After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan 1847010229, 9781847010223

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After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan

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EASTERN AFRICA SERIES Women’s Land Rights & Privatization in Eastern Africa Edited by BIRGIT ENGLERT & ELIZABETH DALEY War & the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia: Making Enemies & Allies in the Horn of Africa KJETIL TRONVOLL

Moving People in Ethiopia: Development, Displacement & the State Edited by ALULA PANKHURST & FRANÇOIS PIGUET Living Terraces in Ethiopia: Konso Landscape, Culture & Development ELIZABETH E. WATSON Eritrea: A Dream Deferred GAIM KIBREAB

Borders & Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa Edited by DEREJE FEYISSA & MARKUS VIRGIL HOEHNE After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan Edited by ELKE GRAWERT Land, Governance, Conflict & the Nuba of Sudan* GUMA KUNDA KOMEY

* forthcoming

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After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan Edited by

E L K E G R AW E RT

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James Currey www.jamescurrey.com is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620, USA www.boydellandbrewer.com © Contributors 2010 First published 2010 1 2 3 4 5 14 13 12 11 10 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. The publisher has no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. This publication is printed on acid-free paper

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data After the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan. -(Eastern Africa series) 1. Sudan--History--Civil War, 1983-2005--Peace. I. Series II. Grawert, Elke. 327.1'72'09624-dc22

ISBN 978-1-84701-022-3 (James Currey Hardcover)

Typeset in 10/11 pt Baskerville by Tina Ranft, Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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Contents

List of Tables & Figures Editor’s Preface Notes on Contributors List of Acronyms Map of Sudan

vii viii x xii xvi

1 Introduction

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E L K E G R A W E RT

I. Implementation & Potential of the CPA

2 The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan

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M E L H A RO U T B I E L

3 After the CPA The Implementation of Power Sharing at the National Level – the Case of the National Assembly

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RANIA HASSAN AHMED

4 Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) A Start from the Bottom

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YA S I R A WA D A B D A L L A E L TA H I R

II. Challenges Facing Post-war Societies in Sudan

5 The CPA & Beyond Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains S A M S O N S . WA S S A R A

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Appendix to Chapter 5 Governmental & NGO Structures in Dilling Locality, Southern Kordofan TAY S E E R E L - FAT I H A B D E L A’ A L

103

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Contents

6 Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in Claiming Communal Land The Nuba Mountains after the CPA

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G U M A K U N D A KO M E Y

7 Return Migration to the Nuba Mountains

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S A M I R A M U S A A R M I N DA M I N

8 Challenges of Basic Education in Southern Sudan Language Policy in Jonglei & Upper Nile States

141

JOSEPH LODIONG LUBAJO

9 Abduction, Confinement & Sexual Violence against South Sudanese 158 Women & Girls in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya M A R I LY N O S S O M E

10 Identity, Citizenship & Reintegration Sudanese Returnees from Kenya

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OBAKA OTIENO JOHN

III. The CPA in its Sub-regional Context

11 Changes in Gambella, Ethiopia after the CPA

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R E G A S S A B AY I S S A S I M A

12 Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella A Perspective from the Border Region MONIKA M. SOMMER

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13 From CPA to DPA ‘Ripe for Resolution’, or Ripe for Dissolution?

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P E T E R W O O D WA R D

14 Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA

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E L K E G R A W E RT

IV. Beyond the CPA

15 Theoretical Outcomes

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E L K E G R A W E RT

Index

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List of Tables & Figures Tables 2.1 Heads of Sudanese Government (1954–2006) 2.2 Sudanese Foreign Ministers since 1989 2.3 Regional Representation in Sudanese Embassies and Consulates, 2004 2.4 Presidents of the Sudanese Constitutional Court 2.5 Presidents of Sudanese Universities according to Regions 2.6 Presidents of the Sudanese State Security 2.7 Allocation of Ministerial Positions in the GONU 2.8 Participation in the Federal Parliament in Khartoum by Party 2.9 Functions of Prime Minister and President in New Sudan 3.1 The Group Building Approach 3.2 The Integrative Approach 3.3 Political Parties’ Representation in the National Assembly according to the CPA 3.4 Parties’ de facto Representation in the National Assembly 3.5 Origin of Members of the National Assembly 3.6 Party Representation in the Assembly’s Committees 5.1 Decision-making Patterns according to Organisational Form 7.1 Respondents’ Reasons for Returning Home 8.1 Teachers and their Standards in Upper Nile and Jonglei States 10.1 Durable Solutions for Sudanese Refugees 11.1 Ethnic Composition of South Sudanese Refugees in Pugnido Refugee Camp 12.1 The Demographic Composition of the GPNRS 2.1 2.2 2.3 5.1 10.1

Figures Model of a Unitary State with some Decentralisation Model of Sudanese Confederation (Commonalities) Model of Complete Separation Decision-making Process in the Women’s NGO Identity and Reintegration vii

40 40 41 41 41 42 43 43 46 53 54 57 57 58 59 108 136 152 187 204 216 44 45 45 108 179

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Editor’s Preface

Five years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of Sudan was signed in Nairobi in January 2005, several research-based assessments of the process of implementing the agreement and the prospects for lasting peace in Sudan are now available. This book compiles scholarly analyses of the implementation of the power sharing agreement of the CPA, of the ongoing conflicts with particular respect to land issues, of the challenges of the reintegration of internally displaced people and refugees, and of the repercussions of the CPA in other regions of Sudan as well as in neighbouring countries. Most of this research was conducted in the framework of a cooperative research project on ‘Governance and Social Action in Sudan after the Peace Agreement of January 9, 2005: local, national and regional dimensions’, which is part of the research programme ‘Knowledge for Tomorrow: Political, Social and Economic Dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa’ sponsored by the German Volkswagen Foundation. The project participants are senior and junior scholars and researchers from the University of Khartoum, University of Juba, Ahfad University for Women, Omdurman, the University of Addis Ababa, the University of Nairobi, and the University of Bremen. The papers assembled in this book were first presented during a workshop on ‘After the CPA: Signs of Change?’ with international participants at the Institute of World Economics and International Management of the University of Bremen in November 2006. They were submitted and updated in 2009. On behalf of the authors of this book, the editor wants to thank first of all the Volkswagen Foundation, which sponsored research about various issues related to the CPA through scholarships for higher qualification at the Master’s and PhD levels. The sponsorship also included workshops like the one at the University of Bremen in

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Editor’s Preface November 2006, where the researchers had the opportunity to discuss their findings with international experts in Sudan research, some of whom also submitted papers for this book. Last but not least, the Volkswagen Foundation contributed to this publication by taking over some of the production costs, together with the Bremen Society for Economic Research (Bremer Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsforschung), to which we also submit our thanks. We also owe respect and gratitude to Dr Douglas Johnson, who extensively commented on the papers in this book and helped the editor with detailed advice. In addition, we extend many thanks to Tino Urban and Jörg Wehrenberg, who committed much of their time to the technical editorial work. Elke Grawert Bremen

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Notes on Contributors

Tayseer El-Fatih Abdel A’al: Senior Lecturer at Ahfad University for Women, Omdurman, Institute of Women, Gender and Development Studies. [email protected]. Rania Hassan Ahmed: Political scientist, University of Khartoum, Public Diplomacy Office of the Embassy of the United States of America, Khartoum. [email protected]. Melha Rout Biel: Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Juba, College of Community Studies and Rural Development/Centre for Peace and Development Studies. [email protected]. Samira Musa Armin Damin: Senior Lecturer in Geography, University of Juba, Faculty of Education, Department of Geography. [email protected]. Yasir Awad Abdalla Eltahir: Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Khartoum, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, Department of Political Science. [email protected]. Elke Grawert: Senior Researcher and Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Intercultural and International Studies (InIIS), University of Bremen. [email protected]. Obaka Otieno John: Political scientist, Maseno University, District Officer in Western Region, Kenya. [email protected]. Guma Kunda Komey: Assistant Professor of Human Geography, University of Juba, Faculty of Education, Department of Geography. [email protected]. x

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Notes on Contributors Joseph Lodiong Lubajo: Community Development Studies, University of Juba, Conduct and Discipline Officer at UNMIS Juba. [email protected]. Marilyn Ossome: MSc in Sociology, Ahfad University for Women, Omdurman, Programme Associate at the Kenya Human Rights Commission. [email protected]. Regassa Bayissa Sima: Senior Lecturer in History, Addis Ababa University, College of Commerce. [email protected]. Monika M. Sommer: PhD candidate in Law and Political Science, Assessor (jur) and Mediator, German Embassy in Pretoria. [email protected]. Samson Samuel Wassara: Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Juba, Faculty of Social and Economic Studies, Centre for Peace and Development Studies. [email protected]. Peter Woodward: Professor of Politics, University of Reading, Department of Politics. [email protected].

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List of Acronyms ABC ADP ADRA AEC ARRA AU CBO CE COER CPA CSO DC DCA DFG DICAC DOP DPA DRC DUP EDD EPRDF ESPA GONU GOS GOSS GPDM GPDUP GPLM GPNRS GPUDM HAC ICSS IDMC IDP

Abyei Boundary Commission Anuak Democratic Party Adventist Development and Relief Agency Assessment and Evaluation Committee Administration for Refugee Affairs African Union Community-Based Organisation County Education Committee Colloquium of the Commission on Ethnic Relations Comprehensive Peace Agreement Civil Society Organisation Developed Country Danish Church Aid Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Development Inter-Church Aid Commission Declaration of Principles Darfur Peace Agreement Democratic Republic of Congo Democratic Unionist Party Empowered Deliberative Democracy Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement Government of National Unity Government of Sudan Government of Southern Sudan Gambella People’s Democratic Movement Gambella People’s Democratic Unity Party Gambella People’s Liberation Movement Gambella People’s National Regional State Gambella People’s Unity Democratic Movement Humanitarian Aid Commission Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Internally Displaced Person/People xii

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List of Acronyms IGAD ILO IMF INGO IOM IRC IRRI IRW JEM JIU JMC JRS KESSULO LDC LWF MDP MDTF MOEST NCCK NCP NDA NDP NGO NIF NMPACT NRDP NRF NUP OAG OCHA OCS ODI OLF OLS PCP PDF PTA QUANGO RaDO RAMP RCT SAF SANO SCC

Intergovernmental Authority on Development International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund International Non-Governmental Organisation International Organisation for Migration International Rescue Committee International Refugee Rights Initiative Islamic Relief Worldwide Justice and Equality Movement Joint Integrated Unit Joint Monitoring Commission Jesuit Refugee Services Kenyan-Southern Sudanese Liaison Office Least Developed Country Lutheran World Federation Majangir Democratic Party Multi-Donor Trust Fund Ministry of Education, Science and Technology National Council of Churches of Kenya National Congress Party National Democratic Alliance Nuer Democratic Party Non-Governmental Organisation National Islamic Front Nuba Mountains Programme for Advancing Conflict Transformation Natural Resource Development Protection National Redemption Front National Unionist Party Other Armed Groups United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Officer Commanding Station Overseas Development Institute Oromo Liberation Front Operation Lifeline Sudan Popular Congress Party Peoples Defence Force Parents and Teachers’ Association Quasi-Non-Governmental Organisation Rehabilitation and Development Organisation Riverine Arabised Muslim Power Bloc Rational Choice Theory Sudan Armed Forces Sudan African National Organisation Sudan Council of Churches xiii

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List of Acronyms SCP SCS SES SIDO SLM/A SMA SMC SOE SPLM/A SRRC SSDF SSIM/A SSLM SSRC SSRRC TPLF TTI UDHR UDSF UK UN UNDP UNFPA UNHCR UNICEF UNMIS UNOCHA UNRISD US USA USAID USAP USCIRF USIP USS WFP WTI ZOA

Sudanese Communist Party Save the Children Sweden Socio-Economic Status Saharan International Development Organisation Sudan Liberation Movement/Army School Management Association School Management Committee Secretariat of Education Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission South Sudan Democratic Forum South Sudan Independence Movement/Army Southern Sudan Liberation Movement Social Science Research Council Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front Teachers Training Institute Universal Declaration of Human Rights United Democratic Salvation Front United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Population Fund United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund United Nations Mission in Sudan United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United Nations Research Institute for Social Development United States United States of America United States Agency for International Development Union of Sudanese African Parties United States Commission on International Religious Freedom United States Institute of Peace United States Ship World Food Programme Windle Trust International Refugee Care Netherlands

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Map of Sudan: omitting the 1956 North-South border line and the agreed boundaries of the Abyei Area (Source: Sudan no. 3707 Rev. 10 April 2007, UN Cartographic Section)

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1 Introduction E L K E G R AW E RT

After a long process of peace negotiations, which started only three years after the outbreak of the second civil war in Sudan in 1983, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on January 9, 2005 between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The CPA raised initial hopes that it would be the foundation stone for lasting peace in Sudan. With its key protocols on wealth and power sharing (GOS/SPLM/A 2004, 2004a), it addresses two root causes of the civil wars in southern Sudan that had devastated the region from 1955 to 1972 and again, after eleven years of peace, from 1983 to 2004. These were economic marginalisation of the South and a near-exclusion of southerners from positions in government. The following introductory sections present the details of the CPA and outline the problems facing its implementation. Finally an overview of the sections and papers in this book is provided.

Background and key issues of the CPA The CPA officially and de facto ended the civil war in southern Sudan after a long process that had suffered many setbacks. It had started in 1986 with negotiations between factions of the formally democratic coalition government under Sadig el-Mahdi and the SPLM/A leadership. The coup d’état of 1989 by Lt. Omar Hassan el-Bashir, backed by the Muslim Brotherhood led by Hassan el-Turabi, was a heavy blow to a nearagreement. During the 1990s, negotiations intensified again under the umbrella of the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), which includes the governments of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. The CPA (GOS/SPLM/A 2005) is a compilation of protocols and agreements between the GOS and the SPLM/A, which includes the Machakos Protocol of July 20, 2002, the Agreement on 1

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Security Arrangements of September 25, 2003, the Agreement on Wealth Sharing of January 7, 2004, the Protocol on Power Sharing of May 26, 2004, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States of May 26, 2004, and the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area of May 26, 2004 (see documents in appendix of Adar et al. 2004; see also GOS/SPLM/A 2004b). This process came to a successful conclusion in January 2005. However, armed conflict escalated in eastern Sudan in 2005 and reached a precarious settlement through a peace agreement in 2006. Violent conflicts in Darfur, which had started soon after the famine of 1983–5, intensified as soon as the first agreements leading to the CPA were reached in 2003, and turned into a real war which has continued in spite of a partial peace agreement concluded in 2006 (see Grawert 2008; Woodward in this volume). The CPA stipulates the transformation of political groups and movements into democratic parties (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 1.4.6). In the current process of implementation, which is scheduled for six years up to 2011, the interests of the former GOS are represented by the National Congress Party (NCP). This party is led by the Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir, who is part of an Arabised Muslim elite originating from the triangle between the Blue and White Nile with Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North as the centre of power. This ‘riverine Arab-Muslim Power Bloc’ (RAMP) (El-Battahani 2002) has dominated government in Sudan since independence, most of the time in terms of military rule, but with three short formally democratic intermezzi (1956–8, 1966–9, 1986–9). The SPLM is the civilian wing of the SPLA, which has been led by a southern Sudanese elite, largely consisting of Dinka, one of the largest ethnic groups in southern Sudan, since 1983. In the process of transforming this militant movement into a political party that strives for political legitimacy, the SPLM claims to represent the interests of all marginalised groups in Sudan (SPLM Economic Commission 2004: 57). The successful part of the peace process is mainly due to one aspect of power sharing: the guarantee of the regional autonomy of southern Sudan. This includes the foundation of a regional Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 3.5), based on a secular regional constitution, with a SPLM-dominated Regional Assembly and Cabinet and the institution of the President of Southern Sudan (ibid.: 2.3.7), the establishment of an independent judiciary (ibid.: 3.6, 3.7), and the right of the population of southern Sudan to decide about independence through a referendum in 2011 (GOS/SPLM/A 2002: 2.5 and 2.10.1.5). A further reason for peace between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A is the proportionate inclusion of the SPLM in the national government of Sudan, with 28 per cent of the ministries and seats in the National Assembly. This government is now labelled Government of National Unity (GONU) and includes a 52 per cent majority of the NCP and 20 per cent drawn from several other northern and southern Sudanese 2

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Introduction parties (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 2.2.5). A Constitutional Court has been established in order to facilitate an independent judiciary (ibid.: 2.11.2.1). Moreover, local governments have been appointed in 26 federal states, ten of which are located in southern Sudan. According to the CPA, the members of the national, regional and state assemblies were supposed to be replaced by elected members following a nationwide ballot in 2009 (ibid.: 1.8.3). A further dimension of power sharing is civil service sector reform which is to ensure proportional occupation of higher positions by southerners (ibid.: 2.6.1.5 and 2.6.2). These arrangements for a more balanced political representation are an attempt to overcome the marginalisation of large parts of Sudanese society through institutional reform. The fair share of southern Sudanese personnel in leading positions is expected to create the potential to balance the vested interests of the old-established RAMP elite with those of the so far excluded parts of Sudanese society. The CPA also stipulates devolution to states with their own constitutions that have to be compatible with the national and regional constitutions (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 4.4.4). Moreover, it includes a section on the repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees as well as the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the war-affected areas to which these groups return (GOS/SPLM/A 2002: 1.5.4). The other crucial reason for the current absence of war in southern Sudan is the formula of wealth sharing. Accordingly, the GONU and the GOSS are each entitled to one half of the total oil revenues stemming from the southern Sudanese oil production, after deduction of 2 per cent for each oil-producing state in the South (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 3.2, 5.5 and 5.6). The CPA also provides for determined development efforts in the wartorn South (Adar et al. 2004: 37–57). The agreement on the reallocation of revenues and enhanced economic investment in the South reflects the will of the signatories to achieve an equitable standard of living for the populations in northern and southern Sudan (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 7.3). This has been backed by Western donor countries, which pledged US$ 4.5 billion for two multi-donor trust funds, one at the national level and one for the South, established for development and infrastructural measures (Sudan Multidonor Trust Funds 2005). The southern fund is administered by the World Bank. The GONU and the GOSS are supposed to contribute a due share of oil revenues for development expenditures. Another important aspect of wealth sharing is the regulation of control over land. The CPA stipulates that land commissions are to be established at national, regional and state levels in order to initiate a process that will amend and develop the relevant land laws towards the incorporation of customary laws and practices (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7; GOS/SPLM/A 2004d: 9.3). The CPA also provides steps towards the solution of particular problems in three critical areas on the boundary between northern and southern Sudan (GOS and SPLM/A 2004c, d). Part of these areas, the 3

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Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan State and the southern part of Blue Nile State and the Abyei area, had been under SPLA control during the civil war. The CPA provides concrete formulae governing how rule over the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States is to be shared between the NCP and the SPLM until democratic elections are conducted. These elections were also scheduled for 2009 (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 1.8.3). In the oil-rich contested area around Abyei, three different conflicts are overlapping. The first is about land claims between the Misseriya Arabs from the North and the Dinka Ngok from the South, both pastoralist peoples who compete for access to pasture and water in the area. The second conflict is about the political attachment of the area to either northern or southern Sudan within the framework of a general process of boundary demarcation between the two parts of Sudan stipulated in the CPA (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 3.1). Under colonial rule, the Abyei area had been incorporated into Kordofan, northern Sudan, for reasons of administrative convenience. During the two Sudanese civil wars, the area became a focus of fighting. Under the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which settled the first civil war in 1972, the residents of the area obtained the right to vote on whether they wanted to join the Southern Region. However, the GOS denied them this right, and this became one of the grievances that resulted in the second civil war. In the 1980s, Abyei came under SPLA control, which won recruits from the Dinka Ngok, whereas the Misseriya sided with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) as militias equipped by the GOS. The discovery of rich oil fields in Abyei has added a third conflict about the rights over this precious resource in terms of wealth sharing as part of the CPA. If Abyei is allocated to the South, 50 per cent of the oil revenues from the area will belong to the GOSS, but if it remains part of the North, it will not fall under the wealth sharing agreement, and these revenues will flow to the GONU. The CPA dealt with the Abyei area in a careful way by declaring it a special area under direct control of the President until 2011. By that date the population of the area will have the right to decide whether they want to belong to the North or the South in a referendum linked to the general referendum in southern Sudan about independence or unity (GOS/SPLM/A 2004c: 8.1 and 8.2). In 2005, a special Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC), composed of representatives of the GONU and the GOSS and local leaders as well as independent experts, was established and given the task of demarcating the boundaries of the area based on the historical land allocation between the Misseriya and Dinka (ibid. 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). However, after the ABC had delivered its report to the Presidency in mid-2005, the NCP and the SPLM failed to reach agreement about its consequences (Alemu 2006). It has turned into the main battlefield of ongoing violent conflicts after the CPA, carried out between the SPLA and the SAF, Misseriya and Dinka, as well as various militias, with numerous casualties. After an outbreak of real war in 2008, the NCP and the SPLM/A agreed to external mediation through the Permanent Court of 4

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Introduction Arbitration. Its ruling in 2009 deviated from the suggestions of the ABC and was accepted by the two parties, but did not satisfy the Misseriya. Further fighting over Abyei looms ahead towards the time of the referendum. A further important arrangement stipulated in the CPA is the restructuring of the military groups and forces according to a precise schedule. The SPLA fighters have to be re-trained so that they can operate as the regular regional army of southern Sudan. Militias ought to be integrated into either the SAF or the SPLA. Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) of the SAF and the SPLA should be deployed in the critical areas along the North-South boundary (GOS/SPLM/A 2003: 4). National, Regional and State Security Councils are to be established in order to supervise the implementation of the security regulations (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 2.7.2.1 and 2.7.2.5). The implementation of the CPA is monitored by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), based on a mandate of the UN Security Council (UN Resolution 1590 of 2005) for a period of six years up to 2011, the time of the referendum on the future of Sudan as a united or divided country. An important institutional set-up for the implementation is the formation of commissions dealing with the various aspects of the CPA such as the sharing of oil revenues (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 3.2), allocation of land (ibid. 2.6 and 2.7), demarcation of the North-South boundary (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 3.1), clarification of the status of the Abyei area (ibid. 5.1), civil service sector reform (ibid. 2.6.1.5 and 2.6.2), the judicial service (ibid. 2.11.4.5), human rights (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 2.10.1.2) and assessment of the implementation process itself (GOS/SPLM/A 2002: 2.4. and 2.4.1). The commissions are generally composed of both parties to the CPA plus independent experts. In particular, the assessment and evaluation commission, which monitors the implementation of the CPA, includes external forces, namely, government officials from Africa, Europe, and America.

Successes and setbacks in implementing the CPA Several steps have been taken to implement the agreements stipulated in the CPA. Others are still in the process and some are far behind schedule: • In November 2005 the interim national constitution was issued, incorporating basic human rights, the basic rules for the formation of the transitional government and other requirements agreed upon in the CPA. The regional and state constitutions were therefore drafted during a controversial process between the main political parties. Positions in the GONU, GOSS and each of the 26 federal states were redistributed according to the Naivasha Protocol of 2004, one of the early documents on which the CPA was founded (GOS/SPLM/A 5

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2004a). Accordingly, 52 per cent of the Cabinet posts and seats in the National Assembly were given to appointees of the NCP, 28 per cent to the SPLM, 14 per cent to other northern and 6 per cent to other southern forces. In the regional GOSS the proportions are 70 per cent for the SPLM, 15 per cent for the NCP and 15 per cent for other southern forces. In the 16 northern states the governments consist of 70 per cent NCP and 10 per cent SPLM, in the 10 southern states 70 per cent SPLM and 10 per cent NCP representatives, with 20 per cent filled by other southern and northern forces respectively, including former militias that are in the process of being transformed into political parties (ibid. 2.2.5 and 2.5.5). In the contested areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile States, the shares are NCP 55 per cent and SPLM 45 per cent, with governors changing between the two half-way through the term (GOS/SPLM/A 2004d: 11.1.5). • In 2006, the Asmara Peace Agreement ended the violent conflict between the Beja Congress in eastern Sudan and the GONU. The Beja are pastoralists living in marginalised areas in southern Egypt, northeastern Sudan and northern Eritrea, who formed a resistance movement in the 1960s and took up arms against the GOS in the 1990s. During their struggle for semi-autonomy of the eastern region, they repeatedly destroyed parts of the oil pipeline between South Sudan and the Red Sea harbour of Port Sudan. The political organisation of the Beja, the Beja Congress, joined the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and tried to become a partner in the peace negotiations between the GOS and the SPLM/A. When they failed, they allied with the Darfurian Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) in the struggle for federation. A partial peace agreement, the so-called Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), was concluded between the GONU and one faction of the Darfurian Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), but this sparked the split in the resistance movement in Darfur and led to an escalation of the war in western Sudan. • The Boundary Technical Committee has not demarcated the NorthSouth boundary as planned, but is still involved in a slow process of identifying the course of the boundary based on archival material from colonial times up to 1956 (Akol 2006). • The national census, the basis for the establishment of constituencies for the elections at local, regional and national levels, was not conducted according to schedule in November 2007 (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 1.8.1 and 1.8.2) but delayed until the end of April 2008. The SPLM had the motivation to postpone the census until all the IDPs and refugees, who were still waiting in northern Sudan, had returned to the South. The party also demanded inclusion of the ethnic and religious 6

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Introduction identity of the population in the census form, with the intention of creating a statistical basis on which claims by the NCP that Muslims form the majority in the South could be verified or falsified. A further reason for the delay was the late release of funds by the GONU to the GOSS. Ultimately the census was conducted without more delay. The identity issues were not incorporated in the form. In some areas, such as Darfur and along the North-South boundary, the census could not be carried out properly because of armed conflict and contests between enumerators of the GONU and the GOSS about the allocation of the area to northern or southern Sudan (author’s observation and interviews with members of the regional assembly in Juba, April 2008). • The formation of commissions that are to deal with the key economic problems in Sudan – land and water rights and the redistribution of oil revenues – has also been delayed. This has led to a lack of transparency about the real national income from oil exports and hence the revenues to be re-allocated according to the CPA (see Kiir 2007). The delay has contributed to the failure to settle numerous mounting conflicts over land and water in many parts of Sudan, which were exacerbated by increased needs for land for the exploration of mineral resources and the mass return of IDPs and refugees. • The redeployment of the SAF and SPLA troops has been conducted slowly. In the Nuba Mountains, violent conflicts between militias backed by the militant forces of each side continued until 2008. Deployment of the Joint Integrated Units was scheduled for October 2006, but up to the beginning of 2008 only 85.6 per cent of them had been formed, and clashes between the SAF and the SPLA were still occurring in Malakal in 2009. Security has remained precarious along the North-South border, where ongoing conflicts over land and water resources between pastoralists and cultivators and between oil companies and local inhabitants who have had to leave their land are also entrenched (UNMIS 2008). The expected role of the SPLM members in the GONU and the National Assembly was to push forward the implementation of the peace agreement. However, the position of the SPLM at the national level has remained weak, so that it has not been able to insist on the timely fulfilment of the CPA. In addition to the objective disadvantages of being the junior partner in government, this also seems to be due to the slow process of restructuring the movement into a proper political party. There are also leadership weaknesses which have caused a partial neglect of the role of the SPLM at the national level in favour of concentrating party activities at the regional level of government (see Grawert/El-Battahani 2007). In southern Sudan the SPLM has been struggling to gain power and control over its territory and the population. Political leaders have 7

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concentrated their efforts primarily on achieving regional security. This has been reflected in the regional budgets of 2007 to 2009, in which the Regional Assembly earmarked nearly 40 per cent of the total budget for security, justice and law and order. The GOSS is under pressure to control underpaid soldiers who previously fought for the liberation army and still carry arms, and to disarm militias and various population groups who continue to carry guns from the time of the hostilities. Moreover, the fear of the current ceasefire failing is not far-fetched. Currently the SPLA has amassed troops near the North-South boundary, where there are also the SAF and militias of the NCP as well as the JIUs that should in fact be the only forces in that area according to the CPA. This overview shows that it is still too early to claim success for the CPA. Tensions are still high in the North-South boundary areas. A solution of the key issues at stake – the attachment of the oil fields to northern or southern Sudan and an agreement about the territory which might come under southern Sudanese sovereign rule later on – is not in sight.

Structure of the book This book contains three main sections dealing with different processes taking place in Sudan and the sub-region, all of which relate to the CPA, plus a concluding chapter. It starts with the analysis of certain aspects of power sharing and a critical assessment of the way they are being implemented. The first section also includes critical assessments of the CPA and consideration of its inherent potential. The second section discusses controversial issues regarding the allocation of land, addresses a range of problems related to the return of IDPs and refugees, and analyses the current divisions and identity issues at stake in Sudan as well as amongst Sudanese refugees abroad. The third section looks into the implications of the civil war and the changes caused by the CPA in the subregion. It also provides some material for comparative studies between decentralisation policies in Ethiopia and Sudan, between the CPA and the DPA, and between the relations of Ethiopia, Chad and Kenya with Sudan. The final chapter gives a theoretical background regarding certain aspects of the CPA and draws several theoretical conclusions from the issues discussed in the book. I M P L E M E N TAT I O N A N D P OT E N T I A L O F T H E C PA

In the first part of the book (Chapters 2–4), the process of implementing the CPA during the interim period is assessed under the two political perspectives of representation and participation. The focus of Chapters 2 and 3 is on the role of elites in conflict and peace processes in Sudan as well as in implementing the CPA. Chapter 4 concentrates on popular participation. Melha Rout Biel traces the history of Arabisation and Islamisation in 8

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Introduction Sudan and the formation of the Arab-African divide in post-colonial Sudan. This history has been linked to a biased allocation of resources and development to the centre around Khartoum and the Blue and White Nile triangle, whilst other regions in the country were marginalised. This distorted development has led to the politicisation of ethnicity in numerous violent conflicts and to the long-lasting civil war. Against this background, the vision of the SPLM/A leader John Garang de Mabior (1983–2005) of a ‘New Sudan’ based on a democratic secular constitution and the sharing of power and wealth, as incorporated in the CPA, can be regarded as a roadmap towards integration of the society, based on a national concept of unity in diversity. The paper focuses on the role of elites in the resolution of the long political, military and social crisis in Sudan, showing that a new elite generation has been recruited from the political and military leaders of the regional resistance movements in southern Sudan and Darfur, from senior staff in Sudanese universities, and Sudanese graduates from Western universities. The military elite obtained the most influential positions of the SPLM/A in the GONU and the GOSS as well as in the state governments, as Biel illustrates with case studies of several high-ranking political personalities. Northern elites prevail in leading positions, as a compilation of the origins of senior political leaders since independence reveals, whereas at the level of the ministries and parliaments, higher representation of southerners can be claimed according to the CPA. Finally, Biel assesses alternative options for a peaceful solution in Sudan. He builds his scenarios on the judgement that the CPA, the DPA and the Asmara Agreement for eastern Sudan are signs of a recognition by part of the Sudanese elite of the need to compromise and to share power and resources. He considers this a first step towards more equality and justice as well as religious, cultural and political tolerance in Sudan. Rania Hassan Ahmed looks into the realisation of the power sharing agreement with a focus on the fulfilment of the demand for fair representation of Sudanese society at the national level. Based on a statistical analysis of the composition of the National Assembly of the GONU, an overview of the history of the main political parties and an investigation of membership in parliamentary committees, she comes to the conclusion that there is still a bias towards the central region and interests stemming from that privileged part of the country. At the national level, the weight of a hardliner faction of the RAMP is reflected in policy decisions that have caused delays in the implementation of the power sharing agreement. In particular, the interest in securing control over the country’s key resources by certain dominant groups, which have been active in politics for a long time, explains these delays. She also identifies weaknesses of the two main parties, the NCP and SPLM, with regard to organisational structure, programmes, and internal power relations as causes of the lack of consistent policies towards the aims stipulated in the CPA. Within the NCP this weakness opens the door to the persistent influence of dominant groups of the RAMP elite. According to her 9

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analysis, the SPLM, on the other hand, has preserved the cohesion of the liberation movement at the national level and is trying to increase its weight by winning support in those areas of the country where economic and political marginalisation and exploitation of key resources have alienated large population groups from the state. The transition from a liberation movement to a democratic political party has not been completed; hence structures are preserved that can form the organisational basis for a resumption of the civil war. The study shows that governance in Sudan is dominated by powerful individuals through control over the country’s key resources rather than by fairly representative political leaders. This results in biased policies and delays in the implementation of the CPA. Yasir Awad Abdalla Eltahir concentrates on political participation as the means by which Sudan’s three structural problems, namely, uneven development, an inadequate political system and civil wars, could be solved. He focuses his study on particular definitions and understandings of participation in different parts of Sudanese society, most of which consider political participation as most meaningful outside the institutions of state and government. According to this research, in southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, and the eastern and northern regions, communities, which fought against the power structure of the old Sudan and its social order, applied a conflict model of political participation based on tribes, ethnic groups, and the SPLM/A. However, as Eltahir shows, the CPA is gradually extinguishing Sudan’s inherently popular democratic elements by turning it into an elitist formally democratic system through the use of commissions and an emphasis on political representation by elites. He points out that, in contrast, political participation according to the local understanding will have the potential to tackle the three structural problems comprehensively, if popular participation is empowered towards a deliberative democracy. With regard to the question of changes after the CPA, these three chapters paint a rather disappointing picture. Although the inclusion of southern Sudanese at the helm of government is a new development, the established RAMP elite apparently continues to have the centre of power and the key resources under its control at the national level. The activities of international NGOs and empowered community-based organisations (CBOs) with a local educated elite at the forefront are crucial to solving the numerous development problems occurring after the long war. However, these activities tend to subsidise and stabilise the current power relations rather than to challenge them. Albeit the CPA has been brought about by a struggle which triggered diverse forms of popular participation, the gradual institutionalisation of a liberal democratic system neglects the popular elements and focuses on an elitist system of political representation. This system may be more inclusive than the previous highly exclusive democracies in Sudan, but reveals characteristics that are likely to alienate the majority of Sudanese society from political involvement. The legitimacy of the emerging new political order is doubtful. 10

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Introduction C H A L L E N G E S FAC I N G P O S T- WA R S O C I E T I E S I N S U DA N

The second part of the book (Chapters 5–10) analyses some of the challenges that have to be dealt with during the interim period after the CPA. A major challenge is to overcome the political divide in Sudanese society, which has even reached the community level. Reconstruction of a unified administration in Southern Kordofan State, which was partly under SPLM/A control and partly ruled by the GOS, requires the reconciliation of the former warring parties and their respective allies in the society on the ground. The tensions at the political level are closely linked to entrenched resource conflicts over land. Chapters 5 and 6 look into this issue from the perspectives of political science, gender studies, and social anthropology. The mass return of IDPs and refugees to the waraffected areas in the Nuba Mountains and southern Sudan poses another serious challenge to Sudanese society and the government. Chapters 7 and 8 study the socio-cultural repercussions of the return movement in the receiving communities. These include innovations and change triggered by the returnees, and the formation of an education system that can overcome the language divide in southern Sudan. Chapters 9 and 10 focus on Sudanese refugees in Kenya and the cultural and identity-related gaps that will have to be bridged if successful reintegration is to be achieved. Chapter 9 looks into the hybridisation and even corruption of culture under the conditions of a long-term stay in a refugee camp. The prevailing gender relations amongst southern Sudanese contain some entry points for the abuse of women, which put them in danger as soon as the traditional protection systems fail to operate. Chapter 10 points out that, beneath the surface of cultural clashes between returnees and resident population groups, there is often a struggle about access to resources, which aggravates reintegration. Samson Samuel Wassara investigates the social, political and economic relationships prevailing in the Nuba Mountains after the war. He looks in particular into the relationship between the NCP and the SPLM and their role in reconciling the divided population, and gives an account of the role of aid agencies in this process. The study reveals that the divide between the Nuba, on the one hand, and the Baggara (cattle herding) and Shanabla (camel herding) peoples, on the other, that had been created by the GOS and SPLM/A during the civil war, has become even deeper since the ceasefire agreement was concluded in 2002, and has led to fatal violent clashes between these groups. Wassara links this divide to underlying causes in terms of conflicts over land. These had started in the 1960s due to the introduction of large-scale mechanised sorghum farming by the GOS, which allocated fertile land to merchants from the RAMP, the northern Sudanese commercial elite. Nuba and Baggara lost their previous rights over this land and its water sources and were forced to compete for the use of land and water in less fertile areas or make a poor living as agricultural labourers. Sorghum production had declined sharply during 11

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the civil war and has now resumed along the same ethnicised pattern. The politicisation of ethnicity has made the previously loosely inter-connected Nuba groups acquire a pronounced ethnic identity and a tendency to acquaint themselves with the SPLM/A. The cross-over of some Baggara groups to the SPLM/A after the ceasefire agreement triggered intensive activities on the part of the NCP in Southern Kordofan to keep the pastoralists on their side. Arms supply fuelled violent conflict between the two groups along ethnic lines. Besides the inter-ethnic, intra-tribal conflicts escalated along the political divide within the Baggara/Shanabla and the Nuba societies. Against this background, Wassara highlights the obstacles to implementing the special Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (GOS/SPLM/A 2004d). Mistrust between the Nuba and Baggara/Shanabla and between the NCP and SPLM/A led to delays in the appointment of ministers, members of the state assembly and, consequently, agreement on a constitution for the Southern Kordofan State. The politically motivated mistrust made a reunification of the two different administrative systems impossible. UNICEF assisted the two parties that were to form the state government in peace meetings which included community leaders, elders and local associations. The outcome was policy recommendations that were able to reinforce integration through inter-ethnic institutions working towards a solution of the land and resource conflicts, and the introduction of peace education in schools, with an outreach into the respective communities. However, the crucial issue of integrating the SAF and SPLA forces in JIUs in order to bridge the military divide in the area has not been completed. Small arms have proliferated in Southern Kordofan and have led to numerous fatal clashes between armed groups. These groups easily find new recruits amongst disappointed young IDPs who have waited in vain for a peace dividend in terms of meaningful socio-economic development in their home areas. Wassara comes to the conclusion that the competition between the NCP and the SPLM for political recruits has created political instability instead of a partnership for peace. In an appendix to this paper, Tayseer El-Fatih Abdel A’al clarifies how aid-related civil society organisations are making decisions at the local level after the CPA. She looks into the approaches that have been undertaken to build a participatory inclusive democracy and establish the rule of law in Sudan. Decentralisation and the related changes in the local governance structures provide institutions with the potential to make decision-making processes more inclusive, so that the interests of the voiceless and marginalised groups may have an influence on public policies. With four examples of organisations in Dilling Locality in Southern Kordofan State, she identifies a substantial difference between the internal organisational structures and decision-making procedures in women’s community organisations and those of international NGOs. Her study reveals that local educated women tend to have the control over decision-making in the 12

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Introduction community organisations, whereas, in international NGOs, decisions are made at the top level in the head offices abroad and in Khartoum, but based on information from staff in the field offices and other organisations working in the same programme sector and area. Guma Kunda Komey shows, with an ethnographic case study, how the contest over land rights has acquired an ethnic dimension in the political context of the Nuba Mountains after the CPA. With a historical analysis grounded in archival and oral history research, he traces the social construction of ‘region’ as the basis for autochthonous, identity-focused claims to land rights. This research reveals how the Nuba peoples gradually adopted a common ethnic identity anchored in the region of the Nuba Mountains, which they constructed as their ‘homeland’. Komey identifies the politics of government-induced land grabbing since the 1960s and then the displacement, forcible resettlement and ethnocide of the Nuba by the SAF and militias of the GOS during the 1980s as the root causes of the spread of the civil war from southern Sudan to the Nuba Mountains. The divide between Nuba, who largely affiliated with the SPLM/A, and the (agro-) pastoralist groups of the region who allied with the GOS, was reflected in two different administrative systems. The SPLM/A-controlled areas were inhabited by Nuba farmers, while in the GOS-controlled areas, from which many Nuba were evicted, groups claiming Arab origin predominated. This difference also pertained to land rights, which were based on customary ownership and user and access rights in the SPLM/A areas, and on the Land Act of 1970, which declares all communally used land to be government land, in the areas under the control of the GOS. After the CPA and with the mass return of IDPs to the Nuba Mountains, the key resources of land, water, forest wood, horticultural development projects, and political power were strongly contested. Komey points out that, in the aftermath of the civil war, ethnic groups raised their demands on the government on the basis of their region as a political category. The politicisation of ethnic identities extends to the manipulation of the native administration and the mobilisation of the relevant institutions by groups close to the NCP in order to counteract the claims to ‘regions’ and their resources by the Nuba. Such claims tend to be fought out violently between these groups. Komey’s thorough case analysis of the two contending groups of the Nuba of Leira and the Shawa-bna concerning the primary right to the Umm Dera-fi area reveals that no objective judgement is possible about identity-driven claims. He shows that, in the absence of an appropriate solution, activities of humanitarian and development organisations as well as government institutions working in the separated areas have even consolidated divisive settlement patterns. Moreover, the Land Commission established in Southern Kordofan according to the CPA is not operating. Komey comes to the conclusion that the CPA is too vague on the crucial issue of land rights and he advocates the incorporation of customary land rights in the legislation. Samira Musa Armin Damin studies the mass return of IDPs to the 13

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Nuba Mountains, which comprised about 600,000 people between 2002 and 2009. Her paper concentrates on the interaction of the returnees with those population groups which had remained in the conflict areas. Land conflicts are a prominent pattern of this. Conflicts occur in Nuba agropastoralist communities, where returnees have found their land being seized by more powerful Nuba groups for settlement, farming or grazing. Violent conflicts also emerge between returnees and investors in mechanised schemes who had seized land from absent farmers during the war. Another source of conflict is the uncontrolled exploitation of resources such as timber, gum Arabic and palm trees by traders from central Sudan, who are backed by government officials and the SAF. Damin investigates how, according to the concept of cultural diffusion, ideas, life-styles, skills and knowledge are transmitted from the returnees to their home societies, and identifies innovations which the returnees bring to the Nuba Mountains based on skills and behaviour they acquired in the receiving areas of the IDPs. This has led to changes in the local livelihood systems, practices and concerns, and also in the ways different ethnic groups co-exist after the CPA. The study reveals high expectations of socio-economic improvements due to the CPA. The restoration of peace and security in these areas, and the marginalisation of IDPs in the urban areas, where they faced inadequate employment opportunities, were the most important reasons for the return of IDPs. A significant number of returnees have been retired employees moving back to spend their old age in the region of their socio–political identification. Damin reveals that the elderly in particular tend to commit themselves to reactivating the local culture, traditions and customs in contrast to government-induced acculturation in the Arabised system in Khartoum. The younger returnees use ideas and practices they brought from their host communities regarding investment in agriculture, livestock production and small enterprises, thus contributing to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of material structures and institutions in the homeland. For many young people, political reasons are also a major factor in their return. They have mostly joined the SPLM. However, lack of socio-economic infrastructure and only marginal assistance in the reestablishment of households in the Nuba Mountains have caused a reverse migration to the urban areas in northern Sudan. Other groups have remained in the towns and support their returning family members with remittances. Damin comes to the conclusion that much still has to be done to secure a safe economic basis and social security for this society, which has to absorb such a large group of returnees. Joseph Lodiong Lubajo analyses the challenges of the language policy in Jonglei and Upper Nile States in southern Sudan as part of the new educational policy of the GOSS. This policy aims at improving school enrolment and retention and the quality of education, reconstruction of schools, girls’ education, education for peace, support of destitute children, child protection, and treatment of traumatised war-affected children. At the adult educational level, it aims to establish literacy programmes for 14

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Introduction SPLA soldiers and adults in southern Sudan, vocational training centres for out-of-school young people and demobilised soldiers, and teacher training institutes. Private organisations are to contribute to this educational system, together with the GOSS. Lubajo traces the language policies in southern Sudan since colonialism when English was introduced as the language of instruction in primary schools. He shows that, even during colonialism, Arabic was used as the language of instruction in government schools in towns such as Malakal in Upper Nile State, where a significant number of officers and traders from northern Sudan used to live. After the first civil war, education had declined to the level of an estimated 10 per cent of the population of southern Sudan ever having gone to school. During the second civil war, in the GOS-held areas, Arabic was introduced as the language of instruction, whereas in the SPLM/A-controlled areas there was virtually no educational service. As a result, the younger teachers and the pupils in southern Sudan adopted Arabic as their second language in addition to their mother tongue. The policy of Arabisation was enhanced in 1989 after the coup d’état of Omar el-Bashir, when all schools in Sudan were required to teach in Arabic. At the time of the conclusion of the CPA, Arabisation of the South was at its height, but 91 per cent of girls and 72 per cent of boys in southern Sudan did not go to school. In the SPLM/A-held areas, UNICEF and NGOs provided rudimentary educational services starting from 2002, complementing the emerging educational system of the SPLM/A. Lubajo points out that this system was authoritarian, male-dominated and mostly run by ex-combatants without any teaching experience. After the CPA, the GOSS created a regional Ministry of Education as well as ministries in each of the ten states in southern Sudan. The new government re-emphasises southern Sudanese identities, cultures, religions and languages as a continuation of the resistance to the Arabisation and Islamisation policy of the GOS during the civil war. Partly in support of the GOSS, but partly with their own agendas, UN agencies, international NGOs, Da’awa Islamiya and the Sudan Council of Churches are now engaged in developing primary education in southern Sudan. According to Lubajo, the main challenges facing the new educational programme of the GOSS are to upgrade the quality of teachers, to train teachers to use English as the language of instruction, and to integrate the masses of children returning from different areas of refuge with different languages of instruction and curricula into the southern Sudanese school system. Marilyn Ossome focuses her paper on the situation of southern Sudanese girls and young women in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya. She points out that refugees in camps survive in a cultural vacuum, or at least under conditions where they try to uphold rudiments of their own culture against a cultural onslaught from Western or local cultures from the inhabitants of surrounding different cultural and social backgrounds. This leads to hybrid cultures, with a great probability of the abuse of practices which are considered as ‘traditional’. Ways of life and culturally conferred 15

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rights and obligations of Sudanese girls and women change significantly in the camp situation. Forced and early marriages, physical and, in particular, sexual violence, abductions, and forced confinement are frequent and have to be considered as manifestations of the process of cultural hybridisation. Ossome compares the gender relations in Dinka and Nuer communities with those in the camp. She stresses that, in Nilotic communities, the involvement of the extended family and community elders in the marriage process is an effective support mechanism that encourages husbands and wives to work out problems in constructive ways. However, a very low literacy rate amongst women and the poverty of parents facilitate early, and therefore often forced, marriages in southern Sudan. Parents may need the bride wealth for survival and justify the outmarriage of a young daughter with her protection by a male guardian and avoidance of extra-marital pregnancy. In contrast, in the refugee camp forced marriage is considered to be ‘a cultural aberration’ that occurs because norms and checks are absent in the camp. Most of the bridegrooms involved in forced marriages are the so-called ‘lost boys’, who had escaped the war by walking across the border to Ethiopia and, after the Ethiopian regime change in 1991, to Kenya and were then resettled in the USA. After the CPA, many of them came to the Kakuma Refugee Camp in order to find a virgin to marry, and offering an extremely high bride wealth to her parents. In many cases the girl and even her mother are not included in the negotiation. During the perod of waiting for finalisation of the resettlement procedures, the girls are kept in places away from their relatives and are frequently sexually abused by their guards. If a girl gets pregnant under these circumstances, she will be rejected on all sides including by her own family, who will have to repay the dowry, because abduction of girls is considered to be a failure of the protective role of the kinship system. It frequently occurs, because young men living in the refugee camp cannot compete with the bride wealth the ‘lost boys’ can afford. According to Ossome, the response of camp institutions, including the UN agencies and international NGOs, the local police, the judiciary, and the community bench courts, to these human rights violations is inadequate. She comes to the conclusion that this collusion between the community, the law enforcers and the aid agencies makes the life of refugee women and children highly insecure and dangerous. The rationalisation of these practices as ‘culture’ is an attempt to avoid a policy revision towards refugee protection. Obaka Otieno John contrasts the state-centric policies of repatriation, reintegration and resettlement of refugees that are based on the concept of individual citizenship, with indigenous concepts of belonging to collectivities. He holds that flight during childhood or being born in a refugee camp can lead to the loss of the latter type of identity, and shows that this causes much more serious problems for the reintegration of refugees in their areas of origin than the question of citizenship. The main reason is that, in contrast to ethnic belonging, the category of citizenship is a social construct that does not necessarily entitle a returning refugee to access to or control of resources. 16

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Introduction As John reveals, there are more subtle components of reintegration than those stressed in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the state-organised process of repatriation. These refer to politics of acceptance, identity and belonging for those whose social identities have been situational and in flux during flight, return and reintegration. Against this background, John uses a rational choice approach to investigate the perception of the benefits and costs of return and reintegration according to various identities. He finds that access to social and cultural belonging in the refugees’ home communities has a high priority for the returnees, because it also determines access to the social values and resources in the homelands. This implies that some refugees do not return because of the difficult access to the identity possessed by the receiving population and the tensions arising in the attempts to re-establish these connections. John points out that hostility tends to occur, because the resident population tries to defend its scarce resources from perceived or real threats arising from the claims of the returnees. The refugees in turn will adopt varying reactions, if they are denied access to certain closed identities, including getting involved in violent clashes over access rights to land. Those who cannot cope with the shift in identity from being a refugee to being a member of an ethnically defined community, which is required for reintegration, resort to a second displacement. They will either go back to the country of refuge, even back to the camp, or to any other location, such as the suburbs of southern Sudanese towns. A main reason to stay away from home is the access to education abroad. John argues that the lack of attention by state-centric organisations to the identity issues of reintegration has led to the lack of preparedness for clashes arising over claims to ownership in the areas to which the refugees return. He suggests that a formula for merging local components of national/formal or state-ascribed citizenship with other potentially existing identities, which people use in defending their rights, could lead to a more constructive way of reintegration. He makes it clear that the priority of the Sudanese returnees in the wake of the CPA is not the right to vote, but the right to survive, to earn a living, to have access to education, health care and housing. Access to these bases of livelihood in the form of ‘belonging’ to a particular community should be considered as a human right that needs to be protected. All the papers in this section provide evidence of the deep socioeconomic, political, cultural and even linguistic divisions, which have to be overcome if peace in Sudan is to become sustainable. Resistance to Arabisation amongst the Nuba and peoples in southern Sudan is expressed by a new emphasis on indigenous culture. However, this is no longer the old village culture. Its expression is influenced by the returnees’ experiences with either the dominant northern Sudanese culture or the cultures in neighbouring countries. Another form of opposition to the dominant system occurs in the political realm by strengthening the SPLM, the party representing the struggle against marginalisation during the civil war. With regard to the new conflicts in the Nuba Mountains after the CPA, two 17

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developments have been revealed. On the one hand, the polarisation and politicisation along ethnic lines, that had already occurred during the civil war, have been enhanced by attempts of the SPLM/A to mobilise the Nuba, whereas the NCP recruits support from Baggara and settlers of West African origin. On the other hand, these new conflicts divert attention from the Arab-African divide and also take on intra-ethnic features. This can be traced to the realignments of communities on ethnic and political grounds as a consequence of the persistence of parallel institutions in the former GOS- and SPLA-controlled areas. The mass return of IDPs and refugees has complicated the re-formation of communities, in particular because of contested access to land. The frequent attempts of some groups to drive out other ethnic groups under the pretext of land ownership along ethnic and political divides provide evidence of the urgency of establishing a functioning Land Commission in Southern Kordofan State as stipulated in the CPA. With regard to the linguistic divide in southern Sudan, the new educational policy of the GOSS is a bold attempt to unify the society in the long run by introducing English as a consistent language of instruction in schools. At the same time, the ethnic diversity that is expressed in different languages is incorporated in the curriculum through courses in those languages that prevail in the respective states. Currently, the return of IDPs and refugee children, who were taught in different languages according to their areas of refuge, adds to the chaos in the educational system, which is already struggling with the Arabic-English divide. The language aspect of the reintegration of IDPs and refugees requires more attention and assistance for the educational sector than was anticipated by the partners formulating the CPA. The reintegration of refugees poses additional challenges to the already difficult situation in southern Sudanese society. This process may fail and lead to a large diaspora, which may be useful in terms of supporting their families through remittances and funding part of the reconstruction of southern Sudan. This would be the outcome, if the current identity division between refugees and the resident communities is maintained and deepened. A second option is that the refugees integrate into the fastgrowing towns in southern Sudan, where they can live in a way that reconciles their refugee and home identities. A third option is that they return to their homelands. In this case, the dangers of an adverse type of cultural hybridisation, which victimises women in particular, have to be avoided. This requires a careful policy towards regulating bride wealth customs, promoting education and professional training of girls in order to raise the average age of marriage, and increasing awareness in the society about the rights of women to self-determination. T H E C PA I N I T S S U B - R E G I O NA L C O N T E X T

The third section in this book (Chapters 11–14) investigates sub-regional repercussions of the CPA with examples of Gambella/Ethiopia, 18

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Introduction Darfur/western Sudan, Chad and Kenya. Chapter 11 provides a historical in-depth analysis of the multiple conflicts in the Gambella region and their relations with the civil war in southern Sudan. It discloses why conflicts have continued, whilst, at the same time, peaceful economic relations have been established between Sudan and Ethiopia after the CPA. Chapter 12 analyses the impact of the introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia on conflicts between ethnic groups in the Gambella region. It shows that ethnic representation has led to increased competition for power positions and related resources, and fuelled conflict rather than settled it. It concludes with the advice that this model should not be replicated in Sudan. Chapter 13 explores the connections between the CPA and the Darfur conflict. It discusses the context which made the successful signing of the CPA possible, and compares this constellation with the conditions under which the DPA was signed. The major reasons why the DPA failed were that many more partners had to be involved because of splits in the Darfurian resistance movements, and a changed international environment. Chapter 14 presents the sub-regional and international actors and institutions that were involved in the Sudanese peace process leading up to the CPA. It analyses the relations of northern and southern Sudan with the neighbouring countries during the war and studies the changes that occurred in the aftermath of the CPA. Finally it assesses the dangers for sub-regional peace, if a renewed international effort to push for the timely implementation of the CPA is not made. Regassa Bayissa Sima shows how the interrelations between the different ethnic groups living on both sides of the border between Sudan and Ethiopia have developed in history. His focus is on Gambella in southern Ethiopia, which shares two major population groups, the Nuer and Anuak, with Sudan. The border area was intensively affected by the two civil wars in Sudan, throughout which refugees and insurgents entered the Gambella region from Upper Nile and Jonglei States. A significant number of Nuer settled in the region, and in the 1980s Sudanese refugees outnumbered the local population. Sima states that deforestation and eradication of game as well as new social, economic, political and cultural conflicts were some of the consequences of the mass influx of refugees and the erection of large refugee camps. Growing access to small arms due to the intensified civil war in Sudan and the political and military alliance between the SPLM/A and the Ethiopian military government (the Derg) led to a militarisation of the Nuer groups in Gambella, which forcibly occupied areas previously used by Anuak. In response, violent conflicts between the two groups occurred more and more frequently. In addition, the resettlement programme of the Derg in the 1980s brought a significant number of other ethnic groups from all over Ethiopia to Gambella. ‘Highlanders’ from northern and southern Ethiopia as well as Nuer dominated the local administration up to 1991, when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 19

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took over power in Addis Ababa. In 1995 Gambella became an administrative unit of its own, the Gambella People’s National Regional State (GPNRS), with proportionate representation of its ethnic groups in the government. Sima points out that this turned the conflict over economic resources between the Nuer and Anuak into a conflict about political control over territories in terms of administrative units and financial government resources. Armed Anuak extended their fight to the refugee camps and indiscriminate killings of highlanders in the early 2000s, one of the reasons being that the Anuak population had become a minority in the region, with the consequence that their access to educational and other services as well as economic resources declined. The majority of the Sudanese refugees were repatriated up to 2008. Sima also looks into economic change after the CPA. On the one hand, trade on the Baro river has resumed between Gambella and Nasir and Malakal in Sudan. On the other hand, cattle raids increased tremendously in southern Sudan, and cattle rustling and even killings again crossed the border into Gambella. The poor integration of militias into the SAF or SPLA, the failure of the GOSS to exert effective and full control in the region, and the easy availability of small arms in the Gambella region following the disarmament of Sudanese militias by the SPLA have added to this tense situation. A promising perspective has opened up, however, with new cooperation between the SPLM/A officials of Upper Nile and Jonglei States and those of Gambella Regional State in order to settle the conflicts along the border. Monika M. Sommer analyses the conflicts in Gambella from the perspective of political science and law. She sets them in the framework of the Ethiopian political system of ethnic federalism and investigates how this system performs with regard to conflict resolution. The Ethiopian system aims to strengthen the formerly marginalised ethnic groups in the country through proportional representation in regional state governments and the constitutional right to form political parties. The central government maintains the ultimate control over economic resources including land, but it delegates decisions about the details of land use to the regional states and provides them with considerable economic freedom in terms of raising their own taxes. Turning to the case of Gambella, Sommer shows that, in the GPNRS, five major ethnic groups are represented proportionally in the government, but the highlanders have been excluded from representation, although they currently amount to nearly one quarter of the population. This constitutional exclusion from political rights has created frictions. After 1991, several ethnic-based parties, which derived their strength mainly from good relations with the national ruling party coalition of the EPRDF, were formed in Gambella, but they soon dissolved again. In 2002 the Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) was formed, an umbrella party composed of the main ethnic groups of the region which, however, administered each ethnic group separately. According to 20

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Introduction Sommer, this peculiar system was a response to the severe ethnic clashes that took place during that year against the background that ethnic belonging had been made a criterion for access to power, participation, material resources and education. She shows that ‘conflict settlement’ in Gambella was dominated by the central government, which also controlled the process of political reorganisation in the aftermath of this conflict. In 2007, all parties, including the GPDM, were abolished, and a uniform party was established, the Gambella Peoples’ Unity Democratic Movement, which has the declared aim of improving relations with the EPRDF in order to gain better and direct access to resources. The regional government of Gambella also formed a Council of Elders, attached to the Regional Council and consisting of well-respected ethnic leaders. This new structure, which is composed of reformed traditional and modern institutions, has the purpose of finally settling the conflicts between ethnic groups. Regarding the suitability of ethnic federalism as a model for other countries including Sudan, Sommer comes to the conclusion that a constitution with the potential for power sharing and effective redistribution will not be sufficient if there is a centralised party structure in place, which bypasses the constitutional right to regional selfdetermination. However, ethnic federalism may lead to more inclusiveness, as in the case of Ethiopia, where local elites participate in politics more than ever before and have the opportunity to adapt constitutional forms of conflict resolution to local needs. The Ethiopian form of federalism is thus not a model that should be replicated in other countries, but it might be a useful starting point for deliberations about the appropriate form of a decentralised system of government, for example in southern Sudan. Peter Woodward analyses the CPA and the DPA and looks into the reasons why the CPA still obtains more than five years after its conclusion, whereas the DPA failed immediately after it was signed. He shows that two important national factors had made the CPA possible. The first was that, at the turn of the century, it was obvious that neither the SAF nor the SPLA could gain the military upper hand in the war. The second was the fact that the power base of the NCP had dwindled, so that it relied mainly on the National Intelligence Service of Sudan (NISS). The SPLM/A was under pressure, because it had to fight not only against the SAF but also against strong NCP-backed southern militias, as well as internal tensions. According to Woodward, an agreement on ending the war was a win-win situation for both warring parties at that time. The NCP hoped to regain strength based on improved legitimacy after signing a peace agreement, and the SPLM/A intended to make use of the opportunity to extend its constituency to the marginalised areas of the North. A third reason was that both parties had an enhanced interest in gaining access to the revenues from oil, land and water, resources which could not be exploited fully in a war environment. At the sub-regional level, a shift in the orientation of the IGAD from purely development-related cooperation towards a stronger 21

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political role, in particular directed towards the resolution of the conflicts in its member states, contributed to the ultimate signing of the CPA. Lastly, the international community, in particular the United States, began to support the peace process, based on a deal which implied that the NCP would stay away from involvement in terrorist plots and lend the NISS to assist the US in its ‘war on terrorism’, and the US would back Kenya in hosting the final peace negotiations. Woodward argues that the DPA, on the other hand, could not build on a long-term process of confidence-building between the negotiating partners like the CPA. Although the conflict, which escalated to unforeseen violence in 2003, can be traced back to the 1980s, peace negotiations started only in 2005. The NCP did not treat the resistance movement as an equal partner as it had done with the SPLM/A, but considered its representatives to be ‘rebels’. Under these conditions, moves towards compromises between the NCP and certain representatives of the Darfurian resistance movement were seen by others as giving in on unequal terms. This contributed to splits and the establishment of ever more factions in the movement, further aggravating the negotiations. Impatient pressures and deadlines set by the representatives of the British and US governments had the effect that, in 2006, the DPA was signed by only one faction of one resistance group, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), and the GONU, whereas the other factions and resistance groups refused to sign the agreement under pressure. This failure to settle the Darfur conflict was immediately reflected in the escalation of the war. Woodward makes it clear that there was no military deadlock nor any mutual political interest in peace as there was in the context of the CPA. Moreover, the sub-regional and international governments were sharply divided about the response to the ongoing hostilities. In particular, the Chadian government, which was under internal pressure, blamed the NCP for backing its enemies, thus justifying its own siding with part of the Darfurian resistance movement. Since the NCP cooperates economically and militarily with China and Russia, no agreement was possible in the UN Security Council, as had been the case with the UNMIS in the CPA. After a rather long process, an AU/UN hybrid force was agreed on. Woodward states that the DPA polarised Sudan as a whole and strengthened the secessionist tendencies in the south and west. The DPA process, the escalating war in Darfur, and the involvement of NCP-backed militias distracted the attention of the international community from the implementation of the CPA. Woodward concludes that power sharing has to be made more inclusive to achieve peace in Sudan. This requires the NCP to loosen its grip on the centres of power. Otherwise, more violence is expected to be the inevitable consequence. Elke Grawert investigates the implications of the civil wars and the peace process in Sudan from a sub-regional perspective and elaborates on the challenges for the institutions that had been involved in the CPA. She 22

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Introduction highlights three main factors, which shaped the political spaces in the subregion around Sudan after independence, namely, militant movements fighting for secession or autonomy and their political bases in exile, ambitious economic programmes involving international cooperation, and the strategic interests of the political and economic superpowers. With the end of the Cold War and the downfall of the Ethiopian military government in 1991, the sub-regional military and political spaces changed. The SPLA shifted its military operations from Ethiopia to Darfur and eastern Sudan. The importance of Kenya grew considerably, since it provided the primary political basis for the SPLM/A and the logistical basis for international humanitarian agencies operating in southern Sudan, and because its government became the key mediator between the GOS and the SPLM/A. The final phase of negotiating the CPA triggered new conflicts between armed opposition groups and the SAF in northern, eastern, and western Sudan. Grawert analyses, in particular, the relations between Sudan and Chad. She identifies an economic space, where international competition for mineral resources is taking place and the strategic interests of the subregional powers are involved. Local and sub-regional resource conflicts about land and water have added to this and made the Sudanese-Chadian border a hotbed of violence. The long-term militarisation of both the Sudanese and Chadian societies contributed to the easy mobilisation of militias by the respective governments against resistance movements. The movements in Darfur took up arms when they realised that voicing their claims violently had been one of the key conditions for the SPLM/A to be taken seriously in the peace negotiations for the CPA. However, the DPA increased the hostilities amongst the fighting groups in Darfur and weakened the movement for political inclusion and development there. This failure in turn strengthened the uncompromising position of the NCP faction in the GONU, which managed to distract international attention from the CPA to Darfur and delayed the implementation of the CPA. Grawert points out that quite a different development has taken place in southern Sudan after the CPA. The GOSS signed economic cooperation contracts with Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya, and numerous investors from these countries as well as from northern Sudan and various Asian and European countries have used the peace for construction, business and oil exploration ventures. But the CPA has also enhanced the small arms market in the sub-region. In the case of Kenya this has led to the escalation of internal conflicts. Finally Grawert assesses the roles of sub-regional and international actors in monitoring CPA implementation in the sub-region. The IGAD has not taken over any further responsibility for the CPA, because of internal preoccupations of the Kenyan government, which chairs its proceedings, and the GONU insistence that the Darfur conflict is an internal affair. The international community has left the task of monitoring the CPA to the UNMIS, which has a limited mandate in terms 23

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of Chapter 6. Meanwhile, spaces have emerged where the untransparent and unmonitored activities of militias, the SAF and the SPLA are taking place in the contested boundary areas between northern and southern Sudan. A new outbreak of civil war between the SPLM/A and the SAF is considered as likely to spread to several regions in northern Sudan and affect the sub-region of North-East Africa much worse than before. A perspective with a potential for sustainable peace could be an enhanced development process in the border areas around Sudan, based on both oil revenues and coordinated development assistance, and making use of the existing economic spaces that livelihood networks of ethnic groups have already created across borders. The papers in this section reveal that the CPA cannot be considered as a national affair of Sudan. It has implications for the neighbouring countries that had also been seriously affected by the civil war, and it has regional implications in other parts of Sudan, as has been outlined in the case of the DPA. The CPA, the DPA, and the Asmara Agreement include aspects of power and wealth sharing and thus an element of including marginalised parts of society in Sudan’s power system. They have the potential to make the CPA more comprehensive. In the case of the failure of the DPA, the implications were enforced secessionist tendencies in Darfur as well as in southern Sudan and a mounting conflict between the governments of Sudan and Chad. At the same time, the CPA improved the relationship between the GONU, Ethiopia and Kenya, and in particular the economic and political relations between these two countries, the GOSS, and Uganda. In order to sustain a peaceful environment within which the long-absent development of southern Sudan can flourish, the implementation of the CPA has to move on, and it should be in the interests of the whole sub-region and the international investors that this is ensured. Such a development requires these powers to share the responsibility of keeping the former warring parties on track to implement their agreement fully. BEYOND THE CPA: T H E O R E T I C A L O U TC O M E S A N D P R AC T I C A L C O N S I D E R AT I O N S

The last chapter in this book reviews those aspects of consociational democratic theory and theories of devolution that have been incorporated in the CPA. Besides the positive outcomes in terms of fair representation and extended political participation, the chapter also presents the flaws and possible adverse results as they have been discussed by political scientists. It continues with some consideration of the concepts of elite and mass political culture and relates them critically to Sudanese society. This section also includes the discussion of potential entry points for deliberative democracy. In a second part, the theoretical aspects of constructing identities are highlighted and conclusions are drawn for the divisions facing Sudanese 24

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Introduction society. This part deals with three perspectives of identity analysis. The first is identity formation through government policies according to particular power interests and strategic considerations, such as the policy of Arabisation and Islamisation in Sudan, or the new language policy in southern Sudan. The second is the grassroots perspective, which interlinks the construction of identity with regions, territories or homelands, dynamic concepts that are loaded with history, culture, religion, social relations, resources and economic interactions. The third perspective is the identity dilemma of refugees who try to reintegrate into their communities of origin and have to bridge several social, economic, cultural and political divides. For a policy of reintegration this means that it has to address the adverse impacts of corrupted or hybrid cultures on certain population groups, mainly young women and children. The last part of the chapter presents the theoretical concept of ‘spaces’ as a useful approach to explain the way sub-regions emerge and the dynamics that shape and re-shape them. It then turns again to the CPA and discusses its flaws and potential in the light of a sub-regional approach.

References Adar, Korwa G./Yoh, John G. N./Maloka, E. (eds) (2004) Sudan Peace Process. Challenges and Future Prospects. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. Akol, Joshua Otor (2006) The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Prospects for a Lasting Peace in the Sudan. Paper presented during the Workshop: After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan: Signs of Change?, University of Bremen, Bremen, November. Alemu, Kassahun Berhanu (2006) Abyei: A Litmus Test for the Successful Implementation of the CPA. Paper presented during the Workshop: After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan: Signs of Change?, University of Bremen, Bremen, November. El-Battahani, Atta (2002) Elections and Northern Hegemony in Sudan, in: Cowen, M./Laakso, L. (eds) Elections in Africa. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. GOS – Government of Sudan and SPLM/A – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (2002): Machakos Protocol, July 20, Machakos. GOS/SPLM/A (2003) Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, September 25, Naivasha. GOS/SPLM/A (2004) Agreement on Wealth Sharing, January 7, Naivasha. GOS/SPLM/A (2004a) Protocol on Power Sharing, May 26, Naivasha, also in www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Sudan/powersharemay04.pdf. GOS/SPLM/A (2004b) Annexure II. Implementation Modalities and Global Implementation Matrix and Appendices, December 31, Naivasha. GOS/SPLM/A (2004c) Protocol on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict, May 26, Naivasha. GOS/SPLM/A (2004d) Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, May 26, Naivasha. GOS/SPLM/A (2005) Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Signed by Taha, Ali Osman and Garang, John on January 9, Nairobi. Grawert, Elke (2008) Cross-border Dynamics of Violent Conflict: The Case of Sudan and Chad, in: Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 43, No. 6, December: 595–614. Grawert, Elke/El-Battahani, Atta (2007) Oil-cursed: The Peace Process in South Sudan, in: Development and Cooperation, March: 110–13, also in http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/ content/archive-eng/03-2007/ foc_art5.html.

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E L K E GR AWE RT Kiir, Salva (2007) Speech of Southern Sudan’s President Salva Kiir on CPA’s 2nd Anniversary. Print-out received from the GOSS in Juba. SPLM Economic Commission (2004) SPLM Strategic Framework for War-to-Peace Transition. New Site, Kapoeta County: SPLM. Sudan Multidonor Trust Funds (2005) First Progress Report July 1 – December 31. Khartoum/ Juba: World Bank Technical Secretariats: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTAFRMDTF/Resources/MDTF_Progress_FINAL_Feb_28.pdf#search=%22%20sit e%3Asiteresources.worldbank.org%20GoNU%20GoSS%20MDTF%22. UNMIS – United Nations Mission to Sudan (2008) Monitoring the CPA: http://www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/ cpaMonitor_jan08.pdf.

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Part I

Implementation & Potential of the CPA

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2 The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan M E L H A RO U T B I E L

Introduction For more than fifty years, Sudan has been at war with itself. National and international interventions with the aim of putting an end to the country’s crisis have failed. It is worthwhile, therefore, to ask what the conflict in Sudan is all about: who is fighting whom, whether it is a racial conflict between the Africans and Arabs of Sudan, or whether it is a conflict between Arab and African elites, and who are these elites? This chapter tries to give brief answers to these questions. The Balad el-Sudan, or the Land of Blacks, gained its independence from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1956. Inhabited by about 40 million people, it comprises more than 500 different tribes, each with its own culture, language, or dialect. Politically, the country is divided into two main groups – Arabs and Africans or non-Arabs, who make up about 80 per cent of the population. From a religious perspective, Sudan is a country of Muslims, Christians and believers of African religions, and was considered by some scholars to have been relatively peaceful up to 1955. The diversities, ethnic, religious, cultural and regional divides which are seen today, did in fact exist during colonial rule, but the country was peaceful and stable. It was shortly before independence that the crisis began. This situation has led many political and social scientists to study the root causes of the Sudan crisis (Diraige 1995: 113–4). Some of them define the Sudan conflict as a political conflict between the Arabs and Africans of Sudan (Beshir 1968: vii) or as a ‘war of visions’ (Deng 1995: vii) between these two groups. The Arabised Sudanese in the north of the country identify themselves culturally, linguistically, racially and politically as Arabs, although they really are not. The elites in the North, who assumed power after the end of the colonial period and divided the country’s wealth and power amongst themselves, seek to associate themselves with the Arab 29

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world. The period of Sudanisation (1954–6) was the time in which the Arab elites in Khartoum began to build their political and financial domination of the country. On the other hand, the pure Africans in the South did not accept the Arabisation and Islamisation policies imposed on them by their northern counterpart. The southerners identified themselves as Africans, sometimes as Christians and believers of African religions (Deng 1995: viii). The late John Garang described the conflict in Sudan as a question of the establishment of a truly democratic ‘New Sudan’, whereby the ‘Old Sudan’, dominated by the Mahdi and Marghani families or by the sectarian parties of Umma and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), would disappear (Kameir 2006). In recent years, therefore, the crisis has centred around the question of reforming the ‘Old Sudan’ or creating a ‘New Sudan’ (Tetzlaff 1993; 1997: 7; Biel 2007a: 36–8), and the struggle for power (Tetzlaff 1993: 160–1). According to Garang, in the New Sudan every Sudanese citizen, whether Muslim, Christian, or unbeliever, is important and should be treated equally, regardless of origin, religion or race. In this way, power and resources should be divided equally. However, the establishment of a democratic secular regime in a New Sudan has proved to be a challenge. Adar et al. (2004: 8) summarised the SPLM’s concept of the ‘New Sudan’ as follows: The choices are two, either the country breaks up into several states, or we agree to establish the New Sudan, a new Sudanese social-political entity to which we pledge our undivided loyalty and allegiance irrespective of race, tribe, religion or gender… a New Sudan where religion and state are constitutionally separated; a New Sudan in which oppression and hegemony by any particular ethnic group are banished.

In the South-North relations, the issues of religion and identity of the Sudanese people and their country have been one of the main problems. In this sense, the conflict can be said to be over religion and ethnic diversity (Deng 1972: 1; Tetzlaff 1993: 14). In addition, it has been identified as a question of sharing the country’s social and economic resources (Tetzlaff 1992). The American scholar, Douglas Johnson, also sees the Sudanese crisis as a conflict over how resources should be distributed between the regions and the centre ( Johnson 2003: 2). In fact, Sudanese resources, construction and development projects are all only allowed to take place in Khartoum or in the North, with little exception for other parts of the country. The background to this situation is the fact that the cultural, religious, historical and ethnic diversity between northern and southern Sudan has been politicised in a way that stresses disparate identities. This is also a result of the ‘Southern Policy’ introduced by the British in 1930, whereby people from both regions had to travel with a passport and other documents, and where those from the North were not allowed to take up trade or jobs in southern Sudan without permission. The reason for this policy was the British administration’s aim to develop the South along the 30

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The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan lines of ‘British East Africa’ rather than along Arab lines, which were more orientated to the Middle East ( Johnson 2003: 10). Accordingly, the South sees itself as African, mainly Christian, and as a historically separate entity from the North, where the majority of the population, although black and therefore African, is affiliated with the Arab culture and practises Islam. The Turco-Egyptian rule of 1821–83 and the Mahdiyya state of 1883–98 also contributed to the North-South problem. Both these systems supported Islamic rule and the Islamisation of the Sudanese people (ibid. 6). The Mahdiyya state in particular was characterised by racial discrimination against non-Muslims and the southern Sudanese especially. Indeed, the period of the Mahdiyya is seen by many scholars as a time of ‘internal colonialism’ (ibid.). This is obvious if one looks at the behaviour of the rulers of the Mahdiyya state – the execution of slavery despite national and international condemnation, and the persecution of those who did not support the Mahdiyya and the Mahdiyya state. In order to find answers to the above research questions, the present author interviewed Sudanese from all regions of the country on the role of elites in the crisis in Sudan. Sudanese living in exile, particularly in Europe, were also interviewed. In addition, a questionnaire was developed and completed by about 1,200 Sudanese inside the country. Among the questions asked was the role of the elite in Sudan in general and in conflict resolution, the cause of the conflict, the definition of ‘elite’ according to the understanding of the Sudanese and the role of language, identity, and religion in the crisis. The participants comprised educated and less well educated individuals. The results were compiled, analysed and compared with other existing studies on elites in Sudan by national and international scholars, which were collected by the author from research institutions such as the Hamburg Institute for African Studies, the Universities of Reading, Bristol and Durham (UK), Khartoum (Sudan) and Bayreuth (Germany), the Munzinger-Archiv/IH-Länder aktuell, and many other sources. The role of education during and after the colonial era and during the wars in Sudan was also taken as an area of research. Elites were identified and classified in accordance with international elite theories (Haller 2003: 337; Biel 2007: 12). The political and social backgrounds of some leading Sudanese figures who are widely thought to be elites were investigated. Governments and national institutions were examined to establish the regional representation of leaders. The results of the data analysis show that the Sudanese elites in both the North and South of the country were part of the Sudanese crisis. In particular, the questions of identity, religion and colonial legacy were identified as contributory factors. The inability of the elites to compromise on important national issues furthered the crisis. The paper continues with a definition of elite, the issue of diversity, and the formation of Sudanese elites. This is followed by an analysis of the factors that confirm the marginalisation of Sudanese regions other than the North from the perspective of political participation and governing 31

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the country. The last part of the paper deals with the role of the Sudanese elite, mostly from a historical point of view. It concludes with findings and recommendations for a lasting solution to the current crisis in Sudan.

Who are the Sudanese elites? Elites can be understood as the minority educated class in a society or country (Holt 1965: 197). In most cases, they possess political and financial power and are therefore influential in the country. Arab means here brown races that are thought to have come from the Arabian peninsula. The term is sometimes also used to describe those people who emigrated from Arabia to Sudan in early times. It is also used for the indigenous African tribes who accepted and were subsequently absorbed into Arab tribes or culture. In the case of Sudan, therefore, one cannot talk of the existence of true Arabs, but of ‘Arabised’ Africans or a mixture of the two cultures and blood (Beshir 1968: 4–5). This ‘Arabisation’ was furthered by the policy of the post-colonial governments in Khartoum that encouraged Arab culture and language in Sudan. Therefore, Arab in this context does not really refer to colour, but to religion, culture, language and policy. In this way, we can describe Arab elites as those from the educated class in northern Sudan who received political, military and financial power from the former colonial rulers after independence in 1956, and who continue to rule Sudan. African elites, on the other hand, comprise the educated classes who acquired their education mostly in missionary schools during and after the colonial era (Beshir 1968: vii; Deng 1995: 11), or later abroad as refugees in neighbouring countries or overseas. However, belonging to elites in Sudan has not necessarily been limited to the educated classes. During the Sudanese war from 1983 to 2005, a number of the SPLA military leaders rose to elite positions, although they were not highly educated. For example, Lt General Paulino Matip Nhial, currently Deputy Chief of Staff of the SPLA, not only possesses military and political, but also financial, power. He is reported to be among the top richest persons in Sudan and is very influential in southern Sudan, if not in the whole country.

The colonial administration and the South-North conflict Northern and southern Sudan were administered as separate territories from 1899 to 1946. At least after 1930, the British colonial authorities treated the northern provinces as part of the Middle Eastern and IslamicArab world, whereas the South was administered by indirect rule, making use of tribal leaders and customary law. The condominium administration concentrated the country’s economic development in the northern riverine 32

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The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan area between the White and Blue Niles. The South remained economically underdeveloped, although southern Sudan has good water reserves and fertile agricultural land. The separate treatment of both northern and southern Sudan should be considered as one of the root causes of the North-South conflict. If they had been administered together, the outbreak of the conflict might have been avoided. Although these contributions to the root causes of conflict in Sudan are helpful in furthering understanding of the issues, there is a need to extend and to update this research to reflect the latest developments, given the fact that many of these studies were published before and during the war. Therefore this paper focuses its analysis on the role that Sudanese elites have been playing in the ongoing resolution of the longest political, military and social crisis in Africa. The power sharing agreement, the civil service reform in terms of proportional employment from north and south Sudan, and the referendum on unity or the separation of south Sudan are the basis of the option of building a New Sudan (see also Biel 2007a: 35–8). The result of the CPA could be the confirmation of a united Sudan or the establishment of a new independent state in southern Sudan. In an attempt to find a peaceful settlement for the whole of Sudan, the DPA and the Asmara Peace Accord for eastern Sudan were signed in 2006. Both agreements recommend an equal sharing of power for the Darfurian and eastern Sudanese. If both agreements are fully implemented, they may lead Sudan in the right direction, particularly in terms of the participation of the marginalised regions of the country.

Issues of diversity in Sudan Sudanese society is made up of 597 different ethnic groups or nationalities and more than 100 languages (Ojway 2002: 24). In terms of ethnic composition, 70 per cent of the Sudanese population are African, 25 per cent are of Arab descent, and 5 per cent are of Nubian origin (Yoh 2003: 5). South Sudan is predominantly inhabited by African ethnic groups, such as Nilotic and Adamawa people. In the eastern region there are black Africans as well as Semitic groups at the border with Ethiopia and Eritrea. Black Africans and Arab ethnic groups are living in the western region, Nubian, Arab and Arabised groups in the northern region. The population of central Sudan is a mixture of African (among them many Nuba) and Arabised ethnic groups from all over the country. Whereas most people in southern Sudan consider themselves to be African and refer to Sudan as an African nation, many northern Sudanese, who can trace their origins on their father’s side to the Middle East, refer to themselves as ‘Arabs’ and regard Sudan as an Arab and Islamic nation. Africans from the west, east, and centre of the country in fact are mostly Islamised and Arabised and, although some would not hesitate to admit that they are culturally Arab, in recent years the majority have become 33

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convinced that they are not Arabs, especially those who belong to the Nubia in Wadi Halfa, Darfur in the west, and the southern Blue Nile in the east (Tetzlaff 1992; Yoh 2003: 84). The national languages are Sudanese Arabic and English, but local languages are spoken in many different parts of the country. In the 1950s and 60s and even into the 70s, Sudanese elites could be differentiated as Arab or English-speaking elites. In the North, the elites spoke Arabic and considered English a colonial language that should be used only for international understanding. Among them were also those who viewed English as a language for intellectuals and the educated class as well as for scientific research, and therefore felt that they must speak and use English (Biel 2003). During the 1950s and 60s, the southern Sudanese elite was educated in missionary schools, where all instruction was conducted in English, so it was natural for them to see English as a national language. In addition, the use of English was widespread among members of southern nationalities who had no common national language. Meanwhile, the elite of south Sudanese origin considers English a national language. This is due to the fact that the majority have been educated in East Africa or in English-speaking countries in the West. In terms of religion, Muslims are estimated to comprise about 70 per cent of the population, the majority of whom belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. Christians in Sudan come mainly from the southern region and comprise 20 per cent of the general population and about 80 per cent of the population of the South. African religions are practised by around 10 per cent of the population. Most Muslims in Sudan associate Islam with Arab culture, and therefore a black African who is Muslim may claim to be an Arab or may be considered an Arab Sudanese by the Muslim community in Sudan. However, the assumption that an African Muslim is an Arab has recently been rejected by African Muslims in Darfur, in the east, and in the centre. It came to an end when the Darfurians rose up against the northern establishment in 2003. After many years of cooperation and association with the sectarian regimes in Khartoum, the people of Darfur, Nuba people of the west, and the people of eastern Sudan discovered that, even if they are good Muslims, speak Arabic well and are rooted in Arab culture, they will remain African Muslims and will not be recognised by the Arabised Sudanese (Yoh 2003: 5; Flint/de Waal 2005: 136). Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige summarised the issue as follows: What happened after independence is that those who inherited political power from the colonial forces refused to recognise and respect the diversity of the Sudan. Instead they only recognised the Arab and Moslem culture and refused to recognise the non-Moslem and nonArab cultures. They also refused to accept a decentralised system of government, which would have been better placed to accommodate the regional diversity of the country. (Diraige 1995: 114)

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The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan The west, east, and south share a common problem: they are all struggling to eradicate marginalisation in terms of development, culture, language and political participation in running the country (Tetzlaff 1992). Thus the question becomes one of reforming the Old Sudan and replacing it with a New Sudan that recognises all religions and cultures, and which puts an end to the marginalisation of the majority of the population and regions (Tetzlaff 2003: 24–5). Indeed, the wars in Sudan from 1955 to 1972 and 1983 to 2005 seem to have been fought over the question of democracy and the democratic rights of nation-building and racial and ethnic equality, as well as wealth sharing. This has led to consideration of whether the country can remain united, or whether the secession of southern Sudan will be the solution, if the idea of a New Sudan fails (ibid.).

The formation of the elite and changes in modern Sudanese society The following historical stages have been important for the development of the modern Sudanese elite: PRE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

As the country prepared for independence and the Sudanisation of the administration took effect, the somewhat less well-educated class, most of whom had held clerical positions during colonial rule, were promoted to higher positions that previously had been reserved for colonial officers and officials. They assumed political and economic power and therefore became influential in modern Sudanese society. Their children either went to the best schools in Khartoum or were sent to England, the United States and other countries, which was regarded as important for their future (Biel 2007). Groups which came to power through the Sudanisation process were dominated by the Mahdi and Marghani families and their associates. During the process, 804 senior national positions were divided among the Sudanese educated class of that time, the majority of whom were primary school leavers. The North took 800 of these positions, while the South was given only four junior posts (see Ruay 1994: 70). The new group called themselves Arab-Muslim and preferred to speak Arabic. CI VI LI AN RULE

During civilian rule, those who had been at the top since independence, i.e. Ismail el-Azhari, 1954–6; Sir el-Khatim el-Khalifa, 1964–5; Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub, 1965–6 and 1967–9; Sadig el-Mahdi, 1966–7 and 1986–9, fought hard to remain in power. They did this through the support of the parties with which they were affiliated. Some of them became top party leaders, others merchants or civil servants in the public services (Biel 2007). 35

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MI L I TARY RUL E

During military rule, junior officers (Aboud, 1958–64; Nimeiri, 1969–85; El-Bashir, 1989–the present) assumed political and economic power and brought about significant changes to the formation and transformation of the elite in Sudan. Those elites which had come to power through their party affiliation were relieved of their power within a few days and became less influential, with a few exceptions (e.g. Sadig el-Mahdi, Hassan elTurabi, and Mohamed Osman el-Mirghani). Those elites which had come to power through their military affiliation established their influence and placed their associates in influential positions, which continued to shape the Sudanese society and nation for years to come. Aboud, Nimeiri and elBashir did not belong to the elite before they took power. Although they were officers in the Sudanese army, they all came from poor families belonging to the northern political establishment, so that their influence was very limited (Biel 2007). MI LI TARY RU LE AND CIVIL WARS

Military rule and civil wars between the South and the North caused changes in the elites and therefore ushered in a new development in Sudan, particularly in the South. With the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 and the establishment of the regional GOSS, a good number of southern Sudanese were appointed as regional ministers and therefore have to be classified as members of political elites. Among them were Bona Malwal, Michael Wal Duany, Isaac Kulang de Mabior, Joseph Lagu, Joseph Oduho as leaders of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), and Dr L. Wol Wol, the representative of the SSLM in Europe during the struggle, to mention but a few. Many came from poor families in southern Sudan, some of them being the first child in the family to be educated. Today, they are the old generation of elites in that part of Sudan (Biel 2007). The same is happening in Darfur and eastern Sudan, where new elites are emerging as the result of a war situation. For example, Abdel Wahid Mohamed El-Nour, the leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) in Darfur, Adam Hussein Adam, who is still studying at the London School of Economics and spokesman of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and Zakaria Mohamed Musa, who completed his studies in Germany and joined the JEM, did not belong to the northern elites, but are the product of the ‘war elites’ in Darfur (El-Ouazghani 2007: 16–19). War elites are defined as those elites which become influential because of the war factor (Biel 2007). ELITE DEVELOPMENT AFTER 1983 AN D BE YO N D 2 0 0 7

The phase from 1983 to 2005 has been one of the most important stages in the development of the elite in Sudan. During that time, the SPLM/A under John Garang managed to control more than 80 per cent of the territory in southern Sudan and a sizable area in the Nuba Mountains, 36

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The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan southern Blue Nile, and the Beja area in the east, and even extended its rule to some parts of northern Sudan. At this time, many new elites emerged. In its areas of control, the SPLM/A established an administration that was run by its own military and civilian staff which represented almost all Sudanese regions. For example, in the Nuba Mountains the military and political elites were led by Commander Yusuf Kuwa Makayi and Abdallah Aziz Adam el-Hilu; in Blue Nile, the regions occupied by the SPLM/A were under the leadership of Malik Agar; and in Equatoria there were Commander James Wani Igga and Governor Samuel Abu-John. In Bahr el-Ghazal, the elites were led by Commander Nhial Deng Nhial, in Western Upper Nile by Commander Dr Riek Machar, and in Northern Upper Nile by Commander Dr Lam Akol and Commander William Nyuon Bany. All these military elites came from different social, political and economic backgrounds. The majority of them managed to reach the elite position during the war, with the exception of Riek Machar, Lam Akol and Nhial Deng Nhial who already had been part of the elite community before they joined the SPLM/A. The SPLM elite in general was not very powerful in economic terms. The northern elites were able to influence political and military development within the centre (Khartoum). Their influence can be explained by the fact that they took control of economic and political decisions and were able to place their own people and supporters in influential areas. For example, they took control of the domestic and foreign trade of the whole country. However, during the civil war, for the first time in the history of Sudan, people from the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, Beja and south Sudan became a significant part of the decision-making process. These people were made commanders, governors or commissioners by John Garang, not in Khartoum as before 1983, but in Bilpam or New Site, the provisional headquarters of the SPLM. John Garang himself was seen by many Sudanese across the country as a beacon of hope for political and social change. With the signing of the CPA, a majority of these SPLM/A political and military elites in the former liberated areas continued to occupy influential positions at both national and regional levels as members of the GONU in Khartoum and the GOSS in Juba. Despite the death of former SPLM leader and Sudanese first VicePresident, John Garang de Mabior, on July 30, 2005, the southern Sudanese, such as Lt General and Sudanese First Vice-President Salva Kiir, Foreign Minister, member of the SPLM Interim National Liberation Council and member of the Politburo Lam Akol, State Minister at the Sudanese Presidency Telar Deng, and Vice-President and Minister of Housing in the GOSS Lt General Dr Riek Machar Teny, are still amongst the important decision-makers in post-conflict Sudan. The question of interest now is: how influential is the new Sudanese elite at national and regional levels within the country, given the current political fragmentation between the North and South of Sudan? With the establishment of the GOSS and the participation of the GONU, the 37

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influence of those southern leaders and members of the SPLM in general cannot be underestimated. Indeed, if some of their decision-making is examined closely, southern Sudan already looks like an independent country. The temporary withdrawal of the SPLM Members of Parliament from the GONU in September 2007 and the resulting difficulties faced by the GONU shed light on the new influence of the elites from the SPLM and southern Sudan, Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. To answer the above question, the influences of each elite will therefore be studied in terms of economic and political power, each person used as an example being examined in terms of his or her power both at the regional level and at the level of the whole country.

Examples of members of the elite community in Sudan Salva Kiir derives his power from his position as the Deputy Chairman of the SPLM/A, which he has occupied since the formation of the SPLM/A in 1983. He is considered by many within the SPLM and in most parts of Sudan to possess political power, but he has little economic power. However, by taking over the position of first Vice-President and President of the GOSS after the death of John Garang, his power has increased. Certainly nowadays he is considered one of the top elite members in the whole of Sudan, and his influence throughout the country is very evident. Nevertheless, Kiir’s position in the South is seen to be somehow weak. This has to do with the general situation in the South and the complexity of power sharing within the GOSS. Kiir has tried to resolve some of the problems through dialogue and playing for time rather than through military force, as used to be the case during the SPLM/A under John Garang. Sadig el-Mahdi possesses economic and political power, but is seen by many in the North as less influential today, both politically and economically, than he was earlier in the 1960s or 80s (Biel 2007). El-Mahdi acquired his economic and political power mainly from his family, but also through his position as long-term Prime Minister of Sudan. He is associated with many traders in Sudan and owns companies that generate personal wealth. Sadig el-Mahdi lost his political power through a military coup against his government in June 1989. His regional influence, for example, in his former power base in Darfur, is disappearing. The majority of the Darfurians are no longer willing to follow him and his Umma Party blindly, but rather want to rule in Khartoum themselves instead of having someone from the North representing them. Even in the North, the influence of Sadig el-Mahdi is growing weaker. Many young northern Sudanese are no longer loyal to the Mahdi family and the Umma Party. Osman Mohamed Taha, who was the first Vice-President of Sudan until 2005 and currently is a member of the Sudanese Presidency, has both economic and political power. Taha came from the Islamist group 38

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The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan that runs banks and many companies in Sudan. Most of those companies have partners in Arab and Islamic countries. Osman Mohamed Taha has considerable political power and regional influence, mostly in northern Sudan. Moreover, because of his position he is very influential within the SAF. Lam Akol was commander of the SPLA from 1984 to 1997 and then on to 2005, when he was appointed Foreign Minister. Akol has political influence but little economic power. In his position as a member of the SPLM Political and Military High Command, he projects his influence throughout the country. He was Secretary of External Affairs of the SPLM and was therefore responsible for the peace talks with the GOS; by then he was very popular. After the Nassir coup of August 1991, he lost some of his influence in the South, but still maintained some level of influence overall. In 2007, the GONU dismissed him from the Foreign Ministry. In 2009 Lam Akol founded his own political party and is ready to run for president of South Sudan in the elections of 2010. Bona Malwal had been a minister in the former Southern Region during the 1970s. He was Minister of Culture and Information during the rule of Jaafar Nimeiri, and also the editor-in-chief of the English-language newspaper The Sudan Times. During that period he became extremely wealthy. He was the first southern Sudanese to own a three-star hotel in Khartoum-Burri and owned a luxurious Mercedes, which was worth about half a million US dollars in the 1990s. During the civil war, he was the editor-in-chief of the Sudan Democratic Gazette, which was very popular with those in exile and among the opposition groups. At that time, he was very close to the late SPLM leader John Garang, but they quarrelled over the CPA in the 2000s. He then formed a political splinter group and was appointed presidential adviser of Omar el-Bashir. Nowadays he has limited political and economic power, but in the southern Sudanese establishment he has considerable economic weight. Angelina Teny was a member of the SPLM Chapter in the United Kingdom in the 1990s. She has a degree in nursing from the UK. Her father was a long-time member of the Sudanese Parliament, representing Unity State (Bentiu) where her family belongs to the leading class. After the signing of the CPA, Angelina Teny became State Minister in the Ministry of Energy in the GONU. Today, she is also a member of the Sudanese National Assembly, representing Leer (Unity State) and the SPLM. Taken together, one can say that she is one of the leading elite members in Sudan. An Itto is a member of the SPLM political office. In the 1980s, before joining the SPLM movement, she was a Lecturer at the University of Juba. In 2005, she was appointed State Minister at the Ministry of Agriculture in the GONU, and in December 2007 became the first woman in Sudan to be appointed Deputy Secretary General for an important party like the SPLM. Itto is a very courageous woman and is counted amongst the top Sudanese elite. Abdeljabar Mahmoud Dosa and Adam Abdelrahman were members 39

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of the SLM-Mini Minawi, before they were appointed State Minister and Chairman of the Darfur Rehabilitation and Development Fund respectively. Both men were not very well known in the country as a whole. The Power and Resource Sharing Agreement between the GONU and the Eastern Front (Beja and Rashidiya Arabs) led by Musa Mohamed Ahmed brought some members of the Eastern Front into the GONU. Mohamed Ahmed was made a presidential adviser, together with some of his supporters. If the northern and southern elites are compared, a majority of the elite members from the northern part of the country are still more economically and politically powerful than those in the south (Biel 2007). The composition of leading functions in history explains why northern Sudanese are better off in terms of economic and political power than their southern counterparts. The distribution of northerners and southerners in leading positions sheds light on this fact. Table 2.1 Heads of Sudanese Government (1954–2006) Name

Position

Ismail el-Azhari General Ibrahim Aboud

Tenure

Prime Minister Head of Military Government Sir el-Khatim el-Khalifa Prime Minister Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub Prime Minister Sadig el-Mahdi Prime Minister General Jaafar Mohamed el-Nimeiri Head of Military Government General Abdelrahman Sura el-Dahab Head of Military Government Dr Dafalla el-Jazouli Interim Prime Minister Sadig el-Mahdi Prime Minister General Omar Ahmed Hassan el-Bashir Head of Military and Civilian Government

1954–1956 1958–1964 1964–1965 1965–1966 1966–1968 1969–1985 1985–1986 1986 1986–1989 1989–present

Source: Biel 2004: 82.

Table 2.2 Sudanese Foreign Ministers and Regional Origin since 1989 Name

Tenure

Region

Ahmed Ali Sahloul Suleiman Abu Salih Ali Osman Mohamed Taha Mustafa Osman Ismail Lam Akol Deng Alor

July 1989–February 1993 February 1993–February 1995 February 1995–February 1998 February 1998–September 2005 September 2005–October 2007 October 2007–to date

North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan South Sudan South Sudan

Source: Khalil 2004: 36, and author’s compilation.

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The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan Table 2.3 Regional Representation in Sudanese Embassies and Consulates, 2004 Region

Share (%)

Northern Sudanese Sudanese from Kordofan Eastern Sudanese Southern Sudanese Sudanese from Darfur Other Sudanese regions

84 9 3 2 0 2

Source: Khalil 2004: 54.

Table 2.4 Presidents of the Sudanese Constitutional Court and Regional Origin (1989–2006) Name

Region

Jalal Ali Lutfi Hassan Mohammed el-Beeli Mahdi el-Fahal el-Tahir Mohammed M. Abu Gisasa Abdalla Ahmed Abdalla Ali Yahia Abdalla Ongay Kasia Yousif el-Wali

North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan Darfur South Sudan North Sudan

Source: Khalil 2004; Biel 2007.

Table 2.5 Presidents of Sudanese Universities according to Regions (1989–2002) Total No. of Presidents N = 54 %

North Sudan

Kordofan

Darfur

South Sudan

East Sudan

36 66

7 13

9 17

0 0

2 4

Source: Khalil 2004: 62–3.

Tables 2.1–2.3 show that, since independence, all heads of the Sudanese government and, until the CPA, all foreign ministers and nearly all representatives of Sudan abroad have come from the northern region (see also Biel 2004: 82). Sudanese governments have been mainly dominated by northern elites which have accumulated economic and political power, with a subsequent marginalisation of other Sudanese regions.Table 2.4 reveals that a great majority of the heads of the Constitutional Court 41

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originate from northern Sudan. Table 2.5 shows that southern Sudanese academics were completely excluded from leadership of important institutions like universities. Table 2.6 Presidents of the Sudanese State Security, Region of Origin and Faith (1989–2006) No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Name

Region

Lt. General Nafayi Ali Nafayi Lt. General Mohamed A. el-Dabi Lt. General Hassan Dahawi Lt. General el-Hadi Abdalla Qutbi el-Mahdi Lt. General Awad Ibn Oaf Lt. General Abdel Kareem Abdalla Lt. General Ahmed Mohamed Alas Lt. General el-Jaili el-Misbah General Yahia Hussein Lt. General Salah Abdalla Lt. General Mohamed Atta

North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan North Sudan

Religious affiliation Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim

Source: Khalil 2004: 47–8; Biel 2007.

As can be seen from Table 2.6, all presidents of the Sudanese State Security have been Muslims and originate from the northern region, so that it can be stated that security is controlled by Islamic elites from the North (Khalil 2004: 47–8). Other regions are marginalised in the security services. These tables might help us to understand why the SPLM, southern Sudan and other regions have been calling for a ‘New Sudan’. Fair distribution of power has been one of the key issues in the violent political conflict. The CPA, the DPA and the Asmara Agreement in eastern Sudan reflect the need for the establishment of a modern ‘New Sudan’ or the reformation of the old one (DPA 2006; Asmara Peace Agreement 2006).

Elites and power sharing as embodied in the CPA, DPA and Asmara Agreement The GONU came into existence because of the CPA (Lingnau 2007: 6). This was a new step in Sudanese conflict resolution, as for the first time a central government was formed by a coalition of both northerners and southerners. The government consists not only of the SPLM and the NCP, but also of the northern Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the southern Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP), and the South Sudan Democratic Forum (SSDF). Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the allocation of 42

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The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan Table 2.7 Allocation of Ministerial Positions in the GONU Party

No. of Ministers

NCP SPLM Other parties Total

16 9 4 29

Source: Biel 2007: 35.

Table 2.8 Participation in the Federal Parliament in Khartoum by Party Party NCP SPLM Other Northern Parties Other Southern Parties Total

Seats 234 126 63 27 470

% of all Seats 52 28 14 6 100

Source: Biel 2007: 35–8.

ministerial positions and seats in parliament among the Sudanese parties at the national level, and that the participation of southerners has significantly increased as the result of the power sharing agreement of 2005. However, the northerners maintain a majority in the government and other institutions, and representation of the Darfurians and the people of eastern Sudan is limited. The SPLM and other parties combined will still be a minority in parliament, with 216 seats (48 per cent). The DPA and the Asmara Agreement also contain power sharing components, which have not been fully implemented. Therefore representation of Darfur and eastern Sudan is not included in the tables.

The role of Sudanese elites in building the ‘New Sudan’ Aready during the peace period following the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, a majority of people in Sudan agreed that there was a need to remedy the political, social, and economic instability and transform Sudan into a stable country (Malwal 1981: 1). The ‘New Sudan’ vision refers to this idea of a stabilised nation, which would offer equality for all citizens with regard to political and economic participation and equal rights and duties for southerners, Darfurians, easterners and northerners. No matter from which region they originate, they should have the same opportunity to become President of Sudan and not be limited to the position of First 43

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Vice-President or Assistant President. There should also be true democracy and full respect for human rights and freedom of expression. Political parties would no longer be based on religion or sectarian groupings. The army should have no role in politics, but should defend Sudan against external threats (John Garang, radio broadcast in 1987). Arabs and Africans would live peacefully together, and a secular state would ensure that all religions would be accepted both in law and in practice. Resources and wealth would be equally distributed among regions and used for the development of the whole country. No wars would be waged with neighbouring countries. Every Sudanese would have the right to education, housing, work and settlement in any corner of Sudan (Biel 2007). ‘Unityin-diversity’ would be accepted and practised throughout the country, whereby the various cultural variables and political groupings, African and Arab, would be recognised (El-Battahani 2007: 50). What should be done if the concept of the ‘New Sudan’ cannot be achieved? As a possible alternative to the wars created by the Old Sudan, the following solutions could be adopted: • Sudan could be separated into new ‘independent Sudanese states’, which could live side by side with each other in the wake of the failure of transforming the Old Sudan. A peaceful relationship should exist between these new states. One could think of an economic and currency union between them. If necessary, resources should be shared. Since most of Sudan’s natural resources, especially oil, are found in particular regions in the south and west, the sharing of oil should be agreed by the new states. The northern state could agree to allow other landlocked states to use Port Sudan for their goods. If necessary, defence should be shared, with a joint defence team established on a voluntary basis. The models of the SPLM for the future reflect these aims. Figure 2.1 Model of a Unitary State with some Decentralisation

NORTHERN SUDAN

SOUTHERN SUDAN

Source: Akok 2001: 91.

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The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan Figure 2.1 is the ‘domination model’ which shows Islamisation and Arabisation of the South by the North, as it has been applied under the Addis Ababa Accord and Islamic federalism. Figure 2.2 Model of a Sudanese Confederation (Commonalities)

NORTHERN SUDAN

SOUTHERN SUDAN

Source: ibid.

Figure 2.2 represents one of the SPLM’s proposals, in which each state is sovereign within a confederation for common areas and issues. It contains the vision of the Garang faction of the party about how the Sudan conflict could be resolved (SPLM 1997: 12). Another SPLM proposal is to create two independent states. This will be the most likely outcome, if the GONU insists on Model I and rejects Model II. This will, however, only be achieved after much violence and bloodshed. Figure 2.3 Model of Complete Separation

NORTHERN SUDAN

SOUTHERN SUDAN

Source: ibid.

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None of the models of the SPLM has yet been achieved. The CPA offered a sort of power sharing that would have worked if John Garang, as a motor for that peace, was alive, or if the NCP had respected the agreement and worked closely together with the SPLM. Given the current situation, what are the options for a solution to the Sudan conflict? If the 2011 referendum in southern Sudan fails, two types of political system may be established in order to achieve a New Sudan. In type I, two executive powers would be established for the coming 40 years. This period of time could help to set up a culture of peace and the sharing of power and resources in the country. In the course of the 40 years, people are expected to adapt to the new system. Table 2.9 Functions of Prime Minister and President in New Sudan Function of Prime Minister in New Sudan

Function of President in New Sudan

Formation of the government

Ceremonial only

Appointment of ministers

Signing the national constitution, when it is passed by both the higher and lower houses of the federal parliament

Relieving the members of the cabinet of their positions

Other minor functions, as may be decided by the parliament

Source: Biel 2007.

Different cases can be anticipated for this scenario: Case 1: If the President comes from the South, the deputy will come from another region. In this case, the Speaker of the Federal Parliament will also come from another region which is not represented by the offices of President or Prime Minister. No post of assistant to the President will be needed. Case 2: If the Prime Minister comes from the South, the deputy will come from another region. In this case, the position of Speaker of the Parliament will go to one of the regions that is not represented by the offices of the President or Prime Minister. Case 3: Wealth sharing is divided more fairly between the regions, as is partly outlined by the CPA and DPA and the Asmara Agreement for east Sudan, but needs to be better defined and made more workable. Case 4: The position of president rotates between all four Regions. This is necessary for building the New Sudan in terms of a fair distribution of power. Moreover, ministerial as well as civil service positions, from the lower levels to the higher positions, will be distributed equally among the regions, as stipulated in the CPA (Biel 2007). A secular state is required in order to remove religion from politics. 46

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The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan Case 5: East, west and south join hands in an election. This may result in the election of elites which come from the marginalised areas. Consequently, a ‘New Sudan’ will be created and made a reality. The application of this system will require great effort and an understanding of its necessity on the part of the majority of the Sudanese elites in all four Regions. Above all, it will require compromise and trust (Haller 2003: 337). The CPA, the DPA and the Asmara Agreement are signs of recognition by part of the Sudanese elite of the need to compromise and to share power and resources. This raises hope that there will be a growing insight into the need for a New Sudan with regard to equality and justice, a country for all citizens regardless of religion, colour, language or political affiliation. If this system cannot be applied for whatever reasons, then the second type of system will be the unavoidable solution. Three independent states must be created, namely, (i) Southern Sudan including the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile State, (ii) Darfur, and (iii) Northern Sudan. In this case, resources will have to be shared between these new independent states.

Conclusion What has been the role of the elite in the Sudan conflict, and what are the consequences for the current process of nation-building in particular? Sudanese elites in both northern and southern Sudan have played highly contradictory roles in finding an end to the ongoing conflict. They have failed in the last forty years to find a compromise (Tetzlaff 2003). Northern elites have been seen as barely compromising on their visions of an ArabIslamic Sudanese state and a process of nation-building through Arab language and culture (Nyombe 1994: 9–21). On the other hand, the southern Sudanese elite, a majority of whom have been serving the interests of the elites in power in Khartoum, have been reluctant to criticise the northern elite or to present their own vision of Sudan at the national level. In contrast, the SPLM under John Garang believed that Sudan could change and that a southern Sudanese, a Darfurian, or a Beja could rule in Khartoum. The Sudanese elites can be classified into political, military and economic elites. If necessary, they can also be divided into African and Arab elites. Such elite groups exist in northern as well as in southern, eastern and western Sudan. They all speak Arabic and English, although the quality of the languages spoken depends on their educational background and region of origin. For this reason, one can still speak of a single Sudanese elite, but with different influences. Although the northern elite speaks Arabic and considers its members to be of Arab origin (Lesch 1998: 3), the southern elite speaks both Arabic and English but considers 47

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its members to be Sudanese and African. Before 1983, this group came mainly from the south. Nowadays, elites in the east and west also consider themselves more African than Arab. What does the above analysis imply for the political interpretation of the various Sudanese peace agreements concluded since 2005? The CPA, DPA and Asmara Agreement are the signs of a ‘New Sudan’, reflecting as they do compromises between the Sudanese elites. They indicate the common understanding that things cannot continue as before. The marginalised regions of the south, east and west must be involved in reshaping the country’s future. According to El-Wathig Kameir, ‘New Sudan has no racial, ethnic or separatist connotations. It is rather a framework, a national project, for building a true and sustainable Citizenship-state capable of accommodating the multiple diversities of Sudanese society’ (Kameir 2006: 1). However, compromise does not mean the exclusion of other options such as separation. The process that started with these peace agreements is only a beginning and it will continue in the coming years. Despite these agreements and compromises, the Sudanese are still very far from realising a ‘New Sudan’. The referendum for South Sudan, scheduled for July 2011, and the implementation of these agreements will show where Sudan’s future lies (Biel 2007: 37). What should be the groundwork for democracy and nation-building in Sudan? It will lie, among other things, in compromise and respect for agreements that will lead to trust amongst the Sudanese elites (Biel 2003: 369). Full participation of the marginalised regions in governing Sudan must be a key element. The NCP faces the dilemma of implementing the recent peace agreements, in particular the CPA, through which it fears a loss of power after ruling Sudan alone for more than fifteen years. Nevertheless, the following recent political developments can be seen as positive steps towards creating trust among the Sudanese elites: (i) the appointment of Salva Kiir Mayardit as Sudanese First Vice-President in 2005; (ii) the appointment of Mini Minawi as Senior Assistant to President Bashir in September 2006 (Sudan Tribune 2006); (iii) the appointment of Mustafa Mohamed Ahmed Tirab as State Minister, Abdeljabar Mahmoud Dosa as Chairman of the Darfur Rehabilitation and Development Fund, and Adam Abdelrahman as Chairman of the Darfur Land Commission on November 7, 2006; (iv) the Power and Resources Sharing Agreement between the GONU and the Eastern Front (Beja and Rashidiya Arabs) led by Musa Mohammed Ahmed; and (v) the appointment of Lam Akol and, later, Deng Alor as Sudanese Foreign Minister. This cements the necessity and willingness of the Sudanese elites to work together to find compromises on the future of the country. The future of Sudan lies in the first place in the full implementation of the peace agreements and continuing compromises among the elites within the north, south, east and west and in general. There will be no peace, if the northerners cannot agree on what kind of Sudan there should be. 48

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The Role of African & Arab Elites in Building a New Sudan Perhaps they should ask themselves whether the country should continue to be run as in the old days, or whether they should give the New Sudan model a chance. The future will tell us the truth about this question.

References Adar, Korwa G./Yoh, John G. N./Maloka, E. (eds) (2004) Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. Akok, Garang (2001) Ethnische Konflikte in Afrika und die Wahrnehmung in Deutschland am Beispiel des Sudan. Unpublished diploma thesis. Berlin: Humboldt University, Faculty of Social Science. Asmara Peace Agreement (2006) available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/ sudan/key-texts-espa-definitions.php, October 2006, accessed on 05/10/2008. Beshir, Mohamed Omer (1968) The Southern Sudan. Background to Conflict. New York/Washington DC: Frederick A. Praeger. Biel, Melha Rout (2003) Der Sudan zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Marburg: Tectum Verlag. Biel, Melha Rout (2004) Modernisierung der Bildung und Verwaltung im Sudan. Ein Land zwischen Bürgerkriegen, Diktaturen und Fremdherrschaft. Münster: Lit Verlag. Biel, Melha Rout (2007) Elitenformierung und Elitenwandel im Prozess der sudanesischen Nationenbildung. PhD thesis. Jena: Friedrich Schiller Universität. Biel, Melha Rout (2007a) Der Sudan nach dem umfassenden Frieden (CPA), in: Biel, M. R./Leisse, Olaf (eds) Politik in Ostafrika – zwischen Staatszerfall und Konsolidierung. Frankfurt: Peter Lang: 35–57. Deng, Francis Mading (1972) The Dinka of the Sudan. New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston. Deng, Francis Mading (1995) War of Visions. Conflict of Identities in the Sudan. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution. Diraige, Ahmed Ibrahim (1995) Unity in Diversity: Is It Possible in Sudan?, in: Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan. London: African Rights. DPA (2006) Darfur Peace Agreement of 5 May 2006; in: www.unmis.org, accessed 09/05/2008. El-Battahani, Atta (2007) Tunnel Vision or Kaleidoscope: Competing Concepts on Sudan Identity and National Integration, in: African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, No. 2: 37–61. El-Ouazghari, Karim (2007) Grund zur Hoffnung? Die Afrikanische Union und der DarfurKonflikt. Report der Hessischen Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, No. 14. Flint, Julie/de Waal, Alex (2005) Darfur. A Short History of a Long War. London/New York: ZED Books. GOS/SPLM/A (2005) Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Signed by Taha, Ali Osman and Garang, John on 9 January, Nairobi, in: www.unmis.org/English.cpa.htm, accessed 10/05/2008. Haller, Max (2003) Die Europäische Einigung als Elitenprozess, in: Hradil, Stefan/Imbusch, Peter (2003) Oberschichten – Eliten – Herrschende Klassen. Sozialstrukturanalyse, Vol. 17. Opladen: Leske & Budrich: 1-22. Holt, P. M. (1965) A Modern History of the Sudan, from the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day. London: Ebenezer Baylis and Son Ltd and Worcester/London: The Trinity Press. Johnson, Douglas (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey. Kameir, el-Wathig (2006) New Sudan: Towards Building the Sudanese Nation-State. Paper presented at the General Congress of the Sudanese Writers’ Union, Khartoum, October 30. Khalil, Ibrahim (2004) The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan. Manifesto of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Darfur. Publisher Anonymous. Lesch, Ann Mosely (1998) The Sudan – Contested National Identities. Oxford: James Currey/Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Lingnau, Hildegard (2007) Deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit den Ländern in

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M E L H A ROUT B I E L Ostafrika und am Horn von Afrika unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Problemfalls Sudan, in: Biel, Melha Rout/Leisse, Olaf (eds): Politik in Ostafrika zwischen Staatszerfall und Konsolidierung. Frankfurt: Peter Lang: 201–25. Malwal, Bona (1981) People and Power in Sudan. The Struggle for National Stability. London: Ithaca Press. Nyombe, B.G.V (1994) The Politics of Language, Culture, Religion and Race in the Sudan. Department of Linguistics and African Language, University of Nairobi, in: Frankfurter Afrikanische Blätter, No. 6: 9–21. Ojway, Philipp Obang (2002) The House of Nationalities. A Space for Preserving the Unity and the Diversity of the South Sudan. Unpublished paper, January. Ruay, Deng D. Akol (1997) The Politics of Two Sudans: The South and the North 1821–1969. Uppsala: Nordic African Institute. SPLM (1997) The SPLM Manifesto, in: New Sudan Herald July–September, Vol.1/97, No.1. Sudan Tribune (2006) Sudanese President appoints three SLM-Minawi Aids, in: www.sudantribune.com/imprimable.php3?id_article=18534, accessed on 11/07/2006. Tetzlaff, Rainer (1992) Sudan: Selbstzerfleischung eines rassisch zweigeteilten Landes, in: Hofmeier, Rolf/Matthies, Volker (eds) Vergessene Kriege in Afrika. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde: 215–250. Tetzlaff, Rainer (1993) Staatswerdung im Sudan. Ein Bürgerkriegsstaat zwischen Demokratie, ethnischen Konflikten und Islamisierung. Münster: Lit.Verlag. Tetzlaff, Rainer (2003) Afrika als Teil der Vierten Welt, der Welt der erodierenden Staatlichkeit – abgeschaltet von der Globalisierung? Paper for the political symposium of the World Ethos project by Hans Küng: Ein neues Paradigma internationaler Beziehungen? Ethische Herausforderungen für die Gestaltung der Weltpolitik, in: http://www.sef-bonn.org/download/veranstaltungen/2003/2003_fachwsbeirat_tetzlaff_de.pdf, accessed 06/05/2010. Yoh, John Gai Nyuot (2003) Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa, in: African Security Review Vol. 12, No. 3: 83–93.

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3 After the CPA The Implementation of Power Sharing at the National Level – the Case of the National Assembly RANIA HASSAN AHMED

Introduction The CPA contains regulations for the crucial issues of power sharing, wealth sharing and self-determination. In the power sharing protocol the two parties (NCP and SPLM/A) agreed to decentralise governance through a significant devolution of power to the 26 states within the federal system. Accordingly, the GONU exercises sovereignty over Sudan as a whole, and the ten states of the southern region are ruled through the GOSS, a primary responsibility of which is to wield authority in respect of the states of southern Sudan, to act as a link to the national government, and to ensure that the rights and interests of the people of southern Sudan are safeguarded during the interim period. To date, the implementation of the CPA is moving at a slow pace. The intention of this chapter is to probe deeply into the challenges and the real causes of the delay, paying particular attention to underlying issues that affect the implementation of the power sharing agreement at the national level of the government of Sudan. In tackling these issues the following questions will be asked: • What are the challenges facing the implementation of the power sharing agreement at the national level? • Are the political parties participating at the national level able to control decision-making and policy formulation and to increase political participation? • Which other groups are involved in decision-making and policy formulation, and in which ways? • How do they interrelate with the ruling political parties? The argument of this paper is that the slow implementation of the 51

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power sharing agreement in the National Assembly is a product of two combined factors: • the weakness of the participating political parties, in particular with regard to their organisational structure, their programmes and their internal power relations; • and, secondly, the existence of certain dominant groups which have an interest in the delay in implementing power sharing in order to secure control of resources. The paper consists of four sections: a conceptual framework, the historical background of political development in Sudan, an analysis of the implementation of power after the CPA, and a conclusion.

Power sharing: Definition, approaches, types and elements In its simplest definition, ‘power sharing’ describes a system of governance in which all the major segments of society are provided with a fixed share of power. This system is often contrasted with ‘government vs. opposition’ systems in which ruling coalitions rotate among various social groups over time (Sisk 2003). Usually the following dimensions are considered as the basic principles of power sharing: grand coalition governments in which nearly all political parties have appointments; protection of minority rights; decentralisation of power; decision-making by consensus (Baechler 2004: 245). According to Arend Lijphart (2004), such a government is constituted by a broadly representative coalition of all significant groups. In the context of intractable conflicts, the concept of power sharing has been extended. A thorough assessment of the causes and dynamics of conflict forms the basis for a wide range of power sharing options that could potentially reduce tension through consensus-oriented governance (El-Battahani 2006). A long-standing misconception about power sharing options for intractable conflicts has been that there is a single formula for power sharing in terms of consociationalism. Consociational democracy is an arrangement of power sharing whereby most political forces in the polity are able to take part in governance. The consociational arrangement envisages not only the state as a whole, but also sub-national entities in terms of needs and participation. The chief aim of the consociational device is to maintain the unity of the state. Its function is to lend legitimacy to the constitutional arrangements and political institutions in place (ElHardalo 2007). In fact two fundamental approaches to power sharing in democracy can be distinguished, the Group Building and the Integrated Approaches. 52

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The Implementation of Power Sharing at the National Level G RO U P BU I L D I N G A P P ROAC H

The Group Building Approach aims to secure the cooperation of the leaders of ethnic groups. Accordingly, elites form multi-ethnic coalitions following elections, but each group is regarded as autonomous and minority rights are granted. This is accompanied by the establishment of federalism, whereby power is devolved to ethnic groups in the territories where they prevail. Minorities receive veto rights on sensitive issues and are proportionally represented. Table 3.1 The Group Building Approach Principles

Practices

Problems

Broad-based coalitions among ethnic political parties

Grand coalition governments

Elites may initiate conflict to bolster their power at the centre

Minority or mutual veto Group rights defined in Can reinforce the ethnic rights on matters of constitutional terms for divisions in society rather importance to the group named ethnic units than promote cross-cultural understanding Proportionality

Proportional representation in the electoral system, proportional allocation of jobs and spending

May reflect well the divisions in society, but does not provide for building bridges across community lines

Group autonomy

Federalism, territorial or corporate

May contain disincentives for contending groups to live peacefully together

Source: author’s compilation following Baechler 2004: 282.

The advantage of the group building approach is that it may secure the cooperation of ethnic group leaders within multi-ethnic coalitions after elections, but at the same time the respective groups will be regarded as autonomous, and their minority rights are safeguarded. On the other hand, this approach may be dangerous. Its assumption that elites can effectively regulate conflict in divided societies, may reinforce and enhance ethnicity in the political system. Hence, this design remains fundamentally anti-democratic (Baechler 2004: 244). I N T E G R AT E D A P P ROAC H

The Integrated Approach has the declared purpose of promoting social integration across group boundaries in order to overcome the ethnic divisions of a society. This approach aims to establish non-ethnic federalism to diffuse points of power through the promotion of intraethnic competition (Baechler 2004: 244). 53

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Table 3.2 The Integrative Approach Principles

Practices

Problems

Incentives for elite and mass moderation on divisive ethnic or racial themes

A president who stands for all groups and who emphasises moderation and reconciliation

Leaders who can rise above the inter-group enmity are hard to find

Intra-group contestation and inter-group moderation in electoral contests

The use of vote-pooling electoral systems, such as the single transferable vote or the alternative vote

Political leaders and key public figures may not be willing to respond to the incentives for moderation, they may prefer to take minority representation as symbolic

Minority influence, not just representation

Federalism is a way to give all minority groups access to power; the regions serve as training ground for national-level moderation

Political leaders may prefer to take minority representation as symbolic

Source: author’s compilation following Baechler 2004: 282–3 and Sisk 2003: 12.

The Integrative Approach presupposes the existence of widely acceptable leaders who can win legitimacy from all main segments of society at national and local levels. This assumption may be wrong, and in that case the Integrative Approach may lead to enhanced ethnic unrest due to disappointed expectations of fair rule.

The political development of Sudan The present is not the first time Sudan has faced transition from war to peace. Twice, in 1983 and 1997, peace failed. This historical experience poses a challenge. The dishonouring of agreements has loomed large in the minds of southern Sudanese ever since. Historically, for them the political issues have been the dual nature of the Sudanese state, a regional imbalance inherited from colonialism as well as the need to challenge the Muslim/Arab domination of the state (El-Battahani 2004). These were the concerns around which all southern Sudanese political forces were united, forgetting in between whatever diversities and differences they had amongst them. For the southern political forces, these issues are not past concerns that have been resolved by signing the CPA. On the contrary, they still remain on their agenda even after signing the agreement. The history of Sudan since independence provides many examples of tensions between political and social forces, bent, on the one hand, towards 54

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The Implementation of Power Sharing at the National Level unifying the different nationalities in one state with a one-dimensional cultural view, and, on the other hand, pressures that reject this view in both content and means. The roots of this contention lie in the contradiction between aims: unifying nationalities and ethnicities, if necessary against their will, in a national state with full harmony, while the other view conceives of the unity of Sudan as a threat. The latter holds that all nationalities should be in one state on the basis of citizenship, but leaving the door open for any of them to abandon or keep its identity within the context of national self-determination (El-Hardalo 2007). Today Sudan is passing through a difficult phase, perhaps the most difficult one in its recent history, a period characterised by tension and confusion between dreams and reality. Hence, it is imperative for all who are dealing with its political, social and economic future to realise that there is need for a genuine transformation that aims not at a transitory administration of cleavages, but considers the roots of the conflict in the context of the culture prevailing in the collective memory of the people. Ali Mazrui’s two different images of Sudan are as relevant today as they were in 1968. The first image shows Sudan as an Afro-Arab bridge able to show the way in which Arab and African identities could be linked to each other. The second image presents Sudan as an example of the inability of those two identities to live together in one country (Mazrui 1969: 163–83). Since 1968 this duality seems to have been intensified rather than bridged. The introduction of the Shari’a laws by former President Nimeiri triggered more than twenty years of war led by the SPLM/A (El-Battahani 2004). The two political parties currently sharing power in the GONU – the NCP and the SPLM – represent these identities politically. They are introduced from a historical perspective below. NAT I O NA L C O N G R E S S PA RT Y ( N C P )

The current NCP was created in 1998, when certain leaders of the former National Islamic Front (NIF) together with other politicians established it as a legal political party. The Popular Congress Party, led by Hassan elTurabi, broke off in 2000 after disagreements between the President and the Islamist ideologue. In the national parliamentary election in 2000, the NCP won 355 of the 360 seats. In the presidential election, the NCP candidate, Omar el-Bashir, won 86.5 per cent of the votes and was reelected; 9.6 per cent of the electorate voted for the former president Jaafar el-Nimeiri, and the remaining votes went to three further candidates. According to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) observer team, the elections were held in a democratic manner, although some major political parties boycotted them (ESPAC 2001). In 2005 the NCP merged with the Alliance of Working Peoples’ Forces Party of former President Nimeiri, but in fact the party remained under the control of the former NIF elite. The NCP has adopted the same fundamental perceptions as the NIF with respect to the maintenance of the Islamic state and implementation of the Shari’a laws. Currently the NCP 55

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controls the political and economic activities in northern Sudan as well as most of the labour unions. All the governors of the 16 northern states are NCP members. The NCP also has a notable southern Sudanese membership, manifested through the inclusion of southern NCP members in the GOSS (El-Nour 2007). T H E S U DA N P E O P L E ’ S L I B E R AT I O N M OV E M E N T ( S P L M )

The SPLM/A is largely based in southern Sudan. As a resistance group, it was formed by some leaders of the Anyanya, who had been fighting in the first Sudanese civil war (1955–72), including John Garang, Salva Kiir Mayardit, William Nyuon Bany and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol. The SPLA fought against the governments of Jaafar el-Nimeiri, Sadig el-Mahdi, and Omar el-Bashir. The declared aim of the SPLM/A is to establish a democratic Sudan with it as the leading party in control of the southern region. Besides religious and ethnic conflicts, the war was also fought over control of the water and oil resources located in southern and western Sudan. In 1991, the Nasir faction of the SPLA, led by Riek Machar and Lam Akol, attempted to overthrow John Garang. The attempt failed but led to widespread fighting in the south and the formation of further resistance groups, among them the Bahr el-Ghazal faction of the SPLA under Kerubino Kuanyin Bol. These internal divisions hampered negotiations with the government. SPLA-Nasir renamed itself SPLAUnited and then transformed itself, with substantial personnel changes, into the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). Several smaller factions signed a separate peace agreement with the GOS in April 1997 and formed the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). The GOS accused Uganda and Eritrea of supporting the SPLM/A and claimed that the government of Uganda allowed it to operate from Ugandan territory. Between 1998 and 2002, the SPLA reunited, with the main southern Sudanese signatories of the Khartoum Agreement returning to the movement. After the CPA, the SPLM was transformed into a political party. In 2005 the SPLM political platform focused on the concept of a New Sudan, in which everyone was to enjoy full citizenship rights and get his/her share of power, wealth and development, especially in the marginalised areas of Sudan, regardless of his/her colour, religion, gender or race (SPLM Economic Commission 2004). This concept has attracted many supporters in the northern states, particularly among the educated elites, which have been frustrated by the performance of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) throughout the rule of Omar el-Bashir. After the former leader John Garang died in a helicopter crash in July 2005, Salva Kiir, Deng Alor, Lam Akol, Pagan Amom, Malik Agar, Abdelaziz el-Hilo, Riek Machar, Mansour Khalid, Nhial Deng, Yasir Arman and Mohamed Yusuf have become the most prominent leaders of the SPLM in southern and northern Sudan. 56

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The Implementation of Power Sharing at the National Level

Implementation of the Power Sharing Agreement with regard to the National Assembly According to the CPA, the national legislature consists of the National Assembly and the State Councils. The National Assembly has 450 members, who were appointed by the GONU according to the CPA power sharing formula in September 2005 (see Table 3.3). Table 3.3 Political Parties’ Representation in the National Assembly according to the CPA (in percentages and absolute numbers) Party NCP SPLM Northern forces Southern forces Total

%

No. of Members

52 28 14 6 100

234 126 63 27 450

Source: GOS/SPLM/A 2005: Power Sharing Agreement.

When the Power Sharing Agreement was implemented in 2005, the detailed composition of the Members of the National Assembly was as shown in Table 3.4. Table 3.4 Parties’ de facto Representation in the National Assembly, 2005 Political Party NCP SPLM NDA Registered Democratic Unionist Party Umma Party Reform and Renewal Federal Umma Party Umma Party Collective Leadership Ansar Al-Suna Muslim Brotherhood Parties Forum Union of Sudan African Parties United Democratic Salvation Front United Democratic Front Sudanese African National Union Southern Sudan Democratic Forum National personalities Total Source: UNMIS 2007.

57

No. of Members

Origin

234 126 20 7 3 3 3 3 3 5 10 5 3 5 4 8 442

North South North North North North North North North North South South South South South

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Of the 55 seats allocated to the northern political forces, 8 were allocated to the Umma Party (Mainstream) and the Popular National Congress, but both declined to participate in the National Assembly. To test the factors which affected the implementation of power sharing, the following methods of data collection were used: observation, interviews (mainly informal), and a questionnaire. The questionnaire was distributed to a sample of 137 members of the National Assembly, originating from 17 different states. On the basis of the data, which were collected in 2006, certain personal characteristics of the members of the National Assembly and issues of governance and political participation were identified. Table 3.5 shows the political parties in each state. It reveals that most of the members of the National Assembly are from Khartoum State. Table 3.5 Origin of the Members of the National Assembly (in absolute numbers and percentages) States/Parties

NCP

Khartoum Gezira White Nile River Nile Sennar Kassala Gedaref Red Sea North Southern Darfur Northern Darfur Western Darfur North Kordofan West Kordofan South Kordofan Blue Nile Lakes Unity Northern Bahr el-Ghazal Western Bahr el-Ghazal Upper Nile Bahr el-Ghazal Western Equatoria Jonglei Eastern Equatoria Warab Abyei Unknown Total

78 23 10 3 6 8 10 4 1 17 8 9 14 2 10 7 1 1 2 1 4 2 1 12 234

SPLM 25 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 8 6 8 10 6 7 8 6 5 7 8 2 2 8 122

Northern Forces

Southern Forces

%

29 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 52

4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 3 3 4 2 3 1 1 26

32.0 6.4 2.6 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.6 1.6 0.4 4.5 2.1 2.3 4.0 0.4 4.7 3.0 2.3 3.0 2.1 2.6 3.5 2.8 1.9 2.3 2.1 1.9 0.4 96.1

Source: author’s data collection 2006 (‘-’ indicates that the number is unknown to the researcher).

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The Implementation of Power Sharing at the National Level The table shows NCP members from 23 and SPLM members from 19 different states. The members of the northern political parties originate from 12 and the members of the southern political parties from 11 different states. Two personalities, who have been appointed to the National Assembly, are from Khartoum and Northern Darfur States; the origin of the 6 other personalities is unknown to the researcher. To match the objective of studying political participation, it is worthwhile to focus on the representation in the committees of the National Assembly, as shown in Table 3.6. Table 3.6 Party Representation in the Assembly’s Committees (in absolute numbers) Committee

NCP

SPLM

Education Legislation Agriculture and Animal Resources Industry, Investment and Trade Security and Defence Energy Culture, Youth and Transport Humanitarian Affairs Human Rights Peace and National Reconciliation Foreign Relations Economy Labour and Public Services Land and Water Information Family and Women Health and Society Development Transport and Roads Tourism and Environment Total

13 14 18 14 14 14 13 15 10 13 12 15 7 10 12 11 11 6 6 228

4 8 6 7 7 8 5 7 10 6 7 8 6 5 7 6 6 5 7 125

Northern Forces 3 4 3 8 3 3 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 2 2 2 2 0 4 48

Southern Forces 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 26

Source: author’s data collection 2006. (The involvement in committees of 7 members amongst the northern political forces, and one amongst the southern political forces, is unknown to the researcher.)

It is obvious that, in some committees, the proportions are not according to the CPA guidelines. This can be partly explained by the self-interests of members and may also be the consequence of distorted data due to the eight unknown members.

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Characteristics of the members of the National Assembly The members’ ages range between 40 and 63 years. The religious affiliation is dominated by Muslims (72 per cent), 5 per cent are Christians and 23 per cent declined to answer. The identification of members’ religious affiliation is relevant, because in some cases they were motivated to join their party because of its programme and activities with regard to religious principles. The duration of membership in the various political parties varies between 10 years and more (55 per cent), 5 and 10 years (17 per cent), and 5 years or less (23 per cent). This reveals that most of the members of the current Assembly had been members of their parties for more than ten years; however, in different functions and not as members of the Assembly. 61 per cent of the sample had never been members of other political parties, whereas 18 per cent had previously been members of other political parties. 21 per cent did not answer this question. Concerning the membership of the committees of the National Assembly, 86 joined out of their own interest, and 14 per cent had been appointed by their political parties. The main motivations to join the respective political parties were the party programmes, activities and principles (42 per cent of the sample). The democratic commitment of their political party was the reason for 35 per cent. 18 per cent claimed that they joined their particular party because of the weakness of the other parties. 5 per cent of the sample had Islamic motives for joining their party. 96 per cent of the sample stated that, after the CPA, the political parties participating in the National Assembly had not changed their political programmes. Only 4 per cent indicated that there had been changes. Two indicators of the degree of political activities on the part of the members of the National Assembly have been included in the study: the contributions in parliamentary sittings, and the membership of committees. 79 per cent of the sample considered the contributions in the sittings as fair and addressing relevant issues; 21 per cent stated that they were not fair. Accordingly, during the four sessions that took place during the period of the research, the members of the National Assembly were free to contribute and discuss their priorities and issues to some extent. However, the response was weak, although vital issues of the economy, social and political aspects, such as infrastructure, conflicts, and disputes between some groups, had been addressed.

Conclusion With this analysis of the implementation of the Power Sharing Agreement at the national level with respect to the National Assembly, the manner of implementation and the significant challenges facing it have been identified. Accordingly, the peace agreement works in a way that enables each party to 60

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The Implementation of Power Sharing at the National Level pursue some self-interest. The main interest of the NCP is to ensure continuity in government and to keep the SPLM as an ally in the face of other opposition parties. Moreover, it has a strong interest in maintaining the confidence of the international community (El-Battahani 2004). The other political forces have an interest in taking advantage of the democratic transition, which is regarded as the beginning of a new period, and ensuring that free elections will be conducted. The study illustrates that the political parties face some obstacles to participating in decision-making within the National Assembly. It can be concluded that the existence of influential sub-groups within each political party has the effect of controlling the party’s decision-making and policy formulation in a way which guarantees their interests, corresponding to the Group Building Approach in power sharing. The review of the history of the main political parties reveals that most of these groups with particular political, social and economic interests have been involved in the political parties for a long time and have been able to maintain their strong influence on state institutions. As a result, the main challenge facing the implementation of the CPA will be to create more transparency so that truth and confidence between the partners can develop and attempts to control decision-making become subject to public debate.

References Baechler, Günther (2004) Conflict Transformation through State Reform, in: Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, in: http://www.berghof-handbook.net/ uploads/download/baechler_handbook.pdf. El-Battahani, Atta (2004) Uneven Economic Development and Naivasha Protocols of Peace Agreement between Government of Sudan and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. Paper presented at a workshop organised by the Association of Civil Society Organisations and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Khartoum, November 7. El-Battahani, Atta (2006) A Complex Web: politics and conflict in Sudan, in: http://www.c-r.org/ our-work/accord/sudan/politics-conflict.php. El-Hardalo, Adlan (2007) Assessing Progress in the Implementation of the CPA. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. El-Nour, Abbas (2007) NCP Assessment of the Implementation of the CPA. Khartoum: NCP. ESPAC – The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council (2001) Democracy in Sudan: The December 2000 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections. Press Release/Commentary posted on February 14 in: http://www.sudan.net/news/press/postedr/13.shtml. GOS/SPLM/A (2005) Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Signed by Taha, Ali Osman and Garang, John, January 9, Nairobi. Lijphart, Arend (2004) Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 2, April: 96–109. Mazrui, Ali (1969) Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tension in Africa. London/Harlow: Longman. Sisk, Timothy D. (2003) Power Sharing, in: http://www.beyondintractability.org/ essay/power_sharing/?nid=1382. SPLM Economic Commission (2004) SPLM Strategic Framework for War-to-Peace Transition. New Site, Kapoeta County: SPLM. UNMIS (United Nations Mission to Sudan) (2007) CPA Monitor, in: http://www.unmis.org.cpa.monitor.english/Sep.2007, accessed: 20/03/2008.

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4 Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) A Start from the Bottom YA S I R AWA D A B DA L L A E LTA H I R

Introduction The CPA has given emphasis to the issues of wealth and power sharing rather than the appropriate political system within which wealth and power sharing should take place. If the two partners of the agreement, the NCP and SPLM, had taken the other way round, i.e. considered the political system first, the CPA would have been more comprehensive and, in a practical way, the partners would have entered the discussion about the mutual/dialectical relationship between the existence/absence of democracy and the existence/absence of peace. Popular political participation is the core characteristic of democracy. Although Sudan’s democratic regimes came to power through popular uprisings against military rule in 1964 as well as in 1985, the country’s political dynamics have repeatedly led to elitist and centralised democracies instead of participatory democracy. This type of democracy has failed to be an effective and sustainable system of governance; it has enhanced the concentration of wealth and power in the urban/centre elitist domains and caused continuous civil war. This chapter argues that it has been the absence of popular participation that made the three democracies in Sudan (1956–8, 1964–9 and 1986–9) instruments or formulas for maintaining the hegemony of the centre over the rest of the country, of the north over the south, and of the elite over the general population. Sudan faces the three structural and connected problems of uneven development, a deficient political system, and civil wars. Hence, the resolution towards even development, sustainable peace and good democratic governance must also be structural: building an appropriate political system that can make development even and stop civil strife and war. The main argument of this paper is that Deliberative Democracy, in one dimension, addresses the so-called incompatibility of participatory 62

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Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) democracy with current systems of representative democracy and is thus able to push the existing uses of democracy in Sudan to the ideal democratic system of governance. In another dimension it addresses the issue of development in the periphery by giving the people in these areas more participation in developmental policy-making, thus tackling the core of the power relationship between the centre and the periphery. And it is able to solve the problem of civil wars, which is connected to the deficient political system and uneven development. The paper investigates ingredients of Deliberative Democracy in local communities, tribes, CBOs, neighbourhoods, etc. and establishes ways in which these can be empowered to build appropriate democratic governance from the bottom nationwide.

The failure of the elitist state The contemporary Sudanese state came into existence – during the rule of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule (1889–1955) – as a result of an improper articulation of a foreign/modern formula with local/traditional bases. It is not ‘a product of society at a certain stage of development’, as Engels says, or an ‘official résumé of societies’, as Marx puts it (Engels 1970/1884: 576; Marx 1992/1886: 23). Therefore, and since then, it has undergone a continuous dislocation between the modern state formula and the indigenous bases. As a result of this dislocation, it is characterised by two related structural features: the first connected to the relationship between the centre and the regions and the second to the relationship between the elites and the masses. With regard to the centre-regions relationship, there is no need to repeat the well-known literature and the empirical calculations of uneven development between the centre of the state and its regions, between the urban and rural areas, and between big towns and remote villages. Since independence, the Sudanese state has never become a ‘nation-state’ in the classical sense or a state that represents its different regions. It is actually the state of the centre. Growing tendencies of regionalism, regionalisation and the ethnicisation of politics and separatism as well as the civil wars in the regions (south, west, east and south-east) are clear manifestations of the reaction to the centralised nature of the state. The CPA, the DPA and the Asmara Peace Accord for eastern Sudan indicate that the future state is going to be shaped, at least to some extent, by these reactions, especially in view of the fact that not only wealth and power sharing came out of these agreements, but also the ‘right to self-determination’ that is built into the CPA. With regard to the elites-masses relationship, it has to be stated that, although the nature of the Sudanese state has witnessed various changes, elite hegemony has been the common factor in (or in spite of ) all these changes. For the purpose of this analysis, the state is defined not as a monolithic entity, institution, or abstract superstructure independent of its social 63

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formation, but as ‘a condensation of social relations, constituted through a long process of struggle and negotiations by socio-economic forces aspiring to achieve domination’ (Ali 1989: 59). This definition will be used to outline the struggle for domination that led to the prevalence of the elitist state. This prevalence can be seen in the following chronological analysis, which is extracted, with a different juxtaposition, from the work of Niblock (1991). From 1956, the date of independence, up to the military coup on May 25, 1969, the Sudanese state can be classified as a traditional elites’ state. During that period it was closely related to, and associated with, the traditional elites (religious and tribal leaders), with the collaboration of urban/modern elites. The socio-economic restructuring by the colonial state provided the basis for this shared domination. Independence made no qualitative change to the socio-economic structure. Thus, from independence to 1969 the post-colonial state was dominated by the Umma and National Unionist (later restructured and renamed Democratic Unionist) parties. The state policies adopted during that time matched the elites’ interests against the interests of their constituencies of peasants, tenant farmers, nomads, etc. The Jawada tragedy of February 1956 is a case that discloses this contradiction. In Jawada village about two hundred tenant farmers died in a disused armoury, where they had been imprisoned following a strike against government policies concerning pump schemes in the White Nile region. This tragedy took place during the regime of the ‘national coalition government’, a coalition of agricultural capitalists with fractions of the bourgeoisie, which included the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the Umma Party and was created only one month after independence. The tragedy has been seen as representing in a nutshell the ‘continuous failure of the dominant power bloc to resolve its contradictions with the farmers in a democratic fashion’ and ‘the reaction of the Sudanese ruling class to the needs of its rural communities’ (Ali 1989: 94–5). Instead of a democratic or peaceful solution of the conflict, this power bloc used brute force. The traditional elites’ state continued up to 1969, irrespective of the change in the political system from democracy to military rule in 1958, and from military rule back to democracy in 1964. The connection between the traditional elites and the Aboud regime (1958–64) was exemplified in the composition of the Central Council, which was formed for civil political participation in government. Traditional elites constituted 43 per cent of this council (Niblock 1987: 223). The ‘1964 uprising’ succeeded only in transferring government from the military to the civil bloc of the traditional elites. The non-participatory formula of democracy made this possible and easy. The 1965–9 state was again dominated by the traditional party coalition, and this state came once again, with minor changes, to dominate the period from the late 1970s to 1989. The modern-elite state took two forms. The first was the bourgeoisbureaucratic state after 1972, marking the end of the collaboration between the May regime of Jaafar el-Nimeiri and the Sudanese 64

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Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) Communist Party (SCP). This state was characterised by a close relationship with the commercial bourgeoisie, whereby the state bureaucrats were transformed into a ‘state bourgeoisie’ (Niblock 1991). Under this regime, the economic policies reflected the interests of the commercial bourgeoisie by favouring an open economy, giving the private sector a leading role, encouraging foreign investment, and adopting a technocratic bureaucracy, which led to the application of the structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund (Abdel Gadir 1985). The second form is the bourgeoisie-Islamic state following the military coup by the NIF on June 30, 1989. This state is characterised by a very close relationship (equalisation or assimilation) between the state and the ruling party and party members who became the new bourgeoisie. Liberalisation of the economy, privatisation, marketisation, liquidation of the public sector, etc., along with the ideological control over the state by the NIF, made the economic policies reflect only the interests of these new rich. According to this analysis, elite hegemony and the absence of popular participation have prevailed throughout the post-independence Sudanese state. Elite domination and popular apathy are apparently the characteristics of Sudanese politics. However, this paper will show that popular participation has taken different forms, which have been made invisible by applying biased categories of analysis.

Debates on popular participation During the past elite-dominated regimes the state failed to achieve development, sustainable rule, unity and peace. Alas, the elitist state has failed. Is a state of the people, the citizens, the masses possible and/or attainable? It is not only by reflecting the people’s interests that a state becomes the state of the people, but also by reflecting their effective participation, not only in decision-making but also in governance. Here, another good question emerges: is popular/mass participation possible? Modernisation theorists in general believe that the era of the affirmative state, the state that plays an active role in solving problems in response to popular demands, is over, and political passivity is the unavoidable price of modernisation and modernity. Not only this, but they believe that it will be beneficial to democracy if many people remain unconcerned and uninvolved in the political process. In developing nations, popular political participation has been regarded as being a destabilising force which exacerbates socio-economic inequality; in other words, higher levels of political participation will promote a lower level of socio-economic equality. Urbanisation, the increase in literacy rates and education will give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations which, if not satisfied, will lead to instability. In short, a high level of popular participation will put a greater burden on new states (Huntington/Nelson 1976: 42). 65

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Theorists of elitist democracy share these ideas. They rely on the justifications of modernisation and believe that, in modern times and conditions, mass political participation is impossible and politics is inevitably the concern of the few. Consequently, representative democracy, constitutional democracy, and power elite democracy – with low popular participation – appear to be the only attainable possibilities (Schumpeter 1952; Lipset 1966). Another version of the elitist theory of democracy objects to popular participation in view of the nature of political activity and the inadequate intellectual attainments of the masses. Politics, in this aristocratic view that goes back to Plato and the Greek philosophers, is an art requiring expertise and qualities naturally bestowed on only a few. The unqualified masses should either be kept off or granted only a limited role in politics. Their essential role should be relatively limited or confined principally to the periodic election of representatives. The above debate on the abilities of the masses to participate can be regarded as a debate on the question whether the masses meet the expectations of democratic theory in the mind of the theorists, and not whether the masses in their own situations are actually participating and making political choices and evaluations on how and where these choices in fact are being implemented. Radical democratic theorists, on the other hand, are in favour of popular participation and suggest that citizens’ participation is intrinsically valuable. In their view, public involvement in politics creates better citizens, better policies and better governance. Mill, for instance, argued that by actively participating in politics, rather than allowing others to make decisions in their own interests, people learn and grow (Robson 1968). According to Pateman, there are three benefits to be obtained from a more participatory democratic society: education, integration, and acceptance of decisions (Pateman 1970). Those radical theorists, on the one hand, agree with the modernisation and elitist theorists that popular participation is low in modern times. On the other hand, they insist that this does not mean ruling out the idealdemocratic element of popular/mass/citizen participation. This puts them in the dilemma that they believe that citizens should be given greater opportunities to participate in making the decisions that govern their lives, but, because they hesitate to leave the normative realm, they do not reveal how to bring this participation about. This paper intends to fill this gap, in line with Morrell who insists that ‘theorists of participatory democracy should discuss not only whether or not opportunities for participation are open to citizens, but also how these opportunities ought to be institutionalized’ (Morrell 1999: 294).

Two approaches to political participation One of the concerns of this paper is to get the radical democrats out of this dilemma, but first let us see why they are in it. A general problem of 66

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Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) theorists of a participatory political system that involves the masses seems to be that, in one way or another, they adopt the mainstream definition of political participation given by the elitist democratic theorists, neglecting other definitions. There are two main definitions, which represent two different paradigms: the instrumentalist approach and the developmental approach. The instrumentalists, who form the mainstream, define political participation as a means to some restricted end, such as the better defence of (mainly) individual interest. According to this definition, political participation denotes ‘those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the election of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take’ (Verba/Nie 1972: 2). It is also defined as ‘activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government decision – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies’ (Verba et al. 1995: 38). This definition is characterised by two main features: it is individualistic and conventional. Firstly, political participation is regarded here as an act taken by private citizens, that is, an act articulating private interest. Based on this assumption, behavioural cost-benefit studies have been conducted in order to measure people’s involvement in politics. According to the so-called ‘SES model’, the socio-economic status of the individual is the sole determining factor for his/her level of involvement. Secondly, the focus is on ‘conventional’ political activities, that is, activities within the formal political system (mainly electoral). The SES model measures four modes of political participation: voting, campaign activity, personalised contact with government officials, and communal activity in the sense of non-electoral activities by which citizens try to influence policies (Verba et al. 1973: 237). Other forms, such as demonstrations, whether pro- or anti-government, are excluded on the ground that they are ‘ceremonial’ or ‘support’ activities, whereas the focus of the theorists is on ‘activities within the system – ways of influencing politics that are generally recognized as legal and legitimate’ (Verba/Nie 1972: 3). Others denote ‘protest and demonstration’ as ‘expressive’ activities, much like ‘pledging allegiance’, and not as ‘instrumentalist’ activities applied to win ‘personal political rewards’, and exclude them from the definition of political participation on these grounds (Milbrath 1965: 14). By considering political participation as an individualistic activity, this approach ignores the fact that there are collective and communal modes of participation. By concentrating on conventional and electoral participation, it overlooks the unconventional types of participation like solving local problems and providing local needs through informal authorities, or protesting and fighting the whole political system. According to the developmental approach, political participation is not only an instrument for an end, but an end in itself. It is part of a process of political education and individual and societal realisation. In politics it is 67

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only by practical experience that the individual and the society at large can manage their own affairs. And managing one’s affairs is part and parcel of being a human being, and for the society to be a human society. In contrast to the instrumentalist concept, the definition of political participation in this approach is broad and inclusive. It covers both individual and collective acts, conventional as well as unconventional modes of participation. The literature dealing with this approach is vast and diverse and sometimes without common agreement. For the purposes of this paper, the definition of Seligson and Booth (1979) will be applied, which considers affecting governmental decision-making as only one purpose of political participation and citizens’ activism, among many others. Different activities with different goals can be observed empirically; they form types of participation that are often not aimed at influencing the decisions of the formal governmental institutions but, as Seligson and Booth also argue, creating and allocating resources for individual and collective needs and benefits. The instrumentalist focus on governmental decision-making as the object of citizens’ activism stems directly from their conventional definitions of political participation, politics and the political process, assuming that governments or formal authorities are the only ones which determine the authoritative allocation of values. Governments and formal authorities do indeed allocate values in societies, but the point here is that they are not the only important institutions for doing this. Informal institutions and authorities, such as, for example, the tribes in Sudanese rural areas, do the same. Seligson and Booth’s conceptualisation of political participation permits the inclusion of both decisions made by formal governmental institutions and informal resource allocation. They define political participation as ‘behaviour influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods’ (Seligson/Booth 1979: 6). This definition has the virtue of being broad enough to include the phenomena instrumentalists regard as participation, without excessively restricting its focus to the institutions of formal government. The narrowness of the mainstream definition of participation has caused students of political participation to overlook or ignore the existence and the nature of popular/mass participation. The fact that the masses do not take part in conventional politics as intensely as the elites does not mean that the masses do not participate at all. They participate, but in other forms, or they have alternatives or other participation mechanisms built on the context in which they are living. According to Seligson and Booth (1979: 48): (w)e can not, however, ignore the other arenas – such as the community and local government – where the masses do make their influence felt. In such arenas, where resources are even scarcer than at the national level, rather than seeking solely to redistribute public goods … participation may actually create new public goods. Thus, such activity is truly developmental.

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A third definition of political participation According to the ‘situational analysis’ approach, the meaning of a certain action to the actors is part of the situation as they see it; or, in other words, conceptions and definitions of acts in a situation also define – or partly constitute – the situation. In a particular context, definitions are relevant to a certain purpose or situation, and consequently are applicable only to a restricted field or ‘universe of discourse’. Whenever a definition or concept is taken outside of this universe, it becomes a kind of metaphor. Against this background, this paper investigates how Sudanese people define ‘political participation’, followed by an analysis of how they in fact do participate in politics. The Sudanese people’s definition used here is extracted from a larger piece of research on political participation in Sudan (see Eltahir 2008). Field surveys were conducted in three research sites, namely, the States of Khartoum (to represent the northern and central part of the country), Southern Kordofan (to represent the western part) and Upper Nile (to represent the southern part). Within these States, data were collected in urban and rural areas, in towns and villages. The total number of informants (for the topics and concern of this paper) was 120. Of these, 52 were from Khartoum State, 23 from Southern Kordofan, and 45 from Upper Nile State; 55 (45.8 per cent) were females and 65 (54.2 per cent) males. Concerning the variable of age, the informants were classified into six groups to differentiate between generations. The biggest group was that ranging from 30 to 40 (51 informants, 42.5% of the sample), followed by the group of 40–50 (32 informants, 26.7%) and the group of 20–30 (25 informants, 20.8%). The other two groups were very small in number; only 5 informants (4.2%) were under 20 and only 2 (1.7%) more than 60 years old. Referring to their educational level, the informants were divided into seven categories or groups according to the common educational standards of the country. There is a group of illiterates (38 informants, 31.7% of the total), a group of those who can only write and read but with no formal primary education (4 informants, 3.3% of the total), a group with primary education (7 informants, 5.8% of the total), a group at the intermediate educational level (2 informants, 1.7% of the total), a group with secondary educational level (13 informants, 10.8% of the total), a group with university educational level (33 informants, 27.5% of the total) and a group with postgraduate education (22 informants, 18.3% of the total). The research revealed a general tendency to define the term ‘politics’ as an action or task. This task is perceived to be undertaken by different actors (the people, government, political parties and the educated) to achieve different goals (in which the provision of basic needs takes the lead in this survey). In order to see how the Sudanese perceive or define ‘political participation’, the definitions presented by a sample of 100 informants were screened. Of them, only 10 definitions can be classified as 69

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mainstream/instrumental. 22 informants gave definitions which considered political participation to be an act or activity that takes place in the formal domain of the government or state. The rest of the definitions are classifiable under the unconventional and partly the developmental definition. The range of definitions can be highlighted by four brief examples: • Political participation is ‘to provide services with the government to the people’; • ‘to have a role in life in different forms like expressing your opinion, participating in or contributing to life’; • ‘participation in the national activities, which begin with work in the neighbourhood and jobs, and is participation in the economic and social areas …’; • involvement in war or armed conflicts. The last is the most unconventional mode of political participation. It was given by informants in South Sudan and Southern Kordofan. When looking at how the interview partners perceive formal and informal political participation and comparing it with the state and government formalism and with the mainstream definition of politics, the requirement of finding an appropriate definition covering this spectrum is obvious. The conventionality of the people’s perception of the term was assessed by looking at the intention of the actors behind the act of participation. The intention was specified in the definitions which assign the actor the attribute of being ‘political’. In the definition stating that ‘political participation is the collective work of the political forces to manage a specific project’, ‘political forces’ would signify such a political intention. In the definition ‘political participation is the participation of all political parties in state policies’, the ‘political parties’ carry the intention of political action. In some cases the arena of action is specified as being political. This is the case in a definition which states that ‘political participation is the awareness about what is going on in the political field’, as well as the definition which says that ‘political participation is the effective work in political process to achieve progress’. The informants considered politics to be connected or related to different arenas, as the following definitions show: • ‘Political participation is the expression and activation of your opinions to design the politics which firstly are related to your private sphere, and then the general or public sphere…’. • ‘Political participation is to be active in the issues concerning society, because all human economic and social life is connected with politics’. There are also different perceptions of the scope within which political participation is regarded as taking place and different relations are assigned to it. Various definitions specify that political participation takes place in the general political arena and in the specific spheres of the political parties, the 70

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Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) state and government, for example stating that ‘political participation is the effective work in the political process’, ‘political participation is the participation in a specific political party…’, ‘political participation is to contribute in the state’s affairs’, and ‘political participation is participation of citizens in government’. In other definitions political participation is considered as a ‘political’ act or as an act in the political sphere, but in the broader sense of the ‘political’. In these cases political participation is considered as taking place in different specific spheres. Some informants consider political participation as an act for solving problems, or related to current problems or situations. There are definitions that hold political participation to be ‘the awareness of what is going on in the political arena, to manage and solve the current problems’, ‘to discuss the problems facing the country and the work of solving them’, and ‘the positive and negative interaction with the current political situation’. Several informants defined political participation as related to the provision of social services, general needs and the contribution in public work, as, for instance, ‘to share in steering public affairs …’, and ‘to share with others in action and opinion concerning personal and general needs’. Those definitions which relate political participation to ‘society’ as scope for action can be added to this category. These include, for example, the definitions that political participation is ‘the free expression of good ideas that help society’, and political participation as ‘part of the political work one is doing in society…’. There is a category of definitions relating political participation to broader areas, among them the following: • Political participation ‘is the right of the citizen to express his opinion about political issues, because politics is connected to every part of his life’. • It is ‘for the citizens to know their rights in different aspects of life’. • It is ‘to have a role in life in different forms …’. • It is ‘participation in the national activities which begin from work in the neighbourhood and jobs, and it is participation in the economic and social areas’. • It ‘is the expression of opinion about whatever is connected to the citizen’s political, cultural, economic, and social life’. In a further step, these definitions were analysed in terms of the ends, goals or targets they include. 40 per cent of the informants mentioned a specific end as structurally related to their definition, which can be classified into three categories. The biggest group identifies the people’s interests, problems, needs and related issues as the targets of political participation, the second group identifies the general interests of the country or related issues, and the smallest group relates political participation to general or abstract values and principles. 71

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From this analysis, it can be concluded that there is a tendency amongst the Sudanese to regard political participation as a collective rather than an individualistic activity. The actor identified in most of the definitions is ‘the people’, ‘the citizens’, ‘political parties’, ‘political forces’, ‘political representatives’ and ‘civil society organisations’. Identifying political participation as an act of institutions, organisations, associations, societies, or groups also indicates that participation is understood as a collective or communal act rather than an individualistic one. This meaning can be related to the developmental rather than the instrumental paradigm of defining the term. Since political participation tends to be interpreted as part of civic engagement, it can be related to social capital and agency theories. Unlike modernisation theory, attitudinal or political culture theory and the civic voluntarism or SES model, social capital and agency theories emphasise the role of mobilising institutions in society. This includes the way in which political parties, trade unions and religious groups recruit, organise and engage people’s activities in politics. In this case study the general trend has been to perceive political participation as an unconventional collective action which lies outside the realm or scope of the state and government and is directed towards achieving collective ends for the benefit of the people, the country, and abstract values. While this definition is totally different from the mainstream conventional instrumental definition presented above, it is not totally equal to the developmental definition. It can, therefore be presented here as a new definition of political participation.

Communal-unconventional participation According to the previous discussion, political participation can take many collective forms like tribal action, ethnic groups’ action, community action, or a form of social movement. The research has revealed that people in Sudan have logical and constructed beliefs within specific domains and situations that enable them to make political decisions and participate politically according to specific situations. They tend to rely on social or ethnic groups to guide their behaviour. In that situation, this may produce highly effective modes of participation. This creates, for the member of the respective group, a ‘short cut’ by using the group or community evaluation, reasoning, information, way of thinking, and participation. In theory, there are two models of collective action. The first assumes that unconventionally confronting the power structure in direct action for collective interests results in conflict. The second assumes that collective interests can be achieved by expanding access to the power structure on the basis of consensus rather than confrontation (Smith/Bryce 1972: 203–4). The conflict model is applicable in southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan, Darfur, eastern Sudan and other parts of northern Sudan, where community action through tribes, 72

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Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) ethnic groups and the SPLM/A launched civil war against the power structure of the old Sudan and its social order. An intensive debate on political participation has focused on the question, why citizens’ involvement in politics is systematically decreasing in Western democracies. Crouch explains this by the emergence of a postdemocracy era, where a ‘vacuum (has been) left in mass political participation by the decline of the working class, and the growth of a political class linked to the rest of society more or less solely via business lobbyists’ (Crouch 2005: 111). Putnam attributes this decline to the broad trend of ‘bowling alone’. He argues that social engagement is dropping in advanced industrial societies because of societal changes, such as changing work patterns, rising television usage, and the decline of social institutions. These trends have supposedly led to a decline in social capital – the skills and values that facilitate participation – and thereby to a decline in the citizenry’s participation in politics (Putnam 2000). The case in Sudan is different. The Sudanese are neither in a post-democratic era, nor bowling alone.

Political participation in Sudan after the CPA Unlike the past regime changes – 1956 (independence), 1958, 1964, 1969, 1985, and 1989 (from democratic to military regimes and vice versa) – the present change came from the regions and not exclusively from the urban centre (Khartoum). During the past changes, the urban masses were involved ‘unconventionally’ in a protest mode of participation and changed the political systems. This time the rural masses became involved in an unconventional protest mode of participation and the CPA was the outcome. C PA : W I T H O N E H A N D I T G I V E S, W I T H T H E OT H E R I T TA K E S

Regardless of any pitfalls, the CPA succeeded in resolving the two major issues of conflict. It brought the war in the South to an end, and, by example, opened the way for ending other wars in other regions of the country. It also brought an end to the historical hegemony of the centre over the peripheral regions and gave the latter the autonomy and the resources for which they took up arms. With the power sharing protocol, the CPA gives the populace conventional political participation – the right of voting to elect the president, the state governor, and people’s representatives in the national and state legislatures within a decentralised system of government with significant devolution of powers, having regard to the national, southern Sudan, state, and local levels of government. The CPA also gives the populace the human rights endorsed in international treaties, the International Conventions on Civil and Political Rights, on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Against Apartheid in Sports (GOS/SPLM/A 2005). 73

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With regard to the general concern of this paper, the CPA has been successful in one of the three structural and connected problems of uneven development, a deficient political system, and civil war: it has put an end to the civil war. With its wealth sharing arrangement, it can be considered a necessary step for solving the second structural problem: uneven development. However, it considers the democratic system of governance to be the appropriate political system within which wealth sharing, even development, and lasting peace should take place. By the democratic system of governance, the CPA means the elitist democracy (with minimum popular participation) that has prevailed in Sudan since independence. The most unconventional (because of its relation to direct democracy) and strongest rights and powers given to the people by the agreement are the right to self-determination for the people of southern Sudan and the popular consultation for the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. In this paper it is argued that the CPA, with the other hand, takes these powers, particularly the last two, and shifts them to the elites. This can be seen generally in the elements of the representative democracy adopted by the CPA, and specifically in the power given to the commissions. The last part of this paper therefore concentrates on how the most significant powers the CPA gives to the people are transferred to the elites. The CPA stipulates that the people of southern Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a referendum to determine their future status. However, it also states that an independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) is to be established during the pre-transition period (January to July 2005) to monitor the implementation of the CPA during the interim period. This commission is to conduct a mid-term evaluation of the unity arrangements established under the CPA (GOS/SPLM/A 2005). In the light of the previous discussion, this immediately raises doubts as to whether the expert assessment and evaluation report will be neutral in mobilising for unity or separation, and suspicions about expanding the mandate of the commission to evaluate the ‘unity arrangements’ and not simply the implementation of the CPA in general. The bias is particularly obvious with regard to the right to popular consultation for the people of the ‘two areas’. In article 3.1 the CPA states that ‘popular consultation is a democratic right and mechanism to ascertain the views of the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile States on the comprehensive agreement’ (GOS/SPLM/A 2005: 92). However, in the very next article (3.2) it says that ‘this comprehensive agreement shall be subjected to the will of the people of the two states through their respective democratically elected legislatures’ (ibid.). Thus they are supposed to decide through representation, and not by a direct referendum like the people of southern Sudan. Not only this, but this representative body is, firstly, to establish a parliamentary AEC ‘to assess and evaluate the implementation of the agreement in each state’ (ibid.). Moreover, an independent commission is to be established by the presidency to do the 74

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Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) same job, ‘to assess and evaluate the implementation of the agreement in the two states’ (ibid.). So there will be two assessment and evaluation reports, and these reports are to be presented to the assemblies of the states for their vote. ‘Once the agreement is endorsed by the people through their state legislature as meeting their aspirations, then the agreement becomes the final settlement of political conflict in the state’ (ibid.). With the hand of the general agreement the CPA gives, and with the hand of the devil hidden in the detail it takes away. If this two-handed argument is true with regard to power sharing, will it be false with regard to wealth sharing? The hand of the general CPA gives wealth, oil revenues and a National Reconstruction and Development Fund to develop waraffected areas in the South and the least developed areas outside southern Sudan. With the other hand, it transfers them to the few hands of commissions and elites. Here, more basic questions arise. Is the CPA a rebirth of the elitist state in a new form? Instead of the elites in the centre, are the elites now in different centres and/or different states? Is this a break of the vicious circle (alternation between democratic and military rule)? Or is it a break of the old social formation of the old Sudan? A study of people’s grassroots activities after the CPA may provide some answers. EMPOW ER I NG DEMO C RAC Y: INTRODU CI NG DEL I BERATI V E DE M O C RAC Y IN SU DAN

The research on political participation in Sudan revealed the following. When the conventional mainstream, individualistic and instrumentalist approach, measuring the level of participation exclusively in political activities within the political – mainly the electoral – system, is applied, it is found that the level of people’s political participation is generally low, and the level of non-elite participation is lower than that of the elites. The developmental concept of political participation states that political participation is a ‘behaviour influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods’ (Seligson/Booth 1979: 6). Applying this definition, the research finding is a high level of non-elite participation in unconventional modes of political participation. Collective, unconventional and communal modes of participation come to light. The research in the urban and rural areas in Sudan has shown that people are active in solving local problems and perform numerous activities in tribal, ethnic and community contexts as well as social movements. There are many forms of neighbourhood activities for providing local needs through informal authorities. Some of the people are involved in protesting and/or fighting the whole political system, in particular in southern Sudan and Southern Kordofan, where community action through tribes, ethnic groups and the SPLM/A culminated in the civil war against the power structure of the old Sudan and its old social order (see also Eltahir 2008). The instrumentalist approach disregards, but the developmental approach regards, the fact that citizens, independently of formal governmental institutions, collectively create resources which satisfy their 75

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own needs. They informally allocate scarce resources for collective benefits. Accordingly, there will be a basis for sustainable and effective democratic governance, if it is built on participatory democracy. Such a system of governance can help in achieving even development and sustainable peace. The conventional, periodic and episodic political participation of the people seems to be ineffective in accomplishing the central ideas of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that are conducive to development of the periphery, and, in a more radical egalitarian version of the democratic ideal, ensuring that all citizens benefit from the nation’s wealth. Field research in Upper Nile and Southern Kordofan States provided evidence of ordinary people participating in discussing and solving their communal problems. This has been common in the Nuer tribe and among the Nuba. They meet and bargain with one another to arrive at an acceptable negotiated solution, sitting under specific trees (Eltahir 2008: 314–26). Such informal institutions, which exist predominantly in the rural areas, can be regarded as elements of deliberative democracy, because the mechanism satisfies its three principles: practical orientation, bottom-up participation, and deliberative generation of solutions. There is also tangible evidence of this type of democracy in some urban civil society organisations whose members are involved in the major decision-making process and in establishing the vision and strategic plans of the organisation (ibid. 304–14). Those institutions have the potential to be radically and deliberatively democratic, since they rely on the participation and capacities of ordinary people (in the traditional cases) and all members of civil society organisations (in the modern cases). Deliberative decisionmaking is in contrast to three major familiar methods of social choice: command and control by experts, aggregative voting, and strategic negotiation. How can the embryonic features of deliberative democracy be empowered and incorporated in the formal and national political system of the whole country? The main issue is to start from below and empower the potential institutions of deliberative democracy in tribes, informal institutions, CBOs, etc. to be more effective in (i) tackling specific, tangible problems (principle of practical orientation), (ii) involving ordinary people affected by these problems together with the officials that are close to them, thus establishing new channels for those most directly affected to apply their knowledge, intelligence and interests to the formulation of solutions (principle of bottom-up participation), (iii) deliberative decision-making, which implies that participants listen to each other’s positions and generate group choices after due consideration. In contemplating and arguing about what the group 76

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Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) should do, participants would persuade one another by offering reasons that others could accept for collective action (principle of deliberative generation of solutions). These principles, that are already applied in some informal groups, will have to be linked to the government structures, starting from the local level up to the national level. Policy-makers and activists in local governance, decentralisation, political parties and civil society organisations and those who prefer the radical/ideal-democratic approach to governance will have the role of encouraging, supporting and replicating the deliberative democratic model in the country. Through this process, compatible, effective and sustainable participatory democracy will grow from the grassroots and in turn address the connected issues of even development and sustainable peace. THE I NSTI TU TI ONAL DESI G N O F D E LIBE RAT IVE DEMOCR ACY

Since the three principles of deliberative democracy are in themselves quite attractive, the pressing question is whether feasible institutional configurations or realistic social conditions will advance them measurably in practice. This means that these three general principles must first be incorporated in institutional designs. Secondly, there must be social prerequisites and conditions that stabilise and deepen their practice. The institutional designs or properties are: (i) Devolution. This means the transfer of public decision-making authority to empowered local units. Since Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) targets local problems and solicits localised participation (localised in both issue and geographical space), its institutional reality requires the commensurate reorganisation of the state apparatus. It entails the administrative and political devolution of power to local action units – such as neighbourhood councils – charged with devising and implementing solutions and being held accountable. (ii) Centralised supervision and coordination. This means the creation of formal linkages of responsibility, resource distribution, and communication that connect these units to each other and to a superordinate, more centralised authority. Although they enjoy substantial power and discretion, local units do not operate as autonomous, atomised sites of decision-making in EDD. Instead, linkages of accountability and communication connect local units to superordinate bodies. These central offices can reinforce the quality of local democratic deliberation and problem solving in a variety of ways: coordinating and distributing resources and solving problems that local units cannot address by themselves. (iii) State-centred, not voluntaristic. This means the use and generation of state institutions to support and guide these local problem-solving efforts rather than leaving them as informal or voluntary affairs. Here, EDD 77

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colonises state power and transforms formal governance institutions. It seeks to transform the mechanisms of state power into permanently mobilised deliberative-democratic, grassroots forms. It is less radical than many activists currently are in the periphery in Sudan, since its central activity is not ‘fighting the power’. But it is more radical in the sense that it has a larger scope for reform and tries to change the central procedures of power. For these institutional properties to operate efficiently in terms of contributing to the realisation of democratic values and deliberative decision-making, some crucial enabling conditions are necessary. Most important is a balance of power between the actors engaged in EDD. A rough equality of power is highly required in the traditional institution of the tribe, where the balance of power is in favour of, for instance, the elders compared with others and of men compared with women. (iv) Evaluation measures. EDD must be applied, assessed, and evaluated by using three important democratic values as yardsticks or measures: effectiveness, equity and sustainability of participation. For effectiveness, the yardstick should measure how the introduction of EDD advances public ends more effectively than alternative institutional arrangements. This includes assessements of (a) how it convenes and empowers individuals who possess intimate knowledge about relevant situations close to the point of action, (b) to what extent those individuals know how best to improve the situation, (c) how the deliberative process that regulates these groups’ decisionmaking generates solutions superior to the hierarchical or less reflective aggregation procedures (such as voting), (d) to what extent actors’ commitment to implementing decisions rises, because the decisions are not imposed from above, (e) how EDD shortens the feedback loop – the distance and time between decisions, action, effect, observation and reconsideration. For equity, the evaluation should measure how the application of EDD helps in generating fair and equitable outcomes. Assessments will have to establish (a) how well the goals of a given action have been served and to what extent this action has delivered effective public action to those who do not generally enjoy this good, (b) to what extent disadvantaged individuals, who are often excluded from public actions, are involved, (c) to what degree decisions come as a result of deliberation and not from strategic bargaining, hierarchical commands or aggregate voting. Finally the goals, outcomes and measures of effectiveness and equity will have to be assessed in terms of sustainability. 78

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Conclusion The issue of political transition and post-conflict reconstruction is a very complex and multi-faceted issue. Its dimensions range from economic, political and social to cultural factors. The CPA, besides aiming at ending the civil war and promoting peace and security, gives the opportunity to establish new political and economic dispensations to consolidate democratic governance and sustainable and equal development for the different regions of the country to address the structural causes of conflicts and political instability: civil war, uneven development, and a deficient political system. This paper has shown that the issue of the political system needs to be re-addressed to avoid the deficiencies of non-participatory democracy. Accordingly, the paper suggested the adoption of (or empowering the already existing elementary features of) Deliberative Democracy in Sudan. This model of democracy, in addition to the above-mentioned potential, has the virtue and ability of bridging the gap between the traditional institutions, wisdoms and experiences, and the modern institutions, formalities and structures. EED can work and be applied as a step towards the values of the ideal participatory democracy, even without immediately altering the modern representative structure of governance as embodied in the legislative assembly, which is structured through aggregate voting for indirect representation and decision-making. It has the virtue and ability of being part of a holistic and strategic reform in the areas of governance, decisionmaking, democratisation, participation and development.

References Abdel Gadir, Ali (1985) The Sudan Economy in Disarray: Essays on the IMF Model. London: Biddles Ltd. Ali, Taisier M. A. (1989) The Cultivation of Hunger: State and Agriculture in Sudan. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. Crouch, Colin (2005) Post-Democracy – Themes for the 21st Century Series. Cambridge: Polity Press. Eltahir, Yasir Awad Abdalla (2008) Political Participation in Sudan. How Sudanese People Get Involved in Politics. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Khartoum. Engels, Friedrich (1970) The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State. Moscow: Progress Publishers. GOS/SPLM/A (2005) Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Signed by Taha, Ali Osman and Garang, John on January 9, Nairobi. Huntington, Samuel P./Nelson, Joan M. (1976) No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lipset, Seymour Martin (1966) Political Man. London: Mercury Books. Marx, Karl (1992) The Poverty of Philosophy. New York: International Publishers Company Inc. Milbrath, Lester W. (1965) Political Participation: Why and How Do People get Involved in Politics? Chicago: Rand McNally.

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YASIR AWAD ABDALLA ELTAHIR Morrell, Michael E. (1999) Citizens’ Evaluation of Participatory Democratic Procedures: Normative Theory Meets Empirical Science, in: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 2, June: 293–322. Niblock, Tim C. (1987) Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics 1898–1985. London: Macmillan. Niblock, Tim C. (1991) The Background to the Change of Government in 1985, in: Woodward, Peter (ed.) Sudan after Nimeiri. London: Routledge. Pateman, Carol (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, Robert D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Robson, John M. (1968) The Improvement of Mankind: The Social and Political Thought of John Stuart Mill. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1952) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen and Unwin. Seligson, Mitchel A./Booth, John A. (1979) Political Participation in Latin America. New York: Holmes and Meier. Smith, Cyril S./Bryce, Anderson (1972) Political Participation through Community Action, in: Bryce, A. et al. Participation in Politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Verba, Sidney/Lehman Schlozman, Kay/Brady, Henry E. (1995) Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Verba, Sidney et al. (1973) Modes of Democratic Participation: Continuities in Research, in: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, July: 235–50. Verba, Sidney/Nie, Norman H. (1972) Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper and Row.

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Part II

Challenges Facing Post-war Societies in Sudan

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5 The CPA & Beyond Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains S A M S O N S. WA S S A R A

Introduction The Nuba Mountains had been part of the political turbulence of Sudan since people in that region engaged in armed struggle in the mid-1980s. The Nuba people sought to pursue their rights in collaboration with the SPLM that was based mainly in southern Sudan. It is the participation of the people of the Nuba Mountains as an integral part of the SPLA that is the reason why the region was covered by the CPA. Chapter V, Article 2.1 of the CPA stipulates that ‘(t)he boundaries of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State shall be the same boundaries of the former Southern Kordofan Province when Greater Kordofan was sub-divided into two provinces’. The basis of the agreement is to find solutions to human rights and freedoms, the development and protection of cultural heritage and the development of human resources and infrastructure within a framework of accountability and transparency. The signing of an agreement is an emotional demonstration of intentions, but its implementation is another process. The CPA was a cause for celebrations in the Nuba Mountains, as in other similar regions covered by the agreement. It was expected that the happiness of the peoples emerging from the harsh realities of violence would translate into collaborative actions of development and joint management of scarce resources in the Nuba Mountains. This chapter examines social and political tension as the potential spoiler of the political, social and economic stability of a region with a violent past. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to assess how the lives of people have changed and the extent to which people and institutions interact within the framework of the agreement. The study attempts to chart the directions of developments in the Nuba Mountains as well as mapping potential challenges to the implementation of the CPA. 83

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Methodological approach of the study The CPA is an agreement concluded between the GOS and the SPLM/A to address the structural causes of conflict in southern Sudan and the marginalised regions affected by the protracted civil war that ended in 2005. The Nuba Mountains are part of the agreement, which has inspired high expectations among the Nuba people. However, the Baggara Arab tribes and other ethnic groups in the region received the agreement with caution. The civil war had had a life-cycle of about two decades in the region. It has created a set of new relationships in which doubt, suspicion and hostility are the order of the day. War-time alliances and alignments continue to influence relationships in the ethnic divide and ideological differences among the communities in the Nuba Mountains. Assessing the state of peaceful coexistence between the communities of the Nuba Mountains should be based on methodological tools such as participatory appraisal, conflict analysis, and responsive evaluation techniques. This implies that the research is based on the involvement of political institutions, civil society and community-based organisations (CSOs, CBOs) and communities in the localities where tension remains high. The guiding questions of the paper are: • What is the state of social, political and economic relationships in the immediate post-conflict period in the Nuba Mountains? • To what extent do the CPA partners collaborate or differ at the different levels of the implementation of the peace agreement in terms of peaceful coexistence after the bitter experience encountered during the civil war? • Are the other stakeholders in the peace process doing enough to guarantee sustainable reconciliation in the deeply divided society of the Nuba Mountains? In functional terms, this paper is considered to be an early evaluation of the CPA in the social context with special reference to the delivery of humanitarian and social services. Qualitative concepts of evaluation are useful for analysing encounter relationships between the partners of the CPA, their followers and other stakeholders such as the NGOs, UN agencies, CBOs and CSOs in the region. According to Heinrich (1997), the key aspects of qualitative evaluation susceptible to application to the postconflict Nuba Mountains consist of: • the use of a holistic approach, because the assessment requires continuous redefinition of the situation to enable understanding and analysis from different perspectives, • the need to build an interpretative description of events to nurture reflections of the complexity of actors’ relationships imposed by the prolonged civil war, and 84

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Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains • the need to maintain a continuous and close contact with different participants in their diverse social and economic environments. The author’s assessment of the post-CPA situation is based on selected responsive approaches recommended by peace researchers (Lederach 1997: 133–7). The study focuses on the tool of description. This helps in the identification of key problems revolving around issues and relationships before considering solutions. Better knowledge of the people and relationships could contribute to initiatives that promote peaceful coexistence, harmony and social integration. Such knowledge could also be useful for responses by concerned actors to social and political crises. The key issues in the paper concern the contextualisation of methods of evaluation to situations in four localities in Southern Kordofan. This has been done through participatory rapid appraisal with communities and local authorities. The participation of people in peace policy dialogue workshops and focus group discussions revealed visions and expectations of different stakeholders such as politicians, administrators, humanitarian agencies, and the communities above all. This approach enabled participatory conflict analysis (Mehler/Ribaux 2000: 102–5) and knowledge about demands and expectations of the communities regarding peace dividends. The key step described in the paper is the opening of peace dialogue at the political and community levels. Policy dialogue workshops created an atmosphere in which different groups began to discuss future-related issues requiring solutions after the signature of the CPA.

Background to the conflict The Nuba Mountains area lies in Southern Kordofan and is almost in the geographical centre of Sudan, covering an area of about 50,000 square kilometres. It is located in a region classified as semi-humid, with rainfall averaging about 600 mm, extending from mid-May to mid-October, allowing grazing and seasonal rainfed agriculture. The society of Southern Kordofan can be classified into two main ethnic groups, the Nuba and the Baggara Arabs. Other minor groups such as West Africans and northern Sudanese traders (the Jellaba) are also of significant importance. The term ‘Nuba’ is applied to the agglomeration of groups currently occupying the Nuba Mountains and parts of western Kordofan. They are so labelled to differentiate them from the Baggara groups who moved into Kordofan pushing the Nuba into the mountains over a century ago. Stevenson (1984) has identified more than 50 languages and dialect clusters, re-grouped into ten major groups. It is believed that the group referred to as ‘Nuba’ today was widespread in Sudan but was forced by the incoming Arab groups to retreat to the mountains, where there was adequate water supply and easy defence (Nadel 1947). The most important Arab groups are the Baggara, including mainly the Hawazma, the Misseriya Humr, the Missiriya Zuruq, the Kenana (Awlad Humeid) and a 85

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minority but influential group of traders referred to as the ‘Jellaba’. Other minority ethnic groups include the Borgo, Borno, Dajo and the West Africans (Fellata). Most of these minority groups are believed to have settled in Southern Kordofan a few decades ago. The West Africans are mainly involved in horticultural activities all over the state (Gore et al. 2002: 17). The Nuba can be considered to be newcomers in the North-South conflict. They began to be drawn into the conflict in 1985–6, fairly early in the war. Together with other groups in Kordofan and Darfur, they had traditionally formed the backbone of the national army fighting the first civil war in southern Sudan. Before the civil war, the Nuba regarded themselves as forming part of an alliance with the Baggara groups and the central government, and the notion of a ‘Nuba’ identity was vague. The current conflict appeared to be one of the factors that raised the level of awareness of the Nuba to identify themselves as a group which has been marginalised by the central government, the Baggara groups, and the Jellaba. The majority of the inhabitants of Southern Kordofan are rural, settled in small villages scattered sparsely all over the region. The nomadic population is about 10 per cent of the total population of the region, whereas the urban population is 13 per cent. The main occupation is agriculture, traditional rainfed or mechanised, depending on climate and soil types. In the clay plains, mechanised farming was introduced in 1968 as a government intervention on a large scale at Habila and the southeastern parts of the Nuba Mountains. The land was mainly exploited by the private sector according to concessions granted by the government to secure food and cash crops. Only well-to-do merchant farmers (the Jellaba) profited from these concessions. The indigenous landowners, the Nuba and the Baggara Arabs, had hardly any significant role to play in this intervention. Their land, as they perceived it, was confiscated from them and the only benefit they could get was working as paid labourers. For the merchant class, it was the best opportunity to boost their traditional trade. Indeed, Southern Kordofan used to produce about 12 per cent of the country’s staple food, sorghum, and 5 per cent of its total cotton production. The civil war disrupted most of the mechanised farming schemes in the Nuba Mountains, which inevitably led to a sharp decline in sorghum production. At present, the state depends on sorghum produced in other regions of Sudan. In any given area, the Nuba recognise three types of land ownership: individually owned land, vacant land that is recognised as communal land owned by the village or hill community, and vacant land that does not belong to anyone. Agricultural production in the Nuba Mountains involves a number of risks. Since harvesting is spread over a long period, large tracts of land are left unused in the practice of shifting agriculture, allowing herders more room for grazing without interfering with crop production. With the introduction of large-scale mechanised farming, this integrated system collapsed, limiting the land available for shifting agriculture and grazing (Manger 1984). 86

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Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains Livestock rearing is an important activity in this state. About 80 per cent of the livestock is owned by the Baggara Arabs, who lead a pastoral mode of life. They migrate seasonally north and south in search of better pastures. During the rainy season (from July to October), they move northwards as far as the southern margins of Northern Kordofan to avoid the muddy conditions and the biting flies in the southern parts of Southern Kordofan. During the dry season (from November to June), they penetrate deeper into the Nuba Mountains and beyond to graze their animals on the rich pastures where water is plentiful (e.g. Lake Keilak and Lake Abyad). Kadugli and Talodi have the highest animal concentration in the state. The Baggara Arabs have taken up cultivation only during the last two decades, when they lost most of their cattle during the droughts of 1984 and 1991. Now they grow millet, groundnuts, sesame and water melons as well as herding cattle. They sell most of the crops they grow in the market and invest the income in animal husbandry. Environmental degradation and persistent droughts in Northern Kordofan instigated the movement of camel owners into Southern Kordofan. The camel owners are generally known as the Shanabla, although the Hamar and other Bedeiri tribes are also involved in this movement. The presence of the Shanabla in Southern Kordofan has added to the complex ethnic mix, which had implications for the civil war and inter-community relationships. The SPLA accused the Shanabla of being agents of the GOS, while the Nuba and Baggara accused the camel owners of cutting down trees that served as shade for people and livestock, and complained that camels consumed the scarce water sources (Gore et al. 2004: 30–6). In short, there is a variety of conflicts, but it can be stated bravely that bad governance by previous regimes accelerated the turmoil in the Nuba Mountains. The bad governance resulted in violent civil war, which in turn gave rise to hostile relationships at the political and community levels. Under the umbrella of the overarching conflict between the GOS and the SPLA, the number of insignificant conflicts over land use, water resources, vegetation, cattle and camel movements increased. These are issues which were regulated in the past through mechanisms and regulations of conflict resolution, and the communities in the Nuba Mountains used to live in harmony. The undermining of the established local systems of governance by parties to the wider conflict threw communities into chaos and the people took the law into their own hands.

Conflict escalation and ethnic militarisation The various ethnic groups in Southern Kordofan have co-existed more or less peacefully despite occasional disputes over land and water sources. However, today grassroots conflicts constitute one of the most serious problems facing the state. Local security has consistently been disturbed 87

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since the 1980s for various reasons and at varying degrees from one administrative level to another. Recently, these conflicts have multiplied, threatening not only peace and order but also the very survival of some communities. Tensions increased between some groups with the arrival of civil unrest in the Nuba Mountains (Rahal 1993). The central authorities treated the Nuba, who are predominantly Muslims, in a manner similar to that of the people in southern Sudan. Civilian populations were forcibly driven out in large areas of the Nuba Mountains and relocated into ‘peace villages’. Segregation by the central authorities in the treatment of social groups in Southern Kordofan in favour of the Arab groups played a part in forming the loose ‘Nuba identity.’ Awareness of ethnic identity as ‘Nuba’ began to override the religious cohesion. The escalation of the conflict deepened the ethnic divide. The support provided by the central authorities to groups like the Hawazma and the Shanabla against the Nuba during the civil war is partly responsible for the Nuba-Hawazma and Nuba-Shanabla grassroots conflict. Several Nuba testimonies revealed that the government of President Nimeiri and Prime Minister Sadig el-Mahdi established the militia forces which massacred the Nuba in various areas. Studies indicate that the government of Sadig el-Mahdi initiated atrocities against the Nuba during the period 1987–9. Three important persons are frequently mentioned by the Nuba as being responsible for initiating sectarian violence in the Nuba Mountains: General Fadlallah Burma, the then Minister of Defence, Brigadier Hamed el-Sheikh, chief of the 18th Brigade, and Ahmed Khamis, chief of military intelligence (Justice Africa 1995: 66–9). The actions of these individuals contributed to numerous atrocities and human rights violations. The most conspicuous massacre took place in 1989 around Lagawa, and this event created the barrier to inter-community confidence. The impact of such conflicts was devastating, because local communities were not able to receive the needed humanitarian assistance provided by NGOs or UN agencies. The government denied the international community access to the Nuba Mountains despite the arrangements of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a consortium of humanitarian agencies that provided assistance to civilians caught in the southern sector of the civil war. The result was mass displacement of the Nuba groups to towns in Southern and Northern Kordofan, as well as to other northern states. The internal displacement exceeded 200,000 persons. In recent years, the resurgence of ethnic and religious intolerance in several regions of Sudan has constituted an alarming threat to political stability. Religion has moved from the margins of the political system into the very heart of governance. The conflicts in the Nuba Mountains and southern Sudan reveal considerable religious intolerance. For example, the ‘Fatwa’ issued by the Islamic Conference on April 27, 1992 in El-Obeid, backed by five prominent Imams and the GOS as the organiser, called on the Arab masses to mobilise against the African Nuba and by extension the 88

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Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains SPLA in southern Sudan (Rahal 2001: 48–9; Justice Africa 1995: 288–91). A Fatwa is the supreme decree or order issued by recognised high-ranking religious clerics in the Muslim community. The government formulated its policy based on the El-Obeid Fatwa, which stated vaguely that the civil war in the Nuba Mountains was deliberately redirected against Muslims. It was a declaration of war on the Nuba irrespective of religious affiliation. Military operations were directed against religious institutions. Reports indicate that mosques were deliberately destroyed, because the Islamic government in Khartoum believed that the Nuba in the SPLA-controlled areas were not practising the true Islam (Justice Africa 1995: 292–5). The policy overlooked the fundamental rights of the people in terms of socio-economic development and religious freedom. This particular perception of the problem complicated the war and confused the attitudes of the Nuba who are both Christians and Muslims.

Southern Kordofan in the CPA As the IGAD negotiations were progressing at a snail’s pace between the GOS and the SPLA, a window of opportunity opened for Southern Kordofan when the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement was brokered by the US and Swiss governments on January 19, 2002. The agreement enabled access to humanitarian assistance for the civilian population in the region. The Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) monitored the ceasefire (GOS/SPLM/A 2002) which created an environment for the return of IDPs, but it was too early for civilians to risk returning home. The GOS and the SPLM/A maintained separate administrative and military structures in different parts of the Nuba Mountains. The situation began to change when a peace deal was signed by the GOS and the SPLM/A negotiators on May 26, 2004 at Naivasha concerning resolution of the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. It was recognised that the IDPs and refugees would return to their original areas and an agreement on the policy framework for this was discussed. Finally the agreement was concluded by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC) of the SPLM/A on July 13, 2004, and witnessed by Bernt Aasen, the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator of southern Sudan (GOS/SPLM 2004). This arrangement encouraged unimpeded movement of people, especially of IDPs. The ceasefire agreement was reinforced by the signature of the CPA. In June 2005 an inter-agency survey on the intentions of IDPs to return indicated that about 73 per cent planned to return to their original states. There is no exact figure for IDP’s returning to Southern Kordofan. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the High Commissioner for Refugees estimated a planning figure of 233,224 returnees (OCHA 2006; UNHCR 89

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2006). Many people went to their villages on their own initiative to assess the situation, and as early as 2005 spontaneous return started. Although this was not encouraged by UN agencies and international NGOs, they drew up plans for way stations in an attempt to count the returnees. Key developments that encouraged the return of IDPs to Southern Kordofan were demining and the construction of way stations equipped with water and sanitation facilities at Kadugli, Talodi and Kauda. Demining activities enabled the authorities to open important seasonal road links between El-Raika and Talodi via El-Farandala and Kadugli and Kauda via Umsirdiba, and certain other tracks. IDPs and refugees have continued to return and settle in their new homes in Southern Kordofan. Returns consist of returnees from both outside Southern Kordofan and within the state. Between January and June 2006, 7,401 households of returnees were traced by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (OCHA 2006). The actual number was most likely much higher, as some returnees did not pass through identified entry points, not all were registered as they passed through, and there was significant intra-state movement. In other situations the return was not spontaneous, as political personalities and parties embarked on semi-organised returns and provided transportation along tribal lines.

Tension between the CPA partners and implications for social harmony Tensions between the GOS and the SPLM/A over the status of the Nuba Mountains were already growing during the process of negotiations. Several Nuba leaders had sided with the SPLM/A and fought alongside the SPLA against the GOS. They believed that the Nuba Mountains should ally with southern Sudan in order to force positive changes in their region and in Sudan at large within the framework of the New Sudan ideology. The Nuba leadership in the SPLM/A strongly opposed secessionist tendencies within the SPLM/A in southern Sudan. This was confirmed by the refusal of Yusuf Kuwa and the Nuba Mountains SPLA commanders to support the Nasir faction of Riek Machar and Lam Akol that broke away from the mainstream SPLA in 1991. The Nuba SPLA leaders maintained this position despite the region’s relative isolation from the mainstream SPLA headquarters in Torit. The government, however, saw this move as a threat to the security of the traditional North. The claim of the SPLM/A to the Nuba Mountains was considered as a southern infringement on a northern territory. The GOS was keen to maintain the North-South structure of the conflict in any agreement emanating from the IGAD-led negotiations. For this reason, it was agreed in Ethiopia that the negotiations should be based on the division of the North and the South in accordance with the 1956 90

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Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains boundaries. It is on this basis that the CPA contains special protocols (Chapters IV and V) on Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei (GOS/SPLM/A 2005). The signature of the CPA has not reduced the tension in the Nuba Mountains despite the fact that only two partners were sharing power in Southern Kordofan. The CPA stipulates the structure of government (Article 4), the executive (Article 5), and the judiciary. The real problem is the uneasy partnership that impedes the establishment of a basis for effective rule. Article 52 of Chapter V states that the governor shall appoint the ministers and commissioners in accordance with the State Interim Constitution (GOS/SPLM/A 2005). This did not happen until November 2006, because the partners to the agreement were still wrangling over the interpretation of the CPA concerning its translation into the State Interim Constitution. The first caretaker government led by SPLM governor Ismail Khamis Gallab was set up in March 2006, but it worked for a shorter period than expected. The political leadership of Southern Kordofan State shifted to the NCP in July 2007 with Omar Suleiman Adam as the governor. From January 2008 the state Cabinet was composed of five ministers from the SPLM, including the deputy governor, and five from the NCP as well as advisers and locality commissioners (UNMIS 2009: 23). Political instability continued to haunt post-conflict governments in Southern Kordofan after the CPA. The NCP-led government of Omar Suleiman Adam stayed in office for only one year. The President of Sudan reshuffled the government of Southern Kordofan in April 2009 and appointed the controversial Ahmed Mohamed Haroun, the man identified as responsible for most of the atrocities that occurred in Darfur. The formula of political representation remained the same as under Omar Suleiman. Hence, the organic law providing the basis of by-laws and rules of procedure in many government units has been progressing at snail’s pace since the signature of the CPA. The competencies specified in Schedule A of Chapter V on social welfare, community empowerment, the provision of basic services, and the management and utilisation of land were not being used effectively to make a change in people’s lives. This situation led to the maintenance of a parallel system of governance, with SPLM/A structures functioning autonomously in Kauda and Julud respectively. In the GOS-held territories, the native administration was re-organised in a way that resulted in the proliferation of new chieftaincies under Amirs (chiefs), who were committed to NCP policies in the Nuba Mountains. These Amirs were assisted by popular committees in the villages and enjoyed considerable benefits from their loyalty to the war-time government. These arrangements were not welcomed by the ordinary Nuba and Baggara people, who used to have a strong affiliation to the Umma Party. These differences in the systems of governance caused misunderstanding between the SPLM and the NCP and even within the parties, which had an impact on the social fabric and reintegration of the Nuba and Baggara communities in Southern 91

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Kordofan after the CPA and led to some hostile realignment of communities on both sides of the war-time divide. Hostilities repeatedly got out of hand in certain localities and the political leaders had to rush to address the issue in fire-brigade style. This situation has been recognised by the top brass of the NCP and SPLM. The partners in the CPA have started to collaborate with UN agencies and interested third parties such as the native administration and local authorities and communities, to provide material and technical support to enable them to work collaboratively to overcome the escalating conflicts. Peace policy dialogue became an inevitable tool for mitigating the tension. The state government of Southern Kordofan, UN agencies and NGOs discussed the modalities of peace dialogue at the grassroots level during the period February–March 2006, and a consensus emerged that more peace-building work was required to bridge the gaps between the NCP and SPLM at the top level in the state and between them and their peers at the local level (UNICEF 2006). The purpose of this venture was to generate social integration and the possibility of enhancing the implementation of the CPA. Without social stability, many provisions of Chapter V would remain a mere blueprint that would not be fully implemented until the end of the interim period.

Sustainable confidence-building: Track One – peace policy dialogue meetings Four peace policy dialogue meetings were successfully carried out by the Southern Kordofan Ministry of Social Welfare. However, the planning of the project was a UN-driven programme. The project objectives were to harmonise inter- and intra-community relations and to manage, prevent and resolve grassroots conflicts emanating from the pervasive mistrust between the various communities, lack of knowledge of CPA provisions, competition for leadership positions between the governing parties, and conflicts over natural resources. Four conflicts erupting after the CPA in multi-ethnic and multioccupational communities were identified. One was the conflict among the Moro Nuba, the Hawazma section of the Baggara, and West African settlers over the location of parallel villages bearing the same names and with the same land use in the Umm Sirdiba–Heiban axis of the Nuba Mountains. The Hawazma villagers and the settlers of West African origin allied against the Moro and Heiban Nuba, who were claiming ownership of the land on which Arab villages and West African settlers’ (Fellata) horticultural gardens were to be found. The issue of land ownership was a post-conflict phenomenon in inter-community relationships. Another case concerned skirmishes that took place between the Raika and Farandala Nuba communities in 2006 over control of land between those in the GOS- and SPLM/A-controlled areas. SPLA elements of the Raika and 92

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Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains Farandala sections of the Nuba set up road blocks a few kilometres from El-Raika village, which had been established during the war by the GOS as a ‘peace village’ south of Kadugli. This was regarded as an SPLA intrusion into NCP territory after the CPA. The third violent conflict was between the Ghulfan and the Dar Naeila (a section of the Hawazma) in Dilling Locality. The cause of the violence was homicide committed by unidentified assailants against Dar Naeila individuals. The Baggara nomads held the Ghulfan Nuba community responsible for the reported deaths and committed revenge killings. The conflict engulfed large parts of Dilling Locality. Finally, the Misseriya Zurug killed two people from the Kamda Nuba in a conflict over a water source at Bataaya village around Lagawa. This conflict escalated into violence between pastoralists and agriculturists in the locality. The epicentres of these conflicts were at Umsirdiba, El-Farandala, the Ghulfan area of Hajar Jawad, Angarko in Dilling Locality, and in Lagawa Locality. The communities that took part were Nuba groups such as the Moro, Farandala, Dilling, Kamdan, and Ghulfan. The Arab/Baggara groups included the Hawazma, Misseriya Zurug, and the Shanabla. The common feature of these conflicts was that they diverged from the traditional trend of Nuba versus Arab groups and turned into both interand intra-tribal conflicts. Some of them signified realignments of communities along ethnic and political lines. The polarisation of same communities between the NCP and the SPLM/A became a new factor in the post-war Nuba Mountains, and was the result of competition between the CPA partners for influence over communities. The policy dialogue meetings were designed to target these conflicts. KADUGLI LOCALITY (UMSIRDIBA AND EL-FARANDALA)

Two workshops in Kadugli Locality took place at Umsirdiba and ElFarandala on 16 May and 7 June 2006 respectively. Reports from UNICEF’s Zonal Office in Southern Kordofan indicated that 137 community leaders from subsections of the Hawazma, Ghulfan Nuba, Misseriya, Fulani, Dageeg Nuba, Moro Nuba, Shanabla camel herders, Farandala, Tasari, Lado and Togoi Nuba attended the meetings. Moreover, 1,200 people joined the opening and closing sessions and the accompanying cultural functions. The meetings were led by the SPLM Minister of Social Welfare Ms Dureya Ahmed, the first woman to be appointed a minister in the region’s history. Facilitators included a group of policy-makers from both the NCP and SPLM (UNICEF 2006a). The most important outcomes of the meeting included the following: • the formation of three multi-ethnic conflict resolution committees to address any conflict emerging after the CPA, • sending recommendations from the meeting to the GONU to consider replacing tribal conferences with integrated area-based conferences to avoid community polarisation, and 93

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• requesting the government of Southern Kordofan to assist in the formation of local land committees to harmonise land acquisition, land use and livestock movement. D ILLING LOCALI TY (HAJAR JAWA D AN D AN G ARKO )

The third policy dialogue meeting took place in the Ghulfan area of Dilling Locality, which comprises the controversial Habila agricultural scheme, one of the main causes of conflict in the Nuba Mountains even before the war. The meeting covered representation from the Kurgol and Habila administrative units. The population of the area is multi-ethnic and multi-occupational and the area is endowed with rich natural resources. Recently the local communities experienced inter- and intra-ethnic social upheavals. Some of these tensions turned very violent and resulted in feuds and counter feuds killing many people. Attempts to bring the protagonists to settle their disputes were largely unsuccessful and recent efforts to hold tribal conferences failed utterly. The reasons behind these conflicts were said to lie in the political competition between the two governing parties, the SPLM and NCP. The conflict situation has been used by both parties to enforce their interests in the area and create further fissions in social relations. The purpose of the meeting was to assist the communities to resolve local conflicts, to enhance children’s rights, and to promote a peaceful environment for the resettlement and integration of returnees. To bring that about in the realities of this area, the organisers adopted a win-win approach for all the parties involved in complex conflicts, namely, community leaders, young people, women’s groups, policy-makers and representatives of the political leadership. This was an attempt to adopt a transparent approach to addressing problems affecting communities and the system of governance. The meeting was successfully conducted on 28 June 2006 at Kurgol south of Dilling. It was attended by 45 community leaders and invited representatives of the state’s Legislative Assembly. The key personalities present were the Dilling locality acting commissioner, the SPLM political adviser, the director general of the Ministry of Social Welfare and his team, the executive officer of Kurgol administrative unit, and representatives of the NCP and the SPLM of Dilling Locality. The opening session was attended by approximately 500 people from around nine tribes of the Baggara, the Nuba, and West African ethnic groups from the locality. However, the meeting was limited to the 45 participants who met in a school classroom for deliberation, while the bulk of the people continued to celebrate their cultural festival in the form of peace songs, peace drama, traditional dance and a wrestling competition. The meeting’s deliberations attributed the conflicts to the following issues: • competition between the governing parties for leadership positions at local level and politically driven change of the positions and titles of community leaders in certain locations 94

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Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains • failure of the government of Southern Kordofan to pass the state constitution that would enable the performance of mechanisms of governance, which in turn would accelerate the implementation of the CPA and the provision of basic services • attempts on the part of some groups to remove other ethnic groups under the pretext of land ownership along an ethnic divide • blockage of nomads’ migration routes by the government’s expansion of agricultural farmland without consultation with various land users, and the denial of access to water points for the nomads and transhumant groups during critical seasons of the year • faulty local post-conflict perceptions, which affiliate the Nuba politically to the SPLM/A and the Baggara to the NCP, a situation that was totally denied by the representatives of both parties and described as fallacious • the high rate of youth unemployment • the large number of uncontrolled armed elements in the area in the post-conflict period. LAGAWA LOCALITY

The final leg of the policy dialogue took place on 15 July, 2006 at Bataaya village in Lagawa Locality. Bataaya is the location where two people from the Kamdan Nuba were killed by Misseriya tribesmen in 2005. The dispute originated over land ownership in a wadi (river valley) that was claimed and fenced by a group of Kamdan Nuba. The Misseriya claimed that the valley had been a camping centre for years, where they watered their livestock during seasonal movements. The conflict affected the relationships between the Misseriya and other Nuba groups in Lagawa Locality, and became the focus of attention of the state government, the locality authorities, and NGOs operating in the area such as the German Agro Action. Sixty people – community leaders and decision-makers from the Misseriya, Kamdan, Tabag, Tulishi, Ubu Gunok Nuba, Dajo and Hamar tribal groups – were invited from the various communities in the area to participate in the peace dialogue meeting. The gathering was also attended by about 700 people who participated in the cultural event that usually accompanies reconciliation meetings. The outcome of the meeting was not very different from the previous meetings in the other localities. It resulted in a reconciliation between the conflicting parties and the formation of a 10-member inter-tribal conflict resolution committee to manage and report on community-based conflicts in the post-CPA period. The meeting was facilitated by the Ministry of Social Welfare, the Lagawa commissioner (SPLM), and policy-makers from both the NCP and SPLM.

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DI LL I NG PEACE CENT RE

A peace policy dialogue workshop sponsored by UNICEF and organised by the Dilling University Peace Centre, was held in Dilling town on 31 July–1 August 2006. The nature of the workshop was slightly different from the state-led meetings organised by the locality authorities. The Peace Centre is a civil society organisation which targets middle-range policymakers, academics and NGOs. There were 50 participants composed of community leaders, middle-range policy-makers, community-based organisations, and representatives of political parties and women’s groups. Five working papers were presented on the background to the conflict situation in Dilling Locality, the CPA and the Nuba Mountains Protocol; peaceful means of conflict resolution; the culture of peace and social coexistence; and the Dubaibat case of the NCP and SPLM working in partnership.1 Representatives of the governing parties as well as other participants debated many issues in relation to the local context. Some of the debates were highly controversial. However, the participants agreed unanimously on the reasons why Dilling Locality has more open tribal conflicts than ever before. According to their analysis, active conflict between the two warring parties affected social stability and integration despite the signature of the CPA. This was due to a latent mistrust between the CPA partners in Southern Kordofan, which was attributed to political recruitment by the SPLM/A in the villages that had previously been under the government and the NCP. The shifting of former NCP members to the SPLM after the CPA resulted in virulent tribal conflicts over the control of services. This was aggravated by the parallel systems of governance in Southern Kordofan, which led to a structure of two incompatible systems of local government, two public administration institutions in force, two civil service systems, two security systems, and two tribal and political leaderships in operation. The fact that these systems were running continuously in parallel resulted in clashes at the lower echelons of government (Wassara et al. 2006). The consequences were increased inter-ethnic and intra-community confrontations, such as the violence at the villages of Werney and Umdehailaib in Talodi Locality in early 2006, when people were killed and a school was razed to the ground. The rival groups claimed to be supporters of the NCP and the SPLM/A at the community level. UNMIS became involved in reconciling the parties under the mediation of Awlad Humeid Baggara leaders in Abu Gebeiha Locality. A second reason identified was the issue of deployment of the military in accordance with the security arrangements of the CPA. In spite of the 1 Dubaibat was a case of successful political co-existence between the NCP and SPLM. While other sections of the Baggara and Nuba were confronting each other in southern parts of South Kordofan, in Dubaibat the NCP and SPLM youth organised joint sporting and cultural events to smooth relationships in their communities. The Hawazma communities, which are part of the Baggara, were involved in many cooperative activities and in sensitising their communities about the CPA and the propects of popular consultation towards the end of the interim period.

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Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains modalities stipulated in the CPA, no progress has been made in Southern Kordofan. Both the SAF and the SPLA have continued to maintain separate commands and have co-existed rather than integrated. The SPLM/A has its own security and police in different locations and even in places formerly under the GOS such as El-Raika south of Kadugli town. The rule of law and order is yet to be enforced all over the state; in some areas a situation has emerged that enables criminals to take the law into their own hands.

Sustainable confidence-building: Track Two – basic schools as spaces for community peace outreach Peace education is usually implemented using two major approaches within the learning environment. One approach consists of in-school activities, most of which are directed at children before they become adolescents, preferably in basic schools. Countries with a history of endemic conflict usually tailor special peace programmes to suit the needs of children and communities. Elements of peace education involving inschool activities include the following: • the development of curricula which include values such as communication, cooperation, problem-solving abilities, and tolerance in their manuals • inclusion of peace education in pre-service and in-service training programmes for teachers at teacher training colleges. The training is upgraded by integrating group discussions, conflict management, cooperative group work, and special training workshops for new teachers before they carry out teaching practice • linking of schools and communities by school outreach programmes, in particular through parents and teachers’ associations (PTAs), to achieve a general mobilisation for peace messages, health education and other social services. Community leaders, local officials, and children convey key messages using a variety of methods: speeches, drama, drawings, and poetry among others. Adult community members stage traditional dances and sports which are popular performances among the local people. Besides schools and community members, UN agencies enticed local government institutions into supporting peace education in the Nuba Mountains. The Faculty of Music and Drama of the University of Dilling was involved in introducing peace drama in this region. A team of trainers from the same university trained 42 teachers and community workers at Dilling and Kadugli during the period 2002–4 when the Nuba Mountains 97

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cease-fire was holding. This capacity-building activity contributed to the dissemination of values of peaceful coexistence in the post-CPA period. This approach was also important for the social reintegration of IDPs in the postconflict period, whose children are an important component of basic school enrolment. Local NGOs were further actors promoting a culture of peace in Southern Kordofan, such as the Badya Centre, which trained 40 primary school teachers and community workers in skills of conflict resolution and tolerance in February 2001, followed by a peace sports tournament and a drawing competition. Nuba-Baggara confidence-building and peaceful coexistence in the post-conflict period during 2005 can be attributed to intercommunity mobilisation by children, teachers and PTAs of basic schools in former government-controlled areas and areas previously in SPLMcontrolled territories in Kadugli and Talodi Localities. Schools have thus become spaces of peace by hosting social and cultural events for passing on peace messages by means of traditional dances, songs, drama, stories, sports, oral testimonies, and focus group discussions about inter-community relationships. This approach helped to create forums of interaction for communities across the lines of the previous political divide to collaborate in addressing inter-community conflicts in the Nuba Mountains through village sub-committees in child-friendly communities in Kadugli and Talodi counties/Localities. The proximity of basic schools to other basic services such as health centres, bench courts, and water points created new dynamism in social relationships. The concerted actions of teachers, parents, and health workers, who are opinion leaders in village communities, mobilised communities and their leaders in out-of-school social events. This could be exploited further for other peace-related activities during the population census and elections.

Challenges in the post-CPA period and prospects The main challenge is the process of establishing a unity government in Southern Kordofan in accordance with the CPA. This could eliminate the uncertainties that lead to the lack of interest on the part of the interim administration in implementing planned activities, among them crucial issues such as reconstruction of all-weather roads to facilitate contact with communities in isolated villages to which IDPs may return. The slow process of establishing the state constitution has weakened the interim government and the positions of the governing parties in the quest for asserting political authority in Southern Kordofan. The uncertainty in the establishment of political institutions and the competition between the NCP and the SPLM created problems at the grassroots level that were more serious than ever before. Secondly, tribal polarisation and politicisation along ethnic lines have become acute. The SPLM/A’s focus on the Nuba tribal groups and the NCP’s on the Baggara and settlers of West African origin have caused the 98

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Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains political and social polarisation of communities. The intensification of the conflicts, even between communities previously known to be allies, has resulted in further fragmentation of communities and tribes in Southern Kordofan. In less than eight months after the CPA was signed, the University of Dilling Peace Centre identified 13 localised tribal conflicts, most of which were in Dilling Locality and became highly fatal. All parties to these localised conflicts have gangs of fighters, and many groups and individuals have easy access to small arms and light weapons. These groups are a threat to public security and especially to that of returnees. Thirdly, there is the phenomenon of shifting allegiances within the ranks of other armed groups besides the SAF and the SPLA. The process of integrating these militias has been complicated in Southern Kordofan. The NCP had not expected the former GOS-backed Baggara militias to shift their allegiance to the SPLA, but such negotiations have occurred. It is unclear what will happen concerning the locations of these militia forces, if the SPLA accepts them into its ranks. Since the CPA has determined the borders between southern and northern Sudan as they were on January 1, 1956, this will imply that the Baggara militias will have to be relocated to southern Sudan, if they are not to create new problems between the SAF and the SPLA. Fourthly, there are unmet expectations among the groups that struggled to establish a new state of relationships based on the principles of human rights and socio-economic development. These groups consist of CBOs, faith-based organisations, women, children, and the young people who look forward to an immediate change in their standard of living and have high expectations about peace dividends. They become frustrated and revolt against the elders, particularly the traditional leaders who are obstacles to emancipation and human rights. The traditional leaders and native administration have become increasingly obsolete and powerless in the aftermath of the CPA. This is coupled with the lack of a strong central authority to maintain law and order. There are fears that the state may move again into outright civil war. The performance of the services sector following the protracted civil war continuously fails to meet the demands of the population, especially the large number of returnees. Finally, the conflict over ownership of land has emerged as the most serious source of conflict in Southern Kordofan. Land issues are apparently shifting from the previous farmers/pastoralists dimension over tenure rights to the issue of who owns the land, in the strict sense of the term. Parallel villages have been established in the post-conflict period as a strategy to claim rights to land. There are cases where the Baggara nomads have decided to become a sedentary population by creating villages on land that the Nuba claim as theirs. Both parties in the state government have been avoiding revealing their intentions regarding the issue, to the detriment of inter-communal harmony. The ambiguity of the positions of the CPA partners on these emerging problems can only contribute to undermining peace in Southern Kordofan in the long run. 99

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Conclusion There have been many actors in the war, as there are during the post-war period. The main actors during the civil war were certainly the GOS and the SPLA. As the hostilities moved into stalemate, they sought the support of communities to contribute fighters for proxy war. This resulted in the formation of Arab tribal militias, who were given the mandate to hold weapons, fight alongside the government, and loot resources such as livestock and agricultural products. The SPLA did the same, engaging the militia and Arab groups such as the Baggara and the Shanabla camel owners who used to roam the forests of the Nuba Mountains. The weapons given to local fighters became instruments of survival and enrichment. The CPA is an obstacle to the actors who enjoyed war dividends. On the other hand, it has provided an opportunity for those who were suppressed during the war to cross over to the SPLM. The massive shift of the Nuba to the SPLM is seen by the NCP as a serious problem. Due to the CPA ruling, these two parties have dominated the political scene, with other parties, such as the Umma, having no role to play in the institutions of governance. The fact that the NCP and the SPLM have been competing for political recruitment has created political instability in the peace partnership. The other actors in the conflict and in the peace after the CPA are the humanitarian agencies of the UN and NGOs. They have played a neutral role according to their mandates during the war and in its aftermath. They are assumed to be neutral in delivering basic services to the needy. However, the social environment of conflict was and still is a matter of concern for the delivery of services. The agencies have worked as pressure groups in the GOS- and SPLM/A-controlled areas through humanitarian diplomacy to deliver food and vaccinations. In times of peace, they have been worried about the social and political instability, and have offered to assist the government and the communities to transcend the war-time animosities. The peace dialogue workshops and basic schools’ peace outreach programmes reflect the support of the humanitarian agencies for re-establishing social relationships and a peaceful environment in the postCPA period. Severe changes have taken place in the Nuba Mountains since the CPA has come into force. The most conspicuous is the apparent increase in population mobility to and from the Nuba Mountains and Southern Kordofan in general. This is an important milestone of peace. The real handicap lies with the availability and distribution of peace dividends. Besides the main road linking El-Obeid to Kadugli and the construction of a tarmacked airport in Kadugli, the average population is still expecting more from the state government in terms of socio-economic development. What is visible to the ordinary citizen is the humanitarian assistance that UN agencies and NGOs provide in the sectors of education, health and water supply. 100

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Problems & Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuba Mountains This study has underlined the weaknesses of political partnership in the state government, brought about not only by the inertia in establishing institutions, rules and laws of governance, but mainly by the mistrust and the absence of a constructive dialogue between the two governing parties and the lack of a visionary approach to the solution of contending issues. Apparently the state leadership has no command over the economic, social and security governance of the political entity of Southern Kordofan. The police and the security and intelligence services are still aligned to the preCPA structures. There is no integration into the military and security organs as stipulated by the CPA. Despite popular disillusionment with the pace of implementation of the CPA, the communities of the Nuba Mountains/Southern Kordofan appear to be convinced that there are opportunities for a change for the better in the post-conflict period. They are aware that there is no magic formula to make peace dividends happen within the short period following the CPA. What the different peace actors and potential beneficiaries in Southern Kordofan expect is that the acute competition between the CPA partners should be normalised through intense confidence-building and pressure on the policy-makers at the national, state, and grassroots levels. From the assessment of the post-conflict situation in the Nuba Mountains and the discussions that have ensued, there is the need to consider the following recommendations: (i) Partners in the CPA should promote dialogue to discuss the rules of competition, policy and operational modalities within a framework of the institutional arrangements of governance. (ii) The government of Southern Kordofan should give priority to the formulation of policies that enhance the provision of services to communities as peace dividends. (iii) The other stakeholders such as the UN agencies and NGOs should persuade the state government to create an infrastructure that could accelerate the provision of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of services, reconstruction, and development. (iv) The capacities of key actors, including the state government, should bebuilt up in the areas of confidence-building and peace policy dialogue with the participation of communities, local authorities, basic schools, and civil society institutions such as the University of Dilling, to enhance social integration.

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References Gore, Paul Wani et al. (2002) Conflict Survey and Mapping Analysis. Unpublished research report undertaken for UNDP, UNICEF and the Ministry of Higher Education. Khartoum. Gore, Paul Wani et al. (2004) Eight Grassroots Conflicts in Sudan. Khartoum: UNICEF. GOS/SPLM/A (2002) The Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement. Initialed by Dr Mutrif Siddig Ali and Cmr. Abdul Aziz Adam El Hilu on January 19. GOS/SPLM/A (2004) Joint Humanitarian Aid Commission and Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Policy Framework for Return and Reintegration of Displaced Persons in a Post-Conflict Sudan, July 13. GOS/SPLM/A (2005) Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Signed by Taha, Ali Osman and Garang, John on January 9, Nairobi. Heinrich, Wolfgang (1997) Building the Peace: Experiences of Collaborative Peacebuilding in Somalia 1993–1996. Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute. Justice Africa (1995) Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan. London: African Rights. Also available at http://www.justiceafrica.org. Lederach, John Paul (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Manger, Leif O. (1984) Trade and Traders in the Sudan. Bergen: University of Bergen, Department of Social Anthropology. Mehler, Andreas/Ribaux, Claude (2000) Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in Technical Cooperation. Eschborn: GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit). Nadel, S.F. (1947) The Nuba: An Anthropology Study of the Hill Tribes in Kordofan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. OCHA – United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2006) Sudan Humanitarian Review, Vol. 2 Issues 2–6. Rahal, Suleiman (1993) The Crisis in the Nuba Mountains. Paper at workshop on the Sudanese Civil War. Oxford: St. Antony’s College/Oxford University. Rahal, Suleiman (2001) The Right to be Nuba: The Story of a Sudanese People’s Struggle for Survival. Laurenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press Inc. Stevenson, R.C. (1984) The Nuba of Southern Kordofan: Ethnographic Survey. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. UNHCR (2006) Return and Reintegration of Sudanese Refugees and IDPs to South Sudan and Protection of IDPs in Khartoum and Kassala States. Supplementary Appeal (March). UNICEF (2006) Monthly Reports. Kadugli Zonal Office, April-June. UNICEF (2006a) Unpublished Activity Implementation Report. Kadugli Zonal Office, August. UNMIS (2009) The CPA Monitor. Monthly Reports on the Implementation of the CPA, Vol. 5, Issue 43, June. Available at http://www.unmis.org. Wassara, Samson S./Suleiman, Mohamed I./Kotrang, Mansour (2006) UNICEF’s unpublished Trip Report on the Assessment of Peace Education in Basic Schools of Talodi Locality, March 22–April 3.

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Appendix to Chapter 5

Governmental & NGO Structures in Dilling Locality, Southern Kordofan

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Local governance refers to the institutions, processes and activities by which people in local administrative units articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations (UNDP 2000). Government bodies as well as civil society organisations are part of local governance. Their interaction influences policies and the establishment of formal and informal institutions. Institutions are defined here as ‘cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability, coherence and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers – cultures, structures, and routines’ (Scott 1995, quoted in Appendini et al. 2002: 33). Organisations are a form of institutions, defined as ‘entities set up around defined processes that result in the attainment of particular goals. The structure of an organization is based on the definition of different functions and roles, and its rules must ensure reliable performance’ (Appendini et al. 2002). The activities of organisations are based on decision-making which requires certain procedures and actors to be involved. Stages or processes of decision-making include recognising a problem, defining the problem in terms of the decision-makers’ objectives, searching for information concerning possible solutions, evaluating and selecting a solution that is in line with the objectives, then authorising the selected solution or choice by a higher level of decision-makers, and finally implementing the selected choice (Mintzberg et al. 1976). After signing the CPA in 2005, approaches have been undertaken to build participatory inclusive democracy and the rule of law in Sudan. For this purpose, changes in the local governance structures and decentralisation of the administration have been implemented. The reforms affect decision-making processes in governmental and nongovernmental organisations. The aim is to create a just society based on the principles of inclusiveness, liberty, equality and cooperation (Dahal et al. 103

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2001; GOS/SPLM/A 2005). This requires the inclusion of the interests of the voiceless and marginalised groups in decision-making so that they will have an influence on public policies. In order to clarify which options these groups have after the CPA, this study outlines the organisational structure in the post-war society of the Nuba Mountains.

The decentralised system and its challenges in Dilling Locality In the Nuba Mountains organisations operate in a context that has been determined by the civil war and the conditions of a post-conflict society. The war has left the local society with two distinct systems of administration; even the notions of the administrative units are different. In the government-held areas, the unit below the state level is termed the locality. It refers to a geographical area with suitable financial resources and a population of not less than 100,000 persons (Republic of Sudan 2003). Dilling Locality covers an area of 15,000 square kilometers with an estimated population of 180,000 persons. In 2001 the population of Dilling town amounted to 105,783 (Dilling Administration Unit 2001). During the war, the locality was divided into four administrative units. After the signing of the CPA, this number was increased to seven: Dilling, Salara, Dalami, Korgul, Habila, El-Debiabat and El-Hamadi (Dilling Locality Office 2006; Dilling Administration Unit 2001). The local society is governed by the executive body in Dilling Locality, composed of the commissioner, the administration unit and the departments of public services and utilities, guidance, agriculture and animal resources, finance and economy and labour force. There are also the police, security, military, Popular Defence Force and Popular Police Force. Moreover, the GOS has re-introduced a ‘native administration’ headed by Amirs whom it appointed in its constituencies (see also Wassara and Komey in this book). Conflict resolution and organising the population of their communities are among the tasks of these administrators. In the areas held by the SPLM/A, the administration consists of the county and two lower levels; the payam and the boma. The county is the primary level of local government below the state and comprises a minimum population of 100,000 citizens (GOSS 2005: 14). The payam signifies an intermediate administrative level between the county and the boma; it consists of an unspecified number of bomas with a minimum population of 25,000. The boma is the lowest level of local government and comprises an area led by a local chief. It contains one or more villages with a minimum population of 5,000, that is, 1,000 tax-paying families (ibid.). The SPLM/A does not admit the GOS system of ‘native administration’ in the areas under its control. It has been seeking to empower local chiefs, allegedly in order to guarantee a mechanism that is sensitive to community needs and problems. 104

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Appendix to Chapter 5 The CPA allowed some political parties to reveal their hidden political work in the area; consequently, they opened offices in Dilling Locality. There is clear competition between the two dominant political parties, the NCP and the SPLM, for building constituencies. Lack of trust between the two parties is particularly strong in the villages, where the affiliates of the SPLM are suspicious of strangers including development workers brought to their areas by organisations unknown to them. This distrust contributed to a long delay in the formation of a legislative body in Dilling Locality until the end of 2006. Consequently, the state constitution, and therefore the laws and regulations which should govern the locality, were not issued according to the schedule stipulated by the CPA. The society in the locality has been facing significant tensions between farmers and pastoralists, which increased after the war (see Wassara and Komey in this book). The dominant tribes in the area organised themselves and conducted conferences in order to establish local centres of power. A local civil society also emerged, consisting of unions, clubs, women’s and ethnic associations, private sector organisations and local activists of political parties. In addition, there have been many national and international organisations working in Dilling Locality. In Dilling town new residential areas were established because of the return of IDPs and refugees. Villages that were affected by the war also witnessed the influx of returnees. The population in Dilling Locality suffers from the poor infrastructure, and shortages of sanitary and water services, quality health facilities, education, electricity and communication facilities. International aid agencies, international NGOs (INGOs) and local NGOs and CBOs are active in these sectors, aiming to contribute to satisfying the basic needs of the local post-conflict society. Women are particularly affected, carrying out triple roles in production, reproduction and community management. Women’s NGOs and INGOs address women’s problems in different ways. The patterns of decision-making in these two types of organisations are compared below.

Case study of two NGOs Aid agencies have a strong presence in Sudan in order to monitor the implementation of the CPA and contribute to the planned reforms. Local and international organisations are involved in peace-building and conflict transformation and in planning, designing, implementing, evaluating and monitoring peace and development programmes and projects. Building and strengthening the structures and decision-making capacities of local NGOs is assumed to contribute to sustainable peace and development. In order to clarify how NGOs try to include the voice of the marginalised population in their policies, a field study was carried out in Dilling Locality in 2005–6. On the basis of a description of the structure of one INGO, CARE International Sudan, and one local women's NGO, Arous el-Jibal 105

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Women’s Association, both working in Dilling, this paper identifies the actors that are predominantly involved in decision-making about development policies at the local level. The NGOs are analysed according to their establishment, staff or members, objectives, programmes, activities, sources of finance and interlinkages with other organisations. The women’s NGO Arous el-Jibal was formed by women who were assisted by men and INGO staff. It is a membership organisation, which addresses women’s needs and aims to empower them to exercise their rights in Dilling Locality. Most of the members are uneducated, vulnerable and poor, whereas the elected leaders are educated women, who run the administrative activities on a voluntary basis. The NGO faces challenges such as lack of skills in organisational management, writing project proposals, and fund raising. Most of the women members do not have free time to run the association and refuse to carry out work on an unpaid basis. Occasionally educated men assist in the organisation’s management, public relations, and accounting. Arous el-Jibal depends financially on donors, mostly UN agencies and INGOs. In addition, it charges membership fees. However, the amount of the fee is small, and members who have no income and depend economically on others do not pay. Arous el-Jibal and other local NGOs face particular problems with regard to access to a permanent office building, equipment, and communication facilities. They usually cannot extend their developmental activities due to the limitations of funds and human resources. CARE International Sudan, on the other hand, has its head office in Khartoum and opened an office in Dilling after the CPA. It is working with partner organisations to implement projects in the area. The staff of CARE are appointed and paid salaries by the management at headquarters. Their offices are mostly headed by educated men, while women take on the secretarial jobs. Both organisations strive to improve the living conditions of people. Their activities include the following: (i) capacity-building by conducting adult education, gender training, and training in health care, food processing and handicrafts (ii) economic empowerment through revolving funds to be used to establish income-generating activities (iii) welfare and relief programmes, whereby non-food and food assistance is provided to returnees from the north for one week up to two months depending on the destination (iv) assistance to returnees by giving them information on the situation at their points of final destination and referring them to other agencies and services in the area (v) networking and advocacy so as to raise the awareness of policy-makers and development organisations on issues regarding returnees. 106

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Appendix to Chapter 5 Most of these activities address the immediate needs of underprivileged groups, aim to alleviate poverty, and are humanitarian in nature. They relate to the socio-economic and political situation in Dilling Locality. The activities of the women’s NGO are small-scale compared to those of the INGO. The local NGO serves a small number of persons in a petty geographical area. Its activities focus on income generation, poverty alleviation and adult education programmes. This type of activities reflects consciousness about women’s conditions, but not about their position in society. Further activities planned by the members are often difficult to put into effect because of financial limitations and the weak capacity of the organisation to implement them. This occurs in particular in organisations created with the assistance of INGOs. Arous el-Jibal as well as CARE have links and networks with government organisations, other INGOs, NGOs, native people’s organisations and individual citizens. The areas where they interlink are funding, exchange of information, exchange of expertise and logistics, and execution of programmes. Neither the local NGO nor the INGO addresses discrimination, gender-based violence, unequal gender relations, cultural and political empowerment or the implementation of peace and human rights, that is, issues that can improve women’s position strategically. The focus of these organisations on humanitarian programmes and their orientation towards practical basic needs is assumed to originate from the structures and actors involved in decision-making.

Decision-making within the two organisations Decision-making procedures in an organisation rely on the form and structure of the organisation, the issues to be decided, the degree of financial independence, and the rules or constitution of the organisation. Figure 5.1 shows how decisions are made in the women’s NGO. In the case of Arous el-Jibal, the needs and project ideas of the women are discussed by the members at the executive and general assembly levels. The members have access to the assembly and can make suggestions. The women of Arous el-Jibal frequently consult educated women or men with experience in development work or INGO staff, in order to identify causes and possible solutions to perceived problems. In the above example, the NGO members decided that income-generating activities were the key to solving the problem of women’s poverty. The findings suggest that educated women dominate decision-making in local NGOs. In the case of CARE, the organisation depends on information from the staff at the field offices and other INGOs working in the same programme sector and area. But decisions regarding the design of the work plan and approval of the budget are made at the top level. Table 5.1 shows how actors shape certain types of decisions in the two organisational forms. 107

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Figure 5.1 Decision-making Process in the Women’s NGO regarding income-generating activities Identify its causes: Illiteracy Unemployment Unequal power relation Culture which considers women as wealth, etc.

Recognising poverty among women

Members

Solution: Provide women with IGA Write a proposal

Endorsing of proposal by president

INGO field-office

Source: author’s chart based on field research 2005–6.

Table 5.1 Decision-making Patterns according to Organisational Form Area of Decision

INGO

WNGO

Organisation’s missions, policies and definitions of objectives

International headquarters

NGO general assembly, male partners of leading women, INGO staff

Organisational legal framework

International, regional and national offices

HAC, male partners of leading women, NGO general assembly, INGOs

Formulation of annual work plan

International, regional, national office, field office, other INGOs or NGOs working in the same area

NGO general assembly, executive officers, male partners of leading women, INGOs

Source: Author’s table based on field research 2005–6.

The table shows that decision-making processes in the women’s NGO are based on a network comprising the members, that is, the affected women representing the target group and male partners with educational advantages and skills, as well as staff of INGOs because of their particular professional experience. The legal framework is set by the state through the Humanitarian Aid Commisssion of the GONU. INGOs tend to define their objectives and set their organisational structure by a 108

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Appendix to Chapter 5 top-down approach of decision-making, whereas they may also consult other agencies in implementing programmes and projects or establishing a work plan. To sum up, the following factors influence decision-making in organisations operating at the local level: level of education and experience of decision-makers, availability of information, networking and partnership with INGOs, NGOs, government agencies, and community members, human and financial resources, infrastructure, institutional framework in place and peace and stability. Under the conditions of a post-conflict society, the approach applied by donors and INGOs appears to be too much orientated towards humanitarian aid. The example of the women’s NGO Arous el-Jibal shows that women consider their needs to be in the field of development. An empowerment approach is required rather than a basic needs approach, in order to mobilise the marginalised population groups and hence, the domestic resources for development. In order to create an environment conducive to development activities, the government and the monitoring agencies have to enhance the unification of the post-war administrative system in the Nuba Mountains and the implementation of the CPA in general.

References Appendini, K. et al. (2002) The Role of Institutions in Local Contexts, in: Cepal Review, No. 76: 69–86. Dahal, Dev Raj/Uprety, Hari/Subba, Phanindra (2001) Good Governance and Decentralization in Nepal. Kathmandu: Center for Governance and Development Studies, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, in: http://cims-rwanda.org/downloads/ Good_Governance_and_Decentralization_in_Nepal.pdf, accessed 05/06/2010. Dilling Adminstration Unit (2001) Population Record. Dilling: Administration Unit. Dilling Locality Office (2006) Documents on Dilling Administrative Units. Dilling: Locality Office. GOS/SPLM/A (2005) Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Signed by Taha, Ali Osman and Garang, John on January 9, Nairobi. GOSS (2005) Local Government Framework and Ordinance. Juba: Ministry of Local Government. Mintzberg, Henry et al. (1976): The Structure of ‘Instructed’ Decision Processes, in: Administrative Science Quarterly, No. 21: 246–75. Republic of Sudan (2003) Local Government Act. Khartoum: Ministry of Federal Government. Scott, W. R. (1995) Institutions in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. UNDP – United Nations Development Programme – (2000) Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press.

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6 Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in Claiming Communal Land The Nuba Mountains after the CPA1 G U M A K U N DA KO M E Y

Introduction The underlying root causes of Sudan’s civil war, which extended into Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains region in 1985, are claimed to have been diagnosed, negotiated and finally transformed into the CPA. Acknowledging the fact that many interwoven causes were behind the eruption of the war, the question of communal customary land rights is postulated here as one of the main root causes of the civil war in Sudan in general and in the Nuba Mountains in particular. After the formal end of the war, the question arises of how, on the one hand, the conflict between the various ethnic groups in Southern Kordofan and, on the other hand, the contradictions between traditional land rights and modern state policy on land rights will be resolved? The issue involves aspects of territoriality, identity, land rights and ethnicity, with their political, economic, cultural, and religious dimensions (see also Komey 2008a: 101–2). In view of this central question, the objective of this chapter is to highlight ethnographically the emerging claims on customary land rights by the Nuba groups and their persistent contention by the other ethnic groups in the region after the signing of the CPA (see also Komey 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b). The bone of contention is that most of these claims are articulated in terms of autochthonous rights. Autochthony is the claim to collective rights on the basis of belonging to an indigenous group with strong ties to an ancestral homeland, associated with an articulation of 1 This paper is part of a research project titled ‘Contested Autochthony: land and water rights in the relations of nomadic Baqqa-ra and sedentary Nuba people of South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Sudan’. The project is part of the ‘Collaborative Research Centre: Difference and Integration’ of the Universities of Halle and Leipzig (http://www.nomadsed.de). It was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) for the period 2004–8. Views expressed in this paper, however, do not necessarily represent these institutions.

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Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in the Nuba Mountains collective rights. The claimed land rights are presented in categories of ethnicity, culture and religion, among others. These categories are difficult to reconcile with the principles of the modern state, since they all have doubtful references and contradict the principle of citizenship, a fundamental pillar of the modern state. Moreover, they are far from clear; they emerge while being invoked. Against this reasoning, the study explores the local discourses and practices of autochthony in the Nuba Mountains. The focus of this study of autochthonous identity politics is on the articulation of autochthony amongst the Nuba in claiming their communal land rights and its contestation with counter claims by other ethnic groups in the region. Intensive ethnographic fieldwork was carried out in three stages over a period of sixteen months between 2005 and 2007. This was supplemented by a literature review and archival consultations. The ethnographic study traces oral narratives of the history of ethnic settlement successions and inter-ethnic settlement and mixtures. It investigates the traceability of boundary shifts and changes, documented or verbal claims to land pursued in terms of autochthony, and the forms of socio-economic interaction between competing actors. The analysis concentrates on the autochthonous claims by the Nuba of Leira and their disputation by the Shawabna group in Umm Derafi area in the central part of the Nuba Mountains. The study applies a mid-range theoretical approach constructed around the key notion of social worlds, or social fields/space (Strauss 1978; Grønhaug 1978; Bourdieu 1985). Using this theoretical approach, the paper traces the trajectories of the concern of autochthony beyond the selected site of Umm Derafi into locations where distant actors – at national and global levels – are involved in different ways in the affairs of the local communities and their conflicts in the aftermath of the CPA. The paper first gives a conceptual account of region as a source of identity and then proceeds with a general overview of the Nuba Mountains region as a social construct, followed by a field-note-centred analysis of the ethnographic data from the Umm Derafi site. The focus of this part is on the dynamics of the autochthonous claims on land rights and their related conflicts and disputation between the Nuba of Leira and the Shawabna. Thereafter the paper assesses briefly the effectiveness of the CPA in addressing the land question in a situation of mounting land-based conflicts in the Nuba Mountains following the signing of the CPA.

The region as a social construct for autochthonous identification As argued elsewhere (Komey 2008b: 992–4, Komey 2009a: 207–9), ‘region’ as an entity is usually loaded with social, ethnic, economic and political contents. The term region, therefore, is applied here not as a mere 111

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geographical space, but as a societal set-up full of political, ideological, socio-cultural and economic dynamic realities (El-Tayeb 1989). Hence, ‘region’ is conceptualised here as: • a local response to historical dynamic processes of external/internal forces and realities, • a focus for identification, based on the interrelationship between land territory and ethnic/community identity, and • a medium for social interaction that creates regional patterns and characteristics (Murphy 1991). The significance of regional understanding is manifested in the dynamics of ethnic and/or nationalist movements as part of an open and complex process of identity formation. Collective identities are not given, but they are created by feelings of community and solidarity, which have evolved through history as social, political and economic processes within the context of people’s own well-defined, demarcated or loosely perceived territorial entities. Therefore, a national or sub-national territory or region is more than a spatially demarcated political or politico-administrative unit: It is a source of identity and self-sustaining resources; it is an ‘historic’ territory, a ‘homeland’, a rightful possession of one’s forefathers through generations. It is distinctive and a unique territory; and the identity of the nation is bound up with memory, and this memory is rooted in a homeland. (Williams/Smith 1983: 509)

Given the fact that societies are defined territorially, socio-cultural and political identities also acquire a territorial dimension. What lies behind the framework of political territories or ethnic regions are spatial constructs with deep ideological significance that may or may not correspond to political or formal constructs. These ideologies are forged in the territorial struggles that produce particular regional arrangements and understandings, and these, in turn, shape ideas, practices and an overall orientation of the group (see also Komey 2008b: 992–4). In Sudan, a country characterised by the complex diversities of its physical and ethno-cultural landscape, the term region has emerged as a self-identifying concept that serves as a focus of cultural, linguistic and historical identity. It also functions as the context within which the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial allocation of resources and distribution of political power are contested. Ethnic groups which occupy a particular region make their demands to the central government on the basis of their region. Thus, the concept of region has been obviously concretised as a political category, a contiguously definable geographical space with a specific character, image and status in the minds of the inhabitants of each region (Komey 2005). The formation of ethnoregionally-based political organisations and movements from the 1950s onwards – like the Nuba Mountains General Union, the Beja Congress in the east, the Darfur Development Front in the west, and the Sudan 112

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Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in the Nuba Mountains African National Union (SANU) in the south, among others – is selfexplanatory evidence. As social constructions, regions are necessarily ideological, and no explanation of their individuality or character can be complete without explicit consideration of the ideas, perceptions, attitudes and aspirations that are developed and sustained in connection with regionalisation processes within the context of nation-building. It is within this concept of the region as a source of ethno-political identity, as an ancestral homeland and a base for livelihood, that the socio-political and ethnic dynamics in the Nuba Mountains region can be understood. Accordingly, they are analysed here as interrelated local social fields within broader socio-economic and political perspectives at national level and beyond.

The social world of the Nuba Mountains region and the civil war The Nuba Mountains, officially known as Southern Kordofan State with Kadugli town as its capital, covers a total area of approximately 30,000 square miles in almost the geographical centre of Sudan. Its hilly topography comprises a complex land configuration of some main mountain masses and a number of isolated hills separated by plain areas. It is part of the savannah summer-rain belt of the Sudan, with sufficient rainfall for crop-raising and cattle-grazing. The plain areas are covered with muddy cracking and non-cracking clay soils with some alluvial deposits on the lowlands. Another type is the sandy soils, which cover the western and northern parts of the region. With these physical characteristics, the region has been a major economic base for the Sudanese agrarian economy (Komey 2005). The recently discovered and exploited oil fields in its western part have given it further economic, political and strategic significance (Suliman 2000). E T H N I C G RO U P S, H I S TO RY O F S E T T L E M E N T S, A N D L A N D U S E PAT T E R N S I N T H E R E G I O N

The population of the region is estimated at 1.1 million, representing 3.5 per cent of the total population in the country, while the Nuba represent about 70 per cent of the region’s total population (Komey 2005: 203). The term Nuba is commonly used to refer to the indigenous inhabitants of more than 80 hill communities of the Nuba Mountains, predominantly sedentary groups that practise traditional rain-fed agriculture as their main means of livelihood. Several writers like MacMichael (1912/67), Nadel (1947), Stevenson (1965), and Mohamed Salih (1999) agree that the Nuba peoples were the first to settle in the area more than 500 years before other groups came in. Notwithstanding the racial, ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Nuba hill tribes, there exist some commonalities like a ‘Nuba culture’, a cultural make-up common to all the various groups (Nadel 1947: 113

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3–4). Based on this feeling of togetherness and common history, their ethno-political identity has been progressively constructed with strong ties to the territory of the Nuba Mountains as their autochthonous ancestral homeland. However, this has been systematically contested by the other ethnic groups in the region. Because of certain major historical and contemporary dynamics, the indigenous Nuba peoples were forced to resort to the hilly parts of the region, while the fertile plains were occupied by others, mainly the Baggara. The historical forces include the following: • the influx of Baggara Arabs in waves into the region and their effective participation in the pre-colonial slave-raids, • Turco-Egyptian rule and its successive slavery campaigns against the Nuba (MacMichael 1912/67, 1922/67; Sagar 1922), • British colonial rule and its closed districts policy (Gillan 1931, Stevenson 1965; Salih 1982). The contemporary forces include • the post-colonial state, associated with two separate, yet interrelated, dynamics, namely, the Jellaba domination over the national politics and wealth including land, and the land-grabbing by various central governments for public and private mechanised schemes (Roden 1969, 1972; Mohamed Salih 1984; El-Battahani 1986; Ibrahim 1988; Harragin 2003) • the war waged by the central government, associated with mass displacement, ethnocide and genocide (African Rights 1995; Mohamed Salih 1999; Suliman 2000; Rahal 2001; Harragin 2003; Manger 2007; Komey 2008a, 2008b). The Baggara, who moved into the area of the Nuba Mountains over 200 years ago as pastoral nomadic peoples, represent the major sub-ethnic group of Arab origin. They migrated to the Nuba Mountains after the turn of the seventeenth century, initially in search of grazing land before they engaged in slave raiding against their local counterparts, the Nuba (MacMichael 1912/67; Henderson 1939; Cunnison 1966). Other small but extremely influential groups include the Jellaba from northern and central Sudan with a long history of engagement in local trade and, later, in rain-fed mechanised farming (Manger 1984; Mohamed Salih 1984; El-Battahani 1986). Another group are the Shawabna, a creole group of mixed origins (Sudan Government 1912; Ille forthcoming), and the Fellata, a West African group who migrated to the Nuba Mountains in search of work as agricultural labourers in the cotton fields during the 1920s (Mohamed Salih 1999: 2). Accordingly, the region’s land use pattern is characterised primarily by the co-existence of two sub-systems of subsistence: rain-fed cultivation and pastoral nomadism. Agricultural land use patterns are practised by the 114

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Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in the Nuba Mountains Nuba on the basis of communal land owned by the village or hill community (Nadel 1947; Komey 2008a), while pastoral nomadism is practised by the Baggara. As nomads, they move systematically northsouth between the Nuba hilly areas during the dry season and then back northwards during the rainy season. Recently, some nomads have been transformed into agro-pastoralists who engage in traditional and mechanised rain-fed cultivation in the Nuba Mountains (El-Battahani 1986; Ibrahim 1988; Suliman 2000). In addition to these two complementary subsistence forms of life, there has been the successive introduction of a mechanised rain-fed farming system in the region since the 1960s. Under the 1968 Mechanised Farming Act and the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, the state was able to engage in land-grabbing in favour of the private sector controlled by a few wealthy Jellaba. This situation was reinforced by the 1984 Civil Transaction Act and its amended versions of 1991 and 1993 that strengthened the power of the government in taking communal land for mechanised private farming. As a result, the local communities and traditional farmers were pushed to the margins and reproduced themselves as landless farm labour in the large-scale mechanised farms on the territory of their own communal land (Ibrahim 1988; Harragin 2003; Komey 2005, 2008a). Thus, the land question has been singled out widely as the main factor that triggered the war in the region (African Rights 1995; Suliman 2000; Rahal 2001). T H E IMPLI CATI ONS OF THE CI VI L WAR O N T E RRITO RY A N D E T H N I C R E L AT I O N S I N T H E R E G I O N

The extension of the civil war from southern Sudan to the Nuba Mountains in 1985 brought about new dynamics that had significant repercussions on the rights to land ownership and access in the region. Firstly, the co-existence of the Nuba and the other ethnic groups in the region ceased to exist as the majority of the Nuba supported the SPLM/A, while some Nuba, the Baggara, and the Shawabna, among others, sided with the successive central governments. Secondly, as the war intensified, the Nuba Mountains territory was progressively divided into two geopolitical and administrative parts, namely, areas controlled and administered by the GOS, with the Baggara having the upper hand in political affairs, and areas controlled and administered by the Nuba-led SLPM/A with the Baggara nomads having no access to the grazing lands and water in this part of the region. Thirdly, the two parties pursued two different policies with regard to land rights in their respective territories. In the SPLM/A-controlled areas, communal ownership based on customary practices was recognised as a legal right and strengthened further, with customary ownership as first rights for the indigenous Nuba and customary use access as secondary rights for the nomadic groups on the same land. Contrary to the SPLM/A strategy, the GOS continued the policy of grabbing arable lands for private 115

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investment based on the 1970 Land Act which offers no legal recognition for customary land rights (African Rights 1995; Mohamed Salih 1999; Harragin 2003; El-Ima-m/Egemi 2004). In a nutshell, the war dynamics intensified the antagonism between the two territories divided along ethno-political lines, resulting in the escalation of the local conflicts along ethnic lines. It also stimulated the articulation of ethnic identities in the struggle for land as a source of socio-political identity and economic survival. In this way, it has been argued that ‘the land question was the single biggest issue of confrontation in the Nuba Mountains on the outbreak of the war, and that the settlement of the land issue, through land and land tenure reforms, is a key aspect of making a lasting peace’ (Manger 2003: 2). The following ethnographic case study demonstrates this connection between the land issue and the civil war in the Nuba Mountains.

Ethnic identities and boundary making in the struggle for land in Umm Derafi Umm Derafi is a small but relatively strategic rural centre in the plains, about 70 kilometres north-east of Kadugli. Khor Umm Derafi that runs from north-east to south-west is one of the distinctive natural features that make it an attractive point for sedentary and nomadic peoples alike. Various ethnic groups have mingled in the course of their settlement, market exchanges, farming and grazing in the area. During the pre-war period, Umm Derafi was composed of numerous clustered hamlets inhabited mainly by the Nuba of Leira and the Shawabna. In addition, the nomadic group of Awlad Ghaboush, a sub-section of the Abdel Ali, roam seasonally in the area. In the process of ethnic interaction between the Shawabna, Leira and Awlad Ghaboush several community institutions were established. In 1954 they demanded a police station in Gardud Tia hamlet, followed by other services including a school, health centre and weekly market. The fact that the chairmanship of the Umm Derafi administrative unit was held consecutively by several leaders of different ethnic groups is an indication of the high degree of ethnic solidarity and harmony in the area during the pre-war period. That amicable co-existence was seriously damaged by the civil war dynamics which followed ethnic lines. The area experienced a series of violent incidents, forcing the Shawabna to relocate to the governmentcontrolled areas and to ally with government forces against the Nubaled SPLM/A. Like most of the Nuba, the Leira people of Umm Derafi were politically and therefore territorially divided when some of them joined the SPLM/A while others resorted to the government-controlled areas. 116

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Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in the Nuba Mountains T H E LEIRA AU TOCHTHONOUS CL AIM S OVE R U MM D E RAFI: HI STOR I CAL NAR RATI V ES A N D ARG U M E N T S

The Leira claim that Umm Derafi has been known as Umm Derafi Leira since the colonial period. It was and still is part of the Leira Omodia2 that represents their ancestral land within the Heiban administrative area. Up to the emergence of the war, Umm Derafi was under the administration of Mek el-Duma Angelo of the Leira, followed by his successor Kajo Bakheit, though it continued to be inhabited by other ethnic groups mentioned above (author’s interview with Mohamed Tia Koko, the Amir3 of Leira, 2006). During the war, the area was completely deserted, with most of the Nuba resorting to the nearby hills controlled by the SPLM/A while the Arab nomads, the Shawabna and some Nuba moved into the governmentcontrolled areas. Towards the end of the war, particularly during 1999–2000, a series of military campaigns were carried out by the government against the SPLM/A in the area. With the assistance of the SAF, the Shawabna under their native leadership were the first to return to Umm Derafi on April 4, 2000. They decided to re-settle at Alali hamlet instead of the original Umm Derafi site and to change the name of Alali to Umm Derafi Sheibun. At present, Alali is emerging as a new village with support from both government institutions and international agencies. In the context of this support, the Shawabna managed to establish a school and a health dispensary as well as an army station. According to the Shawabna, the plan to relocate Umm Derafi to Alali was due to the fact that the original Umm Derafi site was situated in the lowlands, which was unfavourable for protection and defence in case of possible SPLM/A attacks. The Leira, however, gave a different explanation. They maintained that the unilateral decision of the Shawabna to return to Umm Derafi ahead of them, without coordination with the ethnic groups coexisting pre-war in the area, may have entailed a hidden intention by the Shawabna to take over what they claimed as their ancestral territory. In response, the progovernment Amir of the Leira, with the assistance of the army, mobilised some Leira people within the government-controlled areas and returned to Umm Derafi in 2002. They too decided to resettle at a different site called Abu Hamama, four to five kilometres northwards from the Shawabna settlement of Alali, and to replace the name of Abu Hamama by ‘Umm - di- yya’ is a term introduced during the period of Turco–Egyptian 2 Omodia or ‘Umodia’ or ‘Umu rule (1821–85) for a group of villages, numbering from two or three up to thirty or more. It was derived from Arab tribal organisation, whereby each tribe is ruled by a Nazir, beneath whom there are a number of Omdas, each responsible for an Omodia, and beneath the Omda is the Sheikh, who is the headman of a small group of families if the people are nomadic, or of a village if the people are settled. Since then the native administration unit was termed Nazirate for the Arabs or Mekship for the Nuba; and the native leader was called Nazir or Mek respectively (Republic of Sudan 1958: 7). 3 In the early 1990s, the Islamic-oriented government led by the NIF, known later as the NCP, replaced the terms Nazir or Mek with Amir, and subsequently the Nazirate with Imara, as part of its Islamisation programme among native leaders. Though the term Amir is associated with native leadership, it also connotes that this social leader, by virtue of his position as a tribal leader in times of peace, is also a commander (Amir) of the Mujahedin (Islamic fighters) during the jihad (holy war).

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Derafi Leira’. Similar to the case of the Alali village of the Shawabna, Abu Hamama started to emerge as a Nuba-based village, receiving different kinds of social service support from the government and international agencies including a school and a health dispensary, as well as an army unit. The Leira decision was in fact a reaction to the Shawabna unilateral move into the area. The claim was that Abu Hamama village, and not Alali of the Shawabna, would be the new location for the original Umm Derafi. The Amir of the Leira Nuba in the government-controlled areas expressed the following view: We, the Leira, could not return and resettle together with the Shawabna in Alali village this time, because they were not only imposing a new name on the area, but they also started to claim that this is their territory. For this reason, we decided to go and re-open Abu Hamama village and started to resettle under our original name of Umm Derafi Leira. (author’s interview with Mohamed Tia, 2006)

It is obvious that each party wanted to ensure control over the area, by way of assuming ‘actual’ and ‘symbolic’ power in the emerging post-war Umm Derafi. The territorial repositioning of the Umm Derafi site by the two competing parties indicates clearly that a new type of conflict is emerging in the area in the post-war era. The bone of contention seems to be the name of the territory as a symbolic power. In the Leira viewpoint, it is Umm Derafi Leira; from the Shawabna point of view, it is Umm Derafi Sheibun. For the Arab nomads of the Awlad Ghaboush it is Umm Derafi only, with no further labelling that bears autochthonous meaning. The clue here is that a dispute over the name of the territory is not merely a matter of naming; the attached labels of ‘Leira’ or ‘Sheibun’ are loaded with weighty autochthonous connotations which may strengthen the position of a claimant over the contested territory. The Leira insist that all historical records and official documents reveal that the area is known as Umm Derafi ‘Leira’ and not Umm Derafi ‘Sheibun’. The Amir of the Leira claimed that he presented several complaints during 2002 and 2003 to the by then NCP-led government about the Shawabna move of renaming the area. But there has been no response. In the Leira view, the political authorities in Kadugli seem to be backing the Shawabna strategy aimed at taking away part of their communal territory. The Leira Sheikh el-Nur Deldum (author’s interview, 2006) has given a historical account related to the founding of Umm Derafi as a settlement point. He believes that Kochochu and Koko el-Almin, the first Leira settlers in the area, were the founders of Umm Derafi settlement. Later the Leira were joined by Kawalib and Awlad Ghaboush. He insists that the Shawabna were latecomers to the Umm Derafi area. S H AWA B NA L A N D - BA S E D E T H N O - P O L I T I C S A N D COUNTER-CLAIMS

The Shawabna are neither Nuba nor Arabs. Rather, they are of mixed origin or creoles, as a result of the long history of Arab-Nuba interactions 118

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Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in the Nuba Mountains including intermarriage following their migration into the region (see Ille forthcoming). This might have helped the Shawabna to establish a wideranging network and socio-political alliance with Nuba as well as nonNuba groups in the region. In reality, however, they have always been culturally and politically closer to the Baggara Arabs than to the Nuba. This is evident in the way they mobilised their social network during the war when they allied with the Baggara Arabs and the government in fighting against the Nuba-led SPLM/A. As a result, their relations with the Nuba contracted considerably during the war and in its aftermath, as shown by empirical material below. Jebel Sheibun near Umm Derafi, which was famous as a traditional gold mining base during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, seems to have been the first settlement point of the Shawabna. Their ancestors migrated from Messelemia (in the Gezira) some five generations ago, and settled at jebel Sheibun, whence they established their authority over the neighbouring Nuba hills. Three generations ago, the Shawabna were defeated by Sheikh El-Ami- n of the Ghodiat tribe and forced to take refuge at jebel Shwai, whence they ousted the Nuba inhabitants. (Sudan Government 1912: 48)

Due to certain historical and contemporary ethno-political dynamics in the region, they were formally integrated into the broad, federated system of the Rawawga native administration in the 1930s (Stevenson 1965; Ibrahim 1988). At present, the Shawabna are territorially and administratively scattered among several Nuba communities in Mandi of Teira, Shwai, Aggab, Umm Derafi and Suma near Kadugli. They have been able to strengthen, within that federated system, their alliance with the Baggara of the Rawawga while maintaining their own Imara, which includes the above territorially scattered communities. The recent Shawabna-Rawawga ethno-political alliance is obviously directed vis-à-vis the emerging collective ethno-political identity movement of the Nuba, which is centred on autochthonous claims over a territory which they share in practice and therefore compete over its meagre resources. The Shawabna leaders and common people agree that, before the war, they had a long-standing history of co-existence and mutual understanding with various ethnic groups of Arabs and Nuba including the Leira. A key informant, who claims to have been born in Shwai in 1929, gave a detailed historical account of how the Shawabna settled in Umm Derafi during the colonial period. First, for long the Shawabna have been living very peacefully with the Nuba Shwai. In 1937, they were forced to move from Shwai back to their historical base in Jebel Sheibun following a dispute with Arno Kepe, a powerful Mek of Otoro over native administration territorial boundaries. Although the Shawabna insisted on not moving out of Shwai, they were forced to do so when the colonial administration threatened to burn down the houses after the expiration of a given

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ultimatum. In Sheibun, they suffered from water shortage during the dry season before the colonial administration served them with a saniya (water well) in the following year, 1938. But water shortage continued. As a result, they started to move into Umm Derafi, which was by then a thick forest and completely uninhabited jungle. By 1948 almost all the Shawabna families were able to resettle in Umm Derafi. Later, other groups followed, mainly the Awlad Ghaboush migratory nomads, the Hadra people from their nearby hill, and Awlad Momaen from Zelaytaya. At that time, there was no Leira presence at all. It was only since 1949 when the Leira started their flow from their nearby hills in the east into Umm Derafi. The Leira were first led by Marjan and his brother Kalas who stayed in Lolla hamlet in 1950, and in 1951 Kuku el-Amin came from a nearby Leira hill. In 1952, Tia Koko, the father of the present Amir Mohamed Tia Koko, arrived. He later established his own hamlet, which came to be named after him as Gardud Tia. (author’s interview with Sharif Ibrahim, 2006)

Hamid Salatin, a native leader, who led the Shawabna back to Umm Derafi after the war, has been formally recognised by the government in Kadugli as administrative Omda of the Shawabna in Umm Derafi Sheibun, but with no court responsibilities. He claims that the Shawabna are indigenous in Umm Derafi land, and that they have a definite territory within that whole. The area that includes Umm Derafi, Sheibun, Aggab and part of Shwai, represents our forefathers’ land. It has been a livelihood base for our last five to six generations. We the Shawabna therefore have no land other than this to go to. Though the Shawabna genealogical origin can be traced back to the Arab peninsula, the present generation is the product of successive intermarriage between their Arab ancestors and the Nuba groups, because our ancestral fathers did not bring their wives along with them upon their arrival here. They came and married Nuba women and continued this intermarriage process with the surrounding ethnic groups, particularly the Nuba of Shwai, Abol, Leira, Moro and Kawalib, as well as the local Arabs of the Hawazma group. The result is our present Shawabna generation, which is original to this soil as their irreplaceable indigenous homeland. (author’s interview with Hamid Salatin, 2006)

In the Shawabna view, the contest with the Leira over Umm Derafi territory started in 1956, when the government demanded representation in the local council. The multi-ethnic Umm Derafi community unanimously selected Issa el-Duma of the Leira as their representative in Kadugli. In 1957, he wrote a signpost titled ‘Umm Derafi Leira’ and fixed it on the Sheibun road leading to Umm Derafi, without the consent of the Shawabna, who reacted immediately by confronting him, and dismantled the signpost (author’s group interview with Shawabna key informants including Hamid Salatin and Sharif Ibrahim, Umm Derafi, 2006). This incident, in the Shawabna view, signifies the beginning of the contest over 120

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Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in the Nuba Mountains the Umm Derafi territory between them and the Leira. Later, in the mid1970s, the tension between the two ethnic groups continued to escalate, with each party attempting to consolidate its position in different ways, including adding the label of ‘Sheibun’ or ‘Leira’ to Umm Derafi as part of their territorial autochthonous claim and counter-claim (author’s interview with Adam Hakim, 2006). In order to consolidate their position on the ground, the Shawabna managed to establish a new Omodia, which is still in the making, with its seat at Umm Derafi Sheibun (Alali village). Although it falls within the territory of the Leira native administration within the Heiban administrative unit, it is affiliated to the Shawabna greater native administration at Sama, east Kadugli, under Amir Mahmoud el-Murad. From the Leira standpoint, this Shawabna Omodia, if it is to exist at all, should be under the greater Leira native administration, which covers all the Leira territories including Umm Derafi. To strengthen their position further, the Shawabna are exerting a tremendous effort to gain recognition to establish their own native court independent from that of the Leira. With this narrated line of argumentation, coupled with their actual politico–administrative behaviour on the ground, the Shawabna present themselves as the firstcomers, settlers and real founders of Umm Derafi as a settlement point. What is evident here is that the present division of Umm Derafi into Sheibun and Leira is the product of an accumulated historical process of contest between these two ethnic groups. The Shawabna and Leira versions of their respective histories and geographies of settlement in Umm Derafi are significantly different from each other. It is obvious that each party is claiming to be the firstcomer and therefore the founder of Umm Derafi as a settlement point. Through such claims and counter-claims, both sides continue a restless dispute over the Umm Derafi territory with far-reaching repercussions on the local peace. A third position pertaining to the contest over Umm Derafi comes from the Arab nomads of Awlad Ghaboush who have a long-standing presence and coexistence with both Shawabna and Leira in the area. Umm Derafi was founded jointly by the Leira people led by Tia Koko, Morjan Kodi, Koko el-Amin, and Awlad Ghaboush in the 1940s. Later, the Shawabna expanded into the area from Aggab and Jebel Sheibun. Historically, Umm Derafi was known as Umm Derafi without ‘Leira’ or ‘Sheibun’ attachments. At the same time, it was taken for granted by the Leira that it was part of their overall customarily owned territory before they realised that their claim is being contested by the Shawabna. (author’s interview with Adam Hakim, 2006)

The way the Awlad Ghaboush represent Umm Derafi implies that they seem to be supporting the Leira position. Their testimony could be seen as a smart attempt to keep Umm Derafi as a neutral place that should accommodate all the existing ethnic groups including themselves. It also 121

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implies that the Leira added the term ‘Leira’ to Umm to ensure their claim over the area after they had experienced the growing political hegemony of the Shawabna in the area.

Current conflicts over land resources in Umm Derafi Umm Derafi is one of the richest places in the region, mainly because of a certain type of forest wood, Borassus flabellifer linn, known locally as doleib, which is used for house construction in rural and urban settlements. It is therefore an important economic resource in the region that attracts traders and government officials who engage in the wood business by legal and illegal means. This natural resource was subject to excessive overcutting, mostly by the army, following the collapse of the government and the community-based systems of resource management in the area during the war. Since 2002, this activity has been intensified further, when the area was opened up for free movement of people and goods through the Nuba Mountains Cease Fire Agreement. The Leira people in Umm Derafi as well as in the SPLM/A-controlled areas started to feel uneasy about this reemergence of over-exploitation of the local resources by wealthy outsiders. They believe that the Shawabna and the government army stationed in Umm Derafi are the main actors in wood cutting, processing, transporting and trading. Thus, when the Leira people returned to Umm Derafi in 2002, they entered into recurrent conflicts with some of those who were intensively involved in the business of trading in wood resources, which they perceive as their communal property. We had recurring cases of conflicts over cutting wood resources, because we wanted to sustain our resources and use them rationally, while others wanted to maximise their gains out of them at the expense of the present and some generations to come. Despite our effort to stop the business, it continues particularly in the areas not under the control of the Leira Native Administration. (author’s interview with Mohamed Tia Koko, 2006)

Horticulture is another activity which involves serious confrontation between the Leira and the Shawabna in the area. Recently, the Shawabna initiated a process of formal registration of their horticultural lands with support from the Zakat fund.4 The initiative seems to be ethnically based, with the Shawabna the exclusive beneficiaries of the project in the area through their native leadership, which acts as a catalyst in the process of project implementation. At this initial stage, the project has been confined 4 The Zakat fund, officially known in Arabic as Diwan el-Zakat, is one of several Islamic institutions established by the NCP-led government as part of its endeavour to promote its Islamic political ideology and programmes nationwide. This religious-based economic institution, among others, was excessively used and is still being used to economically empower its constituencies at the grass-roots level, sometimes along ethnic lines, as this case testifies.

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Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in the Nuba Mountains to a limited number of families within the Shawabna community in Alali village, with a plan to expand it to the remaining interested Shawabna farmers in the near future. On May 21, 2006, the Omda of the Shawabna arrived from Khartoum via Kadugli, accompanied by a truckload of improved mango tree seedlings supplied by the Zakat fund. Upon his arrival, he held a meeting with the Shawabna community in Alali/Umm Derafi Sheibun and explained how the first batch of seedlings was going to be distributed among certain families who had already prepared their respective plots. He promised that there would be a series of such truckloads coming in, until all the interested families were covered, provided that this first experimental stage was successful. At this juncture, it is worth noting that all the fruit farms, which belong to different ethnic groups, are mixed together in the fertile lowlands around the permanent water sources of the Umm Derafi khor. This pattern of sharing horticultural land among different ethnic groups negates the ongoing claims and counter-claims of definite and concrete territorial boundaries along ethnic lines. At this stage, there were numerous displaced households which had not yet returned to Umm Derafi. The clue here is that any formal demarcation of a farm in the absence of a neighbour is likely to invite dispute over fixation of the formerly loosely demarcated boundaries between the different neighbouring horticultural farms. Therefore, the Leira native authority categorically opposed the Shawabna unilateral horticultural project. Despite this strong opposition, the Shawabna decided to proceed with formal registration of their horticultural plots.

Some key challenges to restoration of the peace in the region Based on this fieldwork-centred ethnographic study of the Umm Derafi case, at least three main dilemmas were identified as serious impediments to the on–going efforts to restore peace and security in the war-torn region after the CPA. These three dilemmas are the firstcomer dilemma, the warimposed dichotomy following the peace, and the ineffectiveness of the CPA in redressing the land-related grievances in the region. BOUNDARY FLUIDITY AND THE DILEMMA OF THE FI RSTCOMER CLAIM

One basic lesson learnt from this case study is that it is not possible to trace empirically the autochthonous claim and its counter contestation. Hence, the chances of concretely establishing land rights based on firstcomer claims and counter-claims seem to be extremely difficult to prove in the absence of clear-cut ethnic territorial boundaries. What is present is a set of loose territorial boundaries in the minds of the different claimants. 123

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These fluid maps in the minds of different ethnic groups overlap in such a way that one part of a territory can be concurrently claimed by two or more ethnic groups coexisting in the region. It is these peoples’ overlapping perceptions and not actual maps that trigger the recurrent land-based conflicts as soon as there is an attempt by one party to try to exercise exclusive control over the land and its resources. Thus, if there is no incorporation of customary land rights and practices into the civil laws and regulations of the modern Sudanese state, the on-going land-based conflicts are likely to intensify and expand with time. This is due to the growing public awareness about land economics, the sharp population growth following the return of IDPs, and the ethno-political polarisation in contemporary Sudan, not only in the Nuba Mountains but also in other war-torn and marginalised regions. THE WA R-I MPOSED DI CHOTOMY AN D T HE D ILE MM A O F T H E P E AC E AC TO R S

One basic feature of the post-conflict Nuba Mountains is the continuation of the war–imposed dichotomy, characterised by a divided politico–administrative setting with sharp ethnic and territorial boundaries in the making. The prevalence of this situation despite the peace indicates that the two ethnic groups, which were able to co-exist socially and mix spatially during the pre-war period, are not able to restore this harmony after the war. The crux of the matter is that the war-imposed settlement pattern, based on boundary making along ethnic lines in the same locale, is being progressively consolidated by certain major peace and development actors: the state institutions, UN agencies, international NGOs and CBOs. Instead of unifying this divided livelihood pattern, most of the actors involved have strengthened the divide. This is clearly manifested in the provision of services, particularly schooling, health, food relief, water supply and security arrangements. To make it worse, each party established its own native administration system, social services, and military units with no coordination or mutual recognition. This implies that the government institutions and the UN and other international actors involved have fallen into the war-imposed dichotomy, not only along political, but also ethnic lines. They allocate services in a way that fosters the institutionalisation of the new spatial patterns of distinctive ethnic boundaries in all features of the public space. These state and non-state actors are expected to act as agents of positive change, facilitators of ethno-social healing and promoters of political reconciliation. As the Umm Derafi case reveals, some of these actors are being coopted or neutralised and have eventually become part of processes and mechanisms which have been making the walls of ethnopolitical antagonism higher following the CPA. In fact, the making of both social and territorial boundaries along ethnic divides has become more and more evident after the CPA. As a result, the grassroots land-driven conflicts have become more frequent and 124

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Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in the Nuba Mountains more violent than at any time before in the region. However, despite this mounting trend of land-driven conflict, no tangible progress has been made in redressing land-related grievances in Southern Kordofan. T H E I N E F F E C T I V E N E S S O F T H E C PA I N R E D R E S S I N G COMMUNAL LAND G RIE VAN C E S

Both the Cease Fire Agreement of January 2002 and the CPA guaranteed cessation of hostilities and the free movement of civilians and goods, with the broader objective of gradually achieving a just, peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the conflict. They were remarkably successful in putting an end to open warfare. But paradoxically, in the Nuba Mountains region, some of their central features – increased stability, increased freedom of movement, the opening-up of the areas – reintroduced new sources of conflict that the war had caused to subside temporarily, all of them tied to the issue of land. They include the return of pastoralists and their herds and the return of the Jellaba investors to practise mechanised farming and the exploitation of natural resources in areas which were not accessible during the war because of insecurity (see Manger 2007). The CPA addresses the land question in the Wealth Sharing Protocol as well as in the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. However, ‘land policy issues are not fully addressed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ (Polloni 2005: 21), and the core land issues have not been resolved, despite the centrality of the land question in the civil war. The Wealth Sharing Protocol highlights the traditional nature of land tenure arrangements but avoids addressing the core issue of customary land ownership rights. Part 2.0 titled: ‘Ownership of Land and Natural Resources’ stipulates that: 2.1: … [T]his agreement is not intended to address the ownership of those resources. The parties agree to establish a process to resolve this issue. 2.5: The parties agree that a process be instituted to progressively develop and amend the relevant laws to incorporate customary laws and practices, local heritage and international trends and practices.

The realisation of these land-related issues is to be dealt with during the interim period (2005–11) by the Land Commissions, to be established at national level, at the regional level in southern Sudan, and at state level in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. Their functions include arbitration and consultation on land reform and customary land rights, appraisal of compensation and recording of land use practices. The Protocols offer no direct guarantees of securing ownership rights for communally owned lands, nor of incorporating customary land rights, practices and laws in the expected new legislation. The final settlement of land issues has been left to the discretion of the Land Commissions. In the absence of clear-cut guarantees or solutions in the CPA to issues related to 125

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customary land rights, there are uncertainties concerning the nature of the laws upon which arbitration will be based, recognition of the customary law, enforceability of the verdicts on lands, and alternatives for redress in case a Commission refuses to consider a claim (Polloni 2005: 21–2). Moreover, the Land Commissions that have been established during the interim period are not operating. No progress has been made in incorporating customary land rights into the legislation at different levels, and the deeply rooted grievances among the indigenous peoples of Sudan in general and the Nuba of Southern Kordofan in particular are not redressed. The crux of the matter here is that, as the transition period passes, the local communities feel more and more insecure about the fate of their communal land as a base for survival and economic livelihood and as a symbol of social and political identification. This growing feeling of insecurity explains, to a large degree, the escalation of the current land–driven conflicts in the region.

Conclusion The ethnographic analysis of the Umm Derafi case has shown that the territorial coexistence of various ethnic groups had been the dominant social form in Southern Kordofan during the pre-war period, though with constant competition over land resources. During the civil war and thereafter, however, this form has undergone drastic erosion with the discontinuity of ethnic coexistence. As a result, the return of the various stakeholders to their previous territories has been a tense process in the post-conflict situation. The new dynamics, which is still in the making, is that each ethnic group is exerting a tremendous effort to try to consolidate its control over land under its actual use while contesting others’ claims. The Nuba’s claim to land rights is increasingly being articulated in terms of autochthonous claims with strong ties to what they perceive as their ancestral land. This is apparent in the emerging Nuba movements, aiming at reconstructing themselves as one unified ethno-political group in order to be able to take collective political action. However, this Nuba position is being contested persistently and systematically by the other ethnic groups in the region. They are using different forms of alliances, solidarity, power and control at various levels of governance, including the manipulation of the native administration, to counteract the Nuba’s emerging collective movement. The re-positioning, claiming and counter-claiming in the struggle of the two ethnic groups of the Leira Nuba and the Shawabna over the Umm Derafi territory resulted in an inevitably escalating trend of land-driven conflicts in the area. This is a typical case of the mounting land-driven conflicts in different parts of the region after the Cease Fire Agreement in 2002 and the CPA. The case reveals at least three main post-conflict dilemmas as critical impediments to the on-going efforts to restore peace 126

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Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in the Nuba Mountains and security in this war-torn region after the CPA, namely: (i) the dilemma of the firstcomer rights in claiming communal land, (ii) the war-imposed dichotomy following the peace, and (iii) the ineffectiveness of the CPA in redressing the land-related grievances in the region. What is most crucial is the delay in the establishment and activation of the land-related institutions stipulated by the CPA, particularly the Land Commissions, and the subsequent negative contributions to the process of restoring peace and security in the region. The case studied suggests that settlement of the land question is a vital step towards achieving sustainable social and political peace and security in the region. However, due to lack of ‘comprehensiveness’ of the CPA with regard to the land question, associated with the disappointing performance of the GONU at federal and state levels, it is doubtful whether the CPA and its stipulated institutions are capable of redressing the deeply rooted land-driven grievances of the indigenous Nuba, among others. The nature, trend and scale of the on-going land-based conflicts in the region are alarming with regard to the likelihood of a resumption of the civil war. In the absence of the political will to effectively address the land question, a central factor among the root causes of Sudan’s recurring civil wars, there is no reason to expect the restoration of political and social peace and security, not only in the Nuba Mountains but also in other similar regions of the country.

References African Rights (1995) Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan. London: African Rights. Bourdieu, Pierre (1985) The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups, in: Theory and Society, Vol. 14, No. 6: 723–44. Cunnison, Ian (1966) Baqqa- ra Arabs: Power and Lineage in a Sudanese Nomad Tribe. Oxford: Clarendon Press. El-Battahani, Atta Hassan (1986): Nationalism and Peasant Politics in the Nuba Mountains Region of Sudan, 1924–1966. PhD Thesis. Brighton: University of Sussex. El-Ima-m, Abdalla El-Tom/Egemi, Omer (2004) Addressing Land Questions in the Nuba Mountains: Capitalizing on Previous Experiences. Khartoum: UNDP. El-Tayeb, Galal Eldin (1989) Industry and Peripheral Capitalism in the Sudan: A Geographical Analysis, 1st edn. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. Gillan, J. A. (1931) Some Aspects of Nuba Administration, in: Sudan Government Memoranda, No. 1. Grönhaug, Reidar (1978) Scale as a Variable in Analysis: Fields in Social Organization in Herat, Northwest Afghanistan, in: Barth, Fredrik (ed.) Scale and Social Organization. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget: 78–121. Harragin, Simon (2003) Nuba Mountains Land and Natural Resources Study: Part 1 - Land Study. International Agriculture Programs, Columbia, MO: University of Missouri and USAID. Henderson, K. D. D. (1939) A Note on the Migration of the Missiriya Tribe into South-West Kordofan, in: Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. 22, No. 1: 49–77. Ibrahim, Hamid El-Bashir (1988) Agricultural Development Policy, Ethnicity and Sociopolitical Change in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan. PhD Thesis, Storrs. CT.: University of Connecticut.

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GUMA KUNDA KOMEY Ille, Enrico (forthcoming) Der Berg Saybu-n und das Gold. Narrative um einen ungewissen Ort in den Nuba Mountains (Sudan), in: Kath, Roxana/Rieger, Anna-Katharina (eds) Raum – Landschaft – Territorium. Halle: Universität Halle. Komey, Guma Kunda (2005) Regional Disparity in National Development of the Sudan and Its Impact on Nation-building: with Reference to the Peripheral Region of the Nuba Mountains. PhD Thesis, Khartoum: University of Khartoum. Komey, Guma Kunda (2008a) The Autochthonous Claim of Land Rights by the Sedentary Nuba and its Persistent Contest by the Nomadic Baqqa-ra of South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Sudan, in: Rottenburg, Richard (ed.) Nomadic-sedentary Relations and Failing State Institutions in Darfur and Kordofan. Halle: University of HalleWittenberg, Orientwissenschaftliche Hefte, No. 26: 101–27. Komey, Guma Kunda (2008b) The Denied Land Rights of the Indigenous Peoples and Their Endangered Livelihood and Survival: The Case of the Nuba of the Sudan, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 31, No. 5: 991–1008. Komey, Guma Kunda (2009a) Striving in an Exclusionary State: Territory, Identity, and Ethno-politics of the Nuba, Sudan, in: Journal of International Politics and Development, No. 7: 1–20. Komey, Guma Kunda (2009b) Autochthonous Identity: Its Territorial Attachment and Political Expression in Claiming Communal Land in the Nuba Mountains Region, Sudan, in Kath, Roxana/Rieger, Anna-Katharina (eds) Raum – Landschaft – Territorium. Zur Konstruktion physischer Räume als nomadische und sesshafte Lebensräume (Nomaden und Sesshafte 11).Wiesbaden: Reichert: 205–28. MacMichael, Harold A. (1912/67) The Tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. MacMichael, Harold A. (1922/67) A History of the Arabs in the Sudan and Some Account of the People Who Preceded Them and of the Tribes Inhabiting Darfur. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. Manger, Leif Ole (1984) Traders and Farmers in the Nuba Mountains: Jellaba Family Firms in the Liri Area, in: Manger, L. O. (ed.) Trade and Traders in the Sudan. Bergen: University of Bergen, Department of Social Anthropology: 213–42. Manger, Leif Ole (2003) Perspectives on Land Tenure and Related Issues in the Nuba Mountains: A Desk Study for the Nuba Mountains Program Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT), UNDP Khartoum. Khartoum: NMPACT. Manger, Leif Ole (2007) Ethnicity and Post-conflict Reconstruction in the Nuba Mountains of the Sudan: Processes of Group-making, Meaning Production, and Metaphorization, in: Ethnoculture, No. 1: 72–84. Mohamed Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim (1984) Local Markets in Moroland: The Shifting Strategies of the Jella-ba Merchants, in: Manger, Leif O. (ed) Trade and Traders in the Sudan. Bergen: University of Bergen, Department of Social Anthropology: 189–212. Mohamed Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim (1999) Land Alienation and Genocide in the Nuba Mountains, in: Cultural Survival Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4: 36-38. Murphy, Alexander B. (1991) Regions as Social Construct: The Gap between Theory and Practice, in: Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 15, No. 1: 22-35. Nadel, Siegfried Frederick (1947) The Nuba: An Anthropological Study of the Hill Tribes of Kordofan. London: Oxford University Press. Polloni, Domenico (2005) Land and the Sudan Transition to Peace, in: Forced Migration Review, No. 24, University of Oxford, Refugees Studies Centre: 21–2. Rahal, Suliman Musa (2001) The Right to Be Nuba. The Story of a Sudanese People’s Struggle for Survival. Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press. Republic of Sudan (1958) First Population Census of Sudan 1955/56: Notes on Omodia Map. Khartoum: Population Census Office. Roden, David (1969) Lowland Farms for a Mountain People, in: The Geographical Magazine, No. 3: 200–6. Roden, David (1972) Down-migration in the Moro Hills of Southern Kordofan, in: Sudan Notes and Records, No. 53: 79–99.

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Ethnic Identity Politics & Boundary Making in the Nuba Mountains Sagar, J. W. (1922) Notes on the History, Religion and Customs of the Nuba, in: Sudan Notes and Records, No. 5: 137–56. Salih, Kamal el-Din Osman (1982) The British Administration in the Nuba Mountains Region of Sudan 1900–1956. London: University of London Press. Stevenson, R. (1965) The Nuba People of Kordofan Province: An Ethnographic Survey. Graduate College Publications Monograph No. 7. Khartoum: University of Khartoum, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences. Strauss, Anselm (1978) A Social World Perspective. Studies in Symbolic Interaction, No. 1: 119–28. Sudan Government (1912) Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Handbook Series 2. Kordofan and the Region to the West of the Nile. Khartoum: Intelligence Department. Suliman, Mohamed (2000) The Nuba Mountains: Resource Access, Violent Conflict and Identity, in: Buckles, D. (ed.) Cultivating Peace. Conflict and Collaboration in Natural Resource Management. Ottawa, DRC/Washington DC: World Bank Institute: 205–20. Williams, C. H./Smith, A. D. (1983) The National Construction of Social Space, in: Progress in Human Geography, No. 7: 502–18.

Interview Partners Mohamed Tia Koko, Amir of the Leira Nuba in the governmentcontrolled areas, Umm Derafi (Leira/Abu Hamama), May 16, 2006. El-Nur Deldum Angelo, Sheikh of the Leira, Umm Derafi (Leira/Abu Hamama), May 19, 2006. Adam Hakim of Awlad Ghaboush, Umm Derafi (Abu Hamama), May 19, 2006. Hamid Salatin, Omda of the Shawabna, Umm Derafi (Sheibun/Alali), May 23, 2006. Sharif Ibrahim Abdel-Alla Ibrahim, Umm Derafi (Sheibun/Alali), May 22, 2006.

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7 Return Migration to the Nuba Mountains S A M I R A M U S A A R M I N DA M I N

Introduction Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are defined as people who have been forced by certain disastrous factors to move without prior arrangements and under very difficult and risky conditions while seeking refuge and protection. This involuntary internal displacement may result from civil wars or from ecologically related disasters such as famine, drought, desertification, floods and earthquakes (Komey 2003: 60). Thus, IDP are individuals or groups of people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, gross violations of human rights or natural/human-caused disasters without crossing an internationally recognised state border (Bascom 1993: 33; IDMC 2006). In this respect, Sudan is no exception since it has been in a state of civil war for more than forty of its fifty-four years of independence. Though various factors contributed in a varying degree to the population displacement in Sudan, civil war remains the single key contributing factor. Throughout the post-colonial era, Sudan has experienced large population movements and displacement because of ecological deterioration and regional disparities in development. The UN estimates that conflicts and drought have left 6.7 million Sudanese displaced, including some 550,000 refugees in neighbouring countries or beyond (Malik 2005: 31). However, the persistent pattern of political instability, coupled with prolonged civil wars in southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, and Darfur, is the main dynamic that has resulted in immense waves of IDPs (Pantuliano 2007). The conditions in the home areas of these population groups were worsened further by drought, a series of famines and the erosion of their agricultural production systems, leading finally to the collapse of their way of life (Bascom 1993: 36). 130

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Return Migration to the Nuba Mountains The CPA brought a period of peace and stability, particularly in the war-torn area of southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile State. It gives the South the right to secede through a referendum to be exercised after a six-year interim period. It also offers significant regional autonomy to the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile (Deng 2005: 7). The CPA outlines the efforts needed for the return, repatriation and resettlement of the IDPs in their respective home areas. At the same time, it envisages a plan for the rehabilitation of the war-affected areas while receiving the returnees. Despite this, however, it seems that many displaced persons have been facing mounting challenges in the course of return to their communities and areas that have been severely devastated during the prolonged civil war. This chapter briefly discusses the return migration of the IDPs of the Nuba Mountains region after the CPA as a socio-cultural, economic and political process. The paper is part of a larger on-going study (Damin, forthcoming). This study premises that, after the signing of the CPA, the process of the IDPs’ return to the Nuba Mountains, among other areas, is contining to face enormous challenges owing to postconflict insecurity, land-related conflicts, and the lack of necessary socioeconomic infrastructure in the receiving areas. Backed by this reasoning, the paper intends to discuss the reasons for migration and return migration and the problems which the returnees face when returning to their home areas. The analysis is based primarily on field research data from the two villages of El-Fouse and Hajar Sultan in Dilling Locality in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains. These two areas have been selected because they represent the villages that were severely affected during the long civil war in the north-western parts of the Nuba Mountains, coupled with massive depopulation. After the CPA, the two areas witnessed a massive return migration of IDPs from urban centres in central and northern Sudan. Data were gathered through individual interviews, observation, and questionnaires during field research in 2006 and 2007. The concept of cultural diffusion provides the analytical framework where ideas, life-styles, skills and knowledge are transmitted from one society to another in the course of population movement. The interaction tends to induce socio-cultural changes among the population in the receiving areas as well as among the returnees (El-Dagas 1996). The returnees are likely to act as agents of change and to contribute significantly to socio-cultural, economic, political and environmental changes in the local social settings. It is hypothesised that the intensity and extent of return migration is related to the political motivation to implement the CPA according to the prescribed schedule. The study attempts to investigate the socio-cultural, economic and political interaction between returnees and local inhabitants with regard to the social system, values, customs and social traditions. The focus is on the possibilities of the emergence of new patterns of life in the areas 131

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receiving these returnees. Finally, the study tries to answer the following questions: • What are the diverse socio-economic and cultural aspects brought by the returnees from urban areas? • To what extent does the daily interaction between returnees and local inhabitants lead to the emergence of new social and cultural patterns of life? • In which fields does the CPA realise, achieve and satisfy the hopes and aspirations of returnees from urban areas? While in-depth answers to these broad questions are the main task of the larger study (Damin, forthcoming), this short paper aims to shed some light on these questions. What follows represents a socio-geographical background of the Nuba Mountains and the population movements during the civil war. Return migration is then analysed with a focus on the causes of displacement and out-migration and the motivation to return. Further, the problems facing the returnees are highlighted. Finally, some recommendations to deepen the understanding of academics, policymakers and practitioners while dealing with the question of the IDPs will be provided.

The Nuba Mountains region: background, conflicts and population movements The Nuba Mountains region is geographically located in the west-central part of Sudan between longitudes 29 and 31 degrees east and latitudes 10 and 12.5 degrees north. The topography of the Nuba Mountains varies from a gently rolling mixed soil of clay and sand to rocky hills and mountains composed of dark cracking clay soil. The area is endowed with one of the most fertile soils and adequate rainfalls in the Savannah belt zone of the Sudan, and constitutes 15 per cent of the country’s arable land. As an agricultural area which is strategically located between equatorial southern Sudan and arid northern Sudan, this region is one of the major economic bases for Sudanese agrarian economy. It is rich in natural resources including oil, which contributes to the elevated economic, political and strategic significance of the region. The Nuba Mountains region is further regarded as an ethno-cultural, economic and political crossroads and bridge between the Arab and Muslim groups dominating the northern parts of Sudan and the various African groups in the southern part of Sudan (El-Bashir 1998: 184). The ethno-cultural territorial set-up brings together people of common heritage, history and destiny (Komey 2005: 181), of which the Nuba, the original inhabitants of the region, constitute the ethnically major group. They display a high degree of cultural and linguistic diversity. Yet, they 132

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Return Migration to the Nuba Mountains share considerable commonalities in physical structure, cultural heritage and language, and speak Arabic as their lingua franca. They are mainly sedentary and practise traditional rain-fed farming as well as rearing livestock. According to the 1956 population census, the Nuba represented 6 per cent of the total population of Sudan. In 2003, their estimated percentage had dropped to 5 per cent (Saeed 2001: 185). According to estimations of the All Nuba Conference during the Cease-Fire in January 2002, 760,000 Nuba people were living in government-controlled areas, 370,000 in SPLM/A-controlled areas, and over one million Nuba were scattered mainly in northern Sudan and abroad (All Nuba Conference 2005). The Baggara (Arabs), who are pastoral nomads, represent the second sizeable group, while other minor groups include people of West African origin, mainly Fellata, northern Sudanese traders known as Jellaba, and other ethnic groups from all over Sudan (Komey 2005: 186). Land use patterns in the area are characterised by the coexistence of sub-systems of subsistence rain-fed cultivation and pastoral nomadism. In addition, there has been successive introduction of modern mechanised rain-fed farming in the clay soil zones of the Nuba Mountains (Komey 2005: 188). Land ownership is thus a central issue in Southern Kordofan. Customary land rights are generally not recognised by the government. The CPA defers the problem of land ownership to the post-agreement phase due its complexity. It does not address the ownership of land and natural resources, but has instituted a process to resolve this question through the establishment of National Land Commissions, a southern Sudan Land Commission and state Land Commissions in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. However, neither the national Commission nor the state Commissions have started operations (Pantuliano 2007: 2). Four main types of land conflict can be identified in Southern Kordofan: • Conflict between pastoralists and farmers, such as the conflict between the Hawazma Arab nomads of Dar Naila and the sedentary Nuba of Golfan in Dilling Locality (observations from 2006/7 field research). • Conflicts between agro-pastoralist communities that have been exacerbated by returnees. This type of conflict differs in various locations. In areas such as Sarf el-Jamous, smaller Nuba groups have found their land being taken up by more powerful Nuba for settlement, farming or grazing. • Conflicts between farmers and traders in the areas where both are exploiting local natural resources. This was a particular problem in Rashad and Abujebeha Localities, where traders were reported to have been illegally logging timber, gum Arabic, and palm trees (doleib) in collaboration with government officials and the army. • Conflicts between returnees and labourers on mechanised farms. Access to land for returnees in Rashad and Abujebeha areas has also 133

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been impeded by the expansion of mechanised farms. State authorities reported that IDPs were unable to move out of the so-called peace villages in which the GOS had resettled them, because their land had become part of mechanised schemes (Pantuliano et al. 2007: 27–8). It is worth noting that the migration of the Nuba to major towns in central and northern parts of Sudan is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, the Nuba have a long history of economically driven, voluntary and selective types of migration since the colonial era. Seeking jobs and education opportunities were the main driving forces at that time. Recently involuntary or forced migration mounted, due to the conflicts and civil wars that ravaged the region during the last two decades. As a result of the intensity of the war between the GOS and the SPLM/A, the number of IDPs from the region increased significantly. Whereas the displaced people in 1984 formed 7.9 per cent of the population of the Nuba Mountains, this percentage rose to 9.9 per cent in 1989 and increased drastically to 40.8 per cent in 1992 (Damin, forthcoming).

Return migration to the Nuba Mountains: ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors Return migration to the Nuba Mountains started after the Ceasefire Agreement of 2002. Various sources estimate different numbers of IDPs who are potentially returnees. The United Nations estimates that the number of returnees will be 46,300 persons (UNMIS 2007). The World Food Programme estimated a minimum of 50,000 and a maximum of 250,000 IDPs returning to their homes by the end of 2006 (WFP 2006), while Pantuliano et al. estimate the number of potential returnees to Southern Kordofan State at 61,500 people (Pantuliano et al. 2007: 17). This represents 41 per cent of the total expected returns to the southern states and the three areas of Southern Kordofan, southern Blue Nile and Abyei. The CPA apparently encourages the return of IDPs to their respective homelands including the Nuba Mountains. Most of the IDPs had settled temporarily in disadvantageous environments around major urban centres in northern and central Sudan. One year after the CPA, the Southern Kordofan state authorities estimated that around 600,000 people had actually returned home during the previous five years (ibid.). Although there is a formal programme being carried out jointly by the GONU and the UN, the pattern of the return migration of IDPs to their homelands has largely remained a spontaneous endeavour, with some returnees making their own efforts to return directly to their areas of origin. Besides spontaneous return, the IDPs execute their journey back home by means of community-organised return, mainly through their own associations, through jointly organised return involving the central 134

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Return Migration to the Nuba Mountains government, state governments and the UN, and through state-organised return (Pantuliano et al. 2007: 17). The return process to the Nuba Mountains started as early as the end of the 1990s, but only in a sporadic pattern. During the present author’s interviews, respondents asserted that during 1997–2000, only a few people returned, because the fighting and insecurity were still rampant in the region. In April 1997, the GOS concluded an agreement with the Central Committee of the SPLM/A United Nuba Faction led by Mohamed Harun Kafi. Under this agreement, the Transitional Peace Council of Southern Kordofan was established with several objectives, including assisting the IDPs to return home. The agreement stipulated that ... the Central Government should resettle all those who were displaced from the Nuba Mountains in cooperation/consultation with the state Government during the transitional period, according to a specific plan of action. Displaced should be resettled in their previous villages. The Central Government bears the responsibilities and the cost of the resettlement of the Nuba returnees according to the international agreements and arrangements. (GOS/SPLM/A 1997: 8)

As a result of this political development, some IDPs found their way back home. However, the direct practical impact was limited. In addition, the agreement did not last long and was undermined by the government itself. In 2002, when the Ceasefire Agreement for the Nuba Mountains was signed, a full cessation of hostilities and free movement of people and goods all over the Nuba Mountains followed. This opened up the region after the long period of local and international isolation of the Nuba people. In particular, those people in the SPLM/A-governed areas faced a new stage in the political history of the Nuba Mountains. The agreement facilitated the reunification of families that had been separated because of the war, resulting in IDPs’ voluntary return in sizeable numbers. Following the conclusion of the CPA, the return of the IDPs has become not only a social but also a political issue to the extent that the success or failure of the return programme is seen by many political circles as one of the key factors that will determine the overall success or failure of the CPA. Due to the importance of the question of IDPs and their return, both the government and the international community have exerted tremendous efforts to allow the IDPs to return to their homelands. Despite the fact that some challenges were obvious and anticipated by the actors involved, some remained invisible until they were encountered by the IDPs or the implementing agencies. The land conflict at home seems to be the major challenge. In most cases, the returnees have found that their land for farming or settlement has been taken up by other newcomers, whether sedentary or agro-pastoral groups. Several factors contribute to the returnees’ decision to return, some of them related to the areas that received them when they were being displaced (push factors), while others are related to the dynamics in the 135

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home areas. The latter may include pull factors, push factors, or a combination of both. Push factors include the lack of employment in the receiving urban centres, and different forms of institutionalised harassment, suppression and marginalisation. Discouraging factors in the home areas include insecurity, local tribal conflicts, land insecurity, poor services and lack of job opportunities for educated or skilled people. On the other hand, the main pull factors are peace and stability and the desire to return to the land of origin as a source of dignified livelihood and a symbol of socio-political identification. Data collected from field research – and provided in Table 7.1 – illustrate that there have been many reasons which encouraged IDPs to return to their original homes. Most significant has been the restoration of peace and security. 54.4 per cent of respondents rated this the single major reason for their decision to return. 22 per cent expected immediate economic development and availability of job opportunities, education and services in the Nuba Mountains after the war. A significant number of the respondents were retired employees, with 23.5 per cent stating that the CPA has given them an opportunity to return home. In addition, there are other reasons. Many returnees expressed their discontent at the mistreatment and marginalisation they underwent in the urban areas. Their suffering fuelled their longing for the homeland as the basis of their socio-ethnic identity and a source of livelihood. Furthermore, they expressed their strong desire to return in order to re-attach themselves to their local culture and the traditions and customs of their respective home areas, especially among the elders who had resisted cultural assimilation in the urban areas. Moreover, the returnees are accustomed to the free and easy movement of individuals and communities in the rural areas, rather than the expensive tied movement and interaction patterns imposed on them by the urban mode of life. Strong social ties, solidarity and cohesion in the home areas have created a highly cherished social system, especially among the elders, which had remained a missing dimension in the urban areas. Finally, with some skills and innovative experiences acquired during their stay in the urban setting, some returnees have become potential agents of change upon their return home. Table 7.1 Respondents’ Reasons for Returning Home Reasons

%

Peace and security Availability of jobs Expected development Availability of education and services Retired employees Total Source: author’s field research data, 2007.

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54.4 14 6 2 23.5 99.9

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Challenges facing the IDPs during the process of return Returnees face many difficulties in the process of return to their homelands. The timing factor seems to be crucial for a safe journey and better settlement. The optimum returning time is the early dry season when returnees would have sufficient time to settle down and engage in preparing themselves for farming activities before the rainy season starts. However, various organised return journeys were scheduled for the end of the dry season or in the early rainy season, thus causing logistical problems. Regularly the rainy season leads to a bottleneck in transport facilities in the region due to the inaccessibility of roads, with prices rising sharply. A one or two days’ journey during the dry season can turn into a journey lasting more than a week in the rainy season. It happened occasionally that returnees were left stranded on their way home because of inaccessible roads. In addition, arriving late implies that returnees will not be able to obtain some local materials necessary for house construction. Moreover, they may fail to join the farming activities. As a result, they continue to depend on relief from international agencies for their living for a further year. The total costs of resettlement for a returnee household are high and usually beyond its ability. Many returnees, mostly from poor families, maintained high expectations of the government and UN agencies supporting them in their attempts to resettle after their arrival in their homelands. However, some of the returnees complained that the support of the agencies involved in their repatriation was insufficient for securing a reasonable and dignified resettlement. Such limited support does not help them to reintegrate into the local socio-economic and ecological systems. The social services in the study area were already limited before the war, and they were completely destroyed during the war. After the CPA the demand for services for both those who had remained at home, on the one hand, and returnees, on the other, rose substantially and could not be met. According to interviews that were conducted with those who had stayed, some of them felt that the returnees had run away during the heat of the war and, after the peace agreement, had returned to share with them the peace dividend. These hard feelings added to the rising tension caused by the shortages and inadequate social services rendered by the government and increased fears that the available resources would not suffice for both groups combined. 16.4 per cent of respondents stated that they planned to return to their previous areas of exile, because the social services and basic infrastructure in their villages were very poor compared with those in the urban areas where they had been living as IDPs. This was particularly the case in the villages of El-Fouse and Hajar Sultan, where the top priority for the returnees is water, because the wells are short of water and the number of hand pumps is low; moreover, the pumps require constant repair. Also the health facilities have not yet been 137

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improved in terms of buildings, professional staff and medicines. The small clinic in El-Fouse is not able to satisfy the needs of the inhabitants. In Hajar Sultan the German Red Cross has started to establish a medical clinic to cover the demand of both stayees and returnees; this may solve the health problem in the two villages in the future. Education, on the other hand, is a third priority for both groups in the area. In El-Fouse there is only one basic school functioning up to class four, but the Fellowship for African Relief Organisation (FAR) is attempting to complete the school up to grade eight. Generally there is a lack of secondary schools in these villages, and this does not encourage the returnees to take their children with them when they decide to return. Furthermore, inadequate transport, infrastructure and mobility, especially during the rainy season, prevent the returnees from visiting the nearby town markets for their daily purchases of basic needs. Evidence shows that some returnees who encountered serious problems during their return journey or in their place of origin, made a reverse migration back to the urban centres in the central and northern parts of Sudan. There is also evidence that return migration has resulted in some forms of family disintegration. The elderly and women and children represent the bulk of the returnees, while the younger generation, which is more skilled, educated, and profitably employed, tends to remain behind in the urban areas for better education, employment and income. They send part of their earnings as remittances to their families who have returned to their homelands. However, in general, the return of IDPs to their homelands in the Nuba Mountains is a positive factor in the rehabilitation and development of the areas that had been severely affected by the civil war. During the years of their displacement, many returnees were able to acquire new skills in fields such as furniture-making, construction and building, retailing and other income-generating jobs that allow them to establish their own small businesses in their respective home areas. But initial capital to start a business remains a main hindrance for many of them. Nevertheless, the study revealed that the interaction between the returnees and the local people is of substantial benefit to both parties. The returnees bring knowledge, skills and trade experience that they gained during their displacement period, and this is contributing to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of various institutions needed in the homelands. While doing so, they are also passing on some of their experience to the local people. At the same time, through the daily interaction between returnees and residents, the returnees get to learn fundamental skills, particularly those related to agricultural practices and the associated socio-economic and cultural norms. The government and some agencies have supported the establishment of local institutions such as schools and training and capacity-building centres, and social facilities such as cultural centres and sport clubs. These have a tremendous impact in connecting local people with their surroundings. 138

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Return Migration to the Nuba Mountains Despite the challenges in the process of return migration to the Nuba Mountains, most of the returnees interviewed agreed that the CPA was indeed an important achievement, because it put an end to the war, hence allowing the IDPs to return to their homes. Precisely 97 per cent of the respondents among the Nuba Mountains returnees agree that signing the CPA was a positive step, because it restored security, freedom of movement for people and goods, and allowed for rehabilitation and re-development of the war-affected areas. Nevertheless, a sizeable number expressed disappointment regarding the implementation of the CPA, which is far below their expectations.

Conclusion A holistic approach is required to achieve a sustainable return environment for the IDPs, taking into consideration all the needs for the resettlement. The national government should encourage displaced people to return to their homelands by assistance in terms of providing transportation to their destination areas and through efforts regarding basic social services. This should be done in cooperation with the government of Southern Kordofan, international agencies and NGOs. The government of Southern Kordofan should also assist the returnees to reach their areas of origin. It should secure the routes and encourage the returnees by supporting them with money to develop their areas in collaboration with the people who did not leave during the war, according to their needs and priorities. International agencies and NGOs should gradually shift from humanitarian aid-driven interventions to development-centred support programmes with a focus on the establishment of permanent medical centres, schools and water supply sources, including building small dams. Special priority should be given to the capacity-building of returnees and local people in order to empower them while participating in the rehabilitation and redevelopment of their homelands, and to the establishment of good governance and the rule of law in Southern Kordofan. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UNMIS and the UN agencies should be more transparent in their information and orientation of the IDPs before transporting them to their homelands. They should assist them in taking the decision to return at the appropriate time in order to make the resettlement process successful. An integrated approach might well lead to a more sustainable return and greater social stability in the area. Finally, the recent instability in the study area needs to be addressed. This refers to the fighting that occurred in the Nuba Mountains between Nuba and Baggara, as well as to the tense relations between the NCP and the SPLM/A about the implementation of the CPA in the area. These instabilities may lead to more humanitarian crises in the Nuba Mountains, if the two partners do not use wisdom in dealing with the situation that exists in the area. 139

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References All Nuba Conference (2005) Final Communiqué, in: Sudan Tribune Online, in: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article9487, accessed 21/04/2008. Bascom, Jonathan (1993) Internal Refugees: The Case of the Displaced, in: Black, Richard/Vaughan, Robin (eds) Geography and Refugees: Patterns and Process of Change. London: Belhaven Press: 33–46. Damin, Samira Musa Armin (forthcoming) Return Migration and Socio-economic and Cultural Change: A Case Study of the Nuba Mountains and Unity State in Sudan. PhD Thesis. Khartoum: University of Juba. Deng, Francis Mading (2005) African Renaissance: Towards a New Sudan: Prospects for Peace, in: Forced Migration Review, No. 24.: Oxford University, Refugees Studies Centre: 6–8. El-Bashir, Hamid (1998) Development Failure and Environment Collapse: Understanding the Background to the Present Civil War in the Nuba Mountains (1985–1998). Working paper presented at Symposium on Perspectives on Tribal Conflict in Sudan, May 11–12. Khartoum: University of Khartoum/IAAS (Institute of African and Asian Studies)/FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung). El-Dagas, Mohamed (1996) Social Change between Practice and Theory. Oman: Majdlawi Distribution and Publishing. GOS/SPLM/A (1997) Peace Agreement between GOS and SPLM/A, United Nuba Faction: Nairobi, Khartoum, in: http://www.occasionalwitness.com/Articles/19990731.html, accessed 2010/05/06. IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) (2006) Internal Displacement Overview of Trends and Developments in 2005, in: http://www.internal-displacement.org/ 8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountrySummaries)/D5B39DF8758ECD72C12573710039 E1FF?OpenDocument&count=10000, accessed April 21, 2008. Komey, Guma Kunda (2003) Internal Displaced Population of Sudan and the Rights of Citizenship, in: Abdel Ati, Hassan/Modesto, Joseph/El-Tayeb, Galal El-Din/Abu Zayd, Yasir (eds) Civil Society Dialogue, Peace, Democracy and Development. Proceedings of National Civic Forum Debate. Khartoum: National Civic Forum EDGE for Consultancy and Research/Heinrich Böll Foundation East Africa and Horn of Africa Regional Office: 60–79. Komey, Guma Kunda (2005) Regional Disparity in National Development of the Sudan and Its Impact on Nation-building: With Reference to the Peripheral Region of the Nuba Mountains. PhD Dissertation. Khartoum: University of Khartoum. Malik, Sajjad (2005) Sustainable IDPs/Refugees Return Depends on Collaborative Approach, in: Forced Migration Review, No. 24: University of Oxford, Refugees Studies Centre: 31–3. Pantuliano, Sara (2007) The Land Question: Sudan’s Peace Nemesis. Briefing Paper prepared for the Social Science Research Council. London: Overseas Development Institute. Pantuliano, Sara/Buchanan–Smith, Margie/Murphy, Paul (2007) The Long Road Home: Opportunities and Obstacles to the Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees Returning to Southern Sudan and the Three Areas. Report of Phase 1. London: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group, August. Saeed, A. Abdel Rahman (2001) The Nuba, in: Rahal, Suliman Musa (ed.) The Right to Be Nuba. The Story of a Sudanese People’s Struggle for Survival. Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press: 6–20. UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan) (2007) Support to Return and Reintegration in Sudan. A Progress Report, in: http://www.unmis.org/english/en-main.htm, acessed on April 21, 2008. WFP (World Food Programme) (2006) Annual Needs Assessment: Food Security Report: Regional Overviews and Recommendations. Khartoum: WFP Sudan Country Office, Programme Unit.

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8 Challenges of Basic Education in Southern Sudan The Language Policy in Jonglei & Upper Nile States J O S E P H L O D I O N G LU BA J O

Introduction Since independence, Sudan, and southern Sudan in particular, has failed to achieve a unanimously accepted unified national/regional language of instruction at the basic level. Identifying the causes of this failure is crucial in order to be able to implement an effective new language policy for the entire basic level of education in southern Sudan. Some scholars found that the fault was either wholly or partially rooted in the language policy of the British colonial power (Sanderson/Sanderson 1981). With their Sudan political service from 1898 to 1954, the British enacted and pursued policies that can be summarised by two specific aspects. First, there was the ‘Southern Policy’, a set of administrative recommendations and procedures contained in a memorandum issued in 1930 by the civil secretary of the (British) Sudan Political Service. Secondly, in the southern provinces education was in the hands of Christian missionaries from 1899 to 1945 (Beshir 1969: 37–60; Sanderson/ Sanderson 1981). In the course of implementing the CPA, issues related to education on the ground have regained attention. The GOSS has started to re-establish English as a unified medium of instruction at the basic level. Many initiatives are being undertaken to improve the sector of basic education in southern Sudan. Approaches are being made towards improving school enrolment and retention, reconstruction of schools, girls’ education, the quality of education, education for peace, support of destitute children, child protection, and treatment of traumatised war-affected children. In addition, there has been the ‘Go to School – 2006’ education initiative by the GOSS. Guided by a historical perspective, this chapter attempts to assess the controversy over the language of instruction in basic schools and the efforts 141

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exerted by the GOSS in its new language policy in Upper Nile and Jonglei States. The paper introduces the provision of an education service in these two states after the CPA, and analyses its efficiency as a social institution with regard to its capacity to equip children with valuable skills for future development. In particular, three aspects are discussed: the training of teachers, the response of different private schools to the New Sudan education and language policies, and the role of parents and teachers associations (PTA) in the implementation of the language policy.

Research methodology and description of the sites Four research methods were employed in the collection of data: • Relevant published materials were consulted for original insights into the topic and the area under study, the most important being Sommers (2005), Beshir (1969, 1974), Sconyers (1978), and Sanderson/ Sanderson (1981). • Field research was undertaken in Upper Nile and Jonglei States, and in Juba and Khartoum, where documents were collected from the national, regional and state Ministries of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST). • Interviews were conducted with officials in the MOEST of Upper Nile and Jonglei States and the Director of the Department of Basic Education in Upper Nile University in mid-2006. In Malakal the Director for Planning in the MOEST gave a comprehensive account of the implementation of the new curriculum. In October 2007, the Director General of the MOEST of Jonglei State in Bor provided valuable information on the status of the new curriculum in that state. • Participant observation was undertaken in schools and during PTA workshops on the responsibilities of parents and teachers. On the basis of these data, the factors that have effects on the implementation of the new language policy in basic schools in the area of study were identified. Jonglei and Upper Nile States are two of the ten states of southern Sudan. The region is the gateway to northern Sudan through the river Nile water way. Upper Nile and Jonglei States fall within latitude 6 degrees south and 12 degrees north and longitude 28.3 west and 35 degrees east. The area is located within the rich Sudanese savannah lands that extend from the northern part of Central Equatoria State at the town of Jemeiza to White Nile State in northern Sudan. In the east it is bordered by Blue Nile State – one of the transitional states in the CPA, the status of which will be determined in 2011 – in the north-west by Southern Kordofan and Unity States, and in the south-west by Lakes State. After the administrative reform of 1994, the former Greater Upper Nile State was divided into three, namely, Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity States (Wani 142

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Challenges of Education: Language Policy in Jonglei & Upper Nile 2005: 28). The inhabitants of these states gain their livelihoods from livestock keeping, subsistence farming, fishing and gum Arabic collection. The tribal composition in the research area includes the Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, Murle, Anuak and other smaller tribal groups. The Dinka are the largest ethnic group in southern Sudan, and are found, as well as the Nuer, Anuak and Murle, in both Upper Nile and Jonglei States. However, Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups are also found in all the other states of southern Sudan except the former Greater Equatoria region. None of these languages has ever been promoted as the lingua franca for these states. However, the 1928 language conference at Rajaf established a common orthography for the writing of Sudanese languages and identified the languages which were to be promoted in schools. Jonglei and Upper Nile States are dependent on the waters from the Bahr el-Jebel, Sobat, Bahr el-Zeraf and Bahr el-Ghazal rivers. There are swamps at Shambe and Lake No. The river Sobat passes about 17 km south of Malakal town before its confluence with the White Nile, flowing from the Ethiopian highlands with tributaries, among them the river Pibor. According to the population census of 2008, Jonglei State had the highest population in southern Sudan with 1,358,602 inhabitants, while Upper Nile State had 964,353 inhabitants, namely 16.4 and 11.7 per cent of the southern Sudanese population respectively. In Jonglei State, nearly half the population, namely, 665,521 persons, are 16 years of age and below (Aleu 2009; Sudan Tribune 2009).

Arabic to be language of instruction in South Sudan’s education Southern Sudanese education, under many circumstances, was destined to be an after thought at best. Changes in major education trends arising from this period have influenced subsequent events. (Sommers 2005)

Controversy over the language of instruction in southern Sudanese schools dates back to the condominium period. Already in the colonial era, in northern Sudan Arabic was the official language and the language of instruction in primary and intermediate schools, whereas English was used in secondary schools until 1967. Administrators used both Arabic and English. Selecting an official language for southern Sudan and a language of instruction at primary school level was a controversial issue. The language conference at Rajaf in 1928 agreed that the use of vernaculars and English as the medium of instruction in schools should be promoted. Bari, Dinka, Latuho, Nuer, Shilluk and Zande were chosen as group languages to be developed and used as media of instruction in the village and elementary schools in the South. But it is worth mentioning that, at the conference, it was made clear that those schools with Arabic as the 143

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language of instruction would be allowed to function in certain places. One of them was Malakal, the current capital of Upper Nile State, where a government elementary school was needed to cater for the northern population in the town. Another was Wau, the capital of Western Bahr elGhazal State, where the town population was using Arabic as a common means of communication. For the purpose of determining an official language for southern Sudan, the conference at Rajaf concluded that English would be promoted as the lingua franca and a necessary skill for advancement in government service. Arabic and even the use of common Arabic terms were to be discouraged (Holt/Daly 2000: 199; Sanderson/ Sanderson 1981). Eliminating Arabic and other Northern influences was seen by the British as strengthening the relationship and sense of group identity of the South which had always been distinct from the North. (Sconyers 1978: 206)

In 1947 decisions were taken to allow Arabic to spread in southern Sudan. The first Sudanese Minister of Education, Ali Taha, assumed office at the end of 1948 and soon began to promote Arabic in schools across the South, ‘with a view to it becoming the common language in the three Southern provinces of Greater Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria’ (Collins 1983: 246). The intention was that ‘Southern Sudan would no longer be looking outside to Uganda or East Africa nor remain isolated from the North’ (Beshir 1969: 174–5). In 1955, a year before Sudan became independent; the mutiny of southern Sudanese soldiers at Torit marked the dawn of Sudan’s history of civil wars between North and South. The fateful educational policy launched in 1949, in which Arabic and Islam had become the basis for education, can be considered as an underlying cause of the mutiny (Beshir 1969: 187). Yet the shadow of the policy extended far beyond 1955, across the subsequent decades of Sudan’s civil wars to the present day (Sommers 2005: 39). From 1972 to 1983, southern Sudan was granted limited local autonomy by the rulers in the North. A new education policy was adopted and eventually launched in collaboration with the North. The teaching materials and curriculum did not contain any specific reference to the local context or southern Sudan. In addition, southern Sudanese education was split into two tendencies, Arabic and English patterns (Fully 1987). The imposition of army rule and the harsh uncompromising instances of the government of the time on the spread of Arabic as a language and Islam as a religion alienated the people of Southern provinces and law and order deteriorated. (Williams/Mills 1976: 24)

At the primary level, most schools in Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces used Arabic, while in Equatoria most schools used English. They were accordingly divided into Arabic and English pattern schools. It was 144

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Challenges of Education: Language Policy in Jonglei & Upper Nile estimated that in 1976 over 90 per cent of the population in southern Sudan had never gone to school (Bure 1993). In 1983, owing to the failure of the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement and the imposition of Islamic Shari’a law by President Jaafar Mohammed el-Nimeiri, a new civil war started. In this period, most schools in Upper Nile and Bahr el-Ghazal provinces taught the school curriculum in Arabic, while most schools in Equatoria taught in English. In 1989, Omar elBashir became President of Sudan and decreed that all schools in Sudan, whether private or public, were to teach the curriculum in Arabic. A new curriculum was also introduced, which was more religious and politically orientated. It was infused with Islam and bore no reference to the local context or southern Sudan. Because of all this, the performance of the educational sector deteriorated. During the 1990s, under the rule of the Salvation Government of President Omar el-Bashir, Arabisation of southern Sudan was imposed forcibly. Arabic-based primary education played a crucial role in reducing the knowledge of the English language amongst the young educated generation to a very rudimentary level (Brophy 2003). The controversy over the language of instruction in basic schools in southern Sudan, and in Jonglei and Upper Nile States in particular, raises the following questions: (i) Why should southern Sudan introduce an education policy different from that of the North? (ii) Is the current curriculum of the GOSS orientated towards the needs of southern Sudanese society or towards political intentions? (iii) Is southern Sudan going to continue with two tendencies, i.e. Arabic and English patterns, as used to be the case previously? (iv) What impact does the emergence of English as the medium of instruction in the former bastions of Arabic state schools have? (v) How will educational policy deal with the curricula of the neighbouring countries that had been taught in southern Sudan andare still being taught after the CPA?

The New Sudan education policy During the course of the war, the SPLM/A set up institutional structures that marked the beginning of authority and services behind its lines. In 1993 the SPLA established the SPLM Secretariat of Education (SOE) in Nairobi, where the SPLM/A leadership had its political base in exile. The SOE developed the SPLM’s initial education policy, which was approved by the first SPLM national convention in April 1994 – a watershed event for the development not only of an education system but also of an SPLM government for southern Sudan. However, the education policy was ‘not widely disseminated due to lack of publishing resources’ (Sommers 2005: 145

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52). In addition, there was also lack of effective local educators and committed partners and donors. In late 1998, the New Sudan Education Policy was established as a revised version of the 1993 document, but once again, it was not widely circulated due to lack of resources. In 2001 UNICEF noted: ‘In the southern part of Sudan there is no established education authority or system’ (UNICEF 2001: 25). The SOE was shifted from Nairobi to southern Sudan only in 1998 or 1999, based on a policy ‘of moving education away from emergency and relief to a development approach’ (Sommers 2005: 53). A commissioner headed the SOE, and beneath this level were the director general and the six departments of planning, administration and finance, quality promotion and innovation, gender and social change, general education, and higher education. The Education Policy of 2002 established an eightfour-four years system of education, namely, eight years for primary, four years for senior secondary, and four years in college (Deng 2003). Emerging from a rebel movement, the SOE was dominated by men most of whom had been part of the SPLM/A and therefore came from a military background. International education officials who were working with the SOE noted that the system tended to be ‘top-down’ and authoritarian. Most of those working in it were ‘not educationists’ (Sommers 2005: 53). An international education official stated: There are hardly any educated Sudanese women in top management posts. When they rise they get distracted by girls’ education instead of becoming mainstream education managers. This limits their educational careers. (Sommers 2005: 52–3)

The SPLM’s Commissioner for education, Kosti Manibe, shed some light on the challenges for the SOE at a historic education symposium in Yambio in June 2001. He noted that since the independence of Sudan, there had never been a clear education policy for southern Sudan, but that the SPLM and the New Sudan were pushing forward the development of a new education system which would suit the development trends of the government. Structures for the central management of the educational system are either weak or non-existent. They are usually short of resources. (Sommers, quoting Manibe’s speech, 2005: 53)

The SOE’s sectoral plan, applicable from mid-2004 to mid-2007, sought, among other things, to increase girls’ primary enrolment from 11 to 30 per cent, get half of all SPLA soldiers and other adults in southern Sudan enrolled in literacy programmes, establish vocational training centres for out-of-school young people including demobilised soldiers, and establish teacher training institutes. These ambitious targets were outlined in action plans which included the involvement of private/international actors in infrastructural, material and training support (Sommers 2005: 53). A further issue on the agenda was the development of a training curriculum for the certifiable qualification of teachers. 146

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Challenges for the GOSS and aid agencies in the educational sector In 2005/6, immediately after the CPA, the GOSS became engaged in education, and aid organisations such as UNICEF, USAID, the WFP, the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and Al-Dawa Islamiya restructured their operations. Areas that used to receive school services and any other kind of support from Malakal in Upper Nile State are now being served from Juba, although it is a long distance away. Most of the UN and other international agencies, which used to serve areas that were under SPLA control during the war, pulled out from remote areas of operation and set up offices in the main towns. However, the GOSS and the stakeholders of the educational sector still face many challenges to fill the educational gaps. First of all, the death of the Vice President of the GONU, John Garang de Mabior, and the violence that followed caused a setback for the work of the UN agencies. Luckily, the disruptions in Malakal and Bor were not very serious compared with those in Khartoum and Juba. Secondly, delays in the formation of the GOSS, particularly in the appointment of ministers, caused some disarray. There was no Minister of Education until late December 2005. Spontaneous setbacks have occurred again and again, because teachers and other educational staff quit the sector to take higherpaid jobs. In the urban areas, religious organisations have given more attention to basic education than the government. Al-Dawa Islamiya continues to support schools by providing good services, thus attracting vulnerable children. Earlier on, this had been the entry point to promote the Islamic culture within the organisation’s strategy of Arabisation and Islamisation of southern Sudanese children. Thirdly, conflicts between militias backed by the NCP and the SPLA, tribal conflicts, cattle rustling, and other acts of banditry continued to cause anxiety amongst the local population and aid workers. Service provision was lagging behind plan already in 2006. A fourth serious problem has been caused by the split of the educational sector in southern Sudan into two tendencies due to the civil war. The split occurs between areas from which people took to safe havens in (Arabic-speaking) Khartoum, and those whose inhabitants sought refuge in (English-orientated) East Africa. These different backgrounds have caused the returnees to resist the full implementation of English as the medium of instruction in southern Sudanese schools, and for use in public offices and in commerce. In this context, converting Arabic teachers and recruiting English teachers has become difficult. In those southern Sudanese states where children are learning in Arabic, refresher courses in English are being given to Arabic teachers. Arabic is supposed to be gradually phased out as the language of instruction. However, as long as teachers have a negative perception of teaching in English, poor performance of pupils will be the result. The first batch of primary school 147

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examinations within the New Sudan curriculum took place in all southern states excluding Arabic finalists’ schools. Schools in transitional areas such as Kauda in Southern Kordofan took foreign (Kenyan) primary examinations. A fifth concern is inadequate humanitarian assistance for returnees. In Upper Nile State, the activities of the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and the UNHCR, the lead agency for the return of refugees, are not properly coordinated. To solve this problem, organisations dealing with the return of refugees and IDPs hold monthly meetings to address the bottleneck and to pave the way for the provision of education. Finally, in the rural areas, school infrastructure is characterised by poor quality teachers, lack of classrooms, lack of furniture, and poor shelters. Frequently pupils turn around in the classroom to perform a teacher’s role in order to fill the gap caused by the lack of teachers. Committed and organised school management committees (SMC) and PTAs strive to establish the required infrastructure. Technical requirements and lack of awareness about the importance of education amongst most of the parents in the rural areas are significant obstacles these self-help organisations are facing.

The controversy about the language of instruction in Upper Nile and Jonglei States Upper Nile and Jonglei States contain strong enclaves of Arabic in southern Sudan. President Omar el-Bashir had pursued his policies of Arabising and Islamising southerners through formal education in the context of the so-called ‘Salvation Government’. The school curriculum was taught in Arabic throughout the nation and orientated towards the religious and political intentions of the GOS. At that time, curriculum reform was undertaken to accommodate Arabisation and Islamisation policies. On the other hand, English was used as the language of instruction in the SPLM/A-controlled areas and in some schools in Equatoria State. Since the GOSS has enacted that English is to be the language of instruction, the pupils in Upper Nile and Jonglei States, who had been learning predominantly in Arabic, have shifted to learning in English in addition to their mother dialects. This means that, in addition to infrastructural rehabilitation, all teachers in these states have to be provided with the skills to teach in English, and new textbooks and other materials are required. THE NEW SU DAN LANGUAG E POLI C Y IN JO N G LE I STAT E

Before the war, teachers in Jonglei State did not have the basic skills for teaching. During the war, all education facilities were immediately taken over by the army. The counties of Fanjak and Pibor were controlled by the government-backed militia leaders Gabriel Tang-Ginya and Ismail Kony. 148

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Challenges of Education: Language Policy in Jonglei & Upper Nile Many people fled to the north from these areas instead of ‘looking forward to joining their brothers in East Africa’ (author’s interview with the Director General of the MOEST of Jonglei State, Aquile Kelei Madol, 2007). Jonglei State’s MOEST was established immediately after the CPA, and it is in charge of primary, secondary, early childhood, and alternative education. The ministry is divided into the following departments: • The Department of Community Creativity deals with awarenessraising of the communities about the importance of education regardless of gender differences. In particular, the nomadic population in Sudan is reluctant about girls’ education. In collaboration with CBOs, INGOs and UNICEF, the ministry is working to provide equal educational opportunities for all children. • The Department for Quality Promotion and Innovation is responsible for standards regarding teachers and pupils as well as school materials. • The Department for Human Resources Development – one of the most effective departments in the MOEST – deals with the provision of equal opportunities for employees through training in order to raise employees’ standards. • The Department of Gender Equity and Social Change is concerned with social aspects in the community. Basically its role is to change the community’s perception of girls’ education and to make gender equity effective in schools. • The Department of Planning and Budgeting identifies the resources needed and ensures accurate allocation of funds. • The Department of Administration and Finance manages issues regarding the ministry as a whole, especially with respect to the effective use of resources. Jonglei State faces particular difficulties in the implementation of the new language policy. Displacement of large numbers of inhabitants including teachers to northern Sudan created a strong orientation towards the Arabic language. Job opportunities tend to concentrate in the Arabicdominated areas. Recruitment of English-speaking teachers from other states is perceived as the occupation of jobs to which the local teachers are entitled. The Director General of the MOEST reiterated: ‘We are very reserved about sending English teachers to the Arabic bastion areas, as these teachers’ safety is not guaranteed’ (author’s interview, 2007). These areas include Fanjak, Ayod, Nyerol, Wuror, Akobo and Pibor, former garrison towns of the GOS. All teaching in these areas is in Arabic. In Duk area, where during the struggle pupils were not exposed much to Arabic, most schools are performing now in English. In Bor town, most of the pupils had to learn in Arabic, but English is rapidly becoming the common language and Arabic is expected to be phased out as the medium 149

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of instruction. The Director General of the MOEST expected that refugees would soon be repatriated, amongst whom the ministry hoped to find teachers to teach in English. Returnees repatriated from the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya were expected to relieve the burden of lack of English teachers in the Arabic-orientated areas. In communities outside Bor town, international organisations support the PTAs and supply local materials, which are the basis for running the schools effectively. The MOEST has established the Maridi Institute of Education which produces textbooks. In 2006 it produced and distributed school materials including teachers’ and pupils’ kits for grades one to four all over southern Sudan with the help of UNICEF and other stakeholders. Other organisations such as Danish Church Aid (DCA) and UNDP provided school furniture. Pledges by donors in the framework of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for printing books and providing school furniture for all grades were high. The above factors and, in addition, on-going tribal wars determine the way the New Language Policy is being executed in Jonglei State. The Arabic language is not completely discouraged, but in offices English is being promoted. This is a political aim, whereby the current generation is to change from looking towards the Arab world and become orientated towards Anglophone countries. The fact that during the 21 years of civil war a majority of refugee children received education in English strengthens this argument (author’s interview with Mr Madol, 2007). T H E N E W S U DA N L A N G UAG E P O L I C Y I N U P P E R N I L E S TAT E

In Upper Nile State, most children are deeply rooted in the Arabic system of education. When the regime of Mengistu in Ethiopia was overthrown in 1991, most of the children from Upper Nile State who had been refugees in Ethiopia were forced to return to Upper Nile or Khartoum. In the formerly government-controlled Upper Nile State, Arabic was the medium of instruction in schools as well as the language of communication in public and in commerce. Instruction in English has come as a result of the CPA, reinforced by returnees from the neighbouring Sudanese states and Anglophone countries. The MOEST and the local education stakeholders in Upper Nile State have been in charge of creating conditions conducive to implementing the New Sudan language policy. A veteran official in the MOEST in Malakal commented: As the new language policy shall comes into effect, the language in basic schools will change. However, the policy will be difficult for us to adopt immediately. At our last meeting in Rumbek, materials for grades one, two, three, and four in the New Sudan curriculum to be taught in English are already set. In most Arabic-speaking states we agreed that the new curriculum should be implemented gradually, beginning from the first class at the basic level and to continue to phase out Arabic in the next progressive years. (author’s interview with the Director for Planning of the Upper Nile State MOEST, Elia Bona, in 2006)

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Challenges of Education: Language Policy in Jonglei & Upper Nile Another respondent, Mr Garang Denyel, added: ‘There are many changes taking place, and I understand that they are going to reduce primary education to six years instead of eight’ (author’s interview at the MOEST in Malakal in 2006). Training of the educational staff is a challenge that needs immediate action in order to adopt the new curriculum in Upper Nile and other southern states along the northern frontier. Upper Nile University is one of the institutions that might provide a quick impact on these communities regarding the New Sudan language policy. However, the department of basic education at the university is currently run in Arabic and attached to the college of education, according to the policy of the decision-makers on basic education in Khartoum. Hence, the Minister of Education viewed with concern the issue of making teachers’ training in English part of the university’s programme. In order to train the teachers to teach in English, a special budget allocation for training purposes has to be put in place. Originally teacher training institutes (TTIs) were running training programmes for basic schoolteachers in Sudan. These institutions functioned as sub-institutions of Bakht er-Ruda University, which had been founded in 1934 and pioneered the teachers’ training programme in Sudan. However, all these institutions have died out. The policies of the Salvation Government in Sudan were intended to increase the enrolment of students in higher institutions by increasing the number of these institutions. In the event, many of these institutions were changed from TTIs to universities: To return these, and especially the TTIs in Malakal, practical steps must be taken to remedy the shortcomings. (author’s interview with the Director of the Department of Basic Education, Upper Nile University, Michael Aban, in 2006)

The numerous returnees flowing back to Upper Nile State have made it all the more urgent to establish English instruction schools in full swing. Currently most of these schools are in Malakal town and in the former SPLM/A-controlled villages. In 2006, the MOEST, UNICEF, and Windle Trust International (WTI) worked on re-training 300 Arabic serving teachers to lecture in English, to assist the ‘Go to School – 2006’ initiative of the GOSS, and to support the CPA language policy. This initiative required the mobilisation of human and non-human resources to bring into effect the new language policy for the children of southern Sudan and to increase and retain school enrolment. In the framework of this initiative, teachers were supposed to complete three modules. However, the programme ended with the completion of only one module, and the rest was discontinued due to lack of funds in December 2006. The question of trained educationalists remains the most important issue to be addressed in order to accomplish the New Sudan education and language policy. Upper Nile education authorities have been striving to address the language issue together with UNICEF through the ‘Fast-track 151

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Teachers Education Programme’, which aims to set standards and includes a curriculum and examinations for teachers’ certification for either preservice or in-service courses. The pre-service programme is a two-year residential course for grade twelve graduates, and the in-service programme a four-year course. Completion of grade eight and basic competence in English are the minimum entry requirements (Saadrack 2006). Table 8.1 Teachers and their Standards in Upper Nile and Jonglei States

States Counties Jonglei Bor Twic E. Pibor Pochala Duk Khor. Fu Ayod Akobo Fanjak Nyirol Uror Total

Upper Nile Malakal Panyikan Fashoda Manyo Renk Melut Baliet Malan Longach Maiwut Nasir Ulang Total

Primary Level Senior Secondary of Education Level of Education P4 P6 P8 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 0 6 14 12 1 2 2 0 1 0 2 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 7 11 6 3 3 2 5 4 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 37 36 25 8 6 4 6 5

0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 6 1 9 20 5 - 0 56 21

University Level of Education Yr.1 Yr.2 Yr.3 Yr.4 Yr.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 40

0 1 0 0 1 17

0 20 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 159 12 19

2 1 0 0 0 5

0 150 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 14 4 2 3

4 0 0 0 0 3

2 0 0 0 0 8

4 0 0 0 0 4

10 0 0 0 0 3

0 4 0 23

0 0 0 0 0 0 12 199

0 1 0 9

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 175 26

0 0 0 7

0 0 0 10

0 0 0 8

0 0 0 13

35 4 0 1 0 69 0 19 0 5 17 5 155

Note: The figures in italics indicate that some of the student teachers, for one reason or another, have not completed their Degrees. Source: UNICEF (2006).

The statistics indicate that there are 267 teachers in Jonglei State. Of these, 100 had only completed grade four of primary school and then started to teach. Most of these teachers are to be found in Fanjak county, with as many as 80 primary four leavers, who are now engaged in voluntary teaching in the state. A total of 36 have at least completed primary eight, 152

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Challenges of Education: Language Policy in Jonglei & Upper Nile and 23 have been above form one of the secondary level of education. Forty teachers have been up to university level, but less than half of them obtained the required degrees. In Upper Nile State, 100 primary teachers have been to only the primary level of education, with half of them to be found in Melut County. 432 primary school teachers have been up to senior secondary level and 155 have reached university level, but have frequently not acquired degrees. The above statistics are a clear indication of the low quality of teachers’ education. It can be concluded that the two states have not acquired teachers with the basic standards of quality needed to run basic education. Moreover, these two states are strong bastions of Arabic. The teachers are barely able to teach the New Sudan curriculum in English.

Actors in education In the former government-controlled Upper Nile and Jonglei States, education is being run by the GOSS, UNICEF, international organisations and religious institutions. The religion-orientated institutions such as the churches and Dawa Islamiya serve the schools for religious interests, claiming the supremacy of faith education over general formal education. Quarrels over the provision of education in southern Sudanese states were high when the GOS encouraged the running of schools by Dawa Islamiya for the purpose of the Arabisation and Islamisation of southern Sudanese children through formal education. In this context, Dawa Islamiya was empowered to run schools effectively and provided with adequate educational services, so that it attracted many children. In particular, children from vulnerable families left other schools that were not able to provide them with teachers and meals and entered the schools run by Dawa Islamiya. In contrast, the church schools have to struggle to survive. As neomissionary relics, they have no donors and depend on collections given by Christian congregations or contributions from parents. These schools are self-reliant but can provide little support to their teachers and children, causing the degradation of education and weak performance in English as well as Arabic. The government schools, on the other hand, are mostly characterised by poor services and low and irregular salaries for their staff. Hence public education has been marginalised, giving opportunities for the rise of the private educational sector. The GOSS’s launching of the ‘Go to School – 2006’ campaign in April 2006 was received with enthusiasm and zeal by southern Sudanese children and resulted in increasing numbers enrolling in learning institutions. Despite all these efforts, schools lack qualified teachers to teach the curriculum in English. UNICEF is particularly active in girls’ education, enhancing children’s enrolment, quality education, training of teachers and peace education. UNICEF’s partner organisations are Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), the 153

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MOEST, Dawa Islamiya, the Sudan Council of Churches and the SubSaharan International Development Organisation (SIDO). This cluster of institutions has extended services for schools to the following localities: Renk, Melut, Maban, Maiwut, Sobat, Baliet, Tonga, Fashoda, Bor, Pibor and Fam Zeraf. 124 primary schools have been supplied with kits and exercise books. Decisions regarding schools are made with substantial involvement of the communities through the PTAs. The MOEST and UNICEF are empowering parents’ participation through a training component called ‘Our Responsibilities’, which gives a clear picture of the role parents should play in their respective schools. This includes parents’ and teachers’ participation in school management, decision-making, ensuring accountability of the school management committee, creating links with the external environment, and general engagement in the welfare of the schools. What effect does the introduction of the New Sudan curriculum have on both pupils and teachers in the two states? At a press conference held on October 24, 2006 at Radio Juba, the MOEST of the GOSS reiterated that 1.5 million children in southern Sudan were out of school, and that only about half the community schools had access to water (Bullen 2006). The net enrolment ratio between 1999 and 2002 had been 20 per cent, and the proportion of those completing four years of primary education had been 28 per cent for boys and 9 per cent for girls. In 2003, 37 per cent of southern Sudan’s children were enrolled in primary education and 63 per cent remained out of school (UNDP 2005). Due to the ‘Go to School – 2006’ campaign of the GOSS, aiming to enrol 1.6 million southern Sudanese children in school by 2007, there has been an increase in enrolments, especially in Upper Nile State. In 2006, pupils’ enrolment numbers increased from 57,622 to 86,511. However, while the average teacher/pupil ratio in urban schools is about 1:45, in the village schools it is 1:90, with variations according to the concentration of population (findings from the author’s field work).

Conclusions and recommendations Teachers’ and pupils’ performance has been affected by an ineffective governance system and ever-changing government policies. Since the condominium era, southern Sudan has not had a common language of instruction in its regions, states, and provinces to determine the course of southern Sudanese children in a unified common language. In Jonglei and Upper Nile States, most teachers in rural areas are volunteers with barely the qualifications to teach the curriculum effectively. The curriculum quandary is a major problem, especially in the border areas with Kenya, Ethiopia and the northern Sudanese states. A unified New Sudan curriculum has been set up by the GOSS. However, the success of its implementation depends on both the quality and the quantity of the teachers. Currently, Arabic-speaking teachers are taking courses to 154

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Challenges of Education: Language Policy in Jonglei & Upper Nile teach in English. Reintegration of southern Sudan’s children through formal schooling and emphasis on using the English language requires the mobilisation of all available resources. A particular shortcoming is the lack of female teachers because of the small numbers of girls who have completed school and attained the qualifications necessary for employment. PTAs and SMCs are not empowered sufficiently to have a say on matters regarding the education of their children and to monitor the implementation of the New Sudan language policy. Hence Upper Nile and Jonglei States face an arduous task. The following practical steps are necessary to establish an adequate system of education in the marginalised areas: • recruitment and retraining of staff to carry out educational duties effectively and efficiently in English as the medium of instruction • provision of physical and learning materials (resource mobilisation) • establishing standards, curricula and examinations for teachers’ and pupils’ certification • establishing a decentralised structure which encourages the participation of educational stakeholders, in particular PTAs and SMCs. These institutions should be involved in planning, decisionmaking, monitoring and supervision, and should observe gender equity in all aspects • empowering and forming links and partnerships with further actors within and outside the educational sector, improving the working relationship with education authorities in the counties, and securing the support of county education committees in all schools. The following suggestions are made on the basis of the research and the above analysis: (i) Institutions of higher learning, like the Upper Nile University, should be fully involved in the accelerated language training of over 900 teachers, in order to implement the New Sudan unified curriculum for southerners. WTI should move its training centres to the counties to enable sustainability of the training programmes. Recruitment and making teachers available to go and teach in the rural Upper Nile and Jonglei state schools should be encouraged by giving hardship allowances. Effective supervision by technical staff in the sector should be encouraged. (ii) Education at the basic level is the responsibility of parents and the government. Parents need information about their responsibilities so that they can act effectively for the welfare of their children. This will in turn ensure the accountability of the stakeholders in basic education. 155

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(iii) Employment of female teachers has to be encouraged to motivate girls to enrol in schools according to the Millennium Development Goals. (iv) Rural schools would not have existed without volunteer teachers, who barely have the qualifications to teach the new curriculum. These teachers should be given the opportunity to be trained to take over the tasks of rural or village school teachers. Depending on the training acquired, they may concentrate on the first three years of primary education or beyond. (v) Training institutes need to be furnished and equipped with the power to serve as centres for the qualification of future teachers. Many training institutes, like the Malakal Teachers Training Institute, are not equipped with the necessary supplies and tutors to make them fully operational institutions to address teachers’ needs. (vi) The education policy-makers of the GOSS should take the necessary measures to create more awareness about education. As a consequence, enrolment rates will increase and more qualified teaching staff will be needed. (vii) The implementation of the new curriculum in English requires the conversion of the teachers currently teaching in Arabic to English as the medium of instruction, according to the new curriculum in both Upper Nile and Jonglei States. The GOSS, the state governments, and the donors have to retain a realistic view of what can be achieved at all levels in a coordinated way.

References Aleu, Philipp Thon (2009) South Sudan’s Jonglei population breakdown, in: Sudan Tribune, July 11, in: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article= 31775, accessed 10/03/2010. Beshir, Mohammed Omer (1969) Education Development in the Sudan, 1898–1956. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Beshir Mohammed Omer (1974) The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace. London: C. Hurst and Co. Brophy, Michael (2003) Progress to Universal Primary Education in Southern Sudan: A Short Country Case Study. Paper commissioned for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2003/4, The Leap to Equality. Paris: UNESCO. Bullen, Kenyi (2006) South Sudan: The World’s Least Literate Nation, in: Juba Post, Vol. 3, No. 42: 7. Bure, Yongo (1993) The Underdevelopment of the Southern Sudan, in: Daly, M./Sikainga, A.A. (eds) Civil War in the Sudan. London: British Academic Press. Collins, R.O. (1984) Introduction, in: Collins, R.O./Deng, Francis Mading (eds) The British in Southern Sudan 1898–1956: The Sweetness and the Sorrow. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press/Oxford: St Anthony’s College. Deng, Luka Biong (2003) Education in Southern Sudan: War, Status and Challenges of Achieving Education For All Goals. Paper prepared for UNESCO EFA Monitoring Report. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex.

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Challenges of Education: Language Policy in Jonglei & Upper Nile Fully, P. A. (1987) Progress in Education and Aspects of Educational Indicators (1973/74–1985/86). A Statistical Study. Juba: Department of Educational Planning, Equatoria Region. Holt, P.M./Daly, M.W. (2000) A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day. Colchester: Pearson Education Limited. Saadrack, Chol S. (2006) Education Policy Briefing: Teacher Training. Juba: MOEST/ GOSS. Sanderson, Lilian Passmore/Sanderson, Neville (1981) Education, Religion and Politics in Southern Sudan 1899–1964. London: Ithaca Press/Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. Sconyers, David (1978) British Policy and Mission Education in the Southern Sudan 1928–1946. Unpublished dissertation. Philadelphia, PA.: University of Pennsylvania. Sommers, Marc (2005) Islands of Education. Schooling, Civil War and the Southern Sudanese (1983–2004). Paris: Institutional Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), UNESCO. Sudan Tribune (2009) Sudan Announces Details of Contested Census Results, in: Sudan Tribune, May 22, in: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article31243, accessed 10/03/2010. UNDP (2005) South Sudan at a Glance. Nairobi: UNDP. UNICEF (2001) Report on Southern Sudanese Education. Nairobi: UNICEF. UNICEF (2006) Rapid Assessment for Learning Spaces, RALS, Southern Sudan. Juba: UNICEF. Wani, Ladu (2005) Education Administration in Upper Nile State, Malakal Town. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press. Williams, Garvey/Mills, L.R. (1976) Education in Southern Sudan: The Education System in Southern Region and Proposals for Its Development during the Six Year Development Plan of the Democratic Republic of Sudan, 1977/78–1982/83. Paris: UNESCO/ Geneva: ILO.

Interview Partners Michael Aban: Director of the Department of Basic Education, Upper Nile University, Malakal, July 17, 2006. Elia Bona Elia: Director for Planning of the Upper Nile State MOEST, Malakal, January 4, 2006. Aquile Kelei Madol: Director General of the MOEST of Jonglei State, Bor, October 25, 2007.

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9 Abduction, Confinement & Sexual Violence against South Sudanese Women & Girls in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya M A R I LY N O S S O M E

Introduction Numerous studies about the post-conflict realignment of societies have shown that, apart from the physical gaps which communities experience during war, the most destabilising effect may be the attack on culture by war and insecurity. In many African societies, culture defines the major growth stages in the lives of children; it is now widely recognised that childhood is both a social and cultural construction and that a diversity of childhoods exists both between and within different cultures (Boyden 1990). Studies show that the evolution of culture in protracted refugee situations has a higher impact on individuals in their formative years in the sense that the socialisation of children moves away from the nuclear family and clan towards a heavier dependence upon the community for child protection, thus making their socialisation process more subject to external rather than internal influences (Boyden 1990; Boyden/Gibbs 1997; Honwana 1999a, 1999b). In emphasising the rights of refugees to family life, Barbara HarrellBond (2000) argues that many families are broken, children being cared for by only one parent, or without either parent. Sometimes, a child has to act as head of the family, trying to care for her/his younger siblings. In camp situations, children often lose role models to guide their development. Even where both parents are present, these children grow up under abnormal conditions. To feed their children, parents are dependent on hand-outs from strangers. Parents are deprived of their authority; their roles as carers and breadwinners are undermined by their dependence on a system over which they have no control. Parents become degraded in the eyes of their children. They suffer the further humiliation of standing in queues to get food, being forced to manipulate the system to get extra ration cards in order to have enough food. They 158

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Violence against South Sudanese Women & Girls in Kakuma may also suffer from enforced idleness, which contributes to the loss of self-esteem, particularly that of men. Domestic violence always increases in refugee situations, and family breakdown is common. Both men and women may be suffering anxiety and depression as a consequence of the hopeless situation in which they are living. Substance abuse is a common problem among men, but women refugees also abuse alcohol as a means of forgetting. Whatever is happening at home, children in camps are growing up in conditions which do not permit their socialisation according to the values of their own culture. For example, little boys have no opportunity to learn agricultural work alongside their fathers (Harrell-Bond 2000). It may be said in such situations that survival needs take precedence over emotional ones, leaving social and cultural fundamentals vulnerable to change, or open, with no clear determinants – a cultural vacuum. The millions of people who become refugees, hundreds of miles away from their own homes, and from the traditional practices, rituals, dances, initiation and celebratory ceremonies that held them together and defined them, find their focus shifted from routine daily existence to the fundamentals of survival. And whereas they are often still able to uphold and practise most of their traditions, often it is done within a vacuum – one that is in many ways open to abuse when members of the community seek any and every way to fill it, often with a medley of practices somewhat influenced by foreign cultures, and also cultural influences from local communities surrounding the camps or informal refugee settlements. The Kakuma refugee camp was established in 1992, after 12,000 ‘lost boys and girls’ arrived from the areas affected by civil war in southern Sudan. The camp is located in Turkana District, north-western Kenya, 95 km south of the Sudanese border, in an area with an arid and semiarid climate and average temperatures of 40 degrees Celsius. Illegal firearms and armed banditry are rampant in the area and sometimes affect the security in the refugee camp. In 2007, Sudanese made up over 43,000 refugees, that is, 72 per cent of the total refugee population of the camp. Most of them were Dinka (63.5 per cent) and Nuer (6.9 per cent) from Bahr el-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Jonglei States as well as Barispeaking people (13.4 per cent) from Equatoria, and others, including those from Darfur and the Nuba Mountains (16.2 per cent). Other refugees came from Somalia and Ethiopia, and smaller numbers from other East and Central African countries. Among the Sudanese refugees, 58 per cent were male and 42 per cent female; 48 per cent of the male and 52 per cent of the female refugees were children below 18 years of age. Between December 2005 and September 2007, nearly 5,600 Sudanese refugees were repatriated and more than 14,400 returned spontaneously to southern Sudan in 2007 (UNHCR 2007). Between 2006 and 2009, the number of Sudanese refugees in Kakuma declined from about 50,000 to about 15,000 (oral information by a staff member of LWF, Nairobi 2009). In 2010 the UNHCR expects about 40,000 159

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newcomers, in particular from Darfur and southern Sudan, due to the expected tensions, violence and unrest caused by the national elections and the referendum (Nyakairu 2010). The cultural onslaught that has been brought upon Sudanese women and girls in Kakuma refugee camp – forced and early marriages, physical/sexual violence, abductions, and forced confinement – may well be a manifestation of the cultural vacuum. An enquiry into the ways of life, the culturally conferred rights and obligations, the systemic abuse of these individuals, and the organisational response to the issues reveals that there is a possibly undeliberate yet obvious collusion between the community, the cultural architects, and the law enforcers/civilian protectors, one that has made refugee life not only desperately insecure for virtually every young woman in the camp, but also potentially dangerous. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect is the extreme simplification of this problem by the perpetrators, the organisations, even the victims themselves, through a stubborn fixation on ‘culture’ as the cause and consequence of any and all injustices affecting women and girls in the camp. Throughout this study, culture was a rhetoric that punctuated every aspect of response and analysis, often stated with unflinching finality. Problematic is the fact that the women are moving aside, giving way to the belief that these injustices are actually their fate, that there is no escape from this, and therefore no point in protesting. This aspect appears to be the one confining these atrocities to a silence that threatens to destroy the fundamental moral and cultural fibre of the community. This study incorporates findings from interviews and focus group discussions with 25 women and girls who have been victimised in this way. Nine of them were interviewed in the ‘Safe Haven’ in the camp. This institution was created by Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) in response to gender-based violence in the camp to provide women with immediate and temporary protection, at least for seven days, until case workers and the community could solve the problem. Women were taken there because of the continuous threat they were facing while living in the community after victimisation. Further reasons were the threat of physical and sexual abuse as a result of their having rejected forced/early marriages, or being pregnant and therefore being ostracised by their community, or merely because they had spoken out against the same. It is almost impossible to obtain accurate information and statistical data from police records. Those available seem to be grossly understated and do not at all corroborate the number of cases that are being dealt with at organisational level, let alone the ones that the research managed to uncover. Obtaining official statements of figures from the organisations dealing with these issues was equally difficult. Therefore this study does not provide precise numerical data of girls reported as having been abducted or under threat of the same. The information contained here is based on conversations with women from the community who knew or heard of a case from within their location or extended family; the information was normally confirmed from 160

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Violence against South Sudanese Women & Girls in Kakuma different sources, thus lending them credibility. At the centre of this chapter are six case studies of girls and young women, which have been summarised by the author and provide a synthesis of the actors involved in a sequence of abduction, confinement, and sexual violence against women and girls in the camp. After introducing these cases, the paper outlines the underlying principles guiding gender relations in Dinka and Nuer communities, and attempts to place the findings from the study into the perspective of these cultural norms. Forced marriage is described here as a cultural aberration in the absence of normative cultural checks, while abductions are argued to be a failure of the traditional kinship system of protection. The study also inquires about the institutional responses to abduction, confinement, and sexual abuse of women and girls in Kakuma camp. Its findings point to a general lethargy on the part of the political and social institutions with regard to security issues of women and girls in the camp, and provides an analysis of the factors institutionalising these abuses.

Six accounts of girls who became victims of gender-based violence in Kakuma Refugee Camp The following summaries of the stories of young women, who were abducted, forcibly married off, confined, or sexually exploited in the process, were recorded by the researcher between April and June 2006. The interviews were carried out in Kakuma refugee camp and in Nairobi. With regard to confidentiality of individuals and in view of the fact that some of those interviewed are minors, only their initial is given here. NAME: R ., AGE: 17, ETHNI C G RO U P: D IN KA

R. lived with an elderly guardian when she first arrived in Kakuma. On three consecutive nights a total of four men crept into her hut and repeatedly raped her. She was afraid that no one would believe her, and could not discuss the subject with her guardian or her boyfriend. Her life became a nightmare as soon as the community members realised that she was pregnant. Even her friends began to avoid her. She dropped out of school, and soon could not even perform routine chores like going to collect her food rations or going to the market without extreme harassment from her peers and open hostility from the elders. As a single mother, R. has been reviled by the Sudanese community, living as an outcast, terrified of being attacked again. Her daughter is also constantly ridiculed and R. fears that she will be sexually or physically abused sooner or later. NAME: J., AGE: 18, ETHNI C G RO U P: D IN KA

One day J. came back from school and was informed by her father and brothers that she was to go to her new home, where her husband, a man she had never met, would join her. Her husband’s people then came to pick her up. She had been kept in the dark about the marriage arrangements 161

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until this time. At her husband’s home, her brothers-in-law confined her to a hut to await her husband returning from the United States. The hut was always surrounded by some young men and all her movements were watched by her husband’s friends and brothers. One of them viciously raped her one time after she attempted to resist him, and she became pregnant. He then went round accusing her of promiscuity. She was threatened and hounded, and her husband disowned her, as did her family. J. found refuge in the Safe Haven with her 9-month-old daughter. NAME: M., AGE: 28, ETHNI C G RO U P: N U E R

M. eavesdropped on her husband and his relatives making arrangements to take her 16-year-old daughter out of school and marry her off to a suitor, who had already paid 2.5 million Kenyan shillings, half of the agreed bride price. She decided to take her daughter to live with her relatives in Nairobi, but her husband found her and accused her of abduction. She was beaten every day to reveal where her daughter was. Eventually she went to the police, and then sought refuge in the Safe Haven, where she lived with her two younger children. Her husband chased her away, and together with his relatives, threatened to kill her for the ‘humiliation’ she had caused them. M. stated: We Sudanese women mean nothing in our community, our only role in a marriage is to produce children, work, look after the children and husband; we don’t have any power, we are powerless to protect our children. (author’s interview in the Safe Haven, Kakuma, in 2006) NAME: A., AGE: 17, ETHNI C G RO U P: D IN KA

A. was lured by a group of young men to meet them at a guesthouse in Kakuma town, where they forcibly locked her in a room for three days. During her confinement, they told her that she was not to leave the room until her husband came, and then she would go with him. They physically manhandled her and harassed her sexually. She cried, but her pleas fell on deaf ears. Word of her confinement got around and she was eventually rescued by some members of her community. Afterwards she could not walk freely around the camp. She feared that it was just a matter of time before she would suffer the fate of some of her friends and cousins, who had been married off to strangers in this manner. She considered her case as threatening and warranting immediate action by the protection agencies. NAME: G., AGE: 21, ETHNI C G RO U P: D IN KA

G.’s father negotiated the bride wealth and agreed to marry her off to a man she had never met. She was dating a young Sudanese man who was in Nairobi at that time – an incentive worker (refugee with some basic skills and education, engaged by the aid agencies for a small payment), who was employed by one of the international agencies. When she learnt of the marriage plans, she ran away from the camp and went to him in Nairobi. 162

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Violence against South Sudanese Women & Girls in Kakuma By the time her family found her, she was already two months pregnant with his child. After both of them endured serious physical abuse and threats, her boyfriend was arrested and locked up in jail (within the camp), where he was to remain until he paid 1.5 million Kenyan Shillings to the girl’s family – compromise compensation for the lost bride wealth, slightly less because she was pregnant. She lived in the prison compound with her husband and their child. NAME: K., AG E: 19, ETHNI C G RO U P: N U E R

K.’s brothers beat her every day, because she refused to go to her husband’s home. Without her consent, she had been married off to an old man, a widower who had already paid the bride wealth to her father. K.’s brothers accused her of hindering their own marriages. They wanted cows from her husband to pay their own bride wealth. Her mother was powerless to defend her, and she eventually sought help from the police station in the camp. The police were reluctant to get involved in ‘cultural and domestic’ matters, and finally confined her within the police compound to ‘protect’ her. When she returned to her marital home, the pressure from her family became unbearable, and she had to give up hopes of any education.

The culture and values shaping the experience and identity of Sudanese women and girls The Nuer and Dinka of southern Sudan are members of the Nilotic population. Culturally, these are pastoral people whose economic, aesthetic and social lives focus on cattle (see Evans-Pritchard 1951, 1945, 1940; Holtzman 2000; Hutchinson 1996, 2000; Johnson 1982; Burton 1981). There is also a large number of farmers in southern Sudan. The female child holds a special place in the Nilotic culture, particularly in terms of marriage and family. It is community life that gives a Nilotic Sudanese woman her identity. Thus, insight into her culture can be the key to making effective use of resources and services in dealing with the special concerns of the female child from Sudan (Duany 2006). In many ways, in 1991, at the beginning of the internal fighting following the split in the SPLA, women and girls were less firmly rooted than were men in the ethnic identities of Nuer and Dinka. This was because women and girls could potentially confer any ethnic identity on their children, depending upon who married them. Both groups are exogamic in the sense that their women and girls may only be married by men who are, by definition, ‘strangers’ or ‘outsiders’ (Hutchinson 2000). Both groups also share a strong bias towards patrilineality, since children generally take on the lineage affiliations and ethnic identities of their fathers rather than those of their mothers’ people. Third and finally, wives in both groups tend to take up residence in their husbands’ homes after marriage. For all these reasons, before the war, most Dinka and Nuer took 163

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the attitude that ‘A woman has no (fixed) “cattle camp” ’. She could be married by several men during her lifetime and bear heirs for all of them. Similarly, people stated that ‘A girl belongs to everyone’ – meaning that she is a potential marriage partner for all men not related to her (Hutchinson 2000). This study problematises this mindset, and finds such ingrained cultural attitudes about women and girls to be at the core of their sexual and physical abuse now in the refugee camp. Hutchinson further found that women’s more ambiguous position at the crossroads of ethnic unities and distinctions afforded them a certain degree of protection and mobility at the start of this war. They were the points through which adversarial relations between men could potentially be diffused and transformed into relations of affinity through marriage. And for this reason, women and children were perceived by both groups as illegitimate targets during periods of inter- and intra-ethnic violence. There was, in fact, an elaborate ethical code among the Nuer that treated women and girls as ‘points of safe refuge’ for fleeing or wounded men. A form of benevolent sexism reigned; before the widespread dissemination of guns by the SPLA, Nuer women often accompanied their husbands, brothers and sons into battle in order to protect them and carry away the wounded. A woman could protect a man who had fallen in battle by throwing herself over him, confident that the advancing warriors from the other side, whether Nuer or Dinka, would not dislodge her in order to ‘finish off ’ the man beneath her. The gendered division of tasks in both groups was one in which only men bore arms. Women and children, in contrast, were treated more as mobile assets, and as such were sometimes kidnapped during major inter-ethnic confrontations (Hutchinson 2000). Close to this, Jok Madut Jok has analysed the ways in which gender violence is socially reproduced within communities and families. He delineates the cultural background against which notions of gender and sexual violence emerge, and analyses the appropriation of women’s reproductive role by the SPLA between 1991 and 1995 in their effort to redefine the role of women (in replenishing the population) in the struggle, and the consequent propagation of violence against women (Jok 1999). Many African societies consider marriage to be created by God. Politically, the woman is considered a bridge-builder. Holtzman (2000) describes the process of marriage as the most important aspect of traditional Nuer family life. A wide kinship network is involved in the process of marrying and continues to have considerable influence over the couple long after the marriage itself is final. Through inter-marriage, the wife builds alliances for her family. Marriage is a political institution and not a function of romance or sexual desire. That is why it is rare among the Sudanese for a marriage to break up. The marriage of a daughter is also an economic event, linked to cattle through the bride wealth which consists of a number of cattle. There are no marriage documents, but the bride wealth gives the father a right to his children. Over time, the cattle change 164

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Violence against South Sudanese Women & Girls in Kakuma hands many times, and it is difficult to return them as they reproduce, multiply, or are lost due to disease and cattle raiders (Evans-Pritchard 1945; Holtzman 2000). Deng (1972) explains that, once a Dinka girl is married, she takes on a new form of status as a married woman. She becomes a guest wife and is often the focus of flirtation by her husband’s age mates. Although the rights and duties of the spouses are neither equal nor identical, they are in a sense reciprocal. The husband’s role is to take care of his wife, to build her a hut, help cultivate her field, provide her with cows for milk, and above all, give her children. The wife’s part is to show devotion to her husband, love him and respect him, care for his health and nourishment, and love his children. In addition, she must exclusively belong to him in a sexual relationship, yet she is obliged to maintain an open house and heart to all his kinsmen and friends. If the wife or husband fails to meet the standard in their reciprocal relationship, the sanctions are less equal. A woman who does not fulfil the norms of wifehood and motherhood faces the threat of punishment ranging from reprimand to beating. In a case of adultery, though, it is the male party who is punished and consequently is responsible for paying the so-called adultery compensation. Among the Dinka people, the act of adultery is legally recognised as an offence committed only by a man against an unfaithful wife of a husband (Deng 1972: 99–100). Literacy rates in southern Sudan are estimated to stand at just 12 per cent for females (UNFPA 2006). One explanation for this could be that formal education is viewed in the family as an investment, and generally one reserved for the male children, because they are the ones to build up the family name. It is assumed that whatever learning a female child acquires will be lost when she marries into another family. This one factor serves to instil in young Sudanese boys a sense of their importance/significance very early in their lives as compared with girls, inevitably setting the stage for an exaggerated claim to rights as they grow older. Low literacy rates are closely linked to the growing phenomenon of forced early marriages. According to UNICEF (2005), parents choose to marry off their daughters early for a number of reasons. Poor families may regard a young girl as an economic burden and her marriage as a necessary survival strategy for her family. They may think that early marriage offers protection for their daughter from the dangers of sexual assault, or more generally, offers the care of a male guardian. Early marriage may also be seen as a strategy to avoid girls becoming pregnant outside marriage. In southern Sudan, a teenage girl is far more likely to be a wife than a student. Out of a population of over 8 million people, only about 500 girls complete primary school each year. By contrast, one in five adolescent girls is already a mother (ibid.). Other studies have shown that a strong relationship can be found between social institutions and literacy ratios. For example, countries where gender discrimination is low show a ratio of female to male literacy of close to 1. The ratio is significantly lower in countries in South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North 165

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Africa, where gender discrimination is high. The indicator on early marriage seems to have a particularly strong effect on this relationship (OECD 2009). Early marriage is common across the region, but in southern Sudan, wracked by decades of civil war, the problem has been exacerbated by endemic poverty. A ‘bride price’, usually paid in cows, is due to a girl’s family on her wedding day – making a daughter one of the only realistic sources of income in the face of stark deprivation. Women are not to be abused physically, because of their reproductive importance. It is considered a disgrace for a man to beat his wife. But in reality domestic violence does occur, and sometimes a woman can provoke a fight. Yet in Nilotic communities, the involvement of the extended family and community elders is an effective support mechanism that encourages the husband and wife to work through problems in constructive ways. Basic Nilotic values guide the elders, whom everyone in the community considers as the authority on ways of living. People depend upon the elders to apply their intuitive understanding of these values in solving domestic and community problems. Generally, the values include trust, cooperation, putting the community first, gratitude and respectfulness. The findings in this study describe how, after many years in exile, these cultural values have taken on a new form and content, are being abused, and have been silently allowed to deny many Sudanese women and girls the enjoyment of even the most basic of human rights.

Forced marriages In the late 1980s, raids in northern Bahr El Ghazal by tribal Arab militias supported by the GOS contributed to large-scale famine and subsequent displacement and flight. After the split in the rebel movement in August 1991, the scene of most intense fighting shifted to Upper Nile province. The primary fighting was conducted not against the GOS, but by one SPLA faction against the other for the next two years. The suffering was intensified by the government’s disruption of the UN-led relief effort and its yearly offensives launched to take advantage of the factional fighting that seriously weakened the SPLA’s effectiveness (HRW Africa 1994). Escaping the raiding, displacement and famine that ensued, scattered groups of suddenly orphaned boys converged and headed towards Ethiopia. They trekked through wilderness, their only relief coming when Red Cross helicopters dropped them food or water. Humanitarian groups could do little more to help them because of the political decision by donors not to support relief efforts outside government-held areas. The boys walked for roughly two months across Sudan to Ethiopia, where they spent about three years in various refugee camps until being forced away in 1991 after the fall of Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam. Some 10,000 arrived in Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya in 1992. The majority 166

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Violence against South Sudanese Women & Girls in Kakuma of the ‘lost boys’, as they came to be known, were between the ages of 8 and 18. In 2001, the United States government resettled about 4,000 of these boys in America in more than 21 states. Starting from about six years later, a wave of forced marriages occurred in Kakuma camp, when the ‘lost boys’ demanded young (virgin) brides, paying millions of Kenyan shillings as bride wealth. The fact of these being forced marriages is hidden behind well rehearsed reasoning along cultural lines that places the onus on the young girls to comply with their traditional obligations. In the camps, the sign that a girl in a family is betrothed is a coloured flag flown high in the homestead. This is meant to keep out any further interested suitors but, in fact, only enhances the vulnerability of these girls to abuse and scrutiny. Interviews during field research revealed that the whole process of identifying a suitor and negotiating bride wealth and its payment is often done with neither the consent nor the knowledge of the girl in question, and in most cases the mother of the girl only comes to learn about it when the final arrangement has been made and it is time to pull the girl out of school. Interviews with mothers disclosed that they frequently suffered physical and psychological abuse when they tried to block such arrangements. There were women who had to be placed under police security or in the ‘Safe Haven’ in the camp, because they helped their daughters escape after bride wealth negotiations had been completed. Some were beaten and even ostracised entirely. These women were powerless when it came to negotiating a better life for their girls. They were also powerless to negotiate a better life for themselves, burdened as they were with the work of looking after the children, the home, the men and looking for food and extra income. Interviews with medical staff in the female ward in the Kakuma refugee hospital, run by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), revealed that three-quarters of the patients in the ward had been diagnosed as suffering from hysteria, described by the staff as ‘a condition in which somebody experiences violent or extreme emotions that they cannot control, especially as a result of shock’. In several cases, the girl was bundled up immediately after settlement of the bride wealth and herded off to her new home – often the boy’s home – but in quite a few cases, the girl was taken to Nairobi to live either with the boy’s relatives or on her own in a rented house, but always under the scrutiny of the boy’s relatives and friends. These girls could not continue their education and were practically imprisoned, with no freedom to move, socialise or work. This confinement could be for lengthy periods of time, when awaiting the arrival of the groom from overseas if he had not already met his bride, or pending paperwork enabling the bride to join him. The UNHCR resettlement procedure in such cases is slow and cumbersome, and takes at least one year to finalise. During this waiting period, the young girl wa guarded by the groom’s henchmen, appointed to ‘keep an eye on her’. In actual fact, this situation invited abuse, torment and harassment. In many cases the girls were 167

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sexually abused and raped by their so-called ‘protectors’, and quite a few ended up impregnated by these men. In this case, girls often faced rejection from all angles: from their own families for the humiliation of a bastard child (and the problem of having to repay the bride wealth), the boy’s family for obvious reasons, and lastly society as a whole, which would label them as prostitutes and immoral girls. Unwelcome back to their own homes, hunted by their would-be abductors, and in most cases unable to gain protection from the Safe Haven facilities, these girls resorted to desperate measures, including taking off on their own to nearby towns and even as far as Nairobi. Away from the family and the community, there was evidence that the girls tended to compromise their safety further by resorting to dubious means of earning a living; some were even trafficked elsewhere for prostitution and labour. There are not many options available to these young Sudanese girls when they find themselves in this situation. Young men living in the camp, and without the money to match the million shilling bride price, also fell into trouble, but they were also part of the problem. Many suffered the misfortune of having their girlfriends or fiancées snatched away and forcefully married off in this manner to ‘lost boys’. Some resorted to elopement with their partners, and some abducted the girls. Once bride wealth was paid to the girl’s family, however, (and a chunk of it spent), the only option for the girl’s family was to find the abductor and put him in jail, until he returned the girl. There were instances where the girl was already pregnant, and in such a case the abductor was compelled to pay a certain portion of the original bride price before being released.

Organisational response Five organisations in the camp are closely involved with security issues, livelihood, repatriation, resettlement and refugee protection: • The UNHCR has the overall mandate to run Kakuma Refugee Camp, where its major role includes reception, registration and administration of refugees in the camp. It also vets refugees for resettlement and is steering the on-going repatriation process of southern Sudanese refugees (UNHCR 2009). • The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is the host organisation in the camp, and UNHCR’s major implementing partner. In 2006–7 it provided up to 60 per cent of the services to refugees, mainly child protection, gender development, water provision, youth protection and development, rehabilitation, education and security. • The Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) ran a community counselling and rehabilitation programme in the camp, with three counselling centres 168

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Violence against South Sudanese Women & Girls in Kakuma which mainly handled patients with mental illnesses. The counselling programme, though limited by staff, was implemented through a community services and outreach programme that relied heavily on the support of the local leadership and community elders. JRS also ran the Safe Haven in the camp. There, the refugees were taught some basic skills like tailoring, jewellery-making, handicrafts, and early childhood education (pre-school to grade four) was offered to resident children. The Safe Haven provided temporary secure accommodation for up to 40 women and children at a time. During their stay, they were not only protected, but also received counselling and emotional support from JRS staff and each other. The main difficulty was finding durable solutions to the problems of those who stayed in the Safe Haven; they were facing serious insecurity in the camp ranging from the threat of abduction of children to threat of forced marriage, domestic violence and rape. Refugees were to be discharged within six weeks, but in many cases this was not possible, because family members were likely to abduct the woman and/or her child (JRS 2006). • The International Rescue Committee (IRC) was the primary provider of health services in the camp, including immunisation, maternity care, general medicine, paediatrics, emergency response, care for disabled people and surgery, plus administration of vaccines and anti-retroviral medicine. Observation and counselling services were also provided in the hospital and clinics. The IRC operated at no cost to the refugees and worked closely with the other implementing partners. It also handled cases of psychotherapy referred to it by the JRS and LWF, which were involved in the social and psychological rehabilitation of refugees. • The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) was the main organisation dealing with HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention in the camp. It also supported women’s groups by providing training and resources for them to start income-generating projects, and was working towards eliminating negative income-generating activities like prostitution and illicit alcohol brewing. Livelihood in the camps was largely dependent upon food rations provided by the World Food Programme. In January 2006, the UNHCR, as part of its repatriation guidelines (affecting mostly the Sudanese, at 69 per cent the largest community in the camp), significantly reduced financial support to its implementing agencies by up to 30 per cent (UNHCR 2007). The organisations’ shift in policy (towards development and rehabilitation of southern Sudan) was intended as a pull factor for returnees. But in the short run the result was that refugees were seeking alternative, at times desperate, means to meet their basic needs. Despite progress made by organisations like the NCCK towards the economic and social emancipation of refugee women, these new policies towards refugees put 169

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pressure on the women to turn to prostitution and illicit brewing as means of survival. In Sudanese communities, where women used to be the breadwinners, the cyclical implications of this were many rape cases in the camp as a result of alcohol and drug abuse. Women’s involvement in prostitution and alcohol brewing minimised the impact of such abuses, essentially by transferring the blame and burden back to them. The response of the agencies to the forced marriages and abuses of girls was low. Many of the organisations were weighed down by the perception that each and every refugee only had an interest in being resettled overseas and no interest in going back home, and therefore would do anything to present his/her case as being worthy of resettlement. This led to genuine cases of threatened abductions/forced marriages, which under the ‘Women at Risk’ criterion would warrant prioritisation for resettlement, but were disregarded by case workers who were quick to assess the girl/woman as applying trickery to obtain resettlement. ‘Women at Risk’ included women facing an unacceptable risk of sexual and genderbased violence or a life-threatening situation, be it in their home country, during flight, in the host country, or in a refugee camp. It was meant for women and girls who had experienced multiple incidences of sexual and gender-based violence and other forms of torture and trauma and did not exclude women living with an adult male (Pittaway/Bartolomei 2003). The Safe Haven in the camp had capacity to take in an average of eleven families at any given time, usually women and young girls at risk of forcible marriage or abduction, or already shunned by their communities for having fallen pregnant out of wedlock, or for any of the other reasons described above, plus their children. The caseworkers interviewed acknowledged the gross insufficiency of the facility, given the number of cases they were presented with each day, so that they had to turn away many needy cases. There was also one child protection centre in the camp, run by the UNHCR Child Protection Unit. Given the large number of children in the camp, more than half the camp population, the capacity of this centre was inadequate. The UNHCR also created a protection area next to the police station for difficult ‘unsolvable’ cases, for many of which resettlement was the only option. In 2006 there were 200 people in the protection area, many of whom were fleeing violence and, once inside, because they feared for their safety, did not leave the cramped premises.

Legal issues The ‘acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as payment of dowry, it being understood that this does not refer to normal marriage customs’ is considered as one of the ‘practices restrictive of the liberty of the person, or tending to acquire control of the person in conditions analogous to slavery’. This is one of the forms of slavery officially encompassed by the League of Nations’ Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar 170

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Violence against South Sudanese Women & Girls in Kakuma Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926 (the ‘Slavery Convention’). The United Nations Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, of 1956 builds on and expands the definition of slavery and similar practices, identified collectively as ‘servile status’. It makes particular reference to ‘...any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 years is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labour’ (Article 1). For legal protection, there were bench courts throughout the Kakuma Refugee Camp, that were often the first point of contact with the law for civil and criminal offenders in the camp. Each community had a bench court to which they elected elders who listened to and decided the cases. There was always a caseworker from the agencies who sat in on the hearings. Cases that could not be determined at this level were referred to the appellate bench courts, and those not resolved at that level were referred to the magistrates’ court of the government of Kenya, which used to sit in Kakuma once every month, starting from 1993. The bench courts at community level had modest success in resolving civil cases, but not one case of the violations of girls’ and women’s rights was resolved through them. Community elders claimed ignorance as to the prevalence of this problem, and most would not even talk about it. Each community in the camp elected its community leaders, normally a man and a woman. These leaders had substantial clout and were regularly consulted and informed of any major decisions taken by the implementing organisations that affected the refugees. The importance of the position was recognised at significantly high levels of the hierarchy, and it was remunerated. Despite the influence and attention they could bring to the grave issues facing women, there was no evidence of agitation by the community leaders for the same. There was a huge discrepancy between official records of abduction, rape and defilement available at the police station, recorded by organisations, and information obtained by research. Official records obtained from the Officer Commanding Station at Kakuma Police Station put the number of abductions, rape and defilement reported between 2003 and March 2006 at six, five and two respectively, yet at least two cases of abduction were reported to the LWF Child Protection Unit every day. In the four-month duration of this research, at least one case was encountered or narrated to the researcher every day. The way in which the institutions’ records varied with regard to the issues created spaces for further abuse of young girls and women. Young men in the camp were observed to be rebelling against their systemic suppression. The abrogation of rites of passage compounded by material deprivation apparently made them seek for alternative ways to express their manhood. Unemployment and other frustrations inherent in social 171

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identification processes have made young men flout culture and traditions. One expression of this has been violence against the women. Both young boys and girls in Kakuma camp were exposed to numerous television screens, video shows, loud rap and hip hop music infused with themes of violence, sex, crime and drug abuse. Bars and discos where dress and language appeared to be borrowed from American rap videos were at the centre of a youth subculture that began to break the rules of social etiquette and cultural systems in the camp. This can be interpreted as a manifestation of refugee warehousing, which is defined as the practice of keeping refugees in protracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness, and dependency in violation of their basic rights under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (see Smith 2004).

Recommendations Whereas placing the victims of abuse in the Safe Haven and in the Child Protection Unit has been a pragmatic answer to the problem, a more lateral approach will be needed if these practices are to be effectively addressed. Evidence suggests that engaging all the key institutions mentioned above, UNHCR, the implementing agencies, security personnel, and community leadership, while getting a commitment from them to fight these practices, could well become the catalyst for change. The social suppression of refugees and strain on their livelihoods point towards the need for creative strategies by the organisations to implement refugees’ rights to freedom of movement and choice of residence, both key factors that could determine refugees’ access to more sustainable livelihoods. The Safe Haven has so far served the very significant purpose of providing some safety and reprieve, albeit short-term, to victimised women and children. The gross inadequacy of this single facility has been pointed out, and, on this basis, it is recommended that the available facilities should be extended to ensure that every girl or woman in need is able to obtain protection. This, however, must not detract from the need to get to the bottom of the human rights violations. Thus, responses by those entrusted with responsibility must remain in focus, and punitive measures should be taken against offenders. The GOSS has taken a public stand against the practice of abduction through the formation of the Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC). The policy implications for the Government of Kenya and the UNHCR will be serious, if these abducted women and children start disappearing across borders. The pressure is to eradicate trafficking in persons. There is thus a need for international support and cooperation. A formal stand by the GOSS is required against these violations of the human rights of women that are being perpetrated in the Kakuma Refugee Camp. The onus is on the Kenyan government 172

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Violence against South Sudanese Women & Girls in Kakuma which will have to lobby for increased security commitments from the international community. The UNHCR ‘Women at Risk’ resettlement criteria (UNHCR 2000) were designed to provide a rapid and effective response to these women and girls, yet the research findings indicate that this programme has fallen short of its promise (see also Pittaway/Bartolomei 2004). Some reasons for this include a tendency to distrust refugee stories, fear of systemic abuse, uncertain risk assessment mechanisms, and also ambivalent attitudes on the part of some decision-makers. In 2003, a US General Accounting Office report on the protection of refugee women and girls found that most UNHCR staff, and staff within NGOs that serve as their implementing partners in camps, had not received practical training on protection concepts and techniques, such as how to identify and address cases of sexual violence. The identification of women and girls at risk is problematic and labour-intensive. It requires both a thorough knowledge of the community and an assessment of the protection risks and gaps (Women’s Commission on Refugee Women and Children 2006). There is need to strengthen these procedures to ensure that women who genuinely need protection have access to it and get it. Education, awareness programmes and role modelling are key components in dealing with the problem of sexual abuse of girls in the camp. Through media such as films, cross-peer discussion forums, community involvement in the rehabilitation of victims (and survivors) of violence, and graphic portrayals of the long-term manifestations of sexual crimes, it will be possible to bring the reality of the problem closer home to the perpetrators, who should be empowered to seek alternative and positive interpretations of their cultures. Lastly, there is the need for additional and certainly more detailed research into the gender interaction in refugee camps. The importance of cooperation between the agencies addressing these issues and research bodies cannot be overemphasised. Organisations’ dissemination of information and statistics on the refugees should also target researchers, and vice versa, for the obvious reasons that this confers legitimacy to studies and promotes transparency. In addition, it is possible in this way to respond in a more timely fashion to these problems as they emerge, instead of policies that are formulated far from the source of the problem. There is the need to exemplify the magnitude of the human rights violations against women and young girls as they take place in the refugee camps.

Conclusion Bringing an end to the practices of abduction, confinement and sexual and physical exploitation of women and young girls in refugee camps will require the community’s elders and leaders, heads of organisations, and law enforcement bodies to acknowledge and speak out forcibly against 173

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these practices. The persistent denials of their existence and rationalisation of the practices within the safety net of ‘culture’ are an attempt by the organisations to wriggle out of the complexities of a policy revision towards refugee protection. It is also society’s refusal to deal with the inevitable evolution of culture that has been exposed to and is being tested by Western influences and the passage of time. A closer examination of the Nuer and Dinka culture reveals the sanctity of the institution of marriage; in absolute terms the community protects and upholds married women. In their well defined roles as mothers and home-makers, women are expected to be obedient, loyal and hardworking, and often can expect reciprocity in the form of cultural safeguards against external abuse and injury to their person or honour. It is possible that many years of civil war in Sudan have driven these traditional values into obscurity. It is also possible that Sudanese children who were born and brought up in the refugee camp never had any real grounding in these values, save for stories and dramatisations to recreate for them a semblance of the life they left back home. At the crossroads, therefore, they are facing only a shadow of what used to be a powerful culture, and a reinterpretation of this culture, battered and corrupted by years of lawlessness. The continued silence surrounding the violent abuses of girls, conveniently fanned by cultural extremism, is breeding a monster that has the potential to overshadow all the positive and quite remarkable achievements that the organisations have made with their administration of Kakuma Refugee Camp over the years. There is a need to re-focus humanitarian assistance to include the qualitative aspects of refugee life.

References Boyden, Jo (1990) Children and Policy Makers: A Comparative Perspective on the Globalization of Childhood, in: James, Allison/Prout, Alan (eds) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood. London/Washington DC: Falmer Press. Boyden, Jo/Gibbs, Sara (1997) Children of War: Responses to Psycho-Social Distress in Cambodia. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD)/International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), available at http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/(httpPublications)/C26E5FA217 DC8FF480256B670065EC5F?OpenDocument. Burton, John (1981) Ethnicity on the Hoof: On the Economics of Nuer Identity, in: Ethnology, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April): 157–62. Deng, Francis Mading (1972) The Dinka of Sudan. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc. Duany, Julia Aker (2006) Believers together with Glad and Sincere Hearts – Special Needs of Sudanese Girls, in: http://www.southsudanfriends.org/specialneeds.html, accessed 24/07/2006. Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1940) The Nuer. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1945) Some Aspects of Marriage and the Family Among the Nuer. Paper No. 11. Lusaka: Rhodes-Livingston Institute.

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Violence against South Sudanese Women & Girls in Kakuma Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1951) Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harrell-Bond, Barbara (2000) Are Refugee Camps Good for Children? New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No.29. Cairo: American University. Holtzman, Jon (2000) Nuer Journeys, Nuer Lives – Sudanese Refugees in Minnesota. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Honwana, Alcinda (1999a) Negotiating Post-War Identities: Child Soldiers in Mozambique and Angola, in: CODESRIA Bulletin No. 1–2: 4–13. Honwana, Alcinda (1999b) Untold War Stories: Young Women and War in Mozambique. Paper presented at the Leuven Conference on Children and Youth as Emerging Social Categories in Africa, November. Human Rights Watch Africa (1994) Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan, in: http://www.swrtc.ca/docs/CIVILIAN%20DEVASTATION.PDF, accessed 06/03/2010. Hutchinson, Sharon (1996) Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War and the State. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hutchinson, Sharon (2000) Nuer Ethnicity Militarized, in: Anthropology Today, Vol. 16, No.3 (June). Johnson, Douglas (1982) Tribal Boundaries and Border Wars: Nuer-Dinka Relations in the Sobat and Zaraf Valleys, 1860–1976, in: Journal of African History, No. 23: 183–203. Jok, Jok Madut (1999) Militarization and Gender Violence in South Sudan, in: Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4: 427–42. JRS (2006) Refugee Women and Children: Preventing Violence, Responding to the Needs of Survivors. Report No.83 (September), in: http://www.with.jrs.net/files/serv38en.pdf, accessed 3/03/10. Nyakairu, Frank (2010) Abuses Drive Darfur refugees 1,000 Miles from Home, in: Thomson Reuters Foundation, AlertNet, March 10, in: http://alertnet.org/db/an_art/ 55866/2010/02/10-171843-1.htm, accessed 11/03/2010). OECD (2009) Social Institutions & Gender Index, in: http://dgroups.org/file2.axd/8f3a7fa01856-43d2-a5ce-422cb922fe2b/The_Social_Institutions_and_Gender_IndexOECD_2009.PDF, accessed on 18/10/2009. Pittaway, Eileen/Bartolomei, Linda (2003) An Examination of the Role of Identity and Citizenship in the Experiences of Women in Kakuma Refugee Camp in Northern Kenya, in: Development, Vol. 46, No. 3: 87–93. Smith, Merrill (ed) (2004). Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, A Waste of Humanity, in: World Refugee Survey, in: http://www.refugees.org/data/wrs/04/pdf/38-56.pdf, accessed 02/03/10. UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) (2006) Briefing Note on Southern Sudan. Juba: UNFPA, Southern Sudan Office (October). UNHCR (2000) The State of the World’s Refugees: 50 Years of Humanitarian Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. UNHCR (2007) Briefing Kit on the Refugee Protection and Assistance Programme in Kakuma Refugee Camp – Kenya. Kakuma: UNHCR, September. UNHCR (2009) 2010 Regional Operations Profile – East and Horn of Africa, in: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a846.html, accessed 10/03/2010. UNICEF (2005) Southern Sudan: Early Marriage Threatens Girls’ Education, in: http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sudan_28206.html, accessed 10/03/2010. Weissbrodt, David/Anti-Slavery International (2003) Abolishing Slavery and Its Contemporary Forms. Geneva: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in: http://www.antislavery.org/english/resources/reports/download_antislavery_publications/ slavery_reports.aspx, accessed 10/03/2010. Women’s Commission on Refugee Women and Children (2006) Displaced Women and Girls at Risk: Risk Factors, Protection Solutions and Resource Tools. New York: Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, in: http://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/docs/womrisk.pdf, accessed 11/05/2010.

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10 Identity, Citizenship & Reintegration Sudanese Returnees from Kenya

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Introduction Repatriation, local integration and resettlement are the three ‘durable solutions’ to the refugee problem, prioritised in that order by the UNHCR. Notably these solutions are state-centric, as they try to secure individuals civic citizenship of some kind. For southern Sudanese refugees in Kenya, repatriation intermittently began in December 2005 following the signing of the CPA. This chapter introduces the dimension of informal identity loss as a stronger factor in reintegration and shows that civic citizenship (state-ascribed identity) has a marginal impact on reintegration compared with the other forms of identity. It argues that citizenship per se cannot adequately guarantee protection of rights lost upon flight, including the right to belong, and that refugees are not in a hurry to ‘recoup’, as a previous study portends (Kibreab 2003). It illuminates aspects of ethnic, tribal, religious and gender identities as well as other forms of quasi- and micro-identities of ‘we’ and ‘they’ which people acquire and shed in the social readjustment to the realities of reintegration. Flight is one of the prime indicators of the perceived or real abuse and /or denial of human rights, whether socio-cultural, political or economic. This phenomenon is particularly prevalent in, albeit not unique to, Africa, where an estimated 40 per cent of the population have been displaced from their homes. In 2005, Sudanese made up the bulk of refugees in the Kenyan Kakuma camp, which hosted 65,000 of them (UNHCR 2005), besides an unknown number in Nairobi and Eldoret towns. In the aftermath of the CPA, the UNHCR signed tripartite agreements with the host countries and the GOSS for repatriation and reintegration. But until now, repatriation and reintegration have been controversial, sporadic and intermittent, despite the massive exhortative campaigns by the UNHCR. Whereas the UNHCR and other aid organisations have concentrated 176

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Identity, Citizenship & Reintegration: Sudanese Returnees from Kenya mostly on the more ready challenges to reintegration such as demining, food, shelter and physical security, they have excluded the more subtle components of the politics of acceptance, identity and belonging. The emerging scenario attests to the fact that reintegration is not merely hampered by physical insecurity and the threat of violence. Part of the reason that official voluntary repatriation and reintegration have not been picked up with the expected zeal is that there exists a gap of knowledge in terms of systematic mapping of the factors that come into play. This paper introduces the dimension of identity politics as a possible strong determinant of a successful reintegration process. When refugees flee, one of the things lost is effective citizenship, whose elements include protection. In this sense, the objective elements of ethnicity, religion or kinship are not necessarily lost. But the problem of the Sudanese refugees is twofold. The second-generation refugees do not have Sudanese citizenship and at the same time some have stayed away from home for over two decades and are thus second- or even third-generation refugees. This amounts to an ‘informal’ identity loss, which presents deep challenges to successful reintegration. It is the position taken by this paper that identity is an important component in reintegration, since the returnees’ rights cannot be protected outside these identities, irrespective of access to formal citizenship. Further, it is suggested that a formula for merging local components of national/formal or state-ascribed citizenship with other potentially existing identities, which people use in defending their rights, could be more constructive for reintegration. It is contended here that an analysis of the complexities of shifting identities and how these facilitate or militate against repatriation and reintegration would better inform repatriation and reintegration of the southern Sudanese. Apart from the well-documented identities of the ‘north/south, Arab/African, Christian/Muslim’ (Lesch 1998: 3; Johnson 2003: 181; Jok 2001: 7) at the macro level, there has hardly been any attempt to look at the microidentities within southern Sudan itself. As the refugees are set to return, there are tensions arising due to exclusions from and inclusions into certain identity tags whose impact on reintegration is negative. This paper addresses the following questions: • What are these identities and how do people arrive at them? • What is the impact of these ‘macro-’ and ‘micro-identities’ on repatriation and reintegration? • How do the returnees react to these challenges? • How is entry or exit to these identities negotiated? • What alternatives to these identities exist and, in the light of international legal provisions, can the human rights of these returnees be protected outside these identities? The paper draws on the experiences of the southern Sudanese 177

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refugees’ repatriation from Kenya after the CPA of January 2005. It discusses the results of a cumulation of interviews with refugees in the Kenyan Kakuma refugee camp and Nairobi settlements as well as officials of the GOSS and humanitarian aid agencies. Returnees were also interviewed in Kapoeta, Eastern Equatoria.

Conceptualising identity This chapter analyses the repatriation and reintegration process of southern Sudanese refugees within a framework of three key concepts: identity, citizenship, and reintegration. ‘Identity’ refers here to the socially inscribed and culturally specific characteristics by which individuals or groups of individuals exclude or include each other in belonging. It includes ethnic, racial, tribal, religious, kinship, gender, and any other form of social inscriptions that people attach to themselves or to others. Identity is thus seen as a socially constructed sense of ‘we’ and ‘they’ as understood, interpreted, and institutionalised by society. It is about perceptions and understandings concerning the relationships of people in the society, which influence their thinking, attitudes, and behaviour. There are generally two theoretical positions on identity. The first is the consideration of identities as based on long-standing bonds that stress the significance of residence on the same territory and common language, religion, descent, and skin colour (Lesch 1998: 4; Smith 1986: 12; Deutsch 1966: 17). In this sense, those markers of sameness and differences are seen as fundamental to social groups. Members of a particular identity perceive their identity as either biologically or geographically determined or both. A contrasting theoretical position is that ‘identity is an attitude’ that people deliberately shape and reshape (Armstrong 1982: 282). This indicates that elites and leaders restructure identities, whether ethnic, tribal, or familial, for instrumental reasons such as to enhance their own power and to mobilise the populace behind their own political goals. Hence identity can be manipulated, and certain aspects can be more salient at certain times and less robust at others. But even without deliberate coercion or deliberate acts of manipulation by the elite, shifts take place in religion, language, and economic structures over time. This implies that social identities are inherently situational and in flux and, hence, the concept of nationality or peoplehood is a construct. From this perspective, the return and reintegration process creates benefits and costs, allocated according to various identities (Hawkensworth/Kogan 1995: 574). This is the view most concurrent with Rational Choice Theory (RCT), which therefore is used in this analysis. Identities are many, and discrimination on the basis of identity is a salient feature of the reintegration process. However, these discriminations do not necessarily lead to violent reactions, since the returnees have a less costly alternative, namely, to return to the camps. RCT can explain the 178

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Identity, Citizenship & Reintegration: Sudanese Returnees from Kenya existence or non-existence of violent identity clashes in the reintegration process. Despite the existence of shared interests defined along certain lines of identity, it may still not be rational for individuals to participate in collective action based on these identities to advance those interests (or redress their grievances). Refugees adopt varying reactions to the denial of access to certain closed identities, and some actually do decide to flee back into the camps. While certain identifiable people have formed militant groups commonly called ‘militias’ and are demanding recognition and inclusion into decision-making, rational choice may suggest that returnees do not engage in such overt militant activity against the GOSS, for instance. The interplay of identity can be depicted as shown in Figure 10.1. Figure 10.1 Identity and Reintegration IDENTITIES Returnee-Refugee Demand for inclusion

Receiving hosts Returnee-IDPs

– Religious ‘Insiders’, ‘we’ Inclusion – Citizenship Belonging – GONU – GOSS – Ethnic/tribal – Kinship – Political Party – Gender – Returnee-Refugee ‘Outsiders’, – Returnee-IDP Exclusion ‘they’ – Militia ‘Un-belonging’ – Others

Access to Resources (Reintegration)

Non-access to resources (Nonreintegration)

Demand for exclusion E.g. INGOS, NGOS, IGOS and others Feed Back (Reintegration, Non-integration) Source: Construction by the author, adapted from Hawkensworth/Kogan 1995.

Rogowski’s definition of ‘stigma’ as any identifying characteristic that has ‘a low cost of detection and a high cost of conversion’ (Rogowski 1974: 71) has proven to be theoretically rich in providing access to the conceptual tools to explore the extent to which ethnic, religious, tribal, kinship, gender identity and other ascriptive characteristics affect individual social and political behaviour and participation in collective action. The strong propensity for heightened political profiles on identity comes when individuals feel stigmatised and marginalised for no other reason but their 179

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identity. For instance, the Nuba Mountains and the southern Blue Nile are peripheries of the North, made up of people whose loyalties are mixed and who do not identify unconditionally with the aspirations of the southern Sudanese. Nor is it certain that the people of these borderlands wish to be part of a southern political entity should it achieve independence (Young 2003: 424). What they share with the South is underdevelopment, political exclusion, and a desire to be free of cultural imposition from Khartoum. Muslims, particularly in southern Blue Nile State, are nevertheless relaxed in their faith, as many drink sorghum beer and are married to Christians or followers of African traditional creeds (ibid). To adopt Rogowski’s idea of a stigma, it would, for instance, be ‘very costly’ to convert from the ‘refugee’, ‘returnee’, ‘outsider’ identities; yet they are ‘detected’ and apportioned at very ‘low cost’. The process of apportioning these stigmas and the reactions to them is essentially a political process, underlying which is a competition for access to resources, both material and non-material. Identity politics as a mode of organising is intimately connected to the idea that some social groups are oppressed, that is, that one’s identity as a woman, returnee, refugee, or any other makes one peculiarly vulnerable to various forms of imperialism. This may include stereotyping, erasure, or appropriation of one’s group identity, violence, exploitation, marginalisation, or powerlessness (Young 1990). In reaction, the stigmatised groups adopt various modes of reclamation, re-description, or transformation of previously stigmatised accounts of group membership. According to Kruks (2000: 85): …(T)he politics of recognition…demand recognition on the basis of the very grounds on which recognition has previously been denied: it is qua women, qua blacks, qua lesbians that groups demand recognition. The demand is not for inclusion within the fold of ‘universal humankind’ on the basis of shared human attributes; nor is it for respect ‘in spite of ’ one’s differences. Rather, what is demanded is respect for oneself as different.

However, in refugee reintegration, the lines of discrimination are not clear-cut and just any identity could be the basis of some sort of discrimination or benefit. Thus the returnees demand inclusion into the universal body of national entitlements, but are not necessarily organised into a united group, since some of them even try to drop this ‘returnee’ identity. As depicted in Figure 10.1, they exercise reverse pressure for exclusion due to the stigmatising tags associated with those identities. Rather than accepting the negative scripts offered by a dominant group about one’s own inferiority, in the light of rational choice, one transforms one’s own sense of the self and of the community, often through consciousness-raising which aims at unifying members of the group for collective action. Upon repatriation, where such costs of conversion out of the group are prohibitively high, it is hypothesised in this study that this leads to disintegration and even second displacement, either back into the countries of refuge or any other location. 180

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The identity factor in reintegration ‘Reintegration’ refers to the process of ‘re-mixing’ and, in the case of people, forging closer relations and cooperation in a society where people have not been together in most aspects of life. This includes physical, social, economic and political reintegration. A successful reintegration process should thus be indicated by the number of refugees repatriated from Kenya, the number of those finding employment, the number of those being engaged in active participation in various activities in Sudan, and the number of those being engaged in the economic life of their home area, among others. Apart from the contested identities that turned up during the more than 20 years of the North-South war, there are aspects of micro-identity contests in southern Sudan itself that point to a potentially volatile reintegration. However, there has been a focus only on civic citizenship as the door to rights, to the exclusion of those identities that are informal, shifting, and micro. Ethnicity, for instance, has both formal and informal as well as subjective and objective aspects. It is the impact of these informal and subjective aspects of such identities, which mostly are in constant flux, that have not been properly examined. Contributing to this debate, Kibreab (2003) has examined the relationship between access to or lack of access to citizenship rights in countries of asylum and the propensity of refugees to return. He hypothesises that in situations where refugees enjoy elements of ‘effective citizenship’, that is, civil, social, and economic citizenship rights in the context of favourable structural factors – relatively secure employment, self-employment, social services such as housing, schools, health care, and social security – the importance of repatriation may diminish as a viable option. Drawing on the experiences of North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand, where refugees are able to enjoy rights of citizenship with definite prospects of becoming citizens (through naturalisation) or denizens through acquisition of permanent status, and where favourable structural factors provide for a decent standard of living, he notes that refugees tend to remain, regardless of whether the conditions that prompted displacement are eliminated. This argument, however, focuses on citizenship – the formal stateascribed identity – as the prime determinant of repatriation or decision to repatriate. The assumption here is that state-ascribed identity (civic citizenship) encompasses or gives access to all the attributes Kibreab mentions – civil, social and economic citizenship rights. However, the situation of the southern Sudanese refugees presents a different case, where the formal state identity is not imperative, nor is its invocation always intended to achieve any of these rights. For instance, most southern Sudanese have lived in conditions that have relegated their Sudanese citizenship to an inferior position compared with the informal identities such as the ethnic or tribal identity, the ‘southerner’ identity, among others, which they create and recreate in the struggle for access to resources and 181

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opportunities. At the time of signing the CPA, many, if not the majority, of southern Sudanese nationals were without formal citizenship. In the wake of repatriation, the only time the importance of citizenship was stressed has been in reference to the voting rights in the impending referendum in 2011. And even then, in southern Sudan the precondition for citizenship has remained predicated on belonging to other identities, such as the ethnic communities and tribes of southern Sudan. Thus spatial identities, the most predominant one being state citizenship, are not the only determinants of the propensity for refugee return, and they are by no means the most important ones. Kibreab (2003) may be right that, different from refugees in developed countries, millions of refugees in the South have returned home. However, in contrast to his findings, it will be argued that the southern Sudanese refugees were not necessarily driven by the desire to recoup formal citizenship rights. In fact, the majority of them have known neither formal citizenship nor the attendant rights and obligations. Being mostly second- and third-generation refugees, born in exile and socialised abroad, surprisingly they have maintained a strong propensity to go back home. This is irrespective of the fact that, for many of these populations, repatriation does not necessarily mean ‘going back home’. The propensity to repatriate can thus hardly be explained only in terms of citizenship rights, since for many of the southern Sudanese refugees, citizenship has never been a tool of access to resources. Rather, it is the yearning to regain the informal identities lost by them or their forefathers, which over the years defined their relationship to property vis-à-vis other social groups. Consequently, the contest is not over access to citizenship, but rather over access to social and cultural belonging in their respective communities. It is these forms of belonging that determine access to the social values and resources, and their resilience is most pronounced. Again, the fact that they do not gain these informal identities in their countries of asylum does not necessarily compel the refugees to repatriate. Rather, it is the lack of or non-access to these identities in their countries of origin that conditions their decision not to repatriate. Whereas the UNHCR is making efforts to ensure safe and dignified repatriation of refugees after the CPA, notable from its programme is the non-emphasis on reintegration. Neither is there reference to contingency plans for counteracting potential clashes arising over claims to ownership in the areas to which it repatriates returnees. Due to this failure, the UN had to run a crisis programme in trying to solve the issue of the Dinka Bor after the local host community unexpectedly turned them away. From past studies of the 1972–4 repatriation process, Rogge and Akol note that there are ‘cultural watersheds that develop between first and second generation refugees’ (Rogge/Akol 1989: 195). Importantly, they state that for many long-term refugees, repatriation does not necessarily mean ‘going home’. Instead, they return to places or social environments that are different or appear to have changed or, alternatively, to places where the resident population regards the returnees as ‘strangers’ because of differing customs 182

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Identity, Citizenship & Reintegration: Sudanese Returnees from Kenya and beliefs that they have acquired. Even though this observation introduces identity as a factor in reintegration, it does not present it as the basis of rejection, or as instrumental within highly competitive struggles for access to resources. In reality people do not fight just because they are different culturally or otherwise, but they do so in defence of their scarce resources, material or non-material, from perceived or real threats stemming from other identifiable groups. They thus aim ‘to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals’ (Coser 1956: 3). However, the tensions between returnees and receiving societies in southern Sudan have rarely become violent. Nevertheless, they have sent strong warnings against repatriation to those still in exile. In the extreme case, Mamdani’s account of the Rwandan genocide concludes that such harsh atrocities are not carried out against neighbours whom we consider to be legitimately living on the same soil, no matter what other differences we may have with them. It is carried out only against ‘those whose very presence in the political arena is considered illegitimate, and whose very bid for power is thus considered an alien usurpation’ (Mamdani 2002: 501). With no major incidents of violence in the repatriation from Kenya, there is nevertheless discrimination with regard to access to public jobs, exploiting the identities of the returning refugees (Tombe 2006: 3). For generations who have lived out of their domicile for more than 20 years, the impact of identity loss is particularly real when it comes to reintegration. If ‘refugees’ from the outskirts of Khartoum are demanding repatriation into the South, and if those repatriated are able to easily negotiate access, then the difficulty of reintegration for those from Kenya cannot be adequately explained in terms of physical insecurity and poor social amenities alone. In reaction to negative identity tags, refugees are inclined to shed this ‘returnee’ identity and seek inclusion. The interplay of identity and counter-identity has produced tensions leading to some repatriated refugees fleeing back to Kenya. Those aspects of informal identities, such as ethnic, tribal, ‘insider/outsider’ identities, which people create to tag each other and themselves, contribute more to the intermittent and largely unsuccessful process of repatriation. Irrespective of whether the returnees are guaranteed Sudanese citizenship, especially those born in other countries, their capacity to redefine their social networks to gain access to the often closed identities is one major challenge that is seriously hampering effective voluntary repatriation. Most noteworthy is the frequent use of terms such as ‘traitor’, ‘sells out’, ‘Jellaba’, ‘collaborator’, ‘proxy operative’, ‘mujrimin’ (terrorist) among the officials of the GOSS and the young educated southern Sudanese in general. Individuals or groups use these terms against other groups or individuals and pretend to be closer to ‘the struggle’ than the other groups. So within southern Sudan itself, various groups are on a path of conflict which is purely psychological and which operates on the principle of the concerted attempt to exclude and marginalise ‘others’ as much as possible from the ‘we’ group. Some of these 183

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include ‘students’, returnees ‘from Kenya’, ‘from Uganda’, ‘from Khartoum’ etc., as well as various ethnic and tribal groups. Thus, apart from the widely documented forms of identity such as ethnicity, tribe, religion, citizenship, and the contested identities of the ‘north/south, Arab/African, Christian/Muslim’ at the macro level, there are these other forms of micro- or quasi-identities that have come into play in the social readjustment to the realities of reintegration within southern Sudan itself. People protect their rights under various laws: state, customary, and religious laws, among others. When individuals are repatriated into areas within which they have no belonging, this ‘un-belongingness’ essentially locks them out of protection and acceptance under these laws. According to one observation, ‘the longer that displaced families are away from their original place of residence the less likely they are to return’ (UNDP 1995: 60). The reason for this difficulty partly is the loss of or the non-access to the identity possessed by the receiving population and the tensions arising in the attempts to re-establish these connections. This is especially real for southern Sudanese refugees, many of whom have been born in Kenya or have been away from their homes for more than two decades. It is contended that this form of identity loss, serious as it is, goes unnoticed yet is very practical in its consequences. The pressures of reconstructing and reconnecting what has been lost often produce tensions, as competition arises over rights of access to such often confined identities. The effects of autochthonous (indigenous nativeness) claims by certain sections of the population on reintegration and the criteria by which people create the stigmatising tags of ‘we’ and ‘they’ have hardly been a key part of the considerations by the aid agencies, the GOSS, and intergovernmental organisations working in the southern Sudanese integration process. With the cessation of war in southern Sudan, the UN expected most, if not all, refugees to repatriate. However, according to a refugee student in Kakuma, ‘…for these our old people who are here, if we have peace in our country then they should go back to Sudan…but for us who are learning here, there is very little we are going to do there, there are no schools’ (author’s discussion with a refugee student in Kakuma, April 2006). Another student refugee observed: This voluntary repatriation is somehow good for people who are not studying here in Kenya. It may be someone’s personal wish to return to Sudan but we must finish our education. (author’s discussion with a refugee student in Kakuma, April 2006)

This presents a clear case for the use of education as a justification for demands for preferential treatment. Notably, this veil of identity is so strong among the students that they are willing to dispense with their ‘old parents’ to relocate back to Sudan while they remain behind. Big demonstrations by students in Kakuma against perceived or real mishandling by the UNHCR have been occasionally organised. The placards have often carried words like ‘We are innocent students who only want education!’, ‘We want a better 184

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Identity, Citizenship & Reintegration: Sudanese Returnees from Kenya life!’, ‘If the UNHCR cannot take care of us, we should be resettled to third countries!’ and so on. The perception of the UNHCR strategy to make repatriation mandatory, as opposed to making it attractive, only causes the refugees to find other ways of justifying their continued asylum. The biggest reason for non-repatriation, for both the students and ‘others’, is the perceived ‘inadequacy of assistance upon repatriation’ (author’s interview with a refugee student in Kakuma, April 2006). However, they do not present this directly to the UNHCR; rather, they tactfully hide behind the most protective identity at the moment – the student identity. Even the urban refugees are clinging to the student identity, much as a justification for staying both in town and in the country of asylum.

The primacy of civic citizenship ‘Citizenship’ as a form of identity refers to the status of having the nationality of a particular territorial state, usually determined by law (McLean 1996: 69). In the republican tradition, qualification for citizenship is associated with particular rights and responsibilities of citizens, and a commitment to equality between citizens is compatible with considerable exclusivity in the qualifying traditions. For instance, the classical republic excluded slaves, women, and certain classes of workmen from citizenship. In general, qualification for citizenship reflects a conception of the purposes of the political community and a view about which persons are able to contribute to or enjoy the benefits of the common good or the freedom of the state (ibid). Every state has a defined territory and a definite population to provide it with a distinct identity and loyalty. States in turn confer civic citizenship (the formal nationality) on members of their population. In Sudan, the CPA has established a semi-autonomous GOSS, which exercises administrative control of the southern provinces, but which cannot legally confer citizenship on its population. Thus, the responsibility of conferring citizenship is still the sole prerogative of the GONU. In the wake of the repatriation following the CPA, there has been a programme to confer formal citizenship on all persons of Sudanese descent returning from exile and residing within the borders of Sudan. For the two decades of the North-South war, there has not been formal conferment of citizenship; hence the majority of the southern Sudanese refugees have neither Sudanese passports nor identity cards. The UNHCR has what it calls the three ‘durable solutions’ to the refugee problem: repatriation, local integration, and resettlement, prioritised in that order. Notably, all three are ‘state-centric’, that is, they are all intended to place a refugee under state citizenship of some kind. Resettlement refers to the relocation and grant of citizenship to refugees in third countries. In the Kakuma camp, there have been a wide range of resettlement programmes over the years, most of which have been to 185

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North America, Australia, and Europe, facilitated by the IOM (UNHCR 2007). Most of the so-called ‘Lost Boys of Sudan’, who first arrived in the Kakuma camp in 1992, have been resettled in North America. Resettlement is limited and based on the quotas and personal specifications given by the receiving country. In 2004, 10,330 refugees departed from Kakuma refugee camp for resettlement, to the USA 9,747, Australia 473, Canada 70, and New Zealand 40 (ibid.). The UNHCR faces the challenge of keeping resettlement as a third alternative after repatriation and local integration, due to its popularity with refugees. The other option available for refugees is naturalisation. This involves refugees being integrated into the local host society, with citizenship rights as may be provided by law. However, this option is largely unavailable in Kenya, since the citizenship laws do not facilitate easy entrance of refugees through either naturalisation or registration. According to a Sudanese refugee in Nairobi: … I have tried getting Kenyan citizenship but the problem is that they look at a lot of things such as where you were born, where you come from, and they deny you citizenship...but sometimes if you have money you can just get it...things are not straight in getting Kenyan citizenship. (author’s interview with a female Sudanese refugee staying in Nairobi, December 2006)

Of the total number interviewed, over 74 per cent have tried at one time and failed to get Kenyan citizenship, and those who have acquired Kenyan passports have had to part with huge bribes of over US$1,000 (author’s interview with a refugee living in Nairobi, December 2006). From the perspective of those who tried unsuccessfully to obtain citizenship, the reasons for failure range from extortion of unaffordable bribes to unclear procedures in the process. Comparing this scenario with members of their communities who have been resettled in developed countries and who have often acquired citizenship, most Sudanese refugees living in Kenya have reported the desire to be resettled in North America and Europe. Asked about his ultimate place of residence, a Kenyan citizen of Sudanese descent had this to say: There are so many southern Sudanese who have gained citizenship in Canada, the US, etc., most of these people will not come back, but the ones in Kenya will have to go back.’ (author’s interview in 2006)

Even the relatives of those who had acquired Kenyan citizenship registered serious doubts as to whether the latter would remain in Kenya, if peace in Sudan was going to ‘foster rapid development for the benefit of all’. In this light, citizenship is projected as a practical key by which people have access to certain benefits accruing from the society, and from which non-citizens are excluded. While the citizens can walk freely in the streets 186

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Identity, Citizenship & Reintegration: Sudanese Returnees from Kenya without fear of police harassment, and while they can seek meaningful employment in Kenya, members of their families who are non-citizens cannot. However, they are willing to drop this citizenship and return to their motherland, when the opportunity presents itself, albeit with a certain measure of caution. As is evident, of the three ‘durable solutions’, two – naturalisation and resettlement – remain only remote possibilities for the southern Sudanese refugees in Kenya. This leaves repatriation, and in our context reintegration of the refugees back into their country of origin, as the best available option to solving the refugee problem. This is, however, not unique to Kenya, since, as Table 10.1 shows, it has always been the most encouraged and the most readily available alternative for refugees. Table 10.1 Durable Solutions for Sudanese Refugees Year

1994

1995

1996

1997 1998

1999

2000

2001 2002 2003

Voluntary 22,526 28,568 23,392 8,069 13,592 1,534 52,923 42,147 19,391 9,747 repatriation Naturalisation Resettlement - 1,142 31 211 236 266 153 39 Source: UNHCR 2003.

According to the table, naturalisation, though second in priority for the UNHCR, remained a remote possibility, not only for refugees hosted in Kenya, but also for those in other countries. The foregoing observation depicts a situation in which the refugees largely have no access to citizenship and the rights extant on it. Coupled with the encampment policy in Kenya, the refugees enjoy neither freedom of movement nor association with the hosts. As Kibreab (2003) would argue, this situation will contribute to the high propensity for these populations to repatriate. However, in this case, the refugees do not enjoy citizenship rights, and those who at least enjoy ‘free movement’, albeit with occasional police harassment, are ‘urban’ refugees. Whereas most Sudanese refugees would want to acquire Kenyan citizenship for the reason that they want to gain the perceived and real benefits of belonging, they are equally apprehensive of the fact of losing the capacity to be citizens of Sudan at the same time, since Kenyan laws do not provide for dual citizenship. However, since they would not be stopped from relinquishing Kenyan citizenship as soon as they become citizens of Sudan, the provision against dual citizenship is not a very big hindrance to the acquisition of Kenyan citizenship. The 1998 constitution and also the 2005 interim constitution of the Republic of Sudan are silent on the issue of dual citizenship, but provide that persons born of a Sudanese mother or father have the inalienable right to Sudanese nationality, its duties and obligations. Everyone who has grown up in Sudan 187

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or has been resident in Sudan for several years has the right to Sudanese nationality in accordance with the law. Importantly, this provision covers the refugees born in Kenya, if at the time of their birth either of their parents were Sudanese nationals. However, it is not this provision for civic citizenship that is the prime consideration for the refugees. Very few people have formal citizenship documentation and have been living in exile for over 20 years with no contact with the government. However, the Sudanese Constitution of March 10, 2004 in its Chapter 1 Section 7 provided the following: • Citizenship shall be the basis for equal rights and duties for all Sudanese. • Every person born to a Sudanese mother or father shall have a nonalienable right to enjoy Sudanese nationality and citizenship. • The law shall regulate citizenship and naturalisation; no naturalised Sudanese shall be deprived of his/her acquired citizenship except in accordance with the law. • A Sudanese national may acquire a nationality of another country as shall be regulated by law. The interim constitution has introduced an important aspect, here in clause (4), which might encourage more and more people of Sudanese descent to acquire citizenship of other countries, but as yet, no such tendencies are observable. On repatriation, it is possible to conclude, as Mamdani notes, that ‘the citizenship crisis is not about scarce resources though it is connected to it’ (Mamdani 2002: 502). Rather, it is about ‘defining access to resources’ (ibid.). Accordingly, citizenship does not entitle one to resources, but it entitles one to enter the struggle for resources. If this entrance is facilitated effectively by citizenship, then this citizenship becomes effective. As opposed to formalistic state-ascribed citizenship per se, it is effective citizenship that conditions successful voluntary repatriation of refugees. If the grant of a particular citizenship does not offer the necessary social, cultural, and political rights, the disposition of refugees to repatriate on the basis of grant or denial of such citizenship is negligible. It is on this basis that some refugees from Kakuma camp, initially granted citizenship in Tanzania, dropped this in a bid to get resettled in North America. It is the denial or abuse or non-defence of human rights that leads to flight. These rights include, but are not limited to, socio-economic rights and, to a marginal extent, political rights. The priority of the Sudanese returnees in the wake of the CPA is not the right to vote, but it is the right to survive, to earn a living, to have access to education, healthcare and housing. But, as has been noted above, civic citizenship itself is still rendered redundant in the light of micro-identities, which not only surpass it, but also, in most cases, serve to give it a meaning. Whereas they may be citizens of the same state, people create multiple identities to define their relationship to 188

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Identity, Citizenship & Reintegration: Sudanese Returnees from Kenya resource ownership vis-à-vis others. Some of these identities include those who were ‘part of the struggle’ and those who were not. This latter category is normally ascribed to returnees, who then attempt to shift this identity of being a ‘returnee’ to being an ‘insider’, from being a ‘traitor’ to being a ‘patriot’, from ‘being a ‘sell out’ to being a ‘comrade’. Therefore, a deeper understanding of perceptions of citizenship and belonging in the region can contribute to more effective advocacy and law-making, better protection for displaced persons and, ultimately, reduction in the causes of conflict.

International legal regime and citizenship rights The ‘right to nationality’ spelt out in international human rights law does not provide enough bases for claims to either state-ascribed citizenship or its most effective forms. Sudan takes part in most international legal instruments providing for citizenship including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since the international community has neither the body nor the capacity to provide citizenship, the provision of such remains the prerogative of nation states. This ensures that the protection of returnee rights, especially the rights associated with official conferment of citizenship such as the right to vote, is impossible outside the ‘citizenship’ link. But as Mamdani observes, citizenship in most of Africa has ‘two dimensions: civic and ethnic’ (Mamdani 2002: 502). He notes that civic citizenship refers to individual rights, which are civil and political, and are usually stipulated as such in the constitution. It is also this citizenship that international human rights law seeks to entrench. In contrast, ethnic citizenship refers to ‘group rights’. These are social and economic, and are normally referred to as ‘customary’ rights. Ethnic belonging gives one, among other rights, the customary right to land and the right of access to customary courts. Over and above the ethnic citizenship, there are other forms of identity that shift according to the rational calculations of the utility of those identities. These include ‘those who took part in the struggle’, ‘traitors’, ‘Jellaba’, ‘mujrimin’, ‘proxy operatives’, ‘militias’, among others. These invariably condition the access to either civic citizenship or ethnic citizenship. Article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: ‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country’. Article 14 (1) of the same document declares that ‘everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’. These are the two prime laws that govern asylum seeking and enjoyment, and they are provided for all mankind. Refugee advocacy organisations have found it prudent to protect refugee rights within the confines of human rights in general, since human rights are also refugee rights by virtue of the latter being human beings. However, there are a myriad of legislations specifically aiming at the protection of refugees, among them the Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation, the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 1967 UN 189

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Protocol, and regional conventions like the one issued by the Organisation for African Unity. All of them are silent on the issue of negotiation of access to lost identities, apart from the UN Convention on Statelessness. As has been discussed earlier, informal identity loss is the subtlest one and the one with the most far-reaching impact on reintegration. Thus, an important component of ‘citizenship’ is to be found in the sense of belonging and in the ‘we’-identity provided for by informal identities. There are thousands of southern Sudanese refugees who do not have anything in the form of official identification papers conferring national citizenship. The GOSS thus relies only on tribal connections and familial associations to determine whether one is a southern Sudanese or not. The fact that it is this population that is going to determine whether Sudan stays united in a ‘New Sudan’ or the South secedes makes the tensions over identity quite real for the GOSS.

Protection elements and returnee identity The essential prerequisite of returnee protection is respect for human rights and the rule of law. However, there is already dissatisfaction, since there are no well-established governance structures, and generally there is no effective citizenship. Access to food, clothing, health care, shelter, water, and other necessities is essential to human survival and safety. There is a serious lack of technical and advisory services to elaborate legal safeguards in areas such as amnesty, property, and citizenship. There are refugees in camps who still think they are villains and who want to run as far as possible from home. For these refugees, repatriation is a hastened and even dangerous affair, and they hold these views because of misinformation and/or non-information on the available amnesties and such other offers. Even though the GOSS is making frantic efforts, albeit rhetorically, the governance structures are still very inchoate and are in most cases overwhelmed by the magnitude of the responsibility bestowed on them. This has been aggravated by the fact that the GOSS and its institutions in the state are still struggling to establish legitimacy in areas that have not known governance for decades. The inter-ethnic/intra-ethnic competition for control, the question of the identity of the people of the Nuba Mountains, and the strong autochthonous claims by certain sections of the population present considerable concerns about the prospects of a successful implementation of the CPA. Upon repatriation, the returnees from abroad find themselves in a more awkward position than the IDP returnees, and are, in a rational process, quick to shed their earlier identity, since they consider it insecure to keep this identity, otherwise being termed ‘mujrimin’, which may be potentially used to lock them out of resources such as land and jobs. These negative tags occur despite the attempt of the UN’s ‘Imagine Coexistence Project’ to train the communities and bring various communities to 190

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Identity, Citizenship & Reintegration: Sudanese Returnees from Kenya performing different tasks together. Doubtless the process needs continuous initiatives to foster confidence-building, co-existence and reconciliation, such as inter-community socio-economic activities, women’s initiatives, and community-based co-existence projects. One returnee stated: If you are not labelled a traitor, you are asked whether you went to the bush to fight the enemy. These are the types of clichés that these protégés are made to memorise and regurgitate. (author’s interview with a returnee and journalist in April 2006)

As things stand now, there are southern Sudanese journalists or semijournalists who ‘religiously believe that to be a good and nationalistic southern Sudanese, one ought not to question the conduct of the GOSS’ ‘... If you open your mouth to question issues either in writing or verbally, you immediately will be labelled as being a traitor’ (author’s interview with a returnee and journalist in April 2006). The impact of this is that, if left unchecked, there will be a rapidly growing culture of aloofness in southern Sudan, a culture of political lethargy, silence, blind following, and forced unity. Arguably, this is necessary since the society is inchoately just emerging from total disintegration and state collapse. But it is equally important to keep it in check lest the society drift from statelessness into dictatorship.

Conclusion This paper has examined the nexus between citizenship and reintegration, including the propensity of refugees to return voluntarily. It is evident that even though citizenship rights are an important factor in repatriation and reintegration, it is not citizenship per se, but rather those aspects of effective citizenship guaranteeing the right to enter competition for resources that condition return. It is argued that, in the exercise of rational choice, the refugees change and re-change identities, depending on what aspects of instrumental belonging are at stake. In the light of the above, there is need to observe the following: as a prime point, the current support for an effective human rights regime, including institutions that sustain the rule of law, justice, and accountability, is laudable. However, it should be taken into consideration that there are those aspects of informal identity loss, which may still lock people out of access to the enjoyment of rights of belonging, even with the grant of full state-ascribed citizenship, since the capacity of the GOSS to provide these rights to the full is still very inchoate. It is important to note that the lasting nature of voluntary repatriation largely depends on the level and nature of protection extended to returnees in the course of their return and re-establishment in their country of origin. The UNHCR and its implementing partners have to redefine their protection parameters upon return to address the delicate imbalances in the discriminating identities that are meted out upon return. Upon repatriation, faced with 191

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limited state capacity, returnees protect their rights under various laws: state, customary, religious, and international laws. There are returnees who repatriate in areas within which they have no ethnic belonging or other form of identity. This essentially locks them out of protection and acceptance under that particular law, notwithstanding the fact that they might be in possession of the civic citizenship. It is contended that this form of identity loss, serious as it is, goes unnoticed yet is very practical in its consequences. The effects and criteria by which people create the stigmatising tags of ‘we’ and ‘they’ should form a key part of the considerations not only by the aid agencies, but also by government and intergovernmental organisations working in the southern Sudanese reintegration process. A consultation of the pre-war land tenure systems and traditional authority could be very helpful. Secondly, in an attempt to foster unity in a country just emerging from two decades of violent and destructive conflict, the GOSS has a myriad of restrictions on individual voices, and this in turn exacerbates the already existing tensions among the southern Sudanese themselves. There is need for the establishment and strengthening of democratic institutions right from this very stage of development in southern Sudan to avoid political repression and to offer effective citizenship for all, especially the returning populations, since it is the lack of this that caused their flight in the first place.

References Armstrong, J. A. (1982) Nations before Nationalism. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Coser, Lewis (1956) The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press. Deutsch, Karl W. (1966) Nationalism and Social Communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hawkensworth, Mary/Kogan, Maurice (eds) (1995) Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics. Vol. 1. London: Routledge. Johnson, Douglas (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey Publishers. Jok, Madut Jok (2001) War and Slavery in Sudan. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Kibreab, Gaim (2003) Citizenship Rights and Repatriation of Refugees, in: International Migration Review, Vol. 37, No. 1: 24–73. Kruks, Sonia (2000) Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, cited in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Lesch, Mosley Ann (1998) The Sudan: Contested National Identities. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Mamdani, Mahmood (2002) African States, Citizenship and War: A Case Study, in: International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3: 493–506. McLean, Iain (1996) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rogge, J.R/Akol, Joshua Otor (1989) Repatriation: Its Role in Resolving Africa’s Refugee Dilemma, in: International Migration Review, Vol. 23, No. 2.

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Identity, Citizenship & Reintegration: Sudanese Returnees from Kenya Rogowski, Ronald (1974) Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support. Princeton, NJ: Princeton. University Press. Smith, Anthony D. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. New York: Blackwell Publishers. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Tombe, Wani (2006) Political Mentors and their Protégés in Southern Sudan, in: Sudan Vision, Vol. 4, No. 795. March 30. UNDP (1995) Resettlement of Displaced Population. Department of Humanitarian Affairs/United Nations Disaster Relief Office – Disaster Management Training Programme. Washington DC: UNDP. UNHCR (2003) Statistical Yearbook. Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR (2005) Analysis of Refugee Protection Capacity Kenya. Programme Report Based on Research by Danny Turton, Strengthening Protection Capacity Project. Geneva: UNHCR, April. UNHCR (2007) Refugees by Numbers, available at www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/ 3b028097c.html. Young, Iris Marion (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Young, John (2003) Sudan – Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias and Peace, in: Review of African Political Economy, No. 97: 423–34.

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Part III

The CPA in its Sub-regional Context

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11 Changes in Gambella, Ethiopia after the CPA R E G A S S A BAY I S S A S I M A

Introduction The Gambella region is located in south-western Ethiopia, bordering on Sudan at the Upper Nile and Jonglei States. The population of Gambella is currently estimated to be about 268,000. There are five ethno-linguistic groups usually defined as the indigenous people living in the region: the Nuer (40 per cent), the Anuak (27 per cent), the Majangir (6 per cent), the Opo and Komo (or Goma) (3 per cent). The 1902 Ethio-Sudan boundary delimitation divided the Nuer and the Anuak between both countries, putting more Anuak and fewer Nuer in the Gambella region of Ethiopia. The Nuer constitute the second largest people of the Nilotes in southern Sudan, whereas the majority of the Anuak live in the Gambella region. These ethnic groups are marked by distinct cultural, linguistic and territorial communities as well as different livelihood strategies. The Anuak and the Opo are predominantly sedentary cultivators and the Nuer are agropastoralists, while the Majangir combine hunting, beekeeping, and gathering with shifting cultivation. The local population of Gambella also exhibit different modes of governance. In the Anuak traditional political system, there are two types of leaders, the Nyiya (kings), who used to control the south-west Anuak villages of Gambella, and the Kwaari (singular: Kwaaro) nobles, who controlled village states. The agro-pastoralist Nuer are led by headmen who are elected by each tribe. The Majangir, Komo and Opo are predominantly egalitarian with traditional socio-political organisations. In 1902 a boundary delimitation agreement between Ethiopia and British-ruled Sudan provided for a lease of the commercial enclave at Itang to the Sudan government. This led to the establishment of the Gambella trading post in 1904 which was linked to Khartoum by steamboat during the rainy season and articulated a new pattern of Ethio-Sudan trade relations (Bahru 1982). However, despite their strategic location along the 197

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trade route, the local population of Gambella were not integrated into the political economy of the enclave. For the ordinary people of the region, the advent of the modern state meant the loss of political autonomy, economic marginalisation, and enslavement. The Gambella region became one of the main sources of slaves in the south-west. This mode of incorporation into the Ethiopian polity left a lasting impression on the local society (Dereje 2006). By the early twentieth century, Gaajak Nuer groups had already occupied parts of the present-day Jikaw district of Ethiopia, whereas the Anuak were in full control of most of the areas along the Baro River. Since then the Nuer expansion across the border continued until they established their major settlement in Itang. The cross-border ethnic ties and the porous and poorly demarcated and administered common border facilitated the flow of southern Sudanese refugees into Gambella region. This became a major source of conflicts and boundary disputes between Ethiopia and Sudan (Bahru 1982). Until 1991, Gambella was peripheral to the national politics, and the highlanders dominated the local administration. Economically Gambella was one of the most marginalised and backward regions and lacked all basic social services. The 1990s brought tremendous political changes to the Gambella region. In 1991 the military regime (the Derg) was overthrown by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and a new federal government was established, consisting of nine regional states. Accordingly, Gambella was dramatically transformed from a remote district to a regional state, the Gambella People’s National Regional State (GPNRS) (Dereje 2006). Gambella has rich natural resources, particularly a large expanse of cultivable land, huge surface and groundwater sources, forests, livestock and fish resources. These conditions render the region very suitable for agricultural development. Oil reserves and other mineral resources add to the region’s natural wealth, to create a bonanza for economic growth. In spite of its enormous natural resources and its tremendous potential for economic development, Gambella has remained one of the most backward and poverty-ridden regions in the country. The local communities were not able to benefit from the rich resources as a result of pervasive conflicts in the region, in which many have been displaced, thousands have been killed, and many still suffer physical and mental injuries. Moreover, the region is characterised by sectional fighting among the Nuer and inter-tribal animosities between the Anuak, Nuer, and Dinka, abundance of automatic weapons, confusion and contradictions of traditional and modern governance institutions, recurrent cattle raids and insecurity and road-side robbery and killing, as well as in some places complete absence of law and order (Tewodros 2007). For almost the past fifty years, the Gambella region has been a sanctuary for several hundreds of thousands of southern Sudanese refugees and insurgents fleeing from the devastating civil wars that affected Sudan. This influx of southern Sudanese refugees into 198

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Changes in Gambella, Ethiopia after the CPA Gambella intensified the already prevalent ethnic friction between the Anuak and the Nuer of Gambella, adding a new dimension to the traditional resource-driven conflict between the two communities. Most of the Sudanese refugees are Nuer, who have ethnic ties with the Nuer inhabitants of Gambella. This chapter attempts to answer the following questions: • What are the effects of the presence of southern Sudanese refugees on the Gambella region and society? • What are the links between the war in Sudan and the recurrent conflicts and socio-economic crises in the Gambella region of Ethiopia? • What is the impact of Sudan’s January 9, 2005 CPA on the Gambella region? Scholars of African affairs have identified different root causes of African conflicts. Accordingly, ethnic, religious, political, and economic dividing lines are considered as making groups contend in particular societies, but also the social relations and political causes, reflected in state repression, lack of political participation, poor governance performance, and unequal distribution of wealth have been stated as causes of conflict (Rugumamu 2001; de Waal 2000). This study focuses on the inter-linkages between politico-military interests, the responses of social groups to insecurity, the interference of aid agencies, and institutional change in the sub-region. It will attempt to show that economic marginalisation provides a more relevant ground than ethnicity and political exclusion for the rise of insurgency and violent conflicts in most parts of the Horn of Africa (Clapham 1991). The study is based on a multi-disciplinary, qualitative approach. During four phases of fieldwork in Gambella, data have been collected through interviews and focus group discussions with indigenous ethnic elders, community representatives, local government officials, agents of NGOs and southern Sudanese refugees in three different camps. In addition, documents and materials from the government and archives and documentations of national and regional governmental and nongovernmental organisations have been thoroughly reviewed. The following section describes the movements of southern Sudanese refugees in Gambella region and looks into the impact of these movements on the local society. In particular, the role of the SPLM/A and the impact of the establishment of large refugee camps in the region is investigated for the period up to 1991. The paper then focuses on the political changes in both Ethiopia and Sudan after 1991 and the repercussions of these changes on the local communities. In the last main section, the impact of the CPA on social and political relations in Gambella is assessed. The conclusion highlights the main aspects of Sudanese-Ethiopian relations as reflected in the Gambella case. 199

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The impact of the southern Sudanese refugee movements on the society of Gambella Region Sudan’s civil wars have been characterised by conflicts within conflict, assaults on civilians, violent ethnic, religious, and factional fighting, and serious problems of identity and cultural survival. The systematic abuse of human rights by both warring parties was the most devastating effect of the war in southern Sudan. Arbitrary assassinations and arrests, torture, forced relocation, dispossession, particularly of land and cattle, enslavement of human beings, forced conversion, rape, and forced recruitment into the government and rebel armies were prevalent. However, Sudan’s crisis has never been a purely domestic issue. The civil wars spread their battlefields beyond Sudan’s borders. Regional and international interests added fuel to the crisis, as will be shown by the case of the Gambella region, where the influx of masses of southern Sudanese refugees intensified the longstanding inter-ethnic conflicts in the area. The long-term presence of the large number of refugees brought social, economic, and ecological consequences for the region. Already in the 1960s, the imperial Ethiopian government allowed southern Sudanese refugees to settle in Itang and granted them land for cultivation, grazing, and constructing houses. The refugees had to pay taxes to the government like citizens. The UNHCR provided the refugees with agricultural tools, clothes, mosquito nets, and 50 Ethiopian Birr for the purchase of seeds, while the Gambella administrative office issued them with identity cards. In 1969, the UNCHR set up the first refugee camp in Itang. A health centre, a school, and an office of the EthioSwedish Red Cross were opened to serve the refugee community. The areas bordering on Gambella were intensively affected by the wars between the GOS and the Anyanya I (1963–72), Anyanya II (1975–83), the SPLA (1983–2005), the Lou-Jikany conflict (1993–4), and the armed conflict following the split within the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A). The southern Sudanese refugees and insurgents who came to Gambella arrived from the eastern parts of the Upper Nile and Jonglei States, which are populated by Nuer, Anuak, Murle, Dinka, Lou and Maban. The Anyanya I rebels, who resisted integration into the national army, set up their camps in Gambella already during the 1960s. After that there was a continuous flow of southern Sudanese refugees, but also of bandits, who organised their own armed followers of five to 70 men, and freedom fighters across the porous Ethio-Sudan border. The 1972 Addis Ababa agreement between the Nimeiri government and the southern Sudanese freedom fighters offered a breathing space in Sudan’s civil war. Many southern Sudanese refugees returned to Sudan. However, a large number of Nuer Anyanya guerrillas, particularly the 200

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Changes in Gambella, Ethiopia after the CPA Eastern Jikany of the Gaajak, who rejected the Addis Ababa agreement, remained in their camps and bases in Gambella, and many Nuer refugees established permanent settlements in Gambella region displacing the Anuak. When Nimeiri repudiated the Addis Ababa agreement and abolished the National Regional Government of Southern Sudan, the SPLA followed the pattern of setting up military bases in Gambella in the 1980s. The second civil war in Sudan was more severe than the first one in conduct and consequences. It generated a staggering number of refugees as the fighting involved systematic attacks on civilians and burning down of villages (James 2007). By the mid-1980s, the southern Sudanese refugee population in Gambella amounted to more than 300,000. Refugees outnumbered the local population, and the presence of this huge number of refugees brought adverse political, economic, social and ecological effects to the region. There was increasing deforestation of the areas around all refugee camps, where the refugees cleared the woodland for house construction and firewood. Hunting and poaching for food also eradicated the wild animals. The intensification of the civil war also increased the availability of small arms in the Gambella region, which in turn led to the militarisation of the different groups in the region. Particularly intensive was the militarisation amongst the Nuer, who were involved in the war as insurgents and came as refugees to Gambella. Numerous reports and appeals of governors and police officers and traditional leaders (Balabat) of the Akobo, Jikaw, Abobo, Gor, Jor, and Itang weredas (districts) indicate that these groups committed atrocities against the local communities of Gambella region (see different files of the Gambella Regional State Council Archive). This development changed the relatively peaceful coexistence between the Anuak and Nuer to confrontation and violence. The continued fighting and splits into factions in the immediate neighbouring territories impacted immensely on Gambella. It can be safely argued that the civil wars in Sudan had extended the battle across the border and intensified the insecurity and instability in Gambella region.

Derg-SPLM/A cooperation and subsequent politicisation of ethnicity in Gambella After 1976, the Derg began to give support to various Sudanese dissidents including arming and training southern Sudanese guerrillas in retaliation for the Sudanese government’s support of the Eritrean secessionists and other Ethiopian opposition movements. The abolition of the Southern Sudan Regional Government and Assembly in 1983 in violation of the Addis Ababa agreement became a turning point in the long-standing violent conflicts in the Gambella region. The interaction among the 201

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successive Ethiopian regimes, the SPLM/A and southern Sudanese armed rebels, southern Sudanese refugees, and the Gambella society – mainly the Anuak, Nuer, and the highlanders of the region – made the conflicts even more complex. After the first armed clashes indicated the renewed civil war in 1983, troops, workers, students, and farmers fled to sanctuaries in Gambella, where they established the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A activities in Gambella attracted considerably more refugees and insurgents from southern Sudan and increased the influx of firearms into the region. The Derg not only supported the establishment of the SPLM/A, but also hand-picked and organised the leaders of the movement in Gambella, where the NuerSPLA alliance with the Derg led to the opposition of the Anuak, who had formed a resistance movement known as the Gambella People’s Liberation Movement (GPLM) in 1978 in Sudan (Johnson 2003: 4; James 2003: 33). The staunch support of the Derg regime for the Nuer-dominated SPLM/A in the Gambella region brought about the further intensification of the Anuak-Nuer violent clashes, which severely affected the socioeconomic conditions of the Anuak communities of Gambella. The Anuak considered the Nuer as agents of the oppressive Derg regime (Kurimoto 1997: 800–1, 808). The Derg’s support included allowing the SPLA to set up military training facilities and bases inside Ethiopia, first in Gambella region at Itang and then in Asosa district (in the present Beni Shangul-Gumuz Regional State) at Jebel Dul. As already noted, this strong support was in retaliation for Sudan’s support of the Eritrean liberation movement and other anti-Derg forces. The commitment of the SPLA leader John Garang to fight for a united Sudan paralleled the Ethiopian policy directed against ‘separatist movements’ within the country. The SPLA established its headquarters at Bilpham, which is 30 km from Itang town, and opened many military camps including training centres at Bonga, Dimma, and Gilo. The administration of Gambella was almost shared between the Derg and the SPLA, since the SPLA was particularly in charge of security in and around the refugee camps and the border areas. However, the relationship between the Anuak of Gambella and the SPLA was by no means friendly. The Anuak referred to the Sudanese refugees and the SPLA as ‘Ajwil’ – those who have a ‘government’ of their own in Gambella. The heavily armed and undisciplined SPLA forces committed atrocities against the local population such as theft, harassment, rape, robbery, torture, and arbitrary arrests. Hence, the establishment of military training camps and guerrilla bases considerably increased the insecurity and the occurrence of violent conflicts in the Gambella region. In 1991, the SPLA split up into two factions. The SPLA-Nasir faction made a vain attempt to rally the support of the Gambella Nuer and to establish a rear base in Gambella. After a series of battles against the Derg and the SPLA, forces of the united Ethiopian resistance movement of the EPRDF and the GPLM occupied Gambella town. This dramatic politico202

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Changes in Gambella, Ethiopia after the CPA military change immediately caused a mass exodus of three different, but closely related, groups of people into Sudan: SPLA officers and their families, Sudanese refugees from the different refugee camps, and Ethiopian Nuer government officials and their families (Johnson 1996, 2003: 88; Nyaba 1997). After the overthrow of the Derg regime, new political structures were introduced in Ethiopia. The administrative change transformed Gambella from an obscure frontier district into a regional state, the GPNRS. The new regional government of Gambella was dominated by the Anuak who claimed that Gambella was an Anuak territory. The Anuak removed the Nuer leadership, which had dominated Gambella under the Derg. The new Anuak rulers accused the Nuer of atrocities committed against the Anuak community by the SPLM/A. Because of the growing number of Nuer in Gambella, particularly in the 1980s with the intensification of the civil war in southern Sudan, the Anuak felt threatened and were reluctant to accept the political participation of the Nuer in the new governance structure. In the new political arrangement, the old conflicts over range lands, fishing ponds, and fertile river basins gave way to inter-ethnic conflicts, which manifested themselves in the struggle to control large territories in order to ensure political control over weredas and zones. The Anuak and Nuer political elites contended for domination of the political structures of these units in order to control the financial resources of the regional state. For these reasons, the integration and citizenship of the Nuer refugees from Sudan in Gambella have become a crucial and controversial political issue.

The role of the refugee camps in the Gambella conflicts The UNHCR and the Ethiopian government constructed three big refugee camps in Bonga, Dimma and Pugnido in the Anuak territories, and this complicated further the conflict in Gambella. The author’s case study of the Pugnido refugee camp reveals that the chronic violent ethnic conflicts in the camp involved the local population. The Pugnido refugee camp is located 115 kilometres south of Gambella town and 60 kilometres from the Sudanese border. The camp was established in 1988 during the intensification of the second civil war, when many southern Sudanese refugees crossed the border through Pachalla to seek refuge in Gambella. In 1991, all the refugees left, following the regime change in Ethiopia. After 1994, the Sudanese refugees started to return, and the UNHCR and the Ethiopian government reopened the Pugnido camp. From 2006 onwards, many refugees were repatriated to their homeland, and in 2009 there were only some 3,500 refugees in the camp, whose major ethnic groups were Nuer, Anuak, Dinka, some Shilluk, 203

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and a few groups from Equatoria. These ethnic groups were living in their own villages. The division of residential sites along ethnic lines (which is the same for all camps in Gambella) reduced inter-ethnic conflicts and enabled the refugees to maintain their tradition and culture. The existence of traditional administrative structures, committees, and clubs amongst the refugees was instrumental in enforcing law and order and ensuring the prevalence of peaceful existence in the camp. In Pugnido, the main ethnic groups of southern Sudanese refugees had established their own central committee, composed of 18 members half of whom were female, and a zonal administration, which consisted of a court, committees for peace, elders, discipline, sports, water, and education and a women’s association. Table 11.1 Ethnic Composition of Southern Sudanese Refugees in Pugnido Refugee Camp Nationality

Ethnicity

Sudanese Sudanese Sudanese Sudanese Sudanese Sudanese Sudanese

Nuer Anuak Dinka Shilluk Murle Fur Others Total

Total 15,079 9,289 1,527 15 11 05 93 26,019

% 57.95 35.70 5.87 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.36 100.00

Source: ARRA 2005.

The Pugnido refugee camp has been administered by three main institutions with specified functions, but working in cooperation to meet the various requirements of the southern Sudanese refugees. These are the UNHCR, the Administration for Refugee-Returnee Affairs (ARRA), a government organ, and international agencies. The UNHCR has been coordinating and monitoring the refugee assistance programme, providing staff and services, and facilitating the participation of UN organisations, such as the WFP, which provided basic rations, supplementary food, and a school feeding programme, and other agencies (UNHCR 2007). The ARRA has conducted regular monitoring of the performance of the NGOs in the camp. It has also been monitoring the NGOs through monthly, mid-year and annual reports, inter-agency meetings, and site visiting. Moreover, it had the obligations of inspection, auditing, and refugee protection, and making available adequate land free of charge, as required for the provision of services to the refugees. ARRA has been working in cooperation with different government offices, such as the regional bureaus of health, education, the police, capacity-building 204

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Changes in Gambella, Ethiopia after the CPA institutions, and the administration of the care, maintenance, and assistance programme for southern Sudanese refugees in Gambella. The following international agencies have been working in the Pugnido refugee camp: •

Refugee Care Netherlands (ZOA), which provided community services, education in environmental awareness, peace building and conflict resolution, a pre-school programme, psycho-social service, and teachers’ training. ZOA also offered counselling assistance to the mentally and physically disabled people and stimulated the promotion of sports, arts and music clubs at the camp. The organisation encouraged the representation and involvement of women in decision-making.

•

Another agency with similar activities has been Save the Children Sweden (SCS), responsible for providing pre-school education to Sudanese refugee children aged three to six years, elementary school teachers’ training, supply of supplementary education materials, and community service for children.

•

The Rehabilitation and Development Organisation (RaDO), which was responsible for awareness-raising about disability prevention and provided auxiliary limbs and physio-therapy services.

•

The Development Inter-Church Aid Commission (DICAC), which provided vocational training in tailoring, shoe-making, and matmaking, income-generating projects including petty trade schemes, and high school education. The general objectives of this project were giving skills to refugees (and also to some members of the local community) in certain critically needed fields that would enable them to support their life needs in the country of asylum as well as after repatriation to their homeland. DICAC assisted the refugees to maintain and strengthen their traditional skills through participation in different activities. The agency also helped the community to develop the idea of credit and savings so as to run small businesses and meet the needs in the refugee camp.

•

The Natural Resource Development Protection (NRDP), an afforestation project, which has been responsible for seedling production, planting of trees on plantation sites, constructing fire breaks, and protecting the natural forest around the refugee settlements.

These agencies have been providing basic services and skills, intended to help the refugees to make use of job opportunities in their homeland after repatriation. In February 1991, the Sudanese refugee population at the three camps of Itang, Pugnido, and Dimma was officially recorded at over 400,000. The SPLM/A administration of the refugee camps anticipated the fall of the Derg regime, and when fighting broke out in Gambella, they organised the mass evacuation of the camps (Johnson 2003: 88). However, the sudden 205

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evacuation of thousands of southern Sudanese refugees from Ethiopia created a new humanitarian crisis in the border region (ibid: 89). Although those who left through Nasir, Pachalla, and Pakok were not registered, available figures suggest that at least 132,000 refugees from Itang and Pugnido came to Nasir and Pachalla, and some 20,000 refugees went from Dimma to Pakok. These returnees were short of food, desperate, and highly mobile along the Sobat and Pibor rivers in response to reports of the arrival of relief aid. In 1993, most of them returned to the refugee camps in Gambella in great need of humanitarian assistance. In November 2002 a violent conflict erupted in Pugnido refugee camp between the Anuak and Dinka refugees, in which 43 Dinka refugees, most of them handicapped persons and children, were killed by local armed Anuak. Following the massacre, both the Anuak and Dinka refugees felt insecure and fled from the camp. Whereas some Dinka took refuge in the Nuer site of the camp, most Anuak refugees mixed with the local Anuak in the surrounding Pugnido, Tata, Pachalla and Gog villages. For the UNHCR and ARRA, ensuring physical protection of the refugees became a challenging task as the inter-ethnic killings continued. Many killings took place on roads, in the camp, as well as at the Gilo River while refugees were bathing and fishing. Some humanitarian workers serving the refugees were also amongst the victims. In 2003 the ethnic hostilities escalated and the security situation worsened, when armed local Anuak started killing highlanders indiscriminately in the whole Gambella region. Under conditions of complete lack of law and order in the region for a year, UNHCR removed its staff. When the security situation improved, the scattered refugees came back, the camp workers returned to work, and the Pugnido refugee camp was reorganised by setting up separate sites for the Anuak, Dinka, and the different Nuer sections in an attempt to end the conflicts in the camp. The Shilluk and Equatorial refugees were moved to the Bonga refugee camp, which was primarily set up in 1994 for the Uduk refugees from the Blue Nile (ARRA 2005). The division of residential sites along ethnic lines in Pugnido became a model for the Dimma and Bonga camps. This structure not only reduced inter-ethnic conflicts and ensured the prevalence of peaceful coexistence, but also enabled the refugees to maintain their traditional governance structures and cultures in exile. The opportunity to retain their traditional culture in the camps was thought to help the refugees to re-integrate easily in their homeland communities after repatriation. A great number of Nuer refugees, however, were not registered in the camps and integrated themselves into the Ethiopian Nuer communities. This shifted the population balance in favour of the Nuer. Hence the provision of education by the UNHCR for refugees and for the communities living adjacent to refugee camps largely benefited the Nuer, because it led to their advancement at the expense of the Anuak dominance (Kurimoto 1997: 800–1). In response to this bias, Anuak plundered refugee camps and killed many refugees. 206

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Changes in Gambella, Ethiopia after the CPA

Changes after the CPA As a consequence of the conclusion of the CPA, three major changes occurred in Gambella region. High numbers of refugees left the region, peaceful trade relations were taken up across the Ethiopian-Sudanese border, and, at the same time, insecurity and violence escalated along the border. These contradictory developments are analysed below. R E PAT R I AT I O N O F S O U T H E R N S U DA N E S E R E F U G E E S

One of the major provisions of the CPA is the repatriation and resettlement of the southern Sudanese refugees who were displaced during the civil war. The CPA stipulates the return of 350,000 southern Sudanese refugees from the neighbouring countries and 4 million internally displaced people to their villages. On February 27, 2006, the governments of Ethiopia and Sudan and the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement to facilitate the return of over 70,000 southern Sudanese refugees from western Ethiopia to their devastated regions. The signatory parties agreed that any process of repatriation should be voluntary. The representatives of Sudan claimed to ensure that the refugees could return in safety and dignity. The representatives of Ethiopia promised to safeguard the rights of those refugees who might decide to stay in Ethiopia. The UNHCR ensured that logistical assistance and protection requirements of the voluntary returnees and their access to basic services and livelihood would be met (UNHCR 2006). The UNHCR, in cooperation with the government of Sudan, UN agencies and NGOs, made efforts to provide at least minimal conditions to enable the refugees to return to their regions of origin. It conducted assessments for each village in southern Sudan to which refugees might return. The assessments included the intensity of local conflict, access to water facilities and other basic facilities, land issues, and mine surveys. After demining, reception centres were set up in the villages. According to the UNHCR reports, in almost all southern Sudanese war-affected regions public institutions like schools, clinics, and police stations were in ruins, and employment and income-generating activities were absent (UNHCR 2007). In cooperation with ARRA and international agencies, the UNCHR repatriated 20,815 southern Sudanese refugees voluntarily to their homeland between March 31, 2006 and March 2007. These included Uduk, Nuer, and Dinka from the three refugee camps in Gambella, amongst them 10,065 refugees from Bonga, 5,257 from Dimma, and 5,493 from Pugnido. The reception station for these returnees to their villages in the Upper Nile and Jonglei States was Pagak, 10 kilometres from the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. 673 refugees from Bonga, 102 from Dimma, and 70 from Pugnido repatriated spontaneously on their own to southern Sudan. Refugees in this category were mostly the young ones with some education or skills from vocational training, and teachers who were expecting employment opportunities in southern Sudan. 207

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The UNHCR and ARRA facilitated the repatriation through information campaigns, medical screening, escort arrangements and the provision of ready-made food en route, coordination of refugee movements, and arrangements to cooperate with local authorities regarding cross-border formalities. The different categories of returnees had different opinions about the journey to their homeland. At Pugnido, the idle camp life with easy access to food, potable water, and free health care had incapacitated many refugees, who suffered from dependency syndrome. In particular, elderly traumatised refugees, young refugees who were born in the camp, and women appeared to need some consultation and reorientation before departure. According to ARRA, problems encountered en route were poor roads and old buses, which retarded the journey, absence of a feeding hall at the assembly point, poor arrangements, delays in the convoy movement, shortage of ambulances for emergency cases, and a lack of radio communication for escort vehicles (ARRA 2007). The repatriation of refugees had a visible impact on the economy and society of Pugnido village. Petty traders and owners of small bars and restaurants faced a stark decrease of income as a consequence of the repatriation. In southern Sudan, the resettlement of the returnees looks gloomy. The GOSS, although committed to implementing the CPA, still has to struggle with difficult challenges. Ethnic militias, financed by the NCP in Khartoum, continued to agitate ethnic violence, thus destabilising southern Sudan still during 2007. The GOSS, and in particular, the state governments, have been facing financial constraints in building infrastructure and administrative institutions. The GOSS still lacks capacity to establish an effective administration to rebuild the war-ravaged southern Sudan, while the NCP lacks commitment to the implementation of the CPA (Sullivan 2006). The internal divisions and contradictions within the SPLM/A have made it fail to challenge the NCP successfully and consistently on most issues related to the implementation of the CPA. After being involved in drafting the CPA, the international community withdrew from the scene and failed to hold the NCP and SPLM/A accountable to their respective commitments. R E V I VA L O F C RO S S - B O R D E R T R A D E

During the British rule of Sudan, the produce of the south-western highlands of Ethiopia, such as coffee, beeswax, civet (musk), hides, sheep and goat skins, and rubber were brought to the Gambella trading post for export to and through Khartoum. At the same time, Greek and Sudanese merchants brought import items such as cotton goods, salt, soap, liquors, wines and spirits, ironware, furniture, Maria Theresa thalers, and empty sacks via Gambella to the commercial centres of south-western Ethiopia. During this period of prosperous trade, salt was the only significant Sudanese product that was imported into Gambella, while other goods 208

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Changes in Gambella, Ethiopia after the CPA were re-imported from Sudan (Bahru 1982: 253). With the independence of Sudan in 1956, the British lease of the Gambella commercial station on the Baro river terminated, and full control of the trading post reverted to Ethiopia. Since then, the nature and volume of the Baro trade considerably decreased and was limited to small-scale trade among the border communities. With the commencement of the civil war in southern Sudan, this trade completely disappeared because of lack of security. An important change that the CPA effected in the Gambella region is the re-opening of the Baro river trade. The products traded from Gambella by motor boats are various basic consumer goods which are in great demand in the war-ravaged counties of Nasir and Malakal. These commodities from the south-western Ethiopian highlands include corn, coffee, oil, flour, tobacco, liquors, beer, some clothing, potatoes, onions, ginger, beans, chillies, spices, lentils, etc. The Nuer merchants and some highlanders dominate the Gambella-Nasir-Malakal river trade. Seven motor boats of varying size are involved in the trade during the rainy season from June to December. A motor boat of an average size carries Birr 20,000–30,000 worth of commodities in a single trip from Gambella. Six motor boats are owned by Nuer and one boat belongs to a highland Ethiopian. Some highland Ethiopians also travel to Nasir and Malakal in search of job opportunities in southern Sudan. In addition to the trading activities, the re-opening of the river route has brought together relatives who had been separated during the civil war. The emerging trans-frontier trade from Gambella since June 2006 has also become an important source of customs duties on import and export for both the government of the GPNRS and the GOSS. In September 2007, the Gambella regional government set up a customs office for the purpose. Another revived cross-border trade is the Pugnido-Pachalla dry season trade, which is dominated by the Anuak, who bring corn, tobacco, and coffee to Pachalla. The small-scale trade across the Akobo river is halted during the rainy season because of the overflow of the river. Both river trade routes have begun to play a significant role in the economic, social, and cultural life of the borderland communities. ESC A LATI ON OF V I OLENCE AND G ROW IN G IN S E C U RIT Y ALONG THE BORD E R

In spite of the above positive developments in Gambella after the CPA, continuous violence in eastern Upper Nile State has adversely affected security in Gambella. Among many factors which have contributed to violence in Upper Nile State are the intensification of cattle raids amongst the pastoralists, the availability of small arms in the region, the poor integration of militias into the SAF or SPLA, and the failure of the GOSS to exert effective and full control in the region. After the CPA, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of young male combatants of the civil war rushing to marry. This has greatly enhanced the demand for cattle for bride wealth payment. But the cattle 209

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population has been depleted because of the war. Subsequently, large-scale armed raiding and cattle rustling have spread in southern Sudan and across the border in Gambella. Armed raids and cattle rustling by the Murle in Jonglei State had devastating effects on the Nuer of Jikaw and Akobo districts of Gambella. The Murle attacks sometimes extended deep into the Anuak territories up to the Itang district of Gambella. The Lou Nuer of southern Sudan have also been raiding cattle in Akobo district since mid-2005. Thousands of armed Lou Nuer have occupied large territories in Gambella and demanded Ethiopian citizenship. The SPLA’s disarmament of the population of Akobo district led to the flow of arms into Gambella. Another crucial long-standing problem of the region has been the endless sectional fighting among Nuer groups, which has a mutual impact on Upper Nile State and the Gambella region. In eastern Upper Nile State, the SPLA has no control over the pro-NCP militia leaders such as Gordon Kong Chuol, who armed different Nuer groups to destabilise the area around Nasir. This has encouraged fighting among the Nuer groups along the common border areas, with spill-over effects on Gambella. The only positive development that was triggered by the growing escalation of violence along the border has been the beginning of cooperation between the SPLM/A officials of Upper Nile and Jonglei States and the officials of the GPNRS to search for a solution to the continuous pastoralist raids and other problems arising along the common border.

Conclusion The impact of the presence of thousands of southern Sudanese refugees on the Gambella region and society has been tremendous. Army mutineers, armed bandits, insurgents, pastoralists and farmers, whose villages had been devastated by the violent war, poured into Gambella. This created internal displacement, socio-economic crises, and ecological destruction in the region. Factional fighting among the southern Sudanese groups in the region has been another challenge for Gambella society. In both Ethiopia and Sudan, internal conflicts have influenced relations between the two countries. Conversely, the harbouring and supporting of insurgents from one’s neighbour prolonged the violent internal conflicts in the sub-region. Despite some positive changes in Gambella after the CPA, sustainable peace and stability of the region will be greatly influenced by the future prospects of southern Sudan.

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References ARRA – Administration for Refugee-Returnee Affairs (2005) Refugee Population Update. Report. Gambella: ARRA, November. ARRA (2007) Refugee Population Update Report for 2007. Gambella: ARRA. Bahru, Zewde (1982) An Overview and Assessment of Gambella Trade. Paper presented at East Africa History Conference on Aspects of the Economic History of Eastern Africa. Nazareth: Addis Ababa University. Clapham, Christopher (1991) The Political Economy of Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa, in: Bahru, Zewde/Pankhurst, Richard/Beyene, Taddesse (eds) The Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies. Addis Ababa: University of Addis Ababa Pess: 703–19. Dereje, Feyissa (2006) The Experience of Gambella Regional State, in: Turton, David (ed.) Ethnic Federalism The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: James Currey/Athens OH: Ohio University Press/Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press: 208–30. Gambella Regional State Council Archive: File No.362/13/03, May 20 1967; File No.141/9/211/62, March 5 1970; File No.11/281/12, March 10 1972. James, Wendy (2003) People Friendly – Project and Practical Realities, in: Johannsen, MajBritt/Kastfelt, Niels (eds) Sudanese Society in the Context of Civil War. Papers from a Seminar at the University of Copenhagen: North/South Priority Research Area, February 9–10, 2001. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen Press. James, Wendy (2007) War and Survival in Sudan’s Frontierlands. Voices from the Blue Nile. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Johnson, Douglas (1996) Increasing the Trauma of Return: An Assessment of the UN’s Emergency Response to the Evacuation of the Sudanese Refugee Camps from Ethiopia, 1991, in: Allen, T. (ed.) In Search of Cool Ground: Displacement and Homecoming in Northeast Africa. London: James Currey: 171–81. Johnson, Douglas (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey Publishers. Kurimoto, Eisei (1997) Politicisation of Ethnicity in Gambella Region, in: Kasuyoshi, Fukul/ Kurimoto, E. et al. (eds) Ethiopia in Broader Perspective, Vol. 2, The 13th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, December 12–17. Kyoto: National Museum of Ethnology. Nyaba, Peter Adok (1997) The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan, An Insider’s View. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. Rugumamu, Severine (2001) Globalization and Africa’s Future: Towards Structural Stability, Integration and Sustainable Development, in: Association of African Planning Schools (AAPS) Occasional Paper Series, Harare: Vol. 5, No. 2. Sullivan, Daniel P. (2006) Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement at One Year of Age. Working Paper FG 6 (February). Berlin: SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). Tewodros, Zewde (2007) Traditional Institutions of Governance and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: A Case Study of Majengir, Anywaa and Nuer of Gambella. Gambella: ACORD Advocacy and Peace Building Support Programme for Local Institutions, Gambella, June. UNHCR (2006) Ethiopia, Sudan, UNHCR Sign Tripartite Agreement on Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees to Sudan. Addis Ababa: UNHCR, February 27. UNHCR (2007) Ethiopia, Field Office Pugnido Camp Profile. Gambella: UNHCR Suboffice, July. Waal, Alex de (ed.) (2000) Who Fights? Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

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12 Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella A Perspective from the Border Region MONIKA M. SOMMER

Introduction Federalism as a form of governance not only enjoys a good reputation in donor countries, but is becoming more and more popular in Africa. At first sight, federalism appears to be the best option for governance in an African context: federalism promises a method to deal democratically with a multitude of groups of diverse histories and identities within a given national entity. Accordingly, in the last decades many African states – South Africa and Ethiopia among others – have opted for a federal rather than a central allocation of power and structures of decision-making. Like other countries before – India, Belgium, Canada, and Spain, to name a few – they developed from unitary states as governments’ response to alleviate threats of secession by territorially clustered minorities. These ‘holding together’ federations (Stepan 1999: 24) are characterised by granting some sub-units particular domains of sovereignty, for example, over language and cultural rights in an asymmetric federation, while maintaining a broad scope of action for the central government and majorities. Sudan has become the most recent and very specific example of an African federal system. The CPA and subsequently the interim national constitution and the interim constitution of southern Sudan (ICSS) define a decentralised system of governance (Arts 1 (2), 50 ICSS) in the attempt to cope with the exceptional diversity of Sudan’s population in ethnic, religious, and linguistic respects. The view over the border to the Ethiopian regional state of Gambella may provide some lessons on the opportunities and limitations connected with the federal experiment in the neighbouring country. Ethiopia has introduced the principle of self-determination for federated regional units in a formerly highly centralised and unitary state. It has gone even further than any other African state, and further than 212

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Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella ‘almost any state worldwide’ (Clapham 2002: 27) in using ethnicity as its fundamental organising principle. This makes Ethiopia’s experiment in ethnic federalism of great potential relevance to the debate about the accommodation of ethnic diversity in democratic states (Turton 2006: 3). Moreover, Ethiopia may serve as an example, where federalism has been introduced, while maintaining and strengthening some of the central institutions of power and the central state as such. Ethiopia has been hailed as a model of democratisation of society at large (Kinfe 2001: 23; Tsegaye 2004: 11). Yet, there are competent critics who have quoted the Ethiopian form of governance since 1991 as a specific example of blocked democracy in Africa (Tetzlaff/Jacobeit 2005: 194, 197). Those who argue along the latter lines assume that the military front that gained power in 1991 took recourse to a formal democratic façade, as they felt the need for democratic legitimacy; coming from a minority background in the multiethnic state, they could get this blessing only by setting up a ‘façade’ (ibid.) of democracy while using institutions to their own particular interest. The presumed interest is to gain and maintain political power – in a predemocratic understanding of ‘the winner takes all’ – and ‘forever’ (Merera 2003). Other authors have warned and depicted the risk of conflict aggravation inherent in the ‘new’ federal and ethnically defined structure of Ethiopia (Asnake 2002: 26; Assefa 2006). Keller (2002: 2) even predicted that these domestic tensions might easily spill over into neighbouring states. The most recent comprehensive report on Ethiopian federalism (ICG 2009) summarises that, while ethnic federalism has entirely failed to resolve the national question, it has empowered single ethnic groups and promoted ethnic self-awareness among all groups (ICG 2009: 29). These assumptions will be examined here from a local point of view, that is, by analysing the structures in place in one of the smallest and most remote regional states of Ethiopia, the regional state of Gambella. Whether the Ethiopian experience can serve as a role model or rather as a negative case study will be addressed in the conclusion of this paper. Ethiopia has a tradition of constitutionalism – though a weak one. Ethiopia’s first constitution was drafted in 1931 and amended in 1955. At the time, the provinces were administered by nobles (of different ethnic origins), called governors, loyal to the emperor and directly responsible to him. The imperial constitution was suspended in 1974 by the Derg, a military regime with Marxist intentions, and replaced by a series of military decrees. A socialist form of the constitution was only promulgated in 1987. After the Derg was overthrown in 1991, the victorious EPRDF convened a conference to endorse a transitional charter and Eritrea’s de facto independence. The charter became the legal basis of four years of interim rule under an EPRDF-dominated legislature, with an executive headed by the leader of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia up to the present. A constituent assembly was elected by universal suffrage in June 1994. A new 213

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constitution was endorsed by a referendum in December 1994 and came into effect in August 1995, formally establishing the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It is based on a bicameral legislature, a ceremonial presidency, and an all-powerful, executive prime minister. For the first time in history, the structure of the state was defined as federal. It is allegedly designed to give a fair voice to Ethiopia’s diverse peoples and to accommodate their differences in language, culture, and historical identity. With the federal Constitution of 1995 the country has been divided into nine states and two municipalities, primarily on the basis of ethnicity, although none of the regions is entirely homogenous and some have considerable diversity. This has been addressed by sub-dividing some regions into zones, in the case of Gambella into the Nuer, Anuak, and Majangir zones. Moreover, the old administrative structure of weredas (districts) and kebeles (local administrations) has been kept intact. 89 distinct ethnic groups with their respective languages have been identified in Ethiopia (Markakis 2003). Nevertheless, Amharic and English have remained the de facto languages of government. Regions are free to choose their own language of administration, although several, like Gambella, eventually opted for Amharic rather than introducing any of the indigenous languages. This chapter aims to look into the experience of federalism in Ethiopia from a strictly local point of view. The declared objective of the specific type of ethnic federalism to strengthen the country’s formerly marginalised ethnic groups should be most relevant in the west and south-west of the country, as for instance in the GPNRS. After more than ten years of federal practice, it should be possible to evaluate here whether the new structures have served to develop self-determination on the ground, or whether the critics are right, who claim that by building a ruling (party) coalition comprising the main representatives of the major ethnic groups, the system has rather served as a mechanism to cement centralised authority. Moreover, it should be possible to evaluate in which way the new political structures have changed life in the region – for better or worse. It seems that the TPLF-led rebel groups that came to power in 1991 were aware of the need to build up trust among the citizens, who had fought against the Derg often in military groups that were constituted along ethnic lines. The necessity of decentralisation of state power was therefore apparent; the call could not be ignored. The interim constitution and even more the federal constitution of 1995 took this into consideration. While federalism per se can be seen as a political compromise between the opposing values of unity and diversity, in general it is expected that the inclusion of contending groups in the decision-making process facilitates civil peace in divided societies and that ‘[p]olicies supported by a broad consensus ... are more likely to be carried out successfully and to remain on course than policies imposed by a “decisive” government against the wishes of important sectors of society’ (Lijphart 1999: 260). Seen from another perspective, it also implies that conflicting interests and groups are at stake 214

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Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella and that – not surprisingly – conflicts might arise in every federal system. Thus the core question can be reduced to asking whether or not the system in place provides for mechanisms that are capable of reducing conflicts or settling them in a constructive process, a process that needs to be accepted by all parties concerned. This paper will therefore examine first the details of the Ethiopian federal system by analysing the federal constitution and the constitution of the GPNRS. In a second step, it will look into the structure of the ruling party, the EPRDF. This approach builds on the assumption that in the practical absence of any opposition party in Gambella – all federal and regional office-holders belong to the same party – the party’s structure and its less formal and transparent meshwork of interaction might be equally important for understanding the specific way of governance in the federal system.

Brief introduction to the Gambella Region and its people The GPNRS can be seen as an Ethiopian enclave in southern Sudan. It shares a long and porous border with Sudan in three directions, and its population is in many respects very similar to the Sudanese population across the border. According to the population census of 2007 (which was not undisputed) the population of this regional state is composed as shown in Table 12.1. The population of Gambella grew to 306,916 inhabitants in 2007 and, with an annual growth rate of 4.1 per cent, it has the fastest growing population in the country (CSA 2008: 11). The indigenous population, recognised as such in the national and regional constitutions, consists of five main ethno-linguistic groups: the Anuak, the Nuer, the Majangir, the Opo, and the Komo. With 46.65 per cent of the population, the Nuer form the biggest ethnic group, followed by the Anuak with 21.17 per cent. In particular the Nuer, but also the Anuak, entertain intense relations with kin in southern Sudan that date from olden times. Those inhabitants of Gambella who originate from different – usually less peripheral – regions of Ethiopia are commonly summed up under the term ‘highlanders’, comprising diverse ethnic identities, such as the Oromo, Kambatta, Amhara and Tigrayans. According to the 2007 census, they form about 26 per cent of the population. The appearance of the first ‘highlanders’ was closely related to the expansion of imperial Ethiopia under Menelik II. During the 1980s, the (forced) resettlement of large farmers’ communities from precarious and drought-prone areas of the country enlarged the group and changed its character. While the early migrants from the highlands were mainly traders or government officials – often of Amhara or Oromo origin – the later influx came from diverse regions and ethnic backgrounds, such as Tigrayans from the very north 215

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Table 12.1 The Demographic Composition of the GPNRS Groups Anuak Nuer Majangir Opo and Komo

Urban % ‘Indigenous’ 9,831 36.2 3,014 11.1 64 0.2 1,067 3.9

Rural peoplea 34,750 61,459 9,286 3,735

% 25.7 45.5 6.9 2.7

Total

%

44,581 27.5 64,473 39.7 9,350 5.8 4,802 3

People from various highland areas of Ethiopia Amharas 4,639 17.1 7,927 5.9 12,566 7.7 Kaffa, Kambatta and other ‘southerners’ 1,334 4.9 12,170 9.0 13,504 8.3 Oromos 5,890 21.7 4,635 3.4 10,525 6.5 Tigrayans 1,341 4.9 1,255 0.9 2,596 1.6 Total 27,180 100.0 135,217 100.0 162,397 100.0 Source: CSA 2008. a

A definition of ‘indigenous’ is provided by the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, No. 169: Article 1.1: ‘(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; (b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. Article 1.2.: Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.’

and Kambatta and Haddiya from the south of the country (Meckelburg 2008: 176). They are united, not only by their lighter skin complexion, but also by the fact that their traditions and current relations are directed towards the centre of the country rather than towards neighbouring Sudan. This is also reflected in religious terms, as they adhere predominantly to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church or to Islam. In contrast, the indigenous population follows either traditional religions or different (mainly evangelical) Christian churches, thereby sharing a cultural heritage with their Sudanese neighbours directly across the border. Since Gambella entered the focus of attention of the Ethiopian imperial state in the late nineteenth century, the region has experienced its share of violence and conflict. But the period since 1991, when the central socialist government was overthrown, has seen a remarkable escalation. Much of this intensification seems due to the fact that ethnicity became a criterion for access to power, participation, material resources, and education for the first time in history. In this context, it is important to 216

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Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella observe that many of the related – violent – conflicts brought the central government, most prominently the federal police, as active players into the region (author’s observation during field research in 2005–7). Rather than re-establishing peace by political and constitutional means in the aftermath of the Itang incident in 2003 for instance, – and then after December 2003 – the federal government reacted with arrests, military presence, and force. The continuous state of emergency that was associated with these events turned out to favour the centralised structures, not the pluralism and selfgovernance proclaimed in the constitution. This was true in military and political terms. Central structures also dominated the process of political reorganisation. This could be seen as an interim phenomenon, however, if the constitutional and governmental structures in place proved to be capable of dealing with the immanent tensions.

The constitutional set-up: Problem solver or part of the problem? This paper intends to look into structural causes for conflict in Gambella, namely, the structure of ethnic federalism that is embodied in the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Federal Constitution) according to Proclamation No. 1/1995, which was endorsed in December 1994 and came into effect in August 1995, and in the Constitution of the GPNRS of 2003 according to Proclamation No. 27/2003. Gambella was among the latest regional states to come up with its own constitution. There is some evidence that it was dutifully copied from other regional constitutions, without much discussion in the region, thus reacting to requests from the federal government. Only a few people know about the existence of the constitution, and even fewer are familiar with its content. These findings might raise doubts as to whether or not the regional constitution of Gambella can be considered as a generic constitution in the sense that it was developed in the region and by its people. Nevertheless, like any other constitution, it defines the official structure of governance, and may develop its legitimacy – which would be ideally based on a broad consensus within the population – in the longer run. Therefore, as a first step the institutional set-up of the constitution will be analysed. In a second step, the dominant structures of governance, first and foremost the institutions of political parties and their way of governance, will be examined. Parties are supposed to play a crucial role in any free form of governance. Ideally they are defined as ‘permanent groups of civil society, which mobilise, articulate and bundle the interests of their followers with the intention of translating these into political power and governance – by way of gaining positions in parliaments and in governments.’ (Tetzlaff/Jakobeit 2005: 166, translation from German by the author). 217

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Conflicts are part of human and social life and can be expected in any society. In a constitutional order – within federal and democratic structures – it is always worthwhile to analyse the system as such, in order to see where the main frictions lie. The aim is to develop an understanding of whether or not the constitutional order provides ways of dealing with immanent conflicts, and if so, whether these institutions enjoy the trust and credibility of all parties concerned, and whether they can be considered as functional. If this is not the case, there is a high probability that immanent conflicts will be solved in different ways, following customary institutions, or – if there is the preparedness – in violent ways. The following subsections will analyse some of the basic decisions taken in the national and regional constitutions. NAT I O N S, NAT I O NA L I T I E S A N D P E O P L E 1

The Ethiopian Constitution has developed a special brand of federalism, designed for the ‘nations, nationalities and people’ (Federal Constitution, Preamble, Art. 9) which Art. 39 V of the Federal Constitution (like Art. 39 VI of the Gambellian Constitution) defines as follows: A ‘Nation, Nationality or People’, for the purpose of this Constitution, is a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.

Unfortunately, this definition does not lead us far. It has already been mentioned that around 89 distinct ethnic groups with their respective languages have been identified in Ethiopia. No one intends to divide the country into 89 regional states; moreover, the mobility of the people makes a strict ethnic division impossible. Nevertheless, the basic political and constitutional decision on ethnicity had to be implemented and found its application in Article 46 of the constitution of the ethnically diverse region of Gambella, which states: • Member nationalities of the Regional State of Nations and Nationalities Gambella are the following: 1) Anuak, 2) Nuer, 3) Majangir, 4) Opo, 5) Komo. • All members of the state have equal rights and authority. • The small nations and people which are governed by each national zone have the right to lead their own Kebele by themselves and to be represented in region and zone directly. (unofficial translation). 1 The term ‘nations, nationalities and people’ will not be analysed here. It lacks clarity, but is understandable in the light of Ethiopian history and the discourses of the Marxist students’ movement of the 1960s that were inspired by the Soviet debates on the ‘national question’ of the early 20th century (Merera 2003:37).

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Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella According to this definition, residents other than those who are recognised as indigenous people – even long-term residents – do not form part of the special constituency of Gambella. It was mentioned above that the ‘highlanders’ are the third largest group in the region, making up about 26 per cent of its population. In political terms, this significant minority group is not fully recognised as a sovereign subject of the regional state. Individual members of the group enjoy other civil rights, first and foremost the basic human and social rights which are spelled out in Chapter II of the regional constitution. These basic rights apply to each and everyone residing in the regional state and in Ethiopia. Political rights in terms of participatory rights, however, are exclusively reserved for those who are indigenous. The de facto exclusion of highlanders may be legitimised and understandable when assuming that the intention of the decentralisation and the foundation of the regions was to give rights of self-governance to people who were previously marginalised and excluded from mainstream development in the country. Thus, understood as group rights, it is not yet set into historical perspective, formulating, for instance, affirmative action rights or minority rights for certain groups over a certain period. Moreover, it neglects the previous marginalisation of other groups. Some of the main highlander groups in Gambella, for example the Kambatta and Haddiya from the south, experienced marginalisation during the imperial expansion of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well. Seen from a pragmatic point of view of conflict prevention, it is enough to state that the division of people according to their ethnic belonging (if this can be the brief translation of ‘Nations Nationalities and People’) divides society anew, thereby creating new frictions that may lead to new conflicts. The constitution does not provide any formula or institutionalised procedure to cope with this foreseeable dilemma. Rather, the newly excluded groups are likely to resort to more unofficial and less visible ways of pursuing their interests – bypassing the democratic and transparent structures of the constitution and the inherent mechanisms of checks and balances. R E S O U RC E S, I S S U E S O F L A N D A N D O I L

Art 40 III of the Federal Constitution declares: The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia.

Art 49 II of the Constitution of Gambella reads: 2.3: within the framework of the federal constitution, the regional government decides upon the use of land and natural resources; 2.10: it determines the payment for land use; 2.14: with the federal government (…) ... it shares royalty payments from the mineral works and from any crude oil and gas findings according to the laws.

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Thus, the federal constitution of Ethiopia has taken a basic decision for state ownership of land, giving use-rights to private persons and institutions. The principle of federal ownership is also maintained in relation to the regional states, which – as in the Gambella case – are entitled to royalties which need to be negotiated with the federal government. Decisions on details of the specific use of the land, however, rest with the regional state. This is relevant in two major areas: firstly in regulating the use of land by the different (ethnic) groups and communities, secondly in deciding about the use of resources found in and on the territory. The way of using the land has become a major cause of conflict between the different ethnic groups in Gambella (see Sommer 2005: 25). Fertile riverine land has become scarce after migrations from Sudan (mainly Nuer), the establishment of three major refugee camps in the region (Dimma, Pugnido, and Bonga), the resettlement of peasants from drought-prone areas to industrialised agricultural villages in the 1980s, to name only some of the most visible developments in recent history. The way land is used differs from community to community. Pastoralists and agriculturists have different needs with regard to land and have developed different customary legal systems. A common feature is the collective – as opposed to private – use of the land. Nevertheless, existing customary forms of land use often collide between the different communities and lead to conflicts, sometimes in the most violent form. Only recently has the violence ceased, not necessarily because the underlying conflicts have been solved, but rather because other problems have drawn the attention more towards the federal government, thereby uniting the Nilotic groups to some extent. In conclusion, it needs to be emphasised that the regional authorities are competent to regulate land use in most areas. One of the exceptions to exclusive regional competence is the profit gained from mineral works and from any crude oil and gas findings, which has to be shared at federal level. With the occurrence of crude oil in the region, these provisions have already developed momentum. While the pastoralist Nuer seem to position themselves for negotiations with the federal institutions, the more sedentary Anuak tend to develop a rather fundamental resentment towards the oil exploitation. The most extreme form is expressed by the violent wing of the GPLM/F, which in a statement issued in November 2005 issued an ultimatum for the Malaysian-based oil company Petronas and its Chinese sub-contractors to leave the country. Summing up, it can be stated that the regional government of Gambella has a considerable degree of economic autonomy under the constitution, which limits the federal government’s influence on economic policy to monetary matters, land ownership, foreign trade and investment, interstate commerce and nationwide transport, and devolves all other economic powers to the regions, including taxation. In practice, however, the regional government has not been able to fill the space provided by the constitutional framework. In contrast to the constitutional set-up, the 220

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Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella regional government seems politically subservient to, and financially dependent on, the central government. Whether greater economic autonomy could be assumed, if regional capacity could be strengthened, may be fully evaluated after analysing the full set of structures in place. It can already be concluded, however, that the constitutional framework has been proved too weak, and not precise enough, to be able to provide a credible and legitimate procedure to transform the conflicts pending within the region and between the region and the centre so far. SUBSIDIARITY

An important aspect in any system –which also gives some insight into the extent of power diffusion – is the regulation of subsidiarity in a given legal system. The Constitution of Gambella accepts the Federal Constitution as supreme (Art. 10 I). Art. 49 of the Gambella Constitution – identical with Art. 52 of the Federal Constitution – then specifies: All powers not given expressly to the Federal Government alone, or concurrently to the Federal Government and the States, are reserved to the States.

Sub-Article 2 of the respective regulations in both constitutions then gives specific powers to the states. These provisions, in principle, give the essential power, in legislative and administrative terms, to the regions, as long as they perform within the wide framework of the Federal Constitution. The constitution itself, however, takes the first step in turning this provision upside down, when enumerating in Art. 52 II the specific powers of the regional states, which it confines to mainly executive functions. These are obvious contradictions, which at least do not serve their purpose. Seen in terms of good governance, this leads to uncertainty and gives the advantage to the politically stronger institutional level, which so far is the federal level. In consequence, many of the regional competences have not been utilised. Not only the rather centralistic party structure comes into the picture here, but also the local inability to take regional matters into their own hands – skilfully and within a well-defined constitutional framework. LANGUAGE

Article 6 of the constitution of the GPNRS decides on Amharic as the working language of the state. In this respect, it differs from other regional states’ constitutions which favour regional languages. This is not surprising in ethnically more uniform regions like Tigray, Amhara and Oromia, but it is the case also in Harar (Harari and Oromo) and other regions. Subarticle 4 even emphasises the right to learn in Amharic (elementary education can be done in the mother tongues). This decision may be explicable, given the comparably brief history of written local languages and the great heterogeneity in some scripts (for Anuak, see Reh 2003: 284). The choice of Amharic as the lingua franca, however, stands in crass 221

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contradiction to the basic decision on ownership and full citizenship in the definition of ‘membership’ of the region in Art. 46 (see above). It creates some obvious frictions that carry a potential for further conflicts. Language problems are apparent. A young and educated Nuer (a graduate of Addis Ababa University) expressed during an interview this side-remark: Language is a big problem. As the working language is still Amharic, most indigenous civil servants are disadvantaged, as they are not able to write proposals and documents in good Amharic. They get the jobs because of the affirmative action policy in place, but in fact they are not able to work to their full potential within the government structures. In the end they sit in their offices, but they do nothing for the people. That’s not good governance! (author’s interview, 6 November 2006)

This remark also reveals a deep dissatisfaction with the incompetence that is perceived as a dominant feature, embedded in the system. P O L I T I C A L PA RT I E S

Article 52 of the Constitution of Gambella refers to political parties as subjects of political power. A political party or a coalition of political parties that has the greatest number of seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives shall form the Executive and lead it. The formation of parties is left to the political players. There are no further regulations referring to the internal structure of a political party, nor to the possible content of its programmes. The factual role and performance of parties in Gambella will therefore be examined in the following section. Whether the political parties meet the standards of the political scientists’ definition, which asks for a structure that organises civil society and mobilises, articulates and combines the interests of their followers, will be seen in the course of these reflections.

Political parties in Gambella The development of political parties in Gambella needs to be focused on from different perspectives – first as a regional phenomenon of organising political elites, secondly as part of the development of the national party structure, particularly the EPRDF as the ruling party in post-Derg Ethiopia, and thirdly in its role with regard to local communities. Since the defeat of the Derg, ethnic identity has become a door-opener for local elites to gain access to power for the first time. In the process, ethnic identities and markers have been intensified and sometimes even reshaped or reinvented in following the new formula. The political framework encourages the creation of new identities and inspires players to position themselves along new ethnic boundaries. The following story 222

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Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella may illustrate this. When asked about Opo and Komo participation in the party, my interview partner started laughing and said: I do not know. There is this Komo – you know him, NN – everyone considers him to be the ‘real Komo’, because he also speaks the language. There is also another one (…), he claims to be Komo. But he does not know anything about Komo. He and others used to identify themselves as Oromos – previously. But it is only with this government – you know ‘colour matters – yes!’ – that they declare themselves to be Komos (….). They always walk from here to the next assignment – because there are not many of them. (author’s interview with a Nuer elder, 29 April 2007)

This quote is of particular interest, first, because the Nuer elder did not seem to know that the Komo have experienced a major dislocation throughout the last century, which in consequence made many of them forget their own language in an environment dominated by Oromo speakers. Yet they returned in large numbers to their places of origin whenever they could, even if they had been born in the highlands and spoke only Oromo (James, 1980: 49). Secondly, it shows how deep the suspicion is, and that it is being taken for granted that ethnicity is something that can be fabricated to a certain extent. Therefore, though it seems funny and fresh in its ‘political incorrectness’, it reveals how seriously the main groups are fighting for the new assets available under the federal structure since 1991. The history of party formation in Gambella reflects this finding. The GPLM, an Anuak-dominated group, came to power in the region. The movement had allied itself with the TPLF and its allies in the EPRDF during the last phase of the war against the Derg – after a short ‘honeymoon’ with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) (Young 1999: 326). Following local narratives, the Anuak – being a sedentary community and, as such, severely subjected to the disruptive revolutionary campaigns of the Derg – launched guerrilla campaigns at a stage when the Nuer in general were still cooperating with the previous regime, which also cooperated with the SPLM/A. This history resulted in an explicit animosity between the two groups, which was aggravated by the increasing pressure of Nuer fleeing from the Sudanese civil war and being readily integrated into local, Nuer family and ethnic structures in Gambella. In the attempt to cope with Anuak dominance in the newly structured region, the Nuer formed the Gambella People’s Democratic Unity Party (GPDUP) in 1992. The new party appealed for recognition to the EPRDF, which was readily given (Gew 2005: 5). In spite of severe tensions that broke out on a regular basis and in violent ways among the communities of Nuer and Anuak – and in which education and jobs were often the points at issue – the two political parties managed to come to an agreement on power sharing. Eleven positions in the executive council of the regional government were divided evenly between the Nuer and the Anuak (five each), with one 223

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position reserved for the third largest indigenous group, the Majangir. It was also agreed that the position of president of the region should be always held by an Anuak, representing the oldest population in the region. Competition between the two parties has been described as destructive, which in combination with widespread incompetence in modern governance led to dissatisfaction among all sectors of the population. It was felt that politicians were only fighting for their own positions, were corrupt and were inciting conflict rather than contributing to constructive solutions. The fact that the head of the GPDM, the first Anuak president of Gambella – Agwa Alemu – was killed by his own people, only highlights the degree of tumult that dominated regional politics at the time. As the local police were often felt to be part of the problem – at least not being immune to ethnic or, in the case of the Nuer, ethnic sectionbased loyalties – the EPRDF reacted by interfering in the party structure. In 1998, the formation of the Gambella People’s Democratic Front (GPDF) was engineered by the centre, in order to reduce what was perceived as ‘negative competition’ (Gew 2005: 7). The GPDF was a party merger that drew its leadership from the former GPLM and GPDUP equally. The party was under the direct guidance of the centre (EPRDF), which resulted in an increasing number of arrests because of alleged corruption, the accusations being taking advantage of government positions with regard to arrangements for construction work (which was greatly needed, given the underdevelopment of Gambella). In late 1999, the Anuak launched a new attempt at a more independent party, the Gambella People’s Democratic Congress (GPDC). This (mainly Anuak) party opposed the unified structures of the GPDF, but did not survive the political intimidation and arrests connected with the 2000 elections (Pausewang/Aalen 2002; Gew 2005). When the GPDC seemed poised to make a strong showing in the elections, the regional authorities imprisoned many of its leaders, thus crippling the party, which ceased to exist in 2001, a year that also marked the end of the GPDF. Discussions over the position of the Vice-president of the region – ‘traditionally’ a Nuer position – triggered other areas of conflict and eventually led to the collapse of the party. In 2002 an umbrella party was formed, the Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM), consisting of the Nuer Democratic Party (NDP) and also accommodating Opo, the Anuak Democratic Party (ADP), which integrated Komo, and the Majangir Democratic Party (MDP). The structure was meant to allow Nuer politicians to handle Nuer problems and administration, Anuak politicians Anuak affairs, and Majangir those of their communities. The formation of the party seemed strongly connected, however, with the Itang incidents in 2002. At the time politicians of the party were perceived not only as failing to control their own communities, but as stirring up hatred, or manipulating ethnic animosity, for political advantage. In the aftermath of the Itang conflict in July 2002, the party was briefly dissolved (author’s interview, 2 January 2007), but revitalised 224

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Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella later in the year. It seems that these party structures served their purpose well. Local logic even introduced a specific system of checks and balances. A Nuer is the head of the combined party, but the head of the government is an Anuak. You know, the assumption is that all the proposals have to be developed by the party. At the party meeting Goaner (the head of the party) has to share, has to summarise the discussions and lead the people towards conclusions. He is very powerful in that regard. So he will then forward the proposal discussed by the party to the head of the government, to Omot. Omot Obang as head of the government then is the one to sign. (…) The basic assumption is, that the fact that a Nuer is the head of the party counterbalances the power of the Anuak as head of the executive; a division of power. (author’s interview with a Nuer elder, 2 January 2007)

This local power deal did not last long. The purely historical part of this review ends with 26 November 2007, when the different parties and the umbrella party were abolished and a new uniform party formed, the Gambella People’s Unity Democratic Movement (GPUDM, name translated by the informant). The declared aim was to improve relations with the EPRDF, the power-centre of the country2 and to gain better and direct access to resources. The previous party elite had applied to become a fully-fledged member of the central party, but had received indications that this would not be possible, as long as the party in the regional state was dispersed in different sub-units. This led to the new formation, strictly following the model of the centre. Now the president of the region is also head of the new GPUDM, ‘like Meles in Ethiopia’, as my informant proudly beamed. R E L AT I O N S W I T H T H E P O L I T I C A L C E N T R E

Knowing that the EPRDF as such is a centralist organisation, deriving from the TPLF as the source and origin of its foundation (see Vaughan 2004: 21), it is not surprising to find a similar party structure within the People’s Unity Democratic Movement of Gambella. Moreover, local submission in combination with the vacuum created by incompetence might have been factors in eventually implementing a centralised order. The TPLF and ANDM (former EPDM) were originally and for the most part of their existence Marxist guerrilla movements, not political parties. They were organised and trained to fight for state power in the bush, not to compete for it in a democratic arena.

2

Up to the present the sole member parties of the Front (EPRDF) are the TPLF, the ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement), the OPDO (Oromo People’s Democratic Movement), and the Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Coalition, SEPDC. Other regional and ‘national’ parties (in the sense of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples) are affiliated, as the GPUDM still is. Its programme, though, is based on that of the EPRDF. An application for full membership is pending (author’s interviews 6/11/2006, 2/1/2007 and 29/4/2007).

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Their structure and conditioning have not altered greatly since 1991 and they have a bearing on the political behaviour of the EPRDF. Democratic centralism is the principle to which both movements adhered. Its purpose is to prevent factionalism and ensure discipline. Needless to say, it is not conducive to pluralism. (Markakis 2001: 51) Whilst the EPRDF’s internal structure can still be called MarxistLeninist in theory and practice, at the local level there is not much sense for, or awareness of, any programmatic objective. Everything seems to be about being represented as an ethnic group or section, which presumably is connected with certain interests that are often not explicitly verbalised. Nevertheless, the new party GPUDM follows Marxist forms and vocabulary. Regular meetings (called congresses) are due to take place once a year. The central committee consists of 60 elected members, who in turn elect the members of the politburo. The politburo manages the day-to-day activities of the party, and is personally identical with the cabinet of the regional government. An exmember of the Nuer party described the relationship between the regional party and the EPRDF as follows: The party in Addis decides something and calls the president of Gambella. He will then assign a politburo meeting, which will come up with the right decision, which will then be proposed to cabinet and endorsed there (…). We are talking about the same group of people here and there. (author’s interview, 2 January 2007)

The EPRDF’s preferred method of indirect, but effective, rule is through evaluation sessions, called Gim-gima, a process that goes back to the days of fighting. This applies to all party members and higher officials. These evaluation meetings are feared and are widely attended and given publicity in the official media. The effects went up to dismissals and arrests of local party leaders in some cases in the past. Whenever there is something to be done in Gambella – be it evaluation, or what or what – it will be at the party level and they will send party cadres from Addis Ababa to do the job. ‘Federal’ just ask the people, identify the problem, and then tell the party what is wrong, to send people, that something has to be done. For instance: last time there was a comprehensive evaluation of each and every individual, Gim-gima. First they evaluate individual party members – Gim-gima is at the party level – they use people as observers. After the recent Gim-gima in March 2007, serious warnings were issued and stricter guidance from Addis was envisioned. (author’s interview with an Anuak elder, 29 April 2007)

In popular knowledge, the local party structures serve as a market for attractive jobs in the government. Candidates for the elections are appointed and have to be approved by the central party/government in 226

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Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella Addis Ababa. The quality of the appointees is often the subject of discussion. Main concerns are based on the candidates’ lack of qualifications, as the ethnic and section-based background is seemingly more important than specific skills (a shortcoming that is usually only recognised when it occurs in the respective ‘other’ group). ROLE OF POLI TI CAL PARTI ES I N C O M M U N IT Y LIFE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Given the exclusiveness of participation in the parties (to local elites) and the centralised character (directed from Addis Ababa) of the party structures, it came as a surprise when several interviewees – non-party members – assumed that the local party structures played a crucial role in facilitating reconciliation meetings between families and sections of ethnic groups concerned in some current conflicts. When looking more deeply into the subject, I was informed better. Asked about the role of the party in a specific incident, a party member responded: The party – not directly. You know, in the last elections there was an agreement that elders have to be included in the election process. (…) Moreover, the government decided to form a council of elders in Gambella. So from the Anuak side two elders, from the Nuer, two elders, and two from the Majangir. They have been given an office within the regional council. (…) So, whenever there is a problem, the government will send these people together with others, as appropriate in each case. (….) I do not know how they are selected, but for instance the head of the elders’ council is a very prominent and crucial figure in Itang: an Anuak. That guy knows a lot about the Nuer and Anuak problem. He has always given good advice as to how to deal with problems. Itang is a very problematic area, with a history of conflicts. This man is always used when it comes to negotiations among the Nuer and Anuak in that part of the region. (author’s interview, 29 April 2007)

What at first glance seemed as if the members of the party, in acute cases, stepped into the role of the traditional councils of elders, in order to find ways towards a solution (mostly in the form of compensation, see Sommer 2007: 48), was somewhat misleading. Modern structures of a political party are influenced by traditional ethnic section lines, but do not necessarily revitalise the traditional council of elders in a new shape. The different versions of how the role of the party is seen in the community are mentioned here, because it reveals some interesting aspects. First, there is an assumption – or an expectation – that the party could also play a role in the community, a role which would be much appreciated. Secondly, there is a recognised need to link traditional forms of governance with formal forms that are, rather, perceived as imported structures. The inclusion of elders in the regional government – as elected members of parliament and also as a council of elders at the 227

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administrative level may illustrate this need and be seen as a first attempt to respond to this demand.3 Yet, they never enjoyed any prioritised attention within the political make-up of the region.

Conclusions and outlook In the context of this book, the question remains; how does the case of Gambella in Ethiopia help to inform our ability to conceptualise and generate theories about federalism in Africa? As a case study of a single regional state, it can do no more than suggest propositions that comparative research in other African settings may test and redefine. Some of the most significant findings include the following: •

The promise of decentralisation has definitely created new expectations at the local level and strengthened indigenous self-esteem. The subsequent contest for access and influence, however – to land, education, positions, and power – has been fought at all levels, with all available tools. The development of the parties in Gambella shows, by many parallel struggles ‘out-of-parliament’, that the competition is fierce. The new structures of the constitution have not been able to channel the competition into nonviolent forms only.

•

In times of crisis, the old wisdom of the times of struggle re-entered via the party lines – centralised ‘order and command’ structures were easier to control, and decisions faster to implement. Therefore the Gambella party structure had the chance to become an outpost of the EPRDF de facto – and will soon be fully absorbed in the one country’s party model.

•

The experience in Gambella shows that federalism in the sense of power sharing and distribution will only become effective when the actors are strong and competent at all levels. Unfortunately this cannot be said in the case of the Gambella regional state; historical and other disadvantages lay a heavy burden on local performance. The central strategy of implementing party discipline will function as long as there is no competent and intelligent alternative being jointly developed and pursued by the different groups in Gambella for the benefit of the public good.

•

In practical terms, the federal structure can be called a misnomer: when comparing the mode of governance in Gambella with the basic decisions in the regional constitution, it can be stated without hesitation that we are talking about two different realities. The crucial question of subsidiarity for instance – crucial in all cooperations between states, whether within a federal state or in a union, like the European Union

3

When Gambella suffered serious budget cuts in the aftermath of the elections of 2005 (Abbink 2006: 173), the council of elders was one of the first institutions to be dismantled (author’s field notes, 2008).

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Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella or the African Union – is solved theoretically in favour of the regional state. Under the Ethiopian constitution, the regional states are meant to be autonomous. The reality turns this relationship upside down: all the local actors felt that they were extremely dependent on decisions from the centre, even though they might differ on the degree of dependence. •

The centralised party structure – reinforced again by the recent changes – clearly contradicts the provisions of the national constitution, as much as the constitution of Gambella. The right to selfdetermination is bypassed by the party structure that promotes de facto upward accountability through the practice of Gim-gima and the need to follow the five-year plans of the central government.

•

Ambiguity, or openness to political solutions in the constitutional framework, tends to favour federal dominance. Neither the regional state nor the community of Gambella has been able to capitalise on the main natural resources, such as exploiting the potential for industrialised farming or the crude oil reserves. Exploiting the natural resources of Gambella leads to the necessity of discussing the benefits which the region can draw from the central state: the regional constitution grants royalties to the regional coffers – which will have to be negotiated, of course. The whole issue of royalties, however, is connected with a sense of fear. So far, no one in the region seems to assume that the regional government might have the negotiating power to cope with the federal level. In this unclear situation, the different ethnic groups try to position themselves, which creates tensions – tensions that may also arise in new conflicts – among the people of Gambella and their different interests and with the federal government.

•

Last but not least, the system of ethnic federalism has defined new minorities in the regional state that, in the case of Gambella, make up a considerable part of the population. This sows new seeds for successive conflicts, where neither the regional nor the national constitution offers adequate structures that will allow minorities to verbalise their concerns.

The outcome of this brief analysis is ambivalent. On the one hand, local elites are benefiting from the (new) federal structures, which may give rise to the hope that they will be prepared to use constitutional and nonviolent forms of conflict resolution in the future. Compared with previous systems – the imperial order and later the military system of the Derg – indigenous elites benefit from the current federal system. Federalism has brought some chances of participation, which has never been the case before. On the other hand, the new structures have not necessarily contributed to more transparency, but rather implemented different layers of (conflicting) governance structures, thus introducing new fields of potentially violent conflicts. What is more, real power sharing between the central government and the region has not yet taken place, while expectations have arisen at the same time. As a result, the situation remains 229

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unclear and untransparent, which may provoke conflict and break up or challenge the status quo at any time. All in all, it contributes to instability in Gambella, in Ethiopia, and in the sensitive border region at large. Finally returning to the opening question – can we talk about a façade democracy in the case of Gambella, defined as a form of governance that hides the real and authoritarian power structures behind meaningless formal institutions supposed to give some legitimacy? Some criteria apply, without any doubt. The ‘self-determination’ of nationalities and people, as proclaimed in the constitutions, is not free from central guidance. The foundation of independent and free political parties is obviously difficult, if not to say impossible. But yet – do people in Gambella need a multi-party system that would lead to further division? Given the history of marginalisation and deep ethnic division in Gambella, the question is still open: what kind of political decision-making process might be best in order to promote meaningful participation? The fact that the provisions of the constitution are not followed may be seen as an indication that the system needs to be reframed. It might need an alternative approach – an approach that does not simply copy Western models, but relies on the old qualities of consensus-building strategies, inbuilt in most African traditions (see Assefa 1993: 29). Assefa suggests in this context that governance should evolve as a process of negotiating interests, a long-term process, in which individuals and different groups can freely participate. Could ethnic federalism then become a role model to meet the different needs of different groups and interests? Seen from the experience of the GPNRS, the answer would be – better not. It has created new self-esteem among the different groups who reside in the region, but has not yet set up an efficient structure to consult peacefully on access to land, resources, and power. It has created new local minorities, a fact which in turn has the strong potential to create new frictions. The Ethiopian case does not provide a prepacked solution for others, and shows that there is nothing resembling a onesize-fits-all formula. But the Ethiopian experiences might still serve as a starting point for debates and decisions in other parts of the continent. The aim of federations that come from a unitary and authoritarian background – to divert sovereignty while maintaining unity – is especially relevant in southern Sudan. Analysing the Ethiopian experience may therefore help in developing a tailored model of federalism for a future Sudan.

References Abbink, Jon (2006) Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and Its Aftermath, in: African Affairs, Vol. 105, No. 419: 173–99. Asnake, Kefale (2002) Federalism, Some Trends of Ethnic Conflicts and their Management in Ethiopia. Unpublished paper. Assefa, Fiseha (2006) Multiculturalism and Federalism, in: The African Economist, in: http://www.ak-sophiabooks.org/ae40_4.htm, accessed on 27/05/2008. Assefa, Hizkias (1993) Peace and Reconciliation as a Paradigm. Nairobi: Acis.

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Ethiopian Federalism Seen from the Regional State of Gambella Clapham, Christopher (2002) Controlling Space in Ethiopia, in: James, Wendy/Donham, Donald L./Kurimoto, Eisei/Triulzi, Alessandro (eds) Remapping Ethiopia. Oxford: James Currey. CSA – Central Statistical Agency (2008) Summary and Statistical Report of the Population and Housing Census. Addis Ababa: CSA/Population Census Commission. Gew, Chuol (2004) Complex Conflict in Gambella – in the Aftermath of the 2002/2003 Events. Unpublished Working Paper. ICG – International Crisis Group (2009) Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents. Africa Report No. 153. Brussels/Nairobi (September), in: www.crisisgroup.org/library/ documents/africa/, accessed 09/2009. ICSS (2005) Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. Juba: GOSS. James, Wendy (1980) From Aboriginal to Frontier Society in western Ethiopia, in: Donham, D.L./James, Wendy (eds) Working Papers on Society and History in Imperial Ethiopia: The Southern Periphery from the 1880s to 1974. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keller, Edmond J. (2002) Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia, in: African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No.1: 21–50. Kinfe, Abraham (2001) Ethiopia from Empire to Federation. London: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development. Lijphart, Arend (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in ThirtySix Countries. New Haven, CT/ London: Yale University Press. Markakis, John (2001) Ethnicity in Conflict Resolution, Political Mobilisation, and State Structuring in Ethiopia. Unpublished Report for Novib/InterAfrica Group. Markakis, John (2003) Ethnic Conflict in Pre-Federal Ethiopia. Paper presented at 1st National Conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, Addis Ababa, May 5–7. Meckelburg, Alexander (2008) Some Preliminary Considerations on Collective Violence, Identity and Conflict and their Coherence: The Case of Gambella, Western Ethiopia, in: Bruchhaus, Eva-Maria/Sommer, Monika M. (eds) Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approaches to Make Sense of Conflict. Münster/Berlin: Lit-Verlag. Merera, Gudina (2003) Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy, 1960–2000. Maastricht: Shaker Publishing. Pausewang, Siegfried/Aalen, Lovise (2002) Ethiopia 2001: Local Elections in the Southern Region. Nordem Report (March), Oslo, in: www.humanrights.uio.no, accessed in 09/2009. Reh, Mechthild (2003) Anuak Language, in: Uhlig, Siegbert (ed.) Encyclopaedia Ethiopica, Vol 1 A–C. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Sommer, Monika M. (2005) Transforming Conflict in the Multi-ethnic State of Gambella in Ethiopia: Mediation in a Divided Society. Unpublished Master Thesis. Sion: Institut Universitaire Kurt Bösch. Sommer, Monika M. (2007) Traditional Instruments of Conflict Resolution and Mediation among the People of Gambella, Ethiopia, in: Smidt, Wolbert G.C./Kinfe, Abraham (eds), Discussing Conflict in Ethiopia, Conflict Management and Resolution. Münster: Lit-Verlag. Stepan, Alfred (1999) Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model, in: Journal of Democracy, No. 10: 19–34. Tetzlaff, Rainer/Jakobeit, Cord (2005) Das nachkoloniale Afrika. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Tsegaye, Regassa (2004) State Constitutions in Federal Ethiopia. A Preliminary Observation. Paper for the Bellagio Conference, March 22–27. Turton, David (2006) Introduction, in: Turton, D. (ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: James Currey. Vaughan, Sarah (2004) Ethiopia: A Situation Analysis and Trend Assessment. A Writenet Report (January), commissioned by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Protection Information Section, in: http:www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/406d299c4.pdf, accessed 12/05/2010. Young, John (1999) Along Ethiopia’s Western Frontier: Gambella and Benishangul in Transition, in: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2: 321–46.

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13 From CPA to DPA ‘Ripe for Resolution’, or Ripe for Dissolution?

P E T E R WO O DWA R D

Peace, with the signing of the CPA in January 2005 after so many years of conflict in southern Sudan, seemed cruelly displaced by conflict in Darfur and the apparent failure of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in April 2006. But it also raised the questions this chapter seeks to address. Why was the CPA possible? What connection, if any, has there been between the CPA and the DPA? Why has the DPA not taken hold? And what are the implications of the two processes for each other?

Why was the CPA possible? When the CPA was signed in 2005, Sudan had had over 30 years of civil war in the south, one peace agreement, Addis Ababa in 1972, that had collapsed, and numerous failed peace talks. Yet with all this failure (in actual fact partly because of it), a somewhat surprised world applauded the agreement. As so often, any attempt at explanation must embrace the national, regional and broader international context that made the conflict in the South ‘ripe for resolution’, a phrase SPLM/A leader John Garang used himself after the signing (Deng/Zartman 1991). At the national level it was broadly accepted that there was military deadlock. The Islamist regime (hereafter the NCP) which had seized power through a coup d’état in June 1989 had sought military victory in the early 1990s. A major factor behind the coup itself had been the need to check a possible deal between the then civilian government of Prime Minister Sadig el-Mahdi and the SPLM/A, which was expected to end the existing Islamic laws introduced in 1983 by the former military regime of Jaafar elNimeiri with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, the forebears of the NIF. With military support from first Iraq and then Iran the NIF mobilised not only the regular army but the new Islamist militias of the People’s 232

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From CPA to DPA: ‘Ripe for Resolution’, or Ripe for Dissolution? Defence Force (PDF), but in spite of all the effort and bloodshed jihad, as it was proclaimed, proved unsuccessful in the South. In the latter part of the decade it looked for a time as if the SPLA might gain the upper hand. The NIF was now internationally isolated, largely due to its sponsorship of international Islamist terrorism, while the SPLA had support from a number of neighbouring states, most notably Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda, with the encouragement of the United States (Woodward 2006). However, that offensive was also unsuccessful and instead there were continuing fluctuations in fortunes, but neither side appeared capable of victory and by the turn of the century this was increasingly accepted by both of them. Politically there was also something of a deadlock. The NCP had tried to make an alternative peace with (then) non-SPLM/A southerners through the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997, but that had failed. It had centred on Riek Machar, who had broken from the SPLM/A in 1991 to form his own movement, and following the 1997 agreement became national VicePresident. However, he soon discovered that the post was largely powerless and in frustration fled to re-join the SPLA. Instead of growing after 1997, the NCP power base was actually shrinking, especially after the break with the Islamists’ mentor, Hasan el-Turabi, in 1999 and his creation of the Popular Congress Party (PCP). Turabi had been the ideologue and eminence grise behind the NCP and the split significantly undermined its Islamic credentials, leaving it ever more a security-based regime. Sudanese politics had largely descended into consisting of a stalemate between two armed camps. In the circumstances the regime recognised that, having begun its period in power by preventing a peace with the SPLA, an agreement with it could strengthen the position of the NCP if properly exploited thereafter. As for the SPLA, it had also had internal problems, as well as being harassed by the NCP-backed Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), and it too could make political gains from an agreement, not only in the South, but also in marginalised areas of the North. Its then leader, John Garang, had always sought to embrace other marginalised and exploited peoples of Darfur and eastern Sudan in what he saw as a national programme to redress the political and economic domination of the Arabs of the riverine north of the country. Garang’s vision went under the banner of the ‘New Sudan’ (Garang 1987). In 1991 the SPLA sent a force into Darfur but it was easily crushed by government forces. It was also increasingly clear that conflict was ‘hurting’ both parties, especially with regard to Sudan’s newly developing oil resources. The NCP was pushing ahead with oil production, including the forced displacements of many local communities that were effectively exercises in ethnic cleansing. Yet there were restrictions on the oil development, especially of likely fields deeper in the South, and access to them would contribute to economic growth that could strengthen the regime. At the same time the SPLA was gaining no benefit at all when both it and its constituents were increasingly aware of the possibilities of wealth that lay beneath their feet. In contrast, peace could unlock not only oil, but Sudan’s other resources, notably water and land of which the South had both in plenty, and thus release considerable development potential. 233

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Regionally a number of Sudan’s neighbours, especially the leading members of the IGAD – Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda – supported the process. IGAD (originally IGADD-Drought and Development) had been formed in the 1980s after the famines of northern Ethiopia and western Sudan, but it had achieved little by way of development and after the end of the Cold War it moved to put its emphasis on ending the region’s conflicts. IGAD had been involved in successive attempts at peacemaking since 1994. The cross-border and regional implications of civil wars in the region were well known to all involved and would be eased by peace (Woodward 1996, 2002). In addition, Sudan’s oil held possible benefits for certain of its neighbours as well. Central to the CPA, and especially the Machakos Protocol that kicked the agreement off in 2002, was the Declaration of Principles (DOP) put forward by IGAD after the unsuccessful peace talks of 1994. The DOP had included the proposal that if the Islamist government would not accept a secular Sudan, the South would have the right to a referendum on secession. The SPLA had accepted the idea with alacrity, and the NCP had included that in the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997. In view of the past cross-border dimension of conflict, IGAD’s support for peace was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. A further vital factor was the attitude of the international community, especially the US. The Clinton Administration had hoped to see the NCP fall in the late 1990s, as its support of international terrorism was fully recognised in the light of attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, and the attack on the USS Cole off the Yemen coast. When that did not occur it began efforts for peace, but it was really under George W. Bush that involvement mounted. At first it came mainly from evangelical Christians who had long been involved in the South and were very influential in the Bush circle. They were supported by a number of human rights groups long concerned at the suffering in Sudan. But there was also impetus from 9/11. Sudan had sheltered Osama bin Laden and el-Qaeda from 1991 to 1996 and feared possible US action after 9/11. The NCP moved swiftly to make its intelligence available to the US for the ‘war on terror’, and the latter accepted involvement in the peace process, giving its support to IGAD and its leading member states, especially Kenya where successive rounds of negotiations took place. During the process the US worked with Britain and Norway, both long concerned with the conflict, in the ‘Troika’ that supported and sought to facilitate the protracted negotiations leading to the CPA. Equally important was the fact that there were no major dissenting voices in the international community. From 1999 there had been the possibility of a Libyan-Egyptian initiative for a broader peace process and with no mention of possible secession for the South. However, diplomacy, with regard to both countries, especially through US-Egyptian channels, checked the initiative and brought virtual unanimity of support for peace (Woodward 2006: 111–33). The CPA itself was the culmination of a series of agreements on specific matters which made it long and complex. 234

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From CPA to DPA: ‘Ripe for Resolution’, or Ripe for Dissolution?

A critical look at the CPA Yet at the same time that the CPA was being welcomed doubts were being raised in a number of quarters. One concern was that it was an imposed peace. Critics argued that from the Machakos Protocol at the start of the process right through to the signing of the CPA over two years later, too much of the input was coming from the international community and not enough from the NCP and the SPLM/A themselves, from the content of the agreement and protocols to the pressure exerted on the parties to sign. As such, it was suggested that there would be at least a lack of a sense of ownership by the parties which could lead to an unwillingness to implement the CPA in full, and at worst that there might be amongst at least some of those involved a sense of resentment at the process and outcome that might give rise to active resistance to it. The issue of ownership was soon exacerbated by the death of John Garang shortly after his appointment as national First Vice-President and President of the GOSS, since Garang had been seen as central to delivering SPLM/A support for the CPA. Following the appointment of his successor and former deputy, Salva Kiir, as well as the reduction in influence in the NCP of Mohammed Osman Taha, who had been Garang’s main counterpart in the negotiations, relations between the two parties deteriorated. The deterioration ranged from mutual allegations of failure to implement the CPA to a virtual stand-off in Abyei, where the NCP refused to accept the findings of the expert review as required by the CPA, so that the International Court of Arbitration was involved in 2009. A second concern centred on the exclusiveness of the agreement. Throughout it had been negotiated by only two parties, the NCP and the SPLM/A, both of which had numerous critics and probably represented only a minority of the population in northern and southern Sudan respectively. Essentially this was because they commanded the two major armed forces and recognised each other in a way they did not extend to others, while the international community saw other claimants to participation either as comparatively weak, and/or likely to complicate the negotiating process. Multi-party negotiations of the kind that took place in South Africa with the end of apartheid had been ruled out with the sidelining of the Libyan-Egyptian initiative. This was a blow for the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party in particular, which had been the two dominant parties in Sudan’s three previous periods of democratic government. In an effort to keep the outside parties informed of developments, visiting delegations were invited to observe the peace negotiations, but they had little if any impact on them. While the scale of support for the excluded parties was not known, they had long histories as major actors in the country’s politics and were thus likely to be concerned with where the exclusive process would leave them. The formal dominance of the NCP and SPLM/A in the interim period before elections was 235

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particularly worrying, since it could provide them with opportunities to use their access to state resources for eventual electoral support. There were also concerns about the terms of some of the protocols. One example concerned wealth sharing that seemed to centre on oil in particular. This was unsurprising since Sudan’s rapid emergence as an oil producer was already having a significant impact on the national economy and could obviously go a good deal further quite rapidly. Yet its impact had only a limited effect upon the vast bulk of the country’s population, particularly in the countryside and especially in marginalised areas of South, East and West. The concentration on oil was perceived as meeting the concerns and interests of elites, especially in and around the NCP and the SPLM/A, rather than the majority of the population. Water and land were both highly contentious (and related) issues that were not fully or directly addressed and there were fears that, when combined with the exclusiveness of the process, the pressing economic needs of the majority would be neglected, and/or that they would be further exploited and marginalised by the apparent concentration on oil. Another line of criticism lay in the long time span for developments envisaged by the CPA, with national elections three to four years away and the referendum on separation for the South not until 2011. This would mean a long period of time for the NCP and SPLM/A to shape events, and could range from consolidation of their respective positions within the processes, or even the time to de-rail the CPA with the intention of subverting the possibility of a wider sharing of power nationally and/or regionally.

Darfur While criticisms such as those above were around from the start of the process that led to the Machakos Protocol, the scale of the violence that flared in Darfur in late 2002 and early 2003 was not foreseen. The economic problems of the region were well known and had caught international attention twenty years earlier. They had not gone away, and political discontent had been rising as indicated in the appearance of The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan in 2000 which was believed to reflect the views of young radicalised Darfurians in particular (Flint/de Waal 2005; Prunier 2005, Daly 2007). Nevertheless, the scale of the conflict was a cause for surprise. There was also surprise at the ferocity of the NCP’s response, much of it through the agency of local armed militia known as the janjaweed. It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to consider the events in Darfur itself so much as the connections to the CPA and the comparative circumstances of the DPA of 2006. The most obvious connection with the whole peace process between the NCP and the SPLM/A was the exclusion of other marginalised areas. The SPLM/A’s call for a ‘New Sudan’ had embraced all marginalised areas in the country, and there had been links between the SPLM/A and the Darfur 236

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From CPA to DPA: ‘Ripe for Resolution’, or Ripe for Dissolution? rebels, yet the latter were not directly beneficiaries of the process and feared the consequences of exclusion (including some former NCP Darfurians who had split along with Turabi in 1999). Their conclusion appeared to be that the NCP was significantly weakened by the extensive concessions it had been forced to make to the SPLM/A, and that the way to advance their cause was to follow the SPLM/A’s example and take up arms. After initial concern that the situation in Darfur could damage the process towards the CPA then under way, and perhaps a lack of initial awareness of the scale of the violence in Darfur, the international community was slow to respond, and it was not until 2005 that efforts to achieve another negotiated peace, this time the DPA, began in earnest. But the question then was whether the Darfur situation was ‘ripe for resolution’ as that in the South had been. While the DPA document in itself was long, detailed and impressive (and connected to the CPA), the circumstances were far from propitious. For a start it was a comparatively recent document which did not have long roots in the relations between the parties, as had been the case with the CPA which had built on a history of negotiations dating from the DOP of 1994. In the course of that process the NCP and SPLM/A had become accustomed to many of the issues and also increasingly experienced as negotiators who took each other seriously. In contrast, it has been said that the talks in Abuja were by no means proper negotiations between the parties. Rather the parties behaved in a manner that suggested substantial mutual suspicion, bordering on contempt, and instead of those feelings being dissipated over the weeks and months of talks, they remained firmly in place. Nor did the sides regard each other as equal parties, with the NCP in particular not fully accepting the importance of the Darfur rebels, an imbalance that reinforced distrust and intransigence amongst both of them. Instead of working towards common ground, they generally did little more than reiterate established demands and exchange insults. Indeed, instead of negotiating with each other, they more often sought to negotiate with the mediators in the apparent expectation that the latter would then argue their case with the other side, saving them from the task of negotiating with each other. For their part, the mediators were said to have drafted texts and then presented them to the parties on a take-it-or-leave-it basis (Nathan 2006). The latter point was not helped by the splits among the rebels themselves. Initially seen as comprising two main factions, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the situation at Abuja became more complex. In addition to some disagreement between these two factions, the SLA itself was to split again apparently along personal and then ethnic lines. The DPA ‘rejectionists’ did then come together to form the National Redemption Front (NRF), but it has not made negotiations any more successful. Thus instead of having two comparatively united and cohesive parties negotiating directly, as had been the case with the NPC and the SPLM/A, the Darfur talks consisted largely of indirect talks in which one side, the Darfur rebels, was prone to factionalism. Their own divisions and 237

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consequent vulnerability were to make a number of them retreat into intransigence, while the Sudan government felt little need to respond to the kinds of demands for concessions being made to it. Eventually the international community turned to strong arm tactics. Senior figures in government in the US and UK in the persons of Robert Zoellick and Hillary Benn were brought in to add weight, but also, being busy people, to set a final deadline, after earlier deadlines had passed unsuccessfully. However, it was to have the opposite effect, for, faced with the new pressure and fearful of the consequences of signing, the DPA text presented to them was signed by only one faction of the SLA, that of Mini Minawi, while the other faction of the SLA led by Abdel Wahid, as well as the JEM, refused to sign until shortly before the national elections in 2010. Disagreement was not only noted amongst the Darfur factions. The CPA had led to the establishment of the GONU, in which the SPLM/A was second in government posts to the NCP. It became increasingly clear in the months after the DPA was presented that there were differences in approach between the NCP and the SPLM/A, and that many statements issued on behalf of the government were in fact NCP rather than GONU statements. Though relations between the Darfur rebels and the SPLM/A were not easy, it was clear that they might hope for more understanding from the latter quarter than from the NCP. The disagreements in Abuja were also reflected in the continuing violence in Darfur itself. The existence of comparative political and military stalemate had been part of the context for the CPA: both were missing in Darfur. Apart from the political differences mentioned, mainly among the Darfurians, there was the fact that violence was continuing on the ground which some at least believed was more important than the peace talks in Abuja, and that, following the rejection of the DPA by two of the factions, both they and the NCP intensified the conflict in the following months with neither side appearing to gain the upper hand. Instead the scale of the conflict and disintegration grew and within a year there were some 20 factions fighting in Darfur in a situation that resembled ‘warlordism’ as much as regional rebellion. Meanwhile the position of the international community was much more sharply divided at the regional and broader international levels. At the regional level Chad was a major problem. The links between the politics of Chad and Sudan, especially Darfur, are deep and complex. Nevertheless it is clear that the government of Idris Déby has been under intense pressure, including attempted armed attack from the east, and Déby himself blamed the NCP as well as his internal enemies for this situation. In the circumstances it is understandable that he has in turn linked himself to the continuing use of force by some of the Darfur factions. At the wider level of Africa, the African Union (AU) and the international supporters of the CPA naturally tried to bring about a settlement and pressurised all parties to sign the DPA, but it was at the wider level that their limitations were shown. The CPA was broadly supported by the international community 238

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From CPA to DPA: ‘Ripe for Resolution’, or Ripe for Dissolution? which applauded the work of both the parties and the ‘Triad’. It was not that there were actual opponents of the DPA in the wider international community, so much as disagreements about what to do in the event of its failure and the continuing fighting and especially civilian suffering in Darfur. Led by the US, there were increasing calls for UN action including the possibility of significant sanctions against Sudan. However, the NCP had developed other allies and they have taken a different view. China had become Sudan’s biggest trade partner and Russia also became a significant source of arms for the government, and both have made it clear in the Security Council that they were opposed to the use of sanctions. Thus the international unity that was a significant part of achieving the CPA has been missing from the search for peace in Darfur. Efforts at peace-making continued with Qatar becoming a leading centre by 2009.

Ripe for dissolution? The initial failure of the DPA, and the problems of negotiating a peace in Abuja when compared with the circumstances of the CPA, suggest that the former will be hard to achieve and implement. However, the disagreements over Darfur between the parties in the GONU have led to questions about not only the region itself, but also its wider impact on Sudanese politics. As far as possible dissolution is concerned, the question relates to the South and the East. In the South, which is beset by its own problems, Darfur will probably not have a significant direct effect. Much more challenging will be the impact of the Darfur situation on the GONU, including within the Presidency itself, where, in addition to the First Vice-President, Salva Kiir, the one faction leader from Darfur to sign the DPA, Mini Minawi, has also called for a UN force to replace the AU. Can the GONU survive such crucial differences or will it polarise with consequent encouragement of the separatists within the SPLA and the South more generally? In the East the NCP has had a recent success with the signing of an agreement – the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) – which bears some resemblance to both the CPA and the DPA, and it may be in a position to build on that to consolidate its position nationally (Young 2007). But the East has never been as likely to seek to secede as the South or the West, and because of its strategic position it is essential to the NCP’s survival that it does not do so. The failure of the DPA and the worsening of the situation on the ground also distracted attention amongst the international community from the implementation of the CPA. Indeed, critics argued that that was the intention of the NCP in continuing its part in the fighting after the failure of the talks. It became increasingly clear that there were areas of the CPA that the NCP was very reluctant to see implemented. Some argued that the most dangerous of these was the NCP rejection of the findings of the commission of experts into the North-South border area of Abyei. The rejection was an apparent breach of the CPA and indicated the NCP’s 239

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determination to retain a major oil-producing area. It also retained troops there in defiance of the CPA and as such this has been seen as a dangerous flash point that could lead to renewed clashes between the two parties to the agreement (Young 2007a). In a major clash in 2008 the town of Abyei was largely destroyed. At the very least the NCP is likely to further sour relations ahead of the 2011 referendum and thus contribute to the possible ‘peaceful’ dissolution of Sudan. However, instead of united international pressure in continuing support of the implementation of the CPA, attention turned to Darfur on which there was less agreement, at least in the immediate aftermath of the failed Abuja talks. Where does that leave Darfur and the DPA? At the very least it will be very difficult to stabilise, and much harder to achieve the regional acceptance of the DPA than was the CPA. At most it could contribute to a widening gap between the major parties to the CPA that encourages separatist sentiment in the South contributing to a situation that runs counter to the CPA, for though it permits a self-determination referendum for the South, both the parties are also pledged to the principle of giving their best efforts to working for the preservation of the overall unity of Sudan – the ‘one country, two systems’ approach. Talk of further dissolution in the East appears to have abated, but it is strategically potentially the most threatening situation for the survival of not just the NCP and any partners it may have in government, but even for the state itself. Sudan is a weak state in the hard grip of the NCP. But part of strengthening the state depends on weakening that grip and sharing power more broadly at both national and regional level. The CPA has shown what can be negotiated, but if further broadening cannot be achieved by negotiation, as the DPA suggests thus far, then there is a real prospect of escalating violence. And if that happens it may have wider repercussions, especially with regard to the South, perhaps bringing dissolution rather than resolution.

References Daly, Martin W. (2007) Darfur’s Sorrow. A History of Destruction and Genocide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deng, Francis Mading/Zartman, W. (1991) Conflict Resolution in Africa. Washington DC: the Brookings Institution. Flint, Julie/de Waal, Alex (2005) Darfur: A Short History of a Long War. London: Zed Books. Garang, John (1987) John Garang Speaks. London: KPI. Nathan, Laurie (2006) No Dialogue, No Commitment: The Perils of Deadline Diplomacy for Darfur. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, December. Prunier, Gerard (2005) Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide. London: Hurst. Woodward, Peter (1996, 2002) The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations. London: Tauris. Woodward, Peter (2006) US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate. Young, John (2007) The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Young, John (2007a) Emerging North-South Tensions and Prospects for a Return to War. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

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14 Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA E L K E G R AW E RT

Introduction The conclusion of the CPA is not only the merit of the two warring parties – the GOS and the SPLM/A – but also an outcome of the commitment of the IGAD, the special envoy of the Kenyan government, General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, and the IGAD Partners’ Forum which includes the governments of the United States, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy and the UN. This success has been overshadowed by the war in Darfur. Moreover, two years after signing the CPA, a speech by the southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir on the occasion of the anniversary of the CPA brought some fundamental shortcomings in its implementation to light, namely, the failure to clarify the border between southern and northern Sudan, to complete the disarmament of militias, and to create transparency about oil revenues. Has the peace process come to a standstill? Is the war in Darfur related to the peace in southern Sudan? How does the mixture of war and peace in Sudan affect the sub-region of North-East Africa? What are the challenges for the institutions that had been involved in creating the CPA? In order to answer these questions, conflict and peace in Sudan are investigated with a concept of ‘space’ (Bourdieu 1985; Löw 2001) that is linked with the ‘New Regionalism Approach’ (Grant/Söderbaum 2003). Instead of a state-centred perspective, the current developments will be studied with a focus on economic, social, cultural, and political spaces where micro-, meso- and sub-regional as well as global arenas of action are interlinked. The impact of war and peace in Sudan on the sub-region of North-East Africa is investigated with the extremely different examples of Chad and Kenya. Whereas relations between Sudan and Chad have been tense and have led to numerous violent incidents since the 1980s, those between Sudan and Kenya appear to be cooperative and economically 241

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beneficial. Besides relevant documents and secondary literature, this study is based on interviews with politicians from southern Sudan and Kenya who have been involved in the current peace process.1 After an outline of the analytical concept, the formation of political, military and economic spaces during the civil war and changes after the CPA are highlighted with a focus on the Sudanese-Ethiopian/Eritrean relationship. Then the main features of the Darfur conflict and its subregional interlinkages, in particular with Chad, are introduced. This is contrasted with the dynamics of the relationship between Sudan and Kenya. Thereafter the actual roles of sub-regional and international actors in monitoring implementation of the CPA in the sub-region are assessed. Concluding remarks point to the potential and challenges for sustainable peace in Sudan as part of the sub-region of North-East Africa.

Conceptual considerations in analysing conflict and peace with sub-regional dimensions The main argument of this study is that peace-building after a large-scale conflict with sub-regional dimensions like the one in Sudan requires the systematic inclusion of sub-regional and global actors in the process. Several external actors are involved in such conflicts as well as in the peace processes. They contribute significantly to the formation of sub-regional structures which emerge in the economic, social, cultural and political spheres in the aftermath of long-term conflict. A few scholars have started to develop analytical concepts to deal with structures extending beyond the state-centred unions for economic or political purposes which are usually the subject of regional studies. The New Regionalism Approach looks into interactions beyond national boundaries from a broader societal perspective and includes in the analysis cultural cross-border identities and sub-regional self-organisation of civil society groups for common concerns (Grant/Söderbaum 2003: 9; Mittelman 1999: 48). According to Grant/Söderbaum (2003: 6), subregional ‘arenas’ that reach across several states include or overlap with numerous meso- and micro-regions. These arenas are formed, for example, by spatial development initiatives, conservation areas or ‘peace parks and enclaves’. Moving beyond these examples, the availability of lucrative resources has to be considered as an important factor that triggers interrelated activities on the part of international economic actors, states, and social forces. The oil belt, for instance, which stretches from West Africa through Chad and Sudan to Gambella in Ethiopia, would also determine such a sub-regional arena. The resource factor significantly shapes economic and political action and interaction with local, national, sub-regional and global inter-linkages. 1

The author conducted these interviews in 2007 in Juba, Jonglei State and Nairobi, partly in collaboration with George Katete, to whom my gratitude is extended here.

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Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA For the purposes of this study, an extension of this concept of New Regionalism is useful. Instead of defining micro- and meso-regions, it is more suitable to apply a concept of ‘spaces’, derived from Bourdieu’s concept of ‘social space’ (Bourdieu 1985) and Löw’s ‘sociology of space’ (Löw 2001). Hence, in this study, a ‘space’ demarcates the territory, resources, institutions and arenas of action that are related to an issue that society perceives as an interconnected social phenomenon. Investigating spaces includes the analysis of actors and structures, the practices of institutions and the images they create, so that a symbolic dimension is added to actual performance. ‘Space’ is regarded as a dynamic unit of analysis, subject to social processes which re-configurate, extend or reduce spaces continuously at a pace that varies over time (Kaltmeier 2007: 454–5). A space in this sense can be formed by a civil society movement that deals with common concerns across state borders, or by multi-level actors within the framework of making use of a particular resource like oil, land, or a river. The annual or temporary movements of population groups, such as pastoralists with their livestock or seasonal labour migrants, can be considered as ‘spaces’ with their own characteristics, socio-economic patterns, and political dimensions that are only to a minor extent determined by state boundaries. Refugees, diasporas and their networks in the societies of the sub-regions create another ‘space’ with particular social, political, cultural, and economic interactions. Investors in resource exploitation together with the related state activities and socio-economic conflicts establish a further socio-economic ‘space’ with multi-level dimensions. But also states and their allies may form a particular ‘space’.

States and boundaries States have a crucial role in these ‘spaces’, since they try to control the structures and activities taking place within them. By using a concept of state as ‘field of power’ (Bourdieu 1985), the reality of post-colonial states in Africa can be captured adequately. A ‘field of power’ has the following characteristics: (It is) ‘marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organisation in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts’ (Migdal 2001: 15–6). By separating the ‘image’ of the state from its ‘practices’, this definition allows an unveiled look into the realities of state activities and an analysis of the morals and institutions guiding them. It also makes it possible to study the forces determining the contradictory behaviour of state components. ‘Components’ may be different administrative, judicial, law-enforcing, security, or legislative units in central or peripheral areas of the demarcated state territory; even single personalities may form a component in collaboration with local allies. Especially at the periphery of a given country, components of the state may encounter ‘pushes, pulls, blurring of 243

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boundaries and domination by others ... (in) numerous junctures between ... (the) state’s diffuse parts and other social organisations’ (Migdal 1994: 3) which may lead at least to inconsistent state action or even to ‘dispersed domination’ (ibid.: 9). Going beyond Migdal’s theory, the contradictory relations between state components and social forces may even culminate in violent conflict with mixed state and non-state actors. This approach explicitly includes the fact that it is not just the state which creates rules and maintains a monopoly on violence, but that there are continuous negotiations, interactions, and forms of resistance which societies exert in the face of de facto existing multiple systems of government. ‘Fields of power’ may interconnect state components of neighbouring countries towards a political space exceeding the boundaries of a single state. Although this study pleads for the use of sub-regional spaces as units of analysis, this does not mean that national boundaries do not have a significant meaning. The revenues from mineral resource exploitation, for example, are supposed to be redistributed within national boundaries. If the benefits are reaped by a small group of the state and/or society, other powerful social groups claiming a share of the wealth are likely to enter into violent conflict (Collier/Hoeffler 2001). In turn the state may invest revenues from mineral resources in armaments in order to defend control over the particular resource against other state components or social groups. A further issue related to states and national boundaries may arise if a valuable resource is transported through a neighbouring country to reach a port. The government may face difficulties in agreeing with the neighbouring country on the terms of dividing the revenues and sharing the costs of infrastructure, maintenance, compensation, and similar issues. Hence, the state remains an important political actor even if a sub-regional perspective is adopted.

Analysing ‘spaces’ in the African context In Africa, frequently the social cohesion between groups of actors is derived not from societal identities, but from community identities such as tribe, kinship, or other claims of common origin. Interactions covered by the subsequent analysis thus include activities for the livelihood security of communities, interactions with migrants and other community members in the diaspora, and networks for the self-protection of communities which extend beyond national boundaries. These interactions form one of various categories of space, while civil society groups are a further category of the formation of spaces. Further interactions are triggered by the contradictory interests of investors in the sub-regional resources, local land users, and state components. In addition, cross-border alliances of resistance groups or government-sponsored militias from the same tribal background are subject to analysis within this conceptual framework. Global actors play a crucial part in most of the sub-regional spaces, since 244

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Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA neo-liberal globalisation in the form of the extension of private economic activities by reducing the constraints and regulations imposed by states has influenced state-society relations. In most African countries, markets were liberalised within the framework of structural adjustment programmes under the regime of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank during the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, the post-colonial states, that often had their main economic basis in state-owned or parastatal companies, were considerably weakened and had to find new ways to continue. Many governments began a downright sell-out of the wealth available on their territories to foreign investors; cheap imported goods flooded the domestic consumer markets and ousted indigenous producers (Stiglitz 2002: 70–2). Since the 1990s, neo-liberal globalisation has taken on the features of a rat race between economic actors from the old industrialised countries and the newly industrialising Asian countries to gain control over Africa’s mineral resources (Patey 2007: 181–2). Resource-rich African states tend to split up into components which manage to secure a share of the income generated from exploiting mineral resources and other state components that remain excluded. The same process affects African societies, creating a tiny layer of beneficiaries and a majority which has to cope with economic hardship and human insecurity, largely neglected by their governments. The low degree of responsibility state authorities take for human security, and hence the challenge for large population groups to cope with risks on a private basis, have to be considered as an impact of neo-liberal globalisation. In the context of the new wave of resource exploitation in Africa, numerous human beings are being displaced from areas where mineral resources are being exploited, or from land that powerful groups claim for more lucrative purposes than cultivation or grazing. Physical violence by state-sponsored or private armed groups is spreading, often caused by ultimately economic interests. A further sub-regional space is created by the intervention of international aid and development organisations, which usually have their headquarters in the capitals of neighbouring countries adjacent to conflict areas. This contributes to sub-regional links in terms of commodity and labour markets related to the aid business and the development of physical and communications infrastructure to facilitate the activities of aid organisations (Riehl 2001: 6–8, Grawert 2007). Countries adjacent to conflict areas also host refugee camps, which are equipped by a conglomerate of United Nations and other humanitarian agencies in the border areas and tend to become settlements with intensive economic and social relations with the surrounding communities. Often this leads to conflict because of privileges granted to the refugees which are denied to the local inhabitants. In some cases refugee camps are also recruitment bases for various armed groups. This implies that refugee movements, camps, and settlements also have to be considered as a micro- or even meso-regional space of action and interaction in analysing the impact of war and the peace process on a sub-region like North-East Africa. 245

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From war to peace: Re-configuration of political-military spaces in the context of the CPA The factors shaping the political spaces in the sub-region around Sudan after the end of colonial rule were militant movements fighting for secession or autonomy and related political bases in exile, ambitious economic programmes involving international cooperation, and strategic interests of political and economic superpowers. During the civil war (1983–2005), both the GOS and the SPLM/A as well as its predecessor, the Anyanya (1963–72), had allies who supported their fight. The GOS cooperated with Libya and Egypt and permitted the Ethiopian resistance movements against the military rule of the Derg (1974–91) to have their offices in Khartoum. The GOS also supplied the Lord’s Resistance Army, which has been fighting the Ugandan government since the 1980s, with arms. This weakened the government under Museveni and allowed the SAF to attack the SPLA with the support of militias from Equatoria near the Ugandan border. The SPLM/A, on the other hand, had training grounds in Derg-ruled Ethiopia, offices in Kenya and Uganda and occupied an area across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that was controlled by a Congolese resistance army. Between 1983 and 1985, it also received support from Libya (see several issues of the Horn of Africa Bulletin and allAfrica.com 06/02/2008). The sub-regional repercussions of the CPA in Sudan cannot be understood without a historical review of relations between Sudan and Ethiopia/Eritrea. The combination of the wars in these two huge countries re-shaped not only political relations in the sub-region, but also had international dimensions through the formation of particular socioeconomic and political spaces. These spaces emerged due to alliances, livelihood networks, and population movements in the context of war. Understanding their dynamics is crucial for the creation of a sustainable peace after the CPA. Until 1991 and the fall of the Derg regime in Ethiopia, cross-border movements from Eritrea and northern Ethiopia to northern Sudan and from southern Sudan to southern Ethiopia were an important sub-regional pattern of the two parallel civil wars in Ethiopia (early 1960s–1991) and Sudan (1963–72, 1983–2005). Militant groups, refugees, and opposition politicians from Ethiopia and Eritrea gained their livelihoods in northern Sudanese towns, agricultural schemes, and camps, and although their living conditions and legal status were precarious, they were tolerated by the GOS and hence relatively secure. The space formed by the EthiopianEritrean insurgents in cooperation with the GOS also included offices of the liberation fighters in Khartoum and movements of convoys carrying medical and food supplies as well as arms across the Sudanese-Eritrean 246

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Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA border (author’s observations during a journey to the liberated areas in Tigray, northern Ethiopia, in 1985). Weapons from Syria and Iraq entered Eritrea through Sudan. The UNHCR and numerous Western aid agencies and NGOs cooperated on northern Sudanese territory with the civilian wings of the Ethiopian resistance movements (Woodward 2002: 123–4). Since the early 1970s, the GOS has intensified its economic and political relationships with the Arab states, which supported not only Sudan financially, but also the Eritrean resistance movement (ibid.: 119–20). Further considerable financial and ideological support for the Eritrean and Ethiopian resistance movements came from the large diaspora emerging from refugees who used Khartoum as a starting point and fled from there to European countries and North America. On the other hand, the Anyanya and later the SPLA built the basis for its armed struggle in training camps located across the border of southern Sudan in southern Ethiopia (see Sima in this book). With the support of the Ethiopian emperor and later the military government of the Derg, southern Sudanese fighters were trained and equipped with arms, during the first civil war from Israel through Uganda, then, under the Derg since 1983, from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Radio stations broadcast the propaganda of the SPLM/A and contributed to increasing the number of SPLA recruits. The movements of vehicles, weapons, and SPLA fighters across the border were not restricted by the Ethiopian authorities (Woodward 2002: 123). Since the mid-1980s, numerous southern Sudanese civilians have fled from the war. Ethnic ties across the border provided a hospitable environment for some of these refugees until 1991, but also caused severe clashes (see Sima in this volume). Until 1991, this space was also shaped by the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies, which fought the Cold War with proxies in Africa and the Middle East. Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, armed by the Soviet Union, stood against Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, supported by the US. The regime change in Ethiopia in 1991 brought a coalition of the former resistance movements to power. It was also a turning point with regard to sub-regional power relations. Since the GOS was on good terms with the new Ethiopian government, against which the SPLM/A had been fighting alongside the Derg, the latter had to remove its troops from the Ethiopian military base. The SPLA also lost its military support from Ethiopia, and its leaders, who had been operating from Addis Ababa, shifted to Kenya. Masses of southern Sudanese refugees also left Ethiopia, some returning to Sudan and many entering Kenya. Soon after, a severe internal split in the SPLM/A weakened the resistance movement. The GOS took advantage of this split to support the splinter factions against that led by John Garang (Gore et al. 2004: 221–2; Johannsen/Kastfelt 2001; Johnson 2003). As a consequence, the SPLA changed its war strategy. In order to build new bases and support, it gradually extended its activities to the marginalised regions in western Sudan, where it supported 247

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already existing resistance movements and forged new alliances with some of them. In this context, the predecessor of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) was founded in Darfur. Throughout the 1990s, the influx of arms into the neighbouring countries from the civil wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia increased dramatically. This in turn caused the escalation of local conflicts and increased the death toll, in particular in Kenya (see Brown 2003: 100). Why the Kenyan government still maintained balanced diplomatic relationships with both the GOS and the SPLM/A will be analysed later on in this paper. Although the regime of Omar el-Bashir, which seized power in Sudan in 1989, was ideologically far from the Ethiopian rulers, they officially maintained good working relations. At the same time, the Islamist faction under Hassan el-Turabi in the Sudanese government supported Islamist movements in Eritrea and amongst the Ethiopian majority population, the Oromo. This led to the breach of the relationship between Eritrea, which had become independent in 1993, and the GOS in 1994. During the Islamist rule in the 1990s, Sudan became increasingly internationally isolated, in particular in 1998 due to indirect involvement of the GOS in terrorist attacks in the sub-region. The border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2002 again changed the political space. In order to regain international recognition and assistance mainly from Saudi Arabia and the US, the GOS engaged in an ambiguous collaboration with the Saudi-backed government of Eritrea, on the one hand, and improved its relations with the US-friendly Ethiopian government, on the other (see Cliffe 2004: 160–2). The US government-driven ‘war on terrorism’ after September 11, 2001 had a significant impact on the sub-region. The GOS in particular was in danger of being put on the black list of the US government and took some measures to improve its image. In this context, it made some positive moves in the peace negotiations with the SPLM/A, which led to first ceasefire agreements in 2002 and 2004 and then the CPA in 2005 (see details in the Introduction). In terms of the concept of ‘political space’, the CPA laid the foundations for a process whereby the former adversaries, the GOS and the SPLM/A, merged in the GONU. The political controversies about appointments to key positions and power struggles between and within the parties, and between party factions, militias, and other forces contributed to the delays in setting up the required institutions. Underlying these delays has been the formation of different components of the state and government which pursue differing aims, partly along the dividing line between the NCP and SPLM, and partly between factions of different military, religious, and tribal origins within these two parties. The process towards the conclusion of the CPA contributed to escalating several long-entrenched conflicts between armed opposition groups and the SAF in the northern and eastern states and Darfur in the west of Sudan (see Grawert 2008; Woodward in this volume). These 248

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Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA conflicts again had sub-regional dimensions, since alliances were formed across borders to enhance the power of the respective militant groups. The Eritrean government tolerated the activities of opposition groups from eastern Sudan with ethnic affiliations on its territory, and, in turn, the Islamist faction of the NCP supported Eritrean Islamist groups. However, in 2006 the GONU became reconciled with the Eritrean government which mediated the Asmara peace agreement with the eastern Sudanese resistance movement (Accord 2008). Through this process, the role of Eritrea in the sub-region has been strengthened. The cooperation between Sudan and Eritrea (and the Islamic Shari’a Courts in Somalia) has created a counter-weight against the new hegemony of Ethiopia, which has been supported by the US and European countries within the framework of the ‘war on terrorism’. The SPLM has been increasingly torn between its role as a junior partner in the GONU and majority rule within the GOSS. At the national level, it was represented by an opportunistic foreign minister until 2007 who appeared to tolerate the foreign policies pursued by the NCP within the GONU. At the regional level, on the other hand, the party has become involved in sub-regional negotiations with all the neighbouring countries. The GOSS signed a political, economic, and cultural cooperation contract with Uganda (GOSS 2007) and subseqently similar contracts with Kenya, Ethiopia, and the DRC. The regional leaders of the SPLM have engaged intensively in peace negotiations with the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army, which had increasingly committed atrocities in southern Sudan after having lost support from the GOS after the CPA. The SPLM/A successfully managed to put a stop to these attacks in 2007, but peace negotiations have not yet come to conclusion (author’s interviews with SPLM ministers in 2008). Nevertheless, the recent activities of the GOSS point to the formation of a consolidated space with economic, social, political and cultural ties between southern Sudan and its neighbours.

Sub-regional economic spaces and their political dimensions after the CPA A geological oil belt runs through Sudan, partly along the border between North and South, partly transecting it, with important oil fields in the South. In Southern Kordofan there are oil fields in areas whose affiliation to northern or southern Sudan will be clarified according to the CPA by referenda in 2011. Other oil fields are expected to be located in Darfur, which is considered as part of northern Sudan. This oil belt extends to Chad in the west and to Ethiopia in the east. These geological conditions have attracted the attention of the main energy-consuming powers in the West and Far East. Chinese and Malaysian state-owned oil companies have the largest share in oil production in Sudan. In addition, mainly Indian, South African, French 249

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and Swedish companies participate in the exploration and production of Sudan’s oil. Due to sanctions by the US government, American companies have not been active in Sudan for about two decades. The US continues, however, to support the southern Sudanese military, and its aid agency, USAID, invests large amounts in development projects in southern Sudan. These can be interpreted as preparatory measures to secure access to oil concessions in the case of an independent southern Sudan (Henken 2008). These examples show that foreign governments and multinational corporations contribute to shaping the economic space in North-East Africa. The energy needs of newly industrialising countries add to renewed competition for concessions. The largest oil producer in Sudan is China which has invested more than US$6 billion in oil production and receives 40 per cent of Sudanese oil exports (McGregor 2008). Towards the end of 2007, the monthly oil revenues of Sudan amounted to almost US$450 million. The bulk stems from exports, less than one-third comes from crude oil processed at Sudanese refineries. In November 2007, the GONU received a share of these revenues amounting to US$287.88 million and the GOSS US$160.35 million. The oil-producing states, that is Unity State, Upper Nile State and Southern Kordofan State, received altogether more than US$7 million per month, whereas those without oil depend only on non-oil revenues. However, in 2009 oil revenues fell by almost 60 per cent, as a result of the global financial crisis (Sudan Tribune 2010). On top of oil revenues, the oil-producing states benefit from an improved road infrastructure built by the mostly Chinese and Malaysian companies for the transport of oil. Nevertheless, petrol is still imported from abroad and, hence, transport and energy costs are very high for consumers in southern Sudan. However, the increasing demand for energy has brought Sudan and Ethiopia closer together. In the beginning of 2008 the two governments agreed on fuel supplies from Sudan to Ethiopia and to connect Sudan to the Ethiopian electricity grid with financial assistance from the World Bank (Sudan Tribune 2009). Within Sudan, the main interest of the NCP faction in the GONU is to keep control over the oil sector, and this interest has led to particular delays in implementing the security rules of the CPA. Although the Sudanese armed forces had been withdrawn from most areas in southern Sudan by July 2007 according to the schedule provided in the CPA, around one-third of the SAF troops have remained along the South-North border and in particular in the Abyei area near the oil fields. The official explanation is that the SAF have to protect the country’s oil wealth, 80 per cent of which is concentrated near the North-South boundary. However, according to the CPA, this would have been the task of the JIUs. Since December 2007, militias pushed by the SAF have carried out several attacks, in particular against returning IDPs, who were on the move back to Unity and Bahr elGhazal States in southern Sudan, resulting in deaths and injuries (Human Rights Watch 2008). Severe tensions and clashes also continued in Abyei, culminating in a short war between the SAF and the SPLA in May 2008. 250

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Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA Foreign oil companies share an interest with central governments in clearing land for the desired economic exploitation. The interfaces of global competition for mineral resources and strategic interests with local and sub-regional resource conflicts make such areas hotbeds of violence. The Darfur-Chad conflict provides further insights into the ways the economic spaces overlap with political spaces formed by the local, regional, national, sub-regional and global actors after the CPA.

The Darfur conflict in its sub-regional context The Darfur conflict cannot be detached from its sub-regional context. Already in its origins the conflict was related to the war between Chad and Libya in the 1980s. The interference of external powers – the US, France, and the SPLA against Libya and its ally, Sudan under el-Mahdi – created the currently deepened division along racial lines in Darfur (Harir 1994: 145–9), where a conglomerate of internal causes of conflict had provided the ground for this splitting up of society. Divisive administrative policies weakened the local leadership, and the policies of subsequent central governments continuously marginalised the region in terms of infrastructure and development programmes (Grawert 1998: 34–5, 74–5). Biased government interventions such as the arming of pastoralists under el-Mahdi (1986-89) and the active support of the so-called Janjaweed militias under the current President el-Bashir increased ethnic and racial tensions. There are three reasons why the tensions turned into war at the time when the peace process between the GOS and SPLA was taking shape and an end of the civil war in the South was becoming likely: •

The fact that the peace agreement would include a referendum for an independent South put the GOS under pressure to consolidate rule in the northern part of the country which includes Darfur. Sudanese society was already highly militarised, and ethnicised resource conflicts were smouldering in Darfur. Hence militias could easily be formed and equipped and sent to ideologically loaded battles (Grawert 2008).

•

Economic interests complemented these political factors. The government has been appropriating fertile land for mechanised farming to the benefit of Arabised Muslim investors from central Sudan (Babiker and other texts in Ahmed/Manger 2006). In the light of the possible separation of southern Sudan after the referendum in 2011 stipulated by the CPA, the rising hope that oil sources could be found in Southern Darfur that would attract international investors has made this region an even more valuable asset for the NCP faction in the GONU. Apparently, the prospect of oil wealth has reinforced the government’s claim to national territory by force at the expense of putting efforts into building a loyal micro-regional constituency among the population of Darfur. 251

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•

From the perspective of the local elite in Darfur and parts of the Darfurian diaspora, the ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains (Southern Kordofan) in 2002 and the prospective peace in the South gave reason to believe that power and wealth sharing were exclusively for the benefit of the parties involved in the peace negotiations. Darfur and the eastern and northern regions of Sudan appeared to be doomed to further economic marginalisation and political under-representation. This perception contributed to the re-emergence and fresh creation of armed resistance groups in Darfur. Among the Darfurian groups, violence became the predominant means of expressing political demands for inclusion in power positions and wealth sharing, since the SPLA had achieved these privileges through extended armed struggle.

The sub-regional component of the current conflict in Darfur stems again, as in the earlier conflict, from political and economic developments in neighbouring Chad. Since 2003, the persevering ruler Déby has tried to consolidate his power through oil incomes and enhanced recognition of his regime by external powers. This materialised in particular in the World Bank-guided institutional framework for the national redistribution of oil incomes. A temporary pacification of the Chadian armed resistance groups through inclusive measures came to an immediate end as soon as Déby began to misappropriate the oil funds for arming his security guard. Armed groups proliferated again and partly joined forces with Darfurian resistance groups from the same tribal background (Grawert 2008; Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2006). After the DPA between the GONU and only one faction of the Darfurian armed groups – the SLA Minawi faction – in 2006 (see Woodward in this volume), armed splinter groups mushroomed in Darfur and began to fight not only against the militias, but also against each other, causing increased suffering of civilians in the region. The GONU and the Chadian government backed resistance groups fighting against the respective other government. Since these groups operate across the border, intrusions of the armed forces of each country into the neighbouring country have been occurring, leading to mutual accusations and the temporary cancellation of diplomatic relations. Attempts to renew an alliance between the two governments failed several times, since components of the respective governments supported resistance groups according to overriding ethnic loyalties or economic gains, in particular regarding fertile land. The civilian population was badly affected by severe human rights violations, rapes and mass executions. More than 2,300,000 people were displaced; more than 4 million people were affected by the fighting (UN-OCHA 2007). About 240,000 refugees from Darfur were hosted in Chadian refugee camps, alongside camps for around 170,000 Chadian IDPs (UN-OCHA 2008). The DPA apparently increased the hostilities and divisions amongst the fighting groups in Darfur. This weakened the movement for inclusion and 252

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Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA the right to power and development in Darfur and strengthened the uncompromising position of the Sudanese government. From similar experiences during the civil war with the SPLA, it can be concluded that splitting resistance – divide and rule – is a deliberate strategy of the NCP faction of the GONU (see also Deng 2004: 115). With this strategy the military option of dealing with conflicts gains priority over political solutions. This pertains not only to the GOS but also to the international powers involved in peace building in Darfur and Chad. Suggestions for solving this conflict centre around the deployment of UN troops with different options regarding their mandate. A robust mandate as preferred by the US and some European members of the UN Security Council has been rejected by China and Russia because of their economic cooperation with the GONU. As a compromise, a hybrid force consisting of UN blue helmets and troops from the African Union (AU) has gradually been established since early 2008. Inclusive sub-regional efforts at mediation have been initiated by the government of Libya and the GOSS, but without success. Libya is considered to be a party with hegemonic sub-regional interests and is therefore not respected as a neutral mediator. The GOSS has so far tried to support alliances between the Darfurian splinter groups, again with its own interest in building an alliance with the western Sudanese militant groups, be it for the coming elections in Sudan or for the case of escalating conflict with the majority faction of the GONU. In 2009, peace negotiations in Doha led to some convergence with the JEM, but a final agreement was still pending in early 2010. As regards the majority faction in the GONU, the policy of delaying implementation of the CPA apparently aims to consolidate a precarious status quo in which the NCP dominates government, while, at the same time, diverting concentration on the CPA to other issues. The strategy of the NCP to keep the focus on war (in Darfur) and not on peace (in southern Sudan) has thus far been successful. The escalation of political unrest and armed resistance in neighbouring Chad has contributed to diverting the interest of the media and hence, the international community. As a result, the international public has not been alert in monitoring the peace process and implementation of the CPA between 2005 and 2008 and has only belatedly realised that the CPA might be in danger of failing.

Repercussions of the Sudanese peace process in Kenya Following the regime change in Ethiopia in 1991, Nairobi became the main political centre of the SPLM/A abroad. The Kenyan capital also hosted the head offices of most of the humanitarian aid agencies operating in southern Sudan. The Kenyan President chaired IGAD throughout this period, and in 1989 Daniel Arap Moi assigned the mediation of peace in 253

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southern Sudan to General Lazaro Sumebeiywo as his special envoy. After the CPA, a Kenyan-Southern Sudanese Liaison Office (KESSULO) was established, reflecting the long-standing relationship of the Kenyan government with southern Sudanese politicians in exile. With regard to the SPLM/A, the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) represented southern Sudan in Kenya in order to facilitate and control the activities of the foreign aid agencies operating in southern Sudan. Meanwhile, the SSRRC has become the main coordinating body of the GOSS for humanitarian and development organisations in southern Sudan and is involved in particular in the repatriation of refugees and IDPs. It has liaison offices in most of the countries neighbouring southern Sudan and still runs its office in Nairobi. With these institutions, key personalities in leading positions have shaped a political and socio-economic space that connects the GOSS with the Kenyan government and allows international aid agencies easy access to the territory of southern Sudan without having to meet northern Sudanese bureaucratic requirements. Within this space, refugees are being repatriated from Kenya, trade is resumed, and Kenyan entrepreneurs engage in investment. The Kenyan government supports the re-building of state structures in southern Sudan, trains professionals, and facilitates the supply of goods, materials, and staff of aid agencies through flights operated by humanitarian organisations from a Kenyan base. However, the Kenyan-southern Sudanese socio-economic space also includes markets of violence. Since numerous groups in southern Sudan used to carry arms during the war, arms trading with neighbouring countries increased when disarmament programmes were conducted. As a result of the influx of arms from southern Sudan and Somalia, armed robbery in Kenya has mounted in the border areas as well as in Nairobi. Bilateral agreements on disarmament between the Kenyan government and the GOSS have not been concluded so far (SSRRC representative Peter Pur Nienkel, Nairobi 2007). This may signify failure. But, building on the argument of Brown (2003: 101) and in the light of ethnicised fighting in Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007 national elections, this ‘neglect’ is possibly a deliberate policy which allows political strongmen to mobilise well-equipped constituencies whenever they see fit for their own political aims. The return of Sudanese refugees and exiled politicians caused a decline of the local economies in the Kenyan Rift Valley and the housing market in Nairobi. On the other hand, the CPA opened a booming market for Kenyan constructors, investors and traders in southern Sudan. Access for business people is easy, since the customs and border regulations have remained the same favourable ‘SPLA tariffs’ as during the civil war and have not been harmonised with the GONU. Kenyan economic actors benefit from the high demand for infrastructure and services in the southern Sudanese towns, where skilled workers, teachers and nurses earn much higher wages than in Kenya. Bilateral government agreements form 254

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Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA a framework for the temporary employment of Kenyan professionals by the GOSS and the state ministries of education in southern Sudan. Entrepreneurs are making a profit from the rising rents and in particular from erecting tent camps which serve as temporary hotels in Juba and the capitals of the southern Sudanese states, and which are gradually being replaced by solid hotel structures. The estimated number of Kenyans working in southern Sudan was 30,000 in 2007 (author’s interview with Aloo, Nairobi 2007). Although southern Sudanese refugees returning from Kenya are better qualified than workers from other countries, they apparently are not competitive in this new market, which has quickly been occupied by Kenyans, Ugandans, and Ethiopians, who are content with comparatively low salaries. Returnees are either employed in all types of positions in the GOSS and state governments or remain without employment. From the Kenyan perspective, the successful implementation of the CPA may open the door to negotiating membership of Sudan – or, rather southern Sudan after potential independence – in the East African Community. This would ease access for Kenyan entrepreneurs and traders to the northern African and Arab markets. Hence, an extension of the economic space may be pushed forward from the Kenyan side. However, the pre-condition of full implementation of the CPA is not guaranteed.

Lack of commitment by external powers to the CPA With the speech of the southern Sudanese President Salva Kiir on January 9, 2007, the GOSS has made it officially known that the CPA is in danger. If the CPA is considered as a step towards sub-regional peace, the external powers that were official participants in the peace process will have to act – first of all IGAD, the IGAD Partners’ Forum, and the UN. Since the CPA was concluded with much engagement on the part of IGAD, this should be the institution responsible for monitoring the implementation of the CPA and the first to raise its voice against violations of the CPA or reluctant implementation. But a meeting of the IGAD ministers, with the CPA at the top of the agenda, scheduled for January 2007, was postponed. In April 2007, the IGAD council of foreign ministers called for an urgent summit of IGAD heads of state on CPA implementation, but only in March 2010 did IGAD officially declare its renewed commitment to the successful implementation of the CPA (Tekle 2010). There are two main reasons for the failure of IGAD to undertake any follow-up of the CPA. First, IGAD aims primarily at sub-regional development and hence does not have a strategy for peace and security. It was only in 2007 that it began work on a sub-regional architecture and, within this framework, sent Daniel Arap Moi, the former Kenyan President, as a special envoy to pursue CPA implementation (author’s interview with Ngessu, 255

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Nairobi 2007). However, apart from a repetition of the facts presented by Salva Kiir earlier on, nothing has come of Moi’s visit to the GONU and GOSS. This was expected, because the visit was scheduled for during the Kenyan election campaign, in which Moi sided with the incumbent president, Mwai Kibaki. Moreover, after his re-election, in a speech during the IGAD summit of February 2008, Kibaki drew a completely positive picture of the progress of the CPA implementation (IGAD 2008). This indicates that Kenya continues to maintain balanced relationships with northern and southern Sudan at a diplomatic level. Secondly, the GONU as a member of IGAD claims that the Darfur conflict is an internal issue that has no connection with the CPA (author’s interview with Aloo, 2007). There has been a suggestion by the SPLM leadership of dealing with Darfur in the same way as with the contested areas of the Nuba Mountains/Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. This would mean using the CPA as the basis on which other conflicts in Sudan may also be tackled in the future (author’s interview with Duku, Nairobi 2007). Since the opportunity to include the whole of Sudan in the CPA has been missed, this may, however, be possible only if the peace between northern and southern Sudan becomes stable after 2011. The international community seems to be leaving the task of monitoring the CPA to the blue helmet troops of the UNMIS and the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC). Both institutions have limited assignments which confine them to monitoring internal issues in the Sudanese polity and the military forces. The UNMIS has not fulfilled its task properly with regard to the security aspects of the CPA. Disarmament of militias and integration in the Sudanese armed forces, SPLA or the JIU, have not been successfully completed. The UNMIS has failed to anticipate violent events and assess their probability. Instead, it reports such incidents only afterwards (author’s interview with Sumbeiywo, 2007), as the incidents in Malakal and Abyei have also shown. Hence, spaces for untransparent and unmonitored activities of militias within the armed forces have grown. The removal of the SAF from southern Sudan has come to a standstill along the North-South boundary. This makes clarification of the border by the GONU on the basis of the recommendations of the boundary commission according to the CPA even more urgent. The AEC that had been set up by the UN has proved to be ineffective and thus another weak institution unable to back the implementation of the CPA in Sudan properly. A further obstacle to putting the implementation high on the international agenda was the role of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Sudan. Jan Pronk’s peceptiveness and subsequent public announcements contributed much to turning the attention of the international public to the Darfur conflict at the expense of the CPA issue. As a consequence, international pressure on the NCP was removed after it had signed the CPA. Instead of increasing the combined effort of the media, NGOs, UN agencies, the Sudan Council of Churches, and political 256

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Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA parties to alert public attention to the shortcomings in the implementation of the CPA, these organisations fell silent after the CPA was signed in 2005. Besides the diversion of international attention to the Darfur conflict in a way that isolated this humanitarian crisis and the human rights violations involved from the problems of CPA implementation, there may be a further reason for this lack of commitment. The previous analysis has already indicated that the interest of Asian and Western states and multinational companies in oil exploitation and related businesses can be seen as a major constraint on determined action with regard to the CPA. The fact that the commercially oriented Islamist faction of the NCP is well connected to international trading structures with Arab-Islamic countries and Asia adds to this worrying prospect with regard to international interest in the implementation of the CPA. After failure of the CPA, a renewal of civil war would incur tremendous costs. Experts warn that such a war will be worse than the previous wars, because this time the SPLM/A will be present in the whole country. This will lead to endless negotiations and humanitarian disasters affecting all parts of Sudan and put the neighbouring countries in an unbearable situation. The governments of these countries fear Sudan as the only theocratic state in the sub-region. Sudanese elite factions are considered to be mobilisers of Islamist groups in Eritrea and the Shari’a Court militias in Somalia and also supporters of armed opponents of neighbouring governments, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda (author’s interview with Aloo, 2007). Hence, it is in the interest of these countries to have in their neighbourhood a peaceful Sudanese society with a government that concentrates on the internal development of the country. Another threatening scenario of the failure of the CPA is a total state collapse with subsequent fighting of many armed groups against each other, predominantly amongst southerners. Arms trade with the neighbouring countries will flourish and destabilise the whole sub-region (author’s interview with Aloo, 2007).

Conclusion The peace process in Sudan has not come to a standstill, but, after some initial progress, it has slowed down considerably. The demand to create a regional government of southern Sudan with substantial political rights vis-à-vis the national government has been met. However, severe tensions have remained along the North-South border in Southern Kordofan and Abyei, Unity and Bahr al-Ghazal States. Hence, the complete fulfilment of power sharing according to the CPA depends on an agreement on the course of the boundary between northern and southern Sudan. This has been obstructed by the NCP which is apparently trying to force the SPLM to accept a boundary which leaves part of the oil fields in the North. This aspect affects the wealth sharing agreement, the basis of which is 257

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a clear definition of the oil income derived in the South. The precondition is again to clarify which areas of the oil belt belong to the South and, hence, the course of the boundary. The massing of soldiers and the continuing use of militias along the North-South border indicates the threat of a new war. The analysis of political, military, and economic spaces has revealed that the shortcomings in the implementation of the CPA have far more complex dimensions than indicating a power struggle between southern and northern Sudanese elites. Sub-regional political competition for hegemony between secular, Islamic and Islamist elites, in particular located in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, has been enhanced by the USdriven ‘war on terrorism’. This has created a gap between elites all over North-East Africa and led to the formation of new political-military and economic spaces. As the analysis of the Darfur-Chad conflict reveals, interests in gaining a crucial share of political power and influence are linked to control over the key resources of oil, land, and water the value of which has increased greatly due to global competition. This indicates that the partial success of the CPA has an opposite side: within Sudan, militant movements proliferate due to the insight that violence gives their demands a stronger voice than peaceful means of expression. This in turn triggers renewed violence at the sub-regional level, due to the formation of crossborder alliances and enhanced arms trade. The sub-regional political environment, in which institutions for the peaceful negotiation of societal interest have been highly constrained by the governments in power, facilitates the use of violence. Whereas the Chadian government has involved itself in conflict and even temporarily declared war on the GONU, the Kenyan-Sudanese relationship created a very different political space. The Kenyan government concentrated on initiatives towards peace negotiations and exerted a tolerant policy towards the Sudanese diaspora. This allowed political activities which laid the foundation forming the GOSS. However, intensified economic relations, labour migration and investment prosper side by side with an illegal arms trade and enhanced violence in Kenya. Under the conditions of the current setbacks and threats to the timely implementation of the CPA in Sudan, avoiding its failure is a challenge primarily for IGAD, the Partners’ Forum, and the UN. Pressure on the factions of the GONU which are causing the delay in following the results submitted by the North-South boundary commission needs to become a major responsibility of IGAD and at least some members of the Partners’ Forum. Close monitoring of the fulfilment of the security regulations in the CPA and enhanced intervention in dissolving militias in the oil belt and relocating SAF and SPLA are tasks of UNMIS which have to be undertaken more determinedly in order to stick to the CPA and avoid further clashes. Building on the experience of the relationship between Kenya and the SPLM/A and later the GOSS, investment in development of the conflict258

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Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA ridden sub-region as a whole might bring a solution that promises lasting peace. Funding the development in particular in the border areas around Sudan can be based on both oil revenues and development funds and making use of the cross-border economic spaces created by the livelihood networks of ethnic groups living in neighbouring countries. Activities of international agencies and bilateral donors should be coordinated in a transparent way by sub-regional institutions, eventually IGAD in cooperation with a platform for sub-regional civil society organisations. A great challenge for societies in north-east Africa will be to put pressure on their governments to limit and regulate the oil consortia which are competing recklessly at the expense of the local population, appropriating land and destroying the environment with the assistance of authoritarian regimes. Regulations from the sustainable use of land and environment and the obligation of foreign investors to train and employ local labour in the oil belt of north-east Africa are urgently required and need the full commitment of IGAD as a development authority together with international partners.

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Challenges of Sub-regional Peace after the CPA Tekle, Tesfa Alem (2010) IGAD Renews Commitment to Support Sudan Peace – Meles (11 March), in: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34380, accessed 11/03/2010. UNMIS (United Nations Mission to Sudan) (2008) Monitoring the CPA, in: http://www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/cpaMonitor_jan08.pdf. UN-OCHA (United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) (2007) in: http://ochaonline2.un.org/sudan. UN-OCHA (2008) Current Emergencies: Chad, in: http://ochaonline.un.org. UN Security Council (2005) Resolution 1590, in: Global Policy Forum, in: http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2005/pkgres1590.htm. Woodward, Peter (2002) The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations. London: Tauris.

Interview Partners Agaw, Abdou, Secretary General of the GOSS, Juba, Interviews in March and October 2007. Aloo, Charles, Director of KESSULO (Kenya-Southern Sudan Liaison Office), Nairobi, Interviews in February and August 2007. Alor, Deng, Minister of Cabinet Affairs of the GOSS, Addis Ababa, Interview in August 2007. Duku, John Andruga, SPLM representative in Kenya at the Liaison Office of the GOSS/Ministry of Regional Cooperation, Nairobi, Interviews in February and August 2007. Ngessu, Director of the Horn of Africa Department of the Kenyan Foreign Ministry, Nairobi, Interviews in February and August 2007. Nienkel, Peter Pur, SRRC (Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Commission) Liaison Office, Nairobi, Interview in February 2007. Sumbeiywo, Lazaro, Special Envoy of the Kenyan President for conflict mediation in the IGAD framework, Interview in March 2007.

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Part IV

Beyond the CPA

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15 Theoretical Outcomes E L K E G R AW E RT

The research compiled in this book contains various challenging attempts to put the CPA and its repercussions in a theoretical perspective. Since wealth and power sharing is one of the formulas that are being applied in one way or another in different conflict-ridden societies, it seems worthwhile to elaborate in some depth the conceptual ideas that have emerged. According to the theoretical issues raised, this concluding chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses the potential of wealth and power sharing agreements to establish public institutions through which peaceful negotiations can become the main means of conflict resolution. It focuses on three key aspects of democratisation: extended political participation, fair representation of relevant social groups, and devolution of power. The second deals with the different social divides that have to be tackled by the CPA. The focus is on the construction of identities during and after the civil war. This section is an attempt to identify the factors which have led to new conflicts after the CPA, to assess the potential for further divides, and to consider approaches to bridge these divides. The last extracts theoretical concepts from the analysis of the sub-regional repercussions of the CPA. It deals with possible approaches to extend the CPA in order to make it more comprehensive. It also conceptualises state-society relations that transcend national borders and assesses the requirements for institutions that may have the capability to establish sub-regional peace.

Can institutionalised power and wealth sharing lead to sustainable peace? Theoretical considerations Several papers in this book touch on the theoretical concepts on which the CPA is based. One paper deals with the issue of institutionalised power sharing, reflecting on ethnic federalism in the case of Ethiopia. 265

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Concepts of power sharing are rooted in theories of democracy. This implies that institutionalised procedures which guarantee participation and representation are regarded as crucial to negotiating societal conflicts. ‘Power sharing’ is a concept derived from consociational democratic theory. In contrast to liberal democratic theory, which advocates absolute competition for power, the consociational approach builds on proportional representation of the most powerful groups, usually in the form of political parties, in the government. Instead of the majority principle, consensus and compromise are the principles in which political decisions are grounded (see Lijphart 1977). The common institutional pattern for realising consociational democracy is the formation of a grand coalition of the main political parties, while safeguarding minority rights. It hands the main power at the national level to political elites. In multi-ethnic countries, the particular needs and rights of minorities are often incorporated through a decentralised system of government (Biel, Chapter 2, Ahmed, Chapter 3, and Sommer, Chapter 12 in this volume). Differently from the pure delegation of administrative tasks from the central level to decentralised units, the type of decentralisation stipulated by the CPA is democratic and implies the devolution of power to locally elected governments. In theory this means that areas of decision-making and implementation, governing functions, resources, and funds are handed over from the central power to locally elected provision units, usually local governments (see Ostrom et al. 1993). A necessary condition for devolution is autonomous control over resources and funds. In a devolved system, officers and elected representatives are held to account for their performance in governing by the local electorate. The areas of autonomous governing of local units are clearly demarcated from those in central government. The relations among devolved units as well as between them and the central government should be cooperative (see Hadenius 2003). Advantages ascribed to devolution are an increase in direct popular participation, a focus on local affairs and concerns of the population due to the enhanced responsiveness of the government to local needs, more opportunities for checks and balances of office holders and politicians, and, thus, greater impediments to power concentration (see Mamdani 1996: 15–21, 298). A devolved system is expected to create an institutional framework for self-organisation and to induce democratic learning processes for citizens and administrators due to extended options for participation. This inclusive approach has also been termed ‘local governance’ (Abdel A’al, Appendix to Chapter 5). By stressing local solutions to concrete local and regional problems, it has been assumed that it can even prevent politicisation of ethnicity, which usually occurs when political elites engage in power struggles at national level (Weiland 1994: 24–6). Moreover, it has been regarded as a means to counter secessionist tendencies (Sommer, Chapter 12). On the other hand, a long list of problems and even dangers of devolution has been discussed in the literature on the subject: 266

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A serious threat to political stability is seen in the dispersion of political power, and this for two reasons. On the one hand, the power of certain state components in local or regional departments may be strengthened in a way that challenges the central state (Migdal 1994: 14–5). On the other hand, political leaders may dominate movements which aim at more autonomy or take on secessionist tendencies. Regional or ethnic identity politics may be enhanced with the consequence of deepening societal, cultural, or rural-urban divides (Turner/Hulme 1997: 158; Woodward, Chapter 13). Local elites may capture decentralised structures and use them for their own particularistic interests at the expense of mass participation, and particularly to the detriment of lower income groups (Turner/Hulme 1997: 158, 172). Clientelist structures can thus be strengthened and reproduce weaknesses in checks and balances. If the majority of the citizens lack opportunities for institutionalised control, rent-appropriating state classes may reproduce themselves or even expand at regional and local levels (Steinich 1997: 76). Devolution may be undermined by a merely technical type of decentralisation in the sense of deconcentration of administrative structures. This may occur in the form of quasi-non-governmental organisations (QUANGOs) that are set up mostly in order to attract or administer funds from abroad, or if official organisers create user group organisations. In contrast to locally rooted self-organised groups, such organisations will not have an established, locally appropriate incentive structure, nor will they be based on tried and tested organisational principles (Ostrom et al. 1993: 221). Another type of undermining devolution is the establishment of a party structure that appears to represent the interests of local groups or even previously marginalised ethnic groups, but is in fact controlled by a centralist national party (Sommer, Chapter 12). Yet another effect of devolution can be disappointment on the part of local inhabitants and their subsequent withdrawal from participation, because they reject the nature of the political activities they are expected to get involved in. Frequently this is caused by local elites which constrain, hamper, or instrumentalise the self-help initiatives of local citizens (Steinich 1997: 75; Heller 2001; Eltahir, Chapter 4). A general problem and a cause for widespread disenchantment with politics is the resource base of local government. One reason is that usually the bulk of resources is used for the payment of the staff and only a small share flows into the services which directly benefit the local population (Turner/Hulme 1997: 169). Levying local taxes is an ambiguous solution. Often taxes are collected haphazardly, because local politicians tend to be reluctant to enforce tax delivery. They do 267

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not want either to undermine their popularity among the population or to lose the support of the local elites (Manor 1999: 28; Damin, Chapter 7; and Sommer, Chapter 12). This theoretical overview suggests that devolution is inevitably a site for political struggle. Under the conditions of a society with deeply entrenched conflicts at the local level, it can be anticipated that local elites will try to instrumentalise decentralised structures for their own power interests. Therefore the central government is very likely to apply a top-down approach to decentralisation and to delay the process of devolution, in particular with regard to the autonomous administration of revenues based on local resources (Biel, Chapter 2; Ahmed, Chapter 3; and Sommer, Chapter 12). Centralised rule has been justified by post-colonial governments in Africa as a means of nation-building by which ethnic, social, religious, and cultural cleavages in society can be overcome. However, in most cases, including Sudan and Ethiopia, this has led to the consolidation of the rule of a particular elite and the marginalisation of large parts of society. The ruling elite in general has the control over the most lucrative resources of the country and uses these for its own interest and enrichment rather than to enhance the welfare of the society as a whole. This is a major cause of civil wars and social unrest in Africa. The case of Sudan shows that this pattern is not necessarily dissolved in periods of democratic rule, because this rule tends to remain ‘elitist’ and exclusive, and resource allocation remains very unequal (Biel, Chapter; Eltahir, Chapter 4). The demand for a democratic system implies the demand for extended political participation of the previously excluded groups. The civil war in Sudan has been ended by the CPA, which has led to the political inclusion of representatives of a previously excluded part of society in the South. However, the question remains open, which type and degree of citizen participation is required to create a functioning democratic system. This issue has been addressed by political culture theorists. According to the liberal democratic model, the purpose of political participation is largely to elect representative rulers and monitor their leadership. The basis for this is a political culture which is a mixture of parochial elements, elements of subject-orientation, and rational-activist behaviour (Almond/Verba 1963: 474–6). In other words, political activism should be there, but not too much of it. Democratic citizens should be obedient to the authorities and not question them extensively. They should also commit themselves to nonpolitical activities in their peer groups so that they stay away from too much political involvement. At the forefront of competitive politics are the elites, whom the groups that are included in the democratic system are assumed to follow in terms of rules and practices. This approach corresponds to rational choice theory, whereby the transition to democracy presupposes a new compromise of government between a liberal faction of the ruling bloc and moderate parts of the opposition. Such an alliance would exclude 268

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Theoretical Outcomes interference from both the hardliners of the ruling bloc and also radical opposition groups. The elites involved in the negotiations will make choices about the extent to which democratic substance and procedures are to be institutionalised, and about the degree of competition and convention to be applied in decision-making processes (Przeworski 1990: 195–7; Biel, Chapter 2; Eltahir, Chapter 4). In contrast, in radical democratic theory, participation is a means and an end at the same time. Participation becomes a self-enforcing power at the grassroots so that a high level of multiple popular political activities is maintained. Political culture concepts inferred from this theory include aspects of social action, readiness to act, and intensity of participation. The focus is not on system stability, but on processes of extending participation, sub-cultural and minority action, and the emergence of social movements (Reichel 1981: 47–58). Political culture is seen as dynamic, reflecting historical experience, political socialisation, and responses to regime performance. In non-democratic and transitional political systems, as is the case in Sudan, participation is not necessarily focused on the regime’s performance. It deals with it in indirect ways. Citizens may collectively create resources which satisfy their own needs and informally allocate scarce resources for collective benefits outside the realm of the state. This corresponds to a broader definition of political participation, which can be termed ‘the developmentalist concept of political participation’. It includes ‘behavior influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods’ (Seligson/Booth 1979: 6) and can even lead to the creation of new public goods through community action. Beyond peaceful activities directed to the satisfaction of collective needs, a further type of political participation is a ‘protest mode of political participation’ which includes engagement in resistance movements against the government or the political system as a whole (Eltahir, Chapter 4). Elements of popular political participation have been included in the CPA in terms of the planned referenda for self-determination and to a very limited extent in some of the commissions which include a minor representation of civil society organisations. Beyond this, there are no other institutionalised areas of popular participation. The CPA largely stipulates a representative democracy by the establishment of democratic political parties, competitive elections, and several key commissions which are composed of representatives of the NCP, the SPLM, and experts. However, not in the agreement, but in the practical implementation, with strong involvement of the UNDP and NGOs, aspects of deliberative democracy are encouraged by the greater involvement of civil society organisations in governance (Abdel A’al, Appendix to Chapter 5). Given the social structure in African countries, potential institutions of deliberative democracy would include tribal associations and CBOs, amongst others (see Grawert 2004: 6–13). In a deliberative mode of decision-making, participants from different social groups would listen to 269

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each others’ positions and generate consensual choices after due consideration. Persuasion by offering reasons that others can accept is the means which would lead to a decision about collective action. Public aims would be reached effectively, because this approach builds on the local knowledge of social groups about relevant situations close to the point of action. Viable solutions for complex problems are built on this local knowledge. This in turn is expected to enhance local societies’ commitment to implementing decisions, because they are not imposed from above (see Habermas 1979). A deliberative popular democracy thus has the potential to create a more equitable political system and the foundation for sustainable peace. The implementation of this participatory model of grassroots democracy could be an appropriate complementary approach to the democratic model and the peace-building approach stipulated by the CPA (Eltahir, Chapter 4 and Wassara, Chapter 5).

Can the CPA facilitate the bridging of multiple divides in society? The divides in Sudanese society, which have led to the civil war and numerous other conflicts, are to a great extent rooted in apparently irreconcilable antagonisms of identities. ‘Identity’ in general refers to socially ascribed and culturally specific characteristics. These can comprise ethnic, racial, religious, clan, gender, and other categories that people attach to themselves or to others. By these categories, individuals or groups exclude or include each other from belonging to a certain community. Identity has thus a socially constructed sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, which is understood, interpreted, and institutionalised by society. It influences the perceptions and understandings of relationships between people in the society as well as their thinking, attitudes and behaviour (John, Chapter 10). Power and wealth sharing touch on the issue of identity by allocating power and resources proportionately according to certain identities. In the power sharing agreement of the CPA, this issue occurs in those parts where representation of northerners and southerners is to be proportionately institutionalised in political office as well as in the civil service (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 2.2.5, 2.5.5, 2.6.2.1 and 2.6.2.2). The referenda for southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan State, Blue Nile State and the Abyei area are also cases where identity is the basic issue, which is to be put into a particular regional and political framework. In the wealth sharing agreement, the identity issue is indirectly tackled by the sections dealing with land reform (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7) and in particular by the protocols regarding the special areas of Abyei, Blue Nile State and Southern Kordofan State (GOS/SPLM/A 2004b,c). Several papers in this book deal with the issue of identity construction in Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya. They elaborate on some theoretical aspects which help to 270

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Theoretical Outcomes clarify how the process of constructing identities is related to socioeconomic claims, and how it may acquire a political dimension. One of the outstanding identity issues in Sudan is the differentiation between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’ (Deng 1973). ‘Arab’ in this context denotes that a person who claims to be ‘Arab’ has ancestors from the Arab countries, who had moved to Sudan mostly as traders and inter-married with Sudanese, starting from around the eighth century. In contemporary times, to be ‘Arab’ refers to being a Muslim, speaking Arabic as the mother tongue, and having adopted elements of the Arab culture. ‘Arab’ also refers to policies towards Islamisation and Arabisation pursued by the ruling elites in Sudan since independence. These policies contain a strong politicisation of identity accompanied by the stigmatisation and marginalisation of non-Arabs. These policies can thus be characterised as political manipulation or instrumentalisation of identities, a deliberate attempt to shape attitudes in order to enhance the power of the political leaders and to mobilise the populace behind their political objectives. The underlying agenda is usually a competition for access to resources (Armstrong 1982: 282; Biel, Chapter 2; John, Chapter 10). In Sudan the policies of Arabisation and Islamisation were intensified under the governments of Jaafar el-Nimeiri between 1983 and 1985, Sadig el-Mahdi between 1986 and 1988, and Omar el-Bashir since 1989. During the still continuing rule of el-Bashir, religion has moved from the margins of the political system into the heart of governance (Wassara, Chapter 5). On the one hand, forcible Islamisation and Arabisation of the southern Sudanese was a major reason which led to the armed resistance by the SPLA starting from 1983. This ‘policy’, which may more appropriately be termed ‘conquest’, went along with the interests of the ruling Arab-Muslim elite in increasing their control over key resources such as oil, land, and water (see Johnson 2003). On the other hand, Arabisation together with growing ethnic and religious intolerance created awareness amongst Muslims in the marginalised areas in western, northern, and eastern Sudan about their non-Arab identity, causing further resistance in violent political and cultural terms (Biel, Chapter 2; Eltahir, Chapter 4; Wassara, Chapter 5). Cultural forms of resistance include a new emphasis on indigenous traditions and customs in the marginalised regions of Sudan, especially after the return of IDPs from cities in northern Sudan where these traditions had been suppressed. Political resistance against Arabisation mainly occurs in terms of joining the SPLM/A (Damin, Chapter 7). Violent resistance against Arabisation has been an aspect of the spread of the civil war to the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile State and still is one aspect of the new wars in Darfur, in eastern and northern Sudan, besides resource-related reasons (Woodward, Chapter 13; Grawert, Chapter 14). The example of the war in the Nuba Mountains shows how the policy of segregation by the GOS in favour of the Arab groups played a part in forming a pronounced ethnic identity amongst the previously loosely connected Nuba, which even began to override the religious 271

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cohesion. The war in the Nuba Mountains deepened the ethnic divide between Nuba and Arabs, and the particular policies of the NCP and the SPLM/A after the CPA apparently sustain this divide (Wassara, Chapter 15; Komey, Chapter 6). Language policy is a particular instrument of politicised identity formation from the side of governments. In southern Sudan the British colonial rulers had introduced English as the language of instruction in most schools. Their aim was to create a distinct identity of the southerners from the Arabic-speaking northerners and to facilitate an orientation of the southern Sudanese towards neighbouring Kenya and Uganda. After independence, the northern Sudanese ruling elites tried to integrate the South by more or less forceful attempts towards the use of the Arabic language. This was part of a policy of re-orientating the southern Sudanese away from the neighbouring Anglophone countries towards the Arabic world. English as the language of instruction was re-introduced in Equatoria, the region bordering on Kenya and Uganda, after the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972. During the second civil war, Arabic was spread in all GOS-controlled areas and more forcibly introduced together with an Islam-inspired curriculum under the rule of Omar el-Bashir after 1989. Hence, Arabic has become the main language of communication between the ethnic groups in southern Sudan, it became the language of instruction in nearly all functioning schools, and the communication abilities in English have been reduced to elderly people and returning refugees from Anglophone countries (Lubajo, Chaper 8). This policy was in tune with the general closeness of the GOS with the Arab world regarding financial and economic cooperation and political relations. After the CPA, the regional GOSS introduced a new educational policy with English as the language of instruction, but also courses in the predominant local languages of each state in the first grades of primary school (Lubajo, Chapter 8). This indicates a government-planned cultural re-orientation away from the Arab influence towards the Anglophone world without neglecting the diverse ethnic identities on the ground. Implicitly this is a long-term policy to open up southern Sudanese society towards the Anglophone Western world, including the facilitation of economic investment and cooperation with the West and with the East African Community. It also paves the way for a more pronounced southern identity against the North and probably prepares the ground for the potential separation of southern Sudan after the referendum in 2011. Whilst Arabisation, Islamisation and, on the other hand, an Anglophone-oriented language policy and secularism are political, government-induced policies of identity formation, the construction of identities at the grassroots level follows a different rationale. It is closely related to regions and resources. Considered from a social science perspective, regions have a much broader meaning than just being geographical territories or administrative units. In the minds of the local 272

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Theoretical Outcomes inhabitants, regions are associated with social, ethnic, ideological, cultural, linguistic, economic and political contents. Hence, regions can be conceptualised as ‘social fields’ or ‘social spaces’ (Strauss 1978; Bourdieu 1985). These spaces are shaped by social interactions and dynamic ascriptions of contents that are adjusted according to historical developments as well as economic and political changes. Hence, behind the framework of political territories or ethnic regions are spatial constructs with deep ideological significance that may or may not correspond to political or formal constructs. These ideologies are forged in territorial struggles that produce particular regional arrangements and understandings, and these, in turn, shape ideas, practices, and the overall orientation of the group (Komey, Chapter 6; Grawert, Chapter 14). In this broad sense, regions become the basis of ethnic and community identities and, hence, a medium for social interaction that in turn creates regional characteristics (Murphy 1991). Collective identities thus emerge because of political and economic processes in the context of people’s own well defined, demarcated or loosely perceived territorial entities with resources from which they are making their living. In this context, land is considered as a rightful possession through generations, bound up with memory rooted in the homeland (Williams/Smith 1983: 509). Claims to land therefore tend to be articulated in terms of autochthonous rights, that is, a claim of collective rights on the basis of belonging to an indigenous group that is based in an ancestral homeland. Within this context resource allocation and distribution of political power have been contested throughout history (Komey, Chaper 6). After the CPA, the concept of region tends to be used increasingly as a political category, that is, as the background on which ethnic groups raise demands to the central government. Although these demands are basically political, they are presented in terms of rights in categories of ethnicity, culture, and religion, categories which emerge while being invoked. Ethnoregionally-based political organisations and movements proliferate and form the framework in which demands and claims on the state are expressed. However, region-based ethnic categories are difficult to reconcile with the requirements of the modern state, which are derived from the principle of citizenship (Komey, Chapter 6; John, Chapter 10). This corresponds to observations of others who have already stated that, in most of Africa, citizenship has the two dimensions of being civic and ethnic (Mamdani 2002: 502). Civic citizenship refers to individual civil and political rights, which are usually stipulated in the constitution and protected by international human rights law. Ethnic citizenship refers to group rights. These are social and economic and tend to be denoted as customary rights. They usually include the right to land and the right of access to customary courts (John, Chapter 10). This reality is not sufficiently reflected in the CPA. The life of refugees poses different challenges to the construction of 273

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identities. It can be considered as a third type of identity formation, which tries to reconcile the identity as refugee with the identity requirements in the assumed homeland. Refugees try to survive far from their homes and their cultural practices that used to keep them together and defined them. They are forced to shift their focus from making their daily living to survival-oriented activities. Even if they uphold some of their traditions, often this is done within an adverse environment that is in many ways open to abuse. In the case of refugees living in camps, their habitual practices are influenced by foreign cultures and the cultures of the neighbouring societies. In response, refugees tend to emphasise their ‘culture’ even more. Under these conditions, ‘culture’ may become the cause and consequence of forms of action that affect less powerful refugee groups in a humiliating and abusive way. In particular, young women and children tend to become victims of their communities’ attempt to maintain gender- and age-specific cultural habits under refugee conditions. Moreover, the pressure of this construction of culture leads to the belief amongst the powerless groups that the injustices they are facing are their fate. They will not consider any escape from this fate and therefore will not object to the mistreatment. This behaviour contributes to a ‘culture of silence’, in particular amongst girls and young refugee women, which may destroy the moral and cultural bases of the community (Ossome, Chapter 9). Childhood and youth are social and cultural constructions with specific rules that vary between societies (Boyden 1990). In camp situations, children are often left without role models that would guide their development. Their socialisation does not take place according to the values of their own culture, but along largely alienated lines. Children may face adults and eventually their parents being deprived of their authority and their roles as carers and breadwinners. These parental roles are undermined by the dependence of parents on a care system over which they have no control. Parents living in camps often undergo humiliating procedures such as queuing for food, or they have to cope with enforced idleness which contributes to the loss of self-esteem, particularly that of men. Under such conditions, violence of men against wives and children as well as substance abuse tend to increase (Harrell-Bond 2000). Children in refugee camps are very likely to grow up in a cultural vacuum or a reinterpretation of the previous culture that has been corrupted during the years of war and lawlessness (Ossome, Chapter 9). This background has to be taken into account when it comes to the reintegration of refugees into their homelands. Reintegration can be regarded as successful if the great majority of refugees have been repatriated or returned on their own from the host countries, have found employment or other means of income in their home areas or in their home country in general, have obtained access to social services, and are actively participating in social and cultural activities (John, Chapter 10). This presupposes citizenship, but it also includes elements of belonging, rooted in ethnic, gender, or other identities. Moreover, it must be based on the self274

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Theoretical Outcomes determination and informed decisions of the returnees and not on forced action by individuals, communities, organisations, or state authorities. Organisations and governments involved in the reintegration process as well as the communities in the homelands of refugees have to take into consideration that there is an important group of refugees who may not reintegrate. There are those who got access to a resettlement programme to Western states, where they may have integrated themselves with organised assistance into the economic, social and political life and enjoy access to social services and career opportunities. They usually maintain a close contact with their relatives, who are still outside Sudan as refugees, or with those who have returned. Some of them provide strong material assistance in terms of reconstructing communities including the social services sector and supplying consumption goods for their relatives. Some of these members of the diaspora will bring innovative ideas and behaviour to their homelands. Others will come back temporarily in order to marry according to the locally recognised cultural standards. However, the attempt to reconcile the identity as resettled Sudanese with the cultural ethnic male identity required in the homeland may lead to violations of the human rights of women in a previously unknown way (Damin, Chapter 7; Ossome, Chapter 9). These issues have to be considered and addressed by the reintegration efforts of the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) of the GONU, the SSRRC of the GOSS and in the states to which refugees return, and by the international aid agencies involved in the process. The research results collected in this volume reveal that, after the CPA, ethnic belonging has become more pronounced than ever before. Politicisation of ethnicity has shaped the frontlines in the civil war and is shaping the conflicts occurring after the CPA. It is likely to grow when the society approaches elections. In which ways these divided identities can be reconciled is one of the greatest challenges governments of segmentary societies have to face. The attempt by the GOS to Arabise and Islamise the whole of Sudanese society has failed. The attempt by the SPLM/A under John Garang to create a united, secular, and democratic ‘New Sudan’ looks more and more like a dream. A small step made by the GOSS is the language policy in southern Sudan, which is meant to create a more unified identity of southerners in the long run. Another attempt has been made by the Ethiopian government with the establishment of ethnic federalism, which officially aims to increase the self-determination of ethnic groups within a unified system of government. What can Sudanese policy-makers learn from the Ethiopian example? The case of Ethiopian federalism shows that institutionalised power and wealth sharing at the regional level is only one step towards real selfdetermination. Even if the constitution provides for control over resources and fair representation, its implementation is subject to the broader framework of power relations. Centralised dominant groups, mostly in the form of a powerful political party or coalition of parties, may directly interfere, using inappropriate means of suppression as has been the case in 275

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Gambella/Ethiopia (Sima, Chapter 11; Sommer, Chapter 12). Another possibility is that such powerful parties undermine self-determination indirectly through the equipment of certain local, often ethnic, groups with arms, turning them into militias that destabilise the development towards more local autonomy, as still occurs in Sudan. On the other hand, Ethiopia has realised more inclusive political participation, guaranteed through ethnic federalism and the establishment of a modernised council of elders that has roots in earlier tribal systems of conflict settlement (Sommer, Chapter 12). However, this is again only one step towards overcoming marginalisation and entrenched conflict along ethnic lines. Such a structure may create new minorities that demand inclusion, hence creating new conflict. If the council of elders does not use means of conflict transformation that tackle the resource-based root causes of ethnicised clashes, this institution will only achieve superficial conflict resolution. In fact, this has been the case in Gambella, where conflicts are largely settled through agreements on compensation (outcome of a workshop discussion with local stakeholders in Gambella in 2008). Hence, the conflicts are likely to break out again, if the competition over resources intensifies due to any external reasons that cause resource scarcity. These can be environmental reasons like droughts or floods, new power constellations which bring in new actors who compete for the existing resources or appropriate them in new ways, or developments in the subregion which change the ethnic balance in the region. A sustainable solution of these forms of conflict must be based on a long-term development policy which includes all levels of the government, private actors and even actors and government authorities of the neighbouring countries (Sima, Chapter 11; Grawert, Chaper 14). This policy has to be based on the effective and sustainable use of the existing resources in areas extending beyond national borders, and includes procedures for the regulation and fair allocation of gains from the future use of existing and new resources.

Can sub-regional peace be achieved after the CPA? Scholars of African development have identified different root causes of conflicts. These can be ethnic, religious, political, and economic cleavages in societies, but also the social and political relations that are reflected in state repression, lack of political participation, poor governance performance, and unequal distribution of wealth (De Waal 2000; Sima, Chaper 11). What has been largely neglected in the analysis of conflicts is the role of the sub-regional alliances and inter-relations across national borders in these conflicts. They tend to be assessed as spill-over effects, but according to the research compiled in this book, this has to be refuted. 276

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Theoretical Outcomes In order to conceptualise the sub-regional implications of conflict and also of a peace agreement like the CPA, the concept of ‘social spaces’ (Bourdieu 1985; Löw 2001) has been applied in this book (Komey, Chapter 6; Grawert, Chapter 14). It provides a suitable theoretical framework for the analysis of the dynamics of different interactions without confining this analysis to national territories. Within the concept of ‘spaces’, economic, social, cultural and political activities at micro-, meso-, sub-regional and global levels can be meaningfully interlinked, and sub-regional and global actors are systematically included in the analysis (Grant/Söderbaum 2003: 6). In this book the concept of ‘spaces’ has been linked with the ‘state-insociety’ approach (Migdal 1994) to analyse the interactions and, in particular, the emergence and escalation of conflicts, between the state and certain social forces (Grawert, Chapter 14). That the civil wars in the greater Horn of Africa have been subregional in character and have not affected neighbouring countries simply through ‘spill-over effects’ becomes clear if Ethiopian-Sudanese relations are reviewed with the above analytical concept. The Derg had supported the SPLA in the Sudanese civil war in retaliation for the support by the GOS of the Eritrean liberation movements and other anti-Derg forces. This support not only included the supply of arms, but the Derg also allowed the SPLA to set up military training and base facilities inside Ethiopia, thus creating a military space crossing national borders. The Derg even shared the administration in the bordering regions with the SPLA, which was responsible for security around the refugee camps in Gambella. This means that a political space emerged that crossed borders and included particular state components and social forces from two countries. This political space became even more complex due to the subsequent interactions and alliances. As the case study of Gambella reveals, there was an alliance between the local Derg-SPLA rule and political organisations of the Ethiopian Nuer. And there was an opposition led by political organisations of the Anuak that closely cooperated with other anti-Derg forces (Sima, Chapter 11; Sommer, Chapter 12). These anti-Derg forces had access to Sudan with the permission of the GOS, which shows again that the civil wars in the two countries had an inherently sub-regional character. The Eritrean, Tigrayan, and Oromo liberation fronts had offices in Khartoum and the GOS did not interfere when they entered Ethiopia with convoys of arms and medical and food supplies. The common interest between the Derg and the SPLA leader John Garang was the fight for a united country against any separatist movement. The interest of the GOS was to destabilise the Derg regime by all means. When this was successful and the EPRDF took over power in 1991, a mass exodus from Ethiopia of SPLA officers and their families, Sudanese refugees, Ethiopian Nuer government officials and their families was the consequence (Johnson 2003: 88). As has been elaborated in this book, the military and political spaces changed dramatically due to the combination of the fall of the Derg 277

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regime, the split in the SPLM/A, and the end of the Cold War. This affected even the regions, as has been shown with the power shifts and escalated conflicts in Gambella and Darfur. After September 11, 2001, the US-driven ‘war on terrorism’ has enhanced the sub-regional political competition for hegemony between secular, Islamic and Islamist elites. This has created a new gap between the elites all over North-East Africa and led to the formation of new political-military spaces (Sima, Chaper 11; Woodward, Chapter 13; Grawert, Chapter 14). This overview shows that retaliation, interest in destabilising a neighbouring government by undermining its power, and the strategic interests of the international powers are an inherent part of these conflicts. This may be interpreted as the instrumentalisation of internal conflicts for external interests. However, this kind of interference contributes significantly to the persistence and even the character of these conflicts, which have to be considered as sub-regional, not national. If the conflicts in the sub-region are fought at least in part as proxy conflicts, driven by external interests, can this be the same in the case of peace agreements? What are the implications of a sub-regional perspective with regard to the CPA? These questions will be discussed in four steps: (i) It will be argued that the CPA has not been ‘imposed’ by external interests. (ii) It will be clearly stated that the CPA has to be opened up for further negotiations on particular aspects such as the Abyei issue and the inclusion of representatives of other marginalised parts of the Sudanese society, in order to avoid more regional conflicts with subregional implications. (iii) The interests of the sub-region in the CPA will be critically assessed. (iv) The implications of a sub-regional approach of conflict resolution are presented in some practically oriented detail with regard to the case of the southern Sudanese-Ethiopian border area. Step 1: Early criticism of the peace process in Sudan which led to the CPA focused on the issue of an ‘imposed peace’. The critics held that the protocols and agreements of 2002–4 leading to the CPA were too little owned by the NCP and the SPLM/A and had been too much pushed by the representatives of the foreign governments participating in the negotiations. The critics expected a reluctant implementation process or even resistance to the document. The warnings were raised even more strongly after the death of John Garang in mid-2005. He had been the strongest supporter of the CPA on the part of the SPLM/A. The agreement now remained with leaders who were much less enthusiastic about its implementation after his death. In addition, the moderate NCP counterpart of John Garang, Mohamed Osman Taha, lost influence in his party which rapidly drifted towards a hardline position (Biel, Chapter 2; Woodward, Chapter 13). However, this does not 278

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Theoretical Outcomes necessarily confirm that the CPA was ‘imposed’. The shift towards hardline positions might have come anyway. There are several indications that the CPA is still the basis for both the former warring parties, to which they stick in general. The temporary withdrawal of the SPLM from the GONU at the end of 2007 in protest against failures to implement the CPA according to the agreed schedule led to a compromise including reshuffles in the government, which caused the SPLM leaders to resume office again. Tensions about the population census caused its delay, but finally it was conducted in order to catch up again with the implementation schedule of the CPA. On the other hand, the violation of the CPA with regard to the crucial issue of clarifying the status of Abyei has caused a localised new war between the SAF and the SPLA. This does not necessarily indicate that the CPA is being rejected, but it does suggest that there is urgent need to re-enter negotiations with external mediation in order to get this special issue back on the track of the CPA schedule. Step 2: There are further issues which may need immediate re-negotiation or, at least, re-confirmation of the CPA by the NCP and the SPLM/A. Many political organisations and armed resistance forces in Sudan regard the involvement of only the NCP and the SPLM/A in the peace negotiations as a deal between two elite groups. This deal favours a minority that is strongly backed by military forces and which does not even fully represent the society in northern and southern Sudan, let alone the West and the East. The international negotiators of the peace process had contributed to this exclusiveness, fearing that the participation of more social forces would complicate the process, prolong it and make it impossible to come to a compromise (Woodward, Chapter 13; Grawert, Chapter 14). From the perspective of the marginalised societies in Sudan such as those in Darfur and Southern Kordofan, there is a further important gap in the CPA. This is the focus of the wealth sharing agreement on the re-allocation of oil revenues, whereas the fair reallocation of the other Sudanese key resources of land and water is not stipulated with sufficient clarity. Land and water conflicts, however, affect a much greater part of the Sudanese population than oil-related conflicts (Wassara, Chapter 5; Komey, Chapter 6; Samira, Chapter 7; Woodward, Chapter 13). The analyses in this book show clearly that the war in Darfur is a reality that has come as a result of these shortcomings in the CPA (Eltahir, Chapter 4; Woodward, Chapter 13; Grawert, Chapter 14). The fierce response by the GOS in 2003 and since 2005 by the NCP in terms of immediately arming militias alongside the SAF has been in line with the strategy the GOS had applied throughout the civil war in the South. This strategy had made it possible for fighting forces to commit atrocities without being held responsible in terms of military rules or any other laws. At the same time, the GOS could claim its own neutrality and present the 279

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killings as incidents of criminality or ethnic clashes. The NCP has again applied this strategy against the Darfur uprising. This indicates that the NCP is not willing to extend power and wealth sharing to more political groups in Darfur beyond the faction with which it signed the DPA. Since the result has been another sub-regional war with deep involvement of social forces and the government of Chad, this should be the entry point for renewed sub-regional negotiations including the relevant actors from Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic, Libya and Egypt as well as the IGAD countries. Step 3: Mediation with a sub-regional focus including all stakeholders in recurrent negotiations is considered as crucial for sub-regional peace in North-East Africa. This process has to be institutionalised with a long-term perspective, so that there may be periods when intensive negotiations or renegotiations are required, and other periods when monitoring the implementation of agreements will be sufficient. However, successful mediation needs favourable conditions. It has been shown in this book that in the peace process leading to the CPA, the representatives of the NCP and the SPLM/A negotiated directly on an equal basis. On the other hand, when the DPA was negotiated in Abuja, the international mediators drafted statements and agreed to be instrumentalised by the warring parties as conveyors of their positions to the other side, thus enabling the warring parties to avoid direct personal talks with each other on an equal level. The final haste and pressure put on the parties to sign the DPA triggered more factionalisation and a partial agreement signed by only one faction out of the whole resistance movement. This kind of mediation thus contributed to the failure of the DPA (Woodward, Chapter 13). Moreover, during the DPA process it turned out that the GONU represented the NCP position rather than a combined position that included the SPLM/A. This increased the mistrust amongst the participants in the negotiations, and in the long run contributed to an internal crisis in the SPLM/A and the replacement of the SPLM/A foreign minister of the GONU. In addition, the failure of the DPA contributed to the wild escalation of the war in Darfur with more and more splinter groups getting involved, partly as politically inspired resistance groups and partly as warlords, who used the war situation for their and their followers’ personal enrichment (Woodward, Chapter 13). With the background of a sub-regional approach to explain these conflicts, this experience suggests the equal inclusion of all relevant actors, and not only the NCP and the Darfurian resistance movements. This inclusive approach would comprise representatives of the respective central and local or regional governments of the sub-region, the political organisations, the military formations, the leaders and other representatives of ethnic groups, and regional or sub-regional civil society organisations. As has been stated in this book, IGAD appears to be unable to take the lead in this process. As a governmental organisation, it tends to 280

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Theoretical Outcomes reflect rigid uncompromising positions and nationalist narrow-mindedness. Moreover, IGAD has become a victim of the global conflict between the US-driven ‘war on terrorism’ and its Islamist and moderate Muslim opponents. Under these conditions, IGAD has too little flexibility to deal with complex conflicts with a broader, sub-regional horizon. This means that the suggested sub-regional negotiation process has to be institutionalised from scratch. The following considerations start deliberately from a micro-level in order to develop first steps for the required institutional framework for continuous sub-regional negotiations with the aim of achieving sub-regional peace. Step 4: After the CPA, a particular conflict pattern has occurred with the political divide between the NCP and the SPLM/A. This has not only led to intra-ethnic fighting amongst the Nuba in Southern Kordofan State (Wassara, Chapter 5; Komey, Chapter 6; Samira, Chapter 7), but also amongst the Nuer in Upper Nile State, with repercussions in the Nuer community in the neighbouring Gambella region in Ethiopia. The NCP still supports some of these groups with arms, thus undermining the disarmament attempts of the SPLA and UNMIS in the region. In southern Sudan these tensions overlap with a tremendous need to acquire cattle for bride wealth and building up a new economic livelihood base after the war. In connection with cultures of manhood and beliefs about god-given rights of possession of cattle, this has led to a great surge in cattle rustling and even killings amongst the Nuer, Murle and Dinka in Sudan and including the Nuer and Anuak in Gambella (Sima, Chapter 11). The discovery of oil in the area has added a further dimension to this pattern of post-CPA conflicts. It includes displacements, special security requirements, the influx of expatriates and a contested involvement of government authorities from the Sudanese states, the GOSS and the GONU as well as the EPRDF and the Regional Government of Gambella on the Ethiopian side of the border. What does this imply for peace agreements in the sub-region? It suggests that all the involved parties will have to be included in sub-regional peace negotiations. As has been shown in the case of Gambella, an agreement between those tribes that are active in cattle raiding and those that are suffering from it, which arranges the payment of compensation, will not solve the conflict (Sommer, Chapter 12). The causes of the conflict are basically rooted in resource scarcity due to the combination of several factors. One of these combinations is the end of the civil war in Sudan and Nilotic marriage habits, which together lead to an increased need of cattle. A further factor adding to this pressure is the mass return of IDPs and refugees who need cattle for their livelihood and for marriage as well. In addition, there is the availability of arms after the war and the slow disarmament of militias. All this occurs within the framework of militarised societies on both sides of the Sudanese-Ethiopian border. This complex mixture of issues suggests that those who will have to participate in the solution of the resulting conflicts are the regional governments of 281

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Gambella/Ethiopia and Jonglei and Upper Nile States/Sudan, the respective armies and militia leaders (and in this case those who sponsor them, that is, the NCP from Khartoum), the regional states’ police forces, the leaders of the cattle-raiding groups and their victims, local institutions for conflict resolution such as the council of elders in Gambella, and equivalent delegates from Sudan. If oil production areas are located on the routes of the cattle herders, the investors will also have to be included in the conflict resolution effort. The task of such negotiations would be first of all to clarify the resource base, in this case the availability and accessibility of land and watering places, the use of and needs for these places in different seasons, the carrying capacity for cattle, and similar issues. Then the routes and places to be used by each group of cattle herders have to be agreed upon. After the CPA, it appears to be possible that this can include areas across national borders which can be used peacefully and limited to the required seasons, if this does not imply displacement of others. Agreements can be put in the form of clear rules, regulations or laws, punishments, and a clarification of the role of the law enforcers on both sides. Even common areas of control may be agreed (outcome of a local stakeholder workshop on ‘Changes after the CPA’ in Gambella in 2008). This example may look very special. It is meant to do so. Sub-regional peace needs exactly this kind of special steps and meetings to work, because a highly determining dimension of the sub-regional conflicts around Sudan consists of unsettled or superficially treated issues of this kind. The analysis of the political, military and economic spaces in NorthEast Africa has revealed that the shortcomings in the CPA itself and in its implementation have far more complex dimensions than indicating a power struggle between southern and northern Sudanese elites. Within Sudan, militant movements have proliferated due to the insight that violence would give their demands a stronger voice than peaceful means of expression. This in turn has triggered renewed violence at the sub-regional level, due to the formation of cross-border alliances and enhanced arms trade. Institutions for peaceful negotiation of societal interests have been highly constrained by the governments in power, at the national level as well as in the case of IGAD at the sub-regional level. This sub-regional political environment facilitates the use of violence. In order to overcome the perpetuation of this pattern, conflict transformation should start from social spaces with multi-dimensional conflicts across borders. There are already initiatives which should be strengthened and enriched by channelling development funds to these areas. Maybe in the long run, such local cross-border peace initiatives can link up and form a new approach to sub-regional peace in North-East Africa.

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References Almond, Gabriel A./Verba, Sidney (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Armstrong, J. A. (1982) Nations before Nationalism. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Bourdieu, Pierre (1985) The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups, in: Theory and Society, Vol. 14, No. 11: 723–44. Boyden, Jo (1990) Children and Policy Makers: A Comparative Perspective on the Globalization of Childhood, in: James, A./Prout, A. (eds) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood. London/Washington, DC: Falmer Press. Deng, Francis Mading (1973) Dynamics of Identification. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. GOS/SPLM/A (2004) Agreement on Wealth Sharing, January 7, Naivasha. GOS/SPLM/A (2004a) Protocol on Power Sharing, May 26, Naivasha. GOS/SPLM/A (2004b) Protocol on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict, May 26, Naivasha. GOS/SPLM/A (2004c) Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, May 26, Naivasha. Grant, J. Andrew/Söderbaum, Fredrik (2003) Introduction: The New Regionalism in Africa, in: Grant J. A./Söderbaum, F. (eds) The New Regionalism in Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.: 1–20. Grawert, Elke (2004) Civil Society Structures in Comparative Perspective: Special Focus on Eastern Africa, in: Africa in Context. Historical and Contemporary Interactions with the World. CD-Rom der Vereinigung der Afrikawissenschaften Deutschland VAD, also in: www.vad-ev.de/2004/download/01tagung/020papers2004/Panel_CivilSociety/ vad2004_Grawert.pdf. Habermas, Jürgen (1979) Communication and the Evolution of Society. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Hadenius, Axel (2003) Introduction, in: Hadenius, A. (ed.) Decentralisation and Democratic Governance. Experiences from India, Bolivia and South Africa. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/study/study2003_3.pdf. Harrell-Bond, Barbara (2000) Are Refugee Camps Good for Children? New Issues in Refugee Research. Working Paper No. 29. Cairo: American University. Heller, Patrick (2001) Moving the State: The Politics of Decentralization in Kerala, South Africa and Porto Alegre, in: Politics and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1. Johnson, Douglas H. (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey. Lijphart, Arend (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies. A comparative exploration. New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press. Löw, Martina (2001) Raumsoziologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Mamdani, Mahmood (1996) Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. Mamdani, Mahmood (2002) African States, Citizenship and War: A Case Study, in: International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3: 493–506. Manor, James (1999) The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. Washington DC: World Bank. Migdal, Joel S. (1994) The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles for Domination, in: Migdal, J.S./Kohli, Atul/Shue, Vivienne (eds) State Power and Social Forces. Domination and Transformation in the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 7–36. Murphy, Alexander B. (1991) Regions as Social Construct: The Gap between Theory and Practice, in: Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 15, No. 1: 22–35. Ostrom, Elinor/Schroeder, Larry/Wynne, Susan (1993) Institutional Incentives and

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E L K E GR AWE RT Sustainable Development. Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. Boulder, CO/San Francisco/Oxford: Westview Press. Przeworski, Adam (1990) Spiel mit Einsatz, in: Transit, No. 1: 190–213. Reichel, Peter (1981) Politische Kultur der Bundesrepublik. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Seligson, Mitchel A./Booth, John A. (1979) Political Participation in Latin America. New York: Holmes and Meier. Steinich, Markus (1997) Dezentralisierung und Entwicklung: Licht in die entwicklungspolitische Dunkelheit, in: Nord-Süd aktuell, Vol. 11, No. 1: 69–79. Strauss, Anselm (1978) A Social World Perspective, in: Studies in Symbolic Interaction, No. 1: 119–28. Turner, Mark/Hulme, David (1997) Governance, Administration & Development. Making the State Work. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. Waal, Alex de (2000) Who Fights? Who Cares? War and Humanitarian Action in Africa. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. Weiland, Heribert (1994) Der schwierige Weg zur Demokratie in Afrika: Voraussetzungen, Chancen und Rückschläge, in: Oberreuter, Heinrich/Weiland, H. (eds) Demokratie und Partizipation in Entwicklungsländern: Politische Hintergrundanalysen zur Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Paderborn: F, Schöning. Williams, C. H./Smith, A. D. (1993) The National Construction of Social Space, in: Progress in Human Geography, No. 7: 502–18.

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Index

alliance/ally 6, 11, 13, 19, 55, 84, 86, 92, 99, 119, 126, 164, 202, 223, 239, 243, 244, 246–249, 252, 253, 258, 268, 276, 277, 282 Anuak 19, 20, 143, 197–204, 206, 209, 210, 214–216, 218, 220, 221, 223–227, 277, 281 Arab 2, 13, 29–35, 39, 44, 47, 48, 54, 55, 85, 88, 92, 93, 100, 114, 117, 118, 120, 132, 133, 150, 166, 247, 255, 257, 271, 272; Arab-African/AfroArab 9, 18, 55, 177, 184; Arabic (language) 15, 18, 34, 35, 47, 122, 133, 143–145, 147–151, 153, 154, 156, 271, 272; Arabisation 2, 8, 14, 15, 25, 29, 30, 32–34, 45, 145, 147, 153, 251, 271, 272, 275; Arabs 4, 29, 32–34, 40, 44, 48, 84–87, 114, 117–120, 133, 148, 233, 251, 271, 272 arms 6, 8, 12, 19, 20, 23, 73, 99, 159, 164, 201, 202, 209, 210, 237, 239, 246–248, 254, 258, 276, 277, 281, 282 Asmara (Peace) Agreement 6, 9, 24, 33, 42, 43, 46–48, 63, 249 associations 12, 72, 97, 105, 106, 134, 142, 190, 204, 269 autonomy 2, 6, 23, 53, 73, 77, 91, 131, 144, 185, 198, 220, 221, 229, 246, 266–268, 276

access – to areas/markets/oil/arms 19, 88, 99, 233, 250, 254, 255, 277; to identity systems (belonging/ citizenship) 17, 177, 179, 181–184, 186, 187, 189–191; to land 13, 17, 177, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189–191; to livelihood resources 4, 11, 16, 17, 21, 95, 125, 154, 179–183, 186, 188, 190, 207, 208, 222, 230, 271, 275, 282; to power/ participation/leaders/courts 21, 42, 72, 106, 107, 189, 216, 222, 228, 230, 236, 273; to services/assistance/ knowledge 17, 20, 21, 89, 137, 173, 179, 183, 188, 228, 274, 275 Africa 5, 9, 18, 29–35, 37, 44, 47, 48, 55, 88, 132, 158, 164, 165, 176, 177, 180, 184, 189, 199, 212, 213, 228–230, 238, 243–245, 247, 268, 269, 271, 273, 276; African Union (AU, OAU) 22, 55, 190, 229, 238, 239, 253; East Africa 31, 34, 144, 147, 149, 159, 255, 272; North-East Africa 24, 241, 242, 245, 250, 258, 259, 277, 278, 280, 282; West Africa 18, 85, 86, 92, 94, 98, 114, 133, 242 agriculture/cultivation/farms 7, 11, 13, 14, 59, 64, 85–87, 95, 99, 104, 105, 113–116, 123, 125, 133–135, 137, 143, 163, 165, 197, 200, 202, 210, 215, 229, 245, 251 aid (agency) 11, 12, 16, 89, 105, 108, 109, 139, 147, 150, 162, 176, 178, 184, 192, 199, 205, 206, 245, 247, 250, 253, 254, 275

Bashir, Omar Hassan el- 1, 2, 15, 36, 39, 40, 48, 55, 56, 145, 148, 248, 251, 271, 272 belonging 4, 16, 17, 21, 32, 34, 36, 39,

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Index 225, 247, 266, 275 coexistence 84, 85, 96, 98, 121, 126, 133, 190, 201, 206 collective 16, 55, 57, 67, 68, 70, 72, 75–77, 110–112, 119, 126, 171, 179, 180, 220, 269, 270, 273 colonial 4, 6, 15, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 54, 64, 112, 114, 117, 119, 120, 134, 141, 143, 246, 272; post-colonial 9, 32, 64, 112, 113, 130, 243, 245, 268 communal/(local) community/CBO 10–18, 25, 34, 37, 5363, 64, 67, 68, 72, 75, 76, 84–89, 91–101, 104, 105, 109–113, 115, 116, 118–120, 122–124, 126, 127, 131, 133, 134, 136, 149–151, 154, 158–164, 166, 168–171, 269 concepts of research 14, 16, 24, 25, 52, 68, 69, 75, 84, 111–113, 131, 173, 178, 179, 185, 228, 241–244, 248, 265, 266, 269, 273, 276, 277 conclusions – from analysis 8, 9, 12–14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 24, 32, 52, 61, 72, 144, 153, 183, 188, 199, 213, 220, 221, 237, 242, 253, 256; of agreement 2, 6, 11, 15, 21, 48, 84, 89, 135, 207, 241, 248, 249, 254, 255 conflict – armed/violent 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 14, 19, 22, 23, 29, 33, 47, 55, 70, 84, 86, 87, 90, 93, 96, 97, 99, 122, 130, 133, 134, 147, 192, 198–203, 206, 210, 216, 217, 220, 224, 229, 232–234, 236, 238, 241, 242, 244, 245, 251–253, 256–258, 265, 270, 277, 278, 280; causes 1, 11, 13, 29, 31, 33, 52, 62, 79, 84, 93, 94, 98, 110, 125, 127, 144, 160, 189, 199, 217, 220, 237, 245, 247, 248, 251, 268, 276, 279, 281; new/after CPA 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 87, 88, 92–97, 99, 100, 111, 118, 124–126, 207, 219, 222, 229, 248, 249, 253, 265, 275, 276, 281; over land 4, 7, 11, 12, 14, 87, 92–95, 99, 111, 118, 124–127, 131, 133, 135, 147, 183, 200, 203, 206, 220, 279; over resources 4, 7, 12, 14, 20, 23, 30, 92, 93, 122, 133, 199, 203, 243, 251, 279, 281; political/ ethnicised religious 4, 8–12, 18–20, 22, 23, 29, 30, 42, 52, 53, 56, 60, 72,

86, 110, 123, 164, 165, 176–179, 182, 184, 187, 189–192, 215, 219, 270, 273–275 borders/boundaries 24, 111, 130, 172, 185, 200, 234, 242–245, 248, 249, 258, 259, 265, 276, 282; demarcation 4–6, 256–258; Sudan-Eritrea/ Ethiopia 16, 19, 20, 33, 154, 197, 198, 200–203, 206–208, 246, 247, 277, 278, 281; Sudan-Kenya/SudanUganda 154, 159, 246, 254, 272; within Sudan/north-south 3, 5, 7, 8, 24, 99, 124, 142154, 180, 239, 241, 249, 250, 256–258 boys 15, 16, 154, 159, 165–168, 172, 186 British 22, 30–32, 114, 141, 144, 197, 208, 209, 272; English (language) 15, 18, 34, 39, 47, 141, 143–145, 147–153, 155, 156, 214, 272 cattle – grazing 11, 14, 20, 85–87, 113–116, 133, 147, 163, 164, 200, 209, 245, 281, 282; raids/rustling 20, 147, 165, 198, 209, 210, 281, 282; census 6, 7, 98, 133, 143, 215, 279 Chad 8, 19, 22–24, 238, 241, 242, 249, 251–253, 258, 280 child/children 14–16, 18, 25, 35, 36, 94, 97–99, 138, 141, 142, 147, 149–151, 153–155, 158, 159, 162–165, 167–173, 205, 206, 274 Christian 29–31, 34, 60, 89, 141, 153, 177, 180, 184, 216, 234 citizens/citizenship 16, 17, 30, 43, 47, 48, 55, 56, 65–68, 71–73, 75, 76, 100, 104, 107, 111, 176–179, 181–192, 200, 203, 210, 214, 222, 266–269, 273, 274 civil society 12, 72, 76, 77, 84, 96, 101, 103, 105, 217, 222, 242–244, 259, 269, 280 claims – political 2, 7–9, 23, 56, 60, 90, 96, 110, 189, 207, 214, 235, 244, 251, 256, 273, 279; to land/identity 4, 13, 17, 34, 92, 95, 99, 110, 111, 117–124, 126, 127, 182, 184, 190, 203, 223, 244, 245, 271, 273 clashes 7, 11, 12, 17, 21, 96, 178, 182, 202, 240, 247, 250, 258, 276, 279 coalition 1, 20, 42, 52, 53, 64, 214, 222,

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Index 9, 21, 22, 33, 38, 43, 46, 51, 52, 57, 58, 60–63, 73, 75, 96, 223, 228, 229, 257, 265, 266, 270; Protocols 1, 2, 5, 12, 51, 73, 91, 96, 125, 190, 234–236, 270, 278; Referendum 2, 4, 5, 33, 46, 48, 74, 131, 160, 182, 214, 234, 236, 240, 249, 251, 269, 270, 272; security arrangements 2, 5, 97, 101, 124, 250, 256, 258; Three Areas: Abyei 2, 4, 5, 58, 59, 134, 235, 239, 240, 250, 256, 257, 270, 278, 279; Three Areas: Southern Blue Nile 2, 4, 6, 12, 34, 37, 38, 47, 58, 74, 89, 91, 125, 130, 131, 133, 134, 142, 180, 206, 256, 270, 271; Three Areas: Southern Kordofan 2, 4, 6, 11–13, 18, 83, 89, 91, 96–101, 110, 125, 126, 133, 134, 139, 142, 256, 257, 270, 279, 281; wealth sharing agreement 1–4, 9, 24, 35, 44, 46, 51, 56, 62, 63, 74–76, 125, 236, 244, 252, 257, 265, 270, 275, 279, 280 customary/custom 3, 13, 14, 18, 32, 110, 115, 116, 121, 124–126, 131, 133, 136, 170, 182, 184, 189, 192, 216, 218, 220, 271, 273

73, 75, 79, 86–88, 92–97, 99, 110, 116, 118, 124, 135, 203, 204, 213–215, 218, 222, 224, 227, 229, 230, 245, 248, 251, 252, 266, 268, 270, 276–278, 280, 281; settlement 20–22, 31, 37, 42, 45–47, 53, 64, 84, 85, 87, 89, 91–93, 95–98, 101, 104, 105, 109, 125, 205, 206, 215, 219, 221, 229, 232, 234, 253, 256, 258, 265, 276, 278, 281, 282 Constitution 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, 20, 21, 30, 41, 46, 52, 53, 66, 91, 95, 98, 105, 107, 187–189, 213–215, 217–222, 228, 230, 273, 275 construction (social) 13, 25, 113, 158, 265, 270, 272–274 contest 4, 6, 7, 13, 18, 24, 54, 110–112, 114, 118, 120, 121, 123, 126, 181, 182, 184, 228, 256, 273, 281 control – by GOS/RAMP/President/ NCP or allies 4, 9, 10, 13, 37, 42, 55, 56, 65, 98, 104, 115–118, 133, 148, 150, 153, 250, 272; over resources 3, 16, 20, 51, 56, 92, 96, 124, 126, 203, 244, 245, 258, 266, 268, 271, 275; political, power, decision-making 12, 20, 21, 51, 61, 76, 95, 122, 126, 158, 167, 170, 190, 197, 198, 203, 209, 224, 228, 243, 246, 267, 274, 282; SPLM/A /GOSS 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, 20, 36, 37, 56, 89, 92, 98, 100, 115, 117, 118, 122, 133, 147, 148, 151, 185, 209, 210, 254 cooperation 20–23, 34, 53, 96, 97, 103, 135, 139, 166, 172, 173, 181, 204, 207, 208, 210, 223, 228, 241, 246, 247, 249, 253, 259, 266, 272, 277 CPA – challenges of implementation 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 22, 30, 51, 54, 60, 61, 83, 98, 106, 131, 135, 139, 146, 147, 151, 176, 177, 183, 186, 208, 241, 242, 258, 267, 273, 275; change after CPA 8, 10–12, 14, 19, 20, 37, 47, 60, 63, 73, 78, 83, 89–91, 94, 99–101, 103, 124, 131, 136, 149–151, 172, 182, 191, 207, 209, 210, 214, 242; commissions 4, 5, 7, 10, 74, 75, 89, 239, 254, 269, 275; land commission 3, 13, 18, 48, 125–127, 133; power sharing/civil service reform 1–3, 5, 8,

Darfur/DPA 2, 6–10, 19, 21–24, 33, 34, 36, 38, 4–43, 46–49, 58, 59, 63, 72, 86, 91, 112, 130, 159, 160, 232, 233, 236–242, 248, 259, 251–253, 256–258, 278–280 decentralisation 8, 12, 21, 34, 44, 51, 52, 73, 77, 103–105, 155, 212, 214, 219, 228, 266–268; devolution 3, 24, 51, 53, 73, 77, 220, 265–268 defence 17, 44, 59, 67, 85, 88, 104, 117, 163, 177, 183, 188, 232, 233, 244 delays 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 23, 51, 52, 105127, 147, 208, 248, 250, 253, 258, 268, 269 democracy 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, 24, 30, 35, 44, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 60–67, 73–79, 103, 192, 212, 213, 218, 219, 225, 226, 230, 235, 265, 266, 268–270, 275 development – by external powers/ donors 3, 13, 15, 24, 30, 32, 90, 105–107, 124, 139, 245, 250, 254, 259, 282; by government(s) 3, 9, 21,

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Index 53–56, 2–68, 74, 75, 178, 203, 222, 225, 229, 236, 252, 257, 258, 266–269, 271, 272, 278, 279, 282 employment 14, 33, 95, 108, 136, 138, 149, 155, 156, 162, 171, 181, 187, 207, 255, 259, 274 equality 9, 22, 30, 33, 35, 43, 44, 46, 47, 65, 72, 78, 79, 103, 107, 108, 149, 165, 185, 187, 188, 191, 199, 218, 237, 268, 276, 280 Ethiopia 1, 8, 16, 18–21, 23, 24, 33, 90, 143, 150, 154, 159, 166, 197–203, 206–210, 212–220, 222, 225, 228–230, 233, 234, 242, 246–250, 253, 255, 258, 265, 268, 270, 275–278, 282 ethnic – diversity/multi- 12, 18, 29, 30, 33, 35, 53, 75, 7, 92–94, 111, 113, 116, 120, 126, 164, 198, 199, 212, 213, 215, 218, 247, 249, 266; divide/clash 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 48, 53–56, 63, 84, 88, 93–96, 98, 105, 110–113, 116, 122–124, 164, 190, 199, 200, 203, 204, 206, 208, 213, 214, 216, 218, 221–224, 227, 230, 233, 237, 251, 252, 254, 266, 268, 271–273, 275, 276, 279, 281; group 2, 10, 13, 14, 18–21, 24, 30, 33, 53, 72, 73, 75, 84–87, 94, 95, 110–112, 114–117, 119–121, 123, 124, 126, 132, 133, 143, 16–163, 184, 197, 203, 204, 113–215, 218, 220, 226, 227, 229, 259, 267, 272, 273, 275, 276, 280; identity 6, 12, 13, 16, 21, 88, 111, 112, 116, 136, 163, 176–179, 181–184, 189, 190, 192, 199, 213, 215, 219, 222, 267, 270–275 Europe 5, 23, 31, 36, 181, 186, 228, 247, 249, 253 exclusion 1, 3, 10, 20, 78, 122, 124, 177–181, 183, 185, 186, 199, 219, 227, 235–237, 245, 252, 268, 270, 279

23, 30, 56, 65, 124, 251, 255, 257, 259, 276; of marginalised/border areas 10, 23, 24, 35, 44, 62, 63, 74–77, 79, 130, 138, 139, 219, 224, 251, 253, 255, 258; of Southern Sudan 3, 10, 12, 13, 24, 33, 75, 142, 143, 145, 146, 169, 180, 250, 258; political, participatory, legal 19, 35–37, 48, 52, 61, 63, 67, 68, 70, 72, 75, 113, 125, 135, 145, 146, 192, 201, 289, 210, 212, 214, 217, 218, 220, 222, 225, 228, 230, 235, 236, 239, 241, 252, 269, 273, 276, 281; social, economic. 63, 65, 79, 83, 89, 97, 99–101, 105, 109, 136, 146, 158, 168, 182, 186, 205, 207, 220, 233, 234, 241, 242, 252, 255, 257, 273, 274 Dinka 2, 4, 16, 143, 159, 161, 163–165, 174, 182, 198, 200, 203, 204, 206, 207, 281 disarmament 8, 20, 210, 241, 254, 256, 281 displacement/IDPs 3, 6–14, 17, 18, 88–90, 98, 105, 114, 123, 124, 130–132, 134–139, 148, 149, 166, 167, 179–181, 184, 189, 190, 198, 207, 210, 232, 233, 245, 250, 252, 254, 271, 281, 282 diversity 9, 10, 18, 29–31, 34, 44, 48, 54, 85, 112, 113, 132, 158, 212–215, 218, 272 division/divide 5, 9, 11–13, 18, 22, 25, 29, 30, 47, 53, 84, 88, 92, 95, 98, 116, 124, 197, 214, 219, 238, 253, 265, 270, 272, 275, 281 donor/MDTF 3, 106, 109, 146, 150, 153, 156, 166, 212, 259 Egypt 6, 29, 31, 63, 114, 117, 234, 235, 246, 247, 280 elders 12, 14, 16, 21, 78, 99, 136, 138, 161, 166, 169, 171, 173, 199, 204, 208, 223, 225–228, 272, 282 elections 3, 4, 6, 39, 47, 53–55, 61, 66, 67, 73–75, 85, 98, 103, 105, 106, 120, 160, 171, 197, 213, 224, 226–228, 235, 236, 238, 250, 153, 254, 256, 266, 268, 269, 275 elites 2, 3, 8–11, 21, 24, 29–43, 47, 48,

factions 1, 6, 9, 22, 23, 45, 56, 90, 135, 166, 200–202, 210, 226, 237–239, 247–253, 257, 258, 268, 280 federalism 3, 5, 6, 19–21, 43, 45, 46, 1, 53, 54, 119, 127, 168, 198, 212–215, 217–221, 223, 226, 228–230, 265,

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Index 100, 101, 103, 126, 139, 154, 190, 197–199, 203, 206, 212, 213, 215, 217, 219, 221, 222, 224, 227–230, 266, 269, 271, 276; local 12, 77, 87, 94, 98, 103, 105, 106, 243, 266

275, 276; ethnic 19, 20, 21, 53, 213, 214, 217, 229, 230, 265, 275, 276 fighting 4, 5, 20, 21, 23, 29, 56, 67, 75, 78, 86, 99, 100, 117, 119, 135, 139, 163, 166, 183, 191, 198, 200–202, 205, 210, 223–226, 238, 239, 246, 247, 252, 254, 257, 277, 279, 281 finance 20, 30, 32, 104, 106, 107, 109, 146, 149, 169, 203, 208, 221, 247, 250, 272 force – external 5, 34, 112, 239, 253; military 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 19, 22, 38, 88, 99, 104, 116, 200, 202, 217, 232, 233, 235, 238, 250, 252, 256, 277, 279, 282; political/social 6, 52, 54, 55, 57–59, 61, 64, 70, 72, 112, 242, 244, 248, 277, 279, 280; violent/imposed 13, 16, 64, 85, 88, 90, 04, 114, 119, 130, 134, 145, 150, 160, 161, 162, 165–170, 191, 200, 215, 233, 237, 251, 257, 271, 272, 274, 275 freedom 20, 44, 71, 83, 89, 122, 125, 135, 136, 139, 162, 167, 172, 180, 185–187, 200, 214, 217, 230

humanitarian – aid/agencies/disasters 13, 23, 59, 84, 85, 88, 89, 100, 101, 107–109, 139, 148, 166, 174, 178, 206, 245, 253, 254, 257, 275 identity 7, 8, 11–13, 16–18, 25, 30, 31, 55, 86, 88, 110–114, 116, 119, 136, 144, 163, 176–181, 183–185, 189–192, 200, 214, 222, 267, 270–272, 274, 275 IGAD 1, 21, 23, 89, 90, 234, 241, 253, 255, 256, 258, 259, 280–282 inclusion – social/political 2, 6, 10, 12, 16, 21–24, 56, 64, 68, 85, 86, 91, 93, 101, 103, 105, 114, 119, 121, 133, 146, 149, 154, 159, 170, 177–181, 183, 184, 189, 207, 214, 227, 237, 241, 242, 252, 253, 256, 266, 268–270, 278, 278, 280–282 institution – political/legal 2, 3, 5, 10, 12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 31, 43, 52, 61, 63, 66, 68, 75–79, 83, 84, 96–98, 100, 101, 103, 109, 117, 124, 127, 145, 161, 164, 171, 172, 190–192, 198, 199, 208, 213, 216–221, 228, 230, 241, 243, 248, 254–256, 258, 259, 265.267, 269, 270, 275, 276, 280–282; social/economic 12, 14, 16, 31, 42, 43, 68, 72, 73, 76–79, 89, 101, 103, 110, 116, 122, 127, 136, 138, 142, 151, 153–156, 160, 161, 164, 165, 171, 172, 174, 178, 199, 204, 295, 207, 218, 220, 221, 241, 243, 252, 269, 270, 282 integration 9, 12, 15, 18, 52–54, 66, 85, 86, 92–94, 96, 97, 99, 101, 119, 139, 176, 184–186, 198, 200, 203, 206, 223, 224, 272, 275; military 5, 7, 12, 20, 101, 209, 256; reintegration 3, 11, 16–18, 25, 91, 98, 137, 155, 176–184, 187, 190–192, 206, 274, 275 interest – economic 9, 21, 24, 61, 65, 123, 244, 245, 251, 257, 268, 271; political/social 2, 3, 9, 12, 22–25, 47,

Garang de Mabior, John 9, 30, 36–39, 44–47, 56, 147, 202, 232, 233, 235, 247, 275, 277, 278 gender 11, 16, 30, 56, 106, 107, 146, 149, 155, 160, 161, 164–166, 168, 170, 173, 176, 178, 179, 270, 274 girls 14–16, 18, 141, 146, 149, 153–156, 159–161, 163–168, 170, 174, 274 GONU 2–7, 9, 22–24, 37–40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 51, 55, 57, 93, 108, 127, 134, 147, 179, 185, 238, 239, 248–256, 258, 275, 279–281 GOS 1, 2, 4, 6, 11, 13, 15, 18, 23, 39, 56, 84, 87–93, 97, 99, 100, 104, 115, 134, 135, 148, 149, 153, 166, 200, 241, 246–249, 251, 253, 271, 272, 275, 277, 279 GOSS 2–9, 14, 15, 18, 20, 23, 24, 36–38, 51, 56, 141, 142, 145, 147, 148, 151, 153, 154, 156, 172, 176, 178, 179, 183–185, 190–192, 208, 209, 235, 249, 250, 253–256, 258, 272, 275, 28 governance 10, 12, 51, 52, 58, 62, 63, 65, 66, 74, 76–79, 87, 88, 91, 94–96,

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Index 259, 279; control/reform/law/ commission 3, 13, 18, 20, 33, 86, 91, 92, 94, 99, 114–117, 122, 124–127, 133, 190, 204, 219, 220, 230, 251, 258, 259, 270, 271, 279, 282; home(land) 12–14, 17, 18, 25, 89, 90, 110, 112–114, 120, 130, 131, 134–139, 159, 161–163, 167, 168, 170, 173, 174, 176, 177, 181, 182, 184, 190, 203, 205–208, 273–275 leadership – local/ethnic/militia 4, 10, 12, 21, 32, 42, 53, 64, 90, 93–99, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 148, 169, 171–173, 178, 197, 201–203, 210, 224, 226, 251, 280–282; political/ military 1, 7, 9, 10, 31, 32, 35–39, 54–57, 90–92, 94, 96, 101, 106, 145, 166, 178, 202, 213, 232, 233, 239, 247, 249, 256, 267, 268, 271, 277–280 legitimacy 2, 10, 21, 52, 54, 67, 164, 173, 183, 190, 213, 217, 219, 221, 230 liberation/liberation movements 68, 10, 22, 36, 37, 202, 213, 223, 237, 246–248, 277 livestock 14, 87, 94, 95, 100, 133, 143, 198, 243 local – government 3, 4, 6, 16, 19, 21, 63, 68, 73, 77, 85, 94, 96, 97, 101, 103, 104, 120, 144, 198, 199, 208, 214, 221, 224–229, 251, 266, 267, 277, 280, 282; livelihood/resources/ culture 14, 15, 34, 114, 133, 137, 144, 244, 251, 254, 268, 272, 275; social settings/conflicts/views 7, 10, 12, 17, 19, 21, 23, 54, 63, 67, 75, 77, 87, 88, 92, 94–97, 99, 100, 104–107, 109, 111–116, 120–122, 125, 126, 131, 132, 135, 136, 138, 139, 146, 147, 149, 150, 159, 169, 176, 177, 182, 185, 186, 197–199, 201–203, 205–207, 213, 214, 221–223, 225, 229, 230, 233, 236, 242, 243, 245, 248, 251, 252, 259, 266–268, 270, 272, 276, 279, 282

51, 52, 59–61, 64–67, 71, 72, 76, 92, 94, 98, 103, 153, 167, 170, 179, 199, 200, 213, 214, 217, 219, 222, 226, 229, 230, 236, 246, 250, 251, 253, 257, 258, 267, 268, 277, 278, 282 international – governments/NGOs/ organisations 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 22–24, 29, 31, 34, 61, 73, 88, 90, 105, 108, 117, 118, 124, 125, 130, 135, 137, 139, 146, 147, 150, 153, 162, 172, 173, 177, 189, 192, 200, 204, 205, 207, 208, 232–240, 242, 245, 246, 248, 251, 253, 254, 256, 257, 259, 273, 275, 278–280 investment 3, 14, 23, 24, 59, 65, 87, 116, 125, 165, 220, 243–245, 250, 251, 254, 258, 259, 272, 282 Islam/Muslim 2, 7, 29–35, 39, 42, 45, 47, 54, 55, 57, 60, 65, 88, 89, 117, 122, 132, 144, 145, 147, 177, 180, 184, 216, 232, 233, 249, 251, 257, 258, 271, 272, 278, 281; Islamisation/ Islamist 8, 15, 25, 30, 31, 33, 38, 45, 55, 117, 147, 148, 153, 232–234, 248, 249, 257, 258, 271, 272, 275, 278, 281 Jonglei State 14, 19, 20, 58, 142, 143, 145, 148–150, 152–156, 159, 197, 200, 207, 210, 282 judiciary/justice 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 16, 36, 47, 54, 91, 103, 125, 160, 180, 191, 243, 174 Kenya 1, 8, 11, 15, 16, 19, 22–24, 148, 150, 154, 159, 162, 163, 166, 167, 171, 172, 176–178, 181, 183, 184, 186–188, 234, 241, 242, 246–249, 253–256, 258, 270, 272 Kiir, Salva 37, 38, 48, 56, 235, 239, 241, 256 language 11, 14, 15, 18, 25, 29, 31–35, 39, 47, 85, 133, 141–145, 147–151, 154, 155, 172, 178, 212, 214, 218, 221–223, 272, 275 land – conflict, /grabbing 7, 11–14, 18, 23, 86, 87, 92, 95, 99, 111, 11–116, 123–127, 131, 133–136, 200, 203, 220, 228, 236, 244, 245, 251, 252,

marginalisation 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21, 24, 31, 33, 35, 41, 42, 47, 48, 56, 84, 86, 104, 105, 109, 124, 136,

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Index 153, 155, 179, 180, 183, 198, 199, 214, 219, 230, 233, 236, 247, 251, 252, 267, 268, 271, 276, 278, 279 migration 14, 87, 95, 114, 119, 120, 131, 132, 134, 138, 139, 220, 258 military 2, 5, 9, 12, 19, 21–23, 32, 33, 36–40, 47, 62, 64, 65, 73, 75, 88, 89, 96, 101, 104, 117, 124, 146, 198, 199, 201–203, 213, 214, 217, 229, 232, 238, 242, 246, 247, 250, 253, 256–258, 277–280, 282; militant 2, 7, 13, 23, 179, 246, 249, 253, 258, 282; militarisation/militia 4–8, 19–23, 88, 99, 100, 147, 148, 166, 179, 189, 201, 208–210, 232, 236, 241, 244, 246, 248, 250–252, 256, 258, 276, 279, 282 mobilisation 13, 18, 23, 72, 74, 78, 88, 97, 98, 109, 117, 119, 151, 155, 178, 217, 222, 232, 254, 257, 271 models 10, 19, 21, 44–46, 49, 67, 72, 77, 79, 158, 173, 206, 213, 225, 228, 230, 268, 270, 274 movement – people/livestock 11, 87, 89, 90, 94, 95, 122, 125, 130–132, 135, 136, 139, 162, 172, 178, 199, 208, 243, 245–247; social/militant 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 19–23, 36, 39, 56, 72, 75, 112, 119, 126, 146, 166, 200–202, 218, 223–226, 233, 237, 243, 246–249, 252, 258, 267, 269, 273, 277, 280, 282

51, 55–59, 61, 62, 91–96, 98–100, 105, 118, 139, 147, 208, 210, 232–240, 248–251, 253, 256, 257, 269, 272, 278–282 negotiation 1, 6, 22, 23, 56, 64, 76, 89, 90, 99, 110, 162, 167, 177, 183, 190, 220, 227, 237, 239, 240, 244, 248, 249, 252, 253, 257, 258, 265, 266, 269, 278–282 New Sudan 9, 30, 33, 35, 42–44, 46–49, 56, 90, 142, 146, 148, 150, 151, 153–155, 190, 233, 236, 275 NGO 10, 12, 13, 15, 1, 84, 88, 90, 92, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103, 105–109, 124, 139, 149, 173, 179, 199, 204, 207, 247, 256, 267, 269 Northerners 40, 42, 43, 48, 270, 272 Nuba 4, 7, 10–14, 17, 18, 33, 34, 36–38, 47, 76, 83–101, 104, 109–120, 122, 124–127, 129–136, 138–139, 159, 180, 190, 252, 256, 271, 272, 281 Nuer 16, 19, 20, 76, 143, 159, 161–164, 174, 197–204, 206, 207, 209, 210, 214–216, 218, 220, 223–227, 277, 281

nation – economical 7, 76, 236, 252; level 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 31, 37, 43, 47, 51, 54, 60, 68, 70, 77, 105, 108, 111, 113, 125, 142, 169, 199, 232, 233, 235, 240, 249, 251, 266, 282; nationality 33, 34, 55, 178, 185, 187–189, 204, 218, 219, 225; political 2, 3, 5–7, 9, 17, 20, 21, 24, 29, 31, 33–37, 39, 43, 46–48, 51, 52, 54–61, 63–65, 73, 75, 76, 86, 101, 112–114, 133, 139, 141, 145, 148, 160, 170, 177, 180, 182, 188–190, 198, 200, 201, 212, 213, 215, 216, 218, 219, 222, 225, 229, 236–239, 242, 244, 251, 254, 257, 265, 267, 268, 276–278, 282 NCP – National Congress Party 2, 4, 6–9, 11–13, 18, 21–23, 42, 43.46.48,

Parliament 9, 38–39, 43, 46, 55, 60, 74, 217, 227, 228 partners 6, 7, 12, 18, 19, 22, 39, 61, 62, 70, 84, 90–93, 96, 99–101, 106, 108, 109, 139, 146, 153, 155, 164, 168–169, 173, 191, 223, 239–241, 249, 255, 258–259 party – political 2, 3, 5–7, 9–12, 17, 20, 21, 24, 30, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42–45, 51–53, 55–61, 64, 65, 69–72, 77, 87, 90–92, 94–96, 98–101, 105, 115, 118, 121, 124, 125, 138, 179, 200, 207, 214, 239, 240, 248, 249, 252, 256, 266, 267, 269, 275, 276, 278–281 pastoralist/pastoralism 4, 6–7, 12–14, 93, 99, 105, 115, 125, 133, 197, 209–210, 220, 243, 251

oil 3–8, 21, 23, 24, 44, 56, 75, 113, 132, 198, 209, 219, 220, 229, 233, 234, 236, 240–243, 249–252, 258–259, 271, 279, 281, 282 opposition 6, 17, 23, 39, 52, 61, 123, 201, 202, 215, 246, 248, 249, 268–269, 277

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Index 214, 218–221, 229, 234, 253, 257, 266, 273, 281; human rights 5, 16, 17, 44, 59, 73, 83, 88, 99, 107, 130, 166, 172, 173, 176, 177, 188–191, 200, 219, 234, 252, 257, 273, 275; land rights 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 17, 18, 21, 86, 92, 94, 95, 99, 110–112, 114–117, 120, 123–127, 133, 136, 189, 192, 200, 207, 220, 233, 243, 245, 251, 273, 282 rule/ruling 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, 20, 29, 31, 32, 35–39, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 54, 62–66, 75, 100, 113, 117, 144, 145, 197, 203, 208, 213–215, 221, 226, 235, 246, 248, 249, 251–253, 268, 269, 271, 272, 277, 279; rule of law/rules 12, 91, 97, 101, 103, 107, 139, 172, 190, 191, 244, 250, 268, 274, 282 rural 63, 64, 68, 69, 73, 75, 76, 86, 116, 122, 136, 148, 154, 155, 156, 216, 219, 259, 267

peace 1, 2, 14, 22, 23, 43, 46, 48, 54, 62, 79, 85, 88, 99, 100, 109, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 131, 136, 184, 186, 214, 217, 232, 234, 241, 252, 253, 255; agreement/deal 2, 6, 7, 21, 48, 56, 60, 84, 89, 137, 232, 233, 235, 241, 251, 276, 278, 281; dividend 12, 85, 99–101, 137, 233; education/ actors/policy dialogues/meetings 12, 14, 85, 88, 92–98, 100, 101, 124, 134, 141, 153, 204, 242, 282; lasting/ culture of 1, 17, 24, 46, 62, 65, 74, 76, 77, 96, 98, 105, 116, 210, 242, 246, 256, 258, 270; negotiation/ talk/partnership 1, 6, 12, 22, 23, 39, 100, 232, 234, 235, 237–239, 248, 249, 252, 253, 258, 279, 281; process/building 2, 8, 19, 22, 84, 92, 105, 107, 205, 234, 236, 241, 242, 245, 251, 253, 255, 257, 270, 278–280; sub-regional 19, 255, 265, 280–282 poverty/poor 11, 16, 20, 36, 105–108, 136–137, 147–148, 153, 165–166, 183, 198–199, 208–209, 276 President 2, 4, 37, 39–44, 46, 48, 54, 55, 73, 88, 91, 108, 145, 147, 148, 219, 224–226, 233, 235, 241, 251, 253, 255, 256 private 15, 65, 67, 70, 86, 105, 114, 115, 142, 145, 146, 153, 220, 245, 276 public 12, 35, 54, 59, 61, 65–68, 70, 71, 75–78, 96, 99, 104, 106, 114, 124, 145, 147, 150, 153, 172, 183, 207, 228, 253, 256, 265, 269, 270

SAF 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 20, 21, 23, 24, 39, 51 , 97, 99, 117, 209, 246, 248, 250 256, 258, 266, 279 security/insecurity 7, 8, 14, 42, 59, 79, 87, 90, 99, 101, 123, 125–127, 131, 135, 136, 139, 158, 159, 161, 168, 169, 173, 177, 181, 183, 198, 199, 201, 202, 206, 207, 209, 244, 245, 255, 277, 281; State Security forces/ intelligence 42, 96, 97, 101, 104, 167, 172, 233, 243, 252 separation 13, 20, 30, 31–33, 44, 45, 48, 56, 63, 74, 89, 97, 113, 114, 135, 202, 206, 209, 236, 239, 240, 243, 251, 272, 277 solutions 2, 8, 9, 12, 13, 32, 35, 44, 46, 47, 64, 76, 77, 78, 83, 85, 101, 103, 107, 108, 125, 169, 175, 176, 185, 187, 205, 210, 224, 227, 229, 230, 253, 258, 266, 267, 270, 276, 281 Southerners 1, 3, 9, 30, 40, 42, 43, 148, 155, 181, 216, 233, 257, 270, 272, 275 space (concept) 23–25, 77, 98, 111, 112, 124, 171, 182, 220, 241–250, 254–256, 258, 259, 273, 276–278, 282 SPLM/A 1–6, 9–13, 15, 18, 19, 20–24, 36–38, 51, 55–57, 73–75, 84, 89–93, 95–98, 100, 103, 104, 115–117, 119,

reconciliation 11, 18, 54, 84, 95, 96, 111, 124, 191, 227, 249, 270, 273–275 reconstruction 3, 11, 14, 18, 75, 79, 98, 101, 138, 141 refugees 3, 6–8, 11, 15–20, 25, 32, 89, 90, 105, 130, 148, 150, 158–162, 164, 166–174, 176–191, 198–208, 210, 220, 243, 245–247, 252, 254, 255, 272–275, 277, 281 rights 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 35, 43, 44, 51–53, 56, 63, 71, 73, 74, 83, 89, 94, 103, 106, 131, 158, 160, 164, 165, 171, 172, 176, 177, 181, 182, 184–189, 191, 192, 207, 212,

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Index 192, 214, 223, 225, 230, 238, 239, 240, 250, 257 universities 9, 31, 39, 41, 42, 69, 96, 97, 99, 101, 142, 151–153, 155 Upper Nile State 14, 15, 69, 141–145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 153, 154, 209, 210, 250, 282 urban 14, 62–65, 69, 73, 75, 76, 86, 122, 131, 132, 134, 136–138, 147, 154, 185, 187, 216, 219, 267

122, 133–135, 139, 145, 146, 148, 151, 199, 202, 203, 205, 208, 210, 223, 232, 233, 235–238, 241, 246–249, 253, 254, 257, 258, 270–272, 275, 277–281 sub-regions 8, 18, 19, 21–25, 199, 210 , 241–249, 251, 255, 257, 258, 259, 265, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282 territory 7, 8, 20, 25, 32, 36, 53, 56, 90, 91, 93, 98, 110, 112, 114–121, 123, 124 , 126, 128, 132, 178, 185, 197, 201, 203, 210, 212, 218, 220, 243, 245, 247, 249, 251, 254, 272, 273, 277 towns 14, 15, 17, 18, 63, 69, 88, 96, 97, 104, 105, 113, 134, 138, 142, 143, 144, 147, 149, 150, 151, 157, 162, 168, 176, 185, 202, 203, 240, 246, 254 trade 14, 15, 20, 30, 37, 38, 59, 59, 72, 85, 86, 114, 122, 128, 133, 138, 171, 197, 198, 205, 207–209, 211, 215, 220, 239, 254, 255, 257, 258, 271, 282 tradition 11, 14, 15, 21, 63, 64, 76, 78, 79, 86, 90, 93, 94, 97–99, 110, 113, 115, 119, 125, 131, 133, 136, 159, 161, 164, 167, 172, 174, 180, 185, 192, 197, 198, 201, 204–206, 213, 216, 224, 227, 230, 271, 274 tribe 10, 12, 23, 30, 32, 64, 68, 72, 75, 76, 84, 85, 90, 93, 94–96, 98, 99, 100, 105, 113, 119, 136, 143, 147, 150, 166, 176, 178, 179, 181, 182, 184, 190, 197, 198, 216, 244, 253, 276, 281

vote/voting 4, 17, 54, 55, 67, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 165, 182, 188, 189 war – after the CPA 4, 11–14, 17, 63, 73, 127, 130, 150, 250, 257, 258, 279; Cold War/war on terrorism/wars in sub-region 22, 23, 234, 246–249, 251, 258, 277, 278, 281; north–south 1, 3, 4, 8–11, 13–19, 21–24, 29, 31–33, 35–37, 39, 44, 125, 127, 130, 131, 134, 141, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150, 158, 159, 163–165, 174, 181, 184, 185, 192, 198–203, 207–210, 223, 232, 234, 238, 241, 242, 245–251, 253, 254, 257, 258, 265, 268, 270–272, 274, 275, 277, 279, 281; in Darfur 2, 6, 22, 36, 238, 241, 251, 253, 271, 279, 280; in the Nuba Mountains 4, 11–14, 17, 18, 84, 86–89, 91–94, 96, 99, 100, 104, 105, 109, 110, 114–120, 122, 125, 126, 131, 132, 135, 136–139, 271, 272 water 4, 7, 11, 13, 21, 23, 33, 56, 59, 85, 87, 90, 93, 95, 98, 100, 105, 110, 115, 120, 123, 124, 137, 139, 142, 143, 145, 154 , 166, 168, 182, 190, 198, 204, 207, 208, 233, 236, 258, 271, 279, 282 West 3, 9, 15, 34, 73, 174, 181, 230, 231, 247, 249, 257, 272, 275 women 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 25, 59, 78, 94, 96, 99, 105–109, 120, 138, 146, 158–167, 169–174, 180, 185, 191, 204, 205, 208, 259, 274, 275

Uganda 23, 24, 56, 144, 184, 233, 234, 246, 247, 249, 255, 257, 272 UN 17, 88, 89, 92, 97, 99, 100, 106, 124, 130, 134, 135, 137, 139, 146, 189, 190, 204, 239, 241, 253, 255, 256, 258; UNDP 103, 150, 154, 184, 269; UNHCR 17, 89, 148, 159, 160, 167–170, 172, 173, 176, 182, 184, 186, 191, 200, 203, 204, 206–208, 247; UNICEF 12, 15, 92, 93, 96, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 165; UNMIS 5, 7, 22, 23, 91, 96, 134, 139, 256, 258, 281; UN Security Council 5, 22, 239, 253 Unity 2, 4, 9, 10–12, 21, 33, 39, 44, 49, 52, 55, 58, 65, 72, 74, 98, 142, 190,

youth/young people 12, 14–16, 25, 38, 59, 94–96, 99, 138, 145, 146, 158, 160–162, 165, 167, 168, 170–173, 175, 180, 183, 207–209, 222, 223, 231, 236, 239, 240, 274

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EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES These titles published in the United States and Canada by Ohio University Press Revealing Prophets Edited by DAVID M . ANDERSON & DOUGLAS H . JOHNSON

The Second Economy in Tanzania T . L . MALIYAMKONO & M . S . D . BAGACHWA

East African Expressions of Christianity Edited by THOMAS SPEAR & ISARIA N . KIMAMBO

Ecology Control & Economic Development in East African History

The Poor Are Not Us Edited by DAVID M . ANDERSON & VIGDIS BROCH - DUE

DAVID WILLIAM COHEN & E . S . ATIENO ODHIAMBO

Potent Brews JUSTIN WILLIS

Swahili Origins JAMES DE VERE ALLEN

Being Maasai Edited by THOMAS SPEAR & RICHARD WALLER Jua Kali Kenya KENNETH KING

Control & Crisis in Colonial Kenya BRUCE BERMAN

Unhappy Valley Book One: State & Class Book Two: Violence & Ethnicity BRUCE BERMAN & JOHN LONSDALE

Mau Mau from Below GREET KERSHAW

The Mau Mau War in Perspective FRANK FUREDI

Squatters & the Roots of Mau Mau 1905–63 TABITHA KANOGO

HELGE KJEKSHUS

Siaya

Uganda Now • Changing Uganda Developing Uganda • From Chaos to Order Religion & Politics in East Africa Edited by HOLGER BERNT HANSEN & MICHAEL TWADDLE

Multi-Party Politics in Kenya DAVID W . THROUP & CHARLES HORNSBY Empire State-Building JOANNA LEWIS

Decolonization & Independence in Kenya 1940–93 Edited by B . A . OGOT & WILLIAM R . OCHIENG ’ Eroding the Commons DAVID ANDERSON

Penetration & Protest in Tanzania ISARIA N . KIMAMBO

MICHAEL TWADDLE

Controlling Anger

Remapping Ethiopia Edited by W . JAMES , D . DONHAM , E . KURIMOTO & A . TRIULZI Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia Edited by DONALD L . DONHAM & WENDY JAMES A Modern History of the Somali (4th edn) I . M . LEWIS

Leaf of Allah

SUZETTE HEALD

Kampala Women Getting By SANDRA WALLMAN

Political Power in Pre-Colonial Buganda RICHARD J . REID Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits

EZEKIEL GEBISSA

Dhows & the Colonial Economy of Zanzibar 1860–1970 ERIK GILBERT

African Womanhood in Colonial Kenya TABITHA KANOGO

HEIKE BEHREND

Slaves, Spices & Ivory in Zanzibar

African Underclass ANDREW BURTON

ABDUL SHERIFF

Zanzibar Under Colonial Rule Edited by ABDUL SHERIFF & ED FERGUSON

The History & Conservation of Zanzibar Stone Town Edited by ABDUL SHERIFF Pastimes & Politics Ethnicity & Conflict in the Horn of Africa Edited by KATSUYOSHI & JOHN MARKAKIS

In Search of a Nation Edited by GREGORY & JAMES L . GIBLIN

H . MADDOX

A History of the Excluded JAMES L . GIBLIN Black Poachers, White Hunters EDWARD I. STEINHART Ethnic Federalism DAVID TURTON

Crisis & Decline in Bunyoro FUKUI

Conflict, Age & Power in North East Africa Edited by EISEI KURIMOTO & SIMON SIMONSE Property Rights & Political Development in Ethiopia & Eritrea SANDRA FULLERTON JOIREMAN

Revolution & Religion in Ethiopia ØYVIND M . EIDE Brothers at War TEKESTE NEGASH & KJETIL TRONVOLL

Custodians of the Land From Guerrillas to Government Edited by GREGORY MADDOX , JAMES DAVID POOL L . GIBLIN & ISARIA N . KIMAMBO Mau Mau & Nationhood Education in the Development Edited by E . S . ATIENO ODHIAMBO of Tanzania 1919–1990 & JOHN LONSDALE LENE BUCHERT

BAHRU ZEWDE

Islands of Intensive Agriculture in East Africa Edited by MATS WIDGREN & JOHN E . G . SUTTON

Kakungulu & the Creation of Uganda 1868–1928

LAURA FAIR

Economic & Social Origins of Mau Mau 1945–53 DAVID W . THROUP

A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991 (2nd edn) BAHRU ZEWDE Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia

SHANE DOYLE

Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa JAN - GEORG DEUTSCH Women, Work & Domestic Virtue in Uganda 1900–2003 GRACE BANTEBYA KYOMUHENDO MARJORIE KENISTON M C INTOSH

Cultivating Success in Uganda GRACE CARSWELL

War in Pre-Colonial Eastern Africa RICHARD REID

Slavery in the Great Lakes Region of East Africa Edited by HENRI MÉDARD & SHANE DOYLE

The Benefits of Famine DAVID KEEN

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Cover illustrations: New buildings around the central market in Khartoum (2009); and Dinka Bor with cattle between Juba and Bor (2008) © Elke Grawert

After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Edited by ELKE GRAWERT

Sudan

in

Contents: Introduction by Elke Grawert – Part I Implementation & potential of the CPA – The role of African & Arab elites in building a New Sudan by Melha Rout Biel – The implementation of power sharing at the national level by Rania Hassan Ahmed – Empowered deliberative democracy (EDD) by Yasir Awad Abdalla Eltahir – Part II Challenges facing post-war societies in Sudan – Problems & prospects for peaceful coexistence in the Nuba mountains by Samson S. Wassara with Appendix on Governmental & NGO structures in Dilling Locality by Tayseer El-Fatih Abdel A’al – Ethnic identity politics & boundary making in claiming communal land: the Nuba mountains by Guma Kunda Komey – Return migration to the Nuba mountains by Samira Musa Armin Damin – Challenges of basic education in Southern Sudan by Joseph Lodiong Lubajo – Abduction, confinement & sexual violence against South Sudanese women & girls in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kenya by Marilyn Ossome – Identity, citizenship & reintegration: Sudanese returnees from Kenya by Obaka Otieno John – Part III The CPA in its sub-regional context – Changes in Gambella, Ethiopia by Regassa Bayissa Sima – Ethiopian federalism seen from the regional state of Gambella by Monika M. Sommer – From CPA to DPA: ‘ripe for resolution’, or ripe for dissolution? by Peter Woodward – Challenges of sub-regional peace by Elke Grawert Part IV Beyond the CPA – Theoretical outcomes by Elke Grawert

GRAWERT

CPA Sudan

Elke Grawert is a Senior Researcher and Senior Lecturer at the Institute for Intercultural and International Studies (InIIS), University of Bremen, Germany.

Editor

After the

After a long process of peace negotiations the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 9 January 2005 between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The CPA raised initial hopes that it would be the foundation block for lasting peace in Sudan. As the Sudanese peace agreement reaches a crisis point while moving into its final year, this book offers a scholarly analysis of the impact of the implementation of the agreement on different Sudanese communities and neighbouring regions. In particular it analyses the implementation of the power sharing agreement, ongoing conflicts with respect to land issues, the challenges of the reintegration of internally displaced people and refugees, and the repercussions of the CPA in other regions of Sudan as well as in neighbouring countries.

An imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620, USA www.boydellandbrewer.com www.jamescurrey.com

EASTERN AFRICA SERIES

EASTERN AFRICA SERIES