were to take an active part in the life of the party, meaning they were to dedicate themselves to the mass organisations, canvas for the party magazine, participate in members’ meetings, and devote themselves to Marxist - Leninist training. At the same time their political influence was marginal. The de - Maoization process, which was partly intended to tone down the SP’s sectarian stamp, also led to adaptations in the party organisation. In 1977 the party introduced the so - called “supporting” membership. The newcomers paid their fee but were not allotted fully - fledged positions within the party. Apparently fearing that this new growth in membership might turn out to be a Trojan horse, the SP decided to shift the core of the grassroots decision - making process from branch meetings to “political working meetings”, which were only open to “cadre members”. These organisational reforms appear to have been fruitful. Though the SP in those days was little inclined to divulge membership figures, it is known to have had some 200 members immediately after the schism in 1971 and an estimated 500 members in the mid - 1970s. In 1987, according to its own membership specifications, the party had about 13,000 members and supporting members.22 Though the tried and tested working method of the mass line was maintained, virtually all mass organisations were disbanded after 1977. In that year’s national elections they had turned out to be unable to mobilise the hoped - for electoral support for the SP, and it was suspected that these organisations were actually obscuring the party itself which, it was decided, needed to become more visible. The mass organisations were replaced by a legal and medical aid - department. In the second period of ideologic changes – the de - Leninization of the SP in the early 1990s – the organisational structure was revised once more. Since

22 Voerman, De “Rode Jehova‘s”, 141; “Verslag van het partijbestuur van de SP over de periode van het Vierde en Vijfde Partijkongres (1987–1991)”, s. l., s. a., [1991], p. 6.

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1977 it had been cadre members only who had the right to vote in the party; the supporting members did not get a hand in political decision - making matters. The statutes were amended in 1991 to upgrade the supporting members into fully - fledged party members, which also granted them a formal voice in the SP. The rank and file was also given more opportunities for participation. In 1990, for instance, a party council was introduced, which would meet once every three months. The party conference was to convene much more frequently in the 1990s than it had done in the 1970s and 1980s. These organisational changes helped to clear the way for SP membership increases in the 1990s. By upgrading the supporting members into regular members the party had well over 15,000 members in early 1992. After the SP’s debut in the Lower House in May 1994 membership rose to approximately 17,000 in January 1995 and to nearly 22,000 three years later. Over the past few years growth figures have truly begun to soar : in 2002 the SP welcomed about 9,000 new members, an increase of one third. By the end of 2006 the party had nearly 50,000 registered members. Out of all SP members in 2005, 60 % are male and 40 % are female. In the combined membership files of the Christian Democrats ( CDA ), Liberal Democrats ( D66), Labour ( PvdA ), and the Liberals ( VVD ), this ratio is 64 % to 36 % ( in 1999 !), implying that the sexes show a slightly more balanced distribution in the SP.23 Compared to the combined CDA, D66, PvdA, and VVD membership, the SP membership is markedly younger. Approximately 26 % of SP members are over 55, as against 42 % in the other parties; 14 % of their members are under 35, whereas 17 % of SP members are below the age of 30.24 Contrasted with CDA, D66, PvdA, and VVD membership, SP members have considerably lower education levels. In 2005, 40 % ( in 2001 : 28 %) of SP members had completed higher professional or university programmes, as against 60 % of the membership of the main Dutch parties. Out of all SP members, 5 % ( in 2001 : 8 %) had completed primary education only, which was still a higher figure than that of the other parties (3 %). More than a third (38 %) of the SP membership has completed lower or higher professional training programmes or lower secondary general education ( in 2001 : 50 %). In general one can say that the educational profile of the SP membership gradually resembles the pattern of the other parties. Virtually half the SP members (49 %) are in employment in 2005, as against 59 % in the other parties. This SP figure is in all probability inflated because the phrasing in the questionnaire was rather ambiguous : all kinds of employment 23 The data on SP members’ geographical origin, sex, and age are in line with party bureau specifications for 1993. The other information on SP members was derived from Resultaten ledenenquête SP 2001, z.pl [ Rotterdam ], z.j. [2001] and Het profiel van de SP - leden 2005, www.sp.nl / partij / leden / profiel.stm ( visited 5 September 2006). The data on CDA, D66, PvdA, and VVD members were derived from Koole / van Holsteyn / Elkink, Rekrutering en representatie in een representatief bestel. 24 Varying age bracket classifications in both studies did not allow us to make a better comparison of membership profiles.

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were included, ranging from paid jobs on the side to full - time working weeks. Out of all SP members, 14 % are retired ( in 2001 : 19 %; other parties : 26 %), 17 % disabled or unemployed ( in 2001 : 18 %; other parties : 6 %). In 2001, the majority of SP members in employment were employed in the public sector : health care (17 %), education (13 %), and government (12 %); 13 % were industrial workers and 6 % construction workers. Surprisingly, in 2001 SP members did not seem to be actively engaged in their own organisation to an above - average degree : for active involvement, 8 % of the interviewees ticked “often” and 21 % “every now and again”; no less than 71 % said they did something for the party “hardly ever or never”. This percentage of non - active members is relatively high, even more so if one takes into consideration that the more active party members are more likely to have completed the questionnaire. These figures do actually mitigate the image, cherished by the SP, that they have the most active membership file in the Netherlands. Data on 2005 were not published. Just like the members of other parties, SP members have also joined many social organisations. The environmental movement is particularly popular : 23 % are members of Greenpeace, 22 % of Natuurmonumenten ( nature conservation), and 15 % have joined other conservationist or environmental organisations. One - third are trade union members. The left- wing is the natural habitat of SP members. A quarter ( in 2001 : 36 %) had voted for the PvdA before they joined the SP, 12 % (2001 : 13 %) for Groen Links, and 3 % ( in 2001 : 4 %) for D66.

3.

The SP as Vox Populi

The driving force behind all the ideological and organisational adaptations was the SP’s populist orientation which was embedded in its Maoist outlooks and outlasted all reforms. In the 1970s the party began to view itself as the “voice of the people” that was supposedly in a better position than anyone else to know the mind of the populace. This pretence of the SP was founded on its implementation of the mass line. The party moved among the masses “like a fish in water”, which enabled it to tap into the will of the “common” people, that is the workers. The starting - point for any SP activity and position was sounding out the views of the “common” man in his neighbourhood or district, or at least the SP’s perception of these views. These views were then more or less elevated into the guideline or norm for subsequent action. Right from the start the SP was very shy of adopting positions that might isolate it from the people. In 1974 Marijnissen said that the SP only carried out what the people demanded, for “it doesn’t matter what we think but what the people want us to do.”25

25 De Groene Amsterdammer, 12 June 1974.

34

Gerrit Voerman

In the early 1980s the populist strategy of the SP caused it to embrace controversial views on issues such as immigrant labour. Manifesting itself as no more than the “spokesperson” of what was on people’s minds, the party argued in favour of offering immigrant workers – with the passage of time – a choice of remigration to their country of origin or integration into and assimilation to Dutch society. If nothing was done, the SP felt, the issue of immigrant labour would cause the rise of a group of “second - class citizens”. The SP would later drop the option of remigration and stress the necessity of integration instead. In addition to rights, newcomers also had duties, such as “achieving certain levels of language proficiency and doing work placements”. The party felt that integration programmes were too often “too noncommittal”.26 It rejected the idea of the “multicultural society”, as this would bring about segregation and concentration of immigrants in neighbourhoods and schools. A novel feature of the SP’s kind of populism, which surfaced in the early 1980s, was the dread of anything that might spread discord among the “common” people so cherished by the party. On the one hand, this fear was dictated by the conviction that it was only capitalism that would benefit from a divided working class and a fragmented population – that is why the party at that time was opposed to “bourgeois feminism” because it stimulated tension between male and female. On the other hand there were considerations of a more nostalgic kind involved here. The SP felt that the common people’s sense of community was being threatened and eroded by the individualization process, a loss of community spirit, and rising unemployment. This would only result in a bleak and unliveable society. In the 1990s the SP’s resistance to individualization found its proper niche in the party’s critique of Neoliberalism. The SP fiercely opposed the neoliberal policy of the government which meant pushing back the role of the state, discarding the idea that society could be moulded by man, drastically cutting back social services, and promoting the free play of market forces. In its election programmes of the 1990s the SP put forward radical solutions over and against such a “demolition policy” : health care and education were to be provided free of charge; rent increases were to be reversed; income differences were to be reduced considerably, with maximum wages amounting to three times minimum wages at most, according to the 1998 programme. The SP’s populist traits found expression in the campaign slogan “Vote against, vote SP”, used in this period, with a red tomato featuring on its election posters as a protest symbol. Recently, however, the SP hardly deserves to be called a populist party anymore. The phrase “common man”, for example, has all but disappeared from party rhetoric. In the 2002, 2003 and 2006 national election programmes the SP is still pursuing “drastic reductions in distribution of incomes and wealth”, but it has disposed of the factor three for incomes. In 2001 the party also decided to change its successful 1990s “Vote against, vote SP” campaign slogan into 26 Eerste weg links : stem voor sociale wederopbouw. Actieprogramma SP 2003–2007, p. 49.

The disappearance of Communism

35

“Vote for, vote SP”. The party leadership feared that with the old slogan the SP would be conveying an overly negative message. Another contributing factor may have been the fact that for a number of years the Socialists had been participating in several municipal governments. In 1996 the SP was to have its first aldermen in the town of Oss, one of its homelands. After the local elections of 1998 the SP gained seats in three municipal governments, eight in 2002, and nearly 30 in 2006. The progress of the SP had to a large extent been the upshot of its strategy of mobilizing discontent. When the party first attained real decision making responsibilities, however, this strategy became less useful.

4.

Parliamentary advance

The transformation of the SP was accompanied and stimulated by its electoral progress. Despite its aversion to parliamentary activity that was a hallmark of its Maoist body of thought, the SP took part in local elections for the first time in 1974, arguing that Socialist propaganda would reach wider audiences in these representative bodies and that it would serve to prop up the party’s extra - parliamentary campaigns. In addition, it was high time indeed for “the voice of the common man” to be heard in parliament. This was to spark off the exponential rise of the SP in local councils. In 1974 the party gained five seats in two municipalities. In an increasing number of towns where it put up candidates, the SP scooped up 9, 22, 41, 71, 126, and finally 190 seats in the 1978–1998 period. With 170 seats in 2002, this advance came to a halt – but only temporarily: in 2006 the party obtained 342 seats. Research has shown that for a long time many SP voters let their voting behaviour in local elections be swayed by local issues.27 There would appear to be a clear correlation, therefore, between the activities initiated by the SP in a particular town and its electoral following. This strength of the SP at the local level – the relation between activism and electoral support – proved to be its Achilles heel at the national level for a long time. In the 1980s the electoral success of the SP remained to some extent a feature of the town or region where it had burst upon the public with its campaigns. As soon as it ventured to take part in parliamentary elections, however, there were all sorts of impediments : the SP’s relative national obscurity, for example, partly due to its lack of success in gaining any television time, despite trying hard; or the traditional electoral magnetism of the Labour Party which was considered by many voters to be the party of government. In 1994, however, the SP could benefit from the crisis within Dutch social democracy. Labour was governing since 1989 and was held responsible for certain reductions in welfare state arrangements. After an electoral campaign during which the SP promoted itself as a protest party and in which it especially criticized Labour, it got two seats and then made its entrance in the Lower House. By 1998 it had five seats, and in 2002 and 2003 nine seats ( see 27 Depla / Schalken, De PvdA - kiezer bekeken. In Lokaal Bestuur, May 1994, p. 23.

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Gerrit Voerman

Table 1 : SP election results 1977–2006 Lower House % 1977

seats

0.3

Provincial Councils Upper House European Parliament %

seats

–

–

seats

1979 1981

0.3

–

1982

0.5

–

0.6

0.4

0.5 0.4

0.9 1.3

2

3.5

5

1995 1999 2002

5.9

9

2003

6.3

9

16.6

25

2004 2006

–

–

0.7

–

1.3

–

5.0

1

7.0

2

1

–

1991

1998

–

–

1987

1994

– –

1984

1989

seats

–

1978

1986

%

1

2.1

12

1

3.3

19

2

5.6

38

4

Table 1). In 2006, the party experienced a real break - through with 25 seats (16.6 %). In the 2006 Lower House elections the social - democrats were a major supplier of voters to the SP : a quarter of the SP voters that year had voted for the PvdA three years earlier. About a third had previously not voted. A detailed analysis of the 2006 elections is not available yet, we have to revert to the data of 2002. In these elections the majority of the SP electorate were female (54.7 %). The party attracted a relatively large number of voters in the 45–54 age bracket (29.1 % against a nationwide 21.4 %). The SP voter was also slightly better educated than the average electorate ( see Table 2).

VI.

Conclusions

Communism does not exist anymore in the Netherlands. One of the most prominent factors which contributed to the downfall of the CPN in the 1980s and ear-

37

The disappearance of Communism

Table 2 : Educational Attainment Levels of SP Voters in the May 2002 Lower House Elections ( in %) SP voters

All voters

Primary education, lower secondary general or lower vocational education

28.2

35.5

Intermediate vocational education

20.5

18.8

Secondary education, higher general secondary and preuniversity education

12.0

11.6

Higher vocational and university education

39.3

34.1

ly 1990s was the increased prosperity and the rise of post - materialism. The material emancipation of the working class was more or less accomplished by the introduction of the welfare state. At the same time the era of post - industrialism seemed to begin. The new middle class came to the fore, with other values and demands than the blue collars used to have. Communism was severely hit by these developments. Not only its materialist basis started to erode, but it was also pushed aside in the ideological superstructure. The CPN dissolved itself in 1991 – a few months before the collapse of the Communist Utopia, the Soviet Union. The same factors which caused the collapse of Communism contributed to the emergence of Green Left. Communists, Radicals and Pacifist Socialists began to resemble each other both ideologically and sociologically. During the 1990s the former Communists gradually changed from red to green within their new eco - Socialist organizational environment. At the beginning of the 21st century nothing reminds to the CPN within Green Left. There is hardly any trace of a Communist legacy in party platforms, in the organisational structure and in the leadership of the party, nor in the composition of party membership. The Dutch Green Left is only a – partially – post - Communist party in terms of its genesis. The overall picture is that of a green party. A smaller part of the CPN languishes within the neo - Marxist - Leninist NCPN, stubbornly defending an ideology which has become old - fashioned and tarnished. Due to the greying of the rank - and file, the party’s days are numbered. The Trotskyist movement, which around the turn of the century thought it could take advantage of the globalisation movement and the anti - war protests, also remained marginal. When it failed to connect to these new social movements or when the connection did not offer real new opportunities, all its three components – SAP, Offensief and International Socialists – started to orient themselves towards the SP, an approach which resembles the old Trotskyist entrism strategy. The previously Maoist SP was the only party which also used to appeal to Marx and Lenin but which was able to survive. It shook off Maoism and Leninism but kept the populist orientation which characterized the “thoughts of Mao”. The strategy of “vox populi”, long - sustained activism and an ideological

38

Gerrit Voerman

blend of materialist demands and environmentalism enabled the party to establish links with substantial parts of the electorate. Its opportunity for a national break - through came in the early 1990s, when the reconstruction of the welfare state came under way under a cabinet in which Labour participated. As a “classical” Socialist party which no longer referred to the Communist patriarchs the party stood up for the social groups which became victim of this policy or which felt betrayed by the social - democrats. Its second break - through came twelve years later, in November 2006. The SP got more than 16 percent of the vote, and has become the third party of the Netherlands. Its electoral growth has continued since the middle of the 1980s, the burning question is when it will stop.

The PDS / Linkspartei.PDS and the Extreme Left – Decline and Renaissance of Communism in Germany Patrick Moreau

1.

Introduction

Our principal object of analysis is the PDS / Linkspartei.PDS ( PDS – Party of Democratic Socialism / Left Party.PDS ). Until 2005 this political body was active almost exclusively in the Eastern Bundeslaender ( federal states ). These are unique examples of post - Communist societies in transition. Since 1990 the PDS has experienced phases of increasing as well as declining electoral power in those states. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the 2002 Bundestag elections the PDS lapsed into a severe identity crisis intensified by ideological, organizational, and financial conflicts. The party seemed to be all but dead and condemned to rearguard action in the Eastern federal states. The 2004 elections, however, saw the PDS return to politics. The 2005 Bundestag elections confirmed this trend : The PDS had formed an alliance with the Electoral Alternative Work & Social Justice ( WASG ), a new left - wing Socialist formation and as “Linkspartei.PDS” ( Left Party.PDS ) obtained 8.7 percent of the vote and 51 seats. The reasons for this success need to be scrutinized and investigated at different levels and with a chronological approach as well as within the context of the competition of the German extreme left.

2.

Research : The State of the Art

Research on the PDS / Linkspartei.PDS is only at its beginning. To this very day, there is no global analysis of the prehistory of the party and its history between 1989 and 2007. There is little knowledge about the years 1990–1992, in spite of the belated opening of the PDS archives. Unfortunately those archives were partially bowdlerized. While there is no general survey, there are contributions on different periods reporting on the state of the party in 1990, 1992, and regularly during the most

40

Patrick Moreau

important elections between 1994 and 2005.1 The more specific ideological aspects were topics of doctoral theses and of various excellent publications.2 Since 1990 the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has observed the extremist wing of the PDS / Linkspartei.PDS and later on the WASG. The annual reports by the Federal and Laender Offices offer numerous details about the political activities of the PDS / Linkspartei.PDS.3 With the exception of the phenomenon of the RAF,4 left - wing extremism has rarely been a topic of research in Germany. Most of the studies concentrate on the cleavage between the German Basic Law ( constitution ) and the totalitarian and anti - democratic nature of left - wing extremism. With the exception of the annual reports of the federal and state offices for the protection of the constitution,5 there are few presentations of the diverse organizations and tendencies. The PDS and the Rosa Luxemburg - Foundation publish numerous documents about the party’s history, sociology, and electoral results. Aside from sometimes apologetic tendencies, those analyses help to comprehend the phenomenon of the PDS.6 For every important election, data about the social state of the electorate is available from opinion research institutes such as infratest dimap or Forschungsgruppe Wahlen.7 Their exit polls, in combination with the data provided by the federal election supervisor and the federal and state statistical 1

2

3 4

5

6 7

On the state of the party, its internal structures, financing, and strategies : Moreau, Die PDS; id./ Neu, Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus und Linkspopulismus; id., Was will die PDS; id./ Lang, PDS. Das Erbe der Diktatur; id., “Le PDS n’est pas une idéologie, mais une identité,” pp. 67–85; id./ Lang, Linksextremismus; id./ Gleumes / Hirscher / Maser / Wilke, Die PDS; id., Les partis communistes et postcommunistes en Europe occidentale, problèmes politiques et sociaux; Segall / Schorpp - Grabiak, Die PDS vor den Europawahlen; Segall / Schorpp - Grabiak / Hirscher, Die PDS im Wahljahr 1999; Moreau / Schorpp - Grabiak, “Man muss so radikal sein wie die Wirklichkeit;” Id., Nach der Berliner Wahl; id., Kulturelle Hegemonie; id., Rückkehr in die Politik ?, pp. 172–197. Thompson, The crisis of the German left; Hartleb, Rechts - und Linkspopulismus; Neu, Das Janusgesicht der PDS; Oswald, The party that came out of the Cold War; Hough, The fall and rise of the PDS; Everts, Politischer Extremismus; Ditfurth, Ostalgie oder linke Alternative; Neugebauer, Die PDS; Gerner, Partei ohne Zukunft ?; Fraude, “Reformsozialismus” statt “Realsozialismus ?;” Bortfeldt, Von der SED zur PDS; Welzel, Von der SED zur PDS. Cf. http ://www.verfassungsschutz.de. For example : http ://www.verfassungsschutz.de / de / publikationen / verfassungsschutzbericht / vsbericht_2004. General Studies : Backes, Links - und rechtsextremistische Gewalt in Deutschland; id., Totalitarismus – Extremismus – Terrorismus; id./ Jesse, Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; id., Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Blasius, Geschichte der politischen Kriminalität in Deutschland 1800– 1980; Zimmermann, Soziologie der politischen Gewalt; id., Massenmobilisierung. An exception : Moreau / Lang, Linksextremismus. For the Reports of the Federal and State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution, turn to : http ://www.verfassungsschutz.de and http ://www.verfassungsschutz. de / de / landesbehoerden. Links to left wing extremist groups : Turn to http ://www.broadleft.org / de.htm. Cf. http ://www.rosalux.de. For example : Spehr, Thesen zum Wahlausgang 2005. In : http ://www.rosalux.de /cms / fileadmin / rls_uploads / pdfs /Thesen_zum_Wahlausgang_ 2005_Spehr.pdf. Cf. http ://www.infratest - dimap.de or www.forschungsgruppe.de.

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

41

offices, give us a detailed description of the PDS electorate.8 The Konrad Adenauer - Foundation also follows the PDS closely in the field of empiricism.9

3.

The PDS : Preferred Option and Vote

We begin with investigating the electoral power of this party at the national, state, and local levels since 1990. Since 1994 the party system in Germany has differed clearly between East and West. Until 2005 there was a four party system ( CDU / CSU, SPD, FDP, Green Party ) in the West, while in the East there was a three - party system ( CDU, SPD, PDS ). In the fall of 2005, however, a system of five components was established due to the emergence of the Linkspartei.PDS at the national level and the reappearance of the Greens and Liberals on the political scene of the East. Table 1 :

PDS - Results of the Bundestag and European elections 1990–2002 (in percent )

Bundestag elections 02.12.1990

2.4

In the former FRG

0.3

In the former GDR

11.1

Bundestag elections 16.10.1994

4.4

In the former FRG

1.0

In the former GDR

19.8

Bundestag elections 27. 09.1998

5.1

In the former FRG

1.2

In the former GDR

21.6

Bundestag elections 22. 09. 2002

4.0

European elections 12. 06.1994

4.7

In the former FRG

0.6

In the former GDR

20.6

European elections 13. 06.1999

5.8

In the former FRG

1.3

In the former GDR

23.0

European elections 13. 06. 2004

6.1

In the former FRG

1.1

In the former FRG

1.7

In the former GDR

16.9

In the former GDR

25.2

In line with many regional elections from 1993–1998, the PDS celebrated its first historical triumph at the 1998 federal elections.10 The party had cleared the 5 - percent - hurdle and sent 36 Members to the Bundestag. Furthermore, it became a partner of the SPD to form the new coalition government in Mecklenburg - Western Pomerania. Still, the PDS remained a regional party, an inheritance of the GDR : While it obtained 21.6 percent of the vote in the new federal 8 Cf. http ://www.destatis.de / themen / d / thm_wahlen.php and www.bundeswahlleiter.de. 9 Cf. http ://www.kas.de; especially the Arbeitspapiere. 10 At the 1994 Bundestag elections, the PDS had received 4.4 percent of the national vote (2.1 Million votes ). In 1998, it attained 2.5 million votes (5.1 percent ).

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Patrick Moreau

Table 2 :

PDS - Results of Landtag elections since 1990 ( in percent )

Bavaria

*

Brandenburg 14.10.1990

13.4

Brandenburg 11. 09.1994

18.7

Brandenburg 05. 09.1999

23.3

Brandenburg 19. 09. 2004

28.0

Berlin 02.12.1990

9.2

In the former FRG

1.1

In the former GDR

23.6

Berlin 22.10.1995

14.6

In the former FRG

2.1

In the former GDR

36.3

Berlin 10.10.1999

17.7

In the former FRG

4.2

In the former GDR

39.5

Berlin 21.10. 2001

22.6

In the former FRG

6.9

In the former GDR

47.6

Berlin 17. 09. 2006

13.4

In the former FRG

4.2

In the former GDR

28.1

Bremen 29. 09.1991

*

Bremen 14. 05.1995

2.4

Bremen 06. 06.1999

2.9

Bremen 25. 05. 2003

1.7

Baden-Wuerttemberg 26. 03. 2006

3.1

Hessia

*

Hamburg 02. 06.1991

0.5

Hamburg 19. 09.1993

*

Hamburg 21. 09.1997

0.7

Hamburg 23. 09. 2001

0.4

Hamburg 29. 02. 2004

*

Mecklenburg-W. Pomerania 14.10.1990 Mecklenburg-W. Pomerania 16.10.1994 Mecklenburg-W. Pomerania 27. 09.1998 Mecklenburg-W. Pomerania 22. 09. 2002 Mecklenburg-W. Pomerania 17. 09. 2006 North Rhine-Westphalia 14. 05. 2000 North Rhine-Westphalia 22. 05. 2005 Lower Saxony 02. 02. 2003 Rhineland-Palatinate 26.03.2006

15.7 22.7 24.4 16.4 18.0 1.1 0.9 0.5 2.7

Saxony 14.10.1990

10.2

Saxony 11. 09.1994

16.5

Saxony 19. 09.1999

22.2

Saxony 19. 09. 2004

23.6

Saxony-Anhalt 14.10.1990

12.0

Saxony-Anhalt 26. 06.1994

19.9

Saxony-Anhalt 26. 04.1998

19.6

Saxony-Anhalt 21. 04. 2002

20.4

Saxony-Anhalt 26. 03. 2006

25.2

Schleswig-Holstein 27. 02. 2000

1.4

Schleswig-Holstein 20. 02. 2005

0.8

Saarland 05. 09.1999

0.8

Saarland 05. 09. 2004

2.3

Thuringia 14.10.1990

9.7

Thuringia 16.10.1994

16.6

Thuringia 12. 09.1999

21.3

Thuringia 13. 06. 2004

26.1

Newly founded as “Die Linke” Bremen 13. 05. 2007

8.4

* No participation. 2006 : Linkspartei; Linkspartei.PDS, Baden - Wuerttemberg and North Rhine - Westphalia 2006 : WASG.

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

43

states including East - Berlin, it received only 1.8 percent in the former FRG, including West - Berlin. The electoral result of 22.6 percent at the 2001 state elections in Berlin is particularly interesting : In the eastern part of the city the PDS received 33.7 percent of the vote, making it the strongest party there. In some polling stations, in quarters where the voters had been employees of GDR - institutions ( for example of the Ministry of State Security ), the PDS received 98 percent of the vote. Furthermore, the PDS was strongly rooted at the local level. In 2002 the PDS held about 6,500 seats in local councils (2005 : 6,000), among them 179 mayors, and 104 seats in the old Bundeslaender. To understand the past and present success as well as the difficulties the party has faced it is necessary to bring to mind some stations of the history of the PDS and to question its nature.

4.

The Historical Background

The SED leadership ( Socialist Unity Party, the East German Communist party) had lost contact with the realities of the GDR, especially since 1985. It had escaped to an “imaginary world”, the coherence of which was guaranteed by an omnipresent repressive apparatus. Authoritarianism, centralism, and the heavy bureaucratic structures of the East German system as well as the SED proved to be globally destabilizing factors. They made it impossible to master the economic, social, cultural, and ecologic challenges and later on the general crisis at every societal and economic level. The crisis of the system was accelerated by the SED leadership’s opposition to Mikhail Gorbatchev’s policy of “transparency.” GDR citizens fled to Hungary. The summer of 1989 brought about a wave of demonstrations whose size multiplied weekly. They were the expression of a deeply distressed society without much prospects for the future. Erich Honecker’s dogmatic blindness finally made most of his faithful followers of the politbureau revolt. Honecker’s successor and protégé, Egon Krenz, was a reputedly extreme orthodox and conservative member of the inner circle. After his acclamation of the Tien An Men massacre Krenz could convince neither the population nor other SED members of the honesty of his asserted will to change the political and intellectual course as proclaimed by the “new” leadership of the party. Egon Krenz collided with his competitor Hans Modrow. The latter was actively supported by Markus Wolf, the grey eminence of the East German espionage, and was trusted by the CPSU politburo. Modrow had assembled an oppositional wing which was to be the future elite and the leadership of the party for the next 15 years. After the fall of the Berlin Wall Modrow became the head of government and tried to stabilize the SED organizationally and to rebuild the credibility of the party in the GDR.

44

Patrick Moreau

In February 1990 the SED changed its name to Party of Democratic Socialism ( Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus – PDS ), with a double purpose : to reform Socialism and to save the SED - State. The new leadership called on the party to subject to constructive criticism of its organizational practices as well as the theoretical foundations of Stalinist inheritance. In reality, this approach clouded and camouflaged a totally different strategy. The main interest of the SED - PDS was to hold and maintain political power as long as possible. The reforms evoked by the Modrow government were not intended as steps toward the establishment of a true democracy but as a means to stabilize the old structures. The SED - PDS had chosen a new name for the party, criminalized its former leadership, and publicly accepted its historical responsibility for the failure of the construction of Socialism. However, these were not the first steps towards a profound renewal of the party but rather a sign of its enforced adaptation to an ever more hostile political and social collective environment. Hans Modrow intended to save the “Stasi” ( short for State Security ) – the political police – by transforming it into a structure charged with the “protection” of the state and its constitution. The credibility of the “efforts” to reform the SED - PDS had already been low, but this attempt completely destroyed it. The population as well as the basis of the party multiplied their appeals to the SED - PDS to dissolve and disband. Wolfgang Berghofer was the mayor of Dresden and another central figure of the reform wing of the SED. In the face of his spectacular resignation from the leadership of the party, the disappearance of the “platforms” in favour of a thorough and systematic reform, the resignation of several hundred thousand members, the collapse or paralysis of the majority of organizations at county and enterprise levels as well as of complete district organizations, the SED - PDS seemed hopelessly doomed during the first weeks of 1990. Hans Modrow changed his policy : He dissolved the Office for National Security ( Amt für Nationale Sicherheit ), heir to the Stasi, and opened the new coalition government to democratic formations. At the same time there was a rising collective uneasiness in the face of the foreseeable risks and cost of the presumable reunification. Thus Modrow could win some popularity, and by February 1990 the PDS had successfully stopped its decline. In March 1990 the PDS stabilized its organization (285 000 members ) and achieved good results in the elections (16.3 percent of the vote ). After this ballot the party entered the opposition. It concentrated its political propaganda around the topics of resistance to “the colonization” and the “Anschluss” of the GDR to the FRG, as well as the necessary preservation of an East German institutional and cultural heritage within the soon to be re - united German state. From the spring of 1990 onwards the PDS began to prepare its expansion to the West with the former reformers of the West German Communist party (DKP – Deutsche Kommunistische Partei – German Communist Party ). It initiated a quasi permanent electoral campaign, thus being able to obliterate to its adher-

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

45

ents its ideological deficits and organizational decline ( Members 1991 : 172,579; 1992 : 146,792; 1993 : 131,406).

5.

Organizational and Strategic Benchmarks

The first aspect we need to consider is the modernization of the organization and – through this – of the political strategy of the PDS since 1991. Since then this structure, especially its leadership and functionaries, thinks and acts like a modernized Communist party comparable to the Western European type. To ensure its survival, the PDS learned and imitated theories and techniques of adaptation and camouflage from the Communist parties in Italy and especially in France. The founders, leaders, and theoreticians of the PDS, i. e., Hans Modrow, Gregor Gysi, and André Brie, had understood as early as 1990 that an attempt to reconstruct the “classical” Marxist - Leninist vanguard party would not have any future in a reunited Germany. The programmatic and organizational concepts of the party prove this. Therefore, it was imperative to modernize methods and to use the disguise of a “Socialist grass roots party.” The prize for the survival of the PDS was a pragmatic ideology, structural reforms, and the downsizing of its apparatus. From December 1989 until the end of 1991 the PDS drastically cut down its apparatus from 14,000 functionaries in February 1990 to about 250 today at the party headquarters. They also had to separate from cadres too discredited and compromised as collaborators of the old regime. Democratic centralism was substituted by the subtle “dictatorship” of an enlarged party leadership. Until 2002 the acceptance of this centre of power was insured within the PDS by the popularity of Hans Modrow among the most conservative members and of Gregor Gysi as the key figure of the reform wing. They were the only two unifying figures of the party. A new PDS - elite formed around the troika of Gysi, Modrow, Brie – the latter being the grey eminence of the PDS. They were generally young members and activists. Most of them had been SED cadres of lower and medium rank until 1990. They assumed control of the specialized reform structures : The working committees at the party executive ( Arbeitsgemeinschaften beim Parteivorstand – AG ). According to a motion of the party executive of February 16, 1991, the political activities of the PDS and particularly of the AGs were to concentrate on existing or potential conflicts within the German society in order to organize parliamentary or extra - parliamentary “resistance.” The main strategic perspectives of these AGs were the implementation of the PDS in the West, its reinforcement in the East, the dialogue with left - wing forces in Germany and, most importantly, anti - capitalist action. In 2006/07 most of these AGs still exist. They have successfully engrained the party among the population of the new Laender, but also within the trade unions, protestant Churches, and pacifist and

46

Patrick Moreau

progressive circles. However, due to the demographic decline of the party (2004: 61,693 members ) its role has been reduced.

6.

Ideologic and Programmatic Benchmarks

The organizational reforms are accompanied by a reflection of the program. The program of 1993 remained unchanged for almost 10 years. It substituted the ideological monolithism of the past with often contradictory positions on the environment, women’s rights, the market economy and its principles of regulation, the importance of the new social movements, etc. This program was conceived as a weapon to criticize the West German political system. But it played hardly any role at all in the party’s growing strength until 2002. This does not imply that the PDS acted completely without any strategic and political framework. Until 2002 one theoretical aspect, inspired by Antonio Gramsci’s model, played a central role : The importance of the intellectuals in the process of subversion of the “civil society.” In May 1990 the PDS decided to become a competitor to the SPD and the Green Party within the political system of the Germany that was to be reunited. As a Marxist party as well as a Socialist opposition force it had to find an answer to the strategic question par excellence, namely of “revolution” and “reform.” At this point we find the Gramscian reference. Its specific place and growing influence were the result of a reflection of 1990/1991 on the nature of Marxism. Since March 1990 the PDS knew it had to become an imminent party in the whole country. To survive, a strategy of adaptation was necessary. Gramsci offered a method and an eschatological vision. From this theoretical foundation the PDS took the state to be not just an apparatus of coercion and repression. Instead, due to the activity of the cultural powers, the state is held to profit from ideologic “hegemony” and from the belief of a majority of citizens in one Weltanschauung by which it is consolidated and legitimated. Consequently, the PDS needs a double perspective of action : head - on and open criticism of capitalism on the one hand, and a subversive and thematically split and manifold agenda aiming at civil society and the cultural consensus on the other. The organizational and theoretical principle was to focus on the weakest links in the chain of the social consensus, namely disadvantaged people ( unemployed persons, single mothers ) or sexual minorities, for example. According to the PDS’ analysis, capitalism had triumphed and will eliminate ( Cuba, North Korea ) or pervert ( China, Vietnam ) the last “Socialist” states. The immensity and suddenness of its triumph ought to give rise to a new situation and to a double - fold crisis in the long run : The first would hit the social - democratic left, but also the ecologists, forced to control capitalism and thus multiply the stabs in the back of their ideals. The second one would concern the organic intellectuals of the “liberal / conservative historical block” who would lack “en-

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

47

emies” – “the death of Communism” – but most of all attractive utopian projects. Capitalism and its administrative elites from the left ( Social Democrats ) as well as from the right ( Conservatives ) should have a hard time to digest their victory : Since global constraints will not diminish, new forms of protest will certainly emerge at the international level ( poor against rich countries, North against South ), as well as at the national one ( young against old, unemployed persons without rights against workers in permanent positions, polymorphous racism etc.). Furthermore, in the face of capitalist globalization, nationalism could intensify and, like in former Yugoslavia or in the former Soviet Empire, “mutate” to more aggressive forms, which in turn would be potentially destabilizing to the new world order. In this sense, the PDS saw its analyses confirmed in 2005. That year brought about the crisis of German social democracy and the rising strength and power of the anti - globalization movement which was represented, for example, by ATTAC ( Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens ). The PDS adopted elements of the analysis of ATTAC as well as of Toni Negri’s book Empire. Based on Gramscism crossbred with anti - globalization à la Negri, the PDS aims at identifying zones of conflict at every level of civil society. The party wants to circulate a specific message for every type of social or economic rupture and political tension. The key and gist is to oppose the social and intellectual consensus wherever possible. This static warfare is fought in the field of culture which is the control centre of ideas and values. It is not fought in that of economy, where the PDS has only very limited influence. Hence the role assigned to the intellectuals who make up about 30 percent of the PDS membership : Most of them are unemployed or retired and thus available as well as educated and trained for the production of ideology, even though they need to learn how to make use of new concepts. The PDS uses these “organic intellectuals” – not only those who have kept their ties with the party in the new Bundeslaender but also a very important group of sympathizing teachers at comprehensive and grammar schools – to live ( or rewrite ) history and politics. Not affiliated with the working class but with the party, this intellectual avantgarde has patiently pursued its political work. Thereby it has objectively fulfilled the “class function” of becoming the spokespersons of dissatisfied and disadvantaged people. In the name of the PDS – and from 2005 of the Linkspartei.PDS – these intellectuals are also charged with defending the identity and the culture of the people of the former GDR. The PDS cadre Klaus Höpke coined the phrase : “The PDS is not an ideology but an identity.” Here it unveils its full sense. But it is necessary to understand that the identity proposed by the PDS has been a virtual one, as its reconstruction was subject to the needs of the party’s propaganda. The elections of 1994, 1998, and 2005 show the success of this model which popularized post - Communist semantics with terms such as “second class citizens,” “occupation by the victors,” “victor’s justice,” “capitalist pillage,” “acculturation,” “contempt of biographies” and of the “accomplishments of the GDR.” Concurrently, for 10 years

48

Patrick Moreau

the PDS deliberately abstained from any systematic platform development. This decision was based upon an exact analysis by its innermost leading circle of the profound ideologic heterogeneity of the party. From 1994 on the PDS stabilized its organization and soundly implemented itself at elections in the new federal states. It turned into a typical post - Communist party accepting the idea of the definite triumph of capitalism over a historical form of Socialism. The party is also convinced that history can be rewritten and that it is necessary to lead an opposition in order to demolish market economy and the principle of profit by attiring the characteristics and symbols of a crusade to save humanity from mostly ecologic but also Fascist global perils. Since 1994 the PDS concentrates on the role of being an ideologic inspirer and organizational motor and takes up anew the classical Communist approach of penetrating and instrumentalizing “citizens’ initiatives,” “new social movements,” as well as collective anti - Fascism. At the same time the PDS embeds itself soundly within the trade union milieu, adheres to a selective practicing of social tension in the new Bundeslaender, and falls back on sometimes violent illegal actions bound to bring about a lot of public attention. Since 1996 the PDS has been able to use ideologic pressure “from the left” on the SPD, as well as to cause the political collapse of Bündnis’90/ Die Grünen (Green Party ) in the new Bundeslaender. The party then attempted to substitute the environmentalists as a coalition partner of the SPD. The toleration of the Social - Democratic government in Saxony - Anhalt since 1994 was the first step and a trial - balloon. The strategic crowning achievements were the SPD / PDS coalitions in Mecklenburg - Western Pomerania in 1998 and 2002 and in Berlin in 2001 and 2006. The defeat at the Bundestag elections in 2002 started the third phase : The party understood the necessity to modernize its program in view of the next federal elections planned for 2006. In the form of the rejection of neo- liberal anti - globalization anti - capitalism remained the central political and ideological reference point. This brought about advances towards other critical groups such as left - wing Social Democrats and ATTAC. Some of them accepted the offer and allied themselves with the PDS in the project Left Party.PDS ( Linkspartei.PDS ) in 2005.

7.

The Conditions of the Electoral Success of the PDS between 1993 and 2002

By way of entrism into most structures of the cultural life and of associations and clubs in the new federal states as well as by reactivating its old satellite structures the PDS was omnipresent. It knew how to efficiently exploit the fears and resentments of the East - German population, which were often well - founded. At the political level the crisis of confidence of the population of the former GDR as well as the crisis of the legitimacy of the democratic parties had grown since 1993 and reached an exceptional level in 2005. The reasons were evident: man-

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

49

ifold economic problems and a very high unemployment rate as well as individual and collective disorientation. In addition, the German political elites could not communicate the superiority of the democratic system to totalitarian principles. Furthermore, a majority of East Germans had the feeling that they were poorly or not at all represented with the “West German” democratic parties. In response to collective anxieties the PDS has led a permanent election campaign. This was combined with a systematic scientific approach ( for example with an analysis of PDS milieus and their declining homogeneity ). Thus, for a long time the party knew exactly where to concentrate men and means. Observers of the political life in the new federal states are often reminded of the infiltration of the “social and cultural social spheres” in the 1990s. Following a classical model of Communist parties, in this first phase the PDS managed to create true peripherals of organizations depending on, close to, or “friendly related” to it. Among these were tenants’ associations, groups of owners of real estate of legally unsettled status, teachers’ unions, and associations for the protection of former officers of the political police and the border troops. Today those organizations have weakened considerably, but the balance of their work should not be under - estimated. In general, the propaganda of the PDS on TV, in the radio, and on billboards has always been the task of West - German advertising agencies. Until about 2000 the work “on the spot,” however, was done by the “turbo retired persons” of the PDS, i. e. those roughly 70 percent of the members aged sixty or more being either on early retirement or unemployed. This remarkable grass - roots neighbourhood action functioned perfectly well : In 1994 and to a lesser degree in 1998 the correlation between the organizational density of the PDS on the spot and its electoral results was manifest and distinct. By 2002, however, things had changed. 7.1

The Macro - Political Context : The new Bundeslaender as a Biotope

The emotional situation of the voters in the new Bundeslaender has made the PDS one of the privileged electoral choices to this day. This can only be understood in a chronological frame. Since 1990 there had been a very rapid improvement in the fields of consumption, travel, and housing which was certainly realized by the population. But it was counterbalanced by the rapid deterioration of the job market. Since 1995/96 the tendency has been reversed : Satisfaction with the new lifestyle has been thwarted by a feeling of fear or diffuse anxiety touching almost every social sphere. The citizens in the new Bundeslaender have become more and more critical of the forms of democratic participation offered to them. The immense hopes of 1990 have apparently given way to disillusion and disappointment. There are two consequences : The process of lifting the states of the former GDR to the economic level of the former Federal Republic

50

Patrick Moreau

has failed. And individuals clearly do not identify with ( West ?) German values and the constitutional system. There is, however, no phenomenon of collective rejection. An autonomous “Eastern” identity has not developed, and one can speak of a mixed identity. Practically nobody wants to return to the political repression of the GDR. The population reacts negatively to a certain political and economic paternalism of the Western elites. In the same way the current economic changes are generally criticized. The argument that present problems have their roots in the past does not “sell” any longer. The current nostalgia for the GDR relates to social, economic, and cultural fields more than the political situation. It is not a process of extenuating the past but rather an attitude critical of both systems and centering around the notion of individual well - being. Past as well as present are neither rejected nor accepted as a whole. Finally, the inhabitants of the new Bundeslaender are no longer willing to accept a discourse where the defeat of the SED system conceded by almost everybody includes a more or less open negation of the work and economic efforts of the population before 1989. The arrogance of the Wessis – the inhabitants of the West – aggravates most Ossis – the inhabitants of the East. The PDS meticulously recognized all the strong elements of this malaise and presented itself as the defender of the population of the former GDR. Consequently, it enjoys a truly collective acceptance. The transformation of the image of the PDS in the West is a recent development. Even though anti - Communism remains predominant there, its image seems to have improved somewhat. The success of the PDS in the new Bundeslaender cannot be arithmetically reduced to GDR - inheritance. The PDS prospers in elections from the agglomeration of several groups of adherents, one of which is the former SED and its structures in their respective milieus. This group was essential until 2000, but its importance has declined rapidly since. In East Berlin, for example, since the first free elections of March 1990 the PDS has enjoyed a strong electoral surge. There, its traditional clientele are the beneficiaries of the former Communist regime supplemented by the administrative, intellectual, and police elites of the SED - state. Some figures : In East - Berlin the SED had 193,000 members in 1989. About 20,000 of them were SED - officials and 5,000 associated with the Central Committee. The Ministry of State Security employed about 45,000 people. The staff of the Academy of Sciences and Fine Arts and the Humboldt University amounted to about 10,000 employees. Between 1990 and 2001 the PDS averaged about 200,000 secure votes at elections. Methodologically, it can not be confirmed whether all these former state and Communist Party officials elected the PDS en bloc, nor whether the party gained new voters. However, the available polls show the PDS to have maintained its moral and intellectual predominance on a vast majority of former cadres of the SED and the various “organs” as well as on the pillars of the intellectual and artistic life of the former regime. This PDS clientele did not only loose their post, but also their social status, and can be

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

51

characterized as the “losers of the reunification.” The nature of a milieu party is most clearly visible in Berlin as well as in former centres of district administration, such as Rostock or Magdeburg. This PDS milieu understands itself as a “group showing solidarity,” or a “community by destiny.” A strong nostalgia for the GDR is prevalent within this solidarity network which is invigorated by militant anti - occidental and anti - West German sentiments. In addition to those naturally favourable milieus, by exploiting the legitimate interests of the East - German population, the PDS has evidently managed to attract the protest vote of a certain group of people who had turned away from the party at the regional and federal elections in 1990. Generally, PDS voters who were won over in 1994 and who stabilized their party preference in 1998 and 2002 are clearly in favour of an authoritarian and ideologic Socialism. They also share a very negative outlook on the present and future economic situation. The PDS communicates with them by a “culture of rejection” of West German values and the democratic system. The only share of the East German population to criticize or reject the liberal democratic fundamental order and the reunification are members and adherents of the PDS. Finally, according to polls, members of the PDS felt “freer than today” during the SED - dictatorship. Examples by the score are revealing of responsiveness and susceptibility to the PDS. In one word, one could speak of the “interior exile” of a high number of PDS - members and voters. But the PDS milieus have weakened, most of all due to demographic reasons, but also due to mobility within the cities. For example, the destruction of the prefabricated high - rise quarters built by the GDR destroys the PDS network and breaks post - Communist solidarity. Finally, the children of the former SED officials and servants show different political behaviour : In 2002 most of them voted for democratic competitors and – a very small fringe of them – turned to right - wing extremists. 7.2

The defeat of the PDS at the 2002 Bundestag elections

With only 4 percent of the vote, the PDS had been the great loser of the 2002 Bundestag elections.11 The reasons for this defeat can be found mainly at five levels : the crisis of the leadership, the effect of the situation ( the great inundation in several new Bundeslaender ), limited competence in certain issues, the lack of a foothold in the West, and image problems. The voluntary resignation from his position as a Berlin Senator and the partial retreat from politics of the great communicator, Gregor Gysi, precipitated a severe crisis of the party. In addition, Lothar Bisky was replaced as the chairman of the party. His successor, Gabriele Zimmer, was an apparatchik without charisma. She was neither a decent speaker nor intellectually strong, let alone inspiring. Her nickname within the party makes this clear : “Zonen - Gabi” – 11

Cf. Infratest dimap, Wahl zum 15. Deutschen Bundestag – 22. September 2002, Berlin 2002.

52

Patrick Moreau

“Zone” was the Soviet zone of occupation from 1945–1949. If somebody is called a Zonen - person, he or she is deemed uninspired, slow on the uptake, churlish, and a provincial yokel. The PDS had to pay a heavy toll for these peripheries. According to polls, its attraction diminished severely. In 1998 21 percent of its members were convinced that the party was lead by very eminent politicians. In 2002 the rate fell to 12 percent The party executive board – the chairwoman Gabriele Zimmer, the head of the parliamentary group in the Bundestag, Roland Claus, and the chief administrator of the party, Dietmar Bartsch, were seen as competitors more interested in their personal future than in the progress of the party.12 The deterioration was extremely perceptible in the new Bundeslaender : In 1998 45 percent of interviewees believed the party to be lead by politicians possessing exceptional qualities. By 2002 less than a third of interviewees (31 percent ) still thought so. Members and adherents of the PDS were also hit by this malaise : 58 percent in 2002 against 89 percent in 1998. Germany – and especially the state of Saxony – suffered from catastrophic inundations in 2002. This permitted the SPD and chancellor Gerhard Schröder to demonstrate their crisis - management and mediating skills. But the floods also brought East and West Germans closer through impressive acts of mutual solidarity. The PDS, having always profited from inner - German resentment, was weakened electorally, and because it did not participate in the outreach its image suffered as well. The PDS had reposed too long on its accomplishments of old. In the East as well as in the West a strong majority of interviewees – 62 percent and 72 percent respectively – regarded the party as representative of East German interests. It had thus become one - dimensional. It was judged as lacking any competence in fields of equal importance such as unemployment or getting the economy going again. In 2002 the PDS electorate was essentially mobilized by the topic of “social justice” (61 percent ). Employment policy (28 percent ), foreign policy (21 percent ), and education (19 percent ) ranged very far behind. Without the only person capable of communicating with the voters in the old Bundeslaender, i. e. Gregor Gysi, the party received only 1.1 percent of the vote in the West and remained at its low level of 1998. For the first time since 1990 the PDS lost votes at a national election. In 1998 it had received 2,515,454 votes (2,054,773 in the East and 460,681 in the West ). In 2002 it ended up with a total of 1,916,702 (1,474,566 in the East and 442,136 in the West ). It had lost a total of 1.1 percent, 0.1 percent in the West and 4.7 percent in the East. The PDS lost 599,000 votes. 229,000 went to the social - democrats. Due to its weak capacity of mobilization, the party lost 260,000 votes to the abstaining camp. The social - demography of the PDS - electorate in 2002 reflected the massive electoral transfers. It lost heavily amongst 18–24 year olds in the East ( - 6 points) 12 For a detailed analysis of the mechanism of the crisis from 1998–2002, see Moreau / Schorpp - Grabiak, Man muss so radikal sein.

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

53

and even more markedly among those with A level or higher education (2002 : 21 percent; 1998 : 29 percent ). Until 1998 the PDS had been the party of employees and civil servants. In 2002 it lost 8 and respectively 9 points amongst these professional groups. Finally, the “neo - liberal” treatment of the socio - economic crisis in Berlin, where the PDS has been associated with power in a coalition government, created a political image problem : It has become increasingly difficult for the party to make the voters understand the contradiction between its Marxist and planned economy program and its neo - capitalist action in the capital. 7.3

The PDS : Searching for Electoral and Organizational Stability

For ten years the PDS had to face a number of organizational constraints which impeded its capacity for political action. First, the number of party members declined. Membership collapsed from 1,463,762 in December 1989 to 280,882 in December 1990. From 1992 on the haemorrhage was stopped. Still, between 1991 and the end of 2000 the PDS lost half of its members, and this development continued between 2000 and 2004. To make matters even more complicated, every attempt towards a breakthrough in the West had remained futile. In spite of all the party’s efforts, the tiny membership of 600 people in 1990 had not risen above 4,000 in 2004. Not only had the PDS completely failed in the West, but new actors had entered into the competition : ATTAC Germany, for example, recruited 12,000 young members in just two years and by 2005 had made it to the top of the anti - capitalist protest forces. The PDS had to face more serious problems which had not been solved until 2004 : The worst one was its demography. The average age of its members had permanently risen since 1990. By 2000 only 0.6 percent of the PDS members were less than 30 years old, while 49.6 percent were over 70. From this point of view the party seems to be in agony. Translated into professional groups, the PDS is a party of retired persons (77 percent ). Only 13 percent of its members are economically active, most of them being teachers, civil servants, public employees, and self - employed persons. Based on these demographic figures, it is evident that within the next five years the party will be threatened by the loss of half of its present membership. The side effects would be very serious : Most of its glacis of friendly organizations of the 1990s have disappeared by now. Due to this demographic pressure, the PDS is no longer present in the every day life of the new Bundeslaender. Even in many towns in the East there is not one single member of the PDS. Still, at the last elections the party achieved results of over 20 percent there. Looking at it this way, the biological argument assuming the semi - mechanical disappearance of the PDS looses its credibility. The party can evidently make electoral progress in “white areas.”

54 Table 3 : Year

Patrick Moreau

Development of the membership of the PDS / Left Party.PDS 1991

East

Year

1994

1995

1996

130 463 121848 112 953 102 976

1997

1998

1999

96 395

91530

84 641

1943

2 074

2 917

3 773

172 579 131406 123 751 114 940 105 029

98 624

94 627

88 594

West Total

1992 891

1871

1905

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

East

79 349

73 483

65 883

61191

56 907

55 265

52 917

West

3 959

4172

4 708

4 378

4 320

6 057

7 257

Total

83 478

77 845

70 805

65 753

61 385

61489

60 174

Various other aspects ought to be analyzed here : For example, the decline of the AGs ( working committees ), the failure of the party’s youth organization SOLID, etc. The consequences of failing to reach the 5 - percent - barrier had dramatic consequences because the Bundestag group of the PDS had become the organizational heart of the party between 1998 and 2002. The permanent staff members of the MPs and the parliamentary staff of the group, the working groups, and the associated experts had turned into the party’s intellectual ( and programmatic ) task force. With only two members of parliament left in 2002, this elite dissolved. The working circles disappeared, and the expert capacities were reduced due to a lack of funding. Worse still, the PDS was no longer attractive for those who considered a possible political career. Apart from the disappearance of the financing of the parliamentary group, the financial crisis of the PDS was deepened by a drop in membership, stagnating donations, and a much lower legal reimbursement by the state of the cost of the election campaign. Therefore, in 2003 the PDS faced with a reduced apparatus and more limited campaign capacities. Finally, and this is an important point, the press was no longer interested in the party and found Gregor Gysi’s heart problems more fascinating than the new party program. However, the PDS still possessed some assets and started to search for means to compensate the effects of the 2002 defeat. The most important assets are the groups of members of the state parliaments in the new Bundeslaender with their regional apparatus. The Rosa Luxemburg - Foundation kept its state subsidies and managed to enroot itself in every federal state. Some of the research and theoretical reflection of the PDS was able to take refuge there. Thus, this structure became a centre of theory and research of good quality. Finally, the party remained deeply enrooted at the local level in the East. Within the party several steps led to consolidation. First, there was the (friendly ) elimination of Gabriele Zimmer and the Communist wing from party leadership. Zimmer had been re - elected at the party convention in Gera. Her new chief administrator was Uwe Hiksch, a Bavarian close to the Communist

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

55

Platform. The new vice chairman, Diether Dehm, was also well known for his sympathy for the extremists. The reformers had been largely eliminated from this new party leadership. They were satisfied to realize the inability of the new party executive to handle the crisis of the party sinking into an organizational chaos. The reformers had toyed with the idea of founding a new party, but finally organized themselves and enforced an extraordinary convention in Berlin in June 2003.13 Lothar Bisky returned to the chairman’s seat. At the same time the leadership was completely cleansed of fundamentalists, with the exception of Sarah Wagenknecht, representative, figurehead, and quasi - religious icon of the Communist Platform. Bisky solidly took back the reigns of the party, reorganizing its finances and evading all ideological conflicts with its left - wing. In spite of his not having any charisma, the new ( and old ) chairman succeeded in reorganizing his troops and reforming the organization. Furthermore, even if largely unnoticed, the PDS adopted a new program in October 2003.14 It was the result of long reflections of the reformers modernizing programmatic positions and attempting to account for contemporary developments like globalization, the state of the world in 2002, etc. One of the concerns of the authors was for the party to avoid the reproach of extremism, but their efforts were to no avail.15 On the “Super Election Sunday” the PDS won a series of successes. Structurally, the political three party system dominating the east since 1990 was challenged at these elections. The Greens and the Liberals at the regional and local level – and the extreme right at the local level – turned into important political actors, and they remained so until the Bundestag elections in September 2005. The European elections on June 13, 2004, were characterized by massive abstention (57 percent ). The conservative parties ( CDU / CSU ) were the winners with 44.5 percent of the vote, even though they lost 4.2 percent in comparison to 1999.16 The SPD suffered a historical defeat, dropping to 21.5 percent ( - 9.2 points ).17 The small groupings were the true winners. They gained 4.5 points and brushed by the 10 - percent - barrier. The PDS received 1,579,693 votes, totalling 6.1 percent. This was a progress of 0.3 points compared to 1999. In the East it won 1,234,551 votes or 25.2 percent and a plus of 2.2 points. However, 13 14 15 16

17

Cf. http ://sozialisten.de / partei / parteitag /08at2/ index.htm. Cf. http ://sozialisten.de / partei / grundsatzdokumente / programm / index.htm. Lang, Ist die PDS eine demokratische Partei ? Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Wahlanalyse Europawahl 2004 : Debakel für die SPD – Unzufriedenheit mit Bundesregierung prägt Wahlentscheidung. In : http ://www.forschungsgruppewahlen.de / Aktuelles / PM_Europa /; Infratest dimap, Analyse der Europawahl und Thüringenwahl. Zwei Wahlen ein Verlierer. In : http ://www.infratestdimap.de / wahlen / europa04/ Infratest_Analyse.pdf; Konrad - Adenauer - Stiftung, Wesentliche Bestimmungsgründe des Wahlergebnisses der Europawahl in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 13. Juni 2004 – Motive der Wahlentscheidung und Politische Stimmung im Vorfeld der Europawahl, processed by Viola Neu, 2004. In : http ://www.kas.de / publikationen /2004/4821_dokument.html. Cf. SPD - Parteivorstand, Europawahl 2004.

56

Patrick Moreau

Table 4.1 : Socio - demographic structure of the electorate ( European Election 2004, diverse Landtag elections 2004) ABL : “old” Bundeslaender NBL : “new” Bundeslaender EU : European elections

SA : TH : BR :

PDS EU 2004 Results

Saxony Thuringia Brandenburg PDS TH

EVO : Change

PDS SA

PDS BR

EVO ABL NBL EVO EVO EVO 2004 2004 2004 ‘99 ‘04 ‘04 ‘99 ‘99 ‘99

6.1 + 0.3

1.7 25.2 26.1 + 4.8 23.6 + 1.4 28.0 + 4.7

6

-0

2

24

26

+5

23

-1

29

+5

6

+1

1

27

26

+5

24

+3

27

+4

6

-0

3

18

21

+2

17

-2

25

+6

25-34

5

-1

2

18

21

-2

18

-2

25

+5

35-44

6

-1

2

21

25

+4

21

0

27

+4

45-59

7

+1

2

27

27

+3

26

+1

31

+5

6

+1

1

30

29

+8

26

+4

29

+3

5

-1

3

15

18

+3

14

-3

23

+7

25-34

4

-1

2

13

16

-6

16

-2

23

+6

35-44

6

-1

3

20

23

+5

19

-2

26

+5

45-59

7

+1

2

29

28

+5

26

-0

31

+8

6

-0

1

28

31

+8

27

+0

32

-1

Sex Male Female Age in years (all interviewees) 18-24

60 or over Age in years (males) 18-24

60 or over Age in years (females) 18-24

7

+0

3

21

26

+4

20

+1

26

+3

25-34

5

-1

1

22

26

+3

21

-1

26

+5

35-44

5

-2

1

22

27

+4

24

+2

28

+2

45-59

7

+1

2

25

25

+1

26

+2

30

+2

60 or over

7

+2

1

32

26

+8

26

+6

25

+6

57

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

Table 4.2 : Socio - demographic structure of the electorate ( European Election 2004, diverse Landtag elections 2004) PDS PDS PDS PDS EU TH SA BR 200 EVO ABL NBL 200 EVO 200 EVO 200 EVO 4 ‘99 ‘04 ‘04 4 ‘99 4 ‘99 4 ‘99 Education High

7

-2

2

29

29

+3

26

-5

29

-4

Medium

6

+1

2

23

23

+2

21

+2

29

+9

Low

5

+2

1

23

26

+9

25

+8

25

+9

Worker

8

2

2

22

26

+5

18

-1

30

+ 11

Employee

5

-2

2

21

25

+2

23

-1

24

-1

Civil sevant Self employed, liberal professions Farmers

4

0

2

19

12

-1

17

-6

16

- 13

3

-2

1

17

13

-3

11

-5

18

+0

5

-2

0

33

7

1

1

31

29

+8

28

+5

31

+5

6

0

3

20

23

+4

22

+2

27

+7

16

2

6

30

36

+8

28

-1

36

+ 11

Yes

9

0

3

34

30

+3

34

+4

29

+1

No

6

1

2

24

25

+5

22

+1

28

+5

Protestant

3

1

1

13

17

+6

11

+2

17

+8

Catholic

1

0

1

13

13

+6

13

+4

11

-0

18

-1

6

13

35

+3

31

-0

33

+2

Present profession

Retired persons Apprentice / pupil / student Unemployed / seeking work Union Member

Religion

Undenominational Source : Infratest - Dimap

the party lost ground where it was affiliated with governmental power, for example in Berlin (14.4 percent, –2.4) and in Mecklenburg - Western Pomerania (21.7 percent, –2.6). In the West it received 345,142 votes and 1.7 percent, a gain of 0.4 percent. The results in the West were important for the future of the party. For the first time it had passed the 2 - percent - barrier in a number of the old federal states ( Hamburg 2.8 percent; Bremen 3.7 percent; Hesse 2.1 percent; Saarland 2 percent ). Only Bavaria resisted (0.9 percent ). The PDS executive made a medium-

58

Patrick Moreau

term analysis : If the party could maintain this percentage by 2006, it would in all likelihood pass the 5 - percent - barrier at the national level. But this could only happen in a very precise context. The PDS had to achieve a break - through into traditional social - democratic milieus. The search for semantic tools and new allies was absolutely necessary. The analysis of the electoral transfers between 2002 and 2004 shows the reasons for the success of the PDS. Its gains depended on the net afflux of 240,000 former SPD votes. Looking at the age of voters, the 2002 social - demography of the PDS remains very similar to that of 1999. Yet there are important changes in the field of socio - professional categories. The PDS looses among people with an “A level or higher education.” But it compensates these losses in other categories, achieving the best results amongst retired and unemployed people. Overrepresentation in the “non - denominational” category reflects de - Christianization during 40 years of Communism. The PDS break - through in the West was only possible because of the weakening of the SPD. The latter party was in a truly difficult political and electoral situation. Between 2002 and 2004 the Social Democrats had lost ground at every single election. Their most serious losses happened in their traditional electoral strongholds which had formerly been characterized by the triad of workers / strong unions / heavy industry. In 2004 the voters judged the election to be not a European but a national issue. Their disgruntlement had been indicated by ever more negative polls and was translated into a vote of retribution. The SPD and its chancellor Gerhard Schröder were reproached because of their lack of economic solutions, especially in regards to high unemployment. The ongoing reforms of the social system ( retirement, social security ) were regarded as unfair and unjust, and advantageous only for the rich. The vague propositions by the conservatives were not perceived as an efficient alternative for the future. This tempted the electorate to give their vote to somebody else. Thus, the PDS could harvest the fruit of its anti - capitalist agitation and of its criticism of the liberal governing of Germany by the SPD. Still, in 2004 the transfers from the SPD to the PDS remained limited to a small segment of the left - wing of the SPD and to critical unionists. However, this tendency was much stronger in the new federal states. There the SPD approached the “low water mark” of 10 percent. The PDS also attained good results at the 2004 local elections. All elections suffered from decreasing and generally very low participation, which is an undeniable sign of the malaise of the voters. Thus, at the local election in the state of Saxony the governing conservatives shrank from 44.5 percent in 1999 to 38.4 percent at the state level. The SPD, too, suffered severe losses : from 18.7 percent in 1999 to 13.6 percent in 2004. The analysis of electoral transfers shows that the democratic parties essentially lost voters to the abstentionist camp, while the PDS mostly attracted the SPD voters of 1999. This success of the PDS at the municipal level depended on the concurrence of several important aspects : The decline of the SPD – and the transfer of social democratic voters to the PDS – as well as the will of the electorate to teach the party which

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

59

held regional power a lesson. But the voters’ decision for the PDS depended on two additional elements : a protest campaign which also furthered the advances of the extreme right and a positive image at the local level. In 2004 about 6,000 local councilmen in Germany provided the PDS in the new federal states with the image of a competent party at this level. Their municipal propositions were much elaborated18, and their solidly embedded working structures united cadres and recognized experts.19 The PDS campaigns in Saxony or Thuringia emphasized the solidity of the local administration or joint administration at the municipal level, often in complete agreement with the other elected parties. At the 2004 elections the PDS campaigned with the slogans “reinforce protest” and “enough !” which had been coined by Sarah Wagenknecht, the “muse” of the PDS Communist Platform. Political observers characterized this populist campaign as “the wages of fear.”20 In fact, contrary to 2002 the PDS managed to relate to the collective mood in the new federal states again. Looking at the years between 1998 and 2001, the stability of collective moods is astonishing : an almost perfect balance between frustration and satisfaction. The situation begins to deteriorate in 2002 with the appearance of a collective pessimism and a growing distrust of institutions. From 2002 to 2003 the appreciation of the situation in the new federal states worsens continually and rapidly. More and more, interviewees regarded their personal economic situation to be threatened and deteriorating. Consequently, the 2004 success of the PDS is partially due to rising economic pessimism. In 2003 the dissatisfaction of interviewees was especially strong in the following key issues : social justice – 71 percent dissatisfied, economic situation – 79 percent, relationship between revenues and prizes – 71 percent.21 Three more aspects played an important role with the formation of a protest potential to be exploited by the PDS. This also holds true for the Bundestag elections of 2005, with regards to personal political influence, the state of democracy, and social security. The only categories still considered satisfying were housing, family, and recreation. For most interviewees the future seems to be bleak and characterized by the fear of deterioration in many fields : social security, employment, salary, and personal security. The comparison with 2001 is striking : the deterioration has been somewhat complete.22 18 Cf. http ://sozialisten.de / politik / kommunal / index.htm; Kommunalpolitische Leitlinien – Entwurf. In : http :// sozialisten.de / politik / kommunal / entwurf_leitlinien / index.htm. 19 For example : Kommunalpolitische Konferenz West – 8. und 9. November 2003 in Offenbach am Main; “Gelungener Auftakt einer kommunalpolitischen Verständigung. Bericht von der Kommunalpolitischen Konferenz West der PDS in Offenbach.” In : http:// sozialisten.de / politik / kommunal / texte_allgemein / view _html ?zid=17765&bs=1&n=6; See also “Für starke Kommunen in einem sozialen, demokratischen und friedlichen Europa. Sömmerdaer Erklärung der Bundeskommunalkonferenz der PDS vom 14. bis 16. Mai 2004”. In : http ://sozialisten.de / politik / kommunal / texte_allgemein / view_ html ?zid=19851&bs=1&n=2. 20 “Lohn der Angst”. In: Der Spiegel, no. 26, 21 June 2004. 21 Source : sfz / leben 2003 ( gew.). 22 Cf. sfz / leben 2001 and 2002.

60

Patrick Moreau

This negative development naturally shows in the opinion on German unity in 2003 and 2005. Only 36 percent see an improvement, while 30 percent speak of a mixture of gains and losses. The group of “losers” has grown massively since 2001. The PDS achieved its electoral break - through with this potential of unsatisfied people. But it also used different motives to convince groups of voters. In the new Bundeslaender German unity is evidently realized only imperfectly and its fulfilment is postponed into a more or less distant future. The number of East Germans who regard themselves as full citizens has dropped by 5 points to a meager 20 percent since 2001. At the same time the number of those who “want the GDR back” has risen from 6 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2003.23 Table 5 :

Development of living conditions 1998–2003 – new Bundeslaender ( in percent ) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Satisfaction with living conditions very satisfied / satisfied

56

59

58

56

47

40

dissatisfied / very dissatisfied

10

7

8

10

12

18

mostly hopes

22

28

31

27

12

6

mostly fears

21

17

14

19

25

41

very good / good

40

47

47

41

36

30

bad / very bad

16

10

13

16

22

30

yes

35

38

36

32

25

23

partly

40

41

43

43

43

39

no

24

21

21

25

32

36

mostly gains

34

43

41

38

35

35

mostly losses

23

15

17

20

25

30

Future expectations

Appreciation of the personal situation

Possibility to fulfil ones needs

German unity

Source : sfz / leben 2004, p. 28.

It was a completely rational political decision of the PDS to make the questions of justice and social security the key issues of its 2003 program and of its election campaigns in 2004 and 2005. According to the polls, they were the most important topics (70 percent, 69 percent ). Equality, the touchstone of the Communist message, was deemed to be of much less importance. The fact that the PDS was capable of winning new voters using the topic of social security is 23 Cf. Sozialreport; database : sfz / leben 1997–2003 ( gew.).

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

61

also partly an inheritance of the past. The electorate in the new Bundeslaender no longer believed in the ability of the governing coalition ( Green Party and SPD ) or its competitors to change things for the better in the future. In this context of general pessimism, the question remains whether the East Germans live in “interior exile.” This is certainly the case for a number of the older members of the PDS. The high number of abstentionists could act as an indicator for this situation. But this is not so : The 2003 polls showed a growing interest in politics : 42 percent against 27 percent in 1997, with only 17 percent showing little or very little interest – compared to 39 percent in 1997.24 Thus, it seems the high level of abstention in 2004 was due to the fact that the voters did not recognize themselves in the competing parties. Also the preference of small groupings points to these findings. The long range survey shows the interviewees’ dissatisfaction with democracy : The figures of 2003 – 47 percent dissatisfied or very dissatisfied – recall those of 1990 : 46 percent !25 The national institutions – government and Bundestag – suffer from this climate. The regional governments, however, are judged and appreciated more positively. Police, courts, and local administrations are also seen in a better light. This shows that the growing distance from central structures does not imply the rejection of the present model of administration. Obviously, the new federal states are not in a “pre - revolutionary” situation.

8.

The Bundestag Elections of September 18, 2005 and the Break - Through of the Linkspartei.PDS

In the fall of 2004 the PDS executive took stock. At the Bundestag elections scheduled for 2006 the PDS stood chances to retain its electoral level of 2004, provided it managed to adhere to the present East German identity and exploit the potential dissatisfaction discernible at every level. It could rely on its political roots. It depended on a contract between the PDS and its voters : The party plainly plays its role as a representative and advocate of a group of voters and in return “cashes in” on a wide political acceptance and a stable electoral preference of about 25 percent in the new Bundeslaender. Apart from its defeat in the West, this picture was only adumbrated by the participation of the PDS in coalition governments in Mecklenburg - Western Pomerania and Berlin. There, a certain disgruntlement was noticeable and the PDS lost ground in the polls. Even though the possibility of passing the 5 - percent - barrier in 2006 became more probable, the PDS knew that at the national level it was balancing on knife’s edge.26 New threats appeared : In the West the left - wing of the SPD became more and more likely to split, partly or completely, into a new left party 24 Source : sfz / leben 2003 ( gew.). 25 Source : sfz / leben 2003 ( gew.). 26 About the strategy of the PDS for 2006, see “Thesen zur strategischen Weiterentwicklung der PDS”, internal document, 22 June 2004.

62

Patrick Moreau

such as the “USPD.” This party would presumably organize itself around unionists who had been expelled in 2004 or were threatened by expulsion from the SPD and personalities such as Oskar Lafontaine, former SPD chairman, and member of ATTAC who was ferociously opposed to the neo - liberal course of Chancellor Schröder. It could attract dissatisfied SPD adherents with strong Socialist and anti - capitalist convictions and thus take the votes necessary to surpass the 5 - percent - barrier away from the PDS. Structurally, additional competitors reinforced themselves. On the one hand, the extreme right attempted to unify, on the other, the anti - globalization movement with actors such as ATTAC gained ground with the youth and threatened to attract some of the youngest people. The disinclination to turn into a political party was credible looking at ATTAC France. But to the PDS it was not necessarily reassuring. Since 2001 ATTAC and its alterglobalist periphery have severely criticised and denounced the ideologic and organizational blocks of parties of the democratic left and the PDS. They tend to favour electoral abstention amongst their adherents. Finally, the PDS could but watch the conservative camp grow stronger. They won all the regional elections, even though the quality of the programmatic offer of the CDU / CSU – i. e. their plans for governing after 2006 – was weak. It was imperative for the PDS to find a new strategy. The success of the Linkspartei.PDS at the Bundestag elections of September 2005 was born in the West. Since 2000 Chancellor Schröder’s policy of “neo liberal” reform had caused growing discontentment among the left - wing of the SPD and within the DGB trade union congress. The “Hartz IV” reform, massively reducing the support of unemployed people, was taken to be true treason of the ideals of left - wing Social Democrats. In response, not only trade unionists and members of the SPD but also former members of the PDS ( coming from the Marxist wing chased from the leadership of the party in 2002), and Trotskyites decide to create two initially competing structures : on the one hand, the Initiative “Work and Social Justice” (Initiative “Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit”), whose member Klaus Ernst, a wellknown trade unionist, rapidly attracted numerous unionists critical of the SPD; on the other the Berlin - based “Electoral Alternative 2006” ( Initiative “Wahlalternative 2006” ) which wanted to be the “new opposition” to the “antisocial” politics of the SPD - PDS coalition government of the state of Berlin. This group attracted followers of Lafontaine, members or former members of the PDS, unionists, people close to ATTAC, and activists of the extreme left. Very soon it became clear to both groups that their only chance was a political alliance. By July 2004 the “Electoral Alternative Work & Social Justice” ( “Wahlalternative Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit” – WASG ) had been founded. Its goal was to participate in the state elections in North Rhine - Westphalia and in medium term in the Bundestag elections in 2006. On May 22, 2005, the WASG achieved an honourable result (181,988 votes, 2.2 percent, no members of state parliament ). This campaign was led without the support of Oskar Lafontaine who had cautiously remained in the back-

63

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

Table 6 :

Membership of the Left Party.PDS and the WASG in the East PDS WASG WASG WASG Linke.PDS WASG Linke.PDS December 31. 05. 30. 06. 30. 09. December April December 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006

Brandenburg

10 428

79

104

168

9 937

194

9 710

7110

63

78

118

6 740

134

6 423

Meckl.-W. Pom. SaxonyAnhalt Saxony

6 434

78

98

137

6 514

154

6 420

15 280

143

176

252

14 873

267

14 066

Thuringia

8 232

36

51

116

7 676

141

7 387

Berlin

9 423

300

476

703

9 525

852

8 911

Direct membership at party executive Abroad

158

Total East

56 907

Total West

4 320

Total

61 385

167

* incl. * incl. Berlin Berlin 679 983 * excl. * excl. Berlin Berlin 5 000 6 276 5 795

* incl. Berlin 1494 * excl. Berlin 8 762

7 259 10 813

55 265

61489

164 19 * incl. Berlin 1742 * excl. Berlin 10 069 11830 (1)

52 917

7 257 60 174 (1)

Source : Linkspartei.PDS - executive; WASG internal information (1) including double membership WASG / LeftParty.PDS

ground to judge the efficiency of the anti - Schröder course of the association. Every actor was surprised when on the evening of this election Chancellor Schröder announced that he would call on early federal elections. Oskar Lafontaine and Gregor Gysi immediately understood the chance that was being offered to them. Those two men knew each other well, appreciated each other, and had been discussing the possibilities of creating a new political formation left of the SPD, which would proclaim itself to be the heir to social - democratic values. The project Linkspartei.PDS started taking shape. To understand its nature, one has to look at the case of Lafontaine. Born in 1943, he has always been a Social Democrat. He was the former Prime Minister of the Saarland, former chairman of the SPD, and former Minister of Finance of Schröder’s first cabinet, from which he broke on March 11, 1999. Retired from active political life, Lafontaine used his time to reconstruct a leftist identity for himself. He became a member of ATTAC and published several books,

64 Table 7 :

Patrick Moreau

Membership of the Left Party.PDS and the WASG in the West PDS WASG WASG WASG Linke.PDS WASG Linke.PDS December 31. 05. 30. 06. 30. 09. December April December 2004 2005 2005 2005 2005 2006 2006

BadenWuerttemberg

486

Bavaria Bremen

606

780

899

439

672

822

158

104

109

Lower Saxony

481

558

Hamburg

348

Hessia North RhineWestphalia RhinelandPalatine Saarland SchleswigHolstein

481

Total West

624

1 279

681

904

615

1 222

699

117

168

185

195

731

1165

637

1 249

1 058

220

288

396

388

424

480

396

570

922

637

1 068

757

1135

1738

2 049

2 889

1703

3 012

1913

258

301

387

614

402

707

454

108

214

288

524

280

560

582

260

191

252

332

365

363

438

4 320

5 000

6 276

8 762

6 057

10 069 (1)

7 257 (1)

Source : Linkspartei.PDS - executive; WASG internal information27 (1) including double membership WASG / LeftParty.PDS

(for example, “The heart beats on the Left” or “Growing rage : Politics need principles” ).28 These works show Lafontaine’s increasing theoretical radicalization. He has absorbed all the arguments of the critics of the neo - liberal globalization and the role of the United States. In this sense, he has always been absolutely intellectually compatible with Gregor Gysi. The latter has also integrated anti - globalization semantics into his political positions. Early in 2005 PDS and WASG were initially searching for ways to cooperate and later to merge. The decision for “unification” fell on June 15, 2005. In return, the PDS accepted a name change and became the “Left Party”, a label acceptable to voters in the West. Looking at the dowry, the WASG was a priori the weaker partner. In June 2005 it had 7,403 members, among them about 400 in the new Bundeslaender. The WASG assembled several tendencies : left - wing social democrats who had broken with their party, a strong minority of whom had sympathized with the 27 In the West the WASG has about one third more members than the Left Party.PDS. The information of the West State organizations of the Left Party.PDS on the membership at the end of 2005 contains WASG - members with double membership. Their number is not known. 28 Cf. Lafontaine, Das Herz schlägt links; id., Die Wut wächst; id., Politik für alle.

65

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

“anti - monopolist” and “pacifist” course of the German Communist Party (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei – DKP ) before 1989; trade unionists from the Communist or Social Democrat camp; critical or former members of the PDS; Trotskyites coming from four different groupings and practising their habitual entrism; Lafontaine’s adherents; and finally ATTAC members. The only personality known throughout the nation was Oskar Lafontaine. It was certainly a very small political world where everybody knew everybody else.29 However, this combination was up - to - the - minute relevant ( the party recruited 2 000 members from June until the beginning of September ). The WASG was, in fact, sociologically young and integrated in the trade unions – 29 percent of WASG members are also members of a trade union – and in professional life. The law forbids the alliance of two parties on one list for the elections to the Bundestag. Therefore, the renamed PDS offered to place members of the WASG on its lists in positions with good prospects. Some of the cadres of this organization decided clearly and simply to become members of the Linkspartei.PDS as well. In 2007 WASG and Linkspartei.PDS wanted to merge into one united party – called the Linkspartei. 8.1

Analysis of a Success

The elections of September 18, 2005, ended with a surprise for both major parties : SPD and CDU / CSU suffered a defeat. The voters provided neither the former coalition of SPD and Green Party nor the competing tandem CDU / CSU and FDP with a governing majority. The true winner of the election was the Linkspartei.PDS which obtained 8.7 percent of the vote – a gain of 4.7 percent compared to 2002. Table 8 :

Results of the 2005 Bundestag elections ( indirect vote / party list ) Number of votes

%

Difference to 2002

Entitled to vote

61,870,711

–

–

Casted votes

48,044,134

77.7

- 1.4

SPD

16,194,665

34.2

- 4.3

CDU

13,136,740

27.8

- 1.7

CSU

3,494,309

7.4

- 1.6

Green Party

3,838,326

8.1

- 0.4

FDP

4,648,144

9.8

+ 2.5

Left Party

4,118,194

8.7

+ 4.7

29 The remains of the DKP, but also very many Turkish or Kurdish ( close to the PKK ) immigrant workers were members of the WASG.

66

Patrick Moreau

The success of the Linkspartei.PDS was impressive. In the new Bundeslaender it registered strong gains, especially in Saxony - Anhalt (+12.2) which is governed by a coalition of CDU and FDP. Its gains were lowest in Berlin, where the governing coalition of SPD and PDS had disgruntled many left voters. In five Bundeslaender in the West the Linkspartei.PDS passed the 5 - percent - barrier. With Lafontaine the actuator, the party skyrocketed to 18.5 percent in the Saarland. Only the most conservative Laender of Bavaria and Baden - Wurttemberg resisted the temptations of this new competitor. Table 9 :

Results of the Linkspartei.PDS by Bundesland – NB : new Bundesland.

Schleswig-Holstein Hamburg Lower Saxony Bremen Hesse Rhineland-Palatine Baden-Wurttemberg Bavaria Saarland Berlin (NB) Brandenburg (NB) Mecklenburg-W. Pomerania (NB) Saxony (NB) Saxony-Anhalt (NB) Thuringia (NB) Former FRG and West-Berlin Former GDR and East-Berlin

Votes

%

Diff. to 2002

78,755 59,463 205,200 30,570 178,913 132,154 219,105 244,701 117,089 303,630 416,359 234,702 603,824 385,422 378,340 1,795,917 2,243,797

4.6 6.3 4.3 8.4 5.3 5.6 3.8 3.4 18.5 16.4 26.6 23.7 22.8 26.6 26.1 4.8 25.3

+ 3.3 + 4.2 + 3.3 + 6.2 + 4.0 + 4.6 + 2.8 + 2.8 +17.1 + 5.0 + 9.3 + 7.3 + 6.6 +12.2 + 9.1 + 3.7 + 8.4

Should the Linkspartei.PDS be able to repeat its success at the regional elections of 2007 ( for example in Bremen ), the party might become an indispensable partner to defend or conquer the power of the left ( SPD plus Green Party ). The social demography of the Linkspartei electorate gives a clear perspective on the future of this party. According to the electoral transfers, the Linkspartei.PDS wins 970,000 votes from the SPD, 290,000 from the CDU / CSU, 240,000 from the Green Party, 10,000 from the FDP, 90,000 from various parties, among them the extreme right, and 430,000 from the abstentionist camp.30 30 Breaking down West : 590,000 votes from the SPD, 180,000 from the CDU, 210,000 from the Green Party, 70,000 from the FDP, 80,000 from various parties and 230,000 from the abstentionist camp.

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

67

Table 10 : Sociography of the Linkspartei 2005 ( in percent ) 8.0

worker

Male

9.0

employee

7.0

Female

7.0

self-employed

6.0

18-24 years

8.0

retired

7.0

25-34 years

8.0

apprentice / pupil / student

8.0

35-44 years

9.0

unemployed

23.0

45-59 years

10.0

major city

10.0

First-time voters

12.0

city

7.6

Regions with high unemployment rates 20.1

town

8.1

Regions with medium unemployment rates

5.7

Rural community

Regions with low unemployment rates

60 or older

7.0

10.1

High density of population

9.0

3.6

Medium density of population

6.9

Strong spending power

4.8

Primary sector

9.1

Medium spending power

5.0

Secondary sector

8.1

Tertiary sector

9.3

Low spending power

21.5

Source : Infratest dimap

The Linkspartei was elected for the following reasons : 60 percent of interviewees named social justice, 43 percent employment policy, 21 percent economic policy and 19 percent education policy. To put it plainly : Oskar Lafontaine had managed to make his economic and social “anti - model” and his anti - neo liberal course credible. Some social and professional data deserve a closer look. The Linkspartei.PDS is slightly preferred by male voters, workers, and inhabitants of major cities and rural communities. Unemployed persons and workers with low spending power turned massively to the party. This clearly makes the PDS a “neo - proletarian” force. 8.2

The 2007 Unification

The unification congress of the Linkspartei.PDS and the WASG took place on June 16, 2007. In spite of the resistance of the fundamentalist wing ( mostly Trotskyites and DKP members ), the unification took place. The new party has a double head : Lothar Bisky, former Linkspartei.PDS chairman, and Oskar Lafontaine, former WASG and erstwhile SPD chairman. The parliamentary party, too, has a double head : Oskar Lafontaine and Gregor Gysi. This unification is based upon programmatic and strategic consent. The WASG positions concerning program, strategy, and tactics, especially those of the wing inspired by Lafontaine, were indeed quite compatible to those of the Left Party.PDS, once again most-

68

Patrick Moreau

ly to the reform wing.31 Both programs were dominated by anti - capitalism expressed by the fight against neo - liberal globalization. Their anti - Americanism32 was as pronounced as their rejection of a “neo - liberal Europe.” 33 Anti - Fascism and anti - racism were important issues following Dimitrov’s approach.34 Both parties advocated state intervention and control of the whole economy, as well as a policy of nationalization.35 The criticism of representative democracy in its present form was one of the key elements. It was combined with the demand of a multitude of plebiscitary elements.36 The program of the Left Party.PDS37 in particular refused a sound examination of the past, especially of the nature of the GDR and of “World Communism.” The strategy of both parties followed Gramsci’s theoretical model : Left Party.PDS and WASG strove for political and cultural hegemony. They were convinced of their need to be present in parliaments and to organize and support extra - parliamentary forces as well. Thus, they wanted to create an oppositional mass movement as a first step toward “overcoming the capitalist system.” This strategy also implicated selective cooperation with extremists resorting to vio31

32

33

34

35

36

37

Cf. “Gründungsprogramm der WASG.” In : http ://www.wasg.de / uploads / media / gruendungsprogramm_20050531.pdf; “Es gibt Alternativen ! Für Arbeit, Gerechtigkeit, Frieden und Demokratie ! Gegen den neoliberalen Zeitgeist.” In : http ://sozialisten.de / sozialisten / parteibildung / abkommen / view_html ?zid=31505&bs=1&n=2; “Das Programm der Linkspartei.PDS.” In : http ://sozialisten.de / partei / dokumente / programm / index. htm. Cf. Lafontaine, (...) um im besten Sinne des Wortes die Verhältnisse wieder zum Tanzen zu bringen. In : http ://sozialisten.de / partei / parteitag / pt1001/ view_html?zid=32604& bs=1&n=29; “Für einen demokratischen Irak – gegen Besatzung und Foltergefängnisse!.” In : http ://sozialisten.de / politik / international / index.htm. “Neoliberale Offensive. Sylvia - Yvonne Kaufmann in der ND - Kolumne ‘Brüsseler Spitzen’.” In : http ://sozialisten.de / politik / themen / europaverfassung / view_html ?zid= 27724&bs=1&n=0; “Diskussion in der PDS um die ‘Verfassung für Europa’.” In : http://sozialisten.de / politik / themen / europaverfassung / view_html?zid=27724&bs= 1&n=0; “Eurovisionen. Was Lafontaine von Europa hält”. In : http ://www.stern.de / politik / ausland /568913.html ?q=lafontaine. Georgi Michajlov Dimitrov, Referat über den Faschismus, 4. Weltkongress der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale, 1928 : “We have to realize clearly that fascism is not a time- bound and passing phenomenon. Instead, it is a complete system of class domination of the bourgeoisie and its dictatorship in the age of imperialism [...] To the freedom of the proletariat and to the class - specific trade union movement, fascism is a permanent and steadily growing threat.” ( Translation by the author ). Cf. Weichold / Dietzel, Bundestagswahl 2005 – Wahlprogramme der Parteien im Vergleich. Analyse der zur Zeit vorliegenden Wahlmanifeste, Programme und Entwürfe, RLS 2005/08. In : http ://www.rosalux.de / cms / index.php ?id=7113&type=0&ftu=8bc dc48be4. “Programm der PDS. 1. Demokratie : Ausweitung individueller und kollektiver Rechte der Bürgerinnen und Bürger / Demokratisierung der Kommune / Wirtschaftsdemokratie / Demokratische Weltordnung.” In : http :// sozialisten.de / partei / dokumente / programm / view_html ?zid=28569&bs=1&n=11; “Programm der WASG, Kapitel : Mehr Demokratie in Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Politik.” In : ibid. “Programm der PDS. IV. Veränderung mit der PDS – Selbstveränderung der PDS.” In: ibid.

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

69

lence, for anti - fascists as well as their organizational integration into the parties, which was often very conflictual. WASG and Left Party.PDS used the same tactics, especially for election and national campaigns. Their habits of speech and slogans – such as “Enough !” – were identical. Elections were suggested to be chances to “settle things” with “those on top”. Protest parties in everyday life, they aired and ventilated the frustrations of the people. They edged their profile with the help of anti - attitudes, instrumentalizing existing fears and insecurities. Due to shrinking or low membership, they developed more and more into media - oriented parties. Their populism was intended and purposeful. This is why they adapted their political rhetoric to publicly accepted norms and standards. Depending on the situation, their figureheads, like Lafontaine, deliberately used or intentionally abstained from verbal provocation, like Gregor Gysi, the “great communicator”. It is too early to take stock of the reunification of this party. The Left has organizations in every Land and more than 70,000 members. The attention the media paid to the unification congress seems to have inspired enough people to join the new party and thus make up for those who had left the WASG in disappointment. Even though empirical data are not available yet, the new membership seems to consist mainly of trade unionists and former SPD - members, but also former Greens. Table 11 : Membership of the Left Party38 Baden-Wuerttemberg

2 007

Saarland

Bavaria

1865

Schleswig-Holstein

Bremen

413

Lower Saxony Hamburg

2 242 900

1199 793

Brandenburg

9 908

Meckl.-W. Pom.

6 543

Saxony-Anhalt

6 557

Hesse

1818

Saxony

North Rhine-Westphalia

4 911

Thuringia

7 531

1 235

Berlin

9 761

Rhineland-Palatine Direct membership at party executive Total

14 342

About 170 72 025

At the Bremen parliamentary elections on May 13, 2007, the Left passed the five - percent - hurdle with ease, gaining 8.44 percent (23,296 votes ) and 7 seats in the Bremen State parliament. This triumph was well - covered in the media and is likely to be repeated at the Saarland elections in 2008. There, with Lafontaine the top candidate, the left will in all likelihood send its second parliamentary party to a West German state parliament. 38 Provisional data, see http ://die - linke.de / partei / fakten / mitgliederzahlen, August 2007.

70 8.3

Patrick Moreau

Conclusion

The future of the Left Party is anything but certain. The Social Democrats will have to make some major strategic decisions. If they want to stop or contain the Left Party, they have to turn to the left and put to sleep their intended reforms. If instead they decide to continue the work done since 1998 in a neo - liberal way, they would present to Lafontaine and Gysi’s party a wide field of action. They could also cause the identity crisis of the SPD to reinforce itself. Its left and trade union wings could form an alliance with or become members of the neo - Communists. Besides this medium term strategic aspect, the capability of German Communism / post - Communism to survive the collapse and disappearance of the GDR is truly fascinating. The PDS has been successful in areas where, since 1990, no other Communist /neo - Communist party in the West has been. It managed to attract a significant fringe of members and adherents to social democracy. This is the scenario which declining Communist movements all over Western Europe dream of. Still, the extreme heterogeneity of the Left Party is a major danger for its future. Different political cultures confront each other; the party remains an accumulation of various political tendenzies from post Maoism to anti - globalization movements such as ATTAC; from orthodox Marxism - Leninism to political ecology, and from revolutionary utopia to neo Bernstein transformationalism. And finally it is directed by two remarkable tribunes coexisting peacefully within this multi - facetted party : But for how long ? The reality of governance in the Laender of Berlin and – until 2006 – Mecklenburg - Western Pomerania and perhaps tomorrow in different Laender of the Federal Republic of Germany – has made it clear that the promises of the PDS wilt with contact to power. The party will find itself at a crossroads : It can stay a party opposed to the system or become a party to the left of the SPD and remain anti - capitalist but determined to reform capitalism.

9.

Excursus : Left - Wing Extremism : Situation, Programs, Strategies

9.1

Potential in Figures

According to the 2006 Annual Report by the ( Federal ) Office for the Protection of the Constitution,39 there were about 37,000 members of left - wing extremist core, subsidiary organizations and organizations influenced by left - wing extremism. Even though the latter organizations are dominated by left - wing extremists, not all of their members pursue extremist goals. The approximately 60,100 members of the Linkspartei.PDS 2006 are not generally qualified as “left - wing extremists”. They are considered to be “potentially left - wing extremist”. With the exception of the PDS / Linkspartei.PDS, figures have been quite stable for the last years and are also valid for 2007. Looking at Germany as a whole, 39 See http ://www.verfassungsschutz.de / de / publikationen / verfassungsschutzbericht.

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

71

as well as at the West and East German Laender respectively, left - wing extremism is presently weaker than it has been for the last decades. In the new Bundeslaender PDS membership has continually declined. Due to its acceptance by the population, the PDS has in some ways neutralized any serious rise of leftwing extremist competing formations. In 2006 left - wing readers could choose from almost 220 newspapers, journals and books. More than 30 publishers and distributors sold about 6.5 million copies. The newspaper “Junge Welt” ( jW, Young world ) is one of the most important dailies of the left - wing extremist camp, with circulation of about 12,000. This paper is produced by the Berlin - based publishing house “8. Mai GmbH” (8th May Ltd. www.jungewelt.de / kontakt / verlag.php ). Articles suggest left - wing extremist activity. In comparison, 30 years ago in 1974 the Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the old FRG listed no less than 102,000 members of left - wing extremist groups. In those days West Germany was one of the strongholds of left - wing extremism : the so - called “K - Gruppen” ( “C - groups” – Communist groups ) were the heirs to the 1968 student protests.40 The left - wing extremist “scene” has never been weaker than today – with the possible exception of the mid - 1960s, i. e. before the outburst of the APO ( extraparliamentary opposition ) and of the student protests, or at the time of the ban of the KPD ( Communist Party of Germany ). The left - wing extremist scene in other European countries is stronger. Compared with its European neighbours, the scene in Germany is weak. This is also due to the fact that in countries such as Italy or France the traditional Communist parties are stronger. The potential influence of left - wing extremism on society cannot alone be judged by figures. The decisive factor is the readiness to pursue extremist – and especially violent – action. We also need to differentiate between the various left- wing extremist formations. Again, the key is the readiness to use action. There are organizations who have not explicitly expressed their extremist inten40 1968 and the political aftermath, Communist groups : Ahlberg, Ursachen der Revolte; Bacia, Der Kommunistische Bund Westdeutschlands, pp. 1648–1662; id., Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, pp. 1810–1830; id., Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands / Marxisten - Leninisten, pp. 1831–1851; Baier, Die Früchte der Revolte; Brandt / Steinke, Die Gruppe Internationaler Marxisten, pp. 1599–1647; Bütow, Radikale Demokratie oder Demokratie der Radikalen; Cohn - Bendit ( Ed.), Wir haben sie so geliebt; Deppe ( Ed.), 2. Juni 1967 und die Studentenbewegung heute; Dutschke, Mein langer Marsch; id., Aufrecht gehen; id., Die Revolte; id./ Wilke ( ed.), Die Sowjetunion, Solschenizyn und die westliche Linke; Ebert, Ziviler Ungehorsam; Fichter / Lönnendonker, Kleine Geschichte des SDS; id., Von der Neuen Linken zur Krise des Linksradikalismus; Grebing, Linksradikalismus gleich Rechtsradikalismus; Guggenberger, Weltflucht und Geschichtsgläubigkeit; id., Wohin treibt die Protestbewegung ?; Hermann, Die Revolte der Studenten; Heumann, Antiimperialistisches Kampffeld Hochschule; Horn, Abschied vom Kollektiv; Horx, Aufstand im Schlaraffenland; Karl, Die K - Gruppen; Knütter, Die Faschismus - Keule; Linn, Politischer Extremismus an den Hochschulen; Negt, Achtundsechzig; Rödel, Der neue Linksradikalismus, pp. 479–487; Schlomann / Friedlingstein, Die Maoisten; Seibold ( Ed.), Die 68er; Uesseler, Die 68er; Wolff / Windaus ( Ed.), Studentenbewegung 1967–1969; Wolfschlag, Bye - bye 68.

Source : Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006. (3) The “scene” can potentially mobilise an additional several thousand (1) Some figures are estimated and rounded. people. (2) The statistics include left - wing extremists with records as suspects or (4) Including the KPF as well as members of other left - wings extremist perpetrators as well as those being presumed ready to use violence. groups in the PDS / Linkspartei.PDS. Only groups which have established structures and have been active (5) The PDS / Linkspartei.PDS is listed separately in the table due to its for some time have been included. ambivalent status.

Table 12 : Members of left - wing extremist organizations and organizations influenced by left - wing extremism (2003–2006)

72 Patrick Moreau

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The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

Table 13 : Survey 2003–2006 of politically motivated violent and other crimes with a left - wing extremist background. Survey of violent crimes committed by left - wing extremists against actual or supposed right - wing extremists (1) 2003

2004 Ag. Right

2005 Ag. Right

2006 Ag. Right

Ag. Right

Violent crimes Homicide

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Attempted homicide

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

192

134

226

149

391

249

444

277

36

6

31

16

29

4

42

8

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

118

53

144

70

298

159

195

81

29

1

19

12

53

7

41

10

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

3

12

10

13

11

22

16

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

102

28

88

15

110

17

115

29

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

483

226

521

273

896

449

862

423

Bodily injury Arson Causing an explosion with intend to injure or damage property Contributing to rioting or civil disorder Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport Unlawful deprivation of liberty Robbery Extortion Resisting public authority Sexual offences Total Other criminal offences Property damage

510

490

713

754

Coercion, threat

35

19

42

44

431

410

654

709

976

919

1409

1 507

1459

1440

2 305

2 369

Other criminal offences Total Total number of criminal offences

(1) The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office ( BKA ). Each offence is counted only once. Of several criminal offences committed, only the most serious counts.

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tions. They may even be in the process of discarding them. This seems to be true at least for a part of the PDS / Linskspartei.PDS membership. But there are still uncompromising enemies of democracy who fight it all out. They may even consider, prepare, or execute violent and terrorist assaults.41 Those differences depend on the bond the organization has to its members. A book - or nominal member of the PDS / Linkspartei.PDS is worlds apart from a post - Maoist cadre of the MLPD, who regards him or herself to be a revolutionary for life. Membership in conspiratorial terrorist cells, extremely liable for prosecution, is another story altogether. 9.2

Goals and forms of organisation

The different forms of organization reflect the different mentalities of left - wing extremist groups. They also correspond to different ideologic camps : the revolutionary Marxists on the one hand, and the autonomists and anarchists on the other. Table 14 : The main German left - wing extremist actors in 2005–2006 Trotskyites : In 2006 20 international Trotskyite umbrella organizations (2005 : 17) with 28 (2004 : 17, 2005 : 21) sections and splinter groups were counted in Germany. About 1,800 activists in 2006 (2005 : 1,600) belonged to structures ranging in size from a handful of members to the major ones of several hundred. Linksruck ( www.linksruck.de ) was the most active Trotskyite organization in Germany (400 members in 2004, 300 in 2005, 2006 : about 350). As the German section of the London based international Trotskyite umbrella organization International Socialist Tendency ( IST ), Linksruck unconditionally adheres to the IST’s program. The British section of the IST, the British Socialist Workers Party ( SWP ), politically dominated the European Social Forum of the anti - globalization movement which met in London in October 2004. The Sozialistische Alternative ( SAV, Socialist Alternative www.sav - online.de ) is the German section of the international Trotskyite umbrella organization, Committee for a Workers International ( CWI ), also London - based. The number of SAV members rose slightly in 2005 to 400 from 380 in 2003, and in 2006 stagnated at its 2005 level.

41

In 2005/06 there is no established German terrorist organization prepared to carry out serious attacks or murders comparable to the Rote Armee Fraktion ( RAF, Red Army Fraction ) which was officially disbanded in 1998.

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

75

Deutsche Kommunistische Partei ( DKP, German Communist Party ) and its periphery : The DKP ( www.dkp.de ) was founded in 1968. In 2006 it counted about 4,200 members (2003 : 4,700, 2004 : 4,500, 2005 : about 4,500). Its weekly “Unsere Zeit” ( UZ, Our Time ) was circulated in 7,000 (2003 : 7,500; 2004 : 7,500, 2005: 6,300) copies in 2006. There are several organizations associated with the DKP. They either share the better part of the party’s creed or are headed by DKP members. The youth and student organization Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend ( SDAJ, Socialist German Workers’ Youth, www.sdajplacerougeorg.h3610.serverkompetenz.net / portal ) and the Assoziation Marxistischer StudentInnen ( AMS, Association of Marxist Students, www.marxisten.de ) remained closely affiliated to the DKP. However, with no more than 300 respectively 60 followers in 2005 and 2006 they are unable to play their traditional role as the DKP’s resource of future cadres. The Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes – Bund der VVN - BdA Antifaschistinnen und Antifaschisten e. V. ( VVN - BdA, Union of Victims of Nazi Persecution – Alliance of Anti - Fascists, reg’d society, www.vvn - bda.de / bund / start. php3) (2006 : 6,000) took over the leadership of the inactive umbrella organization of Communist resistance fighters Fédération Internationale des Résistants ( FIR, International Federation of Resistance Fighters ). Traditionally, DKP - members are also active within the Deutsche FreidenkerVerband ( DFV, German Association of Freethinkers – www.freidenker.de ). The Marxistisch - Leninistische Partei Deutschlands ( MLPD, Marxist - Leninist Party of Germany, www.mlpd.de ) was founded in 1982. It counted more than 2,000 members in 2004, about 2,300 in 2005 and 2006. The MLPD publishes the Rote Fahne ( Red Flag ), REBELL ( Rebel, magazine of the youth - organization of the same name ), and Lernen und Kämpfen ( Learn and Fight ). In 2006 it also published two numbers of “Galileo”, the magazine of the university group of the MLPD. Rote Hilfe e. V. ( RH, Red Aid, www.rote - hilfe.de ) was founded in 1975. In 2006 its 4,300 members (2005 : about 4,300) offered financial support to the group “Angehörige und Freunde der politischen Gefangenen” ( Relatives and Friends of Political Prisoners, i. e. members of the RAF and similar groups) and to Kurds allegedly subject to political persecution due to their activities on behalf of the PKK or its successor organizations. The RH publishes Die Rote Hilfe ( Red Aid).

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Revolutionary Marxists represent by far the most important group of left - wing extremism : Disregarding the PDS, in 2006 they concentrate about 25,000 supporters in 57 organizations. Their program focuses on overthrowing the existing “capitalist” economic system. They want to substitute the market economy by a command economy not committed to gains and competition. According to them, a fundamental rupture is the only way to end “capitalist” societies, to solve the social problem of extremely divergent incomes, and to break up “class society.” Only the extremely sectarian groups still strive for the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” Nevertheless, this order to be established evidently implies a limited amount of private autonomy and little room for entrepreneurial initiative. Most Marxists - Leninists have come to accept the fact that the situation is definitely not in favour of a revolution. The occurrence of coups such as the one which happened in October 1917 can be ruled out. Revolutionary Marxists are at a clear disadvantage concerning the balance of power and relative strength. This evaluation of the situation has nothing to do with a general renouncement of violence. But revolutionary Marxists have come to the conclusion that campaigning for majorities, a policy of alliances with “useful idiots”, and exploiting social protest movements is their only their way to power. They have conceded that this road promises to be a long one. As a result of this analysis of the present situation, revolutionary Marxists have formed two types of organizations that are quite different at first glance : Some of their formations have changed to become political parties. On the surface they function like their bourgeois competitors. They run in elections, try to win new members, and participate in the formation of political public opinion. Most of the revolutionary Marxist parties are Janus - faced, however. Their public openness is complemented by their self - image and concept as a MarxistLeninist cadre and fighting organization. “Democratic centralism” is their ruling principle. It is characterized by strict party discipline, intense member involvement, and partly conspiratorial behaviour. Some of these parties feel rejected by majority society and complain of surveillance by the state’s Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. The DKP and the MLPD as well as the Trotskyite organizations are Marxist - Leninist parties.42 The MLPD focuses on advertising 42 The DKP ran for the European Parliament on June 13, 2004, with its program “A different Europe is possible !” The party received 37,000 votes (0.1 percent ). It was more successful with selected, highly focused campaigns at local elections in Saarland in June and North Rhine - Westphalia in September, winning a surprising proportion of the vote: With 15.6 percent of the vote, it took six seats on the local council of Püttlingen, Saarland; and with 6.5 percent it won four seats on the local council of Bottrop, North RhineWestphalia. On the history of KPD, DKP, SEW : Bärwald / Scheffler, Partisanen ohne Gewehr; id., Deutsche Kommunistische Partei; id., Missbrauchte Friedenssehnsucht; Ebbinghausen / Kirchhoff, Der angepasste Klassenkampf, pp. 556–578; Flechtheim / Rudzio / Vilmar / Wilke, Der Marsch der DKP durch die Institutionen; Heitmann, Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, pp. 901–981; Knoche, Die DKP; Kremzow, Theorie und Praxis der DKP; Meier - Bergfeld, Die Bündnispolitik der Deutschen Kommunistischen Partei, pp. 255– 295; Mensing, Maulwürfe im Kulturbeet; id., Nehmen oder Annehmen; id., Wir wollen

The PDS / Linkspartei. PDS and the Extreme Left

77

its ideas in certain city districts during election campaigns by putting up billboards and initiating “Monday demonstrations”.43 But this ostensible openness does not reach deep. The party does not publish its membership numbers, nor does it accept freedom of opinion among its own rank and file. The official party line must be followed, and deviations are not tolerated. The party is controlled by a central committee headed by a “great chairman”. The Linkspartei.PDS no longer belongs to this type of Marxist - Leninist party. Its internal decision - finding and decision - making processes are relatively open. Within the party plural opinions are articulated by tendenzies and wings. Here, the Linkspartei.PDS has come a long way from its SED - origins. Some revolutionary Marxist organizations refrain from the legal body of a political party. They prefer the “purist form” of a conspiratorial organization. They do not participate in elections, nor do they rally for members. Interested people can only enter upon invitation following a period of candidateship. Quite often they are obliged not to disclose their membership publicly. These groups do not cherish freedom of opinion or tolerate ideological divergence. Once the official “party line” has been established by the leadership, it cannot be challenged or questioned any longer. Inevitably, these groups pursue the better part of their activities conspiratorially. They guard their ideology as if it were the eternal truth, not to be challenged by any present development. Furthermore, they tend to adopt the form of sects, elitist leagues or covenants, and of secret lodges. But seclusion does not necessarily mean small numbers.44 Instead, such phenomena seem to increase their attractiveness in times of rapid social change and of established parties being widely discredited. In 2005 official estimates count about 6,000 followers (2003 : about 5,400; 2004 : 5,500; 2005 : 5,500) of anarchist45 and autonomous groups.46 This is only one fifth of the revolutionary Marxist support. Autonomist groups are present in almost all major cities and in some smaller university towns. But their strongholds are metropolitan areas like Berlin, Hamburg, and the Rhine - Main

43 44

45 46

unsere Kommunisten wieder haben; Minrath, Friedenskampf; Müller, Die Bündnispolitik der DKP; Müller, Die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Westberlins, pp. 2241–2273; Neidhardt / Niedenhoff, Auf dem Marsch durch die Institutionen; Nüske, “Mehr Niederlagen als Siege”, pp. 123–145; Rudzio, Die Erosion der Abgrenzung; Staritz, Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, pp. 1663–1809; Wilke / Brabant, Totalitäre Träumer; Wilke / Müller / Brabant, Die Deutsche Kommunistische Partei. In the fall of 1989, every Monday after peace prayers, there was a protest march in Leipzig to promote changes in the GDR. “Monday Demonstration” has since become synonymous for the move of civil society towards democracy. Trotskyites / divers groups : Backes, Neue Linke und Neue Rechte, pp. 7–28; Bartsch, Anarchismus in Deutschland; Bundesministerium des Inneren ( ed.), Die “Marxistische Gruppe” ( MG ); Konrad - Adenauer - Stiftung ( Ed.), Linksextremismus; Löw, Terror und Extremismus in Deutschland. Anarchists : Lösche, Anarchismus; Saathoff, Graswurzelrevolution; Wittkop, Unter der schwarzen Fahne. Autonomous / Anti - imp : Backes, Autonome und Skinheads, pp. 7–34; ID - Archiv (Ed.), Aufruhr, Widerstand gegen Repression und § 129 a; Pfahl - Traughber, Die Autonomen, pp. 36–46; Schultze / Gross, Die Autonomen.

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area. There are more than 50 autonomist publications. The best known periodical is INTERIM ( www.nadir.org / nadir / periodika / interim ) which is published in Berlin. The first issue of the underground periodical “radikal” since 1999 was published in April 2004 ( www.nadir.org / nadir / initiativ / r_ver ). There is a number of youth magazines highly appreciated in the scene. They are usually distributed free of charge. Autonomous and anarchist adherents strive to destroy the existing political and social system and to substitute it by “self - government and anarchy” which is said to be an “order without authority”. According to them, man was originally living in a society free from social hierarchies, power, and domination. The development of political systems is considered a gigantic historical and cultural error. Therefore, the major enemy of an anarchist is every conceivable form of state order constituting heteronomy and introducing mandatory and liable social rules. “Capitalist” economy is held to be one of the roots of exploitation and repression. But it is less focused on as an anarchistic arch - enemy because it is considered a phenomenon derived from the state. In the face of such political convictions, the preferred form of action by anarchists seems quite clear : Anarchy as a program definitely excludes establishing a system of norms and hierarchies in any form of organization. “Networking” is widely spread in Anglo - Saxon countries, and this social technique appears to be the only one accepted by anarchists. The “links” consist of totally equal, self - determined, and independent initiatives networking in changing and almost arbitrary ways. These structures possess neither leading centres nor hierarchies, let alone “central committees.” The process of decision finding is also bound by a minimum of rules. Instructions and advice from top to bottom are unthinkable, and majority decisions are avoided. Problems are discussed until everybody agrees or decides to let things be. This form of networking functions more smoothly than one would think : The militant protests against international, political, and economic summits over the last years have proven that anarchists need only a minimum of formal organization to pursue their purposes efficiently. The most important groups belong to the so - called “grass - roots movement” (200 adherents in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006) or to the anarcho - syndicalist Freie Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter Union ( FAU, Free Workers Union, www.fau.org, with about 300 followers in 2004, 2005, 2006). The latter is associated with the Internationale Arbeiter Assoziation ( IAA, International Workers Association ).47 German adherents to the autonomous scene, however, often find the AngloSaxon theories of “networking,” “decentralized non - violent action,” or “social resistance” too sophisticated. The “feeling” of this lower class scene is usually reduced to a rather dull, general anarchist disposition against the “pig system”. 47 Their publication “Graswurzelrevolution – für eine gewaltfreie, herrschaftlose Gesellschaft” ( Grass - roots revolution – for a non - violent society without rulers ), http://www. graswurzel.net.

79

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Their most important form of social interaction is ganging up in cliques or the like. Their hostility against organization has a paradoxical effect. “Debates on Organization” recur constantly and always end with the same result : the realization that organizing would indeed make sense as far as political efficiency is concerned. This would, however, betray autonomous principles and thus needs to be ruled out. The lack of generally binding internal structures and codes of behaviour within the autonomous scene guarantees a considerable potential for the unfolding of endemic violence. “Self - determination” and “autonomy” let individual social segments of the scene grant themselves the status of “victims” and “suppressed minorities.” If necessary, they will get their own way against the others by force. One significant example is the endless debate on “sexism” which has destroyed quite a few autonomous groups. Social stress and the permanency of political failures and flops usually make activists leave after a rather short time. Table 15 : Violent and other crimes with an extremist background related to the area of left - wing politically motivated crimes ( by type ). 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Against actual or supposed right-wing extremists

202

226

273

449

423

Against nuclear energy (and CASTOR transports)

16

21

11

68

0

7

1

10

16

4

Against globalization

This scene is not able to act strategically and with a long - time perspective. Therefore it does not seriously threaten the constitutional order of the state. However, it is perfectly capable of severely disturbing public order and security. Members of the autonomous scene are ready to use violence against political opponents and representatives and symbols of the state they reject. This includes clandestinely prepared assaults. In fact, within the militant autonomist scene there are organizations whose attacks have crossed the line of what constitutes terrorist violence. The members of these small, clandestine groups appear to live an absolutely normal life. They leave hardly a trace, thus avoiding identification. Letters claiming responsibility for an attack are signed with a different name each time. This “no - name” militancy is another way to avoid criminal prosecution. However, some groups do operate under the same “brand name”. They want to express continuity, to achieve recognition, and to provide contact possibility. For all these groups militancy is essential and a direct expression of their opposition to the “system” as well as an integral part of their own way of life. In 2005 more than 30 publishers and distributors produced and sold newspapers, journals, and books to serve the left - wing extremist audience. The total number of publications ( nearly 220) have remained about the same, but they sold less ( about eight million copies 2004, 7 millions 2005, 6.5 millions 2006).

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Left - wing extremists routinely use the Internet and its services, including the World Wide Web, newsgroups, and e - mail to spread information, mobilize supporters and promote more intense networking within the scene. Archiving otherwise unstructured and fragmentary information is a well - seasoned means to this end. Portals such as nadir ( www.nadir.org / nadir ), partisan.net, and left - action ( www.left - action.de ) bring together the Internet presence of numerous groups, initiatives, and projects. 9.3

Recent Developments and Fields of Action

9.3.1 Pre - Conditions of the Present Situation In 1989 the failure of “real existing Socialism” initiated a long period of depression of left - wing extremist efforts. This was not only the case for the SED and its West German spin - off DKP. Every Trotskyite, Maoist, and autonomist group, and even the terrorist “Rote Armee Fraktion” ( RAF – Red Army Fraction) had been shocked by the collapse of the system. They suffered from the obvious disappearance of any counterpoint to the capitalist model.48 Establishing a “New World Order” during the first Iraq War seemed to consolidate the “global victory of capitalism.” Every left - wing extremist party in Europe fought the results. But they usually stood alone and with their backs against the wall. On the other hand, the devastating failure had put the jealously guarded individual profiles of the left - wing parties into a new perspective. Their weakness forced them to tolerate each other and to communicate. Suddenly Stalinists were willing to cooperate with Trotskyites. Former reservations of traditional Communists – authoritarian and petty bourgeois at heart – made way for cooperation in selected fields. Especially in Germany, right - wing extremist parties were 48 RAF / terrorism : Yonah / Pluchinsky ( ed.), Europe’s Red Terrorists; Aust, Der Baader Meinhof - Komplex; Backes, Bleierne Jahre; id., Biographisches Portrait : Michael “Bommi” Baumann, pp. 196–204; id., Geistige Wurzeln des Linksterrorismus in Deutschland, pp. 40–46; Baeyer - Katte / Claessens / Feger / Neidhardt, Gruppenprozesse; Bakker Schut, Das Info; Bommi Baumann, Wie alles anfing; Becker, Hitlers Kinder ?; Braunmühl, “Ihr habt unseren Bruder ermordet;” Id., Versuche, die Geschichte der RAF zu verstehen; Brückner, Ulrike Meinhof und die deutschen Verhältnisse; Demes, Die Binnenstruktur der RAF; Fetscher / Rohrmoser, Ideologien und Strategien; Manfred Funke ( ed.), Terrorismus; Hauser, Baader und Herold; ID - Archiv ( ed.), Die Früchte des Zorns; Jäger / Schmidtchen / Süllwold, Lebenslaufanalysen; Jünschke, Spätlese; Laqueur, Terrorismus; Löwenthal, Der romantische Rückfall; Continua, Arbeiterautonomie in Westdeutschland; Mac Donald, Erschießt zuerst die Frauen; Meyer, Am Ende der Gewalt ?; Meyer, “Staatsfeind;” Mosler, Was wir wollten; Müller / Kanonenberg, Die RAFStasi - Connection; Paczensky ( Ed.), Frauen und Terror; Peters, RAF - Terrorismus in Deutschland; Rabert, Linksterrorismus und Rechtsterrorismus; Rauball, Die Baader Meinhof - Gruppe; Reiche, Sexualität und Klassenkampf; Reinders / Fritsch, Die Bewegung 2. Juni; Röhl, Linke Lebenslügen; Schwind ( Ed.), Ursachen des Terrorismus; Sterling, Das internationale Terrornetz.

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booming at that time. This helped unite left - wing extremist parties. “Anti - Fascism” proved to be their uniting bond. The unexpected and sudden eruption of violent protests against international political and economic summits raised new hope. It was sparked by the spectacular “Battle of Seattle.” In this city a totally heterogeneous coalition of Communists, anarchists, eco - activists, and trade unionists had made the WTO Ministerial Conference collapse and end without results. In the wake of this event the rejection of the free market policy mainstream of world economy became the anchor for the reconstruction of the revolutionary left. Protesting against “globalization” and “Neo - Liberalism,” they made the social and ecologic consequences of an economy less and less bound by social restrictions and political control, as well as skyrocketing capital utilization their targets. This “capitalist profit - maximising” fitted exactly to Karl Marx’s patterns of analysis, according to which free capitalist economy tends to expand globally. Consequently, it tends to open potential markets, if necessary by military means. It also extremely increases the differences in income between the impoverished masses of the Third World and the few super rich magnates of the developed industrial countries. Examples of “success” are the massive disturbances at the NATO - Summit in Prague in 2000 and the G8 - Conference in Genoa in 2001. These fired on the “meta - topic” of the social - revolutionary left.49 In the wake of September 11, 2001, most of the revolutionary left analyzed the upcoming Islamic terror in a vulgar Marxist way. These attacks which were justified by religion were taken to be the consequences of colonial exploitation and a lack of social development. Western countermeasures were immediately interpreted as preparations for an internal reduction of civil rights and justifying imperialist aggression in the Third World. The attack on the twin towers was widely assumed to be the result of a Jewish - Capitalist conspiracy controlled by intelligence. This point of view was shared by left - and right - wing extremists alike. The British - American intervention against Sadam Hussein’s regime in Iraq fitted to this pattern. Left - wing extremists all over Europe tried to use spontaneous bouts of anti - Americanism for their own ends. In Germany there was a big demonstration in March 2005. In Berlin 500,000 participants, four fifths of them from East Germany, participated in the biggest anti - American “rally for peace” ever. However, it turned out to be a flash in the pan for all left - wing extremists. Worse still, they supported Arafat’s “intifada,” the corrupt Palestinian leader being an ally of the Baath regime. This in turn provoked an authentic “anti - Fascism :” especially in the left - wing autonomous movement critical of the anti - Semitic implications of the Palestinian “Fight for Freedom.” The rise of the so- called “anti - German” faction marked the beginning of the decline of the autonomous scene.

49 Cf. Moreau / Steinborn, “Eine andere Welt ist möglich.”

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The reforms of the social system and the job market of the late government induced left - wing extremists to take up social agitation again. The situation resembled the description of unrestrained capitalism from a Marxist textbook : a persistently high unemployment rate, decreasing income, increasing taxes and tariffs, longer working hours, and the gradual loss of habitual social securities while the profits of trans - national companies were sky - rocketing. Quite understandably, every revolutionary Marxist was elated by the summer of 2004 “Monday demonstrations” which had been initiated by the MLPD in the new Bundeslaender. The competitors were quite jealous of the results of the actions of those 2,000 Maoists. The MLPD, however, is no potential partner for alliances. It is only interested in partners ready to unconditionally accept its leadership. For this reason, a grand coalition of PDS, ATTAC, DKP, and Trotskyites split the “Monday demonstrations.” Soon some cities had two of them. The reaction of the MLPD in turn was very aggressive : The Berlin police soon found that not only the usual “Black Block” clients were capable of serious fights at demonstrations. However, the “Monday demonstrations,” too, turned out to be a flash in the pan. Quite evidently, even though theoretically, all the prerequisites of a revolutionary situation were there, “the masses” lacked the subjective will for a consistent and long - lasting class struggle. Again, the scene was frustrated. Left - wing extremists also called for participation in protests against the nonmilitary use of nuclear energy. However, their influence on the anti - nuclear movement and on the movement against the shipment of nuclear waste ( CASTOR transports ) has remained rather marginal. 9.3.2 The German Situation and Fields of Action Presently, the left - wing extremist scene is highly fragmented and works in different projects and fields of action. At the Federal Elections in September 2005 the Linkspartei.PDS achieved a spectacular victory and returned to the German Bundestag with a parliamentary party group representing 8.7 percent of the vote. Parts of the left - wing scene consider the success of Gysi and Lafontaine’s team the starting point of the defeat of the “neo - liberal model.” Many of them also link it with the turning down of the EU - constitution in the French and Dutch referendums. The standing of the Linkspartei.PDS within the faction of the European Parliament was greatly secured by its electoral success. This also holds true for the “European Left”, formed in May 2004 due to the efforts of the PDS, among others. Some explicitly revolutionary and left - wing extremist parties had publicly supported the PDS in the last federal election campaign. The DKP with its 4,500 members, for example, had about a dozen of its members run for Bundestag seats on the PDS ticket. Thus, the DKP can accredit itself with a small share of the success. Like the PDS, for many years the DKP had used its connections to

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loosen the association of some carefully selected member unions with the SPD. Obviously, these efforts were successful in some cases and in certain regions. Many WASG members are critical union executives and staff members. Not only trade unionists but also Trotskyites had been interested in the WASG early on. The German Trotskyite scene is extremely fragmented. Its two biggest groups – each counting about 300 to 400 members – are “Linksruck” and “Sozialistische Alternative” ( SAV ), each of them controlled by one of the London- based Trotskyite umbrella organizations. “Linksruck” as well as SAV had ordered its cadres to become members of the WASG - groups in the course of the formation. The Trotskyites acted quite openly, but still their policy of “entrism” hardly met any resistance. Evidently, the exclusion of revolutionaries was not considered important by the WASG. However, the number of Trotskyites was insufficient to control the WASG with its more than 10,000 members. Furthermore, by then the PDS had also entered the scene. Its experienced and expert delegates unobtrusively removed Trotskyites from promising positions on the party ticket. This was less due to distinction and distance than to competition. The Stalinist reflex against Trotskyites, practiced for decades, may have had some impact as well. Whether the fusion of both parties will really be a union of equals or rather a friendly takeover of the small partner remains to be seen. The size of the political arena has enlarged due to the success of the Linkspartei.PDS. Smaller fields of action have lost importance. Trotskyites, for example, have always thought globally. This is shown by a directive of the Central Committee of the “International Socialist Tendency,” the British umbrella organization of “Linksruck :” Trotskyites see the dawn of revolution all over the world : from South America, where Hugo Chavez has pressed his “Bolivar revolution”, to the very successful “Bloco de Esquerda” in Portugal, from the failure of the EU - referendum in France and the Netherlands to the electoral success of the Linkspartei.PDS. Following the example of their British section, they have started dreaming of a system of three concentric circles : The outer one containing informal mass organizations of social protest movements, the middle one with a wide spectre of active left - wing parties, and finally the innermost circle with the Trotskyite elite in full control. They envision “a kernel of organized revolutionary militants that can drive these larger formations forward.” To intensify the social antagonisms in their own country, left - wing extremists continue to dedicate their efforts to social conflicts. The MLPD, inventor of the “Monday demonstrations,” has remained isolated as usual, and could not profit from its own idea. On the other hand, a “broad alliance” of organized social protest was formed, for example, by the organizers of a “strategic conference” in Frankfurt on November 19, 2004. Conferences like this are carefully planned. A “Workshop for the Future” affiliated to the Confederation of Trade Unions is organized by a seasoned DKP - partisan. Members of “Linksruck” participate as representatives of ATTAC, the network critical of globalization; SAV - members turn up as WASG - members, and DKP - members as trade unionists. This time -

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tested configuration presents itself respectably and with broad social diversification. This policy of organized protests prospectively aims at parliamentary seats and government posts for those involved. It is worlds apart from the spontaneity of autonomous political action. However, sometimes both spheres meet at one of the “evergreens” of the left - wing protest scene, namely “anti - Fascism.”50 Because of the absolutely stable concept of the enemy this is one of the few fields where the usual differences among left - wing extremists do not play an important role. In order to prevent Nazi - deployments neither the autonomous scene nor the “broad alliance” of the organized groups shies away from cooperation. In those cases Communists are interweaving churches, unions, and well- meaning people of all sorts. Often enough they are abused to shield autonomous groups fighting either the police or the Nazis. Lately, however, they tend to fight amongst themselves, or to put it more bluntly : They fight their internal competitors, namely the “Anti - Germans.” The latter have confused and disarrayed the traditionally unconditional partisanship of all the oppressed people of the Third World. Arab and Muslim “liberation movements” are accused of being openly anti - Semitic by the “Anti - Germans.”51 Therefore, no leftist German conscious of his responsibility for Auschwitz could participate in an anti - American “peace demonstration” where Hamas members postulate the destruction of Israel. The moral aspects of this debate have destroyed or paralyzed numerous autonomous groups since 2003. The remains of the scene are most likely much smaller and much less vital than the German authorities have assumed. Autonomous left - wing extremists have put their hope on the protests against the G8 - summit which brought together the leaders of the eight main industrialized countries in Germany from June 6–8, 2007. The first attempts at planning the demonstrations appeared on the Internet more than 18 months before the event. The complete extreme left and the Linkspartei.PDS mobilized their followers. They were joined by numerous militant activists, groups and parties from all over Europe. The G8 - summit triggered a series of protest activities, i. e. mass demonstrations, propaganda activities on special issues ( refugees, ecology, women, etc.), decentralized blockades. On June 2 an alliance of organizations ( ATTAC, autonomous groups ) had organized a mass demonstration with several tens of thousands of participants at the Rostock city harbour. In the course 50 Moreau / Schorpp - Grabiak, Antifaschismus als Strategie der PDS, pp. 377–395. 51 The main representatives of the so - called “Hardcoreantideutsche”: Bahamas – Berliner Zeitschrift für das antideutsche Spektrum; Initiative sozialistisches Forum Freiburg (ISF); Phase 2 – Zeitschrift gegen die Realität; konkret – Politisches Monatsmagazin; Jungle World – die linke Wochenzeitschrift. Anti - German standard publications : Bruhn, Was deutsch ist; Küntzel, Djihad und Judenhass; Enderwitz, Konsum, Terror und Gesellschaftskritik; Hanloser ( Ed.), “Sie warn die Antideutschesten der deutschen Linken;” Hagen, Die Antideutschen und deren Rezeption; Kurz, Die antideutsche Ideologie; Wetzel, Antideutsche Kriegsführung.

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of the demonstration about 2,000 rioting members of the autonomous scene, the so - called “Black Block,” went into violent street battles with the police. 9.4

Conclusion

The German left - wing extremists are experiencing a crisis caused by several ideological and organizational factors : The growing strength of the Linkspartei.PDS and the WASG in 2006 and the foundation of the new party in June 2007 made Die Linke a powerful electoral and organizational centre. Therefore, the actors of the left - wing extremist scene find it difficult to reinforce their strength. The anti - globalization movement seems to open up new strategic prospects and to potentially favour the apparition of a new “radicalized generation.” But the actors face the same problem now as they did in the past : The extreme division cannot be masked by the few fields of common action, anti Fascism, and anti - Neo- Liberalism. Unwavering dogmatism makes it difficult to understand political and economic change; the leading cadres and the core of the active membership are worn out, many of them having begun their political lives in the 1970s.

France – The Collapse of the House of Communism Stéphane Courtois / Dominique Andolfatto For half a century, from the 1930s to the 1970s, the French Communist Party (Parti communiste français – PCF ) was the most powerful communist party in Western Europe. After the German Communist Party had been crushed by the Nazis in 1933, the PCF had become the “favorite child” of the communist world system in Western Europe. Strictly controlled by the Communist International from the end of the 1920s to 1943, abundantly supplied with financial means as well as international cadres, endowed with a stable leadership from 1931 until the 1970s, the PCF remained totally orthodox, loyal and faithful to the USSR.1 The PCF was the most powerful communist party in the Western World due to its high election results on local, regional, and national levels : The “red belt” around Paris had evolved at the local elections in 1935. The party contributed 15.4 % of the vote to the 1936 victory of the popular front. The PCF reached its climax in November 1946 when 28.6 % of the vote made it the strongest party in France. Between the two world wars, it had been a “communist archipelago” of small electoral islands lost in the middle of a non - communist – i. e., anti- communist – ocean. After the Second World War, the Communist vote was present in the whole country. It centered around four strongholds : The mining and industrial basin of the North and Pas - de - Calais, the Paris suburbs with their great metallurgical ( automobile ) industries, the Northern and Western fringes of the Massif Central with their small farmers and de - Christianized tenants with a “red” culture, and the Mediterranean border - region uniting the mining basin of Gard, the Marseille working class and the winegrowers and fishermen of the “Red South”. Since 1935/1936 the Stalinist sect had become a mass party ingrained within a part of the population, particularly of the working class.2 The PCF drew its strength from its firm rootedness in the municipal level as well as from its influence on the trade unions. Since 1947 the party had taken over control of the Confédération générale du travail ( CGT ), the longtime union-

1 2

On the control of the PCF by the Communist International cf. : Kriegel / Courtois, Eugen Fried. For a general history of the PCF, cf. : Courtois / Lazar, Histoire du Parti communiste français.

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ist center dominating the working class milieu as well as public and nationalized enterprises in strategic sectors like mines, gas, electricity, harbors, and railways.3 The power of the PCF resulted from its penetration of a part of the state apparatus as a consequence of its three phases of participation in national government : from 1944–1947 – Maurice Thorez, the secretary general of the party, almost became head of government in November 1946 –, between 1981 and 1984, and between 1997 and 2002. Thereby, the party managed to enforce some sort of masked codetermination of the CGT in the public and nationalized sector. Today, however, the PCF is but a shadow of itself. The electoral results of the 2007 presidential and general elections made it a marginalized force within the French political system to the extent that even the question of its survival has to be asked.

I.

The Beginning of the Decline of the PCF

When General de Gaulle came back into power, the PCF caved in electorally for the first time. Its results at general elections dropped from 25.9 % of the vote in 1956 to 19.2 % in 1958. Afterwards it succeeded in stabilizing its vote at about 20 %. At the 1969 presidential elections its candidate even reached 21.5 % of the vote. Strong from these results and facing a much weakened Socialist Party ( Parti socialiste – PS ), the leadership of which François Mitterrand had just resumed, in 1972 the PCF formed an alliance of the “union of the left” with the PS. It signed a common government program from which it hoped to draw political benefits. However, things turned out differently. In fact, this policy of alliances was established while the PCF was lacking leadership after the death of its historic chairman Maurice Thorez in 1964. The latter was initially replaced by Waldeck Rochet,4 and later, from 1972, by Georges Marchais.5 A worker without intellectual education, he was a typical representative of French communism, i. e., a pure product of the Stalinist apparatus fixated on the working class and strongly dependent on Moscow. Georges Marchais and the old guard that had brought him to leadership were completely incapable of comprehending the May 68 shock. This latter was the signal of the evolution of society towards more individual values, more liberal sexuality and morals, and more hedonism. It also affirmed feminism and, more generally, the “new social movements” taking over the demands and claims concerning the identity and culture of a post - industrial society. They relegate the organizations of the “working class movement” to the second position.6 Since the 1970s

3 4 5 6

Cf. the chapter by Dominique Andolfatto in this book. Cf. Vigreux, Waldeck Rochet. Cf. Hofnung, Georges Marchais. Cf. Touraine / Wieviorka / Dubet, Le mouvement ouvrier.

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the PCF thus began to remove itself from a society undergoing complete change. This process could but intensify.7 The economic and technological crises caused by the first oil shocks accelerated this evolution. The Communist power was based on the industrial growth of France during the “Glorious Thirty”, i. e., the years 1945–1975, and on the number of members of the working class, the peak of which was reached in 1968. The mono - industrial basins where the PCF had been strong – the coal mines of Nord - Pas - de - Calais and Gard, and the steel industry in the North and in Lorraine – deteriorated rapidly. This caused the party in those regions to cling rigidly to Marxist - Leninist ideology and its working - class identity. The PCF swam against the current of the social and cultural change following May 1968. In contrast, the PS profited from this change to recapture its central position on the political stage. It benefitted from a more adroit chairman better adjusted to the developments of society and especially to the rise of the middle classes. Mitterrand, by the way, had never hidden the fact that since 1972 he had counted on winning over 2 million communist voters. This led to the point where the PCF preferred ending this alliance which it deemed to be ever more detrimental.8 But this break, too, evoked much disappointment and criticism within the party. Mitterrand’s expectations began to realize at the end of the 1970s. In fact, the 1979 European elections heralded the electoral decline of the PCF : Even though it had obtained 20.6 % of the vote, it had only been elected by 11.9 % of the eligible voters. Since 1958 it had always averaged 16 %. However, the true electoral shock did not occur until the presidential elections of April 26, 1981. The defeat of Georges Marchais, the Communist candidate, was severe : He received 15.5 % of the vote, thus dropping to the level of the 1936 Communist vote. Only 12.4 % of the eligible voters had elected him, compared to 12.6 in 1936.9 Since then the PCF has persistently lost voters at every ballot. This score is the result of a triple movement of the electorate. First, the voters made Marchais pay for his brutal break of the union of the left in 1977. He acted as the divider while – just like in 1936 – the communist voters had strongly desired the union with the Socialists, even though the communist apparatus had been very much against it. Secondly, the phenomenon of the “tactic vote” appeared : While party propaganda insisted Marchais would surpass Mitterrand, many communist voters knew very well a Communist did not stand the slightest chance to become President of the Republic. Therefore they preferred to support the left candidate with the best prospects in the first ballot already. Finally, up to then the strength of the communist electorate had been its fidelity, the vote serving largely as a confirmation of communist identity. But for the first

7 8 9

Hincker, France : le PCF divorce de la société. In : Communisme, 11–12 (1986), pp. 86–98. On this period, see the contemporary chronicles of Kriegel, Un autre communisme ? Platone / Ranger, L’échec électoral du Parti communiste. In : Lancelot ( Ed.), 1981.

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Map 1 : General elections, March 12, 1978, 1st ballot, Parti communiste, Results by cantons ( not official sections – cities divided between several cantons are reunited), registered voters.

Average : 16.8 %. Maximum : 51.3 % ( Port - Saint - Louis, Bouches du Rhône ). Minimum : 0.9 % ( Nasbinals, Lozière ).

time PCF voters had created a strong abstaining movement of their own. “Tactic vote” in favor of the PS and abstaining have undermined the Communist vote at every ballot since then. The defeat depends on temporary factors but also on structural ones. In fact, the communist vote is on the decline everywhere in France. However, in the rural areas it has withstood a little better than in the industrial basins – except

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Nord and Pas - de - Calais – and in the Paris suburbs. Especially in the working class milieu the PCF lost ground : Marchais only obtained 28 % of the labor vote surpassed by Mitterrand’s 30 %. The party paid for its incapacity to protect this social group against the effects of the industrial crisis having ravaged for years and caused mass unemployment.10 Only the vote of the 18– to 24 - year old voters offered some satisfaction – if only provisional : The communist candidate lead with 24 % of the vote. While ferociously fighting the PS since 1978, the PCF still had to appeal to vote for Mitterrand at the second ballot of the presidential elections. However, among the fundamentally anti - Socialist party apparatus, a recommendation was passed around propagating a “revolutionary” vote in favor of the candidate of the right. At the June 14 general elections, the PCF again lost 400,000 votes. It dropped to 16.1 % of the vote from 20.6 in 1978, and only 11.3 % of the eligible vote. This was its lowest score since 1932. It defended only 44 of the formerly 86 parliamentary seats. The PS, on the other hand, commanded an absolute majority at the National Assembly ( Assemblée nationale ). The PCF won only 24 % of the labor vote, and its initial success with the youngsters had evaporated with 18 % of the 18–24 - years old vote. Its position was very weak.

II.

Participation in Government and Accelerated Decline 1981–1990

Threatened by marginalization, the PCF was forced to sign a coalition agreement committing it to support Mitterrand’s politics. On June, 23, 1981, four communists joined Pierre Maurois’ government consisting of 44 members. Charles Fiterman, Marchais’ right hand, was designated Minister of Transportation, Anicet Le Pors of Public Service, Jack Ralite of Health, and Marcel Rigout of Vocational Training. From then on, the PCF regarded itself as a “governing party and fighting party”. It was forced to do the splits between governmental solidarity and protest. This position became increasingly difficult after 1982, when the government was forced to take to strict budgetary discipline. At first, the party was able to consolidate the network of influence on the trade unions through the CGT due to nationalizations and a legislation favorable to the unions. However, in spite of its participation in the government, the PCF showed its incapability to find even a shadow of a solution for the inexorable rise of unemployment, for example in the Lorraine steel industry.11 Furthermore, its former maximalism had raised hopes which could never be fulfilled and which now intensified the repudiation.

10 Nezosi, La fin de l’homme du fer. In : Communisme, 35–37 (1994), pp. 91–109. 11 Platone, Les communistes au gouvernement In : Revue politique et parlementaire, 914 (1985); Duhamel / Parodi, Le PC à l’épreuve de l’exercice du pouvoir. In : Pouvoirs, 32 (1985), pp. 153–164.

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The voters made the PCF pay for its double dealing at the 1983 municipal elections : after that it controls but 1,271 local authorities ( compared to 1,462 before ), loses 19 municipal halls in cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants, and retains only 3 out of 7 large cities with a population of more than 100,000.12 The 1984 European elections confirm this defeat by a Waterloo : The party list headed by Georges Marchais draws only 11.2 % of the cast ballot and 6.1 % of the eligible vote. This is the worst score ever in the history of the party. After this disaster, the PCF profited from the appointment of a new Prime Minister who announced that he would continue the policy of austerity : The party left government in July 1984 and withdrew from the participation which had tied it down through its governmental obligations so that it had not been able to play its traditional role as a people’s tribune. The party then began to violently denounce Socialist politics, renewing its anti - capitalist discourse, entering radical opposition, and trying to elicit and pursuing social agitation through the CGT. This position provoked strong internal contestation and disputation. For the first time, this internal protest did not shrink back from manifesting itself at the 25th party convention in February 1985. This opposition objected to the weak analysis of the decline of the party by the leadership, the internal functioning of the latter, and the appreciation of the “over - all positive balance and account” of the communist countries expressed by Georges Marchais in 1979. The 1986 general elections confirmed the fears of the dissenters : with 7.2 % of the eligible and 9.6 % of the cast ballot – compared to 16.1 % in 1981 - , the PCF lost two thirds of its 1967 electorate in the Paris region and half in the rest of the country. It has only 35 MPs.13 Above all, there is the threat of a new phenomenon : The emergence of the Front national which with 9.8 % surpassed the PCF by number of votes, and also obtains 35 MPs. Thanks to its populist and protest discourse, the FN reaches its best results in the communist municipalities, especially in the labor suburbs. The threats of the “tactic vote” and of abstention are complemented by that of the transfer of a part of the labor vote to the Front national. This third electoral debacle came along with a highly symbolic social defeat.14 Since 1945 the PCF had transformed the state - owned company Régie Renault into a true fortress. There it had imposed a sort of brutal “codetermination” whose rhythm was determined by the strikes and protest marches in the factory which it had turned into its social showcase. In 1984 the company was on the brink of bankruptcy due to serious mismanagement. PCF and CGT objected to the plan for the necessary corporate reorganization. On March 2, 1987, the

12 Ronai, Evolution de la géographie des municipalités communistes. In : Communisme, 47–48 (1996), pp. 165–172. 13 Platone, Parti communiste. In : Grunberg / Dupoirier ( Eds.), Mars 1986. 14 Bruère / Hincker / Simon - Ekovich, Stratégie et tactique du PCF. In : Communisme, 15–16 (1987), pp. 164–180.

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mythic chain which was the heart of the historic factory of Billancourt was stopped. On March 30, the discharge of 1.300 people was announced, and in January, 1988, the management had regained control of the factory doors. The communists concentrated too much on the exclusive defense of their cadres, especially concentrating on the “ten of Billancourt”, lost the battle for the control of this labor stronghold. In November, 1989, the management announced the definitive shutdown of the plant in 1992.15 In this gigantic factory more than 7,000 out of 20,000 jobholders had been registered members of the PCF in 1937. For its last strike in July 1989 the PCF could not convince more than seven participants among 9,000 jobholders. This spiral of defeat intensified the internal struggle. Anticipating the 1988 presidential elections, Pierre Juquin, member of the Central Committee and former spokesman of the party, decided to present a dissident candidacy. He was supported by the “reformers” of the party, but also by other parties of the extreme left, PSU and Ligue communiste révolutionnaire trotskiste.16 This initiative was unique in the history of the party since the dissidence of Jacques Doriot in 1934. Fully conscious of this and of the dynamics set off by the defeats since 1981, Georges Marchais renounced his candidacy and instead appointed an inconspicuous apparatchik, André Lajoinie. The first ballot of this presidential election in April 1988 marked a further step of electoral decline. With 5.4 % of the vote, 2.7 % of the eligible vote, and 2,042,000 votes, Lajoinie suffered from the score of the dissident Juquin – more than 600,000 votes – but most of all from the “tactic vote”. François Mitterand managed a spectacular breakthrough in the communist strongholds, while the candidate of the Front national, Le Pen, collected an additional 14.3 % of the vote.17 The denationalization of the communist vote became evident : France has 95 departments ( without overseas departments ). In 30 of them Lajoinie received less than 5 % of the vote, in further 51 it was less than 10 %. He obtained only 15 % of the labor vote, while Jean - Marie Le Pen acquired 21 % and François Mitterrand 40 %. Worse still, his score among the 18– to 24–years old dropped from 24 % in 1981 to 6 %. At the general elections in June the PCF could only defend its 1986 results by massively presenting active mayors as candidates for parliament, even though traditionally the party had reserved these positions for its national leadership. Still it achieved only 27 seats out of 555 and compared to 35 formerly. 13 of the MPs are mayors.18 15 Cf. Labbé / Périn, Que reste - t - il de Billancourt ?; Linhart, Les ‘dix’ de Billancourt. In : Revue française de science politique, 3 (1992), pp. 375–401. On the failure of the CGT and of “union communism”, cf. Andolfatto / Labbé, La CGT. 16 Juquin, Autocritiques. Id., De battre mon cœur n’a jamais cessé. 17 Cf. Courtois, L’agonie du communisme français. In : Habert / Ysmal ( Eds.), L’élection présidentielle de 1988. 18 Cf. Courtois, Parti communiste. In : Habert / Ysmal ( Eds.), Les élections législatives de 1988.

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Map 2 : General elections, Juni 5, 1988, 1st ballot, Parti communiste Results by cantons ( not official sections – cities divided between several cantons are reunited.

Average : 7.2 %. Maximum : 42.1 % ( Port - Saint - Louis, Bouches du Rhône ). Minimum : 0.4 % ( Saint - Étienne de Baïgorry, Pyrénées - Atlantiques ).

This involvement of communist mayors seems to have had a negative effect on the municipal power of the party, since at the 1989 municipal elections it could defend the city halls only in 27 cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants and in just one large city of more than 100,000 ( Le Havre ). In 60 departments it does not even control one. This ballot was characterized by the loss of old strongholds, held for decades by the party. The reasons were structural rather

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than temporary or economic.19 On the one hand, the PCF paid for having failed to prepare the replacement of the old charismatic leaders from Résistance and Liberation times. The sheer name of those personalities had guaranteed a certain part of their vote. On the other hand, the communist municipalities went through a strong sociological evolution in the 1970s and 1980s : While in the suburbs of the big and medium - sized cities the middle classes by and by replaced the workers, many communist mayors did not amend their working - class oriented discourse. Some of them tried to introduce specific political measures to retain their influence. Some of them chose newcomers to the community according to their social stratum by means of allocating social housing. Others tried to preserve a municipal identity favoring historic and cultural ties with the town as opposed to the state and to the emerging phenomenon of intercommunality. The latter term denotes the technical and financial necessity for neighboring communities to pool their resources, thereby assuring efficient services ( waterworks, waste disposal and management, etc.).20 This defeat on the municipal level brought about a grave abscission of financial, material and human means for the party. Since the 1930s, the communist municipalities had been true strongholds enabling the party to support tens of thousands of members as municipal staff, to benefit from the infrastructure – premises, car park, summer camps, financing of friendly associations, etc. Thus, the party could ensure its hegemony over a captive population to which it could easily relay its politics and ideology. In 1977, at the peak of its municipal empire, the PCF administrated more than 16 % of the population, i. e. 8.6 million people. With only 3 % of the French municipalities in 1989, the PCF administrates only 9.6 % of the population, i. e. 5.2 million people. Sometimes the collapse was spectacular : In the Gard the party dropped from 45.3 % in 1977 to 4.9 %, in the Hérault from 25.6 % to 1.3 %.21 Due to the defeats of 1988/89 and the evasiveness of the leadership, internal protest kept growing. The “rénovateurs” ( renovators ) around Claude Llabres presented a dissident list for the 1989 European elections, thus contributing to a renewed electoral disaster.22 A new tendency appeared, the “reconstructeurs” ( reconstructors ) around former politburo member Claude Poperen. The mayors in turn decided to free themselves from the massive control of the central apparatus called “Fabien”, named after the Paris square where the party headquarters are located. Their dissident tendency was joined by 14 municipalities with more than 35,000 inhabitants lost in 1989, including one 19 Courtois, Parti communiste. In : Habert / Ysmal ( Eds.), Les élections municipales de 1989. 20 Ronai, Comment conserver une municipalité communiste. In : Communisme, 22–23 (1989), pp. 93–106; Rey, La résistance du communisme municipal. In : Communisme, 22–23 (1989), pp. 61–73. 21 Platone, Le PCF aux élections municipales de 1989. In : Communisme, 22–23 (1990), pp. 32–49. 22 Llabres, Les tribulations d’un iconoclaste sur la planète rouge.; Courtois / Lazar, Rechute, rémission ou convalescence. In : Communisme, 22–23 (1989), pp. 162–167.

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large city of more than 100,000 people ( Le Mans ).23 Finally, in October 1989, a fourth opposition manifested itself, that of the “refondateurs” ( refounders ) headed by politburo member in office, Charles Fiterman, and former cabinet minister Anicet Le Pors.24 However, those protests, opposition, and dissidence seemed to cause hardly any damage to the bedrock foundations of the apparatus which had for decades constituted the heart of communist power.

III.

The Culture of the Communist Apparatus

What was this apparatus like on the eve of the collapse of the communist world system ? Which were its values, what was its mental universe like ? We are able to get an idea of this because of the only opinion poll the communist leadership ever authorized among the delegates of a congress. This survey was held at the 27th congress in December 1990.25 The survey shows clearly the social background of the communist cadres : 47 % of the delegates came from the lower classes, especially from the working class – 23 % – while at the same time only 1 % of the delegates of a socialist convention were workers. Even though this characteristic feature had strongly decreased compared to 1976 when 46 % of the delegates had claimed to be workers, the PCF was the only party with working - class functionaries. For that matter, a very large majority of the delegates – 84 % – regarded the description of the PCF as “party of the working class” to still be relevant and appropriate. Inversely, only 25 % of the delegates had a higher education, against 64 % at a Socialist convention. Thus in 1990 the working class consciousness and culture, whether real or imaginary, still remained at the core of communist identity. But in society the world of the working class held a position of decidedly less strategic importance than during the decades after the war. The rate of the labor vote placed the communists behind the PS and the Front national. This is one of the major reasons for the breach between the party and society : The maintaining of the vision of a labor world at the center of an industrial society, while in reality the post - industrial era has begun. This “socio - historic” point of view is aggravated by some central values of the communist ideology confirmed by this survey. First of all, the communist cadre is anti - capitalist and collectivist : 76 % of the delegates favor collective ownership of the means of production – public and nationalized companies – over private property. 60 % think the state ought to play a decisive role with economy, only 12 % favoring regulation by the market. However, in 1990 the total failure of the centrally planned economy of the communist regimes was already clear23 Lévy, Un espace communiste. In : Communisme, 22–23 (1989), pp. 145–160. 24 Le Pors, Pendant la mue.; Fiterman, Profession de foi. 25 SOFRES, Les attitudes politiques des cadres du Parti communiste; Courtois, Les cadres du PCF. In Duhamel / Jaffré, SOFRES.

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ly evident – be it in the USSR where Gorbachev tried reforms, in the people’s democracies that had just collapsed with a fracas, or even China which Deng Xiaoping had led on its way to “socialist market economy”. The French socialists, on the other hand, had taken into consideration the necessities of the market since the 1983 economy drive. It is true that the majority of the PCF delegates declared that they only read L’Humanité which offers a particularly faulty view of the world and does not prepare its readers to understand the ever more complex globalization process. This is the attitude commanding the action of the PCF : to give priority to the defense of jobholders supporting or promoting social conflicts according to the general scheme of “class struggle”. This latter term was a prevailing up - to - date topic for 94 % of the delegates. Consequently, only 9 % of them gave priority to the modernization of the country while 93 % were against merit wages and 75 % favored a strong increase of the estate tax. Thus, the “social question” remains essential for the communist approach, in accordance with the old slogan of the 1920s and 1930s : “Make the rich pay !” This frame of mind owes a lot to the fact that numerous delegates and many jobholders sympathizing with the PCF or being CGT members worked in the public or nationalized sector. The second central value confirmed by the survey reflects one of the original topics sparking the foundation of the PCF at the end of the First World War : pacifism and anti - militarism. Thus, practically all delegates demanded the removal of nuclear forces from Europe and the reduction of the French defense expenditure. This contradicts the interests of that fringe of the communist clientele working at the armament factories depending on the state. During the first Gulf War, by the way, the PCF was one of the major parties to withdraw its support of the French participation in the UN intervention of Iraq. The third central value, closely related to first two, has been a strong element of communist identity from the very first : internationalism in its different modes. Foremost, it is “proletarian internationalism” which for decades had been the signal for communists to rally around the USSR. In 1990, 58 % of the delegates estimate the expression to be outdated. But 72 % still judge the Soviet stock and balance “rather positive”, and 81 % hold a “very positive” opinion of Lenin and a “rather positive” one of Khrushchev. 84 % voice a negative attitude towards Stalin, and 74 % towards Brezhnev who are, however, the two men incarnating more than half a century of history of the USSR. At its 22nd congress in 1976 the PCF settled for the line of “Socialism in the colors of France”. But still, the Soviet experience remained one of the party’s fundamental central points of reference even though it refused to accept its totalitarian reality. Several events tarnished and blemished the image of the USSR since the mid - 1970s : the expulsion of Solzhenitsyn, the persecution of dissidents, the invasion of Afghanistan, the imposing of the state of war in Poland, not to mention the boat people from Communist Vietnam or the Cambodian genocide. In 1982 only 11 % of the French people believed the stock and balance of the USSR and the people’s

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democracies to be “rather positive”.26 Once again, the communist cadres are totally out of tune with society for ideological reasons and because of their communist identity. Their internationalism nourishes from a very strong anti - imperialism which is above all anti - Americanism persisting among 89 % of the delegates and partially shared by the public opinion. 89 % of the delegates also express their anti - Germanism, totally contradicting the policy introduced by de Gaulle and endorsed by Mitterrand which made the French - German couple the motor of the European Union. On the other end of the scale, the “victims of imperialism” rank up high : Vietnam and Cuba receive 79 and 80 % favorable opinions respectively. And 91 % of the delegates approve of the suggestion to annul the debts of the poor countries. This internationalism is also put to use in more unexpected fields : While 80 % reject the wearing of the Islamic veil at school due to their non - religious conditioning, 97 % favor the right of non - naturalized immigrant to vote because the PCF hopes to win this potential electoral clientele in the suburbs. 87 % are even in favor of building mosques. Here again, the communist cadres are very far removed from the lowest classes of society who massively reject Muslim immigration from the Maghreb, Turkey, or African countries. In the field of domestic policy, the delegates are extremely hostile to the founding principle of the Fifth Republic : the general election of the president. 78 % of them object to this principle, while public opinion supports it. Even though between 1972 and 1977 they had formed a coalition with the Socialists and later, between 1981 and 1984, a government, a strong anti Socialist attitude was prevalent among the delegates : On a scale of ten, they marked a degree of popularity of 2.2. 90 % of them expressed a negative opinion of Michel Rocard’s Socialist government. 44 % classified the PS as “right wing”, only 13 % considered it “left - wing”. 41 % admitted not having elected Mitterrand at the second ballot of the presidential elections in 1988. The rupture at the congress of Tours in 1920, the old battle between reformers and revolutionaries had left profound traces aggravating and intensifying the competition between both parties. All the more so, since the PCF was on the decline facing a triumphant PS. The survey reveals in a most symptomatic way the delegates’ vision of their own party : 53 % were “completely” and 43 % “quite” satisfied with its performance. Practically unanimously, they were in favor of retaining the name “Parti communiste” ( Communist Party ). 96 % accepted the expression “revolutionary party” as still prevailing. 41 % thought the PCF ought to stay the way it was, with 34 % favoring the party to adapt. Only 3 % believed that the party ought to change radically. More surprising still : 28 % expected the party to have regained more than 20 % of the vote by 2000. 26 Duhamel / Parodi, La dégradation de l’image de l’Union soviétique. In : Pouvoirs, 21 (1982), pp. 169–179; id., Sur l’effet Kaboul. In : Pouvoirs, 22 (1982).

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This survey among the PCF apparatus shows the party to be anti - modernist, and in serious dissent with the predominant attitudes of the country.27 The PCF returned to that opposition which had already been extremely harmful between 1928 and 1933, later between September 1939 and June 1941, and finally from September 1947 until 1956 : The discrepancy between its inalterable teleological dimension referring to the Bolshevik culture – i. e. the doctrine, organizational model, and the strategy of unconditional support of the USSR – and its societal dimension which had helped the PCF to adapt to the working - class and national cultures at certain moments, like the popular front, the resistance and the liberation. Every time the party had to make a choice the – to use Marc Lazar’s phrase – Soviet passion and the totalitarian passion in a democratic system won over the social and the national passion.28

IV.

From the Collapse of the USSR to the Resignation of Georges Marchais

When Mikhail Gorbachev introduced his policy of glasnost and perestroika, it was met with approval by the PCF for some time. At the 26th party congress in 1987, Georges Marchais even glorified it as the “second communist revolution”. However, even before the fall of the Berlin Wall the PCF had joined the most orthodox ranks of the international communist movement alarmed by Gorbachev’s concessions. The Yeltsin affair at the end of 1987 had already been a most unpleasant surprise. Like the hardliners of the CPSU, the PCF could not understand how a free political debate could develop in Moscow. Soon the PCF interpreted the perestroika as a deviation from Leninism. This is why during the attempted putsch at Moscow on August 19, 1991, L’Humanité of August 20 and 21 clearly supported the putchists. It published their proclamations and stigmatized the US - president’s support of Yeltsin – the Russian president and only obstacle to the Coup d’Etat. As late as on August 22, the communist daily denounces the “defeat of the supporters of this adventure” and acknowledges that Charles Fiterman, member of the politburo and head of the “refondateurs” ( refounders) had voiced his disagreement with the original position of the leadership. The defeat of the putchists left the PCF stunned and at loss. This is shown clearly by the debates of the Central Committee, hastily summoned in September, 2001, after Mikhail Gorbachev’s resignation and the implosion of the USSR.29 Nevertheless, the leadership very quickly established a line of defense and put an end to the discussion. It profited from the walkout of many dissenters who were at a loss facing the events in Moscow and who – like Claude Poperen – were convinced that “the party could no longer change”. The 1990 Sofres sur27 Martelli, Trois sondages sur le fait communiste. In : Société française, 40 (1991). 28 Lazar, Le communisme. 29 Courtois, The French Communist party’s reactions. In : The Journal of Communist Studies, March 1992.

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vey hat already indicated this. Moreover, the opening of the CPSU archives in Moscow permitted access to substantial information on the relationship between the PCF and the CPSU, particularly on the continuous financing of the party, but also of the CGT, by the 1st department of the KGB.30 The PCF tried in vain to distance itself from Soviet communism becoming ever more tainted by the revelations of the archives. But its public image kept deteriorating : In the second half of 1991, only 10 % had a positive opinion of the party, and of Georges Marchais only 7 %. This was the rock bottom of their popularity. This had repercussions on the electoral results. The 1993 public elections ended with the worst score of the left at a general election since the beginning of the 20th century. The drop of the PS was spectacular : It fell from 37.2 % of the vote and 282 MPs in 1988 to 19 % and 67 MPs. In this disaster, the PCF seemed to limit its damage; it kept 22 MPs.31 Nevertheless, its decline continued : It fell from 7.3 to 6 % of those entitled to vote, and from 11.3 to 9.1 % of the casted vote and from 2,675,040 votes to 2,268,931. Above all, the decline was enormous in its strongholds – the PCF lost both MPs in Allier as well as that in Cher. Parallel to the regional situation, the sociological model continued to disintegrate and dissolve : The PCF received but 12 % of the labor vote against 36 % in 1978, 10 % of the employees’ vote (18 %), 3 of the farmers (9 %), and only 9 % of the vote of the 18– to 24–years old against 28 %. This is a palpable sign of the disaffection of the youth with the party and of the lacking renewal of the generation of active members. Thus, at the end of January 1994 the atmosphere of the 28th congress was charged with anxiety and dismay, and the party was in fact split in two : The orthodox pole – centered around provincial and fifty or more years old cadres, members of the apparatus, of the CGT and of the JC ( Jeunesse communiste – Communist Youth ) – was against any change of policy and practical communist politics. The dissenting pole – more Parisian and more intellectual – strove for a reevaluation of the Soviet experience and for a refoundation of the party.32 Tired, ill, and weakened by the disastrous result of his 20 years at the head of the party, Georges Marchais had announced his retreat from the General Secretariat. Confronted with a mitigating debate, some dissidents did not mince their words. Thus Guy Hermier, head of the Marseille party, declared : “It is evident that every attempt to perpetuate the way in which the communist project was translated and ruined in this century will be irrevocably doomed to fail, whatever the tinkering.” The congress settled for some symbolic decisions : the modification of the “Statutes” – the suppression of the reference to Marxism and to “democratic centralism”, but without any real consequences – and the renaming of the “polit30 Courtois, Archives du communisme. In : Le Débat, 77 (1993), pp. 145–156. 31 Courtois, Le déclin accentué du Parti communiste français. In : Habert / Ysmal ( Eds.), Le vote sanction. 32 Le XXVIIIe congrès du Parti communiste français, janvier 1994. In : Cahiers du communisme, 2–3 (1994).

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buro” to “national bureau” and of the “general secretary” to “national secretary”. Three key personalities of the 1970s and 1980s who had been more or less openly avowed opponents of the secretary general, retired from the politburo : Roland Leroy, director of L’Humanité, Henri Krasucki, secretary general of the CGT, and Charles Fiterman. They were replaced by faithful followers of Marchais. One of them was Marie - George Buffet who became a member of the leadership for the first time. To everybody’s surprise, Georges Marchais appointed Robert Hue his successor. This came as a surprise because Hue is then very little known by the media and even less by the general public.33 46 year old Robert Hue, an orderly by profession and a black belt judoka, is a locally elected representative. He is the mayor of Montigny- les - Cormeilles, a town of 17,000 inhabitants in the Paris region, councilor at the general council and regional council of Ile de France from 1986 to 1993. Party member since 1962, he mounted the steps of the communist federation Val d’Oise, before studying at the Ecole centrale, then he was appointed head of this federation. In 1987 he was co - opted to the central committee, and in 1990 to the politburo. As a matter of fact, Hue is a man of the innermost circle: His father in law had been a volunteer in the international brigades and his wife was the nurse of Waldeck Rochet, Marchais’ predecessor who in 1972 was affected by a degenerative nervous illness. Hue owes his rise largely to his mentor, Pierre Blotin, who was Jacques Duclos’ secretary – the party’s number two from 1930s to the 1970s and the man of confidence of the Soviets. Then Duclos served as the secretary of Georges Marchais. Marchais evidently thought he could easily control his appointed successor after having placed him under the control of his inner circle. He was entirely wrong.

V.

Robert Hue and the “mutation”

The new national secretary was immediately confronted with difficulties. At the European elections in June 1994 the communist list won only 6.9 % of the vote. In November Robert Hue was appointed candidate of the party for the presidential election in 1995. He had already freed himself from control by his predecessor and broken with the style of the old Stalinist apparatchiks with their fixation on the working - class. He was open for discussion and put an end to the authoritarian and brutal style of Marchais. Openly opposing the latter and his notorious “over - all positive balance and account” of the Soviet experience, Hue declared already in February 1994 : “Obviously that which appeared over - all positive was not.”34 Being one of the communist elected representatives, deeply rooted in his local environment of the Paris region which had not belonged to 33 Hue, Qui êtes - vous ?; and discussion of Dominique Andolfatto with Robert Hue in November 2003. 34 Declaration on the TV station France 2, February 2, 1994.

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the historic “red suburbia”, he recognized the difficulties of his party very clearly. Returning to the foundations of the pre - Leninist communist ideology, Hue centered his presidential campaign completely on the denunciation of “king money”, declined along four guidelines : Money and the social situation, money and democracy, money and employment, and money and the international situation. This set of positions made positive opinions of him rise to a dazzling 38 % in the surveys and even improved the image of the party. The electoral results reflected this image : Hue receives 6.5 % of those entitled to vote and 8.6 % of the casted votes, gaining 1.1 and 1.8 points respectively compared to Lajoinie in 1988. Winning 2,599,000 votes, he gains more than 576,000. Still he does not achieve 8.8 % of the vote, which is the sum total of the 1995 vote received by the “official” communist, Lajoinie (6.74 %), and the dissident Juquin (2.13 %).35 But the communist vote is distributed in two great blocks. On the one hand, the four strongholds where the PCF collects the majority of its votes : eight departments of the Paris region, seven in the North - West, six in central France, and seven on the Mediterranean coast. There, Lajoinie gained 1,153,103 votes and 56.4 % of his total electorate while Hue collects 1,310,646 votes but only 50.4 %. This is an indication of the continuing decline of the communist vote in these bulwarks. On the other hand, there are the 67 departments where Lajoinie only received 889,308 votes, making it 43.6 % of the total result, compared to 1,289,280 and 49.6 % for Hue. The PCF succeeds in slowing its decline or even gaining strength only in zones of weakness where its electorate is marginal. In spite of its electoral decline momentarily slowed by Robert Hue’s arrival at the head, the PCF party preserved its traditional means of intervention in the social field through the CGT and due to its implantation in the public and nationalized sector. Thus, in December 1995 it contributed to the failure of an important reform of the social security initiated by Prime Minister Alain Juppé. The party had supported a long strike of several thousand SNCF locomotive drivers paralyzing the country for three weeks. In the same way, in 1993 the communists managed to bring about a major secession of the Fédération de l’Education nationale, the vital union center of teachers and professors. Then the communists created the Fédération syndicale unitaire ( FSU ), whose first secretary general, Michel Deschamp, had been a candidate on the party list for the European elections. His successor, Gérard Aschieri, is a former leader of the Jeunesses communistes. For a dozen years the FSU has acquired the position of a majority union in a sector counting more than 1,200,000 civil servants. After his relative electoral success and his social triumph, Hue carried the golden halo of his image as the “strong man” who had saved the party from a debacle. He then decided to display his ambition as a transformer he had devel35 Courtois, Le succès en trompe l’œil du candidat communiste. In : Perrineau / Ysmal, Le vote de crise, pp. 179–188.

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oped in his book Communisme : la mutation ( Communism : The Mutation ) published in the fall of 1995. Insisting on the professed singularity of French communism, the mutation claims a return to the sources attempting to discredit the concept of a “communist party of the type of the Third International” in favor of a “modern, open, dynamic, and democratic party” as if by miracle and without detailed accounts and balances, this could erase 70 years of unconditional alignment to the USSR. For the moment, the operation aimed at keeping the party from disrupting. The drive created on the left by the December 1995 strikers’ movement had made the PCF strong. Early in 1996 it became proactive and began a dialogue with the PS, the Mouvement des citoyens ( Movement of the Citizens ), and the Radicaux de gauche ( Left Radical Party ), but also with the Greens and the Ligue communiste révolutionnaire ( Revolutionary Communist League ).36 On April 2, 1996, an important joint meeting foreshadowed what was to become the “gauche plurielle” ( Plural Left ). As a consequence, Robert Hue permitted a big internal debate from which five tendencies emerged at the 29th party congress. The national secretary and his followers are at the center. At its “extreme left” there are the “conservatives” and the “orthodox” : the Stalinists with their fixation on the working class from the federation of Pas - de - Calais – a former coal mining region –, the Leninists of the Communist Coordination and the nostalgics of the Soviet system united in the Erich Honecker Circle, and the publishing house Le Temps des cerises. At its “left center”, we find the traditionalist members attached to the policy and to the figure of Marchais. At its “right” there are the Refondateurs aiming at the refoundation of the party basing on a “pole of radicalness” ( pôle de radicalité ) uniting the anti - capitalist tendencies. At its “extreme right” there are the members – or simply politically active persons – who from then on reject the anti capitalist pose and recognize that their sensibility and their action shall sign them in with the cadres of parliamentary democracy and market economy. The 29th party congress was the first not to take place at a communist municipality but at a capitalist cathedral, namely the tower of la Défense. And it was also the first one without the traditional spatial - hierarchic arrangement with a high grandstand facing the delegates on the ground floor. Robert Hue presented a speech totally lacking the key - words of Marxism - Leninism : working class, class struggle, Socialism.37 The party is no longer referred to as “the great party of the working class” but as “the party of citizen intervention” which has to fight deviations from democracy “not by abolishing democracy but by strengthening it in the well of direct democracy.” The national secretary tried to re - found a communist identity no longer rooted in the October revolution but in a “French” communism issued from the French Revolution. Its hue is practically

36 Rigoulot, Le PCF et les gauchistes. In : Cahiers d’histoire sociale, 8 (1997), pp. 33–50. 37 XXIXe congrès du Parti communiste français. In : Cahiers du communisme, 1–2 (1997).

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Christian with community, sharing, security the key words of a “human, citizen, solidary revolution”.38

VI.

The failure of the “mutation” and of Robert Hue

Thanks to Robert Hue and his “mutation”, the PCF seemed to have recovered. The general elections early in June 1997 confirmed the stabilization of the communist vote. It was not just the left recording a triumph, rocketing from 91 MPs to 319 and winning the majority at the Assembly. The PCF, too, won 6.4 % of the entitled and 9.9 % of the cast vote and 2,455,000 votes. It gained 0.4 and 0.8 points respectively compared to 1993 and more than 105,000 votes even though it had no longer been able to present a candidate in every constituency, but only in 533 of 555 constituencies. Profiting from agreements with the PS and the Mouvement des citoyens, the PCF became the only candidate of the left in 39 constituencies at the second ballot. It won 35 of them and thus raised the number of its MPs from 25 to 38.39 But still, it barely matched Robert Hue’s score at the presidential elections, even though the latter has always been less favorable for the party than general elections where it profits from its local ties. Thus in 1995 Hue’s personality factor masked the continuity of the decline, some of whose criteria are listed in the sociological data. Two fundamental data of the decline are confirmed : the discontentment with communism of the young and the aging of its electorate, and the enormous decline of communist influence with workers. With the PCF rate of penetration of this electorate stagnating between 9.2 % in 1988 and 10.4 % in 1995, it is surpassed by the Front national whose results are twice as high : 16.9 % in 1995. The PCF loses its principal sociological base of support with the number of workers decreasing and less and less voting PCF. These ambivalent results were compensated by the participation of several communists in the government of the “plural left” lead by the socialist Lionel Jospin. Jean - Claude Gayssot owed his appointment as head of the important ministry of transportation, equipment and accommodation to his erstwhile position at the SNCF. Marie - George Buffet was appointed Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports, and Michèle Demessine, the senator of Nord, was named State Secretary for tourism. Thus, the communist leadership could secure professional revenue for some of its cadres in the ministries. At the same time it could reassure its traditional clientele, namely the civil servants and employees of youth and recreation associations. This point of support was unhoped - for. But in fall 1997, when the Black Book of Communism was published, the limits of the “mutation” became evident : the PCF preferred myth or insult to a se38 Dilas - Rocherieux, Le PCF à la recherche d’une idéologie. In : Cahiers d’histoire sociale, 8 (1997), pp. 51–58. 39 Platone, Le vote communiste. In : Perrineau / Ysmal ( Eds.), Le vote surprise, pp. 161–188.

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Table 1 : Sociological Characteristics of the Communist Electorate, 1978–1997 1978 In %

1988

1995

1997

Voters of Voters Voters General PopulaPopula- Communist PopulaLajoinie Hue Candidates tion Elections tion tion N=185 N=236 N=227

Sex Male

54

53,5

47,4

50,3

47,6

54,2

47,6

Female

46

46,5

52,6

49,7

52,4

45,8

52,4

14,6

13,3

10,6

13,2

11,5

12,6

20,0

20,9

23,7

18,9

17,6

19,3

Age 18–24 years 25–34 years

42*

35–49 years

24

27,0

25,1

29,2

27,6

31,3

28,8

50–64 years

21

22,2

22,3

21,2

20,8

21,1

18,8

64 years and older

13

16,2

18,4

15,3

19,5

18,5

20,5

4

2,4

7,6

0,5

5,8

2,0

4,3

4

3,6

8,6

2,9

9,2

5,0

7,0

4

4,1

8,3

8,3

10,3

8,0

13,5

17,8

18,1

25,2

21,1

27,5

21,7

Profession Farmers Craftsmen, Tradesmen, Entrepreneurs Executives, Higher Academic Positions Mid-management Positions Employees

19**

29,0

32,4

26,7

30,1

26,0

30,2

Workers

49

43,1

25

36,4

23,5

31,5

23,3

Source : Greffet, L’évolution électorale du PCF de Robert Hue. In : Communisme 67–68 (2001), p. 172; Courtois / Lazar, Histoire du Parti communiste français, p. 378. * The 1978 evaluations cover the 18–34 years old. ** This estimation includes the employees and the middle executives.

rious attempt at taking stock of its own history.40 And on this occasion it found itself in the company of Trotskyite groups, with the “refounders” moving closer to the LCR, and the communist left – Leninist tendency – becoming an ally of the Parti des travailleurs ( Workers’ Party ). 40 Courtois / Werth et al., Le livre noir du communisme; on the unwinding and issues of the following intellectual and political battle, especially on the reaction of the PCF, cf. Courtois, Du passé faisons table rase ! In : Courtois ( Ed.), Du passé faisons table rase !, pp. 15–160.

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Robert Hue intended to make the 1999 European elections a major initiative of the “mutation” by his heading the list named “Bouge l’Europe” : a list of double parity, one half of the candidates male and the other half female, one half PCF - members and the other not. The PCF spent the highest budget of all competitors, about 6.1 million Euros. With 2.9 % of the eligible vote, 6.8 % of the cast vote and 1,184,576 votes, the result did not correspond to the means deployed and had even deteriorated compared to 1994 (3.5 % of the eligible and 6.9 % of the cast vote, 1,332,939 votes ). The PCF only defended 6 of its 7 seats at the European Parliament. This lead to a public challenge of the “mutation” with Robert Hue being the target. The PCF was alarmed by the results of the joint Trotskyite list of Lutte ouvrière and LCR which had obtained 5.2 % of the vote. This was the first indication that the Trotskyite extreme left had begun to erode the communist electorate in its traditional strongholds and in the big cities. This was the result of the Trotskyites’ radically anti - capitalist discourse and of their harsh attacks of the plural left government in which the communists co - operated. The regional development hidden in this vote was equally disquieting. In fact, when the PCF made some slight progress at the 1995 presidential and the 1997 general elections compared to the earlier ones in kind, it gained more in zones where it had traditionally been weak – indicators 126 and 109 – than where it had been strong – indicators 112 and 104. Table 2 : PCF Results at National and European Elections, by type of department, 1988–1999 % of cast vote Presidential elections 17 departments “strongholds” 79 others General elections 17 departments “strongholds” 79 others European elections 17 departments “strongholds” 79 others

Indices of development

1988

1995

Base 100=1988 Basis 100=1988

11,06

12,63

112

5,62

7,62

126

1993

1997

Basis 100=1993

15,24

15,85

104

7,35

8,13

109

1989

1994

1999

1989–94 1994–99 1989–99 basis basis basis 100=89 100=94 100=89

12,71

11,41

10,20

89

88

75

6,29

5,63

5,88

88

104

93

Source : Greffet, L’évolution électorale du PCF de Robert Hue. In : Communisme, 67–68 (2001), p. 165.

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At the European elections the list “Bouge l’Europe” lost much more in its strongholds. This confirms an earlier statement : The PCF regains electoral territory mostly in departments with a weak communist vote. If it loses, it mostly does so in its strongholds. In both cases this is a process of marginalization in the political field which will be worsened by the continuing dissociation of the CGT leadership from that of the PCF and by the fall of the communist municipal empire.41

VII. The Dissociation of the CGT and the Fall of the Communist Municipal Empire Since the 1930s the two central pillars of communist power had been its deep municipal rooting and its union support. But at the 29th congress in 1995 the secretary general of the CGT, Louis Viannet, declared that there need no longer be an organic liaison between the union leadership and that of the party. Viannet, who was then a member of the PCF politburo like all his predecessors since 1945, left it as a consequence. Thus, the notorious “transmission belt” between the party and “the masses” which the union had embodied was officially torn, even though the number of PCF members at the head of the CGT was still high. But this decision brought about the gradual dissociation of PCF and CGT. Only in 2001 the secretary general of the CGT who had continued to be a member of the national council ( the former central committee ) of the PCF does not hold a seat in the central organs of the PCF any longer. Moreover, in 1999 the CGT refused to follow an appeal by the party for a demonstration claiming employment, thus symbolically signifying that it was no longer clinging to the party’s coat - tails. Still, many cultural and moral links survived. Many of the CGT leading figures remain close to the PCF. This is one of the reasons why Bernard Thibault, the present secretary general, was outnumbered and the CGT stopped his position on the project of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005. The confederal leadership favored neutrality to reaffirm the diversity of the CGT which it strives for. But the secretaries of the various organizations, most of whom had remained faithful and loyal to the PCF, imposed the opposition to the Treaty.42 The municipal rooting of the PCF had been implemented since 1935 with the spectacular appearance of the “read belt” in the Paris suburbia. It was confirmed at the 1945 elections. At that time the PCF was at the peak of its prestige because of its important role in the Resistance and at the Liberation. Since then, the communist municipalities had become strongholds where the communists controlled the population through the network of their innumerable asso41 Greffet, Le PCF. In : Bréchon ( Ed.), Les partis politiques français, pp. 108–109. 42 For the development of the ties between PCF and CGT, cf. Andolfatto / Labbé, Histoire des syndicats.

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ciations and with its strong clientage. Mercilessly they chased out each and every political competitor adopting even means such as attributing themselves results of more than 60 % of the vote at elections to a point where sometimes no other List dared to run against them.43 Steadily progressing in the 1960s and 1970s, the communist municipal empire reached its peak in 1977 due to agreements on standing down politics with the PS within the union of the left. It was also due to the concurrence of the huge complexes of buildings erected in the mid - size towns during the last two decades being fully occupied and in their first full bloom. From 1977 to 1983 the PCF ruled 72 towns and cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants, 6 of them with more than 100,000.44 But this success was fragile indeed. During this municipal term of office, in many towns and cities recently won, the traditional methods failed. They had a much broader sociological profile than the workingclass suburbs before or immediately after the war. Between 1977 and 2001 the PCF permanently lost ground in the municipalities. In 1983 it won 1,464 town and city halls ( from more than 35,000 villages, towns and cities ). Of 221 cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants, the PCF took 52 – i. e. 23.5 % compared to 32.5 % in 1977. After the 1989 municipal elections it still controlled more than 1,098 municipalities, among them 46 cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants (20 %). 28 of them were situated in the Paris region indicating the fallback to the traditional strongholds of the “red belt”. The 2001 elections again emphasized the decline : The PCF could defend but 29 out of 277 cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants, i. e. 10.4 % with 22 of them situated in the Paris region. Furthermore, it lost its last large city with more than 100,000 inhabitants, Nîmes. This bad result had several causes. There are economic ones : The cities of the industrial basins in decline or in the midst of a restructuring process were hit very hard by the economic crisis and had to pay a high toll of blue collar unemployment. The crisis is also a political one : These municipalities were dissatisfied with suffering from the repercussions of the national decline on the local level. Often they experienced more or less open conflicts between the apparatus of the elected representatives of the municipal bodies adapting their politics to their electoral clientele and the central party apparatus guarding the dogmas and the national line. Moreover, in its strongholds the PCF had established organized fraud as a frequent pattern designed to cut the result of the Socialists and to raise its own. The case of the communist stronghold Ivry - sur - Seine – the bastion of Maurice Thorez – is a very typical example. Since the end of the 1980s this fraudulent practice was substantially reduced due to greater vigilance of the competing organizations, legal sanctions, and the decline of communist militancy as well as its reduced readiness to adopt all pos43 Pronier, Les municipalités communistes. 44 Cf. Lacorne, Les notables rouges.

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Table 3 : Development of the municipal rooting of the PCF in cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants, from 1959 to 2001 Election

Cities governed before the elections

1959

16

1965

25

Cities lost

Total no. of cities acquired

10

1

25

9

1

33

Cities won

1971

33

12

–

45

1977

45

27

–

72

1983

72

–

20

52

1989

52

1

7

46

1995

46

3

8

41

2001

41

2

14

29

Source : Ronai, Essai d’analyse. In : Communisme, 67–68 (2001), p. 183.

Table 4 : The PCF and the Electoral Fraud : The case of Ivry - sur - Seine at the 1986 general elections official results corrected results

extent of electoral fraud Index value (total en voix votes official/total corrected *100)

% of the vote

% of the vote

Right

30,3

32,2

- 418

94

Noncommunist left

24,2

32,1

- 1 746

75

PCF

42,4

33,2

+ 2 051

128

Source : Lerolle, De certaines coutumes électorales. In : Communisme,18–19 (1988), pp. 19–33; id., Les élections municipales de 1995. In : Communisme, 47–48 (1996), pp. 173–198.

sible means. This “deficit” doubtlessly emphasized – artificially – the electoral ebb of the communist vote just like the frauds had artificially increased it. This rooting out of municipal bonds weakened the public presence and visibility of the communist candidates at various elections. In addition, communist militancy once constituting the power of the PCF has declined. Due to this decline it has more and more problems to insure its presence in the whole country. In 1978 the party commanded 28,000 cells. In 1998 the number had fallen to 12,000. The problem was even intensified when the 30th congress abolished cells as organizational units. The PCF is no longer capable of presenting candi-

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dates in each constituency at every election, especially at general elections – even though it endeavored to change this trend in 2007 –, this way automatically losing a good many votes.

VIII. The Decline of Militancy The decline of militancy is caused by the permanent decrease of the membership as well as by the evolution of its sociology. In 1978 the PCF claimed more than 700,000 members.45 In 1984 the number had dropped to 608,000, in 1994 to 500,000, and in 1996 to 274,000. This is a loss of three fifth of the membership in 18 years. Being official figures, they are likely to be exaggerated. Internal opponents insist on the number of 100,000 members in 1999. Membership is declining in every political party because many citizens prefer to co - operate with and participate in associations and networks. In addition, this dissatisfaction with the PCF is partly explained by the evolution of the communist membership’s sociology shown by the results of François Platone’s and Jean Ranger’s survey on a sample of membership cards at the height of communist membership in 1979 and again in 1997. It clearly shows the aging of the membership : the average age rises from 42 years and six months in 1979 to 48 years and seven months. In 1979 39.3 % of members belonged to the age group of 18–34 years, but in 1997 this figure has dropped to 18.3 %. At the same time the number of the age group of 60 and older rose from 15.6 % to 24.4 %. Parallel to this, the percentage of members of the lower social stratum diminishes very significantly. In 1979 the PCF was a young party of workers and professionally active people. In 1997 it is older, has more retired members, the generations of the Popular Front, of the Resistance and the Liberation being over - represented. In 1979 almost 60 % of members had joined the party in the course of the last seven years, in 1997 it was only 39 %. The rejuvenation of membership is quite poor. Furthermore, the intensity of the communist belief and conviction inspiring the members in former decades has declined considerably. This was also the result of the renouncement of the Marxist - Leninist doctrine which had structured this conviction and belief and provided an ideological and scientific dimension to the messianic one. The most symbolic act in this field was the liquidation in 1999 of the theoretical monthly of the party, the Cahiers du communisme founded in 1944 succeeding the Cahiers du bolchevisme of the 1920s and 1930s. But even though before the 2002 presidential elections the PCF had already been very weak, nobody had anticipated the pending disaster.

45 Buton, Les effectifs du Parti communiste français. In : Communisme, 7 (1985), pp. 5–30.

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Table 5 : Socio - Professional Distribution of the Professionally Active Members of the PCF in 1979 and 1997 ( in %) 1979 % of the Population Aged 15 and Above Farmers, Peasants Storekeepers, Traders, Craftsmen, Businessmen Self-Employed Persons, Higher Executives Medium Level Executives and Medium Level State Employees Employees and Service Staff Workers, Farmhands

PCF Members

1997

French Population

PCF Members

French Population

3,4

6,2

1,6

2,7

5,3

7,4

3,2

6,6

4,9

7,7

11,3

12,5

14,7

13,8

19,8

20,2

25,4

28,5

32, 9

30,2

46,5 100

36,4 100

31,3 100

27,7 100

Source : Platone / Ranger, Les adhérents du Parti communiste français. In : Cahiers du CEVIPOF, 27 (2000), p. 19.

IX.

The Failure of the Communist Candidate at the 2002 Presidential Elections

After the failure of his “mutation”, the 2002 presidential elections could have been taken as Robert Hue’s last chance. He prepared them painstakingly : Hardly a year after the congress at Martigues he organized the 31st “exceptional” congress to consent to his abandoning the position of the national secretary and his appointment to a new and honorary function, namely the presidency of the party. The intention was to create the image of himself as a potential president or future minister in a left government considering the then likely prospect of the victory of the Socialist Lionel Jospin. The congress named Marie - Georges Buffet national secretary and implicitly closed the book of the “mutation”. However, at the end of the year 2001 already, things did not work out satisfactorily for the candidate. He was prognosticated 5 % of the vote, the Trotskyite Arlette Laguiller with 5 to 7 %, the ecologist Noël Mamère with 6.5 %, and the second Trotskyite, Olivier Besancenot with 1 % only. Robert Hue’s result at the April 2002 presidential election was disastrous. He obtained a mere 3.4 % of the cast and 2.4 % of the eligible vote, making it the historical all - time low of the communist vote.46 To make humiliation worse, he was outdone by two

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Map 3 : General elections, Juni 9, 2002, 1st ballot, Parti communiste Results by cantons ( not official sections – cities divided between several cantons are reunited.

Average : 2.8 % Maximum : 37.6 ( St. - Amant - Roche - Savine, Puy - de - Dôme ) Minimum : 0.01 % ( Roubaix,Nord ) Constituencies – without officially nominated PCF candidate : 72 ( of 555) – not officially nominated candidate : Loire 1 ( Saint - Étienne Nord ), Nord 7, Nord 10 – dissident candidate : Gard 3 ( Uzès )

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Trotskyite candidates, Laguillier (5.7 % of the vote ) and Besancenot (4.2 %). Robert Hue paid dearly for the aging of his party, especially with first - time and young voters. Only 10 % of his electorate was less than 35 years old – compared to 34 % in 1995. Voters aged 65 and more composed 42 % of his electorate compared to 22 % in 1995. Furthermore, 45 % are retired people – compared to 22 % in 1995. Hue also paid dearly for the competition of the Trotskyites with their radical discourse on the social question. He only received 4 % of the workers’ vote – compared to Georges Marchais’ 28 % in 1981. It is a difficult question where Hue’s votes from 1995 went. One part of the communist 1981 and 1984 abstentionists had turned to the populist Front national in 1986 and 1988. But it seems that in 2002 the losses could have been manifold, to abstention or else to the very important offers of other left candidacies at this first ballot of the presidential elections. According to a post - electoral poll, 9 % of the communist voters of 1995 chose Laguiller in 2002 ( especially in the workers’ regions of the northwest ), 8 % decided in favor of the Socialist Lionel Jospin ( tactic vote ), 6 % for the ecologist Noël Mamère ( in the south ), 6 % Jean Saint - Josse ( association “Chasse, pêche, nature et traditions” – Hunt, Fishing, Nature and Traditions ), 5 % Jean - Pierre Chevènement ( Pôle républicain – Republican Pole ), 5 % Besancenot ( in the South and in the big cities )47, and 3 % Le Pen. Robert Hue’s defeat was confirmed by the following general elections when the PCF only received 4.8 % of the cast ballot and 3.1 % of the eligible vote. Due to 68 constituencies without communist candidates, the results were even exacerbated. For reasons already mentioned – the lack of renewal of the membership, the disaffection of the young and the workers, the competition of the Front national and the extreme left, the collapse of the image of the USSR and of communism –, the nation - wide communist rootage became marginal. The PCF returned to the structure of a “party on an archipelago” which it had already had during all of the 1920s and 1930s : small communist islands lost in a non - communist ocean. The Paris region was of decisive importance, since 33.7 % of the communists lived there in 1997. This underlines the fallback to the last strongholds of “red suburbia”. At these two elections the PCF does not win more than 20 MPs. Robert Hue, who had left the national secretariat, was relegated to the fringe of the party. From that time, Marie - George Buffet has been the “strong man” of the PCF.

46 Andolfatto / Greffet, L’extinction du Parti communiste. In : Revue politique et parlementaire, 1020–1021 (2002), p. 219–227; Greffet, Le PCF aux élections de 2002. In : Communisme, 72–73 (2003), pp. 101–126. 47 Salmon, Extrême gauche. In : Communisme, 72–73 (2003), pp. 127–138.

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Table 6 : Classification of the Rootage of the PCF at the First Ballot of the General Elections in 1993, 1997, and 2002 ( in number of constituencies ) lack of candidate

1993

1997

2002

0

22

73

0 to less than 5 % of the cast ballot

121

80

342

5 to less than 10 % of the cast ballot

278

269

74

10 to less than 20 % of the cast ballot

117

131

31

39

53

35

20 % or more of the cast ballot

Source : Andolfatto, PCF : de la mutation à la liquidation, p. 215.

X.

From one Presidential Election to the Next

For a moment, the fact that for the first time the PCF was lead by a woman seemed to herald the renewal of the party. Born in 1949, Buffet became a member of the PCF in 1969 while studying history and geography. Employed at a communist municipality, she became deputy mayor and, from 1977 to 1983, a member of the regional council. But she did not manage to enroot herself locally and remained a pure product of the central apparatus. She had entered the central committee in 1987 and the politburo in 1994 before being elected MP in a communist stronghold in 1997 and appointed Minister of Youth and Sports of the Jospin government from 1997 to 2002. Formerly close to Georges Marchais, critical of the “mutation”, Buffet rapidly dismissed Robert Hue’s followers. She led a very populist discourse indeed, but without a real strategic line after the shock of the absence of a left candidate at the second ballot of the 2002 presidential elections. But she benefitted from circumstances. At the 2004 regional elections, with the election of many regional candidates, the PCF seemed to sweep off a success. But in reality this victory was largely due to its pact with the PS already at the first ballot, even though Buffet had never ceased to denounce such a coalition ever since 2002. In return, in those eight regions where the party had presented its independent lists the communist decline continued. The same drawback happens at the 2004 European elections : The party only gets 900,000 votes, 5.4 % of the cast ballot and only 3 MEPs. At local elections the PCF has severe problems defending the seats of its retiring elected representatives. This explains its miscalculation at the 2004 cantonal elections: The party lost about 50 seats of general counselors, especially in its former strongholds like Pas - de - Calais, Seine - Saint - Denis, Somme, Var, Allier, Corrèze, most often because its former representative did not run again. In general, the PS profited from these defeats.

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Table 7 : The Strength of the PCF in the Eight Regions Where it Had Presented Independent Lists at the 2004 Regional Elections Election Presidential General

Regional*

European

Year

% of the % of the cast ballot registered voters

1995

9,3

7,1

2002

3,7

2,3

1993

10,2

6,7

1997

10,7

7,0

2002

5,9

3,8

1986

11,0

8,2

1992

9,2

6,1

2004

7,4

4,4

1999

7,4

3,4

2004

6,2

2,6

Source : Andolfatto, PCF, de la mutation à la liquidation, p. 222. * At the 1998 regional elections, the PCF had a common electoral list already at the first ballot in almost all departments. Therefore a comparison with other elections is impossible.

At the referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of May 29, 2005, quite often communist activists played the role of the local animators of the campaign in favor of the “non”. But conclusions seem difficult because this vote of rejection had been called for by opposing tendencies : Front national, sovereigntists, Trotskyite extreme left, and even some tendencies of the PS.48 Still, the geography of the “no - vote” reflects quite well the historical map of the communist vote. In anticipation of the 2007 presidential elections where she was to run, Marie - George Buffet presented the results of the regional elections and the success of the “no” as indicators of the return of support of the party. But previously, before setting up the battle formation of the party, she assembled the 33rd congress.

XI.

The 33rd Congress of the PCF

Not too long ago, a Congress of the PCF was not only a major event in the life of the party, but also in political life in general. The congress was a strong event highly important in the fields of ideology and politics, but also in social and cultural life. On this occasion, the whole communist society – or counter - society – put itself into the limelight and communicated with the nation. The 33rd con48 Laurent / Sauger, Le référendum de ratification du Traité constitutionnel européen.

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Stéphane Courtois / Dominique Andolfatto

gress of the PCF in Le Bourget in March 2006 seems to demonstrate that the congress has become solely an affair for insiders. It only concerns seasoned members, elected representatives and “professionals” of the party. It does no longer seem to interest society, or even the media. Still, the congress remains a particularly favorable moment to measure the development of the supporters of the PCF and of the balance of power between the different tendencies within the party.49 Support can be measured and analyzed according to different criteria : members, voters, and sympathizers. While the vote is known, the PCF was for long time withholding information about its membership and has only recently begun publishing figures. It is necessary to examine all these data especially since the meaning of the membership of a political organization has changed : it does no longer last a whole life and it does no longer seem to be the end of a period of political socialization. When the PCF states 134,000 “card - carrying members” in February 2006, no more than 99,000 of them are also “dues - paying members” entitled to participate in the internal poll on the resolution discussed at the congress. Only 46,000 of them voted. Taking into consideration how simple it was to participate – votes by telephone or internet were possible – this turnout is relatively weak. And even this number roused protest. The opponents of the leadership complained about fraud and exaggerated figures. The real size of the membership is doubtlessly between those alleged 46,000 voters and 99,000 “dues - paying members”. Assuming that participation in the internal poll resembles that observed among other political formations – and not noticeably lower as suggested by the data provided by the PCF – we can estimate the number of members ranging between 60,000 and 70,000. Sociographic data enable the drawing of a portrait of communist members in 2006. Some prominent traits emerge : the small number of workers, the relatively high age of the delegates, the high percentage of retired people, the significant number of union members, mostly of the CGT, and secondarily of the FSU. This indicates the persistence of stable membership networks between the PCF and the CGT, the dominance of the employees of the public sector, one third of the delegates are also elected representatives ( on the local level ). A survey of the delegates at the federal conference of Meurthe - et - Moselle – former working class federation – emphasizes the differences between the image the national congress wants to convey and the reality on the spot. There is an enormous lack of young people, activists, and women – all these elements confirming the loss of membership drive of the party. For a long time, the PCF was perceived as a monolithic organization characterized by the “iron discipline” of democratic centralism. Its electoral decline, the geopolitical disruptions of the 1990s, the renunciation of the fundamental 49 Andolfatto, Autour du XXXIIIe congrès de mars 2006. In : Courtois ( Ed.), Communisme en France, pp. 225–240.

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117

Table 8 : The Official Data of the PCF - Membership Since 1996 Official Membership Estimation (end of the year) 1996

274 862

1997

***

1999

***

2000

***

2000

164 181

2001

***

2001

***

2001 2002

147 622 126 185

2003

***

70 000

2004

132 820

55 000

2004

***

2005

134 000

2006

134 000

CardCarrying Members or Members*

DuesPaying Members

Voters*

47 000 100 000

203 590

57 040 50 156

15 616

138 756

63 941

133 767

42 782

132 820

92 772

24 013

100 346

32 838

99 277

46 210

Object Of Internal Vote

participation in government “agenda” 31st congress basis for discussion 31st congress modifications of statutes Choice of candidate for the 2002 presidential elections

“basis for discussion” 32nd congress European strategy PCFMembership of the European Left Party (EL) “basis for discussion” 33rd congress

Source : Andolfatto, PCF : de la mutation à la liquidation, pp. 241–255. * At internal votes *** Unpublished data.

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Stéphane Courtois / Dominique Andolfatto

Table 9 : Sociography of the delegates of the 33rd congress N = 898 (of 924 delegates) Gender

Women

43,8 %

Age

Less than 30 years

16,0 %

Workers Socio-professional categories

Sector of employment (n=887)

Type of employment

Elected

7,9 %

Employees

25,5 %

Foremen

13,0 %

Engineers, executives, technicians

21,0 %

Teachers

14,0 %

Public sector

62,3 %

Associations

7,6 %

Private sector

30,1 %

Stable employment

55,8 %

“Precarious”

3,0 %

“Out of job”

4,7 %

All Mandates

30,0 %

of them: mayors

11,0 %

Members of an Association or Union

67,7 %

Source : Documents of the 33rd Congress of the PCF.

rule of functioning, namely the democratic centralism, evidently led to a “reconfiguration” of the organization. The PCF seems to remain but a relatively supple federation of quite diverse electoral projects animated by locally elected people, namely mayors, and about 50 parliamentarians, like MPs and senators. The national leadership continues to superimpose itself upon those “projects”. But its means are continually shrinking as is its legitimacy – formerly derived from the international communist system – to strengthen the coherence of the projects and impose its own agenda upon them. Nowadays, the elected representatives act in the greatest autonomy, sometimes even autarky. Likewise, the party’s “rank and file” persists. Its members are often tempted to make their own marks against the elected representatives on the spot – who have become true “managers” such as Patrick Braouezec in Saint - Denis – as well as their national leaders. They favor a form of working - class oriented or nostalgic communism referring to the past or trying to protect or revive certain manifestations of political culture, and with them, certain forms of conviviality more or less bound to region and local history.

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Table 10 : Comparison of the Sociography of the Delegates of the 33rd Congress and the 2006 Federal Conference of Meurthe - et - Moselle Congress of Bourget (in % ; n = 898)

Federal conference Meurthe-et-Moselle (in % ; n = 54)

Women

44

17

Under 30 years

16

–

20–40 years

–

7

40–60 years

–

48

Over 60 years

–

44

Workers

8

44

Employees

26

26

Foremen

13

–

Engineers, executives, technicians

21

28

Teachers

14

4

Unemployed persons

5

6

Retired persons

5

45

Union members

68

67

Elected persons

30

31

Source : L’Humanité and data of the FC of Meurthe - et - Moselle collected by D. Andolfatto.

Who is the leader of the PCF in 2007 ? Two structures control the party : On the one side the national council – the former central committee – and its associated bodies ( national commission of arbitration, and national commission of financial control ), elected at the congress; on the other side the national executive committee ( CEN ) emanating from the national council ( CN ). The national council constitutes a sort of internal parliament holding a one to three - day session every two or three months. It discusses “reports” presented by a member of the executive and forming the basis for the great orientations. Since the 2003 congress the CN has become excessive with 267 members, but lack of participation in the reunions seems serious. The CEN itself, the executive body, has become excessive, too. Since the last congress it comprises 50 “elected ( by the CN ) representatives”, 8 “guests” ( the presidents of the parliamentary groups etc.) and 22 other personalities, employees of the party or “technical personnel”, totaling 80 people. Obviously, this collective cannot lead the everyday life of the PCF. However, the organigram does no longer define – like in earlier times – a secretariat. Thus it is difficult to statutorily determine who the “deciders” really are. The CEN is structured around 10 “coordinators”, each of whom is charged with some sort

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of small ministerial department. The official organigram does not establish any hierarchy. The “departments” are classified along the alphabetical order of their “coordinators’” names : civil rights ( Nicole Borvo ), Europe ( Daniel Cirera ), spokesman ( Oliver Dartigolles ), international relations ( Jacques Fath ), internal life of the party ( Michel Laurent ), coordination of the executive and the initiatives ( Jean - Louis Le Moing ), resources and means ( Jean - Charles Nègre ), ecomomy – social life – employment ( Alain Obadia ), culture – intellectuals – media ( Francis Parny ), city, regions, sustainability ( Jean - Paul Salon ). Marie - George Buffet, national secretary of the PCF since 2001, heads the CEN. The authority of the respective members, the relations of confidence developed between the national secretary and the members of the executive, become clearer through the responsibility of the “reports” ( or other contributions ) presented to the national council in the name of the leadership. According to our exhaustive statistics of these contributions between the two last congresses of 2003 and 2006, about ten personalities stand out as responsible for the presentation of several reports. Doubtlessly they form a sort of informal secretariat. On this “short list” of the CEN there are only two women and two workers – or former workers. The others are former the full - timers or academics. Most of them are between 47 and 59 years old. Two members belong to the “gay” community confirming the existence of new networks within the party and of its national leadership. Five members of the group are elected representatives : Only one MP ( Marie - George Buffet ) and four members of local bodies of the Paris region. Most of them are members of a communist federation of Ile- de - France, most often of Seine - Saint - Denis, and three have been members of the leadership since Georges Marchais’ days. This depicts a “microcosm” as far removed from the sociology of the party as from the image it intends to convey, for example gender parity of the composition of its structures. This group also demonstrates the predominance of the “Parisians” within the apparatus. The deconstruction of the historical structure of the national council permits the determination of the circumstances of access of its members and the specification of which political cultures and networks of influence could be competing with the party headquarters. The 2006 congress marks a net reinforcement of Buffet’s adherents. The majority of CN members (51 %) was newly appointed for this congress or the one before which had also been under the leadership of Marie - George Buffet. Thus, she consolidated her position. In contrast, the “Huistes” – appointed during the leadership of Robert Hue – represent no more than 38 % of the total membership of the CN, while they had still had the majority at the end of the 2003 congress. Finally, 11 % of CN members have held their chair since Marchais’ time, and even 30 % of the 10 most important leaders. Robert Hue and Marie - George Buffet are among them. Both of them had become members of the central committee two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The ratio of rotation of members of the leading bodies of the PCF – a combination of accession to and retirement from the CN at every congress – remains

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Table 11 : The “10” of the PCF Leadership Age MarieGeorge Buffet

Profession Listed by PCF

Federation

57 Employee

SeineSt-Denis

Michel Laurent

56 Engineer

SeineSt-Denis former secretary

Francis Parny

59

SeineSt-Denis

Olivier Dartigolles

35 Teacher

JeanFrançois Gau

Journalist, former 57 secretary of Georges Marchais

Gilles Garnier

Patrice Cohen-Seat Brigitte Dionnet Bernard Calabuig Richard Sheehan

Elected office MP

Year of Reports entering to the CN CN* 1987

6

1985

4

2003

4

PyrénéesAtlantiques secretary

2000

3

Paris region

1979

3

2000

3

1996

2

1996

2

1996

2

2001

2

Regional Councilor of Ile-de-France

Commercial General Council executive former Seineof Noisy-le-Sec 47 chief of staff of then St-Denis Vice-President of minister M.-G. General Council Buffet Lawyer Husband of Councilor of the arrondissement 58 Nicole Borvo, Paris President of the Paris IXe senators PCF Paris 50 Municipal cadre region Val d’Oise General Councilor 48 Mason secretary Of Bezons Paris 50 Metal worker region

Source : Andolfatto, Autour du XXXIIIe congrès de mars 2006. In : Courtois ( Ed.), Communisme en France, p. 235. * Statistics of the contributions to the CN for the period from March 2003 to April 2006. the calculation only includes reports ( or contributions ) inducing the publication of a specific document in the name of the PCF leadership. Improvised contributions at discussions are not taken into account.

relatively high. It concerned 31 % of the members accessing and retiring in 2006, compared to 28 % in 2003 and 52 % in 2000. One quarter of the leaving members were not replaced, while the CN appointed in 2006 comprises more than one third of new members.

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Table 12 : Historical Structure of the National Council of the PCF : seniority of CN seats attributed at the Congresses of 2001, 2003, and 2006 (in %) 1/ classification by year of the congress

2001 2003 2006

2006* % of the reelections according to the congress or the secretariats

1976

2

1

1

8

1979

2

2

1

8

1982

2

1

1

25

1985

2

1

1

16

1987

5

4

2

23

1990

4

4

2

25

1994

5

4

3

40

1996

13

10

7

41

2000

51

36

23

36

2001

15

12

8

53

2003

–

25

15

67

2006

–

–

36

100

100

100

100

–

Marchais 1976–1994

22

17

11

18

Hue 1996–2001

78

58

38

39

–

25

51

88

100

100

100

–

Total des sièges par congrès Total seats by congress 2/ Classification by secretariat

Buffet 2003–2006 Total seats By secretariats

Source : Andolfatto, Autour du XXXIIIe congrès de mars 2006. In : Courtois ( Ed.), Communisme en France, p. 237. * % of the newly appointed at each congress still in position in 2006.

This also translates into a growth of the number of seats of the CN. By the way, this enabled the admittance of some contestants around André Gerin, JeanJacques Karman, and Patricia Latour. This way they could appear more integrated. After the 2003 congress, the 2006 congress permitted the “opponents” to the line represented by Buffet to count their forces. In effect, the preparation of these sessions showed five competing orientations revealing different commu-

France – The Collapse of the House of Communism

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Chart 1 : Ratio of retirement from and accession to the leadership of the PCF ( CC, later CN, CNC, CNCF ). In % of the seats formerly held ( retirements – sorties ) or to be held ( accessions – entrées )

Source : Andolfatto, Le PCF aujourd’hui.

nist “identities”. Outside the PCF – but issued from it – a pole of communist renascence ( the former communist co - ordination of Pas - de - Calais ) defended a sixth project which, however, remained rather confidential. In spite of this abundance, the text of the PCF leadership won 63 % of the voters against 55 % in 2003 – but only 28,406 votes of the 134,000 members claimed by the leadership. Against the text of the leadership, four different texts enabled numerous opponents to collect their forces. The first one, entitled “Wrath and Hope”, was submitted by the exuberant deputy of the Somme, Maxime Gremetz, and received only 4 % of the vote (1,662 votes ). Due to his unpredictable character and playing a game judged too self - centered, Gremetz was isolated even within his own federation. Paris members defended the paper “Let us put the PC back on its tracks” which received 8 % of the vote (3,685 votes ). It revived the criticism of the “mutation” and refused every alliance with the PS for fear of “social democratization” of the PCF. It rejects the strategy of the “forums” established by Robert Hue, permitting a common debate of all left activists as distorting the identity of the party, and criticizes the “reformism” of the CGT and its membership of the European Trade Union Confederation. This paper asserts proletarian internationalism, underlining that the existence of the socialist camp “constituted a superb point of sup-

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port of the fights for emancipation throughout the world.” A third group – former followers of Marchais, often from Val - de - Marne – developed a rather hermetic economic discourse convincing no more than 11 % of the voters (5,125 votes ) compared to 21 % in 2003. The most influential opponents under the leadership of André Gerin, MP and mayor of Vénissieux, and Jean - Claude Danglot, secretary of the federation of Pas - de - Calais, defended the paper “Proud to be Communists” while repeating the criticism of the “mutation” and reaffirming the necessity of the PCF being a “protest party”. Economically, the paper favors workers’ self - management. Being very critical of the United States and of some Asian countries – not China, though – it brushes aside every questioning of the former Soviet system, only acknowledging some “imperfections”. This tendency won 13 % of the vote (5,938 votes ), but only in two federations, namely Pas - de - Calais (85 % of the vote ) and Haute - Saône (84 %). Their positions lost ground remarkably compared to 2003, when they had received 24 %. The 2006 congress thus showed the consolidation of the positions of the Buffet team which managed to cash in on the electoral success – real or feigned – of 2004 and 2005. More generally spoken, a positioning as a protest force found itself legitimized, which in turn lead to the reduction and dispersion of the attendance of groups striving for a more “orthodox” communism.

XII. The Disaster of the 2007 Presidential and General Elections After having totally controlled the 33rd congress and reinforced her position, Marie - George Buffet began to prepare her candidacy. In November 2006 96 % of the 61,980 participants at the internal vote of the PCF named her candidate for the 2007 presidential election. In December 81 % of the 52,302 voters expressed their desire for her anti - liberal candidature. This beautiful unanimity did not correspond with the public image of the PCF. However, after a deep fall at the end of Georges Marchais’ reign and a spectacular upsurge with Robert Hue it had stabilized somewhat. More than one third of the French people have a positive image of the PCF, surpassing its electorate by far. The “good opinion” of communists known by the interviewees has shown a steeply falling trend since 2000 – maybe because these communists are less and less numerous. However, even if the idea of communism itself is condemned by the majority, more than one third still believe that it could be rethought and reactivated. These results were rather encouraging for Marie - George Buffet. But she did not manage to appear as the only candidate of an openly “anti - liberal” camp : The Trotskyite candidates, Laguiller and Besancenot, both adhered to their independent candidacies. On top of that José Bové, representative of the Confédération paysanne ( farmers’ union ) and prominent figure of alterglobalism, appeared as a candidate to the left of Buffet, causing a phenomenon un-

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Table 13 : The public image of the PCF ( in %)*

Opinion of the PCF – good – bad – no answer Opinion of “communists you know” – good – bad – no answer

Sept. 1993

Nov. 1996

Feb. 2000

June 2002**

March 2003

Mach 2006

19 65 16

31 39 30

43 49 8

32 54 14

39 42 19

37 46 17

40 20 40

46 27 24

51 30 19

49 24 27

46 28 26

41 34 25

Source : Andolfatto, Autour du XXXIIIe congrès de mars 2006. In : Courtois ( Ed.), Communisme en France, p. 231. * Representative samples of one million people aged 18 years and older for every year ( polls CSA ) ** In 2002, the survey was held in June after the general elections.

Table 14 : Past or future of communism ? Communism is: an idea belonging to the past and out of date an idea which still has a future if its principles are rethought

February October 2000 2001

June 2002

March 2003

March 2006

54

47

40

53

54

42

47

53

39

39

Source : Andolfatto, Autour du XXXIIIe congrès de mars 2006. In : Courtois ( Ed.), Communisme en France, p. 231.

heard of until then: Communist leaders publicly and collectively supported this non - communist candidate. The director of his campaign was Jacques Perreux – former secretary general of the communist youth and communist vice - president of the general council of Val - de - Marne. Consequently, Buffet suffered a crushing defeat. Her result was the worst at a national election in the history of the PCF.50 Certainly this defeat correlates with the general defeat of the left and of the extreme left getting their worst results since 1969 at the first ballot and since 1965 at the second, even though the 50 Courtois, Chronique d’une mort annoncée. In : Le Monde, May 22, 2007.

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Stéphane Courtois / Dominique Andolfatto

mobilization of the electorate was the strongest since 1981. This makes the result even more significant. And the extreme left – PCG, Trotskyites, and ecologists – was hit the hardest : While in the mid - 1980s it had carried off between 12 % and 20 % depending on the type of the election, it barely passed the 10 % barrier. However, with 691,425 votes and 1.95 % of the ballot, Marie - George Buffet declines severely compared to Robert Hue’s 2002 score of 955,030 votes and 3.4 %. In a quarter of a century, the PCF squandered its electoral capital. Taking the 1981 score of Georges Marchais – 4,412,949 votes and 15.5 % of the ballot – as the basis of 100, Robert Hue had already fallen to 54 in 1995 and to 19 in 2002, and Buffet dropped to 15. The reasons of this disastrous result are partly related to the campaign which at the same time was directed towards reassembling the left and reassembling the anti - liberal movement. Thus, the candidate lost on both sides : to the “tactic vote” because one part of her electorate feared the repetition of 2002 and therefore elected the Socialist candidate Ségolène Royal at the first ballot already. But she also suffered from the vote for Bové who mobilized more than 464,000 voters and 1.3 % of the ballot. The result of Olivier Besancenot adds up with this. In 2002 40 % of his electorate had come from the Socialist camp; therefore he could have feared the backwash of the “tactic vote”. But he kept claiming to be the only legitimate anti - capitalist, revolutionary and working - class candidate and kept up his radical discourse entirely different from the haranguing sermons of Buffet. Siphoning off a good part of Arlette Laguiller’s 2002 voters, Besancenot propelled himself far in front of the PCF with more than 1,472,000 votes and 4.15 % of the ballot. He did not only surpass 5 % of the vote in several departments which Buffet did not achieve anywhere ( compared to Hue’s 14 departments in 2002 and 91 in 1995), but he did so in former communist strongholds : Allier (5 % against 4.5 for Buffet ), Cher (5.1 against 3.8), Haute - Vienne (5.5 against 3.1), Creuse (5.4 against 2.9), Nord (5.2 against 3.0), Pas de Calais (6.2 against 3.4), Seine maritime (5.7 against 2.8) and Somme (5.8 against 2.2). Even communist municipalities did not resist – like the traditional bastions of Vitry (7.7 against 5.5) or Villejuif (8.3 against 6.4). This phenomenon had already appeared in 1995, but it became more pronounced due to the continuing decline of the communist vote : In 1995 in the communist municipality of Calais, for example, Robert Hue had obtained 15.5 % of the vote, and the whole extreme left 7.2 %. In 2002 the relation had turned – Hue 8.6 and the extreme left 14.9 –, and in 2007 this relation had become even more pronounced : Buffet 4.6 % and the extreme left 12.0.51

51

Bue, De la relativité des phénomènes sismiques. In : Communisme, 72–73 (2003), pp. 139–172.

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One of the main reasons for this disaster is the definite disaffection of the workers – the longtime communist electorate by predilection. While Jean - Marie Le Pen reaps about 25 % of this vote and Olivier Besancenot surpasses his national average (7 %), Marie - George Buffet stagnates at 2 %. And Le Pen collects 12 % of the vote of CGT supporters, Besancenot 9 %, and Buffet 7 % – compared to Hue’s 18 % in 2002. This disaffection seems to be confirmed by an abstention rate above the national average in the former communist strongholds (Nord, Pas - de - Calais, Cher, Seine - Saint - Denis, Val - de - Marne, Mediterranean border ). This disastrous result seems to have left the leadership at loose ends. Joelle Greder presented the report to the national council on May 9, 2007. She referred to “deeply shocked communists”, a “communist party hit very hard”, “a true political catastrophe” and concluded : “The question of the future of a tendency of social transformation and of the PCF has been posed.” Jérôme Relinger, of the leadership, is devastated : “Everything must be rebuilt in our comprehension of the world.” The general elections following the presidential elections on June 10 and 17, 2007, confirmed the disaster. Here again, the left and the extreme left scored their worst results since 1958.52 With 4.3 % of the ballot, the PCF lost 0.5 % compared to 2002 followed on the heels by the Trotskyites with 3.4 % of the vote and an increase of 0.6 points. While in 1997 the PCF had passed the 5 % bar in 198 constituencies, this time it succeeded only in 59, in 23 of those it just passes the 20 % - bar. Moreover, it declines from 20 MPs and 2 associated MPs in 2002 to 16 communist and 2 associated MPs, thus losing its parliamentary faction and all the advantages connected with the existence of a faction – such as budget and premises, but also presidency of commissions etc. Confronted with the triumph of the right and of President Sarkozy, the PCF tries to react. Buffet has sojourned the explication of her defeat to a later date, namely an extraordinary congress in 2008. But at the traditional fete of L’Humanité on September 14 and 15, 2007, she brought together for a debate the Socialist François Hollande, the Trotskyite Olivier Besancenot and the spokesperson of the Greens to organize a joint response. Actually, Marie - George Buffet tries at all costs to reach an agreement with the Socialists on common lists already for the first ballot of the local elections in spring 2008. Because the great risk for the PCF presently would be the loss of what remains of its municipal empire. This would deprive the party of its last resources.

52 Martelli, Retour sur une séquence électorale tourmentée. In : Regards, 41–42 (2007), pp. 18–21.

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XIII. The Financial Collapse of the PCF Since the 1920s the PCF has been a party never lacking the means necessary for the maintenance of its very large apparatus of functionaries who were the true striking force of the communists in a country where before the war the organization and supervision of parties – especially Socialist ones – was exclusively guaranteed by elected members. Those funds were provided by the Communist International, then through the peripeties of the war in Spain, and after the war by the thriving import - export companies. They were headed by communists and benefitted from the monopoly of commercial relations with the USSR and the people’s democracies. But those sources have dried up since the end of the 1980s. Therefore, nowadays the PCF suffers from massive financial problems, and even more so because certain secret sources – the funds of the powerful committees of public enterprises controlled by the CGT and thus by the communists – roped in for a long time are presently strictly controlled by the courts . The situation is further strained by the question of reimbursement of the cost of the campaign of Marie - George Buffet – 4.3 million Euros, the highest budget of the “small candidates”. For those, the treasurer perpetually appeals for fees. The loss of seats in parliament also causes a serious shortfall for the budget of a party depending largely on the transfer of indemnities by its elected representatives. The compelled economy measures will be all the more insufferable for the PCF since it has retained a sizeable apparatus and an upscale lifestyle trying to continue playing in the court of the powerful in spite of its longstanding electoral slump. As a matter of fact, according to the latest published data ( concerning 2005), the PCF budget amounts to 34 million Euros against 49 million of the UMP and 47 million of the PS. Evidently, the financial relationship is less than 1.5 between the PCF and the other two parties even though at elections the PCF wins 10 to 15 times less votes. This imbalance will be impossible to be kept for long, all the more because it cannot be accounted for by the contributions paid by those members who have remained faithful to the party. In reality, those contributions account for less than 10 % of the resources of a party largely depending on its network of elected representatives. In spring 2007, the press multiplied its articles on the financial collapse of the PCF to such a point that the party was forced to organize a press conference on June 5, 2007, in order to refute that its national headquarters, the famous building of Oscar Niemeyer at the place du colonel Fabien was for sale.53 But the possible sale had certainly been considered. The PCF also tried to sell works of art it still possessed. It is also known that at least twenty buildings owned by 53 Chichizola / Delahousse / Tabet, Le PCF se prépare à une bérézina financière. In : Le Figaro, June 6, 2007; Van Renterghem, Un air de lutte finale à L’Humanité. In : Le Monde, June 23, 2007.

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129

Table 15 : Development of the PCF Budget ( National Council and Federations) Total Budget 1992:

48 million Euros

1994:

49 million Euros

1996:

49 million Euros

2000:

43 million Euros

2002:

4 1 million Euros

2005:

34 million Euros

Distribution of Ressources (in 2005) Membership fees

9%

Contributions of elected representatives 53 % Donations, fees

14 %

Public subsidies

14 %

Other revenue

10 %

Source : Commission nationale des comptes de campagnes et des financements politiques.

the party had been sold over the past years, among them the former central school of party cadres at Draveil and the building on Boulevard Blanqui in the 13th Paris district which had sheltered Espaces - Marx. And finally, L’Humanité also seems to try to sell a part of its premises at Saint - Denis. It seems likely that the 2007 elections will result in the PCF having to cut its budget by one third. It has already been considering laying off part of its employees after a first social compensation plan in 2002. XIV. Conclusion In 1946, the PCF was the strongest party in France and one of the two most powerful communist parties in Western Europe after 1945 – the other one was the Italian communist party. Since 1978 the PCF has suffered from a permanent decline : an electoral slump, the decrease of its membership, the loss of its municipal empire, the weakening of the CGT – its union transmission belt – and the collapse of its influence within the working class world and among young people. The decline is due to a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors closely overlapping and thus creating dynamics of decline nothing could stop.

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Stéphane Courtois / Dominique Andolfatto

The exogenous factors are national – the development of societal values after the May 1968 movement, the impact of the economic crisis and of de - industrialization after 1973 – as well as international – the collapse of the USSR and of the communist world system, and globalization. The endogenous factors are structural – the stubborn adherence to the Marxist - Leninist ideology and to a working class identity – as well as cyclical : the erratic strategy of alliances and conflicts with the PS, the incapability to operate simultaneously as a fighting as well as a governing party. When – induced by Robert Hue – the leadership decided to begin the mutation, it was too late : The PS had occupied the place of the reformist left and had positioned itself as the dominant party of the left, and the Trotskyites had occupied the space of the radical extreme left working within institutions. Worse still, the heart of the apparatus was not in favor of this change but preferred the familiar situation without any concern about the future. The Italian communist party had behaved absolutely differently : In 1991 it had already had turned over the leaf of communism to transform to a democratic left party and become one of the principal political powers. In contrast, the PCF leadership was incapable of imagining the disruptions caused by the fall of the Berlin Wall, remained frozen in its certainties and steered its party to marginalization. Presently, it is unclear which strategy the PCF should adopt : the project of a unified anti - liberal project collapsed on May 6, 2007. And in the bipartisan process developing between PS and UMP, the union of the left is hardly useful at all for the PS. The PCF might soon join the radical party on the cemetery of great erstwhile actors of the French Republic.

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Annex The Election Results of the PCF since 1945 Year

Type

Votes

Of Election 1945 1946, June 1946, Nov. 1951 1956 1958 1962 1967 1968 1969 1973 1978 1979

Percentage Entitled Voters

Cast Ballots

5,000,000 5,194,000 5,460,000 4,922,000 5,502,000 3,870,000 4,010,000 5,039,000 4,435,000 4,780,000 5,085,000 5,792,000 4,100,000

20.3 21.0 21.8 20.1 20.6 14.2 14.6 17.8 15.7 16.6 17.0 16.8 11.9

26.1 26.2 28.4 25.7 25.6 18.9 21.9 22.5 20.0 21.5 21.4 20.6 20.5

4,413,000

12.4

15.5

1981 1984 1986

General General General General General General General General General Presidential (Duclos) General General European Parl. Presidential (Marchais) General European Parl. General

4,003,000 2,211,000 2,662,000

11.3 6.2 7.3

16.1 11.2 9.7

1988

Presidential (Lajoinie)

2,042,000

5.5

6.9

1988 1989 1993 1994 1995 1997 1999 2002 2002 2004 2007 2007

General European Parl. General European Parl. Presidential (Hue) General European Parl. Presidential (Hue) General Européennes Presidential (Buffet) General

2,680,000 1,394,000 2,274,000 1,334,000 2,599,000 2,455,000 1,185,000 955,000 1,216,000 900,000 707,327 1,115,719

7.2 3.8 6.0 3.5 6.7 6.4 3.1 2.4 3.1 2.2

11.2 7.8 9.1 6.9 8.7 9.9 6.8 3.5 4.8 5.4 1.93 4.29

1981

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Stéphane Courtois / Dominique Andolfatto

PCF Votes at National Elections

L. : general elections; P. : presidential elections; E. : European elections. Internal votes at the PCF (1997–2006) Participants at internal votes

Objects of internal votes

1997

47,000

participation in the Jospin government

1999

57,040

Line of the 31st congress

2000

50,540

Line of the 31st congress

15,616

modification of the statutes

63,941

candidacy at the 2002 presidential elections

2003

42,782

Line of the 32nd congress

2004

24,013

2004

32,838

European strategy Joining of the European Left Party (EL) by the PCF

2001 (June) 2001 (Oct.)

2006 (Feb.) 2006 (Nov.) 2006 (Dec.)

46,210 61,980 52,302

positions adopted at the votes (in % of the cast votes) 80 % approve of the participation 88 % approval of the agenda of the leadership 80 % approval of the leadership’s project 76 % consent 77 % for R. Hue 55 % in favor of the text of the leadership No publication of results 75 % favour joining

63 % in favor of the text of the leadership proposition of the candidacy at 96 % the 2007 presidential election For M.-G. Buffet “Anti-liberal” candidacy at the 81 % 2007 presidential elections For M.-G. Buffet Line of the 33rd congress

Communist and Post - Communist Parties in Switzerland after 1989/1990 – A Survey Dominik Kamber

I.

The History of the Communist Movement in Switzerland

1.

The Foundation of the Communist Party in Switzerland and its Ban in 1941

The first politically organized communist movement was founded in 1918. The party of the so - called “Old Communists” under the leadership of Jakob Herzog was under strong anarcho - syndicalist influence.1 The party was founded in a time characterized by the workers’ struggle. The years between 1917 and 1920 were the high time of strikes with a total of 829 walkouts. The wave of strikes reached its tragic climax with the bloody suppression of a local general strike in Basel leaving five people dead.2 By ballot, the members of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland ( SPS ) refused their party to become a member of the IIIrd International. The “Zimmerwald Left” ( Zimmerwald Manifesto )3 leaves the SPS and together with the Old Communists founds the real Communist Party of Switzerland. After a plebiscite, the CP sections were banned in the cantons of Neuchâtel and Geneva.4 In the named cantons, the FSS ( Swiss Socialist Federation – Fédération Socialiste Suisse ) was founded as successor organization. Two years later, at the beginning of the second World War in 1939, the party organ of the CP, the daily “Freiheit” ( the German term meaning both liberty and freedom ) was banned, and another year later, both FSS organs – “Le Travail” ( Work ) and “Le Droit du Peuple” ( People’s Right ), too. Communist activity and propagan1 2 3

4

Jost, Die Altkommunisten; Rauber, Histoire du mouvement communiste suisse. Historical encyclopedia of Switzerland. http ://www.lexhist.ch / externe / protect / textes / d / D16479 - 1 - 124.html. The “Zimmerwald Manifesto” was adopted by a secret international socialist conference in the Berne village of Zimmerwald at the Zimmerwald Conference ( Sept. 5–8, 1915). On several basic issues no agreement was reached. The majority rejected the revolutionary point of view of Lenin and his supporters. Voters in the Canton of Neuchâtel accepted the ban with 17,000 against 8,000 votes. In the Canton of Geneva, 18,000 ayes won over 12,000 nays.

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da were also made punishable offences. Police controls at political meetings were intensified. On Nov. 26, 1940, the Swiss Federal Council imposed a general ban on the Communist Party of Switzerland supported by a part of the SPS MPs. One year later, the Fédération Socialiste Suisse was banned and its four MPs excluded from the National Council, the large Chamber. Thus, in the year 1941 each and every communist activity was illegal in Switzerland. From 1941–1944 on political work could only be done underground. Still, the illegal CP of Switzerland and the FSS united in 1943. The attempt to fuse with the Social Democratic party of Switzerland failed again. Semi - legal groups developed which participated in the elections of city councils, for example the “Parti ouvrier” in Geneva.5

1.1

The Foundation of the “Partei der Arbeit – PdA”

In May 1944 the Swiss Party of Labor ( Partei der Arbeit – PdA ) was founded in Basel as the successor of the Communist Party of Switzerland. The Foundation of this party constituted an event quite unique in the history of the workers’ movement : The Communist Party of Switzerland, the Fédération Socialiste Suisse, the Socialist Youth and the cultural and various other organizations associated with these movements had been banned by the Swiss Federal Council in 1940 and 1941. 1944, towards the end of the war, another left party formed itself from these circles. It was joined by members of the previously banned movements, but also of the Social Democratic Party and especially by many formerly non - affiliated left - wingers.6 This new Swiss Party of Labor merged the orientations which had been brought into the party by the various political components. It continued to develop its goals and ideas in various programmatic documents and to adjust to the changes of the respective social situation. After the Second World War the PDA met with a lot of sympathy because of its clear support of the positions of the USSR. However, after the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and in the course of the intensification of the Cold War this approval was lost again.7

1.2

The Party until 1989/1990 and its Program

In the 1950s the PdA was relatively strong in the German - speaking cantons of Switzerland, too.8 But during the Cold War its isolation became ever more visible and it changed into a splinter group. The only canton where it could reach 5 6 7 8

PDA, Die Neue Partei der Arbeit. Lossau, Die Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz; Fischer, The Labour Party of Switzerland. Exzerpt from Swisspolitics.org – Die Partei der Arbeit. Moreau, Die Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz. In : Moreau / Lazar, Der Kommunismus in Westeuropa, p. 375–420.

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just above 5 % of the vote was Basel. After the 1968 youth unrests and the foundation of the “Progressive Organizations of Switzerland” ( Progressiven Organisationen der Schweiz – POCH ),9 recruiting their members from the students’ movement, and the increasing competition of other left - wing parties, the PdA continually lost votes.10 In 1989 the party counted about 3,000 members. It was able to hold its ground in its strongholds in Western Switzerland, but in German - speaking Switzerland it fought for survival, especially after the expulsion of the only important section in Basel in 1988. With cadres of a younger generation it hoped to recruit new members and to stabilize new cantonal sections like Berne and Solothurn. The PdA was successful at the local elections in Lausanne where it passed the 5 % - quorum and won six seats at the city council. And in the cantons of Geneva and Neuchâtel it managed to hold its eight respectively four seats at the cantonal parliament.

II.

The Development of the Party after 1990

1.

The Party Program after 1990

After the breakdown of the communist states in Eastern Europe a lively discussion began within the PdA concerning contents, concept, and thus the future of the party and its about 3,000 members. The draft of a new party program emphasized new points regarding statutes as well as contents : Class struggle was replaced by the “movement for Socialism”. The dictatorship of the proletariat had already been dropped by the PdA. New topics such as equal rights for both sexes, the balance of the North - South - divide, and ecology were especially important in this draft. The general goal of this movement was the global democratization of every area of life. Knowing that social change cannot be caused by one single small organization, the PdA expressed its wish for a network of all reform - oriented forces of the various social fields in order to build up a people’s movement in favor of Socialism. The opening up for new ideas and topics the PdA had begun were put into concrete form by launching the people’s initiative “Women and Men”. It demanded a quota rule of a maximum of 60 % of the same gender working in any given political administration with five or more employees. At the same time, the party had launched a second initiative “Equal Rights in Social Security” which demanded the empowerment of the article of equality at the social security agencies. Contrary to the expectations of many political

9

In 1987 POCH dissociated from Marxism - Leninism. Foundation of POCH - Greens. After the dissolution of several cantonal parties between the end of the 1970s and 1993 many POCH - members joined the Green Party and POCH was dissolved. 10 Jeanneret, Popistes.

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observers of the Swiss communist party, the PdA was not shaken to its foundations by the breakdown of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the decline of the Soviet Union, rather the opposite. The younger generation of leaders, who had to take over some years ago, favorably commented on the breakdown of authoritative state - and party - structures in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.11 At two party conventions the Partei der Arbeit elaborated a new program and revised essential elements of its statutes, including the renaming of party organs. On the one hand, the word “communist” disappeared from the statutes; on the other, the new party program still maintains the goal of a communist society. The same way, the principle of democratic centralism as well as the names of Lenin and Engels disappeared from the statutes. The Central committee was renamed party executive, the politburo became the steering board, and the secretary general turned into the president. The new party program maintained the demand of the socialization of the land. A global nationalization of the economy was rejected. The central concerns of the program are equality between men and women, ecology, and more solidarity with the Third World. Furthermore, the PdA advocates a social Europe. The question of EU - membership, however, reveals a deep trench between French - speaking and German - speaking cantons.12

2.

Characterization of Members and Electorate of the PdA

Presently the PDA has 4,000 members. About half of the comrades are women. Due to its small membership, the PdA exists on the fringes as a splinter party. Still, it is present on the Swiss political stage because of some impressive soloists among its members. At the national level, Helvetian communism is represented by Marianne Huguenin and Josef Zisyadis. Both exponents represent the canton of Vaudin in the National Council of Switzerland. According to Zisyadis, the membership averages 45 years of age. The following tables make the existence as a splinter party clear. Presently the PdA is represented at the national level by two members of the National Council. Furthermore, PdA members hold seats in the cantonal parliaments of Geneva, Neuchâtel, Ticino, and Vaud. But no PdA representatives are members of the executive of the cantons ( State Councils, Government Councils, etc.).

11 Année politique suisse – Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Bern, p. 3. 12 Année politique suisse, ibid., p. 4.

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PdA Results at National Council Elections 1987–2003. Source : Electoral statistics of the Federal Parliament http ://www.parlament.ch / homepage / in - statistiken - tabellen.htm

Percent of the Vote. Source : Electoral statistics of the Federal Parliament http:// www.parlament.ch / homepage / in - statistiken - tabellen.htm

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Conclusion

The PdA presently regards itself a pluralist group. It is convinced that progress is only possible with the support of groups striving for similar goals. According to its president, Alain Bringolf, the PdA’s existence is more important than ever, and there is no lack of perspectives.13 However, those postulates as having been “revolutionary” at the time of its foundation – four weeks of vacation for employees, compulsory education until the age of 15, or an adequate old - age provision – nowadays are accepted rights. In spite of this, the PdA still considers itself an opposition refusing concordance and striving for a change of the political system. Due to the change of political relationships between East and West and to the fact that the PdA suffers from shrinking membership and votes, the party can truly be considered a political “quantité négligeable”.

13 Imhof, Die Geschichte der PdA, ibid.

II. Northern Europe

Post - Communism and Leftist Parties in Two Scandinavian Countries after 1989 – The Cases of Denmark and Sweden Svante Ersson From the time of the formation of the modern party system in Scandinavia in the early 20th century, Communist parties have been one component of the traditional five - party system model. At the beginning of the 1920s there were from the left to the right : Communist parties, Social Democrats, Agrarians, Liberals and Conservative parties. Over time new parties have entered the party system, such as Christian Democrats, Populist and Green Parties, meaning that no longer there are any five - party systems in Scandinavia. However, throughout the period from the early 20th century there has been a component of the party system containing parties located to the left of the Social Democratic parties in Scandinavia – Communist or Leftist Parties. The principal aim of this chapter is to map the development of the parties to the left of the Social Democrats in Denmark and Sweden over the last 15 to 20 years. Which parties belong to the Left scene ? Comparing the two countries, which similarities and which differences are found ? What changes have taken place with respect to different arenas such as the internal party arena, the electoral arena and the parliamentary arena ? And what factors may account for these changes over the time ? First, however, a brief overview of research conducted in the field.

I.

Recent Research on the Leftist Parties in Denmark and Sweden

When reviewing recent research on the Leftist Parties in Denmark and Sweden, a number of distinctions may be introduced. Some studies focus on the historical past of these parties, and this to a large extent equals the Communist parties in Denmark.1 There are no monographs dealing with contemporary Leftist parties. Research on these parties is found among comparative or case studies on political parties in general or political parties belonging to the Left. Yet there are not many chapters dealing with Scandinavian Leftist parties in studies deal1

See for Denmark: Jacobsen, Moskva som medspiller; id., Mellem København og Moskva; Larsen; Jørgensen Transformations and crises; and for Sweden Blomqvist Gåtan Nils Flyg; Bolin, Parti av ny typ; Kan, Hemmabolsjevikerna; Schmidt, C - H Hermansson; see also Björlin, Svensk kommunism; id., Nordic Communism.

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ing with Leftist parties in Western Europe.2 There are only scattered pieces of research on these contemporary parties.3 Party membership and the electorates of these parties are covered by general studies on party membership as well as by traditional election studies.4 A renewed interest for comparative studies on the political Left in Western Europe may also be noted, however.5 Scandinavian contributions on these topics may be found in journals such as Arbejderhistorie ( Denmark ), Arbetarhistoria ( Sweden ) and Arkiv för studier i arbetarrörelsens historia ( Sweden ), but they are less frequent today than it was the case in the 1970s or in the 1980s.

II.

Parties on the Left Scene in Denmark and Sweden

Over the period running from the early 20th century to the late 1950s the two Communist parties dominated the Left scene in both Denmark and Sweden.6 The Danish Communist Party ( DKP ) was formed in 1919 and it was the dominating actor to the left of the Social Democrats ( SD ) up to the major split in 1958, when former party leader Aksel Larsen was expelled. In 1959 he formed the new Left - Socialist party, the Danish Socialist Peoples’ Party ( SF ). Another split occurred within SF in the 1960s and resulted in the formation of the Left Socialist Party ( VS ) in 1967. Thus in the 1970s there were three major parties to the left of the Social Democrats in Denmark : DKP, SF, and VS. After 1989, the Left scene has been restructured and the two major parties are now : the SF and the Unity List ( EL ). The Unity List was, to begin with, formed as an electoral coalition in 1989 with DKP, VS and SAP ( Socialist Workers Party; one of the Trotskyite parties on the left fringe ) as major participants, and later in 1991 it was joined by the Communist Workers Party ( KAP ). Since then the KAP has ceased to exist as a political party in 1994; the DKP and SAP still exist as parties, whereas in 1998 the VS was transformed into an organisation. In addition to SF and EL, a number of small parties exist on the left political fringe : the Communist Party in Denmark ( KPiD ) which was formed in 1993 by

2

3 4 5 6

See Waller / Fennema (Eds.), Communist Parties in Western Europe; Bell, Western European Communists; Bull / Heywood (Eds.), West European Communist Parties; Hudson, European Communism – Hermansson, A new face for Swedish communism is the exception. See Wilks, New Left Parties in Scandinavia; Pacek / Radcliff, Economics and the Left Party vote; Arter, Communists we are no longer; Süssner, Parlamentarische Erfolge. See Bille, Partier i forandring; Widfeldt, Linking parties with people; Pedersen, Party membership linkage; and Andersen/Borre, Politisk forandring; Holmberg / Oscarsson, Väljare. Bracke / Jørgensen, West European Communism; Botella / Ramiro (Eds.), The Crisis of communism; Marantzidis, Les strategies des parties communistes; March / Mudde, What’s left of the radical left. Look at the figures outlined in the Appendix on the organisational development of the Left scene in the two countries.

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members of the former traditional wing of DKP; Danish Communist Party / Marxist Leninist ( DKP / ML ) is one of the remnants of Danish Maoism and took its present name in 1995; the Workers Party Communist ( APK ) also belongs to the Maoist wing and was founded in the year 2000; the Common Course ( FK ) was founded in 1987 as the result of a split from DKP and still exists as a political party, although it has broken its earlier relations with the Seaman’s Union.7 The major party on the Left scene in Sweden has been the Swedish Communist Party ( SKP ) which was formed already in 1917. Although there was a number of splits during the inte - war period as well as after the Second World War, there has been no serious competitor to SKP. SKP has changed its name twice : first in 1967, when changing its label to Left Party Communist ( VPK ), and then in 1990, when removing “Communist” from its label to take up the new name, the Left Party ( V ). No Left - Socialist party was formed, although a Socialist League ( SF ), formed in 1968, may have had such ambitions, but it soon was co - opted by the VPK. The first major split from the SKP / V after the war was the formation of a Maoist group in 1967 – the Communist League Marxist - Leninist ( KFML; subsequently in 1973 changing its label to SKP and then to close the party down in 1987); KFML faced a split in 1970 with the formation of KFML( r ), later (1977) KPML( r ), and in 2005 it changed its label to The Communist Party ( KP ). The second major split from SKP / VPK occurred in 1977 when the traditionalist wing of the party formed the Workers Party Communists ( APK ); later in 1995 it changed to the old party label SKP. Other parties operating on the left fringe in Sweden are parties belonging to the Trotskyite tradition, namely the Socialist Party ( SP ) and the Justice Party – Socialist ( RS ).8 The mapping of the political Left in Denmark and Sweden will thus focus on the three major parties : SF and EL in Denmark and V in Sweden. Three political arenas will be covered, namely the internal party arena, the electoral arena and the parliamentary arena.

III.

The Internal Party Arena of the Leftist Parties in Denmark and Sweden

One major goal for political parties is to keep them united and prevent internal divisions that may be conducive for splits. Instruments at the disposal of parties are the party organisation ( finances ) and the party leadership as well as programmatic orientations of the parties; to evaluate how well such goals are achieved one may inquire into the development of party membership figures over time. 7 8

Detailed information on the left political fringe in Denmark is found in Leksikon for det 21. århundrede; available at: http://www.leksikon.org/index.php. Björlin, Svensk kommunism.

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Party organisation

All three parties – EL, SF and V – have connections to a Communist party tradition. The Swedish V has direct links with the Comintern tradition, whereas the SF and EL only have indirect links. V and SF rely on a traditional, hierarchical organisation with a distinct party leadership, whereas EL has attempted to implement an alternative kind of organisation where leadership positions are occupied according to a rota system. In terms of party typology they have all more or less adhered to the mass party type, although they increasingly share features associated with what has been called the cartel party model.9 In particular it is obvious that the political parties today – and this also applies to the Leftist parties – increasingly rely on publicly funding political parties.10 Estimates suggest that V has more than 75 % of its income covered by public subsidies,11 whereas this rate is probably lower for the Danish parties – in 2002 the corresponding proportion for SF was around 70 % and 55 % for EL.12 Historically, initially the parties belonging to the Comintern tradition relied on subsidies by the Comintern itself and later by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( CPSU ). In the Scandinavian context, this means that the old SKP, the APK and the DKP to varying extent received financial support from the CPSU, while this was not the case for the SF.13 After the changes in party leadership of the SKP in 1964 there have been no traces of direct subsidies for financing the party. The DKP and the APK probably received financial support up to the 1980s. Therefore one may conclude that both SF and VPK / V during the last forty years have had no direct subsidies from the Soviet Union, which distinguishes them from the APK and the DKP, i.e. the Left - Socialist oriented parties differ from those parties which represented the more traditional Communist wing among the Scandinavian parties on the left.

2.

Party leadership

For political parties which have been associated with the Communist tradition, party leadership is important. To parties which have adapted to a centralised form of organisation, the position of party leader means the ability to control the party, at least the central apparatus of the party. This is one reason why the position of the party leader is often contested, especially if there are divisions within the party, and this has often been the case among Leftist parties. The Danish SF broke with the centralist tradition of the DKP, yet there is no doubt that Aksel Larsen (1959–68) as the first chairman of the new party had 9 10 11 12 13

Katz / Mair, Changing models. Nassmacher, Party funding. Gidlund, Allmänhetens insyn i partiers och valkandidaters intäkter, p. 44. Folketinget, De politiske partiers regnskaber; see also Bille, Partierne og partistøtten. Thing, Kommunisternes kapital; Björlin, Russisk guld i svensk kommunisme.

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difficulties to break with a life - long experience of working within the Communist movement. The issue of leadership was not unimportant for the split of the VS in December 1967. The then following party leaders have all struggled with the issue of forming a new kind of party, built on other and new principles of organisation : Sigurd Ømann (1968–74), Gert Petersen (1974–91), Holger K. Nielsen (1991–2005), and Villy Søvndal (2005– ). Due to the loss for the SF in the February elections of 2005, Holger K. Nielsen announced that he would resign from leadership at the party congress taking place in April. For the first time the new party leader was to be elected through a membership vote. Three candidates were contesting, one male ( Villy Søvndal ) and two females ( Pia Olsen and Meta Fuglsang ). Villy Søvndal won the competition, receiving close to 60 % of the membership vote, with Pia Olsen coming second with 1/3rd of the vote and Meta Fuglsang receiving 7 % of the vote; almost 80 % of the membership took part in the vote. Since the election of the new party leader there has been some turbulence within the party leadership. A member of the previous party board, Villy Dyhr, who had supported Pia Olsen at the leadership contest, has left SF for the Social Democrats ( SD ); there have been new elections for the position of vice party chairman since Trine Bendix chose to step down in June and was followed by Jakob Nørhøj. This turbulence probably has to do with differences of opinion between modernisers and traditionalists as well as between those being pro - EU ( Pia Olsen ) and those being Euro - sceptical ( Jakob Nørhøj ). Enhedslisten ( EL ) may be seen as the heir of DKP. Yet, one must remember that the EL in addition also shares the traditions of Danish Trotskyism ( SAP ), Maoism ( KAK ) and Left - Socialism ( VS ). These mixed traditions may be one reason for the new kind of alternative organisation chosen by the EL. Party leadership is collective, and various positions in the party board are occupied according to the rota system. The only spokespersons the party has are those who are chosen as leaders for the parliamentary group. DKP is still a constituent part of the EL. After a turbulent period during the first decade of the party after its formation in 1919 Aksel Larsen became the party leader for more than 25 years (1932–58); after his exclusion from the party Knud Jespersen took over for another 20 years (1958–77); at the death of Knud Jespersen Jørgen Jensen replaced him (1977–87); Ole Sohn was the party leader when the party ended as a traditional party organisation (1987–91), but he left EL to join SF. The DKP party organisation then had a collective leadership (1991–2003), but since 2003 Henrik Stamer Hedin (2003– ) has been the new chairman. At times, the party leadership of the Swedish SKP / VPK / V has been contested. To a large extent the party splits occurring in the 1920s were a question of struggling for the party leadership. Party leaders from the beginning of the 1920s include : Karl Kilbom (1921–23), Nils Flyg (1924–29), Sven Linderoth (1929–51), Hilding Hagberg (1951–64), C.H. Hermansson (1964–77), Lars

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Werner (1977–93), Gudrun Schyman (1993–2003), Ulla Hoffman (2003–04), and Lars Ohly (2004– ). Already at the party congress in 1990 Gudrun Schyman stood up against Lars Werner, but she lost the vote. She was, however, elected the first female Party Chairperson in 1993. The election of Gudrun Schyman was understood as a victory for the modernizers within the party in the more or less enduring competition between them and the traditionalists of the party. Due to the strong electoral record for the party up to the 2002 election, her position as a party leader was largely uncontested. She had, however, problems which were not related to her political leadership but more to her personal way of living. Over the years, from 1996 to 1998, there was a number of occasions when she had to admit alcohol abuse, and she also had to take a “time - out” from party leadership to seek treatment for alcoholism. The affair which finally forced her to resign from the party leadership was claims by the tax authorities of tax evasion; this became public in January 2003 and on January 27th she had to leave the position of party leader. She still remained a member of the party and MP, but she increasingly profiled herself as a spokesperson for feminism. On December 7th 2004 she left the party but re - mained an MP and since then has been a leading organiser for a new feminist movement which will stand for the next election in 2006; on April 4th 2005 she announced at a press conference that she was member of the board of a new network Feminist Initiative ( F !) and since September 2005 she has been one of the spokespersons representing F !. When Gudrun Schyman left the party leadership she was replaced by an interim leadership, Ulla Hoffman being elected party chairperson. She held that position until the next party congress, taking place in February 2004. It was only at a late stage in December 2003 that Lars Ohly accepted the position as a party leader candidate. The party leader was to be elected at the party congress, and in the final vote he was supported by 195 of the 225 delegates. Lars Ohly was supported by the traditionalists within the party, whereas the opposing candidate was supported by the modernisers. The outcome of the 35th Party Congress was that the tension between traditionalists and modernisers within the party increased. The former vice chairman of the party, Johan Lönnroth, was increasingly engaged in the broad left - wing oriented network of Left’s Choice ( Vägval Vänster ). Criticism was levied against Lars Ohly for his claim to be a Communist – although he had his own specification of what it meant to be a Communist. A critical scrutiny of Lars Ohly´s political orientations on a TV programme “Uppdrag Granskning”, which was broadcasted on September 28th and October 5th 2004, put Lars Ohly under hard pressure from the media as well as from the modernisers within the party. These events led to further tensions within the party. During spring and early summer of 2005 a few party members, who were also members of Left’s Choice, left the party – ( V ). One of the leading modernisers and also an MP, Karin Svensson Smith, left V to enter the Green Party ( MP ) and its parliamentary group. Subsequently, Lars Ohly declined from his claim that he was a Communist, and

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in December 2005 a working group within the party in December reported to the party board about the party’s historical relations to the Socialist and Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe.14 To summarise, the recent elections of new party leaders in both SF and V have been associated with renewed tensions between modernisers and traditionalists within both parties.

3.

Programmatic orientations

Among political parties on the Left scene deliberations about political programs tend to play an important role. Internal discussions about the party programs focus on goals and means of the parties. Such discussions display areas where there is a common understanding as well as issues of where there are tensions within the party. The principal programs therefore may be more interesting for the internal party arena whereas the electoral programs, or manifestos, offered by the political parties are more aimed at the general public in the electoral arena.

3.1

Principal programs

During the post - war period the Leftist parties in general decided on new party programs roughly every decade. The DKP formulated at least ten party programs during the period from 1944 to 1976, whereas the SF adopted five programs between 1960 and 2003, and SKP / VPK / V took decisions on eight programs from 1944 to 2004. There are distinct variations over the time concerning the orientation of the party programs. Based on a close analysis of the programs of Swedish Leftist parties ( SKP / VPK / V ), one may distinguish three kinds of orientations. First, we have programs dating from the years at about the 1950s, where much of the rhetoric goes back to slogans from the years of the People’s Front – the focus is on the working class. Second, during the 1970s one may identify programs which may be classified as neo - Leninist, where frequent references are made to the rhetoric of a revolutionary class struggle. Third, from the last period, i.e. the 1990s and onward, the focus is on green issues, and feminist theory is also addressed in these programs. Although there is a general agreement within the parties on the broad reorientations in the party programs, one may still find traces in these discussions of the tensions between more traditionalist oriented members and those which may be classified as modernisers. These orientations are related to the issues of rela14

Vänsterpartiets analysgrupp, Från traditionellt kommunistparti till socialistiskt vänsterparti.

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tions with the major Social Democratic parties, acceptance or scepticism towards the European Union as well as opinions on how to reform the Scandinavian welfare state model.

3.2

Electoral Manifests

At each election political parties formulate electoral programs, electoral manifests, where their goals for the coming election period are specified. By these manifests different issues may be addressed, and various standpoints argued for. Based on these manifests, it is possible to identify and classify the political orientations of the political parties along different scales. Figure 1 displays the left – right orientations of the major Leftist parties in Denmark and Sweden between 1945 and 1998, as they have been coded by the manifest - project.15 From the figure we may note that all four parties ( DKP is also included ) are classified as strongly Leftist in their orientation. On the whole, for the entire period the Swedish party tends to be mostly left - wing; over time it is also obvious that the 1960s were a period with more left - wing orientation than it was the case both in the 1950s and in the 1990s. Although there are differences between the four parties, on the whole they tend to follow each other quite closely when it comes to comparisons with the Social Democratic parties; there is a clear distinction in terms of left - right orientation between the Social Democrats and the Leftist parties, although again the Swedish Social Democratic Party ( SAP ) is more left - wing than the Danish party ( SD ), if average scores are compared over the time.

4.

Party Membership

Party membership figures peaked for the Communist parties at about the end of the Second World War. At about 1945 the DKP is estimated to have had some 65,000 members, and the Swedish SKP reached figures up to 51,000 members in 1948. Membership then declined sharply, and in 1950 the figures for DKP were down to 24,000 and in 1960 to 10,000; the new SF had slightly more than 3,000 members in 1960, and it increased to 4,000 members in 1970; during the 1970s the DKP had some 10,000 members at the most. The membership trend was similar for SKP : from 40,000 in 1950 to 20,000 in 1960 and 14,000 in 1970.16 Membership figures for the last 25 years are displayed in Table 1. There are some ups and downs, but by comparing 1980 with 2007 it becomes obvious that SF shows higher figures now than in 1980 and is close to the figures at 15 Budge et al. (Eds.), Mapping policy preference. 16 Thing, Kommunisternes kultur 1993, p. 1012; Hermansson, Kommunism på svenska 1984, p. 350.

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Figure 1 : Left - right orientation in election manifestos : 1945–1998. Source : Budge et al. (2001) ( CD - ROM ). Note : The scale goes from left ( - ) to right (+); the higher the value, the more extreme the orientation on the scale.

about 1990. On the other hand, EL shows a steady increase from the early 1990s up to 2007, although they only have less than half the membership of the SF. The Swedish V witnessed a steady decline from 1980 until the mid - 1990s when the trend changed, and from 1995 there has been a slight increase in membership to a peak in 2002. Overall, V has the highest number of members, followed by SF and EL. Relating membership figures to the electoral support, the membership ratio, the ranking order is different : SF has the highest membership ratio, to be followed by V and EL. Thus, no distinctive changes with respect to the size of membership seem to be associated with the fall of the Communist system. If there are changes, they rather tend to be consequences of political developments within the respective countries.

5.

Conclusion

As for the internal arena, no major changes have occurred among the Leftist parties in Denmark and Sweden. Enhedlisten ( EL ) has in practice replaced the Communist Party ( DKP ). There are tensions between traditionalists and modernisers within the parties, but this is nothing new. It may, however, be the case that the new party leaders in both SF ( Søvndahl ) and V ( Ohly ) may face more serious internal tensions than their predecessors. These tensions have so far had no major impact on the programmatic orientations of the parties, whereas the trend of party membership is upwards in Denmark and downwards in Sweden.

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Table 1 : Membership figures for SF, EL and V : 1980–2007 Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

SF (DK) 4 668 5 218 5 579 6 013 6 885 7 543 8 466 8 572 9126 9123 8 662 7 914 7 786 7 708 7170 6 887 6 573 6 264 6 240 6 440 6 473 6 513 7 065 7 088 7 026 8213 8601 9647

EL (DK)

1 082 999 1 093 1189 1 282 1479 2 023 1 968 1 945 1 992 2 366 2 321 2 524 3750 4250 4100

V (S) 18 157 17 793 17 320 16 761 15 976 15 696 14 379 13 699 13 517 12 935 12 279 11821 11 091 10 649 10 632 11 313 11 652 11 916 13 097 13 589 13 506 13 868 14163 13 411 11 907 11 000 11 075 11100

Sources : Web sites of the political parties; Bille (1997), Widfeldt (1999) and Petersson (2005).

IV.

The Electoral Arena for the Leftist Parties in Denmark and Sweden

It is in the electoral arena where political parties meet their voters. The electoral support for a party tells about the party’s standing with the electorate. Elections studies as well as other studies of public opinion also inform about what is typical of the voters of a political party in terms of social background and ideologic

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orientation. Through opinion polls it is also possible to follow the ups and downs of support for political parties between the elections. This section will thus deal with the electoral support of the political left in Denmark and Sweden, social and ideologica characteristics of the voters supporting the Leftist parties, as well as displaying the support for the Leftist parties in the opinion polls after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

1.

Support for the Political Left at Parliamentary Elections

In the Scandinavian context, the Social Democrats and the political parties located to the left of them – the Leftist parties – may be counted as the political left. One issue may be how to classify the Green Parties. In Denmark, the Green Party ( G ) has never been able to enter the political arena and is not to be counted as an actor at neither the national nor the local level. The Swedish Green Party ( MP ) first entered parliament in 1988 for a first three - years period and was returned again in 1994. From 1994 on, MP has been classified as a party to the left both according to expert surveys and the voter’s self - location. Therefore, the inclusion or non - inclusion of the Green Party among the political left matters in the Swedish case. The support for the left in Denmark hovers over time. The highest levels of support were received at the elections in 1979 and 1990, and the lowest scores were recorded for the elections in 2005 and 1973 respectively. In other words, over the period from 1970 to 2007 it is not possible to discern any distinctive trend, but for the last decades it is obvious that the Danish Left was far weaker in 2007 than it was in the elections around 1990. This decline, however, mainly refers to the SD; the Leftist Parties have for this period scored a support of about 10 %. Geographically, the Leftist parties are strongest in the area around Copenhagen, the capital; these parties are weakest in Southern Jutland, close to the German border. The political left has a stronger standing in Sweden when looking at the electoral support. Comparing the twelve elections taking place between 1970 and 2006, its support was highest in 1994 and lowest in 1991. If the Green Party is included into the total left, the left has had a majority of their own in seven of eleven elections, and if it is excluded, the majority position goes down to four of twelve elections. Just looking at the Left Party ( V ), one may note that for most of the period its electoral support hovered slightly over 4 %, to increase substantially in both 1994 and 1998, when the party received its highest support ever (12.0 %), to then suffer a setback in both the 2002 and the 2006 elections. The rise in support for V from 1994 on is probably due to its position as a Euro sceptical party, capturing a large part of the Euro - sceptical electorate in Sweden, as well as its ability to gain support from disappointed former Social Democratic voters at these elections.

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Table 2: Denmark: Support for the Left, 1971–2007 Elec- Green tion (G) Year

SD

SF

VS

1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007

37,3 25,6 29,9 37,0 38,3 32,9 31,6 29,3 29,8 37,4 34,6 35,9 29,1 25,8 25,5

9,1 6,0 3,0 3,9 5,9 11,3 11,5 14,6 13,0 8,3 7,3 7,6 6,4 6,0 13,0

1,6 1,5 2,1 2,7 3,7 2,6 2,7 1,4 0,6

1,3 1,4 0,9

EL

DKP

1,4 3,6 4,2 3,7 1,9 1,1 0,7 0,9 0,8 1,7 3,1 2,7 2,4 3,4 2,2

FK

KAP Other Total (A)

Left (B)

49,4 36,7 41,2 47,3 50,2 48,1 46,6 49,7 47,5 50,1 45,0 46,2 37,9 35,2 40,7

49,4 36,7 41,2 47,3 50,2 48,1 46,6 48,4 46,1 49,2 45,0 46,2 37,9 35,2 40,7

0,4 0,1 2,2 1,9 1,8

0,1 0,1

Sources : Ministry of Interior (2007). Note : Total Left ( A ) includes the Green Party, whereas Total Left ( B ) excludes the Green Party.

Table 3: Sweden: Support for the Left, 1970–2006 Election Year 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006

Green (MP)

1,7 1,5 5,5 3,4 5,0 4,5 4,6 5,2

SAP

VPK/V

AKP/S KFML/ KFMLr KP SKP

Total (A)

Left (B)

45,3 43,6 42,7 43,2 45,6 44,7 43,2 37,7 45,3 36,4 39,9 35,0

4,8 5,3 4,8 5,6 5,6 5,4 5,8 4,5 6,2 12,0 8,4 5,9

0,4 0,4 0,3 0,2

50,5 49,5 47,8 49,2 53,0 51,7 54,5 45,6 56,5 52,9 52,9 46,1

50,5 49,5 47,8 49,2 51,3 50,2 49,0 42,2 51,5 48,4 48,3 40,9

0,2 0,1 0,1

0,2

Sources : Statistics Sweden (2007). Note : Total Left ( A ) includes the Green Party, whereas Total Left ( B ) excludes the Green Party.

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Still, V has its strongest support in the northern part of the country, and one of its long - held strongholds is the county of Norrbotten. The previous sharp regional patterns in support for the left has diminished, however, and now its support in Stockholm, the capital, and Gothenburg is almost as strong as in Norrbotten; the lowest support for the Left is to be found in the southern region of Skåne, close to Denmark.

2.

Voters of the Leftist Parties in Denmark and Sweden

Social cleavages, in particular class cleavages, have over the time played an important role in Scandinavian politics. With class politics, the working class is expected to support the political left, while the middle classes do not support the left. Class politics looses importance when the working classes no longer vote for left - wing parties and voters from the middle classes go to the left. Class voting is another way of expressing the presence of class politics, and class voting may be measured by the Alford index; the higher the index, the more of class voting. Figure 2 displays the trend in class voting in Denmark and Sweden from the mid - 1950s to the present day. Class voting was quite high in both countries up to the early 1970s. From then on it fell in Denmark to decline further from the 1990s on. Class voting is also on the decline in Sweden, but the level is higher than in Denmark, meaning that in the two countries for the last two decades there has been a distinct variation in class voting. Today class voting is close to being non - existent in Denmark, but it still has an impact in Sweden.

Figure 2 : Class voting in Denmark and Sweden, 1956–2002 ( Alford index ). Sources: Denmark : Andersen / Andersen, Klassernes forsvinden, p. 209; Sweden : Holmberg/ Oscarsson, Väljare, p. 55. Note : Class voting as measured by the Alford index is given in the following way : percent working class voters minus percent middle class voters.

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Table 4 : Class voting among the Leftist Parties, 1990–2002 ( Alford Index ) Year 1990/1991 1994 1998 2001/2002

EL -1 -1 0 -1

SF -3 -4 -2 -4

V 0 3 6 4

Source : Andersen / Andersen, Klassernes forsvinden, p. 210; Holmberg / Oscarsson, Väljare, p. 302. Note : Class voting as measured by the Alford index is given in the following way: percent working class voters minus percent middle class voters.

Class voting may also be applied to political parties, and when it comes to left - wing parties one would expect more support by the working class. Table 4 informs about the trend in class voting for the Leftist parties for the last decade. From the Table we may read that the Danish parties have negative scores in contrast to V, which has positive index scores. These scores suggest that V has a stronger presence with the working class than SF, while EL comes somewhere in - between. In respect of the programmatic orientations of the Leftist parties there has been a shift from emphasizing their working class orientation towards being rather orientated towards to green values as well as a feminist ideology. By tradition, the parties on the left with their working class traditions have had less of support from women. As we can note from data for the last decade, based on the Eurobarometer Trend file, in Table 5 there is variation both over the time and between parties. SF is the party which over the period is supported by more women than men; V and EL both move from gender equality to female domination. In the Appendix ( Table A1), based on the recent election studies available through the Comparative Study of Election Systems ( CSES ), more data on the social background of the voters of the Leftist parties are reported. These data support the general picture outlined above. Support for the Leftist parties is stronger among female voters, among younger voters, among those in lower income groups, among those employed in the public sector as well as among unionised and secular voters. The ideologic orientation of political parties may be captured in various ways. Party programs may be classified according to their left - wing or right - wing orientation ( as in Figure 1), and political parties can be classified according to their position on a left - right scale through expert surveys, or by letting the voters of a political party locate themselves on such a scale. Table 6 presents how voters of the Leftist parties in Denmark and Sweden locate themselves on a left-right scale. As data in the table stem from the Eurobarometer, the scale goes from 1 to 10. It is obvious from the data in the table that the voters of the Leftist parties identify themselves as being left - wing oriented. On average, for the covered period SF voters tend to be less left - wing than the voters of V, and EL - voters locate themselves most to the left.

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Table 5 : Gender gap among Leftist Parties Year/EB 431-1995 440-1995 460-1996 480-1997 510-1999 520-1999 530-2000 541-2000 563-2002

EL 0,9 -0,8 -0,1 -0,6 -1,3 0,8 -1,9 -0,4 -0,7

SF -4,9 -8,3 -5,9 -5,4 -5,3 -6,8 -3,9 -6,0 -4,6

V 3,3 1,0 -1,1 1,5 1,1 -2,2 1,8 -6,2 -3,1

Source : The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trendfile (2005). Note : The gender gap measure is given in the following way : percent male voters minus percent female voters; i. e. a negative figure indicates a plurality of female voters.

Table 6 : Left - right orientation (1–10) among Leftist Parties Year/EB 431-1995 440-1995 460-1996 480-1997 510-1999 520-1999 530-2000 541-2000 563-2002

EL 2,62 2,74 2,46 2,52 1,74 2,12 2,62 2,40 2,72

SF 3,46 3,55 3,47 3,47 3,57 3,35 3,53 3,18 3,22

V 2,91 2,67 2,86 2,60 3,25 3,20 3,11 2,93 3,00

Source : The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trendfile (2005). Note : The left - right orientation scale reaches from the extreme left (1) to the extreme right (10).

3.

Support in the Opinion Polls for the Leftist Parties in Denmark and Sweden

Elections are not decided by opinion polls. Yet, it is no doubt that opinion polls today give a reasonably accurate picture of changing political opinions among the electorate. Figure 3 presents data on political support expressed by opinion polls for the three Leftist parties in Denmark and Sweden for the period starting with January 1990. The opinion polls quite closely follow the electoral outcomes. The scores between the elections do, however, display some interesting patterns. There is a sharp rise in support for V, beginning with the second half of 1994 and reaching its highest support in late 2000; from this peak the trend is clearly down-

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Figure 3 : Support for the Leftist parties according to the Opinion Polls 1990–2005: V ( SE ), SF ( DK ) and EL ( DK ). Sources : V : 1990–1998 : based on SIFO; 1999– 2005 : based on Temo; SF and EL : 1990–1998 : based on SRT; 1999–2005 : based on Gallup.

ward for V, reaching a relatively low level of support in late 2005. The highest figures for SF are reached in 1999, at a time when there were some speculations of the SF possibly joining government, but since then the trend has been downward, and the scores recorded in 2005 are the lowest ever since 1990. Opinion figures for EL follow another path, small variation over time, and its highest scores ever are recorded for 2005. Opinion polls provide additional information about the standing of the Leftist parties within the electorate. Judging from these polls, it is obvious that both SF and V, the two major ones among the Leftist parties, face declining support. This was true for V in the 2006 election, whereas for SF the outcome of the 2007 election deviates from this trend.

4.

Conclusion

In the electoral arena the left is stronger in Sweden than in Denmark, but this is largely a question of the varying strength of the Social Democrat parties. Comparing only the Leftist Parities, there is no major difference : over the last elections they have gained support from about ten percent of the electorate, but at the present stage they face a downward trend in support in Sweden, as recorded by the opinion polls. Class voting is more prominent in Sweden than in Denmark, whereas today SF, EL and V seem to have a majority of female voters.

Post-Communism and Leftist Parties

V.

157

The Leftist Parties in the Parliamentary Arena

The electoral arena may be an important vehicle for political parties to gain influence in the parliamentary arena. Since Leftist parties act within the left political scene, it is only through support for left - wing governments that such a potential influence may be realised. From time to time, support from Leftist Parties may be decisive for the formation of left - wing Governments. In this section the question of Leftist presence in Scandinavian governments will be touched upon. There will first be a discussion of issues on the political agenda which have had impact on the Leftist parties. Over the last decade, one of the major political issues in both Denmark and Sweden has been the EU issue.

1.

Issues on the Political Agenda

Salient issues on the political agenda among Leftist parties during the last decades have been traditional ones, such as unemployment and social welfare, but also issues of new politics on the environment, women’s position in society and the position towards the European Union. In the Scandinavian context the EU issue has doubtlessly been a major one, with impact on the standing of these parties in the political system.17 Denmark entered the European Community in 1973, but at the preceding decisive referendum in 1972 the Leftist parties were some of the major actors on the No - side. Ever since, the Leftist parties in Denmark have been sceptical towards the European Union, and their input was probably decisive for the victory of the No - side at the Maastricht - referendum in 1992 and in the referendum on the EMU in 2000. The Left Party has played a similar role in the debate on joining the EU ( referendum in November 1994 : yes ) and membership of the EMU ( referendum in September 2003 : no ), and the party is still to be classified as a Euro - sceptical party, although more softly today than ten years ago. Both V and EL may be classified as Euro - sceptical parties. This was also the case for SF at the time of the debate about Denmark joining the EC. But over the time SF has come to accept the EU as a political reality, which means that the party supports the EU as a framework for future political cooperation in Europe, but it is critical of proposals aiming at transforming the EU into a European Federation. In terms of concrete issues coming up for referendum, SF said no to Maastricht (1992), yes to the Edinburgh compromise (1993), no to Amsterdam (1998) and no to EMU (2000). SF probably played a crucial role for the formation of a “national compromise” which was conducive for a yes 17

Christensen, The Left - wing opposition in Denmark, Norway and Sweden; and id., Foreign policy objectives.

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Table 7 : The EU orientation (1–7) among the Scandinavian Leftist parties : expert judgments Year\Party 1984 1988 1992 1996 1999 2002

SF 1,67 2,00 3,11 3,78 2,57 2,92

EL

1,20 1,33 1,14

V 1,29 1,29 1,14 1,71 1,33 2,08

Source : Hooghe (2005). Note : The scale goes from Euro - sceptical (1) to Euro - enthusiastic (7).

majority at the 1993 referendum, although at the cost of further tension within the party. Likewise, the Amsterdam treaty spelled out different opinions within the party leadership, and an extraordinary party conference in September 1997 made clear that the party position would be a no (67 % voted for a no at the conference ). In advance of the forthcoming referendum on the new EU Constitution, the party opened up for a general discussion among its membership during the fall of 2004, and this discussion ended with a membership vote. The outcome of this membership vote in December 2004 was a clear majority in favour of a yes – 64 %. This vote took place before the May 2005 referenda in France and Netherlands, and for the time being no referendum will be held in Denmark, as was once planned. This special position of SF on the EU - issue among the Leftist Parties in Scandinavia is supported by data on the EU - orientation of political parties as classified by expert judgments and surveys of the electorates of the parties. Table 7 informs about the positions taken by the Leftist parties on the EU - issue as judged in expert surveys covering the period from 1984 to 2002. According to this scale, the more sceptical the position is, the lower the score, and the higher the score, the more positive the orientation towards the EU. EL stands out as the most sceptical party, to be followed by V, while SF is the least sceptical of the parties. Over the time, the parties are classified as being less sceptical in 2002 than in 1984, although it is obvious that the experts have had problems with classifying the position of SF – the score for 1996 was probably more informed by positions taken by the party leadership than on opinions of the membership and the electorate. Basically, the same picture emerges from data on how the parties’ electorate experience EU membership – good thing, bad thing, or neither nor – as surveyed by the Eurobarometer. Data in Table 8 only reach from 1995 to 2000, but they still display distinctive differences between the three parties on which opinions their electorates have about the EU. With one exception ( EB 53.0 of 2000), there is a plurality of sceptics among the voters of the Leftist parties. Yet, SF deviates from the other two parties, as

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159

Table 8 : Opinions on EU among voters of the Leftist Parties in Denmark and Sweden, 1995–2000 : balance scores Year/EB 431-1995 440-1995 460-1996 480-1997 510-1999 520-1999 530-2000 541-2000

EL -40,8 -75,0 -70,8 -70,6 -54,2 -47,9 -48,0 -20,8

SF -26,1 -32,9 -30,2 -20,3 -16,3 -2,9 8,0 -7,8

V -48,7 -69,6 -60,0 -65,1 -61,7 -41,9 -41,8 -37,3

Source : The Mannheimer Eurobarometer Trendfile (2005). Note : The balance score is given by the subtraction of those saying that the EU is a bad thing from those saying that the EU is a good thing; thus, negative scores stand for a plurality of sceptics towards the EU.

the size of the negative plurality is clearly lower. Both EL and V have a majority among sceptics, whereas in the SF the non - sceptics ( EU is good and neither nor ) forms the majority ( EB 44.0 and 46.0 are the exceptions ). These findings indicate that in the SF there are divisions on the EU - issue not only among the party leadership and its members but also among its voters. At the same time we may note that the sceptics in the party were on the decline over the period 1995 to 2000. The EU - issue has been important for mobilising support for both EL and V over the last 10–15 years. The two Swedish referenda on the EU in 1994 and 2003 have been conducive for gaining support for V. Similar effects can be found in Denmark with relation to the 1992 and the 2000 referenda, whereas SF suffered from the position it took on the 1993 referendum, and internal tensions were raised around the 1998 referendum. It is thus safe to state that the EU - issue has had an impact on the fortunes of the Leftist parties in Denmark and Sweden during the 1990s and the 2000s.

2.

Influence on the Parliamentary Arena

To have influence on the parliamentary arena is not only a consequence of sheer size of parliamentary support. At times, the policy position in the parliamentary arena may be equally important, in particular in countries where minority governments are frequent, and this is the case for Denmark and Sweden. Looking at the Leftist parties for the period from 1990 to 2007, it is easy to establish that none of them have participated in government. This does not mean that they have had no influence on parliament. In Denmark, when Paul Nyrup Rasmusen headed governments including Social Democrats and Radical Liberals, these governments were relying on the ( tacit ) support of both SF and

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EL. A similar situation has been in Sweden where Social Democratic governments also have been relying on support from other parties, the Leftist V and the Green MP. This was the case between 1988 and 1991 as well as from 1994 to 1998. Beginning with 1998, procedures have been established to agree on a contract where V and MP will support the major government bills after consultation between the three parts – during this period both V and MP have had their own employees placed at different ministries. In both Denmark and Sweden one major reason for not including the Leftist parties into a government have in particular been their position on the EU - issue. As long as these parties, and this refers in particular to the Swedish case, in their official programs demand leaving the EU they cannot be allowed as participants in government. Comparing the parliamentary influence of the Leftist parties with reference to their ability to influence government policies, there is no doubt that V has been more influential than SF. To a certain extent, the fact that V has reached such a position is due to developments after 1989. Even though there is an internal debate within V about its relations to its historical heritage, the new course taken in the early 1990s has made it possible for the party to break with its Communist past, at least in the public sphere. Without this break it is doubtful if the Social Democrats would have approached V in the way they have done since 1998. In the Danish case, SF has had no need to break with a Communist past, but here the reason for not joining a government may go back to internal party scepticism towards joining a coalition with a Social Democrat government. Table 9 provides information about governments formed in Denmark and Sweden in the period from 1990 to 2007. From the Table we can establish that there has been no formal participation in government by Leftist parties during this period. This does not mean that Leftist parties will never be allowed to participate in government. Just looking at some other Scandinavian countries, it is the case that the Left Alliance ( VAS ) in Finland has been a member of government for most of the years during this period, and the Leftist Socialist Left ( SV ) has joined the government after the election of September 2005 in Norway.

3.

Conclusion

One of the major issues on the political agenda over the last 15–20 years has been the EU - issue, both in Denmark and Sweden. The Leftist parties in Scandinavia tend to be Euro - sceptical, although here SF deviates from V and EL, meaning that SF includes both people showing a positive and people showing a negative attitude towards the EU - project. The EU - issue has been conducive for the rise in electoral support for V, and to a certain extent also for EL, but at the same time V´s critical stance towards the EU from may have prevented the party from joining a coalition government with the Social Democrats.

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Post-Communism and Leftist Parties

Even though V has not participated in government, it probably has more political influence than what has been the case for SF. Formal agreements about forthcoming government bills have given V and MP a more influential role in Swedish politics in the years 1998 until today than it was the case prior to 1998, and for V this influence probably has to do with its break with the Communist past. Table 9 : Governments in Denmark and Sweden, 1990–2007 Government Denmark: Schlüter Nyrup-Rasmussen Nyrup-Rasmussen Nyrup-Rasmussen Nyrup-Rasmussen Fogh-Rasmussen Fogh-Rasmussen Fogh-Rasmussen Sweden: Carlsson Bildt Carlsson Persson Persson Persson Reinfeldt

VI.

Duration

Parliamentary support

Parties in government

12.90–01.93 01.93–09.94 09.94–12.96 12.96–03.98 03.98–11.01 11.01–02.05 02.05–11.07 11.07–xx.xx

34 % 51 % 43 % 40 % 40 % 41 % 40 % 37 %

KF, V SD, RV, CD, KrF SD, RV, CD SD, RV SD, RV V, KF V, KF V, KF

09.88–10.91 10.91–10.94 10.94–03.96 03.96–10.98 10.98–10.02 10.02–10.06 10.06–xx.xx

45 % 49 % 46 % 46 % 36 % 40 % 51 %

SAP M, FP, C, KD SAP SAP SAP SAP M, FP, C, KD

Conclusion

Studying the period from the fall of the Berlin Wall until today, i.e. roughly the period from 1990 to 2005, there have been some changes in the left - wing political scene in Denmark and Sweden. In Denmark, the Communist party ( DKP ) no longer plays any role in Danish politics. The former Swedish Communist Party ( SKP ) had made efforts to break with Moscow since the 1960s, but it was only in the early 1990s that a real break with the Communist past occurred. In this respect, the fall of the Berlin Wall had an impact on Leftist parties in Scandinavia. Yet, there are still tensions within the parties between traditionalists adhering to more traditional party dogmas and modernisers who demand changes in politics, reflecting changes taking place in a globalized society where

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class cleavages no longer are dominant. These tensions are currently visible within both V and SF. But these tensions represent nothing new, since over the time they come and go, and they have had no immediate consequences for the internal arena in terms of declining membership. It the electoral arena, the most dramatic development is associated with the Swedish V. After years of struggle to gain support of more than the 4 % - threshold, opinion polls showed an upsurge at the time of the first EU - referendum (1994), and this upward trend for the party resulted in its highest outcome ever at the 1998 election. Since the opinion poll scores peaked in 2000, there has been a more or less continuous decline in support for V. A similar downward trend is not discernable for SF, although the electoral fortunes have been less fluctuating. Comparing the Leftist parties with respect to the social characteristics of their voters, there are differences between V on the one hand and SF and EL on the other hand. Class voting still has a meaning for V. In terms of gender gaps there are more similarities, since increasingly all three parties have a majority of its supporters among women. This means that there have been changes also in these respects over the time. In the parliamentary arena the influence of the leftist Parties varies with the presence of a left - wing government. In Denmark, probably SF’s position on the Edinburgh referendum in 1993 was important for the outcome, yet it resulted in no position in the SD - led governments. In Sweden the EU - issue was conducive for the upsurge in electoral support for V in the elections starting with 1994. The parliamentary strength of V at the 1998 election paved the way for forming an agreement to support the Social Democrat government. However, without a previous break with its Communist past it is doubtful whether such an agreement would have been concluded. The effect of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break with the Communist past of the Leftist parties has opened up the way for a normalisation of parties which once have been associated with the Communist tradition. This is thus a kind of indirect impact on the Leftist parties which has resulted in changes among these parties. There are also other factors operating. It is no doubt that in Scandinavian politics the presence of the EU - issue has been positive for the mostly Euro - sceptical Leftist parties considering the generally Euro - sceptical electorate. Other processes may have had other consequences. The breakup of a Scandinavian model and the possible end of Scandinavian exceptionalism has resulted in pressure on the dominating Social Democrat parties and opened up for the presence of distinctive alternatives to their left. The end of Communism symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall certainly has had an impact on societal development in Europe and in Scandinavia. One such consequence is that no more there are any Communist parties operating in Scandinavia ( disregarding the tiny left fringe ), and the Leftist parties which once had connections with the Communist tradition are now normalised. Just as any other type of political party, they face their members, their electorate,

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and other parties on their own merits. If they are successful in this competition, it is to a large extent their own responsibility, and now there is no need to take events into consideration which are going on in Cuba or DPRK when formulating or defending their own policies. For parties that once have been part of the Communist tradition, these are no small changes.

Table A1: Social characteristics of the electorates of the Leftist parties in Denmark (1998 and 2001) and in Sweden (1998 and 2002): column percentages

Gender

Male Female Age 18-22 23-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70+ Houshold income Lowest Quintile Second Q Third Q Fourth Q Highest Q Sector employment Public sector Not Public sector Union membership Member Not member Religious attendance Never Some times Often Sources : CSES Modules 1 and 2.

Denmark 1998 2001 EL SF All EL SF All 39 42 50 69 35 53 61 58 50 31 65 47 18 9 7 12 7 5 18 14 14 10 10 10 20 27 19 12 22 21 21 27 18 31 27 19 13 13 17 24 23 19 5 7 11 6 7 14 5 2 14 6 6 12 29 24 22 27 21 19 27 20 22 17 18 20 21 23 22 19 18 20 9 19 16 8 23 20 14 14 17 29 20 21 69 62 40 52 54 35 31 38 60 48 47 65 75 75 66 25 25 34 92 83 73 8 16 24 0 1 4

Sweden 1998 2002 V All V All 39 52 44 52 61 48 56 48 13 8 18 7 14 13 15 12 16 20 20 21 19 17 21 18 19 19 24 20 13 13 1 13 6 10 1 9 23 18 25 14 28 20 12 16 21 20 35 29 21 21 26 24 7 21 2 18 48 42 63 40 51 48 37 60 76 64 21 37 86 67 11 29 3 4

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Figure A.1 : Evolution of the major Leftist Party organisations in Denmark, 1918–2005

Figure A.2 : Evolution of the major Leftist party organisations in Sweden, 1917–2005

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Abbreviations list of Leftist Parties in Denmark and Sweden Denmark APK DKP DKP / ML EL FK KAK KAP KFML

KPiD RSF SAP SAP SF V VS VSP

Arbejderpartiet Kommunisterne ( Workers Party Communist ) Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti ( Danish Communist Party ) Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti / Marxister – Leninister ( Denmark’s Communist Party / Marxist – Leninist) Enhedslisten ( Unity List ) Fælles Kurs ( Common Course ) Kommunistisk Arbejderkreds ( Communist Workers Circle ) Kommunistisk Arbejderparti (Communist Workers Party) Kommunistisk Forbund Marxist – Leninister (Communist League Marxists – Leninists) Kommunistisk Partiæ i Danmark (Communist Party in Denmark) Revolutionære Socialisters Forbund (Revolutionary Socialists League) Socialistisk Arbejderparti (Socialist Workers Party) (1918–1919) Socialistisk Arbejderparti (Socialist Workers Party) (1980–) Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist Peoples Party) Vänsterpartiet (Left Party) Venstresocialisterna (Left Socialists) Venstresocialistisk Parti (Left Socialist Party)

Sweden APK FK KFML KFML(r)

KP KPML(r) MLK

SF SKA

Arbetarpartiet Kommunisterna (Workers Party Communists) Förbundet Kommunist (Communist Legaue) Kommunistiska Förbundet Marxist – Leninisterna (Communist League Marxists – Leninists) Kommunistiska Förbundet Marxist – Leninisterna (revolutionärerna) (Communist League Marxists – Leninists (revolutionaries)) Kommunistiska Partiet (Communist Party) Kommunistiska Partiet Marxist – Leninisterna (revolutionärerna) (Communist Party Marxists – Leninists [ revolutionaries]) Marxist – leninistiska Kampförbundet för Sveriges Kommunistiska Partiet (m – l) (Marxist – Leninist League for the formation of the Communist Party of Sweden) Socialistiska Förbundet (Socialist League) Sveriges Kommunistiska Arbetarförbund (Swedens Communist

166 SKP SKP SP SP SSV V VPK

Svante Ersson

Workers League) Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti (Swedish Communist Party) (1921–1967) Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti (Swedish Communist Party) (1995– ) Socialistiska Partiet (Socialist Party) (1934–1943) Socialistiska Partiet (Socialist Party) (1982– ) Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Vänsterparti (Swedens Social Democratic Left Party) Vänsterpartiet (Left Party) Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna (Left Party Communists)

Communism in Estonia – Party Dead but Ex - Members Well Off Toomas Alatalu The list of serious academic publications on the topic is quite short. Mart Laar contributed a chapter “Estonia and Communism” for the Estonian edition of the book “Le Livre noir du Communisme. Crimes, terreur et repression” ( Paris 1997). There1 he describes the activities of the Communist Party and its institutions in 1940–91 in Estonia. An interesting analysis of the role of Communist Party leadership ( Central committee ) with the creation of the new Estonian elite in 1986–1997 ( mentioning positions without names ) is represented in works published by Jüri Ruus, Estonian researcher in cooperation with Anton Steen, Norwegian theoretician.2 The most informative of the 2005 publications is “The White Book. Losses inflicted on the Estonian nation by occupation regimes 1940–91”,3 dedicated mostly to activities of the third - ranking Communist Party institutions ( it includes lists of persons who were and are decision - makers in today’s Estonia ). This book bases on the materials collected by the Estonian state commission on the examination of the policies of repression, set up already in 1992. The first group of the Russian Social - Democratic Labour Party in Estonia was set up in 1905. After the proclamation of Estonia’s independence ( Feb. 24, 1918) local Communists ( Bolsheviques ) headed a puppet government in Narva, a town on the Russian border, to fight against it. The first congress of the Estonian Communist Party was held in 1920 and it represented 700 party members. In 1920–34 and 1938–40 the ECP had, under the umbrella of other political parties, 5–10 seats ( out of 100–120) in the parliament. In 1940 the Communist Party was re - founded by the Soviet occupants with 133 members (already 3,751 members were there one year later – the biggest growth in number in that period when compared with fellow parties in Latvia and Lithuania ). On January 1, 1989, the Communist Party of Estonia had 110,132 members and 1,667 candidates for membership and 134,324 members of the Komsomol 1 2 3

Cf. Laar, Kommunism, p. 823–894. More about the same period see : Misiunas / Taagepera, The Baltic states. For example cf. Steen / Ruus, Change of Regime, p. 223–248. On the same topic see : Matonyte, Elites in Soviet. In : http ://www.anthrobase.com / Txt / M / Matonyte¬¬_I_ 01.htm. Cf. The White Book, ed. Republic of Estonia.

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( Young Communist League ).4 There were also October kids and a Pioneer organization, membership in which was strongly recommended ( read : obligatory ) for all schoolchildren 7–14 years old. The population of Estonia was 1.565,662 in 1989. ( The official Soviet time census numbers were always previously “revised”, and according to the latest surveys the real number was about 1.5 million inhabitants ). But in both cases between one - fifth and one - sixth of the population was part of the sole and governing party of the totalitarian regime. 61,5 % of the population were Estonians, 30.3 % Russians ( there were 9 % Russians before Soviet occupation ) or ( mainly ) Russian - speaking people. At the same time Estonians had only a slight majority ( in 1988 it was 50.2 %5) in the ranks of the Communist Party ( this scanty numerical supremacy of native people among party and Komsomol members was in line with an all - Union rule in ethno - political policy for Soviet Republics – in Soviet Autonomous Republics a majority of non - native people was considered essential ). This meant that there were proportionally more Russian Communists than Estonian Communists among the local nomenklatura ( the then decision - makers ). In other words, due to its composition the ECP was and remained their party, i. e. of people coming from the outside ( invaders ). In fact the situation was more complicated, as Russian immigrants had arrived to live on “the territory temporarily occupied during the Great Patriotic War (1941–45)” – an official formulation used in everyone’s “list for cadres” (nowadays CV ) until 1987, which immediately determined native people to be distrusted and second - category citizens. As all citizens were obliged to own documents with descriptions about their own past and their parents’ past, it helped immigrants to feel and act as the leading and trusted part of the population in the borderland. In addition, the majority of Russians settling in Estonia refused to learn and speak the Estonian language. As all official documentation was written either in both languages or in Russian only, the formal bilingualism in everyday practice meant speaking Russian only.

I.

Communists and / versus National Communists

The local Communist leaders had a dual role – they were appointed to their offices after preliminary approval by Moscow or even ( top leaders ) in Moscow, they had to carry out its policy. But at the same time they could see the irrationality and the high cost to be paid for the decisions made by the Central Committee in Moscow. And as the leaders of the former colonial areas – not to forget peculiarities of the development of the Russian empire ( perfectly described by Lenin himself ) – they were ready and sometimes even motivated 4 5

Cf. Ežegodnik Bol’šoj Sovetskoj Ėnciklopedii 1989, p. 195–196. Cf. Eesti Entsüklopeedia 12, p. 70.

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to defend local interests and local people. Their position becomes more understandable as we remember an important but very often untouched feature of Soviet Communism – outside the Kremlin the key post in the structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the post of the second secretary ( a creation of that post was provided by the statutes of the party ). This had to be a person who – after passing different training courses – was sent to different regions by the Central Committee of CPSU and served as Moscow’s hand in party committees at the republican, regional and district levels. A parallel system was created for executive power – at each level the second post ( vice - chairman or the first vice - chairman ) was manned from Moscow. They even had a direct phone line ( without a dial ) to Moscow to be the first informer / messenger. It is important to add that as a rule a Russian by nationality occupied the post of the second post ( to be compared with the highest top – Stalin was Georgian, Khrushchov and Brezhnev Ukrainians etc.). Due to this, there was a permanent conflict and rivalry between local Communist leaders and those being sent from Moscow. The History of Soviet - type Socialism has already confirmed that national Communists initiated and promoted change when opportunities opened. The world is well informed about the reforms and the uprising in Hungary in 1956 and about economic reforms in Hungary in the 1960ies, about the Prague Spring ( Socialism with a human face ) in 1968. At the same time attempts to improve the face or even the content of Socialism were also made in those East European countries which were not only under the Soviet military control but were also incorporated into the Soviet Empire. I point out to the decisions in favour of national culture and against unreasonable economic development carried out in Latvia in 1958–59 by an initiative of Communists from the top, being between 800 and 1,500 persons6 when purged. Eduards Berklavs, Vice - chairman of the Council of Ministers, claimed as leader of “bourgeois nationalists”, was even forced to live outside of Latvia. After returning to his homeland he was among the co - founders of the Latvian National Independence Party in 1988. In Estonia there were events of lesser scale to confront with Moscow’s policy in 1966–69. In this case the actor was young. In February 1966, after heated debates, the13th congress of the Estonian Komsomol adopted two action plans – the official one and a 10 - points plan of political and economic reform, including the demand to enlarge the political rights of the republics, elaborated in secrecy by the Komsomol leaders of the Tartu University. The alternative draft was introduced beforehand at 12 regional committees of the Komsomol, where at least one of the secretaries was a Tartu University graduate, i. e. the revolt was prepared on the all - republican base – a fact taken seriously by the leaders of the Communist Party. The plan, unanimously adopted by the 13th congress, was never made public, its text on unnumbered pages ( glued between pages 68 6

Cf. The Baltic States 1940–1972, ed. The Baltic committee in Scandinavia, p. 89–90; Latvija zem Padomju, ed. Latvijas okupacijas muzeijs, p. 169.

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and 69) was published by 200 copies in edition for the closed fund of the CP CC central archive.7 The congress also voted down the second secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, sent from Moscow (+123–289; out of 440 delegates at the congress, 299 were Estonians by nationality ). This vote had a wide response, but at the CC meeting the then first secretary of the Estonian Komsomol himself stated that in Moscow Sergei Pavlov, the All Soviet Union Komsomol first secretary, had presented him accusations not for the voting down of the secretary but for the approval of the alternative plan.8 The young reformers had some vision about steps in case of victory, but Moscow surprisingly took a time out and three months later succeeded with the appointment of a new second secretary, also sent from Moscow. After this, 10 Estonian top youth leaders, incl. the Komsomol CC secretary for work with students and schoolchildren, the head of the CC students department, the first secretary of the Tartu City Komsomol and the secretaries of the Tartu University Komsomol were fired one after the other. In all cases with the help of the groups of Communists set up with all Komsomol committees – these groups made decisions before Komsomol members had gathered. The next opportunities for national Communists in the Baltic republics arrived with Perestroika. The collapse of the Soviet empire started with the adoption of the Declaration of Sovereignty ( supremacy of Estonian laws over all - Union laws ) on November 16, 1988, in Tallinn. This was done by the national Communists, as the absolute majority of the members of Soviet Estonia’s parliament ( Supreme Soviet ) were members of the Communist Party. The explanation why even hardliners supported this move is simple – it was the time of Perestroika, it was the first move of this kind and the respective proposal was made by the first secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia, whose rightness was unshakable yet as he was considered to be a favourite of Mikhail Gorbachov, i. e. Moscow. This historic decision was taken as unanimously (+258, - 1) as was the unanimous decision of the Communists of the parliament of Czechoslovakia to elect the anti - Communist Vaclav Havel President of Czechoslovakia 13 months later. Thereby I want to say that the well - known velvet revolution of December 1989 was not the first velvet event of that kind in Eastern Europe. In both cases the real decision - makers were the people in the streets – Communists in puppet parliaments voted according to the demands of the people who had gathered around the buildings. Here some more facts are linked with the topic. As it is known, Poland was the first East European country to appoint a non - Communist Prime Minister. This was on August 24, 1989, or NB ! one day after the famous Baltic Chain, 7 8

Cf. ELKNÜ XIII kongressi dokumendid ( Ametialaseks kasutamiseks, Eksemplar No. 02058, ed. EKP Keskkomitee kirjastus, personal archive). Cf. Protokol II plenuma CK LKSM Ėstonii ot 8 Ijunja 1966 g. ( Eesti Riigiarhiiv = ERA, Fond 31, N 106 s. 3, p. 16).

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when 3 million people from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania stood side by side all the way from Tallinn to Vilnius, demanding the restoration of their independence which had been taken away by the Communist neighbour. The elections in Hungary in March - April 1990 are as a rule called the first free, democratic etc. elections in Eastern Europe. But they also took place only NB ! After similar elections in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the new Lithuanian parliament declared immediately that Lithuania was already an independent state – the most revolutionary move in Eastern Europe then. It is the utmost time to start an analysis of post WW 2 events in the three Baltic countries and in the East European countries as a united, closely interrelated and interdependent process. This enables us to better understand the essence of events which had taken place with different intensity in different countries. The Estonian velvet revolution ( traditionally known as the singing revolution) took place in a new atmosphere created by the all - Union Perestroika ( its beginning in Estonia was delayed – in comparison to Moscow – for three years ). This may be partly explained by the cautious conduct of its future leaders in those days, and as a result the hardliners kept their leading posts with the Communist Party until summer 1988 and under the pressure executed by the Estonian Popular Front to support Perestroika ( founded in April 1988 by national Communists and intellectuals who ( both ) very soon distanced themselves from the Communist Party of Estonia ) and by new political actors – the first non Communist parties in the Soviet Union space ( Estonian National Independence Party, Estonian Christian Democratic Party ) set up in summer 1988 in Estonia. Moscow’s ( Gorbachov’s ) countermeasures against a parade of sovereignties, launched in Estonia on November 16th, 1988, ( it quickly turned into an all Soviet Union process, as not only Soviet Republics but also Autonomous Republics proclaimed their sovereignty ) included the founding of openly pro Moscow forces through division – the Communist parties of republics in rebellion were divided into two. Also inter - movements ( inter - fronts etc.) as a counterbalance to Popular Fronts were created. In the case of Estonia this was a mortal blow to the local Communist Party. This became obvious at a later time. The above mentioned data from January 1st, 1989, was taken from the main Soviet handbook – Ежегодник Большой Советской Энциклопедии, which of course served also as tool of propaganda. An overlook of data about Estonia, presented in its yearbooks 1985–90 ( Yearbook 1990 happened to be the last edited one ) gives a picture of how the collapse of the Communist Party had come close. According to the statistics presented in these books, the membership of the CPE developed as follows :9

9

Cf. Ežegodnik Bol’šoj Sovetskoj Ėnciklopedii 1985, p. 179; Ežegodnik Bol’šoj Sovetskoj Ėnciklopedii 1986, p. 180; Ežegodnik Bol’šoj Sovetskoj Ėnciklopedii 1987, p. 178–179; Ežegodnik Bol’šoj Sovetskoj Ėnciklopedii 1988, p. 186; Ežegodnik Bol’šoj Sovetskoj Ėnciklopedii 1989, p. 178–179, Ežegodnik Bol’šoj Sovetskoj Ėnciklopedii 1990, p. 178–179.

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Table 1 : CPE - Members, candidates for membership and members of Komsomol, 1985–1990

January 1, 1985 January 1, 1986 January 1, 1987 January 1, 1988 January 1, 1989 January 1, 1990

Members of CPE

Candidates for membership

Members of Komsomol

104.084 106.051 108.026 109.897 110.132 105.614

3.500 3.548 3.574 3.028 1.667 681

166.732 167.361 165.786 165.786 134.324 62.257

By any doubt this information was also previously revised, but it is not difficult to see how the reserve and the future of the party – number of candidates – had diminished. The most astonishing thing in this row of statistics is an unchallenged number of the Komsomol members in 1986 and in 1987 – a clear attempt to cover from the ( all - Union ) public a mass resignation of the Estonian youth from the Soviet Komsomol. The students were the first social group in Estonia who already in 1987 came to the streets under national symbols and with political demands.10 As in the 1960ies, also then the Estonian Komsomol ( and not the Communist Party itself ) was the first to declare its independence from the all - Union Komsomol – this took place on November 24th - 25th, 1989, at the XXXI congress of the Estonian Komsomol. Moscow’s response was quick – in February 1990 a parallel Estonian Komsomol organization was set up. To understand the courage of the young people it is appropriate to remember that the Communist Party of Lithuania declared its independence from Moscow in December, 1989, the CP of Estonia did so in January, 1991, ( see below ). An open and long (1987–91) confrontation with Moscow gave national Communists a chance to gain popularity among the population and to use this at a later time during the struggle for power with new political forces. This is true in the case of Arnold Rüütel, the President of the Republic of Estonia 2001–2006, who seerved as the nominal head of the Soviet Republic, Chairman of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet in 1983–92. In 1992 and 1996 Rüütel lost the presidential elections to Lennart Meri, a man of word and filmmaker, who did not belong to the Communist Party but was nevertheless a member of the so - called nomenklatura, having been an editor of radio programs in foreign languages on the Estonian Radio since 1955 and secretary for international relations of the Estonian Writers Union. The same goes for Siim Kallas, Estonia’s Prime Minister 2002–2003 and EC commissioner since 2004, who had served as a deputy editor - in - chief of the Communist Party’s daily ( with a right to take 10 Cf. Aare, Fosforiidisõda 1971–1989, p. 186–192.

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part in the Central Committee’s bureau meetings ), it is also true for Andres Ansip, Prime Minister of Estonia since 2005, who had served as head of department of the Tartu district party committee, it istrue for many other first, second and third ranking leaders of contemporary Estonia. Now they are representing other parties and other ideologies, but they all had occupied leading posts during Soviet times and therefore it is possible to say that Communists are still influential in Estonia if we speak about former Communists. Out of 101 MPs elected in 1992, 33 were former members of the Communist Party. In 1995 there were 60 “formers”. In 1999 – 48 former ones and 2 representatives of the post - Communist Party – see below. Among MPs elected in 2003, there were 39 former members of the Communist Party, but only 8 of them had included this fact into their official CVs. Let us add that not all MPs mentioned their previous party affiliation even in 1992 when this had been obligatory.11 Some months earlier – on February 28th, 1992 – the Constitutional Assembly initiated (+19 - 10, but only 29 out of 60 CA members attended this sitting ) a ban on representatives of the former nomenklatura to run on elections and occupy administrative posts. Intensive discussions started, and on May 18th the Supreme Council rejected (+20 - 26, but there were 101 members of the Supreme Council – the majority preferred not to be present at voting ) this idea. According to publications and opinion polls of that time, the majority was against the ban. The fate of the Communist Party of Estonia is a different story. The above mentioned division took place at an ordinary ( the XX.) party congress and on March 24th, 1990, two different Communist parties in Estonia were set up. One, pro - independent statehood and with mainly Estonian membership, was headed by Vaino Väljas ( who in 1980–88 was the Soviet Ambassador to Venezuela and Nicaragua, returned to Estonia as Gorbachov’s favourite to become the party leader in June 1988), another, pro - Moscow and mainly with Russian membership, was at first headed by two Russians but very soon by Lembit Annus, Estonian by nationality. Both leaders were on the eve of being elected to the Supreme Council ( parliament in 1990–92, elected freely and in general democratically, partly thanks to the tactics of the Communist Party of Estonia ) when on Jan. 4th, 1990, its Central Committee plenum appointed only three official candidatesof the party : first secretary Vaino Väljas, Chairman of the Supreme Council Arnold Rüütel and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Indrek Toome. All other Communists were candidates for different institutions, unions, working collectives, as then being alloweed by the election law. At the same time the Estonian Popular Front copied the tactics of their Lithuanian partner Sajudis – an influential Popular Front member had to push the influential Communists 11

Supposedly due to this there exist several versions about of how many ex - Communists have been members of the main legislative body of Estonia. The numbers presented in the text are based on my own calculations as, for example, Steen and Ruus, citing an investigation carried out by students, give 35 ex - Communists in 1992, 59 in 1995 and 17 in 199. Cf. Steen / Ruus, Change of Regime, p. 236, 238.

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off the political scene. Marju Lauristin, the co - chairman of the Popular Front and leader of the just founded Social - Democratic Party, was set up as a candidate in the same electoral district as Arnold Rüütel, but in the very last minute Rüütel was re - registered both as a free - riding and the Greens candidate in another district and not as a candidate for CPE anymore. Väljas was elected to the Supreme Council as an CPE candidate, Toome as CPE and Union Free Estonia candidate, Annus as a candidate for the pro - Moscow Council for Working Collectives; 69 out of 105 Supreme Council members were ex - Communists, incl. Rüütel or Communists, incl. 10 of the first and the second secretaries of the regional committees, and three ( still !) members of the pro - independence Communist Party were even appointed ministers of the coalition government of Edgar Savisaar, leader of the Popular Front ( April 1990– January 1992). Väljas remained an independent member of the legislative body, but his deputy Hillar Eller and other leading Communists, the majority of whom very soon turned into ex - Communists, formed the 16–member Independent Democrats faction. The resolution “On historic - political evaluation of the activities of the CPE”, adopted by the pro - independent forces of the CPE XX. congress on March 25, 1990, stated among others that the CPE had never been an independent political force because it was a tool in the hands of the Komintern and the CPSU and that CPE had accepted a real claim for independence by the Estonian people only in September 1988.12 Its pro - Moscow rival had more ambitious goals. At the opening of the Supreme Council ( March 29th ) its members (15 Russians and Lembit Annus ) declared that they had set up “the Equal Rights faction ( based on the ideology of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights )”. On the next day 11 deputies, headed by Annus, separated from it to set up “the Estonian Communist Party faction ( on the platform of the 28th Congress of the CPSU )”. It functioned ( as rule, using the name “Communist faction” ) until August 27, 1991, when a self dissolution was announced. In December, 1990, the congress of the pro - Moscow CPE declared that this party would follow only the political platform of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the name of the latter was added to the party’s official name – CPE( CPSU ). On January 26th, 1991, the XXI. congress of the pro - independence CPE declared that it had no more organizational links with its formal partner ( according to the terminology used then, there was a coalition of two Communist parties in Estonia ). On June 6th, 1991, the Independent Communist Party of Estonia was officially registered. The party declared itself a successor of the ECP, founded in 1920, and announced its responsibility for mistakes of the past. The registration was protested by 11 members of the Supreme Council who demanded that the ICPE ( this name was forgotten immediately after the regaining of independence ) had to make clear its relations with the CPSU and 12 Cf. ERA, Fond 4957 N 1, sari 3, s. 12, p. 45–46.

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to take responsibility for crimes committed against Estonia and its people.13 In fact it was quite a rare attack against the ICPE, as it was clear for everyone that the weakening of this party’s positions favoured the pro - Moscow CPE. After the proclamation of independence the political landscape immediately changed, as on August 23rd, 1991, the Supreme Council banned all activities of the CPE (CPSU ). On August 27th the property of both Communist parties was taken over by the state. In the case of the CPE ( CPSU ) force was used, but ( the non banned ) ICPE removed from its buildings voluntarily and was “awarded” for this with a 4–floor building which remained in its possession up to 1997. It is interesting to add that the 10–floor building of the Central Committee of the ICPE in the centre of Tallinn City was handed over to the Estonian Foreign Ministry. As the Ministry’s build up had only started, for many years the building accommodated also several foreign Embassies ). Estonia’s State Archive preserves some interesting statistics about the development of the ( independent ) Communist Party of Estonia in the period of Perestroika and in the pre - independence period. ( The numbers in some cases differ from those which were presented in the жегодник’s, but for our purposes the EC’s own information seems more objective than figures distributed by Moscow – the statistics below have been composed in Estonia and were taken from documents with the stamp “For official use”, which were discussed at meetings of the Board of the ECP ). The first one, dated summer 1991, is the only chart which also reflects the size and composition of the pro - Moscow Communist Party in the beginning of 1991 – there are no more data about this party despite a lot of promises given by L. Annus to hand his party’s archive over to the Estonian state ( supposedly all documentation is now in Moscow ). Quite intriguing is the information about changes in the ranks of the pro independent CP in the decisive months of 1990–91. Let us remind the reader that the turning - point of the events of that period was by any doubt the bloody storm of the Vilnius TV - tower by Soviet troops on January 13th, 1991, seconded by renewed killing of innocent people in Riga one week later. But the first open conflict between pro - independence and pro - Moscow forces in the Baltic countries had taken place on May 15th, 1990, when the latter attacked the building which at that time was accomodating both the Estonian parliament and the government. It was the government of the Popular Front. The Congress of Estonia was already completely working ( an alternative centre of power in 1990–92, elected by the initiative of the Estonian Citizen’s Movement in February - March 1990). 592,000 people, identifying themselves as citizens of the Republic of Estonia or applicants for its citizenship, took part in the elections. The executive branch of the Congress of Estonia, the Estonian Committee, was headed by Tunne Kelam, leader of the Estonian National Independence Party,14 and it was 13 Cf. Kukk, Eesti Vabariigi sisepoliitika 1990, p. 25, 31. 14 Kelam Tunne, former Vice - Chairman of the Riigikogu, is now a member of the European Parliament. At the end of the Soviet era he was a known dissident but earlier, being quite a typical representative of the Estonian intelligentsia, he had twice applied for

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Table 2 : The composition of the CPE in 1988–1991 1990 1991 1991 (two parties) (two parties) indep. CPE

By January 1

1988

1989

1. Listed in CPE (in thousands)

112,9

111,8

106,3

47,2

5,0

Workers

33,9

32,6

30,4

30,4

15,3

Coll. Farm members

10,5

11,1

11,6

5,5

8,9

Employees

43,2

43,3

43,9

44,2

51,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0,1

–

12,1

12,8

14,0

20,0

24,4

3. Women (%)

37,6

37,3

38,0

33,0

32,9

4. Native people (%) (Estonians)

50,2

50,0

49,9

24,3

80,7

up to 30 years

13,3

11,6

9,3

7,2

2,9

31–50 years

46,2

45,9

46,1

41,5

37,7

over 50 years

40,5

42,5

44,6

51,3

59,4

less than 5 years

14,4

13,3

11,3

8,7

6,1

6–20 years

41,8

41,2

41,5

38,2

33,2

more than 20 years

43,8

45,5

47,2

53,1

60,7

2. Occupation (%)

Students Pensioners

5. Age (%)

6. Length of affiliation (%)

Source : ERA, Fond 4957, N 1, sari 8, s. 1, p. P 002.

recognized internationally at equal level with the last Supreme Soviet ( for example, by George Bush sen., President of the USA ). Several new political parties had launched their activities, but curiously a lot of Estonians, incl. intellectuals, preferred joining the Communist Party instead of all just mentioned and other opportunities. Thanks to God, this tendency was irreversibly stopped in January 1991, but cautiousness ( or pragmatism or lack of trust towards the leaders of the Popular Front, whose majority were former active Communists, or distrust towards the leaders of the Congress of Estonia, whose majority had been far from policy - making,or deeply - rooted double conduct of personalities which is Communist Party membership to assure his studies as a post - graduate student of philosophy ( his candidacy was rejected by military pensioners ) – this is the issue never forgotten by his opponents in any election campaign. See for example : Kesknädal ( newspaper of the Estonian Centre Party ), March 18, 2003.

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Table 3 : Membership data of the Communist Party of Estonia 1990–1991 11. 06.1990 15. 09.1990 15. 01.1991 01. 07.1991 01.12.1991 1. Listed in CPE (in thousands) 2. Occupation Workers Col. Farm members Employees Students Pensioners 3. Women 4. Native people (Estonians)

3.930

4.978

5.004

4.529

3.531

713 (18,3 %) 288 (7,3 %) 2.110 (53,7 %)

773 (15,5 %) 398 (8,0 %) 2.617 (52,6 %)

764 (15,3 %) 447 8,9 %) 2.574 (51,4 %)

538 (15,2 %) 295 (8,4 %) 1.569 (44,4 %)

–

–

–

819 (20,8 %) 1.345 (31,2 %) 3.178 (80,9 %)

1.190 (23,9 %) 1.664 (33,4 %) 3.991 (80,0 %)

1.219 (24,4 %) 1.646 (32,9 %) 4.036 (80,7 %)

668 (14,7 %) 435 (9,6 %) 2.246 (49,6 %) 2 (0,1 %) 1.178 (26,0 %) 1.520 (33,6 %) 3.546 (78,3 %)

150 (3,8 %) 1.526 (38,8 %) 2.254 (57,4 %)

134 (2,7 %) 1.921 (38,6 %) 2.923 (58,7 %)

147 (2,9 %) 1.885 (37,7 %) 2.972 (59,4 %)

107 (2,4 %) 1.568 (34,6 %) 2.854 (63,0 %)

68 (1,9 %) 1.122 (31,8 %) 2.341 (66,3 %)

248 (6,3 %) 1.466 (37,3 %) 2.216 (56,4 %) 790 (20,1 %)

291 (5,8 %) 1.741 (35,0 %) 2.946 (59,2 %) 1.318 (26,5 %)

307 (6,1 %) 1.660 (33,2 %) 3.037 (60,7 %) 1.539 (30,7 %)

211 (4,7 %) 1.503 (33,2 %) 2.815 (62,1 %) 1.367 (30,2 %)

130 (3,7 %) 1.107 (31,3 %) 2.294 (65,0 %)

– 1.129 (32,0 %) 1.219 (34,5 %) 2.733 (77,4 %)

5. Age up to 30 years 31–50 years over 50 years 6. Length of affiliation less than 5 years 6–20 years more than 20 years 7. Belongs to the CPSU

–

Source : ERA, Fond 4957, N 1, sari 8, s. 1, p. P 020, P 010.

typical for totalitarian societies – people are taking part in transformations and at the same time are guaranteeing their own safety by linking themselves with those in power, incl. the party of the past, or fear or absence of faith that Estonia would regain its independence – looking at point 7 in the following Table 3 we must ask ourselves why people decided to join not only the CPE but also the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as double membership was then allowed – there are no responses to these and other close by content questions,

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as the topic has not been investigated yet !) demonstrated by the then and future Estonian elite in the crucial times from summer 1985 to January 1991 explains quite well the peculiarities of Estonian policy - making and the formation of the new elite. After the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Estonia on August 20th, 1991, the activities of the pro - Moscow Communist Party of Estonia, Intermovement, the United Council of Working Collectives and Workers Guard, which all in previous days had adopted declarations in support of the putsch in Moscow ( incl. 18 members of the Supreme Soviet, none of whom was personally punished for that ), were banned. 10 years later, when a group of former high - ranking figures of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union tried to revive its structures and even started to convoke congresses in Moscow, a participation of the Communist parties of the Baltic countries in these gatherings of hardliners was mentioned. Only in 2003 it was disclosed that there were negotiations about Yuri Mishin becoming a representative of the CP of Estonia. He is rather known as the leader of the Russian Citizens Union in Narva and as the organizer of the commemoration of Lenin’s birthday, the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution and several anti - governmental pickets, demonstrations and rallies. These actions gathered 10–300 people, mainly pensioners. Responding to my request ( September 9, 2005), Yuri Mishin said that he considered himself the leader of the CPE because he was the only first secretary of the CPE District Committee ( he was elected first secretary of the CPE Narva Town committee in February 1991) who had not stepped down or declared that he had left the party and as there were enough ardent followers ( Comrade Mishin declined from telling the number but insisted on a total lack of financing of his and followers activities by anyone ), he continued to fulfil his duties. In 1995–2000 he was also a member of the Council of Compatriots at the Russian State Duma. So, from the point of view of several political forces in Russia, there is still a Communist Party in Estonia and Yuri Mishin ( b. 1946) is recognized as its leader. The Independent Communist Party of Estonia declared to favour the adoption of the new Constitution ( referendum was held on June 28th, 1992) and took part in the general elections of September 20, 1992, as a member of the electoral alliance The Left Alternative. Despite comparatively good positions in the Supreme Council its list included only 14 candidates, what should be considered the party’s tactical move to demonstrate its readiness not to fight for power ( in October, 1992, the stronger Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party applied similar tactics and declined from appointing its candidates in all districts). LA candidates gained a total of 7,374 votes or 1.61 % ( the 13th result among 18 participators ) of all votes. Vaino Väljas, leader of the Communist Party (1988–95), was close to be ( re - )elected, but his safe seat was taken over by his former subordinate, deputy head of the CP Central Committee ideological department, the famous critic of world imperialism Vambola Põder, who ran for the parliament under the flag of the Royalists, a strange populist electoral

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alliance. Põder gained 4,153 votes against Väljas’ 2,670 votes to be elected to the Riigikogu. The list of Royalists gained a surprising total of 32,638 votes and 8 seats, and among the winners there was another CPE CC lecturer – Tõnu Kõrda. CP CC’s spokespersons popularity can be explained simply – they both performed regularly on Estonian TV and radio, and the absolute majority of journalists broadcasting on the screen and air in the Soviet period and in the times of the Perestroika ( its start in Estonia was delayed ) continued their jobs even after the restoration of independence ( incl. those who instead of capitalism started to condemn Communism ). At the same time several persons who had been deprived from the right to speak on TV - radio for being accused of ideologic mistakes never returned to their previous jobs. This election campaign included also quite an intensive propaganda campaign under the slogan of “Sweep them out”, launched by the winning right parties. Of course those “they” were Communists. But on the same day also the first round of the presidential elections took place and Arnold Rüütel, head of state, who had distanced himself from theCPE in 1989–90 ( see above ), was a clear winner with a 42 % popular support ( he lost the second round of elections in the parliament ). A lot depended on the personalities and their readiness to act and their manner of conduct ( Mr. Rüütel never responded to criticism about his past political affiliation ). Some anti - Communist propaganda waves with less or more intensity took place in all following election campaigns. They were very weak before the 1995 general elections, as then the right - wing forces were clear losers. The latter’s return to power (1999 and once again in 2003) was preceded by several special anti - Communist campaigns. For example, in October 1998 a group of former Komsomol activists were ready to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the founding of this organisation and then a group of intellectuals organized a public campaign against it. As a result, the event took place behind closed doors. This may be called the last purely anti - Communist - party campaign. As by that time the official successor of the CPE had lost any significant influence, now fighters against Communism turned their attacks against former Communists in the ranks of other political parties, first of all in ranks of the Estonian Centre Party ( chairman Edgar Savisaar ). On the eve of the 2003 elections the Communist past ( a decision ruled by him as a judge in 1982) of the centrist Minister of the Interior became the hottest topic in the media and, as a result, Ain Seppik resigned ( to be elected to the new parliament one month later ). The corruption of former Communists from other parties was the main slogan of the political newcomer Res Publica on the eve of the 2003 elections and they succeeded. The Communist past of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Economics ( E. Savisaar ), the Minister of Defence ( J. Jõerüüt, Reform Party ), the publisher of the Postimees daily ( M. Kadastik ) and 30 MPs were also raised on the eve of the local elections in 2005 ( statement by co - founders of the Res Publica party from August 17th, 2005, and a performance of the Nazi - style slogan “Commies to the oven” on T - shirts at a soccer match on September 23rd,

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which caused a heated debate and the resignation of Mr. Jõerüüt as a response to the appearance of his subordinate in this shirt ). Returning to the elections of 1992, it is important to add that the modest activity (14 candidates !) of the CPE depended also on insecurity regarding its future. The time when there was a need for the existence of a pro - independence CPE had lasted longer than expected ( among other factors do not forget about the presence of Russian troops in Estonia until August 1994) and despite the comparatively small size of the building left in the hands of the CPE ( compared with 35 other buildings and 471 cars from which the CPE had resigned ), business flourished in it and evidently there was an interest to preserve it, remain temporarily in the background. To be more certain about the future it was decided to set up a new, European style post - Communist Party. On November 28th, 1992, a constituent congress of the Estonian Democratic Labour Party took place. ( Members of the CPE were simply re - registered as members of EDLP. A real revision of membership to assure its accordance with demands of the Law on Parties took place in 1997–98.) A social - democratic programme, based on the programmes of the Left Party of Sweden, the Left Union of Finland and the Socialist Left Party of Norway, as it was announced officially, was adopted. It was the best time for founding such a new party, as the in the political landscape the left- wing happened to be unoccupied after a controversial move of three socialist and social - democratic oriented groups and parties (they all were set up in 1989–91 and one of them had already been admitted to the Socialist International. There was a 8–member Social - Democrats faction in the Supreme Council ) – on the eve of the general elections they joined and under the name of the Moderates gained 10 % of votes and 12 seats, but then decided to join the right - wing coalition government. As it is well known, this government started to carry out radical reforms with minimum social protection. Very soon it became clear that the new post - Communist Party was not able to use this rather theoretical chance. The general mood against Communists was kept hot, thanks to the efforts of Prime Minister Mart Laar, who caught attention at home and abroad by declaring from time to time that his government was non - Communist or even anti - Communist (“the only anti - Communist government in Eastern Europe” ). Of course the main reason for the disabilities of the EDLP was that a time for such a kind of party was over in Estonia. It simply lost its members and turned into a marginal party already by 1994 – the year when the Russian troops were withdrawn from Estonia. This should be considered very symbolic – the occupation forces left and Communism, brought by them, had also come to an end. The EDLP were comparatively successful on the October 16th, 1993, local elections. In the Tallinn City Council its candidates gained 4,113 votes or 2.77 % or practically the same number of votes as the Social - Democratic Party ( participating under its own name ), which gained 4,152 votes or 2.8 % of votes. ( It is possible to conclude that this was a public punishment for the ESDP for joining the right - wing coalition and for the shock therapy of the new government ). In

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Table 4 : Membership data of the CPE and EDLP 1992–94 01. 07.1992

01.11.1992

01. 01.1994

3.246

3.139

1.174

433 (13,3 %) 294 (9,1 %) 1.418 (43,7 %) – 1.101 (33,9 %) –

412 (13,1 %) 287 (9,1 %) 1.361 (43,4 %) – 1.071 (34,1 %) 3 (0,1 %)

61 (5,2 %) 65 (5,5 %) 398 (33,9 %) 1 (0,1 %) 406 (34,6 %) 8 (0,7 %)

3. Women

1.109 (34,2 %)

1.071 (34,1 %)

406 (34,6 %)

4. Native people (Estonians)

2.545 (78,4 %)

2.460 (78,4 %)

1.060 (90,2 %)

54 (1,6 %) 901 (27,8 %) 899 (27,7 %) 1.392 (42,9 %)

48 (1,5 %) 876 (27,9 %) 879 (28,0 %) 1.336 (42,6 %)

6 (0,5 %) 219 (18,7 %) 274 (23,3 %) 675 (57,5 %)

109 (3,3 %) 957 (29,5 %) 2.180 (67,2 %)

100 (3,2 %) 913 (29,1 %) 2.126 (67,7 %)

28 (2,4 %) 180 (15,3 %) 966 (82,3 %)

1. Listed in CPE/EDLP (in thousands) 2. Occupation Workers Farmers Employees Students Pensioners/Dependents unemployed

5. Age up to 30 years 31–50 years 51–60 years over 60 years 6. Length of affiliation less than 5 years 6–20 years more than 20 years

Source : ERA, Fond 4957, N 1, sari 8, s. 1, p. P 045, T 010194.

the elections to the Narva Town Council ( in North - East Estonia, with mainly Russian population ) the EDLP gained the second - best result or 6,746 votes and 12 seats out of 31. Several EDLP candidates were also successful in elections to smaller local councils. For the next Riigikogu elections on March 5th, 1995, the EDLP was fully prepared, as a list of 103 candidates was submitted. Aside EDLP members it included other left - oriented groups and free - riders. If 12,248 or 2.27 % of votes may be qualified as a disappointment ( the 10th position among 17 attendants ), then the results of the local elections of October 29th, 1996, was clearly another failure for the party in Tallinn – its candidates remained on the last, 11th position with 1,456 votes or 1.2 % of votes. EDLP candidates in Narva were successful again – 4,153 votes and 8 seats. The bad performance of the party in Tallinn was directly linked with legal procedures launched to deprive the EDLP from its material basis. All attempts

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to obtain rights of ownership, including the foundation of a new party, joining to the European Left Forum (1995 – the first and the only party from the Baltic states to do so ) and an open resigning from a previous declaration that the EDLP was a legal successor of the ECP ( November 30, 1996) were not enough for Ministry of Justice – after the respective court decision the party was moved out from the last building it had possessed. As the party refused to fulfill the order, the building was taken over by force on October 20th, 1997. Parallel to this, the EDLP suffered another loss as the Social Bank, which it had used for financial operations, declared bankruptcy. Among other consequences the EDLP had to close down its monthly Eile.Täna. Homme ( Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow ) (1996–97). Despite these serious setbacks, the party’s new leadership ( Tiit Toomsalu, born 1949, EDLP chairman 1996–2004) was able to launch a new and successful tactics of alliances and quickly gained astonishing results. This was in many ways thanks to the dubious position of the Social - Democrats in Estonia’s political landscape. In local elections in 1996 a common list of the right - wing parties and the Moderates gained 15,966 or 13.2 % of votes in Tallinn, but clearly stressing the links with right - wing parties and the role of the junior partner in the coalition does not serve the Social - Democrats. No wonder they had troubles to preserve their influence on the trade unions. One more favorable move for ex - Communists was a division among Russian parties ( in 1995 a joint list of two Russian parties was able to the gain minimum number of votes to obtain 6 seats in the parliament, but for the local elections of 1996 three different electoral lists of Russians were submitted, and very soon the number of the Russians parties grew up to 5). Under these circumstances the EDLP was at first renamed Estonian Social - Democratic Labour Party ( at the 6th Congress of ELDP on December 6th, 1997), then cooperation agreements were concluded with five branch trade unions ( of construction workers, miners, metal workers, water transport workers and with the Narva Trade Union Centre ) and in the end an election alliance was proposed to the Russians’ parties. The party’s new social - democratic program said a lot about equal opportunities for Estonian and Russian communities, about the need for a transit country to carry out a balanced foreign policy between the East and the West etc. It was exactly the time when OSCE and other international organizations tried to do everything to overcome the gap between Estonians and Russians, a state integration program was composed and launched (1998) etc. No wonder that an electoral alliance consisting of ESDLP and two parties of local Russians – the Estonian United People’s Party and the Russian Unity Party were warmly supported both from the West and from Russia. Even one of President Yeltsin’s advisors – Georgi Satarov arrived to bless the new alliance. Despite of all kind of support and advice, although in the general elections of March 7, 1999, it gained enough votes (29,682 or 6 %) to enter the parliament this was less than a joint list of two Russians parties had gained in 1995 (31,763 votes ).

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The main winner as well as the main loser of the elections was the ESDLP ! Its joint list with Russians included only 43 candidates of those who took part in the elections of 1995 ( see above ). At the same time a lot of former members of the ESDLP ran in the ranks of the Estonian Centre Party and the Rural People’s Party. Formally, the biggest winner was the chairman of the miner’s trade union, Endel Paap, with 2,530 votes, but a real triumphant politician happened to be the ESDLP leader Tiit Toomsalu, who gained a narrow 134 votes (the fifth best result among ESDLP members, who all gained from 0 to 254 votes, which means that Mr. Paap’s success was an exception ). But due to an inter - party agreement, Mr. Toomsalu was on the second position in the common list of the alliance, and thanks to it he and Mr. Paap, who was listed fifth, entered the parliament. For those who were acquainted with the strange sides of the Estonian election law the election of Mr. Toomsalu was not a surprise, but it happened to be a real Pyrrhic victory for the ESDLP and, what is more important, it was also a Pyrrhic victory for the local Russian community ( the leaders of EUPP and RUP, who had overestimated the chances of ESDLP, quickly lost their influence and posts in the respective parties ), and for local and international promoters of the integration policy ( calculations on sufficient support of Estonians to a common list was simply wrong ). Afterwards it became clear that this electoral alliance had definitively killed the last prospects for the ESDLP to stand up as a left - wing actor on some day. A failure of ex - Communists was historically determined, as already the next local elections (2002) and general elections (2003) demonstrated the success of another tactics of integration – Russians were freely elected councilmen and MPs if they had become members of the Estonian parties. This confirmed that in Estonia a period of parties based on the ethnic principle was over – a truth which was not caught timely by the leaders of ESDLP, EUPP, RUP and their foreign advisors. As a result, an idea of everyday presence of even a small European style post - Communist Party was off the agenda. Meanwhile the ESDLP made also an attempt to become an observing member of the Socialist International – at the 9th congress of the ESDLP ( December 9th, 2000) a respective resolution was adopted, but SI responded negatively to the request. Of course, the SI’s decision depended on a clear position of the Estonian Social - Democratic Party which had never agreed on cooperation with a post - Communist Party. Mr. Toomsalu said at the 13th congress ( Dec. 2004) that his party had during nine years made 7 proposals about starting a dialogue or cooperation with the Moderates - ESDP without receiving any response. On May 7th - 8th, 2004, the ESDLP took part in a founding congress of the European Left Party in Rome (as the only representative from the Baltic countries ). Its representatives – Enn Ehala and Sirje Kingsepp were elected to the Central Board of the ELP. Tiit Toomsalu, leader of ex - Communists, lawyer and owner of a beer importing company, became member of the Constitutional law committee of the Riigikogu and soon became notorious for his endless questions and speeches.

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In fact, all his initiatives were blocked and in 2002 even an amendment was passed to the regulations of the parliament which excluded from law - processing all amendments and initiatives if they had been supported only by one MP. This amendment was openly called the anti - Toomsalu amendment. It is easy to qualify it as an undemocratic measure, but even years later it would be enough to remind somebody that Mr. Toomsalu had submitted to some draft up to 800 amendments and that they all had been put on voting, after which a proposal to cancel anti - Toomsalu measure would be rejected. The most important part of activities of Tiit Toomsalu ( in 2001 his party - fellow Paap deserted from the ESDLP to the ranks of the Estonian Centre Party ) in the Riigikogu was not the distribution of the views of his own party – very seldomly it got serious attention. His main contribution must be considered being a voice of other small parties, not even represented in the parliament. Fulfilling its pre - election promises, the ESDLP convoked a round table of all small parties and succeeded again, as among them there were even openly antiCommunist parties. They became participators of the round table as there were no other possibilities for them to express their views on hot issues to the public – Mr. Toomsalu used an “open microphone” of the Riigikogu to read statements of the round table, composed by leaders of the ESDLP, Estonian Christian- Democratic Party, Estonian Democratic Party ( party of scientists, intellectuals, free - riders – T. A.), Estonian Independence Party, Russian Party in Estonia and Russian Unity Party. It is important to add that both Russian participants of the round table were rivals of the EUP. RPE was a clearly nationalist party and as a kind of tiny RUP pretended to be the unifier of Russian parties in Estonia. Due to this, in 1999–2003 thanks to the efforts of Tiit Toomsalu the society was indeed better informed about political life in Estonia than before and after that period – aside of six parties represented in parliament, five more parties (a representative of the RUP in the Riigikogu deserted to the ranks of the UPP ) were able to communicate their opinion, as the open microphone was transmitted by the public TV. Another clear success of the round table was the fact that all candidates for the President of Republic came to its meetings in August September 2001. It is worth to add that when the ESDLP was newly out of parliament it also found itself in isolation – there was no more round table, and former associates of the round table rejected an idea to set up an alternative parliament of out - of - parliament parties, proposed by the ESDLP. The ESDLP gained representation in the parliament exactly after it had been decided that parties should be financed from the state budget. What this meant for a small party is not difficult to understand if we take the example of the ESDLP – in 2003 it received 159,000 kroons from the state and 68.869 kroons from sponsors, in the same year the total sum of party fees was 15,296 kroons. Despite a permanent one - man - show of Comrade Toomsalu in the Riigikogu, his party quickly lost the ground. As contribution by the ESDLP in electoral alliance was very low and share obtained very great the EUPP refused a new

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alliance proposed for the local elections on Oct. 17th, 1999. Under its own name the ESDLP gained 700 votes or 0,5 % ( the 11th position among 12 contenders) in Tallinn. In Narva 2,549 votes and 3 seats were gained in the Town Council. For the next local elections on October 20th, 2002, once again tactics to make alliances were planned, but it was really difficult to find partners for the election list “Social and Democratic Tallinn” ( Russian’ parties, first of all the EUPP, refused to take part ). It gained 645 or 0.4 % of all votes cast in the capital city. An attempt to create an electoral alliance in the second stronghold of the ESDLP in Narva ended with ... the inclusion of all potential candidates of the ESDLP into the lists of other political parties – the period of ESDLP representation in the Narva Town Council had come to an end. In this situation an internal opposition tried to get rid of Mr.Toomsalu, despite his position as MP. In November 2002 Mr. Toomsalu was forced to resign as party leader, but his adversaries’ idea to at first rename the party the Estonian Labour Party and then turn it into a typical non - profit organization without goals and political program was rejected by the majority of the extraordinary congress and Mr. Toomsalu restored his power. The media put attention to the fact that Toomsalu’s main opponent Margus Lepa, actor and journalist, was close to the Estonian Centre Party. Parliamentary elections on March 3rd, 2003, confirmed the ESDLP’s low profile at the all - Estonian level – 12 candidates who ran under the name of ESDLP gained 2,059 votes or 0.4 % of all votes cast and was on the10th position out of 11 participators ), and as a result financing by the state was stopped. Similar was the fate of the party in the European parliament elections on June 13th, 2004 – its three candidates ( Tiit Toomsalu, Sirje Kingsepp, Nikolai Kulikov ) gained 1,057 votes or 0.5 % of all votes (10th position among 11 contenders ). At the 13th congress of the ESDLP on December 18th, 2004, the party was indeed renamed – to Estonian Left Party. Comrade Toomsalu resigned, and a representative of a new generation, Mrs Sirje Kingsepp, 35, then ESDLP secretary for international relations, who calls herself not a Communist but a socialist and feminist, was elected to chair the party. ( Mr. Toomsalu had called himself a leftist, a socialist, but not a Communist ). Very soon she raised attention as the heroine of a popular reality - TV show ( not a word about politics ), after which her conduct towards elder leading comrades turned to be openly critical. At the party’s board meeting on July 2nd, 2005, she proposed to take part in local elections with a list of “new faces”, which was not supported. Despite this, Mrs. Kingsepp submitted in the name of the party ( her personal ) list of 9 candidates in Tallinn (2 young women, 2 free - riders, 3 train drivers, a nurse and a librarian ). On October 16th, 2005, they gained 189 or 0.1 % of votes. The Tallinn local organization of the ELP, headed by ex - chairman Tiit Toomsalu, took part in local elections together with their former ally – the EUP. The new common list of Estonians and Russians ( Citizens Initiative – Elections 2005) included at top positions 8 followers of Comrade Toomsalu, practically all were

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Table 5 : Age of ESDLP members in 2000 Members of ESDLP younger than 25 years 25–49 years 50–59 years 60–69 years 70–79 years older than 80 years

10 (1,0 %) 164 (16,7 %) 159 (16,2 %) 274 (27,9 %) 264 (26,9 %) 110 (11,2 %)

pensioners who – despite being advertised to vote for them – gained 133 votes ( out of 4,003, received by the list ). The list of 11 ELP candidates in Tartu collected 114 votes and, as previously, several ELP members ran for smaller local councils. All over Estonia, the total number of votes given to ELP candidates (without followers of Mr. Toomsalu ) was 320 (0,06 %). The open rivalry of two ELP groups may affect a crucial problem for the party – its membership. Already in 1994 Estonia’s leading political parties were able to include a regulation into the Law on Political Parties that a party must have a minimum of 1,000 members to be registered ( for newcomers ) and to remain ( since 1997) in the register. Due to this, ESDLP / ELP has officially had a little more than 1,000 members in every year (1,041 in 1998, 1,040 in 1999, 1,162 in 2000, 1,135 in 2002, 1,131 in 2003, 1,097 in 2004, 1,078 in 2005 and 1,041 by the 1. January 2006), but of course this does not correspond to the number of active party members. ( As two thirds of party members live in Tallinn, it is evident, as one may see from above, that not all of them vote for their own party comrades ). The last data on the party’s membership structure were revealed in October 2000 at the meeting of the Board of the ESDLP ( as part of the preparatory work for a report at the 9th congress ).

II.

Future of post - Communist and left - wing forces in Estonia

It is very easy to say that the left- wing of the Estonian political landscape could remain empty or weak. The fate of the Estonian Communist Party and its successors has already been decided by its dual character in Soviet time borderland. It was first of all the party of the occupation regime and linked with immigrants from other parts of the Soviet Union for whom the easiest way to live better and become a member of the nomenklatura was to join the CP. Local people joined the CP for different reasons, incl. a chance to serve Estonian national interests. During the critical days of Perestroika Moscow’s tactics to divide “a leading force of society” to save its control over Estonia produced an opposite result, in which

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two consequences are important in the sense of the party system. First of all the ban on the Communist Party beheaded the badly - rooted Russian community exactly for a period after which it had become obvious that there will not be any strong Russian party and it would be wise to join a suitable Estonian party. The second important result was the exclusion of a possibility that the pro - independence CPE would serve as the fifth column of the empire – this happened first of all thanks to the efforts of the pro - Moscow CPE. When this task was definitively solved, official policy towards the still existing part of the CP changed and depriving it from its ( Soviet - time inherited ) sources of income quickly decided the fate of the CPE despite several rescue manoeuvres already launched by the new leadership ( renaming the party, adoption of social - democratic program etc.). As every Estonian knows well that in 1940, before Soviet occupation, the socio - economic level of Estonia was comparable with Finland’s or even higher and that today Finland is far ahead, it is very difficult to promote any ideas linked with Communist and post - Communist parties. A review of ECP / EDLP / ESDP / ESDLP / ELP’s activities in 1990–2005 permits also to conclude that it has not been presenting any new and original ideas to gain popularity and support among its potential supporters. To some extent there has been a problem of leaders – analysis of potential support permits to conclude that the first leaders of the ( then traditional Communist ) party – Vaino Väljas, Hillar Eller, Enn - Arno Sillari were more popular than Tiit Toomsalu or Sirje Kingsepp who tried to give to party a social - democratic look and the European image. They all had held responsibilities during the transition periods, but while the first leaders were able to follow a certain political line ( very important during the struggle for independence ), then the new leaders acted (under more favorable conditions – building up of the market economy, joining all - European structures etc.) very often emotionally, hoping to catch the attention of the public. Sometimes it happened that they used slogans with wrong timing. So the 7th congress of the party ( August 22nd, 1998) proposed a left alternative to the official policy. At that time a left - from - centre minority government was in power, which was defeated in March, 1999, and replaced by a rightist government. Or another example – the ESDLP’s 7th congress declared to favor a policy of neutrality, thus opposing the policy of joining NATO which was supported by all Estonian political parties ( aside ESDLP only Estonia’s Russian parties spoke in favor of neutrality ). The ESDLP’s 9th congress adopted on Dec.12th, 2000, a detailed platform on foreign policy. It included among others (1) rejection of those tendencies in USA foreign policy whch meant action without international control and out of mechanisms of global balance, (2) a democratic and stable Russia was called a global policy balancer, factor of European stability and Nordic - Baltic neutrality, (3) solutions for several preconditions, mainly linked with the economic level, were demanded before raising the question of joining

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the EU, (4) Estonia’s joining the Nordic economic zone and active participation in the EU Nordic Dimension were declared.15 Mr. Toomsalu took actively part in debates on the national security concept of the Republic of Estonia and several times submitted a proposal to rewrite the text of the concept to exclude joining NATO. The governing coalition was forced to use a series of procedures to avoid voting – join NATO or not – at a session of the Riigikogu ( January - March 2001). Being defeated, Mr. Toomsalu and 3 his Russian colleagues voted against the concept ( on March 6, 2001 it was adopted 64 : 4).16 In February - March, 2002, Mr. Toomsalu and the Board of ESDLP gained attention for their declarations that it was impossible to combat with prostitution, proposing to legalize it through introducing a respective taxation. On May 10, 2003, the 12th congress of the ESDLP adopted a resolution against Estonia’s joining the EU – when a known majority of Estonian people approved joining by a referendum on September 14, 2003. The new leadership of the ELP started with criticism of mistakes made but was not able to avoid a division in ranks on the eve of elections. If it should not be overcome, it is logical to wait that – due to hard rules for preserving parties in the register – the majority of ELP members will join the EUPP, the minority – the Estonian Social - Democratic Party. The latter is now ( once again ) in a phase of taking social - democratic positions. The 11th congress of the Moderates on Feb.7th, 2004, renamed it Estonian Social - Democratic Party and under this name and a social - democratic program it gained a surprising victory in elections to the European parliament. In fact there was one winner – Toomas - Hendrik Ilves, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996–1998, 1999–2002), who had resigned as party leader (1998– 2003) after a failure in the 2003 Riigikogu elections ( the Moderates representation went down from 17 to 6 seats ). The elections to the European Parliament happened to be a personal success of Mr. Ilves – he alone gained a record 76120 votes ( ESDP gained a total of 85 429 or 36.8 % of votes and three seats out of 6 allocated to Estonia ). This has a simple explanation – Mr. Ilves was the only head of the list, who as a former Foreign Minister was easily identified as person being able to work in Europarliament – the numbers one of all other parties were known as men / women without any experience in the international arena. As expected, a personal success of Mr. Ilves was not a guarantee for social- democrats to show similar results without the participation of Mr. Ilves in the future. in the local elections of Oct. 16th, 2005, it gained 15175 or 11.1 % votes and 6 councilmen in Tallinn, but this was the success of a common list of candidates ESDP (7 537 or 4.9 % of votes in 2002) and of the Estonian People’s Union (5131 or 3.4 % of votes in 2002), which both were reinforced by promi15 Cf. www.esdtp.ee / p¬_9.kong.htm. 16 Cf. X Riigikogu Stenogrammid, 2001. II kõide. V istungjärk, p. 849–852. About the main content of discussion on topic in English see : The Estonian Chronology, p. 103–104.

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nent splitters from the Estonian Centre Party. It is logical to wait that now the ESDP will definitively stay on the left- wing of the political landscape, but it is too early to predict the future – if the ESDP will be a big or a small actor in political arena. On September 23rd, 2006, Toomas Hendrik Ilves was elected the President of the Republic of Estonia. This came somewhat unexpected, as after the unsuccessful elections for the Riigikogu the presidential elections continued in the Election Assembly ( consists of MPs and representatives of all local government councils ), where according to preliminary information the majority was to represent the Estonian People’s Union and the Center Party, supporting Arnold Rüütel. But as the two parties’ cooperation was sometimes a total failure ( their internal competition gave 23 local governments a chance to sent T. H. Ilves supporters to the Election Assembly ), Ilves gained a tight victory (174 voted for Ilves, 162 for Rüütel and 9 were impartial ). The biggest rally for Ilves was done by the governing Reform Party and its leader, Prime Minister Andrus Ansip, and as Ilves candidacy was also supported by right - wing Res Publica and Pro Patria Union, the victory of Ilves was considered a success of right - wing politicians. This vision was confirmed by the muddy anti - Rüütel campaign in the media, where made - up stories were spiced with anti - Communist slogans. It is difficult to conclude how much this influenced on the election results, but it is a fact that media in Estonia dedicated almost a year to confront the nation to the black and white ( “the Communist past and the European future” ) scales. In April 2007 Ansip’s new government ( also incl. ESDP ) removed the Bronze Soldier, a symbol of the communist occupation, from the heart of the city to the Military Cemetery. Russian MPs who on the third day arrived at Tallinn insisted in the resignation of the Estonian Prime Minister, and a similar stand was taken by a part of Estonia’s opposition. This for - April campaign is still going on and it is quite intriguing that the dethroners do not forget to mention that Mr. Ansip had been ... a communist ! ?

III. Southern Europe

Few but Pure and Good Members are Preferred to a Mass Party – The Portuguese Communist Party’s Continued Orthodoxy Carlos Cunha

I.

Introduction

The Portuguese Communist Party ( PCP ) celebrated its 86th anniversary on March 6, 2007, as one of the strongest communist parties in Western Europe and as the oldest Portuguese political party in continuous existence.1 The party’s strength has declined since its parliamentary electoral apex in 1979, when it obtained 19 percent of the vote. Still, in the 2005 parliamentary election it received a respectful 7.56 percent at the polls, making it the third largest party. Given that the PCP continues to be rooted in an orthodox, Marxist - Leninist foundation when most other international communist parties have evolved with the fall of the Soviet Bloc, these results are quite good. The PCP continues to play an important role in Portuguese politics and in the international communist movement. It evolved from anarcho - syndicalist roots to its formation in 1921.2 The party went through a continuous clandestine existence under the right - wing military dictatorship which overthrew and replaced the First Republic on May 28th 1926 after a military coup. Since then the party has suffered from government repression. In 1929 the PCP was reor1

2

The headquarters of the PCP is in Lisbon. In 2006 the PCP had between 75 and 80,000 official members; the communist youth ( JCP ) had about 8,000 in 2004. The number of federations or local groups is approximately 1307. The PCP is strongest in the South (Alentejo ) and in urban industrial zones ( Lisbon, Porto, Braga, etc.). The Party has organizations in every area of the nation ( including the autonomous archipelagoes of Azores and Madeira ) and is organized by regions, sub - divided into municipalities, further subdivided by sectors / cells. Its directive organs are the following : Central Committee, Political Commission, Secretariat, Central Commission of Control, and Boards of Regional Organizations. The PCP has at least several hundred party employees. In 2004 the PCP had an operational loss of 324,000 Euros. Personnel made up 40 percent of its expenses. Cf. “Orçamento PCP teve prejuizo em 2004.” In : Diário de Notícias, 10 June 2004, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/06/10/ nacional / orcamento_ teve_prejuizo_2004. html. The PCP emanates from the Portuguese Maximalist Federation ( FMO ) which was formed in 1919 and disbanded one year later.

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ganized by José de Sousa, Júlio César Leitão, and Bento Gonçalves. During the 1920s and 1930s the PCP fought out a Bolshevization struggle : Until 1933 the Communist International’s ( IC ) “class versus class” tactics dominated the PCP strategy. One year later the party was involved in general strikes throughout the nation on January 18th. In 1935 the PCP was dominated by the IC’s “popular front” strategy. After the Spanish Civil War the IC expelled the PCP until 1941. At the same time the party was divided into two groups : José de Sousa’s Grupo dos Comunistas Afastados ( GCA ) and Gonçalves’ Organization of Tarrafal Communist Prisoners. During the 1940s the Stalinization of the PCP was carried out and the party reached the apex of activity and membership. In 1941 orthodox communists around Gonçalves’ position reorganized the PCP with the result that two communist parties existed. Henceforth the PCP was aligned with the GCA and the party was “officially” led by Velez Grilo - Vasco de Carvalho. But in 1945 Grilo’s PCP disappeared. During the 1950s the activity and membership of the party decreased, the PCP passed an “anarcho - liberal shift” at the Fifth Congress in 1957. Maoist and Trotskyite splinter groups emerged within the party during the 1960s. On January 3rd, 1960, Álvaro Cunhal and nine other political prisoners escaped from Peniche prison and fled the country. Cunhal was elected Secretary - General. He and some other top leaders directed the PCP from exile. The party finally became legal during the revolutionary period in Portugal in 1974.3 This long history of continued clandestine struggle gave the party an aura of legitimacy and dedication to the working class among many Portuguese. Government repression meant that mainly the truly committed willing to suffer the negative consequences of membership joined the party. Most of the post - 1940 leaders, therefore, were Marxist - Leninists, which helps explain why the party continues its orthodoxy today. Its historical legacy positioned the PCP to emerge as the strongest political party in the country after the revolution.

II.

The 1974–1975 Revolution and its consequences

On April 25, 1974, a military coup by the Armed Forces Movement ( MFA ) ended the forty - eight years old dictatorship in Portugal and ultimately replaced it with a democratic regime, despite right - and left - wing military counter - coup attempts in 1975. A revolutionary period began with the 1974 coup and ended with the aborted, ultra left - wing military coup of November 25, 1975. During these nineteen months the PCP cautiously analyzed the political situation, strengthened its organization, and presented an image of an organized, disciplined party which favored democracy and close adherence to the MFA program. As the period unfolded, the PCP increased its revolutionary rhetoric and strategy, which helped bring the nation to the brink of civil war. 3

For more detailed analyses on the PCP’s history including complete notation and bibliography see Cunha, The Portuguese Communist Party’s Strategy for Power.

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After the left - wing coup attempt of 1975 the party realized that the opportunity for revolution had diminished, at least temporarily, and tried to reunite the divided forces of the left. The PCP became cautious as it abandoned attempts to extend the revolution and focused on consolidating gains : nationalization, agrarian reform, new liberties, and worker - self management. It hoped that the ‘backward step’ was only momentary and that the revolution would reignite. It became defensive in almost every area of activity. Its influence within the MFA, the news media, and government bureaucracy was sharply reduced after the November 25 purges. The MFA, a last hope to rekindle the revolution, became moderate and progressively relinquished its involvement in politics. Nevertheless, the PCP continued its dual strategy for power as a parliamentary and revolutionary party. It participated in, and tried to reap maximum advantage from elections. Outside parliament the PCP leaders ran a conservative revolutionary party on the defensive; they waited for conditions to mature, so they could launch their offensive anew. While waiting they strengthened their power base. In the agrarian reform and nationalized industrial sector they braced for attack from the right. They tried to expand into the regions and sectors where the PCP was weakest, especially the north and autonomous islands populated by farmers with small and medium - sized plots. The PCP leaders also improved their organization quantitatively and qualitatively, battled opponents on the left, and encouraged militants to continue infiltrating all sectors of society as they awaited a change in the political atmosphere. Although shifts and oscillations occurred from November 1975 on, the leaders’ post - revolutionary strategy was basically the same. The PCP did not alter its long - term approach for power when given the opportunity to do so. Instead, having been offered a new opening to embrace Eurocommunism after the November coup attempt, the leaders decided to continue their orthodox structure and Marxist - Leninist strategy for power. The tactics and short - term strategies were adapted to the new political situation, but the basic analyses upon which they grounded the nation’s transition to socialism remained the same. Why the party did not change its strategy revolves around the leaders’ backgrounds and their social, economic, and political analyses of Portuguese society, which will be discussed below. The PCP continues its orthodox stance, but with a rejuvenated image. While not giving up power completely, the traditional leaders such as Álvaro Cunhal (deceased 2005), Octávio Pato ( d. 1999), and Carlos Costa made way for young, orthodox technocrats such as Carlos Carvalhas and Luís Sá ( d. 1999) to replace them at varied levels in the 1990s. Carvalhas was elected to the newly created position of Adjunct - Secretary at the Thirteenth ( Extraordinary ) Congress of 1990, considered a transition to the Secretary - General post held by Cunhal since 1961. At the Fourteenth Congress of December 1992 Carvalhas was elected Secretary - General to replace Cunhal, but the latter continued to influence the party as President of the newly created executive organ called the National

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Council which was disbanded at the Fifteenth Congress in 1996 when the party streamlined its directive organs. Cunhal then became a Central Committee member until his death at the age of 91. Celebrating the PCP’s 73rd anniversary and twenty years of democracy in 1994, the leaders reaffirmed the Marxist - Leninist path rather than adapt to the changes sweeping Eastern Europe. The PCP clearly supported the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, which began a new round of criticism from its less orthodox members. Renovators, especially intellectuals, either advocated reform or left the party in frustration. Ex - PCP critics such as Barros Moura, José Luís Judas, Joaquim Pina Moura, Raimundo Narcisso, and Mário Lino became leading members of Plataforma de Esquerda ( PE ) in 1992, a “new left” political association which played an active role in domestic politics. It dissolved after two years of activity when many of its members joined the Socialist Party ( PS ) electoral lists for local elections. Throughout the post - revolutionary period the party leaders continue to simplify complex problems into black or white solutions based on a one - sided perspective. The PS is either with the PCP and the people for democracy or it is with the PSD ( the centre - right Social Democrat Party ) and PP ( the rightist Popular Party ) for large capital ( and initially dictatorship ). Elections are analyzed from the standpoint of “the party,” “the left,” “democracy” or “the people.” Favourable results are blown out of proportion while unfavourable results are minimized or ignored altogether. The PCP leaders often read partisan conclusions into elections which are non - partisan. They frequently arrive at judgments for which they have little, if any, supporting evidence. These tactics portray how the leaders distort their analyses to present the results they prefer rather than the results they actually receive. Of course this is politics, and parties to the PCP’s left and right carry out similar analyses. PCP electoral coalitions are primarily created to increase PCP votes and influence in areas where it is weak. Its latest electoral alliance, Unitary Democratic Center ( CDU ), is a case in point. The CDU consists of independents, the Greens, and Democratic Intervention ( originally composed of 36 dissidents from the PCP front Portuguese Democratic Movement – MDP ). The alliance is seen as a farce by most political observers because the Greens have very little popular support, are a communist front, and are only a political party in the legal sense. The farce continued years of speculation that the PCP forms alliances because it is afraid to run with on the ballot its own symbol. The communists continue to argue, however, that the two are separate parties and that the alliance is only for electoral purposes and terminates as soon as the electoral results are formalized after each election.4 As an orthodox communist party in post - revolutionary Portugal, expanding its power basis at the local level is very important. By dealing with concrete problems and producing tangible results over time, the 4

Cf. Inês David Bastos, PCP e Verdes batem com a porta a Santana Lopes. In : Diário de Notícias, 15 December 2004, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2004/12/15/ nacional / pcp_e_ verdes_batem_a_porta_a_santana.html.

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party hopes to gain the support and respect of local residents, especially the peasants in northern and central Portugal. The Bloco de Esquerda ( Left Block - BE ) is a post - modern or post - materialist electoral alliance of three extreme left political associations ( Revolutionary Socialist Party – PSR [ disbanded as a political party 2004], Popular Democratic Union – UDP [ disbanded as a political party 2005], and Política XXI ), along with a number of independent candidates, that was created in 1999 prior to the June run to the European Parliament election.5 While the BE did not win representation to the EU parliament, it did win two parliamentary seats in the October 1999 Legislative election. Individually, the first two parties listed have been on the political scene for several decades. Many of the remaining PE ( discussed above ) members that did not join the PS formed Política XXI in 1994 along with ex - members of MDP and independent activist students. The transformation of UDP and PSR into political associations leaves the Workers’ Party of Socialist Unity ( POUS – Trotskyite ) and the Communist Party of Portuguese Workers ( PCPT / MRPP – Maoist ) as the only extremist parties still in existence that split from the PCP in the 1960s as a result of its “revisionism.” Of these two parties the latter is more active politically even though it rarely receives more than one percent of the vote.

1.

European Parliamentary Election (2004)

The European Parliamentary ( EP ) election of June 13, 2004, was well covered by the print media in Portugal. In terms of television and radio airwaves, the political parties were given air time as in other elections. As a result of the redistribution of EP seats Europe wide, Portugal lost one seat from the previous 25 to only 24 representatives. The election was already on the news in September 2003. The PCP’s GeneralSecretary, Carlos Carvalhas, in his closing speech to the annual “Festa do Avante!” made clear how much importance the communists were placing on the approaching election. They wished to improve on the electoral declines of the previous years and to reconquer their third EP seat lost in 1999. The PCP immediately “nationalized” the 2004 election by considering it a litmus test of the rightist government’s domestic policies. In the months that approached the official campaign the PCP again emphasized its consistent opposition to European Unity with its latest attacks on the European Constitution.6 The party actively called for citizens to vote for the PCP in the elections to show their disapproval 5

6

Cf. Luís Miguel Viana, UDP acaba hoje. In : Diário de Notícias, 2 April 2005, http://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/ 04/02/ tema / udp_acaba_hoje.html; See also Manuel Carlos Freire, Militantes do PSR “contra” a absorção pelo Bloco. In : Diário de Notícias, 13 December 2004, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2004/12/13/ nacional / militantes_psr_ contra_a_absorcao_pel.html. Cf. Susete Francisco, PCP Lança Europeias. In : Diário de Notíçias, 9 September 2004.

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with the rightist government. It also emphasized that while the EP was geographically distant its neo - liberal policies impacted Portuguese workers on a daily basis.7 The head of the party list was the hardliner Ilda Figueiredo, a demonstration that the party was maintaining its orthodox stance. Their campaign was again run under the CDU umbrella.8 The PCP’s main campaign arguments focused on the need to strengthen the EU budget, combat “privatization policies,” revise the Common Agricultural Policy, and end the Stability Pact.9 It also attacked the Constitutional Treaty as “increasing the democratic deficit” in Europe.10 While the PCP was the first to begin policy statements regarding the 2004 election, the BE was the first to announce its head of the electoral ticket, Miguel Portas, in the first few days of November 2003.11 It called for a referendum on the European Constitution prior to the EP elections.12 It also criticized Portugal’s antiquated abortion law ( echoed by the PCP )13 as only equaled by Ireland’s in the European Union ( EU ).14 For its part the BE criticized the reduction of the campaign to soccer allusions as dealing with the electorate as if it were stupid. It preferred to include main subjects in its campaign such as opposition to the Iraq war and the demilitarization of Europe. The BE would push for an EU foreign policy focused on peace and peaceful resolutions to conflicts. On this note it criticized the head of the PSD / PP slate as having sold weapons to Iraq from 1985 to 1990 when he was Minister of Defence. It also voiced its concern regarding the direction of European social policy toward the “Americanization of Europe.”15 The party opposed the European draft constitution and pushed for one with greater public participation in its formation and ratification ( as did the PCP and PCPT - MRPP). The BE was concerned with the impact the new constitution would have on the Portuguese judicial system, as was the PCP.16 The BE argued that it pursued the

7 Cf. Lusa, Carvalhas Pede Voto dos Trabalhadores nas Europeias. In : Público, 18 January 2004. 8 Cf. Maria Henrique Espada / Pedro Correia, Ilda é Cabeça de Lista da CDU às Europeias. In : Diário de Notíçias, 18 January 2004. 9 “PCP Define Linhas Gerais da Campanha Eleitoral.” In : Diário de Notíçias, 27 February 2004. 10 “PCP Quer Evitar Fuga das Empresas.” In : Diário de Notíçias, 20 April 2004. 11 Cf. N.S.L., Louçã Chocado com a “Invisibilidade da Pobreza”. In : Público, 4 November 2003. 12 Cf. Susete Francisco, Bloco Promete Alternativa a Guterres. In : Diário de Notíçias, 5 December 2003. 13 Cf. “A Outra Campanha da Camarada Advogada”. In : Público, 5 June 2004. 14 Cf. João Fonseca, BE Retoma Combate Contra Lei Medieval. In : Diário de Notíçias, 3 June 2004. 15 Maria José Oliveira, Bloco Acusa Deus Pinheiro de Ter Vendido Armas ao Iraque. In : Público, 5 June 2004. 16 Cf. Susete Francisco, Jà não é Imaginàvel a Oposição sem o Bloco. In : Diário de Notíçias, 24 May 2004.

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“high” ground by constructively focusing on issues such as unemployment, immigration, or increased poverty rather than criticizing its opponents.17 The PCP saw the results as encouraging and a victory, despite having failed to gain a third seat in the EU. The party garnered 9.1 percent of the vote when polls claimed they might get only about 5 percent. Although the communists did decline in votes, they did not do so in mandates. The PCP also saw the result as proof of a general unhappiness with the rightist coalition government whose member parties received their worst results in 28 years. On the whole, the left received about 60 percent of the vote while the right got only 34 percent.18 However, disgruntled communists such as Edgar Correia ( d. 2005) from the Permanent Commission of the Movimento da Renovação Comunista ( MRC ), created in March 2003, argued that the elections were a failure for the party when it received its worst results ever in the European elections and failed in its electoral objectives.19 Furthermore, the defeat came at a time of general victories for the rest of the left and declines in the major urban areas, in industrial zones, and among the young. To the MRC this was just the latest sign of the PCP’s misguided direction. The electoral tactics of attacking the PS did nothing to form a leftist alternative which the MRC saw as essential for the future.20 The BE also proclaimed its highest results ever and declared a failure for the right and victory for the entire opposition. When compared to its 1.7 percent result in 1999, the BE almost tripled its results to 4.9 percent and surpassed its 2.7 percent from the 1999 legislative election.21 The PCTP / MRPP had a similar conclusion to its leftist rivals by declaring the electoral results as a vote of no confidence in the rightist government. It also proclaimed its victory in increasing votes and percentages from < .88 percent to 1.06 percent to become the nation’s fifth largest party.22 The PS received its highest percentage ever in Portuguese elections (44.5 percent ) but had to come up with an alternative plan to replace that of the right.

2.

The XVII PCP Congress (2004)

The Seventeenth Party Congress was held November 26 to 28, 2004 in Almada ( across the Tejo River from Lisbon ).23 Jerónimo de Sousa was elected the new 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Cf. Inês David Bastos, Luís Fazenda Dramatiza Apelo ao Voto. In : Diário de Notíçias, 6 June 2004. Cf. “Comunistas Saúdam Resultado Muito Encorajador”. In : Público, 14 June 2004. Cf. www.comunistas.info. Cf. Susete Francisco, Renovadores apontam “bluff” ao PC e Atacam Desunião à Esquerda. In : Diário de Notíçias, 18 February 2004. Cf. Maria José Oliveira, Chegou o Momento de Miguel no Parlamento. In : Público, 14 June 2004. Cf. N.S.L., MRPP Exige a Sampaio Eleições Antecipadas. In : Público, 14 June 2004. In 2004, 1307 delegates ( approximately one per 75 members ) of unknown sociology attended the congress. The earlier party congresses had been held in the following years:

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Secretary - General after Carvalhas announced in October that he would resign as PCP leader after 12 years in the position.24 Sousa was considered by many to not be the ideal leader and was not elected unanimously. He was known for his close links with the proletariat, labor issues, and unions, despite abandoning the labor market decades before to work as a party functionary.25 Unlike Cunhal and Carvalhas he was not an intellectual, nor was he known for such abilities. But given the renewed emphasis on the proletariat and collective leadership, perhaps that is not essential to be the “face of the collective.”26 The deceased dissident, Edgar Correia, who had worked with him closely for more than 20 years within the PCP, considered him to lack leadership skills and be a product of the anti - democratic approach to issues. His knowledge lacked breadth beyond his connections to proletarianism. Sousa was Domingos Abrantes protogé ( one of the most orthodox leaders who was closest to Cunhal ).27 Once again, attempts by reformers to increase internal democracy by proposing changes to the statutes ( via a petition to the Central Committee with 144 communist signatures) allowing for alternate leadership lists and theses, direct election by delegates ( rather than the Central Committee ), and an end to democratic centralism were rejected and not even discussed. The renovators also wanted more dialogue with the PS and BE at a time when the party was moving in the opposite direction by considering them enemies. The hardliners firmly held the leadership organs and had tightened their control by the end of the congress. The Central Committee decreased its size by four members to 176. Of these, 113 (64.2 percent ) were either PCP or JCP functionaries.28 The party emphasized its need to have a large majority of workers and again rejected organized internal factions. It did all this by secret ballot for the first time, but not by choice.

24

25

26 27 28

1923, 1926, 1943, 1946, 1957, 1965, 1974 ( extraordinary ), 1976, 1979, 1983, 1986 (extraordinary ), 1988, 1990 ( extraordinary ), 1992, 1996, 2000. Jerónimo Carvalho de Sousa is a 59 years old ex - metal worker ( machinist ) with a limited intellectual background. He participated in recreational, cultural, and syndical activities under the dictatorship. In April 1974 Sousa joined the PCP. He was elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1976 and was an MP until 1992. In 1995 and 2006 he ran for president. In 2004 he was re - elected to the parliament. At the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2000, there were 1665 delegates : 528 industrial and agrarian workers and fishermen, 526 white collar workers, 353 intellectuals and technical cadres, 24 farmers, 82 businessmen, 109 students, and 43 other. Party functionaries made up 15.86 percent of delegates (254). This congress was also itemized by age : young aged 20 or less (81), 21–30 years old (156), 31–40 (296), 41–50 (614), 51–64 (437), and 64 or older (81). The youngest delegate was 16 and the oldest 85. Women made up 21.68 percent (361) and 10 percent (166) from JCP ( Communist Youth ). Inês David Bastos / Susete Francisco, Jerónimo de Sousa proposto para secretário - geral do PCP. In : Diário de Notícias, 18 November 2004, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2004/11/ 18/ nacional / jeronimo_sousa_proposto_para_secretam.html. Cf. N. L./ Susete Francisco / Graça Henriques, Comité Central eleito com 45 votos contra. In : Diário de Notícias, 28 November 2004, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2004/11/28/ tema / comite_central_eleito_45_votos _contr.html. Cf. Pedro Correia, Funcionários comunistas “invadem” Comité Central. In : Diário de Notícias, 29 November 2004, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2004/11/29/ nacional / funcionarios_comunistas_invadem_comi.html.

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The parliament passed a bill that required the election of party leaders to be by secret ballot, which many consider to have been directed at the PCP. The 1298 congressional delegates elected the new Central Committee with 45 votes against and 24 abstentions.

3.

Legislative Election (2005)

The next test for the leftist political parties came with the 2005 early legislative election scheduled for February 20. The BE began a series of debates with individuals from the entire left, called Fórum da Alternativa para a Mudança (Forum of the Alternative for Change ). Through the Forum the BE launched some of the topics for its electoral agenda, which included dealing with the deficit by decreasing expenditures two percent per year and increasing productivity by substituting the “stability pact” with one that instead emphasized employment and budget consolidation. These two measures were part of the ten concrete proposals for the first 100 days of rule which also included legalizing abortion and withdrawal of Portuguese forces from Iraq.29 But there were few innovative proposals, although it claimed it was the alternative in the election. The BE rejected joining the PS government as a possibility because what it had seen of the socialists’ electoral program was unacceptable. It claimed the PS and BE had different views regarding budgetary and economic policy and that it would not participate in a government whose proposals ran counter to the BE electoral program.30 Francisco Louçã, the party leader, criticized other parties for not yet presenting electoral programs, demonstrating their lack of ideas. The MRC ( metamorphosed into Renovação Comunista [ RC ] on May 5, 2005, and becoming an official political association on December 21, 2006) signed an accord with the BE that would place eight of its members on the former’s lists.31 João Semedo, for example, was third on the Porto list and in an electable position to a parliamentary seat. As an independent on the list he would be free to present his own views even in parliament. The electoral campaign found the Secretary - General of the PCP, Sousa, proclaiming that defeat of the right was almost certain. He criticized the socialists for wanting an absolute majority without presenting concrete proposals to the 29 Cf. Susete Francisco, Bloco reúne esquerda em ciclo de debates. In : Diário de Notícias, 4 January 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/01/04/ nacional / bloco_reune_esquerda_ciclo_debates.html. 30 Cf. Inês David Bastos, BE prevê que programa do PS seja “preocupantemente mau”. In: Diário de Notícias, 6 January 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/01/06/ nacional / be_preve_programa_ps_seja_preocupant.html. 31 Cf. “CDU contra maioria absoluta do PS”. In : Diário de Notícias, 10 January 2005, http://www.dn.sapo.pt / 2005/01/10/ nacional / cdu_contra_maioria_absoluta_ps.html; See also RC website : http ://www.comunistas. info; and Inês David Bastos, BE à espero do apelo ao voto dos renovadores comunistas. In : Diário de Notícias, 11 January 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/01/11/ nacional / be_a_espera_apelo_voto_renovadores_ c.html.

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Portuguese. As it had done in the past, the PCP attacked the PS as its primary enemy ( its closest competitor for votes ) by equating its policies with those of the right.32 The party presented 25 urgent proposals with special emphasis on labour issues ( for example, increase of the minimum wage to 400 Euros per month [374 Euros at the time ], decreased unemployment, and increased pensions ). The measures also included increasing education to a minimum of 12 years, eliminating student fees, withdrawal of Portuguese forces from Iraq, and legalizing abortion.33 Sousa criticized the BE’s transformation into a “depósito geral de adidos” ( general deposit of attachés ) because the electoral list would include RC individuals who, as he claimed, were “collecting old insatisfications, angry with life and frustrated with the situation”, “they are passengers in transit, with a destiny that only time will clarify.”34 The party’s main attacks, therefore, were toward the PS to its right and its main competitor to the left, the BE. The communists argued that the BE did not create original proposals / programs but instead latched on to what the PCP had advocated for years, leading the Bloco in its own campaign to call on the PCP to focus on the nation’s true enemy ( the right ) rather than the left.35 Sousa’s campaign style is more spontaneous than his predecessor’s, Carvalhas.36 The PCP’s analysis of the electoral results was that the right received a resounding defeat, its main goal. The party was also pleased with its increase of 54,000 votes and two additional parliamentary seats from 12 to 14 (7.56 percent ) It was less pleased with the PS being able to garner an absolute majority of seats in parliament with its 45.05 percent showing because this was not enough to defeat the right without also defeating the rightist policies the PS had

32 Cf. José Manuel Oliveira, Jerónimo propõe diálogo ao PS de Sócrates. In : Diário de Notícias, 24 January 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/01/24/ nacional / jeronimo_ propoe_dialogo_ps_socrates.html; and Fernando Madaíl, CDU abre a campanha com comício no Porto. In : Diário de Notícias, 6 January 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt / 2005/01/06/ nacional / cdu_abre_campanha_comicio_porto.html. 33 Cf. “PCP quer salário mínimo em 400 euros”. In : Diário de Notícias, 16 January 2005, http ://www.dn. sapo.pt /2005/01/16/ nacional / pcp_quer_salario_minimo_400_euros. html. 34 “CDU contra maioria absoluta do PS”. In : Diário de Notícias, 10 January 2005, http://www.dn. sapo.pt /2005/01/10/ nacional / cdu_contra_maioria_absoluta_ps.html; Leite, PCP questiona “sacrificios” sugeridos por Sócrates. In : Diário de Notícias, 19 January 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/01/19/ nacional / pcp_questiona_sacrificios_sugeridos.html; Inês David Bastos, BE à espero do apelo ao voto dos renovadores comunistas. In : Diário de Notícias, 11 January 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/01/ 11/ nacional / be_a_espera_apelo_voto_renovadores_c.html. 35 Cf. Francisco Almeida Leite, Bloco sugere a Jerónimo que ataque mais a direita. In : Diário de Notícias, 31 January 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/01/31/ nacional / bloco_sugere_a_jeronimo_ataque_mais_.html. 36 Cf. Paula Sá, Campanha arranca presa a acusações entre PS e PSD. In : Diário de Notícias, 6 February 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/02/06/ nacional / campanha_arranca_presa_a_acusacoes_e.html; and Bettencourt Resendes, O encanto do camarada Jerónimo, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/02/18/ opiniao / o_encanto_camarada_jeronimo. html.

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been pursuing.37 Despite its overall gains, it did lose a seat in Setúbal to the BE which also did well in the election with 6.38 percent of votes. The BE did not reach its goal of becoming the third biggest party ( a position currently held by the PCP ) but remained in the fifth position behind the rightist PP. Nevertheless it surpassed the PCP in several districts ( Coimbra and Faro). In the cities of Leiria, Viseu, and Porto it is stronger than the communists. The BE received eight seats and more than 350,000 votes ( more than double the results in 2002). The most important victory, however, was that the right was defeated.38 Three days after the election the PCP announced that it would present several decisive legislative proposals ( legalizing abortion, increasing pensions and minimum wages, et cetera ) that would test whether the PS would continue its rightist policies. Unlike the BE it did not see the need to hold a popular referendum on abortion, choosing instead to present legislation in the parliament.39 The PCPT / MRPP received .84 percent of the vote.

4.

Local Elections (2005)

Local elections were scheduled for October 9. In total there were 43,489 electable positions, 6884 of which were municipal assembly people, 34,562 parish assembly people for the 4,260 parish assemblies, 308 council presidents, and 1375 local officials.40 Because the left was not able to agree on an alliance as it had done since 1985, Ruben de Carvalho led the PCP ticket for Lisbon. The 1997 local elections saw the PCP lose eight local governments, and in 2001 it lost an additional thirteen.41 But in 2005 the party did quite well, making gains at the expense of the PS in several councils including Barreiro, Sesimbra, Peniche, and Marinha Grande, while holding on to its bastions in Beja and Setúbal placing it as the third most powerful party.42 During the campaign it focused on criticizing the national government. It strengthened the communist po37 Cf. Francisco Almeida Leite, CDU considera maioria absoluta do PS “inquietante”. In: Diário de Notícias, 21 February 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/02/21/ tema / cdu_considera_maioria_absoluta_ps_in.html. 38 Cf. David Mandim, Bloco avança com referendo à lei do aborto. In : Diário de Notícias, 21 February 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/02/21/ tema / bloco_avanca_referendo_a_do_aborto.html. 39 Cf. Francisco Almeida Leite, PCP recusa “entalar” PS e lança propostas - fractura. In : Diário de Notícias, 23 February 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/02/21/ nacional / pcp_recusa_entalar_e_lanca_propostas.html. 40 Cf. “Meio milhão de candidatos”. In : Diário de Notícias, 27 September 2005, http :// www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/ 09/27/ tema / meio_milhao_candidatos.html. 41 Cf. David Mandim. In : Diário de Notícias, 3 May 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/ 05/03/ index.html#papel. 42 Cf. Pedro Correia, Vitória clara do PSD em noite negra para o PS. In : Diário de Notícias, 10 October 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/10/10/ tema / vitoria_clara_ psd_noite_negra_para_o.html.

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sition in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area to become the dominant force and elected two local officials including Carvalho. The victories increased PCP optimism regarding social combat. And these successes came despite the high profile cases of reformist local leaders that the party side - stepped by choosing others to head their lists instead. Only in Alcácer do Sal, Redondo, and Estremoz did those moves hurt the party. It won 32 municipal chambers (7 of which shifted over from the PS ). While it lost 3, it still had a net gain of 4.43 The party emphasized that of the 45,000 names listed in ballots throughout the country for varied positions 15,000 were independents and 9,000 were younger than 30.44 The communists received a healthy 7.5 percent of the vote in the 2005 local elections The BE ran José Sá Fernandes as head of its Lisbon list. It first ran for local elections in 2001, winning the presidency of only one local government in Salvaterra de Magos. BE ran in 120 of the 308 municipalities this time, a significant increase compared to its previous run.45 Its results were far from their hopes, though. They maintained their leadership of the only chamber they won in the previous election ( Salvaterra de Magos ) and did elect local officials to Lisbon ( Sá Fernandes ) and Entroncamento along with five Lisbon assembly people but did not move beyond their six percent victory from the previous elections.46

5.

Presidential Election (2006)

For the January 22, 2006 presidential election the PCP did the same as in previous presidential elections, it decided to present its own candidate, Secretary General Sousa, to communicate the “left’s” perspective and emphasize issues which might otherwise be ignored.47 It was the first leftist party to make the decision, arguing that it was important to take the step because the rightist candidate ( Aníbal Cavaco Silva ) was already surpassing others in organization. The Central Committee wanted to show that the party was not sitting idly, as was the rest of the left. Sousa used the PCP’s favourable results in the local elections 43 Cf. Filipe Morais, Jerónimo deixa aviso ao governo. In : Diário de Notícias, 10 October 2005, http ://www.dn. sapo.pt /2005/10/10/ tema / jeronimo_deixa_aviso_governo. html. 44 Cf. João Figueira, Independentes e jovens renovam listas da CDU. In : Diário de Notícias, 25 September 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/09/25/ nacional / independentes_e_jovens_renovam_lista.html. 45 Cf. “BE quer eleger vereadores”. In : Diário de Notícias, 25 September 2005, http :// www.dn.sapo.pt / 2005/09/25/ nacional / be_quer_eleger_vereadores.html. 46 Cf. Luísa Botinas, Resultados do Bloco ficam aquém das expectativas. In : Diário de Notícias, 10 October 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/10/10/ tema / resultados_bloco_ficam_aquem_expecta.html. 47 Cf. Susete Francisco, PCP avança com candidato próprio às presidenciais. In : Diário de Notícias, 1 July 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/07/01/ nacional /pcp_avanca_ candidato_proprio.html.

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as a springboard to invigorate his presidential run. His argument continued to focus on the PS government’s right - wing policies and Cavaco being the candidate of the rich.48 The PCP also wanted to guarantee that their perspective of domestic and international problems, as well as proposed solutions, would reach a broad audience. In 1991 Carvalhas received 12.9 percent, compared to António Abreu’s 5.17 percent in 2001.49 Sousa received satisfying 8.6 percent and was perceived as presenting a moderate, modern, yet combative image despite his orthodoxy.50 This differed from the label Sousa claimed the media initially imposed on him in 2004 when he became Secretary - General ( that he was working class, a metal worker, inclined to mischievous manoeuvres, orthodox, and of low intelligence ).51 The BE also presented its own candidate, Coordinator of its Political Commission, Francisco Louçã.52 The leader began his pre - campaign by criticizing the “silence” and “abstract discourse” of the other candidates. He emphasized national problems and topics such as social protection, judicial reform, and relations with the rest of Europe, even though critics claimed that those were issues for the government not the president.53 Its result of 5.3 percent did not fulfil the party’s expectation. The PCPT - MRPP also ran their leader, Garcia Pereira, as a presidential candidate, but he only received .44 percent. In this election all left parties ran their candidates to the very end rather than throwing support to the most viable leftist candidate because they did not believe Cavaco would be victorious in the first round. That was, in fact, what occurred when he garnered 50.6 percent.54 All the parties underestimated the right’s first round victory. Sousa, Louçã, and the two PS candidates ( Soares and Alegre ) stated several times that the fact that there were four major candidates

48 Cf. Maria Henrique Espada, PCP teme que PS “ajude” Cavaco. In : Diário de Notícias, 12 October 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/10/12/ nacional / pcp_teme_ps_ajude_ cavavo.html. 49 Cf. David Mandim, Carvalhas sem consenso no PCP. In : Diário de Notícias, 6 July 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/07/06/ nacional / carvalhas_consenso_pcp.html; and for its position in an earlier election : Avante !, 2o Caderno, 13 September 1990, p. 1. 50 Cf. Luís Delgado, Jerónimo – 3 Alegre – 2. In : Diário de Notícias, 21 December 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt / 2005/12/21/ opiniao / jeronimo__3_alegre__2.html. 51 Cf. “Não diabolizo Cavaco”. In : Diário de Notícias, 4 January 2006, http ://www. dn. sapo.pt /2006/01/04/ nacional / nao_diabolizo_cavaco.html. 52 Cf. Susete Francisco, Bloco lança Louçã na corrida a Belém. In : Diário de Notícias, 3 September 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/09/03/ nacional / bloco_lanca_louca_ corrida_a_belem.html. 53 Ibid., Louçã contra “silencio” dos candidatos a Belém. In : Diário de Notícias, 29 October 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/10/29/ nacional / louca_contra_silencio_candidatos_a_b.html. 54 Cf. “Cavaco eleito à primeira e Alegre derrota Soares”. In : Diário de Notícias, 23 January 2006, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2006/01/23/ tema / cavaco_eleito_a_primeira_e_ alegre_de.html.

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from the left was not a negative but instead would facilitate the left reaching 51 percent and ultimate victory in the second round.55

III.

PCP General Policy

While the party emits an appearance of change in varied ways and attempts to rejuvenate its image, for example, by allowing younger leaders to play important roles in the party, in the end attempts for drastic alteration have failed. For the most part, the PCP’s tactics and rhetoric continue to remain orthodox as in the past. Close examination of party policies regarding european integration, social issues, syndicalism, internal divisions, local government, public policy, internal party organization and finance, parliamentary activity, or cultural programs do not demonstrate major shifts. Examples are the party’s stance regarding abortion policy56 and its criticism of the PS government’s right - wing policies.57 As even the PS has been swept up by the neo - liberal tidal wave, albeit a more compassionate variant, increasingly the PCP has played a crucial role in insuring that interests and perspectives of the traditional left are aired. The image of Álvaro Cunhal and other historical communist leaders remains strong. Carlos Carvalhas ( Secretary - General 1992–2004) attempted to moderate the party to no avail. In 2004 Jerónimo de Sousa was elected Secretary - General, a victory by the hardliners over reformers. The party has adopted the “collective leadership” that Cunhal always emphasized ( but did not practice ). It is a theme often repeated in the party press, official speeches, and at the Seventeenth Congress. Sousa is proclaimed to be only one voice among many.58 Although he stopped being a worker many years ago when he became a party functionary he has continued to maintain strong links to the working class as well as unions ( the pro-

55 Cf. David Mandim, Jerónimo critica “confusão” entre “candidatos do PS”. In : Diário de Notícias, 23 November 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/11/23/ nacional / jeronimo_critica_confusao_entre_cand.html; and “Francisco Louçã diz que há clivagens à direita”. In : Diário de Notícias, 4 December 2005, http ://www.dn.sapo. pt /2005/12/ 04/ nacional / francisco_louca_que_clivagens_a_dire.html. 56 The PCP ran a major “sim ( yes )” campaign regarding the referendum on February 11th 2007 to provide abortion on demand up to 10 weeks in pregnancy. The results were yes 59 percent, no 54 percent, and 56 percent abstention. See Paulo Baldaia, Esquerda quer aborto decidido no Parlamento. In : Diário de Notícias, 16 October 2005, http:// www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/11/23/ nacional / esquerda_quer_aborto_decidido_parlam. html. 57 Cf. “Jerónimo de Sousa acusa Governo de gerar desigualdades e injustiças”. In : Diário de Notícias, 1 May 2006, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2005/02/06/ nacional / jeronimo_ sousa_acusa_governo_gerar_d.html. 58 Cf. David Mandim, 2.a figura. In : Diário de Notícias, 9 January 2006, http ://www.dn. sapo.pt / 2006/01/09/ tema /2a_figura.html; and Jerónimo de Sousa no Comício do Porto, 17 March 2007 speech at 86th PCP anniversary, http ://www.avante.pt / index.php ? option=com_content&task=view&id=27660&Itemid=245.

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letarian basis of the PCP was a major issue at the last congress ).59 An example of his commitment to his humble roots and emphasis that he is working class is that he recently checked in to Saint Mary’s Hospital in Lisbon ( a hospital of the commoners rather than the type of private hospitals to which political leaders usually go ).60 That the party’s electoral results remain quite stable ( though on a slow decline ) are also significant given that it remains orthodox despite Carvalhas’ attempts to project a new image for the party. In the end, the public sees that the communists’ change does not manifest itself in other concrete ways because they continue to pursue similar types of policies and tactics as in the past. Sousa has continued and deepened the party’s orthodoxy.

IV.

Portuguese Communism : Theory, Practice, and Forecasts

A major reason why the PCP has not “democratized” is that orthodox leaders, whether young or old, have been able to retain control of the party since its Stalinization during the reorganization of 1940–41. Álvaro Cunhal, a major figure within the party since the thirties and Secretary - General from 1961 to 1992, insisted on keeping the PCP firmly rooted in Marxism - Leninism. While the party has weathered occasional internal attempts to move it to the left or right, continued orthodoxy has been aided by avoiding contradictions from events such as the WWII shifts of policy, the Hungarian invasion of 1956, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. All these incidents occurred while the PCP was clandestine, minimizing the impact and open debate which erupted in many other communist parties. The Polish crisis (1980–81) led to the first real open polemic within the party, and even that did not have a large repercussion. In the midst of Gorbachevian reform and “perestroika” Cunhal refused to alter the PCP’s commitment to the proletariat, which led to the first serious contestations to its orthodox strategy to gain power. The leaders have succeeded in preventing organized renovation attempts from manifesting themselves within the party. Given the air of renewal which shrouds world communism in general, attempts emerged in the late 1980s and continue today. Although continuously defeated, the reformers could not be prevented from expressing themselves at the party’s congresses, beginning with the Twelfth held in 1988. By the Eighties, many of these communists concluded that the crises which existed in the socialist nations were a result of structural problems which ran much deeper than they had ever imagined. For example, a major difficulty in Eastern Europe was the bureaucratic control of nearly everything. Merely con59 Cf. Inês David Bastos / Susete Francisco, Jerónimo de Sousa proposto para secretário geral do PCP. In : Diário de Notícias, 18 November 2004, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2004/ 01/18/ nacional / jeronimo_sousa_proposto_para_secreta.html. 60 Cf. António Aguiar, Líder do PCP é do povo, Letters to the editor. In : Metro Portugal, 20 March 2007, p. 8.

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trolling the state did not guarantee effective socialism. The state needed the support and active involvement of the public. These problems would not disappear through evolution as they first thought. It became evident that the socialist structures needed profound, not just cosmetic change. Furthermore, these reformers continued to see the determinants of these same problems within the PCP. The orthodox leaders refused to adapt to the changing nature of labour in Portugal. They ignored the general social transformations, such as the erosion of agrarian reform, nationalized industries, and other conquests of the 1974 revolution, which had transpired. Even the decline of party support in its strongholds in the Alentejo ( agrarian reform region ) was disregarded. The party needed to accept that the revolution had ended. The PCP’s continued use of “voluntaristic” analyses ( that is, basing analyses on theoretical and hypothetical situations rather than concrete and realistic ones ) could not continue. For example, the party attempted to subordinate certain economic laws to its political goals even if economic realities often resisted political objectives. It needed to change its revolutionary outlook and rhetoric in favour of a new emphasis on elections. This would require demographic and socio - political analyses of the “new” Portugal to attract votes from the young, the new labour sectors, and even “retornados” ( African refugees ). The PCP also underestimated the impact of Portugal’s entry into the European Community and its evolution into the EU of 27 member nations. The party’s analysis of the Portuguese bourgeoisie was that it could not remain competitive internationally under a democratic system. Under democracy workers would attempt to increase their standards of living, leading the entrepreneurial class to seek a return to dictatorship to remain competitive. Increased integration into the international and European economies would increase the dictatorial threat. The analysis proved incorrect in that the aid which the community showered on the nation prior to full integration in 1991 actually bolstered the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the party continues its opposition to developments regarding the EU.61 Since the Eighties waves of reformers have attempted to change the direction of the party. But many communists still do not accept that one should try to change the party from the outside. As good communists they must debate and criticize from the inside and through the statutes. Optimists feel that the party has changed in nature, but its being dominated by orthodox leaders has prevented the change from manifesting itself. Many optimists claim that there is a tacit agreement between some of the young orthodox members and some of the critics to implement change, but implementation cannot begin until the latter have control of the party. These more optimistic members see change occurring while the more pessimistic reformers only see the party trying to prevent change. The optimists point to the fact that there was much more debate and participation 61

Cf. Jerónimo Pimentel / Pedro Correia, As hipóteses estão ainda todas em aberto à esquerda. In : Diário de Notícias, 4 January 2006, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2006/01/04/ nacional / as_hipoteses_estao_ainda_todas_abert.html.

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at the grass roots level as well as more dissent prior to and during the 1988 congress than ever before. They emphasize that despite all the problems very few members have been expelled from the party for criticizing it. The optimists also point to the apparent rejuvenation of top positions ( even if it is replacing the old orthodox leaders with younger orthodox leaders ). They insist that the new program approved at the twelfth congress of 1988 was quite reformist in many respects, although the statutes made it even more difficult to reform the party. And finally they point to the new left alliance for the Lisbon municipal elections beginning in 1989. After 15 years of trying, the PCP finally succeeded in making an alliance with the Socialists, even if only at the local level. But in 2005 negotiations for the latest alliance broke down, perhaps a sign that the orthodoxy is deepening. For all these reasons the optimists remain hopeful, but many pessimists have given up trying to reform the party from within. Yet the latter have also concluded that they cannot reform the party from outside the inner circle either. Many have literally given up trying to change the party from any direction. They feel that the PCP continues to be controlled by a group of orthodox leaders who have not kept in tune with the changing times. Although they admitted Cunhal’s political brilliance they were also aware of his fallibility. They felt that he could only hurt the party and its supporters by refusing to allow change. Many are now frustrated because renovation attempts have become bogged down on structural concerns rather than ideological ones. Unfortunately, the only way to bring about change is to first alter the structure because the orthodox group holds firm control of it, preventing any unapproved change. That is why some reformists attempted to bring change through ideologic discussions with Cunhal. Because this strategy did not work, criticism had to be directed at the structural changes, which they deemed necessary to allow full debate and reform within the party. The most recent sign of internal conflict emerged in October 2006 when primarily intellectuals criticized the party’s official stance regarding North Korea. On October 16 the Central Committee proclaimed solidarity with Kim Jong - il regarding the imperialist escalation on the Korean peninsula. On October 18 only the PCP parliamentary group refused to support a protest motion against North Korea’s nuclear test.62 And the PCP weekly Avante ! of October 19 dedicated a page to the official positions of that country regarding United Nations Resolution 1718 under the heading “Pyongyang wants peace but does not fear war.”63 But once again criticism did not alter party policy.

62 Cf. Pedro Correia, Elogios a Coreia do Norte dividem militantes do PC. In : Diário de Notícias, 23 October 2006, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2006/10/23/ nacional / elogios_a_ coreia_do_norte_dividem_milit.html. 63 “Pyongyang quer a paz mas não teme a guerra”. In : Avante ! no. 1716, 19 October 2006, http ://www.avante.pt / noticia.asp ?id=16605&area=11. Avante ! is the official newspaper of the PCP and O Militante is the theoretical Journal of the Party.

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After decades of projecting a monolithic image the PCP has finally shown that it too suffers from internal divisions. Although attempts at renovation have not succeeded, many communists and political observers feel that it is just a matter of time before the PCP is forced to change.64 The correlation of forces in contemporary Portugal is very different from revolutionary Portugal; yet the orthodox leaders continue to use strategies and language which are more applicable to the past than to the present or future. Can the party adapt to and keep pace with the rapid changes which are transforming modern Portugal ? Or is the party destined to remain an orthodox party ? Many of the renovators feel that the party has missed many excellent opportunities to change. As a result, various factors have placed it in a much weaker position to reform in the future. For example, one of the major problems which the party currently faces is that it lacks what many consider to be a viable project for the future. Mere rhetoric is a weak binding force, and the party has been on the defensive since the Eighties. It can no longer offer Portugal an alternative government or system but only part of an alternative because it will not be strong enough to rule alone. In order to deliver its option it must continue to forge agreements in the future, as it has done in its alliances with the Socialists and other leftist parties for the Lisbon Municipal elections from 1989 to 2001. It needs to develop new language and new techniques to appeal to the public without disregarding party principles. This role will be enhanced by increasing internal discussion, especially at the horizontal level. While it may claim that total democracy exists internally, that alone cannot insure free debate if the party maintains its orthodox structure. Today’s problems are very complex and interrelated. Without horizontal discussion it will be very difficult to resolve them. One reason why various groups of critics emerged within the party in the late 1980s is that the prevention of horizontal discussion made it difficult for a broader organized effort to develop. It is perfectly acceptable for the party to continue to function without unanimity in its leadership organs. The discussion must include self - criticism, something with which the PCP has always had considerable difficulty. That is one of the reasons why it delayed the acceptance of “perestroika” because this would mean having to admit that the party has committed errors in the past. Cunhal, who died in 2005, never accepted “perestroika” and rejected the PCP’s need for reform. When “perestroika” first emerged in the Soviet Union the PCP proceeded cautiously and kept its members ill - informed. It did so by minimizing party press coverage of Soviet Bloc reforms. Although the party used to translate Russian published media word for word, including many of Gorbachev’s speeches, it began publishing only excerpts of his remarks, omitting some of his less desirable political views. With time, the party could not continue to ignore the changes and began selectively covering the most conservative of them in the party press. PCP members had to read external news sources to follow the changes more completely. Cunhal placed re64 For details see the article : Cunha, The Portuguese Communist Party and Perestroika.

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formist events in the orthodox perspective. His responses were as important for what he said as for what he did not say. He did not mention the problems which led to reform in Eastern Europe, the same type of policies which the PCP continues to advocate for Portugal. The PCP leaders are unwilling to radically alter the party. Cunhal especially was a committed Marxist - Leninist and did not see reform as necessary. Although the party insists that he was not opposed to reform or “perestroika,” it is clear from his criticism of Poland and Hungary that he was not happy with the changes going on in the ex - Soviet Bloc. He was not convinced that the revisions were permanent. For example, Cunhal’s speech at the Seventeenth Avante! festival in 1993 or to the Fifteenth Congress (1996) reaffirmed the PCP’s foundation of Marxism - Leninism and its stance versus capitalism, which shows that there was not much opportunity for change in his perspective.65 When Cunhal passed away in 2005 he was one of the oldest and most traditional communist leaders in the world. He had seen many communists rise and fall. He had seen political and economic reformist attempts come and go in China, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and among the Eurocommunist parties. Did “perestroika” and devolution in the East pursue the same route ? His perspective was one of continuity and change, with continuity toward socialism being the stronger force. Cunhal continued to believe that Marxism - Leninism and scientific socialism provide the solutions to resolving the problems of the world. Patience is the key, and that is one reason why he refused to change. This is all part of the master plan. Why should he have believed that reformist attempts were here to stay ? For example, communist parties were being voted back into power in the Ex - Soviet Bloc. Cunhal molded a cautious party. Did the party become lethargic in embracing the changes which swept the Eastern Bloc, or should it remain cautious in favour of continuity ? He had seen many shifts in his lifetime and was gambling that these changes were also temporary. Why attempt to move away from Marxism - Leninism if he was convinced that there was no other way to reach socialism ? The belief that pre - perestroikan, East European - style socialism would improve the economic situation of the proletariat prevented Cunhal from embracing change. Younger and older orthodox communist leaders appear to have embraced his vision of the long - term master plan. Now that he is gone the party could move into new directions, but there are not yet signs of this happening. As recently as May 2005 the PCP weekly newspaper Avante ! was holding Stalin in high esteem for his role against the Axis powers during the Second World War.66

65 Cf. http ://www.pcp.pt / index2.php ?option=com_content&task=view&id=94&Itemid= 149. 66 Cf. “Stalin homenageado”. In : Avante ! no. 1641, 12 May 2005, http ://www.avante.pt / noticia.asp ?id=9554& area=38&edicao=1641; and Leandro Martins, O Partido e o Povo. In : Avante ! no. 1641, 12 May 2005, http ://www.avante.pt / noticia.asp ?id=9579& area=25&edicao=1641.

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One of the major issues in the renovative process is : where do the grass - roots members stand on these issues ? Are they politically sophisticated enough to be interested in the more theoretical issues of party governance ? Or are they only concerned with concrete issues such as maintaining an adequate salary level, participating in strikes, or working to set up the Avante ! Festival ? Preliminary guesses are that some cells may be politically sophisticated enough to be interested in more complex theoretical and organizational issues; but for the most part the blue collar workers that have been traditional supporters of the party will support it no matter what may happen. Most of the grass roots have been members for a maximum of three decades, are not well versed in Marxism or politics, and are incapable of profound debate. Improving their skills in these areas will require slow, patient training. Although many good aspects continue to exist within the PCP, such as its providing a sense of “unity” and a certain “spirit” to its members, this often does not help them to truly achieve their potential. The party prefers to develop followers rather than thinkers. Two to five thousand members do most of the serious thinking in the party. This is one of the reasons why some renovators emphasize the need for a slow, evolutionary transformation. They believe that if change is too abrupt, a rupture may emerge with the more conservative grass roots members. For example, from 1987 to 1988 the PCP was able to minimize the impact of the “six,” a renovator group, because the majority of its members are not avid readers and did not follow criticism in the press first hand. Because intellectuals in general do not have a lot of time to attend meetings or participate in party activity, many grass roots members countered their criticisms with comments such as : “When is the last time that [ the individual ] helped set up the Festa Avante !?”, which emphasizes their feelings that intellectuals prefer their individual pursuits to the collective needs of the party. The PCP orthodox leaders had to face many of the same “events” ( at least in terms of international communism ), which led the Spanish Communist Party (PCE ), Italian Communist Party ( PCI ), and French Communist Party ( PCF – to a more limited extent ) toward Eurocommunism; yet they chose to remain an openly orthodox organization rejecting the view that socialism might be achieved through democratic means. Rather than play the Eurocommunist game to slowly increase its percentage of the electoral vote, PCP leaders preferred to wait for economic deterioration and for conditions to mature, allowing a few more steps toward socialism. Given that Portugal did not have a large middle class to support bourgeois democracy in the mid - seventies, this would appear to have been a reasonable strategy. However, the party leaders maintained their orthodoxy, and revolutionary conditions did not mature in the short - or medium - term, which means these tactics have weakened the party. It is attracting the young in an only limited way because they see the PCP as a conservative organization unwilling to change with the times and are more attracted by the BE. Increasingly, the leaders are concerned with the rising average age of their activists, which explains why they added many young militants to the Central

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Committee and other leadership organs at their congresses since 1983. The party is also failing to attract women and small peasants to the party, which together make up a large percentage of the population. In addition, intellectuals are leaving the party in droves. The crisis also exists in the electoral and membership decline since the elections of the early eighties. A party that once attracted approximately 1.2 million voters has been reduced to less than half that amount. The party is also losing strength in the labour unions, which has made CGTPIntersindical more sensitive and flexible to change than the PCP. While the party has often preferred to ignore the changes transforming Portuguese society, the labour movement does not enjoy that luxury. As the work place continues to change in the midst of the technological revolution, CGTP - Intersindical has had to keep up with the transformations to remain influential. For example, the traditional glass industry of Marinha Grande has evolved toward injection moulded plastic. The federation realizes that the typical worker is becoming more educated and skilled. To attract or hold on to this more sophisticated worker, the unions and the party must evolve from the traditional revolutionary sectarian rhetoric. In short, unless the leaders drastically alter their strategy, which they are not doing, in the long - term the PCP is doomed to become less powerful.67 In the short and medium term change is not likely within the PCP as long as orthodox leaders continue to hold the reins of power. As a result, the party will most likely continue to weaken. Once the reins are no longer theirs to hold, a power struggle may emerge. The PCP will then have a new opportunity for reform if other orthodox leaders do not continue their hold on the party. Only time will tell who will be the victor under such circumstances. The longer the party waits to adapt to the new conditions facing Portugal, the more difficult it will be to preserve the prestige that it accumulated during its impressive clandestine struggle against dictatorship. But the rapid changes occurring in Portugal will make it increasingly difficult for conservatives to maintain monolithic power. While Cunhal was alive he continued to act as if the world still existed in the Cold War. The question is to which extent will unhappiness with the PCP’s direction affect the grass roots of the party ? If division remains at the intellectual level, Cunhalists will be able to maintain control more easily. But if the unrest spreads to the grass roots, change may emerge in the short term rather than the medium to long term. Among the party’s options there are for it to evolve toward Eurocommunist positions or for it to endure a slow decline while it continues to adhere to Marxism - Leninism. Because it does not have the support basis to move toward social - democracy, only the latter position is probable. Most likely, change will only emerge in the long term now that Cunhal is gone and when continued evolution in the ex - Soviet Bloc confirms the contradictions in the 67 Cf. Fernando Medaíl / João d’Espiney / Pedro Correia, PCP procura sucessor para Carvalho da Silva. In : Diário de Notícias, 23 March 2007, http ://www.dn.sapo.pt /2007/ 03/23/ nacional / pcp_procura_sucessor_para_carvalho_s.html.

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PCP’s positions. If the party does change, Cunhal’s long years of leadership place him in the perfect position to bear the brunt of the blame, which will allow the party to evolve in a different direction. But given that orthodoxy has deepened under Sousa and his orthodox leaders, there will be plenty of blame to go around. For the present, the party continues to make acceptable showings in elections, and its influence in the unions is important. Party strength has dwindled as its triad support from the nationalized sector, the agrarian reform, and worker - controlled industries disappeared. This loss of influence has not affected the current leaders who preserve a centralized, orthodox organization and Leninist view of revolution. The role of the party is to patiently wait until the conditions for revolution return. Although the PCP has often been involved in electoral politics since its emergence in 1921, one should not assume that the PCP is committed to social democracy. In the early years following the party’s formation, a lively internal debate emerged between anarcho - syndicalists that wanted to prevent participation in bourgeois politics and reformists who increasingly leaned toward participating in elections. Both the anarcho - syndicalist and reformist tendencies were eradicated during the Bolshevization of the party in the Thirties. Since then the party’s participation in bourgeois politics has been a mere tactic in its dual strategy for power of revolution and evolution ( with emphasis on revolution ).

The PRC – Emergence and Crisis of the Antagonistic Left Simone Bertolino

I.

Introduction

This paper is deals with the Communist Refoundation Party ( Partito della Rifondazione Comunista ),1 an organisation which has been representing an anti - capitalistic stance within the Italian Left since the 1990s. Despite an ideology which aims to override the system, the PRC has been a part of the Prodi government since May 2006, contributing to the leadership and control of the Italian state.2 The PRC was founded on the 3rd of February, 1991 at one p.m., when during the 20th congress of the PCI a group of party leaders announced their decision to contradict the secretary general, Achille Occhetto. Occhetto had decided to dissolve the old PCI ( Italian Communist Party ) and to transmit its political heritage into a new, non-communist oriented organisation. The resistance is also directed towards the suggestion to join the newly emerging PDS ( Democratic Party of the Left ) in Rimini. The history of Italian communism has often been characterised by unprecedented turning points which have been used to direct the party into an ever more “natural” direction within the democratic system. This has often been in reaction to changes at the international level. Both of the previously suggested innovations of 1956 and 1973/76 did not, however, touch upon the nature of the party or its relationship to the socialist world and, moreover, did not pertain to organisational models. Leadership forces such as Togliatti or Berlinguer had ascribed Italian communism with a direction that disassociated it with the systems

1

2

In the following, the Italian Partito della Rifondazione Comunista will either be abbreviated as PRC or be referred to as Rifondazione, the common Italian appellation. The abbreviation MRC stands for the Movement of the Communist New Foundation, before having taken on the form of a party. The party is currently a participant in the government of Romano Prodi which was elected in May of 2006. Giorgio Napoletano, one of the most influential politicians of the former communist party, was elected president upon Prodi’s recommendation. This second Prodi government experienced its first large - scale crisis in February 2007, when the coalition of leftist parties was threatening to fall apart. It was triggered by the debate on American military bases on Italian soil. Prodi was able to pull out of the crisis after a few weeks.

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which had arisen in the October Revolution.3 Several investigations which had been undertaken in the 1970s and 80s showed, however, that the communist basis had had the courage to adapt to leadership decisions4 which questioned the repeated collapses but not the socialist nature or even the legitimacy of the eastern regimes. Gorbatchev’s Perestroika made the conviction possible that state socialism was capable of being reformed. Achille Ochetto’s announcement on the morning of Nov. 12th, 1989, that the Communist Party was to be dissolved, swept away any kind of ambiguities. From this moment onwards, the communists could no longer designate themselves as such. It was the core of the communist leadership which resisted the historic suggestion and from which the foundation of the PRC was formed two years later. From this point onwards, the PRC mastered four parliamentary elections while suffering schisms and internal crises. The party nevertheless stood ground and developed from a nostalgic communist grouping to a party which would be capable of influencing national - political equilibriums while putting forward the suggestion to re - evaluate communist ideology. Until now, the PRC has hardly stimulated any kind of academic attention. With the exception of one survey, which pertains to the first months of the party’s existence,5 there are only very few published studies in Italy which are explicitly dealing with the PRC. The curiosity of social scientists has been concentrated on the PDS, another organisation having arisen from the dissolution of the PCI : This approach may be a result of the prejudice which views the PRC as being a mere remnant of the Italian political panorama.6 All in all it can be said that the fate of most western European communist parties has been extensively neglected after the fall of the Soviet Eastern European regimes and the political irrelevance of groupings which seemed to have been destined to collapse at the beginning of the 1990s.7

3 4 5

6 7

The party distanced itself after events such as the Togliatti memoirs of Yalta in 1964, the declaration on the advantages of the NATO defence shield, and the actions of the Polish General Jaruzelski of 1981. Cfr. Barbagli / Corbetta, Una tattica e due strategie. In : Il Mulino 260, pp. 922–966. For the situation in the Mid - 80s : Accornero / Magna / Mannheimer, Il Nuovo PCI, Special issue to : Politica ed Economia 6, p. 1–16. Dormagen, I comunisti. See also : Amarcord del PCI; Armeni / De Marchi, Chiamateci compagni; Bertolino, Rifondazione comunista; Caponi, Rifondazione comunista; Clementi / Giovannini, La parola al conflitto; Cortesi, Le ragioni del comunismo; Cossutta, Così nacque Rifondazione. In : Rifondazione, 2 (1997); Dalmasso, Rifondare è difficile; Diliberto / Diliberto, La fenice rossa; Garavini, Le ragioni di un comunista; Piselli, Per non morire di provincia; Valentini, La vecchia talpa e l’araba fenice; Vendola, Soggetti smarriti; Volta, Dalla Bolognina a Rimini. See Ignazi, Dal PCI al PDS; Baccetti, Il PDS; Bellucci / Maraffi / Segatti, PCI, PDS, DS. E.g. Bull / Heywood ( Eds.), West European Communist Parties; Wilson, Communism at the crossroads. In : Problems of Communism, May / June 1992; Biezen, Building Party Organisations; Bosco, Comunisti.

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217

The collapse of Italian communism

The years in which the governments of National Solidarity (1976–79) separated, the so - called “Bolognina shift”,8 have been defined as the PCI’s “years of decline”.9 During this time the party was plagued by a slow but constant crisis, as it was simultaneously operating on several fronts ( ideologic, international, organisational and electoral ). The 1980s represented a period of crisis for a majority of western communist parties. The parties which were affected most, however, were those which had played a significant role within their respective nation states as well as at the international level during the preceding decades.10 After the end of “Euro - Communism”, most of the parties found themselves at a political and cultural dead end. The euro - communist phase is seen as a “golden age”, in that the goal of government participation had almost been realised. The socio - economic changes which crept into capitalist societies during these years included the performance of the communist parties in electoral and organisational arenas.11 The development of the service sector, the collapse of the working class and the unified class vote, the emergence of new post - materialist issues and the revitalisation of ethnic and cultural cleavages, as well as the phenomenon of secularisation and individualisation, all throw the foundation of consensus in the European mass left parties, and especially communist parties, into question. As can be seen, all of these factors in the crisis contribute to the idea that a radical transformation of society is not only possible but also desirable. At the same time, the weakness of official Marxism in the face of social change had been addressed ever more clearly by notable intellectuals of communist background throughout the decades.12 The largest threat was undoubtedly, however, of international background : the crisis of Soviet socialism and the associated disreputability of this social and cultural model. The dwindling of the international communist movement since the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 was strengthened in the 1960s. After 1980 the strategic decisions of the diverse groupings diverged more and more. While some parties, such as the French PCF, the Portuguese PCP, the Greek KKE and several smaller ones reacted by reconfirming their allegiance to Moscow, other parties such as the PCI and the 8

A section of Bologna, in which A. Occhetto publicly announced his decision to dissolve the PCI during a memorial event for the partisans. 9 Gallerano / Gallerano, Sul PCI, p. 255. 10 E.g. the PCI, the PCF, the PCE or the Finnish SKP. 11 After the election results of the communist “political family” has fluctuated around the 9 % mark for 2 decades, they sink to 7 % in the 1980s and even drop to a low of 5.7 %. Concerning organisational strength, stagnation similar to the 1970s ( pertaining to memberships ) can be seen. 12 See Ignazi, Il PDS, pp. 29–44 for a thorough analysis of the ideologic crisis that the intellectual Marxist world had to endure at an international level during the 1970s and 80s, and the way it was dealt with by the Italian party.

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PCE strengthened their criticism of the Soviet model.13 The concept of the communist “political family” was exhausted rather quickly. With the end of the national solidarity governments in 1979, a position of national political isolation was added to the international ideologic crisis. This took away the credibility of the party initiatives. The reconstruction of a national, that is an “internal party system”, which excluded the PCI from the circle of possible government partners,14 blocked the party’s process of democratic integration which remained in a situation of “split legitimacy”.15 The stalemate which was produced by a political line without available interlocutors, lead the party to its biggest electoral defeat since the post - war period. In the parliamentary elections of 1987 the PCI not only lost its entire political fortune which it had accrued in 1975–76. It also saw those who were chiefly responsible for its political isolation ( the Socialist Party of Italy, Craxis PSI ) appropriating most of its votes. This proved the party’s own strategy to have failed. The third element responsible for the crisis was slow but constant organisational decline, decline of party membership and receding levels of participation. Above all, it became clear to the cadres of the apparatus that the party model was completely inappropriate given to the changes in Italian society. The self centred nature of the “new party” in Togliatti’s style might in one sense be typical of a party which has been forced to consolidate its organisation into a system of permanent ideologic non - recognition, but it developed from a strategic resource into an ever heavier load. The final transformation of the PCI can be interpreted as an attempt to combat an already inevitable collapse through an organised breach of taboo and a change of the party model. The latter is still based, after all on the defence of the organisation as such, the primum vivere according to Togliatti.16 This could undoubtedly only be implemented by making the most radical of decisions in questioning party identity, its symbols and its names.

13 As a result of the new leadership under Gorbatchev and the fall of the Eastern regimes from 1989 to 1991, this differentiation in political culture intensifies and three types of distinction can be seen : 1) orthodox immobility ( PCF, PCP, PCB, DKP ), 2) the leftist attempt to orchestrate a programme of socialist transformation ( PCE, PCP, PCB, DKP) and 3) the complete dismissal of old identities through a renewal of goals and organisational transformation. See Bull, The West European Communist Movement, pp. 78–97. 14 See Morlino, Consolidamento democratico, pp. 197–238 on the concept of “internal party systems”. For the application of the concept within the communist parties of southern Europe, see Bosco, I comunisti. 15 See Rodotà, La costituzione materiale, pp. 63–92. 16 See Baccetti, Il PDS.

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The end of democratic centralism and internal tendencies shortly before the “transformation”

From an organisational point of view, one of the most important prerequisites of the “transformation” and the re - structuring of the party model was the slow dissociation first of all from principles and later from the practice of democratic centralism within the communist elite. The nomination of “young” Occhetto, first as vice - secretary and later for the highest office was de facto the most immediate consequence of the election defeats of the PCI in June 1987 and in the following autumn. The new secretary immediately initiated a new set of reforms that are seen as a “new course”.17 This found its peak at the 18th congress in March 1989. Occhetto, however, impelled especially the rise of young people who had not yet shown a large party history18 and who would be ready to address the taboo of communist difference. The 18th congress in March 1989 represents an important step : the new leader succeeded not only in a deeply extensive revision in dealing with liberal democratic and other political tendencies. He was also successful in extending the borders beyond the “innovative” coalition into the left of Ingrao. At the same time he attained more freedom of action in regards to internal rules and thereby was able to seal the end of democratic centralism.19 Shortly before the transformation, a positive climate spread in relation to the imminent changes. But in this phase, which groups acted at the top of the party ? In the second half of the 1980’s four main tendencies can be distinguished: The “ready for reform” right - wing with its “Amendolaesque” leader Giorgio Napoletano stands out first and foremost. It was committed to forging an alliance with the PSI and to seeking organisational connections to international socialist groupings.20 The groupings which controlled a heterogeneously constructed party were found to be fixed in the centre. This heterogeneity was based upon a composition of right and left - wing splinter elements. At the end of the 1980s the centre was comprised above all of the new leadership class around Occhetto and the historical leaders embodying the Berlinguer phase. With the collapse of historical compromise and the subsequent death of Berlinguer, the centre no longer had any clearly defined political position.21 It was limited to 17 Amyot, La via italiana al riformismo, p. 131–152. 18 See Baccetti, Il PDS; Ignazi, Dal PCI al PDS. 19 A new congress regulation was passed which allows, amongst other things, the following : the reduction of the electoral commission’s decision making power in drafting candidate lists and the possibility of giving automatic candidature to those who have attained 20 % of deputy votes. The new statutes also propose to strengthen the individual rights of members, to guarantee more autonomy to national representatives and more. See Ignazi, Dal PCI al PDS, pp. 95–96. 20 A so - called Miglirotic tendency – a reform oriented attitude towards Moscow – can be found especially with the executive board, unions, alliance partners and in a few associations. Milan can be seen as the stronghold of these political tendencies. 21 This refers to a political strategy of Berlinguer from 1973 which envisages an alliance with all democratic forces in order to prevent a move towards the right.

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guaranteeing internal stability in being attached at times to the right ( such as in 1986) and at times to the left ( like in 1989). In the left - wing of the party on the other hand, two tendencies can be seen : the groupings led by Pietro Ingrao, and the pro - Soviet group of Armando Cossutta. Both were united by the common will to defend the party’s anti - capitalistic identity. They had always been split in the evaluation of Soviet socialism, which had often been expressed in stronger feelings of mutual animosity.22 The left - wing around Ingrao was dedicated above all to new social movements, ecology, feminism and pacifism and the long range democratisation of the party. This it had in common with the circles around Cossutta.23 Even if the leftists around Ingrao were always the butt of criticism by MarxistLeninist orthodoxy because they were supporting the “third way” of Berlinguer and later the movements of Occhetto, the pro - Soviet component arose in contrast as a reaction to the separation of the PCI from Soviet socialism. The pro Soviet component is rooted in the years between 1979 and 1981,24 when the minority leftist groups united. They rallied around the person of Pietro Secchias, the head of the former Stalinist guard, who on the day of the 8th congress (1956) was an inferior to Togliatti, and around the leaders who opposed the Berlinguerian turning point in 1981.25 The representatives of this are above all Armando Cossutta and Guido Cappelloni.

2.

The “Bolognina shift” and schism in the PCI

The decision to dissolve the PCI changed the situation in the party. Only a few days after the fall of the Berlin Wall the communist party secretary took advantage of the opportunities brought about by the international chain of events to make the most radical of decisions in changing the name and symbol of the party. Thereby the party’s entire identity was renewed. Occhetto’s speech at Bolognina was immediately followed by a complete destabilisation of the alliances at the top and the formation of two new coalitions.26 At the emergency meeting of

22 In this way the group around Ingrao, for example, refused any relationship with pro Soviet groupings. This is in the context of the 16th (1983) and 17th (1986) congresses. 23 Cfr. Cossutta, Il centralismo democratico ieri e oggi. In : Rinascita, April 30, 1988; Cappelloni, l’Unità; Cossutta, Non correnti cristallizzate ma piena democrazia. In : Rinascita, May 14, 1988; letter of 13 workers from the industrial area of Breda in the town of Sesto. 24 Diliberto, La fenice rossa; Valentini, La vecchia talpa. 25 Enrico Berlinguer makes the famous statement “on the decreasing impetus of the October revolution” pertaining to the events of 1981 in Poland. An article which expresses his disapproval of the leadership group appears in Unita on Jan. 6th, 1982. 26 For perspective on the upheavals of November 1989, see Bull, La svolta di Occhetto. In: Politica in Italia; Belloni, Il Partito comunista italiano. In : Politica in Italia; Armeni / De Marchi (Eds.), Cronache della Rifondazione Comunista; Hellman, La difficile nascita del PDS. In : Politica in Italia.

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the central committee, which took place between Nov. 20th and Nov. 24th, a new opposition front was formed which united the largest part of the Berlinguer centre and the left around Ingrao and Cossutta.27 On the other hand, an innovative coalition was formed comprising of the rightists of miglioristi and Occhetto’s “topliners” such as Massimo D’Alema, Walter Veltroni, Claudio Petruccioli and Fabio Mussi amongst others, as well as several renegades of Ingrao and Berlinguer.28 After a five day debate, the recommendation of the secretary was accepted with 219 voices in favour, 73 rejections and 34 abstentions. The “modernisers” pitted against an unambiguous opposition of almost a third of the ruling establishment, slowed down their pace and accepted recommendations by their opponents to postpone the final decision to dissolve the PCI until a special congress within the next months. Only after its approval would a new party be called to life. As the congress approached, the dispute on both fronts intensified. This led to a freeze of internal differences within both blocks. Then again, party identity was on the line and this deepened the rift between the various groupings. The collapse of the Soviet system and the need to put the Italian party system ( which had been blocked by a lack of democratic integration ) into motion called for the “innovative” coalition to “free itself from bottom to top of old ideological packaging”29 and to change the collective party model. In contrast, the two components of the “no - front” bring forth the argument that in order to dissociate the fate of the PCI from the debris of real existing socialism while opening the political system, one would have to free the party of its communist identity. The “shift” hence did not only bring forth change in internal rules and regulations, the end of democratic centralism and the official birth of party wings. It also ended the “collective charisma” that had always surrounded the communist leadership group. The break at the top shows that there had always been a large field of militants within the PCI who were now bound to the ideologic identity of the party. When communist identity was being negotiated, they as a latent group put themselves on the side of the organisational voice.30 The members who were against the upheaval and thereafter stood for the formation of a new communist party stem from these circles. This was most of all because resistance against the “shift” tended to be stronger at the party basis than within

27 By the so - called NO front the majority of the Berlinguer centre ( leadership forces such as Alessandro Nitta, Aldo Tortorella, Gavino Angius ), merged with the left of Pietro Ingrao, the ex PDUP group and, of course, Armando Cossutta. 28 It must be said that generally seen the “shift” also led to internal divisions of the various components : young cadres from Ingrao’s group such as Antonio Bassolino and Livia Turco supported the secretary’s recommendations, while “old” pro - Soviet leaders such as Giancarlo Piaetta rejected the notion. 29 Opening speech of Achille Occhetto, Nov 20th–25th, 1989. 30 Hirschman, Lealtà, defezione, protesta. For the implementation of the “turning point” within the PCI, see Eubank / Gangopadahay / Weinberg, Italian communism in crisis, pp. 55–75.

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the apparatus, while doubt and insecurity amongst voters and sympathisers was still significant.31

3.

From the 19th to the 20th congress : the dilemma of schism

From the first days following the announcement of the “turning point”, the question of separation split Occhetto’s opposition. Because of strong resistance, there was not one single countermovement that could gain any ground : a “second movement” emerged32. Ingrao, Natta and Tortorella were strictly against an alliance with Cossutta, out of fear that their own opposition would be identified with pro - Soviet conservatism. At the same time a future schism would more probably come into question for the representatives of the last tendency. When in the fall of 1990 Ingrao irrevocably ruled out any speculation of a schism,33 other “no” representatives turned openly against the leaders of previous years. From November 1990 onwards an informal group of leaders developed out of the chief figures who were pressing for the formation of a new communist party.34 In other words, while the Movement of the New Communist Refoundation did not officially come into existence until the morning of February 3rd, 1991, when a handful of deputies at the 20th and final congress of the PCI left the arena, the foundational process of the new organisation had already been underway for months. After the schism, the new organisation would develop by three distinct political and organisational processes. Amongst each other they are formally and temporally connected : 1) in the development of the core of the founding heads, 2) in the structuring of an organisational apparatus at the base, and 3) in the selection of a political field of action.35 The ways in which these processes would develop will be the focus of our attention in the following section.

4.

The formation of the leadership group

The PRC leadership group is comprised of several coalitions whose leaders are equipped with their own organisational and political resources. The process as a whole would develop by three basic phases. 31 32 33 34 35

According to survey, in November of 1989 50 % of communist voters thought the “turning point” to be a mistake; more than 40 % were against a change of name. Corriere della Sera, Nov. 19th, 1989. The “second movement” emerged from the alliance of groupings around Ingrao and Berlinguer and officially formed itself at a convention of PCI leadership organs on Dec. 20th, 1989. Ingrao declared that „it is not the time to accept the logics of a convent [...] the new communist establishment can only be attained in that contents and program are decisively struggled for. Diliberto, La fenice rossa, p. 34. Selznick, La leadership nelle organizzazioni.

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The first phase which lasted approximately from September 1990 until the convention in March 1991, is characterised by the ongoing dissolution of the leadership group of the “second movement” and by the development of a new alliance between a part of the Ingrao leaders and the Cossutta group. Key figures of the second movement such as Sergio Garavini, Lucio Libertini, Ersilia Salvato, Bianca Braccitorsi and Rino Serri formed a coalition with Cossutta and formed the core of the founding PRC leaders. Within this first directorate, which came together between November of 1990 and January of 1991, basic alliances were stabilised and the predominant models of interaction of the future dominating PRC coalition were structured. This was possible as during this time the fundamental political resources which were controlled by each individual actor were also beginning to emerge. The highly esteemed leader, Cossutta, had his own organisational network at his disposal, which he had developed during more than ten active years with the PCI faction and which would inevitably carry the new communist organisation. These resources, however, were in the hands of a Pro - Soviet leader outside a limited political sphere and were hardly applicable. Cossutta was burdened with the big handicap of being associated with a too much conservative image. On the other hand, the respective part of the “second movement” which had decided in favour of the schism was indeed less harmonic and organised but received much more consensus than Cossuta’s group. Hence it was Cossuta himself who in January 1991 ( a month before the schism ) was forced to nominate Sergio Garavini as leader of the future communist organisation which was born out of the ashes of the PCI. Cossutta had feared that the new political subject would be crushed by a too narrow identification with the conservative image of his own tendency. A few days after the schism a provisional national organisation was created out of the movement which was comprised of two representatives per region. A national executive, consisting of the two chief leaders, was also constructed. It resides over the latter. The second phase followed between January and April 1991 and arranged for the influx of the ex – PDUP cadre ( Party for Proletarian Unity ). Despite meagre numbers, the connection of the leader of the ex - PDUP was very important for the new movement. They were experienced cadres which occupied important positions in the party apparatus of the PCI but they now stroke upon a movement which had an expanded basis of the masses at its disposal. Without cadres however, it was in the centre of hierarchy. They thereby aimed for a series of important electoral positions. Besides this they characterised the discontinuity of the new movement if we are talking about the organisational culture of the PCI and the pro - Soviet image which distinguishes the movement in this first phase. The final step towards the formation of a leading core followed between May and June 1991 through the connection to the Party of Proletarian Democracy ( DP ). The latter is a small organisation which tried to maintain the legacy of the “new left”.

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The Birth of the MRC : associations and activists

The most pressing problem facing the communist leaders was the formation of an organisation which was rooted in the country. Already a month before the congress in Rimini, Sergio Garavini suggested to quickly collect the first organisational mass memberships ( “le prima adesioni organnizzative di massa” ) and to guarantee “secure self - financing” ( “autofinanzamento certo” ) for the future organisation. Even if the first membership cards of the MRC still showed the PCI symbol36, the type of schism is not in any way symbolically reminiscent of the birth of the PCI seventy years before. There are neither red flags nor revolutionary hymns.37 The decision to prevent a glamorous performance is indicative of a “ritual” strategy not to offend “the political deliberations and above all the respect of discipline and unity inherited by the PCI”.38 This applied tactic attempts to signal that there is an alternative pole to the PDS and to extend this claim to the instable communist basis which must decide between the former PCI and the new organisation. The organisational strength of the MRC formed very quickly. In a single wave of mobilisation, 112 835 members from 1991 were brought together in a few weeks. This was attested by the first official survey of the National Centre on March 10th, 1991, when the number of members had reached 110 304.39 Hence it could be said that the “new party [...] is the result of an emotional wave which begins at the Bolognina speech, is generated by the schism of Rimini and is materialised in that associations of the new establishment formed throughout the peninsula”.40 The high rate of correlation which can be calculated through the percentage between the left opposition at the 20th congress of the PCI ( March 1990) and the extent of the schism ( r =.62)41 demonstrates its scope ( sic ). The provinces where resistance towards Occhetto was strongest experienced the greatest loss, even if data show that the exit did not only affect the new communist organisa36 The party files were printed and distributed during the 20th congress of the PCI. 1921–1991 is written on the cover to demonstrate continuity towards the party which was dissolved in Rimini. 37 The deputees who voted for the path of schism charged out of the central congress hall, and the corresponding press conference took place amongst tears in a “little hall” which was “wallpapered with old blue PCI placards in haste”. Later statements inferred that one of the protagonists of the 3rd of February, Bianca Braccitorsi, had actually suggested a repeat of the 1921 choreography, but Cossutta declared that this was not the case. 38 See Dormagen, I communisti, p. 112. 39 This result also includes the 562 members of “foreign associations” which would be reduced to 27 by 1993. 40 See Dormagen, I communisti, p. 159. Almost 5 000 activists from across the country gathered in the Brancaccio Theatre in Rome on Feb. 10th. In this case, the use of symbols was exuberant and included the obsessive repetition of the communist idea, the frenetic display of communists symbols and flags, the standardisation of ritual and the singing of traditional communist songs such as Bandiera Rossa and Internationale. 41 See Dormagen, I Communisti.

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tion but also protest organisations in north - eastern and southern regions (Lega Nord and Rete ). The interception of this “emotional wave” was realised through the formation of a network at the associations of Rifondazione Comunista, which were not subject to much central control. The process took a rather unorganised and anarchist course. The influx to the newborn movement was preceded by the foundation of associative networks and the development of a countless number of basis committees, which became significant in preparing the exit from the PDS. This took place above all in the big cities.42 The activities of the basis organisations consisted especially of meetings, leafleting and the organisation of smaller local demonstrations, in which issues such as resistance towards the imminent Gulf War, local union conflicts, etc. were brought into connection with congress propaganda. The Ingrao leaders, decisive about schism, discreetly tried to position themselves in this process with the goal of forming an organisational basis at the periphery ( which was almost completely lacking ). At the beginning, the Rifondazione formed itself as a system of solidarity43 which defended communist identity and its symbols. The organisation, at least at its basis, structured itself along both the dimensions of Bund and Gemeinschaft,44 hence along two participatory typologies which stand in connection to each other in : 1) a social movement based on collective enthusiasm which aims to establish a new subjectivity and follows values of universal transformation in which the individual member stands in direct connection, and 2) the subculture which is based on continuity with a closed system of relationships for the defence of a threatened identity which is effected by a series of external events and is dominating especially where a simple schism from the old party is configured. Even if from an analytical viewpoint these two types of participatory systems are different, they certainly prevail side by side in the process of establishing such associations ( perhaps in the consciousness of individual members as well). The hypothesis can nevertheless be made that this form of organisation in a movement dominates in circles where the founding modalities were dominated by fusions or where, in the case of the associations, ideologic / participatory motivations dominated. In contrast to this, it can be assumed that sub - cultural involvement dominated there where the association grew out of the schism and participatory motivation was associative. This is a dominating model in areas where the PCI’s social settlement had taken on the form of class or territorial subculture.45 42 According to the data at hand, Turin, Milan, Florence, Naples and Bari are the centres of the movement. 43 Pizzorno, Introduzione allo studio della partecipazione politica. In : Quaderni di sociologia, XV (1966), pp. 235–287. 44 See ibid. for a detailed discussion of Tonnies’ concepts of Gemeinschaft and Bund. 45 Even if it is impossible to categorise the two participatory systems on a territorial basis, we can nevertheless identify the sub - cultural pre - dominance in three territorial areas : the “red regions” of Central Italy, the industrial belt of the big northern and southern cities, and the old agricultural settlements of the Po Valley lowlands and regions such as Apulia and Calabria.

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In conclusion, three character traits of the PCI’s model of establishment can be drawn out : 1) the centrality of identity stimuli on an ideologic basis which form the decisive vehicle in mobilising support, and 2) the model from which the original directive structure is inspired is above all one of “party democracy”, with activism as the central element of the organisational economy. 3) The dominant foundational modality seems to be one of territorial expansion46 without any stronger control from the centre. The development of the central leadership groups via a process of horizontal integration between already existing groupings forms a prevailing coalition which is characterised by strong differences and instabilities amongst the leading class.

III.

The transformation of the political up to the present : The PRC in Italian bipolarity

1.

Adaptation to the rule of majority vote and organisational problems

The first congress of the Rifondazione in December 1991, along with the elections of April 1992, consolidated the process of organisational build - up and ended the first phase of institutional fluidity. The 1992 elections defined the sociologic and geographic terrain which above all proved the PRC to be a legitimate heir of a considerable part of the communist classe gardée, making a big step from being an organisation to being a political party. While the PRC attempted to consolidate itself organisationally, the transformation of the electoral law into a system of majority vote represented a threat which could throw the survival of the party into question. The first two implementations of the new electoral system in the local elections of June and November, 1992 had a paradox effect for the Rifondazione: Instead of the party isolating itself into niches, an extortion potential arose and it threw itself onto the national scene. The bipolar majority system, which gradually consolidated from 1994 onwards, presented a challenge which influenced all of the future decisions of the communist leadership. The new regulations of the political system forced the party to choose 1) either to adopt a strategy of resistance against the new political ambience and thereby the defence of the electorate which still reacted sensitively towards purely ideologic appeals or 2) a strategy of adaptation to the new rules, including the battle for alliances in electoral potential ( sic ) in which organisational and political autonomy are thrown into question. The challenges of the surrounding arena and the resulting strategic dilemmas conjured a crisis for the fragile party equilibrium. An internal coalition formed in response to the suggestion of the national secretary, Sergio Garavin, to re forge the PRC into a broad coalition of the “alternative left” in alliance with the PDS. This formed above all around Cossutta who represented a theory of sim46 See Panebianco, Modelli di partito.

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227

ple electoral alliances which left both the identity of the organisation and the internal structure of the leadership group untouched. This was founded on pluralist leadership and limited the importance of the national secretary. Garavini’s defeat and subsequent resignation opened a new phase in which the fragility of the leadership group was as high as ever. The situation did not stabilise until January 1994 when, at the second party congress, Fausto Bertinotti was elected the new secretary general and the PCI decided to accept the challenges of the alliances. In the following two years external political events would allow important rearrangements in the party’s internal power structure and its system of relationships with its surroundings to be made. Between 1995 and 1997 the national leadership group tried to change the essential attributes of the party’s founding model. Internally, the importance of the Rifondazione secretary grew to the disadvantage of the other monocratic office, the party chair. A number of phenomena changed the structure of the refoundation’s political possibilities. These included strong politics of personalisation, the ever more relevant role of the media, the consolidation of the bi - polar mechanism in the party system, the PCI’s own political centrality which it had attained with the electoral victory of April, 1996, and the tolerance of the Prodi regime. The communist leaders had the know - how to transform their own abilities into media - effective communicators into a rise in prestige within the organisation, especially in the eyes of the grass - roots members. The imminent re - organisation of the offices of the party secretary and party chair ( Cossutta ) between 1996 and 1998 changed the power resources which were controlled by both internal wings. The leadership around Bertinotti gradually joined forces with the old Cossutta tendency and attained control of all important offices ( organisation, finances, internal affairs, etc.). In order to reduce the safeguard practiced by the followers of the party chairs, it relied ever more on the basis and supported it in its constant opposition to possible compromises with the government. The Cossutta element, in contrast, attained not only control over provincial associations but also over parliamentary groups. It tied itself more and more to the circles of career oriented members. The latter had grown since 1993 with the rooting of the party in local institutions and oriented themselves around the moods of the electorate, commensurate to the support of the logics of the political undertaking which stand in connection to the preservation of institutional positions of influence. A phase of institutionalisation had begun at the same time. With the dominating coalition, the party registered a rise in stability and inner cohesion. It undertook an expansive strategy in order to capture its entourage. The centre, which was lead by the Cossutta - Bertinotti tandem, gained power between 1995 and 1997. Both followed the common goal of jointly gaining control of the party in pressing both the left and right ( the latter exited at the schism of 1995) wings to the side. The organisation grew quantitatively. The foundations for the

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Simone Bertolino

stabilisation of the internal hierarchy and the professional apparatus were strengthened. The leadership also tried during this phase of consolidation to establish its own authority in professing itself to the political line of the “two lefts” ( the battle for hegemony between the governing left and the antagonistic left ). The project was ambitious and was based on an institutional position. Its aim was to eradicate the electorate of the moderate left in order to expand its own voter base as much as possible. As a result of the following two government crises the attempt was doomed : The PRC is caught in a spiral of inner conflict between November 1997 and October 1998, which leads to its exit from the governing majority and to schism within the party. The conflict between the two wings also ended the strategy of occupying new sectors. The establishment of a tendency within in the CGIL, which was supposed to function as a transmission belt for the party within the union, was limited to the cadre of those unions which had once been connected to the PRC. It was only the youth organisation ( the Young Communists ) which attained a certain amount of success and consolidated its own organisation. Most of the conflicts in the relationship between territorial organisation and external society were evocative of the changes of the 1990s. The ambitious project of establishing the connection between party and society,47 which would have been successful in developing unity in the way Chianciano ( June 1997) insinuated, was not realised. Instead, it became apparent during the conference that the restraints of the new rules of the political game had caused much more of a cutting effect between the way in which territorial structures function and the intentions of the national elite to adapt. While the basis entity continued to function according to an identity logic in which membership is mostly of ideologic nature, the central leadership group took on a competitive strategy during this phase. Hence within the party, the basis which isolated itself from external society and emphasised difference towards other political actors was contrasted with the elite which opened itself in seeking relationships with other subjects. Therefore there was a strong contradiction which put the adaptative strategy of the leadership to the test.

2.

Crisis and Innovation : Party or mere movement ?

The collapse of the attempt to institutionalise the party threw the Rifondazione leadership into a deep internal crisis. The competition for the control of the party between the “Bernottarians” and the “Cossuttarians” intensified throughout 1998 and merged into the meeting of the CPN ( national political committee ) on Oct. 3rd and 4th. There Cossutta lost control over the leadership group in deciding to revoke the trust of the Prodi government. He decided to leave the PRC, establishing the Party of Italian Communists shortly thereafter. 47 The documents of the conference speak of the need to build an “antagonistic party of the masses”.

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229

After in consequence of the “Cossutan” resignation an internal left faction had attained the majority and the inner power structures had thereby been rebuilt, the Rifondazione leadership carried the conviction to gain profit from the comeback of the opposition. The defeat at the European elections of June 1999 marked the collapse of the party’s project to socially root itself. It attained an even smaller election result than in 1992 (4.7 %). At the same time a malicious competitor settled in the party’s own political space, which enlarged the effect of the schism at the ballot box. In the debate which began on the day after the elections, blame for the defeat is pushed onto the non - conformity of the organisational model which still characterised the party. According to Bertinotti’s analysis, “Americanisation” brought the traditional party organisation into difficulties, as it favours parties which are characterised by a lighter modus of organisation which is based more on leadership ( e.g., Forza Italia, Lista Bonino, the Democrats ). Ever growing doubts arose as to the efficiency of the territorial party in relation to action. There were attempts to solve this problem with several single issue campaigns. After the collapse of the “Consulta anti - Liberalista” campaign against free trade, discussion around the issue of party form renewal arose again in the first months of the year 2000 ( Feb. 5th and 6th) at the second organisational conference in Chianciano. All of the leaders taking part in the debate underlined the organisational deterioration of the party. The inefficiency of targets which had been specified at earlier conferences was also emphasised. Not only did the party structure get thinner, an increasing discrepancy between members and sympathisers was also perceived. While the former defend their ideological heritage, “simple followers” tend to be less dogmatic while focussing their activities on social action. Even if most indications of the second conference were not realised, the innovation issue attained new life in the second half of 2001 when a new subject, the “no - global” movement, destabilised the alliance of the dominant coalition which had held the ropes since 1998. This overall situation was the condition for the proclamation of the 5th national congress. Two country - wide coalitions struggled for member affirmation during the long debate before the congress which lasted from September 2001 to the actual congress in April 2002. An “innovative” coalition formed around the figure of the secretary general who recommended a far - reaching revision of identity and party form. In the ideologic area, the leadership suggested breaking all ties with Soviet communism and opening up towards the new anti - liberal “critical cultures” which had arisen from the anti - globalisation movement. All of these approaches were concentrated on the recommendation to give the party statutes a new pre - amble. In relation to its organisational model, the PRC overruled the traditional idea of the party being of higher order than the movement, in order to strengthen its no - global nature which had become of equal value to social organisation ( sic ). The new party form stipulated the following : the factual disappearance of identificational and organisational boundaries, a horizontally struc-

230

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tured and easily accessible form of articulation, as well as a form of agitation which is based on thematically oriented single issue campaigns rather than ideologic background. The party finally distanced itself from institutionalisation, whereby organisational and internal structural correlations were reduced as much as possible. The PRC was absorbed into the mass alternative left, in which all anti capitalism / globalisation subjects merge. A radical political and organisational re - structuring formed a “conservative” coalition consisting mostly of ex - Cossutta cadres who had remained in the PRC after the schism of 1998. The “conservatives” were most of all against breaking away from the party’s ideological roots and emphasised adversity towards the influence of the conflict between labour, capitalism and the working class. They also favoured a model of organisation which was broadly structured and separate from the no - global movement, even if it maintained its connections to the latter.48 The three most important innovations adopted by the congress are : 1) the passing of a ground - breaking status preamble, 2) the setting - up of a regional congress with the transmission of functions and tasks to the secondary regional level, and 3) the re - organisation of the central apparatus not only in relation to responsibilities but also in regards to functions with which the dissolution of traditional sectors of organisation and the formation of an “office of innovations” are associated. The result of the congress favours the innovative leadership but at the same time limits its success in that the conservative coalition assures a strong presence in the leadership organisms and the maintenance of important strongholds in the periphery.49 This means the leadership which spearheads the party and recommends its self - reform does not exert complete control of the organisation. It is therefore probable that the power of influence which is exerted by other components after the outcome of the 5th congress and the defeat in the referendums of June 15th, 2003.

3.

The party in society : voters, members, activists and associations

At the voter level the PRC configures itself as a party of relatively small size which oscillates between a minimum of 5 % of valid votes at the election of May 13th, 2001, and a maximum of 8.6 % in 1996 in cross - country surveys. Its average lies at 5 %. Only in the recent election of April 13, 2008, in which the party merged into a Rainbow coalition together with the PDCI and the Green Party, 48 Attention to the issue of the relationship to the middle - left alliance was instead generated by an alternative document of the Trotzkyite left and by a regional sub - organisation rooted in Lombardy. 49 Bertinotti’s suggestions attained more than 50 % of support at the national level, while proposals of the “conservative coalitions” received approximately 28–30 % in the most significant associations of Lombardy. In other regions, such as Piedmont and Emilia, they even approached the 50 % mark. The Trotzkyite Left held its own ground at 15 %.

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231

the PRC collapsed below the parliamentary threshold of 4 % of the valid vote, and the left disappeared from the parliament. In a party system which is both fragmentary as well as bi - polar these numbers allow the party to attain a “potential of extortion” for the chances of the Italian left in forming a government which is not to be underestimated. Even if at the territorial level the PRC electorate shows a strong continuity with the communist tradition ( see table 5), it has taken on streaks of an opinionated, urban voter basis which has more in common with the antagonistic left of the 1960s and 70s than with voters of a traditional communist background. The number of employees, students and people under the age of 30 rises especially after the schism of 1998. The contingent of pensioners and workers is reduced, whereby the latter are proportionally well represented amongst the Party of the Left Democrats ( table 1). The entire structural basis of the PRC is characterised by a weak rootedness in civil society. Its poorly pronounced organisational basis, the weakness of its territorial organisation, its marginal capacity to organise its own voter basis and last but not least its incapacity in building a significant network of sub - organisations are characteristics which the PRC has not been able to overcome from its origins to the present day. The organisational weakness of the party is partly an expression of the weakening of parties in general when speaking of the organisation of relationships between civil society and politics. The tendency of the Italians to join parties was reduced by the following macro - phenomena : the rising inactivation of class cleavages between the 1980s and 90s and the crisis of ideologies which normally contribute to mass identity instead of a spread of anti - party sentiments. The continuous incapacity of the PRC to expand its own basis is nevertheless connected to a certain organisational phenomenon. The very strong entry instability gives the PRC the appearance of being a “transitional party” which is characterised by a higher level of permeability. This is a phenomenon which becomes apparent as early as 1992, one year after its establishment: 14,481 members (12.8 %) had left the party after only 12 months. The trend intensifies during the organisational crisis that shakes the PRC in 1998. It is possible to distinguish three developmental phases of the organisational strength of the Rifondazione. A first phase is characterised by a rapidly ascending level of enlistment which pass the 100,000 mark only a few weeks after the congress of Rimini ( an emotional reaction to the dissolution of the PRC ). Then in the following two years the level rises slightly through the influx of the Party of Proletarian Democracy and the last communist members who had been undecided after the “great shift”. The influx is based most of all on expressive motivations, and membership is for the most part comprised of communists opposed to the dissolution of the PCI. Hence membership almost exclusively mirrors the attributes of the movements that were against the turnaround (“Wende” ). So the PRC is very strong in “red” Tuscany (16.1 % of all enlistments in 1993) but weaker in Emilia (10.7 % total ). It is well rooted in the cities of the

232

Simone Bertolino

Table 1: PRC voters by profession (2001) PRC %

Left Democrats %

Pensioners

20,6

26,8

Housewives

7,4

12,8

12,9

7,5

Unemployed

3,9

4,1

Managers

3,1

2,9

Teachers

4,0

4,3

employed people

14,9

17,5

Workers

23,3

11,5

entrepreneurs/self-employed

1,5

3,3

skilled workers/merchants

4,3

7,1

temporary workers

4,1

2,2

100,0

100,0

Students

Total

Northwest and the urban and rural provinces of the South. On the other hand, the PRC is extremely weak in the “white zones” of the Nnorth and on the islands, where it has only 8.7 % of enrolments. After the rebound of 1994, due to the negative political climate and the reorganisation of the PDS, memberships begin to rise quickly between 1995 and 1997. The territorial dynamic of this ascent changes in comparison to the past year, though. This time the southern regions, after having stagnated in the first years, make a significant leap : they boost their membership rates from 33.8 % to 38.9 %. Between 1993 and 1996 the associations of the southern mainland grow by 143.9 %, even quicker in comparison to memberships (118 %). In contrast to the organisational development of the first years, the expansion in the South and the general rise between 1995 and 1997 take on traits of an opinionated membership which is bound to political centrality which the PRC appropriates in this phase. The influx of voters in the south pre - empts the organisational rise. Such tendencies were already initiated through the takeover of local government businesses beginning in 1993 and the greater opening of local competitive structures.50 The severe conflicts within the party that began in 1998 with the end of the government majority and schism set into motion a phase of organisational descent which continues to the present day. The PRC loses more than a third of 50 In the smaller communes of the South increases in membership can be traced back to the quantitative rise of the associations in a context in which the parties are still seen as an efficient instrument of articulating the political question. This is due to the enhanced possibilities of political participation ( Selle and Svaasand, 1983).

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Table 2 : Party membership (1991–2007) members 1991 112,835

“enlis% of % of re– resigned ted” enlisted resigned enlisted members members members members –

–

–

–

youth

women

–

– –

1992 117,462

19,108

–

16.2

14,481

12.8

–

1993 120,522

13,091

–

10.8

10,031

8.5

–

14,967

1994 113,580

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

1995 115,593

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

1996 127,073

19,249

2,336

15.1

10,105

8.7

10,387

24,102

1997 130,061

18,791

1,710

14.4

17,513

13.7

10,112

28,584

1998 116,757

9,906

1,339

8.4

24,549

18.8

12,183

22,003

1999

95,762

7,966

2,853

8.3

31,814

27.2

10,112

19,706

2000

89,979

7,854

2,698

8.7

16,527

18.4

8,900

18,114

2001

92,020

8,807

2,762

9.5

9,338

10.1

11,916

19,472

2002

88,627

7,163

2,631

8.0

13,027

14.6

12,318

17,619

2003

85,511

–

–

–

2004

97,116

–

–

2005

93,470

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

2006

92,634

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

2007

87,877

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

32,570

– 20,665

– 21.2

– 14,425

– –

Internal sources.

its basis between 1998 and 2002 (31.8 %, or approximately 40 000 members ). The heaviness of the crisis is also indicated by the irreversible decline of the ability to attract members and a limited level of recruitment ( see table 2). Membership instability likewise increases after 1998 with the influence of variable membership components.51 This is shown, beginning in 1999, at 25 % of the stream of entry, compared to 10 % of the previous three years. This allows recruitment to become more and more self - centred.52 The rising fluctuation amongst the membership has eroded the fundamental core of “stable members” necessary for the functioning of the organisation and has accentuated the generational exchange at the basis. 27 % of the members of the “first hour” were still enlisted in 1999, while 44.7 % exhibit only three years of active membership. Three years later in 1998 31,790 supporters had 51 Counted by the party as “re - enlisted members”. 52 A survey conducted in February 1999 shows that family and friends are the social settings in which current members tend to seek recruitment.

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Simone Bertolino

applied for the party membership card. Hence the ranks of the party were renewed by a yearly rate of ca. 16 %. The most significant aspect of this strong tendency towards renewal is the disassociation from differing political generations and organisational cultures within the PRC. The members who had experienced the hard years of resistance and the Cold War amounted to 35 % of the party in 1999. The quota of youngest members lay at 27.4 % in this year. In comparison, the percentage of elderly people in the two northern sub - cultural zones and in the “red” regions lay at 44.3 % or 47.7 % of the total figure. The generation which had politically formed itself between the collapse of real existing socialism and the “Tangentopoli”, made up only 35 % of members in Central Italy and 20 % of sympathisers in the large cities of the northwest. In the Venice region it was only 10 %. These territorial differentiations make it clear that the communist organisations in the two sub cultural areas are characterised by a larger capacity of integration and – on the surface – by less instrumental forms of affiliation. The majority of neo - communist members has always been carried by the network of associations ( hence on basis structures ) which formed after the schism of 1991 in order to guarantee a physical place for all those members who did not want to cease defending their identity and communist organisational practices. Having arisen in order to safeguard the continuity of old communist local groups, in reality the associations functioned differently from the basis structures of the PCI, even if they shared a common formal structure. While the basic structures of the PCI functioned primarily like final destinations of an apparatus, the associations are marked by their political and organisational autonomy and subsequently have much more in common with socialist rather than communist local groups. In spite of attention to the development of the associations on the part of the central organisation, the basic structure of the party has always been characterised by structural weakness and decreased territorial dispersion. Considering the official numbers, the territorial settlement of the PRC fluctuated between a maximum of 2812 associations in 1997 and a minimum of 2010 entities at the last congress. Nevertheless, the weakness of the organisational resources and the competition between the party wings and the territorial choices of the leadership organisms breeds the formation of “ghost” associations ( mere administrative meetings of specific localities ). Hence in 2000 only 1100 associations could be seen as completely self - sufficient. The quota of associations without seats rises from 33.9 % to 40.1 % between 1996 and 2002 respectively. The number of entities without instrumental equipment of any kind ( i. e. computers, chairs, copy machines etc.), remains stable at 63–65 %. The impression that the associations are structurally fragile is confirmed by their small dimensions : More than 26 % of them have less than 20 members in 1996 and only 9.7 % have more than ten members. Seen in this light, it is apparent that more than 50 % of the basic organisational network exists only on paper.

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Table 3 : Territorial Structure ( of the organisation ) in selected years 1996

1998

1999

2001

Associations

2,652

2,805

2,434

2,324

2,010

2,156

2,435

territorial

2,566

2,653

2,287

2,183

–

2,049

–

86

152

147

141

–

107

–

26.9 41.6 21.7

15.3 53.0 23.2

– – –

15.8 57.1 21.3

– – –

11.7 60.4 21.2

– – –

more than 100 9.7 Associations without seat 33.9 (%) Associations without endow65.1 ments (%) Communities without associa74.6 tions (%) Association 31.1 festivals (%) Number of 16,822 direct members

8.6

–

5.9

–

6.4

–

–

30.4

–

40.1

–

–

64.8

–

62.7

–

–

78.1

–

79.5

–

31.6

–

25.7

–

–

– 14,567

–

operational

2002

2004

2006

2007 ca. 2,500

Associations with (%) < 19 members 20 to 50 51 to 100

– 14,307

The diffusion rate of the organisational apparatus shows many gaps : In 1996 there were no associations in almost 75 % of communes of which many are centres of relatively large size. The maintenance of the traditionally sub - cultural settlement is the factor which most of all determines the diffusion level of the associations. In the “red regions” and in Tuscany for example, the percentage of communities without established associations sinks to 42 %, in contrast to 85 % in the northern regions. This is also because 52.1 % of associations in 1996 are found in rural circles with less than 10,000 inhabitants. This shows that the territorial network of the PRC is structured mostly like an organisation from smaller towns which in many ways continues the historic tradition of the worker’s movement ( strong in the smaller and middle - sized settlements of the hinterland). Starting in 1995, the associations in the southern regions multiply by 50 %. This is parallel to the rise in membership throughout the course of three years. Association life in the smaller communities of the South is nevertheless characterised most of all by electoral concerns and by the organisation of local government participation.53 This results in a highly fragile organisational network. The 53 From a structural view, the associations, which were fouded between 1995 and 1997, do not seem to be instruments for the strengthening of identity but rather “Centres of organised action fort he conquest of offices in public administration” [ nuclei d’azione

236

Simone Bertolino

image of organisational weakness which stems from the data on the structures of the associations also mirrors a minute level of “active membership”. This discovery is partly confirmed by the comparison between participation rates and interventions at the congresses. In the southern associations, where the number of attendees is higher, conscious participation ( shown through a tendency of intervention ) is significantly lower than in the northern / central regions. The latter are characterised by lower attendance levels. Internal statements confirm that when attendance levels have risen ( such as at the last congress ), it has often been a result of mobilisation from top down, which was instigated in order to reach consensus at the congresses as amongst deputies. The small number of activists is also confirmed by data on the composition of the association directives, which went down from 16 822 members in 1996 to 14 567 in 2002 ( ca. 13–16 %). There is additional proof from some data of a large north - western association such as Genoa, whose overall quota of active members lay at 16.8 % in 1999. Indicators such as the percentage of associations which organise their own “liberation festivals” show an eroding membership ( falling from 31.1 % in 1996 to 25.7 % in 2002. Internal sources estimate the number of active members across the country at approximately 8 000–8 500 (8–9 %). The PRC remains strong in elections. In the regional elections of 2005 the party attains the 5.6 % mark in 14 areas. For the first time they even win a presidency with Nichi Vendola in Apulia. After a temporary rise membership numbers go down in 2007 to 93,000, while the number of associations rises slightly with ca. 2 500 entities.54 There are no data available on site groups. After three legislative periods proportional representation is once again established at the end of 2005. For the parliamentary elections of 2006 the PRC fields amongst others, the trans - sexual Vladimir Luxuria and the Trotzkyite, Marco Ferrando who proclaims to take the Iraqi side ( in the ongoing war ), even if they were firing on Italians. After a debate about Ferrando’s candidacy he is replaced by the pacifist Lidia Menapace. The PRC attains 7.4 % in the Senate55 and 5.8 % in the Chamber of Deputies. Benefitting from electoral reform, the PRC is more successful in comparison to 2001 than any other political force. Fausto Bertinotti is elected President of the Deputy Chamber on the fourth ballot in April 2006. Thereupon, the central committee elects Franco Giordano the new national secretary on May 7th, 2006. The Prodi government commences its work on May 17th, 2006. After 15 years of existence the PRC enters a government with its own delegacy for the first time. As minister of social solidarity, Paolo Ferrero is the only PRC member in

organizzata per la gestione e la conquista delle cariche negli apparati amministrativi], i. e. organisational structures with very permeable borders, which stabilise a relation concerning ressources and cultural local norms ( Schlesinger, 1991). 54 http ://home.rifondazione.it / dettaglio_02.php ?t=5&s=873. 55 http ://electionresources.org / it /2006, Feb. 11, 2007.

The PRC – Emergence and Crisis

237

the cabinet. Patricia Sentinelli becomes deputy foreign minister. The party provides six state secretaries.

IV.

Conclusions

This paper has examined the organisational development of the PRC, emphasising two factors : 1) the influence of the party’s success model and 2) the effects of geo - political changes in the late 20th century. The particular genetic model of the PRC has lead to two fundamental consequences for the party’s subsequent organisational development. The role of ideology as an important tool in mobilising electoral support on the one hand and a highly decentralised power structure on the other hand are two structural attributes which distinguish the organisation from traditional communist party models. The new system of majority vote has led the party’s field of action to become more complex. The more the possibility of holding decisive weight has grown and boundaries of potential electorate have expanded beyond niches of affiliation, the more the growing inefficiency of an organisational apparatus whose primary function is the upholding of a collective member identity has become apparent to a portion of the leadership. After the failed attempt to transform the PRC into a strong institution with a more compact group of leaders and a rooted basis organisation the Rifondazione falls into a phase of organisational crisis which is characterised by extreme difference and instability at the elite level, as well as a simultaneous deterioration of territorial structures and membership numbers. During this situation of advanced de - institutionalisation and organisational decline an innovative impulse towards party form arises as well. The analysis of the internal debate has shown that the communist leadership sees the organisational performance of the PRC within an ambience of turbulence and ever growing complexity ( i. e. the Italian party system ) as the main reason for the party’s difficulties. The contrast between the imperatives of political competition and an apparatus which has consolidated itself towards a logic of identity is more and more explicitly identified by the leaders as the element which in the framework of extensive reform must be most urgently eliminated. After the defeat in the European parliamentary elections after 1999 the issue of organisational selfreform becomes central. This simultaneously spreads to the revision of the party’s political culture. At the congress of April 2002 the change in the comprehensive party model moves into the centre of debate between wings. Events have shown in the case of the PRC that the personal leadership of the Rifondazione secretary, Fausto Bertinotti, played an important initiating role in bringing the issue of innovation into the centre of debate. There were also attempts to construct a conscious and direct leadership process here. Looking closely, the results of this process change the scenario profoundly. A big part of

238

Simone Bertolino

the planned innovations were not realised and the central leadership exerts ever less control over the organisational apparatus. On this background the split and de - centralised nature of the organisation appears to be the basic characteristic which resists every attempt at revision and proves to be the largest obstacle for any kind of reform. Diverse tendencies see the recommendations of the leadership to re - organise ( to bring the party into harmony with political and social changes ) as a threat to internal equilibrium. The result of the April 2002 congress, where Bertinotti’s theses were barely approved, the recent defeat in local elections and in the referendum of May / June 2003 reduced the internal prestige and manoeuvrability of the leadership even more. The process of innovation was at least temporarily handicapped. When looking at the entire decade of PRC existence, the significance of the 1995–1998 period becomes apparent. Institutional shortcoming and the political / organisational crisis which end the episode of influence on the Prodi government foil attempts to overhaul the party’s output characteristics. This makes adaptation to changed external conditions impossible. The enduring organisational crisis can be traced back to the unsolved problems of these important political phases.

V.

Statistical attachments

Table 4 : Social composition of members in various geographical regions, according to socio - economic categories ( values in %) Northwest

“White Zone”

“Red Zone”

Southern Centre

Islands

Italy

23,3

22,8

21,0

18,9

17,3

20,6

– traditional middle class

4,4

5,4

6,4

5,7

4,2

5,4

– intellectual middle class

23,2

13,1

12,6

18,6

15,9

17,2

– pensioners

29,6

36,1

38,9

16,3

19,5

27,9

– students

4,7

4,3

4,5

13,4

17,6

8,5

– housewives

1,0

1,2

1,4

0,6

1,0

1,0

– unemployed

5,8

8,4

7,5

12,5

12,2

9,1

– others

7,7

8,4

6,8

11,3

9,6

8,8

– working class

Source : PRC information archives : memberships 1999.

The PRC – Emergence and Crisis

239

Percentage of PRC votes in elections to the senate in 2001 and 2006, according to geographic areas

Percentage of PRC votes in diverse parliamentary elections in 2001 and 2006, according to geographic areas

3

5138

93

4694

87

3694

86

98

2

2

3368

83

4550 107

92

3343

4765

96

82

95

2

3178

4540

87

73

96

2

3088

4500

96

3026

458 57

12 2981

489 58

10 2554

462 47

9

5640 127

45

6

35

103

242

105

Umbria

Marches

Lazio

Abruzzo

81

54

2966

45

9804 249

4180

3299 90

71 4322

3592 87

75 4366

3719 84

78

3160 102

3993 106

3887

99

9246 261 11043 242 11049 242

3988

2550

76

68

3515

81

9999 215

3806

3463

89

66

2696

89

8696 217

2905

3170

9905 170

1992

331

4501 132

48

6

89

75

2531

89

7977 203

2818

2823

9510 213

1895

366

4306 132

47

6

63

66

2678

51

7893 189

2961

2651

9492 177

1842

385

4345 105

44

4

61

55

2571

82

7480 190

2551

2597

9224 209

1847

390

4341 110

3253

8311

2748

3451

9056

1836

454

4364

297 19563 277 17904 297 18925 322 19128 332 16406 292 13435 281 12409 270 12454 262 12478 247 12500

59

12

6689 144

Tuscany

3062

381

6622 146

209 13002 258 13005 219 13172 276 13201 271 12212 224

65

26

6586 152

Emilia

3052

442

7146 160

72

90

5140

92

Friuli

5149

3

7321 109

157

28

91

3

8678 132

152

South Tyrolia

4908

3

8223 134

152

214

90

3

8212 130

150

Venice

5093

8856 124

212

355 14899 383 14029 377 14640 344 14852 354 13607 314 10891 315 10787 315 11054 250 11091 264 10741

80

122

3

Lombardy

Liguria

Aosta Valley Piedmont

1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem.

Table 5 : Number of associations and members in selected years (1993–2004)

240 Simone Bertolino

63

105

Italy

–

Basilicata

Sicily

82

Apulia

173

52

Campania

Calabria

–

Molise

19

3798

4416

7168

465

83

85

–

41

6314 143

5432 169

415 29

41

88

3794 128

3844

6065 198

708

6483 141

6303 162

726

35

55

4353 112

3794 158

6437 193

1209

6995 158

7794 207

967

20

55

4669 115

4353 158

6473 205

1263

7385 159

8661 193

1003 22

35

4429 115

4669 135

5739 155

1162

6396 140

8274 190

839 22

–

–

4292 108

4429 102

5392 152

967

5097

6437 179

678

24

31

80

3982 110

5168

4922 143

707

4639 120

6499 184

630

20

34

4231 100

4656 110

5914 103

680

4588 115

7181 133

811

17

32

4180

98

3980 120

5734 144

886

4253 128

6906 180

673

97203

5007

5043

6503

977

5418

6886

660

1993 1996 1999 2002 2004 1997 1998 2000 2001 1995 Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem. Ass. Mem.

The PRC – Emergence and Crisis

241

242

Simone Bertolino

Table 6: PRC results for all of Italy in elections to the deputy chamber from April 9th.–10th, 2006 List

%

Romano Prodi Olivetree

49,8

340

31,1

220

PRC

5,8

41

La Rosa nel Pugno

2,6

18

Party of Italian Communists

2,3

16

Italia dei valori

2,3

16

Union of Greens

2,1

15

UdEUR

1,4

10

Südtiroler Volkspartei

0,5

5

Pensioner Party

0,9

0

The Socialists

0,3

0

Lista Consumatori

0,2

0

Others (Romano Prodi)

0,2

0

Silvio Berlusconi

Others

Seats

49,7

277

Forza Italia

23,7

137

Alleanza Nazionale

12,3

71

UDC

6,8

39

Lega Nord

4,6

26

DC – fomer PSI (Socialist Party of Italy)

0,7

4

Social Alternatie with Alessandra Mussolini

0,7

0

Fiamma Tricolore

0,6

0

Others (Silvio Berlusconi)

0,3

0

0,5

0

243

The PRC – Emergence and Crisis

Table 7: Socio-demografic composition of members in selected years (value in %) 1999

2004

2006

Dif. 06/99

Male

74.5

72.3

70.6

-3.9

Female

25.5

27.7

29.4

+3.9

65

17.3

15.7

15.7

-1.6

entrepreneur

0.3

0.9

1.1

+0.8

professional

2.4

3.7

3.4

+1.0

artisan

3.1

3.6

3.3

+0.2

shopkeeper

2.4

2.6

2.6

+0.2

worker

22.5

22.1

16.1

-6.4

clerk/cadre

Gender

Age 13.7 18,5

-2.0 -2,4 -3.3

Occupation

14.4

16.9

19.0

+4 6

teacher

3.4

2.7

3.4

=

unemployed

9.7

6.1

7.6

-2.1

student

9.3

10.8

14.2

+4.9

pensioner

29.9

25.9

25.2

-4.7

housewife

1.3

4.6

4.2

+2.9

low level

61.6

53.5

49.5

-12.1

middle level

31.2

35.8

37.8

+6.6

7.2

10.7

12.8

+5.6

Education

high level

The Communist Party of Greece after the Collapse of Communism (1989–2006) – From Proletarian Internationalism to Ethno - Populism Nikos Marantzidis

I.

The Communist Party of Greece until 1989

Unique in the European context until 1974,1 the Greek Communist Party was hegemonic within the Left. Up to 1974, the country lacked a strong socialist or social - democratic party – the term “Left” in Greece was and partly remains exclusively associated with Communism.2 This was due to sociological ( weak labor movement reflecting a small industrial working class ) but also to historical reasons. The latter were in strong connection with the civil war (1943–1949) which produced a polarized political environment leading to the isolation of the Communist Party from the rest of the political system. Until the military coup d’ Etat in April 1967, even if the Greek Communist Party was outlawed, its legal political representation, the United Democratic Left ( EDA ), was able to win a substantial degree of political and electoral influence and for a short period it even became the main opposition party gaining 25 % of the vote in the 1958 parliamentary elections. In 1968 the party split because of a continuous and intense interior crisis. The Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia played a catalytic role leading to the creation of a new renovator Communist Party, more independent from the Soviet Union. Later on this party, named Communist Party of Greece – Interior ( KKE Esoterikou ), became the Greek version of the euro - communism. Despite the fact that this party had the support of an important part of the country’s intelligentsia and youth organizations, the KKE Esoterikou never developed into a real threat for the orthodox Communist Party, the KKE. Apart from the first elections after the collapse of the dictatorship where the two parties formed an electoral coalition, the relations among the two Communist Parties were inimical. The two parties faced each other for the first time in the 1977 elections. The KKE succeeded in dominating the Communist space 1 2

The fist part of the article is based on an analysis written by Kalyvas / Marantzidis, Greek Communism 1968–2001, pp. 665–690. Kapetanyannis, The Communists, p. 145.

246

Nikos Marantzidis

Table 1 : Electoral Performance and Proportion of Seats in the Parliament (1974–1985) Elections

KKE

KKE Interior

1974 1977 1981 1985

9.5* (2.0) 9.4 (3.6) 10.9 (4.3) 9.8 (4.0)

– (.6) 2.7 (.6) 1.3 (0) 1.7 (.3)

* In 1974 the two parties participated in the elections in the context of the United Left (Enomeni Aristera ) electoral coalition.

and marginalizing the KKE Interior ever since. Whereas the KKE obtained electoral scores ranging between 9 and 11 percent from 1977 to 1985, the KKE Interior hovered on the edge of relevance, getting less than 3 percent ( Table 1). The KKE’s dominance was also reflected in the organizational field. Its estimated membership in 1987 was 100,000 to 120,000 compared to KKE Interior’s meager 12,000 to 14,000.3 Its domination was due to the endorsement of the Soviet Union, which was considered the “real socialist” incarnation by many Greek Communists. What probably helped this endorsement was a considerable financial component.4 Moreover, the KKE was in control of a valuable brand name with considerable resonance among Communist voters. For the first time since their appearance the Communists felt a strong competition from a Socialist Party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement ( PASOK ). Created in 1974 by A. Papandreou ( the son of a prominent centrist politician ), PASOK adopted a radical discourse, rather not compatible to a European socialist party. This way he was able to expand the party’s audience towards the left electorate. At the beginning Socialists and Communists had the same political impact, but during the years PASOK proved to be extremely efficient. From a small party in the first post - Junta elections it became a powerful party in a few years ( Table 2). Generally, the relations between the two main political families of the left pass through different stages : from cooperation to open struggle. In 1981 PASOK won a resounding electoral victory and formed the first socialist government of Greece. Its victory was a double - edged sword for the Communists.5 On the one hand, PASOK’s victory was based on an electoral platform that granted the Communist Left many of its wishes : it was against EEC membership, against NATO, and against allowing the US military bases to stay in Greece. On the other hand, as it turned out, PASOK was not serious about implementing its radical program; yet between 1974 and 1985 PASOK devel-

3 4 5

Kapetanyannis, The Communists, p. 166. Afinian, Oi scheseis KKE kai KK Sovietikis Enosis, p. 260. Marantzidis, Partis et élections, pp. 7–25.

247

The Communist Party of Greece

Table 2 : Comparative table of the electoral performance of Socialist and Communist parties (1974–1985) Elections Socialist Party – PASOK 1974 1977 1981 1985

13.5 25.3 48.0 45.8

Communist Parties 9.5 12.1 12.2 11.5

oped a strategy that has correctly been described as “populist”.6 This strategy combined a moderate set of policies ( pro - EEC and pro - NATO – even with some reservations ) and a highly radical discourse directed against the Right. PASOK’s ability to sustain this contradictory strategy was contingent on the combination of the charismatic personality of its leader, Andreas Papandreou, and the well greased operation of a very extensive clientelistic machine.7 A key implication of the populist strategy, greatly enhanced by the electoral system of “reinforced proportional representation” that penalized small parties, was PASOK’s consistent ability to “plunder” the electoral reservoir of the two Communist Parties by raising the specter of a return of the Right to power, which was painted with the appropriate references to the Civil War and the dictatorship. Between 1986 and 1989 the relations between the Communist Party and the socialists deteriorated. The KKE shifted its strategy following the 1985 elections ( and PASOK’s electoral victory ) when it failed to make any inroads among disgruntled PASOK voters. After PASOK had implemented an austerity and stabilization program, it faced the sustained and unrelenting opposition from the KKE- controlled trade unions. In 1986 the party refrained from supporting the PASOK mayoral candidate in Athens, making it thus possible for the New Democracy opposition party to carry the city for the first time since 1974. Still, the 1986 municipal elections demonstrated the party’s inability to gain significant ground despite its shift in strategy. In 1989, just before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the KKE and the new party created by the former KKE Esoterikou named Elliniki Aristera / EAR ( which means Greek Left ) decided to form a grand coalition of the Communist and post- Communist Left. This coalition was to have as broad a profile as possible and, indeed, included some disgruntled but high - profile PASOK politicians. This move was spurred by two factors. First, the liberal winds unleashed by the perestroika reforms in the Soviet Union helped decide the KKE to move toward its erstwhile rival. In fact, it appeared at the time that the KKE would enter into a phase of liberalization, following Moscow’s lead.8 For the first time, some young 6 7 8

Mavrogordatos, Civil Society, pp. 47–64; Lyrintzis, The Power of Populism, pp. 667–686. Mavrogordatos, From Traditional Clientelism, pp. 1–26; Lyrintzis, Political Parties, pp. 99–118. Smith, The Greek Communist Party, p. 87.

248

Nikos Marantzidis

up - and - coming party cadres began criticizing past Soviet policies. In July 1989, just after the elections, the KKE replaced its long - standing party secretary Harilaos Florakis by Grigoris Farakos who immediately proceeded to shed his orthodox reputation and reinvented himself as a modernizer.9 Second, in 1988 a series of financial and personal scandals had considerably weakened the prime minister and PASOK leader Andreas Papandreou, and undermined his government, thus generating high hopes of a major defection among the left - leaning segment of PASOK’s electorate. The goal was to take advantage of PASOK’s weakness and turn the Left into a key player in Greek politics. Indeed, the decision to form a coalition was supported by a number of electoral surveys conducted in 1988, suggesting that whereas the KKE and EAR could not hope to dent PASOK’s electoral base as separate parties, they stood a good chance to do so as a combined party of the Left. In short, there was a lot of enthusiasm and anticipation. The KKE - EAR alliance adopted the name Coalition of Left and Progress ( Synaspismos tis Aristeras kai tis Proodou – or simply Synaspismos). Its leaders even declared that their intention was to turn this coalition from a temporary electoral alliance into a permanent political party. In the critical June 1989 elections Synaspismos garnered 13.1 percent of votes. Although this was only 1.6 % more than the combined vote of the two parties in 1985, it was well below the expectations of its leaders who had based their hopes on surveys that credited the new party with 20 percent of vote intentions when it was formed. The embattled PASOK had proved surprisingly resilient. Nevertheless, Synaspismos found itself at the center of the political maneuvering that followed the failure of either PASOK or New Democracy to win a parliamentary majority. As the third major party, the leaders of Synaspismos took the historical decision to ally with the right - wing New Democracy party.10 The stated reason for this unusual decision was that the Left could not possibly ally with a party ( and a leader ) that was involved in so many egregious scandals. The real reason, however, was the combination of the frustration that the Communists, both hardliners and reformists, felt vis - à - vis PASOK’s consistent ability to plunder their electorate, as well as their perception that PASOK’s weakness finally opened - up the opportunity for a major electoral realignment within the center - left. It is important to note that the decision to ally with the Right was greatly influenced by the younger, modernizing cadres of both parties against the reservations of the older leaders who had ostensibly a better understanding of their electorate. 9

Grigoris Farakos (1923– ) took part in the Greek Civil War and left Greece after the KKE had been defeated in 1949. He was elected a member of the party’s Central Committee in 1961 and a member of the Politburo in 1968. He returned clandestinely to Greece during the dictatorship, was arrested, and condemned to prison for life. He was repeatedly elected in the parliament on the KKE ticket from 1974 to 1989 and on the Synaspismos ticket from 1989 to 1993. He resigned from the KKE Central Committee in May 1991. 10 Pridham / Verney, The Coalitions of 1989–90, pp. 42–69.

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249

As it turned out, however, this move proved very costly, for the following elections of November 1989 showed that a substantial proportion of the voters that had supported Synaspismos just four months before did not approve of it and defected from the party, casting instead their vote for PASOK. The party’s share of the vote fell by more than two percentage points ( Table 3). Table 3 : Electoral Performance and Proportion of Seats in the Parliament (1989–2004) Elections 1989 (June) 1989 (November) 1990 1993 1996 2000 2004

KKE

Synaspismos

13.1 (9.3)* 11.0 (7.0)* 10.2 (6.6)* 4.5 (3.0) 5.6 (3.6) 5.5 (3.6) 5.9 (4.0)

2.9 (0) 5.1 (3.3) 3.2 (2.0) 3.2 (2.0)

In 1989 and 1990 the two parties were allied in the context of Synaspismos.

This disapproval was due to the persisting polarization along the right - left axis and the concomitant intense emotional rejection of the Right felt by many Communist voters. These anti - rightist feelings were skilfully cultivated by PASOK strategists. The latter had used a civil war terminology, aiming to mobilize that way the passions of the Communist electorate.

II.

The Communist Party after 1989

In November 1989 the Berlin Wall fell. From this point on, the Communist Left entered into a protracted crisis from which it has yet to recover. Like everywhere else in Europe, the collapse of the Soviet bloc triggered a big crisis within the Greek Communist movement.11 When the Berlin Wall fell, the Greek Communist movement was already in the midst of a crisis caused by its costly decision to ally with the rightist party of New Democracy and the subsequent defection of a substantial part of its electorate. This crisis broke out in 1990, spurred by developments in Central and Eastern Europe. In January 1990 the KKE issued for the first time a very mild statement on the changes taking place in Eastern Europe. The budding reformist wing of the KKE requested that an open discussion take place, a demand that led to bitter conflict within the party, between hardliners and reformists. Although the rank - and - file members appeared to have 11

Bull, The West European Communist Movement, pp. 203–222.

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Nikos Marantzidis

been divided into equal factions, middle cadres came in strongly in favor of reform. However, the old guard was clearly hardline. Eventually, the hardliners wrested a close victory, during the party’s Thirteenth Congress in February 1991. Out of the 111 members elected to the new Central Committee, 60 belonged to the hardline faction. The Central Committee proceeded to replace Farakos by a new party general secretary, the hardliner Aleka Papariga who, as of 2002, remains at the helm of the party. Predictably, the KKE crisis spilled over to Synaspismos, causing its breakup in the summer of 1991. It is estimated that the KKE lost close to 40 percent of its cadres following this breakup, mainly the younger and most dynamic ones, including the most prominent up and - coming leading cadres who had been groomed to take over the party from the old guard. In more than one way this new breakup partly replicated the 1968 split : the reformist side, which kept the Synaspismos label, was made up of the former EAR with the sizeable addition of the young KKE cadres; the hardline side was mostly made of the elderly leadership of the KKE. Indeed, the split between hardliners and reformers exhibited the kind of generational and social cleavages that undergirded the 1968 split : hardliners were primarily older in age ( and had typically spent much of their lives as political exiles in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union ), whereas reformers were younger, having joined the KKE in the wake of the dictatorship’s demise in 1974. Hardliners also tended to come from the ranks of the trade unions, whereas reformers tended to be intellectuals. Last but not least, hardliners tended to have an emotionally charged set of memories shaped by the Civil War, whereas reformers tended to be motivated by more strategic concerns. Once more, many observers predicted that Synaspismos would have easily prevailed over an increasingly irrelevant and marginal KKE, particularly since the KKE could not rely any more on the ideological endorsement and financial backing of the Soviet Union. They were wrong, the party which showed a better capacity to survive in a very hostile environment was the orthodox, hardline Communist Party of Greece.

III.

The strategy of the party after 1989

To understand what were the reasons which helped the Greek Communist Party to survive we need to refer to Stéphane Courtois’ and Marc Lazar’s analytical categories of Teleological and Societal dimension. According to them, Communism is constituted by two dimensions : The first one, the teleological which is related to the initial revolutionary project, comprises a doctrine (Marxism - Leninism as elaborated by Lenin and codified by Stalin ), an organizational model ( the revolutionary party conducted by the professionals of the revolution ) and a strategy ( the unconditionally defense of the Soviet Union and the other Communist states ). The second one, the societal, comprises all the elements of Communist Party life related to the specific society that a Communist

The Communist Party of Greece

251

Party belongs to. The teleological dimension has a centripetal role, impose a cohesion and homogenization to the Communist Parties all over the world. The societal dimension lead to diversification because of the different social, economic and political conditions prevailed in each country. Communist Parties try to connect the two dimensions; when this is proved difficult or impossible, it is always the teleological dimension which prevails.12 After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, everywhere in Europe the teleological dimension faced a fatal hit. The center, the reference point of the system, demised. The only way for Communist Parties to survive was to hold on to the societal dimension. This was not a one - way evolution. Some parties decided to abandon their Communist identity, such as the Italian, the Finish and the Swedish Communist Parties. Some others, such as the French PCF, tried to keep some distance from the past without totally throwing away the whole system. Finally, the Greek KKE remained loyal to its Communist identity and the Communist past without showing any regret.13 In the case of the Greek Communist Party this was possible because the societal and the teleological dimensions were not contradictory. From this point of view, the Communist hold on the societal dimension was not proved counterproductive. But what exactly was this societal dimension in which the Communist Party found refuge for these difficult moments ? We can describe it as ethno - populism. After 1974, Greek society developed some specific ideologic traits and political attitudes which characterize not only the Communist or the left side of the political spectrum but the whole society. These traits were connected with two special events considered traumatic : the military dictatorship from 1967 to 1974 and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, the from resulting Greek military defeat and the partition of the island in 1974. These events created deep anti - American and anti - western feelings in Greek society.14 Undoubtedly, these anti - western feelings were not created in a vacuum. A long anti - western tradition, rising from different social and political environments in Greece – among them the Orthodox Church is by far the most prominent institution – created a specific mental structure, familiarizing Greek society to consider the foreign powers and especially the westerners responsible for every ill. During the post - junta period the socialists took advantage of these feelings to gain power. Andreas Papandreou had personally promised to get rid of the American military bases and to let the people decide about the country’s mem12 Courtois / Lazar, Histoire du Parti Communiste Français, p. 12. 13 Marantzidis, Les stratégies des partis communistes, pp. 169–194. 14 Different researches show that Greek public opinion is the most anti - American in Europe. Around 85 % of the population consider the American policy harmful for the interests of Greece. These negative feelings towards the USA continued to prevail on the public opinion even after the 11 of September 2001. The main slogan was “serve you right”. Even the archbishop of the Greek Church declared that it was a punishment coming from God.

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bership in the European Community through a referendum.15 The Communist Party played on the same ground. Fearing to be exceeded by the socialists in the anti - western rhetoric, the Communists made use of the same type of nationalist and populist discourse. For them, the “only enemy is imperialism”, American as well as European. Since 1989 this has not changed what so ever. Following 1989 and 1991, the party has enlarged its nationalist context, widely employed to fit feelings of hostility to globalization, but also to appeal to traditional anti Americanism. This move paid off after NATO’s bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, following the Kosovo crisis. In contrast to other European publics, Greek public opinion was overwhelmingly opposed to the NATO campaign. The KKE emerged as the most vocal representative of this opposition, organizing demonstrations and all kinds of public agitation against the NATO campaign, effectively tapping into the widespread public feelings of indignation. The party further capitalized on this event by offering two safe positions on its ticket (leading to parliamentary seats ) to two prominent non - Communist journalists who stood as opinion leaders to the bombing opposition. US bombing in Afghanistan, following the New York September 11 attacks, offered another opportunity for the organization of “antiwar” agitation. The KKE’s nationalist turn is generally perceived as being credible because of the party’s long history of anti - Americanism – and more generally “anti - Westernism.” In fact it was ideology which had an important role in KKE’s survivor. Rather than Communist ideology, however, which has been discredited in Greece as much as everywhere else, it is nationalism that has been emphasized. The second resource deployed by the KKE is its sponsorship of social protest. Even though its organization was severely weakened after 1991, the party still has a national machine at its disposal, coupled with considerable organizational know - how. It is a national actor with the ability to give shape and form to all kinds of otherwise local and shapeless forms of social protest. One would imagine that the KKE would be successful when it comes to workers, but in fact the party reaches further extends. For example, it has been able to sponsor and help organize widespread ( and extremely disruptive ) protests by such disparate groups as farmers and high school students. The party also mobilized numerous contingent members in the 2001 Genoa antiglobalization demonstrations. The sponsorship of social protest takes place under a vague anticapitalist and antiglobalization ideological cover which has replaced the tenets of orthodox Marxism. Although this activity does not translate into votes, it helps keep the party active on the agenda. Moreover, it provides KKE with considerable blackmail potential, which could prove to be a substantial bargaining tool. In more than one way, then, the KKE is trying to replicate PASOK’s distinctive brand of ( early ) populism that was based on a combination of nationalism and social protest. However, this strategy has failed to bring in significant electoral returns. The party lacks the charismatic leadership that is essential in mak15 A pragmatist politician Papandreou did not accomplish both.

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ing this brand of populism work. Although this strategy has allowed the party to carve out a niche and survive it is very doubtful that it will provide it with the ability to expand over and above its present six percent reach.

IV.

Social Bases and Organization

In Greece, Communism was never based in important social classes’ cleavages. The country had never seen an important labor movement, like the Scandinavian countries or Germany where the Communist Party could find a support base. It is true that an agrarian movement during the first decades of the twentieth century helped the Communist Party to take roots in the interwar period. This is clearly observed, for example, in the rural region of Thessaly, in Central Greece, where the Party has a considerable political and electoral influence. Beyond that, the electoral influence of the KKE has no special variation. Certainly, its power is based on the labor class inhabited in the popular suburbs of Athens and Piraeus, the unemployed and the retirees. However, there is no social group which constituted an electoral bulwark for the party.

Table 4a : Social composition of KKE voters in parliamentary elections of 2000 and 2004 Sex Men Women Age 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+ Education Less than Elementary School Elementary School High School Higher Education

Elections of 2000 Elections of 2004 6.4 4.6

7 5

5.2 4.1 6.0 6.3 5.4 6.1

5 4 7 7 6 6

6.5 5.7 5.2 5.4

5 6 5 7

Source : Mavris, ‘Oi dyo Ellades’, pp. 17–36; VPRC Institut (2004).

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Table 4b : The Social composition of KKE voters in parliamentary elections of 2000 Profession

Election of 2000

Business persons Farmers Professionals, High School and below Professionals, Higher Education Small business, artisans Public Sector Employees (Elementary and High School Education) Public Sector Employees (Higher Education) Private Sector Employees (Elementary and High School Education) Private Sector Employees (Higher Education) Unemployed Retirees, Public Sector, Elementary Education Retirees, Public Sector, Higher Education Retirees, Private Sector, Elementary Education Retirees, Private Sector, Higher Education Students

4.2 5.2 6.1 5.9 5.4 5.0 4.7 7.6 6.1 9.3 6.5 1.8 8.1 7.3 3.7

Table 4c : The social composition of KKE in 2004 elections Profession Business persons Farmers Professionals Small business, artisans Public Sector Employees Private Sector Employees Unemployed Retirees, Public Sector Retirees, Private Sector Students

KKE 5 7 7 5 6 7 7 6 7 5

If we consider the districts or the cities where the Communist Party has achieved its more important electoral scores, we observe that the majority of these areas are islands or small towns with a specific relation with the Communist Party during the interwar period or / and the Resistance and the civil war. In fact, looking at the tables 5 and 6 we can conclude that the party has better results in the country’s big cities without, however, having remarkable rootstalk.

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Table 5 : The bulwarks of the communist party in the 2004 parliamentary elections (5.90 % average ) District/city

%

Description Islands in the South East Aegean. Important communist penetration during the interwar period reSamos-Ikaria (one district) 14.60 lated to exiled communists and specific local conditions (poverty, old combatants and sailors). It can be considered archaic communism Thassos

Island in the northern Aegean. Important communist penetration during the interwar period re13.50 lated to the tobacco labor movement of the region during the 30s.

Tirnavos

Small rural town in Thessaly near the city of 13.12 Larissa. Communist infiltration during the interwar period and the ’40s.

Lesvos

Big island in the northeastern Aegean. The economy is based on a rural economy and a light industry. Traditionally characterized as ‘little Mos11.65 cow’ because of the very important communist infiltration during the economic crisis of the ’30s and the Resistance movement during the German occupation. Typically archaic communism.

Nea Ionia

Naoussa

Lefkada

Popular suburb next to the city of Volos in central Greece. Inhabited exclusively by Asia Minor refugees. An important labor movement but also 11.42 a considerable intellectual activity helped the party’s electoral development during the interwar period. Small town in northern Greece (about 80 km western to Thessaloniki) The city of the textile 11.31 factory par excellence. The city was the foothold of a very important labor movement during the first decades of the 20th century. Small Ionian Island. Communist development du11.14 ring the period of the Resistance movement.

Suburbs (Second District) of Piraeus

The biggest port of the country. Sailors and 11.06 docks trade unions still today controlled by the KKE.

Kefalonia

Ionian Island developed a communist activity du10.88 ring the Second World War and the Occupation period. The island has a great number of sailors.

Source : Ministry of the Interior.

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Table 6 : The electoral score of the Communist Party in the most important cities (2004) City of

% (national average 5.90)

Athens Suburbs of Athens Thessaloniki Piraeus Suburbs of Piraeus Patra Larisa Irakleion Volos Ioannina Serres

6.86 8.78 6.60 5.87 11.06 7.57 8.83 4.41 8.09 5.53 4.28

Source : Ministry of the Interior.

The institutional space where the Communist decline is more striking as the municipal one. Until the 1980s the Communist Party had very important influence in the institutional sphere of public life. In dozens of cities ( among them Thessaloniki, Piraeus, Larissa ) the KKE had succeeded to conquer and keep power for some years. In this period the party proved to be able to present reliable candidates, considered good managers for local affairs, and created large local coalitions able to keep local power. In general terms the Communist Party was considered the party of the local management par excellence. After 1990 the party lost its role as effective administrator and promoter of local interests. This is probably due to the isolation of the party from the rest of the party system. However, the main reason is related to the scarcity of influential personalities inside the ranks of the KKE.

Table 7 : Number of major municipalities controlled by KKE ( N=61 towns which are either capitals of prefectures or have a population over 70,000) Elections Municipalities 1990 1998 2002 2006

8 3 2 1

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After 1991 KKE’s organizational structure suffered immensely. On the one hand, the party lost its most dynamic segment, its youth organization : most of its cadres defected to Synaspismos or left politics altogether. On the other hand, the party also lost the Soviet Union’s support and was left to fend for itself. After a first phase of retrenchment, when the party was trying to reduce its losses, it has embarked on a phase of timid expansion. For the first time since the fall of the Soviet Bloc the party is regaining a foothold among the young and, as pointed out, its youth organization KNE has been rebuilt. Although far weaker than its previous manifestation, its reconstruction is an indicator of the party’s surprising resilience. At the same time the party has been able to retain a measure of influence with trade unions ( which, in Greece, have been associated very closely to parties ). Interestingly, this resilience has not been accompanied by an organizational opening. The party continues to rely on the old Leninist rule of democratic centralism, a concept that translates the will of the majority ( i.e. the leadership ) into compulsory party policy to be unquestionably supported by all party members. Table 8 : Newspaper Readership – Nationwide circulation of Rizospastis (1980–2005) Year 1980 1986 2001 2005 2006

V.

Number of copies sold 21,000 53,000 7-8,000 6-7,000 8-9,000

Conclusion

With the notable exception of the German PDS ( and the Dutch and Swedish parties of the Left, if classified as post - Communist ), European Communist and post - Communist parties experienced a steep electoral decline during the 1990s. In this respect, Greece is no exception. The Communist Party has lost about 50 % of its electoral force, up to 60 % of its membership and 70 % of the readership of the party’s newspaper, Rizospastis. The party lost also many of its bases on the local administration and saw its forces diminish even in trade unions, which it traditionally controlled. From this point of view there is no special attention to give to the Communist Party of Greece. From another point of view, however, the Communist Party of Greece is in a better situation than predicted fifteen years ago, when the split of the party in

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1991 lead to the creation of a new party in the left spectrum, Synaspismos tis Aristeras kai tis Proodou,16 which was a very dangerous rival. After a period of crisis the party stabilized its electorate and even more showed a small but steady increase of its influence.17 On the opposite, its main rival on the left, Synaspismos, never got over the threshold of 3 %. At the same time, while the KKE survived, it has failed to face the problem of its electoral and political marginalization. The very features that account for its resilience threaten its future : its membership and electorate are aging, despite the infusion of younger voters in 2000 and 2004; and the sponsorship of social protest and nationalism keeps the party in the spotlight at the price of ideological inconsistency and political marginalization. It is true that the social cost of structural economic reforms, the demands of European integration, the rise in crime, and mass immigration promise rewards for political actors willing to capitalize on them. However, the comparative record suggests that Communist Parties are not among the political actors who have successfully capitalized from social discontent during the past ten years; in Europe at least, far- right populism has proved far more successful than its far - left variant. In Greece, a small extreme right party has appeared in the political scene during the last two years. Its discourse imitates in different aspects of Communist ethno - populist rhetoric. Could it become a serious rival for the Communist Party of Greece in the future? It is too early to provide a prominent answer in such a question.

16 For an analysis of the parallel evolution of the two parties see Kalyvas / Marantzidis, Greek Communism 1968–2001, pp. 665–690. 17 Last polls showed that the party could win more than 7 % in the next elections.

The Communist Party of Cyprus – AKEL Andreas Stergiou

I.

Short History of the Party until 2007

The Progressive Party of Working People – AKEL, as the Cypriot Communist Party is widely known, is the oldest political party of Cyprus.1 The Cypriot Communist Party was established under the name KKK ( Communist Party of Cyprus – Kommunistiko Komma Kyprou ) in the 1920s. The founding Conference of the new party was held in Limassol on August 15th, 1926. AKEL was actually a new party which evolved from KKK in the year 1941. In 1943 the old KKK party was absorbed into AKEL. In the following decades success came rapidly for the new AKEL party, although it did not take part in the independence war against the British 1955–59 and remained closely aligned with the Moscow policy. Its moderate and flexible stance on domestic affairs and its consequent strategy of allying with politicians across the political spectrum slowly established AKEL as the main party of the Mediterranean island. The fact that during the Cold War Cyprus belonged to the non - aligned movement proved a favorable factor for the communists. On the other hand, this situation left Cyprus without allies at the most critical moment in its history, when Turkish troops landed on the island in the year 1974 and, contrary to international law, seized and occupied over a third of the island territory. In 1983 the leader of the Turkish - Cypriot community, Rauf Denktash, unilaterally declared the “Independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in the occupied part, recognized only by Turkey. 1

To date, the history and political system of Cyprus remains a Terra Incognita for most European researchers. Thus, this study had to deal with the problem that so far no scientific resources exist which the author could use. Some exceptions are the books by Adams, AKEL; Papageorgiou, To allo KKE [ the other KKE ]; Papafotis, KKE - AKEL, which is in the largest part only a copy of the book by Papageorgiou. In 1984, The party itself published an album with photographic documents and special historic documents: Central Committee of AKEL ( ed.), Album of photographic documents and special historic documents of the communist party of Cyprus. See also Richter, AKEL Kommunistische Partei Zyperns. In : Thetis, 9 (2002), pp. 219–238 and Stergiou, Die Kommunistische Bewegung in Zypern. In : Thetis, 5/6 (1999), pp. 393–408. In addition, the author interviewed two members of the Political Bureau of AKEL, Giannakis Kolokassidis and Andros Kyprianou. He also spoke with Donis Christofinis who had been responsible for the international relations of AKEL for twenty - one years.

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Crisis symptoms, however, emerged in the 1980s within AKEL. Approximately one year before the enormous turbulence in the communist world, on 10 April 1988, Ezekias Papaioannou, party leader since 1949, died. One month before he had expressed his desire to resign because of his failing health. His death ushered in a new era for the Cypriot communist movement. The death of the Secretary - General precipitated an intra - party crisis over the question of succession among the several party factions.2 For many years the communists made no attempt at ideologic - political renewal.3 Support for Soviet policy in the field of foreign policy as a means of securing the favor of a great power in the Cyprus conflict had lost its attraction in the preceding years, and financial prosperity in the Cypriot society offered no opportunities for left - wing agitation in the field of domestic affairs. At its plenary meeting on 22 April, the AKEL Central Committee elected Dimitris Christofias, who belonged to the orthodox Marxist wing of the party, as its secretary - general. Aged 42, Christofias became the youngest secretary - general of a communist party in Europe and simultaneously became the inspiration for the new profile of the Communist Party of Europe. However, the crisis continued to unfold. The so - called Perestroika - Supporters Faction,4 along with some dissident journalists,5 sought to reform the old party structure. For the first time, articles and explanations against the party line were published.6 The conflict reached a climax in January 1990, when the Central Committee of AKEL decided to expel six of its members. On 11 April 1990 the expelled members declared their intention of creating a new party, which finally was established on 29. 4. 1990. The new party, headed by G. Digles, was called ADISOK ( Ananeotiko Dimokratiko Sosialistiko Kinima = Renewed Democratic Socialist Movement ). It held its first congress 7–8 July. It called itself “a pluralist, democratic movement, but with a socialist orientation”. Hovewer, the changes to the world order and in AKEL’s leadership since 1989 did not destabilize the party. It continued to be very cautious. It avoided introducing important and sudden changes either in the party’s bureaucracy or its ideology and policies, a move that could have alienated masses of traditional left voters. The new leader’s style and moderate positions also helped the party to gain the confidence of more Cypriots. Thanks to its influential organization, which became apparent at all levels of public life, AKEL managed to make up for the losses again. 3–7 October 1990 AKEL held its Seventeenth Party 2

3 4 5 6

The party commented on the political change in Eastern Europe very briefly. By a lapidary report the C.C. of the AKEL ( Anakoinosi tis Kentrikis Epitropis tou AKEL Lefkosia 17–12–1989) declared that it did not interfere with the internal affairs of the other communist and labor parties. See Tzermias, Geschichte der Republik Zypern, pp. 616–618. A. Ziartides = chairman of the trade union PEO. An. Kanaouros, P. Digles, M. Papapetrou, A. Fandis. See Xatzikiriakos / Christoforou, Vouleftikes [ parliamentary elections ], pp. 146–151.

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Congress.7 Out of 1,401 elected delegates, a total of 1,280 attended the congress as voters. The orthodox communists gained 30.6 % of the votes and 18 seats in the Cypriot parliament in the parliamentary elections of 1991 and became the second - strongest party. At the same time two new formations emerged, the Liberal Party of former minister Nicos Rolandis and the Pancyprian Refugee Movement ( PAKOP ). The former had its candidates on the lists of the Democratic Rally DISY, while PAKOP presented lists only in constituencies where refugees originate ( Lefkosia, Kerynia, Ammochostos ). The new parties failed to win any seats, the Conservatives ( DISY ) increased its support to 35.8 % and 20 seats, AKEL won back some of the lost ground with 30.6 % and 18 seats, the right - wing liberal party DIKO suffered a setback (19.5 %) and 11 seats, while the socialist party EDEK remained stable at 11 % and 7 seats, one more than in 1985. Soon after the elections the Democratic Rally initiated a goodwill approach to DIKO; it supported the latter’s vice chairman Alexis Galanos to the office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the two parties concluded a coalition pact for the mayoral elections of December 1991. DISY was very generous, supporting DIKO candidates in half of the municipalities. In return, the Democratic Party supported the candidacy of Glafcos Clerides to Presidency in February 1993. After two successive failures, in 1983 and 1988, Clerides was elected President of the Republic in the second round, with a lead of about 2000 votes. In the presidential elections of 1993 the communists lost their influence on the government, for the first time in many years. Their sworn enemy, Glafkos Clerides, won the election against the candidate Vasiliou, supported by AKEL. However, while ADISOK degenerated into an insignificant political group,8 AKEL, with its new leader, Christofias, who had meanwhile developed into a charismatic politician since the parliamentary elections of 1996,9 was remarkably successful. In the form of a coalition ( AKEL – New Forces ) with political personages from the left end of the spectrum, the communists gained 33 % of the votes and 19 seats thanks to the new legislation. Under the competent leadership of Dimitris Christofias AKEL had become the most successful communist party in Europe. The new Secretary - General of the party created a new party profile far from the former Stalinist image.10 Born in Dhicomo on 29 August 1946, a part of Kyrenia District, now in the area occupied by Turkish troops, the historian who studied in Moskow ( Insti7 It is the congress of the renewal of the party. 8 In 1996 the ADISOK united with the party of the former President of Cyprus Vasiliou, KED. Out of this a new party named Elefteroi Dimokrates [ free democrats ] ( EDH ) emerged. Meanwhile they are called Enomenoi Dimokrates ( United Democrats ). 9 On the elections program of the alliance H Diki mas Protasi : AKEL Aristera Nees Dinameis [ Our proposal : AKEL Left New Forces ] ( C.C. of the AKEL, Nicosia 1996). 10 On the personality of Christofias see Zavou, Ta Politika commata tis Kyprou ston 20o Aiona [ The political Parties of Cyprus in the 20th Century ], pp. 437–441.

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tute of Social Sciences in Moscow and Academy of Social Sciences of the Soviet Union, Doctor of Philosophy in History ) developed into one of the most popular politicians in Cyprus in a very short time. At the age of fourteen Christofias became a member of the Pancyprian United Students Organisation ( PEOM ), and in 1964 he became a member of the Progressive Party of the Working People ( AKEL ), of the Pancyprian Labour Federation ( PEO ) and of the United Democratic Youth Organisation ( EDON ). In 1969 at the 5th Congress of EDON, he was elected member of the Central Council. In 1974 he returned to Cyprus and was employed by EDON, where he was elected to the post of central organizational secretary, and in 1977 to the post of secretary general. He served at this post until 1987. During this period he was in regular contact and collaboration with international and national youth organizations. In 1976 he was elected a member of the Nicosia - Kyrenia District Committee of A.K.E.L. In 1982 he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the party, in 1986 member of the Political Bureau and in 1987 a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Following the death of Ezekias Papaioannou, AKEL’s secretary - general, on 10 April 1988, he was appointed acting secretary - general by the Political Bureau of the party. On 22 April 1988, as it has already been described, the plenum of the Central Committee elected him to the post of the secretary - general of the party’s Central Committee, a post to which he was re - elected three more times (1990, 1996 and 2000). At the parliamentary elections of 19 May 1991 he was elected Member of the House of Representatives, standing as an AKEL – Left New Forces candidate in the Kyrenia constituency, and was re - elected at the subsequent parliamentary elections of 26 May 1996 and 27 May 2001. On 7 June 2001 he was elected President of the House of Representatives for the Eighth Term of Office. Under his leadership the party undertook a significant ideologic renewal. The most important ideological change, concerning the attitude of the AKEL to the European Union, took place in 1995. At the European Union summit on Corfu on 24–25 June 1994 it was decided that Cyprus and Malta should be included into the next European Union enlargement. AKEL had to rise to the new challenge facing the country. In the past few decades AKEL had been against any kind of rapprochement between Cyprus and the European Union. In accordance with the policy of the Communist Bloc it considered the European Union “a vehicle of capitalism and imperialism”, a view it had not given up even after the end of the Cold War. The new set of circumstances, however, caused the party to change its principal perception of the European Union. One year after the summit on Corfu AKEL published a brochure with its new position on the EU : “The European Union is by now an existing reality, more economic and less political. Its integration is done in a way that is far from responding to the wishes of the progressive people of our planet. It has made great strides in the field of economic integration, while the social field is not included into its priorities. In the fields of common foreign

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policy, defense and security, dependence on the USA and NATO is obvious. The Europe of the peoples, given the present situation, remains a distant dream. In order to make a move towards the right direction we need to support and strengthen those forces within the E.U. (i. e. the left parties ) which are fighting for an integrated Europe of the citizens, for human rights, for basic freedoms, for the environment, for democracy, social justice and for a better quality of life. Accession to the European Union could also promote a solution to the Cyprus Problem.”11

Re - orientation was justified on the grounds that Turkey could never have a real chance on European Union membership without a solution to the Cyprus problem and Cyprus as a European Union member could get more bargaining leverage. The giving up of the old position on the EU proved a very successful tactic. The last parliamentary elections on 29. 5. 2001 brought a triumph to AKEL. After twenty years, once more it became the strongest party in the Greek Cypriot Parliament. The communists gained 34.71 % of the votes and 20 seats. According to the presidential system of the Republic of Cyprus, shifts in power in the parliament are of little importance. However, they are considered to be the most important test for the following presidential elections.12 Table 1 : Electoral Results Parliamentary Elections 1991 Party AKEL DIKO DISY EDEK Party AKEL DIKO DISY EDEK

Share Seats 30.6 % 18 19.5 % 11 35.8 % 20 11.0 % 7 Parliamentary Elections 1996 Share 33.0 % 16.4 % 34.4 % 8.1 %

Seats 19 10 20 7

According to the last Parliamentary Elections on 27 May 200113, the distribution of seats by party is as follows : 11

However, the party refused to approve the constitution of the European Union, which was approved by the Cypriot parliament in June 2005. 12 See the very interesting analysis by Christoforou, Election Report. In : South European Society & Politics, 6 (2001) 2, pp. 97–118. 13 In June 2001 the new Members of the House elected the General Secretary of AKEL Mr Demetris Christofias as President of the House of Representatives.

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Party

Votes

ADIK (Fighting Democratic Movement)

%

Seats

8,860

2.16

1

AKEL- (Left-New Forces)

142,648

34.71

20

DIKO (Democratic Party)

60,986

14.84

9

DISY (Democratic Rally)

139,721

34.00

19

EDI (United Democrats)

10,635

2.59

1

8,129

1.98

1

26,767

6.51

4

ECOLOGISTS KISOS (Social Democrats Movement)

In view of the impending presidential election, AKEL made an agreement with the Democratic Party, DIKO, in 2001. Thanks to this agreement, AKEL secured for itself the position of the parliament president, which was occupied by the Secretary - General of AKEL, Dimitris Christofias. In return, DIKO secured the support of AKEL for its candidate for the presidential election of 2003. This way the DIKO chairman and common candidate of AKEL and DIKO, Tassos Papadopoulos, achieved an easy victory in the year 2003. Table 2 : The Results of the last 2003 Presidential Election Candidate

Votes

Share (%) Supporting Parties

Tassos Papadopoulos

213,353

51.5

Glafcos Clerides

160,724

38.8

Alecos Markides

27,404

6.6

Nicos Koutsou

8,771

2.1

Others

3,941

1.0

AKEL (34.7), DIKO (14.8), KISOS (6.6), Greens (2.0). Total: 58.1 DISY (34.0), EDI (2.6), ADIK (2.2). Total: 38.8 New Horizons (3.0)

The key to success in presidential elections is the strategy of forming alliances in support of a candidate. In all but one of the post - Makarios presidential elections some parties joined forces before the first ballot. The lesson drawn from all contests over the years is that there is no guarantee that a candidate can secure the total votes of the parties supporting him. A number of other factors play a decisive role for the outcome, including a long - term strategy that can consolidate both the electoral co - operation of the parties and a maximum of popular support. According to the 1960 Constitution the president of the Republic of Cyprus is the highest authority, elected for a five - year term of office. The president is the head of State and government; s / he appoints the Council of Ministers and exercises executive power with the cabinet. The singularity of the Cypriot presidential system lies in Article 54 of the Constitution, according to which “the

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Council of Ministers shall exercise executive power in all other matters”, meaning other than those expressly reserved within the competence of the president and vice- president and the Communal Chambers. The outcome of the February 2003 Cyprus presidential elections confirmed the influence of the communists. The party’s ambitions to assume state responsibilities, expressed since 2001, were fulfilled; its favored candidate, the Chairman of the Democratic Party, Tassos Papadopoulos, was elected to presidency. Success in the first round was based on a strategy of alliances, the persistence of ideologic cleavages and party discipline. The new president chairs a cabinet in which for the first time AKEL’s ministers participate and form a majority. In the new cabinet AKEL got five ministerial positions.14 Tassos Papadopoulos, aged 72, the leader of DIKO, started his career in the anti - colonial struggle and at the age of 25 was appointed Minister of the Interior in the committee that undertook the transition from colonial government to the independent Republic of Cyprus. He held various ministerial portfolios from 1960 to 1970, when he was elected a member of the House of Representatives. He became the president’s, Clerides, aide in the intercommunal talks on the Cyprus issue, succeeding him in 1976 as the Greek Cypriot interlocutor. In 1978 President Spyros Kyprianou accused him of conspiracy against his authority and subsequently removed him from his post. In 1980 Papadopoulos founded his own political party, Union of the Centre ( Enwsh Kšntrou ), which failed to enter parliament. In spite of the bitter enmity of the past, he joined Kyprianou’s party, DIKO, in 1985. He did not seek office until October 2000, when the party founder decided to resign and Papadopoulos succeeded him as chairman without opposition. During his career in politics Papadopoulos has proved an ability to keep a low profile when needed. He has never hesitated to disagree and follow a course of his own. He was one of the two members of the Cypriot delegation at the London negotiations in February 1959 who disagreed with the acceptance of the London and Zurich agreements on independence of Cyprus and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. He also distanced himself from Clerides and his party in the 1970s and followed a solitary course. Following the failure of his own party in 1981, Papadopoulos showed extreme patience; 20 years later he managed not only to gain control of the party he had formerly fought against but also to win the presidency of the Republic. However, difficulties also began at the same time for AKEL. The presidential election on 16 February 2003 took place in a climate of great expectations, coupled with uncertainty over the future of Cyprus. The United Nations had set a number of pressing deadlines with the support of the European Union, and the Cypriots were expected to give their reply after the elections. Tassos Papadopoulos has been viewed as a “hardliner” by most outside observers, many Greek 14

Christoforou, South European Briefing. In : South European Society & Politics, 8 (2003) 3, pp. 94–118.

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and most Turkish Cypriots; his commitment to a solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan Plan has been heavily doubted. This plan ( the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem ) was another attempt by the UN and personally by UN - General Secretary Kofi Annan to bring both sides to the negotiation table. The plan provided for territorial adjustments and a federal state of two regions, under Greek and Turkish Cypriot administration respectively. This development not only directly affected the election campaign, it also created a climate of uncertainty. A solution to the Cyprus issue would have led to a change of the political system and, eventually, to the cancellation of the presidential elections.15 Since the division of the island in 1974 the Turkish side has usually adopted an intransigent attitude towards efforts by the UN to solve the Cyprus problem. The various Turkish governments and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, repeatedly declared that they considered the status quo the solution to the problem. Moreover, whenever negotiations started the Turkish side insisted on the recognition of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” as part of any settlement after its unilateral declaration in 1983 – a demand completely unacceptable to the Greek side but more importantly to the international community as well. Yet the traditional assumptions about the intransigent Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders were shaken by the political changes in Turkey and northern Cyprus since 2002. In a dramatic break with the past, Rauf Denktash and his consistently status quo oriented policy were publicly denounced by a large part of the Turkish Cypriot population in mass demonstrations in 2002 and 2003. However, the final plan proposed by the Secretary - General of the United Nations in 2004, which should have been approved by the Turkish and Cypriot Community in April 2004, took Turkish preferences into account. The occupation of the Northern part of Cyprus was legitimized, while the settlers that the Turkish government had illegally brought to the island in recent decades were naturalized through the plan. The Greek Cypriots also feared that Turkey would exercise its military superiority in the region and possibly conquer an additional part or the entire island. In that context the approximately 35,000 Turkish soldiers currently on the island were perceived as a massive security threat. Finally, they dreaded that the independence of Cyprus would be severely limited if the “mother countries” gained equal or even more rights than those granted to Greece, Turkey and Britain in 1960 in the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, when the Cyprus Republic was created.16 The USA and Great Britain worked in a counterproductive way until the last moment before the referendum to put pressure on President Papadopoulos and AKEL. Finally, Papadopoulos emotionally appealed to the Greek Cypriot peo15 Ibid., p. 95. 16 Mallinson, Kupros mia istoriki Prooptiki, pp. 437–440. Theofanous, To Sxedio Annan kai I Evropaiki Epilogi. Faustmann, The Cyprus Question Still Unsolved. In : Südosteuropa - Mitteilungen, 6 (2004), pp. 44–68.

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ple to reject the Annan plan which threatened the substantive sovereignty of the Cypriot Republic and campaigned successfully for the “no” vote among the Greek Cypriot community. AKEL came into confrontation with its own history and with itself. For decades the party had supported the coexistence of both communities, building bridges to the other side, while the other parties were accusing AKEL of national treason. Now the opportunity had finally come to go a common way with the Turkish Cypriots who in this overwhelming majority were in favor of the plan. The reaction of AKEL, the most influential political and social actor on the island, would decide the result. The Central Committee of the party held its historic session on 9 and 10 April 2004 and adopted the most serious resolution in its history. AKEL called upon the United Nations and the international community to postpone the plebiscite for a few months, so that the deficiencies of the Annan plan could be corrected and a broader acceptance within the Cypriot people could be secured, otherwise the party had to reject the plan. The main deficiency concerned the lack of security guarantees in case the Turkish occupation troops would not withdraw. Conceding to this claim, the UN - Secretary General prepared a draft resolution providing for a strengthened UN presence entitled “United Nations Settlement Implementation Mission in Cyprus” and an imposition of an arms embargo on Cyprus in order to support the demilitarization of the island, which should be approved by the Security Council. However, Russia17 torpedoed a UN resolution which would have provided sufficient guarantees, at least as far as the official AKEL view was concerned. Russia traditionally maintains close and friendly relations with the Republic of Cyprus and in particular with the main pillar of the current government, the communist party AKEL.18 At the same time the plan was rejected by broad parts of the Greek Cypriot population for various reasons. A great dilemma emerged for Communists. If AKEL were to support the plan, it would behave correctly in relation to its history, but would lose enormous popularity. If it rejected the plan, it would betray its political tradition of reconciliation between the two communities, but in the end it would be on the side of the winners of the Ballot. It decided on rejection and remained attractive for its voters. The result was that nearly 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan, while the Turkish Cypriots voted for the plan by a two - thirds majority. In the parliamentary elections of Mai 2006 the electoral alliance lead by AKEL under the attractive name of AKEL Left - Wing and New Forces lost over three per cent of its electoral influence and came to 31.13 per cent. However, thanks to the simultaneously bad electoral results of its main opponent, the Democratic Rally, the AKEL remained the ruling party in the Cypriot political 17

The Greek side lost a lot of credibility because of rumours that AKEL and Papadopoulos urged Moscow to block the necessary resolution. 18 Faustmann, The Cyprus Question Still Unsolved. In : Südosteuropa - Mitteilungen, 6 (2004), pp. 44–68.

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field. Thus, the party was compelled to change its political course towards the three-party coalition which had been in power since 2003. An extraordinary party congress that took place in Nicosia in Mai 2007 nominated for the first time in the whole party history its party leader as its candidate for the 2008 elections. This decision triggered off the break-up of the three-party coalition and the resignation of four AKEL ministers (Foreign Affairs, Interior, Communications, Works and Health).

II.

The Position of AKEL and Its Auxiliary Organizations in the Cypriot Society

In order to be able to reconstruct the special political structures on Cyprus it should be taken into account that the party - political interests penetrate all spheres of public and private life. Thus, in many villages there are coffee houses and taverns which identify themselves with different political formations. Leftand right - wing soccer associations, communist, socialist and conservative cooperatives etc. exist everywhere, so that one gets the impression that everything is completely dominated by politics. A number of reasons, both structural and conjunctural, explain the party’s success. AKEL has implemented modern methods of organization at all levels of its party machine which has a well - defined hierarchy. Its geographical structure, at both the local and national levels, allows for smooth and effective functioning with every member of the party aware of his / her role. At the same time, regular contact with party members and sympathizers is facilitated through numerous parallel and satellite organizations : workers’ and farmers’ trade unions, women’s, students’ and youth organizations. The party also has significant financial power translated into political influence through companies it controls in both the industrial and the services sectors. Like every communist party, AKEL also expects every single cadre to show active political commitment. In the 5th article of the Constitution of AKEL it says : “AKEL draws its strength from its ideological, political and organizational cohesion, from the functioning of party democracy, from its collective work, the conscious participation and action of its members and from the constant enhancement and strengthening of its bonds with the working people and the Cypriot people in general.” In the first organizational article of the constitution it says : “the Party’s organization structure and function is based on democratic centralism, with democracy being constantly developed. The ideas of democratic centralism, enriched by experience and the new political thinking, ensure : 1. Full democracy within the Party 2. Unified line and leadership 3. Conscious discipline”.

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The active cooperation of all cadres enables the party to maintain direct contact to all members and sympathizers of AKEL through various agencies and organizations. AKEL is reputed to be a tightly controlled apparatus, structured around the principle of democratic centralism.19 According to the constitution of AKEL, the members of the Party come from among workers, office workers, peasants, professionals, artisans, scientists, intellectuals and other working people, both men and women, of any national origin, people noted for their social activity. The entry to the Party must be supported by two Party members who know the prospective member well. Decision is taken by the Party Base Group ( P.B.G.) by majority vote, the body immediately above is informed, and the member then receives his party card. Although each member has the right - wing to freely take part in the discussion on working out the Party’s political line, the Party’s tactics and the formulation of decisions, to freely express his beliefs within the Party Organization and bodies, he belongs to and within the bodies he is part of, on any issue under discussion as well as on the activities of any member or cadre or of a guiding Party organ and to freely exercise criticism, in reality the decision - making process is the privilege of a small group of people around the Secretary - General. Therefore, the party created explicit guidelines for the maintenance of party discipline. According to these guidelines, the members and organizations of AKEL are basically obliged to guard and strengthen the cohesion and the unity of the Party. The undermining of party unity and discipline, the creation of splinter groups and factions within the Party, the conscious violation of any of the provisions of the constitution and of the party regulations are liable to disciplinary sanctions. A member of the Party who opposes party decisions, violates party discipline and party ethics, is considered to undermine the prestige of a party organ or of a party cadre or to take recourse to actions that harm the Party and is liable to the following sanctions, depending on the case : ( a ) telling off or telling off accompanied by warning ( b ) removal from posts held ( c ) temporary or indefinite suspension ( d ) dismissal from party. Today party membership, after some withdrawals because of the attitude of the Party to the Annan plan, amounts to 14,000. By European standards this number may seem small, but given a population of about 700,000 it is not negligible. The supreme political body is the congress which is convened every five years. It forms a quorum when 60 % of the elected representatives are in attendance. The congress is also the highest advisory organ of AKEL, electing the Central Committee ( C.C.) and the Central Control Committee ( C.C.C.) of the Party. The Central Committee elects the Secretary - General, the Political Bureau (15 Persons ) and the Secretary to the Party (15 Persons ).20 19 Katastatiko Leitourgias tou AKEL [ Current statute of the party ] (adopted in the 18th Congress of the AKEL in November 1995). 20 Ibid.

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The C.C. guides the work of the party in the period between two Congresses, on the basis of the program, the constitution, the general political line and tactics and of the decisions of the congress ( article 13 of the constitution ). The Political Bureau ( P.B.) directs the work of the Party in the period between the two plenary sessions of the C.C. It deals with all matters that interest the Party. It is answerable for its actions to the C.C. and gives account for its work at every regular plenary session. The number of members of the P.B. is specified by the C.C. and does not exceed 1/5 of its members ( Article 14 of the constitution ). The C.C.C. controls the implementation of decisions by the congress and the Party C.C. as well as the implementation of the policy and tactics of the Party in various fields, controls Party finances and apportions responsibility in the event of a violation of the program, of the constitution or of the regulations for the functioning of the Party.21 According to the constitution of the party ( Article 9), the number of members of the C.C. and the C.C.C. is decided by the congress, at the suggestion of the outgoing C.C. and the C.C.C. respectively. The number of members of the D.C. is decided by the District Conference at the suggestion of the outgoing D.C. The number of members of the Town Committees, the Rural Area Committees and of the Area Committees is decided by the corresponding conferences at the suggestion of the respective bodies. All party organizations are immediately responsible for facing the problems of the area or their place of work, within the framework of the political line, the tactics and the decisions of the Party. For purposes of guidance, for the promotion of decisions and for the study of specialized topics, party organizations convene conferences of cadres. Such conferences are of an advisory and informative nature.22 Today the Party of the Working People possesses the most efficient organization in Cyprus and naturally has its own pool of potential voters and much influence on society. Its organization cuts across all strata of the Cypriot Society, thereby enabling communists to continuously recruit new party members and cadres. The most important auxiliary organizations of AKEL today are the following : PEO ( Pagkipria Ergatiki Omospondia – Pan - Cyprian Workers’ Federation ),23 EKA ( Enosi Kyprion Agroton – Cypriot Farmers’ union ), POGO ( Pagkipria Organosi Ginekeion Organoseon - Confederation of Women’s Organizations ) and EDON ( Enomeni Dimokratiki Organosi Neon - United Democratic Youth Organization ). With 75,000 members the PEO forms the largest labor federation on the island. It dates back to the First World War. The first Cypriot trade union of the island was founded under the name of PSE 1941, joining the existing regional 21 The Constitution of AKEL, Article 16. 22 Article 10 of the constitution of AKEL. 23 About the development of the Cypriot Labour Movement see Katzikides, Arbeiterbewegung und Arbeitsbeziehungen auf Zypern as well as Michaelides, The Turkish Cypriot Working Class. In : The Cyprus Review, 5 (1995), pp. 33–57.

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worker associations to one. In 1946 the PSE was renamed PEO. This year marked the beginning of the reorganization of the trade union, although for many years it was involved in a protracted argument with the British. Since that year the PEO has been in the ascendant,24 expressing most clearly the moderate course of AKEL. At times of crisis, as in the 1970s after the division of the island by force and the resulting economic misery, it accepted wage and other rights cuts25 in order to contribute to the recovery of the national economy. Today the PEO supports government policy because of the participation of AKEL in the cabinet. In return, the communist party protects its interests at the governmental level and blocks unpopular reforms. This happened once at the beginning of the Papadopoulos’ era, when the government had to give in to the unions without a fight because the communist party AKEL had sided with the workers and threatened to fight the reforms. The turn - about was a victory for the communists, suggesting that the president would rather put the future of the economy at risk than the government alliance. We hope to be proved wrong by the events of the next few months, when AKEL will turn up the pressure for people - friendly, vote - buying measures. Moreover, it struggles against the policy of “flexible labor relations” which include the signing of personal contracts but promotes respectable living conditions, safety at work in a pleasant environment, enough leisure time and conditions for creative recreation and easy access to quality spiritual and cultural activities.26 The internal structure of the PEO formally secures the representative participation of every single trade union ( for building, textiles, trade, pressure etc.). The highest organ is the so - called general council ( Geniko Symvoulio ) which consists of 85 to 105 members. The general council is accountable to the congress which meets every four years. Out of the General Council comes the executive council, consisting of 17 to 25 members, as well as the Executive Bureau, consisting of 6 members.27 The youth organization of AKEL, EDON, forms the best means of recruiting new cadres for the party. Its origin dates back to the 1920s. Its development is parallel to the history of the Communist Party of Cyprus because the creation of KKK in 1926, the predecessor of AKEL, is due to some young people from Limassol. It has existed under the name EDON since 1959. In recent years it has significantly contributed to the mutual understanding of the various groups of people on Cyprus. Membership amounts to 8,000.28 24 Richter, Geschichte der Insel Zypern, vol. 1, pp. 432–434. 25 Interview with the C.C. member of the AKEL, Giannakis Kolokassides. 26 Apofasi tou 2ou Synedriou tis PEO. Proti Enotita gia ti drasi dock tin politiki tis PEO ston agona gia veltiosi tou viotikou epipedou ton ergazomenon. [ Resolution der 24th conferenz der PEO 11–13 Mars 2004 : Unity for action in the struggle for improving the life standard of the working people ]. 27 PEO homepage : www.peo.org.cy. 28 According to data of the EDON.

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No specific numbers exist for an accurate estimation of the membership of POGO, the women’s organization of AKEL, created in 1950. In 1988, before its transformation from a woman’s association to a pure communist organization (according to the official terminology there happened a transformation from a woman’s association to a mass movement ), 16,000 members were attributed to POGO. This number may not much deviate from today’s quantitative composition of the organization. The main historical achievement of POGO is its anti - colonialist activities against the British. Approximately 15,000 members are attributed today to the federation of the Cypriot farmers EKA ( foundation year 1946). Thanks to its co - operative spirit, which in past decades secured co - operation with other federations on the island, different organizations were established, promoting the selling of agricultural products, social security and the financing of various corporate business activities. At the organizational level EKA is constituted as a copy of PEO, whereby only the number of people participating in the various bodies is different.29

III.

The Political and Ideological Identity of the Cypriot Communists

At the ideologic level AKEL still defines itself as a party of the working class and the working people pursuing the establishment of socialism - communism, “which is the best, most just and civilized social system, the system which abolishes the exploitation of man by man and creates all the necessary conditions for unhindered progress to prosperity and happiness for the whole people”.30 In respect of its activities, AKEL claims to be guided by Marxism - Leninism which develops with the endless progress of knowledge and by economic and political evolution. AKEL’s ultimate aim is – according to the constitution of the party – the creation of “democratic and humane socialism, of an advanced society based on peace and freedom, on political and social justice and the respect of human rights”. However, this program can be applied only after the independence of Cyprus has been achieved and only if the majority of the Cypriot people democratically support the establishment of this system followed by several interim stages. Thus, the economic transformation of capitalism into socialism and the social and political procedure for the establishment of socialism is shaped by the particular conditions, the nature of each unique society.31

29 About the history of the auxiliary organizations of AKEL see Richter, AKEL die Kommunistische Partei Zyperns. In : Thetis, 9 (2002), pp. 231–235. 30 Current Programme of AKEL ( Published by the CC of AKEL ). 31 Interview with the C.C. Member of AKEL Giannakis Kolokassides and Our Concept of Socialism ( adopted by the 17th Congress of AKEL Nicosia 3–7 October 1990), pp. 7–10.

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It is remarkable that the party avoids any reference to the word “revolution” or “revolutionary procedure”. In opposition, it is underlined that the creation of a socialist society in Cyprus will be the result of the freely and democratically expressed wish of the people of Cyprus. Even the AKEL considers the following as necessary presuppositions for social and political development : “The free functioning of parties, the democratic acquisition, exercise and change of political authority, as well as changes to the constitution or to the social system, provided that such developments follow the free choice of the people through democratic and properly conducted procedures.”32 The ideological orientation of AKEL still shines through of the text adopted at the 17th congress of the party in 1990 and named “Our concept of socialism” ( I antilipsi mas gia to Sosialismo ).33 Marxism and Leninism are still the theoretical foundation of party identity. According to this text, the Leninist conception of socialism constitutes the most important source of modern dialectical thought for socialism. However, it is noticeable how the party emphasizes its loyalty to the non - violent way to socialism. The struggle for socialism will rely on securing a political majority among the people, expressed though the daily struggle for the promotion of the rights of the broader strata of the people and though continuous enlightenment. The securing of a political majority will be achieved through the cooperation and alliance of all those political forces which, to larger or lesser extent, will be interested in the realization of social transformation.34 It is quite untypical that the Cypriot communists do not principally reject Social Democracy which is appreciated for its contribution to the development of values and the dissemination of the ideas of socialism and to social reforms which, in turn, contributed to the improvement of the well - being and social protection of the working people in certain capitalist countries.35 The party acknowledges the capitalist nature of the Cypriot society as a reality. In the political resolution of the last 19th congress ( December 2000) it was reaffirmed that AKEL is striving for a socio - economic policy focusing on man and human needs, not on the absoluteness of market laws and the welfare of numbers and a policy of many - sided and multi - dimensional development, a policy of mixed economy in which private, state and co - operative initiative will coexist and co - operate.36 Actually, the party’s policies on social and economic issues have permanently become more moderate and conciliatory and no major industrial action has been taken in recent years by the powerful trade unions under its control or influence. 32 The Constitution of AKEL. 33 I antilipsi mas gia to sosialismo [ Our Concept of Socialism ] ( adopted by the 17th Congress of AKEL Nicosia 3–7 October 1990). 34 Ibid., p. 11. 35 Ibid., p. 4. 36 Politiki Apofasi tou 19ou Synedriou der AKEL [ Political resolution of the 19th Congress of the AKEL ] (7–9 December 2000).

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However, the AKEL continues to present itself as a communist party, while putting the emphasis on the designation The left - wing party of Cyprus. In addition to its past, a long - standing organizational effort and balanced political choices form the basis of its strength. That is something that can be recognized by the electoral strategy of the party in the last parliamentary elections of 2001. The major issues of AKEL’s campaign were the state of the economy, the growth of criminality and the spread of drugs, the clientelism practiced by the government and the need to take initiatives to resolve the Cyprus question. Meanwhile, opinion polls have indicated that voters were very concerned with criminality and drugs, and to a lesser degree with other internal problems, while the major criteria for choosing a party were the party’s positions on the Cyprus issues, the personality of candidates and ideology. Thus AKEL most strongly shaped the profile of an established social - democrat party. Thanks to its spirit of cooperation with other parties and its moderate governing behavior proved many times in the past it developed the image of a very competent political, social and economic actor in the Cypriot community. Even the Church in Cyprus is the old and respected institution to which the party has a good relationship. Finally it can be concluded that today AKEL corresponds more to a social democratic party which, however, still employs the Marxist - Leninist rhetoric for purely populist reasons. Thus the AKEL does not belong to the category of postcommunist parties which emerged in the era of the Post Cold War but constitutes a political singularity among the parties which still call themselves communist, although the communists perceive their natural role as defenders of the little man against the evils of liberalisation, globalisation and the scary, faceless multinational. Globalisation, as it is being achieved today, does not follow – according to the perception of the Party – a progressive path and is not interested in social justice. The way globalisation is being achieved today “serves only the interests of the economic colossuses and of the leading western powers [...] It subjects the developing countries to the most abject dependence and the most horrendous deprivation of their peoples. Hunger and disease decimate whole populations. The gap between North and South is constantly being widened. In a world which has got all the possibilities, all the resources, all the scientific knowledge and technological know - how to secure a respectable life for all men and women, what prevails is hunger, misery, poverty, disease, unemployment, illiteracy, exploitation of child labour and despair for the future”.37 In this regard, the AKEL follows the classic perception of the other existing communist parties towards the Post Cold War order. Accordingly, globalisation is related to an all - out advance of neo - liberalism, which under the deceitful slogans of freedom of business activities and the freedom of the market covers its 37 I Protasi tou AKEL gia Eksigchronismo tis Koinonias mas [ AKEL’s Proposal for the Modernization of our Society ].

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intention to attack on all fronts the achievements and the living standards of the working people whom the economic colossuses want to transform into the prey of the blind and uncontrolled laws of the market and into a source of easy profit. Millions of people throughout the world are forced by the capitalistic monopoles to face unemployment and to be socially marginalised. “Mankind can and must free itself from this nightmare of a return to barbarism. The new social order, neo - liberalism and the globalisation of capital cannot be the future of mankind. We do not deceive ourselves, hoping for easy victories and for dei ex machine. Yet, whatever the difficulties, the objective need for progressive modernisation will unite the peoples of the world in their struggle against misery and the world hegemony of the few. The world mobilisation, which is getting stronger every day, slowly embraces more and more people. This social and supra - nationalist reaction rekindles the hope for a better future for mankind”.38 This way the party disguises the true situation by clever manipulation. On the one hand it reinforces among party supporters the sense that it is a proletarian party. On the other hand it allays the fears of the Cypriot middle - class that it might alert the status quo. In the case of AKEL this suggests the party to cover the whole spectrum of left - wing ideology, justifying the use of the name AKEL Aristera - Nees Dynameis ( AKEL - Left - New Forces ) introduced since 1991. AKEL also benefited from significant sections of the electorate considering it the only reliable alternative to the right - wing government of Glafkos Clerides. In regard to the Cyprus problem, AKEL is still fighting for a Cyprus that will be independent, sovereign, federal, non - aligned and demilitarized, free from foreign troops, settlers and bases : for a Cyprus where all minorities, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians and Latins will live in peace and brotherhood to build the happy future of their common motherland. “In the struggle to liberate Cyprus, the main enemy of the people of Cyprus is the Turkish occupation and the forces of imperialism which support it, as well as their local stooges and supporters. Against the above, a ceaseless and uncompromising struggle is being waged. The moving force behind this struggle are the workers, office workers, peasants, professionals and artisans, men of letters, the national bourgeois class – all those who have not connected their interests with the interests of the enemies of Cyprus. They are Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians and Latins. To achieve our anti - imperialist, liberation, anti - occupation aims of the struggle it is necessary to forge together all the moving forces into one common front. The basis of such a front will be the alliance between the urban and rural working class and workers generally. AKEL is consistently in the forefront of the struggle for the creation of this common front.”39

Moreover, AKEL considers that the rapprochement of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is an integral part of this common front and consistently struggles for its achievement and development. In this light, the meeting of AKEL,

38 Ibid. 39 The Constitution of AKEL.

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which the Socialist United Party of Turkey and the Communist Party of Greece on 16 and 17 September 1995 is to be evaluated as a milestone. The three parties committed themselves to striving for a resolution of the Cyprus conflict in accordance with international and UN resolutions.40 In this logic, a meeting of several communist parties took place in London on 13 February 1999 in order to sign a “joint declaration” on the continuing abeyance of the Cyprus problem and the escalation of deadlocks, seeking for “a viable and feasible solution [...] based on political equality and economic and social parity of the two communities”. The parties that met in London were AKEL - Progressive Party of Working People, CTP - Republican Turkish Party, YBH - Patriotic Unity Movement, KKE - Communist Party of Greece, Synaspismos- Coalition of the Forces of the Left and Progress of Greece and ODP Freedom and Solidarity Party of Turkey. The parties denounced any action that could lead to an escalation of the aggravated situation and to a possible military conflict. They supported a solution which adequately guarantees the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of a bi - communal, bi - zonal Federal Republic of Cyprus against enosis, partition or secession in any form. This declaration was at this time directed against the political strategy of leader of the Turkish Cypriot Community Rauf Denktash.41 A similar meeting took place in Paris in January 2003, after the negotiations about the reunification of the divided island had again reached a deadlock. Left parties from Turkey, Greece and both sides of Cyprus agreed on the basis of an AKEL - paper upon some measures to promote rapprochement and to restore confidence between the two communities. All of the parties underlined “the urgent need to find a peaceful, just, democratic and viable solution [...] They support a solution that will be based on the consolidation of the security feeling in both communities and the safeguarding of the human rights and freedoms of all citizens without any discrimination on the basis of national origin. The solution will be based on International Law; they call on all concerned and responsible sides to comply with the above mentioned agreed federal framework paving the way for substantive and meaningful dialogue”.42 Of great significance for judgeing on the Cypriot Communists is the evaluation made by the party in 1990 about the class structure of Cypriot society, which still remains the main ideological approach of AKEL. By a fallacious evaluation of the existing capitalistic economic balances the working class is considered to be the largest class in Cyprus in order to legitimate the great electoral support of the party. According to the Communists, the working class includes wage and salary earners who do not own the means of production and provide their labour force to earn a living. It also includes wage and salary earners who, on 40 Official common communique of the parties ( Istanbul, 17 September 1995). 41 Joint Declaration of the Parties that met in London 13 February 1999. 42 New European Left Forum – XXIII Meeting 10–12. 1. 2003 PARIS : Declaration on Cyprus.

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the basis of their income, position and role in production, belong to the middle class or the bourgeois class. The evaluation of the other classes of the Cypriot society is also one dimensional. The bourgeois class is, according the Communists’s analysis, not a homogenous class. It is divided into the lower, the middle and the monopolistic bourgeois class. The majority of capitalist enterprises range from small to average. The big businesses, however, enjoy the biggest share in the distribution of profits. The middle class consists of self employed tradesmen of all kinds and wage or salary earners who play an important role in production and receive higher wages. They do not form a homogenous class; many belong to the class while some belong to the bourgeois class. Although the intellectuals have been traditionally a pillar of communist movements worldwide, the AKEL pays little attention them. In the estimation of the Cypriot Communists about the intellectuals all one can find is that they constitute a social strata and belong to all classes; the working class, the bourgeois and the middle class and that there is a tendency for salaried intellectual work with a parallel passing of the intelligentsia into the working class.43

IV.

The electoral influence of AKEL over time

The decisive factor determining the influence of AKEL is the relationship it has established with the working class since the formation of the Communist Party of Cyprus. The bigger the number of workers, the higher the influence of AKEL. In this respect, the phenomenon of the “red ring” surrounding the town centre is met in Cyprus; the party’s influence increases with distance from city centres. Port towns Ammochostos, Larnaka and Lemesos are traditional left - wing centres, the latter being also a place of increased industrial activity. Important rural communities in the vicinity of towns, especially those without important agricultural resources are left - wing. They are met on an axis between Lefkosia and Larnaka. Labour is not AKEL’s only source of support. Opinion polls show that its influence extends to all social classes, even the upper class. For many decades the party has assisted its supporters to realize their ambitions for social mobility through education in Soviet and other Eastern bloc universities. Thousands of Cypriots were given scholarships under various schemes and have not forgotten that the party’s help was a decisive factor in improving their social status. Refugee support for AKEL is strong. In May 2001 AKEL received about 39 percent of the refugee vote, four points more than the party’s average among the electorate as a whole.

43 I antilipsi mas gia to Sosialismo, pp. 10–11.

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This is due to historical factors. A significant number of refugees came from the coastal town of Famagusta and others from villages in the vicinity of Nicosia and Famagusta, where left - wing influence was very important before 1974. Finally, AKEL’s historical role is the reason why its share of the vote is higher among elderly people, those who grew up with the party, while its more recent history and slow change with regard to political discourse and politics also made it possible to attract young people, although in a slightly smaller proportion than the party’s average. The conservative tradition of agricultural areas remains a rule also in Cyprus. The only exceptions are communities surrounding mines; mining activity started at about 1900, and important labour concentration offered the opportunity for the development of the leftist ideology. The displacement of refugees44 to former Turkish Cypriot inhabited villages has somehow changed the landscape. Party influence up to the 1996 elections shows an increase for the socialist party, EDEK and AKEL, in rural areas as a result of important losses of the centre - right Democratic Party45 DIKO. In the case of EDEK, there is a strong decline of influence in towns and especially in Nicosia which formed the core of its force. AKEL’s influence has benefited from the decline in DIKO’s and EDEK’s share and from the fact that in 1993 the right - wing Democratic Rally Party ( the Conservative Party of Cyprus ) DISY elected in 1993 Glafcos Clerides as President; it played the a role of a force to counterbalance a right - wing government. In February 1988 a businessman, Georges Vassiliou, supported by AKEL, was elected third President of the Republic; he defeated Glafcos Clerides in the second round, with 51.6 % against 48.4 %. A new electoral system, proportional representation with the threshold set to the percentage needed for one seat (1/56 or 1.8 %) was adopted in June 1995. With the hope that the new system would make it easier to elect, two new parties were formed; the New Horizons and the Green Party of Cyprus ( Environmentalists Movement ), along with the Free Democrats Movement which was formed in 1994 by former president Georges Vassiliou, are the new forces to contest seats in the Parliament. In the May 1996 elections the only party to increase its appeal was AKEL, with 33 % and 19 seats. The Democratic Party and socialist EDEK suffered important losses and they were down to 16.4 % and 8.1 %, while losses for the Democratic Rally which had common lists with the Liberals, were limited to about 1.5 points, down to 34.4 %. Two coalitions were formed in view of the mayoral elections in December 1996, the Democratic Rally again joined forces with the Democratic Party, and AKEL cooperated with EDEK. The latter managed to elect the majority of its candidates.

44 Among the refugees the vote for AKEL is high. 45 This party originally appeared as the Democratic Front.

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The central stage in the presidential elections of February 1998 was occupied by the Democratic Party and its leader, Spyros Kyprianou. By an unprecedented move, 45 days before the election, Kyprianou withdrew DIKO ministers who had shared power for about five years in the Clerides government and announced support for AKEL’s candidate, Georges Iakovou. Georges Iakovou had a slight advantage in the first round over Clerides (40.6 % to 40.06 %). Clerides was the final winner and re - elected president with 51.8 %, in a fierce second round battle. Eight parties contested the May 2001 parliamentary elections : the Democratic Rally, AKEL, the Democratic Party, the Social Democrats Movement (KISOS ), which succeeded EDEK, the United Democrats, which succeeded the Free Democrats Movement that merged with ADISOK, the New Horizons, the Environmentalists Movement and the newly formed Fighting Democratic Movement ( ADIK ), founded by former minister and DIKO vice chairman Dinos Michaelides. AKEL increased its share to 34.7 % and became the largest political force, while all other parties lost ground, with Democratic Rally down to 34 %, the Democratic Party to 15.8 % and KISOS to 6.5 %. For the first time eight parties are represented in parliament.46 On 21 Mai 2006 parliamentary elections took place in Cyprus. It was the first electoral range after the rejection of the Annan Plan two years ago and everybody expected the voters to approve or disapprove the attitude of each party to the plebiscite. However, it is known that familiar ties in the Cypriot society play an important part and restrain the voters from changing their voting behaviour. The electoral results can be evaluated as a victory of the president of the Cyprus Republic, Tasos Papadopoulos, whose party increased its electoral share by 25 % (from 14.8 % to 17.92 %). The AKEL Left- Wing and new forces lost over 3 % of their electoral share and came down to 31.13 per cent. Table 3 : Electoral Results 2006 Parliamentary Elections 2006 Party AKEL DIKO DISY EDEK European Party Ecological Environmental Movement

46 Christoforou, Electoral report, pp. 102–105.

Share 31.1 % 17.9 % 30.3 % 8.9 % 5.8 % 2.0 %

Seats 18 11 18 5 3 1

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The communists together with the Democratic Rally, which also lost 3 per cent of its electoral share and came to 30.34 per cent, were the great loosers of the elections. Among the winners belong the Socialist Democrats (former KISOS) with 8.91% and the new European Party 5.75% which is the outcome of the fusion of three small parties. Despite the loss of three per cent of its vote, the AKEL remains the leading party of the island and therefore claimed the victory and the role of key player in the political arena. By surveying the electoral evolution of AKEL we can argue that AKEL’s success is a product of its historical ability to represent and integrate this particular segment of society within its organizational structure, as well as its wider appeal which is not limited to the working class. However, the existence of a large working class and the absence of a powerful and influential socialist party as well as the late emergence and ineffective campaigns of the new left can also be mentioned as factors that explain the AKEL’ s continuous success since the 1970s.

V.

The Concept of Foreign Political Relations of AKEL

In 1994, when Andros Kyprianou filled the post of the “head of the international relations of AKEL”, the party decided to pursue two goals at the same time, i.e. the political and geographical enlargement of party influence. Up to that time the party had maintained relations only with communist parties. The new qualitative change was based on the relationship to the ideological principles of other political camps. In this regard, three categories of parties are under discussion : the social - democratic, the alternative ( the Greens ) and, naturally, the Marxist. Co - operation with right - wing parties, such as the main rival of AKEL in Cyprus, the conservative party DISY, is still strictly rejected. The geographical extension covers Western and Eastern Europe, the Arab countries except Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, as well as the labour party of Israel. Like before AKEL maintains close relations with the communist party of Greece, KKE, as well as the left - wing ecological party of Greece, Synaspismos. Andros Kyprianou is the political climber within the party and perhaps the future successor of Christofias. Born in Nicosia on 26 October 1955, he managed to occupy at very short time the position of the Professional Executive in the Central Committee of AKEL. At the beginning of his political career he was the Head of the Sports Department, of the Local Authorities Department and of the Environment Department of the Central Committee of AKEL. He studied Civil Engineering [ Higher Technical Institute ( A.T. I.)]. He also attended a series of classes in Pedagogics ( organised by the Higher Technical Institute ) and further training in wood technology ( Rimini Training School, Italy ). He was a member of the delegation of the House to the E.U. - Cyprus Joint Parliamentary Committee and chairman of the House Standing Committee on Labour and Social Insurance. Today he is Secretary for International Relations of the Central Committee of AKEL, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party

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and Party Spokesman. He is also a member of the House Standing Committee on Selection, chairman of the House Standing Committee on Domestic Affairs and a member of the House Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Development Plans and Public Expenditure Control. At the parliamentary elections of 27 May 2001 he was elected Member of the House of Representatives standing as an AKEL – Left New Forces candidate in the Nicosia constituency.

IV. Eastern Europe

Communist and Post - Communist Parties in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia Miroslav Mareš Communism and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia ( Komunistická strana Československa – KSČ ) had a strong influence on the history of Czechoslovakia. The basically non - reformed communist parties – the “Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia” ( Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy – KSČM ) and the “Communist Party of Slovakia” ( Komunistická strana Slovenska – KSS ) currently exist within the party systems of both successor states. However, the internal development of the KSS and the KSČM and the different position of these parties ( in comparison with the post - communist and / or social democratic parties in the party system ) show many differences between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Research of this subject is an interesting and important part of modern history, the theory of transition, the theory of parties and party systems and the theory of extremism.

I.

State of the Art

Communist and post - communist parties are among the most frequent objects of research in both Czech and Slovak politics in all the above mentioned theories. The most comprehensive case study on communism ( in the Czech language) in Czechia was published in 1999 by a team of authors headed by Petr Fiala ( Jan Holzer, Miroslav Mareš, Pavel Pšeja ) from the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Masaryk University in Brno.1 Many historical or political publications deal with different periods of the development of the KSČ and the Czechoslovakian communist regime until 1989. The most important work is the edition on Bolshevism and radical socialism in Czechoslovakia.2 Those five volumes are the result of the research project “History of the KSČ and the radical socialism in Czechoslovakia 1918–1989”. Under the direction of Zdeněk Kárník, the research team of this project worked from 2001 to 2005. Historical aspects of the KSC and the communist regime 1 2

Fiala / Holzer / Mareš / Pšeja, Komunismus v České republice. Kárník / Kopeček ( Eds.), Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus, Svazek I–V.

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were also analyzed by many others, historians and political scientists ( Rupnik,3 Rataj4 etc.).5 The chapters about particular periods of the development of the KSČ are included in the general work about Czech parties edited by Jiří Malíř and Pavel Marek.6 Several books and articles analyze the transition from Communism to Democracy in Eastern Central Europe in general or in Czechoslovakia in particular, and within this process also the role of the communist party.7 This is also the case with some texts about the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.8 The history of Czechoslovakian communism is an integral part of various books on modern Czech history.9 The case studies of the KSČM after 1989 were written by political scientists like Vladimír Handl,10 Seán Hanley,11 Michal Kubát, Kai Olaf Lang,12 Maxmilián Strmiska,13 Michel Perottino14 and others. Some other texts analyze special aspects of the existence of the KSČM15 or other Czech communist and post - communist organizations after 1989.16 The KSČM and its position within the sys3 4 5

6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15

16

Rupnik, Histoire du Parti communiste tchéchoslovaque. Rataj, KSČ a Československo 1945–1960. Object of research is the role of communists in the first Czechoslovak Republic, in the period of Nazi - occupation, the Slovakian state or in the period of the Cold War. Many researchers analyzed the reform process inside the KSČ in 1968 in the form of a case study. This issue is also comprehended in general works about reform communism. For the description of the KSČ in the first Czechoslovak Republic, cf. Marek, Komunistická strana Československa. In : Malíř / Marek ( Eds.), Politické strany, vol. 1, pp. 711–746. For the description of the KSČ in the third Czechoslovak Republic, cf. Pernes, Komunistická strana Československa. In : Malíř / Marek ( Eds.), Politické strany, vol. 2, pp. 1131–1142. The description of the KSČ in the communist era, cf. Balík / Holzer / Šedo, Komunistická strana Československa. In : Malíř / Marek ( Eds.), Politické strany, vol. 2, pp. 1243–1270. The description of the KSČM and other communist organizations after 1989, cf. Fiala / Mareš / Pšeja, Komunisté a jejich strany. In : Malíř / Marek (Eds.), Politické strany, vol. 2, pp. 1413–1432. A. o. Suk, Labyrintem revoluce. Rychlík, Rozpad Československa. Among others : Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown; or Tomeš, Slovník k politickým dějinám Československa 1918–1992. Handl, Die Tschechische Kommunistische Partei. Hanley, Towards Breakthrough or Breakdown? In : Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 17 (2001) 3, pp. 96–116. Lang, Die Kommunistische Partei Böhmens und Mährens auf dem Weg zur Macht ? In: Politische Studien, 51 (2000) 370, pp. 90–108. Strmiska, The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. In : German Policy Studies / Politikfeldanalyse, 2 (2002) 2, pp. 220–240. A. o. Perottino, Un visage pratique du néocommunisme tchèque. In : Revue d’Etudes Comparatives Est - Ouest, 31 (2000) 3, pp. 42–68; and Perottino, Position and role of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. In : Cabada ( Ed.), Contemporary Questions of Central European Politics, pp. 176–197. A. o. Balík, Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. In : Kopeček ( Ed.), Trajectories of the Left, pp. 140–149. An analysis of the electoral support of the KSČM is included in the study Kunštát, Veřejná podpora KSČM po roce 1989. In : Naše společnost, 1 (2004) 1, pp. 20–25. On the post- communist organizations in the Czech Republic, cf. Mareš, Pokusy o reformu komunistické strany a postkomunistické subjekty v České republice. In : Hlou-

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tem are described in various publications on the Czech political17 or party system ( or special aspects of the same ).18 There are no complex and comprehensive publications on communism in Slovakia only. Aside from the above mentioned books on the history of the KSČ, the development of the KSS before 1989 is analyzed in several historical texts. The most comprehensive analysis of communist and far left parties within the Slovak party system after the fall of communism can be found in the book “Political parties in Slovakia”, written by the Czech political scientist Lubomír Kopeček.19 Radim Gonda’s doctoral thesis “Political left in Slovakia”20 presents a good insight into the Slovakian left from 1989 to the present. There are case - studies about the Communist party of Slovakia,21 the Party of Democratic Left,22 and the party SMER,23 or about the Slovakian left in general.24 Information and analyses of Slovak communism and post - communism after 1989 can be found in general works about Slovak elections or party system since 1989,25 including analyses of special aspects of these topics.26 So far, there exists only one comparative study on the KSČ and KSS and excommunist parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,27 but several authors have written comparative studies on post - communist parties and party systems

17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27

šek / Kopeček ( Eds.), Rudí a růžoví, pp. 83–99. On the various satellite organizations of the KSČM cf. Mazel, Oponenti systému. In : Fiala ( Ed.), Politický extremismus a radikalismus v České republice, pp. 117–277. Czech Trotskyite and anarcho - communist organizations after 1989, cf. Bastl, Radikální levice v České republice. On violent tendencies and small militant groups and individuals within the Marxist - Leninist and Trotskyite, cf. Mareš, Terorismus v České republice. Cabada / Vodička, Politický systém České republiky. A. o. Vlachová, Party identification in the Czech Republic. In : Communist and Postcommunist Studies, 34 (2001) 3, pp. 479–499. Kopeček, Politické strany na Slovensku 1989–2006. Gonda, Politická levice na Slovensku. Haughton / Rybar, The Communist Party of Slovakia. In : Sociologia, 36 (2004) 6, pp. 545–559; Kopeček, Radikální levice ve slovenské politice. In : Politologický časopis, 7 (2000) 4, p. 447. A. o. Kopeček, Slovenská Strana demokratické levice. In : Politologický časopis, 8 (2001) 2, pp. 195–220 or Kopeček, Strana demokratické levice 1989–2002. In : Hloušek / Kopeček ( Eds.), Rudí a růžoví, pp. 100–137. Krištofík, Ideové a programové vymedzenie strany SMER. In : Středoevropské politické studie, 3 (2001) 3, http ://www.cepsr.cz / clanek.php ?ID=80; Marušiak, SMER – From Pragmatism to Social Deocracy ? In : Kopeček ( Ed.), Trajectories of the Left, pp. 165–177. Muránsky, Die Marginalisierung der Linken. In : Politikinformation Osteuropa, (2004) 4, pp. 1–12. A. o. Haughton, “We’ll Finish What We’ve Started”. In : Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19 (2003) 4, pp. 65–90. A. o. the financing of the Slovak parties, cf. Belko, Financovanie politických strán na Slovensku. In : Středoevropské politické studie, 7 (2005) 2–3, http ://www.cepsr.cz / clanek.php ?ID=241. Gryzmała - Busse, Reform Efforts in the Czech and Slovak Communist Parties. In : East European Politics and Societies, 12 (1998) 3, pp. 442–471.

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in post - communist Europe.28 The most representative comparative study on Central European communist and post - communist parties was written by Anna Grzymała - Busse.29 Czech and Slovak communist and post - communist parties are also often included into the general research on the contemporary European left30 or the global European party landscape. In general, the state of research of Czech and Slovak communism is relatively developed, with Czech communism prevailing after 1989. Various historical analyses, electoral studies, and texts are available, written from the point of view of the theory of extremism etc. However, generally there is no acclaimed analysis answering the questions : “Why is communism aligned to the party so strong in the Czech Republic ?” and “Why is the development of the system position of Slovak post - communist and communist parties so specific ( in comparison with other Eastern central European countries ) ?” Characteristics of the KSČM from the point of view of the theory of extremism are difficult to classify. From the point of view of typology of party families the classification of the Slovak party SMER - SD is difficult.

II.

A Short History of Czechoslovak Communism before 1989

The Communist party of Czechoslovakia was established in 1921 as a result of internal clashes inside Czechoslovakian Social Democracy between democratic socialists and Bolsheviks. The Communist Party of Slovakia ( KSS ) was established in 1939 ( in agreement with the exile party leadership of the KSČ in Moscow ). On September 29, 1948, the KSS was united with the KSČ. But the KSS remained the regional unit of the KSČ in Slovakia. The historical legacy and milestones of the development of the KSČ and the KSS could be characterized like this : In the first Czechoslovak Republic the KSČ had a relatively strong electorate, mostly among workers and the left - wing intelligentsia. It gained electoral results of about 10 %. Although the party was rather critical of the internal structure of Czechoslovakia, it was the only multinational relevant party in pre - war Czechoslovakia. Other ideologic parties existed only within nationally tendencies.31 In 1929 the Stalinist faction assumed control of the party. The KSČ was always under strong influence from Moscow. The sym28 A. o. Ishiyama ( Ed.), Communist Successor Parties in Post - Communist Politics; Hough/ Handl, The post - communist left and the European Union. In : Communist and Postcommunist Studies, 37 (2004), pp. 319–339, Büyükakinci, The Neo - communist Parties and Power in Central and Eastern Europe. In : East European Quarterly, 29 (2005) 3, pp. 367–403. 29 Gryzmała - Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past. 30 A. o. March / Mudde, What’s Left of the Radical Left? In : Comparative European Politics, (2005) 3, pp. 23–49. 31 Jašurek, Self - Determination and the Communism in Czechoslovakia 1921–1936. In : Středoevropské politické studie, 7 (2005) 2–3, http ://www.cepsr.cz / clanek.php?ID= 245.

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bol of the hard line of the KSČ was its secretary general, Klement Gottwald (1946–1948 Prime Minister, 1948–1953 President of Czechoslovakia). In the 1920s and in the first half of the 1930s, as a section of the Communist International, the KSČ harshly opposed the democratic regime. In the second half of the 1930s the party supported the “peoples’ front” against fascism and cooperated with democratic forces. After the Munich Treaty and the establishment of the authoritarian “Second” Czecho - Slovak Republic the KSČ was dissolved by the state on December 27, 1938, and went underground. From 1939–1945 on the pre - war party leadership worked in their Moscow exile. Scores of communists in the “Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia” and in the Slovak state supported antifascist resistance, especially after the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Because of their fight and their close relationship with the victorious Soviet Union the KSČ and the KSS became very popular and influential, mainly in Czechia. Both parties were officially incorporated in the structures of post - war Czechoslovakia. The KSČ and the KSS belonged to the eight parties permitted in the so called “Third Czechoslovak Republic” in 1945–1948. The formal independence of the KSS was a tactical step to eliminate the influence of rival democratic parties. On the other hand, a certain part of Slovak communists always tried to defend an autonomous position within the KSČ. The KSČ won the 1946 parliamentary election in the Czech region with 40.17 % of the vote. The KSS ranked second in Slovakia with 30.37 %. Thus, in Czechoslovakia communists totaled 38.12 %. After a government crisis in February 1948 the communists seized power. The KSČ began to apply the Soviet model of dictatorship. During the 1950s the communist power orchestrated numerous political trials. Various labor camps were modeled on their Soviet ideal, i.e. the Gulag. The best known Czech camp was in Jáchymov – to this day a symbol of the communist totalitarian regime. In 1960 the new Czechoslovak constitution fixed the leading role of the KSČ in society, state and economy. The end of the 1950s and mostly the 60s brought about a certain liberalization of society, supported by a large part of the party elite, too. But the “Prague Spring” with its attempt at “socialism with a human face” ended in August 21, 1968, with the invasion of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian armed forces into Czechoslovakia not to forget German ( GDR ) forces which, given the German - Czechoslovakian history, was particularly tough. The figurehead of the “Prague Spring” was the reform - oriented KSČ secretary general of 1968/1969, Alexander Dubček, a Slovak. This Soviet aggression severely undermined the traditional pro - Russian attitude of Czechs and Slovaks. The Soviet occupation forces did not leave Czechoslovakia until 1991. In October 1968 the federalization law was passed, and this was an important step of the reform processes especially for the Slovaks. After the invasion internal party cleansings started inside the KSČ. Reform communists were expelled from the party. Many of them emigrated and continued their political activity in exile. In Slovakia the process of “purification” of the party was not

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as drastic as in Czechia. The figurehead of normalization was the Slovak Gustav Husák, secretary general of the KSČ from 1968–1987 and Czechoslovak President from 1975–1989. In the 1970s and 80s an authoritarian, so called “normalization regime”, controlled Czechoslovakia, neither supported by the people nor strongly opposed. The opposition was active in small circles of intellectuals and not as strong as the workers’ movement in Poland. In 1968 reform communists played an important role in the opposition. There were also small Trotskyite and Maoist groups and individuals within opposition structures.32 At the end of the 1980s this situation resulted in a lack of reform forces inside the party leadership to support Gorbachev’s “Perestroika”. Most rank and file KSČ members had joined the party for career reasons. An attempt at “Perestroika” by the KSČ in 1987 was just a formal affair and concentrated on small economic reforms. Quite often the ideology of perestroika was rather similar to the ideas of the Prague Spring. Therefore, the Czech post - 1968 nomenclature found it unacceptable. The new party secretary general Milouš Jakeš, who had replaced Gustáv Husák in 1987, was a representative of the 1968 anti - reform forces and of the support of the Soviet invasion. In 1988/89 the symbol of economic reform was the new federal Prime Minister, Ladislav Adamec. At the end of the 1980s true reform communists mostly belonged to the dissident scene or lived in exile. In 1987 a number of 1968 reform communists established their dissident organization, and in February 1989 they published their first public statement under the name “Revival – Club for Socialist Renovation” ( Obroda – Klub za socialistickou přestavbu ). Obroda was active in both federal republics, but most members were Czechs. Obroda was open to dialogue with the communist power, but KSČ leaders regarded Obroda an unacceptable organization being more dangerous than Charta 77, the centrist and right - wing opposition. On the other hand, all through 1989 limited contacts between the KSČ and Obroda existed.33 In summer 1989 small reform forces inside the KSČ began to surface, mainly in Prague at the informal Society of Bohumír Šmeral,34 and in Bratislava at the Institute of Marxism - Leninism. ProPerestroika KSČ rank and file members were probably more numerous in Slovakia than in Czechia. Evidently, various structures inside the secret police “State Security” ( StB ) were struggling for limited reform – mostly concerning economy, but with some political changes, too. But the leadership and a greater part of KSČ members kept up their dogmatic positions in 1989. They missed the chance to connect to the ideas of the Prague Spring still popular with the public. Public acceptance of the communist regime was low. While other Eastern Central European countries initiated and pursued fundamental reform process32 The most important ultra - leftist organization was the Movement of Revolutionary Youth ( Hnutí revoluční mládeže – HRM ) which existed from 1968–1969. It had about 20 members. Later in the 1970s and 80s some of them maintained ultra - leftist positions, others turned to democratic tendencies of dissent. 33 Kokošková / Kokoška, Obroda. Klub za socialistickou přestavbu, p. 15. 34 Bohumír Šmeral was an important pre - war Czech communist.

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es, the KSČ was unable to reform its policy. Thus, it lost the support of the reform oriented leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, too. III.

The Development of the KSČM and KSS after 1989

In Czechoslovakia the so called “Velvet Revolution”, leading to the change of the regime, started after the brutal suppression of a students’ demonstration on November 17, 1989. The KSČ was put on the defensive, and the “Civic Forum” ( OF ) became the most influential formation. It was an assembly of various political forces – including ultra - left groups which were outnumbered, though. The leading role of the KSČ was deleted from the constitution. But the KSČ was not prohibited, and – as a result of an agreement with OF – its representatives stayed in government until the first free elections in June 1990. At the end of 1989 the KSČ was still internally divided . The changes of leadership were not enough for the party to gain popularity. Many reform - oriented members left.35 Although the KSČ declared itself open to former members excluded after 1968, this appeal met only minimal response. The reform oriented members assembled in the “Democratic forum of Communists” ( Demokratické fórum komunistů – DFK ), whose influence was limited within the KSČ. On December 20–21, 1989, an extraordinary party convention decided to keep the name of the party. However, it changed the party program and the strategy toward pluralist democracy, apologized for some historical mistakes, and dissolved the KSČ paramilitary forces – People’s Militias ( Lidové milice – LM). But many orthodox members of the party did not accept these changes. They remained dogmatic Marxist - Leninists. On the other hand, a good part of the members wanted gradual change. They particularly favored a new “non- communist” name of the party. The reform efforts were stronger in Slovakia. In March 1990 the KSČM was founded in Czechia as the national branch of the KSČ. This ended the asymmetry of the existence of the KSS without a similar organization in the Czech Republic. In the first free elections the KSČ competed as a united party, but at the 18th convention in November 1990 it changed into a federal union of the parties KSČM and SDĽ. This union ended in 1992. The split was caused by disputes about reformism as well as a general crisis of the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks. However, also in Czechia there existed reform tendencies. From 1990–1993 Jiří Svoboda, a non - conformist with a reformer’s image and a famous movie director during the communist era at that, was party chairman. In the first half of the 90s reform of the KSČ were attempted in three waves – mostly concen35 On January 1, 1989, the KSČ had 1,701,085 party members, while on June 30, 1990, the KSČ had 756,120 members. Zpráva ÚV KSČ o činnosti od mimořádného sjezdu KSČ. In : Dokumenty 18. sjezdu Komunistické strany Československa, p. 31.

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trating on a change of the name. However, the majority remained fixed on dogmatic positions. In the internal referendum in 1991 ( whose outcome was announced on a special party convention on February 1, 1992), 75.94 % of party members voted for maintaining the name (291,783 out of then 354,545 party members voted ). In a survey in the context of an internal discussion in spring 1993, 52 district organizations of the KSČM voted for maintaining the name, 30 district organizations voted for change and 3 preferred a double name ( traditional name + new name).36 The neo - communist leadership confirmed its position at the 3rd party convention in June 1993. After this convention, the party leader, Miroslav Grebeníček, was a symbol of the non - reformed nature of the party. Grebeníček’s leadership stabilized the situation of the party. Since the 1996 parliamentary elections it had been clear that the KSČM was a hegemonic party of the far left in the Czech Republic and that it competed with the CSSD for left voters. The disciplined electorate of the communist party guaranteed its relevant position; however, its ideological profile limited the coalition potential, though. In spite of its dogmatism, the KSČM obtained important posts in Parliament after the 2002 elections. In the 2002–2006 electoral period the KSČM cooperated closely with the social democrats, supporting many laws in parliament. However, inside the KSČM personal as well ideologic disputes existed. In 2005 the chairman, Miroslav Grebeníček, was replaced by Vojtěch Filip. Filip had been vice - chairman of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the CR since 2002. This change was interpreted as a step towards “modernization” of the KSČM because Filip has a more modern and younger image than Grebeníček, but their attitudes towards politics are similar. Concerning the possible cooperation of communists and social democrats, Filip is more acceptable for the CSSD than Grebeníček. In February 2006 Grebeníček sharply criticized Filip’s loyal relations with the ČSSD. The results of the parliamentary elections in 2006 as well as the municipal elections in the same year are considered a failure for the KSČM because the party lost votes in absolute figures as well as in percent in comparison to 2002. The possible reasons are being discussed within the party. The dogmatists criticize cooperation with social democracy. They are convinced that this leads to the loss of a clear identity of the party. The reformists emphasize the negative dogmatic image of the party and try to start a significant reform of the party again. However, their position within the party is weak. Various reformist communist and democratic socialist groups split away from the party after the failure of their visions within the KSČ or the KSČM and they 36 Zpráva komise o vyhodnocení vnitrostranické diskuse. In : Dokumenty III. sjezdu KSČM, p. 19.

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tried to form democratic socialist parties. However, such parties stayed marginal parts of the party system, including the contemporarily existing Party of Democratic Socialism ( Strana demokratického socialismu – SDS ).37 Many of their members joined the Czech Social Democratic Party ( ČSSD ) later. The more dogmatic groupings existed partially inside the KSČM38 and its youth organization “Communist Youth Union” ( Komunistický svaz mládeže – KSM ),39 but also outside the main communist party.40 They are interconnected with the leftist nationalist and pan - Slavic spectrum.41 The small Trotskyite 37 After the unsuccessful activity of the DFK at the extraordinary convention in 1990, several members left the KSČ and founded the Czechoslovak Democratic Forum ( Československé demokratické fórum – ČSDF ). In 1991, inside the KSČM the platform Democratic Left was formed. It left the party and together with ČSDF merged into the new Democratic Party of Labor ( Demokratická strana práce – DSP ). After the 3rd convention two reform groups split away – the first group joined the Democratic Left ( a coalition partner of the KSČM from the election 1992) and changed it into the Party of Democratic Left ( Strana demokratické levice – SDL ).The second group founded a new party, the Left Bloc ( Levý blok – LB ). In 1997 the SDL and the LB merged into the Party of Democratic Socialism ( Strana demokratického socialismu – SDS ). 38 The dogmatic Marxist - Leninist Club of the KSČ ( Marxisticko - leninský klub KSČ ) was founded in 1990. Later the dogmatic members of the KSČ concentrated in “Dialog clubs” ( the name based on the communist monthly “Dialog” ). 39 On October 12, 2006, the Czech Ministry of Interior dissolved the civic association KSM because the KSM program insisted on the necessity of replacing private ownership of the means of production by collective ownership and that the KSM strove for a revolution. The KSM took the case to court and thus the dissolution has not come into power yet. An international solidarity campaign with the KSM started. 40 The association called Peoples’ Union for National and Social Salvation ( Lidová unie národní a sociální záchrany – LUNSZ ) was founded in 1994 under the leadership of Miroslav Štěpán ( before 1989, secretary of the KSČ in Prague and partially responsible for the brutal attacks on democratic demonstrations in 1988–1989 by the communist police. In 1990/91 he was in prison on account of this ). In 1995 Štěpán founded the Party of Czechoslovak Communists ( Strana československých komunistů – SČK ) which was renamed in 1999 to the “traditional name”, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia ( Komunistická strana Československa – KSČ ). In 1999 the Czechoslovak Party of Labor ( Československá strana práce – ČSSP ) split away from the KSČ. In 2001 a group of Štěpán’s opponents within the KSC, lead by Ludvík Zifčák, tried to win power in the party and again merged with the ČSSP. However, the Czech Ministry of the Interior refused to register the new leadership. Miroslav Štěpán has remained in office. Zifčák’s Komunistická strana Československa – Československá strana práce ( KSČ ČSSP ) has existed since 2001 as a non - registered organization. Its members are also active in non- registered satellite organizations such as the Communist Youth of Czechoslovakia ( Komunistická mládež Československa ) and the Communist movement of Czechoslovakia ( Komunstické hnutí Československa – KHČ ). However, all these dogmatic groups have only some tens of members, and these parties do not usually run for election ( in several senate elections the SCK or KSC were unsuccessful ). 41 With several hundred members, the Slavic Committee of the Czech Republic ( Slovanský výbor České republiky – SVČR ), the Club of the Czech Borderlands ( Klub českého pohraničí – KČP ) and the Patriotic Association of the Antifascist – Antifa ( Vlastenecké sdružení antifašistů – Antifa – VSA - Antifa ) are the most important organizations of this spectrum. See more in : Mareš, Panslawismus im ideologischen Hintergrund der radikalen und extremistischen Strömungen in der Tschechischen Republik. In : Backes / Jesse (Eds.), Gefährdungen der Freiheit, pp. 359–369.

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groups42 are currently not organized in a registered party; however they struggle for the creation of a “new revolutionary party”. Anarcho - communism has significant influence within the anarchist spectrum;43 however this spectrum is weak and split. Other variants of communism are not important in the Czech Republic.44 After November 1989 the reform forces inside the KSČ were more successful in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. Despite the fact that on December 17, 1989, an extraordinary convention of the KSS rejected the reform efforts of the DFK, the new and mostly young leadership of the party was elected. The new chairman, Peter Weiss45, and his supporters started to reform the party to introduce democratic socialism; however the dogmatic opposition within the party still existed. In June 1990 at the first elections of the Slovakian National Council, the KSS ( as a part of the KSČ ) won 13.3 % of the vote and ranked fourth. After the elections, the “Platform of Socialist Orientation” ( close to chairman Weiss ) continued its reforms; however the “dogmatic Platform of the Communist Renovation of the KSS” remained still strong.46 The transformation of the KSČ into the federation of the KSČM and the KSS caused the KSS to be registered as a single party on September 28, 1990. As a result of reformist efforts, the KSS was renamed “Communist Party of Slovakia – Party of Democratic Left” ( Komunistická strana Slovenska – Strana demokratickej ľavice – KSS - SDĽ ) in October 1990 and “Party of Democratic Left” ( Strana demokratickej ľavice – SDĽ ) on February 1, 1991. The general orientation of the party clearly changed towards the non - communist left. This reform process resulted in the split of the dogmatic Marxists - Leninists from the party ( see below). 42 In the Czech Republic the Trotskyite spectrum has but some tens of members and supporters. Three organizations existed, namely the “Socialist Organization of Workers” (Socialistická organizace pracujících – SOP ) as a part of the “League for the Fifth International” with the satellite youth organization “Revo” as a part of “World Revolution” ( in 2006, the “iRevo” as a part of “International Revolution” split from the “Revo” ), “Socialist Solidarity” ( Socialistická Solidarita – SocSol ) as a part of “International Socialists Tendency” and the “Socialist Alternative Future” ( Socialistická alternativa Budoucnost – SAB ) as a part of the “Committee for a Workers’ International”. 43 A small, explicitly oriented “Anarchocommunist Alternative” ( Anarchokomunistická alternativa – AKA ) exists; however anarchocommunist ideas are also strong within the “Federation of the Anarchist Group” ( Federace anarchistických skupin – FAS ) or within the “Czechoslovak Anarchist Federation” ( Československá anarchistická federace – ČSAF ) and within various local anarchist collectives. All these organizations have only several tens of members. 44 The small organization called “1155 : Collectively Against Capital” (1155 Kolektivně proti kapitálu – 1155 KPK ) is inspired by left - wing communism and Luxemburgism. There existed also small left - wing Christian groups with communist orientation – “Christian Dialog” ( Křesťanský dialog – KD ) and “Movement for an Equal society and the Fellow Feeling” ( Hnutí za spravedlivou společnost a lásku k bližnímu – HSSLB ). 45 Peter Weiss worked at the Institute of Marxism - Leninism in Bratislava before 1989. He supported “real” Perestroika. 46 Kopeček, Strana demokratické levice 1989–2002, pp. 104–105.

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Before the elections in 1992 the SDĽ started to co - operate with the “Social Democratic Party of Slovakia” ( Sociálně demokratická strana Slovenska – SDSS); however the plan for a common candidature in elections failed because the leader of the SDSS, Alexander Dubček, rejected such a coalition. The SDĽ was relatively successful at the 1992 elections. It got 14.7 % of the vote and 29 mandates. In 1992–1993 the SDĽ opposed the government of Vladimír Mečiar’s “Movement for a Democratic Slovakia” ( Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko – HZDS ). In March 1994 the SDĽ formed the temporary government ( it had 6 out of 18 ministers ), together with the “Christian Democratic Movement” (Křesťanskodemokratické hnutie – KDH ) and the right - centre oriented “Democratic Union” ( Demokratická unia – DU ). For the 1994 extraordinary elections the SDĽ created an alliance called “Common Vote” ( Spoločná voľba – SV ) with the SDSS, the “Movement of Slovakian Farmers” ( Hnutie slovenských zemedělcov – HZS ) and the Green Party in Slovakia ( Strana zelených na Slovensku – SZ ). However, with 10.4 % of the vote this alliance did not succeed. The SDĽ went into opposition against Mečiár’s government, consisting of the HZDS, the rightwing extremist “Slovak National Party” ( Slovenská národná strana – SNS), and the left - wing populist “Workers’ Association of Slovakia” ( Sdruženie robotníkov Slovenska – ZRS ).47 In 1996 the SDĽ changed its chairman – Robert Migaš followed Peter Weiss – and was admitted to the Socialist International. The SDĽ was more successful at the 1998 elections than in 1996, winning 14.7 % of the vote and 23 mandates. The party formed a coalition government with the “Slovak Democratic Coalition” ( Slovenská demokratická koalicia – SDK), the “Party of Citizens’ Understanding” ( Strana občanského porozumenia – SOP ), and the “Party of Hungarian Coalition” ( Strana maďarskej koalície – SMK ). The presence of the SDĽ in this mainly center right - wing government spoiled its image among leftist voters and caused internal clashes between modernists and radical socialists. Many members of various orientations left the SDĽ.48 This development resulted in an electoral defeat in 2002, when the SDĽ won only 1.36 % of the vote. In 1999 the rise of a new left party in Slovakia began. In this year former vicechairman Robert Fico left the SDĽ and founded the new left party SMER 47 The ZRS was established in 1991 as a civic association ( at first very close to SDĽ ) and transformed into a political party in 1994. The chairman of the ZRS, Josef Ľupták, had been a member of KSČ / KSS in 1965–1969 and 1988–1991. Kopeček, Radikální levice ve slovenské politice, p. 447. The ZRS is the most successful representative of the spectrum of the far left - wing workers’ parties in Slovakia. See more : Gonda, Politická levice na Slovensku, pp. 153–168, pp. 191–200, pp. 361–370. The strong anti - establishment social populism is typical of these parties. Within the ZRS, weak Trotskyite influence also existed. See more : Pečínka, Pod rudou vlajkou proti KSČ. 48 The so called “modernists” founded the split party “Social Democratic Alternative” (Sociálno demokratická alternatíva – SDA ) in 2002. The name of the new party is the verification of the orientation of its founders within the SDĽ.

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(Direction ). In the beginning this party had no ideologic profile but later on adopted a social democratic orientation and won over a part of SDĽ members and voters. However, SMER is a new rather than an ex - communist party. In the 2002 elections SMER received 13.34 % of the vote and 25 mandates. After this success and the electoral failure of the SDĽ SMER merged with SDĽ, SDA and SDSS on January 1, 2005 and it was renamed “SMER – Social Democracy” ( SMER – Sociálna demokracia ).49 The party became increasingly popular between 2002 and 2006 when opposing Dzurinda’s government. But small groups of former SDĽ members did not join the SMER - SD. Instead, they founded a “new” SDĽ in March 2005, whose importance has remained marginal, though. SMER won the parliamentary elections of 2006 (29.1 % of the vote, 50 mandates ) and formed a coalition with the extreme right - wing “Slovak National Party” ( leader Ján Slota ) and the populist “Movement for Democratic Slovakia” ( leader Vladimír Mečiar ). Robert Fico became Prime minister of Slovakia. This controversial government coalition ( due to the presence of nationalists ) led to the decision of the “Party of European Socialists” to suspend the provisional membership of SMER in this European party. Despite internal contradictions, the coalition still exists. In Slovakia there also exists the dogmatic “Communist Party of Slovakia” (Komunistická strana Slovenska – KSS ). As a result of the social democratization of the SDĽ, two Marxists - Leninists groups – “Communist party of Slovakia 91” and “Union of Slovak Communists” – split off from the SDĽ in 1991. At the 1992 elections they competed in an electoral pact, and on August 29, 1992, they fused into the “Communist Party of Slovakia”. The KSS remained marginal in the 1990s; however at the 2002 elections it won 11 seats and 6.32 % of the vote. Internal conflicts about positions in the KSS leadership resulted in the establishing of the new party “Daybreak” ( Úsvit ) in May 2005. But support for this party is very limited and restricted to Eastern Slovakia.50 Unclear attitudes and internal clashes determined the KSS failure at the 2006 parliamentary elections. It got only 3.88 % of the vote and lost its parliamentary representation. The small Trotskyite organizations in Slovakia – “Revolutionary Socialist Movement” ( Revolučné socialistické hnutie – RSH ), “Union of Revolutionary Socialists” ( Zväz revolučných socialistov – ZRS ) and its associated organization “Revo” – were not relevant parts of the political system.51 This holds true for several marginal anarchist organizations partially inspired by anarcho - communism, too.52 49 The SDĽ ended its existence on 31st of December, 2004. 50 At the 2006 parliamentary elections, members of the “Úsvit” were candidates on the list of the left - wing populist ZRS (0.29 % of votes ). 51 Gonda, Politická levice na Slovensku, pp. 568–569. 52 Such as “Direct Action” ( Priama Akcia – PA ), “Antifascist Action Slovakia” ( Antifašistická Akcia Slovensko – AFA ), “Czechoslovak Anarchist Federation” ( Československá anarchistická federácia – CSAF ), “Collective Info - @ - police” ( Kolektív Info - @ - police ), etc.

Communist and Post-Communist Parties

IV.

297

Program and ideology

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia defines itself as a party of communist orientation; its ideology is based on Marxism, and several documents declare Leninist inspiration, too. It strives for Socialism as a “society of free and equal citizens, a politically and economicly, pluralist society which is based on maximal self - government of citizens”.53 Social populism is typical of the party politics, as well as the strong role of the state in social and economic matters.54 The KSČM rejected the CR joining the EU; however contemporarily the EU is accepted “critically”. The Czech communists support the dissolution of NATO. The latest main issue of the KSČM is the fight against the US radar base ( part of the system of the anti - missile defense ) on Czech territory. The dominant ideological profile of the KSČM could be characterized as neocommunist. Its main attributes are : a positive evaluation of the communist past before 1989, medium - term acceptance of the contemporary political order in Europe; however the goal of a society based on Marxist - Leninist ideology as the valid long - term prospect ( the “revolutionary” transition to a socialist / communist regime is defined only generally and vaguely ). The KSČM is a member of the “New European Left Forum”; however the party has only an observer status at the Party of European Left. The Czech communists rejected full membership because according to them the EL is too closely connected to the “capitalist” EU; EL members are parties of EU member states exclusively, and not from other post - Soviet states; furthermore in its statutes the EL rejects Stalinism.55 There are more reformed communist parties apart from the KSČM ( e.g. the French Communist Party, the Italian Party of the Communist Renovation ); however more dogmatic parties can also be identified in Europe ( e.g. the Communist Party of Greece ). The Czech Party of Democratic Socialism characterizes itself as a radical leftwing party with a democratic socialist orientation. It supported Czech membership of the EU and accepted – though often with a grain of salt – European integration. The SDS accepted the integration of the CR into the political structures of NATO; however, the party opposed NATO actions in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. The SDS is a full member of the Party of the European Left. The “Communist Party of Czechoslovakia” and the “Communist Party of Czecho-

53 Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy : Stanovy, 2004. 54 The eight priorities of the KSČM in the 2006 electoral manifesto were : health care, accessible habitation, support of young people, dignified old - age, education and culture, security of citizens, information. Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy : Priority volebního programu KSČM pro volby do Poslanecké sněmovny PČR. Haló noviny, February 13, 2006, p. 4. 55 However, the KSČM officially argues that the term “Stalinism” is unclear and that the crimes of the other communist regimes ( Maoism, Pol - Potism ) could also be condemned. See more : Mareš, Reformists versus Dogmatics. Paper presented at the international conference “The European Left at the Beginning of the 21st Centrury”, p. 5.

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slovakia – Party of the Labour” are strongly dogmatic and active in various circles of Marxist - Leninist groupings. They rejected the existence of the current EU as well as of NATO. The Slovak Party of Democratic Left supported in its program some reform steps of economic transition; however the party was oriented towards social issues. The party gave up on its communist orientation in 1991. But despite its integration into international socialist / social democratic structures, its “social democratization” was only partially realized. Lubomír Kopeček, a Czech political scientist, characterized the SDĽ in its final phase of existence as a post - communist “radical socialist” party.56 It supported Slovakia joining the EU as well as NATO ( however, some members declared their reluctance against NATO ). The party SMER changed its programmatic and ideologic identity. According to the Slovak political scientist Juraj Marušiak, the first programmatic documents of the party were designed as pragmatic and non - ideologic ( with “law, order and stability” being the priorities ). At the 2nd Party congress SMER announced its attachment to “Third Way” parties in Europe ( e. g. New Labour in Britain ). After the 2002 parliamentary elections SMER adopted a social democratic orientation. In May 2005 the party joined both the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists;57 however provisional membership in the PES was suspended in 2006, due to the coalition of SMER with the extreme right - wing Slovak National Party. The Czech CSSD opposed this suspension because relations between the CSSD and SMER are very friendly. SMER supported the membership of Slovakia in the EU as well in NATO. The Communist Party of Slovakia is a dogmatic Marxist - Leninist communist party which has realized only a few tactical changes in its programmatic documents. The KSS defines itself as the successor of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Its propaganda is predominantly made up of social populism. It disapproved of the NATO membership of Slovakia. The KSS expressed support of EU membership before the referendum in 2003, yet on the other hand the party’s opinions of European integration are extremely critical. The party is an observer in the Party of the European Left.

56 Kopeček Strana demokratické levice 1989–2002, pp. 126. 57 Marušiak, SMER – from Pragmatism to the Social Democracy ? Paper presented at the international conference “The European Left at the Beginning of the 21st Centrury”, p. 1.

Communist and Post-Communist Parties

V.

299

Strategy

The KSČM has maintained its communist identity. This results in problems concerning cooperation with potential partners58 on the left – mainly with social democrats. At the beginning of the 1990s the KSČM tried to establish a wide electoral far - left bloc with a non - communist name, but under its leadership, resulting in the 1992 coalition Left bloc. This strategy was not dominant after the 3rd convention of the KSČM ( partially only in KSČM activities within the anti - globalization movement – see below ). The Czech communists aspired to a form of cooperation with the ČSSD. In 1995, at the convention in Bohumín, the ČSSD adopted a resolution which pledged social democrats not to cooperate in government with communists and their successor parties. However, since the end of the year 2005 cooperation between the KSČM and the ČSSD in Parliament has often been very close. Many social democrats and communists consider the governmental cooperation of KSČM and ČSSD possible, e. g. because such cooperation has often been realized at the municipal level. However, a part of social democrats demand deeper reform from the KSČM. The marginal SDS sees attempts to form a far - left bloc with a respectable position for the democratic socialists in the revival of KSČM. SDS members are active in transnational structures of the radical left and on the parties’ web - site try to form something like the Czech “new - left” think - tank. The dogmatic KSČ and KSČ - ČSSP are waiting for a possible significant reform of the KSČM or for the failure of the cooperation of KSČM and ČSSD, because this could induce dissatisfied communist members and voters to support these split parties. Because of the reforms, the Slovak Party of the Democratic Left has been considered a potential coalition partner by many parties in the Slovak party system since the beginning of its existence. However, the engagement of the SDĽ in government coalitions with right - centered parties damaged the left - wing identity of the party and led to its marginalization. The party SMER - SD used its opposition statute for its political enhancement. This party is a potential coalition partner of various parties of the political spectrum. The coalition with the extreme right is unique within the European Party landscape. The KSS and the split party “Úsvit” are generally ostracized within the party system; however within the unstable Slovak party system this might be but a temporary situation. Their most natural partners – various leftist populist workers parties – are currently not important segments of the system. Cooperation with SMER is acceptable for some communists. In its strategy the KSS used the dissatisfaction of the left - wing voters with the policy of the center - oriented left parties and with the policy of the establishment in general. Due to its extra - parlia58 Partial connections of the KSČM with democratic parties exist only at a local level. However, the leaders of those parties often criticize municipal coalitions of their members and communists.

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Table 1 : Comparison of the identity of communist and post - communist parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia* Basic identity

Socioeconomic issues

Attitude to Attitude to the Membership the commu- European in European nist past Union parties

Against Social populism, Positive, membership, KSČM Communist “plurality” of with limited against EUownership criticism Constitution Social solidarity, Democratic partial accepRelatively In favor of SDS Socialism membership tance of market critical economy Against Centrally planDogmatic membership, KSČ Positive ned economy, communist against EUSocialism Constitution Market ecoIn favor of Far left Relatively nomy, with membership, democratic SDL’ critical strong social in favor of EUsocialism issues constitution In favor of Left centre; SMER Social market membership, social demoCritical SD economy in favor of EUcracy constitution Critical to EU, however in Centrally planfavor of KSS Communist Positive ned economy membership, against EUConstitution

Observer in the Party of the European Left Member of the Party of the European Left

Observer in the Party of European Socialists Member of the Party of European Socialists Observer in the Party of the European Left

* Including SMER - SD which is not a post - communist party.

mentary status after the 2006 elections, the position of the KSS is presently weak.

VI.

Organization

The KSČM is organized by a three - level structure ( basic organizations, district organizations, central bodies ). The highest organ of the KSČM is the Convention which convenes at least once in four years. The KSČM has the highest number of members of all Czech political parties : about 100,000 ( KDU - ČSL : ca. 50,000, ODS : ca. 20,000, ČSSD : ca. 15,000, others fewer than 5,000). How-

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ever, the number of members of the KSČM has been decreasing ( from 563,000 in 1990 to 101,000 in 2004). Only a little more than 6 000 new members entered the KSČM between 1990 and 2002. The strongest social group among KSČM members constitute retired people and workers. The real membership of the SDS, KSČ and KSČ - ČSSP is only a few hundred people. Table 2 : Number of members of the KSČM in years of ordinary party conventions 1990

1992

1993

1995

1999

2004

563,000

355,000

317,000

195,000

137,000

101,000

Source : KSČM.

The KSČM has several satellite organizations – among young people, the “Communist Union of Youth” ( Komunistický svaz mládeže – KSM ) is active, despite its having been dissolved by the Czech Ministry of Interior ( see above ). Many female KSČM members and their supporters are organized in “Leftists Clubs of Women” ( Levicové kluby žen – LKŽ ). The KSČM also supports the small “Trade Union Association of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia” ( Odborové sdržení Čech, Moravy a Slezska ). Many Czech communists are active within the left - nationalist and Pan - Slav spectrum. The Slovak Party of Democratic Left started out with a three - level structure ( basic and district organizations + central organs ). Even though party membership decreased during its existence ( from 48,000 in 1992 to 15,000 in 2002), it was relatively high in comparison with other Slovak parties.59 The satellite organizations of the SDĽ were “Democratic Left Youth” ( Mladá demokratická ľavica – MDL ), “Association of Democratic Left of Women” ( Združenie demokratickej ľavice žien – ZDĽŽ ) and the “Association of Leftist Teachers” (Združenie ľavicových učitelov – SLU ).60 The party SMER - SD has a three - level party structure ( district and regional organizations + central organs ). The highest organ is the Congress which convenes bi - annually. Shortly after its foundation the party counted about 5,000 members, the number of members after the integration of the SDDS, the SDA and the SDĽ is not known, nor their social characteristics. The youth organization close to SMER - SD is “Young Social Democrats” ( Mladí sociálni demokrati – MSD ). The KSS has a four - level party structure ( basic, district and regional organizations + central organs ). The highest organ of the KSS is the Congress which convenes at least once in four years. The development of the membership of the KSS shows another trend compared with the SDĽ. The KSS had 1,700 mem59 Only the HZDS and the KDH had more members in the 90s. See Gonda, Politická levice na Slovensku, p. 480. 60 Gonda Politická levice na Slovensku, pp. 535–542.

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bers in 1992, and in 2005 it counted 12,000 members ( however, in 2003, it counted 22,000 members ). The main social groups represented within the KSS are retired people and workers. In 2004 the average KSS member was 60 years old.61 The youth satellite organization of the KSS is the “Union of Socialist Youth” ( Zväz socialistickej mládeže – ZSM ). Table 3 : Membership in the SDĽ, in the KSS and in the SMER 1990 KSS (part of the KSČ)

194,396

1992

1996

2000

2002

2004

–

–

–

–

–

SDL’

48,000

27,600

21,000

15,000

KSS

1,700

15,000

22,000

23,000

? 29,000

Source : Gonda, Politická levice na Slovensku, p. 480.

VII. Electorate The KSČM electorate has remained relatively strong and stable. This is an advantage in a situation when electoral participation in the Czech Republic is sinking. Still, at the parliamentary elections the KSČM lost votes. Surveys show that the KSČM competes for left - wing voters mainly with the ČSSD. The KSČM is supported above all by the lower class and pensioners (23 % in 2006). Often people without leaving examination voted for the KSČM (25 % in 2006).62 The KSČM is stronger on the country than in big cities. Geographically, its support is strongest in regions with high unemployment rates and a low standard of living ( Northern Bohemia, Northern Moravia ). The leftist electorate in Slovakia is generally strong; however electoral fidelity is weak compared to the Czech Republic. In the 1990s SDĽ voters were represented within various important groups of the Slovak public ( including intelligentsia, youth etc.). From the SDĽ voters of 1998, only 18.4 % still stuck with the party in 2002. 9.7 % of its former electorate voted for the split party SDA, 13.8 % for the KSS and 25.3 % for SMER.63 The KSS was supported mainly by old people ( over 55) and the lower class ( people without leaving examination voted for the KSS as well as for the KSČM). According to Czech political scientists Lubomír Kopeček and Jakub Šedo, the best election result of Slovak communists so far in 2002 may be interpreted as a consequence of the dissatisfaction the Slovak peripheries, namely 61 Setkání fóra evropských levicových stran. Haló noviny, 31st October 2005, p. 11. 62 SC & C for the Czech Televison: Volby 2006 – exit poll. http ://www.scac.cz / volby2006_ exitpoll.html. 63 Haughton “We’ll Finish What We’ve Started”, p. 81.

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eastern and partially center Slovakia. There, negative economic and social phenomena – high unemployment, lowering of living standards during social and economic transformation etc. – had developed during the 1990s. This is where Slovak communists won most votes.64 Table 4 : Election Results Czech National Council (1990, 1992) and Chamber of deputies (1996, 1998, 2002, 2006) Total % Mandates KSČM 1990–KSČ 1992–LB ČSDF

1990

1992

1996

1998

2002

2006

954,690 13.24 % 32 0.33 % 0

909,490 14.05 % 35

626,136 10.33 % 22

658,550 11.03 % 24

882,653 18.51 % 41

685,328 12.81 26

85,122 1.40 % 0 7,740 0.13 % 0

LB SDL

–

–

SDS

–

–

–

–

–

475 0.00 % 0

Table 5 : Development of the number of senators of the KSČM 1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2

4

3

3

2

2

Table 6 : Election Results European Parliament (2004) Total % Mandates KSČM

472,862 20.26 % 5

SDS

1,709 0.07 % 0

64 Kopeček / Šedo, Czech and Slovak polical parties. In : Central European Political Studies Review, 1 (2003) 5.

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Table 7 : Elections Results National Council of the Slovak Republic % Total Mandates

1990

KSS/KSČ

450,855 13.35 % 22

KSS

1992

1994

1998

2002

2006

23,349 0.76 % 0 453,203 14.70 % 29

78,419 0.72 % 0 299,496 10.41 % 18

94,015 2.79 % 0 492,507 14.66 % 23

181,872 6.32 % 11 39,163 1.36 % 0 387,100 13.46 % 25

89,418 3.88 % 0 2,906 0.12 % 0 671,185 29.14 % 50

SDL’ 1992–SV

–

SMER-SD

–

–

–

–

ČSDF

515 0.02 % 0

–

–

–

–

ZRS

–

–

211,321 7.34 % 13

43,809 1.30 % 0

15,755 0.54 % 0

Table 8 : Election Results European Parliament (2004) Party

SMER (tretia cesta)

KSS

Total % Mandates 118,535 16.89 % 3 31,908 4.54 % 0

6,864 0.29 % 0

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VIII. Position within the Extreme Left and within the Anti - Globalization Movement The KSČM is the dominant force of the extreme left in the Czech Republic. No other significant far left parties exist in the Czech Republic. However, after 1989 a great part of young far left activists saw the KSČM critically – as a grouping of “old dogmatic people”. This is typical mainly for people from youth subcultures with anarchist influence. In the first half of the 90s the KSČM tried to cooperate with the “Left Alternative” ( the most important Trotskyite and anarchist organization at this time ) and with a part of the editorial of the anarchist review “A - Kontra”. Most anarchist activists rejected such cooperation, however. Despite the influence of anarcho - communism within Czech anarchism, the hostility of anarchists to the KSČM continues. Better relations exist between the Trotskyites and the KSČM than between the anarchists and the communist party. The Trotskyite organizations – mostly the “Socialist Organization of Workers” ( later also the Revo ) – cooperate with the “Communist Youth Alliance”. These organizations realized several common campaigns. Both Trotskyites and Marxist - Leninists from the KSČM and the KSM try to agitate within Roma activists, too, but with limited success.65 The conflict between the “authoritarian” and “non - authoritarian” left66 also influenced on the anti - globalization movement in the Czech Republic. Their “founders” in 1998 were anarchists ( mainly eco - anarchists ) associated with “Peoples’ Global Action”. Activists from various organizations ( “Czechoslovak Anarchists Federation”, “Earth First !”, “Rainbow Keepers” etc.) organized street parties at the end of the 1990s. At these street - parties Leninist and Trotskyite communists were “unwelcome”; they were also physically attacked by militant anarchists. The “top - action” of the AG - movement in the Czech Republic so far – the September 2000 protests against the IMF / World Bank summit in Prague – was organized mainly by the “Initiative against Economic Globalization” ( Iniciativa proti ekonomické globalizaci – INPEG ), including the main demonstration on September 26, 2000 ( the so called S 26). INPEG members were mostly groups and individuals from the anarchist, environmental, and new left spectrum ( citizens of the Czech Republic as well as foreigners ). Communists and Trotskyites were not admitted to the INPEG. The KSM (with support of the KSČM ) and Trotskyites organized their own campaign “Stop the MMF !”, including the great communist international demonstration on September 23, 2000. The most dogmatic communists from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia were involved in the extravagant anti - MMF / World 65 The political activity of Roma people in the Czech republic is generally low; however, after 1989, there existed several Roma leftist organizations ( always only short - lived ). 66 This is the view of anarchists.

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Bank project called the “United Front” ( Sjednocená fronta – SF ); its other members were several Moravist organizations,67 as well the small far - right “Movement of Corporatist Democracy”. A cleavage between the anarchists on the one hand and Marxists - Leninists and Trotskyites on the other also prevailed during the protest against the NATOsummit in November 2002. However, the KSČM supported the participation of various Czech far - left activists ( including anarchists ) at the European social forums in Paris and London. The “Initiative for the Social Forum” ( Iniciativa za sociální fórum – ISF ) was created in the Czech Republic in January 2004. The influence of KSČM, respectively KSM, was important. The ISF organized the first Czech social forum in Prague in September 2004. But participation was low, with only about 80 people ( including “new - left thinkers”, trade unionists, environmental activists, several social democrats, members of the SDS etc.). In spite of the fact that some anarchists had participated in the first Czech social forum, their attitude towards dogmatic communists remained critical. The next Czech forum – the “Revolt Forum” in Prague on October 21, 2005, was more directed towards young people. However, the factionalism of various leftist groupings within the extreme left and Czech anti - globalization activities is still strong ( despite the fact that in 2006 various subjects, including anarchists, protested against the dissolving of the KSM and anticommunist campaigns of the democratic right ). Since 2006 the campaign against the planned military radar base of the US National Missile Defense system is an important element of KSČM and KSM politics as well as of the other far left organizations in the Czech Republic. In the context of this campaign contacts have been established between various anti - militarist organizations from the Czech Republic and foreign countries. The anti - globalization activity plays only a minor role in Slovakia; however the Slovak far - left has organized several AG - actions such as street parties or anti- war protests – mainly in cooperation with Czech organizations. In Slovakia a similar cleavage exists between anarchists and communists ( including Trotskyites ) as in the Czech Republic. The engagement of the KSS and its youth organization SZM within the extreme left youth scene is weaker than that of the KSČM and the KSM in the Czech lands. The most influential Slovak issue within the European AG - movement was the campaign “Free Mario Bango”. Mario Bango is a former activist of the SZM and other Slovak far left organizations. He is of Roma nationality. Bango was sentenced to ten years in prison in 2004 because he stabbed and killed a young man in a bus in Bratislava on March 10, 2001. Bango and his supporters argued

67 These groups support autonomy or independence of Moravia, mainly also of Silesia. A part of the Movement for Self - Government of Moravia and Silesia ( despite rejecting standpoints on the leadership of this organization ), the Moravian and Silesian Information Centre and Moravian Association from Brno were active within the United Front.

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that he had defended himself and his brother Eduard Bango ( also a leftist activist) against a racist attack, however the court rejected Bango’s pleading. A campaign within the European far left started for Bango’s support and discharge, including Eduard Bango’s speech at the Roma - Seminary at the “European Social Forum” in London in October 2004. This campaign was organized mostly by Czech and Slovak Marxist - Leninist and Trotskyite groups; however, several anarchist organizations refused to participate. This conflict has deepened the factionalism within the Czech and Slovak far left.

IX.

Relations to the Communist Past and to Democratic Principles

The KSČM has never really distanced itself from the past before 1989; however it has admitted “some mistakes” in the history of communism. The Czech political scientist Stanislav Balík has analyzed various levels of the input of the KSČM ( official documents of the party, official statements by some communist representatives towards party members and views of rank and file members of KSČM). According to him, at every level the declamations of KSČM representatives about the new attitude towards communist history are insincere and false. Considering the intensity and results of the party’s reform, Balík is convinced that the KSČM judges its own history in a positive light.68 Organizationally, the KSČM is the de facto ( not de jure ) successor of the KSČ. This analysis proves that there are various ideological tendencies inside the KSČM. The most influential one is the neo - communist tendency. Its supporters judge positively on the communist era in Czechoslovakia as well as in the world. Currently they accept democratic institutions and processes; however they hold up basic Marxist - Leninist ideas and strive for a revolution. Reform communists are weak. They support democratic socialism, inspired by new left ideas. In Czechoslovakia the year 1968 constitutes an important tradition for this tendency. Its attitudes are very similar to the SDS policy. Dogmatic communists are also active in the KSČM; however some communists of this orientation are members of split parties ( KSČ or KSČ - ČSSP ). They struggle for the restoration of communism of the orientation before 1956, but they also accept “Breznevism”. At the beginning of the 90s in Slovakia the SDĽ declared a clear ideological distance from the communist past; however organizationally it was the successor of the KSČ in Slovakia, and most of its members had their individual communist past. The SMER - SD was, according to its statement, “established as a result of the nature of the progress following November 1989, which roused the dissatisfaction of the public with its disorder in economic and public affairs, with the dysfunction of the legal state, with profound injustice, with the state’s lack of interest in the individual, with contemptuous disregard for education and 68 See Balík, Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia.

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experience, with the theft of state property, with the continuing increase in the level of crime, as well as the general moral decadence of society”.69 Only a part of SMER members, including its chairman Fico, had been members of the KSS before 1989. According to Czech political scientists Lubomír Kopeček and Vít Hloušek, the orthodox profile of the contemporary KSS links it even more closely to the Communist regime of Czechoslovakia than the Czech KSČM that refuses to accept a similar relation to the regime. A significant majority of its members had been members of the KSS before 1989; however legally and organizationally the KSS is rather a new party ( the organizational structure of the “primary” KSS was taken over mainly by the SDĽ ). Currently, the KSS respects democratic processes; however it is ideologically anchored in dogmatic Marxism - Leninism with its revolutionary aims. X.

Attitudes towards Actors of Consolidated Democracy

The KSČM has strongly criticized the process of economic and social transformation in the Czech Republic in the 1990s and its main actors ( the right - wing governments of Václav Klaus or President Václav Havel ), as well as the democratic left - wing opposition at that time. Since 2002 and above all since 2005/ 2006 the KSČM has often supported the ČSSD70 in Parliament against the coalition partners of social democracy. This cooperation has partly continued after the 2006 elections. The SDS is not relevant within the Czech party system; however the members of the party ( or of the predecessors of this party – the LB and the SDĽ ) were more acceptable than members of the KSČM within the left and center of the political spectrum. They are active in various forums of left - wing intellectuals, where they denounce political and economic concepts of the right - centre parties. Both being of a dogmatic nature, KSČ and KSČ - ČSSP are fundamental opponents of the democratic political representation after 1989 as well of the leadership of the KSČM. Still, some contacts between members of these parties exist. The SDĽ in Slovakia was accepted as a coalition partner shortly after its renaming and cooperated with various democratic forces. It supported the necessary reforms; however it refused their “inadequate” social impacts. During the era of Mečiar governments with authoritarian elements the SDĽ was accepted in Slovakia as well as in the international environment as an important part of 69 SMER – Sociálna demokracia : Party theses, 2003. http ://www.strana - SMER.sk / en / theses. 70 However, in 2003 several communist deputies voted for president Václav Klaus ( the chairman of the ODS ). The reason was, above all, the communist aversion against government candidate Jan Sokol because of his support of Christianity, Sudeten German demands and the deepening of European integration.

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the “democratic opposition”. SMER has criticized the government from the very beginning. It was characterized as a “populist party”. After entering a coalition with the SNS and the HZDS, relations with the opposition ( mostly with the Party of the Hungarian Coalition ) are problematic. However, the democratic order in Slovakia has not suffered any harm. The KSS often opposed democratic actors in Slovakia. XI.

Conclusion

The continuing existence of strong “authentic” communist parties is typical of the development of the Czech Republic. Despite decreasing membership and a loss of voters at the 2006 elections, the KSČM has not lost the capability to mobilize the electorate. Post - communist split democratic socialist parties have remained marginal. The reformed Party of the Democratic Left in Slovakia was a relevant part in the Slovak party system in the 1990s. Currently in Slovakia, the split party SMER - SD is playing the dominant role on the left. It could be maintained that the “two - stage” social democratization in Slovakia has been accomplished. SMER - SD is difficult to define as a post - communist party. It is not the successor party of the KSS, neither from the organizational nor from the ideological point of view. It is a specific segment of the socialist / social democratic party family, despite the fact that within this family it currently plays the role of the “black sheep”, due to its coalition with the extreme right - wing SNS. Social populism and an anti - establishment strategy enabled a relatively successful development of the non - reformed communist parties ( KSČM, KSS ) in both countries. Both these parties and their youth organizations ( KSM, ZSM ) cooperate very closely. In comparison, the position of the KSČM is stronger than that of the KSS. The differences between the situation in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia may be explained as a result of : 1. Different processes within the KSČ / KSS in 1989/1990. In Slovakia the reform oriented communists replaced the discredited party leadership and stayed within the party, whereas in the Czech Republic the reformists were not able to occupy significant positions with party leadership. Their potential supporters left the party shortly after the “velvet revolution” more massively than in Slovakia. 2. The presence of the SDĽ in mainly right - centered governments, which in the public discredited its image as a left - wing party as well as the failure of the far left ZRS within the last Mečiar government. It resulted in the rise of SMER - SD and the “new” KSS. In the Czech Republic neither the KSČM nor any other communist or post - communist party has participated in any government so far, unlike the SDĽ.

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3. In general, the deeper stability and bigger concentration of the Czech party system. While the relatively strong ČSSD occupies the center - left space and the KSČM the far - left space within the political spectrum continuously, the Slovak left space is unstable. This situation facilitates the rise and fall of various political projects.

Post - Communist Parties in Poland after 1989 Piotr Sula

I.

Introduction

The following article is devoted to the scrutiny of the post - communist parties existing in the Polish political landscape after 1989. Within the Polish context the category of post - communist parties turns to be highly capacious, since simultaneously it refers to the party of the social democratic profile ( the Democratic Left Alliance, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD1), the peasants’ party ( the Polish Peasant Party, Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL ) and the group focusing on the organizational outlasting and maintaining the material status (the Democratic Party, Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, SD ). Hitherto conducted research on post - communist parties in Poland was based on two divergent premises; one of them advocated labelling both the SdRP and the PSL as post - communist parties,2 whereas the other one promoted focusing merely on the SdRP.3 Nevertheless, in my opinion both of these parties should be considered post - communist or successor parties, as former communist parties are often called. The validation of such a classification lies in two arguments. Firstly, even though it can be agreed that the role of the PSL forerunner, the United Peasant Party ( Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, the ZSL ), was of marginal importance, it is not deniable that the ZSL supported the Polish United Workers’ Party ( Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR ), which justifies treating it as a branch of the ruling camp. Secondly, undoubtedly from both the organizational as well as the personal aspect the PSL represents the prolongation of the ZSL. Having taken all this into consideration, I intend to focus in this article on the subject matter of both the SdRP and the PSL. 1 2

3

Until 1999 functioning as the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland ( Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, the SdRP ). Such an approach to post - communist parties can be found in e. g. : Millard, The Polish Parliamentary Election of September 1993. In : Communist and Post - Communist Studies, 27 (1994) 3, p. 295; Mahr / Nagle, Resurrection of the Successor Parties. In : Communist and Post - Communist Studies, 28 (1995) 4, p. 400; Jednaka, Partie polityczne wybranych państw Europy Środkowo – Wschdoniej. In : Antoszewski / Herbut, Demokracje Europy, p. 124. See for instance : Ishiyama, Sickles into Roses. In : Lewis ( Ed.), Party Development and Democratic Change; Grzymala - Busse, The programmatic turnaround. In : Communist and Post - Communist Studies, 35 (2001) 1, pp. 51–66.

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As far as the semantic issue is concerned, I suppose there is no need to resign from exploiting the term post - communist parties which I am going to use in this article to identify the parties that are successors in the organizational sense, either of the ruling parties ( the SdRP as the successor of the PZPR ) or those accepting the government ( the PSL as the prolongation of the ZSL and the SD ).

II.

Parties and party system in Poland before 1989

The party system in Poland from before 1989 is not seldomly branded as the façade of a multi - party system.4 Such a structure entails the dominance of one of the parties, whereas the performance of other groups, called satellite ones, is precisely licensed. Consequently, satellite parties constitute a screen behind which the hegemonic party can autonomously and unrestrictedly steer the decision - making. Hence, the multi - party system of this type has nothing in common with the rivalry distinctive to democratic systems. The hegemonic position in the Polish party system was occupied by the PZPR; in turn, the United Peasant Party ( Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZSL ) and the Democratic Party ( Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, SD ) were plainly of a ‘decorative’ function. The SD was relatively the weakest component of this structure, which can be verified by the number of Parliament members after the contractual election of 4th June 1989, with the 27 deputies representing the SD among 460 members of the Sejm ( the lower house ), compared with 173 on behalf of the PZPR and 76 on behalf of the ZSL.5 The election of June opened a new phase in the existence of the satellite parties. As I have mentioned previously, their role before 1989 was confined to keeping up the appearances of democracy. Performing this function was accompanied by the total lack of any impact on the polities of the country. Yet, the situation altered along with the initiation of the democratic transformation process. It could even be argued that at that time the former satellite parties underwent a process of subjectivity, having become fully sovereign actors aspiring to play an active part on the political scene. Paradoxically as well, the structure from before 1989, which then was not comfortable for the ZSL and the SD, provided these parties with indispensable tools that let them fit in perfectly to the new reality. Among these, firstly, the fact of controlling quite a big number of the Parliaments’ seats should be enumerated, this fact, which some years before was of minor importance in the political dimension, suddenly became valuable and, correspondingly, the former satellite parties became an attractive political associate. However, not only the quantity factor ( the number of Parliament members ) but also the quality features enhanced the potential of the SD and the ZSL, 4 5

Sartori, Teoria demokracji, p. 575, 576; Sartori, Parties and party systems, pp. 204–205. Lisicka ( Ed.), System Polityczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, p. 172.

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since organizational autonomy from the PZPR was becoming a symbol highlighting the existence of these parties in the new democratic reality. Thus, it could be ranked as a success for the satellite parties that the views indicating the need of settling the coalition between the PZPR, the ZSL and the SD manifested by some PZPR members in the years 1982–1987 did not show any effect.6 The former PZPR allies took quite a diverse advantage of their prospective, which matter I will elaborate on further in the article. At this point it is worth noting that the former satellites were credited with trust among groups of anti - communist origin, whereas the PZPR and its successor could just dream of it. When assessing the condition of the PZRP before 1989, it is significant to emphasize its undoubted role in breaking the old regime, which process in Poland took, referring to Huntington’s typology, the form of displacement. This term implies the cooperation of governing and opposition parties in building the new democratic order.7 According to Huntington, the governing body could not implement reforms on their own, as the influence of conservatives on the one hand and of those in favour of change on the other was equivalent within the PZPR. Toppling the government by the opposition, in turn, was impossible since the status of the opposition, powerful as it appeared, was not sufficient for this cause. Therefore, the only solution in these circumstances was cooperation between the government and the opposition. Yet such an attitude within the PZPR prevailed only in the second half of the 1990s since until the end of 1987 the authorities hoped to introduce political and economic reform without cooperation with the opposing parties.8 The above - mentioned observations show how huge the influence of the PZPR on the functioning of the political system was before 1989 – the transformations within the party itself induced the democratization process. However, even the reformatory wing of the party was not able to foresee that the system change would have such a radical facet. When reconstructing the reasoning pattern of PZPR politicians starting the round - table conference on 6th February 1989, it has to be mentioned that they were convinced of the possibility to incorporate the opposing parties into the mechanism of the communist country. This goal was to be achieved, in the opinion of PZPR activists, by talking the opposition into so called ‘non - confrontational’ parliamentary elections.9 According to the arrangements settled during the round - table conference, 60 % of parliamentary seats were guaranteed to be taken by the PZPR, the ZSL, and the SD, the next 5 % by parties closely cooperative with the PZPR, like the ‘PAX’ Society ( Stowarzyszenie “PAX”), the Christian - Social Union ( Unia Chrześcijańsko - Społeczna, UChS ) and the Polish

6 7 8 9

Antoszewski, Erozja systemu politycznego PRL, p. 163. Huntington, Trzecia fala demokratyzacji, pp. 156–158. Wiatr, Polska droga do demokracji. In : Kilias et al., Demokracja polska 1989–2003, pp. 42–43. Dudek, Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej 1989–1995, p. 27–28.

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Catholic - Social Union ( Polski Związek Katolicko - Społeczn, PZKS ). It was also agreed that the remaining 35 % of seats in the lower house could be competed over by non - party candidates, meaning the opposition.10 However, in this case there were no guaranteed seats, representatives of the opponent parties were to compete for the seats in Parliament with the ruling camp candidates.

III.

The erosion of alliances and the decomposition of the ruling camp: political consequences of the contract election

The Parliamentary election of 4th June 1989 had the nature of a plebiscite, or even more accurately, that of a protest, since for the society voting on ‘Solidarity’ candidates corresponded with refusing the legitimacy to rule for PZPR members. In other words, very often electoral decisions were determined by the bias against communists rather than endorsement for ‘Solidarity’ candidates.11 The results of the election turned out to be surprisingly satisfactory for the opposition, although it has to be admitted that the scale of the success was related to imposing the majority electoral system both in case of the lower house ( the Sejm) as well as the upper house election ( the Senate ).12 Formally, the pre - electoral unity in the governing camp was to weaken after the election, since all the groups co - acting with the PZPR created their own parliamentary clubs or circles. Obviously, their sizes varied greatly. The ZSL and the SD formed clubs of 76 and 27 members, whereas the ‘PAX’ Society, the UChS and the PZKS – circles extending to 10, 8, and 5 members respectively. The largest club of 173 Sejm members was associated with the PZPR. Of a slightly lower number (161 deputies ) was the Civic Parliamentarian Caucus (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny ), uniting deputies originating from ‘Solidarity.’13 Yet, a fact worth underlining is that the above indicated data refer only to the beginning of the Sejm tenure, as the pattern of power in the Parliament underwent quite vital modifications within the next two years. Concludingly, the suggestions of M. Laver and K. Benoit concerning the stipulation to analyse party systems also between elections get particular magnitude when scrutinizing the Polish Parliamentary arena after 1989.14 Among the changes on the political scene which took place before the Parliamentary elections of 1991 special attention should be devoted to the transformations both within the PZPR itself as well as within the whole camp it was in charge of until 1989. The very PZPR ceased to exist in January 1990, when 10 Chmaj, Od stanu wojennego do okrągłego stołu. In : Wróbel ( Ed.), Polska w okresie przeobrażeń ustrojowych, p. 68. 11 Antoszewski / Herbut / Jednaka, Partie i system partyjny w Polsce, p. 46–47. 12 Migalski, Wpływ ordynacji wyborczych. In : Migalski / Wojtasik / Mazur, Polski system partyjny, pp. 58–60. 13 Lisicka ( Ed.), System Polityczny, pp. 173–164. 14 Laver / Benoit, The Evolution of Party Systems. In : American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003) 2, pp. 215–216.

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during the convention its members took the concurrent decisions on dissolving the party on the one hand and establishing the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland ( Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej – the SdRP ) on the other, with the party reformers as its leaders. The new party included also those PZPR activists who were against introducing political reforms.15 Alternatively, those PZPR members who were in favour of breaking all the ties with the past ( among them was Tadeusz Fiszbach ) formed the Social Democratic Union ( Unia Socjaldemokratyczna, from April 1990 known as the Polish Social Democratic Union, Polska Unia Socjaldemokratyczna, PUS ). This initiative attracted merely several dozens of those attending the convention. Undoubtedly bigger interest was induced among Parliament members of the former PZPR, as 42 of them gathered in this newly formed Parliamentary club. Yet, the lack of wider support for party actions lead to its dissolution in the middle of 1991; a great number of its members later joined the Labour Union ( Unia Pracy ).16 Even before the PZPR dissolution the transformation process within the ZSL had been initiated. During the 11th special party conference in November 1989 the new name of the party was coined, the Polish Peasant Party ‘Rebirth’ (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe ‘Odrodzenie’). In rural areas this group had its opponent by two other parties under the common name PSL. In May 1990 PSL ‘Rebirth’ allied with the ‘Mikołajczykowski’s’ part of the PSL ( pointing to the reference to the group existing in the 1940s ). All these circumstances led to the creation of the Polish Peasant Party ( Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe ). A totally different strategy than that of the PZPR and the ZSL was employed by the SD. Its activists decided to keep the name of the party, as its history dated back to the pre - World War II - period. The biggest political success of the SD was achieved during the 1989–1991 tenure, when its members supported both existing cabinet coalitions – one led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki ( SD representatives having three ministers’ portfolios ) as well as one Jan Krzysztaf Bielecki was in charge of from January on ( one department under control of a SD politician).17 As I have mentioned, taking part in both coalitions should be translated as a prevalent success of the SD, since during the next years there were some identity and organizational problems evident within this party. Of 120 000 members the party managed to keep no more than 10 %.18 Under the organizational aspect, the party was also destabilised by the split of 1993, along with the lack of consistency as far as constructing the election mergers was concerned. In 1997 the SD allied with the Freedom Union ( Unia Wolności ), due to which it had one Parliament member and in 2001 with the Democratic Left Alliance ( Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD ).19 15 Antoszewski / Herbut / Sroka, System partyjny w Polsce. In : Antoszewski et al. ( Eds.), Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Środkowej, pp. 118–119. 16 Dudek, Pierwsze lata, p. 88. 17 Antoszewski / Herbut ( Eds.), Leksykon politologii, pp. 540–543. 18 Morawski, Partia w zaniku. In : Rzeczpospolita, 8th June 2002. 19 Olczyk, Miarka dla Sojuszu. In : Rzeczpospolita, 7th May 2001.

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The Democratic Party did not manage to function as skillfully as the PSL in the new political reality. Yet not worse than the latter party did they do in gathering funds for their performance, although in this context the term gather should no be used. The SD budget was almost entirely dependent on money from letting properties which the party had been given during communist times. Those buildings situated in the centres of the biggest cities, allowed gaining high income incomparable with the needs of such a small party. The SD affiliates became property administrators rather than active politicians. Probably such a status would have been kept but for the amendment to the law on political parties introduced in 2002. It banned the parties to benefit from letting properties. For the SD the only solution in such a situation was selling possessions. Upon deciding to do so, the SD established the foundation ‘Self - governing and Democracy’ ( Samorządność i Demokracja ) which was supposed to own the property and to get income from letting. A problem yet has arisen since buildings were not sold, instead, in this matter, only the preliminary contract was signed. Legal inaccuracies have not been clarified until today, and it is still difficult to speak of any possibilities of applying any sanctions on the SD. Political parties can be declared illegal if they do not hold accounts for the electoral allocation, yet here the book - keeping of the SD is run faultlessly.20 Thus, the SD actions should nowadays be perceived rather as business, not as political ones. Nevertheless, I think that some space should be devoted to the reflection on this party, at least to show in how different ways the resources inherited from the former system are being capitalised. Having observed the political performance of the SD and other groups on the Polish political scene, we can draw the conclusion that we have to deal with a paradox here. Whereas the SD, having a high material status, reveals political passiveness, those groups which face insufficient financial background take an active part in all political arenas ( the electoral, parliamentary and cabinet one ). Perhaps, however, this paradox is only ostensible. Perhaps the SD politicians have come to the conclusion that their party does not need to be as venturesome as other formations, since even without its presence in the political arena the SD will still manage to outlive and consequently those not in such a comfortable position have to prove ambitious. This would mean that political parties may function even with a legitimacy deficit but would not stand a budget deficit. In this article I will above all deal with the issue of parties which may not be so affluent as the SD but at the same time cannot complain about not having been supplied by the former system with any goods useful under the new conditions.

20 Stankiewicz / Stankiewicz, Partia do robienia pieniędzy. In : Rzeczpospolita, 31st March 2005.

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Organizational and programmatic transformations within post - communist parties

The cessation of the communist epoch in Poland was equivalent to the end of the party system in which political parties did not have to ( or could not ) compete. The opening of the electoral market opened a totally new context for the post - communist parties. Yet it is worth noticing that getting prepared for functioning in the structure of open rivalry was much easier for the post - communist parties than for parties originating from the opposition to the old regime because of the size of controlled material resources. I am mentioning only material ones, since having an expanded party formation, considered to be one of the resources constituents, in this situation had a dysfunctional character. Taking no account of the possibility to mobilise territorial structures during electoral campaigns, which was not of no magnitude in the first election after 1989, the expanded party apparatus was filled with values that had nothing to do with democracy. So maybe paradoxically the SdRP, which had an expanded structure, was in a much more difficult situation than parties of the Solidarity background which had to get organised but at the same time were endowed with such a deficient in the communist camp value, namely social legitimacy. Concluding, it is worth noticing that building a modern social democratic party was not an easy assignment in the SdRP position, and those difficulties stemmed from the fact that among the party members there were those for whom democratic principles were not the sole directive of their public performance. With regards to the above - mentioned points it can be argued that the SdRP was much more institutionalised than groups emerging from Solidarity at the beginning of the 1990s.21 The suggestion concerning the level of institutionalisation is also applied to the PSL and the SD which simultaneously were not so much perceived as being responsible for the character of the regime before 1989 as the SdRP. Correspondingly, shaping the ‘democratic’ image could be relatively easier in case of the PSL and the SD. Yet, it is significant to remark that not only do the SdRP and the PSL diverge in terms of the role their predecessors played before 1989, but they also vary in the programmatic and organizational strategies they employed after 1989. From the beginning the PSL decided to adapt mass strategy in the context specified by Otto Kirchheimer.22 This term denotes that the PSL, thus being one of not many parties in East Central Europe which applied such an approach, was interested in the development of its membership base.23 Its mass character can 21 See also : Lewis, Political Parties in Post - communist Eastern Europe, pp. 120–121. 22 Kirchheimer, The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems. In : LaPalombara / Weiner ( Eds.), Political Parties and Political Development, pp. 182–184. 23 Generally in East Central Europe the low interest in taking the active part in the performance of political parties can be observed. This tendency is proven by the data concerning party membership collected between 1997–2000 in twenty European countries ( EU countries, the Czech Republic, Norway, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary ). The average result illustrating the percentage of party members in relation to the entire elec-

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also be confirmed by the mere fact that the political appeal of the PSL was directed at the entire group ( inhabitants of rural areas ), not at individual voters. This group was loyal to the PSL, which is worth underlining since it was quite a peculiar phenomenon against the background of East Central Europe. This loyalty proved both the class and agrarian character of the former PZPR satellite.24 The mass character of the PSL, as I have noticed above, found its evidence also in the number of party members. The following table illustrates the detailed statistics, including information on SdRP members. The PSL, however, was forced to introduce some change to their strategy. The high level of party membership was of course an effective tool in the electoral campaigns, but in 1995, before the presidential elections, the first paid commercials appeared, thus the strategy of the party had to be altered in a direction which would enable them to broaden the group of supporters without further expansion within the party’s membership structure. Such logic resembles the process of transformation of the mass party model into the electoral one in West Europe in the middle of the 20th century.25 However, it does not imply directly that the PSL took the strategy characteristic for electoral parties. Having observed the performance of the PSL, its choice can be rather associated with the strategy of patronage quite often employed in new democracies. The effective functioning of this method is possible only when the party ( the patron ) influences decisions related to the distribution of material goods.26 These goods may take the form either of social privileges for particular groups or of filling posts in the public administration. The PSL as the co - ruling party took care, for instance, of keeping the social insurance privileges for farmers; insurance premiums paid to the Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Społecznego, KRUS ) are much lower than those of the rest of the society insured by the Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych, ZUS ).27 The PSL also took full advantage of the possibility to colonise the administrative structure,28 especially departments which dealt with the issue of the countryside and agriculture ( for example, the Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture, Agencja Restrukturyzacji i Modernizacji Rolnictwa ).

24 25 26 27 28

torate reached in these twenty countries was 4.99 %, whereas in the countries of East Central Europe it was below this level ( the Czech Republic in 1999 – 3.94 %, Poland in 2000 – 1.15 %, Slovakia in 2000 – 4.11 %, Hungary in 1999 – 2.15 %). More on this matter : Mair / van Biezen, Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980–2000. In: Party Politics, 7 (2001) 1, p. 9. Szczerbiak, Party Structure and Organizational Development. In : Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 17 (2001) 2, pp. 94–130. On this issue, for instance : Koole, Cadre, catch - all or cartel ? In : Party Politics, 2 (1996) 4, p. 513; Kirchheimer, The Transformation, p. 184. Herbut, Partie polityczne i system partyjny. In : Antoszewski / Herbut ( Eds.), Polityka w Polsce, p. 123. Sula, Ewolucja wizerunku Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego. In : Jeziński ( Ed.), Marketing polityczny, pp. 380–381. On the reasons for the birth of clientelism in Central Eastern Europe see : Kitschelt, Divergent Paths. In : Diamond / Gunther ( Eds.), Political Parties and Democracy, p. 316.

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Post-communist parties in Poland

Table 1 : Membership in Polish political parties, 1991–2005 Membership Party The Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (since 1999 the Democratic Left Alliance)

1991

1992

1993

1995

1997

1998/ 1999

60,000

–

65,000

60,000

60,000

60,000 150,000

2002

2005

78,471

The Polish Peasant 180,000 200,000 200,000 190,000 200,000 120,000 140,000 140,000 Party Sources : Paul G. Lewis, Political Parties in Post - communist Eastern Europe, London 2000, p. 99; Eliza Olczyk, Sojusz bêdzie wyrzuca³ awanturników. Marek Dyduch, sekretarz generalny SLD, o konfliktach w partii. Rzeczpospolita, 23rd August 2002; www.sld.org.pl; www.psl.org.pl, and own calculation.

Referring to the PSL, it is worth highlighting that this party is deeply rooted in the local social as well as governing structures.29 Such an inclination was proved to some extent by the stable high level of party membership and the successes achieved in local elections.30 When it comes to programmatic strategies, from the very beginning of its performance the PSL was in favour of the extended interventional mechanisms and in favour of the elements of protectionism which were to secure the sphere of Polish agriculture.31 Consequently, PSL presence within the cabinet coalition, which occurred twice during more or less intensified endeavours to enter the European Union, did not disturb evoking Euro - sceptical ambiance.32 Nevertheless, it is worth coming back to the main successor of the communist camp. The scrutiny of the SdRP entails the implication that the effective performance of this party after 1989 was possible, provided that it would break with the communist symbolism. It was not so straightforward, since the old regime marked its permanent stamp on each party element. Hence, the adapta29 Sula, Ewolucja wizerunku, p. 380. 30 On local goverments elections of 2006 see for instance : Śmiłowicz, Porażka Samoobrony, klęska LPR. In : Rzeczpospolita, 14th November 2006; Kula, Już wiadomo, kto będzie górą w samorządach. In : Rzeczpospolita, 28th November 2006. 31 Herbut, Partie polityczne, p. 128. 32 Sula, Euro - scepticism in the party system of Poland. In : Dunčak / Fiala / Hloušek ( Eds.), Evropeizace, p. 373.

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tion to new conditions meant the change of the holistic, programmatic, and organisational as well as personnel nature.33 The transformation process was initialised, as I have mentioned, in 1990 with the creation of the SdRP, with the younger generation at its steers and Aleksander Kwaśniewski as their leader. Yet this does not mean that the representatives of the older generation were totally removed, leaving them ( with Leszek Miller among others ) guaranteed the approval of the party conservatives for the new strategy. Apart from people, the SdRP also inherited the possessions from its predecessor,34 which it did not want, in contrast to some members, to get rid of. Not a smaller challenge than personnel and organizational transformations was for the SdRP the programmatic reform, the effect of which was to build a new social democratic party. The declarations of the new party activists implied that this transformation occurred all at once. But it is virtually impossible to believe that the SdRP politicians having been socialised in the times of the communist regime suddenly underwent the internalisation of democratic values. The process of ‘timing’ the mechanisms of the democratic country along with the change in perceiving this political order as the non - alternative one by the post communist elites seemed to take longer than a few days of the congress on which the PZPR ceased to exist and the SdRP was brought into being. The necessity of introducing fast change in the post - communist party was determined by the international objectives of the SdRP, which came into view right after the formation of this party.35 The status of a fully legitimate member of the Socialist International was gained by the post - communists and a few other parties representing East Central Europe in 1996.36 Initially, the SdRP advocated scepticism towards the institution of the free market as a mere point of their political programme.37 Yet, with time, such an approach got justified by the outcome triggered by the market reforms known as Balcerowicz’ plan. In the wake of the economic reforms social problems appeared, the biggest of which were unemployment and pauperisation of large social groups.38 These circumstances became the ground for post- communists to criticise any further moves of the next cabinets in charge of politicians originating from the former opposition. It is yet worth mentioning that the SdRP support for the extended interventionist mechanisms was gradually limited and the

33 Antoszewski, Wzorce rywalizacji politycznej, p. 198. 34 Quite interesting was the very procedure of transfer. The SdRP was formed during the break in the congress of the PZPR, and the communist party returned to debates to among other things enable the transfer of the property to its successor. On this matter see : Dudek, Pierwsze lata, p. 88. 35 Paszkiewicz ( Ed.), Polskie partie polityczne, p. 215. 36 Kik, Miedzynarodówka Socjalistyczna. In : Zięba ( Ed.), Organizacje międzynarodowe partii politycznych, p. 65. 37 Grzymala - Busse, The programmatic turnaround, p. 60. 38 Raciborski, Wybory i Wyborcy. In : Kilias et al., Demokracja polska 1989–2003, p. 214.

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criticism of reforms was not equal to negating them but rather pointing to too high social expenditure. When it comes to the SdRP attitude to political issues and problems connected with the outlook on life, the fact of the unanimous rejections of concepts such as lustration and de - communisation is significant. The desired regime under Polish conditions is the parliamentary one, in which the president only plays the role of the arbiter. As regards the outlook on life, the SdRP had strictly laic character. It found its reverberation in the fact of criticising the ruling camp, originating from Solidarity, for the introduction of Religious Education to schools, religious symbols to civil institutions and signing up the concordat with the Holy See.39 Thus, the post - communists’ standpoint did not undergo any vital modifications after changing the party label in 1999. Nonetheless, this does not indicate the total lack of any rectification in their views. The introduced changes were the result of the necessity to get immediate support for particular political ventures. There could be mentioned as much as the SLD endeavours to get the support of the Catholic Church hierarchies for the integration process with the EU structures. Before the referendum of 2003, which was to decide about Polish accession to the European Union, the SLD politicians avoided issues which could discourage Church representatives from verbally advocating the integration process.40 Such a strategy is best illustrated by the declaration made in December 2002 by the SLD general secretary, Marek Dyduch, in which he suggested dealing with the anti - abortion law just after the referendum.41 The Prime Minister, Leszek Miller, quickly pronounced his words infelicitous and declared that the government would not deal with amendments to the anti - abortion law. However, not all the government members identified themselves with such an approach at the matter of abortion.42 Soon it turned out that the secretary’s prognostication from December started to fulfil. The SLD initiated work on the amendments to this bill in early autumn 2003, so namely not long after the union referendum.43 The above - mentioned scrutiny leads to the conclusion that both post - communist parties adopted divergent programmatic and organisational strategies. However, this diversity, as it was to turn out, did not eliminate cooperation in the parliamentary and cabinet arena. The genetic aspect, the common past, appeared to play a superior role. Yet, before I will tackle the notion of the post communists’ performance in the electoral, parliamentary and cabinet arenas, I would like to refer to the means of raising founds employed by the post - communist parties in Poland.

39 40 41 42

Ibid., p. 214. Walenciak, Takiego SLD już nie będzie. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 1st March 2004. Kolczak, Najpierw referendum. In : Rzeczpospolita, 19th December 2002. Czaczkowska / Gottesman, Deklaracja musi być. In : Rzeczpospolita, 24th December 2004. 43 Olczyk, Sojusz idzie na wojnę. In : Rzeczpospolita, 20th October 2003.

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Piotr Sula

Financial resources of the post - communist parties in Poland

Considering the way of organising political parties and political strategies preferred by these parties inevitably directs our attention to the means of financing their performance. It turns out that a low level of party membership is correlated with a high share of public money in the budgets of the political parties.44 Correspondingly, if such a relation exists, the question arises whether in East Central Europe political parties either did not intend to expand their membership base since they knew they would get access to public funds anyway, or they were simply not able to include new members because of social unwillingness to get involved into politics, which stance was inherited from the communist epoch, and which situation forced them, in turn, to find the country budget as the source of financing their activities.45 It is not my aim, though, to give the unanimous answer. Yet, I can undeniably assume that finding the instruments of financing their actions was in Poland, but also in other countries moving towards democracy, facilitated due to the role these parties played in the transformation phase, which was not only that of ‘the passive receiver’ of reforms but above all that of the demiurge of the majority of changes including those determining the legal premises of functioning and financing these parties. It is worth indicating that the issue of financing the political parties’ performance from the country budget was not included in the first act regulating the performance of political parties in Poland ( the act on political parties of 28 July 1990), although even before issuing the new law on political parties on June 27th, 1997, the finances of political parties were replenished by the state budget. Such a situation was feasible, as Parliament members who had their offices financed by the State, by the mere fact of the location of these offices in the party head offices, at the same time meant financing the party itself.46 A great majority of the parties’ income was acquired from public fundraising but largely also from donations made by private companies.47 Parties gained the possibility to finance their existence from the State budget in 1997 by a virtue of the act on political parties. It was issued during the SdRP and the PSL common rule. It may be worthwhile to remark that during work on the project of this law the coalition was quite criticised for the proposal of a number of party members required for the registration of the party. Primarily it was assumed that so as to register a party it should assemble 10,000 members. Such regulation would denote the end for a great number of parties originating from the Solidarity camp.48 Therefore this level was lowered in the very act to 1,000 members. 44 45 46 47 48

Lewis, Political Parties, p. 107–108. Sula, System partyjny Republiki Węgierskiej, pp. 24–25. Groblewski, Pieniądze przez biura do partii. In : Rzeczpospolita, 1st February 1995. Subotić, Informacje. In : Rzeczpospolita, 3rd September 1996. Domosławski / Nowakowska, Inne partie do podziemia ? In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 7th November 1994.

PSL

2004 SLD PSL SLD

2005 PSL

3,761

562

216,682 12,542 3,300

0 0 0

67,079 34,371 5,750

2,050

11,560

1,964

77,187

0 0

5,074

583,613 69,031

104,185

14,227

11,628 3,823

0

536,256

1,957

0 0

2,463

47,719

236,763 186,585

4,224,556 385,695 2,299,361 258,812 1,693,265 2,837,792 269, 951 1,713,698 184,706 1,157,009 1,384,800

59,862

463,596 0 937,136

0 0 0 22,548,359

0

1,224,418 118,316

222,000

570

2,595,284

894 642,109 0 318,422 19,297,605

10,528,051 11,222,165

514

31,853,091 7,879,680 26,832,286 728,617 28,416,976 29,948,599 7,311,817 513,996 5,963,637 550,440 4,430,978 645,503 192,960 3,694 342,956 494 496,742 46,395 2,300 6,178,564 3,100 59,367 0 28,732,680

33,583,813 8,043,375 28,136,453 869,113 29,188,556 30,125,499

2003

Sources : The announcement of the National Electoral Commission from 24th May 2004 r. on the reports on the funds resources of political parties in 2003 ( Monitor Polski 2004, No. 25, Pos. 430); The announcement of the National Electoral Commission from 23rd May 2005 on the reports on the funds resources of political parties in 2004 ( Monitor Polski 2005, No. 32, Pos. 456); The announcement of the National Electoral Commission from 5th June 2006 on the reports on the funds resources of political parties in 2005 ( Monitor Polski 2006, No. 41, Pos. 444).

The total income (the sum from points 1-5; with the exception of the electoral fund and point 1 g)). 1. Assets on bank accounts of the party a) the total of funds from physical persons b) the interests of funds in bank accounts and deposits c) derived from selling components of the fixed assets d) derived from practices described in the act of 27th June, article 27 (selling the party’s statute or programme) e) the amount of received allocations f) the amount of received subvention g) the financial means surplus evidenced in part 2 point a) and the funds evidenced in part 2, point b) and c), transferred into the party’s bank accounts 2. The financial means paid into the coffers of the party a) member fees, not exceeding in a year workers’ lowest month salary b) other payments, donations, not exceeding in a year workers’ lowest salary (the register- the first name and surname, address, allocation) c) derived from practices described in the act of 27th June on political parties (the totals not exceeding 10 PLN, derived from selling copies of the party’s programme, its statute or making copies) 3. Intangible assets 4. Other sources not specified in parts 1–3 5. Payments taken with the violation of the act of 27th June 1997 on political parties

SLD

Table 2: The income structure of post-communist parties in Poland in 2003–2005 (with the exception of the electoral fund, in PLN )

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Although the SdRP and the PSL acted solidarily in many circumstances, it can be argued that both these interesting parties represent two entirely contradictory models. This opinion refers even to the number of party members which in case of the SdRP is, as it appears from the previously presented data, much lower as well as to the income structure of these parties. It is worth adding that the means of raising funds are not as dependent on the number of organisation members as on the number of resources it controls ( for the PSL, namely, real estate ). The data gathered by the National Electoral Commission ( Komisja Wyborcza, PKW ), the body responsible for the annual verification of financial reports of political parties, indicates that over 60 % of all the funds collected between 2003 and 2005 came from subsidies or budget subvention. This form of financing is guaranteed by the act of 27th June, 1997 on political parties and the act of 12th April, 2001 on the electoral law to the Sejm and the Senate of the Republic of Poland. Much less of the SLD income came from donations from physical persons ( between 20 and 25 %). The PSL gets its main profits from totally different sources. This is mainly the income from selling properties constituting the party’s tangible assets. They inherited some property from its predecessor ( the ZSL ) and purchased the rest after the electoral success of 1993. These buildings were situated in the central areas of big cities.49 From the information presented in the table it is obvious that in the next years only to a lesser extent, if at all, the ZSL took advantage of budget subventions and grants which was the result of having their financial reports simply rejected by the PKW. The outlined differences between the SdRP and the PSL did not yet preclude their cooperation. Contrastingly, their common performance ( more or less effective ) has been staying at the same level since the beginning of the transformation. In the further part of my work I am going to investigate this matter in a broader sense.

VI.

The rivalry of the post - communist parties in the electoral, parliamentary - cabinet arena

The growing importance of the post - communist parties for both the electoral and the parliamentary cabinet scenes is one of the major features of the evolution of the party system in Poland as well as in other countries of East Central Europe. Special emphasis should be laid on the fact that both these post - communist parties are the only ones existing on the parliamentary scene since 1989. Yet, it should also be remembered that the SLD until 1993 had the status of a party isolated at the parliamentary level.50 The PSL, in turn, was perceived by 49 Naszkowska, W PSL dymi. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 11th September 2003. 50 Jednaka, Partie polityczne, p. 123.

Post-communist parties in Poland

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the rest of the actors of the political stage as ‘the better part’ of the former ruling camp. Yet this party was working on its image by supporting Olszewski’s government in 1991. The best proof of accepting this party as an associate with full rights by the post - Solidarity circles was seen when President Wałęsa put the PSL politician, Waldemar Pawlak, in charge of the cabinet forming mission.51 Isolated as the SLD was on the parliamentary scene, it achieved quite a satisfactory electoral result in 1991 ( detailed information collected in table 3). It is worth paying attention to one vital fact connected with the participation of the SLD in the parliamentary elections. As I have previously mentioned, created in 1990, the SdRP changed its name into SLD in 1999. Until then the Democratic Left Alliance had been functioning; however, it had only been the political and electoral coalition formed in 1991. This alliance, apart from the SdRP playing the crucial role, had comprised from a dozen or so to several dozens groups or organisations. Among these, for instance the trade unions organization – the All Poland Alliance of Trade Unions ( Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych, OPZZ ), the Polish Socialist Party ( Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS ), or the Women’s Democratic Union ( Demokratyczna Unia Kobiet ) are worth mentioning.52 In the subsequent parliamentary elections support for the SLD was systematically increasing. This tendency was interrupted in 2005, when the SLD got the worst of results hitherto. This decrease in popularity of the SLD was associated with numerous accounts of SLD politicians breaking the law.53 The inefficiency in fighting pathologies within the party itself forced some of its members ( among others, Marek Borowski ) to resign from membership and to form the Social Democracy of Poland ( Socjaldemokracja Polska, SdPl ).54 The weak result in the parliamentary election of 2005 became for the disintegrated Left the spur to create an alliance comprising the SLD, the SdPl, and the Labour Union, but as well the central Democratic Party, mainly uniting former members of the Freedom Union. This coalition took the name of The Left and the Democrats’ ( Lewica i Demokraci ).55 According to the initial declarations of LiD members, this enterprise was meant to be of quite a wide timeline horizon. However, what draws our attention is the fact that the four - party alliance was not able to settle the matter of leadership just from the start of their performance and the ambitions pronounced by leaders of the particular parties were a potential source of instability among the central - left - wing parties.56 The problem was not solved after the election of 2007, although in the background of the post - electoral conflict the SLD was triumphant. The leader of this party, Wojciech Olejniczak, was elected the chairman of the LiD parliamentary club. Early in 51 52 53 54 55 56

Sula, Ewolucja wizerunku, p. 383. Antoszewski / Herbut / Sroka, System partyjny, p. 145. Załuska, Sojusz szybko zjeżdża. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 13th February 2004. Kalukin, Drużyna “borówek”. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 27th 28th March 2004. Szymczycha, Lewica w pułapce. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 23rd October 2006. Dębski, Opozycja wciąż niedająca nadziei. In : Rzeczpospolita, 24th January 2007.

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Table 3 : Support for the post - communist parties in Poland, 1991–2005 SdRP/SLD Number of votes in %

Number of seats in Parliament (in brackets the percentage)

PSL Number of votes in %

Number of seats in Parliament (in brackets the percentage)

1991

12.0

59 (12.8 %)

8.7

50 (10.8 %)

1993

20.4

171 (37.0 %)

15.4

132 (28.7 %)

1997

27.1

164 (35.6 %)

7.3

27 (5.8 %)

2001

41.0

216 (46.9 %)

9

42 (9.1 %)

2005

11.3

55 (11.9 %)

7

25 (5.4 %)

2007

13.1

53 (11.5 %)

8.91

31 (6.7 %)

Source : Data collected by the National Electoral Commission; Marek Migalski, Wpływ ordynacji, pp. 65–77; own calculation.

2008, the LiD politicians are still facing the necessity to answer the question of what the status of the structure is and what its function is, and above all, of how to define its political role for the future. Both the SLD and the PSL prove a high level of government relevance. Both parties twice after the parliamentary elections ( of 1993 and 2001) decided to enter cabinet coalitions. In both cases, the initiative was on the SLD side. The PSL, consecutively, had the complementing function. Yet in 1993 the PSL managed to put forward their chairman, Waldemar Pawlak, as candidate for the head of the cabinet. This fact should not be surprising if the political position of the president of that time, Lech Wałęsa, is taken into account. Being biased against candidates suggested by the social democrats, he hinted the possibility of granting support for Waldemar Pawlak as Prime Minister.57 And it was not the first time that Wałęsa confided in Pawlak, since just in 1992 Wałęsa had assigned Pawlak the task ( unsuccessful ) of forming the cabinet for the first time. The cooperation between the SLD and the PSL lasted for the whole tenure, although Pawlak kept the position of Prime Minister only until 1995. As a result of the constructive vote of no confidence, the SLD politician Józef Oleksy took over this function. There seem to be two reasons for such a change. Firstly, within two years, when Pawlak was holding the function of the Prime Minister, his relationship with the President worsened. Secondly, whereas the level of tenseness in the very coalition was systematically growing, the SLD reacted to it in a much less compliant manner towards its partner than at the beginning of the tenure. During the first months of the coalition performance was characterised by the SLD acquiescence towards the PSL, as the social democrats recognized 57 Dudek, Pierwsze lata, pp. 297–298.

Post-communist parties in Poland

327

the PSL as the only political party interested in cooperation with the SLD. At the same time, the SLD politicians understood taking over the executive governing body as the chance of getting out of the political ghetto.58 The Prime Minister, Józef Oleksy, resigned from his post in January 1996 as a consequence of the political storm provoked by allegations of his cooperation with Russian secret services. His place in the coalition cabinet was taken by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz ( SLD ) who was performing his duties until the end of the tenure, that is until autumn 1997. The next phase of coalition cooperation started for the SLD and the PSL after the election of 2000. The function of Prime Minister was assigned to Leszek Miller. In the government created at that time its representatives also had the electoral partner of the SLD, the Labour Party ( the UP ). This coalition endured until March 2003, and although the direct incentives for the break - up could be seen in the divergent opinions concerning the issue of bio - fuels and additional fees for drivers including fees for using highways ( so called vignettes ), the animosity between the coalition partners was gradually escalating and such a breakup was only a matter of time.59 Miller’s government from March 2003 to May 2004 had the status of a minority cabinet. Its fall can be seen as the consequence of the scandals in which SLD politicians took part, the inner conflicts and misunderstandings between the Prime Minister and the President. In May 2004 Marek Belka was assigned the office of Prime Minister and he was in charge of the minority cabinet until the end of the tenure, which is until October 2005. The Polish Peasant Party noted its biggest success in the parliamentary election of 1993. Making no mention of the quantity features of the party relevance, it is worth noticing that the most essential achievement of the PSL is the fact of acquiring the position of the hinge party, which means that at present none of the contemporary parties rejects the possibility of cooperation with the PSL. After the election of 2007 the PSL and the Civic Platform entered the cabinet coalition ( such an alliance was functioning much earlier at the level of particular provinces ). Hence, there could be the thesis ventured that the role of the PSL stems to a lesser extent from the electoral support but is much more determined by employed political strategies by the PSL.

VII. Conclusions The above - given enquiry indicates that the post - communist parties, despite the differentiated programmatic and organisational strategies they exercised, have become permanently inscribed into the political landscape of the III. Republic of Poland. Yet within this context the democratic credibility of the new forma58 Jednaka, Gabinety koalicyjne w III RP. 59 Wojtasik, Gabinety koalicyjne w Polsce. In : Migalski / Wojtasik / Mazur, Polski system partyjny, p. 234.

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tions must be doubted. Since a great majority of members of the post - communist parties acted in the PZPR and the ZSL, it is difficult to accept that the values that constituted the existence of these parties became swiftly extraneous for their members. The seal impressed in the mentality of the party activists after the communist period appears to be the most serious obstacle in acknowledging that the post - communist parties are formations for which democracy is the natural ground. Since 1989 the post - communist parties had been attempting to shape their image of being groups fully accepting the democratic nature of inter - parties rivalry. The fact that this process was much more challenging for the Social Democrats also needs highlighting. It seems that accepting the idea of the European integration process and the European values at the same time can be interpreted as one of the factors indicating the attachment to democracy. If we agree on such a stance, then the social democrats have to be distinguished as a pro - democratic party, since they applied the European perspective quite fast. The SdRP found itself in a dubious situation, on the one hand being inclined to subordinate Poland to the Soviet empire before 1989, on the other one after 1989 pronouncing the readiness to introduce Poland into the frame of the supranational structures of West Europe.60 The post - communists’ attitudes underwent a deep alternation of which the radical character, let us suppose, was only a superficial change. Nevertheless, the SdRP and then the SD should be accounted as the prevalent advocates of Polish incorporation into European Union structures. The pro - European attitude of the social democrats gets a more distinctive appearance when compared with the scepticism so characteristic for the Polish Peasant Party as far as the integration with European structures is concerned.61 Despite the initial doubts referring to the post - communists’ adaptation ( especially from the former PZPR ) to democratic rules, both post - communist formations seem to be ‘civilised’. However, this does not imply that the SLD is perceived as the potential coalition partner by the other parties, yet it appears that so as to reach such a condition will take not as much time as in case of cutting off the mental umbilical cord joining the post - communists with the preceding system.

60 Migalski, Stosunek polskich. In : Migalski / Wojtasik / Mazur, Polski system partyjny, p. 104. 61 Ibid., p. 123.

A Romanian Tale – The Transition of the Communist Party from Ceauşescu to NATO Marius Oprea

I. On December 22nd, 1989, many of the 15,312 employees of the Securitate were caught unaware in a state of complete unreadiness.1 One example : the development of events was so fast that – two hours after the yard of the Securitate Inspectorate at Braşov was teeming with people – a car driven by a military foreman fetched from one of the farms of the Party Household near Braşov a pig for the holiday dinner of the cadres. The lack of imagination in evaluating the events that preceded Ceauşescu’s flight, originating in the sentiment of belonging to an immutable caste of each Securitate operative, brought about the blocking of the system. The day of December 22nd under the assault of the masses, a group of officers from the 5th Division of the Securitate Guard took refuge in a garage of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, where they helplessly witnessed the escape of the dictator and the events to follow. Their commanding officer, Colonel Burlan, one of Ceauşescu’s doubles, and his colleagues waited there for two days, trying to contact their superiors to find out what the new orders were. Eventually, an armoured transport care arrived at the gate of the garage and a civilian descended from it Mihai Montanu, the one they had seen on TV next to Ion Iliescu, self - proclaimed leader of the Frontului Salvării Naţionale [ National Salvation Front ], who had already taken over control, their ex - commander, head of the Securitate Iulian Vlad, captain Mihai Lupoi, whom they had also seen on TV making an appeal to the armed forces. What followed is narrated by Colonel 1

On December 22nd, 1989, the State Securitate Department had a total of 15,312 employees, of which there were 10,114 officers, 791 military foremen, 3,179 non - commissioned officers, and 1,228 civilian personnel. In the central units of the Securitate there worked 6,602 persons, in the territorial units and at the Securitate of the Municipality of Bucharest it was 6,059 persons, in the cadres’ education and improvement schools 225 persons, and in the undercover special units 2,426 persons, of whom 1,892 were officers. Data extracted from the Organization Diagram of the State Securitate Direction which the author published under the pseudonim B. Petriceicu. In : ”România Liberă,” no. 4187, 2003.

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Burloi : “We were ordered to get together and take an oath to the Front. We aligned.” And aligned, they entered transition.

II. This short story illustrates what might be referred to as “the Romanian paradox:” a turn of tables in control of power where the repression ordered by the former regime is responsible for 10 percent of the number of victims reported in the first five days of democracy, at the end of which a Romanian could believe only in one certain fact : Ceauşescu had died. Meanwhile, the Communist Party had disappeared along with his escape. In Romania there was suddenly not a single communist anymore. The power was now held by the National Salvation Front that appeared from nowhere and in which everyone was included. The self - proclaimed leader of the Front, Ion Iliescu, spoke indeed French and English, with a rather strong accent but correctly. He showed up on TV on December 22nd, 1989, with his shirt unbuttoned and with no tie. Although he made constant references to “the revolution”, he refrained from bringing accusations to the former regime but did not exonerate Ceauşescu who had “bespattered the values of socialism.” In this Communiqué to the country it was only stated that “the whole state power has been taken over by the Council of the National Salvation Front [ CNSF ], to which is subordinated the Superior Military Council that coordinates the whole activity of the army and of the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.” Though this formulation was confusing enough to amplify the boundless incertitude and rout of that period, the CNSF returned only on December 24th with a different communiqué, where it was pointed out that : “The units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs will be integrated into the Ministry of National Defense which takes over the sole command over all the troops and combat means of the country.”2 As the return of the dictator became less and less likely, people and institutions embraced the new governing power. Not only the Securitate did so, which had earlier surrendered and turned in their weapons, as we have seen. The former press institution of the Communist Party “The Spark,” appeared on December 23rd under the new title “People’s Spark”, only to become afterwards “The Truth” – quite a coincidence being exactly the translation of the title of the newspaper held by Soviet communists – Pravda. Television started broadcasting under the title of “Romanian Free Television,” but with the same heralds that had brought appraisals to Nicolae Ceauşescu a day before and accused “the hooligans” protesting in the streets against dictatorship. While on the streets war ammunition was fired and the numbers of victims increased every hour, in an anonymous office with No. 226 at the second floor of the former Central Committee Ion Iliescu and his team, consisting of communists and military officers 2

Domniţa Ştefănescu, Cinci ani din istoria României. O cronologie a evenimentelor, decembrie 1989 –decembrie 1994, Bucuresti 1995, p. 34.

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excluded and marginalised by Ceauşescu for their excessively close relations to Moscow, and the joining Securitate commanders were devising the new structures for provisional power. In the Executive Council of the Front, presided by Iliescu, the only person included who was no activist of the former regime or who did not come from the group of pro - muscovite conspirators : the actor Ion Caramitru, seen in the crowd who had protested on 21st December on the streets of Bucharest. The second day after Ceauşescu’s execution, which took place on Christmas, Romania already had a provisional government. Prime Minister Petre Roman often claimed afterwards that he had nothing to do with the “group in room 226.” Yet he was the son of an old member of Komintern, who had lived in Moscow for a long time and was in the avantgarde of those who installed the communist regime in Romania. This was the team that “filled” the vacuum created by Ceauşescu’s elopement. Structurally close to communist practices and ideology, these people did a coup d’état to the street revolution, started in Timişoara, a big city in the North - west of the country on December 17th and set forth in Transylvania and in Bucharest in the following days.

III. The key words that might define the political - institutional evolution of Romania after 1989 are reformism and continuity – yet another paradox. But in Romania’s case, only apparently these terms are contradictory. The democracy installed after Ceauşescu’s escape, qualified by the very same Ion Iliescu as “original” has managed to bring the contradiction to terms. The new power, propagandistically legitimated as “emanation” of the street insurgence, has permanently sought to limit radical transformations, essential for a revolution, to the minimal extent. Priorities were not building a political framework, liberalising economy and rapid privatisation, but taking measures to ensure the continuum for the institutional structures of the former regime. In fact, the only benefits were those regarding the realm of civil rights that had been terribly suppressed by Ceauşescu’s regime : freedom of speech, the right to free association, the right of movement. Reformist policies have been reduced, in the first seven years after the dictator disappeared, to a mere rotation of position holders, a well practiced system along the building stages of socialism. With regard to economy, liberalizing measures were restricted to overnight transformations, by governmental order, of socialist enterprises into “Ltd’s.” Some of these, the most profitable ones, were privatised to the advantage of groups of interests rooted in former communist structures, but even so, during the initial mandates held by Ion Iliescu, economy remained predominantly with State capital, maintained by subventions. Thus workers active in industry were kept for a long time as basis electorate for the new regime. The choice of those dictating Romania’s politics especially during the first years of the so - called

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“transition” was both to preserve in key positions for political decision - making ex - members of the nomenclature of the past regime and to maintain the state bureaucracy almost intact. What happened, from this point of view, was actually advancing of the second line to the vacant positions in the structures of state and party bureaucracy, by eliminating the individuals that were formerly faithful to Ceauşescu.

IV. These facts were less visible from the interior for a long time. The decades of isolation and acute lack of information rendered the Romanian population extremely vulnerable to manipulation and extremely faithful to those days in December 1989 when they claimed to be those responsible for the dictator’s relegation and when it was certain that they were those to execute him. Hence, the messages coming from across the borders addressing the new authorities were granted no attention whatsoever. The first to react were the Americans and the Soviets. In the evening of December 22nd, 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev gave to the Council of Peoples Representatives an informative speech upon the situation in Romania and submitted a message to be sent, by which “full support” was granted to the new authorities, as well as “the sincere desiderate of close collaboration in the interests of socialism and peace.” More reserved, George Bush welcomed the elimination of dictatorship, regreted the dramatic events and promised active support, in case the country should adopt democracy. Chronologically, messages followed coming from communist parties and from Warsaw pact countries : Hungary, German Democratic Republic, and Tschechoslovakia. For example Ladislav Adamec, president of the Tschek Communist Party, proclaims his “conviction that the Romanian people and the honest communists will manage to find a way out” of the historic crises that Ceauşescu had brought them into. Finally, the message signed by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs : “Popular Republic China observes with vivid attention the evolution in Romania, considering it an internal problem of the country” – which in diplomatic language translates the suspicion of the Chinese with regard to Soviet interference in the line of events in Romania. An interference that was not at all to be neglected, given the close relations between Gorbachev and Iliescu, politically stated by signing a bilateral treaty between Moscow and Bucharest on April 5th 1991, shortly before the collapse of the USSR. Meanwhile, at least in theory, measures had been taken to provide a framework for political pluralism, although initially Ion Iliescu was demanding “pluralism within the Front.” The provisional legislative power was held by the Council of the National Salvation Front that was subsequently to turn into the Provisional Council of National Unity. As a consequence of Law - decree No. 8 from December 31st, 1989, regarding “the registration of political parties and civil organisations,” the historic parties reappeared : On January 8th, 1990 the

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National Peasant Christian – Democrat Party was registered at the Court of Justice, Bucharest, and only one week later the National Liberal Party was reborn, the two being historic rivals of the communists at the end of World War II, both disintegrated after the establishment of the pro - Soviet government. Yet by this law it was provided that a political party could be founded with only 251 followers. Later, in early March 1990, a statistic inquiry showed that out of those questioned 81.9 percent considered this number not to be sufficient while only 13.8 percent approved to that figure. A fact that did not prevent that law from being implemented, in a form that became a subtle method of compromising the possibility of alternation in power, by the constant chaos in the political life and the debates in the provisional parliament that were broadcasted on a daily basis. On TV one could see housewives or building administrators who had suddenly become politicians and who were a sharp contrast to the “experience” of those who had taken control of “the country’s destiny” after Ceauşescu’s retreat. As a result of this law there were 27 parties to enter the first parliament; among these political groups such as “The Free Changist Party” or parties that held titles that never lacked terms like national, social, republican, union, revolution. The confusion was maximal. Nobody knew exactly the precise number of all parties registered in Romania. The National Salvation Front was hereby preparing its own metamorphosis into a political party. This officially was announced on January 25th, 1990, as well as the Front’s intention of taking part in the elections. The decision had the dimensions of a coup d’état. Important parties of the opposition, freshly recreated, reacted promptly, organising a significant protest meeting in Bucharest only three days later. Back then, the banners read “We want justice, not Securitate,” “No more communists, no more Securitate officers,” “the Power is Held by the Securitate,” or “Remember 5 words : it’s the same as before.”3 The recovery of the Securitate structures by the authorities that came to power after 1989 is a fact expressed and proved many times and by many people in hundreds of press articles which showed how important zones of society were “contaminated” by the presence of officers of the former communist political police. The following day, January 29th, 1990, was the debut of the first measure of force taken by authorities, which was to account for the close connection of the new structures of power to communist mentalities and practices. By means of television workers were gathered and miners armed with bats were brought, in a counter - manifestation against the opposition, mainly by means of a complex 3

“Those who after December 22nd, 1989, believed that they would do away with Securitate harboured illusions. The Securitate in Romania, just like all similar institutions in the former socialist countries, is organized in such a way that even if a few of its leaders disappear, it goes on functioning without them. Its hierarchy is organized in accordance with the Indian - file principle. When one of its leaders vanishes, the whole file takes one step forward, and thus the places are occupied automatically. This type of organization, however, has a defect which destroyed the unity of the apparatus : if the chief at the head of the file changes course, all the others follow suit.” Oprea, Moştenitorii Securităţii, p. 13.

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campaign of disinformation. The headquarters of the National Peasant Party escaped devastation, and its leader, Corneliu Coposu escaped lynching only by the direct intervention of the prime minister. In a western - movie scene, Petre Roman, son of a Comintern member, turned up on a tank where he offered shelter to his rival Coposu, a politician who had been imprisoned for 17 years as opponent of the communists.

V. There were only few to notice in those days that between the crowds in the streets that continued proclaiming “Be gone Communism” and the provisional power there was a major disagreement. Most people settled for little : on TV images were broadcasted, presenting former Telephone exchanges used for interception, and recurrent appeals for “the country needs tranquillity.” Yet simultaneously, during the first months of the year 1990, authorities undertook intense activities of regrouping and control in political interests of the structures of the former Securitate. The old political police became in time more and more necessary since the tendency of the “provisional power” increased in the direction of legitimising itself as the future political force in Romania. Formally, the former Securitate had already been transferred into the subordination of the Ministry of National Defense via the decree signed on December 26th by Ion Iliescu and Nicolae Militar, and became a part of the composition of this ministry.4 On December 31st, right after Iulian Vlad, former chief of the State Securitate Department ( SSD ), and the people in his entourage had been arrested, Ion Iliescu appointed Gelu Voican Voiculescu – who at the time was vice prime minister of the Provisional Government – commander of the State Security Department.5 On the evening of the same day, at 22.00, Voican Voiculescu organized an extraordinary meeting at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, convening to it the highest - ranking officers of the Securitate. At this meeting he promised the SSD officers that the new power would not wage war against them, but would only abolish the structures of this institution. After January 2nd, 1990, General Militaru and Voican Voiculescu coordinated the takeover of the Securitate by the Ministry of National Defense. Concretely, an analysis of the organizational diagram of the Securitate was conducted and the future intelligence structures of Romania were outlined. These structures had, as a basis, the Securitate personnel and logistics which – formally – had never been abolished. The policy of assigning former Securitate operatives to governmen4

5

“The State Securitate Department, the Command of the Securitate Troops, along with the organs and units reporting to them, are being transferred into the composition of the Ministry of National Defense. In the above - mentioned formations are included the structure, budget, personnel, armament, ammunition, technical equipment, and fixed assets, as well as the assets and liabilities in the country and abroad.” Ştefănescu, Cinci ani din istoria României, p. 34. “România Liberă,” no. 1207, 1994.

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tal structures continued in parallel. In the following years lots of Securitate operatives found refuge with the government and the local structures of the power or with the Romanian representations abroad. Practically, the structures of representation of Romania remained dominated by former Securitate operatives.6 The regrouping of the former Securitate operatives was a clear signal to the West, regarding the pro - Soviet orientation of the new power in Romania. In fact, our country was the last one to sign the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the only country in the Soviet block that could sign, in April, 1991, a basic treaty with the USSR. In February 1990 an Informative Unit of the Ministry for Internal Affairs was created, and in March, under the pretext of the breakout of inter - ethnical conflicts in Tîrgu Mureş, the Romanian Intelligence Service was founded, that enrolled an important nucleus of the former Securitate. Meanwhile two more structures were reborn : The External Intelligence Service and The Guard and Protection Service for Officials. Former Securitate officers, regrouped and reactivated, provided the authorities with an extremely efficient weapon : disinformation. Countless calumnious rumours were targeted against the leaders of the opposition and published by official newspapers of the National Salvation Front and broadcasted by public radio and TV, without right to reply to re - establish the truth. At times, these almost exceeded the absurd. Here is a brief inventory of the main targets and topics of that campaign : the famous anti - communist dissident Doina Cornea, who had resigned from the Front and publicly revealed the metamorphosis of the latter into a political party – was alleged to be distributing money for political interests and to be wandering around the country to buy enterprises, to be actually Jewish and together with Radu Cîmpeanu and Ion Raţiu, whose real name was supposed to be Racz Ianos, – all Iliescu’s counter - candidates – to have signed a “treaty” with an official of the Hungarian Ministry for External Affairs. The forged document “admitted” Hungary’s rights to Transylvania and provided detailed “sale” agreements of Romanian territory for the benefit of the three. It was published several times in facsimile form and broadcasted in major cities, attesting the so - called alleged transaction. Similarly, Corneliu Coposu was said to have spent all his life in the West, in oblivion of the hardships of the Romanian people, grounds upon which a quite popular syntagm was born “you have not eaten soy salami,” inflaming the proletarian electorate to accuse them of being the new representatives of the “bour6

For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the Ministry of Tourism appointed in August, 1993, a number of seventeen former high ranking officers of the former Securitate to positions abroad, as military attachés or commercial counselors. Another eleven were transferred to the Central of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, in leadership positions, strengthening the ranks of Securitate officers already extant in these structures. Peter Ciobanu, a director in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, was known to be a former spy. For more details on the process of taking over of the former Securitate by the new power installed at Bucharest after December 22, 1989, see Oprea, Moştenitorii Securităţii, pp. 13–36.

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geoisie” and “landowners.” In the daily journal “Today,” the official newspaper of the National Salvation Front, Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu, the leader of the former anticommunist political prisoners, was accused by means of forged photographs to have taken part in assassinations committed in 1941 by the legionnaires, the organisation of Romanian Fascism, omitting the detail that at that time Corneliu Codreanu was only 12 years old.7 After the elections of 2000 Octavian Ştireanu, at that time the chief editor of the “Today” journal was chosen to be counsellor in the personal staff of president Ion Iliescu. This entire calumny campaign was turned into a permanent practice in the interval 1990–1992. It was typical of the “D” ( Disinformation ) Service under the command of Mihail Stan who had become a general in 1990 and adjunct of the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service ( RIS ), Virgil Măgureanu.8 One can only recognise in these few examples the classical pattern of accusation of rivals used by the communist regime, either of being “sold to the Jews” or to the Hungarians, although there are plenty of cases where such accusations are mutually contradictory. However, the campaign ensured – besides an etatist policy of massive subvention with electoral punt – the detached success for Ion Iliescu both at the 1990 elections and at those in 1992 or 2000. As a matter of fact, the overwhelming political success of the communist reformists in Romania in three election rounds out of five, as well as their extraordinary political regeneration capacity have been and are still ensured by the non - conflictual cohabitation of the structures of the communist party, those of the Securitate and the bureaucratic apparatus inherited from the former regime. Optimists and officials often claimed that the fate of the Communist Party, which disappeared by itself leaving no trace behind, was shared by the former Securitate. But this disappearance is nothing but a game of appearance. The Decree regarding the dissolution of the Romanian Communist Party ( RCP ), signed under the pressure of the crowd on January 12th, 1990, was repealed only five days later, by a decision of the Council of the National Salvation Front.9 Dissolution would have raised the issue of dividing procedures for the RCP patrimony. Subsequently, by decree 30/ January 18th, it was officially announced that the RCP patrimony was to become state property : It actually consisted of the patrimony of the former party household; Ceauşescu’s hunting villas, shifted to “the state” and given “to the people.” For a month the rest was silence : 7 8

9

The perusing of the collection of the daily newspaper “Azi” ( official newspaper of the NSF ) of the months February–May, 1990, is enlightening as regards this slandering and disinformation campaign. Consulting the collection of daily journals Azi [ Today ] ( official publ. of the FNS ), Adevărul [ The Truth ], Tineretul liber [ Free youth ] ( former official publ. of the RCP, respectively of the Union of Communist Youth ) as well as other journals close to the Front, especially for the period of February–June 1990, but also towards the end of 1992 – proved highly relevant with regard to the above mentioned disinformation and calumniation campaign. Cf. Ştefănescu, Cinci ani din istoria României, pp. 46–47. Most information originates in this volume, as well as in : Ştefănescu, Doi ani din istoria României.

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banc accounts, active and passive shareholding, other than the “party farms.” Similar to the RCP, regarding the Securitate there were more than one motivations : On the one hand the political reasons of the new power were hesitating to make a final cut from the past and on the other hand another one : We should call it the privatisation of the communist regime, according to the pattern the process was taking place at that point in the USSR too.10 The conclusion draws itself : continuation of former structures was not inhibited by reforms; quite on the contrary, reform contributed to their consolidation, by transforming former communist and Securitate officers into an oligarchy that transgresses any type of ideology, any political programme that penetrated not only the National Salvation Front and its political heirs but also the entire structure of Romanian society. A silent, efficient mafia that is only seldomly violent, since it controls or is able to influence the state structures up to the highest level. The Securitate penetrated the Parliament, the Securitate leads from the Government, and the Securitate executes the orders of the power inside the secret services, the Securitate privatized. In policy or in business Securitate people act in accordance with their own rules which have nothing to do with either democracy or market economy based on contracts. Those who stand in their way or those they need are either bought or compromised, as the case may be. Sources of corruption and onerous business, involved in smuggling cigarettes, diesel oil, alcohol and even weapons, bank - bankrupting “advisers” or organizers of financial embezzlements masked as investments funds, always with a sizable political protection and command as well as logistic support, the Securitate people are the fifth power in the Romanian state today. The former Securitate operatives supported and maintained in Romania the climate of corruption in which they move like fish in water, in order to feed with immense amounts of money the political class detaining power. They make, practically, the connection between the political and business zones, situated on the fringes of law, with great potentials of gaining quick profit. Any action against Securitate - Mafia groups failed for this very reason, so as not to “cut” the substantial incomes that fed the welfare of the social - democratic dignitaries. The number of villas, luxury cars, and the size of their bank accounts are directly proportional to the degree of closeness of these links, sometimes based on personal affinities, as in the case of former prime minister Adrian Năstase, counseled at that time by the godfather of one of his sons, the Colonel Ristea Priboi, albeit Adrian Năstase knew very well at that time the request of the North Atlantic Alliance ( NATO ) and of the European partners to diminish the pole of power of former Securitate operatives.

10 For the revealed and illustrated Model of documents from the archives of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union, see Bukovski, Judgment in Moscow.

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VI. The political life of Romania has not had nuances. It has ideologically been situated on two main areas – the large and perfectly - organised group of former communists was opposed by three main political parties, The National Peasant Christian – Democrat Party, The National Liberal Party and The Social Democrat Party, reviving the tradition of the left - wing in the period between the two World Wars. These were accompanied by numerous organisations of civil society, that were highly active and united in supporting a proclamation, launched on March 11th in Timişoara, which provided under pt. eight the restriction from any electoral list for a period of three mandates of all former activists of the communist party or former Securitate members. The opposition was seriously defeated in the first elections held May 20th 1990. The National Salvation Front won 67 percent of all mandates. In addition to this percentage there was also a series of small parties, “path comrades”, funded under its tutorship. The opposition was hardly able to sum up 10 percent. Ion Iliescu was elected president by more than 85 percent of the total of registered votes, against the background of massive participation of the population to the polls. The only real opposition formula was that of the street : in the Piaţa Universităţii [ University Square ] in Bucharest, but also in major cities throughout the country, marathon - manifestations had started sharing the objective of determining the authorities to adopt pt. eight of the Timişoara Proclamation. But after acceding to power by elections the Front’s reaction against the manifestants was quite a tough one. In Bucharest several manifestants were arrested on the night from the 13th to the 14th of June, 1990. The following day a harsh clash burst in the streets between the manifestants and the police forces. Miners were summoned by president Ion Iliescu to come to the capital city where they unleashed violence with sheer atrocity; simultaneously police and army units fired against the manifestants. Officially six people died and 560 were injured. Over 1,000 people were arrested. The brutality of those days are said to have pushed back Romania to the Middle Ages. Those responsible for these events, Ion Iliescu and Petre Roman, have not been brought to justice yet. After the elections in May 1990 the power held by communist structures gained legitimacy. At the institutional level this is accounted for by the reactivation of many activists of the RCP and former Securitate officers who had stayed out of the spotlights for a while. Making use of their expertise, a new operation was initialised, one that has been running to the present day – gaining economic power by transferring the property of the socialist state firstly into the ownership of the members of these structures and only secondly and to a relatively small extent back to the ownership of the rightful owners from which the communist regime had initially confiscated it. This was, however, impeded by the direct intervention of president Ion Iliescu who has officially declared that he considers private property to be nothing but “a trifle.” As a direct consequence of

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the large regrouping of former communist structures the latter won once more the elections on September 27th, 1992, even if the score was significantly lower. Two elements contributed to this loss. The first is the coagulation of the political forces of the opposition and of civil society into an alliance, The Democratic Convention, which managed to sum up 20 percent of the votes. The Convention’s candidate, Emil Constantinescu, represented a threat for Ion Iliescu, the latter being elected president in the second round with a percentage of 47, as opposed to 31 percent held by his counter - candidate. The second element was the schism of the National Salvation Front into the reformist group led by ex - Prime Minister Petre Roman and the conservative wing, having Ion Iliescu as its leader. Roman had been discarded from the position at the top of the government in September 1991, still by means of the brutal intervention of the miners, fact that only deepened the clash between the two wings within the Front. In March 1992 the Front comes to the point of actual schism, Iliescu’s people forming the Front of Social Democracy in Romania, namely the conservative wing that won elections in September of the same year.

VII. In the interval 1992–1996 the country was pushed into an era that was very much similar to that under Brezhnev in the USSR. If one should ask anybody what happened during that period, the questioned person will probably think for quite a while and then answer a little puzzled that he / she can not recall anything. The Prime Minister of that period, Nicolae Vacaroiu, former activist of the RCP, head of the State Committee of Planification during the communist regime, was not exactly an adept of liberal reform. The proliferation of corruption at highest level paralleled by the economic directing and the subvention policy targeted to favour the pro - communist electorate continued, to the detriment of real performance. Eventually, the reverse of this stagnation policy and even economic retrogression caught up with the conservatives and Ion Iliescu who lost the elections in November 1996. The Democratic convention gathered 37 percent of the votes, forming the government together with the democratic reformists led by Petre Roman and the party of the Hungarian minority. Emil Constantinescu scored higher than Ion Iliescu, winning the second round for presidency with 54 percent. The four years when the DCR and its allies governed, despite all of its flaws, set up the path for Romania’s adhesion to NATO and the European Union, mainly by means of a more determined reform policy and a definitely clear prowestern orientation of the Romanian external policy, to contrast the duplicitary one formerly practiced by communist conservatives. The political price for the reforms, the dissensions within the governing coalition, Romania’s involvement in supporting NATO intervention in Yugoslavia – drastically criticised by anti western partisans and by Ion Iliescu’s nationalist partners, has led to the ero-

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sion of the Convention’s governing and of Emil Constantinescu’s image. The main governing party, The National Peasant Christian – Democrat Party, actually disappeared from the political scenery, and the ex - president payed the price for this first right - wing governing in Romania after 1989. With the elections of 2000, Ion Iliescu and his party returned to governing and holding the destiny of the country. The force and nocivity of informal power networks led by large groups of former Securitate operatives was signalled in several circumstances. During Bill Clinton’s visit to Bucharest Jim Steinberg, deputy adviser for the national security of the White House, declared for example that “the Romanian secret services are full of former Securitate officers, to whom no NATO secrets can be entrusted.” Unfortunately, no declaration by President Iliescu or by the Prime Minister Adrian Năstase’s did touch upon this subject. The Romanian authorities rather insisted upon laws of defending NATO secrets, bypassing the essential : those who represent a real danger for these secrets are the very Securitate operatives who guard them. Trained as rivals of NATO, as they betrayed Ceauşescu so they can betray the secrets of the Alliance. Another interval of four years followed, when on the basis of external pro - western policy this time the former communist conservatives played the political pro - NATO and pro - Europe role of their predecessors. With regard to internal affairs, however, the economic policy of the interval 1992–1996 was resumed. First was the transfer of state property into ownership of the groups of interest loyal to power. The proliferation of corruption at high level and the founding of a real system of a political economic mafia that was controlled from the highest level has led to substantial wealth of some officials, as well as that of the old communist structures that supported the power of Iliescu’s conservatives, once more reactivated after having been pushed aside during 1996–2000. The high levels of corruption and the arrogance of the so - called social - democrats, led by Adrian Năstase, an ex “YES man” of Iliescu’s team, have again brought about the loss of elections by the former communists in late 2004.

VIII. During the whole transition period Romania was exposed to the huge and constant pressure of the structures of former activists and of the communist nomenclature, which dictated the decisions in both the internal policy and strategy and in the external ones. On the other hand, in the Parliament, Government, Justice, secret services, and press large groups of former Securitate operatives could actively influence decision-making on things they were interested in. Over the years these structures have constituted and consolidated themselves in informal power networks. At present, a new coalition has been governing for almost one year, a coalition consisting of The National Liberal Party, The Democrat Party and their allies : the party of the Hungarian minority and another one, self - nom-

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inated as conservative, created by a former collaborator of the Securitate. Traian Basescu was elected president, who began his career in the National Salvation Front, his next option being for the reformist wing of the Front – and eventually imprinting to his political party a political perspective that clearly opposed the conservative views of the former communists, grouped mainly in the SocialDemocrat Party and in the nationalist Romania Mare Party. The former still hold the population’s confidence. The latter hold an enormous economic power and the occult Power of the Securitate – while the authorities show no signs to know how or be able to disperse. Exactly on grounds of these considerations there is a risk that the single contribution brought by Romania to the common European capital should be the experience of the survival of communist and Securitate structures and their ability to perfectly adapt to the mechanisms of market economy by perverting them through corruption. The conflict between the two main wings, the liberal - democrat on the one hand and the conservative on the other hand, is still in progress, and the result is still uncertain. Hence, Romania remains a place of political paradox. I shall conclude by two personal examples, meant to account for this situation. First, a while ago the Prime Minister of the country, Călin Tăriceanu, offered me to run the National Archives of Romania. I accepted and announced my programme : withdrawing the archives from the control of the Ministry of Internal Affaires and unclassifying entirely all archives of the Communist Party. As a consequence, I was no longer eligible for this position, due to the vehement opposition of the Minister of Internal Affaires, a politician originating in the structures of the former Front of National Salvation. One of the final steps is the opening of all the archives which contain files up to 1990 and beyond that. Based upon releases from the archives people will be able to know and to judge the activities of the secret police in the last days of the regime. We also have to be sure that at the head of the archives we have open people whose solely professional and personal mission and interest is guaranteeing to others access to the truth. We have come a long way and our efforts were not in vain : we, and when I say we I mean the Institute, have discovered 210 ex - camp commanders who committed genocide before 1989. Based upon the evidence, the experts of the Institute have found these criminals who will be brought to the justice !11 Second, recently I was elected a member of the City Council in Braşov, an important city in Transylvania. During the ceremony of taking the oath I was surprised to re - encounter in the person of the Secretary of City Hall, holding the Bible in front of me and uttering the words I had to repeat, expressing my 11

A book has been officially launched in Bucharest, which gathers the work of the researchers from the governmental Institute for the Investigation of the Crimes of Communism in Romania Institute which I am currently running. This is our first report and the title needs no explanation : Why should we condemn communism ? The answer is rather simple : because, among many other malign characteristics, the communist regimes developed institutions like the Securitate, where people like those above mentioned worked with dedication for their mission : that of restraining the liberties of others.

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commitment to defend the Constitution and the values of Democracy – none other than a former Securitate officer. Instead of any conclusion I have only a single reflexion to add. Back in the 1980s a writer, friend of mine, used to say : “Romania has one foot in the Balkans and the other one in the tomb.” I believe the formula is still valid, only we have switched position – nowadays the foot outside the tomb is in Europe.

The Socialist Party of Serbia Irena Ristić In Serbia the year the Berlin Wall fell was the year of the “happening of the people”. This was the phrase used by the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia ( SPS ) and the media under its control to describe the euphoria the radical changes in the Eastern European states had triggered off in Serbia, too. In Serbia, however, this euphoria had two characteristics : It was not spread by a democratic party or formation but by the former, not reformed, Communist Party of Serbia. This latter still considered itself the legitimate ruling party, and it enjoyed wide - spread support. On the other hand, this euphoria did not aim at a new democratic beginning but at the pursuit of nationalist goals intending neither reform nor a change of system. The SPS was defined as the successor party of the Communist Party of Serbia, using two criteria : firstly, John Ishiyama’s definition of ex - communist parties as those formations which are enrooted within the old regime and have taken over most of the assets, the membership, and the leadership of the former communists.1 Secondly, Michael Waller's criterion : He acts on the assumption that ideological as well as organizational continuity have to be visible at the respective successor party. Explaining organizational continuity, Waller especially emphasizes the remaining in office of the leadership of the party. Thus, if there has not been a change of leadership, one can correctly assume continuity. Therefore, in the case of Serbia the SPS can be taken as the successor party of the Communist Party of Serbia.2

I.

State of the Art

The personality of party leader and Serbian president Slobodan Milošević cannot be separated from the Socialist Party of Serbia. Doubtlessly, the latter is an extremely complex object of research. Contrary to the developments in its closer and more distant environment, this successor party of the Communist Party had 1 2

Ishiyama, Communist Parties in Transition. In : Comparative Politics, 27 (1995) 2, pp. 147–166, here 148. Waller, Party Inheritances and Party Identities. In : Pridham / Vanhanen ( Eds.), Democratization in Eastern Europe. Quoted from : Goati, Stabilizacija demokratije ili povratak, p. 57.

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enjoyed wide and stable support before 1989 and did so in the decade to follow. Until 2000 the SPS continued to maintain its position as the leading party in Serbia. The state of research concerning the SPS is only partly satisfactory and could even be called poor in some fields. It is satisfactory especially concerning empirical research on the social structure and identification with the party of the SPS electorate. Thus, there are numerous empirical studies of the time after the first parliamentary elections in Serbia in 1990 until 2006, among others by Mihailović, Pantić, and Slavujević,3 as well as annual surveys of the Belgrade Institute of Social Sciences. They do not only provide a wide socio - structural “X- ray” of the SPS electorate but also elucidate its values and attitudes on relevant political and social topics. The programmatic and ideological developments of the party since 1989 have been equally well researched, as well as its characterization according to the typologies common in Western European research on parties. Vladimir Goati, a Serbian researcher, has published numerous monographs. We have to take into consideration, though, that the above mentioned empirical studies as well as those by Goati treat the SPS and its electorate only as one aspect of more extensive general studies of parties. To this day, there is no monograph concentrating exclusively on the SPS and its electorate. This gap has not been filled by a foreign author, either.4 The research on the reasons of the strong and continuous power of the SPS is rather inadequate, especially among international authors. However, the reasons that can be traced back to the figure of Slobodan Milošević as well as the means he used ( like the media, state funds, clientelism ) have at least been researched to the greatest possible extent by Serbian authors ( amongst others Slaviša Orlović, Jovanka Matić ). However, there has been no research on the causes resulting from the historic frame in which the SPS appears on the scene. They are almost boundless because the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the solution of the national questions of Serbia and the other ex - Yugoslav states would have to be considered as well as the results of specifically Yugoslav communism and the repeatedly failed attempts at modernization in the history of Serbia. At this point the consideration of specific social structures, collective attitudes and socio - economic developments would be indispensable in order to position Serbia and thus the SPS into adequate surroundings. Even though some Serbian authors such as Latinka Perović and Dubravka Stojanović have started to look into this highly complex field, only fragments of it have been dealt with so far. 3

4

See : Mihailović ( Ed.), Javno mnenje Srbije; Mihailović et al. ( Eds.), Političke podele u Srbiji; Pantić / Pavlović, Stranačke pristalice i komponente političke kulture u Srbiji. In: Lutovac ( Ed.), Političke stranke, pp. 41–113; Pantić, Value Orientation. In : Goati ( Ed.), Elections to the Federal and Republican, pp. 69–85; Slavujević, Promene socijalne utemeljenosti. In : Lutovac ( Ed.), Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije, pp. 189–237. Foreign publications have also only treated the SPS in the frame of broad studies of exYugoslav / Eastern European parties or party systems. See for example : Weckbauer / Hoffmeister, Die Entwicklung der politischen Parteien; Ziemer, Wahlen in postsozialistischen Staaten; Kitschelt et al., Post - Communist Party System.

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In the international research on modernization Serbia is also barely present. The most likely exceptions are the publications by Holm Sundhaussen and some of Karl Kaser's and Marie - Janine Calic's studies.5

II.

Before 1989 : A Historical Survey

Since the break with Stalin in 1948/1949 at the latest, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia ( from 1952 : League of Communists of Yugoslavia LCY – Savez komunista Jugoslavije ) was not altogether comparable with the communist parties in the other Eastern European states. Under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito Yugoslavia was not only no satellite state of the Soviet Union but also developed an authentic variety of communism at the same time. One of the most decisive characteristics of the latter was its principle of “socialist self - management”. Aside from this distinctive feature, however, the LCY followed the same principles known from other communist countries ( i. e. dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism, planned economy, primacy of the party ) and repressed autonomous political powers in the same way. Even though crises of domestic policy seemed to be quickly overcome by ostensible reforms of the system ( the last substantial reforms had been carried out in 1963 and 1974), the aforementioned communist principles, especially the primacy of the party and its leadership, were never challenged.6 Between 1945 and 1989 there were no strong protests or riots. This may well be explained by the economic situation and the openness of the country which in turn depended on the generous international financial and political support Yugoslavia enjoyed as a country “between East and West”. This is why the population in Yugoslavia perceived the communist system as a quite successful model. Therefore, this ideology was much more authentic in Yugoslavia than in other states of the Eastern Bloc.7 After the death of Josip Broz Tito and a permanently deepening economic crisis the LCY was confronted with enormous political and economic problems in the mid - 1980s. The institutionalized party monopoly, the prohibition of any individual political initiative, the continuing inferiority of the planned economy, as well as the accompanying deficit of legitimacy of the regime were just one side of the medal. The other one was the deep discord within the LCY between the ethnicities, the loss of the privileged position of Yugoslavia between the two superpowers, the intensifying of separatist and nationalist tendencies, as well as the unresolved and escalating problem of the Kosovo.8 In this situation the LCY was too weak as a factor of integration. The party organizations of the different 5 6 7 8

Even though a historical approach could explain more plausibly the appearance of Slobodan Milošević and the strength of the SPS, it will not be in the focus of this study for apparent reasons. Goati, Stabilizacija demokratije ili povratak monizmu, p. 24. Mundiju- Pipidi, Miloševićevi. In: Mundiju- Pipidi/ Krastev ( Eds.), Nacionalizam posle, pp. 47–95, here 54. Goati, Smisao jugoslovenskog pluralističkog šoka, pp. 107, 131.

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republics broke up, which was in effect the end of the existence of the LCY.9 One of the two major opponents was the League of Communists of Slovenia striving for reforms, de - centralized pluralist elections and a confederal system of government in Yugoslavia. The other one was the Communist League of Serbia ( CLS ), fighting radical reform and insisting on keeping a centralist - monistic party system as well as a federal Yugoslavia.10 This dispute heralded the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia and definitely transferred the political power to the level of the republics where it concentrated in the hands of the respective political elites. Led by their own national interests and reform concepts, those elites now had to find a solution for the common state. At this point, i. e. in the late 1980s, Slobodan Milošević had already consolidated his power with the LYC. At the eighth session of the central committee of the LYC in September 1987 he had managed to stand up to his political foster father, Ivan Stambolić, and to step by step purge the party respectively its central committee as well as the state apparatus from reform oriented and liberal politicians.11 The 8th session and the following purges of the party can be considered the zero hour of the power of Milošević and his party.

III.

Genesis, Party Organs, and Party Program

1.

The Formation of the SPS

It was not until the mid - 1990s, i. e. significantly later than the other communist parties in Yugoslavia, that the LYC decided ( at least ) to rename. At its inaugural party convention the LYC and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia merged into the Socialist Party of Serbia. The SPS secured about 160 million US$ in cash and real estate by this merger with the Alliance. A solid majority elected Slobodan Milošević as the head of the party. The main committee consisted of 111 members, most of whom had been high functionaries of the LYC before.12 9

Formally, the LCY ceased its work at the 14th extraordinary party congress in Belgrade on January 22, 1990. 10 Goati, Stabilizacija demokratije ili povratak, pp. 34 f. 11 At the time of the 8th session of the LYC central committee Ivan Stambolić was still an important and popular politician. Before 1987 he had been a close friend of the Milošević family. After this session he withdrew from politics and continued his carreer far away from public attention in the field of economy. In 2000, however, his name reappeared in the media, inter alia as a potential presidential candidate of the Serb opposition against Milošević. But when taking a walk in August 2000 he disappeared without a trace. In the course of the search for the assassins of prime minister Zoran Đinđić in March 2003 it was discovered that Stambolić had been kidnapped and killed by special operations units of the Serbian Ministry of Interior. Milošević is presumed to have ordered the murder. 12 Bieber, Nationalismus in Serbien, p. 235.

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Party Organs

According to its statutes, the congress, the main committee, and the president are among the most important organs of the SPS. The highest decision - making body is the congress, usually meeting every four years. Its delegate participants decide the general political directives of the party. The congress elects the president as well as the main committee of the party. According to the statutes, the main committee holds more power than the president of the party. But in fact, studying the history of the SPS, this power has never been realized. From its foundation until early 2007 there was a total of seven SPS party congresses. All this time only two party presidents were elected, while changes in the composition of the main and executive committees were far more frequent. 2.1

The President of the Party

According to the 1990 statutes, the president coordinated the work of the party and was responsible for the convening of the main committee. The 1992 statutes enlarged his authority to the extent that from then on the president also coordinated the relationship between the party organs and the President of Serbia and other state functionaries, provided they were SPS - members. The 2000 statutes once again enlarged the presidential authority by making the president head of the main committee, who could also propose party functionaries. The 2003 statutes cut back the office of the president for the first time : The right to propose party functionaries returns to the main committee, furthermore, the president is no longer head of the main office ex officio. This decision was owed to the fact that then party president Slobodan Milošević was imprisoned at the Hague tribunal and therefore was not able to make internal party decisions.13 At the first SPS congress in July 1990 Slobodan Milošević was elected president. At all following party congresses he was re - elected with a large majority. His last re - election took place at the 6th congress in January 2003. He was elected in absentia because he was already imprisoned. He died in March 2006, but the SPS did not elect a new president until December 2006. At this election the head of the main committee, Ivica Dačić, won a narrow victory over Milorad Vučelić.14

13 Statute of the SPS – www.sps.org.yu 14 Dačić: Niko nema pravo da kaže da se neće ratovati. In : Politika, Dec.04, 2006 ( internet edition ).

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The Main Committee

Even though according to the first statutes, the main committee played a central role, with every change of statutes it lost power to the president, as described in the chapter above. During Slobodan Milošević’s leadership the main committee was reduced to an organ of the execution of his personal policy and a mere instrument of affirmation. This is shown by the high fluctuation of its members. Thus, criticism of Slobodan Milošević, his leadership, or of the attitudes he wanted to impose on the party by leading party functionaries, often led to “party purges”. Without any exception Milošević kept the upper hand while his challengers lost their seats in the main committee or even left the party for good. The first important “purging wave” ended in 1996, when only 5 out of 26 main committee members in office were re - elected. More reorganizations of the main committee followed in 1997 and 2000.15 The frequent exchange of high party cadres indicates persistent opposition against Slobodan Milošević’s policy. Milošević’s drastic measures, on the other hand, prove his ability to win the majority of the party against any challenge and exchange “menacing elements”. With every disciplinary measure of this type he ascertained his monocratic leadership of the party and threatened future internal competitors. Party researcher Orlović is convinced that Milošević intended the permanent exchange of high party cadres to prevent anybody from coming too close – especially concerning the degree of knowledge, authority within the party, and popularity with the general public.16 Summing up, the SPS lacked decisive criteria of internal democracy within the party, at least from 1990 to 2003. The relationship between the leadership and the membership of the party as well as the decisions were determined by Slobodan Milošević. With every change of the statute he expanded the power of the party president at the disadvantage of the main committee. Opposing minority opinions beginning to gain support were retaliated against by exchanging or defaming the respective cadres. Furthermore, the distribution of power within the party was neither clear nor transparent. Therefore, the controlling function of the main committee was but an empty claim. Finally, concerning internal democracy there was no transparent de - centralized party organization. Power concentrated on Slobodan Milošević and a small oligarchic circle selected and controlled by him.17 Robert Michels’s dictum “Whoever mentions organi15 Orlović, Liderstvo u političkim partijama Srbije. In : Lutovac ( Ed.), Političke stranke i birači, p. 137–173, here 155–159. A direct consequence of these disagreements was the foundation of five new parties : Social Democratic Party (1992), Democratic Alternative (1997), Socialist Democracy (2000), Serbian Social Democratic Party (2002), and Serbian People’s Party (2002). All of them play only a marginal role today. Orlović, Nedemokratičnost partija i demokratizacija društva. In : Lutovac ( Ed.), Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije, p. 95–121, here 107. 16 Ibid., p. 157. 17 Stojiljković, Struktura, modeli i praksa. In : Lutovac ( Ed.), Političke stranke u Srbiji, pp. 15–31, here 20.

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zation, speaks of a tendency to oligarchy,” was more than justified for the SPS under Slobodan Milošević. The December 2006 elections of the new party president give the first indication of a more open exchange of opinions within the SPS where even the new president Ivica Dačić does not enjoy total support nor does he claim absolute leadership while disregarding the main committee.18 3. 3.1

Basic Party Programs and Ideology of the SPS The First Basic Party Program of the SPS of 1990

In its first party program the SPS criticizes the “bureaucratic deformations” and the “cult of personality” of the former regime of communist Yugoslavia with its negative influence especially on Serbia.19 Still, the party breaks with the past with far less determination than other ex - communist parties. For example, positive aspects of the former regime are underlined, especially its commitment to the interests of “workers, intelligentsia, and farmers, i. e. those who live from their work”.20 Furthermore, the SPS program emphasizes the principles of socialist egalitarianism such as social equality and solidarity. Accordingly, especially those human rights are pointed out which center on economic and social rights, for example the right to work, to free education and health insurance, or to welfare. Concerning economic policy, in its first party program the SPS supports an etatist concept of market economy with the state maintaining its regulating role and common property the primary base of the economic order.21 The first party program cannot be considered a clear ideological dissociation from communism at all and thus no attempt to establish ties to the concept of Western social democracy.22 Just the opposite, the SPS considers itself a representative of continuity and therefore a supporter of the idea of the old regime. Consequently, socialism continues to be regarded a desirable alternative to market economy.23 Differing from most ex - communist parties, the SPS does not 18 Dačić: Niko nema pravo da kaže da se neće ratovati. In : Politika, Dec. 04, 2006. (Internet edition ). This moderate attitude of the new leadership partly results from the present situation oft he SPS. Compared to the 1990s, its power has greatly declined : After the 2000 change of regime it received only a little over 6% of the vote at the last two parliamentary elections. 19 Essential programmatic features of the Socialist Party of Serbia of the 1st congress on July 16, 1990, p. 1 ( www.sps.org.yu ) 20 The mentioning of the intellgentsia, the interests of whom the party claimed to represent besides those of workers and farmers it traditionally supported, can be considered an attempt of the SPS to free itself from the image of a mass party and adopt one more like a catch - all party. 21 But all other forms of property are explicitly listed as equally valid. Vukomanović, Legitimacijske matrice. In : Lutovac ( Ed.), Političke stranke u Srbiji, pp. 31–61, here 43. 22 For example, trade unions are not mentioned anywhere. Ibid., p. 44. 23 Therefore, the conviction of the SPS that market economic uncertainties would not threaten the citizens‘ existence was not just electoral tactics but rather the consequence

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even try to deny or hide its ideological continuity with the LYC, at least considering economic and social questions.24 In the first party program the national question occupies only marginal space, shortly before the final chapters. The territorial unity of Serbia is confirmed, while the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohia are granted autonomy. The SPS considers it its task “to do everything to explain to the world the whole truth about Kosovo and Metohia, about the causes and grave effects of the activities of the Albanian chauvinists and separatists.”25 Concerning political restructuring within Yugoslavia, the suggestions of the program remain very unclear and vague. A “modern federation” is evoked, where all peoples enjoy equal rights. The SPS demands a new Yugoslav constitution to “enable the creation of autonomous provinces in all of Yugoslavia according to the will of the population and different national, historical, cultural, and other characteristics.”26 Evidently, these claims are not intended to be applied to the autonomous regions of Serbia but primarily to the Croatian regions populated by Serbs.27 3.2

The Second Basic Party Program of the SPS of 1992

The first party program had focused on continuity with the old regime and the national question had played rather a subordinate role. With its 1992 party program the SPS pursued a different course. In 1991 Croatia and Slovenia had declared their independence, and in 1992 the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina had broken out. The regime in Serbia experienced a deep crisis. While the UN introduced economic sanctions, the opposition demanded new elections which were finally held in December 1992. Accordingly, the SPS changed its program. The new party program of December 1992 clearly intensified its nationalist rhetoric. It complained about the new world order, with Yugoslavia being its first victim. While the first program mentioned cooperation with the EU respectively the international community, the 1992 program alludes to the alienation and “isolationist tendencies”28 towards the international community. Furthermore, the right of self - determination of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is explicitly insisted in.29 As for Kosovo, the attitude of the SPS remains the same

24

25 26 27 28 29

of the strong conviction of socialism being a realistic option. Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990 do 1998, pp. 28 ff. Paradoxically, it secured an essential part of its electorate by its commitment to continuity with the values of the old regime and by the fact that it was the successor party of the LYC. See more details in chapters IV and V. Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990 do 1998, p. 30. Essential programmatic features of the Socialist Party of Serbia of the 1st Congress on July 16, 1990, p.11 ( www.sps.org.yu ). Ibid., p.10. Bieber, Nationalismus in Serbien, p. 244. Ibid., p. 247. Essential programmatic features of the Socialist Party of Serbia of the 2nd Congress on Oct. 24, 1992, pp. 28–31 ( www.sps.org.yu )

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as 1990, even though the language of the second party program is much more nationalist.30 This second program is still valid today. It shows the renunciation of the old Soviet - communist ideas and the turning to a “new left”. This has been summed up in the principle of “democratic socialism”, containing general values such as liberty, social justice, peace, and solidarity. Defining its understanding of democracy, the SPS especially mentioned direct democracy ( referendum ).31 The system of a mixed economy described in the first program remained unchanged. 32 3.3

Declarations and Documents

The second basic party program has remained valid until now, even if the SPS does no longer exclusively align its activities with it. The change of its guidelines becomes visible from its declarations or from documents of party congresses. At the 3rd Congress in March 1996, for example, in the document „Serbia 2000 : A Step into the New Century”, the policy of isolation and alienation from the EU and the international community was given up. Since the Congress took place only a few months after the Dayton Agreement, the “consequent peace policy” of the SPS was credited with the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and substantiated with Milošević’s role at the peace negotiations. When the UN sanctions ended, the SPS once again admitted its interest in co - operating with the EU.33 Furthermore, the chapter entitled “Offensive Diplomatic Activity” formulates the integration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into international organizations respectively the joining of the international community as its goal.34 Nation and the so - called national question played a minor role again in this document. The SPS kept up its peace rhetoric until 1997/98 when the Kosovo crisis began. Then it moved nationalist contents and the emphasis of the threat to Serbia by the international community back into the center. Consequently, this rhetoric is mirrored in the document “Reconstruction – Development – Reform” of the 4th Congress. Just like after the Dayton Agreement, Milošević tried again to present himself and his party as the winners of the “war against NATO“ because the NATO bombings had happened just a few months earlier. Confronted with a deep economic crisis and internationally isolated, in this February 2000 document the SPS focused on patriotism ( “modern patriotic left party” ) and conceded a lot of space to the support of small and medium size

30 31 32 33 34

Ibid., pp. 32 ff . Ibid., pp. 5 ff. Ibid., pp. 12f. Striving for membership was not explicitly mentioned, though. Srbija 2000 – Korak u novi vek, document of the 3rd congress of March 2, 1996, p.16 f. ( www.sps.org.yu )

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private enterprises and to the reconstruction of the economy.35 Once again, the party addresses all social spheres. As far as domestic affairs are concerned, the SPS continues to insist in a federation with Montenegro36 in spite of the fact that already in 1997 the Montenegrin government led by Milo Đukanović had broken with Milošević’s regime and had been striving for independence ever since. Just like in 1992, the relationship with the international community and with the EU is characterized as very reserved. It is emphasized that “during NATO aggression Yugoslavia proved once again that it fought against neo - colonialism and hegemonism and won.”37 While striving for the re - integration into the UN and international organizations, the SPS at the same time seeks support from China, Russia, and the non - aligned states.38 The Kosovo continues to be considered an integral part of Serbia in spite of NATO - intervention.39 After the regime change in October 2000 the party still does not change its rhetoric. At the 5th Congress in November 2000 Milošević speaks of “saving the Yugoslav idea,”40 of the international community’s fiasco in the Kosovo,41 and about Serbia “having to fight at several front lines simultaneously again today.”42 These attitudes are accompanied by the conviction of the SPS that the regime change was a putsch and that the new government is not legitimate. Only in 2003 the SPS modifies its distant position by the „Declaration of the 6th Congress of the Socialist Party of Serbia”. The democratic government is accused of a neo - liberal economic policy and of being the main responsible body for the poor economic and social situation in Serbia. But the insinuations regarding a putsch are decreasing. Furthermore, this document mentions the EU - integration of Serbia for the first time.43 At this point Slobodan Milošević was already at The Hague tribunal, and the faction he supported within the party still considering the regime change a putsch and disapproving of EU - integration was no longer successful at this congress.

35 Obnova - razvoj - reforme, documents of the 4th congress on Feb. 17, 2000, p. 3 ff (www. sps.org.yu ). 36 Ibid., p. 26. 37 Ibid., p. 30. 38 Ibid., pp. 30 f. 39 Ibid., p. 27. 40 Kongresni referat Slobodana Miloševića, documents of the 5th extraordinary congress on Nov. 25, 2000, p. 1 ( www.sps.org.yu ). 41 Ibid., p. 4. 42 He talks about the fight against the new democratic government, whose representatives Milošević regards as traitors and foreign agents, as well as the fight against the NATO - states. Ibid., p. 7. 43 Deklaracija šestog kongresa Socijalističke partije Srbije, Januara 2003, p. 2 (www. sps.org.yu ). The approval of EU - integration is not credible because the SPS refuses any form of cooperation with the The Hague Tribunal. This, however, was the elementary precondition of the EU for the consideration of Serbia’s candidacy.

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Electoral Results of the SPS

Between 1990 and 2007 the citizens of Serbia were called to the urns at seven parliamentary and six presidential elections.44 Until September 2000 the SPS was able to maintain its position as the winner. In those years the party received between 28% and 46% of the vote, and at presidential elections the SPS candidates generally received even more support. After the regime change in October 2000 the support of the SPS dropped drastically at all elections. Nowadays the party is able to win only about 5% of the electorate. 1.

The 1990 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

The first multiparty elections in Serbia were held in December 1990. Compared to the other Yugoslav republics, this was very late. The SPS was convinced that all necessary reforms of the system had already been carried out in Serbia before 1989 by the so - called “anti - bureaucratic revolution”. This latter was considered the answer to the question of the political system, which therefore was not a topic at these first pluralist elections in Serbia anymore. Therefore, contrary to the situation of the other Eastern European states, those elections cannot be considered founding elections but rather pre - founding elections.45 By the end of 1990 the SPS was already firmly established. Being the successor party of the LYC, it occupied all important positions within the state, including those in the state electronic and print media. The opposition, on the other 44 The parliamentary elections of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia respectively the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro from 2003 to 2007 are not considered in this study (with the exception of the 2000 elections of the Federal President ) for two reasons : On the one hand, this federation more or less functioned only on paper, while the power was with the respective republics whose leaderships essentially dominated the policy at the federal level. See : Goati, Stabilizacija demokratije ili povratak monizmu, p. 16. The federal institutions were somewhat strengthened, but in reality only the office of the Federal President, when in 1997 Slobodan Milošević let himself ( illegally ) be elected President of the FRY by the Federal Parliament because according to the Serbian constitution he could no longer run for the office of the President of Serbia. As president of the FRY Slobodan Milošević in fact transferred the authority and power of the President of Serbia to the Federal President in order to be able to keep ruling. This office is important to this study only to the extent that at the preponed elections of the Federal President ( who according to a change of the constitution was no longer elected by the parliament but at a direct election by the people ) Milošević was voted out for the first time. The second reason for not analyzing the elections of the Federal Parliament in this study depends on the fact that the presentation of the Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections provides a satisfactory overview of the development of the SPS. The presentation of the federal results would diminish the comprehensibility without providing any additional insight because the polls were held separately in every republic. 45 Ziemer, Wahlen in postsozialistischen Staaten. In : Ziemer ( Ed.), Wahlen in postsozialistischen Staaten, pp. 9–29, here 13 f. Accordingly, the elections of September 2000 are taken to be the Serbian founding elections.

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hand, had neither enough financial means at its disposal nor did the media provide them with enough opportunity to present themselves – with the exception of some print media of little importance. But the decisive factor of these first pluralist elections was the electoral law. This had been passed in the single - party parliament of Serbia before the elections and without the participation of the opposition parties. Consequently, it was suited to the SPS ( two turn majority vote). Considering this situation it was not surprising that the SPS received nearly half of the vote (46.1%) in December 1990, while the two major opposition parties ( Serbian Renewal Movement – SPO and the Democratic Party – DS ) received only 32.2%. As a result of the electoral law the SPS received 77.6% of the parliamentary seats, while the opposition parties were entitled to merely 10%. The SPS was able to rule as the sole party in power. 46 Table 1 : Parliamentary elections in Serbia on Dec. 9 and 23, 1990 Party

Number of Votes

Percentage of the vote

Number of Seats in Parliament (of 250)

Percentage of Seats

SPS

2,320,587*

46.1

194

77.6

SPO

795,789

15.8

19

7.6

DS

374,887

7.4

7

2.8

* Between 1990 and 2007, there were between 6.5 and 7.3 eligible voters in Serbia.

Slobodan Milošević won the presidential elections held at the same time. With 65.3% of the vote already at the first turn he received almost one million votes more than his party at the parliamentary elections. Vuk Drašković ( SPO ) was second with only 16.4% of the vote. Table 2 : Presidential elections, Dec. 9, 1990 Candidate

Party

Number of cast votes

Percentage of cast vote

Percentage of eligible vote

Slobodan Milošević

SPS

3,285,799

65.34

46.72

Vuk Drašković

SPO

824,674

16.40

11.72

46 All data conerning electoral results are provided by the State Electoral Commission (Republička izborna komisija : www.rik.parlament.sr.gov.yu ) and by the Center for Free Elections and Democracy ( www.cesid.org ).

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2.

The 1992 Snap Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

After the outbreak of the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina the political as well as the economic situation in Serbia deteriorated. The economic decline was largely caused by the economic sanctions imposed by the UN in May 1992. Serbia was internationally isolated, and the rhetoric of the SPS and of Slobodan Milošević became more and more nationalist.47 Due to massive pressure by the opposition parties, a system of proportional representation was introduced,48 and snap parliamentary and presidential elections were called. The SPS dropped to 28.8% of the vote and 40.4% of the seats of parliament. In absolute figures, the SPS lost about one million votes compared to the 1990 elections. The Serbian Radical party ( SRS ) led by Vojislav Šešelj finished second with 22.6% of the vote and 29.2% of the seats. Especially because of its emphasis on nationalist politics the party could win over the majority of the former SPS electorate. The two strongest democratic opposition parties, namely the coalition of DEPOS / DS, received 20% of the vote and 22.4% of the seats in parliament. After these elections the SPS had to form a government coalition. Because of their ideological closeness, the SRS supported an SPS minority government. Table 3 : Parliamentary elections in Serbia, Dec. 20, 1992 Party

Number of votes

SPS

1,359,086

28.8

101

40.4

SRS

1,066,765

22.6

73

29.2

994,178

21.1

56

22.4

DEPOS/DS

Percentage of vote

Seats in parliament (of 250)

Percentage of seats in parliament

At the presidential elections Slobodan Milošević was able to prevail over Milan Panić who was supported by all democratic parties at the first turn. Milošević received 53.2% of the ballot, while his opponent reached 32.1%. Again, Milošević got one million votes more than his party at the parliamentary elections held at the same time. But in absolute figures he had lost about 800,000 votes compared to the 1990 presidential elections.49 His re-election in 1992 is considered the most important political decision of the political life of Serbia between 1990 and 2000. It determined Serbia’s fate until Milošević was voted out. 50 47 See : Changes in the SPS party program at the 2nd Congress in October 1992, Chapter III, sub - chapter 3.2. 48 Nine constituencies and a 5% barring rule were introduced. 49 The Serbian Radical Party did not present a presidential candidate of its own and thus could not be voted for like at the parliamentary elections. Therefore, it can be assumed that in 1992 many of the voters who had elected Milošević in 1990, supported the democratic candidate, Milan Panić. 50 Vladimir Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998 – Volja građana ili izborna manipulacija, second enlarged ed., Belgrade 2001, p. 90.

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Table 4 : Presidential elections, Dec. 20, 1992 Candidate

Party

Slobodan Milošević

SPS

2,515,047

53.24

37.4

Civic Alliance

1,516,693

32.11

22.5

Milan Panić

3.

Number of votes

Percentage of vote

Percentage of eligible vote

The 1993 Snap Parliamentary Elections

Because of its extremely nationalist policy the Serbian Radical Party had won additional support in 1993. Therefore, it was convinced to be able to take over power without the SPS and enforced snap elections in fall 1993. The SPS had realized this danger and had begun to propose a nationalist program besides its neo - communist one. This nationalist ideology was intended to cover the right wing spectrum which had continually increased its support of the coalition partner SRS. Furthermore, the nationalist ideology was a suitable tool to avert attention from the poor economic situation51 and to portray Serbia as the victim of the international community and the economic crisis as the result of external factors. To distinguish itself from the SRS the SPS began to support peace plans for Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example the 1993 Vance - Owen Plan, and to present itself more moderate than the SRS in matters of “national interest”.52 This way – and because of its control of the media – the SPS managed to win additional votes at the parliamentary elections in December 1993. In spite of the poor economic situation, the SPS clearly won with 36.7% of the vote. The democratic parties also received more votes, while the SRS lost heavily. The SPS formed a government with the former opposition party New Democracy ( ND ) which had split off the alliance DEPOS. Table 5 : Parliamentary elections in Serbia, Dec. 19, 1993 Party

Number of votes

SPS DEPOS/DS SRS 51

Percentage of vote

Seats in parliament (of 250)

Percentage of seats in parliament

1,576,086

36.7

123

49.2

1,213,146

28.2

74

29.6

595,467

13.8

39

15.6

At this point, more than half of the employees in Serbia had been laid off because their companies had stopped production. The average income amounted to 20 € while the inflation rate was 2% per hour – a staggering 352 trillion per cent per annum. Ibid., p. 102. 52 Ibid., p. 107 ff.

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357

The 1996 Local Elections

At the local elections of November 1996 three democratic opposition parties united in the coalition “Together” ( Zajedno ).53 For the first time they succeeded in destabilizing Slobodan Milošević’s regime. “Together” received the majority of the vote in 40 out of 189 municipalities, especially in bigger cities ( Belgrade, Niš, Kragujevac, Čačak ).54 Milošević attempted ballot rigging and having courts declare the elections void. This sparked off three months of massive civil protest specifically in Belgrade and Niš. After an OSCE - mission had controlled the election results, in February 1997 Milošević finally gave in and acknowledged the victory of the coalition “Together” in a so - called “lex specialis”.55 5.

The 1997 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

The first regular parliamentary elections in Serbia were held in September 1997. Because of the Dayton Agreement and the lifting of the UN - sanctions, the situation in the region was relatively stable. The SPS could no longer score with nationalist rhetoric. At the same time it had difficulties to overcome the economic crisis without reform and without the privatization of state - owned companies. So as not to lose left - wing voters because of those measures and to reassemble them, Milošević’s wife Mirjana Marković founded the Party “Yugoslav United Left” ( YUL ) in 1996. In fact the YUL was a sister party of the SPS. Double membership was permitted, and it was not clear which party some cadres really belonged to.56 In addition, the SPS tried to minimize a possible defeat by increasing the number of constituencies from 9 to 19. The democratic opposition parties considered these conditions unfair, and some of them called for a boycott of the elections. At the elections the coalition SPS / YUL / New Democracy received 34.2% of the vote and 44% of the seats, and the SRS was second with 28.1%. The Serbian Renewal Movement SPO was the only democratic opposition party that had not boycotted the elections and was third. Since SPS / YUL / ND did not have enough seats to form a government of their own, they formed a government coalition 53 “Zajedno” consisted of the Democratic Party, the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Civic Alliance of Serbia. 54 At the elections of the federal parliament on the same day the dominance of the SPS was not questioned. It received 45.5% of the vote and the absolute majority of seats. Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990 do 1998, p. 75. 55 Due to a disagreement within the coalition “Together”, in some cities the SPS managed to recapture power completely or to regain control by joining coalitions as early as summer 1997. 56 For example, a minister answered the question whether he acted as a minister from the SPS or the YUL in government : “I don’t know. I have to ask first. Call me up later.” Later he informed the said journalist that he held his position as a minister of the YUL. Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990 do 1998, pp. 72 f.

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with the SRS. But the most important centers of power ( army, police, state owned companies, and media ) remained under SPS control, thanks to the office of the president which the SPS had won. Table 6 : Parliamentary elections in Serbia, Sept. 21, 1997 Party

Number of votes

Percentage of vote

Seats in parlia- Seats in percent ment (of 250)

SPS/JVL/ND

1,418,036

34.2

110

44.0

SRS

1,162,216

28.1

82

32.8

SPO

793,988

19.1

45

18.0

At the presidential elections Slobodan Milošević could not run because he had been elected twice already. Instead, he had the federal parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia elect him president. The SPS candidate for the office of the president of Serbia was Zoran Lilić. He won the first ballot but received only 37.7% of the vote. He lost the runoff poll with 47.89 against Vojislav Šešelj’s 49.1%. However, the election was declared void because the turnout was claimed to have been less than 50%.57 Table 7 : Presidential elections (1st ballot ), Sept. 21, 1997 Candidate

Party

Number of votes

Percentage of Percentage of cast vote eligible vote

Zoran Lilić

SPS

1,474,924

37.70

20.5

Vojislav Šešelj

SRS

1,126,940

27.28

15.6

Vuk Drašković

SPO

852,806

20.60

11.8

Table 8 : Presidential elections ( runoff ), Oct. 5, 1997 Candidate

Party

Number of votes

Percentage of Percentage of cast vote eligible vote

Vojislav Šešelj

SRS

1,733,859

49.10

24.0

Zoran Lilić

SPS

1,691,354

47.89

23.4

57 It is generally assumed that the low turnout served only as an excuse to thwart Šešelj’s victory.

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The elections were repeated in December 1997 with Milan Milutinović the SPS candidate. In the first ballot he received 10% more votes than Vojislav Šešelj who was second. Milutinović won the runoff so clearly that Groati assumes electoral rigging.58 Table 9 : Presidential elections (1st ballot ), Dec., 1997 Candidate

Party

Number of votes

Percentage of Percentage of cast vote eligible vote

Milan Milutinović

SPS

1,655,822

43.43

37.12

Vojislav Šešelj

SRS

1,227,976

33.18

16.90

Vuk Drašković

SPO

587,776

15.41

8.10

Table 10 : Presidential elections ( runoff ), Dec. 21, 1997 Candidate

Party

Number of votes

Percentage of Percentage of cast vote eligible vote

Milan Milutinović

SPS

2,181,808

56.46

30.1

Vojislav Šešelj

SRS

1,383,868

35.81

19.1

The defeat of the SPS candidate at the first presidential election and the dubious victory at the repetition showed that the SPS could not take its support for granted any longer. It also became evident that the earlier presidential elections had been decided substantially by Milošević’s personality. But Milošević himself was interested in degrading the office of the President of Serbia, especially because he wanted to transfer the power from the Serbian to the federal presidency. Accepting this assumption, one can also presume Milošević to have let the first presidential elections in September fail intentionally in order to stabilize his new position as federal president in the eyes of the public. After having consolidated power in his new office, he supported the SPS candidate from whom he expected considerably less opposition than from Vojislav Šešelj. 6.

The 2000 Elections of the Federal President

Until 1997 the office of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not have any political importance. This changed when Slobodan Milošević had the parliament elect him president in 1997. He transferred the power granted to the President of Serbia by the Serbian constitution to the Federal President. 58 He takes the participation in the province of Kosovo as proof : Compared to the presidential elections in September 1997, it has increased enormously. This indicates the regime having illegally counted the votes from the Kosovo as its candidate’s, since there was no control by opposition parties. Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990 do 1998, p. 122.

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Irena Ristić

Until then it had been only an office of protocol. This indicates once more that the constitutional position and the power of a president do not necessarily always comply with his real power. Between 1997 and 2000, when Milošević announced direct elections for the Federal Presidency, Milošević and the SPS faced an increasing number of problems. The economic situation continued to be disastrous, and the end of 1998 brought about the Kosovo crisis which peaked with the NATO air raids in spring 1999. During the air raids a sort of truce was kept. But directly afterwards the SPS’s control of and power at the Serbian parliament was massively questioned by the opposition and by the international community, as well as Milošević’s legitimacy as president of Yugoslavia. Serbia was isolated again. Milošević reacted by tightening the media law and repressing the opposition. The façade of an ostensibly democratic state was definitely crumbling.59 At the presidential elections on September 24, 2000, the democratic opposition parties united in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia ( DOS ), with Vojislav Koštunica being their candidate. In the first ballot he already received 50.24% of the vote while Milošević was supported by only 37.15% of the electorate. In the days after the ballot Milošević tried vote rigging and fraud to enforce at least a second ballot. But after massive protests all over Serbia he admitted defeat on October 5, 2000, and declared his withdrawal.60 Table 11 : Federal presidential elections, Sept. 24, 2000 Candidate

Party

Number of votes

Vojislav Koštunica

DOS

2,470,304

50.24

35.9

Slobodan Milošević

SPS

1,826,799

37.15

26.5

7.

Percentage of Percentage of cast vote eligible vote

2000 Parliamentary Elections

After Milošević’s withdrawal an interim government was established and parliamentary elections were announced for December 2000. These elections can be regarded the true founding elections in Serbia. The SPS suffered a smashing defeat : It became second strongest party with only 13.5% of the vote. The DOS received 64.4% of the vote and was able to form a government on its own.

59 Goati, Partijske borbe u Srbiji, p. 24. 60 At the elections of the federal parliament, held at the same time, the DOS received 42.9% of the vote and 53.7% of the parliamentary seats, and the SPS 32.2% of the vote and 40.7% of the parliamentary seats.

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Table 12 : Parliamentary elections in Serbia, Dec. 23, 2000 Party

Number of votes

DOS

2,402,387

64.4

176

70.4

SPS

515,845

13.5

37

14.8

SRS

322,333

8.5

23

9.2

8.

Percentage of the vote

Parliamentary seats (of 250)

Percentage of parliamentary seats

The 2003 Snap Elections

Between 2000 and 2003 the SPS continued to lose importance, especially after Slobodan Milošević had been arrested in March 2001 and turned over to the tribunal at The Hague in June 2001. The party tried to make a name for itself as an anti - system party denouncing the regime change of 2000 as a putsch and the extradition of Milošević as kidnapping. But it was incapable to reverse the trend : At the December 2003 snap elections it continued to lose votes. Obviously, Milošević heading the list did not help either. With 7.7% of the vote it came in fifth. Table 13 : Parliamentary elections in Serbia, Dec. 28, 2003 Party SRS

Number of votes

Percentage of the vote

Parliamentary seats (of 250)

Parliamentary seats in percent

1,056,256

27.9

82

32.8

DSS*

678,031

17.9

53

21.1

DS

481,259

12,7

37

14.8

G 17+

438,422

11.6

34

13.6

SPO-NS**

293,082

7.7

22

8.8

SPS

291,341

7.7

22

8.8

* **

DSS – Democratic Party of Serbia ( Vojislav Koštunica ) NS – New Serbia ( Velimir Ilić )

The DOS alliance spit up and the parties emerging from it were at odds with each other. Thus, the SPS supported the minority government of Vojislav Koštunica. For this surprising turn of events it did not explicitly demand ministerial posts. But presumably the party received legal and financial means to support Milošević at The Hague.61 Furthermore, the SPS support is considered the 61

This is apparently also the reason why Milošević gave up his initial opposition of the minority government. Goati, Partijske borbe u Srbiji, pp. 35 ff.

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reason for the dismissal of lawsuits against members of the Milošević family and for providing positions at the boards of directors of state - owned enterprises for SPS officials.62 Supporting the minority government, in a way the SPS became a government party again. Thereby the party hoped for more public presence and a better starting position for further elections. It also strove for the image of a selfless party with a deep sense of responsibility for the state supporting the government in a constructive way and not expecting any service in return.63 But it gave up its image as an anti - system party and relativized its view of the regime change in October 2000. Consequently, the SPS lost that part of loyal voters who did not intend to change their opinion.64 9.

The 2007 Parliamentary Elections

While Vojislav Koštunica’s minority government was in office the SPS did not manage to create a new and recognizable profile for itself. Until his death in March 2006 Milošević enjoyed considerable influence within the party by deciding about the placement on the party list, for example. After his death the party elected Ivica Dačić its new president and took up its old socialist principles during the election campaign. A high cadre described the SPS as a sort of Robin Hood who had to take away from the rich in order to help the poor.65 Furthermore, the SPS stroke a harsher note concerning the Kosovo issue. Dačić, the head of the party, insisted that Serbia ought to go to war in case of a unilateral declaration of independence of the Kosovo.66 At the elections the SPS received 5.6% of the vote. Since many electoral forecasts had expected the SPS not to be able to pass the 5% - threshold, this result was considered a success. However, looking at the last elections, the support of the SPS seems to keep diminishing. After all SPS was not part of the new government coalition which was formed in May 2007 by DS, DSS / NS and G17+.

62 Ibid., p. 36. 63 Ibid., p. 36. 64 Accordingly Ivica Dačić, presidential candidate of the SPS received only 4% of the vote at the next elections in June 2004. 65 Branko Ružić, chairman of the executive committee of the SPS, according to the broadcast Poligraf, Jan. 25, 2007 ( www.b92.net ). 66 Dačić: Niko nema pravo da kaže da se neće ratovati. In : Politika, Dec. 04., 2006. (Internet edition ).

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Table 14 : Parliamentary elections in Serbia, Jan. 21, 200767 Party

Number of votes

Percentage of vote

Parliamentary seats (of 250)

Parliamentary seats in percent

SRS

1,152,105

28.5

81

32.4

DS

914,014

22.6

64

25.6

DSS/NS

666,889

16.5

47

18.8

G 17+

274,874

6.8

19

7.6

SPS

227,304

5.6

16

6.4

LDP*

214,028

5.3

15

6.0

* Coalition LDP - GSS - SUD - LSV – Liberal - Democratic Party ( Čedomir Jovanović )

Summarily, one can state that the SPS could rule alone only after the first 1990 parliamentary elections. But even then it had not received the majority of the vote. Instead it had received more than two thirds of the parliamentary seats with less than half of the vote, due to an electoral law tailored exactly to its needs. At every election to follow until 2000 ( with the exception of 1993), the SPS kept losing votes in spite of the fact that it was the ruling party and controlled the media. Still, during this period it remained the strongest party and controlled the coalitions it needed to enter. When Milošević lost against the opposition candidate Vojislav Koštunica at the September 2000 elections, the SPS lost its power in parliament, too, and has steadily lost voters since. At the last parliamentary elections in January 2007 it reached only 5.6%.68 Table 15 : SPS results at the parliamentary elections in Serbia between 1990 and 2007 Year of the parliamentary election

Number of votes

Percent of the vote

Parliamentary seats (of 250)

Parliamentary seats in percent

1990

2,320,587

46.1

194

77.6

1992

1,359,086

28.8

101

40.4

1993

1,576,086

36.7

123

49.2

1997

1,418,036

34.20

110

44

2000

515,845

13.5

37

14.8

2003

291,341

7.7

22

8.8

2007

227,304

5.6

16

6.4

67 The remaining 8 seats were given to five minority parties. 68 Snap elections will be held on May 11th, 2008, and so far it can be expected that SPS will again pass the 5% - threshold.

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V.

Members and Structure of the SPS Electorate

1.

Membership

Data on the membership of all Serbian parties have to be considered with reservation. The SPS, for example, claimed 200,000 members in 2007 while party specialist and researcher Goati estimates 600,000 the total membership of all Serbian parties in 2005.69 It is not plausible that one full third of them belong to the SPS. In 1996 the SPS claimed half a million members.70 Goati, however, estimates an SPS membership of 350,000 before the year 2000 and about 100,000 in mid- 2002. Finally, by the end of 2005 the SPS membership may reasonably be estimated at about 30,000.71 2. The Social Structure of the Electorate Between 1990 and 1995 the SPS is the party with the broadest social structure, in spite of its constant loss of members. In the early 1990s, for example, the occupational, educational and age structure of the SPS electorate is quite balanced and mirrors the structure of the total electorate.72 Accordingly, in 1990 the SPS support consisted of 45% workers, 11% farmers. 20% state officials, 3% businesspeople and managers, 1% students, and 11% retired people and housewives. The majority of them had no or only a compulsory school diploma, and only 11% disposed of a polytechnic or university diploma. 50% of the supporters were more than 50 and only 10% less than 29 years old. In the mid - 90s the number of workers is decreasing and of farmers increasing. The support of all other professional groups is diminishing. At the same time the number of retired people and housewives quadruples to more than 40%. The educational structure of the electorate changes and the number of older voters increases.73 After the loss of power in October 2000 the SPS electorate and support diminished dramatically, but without a serious change of the structure of the voters. Instead, the trend of the 1990s remains stable : in 2005 half of the SPS vot69 He does not find big differences in numbers during the last 15 years. The number of members of the respective parties, however, has changed. This indicates that active party members left their former and joined other parties. Goati, Partijske borbe u Srbiji, p. 134. 70 Bieber, Nationalismus in Serbien, p. 241. 71 Goati, Partijske borbe u Srbiji, p.136. 72 All data are taken from polls of the Belgrade Institute for Social Sciences ( Center of Political and Opinion Polling Research ) See : Slavujević, Promene socijalne utemeljenosti. In : Lutovac ( Ed.), Demokratija u političkim strankama Srbije, pp. 189–237, here 199 f., 224–227. 73 In 1996 one third to one half of SPS - voters had only a compulsory school diploma or none at all, almost half of them were over 60 years old.

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365

ers are retired people and housewives. The other relevant professional groups are workers (19%), farmers and civil servants (7%). The structural change of the electorate indicates the transformation of the SPS during the last 15 years. Initially it was a true workers’ party, then changed to an agrarian party, and since the mid - 1990s it has finally become a party of the economically inactive part of the electorate, i. e. retired people and housewives. At the same time it changed to the party of the oldest, least qualified, and poorest section of the population and thus the representative of the interests of the so - called “losers of transformation”.74 Considering the urban - rural divide, SPS voters usually live in rural areas. Support in South Serbia has always been stronger than in the northern province of Vojvodina. 3.

The value system of the SPS electorate

Immediately after the first multi - party elections in Serbia opinion research found SPS voters to be nationalist (66%), authoritarian (60%), not markedly religious (36%), and the most nostalgic one regarding the former communist system of all party supporters (72%).75 Until the mid - 1990s these convictions deepened, and additionally a high degree of xenophobia (87%) was found. These attitudes were supplemented by a distinctive etatism revealing itself in high confidence in state institutions.76 In 1996, in a comparative study, SPS supporters had by far the lowest results of all parties in Serbia concerning topics such as “post materialism” (12%), “affiliation to Europe as a priority” (3%), “private property” (30%), “confidence in other people” (29%), and “freedom and liberty above order” (23%). In contrast, they had the highest acceptance rates concerning “egalitarianism” (53%), and “old ideas ( communism ) are better” (59).77 A similar study in 2003 showed the aversion of SPS - voters against Europe even more clearly. The nationalist orientation (88%) and a strong etatism - centralism (76%) had also become more pronounced. The topic “modernism” did not receive any support at all.78 On a value scale of traditionalism versus mod74

75 76 77 78

The SPS addressed the group of the so - called “losers of transformation” by guaranteeing secure jobs ( by a stop of privatization and a ban on dismissal ), not enforcing strict discipline at work, and taking care of the interests of the working class in a paternalist manner. In turn, the SPS was rewarded with passive fidelity even though ultimately it could neither guarantee jobs nor come up with sustainable solutions for the losers of transformation. This unkept promise is one of the reasons for the losers of transformation to turn away from the SPS to the SRS. Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990 do 1998, pp. 95 f. Pantić / Pavlović, Stranačke pristalice. In : Lutovac ( Ed.), Političke stranke i birači, pp.41–113, here 51 ff. Ibid., p.56. Ibid., pp.57–61. All data were gathered by the Institute of Social Sciences ( Center of Political Research and Opinion Research ) in Belgrade. See : Ibid., p. 73.

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ernism SPS voters can be identified as relatively traditionalist individuals. This is why ( according to Tönnies ) they lean towards a national community as their preferred model of a society with ethno - centrist solidarity, justifying undemocratic centralism.

VI.

Reasons for the Predominance of the SPS

At a first glance the continuing electoral victories of the SPS between 1990 and 2000 seem to challenge scientific theory. The series of victories occurred in a period when the standard of living of the total population was permanently declining and the economic and political situation of the country was continually deteriorating. Still, the opposition parties needed ten years to win a majority. At a second glance it becomes evident that even relatively free elections alone do not constitute democracy and that there are very complex reasons for the SPS and Slobodan Milošević remaining in power for many years. They will be shortly explained : As the successor party of the LCS the SPS created the best possible conditions for its first electoral success. It had inherited enormous financial means. Since the nomenclature had not been exchanged it also gained control of all state institutions and economic enterprises. This is why it was able to control the most important decisions before the first pluralist elections and shape them according to its own interests, for example the electoral law. It also had complete control of the media. This way the SPS was the first party to introduce nationalist rhetoric and make it politically acceptable. The party presented itself as the only legitimate representative of national interests.79 At the same time it abided by the communist ideology, especially with regard to economic and social questions. This way it won the vast majority of the voters who considered the Yugoslavian communist model the preferable option and the SPS the guarantor of the desired continuity.80 Based on this heritage and on the confidence of the population, the SPS managed to control society via important centers of power ( army, police, secret service, and media ).81 The wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and later the Kosovo conflict are the second reason for the success of the SPS. These wars could be considered the “elixir of life” of the system, since they caused “collective fear and insecurity of which the government party profited most.”82 These exceptional circumstances enabled the SPS to present the national identity and all questions 79 Until then, nationalist ideology had been the distinctive mark of the opposition parties and the basic feature distinguishing them from the SPS. 80 On the reasons for the wide - spread support of the communist ideology by the Serbian population, see : Ristić, Zwischen Autoritarismus und Demokratie. In : Daxner et.al., Bilanz Balkan, pp.118–136. 81 Bieber, Nationalismus in Serbien, p. 256. 82 Ibid., p. 260.

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of state identity as topics of primary importance, thus distracting from the desolate economic situation. When the latter became evident in times of peace the regime accounted for them primarily with the UN - sanctions and their consequences. A third reason for SPS predominance was the fragmented opposition in Serbia. According to Sartori, the opposition was “bilateral”, i. e. different opposition parties not cooperating and pursuing common interests. The opposition failed with several attempts to adopt a common candidate or support him permanently after an electoral success, or else the efforts were thwarted by Milošević’s aggressive media campaigns or electoral rigging and fraud. Last but not least the number of years of SPS power in spite of the poor economic situation can be explained by the personality of Slobodan Milošević. His charisma was far greater than the popularity of his party. This was clearly evident at parliamentary and presidential elections held simultaneously : The presidential candidate Milošević received about one million votes more than the SPS. According to Herbert Kitschelt’s typology of parties, the SPS had initially been a typical charismatic party. Since the mid - 1990s, when Milošević was forced to accept coalition governments and the economic situation kept deteriorating, the SPS turned into a clientele party. But it was still clearly dominated by Milošević.83 This partly explains why the SPS lost many voters to the Serbian Radical Party after his being voted out and especially after his arrest and extradition to The Hague.84

VII. The SPS in a Process of Change ? Since the SPS was voted out in October 2000 it has suffered a huge loss of voters and a continuous loss of power. This forced the SPS to find a niche of its own and secure the one it had been occupying. It could not distance itself from Slobodan Milošević and his policy during the 1990s because it would have lost the few remaining voters. Instead, the party avowed itself in a demonstrative way to Milošević, electing him president of the party during his absence once again in 2003. But since the SPS never questioned his leadership until his death in March 2006 the party did not change fundamentally until then. Still, the party changed as regards program : It gave up its long lasting opposition against the EU and made Serbia’s integration into the EU its political goal. The party’s commitment to Europe and the change in this respect are not really 83 Stojiljković, Struktura, modeli i praksa. In : Lutovac ( Ed.), Političke stranke u Srbiji, pp. 15–31, here 23. 84 Those two parties had addressed the same population groups between 1990 and 2000 already. After the defeat in September and December 2000 the SRS managed to reorganize faster and to present itself as the representative of the interests of the losers of transformation. Due to the fact that both parties belong to the same political family and that their electorates share almost identical value systems and have the same social structures, the SPS will have a hard time winning these voters back.

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convincing, though, because the SPS continues to refuse cooperation with the Hague war crimes tribunal. This is a precondition for reconciliation with the EU. Another programmatic change concerns the evaluation of Milošević being voted out in October 2000. For the next three years the SPS interpreted this event as a putsch and Milošević’s extradition to The Hague tribunal as kidnapping. Thus, between 2000 and 2003 the SPS functioned as an anti - system party. But in 2004 it decided to support the minority government of Vojislav Koštunica. It may well be assumed that this support was bought or that the SPS exacted certain favors and services in return. Still, it cannot be denied that this support made the SPS a system party again. But the question remains whether this act stimulated the democratic consolidation of Serbia, especially since this party could well be considered a retarding element of the cooperation of the government with the Hague tribunal and the critical reappraisal of the past. Finally there is continuity in view of communist ideology. The party holds on to the program adopted in 1992 which is committed to democratic socialism and a mixed economic system with public ownership being an equally valid form of ownership. Furthermore, the SPS openly propagates so - called “classical leftwing topics” and considers itself the sole representative of working class interests and the interests of the lower social spheres. Still, one might assume at least a latent change : In a wide sense of the word the support of a party coalition advocating market economy could be interpreted as a form of acceptance of the capitalist economic system.

VIII. Conclusion The SPS was founded and has functioned as a party of ideologic and organizational continuity with the former League of Communists of Serbia. Socialism continued to be the accepted goal of social development. In the beginning, in 1990, public ownership was still accepted as the basis of a socialist economy. Later on the party stressed the equality of all forms of property in a mixed economic system. While in government it had converted the bulk of public property to state property and then prevented its privatization. It retained strict state interventionism, stopped the dismissal of workers during the UN - sanctions, and promised a free education and health system. But in the end the party was not able to finance these promises. Besides its self - proclaimed continuity with the LCS, from the day of its foundation the SPS focused on nationalist topics. Rather guarded at first, it regularly placed the so - called national question in the fore, especially during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) as well as during the Kosovo conflict (1998/1999). The party has always succeeded presenting itself the most trustworthy representative of national interests. This is why the SPS won every election between 1990 and 2000. But it received the majority of the seats in par-

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liament only at the first election in 1990. For every later government it needed the support of other parties. The trend of the loss of votes became even more dramatic after the 2000 change of regime. Presently the SPS can only count on slightly more than 5% of the vote. Its electorate has consisted mostly of workers, farmers, retired people, and housewives. This has made the SPS the party of an old and relatively poor electorate with a low level of qualification. Contrary to the electoral results of the party, a convincing majority of the electorate voted for its leader Slobodan Milošević at the presidential elections at the same time. This indicates that his popularity and credibility surpassed that of his party. Consequently, the success of the SPS genuinely depended on Milošević’s personality. He was a highly charismatic personality and at the same time knew how to turn the SPS into a clientelist party, especially after 1993. After its electoral defeats in October and December 2000 the loss of power of the SPS was dramatic. Milošević‘s imprisonment and extradition to The Hague tribunal reduced the party’s importance on the Serbian political scene. Denouncing the 2000 regime change a putsch, the SPS then functioned as an anti - system party. Since its support of Vojislav Koštunica's minority government from 2004 to 2007 it can be reconsidered a system party again. But still it has not managed to distinguish itself anew and stop the loss of its electorate. It continues to make the national question a top priority and to support a socialist economic system. In its declarations the SPS has supported the integration of Serbia into the European Union, which is in fact prevented by the party's refusal to cooperate with The Hague tribunal. A change of its attitude concerning The Hague tribunal and a critical evaluation of the recent past as well as a decision for market economy would presumably make the last SPS - voters defect to the Serbian Radical Party. In the last years the SRS has distinguished itself as the new representative of the interests of the losers of transformation and has been able to win over most of the former SPS electorate. Consequently, the future of the SPS as a parliamentary party is very uncertain. Its only chance to survive as a party seems a profound change of its program and the mobilization especially of younger population groups.

Ukraine 1991–2006 – Where Have All the Communists Gone? Abel Polese In 1990 more than 85 % of the deputies present at the Supreme Council of Ukraine were members of the Communist Party, as reported by Zerkalo nedeli.1 Some labelled themselves democratic communist, but the majority were clearly orthodox communists,2 and “communist” was still the only party in the country.3 On the 24th of August, 1991, the Ukrainian parliament nationalized the possessions of the Communist Party to ban it from the country six days later, shortly after the party had officially registered at the Ministry of Justice of the new Republic of Ukraine on the 22nd of July.4 The Communist Party was eventually re - admitted to the Ukrainian political scene in 1993 and won the 1994 and 1998 elections, attaining second place in 2002. However, in the 2006 parliamentary elections it was unable to win more than 3.26 % of the votes and could enter the Rada only because the threshold was lowered to 3 %.5 Are communists really so rare to find nowadays in Ukraine ? Where have all those affiliated with the Communist Party gone ? A mere 3.26 % of voters voicing support for the communists looks peculiar in the light of the fact that lustration6 or de - communistization of Ukraine has never happened and therefore the 1

2 3 4 5 6

During the 1990 elections communists formed the 239 group, with the opposition winning 125 mandates and the centrists occupying the bulk of the 450 places. Nevertheless, the number of Communist Party members was much higher than those running for a seat with the communists. Ukraina Partiynaya chast IV Komunisticheskaya. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 8 (2002) 383. Article 6 of the USSR constitution identified the Communist Party as the only party in the country. During the 1990 elections non - communist deputies were elected as representatives of blocs and groups but not of political parties. Ukraina Partiynaya chast IV Komunisticheskaya. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 8 (2002) 383. Until the 2002 elections the barrier to enter the parliament was 4 % of the votes at the national level, reduced to 3 % after the electoral reform in force since the 2006 elections. Lustration comes from lustrum, a Latin ceremony of purification, and indicates the practice, in post - socialist countries, of outing people active in communist times by the power, in order to prevent a new communist rule and to bring a new elite to power in order to protect the newborn democracy. Lustration may be carried out by judicial means, like in Poland, or a non - judicial approach could be availed. See, for instance : Williams, A Scorecard to Czech Lustration. In : Central Europe Review, 1 (1999)19 and Rohozinska,

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Table 1 : Comparison of results of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine 1994 Communist Party of Ukraine 12.72 % (CPU)

1998

2002

24.65 %

19.98 %

3.26 %

Split into two par- NU and Kostenko ties, both join NU Bloc

Rukh

5.15 %

Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU)

3.09 %

For the truth (8.55 %)

6.87 %

5.69 %

Peasant (Agrarian) Party

2.74 %

For the truth (8.55 %)

0.37 %

0.31 %

Republican Party

2.52 %

National Front Bloc (2.72 %)

Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine

SPU

Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists

1.25 %

Democratic Party

Bloc of Demo1.08 % cratic Parties (1.23 %)

Green Party

9.40 %

2006

4.05 % National front Bloc (2.72 %)

BIUT

Ne Tak (1.01 %)

Vitrenko Bloc (3.22 %)

Vitrenko Bloc (2.93 %)

NU

NU

Bloc with “Democratic Union Party” (0.91 %)

Popular Deputies of Ukraine (0.49 %)

No part

5.43 %

1.36 %

0.54 %

People’s Social Democratic Party

0.36 %

5.01 %

BIUT

BIUT

Social Democratic Party (United)

0.36 %

4.01 %

6.27 %

Ne TaK (1.01 %)

Nasha Ukraina Bloc (NU)

No part

No part

23.57 %

13.95 %

For a United Ukraine Bloc (FUU)

No part

No part

11.77 %

No part

Party of Regions

No part

No part

FUU Bloc

32.14 %

Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc (BIUT)

No part

No part

7.26 %

22.29 %

Ukraine 1991–2006

373

most prominent communists were not obliged to leave politics, as elsewhere in Europe. Despite a 1991–93 ban that targeted the party, no purge was carried out and communists – that is, members of the Communist Party in 1990 – continued to rule the country; rehabilitation of the Communist Party in 1993 merely officialized the current situation in which most of the lawmakers were of communist background but entered or created new parties with ideological similarities to do away with public opinion. As a general tendency at the end of a totalitarian regime those that served under the old rule might be publicly stigmatized, and summary purges might happen. However, it will be hard to totally phase out the old elites in favour of new ones that have no connection with the totalitarian past because the only elites able to manage the country are those who have done it so far.7 The Ukrainian case is nonetheless peculiar. No purges happened, no elite recharge was perpetuated and only partial stigmatization of the past happened insofar as communists just re - labeled themselves in order to continue a political life. Through an analysis of election results and political actors since independence the reallocation and, in some cases, the political development of communist elites during the first 15 years of Ukrainian independence will be shown to illustrate the importance of the “communist factor” in modern - day Ukrainian politics, where changes in the political elites have happened only at a cosmetic level and most of the Ukraine’s politicians are of communist background. The main argument of this article is that Soviet legacy in Ukraine is still extremely strong in 2007.

I.

The end of the one - party - regime

Although at the 19th Party Conference of 1988 it was decided to hold elections to fill a 2250 deputy Congress of People’s Deputies, the 1989 elections were more a participation exercise than real elections, as there was no alternative ideology. The only way to contrast the Communist Party was a boycott of the elections, which happened in some Western oblastey, albeit minimally.8 Pluralistic tendencies in the USSR were boosted during perestroika with a number of informal groups rapidly growing up. The most important one was the Ukrainian Helsinki Union which was then the basis of the Ukrainian Republican Party. One can also recall the Ukrainian Association of Independent Creative

7 8

Struggling with the past. In : Central Europe Review, 2 (2000) 30. For a complete picture on lustration laws see Ellis, Purging the Past, available at http ://www.law.duke.edu / journals / lcp / articles / lcp59dFall1996p181.htm#H1N1, last accessed 6 January 2007. Kuzio recalls the peculiar situation of Ukraine whose foreign policy was decided by Moscow and had therefore little chance to have some prepared politicians to work in a ministry of foreign affairs to pick up in its nomenclature, Cf. Kuzio, Ukraine, p. 40. Cf. Birch, Electoral Behaviour in Western Ukraine. In : Europe - Asia Studies, 47 (1995) 7, pp. 1152–53 and appendix VI.

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Abel Polese

Intelligentsia established in 1987, the Ukrainian Culturological Club (1987), Hromada (1988) Tovarystvo Leva (1987) and Zeleni Svit9 ( Green World Association, 1987). In 1990 candidates from unofficial non - communist groups were allowed to participate in the national elections, though their campaign was blatantly hindered10 or, in the case of the People’s Movement of Ukraine in Support of Perestroika Rukh, created in 1989 in Kiev11 and being the movement with the best chances to become an official opposition – gathering 280.000 members and 1247 organizations12 – registration dragged on until February 1990 when it was too late to nominate candidates for the March elections.13 A number of independent organizations had already emerged in the second half of the century, proposing themselves in non - political terms to avoid repression. One of those, and a main actor of the 1990 elections, was the Green movement, with the organization “Green World” estimated to have gathered about half a million members,14 included in the Democratic Bloc. Started in the 80s, and at that time connected with the European Green movements, it gained momentum thanks to its “ekosotsializm” ideology, giving priority to ecology matters over goals of economic growth and encompassing political discontent for the USSR politics, whose main failure was represented by the Chernobyl catastrophe.15 The Democratic Bloc campaigning for the 1990 elections was formed by 43 organizations in Ukraine and endorsed by all the main opposition figures.16 9 Cf. Kuzio / Wilson, Ukraine, Chapter 4. 10 Scheduling of meetings at inconvenient times, refusing the meetings or changing the venue a few years before the meeting were some of the strategies used. Cf. Potichnyi, Elections in Ukraine. In : Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 36 (1990), p. 5; in addition, a proclamation of the CP issued before the elections emphasized that only the Communist Party was capable of “expressing the interests of all classes and social groups, of consolidating the society and guaranteeing civic peace in our common house”, while picturing opposition movements as willing to destabilize the country “and push people into political adventurism” Potichnyi, Elections in Ukraine, p. 9. 11 The movement emerged from previous attempts to organize a democratic opposition to the Communist Party. In the fall of 1988 the idea of the “People’s Front of Ukraine for Reconstruction”, an informal opposition movement, was taken up by the Writers’ Union of Ukraine in Kiev, transformed into a draft programme and served as a basis for the creation of Rukh in September 1989, gathering militants from organizations like Ukrainian Helsinki Union, “Memorial”, Taras Shchevchenko Association of Ukrainian Language, Association “Green World” – the prototype of the future Green Party. Cf. Potichnyi, The Multi - Party System in Ukraine. In : Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 2 (1992), p. 3. 12 Potichnyi, The Multi - Party System in Ukraine, p. 15. 13 Numerous cases of rejected candidates from informal organizations were not highly publicized; Cf. Potichnyi, The Multi - Party System in Ukraine, pp. 5–6. 14 Friends from abroad, Earth Island Journal, 7 (1991/92) 1. 15 For further information on green movements see : Potichnyi, The Multi - Party System in Ukraine; Polese, La corrente attitudine verso l’ecologia in Ucraina. In : Gazzetta Ambiente, 4 (2006). See also Russian Eco Anarchism : An Interview with Sergey Formichov, 25 January 1992, available at www.social - ecology.org, last accessed 14 July 2006. 16 A number of elected deputies were former political prisoners, including Vyacheslav Chornovil, the brothers Mykhailo and Bohdan Horyn, Stepan Khmara, Iryna Kalynets,

Ukraine 1991–2006

375

It included a wide range of organizations – including the Rukh and the Greens – but no radical groups such as the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front and the Ukrainian National Party who boycotted the elections on the ground that they could not be truly democratic under Soviet rule.17 The bloc won 125 mandates throughout Ukraine and formed a majority in the city councils of Kiev, Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano Frankivsk as well as in the oblast’ councils of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano Frankivsk.18 Further to the March 1990 election results, article 6 – guaranteeing the Communist Party a political monopoly in the USSR – was removed from the constitution, allowing political pluralism. As a result, pro - independence and opposition movements gained momentum and started openly challenging the role of the Soviet Union in Ukraine. On the 2nd of October 1990, some 150 students – supported by daily demonstrations of up to 100,000 protestors outside the parliament – occupied the centre of Kiev ( Maidan nezalezhnosti or Independence square, at that time ploshad revolutsii, Revolution square ) and started a hunger strike, demanding Prime Minister Vitaly Masol’s resignation ( presented the 17th of October ), new elections, privatization of the party property and repatriation of Ukrainian soldiers abroad. In March 1991 an all - Union referendum was held on the future of the USSR showing willingness to keep the Soviet Union alive,19 though doubts were raised on the real results of the referendum. Further to the August 1991 putsch and the collapse of the USSR, a new referendum and presidential elections were held in December 1991. After the official exit of Ukraine from the USSR, endorsed by more than 90 % of the population, Leonid Kravchuk – the former head of the Communist Party – was

Levko Lukianenko, Bohdan Rebryk and Henrikh Altunian. Also winning seats were Rukh leaders Ivan Drach and Volodymyr Yavorivsky, while then Ukrainian Communist Party leader Volodymyr Ivashko was forced into a runoff, which he later won. Cf. 1990: Ukraine in Transition. In : The Ukrainian Weekly, 52(1990) LVIII. 17 Kuzio / Wilson, Ukraine; for a detail of the constituencies see appendix II in : Birch, Behaviour in Western Ukraine. 18 Ukraina Partiynaya chast II. “Nasha Ukraina”. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 6 (2002) 381; Cf. also “Ukraina Partiynaya Chast I. Partya zelenikh”. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 5 (2002) 380. 19 To avoid boycott by nationalistic forces, head of party Kravchuk negotiated the addition of a second question : “Do you agree that Ukraine should be a part of a Union of Sovereign States on the basis of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine ?” was added to the question “Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of equal, sovereign republics, in which human rights and the freedom of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed ?” with the advice from Kravchuk to answer yes to both questions. But the newly elected democratic governments of Galicia proposed the “Galician question” : “Do you want Ukraine to become an independent state which independently decides its domestic and foreign policies, and which guarantees equal rights to all its citizens, regardless of their national and religious allegiance ?” For a more detailed analysis see Birch, Electoral Behaviour in Western Ukraine, pp. 1156–1157.

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Abel Polese

Table 2 : Typology of the opposition at the presidential elections in 1991 Candidates

results

Kravchuk (independent, formerly communist)

61.59 %

Chornovil (Rukh)

23.27 %

Luk'yanenko (Republican party)

4.49 %

Hryn'ov (Liberal)

4.17 %

Yukhnovs'ki (National liberal)

1.74 %

Taburyans'kyj (People’s party)

0.57 %

Source : Sarah Birch and Gwendolyn Sasse, ‘The Presidential Election in Ukraine’. In : the Presidential Election and the Implication for Europe, Briefing Note 1/99, Sussex European Institute, October 1999.

elected first President of Ukraine.20 It is interesting to note the existence, already in 1991, of a rather consolidated opposition : the national democratic candidate Vyacheslav Chernovil came second with 23 % of voices and three quarters of votes in Galicia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the wave of national democracies throughout the former socialist territories a break with the past was needed in order to give credibility to the ‘new’ political elites. In Ukraine, like in other former socialist countries, this was achieved through a nationalization of the party property and its ban in August 1991. However, unlike most other former socialist countries – including the Baltic Republics – no lustration was carried out and no recharge of elites was proposed. A ban of the Communist Party happened only at a theoretical level, since de facto the communist elite continued ruling the country; despite pressure by opposition groups for early elections in 1992 the Ukrainian parliament, which had been elected in 1990, continued its functions until 1994, and existing networks – including affiliation to the komsomol structures – continued playing a major role in the political and economic life of the country.21 It is true that the Ukrainian Communist Party distanced itself from the Soviet past and revealed a softer side than the Russian one. But it is also true that this was formal : stigmatization of communism was limited to the ideology, and communist elites exchanged a formal ban of the Communist Party with their individual retention of the key positions they occupied throughout the state and the economy.

20 With the Communist Party banned, Kravchuk had to campaign as an independent candidate for Ukrainian presidency, in line with the new manifesto of the Communist Party he proposed to boost Ukrainian sovereignty and limit Soviet influence in the country. 21 See, for instance, Zimmer, The Captured Regions. In : Tatur ( Ed.), The Making of Regions in Post - Socialist Europe, pp. 231–347, here 268 and 274.

Ukraine 1991–2006

377

While the opposition was trying to organize itself, another force emerged in independent Ukraine : the years 1990–1994 were characterized by economic chaos, and some tycoons were able to profit from this, accumulating fortunes from steel exports, the oil trade, coal subsidies and agricultural and chemical exports, though the gas sector revealed itself as the most profitable business, leading to the consolidation of a category of people known as ‘oligarchs’.22 The next step for those oligarchs was to consolidate their rule by entering the parliament and obtaining parliamentary immunity or supporting favourable parliament groups, whatever their ideology, to secure support for their business. Personal or clan, benefit instead of the interest of the nation will be the leitmotiv of most parliamentary factions in Ukraine and will be described as affiliation to the “party of power”, an expression coined in the Nineties23 to indicate politicians striving to remain in power and being more interested in their political survival and personal benefit than in bettering the country. To consolidate Ukrainian statehood, several attempts were made to show a will to break with the past, but the majority revealed only cosmetic changes. The renaming of streets is an obvious example. After independence, in Ukraine the intention was to rename streets associated with the Soviet past with names taken from Ukrainian history. Ulitsa Lenina became ulitsa Bohdana Khmelnitskogo, the first Hetman of Ukraine, in Kiev, and ulitsa Ekaterinskaya in Odessa to remember the founder of the city, Ekaterina the Great. Nevertheless, such a name revolution was confined to the main urban centres – and not even the totality of them – since in smaller urban centres ulitsa Lenina is still, in 2007, the main street, and even the city of Sevastopol still has its ulitsa Lenina.

II.

The 1994 elections and the return of the communists

Where did the communists go after 1991 ? Atomization of political parties, whose registration was much easier after September 1991, and lack of lustration or at least public stigmatization of former communists allowed them to remain in politics and provided them with a range of choices.24 Although new parties were allowed and political opposition was now legal, the political differentiation of society did not translate into a strong multiparty system : mistrust had kept the new political parties of the centre and the right small in membership and underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure,25 with left 22 Aslund, The Ancient Regime. In : Aslund / McFaul ( Eds.), Revolution in Orange, pp. 9–28, here 10. 23 Bojcun, The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March–April 1994. In : Europe - Asia Studies, 47 (1995) 2, pp. 229–249, here 239. 24 Potichnyi, Formation of Political Parties in Ukraine. In : Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1 (1994); Cf. Wilson / Bilous, Political Parties in Ukraine. In : Europe - Asia Studies, 45 (1993) 4, pp. 693–704. 25 Bojcun, The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March–April 1994, p. 239.

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Table 3 : Results of the 1994 Parliamentary Elections ( all the mentioned parties won at least one seat ) Communist Party of Ukraine (left)

12.72 %

Popular Movement of Ukraine “Rukh” (right)

5.15 %

Socialist Party of Ukraine (left)

3.09 %

Agrarian Party of Ukraine (left)

2.74 %

Republican Party of Ukraine (right)

2.52 %

Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (right)

1.25 %

Democratic Party of Ukraine (right)

1.08 %

Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine (centre)

0.83 %

Labour Party (centre)

0.40 %

Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (centre)

0.36 %

Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine (right)

0.35 %

Ukraine Conservative Republican Party (right)

0.34 %

Independents

66.48 %

Source : Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post - Communist Europe, University of Essex, available at http ://www2.essex.ac.uk / elect / database / indexElections.asp? country=UKRAINE&election=ukr94.

parties being numerically stronger. The results of the 1994 elections are evidence of this. The first option for former communists in 1991 was the Socialist Party of Ukraine, registered that same year. Despite the leadership of the reformist Olaksandr Moroz, the party was little innovative at its birth. About 90 % of the party members were estimated to be communists temporarily in the Socialist Party while struggling for the Communist Party to exist once more. The reformist nature of the party was doubtful, since only 42 out of 287 delegates were under 35. Nevertheless, the party showed a tendency to involve technical intelligentsia more than workers of collective farms, as previously done by the Communist Party.26 In its efforts to gather members and successively to keep them, the SPU compromised with a wide spectrum of political positions, being the generator of reformist left, progressive socialism and renewed communism over the Nineties. The second successor of the communists was the Agrarian Party of Ukraine, registered in March 1992. Lead by Serhii Dovhan’, the party won 18 mandates at the 1994 elections27 and then campaigned for the 1998 elections, under Tkachenko’s guide, together with the socialists. 26 Wilson, The Ukrainian Left. In : Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR ?, p. 1296. 27 Ibid., p. 1297.

Ukraine 1991–2006

379

Because of its nature as a protoCommunist Party, in 1993 the SPU went through a deep crisis. When the CPU was rehabilitated, a high number of communists militating in the SPU but waiting for embracing communism again fled the Socialist Party and joined the new Communist Party, prompting the SPU to reorganize its ideology in a way that “not refusing Marxism, [ the Socialist Party] acknowledged the importance of a modern ideology”28 and took the way of a European socialism passing to the centre left. On the opposition side, Rukh which finally could participate as a political party, broke the monopoly of the Communist Party; proposing itself as the second force in Ukraine with 5.15 % of votes ( against the 12.72 % the communists had gained ). However, the winner of the elections is not fully understandable from the results, since independent candidates represent the main faction in the parliament, supported by 66.48 % of the population. There is an explanation for this : paradoxically, the electoral law adopted on 18 November 1993 required less formalities to be carried out to register as an independent candidate than as one nominated by a political party. Some critics of the law argued that the ex - CPU majority had set up an electoral system in which they would not have to identify themselves openly with the newly - reconstituted CPU, the SPU or another party identified with the nomenclature or the old regime, reducing their chances of election.29 The effect of the law was that most people preferred to register as independent candidates and show their political alignment only after being elected. Although there is a lack of analysis of the political orientation of the independents, it would not be all that wrong to say that most of the independents were of a communist background. Table 4 shows some evidence of this. Most elected deputies came from positions they would not have had access to without the support of the Communist Party. With the whole communist nomenklatura keeping its posts in 1990–94, to be a government official or a high - ranking officer was almost incompatible to belonging to the opposition. If the background is relevant, it is also the evolution of these independents; as mentioned before, entering politics was a most fashionable way to consolidate the newly - acquired economic status for many post - Soviet ‘businessmen’,30 many of whom formed a solid alliance and became a third force between communists and opposition. Hence the 1994 elections sanctioned not only a splintering of the communists into pro - independence and pro - union but, and this was the main phenomenon, the consolidation of the “party of power” in Ukraine, a party : a ) including people publicly identified with different political parties; b ) ensuring that any sys28 Ukraina partiynaya chast V. Sochialisticheskaya partya Ukrainy. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 9 (2002) 384. 29 Bojcun, The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March–April 1994, p. 233. 30 Businessmen in former Soviet countries ideologically differ Western ones. For an analysis Cf. Papava / Nodar, On the Shadow Political Economy. In : Problems of Economic Transitions, 40 (1997) 6, pp. 15–34.

380

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Table 4 : Occupational distribution of 163 elected deputies formally registered as independent candidates Ministers, deputy ministers, heads and deputy heads of state committees and security organs

12.3 %

President’s representatives and officials of President’s administration

10.6 %

Oblast’, city and local government officials

8.2 %

People’s Deputies, heads and deputy heads of Supreme Council Commissions

7.6 %

Military officers

4.7 %

Judges and other officials of judiciary

2.3 %

Directors, managers, deputies and department heads in state, co-operative and private enterprises and banks

28.8 %

Academics and academic administrators

11.8 %

Other professions

12.9 %

Total

99.2 %

Source : Holos Ukrainy 9 and 27 April 1994, English elaboration by Bojcun, The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March - April 1994, Table 2.

temic change in the transition period would not threaten their predominance in the state nor their capacity to use state offices to accumulate personal material wealth; c ) further deceiving the public by using that expression to highlight mistrust of state institutions.31 The composition of the “party of power” is extremely heterogeneous; its core constituted by former or current political elites who have acquired enough experience to give continuity to their role, but in recent years people emerging from the economic transition, mostly businessmen, have expressed their interest for politics and entered the political arena.32 At the beginning of the Nineties, when most of the political and economic elites had been or were still members of the Communist Party, the “party of power” was composed of communists, but with the economic emerging of some figures, several businessmen or politician - businessmen joined the “team”. Although there were some parties, like the People’s Democratic Party, perceived as “the party of power”33, one should remark that the “party of power” is more an ideology than a political party; it might be defined as political transformism with the aim of keeping a position. A brilliant case is the presidential

31 Bojcun, The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March–April 1994, pp. 240–241. 32 Rynat Akhmetov is only the last case of businessmen consolidating their economic position through parliamentary immunity acquired by running, in 2006, for a mandate with the Party of Regions, which he finances. 33 Ukraine’s Political Landscape : People’s Democratic Party. In : Monitor, 3 (1997) 240.

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Table 5 : Typology of the opposition at the presidential elections in 1994 ( all candidates, except for Moroz, ran as independent ) Candidate

1sr Round

2nd Round

Kravchuk (centre - right)

37.72 %

45.06 %

Kuchma (centre - left)

31.27 %

52.14 %

Moroz (left)

13.04 %

Lanovyj (centre)

9.32 %

Babych (centre)

2.39 %

Plyushch (centre)

1.29 %

Talanchuk (centre)

0.54 %

Source : Birch / Sasse, The Presidential Election in Ukraine. In : The Presidential Election and the Implication for Europe. Briefing Note 1/99, Sussex European Institute, October 1999.

election of 1994, when two candidates with the same background, the same mentality and backed – at least initially – by the same electorate confronted one another. Leonid Kravchuk was the current President of Ukraine, in the party since 1958, he had been chairman of the Verkhovna Rada in 1990 and then had run as an independent for the 1991 presidential elections. Leonid Kuchma, a communist from the Dnepropetrovsk region, the region always providing the political elites of the country in Soviet times, was the current Prime Minister.34 Kuzio sees little difference between the two candidates from the ideological point of view.35 Both of communist extraction, they incarnate the mentality of the party of power : Kravchuk will act the nationalist to get re - elected, after having been initially skeptical on Ukrainian independence, until he understood it was the only way for him to survive politically;36 Kuchma played the anti - communist promising the economic reform that Kravchuk had been unable to secure and that the densely populated Donbas region had long been waiting for. Eventually, Kravchuk secured the vote of the western regions and Kuchma of the eastern, numerically superior, that allowed the latter to win the presidential post ( see Table 5).

34 Endorsed almost unanimously in 1992, its popularity will keep very high in the nineties; Cf. Zviglyanich, Pre - election Ukraine. In : PRISM, 5 (1999) 16. 35 See Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma. 36 Ibid.

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The dynamics behind the 1996 Constitution

After his election President Kuchma started the preliminary work to provide Ukraine with a new Constitution. The task was rather hard if one considers that an unexpectedly high number of forces wanted to have a voice in it. The communists were certainly one of the main actors and, with Kuchma proposing a number of market - oriented economic reforms, their relationship with the President was not idyllic; in addition we have the national democratic opposition, striving for consolidation of Ukrainian statehood and national unity, the “party of power”, also in competition with the President, and the President itself, at odds with all forces but willing to remain in power. This four - fold team was complicated by two more factors : Crimean separatism and Russian influence on Ukrainian politics. It was the Communist Party that began to mobilize public opinion in support of Crimean self - determination, and it had at least two reasons to do this. Firstly, the CPU was officially committed to a reunification with Russia to continue preGorbachev Soviet politics, hence raising the ethnic issue in Crimea could be a first step towards its goal. Secondly, the communists were not at all happy with the loss of political monopoly and their ban from politics. According to some, by transforming Crimea into an autonomous entity traditional power structures could continue operating undisturbed by developments in the Ukrainian capital.37 Pressure for independence grew with challenges to the communist rule in the country, to secure a communist niche in a decommunistized Ukraine : in November 1994 separatism peaked with the election of a pro - Russian Crimean President on the basis of a Constitution unilaterally adopted in 1992. In 1995 the Autonomous Republic of Crimea adopted a new Constitution, most of whose articles were rejected by Kiev.38 Officially, the 1996 Constitution had, first of all, to solve the issue of Crimean separatism, consolidate a Ukrainian statehood by defining a precise federal or unitary model and define working institutions and competences of local and regional bodies.39 Unofficially, the Constitution became a power struggle. President Kuchma, scared by increasing opposition, put forward a further centralization of the powers in order to control the political life of his opponents; national democratic forces pushed for nation building measures40 and obtained Ukrainian as the sole state language, the adoption of Ukrainian national symbols and single citizenship.41 The price to pay was almost full autonomy for Crimea – upon commu37 Solchanyk, The Politics of State Building. In : Europe - Asia Studies, 46 (1994) 1, p. 49. 38 Wolczuk, Catching Up with ‘Europe’ ? In : Regional & Federal Studies, 12 (2002) 2, pp. 65–88, here 71. 39 Ibid., p. 72. 40 Almost all political parties had nation - building on their agenda, but only those considered nationalist saw it as a priority; see Shevel, Nationality in Ukraine, pp. 387–413. 41 Cf. Kolomayets, Parliament Adopts Constitution in Marathon Session. In : The Ukrainian Weekly, 26 (1996) LXIV; Wolczuk, Catching Up with ‘Europe’ ? In : Region-

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nist pressure – that became an autonomous republic – though depending on Kiev for economic and financial matters – in an otherwise unitary state. The political life of independent Ukraine was characterized by a strong influence of Russia on domestic political decisions. In turn, Russia’s position towards Ukraine may be described at least as ambivalent. On the one hand, the Kremlin liked the communist position – return to a big union – but, because of the political composition of the Russian elites, it disliked the communists themselves. The main reason was the power struggle between communists and Yeltsin in Moscow. During the 1996 elections, while the Crimean Prime Minister Arkady Demidenko hoped for Yeltsin’s success, both Kiev and Crimean communists were supporting the communist Gennadi Zyuganov, his main rival.42 This would result in a lack of official Russian support for the Ukrainian communists until 2001, when communists would be seen as the lesser evil compared to Yushchenko.43 The relation PCU - oligarchs is also functional to understanding a number of political decisions in Ukraine. Although officially Symonenko condemned oligarchic groups,44 an official but regular cooperation between the CPU and oligarchic groups was affecting political decisions of Ukraine. When Kuchma started his mandate, he was keen on economic reform that was not well seen by either communists – as they were to accelerate Ukrainian path toward market status – or oligarchs – who saw in the preservation of the status quo the way to get most economic benefit. Between communists and oligarchs, Kuchma visibly preferred the latter. This is remarkable considering that Kuchma tended not to appoint any communist as Prime Minister, despite their political consistency.45 But even the oligarchs did not share a monolithic position, since they were organized in different clans46 and, coming from the Dnepropetrovsk clan, Kuchma’s preference for the oligarchs was based on temporary alliances that could lead to confrontation with his allies, as happened with Pavel Lazarenko,

42 43 44 45 46

al & Federal Studies, 12 (2002) 2, p. 72; and for a more detailed analysis Wolczuk, The Molding of Ukraine. Ukraine Slow to React Officially; Democrats Worried, Communists Upbeat. In : Monitor, 2 (1996) 115. Kremlin Co - opting Ukraine’s Communist in an anti - Yushchenko Front. In : Fortnight in Review, 8 (2002) 7. Symonenko, From Oligarchic Elite to a Humane Society. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 44 (2003) 469. Vitaly Masol was appointed Prime Minister because of his affiliation with the Kiev clan in 1994 rather than because he was a prominent communist. The number of oligarchic groups is relatively high, however only a number of them are actively engaged in politics. The main clans are from Rinak Akhmetov’s System Capital Management from Donetsk, Viktor Pinchuk’s Interpipe in Dnepropetrovsk and Hruhory’s Surkis and Viktor Medvechuk, not identified with any specific enterprise, from Kiev. Viktor Pinchuk is also Kuchma’s son in law. Important is the presence, in the west of the country, of Petro Poroshenko, the Chocolate King ( he holds the main chocolate factory in Ukraine ) and supporting Yushchenko since 2002. Cf. Aslund, The Ancient Regime. In : Aslund / McFaul, Revolution in Orange, pp. 9–28, here 17–19.

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the first oligarch to challenge President Kuchma. The President was at odds with almost all forces in parliament. This is shown by the fact that Kuchma was constantly trying to square the circle by changing Prime Minister almost every year;47 this constant conflict prompted the President several times to try and propose a parliamentary reform to further weaken him, albeit unsuccessfully.

IV.

The 1998 elections

The lack of consistent reforms and the subsequent disappearance of a stratum of small businessmen from the social arena, because of a constant stalemate between president and parliament, caused a communist revival in 1998.48 Leftist parties proved much stronger in number and support than right - wing parties and ousted pro - presidential centrist parties as shown in Table 6. The party showing the least communist legacy at the 1998 elections was the People’s Movement of Ukraine “Rukh”, the second political force of the country and chaired by the former dissident Vyacheslav Chernovil. In addition, two more new parties entered the parliament in 1998 : the Green Party and “Hromada”. Head of “Hromada” was former Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko, the first oligarch to openly oppose President Kuchma,49 while the second was Yuliya Timoshenko, the gas baroness; the Greens, promoters of an “ekosotsializm” ( a priority of ecologic standards over economic growth ) scored an unexpected 5.43 % after having ignored the 1994 elections. However, analysts attributed this success to two contingent factors : an effective campaign and strong financial resources, the party being often associated with oligarchs.50 The 1998 elections weakened President Kuchma’s position. Not only did the communists receive one out of four votes, but other leftist parties, hostile to the President, were strengthened. The third main force in the country was a coalition between the Peasant’s Party and the Socialist Party of Ukraine, which would seriously affect the balance of forces of the 1999 elections. Formal obligations towards the country’s left majority led to the appointment of Oleksandar Tkachenko, leader of the Agrarian Party and one of the most vocal Ukrainian supporters of the idea of a Slavic Union with Russia and Belarus,51 as speaker 47 After 1994 the position of Prime Minister was occupied by Vitaly Masol (1994/95), Yevhen Marchuk (1995/96), Pavlo Lazarenko (1996/97), Valery Pustovoitenko (1997/ 99), Viktor Yushchenko (1999/2001), Anatoly Kinakh (2001/2002) and Viktor Yanukovich (2002/2004), not to consider Vasyl Durdynets (1997), and Mikola Azarov (2004 and 2005) who were appointed as acting Prime Minister for transitory periods. 48 Zviglyanich, The Communist Victory in the Ukrainian Elections. In : Prism, 4 (1998) 11. 49 Lazarenko was involved in a corruption scandal and sentenced to 9 years of detention in the USA. See : Ukraine : Why Was Former Prime Minister Lazarenko Tried In The U. S. ? In : RFE / RL, 8 June 2004. See also : Former Ukrainian PM Sentenced in US. In: BBC News 25 August 2006 and Kuzio, When Oligarchs go into Opposition. In : Russia and Eurasia Review, 2 (2003) 11. 50 Ukraina Partiynaya Chast I. Partya zelenikh. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 5 (2002) 380. 51 Chair Shaky Under Ukrainian Speaker. In : Monitor, 5 (1999) 221.

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Table 6 : Results of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections Communist Party of Ukraine (left)

24.65 %

Popular Movement of Ukraine “Rukh” (right) Electoral bloc “for the truth, for the people, for Ukraine” (Socialist and Peasant parties) (centre - left) Green Party of Ukraine (centre)

9.40 %

People’s Social Democratic Party (centre)

5.01 %

All - Ukraine union “Hromada” (right)

4.67 %

Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (left)

4.04 %

Social Democratic Party (united) (centre) Popular Party (Popular Agrarian Party and Agrarian Party of Ukraine) Party “Nasha Ukraina” (Party Reform and Order)

4.01 %

Electoral bloc “Ukraine of Labour”

3.06 %

Electoral bloc “National Front”

2.71 %

Electoral bloc “Party of Labour and Liberal Party - Together”

1.89 %

Electoral bloc “Ahead Ukraine”

1.73 %

Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine

1.29 %

Electoral bloc “Bloc of Democratic Parties”

1.22 %

Party of National - Economic Development

0.94 %

Electoral bloc “Social Liberal Union”

0.90 %

Party of Regions

0.90 %

8.55 % 5.43 %

3.68 % 3.13 %

Source : Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua. Parties below 4 % did not enter the parliament. In addition, 50 % of the mandates were assigned on an individual basis, that is candidates were not to be nominated by any political party to be elected. Political orientation of the parties is shown for those entering the parliament.

of parliament. Fear of the left and of communists in particular would prompt Kuchma to consolidate authoritarian rule and pressure on the media and the Kremlin to actively engage in supporting Kuchma against the communist leader, Symonenko, the following year. The Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, receiving 4.04 % of votes, is a radical leftist party led by Nataliya Vitrenko and created after her expulsion from the Socialist Party, led by Moroz. As previously mentioned, the SPU had to reinvent its ideology and, to find its niche, it passed from a left party to a more centrist one. As a result, those elements that were not interested in integrating into the CPU again but were nonetheless radically left - wing felt uncomfortable with the renewed and more moderate SPU. Ideological divergences culminated in 1995 with the exclusion from the party of some of its most radical members,

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amongst which Nataliya Vitrenko and Volodymir Marchenko, who founded, in 1996, the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. There were two social democratic parties campaigning for the 1998 elections and both of them entered the Rada. The one lasting the longest would be the Social Democratic Party ( united ); labelled as a centrist party but led by former President Kravchuk and Viktor Medvechuk, two prominent communists until 1991, it incarnates the quintessence of the party of power with politicians swapping from left to right in search of votes. Initially pro - Western, the party would deny this position to adopt a pro - Russia one and Kravchuk, who acted the nationalist in the 1994 elections, would support Russian language and ties with Russia previously renegated. The People’s Social Democratic Party organized by Valeryi Pustovoitenko as a first attempt to set up a “party of power”52 after a meagre score in 1998, which, led by Verkhovna Rada, deputy Yuriy Buzduhan, would run for the 2002 elections in the Yuliya Timoshenko bloc. Table 7 showing the background of the main party leaders in 1998 may illuminate the reader on the influence de facto communists had in the Nineties.

V.

The 1999 presidential elections

Why did Kuchma win the presidential elections against the communist leader, after having lost the parliamentary ones a year before ? Any explanation should consider at least two events. Russia and Kuchma “politekhnologiya” : In 1997 President Yeltsin and Kuchma signed a Russian - Ukrainian interstate treaty acknowledging existing borders and the territorial integrity of Ukraine. However, Russia blocked its ratification mainly because it recognized Ukraine’s title to Crimea. On 25th December 1998, the Russian Duma ratified the treaty, thanks to the favourable position of the communists, upon request of their Ukrainian counterpart. The argument was that a Russia - Ukraine union would be easier to achieve through friendly relations with the Ukrainian state,53 but there was little doubt that this was done to boost the chances of a candidate from the left in the forthcoming 1999 presidential elections. A communist Ukraine would have a spillover effect on the forthcoming Russian presidential and parliamentary elections, and this is why Putin blatantly endorsed Kuchma, allowing him to play the “Russian card” in Crimea and Eastern regions, nullifying the argument of the “Red forces” that Kuchma had estranged Ukraine from Russia and only leftist parties were willing and able to restore that critical relationship.54 52 Kuzio, When Oligarchs go into Opposition. In : Russia and Eurasia Review, 2 (2003) 11. Cf. Ukraine’s Political Landscape : the Democratic Party and NEP Bloc. In : Monitor, 4 (1998) 54. 53 Ukraine’s Treaty with Russia faces Decisive Test in Moscow. In : Monitor, 5 (1999) 18. 54 Russian - Ukrainian Relations : Convergent Forecast from a Communist and a Democrat. In : Monitor, 4 (1998) 170.

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Table 7 : Background of Party Leaders From 1975 on occupied several positions in the Young Communist League (Komsomol) and then CPU management Vyacheslav Chernovil Journalist, arrested several times in the course of Popular Movement of Ukraine his career, member of the Ukrainian Helsinki “Rukh” Group Moroz: Communist Party member from 1972 to 1991. Secretary of the local Regional Committee Olksandr Moroz and of the CPSU, then Head of the Kiev Oblast Oleksandr Tkachenko Committee and the Oblast Trade Union Electoral bloc “for the truth, for the people, for Ukraine” (Socialist Committee. Tkachenko: in 1981 KPU inspector; Gubernator of Ternopil oblast’ in 1982, Minister and Peasant parties) of Agriculture of Ukrainian SSR in 1985 Vitaliy Kononov Chemical engineer, head of the Dolgoprudnensk Green Party of Ukraine district council “Orgkhim” Popular Deputy of the city of Dnepropetrovsk Valeryi Pustovoitenko (1987–1989), Vice director and then director of People’s Social Democratic Party the city council (1989–1993) Head of Agricultural committee 1986, Pavel Lazarenko Dnepropetrovsk; after independence, Governor All - Ukraine union “Hromada” of Dnepropetrovsk Nataliya Vitrenko Former academic and Assistant at the Verkhovna Progressive Socialist Party of Rada of Ukraine, member of the Socialist Party Ukraine since 1991 Kravchuk: Communist Party member since 1958, Leonid Kravchuk, Viktor Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada in 1990 Medvechuk Medvechuk: Lawyer. In 1990 President of the Social Democratic Party (united) Ukrainian order of lawyers Petro Symonenko Communist Party of Ukraine

In turn, Kuchma was able to profit from the opposition disunity and liquidation of political opponents, when political opponents did not marginalize alone.55 Aside from Symonenko, four people could challenge Kushma’s re - election in 1999 : Vadym Hetman, chairman of the National Bank before Yushchenko, assassinated in 1998, Vyacheslav Chernovil, killed in a car crash in 1999, Pavel Lzarenko, charged with corruption prior to the 1999 elections and Yevhen Marchuk, appointed secretary of the National Security and Defense

55 The alliance of Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz, parliament chairman Oleksandr Tkachenko, former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk and Cherkassy mayor Volodymyr Oliynik, also known as the Kaniv four, failed to present a single candidate against President Kuchma few days before the elections. Cf. Symonenko Rises on the Ruins of the Kaniv Four. In : Monitor, 5 (1999) 201.

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Council and politically marginalized before the second round of the 1999 elections.56 Crucially, Leonid Kuchma was still the President of Ukraine and could count on some support among the oligarchs, and Ukraine was a presidential republic until 2006, which allowed the President to operate even with little support in parliament. The main presidential instrument, therefore, became the presidential administration,57 a small organ not even mentioned in the constitution, that grew up to become a state within the state. De facto, the presidential administration was responsible for the implementation of most of Kuchma’s ideas and functioned as a second executive power, being able to impeach politicians, bother pro - opposition forces with tax inspectors and liquidate President Kuchma’s opponents. To be able to have this main role, the presidential administration needed not to have strong opponents among the political elites, which meant the President had to foster competition among politicians. This was achieved through the second part of the Kuchma strategy, which was to pit politicians against each other to stop them forming any kind of majority strong enough to challenge the President’s rule. This explains the conflictual love - hate relationship that President Kuchma had with most of the politicians in the Nineties. The socialist Moroz was an opponent of the President but was nominated speaker of the parliament in 1994. The communist Symonenko was often under attack by Kuchma’s anti - communist rhetoric but was also functional to Kuchma’s propositions and was used to weaken the opposition once it grew too strong, in the firing of Yushchenko in 2001 and the marginalization of Nasha Ukraina in 2002. This is to say that, even with national democrats consolidating their role, a former communist President partially backed by Russia ( supported by oligarchs and communists – not allied, but fellow traveller often coming along for the ride58) secured continuity of the old elites over the country and prevented the opposition – with Rukh in particular – from growing stronger. No right party shows a convincing performance until 2002 and internal disaccords led to the split of Rukh into two factions ( Evhen Udovenko and Yuri Kostenko, originally from Rukh, ran separately for the 1999 presidential elections ), jeopardizing the opposition’s results ( Table 8). As expected, given the results of the 1998 elections the main opponent of President Kuchma was the communist Symonenko with 37 % of the votes. However, many analysts commented that these results did not mirror the relation of forces in the country and that the results of the communists were pumped up.59 Remarkably, the 1999 elections marked a crisis among the opposition, perceiv56 Kuzio, When Oligarchs go into Opposition. In : Russia and Eurasia Review, 2 (2003) 11. 57 Kuzio, Parliamentary Elections in the “Blackmail State”. In : PRISM, 8 (2002) 1. 58 Rakhmanin, Prosecutor’s Sentence Extended. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 8 (2001) 332. 59 Ukraina Partiynaya chast IV Komunisticheskaya. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 8 (2002) 383.

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Table 8 : Results of the 1999 presidential elections Candidates

First round

Second round

Leonid Kuchma (Independent)

36.49 %

56.25 %

Petro Symonenko (Communist Party of Ukraine)

22.24 %

37.80 %

Oleksandr Moroz (Socialist Party of Ukraine) Nataliya Vitrenko (Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine) Yevhen Marchuk (Independent)

11.29 %

Yuriy Kostenko (Independent) Hennadiy Udovenko (Popular Movement of Ukraine Rukh)

10.97 % 8.13 % 2.17 % 1.22 %

able since most of the candidates were those from leftist parties and with a communist background with the role of the nationalists – and of other presidential opponents – further reduced by the death of the most charismatic figure of the Rukh party, Vyacheslav Chernovil, due to a car accident that many have alleged was provoked.60

VI.

The 2002 elections : the era of the electoral blocs

The year 2002 was a turning point in Ukrainian history, as the equilibrium between political forces was shaken. The opposition since 2000 cried out “Ukraine without Kuchma”, the communists added “Ukraine without Kuchma and Yushchenko”,61 and Putin discovered his liking for the Ukrainian communists, since his interests could be served not only by Kuchma but also by Symonenko. The international community, in turn, started getting interested in the country. Viktor Yushchenko did not enter politics; he was dragged in by Kuchma under pressure from the oligarchs, afraid that the 1998 financial crisis could extend from Russia to Ukraine, and then discarded when the danger was gone. During his appointment as Prime Minister Yushchenko not only avoided financial crisis, he also restored Ukraine’s creditworthiness, and in 2000 Ukraine’s economy recorded a growth of no less than 5.8 % Once the threat ended, the oligarchs no longer needed him and the hardship he had imposed.62 60 See Woronowycz, Rumors of Conspiracy Inflamed by Lack of Criminal Investigation into Fatal Collision. In : The Ukrainian Weekly, 14 (1999) LXVII; Ryzhkov, Tragedy. In: The Day 27 April 1999. 61 Mostovaya / Rakhmanin, Opposition and Contraposition. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 6 (2001) 330. 62 Aslund, The Ancient Regime, pp. 13–14.

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Yushchenko was sacked in April 2001, but decided to remain in politics and organize an opposition.63 He eventually gathered a number of parties that, together with his personal rating, and the support of some “converted oligarchs” such as Petro Poroshenko guaranteed a victory to the opposition in the 2002 elections. What was the role of the communists at the 2002 elections ? To understand this, we should refer to the audiotape scandal of 2000 and the position of Russia, the oligarchs and the communists. In November 2000 the decapitated body of Hrihory Gongadze, a strong critic of Kuchma’s entourage, disappeared five weeks earlier, was found in the outskirts of Kiev. On 28 November 2000 Oleksandar Moroz announced in a conference that he was in possession of a tape linking the President’s office to the disappearance of the journalist Gondadze.64 The authorities denied any involvement and the audiotapes were sent abroad for expert evaluation but, thanks to a mudding of evidence, no official version on the murder has been released as of 2007. Putin declared that this was an internal Ukrainian affair, and implicitly supported President Kuchma.65 The opposition – mainly Timoshenko and Moroz – started up mass mobilization of citizens, and Timoshenko organized a National Salvation Forum to impeach President Kuchma. Petro Symonenko’s communists officially joined the anti - Kuchma movements. When it came to practice, the communists acted pragmatically and they supported, together with the oligarchs, Mikhail Potebenko. The general prosecutor said there was a lack of competence ( or lack of will ) to solve the Gongadze case. The period prior to the 2002 elections is also marked by growing attempts by the international community – mainly the EU and the USA – to gain influence in Ukraine. Pressure on Kiev had been rising after severe criticism by the Council of Europe for not complying with international standards of human rights. Subsequently, a referendum extending presidential powers in 2000 was harshly criticized, and Ukraine was threatened to be suspended from the Council of Europe and other international organizations.66 The 2000 audiotape scandal and the Kolchuga case67 had destroyed the – already minimal – confidence the West could have in Kuchma. International media coverage conse63 Ukraina Partiynaya chast II. “Nasha Ukraina”. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 6 (2002) 381; Cf. Stetskiv, Becoming a Nation. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 19 (2001) 343. 64 Marples, Ukraine’s Kuchma - gate. In : Stasiuk Program Analysis, 6 December 2000, available at http ://www.ualberta.ca /%7Ecius / stasiuk / st - articles / an - kuchmagate.htm, last accessed 12 February 2007. 65 Mostovaya / Rakhmanin, Opposition and Contraposition. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 6 (2001) 330. 66 Woronowycz, European Parliament Monitors Recommended Suspension of Ukraine’s Membership if 16 April Referendum is Held. In : The Ukrainian Weekly, 12 (2000) LXVIII. 67 Ignoring a ban on arms to Iraq, President Kuchma had sold a Kolchuga radar to Baghdad a little before the start of American “military operations” in Iraq. Cf. Varfolomeyev, A Cornered Kuchma Castigates America. In : Russia and Eurasia Review, 1 (2002) 12.

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crated increasing attention to Ukraine, and Kuchma, initially invited to the 2002 NATO summit in Prague to credit him for Ukrainian commitment in the peace missions in former Yugoslavia and talk of future cooperation, was advised not to attend the meeting personally. The opposition gained momentum and prompted President Putin to endorse not only the party backed by President Kuchma, “For a United Ukraine”, but also the Communist Party of Ukraine in the hope to weaken Yushchenko’s performance in the 2002 elections.68 The 2002 elections witnessed the mushrooming of the electoral bloc, and this was also politically motivated. First of all, the formation of an electoral bloc gathering most of the opposition69 and the organization of a “Yuliya Timoshenko” bloc70 caused a system of alliances between oligarchs and the President and the communists after the elections and led to the creation of “For a United Ukraine” bloc registered in 2001 and backed by President Kuchma.71 Five political parties – communist inspired – formed this “indissoluble union” at whose head was designated Volodymir Lytvyn, current head of the presidential administration : the “Labor Ukraine” headed by Serhiy Tyhypko, the Party of Regions led at that time by Mykola Azarov, the People’s Democratic Party headed by former Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoitenko, Mykhailo Hladiy’s Agrarian Party and Anatoly Kinakh’s Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine. 68 Kremlin Co - opting Ukraine’s Communist in an anti - Yushchenko Front. In : Fortnight in Review, 8 (2002) 7. 69 The Yushchenko bloc “Our Ukraine” was formed by ten parties : “Forward, Ukraine !” ( lead by Viktor Musiyaka ), Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists’ ( Yaroslav Stetsko ), the Liberal Party of Ukraine ( Volodymyr Shcherban ), Youth Party of Ukraine ( Yuriy Pavlenko ), the People’s Movement of Ukraine Rukh ( Hennadiy Udovenko ), the Republican Christian Party ( Mykola Pokrovsky ), Reforms and Order ( Viktor Pynzenyk), Solidarity ( Petro Poroshenko ),the Ukrainian People’s Movement Rukh ( Yuriy Kostenko), the Christian People’s Union ( Volodymyr Stretovych ). The bloc can count on the support of six more parties : the Social Protection Party ( Mykola Chechel ), the Party of Homeland’s Defenders ( Yuriy Karmazin ), New Politics ( Oleksandr Puhkkhal), the Social Democratic Party of the Youth ( Roman Chernenko ), New Generation ( Yuriy Myroshnychenko ), Ukrainian Union of Labour Oriy ( Volodymyr Nehoda ) and 118 public organizations. The four political parties, the People’s Movement of Ukraine, the Reforms and Order, the Ukrainian People’s Movement, and Solidarity were awarded the status of a bloc formation and were granted advantages in the creation process of the bloc’s election list. For further information see Ukraina Partiynaya chast II. “Nasha Ukraina”. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 6 (2002) 381. 70 After her withdrawal from the Hromada, Timoshenko created her own party “Batkivshchyna” ( fatherhood ) to ally with the leaders of six more parties : Levko Lukyanenko (“Ukrainian Republican Party” ), Stepan Khmara ( “Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party” ), Anatoliy Matviyenko ( “Sobor” Ukrainian People’s Party ), Vasyl Onopenko (“Ukrainian Social - Democratic Party” ) and Mykola Haber ( “Patriotic Party” ). See Ukraina partiynaya chast III. Bloc Yuliya Timoshenko. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 7 (2002) 382. 71 The pro - presidential “For a United Ukraine” was damaged by the presence of several other pro - presidential blocs such as “Women for the Future”, “Winter Crop Generation” and “Green” that took out votes from “FUU” but then failed to enter the Rada and diminished parliamentary support for the President. See Kuzio, The Elections. In : The Ukrainian Weekly, 15 (2002) LXX.

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Second, the 2002 elections had new rules and it was not possible anymore to run both as a party member and as an independent. Candidates had either to run as party members and sink with the party if the 4 % threshold was not passed, or as independents, leaving behind party support. The bloc option was preferred by two kinds of parties : those with little chance of passing the 4 % barrier and seeking a partner to share voices; and those with a “big name” and unknown parties such as Nataliya Vitrenko, who had enough support from the population to be elected but whose Progressive Socialist Party was almost unknown. As in other cases, her strategy was an alliance with other political forces named “Nataliya Vitrenko Bloc” to sum votes from Vitrenko supporters to those given to the parties of the bloc.72 Communists seemed immune to the bloc - mania. This was surely due to Putin’s support but also to the recent merge of the Symonenko Communist Party of Ukraine with the Communist Party of the former Soviet Ukraine after its 1991 ban had been ruled illegal by the Ukraine’s Constitutional Court.73 Nevertheless, they also resorted to some “pop” techniques, such as including a football player in the electoral list to secure some sympathy.74 Yushchenko’s popularity, acquired during his short political appearance, worked out. In 2002, for the first time, a non - Communist Party won the parliamentary elections, though one should acknowledge that “Nasha Ukraina” shows some communist legacy.75 According to Kuzio, the real opposition was the Socialists, Communists and the Yuliya Timoshenko bloc,76 while Yushchenko’s background did not allow him to go openly against the current regime.77 In spite of its meager results, the “party of power” ( For a United Ukraine ) was still able to form a majority coalition, with the communists relegating “Nasha Ukraina”, the first force in the country, to the opposition. In the end, the winner of the elections was excluded and some minor parties succeeded in forming a majority loyal to President Kuchma that relegated Nasha Ukraina, the socialists and the BIUT to the opposition. It is difficult not to feel the communist influence, and lack of lustration, in the 2002 elections. Most of the lawmakers in the parliament were at least of communist background. The only two leaders that had less connection with communism were Viktor Yushchenko ( Nasha Ukraina bloc ) and Yuliya Timoshenko ( Yuliya Timoshenko bloc ), but also those two have an ambiguous background. Viktor Yushchenko, according to Kuzio, resembles more and more President Kravchuk after independence and has grown up politically under two fervent 72 73 74 75

Rakhmanin, A Theory of Relativity. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 4 (2001) 348. Communist Conference : a Show of Ukrainian Unity. In : Monitor, 8 (2002) 104. Rakhmanin, A Theory of Relativity. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 4 (2001) 348. Viktor Yushchenko had politically grown under Kuchma and this would emerge as a major constraint for political reforms in Ukraine during the Yushchenko presidency and the 2006 negotiations after the parliamentary elections. 76 Kuzio, The Elections. In : The Ukrainian Weekly, 15 (2002) LXX. 77 Although protesting, Yushchenko was shown to be initially reticent to join street protest movements against Kuchma after 2000. Cf. Ukraina Partiynaya chast II. “Nasha Ukraina”. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 6 (2002) 381.

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Table 9 : Results of the 2002 Parliamentary Elections ( all parties below the 4 % threshold did not enter the parliament ) Electoral bloc “Nasha Ukraina”

23.57 %

Communist Party of Ukraine

19.98 %

Electoral bloc “For a United Ukraine”

11.77 %

Electoral bloc “Yuliya Timoshenko”

7.26 %

Socialist Party of Ukraine

6.87 %

Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United)

6.27 %

Electoral bloc “Nataliya Vitrenko”

3.22 %

Women for the Future

2.11 %

Electoral bloc “Crop - Winter Generation”

2.02 %

Communist Party of Ukraine (renewed)

1.39 %

Green Party of Ukraine

1.30 %

Party “Yabluko”

1.15 %

Source : Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, www.cvk.gov.ua.

Table 10 : Distribution of votes according to political orientation of the parties entering the Rada in 2002 Left Parties (CPU, SPU)

26.85 %

Centre Parties (FUU, SDPU (u))

18.40 %

Right Parties (NU, BIUT)

31.23 %

communists : Kravchuk and then Kuchma.78 He was balanced, at least in 2002, by the most nationalistic parties – the two Rukh, Reform and Order, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists – that strongly impacted NU political orientation, but eventually Yushchenko’s pragmatic position would lead to the withdrawal of the most nationalistic parties from the Nasha Ukraina bloc before the 2006 elections.79 The other leader, Timoshenko, now heading the Ukrainian right - wing, had no formal communist background either, but this might be for lack of clear information on her Dnepropetrovsk period.80 She nevertheless grew up politically under Lazarenko, a prominent Communist Party member in the 80s. 78 Kuzio, The Ugly Truths. In : The Ukrainian Observer, 223 (2006). 79 See Kuzio, How to Understand Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. In : The Kiev Post, 15 June 2006; and : Obyknovennyi kuchmizm. In : Ukrainska Pravda, 11 August 2006. 80 Ukraina partiynaya chast III. Bloc Yuliya Timoshenko. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 7 (2002) 382.

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VII. The 2004 elections Kuchma’s strategy to gain from the 2004 elections was elaborated in good time and consisted of alienation of the communists, ethnic polarization of Ukraine and attempt to compact the “party of power” against the opposition.81 Deception of Symonenko was visible by his presidential campaign, urging the electorate not to support either of the candidates once he failed to pass the first round. The first step was to “create” an alter ego to Yushchenko; Kuchma needed a man little known at the national level but whose popularity in the east of the country could counterbalance Yushchenko’s in the western regions. He did so by appointing as Prime Minister in 2002 the governor of the Donetsk oblast’, a man well known in the Donbas basin, backed by the richest man in the country – Rynat Akhmetov – and with enough political connections to secure massive political support. Incidentally, the new Prime Minister was chosen from a region that provided leftist forces – in particular communists – with a high number of votes. By choosing a charismatic figure from Eastern Ukraine, Kuchma managed to get a crucial amount of votes taken away from the communists. Putin agreed on both Kuchma’s choices to endorse Yanukovich and to downplay the communists so that a more elaborate version of the 1999 elections “Russian card” was played. In 2003 the intellectual monopoly on a Slavic Union passed from the communists to pro - presidential parties. Only communists and socialists had pressured for a return to Eurasia; in 2003 Kuchma, together with Lukashenko ( Belarus ), Nazerbayev ( Kazakhstan ) and Putin worked out the concept of a Common Economic Sphare and signed a political agreement in October.82 The plan was well worked out but neglected three factors : the opposition, the international community and the Ukrainians. After the first round of the elections, the opposition campaigned like it had never done before and, because of the economic forces behind them, some have called the ‘orange revolution’ the victory of the millionaires over the billionaires. The international community was increasingly looking at Ukraine as a region to extend its influence, and the 2004 crisis provided the legal framework to intervene and partly counterbalance Russia’s influence.83 Finally the Ukrainians : nobody, not even opposition forces, expected such a massive mobilization84 of citizens and such an active participation of the Ukrainians in political life, which drastically reduced the regime’s 81 This was not fully possible, due to disagreement with some parties. Cf. Kuzio, Former Party of Power Divided Over Supporting Yanukovich. In : Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1 (2004) 54. 82 Cf. Polese, Nalozhenie prostranstv OEEP ( ES - Rossiya ) I OEP ( Belorussiya, Kazakhstan, Rossiya I Ukraina ). In : Evropa 9, pp. 175–194. 83 O’Bechean / Polese, Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004. In : Baer ( Ed.), Politics, Possibilities and Risks. 84 Cf. Wallander, Ukraine’s Election. In : CISI Report, March 2005, available at http:// www.csis.org / index.php ?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=981, last accessed 14 February 2007.

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Ukraine 1991–2006

Table 11 : Results of the 2004 presidential elections First Round

Second Round

Viktor Yushchenko (Independent)

39.90 %

51.99 %

Viktor Yanukovich (Party of Regions)

39.26 %

44.20 %

Oleksandr Moroz (Socialist Party of Ukraine)

5.82 %

Petro Symonenko (Communist Party of Ukraine) Nataliya Vitrenko (Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine)

4.97 % 1.53 %

Source : Central Electoral Commission, www.cvk.gov.ua.

options to solve the crisis by political dialogue. Most analysts were ready to admit that 2004 represented a break with the socialist past, Zerkalo nedeli, one of the main newspapers in the country, celebrated Yushchenko’s victory with satirical pictures expressing the real end of the Soviet Union (13 years after it had happened ). At the political level the communist decline was sanctioned. With the exception of opposition for political reforms they had lost their monopoly in most political spheres. Their official phasing - out was only a matter of time and their electorate would pass either to Yanukovich or to Moroz. Their unofficial phasing out, instead, did not come since most of the politicians still in power had a communist past, evident in the way they operated. At the beginning it seemed as if some sort of lustration would happen. President Kuchma, one of the most influential figures in Ukraine, bartered for immunity by promising to leave the political scene. In addition, the “orange coalition” seemed determined to “put bandits in prison”; at least this was one of the main slogans of the Ukrainian revolution, and to separate business from politics to limit the influence of oligarchs on Ukrainian political life. In addition, transformation of the presidential administration left jobless a number of members of the party of power recycled from the communists. Why was such a break with the past not carried out in the end ? First of all, it was difficult for Yushchenko to go against people with whom he had been working since his early career and under whom he had grown up : how could Yushchenko have accused Kuchma of murder, when Leonid Danilovich was like a father to Yushchenko ? Secondly, even if Yanukovich has been seen as diametrically opposed to Yushchenko, the latter can understand the leader of the Party of Regions much better than the real reformists, as shown when in 2001 Yushchenko negotiated a coalition with the Party of Regions but not with Timoshenko.85 85 Ukraina Partiynaya chast II. “Nasha Ukraina”. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 6 (2002) 381. Cf. Kuzio, How to Understand Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. In : The Kiev Post, 15 June 2006.

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This was eventually repeated in 2006, when the President, deciding whether to form a coalition with Timoshenko or with the Party of Regions, chose the option ideologically closer to him and whom he knew better.86 In addition, Yushchenko is not the radical reformist he seems. After all, his campaign was financed by an oligarch, Petro Poroshenko, the Chocolate King, and most of the democratic reforms introduced during his presidency did not come from his initiative. For instance, the transformation of Ukraine into a parliamentary republic was a compromise from November 2004 and did not come from Yushchenko, who even contested legitimacy of this reform.87 Still, the parliamentary faction called reformist was formed by parties of different backgrounds, namely Moroz’s socialists, the liberal Yuliya Timoshenko bloc and the centre - right Nasha Ukraina, with Yushchenko at the wheel. This coalition would be named the “orange coalition” and would be short - lived after Yushchenko’s election : Timoshenko would be sacked as Prime Minister less than seven months after her appointment.

VIII. The 2006 parliamentary elections and developments The 2006 elections were marked by a higher presence of international forces in Ukraine as a result of a growing pro - western elite and an increased interest in Ukraine as a strategic region. This was counterbalanced by a lack of concrete propositions from the European Union. Our Ukraine and Timoshenko Bloc favoured Ukrainian integration into the Western community, the socialists moderated their pro - Russia orientation after 2004 and the radical left – including communists – still supported a union with Russia. A more moderate position was availed by the Party of Regions, standing in favour of deeper cooperation with Russia and backed once again by Putin. The relationship of forces had nonetheless changed, and the communists showed a drastic loss of support, passing from 18 to 3 % of votes. Oligarchs also seemed to have lost some support not only at the national but also at the local level, where the population was far less sensitive to economic networks than before,88 and this resulted in the excluding figures such as Viktor Medvechuk ( Kiev clan ) and Leonid Kravchuk (Dnepropetrovsk clan ). This change was also favoured by a new electoral law requiring parties to get at least 3 % of votes at the national level to enter the parliament. In addition, independent candidates with no party affiliation are not allowed anymore. A major change in the 2006 elections was the transformation of Ukraine into a parliamentary republic, with the President loosing most of his powers to the 86 Obyknovennyi kuchmizm. In : Ukrainska Pravda, 11 August 2006. Cf. Filenko : If Stetskiv and I Wanted to Make it to Parliament at Any Cost. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 34 (2005) 562. 87 Cf. Polese, Can Free Election Secure Democratic Consolidation ? 88 Rahmanin, Afterglow of the Passing Epoch. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 12 (2006) 591.

Ukraine 1991–2006

397

Prime Minister. The communist electorate is now split between the socialists and the Party of Regions, that differ in two main points : economic reform and relations with Russia. In line with the communist tradition, the socialists also oppose massive economic reform and privatization that is advocated by the Party of Regions, which has kept good relationships with Putin and is well perceived in Russia. Conversely, Putin has two main problems with the socialist Moroz; one is that Moroz was part of the “orange team” that challenged the Russian role in Ukraine and the other is that Moroz has a liking for Russian communists. Still, the majority emerging from the 2006 elections is a leftist one and communists are in parliament, though, unlike four years previously, they have much less possibility to make their voice heard. Most of the electorate traditionally faithful to the communists turned out to the Party of Regions, much stronger, with more charismatic political figures and proposing a manifesto similar to the communist one but with the card of the economic reform that many Ukrainians are expecting.89 Most of the success of the Party of Regions is based on the popularity Yanukovich gained while acting as governor of the Donetsk region that still credits him for the economic transformation of the area and for keeping good relations with Russia on which the local population is partly dependent for small trade. His counterpart, Viktor Yushchenko, lost ground after his election as President in 2004. First of all, one should remark that in 2004 Yushchenko was supported by a wider range of parties, a fact that guaranteed a number of votes normally going to Timoshenko and Moroz. Second, his political mistakes – mainly the sacking of Timoshenko and the failure to purge the political elites of Ukraine from bandits – had a major impact on his campaign. Finally, by refusing to acknowledge the real relationship of forces in the country – Nasha Ukraina was not the main force in the country anymore and only a renewed “orange coalition” with Tymoshenko and Moroz, which Yushchenko tacitly refused, could secure him a majority – he lost not only popular but also political support from his former allies. The socialists formed a coalition with the Party of Regions and ousted him and other main figures of the country into the opposition. Who were the communists in the 2006 elections ? Perhaps a better question to ask is : who were not the communists at the 2006 elections ? The only relatively new force was the Party of Regions, whose leader is Viktor Yanukovich, member of the Communist Party since 1980 and former Governor of the Donetsk oblast’.90 Perhaps the main news of those elections, a party that has no 89 The Party of Regions is based in Donetsk, the region that saw the revival of the Communist Party in 1993 and in which a number of parties have been created since 1990 : the Liberal Party (1991), the Labour Party (1992), Civic Congress (1992), Party of Slavonic Unity (1992). However, aside the CPU no other one was important enough and even the communists started loosing ground after the consolidation of the Party of Regions of Ukraine founded in 2001. 90 See Zimmer, The Captured Regions. In : Tatur ( Ed.) The Making of Regions in Post Socialist Europe, pp. 231–347, here 272–273; and : Premier ministr Yanukovich abo neofitsiina biografiya dlya tekh, khto pidzabuv. In : Ukrainska Pravda, 4 August 2006.

398

Abel Polese

Table 12 : Results of the 2006 elections Party of Regions (centre - left) Bloc Yuliya Timoshenko (right) Composition: All - Union United Fatherland and Ukrainian Social Democratic Party Bloc Nasha Ukraina (centre - right) Composition: People’s Union Nasha Ukraina, Party of Entrepreneurs of Ukraine, People’s Movement of Ukraine Rukh, Christian Democratic Union, Ukrainian Republican Party Assembly, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists Socialist Party of Ukraine (centre - left) Communist Party of Ukraine (left) Opposition bloc Nataliya Vitrenko Composition: Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, Party Russian - Ukrainian Union Popular bloc Lytvyn Composition: Popular Party, Party of all - Ukrainian Union “Justice”, Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party Ukrainian National bloc Kostenko and Plushch Composition: Party of Free Peasants and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine, Party “Sobor Ukrainy”, People’s Party of Ukraine Viche Civil Political Bloc Pora - Reforms and Order Party Composition: Pora, Reforms and Order Opposition bloc “Ne tak” Composition: Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), Republican Party of Ukraine, Women for the Future, All Ukrainian Centre “Soyuz”

32.14 % 22.29 %

13.95 %

5.69 % 3.66 % 2.93 %

2.44 %

1.87 % 1.74 % 1.47 % 1.01 %

Source : Ukrainian Central Electoral Commission, www.cvk.gov.ua.

connection at all with the communists, is PORA that, though positively perceived since being associated with the Ukrainian revolution, was not able to work out full credibility within the electorate. That is to say that, should Ukraine have implemented a lustration like the Czech one, with no trials but a simple banning of the main communist figures from politics, only Nasha Ukraina and the BIUT would be in the parliament now, and still they would have completely different orientations, since Yushchenko would not have grown politically under Kuchma, banned from politics, and Timoshenko under Lazarenko. Nevertheless, some spontaneous – albeit temporary – lustration happened. It is remarkable that some major figures of the Kuchma era failed to enter the parliament. The 2002–2006 parliament speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, head of the Agrarian Party in 2002 and running as head of the Lytvyn bloc, could not pass

Ukraine 1991–2006

399

the 3 % barrier; the same fate had Ukrainian’s first President, Kravchuk, and the former head of the presidential administration, Medvechuk. Finally, as in 2002, the progressive socialist Vitrenko also failed to enter the parliament. As Zerkalo nedeli mentioned,91 weird patterns of response of the electorate to political stimulations might be due to the fact that the electorate is rapidly maturing and adapting to western standards and parties willing to gather consensus should come up with a program, an ideology and some concrete propositions, which is not the case for most political parties in Ukraine. This is also visible through the failure of some big names to enter the Rada. The attempt to play the opposition card by the bloc “Ne tak” ( Kravchuk and Medvechuk ), Vitrenko and the communists did not show the expected results, and those parties had to share an ( already meagre ) electorate; together they collected almost 9 % of the vote, but only one of them entered parliament. The former communist Moroz represents a good compromise of the progressive left. Born politically under communism, he had to reinvent his Socialist Party soon after the legalization of the Communist Party in 1993. This led to the adoption of a solid ideology of European socialism, targeting young people, and a clear manifesto, though Moroz’s choices were sometimes violently contested.92 The most liberal party is, at the moment, the Yuliya Timoshenko bloc, which is continuing the national democratic tradition, western oriented and with a positive attitude towards privatization. The position is shared by Nasha Ukraina which is nevertheless much less nationalist than in 2002. One of the main deficiencies of the Ukrainian political scene is a complete political programme. Since 2002, and this was more visible during the 2004 presidential elections, Nasha Ukraina was opposing the political strategy of President Kuchma, advocating a pro - Western policy but not proposing anything more concrete than an integration with the west, democratic rule and a break with the past ( propositions that were too abstract to constitute an attractive manifesto ).

91 It has been mentioned that a number of people, enjoying most popularity in their district, failed to enter the parliament because the electorate ignored the close relationship with the candidate and based its choice on criteria other than “znakomstvo” ( acquaintance), see : Afterglow of the Passing Epoch. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 12 (2006) 591. This is not a brand new phenomenon of the 2006 elections, the same tendency had been reported by Zimmer, The Captured Regions. In : Tatur ( Ed.) The Making of Regions in Post - Socialist Europe, pp. 231–347, here 338, in 1998 for the small city of Artemovsk. 92 A number of socialist deputies criticized Moroz for his choice to form a coalition with the Party of Regions. Interior minister Yuri Lutsenko even gave up socialist membership after this decision.

400

IX.

Abel Polese

Conclusions : who are the communists today ?

Although communism is in decline as an official ideology, communists are still around. No lustration has been carried out in Ukraine, unlike in other former socialist countries, and the tendency for the elites to recycle themselves after a totalitarian regime is still noticeable. On the one hand this is perfectly logical, since ousting the former communist elites would have left Ukraine with a brand new political elite being rather inexperienced in state management; but on the other hand the lack of even a formal stigmatization, a pre - taste of lustration or punishment of the most dangerous elements, has given full continuity to the communist regime. It is not by chance that the communist elite elected in 1990, after elections defined as unfair and only partially free, characterized by several violations of electoral laws and standards, was the political elite of the country even during the ban of the Communist Party. Many of them survived until 2006 with nobody questioning their sincerity or their “conversion”, as in the case of former President Kuchma, elected as a communist in 1990 and campaigning against the communists in 1994, or former President Kravchuk, head of the Communist Party in 1990, converting to nationalism in 1994 before switching back to the left from 1998 onwards. Political transformism of the communists makes the current political situation of Ukraine extremely ambiguous. Are all the communist gone ? Or do they still “think communist” but label themselves in some other way so as to be able to attract a wider electorate ? Where are the communists today ? To answer this question, one should first answer the question : who are the communists today? If by communist we mean a member of the Communist Party, then our answer is clear : the communists are leaving the political scene of Ukraine and, unless there is a radical reform of the party structures and political technology, they will not enter the parliament at the next elections. But there are at least two more definitions of communist that we can avail. If we consider a communist to be someone of communist background, then communists are everywhere in politics and, with the exception of some Ukrainian dissidents – those still alive – and some of the militants of the 1990 strikes who have entered politics, such as Stetskiv or Filenko, the rest of the political class is communist. The engagement of young people in politics is extremely limited, and the non - communist generations – that is those formed in the Nineties – still play a very marginal role in politics. At the same time one should remark that, even within the Communist Party, there might be divergent opinions and not every “communist” might fully support communist ideology.93 On this basis it might be improper to say that com93 Even during the 1990 elections there was strong disagreement within the Communist Party to the extent that some were asking “how many parties actually are there ?” Potichnyi, The Multi - Party System in Ukraine. In : Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 2 (1992), p. 13.

Ukraine 1991–2006

401

munists are all those with a communist background, it would be more appropriate to spot the “communists” through a psychological analysis of each party member. In this respect, one might classify as “communist” all those showing a communist attitude, that is an attachment to the political past or a communist modus operandi and incapacity to cope with democratic structures. Again, we would run the risk to classify every politician, formed in Soviet times, as communist since the methods of promoting the party, often based on its leader’s popularity rather than on a solid manifesto, have shown that the electorate is much more mature than the political class.94 It is extremely delicate – and subjective – to decide which of the aforementioned definitions is more appropriate when hunting for the communists in modern - day Ukraine. The only thing that is certain is that the communist legacy continues to play a role in Ukrainian politics, regardless of the rightist, leftist or centrist orientation of a party.

94 Afterglow of the Passing Epoch. In : Zerkalo nedeli, 12 (2006) 591.

Between Conformity and the Struggle for Political Survival – The Communist Parties in Belarus Rudolf A. Mark

1.

Introduction

Belarus’s authoritarian regime under Alexander Lukashenko is the last dictatorship in Europe after the fall of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and Montenegro.* It represents a “super - presidential republic with absolute dominance of the president and structures personally controlled by him.”1 Lukashenko’s politics have led the country into political isolation and multi - faceted dependence on Russia. Because the country has not transitioned into a market economy and due to a political philosophy based on Soviet values and the revitalization of Soviet institutions, Belarus presents a contradiction to the transformation processes going on in Eastern Europe.2 Since repression and systematic violation of human and civil rights are typical of a political system that lacks effective balance of power and rule of law, and because Belarus’s population still shows a subservient spirit, the same chances to develop either an assertive civil society or political parties that exist in many of the countries of Central and Western Europe do not exist in Belarus. In 2002 observers counted 45 parties, of which only 18 were registered i. e. tolerated by the Belarusian authorities.3 They are of marginal importance with no access to administrative resources and are excluded from political participation. The bicameral parliament falls far short of representing and implementing the political interests of a free electorate, not to mention overseeing decisions made by the government and its administration. Ever since he came to power in 1994, Lukashenko has systematically distorted the constitutional order by overstretch* 1 2 3

I am grateful to Astrid Sahm and Andrei Belenkov for helping me to unearth information material on the communist parties in Belarus. Luneva, Rezhim Lukashenko, p. 7; White / Korosteleva, Lukashenko and the Postcommunist Presidency, p. 64. Cf. Timmermann, Belarus zwischen Russland und der EU, p. 255. Cf. Feduta / Boguzkij / Martinowitsch, Politische Parteien in Belarus als notwendiger Bestandteil der Zivilgesellschaft : Seminardokumentation, Minsk 2003, http ://www.fes. open.by / Publik / Politische_Parteien_ De.pdf, p. 19; Navumava, Parteien ohne Macht, p. 29.

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ing the president’s competences, enhancing his sphere of influence, and strengthening his personal power. In 1996 he abolished the country’s democratic constitution adopted in 1993. It was replaced by a new version which extended a wide range of competences to the office of the president and reduced the legislative and judicial systems to mere pawns of the executive’s i. e. the president’s will. He exerts his power via the so - called “presidential vertical” from the national level down to the local one by means of censorship, tight control of the mass media, and an almost unrestricted use of police and special forces. He alone appoints managers and heads of administration and authorizes the allocation of financial means.4 Moreover, he considers himself guarantor of the constitution and arbitrator in all questions pertaining to its application and interpretation.5 It is no wonder that observers and commentators call this system “Lukashenkism.”6 In such a system there is no room for political parties as institutions of popular representation. To some degree, this situation is the result of developments typical for Belarus, and the Belarusian representatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( CPSU ) distinguish themselves from their comrades in Ukraine, Russia or Moldova. Whereas the latter have experienced the emergence of factions and reform movements, the call for adopting opposition programs and postulates, the Minsk branch of the communists – loyal to Moscow by tradition – was spared unrest and serious challenges to change. Instead, it showed an ongoing inertia in terms of ideology, program and institutional reform combined with an outspoken political disorientation that rendered the Belarusian communists unable to cope with the situation when the USSR fell apart. They had neither concepts nor the strength to prevent the Supreme Soviet from adopting a proclamation of Belarusian independence and had subsequently to accept their organization’s dissolution or rather the suspension of all party activities.7 Moreover, as it turned out later, the nomenclature proved itself unable to stand up to Alexander Lukashenko’s populist propaganda – not to mention his unscrupulous politics in general. His accession to power sealed the fate of the classical Party of Power in Belarus. Research on communist parties in Belarus has yielded but a small number of publications. The subject lacks attention, and the political circumstances in the country are less than favorable for researchers. As one colleague, with regard 4

5 6 7

For more details see Lindner, Präsidialdiktatur in Weißrussland, pp. 1043–1052; Timmermann, Belarus; Id., Belarus zwischen Russland, pp. 261–284; Sahm, Schleichender Staatstreich in Belarus, pp. 475–487; Förster, Von der Diktatur zur Demokratie – und zurück ?, p. 304; Marples, Belarus a denationalized nation, pp. 89–106; Id., Bac’ka Lukašçnka, pp. 18–29. Cf. Yaskevich, Osnovy ideologii belorusskogo gosudarstva, p. 125. Hill, Post - Soviet Belarus, pp. 9 f. For more details see Mark, Ukraine und Weißrussland, pp. 60–62; Werdt, Belarus und die Gegenwart der Sowjetunion, pp. 285–329; Sahm, Von der BSSR zur Republik Weißrussland, pp. 180–184; Chudakov / Vashkevich / Al’fer / Plisko / Dobrovol’skii, Politicheskie partii, pp. 101, 104 f.; Way, Pluralism by default, passim.

Between Conformity and the Struggle

405

to Lukashenko’s dictatorship, noted, “any discussion of party systems in countries with such a level of violent conflict and repression is largely beside the print.”8 Most publications on the subject are short surveys of the existing parties or articles about the Belarusian party and political systems, which mention communists and their parties, among others. These studies characterize the major features of the political developments and party politics in terms of cooperation, coalition building or election campaigning without paying much attention to programs, organization and institutional problems.9 In 2000 this author published a survey of the reemergence of the communist party, its split into two competing organizations, and their programmatic and institutional development through 1999.10 A group of authors published a comprehensive introduction to the Belarusian party system in 2002. It compares Belarus’s party system with other worldwide and gives a critical assessment of the constitutional and legal frameworks which curtail many aspects of freedom and political participation of the parties in Belarus. Furthermore, the article includes the programs of all parties registered in 1999.11 Useful information about the institutional history of the communists, including details on party leaders and inner party struggles, can be found in a documentary report on political parties in Belarus, published by A. Fedora, O. Bogutzkij and V. Martinowitsch in 2003. Critics argue that this publication takes party proclamations at face value and draw attention to the fact that the authors fail to provide references.12 In the same year a brief publication – labeled as a textbook to be used by universities – was issued by I. V. Kotliarov. On closer examination, however, it appears to be an official pamphlet, obviously aimed to spread the regime’s view on the subject among students and educators.13 With regard to the communists’s role in independent Belarus, researchers agree that from the beginning – the suppression of any political opposition notwithstanding – the existence of these parties was and still is jeopardized by Lukashenko’s proven talent for using Soviet slogans and Soviet nostalgic sentiments more effectively than the communists to gain Belarusian support.

8 Lewis, Political Parties in Post - Communist Eastern Europe, p. 134. 9 Cf. Bobkov / Kuznetsov / Osmolovskii, Politicheskie partii Belarusi; Pankratova, Politische Parteien ohne Einfluss, pp. 45–47; Navumana, Parteien ohne Macht, pp. 33–35; Drakokhrust / Drakokhrust / Furman, Transformatsiya partiinoi sistemy Belarusi, pp. 120–139; Urban, Kommunisticheskie partii Rossii, pp. 407–412; Sahm, Belarus’, pp. 127–137; Korosteleva, The Emergence of a Party system, pp. 35–57, this is a good introduction into the party system, despite the author’s ignorance of research published in other than the English language. 10 Cf. Mark, Weißrusslands Kommunisten seit der Unabhängigkeit des Landes 1991, pp. 139–156. 11 Cf. Chudakov / Vashkevich / Al’fer / Plisko / Dobrovol’skij, Politicheskie partii. 12 Cf. Feduta / Bogutzkij / Martinovich, Politische Parteien. 13 Kotliarov, Politicheskie partii Belarusi.

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Organizational and institutional developments of the communist parties since 1991

The Belarusian communists are organized into two parties, each of which views itself as the legitimate successor of the former CPSU. The latter’s Belarusian branch was dissolved after the coup d’état in Moscow in August 1991 and Belarus’s subsequent proclamation of independence. At the end of that same year, however, attempts were made to restore the party whose members had gathered round a socio - political organization, “For Democracy, Social Progress and Justice” ( DSPS ). This movement’s plans aimed at “uniting and expressing the interests of the working people”, clearly socialist objectives.14 Since restoration of the old party was beyond any consideration for the time being, efforts were made to establish a new party. On initiatives by former regional party leaders, functionaries of the CPSU’s middle stratum, and the communist majority in the Supreme Soviet the new Party of Communists of Belarus ( Partiya Kommunistov Belarusi, since 1994 Partiya Kommunistov Belarusskaya [ PKB ])15 was founded on December 7th, 1991 and was registered by the authorities in May 1992.16 When the overall political situation had normalized and emotions had settled, Belarus’s Supreme Court repealed the ban on the old party, which subsequently reestablished itself as the Communist Party of Belarus ( Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Belarussii [ KPB ])17 under the leadership of its former First Secretary, Anatolii Malofeev, in April 1993. Since both parties shared ideology as well as political objectives, the KPB merged with the PKB at a joint congress a month later.18 The coup led by Lukashenko, who replaced the democratic constitution through an illegal referendum securing additional power for the office of president in November 1996, caused a new division of the Belarusian communists. Whereas a faction loyal to Lukashenko restored the KPB and split from the PKB, the latter joined the opposition. The KPB supported Lukashenko’s suggestion in July 2002 that the two organizations reunite into a single communist party, but the PKB fiercely rejected and to the present shows no inclination “DSPS Razgovor o trude i trudyashchikhsya.” In : My I vremya, 13 (189), 11 November 1991, p. 2. 15 The anti - Lukashenka party was founded in Minsk on December 7th, 1991. Sergei I. Kalyakin is chairman of the communist - socialist party. In May 2003 the PKB registered 7100 members. 16 “Uchreditel’nii syezd PKB.” In : Tovarishch. Gazeta Belorusskikh kommunistov, no. 48–49 (362–363), 6 December 2001; Mihalisko, Setting sail without a Compass, p. 41; Feduta / Bogutzkij / Martinovich, Politische Parteien, pp. 33 f.; Drakokhrust / Drakokhrust / Furman, Transformacija, p. 120; Chudakov / Vashkevich / Al’fer / Plisko / Dobrovol’skij, Politicheskie partii, p. 112. 17 The pro - Lukashenka party was founded in Minsk on February 14th, 1993. Tatiana G. Golubeva is chairman of the communist party. In June 2005 the KPB registered 5300 members. 18 For more details see Mark, Weißrusslands Kommunisten, pp. 144 f.; Feduta / Bogutzkij / Martinowitch, Politische Parteien, pp. 34 f. 14

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to accept the idea under the current circumstances. Nevertheless, in July 2006 and obviously on Lukashenko’s orders the KPB held another unification congress, but the PKB once more turned the offer down. The party chairman, Sergei I. Kalyakin,19 argued that the initiative had been intended to deceive the public, that there was no common basis with the KPB – a “presidential clone” – and that the KPB’s initiative had been the last step towards final separation of the two communist parties.20

2.1

The Communist Party of Belarus ( KPB )

When the KPB was formed in 1993 it enlisted 50,000 members of the former CPSU.21 The party, however, was unable to preserve its membership’s allegiance, which rapidly faded away. A likely reason was rejection by a majority of former CPSU members to merge with the PKB, but there is also reason to suggest that there was widespread weariness and distrust towards parties in general, impeding the recruitment of new members. In any case, both parties have been affected by a continuous decrease in membership since 1993 :22 With regard to the KPB, the decreases in membership seem to have leveled off. This is probably due to members of the PKB going over to the KPB when the former was under mounting repression by the regime. 19 Sergei I. Kalyakin was born on 16 June 1952 in the city of Minsk. He read civil engineering at the University of Radio Technology, and political science at the Belarusian State University in Minsk. Past graduation from the same university he was working as an engineer at several industrial enterprises. From 1977 to 1983 he was a functionary in the Central Committee of the Belarusian Comsomol. Then he was holding several appointments as a party secretary. In 1992 he was elected chairman of a district council in the city of Minsk. He was an MP from 1995 until the legally elected parliament was dissolved by Lukashenka. 20 Cf. Khodasevich, Belorusskoe kommunisticheskoe razdelenie. In : Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 August 2006. Apart from social democrats and the Agrarian Party of Belarus there are some other left - leaning and left - wing organisations active in Belarus. First, we have the Belorussian Patriotic Party – a communist and pro - Lukashenka party which was founded on October 8th, 1994. Its chairman is Nikolai D. Ulakhovich. In February 2002 the party registered 1103 members. Second, we have the Belorussian Party of Labour – a socialist and democratic party which was founded on November 25th 1993. Its chairman is Alexander I. Bukhvostov. In February 2002 the party registered 1077 members. At last, there is the Party of Labour and Justice – also a socialist and democratic party which was founded on June 26th, 1993. Its chairman is Victor A. Sokolov. In February 2002 the party registered 1629 members. 21 Cf. Holtbrügge, Im Schneckentempo, p. 850; Pankratowa, Politische Parteien, p. 45. 22 Cf. Holtbrügge, Im Schneckentempo, p. 850; “Iz otchetnogo doklada t. Lashkevicha A. V. II ( ob - edinitel’nomu ) s - ezdu PKB.” In : My I vremya, no. 22 (67), June 1993; Feduta / Bogutzkij / Martinowitsch, Politische Parteien, p. 22; “Ot diktatury cherez demokratiyu – k sotsializmu ! Otchet Tsentralnogo Komiteta PKB VII ( XXXVIII ) s - ezdu Partii kommunistov Belorusskoi ( dokladchik – pervii sekretar’ CK PKB Sergei Kalyakin),” http://pkb.promedia.by /22–23_05_03/003.htm, last accessed 12 September 2005; “Press- reliz ( hand - out of the KPB, Minsk June 2005),” p. 1, archive of the author.

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Table 1 : Development of membership of the KPB and PKB Year

KPB

PKB

1993

50 000

18 542

2002

4108

7 878

2003 2005 2006

7100 5 300 ca. 5 00023

The organizational structures of the KPB are similar to those of the CPSU. Decisions are made in accordance with the “principle of democratic centralism:” all party bodies are elected from bottom to top; party members are obliged to abide by the decisions of higher - level bodies and to practice strict party discipline, and factions within the party are prohibited. Nevertheless, there is a paragraph in the party statutes allowing minority opinions to be included in the minutes. The party is ruled by a Central Committee ( CC ) and its steering body, the Bureau of the CC, and is chaired by the First Secretary. The members who serve on the CC, the Bureau of the CC, as well as the Central Bureau of Inspection and Control and an Aeropag – the supreme party authority of appeal and party conduct – are elected by the party congress. The party congress is the highest body and convenes at least once every four years.24 In 1997 the KPB comprised some 90 local and regional organizations : in 2005 it comprised seven at the regional level, 132 at the district level, and 300 at the local level.25 The party’s newspaper, My I Vremya, later Kommunist Belorussii My I Vremya, was first published in 1990 by Victor Chikin who later became one of the leaders of the KPB. Its circulation has gone down from 30,000 in 1993 to 1,852 at the time of this writing. Since the elections in 2004 the KPB has had nine seats in the House of Representatives, Belarus’s national parliament, six seats in the regional Soviets, 74 seats in Soviets of districts and urban settlements, and 27 in rural Soviets.26 One of the KPB’s crucial problems continually addressed by party officials is the disproportionately high number of elderly party members. To a great extent, the KPB is a party of former Soviet functionaries, old - guard nomenclature and state pensioners. We do not have exact figures on the demographic structure, but in 1997 only 29 out of 522 delegates to the party congress were blue - collar workers or technical laborers, and only 13 worked on state or collective farms. 186 of the delegates had been awarded medals of service from the Soviet Union. Seven of these were decorated with the order “Hero of the Soviet Union” or 23 According to the party’s chairman Kalyakin. According to the authorities – less than 1000, Khodasevich, Belorusskoe kommunisticheskoe raz - edinenie. 24 Cf. “Ustav Kommunisticheskoi Partii Belorussii.” In : Kommunist Belorussii. My I Vremya, no. 7 (376), 19 Ferbruary 2004. 25 Cf. Bobkov / Kuznetsov / Osmolovskij, Politicheskie partii, p. 96; “Press - Reliz”, p. 1. 26 Cf. ibid.

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Table 2 : First Secretaries of the KPB Year

First Secretaries

1993

Anatolii Malofeev

1996–2002 Viktor V. Chikin 2002–2004 Valerii N. Sakharchenko 2004

Tatiana G. Golubeva

“Hero of Socialist Labor,” the greatest honors the USSR bestowed. The average age of all delegates was 54; 42 percent were older than 60.27 Prospects for recruitment of younger blood into the party – presently one of the most urgent problems to be solved28 – by means of mobilizing campaigns or similar efforts are poor because young people harboring the same political ideas and views as the KPB prefer to join the public youth organization of Belarus. This organization is under direct control of the authorities, benefits from public support, and offers careers and advancement opportunities within the country’s power structures.29 Table 3 : Social Structure of the 522 delegates of the KBP - Congress in 199730 Profession / Occupation Workers

29

Labourers in Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz

33

Managers of industrial enterprises and Productionplants

85

Managers of Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz

17

Scientists and academic staff

18

Teachers and physicians

37

Artists and art functionaries Party functionaries: – Party secretaries of basic organisations – Functionaries of trade unions and other societal organisations – Members of Parliament – Members of local councils

21 287 38 145 8 105

27 Cf. “Doklad predsedatelya mandatnoi komissii XXXIV s - ezda KPB N. A. Prokosinoi.” In : My I Vremya, no. 32–33 (232), October 1997. 28 Cf. “S plenuma minskogo gorkoma KPB. Celi opredeleny. Delo – za rabotoi.” In : Kommunist Belorussii. My I Vremya, 28 May 2005. 29 For more details see Dunzewa, Der Jugendverband im Dienste der Exekutive. In : Belarus - News, 19 (2002), p. 9; Sahm, Gesellschaft als eigenständige Veranstaltung, p. 102. 30 Cf. “Doklad predsedatelya mandatnoi komissii XXXIV s - ezda KPB N. A. Prokosinoi,” p. 55.

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The Party of Communists of Belarus ( PKB )

After the split the PKB not only lost half of its members but as an opposition party it was also exposed to the same repression and restrictions faced by all political groups and organizations in Belarus critical of Lukashenko’s one - man rule. As a consequence, the party lost a great number of its operating organizations which in 1994 included approximately 909 units at the local and 150 units at the district level, but only 257 and 106 in 2003 respectively.31 There is reason to believe that only a few of these are currently still operating. The precariousness of the situation was exacerbated after the PKB’s defeat in the parliamentary elections in October 2004, when only candidates loyal to the regime earned seats.32 The fact that Lukashenko’s regime is determined to suppress any kind of opposition was once again highlighted by the Ministry of Justice’s 2005 decree, forbidding political parties and other non - governmental organizations from running offices in other than public buildings. In practice, this entailed the dissolution of a majority of party organizations on the countryside.33 Moreover, the rent for offices in those buildings is between 8,000 and 10,000 Euros per month, an amount no party can afford. In this way Lukashenko is able to dissolve opposition parties, and as the former speaker of the Belarusian Parliament, Stanislav Shushkevich, put it, no one can suspect any political bias behind the move.34 The PKB’s newspaper, Tovarishch, was founded in 1994 and established a website in 2001. The latter, however, did not survive. It was shut down in June 2006, and currently the print version of the newspaper also seems vulnerable. Distribution through commercial channels is practically impossible, and giving out copies in the streets brings security forces to the scene. Newspaper distributors are arrested by the police and fined by corrupt courts, incidents which representatives of all opposition parties experienced in 2006.35 Despite international protest and interventions, the mass media in Belarus have been suppressed and journalists have been prosecuted by the authorities since 1994. Tricks and “administrative resources” used to that end include charges of slander and libel against critics, as well as measures launched to economically ruin printing houses and publishers. Moreover, “there is an effective ban that has for the past few years forbidden all state institutions to give out in31 32 33 34 35

Cf. Feduta / Bogutzkij / Martinowitsch, Politische Parteien, S. 36; “Ot diktatury cherez demokratiyu,” p. 10. See Sahm, Nach der Wahl ist vor der Wahl, p. 81. Cf. ibid., p. 89; “Staat gegen NGOs, Parteien und Medien”. In : Belarus - News, no. 29, Summer 2005, p. 10. Cf. Gamova, Mest v Minskikh SIZO khvatit na vsekh. V Belorussii prodolzhaetsya otlov liderov oppozitsii. In : Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 May 2006. Compare “Ereignisse in Belarus,” 6–12 November 2006, http ://www.belarusnews.de / de / repotagen / ereignisse - in - belarus - 06. - 12.11.html; “Ereignisse in Belarus,” 4–10 December 2006, http ://www.belarusnews.de / de / repotagen / ereignisse - in - belarus - 04. 10. 12. 2006.html.

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formation to any non - state - run organization, including the media.”36 It goes without saying that media outlets that support Lukashenko and his regime are spared such repression and curtailments. As a last resort, editors and journalists who have the means end up moving their offices abroad.37 In contrast to the KPB, from the beginning the PKB has been a party of functionaries who started their careers within the inferior structures of the former CPSU and the civil service of the Soviet Union. In independent Belarus many of them are blue - and white - collar workers, as the professional composition of the candidates running for parliament in 1995 and 2000 shows. Table 4 : Professional background of 204 candidates running for parliament in 199538 Managers and Chairmen of state and collective farms

91

44.6 %

Professors / headmasters / schoolteachers

29

14.2 %

Civil Service

21

10.3 %

Chairmen of local Soviets

16

7.8 %

Technicians

16

7.8 %

Civil engineers

9

4.4 %

Retired persons

9

4.4 %

Workers

6

2.9 %

Others

6

2.9 %

Table 5 : Professional background of the 75 candidates running for parliament in 200039 Works managers/economists

30

40.0 %

Scholars/Schoolteachers

19

25.3 %

Legal experts

5

6.6 %

Workers

4

5.3 %

Physicians

3

4.0 %

Others

14

Like the KPB, the PKB is struggling to attract young people. The party claims to have adopted an appropriate political concept. At the same time it needs to 36 Schaeffer, Belarus, p. 36. 37 Cf. ibid., pp. 35–38; Oertel, Viel Presse – wenig Freiheit, pp. 24–27; Dzjuba, Theorie und Praxis des Medienrechts in Belarus, pp. 157–171; Dorochow, Massenmedien in Belarus. 38 “Nashi kandidati v dobrii put’ !” In : Tovarishch, no. 19 (21), 12 May 1995. 39 “Informatsionnoe soobshchenie o VI ( XXXVII ) s - ezde Partii Kommunistov Belarusskoi.” In : Tovarishch, no. 34 (296), 25 August 2000.

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Table 6 : Social Structure of the 265 delegates of the PKB - Congress in 200340 Profession / Occupation Workers

47

Agricultural labourers

11

Farmer Employees: – Artists, teachers, medical and academic staff – Engineers, technicians – Managers of industrial and agricultural Plants, of commercial and other organisations Students

1 165 66 60 26 4

Unemployed

4

Employers

6

Retired persons

22

realize that it has to assume power first before it can put this concept into practice. In the meantime the PKB lacks the means and opportunities to recruit young members, for example by way of organizing concerts, dance competitions, festivals, and similar events. The youth problem is a real threat to the party’s survival because, according to figures announced by the party’s First Secretary in 2003, the PKB is losing 600 members annually to death while receiving only 250–300 applications for new membership.41

2.3

The Agrarian Party of Belarus

The Agrarian Party of Belarus was launched by the communist nomenclature of the agricultural sector. It registered in 1992 as the United Democratic Agrarian Party of Belarus and renamed itself the Agrarian Party ( AP ) in 1994. Its membership numbered 250 in 1992 and 10,000 by 1995 but has decreased to some 1,200 over the past years.42 From the beginning, the Agrarians proved themselves reliable supporters of those in power in Minsk. Lukashenko’s coup led to an immediate split of the party because its chairman, Semion Sharetskii – then speaker of the legally elected Supreme Soviet of Belarus – rejected the president’s violation of the constitution and, together with many Agrarians, joined 40 Cf. “Doklad mandatnoi komissii VII ( XXXVIII ) s - ezda PKB,” http ://pkb.promedia.By / 22–23_05_03/ 002.htm. 41 Cf. “Ot diktatury cherez demokratiyu.” 42 For more details see Mark, Weißrusslands Kommunisten, p. 147; “Agrarnaya partiya Belarusi,” p. 3; Feduta / Bogutzkij / Martinowitsch, Politische Parteien, p. 22; Belarus News, no. 5, Autumn 1999, p. 4, Lorenz, Aufbruch aus der Talsohle ?, p. 251.

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the opposition. Due to the regime’s repression and persecution, this faction of the party was destined to fail, and in order to avoid imprisonment Sharetskii went into exile in Lithuania in 1999.43 The remaining group, including 24 Members of Parliament ( MPs ), reorganized itself into the Agrarian Party which up to the present abides by a policy of strict loyalty to Lukashenko.44 The Agrarians do not consider themselves communists but rather representatives of the community of democratic socialism. Their program was and is based on guarantering social justice and security to all citizens, the commitment to the principles of human and common rights and the rule of law, and the introduction of an economic system with controlled competition, corresponding market conditions, and private property. Another central aim is the privatization of public enterprises whose ownership is to be transferred to the working people. The AP’s organizational structure is similar to that of the communist parties. The party’s highest bodies are the Central Council, whose members are elected Table 7 : Development of membership of the communist parties45 Year

PBK

KPB

United PKB

697 608 (CPSU)

1990 1992

15 000

1993

18 542

250 50 000

60 000

1994

18 000

1995

26 000

1996

15 000

1 500

1997

11 000

7110

2001

8 300

2002

7 878

2003

7100

2005

Agrarian Party

4108

10 000

1 242

5 300

43 Cf. Belarus - News, no. 5, Autumn 1999, p. 4; Lorenz, Aufbruch aus der Talsohle ?, p. 251. 44 “Agrarnaya partiya Belarusi,” passim; Chudakov / Vashkevich / Al’fer / Plisko / Dobrovol’skij, Politicheskie partii, p. 407–414; Feduta / Bogutzkij / Martinowitsch, Politische Parteien, p. 87. 45 Cf. Holtbrügge, Im Schneckentempo, p. 850; My I vremya, no. 22 (67), June 1993, p. 2; “Agrarnaya partiya Belarusi,” p. 3; Sahm, Kein politischer Frühling, p. 1028; “Belarus. Entsyklapedychny davednik”. Halouny red. B. I. Satsanka, Minsk 1995, p. 363; Sahm, Belarus’ von der parlamentarischen Republik, p. 135; My I vremya, 32–33, October 1997, p. 3; “Press - reliz;” Feduta / Bogutzkij / Martinowitsch, Politische Parteien, p. 22, 36; http ://pkb.promedia.by /22–23_05_03/003.htm.

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by the Congress and the Executive Committee of the Central Council, headed by the party chairman – currently Mikhail V. Shimantskii. As a loyal supporter of Lukashenko’ regime, the AP won three seats in the last parliamentary elections.

3.

Ideology, Program, and Strategy of the Communist Parties

While the AP is committed to the idea and the principles of democratic socialism, the communist parties regard themselves as legitimate successors to the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party ( RSDLP ) and the CPSU and as defenders and representatives of the communist movement in the Republic of Belarus. At the same time each of the two organizations insists in being the “only ideological and organizational successor to the Communist Party of Belarus in the CPSU.”46

3.1

The Ideology of the KPB

According to the KPB’s program, history has proven that only communists are capable of being “spokesmen of the popular will of the working class, peasants, and the working intelligentsia” and that “the communist doctrine is a great art for creating a humane and just world order, in which the free development of every single person is the precondition of the free development of all people.”47 Of course there is much talk in the program about dialectic materialism, Marxism - Leninism being the basic doctrine. In practice, however, the party has to be flexible and cope with the political system established by Lukashenko, that is the KPB must abide by his rules. The KPB believes that the basic struggle between capitalism and socialism had not yet come to an end and that socialism as defined by Lenin is a precondition for a “future communist association” of free people. This is why Belarus had to be directed to the “path of constructing socialism,”48 the way of constructing, however, determined by history and tradition. Thus when “the Great Socialist October Revolution opened to the Belarusian people the historical chance of finding its state destination in a voluntary union of sister nations,” the Belarusians made their choice. Moreover, the Soviet Union, with all its “achievements,” provided models for the present because the social creativity of its population “generated public and societal institutions never seen before and being

46 “Press - reliz,” p. 1 ( Bold type in the original text ). 47 “Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Belorussii ( priniyata VII ( XXXIX ) s - ezdom KPB 13 dekabrya 2003 goda ).” In : Kommunist Belorussii. My I Vremya, no. 8 (377), 20–26 February 2004. 48 Ibid., p. 7.

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of historical importance for the whole world, such as the Soviets of the working people and the multinational Soviet Federation.”49 In general, there are two pillars on which the KPB’s ideology and philosophy are based : first, on close friendship with the Russian people who had provided enormous resources whenever Belarus was threatened by invading hordes in the past and the fact that Belarusians had been able to rely on the “friendship and mutual aid of the sister republics” during Soviet rule. Only this way the country had been able to preserve “independence and autonomy” during World War II. Thus, the reunification of Belarus with Russia – a precondition for a renewed unification with other sister nations – is one of the KPB’s strategic goals. For this end the KPB became a member of the Union of Communist Parties- CPSU, an organization uniting Communist parties of the former Soviet republics as a nucleus for revival and restoration of the decayed CPSU. Second, the party is committed to the socialist model of the Soviet Union whose stable social and economic security systems and institutions of people’s rule, the Soviets of the working people, are regarded as providing appropriate solutions to all problems with which Belarus is presently confronted. It goes without saying that for the KPB the downfall of the USSR was not the result of organic deficiencies and internal contradictions of the system as such but rather the outcome of bad practice. Thus, it was insufficient use of human intelligence and the resources and institutions of socialism, too high pretensions of parts of the population in terms of consumption and public patronage, and social passivity accelerated by antisocialist forces, slanderers and journalists discrediting socialism and muddying Soviet history that led to the collapse of the Soviet system.50 However, as it is stressed in the party program, socialism has not been defeated because “the bourgeois form of the societal being is approaching the bounds of its physical possibilities.” Instead, mankind had to choose between the western model of consumption and production, which would lead the societal development of the world into a dead end, and a model which would enhance welfare and social security all over the world. The realization of that vision would entail the “preservation of an ecologic balance based on a change in the productive powers, a new way of production and consumption, and a new – humane – orientation of scientific and technological processes.”51 At present this turn towards an alternative way of life is impeded by imperialism, which is to be fought. According to the KPB, the prospects are good because the contradictions of the current era facilitate the “alliance of nationalist and socialist - oriented strata and classes” and enable the party to actively contribute to a development that would eventually lead to a socially just world with equal political rights for all people.52 49 50 51 52

Ibid., p. 2. Cf. “Programma Kommunisticheskoi partii Belorussii,” pp. 2 f. Ibid., pp. 5 f. Ibid., p. 6.

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Program and Strategy of the KPB

The KPB strives to make the population in Belarus fight actively for socialism, which the PKB believes is the only way to overcome the country’s crucial problems. These in turn are seen as a result of counterrevolutionary attempts to restore capitalism, a view which is hardly shared by neutral observers of the economic system in Lukashenko’s Belarus. The communists, however, have their own perception of reality and consider socialist and progressive nationalist parties their allies since “the defense of the national and public interests of the Republic of Belarus is organically linked with the struggle for socialism and appropriate forms of people’s rule.”53 The central objectives and steps to be taken are described in the KPB’s program as follows :54 – To establish the rule of the working people. – To develop the state structures of Belarus; to develop and strengthen the Belarusian - Russian Union and renew the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. – To foster a socially oriented economy to “ensure a high living standard of the conscientiously working members of the society;” “to preserve and develop the social achievements acquired by the Belarusian people in the time of the Soviet Union.” – To foster and strengthen the state’s role in industry, agriculture, financial and credit institutions; to guarantee the participation of the working people in decisions concerning society, economy, authorities, and the people’s control of distribution and exchange of material and nonmaterial goods produced in the country. – To protect public property and the people’s right to it; to protect private property, and to reclaim private property appropriated in neglect of the country’s interests. – To ban private ownership of land and natural resources and trade of them. – To solve disputes through the courts. – To inform the Belarusian citizens about the “enemy - of - the - people character of the bourgeois parties and movements pushing society into a national disaster.” – To take measures to prevent mass media, movies, literature, and art from “degenerating into a force undermining society.” – To foster and enhance the scientific potential and the education of scientific cadres, and to provide the financial means they need. – To secure and strengthen the independence, the international status, and the defense capability of Belarus; to take efforts to liquidate the aggressive bloc of NATO.

53 Ibid. 54 Cf. ibid., pp. 7 f.

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– To determinedly fight all forms of crime; to ensure the individual and general security of all citizens. – To foster the commitment to constitutional rights and liberties. It is not a coincidence that the expressions “constitutional rights” and “liberties” come at the very end of the program. Content and wording of its stipulations reflect attitudes, assessments, and the underlying system of values and norms rightly or wrongly attributed to the Soviet Union and its institutions and are typical of the so - called homo sovieticus, a species widespread throughout Belarus. There is no mentioning of human and civil rights, democracy, or the rule of law, objectives that rank high among European organizations. So far, their attempts to promote social and political transformation and to facilitate the reintegration of Belarus into the European community of nations has been met with limited acceptance on the part of the regime, and also in this regard the KPB follows Lukashenko’s policy.55 The same holds true for the KPB’s goals in the field of foreign affairs. At the heart of the party’s philosophy “fighting imperialism” ranks high on the scale and is considered a top priority. The label “imperialism” is applied to the politics of the United States and western countries in general and understood as a threat to Belarus. Moreover, fighting imperialism is equated with fighting Hitler and Nazi Germany’s occupation of Belarus. According to the KPB, Belarus is exposed to “enormous pressure... through American imperialism and its allies in NATO.”56 US foreign policy is viewed as being similar to the policy Hitler pursued in the 1930s. In the same manner that Hitler created an alliance with Italy and Japan leading to World War II, the US founded NATO to facilitate its militant designs, and – as stated in a public announcement of the Minsk party committee in May 2005 – this led to a war not openly declared and to interference in the internal affairs of many countries in order to undermine their stability.57 Also labeled as enemies or “intriguers” are the Russian oligarchs, participants in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, and the opposition to Lukashenko’s regime. “Supporters of so - called ‘western democracy’ and the extremely well - paid cohorts of journalists and reporters” are also put on this list. They are accused of having waged a “war of information” over many years to discredit the political leadership of Belarus.58 Here the KPB reiterates accusations similar to those made by Lukashenko who sees himself at war with the international media and maintains that the opposition parties in Belarus are financed by millions of Dollars from abroad.59

55 For more details see Timmermann, Belarus zwischen Russland, p. 304. 56 “Press - reliz,” p. 2. 57 Cf. “Obrashchenie grazhdan Respubliki Belarus’ k grazhdanam Soedinennikh Shtatov Ameriki.” In : Kommunist Belorussii. My I Vremya, no. 28 (21–27 May ) 2005 g. 58 Cf. “Press - reliz,” p. 2. 59 Lukashenka, Lyos prezidentskikh vibarau budze virashats’ tol’ki Belaruski narod. In : Zviazda. Belaruskaya gazeta, no. 230 (25562) 24, Listopada 2005 g.

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In order to realize its objectives effectively, the KPB primarily wants to be represented in “all public administrations and spheres of societal activities, which are of importance to the people of Belarus.” In addition, the national parliament, Soviets of all scale, and all institutions of self - rule are regarded as appropriate fields of party activity. Thus, high priority is given to measures ensuring influence on labor collectives, the union of military officers, youth organizations, trade unions, associations of military retirees, and women’s organizations.60 This strategy reflects the party’s deficiencies in terms of membership, partisanship, and participation in political decision making caused by a political system that confines parties to play a limited – if any – role on the political stage. The KPB soon realized which way the wind was blowing and reacted appropriately. From its reemergence in 1996 on the party has supported Lukashenko and his attempts to concentrate power. It did not even object to the sacrifice of central ideological positions to ensure political survival under Lukashenko’s regime. By 1997 the demand and party slogan “all power to the Soviets” was abandoned because – according to the First Secretary’s, V. Chikin’s, argument – an “honest president” like Lukashenko, elected by an overwhelming majority of the population, could be regarded as representing a “form of people’s rule.”61 During presidential elections in 2001 the KPB supported Lukashenko’s reelection arguing that he had “proven himself to be a true patriot and statesman, a competent economist, and an experienced administrator.” He was also praised for his policy of preserving the country’s industrial potential and a functioning agricultural sector, for having averted the outbreak of religious and ethnic conflict, and for doing everything to restore the ties between former Soviet nations that were severed in 1991. The union between Belarus and Russia, officially established in 1999 but not yet entered into force, was also an important achievement, a first step towards reintegrating the former Soviet republics. Moreover, Lukashenko’s policies were endorsed merely because changing them would lead to destruction and bloodshed.62 The KPB not only supports the political program of Lukashenko, it also regards itself as an auxiliary force of the regime, as a tool at Lukashenko’s disposal. This includes the party’s readiness to contribute to the “stabilization of Belarusian society and to foster the gathering of the ... population around the government.”63 Moreover, before the presidential elections in 2004 First Secretary V. Zakharchenko openly appealed to members of the KPB that they 60 Cf. “Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii,” p. 9; “S plenuma minskogo gorkoma KPB;” “Zalog uspekha – distsiplina i yedinstvo. Doklad Pervogo sekretarya TsK KPB V. N. Zakharenko na II plenume Tsentral’nogo komiteta.” In : Kommunist Belorussii. My I Vremya, no. 14 (3832), 3–9 April 2004. 61 “Socialisticheskaya revolutsiya prodolzhaetsya. Doklad Pervogo sekretarya Kommunisticheskoi partii Belorussii Viktora Chikina na XXXIV syezde KPB.” In : My I Vremya, no. 32–33 (232), October 1997, p. 4. 62 Cf. “Communist Party of Belarus wants Lukashenka for president,” 17 August 2001 http://elections.belapan. com / mail / eng / show.php ?show=7998. 63 “Press - reliz,” p. 1.

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should see to fostering discipline during the campaign, as demanded by the president, and becoming an agency for surveillance and control in favor of the authorities.64 On the political stage, since 1996 the KPB has cooperated with parties and organizations which fit best within the regime, enjoyed the president’s protection, and functioned as loyal propagandists of his designs and political manoeuvres. In September 1998, for example, the pro - Lukashenko Patriotic People’s Union was formed, uniting the KPB and approximately 30 political parties and alliances in order to support the president in the coming elections.65 The Union did not last long, but the KPB obtained six seats in the parliamentary elections in 2000. The KPB as well as the AP derive benefits from their loyalty to the regime. For example, the opposition parties, because of administrative tricks and interventions by authorities, won no seats in the parliamentary elections in 2000 and 2004, but the KPB and AP won 107 and 39 of 257 seats in local elections in 2003, respectively.66 Lukashenko fosters loyalty by appointing high - level functionaries of these parties to attractive public positions and offices. In 1996, when the legally elected Supreme Soviet was replaced by a bicameral parliament that was deprived of its essential rights, Lukashenko made A. Malofeev – later First Secretary of the Soviet KPB – the Speaker of the House of Representatives and Nikolai Dzemyantsei – Speaker of the Supreme Soviet until August 1991 – a member of the Council of the Republic, the first chamber of parliament. Viktor Chikin, who was responsible for the split from the PKB, held the office of Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee of Minsk before he was appointed head manager of Belarusian Broadcasting and Television in 2000. The acting First Secretary, Zakharchenko, also made a career within the administration; he had been Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Brest region. Other highlevel functionaries hold leading positions in ministries and other governmental institutions, including the president’s administration. The Secretary of the TsK of the KPB, S. A. Posokhov, for example, was one of Lukashenko’s close collaborators.

3.3

The Ideology of the PKB

Like the KPB, the PKB is committed to the doctrine of Marxism - Leninism and the vision of a “classless society of social justice.” A first step toward this goal would be the “unification and political development of all wage - earning people to achieve their complete liberation from all forms of exploitation.”67 Despite 64 Cf. “Zalog uspekha.” 65 Cf. “Chronologie der Ereignisse in Belarus vom 16. 6. bis 15. 9. 1982”. In : Belarus - News, no. 3 (1998), p. 13; Mark, Weißrusslands Kommunisten, p. 157. 66 Cf. Belarus - News, no. 21, April 2003, S. 9; Navumava, Parteien ohne Macht, p. 33. 67 “Ustav partii kommunistov Belorusskoi s izmeneniyami i dopolneniyami, vnesennimi VIII vneocherednim s - yezdom PKB.” In : Tovarishch, no. 19 (479), 17 June 2004.

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this, the PKB has thrown its ideological ballast overboard and done away with most clichés used in Soviet times. As an opposition party with limited space to move, the PKB has to be ideologically more flexible than the KPB. Furthermore, it must be receptive to new ideas and suggestions, as evoked not only by the political discourse in Belarus but also by dint of the Zeitgeist in general. The opposition communists therefore adhere to the principles of democratic socialism and a multi - party system and reject the dogma of one dominant political ideology. According to the First Secretary Sergei Kalyakin, Lenin had only introduced the one - party system as an interim institution for defending the revolution, which – after the Bolsheviks’s failure to remove it later – had contributed to the collapse of socialism and the demise of the Soviet Union. This is why the PKB, in the absence of communism, promotes pluralism, freedom of expression, and private ownership.68 The call for a “dictatorship of the proletariat” was also abandoned in the party program because post - industrial societies lack the necessary prerequisite and because socialism could not exist without democracy.69 Thus, democratic socialism as defined by the PKB is based on the principles of rule by the people, the rule of law, control of government by parliament, genuine labor and fair wages, a dignified way of life for present and future generations, local autonomy, and a commitment to human rights and to uphold international law.70 At the same time the party underlines its commitment to the interests of society, whose members “must abide by certain common rules.” Society should provide social security based on solidarity, equal rights and opportunities for all members of society and an appropriate economic system. Nevertheless, while the PKB claims that democracy stands for a “commitment to uphold the political rights and liberties of the citizens, … it is not enough. Society also has to ensure economic and social rights and liberties, including workers’s ownership of means of production, their participation in the management of production, and the distribution of the results achieved by their labor.”71

3.4

Program and Strategy of the PKB

The PKB’s main goal is the “Democratization of Belarusian society,” an objective that separates the anti - Lukashenko Communists from their comrades in the KPB. Democratization is to be implemented by the “return of the Republic of 68 Cf. Kalyakin, Mne pomagaet opyt raboty v KPSS. In : Tovarishch, no. 23 (337), 7 June 2001. 69 Cf. Kalyakin / Skrigan / Vozniak, Kommunisticheskaya ideologiya i partiya kommunistov v sovremennoi Belarusi. In : Tovarishch, no. 27 (443), 10 July 2003. 70 Cf. “Platforma partii kommunistov Belarusskoi na predstoyashchikh parlamentskikh i prezidentskikh viborakh, odobrena III plenumom TsK PKB, 18. dek. 1999 goda.” In : Tovarishch, no. 3 (265), 21 January 2000. 71 “Programma Partii kommunistov Byelorusskoi Priniyata VII ( XXXVIII ) s - ezdom PKB 25 maya 2003 goda,” http ://pkb.promedia.by /22–23_05_03/007.htm, last accessed 24 August 2005.

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Belarus to the path of socialist development, which cannot be reached without deep changes in the existing political system that ... has led the country into an economic, social, and legal impasse.”72 Lukashenko is accused of “having eliminated the social achievements of the Soviet period” and “having established a bourgeois, authoritarian, bureaucratic, political regime, supported by an arbitrary executive that has freed itself from the people’s control, ignoring constitution and law.” Consequently, the PKB demands the abolition of the presidential system and the restitution of democracy, as defined above. In this context, fierce criticism is leveled against President Lukashenko for having deprived the Soviets of political rights and having destroyed local self - government.73 He is also blamed for corruption and the country’s economic hardship. Lukashenko’s “absurd policy,” as the PKB calls it, which has introduced a non - socialist, non - collectivist, bourgeois - capitalist economic system to Belarus, has brought the economy to the brink of ruin.74 In contrast, the reform Communists stand for socialism and collectivism, however without clear concepts about how to put these projects into practice and live up to their constituents’ expectations. Because Soviet values, habits, and perceptions are still virulent among large parts of the population, party members continue to demand the abolishment of “wild capitalism,” a return to the “social achievements of the Soviet citizens,” and the improvement of living standards in Belarus.75 On the other hand, party leaders plead for modernization and adaptation of the program to current challenges. From the beginning, these efforts have been met with criticism from a large number of members who reject private ownership of property and market economy. Resistance to the new party program discussed in 2000 was so vehement that the PKB leadership had no choice but to react to it at the party congress in 2003. Thus, with reference to Lenin First Secretary Kalyakin underscored that the program had to fit within the existing political, social, and economic conditions in the country and would only apply to a transitional period until the party assumed political power. At the same time, using a casuistic argument, he pointed out that according to the scientific doctrine of socialism the societal form of property was in all respects more effective than the private one, and consequently – all else being equal – would win the competition of systems. Thus, equal rights for all forms of property would in fact entail the dominance of the societal form of property.76 To summarize, the PKB’s program combines features of a modern party in transition, moving towards Social Democracy, with elements of Soviet social economic concepts, without which the party would not be able to mobilize its 72 Ibid. 73 Cf. “Platforma partii kommunistov.” 74 Cf. “Otkritoe pis’mo Tsentral’nomu komitetu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii.” In : Tovarishch, no. 36 (350), 6 September 2001; “Ot diktaturi cherez demokratiyu.” 75 See, for instance, Nikolay Tolonkov’s Reader’s letter. In : Tovarishch, no. 1 (263), 6 January 2000. 76 Cf. “Ot diktaturi cherez demokratiyu.”

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electorate. At the same time the party’s leadership seems determined to persuade members of the new political philosophy and to deal with criticism targeted at the party program’s social - democratic, even bourgeois values. It was also First Secretary Kalyakin who addressed these objections : he defended the program and made a point of underscoring that “liberty, equality, solidarity, social justice, and democracy” were not incompatible with socialism.77 It stands to reason that not all members of the PKB will subscribe to this assessment, and it remains to be seen whether the party can overcome emerging cleavages on these questions between the leadership and the rank and file. There is also a gap dividing the party regarding the assessment of the breakup of the USSR and its causes. Obviously, there are still many party members who believe that the defeat of the Soviet system was caused not by the inefficiency of the socialist model chosen but by the intereference of external enemies and treason committed by the leadership of the CPSU, namely by Gorbachev and those close to him.78 This was the view the PKB leadership adhered to officially and publicly in the 1990s79 but which has since been abandoned. Today, First Secretary Kalyakin, again using communist dialectics, argues that unless we learn from the mistakes made in the past there will be no chance of moving ahead. Moreover, acknowledging mistakes would not be a sign of weakness but of strength. Thus, with regard to the breakup of the Soviet Union and in contrast to the leadership of the KPB S. Kalyakin – backed by other prominent members on the Central Committee – has changed both his mind and his party’s official position.80 At the same time, however, there is no indication that the party’s fixation on the former Soviet Union as a social - economic model for the establishment of a just society has abated significantly. Like the KPB, the PKB shares many of Lukashenko’s views on foreign policy. They both reject NATO policies and the American policy in Middle East, especially in Iraq. They also criticize the European Union’s security policy of organizing joint forces and enhancing the Union’s capabilities as a global player. According to the PKB’s program, the world has entered a “qualitatively new phase of globalization.” Having destroyed the socialist Commonwealth, international imperialism is now striving to establish a new world order controlled by the US and its allies. However, the problems the world faces can only be solved by an anti - imperialist war of all nations of the planet for a just, i. e. socialist, world in which all people enjoy equal rights.81 77 Cf. ibid. 78 Cf. “Ot diktaturi cherez demokratiyu.” 79 Cf. “Obrashcheniye Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Partii kommunistov Belorusskoi ( PKB ) k kommunistam, trudyashchimsya respubliki v svyazi s 80 - letniem Velikoi Oktyabr’skoi revolutsii.” In : Tovarishch, no. 45 (151), 6 November 1997; Kalyakin, Oktyabr’ i vozrozhdenie sotsializma. 80 Cf. “Ot diktaturi cherez demokratiyu;” Kalyakin / Skrigan / Vozniak, Kommunisticheskaya ideologiya. 81 Cf. “Programma Partii Kommunistov Belorusskoi Priniata V ( XXXVI ) s’ezdom PKB 8 marta 1999g.” In : Politicheskie partii, p. 185; “Kommunisti Belarusi solidarni s bor’boi irakskogo naroda.” In : Tovarishch, no. 20 (282), 19 May 2000.

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One should not overrate these concepts; much of it is rhetoric, the product of efforts to uphold an ideological façade. According to the program, the PKB is committed to a policy of peaceful coexistence with all countries. In contrast to Lukashenko, whose policy has led Belarus into diplomatic isolation, the reform - Communists are determined “to reestablish full relations with foreign countries and to resume cooperation with international organizations.”82 The PKB welcomes the attempts of the Organization for Security and Co - operation in Europe ( OSCE ) to monitor political developments in Minsk and to mediate between opposition groups and the regime.83 Furthermore, as a rule the representatives of the PKB take part in conferences and panels initiated and conducted by international organizations and NGOs to create public fora, promote democracy, and foster civil society. The PKB also sees reunification with Russia and Ukraine as a main goal of Belarus’s foreign policy. It should be achieved in the course of an integration process based on mutual interests and voluntary decisions in order to avoid Belarus being “incorporated” as one of the 90 provinces of the Russian Federation. This is the only point on which the reform Communists agree with Lukashenko who has otherwise having proven himself unable to make headway with regard to the project of uniting the eastern European Slavic nations.84 The party’s criticism, however, is not restricted to the president : his supporters are also under attack. The KPB in particular is a permanent target. The proLukashenko party is accused of having departed from communist principles and having become, as Kalyakin puts it, a “useful device of the ruling power in the fight against the communist movement in the Republic of Belarus.” According to the First Secretary of the PKB Lukashenko – who had “devoted his entire political career since 1990 to the struggle against Belarus’s Communist movement, the liquidation of Soviet rule, and the achievement of socialism,”85 – created the KPB himself, assembling high functionaries of Gorbachev’s former nomenclature. Of course this accusation exaggerates Lukashenko’s role in the institutional development of the Belarusian Communists, but there can be no doubt that ever since the coup in 1996 the two Communist parties have been victims of the president’s maneuvers aimed at paralyzing the Communists as political competitors.86 While the KPB gave in to Lukashenko’s pressure and has become a pil82 Ibid. 83 Cf.“O sdache pozitsii rech’ ne idet.” In : Tovarishch, no. 8 (270), 25 February 2000. 84 Cf. “Programma Partii kommunistov;” Kalyakin, Ja lovlu sopernika na yavnoi lzhi. In : Tovarishch, no. 6 (320), 9 February 2001. 85 “O nekotorikh vivodakh iz itogov parlamentskikh viborov v respublike Belarus’. Doklad pervogo sekretarya Tsentral’nogo komiteta PKB S. Kalyakina na vtorom zasedanii VI (XXXVII ) s - ezda PKB.” In : Tovarishch, no. 44 (306), 3 November 2000; “Belarusian Party of Communists surprised at public support of Lukashenko by Russian Communists’ leader,” http ://elections.belapan.com / mail / eng / show.php ?show=8321, last accessed 2 August 2005; Kalyakin, Za skhozhimi nazvaniyami skrivaetsa protipolozhnaya Sushchnost’. In : Tovarishch, no. 20 (480), 15 July 2004. 86 See also Urban, Kommunisticheskie partii, pp. 408 f.

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Table 8 : Development of print run of the Communist Party Newspapers Year

Tovarishch

1993

My i vremya 30 000

1994

10 000

33 000

1995

21700

15 000

1996

24 500

4 000

1997

9 000

1999

12 220

6 000

2000

8 751

9 000

2002

4 200

2004

3 003

2005

5 000 1850

lar of the authoritarian regime, the PKB did not. Nevertheless, the Communists as a major political force have been eliminated.

3.5

Party Politics and Political Cooperation

Although a parliamentary decree in 1991 temporarily forbade all CPSU activities, the communists were able to maintain their dominant political power in Belarus until 1996. Prominent party leaders had to quit the most prominent positions in public structures, move into the political background, or find shelter with lower - level institutions and the management of state - run enterprises. The majority of functionaries, however, remained in office. This was the case regarding government and administration as well as the Supreme Soviet or the management of the economic sector, thus constituting the political and social economic basis of the so - called “Party of Power.”87 Neither a change of elite nor a change of institutions had taken place, and no opposition force would have successfully been able to press for democratic reorganization of the country. Moreover, the majority of the population refrained from becoming involved in politics and relied on the system that seemed to safeguard a minimum of social security while new regimes in neighboring countries did not. Thus, communists won elections and enjoyed the support of a reliable constituency. Opinion polls in 1993 showed that the United Communist Party, the PKB, was supported by 30 percent of those surveyed. This number fell to 25 percent by summer 1996, still a high rating, before the party fell apart. The split harmed both parties. 87 For more details see Hoff / Timmermann, Belarus in der Krise, pp. 731 f.; Zaiko, Elite groups in the Republic of Belarus, p. 247; Timmermann, Belarus, p. 11.

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Already by 1997, the rating had decreased to 2.5 percent ( PKB ) and 5.5 percent ( KPB ).88 At the beginning of his presidency the United Communists supported Lukashenko and his policies of constraining opposition forces, fostering Russian- Belarusian relations and reintroducing Soviet symbols and emblems which had been abandoned after the declaration of independence. Siding with the president, the PKB whose candidate, V. N. Novikov, had only obtained 4.6 percent of votes during the 1994 presidential elections, achieved very good results during the first parliamentary elections in 1995. The party benefited from Lukashenko’s Soviet - tinted rhetoric and above all from the restrictions of a new electoral law passed at the president’s instigation89, favoring parties that could rely on sufficiently functioning organizational structures and a stable constituency. This was the case with the communists and the agrarians. Thus, after three voting tours and despite Lukashenko’s efforts to manipulate ballots, the communists and agrarians obtained 21.1 percent and 16.7 percent of all votes respectively, which equates to 42 and 33 seats in the Supreme Soviet. Almost half the seats went to “independent” candidates embracing representatives of Lukashenko’s governmental structures, 60 of whom formed the parliamentary faction “Soglasie” ( Concord ).90 Thus, a parliament was elected that seemed to be willing to function according to the president’s rules. This was true of Lukashenko’s policy regarding unification with the Russian Federation, which the “Soglasie,” agrarians and communists supported, but not of the president’s intention to deprive the Supreme Soviet of basic legislative rights.91 Apart from the majority of the “Soglasie” faction, most members of parliament objected to the president’s violation of the constitution – but to no avail. Despite national and international protests, albeit a flawed referendum, Lukashenko amended the constitution, transferring many parliamentary rights and functions to the Office of the President and replacing the Supreme Soviet by a bicameral parliament. More than half of the parliamentarians – besides the majority of “Soglasie,” 24 agrarians and 21 communists – became members of the new House of Representatives, while Lukashenko’s police force expelled those loyal to the abolished Supreme Soviet.92 Except for Russia, no governmental or international organization accepted Lukashenko’s coup, and the new parliament was not internationally recognized. The opposition welcomed this; however it 88 See Mark, Weißrusslands Kommunisten, p. 166. 89 Cf. Sahm, Kein politischer Frühling in Belarus, p. 1022; Karol’, Das politische System und die Innenpolitik in der Republik Belarus’, p. 119. 90 For more details see Mark, Weißrusslands Kommunisten, p. 149; Steinsdorff, Das politische System Weißrusslands ( Belarus ), p. 443; Korosteleva, The Emergence, p. 47. 91 Cf. Saenko, Ot SSSR vnov’ pakhnet “Cheremukhoi”. In : Moskovskie novosti, no. 12, 24–31 March 1996; Malek, Gründung einer “Gemeinschaft der Souveränen Republiken”, pp. A 63 f. 92 For more details see Archiv der Gegenwart, 15–30 November 1996, p. 41592; Sahm, Schleichender Staatsstreich, p. 485; Lindner, Präsidialdiktatur in Weißrussland, p. 1044; Förster, p. 340; Mark, Weißrusslands Kommunisten, pp. 151 f.

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has not been able to improve its situation since, as described above, agrarians and communists were weakened by the splitting - off of large parts of their organizations. However, whereas the anti - Lukashenko faction of the Agrarians failed to consolidate into an opposition party, the PKB was more successful with adapting to the new situation, at least eventually. Status and privileges previously enjoyed as an integral part of the regime were gone, and being in opposition to it was an experience to which the party had to adjust. The only thing the PKB had in common with most opposition groups was the objection to Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime, and it was therefore very reluctant to participate in joint activities with other political groups or organizations. The first challenge the PKB faced were the 2000 parliamentary and 2001 presidential elections. Lukashenko and the authorities did everything possible to weaken the opposition groups and to prevent them from participating. Neglecting all of the OSCE’s stipulations and proposals to mediate between the president and the opposition, Lukashenko in January 1999 increased requirements for political parties to be officially registered and had a new electoral codex adopted in February 2000. Minimum party membership was raised from 500 to 1,000, and local organizations had to have branches in at least four of the country’s six administrative regions. As a consequence, the number of parties fell from 28 to 18; both communist parties survived. Several amendments to the electoral law and a new electoral code put further obstacles in the way of party candidates running for parliament. They were confronted with much bureaucratic harassment, strict limitations on campaign financing other than by small sums provided by the government, and a minimum requirement of 50 percent voter participation in their districts.93 In order to join forces but also as a result of interventions by the OSCE, a “Consulting Council” and a ”Coordinating Council of Democratic Forces” ( Kardinatsiinaya rada demokratychnikh silau ) were founded in 1999. These fora united parties that covered a wide range of ideological and political orientations, such as the Nationalist Democratic Party of the Belarusian People’s Front ( BNF ), the Liberal United Citizens Party ( OGP), the Belarusian Social Democratic Party People’s Hramada ( BSDP HG ), the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada ( BSDH ), the central - left Belarusian Labor Party ( BPP ), the women’s party, Hope, and the PKB. A trade union faction and the Democratic Initiative Charter - 97 also participated in these Councils.94 The intention to create a common opposition that would be a real challenge to Lukashenko’s regime nevertheless failed because the participating parties proved to be unwilling to cooperate. From the beginning, they were unable to adopt a common attitude towards the OSCE’s efforts to bring about a dialogue

93 Cf. Lindner / Sahm, “Dialog” ohne Dialog vor “Wahlen” ohne Wahl ?, p. 992; Förster, Wahlen im Transformationsprozess der Republik Belarus, p. 45. 94 Cf. “Ot diktatury cherez demokratiyu”; Feduta / Bogutzkij / Martinowitsch, Politische Parteien, pp. 24–26; Korosteleva, The Emergence, p. 49.

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between the opposition and the government. The regime’s continuing violations of civil rights, the fact that it showed no inclination to make concessions, distrust towards Lukashenko’s and the OSCE’s true intentions, and, not least, party leaders’s personal ambitions caused the opposition – with the exception of the PKB – to refuse to take part in this dialogue.95 Even with regard to the parliamentary elections in 2000, the opposition parties failed to agree on a common strategy. While a majority of them decided not to nominate candidates, the PKB chose to do so. As the party’s First Secretary argues, even though the authorities have violated and restricted candidates’ rights, under the prevailing circumstances a boycott would not be considered productive since election campaigns provide the possibility to inform the public of the actual situation, an opportunity that should not be missed.96 The election turned out as many observers had expected. On the whole, parties loyal to the regime gained 16 seats, the so - called “independent” candidates 94 seats,97 and the reform Communists none. Some of the 71 candidates running for parliament lost votes to candidates supporting the president; others failed because in many districts the turn - out was less than the 50 percent stipulated by law.98 A further problem faced by all political parties was and still is the electorate’s low acceptance and a bad public image, the result of Lukashenko’s systematic denunciation of parties as fifth columns of forces abroad stirring up conflict and disturbing national consensus as well as the parties’s inability to cooperate. Still, the PKB’s ( and other parties’s ) election disaster was mainly a result of the authorities’ eliminating inconvenient candidates, not infrequently by using so - called “administrative resources :” refusing access to public television and broadcasting stations during the campaigns and particularly by making use of the restrictive provisions of the electoral code.99 Firstly, the electoral code does not allow persons who have been convicted of criminal or administrative violations during the last year to participate in elections, a provision which automatically excludes almost all active members of opposition parties. Secondly, candidates who are otherwise eligible to run can be denied registration if a single signature on his nomination forms is found to be invalid. The methods the authorities in Belarus use to get rid of inconvenient candidates can be even worse, as described in a report by the PKB’s leader, S. Kalyakin : “[Candidates] must be prepared to endure hard pressure put on them as well as on members of their families by the authorities. We cannot allow a repeat of the situation during the past elections, when almost half of the candidates of the PKB renounced their nomination respectively their mandates due to pressure put on 95 Cf. ibid, p. 46; Lindner / Sahm, “Dialog” ohne Dialog, pp. 992–994; Lorenz, Aufbruch aus der Talsohle, p. 251–258; “Politische Parteien in Belarus,” pp. 24–26. 96 Cf. “Ot diktaturi cherez demokratiyu.” 97 Cf. Korosteleva, The Emergence, pp. 49 f. 98 Cf. Luneva, Rezhim Lukashenko, p. 24. 99 Cf. “Die Medien im Wahlkampf. ‘Ein - Mann - Theater’.” In : Belarus - News, no. 15, Autumn 2001, p. 8.

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them by the authorities of the ‘vertical’ and by managers of the enterprises, in which they work – with some being forced to do so the day before the ballots.”100 Thirdly, all candidates have to submit their income and property declarations, and “many of those who have nothing to hide fail to fill out the document correctly.”101 Ironically, the two communist parties supported the addition of this regulation to the electoral code, but some of their contenders later fell victim to it. Thus, the elections became a farce engineered by the regime to make sure that “independent” candidates – representatives of the party of power – would form the majority in the House of Representatives.102 Also in 2001 the regime used administrative resources and discriminatory restrictions in order to prevent candidates from participating in the presidential elections, despite the OSCE’s fervent efforts to make the Belarusian authorities follow democratic procedures.103 Alarmed by its failure during parliamentary elections the opposition, including the PKB, was this time determined to learn its lesson. Although three parties had already nominated candidates, the opposition eventually agreed on Vladimir Honcharik, the long - time leader of the Belarusian trade unions, to run for president. Unlike the KPB, which supported Lukashenko, the PKB initially supported Kalyakin but later withdrew the nomination based on exit polls forecasting a mere 2.1 percent.104 Addressing the Communist Party of the Russian Federation whose chairman, Gennadij A. Zyuganov, in September 2001 had publicly spoken out in favor of Lukashenko, the Central Committee of the PKB complained of the Russian communists’s disregard for the Belarusian reform - communists, who – as it put it – in contrast to the incumbent president, had never tired of flying “the banner for socialism,” and explained the reason why it supported Honcharik. Lukashenko, they argued, had departed from the “fundamental provisions of the election platform” which had won the “confidence of most of the Belarusian people in 1994.” Therefore, the party would support the opposition candidate whose program would to a considerable degree coincide with the aims and purposes of the PKB at the present stage. Honcharik would pursue a social democratic policy and, even more importantly, his victory “would entail the reestablishment of democratic institutions of government and guarantee that citizens and political organizations [ could ] exercise their rights and liberties.” This, in turn, would enable the communists to strengthen their influence and to achieve their political objectives.105 100 “Ot diktaturi cherez demokratiyu.” 101 Patsiomkin, Authorities Push Loyal Candidates to Parliament, http ://elections. belapan. com / main / eng / show.php ?show=658&rubrica=23, last accessed 2 August 2005. 102 Cf. ibid.; Korosteleva, The Emergence, pp. 51 f.; Förster, Wahlen im Transformationsprozess, p. 45; Steinsdorff, Das politische System, p. 445. 103 For more details see Wieck, Demokratieförderung in Belarus’, pp. 871–884. 104 Cf. Rubanov, Two - fifths of Minsk voters undecided whom to support in presidential elections. Special Project by Belapan, http ://elections.belapan.com / main / eng / article.php? show=498&rubrica=17, last accessed 2 August 2005. 105 Belarusian Party of Communists surprised.

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It goes without saying that under the circumstances Lukashenko emerged victorious from the elections which observers deemed “neither free nor democratic” and not in accordance with the norms established by the OSCE and the Council of Europe.106 Only 15.4 percent of the electorate voted in favor of the opposition candidate. Nonetheless, three of the opposition alliance’s parties were determined to continue cooperation. In November 2001 the PKB united with the centre - left leaning BSDH and the Party of Labor into a confederation “For Social Change” ( Za satsial’nia peremeny ) that did not last long. It fell apart while the opposition parties were making preparations for the 2003 local elections, and each party sought to secure the best starting position for its own organization.107 The outcome of these elections once more illustrated Lukashenko’s ability to control political developments in Belarus and safeguarded his regime’s dominance over the country. As in 1999 – when most opposition candidates were refused registration and as a consequence the whole opposition boycotted the elections108 – in 2003 the elections were run without the fulfillment of basic democratic criteria.109 As a result, “independent” contenders viewed as loyal to the president won most of the 24,003 seats in the local councils, while candidates representing political parties obtained 257 seats, of which the two communist parties had gained 185 mandates in regional and local councils :110 Table 9 : Constitution of local councils after local elections ( March 2nd 2003) City Minsk Region (6)

District

Town

Rural municipality

Total

KPB

–

6

55

19

27

107

PKB

–

4

40

3

31

78

Even taking into account the regime’s massive efforts to bar candidates from being elected in many districts, the figures above illustrate that the communists find support above all among the rural population. They enjoy much less sup-

106 Cf. “Chronologie der Ereignisse in Belarus vom 16. 06. 01 bis 15. 09. 01”. In : Belarus News, no. 15, Autumn 2001, p. 15; “Vier Jahre OSZE – Berater - und Beobachtergruppe Förderung der demokratischen Institutionen in Belarus”. In : Belarus - News, no. 16, Winter 2001, p. 6; “Afterword,” pp. 193 f. 107 Cf. “Neugruppierung der Parteienlandschaft”. In : Belarus - News, no. 16, Winter 2001, p. 9; “Welche Wahlmöglichkeiten bieten die Wahlen ? Harter Kampf um die Startpositionen im Vorfeld der Kommunalwahlen”. In : Belarus - News, no. 20, Winter 2003, p. 12. 108 Cf. “Politische Konfrontation in Belarus”. In : Belarus - News, no. 5, Spring 1999, p. 3; Steinsdorff, Das politische System Weißrusslands, p. 462. 109 Cf. “Vorzeitige Abstimmung ohne große Auswahl. Kommunalwahlen verlaufen nach Szenario der Staatsmacht”. In : Belarus - News, no. 21, April 2003, p. 7. 110 Cf. “Zusammensetzung der lokalen Räte nach den Kommunalwahlen vom 2. März 2003”. In : Belarus - News, no. 21, April 2003, p. 9.

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port in the city of Minsk, where about one - fifth of the total population lived in 1999. The 2004 parliamentary elections revealed yet again the regime’s total disregard for civil rights and European democratic standards, as well as the fact that the opposition camp had not been able or, rather, willing to learn from the past by overcoming disunity and obviously lacked political proficiency. Thus, in January 2004 the PKB and five other opposition parties, supported by approximately 200 NGOs, formed a coalition, “Five+,” in order to nominate common candidates and to run a joint election campaign.111 When it came down to it, however, the parties returned to their former practice of competing with each other. “Five+”’s candidates managed to register in 83 of 110 districts, but in 45 of these between two and four opposition candidates were running against each other, thus splitting opposition votes. Consequently, no representative of the opposition was elected to parliament.112 Table 10 : Results of the parliamentary elections 1995–2004 ( mandates of the large parties’ respectively parliamentary factions )113

Year

1995 (199 seats) 1997 (110 seats) 2000 (107 seats) 2004 (109 seats)

PBK

KPB

United PKB

The Agrarian Party

“Independent” (Non-party MPs representing the “Party of Power”)

42

33

95

–

23 (faction)

13 (faction)

61 (faction)

–

6

5

79

–

8

3

97

After fierce arguments between the parties about how to proceed in the future a new approach to unite opposition forces was adopted in 2005. This was motivated by Lukashenko’s previous announcement to run for reelection once more in spring 2006, after having amended the constitution by a referendum in 2004, in which an unexpectedly vast majority of the population voted in favor of Lukashenko’s request.114 So in October 2005 a new coalition – this time “Ten+” – was formed. It chose Alyaksandar Milinkevich, Deputy Mayor of Grod111 Cf. Luneva, Rezhim Lukashenko, p. 27; “Auf der Suche nach dem gemeinsamen Nenner”. In : Belarus - News, no. 24, March 2004, p. 10. 112 For more details see Sahm, Nach der Wahl ist vor der Wahl, pp. 79–81. 113 Cf. Steinsdorff, Das politische System, p. 443; Sahm, Nach der Wahl, pp. 80 f. 114 Cf. ibid., p. 78.

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no, as a common candidate to challenge the incumbent president. That the PKB played a major role in bringing about this alliance and occupies an important position among the groups involved is illustrated by the fact that S. Kalyakin was entrusted with managing the joint campaign staff.115 The results of the presidential elections on 16 March 2006 were clearer than surveys run at the beginning of the year had indicated. Whereas Lukashenko won 82.6 percent of the votes, “Ten+”’s candidate, Milinkevich, received only 3.5 percent, according to the regime. International observers monitoring the elections called them – as in the past – a farce. However, they also stated that even if Lukashenko had not manipulated the votes he nevertheless would have received the majority of votes since, according to surveys, 47 percent of the electorate considered him the ideal politician at the present time.116 There are several reasons for the population’s high regard of the Belarusian dictator. He benefits from the country’s dynamic economic development which on the whole results from the low prices Belarus has been paying over the past years for energy sources delivered by the Russian Federation. This is why his opponents and critics have no chance to persuade the electorate to vote for alternate political programs and conceptions. Even worse, in the eyes of large parts of the population opposition parties are considered trouble - makers who hinder the president in executing his duties for the public good. Moreover, Lukashenko uses this attitude to legitimate prosecution of his opponents without running into criticism from his supporters. After the March elections Milinkevich made a habit of gathering the opposition forces in Minsk to protest the regime’s scores of numerous violations of rights and laws. In response, Lukashenko did not hesitate to have Milinkevich and other prominent opposition leaders – among them Kalyakin – convicted and detained for a fortnight.117 To make matters worse, “Ten+” split along ideological lines. In August four left - wing parties including the PKB decided on a new joint political strategy for 2007, and a month later a PKB spokesman declared that his party was pleading for the founding of a “union of left forces” that would seek registration by the authorities.118 At the same time the PKB became subject to growing pressure by the regime after its attempts to make the “unloved communists”119 merge with the KPB had failed. Already in August the Ministry of Justice announced that it would ban the PKB – under the absurd accusation 115 Cf. “‘Ich verspreche euch den Sieg nicht’. Gemeinsamer Kandidat der Opposition bleibt vorsichtig”. In : Belarus - News, no. 30, Autumn 2005, p. 5 f. 116 Cf. “Vneshnepoliticheskie otnosheniya i elektoral’noe povedenie naseleniya, NISEPI – Nezavisimii institut, sotsional’no - ekonomicheskikh i politicheskikh issledovanii,” http:// www.iiseps.org /3–o6–3.html. 117 Cf. Belarus - Perspektiven, no. 32, Summer 2006, p. 14; “Organisatoren der Aktion Tschernobylski Schljach in Weißrussland werden freigelassen,” http.//www.belnews.de / politik.php ?heute=2006–05–12. 118 Cf. “Oppositionelle Kommunisten vor dem Aus”, in : Belarus - Perspektiven, no. 34, Autumn 2006, S. 9; “Union linker Parteien gegründet,” http ://www. belarusnews.de / de / nachrichten / union - linker - parteien - gegrundet.html. 119 Gamova, Mest v Minskikh SIZO.

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that the party by registering its Minsk office in 1999 had violated the law on parties of 2005. In September the Ministry petitioned the Supreme Court to place a temporary ban on all the party’s activities, arguing that the PKB had refused to provide membership records. These were supposed to give proof that the party’s membership had decreased to less than the minimum 1,000 required for political parties to register.120 Although there are no reliable figures on membership of the parties in question, the odds are against the PKB. Thus in contrast to the KPB, loyal to Lukashenko and anxious to preserve its position within the structures of the Party of Power, its primary political as well as material source of existence, and hence without need or ambition to show a distinct political profile or act as an autonomous organization, the PKB forms part of the opposition camp whose political survival is constantly being jeopardized by the exclusive claim of power of the autocratic regime. So far, the PKB has met this challenge with a strategy pursued along two lines. On the one hand, the reform - communists who share common views with Lukashenko on some aspects of foreign policy, especially with regard to a reunification with Russia, cooperate with the authorities whenever they consider it necessary or an advantage to the party. The PKB took part in the dialogue with Lukashenko when most opposition organizations disapproved of the party - approved amendments to the electoral code, and their representatives accepted Lukashenko’s invitation to participate in drafting a new law on political parties in 2005. However, neither the cooperation nor the ultimate legislation yielded the results the communists had expected. Their involvement turned out to be mere populist gestures to pacify emerging protest. While the KPB assessed the new law positively, Sergei Kalyakin of the PKB criticized that the regime would commit new infringements, introducing severe restrictions in terms of basic political rights and party activities. And indeed, although observers considered the new regulations to be better than previously suspected – because some of them had already been imposed in the past – they are exacerbating the political situation in Belarus, not least through provisions allowing courts to suspend party activities for half a year.121 Nota bene, there is no independent jurisdiction in this country. On the other hand, the neo - communists seek cooperation within the opposition camp in order to concentrate forces and increase effectiveness. However, from the beginning this strategy failed due to the deficiencies the parties involved were unable to overcome. In contrast to the communists, most parties have rather weak party organizations and very small memberships, rather reminding

120 Cf. “Belarus Justice Ministry moves to suspend Communist Party,” http ://en.rian.ru / world /20060926/ 54278552.html; “Oppositionelle Kommunisten vor dem Aus;” “Belarus Moves against Opposition Communist Party,” http ://www.rferl.org / featuresarticle /2006/09/4d4a70bl - ea5b - 4ea0–8.html. 121 For more details see DW, Neue Hürden für politische Parteien in Belarus, http ://www. belarusnews.de / politik 1244–.html, last accessed 22 December 2005.

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to political clubs than to political parties. So there is a greater scope for ambitious personalities and a greater likelihood that individuals will be important contenders in the power game. This has led to a rather high fragmentation of the parties, and since party leaders tend to distrust each other’s political designs compromises are very difficult to reach. Furthermore, although most opposition parties are committed to the idea of democratizing the political system, they are divided with regard to reforms of the economic and social sectors and above all on the question of Belarusian independence. Since demands for a state - run social security system and a reunification with Russia occupy a prominent place among the PKB’s and its partisans’ political objectives, the neo - communists are all but eager to join alliances with parties of different alignments.122

4.

International contacts of the communist parties

The KPB and PKB have been members of the Union of the Communist Parties ( UKP ) which was established in 1993 to replace the CPSU – until its reemergence – uniting all communist parties on the territory of the former Soviet Union. This union is to a very high degree dependent on the Communist Party of the Russian Federation which apparently provides financial means and whose leader, Zyuganov, serves as Chairman of the UKP - CPSU. In 2001 the union assembled 19 communist parties. After the Belarusian communist split the Union never really accepted the PKB,123 and over the past years party relations under this umbrella organization have not improved, not least because of Zyuganov’s support for the incumbent Lukashenko, also a fierce supporter of the idea of restoring the USSR with himself as president. Consequently, PKB’s relationships with the large communist parties in Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova have also been deteriorating. The PKB has reportedly established close relations with more than 40 communist, socialist, and workers’s parties and groups which regard themselves as parties of democratic socialism.124 The members mutually send each other their regards at party congresses, visit each other, and deliver speeches at official party events. Most often mentioned are : PDS, German Communist Party ( DKP ), CP of Greece, CP of Great Britain, CP of Denmark, CP of France, CP of Israel, Labour Party of Korea, CP of Cuba, CP of Nepal, Progressive Party of the 122 For more details see Astrid Lorenz, Wird Belarus eine Parteiendemokratie ? Über die Schwierigkeiten institutionellen Wandels. In : Belarus - News, no. 2, (1998), p. 3; Nistsiuk, Myth About United Belarusian Oppositin Destroyed, http ://elections. belapan. com / main / eng / show.php ?show=673&rubrica23, last accessed 2 August 2005; Korosteleva, Party system development in post - communist Belarus, pp. 73 f.; Rotman / Danilov, President and opposition, pp. 107 f. 123 For more details see Timmermann, Russlands KP, pp. 759 f.; “Ot diktaturi cherez demokratiyu;” SKP - KPSS Soyuz kommunisticheskikh partii - KPSS, http ://www.cprf.ru / kpss / index.shtml, last accessed 17 December 2005. 124 Cf. “Ot diktaturi cherez demokratiyu.”

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Rudolf A. Mark

Working People of Cyprus ( AKEL ), CP of Portugal, CP of the Russian Federation, CP of Spain, CP of Ukraine, CP of Vietnam, Czech and Moravian CP.

5.

Conclusion

The Republic of Belarus is one of the former states of the Soviet Union which are faced with rather complex transformation processes. Unlike its neighbors, Russia and Ukraine, not to mention the reformed republics of East Central Europe, Belarus has made much less progress towards overcoming the Soviet legacy. Since independence there has been no change of elite and no privatization of large enterprises despite the new democratic constitution adopted in 1993. A fierce adherent of the demised Soviet system was elected president by the majority of a population that was unsure of the prospects of democratization and social and economic modernization. Subsequently, Belarus’s first president established an authoritarian regime supported by the former Soviet nomenclature which had lost its leading political role but held on to its privileged positions in the administrative structures and in the industrial and agricultural sectors. They were co - opted by the regime and became pillars of Lukashenko’s dictatorship. From the beginning the leader has shown no inclination to share political power. As a result, political parties in Belarus are expected to function within the structures of the Party of Power or, as a rule, are banned from political participation. Both the KPB and the AP form striking examples of the first scenario, assembling high - level members of the former CPSU. These find a home with official institutions, exchanging the principle of people’s rule for autocratic patronage and Marx / Engels / Lenin for Lukashenko who alone can guarantee a certain degree of prosperity in Belarus. The opposite is true for the PKB. Having renounced obedience to Lukashenko in 1996, the reform communists were banned from power. They still regard themselves as Marxists and Leninists without paying too much attention to doctrine, unless in a revised form. The neo - communists stand for people’s rule and for a policy guaranteeing social security to all in need of it. And there are still large groups of voters in the country that are attracted by this program. Determined to modernize the party in terms of ideology and political goals, the party leaders had to take into consideration a population that, especially in the countryside, is still influenced by the Soviet experience and to this day continues to cultivate Soviet traditions still deeply rooted in everyday life. However, according to their program as well as to utterances and statements made by prominent members, the party appears to have taken a democratic turn. Indeed, the PKB is committed to the rule of law, human and civil rights, and international cooperation. This in mind the party, while not openly admitting it, seems to be leaning towards a social democratic - type of party.

Between Conformity and the Struggle

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Although hesitantly at the beginning, by now the party has become an integral part of the democratic opposition that strives to offer an alternative to Lukashenko’s regime. So far, the odds are against them because there is no indication that the regime is endangered by whatever imagineable force. The opposition parties’ deficiencies and problems still hinder these groupings from growing into a compelling force, and Russia’s president continues to shore up Lukashenko who himself is akin to Putin in terms of state control over society and contempt of civil rights. He is also considered a suitable ally with regard to Moscow’s policy towards the European Union and Putin’s efforts to strengthen the Russian position on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States ( CIS ). The situation may change in the future, as the cases of Ukraine and Georgia have illustrated, but at present there is no prospect of major political change in Belarus.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation ( CPRF ) Galina Michaleva Today the Communist Party of the Russian Federation ( CPRF ) is the largest, best organized, and best structured political power in Russia. It not only has regional departments in every Federation subject and in every large city but also in many small settlements and even in the villages. At the end of 2006 the party had approximately 184,000 members – with a declining tendency. The average age of members is fifty - eight years. The CPRF was the leading power in the “multicolored” alliance of communist and nationalist organizations; it existed since the beginning of 1996, and later dissolved itself. Their constituency considerably grew since the first Duma elections in 1993; however, with the increasing manipulation of the elections it decreased again. Communists are highly represented in the legislative body of all levels, and in some regions they even temporarily formed the majority. Many of the CPRF members were active in the regional and local executive bodies until about 2004.

I.

Background

The history of the CPRF begins with the establishment of the Communist Party of the RSFSR ( CP RSFSR ) on June 20–21, 1990 in Moscow. Since 58 % of members came from the CPSU ( approximately 10 million ) and represented positions according to their leadership, the party was considered a reservoir of the reactionaries. Initially, Ivan Polozkov was elected their first Secretary, followed by Valentin Kuptsov at the beginning of August 1991. After the August Coup, the CP RSFSR was suspended by the Yeltsin Decree from August 23, 1991. Their property was confiscated; the party ( together with the CPSU ) was banned by decree on November 6, 1991. A group of deputies and members of the Central Committee of the CP RSFSR soon asked the constitutional court1 of Russia to review the constitutionality of the decrees. The CPSU trial at the constitutional court ended on November 30, 1992, with the decision that the suspension and banning of the party were constitutional. However, they acknowledged the right 1

Cf. Luchterhandt, Der KPdSU - Prozeß. In : Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts, 43 (1995), pp. 69–103.

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Galina Michaleva

of the party to rebuild the territorial party organizations according to the legal procedure. After the CPSU had been banned, a number of communist and socialist parties and movements evolved. Communist organizations inspired by the CP or developed independently before the party had been banned belonged to their basis, such as The United Workers’ Front ( Ob'edinennyj front trudyashchikhsya, UWF ), the Bolshevik Unity movement ( Edinstvo ), and the Communist Initiative Youth Movement ( Kommunisticheskaya initsiativa ). There were also the activists of the Bolshevik and Marxist platforms2 which were organized within the CPSU 1990; only the most important one of these shall be mentioned here: 1. The All - Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks ( Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Bol’shevikov, ACPB ) which developed on the basis of the Bolshevik platform of the CPSU and the Unity movement. Nina Andreyeva was elected their Secretary General. 2. The Russian Communist Workers Party ( Rossiyskaya Kommunisticheskaya Rabochaya Partiya, RCWP ) was founded as an orthodox Marxist party; its head was General Albert Makashov; members became representatives of the UWF and the “Communist Initiative.” 3. The Socialist Party of Working People ( Sotsialisticheskaya Partiya Trudyashchikhsya, SPW ) combined both representatives of the “Marxist Platform” and the remaining members of the Communist for Democracy movement that did not follow their chairman Aleksandr Rutskoy in founding the Derzhava (“Great Power” ) party. The well - known historian and former dissident Roy Medvedev and Lyudmila Vartazarova were leading members of the SPW. A number of smaller Communist parties also existed, whose ideological spectrum ranged from the orthodox Marxism of the RCWP to the almost social - democratic ideology of the SPW. Adjacent to these parties, or on their basis, some movements seeking to collect unaligned Communists developed. These movements predominantly combined members of the RCWP and other orthodox communist parties : Working Russia ( Trudovaya Rossiya ) and similar movements of regional nature, for example Working Moscow, Working Samara, etc., and the Russian Soviet of Workers. Furthermore, a CPSU Union of the Communist Party was founded, in which communist organizations from the earlier Union republics participated. The new Communist organizations were closely connected with the old and the newly founded patriotic parties and movements; dual membership was very common. Just before and after the beginning of the economic reform, a number of patriotic and “communist - patriotic” organizations which could partly rely on organizations already existing before the coup were founded. In January 2

Cf. Luchterhandt, Die rußländische Parteienlandschaft, p. 1037–1049; Timmermann, Die KP - Nachfolgeparteien. In : Berichte des BIOst, (1992) 27; Schneider / Timmermann, Das Ende der KPdSU. In : Berichte des BIOst, Part I and II (1991), pp. 52 f.

Communist Party of the Russian Federation

439

1992 the founding congress of the Fatherland ( Otechestvo ) organization took place, in which both representatives of the Communist and patriotic parties took part; however, like the foundation of several similar organizations ( such as the “Russian Council” founded in February ) this only served as a preliminary stage to forming a strong, united opposition. In October 1992 representatives of a range of Communist, patriotic and former democratic unions formed a broad oppositional alliance, the National Rescue Front ( Front Natsional'nogo spaseniya, NRF ), which was supported in parliament by the Russian Unity bloc. Both the president and the democratic movement considered the in NRF the greatest danger for democratic reforms. Yeltsin’s attempt to ban the NRF by decree failed because the constitutional court declared this step unconstitutional. The NRF quickly gained influence until the fall of 1993. At the Second Extraordinary Party Congress, held on February 13–14, 1993, on the Klyazma River near Moscow and attended by 805 delegates, the CPRF became “reinstated” as it officially states. However, it was actually a new party with a new name – the Communist Party of the Russian Federation – with approximately 500,000 re - registered members and with a new program policy, since both the statutes of the party as well as the program were rewritten. The party convention elected a Central Executive Committee of 89 people with Gennady Zyuganov as chairman.3 Zyuganov was born in 1944 in the village of Mymrino ( in Oryol Oblast ). He studied pedagogy in Oryol and followed the typical career of a party official, which began with a position as First Secretary of the Oryol Komsomol and ascended to increasingly higher stages in the party hierarchy. In 1983 he became a group leader of the Central Committee ( CC ) of the CPSU and – before the August - Coup – the Central Committee Secretary and a member of the politbureau of the Communist Party the RSFSR.4 Valentin Kuptsov became one of his four deputies. Born in 1937 in the village of Mindyukino ( in Volgograd ), Kuptsov studied as a correspondence course student at a polytechnic university before beginning a career as a party official. He ascended from the position of a plant department party secretary, then to a number of leading positions in the city and in the area party committee of Vologda in 1990, and to that of a department manager of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU. Kuptsov was elected the first party secretary of the CC of the RSFSR on August 6, 1991.5 The statutes of the CPRF were registered on March 24, 1993, by the Russian Ministry of Justice. The party formed in the opposition and saw its assignment in the “defense of the constitutional system and the Soviets”6 and belonged to 3 4 5 6

Cf. Kto est’ čto. Spravočnik. M, 1996, pp. 104–116. Cf. Krotov / Luchterhandt, Zwischen “Patriotismus” und “Sozial - Demokratie”, pp. 855– 861. Cf. Kupcov, Valentin Aleksandrovič. In : Kto est’ kto v rossijskoj politike, vol. II, Moscow 1993, pp. 317–318; Valerij Vyžutovič, Smotrite, kto idët ! In : Izvestija, 4 June 1996, p. 4. Cf. Pravda. 13 August 1993, p. 1.

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the “irreconcilable opposition”, a loose alliance that organized protests and united Communists and patriots in the fight against the President. Therefore, the CPRF first moved against the execution of the April referendum regarding confidence in the president and in the Supreme Soviet and operated against Yeltsin after the Supreme Soviet nevertheless decided on its implementation. The party did not participate in the work of the constitutional conference appointed by the President. In contrast to the other ( radical ) oppositional parties and movements, such as Albert Makashov’s RCWP and Anpilov’s Working Russia movement, the CPRF did not participate in the troubles around the White House in October 1993. However, it denounced Yeltsin’s Decree Nr.1400 as unconstitutional and hostile to the people and characterized the events October of 3–4, 1993, as “Bloody revenge on the Highest Soviet” in public statements. After some initially contradictory instructions ( including a list prohibiting eighteen president - hostile parties and movements ) had been given by the Attorney General, the Ministry of Security, and the Ministry of Justice, the President excluded five social organizations of the united opposition from participating in the forthcoming elections by decree on October 19, 1993:7 the National Rescue Front ( Front Natsional’nogo Spaseniya ), the RCWP (Rossiyskaya Kommunisticheskaya Rabochaya Partiya ), the Officers’ Federation ( Soyuz Ofitserov ), the federation for the social and legal protection of military officials, conscripts and their family members, “shield” (it ), the nationalist Russian National Unity ( Russkoe Natsional'noe Edinstvo ), as well as the Russian Communist Youth Union. The CPRF escaped this fate. However, due to the participation of some party members in the troubles, their activities were suspended by the Ministry of Justice until October 18, 1993, the end of the state of emergency in Moscow. Nonetheless, the CPRF was not excluded from the parliamentary elections set for December 12, 1993.

II.

From Radical Opposition to Participation in Power

1.

Parliamentary Elections and Activities in the State Duma

On October 26, 1993, the first CPRF caucus made the decision to participate in the Duma elections. This signaled a fundamental change of their position, because they shifted their strategy of being an “anti - system opposition” to playing according to the rules and to participation in power. This decision was not only controversial within the Communist “Brother Parties,” which were not inclined to work with the “Regime of Criminals,” but also strongly disputed in the party itself. The CPRF was one of thirteen organizations that were able to collect the necessary 200,000 voter signatures in order to be registered for the 7

Cf. Sobranie zakonodatelnych Aktov Prezidenta i Pravitel’stva Rossijskoj Federacii, Nr. 43, Pos. 4080.

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Communist Party of the Russian Federation

election campaign. Because of its temporary suspension they started three weeks later than the other election unions; however, they managed to submit more than 500,000 voter signatures to the Central Electoral Committee. The party list was compiled according to a pragmatic principle, starting with the characteristics of parliamentary work : The leaders of the regional party organizations ( many of them were close to the radical RCWP or even had dual membership ) found their place in the center or at the end of the list. For the CPRF the elections were a great success : It achieved 12.4 % of the votes and thus 32 seats in the State Duma; furthermore, 16 party members were directly elected8 ( see Table 1). Table 1 : Election results of the CPRF and other Communist parties and election blocs at the parliamentary elections from 1993–2007 ( in %) Election Blocs, Parties Agrarian Party of Russia

1993

1995

1999

7.9

3.7

12.4

22.3

24.2

4.5

2.2

2003

2007

3.6

2.3

12.6

11.6

Power CPRF Russian Communist Labor Party Socialist Party of Russia Union of the Workers Stalinist Bloc for the USSR

0.09 1.5 0.6

In January 1994 the CPRF was registered with forty - five delegates ( two became members of the faction of the “brother party,” the Agrarian Party of Russia, one joined the LDPR, another followed the “New Regional Policy” group ).9 There were only two delegates in the faction that were not members of a party. Among the forty - five there were only five women. One can say that the level of education in the faction was relatively high : The vast majority had a university degree, fourteen even held an academic title, and nine were professors. The vast majority of the faction had also already gained experience in executive positions : nine were former plant managers, nine were holding a chair, and four were party officials; five delegates of the faction had previously possessed a delegate seat in the Federation Council.10 In the Federation Council, the upper house of the Federal Assembly, there were also eleven members of the CPRF. At the party plenum Zyuganov commented on the election results that “The most important outcome of the election campaign consists of the fact that the party passed the most difficult test [...] The CPRF has proven that it is capable of functioning under the most difficult conditions.”11 In the Duma the CPRF fac8 9 10 11

Cf. Soobščenie Zentrizbirkoma. In : Rossijskaja gazeta, 28 December 1993. Cf. Federal’noe sobranie, pp. 114 f. Figured by the author on the basis of : Ibid. Pravda, 28 December 1993.

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tion occupied the position of the Deputy Chairman, two chairmen of the committees ( Viktor Ilyukhin in the Committee of Security and Viktor Zorkaltsev in the Committee of Social Organizations and Religious Unions ) as well as the chairmen of the Mandate Commission. The delegates of the faction who displayed the highest discipline in both the participation in meetings and votings not only distinguished themselves through criticism of the government and the president.12 Additionally, they were quite active in legislative work; in only one year they participated in the composition of more than 120 bills. The faction saw their tasks in the “defense of the rights of the workers” and in the “defense of drafts with socialist values,” concerning the work collectives, the implementation of minimum wages, and the indexation of pensions. Bills assented as “hostile to the people,” such as those regarding the privatization of property, certain taxes, and so on, were blocked.13 For the party, which only existed thanks to the work of amateurs, access to organizational resources which was guaranteed through the seats of the delegates became very important. These resources included communications technology, transportation, the provision of assistants ( five for each deputy as well as for the apparatus of the Duma ) and even – starting at the end of 1994 – the right to free television appearances for the delegates in their constituencies. Although all Duma factions obtained such resources, only the Communists could, because they were well organized, effectively use these opportunities.14 “We can maintain that our way of participation in the elections has been proven. Over the course of the election campaign the combat readiness of the basic party organizations has been examined, [ and ] their connection to the population has been strengthened,” read the conclusion of the Central Election Commission of the CPRF which justified the decision of October 1993.15 Thus, a new task was taken which was to also actively take part in the elections at other levels. However, participation in the federal executive bodies was consistently rejected by the CPRF in order to not lose their oppositional reputation and thus, votes. In his speech at the Third Party Congress of the CPRF Zyuganov explained : “If the present nation - hostile political course is maintained, no one can talk about a participation of the Communists in this government that made itself guilty of the destruction of our great country. This government cannot become a coalition government because coalitions form through a cooperation of political forces and not through individual decisions. On this account V. Kovalev a non - party faction member, was removed from the faction after he had accepted his appointment as Minister of Justice.”16 The statement was followed by the abandonment of signing the social unity agreement. Thus, the CPRF blocked Yeltsin’s plans to form a viable coalition government and his 12 Cf. Schneider, Die nationalistischen und die kommunistischen Fraktionen. In : Berichte des BIOst, (1995) 28. 13 Ibid., pp. 58 f. 14 Gel’man, Pervyj çlektoral’nyj cikl v Rossii. 15 Ibid., p. 16. 16 Vo imja, p. 21.

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effort to secure his position of power on the basis of consent of all important political forces.17 The government and President Yeltsin were further characterized as “hostile to the people” by the CPRF. Zyuganov announced that “Yeltsin’s policy and personal behavior is hurting the dignity of our great nation.”18 Party members’ campaign tactics emphasized “from door to door” or “from human to human” methods. The CPRF’s television advertisements were traditional and boring, and election posters gave a cheap, amateur - like impression. Agitators and signature collectors were members or sympathizers of the CPRF; they worked for free. On central television the CPRF was only marginally represented; however it used regional media very actively.19 This was obviously the right method for the Communist constituency. The 1995 election results were the best in the CPRF’s history, and this legislative period was the only one in CPRF’s history in which it could influence the most important political decisions. It was the only power among the forty three parties listed on the ballot to achieve maximum results with minimum financial resources. With 22.3 % of the votes, the CPRF could double their results from 1993. One must note that the votes of the “leftist” or “Communist” oriented voters were distributed across a number of electoral blocs. Viktor Anpilov’s radical coalition, the Russian Communist Labor Party, was almost able to overcome the 5 % - barrier with 4.53 % of the votes. The traditional socialistic - oriented Power to the People campaign of former USSR Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov also got over one million votes (1.6 %). If we add the 3.7 % of the Agrarian Party, we come to the conclusion that more than one third of the electorate voted extremely left. The election results strongly differed depending on the region. Of the six large election blocs participating in the 1993 elections, only the CPRF was able to not only increase their constituency but also to expand their regional basis : twentyone subjects of Federation, predominantly in the center of the country and along the Volga ( in Bryansk, Kaluga, Oryol, Ryazan, Volgograd, Saratov, Penza, etc.), where the LDPR was still first in 1993, were won by the CPRF in 1995 with approx. 30 % of the votes. The best results were obtained in the North Caucasus (32 % on average ), in the Chernozem Region (31 % on average ), and along the Volga (25 % on average ). In contrast, the CPRF received smaller percentages of votes ( from 5 % to 10 %) in the areas in the north and in the Ural Mountains.20 The CPRF received ninety - nine seats in the State Duma by party list vote; a further fifty - eight members were elected directly in the single mandate con17

Cf. Luchterhandt, Der Aufbau der nationalen Staatlichkeit Rußlands. In : Forschungsstelle Osteuropa ( Ed.), Russland, pp. 26–28. 18 Vo imja, p. 20. 19 Cf. Andrej Vasil’ev / Lidija Dergačeva, Strasti vokrug četvërtoj vlasti. In : Izvestija, 12 April 1994, p. 5. 20 Cf. IGPI materials; Stadelbauer, Zur regionalen Differenzierung der Duma - Wahlergebnisse. In : OE, (1996) 5, pp. 449–457.

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stituencies. Among the directly elected there were twenty that had already trained themselves in parliamentary work as State Duma Delegates ( sixteen ) or as Deputies of the federation board ( four ), and fourteen were previously active in the apparatus of the faction or as assistants of the Deputies ( also in the regions). With 142 members, the Communist faction became the largest in the Duma. The actual number of Communists was even larger, as the CPRF decided to help its “brother party,” the APR, whose twenty directly elected delegates could not form a faction ( thirty - five are needed ), by “delegating” the missing fifteen people to its faction strength. Gennady Zyuganov, a Communist, was elected speaker of the Duma. Since, according to the agreement, each faction and each registered group had the right to place a deputy, Svetlana Goryachova became a deputy of the Duma. Additionally, the CPRF was able to take over the chair in ten of the twenty - six committees, including the chairman of the board of the APR - faction, which had been elected through the CPRF list into the Duma. Some of these were very important committees, such as the Committee for Legislation and the Committee for Court and Justice Reform ( which was led by the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who later gave Anatoly Lukyanov amnesty for his participation in the coup ). In this committee all bills were examined regarding their compliance with current legislation. Additionally, and among the most important, there were the Committee for Security ( under the direction of Viktor Ilyukhin ) and the Committee for Rules and Organization of the Duma. The party program stipulated distinct legislative initiatives. According to Zyuganov at the Sixth Caucus, the faction should primarily focus on laws within the social range; at the subsistence level; to the order of indexation and the increase of the minimum wages, the pensions and social welfare assistance, to the responsibility regarding omitted wages etc.21 According to Lukyanov, the Communists “have 30 % of the seats in the lower house in the parliament, and if we were to add the supporters, we’d have about 215 to 220; however, we need 226. [...] If we carefully fulfill the work of the consolidation of the power of the opposition, we can implement a normal federal law. However, we don’t have enough power to outvote the President’s veto or to pass a constitutional law.”22 Conversely, the election of many party secretaries from the regions led to a radicalization of factions and to their simultaneous de - professionalization. The size of the factions inevitably caused the formation of a hierarchy, so that Zyuganov, for example, was practically inaccessible for the “simple” CPRF delegates and thus the regional party secretaries in the faction have a stronger position than the others. However, the discipline in voting and the participation in 21 Cf. Gennadij Zjuganov, Post glavy ogromnoj strany. In : Pravda Rossii, 22 February 1996, p. 3. 22 Cf. Na zaščite prav čeloveka truda ( Interview with Anatoly Lukyanov.) In : Pravda Rossii, 29 February 1996, p. 1.

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the meetings did not suffer; the CPRF faction still showed the greatest solidarity in the Duma. At its fifth plenum the CPRF called the election results “satisfying” and the Duma elections themselves “the first stage of the most important and crucial political campaign for the fate of the native country.”23 “One should not disguise oneself as poor and tell on every corner that we ‘are not built into the power’. No, indeed we are already inserted; now our task consists of the fact that our opposition toward the policy of the regime should shift into resistance within the power itself, between the representing and implementing structures.”24 The Communists and their allies were ready to cooperate with the government in certain areas and to look for compromises. Representatives of the Patriotic People’s Union were not only present in the regional executive bodies but they were also ready to participate in meetings of the Coordination Board, which was founded by the President in the autumn of 1996.25 As the CPRF now belonged to the political establishment, it also became of interest for the “political entrepreneurs” who cared little about the ideology of the party. Additionally this party, the strongest in parliament, saw new possibilities to stabilize its internal structure.26 Neither the relationship to the regime nor the strategy and tactics of the party changed in the parliamentary election of 1999. However, criticism of the regime became more careful, and the question of the war in Chechnya was excluded. The small leftist parties and blocs that took part in the election tended to criticize the CPRF, but they had little influence. This time the CPRF increased its number of votes from 15.4 million to 16.2 million. It obtained 24.3 % of the votes and won 90 direct and 147 party list vote seats. Now the Communists expressed their positions more reservedly, signalized to be ready to make compromises with the Kremlin. Thus, they could maintain the position of the Duma chairman; Seleznev remained in office. The elections of 2003, which were even less free, became a far greater challenge for the CPRF. As for all oppositional parties, access to the media became more difficult for the Communists because the Kremlin wanted to guarantee the votes necessary for the “leading” party, United Russia, to keep its power. The Kremlin agitation against the Communists constituted 63 % of the entire campaign information, as a complaint submitted to the highest court contended. The Communists had prepared the indictment together with the liberal - democratic Union of Right Forces and Yabloko parties; this shows that the position of the CPRF towards the liberal forces had also changed. The portion of the votes and mandates of the CPRF decreased to 12.6 % of the votes. It only received fifty 23 O političeskich itogach vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoj dumy i očerednych zadačach partii. Postanovlenie Plenuma. In : Pravda Rossii, 18 January 1996, p. 1. 24 Sdelat’ predstoit bol’še, čem uže sdelano. In : Pravda Rossii, 18 January 1996, p. 3. 25 After he first refused to discuss current politics with Chernomyrdin and Chubais without the President, Seleznev finally did attend the meetings. 26 Golosov, “Kar’eristy” i “verujuščie” – Pro et Contra, 3 (1998), p. 69.

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two seats. Due to the absolute majority of United Russia delegates, the CPRF was hardly able to achieve anything. The CPRF was substantially privileged in comparison to the other leftist parties, due to a law passed in 2000 and changed in 2006. As a party represented in the legislature it could participate in the Duma elections without collecting signatures and without a deposit of approximately $2,000,000 USD. The political objectives of the CPRF did not change. Important characteristics remained : general and depersonalized criticism of the “hostile to the people” regime; the appeal to the glorious past of the October Revolution and victory in the Patriotic War; the “build up of socialism”; the nationalization of the profitable industries ( above all the oil and gas industries ); and an anti - western attitude. The position of the CPRF could be characterized by one sentence : The future of the country lies in the past. Such a party can hardly disturb Putin’s new authoritarian regime; rather it is of assistance because the positions of the Communist opposition and of Putin’s hegemonial party, United Russia, converge on many points. Therefore, it is not surprising that the CPRF at the Duma elections of 2007, which were in fact appointments rather than elections, received 11.6 % of the votes and therefore continues to play the role of the parliamentary opposition. The Communists have no veto power, however they are useful because the governing group can tell the West as well as the Russian citizens that everything would be much worse if the Communists came to power. 2.

Regional and Local Elections

Due to successful election outcomes at regional and local levels, the CPRF could strengthen its influence in the accordant representative bodies. According to the party, 46 % of the candidates received seats. This “isn’t a complete number”27 according to Zyuganov, as not everyone could openly declare their allegiance. The portion of Communists in representative bodies differs regionally and correlates with the majority of the Communist constituency which is stronger in small towns and on the countryside, and also in the “red belt” around Moscow, the Volga area and the North Caucasus. The support for Communists at federal and regional levels is very weak in the northwest of the country, in the Urals, and in many regions of Siberia. Nevertheless, thanks to the active party organization and the high discipline of the constituency some Communists are represented in the local governments. Only Moscow and St. Petersburg form an exception. In some regions the Communists hold 20 % of the seats, and in the oblasts of Vladimir and Astrakhan and the Republic of Chuvaschia Communists were even elected as chairmen of the representative bodies.28 At times 21 of the 27 Zaključitel’noe slovo tov. G. I. Zjuganova po političeskomu otčëtu CIK KPRF. III s-ezd KPRF, p. 67. 28 Ibid., p. 13.

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24 deputies of the Volgograd Duma were members of the CPRF. Some representatives of the CPRF were also active in district, city and area administrations. The participation of the CPRF in the elections of the executive leaders in 14 regions of Russia29 formed rather an exception. The CPRF mostly supported independent candidates. The candidates nominated by the party in the oblasts of Sverdlovsk and Novgorod suffered serious defeats in the elections, and only in two cases ( in the areas of Tambov and Novosibirsk [ A. Ryabov and V. Mukha]) did former regional party secretaries manage to win the elections. Furthermore, they were not inclined to identify themselves with the CPRF. The golden days of the CPRF in the regions have passed. Although the party still participates in the elections, the results are increasingly modest from one election to the next. However, this is not due to shrinking influence of the Communists but to the Kremlin’s tendency to guarantee an absolute majority for the hegemonial United Russia party. Therefore, it is not surprising that Nikolai Vinogradov, the last remaining Communist in the position of governor, withdrew himself from the party in 2007 for the chance to be re - appointed by Putin.

III.

Participation of the CPRF in the Presidential Elections

Before the presidential elections in 1996 the CPRF carefully analyzed the results of the election campaign from December 1995 and defined new political objectives, tactics and inner - party structures for the presidential election campaign. The CPRF’s willingness to form a preferably broad coalition in order to support the common candidates was very important. The premises for such a patriotic coalition had long been present. Several attempts to form a coalition of the united left - rights had been undertaken since the August coup. The first was by the deputies and voter union Soyuz ( Union ), then by Fatherland ( Otchizna ) and Russian National State Meeting ( Russkiy Natsional'nyi Sobor / RNS ), and finally by the National Rescue Front. In the regions where a party spectrum was present common protest actions had occurred since 1991. The leaders also operated together or were even the same. Zyuganov himself embodied such a coalition for a long time : as member of the board of Otechestvo and co - chairman of the “Duma” of the Russian National State Meeting and the NRF. The Duma delegate Pyotr Romanov, a famous politician from the patriotic camp, wrote in Pravda: “in order to exceed the constrains of the firm constituency of the Communists one must turn toward the national - orthodox organizations which, thanks to the efforts of the officials, remained beyond the Duma walls and among the democrats and the journalists hostile to Russia [... ] It is important to understand that the Communist patriots and nationalist patriots are not competitors in the major tasks of rescuing the nation and the rebirth of the Fatherland. But neither one nor the other would reach it if they didn’t unite on the way to their common goals.” 29 Cf. IGPI materials : Političeskij monitoring.

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From the very beginning the political basis for this alliance was the rejection of the “Policy of the National Betrayal.”30 Meanwhile, the relationship to political opponents became more moderate, but in the declaration about the essence of cooperation with patriotic forces, which was passed by the Sixth Plenum of the CPRF, the regime was still labeled “immoral and irresponsible” and Yeltsin’s politics “hostile to the Russian people.” The goal – the unification of all forces in order to ensure the victory of a candidate – should take place on the blurry ideological basis of the “best native traditions of the power of the people, collectivism, patriotism and the unity of the nation,” in order to lead “the country out of its deep crisis and onto a normal development path which aspires to the prospering of the state, the predictability of its interior and foreign policy, the well - being of its citizens, the guarantee of their constitutional rights as well as peace and unity within society.”31 This actually succeeded. Of course the “brother party”, the APR, was ready to support Zyuganov although it expressed some differences with the CPRF before the elections, which particularly involved the almost exclusive orientation of the APR towards the chairmen of the Kolkhoz and the competition with the CPRF in the countryside. The broader and somewhat more relaxed Agrarian Union under the leadership of the August - coupist Sergej Starodubtsev as well as the unions of the agricultural - industrial complex were willing to actively fight for the victory of a Communist. This support was rather natural on the part of the People’s Power faction under the direction of Ryzhkov. And even the sharpest critics of Zyuganov and the CPRF from the extremely left part of the Communist spectrum, such as Anpilov, supported Zyuganov as their common candidate. The Union of Communist Parties – Communist Party of the Soviet Union under the direction of Oleg Schenin combined several Communist parties of the earlier Soviet republics, among them also the CPRF, decided to support Zyuganov on its plenum as well.32 The bloc was followed by a number of patriotic parties and movements, among them the Russian Federation of the Entire People ( Rossiyskiy Obshchenarodnyi Soyuz, RFEP ), Rutskoy’s Derzhava, and others. There were regions where several organizations of the opposition supported the “candidate of the patriotic forces,” such as in Tomsk, with fifteen parties and movements as well as unions, among them the SPW, APR, RFEP, the Russian Social - Democratic Union, and the regional department of Svyatoslav Fyodorov’s Workers’ Self Government Party.33 The People's Patriotic Bloc temporarily formed a broad oppositional front behind Zyuganov – with the consequence that there were now hardly any important collective political players, whether among the orthodox lefts or nationalists, who remained outside this alliance.34 30 31 32 33 34

Pëtr Romanov, Edinstvo vo imja Otčizny. In : Pravda, 5 March 1996, p. 1. Pravda Rossii, 22 February 1996, p. 1. Cf. Garifullina, My istoričeski otvetstvenny. In : Glasnost’, (1996) 1, p. 5. Cf. Soobščenie s mest. In : Sovetskaja Rossija, 19 March 1996, p. 1. Cf. Aleksej Kiva, Zjuganov ne tak prost, kak ego maljujut. In : Rossijskaja gazeta, 11 April 1996, p. 3.

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The mobilizing and consolidating figure of Zyuganov and the protest potential behind him were structurally very similar to the Democratic Russia ( DR ) movement which had gathered behind Boris Yeltsin in the years of 1989 to 1991 – but with one substantial difference. The DR existed without a “firm core” or without an organization with independent political meaning. This was different with the People's Patriotic Bloc : the CPRF not only formed its core and was its actual driving force but also survived its collapse without considerable losses. In 1996 the CPRF obtained the best results in its history. Some even believe that this was mainly due to Zyuganov. However, Zyuganov was more important for the voters than the party : He won 4,000,000 more votes than the CPRF. The more calculable the elections became, the less prominent he had to be. The Patriotic People’s Union ( PPU ) was founded after the presidential elections of 1996 and formed itself around the “firm core” of the CPRF. The PPU unified practically all important communist and patriotic - oriented organizations, including the APR and the national - patriotic oriented Derzhava of Aleksandr Rutskoy. It stood in opposition to the policy of the government and the president. The co - ordination board, the leading body of the union, consisted of 150 people in 1996. In addition to Zyuganov, the following were deputy chairmen: Tuleyev the Minister for CIS affairs; Rutskoy, the governor of Kemerovo Oblast; and Nikolai Ryzhkov, chairman of the Duma faction. As a member of the CPRF, the chairman of the parliament, Gennadij Seleznev, also belonged to this alliance. The People’s Patriotic Union of Russia defined its position as “left - central.” The ideology of the alliance was contradictory, a mixture of a special form of “patriotism” and traditional elements of the socialist and / or Communist ideology which were less clearly formulated in their program than, for example, in the program of the CPRF.35 “Patriotism” was thereby understood as the “defense of the entire national and governmental interests,” which was defined negatively in the sense of “anti - west.” In the end of the 1990s the CPRF, which formed the firm core and the driving force of the Patriotic People’s Union, was the largest party in Russia, whose organization extended to all federation subjects, all large cities, and numerous small towns and into the rural areas. There were officially 600,000 members in 1993, the last year stated. The social basis and thus the constituency of the CPRF and of the bloc was to be found in nearly all demographic groups where sympathies for the Communists tendentiously depend on the level of income or the standard of living. Some radical - orthodox Communist movements and parties were only willing to form a coalition with the CPRF in extreme cases, such as the presidential elections. Apart from these exceptions, the sharpest critics of the CPRF “from the left” were found within the Working Russia movement and within the Russian Communist Labor Party. In 2000 the situation became far more difficult for the CPRF : Everyone knew who was chosen to be the next president. Nevertheless, the results of just under 30 % were remarkable ( see Table 2). 35 Cf. Luchterhandt, Die Kommunistische Partei der Russländischen Föderation ( KPRF ).

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Table 2 : Results of the CPRF or of the candidates supported by the Communists at the presidential elections and the results of the winner, 1996–2004 ( in %). 1996 Boris Yeltsin (run-off vote)

53.72

Gennady Zyuganov – 1996 (run-off vote), 2000; Nikolay Kharitonov – 2004

40.41

Vladimir Putin

2000

2004

29.24

13.89

52.90

71.31

In 2004 hopelessness provoked Zyuganov, like other leading politicians, to abstain from participation in the election and to nominate the insignificant Nikolai Kharitonov of the Agrarian Party. The election became a kind of referendum on confidence in the President. The results were modest; however, it documented the degree of support for the CPRF which received 13.9 % of the votes. Zyuganov announced his candidacy in the 2008 presidential elections, but until the end of January there had been an impetuous discussion within the CPRF as to whether it makes sense to participate in this imitation of an election.

IV.

Internal Structure of the CPRF

According to the statute passed at the second extraordinary Party Congress ( and which conforms to the old statute of the CPSU to a large extent ), the CPRF is constructed according to the overall principles of “democratic centralism.” Party cells consist of at least three party members form the basis, and their leading organ is the party meeting. The highest organ of the party is the Party Congress which elects the Central Executive Committee. This is to carry out the decisions of the Party Congress. Additionally, a Central Examination Board is elected. Every citizen of eighteen years or older that acknowledges the programs and the statutes of the CPRF, pays party contributions, and has been involved in the work of a basic organization may become a member of the party. The formation of factions is not allowed, however “platforms” are possible. Members are permitted to take part in social organizations as long as their activities do not contradict the goals of the CPRF. A regulation in the statutes that allows a simple registration of former CPSU members as well as of members of other parties with a communist orientation is very important.36 At the Third Party Congress the statutes of the party were changed.37 The leading party organ was once again called the Central Committee ( CC ), its traditional name. Zyuganov became the chairman of the CC, Kuptsov became his first deputy, and Aleksandr Shabanov, a lecturer at the Moscow State University, 36 Cf. Kto est’ čto, pp. 105 f. 37 Cf. Ob izmenenijach v ustave partii, pp. 48–56.

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was elected his only deputy. CC chairmanship consisted of 19 members, predominantly Duma delegates, among them Lukyanov and Zorkaltsev. A clause was entered in the preamble of the statutes that stated that the CPRF is the legitimate successor of the CPSU and the CP RSFSR on Russian territory. This acknowledgement aims at the return of party property which was confiscated after Yeltsin’s decree. A very important step is the new regulation permitting the formation of independent party organizations with their own programs and own statutes in the subjects of the Federation, as long as these programs and statutes do not contradict the party. This is a first step towards federalization, which practically contradicts the principle of democratic centralism. In order to attract young people to the party, the age limit for party members was also changed. However, party discipline increasingly became an important topic. The most frequent violations that Kuptsov disciplined were dual membership, the formation of factions, and the failure to obey the decisions of the leading organs. With the renewal of the party, the regional departments ( which are strictly subordinated to Moscow ) were predominantly formed of members and organizations from the previously founded RCAP and FR; membership in these former parties usually remained. Also, their organizations were not dissolved. They either became collective members of the CPRF or were permitted dual party membership ( in Samara, Sverdlovsk and Yaroslavl, among others ). There were also those members of the CPSU that had not previously belonged to any organization and “re - established” their membership.38 The party organization was rapidly established and developed, and the successes in the 1993 Duma elections and later in some regional and local elections considerably contributed to the stabilization of the party. In the autumn of 1994 there were party organizations of the CPRF in practically all of the subjects of the Federation, and not only in the metropolitan areas but also in all districts and cities. There were forty- three basic organizations in Tatarstan and forty - six in Mordovia. The CPRF’s membership numbers were practically unattainable for other parties : For instance there were 10,000 members in Volgograd, 4,300 in Novosibirsk, and 8,000 in St. Petersburg.39 District party committees were developed in addition to regional and city committees, and party cells were intensively created in private enterprises in contradiction to Yeltsin’s decree of July 20, 1991.40 At the Third Party Congress Kuptsov demanded that “one should go into the work collectives, into the blocks of flats, and literally in every company [...] The negative consequences of the decree removing the party organizations from the companies have not yet been overcome. There is only one way : Party cells are to cooperate with the union committees regarding the key questions of life in the companies.”41 38 Cf. Gel’man / Senatova, Političeskie partii v regionach Rossii. In : Monitoring IGPI, 8 (1993) 19, pp. 31 f. 39 Cf. Gel’man / Senatova, Političeskie partii v regionach Rossii : dinamika i tendencii. In : Monitoring IGPI, 9 (1994) 32, p. 12. 40 Cf. Valerij Vyžutovič, Korni travy. In : Izvestija, 20 March 1996, p. 5. 41 Ob izmenenijach v ustave partii, pp. 53 f.

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At the Sixth Party Conference Kuptsov defined the tasks of the party regarding this question as follows : “Admission of new members, the forming of a network of basic organizations in all collectives and settlements – these are the main tasks of the party. One is to resume work on the countryside, to activate it at universities and schools where we have lost our positions to a large extent. [...] Due to the election results, many former apparatchiki who in difficult times of the party didn’t want to give anything and abhorred it are now trying to enter the party. That is a dangerous tendency; it can lead to infiltration of our ranks. [...] The time has come to prevent the new registration of members of the CPSU. [...] The re - establishment of party memberships can now only take place by way of new admission for the basic organization of the party.”42 Many of the arguments between the “radical - orthodox” ( RCAP, Working Russia ) and moderate socialists as well as those leaning towards social - democracy ( such as the SPT ) were inevitable, and constant rivalries developed within these organizations and between their leaders. However in the regions even in those with a developed party spectrum, things were completely different. Often there were alliances and blocs combining all organizations from the left of the political spectrum as well as “patriotic” organizations. These alliances were partially temporary ( election campaign related ) and partially stable, for example the “For Peoples’ Power” ( the Sverdlovsk area ), and “Against Poverty, Unemployment and Corruption” ( the Orenburg area ) alliances. Such forms of organizations forced the Communists to ideologic pluralism, which is why the blurred political objective could not even raise astonishment within the center. Furthermore, there was the practical work concerning the construction of the party organizations and of the coalitions with regard to the consolidation and unification of all forces of the opposition. The CPRF, which in comparison to other parties and political unities appears homogeneous, has undergone internal conflicts that are partially power - grabbing and partially ideologic.43 However, to the outside observer there appeared to be “three camps” : the “social - democratic,” the “patriotic” and the “orthodox or communist.”44 It was usually underlined that the political objective of the party is not to be criticized publicly and that all fights would take place “under the table.” Nevertheless, there were contradictions when classifying those groups or leaders, since the positions of the “orthodox” ones ( such as Makashov or Oleg Schenin ) had shifted and Zyuganov or Kuptsov could hardly be classified. Therefore, Zyuganov could arbitrarily, depending upon the audience, appear as a moderate, almost reform - oriented politician ( for example at the Davos meeting or in Bonn in May 1996). However, at the same time he could appear with an apparently

42 Rossija pered vyborom. In : Pravda Rossii, 22 February 1996, p. 2. 43 Cf. Sergej Čugaev, Im nužen novyj Černenko. In : Izvestija, 21 March 1996, p. 5. 44 Cf. e.g. Timmermann, Die Kommunistische Partei der Russischen Föderation. In : Aktuelle Analysen, BIOst, (1995) 69/70; Evgenij Krasnikov, KPRF : kto za kulisami ? In: Moskovskie novosti, (1996) 13, p. 7.

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“firm” Marxist platform at the internal meetings of the CPRF, or present himself as a “patriotic” or nationalist and imperialist devotee of the Great Power, as in his books and in the majority of his public appearances.45 He is obviously no dogmatic ideologist, as Andrei Fadin rightfully noticed, but a practically - oriented politician for whom different ideologies only serve as instruments in the struggle for power. As a practical politician must know, it is impossible to rise to power and remain in power without considering important interest groups (including those from the west ).46 Originally there were two groups within the party. The first was the party officials who were active in the Duma as delegates, “in the apparatus,” or in private businesses and banks. The second was the group of those that organized mass events in the streets. For the first, connections to executives and powerful financial structures became very vital, and they were uninterested in a fundamental change in the situation. The second, whose representatives won many seats in the Duma, found that the best positions and resources had already been allotted. Additionally they lacked professionalism, for which they tried to compensate with their “loyalty to Communist ideals”. Sometimes this conflict is interpreted as an argument between “parliamentary Moscow” and the “fighting regions.” The first group supported Zyuganov and the second Kuptsov who virtually leads the apparatus of the faction and the party. Then again, some observers believed that Kuptsov stood fully by Zyuganov’s side.47 In fact Kuptsov, whose nomination as the parliament chairman ( by Zyuganov) was prevented in the faction by Lukyanov, began with the cleaning of the apparatus, where only a few of Zyuganov’s followers remained. His task, as he saw it, lies in concentrating power in the hands of the party machinery. An important step towards this direction was the change of a statute which now dictates the imperative mandate for party members elected through the lists. Additionally, Communist factions in all of the representative bodies are obligated to consider the opinions and decisions of party organizations. Two politicians, Lukyanov and Seleznev, played an independent role in the leading organs of the party and in the faction of the State Duma. Lukyanov’s main task is to form coalitions. Seleznev emancipated himself from the party after he had been elected the chairman of the parliament and therefore lost his position as a secretary at the closed CC plenum in May 1996, allegedly due to “heavy workload in his position as Duma chairman.” In reality one accused him of the execution of an independent or party - deviant policy. Here the “Rybkin” case repeats itself. Rybkin was a member of the CPRF and the APR and in the camp of the opposition, but after two years of activity as chairman of the Duma he was already so closely connected to government power that he created a government - faithful bloc. 45 Cf. Simon, Gennadij Sjuganow. In : Aktuelle Analysen, BIOst, (1996) 15. 46 Cf. Andrej Fadin, Zjuganov meždu trudom i kapitalom. In : Obščaja gazeta, (1996) 8, p. 8. 47 Cf. e.g. Fedotov, Gennadij Zjuganov. In : Nezavisimaja gazeta, 20 March 1996, p. 5.

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As far as is known, the CPRF does not have any important financial sources in the regions : There are no enterprises owned by the CPRF. The financial assistance from the center is limited to the remuneration of party officials as assistants of Duma delegates. Furthermore, in the regions the CPRF has money donated from sponsors. Membership dues ( of which 20 % remain in the district and city party committees, 40 % are transferred to the leading organs of the area and republic party organizations, and 20 % are transferred to the CC ) only account for 1 % of members’ wages and for only 0.5 % of the livelihood for students and unemployed. Pensioners are exempt from party contributions. Nevertheless, the Russian media reports that the CPRF has maintained relationships to the most important banks and western companies for quite some time. An indication of this is the presence of Vladimir Semago, a member of the board of directors for the MOS business bank and owner of a casino, in the faction and the party.48 At present the CPRF directly or indirectly controls over 150 newspapers and magazines. This concerns the print media only, but access to television channels ( which are controlled by the government ) is also very limited. In the regions possibilities of action of the CPRF depend on the positions of the particular governors or administrations.

V.

Ideology and Political Objectives

“Analytic centers” and groups play an increasing role with the formulation of the political objectives, as well as for concrete political steps and declarations. The most important of these in the first half of the 1990s was the RAU Corporation which was under the direction of Aleksey Podberezkin who cooperated with Rutskoy from 1991 to 1993. However, at the end of 1994 Podberezkin allied with Zyuganov. RAU is well known among experts. It was the only one to publish a ten - volume work on the new political movements and parties in Russia from the early Perestroika to 1993, as well as further reference books (on banks, NGOs, etc.) and a magazine ( Obozrevatel’ ). In 1995 the “Intellectual Inheritance” ( Dukhovnoe nasledie ) foundation was established on the basis of RAU and with the participation of patriotic - minded artists ( Nikolai Gubenko, Yuri Bondarev, and Tatyana Doronina, among others ) as well as the ex - KGB general Valerij Vorotnikov. This foundation significantly participated in the preparation of Zyuganov’s books and program. Another organization, “Russian Scientists for a Socialist Orientation,” predominantly unified orthodox - minded ideologists ( former professors of the Party University in Moscow, experts on the highest Soviet, etc.) who prepare bills for the CPRF faction in the Duma. There

48 Cf. Fadin, Zjuganov meždu trudom i kapitalom. In : Obščaja gazeta, (1996) 8, p. 8.

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were also three analytic centers whose activities were of a closed nature and whose task was to analyze political information.49 The party program of the CPRF was passed at the Second Extraordinary Party Congress in February 1993 and adjusted at the Third Party Congress on January 22, 1995. Although certain changes in the party’s objectives failed to find a place in the program they did, however, find a place in the statutes of the party and in the recommendations of the party for its president candidate Zyuganov, as well as in Zyuganov’s electoral program. They were accepted at the Fourth Plenum of the CC of the CPRF on January 18, 1995. The direction of these changes is clearly recognizable. Marxist - Leninist principles are drifting away in the economic and political areas through a renunciation of a Communist and even a radical - oppositional rhetoric and are drifting towards an orientation on Great Power and patriotism as well as towards the defense of the social rights of the population. The program announced the development of socialism in new ways which are supposed to correspond to the modern level of industrial development, ecologic security, and the nature of the tasks mankind is confronted with. Communism is thereby understood as the future social order ( as in The Communist Manifesto ), as “a Communist association” in which the development of each individual is allegedly a requirement for the development of everybody; however this formula is dealt with in the program. At the same time it is alleged that the “Russian idea is a deeply socialist idea.” The “defense of the national - governmental interests of Russia” organically flows into the “fight against colonial enslavement and the counter - revolution [ and ] for socialism and Soviet forms of the will of the people.” As Heinz Timmermann aptly remarked, the outcome was “a political objective which by its contradictoriness and eclecticism is looking for its kind : It connects conventional Marxism with democratic pluralism; dialectic materialism with orthodox - religious values.”50 There are three stages, comprising the following tasks, which lead to these goals : 1. At the first stage, a government of national rescue should be founded, which is to eliminate the catastrophic consequences of the reforms; in particular the property contradicting “social interests” should be privatized and “returned to the people.” 2. At the second stage, socialist economic reforms should be predominant; while stability is created within the political areas, the workers should take part in the administration in various ways. 3. At the third stage, the socialist economic forms are to prevail everywhere.51

49 Cf. Krasnikov, KPRF : kto za kulisami ? In: Moskovskie novosti, (1996) 13, p. 7; Evgenij Krasnikov, Voždi i duchovnye nasledniki. In : Obščaja gazeta, (1996) 11, p. 8. 50 Timmermann, Die Kommunistische Partei der Russischen Föderation. In : Aktuelle Analysen, BIOst, (1995) 70, p. 5. 51 Programma Kommunističeskoj partii Rossijskoj Federacii, pp. 109 f.

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The “Minimum Program,” which is more precise than these proposals, describes that the further tasks are predominantly within the legislation, among them the electoral law and the social rights. One outstanding point is the prevention of the introduction of private property. Additionally, the annulment of the Belarus Agreement ( regarding the formation of the CIS ) and the voluntary, gradual formation of a union state were announced. Four of the ten items on the agenda stressed a democratic nature. These demands are : 1. A bloc of laws ( regarding the electoral law and the referendum ) which are to guarantee that the citizens can vote voluntarily. 2. The guarantee of the citizens’ right to information as well as access to all political powers which act according the law, and to the media. 3. The general discussion and acceptance of a new constitution by the majority of the people. 4. The maximum possible representation of the workers at all levels of the organs of power and the organs of self administration.52 The “Defense of the citizens and of the human rights in the Russian Federation”53 is also considered a necessity. If we ignore the declarations of a general nature, such as the prevention of conflicts between nations or the purely ideological declarations such as “Stopping the fouling of Russian and Soviet history and of the memory and the theoretical doctrines of V. I. Lenin”54 ( which are obviously of relevance to the conservative minded party members ), one part of these tasks – in the area of legislation – had already been realized in the course of a year. Only one point, the early presidential elections and the formation of a government for the rescue of the nation, is no longer relevant due to the success of the CPRF in the elections and Zyuganov’s good chances in the presidential elections. At the Fifth Plenum of the party the emphasis was on solidifying the slogan “of patriotism and of the defense of national, governmental interests”, whereby the “Russian statehood” was to be developed on the basis of the will of the people and under consideration of cultural - historical traditions.55 At the Fifth Party Conference, where Zyuganov was nominated as the presidential candidate, the following was further emphasized : 1. “We recognize the necessity for different forms of property”; “The state must support the local producers of goods”; “When a private company is working successfully, it must be supported.” 2. The constitution is to be changed : “We will support everything which is connected to the development of federalism on a constitutional basis : We need a strong center and a developed local self - administration”; “the imbalance of 52 53 54 55

Ibid., p. 111. Ibid., p. 117. Ibid. Cf. Sdelat’ predstoit bol’še, čem uže sdelano. In : Pravda Rossii, 18 January 1996, pp. 2 f.

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power must be corrected, the controlling and commanding functions of the representative bodies are to be expanded, and the president’s authority should be limited.” 3. “Social - economic rights are to be guaranteed by the constitution.”56 While the electoral platform of the presidential candidate was even more general and less radical, especially concerning the economic sector, it contained a clear concept as to how the constitutional order was to be changed. It is interesting that the education of a patriotic bloc had hardly any influence on the elaboration of this program : Neither orthodox Leninism, which Anpilov likes, nor the radical - nationalist terminology of those of the Russian Party participating in the bloc or of the Officers Federation are to be found in this document. The platform even looks moderate in the area of foreign policy and only differs by some rhetorical keywords, such as “comprador bourgeoisie”, from the proclaimed policy of the government. Here we find the step by step re- establishment of the Union state on a voluntary basis, an independent and open foreign policy, which does not allow any outside interference, the guarantee of the security of the country by peaceful means, whereby the eastern extension of NATO – without saying – is negatively appraised.57 The positions of the party have since changed insignificantly. The tasks which Zyuganov announced at the Seventh Party Congress in 2000 remain current. They include the increase of influence in the work collectives and the development of a program for the development of the country and to strengthen the party. The CPRF faces a dilemma regarding its program : If it drifts toward a modern social democracy, it risks losing its core constituency. If it continues to undermine the connection of communism and patriotism, it might lose its effectiveness because the other parties, including the dominant party, are also openly or implicitly playing the nationalist card.

VI.

The Social Basis of the CPRF

According to VCIOM opinion polls, in the first half of the Nineties the constituency of the CPRF and of the oppositional parties overall consisted of people whose income was below average.58 Factors that determine the standard of living, especially the amount and dynamics of income, are most likely to correlate with voting CPRF.59 It is actually the voters who, unlike the activists of the party, cannot be accurately described according to age, education, or occupa56 Cf. Zjuganov, Post glavy ogromnoj strany. In : Pravda Rossii, 22 February 1996, p. 3. 57 Ibid. 58 Cf. Sedov, Startovye pozicii partij v načale vybornoj kampanii. In : Social’nye i çkonomičeskie peremeny. Monitoring obščestvennogo mnenija, (1995) 5, p. 15. 59 Cf. Buzen, Vlijanie social’no - çkonomičeskogo razvitija regionov Rossii. In : Polis, (1996) 1, pp. 103–118.

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tion. “Patriotic” or “Communist” voters can be found in nearly all of the voter demographic groups; however opposition devotees tend to have a somewhat lower education, rather live in small settlements than in the large cities. Voters with precise political concepts are rather middle - aged and older.60 The core of the CPRF’s constituency ( namely the majority of those that voted in favor of the party in 1993) remained steady and they were, after two years, ready to vote for the party again. The Communists themselves see their constituency and the social basis of the party in the employees, industrial and agricultural workers, and engineers of state enterprises, where almost one third of them is among the older population (60 years and over ) and two thirds of them are 45 years and older. On the basis of different investigations it was determent that more than 40 % of these groups of voters have a higher level of education. Furthermore, the percentage of workers is relatively low, approximately 20 %, which is lower than at the DPR; at the LDPR this number is twice as high. These insights realizations caused the CPRF to change its opinion about its own core constituency and to adapt their election strategies accordingly, which now mainly target engineers and technicians as well as clerical workers and teachers.61

VII. The CPRF in Putin’s Russia The CPRF’s influence has steadily decreased under Putin. However, it did not have to face the fate of the small Communist parties, which was complete marginalization. Institutional changes such as the abolishment of the governor elections or the increasing role of the “Party of Power,” United Russia, forced the representatives of the regional elites to change their orientation, refrain from association with the Communists, and to enter the United Russia party in order not to lose their positions. However, that was not yet enough for the Kremlin. In 2004 a split of the CPRF was staged, initiated by Tikhonov, the Governor of Ivanovo. However, the independent All - Russian Communist Party of the Future ( ARCPF ) was unable to clearly weaken the position of the CPRF. The second attempt was more successful. In March 2005 Gennadij Semigin, the CPRF’s only remaining financial resource and one of their leading representatives, founded a new leftist party, the Patriots of Russia. The new party represents moderately left positions, pleads for social justice, and avoids criticizing the President. At the 2006–07 regional elections the Patriots of Russia were able to take some votes away from the CPRF. However, by 2007 they were already no longer of use to the Kremlin, and therefore were apportioned 0.89 % of the votes. The CPRF is trying very hard to recruit young voters – but without success. Politically interested youth prefers the radical leftist organizations such as the Avant - Garde of the Left Youth or the 60 Cf. Tumanov / Burykin, Çlektorat Rossii v 1993 godu. In : Socis, (1995) 5, pp. 33–43. 61 Cf. Segal, Çlektorat levych sil, pp. 40 f.

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National Bolshevik Party. However, the CPRF managed to strengthen its positions after the wave of protest in 2004, which was related to the abolishment of privileges. It showed its increasing readiness for cooperation with the democratic opposition, such as the observation of elections and common protest events. The CPRF has moderated its publicly stated position towards the President in order to keep its distance to radical Communist groups. “Patriotic,” anti- western, and nationalist positions which are typical for the party moved further into the foreground along with the increase in official nationalism. The CPRF is no longer a dangerous opposition for the Kremlin. It appears partly guided and enjoys certain toleration. However it determines its position, whether it is more strongly “Kremlin conforming” or decidedly oppositional, one point remains clear : In the foreseeable future it will remain one of the most important players in the political life of Russia.

V. Transnational Cooperation and Comparison

Transnational Cooperation of Post - Communist Parties Rudolf van Hüllen

1.

Preliminary Note

Since the Sino - Soviet split of the 1960s the communist movement has been disunited.1 The end of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe meant the almost total loss of the most important condition of its “internationalist” activities. Thus, the communist movement had lost most of its political, military, financial, and organisational potential. Its “front organizations”, created for the “fight for peace,” anti - fascism, and anti - colonialism, as well as the ostentatious “Meetings of Communist and Workers’ Parties”2 disappeared from the political scene. Initially, only the resilient Trotskyite umbrella organizations and some Maoist terrorist groups survived the shock of the democratic revolutions. At first, the formerly orthodox communist parties fought the apparently global victory of capitalism on their own, within their respective national frameworks, while struggling for their own survival. The first indications of the survival of “Internationalism” came from a poor Mexican province : The perfectly staged rebellion of the Zapatistas and their “intergalactic meetings” emphasized grass root democratic as well as anarchical elements. Thus, they were too esoteric for communists to take them seriously. Communists habitually thought in categories of state power politics. During a conference of the council of ministers of the WTO in December 1999 anti - globalization protests erupted in the “Battle of Seattle.” This latter incident marked the end of the crisis of communist internationalism, although it had taken the European post - communist parties rather by surprise. The criteria of Marxist analysis certainly were perfectly suitable for the investigation of “anti - globalization.” Being a movement, however, its structures are not adequate fields of action for classical political parties. Far from it : Those parties have definitely not been welcome at the “World Social Forum.” Furthermore, international cooperation amongst post - communist parties had been quite feeble compared to the “globalization of capitalism,” even in matters and questions imposing close collaboration. 1 2

Translation : Rita Schorpp. The last “Meeting of European Communist and Workers’ Parties” took place in Berlin ( GDR ) on June 29/30, 1976. It was intended to fight “Euro - Communism.”

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Continuous European integration is without doubt one of those. It may be analysed as a sub - category of “capitalist globalization” and “neo - liberalism.” The revolutionary Marxist forces in what would become Maastricht - countries had only reacted by establishing the very loose consultory formation of the “New European Left Forum” ( NELF ). In 1994 it was complemented by the group of post - Communist parties in the European Parliament, the “Gauche Unie Européenne” ( GUE ). After Sweden and Finland became members the GUE was joined by the “Nordic Green Left” ( NGL ) and changed its name to GUE / NGL. These instruments were continually improved. Meanwhile, a new European party was founded as the centre of trans - national cooperation between post - communist parties in Europe. There has been a new field of action since 9 - 11, 2001. It is not, however, the attempt to develop a specifically leftist position towards Islamic fundamentalist terror. The new field of action has instead been against the American “war on terror.” In the tradition of the communist “fight for peace” this war is defined as a typical expression of capitalist imperialism. This is how communists are tied to wide - spread anti - American reflexes extending far beyond socialist parties and social - populist green formations, into anarchist and autonomous structures, and even into a certain segment of the right - wing extremist potential. The position and attitude towards Islamic fundamentalist terror considerably depends on the ability of post - communist parties to forsake their polarised view of the world. So far, they have differentiated only between capitalist / colonial ideology on the one hand and emancipatory / anti - colonial paradigms on the other. Meanwhile, the phenomenon of Islamic and oriental despotism has been completely ignored. We shall examine trans - national cooperation between post - communist parties with a certain emphasis on Europe. Our focus is on the political attitude of post - communists toward European integration. In an exemplary way this topic shows the strong differentiation between post - communist scenes more than 17 years after the democratic revolutions : Some former communists have completely changed into social democratic parties. They act in a different political sphere and will therefore not be included in our exploration. There are former communists turned green, some only partially reformed communists, finally, besides Trotskyites and Maoist, dogmatically and traditionally frozen parties.3 Even though there is an overlap in their ideologic circles, there is one point of rupture : The formerly Moscow - oriented parties no longer have any central authority. They cooperate on the basis of common agreement and to the extent of shared mutual contents. Trotskyites and Maoists, however, insist on democratic centralism and their claim to be the vanguard. Several Maoist formations outside Europe participate in terrorist activities. This is why they insist on quasi military revolutionary discipline and conspiracy.

3

We follow the classification of March and Mudde, which is useful for the post Communist scene. Cf. March / Mudde, What’s Left of the Radical Left ?, pp. 23–49.

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2.

Formerly Moscow - oriented post - communists

2.1

NELF and GUE

465

2.1.1 The “Confederate Group of the European United Left / Nordic Green Left” ( GUE / NGL ) In July 1994 the “Confederate Group of the European United Left ( GUE )” was founded by the following five parties : the Spanish United Left – Izquierda Unida ( IU ), the French Communist Party – Parti Communiste Français ( PCF ), the Italian Communist Refoundation Party – Partito della Rifondazione Comunista ( PRC ), the Portuguese United Democratic Coalition – Coligaçao Democrática Unitária ( CDU ), and finally two Greek formations, The Greek Communist Party – Kommounistiko Komma Elladas ( KKE ) and The Coalition of the Left and Progress – Synaspismos tis Aristeras kai tis Proodou. After the enlargement of the European Union by the addition of the Nordic countries and Austria in January 1995 the Swedish Left Party – Vänsterpartiet ( VP ), and the Finnish Left Alliance – Vänsterförbundet Vas became members of the GUE. When the Danish Socialist Peoples’ Party – Socialistisk Folkeparti ( SF ) also joined the group, the three northern European parties formed the Nordic Green Left ( NGL ) component. The group was renamed Confederate Group of the European United Left / Nordic Green Left – GUE / NGL. A British and an Italian MEP joined the group in 1998, increasing its number to 34 MEPs from eight countries. After the 1999 elections the GUE / NGL group ranked fifth in the European Parliament with 40 MEPs from 10 countries and 15 different parties. New parties were represented : the Greek DIKKI, the Revolutionary Communist League ( Ligue communiste révolutionnaire – LCR ) and Workers’ Struggle ( Lutte ouvrière – LO ) from France, the German Party The Left ( Die Linke, former East German Socialist Unitary Party, SED ), the Portuguese Communist Party ( Partido Comunista Português – PCP ), the Party of Italian Communists ( Partito dei Comunisti Italiani – PdCI ), and the Dutch Socialist Party ( Socialistisch Partij – SP ). The group united six MEPs from France as full members and five as associated members. There were six German and Italian members respectively, seven from Greece, four from Spain, three from Sweden, and two from Portugal. Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands had one MEP each. In 2001 and 2002 a total of eight MEPs left their former groups to join the GUE / NGL. Thus, with 49 members it became the 4th largest group in the European Parliament. After 10 other states had joined the EU on May 1, 2004, the group was reinforced by the following MEPs : two Cypriots, three Czechs, one Latvian and one Slovak. They had been observers since 2003 and had now become full members. At the European elections in June 2004 the GUE / NGL won 38 seats. Two new MEPs of the Irish Sinn Féin, one representing Ireland and the other the

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United Kingdom, joined the group as well as one from MEP from the Left Bloc of Portugal ( Bloco de Esquerda ). The group represents more than nine million Europeans. In 2007 its 41 members came from 13 countries : six Czech MEPs are members of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia ( Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy), one MEP represents the Danish People’s Movement against the EU ( Folkebevaegelsen mod EU ). The seven Germans are members of the Left Party ( Die Linke ). Three MEPs belong to the Greek KKE and one to Synapismos. One member represents Izquierda Unida from Spain; three are members of the French PCF. One Irish and one British MEP come from Sinn Féin; of seven Italian group members, five belong to the Partito della Rifondazione Comunista and two to the Partito dei Comunisti Italiani. The Cypriote Progressive Party of Working People ( Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou – Aristera – Nees Dynameis – AKEL) is represented by two MEPs. The Dutch Socialist Party (Socialistisch Partij ) has two MEPs as well. One member represents the Portuguese parties Coligação Democrática Unitária ( PCP - PEV ), Partido Comunista Português and Bloco de Esquerda respectively. The Finnish member comes from Vasemmistoliitto. Two Swedish MEPs belong to the Vänsterpartiet. Three parties that are not represented in the European Parliament are associate members of the GUE / NGL : The Socialist Left Party of Norway ( Socialistisk Venstre Parti SV ), the Swiss Worker’s Party ( Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz – PdA / Parti suisse du Travail – PdT ), and the Left ( la Gauche / Déi Lénk ) from Luxemburg. The Frenchman Francis Wurtz is President of the GUE / NGL. The group is represented in every commission and parliamentary committee. It plays an important role in the European legislative process. Its annual budget of 3.94 million Euros in 2005 has enabled the group to pursue extensive political action and activities. It unites orthodox and reformed communist parties as well as “red - green” and post - communist formations. In spite of this ideologic diversity, the group has developed a mode of harmonious cooperation, concentrating on central issues such as anti - capitalism, pacifism, and anti - racism.

2.1.2 The “New European Left Forum” ( NELF ) The importance of the “New European Left Forum” ( NELF ) has been decreasing in the course of post - communist attempts to reorganize in Europe. NELF had been created following an initiative of the Spanish “Izquierda Unida” ( IU ) in 1990. It was formed in November 1991. Until 2006 semi - annual meetings took place in different cities in Europe. The 15th anniversary conference took place in Copenhagen. At first NELF had consisted of European communist parties which in the early 1990s had at least partly reformed and changed their ideologic platforms. Initially, tradition-

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al formations and parties had observed this experiment with a certain amount of reluctance. But its attractiveness kept growing. Presently, 22 parties or umbrella organizations are members or permanent guests of the NELF. About 30 more parties or formations are observers. Yet there is hardly a communist or post - communist party of the former Eastern Block which is a member of NELF.4 – The Members of NELF are : Socialistisk Folkeparti ( SF ) Denmark; Sotsialldemokraatlik Tööpartei ( ESDTP ) Estonia; Vasemmistoliitto ( VAS ) Finland; Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen ( MRC ), Parti Communiste Français (PCF) France; Die Linke, Germany; Synaspismos ( Syn ), Greece; Partito della rifondazione comunista ( PRC ), Partito dei Comunisti Italiani ( PDCI ), Italy; Groenlinks, the Netherlands; Sosialistisk Venstreparti ( SV ), Norway; Izquierda Unida ( IU ), Iniciativa per Catalunya - Verds ( IC - V ), Spain; Venster Partiet ( VP ), Sweden. – Permanent guests are : Kommunistische Partei Österreichs ( KPÖ ), Austria; Akel, Cyprus; Enhedslisten, Denmark; Socialist Labour Party, Great Britain; Socialistische Partij ( SP ), the Netherlands; Partido Comunista Português (PCP), Portugal; Özgürlük ve Dayanisma Partisi ( ÖDP ), Turkey. For “heavy - weights” such as Linkspartei.PDS or PCF, NELF’s attractivity has clearly been decreasing. Their priority is the Party of the European Left ( EL ). The DKP ( German Communist Party ) is an observer at NELF.

4

Members and guests of NELF : Austria: Kommunistische Partei Österreichs, KPÖ, guest; Cyprus: Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou, AKEL, guest; Denmark: Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF; Estonia: Eesti Vasakpartei / Levaya Partiya Estonii; Finland: Vasemmistoliitto / Vänsterförbundet, VL; France: Parti Communiste Français, PCF, Réfondateurs Communistes, Regroupement Communiste, Faits et Analyses, Rouges Vifs, Nouvelle Gauche Communiste / Association Populaire d’Entraide, Pole de Renaissance Communiste en France, PCRF, Combat; Germany: Linkspartei.PDS, Forum 2. Erneuerung; Kommunistische Plattform der PDS – KPF, Gerarer Dialog, Forum kommunistischer Arbeitsgemeinschaften, Marxistisches Forum, Netzwerk Reformlinke, Netzwerk; Great Britain: New Politics Network; Greece: Synaspismos tis Aristeras ton Kinimaton tis Oikologias, SYN, Kokkinoprasino Diktyo tou SYN, Ananeotiki Sypeirosi; Italy: Partito della Rifondazione Comunista PRC, Associazione Bandiera Rossa ABR, periodical Erre, Comunismo dal basso, l’ernesto, Linea Rossa, Associazione Reds, Associazione Marxista Rivoluzionaria “Progetto Comunista”, Falce Martello; the Netherlands: GroenLinks, Socialistische Partij; Norway: Sosialistisk Venstreparti, SV; Spain: Iniciativa per Catalunya IC, Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya PSUC, Izquierda Unida IU, Esquerra Unida i Alternativa EuiA, Col.lectiu per una Esquerra Alternativa CEA, Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya PCC, Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya – Viu PSUC – Viu, Espacio Alternativo, Izquierda Alternativa IA, periodical Viento Sur, Espai Alternatiu, Espacio Revolucionario Andaluz, Arcoiris, Batzac, Partido Comunista de España PCE; Sweden: Vänsterpartiet V; Switzerland: Parti Suisse du Travail / Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz / Partito Svizzero del Lavoro, PdA / PST / PdL ).

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The project of the “European Left” ( EL )

The EL is the attempt to create a common European party. It was founded in May 2004 as “Party of the European Left / European Left – EL,” “Partei der Europäischen Linken / Europäische Linke – EL,” “Parti de la gauche européenne / Gauche européene – GE.” Its supporters were euphoric in their welcoming of the formation. Critics however, condemned it as an attempt to disunite and split the European revolutionary left and accepting the logics and legal frame of the capitalist - imperialist project of the European Union .

2.2.1 History, setting, and development The idea to create the EL had evidently been born amongst NELF and GUE / NGL. Apparently the Italian “Partito della Rifondazione Comunista” ( PRC ) and the German “Die Linke” had been the driving forces behind the creation of a European party. They insist in having pursued the foundation according to the institutional rules of the EU since 1998. They conceded the acceptance of this frame - work which involved annual financial support of about 8 million Euros for this body. This sum has enabled EL to establish a permanent apparatus, to hold regular international meetings and to organize working groups and specialized networks. Presently, five of them are active : Institutional Future of Europe; EL Women’s Network; EL Network of Gay, Lesbian, Bi & Transsexual – Queer – Left Activists, EL Regional Network in the Baltic Region, Working Group for Economic Policy and the EL Network of Activists on Local Policies. The statutes and the “progressive manifest” had been in the works since March 2003. In January and February of 2004 two meetings of interested national parties in Berlin and Athens had prepared the foundation of the party which was to take place in Rome on May 8/9, 2004. The initiators never tried to renounce their roots. They leaned heavily on revolutionary symbolism such as the visit to the memorials of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht5 in Berlin in January 2004 and to Antonio Gramsci’s6 grave in Rome in May. Furthermore, EL was officially founded on the “Day of Liberation from Fascism.” Fausto Bertinotti was elected chairman of EL. In his speech, Bertinotti attested to the “renaissance of a new labour movement.” Clearly following Gramsci’s notion, he confirmed the “cultural refoundation of our history.”7 5

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Karl Liebknecht (1871–1919) and Rosa Luxemburg (1870–1919) were cofounders of The Communist Party of Germany ( Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands KPD ); they supported an insurgency against the social democratic Reich government. They were killed in January 1919 by the royalist military crushing of the uprising. Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) had been successor of Amadeo Bordiga as chairman of the PCI since 1924; imprisoned in 1926, he died in Fascist confinement. Gramsci propagated the “cultural hegemony” of the left as the precondition of establishing a socialist society. To many post - Communist parties his conception has become a blueprint for action. Cf. Jens König, Peter Pan gründet Europa neu. In : die tageszeitung, 10 May 2004, p. 6.

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On May 9, 2004, there were 14 founding parties present. Their respective political importance varies widely. Presently, in April 2007, EL counts 18 member parties and nine observer parties. – The following parties are members : Austria: Communist Party of Austria – Kommunistische Partei Österreichs; Belgium: Communist Party – Parti Communiste ( Wallonie ); Czech Republic: Party of Democratic Socialism – Strana demokratického socialismu; Estonia : Estonian Left Party – Eesti Vasakpartei; France: French Communist Party – Parti communiste français; Germany: The Left Party; Greece: Coalition of the Left, of Social Movements and Ecology – Synaspismos; Hungary: Hungarian Communist Workers’ Party – Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt; Italy: Communist Refoundation Party – Partito della rifondazione comunista; Luxemburg: The Left – déi lénk; Portugal: Left Block – Bloco de Esquerda; Moldova: Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova – Partidul Comuniştilor din Republica Moldova; Romania: Socialist Alliance Party – Partidul Alianta Socialista; San Marino: Communist Refoundation of San Marino – Rifondazione Comunista Sammarinese; Spain: United Left – Izquierda Unida, United Alternative Left (Catalonia ) – Esquerra Unida i Alternativa, Communist Party of Spain – Partido Comunista de Españale; Switzerland: Labour Party of Switzerland – Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz / parti du travail de Suisse. – Parties with observer status : Cyprus: Progressive Party of The Working People – AKEL; Czech Republic: Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia – Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy; Denmark: Red Green Alliance – Enhedslisten – De Rød - Grønne; Finland: Communist Party of Finland – Suomen kommunistinen puolue; Germany: German Communist Party – Deutsche Kommunistische Partei; Greece: A.K.O.A. Renovative Communist and Ecological Left; Italy: Party of Italian Communists – Partito dei Comunisti Italiani; Slovakia: Communist Party of Slovakia – Komunistická strana Slovenska; Turkey: Freedom and Solidarity Party – Özgürlük ve Dayanişma Partisi. The Italian PRC, the German Die Linke, and the French PCF are relative “heavyweights.” However the “Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy” ( KSČM ), with roughly 20 percent of the vote in the Czech Republic had refused to become a member at the founding convention. Its representatives were not willing to accept the “unconditional rejection of Stalinism” asserted in the statutes. The political importance of the Austrian, Swiss, Hungarian, and Romanian Communist parties is quite low in their respective countries. The “Partito della Rifondazione Comunista Sammarinese,” with about 100 members, is practically of no importance at home. For the European scenario, the absence of some parties is of considerable importance : There are no British or Irish formations. Neither the strong Portuguese Communist Party nor the Benelux post - communist parties are represented. The Communists of Poland and most of Baltic States have abstained from

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participation. Because they reject the EU in toto, the Northern European post communist parties have refused to join a European post - communist structure. The EL project is quite complex. In spite of numerous meetings of committees and intense travelling, it does not seem to have really taken off yet. Apparently, EL suffers from the fact that the member parties still put their political priorities on the national level. Thus, they may change their major goals and frames of action rather quickly, depending on the situation at home. Furthermore, the EL assembles a wide range of ideologies, from hardly reformed orthodox communists to left - alternative alliances. The parties do not agree on strategic options. For example, the German Die Linke is quite set on institutional party politics, while the Italian PRC has opened itself to social movements in a remarkable way. As if this were not enough, attitudes on strategic options differ clearly even within the member parties. Some activists judge the EL approach at social movements to be not broad enough. According to them, it leans too narrowly towards the more revolutionary Marxist formations, thus forgoing the chance to become a hinge to them. And finally, the EL project is competing with various social protest movements, the most serious contestant being the anti - globalization movement and its openly anti - party attitude. In short, the radical left is now experiencing the problems of European integration which the democratic parties have been familiar with for a long time.

2.2.2 Internal Structure ( Statutes ) The statutes and programme of the European Left mirror the difficulties which have been named. The statute confirms the character of EL as an umbrella organization for the coordination of autonomous and sovereign member parties. The highest ranking organ of EL is formally the bi - annual congress, currently composed of 12 delegates from every member party. However, its power is limited : It “comments on the report of activities for the preceded period and on the program for further work presented by the Executive Board” and “decides on the political statements of the EL and recommendations to the Executive Board.” It elects the chairperson “on the basis of a proposal by the Council of Chairpersons following a rota principle.” The Council of Chairpersons, in turn, has “with regards to the Executive Board, the rights of initiative and of having objection on important political issues.” Furthermore, it decides on the membership applications of parties and organizations. The Executive Board consists of a chairperson and a vice - chairperson, the treasurer, and two representatives of each member organisation as well as the head of the secretariat. Basically, the executive board and the secretariat are the apparatuses to be operated by the council of chairpersons. During the debate on the statutes, the role of the secretariat was subject to heated discussions quite evidently provoked by the remembrance of infamous

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examples. However, it would be unfair to attribute the strongly centralist structures to traditional communist habits. Instead, they are also partially enforced by the legal regulations of the EU.

2.2.3 Programmatic Statements The program adopted by the founding congress shows some clearly inconsistent tendencies. It attempts to cover the broad ideologic spectrum from traditional communists to followers of alternative left and anti - globalization ideas and attitudes. Therefore, ambiguities were inescapable. The statute claims, for example, the “unreserved disputation with undemocratic, Stalinist practices and crimes which were in absolute contradiction to socialist and communist ideals.” On the other hand, the program ( “Manifest of the Party of the European Left” ) refers to “the values and traditions of socialism, communism and the labour movement.”8 There is no basic criticism of the failures and crimes of socialist systems. The attitude toward European integration is of similar ambivalence : While EL appreciates the EU as an important space for political action, it strives for “the transformation of the present capitalist society” into a new society “which transgresses the capitalist and patriarchal logic.” EL - chairman Fausto Bertinotti is quite correctly thought to be the inspiring driving force of the program, summed up by three central elements : Firstly, a radical decision for peace and against war, secondly a political alternative to neoliberalism together with an economic and social policy defending employment as well as the environment, and thirdly the decision in favour of democracy and participation. Only the last central elements, namely the emancipation and protection of minorities, seem inspired by the post - material New Left. The two other central elements belong to the classic demands of the old left. The left German daily “Neues Deutschland” ( New Germany ) mentioned the “radical decision for peace and against war.” Bertinotti, in a comment for a leftwing alternative daily, declared it a “radical NO to the US - line of pre - emptive war.” The program is quite clear about wars : The Balkan wars, Afghanistan and Iraq are cited as examples of the “outward militarization” of the EU. In other words, the struggle for peace of the European Left takes up old lines and turns against “imperialist” wars. This traditional point of view takes into consideration neither Islamist terror nor ethnic cleansings or the situation of civil and human rights under Sharia law. These aspects and dimensions of international conflicts have not yet been addressed in the EL programme. The official perception seems to remain directed along the parameters of classic communist political ideologies and the objectives of the last century. 8

Manifesto of the Party of the European Left, http ://www.european - left.org / about / docus / doc / manifesto, 2 May 2007.

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Circles of Dogmatic Marxists - Leninists

The persistence in the political ideologies and objectives of the 20th century characterizes other circles of dogmatic Marxist - Leninist parties and their trans - national activities even more. Since 1999 they have met at seven international conferences. According to the chairman of the German Communist Party ( Deutsche Kommunistische Partei – DKP, about 4,000 members ), “73 communist and workers’ parties from all continents” met at the last one in Athens from November 17 - 20, 2005. 44 of them came from Europe. It stands to reason that many of them were small, sectarian factions. Those consultations are only superficially carrying on the tradition of the Soviet world conferences. In Athens there were enormous frictions even amongst European participants who had been familiar with each other for decades. The report of the DKP chairman is a reliable indicator : “There were differences in the appreciation of the Party of the European Left. Attending parties from Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Finland, and Germany are members or observing parties. The comrades from Greece, Portugal, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Norway, and England voiced their rejection of the Party of the European Left for political and organizational reasons. [...] The final discussion on the statement to the press and on the decision of more parties to participate revealed several problems of today’s international cooperation.”9 The frictions are caused by two diverging strategic concepts of the parties continuing to adhere to dogmatic Marxism - Leninism. The “modernists” among them accept globalization as a fact and define class struggle as an international challenge. To them, the working class is no longer the only revolutionary subject. Instead, they expand the notion on a network of different movements of social resistance that is anti - capitalist only in a wide sense. The “traditionalists,” however, maintain the key role as the revolutionary subject of the respective national working class. They insist on the need for communists to direct their main line of attack against national capital and its bourgeoisie. Both types of Marxists - Leninists regard themselves as guardians of orthodoxy. Among them, there are only three parties of some size. The Czech “Stránky Komunistické stany Cech a Moravy” ( KSCM ) sends six MEPs to the GUE / NGL group, making it the second biggest contingent – right behind the German Die Linke with seven MEPs. It disapproved of the “unconditional rejection of Stalinism” as demanded by EL and therefore restricted its participation to observer status.10 The second traditional heavyweight is the “Partido Comunista Portugues” ( PCP ). In Portugal, however, it has been increasingly challenged by the competing “Bloco de Esquerda”, formed and shaped by former Trotskyites, ex - Maoists, and Communist dissidents. The “Bloco de Esquerda” is a member of both EL and EACL. 9 Central Organ of the DKP “Unsere Zeit”, 25 November 2005. 10 For the traditional understanding and for the historical picture of the KSCM, see Balik, Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, pp. 140–149.

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The most unrelenting pillar of the traditionalists seems to be the Communist Party of Greece ( KKE ). After 1989 it had initially cooperated with its “reformers” in “Sysnaspismos.” However, it broke away and managed to stabilize itself on an orthodox basis. In the 2005 parliamentary elections it received 5.9 percent of the vote. The KKE’s attitude towards the EU and the “revisionists” of EL is clear and explicit : It holds EL to develop its political concepts from the point of view of the capital. “Therefore the only realistic choice in the interest of the working class is the weakening of the formation of EL and not participation in its construction.”11 KKE is not only ideologically uncompromising but also very conscious of its tradition. A few years ago it freed the remnants of the World Peace Council from the control of the French PCF and put it under its own ward. Presently, the WPC chairman and the secretary general both are comrades of KKE and of its “Peace Committee” respectively. Drawing on its long experience, the WPC contributes its old anti - American and anti - capitalist world view to the “Fight for Peace.” But unlike before 1989 there are not very many people who listen to it.

3.

Trotskyites

The “European Anti - Capitalist Left” ( EACL ) was founded in Lisbon in March 2000. The assumption that this was a Trotskyite project seems quite convincing.12 EACL is the persistent continuation of earlier attempts from the mid 1980s to form a revolutionary socialist pole against European integration. In those days, using entrism, the sections of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International had approached the post - communist parties and sometimes dissolved within them. Meanwhile, parts of other Trotskyite umbrella organisations have joined EACL. Therefore one must have a look at the Trotskyite scene in Europe. Trotskyite formations are usually smaller than the remnants of the Soviet oriented parties in Europe. Still, they constitute an active and vital element of the left - wing extremist scene. They insist to be the real adherents of true Leninist orthodox ideology of the revolutionary role of the working class and the necessity of a global revolution to destroy and overcome capitalism. They retain democratic centralism because of their “internationalist discipline.” Their umbrella organisations are centrally controlled and very capable of acting on the trans national scene. At the same time they condemn Stalinism as a “bureaucratic aberration” of Leninist norms. Amongst the adherents of the left this has established the image of them sticking to their principles and being “better” communists. The fact 11

KKE General Secretary Aleka Papariga in her interview with the left German daily “Junge Welt,” 17 November 2005. 12 Cf. Lochner, Linke Parteien und Kooperationen in Europa, p. 5.

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that the Trotsky’s political measures did not differ fundamentally from those used by Lenin and Stalin is usually not taken into consideration. There are about two dozen international Trotskyite umbrella organisations. Most of them, however, are sectarian and extremely dogmatic, militant propaganda groups. About half a dozen of them have more members. Three of the participants in the EACL are described below.

3.1

Quatrième Internationale / Secrétariat Unifié – Fourth International / United Secretary

The “Quatrième Internationale / Secrétariat Unifié” ( “Secrétariat Unifié” – SU or “United Secretary” – US ) is the direct continuation of the original International once founded on Trotsky’s directives in 1938. It claims 39 member organizations in 33 countries. 17 of them are European, and most of them are found in Western European countries. This brought the Paris based umbrella organization to concentrate on the problem of “European integration” at a very early point. They initiated early protests, at the 1997 EU intergovernmental conference in Amsterdam, for example. They also established the “European Marches against Unemployment, Precarity and Exclusion.”13 The anti - globalization network “Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions in Favor of the People” ( ATTAC ) was officially created by the French periodical “Le Monde diplomatique.” But the French section of the United Secretary, the “Ligue communiste révolutionnaire – LCR” ( Communist Revolutionary League ) played an essential role with its foundation. Since 1989 the LCR, with more than 1 000 members, has taken over the role in the French Left which had been vacated by the PCF through its failure in “mutating.” Between 2000 and 2004 the LCR counted three MEPs. The followers of the United Secretary are certainly traditionalists. They are by no means dogmatic, however. Most of these Trotskyite intellectuals come from this environment. Internal decisions are made in quite transparent ways and documented by the international bulletin, “Inprecorr.” This does not keep them from participating in violent protest – such as in 2002 in Nizza during an EU - summit – when the situation seems favourable and the police seem reluctant to intervene.

13 French : “Marches européennes contre le chomage, la précarité et l’exclusion.” This basically congenial idea never managed to become a mass movement. With the rise of ATTAC, its structures have by and by disappeared.

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International Socialist Tendency ( IST )

The British Trotskyites of the London based “International Socialist Tendency” ( IST ) are much more inclined to follow such a course of action. The IST had split with the original International in 1950/51, mainly because its leader Tony Cliff (1917–2000) did not consider the Soviet system a “degenerated workers’ state” but rather to be an example of “state capitalism.” Presently, IST consists of 31 sections in 31 countries, 17 of them in Europe.14 The umbrella organization is mainly centred on the British section of the “Socialist Workers Party” (SWP ). The SWP counts several thousand members. But because of its claim to be the avant - garde, its all - dominant behaviour in social protest movements, and its well - organized tactics of entrism it is not very popular among other leftist formations.15 IST cadres are in fact extremely disciplined and follow the orders of their central committee without fail. On the other hand, they are no sectarians. They have been permanently on the lookout for cracks in the glittering facade of capitalism, trying to trace even remote indications of revolutionary tendencies. Since 2000 its leadership has been convinced that the Battle of Seattle could be the signal for the formation of a “New Left.” Nowadays, however, this should not only include the working class but everybody on whom “neo - liberalism” has had an impact. Its chief ideologist, Alex Callinicos, insists : “In particular, systematic use of the united front approach developed by the Bolsheviks and the Communist International during its early years (1918–1923) is of crucial importance in relating to the new political milieus.”16 Since then, the IST has occupied quite a number of fields of action and created a corona of forefront organizations : In Great Britain alone there has been the anti - globalization movement of “Globalize Resistance” (2001), the “Stop the War Coalition” (2003) against the US - British intervention of Iraq, and the camouflage structure “Respect” (2005) for parliamentary as well as extra - parliamentary fights. IST describes its own strategy as building up three concentric circles : “Building the mass united fronts that constitute the movements ( above all the Stop the War Coalition ), building Respect as a broad political alternative that has emerged from these movements and building the SWP as the kernel of organized revolutionary militants.”17 As for potential allies, IST Trotskyites are by no means discriminating. For example, they have established relations with Islamic fundamentalists. Due to the anti - Semitic political objectives of the latter, other leftist formations have criticised this strategy. Especially at the international level IST Trotskyites must justify why Islamic fundamentalists are not 14 Cf. http ://www.istendency.net, 10 April 2007. 15 For example, the IST - Trotskyites were fiercely criticised for their behaviour at the 2004 European Social Forum in London of which, however, they had been the main organizers. 16 Callinicos, The Birth of a New Left. 17 IST Discussion Bulletin, no.7, January 2006, p. 4; Document of Central Committee “International perspectives 2005.”

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to be taken as role - models for a future communist society but quite definitely as “objective anti - imperialists.”

3.3

Committee for a Workers’ International ( CWI )

The “Committee for a Workers’ International” ( CWI ) is also London based. Presently it claims 23 sections in 22 countries, 14 of them in Europe. It emerged from the former “Revolutionary Socialist League”, the British section of the United Secretary. It split off in 1969 after the IV. International had given up entrism into social democratic parties and trade unions at the end of the 1960s. The “deep entrism” of the British comrades had been extremely successful within the Labour Party. For years they had in fact controlled the Labour Party Young Socialists. The entrists had been known to the public as “Militant Tendency” after the title of their publication “The Militant.” It did not take on the name CWI for its international activities until 1974. In the early 1990s New Labour started an extensive campaign for rigorous anti - Trotskyite cleansing. The positions of Militant Tendency within the youth organization and in its Liverpool stronghold were smashed. But together with the projects of alliance of the “Socialist Parties” its cadres managed to occupy the political space left by Labour. CWI is also actively involved in the anti - globalization movement. It is less important there, however, than IST. In the United Kingdom those two Trotskyite umbrella organizations more or less completely dominate the left wing extremist scene. More orthodox communist structures around the “New Communist Party of Britain” are completely marginal.

3.4

The “European Anti Capitalist Left” ( EACL )

After the rise of the anti - globalization movement the main events of political and economic summit diplomacy – meetings and conferences of WTO, WEF, G8, IMF / World Bank, NAC – have regularly been the focus of demonstrations and violent action. This also holds true for the meetings of the European Council. They take place twice a year, once at the seat of the European administration in Brussels, and once in the capital of the member that holds the presidency for a respective six months. In December 2000 a number of Trotskyite formations met at such protests in Lisbon. From this meeting the new trans - national EACL association emerged. It did not, however, go public until after its third conference in Brussels in December 2004. At first only a few sections of United Secretary and CWI participated together with some rather independent formations like the Portuguese “Bloco de Esquerda.” The IST followed later. After in the spring of 2003 Fausto Bertinotti had opened his party for closer contacts with the social movement the PRC joined EACL. Yet, as an author of the United Secretary remarked quite cor-

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rectly, the PRC did not give up its former ties.18 Presently, roughly a dozen formations belong to the EACL. Eight more carry observer status. – Members : Bloco de Esquerda ( Portugal ); Enhedslisten – De Rod - Gronne (Denmark ); Scottish Socialist Party ( Great Britain ); Ligue communiste révolutionnaire ( France, Trotskyite, section of US ); Socialist Workers Party ( Great Britain, Trotskyite, Section of IST ); RESPECT ( Great Britain, Trotskyite, front organization of IST ); Espacio Alternative ( Spain ); Bloque Nacionalista Galego ( Spain ); Zutik ( Spain / Basque region ); solidaritéS ( Switzerland, Trotzkyite, section of US ); Mouvement pour le socialisme ( Switzerland ); Özgürlük ve Dayanisma Partisi ( Turkey ) – Observers and guests : Partito della Rifondazione Comunista ( Italy ); Synaspismos ( Greece ); Déi Lénk ( Luxemburg ); Esquerra Unida i Alternativa ( Spain / Catalonia ); Socialist Party ( Great Britain, Trotskyite, section of CWI); Socialist Party ( Ireland; Trotskyite, section of CWI ); Kommunistische Partei Österreichs ( Austria, orthodox Communist ); Deutsche Kommunistische Partei ( Germany, orthodox Communist ). The EACL - formations regard themselves as the incontestable non - governmental left. For this reason they refrain from propagating any suggestions for the development of European integration. But they clearly reject things they do not like from their anti - capitalist – communist point of view : the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, the EU - definition of terrorist groups, or the liberalization of the EU Internal Market for Services – the so - called Bolkestein Directive, to name some examples. In a way, EL and EACL complement each other : Many EACL - members are observing parties at EL, and vice versa. There are also some double memberships. This proves that former ideologic cleavages do no longer exist the way they have : Orthodox post - communists and the more discursive non- sectarian Trotskyites are able to communicate and – to a certain extent – form alliances. On the whole, the influence of EACL remains limited to Western and Central Europe. Its Trotskyite background activates the traditional reflex of repellence and defence amongst the post - Stalinist parties of Eastern Europe. The actual development follows suite : In spite of polite interest, the attraction of EACL is lessening. Only eleven formations participated in its conference in London in November 2005. The Italian PRC had until then been the connecting force between EL and EACL but was now conspiciously absent. Evidently, the EL project is more attractive. And since the PCR became part of the Prodi government in May 2006 and Fausto Bertinotti was elected President of the Italian Parliament, he is quite likely to have problems dealing with formations who challenge the anti - terrorist consent of the EU and whose behaviour towards Islamic fundamentalists is ambivalent. It may well be that Trotskyites are in the process of repeating their old historic experience : Their political revolutionary intention cannot make up for a lack in numbers. 18 Manuel Kellner. In : Junge Welt, 11 June 2003.

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Maoists

The “Mao - Zedong Thought” centering around the “protracted people’s war” has more and more become a phenomenon of third world countries. But it also there it has either lost attractiveness or it has been substituted by much more powerful Islamic fundamentalist movements. There are still important Maoist tendencies not only propagating but waging “people’s war :” in Nepal, in the Philippines, and – rather latently – in India. There, security experts judge the numerous groups and fractions of Maoist “Naxalites” to be a severe danger.19 In Europe, Maoism is an obsolescent model. There are a few European formations of perceptible size, for example the Belgian Parti du Travail de Belgique – PTB / Partij van de Arbeit van Belgie – PvdA with almost 3 000 members, or the German “Marxistisch - Leninistische Partei Deutschlands” ( MLPD ) with a little over 2 000 supporters. But they are very isolated. But Maoist impulses are to be found amongst migrants to European countries, making this phenomenon a form of imported extremism in a double sense. Three globally operating Maoist formations are also visible in Europe, even if only to extremely limited degrees.

4.1

“Revolutionary Internationalist Movement” ( RIM ) and “World Peoples’ Resistance Movement” ( WPRM )

RIM and WPRM are without a doubt the two ideologically strictest Maoist umbrella organisations. RIM started out in 1984 as the international organization to support the Peruvian “Partido comunista del Peru – Por el Sendero Luminoso de Carlos Maria Mariátegui” ( PCP / SL ). After Sendero - leader Abimael Guzman Reynoso20 had been captured in 1992, the Peruvian party step by step lost the leadership of RIM after the splitting off of factions because of disagreements regarding proper strategy and tactics. Evidently, the predominant organization within RIM is presently the “Communist Party of Nepal ( Maoist ).” Its internet homepage welcomes the visitor with “Long live the Marxism - Leninism - Maoism and Prachanda Path.” Prachanda, a teacher and chairman of the KPN ( M ), had begun a murderous guerilla war against the royalist government in 1986 in which about 13,000 people were killed.21 In Mid - May 2006, after a peaceful people’s movement had made the royal family abdicate, the Maoists declared their renunciation of violence and entered a coalition government in November 19 Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung ( NZZ ), 15 September 2004. 20 In October 2006, Guzman was sentenced for life. Cf. NZZ, 16 October 2006. His first adjudication in 1992 had been annulled in 2003, due to faulty legal procedures. Since 1980 more than 30,000 people in Peru have become victims of Sendero’s terrorism. 21 As for brutality and disrespect of human dignity, Parachanda’s Maoists were equal to their Peruvian role models. Their specialities were mass attacks on police and military posts. The first wave of attackers only served as backstop until the attacked had emptied their magazines. Maoists normally take no prisoners.

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2006. Approximately 25,000 Maoist combatants were disarmed under international supervision.22 RIM does not appear on the political scene any longer as the core organization. In 2004 it had celebrated its 20th anniversary : “RIM’s own understanding of its revolutionary ideology has advanced, especially with the adoption of Marxism - Leninism - Maoism.” This term was said to have substituted the former one of “Mao Zedong Thought.” Still, its attractiveness seems to have dwindled. In 1984 the list of “participating members” names 20 organizations, five of them European. In 2004 the number had shrunk to 14, with only one from Europe.23 From the beginning, though, the 1,000 members US - American “Revolutionary Communist Party” ( RCP ) has been a RIM - member. Since the 1999 “Battle of Seattle” RCP has been the organizational centre of the violent segments of the anti - globalization movement in the USA. It has created a whole wreath of campaign organizations and has pursued similar activities against the intervention in Iraq. RIM has evidently screened this new potential very carefully. It participated in the extremist “Mumbai Resistance 2004” which took place parallel to the “World Social Forum 2004” in India. However, it no longer appeared under its own name24 but rather through a “mass organization” which it controlled, namely the “World Peoples’ Resistance Movement” ( WPRM ). As the “Committee of RIM” declared at the end of 2003, the affiliation is quite evident: “While we should try to develop mass organisations, including those we are leading such as WPRM, or playing an active role such as in MR - 2004, we should be careful not to see these organisations as substituting for our independent communist work.”25 But the project seems to lack attraction. The appeals to establish it keep continuing. Contact addresses in Columbia and Bangladesh, in Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Switzerland are currently published. In Germany there are contact points in Berlin, Magdeburg, Hamburg, Munster / Westfalia, Thuringia, Frankfurt / Main, Munich and Cologne. Just like the German section of RIM, the “Revolutionären Kommunisten” ( Revolutionary Communists ) in former days, WPRM - activists tend to act violently and provocatively towards other left - wing extremists.

4.2

“International League for Peoples’ Struggle” ( ILPS )

The ILPS was founded in Zutphen ( Netherlands ) on May 25–27, 2001. It is clearly moulded by the Maoist “Communist Party of the Philippines” ( CPP ) whose exiled leadership has resided in the Dutch city of Utrecht since 1987. 22 Cf. NZZ, 12 July 2006, 27 July 2006 and 9 November 2006. 23 Cf. http ://cpnm.org / new / RIM_index.htm, 4 April 2007. 24 The RIM Homepage is only accessible through that of CPN ( M ). The RIM bulletin of long standing “A World to Win” was last published in 2005. 25 http ://www.awtw.org / current_issues / co_rim_on_tactics.htm, 4 April 2007.

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339 delegates of 218 organizations from 40 countries are said to have participated in the foundation of this “mass organization.” An “International Coordinating Group” (10 members ) is placed over the “International Coordinating Committee” (24 members ). In its self - portrayal this “anti - imperialist and democratic formation” characterizes itself as a mass movement “not subordinate to any political party, government or religion.”26 This statement certainly seems questionable. CPP - chairman José Maria Sison carries the modest title of an ILPS “general consultant”. But the various executive committees with their impressive titles are manned by numerous CPP functionaries. Originally, ILPS had been intended to be a common project of CPP and the German MLPD. Since the 1990s it had been planned as an “international battle organization fighting for liberation.” Both parties had been sister parties on most cordial terms since 1991. Still, it seems as if they had not been able to agree on the leadership of this new “mass organization.” Originally the founding conference was to take place in Duisburg ( Germany ), but then it was relocated and the contact address of ILPS moved to Utrecht. The MLPD contented itself with an observer status. After the EU had put CPP on the list of terrorist organizations, the MLPD once again consolidated with their Philippine comrades who in turn keep cooperating in another formation controlled by MLPD. In the Philippines, the CPP has been leading a “protracted people’s war” and has not shied away from cooperating with Islamic fundamentalist groups. It is by no means harmless : It is said to have killed up to 1,000 “dissenters” in the course of an internal cleansing in the mid - 1980s.27 In Europe ILPS has remained but a proclamation. One of the forefront organizations of the Maoist Turkish TKP / ML had attempted the foundation of a European coordinating committee in November, 2005. The few appearances of ILPS in Europe usually demonstrate the migrant background of its activists.

4.3

“International Conference of Marxist - Leninist Parties and Organisations” ( ICMLPO )

ICMLPO is a long time project of MLPD. Since 1988 it has assembled “fraternal organizations” at international conferences every few years. There is no stable membership but a “joint coordinating committee” whose chairman – at least until 1999 – was MLPD chairman Stefan Engel. The activities of ICMLPO presumably consist of the repetition of the formal procedure of proposal, ideologic exegesis and adoption of resolutions concerning the development of the imperialist world, the situation of the international working class, strategy and tactics of “true” revolutionaries, and the prepara26 Homepage of the ILPS, http ://www.ilps - news.com / about - ilps / html, 4 March 2007. “MR - 2004” means “Mumbai Resistance 2004.” 27 Cf. the report of Rainer Werning, journalist with sympathies for Maoists. In : analyse und kritik, no. 362, 12 January 1994.

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481

tion of the next conference. Among the preconditions for participation are “adherence to Marxism - Leninism and Mao Zedong - Thought and their creative application in the conduct of the class struggle in each country” and “the struggle against modern revisionism and a positive attitude towards Stalin and Mao.”28 29 parties or formations from 26 countries participated in the 8th IC in summer 2004 : Besides the MLPD there were Maoists from France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Norway, and Turkey.29 This formation is no longer completely homogeneous, however. Typical thus for the new cooperation between Maoists is the following : The French formation referred to the goals of Islamist fundamentalists as contradictory of every communist ideal, therefore refusing unconditional solidarity with the Iraqi terrorist “resistance,” praised to have “achieved unity by overcoming ethnic and religious differences.”30 The Philippine CPP required the appraisal of two Indian terrorist Maoist formations belonging to RIM. Another Indian participant, the “Communist Party of India / ML – Red Flag,” contradicted and accused the competitors of being “petty bourgeois anarchist groups pursuing extreme sectarian lines.”31 The MLPD, in turn, started to disassociate itself carefully from an all too open approval of terrorism in criticising the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso and the Nepalese “CPN ( Maoist ).” Even though “the Basis of the International Conference of Marxist - Leninist Parties and Organisations involves a positive attitude to armed struggle,” it criticised “sweeping and uncritical support :” “Not every armed struggle can be considered a people’s war on the basis of MarxismLeninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”32

4.4

Conclusion

Internationally, the Maoist movement presents itself as a predominantly third world phenomenon. Its European branches are almost all insignificant splinter groups. Furthermore, they draw a considerable number of their supporters from the migrant scene. In comparison with Islamic fundamentalist terror, their threat has been moved to the background. On the other hand, there is no comprehension of the nature of Islamist fundamentalism amongst Maoist organizations with their dog28 Resolution no. 4 of the 8th IC. In : International Newsletter, no. 30, 3 February 2005. Cf. http ://www.icmlpo.de, 3 February 2005. 29 Among the long - time members : “Organisation Communiste Marxiste - Leniniste Voie prolétarienne” ( France ), “Comitati die Appoggio alla Resistenza – per il Comunismo” ( CARC, Italy ), “Kommunistische Organisation Luxemburgs” ( Luxemburg ), “Groep Marxisten - Leninisten / Rode Morgen” ( Netherland ), “Arbeidernes Kommunist Parti / Marxist - Leninist” – AKP / ML ( Norway ). 30 Resolution no. 5 of the 8th IC. In : International Newsletter, no. 30, 3 February 2005. Cf. http ://www.icmlpo.de, 3 February 2005. 31 International Newsletter, no. 30, 3 February 2005. 32 Resolution no. 5 of the 8th IC.

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matic, polarized view of the World. It is taken as an “anti - imperialist ally” more often than as an antithesis of socialist - communist ideas of progress. The Western “Global War on Terror” quite correctly put several Maoist organisations on the list of terrorist organizations. But this led to broader solidarity within this scene where in former days even the most unimportant ideologic questions had made for deadly enemies. Double memberships and alliances have become possible. The Philippine CPP is a good example : It supports Indian parties which are members of RIM, organizes its own umbrella organization and regularly participates in the conferences organized by the MLPD. Apart from the outcome of the astonishing change of the Nepalese CPN (Maoist ), the endlessly splintered scene of up to 150 “Communist Parties of India ( ML )” carries the significant potential in Maoist violence. At least 40 of these Indian formations are acutely ready to use violence or to try to lead a “protracted peoples’ war” following Maoist examples. The two most dangerous ones merged into the “Communist Party of India ( Maoist )” in October 2004. They belong to RIM. Within Indian security forces there exists the fear that it may be a more serious threat to the subcontinent than Al Qaeda.33

33 Cf. NZZ, 15 September 2004 and 19 July 2006. Between 2004 and 2006 the number of mostly civil victims of the “People’s War” of the “CPI ( Maoist )” and for example the “CPI ( Janashakti )” belonging to IMCPLO has roughly quadrupled.

Trade Unions and Communism in Spain, France, and Italy Dominique Andolfatto For a long time, privileged relations – often called “transmission belt” – have existed between communist parties and trade union organizations : PCF ( French Communist Party ) and CGT ( General Confederation of Labor ) in France, PCI ( Italian Communist Party ) and CGIL ( Italian General Confederation of Labor ) in Italy, PCE ( Spanish Communist Party ) and CCOO ( Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions ) in Spain, PCP ( Portuguese Communist Party ) and CGTP ( General Confederation of Portuguese Workers ) in Portugal. Privileged relations also existed between the FGTB ( General Labor Federation of Belgium ) and, singularly, its Confederation of Public Services ( CGSP / ACOD1) with Belgian communists.2 Until 1990, these relations had been more concealed in the Federal Republic of Germany, due to the division of Germany and the prohibition of the CP in the West. But militants of the DGB ( Confederation of German Trade Unions ), particularly of the IG Metall ( Metalworkers’ Federation) – representing the left - wing of the DGB – participated in communist networks. Without statutory bonds, these political and union organizations shared their ideology, agenda, and even their leadership. The role of the trailblazer was assigned to the party, according to the Leninist concept of the division of assignments. The development of this model depended on the particular country. In Italy and Spain, for example, the respective communist parties begin to dissociate themselves from the international communist system, to emancipate themselves from Moscow, and rally around a more liberal concept of democracy. Consequently, the “transmission belt” between the party and the trade union ceased to exist. Both of them became bodies autonomous in their respective spheres. We need to take into account the general decline of CPs. In France the CGT had to leave the orbit of the PCF to evade the maelstrom of its collapse. Circumstances induced this development much more than political choice. Due to this lack of a choice, some members are regretful and even nostalgic of a glo1 2

Générale des Services Publics / Algemene Centrale der Openbare Diensten ( General Confederation of Public Services ). At the international level, privileged relations also existed with the World Federation of Trade Unions ( WFTU ). For example, the CGSP opposed the Czech government’s decision to expel the WFTU ( its head office had been in Prague until 1991). In the 1990s the CGSP cultivated close ties with Cuba.

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rified and romanticized past enlightened and illuminated by the “flame” of communism. Finally, these singular bonds between CPs and trade unions are reconsidered for national reasons inducing a major renewal of the organizational culture and the political positioning of certain organizations. The questions of the construction or reconstruction of a democratic system, of the condemnation of political violence, and, of course, of the development of the integration into the European community explain why the Italian CGIL and the Spanish workers’ commissions turned away quite early from the communist illusion. They converted with more realism – or maybe pragmatism – and finally chose a social democratic model. The communists have always defined themselves against this model and still do so in order to consolidate and strengthen their identity. The French CGT chose a different way. It remained close to the PCF and depended on it for ideological references as well as for its agenda and management.3 But from the early 1980s on the dissociation of the party threatened the trade union organization. Between 1980 and 1985 the official membership collapsed and the CGT lost one third of its members.4 It had to attempt to break this spiral of decline. By its new course the CGT officially dissociated itself from the PCF. However, this development is very moderate, if not dubious. But it restored CGT identity and succeeded in stopping the hemorrhage of its membership in the 1990s. These introductory elements enable the introduction of two models of development of “trade union - parties”, consisting of the CPs and the trade unions depending on them in three Romance countries in Europe. On the one hand, in Spain and Italy the trade union - parties were dissolved voluntarily and helped create – or consolidate – a democratic political system and an economy open to the world. On the other hand, in France the trade union - party “PCGT” existed longer before dissolving – officially. But militant networks, memory, and myths resisted. They even got their revenge on the “enforced” history of the end of the 20th century at the referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on May 29th, 2005. To some extent, PCF and CGT were responsible for the success of the “No” - vote. During the campaign many of their members made this vote their common cause. This essay focuses mainly on the French, Italian, and Spanish cases. After introducing some historical and sociological data it underlines how – according to the respective national context –trade unions differ in key topics depending on their sociological and political environment. This enables us to analyze and compare the development in Italy and Spain with that in France. The French case is somewhat emphasized because the autonomy of the party and the trade 3

4

In his autobiography, Bernard Thibault, secretary general of the CGT since 1999, confirms that the membership card of PCF was – and, sometimes, still is – a key to gain access to the management of the organization. See : Thibault, Ma voix ouvrière, pp. 45–46. See : Development of CGT membership at the end of this contribution.

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485

union has remained a topic of dispute. Certain ambiguities also persist in Italy and Spain, but the break between parties and trade unions seems clearer. Finally, parallels can be detected between France and Germany where communists and trade union networks co - operated during the Cold War. The foundation of the Linkspartei marked the attempt to revive this network.

I.

Four Cleavages, two Models

History, the question of the unity of trade unions, relations with the political power, and international positioning show various cleavages between CGT, CGIL, and CCOO. They are decisive for two evolutionary “trade union - party” models characteristic of the communist universe. 1.

Distinctive History

Founded in 1895, CGT has remained the biggest French trade union. However, it has had to face a serious loss of membership.5 From over 2 million members in 1975, CGT membership officially dropped to 700,000 in 2004 ( including 600,000 active employees ). For about 10 years its strength has been quite stagnating – but the peak of decline seems to be overcome. The CGIL was created in 1906.6 Like the CGT, it had initially been an anarchist formation. Later, the communists endeavored to seize control over it. Under fascist rule, the trade union was prohibited and re - founded clandestinely. During liberation, it asserted itself as the most important Italian trade union while being controlled by the PCI. Since 1947 the PCF gained control of the French CGT in the same manner.7 In 2005 the CGIL counts 5.5 million members ( including 3 million retired people and 2.5 million active employees ).8 Between 1980 and 1990 the CGIL also suffered from a decline of its membership. But proportionally it is twice less important than the losses of the CGT at that time. The CGIL loses one third of its active members, while two thirds leave the CGT. Furthermore, for a few years the CGIL has claimed to have regained members. The Spanish Workers’ Commissions ( CCOO ) are not as old as CGT and CGIL. Their history is also different, even though there are some parallels to the CGIL. The first Workers’ Commissions were founded in the mines of Asturias in the late 1950s, and then developed in the 1960s. Initially, they were 5 6 7 8

On the history of the CGT, see : Andolfatto / Labbé, Histoire des syndicats 1906–2006. On CGIL, see the chapter about Italy written by Adelheid Hege and Catherine Sauviat in : IRES, Syndicalismes, pp. 251–320. For a comparative approach, see : Cella, Il sindacato. See : Andolfatto / Labbé, Histoire des syndicats 1906–2006, pp. 254–272. See : Development of membership of CGIL at the end of the paper.

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Dominique Andolfatto

Chart 1 : CGT Membership, 1945–2006

Source : Andolfatto / Labbé, La CGT, p. 224 ( and CGT congresses in 1999, 2002, and 2006).

clandestine – and dispersed – because Francism did not permit trade union organizations independent of the political power and – a fortiori –controlled by the PCE which was also prohibited. The representatives of the CCOO were finally tolerated by the Franco government within the wage commissions under the condition that they confined to purely corporative action. They developed within the pro - Franco vertical trade unions. The Workers’ Commissions thus learned to exist publicly without ever mentioning their relations with the PCE. After the end of Francism in 1975 the Workers’ Commissions were able to act and appear in public. They are important as the first Spanish trade union confederation.9 Still, they suffered from a decline of their membership in the 1980s but regained some members in the 1990s.10 In 2004 their official membership is 950,000. At the 2003 trade union elections they were supported by 38.9 % of the Spanish employees.11 9

Information – and data – on CCOO are excerpted from documents of the CCOO congress ( Spain ) and the IRES Chroniques Internationales ( Noisy - le - Grand, France ). For contact to the PCE see : Fernandez, Cambio y adaptacion en la izquierda, esp. chapter 7: “La estrategia del PCE e iu hacia CCOO”, pp. 280–318). 10 At the first public CCOO congress the Workers’ Commissions claimed 1.8 million members. At the beginning of the 1990s membership had dropped to 600,000, but they won new members later ( for details, see the end of this paper ). 11 Information provided by the 8th National Congress of the CCOO, Madrid, April 21–24, 2004.

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Table 1 : Members of CGT and CGIL, 1980–2005 ( official data and development ) CGT (members)12

CGT CGIL (index) (members)13

CGIL (index)

1980

1 918 954

100

3 484 004

100

1981

1 925 432

99

3 387 040

97

1982

1 721 463

90

3 266 816

94

1983

1 622 095

85

3 134 011

90

1984

1 381 478

72

3 030 323

87

1985

1 237 925

65

2 939 370

84

1986

1 106 543

58

2 825 273

81

1987

1 030 843

54

2 768 384

79

1988

918 473

48

2 733 017

78

1989

818 294

43

2 717 567

78

1990

829 000

43

2 724 802

78

1991

636 670

33

2 706 214

78

1992

637 878

33

2 641 782

76

1993

639 371

33

2 528 565

73

1994

640 606

33

2 455 630

70

1995

647 019

34

2 387 267

69

1996

654 720

34

2 334 184

67

1997

641 992

33

2 288 141

66

1998

642 253

33

2 303 653

66

1999

664 083

35

2 327 954

67

2000

670 218

35

2 341 743

67

2001

663 067

35

2 372 705

68

2002

682 031

36

2 413 554

69

2003

685 136

36

2 448 074

70

2004

711 049

37

2 478 367

71

2005

–

–

2 510 691

72

Sources : CGT and CGIL; for the CGIL results before 1997 information was excerpted from: Rehfeldt, Italie. In : Chronique internationale de l’IRES, no. 52 May 1998, p. 8.

12 Including 18–20 % pensioners. 13 Results without pensioners.

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Dominique Andolfatto

Table 2 : CCOO Members 1993–2004 ( official results and index evolution ) CCOO CCOO (members) (index)

CGT (index)

CGIL14 (index)

1993

654 000

100

100

100

1995

698 000

107

101

94

1998

713 000

109

100

91

1999

750 000

115

104

92

2000

800 000

122

105

93

2001

850 000

130

104

94

2002

890 000

136

107

95

2003

930 000

142

107

97

2004

970 000

148

111

98/10515

Sources : CCOO, 8th Congress of Madrid, 21–24 April 2004, CGT, CGIL, EIRO ( European Industrial Relations Observatory ).

Two different situations can be distinguished by historical milestones. For quite a long period CGIL and CCOO had been confronted with political regimes of fascist nature. They survived going underground. After the re - establishment of pluralist democracy both organizations enjoyed wide popular support. The CGT had experienced only a relatively short period of clandestineness during the “Vichy regime” (1940–1944). Obviously, its integration into the system, its institutionalization and participation in the system of industrial relationships occurred earlier than that its fellow unions. In the 1980s the CGT had to face the phenomenon of “de - unionization” and the crisis of dwindling membership. Therefore, the historical and social dynamics of the CGT have shifted compared to those of the CGIL and the CCOO. The “integration” of the CGT into the system has not prevented conflicts. In a way, its institutionalization provided the resources for the CGT to let myth, namely the communist illusion, win over reality – or at least coexist with it. Paradoxically, where pluralist democracy has existed the longest, the communist “ecosystem” has best succeeded in surviving even though it has had to adapt and to put itself to the test. When communism collapses, the CGT has to “pay for” its longer alignment with the PCF with the accelerated decline of its membership as well as the degradation and marked polarization of its public image.

14 Results without pensioners. 15 Index 98 without pensioners who constitute more than 50 % of the membership. Index 105 includes pensioners.

489 Trade Unions and Communism in Spain, France, and Italy

Chart 2 : Turnover of the management of PCF ( central committee ) and turnover of the management of CGT ( executive commission ), 1945/46–2006 (% of the seats changed at the congress )

Source : Dominique Andolfatto.

490 2.

Dominique Andolfatto

Fragmentation or Unity of Unions

After 1977 the CGT ended every unity of action with other trade unions. Instead, it aligned closely with the decisions of the PCF concerning the reorganization of the iron and the steel industry. At the international level the CGT refused to condemn the USSR for invading Afghanistan and the proclamation of the state of war in Poland. ( Timid changes can be detected in the late 1990s.) This positioning marks the beginning of internal commotions benefitting the “hardest line”. It links up with the “re - sovietization” of the PCF at that time.16 In contrast, in the 1970s the CGIL favors the unity of action with the two other Italian trade unions, namely the Christian CSIL ( Italian Confederation of Workers’ Trade Unions ) and the socialist UIL ( Italian Union of Labor ). Disagreement on the flexible salary scale, internal differences with the CGIL – between communists and socialists – result in tensions between the unions in the mid - 1980s. But in 1989, facing the need for reforms of the macroeconomic type, their alliance is re - activated to influence the political agenda and support a “more cooperative and consensual” trade union model.17 Since the 1980s the Workers’ Commissions ( CCOO ), too, have moved closer to the second big Spanish trade union, UGT ( General Union of Workers ) which is close to the PSOE ( Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party ). The two trade unions even call several general strikes against the policy of deregulation of the labor market planned by Felipe Gonzalez’s government. But this unity of action cannot prevent certain reforms. The Workers’ Commissions fail with their strategy of total confrontation with the government. This experience shall later promote their openness to reformism. National idiosyncrasies need to be taken into account. But ideological convictions – or orthodoxy –on the one hand, openness and unity on the other, contribute to explain the different dynamism of the CGT and CGIL and CCOO. 3.

Relationship with Political Power

The same cleavage characterizes the relationship of those three organizations with political power. On one hand, the CGT traditionally favors confrontation with the government. However, the degree of this preference seems to depend on the respective government. Thus, in the early 1980s, after the left had come to power – and in particular with communists in government – the CGT curtailed their claims so as not to embarrass the ( communist ) “comrades ministers”. After the communists had left government in 1984 the CGT’s vindictive inflexibility increased once again. But this toughening stance was controversial, 16 See Courtois / Lazar, Histoire du parti communiste français. 17 Hege / Sauviat, Italy. In : IRES, Syndicalismes, p. 251 and pp. 305–310.

Trade Unions and Communism in Spain, France, and Italy

491

indicating that the organization was not as monolithic as it might have seemed.18 In the second half of the 1980s the union was dominated by two more or less opposite tendencies : one proposing the union of ideology and action with the PCF ( in particular against the socialists ), the other trying to promote a more autonomous way. For a long time, the CGI and the Workers’ Commissions had also opposed the ruling powers. But then they changed radically. What did cause this change and lead to a strategy of negotiating “social pacts” with the respective governments and the employers in the 1980s and especially 1990s ? In Italy and Spain the trade unions had decided to accept a certain responsibility and act pragmatically in order to stabilize the democratic balance of power and help consolidate the political systems being established or under pressure. This way, they also supported the European integration of their countries. The CGIL reacted primarily against the political violence and terrorism erupting in Italy after 1968. Because of this terrorism, the CGIL changed its attitude towards “fights” and chose purely political forms of action ( under remote control by the Communist Party ). After Aldo Moro’s assassination the trade unions – and the PCI – even decided to support the government coalition’s efforts to “re - legitimize the state”.19 In the 1990s the CGIL once again played a key role when the Italian “partitocracy” imploded and corruption shook the foundations of the political system. It was also a central actor when structural reforms – of the economic as well as the monetary system – were indispensable for Italy to integrate into the “Euro zone”. These were the key elements of the “social pacts” negotiated by the trade unions since 1992. The recent history of Spain is quite comparable. In the second half of the 1970s the Workers’ Commissions supported the consolidation of the young Spanish democracy and its European integration. Therefore, they embraced a certain reformism and made a compromise with the ruling powers, in particular with the PSOE, solidly in power during the 1980s. This development was promoted by Marcelino Camacho, member of the central committee of PCE and veteran of the Civil War. Under his direction, the Workers’ Commissions even became true supporters of market economy. This change resulted in several “social pacts” in the 1990s. These pacts in turn paved the way for the reform of the retirement system ( Pact of Toledo, 1995), of the regulation of collective industrial action. In exchange for more flexibility, special emphasize was laid on employment and health and safety at work (1997). In France nothing the like occurred. Even if dialogue between trade unions and government existed, any form of cooperation was ruled out. Each union preferred lobbying for its own clientele. Furthermore, meetings were rarely conducted together. Each organization discussed with the government separately. The support of jointly devel18 See the interviews of ex - CGT leaders in : Labbé / Derville, La syndicalisation en France. 19 See Lazar, Maisons rouges; Sommier, La violence politique et son deuil.

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oped projects was out of the question. Collective action was strictly negative : opposition to government projects ( for example, the reform of the retirement of civil servants in 2003, or the “first contract of employment” in 2006). The French trade unions, and particularly the CGT, completely disregard the strategy of social pacts which is so typical of neighboring countries. And collective negotiations of industrial sectors or companies, and their agendas are generally enforced by trade associations.20 4.

International Relations

The Workers’ Commissions were initially dependant on the PCR. Still, they never joined the WFTU ( World Federation of Trade Unions ), the former trade union International controlled by Moscow. Quite the contrary, after 1973 the CCOO voiced their interests in the ETUC ( European Trade Union Confederation ) which unites trade unions not supporting the WFTU. The ETUC and its members belong to the ICFTU ( International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ) which is the counterpart of the WFTU. ETUC members work for a social Europe, especially within the European community built since the 1950s. Because of the opposition of the big social democratic unions, but also of the Spanish UGT, the ETUC delayed the admission of the Workers’ Commissions until 1990. The Italian CGIL joined the ETUC in 1974. It kept criticizing the mode of operation of the WFTU which it left in 1978. The CGIL also became a member of the ICFTU in 1991. Within the ETUC the Workers’ Commissions and the CGIL affirmed their faith in Europe. But they did not show the same enthusiasm of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe supported by the ETUC and adopted in 2004. The CGIL acted cautiously and finally accused the ETUC of a lack of initiative at the European level.21 In view of the Spanish referendum on the Treaty, the secretary general of the Workers’ Commissions, José Maria Fidalgo, insisted that the Treaty offered three major advantages for trade unionism, namely more Europe, more democratic institutions, and better conditions to build a social Europe.22 The Workers’ Commissions also released a common document with the UGT and the ETUC supporting the European project.23 The CGT approaches the international level in a completely different way. In the 1970s it had tried to open up at the national as well as at the international level and attempted to dissociate from the WFTU. But it enacted a massive drawback, ignoring all indications of geopolitical change. Henri Krasucki, secretary general of the CGT and member of the PCF politburo, even became WFTU vice20 See Labbé / Nezosi, Négociation collective, paritarisme et démocratie sociale. In : Andolfatto ( Ed.), Les syndicats en France, pp. 111–138. 21 But the CGIL supported the Treaty. See CGIL, Riprogettare il paese, p. 3. 22 Cf. Le Monde, Feb. 19, 2005. 23 “Mas Europa”, CCOO – UGT – ETUC, Feb. 14, 2005.

Trade Unions and Communism in Spain, France, and Italy

493

president in the 1980s. He often visited communist countries until they collapsed. After this turn of history the CGT membership of the WFTU appeared anachronistic and problematic. The French trade union was isolated in Europe as well as internationally. After a long period of hesitation and internal debates, the CGT decided to leave the WFTU at its 1995 congress – four years after the end of the USSR. This reaction was clearly slow. Finally in 1999, the CGT joined the ETUC – much later than its European counterparts.24 But in 2005 it broke away from them, once again opposing the Treaty establishing a European constitution. One part of its elite still voiced their support of the Treaty, especially Joël Decaillon, its representative at the ETUC executive board. According to Decaillon, the Treaty constituted “a basis of social standards and political rights from which trade unions and social movements could depart to state their claims.”25 Other CGT leaders, most notably Bernard Thibault, its secretary general, recommended a neutral position, which also meant a clear break with the conception of relations within Europe. But the most powerful federations, namely the Federation of Mines and Energy and of the Railway, followed neither of the two. They demanded to oppose the Treaty and imposed the “No” as the official position of the CGT for the French referendum.26

II.

Relationship with the Communist Party

The key to the explanation of the cleavages presented above is to be found in the different developments of the relationship between the three trade union organizations and the respective communist parties. But the nature of the latter has also changed. The Italian and Spanish situations clearly differ from the French one. 1.

The Emancipation of the CGIL and the Workers’ Commissions

The Italian and Spanish trade unionists had emancipated themselves from the PCI and the PCE before the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was a voluntary and well planned step. In Italy this implied the choice of reformism and social democracy. It was also important to reform the Italian political system. In the early 1980s the Workers’ Commissions realized the extent of the collapse of the PCE in Spain. Contrary to declining communism, professional trade union action seemed to have a future. Therefore, this prospect was to be preferred to political militancy. 24 Even the Portuguese CGT – largely controlled by communists – had joined the ETUC earlier (in 1994). 25 Paper published in Le Monde, Nov. 16, 2004 ( also signed by Daniel Retureau, another member of the CGT staff ). 26 The national confederate committee ( CCN ), the collective management of the CGT, decided this on Feb. 5, 2005. Cf. Le Peuple, February 2006.

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For a correct evaluation of the development of the relationship between the PCI and the CGIL we need to go back to the “hot autumn” of 1969. According to Marc Lazar, at that time the PCI as well as the trade union confederations were flooded with “a new basis of workers with low qualification and little political experience, influenced by the extreme left”.27 The trade unions freed themselves from political supervision and even attempted to play their own political role, thus challenging the special relations between the PCI and the CGIL. We have already underlined that the great unions moved closer and decided to establish the unity of action. But this alliance between the unions did not threaten the exclusive bonds with the PCI. At the same time, the CGIL adopts modes of action rejecting every form of violence ( such as picket lines ). This contributes to its economic and political integration but also promotes the trade unionists’ new comprehension of social relations. In 1978 the EUR agreements ( the trade unions moderate wage claims and accept flexibility in exchange for structural reform ) underline this evolution, leading the trade unions to support a government coalition of national unity. Thus, the CGIL gradually develops into a social democratic model. The unity of trade unions strongly legitimizes this. The break with the PCI is unavoidable. After the failure of the communist regimes it is definitive. At its 1990 congress the CGIL dissolved its internal communist tendency in order to definitely overcome the Cold War. More generally, the CGIL shows its independence of any political formation. Still, the majority of its members remain close to the PDS, the former PCI transformed into a social democratic formation in 1990, then to the DS ( Left Democracy ). A minority merged with the PRC ( Communist Re foundation Party ) which united communists being hostile towards the transformation into the PDS ( later DS ) and adhering to communist ideology. By the way, the PRC was founded by CGIL militants in 1991. Its chairman Fausto Bertinotti is a former union leader. Presently, the communists are a minority within the CGIL, representing approximately 20 % of the vote at a congress. But they control militant groups such as “Cambiare Rotta”. They also preserve considerable influence of the Italian political system, as proven by the election of Fausto Bertinotti as President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies in spring 2006. Bertinotti was invited to deliver a speech at the 15th CGIL congress in March 2006. He used this occasion to criticize the “contractual” line of Gugliemo Epifani, secretary general of the CGIL, and stressed the importance of wages.28 A minority within the CGIL which is not to be neglected remains faithful to communism and is attached to Fausto Bertinotti’s PRC. And in the 1990s the “Cobas” reinforced grass root trade unions which were typical of some sectors such as transport and education. Most of their leaders are former trade unionists from the CGIL, strongly opposed to reformism and the moderation of demands. 27 Lazar, Maisons rouges. 28 Le reazioni di politici e sindicalisti, Rassegna sindacale, no. 2, March 2006.

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In the 1990s, together with the CISL and the UIL, the CGIL proved to be one of the pillars of the Italian political and social system, in some cases even mitigating the shortcomings of political power and contributing to Italy’s evolution into a form of consociative democracy. This evolution is represented especially by the tripartite social pacts negotiated by trade unions, employers and the Italian government in 1993 ( the abandonment of the flexible salary scale to compensate for inflation ), 1996, and 1998. These “pacts” enabled the Italian political system to regenerate after the collapse of Christian Democracy in the early 1990s, and the discredit affecting other political formations, too. They also enabled Italy to conform to the economic criteria prescribed by the Treaty of Maastricht for accession to the European single currency, which had initially seemed impossible. Thus, the CGIL – reformist, united with the other trade unions, and with its more than 5 million members29 – plays a key role with these changes. The PRC denounces this development as a form of corporatism, even of “Peronism”, and even a challenge of parliamentarism. The right - wing parties gathered around Silvio Berlusconi share this criticism. However, at the end of the 1990s conflicts developed between the CGIL and the government of Massimo d’Alema, another former communist leader. In order to revive the economy, he planned to limit union rights to companies of more than 15 employees. At the beginning of the new millennium there was disagreement among the “oligopoly” of CGIL – CISL – UIL. But from 2002 on the common opposition to Silvio Berlusconi makes the old allies close ranks again. In 2004 DS member Sergio Cofferati, secretary general of the CGIL until 2002, was elected mayor of Bologna. For some time he even appeared to become Silvio Berlusconi’s main competitor. But the former trade union leader prefers the administration of a city to a political position at the national level. But not just any city : It is the old communist stronghold of Bologna. Thus, in spite of growing indifference towards or even rejection of communism, a certain cultural closeness appears to remain even beyond the existence of a communist party. Thus, communists breaking with the former PCI have scattered across many sectors of Italy. In the companies many grass root militants also remain shaped by the communism. But the younger generation is less politicized.30 In Spain the development of the CCOO did not remain undisputed, either. At the 1996 congress Augusto Moreno convinced a strong minority of 33 % of the membership, the “critical sector”, to remain close to the PCE. At the opening of the 7th Congress in 2000, Antonio Gutierrez, the secretary general of the CCOO, summed up the following development : “For 4 years we have availed

29 Including more than 50 % pensioners. 30 See Dufour / Hege, L’Europe syndicale au quotidien, pp. 153–154.

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ourselves of a model of negotiation without waiting until the government invited us. We designed the pacts ourselves and the results were reasonably positive.”31 At this congress a new secretary general was elected, José Maria Fidalgo. He received 72 % of the vote. A minority remained faithful to communist ideas and close to Izquierda Unida – the Spanish extreme left which the PCE is a part of. In the early 2000s this minority kept growing. José Maria Fidalgo was reelected with only 59 % of the vote at the 2004 congress. He was accused of a certain corporative drift of the organization. The minority reproaches him to be too complacent with the Aznar government. In the same way, the Workers’ Commissions had to reckon with a communist “critical sector” which received about 23 % of the vote at the 2004 congress ( compared to 29 % in 2000). It demands the return to “working class unionism”. It denounces the globalization of economy which the Workers’ Commissions do not reject but attempt to control. The “critical sector” claims to be a part of the PCE and the Izquierda Unida, too. 2.

The Ambivalence of the CGT

The parallelism of the “turnover” of the PCF and CGT directions shows how these two organizations had cultivated one and the same “eco - system” for a long time. Both organizations took their personnel from the same hothouse – namely, the section of the party executives, and shared the same chronology.32 This “turnover” of political and union leaders was important both for the PCF and the CGT at the end of the Second World War. It dropped to rather a low level in the 1950s, indicating the stability of the established teams. In the 1960s the generation of the leaders of the postwar period was gradually substituted. Later the direction of the PCF was barely renewed. It even tried to take up a position of all - round defense in the early 1980s. The CGT developed along the same lines. However, since it was more in tune with social diversity because of its presence in the world of companies, the rotation of its executives appeared always more prevalent than with the PCF. But in the early 1980s this dynamic development came to an end. In the 1990s, intensive renewal of their leading personnel was characteristic for both organizations. The leaders of the Cold War period retire. The CGT needs to manage post - communism, while the PCF has to promote neo - communism. The result was a high degree of instability which was initially typical for the CGT, while the development of the PCF direction occurs more slowly until 2000. In a certain way, the complete turnover which was typical for the last decade of the CGT is also a symbol of its dissociation from the PCF. Suffering from a Quoted after Catherine Vincent, 7e congrès des Commissions ouvrière. In : Chronique internationale de l’IRES, no. 64 May 2000, pp. 39–44. 32 See appendix, chart no. 4.

31

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spectacular loss of membership and electorate, until 2003 the CGT had to compete with a pragmatic CFDT ( French Democratic Confederation of Labor ) mixing the heritage of social Catholicism with democratic socialism as well as with sectoral union organizations. The CGT had to enact its autonomization of the PCF. In fact, surveys regularly show that focusing on the PCF reinforces the image of the confederation. Still, salaried employees appreciate its fighting spirit. Moreover, since the 1980s the exchange of militants with the PCF was no longer able to provide the cadres necessary for the crucial positions. External as well as internal reasons – though more forced than voluntary – justified the emancipation. But this “decoupling” between the two organizations occurred quite late, even though sharp tensions had existed between them in the second half of the 1980s, concerning the agenda of the fight. Everything concerning the teleological dimension of communism, the frame of its theoretical and practical references, its global presence – i.e. the existence of “people’s democracies” and the USSR – were sacrosanct. Thus, in the early 1990s the CGT press often voiced its “disenchantment” after the end of the communist regimes. In endless variations it renounced “tensions”, “agony”, “convulsions”, and “wild capitalism” ... which had taken over the Central European countries. Until then, the same press had shown much understanding – if not durable support – of the communist regimes. In August 1991 the secretary general of the CGT, Henri Krasucki, also played a decisive role for the PCF politburo to neither condemn nor approve of the coup d’état against Mikhail Gorbachev.33 The strategy of autonomization of the PCF truly started in 1995. It was pursued slowly and has even been questioned, if not recently involuted ( in connection with the positioning concerning the project of the Treaty establishing a European constitution ). In fact, even if the CGT direction has seemed to want to innovate social, even political aspects, the influence of communist militants – or since the crisis of communism even left - wing extremists ( in particular Trotskyites ) – remains strong, especially with the unions of civil servants and, more generally, of the civil sector. These innovations were introduced rather late, compared to the Italian and Spanish cases. The withdrawal from the WFTU and the affiliation with the ETUC have already been mentioned. In 1995 CGT also abandoned the principle of the socialization of the means of production and exchange. In 1996 its secretary general Louis Viannet left the PCF politburo. Since his appointment as head of the CGT in 1999 Bernard Thibault has been trying to accelerate this evolution implicating contradictions. In addition, it is difficult to deal with both the “dinosaurs” – faithful adherents to communism – and the “modernists” who call the old communists “anvils” referring to their resistance to change. In the case of social conflicts the trade union leadership is now trying to apply industrial action as well as negotiation. The CGT joined the 33 See Andolfatto, PCF, pp. 100–109.

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ETUC. Since 2005 the CGT seriously considers the membership of the future international trade union combining the ICFTU and the WCL ( World Confederation of Labor, uniting the organizations of Christian origin ) to be founded in 2006. The CGT also continued its official dissociation from the PCF by refusing to openly support the demonstration for jobs organized by the PCF in October 1999. In July 2001 a summit meeting of the CGT and the PCF was held to solve latent conflicts concerning the management of the social dissatisfaction and the respective roles of both actors. It resulted in the publication of a document paying tribute to the “common history” of the two organizations and commemorating the tremendous hopes inspired by the 1917 Russian revolution, the great moments of the workers’ fight of the Popular Front (1936), and the resistance against the Nazis. The events of 1989 are not mentioned. They are only echoed rather negatively by the evocation of a “geopolitical cataclysm at the end of the century”.34 Their analysis – or simply reception – remains ambiguous. In this document the CGT proposes to “re - evaluate” its relations with PCF. But it rejects any accumulation of responsibilities. This results in the secretary general of the CGT abandoning all positions with the PCF leadership. Some few members of the leadership still continue to accumulate trade union and political positions. Going easy on his former communist partner, Bernard Thibault attempts to approach the Socialist Party ( PS ). At the 2002 congress of Dijon he will be triumphantly admitted to the PS. In fact, he tries to widen the political base of the CGT without breaking with the PCF, thus re - animating the union. The PS itself is quite satisfied to join ranks again with the CGT which pursued a different strategy since 1947. The relations between the PS and the CFDT had always been complicated and even deteriorated in the 1990s. Furthermore, the PS and the CGT agree on the primacy of politics, while the CFDT relies on civil society and tries to impose a system of autonomization on the social partners. In spite of the renewed contacts with the PS, three quarters of the CGT leaders in the departments and federations are still PCF members, even if they do not hold important positions within the party anymore. In a book published in 2005 – My Worker’s Voice – the secretary general concedes that the PCF membership has remained essential to be assigned to responsible positions in certain sectors of the CGT.35 In 2005 the debate of the Treaty establishing a European constitution demonstrated the extent of the CGT’s sensitiveness – in spite of the efforts of the last few years – to a political agenda which, in fact, it cannot control. This seems to be dictated by militants – various “conservative”, “orthodox” or “apparatchiks” – preferring political action that reverberates internally or in the media. 34 Communiqué CGT, 17th July 2001. See Andolfatto, PCF, pp. 233–234. 35 Thibault, Ma voix ouvrière, p. 66.

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They have remained close to, if not members of the PCF but also, since the latter’s crisis, of various extreme left - wing organizations, in particular Lutte Ouvrière ( Workers’ Fight ). Balancing the CGT’s socio - political diversity which he has been trying to consolidate, Bernard Thibault at first tried to make the CGT refrain from a formal decision on this treaty ( see above ). The ETUC, which the CGT is a member of, decided in favor of the treaty. One could have left it at that. But the leading elite of the union had different plans : They made this positioning a priority. In February 2005 a vast majority decided to support the nay. This was a serious disavowal of the secretary general and the beginning of an internal crisis. The PCF rejoiced this decision but avoided to challenge the asserted autonomy of the CGT. But the impression prevailed of the two organizations sharing again – and closely – the same action plan and the same ideological perspectives in total ignorance of what really happened at companies and groups. In spring 2005 the realignment of the CGT with the PCF and more generally the extreme left became obvious to everybody except many of its cadres. But basically the twists of the strategy pursued by its secretary general Bernard Thibault since the 1990’s also run up against solid criticism of “orthodox” communists. The latter may still be PCF members or have left the party because of their disagreement with the “mutation” enacted under the aegis of Robert Hue, national secretary of the PCF from 1994 to 2001. One may quote – by way of example – the analysis of the evolution of French trade unionism by two of its “orthodox” tendencies : the “Communist Coordination” and “Shocking Reds” (Rouges vifs ). The Communist Coordination unites one part of the “orthodox” and denounces the “rightist”, “liberal”, “regressive” evolution of the CGT.36 The union is accused of having given up “class struggle”. On the other hand, Communist Coordination supports the conservative tendency “Continue the CGT”, quite a symbolic faction of members being hostile to the new course. Coordination grants it regular access to its newspaper. Harshly criticizing the current CGT, Coordination explains that the difficulties or “renunciations” of the union are less the result of what it is but rather – according to the Leninist view of things – of the “dismissal” of the PCF which does no longer guarantee the “political direction” of the working class. Convinced neither by the “mutation” of the PCF nor by the new course of CGT, the Shocking Reds – assembling former CGT and PCF militants – sought to recapture the characteristic constitution of the culture of the CGT at its “golden age”. These militants lived through their hour of glory at the turn of the millennium. The “communist revival” that they hope for establishes itself by the multiplication of “social movements”, “fights”, and common actions. In the same way, the Shocking Reds renew the discourse of indiscriminate condemnation of governmental action, “employers”, and “capitalist profit”, yet another 36 Gastaud, Essai sur la renaissance communiste, p. 69.

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nostalgic echo of former CGT topics until the 1990s. They consider the anti – globalization and its social forums new vectors of fights which communism must once again grant “coherence and political direction.”37 Obviously, various militant networks – communists or ex - communists – preserve their solid influence within the CGT. PCF membership remains a pledge of conformity, continuing to open many doors in the union. But a turnabout has begun even though its progress is excruciatingly slow. Within the PCF the influence of the CGT - militants remains strong, too. One might even speak of a “unionization”38 of the party which the CGT has provided resources and frameworks for since the 1980s. From this point of view the “transmission belt” has not disappeared but been reversed. Summing up, we must emphasize that in Western Europe the party - trade union model which is typical of the relations between the communist party and a large trade union organization has been challenged since the 1970s. According to the respective national context, this process of deconstruction has been faster or slower and varying in depth. It has not been completely accomplished because communist minorities – often influential – remain within the trade union organizations in question. The crisis of international communism helped reanimate Trotskyite organizations which may dispose of blocking minorities within the trade union federations or other organizations, such as FO ( Workers’ Power) or SUD ( Solidarity, Unity, Democracy ) in France. In turn, these trade union and communist networks can also exercise political influence. The creations of the PCR in Italy or, more recently, of the Linkspartei in Germany are good examples. The latter, created in view of the 2005 federal elections, unites the PDS (East - German ex - communists ), the extreme left of the SPD ( Social Democratic Party ), and the DGB, including ex - communists or communist sympathizers ( in particular IG Metall trade unionists ), and members of the association WASG (Electoral Alternative for Work and Social Justice ).39 If bonds between communism and trade unionism blurred, they are far from having disappeared. There are many remnants in the fields of culture and identity. But there has also been change, as in the case of the CGIL or the Workers’ Commissions.

37 Leaflet of the Shocking Reds ( “Rouges vifs” ), 2000 and 2001. 38 Santamaria, Histoire du Parti communiste français, p. 93. 39 Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit.

( Ex - )Communist Elites and State Capture Patrick Moreau After the collapse of the communist system of power the establishment of democracies has been more or less accomplished.1 The role of the elites and members of the communist parties needs to be analyzed, during the 1989/1990 period of dissolution as well as during the periods of transition and consolidation to follow.2 The initial situation is well known : One single official party controlled the recruitment of elites as well as party members and left a deep imprint on the

1

2

In post - communist Europe some countries remained semi - authoritarian after the 1989/1990 changes. They are characterized by semi - free elections and are called “controlled” or “defective democracies”. See : Croissant / Merkel, Consolidated or Defective Democracy ? In : Democratization, 11 (2004) 5; Merkel et al. ( Eds.), Defekte Demokratie, vol. 2 : Regionalanalysen. Over the last years, the opposition of several countries tried to use semi - free elections to bring about political change often called “revolution” ( for example the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine ). See : Bunce / Wolchik, International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions. In : Communist and Post Communist Studies, 39 (2006), pp. 283–304; Konitzer / Wegren, Federalism and Political Recentralization. In : Publius – The Journal of Federalism, 36 4, pp. 503–522; Kuzio, Civil society, youth and societal mobilization. In : Communist and Post - Communist Studies, 39 (2006), pp. 365–386; McFaul, Transitions from Postcommunism. In: Journal of Democracy 16 (2005) 3, pp. 5–19; Schmitter, External actors in the promotion of democracy and civil society. Paper presented at the ‘Symposium on post - communist social and political conflicts : citizenship and consolidation in new democracies of South East Europe’, Bucharest, 1–3 June, 2007; Simon, Der Wandel autoritärer Systeme. In : Osteuropa, 7 (2006), pp. 79–93; Thompson / Kuntz, Stolen Elections. In : Journal of Democracy, 15(2004) 4, pp. 159–172. In his contribution ‘Three Elites of the Central - East European Democratization’ ( In : Markowski / Wnuk - Lipinski ( Eds.), Transformation Paths.), Jacek Wasilewski distinguishes three phases of social and political change which in turn require three different types of elites and three different types of relations between the elites and the masses. The first phase is that of transition. The elite of this phase needs a vision as well as the will to fulfill a mission. It relates to the masses by symbolic politics. The second phase is that of transformation. This is quite a practical process in the course of which decisions already made need to be implemented. Democracy and market economy are realized. The elite of this transformation is composed of “doers”, men and women of action, the engineers of the new order. Their relation to the masses is characterized by reform politics. The third phase is that of “consolidation” : The new order needs to be stabilized and smoothly operated; society has to get accustomed to and familiar with the new situation. This requires an elite of moderators, integrators, and growth inducers. They relate to the masses by their distributive politics.

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whole civil society.3 The mechanisms of dissolution or survival of the communist parties are much less familiar. In spite of the different intensity in various countries, generally an economic crisis and relative political instability arose. The latter leads to the creation – and sometimes disappearance – of new political or social actors : new parties are founded, and after the breaking up of communist union structures new representatives of the working world emerge.4 Beyond this radical change the formations developed from the former official parties are actually present and continue to influence, and sometimes even craft the emerging democracies. Whatever the view of the communist system before 1989 and its crimes, one must acknowledge that the formations developed from the former official parties have almost everywhere, especially in Central and Southern Europe, been agents of the democratization of post - communist - societies.5 This is certainly true for the formations which have chosen the social democratic way,6 but also for those whose orientation is “democratic socialism”.7 Between 1989 and 1991 they assist in the reorganization and later re - foundation of the state. These phases are certainly shaped by the question of the communist heritage. But the evolving dynamics are also induced by the appearance of new aspects : privatization of the economy, the influx of international capital, freedom of the press, the return of emigrants, the establishment of legal institutions and norms, to name a few.8

I.

Communist Parties and their Elites during the Transition Process

The 1989/1990 peaceful revolutions were characterized by the fact that the communists gave up power practically without resistance. From 1991–1994 they managed to reorganize and began their quest for a new legitimacy before trying to recapture power through elections. This political mobility and the capacity of adaptation are astonishing and might induce observers to speculate about possible manipulation. Could the communist elites have prepared the future since 1987 ? Could they have created mechanisms of dissolving their power and accompanied the revolutions ? Could they have been able to take control of the economy, grow like a cancerous ulcer in a democratic system they controlled through secret influential networks and through the sheer weight of their economic influence ?

3 4 5 6 7 8

See for example : Meyer, Die DDR - Machtelite; Rigby, Political Elites in the USSR. See Bos, Die Rolle von Eliten. In : Merkel ( Ed.), Systemwechsel 1, pp. 81–109. Bozóki, Theoretical Interpretations of Elite Change. In : Comparative Sociology, 2 (2003) 1, pp. 215–247. See : passage on social democratic parties. See : passage on post - communist and reform communist parties See : Crawford / Lijphart : Explaining Political Change and Economic Change. In : Comparative Political Studies, 28 (1995) 2, pp. 171–199; Rüb, Die Herausbildung politischer Institutionen. In : Merkel ( Ed.), Systemwechsel 1, pp. 111–137.

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To answer these questions, a detailed reconstruction of the past is necessary.9 In 2008 one fact is absolutely evident : the former communists have become decision makers of the state and of the economy. In many political systems they have become indispensable. Has there been manipulation ? Two arguments support this hypothesis which must be rejected nevertheless. Since 1985 there has been a massive transfer of funds from the USSR to the West. However, the intention behind them is not clear : One could assume that the PCSU wanted to invest into new high technology economic branches hoping to reduce its industrial gap this way. The second argument is undeniable : It is certain that the Gorbachev wing of the CPSU accelerated the fall of “orthodox” communist leaders in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, or Romania. It is also evident that Gorbachev’s demiurgs lost control of the situation, and that from 1990 the communist elites had to fend for themselves and quite evidently without a clear schedule. Obviously parallel survival strategies of communist elites resulted from similar contexts. Furthermore, the successor parties carefully observed the actions of their former “brother parties” and did not hesitate to borrow ideologic arguments. One important dimension of the transition determined the survival strategies of the successor parties : the polarization of societies in “anti - communist” and “communist”.10 But while the first qualification is relatively clear and reads like a catalogue of accusations on the criminal past of communism, the second remains vague. It includes “still communist” – the orthodox and successor parties – but also former communists without any distinction between the question of the origin and the persistence of a more or less clearly formulated attachment to the pre - 1989 model of communist identity. Without a careful analysis of the various types, this category – “communist” – seems particularly useless. To give it some coherence, a detailed approach of the transition and of the social, political, and cultural change is necessary. The factors within the communist system since 1985 which enabled the communist elites to be successful with their conversion also need to be reflected. The constitutions of the countries of the Soviet bloc as well as 40 years of political life proved that membership of the communist party or its peripheral organizations, like the communist youth or the unions, opened doors and made 9

General survey : Beyme, Regime Transition. In : Governance 6 (1993) 3, pp. 409–425; Hanley / Treiman, Recruitment into the Eastern European Communist Elite. In : http:// repositories.cdlib.org / cgi / viewcontent.cgi ?article=1016&context=ccpr; Higley / Wesolowski / Pakulski, Post - communist Elites and Democracy; Hollander, Political Will and Personal Belief; Lane, Explaining the Transformation. In : Eliaeson, Building Democracy, pp. 125–144; Lane, Social Class as a Factor. In : Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 21 (2005) 4, pp. 417–434; Lane, Civil Society and the Transformation In : Genov / Kreckel, Gesellschaftsanalyse und Ideengeschichte; Mungiu - Pippidi, Europeanization without Decommunization. In : http ://cddrl.stanford.edu / publications/ europeanization_without_decommunization_a_case_of_elite_conversion /; Obradoviñ, Political Elite and Community Modernisation. In : http ://www.ceeol.com / aspx / getdocument.aspx ?logid=5&id=98693BD0–5B80–49B6–A597–AA7EF8A 70541. 10 Hermet, Le passage à la démocratie.

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life easier.11 Social advancement, access to privileges like the admission to university of one’s children, a better apartment or a new car, went hand in hand with the fact of being a member of the party or of being considered a possible candidate. After the loss of its dominant position the party’s ties with society broke. This manifests the ideologic weakness and emptiness of the communist system in spite of 40 years of propaganda. Having belonged to the elite or not, communists chose various political strategies and joined all political parties, whether newly founded or transformed. But a minority of them remained faithful to the successor or orthodox parties. This phenomenon of reconversion occurs very soon among the economic communist elites, especially those associated with international trade, heavy industry, and energy and natural resources. Still, the elites do not desert totally. Many cadres comprehend the chances of the transition to democracy – be it the retaining of resources related to the communist parties ( real estate, enterprises, bank accounts ...) or the appropriation of assets of the communist party during denationalization. There is another reason why it is not surprising that a good part of the communist elites can be found at the head of the economies of the countries in transition : In 1989–1990 there was practically no elite available to exchange. The return of emigrants and the arrival of specialists from the West could not satisfy the demand.12 “Alternative” elites existed almost exclusively in arts, among intellectuals, and in the fields of education and science. The lack of new elites is also true for administration, the armed forces, and the police which are full of ( former ) party members. This was due to the fact that since the early 1980s the PCs in power had tried to widen their social basis and recruited massively. The SED or the PCs of Bulgaria, the USSR, and Romania had hundreds of thousands, even several millions of members. Many of those who had often used the party as a social springboard before remained on their jobs in the new administrations. Before 1990 they had executed the politics of the PCs, and now they did the same for the political powers which had established themselves since 1990, whatever their political color. Confronted with an offensive strategy which was anti - communist as well as critical of ( ex - )communist state employees working in the new administrations ( lustration ), they certainly supported the successor parties of the CPs frequently – but not for ideologic reasons. Instead, they used them to defend their own corporate interests. The example of the new German federal states and the PDS illustrate this. When the political situation developed and the anti - communist phase weakened, new political actors offered their services as mouthpieces of the civil servants. The electoral faithfulness weakened, and new commitments developed. Definitely, there were several communist identities during the phase of the end of communism, and after its collapse several post - communist ones. 11 Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR. 12 See Szelenyi / Szelenyi, Circulation or Reproduction of Elites. In : Theory and Society, 24 (1995) 5, pp. 615–638

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To comprehend the present strength of the successor parties, it is necessary to trace the various post - communist identities, seek their identifying values and their political projects in different post - communist societies.13 The easiest group to distinguish is the membership of the still orthodox Marxist successor parties, while the “democratic socialist” parties or those who have become social democratic often mingle political elites ( and members ) of different backgrounds. There are several executive elites and the relative strength between them varies significantly in the course of times.14 Considering the political and economic post - communist project, we have to look into the ( dis )continuity of the predominance of Marxist ideology, the appreciation of liberal economy, the questions of equality and social justice, of democracy and its modes of representation. Finally, we have to study the phases of participation in power at regional as well as government levels. The policies supported by the successor parties might be forced by coalitions to differ strongly from the official party programs.

II.

2008 – An Overview

In 2008 the analysis of the period proves that returns to power have not been characterized by attempts to return to Soviet communism. The post - communist elites have understood perfectly well that the electoral competition provided them with a chance to act economically and politically but that the voters did not give them a strong ideologic mandate. In general, the motivations of postcommunist voters are economic. Worried about the future, there are many who have always considered the establishment of market economy, the privatizations, 13 Important regional studies for example : Belarus : Grichtchenko / Gritsanov, The Local Political Elite. In : Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 540 (1995), pp. 118–125; Shushkevich, Neokommunism v Belarusi. Russia : Hughes / John / Sasse : From plan to network. In : European Journal of Political Research, 41 (2002) 3, pp. 395–420; Geishecker / Haisken - DeNew, Landing on All Fours ? In : Elsevier, 32 (2004) 4, pp. 700–719; Lane, The Gorbachev Revolution. In : Political Studies 44 (1996) 1, pp. 4–23; Lane, Elite Cohesion and Division. In : Higley / Pakulski : Post - communist Elites and Democracy; Lane, Russian Political Elites. In : International Politics, 34 (1997), pp. 1–24; Lane : Transition under Eltsin. In : Political Studies 45 (1997) 5, pp. 855–874; Poland : Los, Reshaping of Elites. In : The Journal of Power Institutions in Post- Soviet Societies, 2 (2005); Wiatr, Polish Local Elites. In : Communist and Post Communist Studies, 36 (2003) 3, pp. 373–383. Slovakia : Harmadyová / Róna - Tas / Bunčák, Post - Communist Transformation. In : Sociológia, 31 (1999) 3, pp. 235–262. Lithuania : Matonytë, Evolution of Value Orientations. In : http ://images.katalogas.lt / maleidykla / filosofija / FIL - 31.pdf. Czechoslovakia : Eyal, The Origins of Post - Communist Elites. Hungary : Ágh, The Paradoxes of Transition. In : Cox / Furlong ( Eds.), Hungary the Politics of Transition, pp. 15–34; Bozóki, The Hungarian Transition. In : Bozóki / Körösényi / Schöpflin ( Eds.), Post - Communist Transition, pp. 163–194 14 The situation gets even more complicated when communist parties undergo a quickening mutation, from Soviet communism to “democratic socialism” and finally to social democracy.

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and sometimes – like in the Ukraine and in Russia – the development of a savage capitalism an economic disaster in terms of inflation, low income levels, disappearance of social protection, or the dwindling of retirement payments. In this context of the pauperization of the masses the successor parties – as well as many people in everyday life – recreate an ideal image of the communist past. Thus, in spite of its deficiencies and weaknesses the health system of the past is considered better and more just than the present one because of its partial inaccessibility for the lower classes. Market economy means the threat or growth of poverty for many people, but to others it offered the chance to become rich rapidly and sometimes excessively.15 This is shocking and sometimes provokes latent or open rejection of the democratic mechanisms which have permitted these excesses and despoliation. But whenever ex - communists profited this has also nurtured the image of the great power of the “Reds” manipulating and profiting from post - communism. The return to power of former communists as well as their defeats are demonstrated by their electoral results. The observed variability must be interpreted in relation to the evolution of the political systems. In all the Eastern countries, especially in the new members of the European Union, democracy has been accepted without any notable resistance. However, the institutional conditions this political system is based upon are established more slowly. The systems are liberalized by constitutional modifications ( the removal of the primate of the governing single state parties ), political pluralism with the foundation of new parties, and the introduction of market economy. A constitutional frame based on the separation of powers is quickly established : elections are free, held regularly, and freedom of speech and of organization is guaranteed.16 Between 1991 and 1993 these democratic systems consolidate rapidly. Sometimes the electoral competition brings about unexpected results such as the return of the ex - communists. But this process of political alternation proves the consolidation of the young democracies. The only shadow cast ( with the exception of corruption and state capture we shall consider later ) is the apparent political instability due to these electoral results : majorities based on coalitions melt away fast, and new elections often end with the coming into power of a completely different orientation. Evidently, there is no continuous political loyalty, and the voters use the ballot as a means of political sanction. Crises are certainly frequent, but it is also true, that they are resolved by constitutional means. While general elections are the only way of political legitimization, the instruments of democracy, like parliamentary government and judicature, are considered not 15 In an interview, the political scientist Stanislaw Belkowski claimed proof that Putin was the richest of all Russian oligarchs. He insisted Putin controlled and drew profit from 75 percent of the oil trader Gunvor, 37 percent of the oil company Surgutneftegas and 4.5 percent of the gas monopolist Gasprom, even though he did not own it formally, worth a minimum of 40 billion US$ (27.6 billion €). See : Tabu - Bruch in Moskau : “Putin der reichste Oligarch”. In : Der Standard, December 26, 2007. 16 Lijphart, Constitutional Choices. In : Journal of Democracy, 2 (1991) 1, pp. 72–84.

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trustworthy and corrupt. Affairs, nepotism, and the publication of files incriminating the past of politicians nourish a profound distrust of the political personnel, while parliament has only a limited public legitimacy. Sometimes street violence complicates things even more, like in Bulgaria in 1997 or in Hungary in 2007. It is difficult for the parliamentary system to increase its legitimacy even though the economic situation improves or is relatively positive.17 Structurally, the pouches of new poverty persist; retired and unemployed people are hit the worst. It seems as if the situation cannot be improved. Finally, inequality is growing, and the voters make the government parties pay for it irrespective of their political color. Another dimension is the lack of completeness of democracies in the sense that the parties do not agree on the realization of economic reforms even though the European integration makes them obligatory. They also disagree on the social prize to pay. The political conflicts of the Polish society in 2006 and 2007 illustrate this economic and social tension with respect to Europe. Finally, post - communist actors – “democratic socialists” as well as communists – campaign against the European Union and denounce its liberalism. This induces a certain part of the population to fall out of step with Europe as well as with the political system and its representatives in their respective countries. To understand why post - communist social democratic or “democratic socialist” actors survived the crash of 1989 we have to turn back to the Gorbachev period. At this point the crisis of COMECOM is obvious for every communist leader of the Soviet bloc. They are forced to intensify trade with the capitalist world. Within the communist elites the necessities of international commerce brought about the development of a group of commercial, banking, and legal cadres who have extensive experience with international commerce. Specialists for the acquisition of economic information are also perfectly aware of the weaknesses of “communist” science and are more and more convinced that the gulf is deepening at the disadvantage of the Soviet bloc. The protagonists of the international trade of the GDR or Czechoslovakia know that the lagging behind and lack of industrial progress and the problems of production have been multiplying and that exports and the hard currencies they return are threatened. The number of those who are convinced that the end of planned economy is unavoidable is considerable. When the system collapses, those specialists will meet again at the reform tendencies of the communist parties. Naturally, the networks organizing themselves will be present and useful during the economic transformation beginning in 1990, i. e. during the phase called state capitalism. This is all the more true because they are about the only ones who know how market economy and a modern banking system work. And finally, theses economic elites 17

See Bozóki, Confrontation and Consensus. In : Bozóki ( Ed.), Democratic Legitimacy in Post - Communist Societies, pp. 66–82; Filipowicz, Democratic Legitimacy in Post - Communist Societies. In : Ibid., pp. 57–65; Huntington, The Third Wave; Meyer, Democratic Legitimacy in a Historical Perspective. In : Bozóki ( Ed.), Democratic Legitimacy in PostCommunist Societies, pp. 13–56.

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act as the interface with the capitalist groups that immediately pour across the countries turning away from communism. These elites are precious for the directions of the successor parties. They are offered influential positions and therefore they remain, but only partly loyal to their origin. They will coexist with other elites or internal tendencies and get into conflicts with them quite often. Among the competing tendencies, there are the grassroots organizations of the parties. They are populated by old communists united by their memories of the antifascist fight and the construction of the socialism of the 1950s.18 Apparatchiks and other members of the organs constitute a second group. Since the early 1960s they had been the leaders of the country, heads of culture or universities. Now they fight to preserve at least some political influence. Members of the lower nomenclature of administrations and structures related with the former CP form the third group. All these political cultures coexist within the successor parties and are useful for their survival at different moments and with different degrees of intensity. These parties neither want nor are able to completely break with their past. This explains why the “modernists” do not manage to impose a clean and fast break with those from before 1989. This shall complicate the ( re - ) legitimization of the successor parties within the frame of political competition. After the party leaders in office since 1990 had rejected the prospect of dissolving the successor parties and eliminated the most compromised members,19 there remained but one possible strategy : an ideologic change turning either towards social democracy or democratic socialism. The organization continued to exist, thus saving a part of the immoveable and financial property needed for the comeback to the political scene. The nature of this will to save the party was necessarily ambiguous. It brought about the rapid erosion of the most “liberal” post - communist elites who turned away from the political scene, dedicating themselves to business or joining other formations. The arguments of the successor parties were similar in every country. 1989 was the result of a complex process of failure of “real socialism” but did not definitely challenge the idea of socialism. The past of the parties, especially their criminal dimension, were condemned, the involved leaders purged, and the adherence to democracy, human rights, and to fundamental liberties was proclaimed inviolable, and the return to any form of totalitarianism impossible. The latter was emphasized by condemning Stalinism. To limit the internal tensions between different political cultures, the leadership of the successor parties – especially the socialist democratic ones – proceeded to change their organizational structures : They multiplied the number of internal tendencies and supported a grassroot image of party life which by the way does not please the majority of members often longing for the old communist iconography. The leaderships also permitted their members to succeed within market economy. Per18 This basis is dwindling rapidly, aging and remarkably passive. 19 In many cases the successor parties will re - integrate excluded dissidents and, when this is no longer possible, rehabilitate them.

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sonal enrichment is no longer criticized. It is even supported by transferring communist funds to related friendly structures. Available political resources – like the influence of the “modernists” on the banking and administrative systems – are thus put to the disposition of members who want to try their luck in business. This ideologic mobility had some advantages. For a long time the successor parties could avoid a clear and systematic definition of their program, and they could also claim to represent divergent electoral interests. The platforms are assigned to these forms of representation, and their orientation may be towards workers, trade unions, employers, etc. The successor parties thus turn into catchall parties, ideologically mobile, populist by nature, and permanently using the economic and social conflicts typical of young democracies for their electoral purposes. Quite often the last step is the adoption of a new name in order to make clear to the voters the way covered since 1989. The cohabitation of such political identities within one new and supple organizational body is the key for the success of many successor parties. But it is only possible if strong leaders are capable of brilliant maneuvering. This is the case in Bulgaria and in the new federal states in Germany. Compared to Leninist principles, this organizational frame is new. But it is also the inheritance of traditional structures enabling the successor parties – in spite of their declining membership – to be present where the new democratic parties have problems. Local groups, cultural clubs, trade unions and associations, journals and publishing companies play an essential role with the ( re - ) mobilization of a core of faithful members and adherents, and later with the process of winning back a larger electorate. Strong contradictions between the traditional segments and the modernists of the parties are the price of the rescue of segments of the old communist organization. The latter favor the formation of tendencies, platforms, and interest groups. The observable ideologic mutation was successful and legitimated the place the successor parties have occupied since 1991. Still, the question remains whether the winning back of a part of the electorate is due to the voters’ adherence to the theses of “democratic socialism” or social democracy. Several hypotheses need to be examined : The first one is that of the automatic return of former members of the CPs as voters of the successor parties. This assumption cannot be maintained for several reasons. Before 1989 membership of the CP was favored for many reasons : opportunism, the intention to make a career, self - protection, etc. A priori, the successor parties did not offer such a frame. In 1989 former communists won back their freedom of vote. Some of them decided in favor of the successor parties. But the possible advantage of this choice is appreciated individually. The quality of the political offer is much more relevant than faithfulness to the past. Do the electoral gains of the successor parties between 1991 and 1994 depend on a nostalgic offer – like the recreation of a state socialist by nature but cleansed of the errors of the past ? A comparative study of the programs of

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the successor parties shows that this is not the case. Even if certain aspects of the past are defended, something else is essential. The successor parties concentrate on some essential topics : social justice and jobs for everybody. They function as advocates of the disfavored and of the real or potential victims of the change to capitalism. This is why the same formula is used everywhere : protection of the health system, preservation of retirement payments, legal right to a job, support of the disfavored, control of denationalization and privatization, state control by supple interventionism but within the frame of market economy. To put it short : the social costs of capitalism need to be mitigated. Socialism remains an eschatological perspective, but with prodigiously vague outlines. In everyday life private initiative is no longer condemned, and owner - managers of small and medium - sized businesses are called on to serve the people. This corresponds with the identification of enemies : the “rich”, speculators, profiteers, transnational companies, sometimes the nouveau riches and their arrogance. The successor parties present themselves as the only ones capable to improve this situation. The successor parties have not been able to resolve the fundamental contradiction of their discourse defending the common people and the fact that a part of the communist nomenclature has drawn enormous profit from the transition. The first dimension important for success helped enlarge the electorate of the successor parties, sometimes even associate them with power. This strategy is called “the paradox of Walesa” : The voters elect communist formations because they are certain that communism is dead but that some of its ideologic scraps might prove useful. On the long run this explains the return to politics of the successor parties. Sometimes they will be the winners and sometimes the losers of party competition. But the voters will always consider them a lever to pull in order to put pressure on the political system. The voters expect low unemployment and crime rates as well as an efficient battle against corruption from those in government. If they fail, voters have a tendency to transfer their preference to the opposition where the successor parties can regularly be found.20 Definitely, between 1993 and 2008, these parties will succeed mobilizing the voters longing for the “good old times of communism” and the much more important group of those who are disappointed with democracy.21

20 See Klingemann, Partisans and Voters. In : International Journal of Sociology, 36 (2006), pp. 11–44. 21 See Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society.

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Corruption and State Capture in the Post - Communist World

In the electoral field resisting the successor parties but also among voters critical of the effects of transition one problem is of special importance. It is the question of the economic power of the new entrepreneurs issued from the single governing parties and from the economic nomenclatures from before 1989. In all post - communist countries, but to a lesser extent in Poland, Hungary, and in the Baltic States, this group knew how to take advantage of its knowledge and privileges to establish themselves and take control of a part of the market economy established since 1991. The embezzlement of resources of the old system and their use in the new one have nourished many hypotheses. The first one assumes the existence of a special relationship between these economic elites and the successor parties at two levels : The strategy of joint control of the political and economic power during the period of transition between 1989 and 1991 and later on, too, whenever the successor parties are associated with power; and the systematic support of the organization of the successor parties by these businessmen. The economic agony of communism had been obvious since the end of the 1970s and accelerated since the early 1980s. Gorbachev was well aware of this fact and tried to reform the COMECON. His failure brought about the end of the Soviet system and the disappearance of a political model and an economic system based on central planning. The emerging democracies have to overcome a double deficit : They have to establish a democratic political system and change to market economy. Theoretically, the communist system of planning and centralizing ought to give room to a free economy from which the state has withdrawn. The key word was privatization. Even if all the political actors – including the successor parties – agreed on this perspective, this did not automatically induce rapid, concrete changes. The reasons were systemic : In 1991 the economic elites were the same as before 1989. They still managed many state enterprises. Of course they wanted to protect the interests they had had in the old system and keep them in the new one. In some states the simultaneity of those processes enabled powerful interest groups to influence the establishment of state institutions and the definition and organization of a new economic policy to their own profit. Three aspects made corruption and state capture easy : First of all the “rewriting of an unprecedented volume of laws, regulations, and policies”, secondly the “extraordinary redistribution of wealth from the state to the private sector”, and finally the “virtual absence of institutions either within or external to the public sector that could effectively check the abuse of public office during the transition” in many states.22 The concept of “state capture” refers to the “actions of individuals, groups, or firms both in the public and private sectors to influence the formation of 22 Ibid., p. 25.

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laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non - transparent provision of private benefits to public officials.” There are different types of institutions that fall prey to this capture : the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, as well as different organizations and actors involved in the process of capturing : private enterprises, political leaders, and closely knit small interest groups. The objective is always the same : The legal and regulatory framework is distorted, so that a small group of individuals, enterprises, or economic sectors can draw maximum profit from the state. Society at large carries the risks which are as high as the potential losses. State capture is successful where standards of the exertion of political influence are not clearly defined and mediation of conflicting interests is poorly developed. The system of state capture uses the basic legal or regulatory framework to favour particular individuals or groups. The term “administrative corruption” refers to the intentional deviation from or violation of the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules, and regulations to provide private - regarding ( family, close private clique ), pecuniary or status gains. This behaviour includes bribery, nepotism and misappropriation of public resources for private - regarding use.23 Still, the World Bank diagnoses considerable differences in the levels of state capture and administrative corruption among various states. They depend on the original status quo of the institutional and structural framework when entering the process of transition : The situation was advantageous for countries with a longer experience of sovereignty. They usually commanded more satisfactory institutions for public administration, too. Conditions were also better for countries with legal and institutional traditions emphasizing the rule of law. Countries like Hungary, for example, which had implemented models of market socialism earlier, seem to have been more open to reform. Powerful interest groups are more likely to attempt the capture of states and claim the enormous profits of natural resources in countries with immense amounts of them, like Russia. According to the World Bank, initial conditions, for example institutional legacies, strongly influence the transition process, namely the “first moves” such as the choice of the structures of political institutions and the extent as well as the pace of the reform of the economic system. This initial choice moulds a specific type of transition favouring particular economic and social groups and stimulates further reform. State capture and administrative corruption were rampant predominantly in countries with weak basic institutions and a highly concentrated economic power. This initial situation explains much of the difference between various patterns of corruption in different states. But there are other factors triggering

23 See : Caiden, Dealing with Administrative Corruption. In : Cooper ( Ed.), Handbook of Administrative Ethics, pp. 429–456.

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the development of a certain transition path, for example convincing and energetic leaders capable to advocate and endorse policies adverse to corruption. The analysis of the World Bank shows that the corruption of the modern postcommunist world is rooted in inadequate institutions and in policies impeding and undermining free trade and competition. It also proves that in spite of the apparent monolithic nature of communism the institutional legacies differed substantially across the region at the beginning of transition.24 The situation before 1989 is well known : Civil society was weak because free and self - determined social interaction was largely unwanted. The economy of real socialism is founded on the public ownership of the means of production. Members of the state apparatus control the central administration. Structures of administration and economic management merged with those of the communist party prevent the economy from being autonomous. Instead, it has to meet political goals defined by the ruling party. A mono - banking system controls cash flows. The plan determines the policy of finance. Cash emissions and cash transfers are strictly controlled. The monopolization of foreign trade affects the entire economy. The controlling instance is a highly centralized bureaucratic structure. The economic cadres are part of the communist elite and in spite of their growing skepticism adhere to the party line. But dressed up statistics cannot deceive this elite. It realizes the increasingly obvious crisis of the centralized system. Shortage becomes chronic, the currency devaluates because there is nothing to buy except for foreign ( Western ) currencies.25 Mechanisms of alternative provisioning develop; bartering and black marketeering cover some of the economic needs. The clientele system of the apparatchiks becomes the key to getting an apartment, a car, a better job, medication. Since the mid - 1970s these networks canker the economy of real socialism. They capture a growing part of the public resources and attract an increasing number of communist cadres who command personal and public riches when the system collapses. They dispose of technical knowledge but also of funds of their own, networks of partners at every level of administration, economy, and the banking system. Since 1985 this development accelerated and the state capital disappeared before the liberalization of the private sector had even begun. And finally the corrupt grey zone grows more and more, becomes more and more powerful, and monopolizes an ever growing amount of goods and services. When the system collapses, the communist elite reacts in two ways : A small group fears the loss of its advantages and fights for the preservation of a large public sector. But the majority has understood that the system is finished and put themselves at the head of the transformation of the economic system. They want to save – i. e. increase – their resources within market economy. Econo-

24 Ibid., p. 26. 25 See Burchhardt, Wirtschaftsdynamik im Realsozialismus. In : Osteuropa, 45 (1995) 2, pp. 103–119; Kornai, Le système socialiste.

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mists shall speak about “legal consolidation”. This process often ends with the strategic dissociation of people “nostalgic” of the old economic order.26 In 1989–90 the communist power is swept away, but that of the economic communist elites is reinforced because they are still in command of the economy. The emerging democracies accept them as partners and actors of economic transformation because of their omnipresence and knowledge and the lack of cadres to replace them. On the other hand, the now post - communist cadres make a deal with the emerging democracies : They get involved with and support transformation in exchange for their survival. It is a win - win situation : the democracies eliminate a zone of possible resistance and the post - communist cadres can perpetuate their networks of powers and their sources of enrichment. From 1990 on everything concentrates on the ownership of the means of production the workers have lost. Looking at the economic power of the ex - communist nomenclature today, the scenario mentioned earlier, namely that of manipulation, is taken up again : The communist apparatus is said to have anticipated the changes and to have given up the political field to save or reinforce its economic and financial power. Accordingly, between 1990 and 1992 it is supposed to have taken over control of the process of privatization, embezzled the funds and become the owner of numerous industrial enterprises, services or natural resources. The returns and profits were laundered successively, and the communists led the economy of their respective country in a capitalist way.27 To

26 This process has been analyzed by numerous authors, for example : Hankiss, East European Alternatives; Hankiss : Reforms and the Conversion of Power. In : Weilemann / Brunner / Tokes ( Eds.), Upheaval against the Plan. They show that ruling elites do not just step down happily. If they give up their power, they only do so when induced by special conditions. During the phase of transformation they were motivated by the chance of a change of power. According to Hankiss, there are different forms of power existing within every society. When the communist elite had realized the imminent decline of the socialist system and the danger of losing their political power, they looked for ways to save it. He shows that legislation enabling “spontaneous privatization” was the most important procedure to do so. Jadwiga Staniszkis ( The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe ) was also certain that the communist political class would gain profit from the process of privatization to the extent that its members would be able to retain their superior social position. She predicts the development of a wealthy bourgeoisie from the ranks of the former top cadres and the nomenclature. She calls this process of using political power to gain private wealth “political capitalism”. In a similar way, Hankiss predicts a “grand coalition” of the winners as a result of this process. He expects the former communist political class to merge with managers, directors of state - owned firms, top entrepreneurs, and top state administrators. According to Hankiss, “reform” is just a term cleverly hiding deeper processes of elite convergence via power conversion. Members of the potential future elite are striking a new path for their comfortable survival. 27 Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi and Eleanor Townsley propose the theory of “post - communist managerialism” ( see : The Theory of Post - Communist Managerialism. In : New Left Review, 222 (1997), pp. 60–92). They melt the approaches of elite theory and new class theory to a new one : The new elites, namely the “politocracy”, the cultural and managerial elites, represent a new class which controls a system of government the authors

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this end they used the successor parties as well as other political formations. The numerous political and financial scandals of the early 1990s, the stupendous enrichment of the oligarchs and other clans let the young democracies remain in a state of incompletion and general corruption. This thesis needs to be strongly modified. The term nomenclature is too vague. We have to differentiate : The lower nomenclature confirms or saves its administrative power at a local level by clientelism. The upper nomenclature consists of the high communist dignitaries as well as the economic elites. They are the only group that partly gain profit from denationalization. The “technocratic” nomenclature, i.e. the executives of factories and collective farms often become victims of the economic transformation : They are replaced by new managers. The nomenclature in the fields of foreign trade and international banking, however, adapted to and fully profited from privatization. Since 1990 the interests of these different nomenclatures were clearly diverging. They only co operated when they were certain to gain profit. The young democracies neither face a monolithic ex - communist power nor a united and unified economic elite. Certainly, the ex - communist economic elites are powerful enough to influence the transformation in process. But other actors are on the scene, too, like the big international economic players and the international business banks. Finally, there are strong regional differences. Institutional legacies have differed far more across the region than the communist façade had ever revealed. Figure 1 : Administrative Corruption ( bribes as a share of annual revenues )

The thin line at the top of each bar represents the statistical margin of error (based on a single standard deviation) calculated on the basis of the aggregated indicators. Source: World Bank. call “post - communist managerialism”. Its typical indicators are unclear property relations and ownership, and the predominance of social and political insecurity. It was designed to serve the purposes of capitalism in a globalized economy. According to the authors, the predominant ideology of “managerialism” is monetarism which was also used as a political tool.

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The susceptibility of countries to state capture and administrative corruption has been strongly affected by these legacies. They have influenced the level of development of a country’s system of public administration. The lower levels of administrative corruption and state capture in countries with a longer experience of sovereignty are striking. Their public - sector institutions seem to have been more developed and their officials better trained. Especially the former Habsburg Monarchy seems to have left behind a tradition of strong civil service and judicial administration. Countries formerly under Habsburg rule also maintained closer relations with the West. Furthermore, many of them had implemented modifications of socialism – like market socialism and labor management. Thus, they had reduced the role of the state in the field of the economy and provided room for the development of market institutions. Those two legacies, i. e. a stronger public administration and the reduced role of the state in the field of economy, guarantee less administrative corruption. A longer history of sovereignty is often accompanied by a more solidly established civil society. Especially in Central Europe collective action was an essential part of the political process in the various countries. There and in other countries with a strong tradition of civil society, social movements kept reasserting their claim of a liberal political and economic agenda. These countries had quickly understood that there is a subtle relationship between economic growth and democracy. Since the 1960s they had started reforms intending to bring about political and economic liberalization. Many of these attempts were futile – they were repressed. Still, they “provided a blueprint for the way in which social movements could have a profound impact on the process of change. In fact, countries with the strongest traditions of democracy were led into transition by opposition movements and have emerged, not coincidentally, as the states least vulnerable to capture by a concentrated set of private interests.”28 The difference in the amount and structure of corruption seems to have been determined by the structure of the economy, too. Prospective “windfall gains” were enormous in countries with only a few highly productive assets or with considerable natural resources. They were tempting powerful individuals or economic groups to get involved in state capture. Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan all enjoy an immense amount of natural resources. In those countries as well as in the states along the transit routes for the distribution there is evidence of private interest groups attempting to claim these assets and then introduce mechanisms to protect their property from competition. Most transition countries suffered from a dramatic decline of public revenues and skyrocketing inflation rates. The income of state employees often sank below the poverty line. In addition, their salary arrived at highly irregular intervals, sometimes they were not paid for months. “In such an environment bureaucrats become vulnerable to corruption as they search for ways to supplement meagre wages.”29 28 Ibid., p. 28. 29 Ibid.

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The choices and decisions in the beginning of the transition concerned the basic structure of the political institutions as well as the speed and the extent of the first steps of economic reform. The named initial conditions influenced them deeply. This is why countries followed different paths and ended in different situations in terms of economic performance and degrees and forms of corruption. In many Central and Eastern European countries the initial political institutions were decided at roundtable negotiations with a wide variety of actors from civil society representing various social groups and political movements. In the Commonwealth of Independent States – CIS, however, the transition was largely a top down process. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union it was simply a fact in some cases. In the CIS, very often civic participation remained weak. The leaders of the Communist Party managed the early stages of transition more or less single - handedly. “The difference between these alternative exit routes from the communist system, which is illustrated by a comparison of Poland and Russia, has had powerful implications for the establishment of political accountability within these countries.”30 Figure 2 : State Capture Index ( share of firms affected by state capture )

The thin line at the top of each bar represents the statistical margin of error ( based on a single standard deviation ) calculated for each country within the sample. Source : World Bank.

In spite of the different intensity of state capture, the strategies in all transition states are identical. The economic ( ex - )communist elites have continued with different courses of economic action. In early 1990 economy and enterprises are still essentially controlled by the state, and preventive appropriations of public assets are limited. In the course of 1990 funds belonging to the CP are injected into newly founded companies everywhere. The example of the PDS is well 30 Ibid. p. 29

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known, but the situation is the same in Poland,31 Hungary, the Ukraine, etc. The legal permission to privatize enterprises enables the ( ex - )communist elites to act on a grand scale. The communist economic elites shall profit from the importance of their former status and the nature of the communist system. The fusion of party and state apparatus could but facilitate the seizure of public property and the embezzlement of funds. The structures were so entangled that no government authority was able to stand in the way of the transfers of resources. The managers of the state enterprises profited from information and capital to invest into the industry. As a consequence, privatization happened rapidly, without external control and completely outside of the law. The former communists also profited from administrative and banking networks established under the former regime from and information on the state of the economy to become involved in the private sector. The instability or incompletion of the legal system was one of the incisive factors favoring the capture of state resources and the laundering of capital. During the last months of the communist system politically reliable cadres are made chief executive managers of the most important public corporations and enterprises almost everywhere. Since 1990 this measure itself would have never enabled the ( ex - )communist economic elites to take possession of the companies because they remained state property, and the state could always exchange the managers. Certainly the lack of trained cadres was an obstacle slowing the exchange of elites, but this process could have happened in the medium term. The legal void enabled the ( ex - )communist elites to take advantage of the weakness of the young democracies. They created private parasite companies controlling all the channels to corporations and enterprises. They became creditors (and if the corporations and enterprises had problems, they bought off the capital ), they functioned as suppliers or distributors of finished products or commodities and raw materials. Rapidly, the corporations and enterprises were choked, strangled, and finally changed proprietors. The legal provisions of privatization opened another way to despoliation. They offered several models : the first one was the sale of a company to its managers and employees. Since the latter did not dispose of the money to buy stock, the privatized company was in fact under the exclusive control of its managers named by the former communist power who had their own funds. Because of this technique many industrial or service corporations and enterprises were brought under private control. It also enabled the heads of agricultural companies to take possession of collective farms. The privatization of the East - German LPGs is a good example.

31

For a remarkable example of the role of the Polish secret services in state capture, see: Los, Reshaping of Elites. In : The Journal of Power Institutions in Post - Soviet Societies, 2 (2005).

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When companies were privatized by sales of stock to everybody, different reciprocal shareholding groups often funded by bank loans swiped off most of the stock. Here, too, the ( ex - )communist networks in the banking sector favored the monopolizing of companies by holdings controlled by ( ex - )communists. The withdrawal of the state was also achieved by the technique of artificially raising the capital of a public company. This reduced the participation of the state in the company. These actions, too, were systematically swiped off by new financial groups partly managed by the communist economic nomenclature. Small investors, often not informed, were thus kept away from privatization; the “big” buyers bought stock at a price below the real value.32 The capital needed for these operations did not only come from the funds of the CPs / successor parties. Other actors, especially foreign ones, joined the (ex-) communist economic elites. The operation of appropriation was crowned with success but the height of the latter depended on the country. Former top cadres of the communist regime and members of the internal security apparatus still occupy important political and economic positions in countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. “Although the power structure in Russia became more diffuse in the 1990s, old patronage networks and clan structures are particularly strong in various regions and republics, but also in Serbia, Ukraine and Belarus.”33 In those countries there is little state capture by private companies. Other forms of capture are more rampant : political leaders capture the state to promote their own interests. The level of civil liberties is a reliable indicator of the level of state capture : A very low or very high level of civil liberties corresponds with a low level of state capture. The Czech Republic, Poland, and Estonia, among other countries, have introduced a policy of lustration : Former officials of the internal security apparatus and their informers are prohibited from employment in the public sector. To a certain extent this measure limited state capture by ( former ) communist elites. Still, the massive redistribution of state owned assets into private hands can be observed everywhere. In the transition countries this redistribution was the strongest motive for state capture during a certain time span. In the process of privatization individuals capturing the state managed to translate their political influence into claims of legal ownership granting their position in the post - communist market economy. The 2007 report of Transparency International confirms the 1999 analysis of the World Bank. It shows to which extent post - communist societies are

32 Marginally, governments attempted mass privatizations. For example, in Bulgaria the population received bonus notes for participating in privatization. Everybody could either manage his stock himself or entrust it to investment funds. But this hardly prevented despoliations : The investment funds were manipulated which in turn led to the purchase of enterprises which went bankrupt and were then bought by big external financial groups. 33 Mink / Szurek, Cet étrange postcommunisme.

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scarred by corruption to this day even though the positive influence of the European integration is beginning to make itself felt.34 Since 2001 Denmark, Finland and New Zealand have always been the countries with the lowest levels of perceived corruption.35 The 2007 list shows that the Central Asian successor countries of the USSR with authoritarian presidential political systems are all very much marked by corruption. Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Albania, and the Ukraine are practically at equal level. In South - East Europe ( Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia ) the people perceive a rise of corruption. In all the countries integrated into the European Union corruption is still felt, but at much lower levels. Some scores are remarkable, like in Estonia or Slovenia : Their level is close to the German one. In comparison to 2004 the situation has improved significantly in several countries : Croatia, the Czech Republic, Dominica, FYR Macedonia, and Romania. Table 1 : Corruption Perceptions Index 2007 Country Rank Country 2007 1 1 1 16 27 28 39 41 49 51 51 61 61 64 64 69 72

Denmark Finland New Zealand Germany Slovenia Estonia Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia Latvia Lithuania Cuba Poland Bulgaria Croatia Romania China

2007 CPI Score 9,4 9,4 9,4 7,8 6,6 6,5 5,3 5,2 4,9 4,8 4,8 4,2 4,2 4,1 4,1 3,7 3,5

Country Rank 2004 3 1 2 15 31 31 42 51 57 51 44 62 67 51 67 87 71

2004 CPI Score 9,5 9,7 9,6 8,2 6,0 6,0 4,8 4,2 4,0 4,0 4,6 3,7 3,5 4,1 3,5 2,9 3,4

Country Rank 2001

2001 CPI Score

2 1 3 20 34 28 31 47 51 59

9,5 9,9 9,4 7,4 5,2 5,6 5,3 3,9 3,7 3,4

44 47 47 69 57

4,1 3,9 3,9 2,8 3,5

34 See : Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007 – Report. In : www.transparency.org / content / download /27256/410704/ file / GCB_2007_report_ en_02–12–2007.pdf. 35 Transparency International uses a Corruption Perceptions Index ( CPI ) which looks at perceptions of public sector corruption in 180 countries and territories. It scores countries on a scale from zero to ten, with zero indicating the highest and ten indicating the lowest level of perceived corruption.

( Ex-)Communist Elites and State Capture Country Rank Country 2007 79 79 84 84 84 99 99 105 111 118 123 143 150 150 150 150 150 162 168 175

Georgia Serbia Bosnia and Herzegovina Macedonia Montenegro Armenia Mongolia Albania Moldova Ukraine Viet Nam Russia Azerbaijan Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Laos Uzbekistan

2007 CPI Score 3,4 3,4 3,3 3,3 3,3 3,0 3,0 2,9 2,8 2,7 2,6 2,3 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,7

Country Rank 2004

2004 CPI Score

133 97* 82 97

2,0 2,7 3,1 2,7

82 85 102 114 122 102 90 140 74 122 122 133 133

3,1 3,0 2,5 2,3 2,2 2,6 2,8 1,9 3,3 2,2 2,2 2,0 2,0

114

2,3

521 Country Rank 2001

2001 CPI Score

63 83 75 79 84

3,1 2,1 2,6 2,3 2,0

71

2,7

71

2,7

Simplified table. Analyzed countries : 179; CPI 2004 : analyzed countries : 146; CPI 2001 : analyzed countries : 91. Source : www.transparency.org, 2004 Serbia and Montenegro.

The typology of the modes of corruption shows that the countries most affected by petty bribery include Albania, FYR Macedonia, and Romania. Table 2 : Bribery 2007 Quintile of respondents reporting they paid a bribe to obtain a service Top quintile: More than 32%

Countries/Territories

Second quintile: 18–32%

Lithuania, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine

Third quintile: 6–18%

Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic

Albania, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo, Romania

Source : Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2007.

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Bribery is a problem of the suppliers of key services – like education, medical, judiciary, registry, and permit services, police, and utilities such as electricity. The Barometer 2007 reports that low and middle income groups are most affected by bribery because they are the ones who need to seek those services – and therefore have to pay bribes – more often than higher income groups. All over the world political parties and legislation are considered most open to bribery. Furthermore, the police are reported to be more corrupt than other state institutions and service sectors. Key institutions in society that are crucial for the integrity and responsibility of government are tainted. Unquestionably, in many countries corruption damages the legitimacy of the governing system and its representatives. The public view of corruption in institutions varies from one country to the next. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Bulgaria 80 % of respondents consider political parties corrupt. Over the last four years perceptions about corruption have remained quite the same, except that the role of the private economic sector has become more critical. This indicates that the public is more critical of the role of business in the corruption equation than it used to be. Compared to 2003, more citizens in the EU + ( Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine ) expect more corruption in their various countries in the near future. The social consequences are serious : Like in other societies, in post - communist societies the economic capital determines the social position because it stands for wealth and power. In 2008 the social hierarchy in the countries of the former Eastern bloc reflects this phenomenon : The ( ex - )communist elites constitute a very important fringe of today’s new elites.36

36 Recognizing the economic changes of the second half of the 20th century, Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelényi and Eleonor Townsley reformulate their theory of managerialism in East Central European societies in their publication “Making Capitalism Without Capitalists”. They observe that the main interest of managers and other elites was the acquisition of property. The managers’ goal was to get rich and then leave their positions to enjoy their wealth. This is why the authors maintain that post - communist managerialism was a phase not of struggles on the way to a historically new type of regime but of social ones indicating the rise of a new propertied class.

Communism and Neo - Communism in Times of “Globalization” Yolène Dilas - Rocherieux Is it not rather anachronistic to debate “neo - communism” exactly at a time when the term “communism” has lost its verve and power in the oral and written discourse of the political parties trading under this name – with the French Communist Party ( Parti communiste français – PCF ) as a typical example ? Seventeen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc we have to acknowledge that one part of the “heirs” has been working intensely on adjusting to the new situation of post - industrialism and globalization. Transition becomes visible in the open array of the alter - globalization movement by its various labels and in the ideologic refocusing on the globalized figure of the poor, the excluded, and the homeless. These two elements, the fragmentation of the forces and the mutation of the revolutionary subject, evidently confuse the bearings of researchers, forcing them the redefine their methods of investigation. To make our analysis clear, we have to remember that the idea as well as the project of communism have born different names : “Holy Equality”, “Plebeianism”, “Communitarism”, but also “Bolshevism” or “Maoism”, each one attempting a historic leap and specification while claiming a common patrimony. This semantic range necessitates qualifying the denotation of the term itself. It also promotes other criteria to dissociate communism from what it is not. This posit is all the more important because to date neo - communism does not constitute a self - proclaimed partisan ideologic bloc. The prefix neo – from Greek neos – describes something new. Placed in front of an adjective, it underlines the persistence of epochal and perpetual elements of a doctrine or line of thought within that which is new, like neo - Platonism or neo - criticism. This is the assignation of the concept “neo - communism” in order to reconcile forces incompatible at first sight – pre - Marxist, post- Marxist, libertarian and even Christian – but united by an invisible bond that remains to be identified. To this end we start out from that which is palpable in the present movement, namely a militant attitude explicit in three points : on the one hand, the total or partial obliteration of the experiences of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, on the other the recognition and acceptance of a common enemy : “neo liberalism”, even though there is no consent on the means to overcome it nor on the outlines of the “other society”, and finally the return to the archaic prin-

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ciple of the “virtuous equality” as the base of involvement, with the will to re found the utopia of universal happiness. But to corroborate the hypothesis of a recycling of the communist forces and thought within the alter - globalist movement, what appears on the surface is not enough. We must try to find out why the poor or the “withouts” have so easily become subject as well as actor of the radical change hoped for, thus relegating the proletarian to the scrapheap of history. This investigation will also require two steps : first, the identification of communism in its perpetual foundations in order to find its hard core – the invisible thread, and then the comparison of this scheme of reference with the multiple poles of radicalism which are dissipated among the different battle flags of multi - culturalism, uneconomic growth, third - worldism, Trotskyism, neo - Zapatism, etc. We want to show that the death of industrial communism has favored the return to the origins, to the original foundations of the doctrine, in this case to the demonization of individual enrichment in any form. Actor of a radical change, the poor symbolizes the exploited people of the earth confronting the rich countries and calling for their redemption by settling for their past faults.

I.

Identifying communism by its perpetual aspects

For one and a half century communism made “proletariat” its synonym, the revolutionary subject whose mission was the destruction of the capitalist system striving for the collective re - appropriation of the fruits of industrial abundance. The victorious Bolshevik revolution had reconciled the facts of a theory pretending to be “scientific”, thus legitimating a collectivist and productivist model. The Marxist - Leninist experiences needed to come to an end by their Stalinist, Titoist, Maoist, or Khmer variations for the movement and its ideology to become truly destabilized. This lead to the American philosopher Francis Fukuyama’s announcing the end of history on the basis of liberal democracy. In fact, communist intellectuals and groups used the last decade of the 20th century to re groom the doctrine and re - center the revolutionary logics on the poor and metamorphose the enemy with the characteristics of the rich, namely the Western world. Evidently, industrial communism has disappeared. But there remains enough historic mold of theories, ideologies, and utopias to watch it reappear in new forms. But to clear neo - communism from nebulous alter - globalism, the hard core needs to be isolated, i. e. the original brand that holds together all forms of communism, from the primitive model to the industrial one. And to draw this invisible thread, who could be better teachers than those who were originally interested ? For two hundred years, the greatest communist thinkers and actors occupied themselves with legitimizing the doctrine by using the same flagpoles of events, of people, and of ideas. Linking together Plato, Jesus, Thomas More, Campanella, Morelly, Mably, Babeuf, and Owen, the “neo - babouvists” of the

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first half of the 19th century claimed that they wanted to legitimize a doctrine 20 centuries old, held alive by the timeless principle : “Neither yours nor mine; one lives for all, all live for one.”1 These standard - bearing personalities are the same in the Pantheon of 20th century communist historians, among them the Soviet ones2 – with the exception of Jesus who has actually been reintroduced on the alter - globalization scene. The relationship between these thinkers, utopians, and activists depends on the fact that they all regarded corruption in politics, barbarism, the breakdown of community structures, and social injustice as the results of the accumulation of riches in very few hands. Moreover, they all projected themselves intellectually into a utopian ideal city where the germs of desire have been eradicated forever. The amount of publications on this subject3 confirms the assumption of a common patrimony, a communist anchorage ground which refers back to the primacy of the irreducible opposition between richness and poverty. The latter is often exalted as a high virtue. In 1931, in his essay on the origins of communism, the French historian Gérard Walter4 reconciled ancient Greek philosophers with the community practice of Christians and Jews, and with the great gospel texts of which he remembered the phrase “All riches are either unjustly gained or else the inheritance of a sinful man.” According to him, this was a perpetual basis – already partly perceived by the sociologist Émile Durkheim5 – frequently taken up and secularized by modern utopias, among them that of Thomas More in the 16th century, before being theorized in the 19th century. Between Plato’s aristocratic communism, meant to bring the elite of the state back to virtue und wisdom by a collective act of total dispossession, and the city of the 18th century philosopher Morelly who promised life imprisonment to every “raving lunatic” trying to re - introduce “detestable property”6, the belief was preserved in the possibility to purify humanity by drying up the sources of envy and selfishness. But it was Gracchus Babeuf who gave substance to communism by inserting this great idea in a revolutionary project during the French Revolution. He wrote that society had but one final goal : “To provide its members with the greatest possible happiness.”7 The “great educators” – prelude to the Leninist revolutionary vanguard – could reach this goal only by opposing the virtue of poverty to the vice of money. They relied on the sound part of society, namely the workers and farmers. While the revolutionary future aimed at the collectivization of goods and making lazybones work, the essential Babouvist 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Neo - babouvist journal La Fraternité, 1842. See : Volguine, Histoire des idées socialistes. See : Dilas - Rocherieux, L’utopie ou la mémoire du futur. Walter, Les origines du communisme. See : Durkheim, Le socialisme; this work is the summary of the courses held at the faculty of the humanities at Bordeaux from November 1895 to Mai 1896. Morelly, Code de la nature. Letter to abbé Coupé, September 1791, in Babeuf, texts chosen, introduced and annotated by Mazauric, Editions sociales.

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project concentrates on the suppression of the inheritance of assets, of money, of the wage earning system, and of commerce. To guarantee the material existence of people from their birth to their death, everyone ought to receive lodging, clothes, medical care, and food in return for his work. Everything should be provided for “with simple and moderate ease.”8 In this line we find the Englishman Robert Owen and the Frenchman Etienne Cabet who – in 1824 respectively 1848 – created communist colonies in the United States in order to escape the industrial society and proletarization. They preferred community property on a non - productivist base.9 The German Moses Hess also belongs to this line. He is known for having converted Engels to communism – and through this latter, Marx. Hess lauded ethics of work and the end of bondage by the suppression of money. Another example, the German tailor journeyman Wilhelm Weitling, was the leader of the “League of the Just” – the first communist party – before Marx. In his utopia of 1838, “Humanity as it is and as it should be”, he holds that the teachings of Christ are the announcement of community property and thus its legitimation. To erase the wrong contained in the possibility to enrich oneself, they all placed their hopes in a society revolutionizing not only its production but the system of exchange and distribution, according to the expression taken up by Marx : “to each according to their needs.” The communists of the 20th century have never tried to erase this bond between yesterday and today. But they occupied themselves with showing the difference between ancient communism – that of consumption – and the modern one, fixed on production. The transition between one and the other is allotted chiefly to Marx. He is said to have bound the great idea to a scientific corpus and to a strategy of organizing the revolutionary subject, the proletariat. This way the confusion continued about modern communism issued from the ancestral combat against the power of money, but radically dissociated from the ancient form by its knowledge of the contradicting movements of societies at the very heart of the relations of production – and thus the laws of their transformation – from the ancient city to the capitalist system. But modern communism does not result from a break with the old, but simply from the fusion of the communism of consumption – the unique one – and a doctrine emerging in the 1830s, socialism. In 1848, in his “Communist Manifesto”, Marx reconciled ancestral communism with the socialism of the industrial society which privileged the producer, the reorganization of work, and the progress of collective enrichment as the bond of the society to be built. The class struggle and the infrastructural collectivization initiated by the capitalist system thus turned into the condition and

8 9

Babeuf, Manifeste des plébéiens. In : Le Tribun du peuple, no 35, November 30, 1795. In fact, Robert Owen was the manager and owner of a big spinning mill. After the failure of his community New Harmony, he fell back on trade unionism and cooperative workers’ systems.

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dynamics of a radical change before leading to communism. But contrary to the claim of the American philosopher Immanuel Wallerstein,10 modern communism does not arise from the will to bypass a kind of socialism perceived as a liberal ideology – according to him, Leninism had failed in this respect – but results in the union of two antithetic forces : on the one hand, the archaic idea centered around egalitarian redistribution and the rejection of individual enrichment, on the other a socialist body praising the spreading of wealth as means for collective happiness. With Marx, industrial communism had to turn into the trustee of all the riches produced by collectivized labor. But it also had to maintain the obstacles to the weak will of the individual wishing to change, reap or transform to his profit the smallest material belonging. Therefore the Soviets found themselves in a schizophrenic position : They were forced to compete with the capitalist world, to idolize the proletarian and other activists and mass production. But their only way to preserve the communist goal was to bar the individual from every possibility to enrich him - or herself. This dogmatic incompatibility partly explains the economy of scarcity typical of the communist productive world. Abundance was always transferred to a future utopian time. The end of industrial communism was the occasion to return to its original form of egalitarian redistribution in the field of consumption and the rejection of productivism, which means the reconsideration of a part of the Marxist heritage. The transition corresponds with the communists’ – with the exception of the orthodox Leninists – entering the alter - globalization movement.

II.

Neo - Communism and Alter - Globalization

Without the NGOs rising to power on the global scene of the 1980s alter - globalization would have never developed. According to the data of 2002,11 more than 150,000 international NGOs operated in the fields of solidarity economy, of charity, ecology, health, and education. 2,000 of them were accredited at the UNO, supplemented by more than 7,000 national and local actors. The organization of networks of these NGOs in association with the success of the first World Forums in the media created the illusion of a world civil society, of an enormous social movement united against a global system of domination incarnated mainly by the USA, the “mortifying bondsman of the obscene accumulation of riches”, according to the philosopher Alain Badiou, for whom the American armed forces are “the instrument of the Western master race against the miserable of the earth.”12 Remember that the first Social World Forum was born from a decision made in February 2000 in the office of Le Monde diplomatique, by Bernard Cassen, 10 Wallerstein, L’après - libéralisme. 11 See : Charnovitz, Les ONG. In : L’Economie politique, 1st trim. 2002. 12 Badiou, Circonstances, 1, p. 66.

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honorary president of Attac, director general of Le Monde diplomatique and PCF member, Chico Whitaker, executive secretary of the commission “Justice and Peace” of the Brazilian episcopate and former deputy of the Workers’ Party (PT) at the national assembly in Sao Paulo, and Oded Grajew, left - wing businessman, member of the Workers’ Party, presently councilor of the President of Brazil, Lula, for the relations with social movements. Shoulder to shoulder with Ignacio Ramonet, president director of Le Monde diplomatique, these activists planned the event intended as a challenge : “Scuttle Davos !”13 The choice of Porto Alegre was no accident : The city hall was in the hands of the PT and thus inclined to offer logistic and financial support. But most of all it benefitted from a symbolic legitimacy because of its experiments in local administration. Thrice the city had been the showcase of a mystified Latin America, with the figures of Castro, Che, and sub - commander Marcos at the backdrop. The latter was allocated the status of the “liberator of Chiapas” by Bernard Langlois, director of the ultra - left journal Citoyen : “The man with the balaclava and the pipe has possibly triggered this awakening of the South American masses. Moreover, he might be some sort of prophet of another possible world.”14 Thanks to the Fora, the neo - communists have learned to widen their field of action moving with ease from one battle to the next, from illegal immigrants to landless workers, passing the unemployed, homosexuals, women, etc.. An in situ survey in November 2003 among activists of the second European Social Forum ( ESF ) in Paris - Saint - Denis in November 2003 shows the average activist to be a member of 2.4 organizations and active in 1.5 of them.15 This multi - positioning is advantageous for a strategy of monopolizing the discourse and the centers of power by the most experienced and the most radical. This was the case at the preparation of the ESF planned to take place in Florence in the fall of 2002. Bernard Cassen16 tells how activists – mainly Italians affiliated with the Communist Refoundation Party ( the remaining Italian communist party ), French Trotskyites of the Ligue communiste révolutionnaire, and British adherents of the Socialist Workers’ Party ( SWP ) supported each other attempting to replace the charter of the fora elaborated in Porto Alegre with their own text. Their goal was to come to the fore of the global movement, thus being able to create a new International, the Fifth. But this neo - communist entrism succeeded so easily with penetrating and undermining the solidarity movement of which Attac is the figurehead only because both spheres share the same catastrophic vision of the world and of the terrible defeat of the communist and social democrat experiences of the 20th century. Everybody congratulates himself for the disappearance “of a landscape

13 14 15 16

See : Cassen, Tout a commencé à Porto Allegre. Langlois, Le bloc - notes. In : Politis, March 30, 2006. Agrikoliansky / Sommier ( Eds.), Radiographie du mouvement altermondialiste. Cassen, Tout à commencé à Porto Allegre.

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blocked by the social - democrat or Stalinist parties”17, while being convinced of finally gaining control of the course of history. This feeling of a total crisis of society is supplemented by the ideologic haziness of the solidarity movement and its fascination with neo - Zapatism which draws the movement on the side of the poor and those “without”.18 Thus the 2003 ESF at Paris - Saint Denis was saluted by spokesperson of APEIS ( Association for Employment, Information and Solidarity with the Unemployed and Precarious Workers - Association pour l’emploi, l’information et la solidarité avec les chômeurs et les travailleurs précaires19) with the motto “room for the poor”. Chico Whitaker opened his speech with the following diatribe : “Money perverts democracy and distorts the relationship between people.” However, even if the poor have become the mobilizing axis of communists within the alter - globalization movement, unity among yesterday’s hostile brothers has not been achieved. They assert their specific characteristics and regroup in three big militant poles : Marxists, post - Marxists, and the followers of ethical or egalitarian redistribution.

III.

Evident Marxists

Here we find the activists of the Communist Revolutionary League ( Ligue communiste révolutionnaire – LCR ), the French Communist Party ( Parti communiste français – PCF ), the Brazilian Workers’ Party ( PT ) and the Italians from the Communist Refoundation. They all place their hopes on the national and global social movements which they consider the expression of the same suffering and therefore a collective radical actor. While they agree on enlarging their field of interpretation to the poor and excluded, they do not renounce the eschatological thesis of a redemptive revolution necessarily brought about by a revolution leading to the conquest of power. But they disagree in their analysis of the relative strength at the global level and of the identification of the revolutionary subject. Thus, in the best Leninist tradition, Fausto Bertinotti, secretary general of the Rifondazione Comunista, remains faithful to the concept of the lower classes and the workers’ movement to which he assimilates the deprived of any kind. He wants to keep Europe at the head of the global “anti” - movement because of its historical experience in terms of organization and a coherent project opposing the liberal globalization, i. e. communism.20 17

Crémieux ( LCR member and trade unionist [ SUD Aérien ]), Mouvement social. In : Contretemps, 6 (2003), p. 17. 18 See : the following two editions of the Journal Communisme, Les formes du communisme mexicain, 83–84 (2005); and, Cuba, un univers totalitaire, 85–86 (2006). 19 Homepage of L’Humanité : Forum social européen avec les «sans», Ph. Villechalane, October 11, 2003. 20 Bertinotti, Fifteen theses for an alternative European Left ( published on the occasion the Florence European Social Forum by the journal Alternativa November 2002).

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Similarly, Daniel Bensaïd of the LCR wants to substitute the term alter - globalization by “new internationalism” with its headquarter Porto Alegre, the “world capital of resistance against market globalization and imperial militarism.” For Bensaïd the third Forum of Porto Alegre in February 2003 proved the continuous radicalization since the first European Social Forum in Florence in 2002 which he described as “very young, very mixed, very red”.21 He also called for the rejection of each policy of “international charity”22 because according to him the uprising of the masses against the global capitalist system has already begun, pushed forward by the Zapatist rebels and the social fora which have spread to every continent. The global revolution, smothered by Stalin, is marching again. More or less closely linked with the Trotskyite tendency, the “refounders” of the PCF also build on the social movements they assimilate with the new revolutionary subject. The 33rd Congress of the PCF celebrated the women and men of the planet who fight against a world “dominated by money and the marketization of all resources and activities.” Having abandoned the action of a party of professional revolutionaries, these militants bank on a global social movement rising against every form of domination, but also inspired by the strong desire of a world “of equality, justice, liberty, fraternity, respect of nature and human beings.” Thus, the dynamics of transformation were to be looked for among the refusal and the “ambition” of the exploited and those “without” to construct this new world themselves. That is where the forces of communism were to place themselves.23 In fact, Bensaïd, Bertinotti, Besançenot, and Marie - George Buffet regard alter- globalization as a means to regain ground on the solid triptych France – Italy – Latin America, i. e. countries which associate the communist memory of their past with a long experience of radical fight. But they draw the line between those who reject the capitalist system and those who fight neo - liberalism without necessarily questioning market economy.

IV.

The Post - Marxists

Here, hybrid militants meet – original Marxists having reinterpreted the theoretical corpus in the light of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Rosa Luxemburg, Walter Benjamin, or Pierre Joseph Proudhon. To unite these recently hostile groups without breaking with the communist heritage, the post - Marxists favor those advocates of historical materialism within the Marxist family who have refused the ideology of progress. In this way the philosopher Michaël Löwy ties in with Walter Benjamin who had rejected the scientific and industry - oriented 21 Bensaïd, Le nouvel internationalisme, p. 40. 22 Ibid., p. 9. 23 “La visée communiste”, Statement of the 33rd Congress of the PCF, National Council, Jan. 6, 2006.

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logics to reconcile the libertarian utopia with Marxism, thus creating the basis of communist emancipation.24 In the same logics, the political scientist Philippe Corcuff sets his hopes in Rosa Luxemburg to revisit Marxism – “the principal intellectual system of former social movements”25 – in order to rediscover the perspectives of global and individual liberation. From this point of view “libertarian social democracy” is the provisional name of a liberating communist doctrine which would have been applied by “Red Rosa” to balance “the I and the we”. This would reunite anew the communist family, from Marxists to libertarians. But from a theoretical point of view the only truly innovative communist on the alter - globalist field, and therefore the most coherent, is Antonio Negri26 with the coronation of “multitude” as the new revolutionary subject. When the Italian philosopher puts his money on the alter - globalization movement to promote the revolution, he shocks one part of his followers by rejecting the theses of uneconomic growth and of preservation of the welfare state. To the contrary, he claims the “progressist” character of neo - liberalism in destroying the nation - state27 to substitute it by the “Empire”, the supreme state of domination. If these propositions irritate the solidarists, Negri fascinates the most radical ones by combining the Marxist thesis of the alienation of the proletariat by the capital with that of Foucault and Deleuze on the bio - political dimension of total global control of body and consciences. “One specter haunts the world,” he writes, namely that of massive migration, with millions of individuals uprooted, shunted, abandoned, forcing the Empire to react by a global war. In the same way he assimilates the class struggle of the 21st century with the gigantic exodus of miserable populations, with the rise of a “new nomad horde”, this “new race of barbarians” whose destructive faculties were on the brink of a real partisan structure and a common theoretical base. Revolutionary subject of post - modernity, multitude would be the alternative solution to the proletariat, vouching for the total equality of possessing nothing, und of the total liberty due to its capacities to produce unique ethnic, community, religious, geographic, etc. characteristics. For Negri the revolt resulting from the pain of the poor, the excluded, the humiliated, colonized, and enslaved shall have the power of redemption.

24 Löwy, Walter Benjamin. In : Contretemps, 6 (2003), p. 109. 25 Philippe Corcuff, quoted in Molénat, Y a - t - il une pensée alter - mondialiste ? In : Sciences humaines, 160 (2005), p. 19. 26 Italian philosopher and professor, condemned for his assumed complicity in the assassination of Aldo Moro and his involvement with the Red Brigades; the media present him as the author of the “Communist Manifesto of the 21st century” because of his two main publications, both written with American professor Michael Hardt, Empire; and : Moro / Hardt, Multitude 27 This is the reason for his support of the “yes” at the ballot about the European Constitution, which – according to him – is the means to begin the destruction of “this shit of the nation - state”.

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Nevertheless, the passage to the other society will be a “thorny road”, filled with suffering because the insurgence and the destruction of the global enemy will be the price to pay. To achieve this goal, the alter - globalist movement needs to take upon itself the transformation of theories and practices in the sense of the recognition of the multitude as lever of destruction and foundation of global communism. If the communist intellectuals of the 20th century had promulgated their self - destruction as bourgeois, then their redemption requires the annihilation of the global system, the Western model.

V.

The supporters of redistribution

This other fringe of neo - communism is less clear because it is placed at the crossroads of solidarism, anarchism, and communism. This is true for José Bové, former spokesman of the Confédération paysanne ( farmers’ union ), presently in charge of Food Sovereignty at Via Campesina.28 Follower of the concept of civil disobedience in the wake of David Thoreau, he prefers revolt to revolution in order to overcome the capitalist system. He uses the example of the Zapatistas whom he reconciles to the experiments of Larzac and his project of collective heritage : “For me, Mexico is above all the country of Emiliano Zapata, the leader of one of the most important agrarian revolutions in history and of a selfdetermined experience successful in the state of Morelos.”29 Convinced to witness the “collapse of a world in the physical sense of the term”, he trusts in the theses of uneconomic growth to reconcile the landless of the third world with the small western farmers on the road to pauperization on the basis of true equality. To him it is not a question of the collective re - appropriation of the means of production but of redistribution and renunciation of certain privileges. In a similar way the Englishman John Holloway30 is inspired by the experience of the neo - Zapatist guerilla of sub - commander Marcos to break with the revolutions of the 20th century centering on the conquest of the state. But be does not abandon the idea of radical change either. Instead, he conceives it in terms of the dissolution of power and its oppressive structures. The goal is a radical change of the world without taking over the state.31 The other – egalitarian – society will have to invent itself. Several anarchist groups have also to be taken into account. They surf on the “alter - wave” to accelerate the deconstruction of a hated system, like the Black Blocs32 or “objectors to growth” from Serge Latouche to Yves Cochet, including 28 The movement Via Campesina notably comprises the movement of the landless, the Latin - American agrarian unions, and the French Confédération paysanne. It constitutes a sort of agrarian International. 29 Bové, Paysan du monde, p. 134. 30 Professor of political sciences at the universities of Edinborough, Great Britain, and Puebla, Mexico. 31 Holloway, Change the World. 32 See : Dupuis - Déri, Black Blocs.

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Albert Jacquard.33 But the most surprising thing is the return of Christians to this circle who advocate a social doctrine. They found their place in the fora by giving priority to peace and to the battle against poverty. While most of these latter groups are inclined to follow the solidarist line on topics such as debt relief for the poor countries or the taxation of profits to the advantage of the deprived, some of them identify with the poles of radicalism on the question of the redistribution of the riches of the planet. Many groups hesitated before joining the “alter - movement”, for example the Catholic Committee Against Hunger ( Comité catholique contre la faim – CCFD ), with 15.000 members one of the biggest French NGOs in the field of development aid. But in 2003 all of them were present at Saint - Denis, the CCFD, the local diocese, the associations “Justice and Peace”, networks such as Caritas, Emmaus and numerous others, not counting the forced entry of radical Muslim groups which were at the same time defenders of Third World Peoples, global sharing, respect of non - Western identities and cultures as well as of religious practices in a non - religious societal frame. Christian communism is above all egalitarian, the poor having become the pillar of a virtuous society. But this movement is tampered by the South American Christian groups supporting a theology of liberation one of the figureheads of which is Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela since 1998. This extremely diversified Christian presence burns the ideologic landmarks even more by reinforcing the confusion between poverty, virtue, and innocence, with a strong tendency to condemn the western world called to repentance and self - hatred. It is true that the alter - globalization movement benefits from the militant support of the social world fora and from the introduction of new means of communication. They permit to diffuse the identical information at the same instant in every corner of the planet and to summon up heterogeneous troops at the other side of the world. But reunion does not mean unity. The tendency of the fora to retreat on the continents and nations as well as their specific topics bears witness to the concern of the majority of actors : They want to take up national and local problems again. We also have to acknowledge that the representation of alter - globalization in the media, among academics and proponents is not in keeping with reality and that its transnational dimension is largely overestimated.34 If in this context communism experiences a sort of comeback thanks to the “alter - movement”, its return to the poor and consumption forces it to compete with myriads of associations and organizations positioned at the diametrical opposite of revolutionary communist culture. Furthermore, in the more or less long run, Marxists and post - Marxists risk to find themselves in the old schizophrenic situation of the discrepancy between material and concrete demands of a majority of members 33 The latter, one of the more moderate ones, pleads for a 32 - hour working week on the basis of shared work, a monthly benefit of 600 Euros for every unemployed person (plus 300 Euros per child ), and self - sufficiency of the regions. 34 See Agrikoliansky / Sommier ( Eds.), Radiographie du mouvement alter - mondialiste.

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and sympathizers at the national level and the utopian search of a virtuous society detected in the revolt of the exploited, the oppressed, the excluded and those “without”, all of them necessarily being the bearers of a good society.

Conclusion Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau

I.

Western Communism before the Collapse of the Soviet System

According to Stéphane Courtois, the power of communism depends on its political and philosophical modernity issued from the French Revolution with its three great motivating forces – namely the revolutionary, the utopian, and the scientific passion. Its decline based on the counter - modernist aspect of its quasi unconditional lineup behind the USSR, the lack of internal democracy, a totalitarian social and political project, and the mechanistic rejection of market economy. The decline or collapse of the Western CPs since 1990 cannot simply be reduced to the stop of their financing by Moscow or the GDR. In reality, this decline had started everywhere in Europe – except in Italy – in many countries already in the 1950s and accelerated in the 1970s. The mechanism of this decline differs between the countries and cannot be explained by one single factor like the Soviet intervention of Czechoslovakia or leftist competition. Every CP experiences its own specific crisis. In spite of important national differences, CPs which had not come into power share one common aspect of their history : For decades, their political and social power resulted from the affiliation to a rigidly classified and controlled communist system1 as well as from their capability to participate in the democratic life of their respective home countries ( for example France, Italy, Belgium, or Switzerland )2. In some societies they even participated in the process of democratization, for example during military dictatorship in Greece, in Franco’s Spain, and in Salazar’s Portugal. They managed to sail under the colors of freedom of expression of the individual and of society. However, the structure of their proper social and political project was totalitarian because it was inspired by the Soviet model. The success of the communist movement of the 1920s, 30s and 40s, as well as the process of democratization of the Mediterranean was the result of a slow but steady change. In fact, during the first years of their existence, most of the CPs hardly cared for relations with civil society. Their interest concentrated on their own consti1 2

Cf. Harvey, Comrades. Cf. Martelli, Le rouge et le bleu.

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tution as a communist revolutionary group. They had to overcome the social democratic frowst and fug in order to attain Leninist - Stalinist ideals. Already during the 1920s, but especially after 1934/35, i. e. after the coming into power of Italian Fascism and National Socialism, the situation of CPs all over Europe was difficult due to the fascist movements’ growing strength. The CPs had to change and resolutely determined to conquer the masses “democratically”. The revolutionary cadres discovered the necessity of immerging in civil society. The CPs will never forget this lesson of history. It remains central to the present ideological considerations of every communist and reformed party. This development was notably intensified in countries occupied by the Third Reich. From 1941, communists persistently tried to become the spearheads of resistance against the “fascist” occupying forces. During the process of liberation they did everything conceivable to loom large as the leading anti - fascist and patriotic force. This monopolizing of anti - fascism and “resistance” characterizes the beginning of a different development : Since the early 1950s the CPs changed once more, this time creating new identities and forms of political operation, some of which have survived the geopolitical changes of the 1980s. One organizational element has survived in rudimentary form, i. e. the system of “front line organizations”. After the Second World War, all legal CPs were built around a double dimension : – A teleological dimension consisting of a number of unalterable elements based on communist axioms historically predefined by Lenin and Stalin; the doctrine ( Marxism - Leninism ), the organization and its incarnation, namely the apparatus ( based on the principles of “democratic centralism” ), the strategy ( amounting to unconditional support of the Soviet Union and its interests ). – A dimension of civil society including everything the CPs had absorbed from the societies of their home countries : every force and tradition they had nourished from before changing into a real political, social, and cultural actor. Between 1930 and 1950 this bipolar system had given birth to the true communist identity.3 For the better understanding of this complex development, a closer look at the two most important Western European parties is indicated, namely the Italian CP and the CP of France.4 The self - conceptions and images of French and Italian communism are specific and thus basically singular. However, for the understanding of the development of most Western European CPs before the implosion of the Soviet system in 1989/90 they are truly enlightening and paradig3 4

Cf. Foutrier, L’identité communiste. See Lazar, Le communisme; id., Maisons rouges; Kertzer, Politics and Symbols; Spriano, Storia del Partito Comunista Italiano; Agosti, Storia del Partito comunista italiano; Galli, Storia del PCI; Barca, Cronache dall’interno. On the history of the party, see also : www.partitocomunistaitaliano.blogspot.com.

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matic examples of the attempt of many of these parties to adapt to a new political situation and a different geopolitical constellation. As shown by Stéphane Courtois’ analysis in this book,5 the CP in France had been completely stalinized. The after - effects continued in the apparatus until the 1980s. The PCF has been a mass party since 1934/35. However, it is not enough to list the 300.000 members and 72 deputies of 1939 or the officially 700.000 members and 86 deputies of 1978 to explain the PCF’s teleological dimension as a mass party. Despite years of having been banned and repressed the CP of Italy played an important role with anti - fascist resistance and the liberation of the country. Since 1946 it, too, had been a powerful party at elections until it was disbanded in 1990. In 1976, one third of the Italian electorate votes communist (34.4 %), in 1987 (26.6 %), and in 1989 it was one quarter ( European Election 27.6 %). Between 1946 and 1990 the party disposes of a very solid base of members (1946 : 2 million, 1970 : 1.5 million, and 1990 : 1.2 million ). Even though in absolute figures the PCI loses one million members between 1947 and 1990, it remains present at every level of Italian society ( universities, police, companies, administration), in every sphere ( culture, management ), and social group ( workers, farmers, students, etc.). The success of the PCF and PCI has deep roots. It incorporates the spheres of their “internal history” ( apparatus and cadres ) as well as their ideology and strategy. The long - standing tight - knit relationship to social and local communities ( municipalities, industrial branches, milieus of the suburbs of big cities, but also the rural population ) they had successfully penetrated is the true reason for the decades of political power of the PCF and PCI. But France and Italy do not stand alone : Reduced but still vital in 2008, this model of a special relationship also exists in Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Cyprus, and to a certain extent in the new federal states in Germany. From this point of view, three different types of communist self - conception and image can identified.6 They had originally followed each other but later existed side by side. Until 1990, in spite of national conditions, they can also be applied to various other Western European CPs. To a certain extent, they still prevail in 2008. 1. Occupied identities : Since their foundation in the early 1920s the CPs in France, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg had successfully taken over communities or groups with traditionally radicalized identities : certain red rural areas, some workers’ centers, and social - revolutionary circles. 2. Invented and created identities : Between 1918 and 1931 numerous European countries went through a strong surge of industrialization drawing on huge 5 6

See Courtois / Andolfatto, France, in this volume. On the typology of these identities see Lazar, Le communisme; id./ Courtois, Histoire du PCF; id. ( Ed.), La gauche en Europe depuis 1945; id., Maisons rouges.

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waves of migration. In addition to migration into cities within the country, foreign workers ( Italians, Poles, Spaniards, Flemish people, etc.) immigrated into the country. This new working class concentrated in the newly developing industrial centers ( heavy industry, metal processing, blast furnaces, mines, chemical industry ). Initially, the workers’ situation was very precarious. It deteriorated dramatically during the economic crisis of the early 1930s. Between 1933 and 1937 the PCF, like numerous CPs, embedded itself solidly within the working class. The 1936 strikes in France marked the decisive climax. CPs offered a new identity to the whole working class, but especially to the young people. The latter was a predominantly social one concentrating on the defense and protection of jobs, spending power, and the worker’s status. The protection of these interests was often supported by very active and powerful trade unions, in France, for example, by the CGT. The second dimension of identity was territorial : Its roots lay in the city councils, scores of which had been captured by communists since 1935.7 And finally there was a third form of identity : Collective and personal advancement could not take place then and there. The CPs contrasted this situation to the Soviet myth of assumption of power by the working class. In this constellation of euphoria due to a high number of followers and good results at elections within a stabilizing working - class, many CPs managed to create and stabilize a communist workers’ identity. At the same time the apparatus had been created. They were to disappear in 1989 or to manage the organizational crisis. They also chose the leading cadres of the present CPs ( i. e. the CPs in France, Italy, Spain, Cyprus, and Switzerland ). Radicalized identities : Due to their role with resistance against the National Socialist occupying force since 1941, from 1945 on the CPs were able to establish close ties to other groups whose socialist, pacifist, anti - fascist, or left - wing Christian positions and attitudes had been radicalized by the war, the collaboration of bourgeois groups with the German occupying forces, and finally by the fate of imprisoned and deported victims.8 These radicalized groups considered the communists the only reformative, independent, and honest major power of the future. The latter basked in their martyrdom, their participation in many governments immediately after the war, and in their solidarity with the Soviet Union who had been declared the only true winner against National Socialism. In some fields, this heritage has remained alive to this day : Even though the pacifist movement, for example, insists on its independence, the CPs have wide organizational and ideological access at their disposal. This holds true for anti - fascism, too, as well as for (newly inflamed) anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism. Since 1944/45, these three identities melted into a truly communist structure of identity set up around the hard core of the intrinsic communist worker’s identity. Thanks to their political abilities, CP chairmen like Maurice Thorez in 7 8

See Lazar, Maisons rouges. Cf. Vergnon, Les gauches européennes après la victoire nazie.

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France or Palmiro Togliatti in Italy managed to create the synergies necessary for this mergence. They had managed to assemble and align wide circles of small farmers, intellectuals, and wage earners of every type ( employees, state officials, etc.) around the nucleus of industrial workers. Until the early 1980s this was the central constituent of the power of French and Italian communism. Neither the retirement of these leaders nor de - Stalinization could shake or shatter the depth and stability of this identity. Without these synergies CPs began to decline (Austria, West Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Great Britain, etc.). After World War II the French CP as well as many other legal European CPs not operating clandestinely contented themselves with administrating their achievements restricted to “workers” and their proletarian culture. Italy was the only exception ( which, by the way, explains the phenomenon of the PDSI in 1990 and the separation of the Rifondazione ) : Here, due to the influence of Gramscism, bourgeois intellectuals became the object of a systematic and successful appeal and address. Furthermore, communist fixation on the myth of the “worker” had reinforced the natural self - consciousness and self - awareness of the workers. “Working class attitude” is the key concept of the time. This attitude becomes predominantly obvious by the fact that the sons of workers strive for nothing but a job at a factory, just like their fathers. The communist administration was satisfied to offer the next generation the chance to advance within the working class, i. e. in the apparatus, in the trade unions, and in the administration of party enterprises. This attitude favored immobility within working class communities. While supporting the class attitude of the working class, the French CP ( the CPI, the CP of Luxemburg, the CP of Belgium ) confined the workers to a double ghetto : a social ghetto where manual labor became the central value of the working world and a local ghetto which communist administrations had established as niches of survival. They accounted for the reproduction of the working class identity within narrow confines. In spite of these securities, the early 1960s brought about fundamental change. This concerned the territorial and collective world of the working class which was to shake the communist strongholds : Workers discovered privacy and preferred it to voluntary or enforced collective ties. This way they challenged the core of communist identity. The contribution of these commotions to the modernization of the CP was decisive. Due to a large and militant electorate, these distortions enabled the CPs to survive after 1989. The crisis of May 1968 was to erode the foundations of communism in Europe, independent of the power of the CPs in their particular countries. On the surface, 1968 created the impression of the youth demanding the return to the old revolutionary workers’ utopia and of a movement the CPs would benefit from. However, in reality it marked the beginning of a true revolution, the overthrowing of customs, political habits, and social relations. Suddenly, young workers demanded and strove for self - development. Leitmotif of this breakup was the fight against authorities, be it family or manager, party or trade union.

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At the same time, all CPs and their affiliated trade unions had to deal with massive criticism from the left - wing for the readiness of the PCF or PCI to compromise in May / June 1968. Everywhere in Europe, CPs had to face left - wing extremist competition mostly characterized by the rising of Maoist groups. These rivals destroyed the nimbus of the “powerful party of the working class”. They forced the big “orthodox” European CPs as well as the small ones to re - orient themselves. The left - wing / left - wing extremist wave has weakened the communist camp on the long run, as we know now. External pressure on CPs, whether rooted in their societies or not, was severe. They were forced to get interested in topics which were to become essential after 1989 : the question of women’s rights, the position of intellectuals, and ecology, to name a few. It was much more than the covering of new semantic fields. The parties had to integrate into new organizational forms which were noxious for the traditional organization of a vanguard party based upon democratic centralism. This experience was to reoccur over and again. Every time, the old model of the “party of the working class” was more damaged. Since 1989, especially since 1994, most CPs have discovered the surviving left - wing, mostly Trotskyite groups. They found them to be compatible with what had been called a “pole of radicalness from the left”. In 1995, another actor stepped into the limelight : the anti - globalization movement which is characterized by its strong dynamics and increasing attractiveness. To survive, the PCs had to adapt new practices and ideological positions every time. Thus, their electoral image became diffuse. At the same time internal tensions between members, apparatus, and leadership multiplied. There were profound reasons for this development. The economic crisis emerging since 1974 accelerated this process. Its consequences hit all CPs including those who had been legalized shortly before in Spain and Portugal. The sociological backbones of PCF, PCI, and the CPs in Great Britain, Luxemburg, and Belgium were hit by this development. The workers’ strongholds and the industries there ( mining, steel production, shipbuilding ) went through a period of change. The working class downsized dramatically, lost homogeneity, togetherness, and comparability. In France and Belgium about a quarter of the working class has since consisted of foreign workers, plus numerous unskilled workers (young people and women ) and more and more unemployed people. In short : One crisis of capitalism in 1931 had lead to its birth, and another to its disintegration and dissolution in the Mid - 1970s. All over Europe, the communist working - class identity underwent a severe crisis. In France, Belgium, or Luxemburg, the references of this crisis can be followed easily : They create an image of the CPs in the year 1990. In the 1920s and 1930s the “bourgeois” society had discriminated against the communist working class population which still had managed to stabilize itself. Because of the communists, the workers had managed to recreate a new collective identity. In the second period, during the 1940s to 1960s, this group felt an integral and

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integrated part of society due to their dedication and commitment to resistance. Still they continued to negotiate their relations to society collectively, in the political field ( through CPs ) as well as in the social sphere ( through trade unions influenced by communists. For decades, they were the only active workers’ unions ). During a third period, large parts of this community felt strong enough to attempt the individual advancement which leads to integration into society and to a change of social strata. Workers and farmers’ communities thus used CPs as vectors of integration, as a soft entrance to accomplish change towards modernity. The integration of party adherents into society initiated an internal process of disintegration of the communist vector : It had lost its function. The solidity of the communist system embodied by the CPSU was able to conceal this crisis. The end of Soviet communism forced the leading apparatus to make a number of ideological and organizational changes. As for the voters, with the exception of Italy, the consequences were even more severe : The citizens were less and less willing to act within a collective body they did not really feel to be a part of any longer. They refused to do it just for the sake of political reasons or “tradition”. At ballots, too, voters elected according to their present individual interests. For a long time, voting CP had been one of the tenets of communist identity. But from the early 1980s on communist voters all over Europe found their way back to the liberty of their own decision. Polls in different countries have clearly proven them to have always made a very conscientious use of their vote, while carefully considering the type of election as well as time and local factors. After this process of modernization the communist loyalty of the vote has banalized and marginalized itself or just expired. The end of the 1980s was the turning point for the communist movement. Its actual influence within Europe had receded considerably in politics as well as within trade unions. Their identity had been reduced strictly to the teleological dimension. And even the latter was questioned by Gorbachev who even denied its necessity. The breakdown of the Soviet system hit the CPs with full impact. This shock forced every CP to reassess its self - conception and - image, to think about its history, and to judge the value of its organizational, communal, utopian, or union heritage for its survival. The 1970s develop into the decade of Euro - communism.9 This phenomenon has left deep marks in the development of CPs in Europe. The ideological statements of Euro - communist CPs ( The French KPF, the Italian PCI, the Spanish PCE, whose point of view is shared by the Belgian and Finnish Euro - communist tendencies10) make their common ideological main features clear. At least some 9

For the analysis of this phenomenon until the 1980s, see : Narkiewicz, Eurocommunism 1968–1986. Important works : Harvey, A Short History of Communism; Laclau / Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy; Narkiewicz, Toward a Theory of Eurocommunism. 10 Cf. Dörr, Wandel des Kommunismus in Westeuropa; Naif, L’eurocommunisme en Belgique.

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aspects of Euro - communism are a heritage helpful for the understanding of the present functional types of communist or post - communist parties. Euro - communism seems to mean the acceptance of the national character of the respective CP, thus opposing Moscow’s approach of parties “without a native land”. Furthermore, it takes into account the democratic traditions of the European workers’ movement. It strives for a kind of socialism “with a human face”. Internally, Euro - communism means the introduction of a democratic organization close to the party’s rank and file, and the loosening or abandonment of democratic centralism. All Euro - communist parties and movements reject the Bolshevist view of the existence of one single, uniform integrative center of the communist world movement. Consequently, these parties strictly oppose externally prescribed ideological “lines” or similar mechanisms to steer their apparatus. Comintern is declared outdated as a role model as well as its successor Cominform. The Eurocommunist CPs emphasize that the different political, social, cultural, and economic conditions in different countries cannot be truly understood and judged by Moscow. Clearly, this implies the rejection of the Soviet concept of proletarian internationalism which justifies the egalitarian unity of the communist movement and entails subordination to the Soviet Union. The Euro - communist counter model proposes “unity in diversity” with every single CP having the right and the obligation to independently decide about and realize its own policy. The different CPs ought to choose their own way by creating a synthesis between the ideological key theses of communism – especially anti - capitalism – and the traditions of their own countries. CPs – whether in power or not – ought to cultivate a relationship of total equality and mutual non - interference into their respective interior affairs. Of course Euro - communist parties do not totally refrain from consistent future global prospects; but they are considered “international solidarity” based upon a voluntary agreement between equals. The communist world conferences organized by Moscow used to be celebrated like religious “masses for the masses” and were instruments of coordination by force. Now, they are regarded obsolete.11 Euro - communists prefer bilateral talks and regional meetings, for example of the CPs of the Mediterranean. They also prefer to develop contacts to socialists, social democrats, and other progressive actors formerly frowned upon.12 Cooperation with progressive Christian - Catholic and liberal actors is also considered important. In 2008, we can state the realization of this concept. Communist and post - communist parties among the members of the NELF, the GUE / NGL group at the European Parliament, and the European Left Party certainly search for common strategies. But this is done on the political basis of strict independence. Furthermore, the conviction has continued to exist that 11

Cf. Lévesque, Italian communists versus the Soviet Union; Schoch, Die internationale Politik der italienischen Kommunisten. 12 Cf. Amato / Cafagna, Duello a sinistra; Paggi / D’Angelillo, I comunisti Italiani e il riformismo.

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communist and post - communist parties need to emerge into civil society and attempt to communicate with every progressive force. And finally, the idea has been accepted – if with some gnashing of teeth – of the necessity to renounce any formation of a revolutionary social “countervailing power”. Unions and other organizations influenced by communists are also granted autonomy of action instead of unconditional loyalty.13 Ultimately, this means giving up the principle of systematic infiltration of friendly organizations and allies by the communist apparatus. In the course of the 1970s terms like the revolution and its barricades as well as the idea of October 1917 being a relevant model to conquer power disappear from the Euro - communist vocabulary, just like the term of “dictatorship of the proletariat”. Of course, the Euro - communists have not given up the goal of conquering power. But they want to get there by peaceful means – the so - called “democratic way” to socialism. They imagine a takeover of power inspired by Gramsci : The first step for the left - wing forces is to gain political hegemony supported by a solid majority of the population.14 Then power will automatically fall into the hands of the Euro - communist and progressive bloc like a ripe fruit. To this very day, European reformist communist and post - communist parties refer to this process. The basic difference, however, is the balance of power : In the 1970s it was favorable for communists, but presently it has changed in favor of socialist and social democratic parties. Presently, the latter are much more influential than the CPs. The second difference concerns the situation of the progressive forces : In the 1970s, powerful wings of the socialist parties were inspired by Marxism and favored alliances with the CPs. They do not exist any longer, and, like in France, socialists have long since made peace with capitalism. The continuity from Euro - communism to present attitudes of European CPs is indicated by their clear theoretical dissociation from social democratic positions – in spite of the desired cooperation with social democrats that may lead to the participation in government like formerly in France and in Italy. Yesterday’s as well as today’s communists are well aware that “social - democratization” could make their movements disappear in a short time. Communists have always been mostly anti - capitalists. This is no longer the basic attitude of socialists and social democrats in power and collaborating with the system all over Europe. Therefore, communist reproaches of social democracy have remained unchanged during the last forty years : According to Carillo, the PCE leader, Social democratic reforms intend to resolve and ameliorate defects of capitalism but do not aim at a fundamental change of society. However, exactly this fundamental transformation of society remains the final communist goal, whether in its Euro - communist variant then or in its post - communist one now. Revolutionary violence is excluded for this change of society. But communists 13 Cf. Raphael, Partei und Gewerkschaft; Braun, Die italienischen Gewerkschaften und die Kommunistische Partei. 14 Cf. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks; Togliatti, Scritti su Gramsci; Simon / Hall, Gramsci’s Political Thought; Pellicani, Gramsci, Togliatti e il PCI.

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do not refrain from certain compulsory measures : nationalization, state control of banks and insurance companies as well as of big enterprises, control of public invitations to bid, “democratization” of schools and universities, of police, army, etc. The central idea behind this measure is the expected resistance of the propertied class to its expropriation and the inescapable confrontation. The Euro - communists also reappraised the history of communism and of its founding act, namely the 1917 Russian October Revolution. Gramsci’s theses partly influenced their critical conclusion : The bloody revolution could not be taken as the universally mandatory model of transition to socialism, especially not for developed capitalist states with democratic traditions. The industrialized countries could not be compared with Tsarist Russia. To bring the “ideological sting” back into the communist project, an undogmatic analysis of the political systems in their national frames, of social relationships and classes was considered absolutely necessary. The importance of parliamentary - democratic traditions ( the achievements of the French Revolution of 1789) necessitated new forms of the transition to socialism. Presently, reformist communist and post communist parties share the same conviction : The traditional class analysis is given up in favor of a modern, present day societal sociology. Having abandoned the Leninist analysis, this sociology can turn to the “positive dimensions” of democracy ( the “libertarian goods” ). These positive dimensions could then be incorporated into the programmatic offer of a complete transformation of societies. Euro - communists described their democratic way to socialism as a policy of alliances involving different partners and even competing parties. This approach certainly implies the acceptance of party pluralism including not only progressive forces but all political formations. Euro - communists clearly approved of general, direct, and secret ballot elections. This approval in turn implies the rejection of the Leninist role model. They approved of parliament as an institution legitimized by the people and as a fully accepted normative element. It was no longer dismissed as a bourgeois - capitalist tool. Another common approach of Euro - communism and the present positions of the CPs is their intention to re read Marx with the aim of a new and deeper insight and comprehension of the societies which those parties are immersed in.15 Marxism was no longer the only key to the comprehension of history, society, and economy. The doctrine was completed by a number of Marxist and socialist authors adding new dimensions like psychology. Today, communists and post - communists have progressed even further because they must take into account the consequences of the success of the new social movements. The Marxist process of including new authors and theoretical fields was industriously continued and extended, for example by absorbing topics like totalitarianism, environmentalism, feminism, individualism, etc.

15 Even though Euro - communists still used the term of “scientific socialism”.

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For a long time Moscow considered Euro - communists traitors because they had dared to criticize the Soviet Union and its system of power in Eastern Europe.16 Thus, they removed themselves from the pro - Soviet parties professing the conditions in the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies to be the best possible “real existing Socialism”. Euro - communists assembled a series of critical comments from the rejection of the excessive centralization and bureaucratization of economic and political power in the Soviet system to ideological critique accusing the Soviet Union of a lack of effort to overcome Stalinism.17 They explicitly condemned the primacy of the goals of the Soviet military - industrial complex to which every necessary reform in the social, political, and cultural intellectual fields were submitted. The Euro - communist parties did not judge the development of socialist democracy in the USSR in a friendlier manner : They spoke of “russification” and the oppression of minority rights in the USSR, denounced steps against religious practice and against believers, condemned the latent anti - Semitism / anti - Zionism, and the persecution of dissidents. The march into and occupation of the CSSR, the cleansing of the Czech CP, the forcing into line of the country, as well as the oppressive measures after the 1970 Polish workers’ revolts are further points of criticism. But the Euro - communists kept emphasizing that their goals were by no means “anti - communist” or “anti Soviet” and referring to their declaration at the East - Berlin Conference. At this meeting of European CPs late in June 1976 it was openly declared that “not all who do not agree with the policy ( of the USSR ) or who adopt a critical position about its actions can be called anti - communists.” Still, the Euro - communists tried to avoid any rupture with the Soviet Union. They kept emphasizing their “critical solidarity”, sometimes recurring to the “positive total balance” of Eastern European countries – a famous dictum of the leader of the French communists, Georges Marchais. But Euro - communists also bluntly spoke about changes they thought necessary in the Soviet power bloc : the introduction of a pluralist, democratic model of socialism, the abolishment of any state ideology and the abandoning of the supremacy of the CP within the political system in the case of an electoral defeat – i. e. the voluntary giving up of power and return to the opposition role. This short overview of Euro - communism could be refined by considering the specific approaches of the different actors. In fact, the positions of the Italians are not totally identical with those of the Spaniards, the Frenchmen, or the Belgians in the 1970s. But looking for a generally valid formula, one could maintain Euro - communism to have sped up the decline of Western communism and to have been one of the many nails in the coffin of real existing socialism.18 For the CPs it was the chance to start a mutation as shown by the transformation of 16 The Albanian leader condemned Euro - communism, too : Hoxha, Eurokommunismus ist Antikommunismus. The Trotskyite currant did the same : Mandel, Critique de l’eurocommunisme, Paris 1978. 17 Cf. Zänker, Die Abkehr der italienischen Kommunisten von Moskau. 18 Cf. Kertzer, Politics and Symbols.

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the PCI and of the PDS.19 This mutation is still going on and now enables them to play a modest role, but not an unimportant one, in the game of the European forces.

II.

The Decay of the Soviet Union and its Consequences

1.

The Revolutions and the Loss of Power of the Eastern PCs

The revolutionary changes of autumn 1989 in the zone of Soviet influence and in the USSR were initiated mainly by Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy. But they were also caused by the process of change of the civil societies that had been going on in numerous Eastern countries since the beginning of the 1980s. These changes had also been results of the so - called Helsinki policy of détente of the 1970s of the Conference on Security and Co - operation in Europe ( CSCE ). This policy led to the USSR giving up its political and strategic orientation.20 Gorbachev’s key role in the process of the collapse of communism is evident – but ambiguous. Certainly he had opened a breach to reform ideas with his policy of “glasnost” and “perestroika“, but he had never had the slightest intention to destroy the Soviet system.21 This system proved itself much more fragile than Gorbachev or anybody else had ever expected.22 The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has complex reasons. The populations remember the insurgencies of June 17, 1953 in the GDR and of 1956 in Hungary,23 the 1968 Prague Spring, and resistance by the trade union in Poland since 1981. Militarily, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, the collapse of the Marxist liberation movements around the world, the incapability of the USSR to keep up with American research in the field of “star wars” military technology,24 but also to maintain the scientific level of the Western countries, particularly the state of the art of the electronic industry, weakened the Soviet aura. 19 Cf. Canfora, La crisi dell’est e il PCI; Vacca, Gorbačëv e la sinistra europea; Ignazi, Dal PCI al PDS; Minucci, L’ ultima sfida; Prospero, Il nuovo inizio; Pilieri, La grande mutazione; Weinberg, The transformation of Italian communism. 20 On the détente and its effects, see : Bowker / Williams, Superpower Détente; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation; Loth, Overcoming the Cold War; Oudenaren, Détente in Europe. 21 On Gorbachev’s thinking, see : Åslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle; Brown, The Gorbachev Factor. 22 The number of publications on the period of 1989–1991 is enormous. Among the most important are : Ash, Im Namen Europas; Dalos, Archipel Gulasch; Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer; Maier, Dissolution; Szabó, Some Lessons of Collective Protests. 23 On these events and their international consequences, see among others : Foitzik ( Ed.), Entstalinisierungskrise in Ostmitteleuropa. 24 On the arms race, see : Bartlett, The Global Conflict 1880–1970. On the Star War Initiative, see : Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue; O’Sullivan, The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister.

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Ideologically, communism completely lost its teleological aspects and fell back to rituals and a phraseology devoid of any attraction for the population.25 The support of revolutionary movements and of the economies of brother nations like Cuba, the financing of pro - Soviet CPs around the world, the restraints of the repayment of debts to the West accumulated in the 1970s weighed heavily on the communist economies which were more and more afflicted.26 Profound change occurred within communist societies. The CPs are forced to go along with the technical modernization to which they had aspired in order to respond to the “imperialist threat”. A technical elite feebly politicized or completely nonpolitical develops and regards the future of “real socialism” with evergrowing skepticism.27 The majority of party members are also more and more disappointed because they can no longer gain profit from their adherence. The official party is still the one to distribute goods. But the reduced volume of goods to distribute leads to a more serious competition between potential beneficiaries. Clientelism grows. The people are forced to wait in lines or resort to black economy, either by bartering or by getting hold of foreign ( western ) currencies. Corruption and the increasing importance of black economies from the Baltic states to Romania, the growing integration of economies like that of the GDR or of Hungary into the global market, the regular circulation of information about the way of life and the prosperity of Western Societies discredited the socialist planned economy and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon ).28 The security forces and the organs certainly knew the attitude of the populations very well.29 They observed or infiltrated the formation of opposition groups.30 But they did no longer dare to resort to terror because of the lack of political will of the communist leading bodies. Almost everywhere in the Soviet sphere of influence a civil society develops that is in discord, later in opposition to the communist system.31 The rapid and – with the exception of Romania – bloodless implosion of the communist system is caused by the combination of two key factors : first, the capacity of the civil societies to free themselves from the fear of massive repression, to take to the streets, and to organize themselves in powerful political bodies. The second factor is the will and at the same time the incapability of the communist leaders, particularly Gorbachev, to reform the system. In this second 25 26 27 28 29

See : Furet, Das Ende der Illusion. On communist economy, see among others : Kornai, The Socialist System. See further down, about economic communist elites. On the COMECON, see among others : Ahrens, Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe ? On examples of resistance to communism, see : Beyrau, Intelligenz und Dissens; Kappeler / Simon / Brunner ( Eds.), Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion. 30 See Andrew / Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield; Mampel, Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der ehemaligen DDR; Borodziej / Kochanowski / Schäfer, Grenzen der Freundschaft. 31 See Glaeßner, Das Erbe des Kommunismus. In : Id., Demokratie nach dem Ende des Kommunismus, pp. 15–47; Beyme, Ansätze zu einer Theorie des Systemwechsels. In : id., Systemwechsel in Osteuropa, pp. 46–99.

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sphere, two different strata can be distinguished : Political and “operative” measures. Glasnost and perestroika, and the “My way” - doctrine characterize the political field, the Romanian revolution and change in Bulgaria and the GDR the operative dimension. The combination of these two factors made the communist system obsolete and condemned it to disappear. The period of transition began and lasted until 1991. In addition, the transformation of societies and political systems started. This short period of two years deeply imprinted the present situation of the post - communist world. Obviously, the Soviet transition takes by far the longest since it begins with Gorbachev’s coming into power and ends with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. In contrast, the transition period in Eastern Europe is a very short one : it is accomplished by the end of 1990 and, excepting Romania, it is peaceful. In Yugoslavia, however, a bloody conflict springs from the end of communism. In 1991 the result of this transition is on the whole positive.32 Young democracies have established themselves. They rest on a new social or political consensus and organize themselves along classic democratic norms : Constitutions guarantee freedom and liberty, the division of power, institutions, and legal norms. Practically without resistance, a political - legislative body is collectively accepted. Still, this institutional ensemble reflects former developments and the weight of history ( path dependency ). If it is evident that nobody foresaw the collapse of the communist system in 1989, it is also true that within the CPUS and numerous communist leaderships the shattered state and the fragility of the system were known. Thus, the 1989 implosion was the resultant of dynamics due to long - term change. The Eastern European change was neither as brutal nor as intense as former revolutions, for example that of 1917. Timothy Garton Ash coined the term of “refolutions”33 (combining the words “reform” and “revolution” ), calling up the moments of breakage inherent in every change of political system, but also the evident continuities visible in the reforms, the layout of the economy, or the organization of administrations. The central question is whether – aside from the specific chronology of each country – we deal with just one form of transition driven by the intention to eradicate the system of communist power or, to the contrary, different ways of breaking away from communism, and thus with transitions.34 A priori, the original conditions are identical from the Baltic States to Hungary. The Soviet economic system is at the end of its resources and the CPs no longer succeed in satisfying the needs of the people. Sociological changes 32 In 2008, the balance is generally positive, in spite of grey areas in Russia and Belarus. See : Merkel, Gegen alle Theorie ? In : Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 48 (2007), pp. 413– 433. 33 Ash, Ein Jahrhundert wird abgewählt. 34 See : Berglund / Ekman / Aarebrot ( Eds.), The Handbook of Political Change; Schneider / Schmitter, Liberalization, Transition and Consolidation. In : Democratization, 11 (2004) 5, pp. 59–90; Bunce, Rethinking Recent Democratization. In : World Politics, 55 (2003), pp. 167–92.

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have weakened the communist system of power everywhere. Dissatisfaction is predominant. The weight of history plays its role plainly and explains the plurality of ways leading away from communism. When this dissatisfaction pervades in societies which experienced strong moments of resistance to communism in the past ( Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia ), the transition will pass “from the grass roots” and be formed by the collective memory. A social mass movement, for example the Civic Forum in Czechia and Public Against Violence in Slovakia, establishes itself as the only legitimate authority quickly becoming legal. The “anti - communist” phase is enduring, and compromise with the remnants of the old regime is limited. The CPs and their supporters disappear. Rapid economic and institutional transformations enable these countries, for example the Czech Republic, to approach the European Union quickly during the period of transformation to follow. Countries of the Soviet type system, for example Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania, do not know active civil societies, nor do they have strong historical frames of reference of resistance to communism. Oppositional circles are rare. In these countries an external factor, namely Gorbachev’s perestroika, plays the decisive role in the 1989 rupture. The wings of the supporters of Gorbachev’s reforms of CPs relieve the “conservatives” of the power and tightly control the transitions attempting to keep the people from joining in. Continuities and compromise with the old system are numerous. A “reform from top - down” tends to introduce changes appearing democratic but maintaining the control of power in the same hands as before. In this case, the CPs rapidly reform themselves, some choosing to become social - democratic formations. Under this label or under that of “democratic socialist” formations, the ( ex - ) communist elites express their will to change, combined with the ambition to keep up their control of the economy.35 Even if the setting is democratic and elections are the source of political legitimacy, these societies remain torn by violent conflicts about the retaining of the political and economic power by the ex - communist reformers. A third model of breaking away from communism, namely the pact, exists in Hungary, Poland, and the GDR. The opposing camps negotiate with the intention of re - founding the state on the basis of a democratic way of sharing the power. Because of the necessity of the moderate elements to keep the hardliners from desperate action, everybody multiplied their concessions. However, the rules defined at these negotiations turned out to be hardly viable. The attempt of the Modrow government, but also of the Round Table bringing together SED reformers, representatives of the social movement and of the churches, to save the GDR did not stand up to the offer of a monetary union made by the FRG. The people took to the streets with the slogan “We are ONE people”. The majority voted the East German CDU which favored the unification of both states. Thus, the democratic rules adopted by the Round Table actually ruined the con35 See : Moreau, ( Ex - )Communist Elites and State Capture, in this volume.

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sensus achieved. In Poland, the situation is the same : The attempt of making General Jaruzelski the new president of the republic and of guaranteeing 65 % of the seats for communist MPs at the Sejm elections. Solidarity gained 99 of 100 seats at the free election of the Senate, thus demonstrating a division of the legal nation and the real nation. Limited to the short period of 1989–1990 in the Central, Eastern and Baltic European countries, the transitions were models of democratization in spite of imperfection and evident limits like in Bulgaria.36 In Russia and along the borders of the former Soviet empire, however, democracy could not implant itself. Instead, authoritarian or despotic political systems established themselves. Finally, the process of transition could also provoke a war, notably in Yugoslavia. 2.

The Landscape of Left - Wing ( Extremist ) Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

In the early 1990s the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes suggested that the communist single state parties of Eastern Europe were condemned to perish. But after a period of weakness their successor parties were often able to recover and to defend some of their political power, to return to government, or at least to play an important role as “effective parties” within the pluralist party systems of their respective states. The Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia are exceptions : There, the CPs were forbidden as former collaborators of the Soviet - Russian occupying power and were incapable to revitalize. In Slovenia and Croatia the war of independence and the Serbian - Yugoslav identity of communists made the latter disappear from the political stage for good. Only actors capable of reform survived politically.37 In the other Central and Eastern European states an effective revitalization required difficult mutations and adaptations to a changing and partly hostile environment. The development of the successor parties was stamped by the regime change and its role with the latter as well as by the new constellation of actors and institutional as well as socio - economic determining factors of the system. Beginning with the nature and the intensity of system transformation, one can identify a first group of states : There, liberalization and democratization were rapid and the new constitutional states reached a high degree of consolidation in a relatively short time. This holds true for the Baltic States, and especially for the ( former ) GDR, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia. In this context, Eastern Germany is a special case. After the – surprising and unintentional – fall of the wall, transition lead to a rapidly accelerating uni36 On “defective democracy”, see : Merkel et al., Defekte Demokratie, vol. 1 : Theorie, Opladen 2003. 37 See Lukšič, Das politische System Sloweniens; Zakosek, Das politische System Kroatiens. Both in : Ismayr ( Ed.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas, pp. 637–675, 677–726.

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fication process with Western Germany. The political institutions and actors of the West were expanded to the East. Deprived of power, the former single state party changed only half - heartedly. But it survived in a hostile environment as an Eastern regional party vainly attempting to gain ground in the West for a long time. The single state parties in Poland and Hungary were far more successful. Before 1989 already, there had been far more reform - oriented forces among their membership, and they played an active and creative role with the shaping of transition. Due to a process of rigorous social - democratization, they temporarily returned to government and established themselves as important actors within their respective party systems. The CP of Lithuania experienced a similar process after the transition.38 The Czech case resembles the German one because the KSČM did not go through a process of fundamental change of political identity. It was even less enthusiastic of reforming than the PDS. To this day, a positive appraisal of the pre - 1989 period prevails. In contrast to the PDS, the KSČM was able to play the role of a national protagonist of the nay.39 This holds somewhat true for Slovakia, too, which belongs to a second group of states together with Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Serbia, and Croatia. There, the process of liberalization and democratization was interrupted by authoritarian periods and / or the evolving constitutional state had problems of consolidation. In the early 1990s the orthodox - communist KSS emerged from the splitting off of the reform - oriented CP. At the 2002 parliamentary elections it reached 6.3 % of the vote and 11 seats. But four years later it dropped to 3.8 % of the vote.40 The reform - oriented successor party of the CP, SDĽ, was more successful for some time. But its immense pragmatism, making it even participate in national - conservative government coalitions, ruined its reputation with the electorate. SMER even went one step further : The party formed a government with the Slovakian ultra nationalists, but organizationally it can only be considered a successor party in a very limited way. The Slovak scene is symptomatic of a tendency in Eastern Europe hardly to be found in the West, namely unconventional unions and alliances of socialism with nationalism. This was the case, for example, with Milosevic’s SPS that had emerged from the Serbian CP. In the 1990s the SPS was able to defend its predominant position within a pluralist party system because of the Balkan wars and the Kosovo Conflict and because of adroitly playing the Greater Serbian nationalist card. However, after the 2000 changeover of power it lost importance as a merely half - heartedly reformed party. At the elections in January 2007 it only received 5.6 % of the vote.41 Ion Iliescu’s Partidul Democraţiei Sociale din România ( PDSR ) was more successful. Especially in the mid - 1990s it emphasized national patriotism and remained in government until 2004. Even after38 See : Janusauskiené, The Metamorphosis of the Communist Party of Lithuania. In : Bozóki / Ishiyama ( Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties, pp. 224–239. 39 See the contibution of Miroslav Mareš in this volume. 40 See : Ibid. 41 See the contribution of Irena Ristić in this volume.

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wards as a social - democratized party it was able to maintain high election returns. But the Romanian party as well as the Serbian one only used nationalist rhetoric with their ideology remaining predominantly socialist / social - democratic. As far as the Russian CPRF is concerned, there is a discussion as to whether it may still be considered belonging to the left - wing since its president Zjuganov has developed the nationalist ideological elements introduced by Stalin into “Soviet conservatism”.42 The CPRF conjures up the glorious past of the October Revolution and the Victory of the Great Patriotic War and pleads for the “building of socialism” and the nationalization of the oil and gas industry. This does not have much to do with the Western European concept of conservatism. One of the present paradoxes of Russia under Putin / Medwedew is the fact that this party with its still very considerable apparatus has been the only true opposition party in the State Duma. It received 11.6 % of the vote in the manipulated 2007 election. At the same time, it is exploited by the Kremlin in order to demonstrate that “democracy” in Russia would be far worse off with the communists back in power.43 Russia belongs to a group of states where the process of transformation stopped in a hybrid no - man’s - land between autocracy and constitutional state or even ended in clearly autocratic forms. The same holds true for Belarus where political parties – if they are permitted – have only very modest influence if they support Lukashenko’s authoritarian system. Both CPs have remained loyal and faithful to the teachings of Marxism - Leninism. But their working conditions are different : One is a loyal follower of Lukashenko and so to speak part of the “party of power”, while the other one is keeping its distance and paying for it by being kept away from all resources. In the Ukraine, the “party of power” has dissolved during the 2004 Orange Revolution. The political influence of those sailing under the communist flag ( with hammer and sickle ) has been overcome even though the Ukrainian CP managed to increase its vote from 3.7 to 5.4 % at the 2007 parliamentary elections compared to those of the year before. But since – just like in many other Eastern European States – there was no change of elites or lustration, adaptable former communists hold responsible positions everywhere. Presently, it is difficult to judge the consequences on the establishing of democracy. The evaluation of the situation in the small Republic of Moldova is easier. Moldova is the only Eastern European country where a party calling itself communist namely the Partidul Comuniştilor din Republica Moldova ( PCRM ), has been able to win overwhelming electoral victories (2001 : 50.1; 2005 : 46.0 % of the vote ). On the whole, in the pluralist systems of Central and Eastern Europe there are practically no authentic CPs strong enough to veto. Wherever they might be able to do so because of their vote, like in Russia, they are stopped by the 42 See : Umland, Neue ideologische Fusionen im russischen Antidemokratismus. In : Backes / Jesse ( Eds.), Gefährdungen der Freiheit, pp. 371–406, here 393–402. 43 See the contribution of Galina Michaleva in this volume.

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restricted competitiveness of “electoral authoritarianism”.44 The most successful successor parties have largely been social - democratized. The less adaptationinterested but still quite successful left - wing parties in Germany and the Czech Republic are exceptions that need to be analyzed. The historical roots of the Czech communists are very deep. They exploit anti - Western resentment and distinguish themselves as the counterpole of the “neo - liberal” establishment. For the German Linkspartei, the pretense of “colonization” by the West Germans can be assumed an important element of motivation for a part of the electorate.45 Its recent success in establishing itself in the West depends largely on the social populist resistance to the painful restructuring of the German social state promoted by social democracy led by Gerhard Schröder.

III.

Competing Ideological Tendencies

Scientific literature uses several typologies for the classification of ( post - )communist parties. Most of them are based on ideological orientations. András Bozóki and John T. Ishiyama suggest a two - dimensional categorization : They categorize the communist successor parties by 1) their complete or partial reformation / renewal and 2) their “transmutation”.46 The first axis is based on a scale from orthodox Moscow - oriented communism to social democracy, the second on the dichotomic difference between internationalism and nationalism. The first axis corresponds with the accepted differentiation between the revolutionary and reform - oriented left which the authors combine with the question of the acceptance of liberal democracy. While the revolutionary left intends to abolish the economic as well as the political system of competition, the reformoriented left strives for socio - economic change within the institutional and regulatory framework of the democratic constitutional state. The authors use the categories “democratic”, “semi - democratic”, and “anti - democratic”. The second axis accounts for the fact that after the transition some former single state parties attempted to guarantee their survival by channeling nationalist, ethnocentric - xenophobe, sometimes even anti - semitic emotions and resentments. This way, they approached the opposite political extreme, creating a peculiar amalgamation of egalitarian and anti - egalitarian, “left - wing” and “right - wing” elements. It seems doubtful whether this amalgamation is more than just political rhetoric and sufficient to establish an ideological tendency of its own. Furthermore, the category of the partially renewed parties does not elucidate how and in which direction the programs of the respective organizations have developed. Therefore, we suggest classifying the post - communist European left parties in 44 See : Schedler ( Ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism. 45 See : Grzymała - Busse, Redeeming the Communist Past, p. 274. 46 Bozóki / Ishiyama, Introduction and Theoretical Framework. In : Id. ( Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties, pp. 3–13, here 7–8.

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four categories : Social democracy and the traditionalists are the two extreme poles. Social democratic parties doubtlessly accept the tenets of a democratic constitutional state. They do not want to abolish market economy but intend to reform capitalism instead. In spite of certain adaptations, the traditionalists, on the other hand, are still faithfully devoted to communist orthodoxy and plan to overcome the constitutional state as well as capitalism in the long run. Between these two extremes we find two further categories ambivalent towards the basic principles of liberal democracy and market economy, namely reform - oriented communism on the one hand and the red - green left on the other. Both tendencies maintain important parts of traditional Marxist theory ( like anti - fascism, anti - imperialism, anti - capitalism, class struggle, the “historic mission”, a teleological concept of history ). But they reject organizational Leninism ( democratic centralism, ban on factions, concept of the vanguard party, “dictatorship of the proletariat” ). Internally, they make room for a plurality of socialist study or working groups and platforms. The organizational principles of reform - oriented communists and red - green left - wing formations are closer to the constitutional state. But the adherence to Marxist and sometimes Leninist principles create a conflictual relationship permitting a semi - loyal attitude at best. In the medium range, the democratic constitutional state – interpreted as a liberal - capitalist system – may well be the stage for achieving political hegemony. In the long range, it has to give way to the classless and stateless society of the future. Social democracy is omitted below. The other tendencies cannot always be classified unambiguously. Theoretical borderlines are often obliterated by empirical reality. Internally, the actors often embody various tendencies whose balance of power may change in the course of times. 1.

The Traditionalist Model

The traditionalist wing consists of about 40 “big” parties and is “archetypal” : The CPs characterize themselves as revolutionary, working - class oriented, and active with trade unions, internationalist, anti - imperialist, and anti - fascist. They define themselves as vanguard parties. Especially in the post - communist countries most of them still function along the lines of democratic centralism. In general, they refuse any alliance with socialists or social democrats and consider the alter - globalization movement a competitor they want to fight, infiltrate, or exploit. From the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains, the organizational and electoral presence of this traditionalist wing differs widely in Europe. Maoist and Trotskyite groups are also traditionalists. Electorally, however, they are insignificant except in some countries like France, Great Britain, or Belgium. Therefore, they are not represented in the following table.

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Table 1: Marxist-Leninist Parties Albania Austria Belarus

Belgium

Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria

Partia Komuniste Shqiptare (Communist Party of Albania) Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (Communist Party of Austria) Kamunistychnaya Partyia Belarusi (Communist Party of Belarus) Partyia Kamunistau Belaruskaia (Belarusian Party of Communists) Partij van de Arbeid van België (Workers’ Party of Belgium) Parti Communiste belge (Communist Party of Belgium) Radnicko-komunisticka partja Bosne I Hercegovine (Workers’ Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

www.pksh.org

Партия на Българските комунисти (Party of Bulgarian Communists) Komunisticheska Partiya na Bulgariya (Communist Party of Bulgaria)

www.communist-bg.org

Българска Работническо-Селска Партия (Bulgarian Workers-Peasants Party) Croatia Socijalisticka radnicka partija Hrvatske (Socialist Workers’ Party of Croatia) Czech Republic Komunisticka Strana Cech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) Cyprus Anorthotikon Komma Ergazemenou Laou (The Progressive Party of the Working People) Denmark Kommunistisk Parti i Danmark (Communist Party in Denmark) * KPiD Ungdom (KPiD Youth) Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti (Communist Party of Denmark) Estonia Eestimaa Kommunistlik Partei / Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Estonii (Communist Party of Estonia) Finland Kommunistinen Työväenpuolue (Communist Workers Party) Suomen kommunistinen puolue (Communist Party of Finland)

www.kpoe.at

www.pvda.be www.particommuniste.be www.rkp-bih.cjb.net

brsp.hit.bg

www.srp.hr www.kscm.cz

www.akel.org.cy

www.kommunisterne.dk

www.dkp.dk

www.kaapeli.fi/~ktp/ index.html www.skp.fi

556 Germany

Greece Hungary Ireland und North Ireland Latvia Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macedonia

Malta Moldova

Netherlands

Norway Poland Portugal Romania

Uwe Backes / Patrick Moreau Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (German Communist Party) Arbeiterbund für den Wiederaufbau der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (Workers’ League for the Reconstruction of the Communist Party of Germany) Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany) Kommunistiko Komma Ellados (Communist Party of Greece) Munkáspárt (Workers’ Party) Communist Party of Ireland / Páirtí Cumannach na hÉireann Latvijas Sociālistiskā partija (Socialist Party of Latvia) Lietuvos Komunistu Partija / Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Litvy (Communist Party of Lithuania) Kommunistische Partei LuxemburgSektion Luxembourg (Communist Party of LuxembourgLuxembourg Section) Nova Komunisticka Partija na Makedonija (Communist Party of Macedonia) Partit Komunista Malti (Communist Party of Malta) Партия коммунистов Республики Молдова (The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova) Nieuwe Communistische Partij Nederlands (New Communist Party of the Netherlands) Norges Kommunistiske Parti (Communist Party of Norway) Komunistyczna Partia Polski (Communist Party of Poland) Partido Comunista Português (Communist Party of Portugal) Noul Partid Comunist Român (New Romanian Communist Party)

www.dkp.de www.arbeiterbund-fuerden-wiederaufbau-derkpd.de/Dokumente.html

www.k-p-d-online.de www.kke.gr www.munkaspart.hu www.communistpartyofireland.ie www.latsocpartija.lv/?l=2

ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/kpllux

www.pcrm.md

www.ncpn.nl

www.nkp.no www.kompol.type.pl/test2 www.pcp.pt www.npcr.ro

Conclusion Russian Federation

Serbia and Montenegro Slovakia Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

557

Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiskoi www.rkrp-rpk.ru Federatsii (Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Russia) www.rkrp-rpk.ru Российская Коммунистическая Рабочая Партия – Революционная Партия Коммунистов, РКРП-РПК; Rossiiskaja Kommunističeskaja Rabočaja Partija – Revolyutsionnaja Partija Kommunistov) (Communist Workers Party of Russia – Party of Communists of Russia) Soyuz Kommunisticheskih Partii www.cprf.ru Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza (Union of Communist Parties) Nova Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije nkpj.110mb.com (New Communist Party of Yugoslavia) Komunistická strana Slovenska www.kss.sk (Communist Party of Slovakia) Partido Comunista de España www.pce.es (Communist Party of Spain) * Partit dels Comunista de Catalunya www.pcc.es del Tarragonès (Party of Communists of Catalonia, Spanish State) * Euskadiko Partido Comunista www.pcc.es (Euskadi Communist Party) * Partido Comunista de Andalucía de www.pcc.es Almería (Communist Party of Andalucia in Almería) * Partido Comunista de Castilla y León www.pcc.es (Communist Party of Castile and Leon) * Partit Comunista del Pais Valencia www.pcc.es (Communist Party of the Valencian Country) Unificación Comunista de España www.uce.es (Communist Unity of Spain) Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de www.pcpe.es España (Communist Party of the People of Spain) Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti www.skp.se (Communist Party of Sweden) Kommmunistiska Partiets www.kpmlr.se (Communist Party) Les communistes (The Communists) www.lescommunistes.org

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Ukraine

United Kingdom

Komunistyčna Partija Ukraïny (onovlena) (Communist Party of Ukraine [renewed]) Комуністична партія України, Komunistychna Partiya Ukrayiny (Communist Party of Ukraine) Leninskaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Ukrainy (Leninist Communist Party of the Ukraine) Communist Party of Britain * Communist Party Cymru, Wales * Communist Party Scotland New Communist Party of Britain Revolutionary Communist Group

Worldwide

1.1

www.kpu.net.ua

vlksm-lksmu.org

www.communistparty.org.uk www.welshcommunists.org www.scottishcommunists. org.uk www.newworker.org easyweb.easynet.co. uk/~rcgfrfi/index.html

Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) World Federation of democratic Youth The International Union of Students

www.rcpbml.org.uk/ contact.htm wfdy.org www.stud.uni-hannover.de/gruppen/ius International Federation of Resistance www.fir.at Fighters World Federation of Scientific Workers assoc.pagespro-orange.fr/ fmts.wfsw/index.htm World Peace Council www.wpc-in.org Women’s International Democratic www.fdim-widf.com.br Federation

Traditionalist Parties in their Respective Political Systems

Except for the common denominators mentioned above, the differences between these parties are extreme. Frequently, there are several orthodox formations to compete in one country. There are two unexpected events : The first one is the coming into power of one of these PCs by a democratic election. The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova ( Partidul Comuniştilor din Republica Moldova ), heir of the CP of the Socialist Republic of Moldova, has refused any social - democratization after 1990. Even in 2008 it still calls itself communist and has kept the insignia of hammer and sickle. The Moldavian president, Vladimir Voronin, is a member of the PCRM. At the March 6, 2005, general

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elections the party came out far ahead with 45.98 % of the vote (716,336 votes) and 56 of the 101 seats of the Moldavian Assembly. The majority of members of the multi - party government belong to the PCRM. For a long time the party supported the economic and political rapprochement with the Russian Federation, while the other Moldavian parties favored a rapprochement with Romania. But things have begun to develop : Orthodoxy is on the retreat. Under Voronin several state - owned industries were privatized, and the European integration and the eventual EU membership have been evoked as an alternative to the Russian “solution”. The second rather unexpected development happened in Cyprus : In a runoff election, the Greek Cypriots elected Dimitris Christofias, secretary general of AKEL, their new president. He received 53 % of the vote, his opponent got 46 %. In the Balkans, the CPs on former Yugoslavian territory share the idea of the re - foundation of this state. But their approaches are quite different. The New CP of Yugoslavia ( Nova Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije – NKPJ ) evolved in 1990 and is headed by Branko Kitanovic. The party strives for the re - unification of the Yugoslavian state according to Tito’s centralist model. The NKPJ has sister organizations in Montenegro ( New Communist Party of Montenegro – NKPCG ), Macedonia ( New Communist Party of Macedonia – NCPM ), and Bosnia - Herzegovina ( New Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina – NKPBIH ). The NKPJ has tried to organize a New Communist Party of Slovenia (NKPS ) and a New Communist Party of Croatia ( NKPH ). But the New CP of Yugoslavia does not play any role at elections, and boycotted the January 2006 parliamentary elections in Serbia. The Workers’ Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina – WCBH (Radničko - komunistička partija Bosne i Hercegovine ) was founded in 2000. It also advocates a socialist Yugoslavian state, albeit a federal one. The party criticizes Titoism and Soviet totalitarianism. Influenced by the process of European integration, the party is turning away from the orthodox communist model and is on the verge of becoming a reformist formation. The CP of Albania ( Partia Komuniste e Shqiperise, PKSH ) differs from its neighbors on the Balkans : It disapproves of the re - foundation of Yugoslavia. One of its members is Nexhmije Hoxha, the widow of Albanian leader Enver Hoxha (1908–1985). The party refers to his “success” and dreams of returning to communism. The PKSH and its youth organization play practically no role with Albanian politics. At the 2005 parliamentary elections the party received 8,901 votes (0.7 %).47 In Romania, the New Romanian CP ( Partidul Comunist Român ), led by Alexandru Pantazi, was founded in 1991. This splinter group is politically quasi inactive and defends Ceauşescu’s political heritage. In the Baltic States the CPs are above all ethnically Russian formations. They do not strive for the return of the Baltic States to the Russian Republic, they 47 In 2006, the different communist tendencies in Albania reunited under the aegis of the PKSH. In 2002 there had been a split leading to the foundation of the Albanian Party of Labour.

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rather defend the interests of the Russian minorities or of other ethnicities from the former USSR. The CP of Estonia ( Eestimaa Kommunistlik Partei – EKP ), founded in 1990, was the product of a split of the original Soviet EKP. The EKP majority faction favoured reform and therefore broke away from the CPUS and changed into the Estonian Democratic Labour Party.48 Since 2001, the EKP is affiliated with the CP of the Soviet Union ( KPSS[ OS ]), led by Oleg Shenin. In Latvia there are two CPs : The Union of Communists of Latvia ( Latvijas Komunistu Savienîba / Soyuz Kommunistov Latvii LKS / SKL ), founded in 1992, is affiliated with the KPSS[ OS ]; its activities are prohibited. The Socialist Party of Latvia ( Latvijas Sociâlistiskâ Partija / Socialisticheskaya Partiya Latvii LSP / SPL ) was founded in 1994. Its leader is Alfreds Rubiks. In 1991 the former mayor of Riga had been sentenced to six years in prison for participating in a putsch against the Latvian authorities in August 1991. In the October 5, 2002, elections the party joined the left - wing alliance “For Human Rights in United Latvia” ( Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā – PCTVL). The other members were the People’s Harmony Party ( Taitas Saskanas Partija), Equal Rights ( Līdztiesība ), and the Socialist Party of Latvia ( Latvijas Sociālistiskā partija ). The PCTVL was supported mainly by ethnic Russians and other non - Latvian minorities. In 1998 it had won 16 out of 100 seats, and in 2002 it won 25 ( five of them for the Socialist Party ) and 19 % of the vote. At the 2001 local elections it achieved 13 out of 60 seats at the Riga city council. After these municipal elections the PCTVL participated in Riga’s city government, and its member Sergejs Dolgopolovs became deputy mayor of Riga. At the 2005 local elections the party won 13.68 % of the vote and 9 seats in the city council. In 2008 the party concentrates on the defense of the Russian minority, the fight against corruption and the promotion of a Latvia independent of and free from the EU. In 2005 the SPL entered the Harmony Centre ( Saskaņas Centrs ) coalition49 which won 17 seats at the 2006 election. 4 of the 17 seats of the coalition are held by representatives of the Socialist Party. The CP of Lithuania ( Lietuvos Komunistu Partija LKP ), founded in 1989, is illegal. It is affiliated with the Union of Communist Parties – Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( SKP KPSS) and is active among the Russian minority. The CPs of the Commonwealth of Independent States ( CIS ) are closest to the orthodox model. Furthermore, they are united by their will to re - found a Soviet state. Eleven CPs are active in several countries of the former USSR. The most powerful one is the Union of Communist Parties – Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( Soyuz Kommunisticheskih Partii – Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovets48 The EDLP is a post - communist formation which joined the New European Left Forum in July 1995. In 1997 the party was renamed Estonian Social Democratic Labour Party – ESDTP. In 2004 it was a founding member of the European Left party. 49 This political alliance was formed in 2005. Its main member parties are the National Harmony Party, the Socialist Party of Latvia and the “New Centre”. Since the fall of 2005, its chairman has been Nils Ušakovs, a journalist.

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kogo Soyuza SKP - KPSS ), founded in 1993, with Gennadi Zyuganov being its chairman. The CP of the Soviet Union [ Shenin ] ( Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza [ Shenin ] KPSS [ Shenin ], founded in 2001, is also very active in several republics. Not counting Trotskyite or Maoist formations, there are at least 19 CPs, formations, or movements in the Russian Federation. They all oppose Putin’s authoritarian system. Even if they still dispose of some influence within the army and among the impoverished part of the population, above all retired persons, their influence is decreasing. The tendency to fragment these formations can be observed, and the splits multiply parallel to the reinforcement of the Putin system. Presently, Zyuganov’s KPRF is the second largest party in Russia and the largest opposition party.50 At the 2007 Russian parliamentary elections it won 11.6 % of the vote. The second most important party electorally, claiming about 55,000 members in 2006, is the Russian Communist Workers’ Party – Revolutionary Party of Communists ( Rossiiskaja Kommunističeskaja Rabočaja Partija – Revolyutsionnaja Partija Kommunistov, RKRP - RPK ). Founded in October 2001 by unifying the Russian Communist Workers’ Party and the Russian Party of Communists, it is lead by Victor Tyulkin. Tyulkin’s formation had won 2.2 % (1,481,890 votes ) at the Duma elections in 1999. Even though the RKRP - RPK considers the CP of the Russian Federation ( CPRF ) reformist, both parties formed an electoral pact for the 2003 Duma elections in order to concentrate the communist vote. The other formations do not participate in elections.51 Often they are only present in one city, for example in St. Petersburg, or they congregate at a journal or an intellectual circle. The political situation in Belarus has been analyzed in this book. In this country, communists are divided in two currents – one in favor of and the other one hostile towards President Alexander Lukashenko. At the Belarus elections for the House of Representatives on October 13 and 17, 2004, the CP of Belarus (Kamunistychnaya Partyia Belarusi – KPB ), founded in 1996 and led by Tatyana Golubeva, obtained 5.99 % of the vote and 8 seats. At those elections its main competitor of the reform tendency, the Party of Belarusian Communists ( Partyja Kamunistau Bielaruskaja, PKB ), had participated in the People’s Coalition 5 Plus ( Narodnaja Kaalicyja Piaciorka Plus ) which did not secure any seats. These elections were tainted by massive electoral fraud, therefore the true strength of this party cannot be estimated. There are other communist formations, but they do not participate in elections. Lukashenko’s dictatorial system very strictly controls the activities of all political formations. Only those communists affiliated with the regime are able to express themselves. In the Ukraine the communist movement is on the electoral decline.52 The CP of the Ukraine ( Komunistychna Partiya Ukrayiny ), founded in 1918 and re 50 See the contribution by Galina Michaleva in this volume. 51 Sometimes, though, they may form alliances for common lists of candidates with Zyuganov’s party. 52 See the text of Polese, Ukraine 1991–2006, in this volume.

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founded in 1993, is led by Petro Symonenko. In 1998 it obtained 24.7 % of the vote and 121 seats. At the 1999 presidential elections it achieved 22.4 % of the vote, and at the 2002 general elections 19.98 % and 66 seats. At the 2004 presidential elections the party suffered a major setback with only 4.97 % of the vote. At the 2006 parliamentary elections its vote dropped to 3.66 % (21 seats ), in 2007 it received 5.39 % and 27 seats. Its main competitor is the reform oriented CP of Ukraine ( renewed ) ( Komunistyčna Partija Ukraďny [onovlena ]), split away from the KPU in 2000, and headed by Mykhaylo Savenko. At the March 30, 2002, legislative elections the KPU( o ) got 1.4 % of the vote and no seats, dropping to 0.29 % of the vote at the elections of September 30, 2007. There are several other orthodox formations, but they are organizationally weak and do not participate in elections. In the whole European Union there are zones of resistance by orthodox communism, but also those of practically total disappearance. With the exception of the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, in the post - communist member states of the European Union orthodox communism has practically disappeared and does not play any role with elections. The CP of Bohemia and Moravia is still an orthodox formation.53 Its history has been analyzed in this publication (2002 : 18.5 % of the vote for the Czech Republic’s Chamber of Deputies, 41 deputies, 2006 : 12.8 %, 26 seats ). The CP of Bulgaria ( Komunisticeska Partija na Balgarija – CPB ) was founded in 1996, its leader is Alexander Paunov. It belongs to the Coalition for Bulgaria ( Koalicija za Balgarija ), an eight party - alliance led by the successor party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party ( Balgarska Socialisticeska Partija ). At the 2001 elections the Coalition won 17.1 % of the vote and 48 out of 240 seats. At the 2005 legislations it received 34.2 % and 82 seats. But the elections for the European Parliament ended with disastrous 0.98 % of the vote for the CPB. The Hungarian Communist Workers’ Party ( Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt ) was founded in 1993; it is headed by Gyula Thürmer. At the April 2006 legislatives it scored 0.41 % of the vote and no seats. The party’s development into a reform - oriented formation is indicated by its membership of the Party of the European Left. In Poland, Trotskyite and Maoist formations have profited from the disappearance of orthodox communism. The CP of Poland ( Komunistyczna Partia Polski – KPP) was founded in 2002. Led by Marcin Adam, it is dominated by Trotskyites, but there are also orthodox communist members. This splinter group ran for office on a common list with the social - democratic Polish Labour Party ( Polska Partia Pracy – PPP ) at the 2005 legislatives. They obtained 0.77 % of the vote. The CP of Slovakia ( Komunistická strana Slovenska, KSS ) was founded in 1992. At the 2002 Slovak parliamentary elections it obtained about 6 % of the vote and 11 seats. In June 2006 the party suffered an electoral defeat. With 3.88 %, it lost its parliamentary representation because of the five - percent hurdle. The KSS seems to develop into a reform - oriented formation and has an observer status with the Party of the European Left. 53 See : Mareš, Communist and Post - Communist Parties, in this volume.

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In “old” Western Europe the political systems have traditional characteristic features : In Northern Europe there are powerful social democratic parties, while in the South the more left - wing socialist parties are predominant. The communist tendencies show similar differentiations : In Northern Europe post - communist or red - green formations have benefited from the disappearance of orthodox communism.54 In the South, however, some traditional CPs are still electorally strong. The CPs in Greece ( KKE ), Cyprus ( AKEL ), and Portugal have been presented in this book.55 Their electoral and political stability is a heritage of the past ( among others, the civil war, the fight against the dictatorships of Salazar and the junta, and the role of the CPs in the return to democracy ), of an economic situation still strongly marked by an agrarian society and – compared to the rest of Europe – economic progress which is slow but accelerating. In Spain the situation is similar, with the CP of Spain ( Partido Comunista de Espańa ) having played an important role in the fight against the Franco regime and the return to democracy. The PCE consists of 15 regional parties and counts 30,000 members. It still commands a solid trade union basis. Together with other left - wing groups the PCE participates in the electoral alliance Izquierda Unida IU ( about 57,000 members in 2007). At the March 2004 elections IU received 5.3 % of the vote (1,359,190 votes ) and 5 seats in parliament. At the March 2008 elections IU got 963,040 votes (3.8 %) and 2 MPs. The PCE has been progressively abandoning its traditional ideological positions and is slowly changing into a reform oriented organization.56 It competes with about 15 orthodox formations or splinter groups in addition to a strong Spanish anarchist tendency. In Italy, the orthodox communist field consists of formations or splinter groups not participating in elections, while Rifondazione Communista and Partito dei Comunisti Italiani are both reform - communist parties. In the Nordic countries Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden the traditional PCs are very weak organizationally as well as electorally. The same holds true for Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. The situation in Denmark and Sweden has been analyzed in this publication.57 It repeats itself in Finland with three organizations competing : For Peace and Socialism – Communist Workers’ Party ( Rauhan ja Sosialismin Puolesta – Kommunistinen Työväenpuolue ) was founded in 1988. Its members are staunch supporters of North Korea. At the 2007 general elections the party received 0.07 % of the vote (2,007 votes ), in 2003 it had received 0.1 % and 2,908 54 See : Further down, the red - green variation. 55 See the contributions by Cunha, Few, but Pure and Good Members; Marantzidis, The Communist Party of Greece; Stergiou, The Communist Party of Cyprus, all in this volume. 56 The Spanish IU is a founding member of the Party of the European Left. IU sends one MEP to the European Parliament. Willy Meyer Pleite is a member of the EUL / NGL faction. 57 See the text of Ersson, Post - Communism and Leftist Parties, in this volume.

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votes.58 Before 1989 the CP of Finland ( Suomen kommunistinen puolue ) had been pro - Soviet. Since then most members have left the party and founded the Left Alliance together with other member organizations of the People’s Democratic League. In 2007 the post - communist Left Alliance obtained 8.82 % of the vote and 17 seats in parliament, while the CPF only got 0.7 % (18,277 votes ). The Communist League ( Kommunistien Liitto ) split away from the KTP in 2002. This splinter group has not participated in elections. In Benelux, the Labour Party of Belgium ( Parti du travail de Belgique – Partij van de Arbeid van België PTB – PvdA ) was founded in 1970 as “All the Power to the Workers ( AMADA - TPO )”. It is a Marxist - Leninist post - Maoist party. In the 1980s its best result was 0.74 % at the 1987 general elections. At the 2003 elections the different PTB lists obtained 0.57 %; at the June 2007 general elections it received 0.84 % of the vote for the Chamber and 0.82 % for the Senate. The PTB claims to have 2,300 members.59 There is one competing formation : the CP of Belgium ( PCB / KPB ) with its two regional divisions of the CP – Flanders ( Kommunistische Partij – Vlaanderen ) and the CP – Wallonia ( Parti Communiste – Wallonie PC ). The party is changing into a reform - oriented formation. It has only a few hundred members, most of them of rather old age, and received 0.17 % of the vote at the 2003 general elections. The CPB is a member of the European Left Party. The CP of Luxembourg ( Kommunistesch Partei Lëtzebuerg ) was founded on January 2, 1921. Since 1994 it has not won any seats at elections. In 1999 many of its members were among the co - founders of The Left ( Déi Lénk ). At the 1999 and 2000 elections the KPL did not take part in the competition with a list of its own. Instead, KPL members ran on the lists of Déi Lénk.60 After a controversy between the majority within Déi Lénk and leading KPL members the KPL ran separately at the 2004 elections and obtained 0.9 % of the vote. Afterwards the traditional KPL expelled Déi Lénk members. In Germany the post - communist party Die Linke ( the left ) succeeded with an electoral breakthrough in the old federal states in 2007/2008 ( Bremen 8.4 %, Lower Saxony 7.1 %, Hesse 5.1 %, Hamburg 6.4 %), thus reducing the political and electoral influence of the German CP ( Deutsche Kommunistische Partei – DKP ) even more.61 The DKP (4,200 members ) remains an orthodox party. Nevertheless, it has been able to place candidates on the party lists of Die Linke for Landtag ( state parliament ) elections. In 2008 DKP member Christel Wegner was elected Member of the Parliament of Lower Saxony.62 In Austria the CP of Austria 58 59 60 61

Since 2004, the party has one elected councilperson. The PTB has been represented locally by 4 councilpersons in 2000 and 15 in 2006. On Déi Lénk, see : infra, the reformist parties. At the 2005 Bundestag elections the DKP supported the Left Party.PDS. The Left Party. PDS in turn placed DKP - members on its lists of candidates. 62 Christel Wegner spoke out for the re - introduction of the Stasi ( Ministerium für Staatssicherheit – Ministry for State Security, the GDR secret police ), see : Linksabgeordnete

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(Kommunistische Partei Österreichs – KPÖ ) has developed politically since 2003. Meanwhile it can be counted among the reform - oriented formations. Presently the KPÖ defines itself as a part of the alter - globalization movement. At the 2004 European elections it competed as a part of the European Left. As a consequence of this change it experienced a small electoral renaissance.63 But the KPÖ is interesting for a totally different reason : For a long time it was the richest CP in Western Europe and disposed of an apparatus of permanent employees of exceptional importance. Officially, the present financial situation of the party is difficult. The value of the former GDR foreign trade company Novum amounts to about 250 million Euros. It is the property of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Berlin Higher Administrative Court decided that the Novum Company had been the property of the East German official state party SED ( Socialist Unity Party ) and not of the CP of Austria. The KPÖ assets were confiscated. As a consequence of the loss of property due to the court decision about the Novum assets ( about 100 million Euro ), the KPÖ was forced to dismiss its employees and to discontinue the weekly “Volksstimme” ( People’s Voice). It also had to sell its Vienna party headquarters. In 2008 the party can only count on its own feeble resources. Almost 14 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall the dependence of the Western CPs from Soviet and East - German financing became more than evident. The KPÖ competes with several orthodox splinter groups which do not participate in elections. In spite of the fundamental differences of the electoral procedures, the situation in France and Great Britain is similar. Since the beginning of the new century the decline of the reform - oriented PCF has accelerated.64 Besides splits of re - founders or orthodox groups, the party has to compete organizationally as well as electorally with about thirty Trotskyite organizations.65 In 2007 the CP of Britain claimed 1,026 members. At the 2005 general elections it received 1.124 votes and 0.55 %. In Great Britain, too, more than 30 Trotskyite groups compete with this still very traditional party.

mit DKP - Positionen. Gysi und Pau distanzieren sich. In : Neues Deutschland, Feb. 15, 2008. 63 Electoral results of the KPÖ : 2003 : state parliament Tyrol 0.70 %; state parliament Lower Austria 0.77 %; state parliament Upper Austria 0.80 %; 2004 : state parliament Carinthia 0.60 %; European el. 0.78 %; 2005 : state parliament Styria 6.34 %; city council Vienna 1.47 %; 2006 : national assembly 1.01 %. At the 2003 Graz local elections, the KPÖ Graz received 20.75 % (12 councilpersons ). At the January 2008 local elections, the party dropped to 11.18 % (6 councilpersons ). 64 See : Courtois / Andolfatto, France, in this volume. 65 Some of the most important Trotskyite organizations : Revolutionary Communist League ( Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire – LCR ), Workers’ Party ( Parti des Travailleurs – PT ), Communist Union ( Union Communiste ), Workers’ Struggle ( Lutte Ouvrière – LO).

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The Ideological and Organizational Frame

In their programs the orthodox or traditional parties emphasize the “working class” and anti - capitalist action.66 They resort to the distinction made by Marx in the Communist Manifesto in 1848 between the “proletariat” and the working class. The proletariat is committed to its historical revolutionary mission of the destruction of the bourgeois class in order to start building up communism under the condition of the “dictatorship of the proletariat”.67 The October Revolution remains the founding moment still referred to in 2008.68 The Bolsheviks acted in the name of the working class and transformed the latter into a true object of a political religion based on the dogma of a working class united as one world - wide proletariat. This latter is considered to have committed body and soul to the USSR in favor of a global communist revolution. This positive image still inspires many orthodox and traditional parties in 2008.69 The Bolshevist party and its principles of organization, too, are models for the future.70 The traditional parties are convinced that in spite of the 1989 defeat and the disappearance of the USSR a political revolution is possible. According to the Marxist model, this revolution must result from a rupture of the social contract and an enfeeblement of the capitalist elites whose politics will lose their legitimacy. New ideas and new powers will benefit from this situation, namely the theoretical vanguard favoring a new society.71 The revolutionary act is the mission of leaders capable to convince the masses of an alternative political and 66 For example : Conditions of a communist project in the 21st century, www.lescommunistes.org / spip.php ?article630; PARTIPROGRAM FÖR SVERIGES KOMMUNISTISKA PARTI, www.skp.se / partiet / program.htm; The British Road to Socialism, www.communist - party.org.uk / index.php ?file=brs&brs=brs_ch4.txt. 67 OUR CONCEPT OF SOCIALISM (3–7 October 1990), www.akel.org.cy / English / kathodighsh.html: “Marxism as a theory helps in analyzing and understanding social development, while as a method it is a weapon in the hands of the working people in their daily economic and political struggle, in the struggle to change the unjust system of exploitation and build a new society.” 68 For example : Russie : Octobre 1917, la révolution inachevée, www.particommuniste.be / politique - internationale / europe / russie - octobre - 1917–la - revolution - inachevee.html. On the 90th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia (1917), Statement of the Central Committee of the KKE, inter.kke.gr / News /2007news / 2007–07–90th - october; 90 years of the October Revolution. Speech by Jerónimo de Sousa, General Secretary of PCP, 05 December 2007, international.pcp.pt / index2. php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=202; 90 året for den russiske revolution. Tale af Betty Frydensbjerg Carlsson, formand Kommunistisk Parti i Danmark, www.kommunisterne.dk / talerevobetty.htm. 69 See : The Program of the Communist Party of Finland, www.skp.fi / english.php? juttu=243. 70 See : 23rd National Congress ( November 2006). Program of the Communist Party of Ireland. 4. The role and tasks of the Communist Party, www.communistpartyofireland.ie / caipeis - en.html. 71 Socio - economic crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and communist proposals, www.rkpbih.cjb.net; Manifest for kommunistisk fornyelse og enhed. Vedtaget på udvidet landsledelsesmøde i Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti den 24. september 2006, www.dkp. dk /?side=15&debatemne=6&debatid=29.

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societal model. This revolutionary logics of a roadmap to communism was developed by Karl Marx. The construction of a new society at the end of a revolution depends on two preliminaries : the mobilization of the masses that have become conscious of their mission. They are supported by an elite of revolutionaries won over to their cause and the maturity of the mode of capitalist production pushed to the limits by its contradictions. For Marx, the bourgeoisie has not only dug its grave economically but also has produced the workers who will be the actors of this revolution to come. The orthodox parties take up this scheme word by word in 2008.72 This in turn leads to the existence of a myriad of groups headed by leaders who are all convinced that they will be a new Lenin one day. It also leads to this special fixation on the working class and the concept of the vanguard. The myth of the professional revolutionary is permanently present in organizational reflections. They are inspired by Lenin’s pamphlet What Is to Be Done ? ( Russian : Что делать ?) published in 1902. Since his death “Che” has been the symbol of this fighting communist vanguard. In 2008, the reflections of the orthodox parties still center on the question of the organization of the party.73 Lenin’s “What is to be done ?” remains the key reference.74 In this pamphlet he advocates a party consisting of both clandestine and legal structures. The party needs to be formed of scrupulously selected and rigorously disciplined professional revolutionaries acting within a highly centralized structure. The politburo is the head of the leading bodies. Its secretariat consists of the party secretary and its direct deputies who run the urgent affairs. The organization office is responsible for the members and the medium ranks of the cadres; the Central Committee ( CC ) debates the greater ideological lines. In many traditional CPs this model has survived to this day. The same holds true for tendencies that might appear within the CPs. In 1921 Lenin forbade factions within the CC. Since then any expression of an organized opposition has been impossible. Centralization and personalization of power will be pushed to their extremes by Stalin. They will become the norm at all official state parties until 1989. While reform - and post - communist parties accept the existence of various platforms and orientations, the orthodox CPs fight them. This causes numerous splits, especially in the East, and the foundation of new orthodox parties. Until 1989 the base of every CP was the cell, favoring the working class as the target of its action. In theory, this basis appoints the next higher level. According to the principles of democratic centralism, this is done by every level of organization up to the appointment of the leadership.75 In reality, it was the leadership of the CPs that decided the appointment of responsible cadres. In 72 Cine suntem şi ce vrem, www.npcr.ro / despre.html. 73 Type de parti nécessaire pour répondre aux défis du 21ème siècle, www.lescommunistes. org / spip.php ?article1109. 74 Nieuwe Communistische Partij – NCPN, www.ncpn.nl. 75 THE CONSTITUTION OF AKEL, www.akel.org.cy / English / kathodigisikat.htmlARTICLE 6 and ARTICLE 7.

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the whole organization every selection process occurred like this. Presently, in 2008, with only a few exceptions, the orthodox CPs are too weak – and their members and supporters often too old – to apply this model. The basic structures of the CPs are organized locally and almost always merge with existing administrative units at local, regional, departmental, or provincial levels. Cells at companies still exist in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus. But they are an inheritance of the past rather than deeply ingrained institutions.76 The bolshevization of the organizational structures induced by Lenin caused the creation of a body of professional revolutionaries – permanents appointed by the party and constituting the apparatus which in turn led to the professionalization of politics. Between 1920 and 1989 the generous financing by the PCSU enabled the CPs to benefit from numerous permanents devoting themselves to the party. Presently, the CPs are financially weak and the number of their permanent employees has usually been reduced to some leaders and a secretariat. Consequently, those CPs still being electorally strong and disposing of local representations still have a body of permanents. However, their number is decreasing, as the example of the KPÖ shows. The choice of cadres and their promotion within the party are also determined by cadre policy. It was introduced by the CPSU, extended to all the CPs, and has more or less survived until 2008.77 Until 1989 in all pro - Soviet PCs the cadre department appointed cadres to positions that seemed to be most adequate. This selection of the apparatus enabled the CPs to breast crises like the one of May 1968 and for a long time to restrict the constitution of an internal opposition. Presently, the main problem of the traditionalist CPs is the lack of young and well - trained cadres. Since these parties do not offer attractive social prospects to politically ambitious young people, they are no longer attractive. All the orthodox CPs share some strong ideological lines enrooted in Marxism and the common communist past.78 The anti - fascist reflection originates from the Italian communists who are confronted with the rise of Mussolini’s movement in 1919–1924. At first, fascism is analyzed as a form of counter - revolution designed to fight the revolutionary thrust in Europe which is a consequence of the October Revolution. In the course of the 1920s fascism is presented as inherent to capitalism. The fight against fascism assimilating National Socialism and the authoritarian regimes boosts anti - capitalism. Stalin’s response to the rise of “fascisms” will be molded into theory by Georgi Dimitrov in 1935 and take on the form of the policy of the popular front. Fascism is characterized as “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, chauvinist, and imperialist elements of the financial cap76 Our party. COMMUNIST PARTY OF BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA – CPBM. ( KSCM), www.kscm.cz; PCP’s National Meeting on the action and organization of the Party in the enterprises and workplaces, 19 October 2002, international.pcp.pt / index2.php? option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=98. 77 With New Party, with Unbroken Belief Against Capital ! Resolution of the 22nd Congress of the Hungarian Communist Workers’ Party, www.munkaspart.hu. 78 A Living Theory, www.communist - party.org.uk / index.php ?file=theory.

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ital”. Communists are called on to establish an anti - fascist power surpassing the boundaries of the camp of communists and their supporters and to search for allies in the capitalist camp. Because of their anti - fascist line, between 1941 and 1945 the CPs were able to gain legitimacy within their respective societies. Some of them became mass parties for which anti - fascism, like the fight for peace, was a means to increase their influence. They will follow this anti - fascist strategy until 1989. Within the capitalist societies the USSR and its satellites shall locate fascist, war - mongering powers hostile towards real socialism.79 The strategy of an alliance with progressive forces, trade unions, and left - wing Christians in anti - fascist dialectics has survived the fall of the Soviet Union. All orthodox CPs, but also the post communist or reform formations have maintained this line of an anti - fascist alliance.80 Contemporary orthodox parties characterize themselves as pacifist.81 This strategy, applied in 2008, reminds of that of 1947 expressed in Andrei Zhdanov’s doctrine : He distinguished two camps, namely the peace camp under the leadership of the USSR, and the war camp lead by the USA. For orthodox communists, the conflicts in Afghanistan and in the Iraq prove the warlike nature of current American imperialism which remains a threat especially because of its nuclear potential and its present resumption of armament.82 The denunciation of nuclear weapons goes back to the 1950s. Against the American atomic monopoly, the communists launched the peace movement, a world - wide mass organization, strictly controlled by the Soviets. On March 19, 1950, the movement formulated the “Stockholm Appeal” demanding “an absolute ban on nuclear war”. This slogan is still successful today. After Stalin’s death the majority of the CPs arrange themselves behind the veil of peaceful coexistence. From 1963 – 1975 the second Vietnam War offers a new occasion for the communists to reunite vast and violently anti - American popular fronts. Whereas in respect of the Vietnam War the communists won the ideological and propaganda battle, things were different in the bitter dispute about the Euro - missiles between 1979 and 1984. Even though especially in Italy and in Western Germany the communists mobilized enormous masses of people, they were not able to prevent the deployment of Pershing 2 missiles. After the fall of the Berlin 79 On the 60th Anniversary of the Victory over Nazi - Fascism. Statement of the Political Commission of the Central Committee of the PCP, 04 May 2005, international.pcp.pt / index2.php ?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=74. 80 Faschismus ist keine Meinung ! www.kpoe.at / index.php ?id=70&tx_ttnews[ tt_news]= 396&tx_ttnews[ backPid ]=6&cHash=b1c654b0bb. 81 On peace : Manifest Basics – Who we are, www.srp.hr; IMPERIALISTIC WARS AND THE WORKING - CLASS MOVEMENT. Document adopted at the 15th Congress (24. 5. 2003) of the Communist Workers’ Party of Finland, www.kaapeli.fi ~ktp / english / wars.html; Prinsipprogram. I. FREDEN – DET VIKTIGSTE AV ALT, www.nkp.no; NKPs Arbeidsprogram Fredspolitikk, www.nkp.no. 82 Nunes ( member of the Secretariat of the CC and member of the Political Committee ), Against imperialism and against war ! international.pcp.pt / index2.php ?option=com_ content&do_pdf=1&id=207.

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Wall and the disappearance of the USSR the communists are but actors of secondary rank at the centre of the mobilizations against NATO during the interventions in Yugoslavia and then against the Iraq war in 2003. Still, this topic is very present at the propaganda of the orthodox parties. They have opened up another front, though. Israel is presently the second - biggest target of the anti war camp. The Palestinian question is interpreted in terms of an anti - imperialist war.83 This topic has always played a central role for communist policy. In the early 1960s the anti - imperialist fight becomes one of the three main axes of communist propaganda, together with anti - fascism and the fight for peace. Along these lines the Soviets can act at two levels : by help of structures such as the Non Aligned Movement they attempt to increase their ideological influence on nationalist movements, and they try to mobilize the Third World countries against the USA. Ideologically, the CPSU discovers the peasantry of the developing countries as a revolutionary power of the highest importance. In 2008 the orthodox CPs insist that American imperialism remains a major threat84 but that the anti - imperialist forces have begun to reorganize and gain ground in spite of their weakening.85 Certainly, most of the national liberation movements have reached their goals, and the Marxist guerillas are weak. Cuba has bled white financially and does no longer act as an ideological support of the anti - imperialist camp.86 New actors such as Hugo Chavez have appeared on the scene. He is turning more and more into the incarnation of the anti - imperialist ideal, almost like an iconography of Che.87 Ideologically, imperialism is more and more often identified with neo - liberal globalization.88 Future battles 83 De Gaza á Beyrouth, un seul peuple contre l’occupation ! www.lescommunistes.org / spip.php ?article968; Joint statement by communist and workers’ parties 20. 7. 2006 : Solidarity with Palestinian and Lebanese people, www.skp.fi / english.php ?juttu=241. 84 The orthodox communists denounce the European Union as imperialist by nature. See: Reject the undemocratic and imperialistic EU, www.skp.se. 85 23rd National Congress ( November 2006) Programme of the Communist Party of Ireland. 1 Imperialism today, www.communistpartyofireland.ie / caipeis - en.html. 86 This does not stop solidarity with Cuba. For example : Felicitación del PCE al Partido Comunista de Cuba por el 49 aniversario del triunfo de la Revolución Cubana. Secretaría de Relaciones Internacionales del PCE / 01 ene 08, www.pce.es / secretarias / secinternacional / pl.php ?id=591. On this point see the infra analysis on internationalism. Declaration of solidarity with Cuba and the five Cuban patriots jailed in the USA. 15 October 2006, international.pcp.pt / index2.php ?option=com_content&do_pdf= 1&id=175. 87 En el 40 Aniversario del asesinato de Ernesto Che Guevara. Secretaria Relaciones Internacionales del PCE / 08 Oct. 07, www.pce.es / secretarias / secinternacional / pl. php?id=1876. 88 See : PROGRAM KOMUNISTYCZNEJ PARTII POLSKI, On the nature of capitalism, 1. Charakter współczesnego kapitalizmu 2. Imperialistyczna globalizacja www.kompol. type.pl / test2/ articles.php ?lng=pl&pg=43; El PCE reivindica el “marxismo frente al neoliberalismo” Secretaría de Comunicación del PCE / 03 feb 08, www.pce.es / docpce / pl.php ?id=2160; “Empire” or imperialism ? Center for Marxist Research ( KME ) – Greece. Mumbai, January 18, 2004, inter.kke.gr / TheSocial /2004–01–kme; The Program of the Communist Party of Finland, www.skp.fi / english.php ?juttu=243.

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are expected to be fought by new resistance groups such as the Zapatistas or the “landless movements” in South America and Asia.89 2.

The Red - Green / Left - Wing Model

The category red - green / left - wing is justified by a number of convergent aspects: The first one is the identity proclaimed by several of these parties themselves. In 2008 the Nordic Green - Left Alliance ( NGLA ) has five members : Socialistisk Folkeparti, Denmark; Sosialistisk Venstreparti, Norway; Vänsterpartiet, Sweden; Vasemmistoliitto, Finland; Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð, Iceland. Besides this organizational link they also share a common ideological and political platform. The Nordic Green - Left Alliance defines itself as a left - wing alliance promoting democracy and defending human rights. It strives for “international solidarity [...], social justice and an equitable distribution of wealth, gender equality, and solidarity with future generations.” They emphasize ecology : “We are a green alliance. We want sustainable development for the world and Europe, to establish a balance among the economy, the population and the natural environment”.90 The NGLA also “denounce[ s ] the totalitarian, undemocratic system of the Soviet Union and other states, once claiming to be socialist”. On the periphery of the NGLA there are three Greek formations : The major one is Synaspismós tīs Aristerás tōn Kinīmátōn kai tīs Oikologías ( Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology ), the other two are Rizospastikīs Aristerás ( Coalition of the Radical Left ) and Dimokratiko Koinoniko Kinima ( The Democratic Social Movement DIKKI ).91 The political positions of the Dutch GroenLinks ( Green - Left ) are identical with those of its Northern neighbors. Evidently, this political tendency has been able to spread outside the Nordic frame because its ideological foundations, its political strategies and tactics are by no means exclusive of a specific regional identity.92 89 Dangers and potentials of the international situation. The imperialist strategy and the energy issue, the people’s struggle and the experience of Latin America, the prospect for socialism, Contribution of Goran Markovic, President of the Main Board of the Workers’ Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16.11. 2006, www.rkp bih.cjb.net; Socialisme – een fase in de strijd. Venezuela zoekt een weg naar een socialistische toekomst. In : www.ncpn.nl / archief /2008/02/ index.htm. On alter - globalization, see infra. 90 See : www.nordic - green - left - alliance.org / en / platform.htm. 91 The Democratic Social Movement ( DIKKI ) was founded in 1995. At the 1996 Greek general elections DIKKI received 4.43 % of the vote (9 MPs ). At the 1999 European elections it received 6.85 % of the Greek vote and 2 seats at the European Parliament. DIKKI became a full member of the GUE / NGL. At the 2000 Greek general elections DIKKI got 2.69 % of the vote and in 2004, 1.8 %, not winning a parliamentary seat on both occasions. In 2007 DIKKI joined the Coalition of the Radical Left SY.RI.ZA. 92 The platform confirms this : “We are a Nordic alliance, but this does not mean that we are regionalists. On the contrary, internationalism is a basic foundation of our parties

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Table 2: Red-Green / Left-Wing Parties Denmark

Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist Peoples’ Party) Vasemmistoliitto (Left Alliance)

www.sf.dk

Norway

Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left Party)

www.sv.no

Sweden

Vänsterpartiet (Left Party)94 Nordic Green Left Alliance (NGLA) with 5 members (2007): Socialistisk Folkeparti, Denmark; Sosialistisk Venstreparti, Norway; Vänsterpartiet, Sweden; Vasemmistoliitto, Finland; Vinstrihreyfingin - grænt framboð, Iceland Left-wing Socialist Green group in the Nordic Council (VSG in Nordiska rådet)

www.vansterpartiet.se

Finland Greece

Iceland Netherlands

Transnational

Transnational

Transnational

www.vasemmistoliitto.fi www.syn.gr Συνασπισμός της Αριστεράς, των Κινημάτων και της Οικολογίας Synaspismós tīs Aristerás tōn Kinīmátōn kai tīs Oikologías (Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology) www.dikki.org ΔΗΚΚΙ, Δημοκρατικό Κοινωνικό Κίνημα, Dimokratiko Koinoniko Kinima (The Democratic Social Movement) www.syriza.gr Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς, Synaspismós Rizospastikīs Aristerás (Coalition of the Radical Left) Vinstrihreyfingin - grænt framboð www.vg.is/tungumal/ (Left-Green Movement) english/ 93 start.groenlinks.nl GroenLinks (Green Left)

Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)

www.nordic-green-leftalliance.org

http://www.norden.org/nr/ partigrupper/vsg/sk/index. asp?lang=1&p_id=1003% 20 http://www.guengl.org

[...] European and worldwide cooperation with progressive green and left forces will be a priority for our alliance.” 93 See in this volume : Voerman, The Disappearance of Communism. 94 See in this volume : Ersson, Post - Communism and Leftist Parties.

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573

Red - Green Parties in Their Respective Political Systems

Svante Ersson’s analysis of Denmark and Sweden, and Gerrit Voerman’s of the Netherlands hold true for the other formations, too : They share the anti European dimension as well as a program centered on economic equality, social welfare, and environmentalism. In Norway the “No” - campaign was successful at the referendum on the membership of the European Community on September 25, 1972. In the aftermath of this victory the Socialist Electoral League ( Sosialistisk Valgforbund ) was founded. It united the Socialist People’s Party, CP of Norway, Democratic Socialists – AIK and independent socialists. At the 1973 general elections the formation won 11.6 % of the vote and 16 seats. In 1975 the league became a party and was renamed Sosialistisk Venstreparti, Berit Ås was elected its leader. The CP decided to break away and become a competitor of the new party instead.95 From 1977 – 1985 the electoral results were disappointing and the SV did not advance electorally. But at the end of the 1980s the crisis of the communist system brought about an influx of new voters from the communist and progressist camp. In 1989 the SV passed the 10 % hurdle. During the 1990s, in spite of its victorious 1994 campaign against Norway’s accession to the EU, SV lost votes again. In 1997 Kristin Halvorsen96 was elected head of the party. In 2001, at the time of her leadership, the SV achieved its biggest electoral success. She convinced the party to open up towards alter - globalization positions and to sharpen its ecological profile. Still, at the 2005 elections, the party suffered a serious setback. But it passed a coalition agreement with the Labour and Centre Parties. The SV had Kristin Halvorsen nominated for the important post of the Minister of Finance. In Iceland, the Left - Green Movement ( Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð) was founded on Feb. 6, 1999. Under the leadership of its chairman Steingrímur J. Sigfússon the approximately 3,000 party members obtained 14.3 % of the vote (9 MPs ) in 2007. The mobilizing topics are the same as in other Nordic countries, i. e. equality, feminism, environmentalism, and democratization. The party has a very clear - cut pacifist and multi - cultural profile and campaigned against Iceland’s involvement with NATO. The Left Alliance ( Vasemmistoliitto or Vänsterförbundet ) was founded in April 1990 as a result of a merger between the Finnish People’s Democratic League ( SKDL ), the Finnish Women’s Democratic League ( SNDL ), and the CP of Finland ( SKP ). Since its foundation tensions have been strong between modernist and traditional tendencies. They resulted in several splits and resignations of leading cadres joining the Social Democratic Party or the newly formed CP 95 At the 1975 Congress of the Communist Party 113 delegates favoured keeping the party independent, 30 wanted to merge with the SV. 96 For Kristin Halvorsen’s biography and political ideas, see : www.sv.no / oslo / personer / kristin.html.

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of Finland ( Unity ).97 Since its foundation the Left Alliance has always received about 8 to 10 % of the vote (2003 : 9.93 %, 19 MPs; 2007 : 8,82 % 17 MPs ). The Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology (Συνασπισμός, Synaspismós, “Coalition”)98 is the direct successor of the coalition between the two Greek CPs, i. e. the pro - Soviet KKE and its dissident successor – the Eurocommunist KKE interior party favoring the integration of Greece into the European Union – as its largest constituents for the 1989 general elections. In 1989/1990 the results of this coalition were good : At the 1989 European Elections it collected 936,175 votes (14.3 %) and sent 3 MEPs to the European Parliament. The general elections in June 1989 ended with 13.1 % of the vote and 28 MPs for the coalition, in November 1989 with 11.0 % (734,611 votes ) and 21 MPs. At the next general election in 1990 the coalition won 10.3 % (677,059 votes ) and 19 seats. The general elections in 1993 ended with a serious defeat of Synaspismos : It lacked 2,000 votes to pass the 3 % - limit and enter the national parliament. One year later, at the 1994 European elections, the party reached its electoral peak with 6.26 % of the vote and two MEPs. At the 1996 general and the 1999 European elections the party retained about 5 % of the vote. But at the following elections the influence of the party steadily decreased (2000 : 3.2 %, 6 MPs; 2004 3.3 % 6 MPs ). Before the 2004 general elections Synaspismos attempted to take the political offensive again. Together with a number of smaller parties it formed an alliance called Coalition of the Radical Left ( Synaspismós Rizospastikīs Aristerás), SY.RI.ZA.99 But its electoral results remained disappointing. At the 2004 European elections this alliance broke after the election of the new chairman, Alékos Alavános,100 had resulted in a new internal crisis. At the end of 2005 the alliance with the smaller parties was taken up again after Alavános had proposed the extremely popular Alexis Tsipras as candidate for the office of the mayor of Athens at the 2006 municipal elections. Alavános had intended to make an “overture to a younger generation” this way. In May 2006 Athens was the place of the 4th European Social Forum organized by SY.RI.ZA. The success of the forum helped the alliance stabilize. At the general elections on September 16, 97 The CP of Finland ( Unity ) ( Suomen kommunistinen puolue ( yhtenäisyys ), SKPy ) was founded in August 1986 by former members of the internal opposition of the CP of Finland ( Suomen kommunistinen puolue, SKP ). It has remained a marginal force in Finish politics (2003 National elections : 21,079 votes, 0.75 %; 2007 National elections: 18,277 votes, 0.65 %). See http ://en.wikipedia.org / wiki / Communist_Party_of_Finland_( Unity ). 98 Until 2003, it was called “Coalition of the Left and Progress” ( Συνασπισμός της Αριστεράς και της Προόδου, Synaspismós tīs Aristerás kai tīs Proódou ). 99 The parties that originally formed the Coalition of the Radical Left in January 2004 were: Synaspismos ( SYN ); Renewing Communist Ecological Left ( AKOA ); Internationalist Workers Left ( DEA ); Movement for the United in Action Left ( KEDA ) ( a split of the CP of Greece ); Active Citizens ( a political organization associated with Manolis Glezos ); and several independent left activists. 100 See Alavanos’ biography : www.syn.gr / en / cv / alavanos.htm.

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2007, the Coalition of the Radical Left was one of the winners : Quite unexpectedly it received 5.04 % of the vote (361,211votes ) and 14 seats in parliament. The cooperation with the alter - globalization movement shapes the life of the party.101 It is organized in grass - roots manner around various platforms and circles. The strongest platforms in terms of participation are “Left Stream” ( uniting mainstream Marxists – left - wing of the party ), “Volute” ( radical social democrats – right - wing ), “Intervention” ( center ), and the “Red - Greens” ( eco Marxists – extreme left - wing ). SYN is a member of the GUE / NGL group in the European Parliament. SYN describes itself as “a radical left - wing party” fighting for a strategic alliance of the ecologic movement with the left. This ideological combination is predominant at other green - left parties. 2.2

The Ideological and Organizational Frame

The program of the Finnish Left Alliance Party may serve as an example. It also clearly marks the differences between the green - left project, orthodox CPs and reform communist formations.102 Organizationally as well as politically, the Left Alliance defines itself as a sort of NGO, as a “new red - green way of thinking and acting that goes across party lines.”103 Its roots are “the labor movement and its struggle for the equality and freedom of the oppressed”. Ideologically, the Left Alliance “identifies itself with socialist thinking” but disapproves of “the totalitarianism associated with socialism.” It defines itself as an open political alliance and open - minded civil movement. The party wants to intensify and strengthen its ties with the trade union movement and other NGOs. The Left Alliance wants to build “a wide third Left”. The third Left defines itself by a libertarian policy based on the rejection of neo - liberalism and the recourse to the principles of feminist thinking and “environmental consciousness”.104 Equality, freedom, sustainable development and democracy are considered key fundamental values of equal importance.105 This marks the first perceptible difference with reform communist parties of the Linke or PCF type : The latter insist on the primate of equality and maintain their preliminary implementation as the only possibility to establish a just society. Certainly, red - green party programs take this value as a starting point. But social and political equality must be accomplished gradually and with consideration. The abolition of private property and of the right to individual enrichment is rejected, just as every other form of political coercion. 101 SYN is a member of the European Social Forum. 102 See : The Left Road to a Just World, Left Alliance Party Program. Adopted by the 5th Party Congress, 16 June 2007, www.vasemmistoliitto.fi / party_program / en_GB / program. 103 5. Left Alliance – on open and open - minded NGO. In : The Left Road to a Just World. 104 1. The Renewing Left – A World Wide Movement. Ibid. 105 2. The Fundamental Values of Left Alliance. Ibid.

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The Left Alliance proposes an anti - capitalist strategy claimed to be the only one still capable of stopping the crisis endangering humanity with climate change and the limitation of natural resources. Its success is only possible within a vital living democracy. This attitude is shared by reform and post - communist parties which have also developed a strategy of “democratization of democracy”. The difference is that the latter consider the action of the party and its allies the most important instrument of change. Red - green parties, however, dream of a Swiss model where citizens get active, discuss, and decide. People need “to be raised into civil activism”, but “the voices and needs of minorities” must always be taken into consideration. Here, too, there are obvious differences from the reform communist parties which, for example, do not favor unconditional freedom of speech. Fascists, racists, sexists, and militarists, to name a few, are to be excluded from the political society and ought to be convinced and won over by arguments. Of course, red - green parties scorn these groups, too, but their civil rights and freedom of speech are considered intangible. Red - greens, post - communists, orthodox and reform - communists share their criticism of capitalism. In its program the Left Alliance confirms : “Democracy must be stronger than the power of capital.”106 LA wants to replace “the exercise of power favoring the supremacy of capital with a co - operation of all participants and with the just division of the fruits of labor.” The intention is to “revitalize” economy so that the collective needs can be satisfied. Market economy is considered the best instrument for this. Naturally, Left Alliance makes a difference between a healthy market economy and neo - liberal globalization : This “neoliberal mainstream economic policy has put its faith in the sole superiority of the markets and in the unsoundness of all political regulation.” Strengthening the “powers of the stronger”, “centralization and the suppression of free competition” are considered the controlling factors of today. This hegemony is declared a “threat to every welfare state”. The EU is criticized for having turned into an instrument of this domination of capital. The Left Alliance advocates a reform of the European Union : “Europe needs effective common and democratic regulations which in the whole Union area guarantee civil rights, the position of workers and fair rules in working life, social security, sufficient tax income to support the welfare state and sustainable development.” The judgment of these aspects is more or less identical with that of the alter - globalization tendency of the ATTAC type. The red - green parties are also staunchly pacifist and want to dismantle military alliances and “promote universal disarmament, world peace and international security based on the respect of the principles of the United Nations”. The eschatological goal is a “global democracy” based on the respect of human rights everywhere. Priority is given to the eradication of hunger, poverty, blatant inequality, and the oppression of women. Solidarity with migrants is also an issue. One of the preferred allies in the re - foundation of the world is the trade 106 3. Global Capitalism and the Left Alternative. Ibid.

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union movement. Its social and economic fights need to be supported.107 Socially, the Left Alliance wants to renew society on the basis of a long catalogue of fundamental rights : “gender equality, free sexual expression, equality between all people, equal position in the family”, social protection, right of education, but also of housing and job. Multiculturalism and the respect of the rights of minorities, concerning life - styles, social and language norms for example, are especially acknowledged. Finally, the Left Alliance elicits the ecologically imperative reinforcing of a change of course at the global level. The saving of energy, the use of renewable energies, and the protection of biodiversity as well as the education of consumers are top priorities. The above - given formations are closer to the alter - globalization movement than to the reform communist parties. The latter are still largely fixed on organizational requirements and forced to take the ideology of the “second way” into consideration. All red - green formations share a common identity with quite clear outlines : They all consider economic growth a most important goal, but the primacy rests with ecologic decisions. This hierarchy of priorities is unchangeable. They also insist on a fundamental reform of capitalism. There is a general agreement concerning questions of the just distribution of property, of the necessity of a new policy of sharing work, and of the acceptance of immigration. They do not agree on the question of the civil use of nuclear energy. But they are all convinced that a radical reform of society is essential to protect nature. There is some difference concerning the necessary degree of radicalism of social change, the importance of the protection of the environment, and of social reallocation. But many topics are non - contentious : feminism, democratization of political life, the opening towards or unification with the new social movements, pacifism, non - revolutionary and pro - Third - World anti - imperialism, defense of public institutions and of the achievements of the welfare state. The social democratic formations in power are harshly criticized. But nevertheless they are considered to be the only partners capable to bring about change. Therefore, government coalitions with social democrats are considered suitable and appropriate. Most of these formations oppose the construction of the European Union. This is the reason why they have not become members of the European Left Party. 3.

The Reform Communist and Post - Communist Model

Electorally, the reform communist model is relatively strong in Western Europe. It has also inspired a gradually increasing number of communist and post - communist parties in the East.

107 4. Into a Socially Just Finland. Ibid.

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Table 3: Reform Communist Parties Austria

Kommunistische Partei Österreich, KPÖ Communist Party of Austria Czech Republic Strana demokratického socialismu, SDS Party of Democratic Socialism Estonia Eesti Vasakpartei / Levaya Partiya Estonii ELP Estonian Left Party France Parti Communiste Français, PCF French Communist Party Germany Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, PDS Party of Democratic Socialism Die Linke The Left Great Britain New Politic Network, NPN Italia

Luxemburg Netherlands Portugal Romania Spain

San Marino

Turkey Switzerland

www.kpoe.at

www.sds.cz

www.esdtp.ee

www.pcf.fr

http://archiv2007.sozialisten.de/sozialisten/aktuell/ index.htm www.sozialisten.de www.unlockdemocracy. org.uk/ Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, home.rifondazione.it/ PRC xisttest Communist Refoundation Party Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, PdCI /www.comunisti-itaParty of Italian Communist liani.it/frames/index.htm Déi Lénk / La Gauche / Die Linken www.dei-lenk.lu Socialistische Partij, SP www.sp.nl Socialist Party Bloco de Esquerda, BE – Left Bloc www.bloco.org Partidul Alianta Socialista, PAS www.pasro.ro Socialist Alliance Party Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds, IC www.iniciativa.cat/ Initiative for Catalonia Izquierda Unida, IU www1.izquierda-unida.es/ United Left Esquerra Unida i Alternativa, EUiA www.euia.org/ Alternative and United Left Rifondazione Comunista Sammarinese www.rifondazionecomuCommunist Refoundation of nista-rsm.org San Marino Özgürlük ve Dayanisma Partisi, ÖDP www.odp.org.tr/index_en. Freedom and Solidarity Party php Parti Suisse du Travail / Partei der www.pda.ch Arbeit der Schweiz / Partito Svizzero del Lavoro - PdA/PST/PdL Swiss Labour Party

Conclusion

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579

The Reform Communist and Post - Communist Parties in Their Respective Political Systems

The choice of a reformist strategy does not guarantee electoral success, even though several reformist formations have become powerful actors within the electoral systems.108 In France, the PCF has entered a downhill cycle. The results of the PCF at the presidential (2007 : 1.93 %; 2002 : 3.37 %) and general elections (2007 : 4.29 %) as well as the subsequent loss of many members caused a deep crisis. Its former strategy of an alliance and a government coalition with the Socialist Party is presently objected to by a growing number of communists. They discuss the question whether the party should be dissolved and re - founded according to the model of the German party Die Linke. This reorientation seems to have yielded some fruit at the March 2008 local elections. In February 2006 the party claims 134,000 members, 99,281 of them paying their dues. In Germany, after fusing with the WASG to the new formation Die Linke, the PDS was electorally successful not only in its strongholds in the new Bundesländer but also in the old federal states.109 With 8.7 % at the 2005 Bundestag elections, the party has 54 MPs. In the West in 2007 the party made a breakthrough in Bremen (8.4 %, 7 MPs ), in 2008 in Hesse (5.1 %, 6 MPs ), Lower Saxony (7.1 %, 11 MPs ), and Hamburg (6.4 %, 8 MPs ). It forms a coalition government with the SPD in the federal state of Berlin. At the end of 2007 Die Linke counts 71,925 members, the majority of them in the new Bundesländer. The Italian Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, founded in 1991, considers itself the heir of the PCI. Since 1992 the party has gained between 5 and 8 percent of the vote (1992 : 5.6 %, 35 MPs; 1992 : 6.0 %, 39 MPs; 1996 : 8.5 %, 35 MPs; 2000 : 5.0 %, 11 MPs; 2006 : 5.8 %, 41 MPs ). According to its official data, in 1991 the party had 112,278 members, 90,422 in 2000, and 93,196 in 2006. Until 1998 the party supported the first government of Romano Prodi. In October 2004 the PRC joined the center - left opposition. In April 2006 the center - left coalition won the general elections with a very narrow margin. Party chairman Fausto Bertinotti was elected Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. The party joined Romano Prodi’s second cabinet, in which PRC was represented by Paolo Ferrero, Minister of Social Solidarity. Founded on Jan. 30, 1999, Dei Lénk ( the Left ) considers itself a unity movement assembling members mostly coming from the CP of Luxemburg ( PCL ), the New Left ( Nei Lénk ), the Socialist - Revolutionary Party, and the Socialist Workers’ Party of Luxemburg. In 1999 it participated in general elections for the first time and received 3.3 %. The break up with the PCL resulted in the defeat of Dei Lénk at the 2004 elections. The Dutch Socialist Party has its roots in the Maoist movement. The party was founded on Oct. 22, 1972. Until 1989 108 In the East the reformist parties have hardly any electoral impact. 109 See the contribution by Moreau, The PDS / Linkspartei.PDS, in this volume.

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its electoral results were negligible. Since then it has turned away from Maoism, given up on Marxism - Leninism and has consistently improved its results at elections : 1994 : 1.3 %, 2 MPs; 1998 : 3.5 %, 5 MPs; 2002 : 5.9 %, 9 MPs; 2003 : 6.3 %, 9 MPs. The party won a triumphant victory in 2006 with 16.6 % of the vote and 25 MPs. In 2007 the party has 50,740 members, more than tripling its 1992 membership (15,122) and more than doubling that of 1998 (21,975). In 2008 the SP is opposing the government coalition of the social democratic PvdA and the ChristenUnie, formed in early 2007. For the 1999 elections, four organizations formed the Bloco de Esquerda BE, namely the Marxist - Leninist União Democrática Popular ( UDP ), the Trotskyite Partido Socialista Revolucionário ( PSR ), Política XXI, assembling intellectuals formerly close to or members of the PCP and FER - Ruptura, another Trotskyite formation. Since 1999 the party has been progressing electorally ( European Parliament 1999 : 1.8 %, 0 MEPs; Parliament 1999 : 2.4 %, 2 MPs; Presidentials 2001 : 3.0 %; Parliament 2002 : 2.7 %, 3 MPs; European Parliament 2004 : 4.9 %, 1 MEP; Parliament 2005 : 6.5 %, 8 MPs; Presidentials 2006 : 5.3 %). The socialist party alliance Izquierda Unida, IU, was founded in 1986. After the electoral slump of the PCE in 1982 ( from 10 % to 3 %) IU slowly improved its results, reaching 9 % in 1993 (1,800,000 votes ) and nearly 11 % in 1996 (2,600,000 votes ). Its decline began in 1999. In 2000 it signed a pact with the Socialist Party ( PSOE ). At the parliamentary elections of March 14, 2004, the IU received 4.96 % (2000 : 5.4 %) and five (2000 : 8) MPs. It supported José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s PSOE minority government. At the 2008 general elections IU formed an alliance with the Iniciativa per Catalunya. IU received 963,040 votes (3.8 %) and 2 MPs, its worst result ever. Officially IU has about 70,000 members. The Swiss Party of Labour was founded in 1944 by the illegal CP of Switzerland. It reached its best result at the 1947 elections with 5.1 % and seven MPs. Since then its electoral results have been marginal, with the best ones achieved in the French speaking cantons. Furthermore, its political decline seems to have accelerated (1995 : 1.2 %, 3 MPs; 1999 : 1.0 %, 2 MPs; 2003 : 0.7 %, 2 MPs; 2007 : 0.7 %, 1 MP ).110 3.2

The Ideological and Organizational Frame

The close co - operation of “socialist” or “democratic socialist” parties with formations still using the term “communist” in their designation is striking. But the organizational and programmatic analysis shows that this contradiction is only superficial. Within their respective political systems, the reformist formations compete with many actors. Since 1990, the socialist and social democratic parties have 110 See the contribution by Kamber, Communist and Post-Communist Parties, in this volume.

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been the principal competitors. But other political and electoral actors have (re-) appeared : the extreme right, the alter - globalization movement, and the extreme left. The relationship with social democracy and the socialist parties remained the principal problem of the reform and post - communist CPs. Almost all the parties listed in the table have developed similar strategies and analyses because their situation within their respective political systems was more or less identical. They were forced to compete with and put pressure on the democratic left. At the same time they were searching for electoral alliances exactly with this same democratic left. Sometimes they had already achieved this goal by tolerating minority governments or by participating in the exercise of political power on national, regional or local levels. Profound change was the prize of this compatibility. The reform and post communist CPs all underwent an ideological change, the principal components of which are the abandonment of Marxism - Leninism and a rereading of Marx while integrating the political lessons of the 20th century.111 This process of modernization implied various steps. The parties were reorganized as heterogeneous movements allowing for internal conflicts. Factions, currents, platforms, tendencies, and sensibilities offer a multitude of sometimes contradictory programmatic approaches.112 Orthodox communists have to get along more or less well with left - wing ecologists, or anti - imperialists with moderate socialists. Furthermore, the reformist parties have abolished the remainders of democratic centralism and have introduced more internal transparency. They also restructured and slimmed down their apparatus. This was inevitable because of the reduction of membership. The crucial nucleus of reform is the orientation of the parties as electoral parties as well as extra - parliamentary movements within trade unions and on the streets. Another aspect of the re - foundation of the identity of these reform communist and post - communist parties was the decision to establish a new form of internationalism. In the early 1990s the centers coordinating this process were the NELF ( New European Left Forum ) and the GUE / NGL ( the left - wing faction in the European Parliament ), and since 2004 the European Left Party. Because they need to offer their members a utopian project, the reform parties cultivate excellent relations with anti - imperialist and communist movements all over the world.113 The reform parties support the construction of a united Europe but they demand a social and anti - liberal model.114 111 See : Transformations et actualité, www.pcf.fr / spip.php ?article64&var_recherche= stalinisme; Für ein Gesellschaftsmodell, das auf der internationalen Solidarität und auf den Grundsätzen des Sozialismus beruht, http ://www.pda.ch / _wirwollen / wahlen07.php; b. Nutnost rehabilitovat socialismus. In : Programový dokument SDS schválený VII. sjezdem SDSv Jihlavě 22. listopadu 2003, www.sds.cz / storage / mds.doc. 112 Pourquoi un parti communiste ? In : www.pcf.fr / spip.php ?article67&var_recherche= stalinisme. 113 See the contribution by van Hüllen, Transnational Cooperation, in this volume. 114 CONSTRUIRE UNE AUTRE EUROPE, www.pcf.fr / spip.php ?article1259; Agir pour une Europe sociale, www.pcf.fr / spip.php ?article248.

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Ideologically, the programs communist and post - communist parties proposed to their electorate resemble each other.115 The goal is the creation of a ”just world”116 divested of war, oppression, deprivation, and inequality. The basic values of this political project are the principles of equality, freedom, solidarity117 and sustainable development.118 Since everybody must be granted the right to a good life and to participate in society as an active citizen, equality is the benchmark.119 This value shapes every aspect of social and economic life. It implies the elimination of differences in income and property as well as of the power based on ownership. Freedom must be linked with social responsibility and solidarity. The latter two can only develop if the economy is under strict control. The reformist parties distinguish between capitalism and market economy. They want to replace the exercise of power favoring the supremacy of capital by the co - operation of all participants and the just division of the fruits of labor. Fluent functioning of the economy presupposes markets, but the limits of market economy and fair rules have to be set by national and international democracy.120 Market economy must be ecologically, socially and humanly sustainable. 115 KPÖ, Positionen, www.kpoe.at / index.php ?id=6; SF, studieweb, www.sf.dk / index. php?menu=648; SF news and policies, www.sf.dk / index.php ?article=8797; ELP, Programm, www.esdtp.ee / programm.htm; VL, Party Program, www.vasemmistoliitto.fi/ party_program / en_GB / program /; PCF, Index thématique, http ://www.pcf.fr / spip. php?mot242; PDS / Linkspartei.PDS, Das Programm, archiv2007.sozialisten.de / partei / dokumente / programm / index.htm; Die Linke, Positionen von A - Z, die - linke.de / politik / themen / positionen_a_z /; NPN, Who we are, www.unlockdemocracy.org.uk / ? page_id= 490; PRC, Fai una scelta di parte, home.rifondazione.it / xisttest /; PdCI, Argomenti su Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, www.comunisti - italiani.it / frames / index.htm; DL, Wahlprogramm von déi Lénk, www.dei - lenk.lu / sujet / article.asp ? id=419&sub=68; SP, Dossiers van de SP, www.sp.nl / service / dossiers /; IC, Programes Electorals (2006), www. joansaura.org / continguts3/ elPrograma / programa / programa_icv_euia_complert. zip; IU, Programa Electoral de IU 2008. In : www1.izquierdaunida.es / doc / 1204807826212.pdf; EUiA, Valors, www.euia.org / noticia_final.jsp ? id=21; PB, Socialismo 2007, http ://www.bloco.org / index.php ?option=com_content& task=blogsection&id=23&Itemid=51; ÖDP, FREEDOM AND SOL DAR TY PARTY, www.odp.org.tr / genel / bizden_detay_en.php ?kod=556; PdA, Die Partei der Arbeit stellt sich vor, www.pda.ch / _wirwollen / visitenkarte.php; PAS, PROGRAMUL ELECTORAL, www. pasro.ro / paginacuamanuntdocument.php ?ID=5; SDS, Manifest demokratického socialismu, www.sds.cz / download.php ?soubor=3. 116 Eine andere Welt ist dringend erforderlich, www.pda.ch / _wirwollen / visitenkarte.php# anderewelt. 117 Ciutats i pobles per la pau, http ://www.iniciativa.cat /. 118 Die Ökonomie in den Dienst des Gemeinwohls stellen, http ://www.pda.ch / _wirwollen / wahlen07.php. 119 Radicalitat democrática i participació ciutadana. In : Programa Marc Eleccions Municipals 2007, http ://www.iniciativa.cat /. 120 Kapitál a demokracie. In : Programový dokument SDS schválený VII. sjezdem SDSv Jihlavě 22. listopadu 2003. Text souhlasí s návrhem po zapracování došlých připomínek od organizací SDS Milane Neubertem, 2. verze z 7.října 200, www.sds.cz / storage / mds.doc; Möglichkeiten der Demokratisierung des öffentlichen Eigentums, http ://die linke.de / politik / analysen_und_positionen / moeglichkeiten_der_demokratisierung_ des_oeffentlichen_eigentums /; Betere democrazie, http://www.sp.nl /2006/ programma / betere_democratie.shtml.

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At the global level, the reformists fight for worldwide solidarity, the equality of men, and the recognition of human rights. One of their proprieties is peace instead of war and militarism. This implies the dissolution of military alliances, universal disarmament,121 and international security based on the respect of the principles of the United Nations.122 A new world economy must guarantee to satisfy basic human needs in the poorest countries and put an end to inequality and the oppression of women.123 Measures to be taken immediately are to increase the amount of foreign aid and the quota for refugees as well as to create a universal policy of solidarity with immigrants and refugees. Essential labor laws are presented as human rights, among others the right of workers to organize and to go on strike. The trade unions are called upon to intensify and strengthen their international co - operation in order to establish these rights around the world. The reformist parties’ model is a welfare state responsible for the well - being of everybody. Governmental action has to supply the people’s new needs.124 To realize this goal the public economic sector needs to be strong. Basic services have to be provided by public production, state ownership, investments, and subsidies need to be developed on a grand scale.125 Reformist parties support small, self - employed businesses because of their potential to create jobs. Active anti - discriminatory efforts are indispensable in order to create a society where all people enjoy equal treatment, and gender equality is a basic prerequisite.126 Reformists propagate the model of a multicultural state offering everybody the highest possible level of education and civilization. The programs of the reform - oriented parties share some common positions with orthodox communists and red - green parties. Anti - imperialism with a very strong anti - American connotation, a kind of anti - fascism127 which is still saturated with Dimitrov’s theses,128 anti - racism, and finally the importance conceded to trade unionism as an important power of resistance against capitalist globalization. Undeniable differences exist in respect of the problem of hostility 121 Nein zu militärischer Gewalt, http ://www.pda.ch / _wirwollen / wahlen07.php. 122 Beter samenwerken. Internationale politiek, http ://www.sp.nl /2006/ programma / beter_samenwerken.shtml. 123 B ) UNA POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA JUSTA Y REDISTRIBUTIVA, www1.izquierda unida.es / #. 124 Direkte Demokratie – Politische und soziale Erneuerungsprozesse, http ://archiv2007. sozialisten.de / politik / themen / positionspapiere / view_html ?zid=35121&bs=1&n=2. 125 Tre milioni di impiegati e trecentomila precari, http ://home.rifondazione.it / xisttest / tre- milioni - di - impiegati - e - trecentomila - precari - 3a - altro - che - fannulloni - 21; Contre - réformes annoncées, http ://www.dei - lenk.lu / sujet / article.asp ?id=730&sub=25; STATUL SOCIAL DE DREPT. PARTENERIATUL SOCIAL, http ://www.pasro.ro / pagina.php? Categorie=Program; LA DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS CIUDADANOS. In : PROPUESTA DE EJES PROGRAMÁTICOS, www1.izquierda - unida.es / #. 126 Gleichstellung, die - linke.de / politik / themen / positionen_a_z / gleichstellung /; 4.3. Feminitzar els pobles. In : Programa Marc Eleccions Municipals 2007, http ://www.iniciativa.cat /. 127 Rechtsextremismus, die - linke.de / politik / themen / positionen_a_z / rechtsextremismus /. 128 Compare the analysis of the position of conservative CPs.

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to the neo - liberal orientation of the EU but not about the European construction which the reformists support in a critical way. The reformist parties object to the notion that they have been nothing but a sort of “left - wing prick” in the flesh of government since the collapse of the Soviet Union. They emphasize the permanent validity and actuality of the Marxist analysis. They are conscious of the loss of their reference points and role models of the past. The Soviet system failed, as did the social democratic model of the “third way” between capitalism and socialism propagated in the 1950s.129 And the reformists carefully observe the crisis of capitalism presently challenging ultra - liberal dogmas.130 The reform - oriented communists consider it the duty of communists and democratic socialists to re - conquer and regain the future and to prepare the way for social and economic reforms theoretically as well as politically. Robert Hue affirmed in 1999 when he was secretary general of the PCF : “The involvement with present realities in the current phase of the development of society may well be the key to a new chance for a modern communist project.” Today’s “communist reformers” consider capitalism neither the end of history in the sense of Fukuyama nor a horizon out of reach. The ideal remains voluntaristic : The course of things can be and must be changed because it is the last chance of humanity to stop war, exploitation, racism, and poverty and to prevent an ecological disaster.131 But this is the collective task of all anti - capitalist actors – from the revolutionary extreme left to alter - globalization movements such as ATTAC. The reformers have committed themselves to the 21st century. They have not only abandoned the Soviet model but also a certain type of “classic” communist culture of the 19th century. This encompasses the idea of a revolution necessarily anteceding the “socialization of the means of production and of commerce”. In the same way, the “reformers” have discovered the present to be the age of the individual and the past that of “the masses”. Furthermore, those individuals live in new general conditions, namely the wake and rise of globalization. This is why the reformers want to rethink communism / democratic socialism again – not that of the 19th century and industrialization but the new one of the information age and society.132 Of course they are well aware of the contradiction between a “transformation” project as a form of political group dynamics on the one hand and the individual in the focus and center of our societies on the other. The reformers offer a solution : The individual is living with others in a human society showing solidarity. He / she chooses the forms of his / her social and societal contacts him / 129 Cf. Bertinotti, Le due sinister. 130 Komunisté a sociální demokraté. In : Programový dokument SDS schválený VII. sjezdem SDSv Jihlavě 22. listopadu 2003, www.sds.cz / storage / mds.doc. 131 Gysi, Ende der Geschichte ? archiv2007.sozialisten.de / politik / themen / positionspapiere / view_html ?zid=35235&bs=1&n=0. 132 Avançar en la Societat de la Informació i del Coneixement. In : Programa Marc Eleccions Municipals 2007, www.iniciativa.cat /.

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herself. The transformation project of the 21st century offers every single individual the chance to act politically, morally, and economically. He / she is given the possibility to dominate every aspect his / her life consists of : work, habitation, sexuality, new rights and duties, etc. Proposing a progressive way of the transformation of society, modern communism / democratic socialism wants to be the answer of the reality of striving for individuality. Thus, the “new” policy of the reformers is basically a method of ( re )acquiring power and influence which the individual citizen has been robbed of by capitalism. Reformist parties are fundamentally anti - capitalist. This distinguishes them clearly from social democracy which, according to the reformers, acts within capitalism attempting to “limit” its destructions and to “counterbalance” its excesses.133 Therefore, the party’s rallying slogan is : Man comes first, capital second; human development instead of financial profits. Social democracy, the major tendency of the left, cannot maintain a strict anti - capitalist orientation anymore. But due to common ideals and values, the reformers act within the frame of “constructive pluralism” as a symbol of critical solidarity among the left - wing majority. The reformist parties are also oriented towards ecology which they consider an anti - pole to the logic of capitalist profits.134 Thus, they pursue a complementary strategy of cooperation with green formations existing within their respective political systems. The reformers have filled their concept of critical solidarity with offensive contents, namely “pressure from the left”. For these parties the basic problems are not the pace and velocity of measures to be taken. The key is their effect, their “radicality” in the true sense of the word : The parties want to get to the roots of the evil, namely straight to the structures of capitalism. The “reformers” remind socialists / social democrats that they are in danger to disappoint left- wing voters by their present politics. In the French Socialist Party, the SPD or the SPÖ they detect developments inspired by liberalism. The reformers insist that authentic left - wing politics cannot be powerless when confronting “markets”, “economic necessities and constraints”, or “globalization”.135 But even in this context of collective individualism which is so characteristic of capitalist societies these parties have to remain a “community” as well as a surrogate family. This holds true especially for still - existing left - wing or communist milieus. In other places they have to fight a cultural and communicative war ( Gramscism ) against all sides. And finally – and unobtrusively – they have to gain control of social movements. Robert Hue wrote : “( It ) is the task of com133 Cf. Waller / Coppieters / Deschouwer, Social Democracy, 1994. 134 Die Umwelt schützen statt den Kapitalismus, http ://www.pda.ch / _wirwollen / wahlen07.php; 2. Beter delen, http ://www.sp.nl /2006/ programma / beter_delen.shtml; Agir pour préserver la planète, www.pcf.fr / spip.php ?article253; PLACER L’ECOLOGIE AU COEUR DU DEVELOPPEMENT, www.pcf.fr / spip.php ?article1246; 7. Beter groen, http ://www.sp.nl /2006/ programma / beter_groen.shtml; C ) DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE. In : PROPUESTA DE EJES PROGRAMÁTICOS, www1.izquierda - unida.es /#. 135 Globalizace a sociální hnutí. In : Programový dokument SDS schválený VII. sjezdem SDSv Jihlavě 22. listopadu 2003, www.sds.cz / storage / mds.doc.

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munists [...] to work for the social movements’ not only expressing discontent and impatience [...] but most of all the solutions for which the government takes over responsibility.”136 At this point one thing is clearly evident : Alliances offered to groups such as ATTAC or to individuals committed to it are only intended to serve the interests of communists and post - communists. 3.3

The Historical Inheritance Seen from the West : “Lenin’s Mummy in the Cupboard”

The relationship of CPs to history in general and especially to that of the communist movement and “real - existing socialism” is a fundamental element of their identity.137 In spite of differences in detail between the parties, three approaches can be distinguished. The traditional / orthodox CPs as well as Trotskyite and Maoist formations defend the communist idea, the role of the party and its leaders, with Lenin remaining the indisputable founding father. Except for the Trotskyite organizations, they certainly criticize Stalin for his excesses but considering the victory over Nazi - Germany and the modernization of the USSR they judge his total balance “positive”. The post - Stalin building up of socialism is considered marred with errors, but it remains the reference model of the future. Contrarily, the red - green formations clearly belong to the anti - totalitarian camp. They criticize Stalin and denounce real existing socialism as a historical failure, economically as much as socially. The roots of its defeat go back to the Leninist concept of the state and of the exercise of power. The reform - communist and post - communist formations borrow from both reflections, contradictory as they may be. They developed a complex historical reflection enforced by a double strategic necessity : After the disappearance of the USSR, the first one was to stabilize their organizations and their electorates, and in the next phase the second one was the idea to become ( again ) compatible with socialist and social democratic parties to form political and electoral alliances.138 This process of historicizing communism started before the publication of the “Black Book of Communism”. But this publication accelerated this development. A certain coming to terms with history had already begun in 1990. In the dissolving PCI a debate had begun about the Euro - communist phase of the 1970s. Within the PCF, the Gorbachev crisis of the late 1980s made communist and excommunist historians question the past. But the true rupture came about with the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the structures specialized in 136 Hue, Communisme, p. 37. 137 Entre aspiration humaine et tragédies de l’Histoire, www.pcf.fr / spip.php ?article66& var_recherche=stalinisme. 138 Wie hält DIE LINKE es mit ihrer Geschichte ? die - linke.de / partei / geschichte / fragen_und_antworten_zur_auseinandersetzung_mit_der_geschichte /2_wie_haelt_die_ linke_es_mit_ihrer_geschichte /.

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the production of the “history of the labor movement”. With the multiplication of testimonials on communist practice and the opening of the first archives, the crimes of Soviet communism could no longer be denied. Every communist or post - communist party has conceded them. The problem was the existence of strong tendencies attached to the “glorious past of communism” within these parties as well as within their electorate. Depending on their political strength within their respective societies, the parties take up semantic exercises. In 1990 the PDS is weak and isolated, while the PCF is still electorally powerful and accepted as a political partner by the democratic left. Both parties more or less “break” publicly with certain aspects of the past. The execution of communist cadres escaped to Moscow, the purges and Stalin’s crimes are condemned and any “return to Stalinist practice” was declared incompatible with the identity of the parties.139 But still, PDS, PCF, Rifondazione and practically every other CP refuse and deny the term “crime against humanity”. The devastating famine in the Ukraine is considered a consequence of the civil war and by no means the purposeful annihilation of the farmers. The destruction of the “bourgeois” elites while establishing communist powers in the East is depicted as an act of self - defense while facing the risk of a counter - revolution or else as the liquidation of fascist “collaborators”. Concentration camps such as Buchenwald, where social democrats were sent to after 1945, have to this very day been presented as camps filled with Nazis. The “great patriotic war” and the victory over Nazism remain one of the most important moments of global history.140 Other intellectual battlefronts open up and are analyzed to this day : the defense of Marx and the rescue of Leninism. Critics of communism are accused of revisionism. In a statement against the plan of a resolution by the Council of Europe condemning the crimes of the communist regimes, Mikis Theodorakis states on December 27, 2005 : “In the name of the dead communist comrades, of those who fell into the hands of the Gestapo, suffered in death camps and execution sites for Nazism to be exterminated and freedom and liberty to triumph, I have but one word to say to these gentlemen : Shame ! The Council of Europe has decided to change history, to falsify it equating victims with torturers, heroes with criminals, liberators with occupants, communists with Nazis.” In spite of the reluctance concerning the coming to terms with the past of communists and post - communists described above, a common position of CPs, socialists and ( partly ) social democrats has developed : The Soviet camp is

139 Wir brechen unwiderruflich mit dem Stalinismus als System ! Speech by Prof. Dr. Michael Schumann, http ://archiv2007.sozialisten.de / partei / geschichte / view_html? zid=3375; Die PDS hat sich vom Stalinismus der SED unwiderruflich befreit, http:// archiv2007.sozialisten.de / partei / geschichte / view_html ?zid=3340. 140 Československo za stalinismu (1948–1953), http ://www.sds.cz / view.php ?cisloclanku= 2007053001; The Bronze Soldier wears European values, www.esdtp.ee / inglise / statute.htm.

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accused of the perversion of communist ideals.141 In the Western democratic camp, however, those ideals are considered the basic principle and foundation of an honorable attitude, i. e. some sort of radical humanism. The communist utopia was often compared to Christianity by communist intellectuals of the 1990s. It was considered an eschatology supporting the new political project of a “world to conquer”. Socialists and communists purportedly share the goal of establishing a new democracy which shall take current change into consideration and create a new collective justice. Alain Badiou, a Marxist philosopher, wrote in 2007 : “Communism is an idea indestructible in the Platonian sense. The mere fact of abandoning the utopia of an equal, collective society disposing of the state is unimaginable without becoming an accomplice of the inegalitarian violence of the capitalist system.”142 This message of peace of communists and post - communists was soon to be accepted by the democratic left looking for political alliances in order to achieve or remain in power, as it was the case in France or Italy. In 2008, the electoral results of CPs and post - communist parties indicate that the strategy of using the debate on the history of communism to increase their political acceptance has functioned rather well.

IV.

Internationalism : Post - 1990 Attempts at Global Reorganization

Since 1989 a “central command and control of the world revolution” does no longer exist. The following forms of international cooperation can be distinguished : – The relations of communist and post - communist parties to the still existing communist regimes ( regime - centered bilateralism ); – Bilateral, regional, or transnational contacts of European communist and post- communist parties with each other ( party - centered bilateralism ); – Attempts at reorganizing communist and post - communist parties at a multi lateral level after 1989.143 141 Zur Stalinismus - Debatte. 50 Jahre nach dem XX. Parteitag der KPdSU, http://archiv 2007.sozialisten.de / partei / geschichte / view_html ?zid=31685. 142 Badiou, De quoi Sarkozy a - t - il le nom ? p. 123. 143 On the fringes we observe the continuation of the activities of traditional associations having existed before the collapse of the Eastern bloc; this concerns especially the former “front organizations” controlled by the Soviets. These “front organizations” have survived the 1989 change of times in spite of the loss of their financing by the Soviet Union. Of about 12 front organizations known at the end of the 1980s, about half are still politically visible in 2008 : The “World Federation of Scientific Workers” ( WFSW ), the “International Federation of Resistance Fighters” ( FIR www.fir.at ), the “World Federation of Democratic Youth” ( WFDY – ( wfdy.org ), the “World Peace Council” (WPC – www.wpc - in.org ), the Women’s International Democratic Federation ( WIDF – www.fdim - widf.com.br ). A comparison of the “political presence” of these structures in 2008 with that of the 1980s shows these organizations to be of very little importance.

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Bilateral Relations of Post - communist Parties to Communist Regimes

The list of communist countries is a short one in the year 2008. Besides the People’s Republic of China, there are the People’s Democratic Republic of Laos, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Fidel Castro’s República de Cuba. The reports of the conventions show that the European communist and postcommunist parties still cultivate the old rituals of “internationalism”: the responsible experts of the various CPs are delegated to the conventions of brother parties which in turn send their own representatives or diplomats to Europe to participate in conventions or “press festivals” of the most important newspapers.144 North Korea attempts to overcome its political isolation with the help of a group of “fellow travelers” such as the "Comité international de liaison pour la réunification et la paix en Corée – CILRECO".145 This latter is a distant satellite of the PCF.146 North Korean diplomats are also present at communist and post communist party conventions and cautiously try to find a common political basis on the topics of American aggression and peace in Korea. This rather passive policy gives Cuban activism a chance. Confronted with the growing deterioration of its economy, the regime demands material support and manpower ( volunteer brigades ) necessary for its survival from PCs, post - communist parties, and anti - imperialist movements. This action of solidarity for the Cuban regime falls on fertile ground. One reason is the myth of Ernesto Ché Guevara being highly influential among the generation of 1968 and revived at the turn of the century. The other is that as an object of solidarity Cuba has the advantage of directly confronting the “main imperialist power”, the USA. In order to coordinate these actions of solidarity, the Cuban government created its “Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos” ( ICAP www.icap.cu / nosotros.html ) in 1960. The cadres of this institute visit Europe frequently and try to intensify the activities of the different support networks.147 Among the biggest

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They accompany national and international campaigns of communist and post - communist parties, such as the support of Cuba and anti - fascism. But still they remain stones in the mosaic of the “work of internationalism”. For example : At the 3rd session of the 7th PDS convention ( Rostock, March 16/17, 2002), the CPCh had delegated Qiu Yuanping, deputy director of the Central Foreign Affairs Office, and Zhou Rongmei, First secretary of the Central Foreign Affairs Office. From the Vietnamese CP, To Huy Rua, member of the central committee and 1st secretary of the party committee of Haiphong, Pham Tien Nhien, deputy head of department at the central committee, and Nguyen Quynh Anh, expert. On international meetings cf. Ettinger, Reformen, Aufbruch, Tempo, archiv2007.sozialisten.de / politik / publikationen/ disput / view_html ?zid=2331. See : www.cilreco.com. All over the world there are North Korean friendship associations, for example the friendship association of Juche - Ideology of the CP of Germany ( see : www.kdvr.de / start / start.html ), or the Comitato italiano per lo studio del Joutche. For example, the NETZWERK CUBA e. V. ( www.netzwerk - cuba.de ) has 42 member organizations and 67 sustaining members, the sites cubasocialiste.blogspot.com and www.cubasolidaridad.org.

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and financially strongest associations in Western Europe are the front organizations of the German PDS / Die Linke ( Cuba Sí) and of the PCF ( cuba sí france). In 2008 all PCs and most post - communist parties consider the support of Cuba an international front of the utmost importance. In spite of their biting criticism of the regime, most of the Trotskyite internationals share this point of view. 2.

Bilateral, Regional, and Transnational Contacts among European Communist and Post - Communist Parties

There are many different levels of contact. Until 1989 the rules were clear for members of CPs living outside their home countries and for immigrants : In Western Europe, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian or Turkish communists remained members of their respective CPs which had central offices in the immigration countries.148 The Spanish and Italian CPs also possessed periodicals, a central office and an apparatus of their own. The Italian or Turkish communists did not have the right to become members of the national CPs. The national and foreign CPs certainly united for common action, but the independence of the parties was ensured. There were exceptions to the rule : Isolated members of the PCF in West Germany, for example, were permitted to join the DKP. In the East, members of a foreign CP living in a communist state for personal reasons ( work or marriage ) remained compulsory members of the CP of their home - country. After 1989 this rule disappeared. CP members were permitted a double membership. Thus, members of the French, Turkish, or British CPs were also members of the German PDS. Until 1987 the international contacts of pro - Soviet CPs were controlled by Moscow. Since 1990 bilateral contacts have been established by the various parties themselves. During a first period until 1994, declining public interest in CPs after 1990 and the disappearance of obscure financial resources reduced international contacts to a minimum. Preoccupied with their survival, the CPs and the post - communist parties gave priority to saving the apparatus. Still, formations that know each other well cultivate intensive relations. The PDS as the heir of the SED has ties with the PCF going back to the period before 1989. These two parties multiply the contacts of their cadres and leaders, of political and union meetings. After 1994 they turn into a sort of tandem ( which will be joined by the Rifondazione Comunista at about 1998) working for the reconstruction and later for the consolidation of structures of communication such as the NELF, the Confederal Group of the United Left – Northern Green Left ( GUE / NGL ), and finally the European Left Party. Partnerships also exist between the Nordic CPs, and in the Greek world between the KKE and AKEL. At the end of the 148 For a long time, countries like France and Italy served as areas of retreat and logistic support of clandestine CPs, for example the Turkish, Spanish, and Portuguese parties. For security reasons, the shielding off was very strict.

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1990s the situation in Europe has come to normal, and other ties have been established, for example all over the Balkans, but also among the heirs to the PCUS in the new states emerging from the remnants of the USSR. Presently, four different types of transnational contacts can be identified. The first type of contacts is that of parties invited to and present at conventions of CPs or post - communist formations or at the big festivals organized by the bodies of these parties.149 At the 3rd session of the 7th congress in Rostock on March 16 and 17, 2002, the PDS welcomed almost 40 delegations of communist or post - communist parties from the whole world. Most of these formations were also present – with information stands or delegations – at the festival of Humanité on September 14–16, 2007. The second type is that of conferences bringing together parties that are geographical neighbors and / or share common regional political interests. One of the more recent examples is the September 2006 meeting of CPs of the Balkans, the intention of which was to voice their opposition to the “imperialist military presence” in the Balkans.150 Another one is the Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties from the South and East Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Gulf region in January 2008. Its main emphasis lay on the Palestinian question, but the American aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the situation in the Islamic world were debated, too.151 The third type is of ideologic - strategic nature. The PCP organized an international Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties “Dangers and Potentialities of the International Situation. The Imperialist Strategy and the Energy Issue, the People’s Struggle and the Experience of Latin America, the Prospect of Socialism” in Lisbon from November 10 to 12, 2006. 63 parties participated and agreed on an international anti - imperialist and anti - American strategy.152 Finally, there are conferences aiming at re - founding the ideology. The CP of Belarus and the CP of the Russian Federation organized an International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in Minsk from November 3 to 5, 2007. This meeting entitled “The 90th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The timeliness and eternal value of its ideas. Communists in the struggle against imperialism and for socialism” was attended by 72 PCs. It sung paeans to the October Revolution.

149 Messages of greeting or support of sister parties and of progressive forces need to be included. 150 Participants : CP of Albania; CP of Bulgaria; Party of Bulgarian Communists; Socialist Workers’ Party of Croatia; CP of Macedonia; CP of Greece; New CP of Yugoslavia; CP of Turkey; Party of Labour, Turkey ( EMEP ). 151 Participants : Democratic Progressive Tribune – Bahrain; AKEL - Cyprus; CP of Greece; Tudeh Party of Iran; CP of Israel; Jordanian CP; Lebanese CP; Palestinian People’s Party; Sudanese CP; Syrian CP; Communist Party of Turkey. 152 It adopted an “Appeal against militarism and war, for freedom, democracy, peace and social progress” and a “Motion of solidarity with Latin America and Cuba”.

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Forms of Reorganization of Communist and Post - Communist Parties at the Multi - Lateral Level after 1990

The endeavors of the European CPs and post - communist parties to reorganize themselves within the European frame are analyzed in this book.153 At present, the chief actors of this reorganization are the Confederal Group of the European United Left / Nordic Green Left ( GUE / NGL ) and the European Left Party. The New European Left Forum ( NELF ) has continuously been losing importance. Even though their structures differ profoundly, these three bodies have the same problems : The most serious one is the growing confrontation between the parties essentially remaining faithful to the Marxist - Leninist ideals and the reformed and post - communist parties. The traditional parties denounce the social - democratization of the reformed parties, their systematic theoretical loans from the alter - globalization current, as well as their co - operation with the extreme – especially Trotskyite – left. According to the traditional parties, this “loss of ideological profile” – combined with the strategy of a systematic search for an alliance with the socialist and social - democratic parties aiming at a participation in power – could but fail. According to them, the electoral progress of the extreme right in Europe, especially among workers, is the consequence of the abandonment of the concentration on the working class and strategic divergence with the unions. As a direct contrast, the reform and post - communist parties find the fixation of the traditionalists on the model of “real - existing socialism” disquieting and outmoded in the 21st century. All these formations can reunite for common campaigns, for example anti - American ones, and share key words and common denominators such as anti - capitalism, anti - imperialism, anti - fascism, and the fight for peace. But these key words are filled with profoundly different meanings and have become more and more incompatible. This is why most of the Eastern and Southern European CPs have not yet taken part or do not want to participate in the project of the European Left Party. Within this structure the question of Europe plays an important role. The Nordic parties have remained hostile to the European Union. To sum it up, internationalism remains a central principle of the identity of all communist and post - communist parties. But the organization of this kind of internationalism seems rather weak and ineffective against its political adversaries, such as the USA and globalization. Attempting to overcome this deficit, new structures of co - operation have been established, especially in South America. In July 1990 the São Paulo Forum (“Foro São Paulo” – www.forosaopaulo.org ) came together in the Brazilian metropolis for a “Meeting of Left - Wing Parties and Organizations of Latin America and the Caribbean” for the first time. This forum has become a permanent institution. Its 13th meeting took place in San Salvador, the capital of

153 See in this volume : Hüllen, Transnationale Kooperation.

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El Salvador, from January 12 to 14, 2007.154 596 members of 58 parties from 33 countries discussed the political integration of Latin America and the Caribbean. The Brazilian “Partido dos Trabalhadores” ( PT ) ( http ://www.pt.org.br / ) was the driving force behind the realization of this forum at the beginning of the 1990s. Then chairman of the PT, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected President of Brazil on October 27, 2002. The “Forum” does not regard itself a traditional “International”.155 It is much rather a body to discuss and react to questions of Marxist and revolutionary theory after the end of the Cold War. According to the declaration after the first meeting in 1990, it intends to devote itself to “alternatives to imperialism and neo - liberalism” and to the development of “socialist, anti - imperialist, and populist concepts”. Its task is limited to the South American continent. The Forum definitely does not want to act as a new International. Still, its success is remarkable considering the profound disagreement predominant between the various revolutionary tendencies in Latin America until the end of the 1980s. It managed to gather the whole specter of left - wing formations, from traditionally revolutionary Marxist, left - wing socialist, and social democratic parties and groups on the one hand to militant armed organizations which according to European concepts are terrorist on the other.156 Actually, about 50 different Latin American and Caribbean parties and movements are organized by the Forum Sao Paulo. This body of discussion has become so important for the European Left that observers of every bigger post - communist party and of some member parties of the Socialist International were present at the meetings. In 2007, however, tensions have become apparent between revolutionary Marxists who consider Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela and supported by Fidel Castro, the figurehead of Latin American anti - imperialism, while moderates like Lula find themselves looked at askance as reformists.157

154 The meetings : 1990, São Paulo ( Brazil ); 1991, Mexico City ( Mexico ); 1992, Managua (Nicaragua ); 1993, Havana ( Cuba ); 1995, Montevideo ( Uruguay ); 1996, San Salvador ( El Salvador ); 1997, Porto Alegre ( Brazil ); 1998, Mexico City ( Mexico ); 2000, Managua ( Nicaragua ); 2001, Havana ( Cuba ); 2002, Antigua ( Guatemala ); 2003 Quito ( Peru ); 2005, São Paulo ( Brazil ). 155 See : São Paulo Forum – the convergence point of the Latin - American and Caribbean left, www.vermelho.org.br / english / text / forum.asp. 156 See : Echoes of the São Paulo Forum, Part 1, 2, 3, www.vermelho.org.br / english / text/ forum.asp. 157 See : Wie und ob zum Sozialismus, www.dkp - online.de / internat / intzus /39031003. htm; Bilanz lateinamerikanischer Erfahrungen, www.dkp - online.de / internat / intzus/ 39131101.htm.

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V.

Ideological and Systemic Competition

1.

The Building of Europe

The process of the Eastern enlargement of the EU and its European neighborhood policy towards the countries on its Eastern borders pressured non reformed or only half - heartedly reformed CPs in government to transform wherever sizable groups of the population orientated their life perspectives towards the standards of security, rule of law, and welfare in Western European states. Besides the USA and numerous NGOs, the EU in co - operation with the UN was the most important global player promoting human rights, the rule of law, and democracy in Eastern Europe. The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights received about 120 Mio Euros per annum by the EU for the support of numerous development programs in non - EU states around the world.158 The example of the Republic of Moldova convincingly demonstrates the pressure to reform on communist / post - communist parties. Between 1991 and 2006 more than 300 million Euros were pumped into the European country with the lowest GDP (2005 : US$ 800 per capita ).159 2001 brought about the end of a period of governments whose instability had been partly caused by the conflict in Transnistria. The barely reformed CP seized power. But under the presidency of Vladimir Voronin its orientation has become more and more pro - European. Presently, the party considers integration into the EU the most important goal of its foreign policy. In 2005 Voronin’s presidency was re - confirmed after parliamentary elections considered largely free and fair by OECD observers. A plan of action signed with the EU in 2005 was the starting point of the intensification of relations and the gradual rapprochement of the Republic of Moldova towards the economic and social order of the EU. Furthermore, the government committed itself to fighting the staggering corruption and to establish an independent judiciary.160 After the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine chances have increased to solve the Transnistria conflict peacefully. The per capita GDP has noticeably grown during the last years, due to favorable rates of economic growth as a consequence of an improved investment climate and increasing foreign trade with the EU - states. At the same time, pauperization has decreased. On the whole, the risks of an authoritarian backslide have diminished.

158 Cf. European Commission ( Ed.), Furthering Democracy and Human Rights. 159 Cf. European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Republic of Moldova, Country Strategy Paper 2007–2013. 160 Cf. in this volume : Patrick Moreau, State Capture.

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Social Democracy

A considerable number of former CPs has changed profoundly. They gave up Marxist dogmatism and found their permanent place within the family of European social democracy / European democratic socialism. They have fully accepted the political foundations of a pluralist and power - controlling society. They have not only parted with communist symbolism but re - oriented their programs and internal organizations. Their goal is no longer to overcome capitalism but rather to civilize it. In most Eastern European states social democracy has developed from reformed ex - communist parties. This process happened smoothly where reformoriented wings had existed within the single state parties before 1989, like in Poland and especially in Hungary. Generally, they were able to enroot themselves solidly within the party system. Frequently they became the major actors of coalition governments and shaped the politics of their respective countries. In Western Europe there are only few examples of this change because usually the traditional social democratic / democratic socialist parties usually were able to defend their position within the party system. In many ways, Italy is an exception : The PCI was one of the most adaptable Western European CPs. Furthermore, it benefited from the Tangentopoli scandal which unhinged the party system that had developed after the Second World War. It strengthened those formations that were not involved – or only to a lesser extent. Currently, the successor party Partito Democratico represents the most important part of the moderate left.161 In Western Europe, social democracy has had to face the challenge of adapting the systems of the welfare state under the conditions of high national debt. It has had to do so by applying “neo - liberal” concepts, too, while facing the demands of a changing population structure ( low natality, increasing life expectancy ) and the pressure of economic competition heightened by globalization. Social democracy was successful wherever it was capable to prove itself versed in managing the crisis of capitalism while remaining committed to the traditional values of equality, justice, and solidarity. The example of Gerhard Schröder’s government in Germany shows the difficulties of this balancing act if neither the moderate right nor the anti - social democratic left ought to profit from the inevitable interference with social assets and vested rights. In Eastern Europe, however, the problems are lined up differently because often post - communist social democracy was in overall charge of establishing market economic structures.162 Their economic liberalism often surpassed that of their right - wing 161 The DS was part of the Olive Tree electoral coalition which merged with a number of centrist and leftist groups ( Movimento Repubblicani Europei, Italia di Mezzo, Alleanza Riformista, Repubblicani Democratici Partito Democratico Meridionale e Progetto Sardegna ) to form the Democratic Party on October 14, 2007. 162 See : Karasimeonov, Postkommunistische Sozialdemokratie. In : Becker et al. ( Eds.), Sozialdemokratische Reformpolitik, pp. 144–148.

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competitors, like in Poland and Hungary. Against this background, the respective parties have to newly develop their socio - political profile and steadily defend their moderate left - wing position against their socio - populist competitors. 3.

The Ultra - Left

Trotskyites, Maoists, and anarchists / anarcho - syndicalists can be considered traditionalists strictly opposing Moscow orthodoxy. The first two tendencies are variants of Marxism - Leninism. But the Trotskyites are inspired by Lenin’s companion Leon Trotsky, while the Maoists follow Mao Zedong, the Chinese leader of the revolution.163 Anarchists and anarcho - communists differ from both communist tendencies especially in their marked skepticism of institutions and organizations. They totally object to the state apparatus even during the revolutionary period of transition to stateless and classless society. Auto - organization at grass - roots level is to substitute the state. Anarcho - syndicalism – a combination of anarchism and revolutionary syndicalism – considers factory action groups the nucleus of the new auto - organized, libertarian society overcoming capitalism.164 In Europe there are numerous splinter groups of Trotskyite, Maoist, anarchist, and anarcho - syndicalist orientation, often fighting each other viciously. Due to their extreme dogmatic sectarianism, they are incapable of exercising any political influence. Thus, they are no serious competitors of the bigger communist, reform - communist or red - green formations.165 However, there are exceptions to this rule. France is the most important one: There, Trotskyite parties had been revived during the 1968 mobilization. They managed to expand – though only modestly – into the political vacuum created by the erosion of the PCF.166 At the first ballot of the 2007 presidential elections, PCF candidate Marie - George Buffet received merely 1.93 % of the vote while “Pablist” Olivier Besançenot, candidate of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire ( LCR ), carried off 4.08 % of the vote. The second Trotskyite competitor, Lutte ouvrière ( LO ), had named its long - standing member of the leadership, Arlette Laguiller, who received 1.33 % of the vote. Supported by the Parti des travailleurs, “Lambertist” Gérard Schivardi only received 0.34 % of the vote. But the Trotskyite candidates’ total vote amounted to 5.75 %. Even though the support of intellectuals has dwindled considerably since the days of the students’ revolt, the Trotskyites still enjoy certain support in the trade union milieu and in education. 163 Cf. Alexander, International Trotskyism; id., International Maoism in the Developing World; Cosseron ( Ed.), Dictionnaire de l’extrême gauche; Pina, L’extrême gauche en Europe. 164 Cf. Lösche, Anarchismus. 165 Cf. the analysis of Rudolf van Hüllen in this volume. 166 Cf. Bourseiller, Histoire générale de l’ultra - gauche; Barcia / Bourseiller, La véritable histoire; Reynié ( Ed.), L’extrême gauche.

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In many European countries, Maoists have no more influence than Trotskyites. But there, too, are exceptions to the rule : In Turkey, splits off the Türkiye Komünist Partisi / Marksist - Leninist ( TKP / ML ) support several guerilla groups. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution estimates their support in Germany to be about 1.800 people.167 Due to their organizational prudishness, anarchists and anarcho - syndicalists were at a historically grave disadvantage compared to the communists of different tendencies. But in the course of the decline of real - existing socialism they were able to gain some political territory. In Germany the scene of militant autonomous groups inspired by anarchism was buoyed up. At the end of 2006 its estimated 5,500 supporters committed numerous acts of violence on the fringe of the mobilization against the growing significance of right - wing extremist parties.168 In the Romance countries, anarcho - syndicalism has sometimes been able to grow deeper roots than in other European countries. This is the case especially in Spain : During the civil war, anarcho - syndicalists had gained considerable influence and developed alternative economic models.169 The Confederación Nacional del Trabajo ( CNT ), forbidden in Spain under Franco, was re - founded in the late 1970s. However, it has been unable to live up to its former role. Claiming 60,000 members, the union has been able to exert some influence with enterprises and come to the fore with a rather uncompromising position at strikes. Thus, the CNT has become the most important member of the International Workers’ Association ( IWA ) and competes with groups of the CCOO partially under communist influence.170 4.

The Alter - Globalization Movement

Today, besides the extreme right, the alter - globalization movement is one of most powerful competitors of communist and post - communist parties.171 It appeared on the political scene at the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) in Seattle in 1999. Since the mid - 1990s there had been more and more indications of the rise of an anti - liberal movement : in 1994 in Chiapas, the strikes in France in the winter of 1995, the 1998 demonstrations for debt relief, the European marches against unemployment, etc. The alter - globalization movement turned into an international actor no longer to be ignored.172 167 168 169 170 171

Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern ( Ed.), Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006, p. 251. Cf. ibid., p. 136. Cf. Bernecker, Die Soziale Revolution im Spanischen Bürgerkrieg. On the CCOO see the contribution of Dominique Andolfatto in this publication. For a survey of the situation of alter - globalization, see : Moreau / Steinborn, Eine andere Welt ist möglich. 172 Some important publications on the history of alter - globalization : Aguiton, Was bewegt die Kritiker der Globalisierung ?; Della Porta, No global – new global; Sommier, Les nouveaux mouvements contestataires; Veltmeyer ( Ed.), Globalization and antiglobalization; Wieviorka ( Ed.), Un autre monde.

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In the 1990s a global public opinion began to develop, even if only about a very small number of problems, like ecology, debt relief, or the WTO. The remains of the new social movements of the 1960s to 1980s as well as the oneissue groups of the 1990s joined the alter - globalization movement. The peace movement and a part of the extreme left, especially Trotskyites, also associated with this sphere. This confluence explains the rapid growth of the movement and its attractiveness for new groups such as parts of the union movements and consumer associations. From the very beginning, the alter - globalization movement is extremely heterogeneous : Its actors debate and act together. But in specific fields or in the course of common campaigns they may very well act autonomously and according to their own analyses. At least until the 2nd World Social Forum of Porto Alegre in 2002 this heterogeneity was a strong point. It helped the alter - globalization movement to occupy an ever growing political space and to enter the ideological territory and sphere of influence of the democratic left, but also of communist and post - communist parties. Furthermore, it was present in a growing number of fields of social and economic mobilization. This great variety did not become a hindrance because alter - globalization based on common ideological foundations : the inevitable victory of economic, social, ecologic, and cultural rights, presented as “human rights”, over the logic of profits. This basic position welded together and partly covered up the differences between the reform and the revolutionary wings. The mere organizational and theoretical confluence concerning the social question, ecology, and pacifism cannot explain the rise of the alter - globalization movement. Structural aspects need to be considered, too. The policy of most governments, whether they call themselves left - wing or not, is dominated by liberal logics. But there are crises at different levels, like the growth of poverty, unemployment, etc. The policy of structural adaptation and of the acceptance of a model of development based on total integration into the world market and the complete abolition of protective mechanisms has failed. These crises slowly affected the defenders of neo - liberalism and made them use the arguments of the alter - globalization camp for their own internal debates. The World Bank, for example, made the fight against poverty one of its main issues again and accepted the role of the state in the field of development policy. Sustainable development has become an item on the agenda of most governments, and the Tobin tax is a topic of discussion. The alter - globalization movement published this fact very efficiently, thus considerably increasing its credibility. The labor movement is permanently on the decline in Europe, and the CPs and post - communist parties have lost electoral contact with workers almost everywhere. The alter - globalization movement, on the other hand, has achieved a breakthrough because it is in agreement with modern individualism. This phenomenon has been extensively studied by sociologists. It is the motor as well as the break shoe of the alter - globalization protest. The individualism of the 21st

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century is characterized by cocooning, indifference towards others, and the refusal of collective engagement. But at the same time it is the motivating force behind the will to individual emancipation stressing personal responsibility. Individualism leads to a form of political commitment that can no longer be realized within traditional parties and their ideologies. This explains the drop in traditional membership the parties of the left and of the extreme left suffer from every day. But chances of mobilization improve if they develop spontaneously or concentrate on civil society actions, for example in the social field, ecology, or pacifism. That is why young people generally tend to be sympathetic with alter- globalization groups while party membership of people under the age of 30 has been continuously decreasing with every political party – but especially with CPs and post - communist parties. CPs and post - communist parties and the alter - globalization movement compete ideologically. The core of alter - globalization theories is a mixture and modification of various political ideas which generally have Marxist origins. In their analyses, some authors search for a “third way” between socialism and neo - liberalism while others explicitly strive for revolution.173 The analysis of the theoretical texts of the alter - globalization movement proves that there is no closed ideology. It is substituted by the slogan “Another world is possible”. This motto can be filled with various meanings by the respective tendencies. This minimal consensus lacks contents, thus enabling the movement to react promptly to any change of conditions by quickly substituting issues. Thus, every year several new campaigns can be conducted on apparently very different topics. Presently, at the international level, the PCs are too weak and too poorly organized. Therefore they are forced to follow the dynamics of the alter - globalization. This in turn is the subject of severe criticism of all those who strive for an effective anti - capitalist strategy. The popularity of the publications by Susan George, Naomi Klein, Noam Chomsky, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri is by no means restricted to anti capitalist or Marxist circles. To a varying extent, criticism by the alter - globalization movement has penetrated the political bodies of society, like the parties of the democratic left, and a number of think tanks. Those analyses have gone down well in many civil societies around the globe, and not only in the industrialized European societies. In Europe the analyses of the reformist alter - globalization have fallen on fertile ground. The social situation of the people has become more precarious, too. The loss of cohesiveness of conventional politics and growing dissatisfaction with the traditional parties have reinforced the attractiveness of the alter - globalization movement. This development consequently reduces the potential membership and electorate of CPs and post - communist parties. 173 Some important ideological texts : Bello, The future in the balance; Cassen, Le G8 illégitime; Chomsky, Profit over People; Forrester / George, Der Lugano - Report; Hardt / Negri, Empire; id., Multitude; Holloway, Die Welt verändern; Klein, No Logo !; Ziegler, Les nouveaux maîtres du monde.

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But still, this statement needs to be differentiated. First of all, we have to distinguish between Western and Eastern Europe, Central and Southern America and the rest of the American continent, and finally the Afro - Asian group.174 In Eastern Europe the alter - globalization movement is barely organized. It only exists in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. In the other former satellite states of the USSR and in Russia the consequences of the present political and economical transformation have reinforced existing anti - capitalist tendencies. The potential of anti - capitalist protest can make itself heard organizationally and at elections by turning to communist and post - communist parties, nationalist and right - wing extremist formations and rural factions. Alter - globalization is the youngest movement on the political scene and seems to be condemned to powerlessness at least on a mid - term range. In Western Europe, however, conditions are very favorable for alter - globalization protest. In Northern America, too, its impetus is quite strong. There it is supported by three tendencies of different strength, namely the small but very militant ecologic movement, the powerful consumer associations, and finally a conglomeration of pacifists and Bush - opponents reinforced by the Iraq war. The Latin American countries are another fertile ground for alter - globalization. This is shown by the coming into power of sympathizers with the movement, like Lula da Silva in Brazil, and Marxist / left - wing nationalists such as Chavez or Morales, by the high social and economic tensions in Argentine and Uruguay, the growing insistence of the demands of indigenous populations in Peru or Mexico, and the renaissance of neo - Marxist guerilla movements. Especially in Asia, alter - globalization progresses rapidly. Until recently, the movement has most of all been rooted in Latin America and Europe. Alter - globalization has crossed another border : It has entered a world region which – with its “tigers” and “dragons” – has so far been regarded the only one benefiting from globalization. Finally, the alter - globalization movement is one facet of the recovery of the identity of the left. The disorientation of the latter was the result partly of the destruction of communism and of American economic, strategic, and cultural predominance, and partly of the increase of Islamic fundamentalism. However, this is not a complete “ideological renaissance” but rather a partial reconstitution of ideology, utopia, and language with anti - capitalism at its center. The outlines of this anti - capitalism are clear : existing capitalism is the only reason for imperialism, the danger of fascism, and the spread of racism and sexism. At the same time the alter - globalization movement is deeply ecologic because ecology is regarded the counter - pole of the logics of capitalist profit - making. This perpetual emphasis of the primacy of anti - capitalist action is the clear difference to social democracy.175 Alter - globalization has a fiercely utopian dimension : Capitalism is not considered the end of history. “Objectively” – because 174 Due to the lack of scientific analysis, the situation in the Middle East is not included. 175 Cf. Waller / Coppieters / Deschouwer, Social democracy, pp. 154 ff.

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of the structural crisis of capitalism – a broad movement stands the chance to establish a counter - power, thereby pushing back liberal logics, stopping war, exploitation, racism, and poverty, and averting the ecologic disaster. This utopian dimension is both the chance and the weakness of the alter - globalization movement : a chance because of its attractiveness for young people, workers, and intellectuals; a weakness because progress is still minimal. Impatience could make supporters choose the way of radical confrontation with capitalism. 5.

The Extreme Right

The interrelation between right - and left - wing extremist parties within the European party system is extremely complex. On the one hand, the ideological antagonism between left - wing universalism and right - wing particularism is still predominant. It shapes mentalities, ways of thinking, aims and objectives as well as the perception of the enemy. On the other hand, there are ideologic and programmatic intersections; to a certain extent, the parties compete for the same electorate. Furthermore, extreme ends of the party systems are interconnected by a system of “communicating tubes”; there are numerous organizational and strategic parallels. The extreme ends seem close to each other and far apart at the same time. The ideologic antagonism is weakened especially among those formations Bozóki and Ishiyama assign to the category of the “permutated left”.176 Those parties attempt to distinguish themselves in a field generally considered the domain of the ( extreme ) right by using ( ultra - )nationalist rhetoric. Traces of this development can be found in Romania and Serbia. But the prime example is the CP of the Russian Federation. Under the leadership of Gennadij Andreevič Zjuganov, its national - bolshevist wing has become the predominant tendency. Some researchers even classify the CPRF a right - wing extremist party.177 But this categorization does not take into account that the egalitarian and collectivist transformation of the economy still constitutes a central programmatic aim and objective of the CPRF. The Soviet Union is its central point of reference – not only as a symbol but as an economic model. However, its achievements are praised as rather “national” results. Anti - Americanism, anti - Westernism, anti liberalism, and sometimes anti - semitism, too, have come to the fore of aims and objectives and rhetoric to such an extent that they form bridges to the ultra - right. Thus, Zjuganov could be on good terms with representatives of right - wing extremist organizations such as the anti - semitic, neo - pro - monarchist movement “Pamjat”, and sign the charter of an initiative called “Front of National 176 Cf. Bozóki / Ishiyama, Introduction and Theoretical Framework. In : Id. ( Eds.), The Communist Successor Parties, pp. 3–13. 177 Cf. for example Umland, Toward an Uncivil Society ? In : Demokratizatsiya, 10 (2000) 3, pp. 362–391; id., Neue ideologische Fusionen im russischen Antidemokratismus. In: Backes ( Ed.), Rechtsextreme Ideologien, pp. 371–406.

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Salvation” together with ultra - nationalists such as Eduard Limonov, Alesandr Dugin, and Alexandr Barkašov.178 The antagonism between left and right becomes relative due to common antiliberalism and anti - parliamentarianism as well as the common chief enemy defined thereby, namely the West headed by the USA. Furthermore, the symbiosis of nationalism and socialism known from the 1920s and 1930s has become attractive again for the extreme right. Professional observers identify a new “master frame” of the programmatic objectives and propaganda of successful right - wing extremist parties, namely the combination of nationalism / ethno - centrism with the “social question”.179 In many countries right - wing extremist and right - wing populist formations have been able to penetrate traditional electoral strata of the ( extreme ) left this way. Psephology results are clear : Workers, individuals with low educational levels, males, and young voters are overrepresented among the electorate of successful right - wing extremist parties.180 Over the last decade this electoral profile has become more and more similar all over Europe. The formerly stronger middle - class vote has rather turned away again from the extreme right.181 In Germany, for example, workers, unemployed and those with low educational levels are the strongest supporters of parties such as DVU or NPD.182 At the September 2004 Landtag ( state parliament) elections in Saxony the NPD received its best result ever, 9.2 % of the vote. 14 % of workers and 21 % of 18–29 year old males elected this right - wing extremist party.183 The key factor of its success was agitation against the neo - liberal labor market and the social reforms of Schröder’s government ( “Hartz IV” ). Only the nationalist / ethno - centered accentuation distinguished NPD slogans from those of the ( left - wing ) PDS. The PDS’s function as a vehicle of protest was impaired: In East Germany it generally does not act as nor is considered an anti - system party. In the Czech Republic the situation is different because of the different constellation of actors. With its defensive attitude towards the economic influence of German, European, and American capital the KSČM avails itself of fears and resentments similar to those the ( extreme right - wing ) Republicans ( Sdružení pro Republiku – Republikánská strana Československa – SPR - RSČ ) had also chan178 Cf. Thieme, Hammer, Sichel, Hakenkreuz, p. 190. 179 Cf. Steglich, Erfolgsbedingungen der extremen Rechten in Deutschland. In : Backes / Steglich ( Eds.), Die NPD, pp. 55–74, here 72; Rydgren, Is the Extreme Right - Wing Populism Contagious ? In : European Journal of Political Research, 44 (2005), pp. 413–437. 180 Cf. Lubbers / Gijsberts / Scheepers, Extreme Right - Wing Voting. In : European Journal of Political Research, 41 (2002), pp. 345–378; Norris, Radical Right, pp. 129–148. 181 Cf. Fieschi, Fascism, Populism and the French Fifth Republic, pp. 171–172. 182 Cf. Falter, Wer wählt rechts, pp. 61–106; Stöss / Niedermayer, Rechtsextremismus, politische Unzufriedenheit und das Wählerpotential, pp. 21–23; Arzheimer, Wahlen und Rechtsextremismus. In : Bundesministerium des Innern ( Ed.), Extremismus in Deutschland, pp. 56–81, here 72–74. 183 Cf. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Wahl in Sachsen, pp. 40, 45.

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neled from time to time. Typically, the KSČM is partially successful in areas – for instance in the industrial crisis area of Northern Bohemia – in which the Republicans had also had their strongholds.184 Unlike in the Czech Republic, there is no communist populist protest alternative in Poland capable to channel similar fears and resentments. There the former communists have converted to determined supporters of market liberalism and cannot provide a home for social protest or for critical positions towards Europe. The resulting gap was temporarily filled by other actors such as the social - populist “Samoobrona” and the ultranationalist “League of Polish Families”.185 In Eastern Europe, right - wing extremist parties often occupied the ideological vacuum left by the retreat or transformation of the communist single state parties. But this pattern is common in Western Europe, too. For example, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs ( FPÖ ) drew considerable profit from the erosion of the traditional social democratic workers’ milieus. The FPÖ electorate obtained a new “neo - proletarian” profile with workers and employees with low levels of education and income being heavily over - represented.186 The Nordic parties and the Vlaams Belang ( VB ) in Belgium also attract workers with low qualification.187 Evidently, union membership is no longer an integrating stronghold. Right - wing and national populist parties claim to be advocates of the working class, and sometimes they even play this role. Socialists, social democrats, and communists are fiercely competed in their former strongholds. On the occasion of the 1995 presidential elections in France, psephologist Pascal Perrineau coined the term “gaucho - lepénisme” ( left - wing - LePenism ) for the Front national ( FN ) electorate of the industrial hot spots in the North and East of France. There, the national populist party benefited exceedingly from the erosion of left - wing strongholds.188 In the first ballot of the 2002 presidentials, the labor vote of both right - wing extremist candidates ( Le Pen and Mégret ) reached 26 percent.189 In 2007 Le Pen lost least in PCF and Trotskyite strongholds.190 Besides this left - wing - LePenism there is also a “right - wing - LePenism” and the “ninisme” ( neither - nor - ism ) of voters who belong neither to one nor to the other camp.191 Right - wing as well as left - wing extremist parties compete fiercely for an electorate hit extremely hard by the consequences of the globalizing economy. Rightwing extremist parties certainly benefit from the vote of “welfare chauvinists”. But they are even more successful with “modernization losers”, i. e. voters who 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191

Cf. the analysis of Miroslav Mareš in this volume. Cf. Thieme, Hammer, Sichel, Hakenkreuz, pp. 107–125. Cf. Moreau, Le FPÖ, chapter 7. Cf. Moreau, Die extreme Rechte in Europa. In : Backes / Steglich ( Eds.), Die NPD, pp. 33–54. Cf. Perrineau, Le symptôme Le Pen, pp. 243–261. Cf. Mayer, Radical Right Populism in France. Cf. Fourquet, L’échec de Jean - Marie Le Pen, http ://www.cevipof.msh - paris.fr / bpf / analyses / Fourquet_Le%20pen2007.pdf, p. 16. Cf. Mayer, Ces Francais qui votent Le Pen, pp. 282–301.

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are threatened to be steamrolled by the economic changes because of their low levels of education and living standard. This electorate is disappointed of the “established parties” and considers immigrants to be annoying competitors on the job market. Right - wing extremist parties are considered highly credible representatives of the anti - globalization movement by their sympathizers and supporters. Their basic ideological tenets ( particularism, nationalism, and ethno centrism ) naturally include the rejection of the “one world” - vision especially propagated by the left. “Euronat” was founded at the FN Bleu Blanc Rouge party festival on October 9, 2005. In a characteristic way, its foundation manifesto combines the demands for “social justice” and “No Third World Immigration”.192 Besides the FN, the British National Party ( BNP ), the Swedish Nationaldemokraterna ( ND ), the Italian Movimento Sociale – Fiamma Tricolore, the Spanish Democracía Nacional ( DN ) and the Dutch formation Nieuw Rechts ( New Right ) reached an agreement on a common platform. However, their statements were vague, and numerous parties especially from Central and Eastern Europe declined to participate and cooperate. This proves that the basic problems of an “International of Nationalists” have not been overcome at all. In the past they were frequently prevalent and typical of the relationship between the parties represented in the European Parliament.193 This fact is likely to provide “internationalists” with an important advantage in future competitions.

V.

Death of Communism ?

Markus “Mischa” Wolf was head of the General Reconnaissance Administration ( Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung ), the foreign intelligence division of East Germany’s Ministry for State Security ( MfS ). After 1990 he was one of the leading personalities of the PDS. His saying “The last word has not been spoken”194 shows that at least part of the communists / post - communists have not lost hope to turn the tables on history some day. At the end of this publication this hypothesis needs to be questioned. The main focus must center on the communist idea in the 21st century. The decline of “real - existing socialism” in the successor states of the Soviet Union and its belt of satellites, the crisis of socialism and its transformation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America interfered strongly with the development of all those parties in Europe orientated at least for some time towards the various “centers of world revolution”. But it did not at all imply the inevitable historical end of an idea whose “politico - religious” nucleus195 might still fascinate people in the future. 192 193 194 195

Cf. http ://euronat.org /. Cf. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties, pp. 172–183. Quoted from Geyer, Zeitzeichen. On the concept of political religions, see : Besier / Lübbe ( Eds.), Politische Religion und Religionskritik; Bosshart, Politische Intellektualität und totalitäre Erfahrung, pp. 112–

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They might be attracted by the idea of the salvation of mankind in this world through various forms of community of property and goods. The programs of communist and post - communist parties as well as the statements of a part of the alter - globalization tendency prove that there is no lack of efforts to re - create a new intellectual basis of communism. These efforts draw on Marxist and pre - Marxist traditions and attempt to learn from the “errors” of Marxism - Leninism stamped by Moscow. Neo - Marxists reinterpret the corpus of the doctrine while partially reverting to theoreticians like Pierre - Joseph Proudhon, the “young Marx”, Rosa Luxemburg, Michel Foucault or Gilles Deleuze in order to save historical materialism while breaking with the ideology of revolutionary violence and terror.196 Many still consider the social movements their preferred subject of revolutionary change. Others, however, have become followers of the Marxist philosopher Antonio Negri and his innovative theory of revolution. Negri has discovered a new ferment of change, namely the “multitude” of the excluded, unpropertied, and disenfranchised masses produced by global migration.197 Furthermore, the aspect of the unipolar world and the “imperial” attitude of the USA have bestowed new credibility to “anti - imperialist” arguments which seemed outdated and worn out before. They are joined by others who take up anarchist and council communist ideas and advocate the dissolution of all “repressive” structures by the spontaneity of the revolting masses. Like the Englishman John Holloway or the Frenchman José Bové, they are inspired by the Mexican rural resistance of the neo - Zapatist guerilla and of sub - commander Marcos.198 Quite a few set their hopes on the “Bolivarian Revolution” of Hugo Chavez, the authoritarian - populist ruler of Venezuela since 1990, and on the “socialism of the 21st century” he propagates. In the media he is supported by Fidel Castro, the seriously ill leader of the Cuban revolution. Besides the vitality of Marxism,199 we have to pay attention to the people and the organizations. In effect, the progress or not of advocates of neo - communist radical solutions in Europe depends on the ability of democratically elected governments to master the challenges of a globalized economy and to modernize the systems of social security so that they comply with the demands of economic efficiency as well as solidarity with the weak and needy in society. Conditions vary between the political systems. The situation of post - communist and reformed CPs in Europe shows that the strategy “pressure from the left” may bring about totally different results.

196 197 198 199

126; Maier, Politische Religionen. In : Maier / Schäfer ( Eds.), Totalitarismus und politische Religionen, pp. 299–310; id., Politische Religionen; Sironneau, Sécularisation et religions politiques. Cf. Dilas - Rocherieux, Néocommunisme. In : Courtois ( Ed.), Dictionnaire du communisme, pp. 406–408. Cf. Hardt / Negri, Multitude. Cf. REDaktion ( Ed.), Chiapas und die Internationale der Hoffnung. Cf. Martin, On your Marx; Kinner ( Ed.), Rosa Luxemburg.

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After last year’s results of the presidential (1.93 %) and general elections (4.29 %) in France the PCF has considered its dissolution and the re - foundation of a party modeled on the German “Die Linke”, reuniting all anti - capitalist forces including the ultra - left and the alter - globalization movement. In Italy, the alliance of all CPs with the Greens suffered a historic defeat. A major number of the industrial workers of the North turned to the Lega Nord.200 The Left. The Rainbow ( La sinistra. L’arcobaleno ) of former Chamber President Fausto Bertinotti missed the eight - percent barrier for the Senate in every Italian region. With 3.5 %, it also failed to pass the barring clause of the Chamber of Deputies and thus will not have any parliamentarians at present. In the Netherlands the situation is completely different. The Socialistische Partij, emerged from the Dutch communist movement, celebrates one victory after another. In 2003 it had received 6.3 % of the vote; by 2006 the percentage rose to 16.6 %. Die Linke in Germany has also been increasingly successful at state elections.201 The programs of all these formations ( PCF, Rainbow, SP, and the Left ) are identical in many respects : The core of their identity consists of egalitarianism, anti - capitalism and the rejection of neo - liberal globalization, anti - imperialism, anti - racism, and anti - fascism. Using the same ideological elements may win over voters – or it may fail. This is true practically all over Europe, with Russia and Belarus remaining partly in the phase of the establishment of an authoritarian system very far away from constitutional democratic models. May one risk a prognosis of the future ? The future of European communism / post - communism is by no means certain. Its political tendencies are reinforced by some strong parties from new EU - members. They will certainly play an important role with the building of Europe, in the European Parliament as well as in other European institutions. This achievement – based on a permanently improving structure of international cooperation and communication ( the faction of GUE / NGL, the European Left Party ) – is an important asset. These assets seem positive at first sight. However, there are innumerable negative aspects which might lord them over on the long run : These parties are over- aged. They are not attractive for young people who consider structures such as ATTAC more efficient to influence on politics. The traditional milieus which have shaped the communist identity are disintegrating rapidly. The working class is but a sociological myth. Their voters, master of their own electoral decision, turn away from the CPs to other protest formations. The populist extreme rightwing has adopted a proletarian nature by now; the anarchist, anarcho - communist and Trotskyite extreme left have returned to the political scene and register some electoral success in certain countries. 200 The extent can be seen in some working class communities in Italy’s most highly industrialized province of Vicenza. In the traditional industrial city of Valdagno the left received 2.1 %, the Lega Nord 30 %. In Schio the Lega received 25 % of the vote, and the left 2.6 %. In the industrial town of Arzignano, ruled by a left - wing mayor, the relationship was 37 % to 1.5 %. 201 See in this volume : Patrick Moreau, Die PDS / Linkspartei.

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Sociologically, the movements critical of globalization belong to the new social movements. Their growing competition obstructs the recovering of the communist / post - communist parties. Most of them recuperate very slowly from the damage inflicted by the downfall and ruin of real - existing socialism. Within the parties – reformed or not – there is a battle going on between traditionalists and reformers. The traditionalists consider the Leninist model the only future for communism. The reformers know that an alliance with social democrats is absolutely necessary to enhance the credibility of the party and to give it the status and position of a “governing party”. The CPs must pay a high price for both strategies : Leninism with its fixation on a new Red October does no longer seduce people to dream. The policy of consensus of the CPs with the “social democrat and socialist enemy”, on the other hand, blurs the communist identity focused on reform.202 Other actors have benefited from the strategy of the “poles of radicality”. In plain words : There is no via regia for the communist / post - communist parties in Europe today. They are but one group of actors among many others within a changing pluralist left. To put it bluntly : “The last word” may have been spoken, provided that Europe wins the competitions of ideas and by way of reforms masters the problems arising from the socio - economic change induced by globalization, global migration, demographic and climatic challenges in troubled and partly illiberal surroundings.

202 Cf. Juraga / Booker, Socialist Cultures East and West.

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646

Appendix

Abbreviations 4K A.T.I. ABL ACPB ADIK ADISOK AG AKEL AKOA AMS AP APEIS APK APO ATTAC BdA BE BNF BPP BR BSDH BSDP HG C.C. C.C.C. CC CCFD CCOO CDA CDU CDU CFDT CGIL C - groups CGSP CGT CGTP CIS CLS CNSF Comintern CP RSFSR CP CPN

The Four Coalition Anotero Technologiko Institouto Alte Bundesländer All - Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks Agonistiko Dimokratiko Kinima Ananeotiko Dimokratiko Sosialistiko Kinima Arbeitsgemeinschaften beim Parteivorstand Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou Ananeotiki Kommounistiki kai Oikologiki Aristera Assoziation Marxistischer StudentInnen Agrarian Party Association pour l’emploi, l’information et la solidarité avec les chômeurs et les travailleurs précaires Arbejderpartiet Kommunisterne Außerparlamentarische Opposition Association pour une Taxation des Transactions financières pour l'Aide aux Citoyens Bund der Antifaschistinnen und Antifaschisten Bloco de Esquerda Biełaruski Narodny Front “Adradžeńnie” Belarusian Labour Party Brandenburg Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada Belarusian Social Democratic Party People’s Hramada Central Committee Central Control Committee Central Committee Comité catholique contre la faim Comisiones Obreros Christen Democratisch Appel Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Coligação Democrática Unitária Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro Communist groups Confédération générale des services publics Confédération générale du travail Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses Commonwealth of Independent States Communist League of Serbia Council of the National Salvation Front Communist International Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Communist Party Comitato politico nazionale

Abbreviations CPN CPRF CPSU CPSU CR ČSDF CSES CSIL ČSSD CSU CTP CWI D66 DEPOS DFK DFV DGB DIKKI DIKO DISY DKP DKP DKP / ML DL KSČM DOS DP DS DS DSPS DSS DU EACL EAR EDA EDEK EDON EEC EKA EL EL EMU EP ESDTP ESF ETUC EU EU EVP

Communistische Partij van Nederland Communist Party of the Russian Federation Communist Party of the Soviet Union Union of Communist Parties Czech Republic Československé demokratické forum Comparative Study of Election Systems Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori Česká strana sociálně demokratická Christlich Soziale Union Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi Committee for a Workers’ International Democraten 66 Democratic Movement of Serbia Demokratické fórum komunistů Deutsche FreidenkerVerband Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Dimokratiko Koinoniko Kinima Dimokratiko Komma Dimokratikós Sinayermós Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti Deutsche Kommunistische Partei Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti / Marxister Leninister Demokratická levice v KSČM Democratic Opposition of Serbia Democrazia Proletaria Democratici di Sinistra Demokratska stranka For Democracy, Social Progress and Justice Demokratska stranka Srbije Demokratická unia European Anti - Capitalist Left Elliniki Aristera Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera Eniaia Dimokratiki Enosi Kentrou Enomeni Dimokratiki Organosi Neon European Economic Community Enosi Kyprion Agroton Enhedslisten Party of the European Left / Partei der Europäischen Linken European Monetary Union European Parliament Sotsialldemokraatlik Tööpartei European Social Forum European Trade Union Confederation European Union European Elections Evangelische Volkspartij

647

648 F! FAU FDP FGTB FIR FK FO FRG FSS G GCA GDR GE GML / RM GUE HZDS HZS IAA IC ICFTU ICMLPO IC - V IG - Metall IKB ILPS IMF INPEG IS ISF IST IU KAK KAP KAPN KDH KDU - ČSL KENml KFML KFML( r ) K - Gruppen KISOS KKE KKK KP KPB

Appendix Feministiskt initiativ Freie Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter Union Freie Demokratische Partei Féderation Générale du Travail de Belgique Fédération Internationale des Résistants Fælles Kurs Force Ouvriere Federal Republic of Germany Fédération Socialiste Suisse De Grønne Grupo dos Comunistas Afastados German Democratic Republic Parti de la gauche européenne Groep van Marxisten - Leninisten / Rode Morgen Gauche Unie Européenne Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko Hnutie slovenských zemedělcov Internationale Arbeiter Assoziation Communist International International Confederation of Free Trade Unions International Conference of Marxist - Leninist Parties and Organisations Iniciativa per Catalunya - Verds Industriegewerkschaft Metall Internationale Kommunistenbond International League for Peoples’ Struggle International Monetary Fund Iniciativa proti ekonomické globalizaci International Socialists Iniciativa za sociální fórum International Socialist Tendency Izquierda Unida Kommunistisk Arbejdskreds Kommunistisk Arbejderparti Kommunistische Arbeiders - Partij in Nederland Křesťanskodemokratické hnutie Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová Kommunistische Eenheidsbeweging Nederland ( marxistisch - leninistisch ) Kommunistisk Forbund Marxister - Leninister Kommunistiska Förbundet Marxist - Leninisterna ( revolutionärerna ) Kommunistische Gruppen Kinima Sosialdimokraton Kommunistiko Komma Elladas Kommunistiko Komma Kyprou Kommunistiska Partiet Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Belarussii

Abbreviations KPiD KPML( r ) KPÖ KPSS KSČ KSČM KSM KSS KSS - SDĽ LB LCR LCY LDPR LKŽ LM LO MDL MDP MEP MFA ML MLPD MP MP MRC MRC MSD NATO NBL NCPN ND NELF NGL NGO NRF ODP ODS OF OGP OSCE P.B. P.B.G. PAKOP PASOK PCE PCF PCI PCP

649

Kommunistisk Parti i Danmark Kommunistiska Partiet Marxist - Leninisterna ( revolutionärerna ) Kommunistische Partei Österreichs Soiuz kommunisticheskikh partii Komunistická strana Československa Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy Komunistický svaz mládeže Komunistická strana Slovenska Komunistická strana Slovenska – Strana demokratickej ľavice Levý blok Ligue communiste révolutionnaire League of Communists of Yugoslavia Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Levicové kluby žen Lidové milice Lutte ouvrière Mladá demokratická ľavica Movimento Democrático Português Member of the European Parliament Movimento das Forças Armadas Marxist - Leninist Marxistisch - Leninistische Partei Deutschlands Miljöpartiet de Gröna Member of Parliament Mouvement Républicain et Citoyen Movimento da Renovação Comunista Mladí sociálni demokrati North Atlantic Treaty Organization Neue Bundesländer Nieuwe Communistische Partij Nederland New Democracy New European Left Forum Nordic Green Left Non - Governmental Organization National Rescue Front Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi Občanská demokratická strana Občanské forum Liberal United Citizens Party Organization for Security and Co - operation in Europe Political Bureau Party Base Group Pancyprian Refugee Movement Pankpriaki Organosi Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima Partido Comunista de España Parti communiste français Partito Comunista Italiano Partido Comunista Português

650 PCP / SL PCPT / MRPP PdA PdA PdCI PDS PDS PdT PDUP PE PEL PEO PEOM PKB PKK POCH POGO POUS PP PPR PRC PS PSD PSOE PSP PSR PT PTB PvdA PvdA RAF RC RCP RCP RCWP RH RIM RS RSDLP RSFSR RSH RSP SA SAP SAP

Appendix Partido comunista del Peru – Por el Sendero Luminoso de Carlos Maria Mariátegui Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses / Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado Partei der Arbeit Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz Partito dei Comunisti Italiani Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus Partito democratico della Sinistra Parti suisse du Travail Partito di Unità Proletaria Plataforma de Esquerda Party of European Left Pagkipria Ergatiki Omospondia Pankipriaki Eniaia Organosi Mathiton Partiia Kommunistov Belarusi / Partiia Kommunistov Belarusskaia Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan Progressiven Organisationen der Schweiz Pagkipria Organosi Ginekeion Organoseon Partido Operário de Unidade Socialista Partido Popular Politieke Partij Radicalen Partito della Rifondazione Comunista Parti Socialiste Partido Social Democrata Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol Pacifistisch - Socialistische Partij Partido Socialista Revolucionário Partido dos Trabalhadores Parti du Travail de Belgique Partij van de Arbeid Partij van de Arbeit van Belgie Rote Armee Fraktion Renovação Comunista Revolutionary Communist Party Romanian Communist Party Russian Communist Workers Party Rote Hilfe Revolutionary Internationalist Movement Rättvisepartiet Socialisterna Russian Social Democratic Labor Party Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Revolučné socialistické hnutie Revolutionair Socialistische Partij Sachsen Socialistische Alternatieve Politiek Socialistische Arbeiderspartij

Abbreviations SAP SAV SD SD SDAJ SDK SDL SDS SDSS SED SF SF SF SF SKP SLU SMER – SD SMK SNS SOP SP SP SP SPD SPO SPS SPS SPW SRS SSD Stasi StB SU SUD SV SV SV SWP SWP Syn SZ TH UDP UGT UIL UN US

651

Socialistisk Arbejderparti Sozialistische Alternative Socialdemokratiet Socialdemokratiet i Danmark Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend Slovenská demokratická koalicia Strana demokratické levice Strana demokratického socialismu Sociálně demokratická strana Slovenska Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands Sjednocená fronta Socialistisk Folkeparti Socialistisk Folkpartiet Socialistiska Förbundet Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti Združenie ľavicových učitelov SMER – Sociálna demokracia Strana maďarskej koalície Slovenská národná strana Strana občanského porozumenia Socialistische Partij Socialistiska partiet Socialistisch Partij Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Srpski pokret obnove Socialist Party of Serbia Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz / Parti socialiste suisse / Partito Socialista Svizzero / Partida Socialdemocrata de la Svizra Socialist Party of Working People Srpska radikalna stranka State Securitate Department Staatssicherheit Státní bezpečnost / Štátna bezpečnosť Secrétariat Unifié Solidarity, Unity, Democracy Sosialistisk Venstreparti Spoločná voľba Socialistisk Venstre Parti Socialist Workers Party Socialistische Werkerspartij Synaspismos Strana zelených na Slovensku Thüringen União Democrática Popular Unión General de Trabajadores Unione Generale del Lavoro United Nations Unie svobody

652 US USA USSR UWF V VAS VCN VCP VPK VS VVD VVN WASG WCL WFTU WPRM WTO YBH YUL ZDĽŽ ZRS ZRS ZSM

Appendix United Secretary United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United Workers’ Front Vänsterpartiet Vasemmistoliitto Verbond van Communisten in Nederland Communistische Partij Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna Venstresocialisterne Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes Wahlalternative Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit World Confederation of Labour World Federation of Trade Unions World Peoples’ Resistance Movement World Trade Organization Yurtsever Birlik Hareketi Yugoslav United Left Združenie demokratickej ľavice žien Sdruženie robotníkov Slovenska Zväz revolučných socialistov Zväz socialistickej mládeže

Index

653

Index Page references with star indicate a footnote.

Abrantes, Domingos 200 Abreu, António 205 Adam, Marcin 562 Adamec, Ladislav 332 Ahn, Nguyen Quynh 589* Akhmetov, Rynat 380, 383*, 394 Alavános, Alékos 574 Altunian, Henrikh 375* Annan, Kofi 266 Annus, Lembit 173 Ansip, Andres 173, 189 Arafat, Jassir 81 Aristera, Elliniki 247 Ås, Berit 573 Aschieri, Gérard 102 Ash, Timothy Garton 548 Azarov, Mikola 384*, 391 Aznar, José Maria 496 Babeuf, Gracchus 525 Babych, Valeriy 381 Badiou, Alain 527, 588 Balík, Stanislav 307 Bango, Eduard 307 Bango, Mario 306 Barkašov, Alexandr 602 Bartsch, Dietmar 52 Bassolino, Antonio 221* Belenkov, Andrei 403* Belka, Marek 327 Belkowski, Stanislaw 506* Bell, Daniel 11 Bendix, Trine 145 Benjamin, Walter 530 Bensaid, Daniel 530 Berghofer, Wolfgang 44 Berklavs, Eduards 169 Berlinguer, Enrico 215, 219–221, 222* Berlusconi, Silvio 495

Bertinotti, Fausto 227, 229, 230*, 236–238, 468, 471, 476, 494, 529, 579, 606 Besancenot, Olivier 111, 113, 124, 126 f., 596 Bielecki, Jan Krzysztaf 315 Bildt, Carl 161 Bisky, Lothar 51, 55, 67 Biziouras, Nick 10 Blotin, Pierre 101 Borowski, Marek 325 Borvo, Nicole 120 Bosco, Anna 11 Botella, Joan 11 Bové, José 124, 532, 605 Bozóki, András 10, 553 Braccitorsi, Bianca 223, 224* Braouezec, Patrick 118 Brezhnev, Leonid 97, 169 Brie, André 45 Bringolf, Alain 138 Brouwer, Ina 19 Buffet, Marie - Georges 101, 104, 111, 113–115, 120–122, 124–128, 131 f., 530, 596 Bukhvostov, Alexander I. 407* Bull, Martin J. 11 Burlan, Dumitru 329 Burloi, Marian 330 Bush, George 176, 332 Buzduhan, Yuriy 386 Cabet, Etienne 526 Calabuig, Bernard 121 Calic, Marie - Janine 345 Callinicos, Alex 475 Camacho, Marcelino 491 Cappelloni, Guido 220 Caramitru, Ion 331 Carlsson, Ingvar 161 Carvalhas, Carlos 195, 197, 200, 202, 205–207

654 Carvalho, Ruben de 203 f. Carvalho, Velez Grilo - Vasco de 194 Cassen, Bernard 527 f. Castro, Fidel 589, 593, 605 Ceauşescu, Nicolae 330–333, 559 Chavez, Hugo 83, 533, 570, 593, 600, 605 Chechel, Mykola 391* Chernenko, Roman 391* Chernovil, Vyacheslav 376, 384, 387, 389 Chevènement, Jean - Pierre 113 Chikin, Victor 408 f., 419 Chomsky, Noam 599 Chornovil, Vyacheslav 374*, 376 Christofias, Dimitris 261 f., 264, 280, 559 Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz 327 Cîmpeanu, Radu 335 Cirera, Daniel 120 Claus, Roland 52 Clerides, Glafcos 261, 264 f., 275, 278 Cliff, Tony 25, 475 Clinton, Bill 340 Cochet, Yves 532 Codreanu, Corneliu 336 Cofferati, Sergio 495 Cohen - Seat, Patrice 121 Constantinescu, Emil 339 f. Coposu, Corneliu 334 f. Corcuff, Philippe 531 Cornea, Doina 335 Correia, Edgar 199 f. Cossutta, Armando 220–223, 224*, 226–228, 230 Costa, Carlos 195 Courtois, Stéphane 250, 535, 537 Cunhal, Álvaro 194–196, 200, 206 f., 209–211, 213 f. D’Alema, Massimo 221, 495 Dačić, Ivica 347, 349, 362 Danilovich, Leonid 395 Dartigolles, Olivier 120 f. Decaillon, Joël 493 Deng Xiaoping 97 Dehm, Diether 55

Appendix Deleuze, Gilles 530, 605 Demessine, Michèle 104 Demidenko, Arkady 383 Denktash, Rauf 266 Deschamp, Michel 102 Dimitrov, Georgi 68, 568, 583 Dionnet, Brigitte 121 Doriot, Jacques 93 Dovhan’, Serhii 378 Drašković, Vuk 354, 358 Dubček, Alexander 289, 295 Duclos, Jacques 101, 131 Dugin, Alesandr 602 Dukanovic, Milo 352 Dumitrescu, Constantin Ticu 336 Durdynets, Vasyl 384* Durkheim, Émile 525 Dyhr, Villy 145 Dzemyantsei, Nikolai 419 Eller, Hillar 174, 186 Engel, Stefan 480 Engels, Friedrich 136, 434 Epifani, Gugliemo 494 Ernst, Klaus 62 Ersson, Svante 573 Eyal, Gil 522* Farakos, Grigoris 248, 250 Fath, Jacques 120 Féin, Sinn 466 Fennema, Meinert 11 Fernandes, José Sá 204 Ferrando, Marco 236 Ferrero, Paolo 236, 579 Fiala, Petr 285 Fico, Robert 295 f., 308 Fidalgo, José Maria 492, 496 Figueiredo, Ilda 198 Filip, Vojtěch 292 Fiszbach, Tadeusz 315 Fiterman, Charles 91, 96, 99, 101 Florakis, Harilaos 248 Fogh - Rasmussen, Anders 161 Foucault, Michel 530 f., 605 Franco, Francisco 486, 597 Fuglsang, Meta 145 Fukuyama, Francis 524

655

Index Galanos, Alexis 261 Garavini, Sergio 223 f., 226 f. Garnier, Gilles 121 Gaspar, Carlos 11 Gau, Jean - François 121 Gaulle, Charles de 88 Gayssot, Jean - Claude 104 George, Susan 599 Gerin, André 122, 124 Giordano, Franco 236 Goati, Vladimir 344 Golubeva, Tatiana G. 406*, 409, 561 Gonçalves, Bento 194 Gonda, Radim 287 Gongadze, Hrihory 390 Gonzalez, Felipe 490 Gorbachev, Mikhail 11, 15, 43, 97, 99, 170 f., 173, 216, 218, 332, 382, 422 f., 497, 503, 507, 511, 546 f., 549, 586 Gorter, Herman 16 Gottwald, Klement 289 Grajew, Oded 528 Gramsci, Antonio 46, 68, 468 Grebeníček, Miroslav 292 Greder, Joelle 127 Gremetz, Maxime 123 Groot, Paul de 17 Grzymała - Busse, Anna 10, 288 Guevara, Ernesto Ché 589 Guiat, Cyrille 11 Gutierrez, Antonio 495 Gysi, Gregor 45, 51 f., 54, 64, 67, 69 f., 82 Haber, Mykola 391* Hagberg, Hilding 145 Halvorsen, Kristin 573 Handl, Vladimír 286 Hankiss, Elemér 514* Hanley, Seán 286 Hardt, Michael 599 Havel, Václav 170, 308 Hedin, Henrik Stamer 145 Hendrik, Toomas 189 Hermansson, C. H. 145 Hermier, Guy 100

Herzog, Jakob 133 Hetman, Vadym 387 Heywood, Paul 11 Hiksch, Uwe 54 Hitler, Adolf 417 Hladiy, Mykhailo 391 Hloušek, Vít 308 Hoffman, Ulla 146 Hollande, François 127 Holloway, John 532, 605 Holzer, Jan 285 Honcharik, Vladimir 428 Honecker, Erich 43, 103 Höpke, Klaus 47 Horyn, Bohdan 374* Horyn, Mykhailo 374* Hoxha, Enver 559 Hoxha, Nexhmije 559 Hryn’ov, Volodymyr 376 Hudson, Kate 11 Hue, Robert 101–104, 106, 111, 113 f., 120, 122–124, 126, 130–132, 499, 584 Huguenin, Marianne 136 Husák, Gustav 290 Hussein, Sadam 81 Iakovou, Georges 279 Iliescu, Ion 329–331, 334, 336, 338–340, 551 Ilves, Toomas - Hendrik 188, 189 Ingrao, Pietro 219–223, 225 Ishiyama, John T. 10, 343, 553 Ivashko, Volodymyr 375* Jacquard, Albert 533 Jakeš, Milouš 290 Jaruzelski, Wojciech 550 Jensen, Jørgen 145 Jespersen, Knud 145 Jõerüüt, Jaak 179 f. Jospin, Lionel 104, 111, 113 f., 132 Judas, José Luís 196 Juppé, Alain 102 Juquin, Pierre 93, 102 Kadastik, M. 179 Kallas, Siim 172

656

Appendix

Kalyakin, Sergei I. 407, 420–423, 428, 431 f. Kalynets, Iryna 374* Karman, Jacques 122 Karmazin, Yuriy 391* Kaser, Karl 345 Kelam, Tunne 175 Khmara, Stepan 374*, 391* Khrushchev, Nikita 97, 169 Kilbom, Karl 145 Kim Il Sung 22 Kim Jong - Il 22, 209 Kinakh, Anatoly 384*, 391 Kingsepp, Sirje 185, 187 Kirchheimer, Otto 317 Kitschelt, Herbert 10, 367 Klaus, Václav 308 Klein, Naomi 599 Kopeček, Lubomír 287, 298, 302, 308 Kõrda, Tõna 179 Kostenko, Yuri 388, 391*, 398 Koštunica, Vojislav 360–363, 368 f. Kotliarov, I. V. 405 Koutsou, Nicos 264 Kox, Tiny 30 Krasucki, Henri 101, 492, 497 Kravchuk, Leonid 375 f., 381, 386 f., 393, 396, 399 f. Krenz, Egon 43 Krushchev, Nikita 17 Kubát, Michal 286 Kuchma, Leonid 381–395, 398 f. Kulikov, Nikolai 185 Kwaśniewski, Aleksander 320 Kyprianou, Andros 280 Kyprianou, Spyros 265, 279 Laar, Mart 167, 180 Lafontaine, Oskar 62 f., 65–67, 69 f., 82 Laguiller, Arlette 111, 113, 124, 126, 596 Lajoinie, André 93, 102, 131 Lang, Kai Olaf 286 Langlois, Bernard 528 Lanovyj, Volodymyr 381 Larsen, Aksel 142, 144

Latouche, Serge 532 Latour, Patricia 122 Laurent, Michel 120 f. Lauristin, Marju 174 Lazar, Marc 99, 250, 494 Lazarenko, Pavel 383 f., 387, 393, 398 Le Moing, Jean - Louis 120, Le Pen, Jean - Marie 93, 113, 127, 603 Le Pors, Anicet, 91, 96 Leitão, Júlio César 194 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 15, 25, 30, 37, 97, 136, 178, 414, 420 f., 434, 567 f., 586 Lepa, Margus 185 Leroy, Roland 101 Libertini, Lucio 223 Liebknecht, Karl 468 Lilić, Zoran 358 Limonov, Eduard 602 Linderoth, Sven 145 Lino, Mário 196 Llabres, Claude 95 Lönnroth, Johan 146 Louçã, Francisco 201, 205 Löwy, Michael 530 Lukashenko, Alexander 394, 403–406, 407*, 410–414, 416–423, 425–435, 552, 561 Lukyanenko, Levko 375, 391* Lula da Silva , Luiz Inácio 593, 600 Lupoi, Mihai 329 Lutsenko, Yuri 399 Luxemburg, Rosa 468, 530, 605 Luxuria, Vladimir 236 Lytvyn, Volodymir 391, 398 Lzarenko, Pavel 387 Magos, Salvaterra de 204 Măgureanu, Virgil 336 Malíř, Jiří 286 Malofeev, Anatolii 406, 409, 419 Mamère, Noël 111, 113 Mao Zedong 28, 30, 596 Marchais, Georges 88 f., 91–93, 99, 100 f., 103, 113 f., 120, 122, 124, 126, 131, 545

657

Index Marchenko, Volodymir 386 Marchuk, Yevhen 384*, 387 Marek, Pavel 286 Mareš, Miroslav 285 Mariátegui, Carlos Maria 478 Marijnissen, Jan 30, 33 Markides, Alecos 264 Marković, Mirjana 357 Marušiak, Juraj 298 Marx, Karl 37, 81, 434, 566 f., 581, 587, 605 Masol, Vitaly 384* Matić, Jovanka 344 Matviyenko, Anatoliy 391* Maurois, Pierre 91 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz 315 Mečiar, Vladimír 295 f. Medvechuk, Viktor 383*, 386 f., 396, 399 Medwedew, Dmitri 552 Mégret, Bruno 603 Mello, Alejandro 23 Menapace, Lidia 236 Meri, Lennart 172 Michaelides, Dinos 279 Michels, Robert 348 Migaš, Robert 295 Milinkevitch, Alyaksandar 430 f. Militar, Nicolae 334 Miller, Leszek 320 f., 327 Milošević, Slobodan 22, 343 f., 346–349, 351 f., 354–363, 366–369, 403, 551 Milutinović, Milan 359 Mishin, Yuri 178 Mitterrand, François 88 f., 91, 93, 98 Modrow, Hans 43–45 Montanu, Mihai 329 Morales, Evo 600 More, Thomas 525 Moreno, Augusto 495 Moro, Aldo 490 Moroz, Olaksandr 378, 381, 385, 387–390, 395–397, 399 Moura, Barros 196 Moura, Joaquim Pina 196 Musiyaka, Viktor 391*

Mussi, Fabio 221 Mussolini, Benito 568 Myroshnychenko, Yuriy 391* Napoletano, Giorgio 219 Narcisso, Raimundo 196 Năstase, Adrian 337, 340 Natta, Alessandro 222 Nazerbayev, Nursultan 394 Nègre, Jean - Charles 120 Negri, Antonio 47, 531, 599, 605 Nehoda, Volodymyr 391* Nhien, Pham Tien 589* Nielsen, Holger K. 145 Niemeyer, Oscar 128 Nørhøj, Jakob 145 Novikov, V. N. 425 Nyrup - Rasmusen, Paul 159, 161 Obadia, Alain 120 Occhetto, Achille 215 f., 217*, 219–222 Ohly, Lars 146 Olejniczak, Wojciech 325 Oleksy, Jószef 326 f. Oliynik,Volodymyr 387* Olsen, Pia 145 Ømann, Sigurd 145 Onopenko,Vasyl 391 Orlović, Slaviša 344, 348 Owen, Robert 526 Panić, Milan 355 f. Pannekoek, Anton 16 Pantazi, Alexandru 559 Papadopoulos, Tassos 264–266, 279 Papaioannou, Ezekias 260, 262 Papandreou, Andreas 246–248, 251 Papariga, Aleka 250 Parny, Francis 120 f. Pato, Octávio 195 Paunov, Alexander 562 Pavlenko, Yuriy 391* Pavlov, Sergei 170 Pawlak, Waldemar 325 f. Pereira, Garcia 205 Perottino, Michel 286 Perović, Latinka 344

658 Perreux, Jacques 125 Perrineau, Pascal 603 Persson, Hans Göran 161 Petersen, Gert 145 Petruccioli, Claudio 221 Piaetta, Giancarlo 221* Pinchuk, Viktor 383* Platone, François 110 Plushch, Ivan 398 Plyushch, Ivan 381 Põder, Vambola 178 Pokrovsky, Mykola 391* Poperen, Claude 95, 99 Poroshenko, Petro 383*, 390, 391*, 396 Portas, Miguel 198 Posokhov, S. A. 419 Potebenko, Mikhail 390 Priboi, Ristea 337 Prodi, Romano 215, 227, 236, 579 Proudhon, Pierre - Joseph 530, 605 Pšeja, Pavel 285 Puhkkal, Oleksandr 391* Pustovoitenko, Valery 384*, 386 f., 391 Putin, Vladimir 435, 386, 389 f., 392, 394, 396 f., 506*, 552, 561 Pynzenyk, Viktor 391* Rada, Verkhovna 386 Ralite, Jack 91 Ramiro, Luis 11 Ranger, Jean 110 Raţiu, Ion 335 Rebryk, Bohdan 375* Reinfeldt, John Fredrik 161 Relinger, Jérôme 127 Reynoso, Abimael Guzman 478 Rigout, Marcel 91 Rocard, Michel 98 Rochet, Waldeck 88, 101 Rolandis, Nicos 261 Roman, Petre 331, 334, 338 f. Rongmei, Zhou 589* Rosenmöller, Paul 19 Royal, Ségolène 126 Rua, Huy 589* Rubiks, Alfreds 560

Appendix Ruus, Jüri 167 Rüütel, Arnold 172, 189 Sá, Luís 195 Sahm, Astrid 403* Saint - Josse, Jean 113 Sakharchenko, Valerii N. 409 Salazar, António de Oliveira 563 Salon, Jean - Paul 120 Salvato, Ersilia 223 Sarkozy, Nicolas 127 Satarov, Georgi 182 Savenko, Mykhaylo 562 Savisaar, Edgar 174, 179 Schcherban, Vlodymyr 391* Schivardi, Gérard 596 Schlüter, Poul 161 Schröder, Gerhard 52, 58, 62 f., 553, 595, 602 Schyman, Gudrun 146 Secchias, Pietro 220 Šedo, Jakub 302 Seehan, Richard 121 Semedo, João 201 Sentinelli, Patricia 237 Seppik, Ain 179 Serri, Rino 223 Šešelj, Vojislav 355, 358 f. Sharetskii, Semion 412 f. Shenin, Oleg 560 Shimantskii, Mikhail V. 414 Sigfússon, Steingrimur J. 573 Sillari, Enn - Arno 187 Silva, Aníbal Cavaco 204 f. Sison, José Maria 480 Slota, Ján 296 Sneevliet, Henk 23 Sohn, Ole 145 Sokolov, Victor A. 407* Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr 97 Sousa, Jerónimo de 199–207, 214 Sousa, José de 194 Søvndal, Villy 145 Stalin, Joseph 17, 25, 97, 169, 568 f., 586 f. Stambolić, Ivan 346 Stan, Mihail 336 Staniszkis, Jadwiga 514*

659

Index Steen, Anton 167 Steinberg, Jim 340 Stetsko, Yaroslav 391* Ştireanu, Octavian 336 Stojanović, Dubravka 344 Stretovych, Volodymyr 391* Strmiska, Maxmilián 286 Sundhaussen, Holm 345 Surkis, Hruhory’s 383* Sushkevich, Stanislav 410 Svensson - Smith, Karin 146 Svoboda, Jiří 291 Symonenko, Petro 383, 385, 387–390, 392, 394 f., 562 Szelényi, Ivan 522* Talanchuk, Petro 381 Tăriceanu, Călin 341 Theodorakis, Mikis 587 Thibault, Bernard 107, 484*, 493, 497–499 Thoreau, David 532 Thorez, Maurice 88, 107, 538 Timoshenko,Yuliya 384, 386, 390–393, 395–399 Tito, Josip Broz 345 Tkachenko, Oleksandr 378, 384, 387 Togliatti, Palmiro 215, 216*, 218 f., 539 Toome, Indrek 173 Toomsalu, Tiit 182–188 Townsley, Eleonor 522* Trotsky, Leon 25, 596 Tsipras, Alexis 574 Turco, Livia 221* Tyhypko, Serhiy 391 Tyulkin, Victor 561 Udovenko, Evhen 388 Udovenko, Hennadiy 389, 391* Ulakhovich, Nikolai D. 407*

Vacaroiu, Nicolae 339 Väljas, Vaino 173, 178, 187 Vänster, Vägval, 146 Vassiliou, Georges 278 Veltroni, Walter 221 Vendola, Nichi 236 Viannet, Louis 107 Vitrenko, Nataliya 385–388, 392 f., 395, 398 f. Vlad, Iulian 329 Voerman, Gerrit 573 Voiculescu, Voican 334 Voronin, Vladimir 558, 594 Vučelić, Milorad 347 Wagenknecht, Sarah 55, 59 Wałęsa, Lech 325 f. Waller, Michael 11, 343 Wallerstein, Immanuel 527 Walter, Gérard 525 Wegner, Christel 564 Weiss, Peter 294, 295 Weitling, Wilhelm 526 Werner, Lars 146 Whitaker, Chico 528 f. Wolf, Markus 43, 604 Wurtz, Francis 466 Yanukovich, Viktor 384*, 395, 397 Yeltsin, Boris 99, 386 Yukhnovs’ki, Ihor 376 Yushchenko, Viktor 383, 384*, 387 f., 390–392, 394–398 Zapata, Emiliano 532 Zapatero, José Luis 580 Zdeněk, Kárník 285 Zhdanov, Andrei 569 Ziblatt, Daniel 10 Zimmer, Gabriele 51 f., 54 Zisyadis, Josef 136 Zyuganov, Gennadij A. 383, 428, 433, 561, 601

660

Appendix

List of Contributors Prof. Dr. Toomas Alatalu, Tallinn, Estonia Dr. Dominique Andolfatto, Faculté de Droit, Sciences économiques, et Gestion, Université de Nancy II, France Prof. Dr. Uwe Backes, Hannah - Arendt - Institut für Totalitarismusforschung, Technical University of Dresden, Germany Dr. Simone Bertolino, Lecco, Italy Prof. Dr. Stéphane Courtois, University of Paris X, Nanterre, France Prof. Dr. Carlos Cunha, Dowling College, Department of Political Science, Oakdale, NY, USA Prof. Dr. Yolène Dilas - Rocherieux, University of Paris X, Nanterre, France Prof. Dr. Svante Ersson, Umea University, Department of Political Science, Umea, Sweden Dr. Rudolf van Hüllen, Krefeld, Germany Dr. Dominique Kamber, Neuenhof, Switzerland Prof. Dr. Nikos Marantzidis, University of Macedonia, Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, Thessaloniki, Greece Dr. Miroslav Mareš, Fakulta socialnich studii Masarykovy university, Brno, Czech Republic Prof. Dr. Patrick Moreau, CNRS Paris, Visiting Research Fellow at the Hannah Arendt - Institute, France / Germany Dr. Marius Oprea, The Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Romania, Bucharest, Romania Dr. Rudolf A. Mark, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Zentrum für Demokratieforschung, Lüneburg, Germany Dr. Galina Michaleva, Moscow, Russia Abel Polese, Hannah - Arendt - Institut für Totalitarismusforschung, Technical University of Dresden, Germany Dr. Irena Ristić, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Institut drustvenih nauka / Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia Dr. Andreas Stergiou, Kolonos - Athina, Greece Dr. Piotr Sula, Department of Political Science, University of Wrocław, Poland Dr. Gerrit Voerman, Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, The Netherlands