War and Politics in Sudan: Cultural Identities and the Challenges of the Peace Process 9780755619009, 9781780762272

Citation preview

For Marcus

Leach_Prelims.indd v

10/17/2012 7:01:30 PM

Leach_Prelims.indd vi

10/17/2012 7:01:30 PM

M AP OF SUDAN

Leach_Prelims.indd Sec1:viii

10/17/2012 7:01:30 PM

PR EFACE

Regarding Sudanese conflict, the question ‘Why are they fighting?’ first interested me while living in Sudan at the start of the second civil war. My mother, a medical attaché at the US Embassy, arrived in Khartoum during the summer of 1984. The question provoked a flurry of sometimes contradicting responses from adults and other children of various nationalities at my school: narratives of oppression and colonialism, Islamic law, oil interests, tribalism, and the hand of such foreign antagonists as Libya, Israel, and Ethiopia. Individual names to the conflict loomed large: Nimeiri, Garang, Sadiq. The fate of the country seemed to hinge upon the will of a handful of men. Years later, I would see that same blizzard of motivations for war put forth in media reports and diplomatic statements. By the time of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, the causes of war had grown even more complex. Having already discovered the importance of individual personalities in Sudanese politics, I paid even more attention to the CPA after the shocking death of John Garang in July 2005. Would the agreement, so dependent on negotiations between elites, collapse? Would Khartoum see the tragedy as an opportunity to renege on a peace agreement? Would the new leadership of separatist-minded Salva Kiir forego any pretense of unity in the interim period? Understanding what kept peace deals together took on a new importance for me. I looked to the 1972 agreement between Khartoum and

Leach_Prelims.indd Sec1:ix

10/17/2012 7:01:32 PM

x

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

the Anya Nya separatists to find what lessons could be gleaned for the new agreement. Upon reading some of the major literature on the events of that era, I saw that the distribution of similarities and differences between the two agreements might allow for a more detailed comparative analysis. I had already been considering such a study between the CPA and other African peace agreements but was frustrated. I felt that such comparisons neither accurately conveyed the significance of either peace treaty nor produced a better understanding of the countries involved. A comparison of two or three detailed case studies, I felt, was also too limited to promote theories about conflict resolution in general. Comparing peace treaties concluded at different periods within the same state was an unconventional approach, but I believed that, even if it did not explain or rule out broader theories, it might better explain the history of modern Sudan in particular. For a state where domestic conflict is the norm, successful peacemaking efforts must be scrutinized at least as thoroughly as the origins of conflict. By examining the bargaining process, the provisions agreed upon, and the greater political environment, I hoped to find new explanations for Sudan’s unique and violent post-colonial history. The secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the re-emergence of debate over the nature of African states give added urgency to the need for a longer history of war in Sudan. Many readers drawn to study the conflict may still wish for comprehensive answers to the question of why, after several decades of independence, Khartoum finally agreed to allow the region to break away peacefully. Why did it occur under this government and not earlier ones, whether autocratic or parliamentary? How could a regime implicated in such consistent brutality against its own people allow one third of the country, rich in oil and strategically located along the Nile, to secede? Part of my attempt to answer these questions requires explaining how the current regime in Khartoum has attempted to manipulate the national identity of northern Sudanese to preserve its own power. The junta of Omar Hassan Al-Bashir continues to uphold the Arab identity that was so integral to northern nationalism in Sudan, but this identity was for decades forced to give space to Islam as the dominant cultural force in state building. An emphasis on Arab identity

Leach_Prelims.indd Sec2:x

10/17/2012 7:01:32 PM

P R EFACE

xi

reemerged after the Machakos peace process began in 2002, and especially after the Darfur insurrection erupted in 2003. The identity shift served to motivate the Arabized clients of the regime against the nonArab populations assumed to support insurgents in remote northern areas. As the south prepared to become its own nation, the state’s neopatrimonial networks were forced to adjust, and the new line of division rests along the Arab/non-Arab schism. For over a decade now, the National Congress Party (NCP) regime has had no ideological core. The momentum of its early Islamist project propelled it for a time after the dismissal of Hassan Al-Turabi, its chief Islamist ideologue. Turabi, however, encouraged the Darfur insurgency, which was fought in part by a group aligned with him against his erstwhile government allies. Opposition from Sudan’s leading Islamist has led the regime to lean more heavily on Arab unity as a source of legitimacy. Because there is no longer any serious ideological commitment behind either Arabism or Islamism aside from preservation of the regime, they are virtually indistinguishable. Those fighting Khartoum in the hinterlands of South Kordofan and the Abyei subregion, Darfur, Blue Nile and elsewhere have been left out of the new patronage system, contracted substantially in preparation for the loss of the revenue from southern oil that sustained Khartoum for many years. South Sudan, too, will seek to form a national identity in the wake of its independence, a goal consistently shared by the vast majority of the population since the first civil war. Few peoples in the world have fought for their own state as long as the southerners while simultaneously forming so few bonds among themselves as countrymen. Southern nationalists dreamt for over half a century of 9 July 2011. The history over the past year of fighting along the north-south border, continued disputes over oil revenue, corruption and intra-South Sudan infighting indicate that the region’s troubles are not yet behind it. I hope this history of Sudanese attempts at peace will shed light on some of the challenges both Sudans may face going forward. J.D.L. Arlington, Virginia July 2012

Leach_Prelims.indd Sec2:xi

10/17/2012 7:01:32 PM

ACK NOWLEDGEMENTS

The dissertation from which this book was adapted was completed in 2010 at the Australian National University in Canberra. I am very much in debt to the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies staff for their support. Carol Laslett in particular helped me throughout my entire stay as a graduate student in Australia. My advisors were Amin Saikal, Alex Maroya, and Matthew Gray. Dr. Gray was my primary advisory contact, and I am extremely thankful for his regular input and encouragement, extending back to my initial proposal statement. I am also appreciative for the counsel of William Maley of the ANU Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, a friend and former teacher. Dr. Maley first suggested to me that my work might be worthy of publication and encouraged me to commit time to exploring that option. The staff at ANU’s Menzies Library was supremely valuable in my research efforts, and patient in their assistance of a graduate student often blessed with more abstract knowledge about what he thought he needed than practical knowledge of how to get it. Not a single text that I required for my research, no matter how old, obscure, or regionally unavailable, was beyond the means of the ANU librarians to locate and bring back to Canberra. I am truly impressed by their capabilities and dedication. I also thank my colleague Wendy Levy, whose gracious sharing of research material and contacts improved this work considerably.

Leach_Prelims.indd Sec2:xii

10/17/2012 7:01:32 PM

A CK NOW LEDGEMENTS

xiii

I am also indebted to those individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this work, including Douglas Johnson, Patricia Lane, Peter Woodward, Ahmed Al-Shahi, Benaiah Yongo-Bure, R.S. O’Fahey, Richard Barltrop, Richard Lobban, Kazim Omer, and Mohammed Ibrahim. These men and women invited me into their offices and homes or were patient with the various connection problems that often plague extended international phone conversations. Their contributions have aided me enormously in my understanding of Sudanese conflict, and their interviews allowed me to view the contours of the subject with a sharper focus than the written word alone would allow. I would never have completed this work without the help of family and friends: in particular, my mother, Elaine Doherty Leach, and my good friends Charles Gascoigne, Mark Rivers, and Nat Burke. I am thankful to them all.

Leach_Prelims.indd Sec2:xiii

10/17/2012 7:01:32 PM

Leach_Prelims.indd Sec2:xiv

10/17/2012 7:01:33 PM

INTRODUCTION

In the course of post-colonial Sudanese history, tensions between the northern and southern portions of the state have led to two protracted civil wars, the first lasting from 1955 to 1972 and the second from 1983 to 2005. The successfully concluded peace agreements to these wars, the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) of 1972 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, are the landmark moments in Sudanese conflict resolution. A comparative examination of these treaties – both the measures they stipulate and the environment in which they were negotiated – will provide important insights into Sudan’s progress as a state. Despite a significant amount of material chronicling the causes of these wars and their resolution, comparative analysis regarding the resolutions of these conflicts remains scarce; specifically, analysis of what each warring side demanded from the other and how these demands evolved over several decades. Since Sudan became independent in 1956, the country has seen only 11 years of peace. To understand the motives for these wars and their endings is therefore, in a large part, to understand the political history of post-colonial Sudan. That both conflicts erupted along the same north/south fault line, yet revolved around different insurgent objectives, also begs further analysis of the evolution of Sudanese identity as reflected in the peace agreements: specifically, how the conception of national and regional identity changed between the 1970s and the 2000s. Therefore, this book is not a pure analysis of the mechanics of conflict resolution. It is an analysis of a specific state, almost perpetually engaged in domestic conflict, through the prisms of its two most significant peace agreements.

Leach_Book.indd 1

10/17/2012 7:00:41 PM

2

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

This book seeks to bring a fresh approach to understanding insurgent motivations in the two conflicts. The first insurgency had a separatist objective, while the second sought a broader national revolution involving marginalized peoples from areas outside the south. This evolution of southern objectives has rarely been examined in detail, particularly with regard to the resolution of the conflicts. The contradiction that the first insurgency would settle for regional autonomy in the AAA and the second for the option of southern secession in the CPA – both arrangements antithetical to each movement’s respective cause – has also rarely been explored. The goal of this study is to trace the evolution of southern and northern objectives in Sudan’s conflicts within the context of their two successful attempts at conflict resolution. Ultimately, the aim is to determine what the two sides wanted and the process of fighting and negotiations by which they were able to reconcile these goals. Abu Baker El Obeid, in his study of the AAA, highlights the distinction between a historical analysis and a legal analysis of the agreement; he explains that ‘a strictly legal analysis tends to be misleading, since it does not tell us much about how the Southern Problem developed. On the other hand, the historical background would not show how the Agreement was legally formulated.’1 Emulating his ‘middle way’ compromise, much of this book consists of explaining the historical evolution of provisions that would eventually become codified in each of the two agreements. Consequently, while the various conferences and initiatives throughout the history of both wars will be explored, the study will examine them as they relate to the two successful forums. The scope of the work will be limited generally by confining historical analysis within the conceptual boundaries of the events that led up to these agreements. Periods of Sudanese history not directly related to either conflict – the colonial era and the immediate post-AAA period in the 1970s, for example – will be examined primarily in terms of their relevance to the agreements or, more commonly, to substantiate broader themes in Sudanese history that are also addressed in the agreements. Analysis cannot be limited to a strict comparison between the agreements. The treaties were negotiated at different periods within

Leach_Book.indd 2

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

INTRODUCTION

3

the same state’s history and, therefore, must be viewed as part of a historical process to avoid distortion of their significance. The CPA was, in many instances, a response to the perceived failures of the AAA, especially in the realms of security and wealth sharing. As a result, some of the concepts covered in the study can only be viewed as evolutionary processes. The significance of many issues addressed in the text of the agreements simply cannot be analyzed satisfactorily without greater understanding of the history of the debate and conflict they have inspired. In addition, an understanding of events leading up to these agreements can clarify how both sides visualized such concepts as federalism or political Islam, two examples of terms with meanings that changed drastically between agreements. This is especially relevant in the early analytical chapters that focus less on the technical detail of conflict resolution than on the historical trends that dominated Sudanese conflict and, therefore, had to be confronted in the agreements. The study of the region’s history in Chapter One primarily supports the analytical chapters that follow and does not provide a comprehensive history of Sudan. A short review of the colonial era is necessary to explain how the nationalist visions in northern and southern Sudan became so asynchronous, and how the north came to dominate national institutions at independence. There would be no understanding of the southern movements as ‘guerrilla warfare’ were it not for the advent of a modern Sudanese military under the Condominium. Clapham notes that in pre-colonial times, the disparity between African forces was not so great that the term ‘guerrilla’ would have any meaning.2 Because of the study’s focus on the origins of conflict, other important events in colonial Sudanese history – such as the ‘care and maintenance’ period of southern administration in the 1930s, the Nile Valley Unity movement, and the significant role of the Sudanese Communist Party in the early northern nationalist movement – are not examined in detail. Instead, the emphasis is on the foundations of issues that would define the relationship of the warring parties during post-colonial hostilities. A review of such concepts as the Southern Policy and Native Administration helps to explain the lack of integration of the Sudanese state, how this absence

Leach_Book.indd 3

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

4

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

would define future conflict, and how conflict resolution efforts tried to address problems. The coverage of events after the beginning of the first war in 1955 and Sudanese independence provides a chronology to be analyzed in successive chapters, and grounds theory in a historical basis. In addition, it introduces the dominant movements, parties, and individuals relevant to both conflicts and their resolution. Finally, this chapter will describe the patterns of conflict resolution attempts, laying out the basic issues of contention to be evaluated in subsequent chapters. Chapter Two examines the fundamentals of identity and ideology as they applied in northern and southern Sudan. The first part of the chapter discusses the evolution of these processes. Successive regimes in the first war, whether leftist or conservative, advocated Arab Islamic culture as a nation-building tool to compensate for a lack of national integration at the time of independence. Emphasis is made on determining competing visions of national identity – not regional, religious, or tribal identity – because both the peace agreements were of a national nature and did not seek to address such subnational identities directly. Early southern resistance to northern nationalism led to the formation of a fragile shared southern consciousness, but regional unity foundered along tribal lines without the threat of a common enemy to unite the south’s disperate peoples. Chapter Three seeks to clarify the priorities of both parties by examining concessions on issues of identity in the agreements. It clarifies the most important distinctions between the governments concluding the treaties, as well as those among the rebel movements with whom they successfully negotiated. It aims to differentiate between the nationalist vision of successive governments in the first war and the conduct of the Bashir regime in the second. Islam is a complex, multi-faceted element of Sudanese society, but here its influence is addressed primarily in terms of its use as a tool of the state. This focus serves to highlight an often-overlooked distinction in the political role Islam played in the conduct of both wars and its interaction with conceptions of Sudanese nationalism. In the second war, Islam increasingly became a political weapon used regardless of nationalist principles. The decoupling of Islam from the objectives of the northern

Leach_Book.indd 4

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

INTRODUCTION

5

nationalist movement allowed for concessions in the CPA regarding the integrity of the Sudanese state that Khartoum would not make in the AAA. Chapter Four observes the process by which institutions break down, as reflected in the AAA and CPA. The chapter gives issues of identity discussed in earlier chapters a more concrete political foundation and covers Sudanese patronage politics and coalition building. These two characteristics have defined Sudanese governance since independence, and both agreements were designed to extend them. Because both peace agreements were implemented nationally, the chapter will concentrate on national patronage politics rather than similar sectarian and regional networks. In addition, the national nature of the agreements, and their role in attempting to induct the rebel movement into a coalition with the state, also requires that greater attention be paid to the government’s neo-patrimonial tendencies rather than the internal patronage of the various rebel movements. Certain facets of the government patronage apparatus, Islamic banking and regional administration most notably, are so elaborate they are worthy of a separate study. In the interest of space and focus, I have touched upon them only as they relate to the peace agreements. Chapter Four also explains how exclusivist coalitions formed under the patrimonial state during the colonial period helped prevent the emergence of broad-based nationalist movements that appealed to both the north and the south. The national government’s resulting fragile base of legitimacy led to a series of weak coalitions and strong neo-patrimonial hierarchies. The dynamics of patronage politics destabilized and disrupted attempts at mediation of the conflict, as demonstrated during the 1980s by the parliamentary governments’ failed attempts to negotiate an end to the war. These dynamics have destroyed the foundations of northern nationalism and made the ‘New Sudan’ alternative presented by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) insurgent leader John Garang equally unworkable. Chapter Five addresses greed/grievance theories of conflict in the context of the treaties and evaluates the relevance of these theories. Here, analyzing the two treaties comparatively is especially beneficial, as natural resources were a dominant issue of contention in the second

Leach_Book.indd 5

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

6

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

war but played only a peripheral role in the first. In addition, larger patterns of socioeconomic development will be examined to determine the motivations of actors in the wars. The roles the army and insurgent movements had in implementing ceasefires, troop quotas, and other elements of the negotiation process and final agreement will also be reviewed in this chapter. Chapter Six explains why the resolution of Sudan’s wars cannot be analyzed in terms of the demands of internal parties alone but must be observed in the broader context of Sudan’s domestic and foreign circumstances. An analysis of the role outside actors have played in Sudan’s conflicts and their resolution is also a barometer by which to gauge the influence of nationalism, political Islam, and broader Arab/African questions of identity. Especially in a politically weak state, such as Sudan, these broader relationships are particularly obvious indicators of the capabilities, limitations, and motivations of both regimes and rebel movements. The conclusion reaffirms and harmonizes the findings reached in the body of work and further outlines the relevance of the information gained towards Sudanese political history generally.

Leach_Book.indd 6

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

CHAPTER ONE The Or igins Of Nationalism

The theme of a weak central state relying on unstable coalitions and an exploitation of hinterland resources to consolidate power resonates throughout Sudanese political history, predating even the TurcoEgyptian conquest of the early nineteenth century. State expansion traditionally projected outward from the Nilotic center, commonly meeting resistance in such remote regions as Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and southern Sudan. The Islamic faith, initially uncoupled from the early state-building process, spread peacefully from Arab lands through the belt of northern Sudan. The religion retained an orthodox flavor in urban regions but mixed with local practices as it passed through the countryside. These Sufi traditions emerged as the dominant sub-national forms of northern identity, gradually overshadowing tribal affiliations. Climate posed a natural barrier to the spread of Islam, as the marshes and jungles of the south were not conducive to traditional patterns of dissemination. As a result, until the Turco-Egyptian expedition into the upper Nile region no political ties or shared consciousness of any kind existed between northern and southern Sudan. With the Turkish arrival, the south began to identify Islam with a violent, expansionist northern state. As the barrier of climate prevented Egyptian incorporation of the south, the territory served as an unorganizable hinterland notable primarily for its commercial potential in ivory, cattle, and slaves.1

Leach_Book.indd 7

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

8

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

An indigenous Islamic revival movement in the 1880s, led by a charismatic religious figure known as the Mahdi, eventually overpowered the administration in Khartoum. The Mahdi died soon after defeating the Turco-Egyptian forces in 1885. His successor, the Khalifa Abdullahi, presided over an Islamic state for 13 years before a combined British-Egyptian force toppled the regime in 1898. The Mahdist state had further weakened tribalism in northern Sudan, but was unable to penetrate the south permanently. Accordingly, large portions of the region went without administration from outside rule until the 1920s. The chasm between northern and southern experiences during this period would lay the foundation for their distinct identities.

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and Northern Nationalism Twentieth-century colonialism exacerbated the earlier center-periphery dynamic of the state and defined the perimeters of the Sudanese nationalist movement that became so prominent by independence. By 1898, the need to keep the full course of the Nile out of the hands of other European powers compelled the British to overthrow the Mahdist state. To quell opposition from imperialist rivals, Britain undertook the seizure in the name of Egyptian reconquest. Lord Herbert Kitchener’s forces raised both the British and Egyptian flags when Khartoum fell and began nearly six decades of Condominium rule. Egypt, however, would play little more than a token role in the huge territory’s governance, providing only mid-level staff and administrators. Britain’s need to govern Sudan in accordance with its legal obligation to Egypt precluded any division of the vast territory. No portion of the south was to be transferred to British East Africa, regardless of the administrative logic of that approach. The resulting Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, signed in January 1899, was maintainable only while the British controlled both Egypt and the Sudan. Upon the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian regime, neither a Sudanese aristocracy nor any alternative power elite existed. The Mahdist regime was entirely demolished, and the tribal and sectarian structures predating its existence severely weakened. The British

Leach_Book.indd 8

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

9

therefore relied extensively on military governance, but sought out local clients to ease the burden of administering such a vast territory. In towns throughout northern Sudan, especially in the riverine area, the regime promoted esteemed merchants, tribal leaders, and religious figures. By the 1920s, colonial officials would formalize these patronclient relationships as ‘Native Administration’, or indirect rule. The regime chose its clients based on the legitimacy they could provide, and clients grew powerful in return. Upon his replacement of Lord Kitchener as Sudan’s governor general in 1899, Sir Reginald Wingate relied heavily on personal relationships with urban collaborators. An early partnership was with the Khatmiyya, an Egyptian-affiliated Sufi order whose leadership was associated with the Mirghani family. During World War I, the Condominium made a client of the Mahdi’s son, and a neo-Mahdist movement began. The British, fearing that the Ottoman Empire might call the Sudanese to a holy war against them, sought to bring this heretofore marginal figure into the service of Khartoum to counteract any religious propaganda. In return for his loyalty, Khartoum allowed the ambitious Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman Al-Mahdi to reassemble the Ansar, the militant followers of his father. The Khatmiyya and the resurrected Mahdi dynasty would become Sudan’s dominant sectarian rivals throughout the twentieth century. While administrators found personal relationships valuable in the north, they were of limited use in an area as vast and unpacified as the south. The British resorted to harsh methods in subduing Nilotic southerners during the 1910s and 1920s, in part to compensate for their inability to find useful collaborators. Neither the Dinka nor the Nuer, the two dominant Nilotic ethnicities, had a very hierarchical culture. This left few elites with any authority to appeal to more than their immediate circle of tribesmen. Tribal administration, therefore, would only follow violent suppression.2 After initial subjugation, Condominium interest in peripheral regions of the Sudan waned. Administrators viewed the allocation of scarce resources to the south as unwarranted and hoped only that southern tribes remained compliant and affordable to govern. The Dinka came to appreciate this neglect and cooperated with colonial authorities; cattle raids and slave raids from the north actually declined

Leach_Book.indd 9

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

10

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

under Condominium administration. Neither the British nor southerners had any interest in further uniting the south with northern Sudan, making the Condominium territory one of the least integrated in colonial Africa. The British desire for a modern bureaucracy to administer Sudan saw the birth of the first northern nationalist movement. Young, educated northerners considered tribal and Sufi elites too deferential to British rule and obstacles to Sudan’s emergence as a modern nation state. Ali Abd Al-Latif, a former officer of Dinka origin, formed the White Flag League in May 1924 with other military academy graduates. Al-Latif had served a year in prison for writing an article promoting absolute self-determination for Sudan, but upon his release he promoted cooperation with Egypt to end British rule. This wave of nationalism made 1924 a tumultuous year that culminated in the mutiny of Sudanese and Egyptian soldiers and the annihilation of a battalion of them by British troops. The revolt spread throughout the officer corps, even reaching southern towns, such as Wau and Malakal, where it was also suppressed by force. Al-Latif’s southern and slave heritage were representative of the halting steps the British had taken towards meritocracy in the ‘Sudanization’ of the army and government. Former slaves and their descendants benefited disproportionately from education and government employment, particularly in the military. This practice was to end after 1924. To colonial administrators, the Dinka were implicated in northern resistance not only through the leadership of Al-Latif but also in their continued resistance to British administration in their southern homelands. The events of 1924 intensified British determination to enforce separate administration for northern and southern Sudan and to withhold education and development in areas inhabited by the southern Nilotic tribes, especially the Dinka.3 The south’s isolation morphed from a loose arrangement of convenience into a codified practice. While Governor General Harold MacMichael did not formally issue the Southern Policy memorandum until 1930, it had been an unofficial arrangement for years. In 1922, the Condominium banned Arabic and promoted English in southern schools and offices. A memo circulated stating that the south might eventually be administered

Leach_Book.indd 10

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

11

with Britain’s East Africa colonies, after all perhaps even joining them in federation. Military administrators remained in the south years after their northern counterparts returned home, and Khartoum gave them few instructions other than to keep the area pacified on a modest budget. The Condominium introduced Christian missionaries to compensate for reduced education services. By contrast, Islamic influence was kept out of the region where possible, even to the exclusion of capable Muslim administrators. The colonial regime’s purposeful isolation of the south, combined with the lack of economic and social development, led to a slower emerging of political consciousness in that region by the time of independence. This deprivation would later form a basis for southern grievances in the first war. Northern nationalism retained a low profile in the years following the 1924 mutiny. Educated northerners gathered primarily in nonpolitical literary societies that posed no threat to the Condominium. However, the increasingly obvious need for education and development led the still-active northern intelligentsia to dismay over Khartoum’s promotion of tribalism over modernity. Nationalists thought the British were keeping southern provinces backwards to satisfy a European fascination with the ‘noble savage.’ To appease northerners, the government in 1943 formed the Advisory Council of North Sudan, the most forward step yet taken towards self-government. As the name implied, the council excluded the south, perpetuating the suspicion among northerners that the government planned to sever Sudan. Pressure from the small but growing business class in the north led to the Southern Policy’s unravelling. The British had initially encouraged commerce in the north but could not control its spread following World War II. As northern traders slowly infiltrated the south, the artificial barrier became impossible to enforce. Recognizing the futility, the government reversed itself entirely through hasty attempts at integration. In the south, the significance of the 1946 Sudan Administrative Conference, exploring political integration with the north, was widely debated. The legislative body it would create was to extend over the entirety of Sudan, formally ending the south’s isolation. The government’s 1947 abandonment of the Southern Policy was a recognition that when the British left, the south would be integrated with the north.

Leach_Book.indd 11

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

12

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

The Southern Policy had prevented southerners from attending the Sudan Administrative Conference, but a 12–13 June 1947 conference in the Equatorian city of Juba was assembled to address the oversight. The civil secretary, governors of the three southern provinces, 17 southern chiefs, and six northerners attended. Conference members discussed southern participation in the new legislative assembly and, while the meeting garnered some controversy, it was decided that the body would indeed include representatives from all of Sudan.

Southern Nationalism and the First Civil War The unraveling of the Anglo-Egyptian regime increased tensions between north and south Sudan. Between 1952 and 1954, the heated political debate over unification with Egypt became a distraction from more serious internal divisions. The deposition of King Faruq by the Free Officers in Cairo ended the Egyptian monarchy and its claim over Sudan. By 12 October 1952, the Umma Party, the primary advocates of Sudanese autonomy from both Egypt and Britain, signed an agreement with the new Egyptian government effectively guaranteeing Sudan’s right to self-determination. Egypt’s relinquishment of its traditional claim complicated the British mandate over the territory and hastened the arrival of Sudanese self-government in 1953, the first step to independence. While the Mahdists who dominated the Umma Party could make tactical alliances with Cairo, they remained intent on keeping Sudan free of Egyptian control. Ansar violence in Khartoum during the opening of parliament on 1 March 1954 confirmed that union with Egypt carried with it the risk of sectarian civil war. Though such a union became impossible, the contest over it helped bring the southern crisis to the fore. By April 1955, the regime of Gamal Abd Al-Nasser had become hostile to Sudanese Prime Minister Ismael Al-Azhari, a former ally. The Egyptian press launched a campaign declaring that Al-Azhari had neglected the south, and that the region would receive better treatment under an Egyptian-Sudanese federation. A southern delegation invited to Egypt received a warm reception and

Leach_Book.indd 12

10/17/2012 7:00:42 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

13

subsequently voiced its support for a union of the countries, to the ire of both northerners and southerners generally. Even constituents of the Egypt-friendly Khatmiyya order were irritated by such incidents, and Sudanese began to resent what they saw as Egyptian interference in their domestic affairs. Southerners believed Sudan was not ready for independence in 1955. They had also opposed the rushed Sudanization process of 1954 that gave Sudanese from their region less than ten of 800 senior government posts made available by the British. The intense pace of decolonization saw northern officers quickly fill the ranks of the southern regional army group, the Equatoria Corps. This grossly unequal distribution of jobs fanned the resentment of skilled and unskilled southerners alike. On 7 August 1955, a conspiracy to mutiny was discovered in the Equatoria Corps. Authorities were too weak to make immediate military arrests but in Juba detained two civilians suspected of involvement. A mob gathered to protest the arrests and was dispersed with tear gas after an assault on the district commissioner. Khartoum reluctantly dispatched a company to quell the instability, but the unit arrived ahead of its equipment and support. The army command in Equatoria then ordered the Second Company of the Equatoria Corps to rotate to Khartoum, though it had become quite clear that the company would refuse the order. The mutiny began on 18 August 1955. By 23 August, mutineers controlled almost all of Equatoria except Juba. Prime Minister Azhari ordered the rebels to surrender, but they ignored him. Governor General Alexander Knox Helm, summoned back to the Sudan from England, also demanded the rebels stand down. Helm assured the mutineers they would receive fair treatment and a chance to air their grievances. A vengeful northern army, disinclined to keep a promise made by departing British authorities, executed most southerners who turned themselves in. By the time the southern revolt had ended, more than 300 northerners had died. Army retaliatory killings of southerners reached an even higher body count. The tensions introduced at independence had been avoided for most of the duration of the Condominium, and the British were no longer present to either resolve or suppress them. With the barrier between north and south gone, many southerners flocked to northern towns to

Leach_Book.indd 13

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

14

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

find work and to escape the lawlessness of the south following the Torit rebellion. The disparity of wealth between northerners and southerners, hidden for so long, became noticeable. Educated southerners working for the government received less pay than their northern counterparts. Those transferred north received no pay increase, though the northern cost of living was much higher. Southern discontent over economic and political disenfranchisement led to parliamentary turmoil, paralyzing the government’s ability to pass legislation. Subsequent strikes convinced Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil to step down; the military took power. Sudan’s first military dictatorship replaced an unpopular parliamentary regime but still required sectarian endorsement. Both major sectarian factions announced support for General Ibrahim Abboud immediately after his November 1958 coup, but their support did not last long. By 1960, most politicians had lost patience with the junta’s ‘housekeeping’ mission and began coalescing in opposition. The junta’s stepped-up, brutal military campaign only increased southern hostility to Khartoum. By September 1963, former southern mutineers and their affiliates regrouped under the name Anya Nya. Khartoum blamed southern instability on bandits and refused to recognize an organized, growing insurrection. By the mid-1960s, however, military operations were consuming up to 30 per cent of the meager national budget. Abboud sought non-military avenues to address the quandary, which entailed hearing from voices outside a predominantly military government. In September 1964, the regime appointed a commission of inquiry into the cause of the southern problem. Hearings were open to the public, beginning what amounted to a national dialogue concerning the war. Abboud’s decision to allow the public into a controlled debate on the southern question backfired severely and led to the downfall of his dictatorship. The commission of inquiry’s hearings at the University of Khartoum soon became a platform for more general anti-government speeches. Activists argued that state failure in the south was inseparable from state failure throughout Sudan, particularly regarding broken promises to restore democracy. Groups of all political stripes banded together in common cause against the junta. The coup de grace was

Leach_Book.indd 14

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

15

a crippling nationwide strike, organized by the Sudanese Communist Party and various trade union members and academics. Abboud resigned on 21 October 1964. The caretaker premier, Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa, had done ministerial work in the south and many Sudanese hoped he could end the war. His government depended on the leftists who had spearheaded the movement to overthrow the junta and, accordingly, became committed to aiding radical causes throughout Africa. The reckless vigor with which the regime enacted its foreign policy only strengthened the southern insurgency. In 1965, the Anya Nya rebels captured a major stockpile of weapons en route from Khartoum to support the Simba rebels in the Congo. With the Simba defeat, even more weapons became available as former Congolese guerrillas sold them to the Anya Nya or bartered them for food. Southern rebels also began receiving assistance from the furious Congolese government. By this period, the war had reached a stalemate. Southern politicians had confounded parliamentary attempts to sidestep southern grievances and southern guerrillas had drained the legitimacy of Abboud’s rule. It became apparent that the southern problem had the capacity to wear at any regime, whether parliamentary or military. Therefore, the caretaker government proposed a Round Table Conference in Khartoum between the government and southern opposition groups. Al-Khalifa’s experience in the south gave him a credibility there no other post-independence leader yet had earned. East African governments such as Kenya urged exiled southern political groups to overcome their suspicions and attend the March 1965 conference. Proposals discussed at the conference concerned various models of federalism and southern autonomy. The two sides made a secret agreement to exclude the two extremes of separation and the status quo, but little common ground remained. The Anya Nya, not directly represented in the negotiations, exploited the relative leniency of post-Abboud security situation in the south. Insurgent leader Joseph Lagu writes that rebels did not take the conference seriously, particularly after coming across the cache of weaponry bound for Congo.4 In Mohammed Beshir Hamid’s assessment, ‘as Anya Nya gained strength, moderate politicians lost it.’5 Consequently, if the goal of

Leach_Book.indd 15

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

16

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

the Round Table Conference was to reach a peace settlement, it was a failure. Abdel Salam Sidahmed believes the reasons for this were twofold: first, northerners and southerners were still too far apart in their ideas of what a solution should be, and, second, no southern party had sufficient control over the Anya Nya – the forces on the ground.6 The spring 1965 elections ushered in a conservative coalition bent on a military solution. The second parliamentary era represented the crest of conservative northern nationalism. Umma’s Mohammed Ahmed Maghoub won the premiership and upon taking office immediately gave southern rebels 15 days to surrender. Following that period, he ordered the army to ‘deal firmly’ with resistance, inaugurating one of the bloodiest periods of the war. Maghoub also called off any reconvening of the Round Table Conference until there was peace in the south. The government’s attitude moderated somewhat in July 1966 with the ascension to the premiership of Sadiq Al-Mahdi, a Westerneducated grandson of Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman. When a 12-man committee released a report discussing political solutions to the conflict in September 1966, he described it as ‘the only serious task done during the last eight months that deserves being proud of’.7 The committee proposed that a centralized unitary government would not serve Sudan’s national interests, a welcome recommendation in the south. Nationalist pressure within the Umma Party forced Al-Mahdi to shelve the report, however, even after parties across the Sudanese political spectrum endorsed it. In 1967, the northern drive for an Islamic constitution was not conducive to southern accommodation. Likewise, the calls for separation among insurgents and exiled southern politicians grew louder after the 1965 conference stalled. High civilian casualties in the south also made a peaceful solution unrealistic for the remainder of the parliamentary era. The parliamentary elections of 1967 occurred nationwide and included 36 southern constituencies where elections had not been held two years earlier. Southern parties had a disorganized response; the Sudan African National Union (SANU) participated, while the Southern Front called for a boycott and declared that legitimate elections were impossible during a state of emergency. Maghoub returned

Leach_Book.indd 16

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

17

to the premiership in May 1967 and an Islamist constitution returned to the agenda. A draft constitution presented in January 1968 had heavy Islamist overtones and allowed for a strong presidency, a development critics branded as an invitation to authoritarian government. The document would remain controversial until the May Revolution. By 1969, Sudan was economically devastated. Foreign aid had dried up after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the foreign debt from the mid-1960s on had doubled. Sensing the weariness many Sudanese felt with the second parliamentary experiment, a group of middle-ranking officers staged Sudan’s second coup d’état in May 1969. The May Regime sought to establish its nationalist bona fides before negotiating with the rebels. Its objective was to unite the early nationalism of the post-independence era with the revolutionary atmosphere of the 1964 October Revolution. The leftist-military alliance forming the regime did not share a set of socialist principles but was instead a marriage of convenience. The new military leader, Colonel Jaafar Al-Nimeiri, had recently served a year in Equatoria and had some insight into the southern situation. On 9 June 1969, the new government announced its policy regarding the south. The statement recognized the cultural and historical differences between the north and south, the rights of southerners to develop their own cultures and, most importantly, their right to regional self-government. The regime laid out a program for revitalizing the south that extended an amnesty offer to Torit mutineers, encouraged regional development, appointed a minister for southern affairs and renewed efforts to train southerners for governmental positions.8 The Anya Nya, however, was now strongly separatist and still had no leader with the standing to push for an alternate goal. The May Regime was the first in post-colonial Sudan to lack support from either the Khatmiyya or Mahdiyya sectarians, leading to an inevitable confrontation as the new government consolidated power. Nimeiri launched a March 1970 campaign against the Mahdiyya, attacking its Ansar followers and killing the movement’s spiritual leader. Communists affiliated with the regime blamed conservatives and traditional figures for obstructing the possibility of a southern peace proposal but opposed what they viewed as Nimeiri’s quick

Leach_Book.indd 17

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

18

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

resort to violence against the uneducated peasants who made up that religious order. The leftist-military alliance began to splinter by the end of the year. The Sudan Communist Party’s Central Committee, part of which had refused Nimeiri’s request that it dissolve itself and join the May Regime, accused the government of attempting to slow down the fulfillment of its promises of socialism and regional autonomy for the south. By November 1970, Nimeiri would dismiss three communistaffiliated ministers as disloyal to the regime. The following February, open hostility erupted between the May Regime and all factions of the Sudanese Communist Party, which Nimeiri now vowed to ‘crush and destroy.’9 By April, most communist leaders had been dismissed, and some imprisoned. Army officers with communist ties attempted a coup against Nimeiri in July 1971. With help from Egypt and Libya, armed forces loyal to Nimeiri launched a counterattack and restored the president to power three days later. Furious, Nimeiri ordered a massive purge of communists throughout Sudan, arresting hundreds. The Communist Party would never again have such influence in Sudan as it did in the early May Regime.

Preparations for Peace and the Addis Ababa Agreement By August 1971, Nimeiri had tremendously weakened his sectarian opponents. With the destruction of the small but well-organized Communist Party, however, he no longer had any factional base of power. Nevertheless, he rode a wave of popular support after putting down the unpopular leftist coup and ending traditional party bickering. The regime held a plebiscite in October 1971 to legitimize Nimeiri’s presidency. Soon after, he appointed three southerners as commissioners of the southern provinces, a first-time occurrence that boosted his popularity in the region. The breakthrough that would pave the way for a peace settlement came with the appointment of Abel Alier as minister for southern affairs. Unlike his predecessor, Joseph Garang (whom Nimeiri had arrested and later executed for

Leach_Book.indd 18

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

19

his association with the July 1971 coup leaders), Alier enjoyed a good reputation in the south. He had served as a minister of parliament for the Southern Front during the 1960s. A series of smaller trust-building measures preceded Alier’s appointment. A January 1971 Juba conference on southern economic and social development attended by leading cabinet ministers and civil servants became a first step in bringing together northern and southern Sudanese intellectuals. The following March, secret diplomatic exchanges between Sudanese government officials and Anya Nya contacts took place in London.10 In April, Sudan’s UN ambassador Mansour Khalid told a UN press conference that Sudan was on the verge of starting a dialogue with the dominant southern insurgent group. Progress towards that goal was stalled during the attempted coup d’état and its immediate aftermath, but talks resumed in August 1971. By the end of the year the dialogue was ready to enter a formal stage. Nimeiri’s break with the communists allowed him to solidify relations with the institutions that would become crucial to the success of the agreement: the World Council of Churches/All Africa Council of Churches (WCC/AACC) and Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie. In May 1971, a WCC/AACC joint mission arrived in Sudan to petition the government. The delegation asked that humanitarian aid for the south be permitted to pass through Khartoum and offered to mediate the conflict. That October, the WCC/AACC informed Khartoum that the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), now the dominant political faction representing the Anya Nya, accepted that a resolution to the conflict could only occur within the framework of a united Sudan, a non-negotiable condition for the government. While Sudan’s post-colonial relations were often contentious with its eastern neighbor, mainly due to a disputed border and the support each gave the other’s separatist movements, Khartoum and Addis Ababa began to resolve their grievances in 1971. An agreement signed that March by the Sudanese and Ethiopian ministers of foreign affairs ended support for these insurgencies and became a turning point in the bilateral relationship. In early November 1971, Nimeiri’s first state visit to Ethiopia further cemented the relationship. After Nimeiri

Leach_Book.indd 19

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

20

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

departed Addis Ababa, a government delegation led by Abel Alier stayed behind to continue secret talks with SSLM representatives. After weeks of occasionally heated debate, the agreement was signed and formally ratified on 27 March 1972 by SSLM leader Joseph Lagu and, on behalf of the government of Sudan, Mansour Khalid. With the enacting of The Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, its formal title, the southern goal of regional autonomy came to fruition. The provinces of Bahr Al-Ghazal, the Upper Nile, and Equatoria would constitute a self-governing unit within the Republic of Sudan, referred to collectively as the Southern Region. Southerners formed executive and legislative agencies for the region, the High Executive Council and the People’s Regional Assembly. The entire agreement became a law only amendable by a three-quarters majority of the People’s National Assembly and a two-thirds majority in a referendum held in the south. The People’s Regional Assembly had powers to legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, administration, and regional development. Southern parents now had a right to choose the manner of their children’s education. The Addis Ababa Agreement stipulated that southern representation in the national army would be in proportion to the population of the south, but that use of the armed forces fell under the domain of the president of the republic. On the occasion of the promulgation of the law, Nimeiri highlighted sections concerning the armed forces and language. In both areas, he stressed the agreement’s acknowledgement of northern nationalist concerns that the primacy of Arabic as a national language should in some way be recognized and that the integrity of the military should not be compromised.11 The president’s own role in the crafting of the agreement was limited, but he relied on capable mediators such as Alier and Khalid. Nimeiri now had strong support from the south; a third of Sudan’s population gave him a backing no Sudanese leader had enjoyed since independence. After the AAA, the May Regime looked more secure and stable than any previous government, with southerners expressing a level of confidence in Khartoum not seen since independence.12 In 1973, the agreement would be enshrined in the first permanent constitution as Article Eight, stipulating regional autonomy for the south within a

Leach_Book.indd 20

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

21

united Sudan. By the end of June 1972, however, administration of the Southern Region was already in the hands of the southerners.

Peace and the Southern Region The constant patron-client relationship that had historically defined Sudanese politics reasserted itself in the 1970s, as the AAA could never be mistaken for a ‘bottom up’ solution involving all elements of Sudanese society. Instead it was an accommodation made between an authoritarian government with a narrow power base and an insurgency that could not be easily defeated. Nimeiri’s unprecedented acquiescence to the southern demand for self-government was novel enough to seem a break from the patron-client pattern that had defined Sudanese governance since the Turco-Egyptian regime. The next decade, however, would reveal that the agreement was simply a new form of this relationship. In April 1972, Nimeiri appointed Abel Alier president of the High Executive Council (HEC). Alier was to run regional affairs for 18 months before the November 1973 elections scheduled for the Regional Assembly. By renominating Alier before the elections, Nimeiri ensured the candidate would run unopposed even before the assembly had made its choice. This incident became the first of Nimeiri’s many unauthorized interventions into the politics of the Southern Region. Because of Alier’s critical role in bringing peace to the region, most southerners tolerated his selection. The limits of autonomy under the AAA soon became apparent. The regional government had no authority over foreign policy or defense.13 Even in areas where it had authority to act, such as ensuring internal security and local development, the legislature lacked resources and capability. Despite its imperfections, regional government became extremely popular in the south. Many southerners felt a personal loyalty to Nimeiri, and the region repeatedly defended his regime throughout the 1970s. The AAA was not popular with the northern sectarian elements Nimeiri had upstaged in 1969, however. They, along with dissidents ranging from communists to Islamists, formed the National Front in exile.

Leach_Book.indd 21

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

22

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Nimeiri had secured a strong ally in the south, but his inability to consolidate a base in the north, and his destructive attempts to do so, eventually led to the collapse of the AAA. The first major postAddis Ababa challenge to Nimeiri’s rule occurred in September 1975, when rebel officers, backed by the National Front, took over the army headquarters and radio station. While the attempted coup d’état was unsuccessful, Nimeiri passed amendments enhancing executive power, ostensibly to prevent similar efforts in the future. The 1975 incident may have triggered Nimeiri’s tendency towards more authoritarian measures, but another coup attempt in 1976 almost certainly impressed upon him that the National Front could pose a constant threat to his rule. Exiled sectarians like Sadiq Al-Mahdi were key instigators of the 2 July 1976 revolt, but Libya, the Soviet Union, and the Muslim Brothers were also complicit. The plan’s crucial flaw was an underestimation of southern support for Nimeiri. The coup leaders seized key facilities in Khartoum and the primary radio station in Omdurman, but the putsch collapsed when radio broadcasts from Juba alerted the rest of Sudan and the world that Nimeiri had escaped an assassination attempt. Even more critically, he retained the backing of both the Sudanese army and Egypt. Despite having survived two coup attempts in less than a year, Nimeiri now realized that the National Front had enough backing and commitment that he might never completely destroy it. Instead, he opted to negotiate with it in 1977. In the National Reconciliation that year, some Sudanese opposition leaders agreed to accept the basic achievements of the May Revolution in return for a role in government. Nimeiri was able to form a brief but vital alliance with Al-Mahdi, even coaxing an agreement from the former prime minister that, because factionalism might open the door to foreign intrigue in Sudan, the country was not yet ready for multi-party democracy. Al-Mahdi would renounce his role in the government only a year later, however. With sectarian support gone, the most important faction brought in after the National Reconciliation remaining in government was the Muslim Brothers. Under the terms of reconciliation, the Muslim Brothers were allowed to return to active participation in national politics, yet could not operate publicly under their name or as a separate political party.

Leach_Book.indd 22

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

23

Sudan’s leading revolutionary Islamist, Hassan Al-Turabi, accordingly disbanded his political organization and agreed that Islamists would operate as individuals within the Sudan Socialist Union, the only legal party under the May Regime. Through their transformation from exiles to public servants, small cadres of Islamists established an underground infrastructure without drawing attention from normally wary elements of Sudanese society. They began a slow process of infiltrating crucial positions in the military and security agencies. Throughout the 1970s, Khartoum’s neglect of the Southern Region hindered its effectiveness. The years following the AAA saw not strident southern nationalism but growing factionalism and provincialism. To implement autonomy in southern Sudan – a vast area almost bereft of schools, infrastructure, or economic activity – required some level of national stability and commitment. By 1980, national economic woes and ethnic tension had led to repeated army mutinies and general lawlessness. As the Southern Region grew less stable, eventually national critics questioned its very viability. Opponents of regional ‘devolution’ – the process by which Khartoum handed responsibilities to southern administrators – declared the south too regionalized. After the National Reconciliation, Nimeiri also faced pressure from his new northern partners to dissolve regional autonomy completely. He resolved instead by the late 1970s to balance southern power by pushing for regionalization for the rest of the Sudan. Nimeiri then asked Alier to step down as HEC president to avoid a trouncing in elections by the president’s popular choice for Alier’s successor, Joseph Lagu. The former insurgent leader did not last long in the position and was eventually replaced with Alier again, in a series of maneuvers demonstrating Nimeiri’s growing impatience with southern autonomy. No matter how weak it came to be in practice, the ideal of southern autonomy was so envied in other areas of Sudan that further regionalization efforts were inevitable. In 1978, the government began drawing up plans for the eventual Regional Government Act of 1980, which would establish five new regions in the north similar to the Southern Region. Central government ministries were to be dramatically scaled back, with the regions eventually providing all services except foreign

Leach_Book.indd 23

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

24

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

affairs, defense, foreign trade, national facilities, and extraction of mineral and natural resources. As southern unity frayed, the division of the Southern Region into the original three provinces became a political rallying cry. Nimeiri also championed the cause, openly voicing support for it by February 1981. Opponents argued fruitlessly that redivision would negate the AAA, discrediting the constitution of which it was a part and destabilizing the national government. Nimeiri took control of the agenda again, however, when in October 1981 he dismissed Alier, a redivision opponent, for good. Southern regional elections took place in April 1982. After continued interference from Nimeiri and his clients resulted in promises of favors in return for pro-division votes, the final result ultimately gave the pro-divisionists, mainly small Equatorian tribes, a slight margin over the primarily Dinka opponents of division. This development hastened the eventual replacement of the Southern Region, as established in 1972, with three unconnected provincial governments resembling those in the north. It was, therefore, the collapse of the AAA.

The Second War and the Rise of Political Islam Ultimately, Nimeiri’s repudiation of the AAA’s military provisions, rather than its political structures, initiated the second civil war. Before redivision, southern mutinies were sporadic and disorganized. By the early 1980s, however, southern army officers had contacts with insurgents, usually former soldiers themselves, in the new Anya Nya 2. Better coordination of efforts would form the basis for a more sustained, disciplined insurgency than modern Sudan had yet endured. In January 1983, Nimeiri ordered the rotation of southern units in southern garrisons to the north, again in breach of the AAA.14 Between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers at Bor, Pibor, and Fashalla garrisons refused orders. After months of standoff, Nimeiri ordered the national army in Juba to attack the mutineers in May 1983, the first hostilities of the second war. By July 1983, about 2,500 soldiers defected to a new guerrilla movement based just across the Ethiopian border, the Sudan

Leach_Book.indd 24

10/17/2012 7:00:43 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

25

People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLA was under the command of a Dinka officer who had joined mutinies in May, Lieutenant Colonel John Garang. The SPLA was a different movement from previous southern insurgencies. Unlike Anya Nya groups, it was neither separatist nor preoccupied with regional identity. Instead, it sought to represent the whole of Sudan and swore to challenge the interests that dominated Khartoum and oppressed marginalized peoples – southerners in particular but not exclusively. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the political wing of the SPLA, was determined to transcend its southern origins and take its revolution nationwide. Shortly before the collapse of Nimeiri’s regime, political Islam saw its debut as a weapon of the state. In September 1983, Nimeiri issued a new penal code that included five canonical Islamic punishments as national law. His declaration that this was only the first step towards total Islamization of the Sudanese political and legal system caused the Bor crisis to erupt into widespread revolt across the south. While his rule became increasingly authoritarian, Nimeiri was no longer capable of controlling events throughout Sudan. Mismanagement of food production during the previous decade finally wrought devastation in 1984–85, when the worst famine in a century hit Sudan. The regime was powerless to stop it or the opposition to Khartoum that it fostered. By March 1985, oblivious to the growing hostility towards him, Nimeiri felt secure enough in his position as president to travel to the USA for a medical visit and talks with the US government. In his absence, massive demonstrations erupted against the latest round of price hikes imposed on basic commodities. When the pro-regime counter-demonstrations turned out to be comparatively weak, the army stepped in and assumed control of the government. Nimeiri’s rule ended on 6 April 1985. The new regime, the Transitional Military Council (TMC), held power for one year to allow time for parties to organize for elections. The junta appealed to the SPLM/A to join the government in finding a peaceful, democratic solution to the southern problem. It did not accept the SPLM as a national party, however, or its secular agenda.

Leach_Book.indd 25

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

26

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Garang then criticized the TMC as no more than the old regime in disguise and noted that many junta members had served in Nimeiri’s government. TMC chair General Siwar Al-Dhahab himself had overseen military operations in the south.15 Garang urged the Sudanese people to demonstrate and riot until a civilian government free of military or Islamist influence assumed power. Militarily, the SPLA surged after the May Regime’s collapse. Its numbers rose to between 20,000 and 40,000 throughout 1985–86.16 Elections took place in early 1986, resulting in a ruling coalition of parties with 70 per cent of the electorate’s support. The elections were considered free and fair, with more respect for freedom of speech than in any previous effort.17 Because of the security situation, however, only 37 of the 68 southern constituencies held elections. The return to democracy was therefore meaningless for many southern constituents. The TMC could only cope with the instability the south inflicted on the rest of Sudan by alienating its citizens even further. In preparation for elections, northern political parties sought to open a dialogue with the SPLM. At Ethiopia’s Koka Dam in March 1986, the SPLM/A and the Umma Party reached common ground over their desire for the end of Sudan’s military pacts, particularly with the USA and Egypt. Another basic point of agreement was that, rather than one side surrendering or otherwise capitulating to the other, the parties should negotiate a cease-fire. The status of Sharia, the Islamic laws, was the most serious obstacle. Al-Mahdi was prepared to curb their application but not to repeal them entirely.18 Resentments also impeded progress: Garang felt the SPLM/A’s role in Nimeiri’s downfall was not appreciated by Al-Mahdi, who resented that Garang would only recognize him as leader of the Umma Party and not the legitimate leader of Sudan. Upon winning the most seats in the election, Umma still required a coalition to govern and was forced to choose from among parties opposed to the Koka Dam Declaration. The SPLA’s downing of a civilian aircraft near Malakal in August 1986 gave Al-Mahdi the opportunity to rebuke the insurgents and his agreement with them. Outrage throughout the north over the incident ended progress based on the Koka Dam Declaration.

Leach_Book.indd 26

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

27

The parliamentary era saw a succession of coalition governments too fragile to negotiate with the SPLM/A. In the 1986 election, Umma won about one third of the parliamentary seats and formed a government with the Khatmiyya-oriented Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the first of several coalitions with Al-Mahdi as prime minister between April 1986 and June 1989. To appeal to its more conservative members and keep the DUP from leaving the government, Umma implemented a less forceful policy to end the war than that upon which it had campaigned. The party moved away not only from Koka Dam but also from the repealing of Nimeiri’s Islamic laws. Al-Mahdi now insisted that a suitable alternative had to be implemented before they were revoked and did not abolish the laws during his entire premiership. The largest opposition party was the National Islamic Front (NIF), the political party organized by the Muslim Brothers. It strongly denounced negotiations with the SPLM/A, leading Al-Mahdi’s government to become increasingly timid on that issue. Outspokenness finally yielded results for the Islamists; when the Umma-DUP coalition came undone in April-May 1988, Umma’s next coalition included the NIF. Most southern parliamentarians then formed an opposition under the banner of the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP). Even before the NIF joined the government, southerners had been a generally ignored voice. The few southern leaders Al-Mahdi included in his government lacked notable support in their region. Consequently, many southerners believed it was only because of the SPLA’s success that the region’s interests were recognized at all.19 By November 1988, it was clear that the army could not satisfactorily route the insurgents. With elections nearing, DUP leaders finally resolved to meet with the SPLM. The Khatmiyya-supported party felt it had been pushed aside first by Umma then by the new coalition partner, the NIF. DUP leader Mohammed Osman Al-Mirghani and Garang met in Addis Ababa and fashioned an agreement similar to Koka Dam in which the government would not need to dissolve itself, but Sharia law would be suspended until a constitutional conference was convened. It also called for the lifting of the state of emergency in the south, the ending of all military pacts, and a cease-fire.

Leach_Book.indd 27

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

28

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

A jubilant crowd greeted Al-Mirghani upon his return to Khartoum from negotiations with the SPLM/A. Most political forces hailed the Sudan Peace Initiative, but the NIF condemned it as surrender to the secular insurgents. The reservations of several Umma members and Al-Mahdi’s hesitancy to sign on without a broad consensus in his coalition led many ministers to refuse to endorse the accord. As a result, the DUP pulled out of the government on 28 December 1988, leaving Umma with a strengthened NIF as its only real partner. The NIF pushed for a military solution from the moment of its entry into the governing coalition. However, on 20 February 1989 the General Command of the Armed Forces submitted a memo that in part questioned the sustainability of war. It was as clear a message as the generals would give that unless the government soon took steps to resolve the conflict the army might intervene again. Umma acquiesced to the army’s demands, prompting the NIF to leave the coalition. The National Assembly, led by a fifth government that now excluded the NIF, endorsed the DUP/SPLA agreement on 2 April 1989 and began implementing some of its provisions. The delay between the endorsement and the implementation allowed the NIF and its affiliates in the army almost three months to organize their coup. It was launched 30 June 1989, one day before Al-Mahdi planned to suspend the Islamic laws as he had agreed to do in April. The soldiers who instigated the coup were middle-rank officers who would not be able to rely on their military stature alone to stabilize the regime. The SPLM/A was initially skeptical of the new government, especially since a peace breakthrough had seemed at hand. Nevertheless, the new military leader, Colonel Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, vowed to work for peace in the south, declaring that he would talk to Garang ‘soldier to soldier.’20 Bashir sought to convey a practical, no-nonsense approach to negotiations that appealed to conservative northern Sudanese who disdained the previous peace efforts, made from what they considered a position of weakness. The NIF, which gradually emerged as the new junta’s organizational ally, cast the power grab in a populist, even revolutionary, light. The regime claimed it had defended Sudan’s Islamic values from provincialism and sectarianism, and especially from the African secularism

Leach_Book.indd 28

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

29

of the SPLM/A. The coup leaders included some trappings of democracy in the new government, appointing Islamist sympathizers to an assembly that was essentially a rubber stamp for domestic policy. Having promised that it held ending the war as a primary goal, the junta soon faced the task of demonstrating how it might follow through on that objective. In October 1989, however, the SPLA spared Khartoum from having to commit to peace by overrunning the northern town of Kurmuk. Bashir now called on the Arab world to help him defend Sudan from the SPLA, which he declared a front for Marxism and Zionism. Only Libya and Iraq responded with significant aid, but it was enough to take back the town and avoid a serious early threat to the regime. The aid also gave Khartoum an opportunity to launch into permanent jihad footing and allowed it to charge that the SPLA, not the government, had destroyed an early opportunity for peace. Rather than uniting and reinvigorating southerners in common cause against it, the regime’s hawkish, Islamist nature finally began to put an ideological strain on the southern insurgency. Francis Deng has noted the oddity that the SPLM/A, a southern insurgent movement dedicated to freeing the entirety of Sudan from exploitation and tyranny, had been able to grow so much more powerful than the various separatist militias that existed in both civil wars.21 Even separatist-oriented fighters with no interest in national revolution became committed to this well-disciplined force. Until the early 1990s, fate blessed the SPLA with enthusiastic allies and an incompetent enemy. The political dysfunction of Sudan, a state which raced through three military regimes and five parliamentary governments during the 1980s, helped the disciplined, well-funded rebels make gains against a confused and demoralized national army. The overthrow of the SPLM/A-friendly Ethiopian government of Mengistu Haile Mariam in May 1991 led to the first serious turmoil Garang’s movement would face. The new regime in Addis Ababa was unsympathetic to the SPLA and forced it to abandon its crucial Ethiopian bases. Without easy access to food and a safe haven across the border, Garang could no longer provide for his rebel army. The hasty dismissal of the SPLA also disrupted its communication network, through which Garang could learn of and control internal

Leach_Book.indd 29

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

30

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

dissent.22 Discontent with Garang had been growing among some SPLA officers, and the fall of Mengistu seemed to exacerbate it. Many Garang subordinates, especially non-Dinka, were unhappy with his autocratic style and hoped to replace him with a leader more willing to delegate power. Garang was not so unpopular that the SPLA majority was willing to push him aside easily, however. When three commanders revolted against his leadership in August 1991, they only succeeded in splitting the movement in two. Khartoum benefited enormously from the SPLA schism, intimating to the new separatist factions that it would be willing to allow southern secession if they would join the goverment in ending the SPLA’s claim to northern Sudan. Applying pressure to the fault lines between SPLA factions allowed for great gains in the army’s dry season offensive in 1992. By 1994, Khartoum and its militia allies had pushed the SPLA out of most of the south, with many rebels retreating across the Ugandan and Kenyan borders. The split allowed for the government to continue developing southern oil regions by 1992 and to have anti-Garang southern militias, many of which were ethnically Nuer, guard those oil wells against Garang’s predominantly Dinka forces.23 This situation was formalized in 1997, when many of Khartoum’s southern allies signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement and entered into a formal alliance with the regime. In March 1999 a major peace meeting between the two factions of SPLA commanders reconciled many differences. Internal SPLM/A reforms eased reconciliation and weakened Garang’s authority. By November 2001, most southern separatists had ended their attacks on the SPLA, but the decade-long split wreaked havoc on the southern movement and bought the government time to turn its oil wealth into arms.

The Realization of Southern Self-Determination While the government was reluctant to make concessions at two forums in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1992 and 1993, it accepted an offer of mediation by such neighbors as Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. These countries assembled as what would eventually become

Leach_Book.indd 30

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

31

the International Government Authority on Development (IGAD), a body including Sudan. The IGAD Declaration of Principles, drafted to address the conflict in 1994, stated that democracy, secularism, and a fair distribution of wealth throughout Sudan were prerequisites to end the war. Unity was the ideal objective, but the south could vote to secede in a referendum if its residents felt the government had failed to act on the stated prerequisites. The SPLM/A enthusiastically accepted this arrangement, but Khartoum did not and negotiations stalled for three more years. By 1997, after alienating virtually all of its neighbors and in the wake of continued SPLA victories, Khartoum finally relented and conceded that the Declaration of Principles was an acceptable platform for future negotiations. This represented a major breakthrough, as the opposing sides had never agreed on even a basis for discussions in the past. Just when agreement on this negotiating framework seemed to get the peace process back on the right track, new obstacles arose. The outbreak of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war in 1998 ended, for about two years, the pressure on a reluctant Sudan to participate in the IGAD forum. An intra-government power struggle also contributed to the slow process of negotiations during this period. Khartoum may also have retained the hope that by stalling long enough it could skip negotiations and achieve total victory through a petrodollar-financed army, especially after an oil pipeline from the south to the Red Sea finally became operational in 1999. By 2000, the government renewed attempts at ‘forum-shopping,’ or searching for the negotiating forum it considered most favorable of the many that emerged in the 1990s. It was particularly loathe to resume talks under IGAD as it would then be forced to abide by the Declaration of Principles that it had only signed under great military and diplomatic pressure. Khartoum even contemplated possible withdrawal from the IGAD process in early 2001, after a joint EgyptianLibyan peace initiative seemed to gain momentum. Ultimately, it retained token IGAD participation to avoid political fallout. By the end of the 1990s, the military-Islamist coalition governing Sudan began to fracture. In 1999, Hassan Al-Turabi, civilian leader of the Islamist movement, had consolidated enough power as speaker

Leach_Book.indd 31

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

32

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

of the assembly that he felt it was time to rescind certain privileges held by President Bashir. Turabi wrote a bill diminishing presidential power to appoint all governors, department heads, and other key officials. He proposed directly electing state governors and making himself an executive prime minister. Bashir responded to the threat by removing Turabi as speaker and disbanding parliament in December 1999. Even though Bashir firmly controlled the military, Turabi retained a large urban following that could have been an immediate threat to the president had he overreacted. Accordingly, the feud simmered throughout 2000. In May, Turabi was removed as secretary general of the National Congress Party (NCP), the latest incarnation of the regime’s political apparatus. To avoid a war between Islamist factions, Bashir allowed Turabi’s followers to form a separate political party while the president retained control of the NCP. Turabi finally gave the regime cause for arrest in February 2001 when he signed an agreement with the SPLM/A. Turabi stressed that the agreement was a call not to violence but to peaceful resistance against the regime. Nevertheless, he was charged as a conspirator with the insurgents and imprisoned for most of the remainder of the war. The NIF split coincided with another shift of the war to the SPLM/A’s favor. In May and June 2001, the SPLA overwhelmed Raga and Dem Zubeir, two government garrison towns in Western Bahr Al-Ghazal. This resurgence shattered the government propaganda line that the army was winning the war while the SPLA merely prolonged the inevitable. Regime support fell rapidly in 2001, and its attempts to placate its base of urban supporters with aggressive rhetoric only made opportunities for a peaceful settlement seem even more unlikely. Reconciled Nuer and Dinka offered stiffer military resistance towards the nomadic Arab tribes who made up a major element of the government militia network. Eventually, this resistance led to settlements among those groups, sapping still more energy from Khartoum’s war effort. By 2001, both sides suspected that making gestures towards peace could compromise their own positions. The Sudanese government feared both the consequences of southern self-determination and the

Leach_Book.indd 32

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

33

pressure it might create in the north for governmental reform, an echo of events preceding the downfall of Nimeiri. The SPLA feared that the series of humanitarian cease-fires pressed for by NGOs would eventually become a conduit to a more general cease-fire, a prospect it rejected unless implemented in conjunction with a comprehensive peace. As a result, neither side was inclined to stop the conflict immediately. Renewed interest by the international community, particularly the USA, was required to end the stalemate. In September 2001, US President George W. Bush deployed former Senator John Danforth to mediate a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains. Danforth was to establish a framework for improving humanitarian aid efforts but also to complete a report detailing whether the US should help resolve the conflict. In March 2002, after contacting states and organizations already involved in peace efforts, Danforth made his recommendations to the president. He effectively concurred with the IGAD approach, which focused initially on narrowing participants to the SPLM/A and the government while excluding other opponents of the government, particularly in the north. Danforth did not support self-determination for the south, but he considered IGAD a viable forum and encouraged the USA to throw its weight behind IGAD rather than launch a separate initiative.24 In June 2002, talks reconvened with American, British, and Norwegian resource personnel assisting General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, Kenya’s special envoy to Sudan and the chief IGAD mediator. Khartoum and the SPLM/A agreed to establish a bifurcated system with Sharia law in the north and a secular legal system in the south. Following a six-year interim, southerners would vote in a referendum either to remain autonomous within a federated Sudan or to become independent. Since observers believed that the AAA failed in part because it had no international oversight mechanisms, the process initiated in Machakos, Kenya, allowed a variety of security monitoring procedures that became more elaborate as the peace process moved into its second stage. The Machakos Protocol became the turning point in the peace process. It made reference to democratic governance and social, political,

Leach_Book.indd 33

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

34

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

and economic justice for all citizens of Sudan, building off ideals first drafted in the 1994 Declaration of Principles.25 The IGAD process eventually devised a one-state, two-system model, creating two regions with their own banks, constitutions, armies, and governments. It created four layers of government in the south: the government of Sudan, the government of South Sudan, state governments, and local governments.26 The first agreement concluded after the initial protocol, the Agreement of Security Arrangements, was signed on 25 September 2003. It stipulated security provisions during the interim. Under the agreement, the Sudanese army and the SPLA-formed southern army remained separate during the interim and functioned as two distinct forces.27 The SPLA would also withdraw from areas outside the south, such as eastern Sudan. The Sudanese army would withdraw from its garrisons in the south by mid-2007.28 After security considerations throughout most of the state had been addressed, the parties turned to the crucial issues of wealth sharing in a post-war Sudan. Talks resumed on 4 January 2004 in Naivasha, Kenya, and by 7 January 2004 a Wealth Sharing Agreement was concluded. It covered the division of the oil and non-oil revenues and how funds would be used to rehabilitate areas most affected by two decades of war, southern Sudan first among them. It mandated the creation of a National Petroleum Commission to review contracts signed with foreign oil companies and to monitor the distribution of income from natural resources.29 The Power Sharing Agreement, signed on 26 May 2004, gave the SPLM the most prominent position in the newly created Government of South Sudan (GOSS), and representation larger than any faction but Bashir’s NCP in the national government. It would control 70 per cent of the appointed positions in the GOSS until mid-interim elections, with the NCP controlling 15 per cent of seats and the remaining 15 per cent to be divided between other southern parties. Nationally, the NCP maintained 52 per cent of appointed positions, the SPLM 28 per cent, other northern parties 14 per cent, and other southern parties 6 per cent.30 The SPLM would also establish ten new state governments in the south.

Leach_Book.indd 34

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

THE ORIGINS

OF

NATIONALISM

35

Also signed on 26 May 2004 at Naivasha were a protocol to resolve the conflict in the border states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and a separate protocol to resolve the conflict in Abyei. The status of these areas was especially delicate. Local people contested land, while Khartoum and the SPLM contested natural resources The parties agreed to share the positions in the Nuba Mountains region of Kordofan and the southern Blue Nile on a 55/45 basis, with the NCP receiving the larger portion.31 An Abyei Boundaries Commission would determine the land rights of the Dinka and Arab communities in that region, resulting in what was agreed would be a binding resolution.32 Because the government disputed the SPLM’s claim to these areas, the agreements were not officially part of the same IGAD process as the other protocols, though they relied on the same IGAD forum and Sumbeiywo’s mediation. By late 2004, the primary remaining task was to gather all the protocols into one Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and establish a timeframe for their implementation. On 31 December 2004, the parties signed two final documents: an implementation schedule for the protocol provisions and an agreement on the final cease-fire and security arrangements. Implementation modalities were necessary to avoid a repeat of the 1970s when the government only partially enacted expected follow-up measures to the AAA or abandoned them completely. These last two protocols, along with the six other formal agreements, composed the CPA signed on 9 January 2005. The ceremony initiated a six-month pre-interim to prepare Sudan for the sixyear interim. In that time, institutions agreed to in the CPA were to be constructed, and relations between central and southern governments tested. At the end of this period, in 2011, a referendum among southerners would determine if the south would remain a part of the Republic of Sudan or seek independence.

Leach_Book.indd 35

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

CHAPTER T WO THE PILL AR S OF NATIONAL IDENTIT Y

Both the AAA and the CPA attempted to accommodate the evolving conceptions of northern and southern Sudanese national identity. The agreements are testaments to Sudan’s difficulty transcending its regional identities, in part because of the uniquely unintegrated nature of the state at independence. After independence, northern regimes, whether authoritarian or parliamentary, initially did not seek to transcend the Arab-Islamic foundation of their nationalist vision. During the early May Regime, and again with the SPLM/A insurgency, Sudanese aspired to promote a more inclusive nationalist vision. However, neither of these movements could overcome their regional constraints. The 1972 and 2005 agreements form the two defining moments in a long evolution of southern demands for autonomy, beginning with federalism at independence, and gradually becoming more radical over the course of the two wars. The first war began before the south had achieved a cohesive regional identity and, due to political circumstances, ended as a region-wide southern liberation movement was only beginning to form. The inchoate nature of southern nationalism at the time of the AAA signing may have spared Sudan from several more years of separatist warfare but may also have compromised national integration. Without a cohesive identity, southern politics devolved into patronage networks based loosely along tribal and regional lines

Leach_Book.indd 36

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

37

and exploited by the very national president who initially crafted the agreement. With the AAA, Khartoum ceded to the insurgents the primary shared concerns of southerners up to that period: autonomy, government employment, guarantees to defend indigenous culture, and access to education that was respectful of regional identities. While these provisions represented real concessions on the part of the national government, the goal of southern political participation on a national level actually complemented basic northern Sudanese concerns about national integration. As such, the AAA was a landmark refutation of the colonial-era Southern Policy and could have become a viable platform for further integration had the Nimeiri regime been able to form a stronger base of support in the north. The peace following the AAA allowed some integrative measures, but the larger legacy of that agreement was its contribution to the ideology of the next major insurgent movement, the SPLM/A. That the second war’s dominant insurgency fought not for southern secession but for national revolution demonstrates that the few integration attempts made during this period may have successfully altered concepts of identity for southerners. The SPLM/A’s nationalist vision, however, coincided with the eventual emergence of the Bashir regime, which had a unique hostility to any form of nationalism insubordinate to its Islamist objectives. The regime was unwilling to share power except on a strictly regulated, regionally defined basis, thus forcing the SPLM/A to compromise its national objectives and accept the more modest role of a southern liberation movement. Khartoum’s use of self-determination as a bargaining chip with southern militias to gain tactical advantage over the SPLM/A demonstrates the receding of the bedrock northern nationalist principle that Sudan must remain united. The acceptance of the opposing principle of southern self-determination indicates that, while Islam may have been a state-building tool for Sudanese nationalists in the first war, the Bashir regime considered it to be both a tool to perpetuate its own rule and an objective in its own right. This shift towards the use of Islam as a political weapon first occurred in the final years of the Nimeiri regime and was responsible for the abrogation of the AAA and both the outbreak and length of the second war.

Leach_Book.indd 37

10/17/2012 7:00:44 PM

38

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Despite containing more robust provisions regarding national and regional representation for southerners than the AAA, the CPA was actually a weaker vessel for national integration of Sudan. Instead, it codified distinct Sudanese identities nationally and along the northsouth fault line. Then after a six-year period in which those identities were further defined in contrast to each other, it allowed for regional secession.

The Unintegrated State and Northern Nationalism Sudan’s lack of national integration is partially attributable to the techniques the British used to govern a vast territory with few troops or administrators. Officials viewed early experiments with the creation of an educated class of Sudanese administrators as the primary agent of the 1924 mutiny. That revolt had been led by young officers with modern military training, often former slaves, who received promotion from colonial authorities. The genesis of national consciousness in northern Sudan was therefore to some degree a product of Western education. The British viewed the 1924 mutiny as a betrayal by the very class they had advanced. Chastened by their reliance on educated young Sudanese, the Condominium retreated to a patronage structure administered by sectarian and provincial elites. Thus, officials abandoned the drive towards modernity and education that might have served as a conduit for a more inclusive national identity. The wave of nationalism in the early 1920s convinced many administrators that the patronage of traditional leaders, as implemented by Governor General Wingate 20 years earlier, was a superior administrative approach to the gradual transition to formal bureaucracies envisioned by Governor General Lee Stack. Stack’s 1924 assassination in Cairo by an Egyptian nationalist underscored to administrators the dangers of exposing subjects to modern education that might facilitate revolutionary ideas. One interpretation of Ernest Gellner’s assessment of nationalism notes that it commonly assigns to religion a second-tier status, recognizing a possible role in providing political stability but disdaining it as a conservative remnant of the ancien régime.1 Sudanese nationalism

Leach_Book.indd 38

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

39

was unusual in that, while the early nationalist movements of the 1920s failed to challenge the colonial authorities and their sectarian collaborators, later generations of nationalists felt compelled to make common cause with traditional elites, even seeking sectarian patronage to advance their objectives. This cooperation did not undermine the legitimacy of the movement as much as it might have in other African states because the proto-nationalist revolution of the Mahdi in the late 1800s had set a precedent for northern Sudan’s mixture of religion and nationalism. With the growing demand for government jobs in the post-war recession of the late 1940s, nationalists would again push for self-rule. This second nationalist wave experimented with the creation of a more secular form of politics, both to advance modernity in Sudan and to overcome the sectarian rivalry that impeded ejection of the British. The northern backlash to the Southern Policy and the subsequent desire to incorporate the south into northern culture became ‘the only point on which the largely secularist Sudanese nationalist movement expressed Islamic viewpoints.’2 As in 1924, nationalists who attempted to operate independently of sectarians faced serious impediments to their power. The experience of the Ismael Al-Azhari government served as an early demonstration. Azhari seemed an ideal compromise candidate to become the first Sudanese prime minister. Affiliated with the smaller Ismaeliyya Sufi order, he neither threatened the larger sectarian factions nor felt beholden to them. Azhari assumed the premiership following the 1953 elections, a role he would hold until after independence. His nationalist program could not transcend the combined opposition of both dominant sectarian leaders, however, and he eventually aligned with the Khatmiyya in order to govern. Azhari’s strident support of secular nationalism became too much for Khatmiyya parliamentarians to bear and, sensing weakness after his handling of the mutiny in the south, they withdrew backing of the prime minister and formed a separate party. In July 1956, they joined other sectarians in giving the government a vote of no confidence, forcing Azhari to step down. The incident served as a warning to all future parliamentary regimes that a government without sectarian support would be brief.

Leach_Book.indd 39

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

40

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Rising nationalist tensions during the early 1920s led the British to isolate the south from further northern influence. The Southern Policy had its intended effect of preventing national integration by insulating southern Sudanese from the northern political economy. This inhibited the commercial and ideological exchanges so vital to an integrated nation-state. The inter-tribal and religious alliances and compromises upon which other African nationalist movements were founded – alliances that insurgents would seek in the second Sudanese civil war – were not developed between northerners and southerners in the 1940s and 1950s. Northern nationalism, despite its pretences at representing the entire Sudanese people, could not retain its energy and authenticity while incorporating a vision acceptable to southerners. At independence, northerners did not consider southerners as brothers-inarms, instead viewing them as an embarrassing reminder of colonialism and of the impotence of the first wave of northern nationalism in the 1920s. The Southern Policy was an ideological threat to northern nationalism in another capacity. Northern intellectuals understood that the British formalized the south’s colonial isolation in 1930 because they considered Islam to be a religion on the decline. Allowing southerners to be exposed, they believed, might actually hinder their development or even encourage fanaticism.3 Northern nationalists could not let such paternalist prejudice go unchallenged. Islam was one of the few cultural elements shared by northern Sudanese and, therefore, a fundamental pillar of the nationalist movement. The resulting urgency for promoting Islam in the south explains in part the counterproductive brutality of Khartoum’s early nation-building efforts following independence, under both democratic and autocratic regimes. The Condominium’s early thwarting of northern nationalism was, therefore, a key impetus for the first civil war. Both conservative and leftist northerners were encouraged to impose an alien vision upon what was seen as Britain’s last affront. These nationalists were left unaware of the depth of southern suspicion toward Arab Islamic culture and of the dangers of relying on Islam as a state-building tool.4 Unlike other African nationalist movements, northerners did not champion their country’s African identity. Some nationalists worried

Leach_Book.indd 40

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

41

that promoting African heritage, which shared no language or ethnic solidarity, would actually lead to a disintegration of Sudan’s national identity.5 For anti-colonial nationalists, Arabism was a stronger and more natural identity with which to challenge the West.6 Like other nationalist movements, however, northern nationalists prioritized the unity of the inherited state. The traditional ambivalence of colonial officials about Sudanese unity made suspect any notions of recognizing the uniqueness of the south during the pre-independence era. Imported Western terms such as ‘federalism’ and ‘self-determination’ carried imperialist overtones associated with Britain’s contemplation of a divided Sudan. In this regard, northerners fell victim to an irony Jeffrey Herbst notes became common in post-colonial African nationalist movements: in attempting to restore a pre-colonial identity, nationalists were suspicious of creating any modern parallel to the network of semi-autonomous confederacies upon which the traditional, pre-colonial African state had often been established. Instead, these educated, Western-influenced nationalists sought to re-imagine Sudan along the lines of the European nation-building movements that relied on a strong central state controlling territory within rigidly defined borders.7 Sudan faced an exaggerated case of the problem in which the postcolonial state tries to assert power over territory it had never historically been able to control and that was defined by the arbitrary borders formulated by the departed imperial powers. Nationalists took upon themselves a burden even the British would not carry. At independence, parts of the south had been conquered and pacified by the British less than three decades earlier and were still only lightly administered. Nationalist insecurity, therefore, led to the dismissal of any model of governance in which the primacy of central power could be challenged or diluted. The concept of “federalism” came to represent the ultimate defeat of the goal of a united Sudan overcoming artificial divisions imposed by colonial rulers. That southerners’ emerging interpretation of the past created in them a strong need for autonomy, only exacerbated after independence, was a difficult concept to consolidate easily within this worldview. Northern identity at independence did not initially seem incompatible with the democratic process. The mechanics of free elections

Leach_Book.indd 41

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

42

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

without corruption had been met during each of the parliamentary eras. Northerners, however, held parliamentary government in contempt for its military weakness, while southerners despised it for what they regarded as its illegitimacy. When parliamentary governments proved unable to impose the Arab Muslim identity upon the south, a northern nationalist, Abdullah Khalil, actually gave up his premiership and allowed the military to govern in 1958. Democracy became a means to the end of continued state-building. The need to complete the nationalist project, regardless of the immediate effect on traditions of democracy and selfgovernment, became a primary issue in the debate over ‘federalism.’

The Evolution of Southern Demands for Autonomy in the First War A review of southern interaction with the various regimes in Khartoum during the first war is useful before discussing southern identity. The evolving history of southern demands for some formal recognition of autonomous status began before independence and faced opposition at virtually every step from Khartoum. Southerners did not make early calls for autonomy to prepare the south for secession, however, but to implement protective conditions recognizing the region’s backwardness. In the years following the 1947 Juba Conference, which introduced southern parliamentarians to the national legislature for the first time, southerners sought guarantees of a permanent recognition of their region’s unique status. As plans for Sudanese self-government were drafted in 1952, southern representatives pushed for a minister of the southern provinces to be included in the cabinet and a special board for the region with members appointed to it by regional governors. These positions echoed a recommendation in the Marshall Report, a 1949 document issued by the Condominum and detailing the most effective way to modernize Sudan’s administration. Northerners objected that this step would weaken the newly created office of prime minister, establishing dual cabinets and representing a step backwards towards the Southern Policy.8 Federalism became an early vehicle for the emerging southern political consciousness. Southern bitterness over ‘broken promises’

Leach_Book.indd 42

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

43

from northerners would remain a theme of the conflict. Soon after independence, southerners felt northerners did not hold to their vow to consider federation for Sudan in the Constituent Assembly. Khartoum had been unable to frustrate southern conferences in support of federalism in 1954 and 1955 and was forced to use more conciliatory tactics. Southern members of parliament overcame their misgivings and voted for independence in December 1955, but only after a resolution was passed that stated any future constitution would be mindful of southern views. Southerners considered the subsequent rejection of a federal constitution by the constitutional committee in September 1956, and of southern regional autonomy in December 1957, as breaches of trust by the government, increasing the attractiveness of separatist causes for many. Despite resistance from Khartoum, after federalist candidates swept almost all southern seats in the 1957 elections, federalist momentum seemed poised to spread throughout other regions of Sudan. By 1958, Khartoum was receiving similar pressure from such remote northern areas as Darfur, the Beja regions, and the Nuba Mountains. On the day of the Abboud coup, the Fur leadership had been expected to endorse the federation at a large conference in Darfur. This event would have marked a turning point: in the past, the government had been effective at persuading parliamentary delegations from marginalized northern regions to support anti-federalist initiatives by invoking Islamic solidarity.9 The popularity of federalism in Darfur now transformed the concept into a direct challenge to Islam as a state-building tool. Moreover, southern federalists were becoming more disciplined and learning to cooperate with MPs from other regions. Under the new parliament in March 1958, the south was given 46 seats out of 173. Of these, 40 formed the Federation Bloc, an increasingly wellcoordinated group of federation advocates. Abdullah Khalil formed a coalition government from his Umma Party and the Khatmiyyaaligned People’s Democratic Party (PDP), appointing three southern ministers to minor positions in the cabinet. These southerners, however, were not members of the Liberal Party, by far the dominant coalition of southern politicians. This outraged southern MPs, as the

Leach_Book.indd 43

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

44

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

great majority had united in that party expressly to enhance southern power. In retaliation, these MPs voted with northern opposition groups, particularly on issues concerning the south, thereby helping to render Khalil’s government ineffective. A general strike organized in 1958 led to a collapse of faith in the government and its complete paralysis. Khalil, unable to govern and possibly fearing Egypt might find a way to take advantage of this parliamentary chaos, allowed the army leadership to assume state control.10 Like many post-colonial African states, the very weakness of Sudan’s state power allowed marginalized peoples a degree of de facto autonomy. Discussion of federalism, therefore, began as an abstraction confined primarily to southern politicians and elites. The authoritarian nature of the new regime increased both the radical nature of southern demands and southern willingness to use violence in achieving them. The Abboud coup in 1958 quashed any possibility of a suspension of the nationalist state-building project for the sake of federalism. The junta had no tolerance for federalism, the antithesis of its unitary, authoritarian vision for Sudan. The regime’s aggressive nation-building efforts, however, would radicalize previously uninvolved southerners to a degree southern intellectuals had been unable to do. Abboud, free of parliamentary advice or constraints, was oblivious to southern sensibilities. In his narrow, authoritarian concentration on infrastructure and order, he committed avoidable indignities against the peoples of the region and needlessly solidified opposition to Khartoum. In 1961, his regime annexed the resource-rich Bahr Al-Ghazal region of Hofrat en-Nahas to Darfur, reasoning that to leave such a valuable area under the administration of a southern province might actually encourage secession.11 The implementation of this policy was politically insensitive enough to enrage southerners across the region. Uneducated, rural southerners who may not have understood the concept of federalism understood that of theft. Growing southern resistance culminated in the formation of united political opposition in 1962 and the coordination of Anya Nya insurgent forces in 1963. By the dictatorship’s 1964 collapse, the entire south was in revolt, and it was hatred not just of Abboud but of northern administration generally that united southern insurgents.

Leach_Book.indd 44

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

45

Abboud’s simplistic efforts to quash separatism in the region inevitably targeted the most articulate and high profile champions of separatism – the south’s small class of intellectuals. The regime viewed educated southerners with suspicion, especially politicians. In December 1960, an alleged government plot to carry out mass arrests of southern politicians on Christmas Eve led many to escape the country. As refugees in the Congo they formed, in February 1962, the political exile group eventually known as the Sudan African National Union (SANU). Attempts to build a domestic Sudanese branch of SANU resulted in a rival organization, the Southern Front. The vast majority of insurgents, however, remained ensconced in the remote areas of Equatoria and were unconnected to either party. Following the October Revolution of 1964, federalism entered the national conversation yet again. While the parties made little measurable progress at the 1965 Round Table discussions to resolve the war, the forum served as a valuable outlet for the articulation of the parties’ concerns. Southern representatives at the conference started with their highest demands, which were scaled down with increasing frustration. Initially, they advocated a southern plebiscite allowing unity, federation, or separation, but northerners rejected this. A proposal for a confederate alternative with separate administration and armies for the north and south was also rejected. While southerners promoted a loose version of federation, northerners said they would at most accept nationwide regional devolution. Khartoum rejected self-determination on principle, since the government argued that ‘no one section of the country had the right to self-determine itself into secession.’12 In contrast to their dismissive attitude toward southern concerns immediately following independence, northerners were now obliged to articulate their own trepidations about federalism. Federalism proper, involving several tiers of government with full-time employees, was considered a drain on Sudan’s scarce resources. Northerners did not believe that a state with such poor roads, communications, and general infrastructure could support such a model of government. The lack of national integration also led to concerns that federalism would foster excessive localism and distract from Sudan’s national identity and cohesiveness. Finally, William Deng, a former leader turned renegade

Leach_Book.indd 45

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

46

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

from the exiled SANU group, proposed making federal demands negotiable. Other southerners objected to this compromise and the meeting broke off. In order to salvage something from the conference, the parties agreed that a 12-man committee should examine options discussed and report back with their recommendations. After almost a decade of war had exacerbated their political polarization, southerners and northerners found they were negotiating from different ends of the spectrum of regional government. However, the 12-man report issued in September 1966 as a follow-up to the Round Table meeting lay the template of principles that would later be adapted at Addis Ababa and included some early concessions from such northern politicians as the Islamist Hassan Al-Turabi. The report declared that a unitary national government was not appropriate for Sudan but that committee members could not agree on any alternative. Most importantly, it stated that in order to solve the southern problem, the region would have to be treated differently from other remote areas ‘where no such problem has arisen’ and might be entitled to different administrative arrangements as a result.13 The statement was the first instance of northern appreciation for the uniqueness of southern Sudan, and the delegates at Addis Ababa in 1972 would use the report as a template for their own settlement. In 1966, however, northern and southern committee members could not agree upon the relationship between the regional and national governments proposed in the report. Nor could they determine whether the south should remain split into the three traditional provinces or become one vast, united region. Throughout the 1966–67 premiership of Sadiq Al-Mahdi, southerners pushed for the latter option; they argued unity would more easily allow the pooling of resources and services in the region. Northerners countered that the south was too large to be one administrative region. Evidence indicates that the 1960s parliamentary government recognized southern demands for autonomy as legitimate, even while it was unable to resolve the problem. A draft constitution put forward in 1967, though disparaged in the south for its Islamic bent, laid out a regional system of government in place of central rule. Southerners found its proposal of three regional councils for the south inadequate.

Leach_Book.indd 46

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

47

Its national scope did not allow the south to consolidate its strength in relation to other provinces by forming a united region. More importantly, the Maghoub government’s brutal suppression of revolt in the south alienated southerners and made them less amenable to compromise. At the Addis Ababa talks in 1972, however, the SSLM argued again for federation with four regions to be established in the north, south, east, and west of Sudan. The May Regime negotiators refused, and southerners eventually relented.14 The south was the only part of Sudan that consistently sought some administrative autonomy. Jaafar Bakheit, a government negotiator at Addis Ababa, had been the architect of the regional government component of the agreement and hoped to duplicate this system in regions across Sudan as a national reorganization of local government.15 However, the May Regime would not introduce such a program until 1980, when it suited Nimeiri’s political objective of devolution. In contrast with their support of federalism in the 1960s and 1970s, many southerners would view this program as a challenge to the recognition of southern uniqueness, a protection they had relied on under the AAA to keep the Muslim-majority areas of Sudan from ‘ganging up’ on the south. Both military and civilian regimes during the first war rejected the idea of a federal Sudanese government for fear it might encourage secessionists. Nimeiri, like sectarian politicians before him, also feared that acquiescing to such demands would cost the regime support in the central, riverine region. Therefore, Khartoum promoted the AAA as rectification of an imperialist legacy rather than a platform for further government decentralization. Of course, accepting a unique status for the south had drawbacks. Northern nationalists had reservations about acknowledging a north-south duality after their struggle against British attempts to separate the regions. They feared the formation of an autonomous Southern Region might ‘perpetuate the sense of confrontation between North and South.’16 However, the May Regime was loath to cede too much power to northern regions after its 1970 suppression of the sectarians and subsequent abolition of their Native Administration power structures. Sectarian support was still strong in rural areas, and allowing too much regional control there was dangerous.

Leach_Book.indd 47

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

48

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Under the AAA, a northern nationalist regime recognized the aspirations of early southern nationalists, even if it did not recognize the legitimacy of that movement’s ‘nationalist’ objective specifically. The state’s interaction with the south would be dissimilar to its interactions with northern regions. During the early post-colonial years, while relations among northern factions were usually of a political dimension, relations between northern factions and the south increasingly assumed a military nature. ‘The difference between North-South and North-North counteraction to the encroaching cultural assimilation is one of a kind rather than one of degree.’17 Resistance to assimilation by force was a key element of southern identity. Northern awareness that southerners would take up arms to defend their autonomy, in a manner that other marginalized Sudanese would not, finally allowed for a settlement in 1972.

The Foundations of Southern Identity Northern nationalism had no southern counterpart during the 1950s. The accelerated state-building efforts and economic disparity with the north caused more anxiety for southerners than a desire for independence. What increasingly united post-colonial southern Sudan was not a shared identity but shared frustration with the region’s lack of control over its future in an independent Sudan. Southern concerns over the region’s near exclusion from the Sudanization process, by which Sudanese replaced Britons in administrative roles, met with indifference from both northerners and the British. Into this environment, southern political consciousness was born. Woodward observes that ‘an awareness of national politics would probably not have emerged at all after the Second World War if it had not been that party developments were taking place in the north.’18 The first civil war forged the foundation of a southern identity in a way unlike previous shared experiences. Despite decades spent attempting to insulate the region from Arab and Muslim influence, British efforts to create a ‘southern’ identity were neither enthusiastic nor successful. Condominium administrators were careful not to upset traditions or interfere with religion in the north to whatever extent practical

Leach_Book.indd 48

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

49

but showed less deference to southern culture. There, Christian missionaries introduced Western education, language, and, particularly, religion to the southern Sudanese. In effect, the missionaries were to provide education in large portions of the south so the colonial government would not have to spend its own resources. Few missionaries actually operated in the region at any given time, and poor infrastructure prevented the mobility needed to compensate for their low numbers.19 Southerners originally resisted missionaries but, as with British administration, their unobtrusive, even beneficial, presence was eventually accepted. Long-term integration at the most basic levels of interaction before independence would have reduced mistrust between northern and southern Sudanese but was not a priority for the colonial administration. Instead, while the British created southern Sudan as a distinct administrative unit, southern relations with the north created its common regional identity. Southern nationalism emerged in response to the second wave of northern nationalism, not colonial rule. The origins of the first civil war have much in common with ethnic tensions that would define other post-colonial conflicts where minority groups preferred colonial administration to that of rival ethnicities.20 By assuming the role of southern caretakers, British administrators denied northerners the tools required to interact with what were essentially foreign cultures. Even well-intentioned northern Sudanese administrators in the south after independence could hardly compete with the British, who had better ties with missionaries, better knowledge of indigenous languages, and even the capability to play mediator between southern chiefs and southern politicians.21 Northerners alone could not fill these administrative roles, and the few educated southerners viewed their exclusion from these positions as a sign that northern rule would bring an even harsher form of colonialism.22 The nature of north-south interaction during the late Condominium period would reinforce the mythology of betrayal that contributed to early southern nationalism. At the 1947 Juba Conference, both educated and traditional southern representatives joined British administrators and northern representatives in debating the merits of southern participation in the Legislative Assembly in Khartoum. This would be

Leach_Book.indd 49

10/17/2012 7:00:45 PM

50

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

the first stage in integrating the south into the national Sudanese political system. British governors in the south had a paternal relationship towards southerners and greeted the northern representatives at the conference with suspicion. In particular, they found a judge named Mohammed Salah Al-Shingetti to be an ‘antagonistic’ presence. They suspected him of cajoling or coercing the few educated southerners at the conference into supporting southern inclusion in the Legislative Assembly by the end of the conference. On the first day of the conference, southerners had been much more apprehensive about taking such a step.23 Notably, Shingetti could not persuade the tribal chiefs among the 13 southern representatives. Though no vote on the matter was held, many chiefs said they spoke for their people when they resisted joining the assembly. Abel Alier and Francis Deng would later accuse Civil Secretary James Robertson of disregarding the will of most southerners at the conference by deciding unilaterally that the entire Sudanese territory had to be unified through a legislative body.24 Contrary to what they may have expected following the Juba Conference, educated southerners were not inducted into government positions during the Sudanization process. The early southern nationalists referred to this incident as a defining moment in north-south relations, a betrayal foreshadowing later injustices. Thus, a domino effect was set in motion after World War II: northern nationalism hastened the debate over independence, leading to the debate over retaining a unified Sudan, fostering southern nationalism. Educated southerners’ pre-independence receptiveness to national integration indicates that southern political awareness was not born of an innate animosity towards northerners. Deng observes that southerners were not necessarily resisting Islam or Arab culture, which they had already encountered throughout most southern territories and particularly in urban centers. Instead, they resisted the forced integration advocated by northern nationalists.25 The willingness of educated southerners to promote integrative efforts depended largely on the degree of input they would have in creating government structures. The Torit mutiny came at a critical moment, when the patterns for behavior were being established between southerners and the state.

Leach_Book.indd 50

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

51

The manner in which it first erupted and was suppressed marked the introduction of violence to the relationship. In September 1955, a government commission set up to examine the causes of the mutiny produced what would be known as the Cotran Report. It declared that the ‘southern problem’ was fundamentally political, not religious. It counted neither the historic reality of the slave trade nor tensions between various religions as factors in the disturbances. However, it acknowledged the north-south dichotomy: ‘It is only within the last year or so that the average southerner is becoming politically conscious, but this political consciousness, as it is bound to be initially, is regional and not national.’26 The report also confirmed as primary causes of the mutiny the almost complete shutout of southerners from government positions as the British transferred power and southern dissatisfaction with the government’s enacting of election promises to consider a possible federal model for Sudan. While these and other resentments fomented southern revolt throughout late 1955, the mutiny of the Equatoria Corps at Torit itself had not even ‘the beginnings of an articulated ideology.’27 Instead, the brutal northern response to the mutiny, coupled with disingenuous northern assurances to consider southern autonomy and government employment, led to hostility on multiple fronts. Southern identity could coalesce around this narrative of cruelty and betrayal, which the increasingly violent attempts of successive regimes to dominate the south only perpetuated. Southerners, especially elites, had felt alienated from the north during Sudanization, but that process alone did not have the galvanizing potential of heavy-handed counterinsurgency measures and cultural oppression by Khartoum. The south, however, had to overcome several hurdles in creating a durable national consciousness. It took years for southern identity to transcend provincialism and tribalism enough to coalesce behind a single political wing, the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement. Southern resistance in the first war faced a difficult dual challenge in which it had to make coherent demands from Khartoum while simultaneously seeking to create its own institutions and culture in the region. The first southern Sudanese political exile movement, the Sudan Christian Alliance (SCA), was founded in 1961. Its name was chosen to

Leach_Book.indd 51

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

52

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

camouflage the separatist political objectives its host, British-controlled Uganda, would not sanction. SCA members hoped its Christian orientation and the leadership role of clergy figures, such as Father Saturnino Lohure, would attract support from Western Christian organizations by calling attention to the religious persecution of southerners by the Abboud regime. Abboud’s aggressive Islamization campaign, which involved such measures as building Islamic schools across the south and interacting with southern chiefs only once they had taken on Arabic names, intensified southern resistance efforts. Customs that southerners had always found insulting – such as the practice by which northern men felt free to marry southern women but southern men, even Muslim converts, were viewed unfavorably if they sought to marry Arab women – became key elements of southern nationalist propaganda.28 The SCA was not successful in recruiting international support, but it paved the way for more explicitly nationalist southern groups. By the late 1960s, dissident southern politicians had initiated several attempts at forming some shared political identity, but all these efforts failed at transcending tribal allegiance. The insurgents had no manifesto, having only recently achieved the status of a coherent fighting force. In fact, the Anya Nya’s only ideological statement came one month before the AAA was concluded. In January 1972, Joseph Lagu produced a pamphlet entitled ‘The Anya-Nya: What We Fight For.’ The pamphlet, disseminated throughout the south, was virulently anti-Arab and depicted northerners as ‘barbarians,’ historic enemies never to be trusted or accommodated. It presented the Anya Nya as an African Liberation army in the mold of other nationalist movements struggling against colonial oppressors and declared that south Sudan insurgents were defending all of black Africa from Arab imperialism with its Soviet patronage.29 While examples of northern treachery dominated the pamphlet, Lagu hoped to challenge the ethnocentrism prevalent in the insurgency. He declared that the Anya Nya was the south’s only national institution. The movement was regional, Lagu wrote, and troops were to obey superiors regardless of their ethnic background, ‘because by so doing you strengthen the ties that bind our peoples together in our common struggle.’30 Finally, despite the strident rhetoric in defense

Leach_Book.indd 52

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

53

of the southern Sudanese nation, Lagu wrote that the goal of the movement was only self-determination, whether that lead to unity, autonomy, federalism, or separation. Unlike the SPLM/A’s occasional ambiguity of message in the second war, which was partly tactical and partly ideological, the vagueness of objectives here appears to have risen from a real lack of commitment to a specific outcome. Despite the insurgency’s intense hatred for northerners as an enemy, Lagu did not entirely rule out an agreement such as the one concluded in Ethiopia only weeks later.

Tribal Identity and Its Implications for Southern Nationalism The vagueness of ‘southern’ identity directly contributed to the difficulty in ending both wars. Neither of Sudan’s primary insurgent groups, the Anya Nya or the SPLA, fought to preserve any precise understanding of southern cultural identity. The Anya Nya was a network of militias formed to combat the early state-building process of independent Sudan along Arab-Islamic lines. An ideologically loose organization, it contained elements strongly favoring secession and some receptive to regional autonomy within Sudan. The SPLM/A’s objective was to transcend what it considered the dead-end of southern nationalism, instead uniting marginal people across Sudan to destroy the traditional center-periphery national power structure. Neither of these goals relied upon a well-defined conception of southern identity. As the factional and ethnic violence plaguing the south for decades confirms, such an identity, even by the end of the second civil war, did not exist in any stable capacity. One theory of insurgency states that ideological coherence in a movement is more likely to originate in societies with a strong tradition of statehood. Insurgencies without such a tradition are more prone to factionalism and poor discipline.31 In the Sudanese context, the application of this theory is complicated. The Anya Nya was not a disciplined, coherent force, but its reliance on tribal-based structures, grassroots support, the authority of local commanders, and a shared hostility to the north made it difficult for Khartoum to find cracks in

Leach_Book.indd 53

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

54

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

the movement to exploit. On the other hand, the highly disciplined SPLM/A contained such fracture points, and Khartoum was adeptly able to deepen them following that insurgency’s 1991 infighting. The severity of tribal allegiances means specific separatist movements lacked broader regional appeal, even though separatism generally was a popular cause. While separatist movements could potentially exist independent of ethnic affiliation, in practice such movements were unusual. Most separatists championed separation for the region as a whole, but movement elites relied predominantly on one ethnic group or southern sub-region for their base of power. As movements lost traction, their membership eroded to the leaders’ ethnic group. Movements could not transcend tribal identity to form and sustain a revolutionary southern identity. The Anya Nya held the apparently contradictory goal of seeking to rise above tribalism while retaining tribal institutions. While reliance on tribal systems limited the coherence of the Anya Nya as a military force and complicated its ability to work for political objectives, such reliance enhanced its legitimacy at a local level and very likely increased the morale of its soldiers. Anya Nya insurgents were most active in Equatoria, the province with the largest number of small, non-Nilotic tribes. Its ability to coexist with local tribal agendas made it difficult for the Anya Nya to add any form to the early conception of southern identity. However, by relying on existing tribal practices and time-honored systems of administration, the Anya Nya rarely had a shortage of leadership. Insurgents were less reliant on outside sources for food and supplies than on the southern Sudanese themselves. Tribal demographics in part explain the difficulty of transcending tribal enmities in the south. A common recurring tension between tribes in the south has been the relationship between the Dinka, by far the largest demographic in the region and 40 per cent of the southern population as a whole, and smaller ethnicities. There had been occasional hostility, if rarely outright conflict, between the Equatorians and Dinka during the colonial period. The small tribes of Equatoria were strong advocates of separatism in the first war and were more involved in the Anya Nya than residents of the other two southern provinces, particularly Dinka. Nuer separatists were the dominant anti-Dinka,

Leach_Book.indd 54

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

55

anti-SPLA ethnicity in the second war, but were not deeply involved in fighting until relatively late in the first war. The radically different methods through which tribes traditionally governed themselves did not necessarily conflict with the coordination of a regional insurgency but posed problems for administration in a modern heterogeneous state. The Shilluk of Upper Nile and the Azande of Equatoria retained hierarchical structures, while the Dinka and Nuer had very little hierarchy at all. That the Anya Nya was more a network of militias than a united insurgency for most of its existence led southerners to join in service of local agendas. For example, the Ngok Dinka of the Abyei area often joined the Anya Nya specifically to fight the Arab Misseriya tribes, with whom they initiated hostilities in 1965.32 While the autonomy was no doubt attractive to fighters, tribal consciousness impeded the Anya Nya’s larger military considerations, such as the freedom to move over territory the insurgency controlled. Lagu writes that insurgents took insult if fighters from another region came to their area, an insinuation that the local group was too weak to fight independently. In mid-1960s Equatoria, such disputes between tribes on the opposing banks of the Nile were an early indicator that the mobility of Anya Nya fighters would be limited, a situation that did not change substantially until late in the war. The chasm between the southern intellectual leadership and the southern populace further complicated efforts to form a national liberation movement in the region. Most insurgents did not share the ideological fervor of southern political leaders. While hostile to the north, they were not politically engaged enough to identify with parties based on factors other than ethnicity. As a result, such groups as the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) were too weak to provide their own administration and relied primarily on the management of tribal chieftains, especially in rural areas.33 Poor communication between Anya Nya units and high-profile southern politicians complicated peacemaking efforts. In 1968, during the second parliamentary period, government ministers Joseph Garang and Abel Alier attempted to contact southerners in exile, urging them to return to Sudan to take part in a regional autonomy arrangement. When these efforts failed, Garang and Alier surmised that ‘the rebel leaders had

Leach_Book.indd 55

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

56

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

no common platform.’34 The high-profile insurgents and exiled politicians had various intertwining strands of ideology but were simply too disunited to be effective. Some were ardent separatists and some were merely federalists. Others seemed to have no fixed preference, using separatist rhetoric to draw attention to southern grievances, advance a southern identity, or pursue more opportunistic objectives. Separatist dependence on the tribal chiefs, who were reluctant to relinquish their own power for the cause of ‘South Sudan,’ sapped the ideological potential of political groups. The SSPG collapsed in 1969 and was succeeded by the Nile Provisional Government, which also disintegrated soon after because of leadership battles. Government potential to somehow manipulate ethnic fault lines was an insurgent incentive to transcend tribalism. It is revealing that one of the few political factions promoting a strict adherence to tribal mechanisms for southern administration was the Southern Unity Party, a small group of conservative southerners that actually had a northern base.35 Northern nationalists had deep contempt for southern tribalism. They believed that southern resistance stemmed not from a shared southern suspicion and feeling of grievance towards the north, but from petty tribal prejudices cultivated for decades by British administrators. In fact, the predilection of early regimes to treat the outbreak of hostilities in the south as tribal fighting and banditry, unrelated to any legitimate political grievances, gave further incentive for southern nationalists to overcome tribal factionalism in favor of a more cohesive and effective resistance. Soon after the May Revolution of 1969, the regime put forth a declaration in which Colonel Nimeiri recognized southern grievances as legitimate and promised to consider regional autonomy for the region. As a result, a new school of thought formed among southern politicians, who tried to consolidate their factions under the same leadership and begin a dialogue with the new regime while the Anya Nya continued to fight. The emerging consensus gave Lagu some political cover during his ascent to Anya Nya leadership. Only in 1970 did the various movements abandon their individual causes and form the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), the first southern movement of regional stature.36 This new group was more sophisticated than its predecessors, consisting of both a political and a military wing.

Leach_Book.indd 56

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

57

Lagu, a Sudanese army officer who joined the insurgency in 1962, had some control over the flow of foreign arms to the Anya Nya recruits he trained. He retained contact with, and gained the respect of, future regional commanders, helping his ascent over military superiors and the exiled politicians who struggled to control the insurgency. In addition, Lagu’s background as the son of a prestigious family from the less-populous Madi people of Equatoria made him a good consensus candidate. His tribe was not so large that other southerners felt threatened by his leadership, and his family status was not so humble as to incur resentment or scorn from other tribal elites. In addition to knowing Acholi and Juba Arabic, Lagu had been educated with many Dinka, giving him some insight into Dinka customs and language.37 Throughout 1970 and 1971, individuals and factions that did not accept Lagu’s leadership eventually retired or left the Anya Nya. Upon uniting the Anya Nya under his leadership, Lagu sought to implement reforms to convert it from a series of linked local militias to a regional prototype for a southern army. He considered each of the three provinces to be of equal significance, even though Equatorian forces still vastly outnumbered those in Bahr Al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. Resolving early tensions between the Equatorian east and west Nile bank tribes prepared Lagu for the need to make conciliatory moves towards fighters accustomed to operating autonomously. Such gestures as promoting officers from Upper Nile to Anya Nya leadership by 1971 improved the insurgency’s reputation as a pan-southern fighting force. By the time of the AAA, the Anya Nya insurgency was as unified as it had ever been. The SSLM was the only effective, exclusively southern liberation movement in Sudan’s history, though it existed for only two years until the ratification of the AAA made it obsolete. Consequently, it did not have a chance to fully develop its political ideology beyond a simple message of unity in the face of northern aggression. The war simply did not continue for long enough or revolve around a shared set of objectives by which a synthetic nationalism could have coalesced after years of battle comraderie. Had the first war continued past 1972, the makeshift institutions formed during the Anya Nya struggle could have conceivably become the basis for southern administration and,

Leach_Book.indd 57

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

58

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

eventually, a southern state. Perhaps realizing this, many Anya Nya were hesitant after the AAA to dismantle the grassroots medical and educational facilities they had carefully built up, even though the money then coming in for famine relief and development was intended to make these structures obsolete. The agreement was concluded before the young southern nationalist movement achieved clarity of vision or a broad enough legitimacy to rise completely above ethnocentrism. Lagu wrote decades later that southern unity came from the shared fight against the north. The post-AAA peace revealed only ‘the peculiarity of each one of the three provinces.’38 Mutinies, desertions, and interethnic fighting, particularly between officers and subordinates of different ethnicities, marred post-AAA efforts to integrate the Anya Nya into the Sudanese army. Even in peace, the difficulty in transcending the provincialism of former insurgents remained. Unresolved ethnic tensions contributed to the collapse of the AAA and were further strained when the rise of southern ‘redivision’ became a political issue in the late 1970s. With the fall of Idi Amin’s Ugandan regime in 1979, several of his backers from Equatorian tribes, who had crossed the border to enjoy employment and a higher standard of living, returned to their native province in the south. The demographic balance versus the Dinka in the southern region changed, leading Equatorians to push for better representation in the regional government. The migration also increased resentment among Equatorian tribes such as the Bari against the Dinka, many of whom had moved into Equatorian lands during the years of peace. By 1980, tribal tensions ran high, even in the People’s Regional Assembly. In addition to the post-AAA resurgence of tribal politics, southern elites often jockeyed to enhance their personal status, creating opportunities for division Nimeiri later exploited. Lagu writes of several instances in which he or other southern political figures felt slighted by their position in the new government.39 In the 1980s, Nimeiri rededicated his efforts to take advantage of southern internal divisions. In February 1980, after Lagu had been touched by scandal and charges of authoritarianism, Nimeiri dissolved the Regional Assembly and removed Lagu as High Executive Council president after only two years. He returned Abel Alier, a Dinka, to power. This act only

Leach_Book.indd 58

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

THE PILLARS

OF

NATIONAL IDENTITY

59

goaded many southerners, particularly Lagu’s fellow Equatorians, to clamor for the redivision of the Southern Region. Redivision was seen as a method to counter the power of the Dinka, who dominated politics in the Southern Region by virtue of sheer numbers. Becoming an important ally of Nimeiri’s regarding redivision, Lagu speculated that, since the rest of Sudan was now regionalized, the north could not apply the same amount of pressure to southerners and, therefore, no reason existed for keeping the region in one bloc.40 The failure of integration allowed for such political posturing to open anew the scars of war only a decade after the AAA. While there was no broader consensus on what a ‘southern identity’ meant when the south was not confronted with northern repression, southern militancy did not abate after the AAA signing. Douglas Johnson recalls that during a visit to the Jonglei area of Upper Nile in 1975, he heard children of eight or nine singing Anya Nya songs, though they would have been too young to remember the movement. ‘By the time 1983 came around these kids were much older . . . This is part of the reason why the second civil war took off much faster than the first one. People were primed by their experience in the first civil war. They knew what the issues were.’41 Without the active oppression of the military, however, this resentment did not have the galvanizing effect that slowly occurred in the first war. The spirit of southern nationalism that the first war had fostered did not automatically resume once the peace ended. In fact, it had likely weakened after the AAA. As the region became more divided along tribal lines without the shared threat of the north, animosity between tribes would continue into the second war. As Benaiah Yongo-Bure summarizes, in the 1970s ‘there were divisions among the south, and it carried on. The SPLM/A inherited a divided south.’42

Leach_Book.indd 59

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

CHAPTER THR EE CULTUR AL GR IEVANCES ADDR ESSED AT THE PEACE TABLE

When the SPLM/A signed an agreement in total opposition to its original objective, the AAA was, in one sense, finally defeated. The SPLM/A’s message of unity and national liberation was born out of the era of peace following the AAA, but the hardening of cultural identities during war made these goals unachievable. Khartoum viewed the SPLM/A as a southern movement, despite its stated objectives. Many southerners were unhappy with northern representation in the movement, either because of prejudice or simple resentment over the complications their presence created regarding secession. By compromising its ideals, the nationalist SPLM/A was forced to begin drafting an agreement in 2002 that the SSLM would have been envious to conclude in 1972. While the Bashir junta eventually came to resemble a conventional Arab dictatorship, relying on a selective application of Islam to retain power and authority, its formative coalition with radical Islamist ideologues left a lasting impact on policy. This element of the regime was not powerful enough to implement a complete Islamist revolution by 2005. The early revolutionary ‘trial and error’ period, however, allowed political Islam to pose a strong enough challenge to Sudanese nationalism that by 2002 the government finally accepted the potential division of the Sudanese state.

Leach_Book.indd 60

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 61

A commonly noted structural flaw of the CPA was the undemocratic nature of its crafting. The rationing out of representation to the two parties concluding the peace agreement – the SPLM and the NCP – had the potential to alienate other southerners and cause further disillusionment with Sudanese democracy. At the time of the CPA signing, John Garang could only promise parties excluded from the agreements that they would not be ignored. Democratic representation in a united Sudan did not appear to be as important an objective for most southerners as self-determination, an eternally thwarted goal that would subordinate all others within the SPLM by the early 2000s. An assessment of the regional mood conducted soon before the CPA was finalized indicated that northerners considered a return to democracy and an end to the war to be national priorities, while southerners would bypass a transition to democracy, especially nationally, if that transition posed any threat to the ultimate objective of southern self-determination.1

Education and Language in the Addis Ababa Agreement The collective identity of a people is a multi-layered concept. John and Sarah Voll describe it as a synthesis of arts, science, institutions, and common beliefs; they note that one of its more measurable components is mass education, which can lead to a national culture, a higher identity.2 An emphasis on southern control over education in the region would, therefore, have been a priority for SSLM negotiators even without the substantial government intrusion of the past. By 1972, southerners considered education in post-colonial Sudan as the ‘soft’ means Khartoum used to assimilate them into Arab culture, an alternative to the ‘hard’ methods employed by the military. Northern resistance to a separate southern education policy also had historic roots. Northern nationalists had always considered the colonial reliance on missionaries to teach southerners as evidence of the British intention to detach the south from the Muslim, Arabic-speaking north and include it with the Christian, English-speaking colonies of East Africa. The Abboud regime, with no southern parliamentarians to

Leach_Book.indd 61

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

62

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

stall or object to the decision, curtailed missionary activity in 1963 and dismissed all Christian orders from the region two years later. In keeping with the May Regime’s choice to recognize the distinct nature of the south, AAA provisions actually stressed the peculiarity of the southern experience in order to limit the region’s impact on national education. Northern negotiators ensured the institutions of the Southern Region had no authority over matters of educational planning at a national level.3 However, the People’s Regional Assembly was free to legislate the administration of public schools in the south in accordance with local languages and culture, provided it also did so in accordance with national policy. The AAA protected religious freedoms and the right of parents to choose the method of their children’s education.4 The tensions between regional and national authority concerning education were apparent in these articles; the agreement sought to mollify both sides but did not address the possibility that an overbearing national government might eventually be inclined to broaden its education policy at the expense of the region. Employment opportunities also motivated demands for education. Remembering the near-total exclusion of southerners during the Sudanization process of the 1950s, southern elites realized that to compete with northerners at something other than guerrilla warfare would require training in law, agriculture, engineering, and other fields relevant to building southern society and infrastructure. Southern Sudan was one of the least educated regions of Africa, and the troika of benefits education provided – cultural awareness, state building, and employment – made clear why it became a top concern of SSLM negotiators. Despite initial enthusiasm, the post-AAA era did not bring a boon to southern education. Few new schools were actually built. Instead, the Islamic schools the Abboud regime had built in the south were converted to secular secondary schools. While a multi-purpose technical training center was set up in Juba, no teacher-training colleges were established.5 The lack of a regional academic curriculum occasionally resulted in the teaching and administering of exams to people in languages they did not speak. In fact, during the period between wars, the south acquired no more than one-tenth the educational

Leach_Book.indd 62

10/17/2012 7:00:46 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 63

facilities available in the north.6 By 1980–81, even such a remote northern province as Darfur had more primary, intermediate, and secondary teachers than the combined three provinces that made up the Southern Region.7 One of the few areas where education for southerners realized its objectives after the first war was in tertiary education abroad. In accordance with the AAA, the national treasury was to provide grants to the Southern Region to increase university education, especially to Egypt and the West.8 Foreign support for southern education was also instrumental in some of the few educational successes in the region, though it could not compensate for the inadequacy of domestic expenditure. The World Bank financed educational projects such as a secondary school in Juba, a vocational center in Wau, and rural education centers throughout Equatoria and Bahr Al-Ghazal.9 Though the AAA did not live up to its promise on education, with a combination of peace and time, new possibilities became apparent. More southerners, especially the younger educated ones, could glimpse a future in which they belonged not simply to their tribe, or even ‘the south,’ but a wider, inclusive Sudan. As they did in other fields, these educated Sudanese began to rise through the ranks of the military. One of the reasons Anya Nya soldiers had difficulty integrating into the Sudanese army after the AAA was that few of them had the formal training required to achieve ranks equivalent to those they had attained as insurgents. There was not a single medical doctor in the first insurgency. By contrast, the SPLM/A leadership was particularly well educated: four officers had PhDs, several members were medical doctors or engineers, and most NCOs were literate.10 In short, while insufficient funding prevented education from reaching all southerners, the elites who would form the next insurgency were substantial beneficiaries. These elites would advance a new identity for the insurgency that was politically savvier and more enlightened, but less resonant for common southerners. At the AAA talks, the SSLM priority of protecting southern languages touched on two other practical issues: government employment and the preservation of cultural identity. Identity is often formed as individuals realize that the language they communicate in, particularly

Leach_Book.indd 63

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

64

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

their first language, determines not only their cultural background but also other prospects in life, including social status and employment. A compromise over the status of language – with Arabic being the nominal national language but English the functional language of the south, supplemented by indigenous languages – showed some understanding on the part of southerners of the deep-seated northern desire to be rid of the colonial Southern Policy once and for all.11 For regime negotiators, allowing English and regional languages any role in education or government affairs was a major concession, since northerners had come to see these languages as symbols of imperialism and ignorance. After the AAA, southern indigenous languages became common in local councils and even in the People’s Regional Assembly. Alier presents three reasons why the northern AAA delegation finally acquiesced to a protected status for the English language. First, almost all southerners who were to run the machinery of government spoke better English than Arabic. Moreover, English was a more broadly used international language. Finally, the agreement itself was in English. Northern allowances for languages other than Arabic were, therefore, less a concession to southern nationalism than to southern reality.12 If key AAA provisions such as regional self-governance were to be implemented, Arabic could not be the only language of official business. Such a practical concession was, nevertheless, difficult for the Khartoum delegation. The compromise rejected the long-standing northern nationalist dream that Arabic would be the language binding all Sudanese, Arab or non-Arab, northern or southern. This objective preceded the Abboud regime, and even independence. The nationalist Abd Al-Rahman Ali Taha announced in 1949 that ‘as the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions it is of great importance that there should be one language which is understood by all its citizens. That language could only be Arabic, and Arabic must therefore be taught in all our schools.’13 With the end of the Southern Policy in the late 1940s, Arab culture slowly began to enter southern political consciousness and, in 1950, Arabic language was finally introduced in southern schools as a subject. In April 1955, Taha, now Sudan’s first minister of education, declared

Leach_Book.indd 64

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 65

that he would seek a unified system of education across Sudan so that by 1964 southern boys could take an Arabic-language test to enter intermediate school.14 Two years later, he announced that the national government would take charge of southern education. The absorption of the missionary schools by the government and the introduction of the new Arab-Islamic curriculum caused widespread outrage in the south, contributing to the southern parliamentary revolt that precipitated the Abboud regime’s ascent. Many southerners could respect, in theory at least, northern concerns about permitting English and native languages to thrive. As Alier explains, the Condominium’s prohibition of Arabic in the south had been ‘in no conceivable way for the benefit of its people, whether they were to become independent or join East Africa or the north.’15 With the collapse of the Southern Policy in the late 1940s, Arabic soon regained its status as a practical language to learn in southern towns, and might have continued to spread through peaceful commerce. However, the brutal imposition of the language, especially under the Abboud and Maghoub governments, alienated southerners who might otherwise have been receptive towards that element of integration. An example came in 1958, when Arabic was made the official national language of Sudan. Southerners protested the cultural insensitivity of this motion and noted that most southern officials, lacking a working knowledge of Arabic, were now considered unfit for much government employment. Under Abboud, Arabic language skills became mandatory for advancement in the military, driving southerners who might have opposed separatism or joined the military simply for employment instead to join the Anya Nya.16 The issue of language was not nearly as contentious an issue in the second war, partially because the central government had become less aggressive in its efforts to force southerners to speak Arabic. The early nationalist vision of the SPLM/A, however, also did not prioritize making a distinction between Arab and African cultural identities. SPLM/A leader John Garang recognized the practicality of Arabic as a national language but warned northerners against the cultural chauvinism often accompanying its spread.17 Garang’s early desire to create a new vision of Sudanese nationalism – rather

Leach_Book.indd 65

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

66

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

than continue the exclusively southern, anti-Arab objectives of the first insurgency – demonstrated the degree to which education had changed the way insurgent elites thought about the problem of Sudan.

The Blurring of Identity During Peace and the Formation of the SPLM/A The AAA led to early unity in the south but also to the localism and provincialism northern nationalists feared. With the signing of the AAA and the dissolution of the SSLM, the southern nationalist movement began to wither. Relative peace and stability in the post-AAA south led instead to two consecutive, contradictory phenomena: an increased tendency towards tribalism and localism on an administrative level, and a broader vision for how to address disparity between the north and south on a national level. The former characterized southern politics until the early 1980s, though the separatist momentum had dissipated; the latter defined the form the insurgency would take when the AAA collapsed in 1983. In Sudan’s past, historians have noted that during periods of peace and stability groups have shown a propensity either to blur the lines between each other or to become more receptive to adopting identities previously associated with other groups.18 While long periods of Sudan’s history since independence have seen northern and southern factions seeking to demarcate cultural identity with increasingly defined lines, identities are not inevitably distinct, permanent, or uniformly perceived by group members. For example, the Fur and Beja communities adhere to African traditions with no Arab origin yet are united with Sudanese claiming Arab identity through the Muslim faith. Southerners have for generations used Arabic as the lingua franca of commerce, yet feel little compromise to their own ethnic identities. As Bona Malwal surmised about the first war, ‘eastern and western Sudan, indeed the rural Sudan, may already have come to realize that the South struggled not against Islam, but for its share of power at the national level and for an equitable distribution of economic benefits.’19

Leach_Book.indd 66

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 67

Language, culture, history, and religion are, therefore, not immutable elements mercilessly driving humanity; rather, they are potential instruments in the forging of national identity. While nationalism traditionally assumes a foundation on some ethnic base, in many post-colonial states political leaders simply do not have the powers of persuasion or coercion to reconstruct national identity along such lines. Northern nationalists in the first war aggressively sought to impose their culture on southerners at independence, only ensuring insurgency and war. The September 1983 Sharia laws, which sanctioned such brutal punishments as amputation, ended the tensions among southern factions then at odds over the issue of redivision and turned their collective resentment towards Khartoum. Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu overcame their political rivalry to write a joint open letter in which they warned President Nimeiri that amendments to Islamize the constitution would upset the order upon which peace in the south had relied. Had economic and ideological factors not intervened, the AAA might have formed the basis for national integration that had eluded earlier regimes. Nimeiri emerged from the AAA talks in 1972 with more popular support than any regime leader before him. Much of that support came from the southern quarter of the population that had only just put down arms aganst the state. As late as 1978, Deng could speculate with regard to national integration efforts of the 1970s that ‘the dynamics in the process are quite likely to blur, if not eliminate, the South-North dividing line in favour of consolidated national unity.’20 Many Dinka chiefs considered the post-AAA period an opportunity to prove themselves as southerners, to not let Nimeiri stand alone in his efforts to integrate and strengthen the Sudanese state. Catering to these traditional leaders might have provided an opportunity to achieve these objectives, but Nimeiri was unable to capitalize on this optimism. Instead, the next effort at forging a new, more inclusive Sudanese identity would come not from Khartoum but from the second wave of southern insurgents. The formation of the SPLM/A after the separatist ambitions of the first war was ‘a victory for the nation-building ideals successive Khartoum regimes have purported to espouse.’21

Leach_Book.indd 67

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

68

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

National events also halted integration efforts. The aftermath of the 1975 coup attempt began a period in which Nimeiri would focus on enhancing his personal power over the state. Under the 1973 constitution, the president was a strong executive with significant control over the legislature as well. Amendments introduced following the 1975 coup attempt would give him even more authority, disrupting an already slim balance of power. The Self-Government Act of 1972 was ambiguous or silent on some issues connected with executive and legislative functions of government in the south. The southern regional government consisted of a parliamentary system with the executive directly dependent on the legislative body, yet the national executive was a strongly authoritarian presidency. Other regions began to resent the south’s autonomy and demanded the same parliamentary freedom at a sub-national level, potentially damaging the authoritarian foundations of the May Regime. Accordingly, Nimeiri’s increasing personal authoritarianism involved even less regard for AAA institutions. When he finally dissolved the Southern Regional Assembly in 1981, he declared that, even though the AAA did not give him this power, he was taking the action under the presidential powers granted him by the 1975 amendments.22 The SPLM/A’s vision of national revolution, and its eventual retreat to southern self-determination if that vision could not be achieved, made it a difficult movement to classify in comparison to other African insurgencies. Its occasionally contradictory goals by the end of the second war were not a result of a poorly articulated vision or of ideological vagueness. Rather, they were the inevitable by-product of a movement that had been fighting for several decades and was forced to adjust to a continually changing political environment. The war between Khartoum and the SPLA, Africa’s longest-running conflict, went on for so long that it effectively defied comparison with most other African conflicts. As Johnson notes, the most useful comparison of the SPLA is not to insurgencies from elsewhere in Africa but to the Anya Nya movement of the first Sudanese war. Despite its early socialist rhetoric, the SPLA was not Maoist and did not adhere to any real leftist philosophy. It was not formed to emulate other ideological or separatist insurgencies in Africa but to rectify the flaws of Sudan’s

Leach_Book.indd 68

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 69

earlier Anya Nya insurgency.23 These flaws included poor organization, rivalry between political and military leaders, a lack of supplies and support, and poor training. The Anya Nya’s call for self-determination in the south prevented it from relying on the prospect of federalism to form alliances with other remote regions of Sudan as the Liberal Party had been able to begin doing politically in the late 1950s. On the other hand, the SPLA call for a national revolution gave it political flexibility and regional support but complicated efforts at retaining southern unity. Consequently, the movement’s base remained susceptible to fractiousness and division, as the 1990s would demonstrate. SPLM/A nationalist objectives affected the very structure of the movement, which had a different internal organization than the Anya Nya. The SPLA was modelled on the Sudanese army, making it a more disciplined and effective force than its rival Anya Nya 2 militias. Senior officers who had deserted the national army staffed its ranks, along with about 2,000 to 3,000 civilian recruits. The SPLM/A attempted not to base its administrative division of conquered areas along tribal lines, as had been common in the first war. Instead, the leadership typically structured administration within provinces created before the war. Unlike insurgencies in the first war, few initial steps were needed to create a ‘shadow government.’ This variance was primarily a consequence of the movement’s ultimate goal: it did not see itself as a southern ‘alternate government’ but sought instead a unified and secular New Sudan. Most administration in captured areas correlated with the old Native Administration and the post-AAA Southern Regional governments.24 The evolution of Sudan’s interaction with the outside world affected the durability and legitimacy of insurgent governing structures. While insurgents in the first war received little outside support from aid organizations, such groups were quite active in the second war. The Anya Nya relied on tribal support rather than a top-down vision of administration. On the other hand, the SPLM/A’s over-reliance on NGOs as substitutes for state administration hindered not only the development of genuine administration but also regional integration. The SPLM/A sought to control NGO support by creating such programs as Sudan Transitional Assistance and Relief (STAR), which was

Leach_Book.indd 69

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

70

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

meant to re-establish southern civil society in SPLA-controlled regions but had middling success.25 The SPLM/A objective to challenge the foundation of Sudanese national identity also directly tested the foundation of southern resistance. While separatism may never have been an achievable goal for early southern insurgents, it at least was a clear and direct objective that northerners and southerners alike could understand. Calls for separatism were the most extreme method southerners had to alert northerners of the injustice and oppression which they felt epitomized the northern presence in the south. Not only was it easier to understand, the separatist position was more popular than the New Sudan objective. Separatism had been broadly, if shallowly, supported by most southerners, especially in Equatoria during the first war and Bahr Al-Ghazal in the second. The SPLA’s military challenge to the state was, for many northerners, also a challenge to their identity. Once the insurgents began making significant gains against the Sudanese army in the mid-1980s, opposition began consolidating in the north. The Sadiq Al-Mahdi government particularly saw the SPLA advance on Kurmuk and Gaysan in the southern Blue Nile region during late 1987 as a threat, and was both offended and alarmed that a southern rebellion could capture what were considered northern areas of the country. The government resented the SPLM/A’s claim to represent northern Sudanese as well as southerners, an indignity it had never faced from the Anya Nya. The insurgents advance resulted in a wave of nationalist rhetoric, with Khartoum calling on other Arab states to defend Islam. An antisoutherner backlash rose again. Over time, SPLA intrusion into the north became commonplace, especially as its broad message of a New Sudan allowed it to recruit insurgents in remote areas such as the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, and the Beja regions. The Nuba were particularly involved in the SPLA’s campaign against Khartoum. Marginalized from the riverine center, yet not dissimilar or remote enough to seek separation, the Nuba had no deep ties to the state. Although Nuba were anti-secessionist during the first civil war, they had built no lasting political alliances with the north during the parliamentary periods.26 Considering themselves

Leach_Book.indd 70

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 71

among the most indigenous of Sudanese, Nuba who joined the SPLA sought self-determination more to advance regional autonomy and access to national power than to advance secession. Their participation in the second war was a significant boost to the SPLM/A’s campaign against the traditional Arab-oriented conception of Sudanese identity, but did not signify that the Nuba now considered themselves culturally or politically southern. Under the right circumstances, the SPLM/A might have reached an agreement with such northern nationalist parties as the DUP or Umma and, thereby, achieved its minimum goals of a national constitutional conference and a united Sudan with respect for secular principles. However, the unstable nature of northern Sudanese democracy thwarted efforts to achieve a solution before the 1989 coup brought Bashir’s coalition to power. Unlike the sectarian parties and trade unions the SPLM/A engaged with in the 1980s, the new junta was a mixture of military authoritarianism and revolutionary Islam. The lack of an NIF nationalist core first made compromise with the SPLM/A impossible, then made it possible only as long as identity was codified and segregated. As a result, the CPA is not an agreement promoting national identity or integration as the AAA was; it is a codification of regional identities.

The Evolution of Self-Determination as a Southern Demand and the 1991 SPLA Split ‘Self-determination’ was a useful rallying cry for southern politicians in the first war because it united a broad coalition of southerners. During the 1960s, the SANU organization officially championed the right to self-determination even though most of its members preferred outright secession. The vagueness of the concept made it easier to defend than specific proposals such as federation or regional autonomy. However, it also forced advocates of self-determination to defend themselves against charges of secretly supporting secession. In addition, during the first war this vagueness helped confuse the ultimate objectives of southerners, subsequently making it less clear to northerners what concessions needed to be made to end the war.

Leach_Book.indd 71

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

72

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

The lack of any political coherence in the separatist movement during the first war was exemplified at the 1965 Round Table discussions, when southern political leaders could not present the north with a united front to their demands. One SANU faction, led by William Deng, endorsed federation. Another, led by Aggrey Jaden, endorsed peaceful separation. The Southern Front called for a self-determination referendum including options ranging from a unitary government to secession; northern delegates abhorred the possibility of such a vote as the latter outcome seemed inevitable. Northerners declared they would allow, at most, a negotiated form of regional government for the south. While many southern delegates might have been receptive to an autonomous arrangement, they could not remove the separation option from the table without risking a split in the already weakly aligned southern groups. Attendees also had concerns that politicians who had not attended the conference in Khartoum would use the compromise to build their own prestige, denouncing those southerners who had participated as ‘sell-outs.’ So personality-based and ideologically unserious was the political movement of the 1960s that by 1971, several leading separatist politicians came together to back the military leader Lagu, who, after the drafting of the AAA, declared that he had never actually been a separatist.27 The southern politician’s rhetoric of secession in the first war seemed to have been a response to the various new offensives against southern resistance launched by successive governments in the 1960s. The more aggressive northerners became towards the south in the war, the less southerners were able to picture an amicable solution in which Sudan remained united. This trend began anew in the second war after the 1989 Islamist coup. As the Islamist regime in Khartoum alienated an ever-larger portion of the Sudanese population, it fostered a new separatist movement within SPLA ranks. Concluding that the NIF regime would never submit to the New Sudan policy of a secular and egalitarian state, some SPLA officers proffered an alternative where Khartoum could keep its homogenous Islamic state in the north in return for peaceful southern secession. Thus, the ascent of the Bashir regime led directly to the rupturing of the SPLA goal of a united New Sudan.28

Leach_Book.indd 72

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 73

For much of its early existence, the SPLM/A was run in an autocratic manner by John Garang, whose reluctance to delegate power and to respect tribal priorities over immediate political and military objectives was also at the heart of the 1991 schism. A major factor in the split was Garang’s decision, by late 1990, to attempt to take Juba, the heavily fortified Equatorian capital that no rebel force had captured in either war. Garang’s strongest detractors within the movement knew that once he took Juba his leadership of the resistance would become essentially indisputable. Accordingly, they resolved to attempt a revolt against him soon after the Marxist Ethiopian regime supporting the insurgents fell in May 1991, when SPLA forces would be disorganized and weak.29 The SPLA’s vision, which placed national strategy foremost, had the potential to cause some dissent among not just rival elites in the movement but also its fighters in the most vulnerable areas of the south. A focus on regional strategy over a more grassroots concentration on individual fronts sometimes meant the separation of fighters from their home territory, potentially leaving their land and families exposed to the enemy. This practice became a contentious issue in the mid-1980s, when Misseriya raids on the Dinka and other tribes in Bahr Al-Ghazal led some of Garang’s rivals to step up their criticism of his leadership. More bloody dissent would manifest itself tribally, however, when in November 1991 30,000 Nuer united under former SPLA commander Reik Machar to declare war against Garang’s faction and its Dinka base. The new group, SPLA-United, was just one of a myriad of new southern militias to form during the 1990s, but the only one with any real initial power to damage Garang’s SPLAMainstream. The emerging split took on a tribal dimension from the outset, when Nuer units in the SPLA began killing Dinka officers in anticipation that they would not support the new movement.30 Such incidents instantly branded the schism as tribal in motivation, a label the SPLA breakaway groups never overcame. Khartoum encouraged this split, indeed allying with SPLA-United throughout the 1990s to weaken the southern insurgency as a whole. After failing to overthrow Garang’s leadership, most separatist groups found themselves weak and without allies. They therefore allied with

Leach_Book.indd 73

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

74

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Khartoum despite obvious ideological incompatibility. Members of many smaller tribes, and large ethnicities that felt excluded such as the Nuer, considered Khartoum to be a long-term enemy. The authoritarian nature of SPLM/A leadership and its domination by Dinka officers, however, instigated other groups to revolt and form militias that favored separatism but also accepted backing from the government. This contradiction was difficult to justify to those outside any given militia’s dominant ethnic group and eventually sapped at the credibility of these factions. The schism became yet another example of tribalism stifling a broader-based southern nationalism. The separatist movement revealed the nature of conflict over Sudanese identity in both wars. Renegade SPLA factions often joined disenfranchised individual elites and the narrow base of their ethnic group. Petitions to represent a broader southern separatist movement failed, even though the goal of secession enjoyed more popular resonance than John Garang’s message of a united Sudan.31 However, the movement was successful at reintroducing separatism to the conflict as a southern aspiration and forcing the SPLM to concede at the Abuja talks in 1993 that, if national liberation was unachievable, self-determination for the south should be an option in any agreement. The NIF regime took advantage of these scaled-back SPLM/A ambitions to charge the main movement with separatism, thereby robbing it of support from marginalized areas of northern Sudan. Because Khartoum never implemented the self-determination provisions of the agreements it signed with the southern militias, many southerners eventually left the alliance. Most elites, such as Reik Machar of the SPLA-United faction, rejoined Garang’s SPLA. Throughout most of Sudan’s post-colonial history, few regional actors in East Africa concurred with the principle of southern selfdetermination if it meant the possibility of secession. The potential separatist movements in several African states with arbitrarily drawn, colonial-era borders prohibited such discussion. In the first civil war, secession was the obvious goal of most southern insurgents, and, consequently, the south had few African allies. In the second war, the SPLM/A received early support from such states as Libya and Ethiopia

Leach_Book.indd 74

10/17/2012 7:00:47 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 75

because of its anti-separatist agenda and, as a result, posed a more significant threat to Khartoum than had the Anya Nya. However, the geographic expanse of Sudan was so large and the government so well embedded in the capital and major northern towns that national revolution proved impossible. The insurgency was forced to accept potential secession as a compromise. The CPA provisions show that Africans have been willing to put aside traditional post-colonial nationalism and look at new solutions to end the history of failed states. In the past decade, scholars have also questioned the wisdom of providing recognition to states that prove incapable of controlling their internal security. Jeffrey Herbst has argued, using southern Sudan as an example, that the devotion of African states to maintaining borders they cannot control is one of the crucial flaws in the post-colonial African political order.32 Benefits such as UN membership and financial dealings with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank bestow legitimacy on states that may not have demonstrated an ability to maintain internal stability and cohesion. These states are, nevertheless, favored at the expense of more effective regional or ethnic identities. Morten Bøas and Kevin Dunn have also noted that the outmoded fixation on nation-states in Africa leads to treating insurgent movements that have valid grievances not as stakeholders in the states in which they reside, but merely as sources of instability.33 A re-examination of the sanctity of state sovereignty coincided with the erosion of the taboo against examining the merits of Sudanese secession on a point-by-point basis. Soon after the 1991 schism in the SPLA, regional actors sympathetic to southern grievances, or at least antagonistic to the Bashir regime, became more conflicted over the principle of a united Sudan at any cost. In negotiations between the SPLM/A and the Bashir regime in Abuja during the early 1990s, the Nigerian mediators ruled out self-determination as an option if it meant secession, anathema to Nigeria after the Biafra uprising of the 1960s. In addition, the only potential compromise the government might have been willing to make, allowing the SPLM/A some regional control until a satisfactory solution for national unity could be arranged, was unacceptable to the insurgents.

Leach_Book.indd 75

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

76

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

By 1994, however, IGAD’s East African mediators would emphasize in their Declaration of Principles that unity was conditional on the ability of the government to uphold its citizens’ rights. After an early round of IGAD talks collapsed over the issue-specific conditions allowing for self-determination, a second round produced the Declaration of Principles as a framework for negotiation. For southerners, the principle of self-determination put moral responsibility for southern secession primarily on Khartoum. The SPLM/A had already acknowledged the new relevance of self-determination as policy with an August 1992 manifesto in which it proposed a north-south confederation for two years, followed by a referendum in the south on confederation versus independence.34 With the Declaration of Principles, self-determination had become a tenet accepted by a primary regional forum. During the June 1995 Asmara talks, many elements of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), Sudan’s opposition umbrella group, conceded that the south should be allowed to separate if it chose to do so in a referendum after two to four years. In the interim, the region would retain its own separate standing army. They also agreed that the Ngok Dinka of Abyei were to have a referendum on whether to join the south or stay in Kordofan, and the Nuba would also have a right to determine their future.35 This new arrangement meant that the formerly nationalist forces included in that exile group – the Democratic Unionist Party and the Umma Party in particular – accepted that a united Sudan was no longer a stated fundamental objective of any major northern political force.

The Codification of Identity Facilitated by the CPA The SPLM/A aspired to overcome tribal divisions by forming nationwide alliances between opposition groups and advocating common principles and ideals over ethnic or religious distinctiveness, in the manner of successful African liberation movements of earlier decades. Their efforts had mixed results, however, and the insurgents were forced to accommodate southern tribalism and factionalism, particularly after the movement split in 1991. The split was ostensibly about strategic differences: secession versus national revolution. A contingent

Leach_Book.indd 76

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 77

of the SPLA had always seen talk of unity as a propaganda tactic, with separation as the preferred objective. Many southerners thought that the goal of a united, egalitarian Sudan was unrealistic and were unhappy that the SPLA had begun working with the NDA, which included several parties that had violently suppressed southern resistance in the past such as the Umma Party and the DUP. Yet the clear ethnic division indicated early on that the split was not entirely ideological, and it would become less so with time. Allowing self-determination after a six-year interim became the touchstone of the CPA. From it arose several other complications that the AAA had not addressed. The CPA sought to quantify elements of Sudanese society. The integrative goal of the AAA – giving southerners some regional autonomy and access to the state but little else – had been a nationalist response to the forced regional segregation of the colonial period. Specifically, the end of the nationalist project in Khartoum made it easier for the SPLM/A to seek many more regional concessions than the AAA had provided, not simply for the south but for disputed regions along the north-south fault line as well. Power sharing concessions at a national level allowed the two parties to stand in for northerners and southerners generally. CPA stipulations on power sharing before interim elections and in government ministries demonstrated dramatically how Sudanese identities sharpened over the course of the conflict. In the years of interim government preceding parliamentary elections, the National Congress Party (NCP) would receive 52 per cent of the National Assembly seats, the SPLM 28 per cent, other northern political forces 14 per cent and other southern political forces 6 per cent.36 Similar divisions, albeit with different ratios favoring the NCP in the north and the SPLM in the south, were made between the parties in assemblies at lower tiers of government. Even the administration of the national capital was divided, with the two parties to be ‘adequately represented.’37 By the end of the second war, the SPLA had formed ties with insurgent groups in such areas as the Beja east, where the Anya Nya’s message of southern separatism had earned it no followers in the first war. These relations became strained as peace between the south and Khartoum became more likely. When the SPLM/A and Khartoum

Leach_Book.indd 77

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

78

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

began their peace process in 2002, anti-government forces in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and the Beja regions feared a deal between the south and north to partition the state. Such a deal would allow the Islamist regime to declare Sudan an Arab Muslim country into which marginal northern populations and other political groups would be forced to assimilate. Without military pressure from SPLA insurgents, Khartoum could implement this policy more easily. Nowhere were the concessions the SPLM was forced to make more apparent than in its negotiation of the three disputed areas along the north-south fault line: Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei. The SPLM had pushed for 50/50 representation in the legislatures of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile but had accepted a 55/45 split, playing minority party to the governing NCP. Under strong international pressure from the IGAD partners to concede on key points, the SPLM/A retreated from their stance that Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan participate in the 2011 referendum for the south. Should the states wish to secede from Sudan, they would be forced to do so through a vote in the legislature, allowing the NCP the opportunity for substantial influence.38 Significantly, Khartoum also insisted that the new arrangements for these regions could not be included as part of the official CPA but only as a separate, parallel agreement. The final agreements on the disputed regions were in keeping with the government’s position regarding the nature of the war since it assumed power. During the first talks between the NIF-backed regime and the SPLM in Addis Ababa in August 1989, the government delegation made it clear that it proposed to treat the new war as a continuation of the southern problem, disregarding the SPLM/A’s national objectives and its recruiting of members from outside southern Sudan. This complete rejection of the SPLM/A’s New Sudan concept remained the Bashir regime’s policy throughout the war. As it sought to curb the SPLM/A’s nationalist agenda, Khartoum was also scaling back the northern nationalist project. The driving force behind the waning of nationalism during the NIF regime was Hassan Al-Turabi, whose distaste for the tendency of secular Sudanese nationalists to lean on Islam as a tool dated back to his arrival on the political scene in the early 1960s. At that time, Islamists had become

Leach_Book.indd 78

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 79

unhappy with the Abboud regime’s mining of Islam for rhetoric and culture to legitimize its authoritarian brand of nationalism rather than relying on Islam as an instrument of governance in itself. Turabi’s ascent to the Muslim Brothers leadership in 1964 led to that movement joining more leftist parties in the that year’s October Revolution that overthrew the junta. Upon his rise to power with the Bashir regime, Turabi indicated that he rejected the conventional practices of the nation-state. His ultimate goal was not a united Sudanese state but an Islamist revival that could overcome such artificial constructions as national borders. To this effect, he began the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress in 1991. In a display of regional solidarity to accompany its inauguration, Sudan declared that visitors to the Khartoum airport from Arab states would no longer require visas.39 The purpose of this exercise, however, was revealed throughout the mid-1990s to be not a revitalization of the Arab nationalism of previous eras. Rather, it was to foster a revolutionary Islamist state that hosted international terrorists and fostered hostile relations with its neighbors, Arab and non-Arab alike. While the NIF regime did not share the integrative goals of previous nationalist regimes, it did not stop attempting to retain the south. Securing access to southern oil was a priority for the regime, which meant stepping up the war effort and dismissing southern demands for any meaningful regional autonomy. At each conflict resolution forum it attended with the SPLM/A throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Khartoum began ‘forum-shopping’ as soon as the details of a self-determination agreement were to be negotiated. Garang, however, offered a consistent, stark choice throughout the decade: a secular Sudan or two Sudans. The government could not achieve both.40 Ultimately, the regime chose to reject the prospect of a united, multicultural Sudan in favor of an Islamic state, thereby converting Islam from a nationbuilding tool into an end in itself. Consequently, Islamic law took on an even more significant role than it had played during the debate over an Islamic constitution in the late 1960s. The need to retain Sharia throughout the north became self-reinforcing; the government argued that because Islamic law was the primary basis for its rule, to remove Sharia from the constitution would lead to the regime’s removal from

Leach_Book.indd 79

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

80

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

power by either a military coup or a popular uprising. By the early 1990s, some regime members appeared receptive to the possibility of southern secession if it would help facilitate the implementation of Sharia elsewhere in the state.41 In the final CPA text, both sides eventually agreed that Khartoum would remain the capital city, with Sharia to be the law and non-Muslims exempt. Allowing Sharia in the national capital was a substantial concession for the SPLM/A, but it complimented the government’s concession to allow the south to secede. By further codifying the Arab/ non-Arab, Muslim/non-Muslim dichotomy, the parties agreed to a divided state, whether eagerly or reluctantly.

Islam: From Nation-Building Tool to Instrument of Jihad Early post-independence regimes saw Islam, with its unrivalled legitimacy and authenticity among northern Sudanese, as a potential cornerstone for the new state. The first attempts to spread the religion after independence came in 1957, when Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil authorized substantial finances for a program to promote Islam in the southern provinces. The Abboud regime was even more aggressive, viewing the southern problem as an artificial one that would be resolved after the state forcefully pushed for a centralized, united Sudan. Islam and Arabic had created a somewhat integrated – if not homogenous – culture out of the tribally diverse northerners; the junta’s notion that this formula could also be applied to the south did not seem outlandish.42 The spread of Islam and Arab culture throughout northern Sudan had been steady and unhurried, however, taking place over generations. These cultural practices accordingly posed comparatively little threat to local identity or cultural autonomy. By contrast, the abrupt way Khartoum introduced Islam in the south at independence led locals to fear its influence. The tendency of the northern nationalist movement to disregard the causes of southern anxiety continued after the October Revolution. In June 1965, following the return to parliamentary democracy, northern parties fixated on another issue certain to alienate southerners: the

Leach_Book.indd 80

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 81

creation of a national Islamic constitution. The prospect of an Islamic constitution had intrigued the Sudanese establishment almost since independence. It was seen as having the potential to encapsulate the legal embodiment of the religion that united Sudanese throughout the north, regardless of Arab or African traditions. The draft constitution submitted during this period had been a step in that direction, specifying that Islam was to be Sudan’s official religion and Sharia its primary source of legislation.43 The war continued through the late 1960s into the early May Regime, but Islam as a nationalist tool had lost its vitality. Nationalists were forced to accept, especially after the Round Table discussions, that the northern imposition of Islam was a primary cause of southern insurrection. The National Reconciliation of 1977 was a crucial turning point in the transformation of northern identity. The event marked a re-affirmation by the government of the religious character of Sudan and allowed the Islamists to lay the foundation for their ‘post-nationalist’ vision of the Sudanese state. In the 1970s, following the AAA, Islamists debated the merits of letting the south secede. Some argued that so long as Islam was identified with northern nationalism, it would be difficult to ensure the religion’s spread in the south. Ultimately, they understood that coupling Islam with northern nationalism increased southern hostility to the former.44 Some Islamists theorized that conversion would occur naturally as southerners became better educated and less threatened by Islam. In essence, the conflict between the religion and the south would resolve itself. Islamists, therefore, recognized the dilemma, and even a solution, but declined to act upon this knowledge. With the 1977 reconciliation, Islamists returned to power and no longer felt compelled to explore such gradual, noncoercive options. Nimeiri began drifting towards a personal Islamist conversion in the late 1970s, following his reconciliation with the Muslim Brothers and some sectarians. Whether his new faith was sincere or not, his experiment with Islamizing the laws of Sudan in the early 1980s marks the first time in Sudan’s post-independence history that Islam would be used by a leader not predominantly as a state-building tool, but as a political weapon. Nimeiri’s implementation of a crude and brutal set of religious laws, introduced in September 1983, both contributed

Leach_Book.indd 81

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

82

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

to the renewal of war in the south and made it extremely difficult for later governments to accommodate the grievances of the SPLM/A. The laws were also deeply unpopular among northern Sudan’s Sufi majority, who practiced a more flexible and adaptable Islam than Nimeiri’s harshly implemented measures allowed. Only the Muslim Brothers greeted the laws enthusiastically. The introduction of Sharia law created its own challenge to the legitimacy of the state, one that had never existed under the nationalist regimes of previous decades. The laws simply could not be enacted in the south. This was not because Nimeiri had spared that non-Muslim region from Islamic laws, but because the region’s officials refused to enforce them. No other post-colonial regime had suffered such a serious blow to its legitimacy. Nimeiri’s assault on secular institutions accelerated after the 1983 introduction of the September Laws. He replaced the People’s Assembly in Khartoum with a Majlis Al-Shura, a body of religious consultation, whose members were to swear a religious oath of obedience to Nimeiri. When several ministers of parliament, all southern, objected to some of the Islamist amendments Nimeiri had attached, he disbanded the body. It remained dissolved until he was toppled in 1985. The waning of northern nationalism as a governing principle continued in the four-year period between the Nimeiri and Bashir dictatorships. What distinguished the 1985 revolution most from the 1964 revolution was that leftist nationalism was not represented in the later uprising. The trade unions were moderate compared to other elements of the Transitional Military Council (TMC), but there was no ideological equivalent to the Communist Party. This new reality decreased the pressure on the conservative TMC generals to adhere to the principles of secular nationalism. Although the 1985 uprising was led by guilds such as the Sudanese Lawyers Association which rejected Nimeiri’s September Laws and endorsed the non-religious transitional constitution of 1956, the laws would remain in place under the TMC. General Siwar Al-Dhahab, head of the military council, considered repealing them to be ‘blasphemous.’45 While such a conservative attitude might be expected from a general, Peter Kok alleges that the organization of trade unions affiliated with the

Leach_Book.indd 82

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 83

TMC applied little pressure to cancel the laws. He reflects that this was the greatest testament to northern ambivalence towards secularism as a governing principle.46 As explained earlier, implementing laws derived from Islam had been a key plank of Sudanese nationalism for many northern politicians, and even some secular politicians felt obligated to champion the idea. As a result, once Sharia laws were decreed, politicians were loath to remove them, regardless of their imperfections. Despite superficial commitments to the post-colonial parliamentary nationalism, Al-Mahdi’s second government during the 1980s did not repeal the Islamist laws put in place by the opportunistic Nimeiri, revealing the weakness of the northern nationalist project by this period. This new foundation of Islam could not be revoked, only built upon. In addition, it revived southern anger at the north and ended what little potential remained for national integration during the peace following the AAA. Simply put, underwhelmed with the post-AAA attempt at creating an inclusive nationalist identity, northern Sudanese elites were prepared to sacrifice the agreement in order to enact a northern nationalist objective that had seemed abandoned years earlier. Sudan’s post-AAA economic woes may have been valid reasons for the national government’s inability to fund the agreed level of southern development, but the abolition of the Southern Region and the passage of Islamic law in the south were against both the letter and spirit of the agreement and a strong indication that the project to integrate the south into the state had failed. The introduction of Sharia led to a return of southern hostility to the state and destroyed whatever trust or goodwill had been established following the AAA. Southerners viewed the laws as a gauntlet thrown down by the north to demonstrate their uncompromising vision of Sudanese identity, and this alienated the south from the government more than any other issue in the second war.47 The inability to resolve the issue at negotiations hindered the parliamentary peace initiatives throughout the 1980s and gave credence to the breakaway separatist faction in the second war, which declared that Sharia made a united Sudan all the more impossible.

Leach_Book.indd 83

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

84

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

After their 1989 coup, staged in part to prevent the suspension of the September Laws, the military-Islamist coalition began pushing its religious agenda wholeheartedly.48 Unlike Sudan’s nationalist governments during the first war, the NIF junta was under few illusions that its regime was ultimately inclusive. Its open disdain for traditional Islam in Sudan estranged it from northern factions. Turabi’s pan-Islamist agenda was not simply a return to the Islam-influenced nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s. The sectarian parties during that period were not predominantly devoted to Islamist policies. Rather, ‘their strength derived from Islamic sentiments of solidarity . . . used to articulate basically secular nationalist positions.’49 The new regime, on the other hand advanced a narrow interpretation of Arab-Islamic culture, foreign to Sudan’s native Sufi traditions. Khartoum’s aggressive new Arab chauvinism alienated such non-Arab groups as the Beja and even the devoutly Muslim Darfuris. The ruling Islamists attempted to delegitimize the sectarian parties, especially the Khatmiyya-aligned Democratic Unionist Party, because they felt these parties too willingly compromised the primacy of Islam during the parliamentary eras by paying deference to local Sufi customs that deviated from orthodoxy. The tension between Islamism and Arabism has been a constant in post-colonial northern Sudan, with the latter including everything from an embrace of Arab Sudanese culture to a desire to join a federation of Arab states. As Oluwadare Aguda wrote in 1973, The political aims of the pan-Arabists are fundamentally and diametrically opposed to those of the Islamists, except as regards the wish to subordinate the interests of non-Arabs. Their major goal is to merge the Sudan with other Arab states, and it must not be assumed that there is widespread militant support for this. But they are also anxious to break the stranglehold of the religious sects over Sudanese politics, and to make the state play the leading role in all aspects of development.50 Even while Islamists, such as Hassan Al-Turabi, disdained the traditional pairing of Islam and nationalism in Sudan, the NIF-backed

Leach_Book.indd 84

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 85

regime used the ambiguous relationship between the two to its advantage. In the early days of his regime, Bashir stressed that the new order was ‘pan-Arab’ to help solidify support among the crucial, Arabized, riverine center of the country and to draw attention away from the Islamist element of the regime. The first policy statement of the junta’s Revolutionary Command Council asserted the revolution was pan-Arabist, though non-partisan, and emphasized strengthening the armed forces and improving international relations. The regime relied on Sudan’s history of takeovers from secular army officers to mask its Islamist agenda. The NIF refashioning of the southern war into a formal jihad in 1992 was an inevitable move. As the most militant of Islamists and Arabists, the junta leadership would have squandered its credibility as a legitimate government had it not taken the most ardent line a pious Islamic regime could take. The SPLM/A’s advocacy of a national identity ‘renaissance’ was a threat to Arab-Islamic supremacy and helped the regime radicalize the public. Holy war was also a more galvanizing call to action than the mere defense of Arab nationalism. With the abrogation of the AAA, non-Muslims no longer had a state-guaranteed right to defend their own identity or develop their culture. They were either to assimilate culturally or sequester themselves in small territories where they could claim exemption from religious laws and language requirements. Turabi had for years viewed conversion of the south as a religious obligation of Sudanese Muslims; he argued that the region had no real culture of its own.51 Accordingly, the Sudanese campaign in the 1990s became the first jihad initiated by a modern Muslim state in post-colonial Africa to Islamize its minority peoples. To curb the SPLA’s influence, Khartoum attempted to implement a cordon sanitaire around the south by relocating non-Arab villages just north of the three southern provinces. This was the most aggressive attempt to isolate the region since the colonial Southern Policy that northern nationalists had fought for decades to destroy. While the Islamist attack on southern cultural identities may not have had the backing of most northern civilians, who were tired of war, it fostered more southern animosity towards the north generally.

Leach_Book.indd 85

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

86

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Self-Governance for Southern Sudan Both peace treaties attempted to address to some degree the fundamental question of the role of democracy in keeping peace. Democracy – or at least a democratic form of self-governance – is an obvious way groups can defend cultural integrity, but the experience of the AAA has shown that it is not always the most sought-after goal for insurgents seeking to protect their culture from national intrusion. Incorporating safeguards for the fragile democratic institutions the AAA created in the south was not a high-ranking objective for the SSLM delegates negotiating that treaty. Although the agreement text allowed an unprecedented amount of self-governance, including a regional executive and legislature, the heavy influence of the national president consistently pervaded these democratic institutions. The AAA permitted President Nimeiri to appoint up to one-fourth of the People’s Regional Assembly delegates in the south. The People’s Regional Assembly could ask the national president to ‘postpone’ a national law coming into effect in the south, but he was not obligated to comply. The national president could appoint and remove members of the Southern Region’s High Executive Council (HEC), on recommendation from the council’s president.52 The national president also appointed the HEC president and its members for the 18-month interim period between the March 1972 ratification of the AAA and the 1973 elections.53 Moreover, the formation of informal factions instead of formal political parties hindered the democratic nature of the Southern Region. Sudan remained a one-party state, with all political business conducted within the Sudan Socialist Union. Officially, there were no parties in the south, in keeping with the continuing neo-patrimonial nature of the regime. Competitive elections could be held, but the lack of parties made candidates more reliant on tribal affiliation or personal loyalties than the popularity of their positions on issues. Former insurgent leader Joseph Lagu recalls that ‘there seemed to be two undeclared political parties in the south: one patronized by Abel Alier and the other by me.’54 As they were enacted, these ephemeral democratic arrangements revealed that southern democracy appeared

Leach_Book.indd 86

10/17/2012 7:00:48 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 87

to be following in the shallow footsteps of the parliamentary democracy practiced in Khartoum during the 1950s and 1960s; the rule of law was upheld arbitrarily and factional and regional squabbling took the place of policymaking with the public good in mind. This conundrum is the ultimate demonstration of the weakness of southern identity by 1972: a vibrant southern nationalist movement with a charismatic authoritarian leader would have preferred a more independent regional executive. Alternatively, a vibrant democratic movement in the south would have preferred a more independent regional assembly. A truly democratic-minded southern establishment would also have revolted against Nimeiri much sooner after his constant intrusions into the political system throughout the 1970s and 1980s. There was also great southern passivity towards monitoring the actions of regional government during this period, contributing to the atrophy of good government after the AAA. In fact, had the southern movement been a more coherently nationalist force by 1972, it may even have settled for a less democratic structure. Particularly in areas with no modern democratic traditions, nationalist and democratic movements were in tension with each other. As Claire Metelits notes: The tasks of liberation and democracy are driven by different logics. Liberation is driven by the need to unite, which in much of history is accomplished through strong authoritarian states . . . Democracy, in contrast, is driven not by the logic of unification, but rather by diversity. Democracy creates divisions between groups; it factionalizes, [sic] rather than unifies.55 While in many states this tension often leads to authoritarianism in the name of the continued cause of nationalism, in southern Sudan the nationalist movement was so weak that regional politics veered towards the other extreme. Democratic procedures led to factionalism and provincialism with few uniting principles or aspirations to hold the region together. Peoples who see themselves as permanent minorities – whether southerners in Sudan or non-Dinka tribes in the People’s Regional

Leach_Book.indd 87

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

88

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Assembly of the Southern Region – often do not accept simple majoritarian democracy. This attitude undermines the utility of a conventional parliamentary system such as that which colonial powers introduced to their colonies. On a national level, reliance on a Westminster parliamentary system in Sudan led to a neglect of the regions and multiple military takeovers. No party ever had enough support to dominate parliament, resulting in such political maneuvers as opportunistic alliances with regional parties. Public disillusionment with democracy as a formal institution in remote areas was often the result. However, the southern lack of reliance on modern democratic institutions demonstrates less an anti-democratic inclination than ambivalence about democratic institutions introduced from the central government. None of the parliamentary eras in Sudanese history are remembered with fondness in the south. The second parliamentary period of the 1960s would have been fresh in the memory of southerners by the time of the AAA drafting. Indeed, the 1965 elections confirmed to many southerners the hypocrisy of the north, which they saw as demanding democracy for every region except the most disenfranchised and alienated. The elites of the two major parties were determined to hold the first elections to follow the Abboud dictatorship. When the war made security for southern elections impossible, northern parties simply petitioned to cancel them. Both southern and smaller northern parties held that the decision would foment separatism, but it was made anyway. It was a severe blow to southern faith in a democratic political process within Sudan, and, by the time of the 1967 elections, many southerners openly supported secession. The damage to southern faith in parliamentary democracy was two-fold, as the Southern Front had signed on to the plan not to hold the 1965 elections in southern districts. The Maghoub government showed its disdain for southern parties by appointing northern traders who resided in the south to those assembly seats, even though Sudan’s High Court had ruled against this policy. Accordingly, many southerners held neither the democratic process nor their own representatives in high regard. Resurgent tribalism also challenged the integrity of democratic politics in the Southern Region. The need to manage such sensitive

Leach_Book.indd 88

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 89

divisions as tribal politics made authorities fearful of relying purely on democratic institutions. The practice of one candidate voluntarily stepping down in favor of another became as acceptable as a contested election. This is well demonstrated by the 1978 contest between Clement Mboro and Samuel Aru Bol; the latter eventually withdrew his claim to the disputed position of speaker of the People’s Regional Assembly. The principle was illustrated again that year when the HEC president, Abel Alier, agreed to stand down so the more popular Joseph Lagu could serve in the office without having to defeat Alier at the polls. Such a defeat might have provoked tribal and regional tensions once again, this time between Dinka supporters of Alier and Equatorian supporters of Lagu. The southern suspicion of parliamentary politics continued into the 1980s and was remembered so bitterly that John Garang assured his supporters at the signing of the CPA that future democracy would not simply be a return to the parliamentary eras.56 Instead, the CPA sought to combine an autonomous southern region with a formal, nationwide federal structure. The CPA allowed for a multi-level system of government: national, southern, state, and local. The Government of South Sudan and each of Sudan’s states were also to have their own constitutions, in compliance with the National Interim Constitution.57 The CPA guaranteed every citizen the right to vote and general periodic elections.58 The first elections were to take place at all levels of government before the end of the third year of the interim. In a move similar to that in the post-AAA elections, the CPA excluded from the running candidates who did not vow to uphold the agreement.59 Neither agreement cited tribal divisions in any detail when discussing self-governance. In the first agreement, this omission might have been the result of a nationalist regime seeking not to categorize Sudanese by tribes. Native Administration, the colonial relic of tribal rule, had only just been abolished in 1971. In the second war, the nationalist SPLM/A might have simply assumed that a multi-tier federal system would allow the states to protect their own cultures. Self-governing aspects of the CPA seemed vindicated when a study completed in June 2005 revealed that the most popular model of government throughout Sudan remained a decentralized federal system.60

Leach_Book.indd 89

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

90

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Southerners wanted democracy, but they were not willing to rely on democratic institutions to preserve their autonomy. Southern wariness over the value of democracy for its own sake is explained by the region’s history better than some conflict resolution theory, which holds that power-sharing arrangements without strong democratic underpinnings are likely to fail as they rely more on the mutual interests of the parties rather than democratic institutions.61 Empirical data has shown, however, that in the late twentieth century democracy was not a primary factor in decreasing the chances of renewed civil war.62 Therefore, while democracy can help a people assert and defend their cultural identity, by itself it is not enough to bring peace. Despite the initial weakness of its civilian institutions, the SPLM/A would not settle for an apparatus to be defined, manipulated, and controlled by the central government, as happened in the 1970s. As Garang outlined at the CPA ceremony, ‘in preparing to implement [the CPA], the SPLM/A had established committees to work out mechanisms for the transformation from organs for guerrilla warfare and armed opposition into organs of good governance.’63 Rather than focus on democratic elements, such as early elections and the invigoration of political parties, the SPLM argued for a defined set of powers shared by the government and the former insurgents.

Language in the CPA More than the strength of democratic institutions, southerners would rely on three elements to protect their culture during the interim following the CPA: the threat of secession, the southern army’s ability to protect its citizens, and the direct codification of culture and rights in the CPA agreements. Religious discrimination from the national government was the most important of the prohibitions in the Machakos Protocol. Khartoum was forbidden from discriminating against citizens based on religion ‘or other beliefs.’64 National legislation contradicting religious or customary practices of the majority of a state or region could be challenged locally or subjected to national review. The staggered order of CPA agreements over three years provides some insight into the significance of issues that was not as obvious

Leach_Book.indd 90

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

CULTUR AL GRIEVANCES A DDRESSED

AT THE

PEACE TABLE 91

in the rapidly concluded AAA. By the early 2000s, southerners were more concerned about self-determination than whether Khartoum recognized the importance of language, which had been a hotly contested issue in the AAA negotiations. While the 2002 agreement mentioned cultural issues of religion, autonomy, and self-determination, the specifics of the status of language were not laid out until the 2004 Power Sharing Agreement. The Machakos Protocol simply contained a passing acknowledgement of Sudan’s ‘linguistic diversity.’65 The final provisions for protection of language were, nevertheless, quite apparent. Particularly in asserting itself through the spread of the Arabic language, the northern nationalist movement offered stronger protections for Sudan’s regional languages than did the 1972 agreement. More importantly, the self-determination component of the earlier Machakos Protocol precluded regulation against use of any language in the power-sharing agreement. English joined Arabic as an official southern language, as both were used in work and education. All indigenous languages were considered national languages, worthy of promotion, and any states or regions could adopt additional official languages as they saw fit.66 This egalitarian solution was in keeping with the personal philosophy of John Garang, who had never prioritized limiting the spread of Arabic so long as Khartoum would recognize the practicality and cultural importance of other southern languages. During the 1980s, he had even stated that, while he did not speak Arabic fluently, he could accept it as a national language that need not threaten his southern identity. Garang cited the American use of English and Latin American use of Spanish in this regard.67 The diffusion of language as a cultural weapon may be one of the few legacies of integration that survived from 1972 until the signing of the CPA. Despite occasionally simplistic propaganda, the early southern nationalist movement was able to distinguish between Islam and Arab culture. During the first war, some southern nationalists even had an Islamic background or were practicing Muslims. The ability of southerners to make an easy distinction between Arab and non-Arab Islam is a testament to Arabic’s ability to spread easily throughout Sudan before hostilities began in the 1950s. In northern Sudan, Arab

Leach_Book.indd 91

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

92

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

identity – Arab custom and particularly language – generally arrived with each wave of Islam. Arabic’s script gave it a durability unmatched by local languages which had no alphabet. Literacy strengthened communities and actually empowered local peoples to record their history and affirm their identity. In part to emulate this history, regimes such as Abboud’s leaned heavily on Arab and Islamic culture to assimilate the south. The two were strong cultural signifiers, beacons that could be used to pull disparate peoples into an emerging post-colonial nation. Modern assimilation efforts, however, were ultimately counterproductive and would become even more so with the reintroduction of the Islamic project in 1983. Heather Sharkey quotes the French linguist Catherine Miller, who wrote in 1989 that ‘abusive centralization and the non-recognition of ethnic minorities have cancelled out the capacity for potential integration that [the government’s policies] of Islamization and Arabization may have held.’68 As general resentment grew over riverine Arab treatment of other remote areas of Sudan, and as Khartoum monopolized resources and political power by the 1990s, Arabic language ceased to be a gateway to Arab culture. The CPA was crafted to recognize the cultural divide and the likely futility of efforts to fashion a Sudanese identity inclusive of citizens from all religions and cultures. The Bashir regime was adamant about retaining such Islamic elements as Sharia law throughout the north, including in Khartoum. The objective of an Islamic society, governed according to Islamic law, was incompatible with the SPLM/A’s secular objective. Prospects for a newly conceived, inclusive identity appeared possible following the AAA, but tribalism in the south and regime insecurity in the north eventually led to the creation of a new agreement that codified the differences between north and south instead of attempting to transcend them.

Leach_Book.indd 92

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

CHAPTER FOUR PATRONAGE, STATE DYNA MICS, AND CONFLICT R ESOLUTION

The vastness of Sudan, its inhospitable terrain, and the scarcity of easily obtainable resources have typically rendered the state too weak to operate using purely coercive methods. Regimes find themselves forced to depend on selectively chosen patron-client relationships. A ruler’s political power in Sudan relies on the legitimacy or military backing it receives from a more powerful or established group at the expense of other factions of Sudanese society. The exclusive nature of these relationships makes them unstable coalitions, constantly subject to change. State reliance on patronage networks exists independently of such abstract political concepts as national identity, though nationalist movements have often depended on these networks as well. The persistence of these networks has contributed to all of Sudan’s dominant peace agreements since independence, and to the abrogation of the AAA. Sudan’s system of administration can be described as neo-patrimonial, an advanced form of earlier patrimonial forms of rule. The constant forging of new alliances and the subsequent erosion of institutions has made politics in Sudan heavily reliant on individual personalities. Neo-patrimonialism affects the very composition of the state by placing the complex bureaucracies of a modern, legal-rationalist system in service to the personal relationships developed between a leader and a

Leach_Book.indd 93

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

94

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

favored faction.1 In Sudan, this means combining the traditional centerperiphery framework with the modern institutions introduced to Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The legal-rational ‘sphere’ consisted only of the area surrounding the capital. Much of the rest of the Sudanese territory is still administered under a patrimonial system relying on sheikhs and elders, the same rural elites who served as an intermediate authority for Condominium officials.2 Most of Sudan’s peace agreements, including both the 1977 National Reconciliation and the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement, have been attempts to draw opponents of the state into an exclusivist, patronage-based coalition. The compromises necessary for such exclusivist coalitions, often made between groups with radically different platforms, erode the ideological vitality of the participating parties’ agendas. Since these compromises can also erode base support, regimes increasingly rely on controlling state instruments of force, either coopting the army or relying on more pliable agents such as militias and security services. The large coalitions that typify democratic regimes are dependent on successful policies, while exclusivist coalitions instead depend on their ability to provide services to a narrow base of supporters or otherwise implement a specific agenda. Exclusive patron-client coalitions prevented the southern conflict from being resolved under parliamentary regimes. Sudan’s sense of identity has traditionally been so fragmented that democratic coalitions lose political vitality as they become more representative of Sudanese society. During the parliamentary eras, the sectarian parties could only form fragile governing coalitions that constricted their ability to make bolder gestures towards peace or secularism. The dynamic of an authoritarian state at war is fundamentally different from that of a democracy. As Jack Levy writes, ‘authoritarian leaders devote fewer resources to war because the costs of failure in war are less and because they need some of those resources to distribute to their key supporters at home.’3 This theory was formed to explain inter-state wars. That the dynamic so aptly describes Sudanese conflicts only emphasizes how unintegrated the state remained following independence. Authoritarian regimes in Sudan, not reliant on popular

Leach_Book.indd 94

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 95

support, also had more freedom and more incentive to negotiate peace. Both wars ended after an autocratic government in Khartoum with a narrow base of support had recently quashed a former coalition partner that threatened its rule. In both cases, the exiled partner became an impediment to conflict resolution in the south. Also in both cases, the north attempted to use the peace agreements as the basis for a new exclusivist coalition with the south. Once the AAA is viewed as an attempt to induct southern elites into the patronage system, the relative lack of success at integrating the region with the rest of Sudan and the exaggeration of political divisions in the region prior to the outbreak of the second war become easier to understand. The AAA coalition finally collapsed in large part because of Nimeiri’s need to find a stronger coalition partner in the north to preserve his rule. This resulted in Nimeiri’s withdrawal from the nationalist project by the early 1980s and his attempt to access newly discovered southern oil, both steps taken to accommodate his northern coalition partners. The Bashir regime and the SPLM/A had more difficulty concluding the CPA because, for most of the conflict, the two parties had incompatible visions for the future of Sudan. As a result, each party sought to form as many tactical coalitions with others as possible. This process destroyed the integrity of national institutions, most significantly the national army, making its status in a post-war Sudan subject to negotiation for the first time. Consequently, while the CPA was consistent in that it formed another exclusive coalition between the ruling NCP and the SPLM, it was unique in that its conclusion forced the government to authorize the instruments through which the patronage system could be challenged: a separate standing army and the right of secession. Post-independence challenges to the system have been few and have not lasted long, but they have never been as carefully arranged as the 2005 agreement, in which the national government was pressured into ceding an unprecedented amount of control to the south. The state meant both the AAA and the CPA to be a forum to incorporate the south into the patronage system, to the detriment of more traditional partners in the north. The first agreement collapsed

Leach_Book.indd 95

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

96

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

after Nimeiri sought to form a new Islamist coalition in the north. The second coalition, upon its collapse, ended with the creation of a new state, changing the dynamic between the former partners from that of ‘state and society’ to that of ‘state and state.’

Parliamentary Patronage and Peace Efforts of the 1980s The pervasiveness of neo-patrimonial networks during the parliamentary periods was a primary source of southern disillusionment with democracy. In fact, governments established by sectarian political parties were actually less flexible at selecting a base of patronage than authoritarian regimes were. Their concern was foremost to maintaining the support of the traditional sectarian factions, and that relationship provided little incentive to compromise with the south while in power. While British concern to avoid upsetting Egyptian claims to Sudan initially led to wariness about allowing the sectarian leaders too much formal power, after the sectarians supported Britain in World War I, the mutiny of nationalist forces in 1924 and the assassination of Governor General Lee Stack in Cairo that same year, officials in Khartoum would give them freer reign to shape northern Sudanese society in their own image. Following that tumultuous year, the sectarian leaders would become an implacable obstacle to the growth of Sudanese secular nationalism. The November revolt by Sudanese and Egyptian troops throughout the country did not inspire a mass following in part because it lacked sectarian support. Sectarian leaders could dissuade their followers or even turn them against the nationalist movement. A sectarian-owned newspaper mocked the Dinka ancestry of nationalist figurehead Ali Abd Al-Latif, and his White Flag League could barely function outside of larger towns. While colonial authorities might have preferred direct control, sectarian participation allowed them to argue that the educated class from which most nationalists derived was a tiny, elite clique. The religious leaders who supported the regime, on the other hand, were depicted as speaking for the majority. As Benedict Anderson explained, the colonial state ‘invited “natives” into schools and offices, and . . . excluded them from boardrooms, [meaning] that to an unprecedented extent the key early

Leach_Book.indd 96

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 97

spokesmen for colonial nationalism were lonely, bilingual intelligentsias unattached to sturdy local bourgeoisies.’4 Colonial promotion of the sectarian factions therefore created the dominant political division in northern Sudan, one that would reappear consistently during the state’s parliamentary episodes. The parliamentary system introduced by the Condominium in the 1940s did little to change the basic composition of the sectarian power structure. Representative assemblies were established to appease the second wave of Sudanese nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s more as concessions to the politically active element of northern Sudan than as enduring national institutions. The competition between nationalist and traditional elites that would define post-independence nationalism was also a result of Condominium policy. Stack’s original 1920s plan of ‘complementing’ tribal chiefs with educated elites did not work out as intended. Both groups fell victim to sectarian pressures and quarrels. Tribal chiefs selected for the council were disdained by both the intellectuals who served on the council and those who boycotted it. Most of these chiefs had little input on matters not directly related to their own local authority and were generally content to take the positions of Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman, the only sectarian supporter of the council. Through his benefaction the Umma Party was formed in 1945 and became the first modern Sudanese political party. The Khatmiyyaoriented Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was soon to follow. Native Administration, the British system of governance relying on traditional authority, also worked to sectarian advantage. Since rural Sudanese had little participation in the nationalist movement, these parties were strongly sectarian, without significant involvement in the political issues concerning nationalists. Peasants would simply vote for the tribal or religious leaders with whom they were familiar, and those leaders typically deferred to sectarian elites. The British initially hoped to repress popular Islam in Sudan, but by the 1940s they had accorded the Mahdiyya and Khatmiyya sectarian leaders a higher position than any other Sudanese. The elites provided legitimacy for the British administration, a practice that continued when modern political institutions formed in the late 1940s.

Leach_Book.indd 97

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

98

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

They would appear at the beginning ceremony of each session of the Advisory Council and withdraw when debate commenced.5 The Legislative Assembly, which replaced the council, also relied on sectarian benefaction from the outset. As the fall of Ismael Al-Azhari’s government soon after independence demonstrated, secular nationalists did not have the ability to confront the sectarian elites in a political contest. Unlike secular nationalists, these movements had legitimacy that preceded the Condominium and had only been reinforced by British administrators. These politicians quickly learned to align themselves with either the Umma Party or the DUP, a practice that compromised the vitality of the nationalist movement and inhibited the liberal nature of any parliamentary democracy in Sudan. Conservative elites tolerated modern institutions so long as they posed no serious threat to their sensibilities or power. When it was necessary, however, sectarians and their political supporters felt free to sidestep modern institutions. During the parliamentary period of the 1960s, for example, Umma’s Sadiq Al-Mahdi purged the assembly of its communist members despite a high court ruling that the action was illegal. In the neo-patrimonial tradition, the modern tools of the state were useful only so long as they could be employed to solidify the base of the leadership. The priorities of constituents, therefore, undermined the judiciary and the political rights of the opposition. The manipulation of the principles of liberal democracy under the parliamentary regimes was constant. Yet, ironically, elections during these periods were regarded as adhering to at least the mechanics of a fair voting process, far more so than in neighboring African and Arab states. In terms of contemporary issues discussed and acted upon, however, the political climate was bleak. The sporadic representation of peoples from remote regions did not improve their lot. Regional parties hoping to compete in the democratic process, including those from the south such as the Sudan African National Union (SANU) and the Southern Front, were forced to form tactical alliances with larger sectarian parties. Little united these coalitions ideologically. For example, Sadiq Al-Mahdi relied on the support of SANU for his Umma Party to form a government in the 1960s but rarely voiced support for the smaller party’s championing of southern rights. Southerners were

Leach_Book.indd 98

10/17/2012 7:00:49 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 99

rarely appointed to cabinet positions, and then given only the most marginal of portfolios. From the outset, southerners were ill equipped to compete in the parliamentary process, in part because of their lack of involvement in earlier democratic institutions. Southerners had no political representation in Khartoum until 1948, when they were included in the Legislative Assembly. To organize and champion their calls for recognition of southern distinctiveness and representation in a united Sudan, southerners formed what would become the Liberal Party in 1952. A conference of the party at Juba in October 1954 passed a resolution demanding federal status with the north. By June 1955, a motion was passed in Juba declaring that all southerner MPs, regardless of party, would vote together on key issues as a united Southern Bloc. Southern elites desperately attempted to compensate politically for their economic shortcomings, hoping to slow down the apparently unstoppable drive towards independence. Northern parties, however, undermined southern bids to participate in the political process independent of northern patronage. The poorly funded Liberal Party had almost no influence outside Khartoum and the larger southern towns, leaving it susceptible to personal rivalries and manipulation by other parties.6 In elections, competing southern rivals sometimes split the vote of their base, allowing more organized northern parties to pick up the contested seat. This theme continued after the reintroduction of the parliamentary system in 1965. Numerous small parties contested elections that year, but the government inevitably consisted of the same conservative sectarian coalitions. The disorganized nature of civic participation in a time of war led parties to fragment, leaving them vulnerable to manipulation. Suspicions of northern interference in the nascent southern democratic process resulted and, subsequently, so did southern disillusionment with democratic institutions. During parliamentary elections, southern parties were especially susceptible to division when larger parties lured their members with the promise of power or money. This factionalism reached its apex in the late 1980s, when the dominant parties lured candidates from the hinterland to align with them in exchange for employment or other benefits. After southern political

Leach_Book.indd 99

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

100

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

groups such as the United Sudan Africa Parties established communications with the SPLM/A in late 1987, Sadiq Al-Mahdi’s government relied on patronage and the promise of positions for some elites to break their political unity. Khartoum viewed with concern the prospect of a united southern political movement coordinating with an extremely effective military organization. Al-Mahdi’s patronage of southern politicians allowed for short-term manipulation but could never purchase any lasting political support. As the political elite in a sectarian dynasty, Al-Mahdi was already obliged to provide a constituency with the benefits of his leadership. Mansour Khalid gives a detailed account of how leaders such as Al-Mahdi made rewarding party members and family an important consideration in their policies.7 During parliamentary governments, licenses for imports, exports, and agriculture were typically distributed on a partisan basis. In accordance with their preferred areas of economic activity during coalition governments, Umma/Mahdiyya adherents would usually control or influence the ministry of agriculture while the ministry of commerce was dominated by NUP/ Khatmiyya affiliates. The parliamentary regime of the 1980s spent vast amounts on military hardware and doled out lavish benefits, such as private cars exempt from excise duties, to senior military staff.8 In this way, the military was treated more as a constituency than an instrument of state policy. While patronage provided a strong incentive for sectarian elites to tend to their own at the expense of southerners, weak democratic institutions and the strong nationalism of parliamentary leaders created incentives to avoid any meaningful patronage for southerners, particularly in periods of war. Emulating the experience of other democratizing states, the political weakness of successive nationalist governments encouraged a need to appear aggressive, especially towards southern insurgents. The determination of most parliamentary governments to suppress insurgency with force, coupled with a wariness to impose a significant burden for this effort on northern taxpayers and recruits, highlighted the citizen/subject structure of Sudan’s patronage system. Parliamentary governments lacked a mandate to impose taxes or

Leach_Book.indd 100

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 101

conclude a peace with insurgents. They derived legitimacy from their factions alone, who granted it based not on specific policy proposals but on deeper spiritual and political allegiances. The fragility of these governments meant they could not match their ambitious national objectives with sound fiscal policy. Sudan’s foreign debt doubled from 1964 to 1969, and the government increasingly relied on indirect taxation rather than income tax.9 Each time the state reverted back to democracy, it resembled nothing more than the legislative assembly Khartoum had inherited from the British. But a simple Westminster-style government was insufficient to accommodate such a vast, diverse state as Sudan democratically. National elections alone were not enough of a concession to self-governance for minorities who feared or distrusted centralized state power. The sectarians who benefited from this system saw no reason to empower independent institutions. The politically unstable environment created by sectarianism and the inability of politicians to challenge it helps explain why the AAA and CPA were concluded under the only regimes in post-colonial Sudanese history not reliant on either of the sectarian factions for support. Despite the reluctance of parliamentary regimes to negotiate with southern insurgents, a slow evolution towards considering such a move began following the collapse of the Nimeiri regime. This shift did not begin, however, with the Transitional Military Council (TMC), the junta that replaced the May Regime in April 1985. The TMC’s conservative nationalist orientation was reminiscent of pre-Nimeiri governments, a fact that did little to assuage SPLA suspicions. John Garang was unconvinced that TMC leader and former Nimeiri defense minister Siwar Al-Dhahab shared the SPLM/A’s priority of a secular, inclusive state. He felt his fears confirmed after Al-Dhahab repealed the 1973 constitution but left in effect most of Nimeiri’s Islamic September Laws. The new Transitional Constitution, drawn up by lawyers under the TMC in 1985, actually affirmed the basis for the September Laws in the 1973 constitution. It did not, however, express that document’s respect for indigenous non-scriptural religions. Furthermore, this was the first drafting of a constitution in which no southerners were consulted.

Leach_Book.indd 101

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

102

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

The SPLM/A viewed the new government as an informal alliance between the military and the newly created National Islamic Front (NIF), the two most unyielding and belligerent elements of northern society. TMC behavior over the course of the year would bear these fears out. The TMC allowed the continued infiltration of the NIF into the military while cracking down on the influence of other radical ideological movements such as Ba’athism. Concerning a peace agreement, all the TMC would offer the SPLA was a reinstitution of the AAA, which Garang by that period had declared to be totally discredited. Such actions indicated to the SPLA that the TMC leadership had neither the liberal outlook nor the imagination necessary to reach a compromise with the SPLA. The TMC limited itself to one dominant objective: stabilizing Sudan just enough to hold parliamentary elections within a year. It was, however, unable and unwilling to strengthen democratic institutions. New parties lacked the time to organize, giving strength to those conservative parties that had been free to organize since the 1977 reconciliation and could simply assemble their religious partisans. The sheer number of new parties, combined with the weak alignment of the Khatmiyya-affiliated DUP, led to poll results favoring Umma and the small but highly-organized NIF. Throughout the 1980s, the SPLM/A became wary of what it considered various government attempts to ‘buy off’ insurgent leaders, a pervasive practice which Garang and his lieutenants believed helped destroy the AAA. Garang accused the TMC of engaging in similar intrigues as the deposed Nimeiri had: attempting to lure the insurgent leaders to Khartoum where they would be given government positions and prestige, keeping them cut off from their base in the south, and inducting them into a dependent relationship.10 SPLM/A suspicion of exclusive alliances made a peace agreement even more elusive, since even during parliamentary periods the state was slow to break its tendency toward narrow coalition building. The parliamentary era of the 1980s displayed weaknesses similar to those of the 1950s and 1960s, but the SPLA’s powerful existential threat to the traditional patronage system led to a political evolution in the north. While the 1960s parliamentary era began with the

Leach_Book.indd 102

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 103

first real dialogue between the two parties in Sudan’s history, further progress would not occur under any successive elected government until the 1969 coup. In contrast, the SPLA’s strength and its desire to overthrow the fragile coalition governments in Khartoum led to a series of peace proposals from various opposition parties. Though each of these motions was a calculated maneuver within the context of northern party politics, they laid the groundwork for a more inclusive national dialogue. This emphasis on parliamentary tactics, instead of the formation of a larger strategy to end the war, is why each northern faction’s attempt to find common ground with the SPLM/A saw opposition from other factions despite the potential for a broader reconciliation. In 1986 the NIF and DUP opposed the Koka Dam Declaration, the DUP and Umma dismissed the NIF’s 1987 Sudan Charter, and the NIF and Umma rejected the Sudan Peace Initiative of 1988. The difficulty northern parties had in expanding bilateral talks impeded these gestures towards reconciliation. The parties each sought to use a peace accord to launch an exclusive dialogue with the increasingly powerful SPLA but were internally too weak to commit fully. As prime minister, Al-Mahdi’s ability to follow up after Koka Dam was limited by his own reactionary Ansar movement, his DUP coalition partners, the hardline NIF opposition, and his preference to keep the dialogue dependent on his own involvement rather than convert it into a more formal, inclusive process. Consequently, momentum from the talks was lost and a planned constitutional conference set for June 1986 was never convened. Instead, Al-Mahdi simply sent an emissary to Addis Ababa to ask the SPLM to join the government and to set up a personal meeting between himself and Garang. This meeting occurred in July 1986, but if it was an attempt to establish an exclusive UmmaSPLM coalition it was unsuccessful. Relations between the new regime and the insurgency deteriorated even further when it became apparent that Al-Mahdi would rely heavily on the ministers from the former May Regime, leading the SPLM/A to jeer that the new parliamentary government was simply ‘Nimeirism without Nimeiri.’11 Al-Mahdi’s choice to push vigorously for peace prior to elections then to back away quickly from the Koka Dam talks after his ascension to premiership is indicative not only of how poor his ability to

Leach_Book.indd 103

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

104

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

form strong coalitions was but also of how little political freedom he actually retained. Al-Mahdi’s prestige among his followers, particularly the militant Ansar, derived from his esteemed lineage as a fourthgeneration descendant of the original Mahdi. While this devotion to his personal qualities ensured that he always had to remain mindful of the conservative, traditional bent of his constituents, he was not expected to carry out any political agenda that differed radically from the rival Khatmiyya leadership in the DUP. The neo-patrimonial relationship he maintained with his constituency was built around his role as the leader of an older tradition, not his political philosophy. For a short time during the late 1980s the neo-patrimonial system appeared unable to withstand the combined pressures of the SPLA insurgency and the re-establishment of democracy in Sudan. The DUP’s search for new political partners after becoming marginalized in the government coalition may have launched a trend towards broader, more inclusive coalitions during the parliamentary era. The DUP initially began to mend relations with the southern umbrella organization Union of Sudanese African Parties and with the National Alliance for National Salvation, an urban coalition of trade unionists and academics that had already established some contact with the SPLM/A. The NIF and Umma were both unhappy with these DUP coalition-building attempts and furious with its dispatch of emissaries to Addis Ababa to meet SPLM representatives in late 1988. This meeting would result in the Sudan Peace Initiative of November 1988, an agreement between the DUP and SPLM to suspend existing religious laws and rescind the state of emergency laws in the country since Nimeiri’s fall.12 With the implementation of those conditions, the SPLA would agree to adhere to a cease-fire and discuss further measures towards peaceful reconciliation. The agreement was met with extreme enthusiasm in Khartoum, but Prime Minister Al-Mahdi refused to acknowledge it legislatively. The Sudan Peace Initiative began a short-lived evolution that might have forced the ruling party to break its strong preference for exclusive coalitions had not the democratic process been cut short. The change was not an ideological shift, however; Al-Mahdi effectively endorsed the terms of the DUP-SPLM agreement but

Leach_Book.indd 104

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 105

resented the challenge it posed to his personal authority as prime minister. He preferred that parliament grant him exclusive authority to deal with the insurgents. The desperate situation Sudan faced by the end of the decade would show how untenable the tradition of strong individual personalities dominating weak political institutions had become. Institutions ranging from civil society to the military began to resist. By the end of the 1980s, the second war was costing an average of US$1 million a day, leaving the government unable to pay public servants or reform its budget by cutting expenditures. The broad national support for the DUP-SPLM November Accords was an implicit refutation of Al-Mahdi’s recalcitrance. In order to save his premiership from the DUP’s momentum, he organized a new coalition excluding the rival party and relying on the NIF. This move did not halt the renewed push for peace. The initiative to halt the war received backing from more than 50 organizations in a signed statement including signatures from every political party in Sudan except the NIF. Pressure from the army, specifically its February 1989 memo advocating a political solution to the war, began to soften Al-Mahdi’s position. The army remained one of the few institutions with enough power and legitimacy in the north to curb the appetites of national leaders.

The Collapse of the May Regime’s Governing Coalitions While the above history demonstrates how parliamentary regimes in Sudan typically relied on coalitions that were too unstable to commit to peace agreements, authoritarian governments also faced challenges in forming governing coalitions. The Nimeiri experience remains the best example of the corrosive effects of exclusivist coalition building on regimes driven by ideology, a tendency evident in both the crafting of the AAA and its eventual abrogation. Nimeiri destroyed his leftist base after communist-affiliated officers attempted a coup in July 1971. The purging of the far left created a vacuum filled by less ideological technocrats who appealed to Nimeiri to make peace for the stability of both the region and the regime.

Leach_Book.indd 105

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

106

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Contrary to early rhetoric, former Foreign Minister Mansour Khalid insists ‘the May revolution was not an ideological revolution, Marxist or otherwise. It was perpetrated by dissatisfied nationalist officers who had no political commitments. The military-Communist marriage was a political exigency.’13 Nimeiri relied on the small but highly organized Communist Party, banned during the previous parliamentary era, to help his junta of Free Officers combat the regime’s earliest enemies: reactionary sectarians and modern Islamists. The nationalization of banks, businesses, and private companies during this early socialist period was the first attempt to reorient the patronage system by crippling the sectarian factions dependent on land and commerce. Leftists were also the initial advocates of overhauling local administration and resolving the southern problem. By intertwining conflict resolution with ideological goals, Nimeiri’s early leftist coalition actually impeded peace efforts. The minister for southern affairs, former Sudan Communist Party member Joseph Garang, was the architect of early efforts to secure peace.14 Despite his Dinka origins, Garang and other communist leaders had absolutely no base of support in the south.15 Their hasty efforts to establish a socialist network in a region with little interest in externally imposed, ideological governance provoked a mutual hostility. For Garang and his comrades, socialism was a necessary precondition to southern regional autonomy, and no settlement would be reached with the southern ‘bourgeoisie and separatists’ who would no doubt seek to take power away from nascent socialist institutions. By 1971, the war was becoming extremely expensive. The political impasse between the socialist government negotiators and the Anya Nya was draining the vitality of a supposedly revolutionary government, as the southern problem had done to regimes in the past. The Sudanese left had undergone a major ideological shift by the beginning of the second war. Early post-colonial leftists were not interested in accommodating the emerging southern nationalism. Suspecting the insurgency was not truly popular, Joseph Garang in particular declared that the south lacked any legitimate national identity. Nimeiri’s purge of the left in 1971 and his eventual embrace of political Islam effectively removed leftists as a force in Sudanese

Leach_Book.indd 106

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 107

politics. In the second war, the remaining moderates from the May Regime such as Mansour Khalid and Abel Alier would place their sympathies with the SPLM/A, thus bolstering its legitimacy as a national insurgency and giving the south a key role in the nationalist movement. The region was no longer simply relegated to the passive role of an entity to be acted upon or an incoherent quasi-separatist force. As Richard Lobban summarizes, ‘In the first war, Joseph Garang was trying to deliver the government’s message to the south, whereas in the second war, John Garang was trying to deliver the south’s message to the government.’16 Because the AAA’s March 1972 conclusion was exclusivist, primarily being between an SSLM negotiating team and a government delegation, it would not address the nearly incoherent platform of the broader Anya Nya insurgency. In the weeks following the initial agreement, the SSLM delegation struggled to gain the confidence of their rank and file by attempting to insert several amendments, including proposals for a separate southern army, the power of the south to make treaties with foreign governments, and other arrangements of loose confederation. When the Khartoum delegation saw these amendments as too contentious to be worth considering, Lagu himself made the decision to ignore them and ratify the agreement as it had been negotiated the previous month. He returned an entirely new team of delegates on 27 March 1972. Though some hardline separatists such as Joseph Oduho were included in the new line-up to demonstrate the broad support the negotiations had in the south, this reshuffle underscored that the agreement was primarily between Lagu and the government. The traditional nationalist forces of the north voiced vehement opposition to the final agreement and formed a coalition stretching across the political spectrum. The Communist Party, once again in exile, declared that the AAA represented a ‘drastic crime . . . that endangers the passage of progress and revolution not only in the Sudan, North and South, but also in all parts of the Nile Valley as well as in the Arabic [sic] area.’17 The DUP and Umma Party believed the agreement gave too much to southerners and would foster separatism. By 1974, a National Front exile group formed including both the two sectarian parties, the Muslim Brothers, and even some communists.

Leach_Book.indd 107

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

108

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Islamist opposition stemmed primarily from the Southern Regional Assembly’s right to petition the national president to remove bills before the National Assembly adversely affecting the south.18 The project to Islamize Sudan now faced a further legal impediment in the creation of the Southern Region. The AAA established a framework allowing political dialogue and compromises along the road to implementation.19 Negotiators delayed difficult decisions, such as the finality of borders and the permanent status of southern troops, as doing so was the only realistic way of reaching an agreement. The AAA, consequently, lacked the rigorous implementation regime the CPA would later include. The faith of negotiators that national and regional governments would preserve AAA institutions while building upon them was misplaced. Instead, the agreement began a new phase in southern politics with the patronage system, now free of the ideological constraints of Arab nationalism or socialism, extending to the south. Southern elites became reliant on Nimeiri alone to defend the integrity of the treaty in Khartoum. The president had positioned himself as a guardian of southern autonomy against reactionary northern forces. The coalition between Nimeiri and southerners under the AAA faced immediate problems for governing. Remote regions had not traditionally been incorporated into the Sudanese patronage system, as poverty and distance made them of limited usefulness in consolidating central power. In a vast country with such poor infrastructure, stable coalitions required a central base in the riverine region. Accordingly, Nimeiri was forced in 1977 to reconcile again with northern dissidents. He also narrowed his southern coalition to a smaller field of elites who would champion, in the name of employment opportunities and freedom from Dinka dominance, redivision of the Southern Region into three provinces. Neo-patrimonial networks rely on the benefaction of certain constituencies over others, and post-AAA southern Sudan offered many potential clients. While tribal and regional divisions were profound, one of the most significant schisms after the agreement was between southerners who had remained inside Sudan during the war, often working for the government, and those who had been either in exile

Leach_Book.indd 108

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 109

or active in the insurgency.20 ‘Insiders’ included Abel Alier and were generally more moderate and better educated. ‘Outsiders’, led by Joseph Lagu, were less willing to compromise on possible benefits from the post-war arrangements and had generally preferred armed resistance and secession during the war. The earliest post-war beneficiaries were ‘insiders’, not simply due to favoritism but as a practicality since, with the exception of some southern elites, ‘outsiders’ were less educated and in many cases even illiterate. Government employment, especially in the military, was highly sought after and advanced southern inclusion in a patronage network. Since it was barely feasible to employ all Anya Nya, most of these positions went to bettereducated ‘insiders.’ By the end of the 1970s, however, Nimeiri would turn his patronage towards the former ‘outsiders’ and induct them into his own dwindling base of support. After exhausting political partnerships in the south and instigating renewed war, Nimeiri even began arming southern insurgents to fight each other. His patronage for various Anya Nya 2 secessionist groups fighting the nascent SPLA launched a practice that Al-Mahdi and Bashir would late emulate. Nimeiri also used the tension between the authoritarian national government and the democratic administration of the Southern Region to extend his influence. While the national constitution outlined a one-party state under the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), the regional arrangement in the AAA had no corresponding function in the south. The SSU first intruded on regional government in 1973, when Nimeiri nominated Alier as the official party candidate to continue serving as the High Executive Council president, a role he had filled in the interim following the peace treaty. Nimeiri’s rationalization was that since the HEC president was required to be a member of the SSU, and since Nimeiri was the head of the SSU, Nimeiri should therefore nominate the HEC president. The intervention was actually unnecessary as Alier had majority support in the Regional Assembly.21 It set a bad precedent for democratic proceedings in the south and allowed Alier’s critics to paint him as a northern stooge. Intimidated, other candidates for the position withdrew after Nimeiri’s intervention. Thus the SSU’s very presence went against the logic of southern regional autonomy. In

Leach_Book.indd 109

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

110

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

any conflict, the national party would clearly be able to assert superiority over the regional organization whenever necessary. Nimeiri’s intrusion into southern politics to support a preferred faction became routine. Elections for the Regional Assembly were held in 1973, 1978, 1980, and 1982, with Nimeiri regularly intervening; he even arbitrarily dissolved the assembly in 1980. Provincial commissioners in the south still reported directly to Khartoum, bypassing regional jurisdiction entirely. The president had so many avenues of influence, and southern institutions were so weak, he could undermine southern autonomy even without such bold frontal assaults. Discrepancies existed in the AAA concerning the separation of powers. The agreement implicitly allowed the national president to remove the president of the HEC, and, since the cabinet would be forced to resign, the entire regional government. Furthermore, the national president had power to veto regional legislation, a significant compromise of regional autonomy. Ultimately, the agreement relied on the goodwill of the national president and his respect for the constitution of 1973 in which the AAA was incorporated. The constitutional amendment process was never used under Nimeiri, even on the question of the redivision of the south. Since the president was legally obligated to consult the HEC president and the speaker of the Regional Assembly concerning any attempts to dissolve that assembly, his 1980 proposal for a southern plebiscite on the issue of division was constitutionally suspect. The decision did not come from the region’s president or speaker but solely from Khartoum.22 In 1981, Nimeiri reinvigorated his efforts to form a reliable cadre of clients in the region while strengthening his standing with the army should opposition become violent. The president succeeded in convincing four southern politicians who had recently been defeated or removed from government, including former rebel leader Joseph Lagu himself, to sign a petition requesting that the president redivide the Southern Region. Nimeiri assured them that redivision would allow for more government jobs. There would be three governors instead of one HEC president, and 45 ministers instead of 15 under the existing Southern Region. Nimeiri also promised more money for southern development. These politicians now formed the core of Nimeiri’s new ‘outsider’ base.

Leach_Book.indd 110

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 111

Pressure from the national government to realign the southern patronage system eventually cracked the ideological coalitions forming there. In the spring 1982 elections, those who favored keeping the Southern Region united won more seats than those who favored redivision. Some southern activists charge that Nimeiri, not satisfied with initial results favoring unionists, delayed responding to the election results until he persuaded enough unionist candidates to change their position. After intense lobbying throughout May 1982, enough unionists were persuaded to vote for divisionist James Tambura that he won the election. Some had a personal distaste for Alier, but many others were persuaded by the promise of more available cabinet positions. The desire for more government positions that led to the AAA’s creation was therefore also an incentive for some politicians to repeal it. Tambura defeated the unionist Clement Mboro, and Nimeiri now had an ally in undermining the foundation of a united south. By 1983, Nimeiri felt strong enough to implement a rapid succession of moves dismantling the AAA. In June, he issued a presidential decree dividing the south into three regions again. Tambura would become head of the restored Equatorian region. Alier was removed from the national vice presidency and replaced with Lagu. It was on the basis of this abrogation of the terms of the AAA by the very parties that had agreed to it 11 years earlier that SPLM/A leader John Garang denounced the agreement as a corrupt bargain between bourgeois northern and southern elites: ‘The Northern elite dictated the terms, while the Southern elite compromised the interests of the masses in return for jobs which had long been denied them during Sudanization in the 1950s.’23 The SPLA came together between May and July 1983, nearly concurrent with the south’s redivision, and would be defined by its refusal to be ‘bought off’ by the government in Khartoum, especially during its formative years. Nimeiri was caught off guard by the insurgency and responded haphazardly. Military offensives were ineffective and various mediation and reconciliation efforts with rebels were rejected. Remembering their success in the crafting of the AAA, Nimeiri approached the World Council of Churches and such neighbors as Kenya to mediate between Garang and himself, futile gestures after his drift towards

Leach_Book.indd 111

10/17/2012 7:00:50 PM

112

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

political Islam. He attempted, without success, another ‘National Reconciliation’ maneuver between the Khatamiyya and Ansar to face the south with a united front, in the same manner as he had turned to the south to fend off these northern factions a decade earlier. By late 1984, Nimeiri was reduced to rescinding the redivision edict and returning to the original AAA. The SPLA surely must have sensed weakness in this completely arbitrary decision by a leader who had exhausted his credibility nationwide.

The Erosion of the Military as a National Institution Nimeiri’s induction of former insurgents into the military may have been a necessary condition of peace, but it began a slow ceding by the state of its monopoly on the legitimate use of force; various clients, including the military, security, and paramilitary forces, benefited. The ultimate result of this long process was the delegitimization of the national army as a guarantor of southern security and the subsequent validation of the SPLA demand for a separate southern army.24 Moreover, Khartoum’s inconsistent integration of insurgents into the national army following the AAA allowed the SPLM/A to argue for more extensive concessions on security provisions in the CPA process. The army is among Sudan’s oldest secular institutions. Founded by the Condominium in 1924, it was rarely used during the colonial period as an instrument of internal repression. The military was not seen as a detached institution, as in other African countries, but as a ‘mirror’ of Sudanese society.25 Traditionally, the military was exposed to the many ideological trends common in northern Sudan and, as demonstrated by the history of mid-level coup d’état attempts, often acted upon those trends. Because of the modern, secular foundation of the army, even conservative nationalists hesitated to use Islam as a mobilizing force in warfare. During the first war, no call to jihad against southern rebellion was issued, in part because successive regimes considered it an outmoded, anti-modern method of conflict. The Abboud regime, Sudan’s first post-independence dictatorship, presented the first compromise of the army’s reputation for impartiality

Leach_Book.indd 112

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 113

and integrity among northerners. Immediately following its 1958 coup, the army relied on its professional military composition to assure urban, riverine northern Sudanese that it would be a welcome antidote to the chaotic and unstable parliamentary period of the 1950s. The regime, however, could not adopt the appearance of neutrality in its state-building efforts as the British had done. The junta was identified with distinct elements of Sudanese society; many of its members were affiliated with the Umma Party. Civil society had grown strong in the era of independence and could better protest this bias and the autocratic nature of the regime than had been the case under colonial rule. After massive protests in 1964, sparked by the government allowance of a public dialogue about the war, Abboud stepped down. The army’s self-image as a conservative, law-and-order institution unsullied by political trends also faced internal challenges. By the 1960s, the officer corps was not as reliably conservative as it had been before independence. Gamal Abd Al-Nasser’s radical example in Egypt deeply impressed many low to mid-ranking nationalist officers. In their 1969 coup, the officers would adapt a revolutionary tone similar to that of the Egyptians, claiming that the takeover was to defend the 1964 October Revolution from reactionary forces dominating parliament. This inclusive nationalist vigor, combined with the desperation of a fragile regime seeking a new partner, allowed Nimeiri to absorb insurgents into the army. The novelty of this move disguised its being in accordance with other elements of the AAA by extending the national patronage network to the south. The incorporation of rebels into the army would have been unthinkable to the orthodox Abboud, who considered the Anya Nya to be little more than bandits impeding the army’s Arab-Islamic state-building project. The patronage system established by the AAA could not alone solidify Nimeiri’s hold on power, as demonstrated by a series of events in the mid-1970s that led him to consider another exclusivist coalition. The short-lived coup attempt in September 1975 undermined Nimeiri’s faith in his regime’s stability and convinced him to introduce amendments giving him more power to issue executive decrees and build up his security apparatus. The move continued his increasing personalization of power and his dependence on security forces, but it did not contain

Leach_Book.indd 113

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

114

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

the threat to Nimeiri from his enemies abroad. Another coup attempt in 1976 highlighted how Nimeiri’s obligations to his southern partners under the AAA compromised his regime’s security in remote regions. Many conspirators in this attempted power grab came from the western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, where there existed massive discontent over the continued lack of development. Such feelings were compounded by the national government’s collection of revenues from these regions to fund administration in the south. Growing insecurity in the south during the 1970s also contributed to the National Reconciliation of 1977, wherein Nimeiri welcomed sectarian dissidents and Islamists back into Sudan. Southern soldiers began periodic revolts as early as 1975 and 1976, when they defied authority in the towns of Akobo and Aweil respectively. These uprisings formed the basis of the Anya Nya 2, an insurgent regrouping that simmered for years until it exploded at the beginning of the second war. In February 1977, former Anya Nya forces attempted to take over the Juba airport, declaring that reinforcements would be flying in from other countries to liberate the south and overthrow the regime. This incident, coming only six months after the 1976 coup attempt, may have shaken Nimeiri’s faith in southern support. When the operation failed, the mutineers escaped into the jungle, leaving behind uncertainty as to whom their conspirators within the national or regional governments might have been.26 Nimeiri now realized the limited usefulness of his coalition with the south and the value of making amends with the factions his regime had overthrown. The security services had no personal loyalty to Nimeiri, and, by the mid 1970s, it was not clear that they could neutralize the threat from opponents in exile even if they were loyal. Due to his national weakness, which the AAA could only temporarily abate, Nimeiri chose to reconcile with his northern enemies, seeking to induct them into his patronage network. While the National Reconciliation targeted primarily the major sectarian parties, the ultimate beneficiaries were the Muslim Brothers. Nimeiri’s interest in incorporating the security apparatus into his patronage network, coupled with his need to accommodate his new Islamist allies with employment, led to a natural infiltration of Islamists into the security forces. Nimeiri

Leach_Book.indd 114

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 115

found that patronizing the security forces was even more economical than his similar efforts with the military, and his increased reliance on the former to defend his rule would be emulated by the NIF regime. Nimeiri’s last vice president, Omar Mohammed Al-Tayeb, was a career intelligence officer and became the president’s means to avoid overreliance on the military. National Reconciliation may not have marked the end of the AAA, but in practice the agreements would clearly be at odds. The National Front, particularly the Muslim Brothers, consistently pushed for a review of AAA provisions in such areas as language, culture, religion, and security arrangements. Nimeiri’s motion of inclusion towards northern exiles coincided with widespread retirements and dismissals of southern officers. These southerners had been absorbed into the national army as part of the 1972 agreement but were not recommissioned at the end of the specified five-year period.27 While these retirements did not violate the letter of the agreement, they did violate its spirit. Southerners had expected these positions to mark the beginning of regular southern representation, not serve as a one-time gesture. Unlike the CPA, the AAA was not reliant on implementation modules so much as it was on good faith between the parties. The movement of troops in the period immediately preceding the second war demonstrates well the priorities of southerners regarding causes of the conflict, which would be echoed in negotiations two decades later. As famine and economic mismanagement wracked the country and his regime began its steep decline, Nimeiri fell under pressure to access oil revenues for the state. Over the years, southerners had become suspicious of Khartoum’s intentions regarding the Bentiu oil fields. They would feel their concerns validated when, by the early 1980s, the president began rotating southern units out of the area and replacing them with troops from western Sudan. This action became a precursor to the rotation of southern troops in early 1983 that resulted in the mutiny at Bor and renewed war. The later removal of southern troops from their home region entirely, not their earlier removal from the oil regions, led to widescale hostilities. This indicates that, while exclusion from access to Sudan’s natural resources

Leach_Book.indd 115

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

116

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

and the region’s redivision may have increased southerners’ animosity towards Khartoum, only a perceived threat to southern security led to violence. As his rule became ever more tenuous throughout the 1980s, Nimeiri was increasingly obliged to ensure army loyalty. Army patronage was expensive, however, and Nimeiri soon found that rather than pay the army out of the treasury he could use state power to allow the military to function as a commercial enterprise. The armed forces received a monopoly on the importation and production of certain goods and began to make up a vital sector of the national economy. The establishment of this Military Economic Cooperation appeared to secure the regime temporarily. The army remained loyal as late as 1982, when it crushed civilian unrest over IMF-backed price rises on basic goods. With the collapse of the AAA, however, the militaryeconomic alliance may actually have exacerbated tensions in the south. The cooperative benefited when renewed hostilities disrupted reliable transport. With civilian traders from the north unable to reach southern markets, the military cornered many areas of trade throughout the region. Early profits were short-lived, however. The SPLA soon overcame army units poorly positioned and equipped to suppress the renewed insurgency. The steady compromise of the army’s role as a national institution in pursuit of more immediate political objectives resulted in Khartoum’s willingness to allow the SPLA to preserve their military capability under the terms of the CPA. The evolution of this process was long and paralleled the general waning of northern nationalism. While their origins stemmed from the early 1980s, militia networks would pose the greatest challenge to the army’s monopoly on violence by the end of the century. Khartoum’s inability at that time to stop desertification of northern lands pressured savannah nomads to move southward in search of water. This migration began intense competition between Arabized and non-Arabized tribes over grazing land. Nimeiri exacerbated this problem by arming tribes friendly to the government early in the second civil war, Baqqara Arabs in Bahr Al-Ghazal most notably.28 Later governments would continue this policy during the second civil war to demonstrate that the conflict was tribal, not ideological,

Leach_Book.indd 116

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 117

and to disguise the level of direct government involvement in suppressing the insurgency. The weakness of the parliamentary regimes following Nimeiri and their eventual inability to rely on the army to prosecute the renewed war in the south led to the most important rival of the conventional military, the umbrella organization of northern militias known as the Popular Defense Forces (PDF). The PDF represented an expansion of the patronage system to the north Sudan hinterland, where the military was too overwhelmed with the southern rebellion to provide security. The formal creation of the PDF posed an assault on such venerable institutions as the army and such weaker ones as the national assembly. After a Dinka attack on a southern Kordofan village in July 1985, tribal leaders in the region gave the visiting minister of defense an ultimatum: Khartoum would either provide security for the Arab peoples in southern Darfur and southern Kordofan or these tribes would turn to the SPLA for their security, in essence joining the insurgency. The military was at the time too demoralized and overextended to pacify the area. The minister’s delegation, therefore, decided to arm the Baqqara – without authorization from the constituent assembly. The formation of the paramilitary PDF was therefore an attempt to rely on the patronage network in conducting the civil war as the army had neither the will nor ability to act on its own. Upon the return to parliamentary politics, the factional nature of Sudan made the politics of the military a political consideration. While the Khatmiyya sectarian faction, and increasingly the National Islamist Front (NIF), had many loyalists among the ranks, Sadiq Al-Mahdi and the Umma Party typically retained only ambiguous support, especially in the officer corps. Al-Mahdi realized that by turning to a paramilitary force such as the PDF he could mobilize his Ansar loyalists independent of the army and continue relying on tribal militias. However, the decision was not a popular one. Al-Mahdi did not consult the assembly regarding militias because many members of his own Umma Party opposed the plan. It is revealing that, of the various parliamentary factions, only the NIF overwhelmingly supported this move to bolster the war effort. Hence, what began as a tool of convenience by one of Khartoum’s more

Leach_Book.indd 117

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

118

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

fragile coalitions paved the way for further compromises under the later, even less popular, NIF regime. Controversy was not limited to the political sphere. General Abd Al-Majid Khalil, the defense minister who in February 1989 would resign over the war, objected to what he saw as the prime minister’s compromising of the integrity of the army, one of Sudan’s most stable institutions. Khalil disapproved not only of the Umma-backed militias in the west and south, but of Al-Mahdi’s appointment of his own cousin, a Baqqara Arab chieftain, as army chief of staff. This appointment further demonstrated that neo-patrimonialism continued unabated even during parliamentary periods. Despite the vital need to discuss the army’s role in a peaceful Sudan, none of the peace initiatives proposed in the parliamentary era of the 1980s – not the Koka Dam Declaration, the Sudan Peace Initiative, or the Sudan Charter – touched on reorganization of the military. The AAA allowed a set amount of rebels to join the institution individually but made no deeper attempt to restructure the force.29 While the structure of the army seemed non-negotiable in Sudan’s various peace agreements, the challenges to its hitherto unique role posed by the various militias throughout the state left its unity an issue of discussion by end of the 1990s. Nationalist officers traditionally considered withdrawal from the south an unacceptable admission that the army was a northern institution only. The erosion of army capability over the course of the second war made its universal authority easier to challenge by the time of the 2003 Security Agreement. This experience of absorbed insurgents after the AAA weighed in the mind of SPLM negotiators during the IGAD process. ‘Immediate integration’ of the SPLA into the Sudanese armed forces was the government’s original position in these talks. In 2003, Khartoum recognized the SPLA’s objection that such a post-AAA integration left southerners unable to defend themselves. Both parties in the IGAD process negotiated with the understanding that for neither side to feel militarily insecure was the best way to avoid renewed conflict. To keep the peace process alive, mediators allowed the sides to avoid provisions in the agreement hindering the ability to maintain and equip their armed forces. During the negotiations to finalize the permanent ceasefire in late 2004, neither side’s primary negotiators considered the

Leach_Book.indd 118

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 119

issues of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration important enough to warrant extended discussion. These matters, so fundamental to debate in the AAA, were instead left to advisors and resource people during the CPA process.30

The Rise of Militia Warfare Resolving the tension of a regime founded on two power centers, civilian Islamists and the military, became an important step towards ending the war. The rivalry between Bashir and Turabi, which ultimately led to the deepest rift in the regime in 1999, centered primarily on the degree to which the military-Islamist coalition should stay revolutionary or become more pragmatic and conservative. Turabi believed the Islamic project should be progressive and pressed for the regime to become less authoritarian throughout the 1990s. His concept of Islamist revolution began with a military vanguard that would eventually cede power to civilian institutions as the revolution spread. By the end of the decade, he made bold demands for liberalization and spoke of reinstituting some basic civil liberties and other political reforms. Bashir recognized Turabi’s gambit as a threat to his own power. As president, he had maintained good relations with the military, his most crucial base of support. When it became clear in December 1999 that Turabi, as speaker of the assembly, was about to use that body to legislate Bashir’s powers out of existence, loyalist forces surrounded the legislative building and Turabi was dismissed as speaker. Even though Islamists had successfully infiltrated the army over decades, the military would not allow Islamist civilians, with their vision of a network of militias dominating Sudan’s state security, to take over completely.31 The Bashir-Turabi partnership, by its very nature as a militarycivilian Islamist coalition, carried within it competing objectives. While the military faction under Bashir considered the army the ultimate preserver of order and stability, Turabi considered it simply a means to the end of Islamic revolution. The NIF had sought for years to infiltrate the army with Islamists, a process that did not end with its assumption of power. The new regime methodically

Leach_Book.indd 119

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

120

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

removed senior army officers it deemed a threat, even as Bashir himself had accused the previous government of undermining the army’s efforts in the south through its excessive focus on political objectives. Reorganization of the army for political reasons was, therefore, not a new concept for Islamist officers. While many might have understood the need for the regime to switch to civilian leadership for appearance’s sake, they became increasingly concerned about Turabi’s transfer of security duties to civilian institutions. Turabi believed that, so long as the military dominated the regime, a perfect Islamist state would not be achieved. Even after years of Islamist infiltration, the army remained difficult to Islamize completely. Turabi envisioned that the PDF would eventually replace the army as Sudan’s dominant fighting force.32 He accepted that an authoritarian regime needed coercion capability but preferred to rely on security services and popular militias, over which he as a civilian had more control. Gradual state reliance on tribal militias to fight the war undermined the military’s monopoly on force. Critically, it was also cheaper to supply militias than to train and equip an expanded conventional army. Militias did not receive regular salaries but instead kept the spoils of war, allowing Khartoum to deny accountability and blame their actions on the generally fragile security situation or inter-ethnic violence. The NIF regime expanded Al-Mahdi’s PDF militias after their 1989 takeover, introducing conscription and better coordinating with tribal leaders. Most military members of the new junta were suspicious of any rival to the army, but they could not argue with the early success of the murahileen, Arabized nomads based in Bahr Al-Ghazal and western Kordofan who revitalized the war effort against the SPLA. As the imperative of the war became to guard the oil fields, relying on tribes located near producing areas seemed more practical than transporting troops unfamiliar with the territory to fight there.33 Relying on tribal militias also meant fewer casualties among conscripts recruited from the urban centers, thereby mitigating the war’s unpopularity in these crucial areas. As the SPLA grew stronger in the late 1990s, Khartoum hastened it efforts to recruit tribal militias on the north-south border. These militias operated autonomously from the command of the regular armed forces, weakening Khartoum’s authority over them and blurring the

Leach_Book.indd 120

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 121

line between organized militia and affiliated tribal forces. Militias pursued not only the government’s agenda but also local vendettas. The subsequent government-sanctioned brutality often radicalized non-Arab Sudanese in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile regions who might previously have been neutral in the war or even sympathetic to Khartoum. As organized resistance to Arab tribal raids increased, government-backed militias, frustrated with their lack of government funding, sometimes cut their own deals with the SPLA and southern peoples. By 1997, momentum favored the SPLA again, and the PDF was running out of recruits. During 1998, PDF recruitment in the north reached an all-time low, and Khartoum increasingly invested in another long-running practice: supporting South Sudanese militias against their SPLA rival. The Bashir junta promoted its alliances with southern militias throughout the 1990s as a ‘Peace From Within’ process, signing a series of agreements with various anti-SPLA southern factions. After the 1992 Frankfurt Agreement, Khartoum began patronizing the breakaway SPLA factions in earnest, demanding they be allowed to participate in the first round of peace negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria. The SPLA breakaway group SPLA-United, later the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), began to accept government arms and funds. Khartoum also armed smaller, tribe-based Equatorian militias that resented the heavily Dinka composition of the SPLM/A hierarchy and the movement’s authoritarian nature. NIF-favored candidates took governorships in the south and treated the state budgets as largesse.34 Under the guise of better coordinating these southern militias, the government sought to marginalize militia leaders by sapping their autonomy. By the mid-1990s, some purported secessionists appeared ready to discard even the possibility of secession, with the apparent willingness of Lam Akol’s movement, a primary breakaway faction of the SPLA, to settle for self-government within Sudan. Reik Machar, another Garang rival, saw his forces divided into units that were eventually removed from his command. Finally, Machar betrayed his initial separatist goal entirely by consenting to a token degree of federalism in an Islamist Sudan. By 2001, his movement was ideologically exhausted and irrelevant.35

Leach_Book.indd 121

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

122

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

For the government, the southern militias had both a military and political purpose. By signing various peace agreements with militias and demanding their presence at negotiations with the SPLM/A, Khartoum could demonstrate a faithful pursuit of peace efforts and stave off international efforts to brand it a warmonger. It could also portray the SPLM/A as one of many groups, and therefore unrepresentative of the southern majority. However, once the regime became more serious about a negotiated peace after 2001, it began to neglect separatist elements, many of which had already collapsed or returned to the SPLA by that point.

Coalition-Building in the Second War: New Norms for Conflict Resolution The tactical nature of the NIF regime accelerated the decay of institutions under its rule. As the NIF compromised such institutions as the army and the banking system, it created new norms. In the first war, parliamentary and military regimes conducted the war in the south with similar levels of intensity. Both regime types were nationalist and shared an objective. However, the way these governments conducted war differed substantially from the conduct of the Bashir regime and the final years of Nimeiri. Neither Islamist autocrat had nationalist objectives at heart, and, therefore, each enjoyed a freedom to cut deals with southern militias for long-term promises of independence in exchange for short-term support against the SPLA. When it came time to negotiate with Garang after he abandoned his objective of national revolution, secession became a reasonable alternative. More became subject to negotiation in the second peace settlement not simply because the SPLM/A had more numerous demands than the SSLM had, but because the Bashir junta made so many earlier tactical agreements indicating what it would allow in a settlement. In the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997, the government met with several factions of the umbrella militia organization the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) and agreed to allow a four-year interim, preceding a referendum that would allow the south to opt to secede from Sudan.36 This treaty had no significant impact but set a precedent by

Leach_Book.indd 122

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 123

which the SPLM/A could bargain for a similar six-year accommodation in the July 2002 Machakos Protocol.37 When Khartoum finally began to make peace with the only substantial insurgent movement in the south, the SPLM/A, negotiated southern independence became a possibility for the first time in Sudan’s post-colonial history. The SPLM/A and international actors pressured the government to repeat earlier concessions, only this time in a more substantial, comprehensive, enforceable treaty. As an SPLM/A negotiator during the IGAD process explained, these previous treaties ‘laid the basis for the CPA.’38 The Bashir regime revealed its ultimate priority, unhindered Islamization of the north, over the course of several years. At Abuja 2, an early initiative to end the second war hosted by Nigeria in 1993, Peter Kok charged that the government’s hidden agenda ‘was to secure a deal for NIF-SPLA Condominium rule over the Sudan. [The Bashir regime] invited the SPLA to be a full partner in the system and to participate in and defend it.’39 The specifics of resource-sharing were not discussed in Abuja, however. Khartoum also objected to provisions for an independent southern army and multi-party democracy. While many of these demands would later be realized in the CPA, the government could not accommodate the SPLM/A at that time, as the insurgents had recently committed to multi-party democracy through agreements with other National Democratic Alliance (NDA) members. The SPLA-NDA partnership for a democratic, egalitarian Sudan was in keeping with SPLM/A principles but complicated peace efforts. Khartoum could not make the same compromises on religious law with northern opposition groups as it could with the SPLA. The tension became obvious with the Cairo Declaration of May 2003 signed between Garang and sectarian leaders Sadiq Al-Mahdi and Mohammed Osman Al-Mirghani. It called for a secular national capital, which until then been a point of contention in the peace process. Two months later, in the Kenyan town of Nakuru, the government delegation angrily rejected a draft proposal of the idea, indicating strongly that subordination of Sharia to any other national consideration was off the table. Only at this point were the real contours of the regime’s priorities apparent and what set it apart from the traditional religious parties truly clear. Unlike the

Leach_Book.indd 123

10/17/2012 7:00:51 PM

124

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

sectarians, Bashir would not concede the Islamist project in northern Sudan, even for the sake of peace or national unity. After rejecting the Nakuru document, the government realized it needed to demonstrate that its Islamist policy had popular backing in the north. It loosened restrictions on certain elements of civil society, particularly on supporters of the ousted Turabi, and appealed to their patriotism and shared faith. While the Nakuru draft contained much of what the parties would eventually agree to, it was too early in the process for the government to make needed concessions. Only when IGAD negotiator General Lazaro Sumbeiywo convinced Bashir to allow Vice President Ali Osman Taha to negotiate directly for Sudan did the delegation have authority to cede such sensitive points. During the Naivasha talks, Taha became the highest profile representative of Islamists who sought to temper their revolutionary vision with pragmatism, eventually throwing in their lot with Bashir during his struggle with Turabi. While factionalism and personality played a role in the split, at its core existed growing ideological differences. By 2001, the regime had lost its revolutionary fervor. It had destroyed the northern sectarian power bases and preserved Islamic law, but it could not spread its revolution to other Muslim countries; no one wished to emulate the Sudan experience. It had prevented compromise with the SPLA but could not defeat the movement. Bashir felt he had to remove the ideological element of his regime, even at the risk of losing its legitimacy. Turabi’s revolutionary project was not compatible with the pragmatic nature of Bashir’s new vision of a rentier state which prioritized stability while consolidating the Islamist gains made so far. Bashir’s tack towards pragmatism even drew support from former Turabi acolytes. As head of security in the 1990s, Taha had been a powerful Turabi loyalist, who attempted to replace the traditional tools and institutions of the state with Islamist alternatives. After a decade of mixed results, he concluded that Islamists had to become more practical about transforming the state, adhering to established Islamic laws but scaling back Turabi’s broader revolutionary vision. The failure of Islamic finance networks was another incentive for Taha and his successor as security head, Salah Abdullah Gosh, to switch camps from Turabi to Bashir. By late 1992, scandals had plagued Islamic

Leach_Book.indd 124

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 125

banks and charities and undermined their revenue-generating ability just as Sudan was on the verge of becoming a major oil exporter. There would be no better time for a security professional to re-establish himself as a client of Khartoum. The schism between Turabi and Bashir led to a dramatic realignment of partnerships and coalitions among Sudan’s elites. One rift came within the PDF militias, encouraged by Turabi’s new denunciation of the conflict as a false jihad. Turabi cultivated ties with pious peoples in the more remote areas of the north. Now powerful leaders of such tribes as the Misseriya and Rizeigat, formerly participants in the jihad against their southern neighbors, began discouraging young men from joining the militias. Turabi continued the tradition of alienated northern politicians in the second war by reconciling with the SPLM/A. Throughout 2000, he transformed himself into a vigorous advocate for representative democracy throughout Sudan. His ultimate rebuke of Bashir came in the February 2001 signing of a memorandum of understanding with the SPLM/A supporting southern self-determination and declaring that an Islamic state could not precede an Islamic society. In June 2003, SPLM/A representatives met with Turabi in London, and Garang met with the sectarian leaders Sadiq Al-Mahdi and Mohammed Osman Al-Mirghani in Cairo. They affirmed an allegiance to secular law. At this point, Turabi’s Popular Congress Party (PCP) announced its support for the principles of the Machakos Protocol, thereby diffusing the possibility that Islamists who did not agree with the peace process would pose a serious threat to it. Bashir faced pressure to retain Sharia law from protests of urban Islamists, many of whom remained active in the PDF. The president was constrained from supporting a more moderate position because he drew most of his support from this urban group, which was better positioned than the remote tribal militias to challenge Bashir’s leadership if they sensed he was being too conciliatory. The resurgent debate over the role of religion in the state became a delicate issue after the Machakos Protocol in 2002, when the regime was forced to find common ground with the militantly secular SPLM while avoiding outrage from its urban Islamist base. Bashir, therefore, avoided

Leach_Book.indd 125

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

126

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

any public role in the negotiation process so as not to be drawn into taking a premature stance on such delicate issues as the status of Sharia law in the capital. He instead presented himself as operating at the behest of the Sudanese people in his defense of religious law throughout the north.

The National Democratic Alliance and the CPA The National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the umbrella network of anti-government groups formed soon after the Bashir coup, represented a broad cross-section of Sudanese society. For negotiations to occur between this coalition of dissidents and a government with no popular base might have seemed a natural circumstance. In the tradition of Sudanese conflict, however, the regime preferred to sap the movement’s power by luring individual elements back with patronage. Susceptibility to this practice, combined with a lack of coherence or fighting power, led the NDA to play no direct role in the IGAD process. Upon its 1989 formation, the NDA was initially united only by its shared hostility to the new dictatorship. It did not gain cohesion until the mid-1990s, partly because its sectarian party members were overly certain that, like Nimeiri, the fragile Islamist regime would eventually be forced to negotiate with the popular factions it had overthrown. Accordingly, they waited fruitlessly for several years before turning towards reconciliation with the SPLM/A. In December 1994, the Umma Party and the SPLM/A signed an agreement endorsing such tenets as secularism and southern self-determination. After an initial period of wariness, the NDA and SPLM/A took steps to work in concert against Khartoum. Finally, in the Asmara Declaration of June 1995, the NDA united the SPLM/A and 14 other parties opposed to the NIF regime. While it had little ideological solidarity, the NDA’s very existence demonstrated a measure of inclusiveness and seemed to reaffirm the reconciliation efforts the sectarian parties had made individually towards the SPLM/A during the 1980s. In addition to their united front of

Leach_Book.indd 126

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 127

opposition to the government, the NDA factions complemented each other. The SPLA had a seasoned, dedicated military presence inside Sudan, which the NDA lacked. The NDA provided the SPLM/A with political legitimacy in northern parts of Sudan and helped the insurgency establish itself diplomatically in the Arab world, most notably with Egypt. Like the SPLA in the early 1990s, the NDA suffered from internal divisions brought on by the expulsion of formerly supportive states. Unlike the SPLA, it never fully recovered from these differences. When war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998, the NDA lost its two primary benefactors as each state wooed Khartoum to assist it against the other. At the same time, Bashir was trying to neutralize the NDA by offering ‘carrots.’ While Khartoum sought to marginalize the traditional sectarian orders throughout most of the 1990s, only the schism between Bashir and Turabi towards the end of the decade led to a new patronage approach. From the outset, Bashir hoped to make a National Reconciliation type of deal with the ousted sectarians. As early as 1993, he appeared to realize that, while he could not avoid negotiating with all the regime’s enemies, he could opt for bilateral talks in order to make private deals with opposition elites. In his quest to keep what he considered an ideological revolution pure and untainted by Sudan’s reactionary religious figures, Turabi had prevented such efforts. Sectarian elites were similarly repelled by Turabi’s rhetoric, which dismissed them as colonial Sufi relics. They were, therefore, reluctant to approach the regime while he retained power. With Turabi gone, Bashir felt free to make peace individually with the sectarian leaders. Seized property was returned to those elites who abandoned the NDA and came back to Khartoum. The Islamic project had removed assets from both the Mahdist and Khatmiyya factions but had not changed the allegiances of their rural followers, who were too traditional to adhere to the NIF’s brand of revolutionary Islam. Bashir hoped to tempt back the leaders who could appeal to their many loyal followers on behalf of the regime. The quickness with which he succeeded exposed the decline of sectarian power inside Sudan and the inherent weakness of the NDA. Both Khatmiyya and Umma elites understood that they could only cultivate their movements from within

Leach_Book.indd 127

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

128

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Sudan. After years of alternating persecution and patronage by various regimes, allegiance to the sectarian leaders was no longer so deep that they could organize their followers politically or militarily while in exile. Most northerners were not eager to join the SPLA in the fight against the government, but simply wanted little to do with the war at all.40 Once the sectarians had returned to Sudan, Khartoum had little to fear from them. In its eventual negotiations with the SPLM/A, Khartoum relied on elites within its fold to mollify conservative northerners who retained Sufi loyalties but were suspicious of the peace process. During one round at Naivasha, Khartoum negotiator Ghazi Salahuddin Attabani successfully encouraged Umma and DUP members to attend the negotiations as witnesses. On 4 December 2003, Taha met with Mohammed Osman Al-Mirghani, who was then simultaneously leader of the DUP, the NDA, and the Khatmiyya order, in Saudi Arabia to sign a peace accord. DUP officials later confirmed that this demonstrated NDA support for the IGAD process.41 Those NDA members not drawn in by the regime would learn that a failure to organize militarily had been a costly mistake. At a meeting in Cairo in 2003, NDA representatives complained to SPLM/A officials that they did not feel their interests were being adequately represented in the ongoing peace process. SPLA official Pagun Amum instructed the umbrella organization to ‘use your stick in the East if you want the government to pay attention to you.’ 42 As the chairman of the Beja Congress, Omer Mohamed Tahir, told ICG in October 2003, after the conclusion of the Security Agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM: ‘The lesson we learned is that IGAD and the government will only listen to force. The SPLA were recognized because they resorted to force. This is why we launched our activities in the east.’43 The Darfur rebellion arose in part out of the resentment felt by marginalized peoples in that section of Sudan at not having their grievances addressed in the IGAD process.

The CPA Challenge to Exclusivist Coalitions The IGAD participants and mediators after Machakos believed that, given the sweeping nature of the issues to be covered in the talks, the

Leach_Book.indd 128

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 129

early inclusion of too many parties had the potential to render the forum dysfunctional. Leaks and ulterior agendas might sink the process as groups with competing priorities jostled for position. Instead, the IGAD mediators made it clear during negotiations at Naivasha that they envisioned a two-step solution: begin with an agreement between the Sudan government and the SPLA, then bring in other groups through elections. Many participants recognized that the fatal flaw of the AAA was the failure to bring in other parties to enhance the legitimacy of the agreement. The 1972 agreement’s inability to stabilize the regime meant that only five years later, Khartoum felt compelled to sign a separate agreement with northern exiles, one completely uncoordinated with the AAA. The exclusionary tendency of negotiations would continue during the second peace process as well. As talks progressed after the Machakos breakthrough in 2002, the negotiating delegations on either side began to shrink. Garang replaced Salva Kiir as lead negotiator first with Garang loyalist Nihal Deng Nihal, and then he assumed the role himself. Similarly, several observing parties, including the USA, felt that Khartoum’s lead negotiator, Ghazi Salahuddin Attabani, was ineffective. Vice President Taha replaced him with Idris Mohammed and then took over duties as the primary, and occasionally only, negotiator for Khartoum. Direct talks among elites marked a level of engagement unprecedented in the history of Sudanese conflict resolution, but there was a danger that such contact might perpetuate the exclusive coalition building which traditionally defined such agreements. The private, bilateral negotiations between Vice President Taha and John Garang beginning in 2003 were not recorded. Both parties and mediators avoided discussion of the human rights violations that occurred throughout the war, and mediators later stated that the government and the SPLM sought to grant each other a general amnesty concerning such issues but were discouraged by outside parties.44 During the Naivasha process, the NDA and civil society organizations pressured the mediators and the two parties, especially the SPLM, to recognize the need for an eventual democratic transformation in Sudan. While both parties initially held that there would be no elections during the interim following

Leach_Book.indd 129

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

130

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

the agreement, the SPLM/A proposed an arrangement in which elections would be held at all levels, including the presidency, before the end of the third year of the interim. Under the 2004 Power Sharing Agreement, the parties also agreed to the free establishment of political parties for that election.45 Despite Garang’s alleged authoritarian tendencies and his exclusion of other SPLM/A mediators during latestage negotiations, the SPLM/A’s long-term interest was in keeping the results of negotiations as inclusive as possible. Dissatisfied factions might return to violence and even receive government support as had become a tradition with SPLA antagonists. Garang tried to counter this possibility by allowing a small amount of non-SPLM/A southerners in the Regional Assembly and by attempting to induct southern militias into the SPLA proper.46 While negotiations were often conducted solely between Taha and Garang, Kenyan mediator Sumbeiywo played middleman, protecting them from the interference of outside parties looking for a seat at the table. Sumbeiywo writes that, rather than try to exclude him, at times both parties attempted to involve him more than he believed appropriate: ‘Early on the parties started wanting me to produce papers for both parties, so that they could attribute it to the Secretariat, claiming it wasn’t their position. They were concerned about their people back home accusing them of selling out.’47 By the signing of the Machakos Protocol in mid-2002, civil society in the north had steadily re-emerged after over a decade of arrests and crackdowns on independent organizations and activists. Intense public interest in the peace process would provide another avenue for the resurgence of civil society in the north, to the government’s dismay. The Sudan First Forum, a group of civil society leaders, politicians, and academics, formed in mid-2002 to evaluate the Machakos Protocol and recommend their own proposals to the two parties and the mediators. By April 2003, the government had suppressed the group’s initiative.48 The junta wanted full control over the peace process, prohibiting NGOs and religious organizations from involvement. Bashir no doubt remembered that an open forum to discuss resolution of the ‘southern problem’ in the first war led to escalating protests resulting in Abboud’s 1964 resignation. Throughout 2003 and 2004,

Leach_Book.indd 130

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 131

bolder pushes by non-Islamist candidates in the larger unions and associations forced the government to reassert control. The resurgence of civil society in the 2000s made keeping the CPA process exclusive more difficult than it had been in previous agreements. The Bashir regime sought to temper civil society’s political effect generally. The robust civil society that had emerged from the parliamentary era of the 1980s became the regime’s target as, from 1989 to 1992, NIF security forces cracked down on newspapers and trade associations, often in search of NDA sympathizers. The government’s heavy-handed tactics increased the likelihood of a backlash but also allowed Khartoum a free hand in its war policy, foreign policy, and implementation of Sharia law. To avoid the slow undermining of institutions created by a new treaty, as occurred following the AAA, the 2004 Power Sharing Agreement made it clear that the new constitution for the government of national unity was to be subordinate to the CPA and the 1998 constitution. Where laws in the interim constitution conflicted with the CPA, the latter took precedence. In contrast to the AAA, which was adapted into the 1973 constitution that followed it and had no priority over administrative structures previously in existence, the new constitution was designed to be an instrument of the legal implementation of the CPA.49 For the duration of the war, most civil administrative and law enforcement positions in SPLA-controlled territory were occupied by SPLA veterans. It was rare that such positions would be merit-based and open to civilians. Consequently, civil administration management was often personality oriented, and rigidly militaristic in composition. As the second war progressed, the SPLM was forced to consider the needs and opinions of civil society to better administer regions under its control. This process continued during peace talks when workshops united senior administrators, community representatives, and NGOs in a dialogue covering such topics as civil administration, health, education, and law enforcement. The SPLM needed the feedback generated from this type of gathering to assess what the foundation for administration might look like after the war. In this way, the insurgency could determine what to push for in a peace settlement, even if

Leach_Book.indd 131

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

132

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

it did not allow broad elements of civil society to participate directly in that settlement. As the SPLM/A yielded to pressure to stay more attuned to the needs and demands of southerners, it was also forced to curb its ambitions to the will of this constituency. The Machakos Protocol of 2002 represented a more practical re-evaluation of the Declaration of Principles concluded eight years earlier. The protocol was necessary to move negotiations forward after a long and dangerous period of impasse. The IGAD process had reached a stalemate by 2000 after a round in which mediators delivered a statement to the parties essentially paraphrasing the 1994 declaration with no real additions. The next step at that time was not clear, though in a 26 September letter the SPLM/A indicated that commitment to southern self-determination must be firmer than that already stipulated in the Declaration of Principles.50 Two years later, negotiations got back on track in Machakos. SPLM/A chief negotiator Salva Kiir endeavored to find a substantial issue on which the parties could compromise. There had been no progress on the issue of a secular Sudanese state, so Kiir sought an agreement on power sharing, also unsuccessfully. Only on the issue of self-determination could the SPLM/A make a serious breakthrough not already covered in the abstract by the Declaration of Principles; a six-year interim was locked in before a referendum on southern self-determination.51 Kenyan negotiator Sumbeiywo explained the urgency to convert the Declaration of Principles into a more specific negotiating text when he addressed what he believed were the dominant issues of contention: ‘self-determination and the separation of state and religion.’52 The Machakos Protocol was essentially a reiteration of the Declaration of Principles, with the major exchange of the latter’s advocacy of a secular Sudan for a more concrete promise of southern self-determination. While neither party found this arrangement ideal, it more accurately clarified their fundamental priorities. IGAD mediators had great difficulty in getting the two sides to talk to each other in the year following the breakthrough at Machakos, and introducing less militarily powerful parties would only have

Leach_Book.indd 132

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 133

complicated the process. With the collapse of the NDA as an effective opposition group and the reconciliation of the SPLA with the many separatist factions it had fought during the 1990s, rebels were now extremely suspicious of Khartoum’s exclusive brand of deal making. Southerners and northerners alike had been lured by Khartoum’s promises, to disastrous result. Consequently, rank-and-file SPLA were deeply reluctant about the possibility of Garang personally meeting Vice President Taha to negotiate areas of contention, as he was expected to do in September 2003. Except for Salva Kiir and Pagan Amum, Garang’s advisors and most of the 3000 commanders meeting in Rumbek preferred he not attend the conference. However, Kenyan Foreign Minister Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka told the SPLM/A’s top officer in Kenya, Justin Yac, that if Garang did not come to Kenya, the SPLM/A delegation would be kicked out of the country. Insurgent credibility would be damaged in the eyes of IGAD’s Western backers, and Khartoum could argue that the SPLM/A was not serious about peace negotiations. Without this meeting it was possible the peace process would disintegrate.53 The challenge to exclusive coalitions directly affected the crafting of the peace process. IGAD mediators had no authority to fix the structural problems of Sudan, and it became apparent that neither Taha nor Garang nor their delegations were free to make concessions regarding their constituencies’ core demands. Advisors were tasked foremost with attending to the warring parties’ grievances to the degree that cease-fire conflict would end. They were not charged with providing a permanent solution. While he lacked prior experience in conflict negotiation, both parties regarded Sumbeiywo as a credible mediator. Nicholas Haysom, a South African member of Sumbeiywo’s team, recalls that the general also excelled at applying appropriate pressure on the parties: ‘He tried to be assertive on the process but leave the substance to the parties.’54 The flexibility of this mediation was not conducive to introducing heavy structural changes to the Sudanese state, but a less-flexible process might not have been as successful. Patricia Lane, an Australian resource person on wealth-sharing issues, believes that Sumbeiywo’s mediation style was effective ‘‘because he was the sole mediator over

Leach_Book.indd 133

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

134

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

wealth, power, security and the three areas [Abyei, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile].’ He didn’t have a large bureaucratic team, he had only a couple of dedicated advisors in the power sharing: the rest were basically resource people brought in ad hoc to deal with specific issues, who then departed . . . Sumbeiywo didn’t say, ‘This is my mediation strategy, step one, step two, step three,’ he would do whatever worked or looked like it would break the deadlock of the day.55 Lane argues that Sumbeiywo ‘took different tacks’ in mediating if the existing strategy had reached an impasse. By contrast, Lane notes that other mediation processes in Sudan have been less successful. When you compare it with subsequent mediations, all of them have been run through bureaucracies with a degree of diplomatic protocol that tended to get in the way of fast changes in tactics. It is difficult to be critical of the AU in the subsequent negotiations on Darfur; they had a much less centralized and more disorganized set of players in the movements. But there were also a lot of advisors, which in some cases might have reduced flexibility.56 In the 1990s, attempts were made to turn the Declaration of Principles into a more broad-reaching, conciliatory negotiation framework. Government negotiator Ali Al-Haj came close to conceding on the issue of southern self-determination, and even to some compromise on the issue of Sharia during the mid-1990s negotiations. However, he was subsequently removed and Khartoum quickly issued a statement declaring such concessions would not be made.57 Not until years later would the government again be amenable to such compromises, when internal restructuring of the regime, combined with pressure from the SPLA and outside actors, facilitated the drafting of the Machakos Protocol. The difference between the 1994 and 2002 agreements demonstrates an understanding that the conflict could end but only with a

Leach_Book.indd 134

10/17/2012 7:00:52 PM

PATRONAGE, STATE D YNAMICS, CONFLICT R ESOLUTION 135

recognition that each party had achievable and unachievable priorities. In deference to his sidelined NDA partners and wary rank and file, Garang sought to avoid cutting an exclusive deal with Khartoum. The provision that non-SPLM, non-NCP representatives could be elected was meant to retain some slender element of his original nationalist vision. As a practicality, the SPLM had to avoid open-ended exclusive deals with Khartoum because it was still not strong enough to alienate other government opposition groups if war resumed. In recognizing the limits of his organization’s strength, however, Garang was forced to concede that the SPLM/A no longer had the power or will to fight on behalf of all Sudanese and would assume the role of a southern force. Abdelwahab El-Affendi contends that the CPA indeed represents a significant change to Sudan’s government, noting that its protocols ‘prescribe limits beyond which various tiers of government must not trespass, and individual and group rights that may not be violated.’58 He also notes that: The agreement is unique in that it has not come about as a result of any major transformation in either the outlook or the relative strength of the major parties. Both parties remain as committed as ever to divergent, even antagonistic visions for the future of the state. Both remain strong enough to seek to advance that vision. Both entertain realistic hopes that the agreement will make them even stronger. Both have hailed the agreement as a victory for their project.59 While no ‘major transformation’ concluded the CPA, the applicability of this statement more to inter-state wars rather than civil wars shows the CPA in fact led to an enormous transformation. Not only does the treaty seek structural change, it reflects an entirely different vision of the Sudanese state – one that challenges the principle of the state’s very unity. Furthermore, the agreement challenged the effectiveness of Sudan’s neo-patrimonial networks by allowing the south to retain its military power.

Leach_Book.indd 135

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

CHAPTER FIVE SECUR IT Y, R ESOURCES, AND DEVELOPMENT

The contest over natural resources played a significantly smaller role in Sudan’s first war than its second. Before the 1970s, oil companies found few opportunities to invest in remote areas.1 By the end of that decade, the more relaxed commercial atmosphere and the stability of post-civil war Sudan allowed for the discovery of enormous oil deposits in the southern central region, with the largest reserves in the Bentiu region of the former Upper Nile province. The introduction of oil wealth into Sudanese conflict made resolution of the second war a much more complex and intricate affair than that of the first, as oil reserves gave added emphasis to wealth sharing, geography, and even identity. Oil internationalized Sudanese conflict and added yet another lens through which groups in the conflict viewed their identity and sought to formalize it. The Sudan conflict, it has been argued, is a product of environment, with resources playing a more substantial role than visions of identity and cultural insecurity.2 A thorough examination indicates the opposite: oil wealth did not spark the second rebellion but exaggerated pre-existing animosities that initiated and prolonged the war. Contrary to some economic determinist theories of conflict suggesting that resources lead to ostensibly ethnic and religious civil wars, SPLA objectives in the second war were not initially dedicated to the exclusive grievances of one religion, ethnicity, or even region. In Sudan, resources may simply have given a more legitimate, quantifiable face

Leach_Book.indd 136

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

137

to the unique economic marginalization of the south; southern resistance movements had never been entirely successful at presenting this marginalization as distinctly southern since neglect of remote areas was such a national phenomenon. The need to resolve the contest over natural resources with a wealthsharing protocol extended not only the length of the second war but of the peace process. The division of oil revenue between parties required a distinct agreement, and oil impeded such critical benchmarks as the implementation of a lasting cease-fire throughout negotiations. The SPLA continued fighting during the Naivasha process out of concern that, with a stable security situation, the government could extract southern oil and use oil money to purchase arms or diplomatic support for the war. The government consequently sought to improve its regional security by guarding oil fields with either troops or proxy militias. Both parties’ emphasis on security discouraged integrating individual SPLA insurgents into the national army as part of a settlement, the arrangement that had occurred in the AAA with former Anya Nya. Instead, southerners finally achieved the oldest of insurgent demands, an independent army for the region. Oil production contributed to Sudan’s identity conflict by increasing the disparity of wealth nationally, which exacerbated regional and ethnic animosities. Capitalizing off the resulting tensions became a regular practice of the Bashir junta, which relied on new revenues to enhance the neo-patrimonial structures it needed to govern. As in the post-AAA period, extending this network required placating some southern elites with high-ranking jobs or other benefits. After the CPA, however, southern elites would enjoy both a broader power base in the region and a formidable standing army, challenging the neo-patrimonial hierarchy and the integrity of the state it governed. The political and military struggle over oil and other natural resources should be considered in the context of southern Sudan’s wider concerns about its own regional development throughout both wars. Nothing strikes more closely at the sensitive issue of development than the Jonglei Canal project to increase Nile water flow in southern Sudan. An examination of Sudan’s debate over oil wealth with respect to this much older project is instructive to understanding

Leach_Book.indd 137

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

138

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

southern concerns about development and natural resources. Ignoring the interrelatedness of development, security, and resources ensures misidentifying the origins of conflict.

Security and Cease-Fires in the Sudan’s Settlements The preference for a stable security environment to extract natural resources added another dimension to the importance of cease-fires in civil war. The introduction of oil as an issue of contention led to additional military and legal problems, such as the abandonment of cease-fire agreements and the auctioning of oil concessions to multiple parties. Such behavior would have derailed the Addis Ababa negotiations, which were largely based on the good faith established through a quick series of confidence-building measures, including cease-fires. ‘Talking while fighting’ was a more pronounced feature of the second war’s peace process, but the tendency for parties in both wars to break or otherwise take advantage of cease-fires is well documented. The separatist nature of the first war meant that Anya Nya insurgents rarely had incentive to allow liberal northern forces room to move diplomatically. No government in Khartoum, no matter how openminded about southern concerns, would allow the region to secede peacefully, the only objective that would facilitate a southern ceasefire. After the fall of the Abboud regime in 1964, the Anya Nya took advantage of the transition government’s repealing of harsh security measures in the south to beef up their strength. This damaged that government’s credibility with northern voters, who opted for more hawkish leadership in June 1965. Perhaps also due to the lack of coordination between its political and military wings at that time, the Anya Nya relied on coercion out of habit. Even as late as December 1971, when preliminary mediation efforts had begun in the Ethiopian capital, both Khartoum and the Anya Nya launched new offensives. It took a change in southern objectives to disrupt this pattern. Once SSLM leader Joseph Lagu determined that a separate southern state borne out of revolution was an unrealistic objective, his immediate goal became the creation of an atmosphere conducive to negotiations

Leach_Book.indd 138

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

139

for regional autonomy. At the 15 May 1971 meeting between World Council of Churches/All Africa Council of Churches (WCC/AACC) representatives and those of the May Regime, it was resolved that: (1) Khartoum supported WCC/AACC attempts to contact Anya Nya representatives interested in reconciliation with the government. (2) Groups to be represented had to have broad influence in the south. (3) Talks could be held in any location. (4) Khartoum would agree to an interim ‘cooling-off’ period, providing no risk to security was involved. (5) Discussion would be limited to regional autonomy within the context of a united Sudan. (6) ‘The question of under whose auspices the talks would take place would be discussed later.’3 In June 1971 the WCC/AACC delivered these conditions to Mading de Garang, the SSLM representative in London. The SSLM responded point-by-point to the six items, specifying that regional autonomy was a starting point for issues concerning the status of the south and that it preferred an actual cease-fire to a ‘cooling-off’ period. A cease-fire might establish trust among parties and ensure Anya Nya representatives could safely reach Ethiopia to participate in secret talks with representatives from Khartoum. By January 1972, it was the insurgency, not the government, which was most adamant about a cease-fire before the Addis Ababa negotiations. The May Regime’s acquiescence to this condition signalled a breakthrough in efforts to end the war. Approval of the proposal was not unanimous within the regime. Some nationalists believed it would be a de facto recognition of the Anya Nya as a second army within the state, delegitimizing the national army’s traditional monopoly on force. Others did not oppose a cease-fire so long as it facilitated a political settlement. In contrast with the SPLA, southern insurgents in 1972 had no known oil resources to prevent Khartoum’s exploiting. It was therefore easier for both sides in the first war to use cease-fires as trustbuilding measures; there was less tactical incentive for either side to

Leach_Book.indd 139

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

140

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

violate them, and violation would not have achieved broader strategic objectives. At the end of the negotiations in Addis Ababa, Khartoum boldly announced a unilateral cease-fire on 12 March 1972, before the agreement was finalized. This move was astute, not only because it was a leap of faith demonstrating Khartoum’s sincerity, but also because it presented the AAA not as merely a starting point for discussion but as the document that could potentially end the war. This put pressure on the SSLM to hold to the terms negotiated by that point as the final agreement, rather than to push for better terms in another round. The early fragility of this cease-fire was underscored when it later became clear that some Anya Nya fighters might not hear of the agreement for months. In addition, many Anya Nya fighters, some of whom would soon form the separatist Anya Nya 2, did not support the concessions made by the SSLM on their behalf. The parties, however, had built up a sufficient level of trust that the agreement withstood immediate challenges. In conjunction with reassuring events, such as the Anya Nya’s December 1971 release of the northern survivors of a plane crash in territory they controlled, the cease-fires created a climate conducive to negotiations. Nevertheless, underscoring the patronage nature of the AAA, Lagu refused to ask his men to turn in their weapons until they received positions and modern weapons in the Sudanese army. Peace fell upon the SSLM suddenly. In early 1972, the movement was still establishing its reputation as a legitimate representative body with whom the government should negotiate, not simply a gang of bandits unworthy of recognition. Khartoum refused to recognize Anya Nya groups in any capacity for most of the war, in part because the insurgency had such a disorganized hierarchy, but also because Sudan possessed the insecurity of a recently independent state seeking to establish its sovereignty and internal security. The cease-fire and other events allowed for a unique conciliatory atmosphere that the parties were quick to use for mutual advantage. By 2002, the SPLM/A had far surpassed the use of cease-fires as a milestone of legitimacy. Its representatives had already met several times with representatives of the Bashir regime and previous governments. Khartoum might seek other methods to discredit the

Leach_Book.indd 140

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

141

insurgency but could not deny that the SPLM/A was an ideologically driven, effective rebel force. Instead, cease-fires became another tool of war. Until the early 1990s, the regime’s representatives at the Abuja discussions made it clear that they would not agree to anything other than temporary cease-fires until political issues were resolved. The government was convinced that it could eliminate the SPLA as a threat with its June 1993 offensive, and the SPLA in turn did not want to hold to a cease-fire while it was at such a strategic disadvantage on the ground. By 1994, this pattern was well enough established that the IGAD Declaration of Principles stated formally what had become the SPLM/A’s de facto policy: the only cease-fire the SPLM/A would commit to with certitude was one that coincided with a final settlement.4 The few cease-fires issued towards the end of the conflict were usually violated. By 1997, the regime began to press for a cease-fire before negotiations could even commence, asserting that such a move was a vital confidence-building measure between the two parties and was necessary for any discussions of the complicated issues in contention. Two urgent incentives existed for this line of reasoning. First, from an economic perspective, it would be far easier to extract oil from the southern fields during a cease-fire. Second, the regime hoped to reverse its increasingly isolated diplomatic situation while fighting against a politically resurgent SPLM/A. Khartoum’s repeated disregard of previous cease-fires – including one organized in 1995 by Jimmy Carter, the former US president, during a high-profile visit to the Sudan – gave the regime little credibility with the SPLM/A or neighboring states. Such a pattern of broken agreements continued to mark the 1997–2001 stalemate.5 By the end of the century, oil revenues had gone from being a longheld government objective to an economic reality. They were a key factor in creating the stalemate that would abate with the Machakos Protocol but only be fully resolved with the conclusion of the CPA. By 1999, a pipeline from the southern oil fields to the Red Sea became fully operational, throwing the government a financial lifeline in its war efforts. The SPLA immediately began targeting the pipeline; its first attack occurred in September 1999. Insurgents escalated their

Leach_Book.indd 141

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

142

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

military campaign to destroy the rationale behind Khartoum’s assurances to the northern public that oil would buy the weaponry necessary to crush the SPLA. Insurgents even briefly captured the Bahr Al-Ghazal garrison towns of Raga and Dem Zubeir by June 2001. The following August, an insurgent assault on Heglig in Southern Kordofan showed they retained the capability both to enter northern Sudan and to attack areas near the oil fields. Even in the lead up to the Naivasha process, the perception that the government used cease-fires in bad faith elsewhere in Sudan undermined attempts to implement them in the south. The government’s willingness to reorganize troops for further offensives was underscored after the Nuba Mountains cease-fire of December 2001, when Khartoum transferred troops from that area into western Upper Nile to remove local people from strategic areas surrounding the oil fields.6 The practice of negotiating without cease-fires posed a serious threat to the Naivasha peace process, which got underway in mid2002. At Machakos, IGAD mediator Sumbeiywo had gone along with the SPLM/A demand that negotiations take place without any immediate cease-fire because he believed that continued hostilities might put pressure on the parties to conclude the process quickly and deter them from unrealistic objectives. New oil contracts in which the parties shared revenue could only come into effect after the conclusion of a comprehensive peace treaty; Khartoum thus had an incentive to sign contracts before the final agreement as it would not be required to share those revenues. Neglect of such loopholes did nothing to discourage the perceived untenability and persistent violation of cease-fires. Negotiators established a negotiating framework in 2002 and then needed to sell it to wary constituents. This necessity may account for the Machakos Protocol’s vagueness about what constituted ‘democracy’ and ‘secularism.’ The agreement seemed intended to draw the interest and support of parties not up to that point involved in the IGAD process. Despite the apparent exacting deliberation at Machakos to ensure growing levels of consensus among parties, it soon became obvious that even the principal participants could not agree on the goals of the peace process. Bashir signed the document at Machakos without first

Leach_Book.indd 142

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

143

ensuring that Vice President Ali Osman Taha and Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismael, among others, supported the declaration. Ismael in turn had reassured Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that no agreement signed with the SPLM/A would allow southern self-determination.7 That section of the protocol in particular raised objections from senior officials that, in the future, others regime member must have the opportunity to discuss such provisions.8 The SPLA capture of Torit in October 2002 and the resulting deaths of several government officials – including a close associate of President Bashir – gave the government an excuse to temporarily withdraw its negotiators. To save face, Khartoum could not resume talks without retaking Torit and succeeded in doing so only a few days later. After a few more skirmishes had satisfied honor, IGAD mediators persuaded both sides to return to Machakos by 17 October, this time agreeing to a cease-fire for the duration of the negotiations. When neither side initially abided by the cease-fire, Sumbeiywo called for both parties to renew their commitment in February 2003. This amended cease-fire included an article specifically calling for a halt to construction of the Bentiu-Adok road, which allowed access to the oilproducing areas along the border. The amended document served as a mechanism ensuring troop movements for both parties and their allies became more transparent; it also appointed an international monitoring team.9 Despite violations, the Memorandum of Understanding allowed enough stability for international NGOs to expand operations in the south. Southerners widely understood this move to signal that the war was coming to an end. The difficulty in relying on temporary cease-fires during negotiations lent urgency to a permanent security agreement becoming the natural next step of the peace process. The prospect of a final agreement led to one last burst of cease-fires and skirmishes, however. As late as September 2004, the governmentbacked SSDF militia worked with military intelligence to capture strategic southern towns and improve Khartoum’s standing before the war’s end. While the 2003 Security Agreement instructed the Sudanese army to begin redeploying its regular units out of the south in preparation for a final settlement, Khartoum had for years supported and cooperated with militias still actively hostile to the SPLA.

Leach_Book.indd 143

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

144

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Unlike the situation preceding the AAA, the government during the Machakos process had strong economic incentives to control territory in the south through its proxies. The more territory its southern allies controlled, the harder it would be for the southern government to implement security measures or pose a threat to the oil fields. In the second war, oil and security issues shared a close relationship.

Sudan’s Economic Partnerships Government desire for substantial oil revenues to consolidate its power, coupled with a required level of stability and security for oil extraction, has shaped Sudan’s relationship with international economic partners. The internal politics of potential foreign partners, particularly in the West, has also limited Sudan’s options in this regard. The Bashir regime was ill prepared to continue the war upon assuming power in 1989. Sudan would not become a net exporter of oil until 1999 and had not received superpower patronage since the fall of Nimeiri in 1985. During the interim period, Khartoum relied on the investment of friendly regional governments. It also began to forge business relationships with wealthy radical Islamists such as Osama bin Laden. By the mid-1990s, Sudan’s renewed efforts to secure the Bentiu oil fields and attract investors to its oil sector made Khartoum less reliant on such patrons. During this rehabilitation process, the regime would discover Western oil companies to be unreliable economic partners. Pressure from Western NGOs and governments ultimately ended most Western oil investment in Sudan in the years preceding the Machakos Protocol. The USA banned its oil companies from operating in Sudan during the 1990s, and smaller companies such as Canada’s Talisman also pulled out eventually. By 2001, European activists started raising awareness about Sudan. The European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, a group of more than 40 European NGOs, sought to end oil development and the marketing of Sudanese Nile Blend until a comprehensive peace agreement was in place.10 Western companies were also reluctant to work in politically unstable areas, as demonstrated when a January 2002 counteroffensive by the Sudanese army in the Bentiu area forced a consortium managed

Leach_Book.indd 144

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

145

by Sweden’s Lundin Petrolum to suspend operations for the second time in two years. During a lull in the hostilities over the summer of 2002, Khartoum ordered companies to resume work or have their concessions cancelled. That October, Lundin and Austria’s OMV approached Malaysian and Chinese representatives and proposed a new consortium with Khartoum to review its management of security.11 The deal collapsed, however, and both companies had sold their rights by mid-2003. Over time, most Western companies were eventually replaced by Asian state-owned rivals that were less sensitive about Sudan’s internal policies and less risk-averse. After 1999, the regime stalled the SPLA’s advances long enough to convert oil revenue into mortars, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. By August 2001, Sudan was producing enough oil to earn observer status at OPEC meetings. The economy resumed growth throughout 2001 and 2002, though most of the new oil revenue was put towards war-related activity. Khartoum also used its new wealth to solidify strategic international alliances. Sudan’s desire to capitalize on oil revenue led it to diverge from a simple profit-based, economic determinist pattern of behavior. Sudan did not seek to improve relations with the West in order to partner with the more advanced, efficient Western oil companies. To the contrary, in order to avoid reliance on Western companies that might be susceptible to public pressure over Sudan’s human rights record, the regime chose to do business with less technologically advanced non-Western oil firms. This hindered Sudan’s ability to capitalize on oil revenue, as new partners from such areas as Eastern Europe were not as adept at exploration and production as their Western rivals.12 The regime realized, however, that alternatives to the West would be necessary for the duration of the war. As Sudan looked ever eastward for wartime investment, China quickly emerged as an attractive partner. Not only did its booming economy provide a dependable consumer base for Sudan’s oil, but it could also offer the weaponry Sudan needed and provide a UN Security Council veto over resolutions condemning Sudan for human rights abuses. Khartoum slowly cultivated its relationship with Beijing, often at the expense of Western oil companies. Critics charge that in the

Leach_Book.indd 145

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

146

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

mid-1990s, Khartoum even pressured the small Canadian firm Arakis to allow the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) into the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) consortium so the regime could have greater access to Chinese weapons.13 With Western investment drying up, the Khartoum-Beijing alliance could more fully blossom. China provided an economic-diplomatic-military package not easily replaced by Western companies. For China, energy security was more important than commercial interests in CNPC planning. The CNPC presence allowed China to invest in less lucrative or strategically important areas of the Sudanese economy, such as pharmaceuticals, banking, agriculture, and industry. While these were peripheral areas of trade for Beijing, they helped cement China’s role as Sudan’s dominant trading partner and provided a model for further investment in Africa. China’s concern about the flow of oil from Sudan contributed to its vacillations in the peace process. In 1997, GNPOC completed work on a pipeline connecting the western Upper Nile to the Red Sea. Chinese workers coordinated activity with the Sudanese army, which forcibly depopulated southerners in the area. The campaign to clear the oilproducing regions for wells and infrastructure met significant resistance from SPLA troops. However, after the oil from the region came online two years later, China urged a settlement to keep oil extraction and transportation stable. This attitude shifted again by 2003, when China began moving more armed personnel to Sudan to protect a new pipeline, allowing Khartoum to divert its own forces to other unstable areas, such as Darfur and the east. China’s preference for bilateral relations likely inhibited it from playing a larger role in the IGAD process, which involved several tiers of activity from multiple states. More assertion about Chinese preferences for the terms of a peace agreement after 2002 might have been expected, as China was purchasing over 65 per cent of Sudan’s oil at that time.14 China, however, came to realize peace need not threaten its interests. With its role as Sudan’s dominant oil purchaser secure and with infrastructure in place for exporting, a stable environment actually became preferable. Beijing provided an incentive for Khartoum to reach a final agreement with assurances that, if the security situation

Leach_Book.indd 146

10/17/2012 7:00:53 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

147

around the oil fields improved, China would switch to financial payments for the oil it bought rather than trading oil for Chinese goods, a common practice in the past.15 China retained a close relationship with the ruling NCP but understood it would need to establish contact with the SPLM and show its interest in the success of the CPA. To this effect, following the 2005 settlement, China contributed more than 400 peacekeeping troops to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).16 While initially only a small presence in a force of 10,000, this contribution nevertheless indicated endorsement from a crucial player.

Legal Disputes Over Oil Concessions Throughout the peace process, the battle over southern oil was fought militarily, politically, and legally. The SPLM/A not only attacked oil installations to destroy the government’s revenue stream, but also signed contracts with oil companies over concessions the government had already sold. The objective was to voice SPLM/A unhappiness at what it considered government deception over oil contracts. Like broken cease-fires, however, the resulting legal confusion further eroded trust between the two parties. SPLM/A officials signed legally dubious oil contracts in retaliation against Khartoum’s rapid selling-off of concessions just before the conclusion of the CPA.17 As the SPLA relied on the threat of resumed hostilities to maintain its military leverage, it also used the threat of competing concessions to provide political leverage when negotiating with Khartoum. As a final peace accord seemed increasingly likely, however, such actions only branded the SPLM (soon the government of South Sudan) as unserious about peace and incompetent in business matters. In hindsight the legal gambit was an expression of southern frustration with Khartoum at the delay throughout 2003 of a final peace agreement. Rather than trying to increase its share of wealth, the SPLM apparently complicated the legality of concessions to protect the security of southerners in areas affected by Khartoum-contracted concessions. In September 2003, the SPLM/A stated that for a final peace agreement the government would have to renegotiate contracts ‘deemed to have fundamental social and environmental problems

Leach_Book.indd 147

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

148

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

which can not be rectified by remedial measures.’18 Southerners argued that, since they had not been consulted, the contracts were illegal. By January 2004, the SPLM/A appeared willing to concede the issue. According to the terms of the Wealth Sharing Agreement, existing contracts were not renegotiable. Khartoum accepted language allowing for remedial measures should contracts create serious social or environmental problems. The SPLM could assign representatives to review the contracts, and affected parties could receive compensation.19 In further recognition of SPLM concerns, an appeals process was fashioned so states could contest oil contracts signed during the interim.20 The right to renegotiate contracts was itself a negotiable point for the SPLM/A but not for the government, which did not want its business reputation with international oil companies damaged. The government informed southerners that their region would also suffer from oil companies’ fear of political instability and subsequent wariness of investing if contracts were dishonored. Such a lack of confidence might pose a hurdle for renewed investment from Western oil companies, since the possibility of the south’s secession already made the area high risk for oil operations. As the process stalled in late 2004, southerners pressured the government to return to the negotiation table by raising legal challenges to concessions that Khartoum had signed throughout the course of that year. The southern Sudanese regional oil company, Nile Petroleum, and another company appointed by the southern government were to join a consortium in the southern oil fields. A consortium led by Total, a French petroleum company, renewed its annual agreement with the government in December 2004 to the oil-rich area of Bentiu called ‘Block B,’ a concession it had held since 1980. Two months later the SPLM/A charged that it had signed a deal for that concession the previous August. Continued legal and technical difficulties with these southern concessions led to John Garang’s February 2005 pledge to deregister concession agreements the SPLM/A had signed before the CPA. 21 The SPLM was less cooperative on the division of southern aboveground resources. It insisted on the establishment of a National Land Commission and a Southern Sudan Land Commission to adjudicate competing land claims and provide legal protection to the customary

Leach_Book.indd 148

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

149

land rights of local communities.22 The parties disagreed over the foundation of Sudanese property law: one option was the Land Registration Ordinance of 1925 that allowed traditional landowners some freedom to keep titles. Alternatively, the Bashir regime held to the Land Act of 1970, which deemed all land to be property of the government unless otherwise specified.23 The SPLM argued that the 1970 law was enacted at the height of the first civil war, before the SPLM even existed, and was too dated to hold relevance. In addition, much of the documentation on land ownership had been lost or destroyed during the second war. The SPLM proposed instead that land should be regarded as belonging to local communities, on whose behalf the insurgents considered themselves to be negotiating. Patricia Lane, an Australian property lawyer who assisted as a resource person during the wealth-sharing negotiations, recognized that the issue of landownership could become a considerable obstacle to an agreement. Rather than hinge the resolution of the land dispute on the resolution of the ownership debate – which was intractable – Lane suggested the parties record the existence of a disagreement and create mechanisms to resolve it later. This arrangement became the basis of the national and southern land commissions, which envisaged a process of land law reform to sort out the question of ownership.24 The same dispute existed in relation to ownership of natural resources. Especially concerning natural resources, Lane argued that ‘the purpose of making this agreement is really how to share the wealth.’25 The parties agreed to leave aside the question of ownership if the mechanism for dividing the returns from resources could be achieved.26 This compromise encapsulated some of the parties’ priorities. Preoccupied with maintaining oil revenues from already negotiated contracts, Khartoum was not as urgently concerned with demonstrating its sovereignty by claiming these resources so long as revenue was not threatened. Khartoum also recognized southern autonomy over surface land as a legitimate demand of the SPLM/A that was in accordance with the principles of self-determination outlined in the Machakos Protocol.27 Most importantly, Khartoum understood that control over southern land was not a negotiable issue for the SPLM. Use of land could not be divided as neatly as the profits from

Leach_Book.indd 149

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

150

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

subterranean resources, and the people who lived there had a history and a relationship with it. Accordingly, a more complex regime had to be established. While its undemocratic nature allowed the SPLM/A delegation to Naivasha more freedom to negotiate with the government than it might otherwise have enjoyed, the movement was still forced to address the priorities of southern constituents if it hoped to implement an agreement without popular resistance. Championing land rights, therefore, took precedence over ownership claims on subterranean resources. Oil revenues might have been crucial to the SPLM/A in financing an army and reconstructing the south after over two decades of war but, as Lane explained, the pastoralist and agrarian majority of southerners had other priorities: People don’t actually see a lot of their own cultural or economic interests being articulated when you talk about oil. Because oil . . . they just pack it off out of the country in a huge pipeline, whereas land and their own economies are going to be much more poignant and meaningful.28

Oil Wealth and the Southern Army SPLM/A concerns over the security situation created by the concentration of oil wealth in the south facilitated the demand for an autonomous southern army, controlled solely by the government of South Sudan. A southern army, independent of Khartoum’s control, had been a long-standing southern condition in acquiescing to a united Sudan throughout both wars. Oil wealth did not create the southerners’ desire for a separate army. Since independence, southerners had believed that without an autonomous security force they could be politically disenfranchised in a united Sudan. This suspicion was reinforced during the wars, even under ostensibly democratic governments. In 1986, for example, the instability and chaos of the early second civil war led the government to cancel voting in half the southern constituencies.29 The IGAD mediators also came to realize how important a separate army was to southerners. In his visits to the south during the Machakos

Leach_Book.indd 150

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

151

process, Sumbeiywo discussed with residents their concerns and objectives for a settlement. He observed that, ‘the people did not mind dividing oil or living under Sharia law. All they wanted was to have their own army.’30 As Garang stated: Our guarantee is organic. The fact that Southern Sudan will have its own separate army during the interim unity in addition to the integrated forces and other security forces is the only fundamental guarantor and indeed the cornerstone for the survival of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.31 It was yet another reason that a security agreement was the first protocol to be agreed upon after Machakos. An autonomous military force remained a consistent objective of southern insurgents throughout both wars. At the 1965 Round Table talks, southern representatives pushed for a southern militia, responsible to the national government, to operate regionally in place of the national army. Northern representatives refused, arguing that such an arrangement would compromise the nation’s sovereignty by limiting the jurisdiction of the national army, one of Sudan’s strongest national institutions. Khartoum had not sought to diffuse the issue at that time by integrating southerners into the existing security apparatus. Few southerners were inducted into the army, police academy, or prison warden services after independence. The issue emerged again during the AAA negotiations. Government negotiator Abel Alier notes that during these discussions ‘security was the area where the most sensitive nerve of the North-South conflict was embedded. All other matters, including sharing of economic resources, depended upon it.’32 As during the Naivasha process 30 years later, security became the first topic of discussion at Addis Ababa after the initial breakthrough of agreeing to meet in the first place. The SSLM believed it should control an autonomous army to protect the new Southern Region in case the May Regime fell and a new government attempted to abrogate the treaty. Insurgents rejected a government counterproposal for a ‘road gang,’ or a border patrol, primarily because it would pay members less than the national army was paid and would

Leach_Book.indd 151

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

152

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

keep southerners in the countryside away from the towns, where they felt they were most needed to protect civilians.33 For the SSLM, the capacity to defend southerners from Sudan’s own troops was potentially more important than defending the national border. Security provisions were intensely debated in the lead-up to the AAA. One proposal discussed at the February 1972 negotiations advocated a reinstitution of the Condominium-era Southern Command, with fixed ratios of southern to northern troops in the region. The two parties, however, could not agree on the composition; the government argued for three northern troops to each southern troop, southerners for the reverse ratio. Khartoum’s delegates were reluctant to compromise without knowing the size of the Anya Nya force, later estimated to be between 10,000 and 15,000. In a move emulated by the SPLA three decades later, the SSLM team refused to provide numbers for fear it would compromise insurgents should the agreement collapse. The government proposed stationing 15,000 troops in the south, half northerners and half southerners. The SSLM resisted because only 4500 of its troops would have access to the armory. The rest would be prison wardens and police. The security deadlock became the most dramatic impediment to a final agreement, finally leading AAA moderator Burgess Carr to ask that Emperor Haile Selassie intervene. Selassie persuaded the parties to submit to a 50/50 ratio of troops in the south, leaving only the total number to discuss. After a subsequent debate, southerners finally accepted 12,000 troops in the south, with half of them to be Anya Nya and all to have access to the armory. Nimeiri faced more than just political pressure to avoid compromising the army’s integrity. After the 1971 purge of the left, his regime depended exclusively on military support, and he believed he could not risk the resentment integrating former insurgents might cause. However, Burgess Carr reveals that the civilian negotiators were the most unwilling to compromise on forces in the south, while the officers were more flexible.34 This underscores the point that a united military was more important to the political tenets of Sudanese nationalism than it was to actual military effectiveness. The integration of Anya Nya individuals, rather than units, into the national armed forces was complicated and unpopular with southerners, but Joseph Lagu’s

Leach_Book.indd 152

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

153

decision to lead by example and rejoin the army as a major general helped facilitate the transition. In the south, however, protests for separate regional military arrangements persisted. Among proposed amendments to the AAA presented by Lagu to Alier on 27 March 1972, though later discarded, were proposals to create two armies and two financial institutions.35 As a young captain in the Anya Nya, John Garang also voiced several early criticisms of the AAA. Instead of insurgent integration, he proposed three separate armies: one for southern Sudan, one for the rest of Sudan, and one that was a mixture.36 This division of force would become the foundation for the security agreement he negotiated three decades later at Naivasha, Kenya. Garang’s advocacy of national revolution, as opposed to regional autonomy, meant that by the time the SPLA emerged in the early 1980s he was no longer the most forceful advocate for the ‘multiple army’ solution. Early southern adversaries of the SPLM/A now championed the idea, especially separatists at odds with the militant vision of unity Garang’s movement advocated. In November 1984, William Chuol, an Anya Nya 2 leader and an early Garang rival, put forward to Nimeiri a federal plan that was almost a confederation of the north and south with independent regional armies.37 Throughout the rest of the 1980s, however, few of the charters or workshops instigated for the purpose of ending the war dealt seriously with the issue of military reorganization, possibly because none ever progressed far enough to confront this sensitive issue. By July 1989, however, Garang was demanding from the new Bashir regime that, in addition to a secular democratic regime, SPLA troops reintegrate into the national army on a 50/50 basis.38 This new demand was in response to the growing push within the insurgent movement, and the south generally, for southern regional autonomy, possibly in preparation for secession as a more immediate goal than national revolution. This sentiment erupted violently during the 1991 insurgent schism. The September 2003 Security Agreement, though the first protocol to be signed after the Machakos Protocol, took over a year to conclude. A catalyst was Bashir’s angry July 2003 dismissal of a draft proposal at Nakuru, Sumbeiywo’s attempt to end the deadlock over how to follow

Leach_Book.indd 153

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

154

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

up the breakthrough at Machakos. While the proposal for a secular national capital was most offensive to the regime, another contested provision was for a separate southern army. Sumbeiywo overreached with the document, but Khartoum’s absolute rejection of it struck many Western IGAD supporters as evidence of a less than sincere commitment to the peace process. US Special Envoy John Danforth in July 2003 speculated that perhaps neither side really wanted peace at all. Washington intimated that, while relations with Khartoum might improve following a new protocol, they would certainly become worse without one. Khartoum likely chose security as the next issue to resolve both to appease IGAD players and to prevent the derailment of talks by increased hostilities. The regime wanted to buy time before negotiating more sensitive topics, such as wealth sharing and the status of Sharia law in northern Sudan.39 Many involved in IGAD’s mediation suspected that government negotiator Ghazi Salahuddin Attabani did not have the standing in the regime to make concessions. In September 2003, IGAD successfully petitioned Bashir to allow Vice President Taha to attend as a negotiator. Upon his arrival in Kenya, Taha fell under immediate pressure to concede on at least one substantial point following Khartoum’s dismissal of the Nakuru document.40 Eventually, the government agreed to the principle of two armies, along with smaller Joint Integrated Units that included troops from both parties. The funding became problematic, however, as Khartoum argued it could not finance a southern army that had until very recently been an insurgent force fighting against the state. The SPLA objected, arguing that not funding the southern army would be contrary to the national, united spirit outlined at Machakos. Primarily because they would not acquiesce to the national government’s demand to reveal troop numbers and other details, the rebels finally accepted that the southern government would fund the southern army. The creation of two armies connected by a smaller integrated force became the first example of Garang’s strategy for the peace process: to create national institutions easily separated in the event of southern independence. The principle of ‘unity, with the capacity of separation,’ not of regional devolution, dictated the creation of southern institutions

Leach_Book.indd 154

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

155

that mirrored the national.41 This bifurcated vision allowed Garang not only to appeal to southern separatists, but also to buy time during an interim for the SPLM to consolidate its gains free of warfare. Taha’s consent to removing the national army from the south by July 2007 was seen as vindicating the SPLA’s charge that the army had been an illegitimate occupying force. The regime’s preference to make this enormous concession rather than curb Islamic law in the capital provided another indication that political Islam had finally trumped Sudanese nationalism. The meeting between Taha and Garang overcame internal resistance in their own parties. Taha faced opposition to this meeting from hardliners in his own regime, in particular from the negotiator he had replaced at Naivasha, Attabani. Garang was almost detained in Rumbek by his own commanders, who had grown suspicious of Khartoum’s stalling and questioned the wisdom of meeting with Taha. After the prolonged July-September drama and the signing of the Security Agreement, the parties took a hiatus from the talks in October 2003. Taha and Garang would reach another impasse over the status of the Abyei region, and both men would feel the pressure of internal politics within their own camps once again.

Oil Wealth and Southern Militias The 2003 Security Agreement barred armed groups other than the SPLA and the national army from operating in the Sudan. Such groups could be incorporated into either one force or the other but could not operate independently.42 The most obvious casualties of this provision were the government-aligned militias Khartoum had relied upon as proxies to protect oil fields from SPLA attacks and to fight in areas of the south inaccessible to the national army. As a final peace agreement seemed increasingly likely, the militias challenged the SPLA’s status as the only lawful southern army. The SPLA rejected continued demands by the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), one of the larger militias, for recognition in a final agreement, stating that such a move would abrogate the already completed security protocol. Once that protocol was compromised, the government might also try to reopen

Leach_Book.indd 155

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

156

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

protocols it wished to see renegotiated. The SPLM, and the government of South Sudan (GOSS) that it dominated, spent much energy during the interim trying to neutralize the spoiler potential of the SSDF and other militias. Under the CPA, the national army was limited to 24,000 troops in the south as part of the Joint Integrated Units. Should the government wish to support southern militias, they would have to become part of this force.43 Such absorption was unlikely to occur for a substantial amount of SSDF troops, as Khartoum realized their secessionist nature made them potential SPLA allies if the south chose secession in the 2011 referendum. Following the September 2003 Security Agreement, John Garang sought to begin a dialogue with the SSDF leadership. Until the signing of the CPA, this effort had mixed results. Khartoum was determined to prevent the two southern groups from becoming too close, either by limiting their contact or by exacerbating tensions between them. A critical point of contention between the SPLA and SSDF was that the CPA wealth-sharing provisions were much less generous to the south, and the oil-producing regions specifically, than were provisions in the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA) the SSDF had signed with the regime. Under the KPA, which allied the SSDF with Khartoum, southerners were entitled to three-quarters of the oil revenues generated in the south, while under the CPA the region received only half the revenues.44 The specific areas producing oil in the south were entitled to 40 per cent of that revenue under the KPA, while under the CPA they receive only 2 per cent. This arrangement reflected the nature of the militias signing the agreement. Many were composed predominantly of Nuer, the Nilotic people who lived in oil-rich areas like Bentiu. Suspicions that other southerners, especially Dinka, might claim what they saw as their wealth led them to believe a tactical agreement with Khartoum might best defend their interests. The SPLM/A, on the other hand, claimed to represent the broader needs of the south. It argued that substantial oil revenue need not be diverted to the producing areas since, as occurred in Bentiu, they would benefit from the development and infrastructure provided by oil companies and the national and southern governments.

Leach_Book.indd 156

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

157

The SPLM/A leadership realized its legitimacy in negotiating a lasting agreement would hinge on what sort of compromises it could forge over substantive technical issues, such as the division of oil revenues. In the early post-Machakos Protocol discussions about wealth sharing, the SPLM/A referred to the generous terms of the KPA regarding oil revenue for the south and insisted that if weaker, less broad-based militias such as the SSDF could argue for three-quarters of the revenue, the SPLM deserved 90 per cent.45 By October 2003, after the signing of the Security Agreement, the SPLM/A scaled back its demands to 60 per cent oil revenue for the south, 5 per cent for oil-producing regions, and the remainder for Khartoum. The 50/50 arrangement, distributed only after the oil-producing states received 2 per cent, finally appeared in the wealth-sharing protocol of January 2004.46 The SPLM appeared to join a National Petroleum Commission as a trade-off for the government to concede 50 per cent of the oil revenues. However, this was in keeping with the Machakos Protocol’s framework of unity-minded, integrated institutions.47 In the days before the conclusion of the Wealth Sharing Agreement, the government attempted to revive a section of the Nakuru Document it had dismissed only six months earlier. This section called for transferring money from the national government to the south, according to an agreed percentage of the Gross Domestic Product.48 The SPLM/A refused and held to its demand for a direct sharing of oil revenues. The government finally conceded on this point, in a large part due to international pressure, particularly from the USA, to complete a comprehensive agreement during early 2004. When the SPLM/A renounced a claim to oil outside the south, the government finally agreed to the 50/50 division of southern oil. The method for collecting and dividing revenue also provoked debate. While the southern government could split non-oil revenue and taxes evenly with the national government, the south had almost no tax base by 2005. Nearly all regional revenue would come from oil wealth. For the SPLM/A it was, therefore, vital to retain a large percentage of oil revenue as a practical matter in addition to the symbolism of the south reclaiming its resources. The method proposed by Khartoum, in which the national government regularly transferred funds to the south, lay discredited after the May Regime failed to act on a similar system

Leach_Book.indd 157

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

158

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

implemented following the AAA.49 The new arrangement also appealed to separatists in the south: it would be easier for them to remind southerners that at the beginning of the interim, Khartoum had shown little interest in sharing national resources. Rather than continuing the AAA’s objective of reorganizing institutions in the name of unity, the CPA was devoted to clarifying and codifying differences between the parties in such a way that they would not erupt into conflict.

Regional Boundaries and Natural Resources Since independence, Khartoum had routinely redrawn boundaries to gain access to natural resources and deprive the south of revenue. This redrawing became an issue of contention in both agreements. In the early 1960s, for example, the Abboud regime transferred the copperrich areas of Hofrat en-Nahas and Kafia Kingi from Bahr Al-Ghazal to Darfur. The AAA stipulated that these areas were to be returned to Bahr Al-Ghazal. Nimeiri’s discrete leasing of Kafia Kingi to Chevron oil in the late 1970s, followed by the outright transference of the area back to Darfur in 1980, was another violation of the agreement. Nimeiri also kept the proceeds from licensing the Bentiu oil fields, even though the AAA specified that the southern regional government was to legislate where such revenue went.50 The contested border area of Abyei also complicated the interim peace in terms of both security and natural resources. Taha and Garang concluded a 2004 agreement that established wealth-sharing provisions for revenue from that region separately from those of the CPA. It became clear during the interim that most oil produced in northern Sudan would come from Abyei, which was now critical to the survival of the regime. According to the agreement, the national government was to receive 50 per cent of revenue from Abyei, the Government of South Sudan 42 per cent, and the local people and states, 8 per cent. The debate over the status of Abyei at Naivasha shared characteristics with that over the south as a whole. The SPLM/A first argued that Abyei be transferred to the south by presidential decree. When the government refused, the SPLM/A suggested a self-determination referendum, similar to, but separate from, that scheduled for

Leach_Book.indd 158

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

159

the south at the end of the interim. Though the negotiations were concurrent with the other Naivasha protocols, Khartoum would not discuss the interim status of the disputed areas under the auspices of IGAD. It allowed Sumbeiywo to represent Kenya, but not the regional body, as a mediator. This condition reflected Khartoum’s desire to negotiate with insurgents in remote northern areas separately from those in the south. Sumbeiywo asserts that Khartoum prevented him from including other parties in the CPA, instead inviting him to attend the separate peace negotiations for Darfur and the east if he wished.51 The regime sought to cast the SPLA as an exclusively southern fighting force with no legitimate claims to areas outside that region. In Abyei, as in the south generally, the problems of oil only built upon the pre-existing problems of identity. Resources alone could not explain this area’s uniqueness for understanding Sudanese conflict. Colonial officials transferred the Abyei territory to northern Sudan for the ease of administration in 1905, but sustained ethnic conflict between Misseriya Arabs and Ngok Dinka only began during the first civil war decades later. Abyei remained a contentious issue in the years following the AAA, even before the discovery of sizeable oil deposits. A subsection of the 1972 agreement allowed for areas of Sudan outside the Southern Region that were ‘culturally and geographically’ southern to be included in the region after a referendum on the motion, but no such referendum took place.52 Francis Deng, a Ngok Dinka, inserted this section during a meeting with the SSLM delegation in London before their trip to Addis Ababa in late 1971. It was not in reference to Abyei alone, but to the southern Blue Nile, Chali Al-Fil, the Nuba Mountains, and any other border area wishing to have a referendum. When Nimeiri opted not to implement this provision of the AAA, no member of the south’s regional High Executive Council, the only body that could legally protest under the AAA, seriously challenged the decision.53 The failure to act upon this provision demonstrated the creeping provincialism of southern administration after the conclusion of the first war. With peace and a measure of autonomy, southern politicians felt less incentive to champion the claims of the remaining disputed areas.

Leach_Book.indd 159

10/17/2012 7:00:54 PM

160

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

The redrawing of state and provincial borders for political redistribution of resources became a constant theme in the history of independent Sudan, but nowhere more so than in Abyei immediately before the CPA. Khartoum created the Heglig locality in 2000 and the Sitep locality in 2005, removing key oil areas from Abyei proper.54 In December 2004, SPLM officials charged Khartoum with moving the enormous Heglig oil field from the Upper Nile state to Kordofan just before CPA finalization.55 This action denied the southern government a large source of income and became a contentious issue throughout the interim; contradicting 2005 and 2009 decisions did not resolve the issue. Another topic of dispute in the Abyei area was the status of migratory peoples and permanent residents. At the outset of negotiations on the disputed border areas in 2004, Khartoum demanded that delegates from each party be residents of the area under discussion. The subsequent presentation of a Misseriya Arab as a government negotiator drew southern objections. The Misseriya visited Abyei seasonally, and the SPLM/A refused to accept their status as ‘residents’.56 In January 2007, Bashir claimed that the experts in the commission on Abyei’s borders had exceeded their mandate by producing not a map describing the Ngok Dinka area transferred in 1905 to Kordofan, but rather a map showing the 1965 settlement. This, Khartoum claimed, forfeited the commission’s authority to decide the issue. SPLM partisan Luka Biong Deng believes that the debate over the Abyei commission was meant simply to delay the implementation of that protocol and its agreement on the extraction of oil in that region; he notes that it is estimated that Abyei produced 65 per cent of northern oil during this period.57 That both parties’ constituents considered the Abyei compromise unsatisfactory explains why it was the only text of the CPA ‘for which neither side claims any ownership.’58

Development and the Patronage State As the initial goals of the British in Sudan were strategic rather than economic, only selective, government-dominated development was implemented under the Condominium, a pattern post-colonial

Leach_Book.indd 160

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

161

governments continued. The early independent Sudanese state generally was unable to promote development throughout the countryside and instead built on the development structure it inherited, which consisted of a few small projects in remote regions. Despite rhetoric advocating laissez faire capitalism for the south, economic projects during the Condominium were directed by the state. However, southern industry was not developed and the region was not tied economically to the rest of Sudan. Independence exacerbated this trend, as from the late 1950s until 1972 almost no economic development occurred in the region. The Abboud regime even relocated northwards projects initially scheduled for the south to accommodate its power center.59 Southerners realized by the period of the Addis Ababa discussions that any post-war economic activity in the region would rely heavily on the development of natural resources. While the AAA recognized that the Southern Region would need some control over resource management, it did not foresee how important such provisions would become. One article of the agreement allowed the Regional Assembly control of legislation over mines and quarries in the south, so long as such laws did not conflict with the rights of the national government. The national constitution, however, declared that such resources were property of the national government, which would control how they were extracted. The conditional autonomy of the region over its natural resources was, therefore, meaningless. The 1972 agreement may not have been consciously constructed to adapt to the neo-patrimonial system of Sudan but it nevertheless adhered to its logic closely. The AAA drafters sought to give the south regional power, which it wanted, and ties to bind the region to the north, which Khartoum wanted. The resulting compromise was a form of dependent regionalism. The north provided most of the domestic funding and administration in the south as the southern economy, devastated by years of war, was incapable of propping itself up. The AAA – or at least its financing – had been based on the constant reality of southern poverty. As Alier recounts, during the AAA talks some government delegates expressed certainty that the economic situation would hold Sudan together, despite rebel talk of secession.60

Leach_Book.indd 161

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

162

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

After 1972, southerners continued to rely on northern merchants to import manufactured goods, as few were produced in the region. The institutions created by the AAA were heavily dependent on Khartoum financially, since no viable internal revenue source existed in the region. Khartoum never made developing the post-war southern economy a priority. In his listing of several projects begun but never completed after the first war, Yongo-Bure surmises that they had been initiated to placate southerners without any consideration of long-term investment or economic viability.61 Under the agreement, national funds were to be transferred to the regional treasury for southern development projects, but few ever came. A month after concluding the AAA, Nimeiri signed a law allowing the regional government to collect taxes imposed on the south by the central government. However, both income taxes and excise duties on goods from the north were difficult to collect in the south and, as a result, regional dependence on the national government increased. For most of the inter-war period, development funding for the south was between a third and a fourth of what had been budgeted. Most funding came from foreign sources or from inflationary financing: extra money printed by the government. Between 1972 and 1977, only 20 per cent of the development funds slotted for the south were actually delivered.62 Southern inefficiency and poverty disguised the neo-patrimonial nature of the AAA, but the development of an oil industry, or any other independent southern source of wealth, had the potential to upset this relationship. Khartoum’s tendency to assert itself in the face of southern financial independence began to emerge even when handling non-petroleum revenues. During the early 1980s, for example, trade with East Africa led the Equatorian border town of Yei to become the second largest customs duty point in Sudan. Over time, the central government would withdraw the right of the regional government to collect this revenue.63 Development throughout Sudan after the AAA prioritized immediate regime objectives, further intertwining patronage and development. Nimeiri’s accelerated regression into patronage politics coincided with the failure of development projects in the mid-1970s, when the regime

Leach_Book.indd 162

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

163

pushed for further reliance on large-scale agricultural schemes to sustain the economy. Mismanagement of several agricultural schemes throughout the 1970s and 1980s led to the disruption of the agrarian economy and mass displacement, trends that only exacerbated wealth disparity and facilitated the patronage system. The decline of this vital economic sector led to a shrinking base of support for the regime and forced Nimeiri to consolidate his military support, even at the expense of the national economy. The need to enhance his patronage network gave further incentive for Nimeiri to seek as much control over oil revenues as possible, inevitably pressuring him to abrogate the AAA. By 1978, the discovery of sizeable oil fields in the south heightened controversy over development. The planned construction of an oil refinery in the south would have led to both development and employment, but instead it was built in the north. As president of the Southern Region’s executive body, Abel Alier recommended the refinery be built in the south, but Nimeiri invoked his right under the AAA to reject that proposal. Southerners resented both the national government for denying economic development in the region and the regional government for its dependence and weakness. Southern demands during this period were not to claim oil ownership but for employment opportunities in the development of southern resources and an equitable division of wealth from those resources. Southerners held no positions on the board of Sudan’s national White Nile Petroleum Company. Chevron based its headquarters not near the oil fields in Bentiu but in the nearby northern city of Muglad. Animosity between southerners and Chevron would only deepen in the second war. The US company involved itself directly in tribal conflict, allegedly to regain control over its operations by sponsoring a Baqqara militia to protect the oil fields from southern insurgents in 1988.64 Perhaps realizing conditions could only deteriorate under the Bashir regime, Chevron finally withdrew from Sudan in 1990. The end of Nimeiri’s regime may have halted the corruption directly tied to him but did not end the political instability associated with his agricultural policies. The resulting desertification from poorly planned, mechanized farming schemes pressured nomadic peoples in the provinces of Kordofan and Darfur to move further south in search

Leach_Book.indd 163

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

164

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

of water, leading to even greater conflict along the north-south border. Disaffected northern tribesman formed the nucleus around which Sadiq Al-Mahdi established early Popular Defense Force militias in the 1980s. Southern agriculture languished, even more badly affected by mismanagement and neglect than that in the north. A colonial-era cotton scheme in the Zande region of Equatoria was reactivated after the AAA, but by the early 1980s farmer support for this project was declining.65 Cooperatives were set up to minimize the difficulty of increasing agricultural production, but little financing was available for even these relatively cheap activities. In a state where the competition of patronage networks rather than political parties had effectively become the system of government, little incentive existed for any comprehensive development, particularly outside urban centers. Aside from an adherence to the traditional Islamic tenet of alms, neither of the sectarian parties in power attempted to expand social services to more remote areas or even to the urban poor. The early Arab socialist incarnation of the May Regime worked to change this dynamic but was unable to gain ideological acceptance and settled for creating a more inclusive patronage system involving southerners. The promise of southern oil wealth had the potential to change the center-periphery dynamic and disrupt the neo-patrimonial foundation of Sudan. As Abel Alier explained, ‘remove poverty from the South and Sudan’s unity would be fundamentally shaken especially [now that] the other weapon . . . the army, was no longer effective [after the AAA]’66 The highly coordinated nature of oil production allowed its easy consolidation into patronage networks and advanced hierarchical and centralized power in a way more easily transportable resources could not. Southern rebels could not take advantage of the resource wealth in their territory as insurgents in diamond-producing areas of West Africa had. The remoteness of southern Sudan and its poor infrastructure also precluded extensive trade of other regionally plentiful resources, such as timber. Lee Seymour suggests that the scarcity of lucrative resources and access to markets may actually have helped the SPLM/A stay ideologically coherent in its crucial formative years and prevented Anya Nya 2 separatists from funding their less organized,

Leach_Book.indd 164

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

165

though more ideologically popular, militias.67 These practical considerations explain why economic determinist models cannot fully account for the nature of Sudanese conflict or the priorities addressed within the peace agreements. Like Nimeiri, the Bashir regime perpetuated its neo-patrimonial system under the rubric of decentralized authority. While the former sought to advance regional autonomy in the early 1980s, the latter created a quasi-federal system in the 1990s wherein power was derived from Khartoum, not the states it created. Nimeiri’s 1983 order abolishing the Southern Region, ostensibly to allow for local control, also denied the right of the renewed three provinces to tax the extraction of natural resources in their territory. This selective understanding of devolution was emulated 15 years later with the concept of federalism. Under the Bashir regime’s 1998 federalization system oil revenue sharing did not extend to the state level, leaving states with a limited base for tax revenue. Both regimes relied on the details of financing and taxation to retain central power. The subjugation of commercial activity and civil society to political and military networks allowed the state to rely on means other than coercion to combat its opposition. These included buying off rival factions or creating and subsidizing new ones. While Nimeiri was only able to oppress or accommodate the traditional northern sectarian factions, oil revenue allowed Bashir the power to divide and further manipulate them. Nimeiri turned to Islam to consolidate his regime’s power, but oil wealth allowed Bashir to turn away from Islam, or at least the more revolutionary version espoused by Turabi. The early Bashir junta depended on a fragile coalition similar to that of the late Nimeiri regime: Islamists, conservative commercial elites, and the military. After early consolidation of its rule, Bashir’s regime faced difficulty in expanding its base during the early 1990s, when wealth disparity and poverty were at unprecedented heights. As armed opposition rose in the marginalized areas of Sudan, the regime began to rely even more on the promise of oil revenues to secure loyalty. Southern milita leaders who fought the SPLA were rewarded with offices in Khartoum and official titles, even as their autonomous power was diluted.

Leach_Book.indd 165

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

166

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Development, Ethnic Tension, and the Jonglei Canal Even before Sudan was independent, the isolated south was developed according to the whims of external forces. Condominium officials tended to avoid development projects that, regardless of their wisdom or profitability, might have met with local hostility. Administrators were too poorly equipped to deal with uprisings and were concerned that even ‘the pockets of development’ forming in the south – products of the few resources available to administrators – would have social implications authorities might not be able to control later. History would confirm these suspicions. Labor disputes and anxiety about the lack of southern development relative to the north led to riots at a cotton-growing development project in the Zande area of Equatoria during July 1955.68 The hiring of northerners for the Zande scheme offended locals and contributed to separatist discontent. The event was a harbinger of the more serious mutiny at Torit the following month that initiated wider northsouth hostilities. Post-colonial authorities learned few lessons about the pace of development in an independent Sudan, and would be even bolder about such projects after independence. The need to unite Sudan and undo the colonially imposed ‘grass curtain’ between north and south made development urgent, and national interests took priority over the local. Sudan’s authoritarian regimes often emphasized development. The Abboud regime in particular concentrated on infrastructure, compensating for its ideological inertia by setting ambitious top-down development benchmarks. In both wars, however, the poor security conditions of the south meant that almost all regional development was in service of government efforts to suppress insurgency. Abboud’s main contribution to southern development, a railway connecting Wau to the rest of the country’s infrastructure, allowed military access to Bahr Al-Ghazal. Similarly, projects during the Bashir regime such as the construction of a southern road to Malakal were framed as ‘peace through development’ but existed foremost to aid central commercial and military access to the south.

Leach_Book.indd 166

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

167

The early nationalist incarnation of the May Regime indicated it had broader developmental goals for the south, an impetus for it to end the first war. Nimeiri’s earliest policy statement on the south showed a desire for development, though three years passed before the regime was able to moderate its ideological objectives enough to implement its goals. Nevertheless, Nimeiri’s statement demonstrated that the May Regime understood that a state as poor as Sudan at that time could not simultaneously wage war and meet ambitious development objectives. With the AAA, the regime had an opportunity to live up to its rhetoric. The lack of promised development was, therefore, a failure of the AAA and the parties that agreed to it. Juba remained without a water system and had no electricity grid. The only hospital dated from the colonial era. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the south exported next to nothing despite the region’s fertility. After the AAA, even the Dinka chiefs, reputed to be conservatives averse to new technology, strongly demanded development and education.69 Southerners continued to leave the region for the north but were pushed back or forced to live in slums surrounding urban areas. The south’s historic economic isolation directly affected the composition of the AAA, partially explaining its lack of a rigid implementation schedule for development. Lagu admits that the economic provisions of the AAA were weaker than those regarding cultural, military, and political concerns mainly because only one member of the SSLM negotiating team, Lawrence Wol Wol, had any background in economics. Lagu states that government negotiator Jaafar Bakheit noticed this lack and tried to assist the southern team in negotiating arrangements, but others in the government delegation dissuaded him.70 A lack of consensual development and an inability to share resources eroded the foundation of the AAA in the south by the early 1980s. Slow development fostered ethnic jealousy among the varied peoples of the region, a jealousy sometimes provoked by a cynical national government. Until 1977, when officials finally devised a six-year plan for the south, annual budgets for the region were uncoordinated.71 The failure of the government’s national development projects and the need for financial stringency to pay back creditors led it to hold back on

Leach_Book.indd 167

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

168

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

development funds for regions not vital to its immediate stability such as Darfur and the south. Competition for development funds among the regions and among southerners themselves damaged national and regional unity. Khartoum paid sustained attention only to the excavation of the Jonglei Canal and the development of the oil regions. Southern hostility towards national management of regional resources predated large discoveries of oil in the south and did not abate with the AAA. The Jonglei Canal project was a long-existing plan to increase the flow of the Nile to the north. It bypassed the Sudd, a network of southern swamps that lost water to evaporation. Retaining that water would help increase agriculture in northern Sudan and Egypt but would also change the ecology of Upper Nile province and the livelihoods of some of its residents. The canal plan had first been put forward during the Condominium and again at independence. The instability of the south precluded any further action, but the plan was revived soon after the first war’s end. In June 1974, a commission submitted a report to Cairo and Khartoum and recommended the digging of the canal from Jonglei to Malakal. Events surrounding the engineering of the canal in the 1970s reinvigorated southern suspicions of the north. Rumors soon arose that millions of Egyptian immigrants would be granted the agricultural land recovered from the swamp. Some southerners were skeptical of the need for a canal at Jonglei, when more water could be supplied to the north from the Blue Nile flowing from the Ethiopian highlands, or further up the White Nile at Juba and Nimule.72 Government neglect of local peoples only confirmed suspicions. The development projects Khartoum promised southerners to complement the canal were never completed. While economic conditions improved in the canal zone from 1977 to 1983, the improvement was as incidental as the later infrastructure built up around the Bentiu oil fields by 2000. To allay southern concerns, regional development projects were to be implemented beginning in the mid-1970s. Reforestation, infrastructure, schools, cattle raising, and the replacement of seasonal northern workers with a permanent staff of southerners were among Khartoum’s guarantees.73 By 1985, however, most of the canal had

Leach_Book.indd 168

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

169

already been excavated and even the initial studies for these projects had not been finished.74 The broken promises about Jonglei development were detrimental to thousands and led to some of the earliest anti-government sentiment in the years before the second war. Bridges that were to cross the canal excavation area were not built, resulting in pastoralists becoming unable to move their herds. Flood embankments alongside the canal were built too low and livestock drowned.75 The canal also created artificial flooding on its east bank, which prevented water from reaching villages as it had in the past. A plan to build a smaller canal for crop irrigation had been discarded by the time digging on the Jonglei Canal began in 1978. Throughout the second war, the Jonglei project remained a symbol of the dismissive nature of Khartoum’s development policy for the south. The SPLM/A listed the disregard for the long-term interests of the surrounding peoples during its construction as one of its primary grievances against the May Regime. John Garang, who obtained his agricultural economics Ph.D. in the study of the canal, argued that it was too sensitive a project to leave the planning solely to Khartoum. The SPLA occupied the digging area in early 1984 but vowed not to destroy the expensive equipment being used to build the canal. Garang stated that the insurgents were against not canal construction, but rather the insensitive, exploitative manner through which it was achieved.76 The project remained uncompleted throughout the rest of the war and the CPA interim period.

Sudan and Rentier Theory In Sudan, the interplay of development with security and contested resources complicates arguments identifying economic opportunism as the cause of rebellion. The Hoeffler-Collier theory of rebel predation, for example, posits that rebel grievances may be legitimate or imagined, but it is economic incentive that leads to armed rebellion.77 While the second war had an economic component in the form of natural resources, division of rents never lay at the heart of the problem. Moreover, the SPLM/A failed to meet much of the theory’s criteria

Leach_Book.indd 169

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

170

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

for predatory separatist movements. Insurgents received only minor military and economic support from the southern Sudanese diaspora. The predation theory contends that significant support is often a factor in continuing civil war.78 During the first war, in which secession was a rebel objective, insurgent representatives in Europe found that rather than helping efforts to fund and aid the Anya Nya, the southern Sudanese diaspora actually called for an end to the war without priority given to the achievement of the separatist objective.79 The south, rich with oil, had few resources insurgents could rely on commercially while hostilities continued. While the SPLA rebellion had an economic incentive, such an incentive alone did not qualify the rebellion as predatory; there may simply have been no other stable economic activity by which to make a living. As Garang wrote in the early years of the SPLA, the continued marginalization of the south from economic activity, along with heavy-handed government attempts to restore order, meant that ‘the marginal cost of rebellion in the south became very small, zero or negative: that is, in the south, it pays to rebel.’80 Southern rebellion in both wars was fueled not by rebel economic opportunism but – in part – by anger over regional economic marginalization and the failure of what little development occurred in the region to take into consideration the livelihoods of local peoples. The Jonglei Canal project became a vivid indicator that conflict in the south stemmed more from opposition to the disruption of traditional southern life than from a desire to hoard resource wealth. The supplemental role natural resources have played in sparking conflict in the south can be best observed by examining the ostensible objectives of each insurgency. In the first war, southern Sudan was isolated, marginalized, and poor, yet the rebel movement opted for secession from the state. In the second war, after southern Sudan was found to contain sizeable oil deposits, the primary insurgent group nevertheless adhered for many years to the goal of a ‘New Sudan’; a national revolution in which southerners would likely come under pressure to share their wealth with other remote areas. The SPLM/A even clung to a modulated version of the unity goal after facing an internal rebellion over the matter in 1991 and in the face of consistent evidence that the vast majority of southerners wish to secede. The fact that southern

Leach_Book.indd 170

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

171

nationalism was even weaker among insurgent elites in the second, resource-fueled war than it had been in the earlier war, where resources played a smaller role, upends the theory that economic opportunism was the driving force behind the conflict. In fact, economic incentive seemed to affect nearly all the actors in the first war except the Anya Nya. During that conflict, many southerners expected that the Milton Obote government in Uganda would support their cause, in recognition of the ethnic ties shared by certain Equatorian and northern Ugandan peoples. Instead, Obote in the late 1960s and early 1970s coordinated with Khartoum to suppress the Anya Nya on the Sudan-Uganda border. Obote had earlier supported the Congolese Simba rebels, who had access to gold and ivory. While Khartoum may have channelled funds through its embassy in Kampala to persuade members of the Obote government to support Sudan, the Anya Nya lacked access to such resources.81 The early separatist movement was not predatory but rested instead on economic and class motivations. Separatism was strongest among the partially educated, semi-skilled southerners who occupied an ‘intermediary position’ linking the towns to the countryside and who were predominantly concerned about employment: Southern artisans, mechanics and bricklayers had always prided themselves . . . on competence and efficiency in their respective trades. The fact that they always had to have a Northern foreman of no better qualifications or experience, other than fluency in Arabic, naturally aroused resentment and suspicion; the practice was viewed as part of the government’s secret plan to dominate the south.82 Insurgents in the first war were, therefore, motivated by economic disparity but hardly for reasons of predation. Nor was the separatist cause inspired by a shared ‘southern’ Sudanese identity. What little cultural unity existed between southerners by 1972 was forged by war; the war itself was not waged to defend a set of common ideals. Government-funded militias, such as the SSDF, appear to adhere more closely to the theory of predation than Garang’s movement.

Leach_Book.indd 171

10/17/2012 7:00:55 PM

172

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Under John Garang’s vision of national revolution, Bentiu residents would share oil concessions on their land for the national good. The less generous terms of the CPA to the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 provided an economic motive for people living in oil-producing regions both to support separatism and oppose Garang. Furthermore, Nuer had consistently protested their lack of representation in the SPLA hierarchy, and some Nuer elites petitioned the government for an increased share of oil wealth, and eventually separatism, in return for their war against the dominant faction of the SPLA. Nuer became the dominant ethnicity composing the 1991 breakaway faction that violently separated from the primary, Dinka-majority wing of the insurgency. Animosity between the SPLA and rival militias grew from personal, political, and ethnic differences, but also from long-standing feuds over traditional resources. In the localized militia wars, cattle had been a more central resource than oil. As war displaced cattleherding people they migrated to new areas and competed for land with farmers and other pastoralists, often of other ethnicities. As oil revenue simply exacerbated the wealth disparity already in existence, it also stirred pre-existing ethnic tensions. The economic rationale for separatism is not in itself an adequate explanation of the history of hostility between north and south Sudan. In particular, to single out oil as an incentive for separation casually disregards how the politics of oil intertwines with other grievances. The difficulty in locating and marketing lootable resources in the south discourages the application of neat predation theories. The connection between natural resources, ideology, and state power can be explored in other ways. Jeffrey Herbst submits that insurgencies facing a strong state must provide some ideological motivation, while those which do not, and also have access to outside funding or resources, may rely less on mobilizing politics and on profit motive to recruit soldiers.83 Sudan’s sheer size has made toppling the central government difficult, particularly from the distant south. Even when Khartoum was at the nadir of its power, the SPLA never faced the kind of weak state as seen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the 1990s. While the Sudanese government lacked the ability to

Leach_Book.indd 172

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

SECURITY, R ESOURCES,

AND

DEVELOPMENT

173

consistently project its power in most areas of the south, its ability to retain key towns such as Juba made it a constant presence in the region. In addition, the very length of the wars compelled resistance leadership to form a coherent ideology to explain political motivations to military actors. In the first war, ideology only made the jump from politicians to soldiers months before the peace agreement, too late to have any lasting effect afterwards. In the second war, John Garang’s New Sudan ideology was a constant platform, originating at the birth of the SPLM/A. It was scaled back only when the objective of overthrowing the regime in Khartoum no longer appeared feasible. Rentierism, studied in detail by scholars of Arab societies, is a useful concept for examining oil-rich Sudan. While the criteria for what determines a rentier state may vary, such states typically have an economy relying on sizeable, regularly received rents in exchange for indigenous resources. Specifically, Giacomo Luciani classifies a rentier state as one ‘whose revenue derives predominantly (more than 40 per cent) from oil or other foreign sources.’84 By this metric, Sudan never qualified as a rentier state during the war. Oil production saw an unprecedented increase during the period surrounding the Naivasha peace process, with revenues doubling from 2002 to 2003 and doing so again between 2003 and 2005.85 However, Sudan never neared Luciani’s qualifying standards. During 2004–08, when oil production in Sudan swelled following the southern peace agreement, it nevertheless, only made up between 10 per cent and 14 per cent of the GDP. This low percentage was not complemented by other petroleum-related areas of industry. The entire industrial sector, consisting of petroleum, manufacturing, electricity, water, and building and construction, only constituted 27.8 per cent of the GDP in 2005. By 2008, industry in its entirety composed almost 35 per cent of Sudan’s GDP. A more likely theory is that Sudan was not a rentier state at the time of the CPA, but sought to become one. Only a substantive peace agreement in the south would make this possible. ‘The Sudan case shows that capital-intensive, non-lootable natural resources can provide an opportunity for peace processes because their commercialization depends on a certain level of security.’86 This is more in keeping with a theory that non-lootable, highly profitable resources, such as

Leach_Book.indd 173

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

174

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

oil, can be conduits to peace because they require foreign investment and a certain level of security for their extraction.87 Any tendencies Sudan shares with rentier states can instead be explained by its neo-patrimonial governing structures, which are only enhanced by rent-seeking.88 Neo-patrimonialism exists in many nonrentier countries. Sudan, for most of its history, has been too large and too poor for rentierism, but not too large to accommodate an exclusivist national patronage system. This distribution of scarce resources accounts in part for the failure of nationalist projects in the country, as well as the state’s failure to integrate remote regions.

Leach_Book.indd 174

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

CHAPTER SIX INTER NATIONAL INFLUENCE IN THE AGR EEMENTS

External forces played a role in resolving both civil wars and in impeding earlier settlements of the conflicts. In neither instance, however, did international involvement change the fundamental cause of the war: the dispute over the nature of Sudanese identity. As with the discovery of natural resources, heavy international involvement has helped obscure this cause, particularly in the second war. International actors’ multiple peace initiatives and forums were results of their own evolving interests and often were not attuned to either the negotiating parties’ objectives or the internal realities of Sudan. The competition in the late 1990s between the IGAD-mediated process and the Egyptian Libyan Joint Initiative (ELJI), for example, demonstrated the fragility of the NDA coalition and the subsequent tendency for forum sponsors to revert to their national interests under pressure. Sudan’s weak government, porous borders, and diverse, often remote, populations can blur the line between its foreign and domestic policies. The larger trajectory of Sudan’s foreign affairs, at least as they pertain to its civil wars, has been from early post-colonial suspicion of foreign intrusion towards acceptance of a certain level of international involvement in domestic matters. Most post-independence regimes, particularly the early ones, placed a high priority on defending and

Leach_Book.indd 175

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

176

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

enhancing the centralized state and finding Sudan’s place among Arab nations. However, coming to terms with the state’s weak nature, even after its enhancement by oil revenue, forced Khartoum to abandon the conceit that Sudan was fundamentally an extension of Arab and Islamic culture in an African setting.1 The state’s inability to promote this identity peacefully inside its borders, or to adopt the alternative national visions put forth by either the early May Regime or the SPLM/A, invited foreign involvement. Throughout the first war, the various parliamentary and military regimes sought to minimize the role of international actors in peacemaking precisely because the recently independent, unintegrated state was so insecure in its identity. Consequently, the light emphasis on international involvement in mediation helped legitimize the AAA as a primarily Sudanese achievement. Khartoum’s accommodations to southern rebels under the AAA and its subsequent retreat from earlier commitments to Arab unity were forays into the creation of an identity unique to Sudan. The new vision failed, in part because of continuing internal and external pressures on Sudan to adhere to an Arab-Islamic identity, but primarily because the domestic institutions established by the agreement were eventually eroded of vitality. The CPA had the opposite weakness; the heavy foreign influence on its institutions from the outset compromised their effectiveness without external pressure. A lack of confidence in national institutions made it necessary for foreign parties to fill the vacuum after the second war. An international environment, however, rarely exists to facilitate resolution of such a difficult conflict in such a geopolitically marginal state as Sudan. Broader international bodies often prefer to engage after regional organizations have already become involved. In 1994, the body that would become IGAD deviated from the task of managing scarce water resources to provide a forum for conflict resolution once it became apparent the war would continue to overshadow the organization’s original mission. Even with this forum, peace efforts stalled until the new century, when the international focus on terrorism leading up to the Naivasha process reinvigorated organizational commitment. This new focus was complemented by the internal and

Leach_Book.indd 176

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

177

regional environment generally becoming more conducive to peace than had been the case in the 1990s. Managing spoilers and the regional powers that supported them was a constant task of mediation throughout both wars. Involving spoilers in the mediation process is one way to neutralize their effect. Nimeiri’s reconciliation during the first war with Uganda and Ethiopia, states formerly amicable to Anya Nya insurgents, was instrumental in bringing about the AAA. Regional organizations are also an effective way to insure the interests of neighboring states are advanced, or at least not threatened, by peace. The IGAD states were particularly valuable because they could coordinate the activities of powerful western states such as the USA and the UK. These states could provide resources needed for the peace process and use their influence to manage potential spoilers: groups that did not want a successful peace agreement at least until their objectives were met. Khartoum was always wary about outside interference in resolving its internal conflict and, generally, had success in isolating the Anya Nya from effective international support. As blocking international forces became more difficult in both the second war and peace process, the Bashir regime sought to manipulate outside actors by turning them against each other, searching for new venues of mediation, and locating powerful strategic allies such as China. By 2002, Khartoum felt more confident in its engagement with the outside world than it had 30 years earlier, as it had gained much more experience in dealing with outside actors through international aid, oil companies, and a longer post-colonial history.

Foreign Support and the Evolution of Insurgency in the First War The role of self-sufficiency in ideologically motivated insurgencies can be difficult to reconcile with the practical demands of guerrilla warfare. Reliance on outside forces can delegitimize insurgents or it can demonstrate the respect a movement commands internationally. Anya Nya separatism was not based on a foundation of southern nationalism but on shared grievances against the north. It

Leach_Book.indd 177

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

178

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

was nowhere near as ideologically driven at formation as the SPLA. Before supplies were received or pilfered from outside sources, most early resistance after the August 1955 mutiny was uncoordinated, sporadic, and heavily based in Equatoria. The rebels at this time were unorganized bands, hiding in the countryside and with neither a formal hierarchy nor a set of objectives. Their bond was ‘based on narratives of betrayal and exile.’2 While more than simple predatory groups, they lacked the organization or ideological foundation necessary to attract foreign support. The ideological incoherence of the movement meant foreign support was not viewed domestically as an indicator of the weakness of the movement, rather, as an indicator of its status internationally. In both wars, initial foreign aid to insurgents was usually a reaction to Khartoum’s policies and not borne of allegiance to the rebel cause itself. This is especially true in the first war, where the Anya Nya received aid either accidentally, as in its 1965 interception of weapons being sent to Congo-Kinshasa, or purposely, as when it began receiving airdrops from Israel. While Sudanese leaders persisted in framing the conflict as an attack on Arabs, early May Regime leaders also perceived it as a counter-revolutionary assault by such reactionary states as Israel, Ethiopia, and the Congo.3 Israel’s full complicity with the SSLM is not known, in part because the files of the SSLM were destroyed following the AAA. Soon after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, however, Anya Nya began receiving small arms and other aid through periodic airdrops from Ethiopia. Beginning in January 1971, Anya Nya went to Israel for training in weapons, communications, management, and medicine.4 Israel became the Anya Nya’s most valuable state ally and provided sufficient arms to sustain attacks on the Sudanese army, though not enough to engage it in conventional warfare or allow any major territorial gains. The Israelis appear to have had ideological reason to support Joseph Lagu specifically over the several other political factions in the south during the late 1960s. Nevertheless, Israeli aid helped Lagu and the SSLM consolidate control of the Anya Nya. By 1971, Lagu’s consolidation of control over Anya Nya forces led to more focus in both leadership and message. Lack of a consistent, reliable

Leach_Book.indd 178

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

179

propaganda apparatus to disseminate the Anya Nya message, as the Biafrans had used in their war effort in Nigeria, prevented the insurgency from being widely understood. For most of its duration, the conflict did not receive regular media coverage outside of such directly affected countries as Congo-Kinshasa, Kenya, and Uganda. By the time of the AAA, however, the SSLM had permanent emissaries in London, Washington, Paris, Addis Ababa, and Kampala. The London office of the SSLM was especially valuable, as it put the movement in contact with former Labour MP Sir Dingle Foot, who would later help the SSLM negotiating team during the drafting of the 1972 agreement. Outside assistance to the Anya Nya was never substantial enough to help the movement achieve its professed goal of secession. While other states saw the rebel movement as a vessel through which to attack the Sudanese government, none of them supported secession. Those external actors most committed to the secessionist cause of the Anya Nya were non-state actors like the Verona Fathers and other missionary organizations with a long history in the south but without access to, or interest in, military support. Furthermore, no African states viewed the war as a crusade; Christianity was not a strong enough ideological force to compel Christian-led regimes to intervene on behalf of the southern Sudanese, even in sub-Saharan Africa. Even the still-potent ideology of African liberation did not mobilize the continent to the Anya Nya cause. Neither colonial nor postcolonial African states would easily recognize the movement to create a south Sudan. Recognition became even less likely after the experience of the Biafra secessionist movement in Nigeria, which overshadowed the Sudanese insurgency until it collapsed in 1970 and became another case study of the folly of secessionist wars. That conflict had divided African states, but those who had supported the doomed Biafran campaign, even liberation-minded governments such as Tanzania’s, were now chastened. Uganda, Ethiopia, and Congo-Kinshasa were among the most sympathetic of all states to the Anya Nya by 1971, but none of them wished to encourage separatism in Africa. Ethiopia and the Congo faced their own secessionist rebels, Kenya had concerns about separatist potential among ethnic Somalis in the north, and Uganda worried that the former Bugandan kingdom might seek self-determination.

Leach_Book.indd 179

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

180

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Opposition to southern Sudanese separatism, however, did not translate into support for Khartoum. In the Horn of Africa, peace treaties have generally been unsustainable if concluded without the support of neighboring states. Consequently, in both wars, Sudan was forced to pair successful peace agreements with a broader mending of relations with other states, whether in the service of regional security or to attract international support. Sudan’s multiple, porous borders ensured that peace could not be made in a vacuum. Instead, it was accompanied by an adjustment of bilateral relations with multiple governments, either before or soon after the conclusion of the agreements themselves. Both peace treaties were actually the apexes of a series of foreign policy shifts by Khartoum in the early 1970s and early 2000s. In the 1960s, Sudan’s nationalist urge to assert Arab-Islamic credentials strained relations with its most important non-Arab neighbor, Ethiopia. These relations declined sharply after 1962, the year Addis Ababa rescinded Eritrean autonomy and sparked a secessionist backlash in that territory with broad Arab support. Khartoum needed economic aid from the Arab world but was under pressure from its African neighbors to denounce secessionist movements. The transitional government after the 1964 October Revolution rejected Abboud’s apathy towards foreign policy and was keen to assert its solidarity with Arab states by supporting the Eritreans. In retaliation, Ethiopia allowed Anya Nya insurgents to operate out of its territory as early as January 1965. In stark contrast to Bashir’s confidence in his ability to manipulate international actors during the second war, Nimeiri viewed the unavoidable internationalization of Sudan’s first civil conflict as a strong incentive for a negotiated solution. By 1971, both Khartoum and Addis Ababa had reason to negotiate an end to their civil wars, which were moving beyond regional affairs as rebels gained international backing: Sudanese secessionists from Israel and Eritrean secessionists from Arab states. Nimeiri realized that improving relations with Ethiopia would be the key to pressuring the Anya Nya. In addition to resolving the Eritrean problem, a key motivation for conservative, Christianmajority Ethiopia to respond positively to Nimeiri’s gestures was to avoid encirclement by hostile, socialist-aligned Muslim states.5

Leach_Book.indd 180

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

181

The March 1971 rapprochement between Nimeiri and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie established a new cooperation regarding security. The flow of illicit arms and ammunition into Upper Nile Province from Ethiopia began to dry up. In the agreement, the two states also committed to settling all outstanding border disputes. The re-establishment of cordial relations between the two states allowed Addis Ababa to emerge as a feasible venue for secret negotiations between Khartoum and the southern rebels. As headquarters of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, Ethiopia’s capital was a hub of traffic for officials from all over the continent, allowing travel there by Sudanese government officials and southern politicians with Anya Nya ties to raise no suspicion. Nimeiri realized Sudan would also need to work more closely with Uganda to control insurgents operating along their shared border. In January 1971, Ugandan army Chief-of-Staff Idi Amin staged a coup against President Obote. Amin maintained close personal ties to leaders in Lagu’s Madi tribe in Equatoria, even channeling Israeli aid to the Anya Nya for months before the coup. When the deposed Obote escaped to southern Sudan and began planning attacks to destabilize the Ugandan junta, Amin realized he would have to end support for the Anya Nya if he wanted Sudan to expel the former president. He accordingly became receptive to a negotiated settlement in Sudan, even offering Uganda as a venue for negotiations. In this regard, the AAA served Khartoum well in realigning the region towards Sudan’s antiIsraeli interests. In April 1972, only a month after the AAA, Amin cut off relations with Jerusalem and expelled all Israelis from Uganda.

Multi-Track Diplomacy and the AAA Track one actors—states—can raise the profile of both war and peace efforts, internationalizing other states’ domestic conflicts more than those states might prefer, especially in the case of a nationalist government hoping to pacify an insurgency. At the end of the first war, negotiations relied on some multi-track diplomacy in which the discretion and expertise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), an example of track two organizations, was backed by the resources of

Leach_Book.indd 181

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

182

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

governments, both regionally and internationally. The World Council of Churches/All Africa Council of Churches (WCC/AACC) mediation efforts demonstrate how an NGO can help establish informal communications between warring parties, beginning a dialogue that does not compromise their interests or put those interests at risk in the future. Perhaps due to the secular, nationalist nature of the May Regime, the WCC/AACC’s religious affiliation allowed it a degree of moral authority while its non-governmental nature made it less of a political threat. The organization was sensitive to the delicate nature of these talks and did not attempt to impose on the proceedings. Mediator Leopoldo Niilus insists the moderators tried to take as invisible a role as possible, even referring to themselves as ‘go-betweens’ rather than ‘mediators’.6 A 1970 event offers an example of the difficulties of relying on a mediator not regarded by both parties as neutral. The early leftist composition of the May Regime made the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) an unsurprising international track two choice by Khartoum. The MCF was a leftist British society not connected to government, though affiliated with many left-leaning British politicians. In 1970, it established contacts with both the May Regime and the SSLM’s representatives in London. Southerners at this point did not trust the new regime, whose peace overtures coincided with Soviet-backed assaults on the Anya Nya. Joseph Garang, the communist minister of southern affairs, played middleman between the MCF and other leftist groups that might serve as mediators. The influence of his clique, however, waned throughout 1970, well before their July 1971 coup attempt, and contact between Khartoum and such groups was suspended. The WCC/AACC role as an AAA facilitator was somewhat unexpected given the combative relationship between church organizations in the south and Sudan’s early post-independence regimes. Abboud’s expulsion of missionaries, along with the regime’s push to Islamize the south, aided the efforts of exiled southern politicians to convince international Christian organizations of religious persecution. Sudan was loath to rely on international or regional organizations to mediate, but the WCC/AACC established a degree of trust with post-Abboud governments by remaining politically neutral. Upon his ascent to the premiership in July 1966, Sadiq Al-Mahdi welcomed a large AACC

Leach_Book.indd 182

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

183

delegation on their first visit to Sudan. The organization had contacts with several leaders across Africa, and the prime minister may have hoped to reconnect with the continent after the semi-isolationism and general dismissal of non-Arab African states characterizing the Abboud dictatorship and the Maghoub parliamentary government. While the meeting helped secure the council’s reputation in the north, it created some apprehension on the part of southerners, many of whom were offended that the AACC seemed to accept Khartoum’s portrayal of the conflict unquestioningly, making no attempt to contact southerners in exile. The establishment of this relationship by Al-Mahdi and its revival by Nimeiri demonstrated the flexibility nationalist leaders were learning to display when dealing with secular or non-Islamic religious organizations, so long as these organizations had no colonial connection and posed no threat to sovereignty. The isolated nature of the conflict meant any NGO aid would generally pass through Khartoum, allowing for easier government management than would be the case in the next war. The forum itself was in keeping with this suggestion of a new, more inclusive nationalist spirit. both AACC mediators were fellow Africans; Burgess Carr was Liberian and K. E. Ankrah was from Ghana. Sudan Council of Churches delegate Samuel Athi Bwogo, a participant in preparatory work for the negotiations, was a southern Sudanese.7 The WCC/AACC represented itself less as a church organization than a regional body, even a prototype for IGAD three decades later. However, it lacked the direct involvement by other governments that might upset the nationalists of the 1970s. The international legitimacy bestowed on an insurgency coming into negotiations affects its conduct within these negotiations. During the AAA talks, the government delegation was happy with a casual approach to mediation, while the SSLM sought to formalize roles as much as possible. Carr believes that this was a push by rebels to gain the official recognition so long denied them by Khartoum.8 The negotiators set up the agenda so that the most easily resolvable issues of contention would be tabled first. Carr, Ankrah, Bwongo, and Niilus worked to break down the delegations into smaller groups by detaching more specialized areas of governance and economics from the

Leach_Book.indd 183

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

184

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

broader negotiations as needed. In this way, the WCC/AACC hoped to oversee the process without deep involvement in the discussions between technical specialists and their counterparts. Contrary to research indicating track one and track two efforts are more effective when orchestrated separately, relations between the WCC/AACC and the official peace process became more successful as they grew closer.9 The church organization was, in fact, a track two body that officially entered the track one process of mediation. The WCC/AACC began its involvement in the conflict resolution process by concentrating on the humanitarian dimension, with the preparatory work in Addis Ababa in January 1971 done on humanitarian issues specifically. There were early hurdles to switching out of this realm into peace negotiations. Church organizations remained cool to the idea of joining with Khartoum to help facilitate a negotiated peace while the ardently anti-missionary Joseph Garang remained in the government. The OAU’s principles of ‘non-interference’ in the internal affairs of African states also inhibited the AACC from deviating from humanitarian issues. Over the course of 1971, tentative steps were taken towards a mission change. In March 1971 in Kampala, the WCC/AACC delegation met unaffiliated church groups active in channeling money and humanitarian aid to the Anya Nya. These groups asked the WCC/ AACC to abandon its concentration on channeling humanitarian aid to the south through Khartoum and focus instead on dialogue between the parties. By then, WCC/AACC representatives had become convinced that the obstacle to peace was not religion but ‘a complexity of reasons — which might include religion, race, political, social and economic factors — all of which had combined to create a political problem’.10 In May, the delegation told Khartoum officials it would try to establish contact with rebel leaders as a precursor to formal negotiations. By October, the southerners indicated they were receptive. In the interim, the coup attempt by leftist hardliners resulted in Nimeiri’s replacement of Joseph Garang as minister of southern affairs with the more moderate Abel Alier, a move that facilitated better communication with the church delegation. Alier informed the AACC delegation that Khartoum was ready to conduct talks, but only

Leach_Book.indd 184

10/17/2012 7:00:56 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

185

on the basis of a unified Sudanese state. In contrast to the government’s practice in the second war of making peace with smaller militias in order to weaken the larger force of the SPLA, Alier demanded that, to assure a final agreement would be adhered to, the individuals sent as insurgent delegates must not represent splinter factions but the bulk of Anya Nya fighters.11 The WCC/AACC also relayed a message through Alier’s party that the government and the SSLM should have a preliminary meeting, which they did in early November 1971. In keeping with Khartoum’s reluctance to allow external organizations to be represented in the negotiations, Carr was retained as the primary ‘moderator’ for the talks but served as an individual rather than as a representative of the church ‘or any other foreign entity’. He had no power to force rulings on either side. Foreign delegations, however, were useful to both parties in observing the formal conclusion of the Addis Ababa negotiations, as the agreement was witnessed and signed by Haile Selassie and the WCC/AACC representatives. The agreement also allowed for a small amount of United Nations involvement in dealing with what was generally regarded as its field of expertise, the coordination of efforts to repatriate refugees.12 Foreign actors could not apply substantial pressure to the two parties to the Addis Ababa negotiations but could curb excesses and inconsistencies. Mediators typically only seriously challenged the parties when it appeared negotiations were on the verge of derailment. On two occasions in December 1971, the WCC warned the Khartoum delegation that if the government did not end its final military offensive and its anti-Anya Nya propaganda during the talks, the mediators would withdraw from the process. Consequently, Vice President Alier persuaded Foreign Minister Mansour Khalid to recall all Sudanese ambassadors to Khartoum, brief them on the state of negotiations, and instruct them to moderate their rhetoric.13 Such intervention was even more vital following the initial February 1972 discussions, when discrepancies became apparent between what SSLM delegates had negotiated and the demands from others in the movement for provisions allowing even greater southern autonomy. Lagu masked his inability to authorize the AAA as originally negotiated by stating that the original delegation did not sufficiently inform

Leach_Book.indd 185

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

186

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

him about concessions. Ethiopian intelligence head Nebiyelul Kifle claimed, however, he had access to the telex machines the insurgent delegation used in Addis Ababa to confer with headquarters. On 27 February 1972, he produced several telexes contradicting Lagu’s story, and the SSLM leader dropped his opposition to the signing of the treaty.14

Nimeiri’s Reversal of Superpower Alliances In both cases, Sudan’s successful peace agreements followed or instigated a much larger shift of Khartoum’s ideological priorities. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war and its repercussions made conditions ill-suited towards peace talks for the rest of the decade and precipitated Sudan’s reliance on Soviet patronage. After the 1967 war, the Soviets began providing what would amount to US$150 million in aid to Khartoum. Under the Nimeiri regime Soviet backing reached its peak, and Soviet military advisors entered Sudan in 1970. A Soviet alliance was a natural foreign policy choice for a leftist regime, but the dependent nature of the relationship eventually offended many nationalist sensibilities. Much of Sudan’s cotton export was put aside for Eastern Bloc states in return for support, and Khartoum depended on Moscow for spare parts to maintain Soviet military hardware. The Soviet decision to introduce thousands of their own technicians rather than train Sudanese to operate this equipment revived memories of the colonial period when, for decades, Sudanese had been shut out of administrative positions. Nimeiri’s promotion of socialism and Eastern Bloc allegiance ended after the failed coup attempt of 1971, and relations with the USA would resume just months after the AAA. While there is little doubt that the failed coup attempt against him instigated this shift, Nimeiri had other incentives to couple switching alignment to the West with ending the war. In addition to draining Sudan’s financial resources, the hostilities in the south made western European states – a major source of aid and development for Africa – hesitant to give assistance to Khartoum. Furthermore, a rapprochement with the USA might facilitate World Bank financing for the ambitious agricultural

Leach_Book.indd 186

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

187

projects the regime hoped to implement during the 1970s.15 In March 1972, Nimeiri declared that, since the Soviet Union was withholding replacement parts for Sudan’s weaponry after the execution of leading Sudanese communists in the wake of the July 1971 coup attempt, Sudan would seek other patrons. From the outset, the May Regime hoped to project an image as a model of African nationalism for its neighbors. In January 1970, it hosted a Khartoum summit meeting of East and Central African states. Following the AAA, the regime could facilitate its early promise, establishing a reputation as a moderate in both Arab and African spheres. After years of animosity, the warming of relations between Sudan and imperial Ethiopia, which had feared both the socialist and Arab nationalist strains of Sudan’s post-colonial identity, was in accordance with Nimeiri’s shift to the West. Relations between Chad and Sudan were solidified after the AAA, when Khartoum withdrew support for FROLINAT insurgents on its western border.16 Throughout Africa, Nimeiri would now recraft his image to that of a bold African peacemaker. He also sought to heal his regime’s radical reputation with conservative Arab states and, by late 1971, relations between Khartoum and Riyadh were on the mend. The Saudis had been unhappy with Sudan’s ties to the Eastern Bloc states and retaliated by staying on friendly terms with much of the northern opposition in exile. Nimeiri made his first official visit to Saudi Arabia in April 1972, immediately after the AAA, and two years later both states would agree to explore jointly the Red Sea’s mineral resources, ending a long dispute between them. The erosion of the exclusively Arab component of northern nationalism helped facilitate peace with the south and contributed to its cohesiveness during the early post-war years, but was not without cost. The AAA was a declaration that Sudan would move away from Nasser’s dream of Arab nationalism. A united federation of Arab states would not be salvaged after Sudan abandoned the idea in mid-1971. This new hesitancy dismayed Cairo, though Anwar Sadat’s decision soon after to make his own shift from the Soviet Union to the West insured relations with Sudan would remain healthy. On the other hand, personal relations between Nimeiri and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya began to

Leach_Book.indd 187

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

188

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

deteriorate after the AAA, not because of that settlement specifically but because of Nimeiri’s abrupt reorientation away from federation. Libya, like Egypt, had aided Nimeiri in fending off the 1971 coup attempt. Qaddafi took Sudan’s warming to the USA and reactionary states, such as Saudi Arabia, as a personal insult coming so soon after the rejection of federation. Qaddafi viewed the AAA as a symptom of Nimeiri’s greater failings, and enmity between them grew throughout the 1970s. The fluid environment created in the period it took for Nimeiri’s regime to pivot towards the West was in itself conducive to negotiations. In late 1971, during the preliminary talks in Addis Ababa, Alier warned SSLM leaders and other southern exiles that the conditions that had allowed the insurgency to continue throughout the 1960s would soon disappear. As Khartoum sought to improve relations with the West and its regional allies, it would ask in exchange that these states end even tacit support for southern insurgents. Foreign military assistance had helped consolidate and empower the Anya Nya, and the movement became reliant on a consistent outside flow of ammunition, mines, and medical supplies. Losing access to this equipment would return the Anya Nya to its pre-1960s status as little more than rural bandits and reduce any leverage it had for negotiations with Khartoum. While the AAA did not have as formalized a role for foreign influence on its crafting and implementation as the CPA did, it was not immune to outside pressure. A key weakness of the earlier agreement’s implementation was its reliance on outside aid sources. As the world economy slumped in 1973, funding from friendly governments and aid organizations became scarcer.17 The post-AAA environment became a cautionary tale of the involvement of foreign states in supporting peace settlements. An artificially controlled negotiating environment, overly reliant on support and enforcement from outside actors not continually invested in that agreement’s success and deriving little authority from the rank and file of warring factions, can eventually destroy the lasting legitimacy of an agreement. Despite its weak international support financially, the AAA benefited from being seen as an innovation in African conflict resolution and

Leach_Book.indd 188

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

189

because it appeared to fit into the context of post-colonial Africa in a way the southern insurgency did not. Reconciliation between Africans of different ethnicities within the same state was a more appealing and optimistic vision of the continent’s future than yet another war fought over colonially imposed boundaries.

Sovereignty and Foreign Interference Sudan’s earlier post-independence regimes often displayed ambivalence about the nation’s role in world affairs. The focus of northern nationalism on state integration and civil war created a reluctance to engage in the few foreign policy dilemmas of the isolated colonial age. This reluctance was epitomized by the rapid post-independence dissolution of the movement to form a united state with Egypt. Aside from the settlement of border and water issues with Egypt, Sudan’s first military junta had almost no foreign policy goals at all. Sudan, like post-colonial regimes across the continent, was suspicious of foreign involvement in its domestic affairs, even in matters of conflict mediation. In May 1961, Sudan participated with other liberated African states in a conference held in Liberia where attendees pledged ‘noninterference’ in each other’s internal affairs. Abboud’s Sudan sought neutrality in the Cold War, primarily to retain goodwill and economic aid from all parties. The caretaker government brought to power after the 1964 October Revolution deliberately attempted to reverse Abboud’s ideological indifference. Its more Arab socialist, anti-imperialist agenda involved re-engaging the world through support of regional liberation movements, namely backing Nasser and the republicans in the North Yemen civil war, the Eritrean secessionists in Ethiopia, and the Simba rebels in the Congo. The consequence was Sudan’s introduction to the regional cross-border intrigue that contributed to the tenacity of the southern insurgency. Ethiopia and the Congo began their support for the Anya Nya to counteract Sudan’s interference within their borders. Out of a nationalist desire to establish the legitimacy of the postcolonial government, Khartoum emphasized domestic processes to

Leach_Book.indd 189

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

190

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

resolve the war. Sudan’s first attempt at seeking a non-military solution, the Round Table discussions of 1965, stressed internal mediation of the conflict, with representatives from friendly states relegated to observer status. Northern parties rejected the involvement of OAU or UN observers in these talks, believing their presence might internationalize the war. They also demanded the exclusion of Ethiopia and Congo as observers because of the support of those states for Anya Nya rebels. The inclusion of such states as Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt put pressure on the government not to declare the conference a failure. Accordingly, though no solution occurred, a 12-man committee was formed to recommend solutions after the conference. When the report was issued in September 1966, however, the Al-Mahdi government implemented none of its proposals that might have recognized southern grievances. Defense of the sovereignty of Sudan was a core principle of Sudanese nationalism, shared across the political spectrum. Nimeiri and Al-Mahdi could reconcile temporarily in 1977 out of shared concern that a divided Sudan opened itself to potential foreign manipulation. During the 1980s parliamentary era, several OAU-sponsored peace initiatives from neighboring states, such as Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire, were put forth but foundered. Only with the erosion of northern nationalism as an organizing principle and the rise of political Islam did Sudan become less wary of international involvement in the resolution of its internal conflicts. As the state became more comfortable in its sovereignty in the 1990s, it learned that it could use international institutions and legal norms to its advantage against insurgents. Khartoum’s legal advantage extended to the behavior of states it was not cordial with, as William Reno observes: The continuous activities of international arbitration and other commercial practice overwhelmingly reinforce the globally recognized sovereign, not its competitors. Bereft of legal protection, underwriters and investment rating services shy away from such deals to avoid liability. Thus southern Sudanese groups pursue legal action against firms doing business in Sudan not as members of a southern organization with a rival claim to governance

Leach_Book.indd 190

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

191

or as a separate authority. Instead they must present themselves in US District Court under the US Alien Tort Claims Act as citizens of Sudan. Their claims would have no standing in US courts if they approached this issue based upon a claim to be an alternative sovereign over the disputed territory. Thus they approach the court, and by extension the international system, as citizens of the state from which many southern Sudanese wish to secede.18 The Islamist-military coalition ascending to power in 1989 viewed sovereignty less as a moral imperative than as a tool for defending the seat of its Islamic revolution and, most importantly, the regime itself. While the early post-colonial regimes underwent a relatively slow process of acknowledging the limits of sovereignty in internal conflict, the NIF regime did not have the luxury of keeping the international community at bay, especially as regional security and humanitarian issues began to concern an ever-widening circle of states. As a result, the regime often relied on the principle of sovereignty as a last resort in negotiations, not a first one. At the Abuja 2 talks in 1993, for example, Khartoum did not resist mediation. Instead, when pressed for concessions on Sharia law and the strict security measures in the south, Sudan argued that Nigeria interfered with Sudanese sovereignty. The regime invoked the same concern in mid-2004 to avoid a premature conclusion of the Naivasha process. At that time, Khartoum argued that it was unable to conclude the agreement with the SPLM/A because it was too preoccupied with the Darfur insurgency. Even though the more recent outbreak of violence in the west had the potential to stall or even derail ongoing mediation efforts, the regime refused to allow IGAD mediation there. While the Bashir regime would eventually rely on the UN for CPA implementation, it objected to that body’s involvement in the actual negotiations. IGAD’s primacy in mediation resulted in part from the complete antipathy the Sudanese government had for any UN role, especially early in the process. The UN would enforce the CPA because IGAD members were reluctant to enforce the agreement under their own authority. The arrangement also fit the UN’s general preference

Leach_Book.indd 191

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

192

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

for a detailed peace agreement between warring factions to precede its intervention into the monitoring process. Nevertheless, for a sovereign government that had not lost a war to submit to such a level of UN involvement internally was unusual and indicated the pressure Sudan was under to have the agreement implemented. Elections were to be internationally monitored and IGAD representatives would evaluate the early implementation of the agreement in coordination with other regional or international bodies as agreed by both parties.19 This pressure was successful because, throughout the peace process, the Bashir regime could not translate potential oil wealth into broad domestic popularity. A problem for the regime, considering how closely it veered to international pariah status in the mid-1990s, was that its narrow domestic base forced it to rely on international partners more than any prior Sudanese government. During the 1990s, Khartoum sought stronger economic relationships with such states as China in part to avoid making the dramatic concessions in power sharing Nimeiri was forced to make in the AAA and in the National Reconciliation of 1977. Nevertheless, the regime’s inability to reconcile with rivals tainted the integrity of treaties it tried to craft domestically, such as the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement. The regime’s frail base affected not only the crafting but also the implementation of the CPA, as the government needed more international guarantees than a parliamentary government with a large base might have. By the period of the Naivasha process, international donor support had become another ‘carrot’ IGAD’s Western partners could use to hasten conflict resolution.20 The promise of foreign support led the mediators to establish a multi-donor trust fund for both the national and southern governments.

Foreign Support and the Evolution of Insurgency in the Second War The SPLM/A’s goal of national revolution allowed for ideologically stronger foreign alliances than the Anya Nya could form. With the overthrow of the Haile Selassie monarchy in 1974 by the Marxist Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Eritrean question would darken Khartoum-Addis

Leach_Book.indd 192

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

193

Ababa relations again. Sudan once more felt pressure from the Arab world to support the Eritreans during their separatist efforts in the late 1970s. Consequently, Ethiopia became more inclined to support Anya Nya 2 forces in southern Sudan and to support the SPLA after 1983. The early leftist pretensions of Garang’s insurgency were less a serious indication of socialist aspirations than a sop to the movement’s patron. Early in the second war, Mengistu allowed the SPLM/A to transmit from a radio station in Ethiopian territory. The insurgents could, thus, counter Khartoum’s propaganda that it was another separatist rebellion in the tradition of the Anya Nya, a movement that never had such access to technology for message dissemination. The SPLM/A pledge to national unity mollified states that might not have supported a return to separatism and anti-Arab sentiment. Ethiopia’s support allowed the SPLA a safe haven from which to centralize its power and train recruits in much more favorable conditions than earlier insurgents enjoyed. The Anya Nya had used Ethiopian territory to attack inside Sudan but was never allowed access to the Ethiopian security apparatus. In its formative period, when animosity between the Nimeiri regime and Sudan’s neighbors was at its height, SPLA recruits were trained directly by the Ethiopian army, with support from Cuba and Libya. Aid from Kampala after 1986 was primarily a result of the camaraderie between Garang and new Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni. The two had attended school in Tanzania together. Even this relationship, however, was a continuation of the regional tit-for-tat approach to state funding for insurgency. With Khartoum providing exile status to the government he had toppled, Museveni occupied southern Equatoria with 14,000 Ugandan troops throughout the late 1980s. Museveni had ideological reasons for supporting the SPLA as well. He was a critic of the post-colonial concept, embraced by the OAU, that allowed advantages for centrally located and internationally recognized governments over insurgent movements, no matter how tyrannical those governments might be. Fellow insurgent-turned-president Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea shared the same criticisms and, after a brief period of hostility to the SPLA following its 1993 independence, Eritrea would also become supportive of Sudan’s rebels.21

Leach_Book.indd 193

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

194

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Post-Nimeiri governments in Khartoum urged the SPLA to end its campaign but were reluctant to make concessions that would facilitate this end. The Transitional Military Council (TMC) offered little more than a reinstatement of the AAA, and the SPLM/A remained unimpressed with Al-Mahdi’s increasingly conservative government positions and policies. This intransigence fostered resentment among northerners, and suspicion that the SPLM/A was impossible to satisfy and must have a hidden separatist agenda. After the SPLA capture of the towns of Kurmuk and Qaysan in Southern Blue Nile province in late 1987, the government subsequently accused SPLA patron Ethiopia of attacking the Arab world. This instigated military support for the Al-Mahdi government from Iraq and even Libya, which had only recently stopped assisting the insurgents. Groups that had reached accommodation with the SPLM/A, such as the trade unionoriented National Alliance for National Salvation and various southern parties, were viewed with disdain and suspicion by other political factions. As the SPLA gained the upper hand by the end of the 1980s, some allies worried that such heavy foreign support might compromise the organization’s nationalist objective. After consolidating power in Kampala by 1990, Museveni withdrew Ugandan armed forces from Sudan and replaced them with military advisors, possibly out of a concern that heavy Ugandan involvement in Sudan’s civil war could diminish the legitimacy of an eventual SPLA victory in the south.22 Museveni’s observation that the SPLM/A had become structurally dependent on foreign support was shared by some of the insurgency’s top commanders. As the Mengistu regime became increasingly unstable, Garang lieutenants such as Kerubino Kuanyin Bol argued that the strong SPLA dependency on Addis Ababa was an ideological and practical error. The collapse of Ethiopia’s Marxist regime in 1991 helped instigate a violent split in the SPLA, in which Bol joined the breakaway SPLA-United faction. The assumption of power by the NIF-aligned regime of Omar Hassan Al-Bashir in 1989 saw a dramatic internationalization of the war, and therefore of the mediation efforts. Establishing good foreign contacts early was crucial for the NIF regime, which had come

Leach_Book.indd 194

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

195

to power through a hastily organized coup and needed to cement its authority. It hoped to achieve this through the recognition of its legitimacy by foreign governments. Sudan’s poor standing among key states made this possible: both Egypt and the United States had become disillusioned with Al-Mahdi’s government and made few protests against its overthrow. Hassan Al-Turabi’s notoriety as an Islamist meant his role in the 1989 coup had to be concealed so such important Arab neighbors as Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia could recognize the new regime. As a result, the NIF was banned along with all other political parties, and Turabi jailed. By March 1990, Bashir had convinced Egypt that he would distance himself from the more radical strain of Islamism and make peace with the still formidable SPLA. So encouraged was Hosni Mubarak that in a meeting at an OAU summit that year he urged Garang to make a deal with Bashir while the window was open to do so.23 As the regime relied on Egypt’s recognition for legitimacy among many northern Sudanese, it turned to Libya for aid. Soon after the coup, Bashir traveled to Tripoli where he promised Sudan’s renewed commitment to eventual Arab federation, a concept that had been dormant in Sudan since 1972. In return, Qaddafi supplied both the legitimacy of an Arab state recognizing Sudan’s new leadership and subsidized oil shipments, crucial gifts to a narrowly based regime trying to hold on to power. Qaddafi did not realize for months how closely connected Turabi was with the regime or that its guiding ideology was not so much pan-Arab as pan-Islamist. Continued SPLA victories, especially on northern soil, allowed the new regime to make appeals to nationalism that masked the tension between its revolutionary and conservative wings. Schisms in the military-Islamist coalition forming the regime could be seen during early crises, such as Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Bashir was inclined to side with the Saudis and Egyptians, even sending troops to defend Saudi Arabia and supporting the Arab League’s resolution condemning the invasion. Turabi, representing the more ideological wing of the regime, openly declared support for Iraq. His considerable influence in the government resulted in the Sudanese delegate to the Arab League abstaining from the vote condemning Iraq’s invasion, a

Leach_Book.indd 195

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

196

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

move that appalled Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Iraq’s defeat ended its capability to supply Sudan with arms, and Sudan’s position on the Gulf War ended significant aid from other Arab states. By the mid-1990s, Khartoum had strained relations with almost all its neighbors, even those, such as Libya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, that had earlier been amicable to the regime. A 1995 assassination attempt against President Mubarak in Addis Ababa that implicated Sudanese intelligence angered the Ethiopians and Egyptians. Eritrea ended relations with Sudan in 1995 for supporting an Islamist jihad against its government and for trying to foster divisions between Christian and Muslim Eritrean nationalists. Uganda was furious that Khartoum supported insurgencies within its borders and also severed relations with Sudan in 1995. Sudan was also insensitive to pressure from its neighbors concerning the sharing of the Nile waters, recalcitrance that upset Ethiopia in its attempts to begin major dam-building projects on the Blue Nile and Atbara rivers. Libyan-Sudanese relations also deteriorated as Tripoli held Khartoum responsible for 1993–95 attempts to destabilize Qaddafi’s regime.24 While the NIF regime was earning a reputation as a radical element in the region, the SPLM/A was successfuly positioning itself internationally as a worthy cause. It was well supplied by foreign allies and militarily well positioned by 1990. The southern movement had learned lessons from the Anya Nya, and from southern parties in the 1960s that had failed to establish themselves regionally. Years before IGAD’s involvement, southern Sudanese political parties were already attempting to draw the attention of other states to the conflict. In late 1987, several smaller southern groups combined to become the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP) and opened communications with the SPLM/A in the friendly states of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, a move supported by those governments. Such early attempts to involve regional neighbors would see fruition in the following decade. In the 1980s, such events as the Koka Dam Declaration and the Sudan Peace Initiative would become more exclusively Sudanese initiatives than even the AAA had been. As the conflict wore on, however, African states like Nigeria became drawn into mediation efforts. The Abuja conferences of 1992 and 1993 were the first serious international

Leach_Book.indd 196

10/17/2012 7:00:57 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

197

efforts to end hostilities in the second war. After the 1991 SPLA split, Nigerian ruler Ibrahim Babangida, who was sympathetic to the SPLM goals of racial and religious tolerance and self-determination, feared the movement’s defeat by a resurgent Khartoum. He and Bashir agreed to convene a new round of talks in the Nigerian capital in May 1992. Bashir adamantly hoped to keep the West uninvolved in peace efforts and appreciated Babangida’s 1991 request of the USA that it allow Africans the opportunity to resolve their own conflicts. The talks achieved little, since the Sudanese government felt it was in a strong enough position to avoid making concessions. Babangida convened a second round of talks a year later, but by that point the SPLA was even weaker. Khartoum proposed that the SPLM/A accept its federal model with some exceptions, such as exemption from certain elements of Sharia. The SPLM/A rejected this proposal and called for a confederation and secular democracy. Again, the conference ended in a stalemate. The Abuja talks were a failure, but they raised the SPLM/A’s profile throughout Africa just as Khartoum’s Islamic radicalism was turning it into a pariah. As the Islamist nature of the NIF regime became apparent, several states began to establish communications with the SPLM/A. The Ethiopian regime that had toppled Mengistu in 1991 had been hostile to the SPLM/A, a Mengistu ally. As Garang’s movement grew weaker throughout the early 1990s, however, Addis Ababa decided the insurgency’s collapse would not be in Ethiopia’s interests. Ties were re-established in 1993 and Ethiopia sent military advisors to assist the SPLA. After the 1995 assassination attempt on Mubarak in Addis Ababa, both Ethiopia and Uganda stepped up political and military support for the SPLM/A. The NIF regime’s aggressive Islamic identity disturbed many non-Muslim states and led to sympathy for the SPLM/A that the Anya Nya had not enjoyed in the first war. By the mid-1990s, the SPLM was receiving political support throughout sub-Saharan Africa, from states as distant as Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The IGAD Coalition and Southern Self-Determination As mediation efforts became more international in the second war, the topic of southern self-determination was more widely discussed.

Leach_Book.indd 197

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

198

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Notably, Sudan’s neighbors, in their capacity as IGAD members, played a large role in the advancement of the principle of self-determination. The first war had relatively little track one diplomacy; that is, efforts from other states to mediate the conflict. On the other hand, the second war’s threat to regional security hastened IGAD’s involvement in resolving that conflict. As the circle of international participation gradually expanded and Khartoum slipped out of favor with many involved states, support for southern self-determination grew. The IGAD states’ interest in conflict mediation was borne of their inability to pursue their main objective of environmental development so long as the Horn of Africa remained politically unstable. IGAD mediation began with the end of Nigerian mediation efforts in 1993, as the fall of the Babangida government precluded another round of talks in that country. Instead, Nigeria passed the torch of mediation to East Africa and argued that Sudanese neighbors such as Uganda and Kenya should be included in the ‘circle of mediators’ since those states had an interest in ending the regional instability.25 After September 1993, Khartoum was receptive to IGAD’s assumption of mediation efforts from Nigeria, reasoning that its neighbors might be sympathetic to government concerns. Eritrea and Ethiopia were then still on good terms with the NIF regime, and Kenya remained neutral throughout the war. Ethiopia’s presence in particular reassured Khartoum, since, even though it never had a high profile in the mediation, Addis Ababa indicated support for a united Sudan and was, therefore, an important counterweight to both Eritrea and Uganda, who were less reliable on that point. Most significantly, IGAD was the only forum containing states with enough influence in southern Sudan to convince the SPLM/A – or pressure it if necessary – to accept reasonable terms of peace. As most IGAD states were on cordial terms with the USA during this period, Khartoum also hoped to deflect growing hostility from Washington following the implication of Sudanese government officials in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the subsequent addition of Sudan to Washington’s list of states supporting terror.26 Khartoum’s faith in the new forum was to be shaken. At Abuja, Nigeria had opposed the SPLM demand for a referendum on selfdetermination, arguing that the constitutional conference the rebels

Leach_Book.indd 198

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

199

wanted was sufficient to voice demands for southern autonomy. IGAD’s Declaration of Principles, however, drew from the SPLM/A platform presented during the 1993 Abuja 2 talks, which called for a qualified right to self-determination. Khartoum and the Nigerian mediators rejected this principle; both considered a unified state to be a necessity. IGAD, on the other hand, considered unity to be conditional on national secularism. With hindsight, it should not have been surprising that Eritrea and Ethiopia might find this SPLM/A demand to be reasonable since both regimes had begun as secular insurgencies. IGAD had not initially been set up to deal with conflict resolution but with water problems in the Horn of Africa. Its mission shifted in the 1990s as the destabilizing effects of the war increased. IGAD became the regional organization through which almost all mediation would continue. While IGAD gained recognition as the forum through which the war was to be mediated, the fragile nature of its composition became more apparent as its new mission progressed. Throughout the 1990s, IGAD mediation proceeded with a series of fits and starts as the various member states balanced their security interest in ending the Sudanese war against other priorities. The strained relationships between Sudan and various IGAD states in the mid-1990s contributed to the stalling of peace talks. After Asmara broke off diplomatic relations with Khartoum in late 1994, Sudanese officials declared they would not participate in the forum while Eritrea was still an IGAD member. Poor relations with other IGAD member states during this period also compromised IGAD’s image of neutrality. The hostile actions of individual IGAD states toward Sudan during the 1990s paradoxically contributed to the organization’s later effectiveness in mediation. Khartoum’s poor relations with its neighbors allowed IGAD the license and will to use sticks in addition to carrots, a freedom no other forum would enjoy. Post-Mengistu Ethiopia in particular, through its rapprochement with and support of the SPLA, put unexpected pressure on Khartoum, extracting concessions that would later form the basis of the CPA. In 1997, when its relations with neighbors reached their nadir, Sudan signed both the Khartoum Peace Agreement and the IGAD Declaration of Principles, two documents consenting to south Sudan’s right to self-determination. Getting both

Leach_Book.indd 199

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

200

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

parties to adhere to the Declaration of Principles after three years of stalling by Khartoum was the only real achievement of the IGAD process by this point. Nevertheless, it was a milestone in the understanding of the south’s relationship with the state. Regional support for the SPLA during this time eventually facilitated Khartoum’s acquiescence. The success of regional states in extracting such concessions led the USA to rely on IGAD. In keeping with the hostile position it had taken since the 1993 bombing at the World Trade Center, the Clinton administration initially sought to aid IGAD regimes in their coercive efforts towards the Bashir regime. In late 1996 and early 1997, Washington transferred US$20 million in military aid to Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, three IGAD members then on poor terms with Sudan. It is widely assumed that this aid was funnelled to the SPLA. By the 2000s, however, Washington would abandon its unofficial policy of regime change and instead work with other partners to bolster IGAD negotiations. By 1999, the IGAD forum, still only marginally effective, began more intense efforts to formalize the process of negotiations and make them routine. That year an IGAD secretariat was created with a mandate for a process of continuous negotiations between the two parties. Moreover, by this time IGAD’s European partners had become willing to provide more funds to the process in Nairobi. The new emphasis on organizational structure, along with invigorated external backing, marked the start of that forum’s increased usefulness. The second war reached its ultimate period of stalemate in 2001. Regional and international opinion increasingly favored the SPLM/A, but the Bashir regime’s reliance on new oil revenues to buy weapons and support ensured it would not be dislodged from Khartoum.27 The pattern would be broken with the entry of the USA into direct mediation in the second half of 2001. As the USA became involved, it also brought its own understanding of the conflict. President George W. Bush’s special envoy to the region, John Danforth, began his involvement in Sudan by advocating a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains, an area with much hostility to Khartoum but very little enthusiasm for separatism. Limited exposure may have influenced Danforth’s

Leach_Book.indd 200

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

201

perception of the conflict, since at one point he told Kenyan mediator Sumbeiywo that the problem could be solved if the government would simply ‘divide the oil.’28 The inference was that solutions for conflict in the Nuba Mountains might be appropriate for the larger war, bypassing questions of southern identity and accepting the theory that rent division was the cause of violence. By 2002, the USA began involving itself in the mediation process more than the regional moderators, especially Kenya, considered necessary. In the period leading up to the Machakos Protocol, the USA and Kenya seemed in competition to host the process. When the USA offered to host an IGAD meeting in Washington, Kenya resisted. Only the eventual US acquiescence to regional mediation led by Kenya would end this competition. Once the USA had agreed to Kenya’s primacy as mediator, few other states would challenge it for that role. Soon a troika of the USA, UK, and Norway had stepped forward as the leading Western sponsors of the peace process. These states formed a second ring of negotiation participants that would support the first ring consisting of the two parties and the IGAD mediators, especially Sumbeiywo. The IGAD Partners Forum, a collection of Western states with conflicting interests, had been difficult to manage because of its reliance on consensus. Over 2001 and 2002, this troika would emerge as the Western states committed to deeper involvement than the others.

The Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative The competition between an initiative introduced by Sudan’s Arab neighbors and the IGAD process demonstrates the hazards that occur when states tailor their involvement in a peace process to the advancement of their own interests. Emeric Rogier observes that, when presented together, the ELJI and IGAD process both had the potential to intensify hostilities.29 Northern opposition could rally around the unified vision of Sudan in the ELJI, while southerners could support the self-determination components of the Machakos Protocol. US intervention on the side of the IGAD process – with an eye towards Egyptian interests– may have kept the tension from getting out of hand.

Leach_Book.indd 201

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

202

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

The ELJI began gestating during a long period in which Egypt felt sidelined in the region. Throughout the 1990s, Cairo had no influence in any of the states of East Africa and watched helplessly as Khartoum succumbed to a mediation framework with no Egyptian participation. Egypt was eventually granted observer status in the IGAD mediation process, but Ethiopia in particular was suspicious of its intentions and resisted allowing it any further role in the forum.30 Egypt’s disapproval of the manner in which successive Sudanese governments handled the new war during the 1980s, especially its insistence on nationwide Islamic law, led to Cairo taking a somewhat impartial stance during most of the war, a tacit acceptance of the SPLA as an inevitable by-product of poor leadership in Khartoum. Despite souring relations with the NIF regime throughout the 1990s, Egypt never funded the SPLA and sought to avoid getting drawn into the conflict, unlike other states in the region. Even after the 1995 assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak, when the USA increased calls for severe sanctions on Sudan, Cairo fought against an arms embargo and held that the northern Sudanese had the right to defend themselves during a civil war.31 Nevertheless, Egypt’s hesitant relations with the SPLM/A were better than its nonexistent relations with Anya Nya in the previous war. The separatist nature of the earlier movement and its relative weakness gave Cairo little reason to establish communications. Egypt remained continually uncertain of how to deal with its upstream neighbor. It considered overthrowing the Bashir regime after Sudan’s connections to the assassination attempt on Mubarak were discovered, but eventually shifted to a policy of engagement as the USA would also do years later.32 Cairo’s relations with Khartoum would remain poor throughout the 1990s, however, only mending when Bashir won his struggle against Turabi at the end of the decade. Egypt then declared that it opposed southern self-determination and worked with Libya to advance a peace initiative more favorable to northern Sudanese interests. The ELJI, launched in 1999, had no provision for southern selfdetermination and called for the inclusion of northern opposition members from the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in the negotiation process. The ELJI proposed a constitutional conference and the

Leach_Book.indd 202

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

203

establishment of an all-party transitional government, an arrangement meeting some of the key demands of Sadiq Al-Mahdi, who was considered a force behind the forum. Al-Mahdi’s frustration with the SPLM/A and other NDA elements who expressed hesitancy regarding the ELJI led him to make his own peace with Khartoum in November 2000 and to declare that the remaining opposition was not serious about negotiations. Egypt, in seeking to advance an initiative protecting its security interests, had succeeded only in fracturing the NDA, which over the previous five years had been attempting to forge strong enough ties among its various members to act as a coherent government-in-exile. Khartoum appeared to view the initiative as a new weapon for forcing a wedge between opposition groups, but this ability it had perfected in the last decade was becoming less useful. After the initiative’s introduction, the secretary general of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) declared that Khartoum might consider bypassing the SPLM/A if it boycotted a prescribed peace conference. This was an empty threat, as both the government and NDA members realized that the failure to address the southern demand for self-determination would render any peace initiative futile. Self-determination had become a non-negotiable point for the SPLM/A, and its omission relegated the ELJI to the periphery. Without the SPLA’s full participation, the usefulness of the forum was compromised. As the failure of the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement proved, no serious peace could be made in the south without the inclusion of Garang’s powerful group. Additionally, neither the SPLA nor many other NDA parties would commit to a plan that did not honor the importance of the separation of religion and state. The slow process after the ELJI’s initiation contributed to its irrelevance. Tripoli issued five verbal points in September 1999 but requested a response from the NDA only ten months later. The sponsors did not begin drafting proposals for another year. The SPLM/A and Khartoum would never meet for negotiations under the ELJI. The government eventually had neither the power nor the interest in the initiative to fight to retain it. The SPLM/A was also wary of the initiative because it doubted the commitment of either sponsoring state to

Leach_Book.indd 203

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

204

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

democracy or human rights, both of which would become insurgent priorities without the option of southern self-determination. The insurgents also recognized the initiative’s potential to facilitate Khartoum’s forum shopping. Because of their Arab constituencies, neither the government nor most NDA parties from northern Sudan could afford to ignore the ELJI even if they would have preferred to do so.33 By 2001, NDA impatience with the stalemate, its exclusion from the IGAD process, and a desire to see stronger advancement of the priorities of northern regime opponents drove the exile group to call for a merging of the ELJI and the IGAD process. By 2001, the NDA was having difficulty even scheduling appointments with IGAD mediators; when its representatives showed up to the Machakos negotiations in July 2002, the SPLM/A did not allow them a seat at the negotiating table.34 The exclusion of the NDA and others from the Naivasha process resulted from the IGAD mediators’ belief that the parties with the main grievances and the main military capacity should have their concerns addressed before other parties were included. IGAD’s narrow focus on resolving differences between the NCP and SPLM/A before other parties—backed by the troika of Norway, the UK, and the USA – gave the Bashir regime an excuse to delay any negotiations in Darfur. The regime consistently found reasons to draw out the Naivasha process while it continued its western military campaign. The unpopularity of the USA in the Arab world following the 2003 invasion of Iraq allowed Khartoum to more easily fend off US pressure to end the process quickly, as it decried further Western aggression. The ELJI could not be completely ignored, as its sponsoring states were both too powerful regionally to have their interests disregarded. Instead, IGAD mediators made more efforts to ensure Egypt and Libya felt their concerns were addressed in the IGAD process. By seeking to fold the ELJI into the IGAD process, US Special Envoy John Danforth may have been attempting not to sideline Egypt, a more crucial US ally than any of the IGAD states. The USA did not have formal relations with Libya, but the UK did. London used its influence to ensure Tripoli would not become a spoiler in the process.35 In a 2003 interview, IGAD mediator Sumbeiywo stressed that he had been to Egypt often to ensure that its government was aware

Leach_Book.indd 204

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

205

of the status of negotiations and, he said, Egypt now supported the IGAD process.36

The USA Commits to Peace The USA was one of the first parties the Bashir regime would turn to in early efforts to control the peace process, approaching Washington to mediate in March 1990.37 That initiative was scuttled after Sudan’s equivocations during the 1990–91 Gulf War, and animosity between the countries grew over the decade. The government’s successful effort to thwart Garang’s assault on Juba shortly after the first Abuja conference in 1992 further alienated Khartoum internationally, as it involved massive retaliatory measures against Juba’s civilian population, including the execution of two Sudanese USAID employees. The American-Sudanese relationship was typically cool following the overthrow of American client Nimeiri but became outright hostile by the late 1990s. In November 1997, the Clinton Administration imposed trade and economic sanctions. Relations reached their nadir with the US August 1998 bombing of a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, a retaliatory strike for the Al Qaeda bombings of two US embassies in East Africa. Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden no longer resided in Sudan, but Sudan’s links with radical Islam were known. Washington’s allegations that the factory produced chemical weapons agents were never verified, but the depth of the administration’s hostility was no longer in question. By the turn of the century, European support for the American hardline policy on Sudan had collapsed. Only a few states, primarily Norway and the Netherlands, supported a firmer policy over renewed calls for engagement. Khartoum’s cooperation with Canadian and Chinese oil companies led such states as Germany, France, and the UK to believe isolation was increasingly counterproductive. The Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 had allowed Khartoum access to oil fields, gaining the interest of European oil companies and fracturing any Western consensus over isolating Sudan. Khartoum also hoped to counter US influence with that of Europe, especially France, using the prospect of revived Total oil concessions as an incentive.

Leach_Book.indd 205

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

206

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

The government and even some parties in the northern opposition came to consider the European Union to be a more even-handed mediator than the USA, which was seen as too sympathetic to the SPLM/A. By the end of its second term, the Clinton administration began changing its strategy from one of isolating Sudan while pursuing regime change towards one of engagement, a policy pursued with even more vigor by the incoming Bush administration. The old strategy was no longer working: as former US ambassador to Khartoum Donald Petterson notes, Sudan’s neighbors were indeed hostile to the Bashir regime by the end of the century but only because of its own actions, not encouragement from Washington.38 In May 2000, both governments agreed that a counterterrorism team from Washington would begin work in Khartoum. By July 2000, some US security agencies, and Clinton special envoy to the region former congressman Harry Johnston, were already pushing for the USA to change its strategy in order to gain access to Sudan’s intelligence on Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.39 The Bush administration would continue this change of policy upon taking office in January 2001. Bush sought to streamline the role of the USA and other states involved in the war, and to simplify demands on Khartoum. Bush’s envoy, John Danforth, envisioned the US role as bringing its allies into the process, and he coordinated visits to the Egyptian, Ugandan, and Kenyan presidents to that effect. He also believed the USA and Europe needed to harmonize their roles in the peace process. In addition, Washington modified its bilateral approach with Khartoum. A July 2001 delivery of 40,000 tons of wheat from USAID to Sudan was an early olive branch from the new administration, the first of many aid-related gestures that paved the way for Danforth’s involvement later that year. Given Khartoum’s compliance on the peace process and its sharing of information related to Al Qaeda after the 11 September 2001 terror attacks, Washington would have difficulty opposing the lifting of sanctions. The USA, however, soon established a link between sanctions and Sudan’s commitment to peace efforts that had not been apparent when sanctions were first imposed. New conditions were now drawn up just as Khartoum had complied with the previous ones.

Leach_Book.indd 206

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

207

Khartoum would now be removed from the list of states sponsoring terrorism only after signing a peace agreement.40 This shift of policy was inconsistent with previous White House statements but was in keeping with the recommendations made by a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report in early 2001. The report focused on ending the war instead of the multiple goals of the Clinton administration and helped Khartoum understand that ending the war was to be the overriding US objective now, despite Washington’s earlier inconsistency. The CSIS report suggested bypassing competing initiatives, such as the ELJI, in favor of joining Norway and the UK to advance a new mediation forum building on the early achievements of IGAD, which had languished for years by 2001.41 It posed that the US reestablishment of relations with Sudan would be a strong incentive for Khartoum to commit to peace, as the USA could remove UN Security Council sanctions and support World Bank and IMF involvement in Sudanese finances. The report also addressed the internal divisions in the regime. Citing Bashir’s split with Turabi, it declared that, even when supplemented by new oil revenues, the regime was ‘arguably weaker than in earlier periods and for that reason less able to act coherently and deliberately’.42 Significantly, the report did not suggest using these internal rifts to destabilize the regime but to persuade it to commit to peace, an approach the administration would emulate. It is possible that the peace process would have fallen apart without the increased international pressure, especially from the USA. An attempt by the IGAD mediators to revive their process in June 2001 brought Bashir and Garang to talks in Kenya, hosted by Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, but made no other significant headway. Soon thereafter, the SPLA captured the town of Raga, a key government position in northern Sudan, and heated fighting ensued for the following three months. Khartoum’s unease at being a potential target of US military action in the months after the 11 September attacks was an incentive to abide by Danforth’s relatively mild tests of good faith.43 The focus on ending the war above other goals allowed Danforth to implement benchmarks that were less a separate American peace initiative than criteria for further US involvement. The test to implement a

Leach_Book.indd 207

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

208

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains, one of the areas that had seen the most fighting throughout the war, was a positive first step. Failure would have meant US disengagement from the peace process and, implicitly, the stalling of improved bilateral relations. Success indicated that Khartoum was ready to allow foreign peace observers within Sudan’s borders for the first time. This initial test was followed by three others outlined in the Danforth plan: an inquiry into the resurgence of slavery in the region, further short-term cease-fires throughout the south to allow humanitarian aid in the region, and an end to attacks on civilians.44 While the tests were not met with exemplary results across the board, enough action was taken that Danforth could report to the president in April 2002 that both sides were negotiating in good faith and that the USA should therefore aid the peace process. Ending hostilities in the Nuba Mountains may not have directly contributed to the IGAD process, but the episode is significant in that it demonstrated to the warring parties that the USA was ready to assist in resolving the conflict, and to Washington that devoting US resources and prestige to the negotiation efforts need not be a fruitless gesture. Additionally, it ended hostilities in one of the disputed north-south border regions, thereby making it easier to discuss a permanent settlement for Southern Kordofan without negotiation being dictated by new hostilities on the ground there. The Nuba Mountains promoted an atmosphere in which the IGAD process could move forward. In his 2002 report to President Bush, Danforth wrote that even though he took Egyptian wariness of southern self-determination to heart, he believed the USA should back the IGAD process exclusively. He recommended that Washington not initiate its own peace process, instead opting to test whether peace was achievable by monitoring human rights in the area and applying confidence-building measures. As these were implemented, the USA began to back the IGAD forum more strongly. A December 2002 meeting of President Moi and General Sumbeiywo with President Bush at the White House confirmed Washington would support IGAD mediation for the duration of the process. The schizophrenic US approach was a product not only of the change of administration, but also of the role of congress, best

Leach_Book.indd 208

10/17/2012 7:00:58 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

209

typified by the 2001 introduction of the Sudan Peace Act. The act declared that sterner measures were necessary in dealing with Khartoum, as ‘the disengagement of the front-line states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda foster[ed] the belief among officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the battlefield [could] be achieved’.45 The State Department preferred to keep the delicate negotiations within its own realm and resented the challenge posed by the act. The act was introduced again in October 2002, promising further sanctions if Khartoum was not seen to be acting in good faith in peace negotiations. It made available to the president up to US$100 million a year from 2003 to 2005 to prepare the southern areas outside the control of Khartoum for peace. Khartoum would also be threatened by a blockade of loans from the IMF and World Bank and damage to diplomatic relations if Bush did not, every six months, certify that the regime was cooperating with the peace process.46 By the later period of the peace process, Washington was running out of economic disciplinary measures to pressure Khartoum. Of the various types of sanctions threatened in the Sudan Peace Act, most had already been enacted and the rest, especially a proposed arms embargo, would require the unlikely cooperation of such states as China and Russia. Nevertheless, Bush’s involvement in the peace process could give momentum to the talks when they appeared stalled, as in April 2003, when his reaffirmation of Sudan’s cooperation during the period of apparent stalemate allowed the parties time to conclude the September 2003 Security Agreement. As it became more apparent that the parties were locked into the mediation process and could no longer credibly pull out or shop for forums, Washington became less concerned about how Khartoum would react to sanctions. On 22 July 2004, the US congress passed resolutions declaring that Khartoum and government supporters were committing genocide in Darfur, based on the criteria in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. On 23 December 2004, Bush signed the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, which advocated sanctions against Khartoum for atrocities committed in Darfur.

Leach_Book.indd 209

10/17/2012 7:00:59 PM

210

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

By early 2004, US officials were rallying for a quick push to wrap up the peace process. But Sumbeiywo, backed by the Norwegians, sought additional time to lock in an implementation process. He felt a lack of implementation was one of the critical failures of the AAA.47 The USA allowed the prospect of an official ceremony at the White House marking the agreement, but the State Department admitted that this was more to raise the prestige of the agreement than to convince the two parties to make peace.48 Eventually, the escalating violence in Darfur made such an event politically impossible.

International Attention and IGAD Focus A primary obstacle to resolving the conflict during the 1990s was the consistent generation of uncoordinated peace initiatives by several potential mediators. Rather than settle on pursuing a single initiative, the government seemed content to stall and forum shop throughout the second war.49 Khartoum rarely pulled out of forums unilaterally without reason, instead complaining that certain forums or mediators had reached the limits of their usefulness. After September 1995, for example, Khartoum declared that the IGAD talks had reached a dead end and began searching for alternative mediators, thereby retaining a peacemaker image while completing military operations on the ground. By mid-1996, Bashir was calling for face-to-face talks, arranged by either Kenyan President Moi or South African President Nelson Mandela, between himself and Garang. This was another early attempt to step outside the IGAD process. Forum-shopping would become more difficult for Khartoum as IGAD began to maximize its strengths and improve its organizational structure. The regional body and its backers had to harmonize the advantages of organizational mediation versus great power mediation. The warring parties regarded IGAD as a legitimate forum, but the organization itself lacked the ability to provide military or economic carrots and sticks to steer the parties through especially difficult areas of negotiation. Major powers, on the other hand, possessed sufficient

Leach_Book.indd 210

10/17/2012 7:00:59 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

211

means of coercion and incentive but lacked the legitimacy of a regional or international organization. Powerful international actors also lacked the immediate focus on regional conflict shared by neighboring states, as demonstrated by the scattered, hesitant approach of the USA towards peace in Sudan. As a result, the best hope for mediating a protracted conflict became a concert of regional and international actors, the exact arrangement that defined the late IGAD process. Several events within the IGAD organization helped it progress from a languishing, nearly abandoned forum at the end of the century into the forum which shepherded the CPA to completion. Kenyan President Moi’s appointment of Sumbeiywo to head IGAD mediation, along with the renewed efforts of the USA, UK, and Norway in providing assistance to the regional organization, contributed to its resurgence by 2002. As those three actors came to the forefront, other Western states endorsing the IGAD process became less involved. Likewise, as IGAD’s task switched from providing a forum for mediation to the actual mediation itself, Kenya rose in prominence above other states.50 With fewer players directly involved in the process, the mediators could move into more sensitive areas of negotiation. Such maneuvers were not possible earlier in the IGAD process or following the ELJI, when the parties routinely issued press releases and public statements, a process which kept supporters of both factions fully informed but made compromise difficult. Khartoum attended Machakos in 2002 partly for fear of being labelled a ‘renegade’ actor, unreceptive to peace efforts. As the IGAD process picked up steam, however, the government continued to search for alternative forums each time it seemed on the verge of making a major concession. In 2003, after the government delegation angrily rejected Sumbeiywo’s Nakuru document, Khartoum again approached South Africa to take over mediation.51 By March 2004, the government was attempting to use the involvement of other states to delay negotiations, announcing that it would not finalize a comprehensive agreement until 2005, so that it might have time to familiarize itself with any incoming US administration. With so much international support for the IGAD forum, however, it became harder for Khartoum to derail the process.

Leach_Book.indd 211

10/17/2012 7:00:59 PM

212

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Khartoum’s reluctance to commit to a single mediation forum was not unanticipated. IGAD members attempted to rally Western governments behind their mediation efforts in the 1990s, not for funding or even basic technical support, but to keep these states (Australia, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, Norway, and the US) from backing, or becoming, rival mediators. This coordination was crucial to combat forum-shopping efforts already under way. In particular, IGAD’s early attempts to reach out to industrialized states further pulled the United States into backing the forum as the only avenue for negotiations. The presence of so many of Washington’s allies in the ‘Friends of IGAD’ club (later the IGAD Partners Forum) gave the forum an advantage no other peace initiative had at the time. American hesitancy to back the forum, or a choice to reinvigorate the initiative sponsored by its Egyptian ally, might have stalled the process once again. Western states also contributed financing to the peace process. IGAD Partners, such as the USA, contributed significantly to traveling and accommodation funding, as well as funding for workshops and communications which IGAD itself could not afford. From February 2002 on, the UK helped finance the Joint Military Commission that monitored the implementation of the Nuba Mountains cease-fire. After amendments in February 2003 to the Memorandum of Understanding between Khartoum and the SPLA, the UK also contributed to the Verification and Monitoring Team. Norwegian delegates from the IGAD Partners Forum coordinated heavily with the IGAD Secretariat in the first half of 2002, preceding the Machakos Protocol. Much of their involvement consisted of providing technical support for draft proposals, lending their credibility as a successful international mediator to the peace process, and reassuring Egypt that its interests would be taken into consideration despite the failure of its initiative to gain momentum. A Norwegian brigadier general assumed command of the international team sent to monitor the Nuba Mountains cease-fire in 2002. The Norwegianheaded Joint Assessment Mission Core Coordinating Group included representatives from the government, the SPLM, the UN, and the World Bank.

Leach_Book.indd 212

10/17/2012 7:00:59 PM

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

IN THE

AGREEMENTS

213

International agencies were able to keep momentum going even during long stalls in the peace process such as the one between the Machakos Protocol of July 2002 and the Security Agreement of September 2003. In May 2003, the World Bank, the UN Development Programme, and the two parties established a Joint Assessment Mission to determine the needs of Sudan throughout the interim and to prepare for the pre-interim requirements. By mid-2003, Arab states also promised to contribute to the reconstruction of southern Sudan, with Libya contributing US$1 million, and Qatar and Syria each offering US$500,000. Such aid was another indicator that all areas of the international community anticipated the conclusion of the war very soon. Both parties accepted outside mediation, especially the SPLM/A, which hoped to secure an outside guarantor of security provisions. In his report to President Bush advocating US involvement in the IGAD peace process, Danforth recognized this reality as it applied to ceasefire implementation. He noted that earlier initiatives had few major roles for international actors ‘and often collapsed because of the intense distrust of the parties who could not monitor compliance and verify implementation. Our proposals were designed to avoid this failure.’52 To ensure cease-fires were honored and atrocities against civilians reported, a Civilian Protection Monitoring Team formed in September 2002. Ultimately, the final contribution of international actors to the CPA was a maneuver by Sumbeiywo and Danforth to pressure the two parties to finalize the outstanding modules of implementation, declare a final cease-fire, and sign the comprehensive treaty. By November 2004, the talks had stalled over these issues. To break the impasse, Sumbeiywo contacted Danforth, now US ambassador to the UN and chair of the Security Council. The former US special envoy to Sudan organized a convening of the Security Council in Nairobi on 18–19 November 2004 to encourage the parties to conclude the talks.53 Sumbeiywo used the imminent arrival of the UN Security Council to coax the parties to agree to sign the documents necessary to conclude the peace process. The IGAD process put less emphasis on the presence of professional negotiators than on the legitimacy of the mediation process. In this

Leach_Book.indd 213

10/17/2012 7:00:59 PM

214

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

instance, perhaps unusually, legitimacy seemed to be more associated with state actors than with neutral professional mediators. In Sudan’s case, the mediator was Sumbeiywo, a high-ranking former Kenyan general whose authority was accepted, sometimes grudgingly, by both parties’ leaders.54 Sumbeiywo garnered this respect even though he lacked formal experience in conflict resolution. Sudan’s only other relative success in peacemaking, the AAA, also avoided a role for professional negotiators at the heart of the process. The WWCC/ACC, which mediated the AAA, was a religious organization and not a professional mediation body. Its delegates understood Sudan very well but were not well-versed in mediating civil conflicts. The IGAD experience demonstrates that rather than member states competing with each other and disrupting the process, the opposite can occur: a well-coordinated peace initiative, seeking to include a wide number of actors both regionally and internationally in limited roles, will have enhanced legitimacy in a peace process. In addition, when participating states endorse the peace process, it is harder for insincere parties to seek other forums for mediation. The USA and other Western states made their priorities clear to both parties during the IGAD process. None of these states were openly working in the interest of either party, but the USA had in the past supported the SPLA and had stressed coercive measures, in the form of sanctions, against the regime. Despite the history of American favoritism to the insurgents, Washington’s newfound consistency in policy towards Sudan, and its support of the IGAD mediation process, prevented Khartoum from continued forum-shopping. With leaders from both parties participating in the agreement, priorities could be laid bare after years of fighting, and a new vision of what it meant to be Sudanese could emerge.

Leach_Book.indd 214

10/17/2012 7:00:59 PM

CONCLUSION

Sudanese conflicts do not adhere easily to consistent theory about conflict resolution. The size of Sudan and the inability of southern rebels to take the capital, or secure any defensible territory by force, meant that insurgencies continued regardless of the change of regimes in Khartoum. The state was so unintegrated that many theories of conflict resolution simply were not applicable. War has continued under both parliamentary and authoritarian regimes. It has continued whether the south was considered a financial drain or a bounty of natural wealth. War has been fought in the name of southern independence and Sudanese national revolution. Ideologically, southern insurgencies have been led by both ardent anti-communists and communist-supported ideologues. Ethnically, insurgent leadership has spanned regional and ethnic divides, having been both Equatorian and Nilotic. One consistency in both wars was the prominent role given to the definition and preservation of cultural identity. While cultural identity may itself be mutable, in the post-colonial world it is often the most intractable of issues to fight over. Unlike ideological conflicts, conflicts over identity, especially separatist conflicts, are often not resolvable through formal mediation or outright conquest. Such conflicts can heighten awareness of identity in individuals who had not previously felt ethnic, religious, or factional insecurity. These conflicts are often more difficult to reconcile than contests over natural resources or power-sharing arrangements. Conflicts of identity ultimately become violent when members of a group believe that the assertion of another group’s identity threatens its own.

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:215

10/17/2012 7:00:59 PM

216

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Accordingly, agreements could only be reached when one side had abandoned its nationalist vision for Sudan. The Addis Ababa Agreement was drafted while the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement had adopted the machinery of an insurgent nationalist movement but had yet to become so ideologically rigid that it could not agree to significant concessions concerning that goal. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was adopted when the Bashir junta eventually dropped its early pretences of Sudanese nationalism and became willing to allow the south’s possible secession. The constant tactical alliances made by both parties in the second war had different results. In the case of the SPLM/A, forming partnerships with other groups allowed the insurgency to become a truly nationalist movement; this opportunity receded when the insurgency could not overthrow the Bashir regime. On the other hand, Khartoum’s coalitions were not only less inclusive than the SPLM/A’s, but locked the government into compromises and precedents such as self-determination and sharing of oil revenue. Although the war became a complex political web, no coalition or ideology was able to mask the north/south schism resting at its core. This was true even of the second insurgency, ostensibly committed to national revolution across Sudan. As Douglas Johnson observed, ‘the debate within the SPLM/A over whether the South is best served by restructuring the whole country, or by separating from the rest of the Sudan, is still a debate about how best to defend the South.’1 This is in part because the south had never been fully integrated into a shared vision of Sudanese national identity, the dominant cause of both civil wars. The agreements sought to address this problem using antithetical solutions: the significance of the AAA is that it ended a war by seeking to resolve the conflicts in Sudan’s national identity. The CPA ended a conflict by seeking to more clearly define the differences in Sudanese identity. With the CPA, the demand for formal recognition of southern exceptionalism had evolved since independence from a preference for federalism, to regional autonomy, to self-determination with the possibility of secession. Yet as proposed solutions became more drastic, government rhetoric became more accommodating. Concessions to federal democracy, and individual and group rights, were made in the CPA that were not present in the earlier agreement.

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:216

10/17/2012 7:00:59 PM

CONCLUSION

217

The decades of war first exaggerated, then hardened, the divisions between northerners and southerners over the issue of national identity. The first agreement was directly related to the south’s cultural insecurity and lack of economic opportunities. The second agreement concerned similar problems but in the context of an aggressive, radical reinterpretation of national identity by both parties to the conflict. Yet the years of war conglomerated neither north nor south into more cohesive national units individually. Southerners have sought regional solidarity throughout the history of independent Sudan, as evidenced by such political parties as the Southern Front in the 1960s and by the AAA demand for an autonomous south. Deep ethnic differences still remain and may be as severe as they were at independence. The northern identity may be even more fractured, as uprisings throughout the state in the 1990s and 2000s demonstrate, and as exemplified by the National Democratic Alliance’s cooperation with southern insurgents against an Arab Muslim government. The Bashir regime has relied on Arab chauvinism as a weapon against other northerners, as evidenced in the Darfur conflict. However, it is the regime’s Islamist component which is most prominent, and most rejected, in the south. This is a notable contrast to the first war when the Arab identity of nationalist governments was most resented and Islam served primarily as its identifier. By the early 1970s, southern identity was so inchoate that the AAA was able to address southern concerns simply by promising to protect indigenous culture and to allow southerners some autonomy and access to central power. The agreement provided some benefits to marginalized southern elites without weakening the position of the national government domestically or abroad. To the degree that Khartoum did not fulfill its promises, particularly in the area of employment (primarily army positions), militancy against the central government continued in the form of a low-level insurgent campaign and mutinies at southern garrisons throughout the 1970s. By 1972, what southerners really sought was for northerners to leave them alone. They did not want interference from the northern army or to be forced to adapt northern culture and language. Significantly, southerners fought for the right to determine the nature of education in their region and the freedom to pursue more education

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:217

10/17/2012 7:00:59 PM

218

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

nationally and internationally. These cultural freedoms were the real gains of the AAA, not the democratic institutions that, as the peaceful interim between wars continued, so often foundered along tribal lines. Education, as a result, led not to a rejection of southern identity so much as a desire to transcend it. This theme would carry on in the next insurgent movement. The lesson of Sudanese conflict resolution is not that southerners did not appreciate formal democratic institutions, but that they did not see these institutions as imperative for protecting southern culture from national interference. Southerners appear to have fought for democracy as a conduit for cultural preservation. Some of the cultural elements that have defined southern Sudan since long before independence are not easily conducive to modern democratic institutions. Currents of tribalism in the south were antithetical to the purely democratic arrangements a nationalist cause might fight for; southerners might not have wanted to be dominated by the north, but neither did the Shilluk, Nuer, or Equatorian peoples wish to be dominated by the more populous Dinka. John Garang’s movement hoped to rise above these divisions by constructing a new, all-inclusive Sudanese nationalism. It was a more formidable insurgent movement than the Anya Nya, yet it was also unable to achieve its objectives. Even a concept as egalitarian as the SPLM/A’s New Sudan, which had broad support among even northern Sudanese opposition, was compromised to the point of obsolescence by the CPA. During the IGAD mediation process, the SPLM/A was forced to abandon large parts of its vision and instead debate the highly charged issue of self-determination for the south, a significant change of agenda for the group. Garang, unlike Joseph Lagu in the earlier war, had been a politically experienced and engaged actor who advocated radical measures to address economic and political imbalance across Sudan. Nevertheless, like Lagu, he was compelled to settle for a power-sharing arrangement with himself representing the south and the Bashir regime as a dominant partner, if not a patron in the traditional Sudanese sense. The internal political dynamics of Sudan’s attempts at conflict resolution have also been defined by the actors’ difficulty in challenging

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:218

10/17/2012 7:00:59 PM

CONCLUSION

219

the patronage state, the tendency towards exclusivist coalitions, and the destruction of institutions that make broad-reaching, multilateral peace agreements possible. This inter-feeding troika of conditions has existed throughout Sudan’s history regardless of the varying conditions of natural wealth, the varying dominant visions of national identity, or the state of engagement with international actors. In Sudan, the patronage dynamic has not been confined to authoritarian rule but has continued under parliamentary regimes, which have also proved unable to sustain broad-based coalitions. This shortcoming explains the increased reliance on lightly armed militias raised in remote areas of the state to fight the war, even under such ostensibly democratic regimes as Sadiq Al-Mahdi’s government of the 1980s. It also explains the corrosion and neglect of civil society and its institutions, which are vital to popular democracy but not to neopatrimonial political networks. The succession of weak parliamentary coalitions precluded stability while trading any expression of clear ideological divisions for short-term alliances of convenience. These alliances had no meaning or obvious benefit for the majority of Sudanese. State integration was rendered impossible in a large part because of the unabated neo-patrimonial political structure. The need for various regimes to form exclusive coalitions has led to an emphasis on the oversized personalities of individual elites. Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Hassan Al-Turabi, Jaafar Al-Nimeiri, and John Garang all left their imprint on the state through their attempts at exclusive deal making. SPLA splinter factions were similarly personality-based. Elites’ inability to agree on a way to integrate the state resulted in an increased reliance on the personal relationships between a handful of individuals, nearly the only constant in post-colonial Sudanese administration. The focus on individual personalities is especially notable in the first war, where ideological differences were less pronounced. There are parallels to the way the two military leaders emerged in this conflict. Nimeiri crushed rightist and leftist challenges, but his subsequent political vulnerability forced him to form a new coalition. Lagu was able to extend his control over the various political and military factions that composed the southern insurgency, but recognized the need to make peace quickly because of the changing international

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:219

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

220

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

climate. While both leaders faced internal and external pressures, the AAA was likely concluded in part because neither side felt constrained by a constituency. Nimeiri prevented any attempt to mobilize against the settlement from the north and Lagu, through his command of the broadest part of the insurgency, was able to wean control away from his potential rivals in the south. Similarly, inducting enemies into bilateral coalitions was the only form of political compromise the Bashir regime had known by the time of the IGAD peace process. The junta eventually struck an exclusive partnership with every faction in the country, beginning with the very coalition of civilian and military Islamists that launched the regime in 1989 and continuing to the partnership with the SPLM/A in 2005. The regime’s most notable success in tactical manipulation was that it created enough of a rift in the SPLA to dilute the insurgent movement’s uncompromising goal of national revolution. It further was able to lure away temporary SPLM/A allies, such as the Umma Party, making an already weak northern opposition even weaker and exacerbating the north/south divide in Sudan. The ease with which Khartoum was able to pull some factions of the NDA into its fold compromised the effectiveness of that opposition movement and gave both parties to the CPA reason to sideline it. The decision to avoid being inducted into the neo-patrimonial system as a subservient client of the national government was perhaps the only ideological consistency of the SPLM/A, and what makes the CPA a singular agreement in Sudanese history. The tactical, asymmetrical partnerships that have defined Sudan’s history have limited the ability of parties to seek peace with outside factions. As Nimeiri had attempted to do with his unwieldy coalition of southerners, Islamists, and the military, Bashir sought to keep sectarians, militias, and Islamic financiers all reliant on him personally, primarily through largesse. He could not make peace with NDA members such as Umma leader Sadiq Al-Mahdi until his coalition with Turabi collapsed. Like Nimeiri, he could not reach a peace agreement with the dominant southern insurgency group until his regime ended its coalition with the radicals it had until then relied upon to retain power.

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:220

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

CONCLUSION

221

The center-periphery patronage system in Sudan constantly pushes against inclusive nationalist ideologies and national institutions; those that do come to be in opposition to this system are eventually compromised, co-opted, or sidelined. The pattern is apparent not only when analyzing the underpinnings of political agreements but even when examining the integrity of institutions as vital to the state as the army and the banking system. The need to re-orientate state institutions to serve the purposes of whichever exclusivist coalition is currently in operation has left Sudan with only shallow institutions that are easily challenged by force or coercion. Importantly, it also buttressed southern demands during the Naivasha process for independent institutions not as easily compromised by Khartoum. In both the CPA and AAA, issues of identity were paramount. Only when they had been resolved could the parties turn to security matters and the division of wealth. The importance southerners placed on taking control of their own security actually grew proportionate to Khartoum’s willingness to compromise the unity of the Sudanese army. This process began with the AAA, which marked the military’s first significant compromise by allowing insurgents who had been former enemies to be integrated within it. In the late 1970s, the process continued with Nimeiri’s enhancement of the intelligence services as a rival to the military. The reliance on various militias throughout the 1980s and 1990s continued the trend of outsourcing the military’s traditional monopoly on violence. As the regime began to rely less on state institutions such as the military to fight the war, the southerners began to push for their own separate army in any eventual peace agreement, a long-standing objective since the first civil war. The right of a regional armed force to defend southerners against state aggression has been a continuous, though little commented-upon, theme of both wars and both treaties. Neither administrative intrusion from Khartoum nor Nimeiri’s general authoritarianism initiated the hostilities of the second war; the plan to remove southern troops from southern soil was the impetus. The 2003 Security Agreement, with its focus on two separate armies and few integrated units, was the SPLM/A’s preferred model for most national institutions. Though it finally conceded the point,

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:221

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

222

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

the government was less willing to agree to a similar arrangement for banking, since the Bashir regime had made an Islamist banking system a priority. Preserving and promoting Islamic law was the reason for Bashir’s 1989 coup in the first place, and such laws were applicable to the financial system. In addition, the regime used control over the banking system as an effective weapon throughout the north. Islamic banks were simultaneously instruments of patronage, economic power, and Islamist identity. The Bashir regime used Islamic banks, tax cuts, and other economic incentives to advance the war effort in the north. It abandoned any pretences of carrying on the unitary philosophy of early nationalists, instead hoping to salvage what legitimacy it could with its Islamist base. Ironically, Turabi’s ejection from the regime led Bashir to cling even more tightly to the Islamist project that so alienated southerners, as he no longer had the authenticity of the state’s most renowned Islamist to prop up his rule. The erosion of nationalist ideology by neo-patrimonial dynamics had a direct effect on the crafting of both the 1972 and 2005 treaties. Ultimately, each side made concessions out of sheer exhaustion with war in both agreements. This is to be expected. Peace treaties are not concluded in a vacuum where parties can ignore the realities of war’s slow destruction of prosperity and society in favor of a discussion of the abstract concept of ‘national identity.’ It is not generally assumed that, with the conclusion of a negotiated settlement in a civil war, two parties must necessarily commit to any broader united vision of a state’s future. In fact, many peace treaties are implemented to buy time for peace, in the hope that deeper structural and ideological foundations might grow after the parties involved have tasted the prosperity and security peace presumably will provide. What is significant is the slight degree to which the traditional visions of national identity have been represented in the conclusion of these peace treaties, even in the fervent ideological climate of the second civil war. This analysis seems to support the conclusion not only that Sudan is a difficult state for the government to control in its entirety, but also that there is no shared identity to accommodate the cultural and religious schisms within it. Peter Woodward describes how, in the period following the Naivasha process, Sudanese he encountered focused

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:222

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

CONCLUSION

223

increasingly on the concerns of their specific region rather than the well being of the state as a whole. They would cite the Bashir regime as having facilitated this attitude, a contrast to the nationalist movements of the 1960s.2 Given the brutality of these two civil wars, it is likely that attempting to create a broader Sudanese identity would have been even more difficult in 2002 than it was at independence. Economic incentive has also played a role in Sudan’s attempts at conflict resolution. In each conflict, peace did not come primarily from the parties’ trust that their objectives could be realized through cooperation, but instead out of the realization of the futility of their war efforts. In the first war, the regime could not meet its national economic objectives while a large amount of each annual budget was diverted to military expenditures. In the second war, Khartoum’s economic priorities were to access resources in the south or in disputed areas along the north-south border. Hence, the governments in both wars faced some economic incentive to end hostilities. On the other hand, southern rebels, separatists, and national revolutionaries alike came nowhere near achieving their objectives in either peace agreement. Particularly in the second war, insurgents settled for peace not because it was potentially lucrative, but because the cost of fighting was becoming prohibitive. This increasing price was primarily a consequence of the government’s growing oil wealth, which it used to stabilize itself while continuing an unpopular war. Sudan may have lacked the oil reserves to evolve into a true rentier state, but it was able to integrate the oil economy into the patronage system that defines the political economy. Southern oil wealth, however, has not fundamentally changed priorities for either the government or the rebels in the second war. It simply adds another lens through which to view an already intricate conflict. Sudan’s poor integration as a state defies “greed or grievance” dichotomies generally. The diverse, tribal nature of the south has not allowed the region to seek a common opportunist goal of seceding in order to more exclusively enjoy economic resources, as theories such as those put forward by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler would hold.3 Southern rebel groups have developed animosities and tactical alliances that cannot be explained broadly by any single economic-rationalist model.

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:223

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

224

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Rather, these alliances stem from deeper concerns about security and culture. Khartoum is capable of using natural wealth to retain power or exploit divisions among insurgents, but such practices do not strike at the heart of southern discontent. In the second war, oil wealth changed the insurgents’ tactics but not their ultimate objective. A lack of oil wealth in the first war allowed the potential for trust-building measures that would be largely absent from the second war. In the latter conflict, the southern preference to negotiate before implementing a cease-fire was primarily a means to disallow the government a peaceful environment for oil production. Not only did the southerners feel the oil was rightfully theirs, but, more urgently, they knew that Khartoum would use that wealth to buy more advanced weaponry for prosecuting the war. The promise of increased oil revenues drove the government to sustain the war effort throughout the 1990s, even as it strained the financial seams of the state. Though the SPLM took precautions in the wealth-sharing agreement to keep Khartoum from siphoning off all of the south’s resources, benefiting from oil wealth was clearly not the movement’s top priority. Instead, the dominant southern concerns were that oil reserves not pose an excuse for central control of the southern region and that extracting resources from the earth not create problems for the local populations in the oil areas. As they had felt about water during the post-AAA period of Jonglei Canal excavation, southerners were as interested in controlling the local development around regions producing oil and other resources as they were in sharing in those resources themselves. As a result, during the Naivasha process the SPLM could leave ownership of underground wealth unresolved as long as the south received an agreed amount of revenue. They would not make similar compromises on surface land rights however, since that might mean an inability to contain the development brought on by oil production. Southern Sudan’s lack of infrastructure and remoteness prohibited insurgents from significant profit off the few resources they could easily access, such as timber. In negotiations, the SPLM faced a difficult task as it sought to protect the interests of its southern base as well as those of the contested

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:224

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

CONCLUSION

225

areas of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and South Blue Nile. Abyei had been beset by intractable problems of identity even before oil politics made the area more contested. This reality also contradicts economic determinist theories of predation arising independently from cultural and ethnic grievances. While the nature of Sudanese identity was at the heart of both treaties, its significance may have been disguised by the heavy international involvement in the second agreement. In contrast to the 1970s, when the OAU discouraged its members from becoming too deeply immersed in each other’s internal affairs, by the 1990s regional organizations such as IGAD were often the first multilateral bodies to become involved in conflict resolution. IGAD did not have the powers of coercion to force a peace agreement but was able to lay groundwork, such as the 1994 Declaration of Principles, that could be built upon as the forum received increased international support in the new century. The Bashir regime’s retreat from nationalism actually allowed even more foreign influence within Sudan. The regime’s destabilization of the region during its radical, original incarnation and its subsequent forum shopping for mediation efforts widened the circle of involvement in its civil war to the point where Khartoum was unable to impede the introduction of such issues as southern self-determination. The Nimeiri regime, which still retained an early post-colonial insecurity about international involvement in domestic affairs, had been better able to curb unwanted outside influence in 1972. Gradually international actors, including the USA, became involved in all aspects of monitoring and implementation of the CPA. The incompatibility of national objectives, coupled with the SPLM/A’s refusal to participate in the same dependent coalitions previous southern militias had accepted, meant the warring parties had simply exhausted the trust necessary to conclude an agreement free of outside influence. The collapse of the AAA, an agreement that had not relied heavily on international guarantees, in no small part contributed to the involvement of international actors during the second peace process. As war took its toll on the Sudanese population, international aid would also become a conduit for mediation. In both agreements, outside parties became involved in conflict resolution nationally after originally pursuing more modest

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:225

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

226

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

humanitarian objectives, as demonstrated by the early contributions of both the WCC prior to the AAA and by former US Senator John Danforth through his initial work in the Nuba Mountains prior to the Machakos Protocol. The inclusion of international actors can complicate conflict resolution. Outside actors sometimes do not understand issues sufficiently or merely seek to advance their own interests. In the case of the AAA, Ethiopia’s interests were similar enough to Sudan’s that its involvement posed no threat to an agreement. With each new tier of mediators in the IGAD process, however, new opportunities for confusion arose. The IGAD forum avoided the distraction of these outside parties by restoring focus in 2001 to the overriding goal of ending the war. The gradual ascent of Kenya as the dominant mediation authority also lent clarity to the process. As IGAD grew from a regional to an international concert, outside actors often focused on security and resource concerns, sometimes without a clear understanding of the deeper conflicts within the state. The complicated system of compromises and power sharing in the CPA was not just a result of the wariness of two parties towards each other and their opposing interests regarding resources and ideology; the system is a testament to the fundamental difficulties of a peace process dominated by the interests and offices of external actors. Outside actors can contribute to a peace process by providing institutions, mediation, good offices, and donor support, and sometimes by resorting to pressure and coercion. These actors, however, are not equipped to foster an integrated national identity or even to create viable domestic institutions for achieving an enduring peace. As a result, the legitimacy of the Naivasha process was threatened not only by an internal lack of viable institutions but also by an unbalanced amount of outside involvement. An example of the international involvement’s potential for disharmony is the tension between the ELJI and the IGAD peace process during the early 2000s. Both emphasized the priorities of each party. Self-determination had become for many southerners the ultimate recognition of southern identity, and the contest between the Egyptian initiative and the IGAD forum demonstrated the differences

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:226

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

CONCLUSION

227

between southern and northern dissidents concerning its importance. Significantly, Khartoum agreed to back away from the ELJI in favor of the ongoing Naivasha process. Such an Arab-led proposal might have been more appealing to a more representative government or a more nationalist dictatorship, but it was eventually abandoned by the Bashir junta, which was neither representative nor nationalist. Nor did IGAD’s call for southern self-determination stop the regime from participating in that forum. The AAA and the CPA chart an evolution of Sudan’s retreat from the objective of forming an integrated state. The AAA was the cornerstone of a nationalist project that could not withstand the strain of Sudanese neo-patrimonialism. The need for Nimeiri’s authoritarian regime to preserve its own survival demanded subsequent narrow coalitions preventing any inclusive nationalist identity from being built in the years after the first war. The parliamentary governments of the 1980s were unable to halt this dynamic. The CPA, as a result of internal and external pressures placed on the government, in addition to the Bashir regime’s own incentives for survival and the continuation of a diminished Islamic project, challenged both the attempts at a Sudanese nationalist project and the patronage state as it has existed nationally. The SPLM/A finally compromised its nationalist agenda thoroughly by fighting for and achieving an autonomous, regional standing army and the southern right to self-determination.

Leach_Book.indd Sec7:227

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

DUP ELJI GOS GOSS HEC IGAD KPA NCP NDA NIF NUP OAU PDF PDP SANU SCA SPLA/M SSDF SSIM SSLM SSU TMC WCC/AACC

Leach_Book.indd 228

Democratic Unionist Party Egyptian Libyan Joint Initiative Government of Sudan Government of South Sudan High Executive Council Intergovernmental Authority on Development Khartoum Peace Agreement (1997) National Congress Party National Democratic Alliance National Islamic Front National Unionist Party Organization of African Unity Popular Defense Force People’s Democratic Party Sudan African National Union Sudan Christian Alliance Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement South Sudan Defense Force South Sudan Independence Movement Southern Sudan Liberation Movement Sudan Socialist Union Transitional Military Council World Council of Churches/All Africa Council of Churches

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

NOTES

Introduction 1. Abu Baker El Obeid. Political Consequences of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Stockholm: Liber Tryck, 1980, 15. 2. Christopher Clapham. “Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies.” African Guerrillas. Ed. Christopher Clapham. Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998, 3.

Chapter 1 The Origins of Nationalism 1. Jeffrey Herbst. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000, 20–21, 42–43. This practice adheres to the traditional pattern of state building in pre-colonial Africa, where people and resources were the objective to be captured, not territory. 2. Francis Deng. Africans of Two Worlds: The Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1978, 157–158. Collins, Shadows in the Grass, 31. Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 39. Herbst quotes Thomas J. Barfield’s observation that the powers of Dinka chiefs were weak in part because of the vastness of the region: dissenting factions could always move away. 3. Francis Deng. War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan. Washington, Brookings Institute, 1995, 111. 4. Joseph Lagu. Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope). Khartoum: M.O.B. Center for Sudanese Studies, 2006, 124. 5. Mohammed Beshir Hamid. “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy: ‘Splendid Isolation’, Radicalisation and ‘Finlandisation’.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 129.

Leach_Book.indd 229

10/17/2012 7:01:00 PM

230

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

6. Abdel Salam M. Sidahmed. Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, 85. 7. Mohamed Omer Beshir. The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1975, 17. 8. President General Nimeiry’s Policy Statement On The Southern Question, 9 July 1969. Telephone interview by the author with Richard Lobban, Providence, Rhode Island, 2009. 9. Cecil Eprile. War and Peace in the Sudan 1955–1972. London: David & Charles, 1974, 127. 10. ibid., 147. 11. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, 157. 12. Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955–1972, 136, 158. 13. Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Article 7i, 7ii, and 7viii. Hartwig Euler. “Human Rights in Sudan: Islamic State and Cultural Diversity”. Missio. Pontifical Mission Society, 2005, 21. 14. Charles Gurdon. Sudan at the Crossroads. Cambridgeshire: Menas Press Ltd, 1984, 89. Gurdon writes that regional commander Sadiq Al-Banna made the decision to rotate troops without the knowledge of national or regional government officials. Addis Ababa Agreement, article 27ii. This article noted that the National President must accept advice from the HEC president on the use of armed forces in the southern region, a term already violated as Nimeiri had earlier suspended that regional position. 15. Kamal Osman Salih. “The Sudan, 1985–9: The Fading Democracy.” Sudan After Nimeiri, Ed. Woodward, Peter. London: Routledge, 1991, 65. 16. Peter Woodward. Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State. Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers; London: L. Crook Academic Pub, 1990, 205. 17. Abdalla Hamdok. “The Future of Democracy in Post-War Sudan.” The Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, Ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2005, 136. 18. Woodward, Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State, 210. Ahmed Alawad Sikainga. “Northern Sudanese political parties and the civil war.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993, 85. Lobban, interview. Lobban notes that Al-Mahdi, despite advocating parliamentary democracy, could never afford to become too secular lest he offend his deeply religious Ansar constituency. 19. Douglas H. Johnson. The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, 81. 20. Alex De Waal. Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. London: Hurst & Company, 2004, 184.

Leach_Book.indd 230

10/17/2012 7:01:01 PM

NOTES

231

21. Abdullahi An-Na’im and Francis Mading Deng. “Self-Determination and Unity: The Case of Sudan.” Respect 1:4 (November 2006), 10. 22. Yehudit Ronen. “Ethiopia’s Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War: Was It As Significant as Khartoum Claimed?” North African Studies 9:1 (2002), 114. The SPLA was also no longer permitted to operate its radio station from Ethiopian territory,severely damaging its ability to spread its message throughout Sudan. 23. International Security Studies. “The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward.” African Security Analysis Programme. Occasional Paper 86, March 2004, 10. 24. John C. Danforth. “Report to the President of the United States on the Outlook for Peace in Sudan.” 26 April 2002, 2, 16, 26. Interview by the author with Douglas Johnson, Oxford, 2007. Johnson states that Danforth’s report, which did not recommend pushing for a secular ‘New Sudan’, was another impetus for the SPLA to push for southern self-determination. 25. Machakos Protocol, 2002, article A 1.5.1. and 1.5.2. Declaration of Principles, section 3.4. 26. Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, article 1.5.1.1. 27. Framework on Security Arrangements, 2003. Sections 1b, 4 and 5.1. A smaller Joint Integrated Force and Joint Defense Board would be created. 28. Framework on Security Arrangements, 2003. Sections 3b and 3c. 29. Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004. Sections 3.2 and 3.4.5. 30. Power Sharing Agreement, 2004. Sections 2.2.5 and 3.5.1. 31. Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, 2004. Section 11.1.1. 32. Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, 2004. Section 5.

Chapter 2 The Pillars of National Identity 1. Brendan O’Leary. “On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner’s Writings on Nationalism.” British Journal of Political Science 27 (1997), 192. 2. Abdelwahab El-Affendi. “Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa.” African Affairs 89:356 (July 1990), 372, 373–374. 3. Robert O. Collins, Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918–1956. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1983, 172. Civil Secretary Harold MacMichael, the author of the 1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy which prohibited the use of Arabic in southern Sudan, that same year wrote: ‘The religion of the Arab is the fruit of thirteen centuries of discipline and dogma, and it appears now to have reached a stage of worldwide stagnation, periodically rippled by political restlessness.’ 4. Telephone interview by the author with Richard Lobban, Providence, Rhode Island, 2009. As Lobban states, northern nationalists, whether of

Leach_Book.indd 231

10/17/2012 7:01:01 PM

232

5.

6.

7. 8.

9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

Leach_Book.indd 232

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

the DUP or Umma, or smaller parties, ‘were unabashedly Muslim ... they just didn’t have enough experience governing to see that their religion might unify their immediate forces but it would send the periphery spinning off.’ Heather J. Sharkey. “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race.” African Affairs 107:426 (2008), 41. In 1972, Egyptian scholar ‘Abd Al-Majid ‘Abidin stated that for the Sudanese, ‘embracing Africanism (tazannuj) would be divisive precisely because Africans (zunuj) were so heterogeneous and, he claimed, lacked a basis in language or civilization. “The call to Africanism ... would lead to a call for division, fragmentation, and tribalism in this country.” ’ Francis Deng. “Green is the Color of the Masters: The Legacy of Slavery and the Crisis of National Identity in Modern Sudan.” Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance and Abolition, Yale University. New Haven, Connecticut. 23 October 2004, 12. ‘Identification with the Arab East was as much a reaction against Western domination as it was an escape from the inferiority of the African background.’ Jeffrey Herbst. States and Power in Africa, 97, 100. Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim. Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1969, 198–199. Al-Rahim writes that federalism opponents also claimed that the south was no more backward than the Nuba Mountains or the Beja area in eastern Sudan or Darfur. Instead, the south was to be guaranteed a ministerial position in the cabinet, later raised to three by the time the Transitional Constitution was drafted. Ann Mosely Lesch. The Sudan: Contested National Identities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998, 37. Peter Woodward. “Military-Civilian Relations.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 66. Khalil had himself been an army officer, which may have reassured him that the new junta would be effective. Abel Alier. The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. Exeter, Devon, UK: Ithaca Press, 1991, 101. Hamid, “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy,” 128. Report of the 12 Man Committee, The Relationship Between Central and Regional Authorities: The Regional Geography, sections 1, 3a-3c. Hizkias Assefa. Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, 121, 135. The government argued that it was outside the purview of the SSLM to advocate for other regions of the state.

10/17/2012 7:01:01 PM

NOTES

233

15. ibid., 134–135. At the Addis Ababa talks the SSLM put forward a four-state plan, settling for a two state model only if that proposal was not acceptable. The objective was to ensure that the south was not cornered by an imbalance of northern power. 16. Report of the 12 Man Committee, section 4d. 17. Salah El-Zain. “Articulation of Cultural Discourses and Political Dominance in Sudan.” Respect 1:2, (March 2006), 4. 18. Woodward, Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State, 72. 19. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, 19. 20. George W. Shepherd. The Politics of African Nationalism: Challenge to American Policy. New York: Praeger, 1962, 91. Shepherd notes a similar situation in Ghana, where the British transferral of authority in 1957 led Ashantis to threaten rebellion unless the British stayed, and members of the national opposition were also involved. 21. Woodward, Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State, 90. 22. Oliver Albino. The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint. London: Oxford University Press, 1970, 4–5, 119. Albino, a separatist southern politician, characterized the postcolonial subjugation of the south by the north as a form of colonialism, with northerners in the south behaving more like colonial officials than the British ever had. 23. Beshir Mohammed Said. The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa. London: Bodley Head, 1965, 61. A transcript of the Juba Conference included in Said’s book reveals that on the first day of the meeting such educated southerners as Clement Mboro and Philomon Majok, who had opposed southern inclusion in the Legislative Assembly on the grounds that southerners needed more time to be politically ready for modern democracy, had changed their minds. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, 90. Civil Secretary James Robertson, who favored the unity policy at the time, also admitted that Al-Shingetti may have intimated to southerners that this would be the last chance they would have to determine the course of their future, and they should seize the opportunity to participate, even if they did not believe they were prepared, another explanation for Mboro’s change of heart. 24. Abel Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 17. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, 63. In 1964, Deng claims Robertson admitted that he by that point believed he should not have reversed the separatist policy since northerners and southerners were too different to form one nation-state. 25. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, 136. 26. ibid., 26–27. El Obeid, Political Consequences of the Addis Ababa Agreement, 78.

Leach_Book.indd 233

10/17/2012 7:01:01 PM

234

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

27. Telephone interview by the author with R. S. O’Fahey, Oslo, 2009. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 490. 28. Joseph Oduho and William Deng. The Problem of Southern Sudan. London: Oxford University Press, 1963, 54. Deng, Africans of Two Worlds, 212–222. 29. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 490, 505. 30. ibid., 498. 31. Clapham. “Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies,” 13. 32. Arop Madut-Arop. Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace: A Full Story of the Founding and Development of the SPLM/SPLA. Charleston, South Carolina: Booksurge, 2006, 64. 33. Johnson, interview. Dunstan M. Wai. “Political Trends in the Sudan and the Future of the South.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 165. 34. Gabriel Warburg. Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society. London: Frank Cass & Company, 1978, 158. 35. El Obeid, Political Consequences of the Addis Ababa Agreement, 96–97. 36. Dunstan M. Wai. The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan. Teaneck, New Jersey: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc, 1981, 146. Elias Nyamlel Wakoson. “The Southern Sudan: the Political Leadership of the Anya-Nya Movement.” PostIndependence Sudan. Ed. C. Allen. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, 1981, 107. Wakoson describes the willingness of the leaders of the Nile Provisional Government to step down in July 1970 and defer to the leadership of Lagu and the SSLM as a key moment in the history of southern nationalism. 37. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 173, 194, 231. Lagu cites the endorsement of Father Saturnino Lohure, priest and Anya Nya organizer, as another legitimizing factor in his consolidation of power. 38. ibid., 397. 39. ibid., 270, 297, 322. Lagu writes openly that he had great resentment for Alier, who took the presidency of the Southern Region’s High Executive Council, a position Lagu felt he had earned. 40. Hamid, “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy,” 133. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 53. 41. Johnson, interview. 42. Telephone interview by the author with Benaiah Yongo-Bure, Flint MI, 2009.

Chapter 3 Cultural Grievances Addressed at the Peace Table 1. International Security Studies, ‘The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward,’ 11.

Leach_Book.indd 234

10/17/2012 7:01:01 PM

NOTES

235

2. John Obert Voll and Sarah Potts Voll. The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985, 147. 3. Addis Ababa Agreement, Article 7ix. 4. Addis Ababa Agreement , Article 11v and 11vi and Appendix A, Article 4. 5. Yongo-Bure, interview. Benaiah Yongo-Bure. The Economic Development of Southern Sudan. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2007, 118, 153. 6. Luka Biong Deng, “Education in Southern Sudan: War, Status and challenges of achieving Education for All Goals.” Respect 4 (November 2006), 5. 7. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development of Southern Sudan, 112. Mansour Khalid. The Government They Deserve. London: Kegan Paul International, 1990, 273. Despite the opening of a university in Juba in 1977, southerners were still a fraction of Sudanese graduates. 8. Addis Ababa Agreement, Appendix B, Article 15. 9. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development of Southern Sudan, 155. 10. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 269. 11. Addis Ababa Agreement, Article 6. 12. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 100–101. 13. Sharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race,” 33. 14. Mom Kou Nhial Arou. “Devolution and the Southern Problem in the Sudan.” Post-Independence Sudan. Ed. C. Allen. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, 1981, 120. 15. Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question,” 15. 16. Scopas S. Poggo. “General Ibrahim Abboud’s Military Administration in the Sudan, 1958–1964: Implementation of the Programs of Islamization and Arabisation in the Southern Sudan.” Northeast African Studies 9:1 (2002), 75. 17. John Garang. John Garang Speaks. Ed. Khalid, Mansour. London: Kegan Paul International, 1987, 129. 18. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, 408, 454. P.M. Holt. A Modern History of the Sudan. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961, 6, 9. Examples include the ancestral linkages many northerners claim to the Prophet Mohammed and his companions and the formation of ‘synthetic’ tribes, such as the Kababish of Kordofan. 19. Malwal, Bona. The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood. New York: Thorton Books, 1985, 23. 20. Deng, Africans of Two Worlds, 188–189, 194. 21. Martin Daly. “Broken bridge and empty basket: the political and economic background of the Sudanese civil war.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993, 5.

Leach_Book.indd 235

10/17/2012 7:01:01 PM

236

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

22. Hamid, “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy,” 132. Peter Nyot Kok. Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985–1995: Analysis, Evaluation and Documentation. Berlin: Deutsches Orient Institut, 1996, 127. Addis Ababa Agreement, Appendix A, Article 3v. Kok notes that the amendments curtailed human rights, such as freedom of movement, allowed for administratively ordered detentions, and prevented judicial review of presidential decrees. This was the first major violation of the AAA, which protected the right to the writ of habeus corpus. 23. Johnson, Douglas H. “The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism.” African Guerrillas. Ed. Christopher Clapham. Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998, 53–54. 24. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 105. 25. Peter Woodward. US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006, 107–108. 26. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 131, 135. 27. Clapham, “Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies,” 9. Clapham cites the distinction between well-educated insurgency leaders and those with less education, noting that in an African context the latter lack the ability ‘to create disciplined movements with clearly defined political projects’. This would seem to be a relevant distinction between Garang and Lagu. The former sought a specific revolutionary concept of a New Sudan, the latter fought for a vaguely separatist cause, but had little ideological groundation. 28. Johnson, interview. Johnson can remember no statement from the SPLA or any of its members that southern self-determination was being considered as a ‘fallback position’ to national revolution prior to the 1991 schism in the movement. 29. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 94. 30. Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace, 279. 31. Yongo-Bure, interview. Yongo-Bure notes that SPLA renegades such as Lam Akol and Machar also underestimated the power of Garang’s personal charisma, noting that many southerners preferred to follow him because they admired his leadership qualities and his consistency, even if they did not agree with his unitary vision. 32. Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 100–101, 263–265. 33. Morten Bøas and Kevin C. Dunn. “African Guerrilla Politics: Raging Against the Machine?” African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine. Eds. Bøas, Morten and Kevin C. Dunn. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2007, 11, 25. 34. Francis Mading Deng and Mohammed Khalil. Sudan’s Civil War The Peace Process Before and Since Machakos. Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa, 2005, 6. 35. Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace, 389. 36. Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 2.2.5.

Leach_Book.indd 236

10/17/2012 7:01:02 PM

NOTES

237

37. Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 2.4.2. 38. Johnson, interview. 39. J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins. Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989–2000. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003, 57 193–194. Tim Niblock. “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001, 212. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 46–47. Lobban, interview. Khalid Al-Mubarak. Turabi’s “Islamist” Venture: Failure and Implications. Cairo: El Dar El Thaqafia, 2001, 100. Under the Nationality and Passports Law of 1994, the president could grant Sudanese citizenship to any foreigner, regardless of other outstanding conditions. This allowed for the harboring of high-profile Islamists such as Tunisia’s Rashid Al-Ghannoushi and terrorists such as Sheikh Omar Abd Al-Rahman and Osama Bin Laden. 40. Johnson, interview. ‘Self determination for the south had risen on the agenda with the intransigence of the NIF government.’ 41. Sikainga, “Northern Sudanese political parties and the civil war,” 88. Ann Mosely Lesch. “Sudan: The Torn Country,” Current History 98:628 (May 1999). By the late 1990s, Bashir encouraged the possibility that Khartoum would be willing to allow southern secession, declaring, ‘The option of separation with peace is better than that of unity with the continuation of the war’. 42. Hamid, “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy,” 128. 43. Ismail Bin Matt. “Toward an Islamic Constitutional Government in Sudan.” Thirty-Fifth Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists. Hartford Connecticut. 27–29 October 2006, 8. 44. El-Affendi, “Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa,” 379, 389. 45. Salih, “The Sudan, 1985–9: The Fading Democracy,” 63. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 63. 46. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985–1995, 25–26. 47. Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 140. Mansour Khalid. Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-may. London: Kegan Paul International, 1985, 9. Islamists encouraged this alienation, ‘almost suggesting that if the price of Islamicization is the secession of the South, then let it be so’. 48. Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace, 235. Madut-Arop writes that the Islamist program of the 1990s had no parallel in Sudanese history, not even the slapdash Islamization under Nimeiri. The government took control of media such as newspapers. Television and the radio served as instruments of Muslim piety, broadcasting calls to prayer five times daily. Morality police patrolled the streets looking for indecently dressed women. The teaching of arts and music was curtailed, the mingling of the sexes in social gatherings and the drinking of alcohol banned.

Leach_Book.indd 237

10/17/2012 7:01:02 PM

238

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

49. R.S. O’Fahey. “Islam and Ethnicity in the Sudan.” Journal of Religion in Africa 26:3 (August 1996), 261–262. O’Fahey cites Islamist Abdelwahab A.M. Osman’s criticism of both Sufi sectarianism and the Western-oriented secularism espoused by intellectuals, dismissing them both as alien colonial creations. 50. Oluwadare Aguda. “Arabism and Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 11:2 (1973), 191. 51. Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question,” 24. 52. Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Sudan, Article 10, 14, 20. 53. Addis Ababa Agreement: Protocols on Interim Arrangements, Article 1. 54. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 324, 398–399. 55. Claire Metelits. “Reformed Rebels? Democratization, Global Norms and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” Africa Today 51:1 (Fall 2004), 77. 56. John Garang. “Text: Garang’s speech at the signing ceremony of S. Sudan peace deal.” Sudan Tribune. Garang called the parliamentary eras the ‘sham procedural democracy of the past ... a camouflage for the perpetuation of vested interests.’ 57. Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 2.12.11, 3.2, 4.3. 58. ibid., section 1.6.2.11. 59. ibid., section 1.8.6. In 1972, this provision was not included in the text of the AAA. 60. Lokuji, Alfred Sebit. Hazards in the Power Sharing Aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the Interim Period in the Sudan. Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Project Ploughshares, 2006, 11. 61. Fen Osler Hampson. “Parent, Midwife, or Accidental Executioner? The Role of Third Parties in Ending Violent Conflict.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 393. 62. Licklider, Roy. “Obstacles to Peace Settlements.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 707. Licklider bases this off a study of 83 cases from 1945–93. He argues that ‘Democracy may be a superior form of government for a variety of reasons, but it is not clear that it prevents renewed civil wars.’ 63. UN Security Council 5120 meeting, press release 2005. 64. Machakos Protocol, 2002, sections 6.5, 6.5.10. 65. ibid., section 1.5.1. 66. Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 2.8.4. 67. Garang, John Garang Speaks, 129. Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983, 122. This is in keeping with Anderson’s theory that, in the colonial context, language in itself need not be an emblem of nationalism. ‘Nothing suggests

Leach_Book.indd 238

10/17/2012 7:01:02 PM

NOTES

239

that Ghanaian nationalism is any less real than Indonesian simply because its national language is Englsh rather than Ashanti.’ 68. Sharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race,” 25.

Chapter 4 Patronage, State Dynamics, and Conflict Resolution 1. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 62. ‘The characteristic feature of neo-patrimonialism is the incorporation of patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions.’ 2. Erdmann, Gero and Ulf Engel. “Neopatrimonialism Revisited – Beyond a Catch-All Concept.” German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Working Paper 16, February 2006, 19. Stefan Lindemann. “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Development Studies Institute. London School of Economics and Political Science. Discussion Paper 15 (February 2008), 14. 3. Jack S. Levy. “Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 360. 4. Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities, 1983, 127. 5. Woodward, Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State, 74. 6. ibid., 101. 7. Mansour Khalid. The Government They Deserve. London: Kegan Paul International, 1990, 382–384. Al-Mahdi took it upon himself to compensate family members for property confiscated by the Nimeiri regime, and insisting foreign companies replace their usual representatives in Sudan with family members. He also bestowed patronage on parliamentarians and protected a relative from prosecution for profiteering off oil imports. 8. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Alsir Sidahmed. Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East. London: Routledge, 2005, 34, 123. 9. Fatma Babiker Mahmoud. “Businessmen and Politics.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 14. 10. Garang, John Garang Speaks, 67. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 96. Telephone interview by the author with Peter Woodward, Reading 2007. 11. Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 353. Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 160. Woodward, Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State,

Leach_Book.indd 239

10/17/2012 7:01:02 PM

240

12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

Leach_Book.indd 240

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

210. 18 of the 25 ministers Al-Mahdi named had served as national or regional ministers under Nimeiri. Sudan Peace Initiative, 1988, sections A1, A2 and A3. Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-may, 16. Joseph Garang was of no direct relation to fellow Dinka, and future SPLM/A leader, John Garang. J. Bowyer Bell. “The Conciliation of Insurgency: The Sudanese Experience.” Military Affairs 39:3 (October 1975), 109. Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955–1972, 165. The lack of support in the south for Joseph Garang’s communist platform was nearly unanimous: he had been defeated so overwhelmingly in three previous elections that he lost his deposit each time. Lobban, interview. Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 138. Addis Ababa Agreement, Article 15i. Addis Ababa Agreement, Article 1. Nelson Kasfir. “Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement.” African Affairs 76 (April 1977), 158. Yongo-Bure, interview. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 270–273. Alier’s appointment was more controversial among the former rebels, who considered him too close to the May Regime, and who believed that the position of High Executive Council president should be conferred upon one of them. Nimeiri explained to Lagu that Alier had a better understanding of the political dynamics of the regime, and they instead agreed that Lagu and colleagues he specified would hold positions in the Sudanese Army of the same rank as those which they had held in the insurgency. Malwal, The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood, 29. Elias Nyamlel Wakoson. “The politics of Southern self-government 1972–1983.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993, 40. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 173. Addis Ababa Agreement, Article 2. Garang, John Garang Speaks, 51. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 118–119. A proposal for such an army had been one of the amendments Lagu’s SSLM subordinates had pressed him to introduce in the weeks of March 1972, after the drafting of the AAA and before its ratification. The discarded amendments included other arrangements of loose confederation such as the power of the south to make treaties with foreign governments. Woodward, Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State, 232. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 353–354. Addis Ababa Agreement, Article 1.

10/17/2012 7:01:02 PM

NOTES

241

28. R.S. O’Fahey. “Islam and Ethnicity in the Sudan.” Journal of Religion in Africa 26:3 (August 1996), 265. Woodward, Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State, 192. The Rezeigat and Misseriya tribes were particularly common in the PDF, as they had a recurring animosity towards the Dinka in this area. Jendia, Catherine. The Sudanese Civil Conflict: 1969–1985. New York: Peter Lang, 162. Baqqara tribes had been generally neutral in the first war, seeing the conflict as a fight between the south and Khartoum. However, in 1983, Nimeiri removed the ethnic demarcations along the border of Bahr Al-Ghazal and the northern provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, allowing the pastoralist Baqqara free passage to southern grazing lands. The result was not only the overgrazing of traditional Dinka and Nuer lands, but that in the second war the northern pastoralists would become Khartoum’s clients as it was the government which allowed access to the fields. 29. Addis Ababa Agreement , Article 27. 30. Richard Barltrop. The Negotiation of Security Issues in Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Geneva: Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008, 23–25. As Sulafedeen Salih Mohammed, head of the Northern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission as quoted in 2007, ‘In Sudan we ended up with two very strong military institutions, whereas in most peace processes you end up with one. Could this have been avoided? I doubt it very much. [Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration] wasn’t really part of the agreement.’ Barltrop notes that both parties rejected the standard terminology of disarmament and reconciliation. Southerners favored the term ‘force reduction’ over ‘disarmament’, since the latter implied defeat. 31. De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, 41. By 1999, Turabi had begun initiatives which even Islamist officers found objectionable, such as his revision that year of the Sudanese military code so that it conformed with Islamist principles. 32. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 134. 33. Jago Salmon. “A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces.” Small Arms Survey 10 (December 2007), 9. Woodward, interview. International Crisis Group. God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan. Africa Report No. 39. 10 January 2002, 27, 121. In the 1980s, senior army officers at the Khartoum Military College developed plans focusing on destabilizing the Dinka in order to win the war, confiscating or destroying Dinka cattle and other assets to cripple the local economy and, subsequently, insurgent leadership. The army argued that lightly armed horsemen would be mobile enough to launch devastating ‘hit and run operations’. Sudanese military intelligence also began working with tribal militias in Bahr Al-Ghazal and Equatoria.

Leach_Book.indd 241

10/17/2012 7:01:02 PM

242

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

34. Mohammed Suliman. “Civil War in Sudan: The Impact of Ecological Degradation.” Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) Occasional Paper No. 4. Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. December, 1992, 24. The Mundari, Acholi, Latuka, Madi, Azande and Toposa are tribes that have constituted governmentsponsored, anti-SPLA militias at some point during the second war. MadutArop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace, 114, 246–251. As a result of the ‘Peace From Within’ development campaign, administration of the south under the NIF regime eventually became devoid of any meritocratic tendencies; being an Islamist who opposed the SPLA was the primary requirement. 35. Johnson, interview. Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace, 298–300. The author lists eight breakaway SPLA factions which were at one time or another in the 1990s supported by Khartoum. Many of them signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997. Donald Petterson. Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003, 232. Machar became disillusioned with his arrangement with the government, Finally breaking with the government in February 2001. He rejoined Garang’s SPLA in January 2002. 36. Khartoum Peace Agreement, 1997, Chapter 4. 37. Machakos Protocol, 2002. Section 3.5. 38. John Young. “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation.” Institute of Governance Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. 30 May 2007, 15. 39. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985–1995, 194. 40. Interview by the author with Kazim Omer, Canberra 2009. Omer notes that the Umma party’s support for the organization did not mobilize Ansar warriors against the government, as those cadres looked to the Mahdiyya movement more for spiritual guidance than political organization. 41. International Crisis Group. “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace.” Africa Report No. 73, 11 December 2003, 14. 42. Interview by the author with Mohammed Osman Ibrahim, Canberra 2009. 43. ICG, “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace,” 18. 44. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 24. Human Rights Watch. “The Impact of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on Southern Sudan.” March 2006, 16. Instead, the CPA includes a clause calling for a reconciliation process to be a task for the new government, but avoids a general amnesty such as that which was included in the AAA. Addis Ababa Agreement: Protocol on Interim Arrangements, Chapter III, Article 1. Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 1.7.1. 45. Power Sharing Agreement, 2004. Section 1.4.6. 46. ibid., section 3.6. Before elections, the SPLM was to dominate the assembly of the Government of South Sudan with 70 per cent of the seats, the NCP was allotted 15 per cent and other southern parties the remaining 15 per cent.

Leach_Book.indd 242

10/17/2012 7:01:02 PM

NOTES

243

47. Lazaro Sumbeiywo. “The Mediator’s Perspective.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 26–27. 48. ICG. “Sudan Endgame.” Africa Report No. 65, 7 July 2003, 27. 49. Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 2.12.5 and 2.12.9. 50. Deng and Khalil, Sudan’s Civil War The Peace Process Before and Since Machakos, 7. 6. Declaration of Principles, 1994, sections 3 and 4. 51. Johnson, interview. This sequence of proposed areas for negotiation was relayed to Johnson by Bona Malwal from a conversation he had with Kiir soon after the Machakos Protocol. 52. Sumbeiywo, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 23. 53. Waithaka Waihenya. The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process. Nairobi: Kenway Publications, 2006, 121–23. Garang had given a deputy, Justin Yac, a letter to give to Musyoka asking to reschedule the negotiations with Taha, but Yac did not give the letter to Musyoka, instead writing back to Garang that either he return to Kenya or the entire SPLA would be evicted. 54. Nicholas Fink Haysom. “Reflecting on the IGAD Peace Process.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 31. 55. Telephone interview by the author with Patricia Lane, Sydney, 2009. 56. Interview with ibid. 57. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 27. 58. Abdelwahab El-Affendi. “Sudanese Futures: One Country or Many?” Contemporary Arab Affairs 1:1 (2008), 65–66. 59. ibid., 65–66.

Chapter 5 Security, Resources, and Development 1. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development of Southern Sudan, 76. Before exploration of the south in 1974, oil exploration in Sudan primarily took place on the Red Sea coast and in other parts of Eastern Sudan. 2. Paul Goldsmith, Lydia A. Abura, and Jason Switzer. “Oil and Water in Sudan.” Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts. Eds.Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2002, 197. 3. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 150–151. 4. Declaration of Principles, 1994, section 6. The policy was reaffirmed in the Security Agreement, 2003, section 2. 5. Johnson, interview. Abdelwahab El-Affendi. “The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: The Limits of Regional Peacemaking?” African Affairs 100 (2001), 589–590, 596. El-Affendi suggests that the ineffectiveness of the IGAD process during the late 1990s was one of the reasons Khartoum adhered to it, despite the growing bias against the regime by the forum and its Western

Leach_Book.indd 243

10/17/2012 7:01:03 PM

244

6.

7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

13.

14.

15. 16.

Leach_Book.indd 244

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

backers. This would explain why Khartoum’s more intense ‘forum-shopping’ efforts did not begin until after the turn of the century, when regional and international actors began coalescing around the IGAD process. Emeric Rogier. No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan’s Torturous Ascent to Heights of Peace. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael. August, 2005, 60, 72. Practices such as these were initially addressed in the 15 October 2002 Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, section 3, which addressed abuse and violence against civilians. The principle was finally incorporated into the CPA via the Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 1.6.2.14, which guarantees citizens the freedom of movement and to choose their own residence. De Waal. Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, 243. Machakos Protocol, Part C, sections 3.3 to 3.6. Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army, 15 October 2002, article 3, and the 4 February 2003 addendum, articles 4 and 6. ICG, God, Oil and Country, 208. Egbert Wesselink. “Oil Fuels War in Sudan.” Adding Fuel to the Fire: The Role of Petroleum in Violent Conflicts. Swisspeace Annual Conference 2003, (2004), 18. William Reno. “Economies of war and their transformation: Sudan and the variable impact of natural resources on conflict.” Money Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in the Southern Sudan. Maison International, Brussels, 12–13 June 2001, 20–21. Telephone interview by the author with Richard Barltrop, London 2009. Africa Confidential (1997). Vol. 38. No. 1. January 17th, 1997. Khalid, Mansour (2003). War and Peace In Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries. London: Kegan Paul, 347. Luke A. Patey. “A Complex Reality: The Strategic Behaviour of Multinational Oil Corporations and the New Wars in Sudan.” Danish Institute for International Studies. Report 2006:2 (2006), 33–34. Waihenya, “The Mediator,” 127. IGAD mediator Lazaro Sumbeiywo states that there was one brief, awkward attempt by China to involve itself directly in January 2004. During discussions on the Wealth Sharing Agreement, a Chinese official appeared at the Naivasha hotel where talks were ongoing with the hope of convincing the two parties to speak with the Chinese ambassador. Sumbeiywo quickly barred the official from the proceedings. Achim Wennman. “Wealth-Sharing Beyond 2011: Economic Issues in Sudan’s NorthSouth Peace Process.” The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, 2009, 18. Daniel Large. “China’s Involvement in Armed Conflict and Post-War Reconstruction in Africa: Sudan in Comparative Context.” Danish Institute for International Studies. 2007:8 (2007), 67.

10/17/2012 7:01:03 PM

NOTES

245

17. International Crisis Group. “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace.” Africa Report No. 96, 25 July 2005, 19. 18. Jostein F. Tellnes. “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan.” National Political Science Conference, Hurdalssjøen, Norway, 5–7 January 2005, 19. 19. Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 4. Provision 4.5 specifies only that ‘persons who have their rights violated by the oil contracts are entitled to compensation’. 20. ibid., 2004, section 3.5.4. 21. ICG, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace.” 25 July 2005, 20. 22. Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 3.1.5. 23. Omer Egemi. “Land and the peace processes.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 54–55. The CPA calls for incorporating customary laws with the establishment of four Land Commissions: one national, one in southern Sudan and one for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states each. The final agreement recognizes customary rights, but how to reconcile this with the Native Administration system, which manages land conflicts, is not explained. 24. 2004 Wealth Sharing Agreement, section 2.6, 2.7. 25. Lane, interview. 26. ibid. This method of agreeing of a division of revenue while the issue of ownership remained in question was derived from a similar process used in Australia under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) to arbitrate disputes between miners and Aboriginal communities in advance of a determination of whether or not the native title claimants actually had native title over the claimed land. 27. Machakos Protocol, 2002, sections 3.2.3, 3.2.4 and 6.4. 28. Lane, interview. Lane adds that the non-economic significance of oil lay more in the method by which the pipeline had been built – ‘by bombing people along the route out of the way during construction ... It was fair to say that people did see a large symbolic issue in the oil, but as a symbol of oppression, not as a wealth generator in their daily lives.’ 29. Heather Deegan. “Structures of Government in the Islamic Republic of Sudan: The Question of Legitimacy and the 1998 Draft Constitution.” The Journal of North African Studies 4:1 (March 1999), 97. 30. Waihenya, The Mediator, 111. 31. Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace, 406. 32. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 106. 33. ibid., 108.

Leach_Book.indd 245

10/17/2012 7:01:03 PM

246

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

34. Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict, 139. 35. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 119. The discarded amendment concerning the army in the south recommended replacing northern troops in the region with southern ones over a period of five years. 36. ibid., 261. 37. ibid., 274. Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace, 109. The plan was rejected by Nimeiri. 38. Mohammed O. I. Maundi, William Zartman, Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Kwaku Nuamah. “Sudan: 1983–1993.” Getting In: Mediators’ Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2006, 130. 39. Barltrop, interview. 40. ibid. 41. Lane, interview. Garang declared this expressly at one 2003 meeting with technical experts: national and southern bodies should be linked, but capable of separating should the south opt for independence. The creation of the Southern Sudan Land Commission, and Southern Sudan Petroleum Commission in addition to the National Land Commission and National Petroleum Commission exemplified this principle, as did the SPLM push for a separate southern currency. 42. Security Agreement, 2003, sections 7a and 7b. 43. ibid., section 4.1c. 44. Khartoum Peace Agreement, 1997, Annex 3. 45. Tellnes, “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan,” 20. Wennman, “Wealth-Sharing Beyond 2011: Economic Issues in Sudan’s North-South Peace Process,” 17. 46. Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 5.5 and 5.6. 47. Jostein F. Tellnes. “The unexpected deal: oil and the IGAD process.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 39. 48. Ibid., 40–41. 49. Tellnes, “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan,” 22–23. 40. Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 8.2.1 and 8.3. A Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) would be established to assure transparencies in fund transfers to the southern and state governments from the National Treasury Fund. The FFAMC would be composed of three members each from the national and southern governments, and the finance ministers of each state. 50. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 48. Addis Ababa Agreement, Chapter IV, Article 11xiv. 51. Sumbeiywo, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 27. 52. Addis Ababa Agreement, Chapter II, Article 3iii. 53. Johnson, interview.

Leach_Book.indd 246

10/17/2012 7:01:03 PM

NOTES

247

54. International Crisis Group. “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock.” Africa Briefing No. 47, 12 October 2007, 5. 55. International Crisis Group. “A New Sudan Action Plan.” Africa Briefing No. 24, 26 April 2005, 4. 56. Jason Matus. “The three areas: a template for regional agreements.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 35. 57. Luka Biong Deng. “The Sudan CPA: A Framework for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Transformation of Sudan.” Address to the US Congressional Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health. 24 January 2007, 18–19. 58. Endre Stiansen. “GOS Revenue, Oil and the Cost of the Civil War.” Money Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan. Maison International, Brussels, 12–13 June 2002, 24. 59. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development of Southern Sudan, 11. Most significant were the northern relocation of a sugar factory originally located near Mongalla and a paper factory originally built in Malakal. 60. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 102. 61. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development of Southern Sudan, 71–72. 62. Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 274. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development of Southern Sudan, 31. 63. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development of Southern Sudan, 137, 140. El Obeid, Political Consequences of the Addis Ababa Agreement, 57, 130. Addis Ababa Agreement, Chapter III, Article 7. The regional government was allowed to collect customs revenue from border trade, but only as approved by the central government. 64. Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 224. 65. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development of Southern Sudan, 36. 66. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 236. 67. Seymour, Lee J. M. “The Oil-Conflict Nexus in Sudan: Governance, Development and Statebuilding.” Money Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan. Maison International, Brussels, 12–13 June 2001, 19. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 165. 68. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, 92. 69. Deng, Africans of Two Worlds, 189–91, 195–196. 70. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 254. 71. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development of Southern Sudan, 48. 72. Yongo-Bure, interview. El Obeid, Political Consequences of the Addis Ababa Agreement, 135. 73. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development of Southern Sudan, 177–181. 74. Taisier M. Ali, Robert O. Matthews and Ian Spears. “Failures in Peacebuilding: Sudan (1972–1983) and Angola (1991–1998).” Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2004, 290–291.

Leach_Book.indd 247

10/17/2012 7:01:03 PM

248

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

75. Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 205. 76. Garang, John Garang Speaks, 122. 77. Paul Collier. “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 160161. 78. ibid., 148. 79. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 153. 80. Garang, John Garang Speaks, 21. 81. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 132. 82. R.K. Badal. “The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan.” African Affairs 75:301 (1976), 470–471. 83. Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 133–134. 84. Giacomo Luciani and Hazem Beblawi. “The Rentier State”. Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World, Volume 2. Eds. Luciani, Giacomo and Hazem Beblawi. London: Croom Helm, 1987, 72. 85. “Sudan Economic and Strategic Outlook: Marching Amid the Conflicts.” Global Research, Global Investment House. January 2007, 3. 86. Wennman, “Wealth-Sharing Beyond 2011: Economic Issues in Sudan’s North-South Peace Process,” 8. 87. Wennman, “Wealth-Sharing Beyond 2011: Economic Issues in Sudan’s North-South Peace Process,” 13. 88. Erdmann and Engel. “Neopatrimonialism Revisited – Beyond a Catch-All Concept,” 28.

Chapter 6 International Influence in the Agreements 1. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan, 351. Former Prime Minister M.A. Maghoub epitomized the conservative nationalist philosophy when he declared that Sudanese identity should be ‘firmly based on Islam, Arabic culture and African soil.’ 2. Bøas Dunn, “African Guerrilla Politics: Raging Against the Machine?” 34. 3. Woodward, interview. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 152. Congo was an early Anya Nya ally up until the 1965 general election of Sudan. The ascent of the communist opponent Maghoub to the premiership that year was viewed positively by the West. Congo, a Western client, accordingly began halting airdropped aid to Anya Nya rebels, though it continued to allow insurgent activity on its porous Sudanese border. 4. Robert O. Collins. “Civil Wars in the Sudan.” History Compass 5:6 (2007), 1782. 5. A leftist regime had also come to power in Somalia in 1969. 6. Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict, 184, 205.

Leach_Book.indd 248

10/17/2012 7:01:03 PM

NOTES

249

7. Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict, 131, 170–171, 173. Kelleher, Ann. “A Small State’s Multiple-level Approach to Peace-making: Norway’s Role in Achieving Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” Civil Wars 8:3 (September 2006), 301–302. In another demonstration of the second war’s assault on national institutions, the Sudan Council of Churches would eventually split into two branches as the pressure of the conflict made a national council unsustainable. 8. Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict, 133. 9. Cynthia J. Chataway. “Track II Diplomacy from a Track I Perspective.” Negotiation Journal 14:3 (1998), 16. 10. Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 81. 11. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 77. 12. Addis Ababa Agreement: Protocols on Interim Arrangements, article 2. 13. Assefa, Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict, 175. 14. ibid., 145, 146–147. 15. Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-may, 306, 312. 16. Stevens, Richard P. “The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan’s AfroArab Policy.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 14:2 (June 1976), 254. 17. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 169–170. Alier notes that the first cutbacks in AAA-provided jobs were in areas such as the forestry service, whose size was reduced by a third as early as 1975. 18. Reno, William. “Sovereign Predators and Non-State Armed Group Protectors?” Curbing Human Rights Violations of Armed Groups. UBC Center of International Relations. 13–15 November 2003, 9–10. 19. Machakos Protocol, 2002, sections 1.8.7 and 2.4.1. 20. Lane, interview. 21. Christopher Clapham. “Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies,” 4. 22. Peterson, Scott. Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda. London: Routledge, 2000, 213. Despite his concerns about the movement’s reliance on outside support, Museveni continued to aid the SPLA, becoming its lifeline in times of trouble. In 1994 he helped the Norwegian People’s Aid channel military assistance to the SPLA, some of it provided by the United States, which also gave that NGO a direct donation of US$11 million. 23. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 57, 72. The Egyptians also approached leaders of the G-7 economic conference in Paris, and specifically asked American officials to waive its policy of not supplying economic aid to regimes which overthrow democratic governments. De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, 184. 24. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 51. 25. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 179. 26. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 13.

Leach_Book.indd 249

10/17/2012 7:01:04 PM

250

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

27. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 118–119. Young, “Sudan

28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35. 36. 37.

38.

39. 40.

Leach_Book.indd 250

IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 32. Young writes that Khartoum believed the US intervened in mid-2001 because the tide was turning against the SPLA at that point, though the uprising in Darfur in 2003 demonstrated that this would not remain a constant pattern. Malik Agar, the SPLM/A governor of the South Blue Nile, stated in March 2001 that unless Khartoum’s access to oil revenues was stopped, the SPLA could only hold out fighting for another three or four years. Waihenya. The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process, 89. Johnson, interview. Rogier, No More Hills Ahead? 43. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 52, 125–126. Al-Shahi, interview. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 94. ICG, God, Oil and Country, 54. El-Affendi, “The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan,” 595. A primary reason Sudan was forced to rely on the IGAD process during the mid-1990s was that Arab neighbors such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which might have made friendly mediators, were alienated by Khartoum’s conduct during that period. Ibrahim, interview. Ibrahim notes the difficult position many NDA members found themselves in after the government demonstrated that it might be receptive to the ELJI: the NDA had already committed to southern selfdetermination, but the ELJI addressed the core concerns of northern exiles. In addition, the NDA wanted to involve Egypt and Libya for fear they might otherwise become supporters of the government. De Waal, “Sudan: international dimensions to the state and its crisis,” 17. Johnson, interview. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 125. Sumbeiywo, Lazarus. Interview. IRIN News Service. 30 May 2003. Sumbeiywo, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 22–23. Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah, Getting In: Mediators’ Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts, 139–141. The US proposal allowing the SPLA to control the south, which they had largely conquered by that point. The government opposed the proposal because it would require foreign monitors to enforce the ceasefire. It was rejected by the SPLA as it was contrary to that movement’s national revolution objective. In addition, it was unlikely Ethiopia’s Mengistu regime would cooperate as the initiative would A) end its proxy war against Khartoum too quickly and B) endorse a quasi-separatism which Ethiopia abhorred, particularly with its own separatist threat in Eritrea. Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe, 172. Johnson, interview. Johnson, interview. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 109. Woodward, interview.

10/17/2012 7:01:04 PM

NOTES

251

41. Francis Deng and J. Stephen Morrison. U.S. Policy to End Sudan’s War: Report of the CSIS Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001, 2, 7, 9. 42. Deng and Morrison, Report of the CSIS Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy, 4. 43. Johnson, interview. Johnson quotes high-ranking NIF official Salah Abdallah Gosh as saying that the regime cooperated with the United States after 11 September primarily in order to protect itself. 44. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 121–122. 45. Sudan Peace Act, 2002, section 2(15). 46. Sudan Peace Act, 2002, sections 5(b)(1), 6(b)(1) and 8. 47. Waihenya, The Mediator, 134. 48. Snyder, Charles. “Remarks on the Signing of the Naivasha Protocols.” Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs On-the-Record Briefing. 27 May 2004. 49. Barnaba Marial Benjamin. “The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army and the Peace Process,” The Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, Ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2005, 50. Benjamin counts ten distinct mediation forums Khartoum participated in during the first seven years of the NIF regime alone. 50. Waihenya, The Mediator, 109. The US was foremost among states which successfully petitioned incoming Kenyan president Kibaki in late 2002 to retain Sumbeiywo in his position as IGAD negotiator, despite the fact that his appointment by previous president Daniel arap Moi left his standing in doubt. 51. ibid., 114–115. South Africa, like Egypt, deferred to IGAD’s mediation, a testament to the organization’s growing stature in this sphere. 52. Danforth, “Report to the President of the United States on the Outlook for Peace in Sudan,” 7. 53. Waihenya, The Mediator, 136–137. 54. Both Bashir and Garang were career military men, perhaps lending weight to Sumbeiywo’s credibility that other negotiators would lack.

Conclusion 1. Douglas H. Johnson. “The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism,” 71. 2. Woodward, interview. 3. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. “The Political Economy of Secession.” World Bank – Development Research Group. 23 December 2002, 2–3.

Leach_Book.indd 251

10/17/2012 7:01:04 PM

BIBLIOGR APHY

Abdelwahab El-Affendi. “Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa.” African Affairs 89:356 (July 1990), 372, 373–374. Africa Confidential (1997). Vol. 38. No. 1. January 17th, 1997. Aguda, Oluwadare. “Arabism and Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 11:2 (1973). 177–200. Accessed 16 April 2008. http://www.jstor.org/stable/160105 Al-Mubarak, Khalid. Turabi’s “Islamist” Venture: Failure and Implications. Cairo: El Dar El Thaqafia, 2001. Al-Rahim, Muddathir Abd. Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1969. Albino, Oliver. The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. Ali, Taisier M., Robert O. Matthews and Ian Spears. “Failures in Peacebuilding: Sudan (1972–1983) and Angola (1991–1998).” Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2004. 282–314. Alier, Abel. “The Southern Sudan Question.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973. 11–29. Alier, Abel. The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. Exeter, Devon, UK: Ithaca Press, 1991. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. An-Na’im, Abdullahi and Francis Mading Deng. “Self-Determination and Unity: The Case of Sudan.” Respect 1:4 (November 2006). 1–26. Accessed 26 March 2008. http://sudan-forall.org/sections/ihtiram/pages/ihtiram_ issue4/a.annaim_francis-deng.pdf Arou, Mom Kou Nhial. “Devolution and the Southern Problem in the Sudan.” Post-Independence Sudan. Ed. C. Allen. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, 1981. 114–142.

Leach_Book.indd 252

10/17/2012 7:01:04 PM

BIBLIOGR APHY

253

Assefa, Hizkias. Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies – The Sudan Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Badal, R.K. “The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan.” African Affairs 75:301 (1976). 463–474. Accessed 16 April 2008. http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/75/301/463?ck=nck Barltrop, Richard. The Negotiation of Security Issues in Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Geneva: Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2008. Accessed 17 April 2009. http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/4490.pdf Bell, J. Bowyer. “The Conciliation of Insurgency: The Sudanese Experience.” Military Affairs 39:3 (October 1975), 105–114. Accessed 21 October 2007. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1986901.pdf Benjamin, Barnaba Marial. “The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army and the Peace Process,” The Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, Ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2005. 37–57. Beshir, Mohamed Omer. The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1975. Bin Matt, Ismail. “Toward an Islamic Constitutional Government in Sudan.” Thirty-Fifth Annual Conference of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists. Hartford Connecticut. 27–29 October 2006. Accessed 16 October 2007. http://www.amss.org/pdfs/35/finalpapers/IsmailbinMatt.pdf Bøas, Morten and Kevin C. Dunn. “African Guerrilla Politics: Raging Against the Machine?” African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine. Eds. Bøas, Morten and Kevin C. Dunn. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2007. 9–37. Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Burr, J. Millard and Robert O. Collins. Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989–2000. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003. Chataway, Cynthia J. “Track II Diplomacy from a Track I Perspective.” Negotiation Journal 14:3 (1998). 269–287. Accessed 30 February 2008. http://www. springerlink.com/content/v610x4j82358551h/fulltext.pdf Clapham, Christopher. “Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies.” African Guerrillas. Ed. Christopher Clapham. Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998. 1–18. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. “The Political Economy of Secession.” World Bank – Development Research Group. 23 December 2002. Accessed 19 January 2008. http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/self-det.pdf Collier, Paul. “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003. 143–162. Collins, Robert O. “Civil Wars in the Sudan.” History Compass 5:6 (2007). 1778– 1805. Accessed 20 January 2008. http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgibin/fulltext/118491949/PDFSTART

Leach_Book.indd 253

10/17/2012 7:01:04 PM

254

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Collins, Robert O. Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918–1956. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1983. Daly, Martin. “Broken bridge and empty basket: the political and economic background of the Sudanese civil war.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993. 1–26. Danforth, John C. “Report to the President of the United States on the Outlook for Peace in Sudan.” 26 April 2002. Accessed 18 October 2007. http://pdf. usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB158.pdf De Waal, Alex. “Sudan: international dimensions to the state and its crisis.” Crisis States Research Center, Occasional Paper no. 3 (April 2007). Accessed 20 May 2008. http://www.crisisstates.com/download/op/op3.DeWaal.pdf De Waal, Alex. “Some comments on the militias in contemporary Sudan” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993. 142–156. De Waal, Alex. Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. London: Hurst & Company, 2004. Deegan, Heather. “Structures of Government in the Islamic Republic of Sudan: The Question of Legitimacy and the 1998 Draft Constitution.” The Journal of North African Studies 4:1 (March 1999). 87–101. Accessed 9 February 2008. http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/421458_751308256_776167036.pdf Deng, Francis Mading and J. Stephen Morrison. U.S. Policy to End Sudan’s War: Report of the CSIS Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001. Deng, Francis Mading and Mohammed Khalil. Sudan’s Civil War The Peace Process Before and Since Machakos. Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa, 2005. Deng, Francis Mading. “Green is the Color of the Masters: The Legacy of Slavery and the Crisis of National Identity in Modern Sudan.” Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery, Resistance and Abolition, Yale University. New Haven, Connecticut. 23 October 2004. Deng, Francis Mading. Africans of Two Worlds: The Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1978. Deng, Francis Mading. War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan. Washington, Brookings Institute, 1995. Deng, Luka Biong. “The Sudan CPA: A Framework for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Transformation of Sudan.” Address to the US Congressional Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health. 24 January 2007. Accessed 15 May 2008. http://internationalrelations.house.gov/110/den012407.htm Egemi, Omer. “Land and the peace processes.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006. 54–55. Accessed 18 October 2007. http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/ Sudan_peace_by_piece_1_.pdf

Leach_Book.indd 254

10/17/2012 7:01:04 PM

BIBLIOGR APHY

255

El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. “Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa.” African Affairs 89:356 (July 1990). 371–389. El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. “Sudanese Futures: One Country or Many?” Contemporary Arab Affairs 1:1 (2008). Accessed 16 April 2008. http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/722179_751308256_789764973.pdf El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. “The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: The Limits of Regional Peacemaking?” African Affairs 100 (2001). 581–599. Accessed 16 October 2007. http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/ reprint/100/401/581 El Obeid, Abu Baker. Political Consequences of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Stockholm: Liber Tryck, 1980.El-Obeid, Amani M. Chronique Politique du Soudan 2003. Cedej, Le Caire, Etudes et document, 16–17 (2004). Accessed 16 October 2007. http://www.cedej.org.eg/IMG/pdf/politicpdf.pdf El-Zain, Salah. “Articulation of Cultural Discourses and Political Dominance in Sudan.” Respect 1:2, (March 2006). 1–14. Accessed 16 October 2007. http://sudan-forall.org/sections/ihtiram/pages/ihtiram_issue2/pdf_files/ ihtiram2_salah-elzein.pdf Eprile, Cecil. War and Peace in the Sudan 1955–1972. London: David & Charles, 1974. Erdmann, Gero and Ulf Engel. “Neopatrimonialism Revisited – Beyond a CatchAll Concept.” German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Working Paper 16, February 2006. Euler, Hartwig. “Human Rights in Sudan: Islamic State and Cultural Diversity”. Missio. Pontifical Mission Society, 2005. Accessed 16 October 2006. http:// www.missio-aachen.de/Images/13%20SudanE_tcm14–31338.pdf Garang, John. “Text: Garang’s speech at the signing ceremony of S. Sudan peace deal” Sudan Tribune. Accessed 5 December 2006. http://www.sudantribune. com/spip.php?article7476 Garang, John. John Garang Speaks. Ed. Khalid, Mansour. London: Kegan Paul International, 1987. Global Investment House. “Sudan Economic and Strategic Outlook: Marching Amid the Conflicts.” January 2007. Accessed 12 December 2009. http:// www.sudanembassy.ca/Docs/Sudan%20Economic.pdf Goldsmith, Paul, Lydia A. Abura and Jason Switzer. “Oil and Water in Sudan.” Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts. Eds.Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2002. 187–241. Accessed 16 April 2008. http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/ administration/file_manager/file_links/SCARCITYCHAPTER5. PDF?link_id=3893&slink_id=1514&link_type=12&slink_type=13&mpl_ id=3 Gurdon, Charles. Sudan at the Crossroads. Cambridgeshire: Menas Press Ltd, 1984.Gurdon, Charles. “The economy of Sudan and Recent Strains.” Sudan After Nimeiri, Ed. Woodward, Peter. London: Routledge, 1991. 18–33.

Leach_Book.indd 255

10/17/2012 7:01:05 PM

256

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Hamdok, Abdalla. “The Future of Democracy in Post-War Sudan.” The Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, Ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2005. 28–140. Hamid, Mohammed Beshir. “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy: ‘Splendid Isolation’, Radicalisation and ‘Finlandisation’.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986. 122–139. Hampson, Fen Osler. “Parent, Midwife, or Accidental Executioner? The Role of Third Parties in Ending Violent Conflict.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003. 387–406. Haysom, Nicholas Fink. “Reflecting on the IGAD Peace Process.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006. 28–31. Accessed 18 October 2007. http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/Sudan_peace_by_piece_1_.pdf Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000. Holt, P.M. A Modern History of the Sudan. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961. Human Rights Watch. “The Impact of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on Southern Sudan.” March 2006. Accessed 4 November 2006. hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudan0306/ sudan0306.pdf International Crisis Group. “A New Sudan Action Plan.” Africa Briefing No. 24, 26 April 2005. Accessed 16 October 2006. http://www.crisisgroup.org/ home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3391 International Crisis Group. “Sudan Endgame.” Africa Report No. 65, 7 July 2003. Accessed 26 October 2006. http://www.reelvoices.org/diaries/resources/ A401038_07072003.pdf International Crisis Group. “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock.” Africa Briefing No. 47, 12 October 2007. Accessed 12 November 2007. http:// www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5122 International Crisis Group. “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace.” Africa Report No. 73, 11 December 2003. Accessed 16 October 2006. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=2416 International Crisis Group. “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace.” Africa Report No. 96, 25 July 2005. Accessed 16 October 2006. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3582&l=1 International Crisis Group. God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan. Africa Report No. 39. 10 January 2002. Accessed 16 October 2006. http:// www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400534_28012002. pdf

Leach_Book.indd 256

10/17/2012 7:01:05 PM

BIBLIOGR APHY

257

International Security Studies. “The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward.” African Security Analysis Programme. Occasional Paper 86, March 2004. Accessed 16 November 2006. http://www.sudantribune. com/IMG/pdf/IGAD_peace_process20040213.pdf Jendia, Catherine. The Sudanese Civil Conflict: 1969–1985. New York: Peter Lang, 2002. Johnson, Douglas H. “The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism.” African Guerrillas. Ed. Christopher Clapham. Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998. 53–72. Johnson, Douglas H. The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. Kasfir, Nelson. “Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement.” African Affairs 76 (April 1977). 143–166. Kelleher, Ann. “A Small State’s Multiple-level Approach to Peace-making: Norway’s Role in Achieving Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” Civil Wars 8:3 (September 2006). 285–311. Accessed 9 March 2008. http:// www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713634578 Khalid, Mansour. Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-may. London: Kegan Paul International, 1985. Khalid, Mansour. The Government They Deserve. London: Kegan Paul International, 1990. Khalid, Mansour. War and Peace In Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries. London: Kegan Paul International, 2003. Kok, Peter Nyot. Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985–1995: Analysis, Evaluation and Documentation. Berlin: Deutsches Orient Institut, 1996. Lagu, Joseph. Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope). Khartoum: M.O.B. Center for Sudanese Studies, 2006. Large, Daniel. “China’s Involvement in Armed Conflict and Post-War Reconstruction in Africa: Sudan in Comparative Context.” Danish Institute for International Studies. 2007:8 (2007). Lesch, Ann Mosely. The Sudan: Contested National Identities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. Lesch, Ann Mosely. “Sudan: The Torn Country,” Current History 98:628 (May 1999). Levy, Jack S. “Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003. 3–28. Licklider, Roy. “Obstacles to Peace Settlements.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003. 697–718. Lindemann, Stefan. “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa.”

Leach_Book.indd 257

10/17/2012 7:01:05 PM

258

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Development Studies Institute. London School of Economics and Political Science. Discussion Paper 15 (February 2008). Accessed 18 September 2008. http://www.crisisstates.com/download/dp/dp15.pdf Lokuji, Alfred Sebit. Hazards in the Power Sharing Aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the Interim Period in the Sudan. Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Project Ploughshares, 2006. Luciani, Giacomo. “Allocation vs Production States: A Theoretical Framework.” The Arab State. Ed. Luciani, Giacomo. London, Routledge, 1990. 63–84. Luciani, Giacomo, and Hazem Beblawi. “The Rentier State”. Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World, Volume 2. Eds. Luciani, Giacomo and Hazem Beblawi. London: Croom Helm, 1987. Madut-Arop, Arop. Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace: A Full Story of the Founding and Development of the SPLM/SPLA. Charleston, South Carolina: Booksurge, 2006. Mahmoud, Fatma Babiker. “Businessmen and Politics.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986. 7–19. Malwal, Bona. The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood. New York: Thorton Books, 1985. Matus, Jason. “The three areas: a template for regional agreements.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006. 34–37. Accessed 18 October 2007. http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/Sudan_peace_by_piece_1_.pdf Maundi, Mohammed O. I. William Zartman, Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Kwaku Nuamah. “Sudan: 1983–1993.” Getting In: Mediators’ Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2006. Metelits, Claire. “Reformed Rebels? Democratization, Global Norms and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” Africa Today 51:1 (Fall 2004). 65–82. Accessed 13 January 2009. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/africa_today/ v051/51.1metelits.pdf Niblock, Tim. “Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. O’Fahey, R.S. “Islam and Ethnicity in the Sudan.” Journal of Religion in Africa 26:3 (August 1996), 258–267. Accessed 22 October 2007. http://links.jstor. org/sici?sici=0022–4200%28199608%2926%3A3%3C258%3AIAEITS%3 E2.0.CO%3B2-T O’Leary, Brendan. “On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner’s Writings on Nationalism.” British Journal of Political Science 27 (1997). 191–222. Oduho, Joseph and William Deng. The Problem of Southern Sudan. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. Patey, Luke A. “A Complex Reality: The Strategic Behaviour of Multinational Oil Corporations and the New Wars in Sudan.” Danish Institute for

Leach_Book.indd 258

10/17/2012 7:01:05 PM

BIBLIOGR APHY

259

International Studies. Report 2006:2 (2006). Accessed 6 January 2007. http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2006/lpa_complex_reality_sudan.pdf Peterson, Scott. Me Againnst My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda. London: Routledge, 2000. Petterson, Donald. Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003. Poggo, Scopas S. “General Ibrahim Abboud’s Military Administration in the Sudan, 1958–1964: Implementation of the Programs of Islamization and Arabisation in the Southern Sudan.” Northeast African Studies 9:1 (2002). 67–102. Accessed 16 October 2007. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/northeast_african_studies/v009/9.1poggo.pdf Reno, William. “Economies of war and their transformation: Sudan and the variable impact of natural resources on conflict.” Money Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in the Southern Sudan. Maison International, Brussels, 12–13 June 2001. Accessed 12 October 2007. http://www.bicc.de/ events/sudanws/5reno20august02.pdf Reno, William. “Sovereign Predators and Non-State Armed Group Protectors?” Curbing Human Rights Violations of Armed Groups. UBC Center of International Relations. 13–15 November 2003. Accessed 16 March 2009. http://www. maxwell.syr.edu/parc/Articles/Sovereign%20Predators%20and%20NonState%20Armed%20Group%20Protectors.pdf Rogier, Emeric. No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan’s Torturous Ascent to Heights of Peace. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael. August, 2005. Ronen, Yehudit. “Ethiopia’s Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War: Was It As Significant as Khartoum Claimed?” North African Studies 9:1 (2002). 103–126. Accessed 9 February 2009. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/northeast_african_studies/v009/9.1ronen.pdf Said, Beshir Mohammed. The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa. London: Bodley Head, 1965. Salih, Kamal Osman. “The Sudan, 1985–9: The Fading Democracy.” Sudan After Nimeiri, Ed. Woodward, Peter. London: Routledge, 1991. 45–75. Salmon, Jago. “A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces.” Small Arms Survey 10 (December 2007). Accessed 9 March 2008. http://www. cmi.no/sudan/doc/?id=949 Seymour, Lee J. M. “The Oil-Conflict Nexus in Sudan: Governance, Development and Statebuilding.” Money Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan. Maison International, Brussels, 12–13 June 2001. Accessed 5 March 2007. http://www.prio.no/misc/nisat/Download.aspx?file=1252 Sharkey, Heather J. “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race.” African Affairs 107:426 (2008). 21–43. Accessed 26 March 2008. http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/ reprint/107/426/21

Leach_Book.indd 259

10/17/2012 7:01:05 PM

260

WAR

AND

POLITICS

IN

SUDAN

Shepherd, George W. The Politics of African Nationalism: Challenge to American Policy. New York: Praeger, 1962. Sidahmed, Abdel Salam and Alsir Sidahmed. Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East. London: Routledge, 2005. Sidahmed, Abdel Salam M. Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996. Sikainga, Ahmed Alawad. “Northern Sudanese political parties and the civil war.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993. 78–96. Snyder, Charles. “Remarks on the Signing of the Naivasha Protocols.” Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs On-the-Record Briefing. 27 May 2004. Accessed 12 January 2007. http://statelists.state.gov/scripts/wa.exe?A 2=ind0405d&L=dossdo&D=1&O=A&P=309 Stevens, Richard P. “The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan’s AfroArab Policy.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 14:2 (June 1976), 247– 274. Accessed 16 October 2007. http://links.jstor.org/sic?sic=0022–278X%2 8197606%2914%3A2%3C247%3AT1AAAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y Stiansen, Endre. “GOS Revenue, Oil and the Cost of the Civil War.” Money Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan. Maison International, Brussels, 12–13 June 2002. Accessed 8 November 2006. http://www.bicc.de/events/sudanws/6stiansen5June02.pdf Suliman, Mohammed. “Civil War in Sudan: The Impact of Ecological Degradation.” Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP) Occasional Paper No. 4. Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. December, 1992. Accessed 4 January 2007. http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ ISN/238/.../doc_240_290_en.pdf Sumbeiywo, Lazaro. “The Mediator’s Perspective.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006. 22–27. Accessed 18 October 2007. http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/ pdf/Sudan_peace_by_piece_1_.pdf Sumbeiywo, Lazarus. Interview. IRIN News Service. 30 May 2003. Accessed 2 November 2006. Tellnes, Jostein F. “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan.” National Political Science Conference, Hurdalssjøen, Norway, 5–7 January 2005. Accessed 12 November 2007. http://www. statsvitenskap.uio.no/konferanser/nfkis/cr/Tellnes.pdf Tellnes, Jostein F. “The unexpected deal: oil and the IGAD process.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006. 38–41. Accessed 18 October 2007. http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/Sudan_peace_by_piece_1_.pdf United Nations Security Council, 5120 meeting. January 2005. http://www. un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8306.doc.htm

Leach_Book.indd 260

10/17/2012 7:01:05 PM

BIBLIOGR APHY

261

Voll, John Obert and Sarah Potts Voll. The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985. Wai, Dunstan M. “Political Trends in the Sudan and the Future of the South.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973. 146–173. Wai, Dunstan M. The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan. Teaneck, New Jersey: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc, 1981. Waihenya, Waithaka. The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process. Nairobi: Kenway Publications, 2006. Wakoson, Elias Nyamlel. “The Southern Sudan: the Political Leadership of the Anya-Nya Movement.” Post-Independence Sudan. Ed. C. Allen. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, 1981. 86–113. Warburg, Gabriel. Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society. London: Frank Cass & Company, 1978. Wennmann, Achim. “Wealth-Sharing Beyond 2011: Economic Issues in Sudan’s North-South Peace Process.” The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, 2009. Accessed 12 December 2009. http://graduateinstitute. ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/5925/CCDP-Working-Paper-1-Sudan.pdf Wesselink, Egbert. “Oil Fuels War in Sudan.” Adding Fuel to the Fire: The Role of Petroleum in Violent Conflicts. Swisspeace Annual Conference 2003, (2004). 15–22. Woodward, Peter. “Military-Civilian Relations.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986. 65–74. Woodward, Peter. Sudan, 1898–1989: the Unstable State. Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers; London: L. Crook Academic Pub, 1990. Woodward, Peter. US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006. Yongo-Bure, Benaiah. The Economic Development of Southern Sudan. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2007. Young, John. “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation.” Institute of Governance Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. 30 May 2007. Accessed 9 December 2008. http://www.cmi.no/sudan/doc?id=890

Leach_Book.indd 261

10/17/2012 7:01:05 PM

INDEX

Abboud, Ibrahim 14–15, 43–45, 52, 61–62, 64–65, 79–80, 88, 92, 112–113, 130, 138, 158, 161, 166, 180, 182–183, 189. Abdullah Khalil 14, 42–44, 80. Abuja talks of 1992 and 1993 30, 74, 75, 121, 123, 141, 191, 196–197, 198–199. Abyei 35, 55, 76, 78, 134, 155. 158–160, 225. Acholi (language) 57, 241. Advisory Council of Northern Sudan 11, 98. Afwerki, Isaias 193. Agar, Malik 249. Akol, Lam 121. Anderson, Benedict 238. Ankrah, K.E. 183. Alier, Abel 18–21, 23–24, 50, 55, 58, 64–65, 67, 86, 89, 107, 109, 111, 151, 153, 161, 163–164, 184–185, 188. Amin, Idi 58, 181. Amum, Pagan 128, 133. Ansar 9, 12, 17, 103, 104, 112, 117, 230. Anya Nya 14–17, 19, 42, 52–58, 63,65, 68–70, 75, 77, 106–107, 109, 113, 137–140, 152–153,

Index.indd 262

170–171, 178–180, 181–182, 184–185, 188–190, 192, 193, 196, 197, 202, 218; formation and composition of 14, 44, 53–55, 69. Anya Nya 2 24, 69, 109, 114, 140, 153, 164, 193. Arakis 146. Attabani, Ghazi Salahuddin 128–129, 154–155. Australia 212, 244. Azande 55, 241. Azhari, Ismael Al- 12, 13, 39, 98. Babangida, Ibrahim 197–198. Bakheit, Jaafar 47, 167. Baqqara 116–118, 163, 240. Bari 58. Bashir-Turabi split 31–32, 119–120, 124, 125, 165, 202, 207, 222, 240. Beja Congress 128. Bin Laden, Osama 144, 205, 236. Bol, Kerubino Kuanyin 194. Bol, Samuel Aru 89. Bor Mutiny of 1983 24, 115. Buganda 179.

10/17/2012 7:00:17 PM

INDEX Bush, George W. 33, 200, 206, 208–209, 213. Bwongo, Samuel Athi 183. Cairo Declaration of 2003 123. Canada 146, 205, 212. Carr, Burgess 152, 183, 185. Chad 187. Chevron Oil 158, 163. China 145–147, 177, 192, 209, 243. Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) 146. Chuol, William 153. Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPA instrument) 213. Clinton Administration 200, 205–207. Collier-Hoeffler theory of rebel predation 169, 223. Communist Party of Sudan 3, 15, 18, 82, 106, 107. Condominium 3, 8–13, 38, 40, 42, 48, 49, 65, 94, 97, 98, 112, 152, 160, 161, 166, 168. Congo, Democratic Republic of (Zaire, Congo-Kinshasa) 15, 45, 171, 172, 178–179, 189–190, 248. Cotran Report 51. Coup attempts: 1971 coup attempt 18, 105, 182, 184, 186–188; 1975 coup attempt 22, 68, 113; 1976 coup attempt 22, 114. Coup d’etat of 1969 see May Revolution. Coup d’etat of 1989 28, 71, 72, 84, 191, 194–195, 222. Cuba 193. Danforth Report (2002) 33, 213, 230. Danforth, John 33, 154, 200, 204, 206–208, 213, 226. Darfur 7, 43, 44, 63, 70, 78, 84, 114, 117, 158, 159, 163, 168, 232.

Index.indd 263

263

Darfur conflict of 2003 128, 134, 146, 191, 204, 209–210, 217. de Garang, Mading 139. Declaration of Principles (1994) 31, 34, 56, 76, 132, 134, 141, 199–200, 225. Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 27–28, 71, 77, 97–98, 102–105, 107, 128, 231. Deng, Francis 29, 50, 67, 159, 233. Deng, William 45–46, 72. Dhahab, Siwar Al- 26, 82, 101. Dinka 9–10, 24, 30, 32, 35, 54–55, 57–58, 67, 73, 74, 76, 89, 96, 106, 108, 117, 121, 156, 159–160, 167, 172, 218, 229, 240–241. Egypt (colonial era) 7, 8, 10, 12–13, 18, 94, 96. Egypt (Republic of) 22, 26, 44, 63, 113, 127, 168, 188, 189, 190, 195, 196, 202, 206, 208, 212. Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative 31, 175, 201–205, 226. Equatoria Corps 13, 51. Eritrea 30, 127, 180, 189, 192–193, 196, 198–200, 209, 250. Ethiopia, 19, 24, 26, 29, 30, 73, 74, 139, 168, 177–181, 186, 187, 189, 190, 193, 194, 196–200, 202, 209, 226. Ethiopian Eritrean war of 1998–2000 31. 127. Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (CPA instrument) 245. Foot, Dingle 179. France 205. Frankfort Agreement (1992) 121. FROLINAT 187. Garang, John 5, 25–30, 61, 65, 73–74, 79, 89–91, 101–102, 111, 121–123, 125, 129–130, 133,

10/17/2012 7:00:18 PM

264

WAR

AND

POLITICS

135, 148, 151, 153, 145–156, 158, 169–173, 193–195, 197, 207, 210, 218, 219; Negotiations with sectarian parties 26, 27, 61, 103, 123, 125; Negotiations with Bashir regime 28, 79, 122, 129–130, 133, 135, 153, 155, 158, 203, 207, 210; 1991 SPLA schism 29–30, 73, 74, 197. Garang, Joseph 18, 55, 106, 107, 182, 184. Germany 205. Ghana 183, 190, 232, 238. Ghannoushi, Rashid Al- 236. Gosh, Sallah Abdullah 124, 250. Government of South Sudan 34, 89, 147. Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company 146. Gulf War (1991) 195–196, 205. Haysom, Nicholas 133. Herbst, Jeffrey 75, 141, 172. High Executive Council 20, 21, 23, 58, 86, 109–110, 159, 230. Hoeffler, Anke 223. Idi Amin 58, 181. IGAD Partners Forum (Friends of IGAD) 78, 154, 192, 200, 201, 212. Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 31, 33–35, 76, 78, 118, 123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 132, 133, 141–143, 146, 150, 154, 159, 175–177, 183, 191, 192, 202, 204–205, 207–208; support of southern self-determination 197–201; international attention 210–214. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 75, 116, 207, 209. Iraq 29, 194–196; 1990–1991 invasion of and expulsion from Kuwait 194–196, 205; 2003 US-led invasion of 204.

Index.indd 264

IN

SUDAN

Ismael, Mustafa 142–143. Israel 178, 180–181; Arab-Israeli War (1967) 17, 178, 186. Italy 212. Jaden, Aggrey 72. Jihad (holy war) 9, 29, 80–85, 112, 125, 196. Johnson, Douglas 59, 230, 242. Johnston, Harry 206. Joint Assessment Mission (CPA instrument) 212–213. Jonglei Canal 137, 166–169, 170, 224. Juba, assault on (1992) 73, 205 Juba Conference (1947) 12, 42, 49, 50, 232. Kenya, 15, 30, 33, 34, 111, 123–132133, 153–154, 159, 179, 190, 196, 198, 201, 206, 207, 211, 226, 242. Khalid, Mansour 20, 100, 106, 107, 185. Khalifa Abdullahi 8. Khalifa, Sirr Khatim Al- 115. Khalil, Abd Al-Majid 118. Khartoum Peace Agreement (1997) 30, 94, 122, 156–157, 172, 192, 199, 203, 205, 241. Khatmiyya 9, 13, 17, 27, 39, 43, 84, 97, 100, 102, 104, 117, 127–128. Kibaki, Mwai 251. Kifle, Nebiyelul 186. Kiir, Salva 129, 132–133, 242. Kitchener, Herbert 8, 9. Koka Dam Agreement (1986) 26–27, 103, 118, 196. Lagu, Joseph 15, 20, 23, 52, 53, 56–57, 58–59, 67, 72, 86, 89, 107, 109–111,138, 140, 152–153, 167, 178, 181, 185–186, 218–220. Land commissions of CPA 148, 149, 244, 245. Lane, Patricia 133–134, 149, 150. Latif, Ali Abd Al- 10, 96.

10/17/2012 7:00:18 PM

INDEX

265

Legislative Assembly (Condominium period) 12, 49, 50, 98–99, 101, 232. Liberal Party 43, 69, 99. Liberia 183, 189. Libya 18, 22, 29, 74, 187–188, 193–196, 213, 250. Lohure, Saturnino 52, 233. Lundin Petroleum 145.

Moi, Daniel arap 207, 208, 210, 211, 251. Movement for Colonial Freedom 182. Mubarak, Hosni 143, 195, 196, 197, 202. Museveni, Yoweri 193, 194, 249. Muslim Brothers 22, 27, 79, 81, 82, 107, 114, 115. Musyoka, Stephen Kalonzo 133, 242.

Machakos Protocol (2002) 33, 90–91, 123, 125, 129, 130, 132, 134, 141, 142, 144, 149, 153, 157, 201, 211–213, 226, 242. Machar, Riek 73, 74, 121, 235, 241. Macmichael, Harold 10, 231. Madi 57, 181, 241. Maghoub, Mohammed Ahmed 16, 47, 65, 88, 183, 247, 248. Mahdi, Abd Al-Rahman Al-, 9, 16, 97. Mahdi, Sadiq Al- 16, 26–28, 46, 70, 83, 98, 100, 103–105, 109, 117, 118, 120, 123, 125, 164, 183, 203, 219, 220. Mahdi (Muhammed Ahmed) 8, 9, 39. Malwal, Bona 242. Mandela, Nelson 210. Marshall Report 42. May Revolution (coup d’etat of 1969) 17, 21, 22, 56, 103, 106, 113. Mboro, Clement 89, 111, 232–233. Memorandum of Understanding (October 2002) 143, 243. Memorandum of Understanding (February 2003) 143, 212. Mengistu, Haile Mariam 29, 30, 192–194, 197, 199, 250. Mirghani, Mohammed Osman Al- 27, 28, 123, 125. Missionaries 11 49, 61, 62, 65, 179, 182, 184. Mohammed, Idris 129. Mohammed, Sulafedeen Salih 240.

Nakuru document (2003) 123–124, 153–154, 157, 211. Namibia 197. Nasser, Gamal Abd Al- 12, 113, 187, 189. National Alliance for National Salvation 104, 145, 194. National Democratic Alliance 76, 77, 123, 126–128, 129, 131, 133, 135, 175, 202–204, 217, 220. Asmara talks of June 1995 (National Democratic Alliance) 76, 126. National Front 21, 22, 107, 115. National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP); as National Islamic Front 27–28, 32, 71, 72, 74, 78, 79, 84, 85, 102–105, 115, 117–121, 122–123, 126, 127, 131, 191, 194–198, 202; as National Congress Party 32, 34, 35, 61, 77, 78, 95, 147, 203, 204; Split with Turabi 32, 119, 120, 124–125, 127, 202, 207, 220 National Petroleum Commission (CPA instrument) 34, 157, 245. National Reconciliation (1977) 22, 23, 81, 94, 102, 114, 115, 127, 192. Native Administration 3, 9, 47, 69, 89, 97, 244. Netherlands 205, 212. Nigeria 30, 121, 190, 191, 196–199; Biafra conflict 75, 179. Nihal, Nihal Deng 129. Niilus, Leopoldo 182, 183.

Index.indd 265

10/17/2012 7:00:18 PM

266

WAR

AND

POLITICS

Nile Petroleum 148. Nile Provisional Government 56, 233. Nimeiri, Jaafar Al- 17–20, 37, 95, 102– 106, 113, 152, 153, 158, 167, 177, 180–181, 181, 184, 219, 220, 221, 225, 227, 230; regime collapse 25, 26, 33, 101, 104; superpower alliances 184–194, 205; involvement in southern politics 21–24, 47, 56, 58–59, 68, 86, 87, 108–111, 159, 162–163, 239; and political Islam 37, 67, 81–83, 95–96, 107, 114, 116, 122, 126,165, 237. Norway 201, 204, 205, 207, 211, 212. Nuba Mountains 7, 33, 35, 43, 70, 78, 121, 142, 159, 200, 201, 208, 212, 225, 226, 232. Nuer 9, 30, 32, 54, 55, 73–74, 156, 172, 218, 240. Obote, Milton 171, 181. October Revolution (1964) 14–15, 17, 45, 79, 80, 113, 180, 189. Oduho, Joseph 107. OMV (oil company) 145. OPEC 145. Organization of African Unity (OAU) 181, 184, 190, 193, 195, 225. People’s Democratic Party 43. People’s Regional Assembly 20, 58, 62, 64, 86, 87, 89. Petterson, Donald 206. Popular Congress Party 125. Popular Defense Forces 117, 120, 121, 125, 164. Power Sharing Agreement (2004) 34, 91, 130, 131.

Qadaffi, Muammar 187–188, 195, 196. Qatar 213.

Index.indd 266

IN

SUDAN

Raga and Dem Zubeir capture by SPLA (2001) 32, 142, 207. Rahman, Omar Abd Al- 236. Redivision of the Southern Region (1983) 24, 58–59, 67, 108–112, 116. Regional Government Act of 1980 23, 47. Round Table Conference of 1965 15–16, 45, 46, 72, 81, 151, 190. Sadat, Anwar 187. Saudi Arabia 128, 187, 188, 195–196, 249. Security Arrangements Agreement (2003) 118, 128, 143, 151, 153, 155, 156, 157, 209, 213, 221. Selassie, Emperor Haile 19, 152, 181, 185, 192. “September Laws” (1983 Sharia laws) 25, 67, 81, 82, 84, 101. Sharia law, see “September Laws” Shilluk 55, 218. Shingetti Mohammed Salah Al- 50, 233. Simba Insurgency (Congo-Kinshasa, 1965) 15, 171, 189. South Africa 210, 211, 251. South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) 122, 143, 155, 156, 157. South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) 19, 20, 51, 56, 57, 60, 61, 66, 86, 107, 122, 178, 179, 182, 216, 232, 233, 239; in AAA negotiations 20, 47, 62, 63, 88, 107, 138–140, 151–152, 159, 167, 183, 185–186, 188. South Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) 55, 56. Southern Front 16, 19, 45, 72, 88, 98, 217. Southern Policy 3, 10–12, 37, 39–40, 42, 64, 65, 85, 231. Southern Region 23, 47, 58, 62, 69, 86, 88–89, 106, 109, 111, 151,

10/17/2012 7:00:18 PM

INDEX 159, 161, 163, 234. Formation of 20–21, 108; Dissolution of 24, 59, 68, 83, 108, 110, 165 Southern Unity Party 56. Stack, Lee 38, 96–97. Sudan Administrative Conference (1946) 11–12. Sudan African National Union (SANU) 16, 45–46, 71, 72, 98. Sudan Christian Alliance (SCA) 51. Sudan Council of Churches 183, 248. Sudan First Forum 130. Sudan Peace Act of 2002 (US) 209. Sudan Peace Initiative (1988) 28, 103–104, 118, 196. Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ Movement; formation 5, 25, 111, 193; SPLA schism (1991) 29–30, 54, 75, 153, 170, 172, 197, 235; SPLA split and demand for southern autonomy 71–76. SPLA-United, Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) 73–74, 121, 194. Sudan Socialist Union 23, 86, 109. Sudanization 10,13, 48, 50, 51, 62, 111. Sumbeiywo, Lazaro 33, 35, 124, 130, 132–134, 142, 143, 151, 153, 154, 159, 201, 204, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 243, 251. Taha, Abd Al-Rahman Ali 64. Taha, Ali Osman 124, 128–130, 133, 143, 154, 155, 158, 242. Tahir, Omer Mohammed 128. Talisman 144. Tambura, James 111. Tanzania 179, 193. Tayeb, Omar Mohammed Al- 115. Torit Mutiny (1955) 13–14, 17, 50, 51, 166. Total petroleum company 148, 205. Transitional Military Council (TMC) 25–26, 82, 101–102, 194.

Index.indd 267

267

Turabi, Hassan Al- 23, 31–32, 46, 78–79, 84, 85, 119, 120, 124–125, 127, 165, 195, 202, 207, 219, 220, 222, 240. Turabi/SPLM reconciliation (2003) 125. Twelve Man Committee report (1966) 16, 46, 190. Uganda 30, 52, 58, 171, 177, 179, 181, 190, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 200, 206, 209. Umma Party 16, 26–28, 43, 71, 76, 98, 100, 102–104, 107, 113, 117, 118, 127, 128, 220, 231, 241; Formation of 12, 97; NDA involvement 77, 126. Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP) 27, 196. United Nations 19, 75, 145, 181, 185, 191–192, 207, 212–213; UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 147. United States of America 25–26, 33, 129, 144, 154, 157, 177, 186, 188, 191, 195, 197, 198, 200–202, 204, 211–214,225, 249; US involvement in CPA process 205–210; Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant bombing (1998) 205. USAID 205, 206. USSR 22, 52, 182, 186–187. Verification and Monitoring Team (CPA instrument) 212. Verona Fathers 179.

Wealth Sharing Agreement (2004) 34, 148, 149, 156–157, 224, 243. White Flag League 10, 96. White Nile Petroleum Company 163. Wingate, Reginald 9, 38.

10/17/2012 7:00:18 PM

268

WAR

AND

POLITICS

Wol Wol, Lawrence 167. Woodward, Peter 222–223. World Bank 63, 75, 186, 207, 209, 212, 213. World Council of Churches/All Africa Council of Churches (WCC/ AACC) 19, 111, 139, 182–185, 214. 226. World Trade Center attack (1993) 198, 200.

Index.indd 268

IN

SUDAN

World Trade Center attack (2001) 206–207, 250.

Yac, Justin 133, 242. Yemen (North Yemen Civil War) 189. Zambia 197. Zande scheme 166. Zimbabwe 197.

10/17/2012 7:00:18 PM