Volume 1, Tome I: Kierkegaard and the Bible - The Old Testament (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources) [1 ed.] 9781409402855, 9781409404439, 1409402851

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KierKegaard and the BiBle tome ii: the new testament

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Volume 2, Tome II

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources is a publication of the søren Kierkegaard research Centre

General Editor Jon stewart Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Editorial Board Katalin nun peter ŠaJda Advisory Board istvÁn CzaKÓ Finn gredal Jensen david d. possen heiKo sChulz

This volume was published with the generous financial support of the danish agency for science, technology and innovation

Kierkegaard and the Bible tome ii: the new testament

Edited by lee C. Barrett and Jon stewart

First published 2010 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © lee C. Barrett, Jon stewart and the contributors 2010 lee C. Barrett and Jon stewart have asserted their right under the Copyright, designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice .. Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Kierkegaard and the Bible. tome 2. – (Kierkegaard research ; v. 1) 1. Kierkegaard, soren, 1813 – 1855. 2. Bible–use–history–19th century. 3. hermeneutics–history–19th century. i. series ii. Barrett, lee C., Jon stewart 198.9–dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kierkegaard and the Bible / lee C. Barrett and Jon stewart p. cm. — (Kierkegaard research: sources, reception, and resources) includes indexes. isBn 978-1-4094-0285-5 (v. 1 : hardcover : alk. paper) — isBn 978-1-4094-0443-9 (v. 2 : hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Kierkegaard, søren, 1813–1855. 2. Bible—use—history—19th century. 3. Bible—Criticism, interpretation, etc.—history—19th century. i. Barrett, lee C., Jon stewart ii. title. B4378.B52B37 2009 220.6092—dc22 isBn 9781409404439 (hbk) Cover design by Katalin nun.

Contents List of Contributors List of Abbreviations

PART I

vii ix

InDIvIDuAL TexTs AnD FIguRes

simeon and anna: exemplars of patience and expectancy Lee C. Barrett

3

Jesus’ miracles: Kierkegaard on the miracle of Faith Jolita Pons

17

the sermon on the mount: the dialectic of exhortation and Consolation Lee C. Barrett

33

the lily in the Field and the Bird of the air: an endless liturgy in Kierkegaard’s authorship Leo Stan

55

peter: the “pitiable prototype” Kyle A. Roberts

79

the pharisee: Kierkegaard’s Polyphonic Personification of a Univocal Idea Paul Martens

93

the tax Collector: model of inwardness Timothy H. Polk

107

the woman in sin: Kierkegaard’s late Female prototype Paul Martens

123

Kierkegaard and the Bible

vi

lazarus: Kierkegaard’s use of a destitute Beggar and a resurrected Friend Kyle A. Roberts

139

The Crucifixion: Kierkegaard’s use of the new testament narratives Lee C. Barrett

151

the resurrection: Kierkegaard’s use of the resurrection as symbol and as reality Lee C. Barrett

169

paul: herald of grace and paradigm of Christian living Lori Unger Brandt

189

James: putting Faith to action Kyle A. Roberts

209

PART II

OveRvIew ARTICLes

Kierkegaard’s latin translations of the new testament: a Constant dialogue with the vulgate Niels W. Bruun and Finn Gredal Jensen

221

Kierkegaard’s use of the new testament: intratextuality, indirect Communication, and appropriation Timothy H. Polk

237

Kierkegaard’s Biblical hermeneutics: imitation, imaginative Freedom, and paradoxical Fixation Joel D.S. Rasmussen

249

Kierkegaard and eighteenth- and nineteenth-Century Biblical scholarship: a Case of incongruity Mogens Müller

285

Index of Subjects Index of Persons

329 335

list of Contributors Lee C. Barrett, lancaster theological seminary, 555 w. James st., 17603 lancaster, pa, usa. Lori unger Brandt, toronto school of theology, 47 Queen’s park Crescent east, toronto, ontario, m5s 2C3, Canada. niels w. Bruun, the royal library, research department, søren Kierkegaards plads 1, po box 2149, 1016 Copenhagen K, denmark. Finn gredal Jensen, society for danish language and literature, Christians Brygge 1, 1219 Copenhagen K, denmark. Paul Martens, department of religion, Baylor university, one Bear place #97284, waco, tX 76798–7284, usa. Mogens Müller, the theological Faculty, department of Biblical exegesis, university of, Copenhagen, Købmagergade 44-46, po box 2164, 1150 Copenhagen K, denmark. Timothy H. Polk, hamline university, Box 132, 1536 hewitt ave, st. paul, mn 55104, usa. Jolita Pons, Council of the european union, Ko 158 00/46, 175 rue de la loi, 1048, Brussels, Belgium. Joel D.s. Rasmussen, Mansfield College, Oxford University, Mansfield Road, oxford, oX1 3tF, uK. Kyle A. Roberts, Bethel seminary, 3900 Bethel drive, sem a213, po, Box 7027, st. paul, mn, 55112–6999, usa. Leo stan, Centre for the study of theory and Criticism, university of western ontario, somerville house, rm. 2345a, london, ontario n6a 3K7, Canada.

list of abbreviations Danish Abbreviations B&A

Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard, vols. 1-2, ed. by niels thulstrup, Copenhagen: munksgaard 1953–54.

Bl.art. S. Kierkegaard’s Bladartikler, med Bilag samlede efter Forfatterens Død, udgivne som Supplement til hans øvrige Skrifter, ed. by rasmus nielsen, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1857. EP

Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer, vols. 1–9, ed. by h.p. Barfod and hermann gottsched, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1869–81.

Pap.

Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols. i to Xi–3, ed. by peter andreas heiberg, victor Kuhr and einer torsting, Copenhagen: gyldendalske Boghandel, nordisk Forlag 1909–48; second, expanded ed., vols. i to Xi–3, ed. by niels thulstrup, vols. Xii to Xiii supplementary volumes, ed. by niels thulstrup, vols. Xiv to Xvi index by niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1968–78.

SKS

Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vols. 1–28, K1–K28, ed. by niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim garff, Jette Knudsen, Johnny Kondrup, alastair mcKinnon and Finn hauberg mortensen, Copenhagen: gads Forlag 1997ff.

SV1

Samlede Værker, ed. by a.B. drachmann, Johan ludvig heiberg and h.o. lange, vols. i– Xiv, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1901–06. English Abbreviations

AN

Armed Neutrality, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

AR

On Authority and Revelation, The Book on Adler, trans. by walter lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1955.

ASKB

The Auctioneer’s Sales Record of the Library of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by h.p. rohde, Copenhagen: the royal library 1967.

x

Kierkegaard and the Bible

BA

The Book on Adler, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

C

The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

CA

The Concept of Anxiety, trans. by reidar thomte in collaboration with albert B. anderson, princeton: princeton university press 1980.

CD

Christian Discourses, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

CI

The Concept of Irony, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1989.

CIC

The Concept of Irony, trans. with an introduction and notes by lee m. Capel, london: Collins 1966.

COR

The Corsair Affair; Articles Related to the Writings, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUP1

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 1, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUP2

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 2, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

EO1

Either/Or, part i, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1987.

EO2

Either/Or, part ii, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1987.

EOP

Either/Or, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin Books 1992.

EPW

Early Polemical Writings, among others: From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle Between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, trans. by Julia watkin, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

EUD

Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

FSE

For Self-Examination, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

List of Abbreviations

xi

FT

Fear and Trembling, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1983.

FTP

Fear and Trembling, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin Books 1985.

JC

Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

JFY

Judge for Yourself!, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

JP

Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols. 1–6, ed. and trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, assisted by gregor malantschuk (vol. 7, index and Composite Collation), Bloomington and london: indiana university press 1967–78.

KAC

Kierkegaard’s Attack upon “Christendom,” 1854–1855, trans. by walter lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1944.

KJN

Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, vols. 1–11, ed. by niels Jørgen Cappelørn, alastair hannay, david Kangas, Bruce h. Kirmmse, george pattison, vanessa rumble, and K. Brian söderquist, princeton and oxford: princeton university press 2007ff.

LD

Letters and Documents, trans. by henrik rosenmeier, princeton: princeton university press 1978.

LR

A Literary Review, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin Books 2001.

M

The Moment and Late Writings, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

P

Prefaces / Writing Sampler, trans. by todd w. nichol, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

PC

Practice in Christianity, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1991.

PF

Philosophical Fragments, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

PJ

Papers and Journals: A Selection, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin Books 1996.

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PLR

Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes as the Occasion May Require, trans. by william mcdonald, tallahassee: Florida state university press 1989.

PLS

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by david F. swenson and walter lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1941.

PV

The Point of View including On My Work as an Author, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, and Armed Neutrality, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

PVL

The Point of View for My Work as an Author including On My Work as an Author, trans. by walter lowrie, new York and london: oxford university press 1939.

R

Repetition, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1983.

SBL

Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1989.

SLW

Stages on Life’s Way, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1988.

SUD

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1980.

SUDP The Sickness unto Death, trans. by alastair hannay, london and new York: penguin Books 1989. TA

Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. A Literary Review, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1978.

TD

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1993.

UD

Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1993.

WA

Without Authority including The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, Two Ethical-Religious Essays, Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, An Upbuilding Discourse, Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

List of Abbreviations

xiii

WL

Works of Love, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1995.

WS

Writing Sampler, trans. by todd w. nichol, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

part i individual texts and Figures

simeon and anna: exemplars of patience and expectancy lee C. Barrett

I. Introduction simeon and anna make a single and rather brief appearance at the end of the birth narrative in the gospel of luke. in luke 2:25–38 simeon is described as a righteous and devout man who looked forward to the consolation of israel (luke 2:25), and anna is characterized as a prophetic widow who prayed ceaselessly in the temple (Luke 2:36–7). Both Simeon and Anna recognize and celebrate the salvific identity of Jesus when the baby is brought into the temple by mary and Joseph for the ceremony of the consecration of the first-born son. Having announced the redemptive and messianic mission of Jesus, simeon and anna disappear from the pages of the Bible. in spite of the fact that they make just one cameo appearance in just one of the gospels, the two characters attained more prominence in the worship of the church than their minor role in the narrative would ordinarily have warranted. in the middle ages simeon’s prayer of praise, known in latin as the Nunc Dimittis because of the first two words of this passage in the Latin translation of the Vulgate, became part of the service of Compline in the daily office. During the reformation the church order for northern germany and denmark developed by Johannes Bugenhagen (1485–1558) in 1537 included an order of worship for Vespers that contained the Nunc Dimittis. Although the practice of the daily office declined in lutheran congregations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it remained part of the official liturgical heritage of the Lutheran churches.1 more importantly, in the lectionary of the danish Church the text narrating the story of Anna and Simeon, Luke 2:22–40, was designated as the gospel reading for the first sunday after Christmas. as a result, simeon and anna were not obscure names for a lutheran theological student in nineteenth-century denmark. Kierkegaard’s attention to the two characters reflects their dramatic but brief role in scripture. apart from popping up in Kierkegaard’s authorship as incidental illustrations of general themes, simeon and anna make only one sustained appearance in only one upbuilding discourse. however, as in the new testament that single appearance is fraught with significance. Although the space in Kierkegaard’s corpus devoted to the two characters is tiny, they perform a vital function in drawing together see luther d. reed, The Lutheran Liturgy, philadelphia: Fortress press 1947, pp. 390–1. 1

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and encapsulating crucial themes from both the discourses and the pseudonymous literature. II. Kierkegaard’s Exegetical Context the story of anna and simeon was not a particularly important focal point for theological or exegetical debate in early modern northern europe. it was generally eclipsed by the furor surrounding the more dramatic and controversial birth narrative in luke that preceded it. however, questions about its historicity and, more significantly, its theological significance were raised. Following the lectionary, martin luther had used luke 2:33–40 as the text for two published sermons for the first Sunday after Christmas.2 in many ways, these sermons established the basic framework for lutheran engagement with the passage. in general, the story of simeon and anna functioned as a trope in luther’s antipelagian polemic. simeon and anna who waited for god to initiate redemptive action became paradigms of the appropriate Christian reliance upon god’s grace rather than upon self-generated works. luther stressed the joy that is stimulated by the confidence in God’s victory over sin and death and the wonder at God’s mercy that is evoked by grace. in spite of this dominant joyful note of the gratuity of salvation, luther introduces a more somber theme, observing that this glorious good news of god’s grace will offend many, as simeon had predicted. god’s presence in Christ is hidden in lowliness and cannot be perceived by those who trust in their own spiritual prowess. Therefore, those who proclaim the gospel of justification by grace will encounter opposition from a world enamored with works-righteousness. applying the text to his own situation, luther claimed that the priests of the roman church were among the enemies of the gospel predicted by simeon, and that the proclamation of grace through Christ had evoked their lethal hostility and thereby exposed it to public view. while sharing many common motifs with luther’s interpretation, John Calvin’s exposition of the simeon and anna story diverged in emphasis from luther’s and more closely anticipated Kierkegaard’s engagement with the narrative. like luther, Calvin highlights the passage’s implicit theme of reliance upon grace. in fact, the purification of Christ points to the fact that Christ took upon himself the uncleanness of human nature, an uncleanness that can only be purified by God’s unmerited grace.3 see martin luther, “sunday after Christmas,” in Dr. Martin Luther’s House-Postil or, Sermons on the Gospels for the Sundays and Principal Festivals of the Church-Year, vols. 1–2, trans. by e. schmid and d.m. martens, 2nd ed., Columbus, ohio: J.a. schulze 1884, vol. 1, pp. 152–70; martin luther, “das evangelium am sonntag nach dem Christtag,” in D. Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, abteilung i: Schriften, vols. 1–65, ed. by the Kommission zur herausgabe der werke martin luthers and the heidelberger akademie der wissenschaften, weimar: Böhlau 1883–1929, vol. 10, tome 1.a (1910), pp. 379–448. the sermon in House-Postil was based on an auditor’s notes taken when luther was too ill to preach in church and instead preached at home to his family and friends. 3 Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34, vol. 1, pp. 71–9 (ASKB 92–95). 2

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however, Calvin devotes much more attention to simeon and anna as exemplars of faith. simeon was said to be both pious and just, thereby suggesting that he respected and obeyed the two tables of god’s law. moreover, both characters were not only devout but also humble, not part of the priestly elite. the theme of lowliness (which luther had also stressed) is reinforced in the text by the fact that mary and Joseph offer two turtledoves, which in Leviticus 5:7 is the recommended sacrifice for those who cannot afford a sheep. it is these humble people who trust in the promises of god. simeon and anna, having put aside worldly ambitions, can perceive the glory of Christ hidden under the humble circumstances of his family. Calvin proceeds to emphasize simeon’s and anna’s virtues of expectation and hope directed toward the anticipated redemptive acts of god. in Calvin’s account, the virtue of hope is linked with the virtue of patience. the Christian who trusts in god’s grace must be prepared to encounter the world’s opposition and patiently endure present afflictions. Calvin associates this patient endurance with anna’s decision to abstain from a second marriage, a theme that would be crucial for Kierkegaard. For Calvin, more so than luther, simeon and anna function as paradigms of patient expectancy. Because this pericope was embedded in the cycle of luke’s nativity stories, its origin was part of the general debate concerning the sources of the gospels that had been spawned by the rise of higher criticism. wilhelm martin leberecht de wette (1789–1849), whose introductory text on biblical studies Kierkegaard frequently consulted, claimed that luke had utilized three types of sources: a common oral tradition as proposed by Johann gottfried herder (1744–1803), a variety of fragmentary writings derived from that tradition as suggested by Friedrich schleiermacher (1768–1834), and the gospel of matthew.4 de wette noted the distinctiveness of luke’s pervasive concern for the poor and oppressed and his opposition to the rich. He also identified in Luke a Pauline tendency to stress the universal scope of god’s redemptive activity. de wette concluded that luke had been born a gentile and intended his gospel for a gentile audience. he opined that luke had been composed by a friend of paul, although it had probably not been written under the direct supervision of paul. de wette dealt more explicitly with the simeon and anna story in his brief commentary on luke.5 he argued that simeon was probably not the son of hillel or the father of gamaliel, a theory that had gained some currency. oddly, de wette devoted very little attention to anna. he did stress the role of mary as the “mater dolorosa,” a role rooted in the fact that her son would be “a sign that will be opposed so that the inner thoughts of many will be revealed” (luke 2:34–5). in general, de wette treated the story as a component of the prehistory of Jesus, and noted the striking contradictions between matthew and luke concerning this prehistory. with typical caution, de Wette concluded that it is difficult to determine exactly what actually happened. wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, vol. 2, p. 122; pp. 143–55; pp. 174–6 (ASKB 80). 5 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 23–5 (ASKB 108). 4

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hermann olshausen (1796–1839) had studied with de wette and shared his opinions about the pauline universalizing dynamics in luke’s gospel, but was more conservative than de wette on matters of authorship and historicity.6 he proposed not only that the author of luke was indeed the friend and traveling companion of paul mentioned in acts, but also that paul had probably supervised the composition of the Gospel. Influenced by Friedrich Schleiermacher, Olshausen emphasized the theme that Jesus’ human personality developed according to the general laws of human nature. Therefore, the purification in the temple and the blessing was entirely appropriate, for Jesus’ solidarity with sinful human flesh made such rituals of transformation necessary. to make sense of Jesus’ participation in human vulnerability and the need for growth, olshausen articulated the theme of kenosis, the radical self-emptying of Jesus. For olshausen, luke 2:22–38 was framed by the pervasive motif that Jesus must humble himself and suffer in order to raise his brothers and sisters to a new spiritual level. the deliverance of humanity from sin and suffering could only be accomplished through the condescension of Jesus. the entire passage is an allusion to the future suffering of Christ and the suffering caused by Christ. simeon accurately foretells that Christ will be a stumbling block to many, that the cross will confront individuals with the choice of accepting its message of self-emptying love or succumbing to offense, and that it will provoke widespread opposition. The crucifixion of the messiah confronts the individual with the need to make a decision. olshausen emphasizes the role of mary in this passage, for she is not yet reborn and must discover consolation in the midst of grief. For olshausen, mary functions as the prototype of the follower of Christ who still needs to grow in faith through adversity. within this framework, simeon and anna play the roles of the pure of mind who are led by spirit. They do not rely upon human reflection and autonomous choice, but upon an internal sense of truth which they courageously follow. Olshausen highlights Anna’s tender fidelity to the memory of her deceased husband, a memory that she patiently preserved, and thereby schooled herself in the virtues of perseverance and hope. By stressing these points, olshausen was continuing the interpretive trajectory initiated by Calvin. Kierkegaard could have been familiar with many of these reflections on the simeon and anna story. in the 1832–33 winter term, Kierkegaard heard henrik nicolai Clausen’s (1793–1877) lectures on the synoptic gospels, in which the simeon and anna passage could have been mentioned. Kierkegaard owned Calvin’s new testament commentaries and quoted a passage from one volume in his notes for an exegesis of ephesians from 1834–35.7 he owned de wette’s exposition of luke and frequently relied upon de wette in his exegetical work as a student.8 perhaps most importantly, he also owned olshausen’s monumental work on the new testament and cited it as early as 1838.9 as we shall see, echoes of Calvin and hermann olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments zunächst für Prediger und Studirende, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–44, vol. 1, pp. 131–41 (ASKB 96–100). 7 Pap. i C 35 / JP 6, 5068. 8 SKS 18, 119, gg:2 / KJN 2, 111. 9 Pap. ii C 2. 6

Simeon and Anna: Exemplars of Patience and Expectancy

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olshausen are particularly strong in his one extended treatment of the simeon and anna passage. III. Kierkegaard’s Use of the Simeon and Anna Story references to anna and simeon are not numerous in Kierkegaard’s writings. in an early journal entry of 1838 Kierkegaard mentioned anna and simeon in order to illustrate the theme of the necessity to wait for the lord, who will eventually come even if those awaiting them are old like anna and gray like simeon.10 in this context Kierkegaard calls simeon “noah the 2nd,” an allusion to the description of noah as being “righteous” and “blameless” (genesis 6:9). given the fact that Kierkegaard wrote this entry on december 31, he may just have heard a sermon based on this text which was the lection for the first Sunday after Christmas. In an entry from 1839 Kierkegaard wrote of “perseverance in expectancy” and used the figures of Simeon and anna to contrast an expectation of the eternal and the imperishable with an expectation of the worldly fulfillment of ambition and desire.11 anna and simeon’s expectation of an imperishable and heavenly fulfillment could never be satisfied too late, even if it arrived at the hour of death. in 1844–45 Kierkegaard had planned to compose a “Funeral address for anna the prophetess, phanuel’s daughter,” as a discourse on imagined occasions.12 anna is again associated with “patience in expectation” in a journal entry of 1849.13 in these instances Kierkegaard’s interpretive emphases resemble those of Calvin and olshausen and parallel his more extended treatment of anna and simeon in an upbuilding discourse of 1844, for the two biblical characters function mainly as exemplars of patient hope and trust. without mentioning simeon and anna, Kierkegaard often borrowed phrases derived from the passage in which they figure, such as “the sign of contradiction” that will “disclose the thoughts of their hearts” (luke 2:34).14 in order to describe the pain that the offensive potential that the lowliness of the incarnation, particularly the cross, will cause, Kierkegaard appropriates the image of “the sword that pierces a mother’s heart,” a phrase based on the verse “and a sword will pierce your own soul too” (luke 2: 35).15 he uses this allusion to Christ as the sword that punctures mary’s heart again in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, suggesting that Christ’s profound suffering was the awareness that his life of self-emptying would cause suffering to those who were his intimates.16 moreover, “a sword that passes through your heart” is used to describe the way that a Christian must pass through temporal suffering in order to reach eternity.17 in an upbuilding discourse of 1850 Kierkegaard praises mary for not succumbing to despair even though a sword did 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

SKS 17, 273, dd:187 / KJN 1, 264. SKS 18, 65, ee:191 / KJN 2, 60. Pap. vi B 153 / TD, supplement, p. 113. SKS 22, 48, nB11:79.b / JP 6, 6410. SKS 12, 129–34 / PC, 124–7. SKS 4, 240 / PF, 34. SKS 8, 352 / UD, 254. SKS 10, 113 / CD, 101.

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indeed pierce her heart.18 similarly, Judge for Yourself! employs the expression to indicate that Jesus must inevitably make those precious to him unhappy in worldly terms.19 in a late journal entry of 1854 Kierkegaard claimed that simeon’s words suggest that mary was an exemplar of the human doubt that is triggered by the prospect of Christ’s suffering, causing mary to wonder if the whole promise of redemption had been illusory.20 in all these instances Kierkegaard’s stressing of the potential offensiveness of the prospect of a lowly, suffering messiah and the pain that this humble messiah will engender is in line with the interpretive tradition stretching from luther through olshausen. Kierkegaard’s most extended treatment of the simeon and anna passage occurs in “patience in expectancy,”21 his third discourse on patience, published along with “to preserve one’s soul in patience”22 in Two Upbuilding Discourses in 1844. the first discourse on patience, “To Gain One’s Soul in Patience,” had been published as the last of Four Upbuilding Discourses of 1843.23 “patience in expectancy” is also the centerpiece of a series of three discourses exploring the virtue of expectancy, including “the expectancy of Faith” of 184324 and “the expectancy of an eternal salvation” of 1844.25 Kierkegaard’s exposition of “expectancy” (Forventning) is functionally a meditation on the foundational Christian virtue of “hope” (Haab), as becomes evident in his shift to the word “hope” in “strengthening in the inner Being.”26 Because “patience in expectancy” is the capstone of two major intersecting thematic series in his edifying discourses of 1843–44, simeon and anna play a role in his authorship whose significance is disproportionate to the infrequency and brevity of the two character’s appearance in the Bible. By synthesizing patience and expectancy, they (particularly anna) function as the premier exemplars of the endurance and resilience of Christian hope, as they had somewhat more modestly in Calvin and olshausen. Kierkegaard introduces his reflections on Simeon and Anna with an acknowledgement of the difficulty of speaking about expectancy. This communicative difficulty accounts for the need to have recourse to biblical paradigms of hope, such as anna. the problem is the general human inability to even imagine patient expectancy. this unfortunate incapacity has several roots and appears in several guises. When fulfillment has come, individuals tend to forget the prior expectancy, while those persons who have never experienced expectancy find talk of it to be

SKS 12, 263–4 / WA, 149. SV1 Xii, 443 / JFY, 173. 20 SKS 25, 287–8, nB28:99 / JP 1, 364. 21 SKS 5, 206–24 / EUD, 205–26. 22 SKS 5, 185–205 / EUD, 181–203. 23 SKS 5, 159–74 / EUD, 159–75. 24 SKS 5, 17–37 / EUD, 7–29. 25 SKS 5, 250–68 / EUD, 253–73. SKS 5, 250–68 / EUD, 253–73. 26 SKS 5, 100–1 / EUD, 94–5. see robert roberts, “the virtue of hope in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), pp. 188–9. 18 19

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opaque.27 to make any communication about expectancy even more problematic, Kierkegaard notes that expectancy cannot be grasped by those who in despair blew out the lamp of expectancy,28 those who harden hearts to expectancy in order to avoid disappointment,29 and those who expect nothing.30 he notes the additional impediments to understanding created by those who fragment their souls in busyness,31 and those who romantically yearn for experience to fill them with greater expectancies and therefore disperse themselves in inexpressible cravings and desires to win everything.32 adding these categories of persons together, the set of individuals who are incapable of understanding expectancy would seem to include everyone. perhaps communication about expectancy is impossible and a discourse about expectancy is self-defeating. however, Kierkegaard introduces another set of considerations that more optimistically point to a possible strategy for communication about expectancy. expectancy is not merely a single episodic experience or type of experience, but is a dimension of all experience, a fundamental structure of life in time. Kierkegaard observes, “all life is again one night watch of expectancy.”33 human nature is naturally oriented toward the future actualization of desires and hopes. Because human consciousness transcends the present moment, healthy human life that has not completely succumbed to despair is teleologically oriented toward a future good. Kierkegaard stresses this theme in the first upbuilding discourse, “The Expectancy of Faith,”34 which functions as a foundation for the rest. the problem with humanity is that most individuals dissipate their identities in multifarious piecemeal “petty, transitory expectancies,”35 rather than focusing their attention and energies on the ultimate fulfillment, the “eternal” awaiting individuals in time and at the end of time.36 however, this dispersal of the self can be overcome. Kierkegaard links this prospect of unifying the self through the cultivation of the expectation of eternity with becoming immortal.37 The hunger for such an absolute, enduring fulfillment can be awakened in the human heart. the soul can and should be stirred to expect eternity rather than to expect a hodge-podge of paltry, worldly satisfactions. Because the yearning for unity and continuity has not been entirely extinguished, communication about patient expectancy may be possible. to nurture such expectancy, Kierkegaard enlists the aid of simeon and anna. Kierkegaard does not discursively describe patient expectancy and then authoritatively exhort the reader to go enact it. Kierkegaard does not produce an instruction manual on the rules and regulations of a patient, expectant life or a set of instructions on how 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

SKS 5, 206 / EUD, 205. ibid. SKS 5, 211 / EUD, 210. SKS 5, 219 / EUD, 219–20. SKS 5, 211 / EUD, 211. ibid. SKS 5, 207 / EUD, 206. SKS 5, 25–7 / EUD, 16–17. SKS 5, 207 / EUD, 206. ibid. SKS 5, 214 / EUD, 214.

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to generate hopefulness in oneself. such a didactic exercise would lack the dimension of self-reflection and self-interrogation necessary for grasping the significance of hope for oneself. rather, through the contemplation of a paradigmatic model of expectancy from the past, the appropriate sort of expectancy can be stirred up. an example of patience in expectancy can militate against impatience and the dispersal of the self in trivial hopes. here Kierkegaard’s use of simeon and anna parallels Johannes de silentio’s employment of abraham as a model of hope in Fear and Trembling.38 In both cases the difficulty of understanding the model is confessed, and the incapacity of speech is noted, but silent contemplation of the model is encouraged as a device that might foster the growth of a virtue.39 Kierkegaard’s praise of anna and loving description of the attractiveness of anna’s character invite the reader to imagine the possible joys of a life of patient expectancy, while his confession of the difficulty of comprehending Anna provokes the reader to engage in even more strenuous efforts to understand the life of hope.40 Kierkegaard’s barrage of rhetorical questions about anna’s expectancy goad the reader to imaginatively explore the possible contours of a patient, expectant life. anna’s hope is a mystery that tantalizes and attracts the reader and thereby may catalyze a desire to plumb the meaning of hope by personally appropriating it. as Kierkegaard remarks, not until a person “chooses expectancy, not until then can anna truly become an object of contemplation.”41 To provide an apt object for contemplation, Kierkegaard stresses the figure of anna rather than that of simeon, even though simeon gets more attention in luke. anna is presented as the paradigmatic expectant one, even though it is simeon who is described as the one who was just, devout, and “looking forward” (προσδεχόμενος) to the consolation of Israel (Luke 2:25). For Anna, the ultimate fulfillment of all expectancy is identified with the birth of the promised messiah. The messiah’s birth is the implicit hope of “the age, of the nation, of the generations, of the human race, of adam, and of millions.”42 it is the satisfaction of the primal longing that had been “in the world as early as man learned to understand it.”43 For Kierkegaard, the god whom anna patiently anticipates is the proper and true object of all human longing, and not the highest value in a hierarchy of relatively desirable goods. accordingly, Kierkegaard situates the Simeon and Anna episode in the context of fulfillment of the deepest hopes of the patriarchs.44 Because she is the culmination of the expectancy of ancient israel, the text emphasizes that anna was a prophet.45 By treating anna as the instantiation of all the most profound hopes of israel and by extension of all humanity, Kierkegaard was identifying himself with the interpretive strategies of luther, Calvin, de wette, and olshausen. SKS 4, 105–47 / FT, 9–53. SKS 5, 223 / EUD, 224. 40 see david possen, “Can patience Be taught?” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, pp. 239–40. 41 SKS 5, 213 / EUD, 212. 42 SKS 5, 223 / EUD, 225. 43 SKS 5, 208 / EUD, 207. 44 SKS 5, 209 / EUD, 208. 45 SKS 5, 217 / EUD, 217. 38 39

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Kierkegaard is drawn to anna because of one particular bit of biographical information that the text mentions in passing. Kierkegaard focuses on the fact that anna had remained a widow after she had been married for only seven years, rejecting the possibility of remarriage. as we have seen, both Calvin and olshausen had noted a connection between anna’s patient endurance of her widowhood and fidelity to her deceased husband and her enduring expectation of God’s redemptive activity. Her expectations for ordinary earthly fulfillment were shattered by her decision to remain faithful to the memory of her departed mate. paralleling olshausen, Kierkegaard points out that anna was free according to Jewish law to remarry, so that the prolongation of her single state was voluntary. anna was bound not by external constraint but by freely given love.46 By remaining faithful to her husband, she remained true to herself, raising her love above the vicissitudes of time and circumstance. (In this regard Anna parallels the “knight of infinite resignation” described in Fear and Trembling.) By resolving to continue to love one who was dead anna demonstrated that her love was not contingent upon any hope of earthly reciprocity or any expectation of reward and therefore was impervious to life’s vicissitudes.47 anna’s decision to eschew the temporal consolations of remarriage and presumably the satisfactions of all family ties was implicitly a decision to embrace the eternal. Because of luke’s brief suggestion of anna’s renunciation of the hope of earthly felicity, the figure of Anna has enough thickness to serve as an exemplar of patient expectancy in a way that simeon cannot. Kierkegaard points to a variety of narrative features in luke’s account to foreground the story’s devaluation of ordinary worldly conceptions of fulfillment. in the eyes of society, anna is “poor and forsaken,” as well as “barren,” and is “lost to the world.”48 like olshausen, Kierkegaard contrasts luke’s tale of anna and simeon’s blessing of the newborn messiah to the structurally parallel story in matthew of the adoration of the Christ child by the three kings. matthew’s tale is full of marvels like the miraculous star and expensive gifts while luke’s story emphasizes the poverty and lowliness evident in the interaction of anna and simeon with the holy family. the humble circumstances of Joseph, mary, and Jesus are signaled by the offering that they present at the temple, the offering specified for the destitute.49 Anna’s relinquishing of ordinary marital fulfillment is part of this more general theme of transcending worldly definitions of success and well-being. Kierkegaard’s rhetorical flourishes and stratagems are designed to help the reader feel the attractions of renouncing merely worldly expectations for felicity and instead hoping only in and for god. Kierkegaard’s description makes it clear that anna did not renounce worldly happiness simply in order to embrace a life of masochistic suffering. By giving up the temporal, anna gained the eternal. Because her constant love was not dependent upon temporal outcomes, her life became “fruitful of the eternal.”50 By not remarrying, anna had achieved a unity and continuity that the 46 47 48 49 50

SKS 5, 210 / EUD, 209. SKS 5, 211 / EUD, 210. SKS 5, 223–4 / EUD, 224–5. SKS 5, 224 / EUD, 225. SKS 5, 208–9 / EUD, 207–8. SKS 5, 210 / EUD, 209. SKS 5, 217 / EUD, 218.

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world could neither give nor take away. in fact, she already perceived the eternal through her continuing expectancy in time (which seems in part to be the hope of an eschatological reunion with her husband). patient expectancy is not just a means to the end of attaining the eternal; rather, it is major component of the enjoyment of the eternal. through becoming patiently expectant, an individual is attaining the eternal in time. Because of her renunciation of earthly happiness, Kierkegaard could paint anna’s character in glowing and attractive colors. Kierkegaard proposes that tranquility shown in her eyes. although resigned to the loss of her husband, she was reconciled to life and greeted the future with expectancy.51 most importantly, her hope for her husband gets generalized and thereby acquires overt religious significance.52 anna expands the hope to embrace the future well-being of the whole nation. her expectancy includes not only the hope for reunion with the dear departed, but also hope for the transparency of the self and god, so that god’s providence is no longer experienced as a riddle.53 moreover, anna’s expectancy is resilient and impervious to challenges, for this type of fulfillment can never come too late. Therefore, Anna has no reason to be impatient. The expected fulfillment is not a temporal matter. Kierkegaard contrasts anna with the foolish virgins of matthew 25:1–13, noting that Anna’s expectancy was not contingent upon its speedy fulfillment or even its fulfillment in her life-time, and therefore was impervious to disappointment.54 the delay in the fulfillment of one’s hopes can disappoint an individual only if those hopes are for earthly satisfactions. Anna was confident that the promised birth of the messiah must happen, and that confidence gave her the equanimity of eternity. this portrait of the attractive features of anna’s character can serve to stimulate the reader’s desire to understand patient expectancy more intimately and to personally experience the joys of a life of hope. the resilience of true expectancy is supported by another consideration that Kierkegaard highlights. a critical feature of true expectancy is that its object is not something that can be brought about by a person’s own power.55 Because the actualization of the hope is not dependent on the individual’s agency, the individual can do nothing but leave the fulfillment of her expectancy up to God. The expectation of fulfillment from God makes patience possible.56 Anna is confident that her hope is reliable and that its satisfaction is assured precisely because its actualization does not depend on her own feeble powers or on any unreliable finite agency. Consequently, her expectancy is not vulnerable to discouragement if empirical events seem to conspire against it or to disappointment if its actualization seems to be delayed. Anna’s expectancy was not liable to falsification because it was not predicated upon assessments of empirical probabilities.57 Because she recognized that the time of the 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

SKS 5, 212 / EUD, 211. SKS 5, 223 / EUD, 224. SKS 5, 217 / EUD, 217–18. SKS 5, 216 / EUD, 216. SKS 5, 213 / EUD, 213. SKS 5, 220 / EUD, 221. SKS 5, 221–2 / EUD, 222–3. see roberts, “the virtue of hope in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses,” pp. 192–3.

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fulfillment was in God’s hands and had nothing to do with observable signs of human progress, anna always experienced every moment of her life as being just as close to the fulfillment as every other moment.58 here an even more attractive feature of anna’s expectancy becomes evident. according to Kierkegaard, if a person realizes that he is nothing, and relies totally upon god, that person will be capable of wonder and joy. Kierkegaard concludes the essay: if, however, a person knew how to make himself truly what he truly is—nothing— knew how to set the seal of patience on what he had truly understood—ah, then his life, whether he is the greatest or the lowliest, would even today be a joyful surprise and be filled with blessed wonder and would be that throughout all his says, because there is truly only one eternal object of wonder—that is god—and only one possible hindrance to wonder—and that is a person when he himself wants to be something.59

however, Kierkegaard does not omit the daunting and potentially offensive aspects of anna’s life from his depiction. as we have seen, neither luther nor Calvin nor olshausen ignored the note of ominous foreboding in luke’s narrative. it is important for Kierkegaard that the reader should realize that anna’s patience in expectancy was not just an easily activated innate power to endure life’s vicissitudes. her resilient hopefulness was not any naïve youthful optimism or natural effervescence.60 patient expectancy like anna’s is a hard-won achievement and is not an immediate natural endowment. her attitude to the future was certainly not based on any cognition of what would likely transpire the next moment.61 her hopefulness was not the product of any easy and reassuring calculation of probabilities.62 rather, anna’s disposition of patient anticipation was a new kind of heavenly expectancy born of the collapse of earthly expectations and likelihoods. Kierkegaard writes, “up out of this sea, expectancy rises reborn again and sees heaven open—reborn, no, newborn, for this heavenly expectancy begins precisely when the earthly expectancy sinks down powerless and in despair.”63 anna’s patient expectancy was the fruit of a struggle.64 For anna it was a struggle to persevere; it was a struggle to pray day and night and to thereby cultivate the inward constancy and integrity that could resist all the temptations to scatter the self in the multifarious cares of life. patent expectancy is not an episodic experience that comes over a person, nor is it a singular act that can be performed once and then forgotten. rather, it is a virtuous habit, an enduring disposition to act, think, and feel in particular ways in the face of life’s challenges. as a character trait, patient expectancy is subject to being strengthened or weakened; it is the sort of thing that can be won or lost. therefore, patient expectancy requires ongoing intentional cultivation so that it does not atrophy and degenerate. For this reason Kierkegaard 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

SKS 5, 222 / EUD, 223. SKS 5, 224 / EUD, 226. SKS 5, 219 / EUD, 220. SKS 5, 215 / EUD, 215. SKS 5, 218 / EUD, 219. SKS 5, 214 / EUD, 214. SKS 5, 213–14 / EUD, 213–14. SKS 5, 222 / EUD, 223.

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emphasizes the length of anna’s widowhood and her ongoing, life-long arduous act of renunciation. anna’s celebrated patience is her persistence in sustaining an attitude of hope in the face of all the trials and tribulations that would militate against it by suggesting that the advent of the messiah had been too long delayed. Kierkegaard, like luther, seeks to alert the reader to the reality that the path of patient expectancy is fraught with internal struggles and external opposition. it should not be chosen without full awareness of the difficulties and dangers. In spite of this warning and frank admission of difficulty, Kierkegaard’s discourse most basically celebrates the profound joy of a life of patient expectancy like that of anna. Kierkegaard’s communicative strategy is founded on the assumption that a person can be shaped in the image of the object of that person’s chief expectancy, in the image of that which is most loved by an individual.65 the object of anna’s expectancy was the ultimate fulfillment of humanity’s deepest longings, the advent of the messiah in the fullness of time.66 Because of the superlative and eternal goodness of the object of her hope, even if anna had not lived to see its appearance in time, she would have been shaped in the image of eternity and would have seen fulfillment in eternity.67 By cultivating patient expectancy through the practice of prayer, anna already enjoyed intimate fellowship with god, which was the very thing for which she hoped. Just as anna was reshaped in the image of her object of contemplation, so also the reader can begin to be reshaped through the contemplation of the example of anna. the reader’s gaze can be redirected to the eternity that was the focus of anna’s attention.

65 66 67

SKS 5, 218 / EUD, 219. ibid. SKS 5, 223 / EUD, 224.

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Simeon and Anna [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34, vol. 1, pp. 176–81 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 58–65 (ASKB 106–107). [herder, Johann gottfried], Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 9, pp. 74–83 (ASKB 1676–1684). hersleb, svend Borchmann, Lærebog i Bibelhistorien, 3rd printing, Copenhagen: Fr. Brummer 1826, pp. 173–7 (ASKB 186). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments zunächst für Prediger und Studirende, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–44, vol. 1, pp. 131–41 (ASKB 96–100). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, vol. 2, p. 122; pp. 143–55; pp. 174–6 (ASKB 80). —— Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 23–5 (ASKB 108). winer, georg Benedict, Biblisches Realwörterbuch zum Handgebrauch für Studirende, Kandidaten, Gymnasiallehrer und Prediger, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Carl heinrich reclam 1833–38, vol. 1, p. 544; vol. 2, p. 635 (ASKB 70–71). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of Simeon and Anna Burgess, andrew, “patience and expectancy in Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2000, p. 209. grøn, arne, “temporality in Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2000, pp. 191–204. guillamore hansen, p., Søren Kierkegaard og Bibelen, Copenhagen: p. haase 1924, pp. 159–64. Kangas, david, “the logic of gift in Kierkegaard’s Four Upbuilding Discourses,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2000, pp. 100–20.

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lotti, michael, “an education in possibility,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), pp. 150–4. parkov, peter, Bibelen i Søren Kierkegaards “Samlede Værker,” Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1983, p. 34; p. 72; pp. 81–2. pattison, george, Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology, london: routledge 2002, pp. 35–64; pp. 118–40. perkins, robert l., “upbuilding as a propaedeutic for Justice,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), pp. 348–56. possen, david, “Can patience Be taught?” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), pp. 239–63. roberts, robert, “the virtue of hope in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), p. 188; pp. 199–201. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, p 174. Shakespeare, Steven, “A Word of Explanation: Transfiguring Language in Kierkegaard’s Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), p. 97. walsh, sylvia, “when ‘that single individual’ is a woman,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), p. 47.

Jesus’ miracles: Kierkegaard on the miracle of Faith Jolita pons

I. in this article we aim to provide an overview of Kierkegaard’s interpretation of miracles,1 more specifically of the miracles performed by Jesus Christ as described in the new testament. in The Book on Adler Kierkegaard discusses the concept “miracle” in greek thought and in the Christian tradition. For the greeks, a wonder, prodigy, or miracle is something imperfect, since it is a deviation, an abnormality. Kierkegaard emphasizes the fact that, contrary to the view of the greeks, in traditional Christianity a prodigy or miracle is usually seen as something extraordinary, as higher than the norm, as superior to the commonplace. however, Kierkegaard proposes, “the true dialectic of the prodigy is the unity of these two elements,”2 that is, the unity of the imperfect (the greek view) and the more-than-perfect, the extraordinary (the traditional Christian view). First, a miracle is regarded as a phenomenon lower than the norm or the general category, and then in the paradoxical sense it is viewed as something higher than the norm. we will see throughout this article that “miracle” for Kierkegaard is a dialectical concept, defined by the tension between these poles. For the Christian world the understanding of miracle has been generally shaped by the definition given by St. Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica. according to aquinas, a miracle is an occurrence that “lies outside the order of nature.”3 it seems that in the philosophical tradition the “outside the order of nature” theme has been assimilated to the “against the order of nature” theme.4 thus david hume the word “miracle” comes from the latin mirare, to be astonished, to wonder. the danish word vidunder coming from the verb undre has the same etymology. sometimes Kierkegaard makes a distinction between a wonder and a miracle, using respectively the danish words under and mirakel, but when speaking about the miracles in the new testament he usually refers to them as mirakel. it is my impression that usually Kierkegaard uses under and mirakel synonymously. 2 Pap. vii–2 B 235 / WA, supplement, p. 162. 3 thomas aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 110, art. 4. 4 philosophers had been actively interested in the concept of miracle long before Kierkegaard, but in earlier centuries they had been unable to question it radically because of the power and control of the church. Questioning the reality of miracles would have amounted to heresy and been perceived as a denial of god’s existence or at least god’s omnipotence. this situation of repression led to all sorts of exotic approaches to miracles (both to the miracles 1

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(1711–66) in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals claims, “A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.”5 in his article concerning Kierkegaard and miracles Jyrki Kivelä comments, “Kierkegaard is only tangentially interested in the philosophical problem of miracles. according to Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms, the miraculous element is never immediately observable in an alleged miracle.”6 Kivelä also remarks, “in Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays Kierkegaard writes how ascension ‘disrupts or contravenes natural laws’ and how it ‘goes against all the laws of nature,’ but he does not call ascension a miracle and, in fact, does not explicitly discuss natural laws in relation to miracles at all!”7 the claim that Kierkegaard was not really interested in the philosophical issues pertaining to miracles is true only to a certain extent. For Kierkegaard the question of miracles is an integral part of the question of faith, and is closely related to some of the other major themes in his literature, such as paradox, offense, and the absurd. therefore, he did treat the concept “miracle” from a philosophical point of view as he was elaborating these other themes. Kivelä adds that Kierkegaard “also shows very little interest in miracles explicitly defined as violations of natural laws.”8 indeed, it does seem that Kierkegaard was not interested in the traditional philosophical debate about the relation of miracles to the natural laws. Kierkegaard simply did not conceive the miracles of the new testament as being contrary to nature. according to Kierkegaard, the “wonder” is against nature, but the “miracle” in the new testament is above nature. thus Kierkegaard speaks of the new testament and to any contemporary claims about alleged miracles). For example, as early as 1699 an anonymous author who may have been george hooper (1640–1727) published A Calculation of the Credibility of Human Testimony in which he discussed methods of calculating the credibility of reports of miracles based on mathematical formulas. in the eighteenth century a major debate about miracles became more heated in great Britain and the european continent. in addition to the well-known interpretations of miracles advanced by John locke and david hume, a range of other authors, including thomas sherlock (1678–1761), peter annet (1693–1769), and thomas woolston (1668–1733) contributed controversial material to the discussion. thomas woolston published Six Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour (1727–29), was convicted of criminal blasphemy, and died in prison. some of hume’s contemporaries were very enthusiastic about possible uses of the probability calculus (such as attempts by pierre laplace (1749–1827) and Charles Babbage (1791–1871) to use the probability calculus to quantify the validity of eyewitness testimony and in part the validity of multiple testimonies). on the other hand, in his Dictionary of Philosophy voltaire claimed that for god to perform miracles would be inconsistent with the perfection of creation. the created order is in no need of improvement, so the concept of miracle contradicts rather than supports belief in god’s omnipotence. 5 david hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, oxford: oxford university press 1995, p. 115, note 1. 6 Jyrki Kivelä, “Kierkegaard on miracles: introductory observations,” Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 43, 2002, pp. 11–15. to my knowledge this is the only piece of secondary literature dedicated exclusively to the question of miracles in Kierkegaard’s works. 7 ibid., p. 12. 8 ibid., p. 11.

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about John the Baptist, whose origin he describes “as marvelous (vidunderlig) as the origin of the one whose coming he proclaimed, but the difference here again was the same as the difference between the marvel (det Vidunderlige) that an aged woman becomes pregnant, which is contrary to the order of nature (mod Naturens Orden), and that a pure virgin bears a child by the power of god, which is above the order of nature (over Naturens Orden).”9 thus for him the miracles in the new testament are neither outside nor against natural laws but rather are above them. indeed, for Kierkegaard miracles represent or reflect an utterly new order of things.10 But even if he is not concerned with the relation between miracles and the laws of nature or with the relation between miracles and historicity, Kierkegaard does discuss miracles quite extensively. the proof of Kierkegaard’s keen interest in miracles is the fact that a reference to miracles is featured in the titles of two of his books, namely The Sickness unto Death and Philosophical Fragments. the reference in The Sickness unto Death is to the celebrated passage that includes that phrase in John 11:4. we remember that in spite of Jesus’ announcement that this sickness is not unto death, lazarus nevertheless does die. however, even though the reality of lazarus’ death is emphasized by the text, it is paradoxically the case that not only was the sickness not unto death, but it was in fact unto life in the most pre-eminent sense—unto the glory of god. the reason that this sickness was not unto death was not because lazarus had been sick, had died, and been raised from the dead, but “because he (Christ, the power of new life) exists.”11 Kierkegaard quotes the Bible to explain lazarus’ death, which is “for the glory of god, so that the son of god may be glorified by means of it.”12 at least this particular miracle of lazarus’ restoration to earthly life serves to illustrate the glory of god.13 Already this first example shows a double movement intrinsic to miracles: miracles happen only if one believes, but their happening makes one believe or strengthens one’s belief. the passage about lazarus opens with Jesus stressing the need to believe during his conversation with martha in John 11:25–7, and it closes with the result that after the miracle had been performed “many…believed in him.”14 in Philosophical Fragments a crucial passage pertaining to miracles cites the example of one of Jesus’ works in John 6:12. After having fed 5,000 people with five barley loaves and two small fish, “he (Jesus) said unto his disciples, ‘Gather up the fragments left over, so that nothing may be lost.’ ”15 (echoing this miraculous episode in John 6:35, a most notable passage, Jesus says, “i am the bread of life.”) several times in his literature Kierkegaard comments on this miracle and the significant fact that the crumbs, the “fragments,” were commanded to be gathered up after the multitude had eaten. Kierkegaard writes: SKS 5, 271 / EUD, 277. SKS 18, 120, gg:3 / KJN 2, 111–12. 11 SKS 11, 124 / SUD, 7. 12 Jn 11:4. 13 Crudely speaking, it seems that Jesus lets lazarus die so that he can perform a miracle of resurrection that would be even more spectacular and more powerful than the miracle of healing. 14 Jn 11:45. 15 Jn 6:12. 9

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Jolita Pons In the feeding of the five thousand (John 6:1–15) there is presented a remarkable example of the union of wealth and economy. After sufficient food for five thousand had been procured by a miracle (what abundance compares with this!), one would expect the leftovers to be wasted. But god is never like that—everything was carefully gathered together, according to the gospel. the human way is to be unable to work miracles and at the same time to waste the leftovers. the divine way is miraculously to create the abundance and then to gather up the crumbs.16

elsewhere Kierkegaard notes, “But Christ performs a miracle and can perform a miracle at any moment—and he has the crumbs collected; he does not disdain the crumbs.”17 the capacity to create abundance is set in relation to economy and to the respect that should be shown towards a very small, very “humble” amount of resources. this episode functions as a paradigm of Christ’s concern for the small and the insignificant, and for the poor and the sick. Even though Christ has multiplied the bread and can presumably repeat the miracle, the fragments are gathered up to the very last one. this juxtaposition parallels other polar opposites that are kept in dialectical tension in the person of Jesus, such as the contrast between his ability to perform miracles, to make the impossible possible, and his non-resistance to crucifixion. Indeed, as we will see later, the performance of miracles draws attention to the contrast or contradiction between the demonstration of omnipotence and the correlative expression of impotence. II. Miracle and Proof traditionally miracles have been linked to the demonstration or proof of god’s existence and his omnipotence. apart from his general skepticism concerning the possibility of any proof or demonstration in relation to god (see, for example, Concluding Unscientific Postscript), miracles in particular for Kierkegaard are not a proof of god’s being or attributes, at least not directly. in no fashion is the occurrence of a miracle a proof of god’s existence. however, the fact that an individual has believed an event to be a miracle could be considered as a sort of demonstration of that person’s faith (but, of course, this is rather tautological). Kierkegaard asserts that instead of judging spiritually, human beings want an “indication” (Kendetegn) that would show them what is good and perfect, complete with a proof that the message really comes from above. people want a sign, a miracle that would dissipate all doubt. But is it possible that something material, a concrete sign, could open up the domain of the spiritual and be decisive? Could proof in the form of flesh and blood evidence be the real opposite of doubt, or would such alleged proof not rather be the confidant of doubt (Tvivlens Fortrolige)?18 indeed, in matthew 24:24 Jesus warns against the performance of signs (assimilating them to wonders), inviting the hearer to withhold trust in these. By warning that “false messiahs and false prophets will appear and produce great signs 16 17 18

SKS 20, 110, nB:176 / JP 3, 2717. SKS 20, 225, nB2:218 / JP 3, 2318. SKS 5, 138 / EUD, 134.

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and omens,” Jesus seems to suggest that he is not recognizable by signs or miracles. on the other hand, miracles are presented as a possible proof of Jesus’ divine power in the new testament itself, even though trust in their testimony is presented as the “second best” option, needed only if the word is not enough. thus in John 14:11 we read: “Believe me that i am the Father and the Father is in me; but if you do not, then believe me because of the works themselves.” Because of this “external” aspect Kierkegaard sometimes speaks about a supposed miracle as something superficial and superfluous, and as something akin to a sensory illusion. he remarks, “the point is that in Christendom one has only a fantasy picture of Christ, a fantasy God-figure, directly related to performing miracles. But this is an untruth; Christ never looked like that. the Christianity of Christendom is fantasy in both respects—with respect to miracles and with respect to Christ.”19 elsewhere Kierkegaard also says that the truth should be understood on its own terms and not with the help of “supporting means” that supposedly make it easier to understand. such means, including miracles, are illusions (Sandsebedrag). But he also claims that an alleged miracle is the truth for the believer, although it is not for one who does not believe.20 if a miracle were a proof of truth, it would be nothing but illusion. without faith any miracle is an illusion. a miracle can be considered to be “subjective,” but only in the sense in which subjectivity is truth for Kierkegaard, not in a fantastic psychological way. however, Kierkegaard seems to agree that at least to a certain extent a miracle is a sign (but perhaps it is not only an external sign; perhaps it is a sign of internal change when the internal miracle echoes the external one in the rebirth or confirmation of an individual’s faith). Even though a priori miracles are intended for those who are of little faith, hoping to benefit those who need to see before they believe, we will discover that in Kierkegaard’s literature the role of miracles is not quite so simple. in fact, miracles truly exist or happen only for those who have faith. They cannot be dissociated from faith if we are to avoid disfiguring them and confusing them with illusions, tricks, and suchlike. the question of miracles as proofs should be considered in the larger context of proofs of the existence of god, or of the historical reliability of the Bible, and more generally in the context of an historical approach to faith. we know that Kierkegaard did not think that historical accounts can validate or invalidate matters related to faith. For example, he writes, “lessing opposes what i would call quantifying oneself into qualitative decision; he contests the direct transition from historical reliability to a decision on an eternal happiness. he does not deny (for he is quick to make concessions so that the categories can become clear) that what is said in the scriptures about the miracles and prophecies is just as reliable as other historical reports, in fact, is as reliable as historical reports can be.”21 however, the historic account is indifferent to the situation of an individual human being; strictly speaking, it cannot be interesting to an individual. if the miracles are to function as demonstrations, they can do so only as some kind of confirmation. They can demonstrate only “internally,” only for 19 20 21

SKS 12, 106 / PC, 97. SKS 19, 403, not13:39 / JP 4, 4319. SKS 7, 94 / CUP1, 95–6.

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a believer. Consequently, they are not demonstrations in any conventional sense. Kierkegaard writes, “the demonstrations for the divinity of Christ that scripture sets forth—his miracles, his resurrection from the dead, his ascension—are indeed only for faith, that is, they are not demonstrations.”22 Based on matthew 11:6 (see also luke 7:23), Kierkegaard provides a more complex and a more nuanced interpretation of miracles considered as proofs or demonstrations: matthew 11:6 (parallel passage to luke 7:23). From his prison John the Baptist has sent a message to Christ asking him whether he is the one who is come or should they look for another. (4) and Jesus answered and said to them: go and tell John the things that you hear and see: (5) the blind see and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the good news is preached to the poor (6) and blessed is he who is not offended at me. thus Christ does not answer directly; he does not say: tell John i am the expected one. that is, he requires faith and therefore cannot give someone who is absent a direct communication.23

although it seems that in answering John the Baptist’s question Christ does indeed cite miracles as proof, Kierkegaard draws our attention to the second part of Christ’s answer. this portion of Christ’s response suggests that miracles by themselves cannot serve as a direct proof and that Christ immediately links miracles to the possibility of offense, that is, to the trial that miracles trigger and to the challenge to not be offended by them. Kierkegaard thus continues: moreover, Christ’s answer contains in contento [in brief] what customarily goes under the name of “demonstrations of the truth of Christianity,” but without the evidence from prophecies…with the exception of the evidence from prophecies, the other demonstrations of the truth of Christianity are contained in Christ’s answer. he alludes to the miracles (the lame walk, the blind see, etc.) and to the teaching itself (good news is preached to the poor): and then, strangely enough, he adds, “Blessed is he who is not offended at me.”…he does not say: Ergo i am the expected one; he says after having referred to the demonstrations: Blessed is he who is not offended at me.24

thus Kierkegaard explicitly relates miracles to paradox and the possibility of offense (we will address these issues a bit later) in relation to their function as a demonstration. he writes: where, then, does the possibility of offense lie? there is a miracle here, and the miracle is the demonstration, and it is on the basis of the miracle that one has wanted to demonstrate directly the truth of Christianity!...with our knowledge of who Christ is (if in other respects one can have knowledge of that at all) or at least imagining that we have knowledge, let us not, coming eighteen hundred years later, consider the miracle and then—become convinced. what abysmal nonsense! if we know who Christ is, how can the demonstration be said to demonstrate it to us!...if it is to mean anything that miracles demonstrate who Christ is, then we certainly must begin with our not knowing who he 22 23 24

SKS 12, 41 / PC, 26. SKS 12, 103 / PC, 94. SKS 12, 104 / PC, 95.

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is, accordingly in the situation of contemporaneity with an individual human being who is like other human beings, in whom there is nothing to be seen directly, an individual human who does miracles and himself claims to do miracles!...You see something inexplicable, miraculous (but no more); he himself says that it is a miracle—and you see before your eyes an individual human being. the miracle can demonstrate nothing, for if you do no believe him to be who he says he is, then you deny the miracle.25

it is thus a deadlock: if you do not know who Christ is (not historically and externally, but personally), then miracles cannot prove that he is god. at most, miracles may show that he is a very skilful magician. if, on the other hand, an individual does believe him to be the god-man, then miracles do not teach that person anything new. Consequently, we have to search for another meaning of miracles. For Kierkegaard, a miracle is an object of faith; therefore, it is incompatible with any factual, concrete proof. Kierkegaard asserts, “even a miracle…gives no material (sandselig) certainty, since the miracle is the object of faith.”26 a miracle cannot function as proof because it belongs to another sphere. the material/sensual and the spiritual spheres do not communicate directly and should not be confused with one another; the lack of immediate interchangability between them is a recurrent theme throughout Kierkegaard’s works. Because a miracle is neither natural nor against nature, it is neither reasonable nor unreasonable, but can only be an object of faith. a miracle is as inaccessible to reason as is the absurd or the paradox; that is, reason has no power at all to dissolve it into nonsense or prove that it is nonsense.27 Kierkegaard says: after all both are equally meaningless: either (this is what lessing himself does, that is, by publishing the wolfenbüttel Fragments) to employ all one’s acumen to show the unreasonableness of a miracle and then on that basis (that it is unreasonable) conclude that it is ergo no miracle—but would it be a miracle if it were reasonable?—or (this is the wisdom of speculation) to employ all one’s profundity and acumen to understand the miracle, to make it understandable, and then conclude that it ergo is a miracle because it is understandable—but then it is indeed no miracle. no, let miracle be what it is: an object of faith.28

Kierkegaard maintains, “what is decisive is that with god everything is possible.”29 He bases this affirmation on Matthew 19:26: “For mortals it is impossible, but with god all things are possible.” with god everything is made possible for us, and belief in that divinely given possibility is an essential characteristic of faith. the possibility and the impossibility correspond to faith and to understanding. to believe is indeed to lose the understanding in order to gain god. if the belief that what is impossible for humans is possible for god is a tenet that is decisive for faith, then it obviously follows that the belief in miracles is decisive for faith, for a good definition of “miracle” is the making possible of the impossible. 25 26 27 28 29

SKS 12, 105 / PC, 96. SKS 11, 101–2 / WA, 97–8. SKS 23, 23, nB15:25 / CUP2, supplement, p. 99. SKS 22, 44, nB11:75 / JP 3, 2720. see SKS 4, 137 / FT, 46. SKS 20, 83, nB:107 / JP 5, 5961.

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II. The telos of Miracle if a miracle is not meant to serve as a proof, what purpose does it serve? on the one hand, Kierkegaard seems to assert that it actually serves no purpose, at least no tangible or immediate purpose. however, the two considerations that a miracle is not a demonstration or a proof, and that it does not have an immediate purpose do not mean that a miracle is meaningless or useless. on the contrary, Kierkegaard repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of miracles for every generation. Kierkegaard claims that the category “miracle” is essential to Christianity, and that the acceptance of miracles is inseparable from being a Christian. Kierkegaard warns that “when there are no longer any miracles Christianity no longer exists at all.”30 there are different types of miracles. some serve to accentuate an immediately beneficial effect such as a healing (even though we will see later that Kierkegaard does not think that physical healing is the primary function even in these cases), while others, such as calming the sea or turning water into wine, do not seem to serve any purpose. in any case, according to Kierkegaard the concrete telos does not exhaust the meaning of a miracle. Kierkegaard writes, “this finite intention robs the miracle, along with everything higher, of its true infinity, its true divine freedom.”31 A miracle is an expression of infinity and freedom; it is superfluous but necessary. A miracle is an infinite excess that is not limited to concrete goals and practical consequences; its significance is not restricted to its immediate beneficial effects. Kierkegaard says, “how infinitely stupid it is to regard Christian miracles thinking only about a beneficial intention, as if the power of the infinite which breaks all laws and boundaries was not—si placet—a reasonable ground for miracle. like the miracle which turns water into wine at a marriage.”32 miracle breaks not only natural laws but also “rational” or economic laws; it is a testimony of infinity. Kierkegaard places the concept “miracle” in the very heart of faith—together with “paradox” and “the absurd” it constitutes the sign of contradiction. Kierkegaard observes: Conceited sensibleness considers itself qualified to protest the miracle when it does not appear to have a finite teleology, it is not beneficial, for example. Christ’s commanding the sea (Mt 8:26) to be calm and quiet is not judged to have any such finite teleology— ergo. o human sensibleness! no, the miracle is to be regarded from another side. it is a part, especially by way of contrast, of making Christ the object of faith, the sign of contradiction, wherein lies the possibility of offense. the miracle comes again in the passion story. here the tension arises precisely from his being impotent in this way—he who commanded even the waves and the wind, almost as if merely for the enjoyment of his divine power.33

he suggests that if one does not want to consider miracles in the deepest sense, then the aesthetic sense seems at least as appropriate as the utilitarian one. Kierkegaard proposes, “But if one does not want to enter into the far more profound inquiry 30 31 32 33

SKS 25, 395, nB30:17 / JP 3, 2725. SKS 18, 120, gg:3 / KJN 2, 112. SKS 22, 346, nB:14:5. SKS, 25, 246, nB28:39 / JP 3, 2723.

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whereby miracles are viewed as part of the new order of things, which in the new testament is called the Kingdom of heaven, then it seems to me that the purely esthetic side of miracles could make just as strong a case as the moral.”34 miracle is a “foretaste” of a new order; it interrupts the usual course of the temporal world and provides a glimpse of the eternal, of the kingdom of heaven. in this sense a miracle is like an instant. But if a miracle is not considered from the perspective of faith, then its aesthetic dimensions are as powerful as its ethical nuances. Kierkegaard writes: The meaning of the miracle of the five loaves and two fish is not that a person should expect something similar, nor is it that preacher-prattle about how frequently even a little has proved to be sufficient—this is nothing more than an attempt to explain the miraculous by the nonmiraculous, by substituting something which is not a miracle. the meaning is that the troubled person should let himself be quieted, should be edified or built up by the thought of the power of the almighty, be built up and quieted by the release which miracle provides. The miracle has esthetic significance. It is like a drama, except that it must be believed, but it should have a cleansing and quieting effect on the troubled person’s passions, so that he does not remain completely prosaic and petty of heart.35

one of the meanings of miracle then seems to be the experience of catharsis. Kierkegaard speaks about an aesthetic mis-en-scène and compares miracle to a theater play. it seems then that one of the functions of miracle is to impress the individual with the power of the divine and to open the soul up for the absurd. Kierkegaard considers this widening of the soul to be an upbuilding aspect of miracles.36 miracles are part of Christ’s indirect communication; they serve to “draw attention” to the paradoxical nature of Christ’s identity, life, and teachings. Kierkegaard observes: But lest this contradiction become a contradiction that exists for no one or does not exist for anyone—somewhat like a mystification that is so extraordinarily successful that its effect is nil—there must be something that draws attention to it. the miracles essentially serve this purpose, and a single direct statement about being god. Yet neither the miracle nor the single direct statement is absolutely direct communication; for in that case the contradiction is eo ipso cancelled. as far as the miracle, which is the object of faith, is concerned, this is certainly easy to see; as for the second, that the single direct statement is nevertheless not direct communication, this will be shown later.37

III. Miracle as Part of Indirect Communication according to Kierkegaard, Jesus’ miracles play a major part in his indirect communication. Kierkegaard observes, “that is, he himself makes it clear that in 34 35 36 37

SKS 18, 120, gg:3 / JP 3, 2713. SKS 20, 96, nB:140 / JP 3, 2715. SKS 22, 140, nB11:232 / JP 3, 3485. SKS 12, 140 / PC, 126.

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relation to him there can be no question of any demonstrating, that we do not come to him by means of demonstrations, that there is no direct transition to becoming Christian, that demonstrations can at best serve to make a person aware, so that made aware he can now come to the point: whether he will believe or he will be offended.”38 drawing attention and making aware are recurrent features of indirect communication that allow an individual to make a choice in freedom. But at the same time a miracle is also presented as the occasion for a spiritual trial. Kierkegaard warns, “the miracle can make aware—now you are in the tension, and it depends upon what you choose, offense or faith; it is your heart that must be disclosed.”39 another feature of indirect communication is the invisible presence of the one who communicates. For example, in his interpretation of the healing of the blind man in John 9:1–38 Kierkegaard emphasizes the themes of invisibility and the incognito. in this passage a direct link between the presence of Christ and the miraculous healing is absent. what is highlighted is not the miraculous event in itself but the fact that Christ made the beneficial act as hidden as possible. When Christ made it possible for the blind man to receive his sight, he sent him away and told him to go wash in the pool of siloam.40 Kierkegaard remarks, “here he received his sight, but the lord was not standing with him there, and in this way he who was his benefactor knew how to make himself invisible to him, even though his benefaction consisted in giving him his sight.”41 this plays down the spectacular side of the miracle by distancing the cause from the effect. a miracle does indeed happen but not in an obvious or demonstrative way; the miracle happens rather than is performed. it needs to be remarked, however, that Kierkegaard deliberately ignores one aesthetically spectacular aspect of the episode that immediately precedes Jesus’ sending away of the blind man: in John 9:6 Jesus spits on the ground to make clay to anoint the eyes of the blind man. For Kierkegaard miracles are dialectical and have a double structure. the relation is as follows: “first comes the faith which believes miracles, believes because it sees miracles, and then next, the faith which believes although no miracles happen. These two qualifications are the qualifications faith, and the marks of offense and the absurd are there.”42 Kierkegaard separates this phenomenon in two movements: first an individual believes because he sees miracles, while in the second stage an individual believes even if there are no miracles. a miracle is like a propadeutic, a preparation for the second stage of faith, which involves the capacity to abandon reason, to accept the absurd, and not to be offended at paradox. the existence of the god-man is the paradox, the absurd, and a miracle is the realization of the absurd, not simply of the impossible, but of the impossible that due to faith (because it is believed) becomes the absurd. in the double structure of miracles we can hear echoes of another main category related to faith, namely, repetition. Kierkegaard writes, “imagine one of those 38 39 40 41 42

SKS 12, 104–5 / PC, 95–6. SKS 12, 105 / PC, 96. Jn 9:7. SKS 5, 154 / EUD, 153. Pap. viii–1 a 672 / JP 2, 1125.

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unfortunates whom Christ healed by a miracle. in order to be healed, the person must believe—now he believes and is healed. now he is healed—and now that he is saved, his faith is twice as strong. it is not this way: he believed and then the miracle happened and then it was all over. No, the fulfillment doubles his faith; after the fulfillment, his faith is twice as strong as it was before he was saved.”43 the miracle participates in the repetition and redoubling of faith. in Kierkegaard’s account, Jesus performs miracles in the manner of a socratic midwife. Jesus himself says that it is the person himself who actually accomplishes the miracle. in the new testament the active role of the believer is emphasized several times. For example, in luke 11:19 Jesus says “your faith has made you whole,” and in matthew 9:29 he touches the eyes of some blind men and declares, “according to your faith let it be done to you.” similarly, in matthew 9:2 Jesus discerns the faith of the people carrying the paralytic and tells them to take heart. the reality of the “material” aspect of a biblical miracle is never denied by Kierkegaard; indeed, he speaks of the certainty of healing and of being “helped to faith” by such healing.44 however, at the same time the materiality of the miracle is somehow transcended. although the practical, concrete nature of the miraculous event is acknowledged (through various references) as actually having happened, this physical dimension is never emphasized as such. while there is an “objective” event of healing, the concrete action—whether against, above or outside nature—in itself does not constitute a miracle. the objective component is always only a prelude to the real miracle. the real miracle happens only if an individual believes, and it is that individual’s faith that saves the person; it is the faith that performs the miracle.45 that is, faith is the phenomenon that is truly miraculous. We should briefly consider the relation between miracles and sin, and healing and sin. in the story about the paralytic (matthew 9:1–8), Jesus says that he will show that the son of humanity is given the power to forgive sins. therefore, he says to the afflicted person, “Stand up, take your bed and go to your home.”46 Kierkegaard observes, “it was a miracle when Christ said to the paralytic: Your sins are forgiven, arise and walk. But if that miracle does not happen to me now—what miraculous cheerfulness (Frimodighed) one’s faith must have to believe that sin is entirely forgotten…to believe this and to become a new man so that one hardly recognizes himself again!”47 it seems that it is the forgiveness of sins (and proactively the faithful individual’s repentance and belief in the forgiveness of sins) that is truly miraculous; the ability to stand up and walk is only a consequence. miracles do not only heal physical sickness; they heal persons in more profound ways. miracles can liberate an individual from the power of evil and conduct an individual to the kingdom of god.48 in other words, the miracle for Kierkegaard is the “healing of the soul,” the personal renaissance, the spiritual awakening. the real miracle is 43 44 45 46 47 48

SKS 12, 292 / WA, 176. see SKS 12, 89 / PC, 75. SKS 17, 262, dd:144–144.a / KJN 1, 253. SKS 24, 80, nB21:129 / JP 2, 1223. SKS 20, 360, nB4:156 / JP, 2, 1213. SKS 18, 121, gg:5 / KJN 2, 112–13.

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to become different while yet remaining the same; the real miracle is to become “newborn.” Kierkegaard underlines the theme that a person is blessed if he believes in miracles, and he immediately associates this motif with belief in the forgiveness of sin. Kierkegaard writes: and whatever a person’s condition in life is to be, whether he is to live in poverty and misery, blessed is the one who is not offended but believes that he fed five thousand people with five loaves and two small fish, blessed is the one who is not offended but believes that it happened, is not offended because it does not happen now but believes that it did happen…and whatever the person’s transgression may be, if his guilt was so terrible that not merely he himself but humanity despaired of the possibility of its being forgiven—and yet blessed is the one who is not offended but believes that he said to the paralytic, “Your sins are forgiven,” and that it was just as easy for him to say that to the paralytic as to say “pick up your bed, get up and walk” (mt 9:2–5; mk 2:5–9, lk 5:20– 23)—blessed is the one who is not offended but believes in the forgiveness of sins even though not helped to faith, as in the case of the paralytic, by the certainty of healing.49

on the other hand, in one of his journal entries Kierkegaard gives a metaphorical interpretation of deafness: “What we find in Mk 7:31–37 ‘he could not hear’ describes hum. knowledge as it was before Christianity for heaven had not been opened to him, and god’s word has not re-sounded [gjenlydt] (for although everything had been created by god, there was not yet a re-sounding, a re-sonance in creation).”50 the miracle then can be understood as a parable or metaphor, where “blind and deaf” functions as a metaphor for sinfulness, and lack of faith is the only cause of the physical sickness. if sickness is related to sin, then when sins are forgiven, healing is a “normal” consequence. the only extraordinary thing, the only true miracle, is that sins can be forgiven. however, there is always a tension between the metaphorical and the literal interpretation of the Bible in Kierkegaard’s works. this passage should be understood in the context of repetition; the miracle happens when god’s words start resonating in an individual, and when an individual begins to appropriate them. nevertheless, Kierkegaard reminds us not to forget Jesus’ practical side, for Jesus also helped individuals to cope with their temporal and earthly needs. his concern for earthly well-being is evident in his efforts to heal the sick and feed the multitudes.51 Because of the benevolence manifested in Jesus’ healing miracles, Kierkegaard sometimes refers to those miracles in order to show what concrete “earthly” acts of love are like. the example of the gratitude of one of the ten lepers whom Jesus had healed leads us to another aspect of miracles,52 namely, the fact that a miracle is conceived by Kierkegaard as a burden, as a requirement to follow the savior. several times in his works Kierkegaard emphasizes how demanding the event of a miracle is. Kierkegaard protests that although modern Christians often claim that miracles are 49 50 51 52

SKS 12, 89 / PC, 75. SKS, 18, 59, ee:171 / KJN 2, 54. SKS 22, 283–4, nB13:18 / JP 1, 347. SKS 17, 262, dd:144 / KJN 1, 253.

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no longer needed now that Christianity has become so widespread, there is actually more need of miracles now than ever before. Contemporary people are clever enough to understand how demanding and strained [anstrenget] life would become if they really had to deal with miracles.53 according to Kierkegaard, far from being a relief or a help, a miracle is more of a burden.54 Kierkegaard maintains that, as it is described in the new testament, Christianity involves existing with intensity. part of this intensity is the fact that it is immensely demanding to be contemporary with miracles.55 miracles are not a favor from god, but are rather an engagement with god. they are a call to follow the one who performs them. even the concrete beneficial effects of miracles are tied up with this requirement. For Kierkegaard, the meaning of “miracle” is obvious; it means “to follow.” he observes, “Christ’s meaning is clear—the one who has been helped (with the help of miracles) should now unite with him, become his imitator [Efterfølger], forsake this world….in order to perform miracles Christ presupposes: faith. essentially this means that the one who wants to be helped must be prepared to will to die to the world….this is the relationship, and then all this about miracles loses its fascination.”56 IV. Miracle and Paradox, Offense, and the Absurd we have mentioned that in Kierkegaard’s works miracles are understood in relation to major aspects of faith, such as paradox and offense. the paradox is the claim that the eternal essential truth has come into existence in time. Climacus writes, “the paradox is primarily that god, the eternal has entered into time as an individual human being.”57 in Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard says that “the paradox is most improbable” and that “the paradox is the wonder.”58 the paradox is as incomprehensible for reason as is a miracle. anti-Climacus insists, “the godman is the paradox, absolutely the paradox. therefore, it is altogether certain that the understanding must come to a standstill on it.”59 the notion of the paradox is closely related to offense, since offense is caused by the paradox and is offense at the paradox.60 when a miracle is considered from an historical point of view, it leads only to offense.61 Just as offense occurs when understanding stumbles on the paradox, so also understanding comes to a standstill when it is confronted with a miracle. the miracle can be grasped only by faith, and not by understanding. Paradox is at the core of the paradigm of contradiction that typifies the life of Christ, and for Kierkegaard miracles also are a constitutive part of the sign of contradiction. Kierkegaard indicates this connection by saying, “Yet he, the miracle worker, is 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

Pap. Xi–2 a 339 / JP 3, 2726. SKS 26, 51, nB31:68 / JP 2, 2098. SKS 25, 395, nB30:17 / JP 3, 2725. SKS 23, 423–4, nB20:57 / JP 2, 1872. SKS 7, 541 / CUP1, 596. SKS 4, 256 / PF, 51. SKS 12, 95 / PC, 82. SKS 4, 255 / PF, 50. Pap. v B 12 / PF, supplement, p. 199.

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still the lowly man who literally does not have a place to lay his head.”62 according to Kierkegaard, an individual becomes unfaithful if that individual loves only the omnipotent one who performs miracles and not the lowly one who humbled himself to be our equal, to be like us.63 the opposition of the omnipotence and impotence constitutes a paradox. For Kierkegaard the paradox is that the god-man attracts attention, if by no other means then through the anomalous tension of being crucified and performing miracles. this does mean that he is recognizable in part by his godly authority, even though faith is required to discern the paradox.64 even though Christ comes incognito he is not entirely an incognito; he provides humanity with signs, one of which is the performance of miracles. a miracle—which is an expression of godly authority and a dimension of the real paradox, the confirmation of the claim that “for God everything is possible”—creates a sharp contrast with crucifixion. Jesus does not perform a miracle for himself but instead abandons himself completely. the concept “miracle” acquires its full sense only in contrast to impotence, an impotence that is best depicted in the crucifixion narratives. Kierkegaard writes, “The miracle comes again in the passion story. here the tension arises precisely from his being impotent in this way—he who commanded even the waves and the wind, almost as if merely for the enjoyment of his divine power.”65 in order to be able to understand the passion story we must remember that Jesus was capable of performing miracles. If we are to grasp the full significance of the crucifixion, and of Jesus’ complete sacrifice, we must consider it in contrast to his omnipotence. Kierkegaard even speaks about the miracle performed on the cross: “oh, when he walked about in Judea, he moved many by his beneficial miracles; but nailed to the cross he performs an even greater miracle, he performs love’s miracle, so that, without doing anything—by suffering he moves every person who has heart.”66 in his works Kierkegaard speaks not only about the miracles presented as such in the New Testament, for Kierkegaard’s definition of miracle is extensive and includes other types of phenomena ascribable to god’s agency, such as the “miracle” of humility or the “miracle” of love. regarding love’s forgiveness Kierkegaard claims, “the miracle of faith happens and every miracle (Mirakel) is then a miracle of faith—no wonder, therefore, that along with faith miracles (Miraklerne) also have been abolished!”67 the real miracle is the improbable transformation brought about by faith. Kierkegaard proposes, “that Christ makes something big out of something small, as at the feeding of the 5,000, is usually referred to as a miracle. But Christ also works a miracle inversely—makes something big (everything that wants to be something) into something little, makes it infinitely nothing in humility. We may think that this miracle is much easier, but it is not so. every qualitative change, every infinite change in quality, is genuinely a miracle.”68 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

SKS 12, 55 / PC, 41. SKS 4, 239 / PF, 32. SKS, 18, 176, JJ:111 / KJN 2, 163. SKS 25, 246, nB28:39 / JP 3, 2723 SKS 10, 300 / CD, 280. SKS 9, 292–3 / WL, 294–5. SKS 24, 59, nB21:90 / JP 3, 2721.

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Miracle Stories Bretschneider, Karl gottlieb, Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros Novi Testamenti, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., leipzig: Barth 1829 [1824], vol. 1, p. 552 (ASKB 73–74). [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34, vol. 1, pp. 114–234; vol. 3, pp. 30–229 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, Copenhagen, C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 120–578 (ASKB 106–107). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments zunächst für Prediger und Studirende, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–44, vol. 1, pp. 189–544; vol. 2, pp. 80–299 (ASKB 96–100). rosenkranz, Karl, Encyclopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften, halle: C.a. schwetschke und sohn 1831, pp. 152–62 (ASKB 35). staudenmaier, Franz anton, Encyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften als System der gesammten Theologie, mainz: Kupferberg 1834, p. 394; p. 406 (ASKB 69). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten and Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed, Berlin: g. reimer 1833, vol. 2, pp. 134–202 (ASKB 80). —— Kurze Erklärung des Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 34–97; pp. 130–72 (ASKB 108). —— Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838, pp. 37–166 (ASKB 109). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of the Miracle Stories Come, arnold B., Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering Myself, montreal: mcgill-Queen’s university press 1997, pp. 258–60; pp. 305–11. deuser, hermann, Dialektische Theologie. Studien zu Adornos Metaphysik und zum Spätwerk Kierkegaards, munich: Kaiser 1980, p. 241. dupré, louis, Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence, new York: sheed and ward 1963, pp. 133–42.

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evans, C. stephen, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, Bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 1992, pp. 152–66. —— “apologetic arguments in philosophical Fragments,” in Philosophical Fragments, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1994 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 7), pp. 63–83. gouwens, david J., Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1996, pp. 128–33. guillamore hansen, p., Søren Kierkegaard og Bibelen, Copenhagen: p. haase & sons 1924, pp. 144–59. hirsch, emanuel, Kierkegaard-Studien, vols. 1–3, new edition by hans martin müller, waltrop: spenner 2006 (vols. 11–13 in emanuel hirsch, Gesammelte Werke, vols. 1–48, ed. by hans martin müller, waltrop: spenner 1998ff.), vol. 3, pp. 160ff. Kivelä, Jyrki, “Kierkegaard on miracles: introductory observations,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 43, 2002, pp. 11–15. Kloeden, w. von, “Bible study,” in Kierkegaard’s View of Christianity, ed. by niels thulstrup and maria miklová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 1), pp. 16–39. law, david r., Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, oxford: Clarendon press 1993, pp. 187–88; p. 195. lønning, per, Samtidighedens Situation. En studie i Søren Kierkegaards kristendomsforståelse, oslo: Forlaget land og Kirke 1954, pp. 88–9. mcKinnon, alastair, “ ‘miracle’ and ‘paradox,’ ” American Philosophical Quarterly, no. 4, 1967, pp. 308–14. minear, paul s. and paul s. morimoto, Kierkegaard and the Bible, princeton: princeton theological seminary 1953, pp. 1–15. parkov, peter, Bibelen i Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Vaerker, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1983, pp. 20–45. pedersen, J., “Kierkegaard’s view of scripture,” in The Sources and Depths of Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup and maria mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2), pp. 27–57. polk, timothy h., The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997, pp. 125–32. pons, Jolita, Stealing a Gift: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms and the Bible, Fordham: Fordham university press 2004, pp. 56–9. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Soren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, pp. 72–80; pp. 102–36. rose, tim, Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology, aldershot: ashgate 2001, pp. 97–100.

the sermon on the mount: the dialectic of exhortation and Consolation lee C. Barrett

the sermon on the mount, the teachings ascribed to Jesus in matthew 5:3–7:27, virtually saturates Kierkegaard’s authorship. at times he bases entire discourses on portions of it, often he directly quotes verses from it, and most frequently he echoes its distinctive phrases. such traces of the sermon on the mount can be found in every genre of his corpus, ranging from the journals, to the pseudonymous works, to the signed literature. Because of the magnitude of the Sermon on the Mount’s influence upon his work, it will not be possible to examine all the instances in which he alludes to it or borrows from it. another article in this volume deals intensively with Kierkegaard’s employment of one key passage concerning the birds of the air and the lilies of the field: Matthew 6:25–33.1 this article focuses on two other portions of the sermon on the mount that were crucial for Kierkegaard: the Beatitudes contained in matthew 5:3–11 and the exhortation to “enter through the narrow gate” found in matthew 7:13–14. I. The History of the Interpretation of Matthew in the Early Modern Period For many Christian theological traditions the sermon on the mount has frequently been regarded as a puzzling portion of the gospels. often in the history of the church its meaning and significance have been bitterly contested. Part of the puzzlement concerns these biblical verses’ authorship, historical context, and literary or oral sources. however, even more vexing and controversial issues concern the theological and ethical implications of the passage’s content. the question of authenticity and historical accuracy could not be ignored by the early expositors of the Bible, for the sermon delivered on the mountain in matthew bears striking similarities to a sermon that Jesus delivered on a plain in luke 6:20b– 48, seemingly at a later stage in his ministry. the similarities and differences between the two raised the question of whether Jesus had delivered two different sermons or just one. if the answer was one, then the existence of two rather different renditions needed to be explained. also, the question of which version, if either, was more authentic needed to be resolved. if the answer was two, then the duplication and see leo stan, “the lily in the Field and the Bird of the air: an endless liturgy in Kierkegaard’s authorship,” pp. 55–78 in this volume.

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divergences needed to be accounted for. even the most revered fathers of the early church were divided on this matter. John Chrysostom (ca. 345–407), patriarch of Constantinople, assumed that the passages in matthew and luke were two different versions of one speech, 2 but augustine of hippo (354–430), his near contemporary, argued that they were two entirely separate speeches.3 over a millennium later the equally influential Martin Luther (1484–1546) sometimes implicitly conflated them and sometimes distinguished them.4 John Calvin (1509–1564) followed Chrysostom in regarding the reports in matthew and luke as two versions of one speech.5 the development of higher criticism in the eighteenth century gave this discussion about the historicity of the sermon on the mount new sophistication and augmented its intensity. Johann gottfried herder (1744–1803) concluded that the speech in matthew did originate from the historical Jesus, for it was saturated with what he took to be Jesus’ characteristic anti-pharisaic piety.6 Johann gottfried eichhorn (1752–1827), however, noted that luke and matthew share with one another a great deal of material that is not found in mark, and proposed that the sermon was part of a non-marcan source used by matthew and luke.7 Influenced by such arguments, Friedrich schleiermacher (1768–1834) doubted that the sermon had been recorded by the apostle matthew.8 august tholuck (1799–1877) tried to steer a middle course between the assertion of historical accuracy and skepticism, admitting that the version in matthew betrayed evidence of some redaction, while maintaining that it nevertheless was fairly authentic.9 tholuck argued that the probability that Jesus had delivered one speech was not compromised by the existence of two differing accounts, for the two versions could be harmonized. perhaps the plain mentioned in luke was simply a less steep part of the mountain mentioned by matthew, in which The Homilies of S. John Chrysostom Archbishop of Constantinople on the Gospel of S. Matthew, trans. by george prevost, london: J.h. parker 1843 (The Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church Anterior to the Division of the East and West, vol. 11), tome i, pp. 197–223. 3 augustine, De consensus evangelistarum, Colonia: alopecius 1539, pp. 104–8. 4 martin luther, The Sermon on the Mount (Sermons) and the Magnificat, vol. 21 in Luther’s Works, vols. 1–55, ed. by Jaroslav pelikan, st. louis, missouri: Concordia 1955–86, see p. 11; p. 18; p. 29; p. 44; p. 188; p. 206; p. 265. 5 John Calvin, Johannis Calvini Commentarii in novum testamentum, ed. by august tholuck, vols. 1–4, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34, vol. 1, pp. 134–96 (ASKB 92–95). 6 see Johann gottfried von herder, Erläuterungen zum Neuen Testament aus einer neueröffneten morgenländischen Quelle, vol. 11 in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, see pp. 133–44 (ASKB 1676–1684). 7 Johann gottfried eichhorn, “Über die drey ersten evangelien: einige Beyträge zu ihrer künftigen kritischen Behandlung,” in his Allgemeine Bibliothek der biblischen Litteratur, vols. 1–10, leipzig: weidmann 1787–1801, vol. 5, pp. 761–996. 8 see Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämmtliche Werke (variant title: Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Literarischer Nachlaß), abteilung 1, Zur Theologie, vols. 1–13, Berlin: g. reimer 1834–64, vol. 8, Einleitung ins Neue Testament, ed. by georg wolde, pp. 195–251. 9 august tholuck, Philologisch-theologische Auslegung der Bergpredigt Christi nach Matthäus, zugleich ein Beitrag zur Begründung einer rein-biblischen Glaubens- und Sittenlehre, hamburg: perthes 1833, pp. 1–39. 2

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case the shorter sermon in luke could be regarded as an extract from matthew’s longer version. Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860) detected just as much redactive activity in matthew’s version as in luke’s, but nevertheless suspected that the matthean account was the more genuine of the two.10 david Friedrich strauss (1808–74) articulated the more radical hypothesis that the sermon as recorded in matthew incorporated many sayings that Jesus had uttered on different occasions, although strauss did opine that many of these sayings were authentic to Jesus and that Jesus had probably delivered some major public address.11 Because statements in the sermon presuppose awareness of the messianic identity of Jesus, which according to matthew himself was not manifested until later, strauss argued that the sermon could not have been delivered as early in Jesus’ career as matthew placed it. therefore, according to strauss, the sermon as reported in matthew is certainly not an eyewitness account. the more moderate wilhelm martin leberecht de wette (1780–1849) actually agreed with strauss that the apostle matthew was probably not the author of the account, for the chronology in matthew seems too arbitrary to have originated from an eyewitness, and the sermon on the mount occurs too early in the gospel narrative.12 hermann olshausen (1796–1839), whose work Kierkegaard consulted, adopted the more conservative position that the current gospel in the canon is a greek version of the apostle matthew’s original (but now lost) aramaic gospel intended for a Jewish Christian audience.13 however, according to olshausen, the greek version still should be accorded great authority, for it had probably been produced under matthew’s direction. olshausen conceded that the sermon as it stands in the text had not been delivered as a whole by Jesus, but was a compendium compiled by matthew who, guided by divine inspiration, accurately discerned the underlying coherence in Jesus’ scattered remarks. these problems of authorship, origin, authenticity, and historical accuracy, however troubling, were eclipsed by the disturbing theological issues raised by the text. the most obvious conundrum was that strict obedience to the words ascribed to Jesus would make ongoing cultural and political life difficult or even impossible. given Jesus’ daunting exhortations to love enemies, turn the other cheek, give to everyone who begs, and to take no thought for the morrow, the discharge of ordinary societal responsibilities and following Christ would seem to exclude each other. if the sermon’s injunctions were construed as precepts to be followed literally, anyone attempting to live them out would have to sever familial bonds. moreover, economic life based on reciprocal exchange would be drastically undermined. through the centuries Christians attempted to negotiate the problem of the loftiness of the ideal Ferdinand Christian Baur, Kritische Untersuchungen über die kanonischen Evangelien, ihr Verhältnis zu einander, ihren Charakter und Ursprung, tübingen: Fues 1847, pp. 455–8; pp. 585–9. 11 david Friedrich strauss, Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet, vols. 1–2, tübingen: osiander 1835–36, vol. 1, pp. 569–87; pp. 639–40; p. 652. 12 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838, pp. 54–87 (ASKB 109). 13 hermann olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments zunächst für Prediger und Studirende, vols. 1–4, 3rd ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837– 40, vol. 1, pp. 193–253 (ASKB 96–100). 10

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proclaimed by Jesus by developing a variety of interpretive strategies. one tradition stretching from augustine14 to aquinas15 regarded the Beatitudes as an allegory of the ascent of the soul from the active life to the contemplative life. aquinas further treated the rigorous ethical demands as “evangelical counsels” applying not to all Christians but only to those who seek a higher level of perfection, such as the clergy and those in religious orders.16 the “councils of perfection,” often associated with monastic vows, were differentiated from the commandments that all Christians are required to obey, preserving for the spiritual elite the rigor of the ancient Christian ideal of following the self-abnegating way of the cross. on the other hand, perfectionist groups such as the anabaptists insisted that the imperatives in the sermon should be regarded as guidelines for the individual and communal life of all Christians, which would involve the renunciation of participation in government, and, for some, even the rejection of private possessions. discontent with both the roman Catholic and the anabaptist options, martin luther espoused an alternative view. his weekly sermons on the sermon on the Mount preached between 1530 and 1532 became enormously influential for subsequent lutheran theologians.17 in these sermons luther rejected both the twoclass ideology of the official church and the more universally applied rigor and literalism of the radical dissenters. For luther, the sermon should be treated neither as counsels of perfection intended only for the spiritual elite nor as a blueprint for a Christian society. against his Catholic adversaries, luther argued that there is no distinction between the councils of perfection and the commandments; there is no difference between the norms of the Christian life that the laity should follow and the regulations governing the lives of cloistered brothers and sisters.18 luther used his theory of the “two kingdoms” as a hermeneutic lens to interpret the sermon’s injunctions. the divine, spiritual kingdom of grace is founded upon the unmerited love of god which should be freely received by the individual and, in gratitude, freely extended to the individual’s neighbors. the secular kingdom, however, is founded upon the need to preserve the orders and structures of creation in a sinful world, and therefore must operate with the punishment and coercive restraint of sin. Because the sustaining of the created order requires the exercise of political and economic power, the civil government cannot be bound by the ideal of nonviolence. Consequently, the requirements of the orders of creation and the gospel ideals articulated in matthew will always exist in tension with one another. according to luther, many of the ideals of the sermon on the mount pertain to the divine kingdom, to the individual’s relation to god and more private relations to neighbors, and not to the structures of civil society. of course, the two kingdoms are not dichotomous; Sancti Aurelii Augustini De Sermone Domini in monte libros duos, ed. by almut mutzenbecher, turnholti: Brepols 1967, pp. 8–10. 15 thomas aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vols. 1–61, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2006, vol. 24, ed. by edward d. o’Connor, pp. 43–63. 16 thomas aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vols. 1–61, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2006, vol. 47, ed. by Jordan aumann, pp. 1–306. 17 luther, The Sermon on the Mount (Sermons) and the Magnificat, pp. 3–294. 18 ibid., pp. 3–6; pp. 74–7; pp. 128–9. 14

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they are distinguished but held in a creative dialectical tension. For luther, the violence of the government should be employed in the service of love. although the Sermon on the Mount does not articulate a rule for society, it should influence the public behavior of Christians. in Kierkegaard’s lifetime hermann olshausen continued this interpretive trajectory begun by luther.19 according to olshausen, the kingdom proclaimed by Jesus in Matthew is purely inward, and is not to be identified with political arrangements. not even the church can be regulated by laws of the kingdom proclaimed by Jesus. lamentably, political institutions using coercion must exist because of the pervasiveness of human sin. the sermon on the mount cannot be used as a source of guidelines for the construction of a civil or ecclesial polity. an equally serious problem for luther and all subsequent protestants was the sermon on the mount’s insistence upon the pursuit of a higher righteousness, a moral ideal even more exalted than that of the scribes and pharisees. many exegetes discerned a parallelism between the ten Commandments and the sermon on the mount, which implied that Jesus’ address was a declaration of a more rigorous law than that proclaimed by moses. loving enemies and turning the other cheek are intimidating standards of personal behavior. most shockingly, matthew’s Jesus exhorts the reader to “Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect” (matthew 5:48). the disturbing implication of this exhortation to be perfect could be that a proper relationship with god depends upon the performance of righteous deeds. If so, Luther’s central claim that justification is based on God’s unmerited grace and not on meritorious works would be seriously jeopardized. again the two kingdoms theory was implicitly enlisted by luther to explain the ostensible valorization of good works.20 although salvation does not depend on the individual’s righteous works, the fruits of gratitude for grace should appear in the individual’s life, most particularly in the individual’s fulfillment of secular duties.21 purity of heart is trust in the gospel, which then inspires good works in the public sphere. all individuals who trust in god’s grace should strive to do their duty in the secular kingdom. Consequently, in the Beatitudes some of the exhortations to act righteously apply to outward righteousness in the secular kingdom, which is faithful obedience in the discharge of an individual’s offices and duties. God intends that those who are freely redeemed by grace should strive to sustain the orders of creation that make human life possible, even though this endeavor has no bearing on their salvation. the sermon on the mount’s blessing of the persecuted and suffering raised this question of works righteousness in a particularly vivid way, for these statements could be construed as ascribing meritorious significance to the embrace of tribulation. However, Luther regarded the warnings about persecution and affliction in the light of his emphasis of justification by grace. He did insist that persecution is an inevitable consequence of discipleship. in discussing the “narrowness of the way” luther olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vol. 1, pp. 193–253. 20 luther, The Sermon on the Mount (Sermons) and the Magnificat, pp. 115–17; p. 254. 21 ibid., p. 26; pp. 37–8; pp. 265–6; p. 277. 19

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cautions that Christianity will always give offense;22 opposition will always be the destiny that those who believe the gospel must face.23 the world inevitably slanders those who adhere to the true faith and therefore the resolution of believers will begin to falter.24 although the ultimate motive force behind the tribulations and sorrows of Christians is the devil, the more proximate agents of affliction are the minions of the papacy who scorn true biblical doctrine. luther associates the narrowness of the way with the fact that the authorities or the majority may very well not be correct about doctrine. the enemies of sound doctrine may even attack the civic order of reformed principalities and try to disrupt the preaching of the word. the proponents of the papacy are always numerous and are often accorded so much public honor that the truly faithful are often tempted to conclude that the papists must be right. to make matters even worse, false prophets, who are equated with unauthorized teachers (probably anabaptists) and with errant ministers, violate the social order and contribute to doctrinal confusion.25 with these temptations and tribulations in mind, Luther links the hardship and suffering of the Christian life with the difficulty of remaining faithful to true doctrine, particularly the theme of justification by grace, in the face of so much opposition. nevertheless, luther concludes that Christ makes affliction sweet by pointing out the inevitability of affliction, for then affliction is an indication that the individual is truly traveling the path of discipleship.26 as Kierkegaard would later do, luther read the “narrow way” verse in the light of Jesus’ reassuring invitation, “Come to me, you who are heavy laden, and i will give you rest” (matthew 11:28–30). other reformers developed different themes to reconcile the focus on righteousness with the Protestant conviction that the individual is justified by grace. reading matthew in the light of paul, philipp melanchthon (1497–1560) maintained that the core message of the sermon is the distinction of opera externa, which he associated with the righteousness according to the law that was critiqued by paul, from the iustitia Christi, the faithful inner disposition, which is effected by grace.27 in a similar way, huldrych zwingli (1484–1531) claimed that the sermon’s purpose is to differentiate the homo externus from the homo internus, external acts from inner motivations.28 therefore the purpose of the sermon is to shape the inner man, not external behavior; such a purpose is entirely compatible with the cultivation of trust in God’s grace and does not jeopardize the principle of the unmerited justification of the sinner by god. John Calvin developed a rather different theme, claiming that the sermon is indeed intended to function as a guide for a holy life, based on Jesus’ ibid., p. 241. ibid., p. 245. 24 ibid. p. 242. 25 ibid. 26 ibid., p. 246. 27 philipp melanchthon, Annotationes in Evangelium Matthaei iam recens in Gratiam studiosorum editae (1523), in Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl, vols. 1–7, ed. by peter F. Barton, gütersloh: mohn 1951–78, vol. 4, pp. 133–208. 28 huldrych zwingli, Annotationes in Evangelium Matthaei, in Opera completa editio prima, vols. 1–8, ed. by melchior schuler and Johannes schulthess, zurich: schulthess & höhr 1829–42, vol. 6.1, pp. 218–49. 22 23

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interpretation of Jewish law.29 although the pursuit of such a holy life does not justify the Christian, it is nevertheless god’s intention that the elect shall not only be justified, but shall also grow in righteousness (sanctification). The Sermon on the mount adumbrates the basic principles of the holy life that Christians, animated by grace, should aspire to live by. For subsequent theological descendents of Calvin, the sermon on the mount functioned as a paradigmatic example of the law’s “third use,” the use of the law to guide the lives of the saints. the issue that legalism or “works righteousness” might be encouraged by the sermon on the mount continued to be a disturbing issue even after the rise of higher criticism. the more the sermon on the mount was situated in the context of ancient Jewish piety, the tighter the association of right relationship with god and active obedience seemed. david Friedrich strauss indirectly raised these suspicions by claiming that Jesus shared the limitations of his age, and did not articulate moral insights that were unprecedented.30 Jesus did not intend to break with Judaism, but rather saw himself as the messiah of Israel and as an eschatological figure. Jesus understood himself to be a teacher in the mosaic tradition.31 in matthew Jesus simply requires a more strict observance of the law. wilhelm de wette, in his short commentary on matthew, admitted that the sermon articulates a new law and a new piety.32 however, other commentators sought more overtly to preserve the outlines of Luther’s attempt to reconcile the imperatives with justification by grace. hermann olshausen, a biblical scholar used by Kierkegaard, continued to interpret Matthew in the light of Paul and the Lutheran doctrine of justification by grace.33 Like most Lutherans, Olshausen identified the “mourning” mentioned in Matthew 5:4 as the suffering due to the individual’s awareness of guilt, and the “comfort” as the justification of the sinner.34 to reinforce this lutheran hermeneutic, olshausen pointed out that the Beatitudes, matthew 5:3–11, frame the commandments in the sermon on the mount; this contextualization of the imperatives in a setting of blessing implies that they must be regarded as gifts of grace. Jesus first seeks to awaken childlike trust in the parental power and compassion of god before issuing any directives. similarly, according to olshausen, the “poor in spirit” mentioned in matthew 5:3 are the contrite, those individuals who with a profound sense of their own spiritual poverty long for god’s grace.35 in olshausen’s view the lord’s prayer (matthew 6:9–14) is structured around the themes of god’s riches and generosity on the one hand, and human need and receptivity on the other. in fact, throughout the sermon on the mount faith in god’s benevolence is presupposed as necessary for the reception of Jesus’ law of love.36 Consequently, neither works of righteousness nor prayer itself should be regarded as meritorious. however, olshausen does give see Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vol. 1, pp. 134–96. strauss, Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet, vol. 1, p. 579. 31 ibid., p. 580. 32 de wette, Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, pp. 54–87. 33 olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vol. 1, pp. 193–253. 34 ibid., p. 204. 35 ibid., pp. 203–4. 36 ibid., pp. 204–7. 29 30

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this lutheran approach to the text a distinctive emphasis. he assumes that human beings possess a longing not only for forgiveness but also for a higher religious life, and hunger for a principle of such a life which they know they cannot attain by their own unaided capacities. For Olshausen (who had been influenced by Friedrich schleiermacher), of central importance in the text is the fact that Jesus implicitly promises the availability of a new internal disposition.37 through the words of Jesus a divine life is awakened in the individual, an ardent longing for divine things. at this point olshausen draws attention to the centrality of the theme of love in the sermon on the mount, shifting the focus away from the more typically lutheran concentration on faith. the individual who internalizes the sermon longs to become loving in the way that god is loving. in the sermon, Jesus sought to inculcate pure love and even envisioned a kingdom of love. olshausen adopted the language of internal dispositions versus external acts that had been typical of melanchthon and zwingli. the religious life encouraged by Jesus is an internal spring from which the impulse to action flows.38 the internal principle of the life of love is the root that generates the fruits of loving works. (of course, luther himself had proposed this very thing.39) Virtue flows from adoption by God. By orienting the individual to eternal rather than perishable goods, the lord’s prayer itself inspires works of love. Consequently, Jesus’ imperatives should not be construed as a new law heteronomously set over against the individual. Jesus taught a free conception of the commandments, making them inward and spiritual. olshausen consistently contrasts Jesus’ inward understanding of the commandments and the pharisaic outward interpretation. Unlike Jesus, the Pharisees remained fixated on the external form of action. In contrast to this, Jesus’ law of love cannot be reduced to fixed rules, nor can it be based on external compulsion. Jesus’ specific injunctions should not be treated as if they were universally applicable moral precepts. For olshausen, what matters according to matthew 5–7 is not the act but the attitude. olshausen also agreed with luther’s assessment that the implication of matthew 5:11–12 is not justification by works, but is the theme that the righteous will always suffer, for Christianity is heterogenous with worldly values.40 those who follow Christ truly in a fallen world will certainly suffer for the faith. like luther, olshausen exhorted the believer to rejoice in the midst of suffering, for suffering is evidence that one is following the narrow path of Christ. Conversely, worldly praise is often an indication that purely secular ambitions have displaced commitment to Christ’s way of life. the sermon on the mount manifests the fact that genuine Christianity is oriented neither to political power and glory nor to private success. at this point olshausen added an emphasis usually not stressed as dramatically in luther’s works.41 worldly sensibilities are hostile to Christian values because the two value systems are based on different understandings of love. the world valorizes natural love of friends and family based on ties of reciprocal advantage and natural inclination. 37 38 39 40 41

ibid., pp. 229–30. ibid., pp. 231–2. luther, Sermon on the Mount, p. 37. ibid., pp. 207–9. ibid.

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Because it is aimed at the satisfaction of the affective needs of the individual, natural love is fundamentally self-oriented. however, the sermon on the mount’s radical love of neighbors and even enemies is self-oblivious, concerned only with the wellbeing of the other. Consequently, the path of Jesus’ type of love involves painful and difficult self-denial. Instead of reciprocity, Jesus proclaims self-giving, and instead of retaliation the forgiveness of enemies. The world that craves gratification and success cannot accept or even tolerate this prospect of victory through self-emptying and humiliation. the world cannot comprehend the fact that the reward of this type of love is purely intrinsic, having nothing to do with temporal advantage. Consequently, worldly society cannot help but be hostile to this subversion of all its aspirations. II. Kierkegaard’s Familiarity with the Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount through many different channels, both direct and indirect, Kierkegaard would have been familiar with many of these interpretive traditions and controversies. not least among these channels was Kierkegaard’s formal theological training. he heard henrik nicolai Clausen (1793–1877) lecture on the synoptic gospels in the winter term of 1833–34. Clausen also alluded to the sermon on the mount in his lectures on dogmatics that Kierkegaard attended.42 Clausen again lectured privately on the synoptics in the winter term of 1838–39, which may have inspired Kierkegaard’s notes on matthew.43 a version of Clausen’s exposition of the synoptic gospels was later published in 1850, in a volume that Kierkegaard owned.44 Kierkegaard’s own reading augmented his awareness of the expository issues and disputes surrounding the gospel of matthew in general and the sermon on the mount in particular. Kierkegaard may have read wilhelm de wette on the gospel of matthew during 1838–39, for he referred to it in his notes on matthew.45 Kierkegaard was at least indirectly familiar with the ideas of david Friedrich strauss, including strauss’ theme that in Judaism god’s law is heteronomously set over against the individual, for he took notes46 on Julius schaller’s Der historische Christus und die Philosophie: Kritik der Grundidee des Werks: das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss…47 in 1838 Kierkegaard also mentioned Ueber die Ironieen in den Reden Jesu by Friedrich Joseph grulich (1766–1839).48 he showed familiarity with Johann SKS 19, 24, not1:6. SKS 19, 25, not1:6. SKS 19, 33, not1:6. SKS 19, 52, not1:7. SKS 19, 56, not1:7. SKS 19, 62, not1:8. SKS 19, 68, not1:8. 43 SKS 19, 77–85, not1:9. see SKS K18, 170 / KJN 2, 433. 44 henrik nicolai Clausen, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 204–87 (ASKB 106–107). 45 SKS 18, 119, gg:2 / KJN 2, 111. 46 SKS 18, 318–37, KK:2 / KJN 2, 292–308. 47 Julius schaller, Der historische Christus und die Philosophie: Kritik der Grundidee des Werks: das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss, leipzig: otto wigand 1838, pp. 106–24 (ASKB 759). 48 Friedrich Joseph grulich, Ueber die Ironieen in den Reden Jesu: noch ein Beitrag zu seiner Characteristik, leipzig: wienbrack 1838, pp. 1–127. see SKS 18, 101, FF:134 / KJN 2, 93. 42

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august wilhelm neander’s (1789–1850), Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel,49 a work not found in the auction catalogue of his library but evidently consulted in 1834.50 a journal entry from 1838–39 reveals an engagement with olshausen’s work.51 moreover, in The Concept of Anxiety52 Kierkegaard seems to rely upon olshausen’s volume on the synoptic gospels.53 Kierkegaard was also acquainted with at least some of the works of tholuck, although a direct reading of tholuck’s work on matthew cannot be documented.54 in one passage in his literature Kierkegaard seems to follow tholuck’s attempt to reconcile the accounts in matthew and luke by suggesting that Jesus delivered the sermon at the foot of the mountain.55 in general, Kierkegaard does not engage the scholarly debates about the historicity or the possible sources of the sermon on the mount, even though he was aware of these controversies. he consistently writes as if the words recorded in matthew should be appropriated by the reader as the veridical words of Jesus. this, of course, was typical of Kierkegaard’s general strategy of reading the Bible as the authoritative word of god addressed to the reader for the purpose of personal transformation. in this type of reading questions of textual sources and redactions would be nothing more than distractions and evasions. however, Kierkegaard does exhibit a profound interest in the theological issues that arose in the history of the interpretation of matthew 5–7. as we shall see, Kierkegaard’s use of the sermon on the Mount sometimes has a distinctively Lutheran flavor, while at other times it seems to be a corrective to lutheran emphases. in both cases, Kierkegaard’s exposition often parallels that of hermann olshausen, even though olshausen is not directly cited. III. Kierkegaard’s Use of the Beatitudes and the Sermon on the Mount as a Whole at times Kierkegaard explicitly followed the lutheran pattern of treating the implied imperatives in the sermon on the mount as descriptions of the fruits of faith. For example, in Three Upbuilding Discourses from 1843 Kierkegaard cites matthew 5:8, the statement that the pure in heart always see god, as the basis of pure-hearted individuals’ willingness to hide a multitude of sins committed by their neighbors.56 those who are aware of god’s love and who love god in return do not seek to ferret out the sin in others. similarly, the exhortation in matthew 5:44 to “pray for those Johann august wilhelm neander, Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel, vols. 1–2, hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1832–33, vol. 1, pp. 454–5; vol. 2, p. 666. 50 Pap. i C 16 / JP 5, 5059. 51 Pap. ii C 2. 52 SKS 4, 420 / CA, 118. 53 olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vol. 1, pp. 284–302. 54 SKS 18, 368, KK:7 / KJN 2, 337. 55 SKS 19, 41, ee:107 / KJN 2, 36. SKS 10, 21 / CD, 9. 56 SKS 5, 70 / EUD, 60. 49

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who persecute you” is regarded as an expression of spiritual festivity, of the bliss that follows from fellowship with god.57 something similar occurs in “the gospel of sufferings,” in which the meekness that includes the willingness to turn the other cheek (matthew 5:39) carries this seeming burden of non-retaliation lightly because the individual “actually needs to forgive his enemy.”58 the grateful acceptance of one’s own forgiveness, the removal of the heavy burden of guilt, guarantees that “a new life will spring in the believer.”59 here again the appropriate appreciation of the magnitude of god’s grace, and trust in the power of that grace, motivates the virtues and way of life extolled in the Beatitudes. not only does this motif parallel luther, but it also echoes olshausen. at other times Kierkegaard could actually operate in the reverse manner, and emphasize the law-like quality of the sermon on the mount, treating it as an external imperative. Kierkegaard writes, “Christ as the prototype [Forbilledet] is still a form of the law, yes, the law raised to a higher level.”60 like many of his theological forebearers, Kierkegaard compares the sermon on the mount to the law delivered by moses on mount sinai.61 even the lord’s prayer corresponds to the ten Commandments as an epitome of god’s sole demand.62 the loftiness of the requirement exposes our inadequacy. the introduction to part i of Christian Discourses again compares the sermon on the mount to the giving of the law in the old testament.63 in fact, this entire part i is framed by matthew 6:24, “no man can serve two masters,” which Kierkegaard treats as an imperative.64 elsewhere the claim in matthew 7:24 that everyone who acts upon Jesus’ words is like a house built upon a rock is treated as a command to obey Jesus’ teachings without advanced proofs of their truth.65 in fact, Kierkegaard could even go so far as to treat verses that articulate blessings as if they were imperatives or statements of conditions that must be satisfied. For example, in one instance he expounds matthew 5:8 as being a declaration of the condition that one must be pure in heart in order to see god.66 he uses this verse as a confession, but then adds that an individual cannot glimpse god without being conscious of oneself as a sinner. similarly, in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits matthew 5:9 is again used on the occasion of a confession as an imperative to encourage the pursuit of purity of heart, for only the pure in heart shall see god.67 in “on the occasion of a Confession” the Beatitudes also function as an admonition to cultivate the proper sorrow over sin, which involves regarding sin not as a congeries of discrete misdeeds, but as a unified disposition. In this context the Beatitudes also 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

SKS 23, 125, nB16:44 / JP, 4648. SKS 8, 334–5 / UD, 245. SKS 8, 346 / UD, 247. SKS 23, 80, nB15:114 / JP 2, 1654. SKS 19, 41, ee:107 / KJN 2, 36. SKS 18, 96, FF:103 / KJN 2, 88. SKS 10, 21 / CD, 9. SKS 10, 20 / CD, 7. SKS 23, 51, nB15:75.a / JP 1, 74. Pap. vi B 139 / TD, supplement, p. 130. SKS 8, 138–9 / UD, 24.

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implicitly warn against blaming this perverse tendency on the corporate fallenness of humanity; again they function as an imperative.68 most dramatically, a journal entry from 1852 more diffusely alludes to matthew 5–7 and concludes that one is not first consoled by eternity and then gives up the things of this world, but rather that one first is obliged to give up the things of this world and through the suffering eternity comes into being for the individual.69 here the imperative force is clear, and obedience to the imperative seems to be the entrance to eternity. the imperative force of the Beatitudes is even more evident in Kierkegaard’s general descriptions of the shape of the Christian life. in these contexts the Beatitudes do not function as specific precepts to be literally enacted, but as more general articulations of the basic attitude toward life that Christians should nurture in themselves. Kierkegaard consistently elaborated the theme of the incompatibility of a life of worldly aspirations with the pursuit of the Christian ideals expressed in the sermon on the mount. in Two Upbuilding Discourses from 1844 Kierkegaard cites matthew 5:1–11 in the context of praising anna, the prophetess who refused to remarry upon the death of her husband in order to devote herself to the expectation of the coming messiah. paraphrasing matthew, Kierkegaard concludes that blessed are those who, like anna, give up worldly expectancy.70 in Christian Discourses Kierkegaard notes that the reference to the “mountain” in the sermon on the mount suggests that the values articulated by Jesus are higher than all earthly goods.71 the Beatitudes elaborate the differences between the ideals of the Christian life and all worldly values. here the relevant passages in matthew serve as a springboard to launch a polemic against worldly-minded Christians. in Kierkegaard’s pages the imperative to live according to the Beatitudes is closely linked to another motif. Kierkegaard also uses the Beatitudes to argue that the Christian life will necessarily involve tribulation, just as luther had done. in Four Upbuilding Discourses from 1844 Kierkegaard conflates Matthew 5:3 and 5:8 in order to argue against the identification of children with the “poor in spirit,” for a child prays to thank god only for the pleasant blessings of life (according to the child’s own conception), and is not grateful for the activity of god in tribulation.72 like luther and olshausen, Kierkegaard often focused on the unique and particularly anguished suffering that was due to persecution. in a proposal for an upbuilding discourse that he never wrote, Kierkegaard contrasted the blessedness of those who are persecuted to the superficial worldly good cheer of those who rejoice because they are socially honored.73 although the plan to develop this theme in a separate discourse was not actualized, much of the material was incorporated in Christian Discourses.74

68 69 70 71 72 73 74

SKS 5, 412 / TD, 32. SKS 25, 32–4, nB26:25 / JP 2, 2222. SKS 5, 224 / EUD, 225. SKS 10, 230–1 / CD, 222–3. SKS 5, 367–8 / EUD, 384–5. SKS 20, 289, nB4:5 / JP 5, 6096. SKS 10, 233–5 / CD, 225–7.

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in many contexts Kierkegaard also elaborated another dimension of the theme of the blessedness of suffering based on matthew 5:11–12. For example, in Christian Discourses he focused on the passage’s claim that it is indeed blessed to suffer mockery in the pursuit of a good cause.75 particularly in “the Joy of it, that one suffers only once But is victorious eternally,” matthew 5:11–12 is used to show that for all eternity it will be a source of blessedness to recollect the sufferings that have resulted from the individual’s covenant with god.76 this type of joy is contrasted with ephemeral earthly pleasures, which cannot be eternally recollected. Kierkegaard adds that compared to eternity all earthly suffering is but a moment. here the Beatitudes point to the eternal value of a life of Christian virtue; the suffering that is a component of this life participates in its eternal value. similarly, in Practice in Christianity, anti-Climacus alludes to matthew 5:10 in order to make it clear that the suffering that the Christian life uniquely entails is not the misery caused by natural calamities, but is suffering for the sake of righteousness, a suffering that paradoxically involves joy.77 again, he insists that when such persecution strikes a faithful individual, the afflicted one should be glad. Elsewhere Kierkegaard even proposes that we should pray for enemies, as matthew 5:44 asserts, precisely because their persecution helped us find true bliss.78 again, the intimate linkage between suffering for the faith and the bliss of eternity is suggested. throughout his literature in which he makes use of the sermon on the mount Kierkegaard links the theme of god’s gracious blessing of the individual and the theme of god’s imperatives addressed to the individual in two different ways. at times he treats the willingness to obey the imperatives as the fruit of trust in the blessings proclaimed by Jesus. in these contexts Kierkegaard is close to the motifs articulated by luther and reiterated by olshausen, according to which the new obedience of the Christian to Christ the new moses is inspired by gratitude for the forgiveness of sins and god’s parental benevolence. however, at other times in Kierkegaard’s literature Jesus’ announcements function as simple commands, with little attention to the motivation for obeying them. here the work of strauss, de wette, and others may have generated a greater sensitivity to the law-like qualities of the sermon on the mount, and its continuity with the laws of ancient Judaism. Kierkegaard does not attempt to theoretically synthesize these two tendencies. sometimes he seeks to elicit active gratitude, and sometimes he merely admonishes and even threatens. in a way, the difference between these two dynamics approximates the difference between the “third use” of god’s law in lutheran and reformed theology (to guide the lives of the faithful) and the law’s “first use” (to restrain sin). Sometimes the individual must be consoled and inspired, and sometimes the individual must be commanded and prodded. the different rhetorical purposes of Kierkegaard’s various writings determine which particular elaboration he gives to his allusions to the sermon on the mount.

75 76 77 78

SKS 10, 230–40 / CD, 222–33. SKS 10, 115–16 / CD, 104–5. SKS 12, 116–17 / PC, 108. SKS 23, 125–6, nB16:44 / JP 4, 4648.

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IV. Kierkegaard’s Use of the “Narrow Gate” and the “Hard Road” of Matthew 7:13–14 in developing this theme of the necessary connection between the Christian life and suffering and persecution, Kierkegaard not only cited the Beatitudes but also frequently alluded to matthew 7:13–14: “enter through the narrow gate; for the gate is wide and the road is easy that leads to destruction, and there are many who take it. For the gate is narrow and the road is hard that leads to life, and there are few who find it.” His focus on the hardship and suffering of the road was supported by the consideration that in danish the word Trang not only means “narrow” but also has a nuance of “hard” and “difficult.” in elaborating this passage, Kierkegaard sometimes focused on the general woes that afflict all humans. In Three Upbuilding Discourses from 1843 the assertion that the way is narrow is associated with the general need to be educated in the school of adversity.79 life’s disappointments must be accepted as opportunities for spiritual growth without cynicism or bitterness. even near the end of his life he continued to insist that the eternal is not indifferent to the way that it is acquired, which is through the narrow path of difficulty.80 the pursuit of the eternal is inimical to an attachment to worldly comfort.81 throughout all such passages Kierkegaard suggests that tragedy is not simply something that an individual passively undergoes. an individual’s attitude toward suffering is something that can be voluntarily adopted and fostered. The unavoidable tragedies that afflict all human lives can be accepted in patience and faced with courage. the way in which an individual undergoes suffering is not entirely the product of necessity, for an individual can strive to combat despair and maintain trust and hope in god. thus, the inevitable woes of existence can be accepted as having spiritually educative potential. more frequently, however, Kierkegaard restricts the narrowness of the way to the suffering that results from the voluntary choice of a way of life.82 this is particularly evident in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. in the initial description of existential pathos Climacus uses the imagery of matthew 7:13–14 to contrast the path of virtue and the path of pleasure, or the ethico-religious life and the aesthetic life.83 the pursuit of virtue necessarily involves the willingness to act virtuously even if the consequences will involve the frustration of the individual’s aspirations for worldly happiness. here the contrast of the narrow and broad ways functions in the context of Climacus’ critique of efforts to mediate the demands of duty and pleasure, including the claim of a pastor that “little by little” the narrow path can actually lead to temporal benefits and consolations. Such an attempt to synthesize ethicoreligious and aesthetic goals is symptomatic of an individual’s failure to maintain an absolute relationship to the absolute. such an appropriately absolute relationship must never relax the willingness to accept suffering; the Christian road remains 79 80 81 82 83

SKS 5, 94–5 / EUD, 88. SKS 13, 382 / M, 320. SKS 13, 152 / M, 110. SKS 13, 89 / FSE, 67. SKS 7, 366–7 / CUP1, 403.

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“narrow, stony, and thorny” until the end.84 throughout his authorship Kierkegaard maintained this linkage of Matthew 7:13–14 with the difficulty of dethroning relative goods from a position of absolute importance. in The Moment he continued to insist that any relationship with the deity makes life difficult, with “long inner battles and spiritual trials.”85 similarly, in his late discourse The Changelessness of God, the hard way is identified as unconditional obedience to God’s changelessness, renouncing everything worldly without deviation during the course of a lifetime.86 here the intentional dying away to immediacy is the real source of suffering, not the accidental misfortunes that inevitably trouble human lives. Kierkegaard, like his lutheran forebearers, could link the narrowness of the way with the difficulty of overcoming sin. Here Matthew 7:13–14 functions according to the “second use” in lutheran theology, exposing the sin of the individual. in The Sickness unto Death the phrase “the road to destruction” is used to alert the reader to the fact that seemingly innocuous everyday decisions, not just the momentous egregiously vicious ones, are actually sinful, for they are made without faith.87 the broad way of sin gives an all-encompassing continuity to an individual’s life; sin is a continuing state, not just a set of discrete actions. at times the narrowness and difficulty of the way is linked with its power to cause offense to an individual’s sense of self-worth. in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript a major dimension of this offense is the recognition that the individual does not have the power to relate properly to the eternal. the consciousness of sin triggered by the appearance of the god in time exposes the incapacity of the individual to relate absolutely to the absolute. according to Climacus, the pain of the candid confession of spiritual failure differentiates true faith from the triviality of domesticated Christianity with its contentment with undemanding bourgeois virtues. here Climacus, following a tradition stretching from Luther through Olshausen, identifies the repellant anguish of sin-consciousness and the consequent need for hope in god’s grace with the narrow way.88 Kierkegaard repeated this association of the narrow way with the anguish of repentance in his signed writings. in the “occasional discourse” often called “purity of heart is to will one thing” Kierkegaard explicitly links the narrowness of the way with confession. he observes that the image of narrowness is particularly apt because confession disallows any comparison with the virtue and vice of others; confession must always be done “single-file.”89 the broadness of the way of the crowd diminishes the sense of individual responsibility and thereby makes contrition less acute. as Kierkegaard’s literature progressed, so also did his tendency to associate the narrowness of the way with suffering due to the world’s opposition to authentic Christianity. in Practice in Christianity anti-Climacus cites matthew 7:13–14 and its metaphor of the “straight gate” to contrast the illusory ideology of the church 84 85 86 87 88 89

SKS 7, 367 / CUP1, 404. SKS 13, 380 / M, 318. SKS 13, 330 / M, 271. SKS 11, 217 / SUD, 105. SKS 7, 532 / CUP1, 585. SKS 8, 250 / UD, 152.

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triumphant with the true values of the church militant.90 the broad way with a wide open gate is the self-congratulatory ideology of a church that regards itself as victorious and successful in this world. such success can only be accomplished through the church’s craven and self-deceptive capitulation to the values of the world. in opposition to such nefarious accommodationism, anti-Climacus maintains that true Christianity is the life of self-giving love, and that any genuinely selfless disregard of one’s own worldly hopes in order to love the neighbor will always entail suffering. anti-Climacus warns, “But woe, woe to the Christian church when it will have been victorious in this world, for then it is not the church that has been victorious but the world….then the way to life is no longer narrow and the gate straight, nor are there only a few who find it.”91 in For Self-Examination Kierkegaard explores this theme further, using matthew 7:13–14 to expose the root cause of the world’s persecution of Christians.92 the world cannot tolerate the prospect of self-denying love, for it undermines the world’s own valorization of self-aggrandizement. Because of this irreconcilable conflict of values, love of god will always elicit the world’s wrath and therefore will always entail hatred of the world. Because of this lamentable reality, narrowness becomes a defining characteristic of the way of Christ. The narrowness that self-giving love involves is evident in every moment of Christ’s life. the narrowness can be seen in the lowliness and poverty of Christ’s birth, in his willingness to be subject to temptation, and his resistance to the temptation to exercise kingly power.93 according to Kierkegaard, Jesus knew that love would put him on the cross, and was even willing to accept the sense of god-forsakenness. in The Moment this use of matthew 7:13–14 to expose society’s hostility to the gospel is repeated. Kierkegaard warns that the individual can expect “many a painful collision with the surrounding world.”94 in this sense the narrowness of the way is experienced by any person of character with principles, and especially by any Christian who has died to this world and suffered for the doctrine. Christendom, on the other hand, has encouraged the spiritually lethal delusion that easiness is a sign that a way is the right way. Kierkegaard cautions that in contrast to the false “blood-witnesses” who are a success in this world, the individual Christian who truly follows the hard way will be hated by all.95 the true Christian must beware of the clergy who covet earthly rewards, who go about in long robes, and who mislead people by identifying Christianity with mediocrity in order to avoid the persecution typical of the hard way and the narrow gate.96 in For Self-Examination Kierkegaard explored yet another daunting aspect of the narrowness of the way mentioned by matthew.97 as Kierkegaard notes, in his own 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

SKS 12, 218 / PC, 224. SKS 12, 218 / PC, 223–4. SKS 13, 80–2 / FSE, 57–9. SKS 13, 83 / FSE, 60. SKS 13, 380 / M, 318. SKS 13, 162 / M, 120. SKS 13, 251 / M, 200. SKS 13, 83–4 / FSE, 61.

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exposition the narrow way becomes even narrower as the life of love progresses. the tension between the life of love and worldly values causes even more suffering to the follower of Christ as it becomes clear to him that the pursuit of the narrow way will probably cause unhappiness and offense to those who are dear to him.98 the pursuit of the narrow way could potentially divide fathers from sons and could even trigger so much offense in an individual’s loved ones that it could be the occasion of the loss of their eternal salvation. the way is narrow in that it necessarily involves the risk that the individual’s own life will be an offense to those the individual loves. like luther and olshausen, Kierkegaard also regards the suffering that the narrowness of the way entails as a paradoxical source of joy. he intended his remarks about the narrow way in For Self-Examination to be a reflection for Ascension Day, a joyous celebration of Christ’s victory in eternity.99 the joyous news is that the imitation of the narrowness of the way produces a longing for the promised eternal blessedness, and this longing militates against debilitating doubts. the quieting of doubt concerning eternal blessedness is the happy fruit of the imitation of the narrowness of the way that Christ walked.100 similarly, in “the gospel of sufferings” Kierkegaard elaborates the joy to be found in the thought that it is not the road that is hard but that hardship is the road.101 The road to perfection is not accidentally difficult, as if the road would remain the same if the hardship were removed.102 rather, the hardship itself is a necessary component of the road; the hardship and the road are inseparable.103 the destination of the road cannot be reached without considering the issue of how the road is walked. there is joy to be found in this thought,104 because if hardship is the road, then no doubt can arise that perhaps the hardship could be taken away and the path could still go on to perfection.105 Consequently, when suffering strikes the follower of the narrow path, the individual need not engage in confusing deliberations about theodicy, wondering how a loving god could permit tragedy. this is a consoling thought because if the individual realizes in advance that the Christian road will necessarily become harder and harder, there is no need for the individual to waste time wondering about or envying the carefree lives of those on the broad path.106 the joy is that the individual can immediately begin the task of walking, undeterred by doubts about divine benevolence or puzzled by the apparent absence of cosmic justice. the obedient walking of the hard path brings more certainty than does any effort to resolve doubt by reflection. Moreover, the passage in matthew implicitly comforts the individual on the hard path with the reassurance that the hardship is not superhuman.107 the road is indeed passable and pursuing it is practicable, and the path does lead to the promised destination. if the 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107

SKS 13, 82 / FSE, 59. SKS 13, 87 / FSE, 65. SKS 13, 89 / FSE, 67. SKS 8, 384 / UD, 289. SKS 8, 387 / UD, 292. SKS 8, 395 / UD, 301. SKS 8, 387 / UD, 292. SKS 8, 391 / UD, 296. SKS 8, 391 / UD, 297. SKS 8, 395 / UD, 300.

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difficulties were insuperable, the Christian life would not be described as a road at all.108 according to Kierkegaard, this theme of necessary but surmountable hardship, encapsulated in matthew 7:13–14, is consistently evident throughout scripture. therefore, the assurance that hardship is a feature of the road to blessedness is based on the authority of eternity.109 in all these passages Kierkegaard was extending a trajectory rooted in luther himself. however, Kierkegaard gave this tradition of interpretation a distinctive emphasis. rather than associating persecution with the fallen world’s hostility to correct belief, as luther generally had done, Kierkegaard linked it more strongly to the world’s antipathy to the prospect of self-giving love. By doing so and by reading matthew 7:13–14 through this lens, Kierkegaard was not unique, for the seeds of this emphasis could already be found in the work of olshausen.

108 109

SKS 8, 398 / UD, 305. SKS 8, 395 / UD, 300.

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Sermon on the Mount Bretschneider, Karl gottlieb, Handbuch der Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche oder Versuch einer beurtheilenden Darstellung der Grundsätze, welche diese Kirche in ihren symbolischen Schriften über die christliche Glaubenslehre ausgesprochen hat, mit Vergleichung der Glaubenslehre in den Bekenntnisschriften der reformirten Kirche, vols. 1–2, 4th revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: Barth 1838, vol. 1, p. 179; p. 302; p. 443; vol. 2, p. 163; p. 701; p. 725 (ASKB 437–438). [Calvin, John], Iohannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34, vol. 1, pp. 134–96 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel, 1850, pp. 204–87 (ASKB 106–107). hahn, august, Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens, leipzig: vogel 1828, p. 502; p. 505 (ASKB 535). [hase, Karl], Hutterus redivivus oder Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, 4th revised ed., leipzig: Breitkopf and härtel 1839, p. 287; p. 296 (ASKB 581). herder, Johann gottfried von, Erläuterungen zum Neuen Testament aus einer neueröffneten morgenländischen Quelle, vol. 11 in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, see pp. 133–44 (ASKB 1676–1684) luther, martin, En Christelig Postille, sammendragen af Dr. Morten Luthers Kirkeog Husspostiller. Efter Benjamin Linders tydske Samling, new danish trans. by Jörgen thisted, Copenhagen: den wahlske Boghandling 1828 (ASKB 283). —— Luthers Werke, vols. 1–10, ed by otto von gerlach, Berlin: g. eichler 1840– 41, vol. 5, p. 84–5 (ASKB 312–316). müller, Julius, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, vols. 1–2, 3rd revised and enlarged ed., Breslau: Josef max 1849, vol. 1, p. 271 (ASKB 689–690). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 1, pp. 193–253 (ASKB 96–100). rosenkranz, Karl, Encyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften, halle: C.a. schwetschke und sohn 1831, p. 154 (ASKB 35). schaller, Julius, Der historische Christus und die Philosophie: Kritik der Grundidee des Werks: das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss, leipzig: otto wigand 1838, pp. 106–24 (ASKB 759).

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wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838, pp. 54–87 (ASKB 109). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of the Sermon on the Mount andic, martin, “against Cowardliness,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), p. 304; p. 306; p. 322. Barrett, lee, “the Joy in the Cross: Kierkegaard’s appropriation of lutheran Christology in ‘the gospel of sufferings,’ ” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), p. 271. Come, arnold B., Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self, montreal: mcgill-Queens university press 1997, pp. 278–80. dibelius, martin, The Sermon on the Mount, new York: scribner’s sons 1940, pp. 49–52; pp. 117–18. gouwens, david J., Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1996, p. 174; p. 181. guillamore hansen, p., Søren Kierkegaard og Bibelen, Copenhagen: p. haase & søn 1924, pp. 71–93. hall, amy laura, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2002, p. 19. Kloeden, wolfgang von, “Biblestudy,” in Kierkegaard’s View of Christianity, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 1), pp. 18–19; p. 27; p. 30. law, david, “Cheap grace and the Cost of discipleship in Kierkegaard’s For SelfExamination,” in For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourself!, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21) p. 125; p. 141. lindström, valter, Efterfölgjelsens Teologi hos Sören Kierkegaard, stockholm: svenska Kyrkans diakonistyrelses Bokförlag 1956, pp. 136–62. nelson, Christopher, “the Joy of it,” in Christian Discourses and The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2007 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 17), p. 134. parkov, peter, Bibelen i Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1983, pp. 20–22. polk, timothy h., The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997, p. 136. pons, Jolita, “on imitating the inimitable: example, Comparison, and prototype,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), p. 192.

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possen, david d., “Faith’s Freedom from Care,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), p. 153. —— “on Kierkegaard’s Copenhagen pagans,” in Christian Discourses and The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2007 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 17), p. 35. rae, murray, “Kierkegaard, Barth, and Bonhoeffer: Conceptions of the relation between grace and works,” in For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourself!, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), p. 147; p. 161. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, pp. 114–17. walsh, sylvia, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Christian Existence, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania state university press 2006, pp. 138–9.

the lily in the Field and the Bird of the air: an endless liturgy in Kierkegaard’s authorship leo stan

I. Introduction Because of its creationist assumptions, monotheistic thought is generally regulated by a very keen sense of ontological order and hierarchy. the material creation and what preceded it―the supra-celestial worlds of angels―have been conceived as a harmonious whole, in which all the regions of being are interconnected and hierarchically structured according to their distance or proximity to the Creator.1 the higher up the ladder of creation entities are situated, the more animate and ethereal they become. due to their spiritual superiority the upper levels are increasingly less visible. The lower ones are defined by a rather crude materiality including the impenetrable density of rocks and the visceral corporeality of animals. By virtue of its inanimate nature the mineral world represents the nethermost sphere, followed by plants with their non-spiritual vitality.2 next, animality adds an active and instinctive component to the submissiveness of botanical life, while humankind adds a unique spiritual element that attains its apex in the angels. most of søren Kierkegaard’s religious thought presupposes this creationist world-view. Christian philosophers have often viewed nature as pointing beyond its immediate physicality, seeing it as a symbolic terrain in which two heterogeneous domains come together in a meaningful, although cryptic, way. though suspicious of the nascent scientific analysis of nature and critical of the naturalistic sentimentalism of romantic poets,3 Kierkegaard was not totally innocent of a certain metaphysical 1

p. 44.

Andrei Pleşu, Despre îngeri [on angels], Bucharest: humanitas publishers 2003,

“in plants,” anthony the great states, “there dwells a life without soul, without spirit and without reason.” Quoted from Pleşu, Despre îngeri, p. 46, note 39. 3 in fact, some of Kierkegaard’s journal entries on nature have a highly romantic tone. see Pap. vii–1 B 207 / JP 3, 2842. SKS 18, 46, ee:125 / KJN 2, 42. SKS 19, 201, not6:27 / JP 3, 2829. SKS 19, 226, not8:6 / JP 3, 2831. SKS 18, 261, JJ:367 / KJN 2, 240–1. SKS 18, 273, JJ:398 / KJN 2, 252. Pap. vii–1 B 205 / JP 3, 2840. Kierkegaard could not have freed himself completely from the influence of the Romantics. He, in fact, shares with them the concern for temporality and becoming, a contentious-individualistic understanding of Geist, and a metaphysical interpretation of natural beauty. 2

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outlook. More specifically, he projected the natural microcosm upon the ideal(ist) horizon of monotheistic religiosity.4 At the same time, his reflections on this matter display a deep equivocity. on the one hand, in full accord with Christian doctrine, Kierkegaard upholds the belief that god is the founding and loving power sustaining everything that is.5 on the other hand, in quite a few of his works, both pseudonymous and signed, nature exhibits an unambiguous negativity, most probably due to the soteriological undercurrents of Kierkegaard’s thought.6 this very equivocity allows Kierkegaard to infer that god is not directly present in (nor straightforwardly deducible from) the natural world, even if invisibly god is on most intimate terms with it. as if anticipating heidegger’s ruminations about the sacred, Kierkegaard conjectures that in creating, the transcendent agapeically withdraws from and conceals itself behind the created world.7 in order to avoid any pantheistic slip and to stress god’s utter alterity, nature is seen as containing only traces of the divine. this will prove essential to Kierkegaard’s comments on the spiritual instruction provided by lilies and birds that he based on matthew 6:26–34 and luke 12:24–30. the lily and the bird will appear as the opaque veil behind or beyond which god’s presence is certain, although perpetually concealed from and indiscernible to the secular eye.8 put otherwise, the religious relevance of nature is always oblique. indeed, much as they may inaugurate a Christian life, the bird and vegetable realms cannot introduce an individual to all the imperatives of Christianity. When adequately contemplated, nature can function as an efficient spiritual teacher, but its instruction does not exhaust all the aspects of the faith-relationship to Christ. those who seek god must discern the transcendent tracks within the immanent sphere, without, however, stopping with them. this is not the place to describe all the views of nature in Kierkegaard’s time. notwithstanding, it should be mentioned that he had an unequivocal suspicion of natural philosophy as such and tried to temper the pantheist tendencies of Naturphilosophen with a Christian understanding of transcendence and soteriology. For his critiques of natural sciences, see SKS 25, 185–8, nB27:72 / JP 3, 2823. SKS 20, 58–62, nB:70 / JP 3, 2807. SKS 20, 63–7, nB:73 / JP 3, 2809. SKS 20, 69, nB:80 / JP 4, 4267. SKS 20, 71, nB:84 / JP 3, 2817. SKS 20, 73–4, nB:87 / JP 3, 2820. SKS 23, 44, nB15:65 / JP 4, 4174. SKS 24, 314–15, nB23:222 / JP 3, 2822. SKS 25, 324, nB29:45 / JP 3, 2824. 5 For creation as an act of pure love, see SKS 4, 231–2 / PF 24–5. SKS 4, 235–8 / PF, 28–31. SKS 18, 192, JJ:160 / KJN 2, 178. Pap. vii–1 a 143 / JP 2, 1348. SKS 21, 137, nB7:113 / JP 2, 1379. 6 Compare and contrast, in this sense, SKS 8, 277 / UD, 179. SKS 8, 282 / UD, 184. SKS 8, 285 / UD, 187. SV1 Xii, 452 / JFY, 182 with SKS 4, 360–4 / CA, 56–60. SKS 4, 246 / PF, 42. SKS 4, 249 / PF, 44. SKS 11, 45 / WA, 40–1. 7 see, for example, SKS 7, 221–2 / CUP1, 243–4. SKS 20, 383, nB5:32 / JP 2, 1366. scriptural testimonies concerning god’s inaccessible hiddenness can be found in ps 17:13; ex 33:20–3; 1 tim 6:16; 1 Jn 4:12. For god as changeless mover moved by love, see SKS 18, 192, JJ:160 / KJN 2, 178. Pap. vii–1 a 143 / JP 2, 1348. SKS 21, 137, nB7:113 / JP 2, 1379. 8 SKS 5, 304 / EUD, 310. SKS 9, 375 / WL, 382–3. god’s invisibility is probably rooted in the qualitative difference that separates him as Creator from the created universe. in this sense, the paradigmatic biblical episode is Yahweh’s refusal to be directly contemplated in ex 33:20–3. however, Christianity does postulate the possibility of beholding the divine in an unmediated manner. see lk 9:28–36; 1 Cor 13:12. 4

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i consider these general remarks to be essential for understanding the way in which Kierkegaard appropriates the new testament theme of lilies and birds.9 as the historico-biographical context of this encounter has been carefully discussed by others,10 my approach will be rather thematic. i shall start with the effect of birds and lilies when viewed side by side. subsequently, i will deal with those religious qualities that come to the fore when Kierkegaard discusses the two individually. II. The Ontology of Serene Submission: The Communal Teaching of Lilies and Birds Christians, according to Kierkegaard, are not the only ones who turn to nature for peace and reassurance. poets, especially those of romantic provenience, recurrently return to it in order to escape their estrangement from society or, as in the case of pantheists, in order to explore the mysterious paths of sacredness. the romantic interaction with nature is thus either escapist or melancholic. Kierkegaard adds that in the light of the gospel and its non-negotiable tasks romantics totally miss the point of nature. The Scripture exhorts them to not flee from an inhospitable sociality or from an inward void, but rather to adore and venerate god by tracing everything back to god.11 instead, they become offended and resent the edifying lesson of the birds and lilies.12 To the edified follower of Christ the bird and the lily function as instructors of a transcendent origin. the reason why the new testament text depicting their status as paragons came to be one of Kierkegaard’s treasured gospel passages13 was that it targeted the anxious self in order to cure it. Kierkegaard notes that according this theme appears mostly in Kierkegaard’s signed authorship, being almost absent from the pseudonymous literature. the exceptions are SKS 3, 268 / EO2, 282–3. SKS 3, 324 / EO2, 344. SKS 4, 237 / PF, 29–30. SKS 4, 259 / PF 56–7. one can also fruitfully consult Climacus’ elaborations on religiousness a for possible parallels. see SKS 7, 504–11 / CUP1, 555–61. SKS 7, 518–21 / CUP1, 570–3. SKS 7, 526–33 / CUP1, 578–86. 10 see the historical introductions to WA, JFY, UD, and CD. Bruce h. Kirmmse, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, Bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 1990, pp. 279–305; pp. 340–58; pp. 423–48, and pp. 518–19, note 3. gregory r. Beabout, “the silent lily and Bird as exemplars of the virtue of active receptivity,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2007 (International Kierkegaard Commentary), pp. 127–46. george pattison, “the Joy of Birdsong or dialectical lyrics,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, pp. 111–25. For a broader contextual account, george pattison, Kierkegaard, Religion and the NineteenthCentury Crisis of Culture, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2002, pp. 1–24. 11 SKS 8, 264 / UD, 164. 12 SKS 11, 13–15 / WA, 7–9. SKS 11, 22 / WA, 16–17. though he has an inkling of eternity, the poet remains unmoved by the gospel’s earnestness due to his inchoate ludic character. in the two essays cited above, gregory r. Beabout and george pattison argue that Kierkegaard has the romantic poets in mind for a stark contrast with the lily and bird motif. 13 mt 6:24–34. see SKS 23, 478, nB20:160 / JP 6, 6673. see also Christopher a.p. nelson, “soundings of silence: the lily, the Bird, and the dark Knight of the soul in the writings of søren Kierkegaard,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, pp. 43–83. 9

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to matthew lilies and birds are invulnerable to worries and permanently exude the peace of resting in god, thereby providing the salutary teaching of quietude.14 this teaching, it is added, is indefatigable, gentle, and, given its effortless accessibility, highly efficient.15 the teaching’s gentleness issues from its inability to indict anyone morally or eschatologically; rather, it reassures perturbed individuals in a silent, invigorating, and persuasive fashion. therefore, the invitation to internalize this teaching is solemn and not liable to interpretations or misunderstandings.16 the formative relation to spiritual masters such as lilies and birds is never coercive. Their upbuilding potential, Kierkegaard specifies, is incommensurable with the very idea of subservience. the inspirational pedagogy offered here requires not only charismatic teachers and loyal pupils; it also requires a holy gift, freedom, which, as with all other gifts, must be received responsibly and gratefully. Because the lilies and birds never encumber our divinely granted autonomy, it is completely up to us to appropriate or reject their guidance. this means that, from our vantage point, the religious excellence of lilies and birds is neither mechanically given, nor a priori possessed. the internalization of their lesson hinges on our free agency and adequately oriented will.17 insofar as nature can be a religious reminder, becoming an apprentice of lilies and birds should not be understood as a return to a kind of primal, animal-like, yet guiltless, condition of idealized savagery. the Christian perspective on naturalness is not conducive to an ontological retrogression to a more originary state, which allegedly compensates for all the discontents of civilization. on the contrary, for Kierkegaard, through the adequate contemplation of the field’s creatures we retrieve or remember our common humanity and stay content with it.18 This beneficial recollection will wean us from the habit of enviously comparing ourselves to other people, and will initiate the difficult, albeit crucial, lesson of Christian equality.19 But exactly what, for Kierkegaard, is this equality? it is what humans essentially are: singular selves existing before the divine. Birds and lilies symbolically point to a cruciform ontology, in which the horizontal ground of the world meets the perpendicular axis of transcendence. Indirectly, they trigger a definite intuition of existing from the outset before god.20 as a result, their imitators will always be subjected to an unworldly ultimatum: to face god as omnipresent reality and ultimate telos of one’s existence,21 to willfully and unconditionally relate oneself to the Creator and sustainer of life as such.22 Kierkegaard argues that before the 14

180–1.

SKS 10, 49 / CD, 38. SKS 10, 69 / CD, 60. SKS 8, 260 / UD, 160. SV1 Xii, 450 / JFY,

SKS 10, 23 / CD, 10. SKS 8, 260–2 / UD, 160–2. on birds’ and lilies’ incapacity to deceive, see SKS 11, 19–20 / WA, 13–14. 17 SKS 11, 29, / WA, 24. SKS 11, 43–4 / WA, 39–40. SKS 10, 23 / CD, 11. 18 SKS 8, 262ff. / UD, 162ff. 19 SKS 8, 262 / UD, 161. SKS 8, 280 / UD, 182. 20 SKS 11, 22 / WA, 17. 21 SKS 11, 26ff. / WA, 21ff. 22 lilies and birds dissuade a person from cultivating shrewdness. in general, any conditional attitude is absolutely detrimental to genuine religiosity. SKS 11, 31 / WA, 26. 15 16

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absolute everyone is fully equal and the lesson of this equality, gratuitously taught by lilies and birds, permits humankind to come together spiritually. the universally human reality underlying this equality is always qualitative: it rests on individual existence and is transcendently oriented. here, Kierkegaard points out a fundamental difference: in contrast to lilies and birds that exemplify pure being, humans are defined by a dynamic relationality. they have to exert themselves in order to be what lilies or birds naturally and spontaneously are. personhood is ceaselessly subjected to an ethico-religious, will-oriented process of becoming.23 the pupil of lilies and birds must adopt a stance towards their own existence and within that stance must struggle to relate adequately to their (infinitely heterogeneous) origin and truth. The struggle is due to a paradoxical imperative: in order to begin existing, in Kierkegaard’s sense, every disciple must empty themselves before the absolute. in sum, the Christian life is inherently kenotic. regardless of the amplitude, vigor, and even goodness of their actions and plans, the believer has to annihilate every trace of meritoriousness and must attribute every single achievement, be it mundane or spiritual, exclusively to the other.24 Furthermore, the strenuous realization of inner kenosis must be achieved in silence and within the horizon of a freely appropriated fidelity.25 letting the supreme one act in and through us, adopting the angelic posture of being disinterested instruments of god’s love, represents the acme of faith for Kierkegaard. he calls this unique combination of resolute self-emptying and certainty of god’s active lordship and love “unconditional obedience.” as they moment by moment submit to God’s will alone, birds and lilies figure among the best possible teachers of religious conformity to god.26 to fully serve the only master worthy of serving eradicates the ambivalence inherent in all earthly master–slave relationships. in fact, in obeying the lord unconditionally we humans attain a simplicity through

“so easy it is for the bird and the lily with being; so easily they go about living; so natural is the beginning for them or their coming into being. it is the lily’s and the bird’s fortunate privilege that it is made so easy for them to begin to be, that once they have come into existence they have begun at once, they are immediately at full speed in being and there is no need at all for any preliminaries to the beginning, and they are not at all tested in that difficulty much discussed among people and portrayed as very perilous―the difficulty of beginning.” SKS 10, 50 / CD, 38–9. it might seem strange that birds are not associated with the process of becoming. most probably, this is because Kierkegaard views them as lacking inwardness. 24 SKS 11, 22–3 / WA, 17–18. 25 SKS 11, 16 / WA, 10–11. SKS 11, 19 / WA, 13–14. SKS 10, 23 / CD, 11. 26 SKS 11, 29 / WA, 24. SKS 10, 71 / CD, 61–2. SKS 10, 90 / CD, 82. SV1 Xii, 449 / JFY, 179. unconditional obedience, rather than philological competence and exegetical skills, is the most appropriate way of grasping the true message of the gospel. SKS 11, 38 / WA, 34–5. the total submission to divine will is so central that evil is described by Kierkegaard as disobedience; this is the source of the grave human culpability and the subsequent need for grace, as opposed to the innocence of lilies and birds. SKS 11, 35 / WA, 31. on kinship with god in and through perfect obedience, see SKS 10, 90 / CD, 82. 23

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which we enter a “perfect unity” with the divine.27 here it should be noted that, although lilies and birds are the qualified “obedient teachers”28 who proclaim that “when human beings spin and sew it is nevertheless really god who spins and sews,”29 they do not impel us to an existential catatonia or resigned robotism. Kierkegaard clearly specifies that such unreserved service to the transcendent takes away neither human freedom, nor the need to work. to choose god and to act in full obedience to god’s decrees will never eliminate the need to labor for subsistence. actually, it is only when humans sew in the most active sense that god invisibly and bountifully sews for them. while unconditionally acquiescent, Christians still sow, reap, and gather in barns,30 without forgetting that everything good (including the most basic means of survival) comes solely from above. Kierkegaard includes three spiritual themes in the tutelage offered by lilies and birds: silent inner prayer, tremendum dei, and joy.31 true silence, as opposed to the tepid rhetoric of poets and the obstinate muteness of the demonic, connotes a sincere openness towards transcendence. silence is also the sine qua non of the art of praying wholeheartedly in a world in which discursive skills are either admiringly revered or idolized for their manipulative potential. prayers are incommensurable with any kind of speech―including the speech within―while the speechlessness enveloping them makes possible the marvelous encounter with their object.32 as Kierkegaard puts it, “to pray is not to listen to oneself speak but is to become silent and to remain silent, to wait until the one praying hears god.”33 this suppliant wordlessness portends the fear of god, in which all wishes, desires, and verbosity vanish in a passionate, honest, and awe-filled recognition of the Other as wholly other.34 SKS 11, 37 / WA, 32. SKS 11, 38 / WA, 35. on perfection by co-working with god, see SKS 8, 295–6 / UD, 198–200. For an interesting comparison between Kierkegaard and hegel on simplicity, complexification, and unity with being, see Pattison, “The Joy of Birdsong,” pp. 119–23. 28 SKS 11, 29 / WA, 24. 29 SV1 Xii, 452 / JFY, 183. we shall see that birds are most persuasive in teaching this wisdom. 30 SKS 8, 303 / UD, 208. on thanking god for providing all that is necessary for basic subsistence, see SKS 5, 155 / EUD, 154. 31 For a general account of all these spiritual tasks, see evelyn underhill, Mysticism, new York: new american library 1955. the psychology behind the fear of god, prayer, and joy can be found in Jerome Kroll, Bernard Bachrach, The Mystic Mind: The Psychology of Medieval Mystics and Ascetics, new York: routledge 2005. 32 nelson, “soundings of silence,” p. 68; Beabout, “the silent lily and Bird as exemplars,” pp. 143–4. on praying in fear of god, see SKS 11, 17–24 / WA, 11–19 passim. For a good survey of the role of silence in Kierkegaard’s authorship, see nelson, “soundings of silence,” pp. 43–83. the article includes an orienting bibliography on silence as a philosophical topic on pp. 43–4, note 3. also see ettore rocca, “søren Kierkegaard and silence” in Anthropology and Authority: Essays on Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by poul houe, gordon d. marino, and sven h. rossel, atlanta: rodopi 2000, pp. 77–83. 33 SKS 11, 17 / WA, 12. 34 the dialectic is thus circular and self-sustaining: silence is the adequate medium, in which God’s salvific work is received in fear and trembling (Phil 2:12); at the same time, the trembling fear sensed on this occasion mutes any propensity to speak. SKS 11, 17 / WA, 11. 27

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the ineffability suggested by lilies and birds is an integral part of a mysterium tremendum which accords with the Kierkegaardian insistence on the utter alterity of god. and yet, though the earnest believer can speak with god only “in much fear and trembling,”35 the certainty that the Christian deity is not only “the omnipotent one,” but also the concerned Father who “bears all your sorrow lightly as nothing,” should be a continuous source of joy.36 in this sense, as they shy away from transmitting sorrow over sinfulness, lilies’ and birds’ instructive skills are unique. Kierkegaard contends that their unearthly beatitude is most contagious because joy spreads most rapidly when communicated by someone or something joyful.37 since the way they are (i.e., unconditionally jocund) and what they teach perfectly coincide, lilies and birds manifest such an efficiency in the dissemination of joy that in their presence even the constitutional ephemerality of the world loosens its despondent grip.38 Kierkegaard adds that this spiritual felicity dissolves the future and the past as sources of sorrow, nostalgia, and worry, giving rise to an undifferentiated oneness between the self and its transcendent ground.39 Finally, joy shelters an eschatological dimension, inasmuch as by gaily existing in god at this very moment and regardless of all possible tribulation, the individual is offered an unexpected foretaste of paradise.40 accordingly, attaining this inner bliss and holding on to it with all one’s might is an unpostponable call, a duty to be fulfilled this very day. III. The Aesthetics of Silent Suffering: Lilies’ Instruction when considered in conjunction with birds, lilies helped us focus on the individual and inward dimension of spirit. when considered separately, their pedagogy will cover two major themes, only one of which is fundamentally new. namely, in addition to the theme of radical human equality before the divine, Kierkegaard will combine an emphatically providential interpretation of suffering with a creationist aesthetics; it is this combination that particularizes lilies’ excellence. in the subsequent section, we shall see how the aviary world deepens these psychological considerations suggested by the lilies, and adds to them a concern for the socio-economic side of selfhood. To begin, Kierkegaard reaffirms the connection between the instruction of the lily and a “spiritual democracy.” given his rampant and relentless attacks upon all ibid. SKS 11, 46 / WA, 43. 37 SKS 11, 40 / WA, 36. 38 Cf. SKS 11, 40–8 / WA, 36–45. SKS 22, 99, nB11:168 / WA, 201. see 1 pet 5:7. 39 lilies and birds, whose appearance here and now exhaust their being, may be taken as a pertinent analogy for the religious component of personal identity. see SKS 11, 42–3 / WA, 39: “Joy is the present time with the whole emphasis on: the present time. therefore god is blessed, he who eternally says: Today, he who eternally and infinitely is present to himself in being today. and therefore the lily and the bird are joy, because by silence and unconditional obedience they are completely present to themselves in being today.” see also SKS 11, 48 / WA, 44–5. SKS 10, 79–81 / CD, 70–1. 40 SKS 11, 48 / WA, 44–5. 35 36

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forms of collectivism because of the despiritualizing homogenization they entail, it might come as a surprise that Kierkegaard eulogizes the lilies’ wishful sense of indistinctness and uniformity. First, he holds that every statement about lilies is essentially impartial, referring to them both individually and collectively.41 second, and more importantly, “if a human being is going to compare himself to the lily, he has to say: all that i am by being a human being—that is my clothing. i am responsible for none of it, but glorious it is.”42 In enjoying the sight of an open field, the disciple should learn from the lilies “to be contented with being a human being and not to be worried about diversity among human beings; [one] learns to speak just as tersely, just as solemnly, and just as inspiringly about being a human being as the gospel speaks tersely about the lilies.”43 Kierkegaard implies that, if equality is worth pursuing, it must be only within the horizon of a Christianly informed humanness. his argument is phrased in negative terms and runs as follows: given that “[all] worldly worry has its basis in a person’s unwillingness to be contented with being a human being, in his worried craving for distinction by way of comparison,”44 and given that perpetually defining oneself solely in relation to others is the highway to perdition, and given that rivalries with respect to beauty and status never occur in the world of lilies,45 one should remain untroubled by one’s station in life regardless of all economic, social, and political imbalances.46 The indistinctness to which Kierkegaard testifies here is attributable to the glory lovingly granted by transcendence to every person without exception. the biting lesson for the lowly and the lofty alike is that “all of solomon’s glory is nothing in comparison with what every human being is by [merely] being human.”47 in short, the lily is the intimation of that common status that unites humans in the face of the worldly differences that modern politics is obsessed with.48 how ironic, according to Kierkegaard, that a simple field flower expresses this truth better than any human can. my second contention is that the lily theme introduces us to a Kierkegaardian “spiritual aesthetics,” in which a pathos-laden soteriology incorporates the category

SKS 8, 265 / UD, 166. SKS 8, 290 / UD, 191–2. 43 SKS 8, 269 / UD, 170. see also SKS 8, 265 / UD, 166. 44 SKS 8, 270 / UD, 171. 45 SKS 8, 262 / UD, 161. lilies trigger the realization that all mundane comparisons are ultimately inhuman, destructive, and “morbid.” SKS 8, 268 / UD, 169. SKS 8, 288 / UD, 190. 46 SKS 8, 268 / UD, 169. 47 SKS 8, 264 / UD, 165. 48 SKS 8, 289 / UD, 190. earthly diversity obstructs a healthy sense of human universality; Kierkegaard writes: “In the worry of comparison, the worried person finally goes so far that because of [worldly] diversity he forgets that he is a human being, in despair regards himself as so different from other people that he even regards himself as different from what it is to be human.” SKS 8, 268 / UD, 169. For more on this equalizing universality, see SKS 8, 269–70 / UD, 170–1. 41 42

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of beauty.49 on this point, Kierkegaard’s reasoning is original and his rhetoric is anthropomorphic. No field flower, he argues, is able to hide its fated degradation. The lily’s withering personifies an unconcealable suffering which is so great that, were a human being to endure it, she would simply be crushed by it. Yet, the lily is able to assume it in an unbreakable silence.50 The lily’s subtle lesson is threefold. The first lesson highlights the need for a benevolent submission to one’s given condition, and ultimately, to its divine originator. the second exhorts us to embrace our sufferings wordlessly, thus assigning them a quasi-liturgical significance.51 thirdly and most significantly, the visible beauty of these flowers is, for Kierkegaard, inseparable from the total submission that they anagogically stand for. as if recalling an early Christian ascetic and anticipating nietzsche’s zarathustra in a single passage, our author exclaims: …if one is a lily it is actually no art to be beautiful, but to be beautiful under these [hostile] conditions, in such surroundings that do everything to hinder it, in such surroundings to be fully oneself and to preserve oneself, to mock the whole power of the surroundings…but to be completely free of care in all its beauty!..Because [the lily] is fully and completely itself and unconditionally free of care―the two correspond to each other directly and inversely―it is beautiful. Only by unconditional obedience [to God’s will] can one with unconditional accuracy find the place where one is to stand; and if The first expression of such aesthetics can be found in SKS 3, 267 / EO2, 282. on the unity between the good, the true, and the beautiful in Kierkegaard’s reflections on lilies and birds, see Beabout, “the silent lily and Bird as exemplars,” p. 146. For more on a possibly aesthetic theology in Kierkegaard’s corpus see ettore rocca, “Kierkegaards teologiske æstetik. om troens perception,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 23, 2004, pp. 76–95. For a holistic rereading of Kierkegaard’s theory of stages based on the motif under discussion here, see stephen n. dunning, “transformed by the gospel: what we learn about the stages from the lilies and the Birds,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 111–28. see also sylvia walsh, “if the lily Could speak: on the Contentment and glory of Being human,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, pp. 129–52. A highly insightful account of aesthetics, rooted in the creationist-salvific doctrine of Christianity, can be found in david Bentley hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth, grand rapids: eerdmans 2003. 50 here, the human gift of speech is not necessarily an advantage. Kierkegaard states that in opposition to lilies, humans indefinitely perpetuate and increase their suffering by speaking about it. 51 SKS 11, 21–2 / WA, 16. Kierkegaard writes: “out there with the lily and the bird there is silence. But what does this silence express? it expresses respect for god, that it is he who rules and he alone to whom wisdom and understanding are due. and just because this silence is veneration for god, is worship, as it can be in nature, this silence is solemn. and because this silence is solemn in this way, one is aware of God in nature―what wonder, then, when everything is silent out of respect for him! even if he does not speak, the fact that everything is silent out of respect for him affects one as if he spoke.” at the same time, Kierkegaard refers to an incentive to speak with oneself, which is prompted by the lilies. SKS 8, 264 / UD, 165. what a human being learns from them is to speak about the human condition “tersely,” “solemnly,” and “inspiringly.” SKS 8, 269 / UD, 170. see also nelson, “soundings of silence,” pp. 64–70. 49

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the passivity envisioned here is not sheer indifference.53 as already stated, unconditional obedience―a quality at which lilies excel to a high degree54―aims at a type of passivity that requires actively (that is, kenotically) letting oneself be adorned by creation’s designer. the analogy is based on the fact that the beautiful appearance of the lilies calls attention to their natural imperviousness to the hustle and bustle of human affairs.55 the aesthetic contemplation of the lilies’ adornment could then have a tranquilizing function because all willful emancipation from inimical surroundings is visibly materialized as superfluous beauty.56 the active element in such detachment (with aesthetic implications, nota bene) lies in the free and trusting consent to a divine purposiveness that reigns over everything in the wisest possible way. Because lilies never “feel abandoned,” their obedience goes so far that, had it meant their annihilation, they would still perceive it as god’s will and submit to it accordingly.57 unfortunately, humans most often resist internalizing this discipline. when required to obey, they respond by being offended or by setting certain selfserving conditions for their obedience. Yet, Kierkegaard retorts, even when no one seems willing to practice total surrender to god, it remains imperative to embrace everything in life, suffering included, freely, joyfully, silently, and loyally.58 this is the only sacred and aristocratic beauty that every one of us could incarnate. IV. Lofty Equality and Transcendent Economics: The Edification of Birds to acknowledge the religious symbolism suggested by the world of birds is to draw attention to a commonplace. traditionally, birds have furnished the most appropriate metaphor for the human soul and the celestial sphere,59 intimating a blissful freedom, continually revived and renewed. in the Christian milieu, they enjoy a unique prestige abundantly attested in the scripture itself.60 moreover, the liturgical use of SKS 11, 32 / WA, 27–8; additions in square brackets are mine. in this very sense pattison writes that in following the example of lilies and birds “we must ourselves actively choose the grace that is always already offered, offered already in the god-relationship of creation, as, more intensely and decisively, in the Christ-relationship of redemption.” pattison, “the Joy of Birdsong,” p. 125; emphasis mine. 54 SKS 8, 263 / UD, 163. 55 SKS 8, 262ff. / UD, 162ff. SKS 8, 283–4 / UD, 186. SKS 8, 73 / TA, 75. such spiritually significant insouciance is exceptionally embodied by birds. SKS 4, 251 / PF, 45. SKS 4, 259 / PF, 56–7. SKS 5, 349 / EUD, 364. 56 SKS 8, 263–5 / UD, 164–5. SKS 8, 281–2 / UD, 183–4. 57 SKS 8, 262 / UD, 162. SKS 11, 32 / WA, 28. on lilies in the contradictory horizon of divine love, see SKS 4, 237 / PF, 29–30. 58 SKS 11, 31–4 / WA, 26–9. 59 plato, Phaedrus, 246b–d. 60 the dove would be an example. its symbolism permeates the Judeo-Christian symbolism. see gen 8:11; Jer 48:28, 60:8; isa 40:31; ps 17:8, 36:7, 55:6; song 1:15; Jn 1:32; mt 3:16, 10:16. 52 53

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their imagery is both extensive and central, inviting us to pray and to celebrate divine creativeness and proximity.61 in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, the aviary instructors assist the soul in acquiring spiritual qualities that revolve around inwardness and human interactions. here we sense a barely perceptible progression from the lesser realm of plants to the more energetic and independent world of birds. in Kierkegaard’s edifying teleology, the latter, although not lacking in negativity,62 could retie the broken bond with the sacred when transcendental duties have been obscured by oblivion and indifference. so, why does Kierkegaard consider birds to be worthy of our spiritual attention? He mentions first the calming effect of their image,63 inasmuch as their immediacy suggests a religious appropriation of the present.64 next, their nomadism and innocent ignorance epitomize a nonchalance that hides in its depths a faithful obedience to a heterogeneous absolute authority and to a will that maintains the harmony of the world as a whole.65 But these are just the introductory reasons why any field bird deserves the distinguished title of godly teacher.66 the contours of the avian instruction are delineated by Kierkegaard along two main lines: the societal status of personhood and the negative passions that hinder one’s relationship to transcendence. though pointing to the invisible dynamics of the individual’s psyche, birds have an unexpected implication for the concreteness of co-existence as well. in deepening some themes tangentially touched upon in the lily’s pedagogy,67 the birds’ instruction confers upon them a practical weight and thus augments their cogency and universality. when deployed edifyingly, this particular trope of “birds” proves to be fruitful for both a devotional contemplation of the immediacy of existence and a religiously catalyzed introspection. apart from self-observation, which has already been encouraged by the flowers’ pedagogy about Isa 38:14. Pleşu, Despre îngeri, p. 138; p. 140. in equating it with exteriority and beastliness, Kierkegaard assigns a derogatory sense to animality, which he subsequently uses to attack all manifestations of collectivism. see SKS 3, 174 / EO2, 179. SKS 8, 126 / UD, 10. SKS 8, 288 / UD, 190. SKS 11, 229 / SUD, 117–18. however, humankind is not free of a certain animal element; cf. Pap. viii–2 B 168:2 / SUD, supplement, p. 143. on the cruelty of predatory birds and the spiritual dangers they illustrate, see Pap. X–5 B 5, 10–12 / WA, supplement, p. 200. 63 SKS 8, 270–1 / UD, 172. SKS 8, 282 / UD, 184. SKS 8, 295 / UD, 197. SKS 11, 31–2 / WA, 27. 64 SKS 11, 19 / WA, 13–14. SKS 10, 50 / CD, 39. on salvation and the improvidence of birds, see SKS 5, 255 / EUD, 258–9. 65 SKS 10, 36 / CD, 24. SKS 10, 70–1 / CD, 61–2. SKS 10, 89–92 / CD, 81–3. Kierkegaard seems to find the nomadism of birds to be extremely fruitful for existential therapy. Pap. vi B 222 / JP 5, 5761. Furthermore, during april 1850 he manifested a bizarre interest in “the time of arrival of the most important migratory birds.” see B&A, vol. 1, pp. 279–80 / LD, letter 262, pp. 355–6. in an early journal entry the departure of migratory birds is associated with “the deeper longings in man’s breast.” SKS 17, 21, aa:12 / KJN 1, 16. 66 SKS 8, 277 / UD, 177. 67 For instance, the spiritual equality to which lilies point is directly linked with the birds’ exemplarly function in the struggle against the worry of possessions. lilies also hint at the importance of suffering for faith. 61 62

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suffering, 68 possessiveness will be the core issue in the birds’ teaching.69 with this in mind, Kierkegaard discusses poverty, abundance, and loftiness. when dealing with the passions, his uplifting reflections focus on hubris, self-torment, vacillation, and disconsolateness. Kierkegaard starts by stating that, given our habitual concern for livelihood, we are all tempted to measure our lives by the socio-economico-political footing of others.70 however, when mere subsistence claims our exclusive attention, it generates an imperialistic worry that eventually obscures the higher duties of eternity. Therefore, the danger of thinking in the envy-laden categories of affluence and poverty, a practice that distracts the individual from being contented with what she is and has, grows and becomes almost ubiquitous.71 that is why, when experiencing the elementary anxiety of survival, it can be transformative to pay close attention to the birds of the air.72 Kierkegaard comfortingly assures that a mere upward look at birds should effect an instant blindness to any primal anxiety. the birds’ self-contentment is able to cure us of the very root of such apprehensions: possessiveness.73 Besides, like the lilies, birds impart to us the certainty that only the heavenly Father keeps everything alive.74 But, unlike the lily, they communicate a sense of the high importance of work that is not solely pleasing to god, but also religiously necessary. whereas lilies inspire in us a freely consented passivity, birds typify a selfless activity concretized in labor that resists meritoriousness and refuses all rewards. Contrariwise, the presumption that one can independently provide for oneself remains a way to distance oneself from god.75 to co-work with god, while imputing to god all the fruits of physical effort, regardless of the laborer’s burdens, is to imitate the classical example of birds who never sow nor spin but neither perish of hunger, and who, when storing, never misuse the nurture given to them.76 By contrast, Kierkegaard sadly adds, humans can sow, spin, store, and consider

“indeed, little by little [the worried one] discovers that he is speaking about himself, that what he says about the lily he says about himself. it is not the lily that is saying it; the lily cannot speak.” SKS 8, 264 / UD, 165. 69 this is due to the incapacity of plants to personify anything relevant regarding work, production, wealth, or the lack thereof. SKS 8, 262–3 / UD, 163. Because of this, they are imperfect. SKS 3, 268 / EO2, 283. on the link between the inactivity of lilies and the prayer for an expectation of salvation, see SKS 5, 255 / EUD, 258–9. 70 we have already learned from the lilies and birds that interpersonal or societal comparisons are noxious to religiousness. Kierkegaard actually deems mundane comparisons as “one of the most corrupting kinds of defilement.” SKS 8, 279 / UD, 179. see also notes 48 and 51 above. 71 SKS 8, 278 / UD, 178–9. SKS 10, 32–3 / CD, 20–1. 72 SKS 8, 270ff. / UD, 171ff. 73 SKS 10, 33 / CD, 21–2. SKS 10, 48–50 / CD, 37–8. 74 SKS 8, 272 / UD, 172–3. however, Kierkegaard inadvertently contradicts himself when writing that “to the bird it is also as if its life were not the object of anyone else’s care.” SKS 10, 29 / CD, 17. 75 SKS 8, 277 / UD, 177. 76 For an unexpected aesthetics of work, see SKS 3, 268 / EO2, 282. 68

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themselves worthy of whatever results from their toil without any intimation of filial gratitude. For Kierkegaard, a key disparity exists between humankind and the winged beings of the field, which I would term the initial inequality of the material status quo. More specifically, in the human universe there is a discrepancy among the possessions of different individuals. some own more than others and some have to work harder (sometimes to an enormous extent) for what others possess with no effort whatsoever. people live with an imbalance between those who have in abundance and others who have little or nothing. Frequently enough, political thinkers have argued that an injustice exists in the relations between the affluent who want to boost or at least preserve their fortune, and the destitute who, tragically enough, are never allowed to accumulate, being kept on the verge of survival.77 such views were not foreign to the philanthropic, socially concerned, and religious author, søren Kierkegaard. Yet, for him, when material inequities become detrimental to the process of becoming spirit, a glance at the attitude of the birds towards work and its fruits might put an individual back on track.78 the reason why the material situation should never be given high priority in a spiritual journey is that God―the one who is richest in perpetuum―solicitously and constantly gives enough to everyone.79 the idea of an autonomous, immanent selfsustenance is an apostatic delusion. Consequently, in sharp contrast to many political thinkers, Kierkegaard declares that whether one arduously toils and struggles for the daily bread or one sows, gathers in barns, and selfishly accumulates much more than one needs, no one will ever survive or flourish without the assent of the High.80 From an ideational perspective, to associate Kierkegaard with the tradition that culminated in the marxian corpus is to distort his literal intentions. Kierkegaard’s remarks about poverty and riches as part of the birds’ spiritual pedagogy goes against every single philosophical presupposition of socialist agendas. some of the elements of Kierkegaard’s anti-communistic religious ideals, as gently and decisively enacted by their winged practitioners, must be explored. to birds poverty is never a troubling issue.81 For humans, however, inasmuch as poverty might lead to corporal misery and mental degradation, it remains a disturbing phenomenon. Kierkegaard, unlike his socially apprehensive colleagues, voices two critiques of this view, but from a reverent position. The first is that the poor, probably due to the universality of sin, are not the saintly victims of greedy exploiters, as marxists assume; rather, they may not only long to escape from their degrading indigence but also to get rich themselves, even while resentfully despising the wealth that is not theirs. the second reason is that, in grieving about their wretched condition, the impoverished forget the fundamental equality promised

Kierkegaard never defends this idea. the closest he gets is the mere realization that some can barely make ends meet. SKS 10, 26 / CD, 13–14. 78 SKS 10, 25–47 / CD, 13–36. 79 SKS 10, 36 / CD, 24. SKS 8, 277 / UD, 177. 80 SKS 8, 273 / UD, 173. 81 SKS 10, 25–7 / CD, 13–4. 77

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and guaranteed by the gospel.82 This is not to say that Kierkegaard perfectly fits the profile of a bourgeois reactionary. Actually, he sounds as critical of the well-off when he denounces their inhuman mercilessness.83 the scripture itself, Kierkegaard reminds us, though seemingly privileging the poor, never judges humans according to the material differences between them;84 instead of taking sides with some against others, it compels all to live as equals before god and to reach towards the neighbor only with agape.85 By carefully contemplating the birds, the poor will learn how to be satisfied with what every human individual always already is. this is something of great significance for Kierkegaard. Since the bird does not struggle to attain something beyond its ontological condition, humans ought to assimilate this lesson of contentment with being human.86 if the individual ranks low on the socio-economic spectrum, but feels self-sufficient by having God as his creator and companion, he will spiritually outdo the affluent person who remains consumed by worry about making a living.87 moreover, according to the Christian ideal of poverty, the pauper, not unlike the birds, should dispense with the care of poverty, and then poverty will loosen its unforgiving clutch.88 Kierkegaard goes so far as to state that the impoverished Christian who lacks the worries that usually accompany indigence “The Gospel wants first of all to remind even a destitute person not to forget completely how gloriously he is clothed by god.” SKS 8, 287 / UD, 188; see also SKS 8, 292ff. / UD, 194ff. Equality is to be affirmed and internalized only before God who is the paternal sovereign that never forgets nor privileges anyone. SKS 8, 273 / UD, 173. on religious equality as the universal ability to pursue god’s kingdom, see SKS 8, 305 / UD, 210. For possible gender criticisms of this view, see sylvia walsh, “if the lily Could speak,” passim. 83 SKS 9, 320 / WL, 323–4. 84 Kierkegaard does not seem concerned whether these material discrepancies are natural or not. he is more interested in their bearing on the present and future life of the believer, rather than their (more or less unjust) provenience in a distant past. marxists or critical social theorists, however, tend to start with a genealogical analysis of the present, which cannot avoid ideological presuppositions, and then prescribe solutions for the future on the basis of the analysis of the past. the present is a time for becoming aware of the unjust state of affairs, which demands urgent action for the sake of ideals attainable in a very distant future. For Kierkegaard, however, present injustices lose their tragic dimensions when considered in the light of the Christian ideal. it is precisely this ultimate ideality (continually to be appropriated in the present) that qualifies any concern for economic justice as secondary at best. When using the birds motif, Kierkegaard is absolutely uninterested in the genealogy of the material contrasts among human beings. 85 SKS 8, 280 / UD, 180. 86 SKS 10, 48–9 / CD, 37–8. 87 SKS 8, 277 / UD, 177. SKS 8, 280 / UD, 181. the rich are subjected to the same rigorous spiritual treatment as the poor. without taking sides, Kierkegaard also speaks critically of great fortunes and ceaseless accumulation. he uses the example of birds that, because of their ignorance and nomadism, rid themselves of the care for abundance and thus prove their superiority over human paganism. true Christians have the duty to remain god’s exceptional creatures. even when having possessions in abundance, they must live as if without possessions. SKS 10, 37–8 / CD, 25/6. SKS 10, 44 / CD, 32–3. 88 SKS 10, 26 / CD, 14. 82

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should “not speak of the poverty but instead of his riches,” because the possibility of passing from material destitution to religious wealth89 is universally given and is “the most blessed.”90 through this rather unsophisticated but Christian argument Kierkegaard concludes to the horror of all social justice activists that ultimately “poverty and abundance, lowliness and loftiness are in themselves matters of indifference, of innocence…that which, Christianly, does not matter at all.”91 in regard to possessions in general, the theme of the archetypal nature of birds reaches its acme: without owning anything in this world, they live as if filled with the awareness of the unearthly source of all earthly provisions.92 it is as though they perfectly follow the biblical exhortation to let each day have its troubles, to refuse to secure the future, and to resist any impulse to gather, deposit, and guard.93 For humans, this is still an endless task. moving to the second theme, Kierkegaard symbolically associates the world of birds with an efficient cure for the inward turmoil or indecisiveness of the human soul. his meditations on such Stemninger (moods) are rhetorically light and psychologically basic, but highly efficient as part of a religious therapy.94 the inner states addressed by the bird trope are spiritually unhealthy; their overcoming is, nonetheless, gentle and accessible to everyone. so, why and how do birds become an occasion for such inward healing? the mere care about the next day, Kierkegaard states, might verge on selftorment.95 indecisiveness, vacillation, and disconsolateness are ultimately selfconsuming96 and are instantiations of sinfulness.97 This contorted interiority afflicts all of humanity and comprises a large spectrum of apostatic maladies: from fatalistic resignation98 and the consequent indifference to one’s spiritual calling,99 to conceited contrition,100 to self-hatred (in which paganism excels),101 and to demonically prideful disdain.102 Birds are an antidote to these gloomy conditions inasmuch as, in humbly serving a single master103 with whom they soar up high and surmount all the overall doctrinal principle is: “there is only one rich person: the Christian; everyone else is poor, the poor and the rich.” SKS 10, 47 / CD, 36. this Christian wealth is always and essentially of a heavenly nature. SKS 10, 29 / CD, 17. 90 SKS 10, 34 / CD, 22. 91 SKS 10, 69 / CD, 60. 92 SKS 8, 272–3 / UD, 173–4. 93 SKS 8, 277 / UD, 177. Birds are also a symbol of detachment from everything temporal. SKS 8, 270 / UD, 172. 94 The same can be asserted about the healing efficiency of the lilies. 95 SKS 10, 80 / CD, 70–1. 96 SKS 10, 89–98 / CD, 81–91. 97 SKS 10, 88 / CD, 80. 98 SKS 4, 136–9 / FT, 41–6. 99 SKS 11, 158–61 / SUD, 42–6. 100 SKS 11, 223–5 / SUD, 110–12. 101 SKS 10, 88 / CD, 79. 102 SKS 11, 225ff. / SUD, 113ff. For more on demonism vis-à-vis the sacred silence taught by lilies and birds, see nelson, “soundings of silence.” 103 SKS 10, 89–92 / CD, 81–3. 89

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worldly adversities,104 they are the fiercest enemies of morbidity, vacillation, and melancholy.105 as we have already seen, they are the most reliable transmitters of joy. Finally, the crowning lesson of the sky’s creatures is to live loftily in the Christian sense.106 loftiness here is essentially different from pride, for it has an unequivocally spiritual connotation. the apologist Kierkegaard writes that, doctrinally speaking, “there is one loftiness: to be a Christian—and one abyss: paganism.”107 what is more, if we view faith as transcending everything,108 then birds, whose element is celestial, figuratively represent the teachers of loftiness without perdition-filled care.109 viewed in this way, Christianity appears to be heterogeneous to the baseness, sickliness, and debility nietzsche equated it with. there is as much eminence and elevation (both values of nobility) in living Christianly as there is grace and ataraxia in any bird’s flight. However, unlike Nietzsche, Kierkegaard refuses to accept any pagan contribution to the history of these virtues. he writes, “in its loftiness the bird is without the care of loftiness. in his earthly loftiness elevated above others, the eminent Christian is lofty without the care of loftiness. the eminent pagan with his care belongs in the abyss; he actually is not lofty but is in the abyss.”110 or, even more apologetically, he asserts: the bird’s loftiness is the shadow, the Christian’s the reality, the pagan’s the nothingness. the bird has air within itself, and therefore it can hold itself up in loftiness; the eminent pagan has emptiness within himself, and therefore his loftiness is a delusion; the eminent Christian has faith within himself, and therefore he hovers in loftiness above the abyss of earthly loftiness.111

SKS 8, 284 / UD, 187. SV1 Xii, 453 / JFY, 183–4. this is all the more important because birds are not exempted from suffering. SKS 11, 20 / WA, 15. Birds are completely free of disconsolateness because they obey their master and benefactor without reserve or doubt. that is why, when working, birds look continually jocund and exhibit their elation by singing. For them the occasions to rejoice are endless. SKS 11, 40–1 / WA, 36–7. SKS 10, 90 / CD, 82. 106 SKS 10, 60 / CD, 50. the birds’ instruction about the dangers of presumptuousness does not add anything new to the overall picture. SKS 10, 69–78 / CD, 60–9. Basically, birds lack all craving for high status and thus have no seed of anxiety. with humans, however, presumptuousness deepens the already extant abyss between them and the divine. By contrast, “grace comes through god to each person who as a Christian draws nearer to him.” SKS 10, 77 / CD, 69. pagans, Kierkegaard argues, excel in being presumptuous and therefore rank even lower than birds on the onto-soteriological scale. he writes, “as much closer to god as the Christian is than the bird, so much further away from god the pagan is than the bird.” ibid. 107 SKS 10, 68 / CD, 59. 108 SKS 8, 292 / UD, 194. 109 SKS 10, 58–68 / CD, 48–59. SKS 8, 272 / UD, 172–3. on the symbolic loftiness of the bird, see SKS 10, 68 / CD, 58–9. SV1 Xii, 456 / JFY, 187. 110 SKS 10, 68 / CD, 58. 111 SKS 10, 68 / CD, 59. 104 105

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whereas lilies have presented us with a spiritual equality “at the grass roots,” birds present us with an equality from above. while the indistinctness intimated by lilies is immediate and actual, the non-differentiation among birds is ideal, because it combines kenosis with a sense of greatness. although independent of its fellows, every bird is truly and definit(iv)ely attached to the Other.112 true enough, birds are lofty, but not elevated above other birds as each follows God’s will selflessly, faithfully, and therefore, gloriously. V. Upbuilding Introduction to the Christian Superiority of Humankind in their prefatory remarks about “the lily in the Field and the Bird of the air,” howard and edna hong argue that the devotional discourses in this book can be read in line with Johannes Climacus’ understanding of religiousness a.113 By implication, they do not belong to Christianity, as articulated by the same pseudonym under the rubric of the paradoxical-historical religiousness B.114 However, are we justified in relegating lilies and birds to a secondary position that is surpassed by Christ’s salvific revelation? Are these natural masters too immanent to accommodate any significance for Christian transcendence?115 actually, Kierkegaard is far more nuanced concerning nature’s incapacity to introduce the self to the crucial imperatives of Christianity. First, we should not forget that lilies and birds symbolically express Christ’s truth.116 second, Kierkegaard argues that the task of following the avian and floral exemplars agrees with the gist of Christ’s gospel.117 third, in maintaining that the lily and the bird are at one with their guidance,118 Kierkegaard anticipates the theme that Jesus’ life and teaching form an SKS 10, 59–62 / CD, 48–52. howard and edna hong, “historical introduction,” in WA, pp. xiii–xiv. 114 the argument is somewhat simplistic: due to the absence of any allusion to forgiveness, lilies and birds cannot be the teachers of religiousness B. see nelson, “soundings of silence,” p. 70. see also hubert l. dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, division i, Cambridge, massachusetts: mit press 1991, pp. 294–7. sylvia walsh is more nuanced on this issue. she holds that, by virtue of their humorous character, the two can be placed at the confinium between religiousness a and B. see walsh, “if the lily Could speak,” pp. 131–5. my thesis reinforces walsh’s interpretation from a slightly different and more global perspective. see also the careful and insightful analysis of david d. possen, “Faith’s Freedom from Care,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, pp. 153–72, see especially pp. 170–1. For a critique of the identification of Kierkegaard’s discourses as instantiations of religiousness a, see thomas anderson, “is the religion of Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses religiousness a?” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), pp. 51–75. 115 sylvia walsh equates the metaphorical teaching of lilies and birds with “an immanent religiosity.” see walsh, “if the lily Could speak,” p. 150. 116 SV1 Xii, 449 / JFY, 179. 117 SKS 11, 13–15 / WA, 7–9. 118 in other words, there is no gap between their being and their spiritual instruction. SKS 11, 41–2 / WA, 37–8. 112 113

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indissoluble unity, an idea he scrupulously defends in Practice in Christianity.119 Fourth and finally, the bird’s exemplary function is rooted in its capacity to live only in the present and to disregard all future mundane concerns or past sorrows;120 by analogy, the true Christian should feel transported to heaven in this very moment.121 it would be more correct to say that Kierkegaard thematizes the limitations of birds and lilies with regard to the message of Christianity. For instance, he reminds us that the exhortation to follow their teaching is only metaphorical because their religious authority is null. most importantly, something immanent could never introduce humans to Christ’s spiritual drama with its cardinal requirement of self-sacrificial mimesis.122 the otherness of Christ is so acute that, other than the Father’s love and absoluteness, nothing else seems commensurable with it. within a strictly Christological framework any immanent teaching, metaphor, and teacher are inadequate. this brings us to Kierkegaard’s admonitions concerning the insurmountable qualitative differences between Christianity and the world of birds and lilies. we should be aware that the two are never identical with one another.123 to give a few examples, Kierkegaard asserts that, unlike birds, the Christian is to ceaselessly work towards the civitate Dei and prioritize his or her celestial destiny above everything else.124 next, it “scarcely occurs to the bird that it is to take care of itself, even less that it is appointed to take care of others.”125 the bird’s seemingly carefree nature is hardly reconcilable with the Christian duty to saturate his or her life with love for the neighbor. The ontology of the aviary-floral universe diverges from the Christian anthropology in another sense. Birds and lilies are always already placed before god in a mechanical fashion, as it were, whereas the believing self has to consciously and righteously struggle to attain this posture. the transition from potentiality to actuality rests on the dynamism of inwardness, which flowers and birds lack entirely. indeed, although Kierkegaard symbolically speaks of birds as capable of volitional acts,126 only humans enjoy the privileged ability to relate to themselves, to one another, and to god in a voluntary or dialectical manner. this ability is the divine imprint on their being.127 For a bird or a lily, confronting the transcendent in a conscious, inward, and passionate manner is purely impossible. By its very nature the bird “fortunately escapes the difficulty of the beginning and therefore acquires no conception of how lowly it is; but then, of course, it is incomparably more lowly than the lowly Christian who knows how lowly he is.”128 in a similar vein, Kierkegaard describes birds as incomparable to wealthy Christians who must praise the lord 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128

SKS 12, 128 / PC, 123. SKS 10, 79–80 / CD, 70. SKS 10, 88 / CD, 79. SV1 Xii, 456 / JFY, 187. SKS 10, 21 / CD, 9. SKS 10, 29–30 / CD, 17–18. SKS 10, 59 / CD, 49. SKS 10, 73 / CD, 65. SKS 8, 264, UD, 165. SKS 8, 290 / UD, 192. SKS 10, 51 / CD, 41.

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for the opportunity to enact their love for others.129 Whereas the affluent Christian must kenotically become ignorant of what he or she possesses,130 and gratefully cowork with god in spreading benevolence, the bird’s and lily’s incompatibility with possessiveness per se is a sheer fact.131 to all this Kierkegaard adds the qualitative gulf that separates human selfhood from the ontology of a bird or a lily in the creationist framework. the superiority originally given by god to humankind is not lost despite the emergence of sin. there are, in other words, some qualitative unalterable differences that place humanness above everything else created.132 this pre-eminence resides in the volitional religious engagement mentioned above, to which all humans are called. true Christians, Kierkegaard adds, are characterized by the fideistic awareness of having an omniscient and loving Father in heaven, whose kingdom surpasses in power, significance, and worth all earthly kingdoms taken together. Moreover, Christians believe that “a human being is not differentiated from the bird by his inability to live on just as little [the daily bread] but by his inability to live ‘on bread alone.’ ”133 while convinced of their transcendent home and blessed status as a child of god, the believer rests assured that god’s grace will satisfy their unearthly needs, and superabundantly so. moreover, as opposed to all birds, the Christian is sure that “no sparrow falls to the ground without the heavenly Father’s will,”134 and that just as one will be fed in this life, “he will some day live blessed in the hereafter.”135 while no bird prays or gives thanks for god’s daily nurture, to the faithful human prayers are more important than “meat and drink…for him [they] are indeed his food, just as it was Christ’s ‘food to do the Father’s will.’ ”136 so, it is those qualities that involve a dialectical-volitional (i.e., historical) relationality to transcendence that elevate humankind above the natural world.137 amongst these differentiating determinants we should include spirit,138 discursivity,139

the wealthy Christian is always liable to learn both that god is the actual, universal, although hidden, benefactor, and that the faithful are providentially used for agapeic purposes. SKS 10, 44 / CD, 33. indeed, it is impossible to reconcile the ideas expressed in SKS 10, 41–5 / CD, 28–33 with any leftist revolutionary rhetoric. on the other hand, Kierkegaard is not an unconditional defender of wealth, for he spots a sinful dimension in desires for economic security. SKS 8, 277–8 / UD, 178. 130 SKS 10, 44 / CD, 33. 131 SKS 10, 35–8 / CD, 23–6. SKS 10, 51–2 / CD, 41. 132 note that this special status is discussed by Kierkegaard in connection with an explicit belief in the Fall. 133 SKS 10, 27 / CD, 15. 134 ibid. 135 SKS 10, 28 / CD, 16. 136 ibid. 137 Birds and lilies suggest being and actuality, while the Christian religion is more concerned with subjective becoming and existential possibilities. SKS 10, 37–8 / CD, 26. 138 SKS 4, 348 / CA, 42. Pap. v B 53, 16 / CA, supplement, pp. 186–7. 139 SKS 11, 16–17 / WA, 10–11. SKS 11, 21 / WA, 16. 129

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consciousness,140 a directly god-related conscience,141 and also despair, Angest,142 and all other apostatic possibilities rooted in freedom.143 in its own way, each of these indicates an exclusively human interactivity with a trans-mundane world and its stringent imperatives.144 But there are more exceptional characteristics that undergird the view of humanity as “the creation’s wonderwork” and as the illustrious ruler of all lilies in the field or birds of the air.145 Kierkegaard detects this holy glory in the possibility to opt for god’s kingdom against worldliness in a calm and audacious manner.146 Fallenness is thus counterbalanced, if not defeated, by a primordial eminence.147 as the scripture itself proclaims, humans are made in god’s image and, Kierkegaard adds, individually established by the Creator himself.148 as such, they are the only ones bound for a blessed happiness in the hereafter. no other creature enjoys the privilege of resembling god, of doubling corporeal erectness with the possibility of lifting one’s vision in adoration.149 Kierkegaard is most adamant in asserting the invisible dimension of this originary godliness.150 given that the spirit represents the “invisible glory” of personhood, and that the manifestation of this loftiness is contingent upon the veneration of god, the self, in contradistinction to everything natural, will attain its excellence in and through a doxological kenosis.151 Kierkegaard writes: this is what is expected, not that the human being is to come and assume the command, which is also glorious and is assigned to him, but that worshipping he shall praise the Creator, something nature cannot do, since it can only remind the human being about doing that. it is glorious to be clothed as the lily, even more glorious to be the erect and upright ruler, but most glorious to be nothing by worshipping!152 SKS 8, 292–3 / UD, 195–6. SKS 9, 144 / WL, 143. SKS 9, 370 / WL, 377. 142 SKS 11, 131 / SUD, 15. SKS 4, 348 / CA, 42. 143 SKS 10, 71 / CD, 61–2. 144 SKS 11, 16 / WA, 10. SKS 11, 24 / WA, 19–20. SKS 11, 38 / WA, 35. 145 SKS 8, 264 / UD, 165. SKS 8, 288 / UD, 189. 146 Cf. SKS 8, 300–37 / UD, 205–12. in a more soteriological vein, it is glorious that humans can uniquely combine a full and earnest awareness of their tribulations with a salutary freedom from care. SKS 8, 294 / UD, 197. Kierkegaard’s emphasis on human glory is exclusively religious. see also his admonitions on the danger of forgetting this divine glory through mundane distractions, evasions, comparisons, busyness, ingratitude, and an obsessive attachment to worldly worries. SKS 8, 265 / UD, 165–6. SKS 8, 285 / UD, 187–8. SKS 8, 297–9 / UD, 201–3. 147 SKS 8, 264 / UD, 165. SKS 8, 289–92 / UD, 190–4. SKS 8, 297–307 / UD, 201–12. 148 SKS 5, 314–15 / EUD, 323–5. By contrast, the crowd is equated with the most base animality. SKS 8, 288 / UD, 190. 149 SKS 8, 289–90 / UD, 191–2. 150 “thus the invisible Creator reproduces himself in the invisibility, which is the qualification of spirit, and the image of God is explicitly the invisible glory.” SKS 8, 290 / UD, 192. 151 SKS 8, 291 / UD, 193. on humility as another manifestation of human exaltation, see SKS 8, 277 / UD, 177. 152 SKS 8, 291 / UD, 193. 140 141

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we can, therefore, safely conclude that birds and lilies are not understood by Kierkegaard in an animist, pantheistic or a gnostic–dualist framework. to spiritually precarious humankind they are situated in the limbo between a created immanence and the creating, incommensurably different deity. perhaps without knowing it, Kierkegaard overcomes the proto-dualism which threatens any soteriological doctrine by the interposition of an ontological region characterized by both sheer immediacy and openness to spirit. When observed in regard to edification, nature points to a visible familiarity with the beyond, which is psychologically comforting and curative. Christianity, however, is the realm of invisibility, self-abasement, struggle against sin, ideality, distance, and rigor. in between we have the Janus Bifrons incarnated in plants and birds. We are now in the position to understand better the complexity of the floral– avian space, and its intercessory role. the overarching themes become more evident if we consider the birds’ and lilies’ positive and negative sides that reinforce their mediating function. my proposal is that the motif’s positivity is rooted in its capacity to instantiate a universality in which immanence comes into contact with the vertical pole of becoming.153 this universality has a therapeutic purpose and ought to be (re)assumed in a world filled with purportedly immutable differences. For Kierkegaard, the access to the universally human proceeds through an exteriority that triggers an introspective return to oneself.154 through this outwardly mediated self-reappropriation we encounter the only dissimilarity that matters, that is, the infinite heterogeneity of our Originator. The underlying contention is that, when inwardness neglects the religious ground of its existence, something exterior might be an effective reminder of it. The negativity of the floral and feral model should be conceived, on my reading, only in terms of soteriological insufficiency. we have seen that Kierkegaard framed his discussion of human superiority over birds and field flowers around what he considered to be the unique features of Christianity: a processual-agonistic view of selfhood, combined with a transcendent teleology, plus the decisive awareness of the fallen or sinful condition of humankind that requires a salvific, grace-giving, and agapeic understanding of god. in the same Christian perspective, spirituality is traced back to an inchoate resemblance to the Creator and to god’s redemptive embodiment in Christ. Thus, to follow a paradoxically suffering (i.e., self-sacrificing and kenotic) god who assumes the human condition and delivers it through his own death points to an existential path from which nature’s creatures are excluded. VI. A Proto-Angelology? Kierkegaard’s estimations of the spiritual implications of the biotic world are hardly problematic or inconsistent. the motif of the birds and the lilies seems to 153 By immanence i mean what Kierkegaard considered to be the aesthetic sphere of human existence. equality is perhaps the most important lesson of lilies and birds vis-à-vis the interhuman (or horizontal) relationships; the vertical ground of this equality is a meta-worldly (i.e., utterly different) deity. 154 SKS 8, 264 / UD, 165.

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be structured by an ingenious coherence that is absolutely necessary when dealing with the phenomenon of spiritual transformation. My first conclusion is that, having avoided dualism, Kierkegaard is able to avoid solipsism as well, by making something external to the self a mnemonic instrument for regaining an inner sense of common humanness, which is oriented toward a reality that is absolutely and infinitely other. this is how the danger of Indesluttethed (“enclosedness”) is circumvented. moreover, the interiority to which such an edifying encounter with exteriority gives birth is not only corporate, but also holistic: the instruction of the lilies and birds synchronically addresses the individual’s passions, conscious volition, memory, and imagination.155 the relationship with god engages human selfhood in its totality. my second overall thesis is that by developing the Christian motif of lilies and birds in the manner outlined above, Kierkegaard (a) draws fruitful implications out of biblical creationism; (b) turns spatiality (or outwardness) into an occasion for introspection as a first step on the way to the divine; (c) infuses naturalness with a fideistic component and thus reduces the qualitative (proto-dualistic) gap between the immanent and the transcendent; (d) introduces and amplifies the apophatic notion of the divine incognito,156 whereby god appears withdrawn from creation although lovingly sustaining it from beyond; (e) identifies a way to deal with the tribulations of life, be they internal or external, without directly resorting to Christ as divine comforter; (f) develops a kind of pre-Christian, intermediary, yet monotheistic, religiousness as an efficacious propaedeutic to Christianity itself; and (g) introduces the need for salvation in an accessible, less traumatic fashion, that is, as a mild preparation for the stringent imperatives of Christianity. no bird or lily could ever instruct us about the imitation of Christ. their lesson is rather stagnant, prefiguring the changelessness of eternity. Christ’s teaching emphasizes becoming, singularity, paradoxicality, antagonism, and an undeserved reconciliation. On Kierkegaard’s account lilies and birds are insufficient to express the soteriological drama of Christianity. But neither are they symbols of pantheism. rather, lilies and birds exhibit an angelic skillfulness in pointing beyond themselves to suggest that we are meant for a greater proximity to god than the angels.

among the passions mentioned in this study, we must recall the fear of god and the tribulations of interiority, and also quietude and joy. Conscious will was essential to the task of freely choosing god and kenotically submitting to his decrees. with respect to memory Kierkegaard refers to lilies and birds as “reminders.” also, in the meditations analyzed here he repeatedly appeals to our imaginative powers. 156 on other apophatic motifs in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, see david r. law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, oxford: Clarendon press 1993. 155

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Lilies and the Birds [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: eichler 1833–34, vol. 1, pp. 176–81 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 267–70 (ASKB 106–107). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 1, pp. 240–5 (ASKB 96–100). usteri, leonhard, Udvikling af det Paulinske Lærebegreb i dets Forhold til det Ny Testamentes bibelske Dogmatik. Et exegetisk-dogmatisk Forsøg, trans. by wilhelm Johan Jacob Boethe, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1839, p. 158 (ASKB 850). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 79–95 (ASKB 108). —— Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838, pp. 79–82 (ASKB 109). —— Lehrbuch der hebräisch–jüdischen Archäologie, 3rd ed., leipzig: vogel 1842, pp. 80–108 (ASKB 872). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of the Lilies and the Birds Barlow, Brian, “absence and presence: the religious and psychological meaning of ‘the lily in the Field and the Bird of the air,’ ” Religious Studies and Theology, vol. 17, no. 2, 1998, pp. 20–3. Beabout, gregory r., “the silent lily and Bird as exemplars of the virtue of active receptivity,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 10), pp. 127–46. dunning, stephen n., “transformed by the gospel: what we learn about the stages from the lilies and the Birds,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 111–28. Ferreira, m. Jamie, Kierkegaard, malden, massachusetts: wiley-Blackwell 2009, pp. 122–4. guillamore hansen, p., Søren Kierkegaard og Bibelen, Copenhagen: p. haase 1924, pp. 75–6.

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Kirmmse, Bruce h., Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, Bloomington, indiana: indiana university press 1990, pp. 294–7. mahn, Jason h., “Kierkegaard’s Three Devotional Discourses and the Felix Culpa theme,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 10), pp. 85–110. malantschuk, gregor, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Existence, trans. by howard and edna hong, milwaukee: marquette university press 2003, pp. 127ff. nelson, Christopher a.p., “soundings of silence: the lily, the Bird, and the dark Knight of the soul in the writings of søren Kierkegaard,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 10), pp. 43–84. pattison, george, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious: From the Magic Theatre to the Crucifixion of the Image, london: sCm press 1999, pp. 164–6. —— “the Joy of Birdsong or dialectical lyrics,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 10), pp. 111–26. pons, Jolita, “on imitating the inimitable: example, Comparison, and prototype,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 173–97. possen, david d., “Faith’s Freedom from Care,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 153–72. rocca, ettore, “Kierkegaard’s second aesthetics,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 1999, pp. 285–6. —— “søren Kierkegaard and silence,” in Anthropology and Authority: Essays on Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by poul houe, gordon d. marino, and sven h. rossel, amsterdam: rodopi 2000, p. 80. —— “Kierkegaards teleogiske æsthetic. om troens perception,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 23, 2004, pp. 76–95. shakespeare, steven, Kierkegaard, Language, and the Reality of God, aldershot: ashgate 2001, pp. 113–25. walsh, sylvia, “if the lily Could speak: on the Contentment and glory of being human,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 129–52.

peter: the “pitiable prototype” Kyle a. roberts

simon peter, one of the “twelve,” the nucleus of Jesus’ followers mentioned in the Four gospels, was given the name Petras1 by Jesus.2 peter was one of the inner circle of the twelve disciples (a core which also included peter’s brother andrew, James and John).3 An impetuous character, Peter was often the first of the disciples to speak and act; his behavior elicited Jesus’ affection and ire, providing him numerous opportunities to teach peter and the others the true nature of the kingdom of god. perhaps for this reason peter captured Kierkegaard’s literary and theological imagination more than did any of the other disciples. Kierkegaard found in peter’s story both a fertile illustration of the religious potentiality of faith and also an example of the inescapable reality of doubt in human experience. he saw in peter a supra-human quality of religious passion as well as an all-too-human example of religious mediocrity. when peter represents the passion of faith, he expresses something to be admired and appropriated for oneself. when he fails to do so, he exemplifies the mediocrity of Christendom. In the latter case, he is described as the “pitiable prototype.”4 Kierkegaard expresses his disposition toward and use of peter thus: “when peter does the good, then peter is peter, and i try to learn from him. when peter does wrong, then i have nothing to do with him, for i shall not learn this from him.”5 in Kierkegaard’s writings, peter does more that is “wrong” than is good. nonetheless, Kierkegaard has plenty “to do with him,” for he uses peter’s life as an apostle of faith and doubt to articulate the difficulty of appropriating authentic New testament Christianity in the modern world. the aramaic Cephas and the greek Petras mean “rock.” Jn 1:40–42. this and all subsequent biblical references, other than Kierkegaard’s own citations of biblical texts, will be to the New Revised Standard Version with Apocrypha, new York and oxford: oxford university press 1989. 3 m.J. wilkins, “disciples,” in The Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, ed. by Joel B. green, scot mcKnight, and i. howard marshall, downers grove, illinois: intervarsity press 1992, p. 178. For extensive information on the apostle see also oscar Cullmann, Peter: Disciple, Apostle, Martyr, trans. by Floyd v. Filson, philadelphia: westminster press 1962, and pheme perkins, Peter: Apostle for the Whole Church, minneapolis: augsburg Fortress press 2000. 4 This term comes in a reference to Peter’s denial of Christ at the crucifixion to a servant girl. Cf. SKS 10, 299 / CD, 278. 5 SKS 20, 411–12, nB5:100 / JP 1, 959. 1 2

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Five major events, or movements, in the life of Peter serve as major influences in Kierkegaard’s religious philosophy: (1) Jesus’ calling of peter (along with his brother Andrew) to leave his career as a fisherman and become his disciple;6 (2) peter’s proclamation that Jesus was the “messiah [Christ],7 the son of the living god”;8 (3) peter’s censure and rejection of Jesus’ prediction that he would go to Jerusalem to be killed (to which Jesus responded to peter: “get behind me, satan. You are a stumbling block to me; for you are setting your mind not on divine things but on human things”);9 (4) peter’s threefold denial of his association with Jesus when confronted by a servant girl near the site of Jesus’ crucifixion;10 (5) Jesus’ forgiveness of Peter and affirmation of his status as a disciple after the resurrection.11 Each of these five movements serves to illustrate, for Kierkegaard, several important religious and philosophical points, of which three emerge as primary: (1) the importance of the passion of faith in “Christ, the son of the living god” and the corresponding negative consequences of doubt in the same; (2) the tragedy of religious mediocrity, manifested, for Kierkegaard, in Christendom’s failure to live according to the ideal of the new testament; and (3) the transforming power of god’s love and forgiveness for even the most pitiable sinner—for example the traitor who had been a beloved friend to the one he betrayed. By examining primarily the five movements named above, we will elucidate these three central Kierkegaardian points and, by so doing, discover why Kierkegaard finds in the story of Peter rich resources for understanding and explicating the human condition. he sees in peter the potential in every person for faith and doubt, goodness and lowliness, heroism and cowardice, and victory and failure. But mainly he perceives in peter’s story the redeeming, forgiving power of god’s love potentially experienced in a contemporary relationship with Christ. I. Peter, Apostle of Faith A. “We Have Left Everything” (Movement One) true discipleship requires voluntary self-renunciation. in Christian Discourses, Kierkegaard explains that simon peter, along with the brothers James and John, voluntarily left their simple lives as fishermen to follow Jesus. Christ had no worldly possessions and could not offer his disciples the security of a certain income: “so peter left the certain and chose the uncertain, chose to be Christ’s disciple, the disciple of him who did not even have a place to lay his head.”12 By venturing his

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

mt 4:18–22; mk 1:16–20. Both the hebrew Messiah and the greek Christos mean “anointed one.” mt 16:13–20. For parallel accounts see also lk 9:18–20 and mk 8:27–33. mt 16:23. see also mk 8:32–3. mt 26:69–75; mk 14:66–72; lk 22: 54–62; Jn 18:15–27. Jn 21:15–19. SKS 10, 193 / CD, 182.

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life with Jesus, however, peter could be certain of his “downfall” because “Christ did not leave his disciples uncertain about what was in store for him.”13 unlike Job, who lost his possessions involuntarily, the mark of the apostle of faith and of the “essentially Christian,” is “voluntary renunciation.”14 and yet the renunciation of all one’s worldly possessions cannot measure up to god’s gift to humanity of eternal salvation: “Father in heaven, when i think about the matter of my salvation, i do not take out the accounting, because i know very well that i cannot pay one in a thousand, and i know very well that peter stood more securely on the billowing sea than someone who insists on his rights before you.”15 Kierkegaard recognized in peter a paradigm of faith, an expression of the essentially Christian. But added together, peter’s actions betray more doubt than faith, more failure than success, and the need for grace more than the possibility of accruing merit. in one stroke Kierkegaard can praise peter’s faith when he stands secure on the raging sea and warn his readers not to doubt, as peter did, when his faith lost focus in the midst of the storm: and whatever a person’s fate in the world is to be, however buffeted by the storms of life, blessed is the one who is not offended but believes that he rebuked the waves and it became dead calm, believes fully and firmly that Peter sank simply and solely because he did not believe fully and firmly.16

B. The Affirmation: “You are the Christ, the Son of the Living God!” (Movement Two) the gospel writers tell us that Jesus had attracted many followers in his brief ministry. the careers of many of his followers, however, turned out to be shortlived. recognizing this, Jesus asked his disciples whether they too would leave him. peter’s response, “where else shall we go? You have the words of eternal life,” was, for Kierkegaard, an expression of an essential component of Christian discipleship: the recognition of one’s absolute need for god. For Kierkegaard, the “consciousness of sin” and the question of eternal life, “salvation hereafter,” bind the true disciple to Christ and to Christianity.17 The existential identification of dependence upon God is necessary to become an authentic self and to position oneself in hope for attaining salvation.18 the true disciple is a genuine “penitent,” who truly recognizes their deep

ibid. SKS 10, 189 / CD, 178. 15 SKS 5, 268 / EUD, 272. 16 SKS 12, 87 / PC, 75. 17 SKS 22, 283, nB13:17 / JP 1, 346. 18 the existential realization of one’s dependence on god does not foster, in Kierkegaard’s thought, a trite and easy assurance of the nature of one’s relation to god and to eternal salvation; rather, it does the opposite. the authentic, passionate disciple always lives before god and the question of eternal salvation in fear and trembling. 13 14

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need for god’s grace.19 peter served for Kierkegaard as a poignant illustration of humanity’s existential need for god. Jesus, knowing of the many opinions people had of him, asked his disciples a pointed question: But who do you say that i am? peter’s answer, “You are the messiah [Christ], the son of the living god,”20 was, for Kierkegaard, a manifestation of great faith. what made it so and afforded it such prominence in Kierkegaard’s thought was the fact that Peter had identified Jesus as the God-man, and, rather than taking offense at him, believed.21 the essential unrecognizability of the god-man, enabling him to be the occasion both for offense and for faith, is a central theme for anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity.22 as he notes, people commonly—but incorrectly—assume that the fullness of divinity in Christ would enable people to more easily recognize him as god. rather, for anti-Climacus, the greater Christ’s divinity, the more difficult it would have been for a human being to recognize that he was God. He concludes, “thus it was not flesh and blood but the opposite of flesh and blood that inspired peter to recognize him.”23 Christ’s response to peter’s proclamation of faith (“Blessed are you, simon son of Jonah!”24) was a “joyful” one;25 yet it revealed the heavy burden (as Kierkegaard puts it, one hears in his response an “echo” of suffering) inherent in Jesus’ ministry.26 Nonetheless, Christ rejoiced because of Peter’s faith. While Peter’s affirmation of Christ’s divinity served for Kierkegaard as a prototype of faith and of “essential Christianity,” the apostle worked better in Kierkegaard’s thought to exemplify doubt, religious mediocrity, and the necessity of god’s love and forgiveness. in the narratives of peter’s weaker moments, Kierkegaard draws a connection between the apostle and contemporary Christianity.

SKS 21, 101, nB7:53 / JP 6, 6261. mt 16:13–20. see also lk 9:20 and mk 8:27–33. 21 anti-Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Practice in Christianity, makes the point that faith or offense are the two possibilities available to the one confronted by claims of the god-man. 22 Jesus’ assertion to be god, howsoever directly presented, remains essentially indirect because god is “incognito” when he makes the assertion. SKS 12, 128–47 / PC, 123–44. 23 SKS 12, 134 / PC, 128. 24 mt 16:17. 25 SKS 12, 90 / PC, 79. it was particularly joyful to Jesus because it came at a time when many were deserting him: “oh, to be the savior of the world!” to be the god-man who invites all to come to him meant that he would suffer; because many would take the path of offense rather than of faith. indeed, as anti-Climacus explains, Christ continually subjects himself to suffering because the possibility for offense is always occasioned by his offering himself as the savior of every person. 26 SKS 12, 109 / PC, 99–100. 19 20

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II. Peter, Apostle of Doubt A. The Rebuke: “Get Behind Me, Satan” (Movement Three) toward the end of Jesus’ earthly ministry, he tells his disciples that he will journey to Jerusalem to suffer and die at the hands of the priestly and scribal authorities. peter exclaims that such things could never happen to Jesus, to which Christ responds: “get behind me satan. You do not have in mind the things of god, but of man.”27 peter’s failed attempt to thwart Jesus’ resolve illustrates, for Kierkegaard, Christendom’s lack of understanding regarding the true nature of the god-relationship and of authentic Christianity. peter had, Kierkegaard notes, “good intentions”; he related to Christ as a “friend.” But a friend, in the sense in which peter was acting as one, “does not help one to take risks and to make sacrifices but does indeed help to bargain and knock down the price.”28 while peter may have been “sympathetic,” and, to that degree, a “true friend,” he was, not entirely without self-love, either, since it was also for his own sake that peter was severe. he says, “this must never happen to you,” because it does not even occur to peter that Christ would voluntarily expose himself to this, and if it had, he no doubt would have allowed himself to speak even more strongly.29

peter, though manifesting compassionate and loving intentions, could not escape the trap of merely human self-love. thus, he could not relate adequately or rightly to god’s absolute conception of love as represented in Christ.30 though it was the “ungodly world” that crucified Christ, even his disciples did not truly understand him; they continually seemed to be trying to win him over to their conception of what love is. peter was “burning with love,” but because “his conception of love was false,” his words sounded to Jesus “as if it were satan who was speaking!”31 in his journals, Kierkegaard connects Christ’s anger towards peter to the latter’s “mediocrity.”32 But if Jesus would consider the apostle peter mediocre, how much more would Jesus take offense at Christendom? Consider first Peter the apostle. He is an apostle and therefore measures a good two feet taller than what we call the mediocre…listen, you battalions of mediocrity, you who

Kierkegaard puts it: “when peter, with every good intention, humanely wants to hold Christ back, Christ says as categorically as possible: You perceive only what is human; this is satan’s impulse. get behind me, satan.” SKS 26, 127, nB32:16/ JP 4, 4911. 28 SKS 12, 125 / PC, 118. 29 SKS 12, 127 / PC, 119. 30 ibid. 31 SKS 9, 116 / WL, 110. as Kierkegaard implies here, Jesus was not suggesting that peter was in a real sense possessed by satan. in another entry Kierkegaard explains that Peter’s “idea is inspired by Satan,” implying that Peter was influenced by the demonic, but was not speaking as satan’s mouthpiece. Pap. Xi–3 B 148 / JP 4, 4494. 32 Pap. Xi–3 B 148 / JP 4, 4494. 27

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Peter’s mediocrity illustrates, for Kierkegaard, Christendom’s flattering “cordiality” toward god: “Christian orthodoxy has excelled in buttering up god, sparing itself, and then calling it cordiality toward others, etc.”34 Christ’s rebuke of peter (who is “two feet taller” than ordinary people) shows how high the ideal of genuine Christianity actually is. “nothing more is needed to see that the kind of leveling Christendom does is neither more nor less than the offense, the work of satan, and all of mediocrity’s teachers of Christianity are: the offense, instruments of satan.”35 while it may be possible, Kierkegaard acknowledges, to elevate Christianity too high, nevertheless “mediocrity is always guilty.”36 the inhabitants of Christendom falsely think that their mediocrity will safeguard themselves from “the guilt of offense.” But this self-deception could not be further from the truth. For Kierkegaard, there is no more powerful illustration of this point than peter’s well-meaning attempt to dissuade Christ from suffering unto death.37 the task of the Christian is to remain true to god and to god’s conceptions of the world, rather than to act according to merely human conventions.38 the Christian life must be centered on god, rather than on the concerns of temporality, however good they may appear to the one concerned.39 B. The Denial: “Stumbling Over Straw” (Movement Four) without faith one stumbles over pieces of straw (peter becomes afraid of a girl—and denies Christ).40

the event in peter’s life that seemed to captivate Kierkegaard more than any other was Peter’s denial of Jesus to a servant girl at the crucifixion. Here Kierkegaard calls

Pap. Xi–2 a 427 / JP 3, 2685. ibid. 35 ibid. 36 ibid. 37 ibid. 38 Kierkegaard affirmed that, upon the resurrection of Christ and the descent of the Holy spirit at pentecost, peter had come to a true understanding of god’s conceptions of reality. in Judge for Yourself!, he notes that peter, contra the non-Christian skeptics, knew that true sobriety was to be filled with the Spirit. “Here as everywhere it is manifest that the world and Christianity have completely opposite conceptions. the world says of the apostles, of the apostle peter as their spokesman, ‘he is drunk,’ and the apostle peter admonishes, ‘Become sober.’ Consequently the secular mentality considers Christianity to be drunkenness, and Christianity considers the secular mentality to be drunkenness.” SV1 Xii, 380 / JFY, 96. 39 SKS 21, 242–3, nB9:72 / JP 6, 6323. 40 SKS 24, 176, nB 22:142 / JP 1, 576. 33 34

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peter the “pitiful prototype,”41 who “repudiated” his benefactor.42 not only did peter not risk his life for Jesus at that final hour; he also “remained standing there as a spectator, which he made sure he could be…” by denying Christ:43 in this way you stood—accused, condemned, insulted; you sought in vain to discover a form that still resembled a human being, to say nothing of a kind face upon which your eyes could rest—and then you saw him, your friend, but he denied you. and the derision, which had been strident enough, now sounded as if echo had amplified it a hundred times!44

peter’s denial of Christ revealed his lack of faith. anti-Climacus explains this lack of faith by referencing the inherent difficulty of believing in the paradoxical reality of the god-man. By becoming incarnate as a particular individual human being, god communicated himself to humanity indirectly; thus, he could only be believed through the passion of faith. peter recognized both Jesus’ humanity and his greatness, but he could not comprehend—at the foot of the cross—that this person who had suffered at the hands of his enemies, “and then does nothing,” is “the Father’s only begotten son”:45 “that a human being falls into the power of his enemies and then does nothing, that is human. But that the one whose almighty hand had done signs and wonders, that he now stands there powerless and paralyzed—precisely this is what brings peter to deny him.”46 peter had already accepted that god the son voluntarily became a particular human being in Jesus Christ. But he could not exert the passion of faith in the face of god’s voluntary suffering unto death. such belief proved too much even for that most passionate of disciples. peter’s denial reveals the extent of human failure and the seeming impossibility of believing that Christ is god. thus, as Kierkegaard notes, the inherent incredibility of Christ’s death and resurrection makes necessary the universality of his atonement. that which is so difficult to believe (that God died for the sins of humanity) is the very thing which enables and enacts god’s forgiveness.47 By focusing on peter’s denial of Christ, Kierkegaard exposes the radical potential of humanity for failure. But he also shows the providential power of god in the face of temporal, human fallenness. god employs the weakest of human agents to bring about the redemptive reality of the eternal realm within temporality itself. Kierkegaard, reminding his readers of the likelihood they would have acted as did peter, says, “let no one dare to forget that on that night he was along as an accomplice, let no one dare to forget this pitiful prototype whom in other ways he scarcely resembles—the apostle peter.” SKS 10, 299 / CD, 278. 42 SKS 5, 154 / EUD, 153. 43 SKS 9, 169 / WL, 168–9. 44 ibid. 45 SKS 12, 112 / PC, 103–4. 46 ibid. 47 as Kierkegaard notes, “if peter had not denied him, then there would have been at least one person who would not, just like every other individual in the human race, have needed reconciliation. But now they all betrayed him, and thus all need to take part in the meal of reconciliation!” SKS 10, 300 / CD, 280–1. 41

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C. God is Not Surprised by Human Failure: The Provisions of Providence For Kierkegaard, god’s providence hedges the inevitability of human failure. even god’s highly trusted ones, “god’s real instruments,” vacillate in the beginning. they “have spoiled, betrayed, ruined the very cause they were supposed to serve.” so peter “had damaged the cause of Christianity by denying Christ—and it was Christ he was supposed to serve.”48 But god was not surprised; in fact, he uses human failure to protect his people from the fatal temptation of “meritoriousness,” which is always easy “to slip in.” Kierkegaard notes, citing a commentator, that after the crucifixion none of the disciples sought high places of honor and privilege at the right hand of Jesus.49 they accepted their rightful place—at his feet. Kierkegaard suggested that god waited until the very end to secure peter’s faith, so that his faith would indeed be secure: people are always busy in order to win adherents. and it is extremely important (to them, that is) that it happens immediately. they rush to employ every means and to reject everyone who declines. god wins his adherents patiently; he wins them at the last moment. this is why a human being’s adherents fall away—at the last moment; but god’s adherents persevere.50

the recognition of one’s lack of merit and inability to live heroically before god, apart from god, can only be acquired through the strain of experience. the difference, Kierkegaard notes, between “secular advancement” and “spiritual advancement” is that repentance plays a central role in the latter: “so it was with the apostle peter’s denial. if there is a step which is too high for a person and yet has to be reached, this is the last power a man has, this repentance for having wanted to cheat.”51 peter’s failure reveals that repentance is the necessary step forward. For repentance to work in this way, one needs a “witness.” the “witness” is, Kierkegaard says, the memory of one’s failure. Peter’s witness was the memory of his “denial,” etched firmly in his mind. But that guilt-inducing memory would be supplanted by the memory of the “look of love” which Jesus mercifully gave him.52 SKS 22, 175–6, nB 22:141 / JP 2, 2094. Kierkegaard writes: “the commentary on peter’s denial in the wolfenbüttel Fragments (Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger, para. 54. p. 235) is rather witty: the twelve stools on which they had clamored to sit were now suddenly set aside, and no one clamored any more to be on his right or on his left. generally speaking, this paragraph and the one following by a scoffer are not without boldness and ingenuity.” see Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger. Noch ein Fragment des Wolfenbüttelschen Ungenannten, ed. by gotthold ephraim lessing, Braunschweig: n.p. 1778, p. 235. see SKS 22, 87, nB11:149 / JP 3, 2376. 50 SKS 20, 149, nB2:22 / JP 1, 461. 51 SKS 22, 361, nB14:29 / JP 1, 237. 52 SKS 20, 149, nB2:22.a / Jp 1, 462. in another entry Kierkegaard says that the “cock became peter’s symbol.” SKS 26, 388, nB35:25 / JP 6, 6933. this is, of course, a reference to the rooster who crowed three times after peter’s denial, reminding him of Jesus’ prediction that he would deny him and inducing peter’s realization of his failure. the title of this entry, “the Christian coat of arms,” suggests that for Christians the mark of belonging, and the memory of our “exploits,” is the memory of guilt. 48 49

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III. Christ’s Restoration of Peter: A Glance and Three Questions (Movement Five) A. A Glance of Love if peter, an apostle capable of great faith, struggled mightily to sustain faith in the god-man, can ordinary present-day disciples of Jesus fare better? Kierkegaard uses Peter to remind his readers that the way of faith is difficult. But Peter’s story provides more cause for hope than despair; for while peter is the “pitiable prototype,” Christ is the true prototype, the “faithful friend,” and the redeemer of those who fail to keep faith. whereas peter denied Christ three times, Christ, after his resurrection, restored peter with a question he repeated three times: “peter, do you love me?” But even before the question was asked, Christ saved peter from a more destructive despair with a simple look, a meek, forgiving “glance”: when peter had denied him three times and Christ only looked at him meekly, does not this meekness conceal peter’s guilt and make it something far less! Just listen to the cry in the words: to deny his lord three times at the very moment he is being betrayed, in the hands of the enemy, insulted and mocked! You shudder as you become aware of it, not through the description of it but merely through the utterance. Christ’s meekness, however, keeps one from becoming aware of how deep this fall was.53

in this simple act, so Kierkegaard suggests, Christ protected peter from heavier guilt and suffering, lightening his burden. the look of forgiveness once again reveals the infinite difference between the God-man and sinful, human beings. The look was not a “repelling” look, but a “saving look.” Kierkegaard writes: in the passion of anger the wronged friend cannot see that the one denying is in danger. Yet he who is called the savior of the world always saw clearly where the danger was, saw that it was peter who was in danger, saw that it was peter who should and must be saved. the savior of the world did not make the mistake of seeing his cause as lost if peter did not hasten to help him, but he saw peter as lost if he did not hasten to save peter.54

B. Three Questions: “Simon, Son of Jonah, Do You Love Me?”55 the restorative work begun with the glance of forgiveness was completed when Jesus confronted peter, after his resurrection and during his appearances to his disciples, with a threefold question: “simon, son of Jonah, do you love me?” Kierkegaard

SKS 8, 344 / UD, 244–5. in Works of Love, Kierkegaard writes, “his love was totally present in the least things as in the greatest; it did not concentrate more intensely in single great moments, as if the hours of daily life were outside the requirements of the law. it was equally present in every moment, not greater when he expired upon the cross than when he let himself be born. it was the same love that said, ‘mary has chosen the better part’ and the same love that with a look rebuked—or forgave—peter.” SKS 9, 94 / WL, 100. 54 SKS 9, 171 / WL, 170. 55 Jn 21:15–19. 53

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sees in this question both the lightness of joy and the heaviness of responsibility. 56 Mostly, Kierkegaard finds here the depth and consistency of divine love, magnified against the inconstancy and fickleness of merely human love. Kierkegaard does not miss the significance of Christ’s asking the question three times. But Christ’s motivation for asking the question was not typical of humanity. He was not asking simply to be affirmed by Peter that in fact he was loved; he was not “craving to hear it” in the sense that people typically long for such assurances; for Christ, as divine, already knew peter’s heart.57 Christ, who knows all things, asked the question a third time in order to accomplish a purpose of bringing about repentance and restoration. Kierkegaard observes: what an appalling contradiction that the one who is god loves humanly, since to love humanly is to love an individual human being and to wish to be that individual human being’s best beloved. this, you see, is why peter became despondent over the asking of the question a third time! in love’s direct relationship between persons, there is a new joy in the asking of the question a third time, and a new joy at answering a third time, or the too-often-repeated question makes one despondent because it seems to betray mistrust. But when the one who knows everything asks a third time, that is, finds it necessary to ask a third time, then it surely must be because he, since he knows everything, knows that the love is not sufficiently strong or deep or high-spirited in the person who is asked, one who indeed also denied three times.58

Christ knows that peter needs to strengthen his love; he has not yet been made complete in his ability to love absolutely—keeping god as the middle term.59 merely human love, characterized as it is by immediacy, lacks the complexity inherent in true works of love. Further, it is devoid of the richness and authenticity characteristic of divine love; the latter is strenuous, but is necessary for true discipleship and for the development of genuine selfhood. that Kierkegaard sees “joy” in Christ’s question to peter is seen in the following excerpt from Practice in Christianity: “how great was his joy when he considered peter blessed—‘Blessed are you, simon peter,’—because peter believed; how great his joy was you can see in his asking peter three times: do you love me?” SKS 12, 90 / PC, 79. this use of the account by Kierkegaard is a completely positive portrayal of the threefold question. lacking are the suggestions, elsewhere noted, that the purpose of the repetition of the question was to point out peter’s failure to love Christ truly, thus revealing his need for Christ’s forgiveness. 57 Kierkegaard notes here that Christ could “sympathize with people in this need to love and to be loved, sympathize purely humanly. this is described in the gospel of John (21:15ff.), where we read, ‘Jesus said to simon peter, “simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?” he said to him, “Yes, lord, you know that i love you.” ’ ” But Kierkegaard goes on to affirm that, “This answer indicates the misrelation. Even though a person otherwise knows that he is loved because he has heard the yes before, he is very eager to hear it and therefore wants to hear it again, even though he knows it from something other than this mere yes, to which he still turns back, craving to hear it—it is of course in another sense that Christ can be said to know that peter loves him.” SKS 9, 157–8 / WL, 155. 58 SKS 9, 157–8 / WL, 156. 59 that god must be the “middle term” (the source of and the end to which any act of love between persons is ultimately directed) in any true work of love is a primary theme of Works of Love. 56

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Here, in the midst of the difficulty, the transforming reality and necessity of God’s grace is once more apparent. Christ does not require that Peter first become a different person, a complete self, and a true genuine lover in order to be loved by him. rather, Christ, in loving peter…accomplished loving the person one sees. he did not say, “peter must first change and become another person before I can love him again.” No, he said exactly the opposite, “peter is peter, and i love him. my love, if anything, will help him to become another person.”60

Christ “won” peter by his “faithful friendship.”61 He did not demand first a change in peter or in the nature of the friendship before he would love him as a friend. But his act of love in confronting peter with a piercing question spurred a dramatic change in peter’s selfhood, and, as Kierkegaard elsewhere intimates, his understanding of life.62 as Kierkegaard writes, “peter’s denial gave him momentum afterwards, because in repentance he had infinitely much to make up for.”63 IV. Conclusion For Kierkegaard the story of peter is the story of humanity; but it is also the story of Christ. the god-man initiates forgiveness for the follower who moves toward him, however clumsily, inconsistently, and lacking in faith. Kierkegaard uses the story of peter to initiate readers into a life of discipleship, to convict them where they fail, and to encourage them to move forward, trusting in the promises and the grace of god, seen most visibly and poignantly in the god-man. the contemporary reader of peter’s story should not shy away from a rigorous attempt to appropriate it. as Kierkegaard reminds us, we should not simply “admire” or “praise” peter where he does well, rather we should become ourselves contemporary with the rigorous relationship to Christ that his life exemplifies: we are now accustomed to praise Christ’s relationship to peter, but let us take care that this praise is not an illusion, a figment of the imagination, because we are unable or SKS 9, 173 / WL, 172. ibid. 62 in Judge For Yourself!, Kierkegaard draws a rather stark contrast between a merely human understanding of things and a divine, or Christian understanding. he uses peter’s participation in the miracle at pentecost, in which the spirit descended upon the apostles and enabled them to speak in other languages, to draw this contrast. whereas the pagan observers assumed that the apostles were drunk, peter asserted that they were truly sober. Kierkegaard’s point in the passage is that participation in authentic Christianity by the transforming power of the spirit is a requirement for having a true and “sober” understanding of life. he writes: “here as everywhere it is manifest that the world and Christianity have completely opposite conceptions. the world says of the apostles, of the apostle peter as their spokesman, ‘he is drunk,’ and the apostle peter admonishes, ‘Become sober.’ Consequently the secular mentality considers Christianity to be drunkenness, and Christianity considers the secular mentality to be drunkenness.” SV1 Xii, 380 / JFY, 96. 63 SKS 23, 400, nB 20:18 / JP 3, 3507. 60 61

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Kyle A. Roberts unwilling to stretch our thinking to think of ourselves as contemporary with the event. so we praise Christ and, on the other hand, provided we are able to become contemporary with a similar event, act and think altogether differently. no account regarding the contemporaries’ view of Christ’s relationship has been preserved, but if you meet them, these contemporaries, then question them, and you will hear that on this occasion, as on almost every occasion Christ did something, it was said, “the fool!”64

discipleship requires becoming contemporary with Christ. peter’s life, a struggle of faith and doubt, gives the reader a concrete story to which he or she can become contemporary, in order to relate to Christ. we earlier noted Kierkegaard’s remark, that “when peter does the good, then peter is peter, and i try to learn from him. when peter does wrong, then i have nothing to do with him, for i shall not learn this from him.”65 in one sense, Kierkegaard’s writings refute this statement. For Kierkegaard does not ignore peter’s story; to the contrary, he pays special attention even to his glaring faults and failures. Yet in a different sense, Peter’s influence on Kierkegaard’s thought affirms the statement. He does not appropriate peter’s errors and make them his own, or suggest that his readers do so. rather, he sees in peter the ever present and possible failings inherent in the human condition. whereas peter is the “pitiable prototype,” and his actions are to be imitated only where he succeeds, Christ is the perfect prototype and the redeemer of all who, like peter, follow him in faith—and in doubt—to the end.

64 65

SKS 9, 172 / WL, 171. SKS 20, 413–14, nB5:100 / JP 1, 959.

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Peter Bretschneider, Karl gottlieb, Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros novi Testamente, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., leipzig: J. Barth 1829, vol. 1, p. 670; vol. 2, p. 277 (ASKB 73–74). [Calvin, John], Iohannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34, vol. 1, part i, pp. 123–31; vol. 1, part ii, pp. 104–15; pp. 317–20; pp. 343–6; pp. 396–410 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolking af de synoptiske Evangelier, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 120–47; pp. 442–62; pp. 707–52 (ASKB 106–107). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 2, pp. 479–90; pp. 595– 601 (ASKB 96–100). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Kurze Erklärung des Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 55–8; pp. 114–26; pp. 159–66; pp. 188–96 (ASKB 108). —— Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäï, leipzig: weidmann 1838, pp. 204–15 (ASKB 109). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of Peter Ferreira, m. Jamie, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, new York: oxford university press 2001, p. 27; p. 39; pp. 103–4; p. 111; p. 138; p. 152; p. 172; p. 180; p. 206. lotti, michael, “an education in possibility,” in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 153–4. minear, paul and paul morimoto, Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, princeton, new Jersey: princeton theological seminary 1953, pp. 1–17. plass, paul, “antinomy and exegesis in Kierkegaard,” Theologische Zeitschrift, vol. 42, 1986, pp. 26–39. polk, timothy h., The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997, p. 50; p. 57; p. 70; p. 82; p. 97; p. 108; p. 111. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, pp. 132–3.

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untruthful, hypocritical, duplicitous, sophistic, shrewd, external, complacent, judgmental, proud, contemptuous, sanctimonious, cruel, and self-righteous. if one were creating a list of malformed or odious character flaws, one might begin with these adjectives. the words are different yet the general tenor is the same, and these are precisely the terms with which Kierkegaard presents the character of the pharisee. For Kierkegaard, the pharisee is treated neither as the prototypical precursor to the diverse tradition known as rabbinic Judaism nor as the precursor to the enlightened and pious Judaism suggested in gotthold ephraim lessing’s (1729–81) Nathan the Wise.1 Kierkegaard was not influenced by the biblical scholar Hermann Olshausen’s (1796–1839) effort to portray some pharisees as non-malevolent,2 sincere devotees of the law, even though Kierkegaard sometimes consulted olshausen’s text. rather, the pharisee is drawn from some of the more polemical passages in the new testament and treated almost univocally as the counterpoint to Jesus, as the antithesis of Jesus, and as the anti-Christ. as the long list of negative descriptors indicates, however, Kierkegaard’s polemical position is developed in a variety of manners. It is worth noting that the figure of the Pharisee is never directly developed to any extent within Kierkegaard’s corpus. rather, the pharisee repeatedly appears illustratively or ancillary to other matters under discussion. the structure of this article illuminates the way in which a comprehensive and nearly univocal portrait of the pharisee emerges in the midst of a variety of arguments, anecdotes, and observations. In the first part of this article, the argument begins thematically with the charges of sophistry and then moves through various types of external legalism. Following these introductory and general topographical analyses, the second part of the article turns toward Kierkegaard’s comments concerning the pharisee that emerge in the context of his interpretation of three biblical narratives: the woman caught in sin (John 8:1–11), the woman who entered the pharisee’s gotthold ephraim lessing, Nathan der Weise, Berlin: voß 1779. hermann olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 2, pp. 236–47 (ASKB 96–100). 1 2

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house (Luke 7:36–50) and, finally, the Pharisee and the tax collector (Luke 18:9– 14). in conclusion, the article returns to a few of Kierkegaard’s late comments that summarize the polyphonic presentation of the pharisee as the faithless antagonist of Christ. I. A Topographic Summary in his earliest dated comment on the pharisees, written late in 1834, Kierkegaard places the pharisees among those who tragically misunderstood Jesus. But “everybody” belongs to this group, including the disciples.3 in the years following this general comment, however, the pharisee becomes one of the characters that are singled out for intentional and idiosyncratic derogation. By 1839, it appears that Kierkegaard had settled on the framework that would guide all further comments, namely, the opposition and conflict between the Pharisee and Jesus. For example, Kierkegaard notes that Jesus did not “speak to the disciples from the fullness of his heart until the pharisees were silenced and departed.”4 it becomes clear, as more writings emerge, that Kierkegaard’s critique of the pharisee is not a random or arbitrary attack. rather, the critique is focused around the two particular issues of sophistry and legal externalism, issues that become issues because of Kierkegaard’s normative assumptions about Christ and Christianity. A. Sophistry throughout the history of western philosophy, the sophists have rarely received positive reviews. On this point, Kierkegaard fits neatly into the tradition. Very early in his writing career, Kierkegaard began to use the pharisee analogously to the sophist: “the sophists are reminiscent of the pharisees, who in the realm of the will operated in the very same way as the sophists in the realm of knowledge.”5 Because Christianity is “not related to knowing but to acting,” the pharisee and the sophist are dangerous because they “tempt with crafty talk,”6 because they are “hairsplitters” and “ruminators” who become infinitely delayed in asking questions.7 the example par excellence in this respect is the self-justifying question posed to Jesus by the pharisee in luke 10:29: “and who is my neighbor?” Kierkegaard explains that the pharisee thought that this might develop into a very protracted inquiry, one that would take a very long time and end with the inconclusive conclusion that it is impossible to determine the concept of “neighbor” with absolute accuracy.8 it is also important to remember, in precisely this context, that this form of protracted

3 4 5 6 7 8

Pap. i a 33 / JP 1, 118. SKS 17, 278, dd:206 / KJN 1, 269. SKS 1, 258 / CI, 213. SKS 5, 203 / EUD, 201. SKS 9, 101 / WL, 96. ibid.

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inquiry is not merely benign delay but malignant opposition to Christ, whose love is described by Kierkegaard as “sheer action.”9 if Kierkegaard denounces the pharisee for protracted inquiry and delay, he also acknowledges that the pharisee is concerned with coming to some sort of conclusion as to what is right and acting according to it. Because of this, it is clear that the pharisee is not also a skeptic. rather, Kierkegaard’s pharisee is concerned with knowing and doing, just a misguided kind of doing. “legal righteousness” and “ungodly externality” are both used to describe this concern for the wrong actions, though it takes other forms as well.10 in fact, the heart of the matter is not even found in the pharisee’s attention to the wrong action. the heart of the matter is, literally, in the heart of the pharisee. as Kierkegaard expresses it, it is in the hiddenness of the heart that the pharisee is evil; in his heart the pharisee is ungodly. But, even this statement does not capture Kierkegaard’s critique. perhaps the core of Kierkegaard’s complaint is best described as the idiosyncratic misrelation between inwardness and externality expressed in the pharisee because of his evil heart, a misrelation that will be revisited below. B. Ungodly Externality reinforcing the assumption that Christianity is related to acting and not knowing, Kierkegaard further highlights the Pharisee’s concern with “the infinite power of seventeen concerns” rather than with absolute inwardness that collides with Christendom.11 in this context, Kierkegaard is happy to introduce matthew 15:11— “it is not what goes into the mouth that defiles a person, but it is what comes out of the mouth that defiles”—in order to highlight the external falsity of the Pharisee.12 For Kierkegaard, the Christian requirement of absolute inwardness or piety is not directly commensurable with the external. absolute inwardness can never be completed in the external, which he refers to as “an outright relativity.”13 Kierkegaard continues: “By making devoutness and piety inwardness, Christ prodded this whole structure of qualifications and relativities, this direct recognizability of piety by honor and esteem, power and influence, this objectivity, as the scribes and Pharisees would have called it.”14 At first glance, it appears that the charge of hypocrisy is fundamental to Kierkegaard’s critique since the pharisee says one thing and acts in a way that does not seem commensurate. Kierkegaard provides ample evidence for this charge, for he is aware of this biblical trope, most directly drawn from matthew 23:4: “do whatever [the scribes and pharisees] teach you and follow it; but do not do as they do, for SKS 9, 104 / WL, 99–100. Christian love as sheer action is defined against “worldly busyness,” thereby recalling images of both the pharisee and Kierkegaard’s contemporary targets (SKS 9, 102–3 / WL, 98). 10 SKS 11, 196 / SUD, 82. SKS 17, 133, BB:38 / KJN 1, 125–6. 11 SKS 20, 254, nB3:17 / JP 1, 183. 12 SKS 12, 95 / PC, 86. 13 SKS 12, 100 / PC, 92. 14 SKS 12, 100 / PC, 91–2. 9

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they do not practice what they preach.” it should also be noted that Kierkegaard applies the latter half of this injunction diachronically to his contemporary situation against the philosophers who demand the impossible, who demand the heavy burden of doubting everything without doubting everything themselves.15 Contrasting the heavy burdens of the pharisee, Kierkegaard draws forward matthew 11:30, a text that reminds the reader that Christ’s yoke is beneficial and his burden is light.16 upon further examination, Kierkegaard also interprets the hypocritical misrelation between the internal and the external to mean that the pharisee had essentially given up the internal and concerned himself solely with the external. returning to the mention of Christendom above reminds us that the pharisee’s role is, again, appropriated trans-historically. Clearly, Kierkegaard understands the pharisee as a first-century opponent of Jesus, yet he also understands the Pharisee as a type that perennially opposes Jesus.17 speaking of false teachers, Kierkegaard suggests that the nineteenth-century danish religious leaders may, in fact, be worse than the pharisees. he notes that they presumably cannot be called pharisees, but something that is “worse” than a pharisee. the “worse” here is, however, entirely in line with what had already been ascribed to the pharisee: one who scrupulously indicates the right road but does not walk it himself or one who speaks the truth, recommends it to others, and then changes the road that he walks along.18 in this vein, Kierkegaard also notes the quip made by Johann georg hamann (1730–88): “i would rather hear the truth from the mouth of a pharisee than from an angel or apostle.”19 despite Kierkegaard’s obvious affection for hamann, on this point hamann’s “polemic goes too far and is at times…blasphemous.”20 granted, Kierkegaard also wants to criticize or humble the world in a certain sense, but he recognizes that hamann’s extreme irony and desperate humor diminishes the truth which continues to remain the truth despite the fact that the pharisee makes bad use of it.21 in Kierkegaard’s thought, there is a necessary coherence between the truth and the teacher of the truth and hamann’s quip undermines this link, thereby

Pap. iv B 6 / JP 3, 3291. see also Pap. Xi–3 B 306 and SKS 26, 283–4, nB33:42 / JP 4, 3870. 16 SKS 8, 331 / UD, 230. of course, Kierkegaard is also aware of the irony in this passage, recognizing that Christ’s yoke is light and beneficial in a less than ordinary sense. 17 in his later years, Kierkegaard tends to identify Judaism with danish Christendom: “the only Christianity there is in Christendom is really Judaism. rightly so, for Christianity thought about in repose (established) is Judaism” (SKS 21, 98, nB7:44 / JP 1, 378). For a full summation of the complicated relationship between Kierkegaard’s Christianity and Judaism, see Bruce h. Kirmmse, “Kierkegaard, Jews, and Judaism,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 17, 1994, p. 89. 18 SKS 8, 403 / UD, 311. 19 Pap. v B 6:1 / PF, supplement, p. 196. see Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, vol. 1, p. 497 (ASKB 536–44). 20 SKS 17, 129, BB:37 / KJN 1, 122. 21 SKS 17, 120, BB:27 / KJN 1, 113–14. SKS 19, 187, not5:33 / JP 2, 1722. SKS 5, 153 / EUD, 152. 15

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undermining the heart of Kierkegaard’s critique of the pharisee.22 For this reason, Kierkegaard also criticizes hamann for “tempting god.”23 when one steps back for a moment, it may seem strange that Kierkegaard utilizes the critique that the pharisee says one thing and does another while also claiming that the pharisee is entirely given to externality while still charging the pharisee with retaining an evil heart. perhaps this series of charges cannot be neatly reconciled, but it is clear that in all of them the pharisee remains a hypocrite, a point which Kierkegaard doggedly holds on to. appropriate actions—or perhaps an appropriate existence—would, unsurprisingly, be the expected criteria for judging the pharisee given Kierkegaard’s definition of Christian love as “sheer action.” Kierkegaard’s further comments clearly indicate that his concern with the selfdeifying Christendom of denmark is intertwined in his critical evaluation of the pharisee. Practice in Christianity polemically provides more than a clue concerning this link: that is, the scribes and pharisees had become so holy, and so holy do people always become when they deify the established order that their worship makes a fool of god: under the guise of worshiping and adoring god, they worship and adore their own invention, either in self-complacent joy, since they themselves are the inventors, or in fear of people.24

Kierkegaard also reframes his critique with reference to the original and essential contest between Judaism and Christianity: “By the time Christianity appeared, Judaism had developed into its own parody: the pharisees in the law and the concept of an earthly messiah in the prophets.”25 and, assuming the link between the pharisee and Judaism, he echoes an earlier critique found in Fear and Trembling: thus, Judaism at the time of Christ became, through the scribes and the pharisees, a complacent, self-deifying established order. the outer and the inner had become entirely commensurable, so totally that the inner had dropped out. ah, now everything is as it should be; now the established order is deified….Obviously the scribes and Pharisees were also of this opinion. that piety and godliness should suffer in the world was oldfashioned; now, of course, there was congruity—the more pious and devout, the more esteemed.26 see, for example, the unity between teacher and the teaching in Philosophical Fragments (SKS 4, 264 / PF, 62) and For Self-Examination (SKS 13, 80 / FSE, 57). 23 SKS 17, 128–9, BB:37 / KJN 1, 122. For a fuller account of the relationship between Kierkegaard and hamann, see sergia Karen hay, “hamann: sharing style and thesis: Kierkegaard’s appropriation of hamann’s work,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome iii, Literature and Aesthetics, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2008 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 97–113. 24 SKS 12, 100 / PC, 92. Kierkegaard’s critique of the hermaphroditic or neuter nature of his contemporary clergy dressed in their long, feminine robes is also anachronistically applied to the pharisee. see SKS, 30, 426, nB30:51.a / JP 3, 3176. 25 SKS 18, 77, FF:14 / KJN 2, 71. 26 SKS 12, 97–8 / PC, 89. in a related passage, Kierkegaard’s comments on righteousness that “exceeds that of the scribes and pharisees” (mt 5:20) that “the more” in this context refers 22

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at an almost comical level, Kierkegaard notes that the total concern with externality attends to the details of Jesus’ crib, of the rags in which he was wrapped, of the two thieves crucified alongside Jesus, of the Pharisees and the soldiers who rolled the stone in front of the tomb.27 at a more malignant level, the concern with externality disregards the demand for absolute inwardness and accepts or invents the external as self-deifying.28 in the preliminary topographical analysis of Kierkegaard’s comments, I have sought to demonstrate that (despite the initial seemingly superficial charges of sophistry) it is precisely this latter malignant level to which Kierkegaard eventually consigns the legalist and ungodly pharisee. the remarks examined above, however, are not the only comments Kierkegaard provides. in the following pages, i provide a supplementary examination of three more focused appearances of the pharisee in relation to Kierkegaard’s use of select biblical narratives. at the risk of sounding repetitive—because, in fact, Kierkegaard’s critique is repetitive—the tentative conclusions concerning the pharisee sketched above will be tested against what the further comments reveal. II. The Pharisee in Three Biblical Narratives Kierkegaard frequently wrote discourses or sermons devoted to or drawn from select biblical texts. in his corpus, he wrote extensively on the three gospel narratives examined below: (a) the woman caught in sin (John 8:1–11), (B) the woman who entered the pharisee’s house (luke 7:36–50), and (C) the pharisee and the tax collector (luke 18:9–14). the pharisee plays a role in all of these narratives, and each narrative provides a slightly different account of this figure. A. The Woman Caught in Sin (John 8:1–11) according to the story found in John’s gospel, the scribes and the pharisees brought a woman who had been caught in adultery to Jesus while he was teaching in the temple one morning. the scribes and pharisees reminded Jesus that the law of moses commanded that such women be stoned and asked him, “now what do you say?” In response, Jesus “bent down and wrote with his finger on the ground.” Upon further questioning, Jesus then said “let anyone among you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her.” Jesus then returned to writing on the ground while the scribes and pharisees left one by one. in the closing conversation, Jesus told that

to “suffering for the teaching, suffering for the good one does, suffering at the hands of men.” here, too, Kierkegaard assumes the collision between Christianity and the world, since there is “hatred between god and men” (SKS 26, 18, nB31:22 / JP 4, 4710). in problema ii of Fear and Trembling, Johannes de silentio offers a parallel analysis of his contemporary situation: “the ethical is the universal, and as such it is also the divine….thus in the ethical view of life, it is the task of the single individual to strip himself of the qualification of interiority and to express this in something external” (SKS 4, 160–1 / FT, 68–9). 27 SKS 17, 216–18, dd:6 / KJN 1, 208–10. 28 see, for example, SKS 25, 151–2, nB27:38 / JP 4, 4699.

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woman that if neither the scribes nor the pharisees condemned her, neither would he. Jesus then concluded with: “go your way, and from now on do not sin again.” the authenticity of this passage in John was widely challenged in Kierkegaard’s era. even the rather conservative hermann olshausen admitted that the story was not found in the oldest codices and that its style was very unlike that of John. olshausen concluded that the passage was spurious, and even expressed profound doubts about any possible historical reality that might lie behind the tale. moreover, he was troubled that if some such event had occurred, it had to be explained in such a way that Jesus would not be depicted as an antinomian who was undermining the system of civil punishment necessary for any legal system to function.29 Kierkegaard, however, ignores these questions about textual authenticity and historical accuracy. For Kierkegaard, the central issue in this story is judgment. In the first and more obvious sense, the guilty judgment concerning the woman’s adultery is offered by the scribes and pharisees. according to Kierkegaard, they “discovered a multitude of sins,”30 and they quickly discovered her guilt as “it was indeed easy, since her sin was open.”31 But, as the story demonstrates, the scribes and the pharisees were easily silenced with “one word from the lord.”32 later, when Kierkegaard references this story again in Christian Discourses, judgment is brought to the fore in a second sense. this time the judgment under consideration is not merely the judgment of the scribes and pharisees. rather, the judgment rendered by our own hearts becomes the focus. Clearly, Jesus’ rescue of the woman caught in adultery was only a temporary reprieve as the scribes and pharisees “could come again with their condemnation.”33 Kierkegaard’s emphasis here in the later context is on the reality that the judgment of our hearts is continually present and more dangerous than the judgment of the scribes and pharisees. his response to this new dilemma is that god in heaven is greater, “not greater than the pharisees and scribes,” but “greater than your own heart!”34 if the issue is judgment, however, the solution is love and mercy. it is not Jesus’ judgment that rescued the woman in sin because the punishment of sin breeds new sin.35 in this way, Kierkegaard clearly relativizes or undermines the importance and usefulness of the pharisee’s judgment. rather, it is Jesus’ love that rescued the woman in sin. reiterating a theme addressed numerous times in his discourses, Kierkegaard argues that it is only love that hides a multitude of sins. in Works of Love, one of the ways in which love hides a multitude of sins is that “what it cannot avoid seeing or hearing, it hides by silence, by a mitigating explanation, by forgiveness.”36 this notion seems to be precisely what Kierkegaard has in mind when the events of John 8 appear in the upbuilding discourses. But, lest we stray too far beyond the pharisee olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vol. 2, pp. 236–47. 30 Pap. iv B 144 / JP 3, 2397. 31 SKS 5, 77 / EUD, 67. 32 SKS 5, 77 / EUD, 67–8. 33 SKS 10, 316 / CD, 294. SKS 10, 311 / CD, 289. 34 SKS 10, 315 / CD, 293. 35 SKS 5, 77 / EUD, 68. 36 SKS 9, 286 / WL, 289, emphasis original. 29

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himself, let it suffice to say that it is absolutely clear that the Pharisee must have been living in sin, since only “sin discovers a multitude of sins.”37 B. The Woman who Entered the Pharisee’s House (Luke 7:36–50) A story about a second sinful woman also plays a significant role in illuminating how Kierkegaard understands the pharisee. in the gospel of luke, there is a short account of a meal Jesus was sharing with a pharisee in the pharisee’s house. while Jesus and the pharisee were eating, a woman who was a sinner entered, weeping, and began to wash Jesus’ feet with her tears and to dry them with her hair. Further, she began to kiss Jesus’ feet continuously and to anoint them. in the story, the pharisee takes offense because the woman is a sinner; Jesus counters with a parable concerning how those who have been forgiven more are more grateful. Jesus then berates the pharisee for not caring for him in the same manner as the woman, noting, “therefore…her sins, which were many, have been forgiven; hence she has shown great love. But the one to whom little is forgiven, loves little.” in conclusion, Jesus forgives the woman and exhorts her to “go in peace.” In this brief narrative, Kierkegaard finds ample fodder for his critique of the pharisee. here, the pharisee is proud, mocking, cold, contemptuous, sanctimonious and terrifying. whatever the woman’s heart accused her of, “its charges had endorsement in the faces of the pharisees.”38 or, to rephrase, the “judgment of the world was legible on the faces of the pharisees.”39 the irony of the story’s location is not lost on Kierkegaard, and he makes a point of noting that it was precisely in the house of the pharisee where the sinful woman found forgiveness.40 of course, she did not find forgiveness in the Pharisee but in Jesus. despite the pharisee’s condemnation—and the associated condemnation of Jesus, for he failed to recognize the sinful nature of the woman—this woman “became and is a prototype.”41 And so we find, again, Kierkegaard appropriating biblical characters for his contemporary context. not only is the pharisee a trans-historical type, but the woman who was a sinner is also one of the same. she is a prototype. despite the judgment of the pharisee, Kierkegaard acknowledges that “this woman forced herself into a dinner in a most unseemly way,” but he also acknowledges, again, that she is a prototype: “today she has not come to the wrong place, between the confessional and the Communion table.”42 SKS 5, 77 / EUD, 67. SKS 5, 84 / EUD, 75. see also SKS 11, 274–5 / WA, 138. SKS 12, 267 / WA, 154–5. 39 SKS 5, 86 / EUD, 77. 40 SKS 12, 268 / WA, 155. 41 SKS 11, 279 / WA, 143. 42 SKS 11, 280 / WA, 144. in a draft for a discourse on god’s love hiding a multitude of sins, Kierkegaard seems to acknowledge the similarities and overlap in Jesus’ treatment of the two women vis-à-vis the pharisee by referencing the events of John 8:1–11 and then adding the textual referent for the woman in the pharisee’s house. he states: “when the pharisees surrounded that woman, they discovered a multitude of sins, but Christ wrote in the sand— and hid it. in Christ, everything is revealed—and everything is hidden. (luke 7:36–50)” (Pap. iv B 144 / JP 3, 2397). 37 38

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using this second narrative, Kierkegaard has accomplished precisely what he accomplished with the first: pitting the judging Pharisee against the loving and forgiving Jesus for the purpose of arguing that the pharisee, because he lives in sin, only has eyes for sin. there is much one could say about Kierkegaard’s treatment of the two women around whom Jesus and the pharisee dance, but saying more about them at this point would detract from the emerging dichotomy Kierkegaard is developing. in the third narrative, another “third” is introduced, but this time, it is not a woman but a sinful man. C. The Pharisee and the Tax Collector (Luke 18:9–14) the third story in which the pharisee makes a sustained appearance is a short parable. in this parable, Jesus describes a scene in which two people go to the temple to pray. The first, a Pharisee, prays: “God, I thank you that I am not like other people… or even like this tax collector.” the tax collector, standing far away, was beating his breast saying, “god, be merciful to me, a sinner!”43 Jesus then ends with the following summation: “I tell you, [the tax collector] went down to his home justified rather than the other; for all who exalt themselves will be humbled, but all who humble themselves will be exalted.” one of Kierkegaard’s earlier journal entries notes that we are both simultaneously the pharisee and the tax collector, and this is a sentiment that can probably be assumed in the rest of his comments.44 that being said, however, it does not mean that the pharisee escapes unchallenged.45 of course, Kierkegaard acknowledges the tax collector is, humanly speaking, superior to the tax collector. But the mistake the pharisee makes is to make these sorts of human comparisons “in god’s house,” for by god’s standard these sorts of comparisons are cheeky and, in the end, “rubbish.”46 For this reason, the hypocrisy of the pharisee is somewhat comical here in that it is clear he is speaking “with himself or with another pharisee” rather than with god.47 Kierkegaard states this last assertion even more forcefully in Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays. after roundly criticizing the pharisee for his pride, hypocrisy, sanctimoniousness, and the like, he continues: “he stood proud, secure, and self-satisfied; from him no cry was heard. What does it mean? It also has another and totally different meaning: neither was he before god.”48 again, Kierkegaard interestingly, Kierkegaard refers to this plea—“god be merciful to me a sinner”—as “the socratic principle expressed in the realm of action.” see SKS 17, 218, dd:6.d / KJN 1, 210. 44 SKS 17, 274, dd:191 / KJN 1, 265. 45 even the Judge in Either/Or, part 2 cannot help but allude to the undesirable nature of the pharisee’s actions (SKS 3, 183 / EO2, 188). 46 SKS 21, 186, nB8:101 / JP 2, 1381. see also SKS 18, 37, ee:99 / KJN 2, 32–3. 47 SKS 6, 222 / SLW, 238. Kierkegaard mentions the relation between these two in a provocative vein later in the journals: “a strange nemesis hangs over the pharisee….ignoring others is indeed pride, and yet it is the proud pharisee who notices ‘this tax-collector,’ whereas the tax-collector humbly ignores the pharisee” (SKS 22, 225, nB12:137 / JP 4, 4165). here, Kierkegaard is pointing to the issue of whom one is talking with or to in god’s house. 48 SKS 11, 267 / WA, 131. see also SKS 20, 194, nB2:134 / JP 3, 2861. 43

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seems to be returning to the lack of true inwardness in the pharisee, the one who is only concerned about the external appearance of the tax collector. Continuing this discourse, however, Kierkegaard makes two further points about the narrative’s reversals. First, the location of the pharisee and the tax collector are reversed. the narrative begins with the pharisee standing near and the tax collector standing far off; the narrative ends with the tax collector near and the pharisee standing far off.49 second, the disposition of the pharisee is reversed. the pharisee who began by proudly lifting his eyes to heaven ends standing under god’s opposition, which is “an annihilating pressing down.”50 so, as it turns out, even if the pharisee is not standing before god, god is still standing before and opposing the pharisee. One final note concerning the relationship between the Pharisee and the taxcollector worth highlighting is the fact that Kierkegaard is, to a limited extent, also indebted to comments made by martin luther (1483–1546) concerning their relationship. referring to a sermon by luther on this particular passage, Kierkegaard takes the time to jot down two further disparate thoughts. First, luther points out that the guilt of the pharisee lay in his feeling of superiority, in his negligence, in his refusal to think about helping the tax-collector towards salvation, thereby merely using the tax-collector as a foil to illustrate his own piety.51 second, luther points out that the pharisee sinned most deeply by thanking god that he was righteous. in this way, the pharisee has chosen the wrong criterion, the human criterion, the external criterion, for self-examination.52 these two notes from luther, even if they are not foundational for Kierkegaard’s understanding of the pharisee, align very well with the characterization outlined above. III. Conclusion In addressing this final passage, Kierkegaard again dances indirectly with the pharisee through the comparison with a tax-collector. the point is sharp and impossible to miss: the tax-collector is acting in line with Jesus while the pharisee is not. although the stories are different, the tax-collector, the woman who went to the pharisee’s house, and the woman caught in sin formally function in a parallel manner. and, in all of these biblical passages that Kierkegaard develops at some length, the characterization of the pharisee that emerges remains consonant with the topographical summary presented in the first part of my argument. see also SKS 22, 77, nB11:129 / JP 4, 3933. SKS 11, 263 / WA, 127. SKS 11, 268 / WA, 132. Kierkegaard is very attentive the differences between the Pharisee and the tax-collector and he notes five in a related journal entry: (1) location, (2) whom they are talking to, (3) direction of gaze, (4) disposition towards God, and (5) which one of them went home justified (SKS 21, 85, nB7:17 / JP 4, 3932). see also SKS 20, 355, nB4:149 / JP 4, 3927. 51 SKS 23, 337–8, nB19:13 / JP 3, 2519. see martin luther, En Christelig Postille, sammendragen af Dr. Morten Luthers Kirke- og Huuspostiller, new danish trans. by Jørgen thisted, Copenhagen: den wahlske Boghandling 1828, pp. 471ff. (AKSB 283). 52 SKS 24, 453, nB25:24 / JP 3, 3063. SKS 21, 168, nB8:52 / JP 3, 3032. see luther, En christelig Postille, pp. 473ff. 49 50

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Before concluding, however, one final set of observations ought to be highlighted, namely, Kierkegaard’s observations concerning the pharisee’s direct response to Jesus. In this context, defiance is probably the best way to describe the Pharisee. Kierkegaard says as much when he suggests that the Pharisees acted “defiantly but constrained” during the night of the last supper.53 Their defiant “lack of faith” is also evidenced, according to Kierkegaard, in their attempt to undermine Jesus’ healing of the demoniac in matthew 12. in short, the pharisees’ recourse to claiming that Jesus acted under the authority of Beelzebub revealed just how deeply they were offended by Jesus.54 And, finally, later in life, Kierkegaard autobiographically returns to the trans-historical relevance of the pharisee in critiquing his contemporary context: i do not write this as if it could occur to me to hope to convert an assistant professor. How can I hope to influence a person whom Christ’s utterances against the Pharisees and against pontificating cannot frighten. Here the verse applies: They have Moses and the prophets; if they do not believe them, then neither will they believe etc.55

Defiance, in relation to the authority of Jesus, certainly characterizes the Pharisee’s direct response. But, defiance is just one more expression of opposition to Jesus. in this way, it joins the long list of characteristics listed in the opening line of this article. Kierkegaard once wrote that “the holy scriptures are the highway signs: Christ is the way.”56 as one attends to Kierkegaard’s animation of the pharisee, it becomes clear that even if all of the highway signs in scripture are aligned with the way of Christ, not all of the signs point towards Christ. what Kierkegaard says about the path of the commentators can also be applied to the pharisee: “Following the path of the commentators is often like traveling to london; true, the road leads to london, but if one wants to get there, he has to turn around.”57 Yes, following the path of the pharisee leads to Christ, but if one wants to follow the way of Christ, one has to turn around. In this way, Kierkegaard’s polyphonic personification of the Pharisee remains, to the end, essentially the personification of a univocal idea: the counterpoint to Jesus, the antithesis of Jesus, the anti-Christ.

53 54 55 56 57

SKS 10, 296 / CD, 276. SKS, 12, 109–10 / PC, 101. SKS 26, 58, nB31:77 / JP 6, 6897. SKS 20, 105, nB161 / JP 1, 208. Pap. i a 55 / JP 1, 203.

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss The Pharisee [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34, vol. 1, pp. 57–60; vol. 2, pp. 22–6 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 330–5; pp. 568–70 (ASKB 106–107). [hamman, Johann georg], Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, vol. 1, 1821, p. ix; p. 497 (ASKB 536–544). hase, Karl, Das Leben Jesu. Ein Lehrbuch zunächst für akademische Vorlesungen, leipzig: Johann Friedrich leich 1829, p. 92; p. 109; pp. 113–14; p. 124 (ASKB u 51). [luther, martin], En Christelig Postille, sammendragen af Dr. Morten Luthers Kirke- og Huuspostiller, new danish trans. by Jørgen thisted, Copenhagen: den wahlske Boghandling 1828, pp. 471ff. (ASKB 283). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed, Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 1, pp. 427–30; pp. 704–12; vol. 2, pp. 236–47 (ASKB 96–100). rosenkranz, Karl, Encyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften, halle: C.a. schwetschke und sohn 1831, pp. 142–38; pp. 162–3 (ASKB 35). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 48–50 (ASKB 108). — Lehrbuch der hebräisch-jüdischen Archäologie, 3rd ed., leipzig: vogel 1842, p. 68 (ASKB 872). winer, georg Benedict, Biblisches Realwörterbuch zum Handgebrauch für Studirende, Kandidaten, Gymnasiallehrer und Prediger, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: reclam 1833–38, vol. 2, pp. 289–93 (ASKB 70–71). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of The Pharisee guillamore hansen, p., Søren Kierkegaard og Bibelen, Copenhagen: p. haase 1924, pp. 139–42. hough, sheridan, “what the Faithful tax Collector saw (against the understanding),” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (Kierkegaard International Commentary, vol. 18), pp. 295–311. Kirmmse, Bruce h., “Kierkegaard, Jews, and Judaism,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 17, 1994, p. 89.

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martens, paul, “authority, apostleship, and the difference between Kierkegaard’s old and new testaments,” in The Book on Adler, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2008 (Kierkegaard International Commentary, vol. 24), p. 139. minear, paul and paul morimoto, Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, princeton, new Jersey: princeton theological seminary 1953, pp. 14–15. parkov, peter, Bibelen i Søren Kierkegaards “Samlede Værker,” Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1983, pp. 34–5. polk, timothy h., The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997, p. 108. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, pp. 135–6. taylor, mark lloyd, “practice in authority: the apostolic women of søren Kierkegaard’s writings,” in Anthropology and Authority: Essays on Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by poul houe, gordon marino, and sven h. rossel, amsterdam: rodopi 2000, pp. 85–98. walsh, sylvia, “prototypes of piety: the woman who was a sinner and mary magdalene,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 18), pp. 313–42.

the tax Collector: model of inwardness timothy h. polk

In Jewish Palestine of Jesus’ time there was probably no figure held in public contempt more than the tax collector.1 typically a Jew himself,2 he was in the employ of rome and was viewed as a traitor. he customarily augmented his pay by exacting a surcharge from the tax payers, most of whom were poor, thus adding corruption to his general noxiousness. at the same time, there were “collectors of the temple tax,”3 failure to pay which would place a Jew outside the ban. hence the appearance of “those who received the didrachmas” (matthew 17:24) was hardly welcome. obviously, because the roman tax trumped the temple tax, not only did the former offend israel’s integrity as the people of god—that was a given—but its collector represented a personal assault on the individual’s religious identity itself. søren Kierkegaard need not have known the historical details to have recognized the radical makeover that Jesus and the new testament writers made of the ugly picture of the tax collector. Christian culture had had over a millennium to naturalize this villain-to-hero turnaround; thus it became Kierkegaard’s task to defamiliarize and renew it. the gospel of luke, scripture’s special home for the tax collector, has as one of its predominant themes the “great reversal.”4 nothing could be more hospitable to Kierkegaard’s penchant for paradox, dialectical thinking, and thematic pairings/contrasts, all of which we shall see aplenty in his treatment of the tax collector, most often in ways that overlap. More specifically, the paired in greek the word is τελώνης. it is likely that some Jewish tax collectors were underlings of non-Jewish agents who had bid for collection rights. that would scarcely have enhanced the Jewish collector’s popularity. see Klyne r. snodgrass, Stories with Intent: A Comprehensive Guide to the Parables of Jesus, grand rapids, michigan: eerdmans 2008, p. 467. 3 in greek, οἱ τὰ δίδραχμα λαμβάνοντες. added to the roman tax, the temple tax would have brought the total tax burden of the typical Jewish farmer to roughly 30 percent of his annual income. in early agrarian societies that would be staggering, not to mention impoverishing. see Bart d. ehrman, The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings, 4th ed., new York: oxford university press 2008 [2000], p. 247. For Kierkegaard’s single reference to the collectors of the temple tax, see below. the relevant biblical text is mt 17:24. 4 see, for example, luke timothy Johnson, The Gospel of Luke, Collegeville, minnesota: liturgical press 1991 (Sacra Pagina Series, vol. 2), p. 22. For the gospel’s premier statement of the great-reversal theme, see Mary’s Magnificat in Lk 1:46–55. 1 2

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themes include inwardness/externalization, knowledge/appropriation, what/how, willing-one-thing/double-mindedness, judgment/justification, comparison/insight, Christianity/Christendom, and of course direct/indirect communication. But before tackling the substance of the matter, we might consider some of the objective data. I. Basic Data and Distinctions assuming that objectivity does not preclude ambiguity, we can begin with this chapter’s bivalent title “the tax Collector.” the title can serve as a collective concept representing a whole social-economic stratum in Jesus’ time. in that vein we would normally say “tax collectors.” at the same time, the title also works literally to refer to one or another singular figure whom Jesus encounters or portrays in his sayings. Kierkegaard’s dual usage requires that we treat the topic in both numbers, singular and plural. the term “tax collector”—singular or plural—occurs 23 times in the new testament, depending on text-critical and translational variations. Considering Kierkegaard’s monumental corpus, much larger than the new testament, his use of the biblical texts pertaining to or naming the tax collector is modest. moreover, the occasional neglect to name the figure when quoting a text that includes him suggests that the tax collector is not always so compelling a character that Kierkegaard cannot afford to omit him.5 still, the omission is rare, if not unique, and most of the references to the text are significant for our purposes. a notable and notably early index, that of paul minear and paul morimoto, locates 14 references to the relevant biblical texts,6 one dating from 1844, and the rest from 1846–54. in other words, most come from the second authorship, while only a few come from the pseudonymous works. the primary biblical text is Jesus’ parable of the pharisee and the tax Collector in luke 18:9–14, the illustration of the penitent who confesses his sin in contrast to the religious leader who indulges in smug selfcongratulation. the primary instance of Kierkegaard’s 14 references is his detailed exposition of this parable in the sermon “the tax Collector: luke 18:13” (1849).7 we shall be exploring this sermon subsequently. minear and morimoto sort their remaining 13 instances into two categories of six and seven each. the six instances see, for example, SKS 8, 332 / UD, 231. another way to think of this omission is that it might easily result from the tax collector’s typical identity as a sinner. the two words often appear as a word pair, i.e., more or less as synonyms. in effect, to say “sinner” is virtually to say “tax collector.” 6 paul minear and paul morimoto, Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, princeton: princeton theological seminary 1953, pp. 20–6. old as it is, this index is extremely thorough, more so even than the hongs’. see Cumulative Index to Kierkegaard’s Writings, prepared by nathaniel hong, Kathryn hong, and regine prenzel-guthrie, princeton: princeton university press 2000, pp. 399–418. Certainly, it is hard to imagine anyone more intimately knowledgeable of the Kierkegaard corpus than the hongs. on the other hand, in paul minear we have one of the premier biblical scholars of the second half of the twentieth century. 7 see the middle discourse of Kierkegaard’s Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, SKS 11, 263–9 / WA, 125–34. 5

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are direct references, instances either quoting or paraphrasing the key biblical text or otherwise clearly indicating Kierkegaard’s employment of the biblical material. With the final seven instances the connection to the primary text/figure is allusive, sometimes remotely so.8 as extensive and discriminating as the minear–morimoto index is, it has one unavoidable shortcoming and one gaping lacuna. the shortcoming is that it cannot direct us to freestanding references to the tax collector, references unconnected to specific biblical texts. The most famous example comes in the “Preliminary expectoration” of Fear and Trembling written in 1843. in this celebrated passage Johannes de silentio is trying to imagine the knight of faith, that hidden Christian who has renounced the finite yet is free to embrace it “by virtue of the absurd.”9 de silentio writes, “here he is….i jump back, clap my hands, and say half aloud, ‘good lord, is this the man, is this really the one—he looks just like a tax collector!’ ”10 the gaping lacuna in the minear–morimoto index is that it notes only one reference to the relevant biblical texts in Kierkegaard’s journals and papers.11 there actually appear to be eight. this would bring our total number of Kierkegaard’s tax collector references, including the one in Fear and Trembling above, to 23. seven of the journal references pertain to the detailed exposition of the parable, and all but one (dated 1839) come within the brief period 1848–49. the eighth refers directly to the “chief tax collector” zacchaeus in luke 19:8.12 as Kierkegaard’s only reference to the zacchaeus story, we shall begin our more substantive analysis with this curiosity. II. Orientation: Preliminary Probes what is curious about Kierkegaard’s making only one reference to this arch tax collector zacchaeus is that luke places the story of zacchaeus (luke 19:1–10) in close proximity to the parable of luke 18:9–14, the passage that Kierkegaard emphasizes, and Kierkegaard seems to be extremely alert to context in scripture. Yet he may be sensitive to context here, too. he is citing an observation that the earlynineteenth-century poet-priest Friedrich ludwig zacharias werner (1768–1823) makes about a Lukan wordplay. The wordplay is between the wild fig tree, “wild” meaning “ridiculously shaped” according to werner, and the little zacchaeus who

minear and morimoto, Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, p. 15. SKS 4, 133 / FT, 37. 10 SKS 4, 134 / FT, 38–9. as of 1843 Kierkegaard had not yet fully developed the dialectic of inwardness, namely, the externalizing of one’s faith in witness against the dominant culture. we shall return to this campaign against culture below. 11 minear and morimoto (Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, p. 14) have a good excuse. they were working with the highly selective 1938 dru translation of the journals. see alexander dru, The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard, new York: oxford university press 1938. 12 SKS 21, 372, nB10:210.a / JP 4, 5050. 8 9

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“ ‘surely must have looked ridiculous in the tree.’ ”13 Kierkegaard paraphrases werner with a Christological turn: “[zacchaeus] has really made himself ridiculous because of his zeal to see Christ.”14 luke’s theme was really articulated back in verse 18:14, the humbling of the exalted and the exalting of the humble,15 a motto of the great reversal so significant for Luke. Kierkegaard now adapts the aphorism to a form of what in Practice in Christianity anti-Climacus calls “the offense,” the individual Christian’s requirement to suffer the opposition of the established order. with the journal reference coming in 1849, Kierkegaard is well into the second authorship and just months past the completion of Practice.16 his battle for Christianity against Christendom is intensifying, it would seem, daily. Practice in Christianity provides a reference to the tax collector in just that vein. we might call it a picture of the tax collector at work, collectors of the temple tax to be exact. apparently on the lookout for tax evaders, they ask peter in matthew 17:24, “does your master not pay taxes?” Jesus chooses not to offend the authorities despite assuring peter that “the kings of the earth” have no real authority over him.17 antiClimacus cites the passage to make a lutheran distinction between the two kingdoms, divine and human, though with an interesting nuance. while Christ acknowledges that normally paying taxes is an “unimportant externality” and therefore pays, when the institutions of Christendom claim that faith turns on demonstrations, that is, a tax the disciple must not pay—and a collision with the external that the contemporary Christian cannot avoid.18 three years earlier at the turning point to Kierkegaard’s second authorship, the battle had taken the form of “only a jest,”19 biting though it was. in Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard’s Climacus begins a self-ironizing farewell to see Zacharias Werner’s Sämmtliche Werke: Aus seinem handschriftlichen Nachlasse; Einzige rechtmäßige Original-Gesammtausgabe in 13 Bänden; Herausgegeben von seinen Freunden, vols. 1–13, grimma: verlags-Comptoir 1840–41, vol. 13, p. 34 (ASKB 1851–1854). werner was born in prussia, in 1768, and died in vienna, 1823. For more see nikolas scheid, “Friedrich ludwig zacharias werner,” Catholic Encyclopedia, vols. 1–17, new York: robert appleton 1907–18, vol. 15, p. 589. probably werner’s work would have become available to Kierkegaard in 1840–41. 14 SKS 21, 372, nB10: 210.a / JP 4, 5050. the same observation, in fact the same wording, can be found in modern commentaries. see, for instance, the following from david l. tiede: “But, like the woman who disrupted simon’s banquet (lk 7:36–50)…, zacchaeus risked ridicule by climbing a tree to see Jesus. that is the only reason his short stature is interesting. what is most remarkable about him is not his height but his faith as displayed in this absurd position.” david tiede, Luke, minneapolis: augsburg publishing house 1988, p. 307. 15 See also Lk 14:11. A famous variant of the same theme is “the last will be first and the first will be last” of Lk 13:30 (cf. Mt 23:12). 16 Kierkegaard completes Practice in Christianity in 1848, and it is published in 1850. see the hongs’ “historical introduction,” PC, pp. xi–xii. 17 Kierkegaard also subtly alludes to the mt 17:24 passage in “the Cares of the pagans.” the allusion makes no reference to the temple tax collectors themselves. see Christian Discourses of 1848, SKS 10, 32 / CD, 19. 18 SKS 12, 101 / PC, 92–3. 19 SKS 7, 78 / CUP1, 78. the motif of the jest runs throughout the book. 13

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his readers by contrasting himself to the “speculative thinkers and great men with matchless discoveries” of his time. of course, they are the real target of his irony, just as the whole book is targeting the speculative age these “honorable gentlemen” serve. “[Y]et i think that none of the honorable gentlemen can be as well off as a private humorist is in secret,” says Climacus of himself, “whether, isolated, he beats his breast or laughs quite heartily.”20 the allusion to the penitential behavior of the tax collector in luke 18:13 is not as conspicuous as most of the references in the corpus, but its use in the context of a jesting critique of the speculative age hints toward what later becomes the attack upon Christendom. Basically, the rest of Kierkegaard’s references focus on the constitution of the self, most often in relation to others. however, the earliest of all the references, a journal entry of 1839, briefly remarks on human nature in general, using the Pharisee and the tax collector of the parable as opposing paradigms: “the confusing thing about us is that we are simultaneously the pharisee and the publican.”21 indeed, the observation is so brief one is tempted to dismiss it as a truism. Yet for the reader facing the intensely sharp contrasts in the rest of the corpus, the saying provides some assurance that the author’s credentials as a psychologist are well earned. he knows the ambivalence, the double-mindedness, that is at our core. the theme of double-mindedness will recur in Kierkegaard’s sermon on the parable of the pharisee and the tax collector. we turn now to that sermon. III. The Parable of Luke 18:9–14 luke 18:9–14 was the subject of some attention by biblical scholars during Kierkegaard’s lifetime. most notably, the moderate historical critic hermann Olshausen (1796–1839) who had been influenced by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and august neander (1789–1850), raised a question concerning the historical context of Jesus’ telling of the parable.22 olshausen argued that the target audience of the parable, described by luke as those “who trusted in themselves that they were righteous” (luke 18:9), could not have been the pharisees, as had been commonly supposed. according to olshausen, it would have been odd for Jesus to direct this parable to an audience of pharisees when a pharisee is featured as one of the major characters in the parable itself. olshausen proposed that the original audience of the parable had probably been the band of disciples themselves, who were all too susceptible to self-righteousness and all too prone to rely upon the performance of external works of the law for salvation. although Kierkegaard owned the work in which olshausen developed this theory, he showed no interest in such reconstructions of the original historical setting of the parable. nevertheless, olshausen’s conclusions about the rhetorical purpose of the parable agreed with SKS 7, 560 / CUP1, 617. SKS 17, 274, dd: 191 / KJN 1, 265. 22 hermann olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments zunächst für Prediger und Studirende, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–44, vol. 1, pp. 708–11 (ASKB 96–100). 20 21

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Kierkegaard’s assessment that it functioned primarily as an indictment of spiritual self-satisfaction, including the smugness of religious leaders. the biblical text for Kierkegaard’s sermon reads as follows: 9) he [Jesus] also told this parable to some who trusted in themselves that they were righteous and regarded others with contempt: 10) “two men went up to the temple to pray, one a pharisee and the other a tax collector. 11) the pharisee, standing by himself,

was praying thus, ‘god, i thank you that i am not like other people: thieves, rogues, adulterers, or even like this tax collector. 12) i fast twice a week. i give a tenth of all my income.’ 13) But the tax collector, standing far off, would not even look up to heaven, but was beating his breast and saying, ‘god, be merciful to me, a sinner!’ 14) i tell you, this man went down to his home justified rather than the other; for all who exalt themselves will be humbled, but all who humble themselves will be exalted.”23

there are no annotations to the text in the New Oxford Annotated Bible to suggest that Kierkegaard’s Danish text would vary significantly from the NRSV;24 there are no parallels to the lukan text among the other gospels, and the translation accords perfectly with Kierkegaard’s interpretation. Kierkegaard’s interpretation, moreover, has directly informed what may be for our decade the definitive survey of Jesus’ parables, that of Klyne snodgrass, Stories with Intent: A Comprehensive Guide to the Parables of Jesus.25 But to what extent and how confidently we can see traces of the interpretation in other current work is hard to say,26 since the basic exegetical strokes are fairly common. in any event, with the biblical text in place we can address the sermon itself, starting with its contexts. The New Oxford Annotated Bible, 3rd revised ed., new York and oxford: oxford university press 2001. 24 neither are there suspicion-raising annotations in The New Interpreter’s Study Bible: New Revised Standard Version with the Apocrypha, nashville, tennessee: abingdon press 2003; The HarperCollins Study Bible: New Revised Standard Version, including the Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books, san Francisco, California: harperCollins publishers 2006; or the Oxford Access Bible: New Revised Standard Version, new York and oxford: oxford university press 1999. 25 Klyne snodgrass, Stories with Intent: A Comprehensive Guide to the Parables of Jesus, grand rapids, michigan: eerdmans 2008, p. 475. in this context snodgrass summarizes Kierkegaard’s interpretation in a tidy 70 words. 26 From the time of Kierkegaard’s death to the present, the amount of published work on the gospel of luke is vast. For example, the number of commentaries in Joseph Fitzmyer’s “select Bibliography” is approximately 125 as of 1985. see Fitzmyer, The Gospel According to Luke, garden City, new York: doubleday 1981–85 (The Anchor Bible, vol. 28a), pp. 259– 83. nevertheless, as of 1993 Brevard Childs could say that the bulk of Kierkegaard’s new testament exegesis remains largely forgotten. see his Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflection on the Christian Bible, minneapolis, minnesota: Fortress Press 1993, p. 708. Especially adroit in catching Kierkegaard’s flavor is Tiede’s Luke (see note 14 above). as a taste, compare the following sentence on luke’s intended audience for the parable with Kierkegaard’s first paragraph in his sermon: “In fact, Jesus’ story also addresses all those Christian readers who have justified themselves at the expense of the Pharisees, counting themselves to be more righteous in their humility than the self-righteous pharisees.” (see ibid., p. 307.) 23

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A. Theological-Literary Context one can assume that a nineteenth-century sermon has a theological edge, and in Kierkegaard’s case the edge is blunt. it is lutheran, it is theocentric, it is christomorphic, and it has little or no ecclesiology. in terms of literary context, the sermon is the middle discourse of the Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays published in 1849.27 the three sermons are tightly interconnected. “the tax Collector” and the third sermon, “the woman who was a sinner: luke 7:47,” parallel each other, and both are governed by the first, “The High Priest: hebrews 4:15.” the hebrews text—“we have not a high priest who is unable to have sympathy with our weaknesses, but one who has been tested in all things in the same way, yet without sin”—merits attention both in itself and because it reflects a close corollary. narratively, the high priest is Jesus the god-man who answers in advance the common need of the tax collector and the female sinner. pastorally, hebrews’ low Christology, emphasizing Christ’s full humanity,28 guarantees that the god-man’s answer to their need does not come out of noblesse oblige but out of his having fully shared in their mortality. “[t]here still is…one who can put himself completely in your place,” Kierkegaard assures his reader.29 the corollary to the 4:15 text, hebrews 5:8 (“although he was a son, he learned obedience from what he suffered”), appears in Kierkegaard’s “gospel of sufferings” (1847) and occasions a different reference to the tax collector. Kierkegaard quotes luke 7:34 and its parallel in matthew 11:1930 which describe Jesus as “the friend of tax collectors and sinners.” his point is to observe that Christ’s seeking such company draws the contempt of those who deem themselves his betters. again, Jesus knows the tax collector and woman’s situation because he has personally appropriated it as his own. the parallelism of the second and third sermons in the trilogy is carefully designed. indeed, the woman who was a sinner virtually is the tax collector. Both are anonymous prototypes, and she like him stands in contrast to a pharisee and is judged by that pharisee and his friends, who in judging her also judge Christ and thereby themselves, as Christ points out.31 pursuing the idea of the prototype will now take us from the contexts of the sermon to its contents.

see note 7 above. hebrews’ low Christology is balanced by a high Christology, Jesus’ full oneness with god, with an explicitness unmatched in scripture. 29 SKS 11, 257 / WA, 122. 30 the symbol “//” indicates the identity of the two gospel verses, luke and matthew having each drawn from the hypothetical “Q” source. 31 lk 7:43–7; SKS 11, 278 / WA, 142. 27 28

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B. Contents 1. Prototypes, Inwardness, and Indirection we see that twice within the introductory two pages Kierkegaard refers to the tax collector as a prototype. The first instance is in a caution against hypocrisy. Kierkegaard warns that it is much too easy to identify with the “good guy” in the story. the second instance proposes that the tax collector be taken, given the discourse’s occasion, more as the model participant in communion than merely as “the prototype of an honest and god-fearing churchgoer.”32 although applied with a touch of irony here, the concept “prototype” itself is taken quite seriously by Kierkegaard. in The Concept of Anxiety, for example, he applies it in a subtle allusion to v. 11 of the parable, specifically to the anxiety-laden tax collector as the type of person over whom “cowardly sympathy” boasts.33 in a journal entry four years later, he notes an advantage in the fact that “prototypes are anonymous…” whereas “names distract so easily…, the anonymous prototype constrains a person to think of himself insofar as this can be done.”34 perhaps “constrains” was too strong a word since the prototype also serves as a means of indirect communication. By attending to the model, the reader is drawn, not compelled, to make a transfer from the character to the self.35 in any case, the reader’s inwardness and appropriation of the parable are what Kierkegaard is after, and these he will pursue assiduously in the body of the sermon. But for the moment, the tentative note in his “insofar as this [inwardness] can be done” gets further development in the sermon’s introduction. the development comes via the caution against hypocrisy. the caution becomes caustic as Kierkegaard observes among churchgoers a sanctimonious putting on of the tax collector’s humility, a sanctimoniousness even worse—he says with an intratextual nod to luke 14:8–10—than the vainglorious pride that seeks out the highest seats at the table by seeking the lowest.36 hardly evidence of inwardness! as we have seen earlier, the humility/pride now foregrounded in our parable is a lukan motif of the great reversal. in a journal entry Kierkegaard remarks on the SKS 11, 264 / WA, 128. emphasis mine. subsequent italics not marked as mine are Kierkegaard’s. 33 SKS 5, 351 / CA, 54. this is one of the more remote allusions mentioned in note 8 above. to clarify, Kierkegaard is speaking of the phenomenon of demonic anxiety which “usually is ignored…or is construed sentimentally and movingly with a cowardly sympathy that thanks god for not being like such a person,” the sort who recognizes that he “becomes guilty only through himself.” 34 SKS 22, 244, nB12:167 / JP 2, 1856. 35 in Stories with Intent, snodgrass describes the story’s genre as a “single indirect narrative parable,” distinguishing it from the “double indirect narrative parable.” the distinction is that in the former, the reader is invited to perform a transference from the primary character in the narrative to himself or herself. in the latter, the reader is intended to make the personal transference while also redirecting the parable’s meaning to another plane. in the parable of lk 18:9–14, Jesus’ subject matter, the two characters’ mindset and behavior, is the meaning. see snodgrass, Stories with Intent, p. 10; pp. 13–15; p. 462. 36 SKS 11, 263–4 / WA, 127 32

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paradoxical quality of the contrast: “a strange nemesis hangs over the pharisee…. ignoring others is indeed pride, and yet it is the proud pharisee who notices ‘this tax collector,’ whereas the tax collector humbly ignores the pharisee.”37 Kierkegaard’s ten-fold use of the humility/pride contrast in the sermon’s introduction underscores the paradox. it is no surprise, then, that sharp contrasts inform the structure of the sermon as a whole, as they do Jesus’ parable.38 in an earlier journal entry Kierkegaard lays out the contrasts between pharisee and tax collector—contrasts in physical position, person addressed, direction of sight, tone of speech, and result.39 these then help structure the body of the sermon. at the same time the body of the sermon follows the sequential form of traditional biblical exposition. Kierkegaard moves phraseby-phrase through verses 13–14a of the parable: (1) “and the tax collector stood far off,” (2) “and he would not even lift up his eyes to heaven,” (3) “he…did not look to the side either,” (4) “he beat his breast and said: ‘god, be merciful to me, a sinner,’ ” and (5) “The tax collector went home to his house justified.” Each of the five allows us to see corollary tax collector references in the corpus. 2. “Stood far off”: Inwardness, Comparison, and Self-Deception the opening phrase “stood far off” is densely packed.40 Kierkegaard wants first to emphasize the tax collector’s solitude. the solitude is essential for the requisite inwardness, which in his notes he explicates as the consciousness of sin that locates the worshiper who kneels at the altar for communion. “the inwardness determines the distance,” he says, meaning the spiritual distance requisite for understanding just how far away from god one truly is when one stands before god.41 in the sermon, of course, he puts it in the second person: “if you are alone with yourself before god, then you are indeed standing far off.” only then can you fathom how utterly you have estranged yourself from god. now, there is a concomitant danger in not maintaining the requisite solitudeinwardness. in the company of others one is inclined to apply “a fraudulent criterion” to one’s god-relationship, “the criterion of human comparison.”42 it is precisely this criterion the pharisee succumbs to in his pretense that he “stood by himself.” he was “proudly using other people to measure his distance from them.”43 the attitude of the pharisee here is certainly not what Kierkegaard means by inwardness. the comparison theme has a special place in Kierkegaard’s thought—of course, always cascading into the stream of other themes. Notice the flow here. The idea of SKS 22, 225, nB12: 137 / JP 4, 4165. in addition to describing the parable’s genre as a single indirect narrative, as in note 33 above, Snodgrass defines it yet more technically as “a syncrisis, a comparison of opposites by juxtaposition.” see snodgrass, Stories with Intent, p. 462. 39 SKS 21, 85, nB7: 17 / JP 4, 3932. 40 SKS 11, 264–5 / WA, 128–9. 41 SKS 22, 77, nB11:129 / JP 4, 3933. this entry employs second-person address, suggesting that Kierkegaard is already in the process of writing the sermon. 42 SKS 11, 265 / WA, 129. 43 ibid. 37 38

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comparison dominates large portions of Works of Love, part ii, Chapter 2 especially, “love Believes all things, and Yet is never deceived.”44 the deception is in imagining that one is ever in a position to judge another. obviously, the tax collector is the victim of the pharisee’s self-deception.45 self-deception in turn lies near the heart of double-mindedness, the antithesis to purity of heart. here enters another allusion to the tax collector’s standing far off in solitude, again in that inwardness it takes to confess one’s infinite guilt before God. In the opening prayer of “Purity of heart is to will one thing,” Kierkegaard asks god that his reader be given the divine resolve it takes to will the one thing that is god. he acknowledges on the reader’s behalf the interruption it takes for the penitent to stand “in the confession of sin…alone before You in self-accusation.”46 Certainly, this is one of the more remote allusions, if not the most remote, to our tax collector in luke 18:13. nevertheless, it does indicate the degree to which both figure and text saturate Kierkegaard’s mind. they seem to emerge spontaneously. 3. Averting the Eyes: Inwardness in Seeing God Kierkegaard devotes two paragraphs to the next piece of the verse—“and he would not even lift up his eyes to heaven”—homiletically amplifying the piece by doubling it—“he…did not look to the side either.”47 In the first paragraph, the tax collector’s casting his eyes down is the expected reaction of one who knows himself to be in the presence of the holy and infinite God: he is “exhausted” by the weight of it, “like one dying.” whether we are intended here to catch a scent of isaiah 53:3 is debatable, but a journal entry of the same year takes an explicit Christological turn in referring to the text. The tax collector’s not lifting his eyes to heaven reflects the loss of confidence, a confidence which Christ will nevertheless restore.48 the gesture can also be described, as it is in “the gospel of sufferings,” in terms of a conscious despair, which Kierkegaard says is preferable to the unwitting despair of the person who does not know himself before god well enough to “drop his eyes in the consciousness of his guilt and of what he owes god.”49 it is so preferable, Kierkegaard observes in another journal entry, that the looking down away from god is in fact a true looking up to god.50 see also “comparison” in SKS 9, 31 / WL, 27; SKS 9, 43 / WL, 36; and SKS 9, 182–7 / WL, 182–6. 45 with respect to self-deception, one might note the title of John douglas mullen’s excellent introduction to Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy: Self-Deception in the Present Age, new York: university press of america 1995. mullen gives the topic special treatment in explicating The Sickness unto Death in chapter 5, “a theory of human Corruption” (pp. 59–77); and it later recurs in regard to The Concept of Anxiety (p. 114), the Postscript (p. 140), and finally in a footnote remarking on its relative neglect in the work of psychologists (p. 170, note 5), a neglect that has no doubt been met since the mid 1980s when mullen was writing. 46 SKS 8, 123 / UD, 7. emphasis mine. 47 SKS 11, 266 / WA, 130. 48 SKS 22, 254, nB12:181 / JP 4, 3937. 49 SKS 8, 374 / UD, 278. 50 SKS 20, 355, nB4:149 / JP 4, 3927. 44

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the second paragraph performs its doubling (“did not look to the side either”) by beginning and ending with renewed emphases on the spiritual “inward”-ness of the posture.51 underscoring the syncretic structure of the parable, each sentence contrasts the two characters’ different foci. though standing by himself, the pharisee “saw the tax collector” with the self-centeredness of the proud. his true focus was on himself. in contrast to the pharisee’s demeanor, Kierkegaard notes, “But the tax collector humbly saw no one.” rather, “with inward gaze he was in truth—before god.”52 then follows the climax, Kierkegaard’s exposition of the tax collector’s prayer in body and word. 4. Inwardness Externalized: “And he beat his breast and said, God, be merciful to me, a sinner” (v. 13b) Curiously, in the sermon Kierkegaard does little with the first phrase of v. 13b, the beating of the breast, but elsewhere the references to it are striking. in “purity of Heart” he modifies the breast beating by adding a parallel predicate. He warns his reader against “will[ing] the good out of fear of punishment” when it is rather fear of god that ought to do the motivating. to that end he says one would do well to “punish himself” and “ ‘beat his breast and scourge his heart.’ ”53 in this context he makes no mention of the tax collector himself. likewise in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Climacus argues that a preacher’s beating his own breast is far preferable to crudely thundering at the congregation. the preacher’s self-accusation “hinders any comparison” precisely because of the indirect stance. 54 it is his anguish, not the worshipers’ remorse…unless they are moved to appropriate it inwardly as their own. in the sermon Kierkegaard explicates the tax collector’s actual cry, “o god, be merciful to me, a sinner,” by heaping up metaphors of maximum distress— forsakenness in the desert, attack by fierce beasts, assault by bandits, mockery by the storm, indifference to the birds. the aim is to fathom the terror that produces the cry, a pure terror that leaves no room for hypocrisy or hidden agendas. utterly alone before god, standing over the abyss, the tax collector knows beyond illusion who he is: the sinner.55 elsewhere in the corpus the two references to the tax collector’s cry follow those to his breast beating in one simple respect. the tax collector himself is not mentioned. otherwise, Climacus’s concern with the preacher and his preaching is met with a note about authentic preaching (that of the thief crucified beside Christ)

SKS 11, 266 / WA, 130. SKS 11, 266 / WL, 130. 53 SKS 8, 158 / UD, 45–6. emphasis mine. Kierkegaard’s freedom in working with scripture is evident in his inclusion of the new phrase within the quotation marks. 54 SKS 7, 482 / CUP1, 530–1, see asterisk. emphasis mine. 55 Although Kierkegaard rarely if ever uses the definite article with “sinner” in referring to the tax collector’s cry, the definite article is used in the Greek of Lk 18:13 (ὁ ἁμαρτωλός meaning “the” sinner). 51 52

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in “the gospel of sufferings,” and the concern with motivation in “purity of heart” is met by the threat of meritoriousness in Judge for Yourself!. to start with the latter, Kierkegaard’s polemical target is “the professor” who more or less defines, disastrously, the Christianity of the age. The professor’s objective being objectivity, he has no heart for imitation, the mark of discipleship, “Christianity’s requirement.”56 still, Kierkegaard shares luther’s anxiety that imitation can issue in the self-deception of thinking one has merit before god. “Frightful!” he exclaims, and continues: i completely agree with luther…that a person who countless times, if that were possible, countless times every day for a lifetime, had committed all the most horrible crimes— but still has the one comfort of saying to god: God, be merciful to me a sinner—that he may count himself indescribably happy compared with the person who, making every sacrifice for the truth in greatest possible self-denial for an entire lifetime, for one single moment made the mistake of thinking he had merit before god. what a horrible curse a person can bring upon himself—to venture to sacrifice, to suffer everything, and then to have it turn into the most terrible torment for him by being presumptuous before god.57

with the verbatim cry and the picture of a character dressed in daily crimes, Kierkegaard makes the tax collector qua prototype vividly present, mentioned or not. the tax collector appears just as vividly in “the gospel of sufferings” as the robber on the cross beside Jesus. attesting that “i suffer as guilty,” the robber preaches repentance, “Christian repentance,” Kierkegaard insists, recasting the robber’s words as the tax collector’s.58 a troubling feature of the emphasis on “Christian repentance” is that Kierkegaard explicates it by contrasting it to Judaism: [i]t is a Christian repentance sermon, because the Jews nevertheless hold to the conception that there are holy men who should preach repentance and that by striving one can become holy enough to be a preacher of repentance. in Christianity, however, an actual sinner preaches repentance, and even the holy men, humanly speaking, must put up with an actual sinner’s being a preacher of repentance who does not say “woe unto you,” when he begins, but says “god be merciful to me a poor sinner, i suffer as guilty.”

the problem is that the tax collector’s prayer is a quotation of psalm 51:1— “have mercy on me, o god, according to your steadfast love; according to your abundant mercy, blot out my transgressions.” verse 17 of the psalm then provides an inclusio reinforcing the petition: “The Sacrifice acceptable to God is a broken spirit; a broken and contrite heart, o god, you will not despise.”59 in other words, King david preaches repentance by his own repenting long before the tax collector or the robber 56 57 58

“poor.”

SV1 Xii, 465 / JFY, 197. SV1 Xii, 466 / JFY, 198. emphasis mine. note again Kierkegaard’s liberty to amplify the quotation, here with the word

Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, 2nd ed., new York: Charles scribner’s sons 1972 [1954], p. 144. with respect to the inclusio, numerous scholars speculate that vv. 18–

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on the cross. in sum, Kierkegaard is not exempt from the dominant culture’s habit of coating “the Jews” with works-righteousness.60 5. Peroration: Syncrisis into Blessing, Intratextuality, and Indirect Communication The sermon’s final piece of exposition takes as its point of departure Jesus’ taut conclusion to the parable: “i tell you, this man”—rebuking the pharisee’s ‘this tax collector’—“went down to his home justified rather than the other.’ ” 61 Kierkegaard’s conclusion, however, is rhetorically expansive. he employs four paragraphs to review the parable’s radical contrasts. three times he marks the lukan great reversal with the observation “thus the picture turns around.”62 And five times in rapid succession he uses the phrase “before god”63 to transport his listener from judgment to justification, from confession to the communion table. Beyond the sermon, there seems to be only one reference to the parable’s concluding verse, but it is a marvel of intratextuality. We find it in “The Gospel of sufferings” in a discourse on the metaphor of the road. in typical form Kierkegaard defines “the road” spiritually/existentially—“spiritually understood, the road is: how it is walked.”64 He then illustrates the definition by broadly paraphrasing Luke 17:34–6 while imitating that text’s triadic form of stark, paradoxical contrasts. Kierkegaard writes, “it is indeed as scripture says—two people can be sleeping in the same bed—the one is saved, the other is lost; two people can go up to the same house of worship—the one goes home saved, the other is lost; two people can recite the same creed—the one can be saved, the other is lost.”65 it is the how of one’s sleeping, the how of worship, the how of reciting the creed that matters—that “how” being the humbling of oneself before god, in everything giving the self over to god. we see the tax collector’s story (luke 18:10, 14) subtly but unmistakably in the italicized one of the pairings. thematically, luke’s point is the folly of trying to secure oneself. Kierkegaard recognizes the psychological tie between that folly and the self-justification that nine verses later the Pharisee pursues and the tax collector passionately avoids. it is as if Kierkegaard literally sees the short space between the two texts so that luke 18:14 instantly invokes and invades luke 17:34–6.

19 are a post-exilic addition to the pre-exilic psalm. thus, verse 17 of the psalm is seen as concluding the psalm on the same note with which it began. 60 it is arguable that the dominant culture had already become “Christendom” with the imperial instituting of Christianity in the fourth to sixth centuries, from emperors Constantine to Justinian. although many people want to trace the castigation of Jews for works-righteousness back to the apostle paul’s letter to the romans, they fail to notice the strict command to gentiles in rom 11:21 against boasting over Jews. however unfaithful paul finds the Jews’ negative response to the proclamation of Jesus as a crucified messiah, it is never grounds for gentile arrogance. 61 lk 18:14a. emphasis mine. 62 SKS 11, 267–8 / WL, 131–2. 63 SKS 11, 266–8 / WL, 130–2. 64 SKS 8, 386 / UD, 291. 65 ibid. emphasis mine.

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such intratextuality, profoundly attuned to the gospel’s shape, consistently shapes Kierkegaard’s reading of scripture. what remains for us is the sermon’s conclusion, three paragraphs of indirect communication disguised as direct address.66 the preacher Kierkegaard—indirection need not always be by pseudonymity—allegorizes the parable and its tax collector as the listener’s movement from confession to holy Communion to home. in effect, the listener becomes the tax collector, the identification of the two being invited by the preacher’s imagination and appropriated by the listener’s. in the long third paragraph, however, the identification is motivated in an especially complex threefold way: first, by the preacher’s assurance of blessing in the communicant’s justification; second, by a blessing itself—“may you find joy and blessing”—indirect by virtue of the jussive grammar, that is, by the asking for appropriation; and third, by a shift from the second person to the third person in a description of the person who does indeed find blessing. In short, with this third paragraph, the homiletic Kierkegaard pulls out all the rhetorical stops. with the conclusion of the sermon, we conclude our survey of the tax collector in Kierkegaard’s writings. as promised at the outset, the survey covers a good number of the dialectical themes that structure his thought, eight to be exact. But if we had to prioritize, two ideas stand out. one is a theme, the other a purpose, and both give credence to Kierkegaard’s self-description as a religious writer. First, for Kierkegaard the tax collector models the inwardness that does not shrink from the dread of standing alone before god. the inwardness corresponds with Kierkegaard’s emphasis on and frequent address to the “single individual,” the obvious mark of his famous, or infamous, individualism. The second feature follows from the first. Kierkegaard’s use of the tax collector is invariably in the service of religious edification, prodding Christians into becoming Christian, Christendom notwithstanding.

“disguised” in the sense that the sermon’s direct address to its “listener” is itself a form of indirect communication. Its orality is a fiction of the genre. The reader is asked to think of himself or herself as hearing the sermon when in fact it is a written text. 66

Bibliography I. Works in the the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Tax Collector Bretschneider, Karl gottlieb, Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros novi Testamenti, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., leipzig: Barth 1829, vol. 2, pp. 505–6 (ASKB 73–74). [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, ed. by august tholuck, vols. 1–7, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 57–60 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 569–77 (ASKB 106–107). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments zunächst für Prediger und Studirende, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–44, vol. 1, pp. 704–12 (ASKB 96). rosenkranz, Karl, Encyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften, halle: C.a. schwetschke und sohn 1831, pp. 157–8 (ASKB 35). [werner, zacharias], Zacharias Werner’s Sämmtliche Werke: Aus seinem handschriftlichen Nachlasse; Einzige rechtmäßige Original-Gesammtausgabe in 13 Bänden; Herausgegeben von seinen Freunden, vols. 1–13, grimma: verlagsComptoir 1840–41, vol. 13, p. 34 (ASKB 1851–1854). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 93–4 (ASKB 108). winer, georg Benedict, Biblisches Realwörterbuch zum Handgebrauch für Studirende, Kandidaten, Gymnasiallehrer und Prediger, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: reclam 1833–38, vol. 2, 1838, pp. 854–6 (ASKB 70–71). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of the Tax Collector Cappelørn, niels Jørgen, “søren Kierkegaard at Friday Communion in the Church of our lady,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 18), pp. 255–94, see p. 278; pp. 287–90. Childs, Brevard s., Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflection on the Christian Bible, minneapolis: Fortress press 1993, p. 708. guillamore hansen, p., Søren Kierkegaard og Bibelen, Copenhagen: p. haase 1924, pp. 139–42.

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hough, sheridan, “what the Faithful tax Collector saw (against the understanding),” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (Kierkegaard International Commentary, vol. 18), pp. 295–311. Kloeden, wolfdietrich von, “Biblestudy,” in Kierkegaard’s View of Christianity, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 1), pp. 33–7. minear, paul and paul morimoto, Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, princeton, new Jersey: princeton theological seminary 1953, pp. 14–15. mullen, John douglas, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy: Self-Deception in the Present Age, new York: university press of america 1995, pp. 59–77; p. 114; p. 140; p. 170. parkov, peter, Bibelen i Søren Kierkegaards “Samlede Værker,” Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1983, p. 38. pattison, george, “d.F. strauss: Kierkegaard and radical demythologization,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), p. 247. plekon, michael, “Kierkegaard and the eucharist,” Studia Liturgica, vol. 22, 1992, pp. 214–36. rose, tim, Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology, aldershot: ashgate 2001, p. 94. snodgrass, Klyne r., Stories with Intent: A Comprehensive Guide to the Parables of Jesus, grand rapids, michigan: eerdmans 2008, p. 467. tiede, david l., Luke, minneapolis, minnesota: augsburg publishing house 1988, p. 307. walsh, sylvia, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Christian Existence, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania state university press 2005, p. 9.

the woman in sin: Kierkegaard’s late Female prototype paul martens

this alteration where children and women have become “the human” has also altered Christianity to the exact opposite of the original; it has become sheer gift—it was sheer task.1

this comment, written in one of Kierkegaard’s journals, clearly suggests that women’s existence, at least as he saw it in his contemporary denmark, is the opposite of original Christian existence. as his reception indicates, women frequently do not fare well in Kierkegaard’s writings.2 Kierkegaard is, however, occasionally inconsistent on this matter and the purpose of the following pages is to illuminate how Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the character of “the woman in sin” [Synderinden], introduced in luke 7:36–50, illustrates how a female can serve as a potentially “positive” prototype of true Christianity.3 much is wrapped up in Kierkegaard’s use of the character of the woman in sin: the god-relationship, gender identity, confession, communion, gift, and task, to name just a few themes. therefore, it should surprise no one that differing evaluations of Kierkegaard’s woman in sin emerge relative to which lens one selects.4 the particular theme that focuses the following argument SKS 26, 357, nB34:43.a / JP 3, 3211. see, for example, the essays in Feminist Interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by Céline léon and sylvia walsh, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania state university press 1997. 3 here i am borrowing the ambivalence of Kierkegaard’s “positive” description of woman suggested by leslie howe when she argues that Kierkegaard’s positive assessments of women are “not much of an advance over the negative ones.” this is a question we will return to at the conclusion of this article. see leslie howe, “Kierkegaard and the Feminine self,” Hypatia, vol. 9, no. 4, 1994, p. 152. 4 see, for example, mark lloyd taylor’s enthusiastic assertion that this woman should be considered apostolic in “practice in authority: the apostolic women of søren Kierkegaard’s writings,” in Anthropology and Authority: Essays on Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by poul houe, gordon d. marino, and sven h. rossel, atlanta: rodopi 2000, p. 87. For a differing perspective, see Céline léon’s disappointed conclusion that the qualities extolled by Kierkegaard in this context are “none other than those which have been used to ensure, and enforce, women’s oppression,” found in “the (in-)appropriateness of using the Feminine as paradigm: the Case of Kierkegaard,” Philosophy Today, vol. 44, no. 4, 2000, p. 341. 1 2

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is the opposition of gift and task explicitly named by Kierkegaard in the opening citation. i return to this theme at the conclusion of the article in order to argue that it is, in fact, a false opposition in Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the woman in sin. But, it is precisely this false binary relating to the woman in sin that causes her to be elevated first and then later to be discarded. In order to justify this conclusion, allow me to return to the basic details of Kierkegaard’s development of this character. the woman in sin, though not usually considered one of Kierkegaard’s major characters, makes a significant appearance in three upbuilding discourses—once early, and twice late. First, she appears in the closing pages of an 1843 upbuilding discourse organized around 1 peter 4:7–12;5 later, she appears prominently in two discourses published immediately before and after Practice in Christianity.6 of course, brief allusions to this particular woman and to key textual fragments contained within her narrative are scattered throughout the corpus. in the later discourses, however, sustained attention to and utilization of the woman in sin occurs in unique circumstances. to grasp the extent of the role that the woman in sin plays in the corpus, part i summarizes the biblical text in which she appears and highlights the elements of the narrative that frequently appear earlier in Kierkegaard’s corpus. Following this, Part II briefly outlines the relevant biographical comments and circumstances surrounding the writing of the two late discourses. thirdly, and most substantially, part iii presents a sustained examination of the character of the woman in sin as she is appropriated for a particular purpose in the late discourses devoted to her story. proceeding in this way helps shed light on how the late attention is foreshadowed much earlier and also on how the late developments both extend and diminish the role and influence of the woman in sin. I. Context: The Biblical Text the story of the woman in sin utilized by Kierkegaard is drawn from luke 7:36– 50. there appear to be partially parallel synoptic accounts in matthew 26:6–13 and mark 14:3–9,7 but the differences in location and other significant details seem to drive Kierkegaard consistently back to the unique narrative appearing in luke.8 By the discourse is titled “love will hide a multitude of sins,” and it is the second of Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843), see SKS 5, 84–6 / EUD, 75–8. 6 The first of the late discourses is “The Woman Who Was a Sinner,” which is the third of Three Discourses at Friday Communion (1849) (SKS 11, 271–80 / WA, 135–44); the second of the late discourses is An Upbuilding Discourse (1850) (SKS 12, 257–73 / WA, 145–60). 7 it appears that the only times Kierkegaard comments at length on the semi-parallel passages can be found in: (a) Practice in Christianity where Kierkegaard draws attention to the act of anointing Jesus for his burial, an element not mentioned in lk 7:36–50 (SKS 12, 172 / PC, 168) (cf. mt 26:12 and mk 8); and (b) Christian Discourses where Kierkegaard notes that the woman’s repayment for anointing Jesus head is that she is “recollected through all the centuries” (SKS 10, 300 / CD, 280) (cf. mt 6:13 and mk 14:9). 8 in Kierkegaard’s corpus, there is a second sinful woman aside from the woman in sin found in lk 7:36–50. this second character is the woman caught in adultery as recounted in Jn 8:1–11. This other woman figures both early—Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843) (SKS 5, 77 / EUD, 67–8) and Four Upbuilding Discourses (1843) (SKS 5, 141 / EUD, 138)—and 5

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doing so he was in accord with the opinion of hermann olshausen (1796–1839), the biblical scholar often used by Kierkegaard, who insisted that this episode in luke is significantly different from the ostensibly similar stories in the other Gospels.9 in espousing this theory, Olshausen disagreed with the influential view of Friedrich schleiermacher (1768–1834), who had argued that all the instances of a woman anointing Jesus must refer to the same event.10 the story begins with Jesus going to a pharisee’s house to eat. a woman who was a sinner—which is usually inferred to mean she was a prostitute—had heard this and also went to the pharisee’s house. once there, she began to weep, to wash Jesus’ feet with her tears, and to anoint them with oil that she had brought. the remainder of the story contains the exchange between Jesus and the pharisee concerning the appropriateness of the woman’s action. in responding to the pharisee’s disdain directed towards the woman, Jesus poses the question whether the one who is forgiven 50 denarii or the one who is forgiven 500 denarii loves more. the right answer, of course, is provided by the pharisee: the individual who is forgiven more, loves more. acknowledging this, Jesus turns to explain, based on their respective actions, how the woman demonstrated that she loved him more than the pharisee loved him. and, for Kierkegaard, the clinching comment in the exchange is often repeated in one form or another: “therefore, i tell you, her sins, which were many, have been forgiven; hence she has shown great love. But the one to whom little is forgiven, loves little.”11 this exchange between Jesus and the woman generated a particular theological puzzle for protestant interpreters. in an expository volume on the gospels that late—Christian Discourses (SKS 10, 309–17 / CD, 289–95). although Kierkegaard does “exploit” the thematic connections between their stories, as taylor states it, he is also right to note that Kierkegaard does not treat these women as the same person. that being said, taylor may be wrong in claiming that they are not associated with mary magdalene as they have historically been linked in popular Christian imagination. in Stages on Life’s Way, the following appears: “suppose that mary magdalene had had no witness to her shame and she could have sneaked through life with honor and in death sneaked out of the world with a myrtle wreath upon her brow—it seems to me that through her courage she won another honor; it seems to me that in death she lies more honored without the myrtle wreath than with it” (SKS 6, 328–9 / SLW, 353–4). Certainly, this does not claim that either the woman in sin or the woman caught in adultery is mary magdalene, but it may be possible to see the parallel here between mary magdalene and either the woman in sin or the woman caught in adultery. see taylor, “practice in authority,” p. 86 note 11. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between mary magdalene and the woman in sin in Kierkegaard’s writings, see sylvia walsh, “prototypes of piety: the woman who was a sinner and mary magdalene,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 18), pp. 313–42. 9 hermann olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed, Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 1, pp. 420–3 (ASKB 96–100). 10 Friedrich schleiermacher, “ueber des schriften ds lukas, ein kritischer versuch,” in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämmtliche Werke. erste abtheilung, Zur Theologie, vols. 1–11, Berlin: g. reimer 1834–64, vol. 2, pp. 37–115. 11 lk 7:47.

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Kierkegaard owned, John Calvin (1509–64) had noted the unfortunate possibility of construing Jesus’ absolution as a response to the woman’s demonstrations of love for Christ, thereby seeming to make her forgiveness contingent upon her loving works. Calvin had countered this interpretation that undermined the foundational protestant doctrine of justification by grace with the proposal that the woman’s love was not the cause of her forgiveness but was, rather, the effect of it.12 in another volume that Kierkegaard possessed, hermann olshausen similarly worried that the woman’s love so valorized in the passage might be regarded as an antecedent condition upon which her justification was founded.13 if this were so, the passage would furnish support for a Catholic doctrine of salvation by works. against this view olshausen argued that the woman’s ability to inwardly receive forgiveness was an instance of faith, which is love in the mode of receptivity to god’s grace. her receptive love was stimulated when the forgiving power of Christ’s love approached her, and her love then manifested itself in action. Kierkegaard shared this long-standing concern about the relation between the woman’s love and Christ’s forgiveness. By all accounts, it was the connection between loving much and being forgiven much, and the connection between being forgiven little and loving little that determined the vast majority of Kierkegaard’s references to this passage and also determined his interpretation of the woman in sin. it is necessary to note that there are other elements of this story that are used in other parts of the corpus that evoke the character of the woman in sin. For example, Jesus’ comment concerning the difference between a debt of 50 and 500 denarii14 appears both in Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843)15 and Christian Discourses (1848).16 Further, Johannes Climacus also alludes to the story in arguing that “though my eyes were more flooded with tears than a repentant prostitute’s, and though each and every tear of mine were more precious than the copious tears of a pardoned prostitute,” the savior could not manifest himself in any other way than as a humble servant.17 And, finally, Kierkegaard suggests, in “Guilty”/“Not Guilty,” that Mary magdalene—traditionally understood by interpreters to be the woman in sin—is more honored because she had witnesses to her shame while also acknowledging that the woman felt her guilt most deeply when she stood “alone before the lord.”18 aside from these exceptions, all of the other allusions to the woman in sin are, in some way, expressions of the theme of loving much and being forgiven much.19 Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34, vol. 2, pp. 22–6 (ASKB 92–95). 13 olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vol. 1, pp. 427–30 (ASKB 96–100). 14 lk 7:41. 15 SKS 5, 68 / EUD, 58. 16 SKS 10, 312 / CD, 290. 17 SKS 4, 240 / PF, 33. this text evokes lk 7:38. 18 SKS 6, 328–9 / SLW, 353–4 and SKS 5, 414 / TD, 35. 19 SKS 3, 61 / EO2, 54–5. SKS 5, 356 / EUD, 371. SKS 5, 379 / EUD, 397. SKS 5, 425 / TD, 49. SKS 9, 221 / WL, 219. SKS 9, 280 / WL, 282. see also the biographical comment in this vein found in SKS 21, 358, nB10:191 / JP 6, 6389. For another summary of the appearances of the woman in sin, see walsh, “prototypes of piety,” p. 313. 12

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amidst the various allusions to loving much and being forgiven much stands a sustained reflection in the second of Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843). developing the idea that love hides a multitude of sins in this early context, Kierkegaard already foreshadows the later solidification of the dual role that much love and much forgiveness holds: it is both a judgment and a comfort; it is both a task and a gift. on the one hand, Kierkegaard holds out the example of the woman who wept in the presence of the pharisees’ disapproval, who wept until her tears of repentance became tears of adoration. understood in this way, the woman was able to “weep herself into the peacefulness of love.”20 From this point of view, Kierkegaard emphasizes the gift of forgiveness as follows: “the person who loves much is forgiven much, and this is love’s blessed deception, ‘that the person who is forgiven much loves much’—so that to need much forgiveness becomes an expression of love’s perfection.”21 on the other hand, returning to the story from the beginning, Kierkegaard tells the story with the aim of highlighting the task of love, the love that was already at work in the woman: then love discovered what the world concealed—the love in her; and since it had not been victorious in her, the savior’s love came to her assistance so that the one “who was released from a debt of five hundred pennies might love more,” and he made the love in her even more powerful to hide a multitude of sins, the love that was already there, because “her many sins were forgiven her, because she loved much.”22

the suggestion that Jesus’ forgiveness may be conditional haunts Kierkegaard’s conclusions drawn from the story and there is clearly an overlap between gift and task in this early discourse concerning love’s ability to hide a multitude of sins. the grace of forgiveness is given the upper hand. Yet the ambiguity in the relationship between the love and repentance of the woman in sin and the love and forgiveness of Jesus remains. and, in this ambiguity surrounding the character of the woman in sin, Kierkegaard already intimates the emphases that he will later revisit and sharpen. there are gestures to loving much and being forgiven much in other places in the corpus, but the character of the woman that is initially developed already in 1843 already stands as a positive and problematic prototype because of the internal pressures of expressing Christianity as both gift and task in the same character. II. The Woman in Sin and the Completion of the Corpus as indicated earlier, the two late discourses devoted to the woman in sin immediately precede and follow Practice in Christianity. during this time, Kierkegaard seems to have been incredibly indecisive concerning the public conclusion of his authorship. at one point, it appears that the publication of Practice in Christianity would be the “zenith of Christianity in ethical rigorousness.”23 Because this ethical rigorousness 20 21 22 23

SKS 5, 84 / EUD, 76. ibid. SKS 5, 86 / EUD, 77. SKS 22, 149, nB12:7 / JP 6, 6445.

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would be an ideal rather than a communication of that to which Kierkegaard’s life existentially conformed, Practice in Christianity would have to be a poetic communication. But Kierkegaard wrestled with ending his corpus with a pseudonym, especially a pseudonym who required more than he himself could exemplify. amidst these worries, Kierkegaard sought a place of rest, a place of rest that related to but did not repeat Practice in Christianity. therefore, even as Kierkegaard claimed that the Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays were related to anti-Climacus,24 so too were the discourses that immediately followed. Kierkegaard articulates the relationship as follows concerning the Three Discourses: they are now delivered to the printer. (1) i must have a place of rest, but i cannot use a pseudonym as a place of rest; they are parallel to anti-Climacus, and the position of “[two] discourses at the Communion of Fridays” is once and for all designated as the place of rest of the authorship. (2) since at this time there is an emphasis on my pseudonym (Climacus), it is important for the stress to be in the direction of upbuilding…. (3) the preface is reminiscent of the two upbuilding discourses of 1843, because to me it is very important to emphasize that i began at the outset as a religious author; it is of importance for the repetition.25

of course, Kierkegaard may have temporarily suspended his published authorship after the publication of For Self-Examination which was published a month after Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays. But, as with each previous attempt to bring his publishing to an end, Kierkegaard continued to write for himself. and, eventually his authorship reappeared publicly with a vengeance late in 1854. the question remains, however, as to why these discourses surrounding Practice in Christianity could serve as an appropriate place of rest for Kierkegaard. i suggest that attention to the role of the woman in sin begins to answer this question. By this time in his writing, Kierkegaard had begun to use the idea of a prototype [Forbillede] rather frequently. in the manner of his familiar Christocentric understanding of Christianity, the prototype held up for his reader up to this point was usually Jesus Christ.26 according to Practice in Christianity, Jesus as prototype is an ideal, an infinite ideal, an unconditioned ideal that calls for imitation.27 on the other hand, a woman—especially a woman in sin—would be a much more approachable prototype. or, at least that is what Kierkegaard seems to be intimating when he introduces the woman as a corrective: “on the whole, the woman is and ought to be a corrective in proclaiming the ethical-religious. one must not make it rigorous for men and have another kind for women, but in making it rigorous one ought to respect the woman as an authority also and temper it through assistance from that source.”28 with this in mind, Kierkegaard boldly introduces his An Upbuilding Discourse SKS 22, 309, nB13:57 / JP 6, 6515. SKS 22, 322, nB13:79 / JP 6, 6519. 26 see, for example, SKS 20, 213, nB2:182 / JP 2, 1837; and SKS 12, 183 / PC, 184. SKS 12, 199 / PC, 202. SKS 12, 231–2 / PC, 238. 27 see, for example, SKS 12, 232–3 / PC, 238–9. 28 SKS 22, 360, nB14:28 / JP 6, 6531. 24 25

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from 1850: “that a woman is presented as a teacher, as a prototype of piety, cannot amaze anyone who knows that piety or godliness is fundamentally womanliness.”29 a statement more opposed to the sentiments of the opening epigraph of this article could not be written. But is the Christianity Kierkegaard attempts to articulate here fundamentally womanliness? On the one hand, Kierkegaard continues to elevate the specific characteristics of women that make them suitable to serve as a prototype of true Christianity: passion, imagination, feeling, decision, and not being distracted by thoughts, intentions, and resolution. in short, “one” is the element of woman: one wish, one sorrow, and one thought.30 on the other hand, despite the differentiation between man and woman that Kierkegaard emphasizes, it seems that to read this as differentiating for the sake of differentiation is to misread Kierkegaard’s intention. much has been made of the problematic caricature of women suggested here, and i agree both that it is a caricature and that it is problematic.31 that being said, Kierkegaard seems to be intending to move in the direction of equality, even if he is awkwardly stumbling in that direction. In the preface to his first discourses in 1843, “that single individual” surfaced as an element that was repeated verbatim in the preface to each subsequent collection of upbuilding discourses. when Kierkegaard returned to writing after the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits were again dedicated to “that single individual.” in an unpublished preface to the Upbuilding Discourse written in november 1850, Kierkegaard recounts this history and continues: “the single individual”—of course, the single individual religiously understood, that is, understood in such a way that everyone, unconditionally everyone, yes, unconditionally everyone, just as much as everyone has or should have a conscience, can be this single individual and should be that, can stake his honor in willing to be that, but then also can find blessedness in being what is the expression for true fear of God, true love for one’s neighbor, true humanity, and true equality.32

It is no secret that “that single individual” was, in various instances, specifically identified as Regine Schlegel, his former fiancée. Therefore, not only is there a return to the upbuilding and the religious in these late discourses, there is also a further repetition here that should not be missed, a repetition related to regine. Kierkegaard SKS 12, 263 / WA, 149. SKS 12, 264 / WA, 150. echoes of an earlier discourse—part i of Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, also known as “purity of heart”—can be heard loud and clear in these comments. see also Pap. X–5 B 115, 3 for an unpublished variation of the introductory comments. 31 alongside the cautionary voices noted above, one could also add george pattison’s claim that “it is hard to avoid the conclusion that woman, even when spoken of as a ‘teacher’ remains (along with the world of nature) in the category of the ‘Other’ whose significance is determined by her function in relation to man,” in “Jung, Kierkegaard, and the eternal Feminine,” Theology, vol. 90, 1987, p. 438. 32 Pap. X–5 B 117 / JP 2, 2033. see also Pap. X–5 B 118 for a reiteration of the emphasis on equality. 29 30

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himself reveals this: “if it had been possible, the reconciliation with “her” would have occurred simultaneously with the three discourses…which contain in the preface—for the sake of the entire authorship—a repetition of the preface to the two upbuilding discourses of 1843, a book i knew she read at the time.”33 in fact, the poorly veiled dedication “to one unnamed, whose name will one day be named” at the beginning of the Two Discourses published in 1851 indicates that regine is on Kierkegaard’s mind in the midst of his argument for equality and his appropriation of the woman in sin.34 If “that single individual” can find true blessedness, if “that single individual” can find true humanity, if “that single individual” can find true human equality, and if “that single individual” can be a woman, well, then it should not surprise anyone that a woman can also become a prototype for Christianity. and so we return to the character of the woman in sin. III. The Woman in Sin as Prototype A. 1849 “the woman who was a sinner,” published in 1849, is the third in a series of discourses that serially and progressively address the characters of the high priest and the tax collector. in this context, Kierkegaard focuses the discourse around the love of the woman in sin. articulating the love of the woman in sin, however, is not exactly a straightforward procedure. the phrase “she hated herself: she loved much” appears four times in the initial pages.35 Following this, various forms of linking loving much with “forgetting herself” also appear numerous times, stated most directly as “the true expression of loving much is just to forget oneself completely.”36 in this way, the woman in sin divests herself of dependence on her own actions and identity and becomes an anonymous “eternal picture”; in this way, she made herself “indispensable to the savior”; in this way, she decreased so that Christ could increase. ultimately, however, the woman in sin expresses her love by confessing her sins: “this is why a perfectly honest, deep, completely true, completely unsparing confession of sins is the perfect love—such a confession of sins is to love much.”37 the woman passes the test of whether she loves Christ more than she loves her sin.38 SKS 22, 370, nB14:44.g / JP 6, 6545. see SKS 22, 275, nB13:4 / JP 6, 6675, where drafts of the dedication include the letters r.s., and SKS 23, 94, nB15:130 / JP 6, 6676 where the authorship in its entirety seems to be dedicated to regine. 35 SKS 11, 274–5 / WA, 138–9. when Kierkegaard speaks of hating herself he has in mind the woman’s willingness to resist and run counter to the social expectations of her context, such as her willingness to visit the house of a pharisee during a dinner, as well as her willingness to face her sin and shame in facing Christ. see also SKS 22, 241, nB12:161 / JP 4, 4024. 36 SKS 11, 277 / WA, 140. see also Pap. X–5 B 25:7. 37 SKS 11, 279 / WA, 143. 38 ibid. 33 34

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Because of and in her confession of sins, the woman in sin became and is a prototype. she hated herself; she forgot the masculine diversions of speech and language and the restlessness of thought; she forgot even herself and her sin. in forgetting herself, she recognized that she is capable of “literally nothing at all.”39 at the same time, she remembered that “Christ is grace and the giver of grace.”40 For this reason, Kierkegaard intentionally refers to a prototype as an eternal picture: the prototype is an anonymous and eternal picture because the prototype constrains a person to think of himself or herself insofar as this can be done, to project one’s own existence into the place held by the prototype.41 in recognizing that one is, like the woman, capable of “nothing at all” when it comes to the forgiveness of sins, one recognizes that Christ is capable of “unconditionally everything.”42 here, too, there is an equality that obviates, or at least ignores, gender. in the movement towards this recognition of Christ as grace and the giver of grace one finally comes to an appropriate place of rest, the type of rest that Kierkegaard was looking for to conclude his authorship: she is far from a forbidding picture; on the contrary, she is more inciting than all rhetorical incitements when it is a matter of accepting that invitation that leads to the Communion table: “Come here, all you who labor and are burdened,” because she walks there in the lead, she who loved much, she who therefore also found rest for her soul in loving much—yes, or in the forgiveness of her many sins—yes, or she who, because she loved much, found rest in this, that her many sins were forgiven her.43

B. 1850 the upbuilding discourse published the following year pursues many of the same themes in a slightly more organized fashion. much like the requirement to hate oneself, the discourse begins with the preparatory task of becoming indifferent to everything else but one’s sin. the task as task is reinforced by Kierkegaard’s use of “shall,” as in the requirement that one shall be concerned over one’s sin.44 echoing the logic present in Works of Love, Kierkegaard lets the dissimilarities stand—he lets the woman be a woman, he lets the pharisee be a pharisee, and so on—but vehemently argues that these dissimilarities must become “unimportant” and treated with “infinite indifference” in order to properly understand the true equality of standing before god.45 in the upbuilding discourse, it is the “unconditional preoccupation” SKS 11, 276 / WA, 140. SKS 11, 279 / WA, 143. 41 SKS 22, 244, nB12:167 / JP 2, 1856. see also Pap. X–5 B 26:8 and SKS 24, 74, nB21:123 / JP 4, 4044 on the nondescript nature of the prototypical nature of the woman in sin. 42 SKS 11, 276 / WA, 140. 43 SKS 11, 280 / WA, 144. 44 SKS 12, 266 / WA, 152. 45 see, for example, SKS 9, 75–81 / WL, 69–74. of course, criticisms concerning this sort of equality or androgyny have been voiced by howe and others. see howe, “Kierkegaard and the Feminine self,” p. 151. 39 40

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with only one thing—her sin—that leads the woman to seek forgiveness, to seek to come closer to god.46 having articulated this preparatory movement, Kierkegaard then moves to the second lesson that the prototype teaches: “with regard to finding forgiveness she herself is able to do nothing at all.”47 Yes, the woman does many things. she enters the pharisee’s house, she weeps, she anoints and washes Jesus’ feet, she remains silent, and she goes home. Kierkegaard recognizes and notes all of these actions. Yet, when it comes to her own forgiveness, she can only practice “the sublime, rare, exceedingly difficult, true feminine art: do nothing at all.”48 again, although doing nothing is essentially feminine here, this thought is not new in the late discourse, nor is it uniquely feminine. earlier in Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard makes a similar point in arguing that one can only be assured of the existence of the god if one lets go of an attempt to demonstrate the god’s existence. playfully, Johannes Climacus claims that “this letting go, even that is surely something; it is, after all, meine Zuthat [my contribution].”49 in this way, Kierkegaard shatters, or attempts to shatter, the economy of forgiveness and the economy of one’s control over the godrelationship. But, the text does not allow an escape from an economy of forgiveness so quickly, a fact Kierkegaard has to circumvent for his own interpretation to work. to do so, he provides the following elaborate hypothesis: then she hears him say, “her many sins are forgiven her”…that she does hear. he says still more, he adds, “because she loved much.” i assume that she did not hear this; it might have disturbed her that there was a “because”—which referred to her. perhaps it would also have made her love uneasy that it was praised this way. therefore i assume that she did not hear it, or perhaps she did hear it but heard it wrong and believed he said: because he loved much, and therefore the talk was about his infinite love, that because it was so infinite, her many sins were therefore forgiven her, something she could so very well understand.50

in separating the woman’s love and her forgiveness in this way, Kierkegaard can maintain the two separate movements that make the woman’s forgiveness possible: the movement of confession taken by the woman and the movement of forgiveness taken by Jesus. Both are acts of love, but their relation is and must be causally unrelated. Kierkegaard seems to be so unnerved by the possibility of there being a causal relationship that he continues, claiming that if there is an economic relationship between confession and forgiveness, it is Christ’s forgiveness that puts one in debt: no, what a deplorable aberration, or what frightful presumptuousness, for a human being to get such an idea even in the most remote way! no, with regard to gaining the forgiveness of sins, or before god, a person is capable of nothing at all. how would it

46 47 48 49 50

SKS 12, 264–8 / WA, 150–5. SKS 12, 268 / WA, 155. SKS 12, 270 / WA, 157. SKS 4, 248 / PF, 43. SKS 12, 270 / WA, 157.

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even be possible, since, after all, even in connection with the slightest thing of which a person is capable, humanly speaking, he is capable of nothing except through god.51

and with this emphatic statement Kierkegaard assumes the question has been answered. the third lesson of the discourse, however, is not entirely unrelated to the second. if the second lesson is that one can do nothing at all to gain forgiveness, the third lesson clarifies precisely why one can be comforted despite one’s own impotence concerning forgiveness: Christ’s death becomes “the infinite comfort, the infinite headstart with which the striver begins.”52 For Kierkegaard, the atonement becomes the ultimate pledge that one’s sins are forgiven, a comfort that not even the woman in sin had when she spoke face to face with Christ. no longer is Jesus Christ only the prototype that no one, not even the apostles, can follow entirely. Jesus Christ is now also the atonement because his death “infinitely changes everything.”53 when one looks back at the upbuilding discourse published in 1850, then, it becomes clear that the woman in sin becomes Kierkegaard’s prototype that leads one to Christ as the atonement. the stringent prototype of Christ utilized in Practice in Christianity is toned down to allow for human weakness, to prototypically make the movement of confession that Jesus never had to make. the woman in sin, therefore, again stands as prototype between the confessional and communion as she did in the previous discourse. she makes the movement of turning from her sin; she recognizes that she cannot do anything in the face-to-face encounter with Christ; Christ offers her forgiveness. IV. Conclusion One year later, in 1851, Kierkegaard again returns to Luke 7:47. The first of Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays self-consciously circulates around the statement that “But one who is forgiven little loves little.”54 the subtle semantic shift from much love and much forgiveness to little love and little forgiveness indicates a new tone. rather surprisingly, the woman in sin does not make an appearance in the discourse. sylvia walsh suggests that the reason she does not explicitly appear is because the focus of this later discourse is the “obverse side of love and forgiveness, namely, the instance of not loving Christ and therefore of not receiving forgiveness

SKS 12, 271 / WA, 158. SKS 12, 272 / WA, 159. 53 ibid. it is worthwhile to note here the difference between the early discourses and the later communion discourses: the reassurance in the communion discourses is viewed in light of one’s relationship to Christ as savior and redeemer and not merely in light of one’s relationship to god or eternity. see niels Jørgen Cappelørn, “søren Kierkegaard at Friday Communion in the Church of our lady,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 18), p. 291. 54 SKS 12, 285 / WA, 169. 51 52

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aright at the communion table.”55 the text seems to justify walsh’s conclusion, but noting this simply raises the question as to why Kierkegaard would need to move beyond the place of rest he had so completely articulated with Christ’s saving work in the atonement at the end of the upbuilding discourse. so, why would Kierkegaard move to address the failure to love at this point in his corpus? it seems that the vexing relation between gift and task, again, is at the root of this discourse. on the one hand, and walsh notes this well, Kierkegaard rejects the “baleful region of meritoriousness.”56 on the other hand, however, he continues: “when you love much you are forgiven much—and when you are forgiven much, you love much….First you love much, and much is then forgiven you—and see, then love increases even more.”57 As one can see, the difficulty with Kierkegaard’s rejection of meritoriousness still remains: the cycle of love and forgiveness begins with the individual’s love. and, then the cycle continues, namely, one must continue to love after forgiveness. By 1851, it appears that more than the woman in sin is needed to exemplify Christianity. when one remembers that the woman in sin is related to Practice in Christianity, it seems that the ethical-religious position of Practice in Christianity attains primary status as Kierkegaard recontextualizes the place of confession. For Self-Examination, also published in 1851, signals the new context clearly: “Christianity’s requirement is this: your life should express works as strenuously as possible; then one thing more is required—that you humble yourself and confess.”58 Yes, by the end of 1851—to say nothing of the last years—Kierkegaard was able to say that times were different, “and different times have different requirements.”59 after 1850, the shift of attention from loving much to loving little is symptomatic of a general shift in the corpus away from comfort and towards condemnation, from invitation to imprecation, from gift to task. granted, all of these elements have been present previously and also remain in some form or other. Yet, Kierkegaard’s renewed and increasingly critical quest to draw forward the minor premise of Christianity—“works, existence, to witness and suffer for the truth, works of love, etc.”—simply leaves the woman in sin behind.60 her confession becomes too quick, too isolated from a life of striving, and simply too one-sided. in short, it seems that the woman in sin becomes too vulnerable to taking god’s grace in vain, to understanding Christianity simply as god’s gift. By the conclusion of the Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, the communion table no longer invites those who labor and are burdened. rather, the communion table becomes the place of striving: this is why the lord’s supper is called communion with him. it is not only in memory of him, it is not only as a pledge that you have communion with him, but it is the communion, this communion that you are to strive to preserve in your daily life by more 55 56 57 58 59 60

walsh, “prototypes of piety,” p. 337. SKS 12, 291 / WA, 176. see walsh, “prototypes of piety,” p. 338. SKS 12, 291 / WA, 176. SKS 13, 46 / FSE, 17. SKS 13, 44 / FSE, 15. SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24.

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and more living yourself out of yourself and living yourself into him, in his love, which hides a multitude of sins.61

in this way, Kierkegaard returns to Christ as the prototype, Christ as the narrow way that leads to suffering, Christ as the way that leads to death, Christ as the one that one shall imitate. stepping back, it is clear that the woman in sin plays a particular role in elevating god’s grace at a particular juncture in Kierkegaard’s corpus. although her characterization is laced with anachronistic stereotypes, Kierkegaard seeks to draw her forward in order to highlight the equality of all humans both in sin and in needing to go to Christ in confession. her usefulness, however, proves to be temporary as Kierkegaard’s corpus continues to evolve. after 1850, she is left behind—literally and metaphorically. i would like to argue that she is left behind because of her role in elevating grace and not because she is a woman, but it is unclear that these two can be easily separated. that Kierkegaard, in his last days, continues to identify god’s gift of grace with womanliness is unfortunate for many reasons, including the fact that he seems to paint both women and Christianity into impossibly onesided caricatures that become simply untenable. all that being said—and even if Julia watkin may be right that the logic of Kierkegaard’s late misogyny is present through the entire corpus62—the woman in sin remains one of the few characters in the corpus that compellingly calls one to a place of comfort, to a place of rest, to a place where the atonement seems to have the last and final word.

SKS 12, 302 / WA, 188. Julia watkin, “the logic of søren Kierkegaard’s misogyny, 1854–1855,” in Feminist Interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 69–82. 61 62

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Woman in Sin [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: eichler 1833–34, vol. 2, pp. 22–6 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 330–5 (ASKB 106–107). [hamman, Johann georg], Hamann’s Schriften, vols. 1–8, ed. by Friedrich roth, Berlin: g. reimer 1821–43, vol. 1, p. ix. (ASKB 536–544). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 1, pp. 427–30 (ASKB 96–100). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 48–50 (ASKB 108). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of the Woman in Sin Ferreira, m. Jamie, Kierkegaard, malden, massachusetts: wiley-Blackwell 2009, p. 167. howe, leslie a., “Kierkegaard and the Feminine self,” Hypatia, vol. 9, no. 4, 1994, pp. 142–8. léon, Céline, “the (in-)appropriateness of using the Feminine as paradigm: the Case of Kierkegaard,” Philosophy Today, vol. 44, no. 4, 2000, pp. 340–1. parkov, peter, Bibelen i Søren Kierkegaards “Samlede Værker,” Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1983, pp. 34–5. pattison, george, “Jung, Kierkegaard and the eternal Feminine,” Theology, vol. 90, 1987, pp. 437–9. polk, timothy h., The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997, p. 108. possen, david d., “Can patience Be taught?” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), p. 256. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, pp. 135–6. taylor, mark lloyd, “practice in authority: the apostolic women of søren Kierkegaard’s writings,” in Anthropology and Authority: Essays on Søren

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Kierkegaard, ed. by poul houe, gordon d. marino, and sven h. rossel, amsterdam: rodopi 2000, pp. 85–98. walsh, sylvia, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Christian Existence, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania state university 2005, p. 45; p. 172. —— “prototypes of piety: the woman who was a sinner and mary magdalene,” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 18), pp. 313–42. —— “when ‘that single individual’ is a woman,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), p. 48.

lazarus: Kierkegaard’ use of a destitute Beggar and a resurrected Friend Kyle a. roberts

Of the two different figures named Lazarus in the New Testament, the less prominent appears in the gospel of luke (16:19–31). in this text, Jesus tells a parable about a rich man (tradition has given him the name “dives,” meaning wealthy) and the destitute lazarus who begged daily for food outside the former’s gate. the rich man ignores the beggar’s pleas for help. after both lazarus and the wealthy man die, the tables are turned when, in “abraham’s bosom,” the rich man, tormented by thirst, can only beg lazarus to give him a drink of water. Kierkegaard makes use of this figure to convey the lesson that external situations (e.g., poverty or wealth) should not define how people evaluate themselves and each other in the internal world of the spirit. the more prominent lazarus appears in the gospel of John (chapter 11); he is named as a friend of Jesus and as a brother to mary and martha. when lazarus becomes deathly ill, mary summons Jesus to Bethany in the hope that he would heal her ailing brother. Jesus arrived four days after lazarus had already died and had been buried. upon consoling mary, he reveals god’s power by resurrecting his friend from the dead. Kierkegaard employs the figure of the resurrected Lazarus to express the idea that Jesus Christ both empathizes with human suffering and enables individuals to overcome both physical and spiritual death. Each of the two figures, who are often confused with one another, will here be considered in turn. I. Lazarus the Beggar A. In the World of the Spirit, All Are Equal with the exception of The Sickness unto Death, both of the Lazarus figures appear only in Kierkegaard’s signed, “religious” writings and in journal entries connected to those writings. the “beggar” of luke’s parable occurs in the Four Upbuilding Discourses of 1844, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, Works of Love, and in Kierkegaard’s journals. the discussion of lazarus the beggar in the scholarly literature of Kierkegaard’s day tended to focus on the parable’s ostensible ethical implications, primarily the

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apparent critique of selfishness and greed.1 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette (1780–1849) regarded it as a critique of the selfish desire for continuing pleasure and security typical of worldly and wealthy individuals.2 hermann olshausen (1796–1839), however, feared that de wette had stressed the intrinsic evils of wealth a bit too much and had misleadingly construed the parable as suggesting a divine preference for the poor as an economic class quite apart from their possible moral attributes; instead of such a class-related thrust, olshausen claimed that the parable’s main purpose is to condemn the desire to avoid personal suffering, a desire that leads to a lack of empathy and compassion.3 olshausen added that the rich man is not portrayed as being eternally damned. although he is certainly not spiritually healthy in his present state, he is not permanently beyond the scope of god’s grace and therefore is not without hope. the rich man does exhibit a spiritually healthy concern for the ultimate well-being of his brothers, a solicitude that demonstrates at least a modicum of unselfishness. In general, Olshausen sought to mitigate the seeming dichotomistic harshness of the parable by portraying the rich man as a potential candidate for god’s mercy. although Kierkegaard does not directly refer to this minor interpretive controversy in his published works or journals, he owned the books both by de wette and olshausen. in the second of four discourses from 1844 (“the thorn in the Flesh,” with its scriptural text taken from 2 Corinthians 12:7) the figure of Lazarus functions as an example of great suffering and “wretchedness.” in this discourse, Kierkegaard posits that both suffering and blessedness (or “beatitude”) are necessary for the development of authentic selfhood in the world of the “spirit.” as he writes, “woe to the person who wants to be excused from suffering!”4 interestingly, the spiritually deleterious consequences of attempting to avoid suffering is a motif that both de wette and olshausen had detected in the parable. For Kierkegaard, the apostle paul’s experience of being “caught up to the third heaven” (beatitude) is counterbalanced in life by the “thorn in the flesh” (suffering) that he also reported.5 the apostle is not to be taken as unique or singular; rather, all persons who desire to be “upbuilt” (to “receive the upbuilding”) must encounter the “terrifying” in their struggle with god.6 the “world of the spirit” includes both blessedness and suffering, regardless of social, intellectual, and economic distinctions. such comparisons cannot determine the inner nature of a human being, nor will they protect a person from experiencing both suffering and joy. in the “world of the spirit, there is neither sport nor spook; there luck and chance do not make one person a king, another a beggar, one person as beautiful as an oriental queen, another more henrik nicolai Clausen, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, vol. 1, pp. 551–4 (ASKB 106–107). 2 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 98–106 (ASKB 108). 3 hermann olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–44, vol. 1, pp. 685–93 (ASKB 96–100). 4 SKS 5, 326 / EUD, 337. 5 SKS 5, 318–26 / EUD, 328–37. 6 SKS 5, 325 / EUD, 335–6. 1

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wretched than lazarus.”7 rather, in the world of the spirit, “all are invited”; that is, all human beings have the potential to become an authentic self and to find their identity equally in their relation to god and eternity.8 in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, Kierkegaard asserts that there are essential commonalities between all human beings which supersede distinctions and differences that separate them on the “external” or temporal/physical plane. lazarus, for Kierkegaard, is a prime example of wretchedness and lowliness, for he is “almost unidentifiable in poverty.”9 Combing passages from both the old and new testaments in a display of bold intratextuality, Kierkegaard contrasts the lowly lazarus to the glorious King solomon of 1 Kings to whom Jesus alluded in matthew 6:29. such differences between human beings at the external level do not diminish the more important truth that both the king and the beggar are human beings. anxiety results from a fundamental unwillingness to embrace both the equality and the distinctiveness of one’s humanity while rejecting the temptation to compare oneself with others. Kierkegaard urges the reader of this discourse to learn from the lilies how “to be contented with being a human being” and not to let differentiation exacerbate anxiety, thereby stultifying the self’s development in freedom.10 in the external world, Kierkegaard says, it is appropriate to address royalty with formalities, such as “your majesty.” when employing the “eternal language of earnestness,”11 however, formal distinctions are rendered meaningless and are leveled to an egalitarian plane. thus, in the world of the spirit, the same word, “man,” is used to address a variety of people in a panoply of situations. Kierkegaard writes: we use the very same term of address for the lowliest person when he, like lazarus, is sunk, almost unidentifiable, in poverty and wretchedness—we say: Man! And in the decisive moment in a person’s life when the choice of diversity is enjoined, we say to him: man! and in the decisive moment of death when all diversities are abolished, we say: man! Yet this does not mean that we are speaking disdainfully. on the contrary, we are using the highest term of address, because to be a human being is not lower than the diversities but is raised above them, inasmuch as this, the essentially equal glory among all human beings.12

For Kierkegaard, lazarus serves as the archetype of wretchedness in temporality and as a foil to the wealthy King solomon. as Kierkegaard writes in Works of Love, external distinctions must be regarded very lightly and held on to loosely for they do not define a person in the most important sense—that in which they are defined in the world of the spirit.13 This is a lesson best learned from the “lilies of the field.” SKS 5, 325 / EUD, 335. ibid. 9 SKS 8, 270 / UD, 171. 10 ibid. 11 SKS 8, 270 / UD, 170–1. 12 SKS 8, 270 / UD, 171. 13 SKS 9, 94 / WL, 88. see also Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, oxford: oxford university press 2008, pp. 42–64, and C. stephen evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations, oxford: oxford university press 2004, pp. 203–22. 7 8

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B. “As if the Dogs Were Merciful” the publication of Works of Love (september 29, 1847) followed Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits by only six months. as howard and edna hong note, this collection intensifies Kierkegaard’s ethical writings in its focus on the “deed” quality of love, which is “not a volatile, lovely feeling” but is “the highest good of ethical vision.”14 For Kierkegaard, Christian love is fundamentally different from any other form of love; that difference is highlighted in the paradigm figure of love, Jesus Christ. in his Works of Love discourse, “mercifulnesss, a work of love,” Kierkegaard suggests that the parable dramatically underscores the inhuman cruelty of the rich man by comparing his lack of empathy for lazarus to the dogs who licked the beggar’s sores. he writes, “what a contrast! now, we shall not exaggerate and say that a dog can be merciful, but in contrast to the rich man it seems as if the dogs were merciful.”15 in the parable of the compassionate samaritan, the samaritan serves as a foil to the levite and the priest. But here, the contrast is nearly unthinkable. while the rich man could do something to help lazarus, the dogs can, in effect do nothing. Yet it is possible to be merciful while not being able to do anything—like the dogs of the parable.16 mercifulness is a disposition—a willingness—rather than an ability. it lies in the sphere of inwardness. it is sometimes put into action, but whether or not it is first present as a disposition is the foremost consideration.17 II. Lazarus, Resurrected Friend of Jesus The story of Jesus’ resurrection of his friend Lazarus figured prominently in the late-eighteenth-century and early-nineteenth-century debates about the plausibility and even possibility of biblical miracles. the raising of lazarus attracted particular attention not only because of its dramatic nature, but also because it is mentioned only in the gospel of John. its conspicuous absence in matthew, mark, and luke inevitably raised questions about its historicity. one trajectory of biblical scholarship continued to defend the basic historical accuracy of the account in John. hugo grotius (1583– 1645) had early wrestled with the problem of the silence of the first three Gospels on this matter, and had concluded that the synoptic writers did not narrate the event because they wanted to protect lazarus’ family from reprisals from the authorities who were still striving to eliminate any evidence of Jesus’ supernatural power. John, grotius opined, wrote his gospel later than the others, after the immanent danger had passed.18 this view enjoyed remarkable persistence, for it was later endorsed

see the “historical introduction” to WL, pp. xi–xii. SKS 9, 320 / WL, 323. 16 SKS 9, 320–1 / WL, 323–4. 17 ibid. 18 hugo grotius, Annotationes in Novum Testamentum, vols. 1–9, 2nd revised ed., groningen: w. zuidema 1826–34, vol. 4, pp. 165–80. 14 15

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by the influential Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg (1802–69), the orthodox Lutheran professor of biblical studies at Berlin.19 hermann olshausen of the universities of Königsberg and erlangen also affirmed the eyewitness nature of the story and its authentic Johannine authorship, adding that it was yet another miracle that lazarus had not decomposed.20 Friedrich schleiermacher (1768–1834) also believed that the story of the raising of lazarus sounded like an eyewitness account, and consequently proposed that this quality of immediacy demonstrated that John was written before the synoptic gospels.21 schleiermacher employed this argument against Karl gottlieb Bretschneider (1776– 1848), who denied the apostolic authorship of John on the grounds that John reflects the logos theology of the alexandrians and therefore must date from a period long after the apostle’s death.22 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette (1780–1849) influenced by Schleiermacher, accepted the historicity of the miracle of the raising of lazarus, although he recognized that the story is saturated with a unique Johannine concern to portray Jesus as the eternal logos, a theological project that de wette actually endorsed.23 a very different interpretive trajectory was intensely skeptical about the facticity of the lazarus story. For example, heinrich eberhard gottlob paulus (1761–1851), the quintessentially rationalistic professor of biblical studies at heidelberg, proposed empirical explanations for Jesus’ miracles, including the raising of lazarus. according to paulus, lazarus had not really been dead but rather had been prematurely buried while in a deep coma-like state.24 even more radically, david Friedrich strauss (1808–74), who had been dismissed from teaching at tübingen in 1835, argued that the episode was not historical at all and that its presence in the Bible was due to the potent and imaginative myth-making activity of the tradition that informed the Fourth gospel.25 Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860) continued this line of ernst wilhelm hengstenberg, Das Evangelium des heiligen Johannes, vols. 1–3, Berlin: g. schlawitz 1861–63, vol. 2, pp. 198–272. 20 olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vol. 2, pp. 289–99 (ASKB 96–100). 21 Friedrich schleiermacher, Einleitung ins Neue Testament, ed. by georg wolde, Berlin: g. reimer 1845 (vol. 8 in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämmtliche Werke, Erste Abtheilung. Zur Theologie, vols. 1–11, Berlin: g. reimer 1834–64 (some of the volumes were published in Berlin: august herbig)), p. 283. 22 Karl gottlieb Bretschneider, Probabilia de Evangelii et Epistolarum Joannis, Apostoli indole et origine eruditorum judiciis modeste subjecit, leipzig: Barth 1820, pp. 36–7. 23 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums und der Briefe Johannis, 3rd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1846, p. 146. see also wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, pp. 176–200 (ASKB 80). 24 heinrich eberhard gottlob paulus, Das Leben Jesu, als Grundlage einer reinen Geschichte des Urchristentums, vols. 1–2, heidelberg: C.F. winter 1828, vol. 1, p. 282. 25 david Friedrich strauss, Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, vols. 1–2, tübingen: C.F. osiander 1835–36, vol. 2, pp. 133–73. Kierkegaard was aware of strauss through his taking of copious notes on Julius schaller’s (1810–68) critique of strauss, Der historische Christus und die Philosophie: Kritik der Grundidee des Werks das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss, leipzig: otto wigand 1838 (ASKB 759). see SKS 18, 318–37, KK:2 / KJN 2, 292– 19

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interpretation, arguing that the gospel’s tendency to exhibit the unity of the divine and the human motivated the depiction of the power of Christ over death.26 other scholars, unwilling to affirm the narrative details in the story but also reluctant to declare it fictitious, pursued a more moderate interpretive strategy. Friedrich Lücke (1791–1855), professor at göttingen, took a mediating position on the miraculous nature of the episode, hoping to harmonize the natural and supernatural dimensions by claiming that lazarus really had been dead, but that he was able to walk out of the tomb because his body had not been tightly bound.27 august neander (1789– 1850) also claimed that the event did not contradict the laws of nature but rather transcended them; Jesus restored the proper relations of nature and spirit that had been disrupted by sin and thereby allowed the natural laws to operate in the way god had originally intended.28 as we shall see, Kierkegaard refused to get embroiled in these interpretive controversies, avoiding all attempts to historically reconstruct the episode. He was content to simply reflect on the narrative as it is found in the text. the resurrected lazarus functions in Works of Love, The Sickness Unto Death, and related entries in the journals and papers as an occasion to discuss the power of Jesus Christ in conquering death and the anxiety which can otherwise squelch the self’s possibilities as a properly related synthesis of the eternal and the temporal. Christ overcomes spiritual death by empathetically bearing the sufferings of humanity and, through the atonement effected by the cross, destroys the power of sin and guilt which can hinder the individual’s relation to god, to self, and to others. A. “Christ’s Love is Sheer Action” in the Works of Love discourse, “Love is the Fulfilling of the Law,” Kierkegaard wrote that Christ became, ironically, the “downfall” of the Law by fulfilling the Law’s requirement.29 His will was unified with the will of God; thus, “perfectly fulfilling” the law was “his one and only life necessity.”30 love, in Christ, was “sheer action,” so that everything Christ did was bound together in a single undivided volitional whole.31 Consequently, because Christ is the paradigm, Christian love is “whole and collected, present in its every expression, and yet it is sheer action.”32 at the grave of lazarus, Jesus showed that he was “sheer action” because even his weeping “did not

308. in 1841 in Berlin Kierkegaard also heard philipp marheineke’s (1780–1846) lectures on the history of dogma in which marheineke also critiqued strauss. see SKS 19, 271, not9:1. 26 Ferdinand Christian Baur, Kritische Untersuchungen über die kanonischen Evangelien, ihr Verhältniß zu einander, ihren Charakter und Ursprung, tübingen: Fues 1847, p. 184; p. 247; p. 257; p. 443. 27 Friedrich lücke, Commentar über das Evangelium des Johannes, vols. 1–2, Bonn: weber 1840–43, vol. 2, pp. 440–90. 28 august neander, Das Leben Jesu Christi in seinem geschichtlichen Zusammenhang und seiner geschichtlichen Entwickelung, hamburg: perthes 1837, pp. 338–57. 29 SKS 9, 105 / WL, 99. 30 ibid. 31 ibid. 32 SKS 9, 104 / WL, 98.

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just fill up time.”33 Jesus’ determination and embodiment of knowledge by/in action meant that he stood in contrast to those at the grave of lazarus who did not know what to do. Christians are to “abide in Christ” so that their “love might become like this,” while recognizing that only because of Christ’s abolishment of the law through the sheer action of love is such an aspiration even thinkable.34 B. Christ Weeps for Lazarus (and Suffers With Us) in a journal entry dated september 1, 1848—the day that he preached a Friday communion service in Frue Kirke—Kierkegaard wrote that he “almost threw it [the sermon] away” and chose another theme “which has gripped me so powerfully.”35 that theme would become the basis of his “high priest” (hebrews 4:15) discourse from Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays,36 which explores Christ’s empathy with humanity as one who suffers with them. the narrative depiction of Jesus weeping for lazarus illuminates this aspect of divine empathy. his few mentions of Lazarus in this connection were not retained in the final published versions of the discourse. in this entry he opined that human beings can never have true empathy for the sufferings of others: “one person can never quite do this in relation to another—there is a boundary.”37 though human beings cannot suffer with others, “Christ did it.”38 he writes: and in every way he put himself in every sufferer’s place. if it is poverty and need—he too was poor. if it is ignominy etc.—he too was scorned. if it is fear of death—he too suffered death. if it is sorrow for one deceased—he too wept for lazarus. if it is sadness for the confusion and corruption in the world—he too wept over Jerusalem.39

Because Christ was fully divine and fully human, he could empathize with lazarus and suffer with and for all of humanity. in the margin of the entry cited above, Kierkegaard expounds on his theology of atonement. Christ, he says, “put himself completely in your place,” so that the sinner escapes “punitive justice” through the love of the redeemer.40 in yet another addition to the margin of the entry, Kierkegaard writes that “no human being” has been tempted in a “reversal” in the way that Christ was: “to be god and then to become a poor servant, to come from heaven down to earth.”41 In the final published version of Three Discourses at the Communion SKS 9, 105 / WL, 99. ibid. 35 SKS 21, 83–4, nB7:14 / JP 4, 3928. 36 SKS 11, 251–9 / WA, 113–24. these three discourses were published on november 14, 1849. they were originally intended as companion pieces to The Sickness unto Death. see the “historical introduction” to WA, p. xv. this volume contains Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, as well as An Upbuilding Discourse and Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays. 37 SKS 21, 83–4, nB7:14 / JP 4, 3928. 38 ibid. 39 ibid. 40 SKS 21, 83–4, nB7:14.c / JP 4, 3931. 41 SKS 21, 83–4, nB7:14.b / JP 4, 3930. 33 34

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on Fridays (which lack the references to lazarus mentioned in his journal entries), Kierkegaard writes that the upshot of Christ’s empathy with human sufferings is that people should not complain about their sufferings, but should bear in mind that Christ also suffered and that he understands them. they should “bear in mind that unconditionally and incomparably unconditionally he of all sufferers was the one who suffered the most.”42 C. “This Sickness is Not Unto Death” published just weeks prior to Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, Kierkegaard took the title of The Sickness unto Death from the story of the resurrected lazarus. here he develops, through his pseudonymn anti-Climacus, the point that physical death is not the “sickness unto death” and that the presence of Jesus Christ means that death is not final but is the transition to eternity. What, then, is the sickness unto death? the fatal malady is that deepest form of despair in which the self remains improperly related to itself, to God and to others. Kierkegaard had been dissatisfied with his philosophical and theological contemporaries’ failure to develop a “genuine anthropological contemplation.”43 The Sickness unto Death, a companion piece of sorts to The Concept of Anxiety was, at least in part, an attempt to fill that void. In The Sickness unto Death he extends the discussion of anxiety in a more explicitly theological arena by exploring the relation between guilt, sin, and despair. a decade before the publication of The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard had written several journal entries on despair and forgiveness, one of which included a reference to lazarus.44 These appear to reflect the original conception of the thesis of The Sickness unto Death. in these entries, Kierkegaard wrote about the fallaciousness of “defiantly challenging heaven” because “you believe your troubles are so great, your grievance so just, your sighs so deep and so gripping that god must be tempted by them?”45 in the margin of this entry, Kierkegaard wrote that such talk is as impotent as your arm. But then when you humble yourself before god and say: my god, my god, great is my sin, it cries to you, to the heavens…then heaven opens up again, and god, as the prophet says, looks down upon you through his window and says: Just a little while, just a little while, and i will etc.; then Christ’s words regarding you sound as they did before, when spoken of lazarus: this sickness is not unto death; no, on the contrary, it is unto life.46

in The Sickness unto Death, anti-Climacus develops the idea that a “self” is constituted by a properly related synthesis between eternity and temporality and infinity and finitude (or possibility and necessity). As Merold Westphal points out, these relations within the self do not, on their own, constitute the emergence of the self. rather, selfhood requires a conscious, reflected relation of the self to 42 43 44 45 46

SKS 11, 255 / WA, 119. see “historical introduction” to The Sickness unto Death, pp. ix–x. ibid. SKS 17, 272, dd:183 / KJN 1, 263. SKS 17, 272–3, dd:183.a / KJN 1, 263–4.

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itself.47 Furthermore, the self must become conscious, not only of its relation to itself and others, but of its relation to god. this necessitates an essentially religious orientation in which a person’s identity is existentially discerned relative to both the transcendence and grace of god. despair, which is the psychological side of sin, is experienced when that orientation is lacking and when the self’s relation to itself, to god and to others is fractured. despair takes, in The Sickness unto Death, three conscious forms: (1) in despair not to will to be oneself, (2) in despair not to will to be a self, and (3) in despair to will to be oneself. the consciousness of despair correlates to the possibility of the self’s emergence in a positive relation to god. in this sense despair can be, ironically, a bridge to authentic, passionate faith. with the help of the eternal, the self must lose itself in order to gain itself. in his introduction to The Sickness unto Death Kierkegaard employs the figure of lazarus to express the point that, because of Christ, neither physical death nor spiritual despair is a “sickness unto death.” he writes: when Christ approaches the grave and cries out with a loud voice, “lazarus come out” (John 11:43), is it not plain that “this” sickness is not unto death? But even if Christ had not said that, does not the mere fact that he who is “the resurrection and the life” (John 11:25) approaches the grave signifies that this sickness is not unto death: the fact that Christ exists, does it not mean that this sickness is not unto death!48

in the Christian understanding, physical death is not the end. rather, it is a “minor event” which must be interpreted in the light of a greater perspective afforded by eternity. In this sense, “there is infinitely much more hope in death than there is in life,” because death marks the final transition to eternity.49 Furthermore, there is much hope in the present because the believer, anti-Climacus notes, “has the ever infallible antidote for despair—possibility—because for god everything is possible at every moment.”50 The two distinct Lazarus figures function in Kierkegaard’s authorship to express distinct but related ideas. lazarus the destitute beggar helps Kierkegaard to articulate a hermeneutic of the spirit through which all human beings are recognized as created in the image of god and are of equal worth, regardless of their temporal, “external” distinctions. lazarus the resurrected friend of Jesus provides Kierkegaard with a beautiful lens through which the reader can see the depth of Christ’s pathos and love for humanity and through which he can challenge the reader to emulate that love in relations to others. the resurrected lazarus also gives Kierkegaard a powerful expression for the idea that would serve as the culmination of his psychological and theological anthropology. Because of the gift of Christ, humanity need not finally succumb to a “sickness unto death,” but has hope for life through a properly ordered relationship to god, to self, and to others. merold westphal, “Kierkegaard’s psychology and unconscious despair,” in The Sickness unto Death, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1987 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 19), p. 42. 48 SKS 11, 123–4 / SUD, 7. 49 SKS 11, 123 / SUD, 8. 50 SKS 11, 155 / SUD, 39–40. 47

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Lazarus [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: eichler 1833–34, vol. 2, pp. 48–53; vol. 3, pp. 211– 29 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, vol. 1, pp. 551–4 (ASKB 106–107). hase, Karl, Das Leben Jesu, leipzig: leich 1829, pp. 139–42 (ASKB a i 37 and ASKB u 51). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments zunächst für Prediger und Studirende, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–44, vol. 1, pp. 685–93 (ASKB 96–100). schaller, Julius, Der historische Christus und die Philosophie. Kritik der Grundidee des Werks das Leben Jesu von Dr. D. F. Strauss, leipzig: otto wigand 1838, pp. 106–25 (ASKB 759). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, vol. 2, pp. 176–200 (ASKB 80). —— Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 98–106 (ASKB 108). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of Lazarus evans, C. stephen, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations, oxford: oxford university press 2004, pp. 203–22. —— “the relational self: psychological and theological perspectives,” in JudeoChristian Perspectives on Psychology, ed. by william miller and harold delaney, washington d.C.: american psychological association 2005, pp. 78–95. Ferreira, m. Jamie, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, new York: oxford university press 2001, pp. 188–99. minear, paul and paul morimoto, Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, princeton, new Jersey: princeton seminary 1953, pp. 1–17. nicholson, graeme, “the intense Communication of Kierkegaard’s discourses,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 349–69.

pattison, george, “the art of upbuilding,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 77–90. piety, marilyn g., “good Faith,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 157–80. podmore, simon d., “the dark night of suffering and the darkness of god: godForsakenness or Forsaking god in ‘the gospel of sufferings,’ ” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 229–56. polk, timothy h., The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997, pp. 91–118. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, pp. 101–41. westphal, merold, “Kierkegaard’s psychology and unconscious despair,” in The Sickness unto Death, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1987 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 19), pp. 39–66.

The Crucifixion: Kierkegaard’s use of the new testament narratives lee C. Barrett

Allusions to scriptural passages concerning Christ’s crucifixion pervade Kierkegaard’s literature from the pseudonymous works to the later Christian discourses. predictably, the references and allusions become more frequent in the explicitly Christian literature. throughout the corpus, the passages that Kierkegaard relies upon remain relatively constant. he uses these passages to develop the themes of Jesus’ crucifixion as the atonement for sin, the cross as the manifestation of God’s love in the form of suffering lowliness, and the passion of Christ as the prototype for the Christian life. Kierkegaard’s concentration on these particular elaborations of the crucifixion stories is explained in his own writings. For example, in a journal entry of 1854 Kierkegaard announces that the sacrifice of the God-man is the atonement, a loving sacrifice that elicits a grateful response, and also the example that demands the imitation of being unconditionally willing to be sacrificed for others.1 in another journal entry of 1849 Kierkegaard nuanced this distinction, making it clear that although Christ is indeed the prototype, the atoning aspect of Christ’s death cannot be emulated.2 insofar as Christ is the savior and reconciler of the race, the follower cannot hope to resemble him. in spite of this caveat, as we shall see, Kierkegaard did use many aspects of Jesus’ crucifixion as paradigms for the Christian life of self-abnegation in service to god. we shall consider Kierkegaard’s use of the new testament passion narratives in relation to each of these three major themes of atonement for sin, manifestation of divine love, and paradigm for emulation. I. Sources of Kierkegaard’s Familiarity with the Crucifixion Narratives Kierkegaard owned and utilized a variety of exegetical and theological works on the new testament that included explicit expositions of the passion narratives. Karl gottlieb Bretschneider’s (1776–1848) Lexicon Manuale Graeco–Latinum in

1 2

SKS 26, 23-4, nB31:30 / JP 1, 83. SKS 21, 284–5, nB10:54 / JP 1, 693.

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libros novi Testamenti served as a primary lexicographic aid.3 expository works by wilhelm martin leberecht de wette (1780–1849) on luke and mark,4 and matthew,5 Friedrich lücke (1791–1855) on John,6 hermann olshausen (1796–1839) on all the gospels,7 and henrik nicolai Clausen (1793–1877) on the synoptic gospels,8 were owned by Kierkegaard. however, none of these seems to have exerted particular influence on his use of the crucifixion narratives. In general, Kierkegaard employed a straightforward narrative reading of the biblical texts that was relatively independent of any technical exegetic approach. his use of the biblical passages did not hinge upon the technical reconstruction of historical contexts, the nuances of the vocabulary in the original languages, or the analysis of manuscript transmission and possible sources behind the received texts. II. An Overview of Kierkegaard’s Use of the New Testament Crucifixion Narrative A. The New Testament and Christ’s Atonement for Sin when speaking of the atonement, Kierkegaard did employ a rather orthodox lutheran conceptuality and terminology. this traditional theological perspective informed the way that he employed scriptural motifs and passages concerning the crucifixion. Like lutheran orthodoxy, Kierkegaard most frequently associated Christ’s passion with the atonement, the overcoming of the guilt of human sinfulness that has rendered humanity liable to divine condemnation.9 in a journal entry of 1849 Kierkegaard insisted that Christ, as the atonement, makes restitution for sin, a process to which the believer contributes absolutely nothing.10 in The Sickness unto Death anti-Climacus remarked that Christianity “by means of the atonement wants to eliminate sin as completely as if it were drowned in the sea.”11 this atoning work was concentrated in Christ’s destined suffering and death on the cross, although the sacrificial pattern of Christ’s entire life was an anticipation of this passion.12 Kierkegaard recommended “the comfort of his (Christ’s) death as the atonement,” observing that although Karl gottlieb Bretschneider, Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros novi Testamenti, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., leipzig: J. Barth 1829 (ASKB 73–74). 4 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836 (ASKB 108). 5 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 109). 6 Friedrich lücke, Commentar über die Briefe des Evangelisten Johannes, 2nd ed., Bonn: eduard weber 1836, vol. 3 [vol. 1, 1820; vol. 2, 1834] (ASKB 110). 7 hermann olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–44 (ASKB 96–100). 8 henrik nicolai Clausen, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850 (ASKB 106–107). 9 see david r. law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, oxford: Clarendon press 1993, p. 203. 10 SKS 22, 368, nB14:42 / JP 1, 983. 11 SKS 11, 214 / SUD, 100. 12 SKS 12, 172–5 / PC, 168–71. 3

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Christ’s life was also a bearing of the sins of the world, it was his death that “changes everything.”13 in journal entries of 1849 and 1852 concerning the hostile crowd’s taunt that Christ on the cross should save himself (matthew 27: 40–42), Kierkegaard insisted Christ saves others precisely by refusing to come down from the cross.14 As Anti-Climacus’ significant invocation in the opening of Practice in Christianity observes, the purpose of Christ’s life was to come to earth to seek the lost, and to suffer and die.15 Kierkegaard tended to describe the atonement accomplished through the crucifixion using the terminology of “satisfaction” and “sacrifice” rather than the language of “penal substitution” more typical of the reformed heritage.16 Christ is the Atoner who has made satisfaction sufficient for the entire race by his suffering and death.17 the language is ultimately rooted in the work of anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), who argued that Christ vicariously satisfied God’s honor and justice.18 in a journal entry of 1851, Kierkegaard complimented anselm for insisting that god’s honor does indeed require that satisfaction must be made for sin.19 in another entry from the same year, Kierkegaard defended anselm for arguing that god could not be lenient without satisfaction for sin, because god must apply the standard of righteousness.20 the tension between god’s righteousness and god’s desire for reconciliation is almost “the divine combat of divine passion with itself,” a combat that plays itself out in the satisfaction of god’s honor by Christ. 21 to support this rather anselmic understanding of the atonement as satisfaction for sin, Kierkegaard often alluded to the general contours of the passion narrative in the Four Gospels rather than to specific passages. For example, in “Does a human Being have the right to let himself Be put to death for the truth?” the pseudonymous author insists that “my soul rests entirely in faith” concerning the doctrine concerning Jesus’ death and sacrifice, but mentions no particular biblical passages to support these teachings.22 similarly, in making the subtle point that although Jesus willed to make an atoning death he was nevertheless not responsible for his own execution, Kierkegaard alluded to no biblical passage to support this claim, even though the details of the narrative could have substantiated his point.23 Similarly, in a rather lengthy reflection in Works of Love on the paradoxical fact that Christ’s love exhibited on the cross seemed like a cruel abandonment of the disciples to disillusionment, Kierkegaard appealed to no particular biblical passages.24 SKS 12, 272–3 / WA, 158–9. SKS 22, 275–6, nB13:6 / JP 1, 345. SKS 24, 501–2, nB25:85 / JP 1, 360. 15 SKS 12, 18 / PC, 10. 16 SKS 24, 302–3, nB23:205 / JP 1, 532. 17 SKS 23, 104, nB16:15 / JP 4, 4038. SKS 22, 166, nB12:46 / JP 1, 342. SKS 11, 259 / WA, 123. SKS 12, 272–3 / WA, 158–60. SV1 Xii, 423 / JFY, 147. SKS 9, 116 / WL, 112. 18 see david gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1996, p. 147. 19 SKS 24, 302, nB23:204 / JP 2, 1423. 20 SKS 24, 302–3, nB23:205 / JP 1, 532. 21 ibid. 22 SKS 11, 64 / WA, 58. 23 SKS 20, 203–4, nB2:157 / JP 5, 6050. 24 SKS 9, 114–17 / WL, 108–12. 13 14

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Often, however, in elaborating the theme of sacrificial atonement Kierkegaard did more than allude to the basic event of the crucifixion and did indeed refer to particular new testament passages. For example, in “does a human Being have a right to let himself Be put to death for the truth?” the report in luke 23:34 that Jesus on the cross prayed for his enemies is cited to demonstrate that Jesus was willing to bear his enemies’ cause, thereby warranting the title “the Sacrifice.”25 in Works of Love the contention that the atonement, contrary to human conceptions of love, involves a sacrificial death is based on the story of Peter’s objection to Jesus’ passion prediction in matthew 16:23.26 in “discourses at the Communion on Fridays” the episode of Jesus’ thirst on the cross in John 19:28 is cited to support the claim that the sorrowing savior will take away the individual’s real sorrow, the consciousness of sin.27 Kierkegaard employed another set of biblical allusions to support the closely related theme that this sacrifice of Christ for our sins must be passionately appropriated by the individual. Kierkegaard frequently reiterated the point that the doctrine of the atonement cannot be considered in the mood of detached objectivity or quiet contemplation but can only be appropriated through the transformation of the individual’s subjectivity. according to Kierkegaard, the individual must become contemporaneous with the crucifixion and feel the atonement’s simultaneous attraction and offensiveness. Climacus cites Jesus’ cry “It is finished” in John 19:30 to insist that the immediate contemporary’s quest for more empirical evidence to validate claims about Christ is terminated, just as it must be for later followers.28 Both the contemporary and the later follower must respond with passionate commitment. Similarly, Climacus argues that the effort to consider the crucifixion objectively is entirely inappropriate because even inanimate objects like the curtain of the temple, which was torn, and dead bodies, which came out of their graves, were not permitted to remain detached (matthew 27:51–2).29 perhaps Kierkegaard’s most elaborate exploration of the subjective response to the crucifixion as atoning sacrifice is found in his story of the child who is shown a picture of the crucified Jesus after having viewed illustrations of victorious heroes.30 Having identified Christ’s passion with his destiny as the “sacrifice” earlier in the essay, Kierkegaard concludes that this generation cannot get rid of the picture of the crucified one any more than the Jews could get rid of pilate’s inscription “King of the Jews” mentioned in luke 23:38.31 The picture of the abased and crucified one, when viewed as if for the first time, is intended to move the individual just as it did the apostles who “wanted to know nothing except Christ alone and him crucified” (1 Corinthians 2:2).32

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

SKS 11, 93 / WA, 88. SKS 9, 116 / WL, 110. SKS 10, 283 / CD, 266. SKS 4, 303 / PF, 106. SKS 7, 254 / CUP1, 279. SKS 12, 177–80 / PC, 174–9. SKS 12, 178 / PC, 175. SKS 12, 180 / PC, 178.

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When treating Christ’s passion as a sacrifice or satisfaction for sin, Kierkegaard usually identified the appropriate subjective response with the recognition of the horror of personal and corporate guilt. in a journal entry of 1847 he remarked that the guilt of the world is made known through the crucifixion.33 in a journal entry from the following year Kierkegaard observed that only an individual in despair over sin can understand the atonement by feeling the need for it.34 throughout “does a human Being have the right to let himself Be put to death for the truth?” the author highlights the theme that the demonstration of the world’s evil was the purpose of the crucifixion, and indirectly encourages the reader to experience that guilt.35 in Christian Discourses the story of the crucifixion functions as part of Kierkegaard’s cultivation of the disposition to attend worship in order to repent rather than to be relieved of earthly suffering.36 according to Kierkegaard, when one enters the house of the lord one will encounter the horror that the human race rebelled against god, seized God, and crucified God, an atrocity so appalling that it trivializes every other form of human woe. the passion should not be regarded as a past event, but as a contemporary occurrence at which the author and the reader are present, accomplices in guilt. this same theme recurs in the “discourses at the Communion on Fridays,” in which Kierkegaard insists that the entire race crucified Jesus, and that therefore all human beings are accomplices.37 No person should regard Jesus’ crucifixion as a past event; we should each imagine ourselves as being present in the crowd in order to appreciate the extent of our culpability. Sometimes Kierkegaard did quote specific biblical passages when using the crucifixion story to encourage guilt. Kierkegaard cited Pilate’s words “See what a man” (John 19:5) as an invitation to visualize the horror of Jesus’ suffering and crucifixion in order to exacerbate the reader’s sense of responsibility and guilt.38 the same passage is used in “discourses at the Communion on Fridays” in the author’s confession that he would have been in the crowd that crucified Jesus. 39 in For SelfExamination the story of pilate’s ritualistic washing of his hands is employed to show that allegedly cultured people, paragons of civic virtue, are also responsible for Jesus’ execution, just as much as the vulgar crowd that shouted “Crucify him!”40 Kierkegaard often utilized Luke’s account of the crucifixion to clarify and exacerbate humanity’s guilt. in “discourses at the Communion on Fridays” Kierkegaard expatiated on Luke’s narration of how Jesus, although crucified as a criminal, nevertheless forgave his enemies and prayed for those who executed him (luke 22:52, 23:32–4).41 the contrast of Jesus’ compassionate behavior and humanity’s hateful response demonstrates that our worldly value system must reject Jesus’ demonstration of self-sacrificial love as a criminal act. According to worldly 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

SKS 20, 123, nB:212 / JP 1, 460. SKS 21, 119, nB7:82 / JP 4, 4016. SKS 11, 61–93 / WA, 55–89; see also SKS 20, 155–6, nB2:37 / JP 1, 305. SKS 10, 184–6 / CD, 172–4. SKS 10, 299 / CD, 278. SKS 10, 186 / CD, 174. SKS 10, 272 / CD, 259. SKS 13, 86 / FSE, 64. SKS 10, 297 / CD, 277.

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prudential standards, Jesus’ self-giving on the cross was an offensive regression rather than a spiritual progression. later in the same discourse Kierkegaard again alluded to the passage to make it clear that by killing Jesus humanity cannot ignore the damning fact that it has rejected love.42 in these communion discourses Kierkegaard also referred to the lukan account of the repentant thief on the cross who accepted his own guilt and testified to the innocence of Jesus (Luke 23:39–43).43 Kierkegaard confessed that if he had been at the crucifixion, unlike the repentant thief on the cross, he would not have been converted, but would have been intimidated by the crowd and participated in the mockery. elsewhere Kierkegaard appealed to luke 23:35 in which the religious leaders ridiculed the crucified Jesus by jeering “He has helped others” in order to expose the incriminating fact that such scoffing is the typical human response to god’s love.44 Besides employing the crucifixion story to foster the self-ascription of guilt, Kierkegaard also used these passages to encourage various forms of joy and relief, attempting to catalyze a positive appropriation of the atoning work of Christ. in these contexts he showed a preference for the story of Jesus’ brief dialogue with the thief on the cross in luke. in an upbuilding discourse Kierkegaard prominently quoted the thief’s words from luke 23:41, “we are receiving what our deeds have deserved, but his one (Jesus) has done nothing wrong,” in order to foster the very paradoxical joy over the fact we humans, unlike Jesus on the cross, always suffer as guilty.45 the devastating spiritual horror of doubting god’s love is illustrated by pointing to Jesus’ cry “my god, my god, why have you abandoned me?” (matthew 27:46; mark 15:34)46 the extremity of Jesus’ anguish was rooted in the fact that he knew that he was absolutely innocent and did not deserve to be so grievously afflicted. the rest of us humans, like the repentant robber, can console ourselves with the recognition that we are indeed guilty and do merit such punishment. at least the thief on the cross, like the rest of us sinners, was presented with a task, the arduous business of repentance; Christ, however, did not have that task to give his suffering meaning. Consequently, we sinners cannot legitimately doubt the justice of god, a doubt that would so undermine all confidence in God’s goodness that it would be more horrible than undergoing the most rigorous deserved punishment. the thief’s anguished observation points to the good tidings that god is not in the wrong in allowing humanity to suffer woes.47 a different type of joy, the joy of repentance, is suggested by Jesus’ declaration to the penitent thief, “today you will be with me in paradise” (luke 23:43).48 similarly, the same passage is cited in “discourses at the Communion on Fridays” in order to celebrate the availability of grace and awaken a sincere desire to accept it.49 in The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

SKS 10, 300 / CD, 280. SKS 10, 273 / CD, 259–60. SKS 12, 66 / PC, 53. SKS 8, 363 / UD, 265. SKS 8, 368 / UD, 270. SKS 8, 376–7 / UD, 280–1. SKS 8, 364–71 / UD, 267–75. SKS 8, 362 / UD, 265. SKS 10, 287 / CD, 268.

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Air luke 23:43 is quoted to point to the possibility of a felicitous transition from anxiety-ridden time to the joyful eternity of ascribing all power and glory to god.50 in For Self-Examination the same passage is used to heighten the jubilant realization that we, like the thief on the cross, are saved by grace, and not by any meritorious actions.51 of course, instead of eliciting joy and relief, the theme of Jesus’ atonement for sin could also trigger the opposite response of being offended. the ambiguity of the passion story, with its simultaneous attractive and repellant qualities, makes a free response of either faith or offense possible.52 alluding to luke 23:39–43 in a journal entry of 1838 Kierkegaard observes, “Christ walks in history as he walked in his life (his earthly life)—between two robbers: one of whom hardens his heart, the other repents.”53 The bitter animosity that resulted in the crucifixion was provoked by Christ’s maximal claims about himself and his significance.54 when explicating the crucifixion narratives, Kierkegaard often insisted that the spectacle of the crucifixion of the epitome of love so profoundly undermines any positive assessment of humanity’s spiritual capabilities that it could easily provoke the rejection of the theological import of the story. the murder of the most innocent human being, or, more strongly, the murder of god, repels any individual who cherishes a concept of the fundamental goodness of human nature.55 once the individual begins to suspect that Christ’s crucifixion was not accidental, but was the inevitable consequence of the evil in the world, the natural human response is to recoil and deny this shocking revelation.56 the stark exposure of the depths of the individual’s and the world’s hatefulness may be more than an individual will chose to tolerate. the realization that the person who claims to be god is a suffering and rejected criminal awakens the unsettling thought that god’s values may not be the world’s values, and this suspicion causes offense.57 to make this point most thoroughly, anti-Climacus appeals to the story of peter’s denial of Christ right before the passion itself (matthew 26:31, 33; mark 14:27, 29).58 B. The New Testament and the Cross as the Manifestation of God’s Love In Kierkegaard’s pages the crucifixion narratives often function in ways that have little to do with the sacrificial view of the atonement or the subjective appropriation of that doctrine. Kierkegaard also uses the crucifixion stories to demonstrate the intensity of god’s love, in a manner more reminiscent of peter abelard (1079–1142) than of anselm. Because it is god who suffers in Christ, Christ’s sufferings manifest the extreme depths to which god was willing to go in order to love humanity. this 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

SKS 11, 48 / WA, 44. SKS 13, 44 / FSE, 15. SKS 20, 115, nB:193 / JP 1, 304. SKS 18, 97, FF:111 / KJN 2, 89. SKS 24, 495, nB25:79 / JP 1, 358. SV1 Xii, 445–50 / JFY, 174–80. SKS 20, 155–6, nB2:37 / JP 1, 305. SKS 12, 111–27 / PC, 102–1. SKS 12, 112 / PC, 103.

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demonstration of divine love, if appreciated properly, possesses the power to awaken responsive love in the individual’s heart. salvation is more a matter of cherishing the magnitude of this love than a matter of trusting in the forgiveness of sin. For example, in Practice in Christianity’s story of the child who is shown a picture of the crucifixion, Anti-Climacus writes, “Tell the child that he (the crucified man) was love, that he came to the world out of love, took upon himself the form of a lowly servant, lived for only one thing—to love and to help people.…”59 Citing luke 23:34, anti-Climacus proceeds to show how Christ’s demonstration of love led to his crucifixion, which itself could not destroy his resolution to manifest love to his enemies. similarly, in Works of Love Kierkegaard explains that the demonstration of Christ’s radical love for humanity would inevitably bring him into conflict with the world and eventuate in his crucifixion, a destiny that he accepted out of love.60 in For Self-Examination Kierkegaard alludes to the crowd’s shout of “Crucify!” (mark 15:13–14) to show that Christ loved humanity and willed the incarnation along with its attendant sufferings in spite of his knowledge that humanity would crucify him.61 Christ knew that the supreme act of love, the incarnation, would put him on the cross (John 11:46–53).62 sometimes Kierkegaard went so far as to identify love’s suffering as the ultimate purpose of the incarnation. For example, Climacus argues that Christ came into the world in order to suffer; the suffering is intrinsic to the fact god entered time as a human individual.63 Christ can function as the absolute comforter because he suffered in a way no one else can (matthew 27:28).64 in these sections of Kierkegaard’s corpus the passion story is treated primarily as the narrative of self-abasing love. According to Kierkegaard, in Christ’s crucifixion God is shown to be the suffering god who loves individuals unto death. god in Christ freely chose the suffering and death that inevitably resulted from loving a murderously resistant humanity. By using new testament passages to identify Jesus’ passion as the suffering of god, Kierkegaard was implicitly adopting luther’s doctrine that the attributes of the divine and human natures in Christ were so thoroughly communicated to each other that the suffering associated with the human nature could be ascribed to the divine nature.65 in dealing with these passages, Kierkegaard also followed lutheran theology in emphasizing the divine nature’s “state of humiliation,” the self-emptying of the divine nature expressed by the term “kenosis.” this becomes particularly clear in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits in which Kierkegaard remarks that Jesus had to deny himself and conceal his divine power until after his death when “nature” revealed his divine identity through the tearing of the temple curtain and the opening of the graves (matthew 27:51–4). 66 SKS 12, 178 / PC, 176. SKS 9, 114–16 / WL, 110–11. 61 SKS 13, 83 / FSE, 60. 62 ibid. 63 SKS 7, 541–4 / CUP1, 596–9. 64 SKS 10, 283 / CD, 266. 65 see tim rose, Kierkegaard’s Christocentric Theology, aldershot: ashgate 2001, pp. 107–17. 66 SKS 8, 326 / UD, 224–5. 59 60

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this theme of the god’s self-emptying that culminates on the cross informs Kierkegaard’s use of many particular new testament passages. in Practice in Christianity “the sign of contradiction” mentioned in luke 2:34–35 (a passage that was interpreted as a prediction of Jesus’ crucifixion) is regarded not only as the fact that god became human, but also that god became a lowly, suffering human.67 similarly, in Judge for Yourself! Christ’s divine glory is manifested only in debasement, including the suffering of the cross.68 the basic text that informs Practice in Christianity, no. iii, “and i, when i am lifted up from the earth, will draw all to myself” (John 12:32), is used to suggest that Christ’s elevation was only accomplished through a descent into lowliness, including being “scorned, despised, mocked, and spat upon” (matthew 27:28–31; mark 15:18–20).69 in this section Christ’s exaltation is the obverse of his abasement, the “continual mistreatment that finally ends in death.”70 Christ’s refusal of worldly power and his willingness to suffer and die are the hidden potency of his love. Kierkegaard often accentuated the abasement and suffering love of Christ by citing Christ’s cry of dereliction, “my god, my god, why have you forsaken me?” (matthew 27:46; mark 15:34).71 in “discourses at the Communion on Fridays” the passage demonstrates that the one who requires that we undergo the suffering of repentance has experienced the ultimate human sorrow of experiencing abandonment by god.72 in alluding to this passage in Practice in Christianity, anti-Climacus associates Christ’s feeling of abandonment with the fact that he was bound by the incognito that he had assumed in order to remain unrecognizable to eyes blinded by worldly values.73 Similarly, Christ’s cry of dereliction figures in For Self-Examination to accentuate the extremity of his superhuman sufferings that contradict all human expectations of what it is to be one with god the Father.74 in Judge for Yourself! the cry reveals that Jesus was overwhelmed by the despairing recognition that the world does not want to serve one master (god).75 Kierkegaard often used New Testament passages concerning the crucifixion to contrast human conceptions of divine power and the counter-intuitive reality of god’s agency exercised through abasement. in the discourse “the high priest” this juxtaposition is evident in Kierkegaard’s exposition of the story of the disciples’ reluctance to sit at his right or left hand when they realized that his ascent to a throne was really his elevation on the cross.76 the story of Christ’s being robed in purple by the tormenting soldiers (matthew 27:28) is mentioned to further underscore the contrast between humanity’s contempt for Christ’s lowliness and the fact that this 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76

SKS 12, 130–7 / PC, 124–33. SV1 Xii, 434 / JFY, 161. SKS 12, 177 / PC, 163. SKS 12, 172 / PC, 168. SKS 4, 454 / CA, 155. SKS 10, 283 / CD, 266. SKS 12, 137 / PC, 132. SKS 13, 86 / FSE, 64. SV1 Xii, 448 / JFY, 178. SKS 11, 254 / WA, 118.

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lowliness is the true form of Christ’s glorification.77 similarly, in “discourses at the Communion on Fridays” the fact that the adulation of the crowd turned to ridicule culminating in the mockery of the royal purple robe (matthew 27:28) indicates that Christ’s true identity is manifested in humiliation; it is this humiliation that should be pictured rather than Christ’s unadulterated glory.78 the disjunction between Christ’s abasement and “what the human mentality naturally thinks and covets” is underscored by the fact that he was crucified as a criminal (Matthew 26:55; Luke 22:52. 23:32–3); Christ’s life-long, progressive abasement was completed in the unthinkable horror of the crucifixion.79 the manifestation of divine love on the cross, willing to abase itself and suffer superhumanly, should transform the individual’s heart and awaken spiritually salubrious passions and dispositions. after mentioning Christ’s willingness to sacrifice his life, Anti-Climacus asks, “Is this sight not able to move you?”80 antiClimacus proceeds to illustrate the transformative power of the crucifixion story in his tale of the boy who discovered a picture of the crucifixion, bearing the title “King of the Jews,” mixed in with pictures of ordinary heroes (matthew 27:37; mark 15:26; luke 23:38; John 19:19).81 after being told that the executed criminal in the picture was the savior of the world and the most loving man who ever lived, the child, as he matured, would experience a succession of emotions all catalyzed by attraction to the crucified one. Quoting 1 Corinthians 2:2, Anti-Climacus concludes, “This is how it (the picture of crucified love) moved the apostles, who knew nothing and wanted to know nothing but Christ and him crucified—can it not so move you also?”82 the reader, like the child, should be profoundly stirred by the depiction of the final abasement of Christ. this pattern of abasement revealed in the cross, like the exposure of guilt, also leads to the possibility of offense. Just as Jesus’ contemporaries were appalled at the prospect of suffering love, so also the love revealed on the cross can still provoke the hostility that generated the crucifixion. The story exposes the extreme costliness of love. it was precisely because Christ loved the world, and showed what true love involves, that Christ elicited the world’s hostility. the execution of the epitome of love reveals that anyone who risks everything for the good will be persecuted.83 anti-Climacus stresses the possibility of offense when the “double danger” becomes evident that the life of love leads not only to inner suffering, but also to getting crucified by the world.84 similarly, in For Self-Examination the crucifixion of Jesus triggers the discovery that love is hated by the world, and that anyone who follows Christ must accept the enmity of this unloving humanity.85 By flagrantly SKS 8, 277 / UD, 224. SKS 10, 297 / CD, 276. 79 SKS 10, 297 / CD, 277. 80 SKS 12, 174 / PC, 171. 81 SKS 12, 177–80 / PC, 174–8. 82 SKS 12, 180 / PC, 178. 83 see arnold Come, Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self, montreal: mcgill-Queen’s university press 1997, pp. 289–91. 84 SKS 12, 114–27 / PC, 105–21. 85 SKS 13, 105-6 / FSE, 84–5. 77 78

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contradicting worldly expectations, Jesus incited the murderous hostility of the crowd that intimidated even his well-wishers into compliance with the crucifixion, so that only the most feebly commiserating words were spoken (John 19:5).86 Jesus was sacrificed precisely because humanity wanted a triumphant, worldly king (Matthew 27:11; mark 15:2; John 18:33–7), and recoiled from the prospect of serving one master, the god of suffering love.87 Those who crucified Jesus were motivated by outrage at his failure to be the mighty political messiah, the “expected one,” who would fulfill worldly dreams of glory.88 Jesus, however, made the truth about love manifest in the most radical way, by refusing to exercise royal force and appearing to be god-forsaken (mark 15:34).89 the crowd’s disappointment in not having a king who could guarantee worldly felicity was sarcastically recognized in pilate’s inscription, “the King of the Jews,” whose evident powerlessness was contrary to ordinary human expectations concerning political success (John 19:19–22).90 the crowd’s shouts of “Crucify, crucify!” were fuelled by its inability to discern the exaltation in the debasement (mark 15:13).91 the crowd could not comprehend Christ’s unwillingness to call down legions of angels (matthew 26:53),92 or appreciate his prayer for his enemies (luke 23:34).93 By crucifying Jesus, the multitude was enacting its offense at the truth that love does not seize coercive power over others. similarly, in “a person must will the good in truth,” Christ’s refusal to save himself was perceived by his contemporaries as an example of his foolish squandering of political opportunities (matthew 27:41).94 in the same essay Kierkegaard observes that when Jesus said “It is finished,” the shallow crowd concluded that he had accomplished nothing of significance (John 19:30).95 according to the world Jesus had lost everything, but according to eternity he had won everything. the same point is made in Judge for Yourself!, in which Christ’s cry “It is finished!” (John 19:30) is again used to accentuate the disjunction between worldly and godly definitions of accomplishment.96 Christ’s final words “Father, into your hands I commend my spirit” (luke 23:46) are then quoted to further underscore the difference between genuinely serving god and serving ordinary worldly values.97 throughout Practice in Christianity anti-Climacus quotes pilate’s pitying and ironic reference to the scourged Christ awaiting crucifixion, “See what a man” (John 19:5), to highlight the potentially offensive contrast between Christ’s lowliness and seeming powerlessness and human conceptions of power and love.98 elsewhere the 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

SKS 10, 272 / CD, 259. SV1 Xii, 447–8 / JFY, 176–8. SKS 11, 66–8 / WA, 60–2. SKS 11, 67 / WA, 61. SKS 11, 68 / WA, 62. SKS 11, 69 / WA, 63. SKS 11, 70 / WA, 65. SKS 11, 92 / WA, 88. SVS 8, 197 / UD, 91. SKS 8, 197 / UD, 92. SV1 Xii, 448 / JFY, 178. ibid. SKS 12, 173 / PC, 170.

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same words of pilate are used to underscore the paradoxical fact that it is the abased prisoner who seems helpless that is the only one who can truly help humanity.99 The same passage from John’s crucifixion story is used to warn the reader to resist being offended by the spectacle of god’s lowliness.100 moreover, pilate’s remark draws attention to the fact that the claim that god has become a lowly, powerless human individual is even more offensive than the general claim that god has become human.101 pilate’s words are also employed to illustrate how Christ’s lowliness stands in sharpest contrast to human definitions of truth.102 the possibility of offense at this manifestation of suffering love led Kierkegaard to stress yet another aspect of Christ’s anguish on the cross. in Practice in Christianity anti-Climacus describes Christ’s inner grief caused by his awareness that his indirect way of expressing love through the suffering of the cross might well be a stumbling block and an offense to many. this inner turmoil is something very different from the outer suffering of being mocked and crucified, and much more distressing.103 Consequently, Christ was internally crucified by his realization that his actions and passion were being misunderstood by the various crowds who shouted “see, what a man!”104 similarly, in “the gospel of sufferings,” Christ suffers from pilate’s derisive remark “see, what a man” because he recognized that he had inspired in many nothing more than misunderstanding, rage, and at best pity (John 19:5).105 anti-Climacus also cites the cry of dereliction (matthew 27:46) to reveal the extent to which Christ had bound himself to the incognito of unrecognizablity and thereby accepted the inevitability that he would be “the sign of contradiction” that discloses the thoughts of the heart (luke 2:34–5).106 in Philosophical Fragments Climacus also describes the anguish of the god who assumed the form of a servant, all the while recognizing the likelihood of being misunderstood by the beloved, and characterizes this anguish as more sour than vinegar, a reference to the sponge offered to Jesus on the cross (matthew 27:48)107 the reference to the drink of vinegar (matthew 27:48) recurs in “the gospel of sufferings,” where it once again highlights the agony of being an affliction and a curse to those whom he tried to love.108 C. The New Testament and Christ’s Passion as a Prototype A third set of references to the story of the crucifixion occurs in contexts in which Kierkegaard was presenting Christ not as the savior but as the prototype for the Christian life.109 particularly in Practice in Christianity, the abased Christ is 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

SKS 12, 52 / PC, 39. SKS 12, 89 / PC, 76. SKS 12, 111 / PC, 102–3. SKS 12, 201 / PC, 204. SKS 12, 140–2 / PC, 136–9. SKS 12, 173 / PC, 170. SKS 8, 353 / UD, 254–5. SKS 12, 136 / PC, 132. SKS 4, 240 / PF, 34. SKS 8, 353 / UD, 254. SKS 12, 115 / PC, 106. SKS 12, 123 / PC, 116.

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presented as the pattern for the Christian life, a pattern that includes the readiness to undergo the suffering exhibited on the cross, including being mocked, insulted, and executed as a criminal by an offended society. it is the suffering and humiliation of Christ that followers are to imitate, not his atoning work. in Practice in Christianity, again quoting pilate’s words “see what a man” (John 19:5), anti-Climacus contrasts this proper attitude of engaged imitation of the crucified one with the inappropriate attitude of detached contemplation. the Christian should not stand near the cross in order to make observations, but rather “in the situation of contemporaneity” should be nailed to the cross with Christ.110 looking up at the foot of the cross should inspire the believer “to want to suffer at least in some way akin to his sufferings.”111 antiClimacus adds that Christ’s life was an examination in obedience, a test, to serve as the paradigm for the lives of all of us. his voluntary acceptance of death on the cross was the culmination of this obedience that involved the willingness to suffer. Christ’s saying on the cross “It is finished” (John 19:30) signaled that his completed life is now the prototype to guide his followers.112 other writings echo this theme of imitation of the crucifixion. Such suffering is not an accidental accretion to the Christian life, but a necessary mark of it. in For Self-Examination Kierkegaard insists that only by imitating the “narrow way” of Christ’s passion will our lives lead to the ascension, a path that for “blood witnesses” may even involve an approximation of Christ’s sense of dereliction (mark 15:34).113 in Judge for Yourself! the following of Christ the prototype involves the realization that only the cross of humiliation, and not the star of glorification, is to be worn by us in this life (Luke 14:27).114 similarly, in “the gospel of sufferings,” to follow Christ means to take up one’s cross and carry it in obedience unto death (matthew 16:24; luke 14:27; philippians 2:5).115 as with the prototype, so it must be with the imitator. in “does a human Being have the right to let himself be put to death for the truth?” the pseudonymous author explores the example of a child who sees a picture of the crucified Christ and “was driven by an inexplicable power to want to resemble him insofar as a human being can resemble him.”116 the desire to imitate Christ and seek death for the truth then triggers a tortuous reflection on the dangers of making one’s executioners guilty of the martyr’s murder, a reflection that is saturated with the yearning to be sacrificed for the truth, as Christ was.117 of course this imitation of Christ’s passion does not mean that the follower of Christ must literally get crucified or somehow physically martyred. Kierkegaard remarks that “the imitator [Efterfølger], even if he does not die on the cross, nevertheless resembles the prototype in dying ‘with the cross on.’ ”118 in this context imitating the crucified one involves letting go of immediate attachments and worldly aspirations. 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118

SKS 12, 174 / PC, 171. ibid. SKS 12, 183–4 / PC, 183–4. SKS 13, 86-7 / FSE, 64–5. SV1 Xii, 434 / JFY, 161. SKS 8, 323–5 / UD, 221–3. SKS 11, 62 / WA, 59. SKS 11, 74 / WA, 72. SKS 8, 323 / UD, 221.

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the magnitude of what is actually given up does not essentially matter; the critical thing is the underlying disposition to renounce whatever may be necessary. moreover, anyone willing to walk Christ’s road must be willing to be forsaken and mocked. Consequently, the imitation of the Christ’s passion is a continuing way of life, not just an occasional episode.119 in Practice in Christianity the way of the cross is a life of self-denial, including the willingness to be despised and persecuted by society.120 in order to be with Christ in his loftiness, we must join him in the abasement of being spat upon and ridiculed (matthew 27:30).121 this imitation of the passion, even in a non-literal sense, is different from a “temporal cross,” a natural defect or tragedy that might afflict an individual.122 in Judge for Yourself! the effort to follow the example of the crucified Christ in serving only one master will involve the suffering that eventuates from foregoing earthly rewards (mattthew 6:24).123 in the same text Kierkegaard recounts the story of the crucifixion, generously alluding to biblical passages (matthew 27:11, 46; mark 15:2, 34, luke 23:46; John 18:33–7), concluding that the appropriate imitation is voluntarily to “suffer for the doctrine.”124 in “the gospel of sufferings” Kierkegaard cites luke 23:34, Christ’s words of forgiveness to those who crucified him, to show that the imitation of Christ’s meekness involves the perpetual willingness to forgive meekly and lightly.125 in addition to letting go of immediacy in general, the imitation of Christ involves the acceptance of hostility and persecution in order to love the enemy. moreover, to imitate the suffering Christ the believer must be willing to surrender encumbering preferential relations (luke 14:26).126 in Christian Discourses this willingness to sacrifice preferential loves and even risk being completely misunderstood is likened to being crucified or nailed to the stipulation that one must love Christ (matthew 10:37, 22:37; mark 12:30).127 all of these forms of imitation of Christ’s passion are seen as necessary components of the Christian’s education for eternity, because love, the hallmark of eternity, involves suffering. D. The Crucifixion Narrative as a Source for Rhetorical Flourishes Occasionally Kierkegaard could borrow an expression from the crucifixion stories and use it in ways that had little to do with the stories themselves or the doctrine of the atonement. he employed a phrase from the passion narratives, “they know not what they do” (luke 23:34), in order to make polemical points that were often only tangentially related to the passion of Christ. For example, he observes that philosophers, by refusing to start with faith, know not what they do.128 similarly, 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128

SKS 8, 323–6 / UD, 221–5. SKS 12, 115–27 / PC, 106–20. SKS 12, 158 / PC, 154. SKS 11, 185 / SUD, 70–1. SV1 Xii, 448–9 / JFY, 178–9. SV1 Xii, 447–9 / JFY, 176–8. SV1, 469–75 / JFY, 201–9. SKS 8, 344 / UD, 244. SKS 8, 325 / UD, 223. SKS 10, 194–5 / CD, 183–5. SKS 11, 64 / WA, 58.

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orthodox apologists for Christianity in trying to make Christianity probable know not what they do.129 moreover, according to Climacus, all religious enthusiasts who want an immediate transition into Christianity are deceivers and know not what they do.130 most ominously, in the present age individuals know not what they are doing in regard to the leveling of all human distinctiveness.131 in all of these instances, the somber echoes of the passion narrative added rhetorical gravity to Kierkegaard’s polemical barbs.

129 130 131

Pap. vii–2 B 235, 77 / BA, 39. SKS 7, 55 / CUP1, 49. SKS 8, 83 / TA, 86.

Bibliography I. Works in the the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Crucifixion Bretschneider, Karl gottlieb, Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros novi Testamenti, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., leipzig: J. Barth 1829, vol. 2, pp. 432–4 (ASKB 73–74). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 761–97 (ASKB 106–107). lücke, Friedrich, Commentar über die Briefe des Evangelisten Johannes, 2nd ed., Bonn: eduard weber 1836, vol. 3, pp. 109–207 [vol. 1, 1820; vol. 2, 1834] (ASKB 110). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–44, vol. 2, pp. 165–84 (ASKB 96–100). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 184–200 (ASKB 108). —— Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838, pp. 235–61 (ASKB 109). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of the Crucifixion Barrett, lee C., “the Joy in the Cross: Kierkegaard’s appropriation of lutheran Christology in ‘the gospel of sufferings,’ ” Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 257–85. deuser, hermann, Sören Kierkegaard. Die paradoxe Dialektik des politischen Christen, munich: Kaiser 1974, pp. 216–19. Fishburn, Janet, “søren Kierkegaard: exegete,” Interpretation, vol. 39, 1985, pp. 229–45. gouwens, david, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1996, pp. 146–7. guillamore hansen, p., Søren Kierkegaard og Bibelen, Copenhagen: p. haase 1924, pp. 182–295. hinkson, Craig, “luther and Kierkegaard: theologians of the Cross,” International Journal of Systematic Theology, vol. 3, 2001, pp. 27–45. hirsch, emanuel, Kierkegaard-Studien, vols. 1–3, new ed. by hans martin müller, waltrop: spenner 2006 (vols. 11–13 in emanuel hirsch, Gesammelte Werke,

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vols. 1–48, ed. by hans martin müller, waltrop: spenner 1998ff.), vol. 2, pp. 433–7; vol. 3, pp. 71ff. law, david, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, oxford: oxford university press, 1993, pp. 198–205. minear, paul and paul s. morimoto, Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, princeton, new Jersey: princeton theological seminary 1953, pp.1–17. pedersen, J., “Kierkegaard’s view of scripture,” in The Sources and Depths of Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie miklová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C. a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2) pp. 27–57. polk, timothy h., The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997, p. 35; p. 57; p. 98; p. 107. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman and holman 1994, p. 76; p. 95; pp. 133–5.

the resurrection: Kierkegaard’s use of the resurrection as symbol and as reality lee C. Barrett

the new testament passages that narrate Jesus’ resurrection or describe the general resurrection of human beings do not figure prominently in any overt way in Kierkegaard’s literature. the theme of resurrection receives much less attention than does the passion of Christ the savior, or the life and teachings of Christ the prototype. a cursory glance through Kierkegaard’s pages would suggest that good Friday dramatically upstages easter. Kierkegaard rarely cites the empty tomb narratives in matthew, mark, or luke, and mentions the resurrection story in John with only slightly more frequency. admittedly, Kierkegaard does occasionally allude to the gospel stories of the epiphanies of the resurrected Christ, but these references function more as illustrations or embellishments of somewhat unrelated points than as substantive themes in their own right. however, this relative lack of direct citation does not mean that the biblical accounts of Jesus’ resurrection were unimportant to Kierkegaard, or that he was uninterested in biblical teachings about the resurrection of individuals. Frequently Kierkegaard alludes to the resurrection of Christ and the resurrection of individuals without basing his remarks on any particular biblical passage; the stories are often tacitly presupposed by his arguments and literary ploys. as we shall see, resurrection is more important to Kierkegaard than it initially seems. the theme informs Kierkegaard’s works in several different ways, all of them vital to his purposes. in fact, Kierkegaard selectively borrows from at least two different strands of theological reflection on the resurrection, but avoids endorsing either one in order to develop the concept in his own unique way. his general aim to simultaneously upbuild and unsettle the reader accounts both for his reticence to expatiate about resurrection and his selective appropriation of reflection about resurrection. in order to appreciate the distinctiveness of Kierkegaard’s treatment of resurrection, his remarks must be situated in the context of eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury biblical and theological investigations of the resurrection of Jesus. Because the resurrection of Jesus had often served as the primary warrant for believing in the resurrection of all persons, the interest in the general issue of resurrection tended to focus more narrowly on the veracity of the biblical claims about the raising of Jesus.

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I. The Resurrection of Jesus in the Biblical Scholarship of Kierkegaard’s Era The historicity, nature, and significance of Jesus’ resurrection were hotly debated in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. several different interpretive trajectories emerged, all of which raised questions about the proper way to engage the relevant biblical texts. the issue of the accuracy of the new testament narratives had become particularly significant because theologians and biblical scholars influenced by the Enlightenment, hoping to defend Christianity against skepticism without falling back on sheer dogmatism, had cited the resurrection narratives as evidence for the truth of Christianity. if the accounts could be shown to be historically probable, then the likelihood that Jesus of nazareth had been raised would tend to corroborate the conviction that he was the incarnation of god or at least god’s supernatural messiah. For many, such as the influential scholar of Semitic languages Johann David Michaelis (1717–91) who had been influenced by Aufklärung philosopher Christian wolff (1679–1754), the plausibility of Christianity rested in large part on the demonstration of the accuracy of the resurrection stories in the new testament.1 as michaelis succinctly phrased this stance, “the resurrection of Christ is the cornerstone of Christianity.”2 the twin problems for these defenders of Christianity were that the discrepancies among the gospel accounts raised disturbing questions about their reliability, and the rampant supernaturalism that pervaded them was difficult to reconcile with Enlightenment sensibilities. one interpretive response to this quandary was to embrace the skeptical doubts and deny the historicity of the resurrection narratives entirely. thomas woolston (1669–1733), an english skeptic who was eventually charged with blasphemy, denied that any supernatural resurrection had occurred and claimed that the disciples had simply stolen the body of Jesus from the tomb.3 peter annet (1693–1769), another english deist, emphasized the glaring discrepancies among the four divergent gospel narratives, including disagreements about the number of angels, the identities of the women at the tomb, the role of mary magdalene, and the basic sequence of events.4 annet concluded that the truth of a religion cannot be based on such doubtful historical claims, but that the ethical value of Christianity can be directly intuited. annet also rejected miracles, and by implication the miracle of the resurrection, as being contrary to the laws of nature that had been inscribed in the universe by a supremely intelligent god.5 the maverick german thinker Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768), influenced by the English Deists, agreed that the contradictions in the gospel accounts discredited them, and concluded that Johann david michaelis, Erklärung der Begräbnis- und Auferstehungsgeschichte Christi nach den vier Evangelisten: Mit Rücksicht auf die in den Fragmenten gemachten Einwürfe und deren Beantwortung, halle: waisenhaus 1783, pp. iv–v. 2 ibid., pp. iv–v. 3 thomas woolston, A Sixth Discourse on the Miracles of our Saviour, london: Booksellers of westminster and london 1729, pp. 1–71. 4 peter annet, The Resurrection of Jesus Considered; In Answer to the Tryal of the Witnesses, By a Moral Philosopher, 2nd ed., london: published by the author 1744, p. 56. 5 ibid., pp. 94–6. 1

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faith could not be based on such dubious evidence.6 he proposed that it was most likely that Jesus had anticipated an earthly messianic kingdom, an expectation that had been sadly disappointed. in response to this colossal frustration of their hopes, Jesus’ disciples had stolen his corpse and invented the tale of the discovery of the empty tomb.7 later, the new testament scholar heinrich eberhard gottlob paulus (1761–1851) denied the historicity of the resurrection by developing an alternative theory that avoided ascribing such gross duplicity to the disciples: Jesus was not resurrected because he had not really died. rather, he had fallen into a profound trance, rendering him inert, from which he had been resuscitated.8 Another interpretive trajectory denied the allegedly foundational significance of the question of the resurrection stories’ historical reliability. gotthold ephraim lessing (1729–81) proposed that the resurrection did not justify the theological conclusions that were being drawn from it, for even seeing the resurrection personally would not have warranted the assertion that Jesus was the son of god, for resurrections could be accounted for without the hypothesis of divinity.9 also, the historical distance between the event and the contemporary individual made the desired degree of historical certainty impossible to attain. other thinkers agreed that the truth of Christianity is not based on calculations of the probability of Jesus’ resurrection. salomo semler (1725–91) argued that the acceptance of the truth of Christianity depends on an intuition of the moral profundity of Jesus’ message, and not on the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection.10 another hermeneutic strategy was to reinterpret the resurrection stories in such a way that the troubling implication of some sort of physical reanimation of Jesus was removed as unhistorical or irrelevant, or both. Johann gottfried herder (1744–1803) affirmed the historicity of some sort of resurrection, but regarded it as a spiritual transformation in which the human spirit of Jesus was absorbed into god.11 samuel reimarus, “Über die auferstehungsgeschichte,” in Fragmente des Wolfenbüttelschen Ungenannten, ed. by gotthold ephraim lessing, 4th ed., Berlin: sander 1835, pp. 360–410. 7 samuel reimarus, “von dem zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger,” in Fragmente des Wolfenbüttelschen Ungenannten, ed. by gotthold ephraim lessing, pp. 82–175. 8 heinrich eberhard gottlob paulus, Das Leben Jesu, als Grundlage einer reinen Geschichte des Urchristentums, vols. 1–4, heidelberg: C.F. winter 1828, vol. 2, p. 264. 9 gotthold ephraim lessing, “Über den Beweis des geistes und der Kraft,” in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s sämmtliche Schriften, vols. 1–32, vols. 1–28, Berlin: vossische Buchhandlung 1825–27; vols. 29–32 Berlin and stettin: nicolaische Buchhandlung 1828, vol. 5, pp. 80–4 (ASKB 1747–1762). 10 Johann salomo semler, Beantwortung der Fragmente eines Ungenannten, insbesondere vom Zweck Jesu und seiner Juenger, 2nd revised ed., halle: verlag des erziehungsinstituts 1780, p. 250. 11 Johann gottfried herder, Von Gottes Sohn, der Welt Heiland. Nach Johannes Evangelium, in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 17, pp. 116–26 (ASKB 1676– 1684); Johann gottfried herder, “von der auferstehung als glauben, geschichte, und lehre,” in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vol. 16, pp. 81–173. 6

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georg lorenz Bauer (1755–1806) interpreted the quite physicalistic teachings about resurrection ascribed to Jesus as an accommodation to the cultural sensibilities of the ancient world; Jesus really implied that humans will enjoy a spiritual immortality although his culture was not yet ready to comprehend that abstract notion.12 Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860) maintained that the question of the nature of the resurrection is beyond the historian’s competence. For Baur the critical thing in the new testament is not that Jesus was resurrected but that the disciples believed that he had been; the strength of their faith in the resurrection, rather than the resurrection itself, was the basis for their zeal. through belief in Jesus’ resurrection, the spirit of Jesus was able to transcend the particularities and cultural limitations of Judaism and acquired a universal significance; it became an indication of the universal fatherhood of god.13 in other words, Jesus was raised, not physically in an individual body, but spiritually in the faith of the early Christians. david Friedrich strauss (1808–74) regarded the resurrection narratives, rife with contradictions and supernatural phenomena, as the products of the myth-making process of the early church. through the medium of myth, complete with supernatural occurrences, the disciples expressed their understanding of Jesus. the historical Jesus himself did not predict his own crucifixion and resurrection, and the passion of Christ was not foretold in the old testament. the basic motifs of the easter story were the products of the early Christians’ imaginative construal of Jesus’ significance.14 Another strategy was to affirm some sort of physical resurrection while admitting the impossibility of reconstructing the exact nature of the event. Friedrich schleiermacher (1768–1834), for example, did claim that Jesus’ death was real and did propose that his body was revivified, but remained reluctant to endorse all the miraculous details in the stories.15 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette (1780–1849), a friend of schleiermacher, acknowledged the inconsistencies in the gospel accounts but continued to claim that something extraordinary had indeed occurred. the appearances of the resurrected Jesus to the disciples were not mere subjective visionary experiences nor did Jesus merely recover from a coma. however, what exactly happened on easter morning cannot be reconstructed or even conceptualized.16 Johann august wilhelm neander (1789–1850), another student and friend of schleiermacher, similarly supported the historicity of the resurrection, georg lorenz Bauer, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, leipzig: weygand 1800–02, vol. 1 (Christologie nach den drey ersten Evangelisten), pp. 316–80. 13 Ferdinand Christian Baur, Geschichte der christlichen Kirche, vols. 1–5, tübingen: Fues 1853–62, vol. 1, pp. 38–40. 14 david Friedrich strauss, Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, vols. 1–2, tübingen: C.F. osiander 1835–36, vol. 2, pp. 554–663. 15 Friedrich schleiermacher, Das Leben Jesus, ed. by K.a. rutenik, Berlin: g. reimer 1864, pp. 464–9; Friedrich schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche, vols. 1–2, Berlin: g. reimer 1835–36, vol. 2, pp. 84–93; pp. 486–93 (ASKB 258). 16 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums und der Briefe Johannis, in his Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, vols. 1–4, leipzig: weidmann 1835–48, vol. 1, p. 216; wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838, pp. 269–73 (ASKB 12

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claiming that the dramatic transformation in Jesus’ followers from being fearful cowards to confident proclaimers of a dangerous message could only be explained by assuming that the resurrection of Jesus was an actual event in human history. neander even endorsed the historicity of the extraordinary signs that companied the raising of Jesus, such as the earthquakes and the darkening of the sun.17 in a parallel manner hermann olshausen (1796–1839), a theologian associated with neander, argued that the resurrection accounts in the gospels were entirely historical.18 Kierkegaard would have been aware of the general features of these interpretive tendencies. he alludes to the controversy about the speculations of reimarus that raged between lessing and Johann melchior goeze (1717–86),19 and to reimarus’ fragment that critiqued the resurrection narratives.20 Kierkegaard owned lessing’s works and references to lessing saturate the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.21 Kierkegaard used Baur’s Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Sokrates und Christus in The Concept of Irony, possibly in order to parody it.22 Kierkegaard was familiar with strauss through his taking of copious notes on Julius schaller’s (1810–68) critique of strauss,23 and through the lectures by philipp marheineke (1780–1846) delivered in Berlin in 1841 that critiqued strauss.24 Kierkegaard became familiar with schleiermacher through his tutorial on The Christian Faith with hans lassen martensen (1808–84) in 1834. on the more exegetically moderate side, Kierkegaard owned and used works by de wette,25 as well as four volumes of olshausen.26 although Kierkegaard seldom refers explicitly to the intricacies of these scholarly 109); wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Kurze Erklärung des Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 117–23; pp. 194–200 (ASKB 108). 17 Johann august wilhelm neander, Das Leben Jesu Christi in seinem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange und seiner geschichtlichen Entwickelung dargestellt, hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1837, pp. 611–33. 18 hermann olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtlichen Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 1, 1838, pp. 554–605 (ASKB 96–100). 19 SKS 7, 90 / CUP1, 91. 20 SKS 7, 105 / CUP1, 107. see also SKS 21, 63, nB11:112 / WA, supplement, p. 239. 21 see Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s sämmtliche Schriften. 22 Ferdinand Christian Baur, Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Sokrates und Christus, tübingen: Fues 1837 (ASKB 422). see SKS 1, 75–7 / CI, 13–15. SKS 1, 93 / CI, 31– 2. SKS 1, 113 / CI, 52. SKS 1, 128–9 / CI, 69–70. SKS 1, 153–4 / CI, 99–100. see also david d. possen, “F.C. Baur: on the similarity and dissimilarity between Jesus and socrates,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 23–38. 23 SKS 18, 318–37, KK:2 / KJN 2, 292–308. see george pattison, “d.F. strauss:Kierkegaard and radical demythologization,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, pp. 233–53. 24 SKS 19, 271, not9:1. 25 see de wette, Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi and Kurze Erklärung des Evangelien des Lukas und Markus. 26 see olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtlichen Schriften des Neuen Testaments.

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disputes, his general remarks about the resurrection show that he was well aware of their general contours. II. The Many Functions of Jesus’ Resurrection in Kierkegaard’s Works: Resurrection as Symbolic Trope although Kierkegaard does not give any sustained attention to the narratives of Jesus’ own resurrection, or to Jesus’ miraculous raising of dead individuals, he does allude to them. his purposes in so doing are various, ranging from the trivial to the profound. occasionally he merely mines the stories for an incidental illustration of a point that could have been made equally well with a phrase from shakespeare or goethe, while sometimes he deploys them as the foundation for a critical argument. one of his primary strategies is to use the narrative structure of the resurrection stories as a symbol for some of the passional dynamics of the human heart. in so doing, he was implicitly appropriating a way of using the texts that had been developed by the “mythic” interpreters. the resurrection stories about Jesus really exhibit the passions that should inform every Christian life. Kierkegaard, however, modified this strategy and used it for his own purposes. As we shall see, he also counterbalanced and tempered it with a very different use of those same texts. at times Kierkegaard would simply lift a phrase from the resurrection narratives and use it out of context. For example, in 1835 in a draft of an address to the student association, Kierkegaard quotes the phrase in John 20:17 “do not hold me” merely to indicate the general point that the best aspect of an intuition is so evanescent that it evades being grasped.27 here Jesus’ words are nothing more than an expression of a general truth about human experience that has little to do with the particularities of the story in which it is embedded. more often, however, Kierkegaard alludes to the biblical passages on resurrection for more important purposes. more often there is an intimate connection between the structures and themes of the resurrection stories and the uses to which Kierkegaard puts them. in developing major motifs in his literature, Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms did sometimes spiritualize the resurrection, divorcing it from the materiality of the raising of Jesus and from any concern for the specifics of a future life for individuals. in many contexts in Kierkegaard’s corpus the resurrection functions as a cipher for some aspect of the Christian life on earth. in a way, “resurrection” refers to a possible quality of present experience. sometimes talk of the general resurrection of the dead is linked with the theme of the eternal significance of the ethico-religious quality of the individual’s temporal life, as is evident in The Concept of Anxiety when vigilius haufniensis uses the phrase “the fullness of time (when god sent his son)” from galatians 4:4.28 without identifying the specific biblical passage or its Christological context, Vigilius links resurrection and the consequent judgment of the individual with the theme of the decisiveness of the moment, the moment in which the individual chooses 27 28

Pap. i B 1 / JP 5, 5115. SKS 4, 393 / CA, 90.

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sin or faith.29 the implied connection between eternal life and judgment, with the implication of resurrection, is particularly clear in matthew 25:31–46, although vigilius does not draw this passage to the reader’s attention. even though he does not marshal scriptural verses to buttress his contention, vigilius argues that only when the moment of choice has such decisiveness is the future defined as something truly new, rather than as a simple continuous extension of the past and present. the concept of judgment and therefore also the concept of resurrection are linked with the possibility of the choice of sin or faith, without which those concepts would lose their significance. Here talk of resurrection serves to accentuate the sense of the ultimate seriousness of the individual’s life. “resurrection” is associated with the earnestness of the choice of a new type of life, one that is characterized by moral and religious values, passions, and commitments. in “there will Be the resurrection of the dead, of the righteous and the unrighteous,” one of the “Christian” discourses, 30 and also in his notes for a proposed discourse for awakening,31 Kierkegaard cites the words of acts 24:15 that there will be the resurrection of the dead, of both the unrighteous and the righteous. here Kierkegaard contrasts the seriousness of the prospect of such a judgment of the individual’s life with the frivolity of the desire to turn the issues of immortality and god’s evaluation into a speculative problem requiring demonstrations. Kierkegaard laments that the issue of immortality has been metamorphized into a cognitive puzzle while it is really a matter for urgent action. Kierkegaard inverts the connection between the conviction of immortality and the concern about a final judgment by suggesting that actually it is the certainty of judgment that should be the ground for convictions about immortality. we know that we are immortal insofar as we become convinced that our lives will be evaluated. in this context immortality, or the resurrected life, is the eternal significance of the distinction between righteous and unrighteous lives. Resurrection is not identified in terms of new experiences, but is a quality of the individual’s earthly life. Kierkegaard summarizes, “this means: immortality and judgment are one and the same. immortality can be discussed properly only when there is discussion about judgment.…immortality is judgment. there is not one more word to say about immortality; the one who says one more word or a word in another direction had better beware of judgment.”32 anti-Climacus deploys the concept of resurrection in a parallel way, to highlight the significance of the basic shape and teleology of an individual’s earthly life. according to anti-Climacus, the phrase “the sickness unto death” said by Jesus in the context of the story of lazarus’ resurrection refers not to any physical malady leading to physical extinction but rather to something else, an illness of the spirit.33 it is despair that is the truly fatal sickness. For Christians physical death is by no means the ultimate threat, as Jesus’ cry “lazarus, come out” (John 11:43) and his ibid. SKS 10, 212–21 / CD, 202–13. 31 SKS 29, 289, nB4:5 / CD, supplement, p. 378. 32 SKS 10, 214–15 / CD, 205–6. see also gordon marino, Kierkegaard in the Present Age, milwaukee, wisconsin: marquette university press 2001, pp. 64–7. 33 SKS 11, 123–5 / SUD, 7–9. 29 30

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power over biological death demonstrates. physical death, along with all forms of temporal suffering, is a minor event when compared to “eternal life.” this eternal life is certainly not identical with physical resuscitation. anti-Climacus contrasts the physical resurrection of lazarus with the fact that Jesus himself is the resurrection and the life (John 11:25). the real resurrection is not the reanimation of lazarus’ corpse. rather, eternal life is trust in the one who is the resurrection and the life, Jesus. in the less ecclesial terminology of anti-Climacus, eternal life is the activity of the self resting transparently in the power that established it.34 the power of this trust, as over against merely physical resurrection, is the faith that grasps the “eternal.” once again, talk of eternity and resurrection is used to highlight a quality of the Christian life in time. at times the details of the stories of Jesus’ resurrection are employed to point to the seriousness of life and the need for the self-ascription of responsibility. in The Moment Kierkegaard appeals to Jesus’ resurrection appearances to indicate the discrepancy between the seriousness of Jesus’ resurrection and the superficiality of confirmation, a rite that was intended to signal that a life-transforming decision had been made by a 15 year-old.35 Kierkegaard, of course, feared that the hosts of 15 year-olds presented for confirmation had made no such existentially monumental decisions. The text for the first Sunday after Easter, the Sunday traditionally intended for confirmations, was John 20:19–31, which opened with the phrase “when the doors were shut” to introduce the story of Jesus’ appearance to the frightened disciples. the closed doors of the passage contrast with the open doors of the church that make membership in the putative contemporary band of disciples, the ecclesial establishment, available at very little cost. Kierkegaard concludes that confirmation is bigger nonsense than baptism. here the reference to Jesus’ resurrection is used negatively to unmask the superficiality of contemporary church practice. By implication, the “shut doors” of the new testament story point to the rigors of the Christian life. in the same way the miraculous details of the resurrection stories serve not to corroborate Christianity but to humorously expose the difference between the wisdom of Christian earnestness and the folly of human sagacity. the contrast between the insignificant details of the miracle of Jesus’ resurrection and the spiritual significance of the event function as an exposé of faithless and worldly human expectations concerning what is possible.36 the element of the humorous is present in the resurrection stories, such as the fact that the pharisees and soldiers rolled a great big stone in front of the tomb, foolishly believing that such an act could thwart the transcendent power of resurrection (matthew 27:59–66). if the guards feared that death could not hold Jesus, surely they should have realized that a mere stone could not. in a more ironically oblique way, the resurrection story functions as a cipher for the general power of god with whom anything is possible. most precisely, the resurrection can symbolize rebirth from sin. in a journal entry from 1849 Kierkegaard observed approvingly that zacharias werner (1768–1827), 34 35 36

SKS 11, 130 / SUD, 14. SKS 13, 300 / M, 244. SKS 17, 218, dd:6 / KJN 1, 210.

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a roman Catholic with romantic leanings, proposed that the three resurrections performed by Jesus, the raisings of the daughter of Jairus, the son of the widow of nain, and lazarus the friend of Jesus, represent rebirth from three different degrees of damnation.37 here the physicality of the resurrections in those three New Testament stories is reduced to a metaphoric function, and the specificity of the incidents becomes a vanishing moment in the depiction of a general dynamic in human life. regeneration from sinfulness is a potentially complex process that occurs in this life. along these same lines, Kierkegaard sometimes uses the details of the story of Jesus’ physical resurrection as metaphors for more specific aspects of any Christian’s spiritual rebirth. in at least one instance, the comparison serves to accentuate the dimensions of crisis in anyone’s spiritual resurrection, as well as the danger that always accompanies such a revitalization.38 Kierkegaard cites (John 12:10), the story of Jesus’ raising of lazarus and the murderous hostility that this act provoked, in order to point out that it is dangerous to be raised from the dead by Christ. this animosity that the corporeally resurrected lazarus encountered reveals that the adoption of the Christian life by anyone, which is a kind of spiritual resurrection, will elicit society’s hostility and rejection. the story of lazarus illustrates the risk and suffering that is an inevitable dimension of the Christian life. in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits the theme of resurrection is again used to signal the spiritual significance of accepting the suffering that is constitutive of the Christian life. Kierkegaard writes, “oh, there is indeed on this side of the grave something akin to a resurrection [Opstandelse] every time a person by willing to do everything or by willing to suffer everything stands up [staa op] by being in the decision and in the decision remains standing with the good.”39 according to Kierkegaard, a resurrection occurs whenever an individual wills to suffer everything for the good, even if the sufferer can accomplish nothing in worldly terms. this last emphasis leads Kierkegaard to link “resurrection” with the radically egalitarian theme that anyone can strive to follow Christ and thereby encounter persecution. he elaborates that the hope of every good person is that in the resurrection the differences of deafness, blindness, and physical deformities will be eradicated. Kierkegaard, practicing his strategy of biblical intratextuality, conflates Matthew 22:29–30 which denies the difference between married and unmarried persons in the resurrected life with Jesus’ remark in matthew 11:4 that he gives sight to the blind and hearing to the deaf. By conjoining these two texts Kierkegaard concludes that in regard to resurrected life the difference between hearing and being deaf is of no consequence. the irrelevance of physical ability and attractiveness is evident in the fact that anyone, no matter what their corporeal condition, can suffer for the good. although this trope seems to presuppose some sort of post-mortem existence, SKS 21, 369–70, nB10:207 / JP 3, 2867. see Zacharias Werner’s Sämmtliche Werke: Aus seinem handschriftlichen Nachlasse; Einzige rechtmäßige Original-Gesammtausgabe in 13 Bänden; Herausgegeben von seinen Freunden, vols. 1–13, grimma: verlags-Comptoir 1840–41, vol. 12, pp. 144–6 (ASKB 1851–1854). 38 SKS 21, 369, nB10:206 / JP 3, 2866. 39 SKS 8, 215 / UD, 111. 37

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the rhetorical force falls on the assurance that the possibility of suffering for the good is democratically available to all. talk of “resurrection” functions to foster an appreciation of the universal distribution of the possibility of salvation through suffering for righteousness. similarly, in Christian Discourses Kierkegaard uses Jesus’ resurrection as a device to highlight the Christ-like suffering that is part and parcel of Christian existence.40 alluding to paul’s words “i want to know Christ and the power of his resurrection and the sharing of his suffering by becoming like him in his death” (philippians 3:20), Kierkegaard emphasizes the intimate connection between the power of Christ’s resurrection and “the sharing of his suffering.” Kierkegaard writes. “Yes, and where someone suffers innocently for the sake of righteousness and calls upon his name, there, in addition to the voice that calls upon him, is something that calls upon him even more powerfully, and therefore the communion of his suffering and the power of his resurrection are there: how blessed to suffer mockery for a good cause!”41 the resurrection of Christ is a dynamism that is operative whenever an individual voluntarily decides to accept the possibility of suffering innocently for the sake of righteousness. in imitating Christ the prototype, the acceptance of society’s virulent hatred and the isolation that is its product solidifies communion with god. echoing revelation 17:8 and 20:15, Kierkegaard adds that such people who are mocked as Christ was mocked have their names inscribed in “the Book of life.”42 here resurrected life is portrayed as a quality of the imitation of Christ in this present life; it is the sense of blessed communion with god that is born of Christ-like suffering. in all these instances references to Jesus’ resurrection or to the resurrected lives of individuals function as symbols of dynamics present in earthly life, particularly the ideal dynamics of the Christian life. the biblical theme of resurrection illumines and accentuates the ethico-religious seriousness of life-shaping decisions, the selfascription of responsibility, the need to trust in god, the dying away to sinfulness, and the acceptance of Christ-like suffering for the sake of righteousness. in general, “eternity” or “the resurrected life” appears to be the ultimate meaningfulness of this life. Commitment to the Christian norm gives the individual’s life an enduring continuity. the ideal continuity should be resilient, reliable, and unchanging. Because it should be impervious to the vicissitudes of temporal life, such a mode of existence can be described as “eternal.” accordingly, Climacus associates “eternity” with “the subjective issue,”43 “infinite passion,”44 and the individual’s own “infinite interest in eternal happiness,”45 and asserts that “eternal happiness” exists only for the subjective individual.46 this trajectory in Kierkegaard’s literature, taken by itself, would suggest that eternity, or the resurrected life, is the “eternal” dimension of our 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

SKS 10, 233 / CD, 225. ibid. ibid. SKS 7, 25–6 / CUP1, 15–17. ibid. ibid. SKS 7, 152 / CUP1, 163.

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earthly life. oddly, this tendency to spiritualize resurrection, regarding it as a symbol of the travails and possibilities of the human spirit in temporal existence, would tend to link Kierkegaard with the “mythic” proclivities of the tübingen school and its predecessors. III. The Many Functions of Resurrection in Kierkegaard’s Works: The Resurrection as Specific Event at other times Kierkegaard’s references to resurrection and the stories of Jesus’ resurrection more overtly emphasize the significance of the historicity and particularity of Christ’s resurrection. here the resurrection stories do not function as symbols or allegories of general spiritual dynamics, but rather as narrations of quite singular events. in some instances references to Jesus’ resurrection serve to reinforce the significance of themes that Kierkegaard detected in the entire pattern of Christ’s earthly life. here the focus is often on the historical particularity of that one absolutely decisive earthly life. For example, in luke 24:29 the request of the two disciples who have encountered the resurrected Jesus on the road to emmaus that Jesus “stay with us, because it is almost evening and the day is now nearly over” is cited in order to reinforce an appreciation of Jesus’ freedom from earthly security and attachments. Jesus, of course, does not stay with them all evening.47 according to Climacus, the dialogue shows that Jesus was as carefree as a bird, wandering about unpredictably, and stopping wherever evening found him. the fact that Jesus in this story had recently died and been resurrected is incidental to its rhetorical force; this extraordinary circumstance only gives more weight to Jesus’ general pattern of freedom from earthly cares. often references to the resurrected Christ are used to underline the necessary connection between abasement and exaltation in Christ’s life in general. allusions to new testament passages concerning the glory of the resurrection show that Christ’s abasement is integral to his glorification, for it is the abased one who is the glorified one. Citing matthew 28:18 in Practice in Christianity, anti-Climacus associates the fact that “he is the one to whom all power is given in heaven and in earth” with the fact that “he was born an illegitimate child.”48 the contrast between the ascension and glory and the abasement, and then their identification, suggests that it is only through the abasement that Christ could be glorified. In Christ’s life as a whole his glorification is his willingness to enact a life of self-giving love, and his consequent acceptance of abasement and lowliness. the glory of resurrection is inseparable from the travail of crucifixion, for both are dimensions of Christ’s radical compassion. sometimes the narrative details in the story of the resurrection are used to contrast the glorious nature of resurrection to the degradation of Christ’s life and crucifixion. Kierkegaard observes that Christ was buried in a new grave, with honor and solicitude not shown to him during his passion (matthew 27:60).49 the manner of his burial was 47 48 49

SKS 4, 260 / PF, 57. SKS 12, 171 / PC, 167. SKS 22, 38, nB11:56 / JP 1, 337.

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an exception to the humiliation evident in the manner of his death, and points forward to the resurrection. in order to prevent any misunderstanding, Kierkegaard quickly adds that the miraculous nature of the resurrection is independent of any particular manner of disposing of Christ’s body, including cremation and the dispersal of the ashes to the four winds. the story of the burial serves only as a foreshadowing of the resurrection and not as an explanation of the way in which the resurrection was accomplished. The main point is that although resurrection and crucifixion cannot be essentially separated, the glory of resurrection is not to be collapsed entirely into the pain and humiliation of Christ’s passion. other uses of the story of Jesus’ resurrection in Kierkegaard’s writings pertain not to Christ’s humiliation and suffering, but to his divine power. sometimes references to the resurrected Christ function to emphasize the uniquely transcendent authority of the god-man as over against the relative eloquence and alleged profundity of the genius. in “the difference between a genius and an apostle” in Two EthicalReligious Essays, the quotation of “all power in heaven and earth is given to me” (matthew 28:18) undercuts any effort to prove by human standards of evaluation that Christ is a profound teacher.50 the resurrected status of Christ underlines the uniqueness of his absolute authority and its independence from all ordinary criteria and procedures for establishing and ascribing authority. sometimes Kierkegaard stresses the ambiguous nature of the resurrection appearances in order to underscore the objective uncertainty that the risk of faith requires. he cites luke 24:30–1 (“he took the bread and blessed and broke and began handing it to them. and their eyes were opened and they recognized him, and he vanished from their sight.”) in order to suggest that the recognition of Christ as the sign of contradiction, as the prototype, requires that Christ become “invisible.”51 only if Christ is not immediately given to direct experience can Christ be the object of genuine faith and therefore also the object of courageous imitation. in fact, the imitator can only strive to be like Christ with the appropriate fear and trembling, if Christ is invisible. Christ continues to be invisible at the communion table, not available to the procedures of objective corroboration, although he can nevertheless be recognized by faith in the breaking of the bread. the motif of the objective uncertainty of the resurrection of Christ occurs elsewhere in Kierkegaard’s writings. it is echoed in Climacus’ suggestion that it is a good thing that the resurrection cannot be demonstrated, for if it could, there would be no pathos-filled venture to believe in spite of objective uncertainty.52 Citing philippians 2:12, Kierkegaard in his own voice warns that an individual must not be completely certain of eternal blessedness or immortality in order to maintain the necessary fear and trembling that is constitutive of faith.53 any certainty would undermine the appreciation of the utterly gratuitous and unforeseeable character of immortality and salvation. without the recognition of improbability, wonder and gratitude would erode, devolving into smug complacency. the parable of foolish 50 51 52 53

SKS 11, 106 / WA, 102. SKS 22, 246, nB12:170.a / JP 6, 6495. SKS 7, 391–2 / CUP1, 429–30. SKS 10, 219–20 / CD, 211–12.

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bridesmaids who were so certain of the return of the bridegroom (taken to be a symbol of the return of the resurrected Christ) that they fell asleep (matthew 25:1– 12) is cited to corroborate this contention. Kierkegaard not only stresses the particularity and historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, but also at times emphasizes the particularity and actuality of the resurrection of individuals into some sort of post-mortem future. when so doing, he uses language that suggests that the resurrection is a future state of affairs and not merely the eternal dimensions of this life. his rhetoric exhibits a referential rather than a symbolic force. Kierkegaard writes, “For the minute i die and leave this world, i will then (as i see it) instantly (so frightfully fast does it happen!), I will then instantly be infinitely far from here, at another place.…”54 in such contexts, Kierkegaard frequently does allude to biblical passages concerning the resurrection of human beings in general to support the notion of life beyond death. For example, in an upbuilding discourse Kierkegaard discusses the virtue of patience in regard to the expectation of an eternal happiness.55 here “eternal happiness” is clearly more than an ideal quality or dimension of present earthly experience. Patience is necessary because the fulfillment of the promise of eternal happiness has not yet been actualized. in this context Kierkegaard mentions the expectation of the resurrection, of both the righteous and the unrighteous (acts 24:15), and the expectation of reunion with those whom death took away. he also claims that in this resurrected life the individual’s earthly existence will become transparent and result in a blessed understanding between the individual and god. Kierkegaard contrasts the patient expectation of Anna the prophet who finally beheld Christ in the temple to the shrewd worldly calculations of the probability of earthly successes and pleasures that sadly characterizes human societies. Belief in resurrection is expressed in the confidence that “it will happen,” which is a perduring disposition of trust and hope for something that transcends earthly time. the use of “resurrection” to suggest an actual trans-mortem state of affairs is also evident in Kierkegaard’s critique of the worldliness of contemporary Christendom. he contrasts the hope for resurrection with the established church’s attachment to earthly delights, including marriage.56 the entrance into the resurrected life, the funeral, should not be a lugubrious ritual; rather, it should be a time of joy; for the soul is about to be united to its beloved. the joy here is not a retrospective celebration of a life well-spent, but an anticipation of a new type of experience. Consequently, the crowd should be dressed in white not at weddings, as was the current practice of the church, but at funerals. Kierkegaard’s reference to wedding garments echoes Jesus’ parable of the brides who eagerly awaited the bridegroom (matthew 25:1–12). sometimes the reality and distinctiveness of the resurrected life is emphasized to such an extent that Kierkegaard or his pseudonyms can contrast it to present experience. along these lines, in The Concept of Anxiety vigilius haufniensis alludes to mark 12:25, a passage in which Jesus announces that the resurrected ones are like 54 55 56

Pap. X–6 B 232 / JP 6, 6842. SKS 5, 214 / EUD, 216. SKS 25, 370–2, nB29:107 / JP 3, 2908.

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the angels in heaven who neither marry nor are given in marriage.57 angels and resurrected individuals have no ongoing history of attempting to synthesize spirit and animality, no continuing project of integrating the psychical and the physical. any such synthesis is possible only if the two dimensions are experienced as being in tension with one another. the fact that such a synthesis is not immediately given to living human individuals but presents itself to them as a task gives the sequences of decisions in this life significance, and therefore establishes a real history for an individual life. The spiritually significant history of an individual begins the moment that the contradiction is posited for that individual, catalyzing some type of intentional response. resurrected persons have no such continuing history because sexual difference is cancelled in the resurrection. For them, there is no dialectical tension of sexuality and spirit to be negotiated or resolved. this observation about the resurrected life enables haufniensis to stress the difference between the absence of any possible contradiction and the task of synthesizing the tensive components of our nature, as well as the difference between the absence of tension and the condition of anxiety that had preceded the positing of the contradiction. so, in a circuitous way, the resurrected life serves to clarify the difference between life experienced as a task to reconcile a contradiction, the prior condition of anxiety from which the contradiction arose, and the final elimination of the contradiction. This rhetorical strategy accentuates the otherness of the resurrected life and assumes its reality. similarly, later in The Concept of Anxiety, haufniensis reiterates the point that a perfect spirit, a category which includes resurrected individuals, cannot be thought of as being sexually qualified, and cites Luke 20:34–6 to support this claim.58 sensuality, although it is not intrinsically sinful, appears when it is posited in abstraction from the spirit.59 Once again a description of the resurrected life clarifies the tensions and challenges of earthly life. once again it can only serve this purpose if the resurrected life is construed as other than earthly life and as enjoying some sort of reality. the reality and nature of the resurrected life, particularly its corporeal dimensions, functions as a background issue in The Concept of Irony.60 Kierkegaard discusses the various arguments for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo, finding all of them to suggest that the soul is indeterminate and without predicates. he continues with biting sarcasm that those who have been nurtured by philosophy will be similarly without bodies. in contrast to this view of disembodied immorality, Kierkegaard cites approvingly the words of John that “we do not know what we shall be” (1 John 3:2), adding that John accepted belief in the resurrection of bodies although he refused to speculate about the exact nature of such a differently embodied life. By so doing, Kierkegaard revealed that the resurrection of bodies was a presupposition for him at least in this text, and also was a source of comfort for John. disembodied immortality is insubstantial and devoid of actuality; it is purely negative. on the other hand, Christianity’s theme of the resurrection of the body indicates the abiding SKS 4, 355 / CA, 49. SKS 4, 382 / CA, 79. 59 see Karl g. Bretschneider, Handbuch der Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, vols. 1–2, 4th ed., leipzig: Barth 1838, vol. 1, pp. 727–40 (ASKB 437–438). 60 SKS 1, 166–7 / CI, 74. 57 58

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significance of a particular, individuated identity. While one must not indulge in “topographical and statistical surveys of the new world,” nor in “fantastic potpourri,” a reader faithful to the text of John should affirm an “experience beyond this world” involving some sort of individuation and something analogous to embodiment.61 elsewhere in The Concept of Irony Kierkegaard refers to the “resurrection of bodies,” without citing a particular biblical passage.62 he uses the phrase in the context of a discussion of the platonic theory of the immortality of soul, including its pre-existence, based on the phenomenon of the recollection of truth. Kierkegaard proposes that if the motif of pre-existence is interpreted in the light of the phenomenon of becoming, the reality of which socrates in the Phaedo has assumed, then socrates has demonstrated the resurrection of bodies, which he did not intend to do.63 the development of this theme presupposes a contrast between the platonic concept of the non-corporeal immortality of the soul and the Christian doctrine of a bodily resurrection, and between immortality construed as a perduring quality of the soul and resurrection as a dramatic re-creation of the self. even some of the more popular images associated with resurrection into a future mode of existence can be found in Kierkegaard’s pages. the theme of being reunited with departed loved ones is not absent from Kierkegaard’s journals. in contrasting hope for resurrection with fatuous worldly hopes, Kierkegaard remarks in 1841 that, unlike worldly expectations that can be disappointed, the expectation of the resurrection of the dead cannot be disappointed.64 among those aspects of the resurrected life for which we hope is the blessedness of “being gathered together with those who are dear to you,” as well as seeing “your life transfigured in God.”65 most dramatically, Kierkegaard does at least at one point refer to a future day of resurrection associated with the return of Christ. in a journal entry of 1840 he alludes to ephesians 5:14 and writes that more glorious than the dragoon’s trumpets will be the archangel’s call, “awake all who sleep, the lord is coming.”66 the tone of the passage is a celebration of victory, analogous to the way that cavalry troopers anticipate victory when the charge is sounded. the force of the citation is to stimulate a hopeful anticipation of an event which is irreducibly future and cannot be reduced without remainder to a dimension of present experience. In these passages Kierkegaard is engaging a subtle and difficult dialectic. On the one hand he intimates that talk of the resurrection of individuals refers to something more than a quality or dimension of present earthly experience. the resurrected life cannot be reduced without remainder to a mere ideal of ethico-religious authenticity. the biblical references to resurrection, including both the resurrection of Christ and the resurrection of individuals, point to a joy and blessedness that exists beyond the confines of temporal life. It is important for Kierkegaard to emphasize this point, ibid. SKS 1, 133 / CI, 69. 63 see Ferdinand Christian Baur, Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Sokrates und Christus, pp. 109–21 (ASKB 422). 64 SKS 19, 216, not7:42 / JP 2, 1665. 65 ibid. 66 SKS 19, 202, not6:35 / JP 5, 5476. 61 62

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and to sound almost like a literalist, in order to encourage the buoyant hope that he regards as essential for the Christian life. on the other hand, he does not want to treat “resurrection” as if it were a proposition or hypothesis that could be entertained in a mood of speculative curiosity or objective detachment. the issue of resurrection can only be meaningful for those who care passionately and persistently about the quality and direction of their earthly lives. Climacus suggests that the question “what it means to be immortal,” which implies a continuous identity in eternity, only becomes a real, heart-felt puzzlement for those whose lives already exhibit a hunger for sameness.67 only to such individuals does the concept “same” (as in “continuation of the same life in eternity”) make sense, for only those individuals have begun to lead lives that possess any continuity and therefore only those lives could be continued in eternity. in a context of pure objectivity the question of resurrection and eternal life cannot be asked. moreover, Kierkegaard was suspicious that an undue interest in resurrection might be symptomatic of a purely self-interested desire to embrace the Christian life for the sake of an eternal reward, construed in terms of earthly goods, or to avoid post-mortem punishments imagined as being analogous to temporal punishments.68 Kierkegaard says little about Christ’s resurrected state of exaltation, either Christ’s or the follower’s, for he fears that spiritually premature speculations about eternal bliss would degenerate into self-indulgent fantasies and distract the reader from the urgent business of walking the difficult road of Christ’s lowliness and self-giving love.69 The imitation of Christ must reflect Christ’s life of self-denial motivated by sincere love for the neighbor, epitomized by his taking up of the cross. Just as Christ freely accepted the state of humiliation, so also the follower of Christ must accept analogous forms of suffering, without any self-serving concern for future compensation. given these considerations, Kierkegaard’s dual use of the biblical accounts of the resurrection of Jesus both as a symbol of the spiritual dynamics of the Christian life and as a description of an historical event (and a pledge and foretaste of the future resurrection of individuals) makes sense. he used the resurrection as a symbol of spiritual dynamics to foster the development of the appropriate form of subjectivity necessary for any meaningful talk of resurrection. when doing so, Kierkegaard could adopt some of the strategies of the tübingen school and the other spiritualizers of the resurrection stories. of course, he would modify their approach, adapting it to encourage the self-ascription of responsibility, the embrace of objective uncertainty, and the adoption of a life of suffering for righteousness. But along with this nurturing and prodding of the requisite forms of pathos, Kierkegaard would also present the resurrection (both the resurrection of Jesus and the future resurrection of individuals) as an actuality that gives the Christian hope specificity and direction. When pursuing this purpose Kierkegaard would sound more like de wette or even olshausen, with their insistence that something actual and utterly unique had happened in human history. as a result, Kierkegaard had to conclude that the historical claims concerning 67 68 69

SKS 7, 158–63 / CUP1, 171–7. SKS 8, 152–70 / UD, 39–60. SKS 8, 384–98 / UD, 289–305.

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the resurrection are essential to Christianity in order to preserve the focus for the hope, while the attempt to corroborate those claims must be avoided in order to preserve the necessary mood of fear and trembling.

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss the Resurrection Baur, Ferdinand Christian, Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Sokrates und Christus, tübingen: ludwig Friedrich Fues 1837, pp. 109–21 (ASKB 422). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 798–822 (ASKB 106–107). herder, Johann gottfried, “von der auferstehung als glauben, geschichte, und lehre,” in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 16, pp. 81–173 (ASKB 1676–1684). —— Von Gottes Sohn, der Welt Heiland. Nach Johannes Evangelium, in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 17, pp. 116–26 (ASKB 1676–1684). lessing, gotthold ephraim, “Über den Beweis des geistes und der Kraft,” in Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s sämmtliche Schriften, vols. 1–32; vols. 1–28, Berlin: vossische Buchhandlung 1825–27, vols. 29–32 Berlin and stettin: nicolaische Buchhandlung 1828, vol. 5, pp. 80–4 (ASKB 1747–1762). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtlichen Schriften des neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 1, 1838, pp. 554–605 (ASKB 96–100). schaller, Julius, Der historische Christus und die Philosophie Kritik der Grundidee des Werks: das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss, leipzig: otto wigand 1838 (ASKB 759). schleiermacher, Friedrich, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsä[t]zen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt, vols. 1–2, 3rd unchanged ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1835–36, vol. 2, pp. 84–93; pp. 486–93 (ASKB 258). [werner, zacharias], Zacharias Werner’s Sämmtliche Werke: Aus seinem handschriftlichen Nachlasse; Einzige rechtmäßige Original-Gesammtausgabe in 13 Bänden; Herausgegeben von seinen Freunden, vols. 1–13, grimma: verlagsComptoir 1840–41, vol. 13, p. 34 (ASKB 1851–1854). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, pp. 176–200 (ASKB 80). —— Kurze Erklärung des Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836, pp. 117–123, pp. 194–200 (ASKB 108).

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—— Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838, pp. 269–73 (ASKB 109). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of the Resurrection arbaugh, george e., and george B. arbaugh, Kierkegaard’s Authorship, london: george allen and unwin 1968, pp. 278–9. Barrett, lee C., “the Joy in the Cross: Kierkegaard’s appropriation of lutheran Christology in ‘the gospel of sufferings,’ ” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2005 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 257–85. Come, arnold, Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self, montreal: mcgillQueen’s university press 1997, p. 65; p. 78; p. 89. deuser, hermann, Dialektische Theologie. Studien zu Adornos Metaphysik und zum Spätwerk Kierkegaards, munich: Kaiser 1980, pp. 274–5. glenn, John g., Jr., “ ‘a highest good…an eternal happiness’: the human Telos in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 12), pp. 247–62. gouwens, david J., Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1996, pp. 160–2. hall, harrison, “love and death: Kierkegaard and heidegger on authentic and inauthentic existence,” Inquiry, vol. 27, 1984, nos. 2–3, pp. 179–97. huntington, patricia, “suffering and strife: For what Can we hope?” in Christian Discourses and The Crisis and A Crisis in the Life of an Actress, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2007 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 17), pp. 95–118. lønning, per, Samtidighedens Situation. En studie i Søren Kierkegaards kristendomsforståelse, oslo: Forlaget land og Kirke 1954, pp. 160–1. —— “the Christian death,” in The Sources and Depths of Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2), pp. 168–78. malantschuk, gregor, Kierkegaard’s Way to Truth, trans. by m. michelsen, minneapolis: augsburg 1963, pp. 79–96. —— Frihed og Eksistens. Studier i Søren Kierkegaards Tænkning, ed. by niels Jørgen Cappelørn and paul müller, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1980. marino, gordon, Kierkegaard in the Present Age, milwaukee, wisconsin: marquette university press 2001, pp. 61–75. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, pp. 100–27. watkin, Julia, Kierkegaard, london: Continuum 1997, p. 24; p. 36; p. 41.

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I. Introduction In a field with so many resources dedicated to the examination of every aspect of Kierkegaard’s life and writings, it is remarkably surprising how few scholars have analyzed the significant influence of Paul upon that corpus. even those who have set out to explore Kierkegaard’s use of scripture explicitly, in particular timothy polk and Joseph rosas, seem not to deal with Kierkegaard’s use of paul to any great extent. polk, in The Biblical Kierkegaard, does not treat Kierkegaard’s use of paul extensively, except to notice, several times, that in Works of Love Kierkegaard feels free to intercalate a chapter on a passage from 1 Peter into the middle of five other chapters based on 1 Corinthians 13.1 this observation functions for polk as evidence of his hypothesis that Kierkegaard’s primary engagement with scripture was canonical.2 later, he observes that Kierkegaard seems to disregard the higher criticism of his day, citing deutero-pauline epistles seamlessly with other epistles that were regarded as “authentically” pauline.3 other than these references, however, he gives no close examination of paul’s impact on Kierkegaard’s thought. rosas, whose book Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard is perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of Kierkegaard’s use of scripture, claims with certainty that Kierkegaard had a personal preference for the synoptic gospels and the letter of James and hardly mentions Kierkegaard’s extensive use of paul.4 however, while rosas is right about Kierkegaard’s preference for the synoptic gospels, references to paul and the pauline epistles clearly outnumber references to James in Kierkegaard’s literature. Rosas does not attend to the many and significant ways that Paul prominently figures in many of Kierkegaard’s directly Christian works, particularly in his edifying discourses and in Works of Love, both of which utilize references to scripture more than any other of Kierkegaard’s works. given rosas’ 1 timothy h. polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997, p. 97. 2 ibid. 3 ibid., p. 150. 4 l. Joseph rosas, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, p. 148.

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articulation of Kierkegaard’s canon, one might be surprised to learn that eight of the 18 chapters that comprise Works of Love, arguably one of Kierkegaard’s most important works, derive directly from pauline (or deutero-pauline) epistles, compared with only three based on the synoptic gospels and none from James. likewise, of the edifying discourses, five discourses are based on Paul, compared with four on the gospels, three on James, two on old testament texts, and another two on 1 peter. of these discourses, two are dedicated to imaginative musings regarding the person and apostlehood of paul himself, a theme expanded in Kierkegaard’s essay “the difference between a genius and an apostle.”5 exceptions to scholarly inattention to paul in Kierkegaard include paul martens in his article “authority, apostleship, and the difference between Kierkegaard’s old and new testaments,”6 in which he deals with questions regarding paul’s divine authority as an apostle in conversation with Kierkegaard’s The Book on Adler.7 other expositors of Kierkegaard do note the importance of paul to him in passing. m. Jamie Ferreira, in Love’s Grateful Striving, considers how paul’s discussion about love in 1 Corinthians figures into Kierkegaard’s arguments in Works of Love.8 Janet Forsythe Fishburn, in “søren Kierkegaard, exegete,” also discusses paul but limits her research to Kierkegaard’s translation and use of galatians in his early works and journal entries.9 george pattison notes the presence of paul in the upbuilding discourses,10 and david gouwens alludes to Kierkegaard’s employment of paul.11 these scholarly investigations or at least mentions of the role of paul in Kierkegaard’s literature, however, seem to be exceptions to the rule of general neglect. given Kierkegaard’s heavy reliance on paul, it would seem that this subject deserves some further attention. Because Kierkegaard’s use of paul occurs predominantly in his nonpseudonymous works, paul’s words are usually positively cited in order to promote directly Kierkegaard’s Christian edifying purposes. while in other places he might portray a biblical character or text through the eyes of a non-Christian author, as he does with abraham in Fear and Trembling, paul is largely absent from these more overtly indirect communicative forays. when addressing paul or paul’s writings, Kierkegaard’s tone is consistently reverent, as though he is deliberately careful not to allow paul’s voice to stray from its sacred context. in regard to any pauline phrase he expresses dismay that it could be sacrilegiously used in such a careless SKS 11, 97–111 / WA, 91–106. paul martens, “authority, apostleship, and the difference between Kierkegaard’s old and new testaments,” in The Book on Adler, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2008 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 24), pp. 121–38. 7 Pap. viii–2 B 15, 67–8 / BA, 34–5. 8 m. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, new York: oxford university press 2001, pp. 137–8. 9 Janet Forsythe Fishburn, “søren Kierkegaard, exegete,” Interpretation, vol. 29, no. 3, 1985, pp. 229–45. 10 george pattison, Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses, london: routledge 2002, p. 160; p. 164. 11 david gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1996, p. 161; p. 210; p. 228. 5 6

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and impudent manner so as to egregiously misrepresent paul.12 Kierkegaard is rather consistent in his treatment of paul throughout his corpus, affirming his status as an apostle, emphasizing his call to action (rather than a more lutheran focus on paul’s assurance of grace), and ascribing a sense of divine authority to both paul’s life and writings. II. Interpretations of Paul in Kierkegaard’s Context debates about the genuine or spurious authorship of various epistles attributed to paul, the unity and integrity of the received versions of the epistles, and the proper understanding of paul’s central message had proliferated in biblical scholarship for over a century. one trajectory of interpretation found paul to be generally unreliable and tended to theologically marginalize his letters. the english deist peter annet (1693–1769) gained notoriety by claiming that the evident discrepancies between paul’s self-reports in his letters and the narration of his career in the Book of acts could not be harmonized.13 Finding acts to be more plausible, annet concluded that paul prevaricated. hermann samuel reimarus (1694–1768) regarded paul’s writings as one of many efforts in early Christianity to explain the failure of Jesus to meet messianic expectations by formulating a theory of an ever-postponed return of Christ to inaugurate a glorious kingdom.14 a more prevalent and powerful tradition of interpretation valorized paul as a champion of universal religious principles and values in opposition to the more parochial rituals and laws of Judaism. the deists themselves, who were by no means unanimous in their assessment of paul, often regarded paul as a proponent of natural religion. thomas morgan (d. 1743), a rationalistic Quaker, described paul as a proto-deist who resisted Jewish ceremonial law in order to promote the authority of natural law and the inner conviction of moral truth.15 morgan regarded paul as the opponent of all Judaizing ritualistic and legalistic tendencies within Christianity, a retrogressive propensity that he associated with the party of peter in the early church. this image of paul the anti-ethnocentric champion of universal truths enjoyed a surprising longevity and even influenced the renowned biblical scholar Johann salomo semler (1725–91)16 and later the tübingen school. semler, shaped by both Pietism and rationalism, identified the writings of Paul and John as the core of the

SKS 5, 317 / EUD, 327. peter annet, The History and Character of St. Paul, Examined: In a Letter to Theophilus, a Christian Friend, london: F. page 1748, pp. 1–106. 14 hermann reimarus, Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Junger, Braunschweig: s.n. 1778, pp. 198–202. 15 thomas morgan, The Moral Philosopher: In a Dialogue between Philalethes, a Christian Deist, and Theophanes, a Christian Jew, london: published by the author 1737, p. 213; p. 227; p. 249; pp. 361ff. 16 Johann salomo semler, D. Io. Semleri paraphrasis in primam Pauli ad Corinthios epistolam, halle: hemmerde 1770. 12 13

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canon,17 for they make clear the centrality of faith and the law of love. even within the pauline epistles, semler distinguished the universally relevant and authoritative portions from those passages that were context-specific, such as clothing regulations for women.18 For semler, not all passages in paul’s writings are equal in inspiration or authority; their value varies according to the degree to which they articulate universal moral truths. motivated partly by a desire to separate the wheat from the chaff in paul, semler disputed the unity of romans and 2 Corinthians.19 similarly, according to Johann david michaelis (1717–91), paul was not an ecstatic spiritualist but a proponent of rational moral truths.20 michaelis doubted the pauline authorship of hebrews, a book which seemed tied to the cultic system of Judaism.21 Johann gottfried eichhorn (1752–1827) rejected the idea of a second roman imprisonment, an hypothesis that had been developed by more conservative commentators in order to attribute the pastoral epistles to paul, books which tended to present paul as an advocate of culturally-conditioned mores.22 throughout his classic volume on paul’s theology, georg lorenz Bauer (1755–1806) argued that paul accommodated his universal message of god’s love (that included a dimension of judgment of evil) to mythic sensibilities that resonated to the images of sacrifice and blood atonement.23 to a degree this construal of paul as the advocate of universal religion survived in hans lassen martensen (1808–84), Kierkegaard’s theological tutor and later ideological foil, who associated paul with the claim that a primitive concept of god is present in all humans.24 Another trajectory of interpretation identified the theme of new life in Christ as the core of paul’s message. traditional lutheran theology had associated paul primarily with the message of justification by grace through faith, often regarded as a forensic act, but the pietists added a new emphasis on the pauline themes of internal regeneration and sanctification. Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705) emphasized paul’s conversion and the related themes of the new creation and the fruits of the spirit.25 For spener and most pietists the heart of paul’s teaching was not a merely see Johann Salomo Semler’s Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Canon, vols. 1–4, halle: hemmerde 1771–75, vol. 1, pp. 110–24. 18 ibid., pp. 117–24. 19 Johann salomo semler, Paraphrasis II. Epistolae ad Corinthos. Accessit Latina vetus translatio et lectionem varietas, halle: hemmerde 1776, pp. 238–9. 20 Johann david michaelis, Einleitung in die göttlichen Schriften des Neuen Bundes, vols. 1–2, 4th ed., göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht 1788, vol. 2. 21 Johann david michaelis, Erklärung des Briefes an die Hebräer, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., Frankfurt and leipzig: J.g. garbe 1780, vol. 1, pp. 1–86. 22 Johann gottfried eichhorn, Einleitung in das Neue Testament, vols. 1–3, leipzig: weidmann 1804–14, vol. 3, pp. 411–527. 23 georg lorenz Bauer, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, leipzig: weygand 1800–02, vol. 4. 24 hans lassen martensen, Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie i vor Tids dogmatiske Theologie, trans. by l.v. petersen, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1841, pp. 54–5 (ASKB 651). 25 philipp Jakob spener, Erklärung der Epistel an die Galater, Frankfurt am main: zunner 1697. 17

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extrinsic imputed justification but a new birth of the individual that leads to a new life in Christ. this shift in focus had hermeneutic implications for the reading of paul and all of Scripture. The influential August Hermann Francke (1663–1727) cited paul in recommending that scripture be read with the practical intention to apply it to one’s own life.26 Francke recommended that it be read as a letter from a friend declaring that friend’s will. the friend’s will should be executed as expeditiously as possible rather than become a subject of interpretive dispute. this motif of the letter from a beloved expressing a wish with which the recipient should comply would be echoed in Kierkegaard’s For Self-Examination.27 pietism had an impact upon the interpretation of paul way beyond its own religious communities. Johann gottfried herder (1744–1803), eclectically combining pietism, Classicism, and romanticism, worried about the hermeneutic implications of the higher criticism of the Bible, including its implications for reading the epistles of paul. while thoroughly embracing the need for sensitivity to issues of genre and historical setting, in a manner reminiscent of Francke, herder urged theological students to read the Bible as a letter from a beloved father or fiancée, and to listen for the voice of god.28 For Herder, this attitude toward Scripture was significantly different from the critical scientific approach to the text. The letters of Paul should be read as if they were addressed to the reader’s own self.29 echoing the pietist emphasis of sanctification, Herder insisted that Paul’s writings about faith were not in conflict with James’ passages about works of love, for paul regarded faith as a phenomenon that would be enacted in ethical behavior. paul emphasized faith in order to debate with the pharisees and their narrow legalism, not in order to disparage the need for a transformed way of life. during Kierkegaard’s lifetime Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860), the celebrated tübingen historical theologian, synthesized the view of paul the enemy of religious parochialism with the pietist view of paul the advocate of new birth— Baur argued persuasively that there were only two main factions in the church of Corinth, a gentile party of which paul was one leader, and a Jewish Christian party looking to peter.30 For Baur, in this controversy paul represented a healthy appeal august hermann Francke, Manuductio ad Lectionem Scripturae Sacrae, halle: zeitler 1693. in 1851 Kierkegaard read and commented on heinrich ernst Ferdinand guericke, August Hermann Francke. Eine Denkschrift zur Säcularfeier seines Todes, halle: Buchhandlung des waisenhauses 1827. see SKS 24, 248–9, nB23:82 / JP 3, 3321; SKS 24, 253–4, nB23:92 / JP 3, 3322. 27 SKS 13, 54-8 / FSE, 26–30. 28 Johann gottfried herder, “Briefe an theophron,” in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 15, p. 69 (ASKB 1676–1684). 29 Johann gottfried herder, “Briefe, das studium der theologie betreffend,” in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vol. 13, pp. 11–17. 30 Ferdinand Christian Baur, Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi. Sein Leben und Wirken, seine Briefe und seine Lehre: Ein Beitrag zu einer kritischen Geschichte des Urchristentums, stuttgart: Becher and müller 1845. see also Ferdinand Christian Baur, “paulus, Jesu Christi apostel,” in Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, vols 1–20, ed. by henrik nicolai Clausen and matthias hagen hohlenberg, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1833–52, vol. 14, 1846, pp. 317–434. 26

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to universalizable values and the universality of grace in opposition to petrine parochialism. paul also represented the authority and autonomy of individual religious self-consciousness, for paul experienced the immediate presence of Jesus in his conversion. For the individual believer, justification is also a union with the divine spirit that gives birth to a new creation. paul’s view of reconciliation with god is more than the mere pardon of sins or the legal imputation of righteousness. many other authors paralleled this appropriation of themes from both rationalism and pietism. wilhelm martin leberecht de wette (1780–1849), who had studied with herder and been associated with schleiermacher, also emphasized paul’s conviction that individuals could be transformed into the likeness of god by using Jesus’ faith as a model.31 according to de wette, for paul a new life in Christ is an essential dimension of reconciliation. like most scholars, de wette saw paul as loosening the ethnocentric bonds of Judaism in order to make way for a more universal type of religious experience. similarly, Johann august wilhelm neander (1789–1850) agreed with herder that James on works and paul on faith are reconcilable.32 paul focused on the objective foundation of reconciliation with god and James focused on the subjective consequences of that reconciliation. paul assumed that if the love of god is received into an individual’s self-consciousness that it would bear the fruit of a new way of life. some authors whom Kierkegaard read accentuated this “new life in Christ” aspect of paul’s epistles even more strongly. hermann olshausen (1796–1839), an ally of neander, regarded paul as the crown of the new testament, for paul synthesized the greek and hebrew traditions.33 By doing so he differed somewhat from Friedrich schleiermacher (1768–1834), who tended to regard paul as an example of Jewish speculation about the significance of the life of Christ, rather than as an exponent of a more Hellenistic style of reflection like that of John, whom Schleiermacher preferred.34 olshausen was conservative about historical matters, accepting most of the books ascribed to paul as authentic, except hebrews. olshausen stressed paul’s character and his habit of interpreting doctrine in terms of his own experience. paul, unlike John who was oriented toward contemplation, situated the gospel in the life of action, in the human awareness of incapacity for right action and the need for help. although olshausen was well aware of paul’s anti-legalism, he also drew attention wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, vol. 2, pp. 213–88 (ASKB 80). see also wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Kurze Erklärung des Briefes an die Römer, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838, pp. 1–170 (ASKB 112). 32 august neander, Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel: als selbstständiger Nachtrag zu der allgemeinen Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche, hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1832–33, vol. 2, pp. 431–6. 33 hermann olshausen, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 3, pp. 3–61; pp. 475–502 (ASKB 96–100). see also the much shorter hermann olshausen, Die Briefe Pauli an die Römer und Korinthier, Königsberg: unzer 1837, pp. 1–88 (ASKB 103). 34 Friedrich schleiermacher, Einleitung ins Neue Testament, ed. by g. wolde, vol. 8 in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämmtliche Werke. abtheilung 1: Zur Theologie, vols. 1–11, Berlin: g. reimer 1835–64, pp. 474–82. 31

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to paul’s hostility to the prospect of appealing to the theme of grace in order to relax the expectation of growth in virtue. olshausen’s claim that the imitation of Christ is a dimension of the proper engagement with Scripture would find a receptive ear in Kierkegaard. Friedrich august gotttreu tholuck (1799–1877), also indebted to pietism, stressed the drama in romans of the individual’s movement from sin and guilt through faith in Christ’s atoning work to new Christ-like life.35 The believer’s identification with Christ is the foundation of this internal death and rebirth; the pattern of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection is replicated in the believer’s descent into the consciousness of sinfulness and ascent into union with the risen Christ. in this way Christ remains the contemporary of the individual believer, a theme that Kierkegaard would also stress. Kierkegaard was familiar with many of these authors and interpretive strategies, either directly or indirectly. he took notes on neander’s Die Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel,36 which he probably read in conjunction with Carl emil scharling’s (1803–77) course on the Corinthians correspondence in 1834.37 in 1834–35 Kierkegaard used leopold immanuel rückert’s (1797–1871) commentary to study ephesians.38 Rückert, who had been influenced by pietism, emphasized the need for the interpreter to disregard all dogmatic and moral preconceptions and imaginatively put the interpreter’s own self into paul’s context. Kierkegaard also referred to leonhard usteri’s (1799–1833) Udvikling af det Paulinske Lærebegreb i dets Forhold til det Ny Testamentes bibelske Dogmatik,39 whom he commended for developing pauline doctrinal themes concerning the fall of adam and eve.40 in 1838 Kierkegaard referred to olshausen41 and to de wette.42 Kierkegaard’s exegetical notes on romans, possibly taken from scharling’s lectures in 1839–40, cited tholuck’s Auslegung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer.43 henrik nicolai Clausen’s (1793–1877) lectures on dogmatics of 1833–34 were peppered with references to paul, with many of them dealing particularly with the scriptural roots of the doctrine of hereditary sin.44 Friedrich august gotttreu tholuck, Auslegung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer, 3rd ed., Berlin: dümmler 1831, pp. 181–260; pp. 330–406 (ASKB 102). 36 see neander, Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel. 37 Pap. i C 16 / JP 5, 5059. Pap. i C 18 / JP 5, 5059. 38 leopold immanuel rückert, Der Brief Pauli an die Epheser, leipzig: Köhler 1834, pp. 271–306. see Pap. i C 35 / JP 5, 5068. 39 leonhard usteri, Udvikling af det Paulinske Lærebegreb i dets Forhold til det Ny Testamentes bibelske Dogmatik. Et exegetisk-dogmatisk Forsøg, trans. by wilhelm Johan Jacob Boethe, Copenhagen: philipsen 1839 (ASKB 850). see Pap. i C 35. 40 SKS 4, 345–6 / CA, 39. see usterei, Udvikling af det Paulinske Lærebegreb i dets Forhold til det Ny Testamentes bibelske Dogmatik, pp. 30–1. 41 Pap. ii C 2. 42 SKS 18, 119, gg:2 / KJN 2, 111. 43 SKS 18, 364, / KK:7 / KJN 2, 333. SKS 18, 367, KK:7 / KJN 2, 336. SKS 18, 368, KK:7 / KJN 2, 337 44 SKS 19, 7–85, not1:1–9. 35

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Most of these authors and teachers, except for Clausen, had been influenced by the pietist approach to paul. exposed to readings of paul that foregrounded the centrality of new life in Christ and the actions that flow from it, Kierkegaard showed an intense interest in paul’s exemplary faith and character, and asserted the compatibility of paul and James. many highlighted the need for the personal appropriation of that textual theme of new life in order to interpret paul rightly. as we shall see, this pietist-derived understanding of paul would be echoed in many of Kierkegaard’s texts. III. Kierkegaard on the Person of Paul while it is true that Kierkegaard does not try to drastically recast paul or his writings, he does interpret the person of Paul imaginatively, filling in details of his life and calling, and elaborating on his experience in a roman prison. one could compare his imaginative treatment of paul to the way that he treats abraham through the eyes of Johannes de silentio in Fear and Trembling: in regard to both characters Kierkegaard enters the pathos of the person, imagining emotions and motivations in order to understand more profoundly the nature of the story. Kierkegaard’s treatment of paul, however, spoken in his own voice, displays little of de silentio’s doubt or uncertainty. where de silentio makes no claim to faith and despairs of ever achieving such a faith as abraham’s, Kierkegaard, writing in his own voice, consistently lifts paul up as one to whom Christians must give their attention, an apostle who speaks with divine authority and points Christians toward their truest goal, which is to live in such a way that their faith speaks through their actions. First and foremost for Kierkegaard, paul is an apostle. in his essay, “the difference between a genius and an apostle,” Kierkegaard sets the two archetypes beside each other for the purpose of comparison. a genius, he submits, aside from being brilliant and profound, is primarily concerned with eloquence and style and is appreciated as much for the aesthetic flourishes with which an original thought is presented as for the thought itself. By contrast, an apostle is not known for his cleverness but for the divine authority with which he speaks. most often an apostle is an ordinary person and does not become more intelligent or profound by virtue of god’s call.45 rather, an apostle appeals to the divine authority that immediately inspires him (indeed, if an apostle were to appeal to cleverness, he would be a fool!).46 whereas a genius is born, an apostle is called and appointed by God; while a genius is self-satisfied and vain, an apostle exists for the sake of others and answers to god.47 a genius is concerned with immanence and has an immanent teleology, while an apostle is concerned with transcendence and has an ultimate teleology. while a genius has no greater purpose than to entertain and amuse, an apostle exists for the sake of his mission. an apostle is willing to lay down life and limb for the sake of the message, a revelation that comes directly from god. indeed, when an apostle speaks, the words will likely not be beautifully spoken. For example, Kierkegaard imagines paul admonishing that 45 46 47

SKS 11, 97–101 / WA, 93–8. SKS 11, 100 / WA, 96 SKS 11, 109–11 / WA, 105–8.

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“you must consider that what i [paul] say has been entrusted to me by a revelation; so it is god himself or the lord Jesus Christ who is speaking, and you must not become involved presumptuously in criticizing the form.”48 apostles are who they are by virtue of divine authority, called by god to “proclaim the word, to act and to suffer,” living “the unceasingly active life” as god’s messengers.49 it is with this orientation toward what it means to be an apostle that Kierkegaard interprets paul’s life and writings. paul, the only apostle mentioned explicitly in the above essay,50 is for Kierkegaard an exemplar of what it means to be a faithful apostle. as articulated in two edifying discourses, paul, as apostle, displays through his living the paradox of true faithfulness and, in so doing, is willing to suffer for the sake of his message, even to the point of seeing his suffering as a means of furthering god’s purposes in the world. in his discourse, “strengthening in the inner Being,” a discourse that centers around ephesians 3:13–21,51 Kierkegaard ponders paul, writing to the church in Ephesus from his imprisonment in Rome, too insignificant for rome to take real notice of him, disgraced even by his own people, and consigned to oblivion. Kierkegaard writes that “he who brought with him that conquering conviction was now assigned the solitude of imprisonment,” his dream ended, his vision wasting away.52 any other person, muses Kierkegaard, whose dreams had been dashed and whose mission had been brought to such an ignoble end, would have written to his supporters’ desperate appeals for help or pity; he could have written “do not forsake me now when i am forsaken by all.”53 “But,” writes Kierkegaard, “paul was an apostle. even though distressed, he nevertheless was always happy; even though he was poor, he always made many rich; even though he had nothing, he nevertheless possessed everything.”54 in this spirit, then, he wrote to the ephesians, instructing them not to be preoccupied with his own suffering, and instead expressed concern for the welfare of the community of believers. strengthened by the spirit of god, paul continued to testify despite temptation, need, loneliness, and even when his own testimony eluded him.55

SKS 11, 100 / WA, 96–7. SKS 11, 109–10 / WA, 106. 50 SKS 11, 100 / WA, 96. 51 Kierkegaard did not refer to the disputes about the authorship of various books attributed to paul. as we have seen, the authorship of 1 and 2 timothy, and titus, was widely contested, and the authorship of ephesians, Colossians, and 2 thessalonians was also disputed. here Kierkegaard treats a contested text as he would treat a text that was authentically written by paul, engaging ephesians as though paul wrote the letter, imagining what paul might have been experiencing in a roman prison as he wrote to the Christians in ephesus. timothy polk takes this to indicate Kierkegaard’s lack of interest in historical readings of scripture, favoring a reading that honors the apostolic nature of the text, evidenced by the spirit working through it rather than the accuracy of its historical minutiae. see polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, p. 151. 52 SKS 5, 88 / EUD, 81. 53 ibid. 54 SKS 5, 89 / EUD, 82. 55 ibid. 48 49

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likewise, in his discourse, “thorn in the Flesh,” a commentary on 2 Corinthians 12:7, Kierkegaard considers paul’s sufferings, which, he reminds his readers, are greater than theirs, even if they would invent some.56 referring several times to paul as “apostle,” he commends paul for not wishing to be exempt from suffering, for not berating himself for his shortcomings, and for instead using these as tools for his witness.57 referring again to paul’s life, Kierkegaard notices that paul was all too human, writing, “leave it to a worldly admiration to think that paul was always great, that even in his error there was still something extraordinary.”58 paul’s persecution of the church in his early years should have, according to common wisdom, rendered him unworthy to be an apostle. Yet, paradoxically, it was for Kierkegaard the very fact of his fallen humanity that rendered Paul eminently qualified to be an apostle; it became a thorn in his flesh that spurred him on to greater witness.59 this most human of weaknesses became instead a testimony that paul’s accomplishments could only be credited to the power of god working through him. For Kierkegaard central to paul’s apostleship was the paradox of his faithful witness. when he was persecuted, he thought not of himself and only of others. when he suffered, he transformed his suffering into testimony. rather than becoming resentful or self-pitying, he declared instead that he suffered for god and continued to press on as a co-laborer with god.60 when another might have been discouraged at the futility of his mission, paul continued to testify. paul’s real life choices (i.e., how he acted) indicate for Kierkegaard the presence of divine authority. though little is known about the details of the life of paul, Kierkegaard claims that “we do, however, know paul” through his inner struggles and outward witness.61 his actions and attitudes, particularly his willingness to suffer for the sake of his message, serve as evidence for Kierkegaard that paul was a true apostle who spoke a message from god, a message that was communicated with authority. IV. The Writings of Paul what did paul write that was so worth heeding, according to Kierkegaard? given the fact that Kierkegaard was a lutheran, and in many regards a staunch lutheran, one might expect that a dominant theme in Kierkegaard’s engagement with paul would be grace. one could reasonably assume that the many pauline texts that emphasize salvation by grace through faith62 would dominate his discourses and drive Kierkegaard’s interest in paul. Yet, far from being central to Kierkegaard’s treatment of paul, these texts make scarcely any appearance in his writings, an omission that can only be taken to be intentional. even a brief perusal of rosas’ extensive index of scriptural texts in Kierkegaard’s works reveals his disinclination to converse with 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

SKS 5, 322 / EUD, 332. SKS 5, 319 / EUD, 329. SKS 5, 329 / EUD, 340. SKS 5, 332–3 / EUD, 345. SKS 5, 322–3 / EUD, 333. SKS 5, 104 / EUD, 98. SKS 5, 328 / EUD, 340. see, for example, rom 3:27–8, 11:6; gal 2:16, 21, 5:4; eph 2:5, 8; titus 3:7.

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these texts, indicating his intention to engage paul on a different level and with different emphases.63 Certainly, many of the pauline texts that Kierkegaard chooses as a text for a discourse are much more obscure than the classic “salvation by grace” passages. as noted above, Kierkegaard’s most extensive use of paul’s writings occurs in his edifying discourses and Christian Discourses, and comes to full expression as a major conversation partner in Works of Love. suspicious as he was of the emerging historical critical approaches to the Bible, he appears to read paul in the way that he recommends everyone should read the new testament. in quotations taken from his journals and cited by paul martens,64 Kierkegaard states, “read the nt without a commentary.”65 he also asserts, “it is a very simple matter. pick up the new testament: read it,”66 and “take any words in the nt; forget everything except pledging yourself to act accordingly.”67 he explicitly invites his readers in Works of Love to play “stranger” with paul’s text, to read an old and familiar text as though it were strange and new, opening oneself to whatever the text might reveal.68 it is not the case, however, that Kierkegaard simply read the pauline epistles, making no choices whatsoever about what was relevant for Christian consideration or worthy of commentary. Rather, Kierkegaard’s choices reflect and serve his purpose: to call Christians away from the domesticated, assimilated “easy life” that Christianity had become69 to an authentic, enacted faith characterized by a life of selfdenying service and love for others. while the mystery of grace is an ever-present (and sometimes unspoken) theme in Kierkegaard’s treatment of paul, he articulates emphatically that an authentic life of faith never ends with the assurance of grace, but bears fruit in the attitudes and actions of those who claim it. Kierkegaard consistently goes to great lengths to argue that for paul, faith and works are not separate, but that it is grace which enables Christians to imitate Christ in their everyday living. By so see rosas, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, pp. 157–96. martens, “authority, apostleship, and the difference between Kierkegaard’s old and new testaments,” p. 121. 65 SKS 23, 151, nB16:84 / JP 1, 210. in this stipulation, Kierkegaard possibly violated his own standard. Fishburn suggests that Kierkegaard learned the practice of identifying with paul as a way of grasping his intentions from commentaries on ephesians and philippians by “ruckert,” meaning leopold immanuel rückert (Fishburn, “søren Kierkegaard, exegete,” p. 233). Kierkegaard did cite a commentary on ephesians by rückert, Der Brief Pauli an die Epheser, pp. 271–306. see Pap. i C 35 / JP 5, 5068. in Commentar über den Brief Pauli an die Römer, leipzig: hartmann 1831, pp. viii–x, rückert invites interpreters of paul to “put on, so far as humanly possible, the whole individuality of the apostle.” (Quoted from werner Kümmel, The New Testament: A History of its Problems, minneapolis: abingdon Press 1970, pp. 110–11.) In this case, since Rückert advocated first person identification with the text methodology, Kierkegaard may have been willing to make an exception to his “no commentaries” rule. 66 SKS 21, 327, nB10:140 / JP 3, 2865. 67 SKS 23, 241–4, nB17:102 / JP 3, 2872. 68 SKS 9, 213 / WL, 210. see Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, p. 137. 69 lee C. Barrett, Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: abingdon press 2010, p. 7. 63 64

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doing, Kierkegaard was echoing a central concern of pietism and the neo-pietism of tholuck. what Kierkegaard gleans from paul, however, is not a list of actions and activities that must be undertaken in order to live more Christianly. he, like the rationalists, did not want to identify Paul with any culturally specific and therefore parochial set of behavioral precepts. on the contrary, Kierkegaard is careful to note that right actions, such as forgiving an enemy, done out of prideful or self-serving intention, negate the actions themselves and cause more harm than good.70 rather, Kierkegaard lifts from paul the attitudes and inner characteristics that reside within a person of faith and result in visible, Christian actions. Jamie Ferreira calls these inner characteristics “hidden, yet recognizable tasks,” works of love that “do not necessarily involve publicly observable behaviors,” but result in attitudes and dispositions that reflect the transformation of the inner person.71 Kierkegaard shows each of these characteristics to be paradoxical and foolish according to secular standards, and argues that the very paradoxical nature of these characteristics is essential to a true life of faith. Below, i will articulate some of these major themes. A. Unreasonable Hopefulness Kierkegaard takes up this theme in “the expectancy of an eternal salvation,” a discourse on 2 Corinthians 4:17–18 found in Edifying Discourses. here, Kierkegaard dwells on paul’s instruction to “not esteem the things that are seen, but the things that are unseen; for the things that are seen are temporal; but the things that are unseen are eternal,”72 taking “that which is eternal” to mean, in this instance, the expectation of eternal happiness. against a societal bias that rejects all such hoping, Kierkegaard asserts that unreasonable hoping has tangible and positive consequences for the “earthly, troubled life,”73 and claims that thoughts toward eternal happiness are never wasted, but fruitful. he asserts emphatically that an expectation of eternal happiness accomplishes the impossible: to be in two places at once, oriented in the same moment toward the transcendent as well as the immanent.74 advising the readers to “keep before our eyes the apostolic words,”75 Kierkegaard cites two areas of significance of eternal happiness for the present life. First, to focus on eternal happiness reveals that the standard of experience in temporal existence is insufficient.76 For paul, being oriented toward eternal happiness is what enabled him to mention with acceptance and even joy “our affliction, which is brief and light” despite his experience of intense persecution.77 since “eternity was his goal and its salvation his criterion,” his suffering and afflictions were diminished; when his burden became too heavy, 70 71

p. 138. 72 73 74 75 76 77

SKS 9, 291 / WL, 295. Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, 1 Cor 4:18. SKS 5, 261 / EUD, 266. SKS 5, 251 / EUD, 254. SKS 5, 255 / EUD, 259. SKS 5, 256 / EUD, 259. SKS 5, 256–7 / EUD, 259–60. SKS 5, 258 / EUD, 262.

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he weighed it and it became light.78 as such, the expectation of eternal happiness serves as a refuge in time of need, nourishing and strengthening one’s experience of immanent reality with transcendent hope. the second and most critical result of the expectation of eternal happiness is the reconciliation of “everyone with his neighbor, with his friend, and with his enemy” because what is nonessential has fallen away.79 one who expects eternal happiness no longer focuses on petty, inconsequential grievances and certainties that enable people to exclude others.80 acquiring eternal happiness by means of the certainty of grace, on the other hand, results in the ability to extend grace and thus be reconciled, one to another.81 Kierkegaard returns to the theme of unreasonable hopefulness in Works of Love where he wrestles with 1 Corinthians 13. what does it mean that love hopes all things and believes all things when clearly all things are not to be trusted or hoped for? Characteristically giving the written scriptural word the benefit of the doubt, Kierkegaard pushes past the absurdity of paul’s claims, turning conventional wisdom on its head once again. the problem with choosing not to believe all things, he claims, is the dilemma of deciding which things are to be believed and which are not. such a worldly decision requires faith in the power of one’s own knowledge; the attitude assumes that if one knows enough one can be secured against making mistakes in this judgment concerning what to believe. Kierkegaard has contempt for that misplaced certainty, stating that “only half-experienced and very confused people” put their faith in this kind of reasoning.82 in believing all things and hoping all things, knowledge born of mistrust is purified in love, for love is more willing to look foolish than be in error.83 in choosing to believe and hope, mistrust is subverted and love is shown. here again, Kierkegaard urges the cultivation of inner attitudes, gleaned from Paul, in order that they may have real significance in the service of others. A certain type of action should flow from faith. As Herder and others had claimed, paul and James are by no means incompatible. B. Self-Denial according to Kierkegaard’s reading of paul, a life of faith has nothing to do with furthering one’s own interests and everything to do with the upbuilding of another, even at one’s own expense. “True love,” writes Kierkegaard, “the self-sacrificing love, which loves each human being according to his distinctiveness, is willing to make every sacrifice—it does not seek its own.”84 Reflecting on Romans 13:10, Kierkegaard observes that this love does not occur in a single moment but continues through time as an expression of a lifetime of loving that emerges from a transformed

78 79 80 81 82 83 84

SKS 5, 258–9 / EUD, 262–3. SKS 5, 260 / EUD, 265. SKS 5, 260–2 / EUD, 265–6. SKS 5, 262–6 / EUD, 266–71. SKS 9, 232–3 / WL, 231. SKS 9, 233–4 / WL, 232–3. SKS 9, 272 / WL, 274.

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heart.85 in “love does not seek its own,” Kierkegaard explicates 1 Corinthians 13:5, affirming that true love is willing to make every sacrifice for the sake of another. such a life, says Kierkegaard, is not wasted but reaps the blessings of joy;86 to love another is worth every sacrifice.87 in Kierkegaard’s reading of paul, it is essential that other-regarding actions flow from faith. C. Willingness to Suffer For Kierkegaard, the self-denial required of a follower of Christ rightly includes the willingness to suffer. according to Kierkegaard, part of what it means to be an apostle is the certainty of suffering; apostles will be “scourged, persecuted, mocked, crucified and beheaded,”88 a fate that is unavoidable if one truly enacts the requirements of faith. taking paul as a paradigm for joyful self-denial and sacrifice for the sake of faith, Kierkegaard cautions that being a Christian involves significant risk and should not be undertaken “if your ultimate and highest goal is to have life made easy and sociable.”89 in this spirit, Kierkegaard takes paul to have written, “therefore i ask you not to lose heart over the hardships i am suffering for you, which are your glory.”90 like Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the hope for eternal happiness, this suffering exists not for its own sake but has practical implications for the Christian life. self-denial and suffering occur always for the sake of another, facilitating acts of love and kindness that demand no reciprocity from the beloved but exist only for the other’s benefit.91 other attitudes that can be discerned in Kierkegaard’s treatment of paul are obedience to the call of god, gratitude despite adversity, humility, a keen sense of insufficiency, and an overarching deep reliance on God to strengthen the reader for the journey. Quoting 1 Corinthians 13, Kierkegaard reminds his readers that Christian love is patient, is not jealous or resentful, and does not seek its own or rejoice at wrong, that love bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things and endures all things, and that love is not arrogant, impetuous, or irritable.92 all of these characteristics, derived at least in part from Kierkegaard’s pauline canon, depict a deep inwardness, the paradoxical inner landscape of one who truly lives a Christian life. Inner attitudes overflow into a life of good works, giving shape to a life lived for the sake of others. loving actions become a matter of course, the natural outpouring of a life that has been transformed from the inside out. this theme is most fully developed in Kierkegaard’s chapter iii a of Works of Love: “romans 13:10. love is the Fulfilling of the Law.” Here, Kierkegaard lambastes the prevailing dependence on “ingenuity and profundity” in a quest for social acceptance, characteristics that 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

SKS 9, 134–6 / WL, 132–4. SKS 9, 277 / WL, 279. SKS 9, 118 / WL, 114. SKS 9, 125 / WL, 122. SKS 9, 127 / WL, 124. eph 3:13, quoted from “strengthening in the inner Being,” see SKS 5, 89 / EUD, 82. SKS 9, 104 / WL, 100. SKS 9, 230–4 / WL, 219–21.

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he says enable people to “play Blindman’s Bluff,” willfully and craftily removing themselves from responsibility for or obligation toward another human being.93 Kierkegaard sees this responsibility as the essence of the Christian life, one that Christians in his day, from his perspective, had abdicated, hiding behind a vapid interpretation of the doctrine of grace to cheaply ensure their salvation.94 according to Kierkegaard, though love is central to the Christian life, people are afraid to look to paul to answer the question, “what is love?” precisely because he calls them away from objective inactivity and toward an active loving that cannot be equivocated or reasoned away.95 he writes, “if, then, you in any way, even in human frailty, will aspire to carry out the words of the apostle, that love is the fulfilling of the Law, then take care with people!...But take care lest it become more important to you that you are looked upon as loving them than that you love them.”96 true Christian love, for Kierkegaard, is evidenced by concrete actions with real-world implications rather than promises and good intentions. For this reason, says Kierkegaard, paul insists that love and law go together and may even be synonymous; Christ, whom Kierkegaard sees as the real law-giver, has mandated the law of love. Because love fulfills the law, no case can be made that the law no longer exists or that nothing more is required for the one who is a Christian. on the contrary, more is required, for in Christ the law becomes even more stringent and more exacting; the transformation of love in Christ requires genuine participation in the “society of love,” participation that sets people at loggerheads with the world.97 this reading of paul goes against the traditional lutheran emphasis, which reads paul through the lens of sola fide, though Kierkegaard himself affirms this doctrine wholeheartedly. indeed, as a devout lutheran, Kierkegaard is “deeply and humbly aware” that his salvation could never be assured by the works of his hands, but declares “if i am ever saved i will be saved by grace, just as the robber on the cross.”98 Kierkegaard despairs, however, that the doctrine of grace has displaced any notion of personal responsibility, cheapening the living of the Christian life. in a parody of this mentality, Kierkegaard quips, “excellent!...luther says: it depends on faith alone….so we take his words, his doctrine—and we are free from all works—long live luther!”99 this complaint was one of Kierkegaard’s principal charges against Christendom; he maintained that Christian people had forgotten the true requirements of the Christian life. rather than relieving Christians of all responsibility, Kierkegaard was convinced that salvation by grace through faith should produce a life of Christian love toward others. here Kierkegaard has no quarrel with luther; in fact, he has much sympathy for Luther’s reasons for over-emphasizing the sufficiency of grace for salvation, responding as he was to a critical distortion that had infected medieval Christianity. 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

SKS 9, 102 / WL, 97. SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24. SKS 9, 103–4 / WL, 97–8. SKS 9, 132 / WL, 129. SKS 9, 125 / WL, 122. SKS 13, 45 / FSE, 15. SKS 13, 45 / FSE, 16.

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he writes, “everything had become rather tortured, laborious, and unpleasant…. everything had become works” as though salvation itself depended upon them.100 Kierkegaard admits that luther performed a necessary correction of this “works salvation” by emphasizing the saving power of grace, though he critiques luther for being insufficiently dialectical in this emphasis.101 Kierkegaard suggests that luther never intended that grace should stand apart from works in the living out of the Christian faith. neither did paul disregard works as a necessary component of the Christian life. Kierkegaard’s argument with the church over its misappropriation of the doctrine of grace lies neither with paul nor with luther, but with the subsequent generations of Christians who, intentionally or otherwise, perverted luther’s emphasis on salvation by grace through faith into a bland, undemanding faith that requires nothing of its adherents. in an effort to present a corrective to this new milieu, Kierkegaard declares that after the era of luther the pendulum had swung too far to the other side, emphasizing grace to the exclusion of works. going back to paul, he reveals to his readers what they may never have known: that paul focuses not only on salvation by grace through faith, but proclaims a salvation that results in a life of love and service to others. By lifting from paul the inner characteristics of one saved by grace, Kierkegaard holds grace and works together, fleshing out what he understood to be Christianity’s most basic tenet: “that your life should express works as strenuously as possible; then one more thing is required—that you humble yourself and confess: But my being saved is nevertheless grace.”102 Certainly Kierkegaard looked to paul as an exemplary Christian whose life should be emulated. But did Kierkegaard consider himself to be an apostle like Paul? Fishburn presents the argument that he certainly identified both with Paul and Jesus, at least in his descriptions of himself as an exception and as the suffering servant.103 drawing on what she suggests was an early preoccupation with paul’s articulation of his calling to ministry in galatians 1:15–18,104 Fishburn wonders if the galatians passage might describe what Kierkegaard came to understand as “his SKS 13, 44 / FSE, 15. SKS 23, 367, nB19:57 / JP 3, 2521: “ah, but luther was not a dialectician; he did not see the enormous danger involved in making something else supreme….he did not understand that he had provided the corrective and that he ought to turn off the tap with extreme caution lest people automatically make him into a paradigm.” see sylvia walsh, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Christian Existence, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania state university press 2006, p. 156. 102 SKS 13, 46 / FSE, 17. 103 Fishburn, “søren Kierkegaard, exegete,” p. 236. For further discussion of Kierkegaard’s unconscious identification with Christ, see Roger Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, Charlottesville, virginia: university press of virginia 1993, pp. 258ff. 104 gal 1:15–18, “But when he who had set me apart before i was born, and had called me through his grace, was pleased to reveal his son to me, in order that i might preach him among the Gentiles, I did not confer with flesh and blood, nor did I go up to Jerusalem to those who were apostles before me, but i went away into arabia; and again i returned to damascus.” as quoted by Fishburn, “søren Kierkegaard, exegete,” p. 236. 100 101

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unique vocation just after the traumatic breaking off with regine,” causing him to identify his own mission with paul’s.105 she also notes that he, like paul, lacked the normative credentials for authority, referring to Kierkegaard’s failure to pursue ordination and presumably likening it to paul’s history of persecuting Christians, a history Kierkegaard calls Paul’s thorn in the flesh, or that which reminds him constantly of his inadequacy and therefore makes him more effective.106 Certainly Kierkegaard holds paul up as a paradigm of faithfulness for Christians to imitate in the life of faith, taking special note of his perseverance despite suffering and persecution, and may have taken comfort in his own hardships as a result. it is also apparent that Kierkegaard believed that he had a message for the Christian world that he was convinced was worth hearing. one important distinction is missing from Kierkegaard’s writings, however, that would qualify him for apostleship as he saw it: the sanction of divine authority. while he is unequivocal that an apostle derives authority from a divine source, Kierkegaard consistently acknowledges that he has received no such calling and therefore speaks without authority of any kind, having obtained neither the credentials of ordination nor a direct calling from god. indeed, while wrestling with the issue of direct revelation in The Book on Adler, he concludes that while such a thing is indeed possible, neither he nor his acquaintance adler had received such a calling.107 Kierkegaard holds paul up as a model to emulate, but had no illusion that he himself was an apostle of the same variety. despite scholarly inattention to paul in Kierkegaard’s corpus, paul clearly resides at the center of Kierkegaard’s call to the Christian life. pushing past a traditional (and superficial) reading of Paul that narrowly focused on imputed righteousness, Kierkegaard lifts up paul not only as the herald of god’s grace but also as a paradigm of Christian living. For Kierkegaard, paul was the epitome of one saved by grace, for his life and calling exemplified the difficult road that is required of followers of Christ. downplaying the pauline traditional texts concerning faith and works, Kierkegaard, through paul, paints a picture of the inner landscape of a follower of Christ, calling his readers to attend to their attitudes and dispositions in order that works of love can emerge. In so doing, Kierkegaard was in significant continuity with the biblical scholars who had been influenced by Pietism. Although he remained suspicious of the tendency of higher criticism to distract the individual from the business of leading the Christian life by their foregrounding of irresolvable historical questions, Kierkegaard was indebted to many of the higher critics for their recovery of the pauline theme of Christ-likeness.

105 106 107

Fishburn, “søren Kierkegaard, exegete,” pp. 236–7. ibid. Pap. viii–2 B, 7.7–11 / BA, 82–90.

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss Paul adler, adolph peter, Forsøg til en kort systematisk Fremstilling af Christendommen i dens Logik, Copenhagen: louis Klein 1846, pp. 47–8; p. 56 (ASKB u 13). Baader, Franz, Ueber den Paulinischen Begriff des Versehenseyns des Menschen im Namen Jesu vor der Welt Schöpfung. Sendeschreiben an den Herrn Professor Molitor in Frankfurt, vols. 1–3, würzburg: stahel 1837 (vols. 1–2, ASKB 409– 410; vol. 3, ASKB 413). —— Revision der Philosopheme der Hegel’schen Schule bezüglich auf das Christenthum. Nebst zehn Thesen aus einer religiösen Philosophie, stuttgart: liesching 1839, p. 56; pp. 84–5; p. 118; p. 157; p. 182 (ASKB 416). Billroth, gustav, Commentar zu den Briefen des Paulus an die Corinther, leipzig: weidmann 1833 (ASKB 104). herder, Johann gottfried, “Briefe, das studium der theologie betreffend,” in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 13, pp. 11–17 (ASKB 1676–1684). —— “Briefe an theophron,” in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 15, p. 69 (ASKB 1676–1684). martensen, hans lassen, Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie i vor Tids dogmatiske Theologie, trans. by l.v. petersen, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1841, pp. 54–5 (ASKB 651). müller, Julius, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde, vols. 1–2, 3rd revised and enlarged ed., Breslau: Josef max 1849, vol. 1, pp. 434–59 (ASKB 689–690). olshausen, hermann, Die Briefe Pauli an die Römer und Korinthier, Königsberg: unzer 1837, pp. 1–88 (ASKB 103). —— Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–40, vol. 3, pp. 3–61; pp. 475–502 (ASKB 96–100). rosenkranz, Karl, Encyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften, halle: C.a. schwetschke und sohn 1831, pp. 167–74 (ASKB 35). scharling, Carl emil, De Paulo apostolo ejusque adversariis commentatio quam ad summos in theologia honores inter publica solennia ecclesiæ ante trecentos annos in Dania reformatæ rite obtinendos, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1836 (ASKB 105). tholuck, Friedrich august gotttreu, Auslegung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer, 3rd ed., Berlin: Ferdinand dümmler 1831, pp. 181–260; pp. 330–406 (ASKB 102).

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usteri, leonhard, Udvikling af det Paulinske Lærebegreb i dets Forhold til det Ny Testamentes bibelske Dogmatik. Et exegetisk-dogmatisk Forsøg, trans. by wilhelm Johan Jacob Boethe, Copenhagen: philipsen 1839 (ASKB 850). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, vol. 2, pp. 213–88 (ASKB 80). —— Kurze Erklärung des Briefes an die Römer, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838, pp. 1–170 (ASKB 112). winer, georg Benedict, Biblisches Realwörterbuch zum Handgebrauch für Studirende, Kandidaten, Gymnasiallehrer und Prediger, vols 1–2, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Carl heinrich reclam 1833–38, vol. 2, pp. 245–63 (ASKB 70–71). zeuthen, ludvig, Om den christelige Tro i dens Betydning for Verdenshistorien. Et Forsøg, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1838, p. 34; p. 54 (ASKB 259). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of Paul Bohlin, torsten, Kierkegaards dogmatiska åskådning i dess historiska sammanhang, stockholm: svenska Kyrkans diakonistryrelses Bokförlag 1925, pp. 60–172. damgaard, iben, “Kierkegaard og Bibelen,” in Skriftsyn og metode, ed. by sigfred pedersen, Århus: aarhus universitetsforlag 2002 (Dansk kommentar til Det nye testamente, vol. 1), pp. 170–94. eriksen, niels nymann, Kierkegaard’s Category of Repetition, Berlin and new York: walter de gruyter 2000 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 5), pp. 47–9. evans, C. stephen, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, oxford: oxford university press 2004, p. 157. Fishburn, Janet Forsythe, “søren Kierkegaard, exegete,” Interpretation, vol. 29, no. 3, 1985, pp. 229–45. gouwens, david J., Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1996, p. 161; p. 210; p. 228. Ferreira, m. Jamie, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, new York: oxford university press 2001, pp. 137–8. hall, amy laura, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, Cambridge: Cambridge university press 2002, p. 29; p. 54; p. 61; p. 202. Josipovici, gabriel, “st. paul and subjectivity,” in his The Book of God, new haven, Connecticut: Yale university press 1988, pp. 235–256. Kloeden, wolfgang von, “Biblestudy,” in Kierkegaard’s View of Christianity, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 1), pp. 16–38. malantschuk, gregor, Frihed og Eksistens. Studier i Søren Kierkegaards Tænkning, ed. by niels Jørgen Cappelørn and paul müller, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1980, pp. 11–18. martens, paul, “authority, apostleship, and the difference between Kierkegaard’s old and new testaments,” in The Book on Adler, ed. by robert l. perkins,

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macon, georgia: mercer university press 2008 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 24), pp. 121–41. mulder, Jack, Jr., “the Catholic moment? on the apostle in Kierkegaard’s ‘the difference between a genius and an apostle,’ ” in Without Authority, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2007 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 18), p. 209. pattison, george, Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses, london: routledge 2002, p. 160; p. 164. pedersen, Jørgen, “Kierkegaards view of scripture,” in The Sources and Depths of Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2), Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978, pp. 27– 57. polk, timothy h., The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997. pyper, hugh s., “the lesson of eternity: Christ as teacher in Kierkegaard and hegel,” in Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1994 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 7), p. 131. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994. thulstrup, niels, “adam and original sin,” in Theological Concepts in Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen, C.a. reitzel 1980 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 5), p. 123; p. 127; p. 130. watkin, Julia, Kierkegaard, london: Continuum 1997, p. 26; p. 99. westfall, John, “the death of the apostle: authorial authority in The Book on Adler and roland Barthes,” in The Book on Adler, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2008 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 24), pp. 187–8. ziolkowski, eric, “the Child and Kierkegaard’s ‘one who loves’: the agapic Flip side of peter pan,” in Works of Love, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1999 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 16), p. 280; pp. 282–3; p. 291; p. 294.

James: putting Faith to action Kyle a. roberts

and James says: Be not only hearers of the word but doers of it. But in order to become a doer of the Word one must first of all be a hearer or reader of it, which James does indeed say.1

I. Introduction the dialectic of law and grace in Kierkegaard’s thought is well known.2 Christianity, as Kierkegaard articulates it, holds apparent opposites in dialectical tension: strenuousness and leniency, grace and law, conviction and consolation. these inherent tensions do not, however, rule out their “fusion” in the context of actuality.3 According to Kierkegaard’s observations, Denmark’s official Christianity had insidiously eased the tension by emphasizing grace to the exclusion of works. thus the biblical passages that conferred leniency and consolation were readily SKS 13, 53 / FSE, 25. Cf., for example, For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21). see especially the articles by david Cain, lee Barrett, Craig hinkson, murray rae, and martin andic on the law–gospel dialectic and the role of the prototype as the ideal in the Christian life. 3 paul plass describes the relationship between absolute human responsibility and absolute divine grace as a “fusion.” For plass, the subjective and objective elements presented in scripture are to be seen as “antinomies” which are cancelled out when action takes precedence over conceptual understanding. this does not, for plass, cause Kierkegaard to collapse into a mere subjectivism, but nor does it offer certainty of knowledge in the objective realm. rather, it exchanges the less certain category of objective truth (in which only probability is possible) with the more certain category of subjective truth (in which one’s action enables the actualization of truth in one’s personal existence). i would add that for Kierkegaard the latter category is more certain also because the finitude and fallenness of humanity entail that a supernatural revelation and a covenantal relationship are required for humanity to have any confidence at all regarding the nature and content of essential truth. Cf. paul plass, “antinomy and exegesis in Kierkegaard,” Theologische Zeitschrift, vol. 42, 1986, pp. 26–39. 1 2

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appropriated both by the average Christian and by the cleric, while the imperatives of the new testament were rationalized away. Kierkegaard writes: “Christendom” falsely appropriates the words of consolation and encouragement—and in the long run still never uses them. For in the world of the spirit everything hangs together: if I truly were to use such a prodigiously exalted consolation, the first effect the consolation would have would be to make my life more strenuous. The first thing the consolation does is to give me strenuousness.4

much of Kierkegaard’s “second authorship” is an attempt to correct what he viewed as danish lutheranism’s unfaithful appropriation of Luther’s doctrine of justification by faith alone and its devaluing of the place of works in the Christian life. the new testament’s epistle of James provided Kierkegaard with a theological corrective to what he perceived as a pervasive misunderstanding of and abuse of grace. II. Kierkegaard’s Historical Context the epistle of James had always occupied an ambiguous position in the lutheran heritage, for luther had famously disparaged it because it seemed to suggest justification through the performance of good works rather than justification by grace through faith. that legacy of suspicion continued during the period of Kierkegaard’s theological maturation and was perpetuated by some higher critics of the Bible. Johann gottfried eichhorn (1752–1827) doubted that the book had been written by James the apostle or James the brother of Jesus; these doubts made the epistle easier to marginalize.5 the celebrated biblical scholar wilhelm martin leberecht de wette (1780–1849), whose exegetical work Kierkegaard used extensively, continued to regard James as being in opposition to paul. he presented the hypothesis that the epistle of James is actually a product of the post-apostolic church, designed to critique the young church’s growing accommodation to the world. in the letter this deleterious accommodation finds its theological support in the Pauline theme of reliance upon faith alone. according to de wette, James’ antidote to this accommodation was an unfortunate failure to appreciate the spiritually beneficial implications of Paul’s doctrine of justification by grace.6 in a somewhat more subtle 4 SKS 25, 191, nB27:77 / JP 3, 2897. as Kierkegaard writes, “the error from which luther turned was an exaggeration with regard to works. and he was entirely right; he did not make a mistake—a person is justified solely and only by faith. That is the way he talked and taught—and believed. and that this was not taking grace in vain—to that his life witnessed. splendid! But already the next generation slackened; it did not turn with horror away from exaggeration with regard to works (in which luther lived) toward faith. no, it made the lutheran position into doctrine, and in this way faith also diminished in vital power.” SV1 Xii, 462 / JFY, 194. 5 Johann gottfried eichhorn, Einleitung in das Neue Testament, vols. 1–5, leipzig: weidmann 1804–27, vol. 3, part 2, pp. 569–98. 6 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2, 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, vol. 2, pp. 301–13 (ASKB 80).

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way, Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860) perpetuated the tendency to juxtapose paul and James by proposing that the epistle of James was an attempt to synthesize the positions of paul and the gentile Christians, on the one hand, and peter and the Jewish Christians, on the other. Baur tended to regard James’ affirmation of works as a dilution of the Pauline emphasis of justification by faith, a theme that Baur favored.7 however, countervailing interpretive tendencies had appeared, suggesting a fundamental compatibility of James and paul. luther himself was capable of using James positively, having written a sermon based on James 1:17–21,8 a sermon which Kierkegaard read in 1850.9 in the eighteenth century, partly inspired by rationalism and partly by pietism, many biblical expositors began to challenge the traditional contrast of Paul and James and the identification of that contrast with the dichotomy of faith and works. while meticulously investigating the identity of the author of the Epistle of James and reaching no definite conclusions, Johann David Michaelis (1717–91), a neologian who sought to synthesize reason and revelation, objected to the denigration of James, proposing that if the book is dismissed as an epistle of straw, so also must be Jesus’ sermon on the mount.10 Johann gottfried herder (1744–1803) took the epistle of James very seriously, believing that it had been written by James the brother of Jesus who became the leader of the Jerusalem church.11 Contrary to luther’s more critical interpretive moods, herder found James to be compatible with the pauline literature, for both James and paul agreed that faith must manifest itself in loving actions. Johann August Wilhelm Neander (1789–1850) wrote an influential commentary on James that further promoted James’ theological rehabilitation.12 like herder, neander argued in his exhaustive recounting of the history of the early church that James and paul could be harmonized, for James simply spelled out the ramifications of God’s objective action (the aspect of justification emphasized by paul) for the subjective life of the believer and the believer’s actions.13

Ferdinand Christian Baur, Geschichte der christlichen Kirche, vols. 1–5, tübingen: Fues 1853–62, vol. 1, pp. 96–8. 8 martin luther, “sermon on Fourth sunday after easter,” in his En Christelig Postille, sammendragen af Dr. Morten Luthers Kirke- og Huuspostiller, new danish trans. by Jørgen thisted, Copenhagen: den wahlske Boghandling 1828, pp. 248–55 (ASKB 283). 9 SKS 23, 461–2, nB20:130 / JP 6, 6666. 10 Johann david michaelis, Einleitung in die göttlichen Schriften des Neuen Bundes, vols. 1–2, 4th revised ed., göttingen: vandenhoek und ruprecht 1788, vol. 2, pp. 1141ff. 11 Johann gottfried herder, “Briefe zweener Brüder Jesu in unserm Kanon,” in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 11, pp. 187–286 (ASKB 1676–1684). 12 Johann august wilhelm neander, Der Brief Jakobi. In berichtigter Lutherscher Uebersetzung von K.F.Th. Schneider. Praktisch erläutert durch August Neander, Berlin: Karl wiegandt 1850. 13 Johann august wilhelm neander, Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel: als selbstständiger Nachtrag zu der allgemeinen Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche, vols. 1–2, hamburg: Friedrich perthes 1832–33, vol. 2, pp. 419–42. 7

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Kierkegaard could have been familiar with this revision of the relationship of the epistle of James and the pauline literature from his theological library. he owned copies of books by de wette14 and georg Benedict winer (1789–1858)15 that outlined these scholarly controversies. he also probably became familiar with exegetical disputes during his translation of most of James (up to 4:15) into latin,16 which he may have done in conjunction with a class by Carl emil scharling (1803–77) on galatians, James, 1 and 2 peter, and Jude in 1835–36.17 III. Kierkegaard’s Use of James James is cited only rarely and incidentally in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous literature. However, James figures much more prominently in the upbuilding discourses and overtly Christian writings. Most significantly in his earlier works, James 1:17–22 provides the scriptural text for three different upbuilding discourses of 1843 entitled “every good and perfect gift is from above,” whose very name echoes that passage.18 In the first of these discourses, James 1:13 is used to suggest that God does not tempt anyone and to encourage trust in the constancy of god’s love.19 according to Kierkegaard’s appropriation of James, everything that happens can be received as a good gift by anyone who possesses the virtues of humility and trust;20 everything, even a calamity, can be a good gift if it is accepted in gratitude. in the second discourse based on James 1:17–22,21 Kierkegaard elaborates the theme that god, like a solicitous father, provides not only the ultimate good gift, which is god the font of all goodness, but also the very need for god. in the third discourse22 Kierkegaard emphasizes the equality of all persons in the giving and receiving of good gifts, for all instances of humans giving and receiving are themselves gifts from god. Because God is the ultimate giver, all human individuals are equal in their insignificance. The theme that god is actually the agent responsible for the good gifts that humans give to and receive from one another is repeated in Christian Discourses along with the reference to James 1:17.23 James 1:17 appears again in Works of Love to suggest that even the wrongs done to a person by other people should be accepted as a “good and de wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vol. 2, pp. 301–13. 15 georg Benedict winer, Biblisches Realwörterbuch zum Handgebrauch für Studirende, Kandidaten, Gymnasiallehrer und Prediger, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Carl heinrich reclam 1833–38, vol. 1, pp. 620–3 (ASKB 70–71). 16 SKS 17, 194–7, CC:11 / KJN 1, 185–8. 17 SKS K17, 323–6 / KJN 1, 428. 18 SKS 5, 39–56 / EUD, 31–48. 19 SKS 5, 46 / EUD, 38. 20 see andrew Burgess, “Kierkegaard’s discourses on ‘every…perfect gift’ as love letters to regine,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), pp. 15–30. 21 SKS 5, 129–42 / EUD, 125–39. 22 SKS 5, 143–58 / EUD, 141–58. 23 SKS 10, 34 / CD, 32. 14

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perfect gift from god.”24 in all these instances Kierkegaard uses James to encourage an almost pauline trust in god’s gracious agency. the importance of this passage to Kierkegaard is indicated by his declaration in 1852 that it had been a text that he had strongly emphasized with regine olsen during their courtship.25 at the same time that Kierkegaard employed James to celebrate god’s graciousness, he also used James to accentuate the imperative dimension of the Christian life. in the Upbuilding Discourses Kierkegaard cites James 2:8 in support of the theme of equality implicit in the divine law to love one’s neighbor as oneself.26 similarly, in Works of Love James 2:8 is alluded to when Kierkegaard calls the commandment “you shall love your neighbor as yourself” the “royal law.”27 the title of the lengthy section “purity of heart is to will one thing” in “an occasional discourse” is adapted from James 4:8.28 in this context the passage from James functions as a stimulus for repentance and as a call to unify the self by consistently striving to will the good. accordingly, Kierkegaard refers to James 1:7–8 in order to critique the various forms of double-mindedness that subvert the willing of the good.29 in all these instances James serves to present the daunting demands of genuine Christianity. For Kierkegaard, James is both a hymn of praise to god’s gracious agency and a call to human action. the nature of the dialectical relation of the uses of James to suggest both god’s gracious indicative and god’s demanding imperative becomes most clear in For Self-Examination. here, in Kierkegaard’s extended exposition of James 1:22–7, he contrasts two “times”: the ascetic legalism of medieval Christianity and the antinomianism of nineteenth-century denmark. in medieval Christianity, “everything had become works” and thus “through petty self-torments, they had made god just as petty.”30 in the lutheranism of Kierkegaard’s denmark the apostle James had been “shoved aside.”31 although luther’s life had expressed both works and faith, his criticisms of James’ theology and the canonicity of the apostle’s letter led Kierkegaard’s contemporaries to say, “excellent…this is something for us…we are free from all works…long live luther!”32 Kierkegaard knew well that faith and works were not an “either/or” relationship. as he states, “in every human being there is an inclination either to want to be meritorious when it comes to works or, when faith and grace are to be emphasized, also to want to be free from works as far as possible.”33 luther’s intention, Kierkegaard writes, was not to remove works from Christianity. rather, he only wanted to take “meritoriousness” away from works. works are for the purpose of witnessing for the truth and of driving people to their 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

SKS 9, 376 / WL, 384. SKS 24, 522, nB25:109 / JP 6, 6800. SKS 5, 144 / EUD, 142. SKS 9, 32 / WL, 24. SKS 9, 62 / WL, 55. SKS 8, 138–9 / UD, 24. SKS 8, 223 / UD, 121. SKS 8, 152 / UD, 40. SKS 13, 44 / FSE, 15. SKS 13, 45 / FSE, 16. SKS 13, 45 / FSE, 15. ibid.

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existential need for god and his grace, not for pointing to the works themselves or to the one who does them as deserving of accolades or important clerical positions. however, the “secular mentality” of post-reformation denmark took both works and meritoriousness away together.34 were luther alive in nineteenth-century denmark, Kierkegaard suggested, he would recognize that James’ emphasis on the connection between grace and works was a necessary corrective: But imagine luther in our own generation, aware of our condition—do you not think he would say as he says in a sermon, “the world is like a drunken peasant; if you help him up on one side of the horse, he falls on the other side.” do you not think he would say: the apostle James must be drawn forward a little, not for works against faith—no, no, that was not the apostle’s meaning either—but for faith, in order, if possible, to cause the need for grace to be felt deeply in genuine humble inwardness and, if possible, to prevent grace, faith and grace as the only redemption and salvation, from being taken totally in vain, from becoming a camouflage even for a refined worldliness.35

For Kierkegaard, grace and faith—both gifts of god—must remain the “major premise” of Christianity. But works must remain the ever-present “minor premise” and a testimony to the efficacy of grace and faith.36 as Kierkegaard noted, sustaining the priority of works is particularly important for an ordinary human being, or a “cunning fellow.” he confesses: i have become convinced that i am not an honest soul but a cunning fellow. thus it certainly becomes most proper to pay attention to the minor premise (works, existence, to witness to and suffer for the truth, works of love, etc.), the minor premise in lutheran doctrine. not that the minor premise should now be made the major premise, not that faith and grace should be abolished or disparaged—god forbid—no, it is precisely for the sake of the major premise, and because i am the kind of fellow i am, it certainly becomes more proper to pay attention to the minor premise in lutheran doctrine—for in relation to “honest souls” nothing needs to be done.37

the epistle of James, which reminds it readers that works accompany true faith, held, for Kierkegaard, the answer to a re-establishment of a fuller understanding and appropriation of the Christian gospel.38 it contained the missing “minor premise” of lutheran doctrine, and provided Kierkegaard with the missing link for the reintroduction of new testament Christianity into Christendom. SKS 13, 46 / FSE, 17. SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24. in an earlier draft, Kierkegaard wrote, “suppose that luther is aware of the conditions. what will he say? he will say: works must then be accentuated again; James, too, has a point, not against faith (nor did James mean that either) but for faith.” Pap. X–6 B 2, 8–9 / FSE, supplement, pp. 228–9. 36 SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24. 37 SKS 13, 52-3 / FSE, 24–5. 38 in another earlier draft of a text in For Self Examination, Kierkegaard wrote, “more attention must be paid to works. i have done James an injustice; he is indeed really right, namely, not against faith (and that certainly was not his meaning) but for or with faith.” Pap. X–6 B 6:10 / FSE, supplement, p. 233. 34 35

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The question Kierkegaard asks in the first chapter of For Self-Examination, “what is required in order to look at oneself with true Blessing in the mirror of the word?” he answers in the second chapter, “Christ is the way.” one must relate contemporaneously to the god-man by following him in discipleship. particularly in his explicitly religious authorship, Kierkegaard provoked his readers to ask the existential question, “what must i do to be saved and to become a true self?” he also encouraged his readers to inwardly appropriate god’s promises of grace and redemption in Jesus Christ. he assured his readers that while Christianity makes strenuous demands, it also provides the enabling power to fulfill the demands and applies forgiveness when the striver fails to fulfill them. Christendom, Kierkegaard said, had done away with the law/grace dialectic in the new testament: they have made grace a “discharge from the law.”39 For Kierkegaard, by contrast, the “relationship of the gospel to the law is that of the radical cure.”40 he exhorts: all those commands and orders of the law avail nothing; nothing comes of them; a person is never saved by them. no, come in all earnestness to a breaking point, a breakthrough; break with all that within you with which the law with all its commands is quarreling; break with it entirely—all of your past has been forgiven (grace) and god will help you (grace). Become a new man, perfect as the truth (the gospel is the truth).41

the Bible directs readers toward obedience to Christ and the imitation of Christ. But the intention of the gospels is not to “crush” the striver. rather, “its intention is that by means of the requirement and my humiliation i shall be lifted, believing and worshiping—and then i am light as a bird.”42 even the thought of god’s grace is uplifting. the purpose of the new testament ideal, as Kierkegaard has it, is to “press toward humility,” so that one acquires existential awareness of the need for grace and a deep and abiding sense of one’s absolute need for god. in this way the alleged opposition of paul and James is overcome in James’ vision of a trusting, repentant, active faith.

39 40 41 42

SKS 25, 348, nB29:89 / JP 3, 2905. SKS 25, 347, nB29:89 / JP 3, 2905. SKS 25, 347–8, nB29:89 / JP 3, 2905. SV1 Xii, 427 / JFY, 153.

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library that Discuss James Bretschneider, Karl gottlieb, Handbuch der Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche oder Versuch einer beurtheilenden Darstellung der Grundsätze, welche diese Kirche in ihren symbolischen Schriften über die christliche Glaubenslehre ausgesprochen hat, vols. 1–2, 4th ed., leipzig: J.a. Barth 1838 [1814], vol. 1, pp. 611–12 (ASKB 437–438). [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34, vol. 7, pp. 341–86 (ASKB 92–95). hahn, august, Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens, leipzig: vogel 1828, p. 136 (ASKB 535). hase, Karl, Hutterus redivivus oder Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche: Ein dogmatisches Repertorium für Studierende, 4th revised ed., leipzig: Brietkopf und härtel 1839, p. 273 (ASKB 581). herder, Johann gottfried, “Briefe zweener Brüder Jesu in unserm Kanon,” in Johann Gottfried von Herder’s sämmtliche Werke. Zur Religion und Theologie, vols. 1–18, stuttgart and tübingen: J.g. Cotta 1827–30, vol. 11, pp. 187–286 (ASKB 1676–1684). luther, martin, En Christelig Postille, sammendragen af Dr. Morten Luthers Kirkeog Huuspostiller, new danish trans. by Jørgen thisted, Copenhagen: den wahlske Boghandling 1828, pp. 248–55 (ASKB 283). rosenkranz, Karl, Encyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften, halle: C.a. schwetschke und sohn 1831, p. 174 (ASKB 35). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, vol. 2, pp. 301–13 (ASKB 80). winer, georg Benedict, Biblisches Realwörterbuch zum Handgebrauch für Studirende, Kandidaten, Gymnasiallehrer und Prediger, vols 1–2, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Carl heinrich reclam 1833–38, vol. 1, pp. 620–3 (ASKB 70–71). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of James andic, martin, “the mirror,” in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 339–42. Barrett, lee, “Faith, works and the uses of the law: Kierkegaard’s appropriation of lutheran doctrine,” in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. by

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robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 77–110. Burgess, andrew, “Kierkegaard’s discourses on ‘every…perfect gift’ as love letters to regine,” in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2003 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 5), pp. 15–30. Cain, david, “a star in a Cross, getting the dialectic right,” in For SelfExamination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 315–34. Fishburn, Janet Forsythe, “søren Kierkegaard: exegete,” Interpretation, vol. 39, 1985, pp. 229–45. hinkson, Craig, “will the real martin luther please stand up! Kierkegaard’s view of luther versus the evolving perceptions of the tradition,” in For SelfExamination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 41–76. Kloeden, wolfdietrich von, “der Begriff ‘dypsychos’ in Kierkegaards denken. ein Beitrag zur existentiellen exegese von Jak. 4:8,” in Faith, Knowledge, and Action: Essays Presented to Niels Thulstrup on his Sixtieth Birthday, ed. by george l. stengren, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1984, pp. 54–63. minear, paul and paul morimoto, Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, princeton, new Jersey: princeton theological seminary 1953, pp. 3–13. parkov, peter, Bibelen i Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1983, pp. 87–132. plass, paul, “antinomy and exegesis in Kierkegaard,” Theologische Zeitschrift, vol. 42, 1986, pp. 26–39. polk, timothy h., The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997, pp. 119–52. rae, murray, “Kierkegaard, Barth and Bonhoeffer: Conceptions of the relation Between grace and works,” in For Self Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 143–67. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, p 148. thust, martin, Sören Kierkegaard. Der Dichter des Religiösen. Grundlagen eines Systems der Subjektivität, munich: C.h. Beck 1931, pp. 386–401. watkin, Julia, “the letter from the lover: Kierkegaard on the Bible and Belief,” in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 287–313.

part ii overview articles

Kierkegaard’s latin translations of the new testament: a Constant dialogue with the vulgate niels w. Bruun and Finn gredal Jensen

I. The General Background and Purpose of the Translations during the years 1833–36, søren Kierkegaard was working diligently on his translations of parts of the new testament from greek to latin. these translations are found in the Journal CC, entries CC:1–11.1 at the same time critical questions were being raised by scholars in the field about the usefulness of continuing to use latin as the language for examinations.2 as a preliminary step towards reform, the catalogue of courses at the university of Copenhagen, traditionally published in Latin, was published for the first time also in Danish in 1833 at the request of professor henrik nicolai Clausen (1793–1877); further, in 1835 a royal resolution was decreed that in a limited number of cases the native danish language could be used as the language of examination by the theological Faculty, while the use of the Latin language for the written examinations was retained in the exegetical fields.3 this contribution is a revised version of our german article, “die lateinischen Übersetzungen søren Kierkegaards aus dem neuen testament,” Neulateinisches Jahrbuch / Journal of NeoLatin Language and Literature, vol. 4, 2002, pp. 17–30; an earlier, shorter version of this is “Kierkegaard’s latin translations of the new testament in the Journal CC,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2001, pp. 443–52. 1 the text, edited by niels w. Bruun and Finn gredal Jensen, has been published in SKS 17, 145–97, CC:1–11 / KJN 1, 139–88; a critical account of the text, an introduction and explanatory notes are found in SKS K17, 267–326 / KJN 1, 427–62. 2 in 1832 peter larsen, at the time a theology student, published at his own expense his Forslag til at afskaffe det latinske Sprog, som Examinations-Sprog, saavel ved alle EmbedsExamina i Almindelighed, som ved examen theologicum i Særdeleshed, and later in the same year his Betragtninger over det latinske Sprog fra forskjellige Synspuncter. in 1834 nikolai Frederik severin grundtvig (1783–1872) opened his initial attack on the “black school” with the pamphlet Den latinske Stil, reprinted in Nik. Fred. Sev. Grundtvigs udvalgte Skrifter, vols. 1–10, ed. by holger Begtrup, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1904–9, vol. 8, pp. 26–39. 3 Cf. the royal resolution from December 13, 1835: “In the final examination in theology it is in part allowed to use the danish language instead of the latin language, such that of the 6 exercises which are worked out in the written examination, at most 3 parts, at least 2 parts, and as a rule the exegetical parts, should be written in latin, the others by contrast in danish.” Contained in Samling af Forordninger, Rescripter, Resolutioner og Collegialbreve, som

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For the written examination in new testament exegesis the student would receive a part of the original greek text, which he was to translate into latin without the aid of any reference works. afterwards he was to give a commentary on the text, also in latin, focusing on both its linguistic aspects and its content.4 thus, it was an examination which presupposed a thorough and solid knowledge of greek and a large, active vocabulary in latin. Kierkegaard was a pupil at the Borgerdyd school (i.e., the school of Civic virtue) of Copenhagen during the years 1821–30. at the time it was the leading grammar school both in Copenhagen and in the rest of the country. he offered for the university entrance examination (studentereksamen) in latin more than 11,000 verses of poetry and around 1,250 pages of prose.5 his preparations for the examination in greek were not so extensive, but its 10,000 verses of homer and 330 pages of prose were nonetheless awe-inspiring.6 on the strength of this extraordinary philological education, the young Kierkegaard was an able latinist, who had already demonstrated his sense for latin composition during his time at the latin school.7 during his years as a theology student, Kierkegaard taught both latin grammar and composition at his old school; moreover, he functioned in the capacity of external

vedkomme Geistligheden, vols. 1–3, ed. by J.l.a. Kolderup-rosenvinge, 3rd ed., Copenhagen: J. deichmann 1838–40, vol. 3, p. 103. in 1847 the danish language won even more ground, and in 1850 latin was entirely eliminated as a language of examination at the theological Faculty. 4 the organization of the written examination in exegesis is known from two extant completed examinations from the exam given in January 1846 (rigsarkivet, Copenhagen, Ku. 31.07.05). 5 in the higher classes Kierkegaard had 12–13 lessons every week in latin reading and 4–5 lessons in latin composition. Concerning Kierkegaard’s time in school, see per Krarup, Søren Kierkegaard og Borgerdydskolen, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1977. 6 the extent of the reading in latin and greek is seen from Kierkegaard’s “school testimony,” cf. Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, trans. and ed. by Bruce h. Kirmmse, princeton: princeton university press 1996, pp. 14–15; p. 273. thulstrup’s version of this in B&A, pp. 4–5, is misleading since he has “reconstructed” a school testimony for Kierkegaard; without respect to the source he makes a reference to the prose texts given for the examination by the top student in the class. 7 on his shelf Kierkegaard had Frederik Christian olsen’s edition and translation of a textbook by the german philologist C.g. zumpt, Opgaver til Oversættelse fra Dansk paa Latin, uddragne af de bedste nyere latinske Forfattere. Til Brug for de lærde Skolers høiere Klasser, Copenhagen: a. soldin 1826 (ASKB 1011), as well as [Karl ludwig roth and Karl Friedrich von nägelsbach], Uebungen des lateinischen Stils mit Commentaren und Hinweisungen auf die Zumptische und Schulzische Grammatik, nürnberg: schrag 1829 (ASKB 1008). later he bought Johann philipp Krebs, Anleitung zum Lateinischschreiben in Regeln und Beispielen zur Uebung, nebst einem Antibarbarus. Zum Gebrauche der Jugend, 7th ed., Frankfurt am main: heinrich ludwig Brönner 1834 (ASKB 1005). the poet h.p. holst (1811–93), Kierkegaard’s classmate, says in a letter from september 11, 1869, “at the Borgerdyd school we had a regular practice whereby i wrote the danish essays for him and he wrote the latin ones for me.” Cf. Encounters with Kierkegaard, p. 12.

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examiner in latin and helped his former headmaster michael nielsen (1776–1846) with the corrections of the latin compositions from the higher classes.8 the reason that the student søren Kierkegaard set about translating the new testament into latin is thus obvious: it was a project whose motivation seems to have been more his desire and clear fondness for latin composition than merely the wish to get through the exegetical examination with a good grade.9 II. The Connection with Kierkegaard’s Theological Studies Kierkegaard’s translations of the greek new testament in the Journal CC contain the following works: acts of the apostles 1–4 and 24–27 (CC:1); the letter to the philippians (CC:2); the letter to the Colossians (CC:3); the First and second letter to the thessalonians (CC:4–5); the First and second letter to timothy (CC:6–7); the letter to titus (CC:8); the letter to philemon (CC:9); the letter to the hebrews (CC:10); the letter of James 1–4:15 (CC:11). there is no concrete information in these translations which makes it possible to establish with any certainty the date of composition. however, there can be no doubt about the fact that Kierkegaard’s work on the translations was connected with his course of studies in theology, which began in 1830 and was completed ten years later. the editors of the Papirer have put forth the assumption that the translations reflect Kierkegaard’s participation in some of the lectures and seminars on exegesis at the university of Copenhagen in the years 1833–36,10 and that the translation of acts can be placed in connection with Professor H.N. Clausen’s lectures on “the difficult parts of acts of the apostles,” which took place in the winter semester 1833–34.11 Cf. the school testimony concerning Kierkegaard’s skills in latin by michael nielsen, dated november 1840: “at my request he has therefore helped me for several years with students who were weak in latin composition, and he has successfully motivated them to do the sort of thinking that is not merely directed at passing the examination but that will continue to have an effect in their later lives. For a couple of years, when my own weak eyesight prevented me from correcting the essays of the most advanced class, he did this in my stead...in accordance with his request, during one academic year he taught latin to the students...several of them were graduated this year, when during my busiest time he again was kind enough to assist me with latin and composition for the advanced class, and he performed just as well as i would have.” Encounters with Kierkegaard, p. 28. 9 Kierkegaard prepared for the examination in new testament exegesis in July of 1840. at the time the topic of this examination was Jn 1:6–18. it is not known what grade he received since the practice of giving grades for the individual parts of the examination was not introduced until 1847. 10 Pap., 1st ed., vol. i, p. Xv. 11 Index lectionum in Universitate Regia Hauniensi per semestre hybernum a Kalendis Novembribus A. MDCCCXXXIII habendarum, Copenhagen: Jens hostrup schultz 1833, p. 2: “dr. HENR. NIC. CLAUSEN, P. P. O., publice capita difficiliora Actorum Apostolorum interpretabitur diebus martis et Jovis h. Xi.” here and in the following notes we quote from the latin catalogues of courses; as already mentioned, the catalogue also appeared in danish starting in 1833 (for the winter semester 1833–34). the winter semester ran from november 1 until the end of march of the following year. summer semester ran from may 1 until the end of september. 8

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in the catalogue of courses for the winter semester 1834–35 it is written, “mag. C.e. scharling...will in public lectures...explain paul’s letters to the ephesians, the Colossians, and the philippians.”12 this series of lectures might have inspired Kierkegaard to translate philippians and Colossians; he then skipped ephesians and, on his own, translated 1 and 2 thessalonians.13 in the summer semester 1835 professor Christian thorning engelstoft (1805–89) gave lectures on the pastoral letters.14 it is conceivable that Kierkegaard’s translations of 1 and 2 timothy and titus are connected to this series of seminars, but he apparently worked out the translation of philemon on his own initiative. in the catalogue of courses for the winter semester 1835–36 it says that “mag. C.e. scharling...will...explain paul’s letter to the galatians, the letter of James, the two letters of peter and the letter of Jude,” and on the same page it is announced that “ernst vilhelm Kolthoff...will give privatissime a seminar on the letter to the hebrews.”15 it thus seems possible that Kierkegaard’s translation of hebrews and of James, which he did not manage to complete, can be understood as having some connection with these two course offerings. But ultimately, it simply cannot be determined to what extent Kierkegaard actually participated in any of the aforementioned lectures since the lists of participants from these lectures and seminars are not extant.16 however, it seems very probable that the translations, also being preparations for the examination, were to some degree—in a manner similar to many of Kierkegaard’s other journal entries related to his studies— inspired by his participation in the instruction at the university of Copenhagen.

Index lectionum in Universitate Regia Hauniensi per semestre hibernum a Kalendis Novembribus A. MDCCCXXXIV habendarum, Copenhagen: Jens hostrup schultz 1834, p. 2: “mag. Car. em. sCharling, p. p. o., diebus martis, Jovis & veneris h. iX. epistolas Pauli ad Ephesios, Colossenses & Philippenses publice interpretabitur.” 13 Concerning Pap. i C 36 (SKS 17, 158–71, CC:2–5 / KJN 1, 151–63), the editors of the Papirer incorrectly state (vol. i, p. 205) that Carl emil scharling’s (1803–77) lectures on exegetics in the winter semester 1834–35 also included 1 and 2 thessalonians. 14 Index lectionum in Universitate Regia Hauniensi per semestre æstivum a Kalendis Majis A. MDCCCXXXV habendarum, Copenhagen: Jens hostrup schultz 1835, p. 2: “lic. Chr. thorn. engelstoFt, p. p. e., publice dd. lunæ, mercurii et saturni h. X–Xi epistolas Pauli pastorales interpretabitur.” Concerning Pap. i C 42 (SKS 17, 171–81, CC:6–9 / KJN 1, 163–73), the editors of the Papirer incorrectly state (vol. i, p. 209) that engelstoft, in his working through the pastoral letters, also included philemon. 15 Index lectionum in Universitate Regia Hauniensi per semestre hibernum a Kalendis Novembribus A. MDCCCXXXV habendarum, Copenhagen: Jens hostrup schultz 1835, p. 2: “mag. Car. em. sCharling, p. p. o. ...privatim singulis septimanæ diebus h. iX epistolam Pauli ad Galatas, epistolas Jacobi, Petri, Judæ interpretabitur”; “ernestus guilielmus KolthoFF, theol. lic., binis per hebdomadem horis epistolam ad ebræos scholis repetitoriis privatissime exponet.” 16 From this period very few lists of course participants have survived; cf. valdemar ammundsen, Søren Kierkegaards Ungdom. Hans Slægt og hans religiøse Udvikling, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1912 (Festskrift udgivet af Københavns Universitet i Anledning af Universitetets Aarsfest, November 1912), pp. 86ff. 12

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III. Textual Basis, Reference Works, and the Vulgate the textual basis for Kierkegaard’s Bible translations is the 4th edition from 1829 of Novum Testamentum Graece, edited by georg Christian Knapp (1753–1825).17 he bought two copies of this critical edition, which was excellent for its time. Both copies can be found today at the royal library in Copenhagen. Judging from the frequent underlinings in the greek text and in the critical apparatus, one can surmise that the one copy (ASKB 14–15), which was bought by p.s. lund at the auction of Kierkegaard’s books and which is today in the Kierkegaard archive (e 94), was the one used by Kierkegaard during the translation work itself, whereas the other copy (ASKB 16) was primarily used when he made notes on the relation between the old and the new testament and among the synoptic gospels. with regard to reference works, besides the usual greek18 and latin19 dictionaries of the day there was a single handbook which had a fundamental and characteristic significance for the genesis of the translations, namely Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider’s (1776–1848) Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros Novi Testamenti, of which Kierkegaard owned the second edition from 1829.20 this new testament dictionary is, like the rest of Bretschneider’s works, a good and solid piece of work. Kierkegaard’s diligent and constant use of Bretschneider’s dictionary is documented not only in the marginal notes, which are chiefly found at the beginning of the Journal CC,21 but also in the choices which he makes during the work in rendering the greek text into latin. it is no surprise that the schooled philologist Kierkegaard uses the dictionary very judiciously, and one can perceive in him a great desire to find new and different solutions from the ones which Bretschneider gives.

῾Η καινὴ διαθήκη: Novum Testamentum Graece. Recognovit atque insignioris lectionum varietatis et argumentorum notationes subiunxit Georg. Christian. Knappius, vols. 1–2, 4th ed., halle: libraria orphanotrophei 1829 [1794] (ASKB 14–15 and 16); in the following referred to as “Knapp.” Kierkegaard also owned a copy of J.a.h. tittmann’s critical edition of the new testament from 1828, ῾Η καινὴ διαθήκη: Novum Testamentum Graece, leipzig: tauchnitz 1828 (ASKB 19); but since his own copy has not been located, we cannot know whether he consulted this text edition during his work on the translations. 18 paul arnesen, Græsk-Dansk Ordbog, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1830 (ASKB 993); J.g. schneider, Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch, vols. 1–2, 3rd ed., leipzig: hahn 1819 (ASKB 994–995). 19 Jacob Baden, Dansk-Latinsk Ordbog, 3rd ed., Copenhagen: gyldendal 1831 (ASKB 1013); i.J.g. scheller, Deutsch-Lateinisches Lexicon, vols. 1–2, 3rd ed., leipzig: Caspar Fritsch 1805 (ASKB 1014–1015); i.J.g. scheller, Lateinisch-Deutsches Lexicon, vols. 1–5, 3rd ed., leipzig: Caspar Fritsch 1804 (ASKB 1016–1020); F.K. Kraft, Deutsch-Lateinisches Lexikon, 3rd ed., leipzig and merseburg: ernst Klein 1829–30 (ASKB 1021–1022). 20 K.g. Bretschneider, Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros Novi Testamenti, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., leipzig: Barth 1829 [1824] (ASKB 73–74); in the following referred to as “Bretschneider.” the dictionary is based on the work of the excellent new testament philologist and lexicographer Johann Friedrich schleusner, Novum Lexicon Graeco-Latinum in Novum Testamentum, vols. 1–2, leipzig: weidmann 1819. 21 the marginal additions, which apart from one exception (discussed below) are written in latin, contain explanations of words taken from Bretschneider. 17

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the Finnish philosopher Kalle sorainen (1893–1983) has commented on Kierkegaard’s relation to the latin Bible translations which were available to him.22 according to sorainen’s view, Kierkegaard not only consulted the vulgate, but also the Bible translations of erasmus of rotterdam (1516),23 sebastian Castellio (1546– 51),24 and theodor Beza (1565). however, sorainen’s material does not prove Kierkegaard’s dependence on erasmus, Castellio, or Beza, and our more thorough examination of the respective translations makes clear that the various points of similarity between them, on the one hand, and Kierkegaard’s translations, on the other, are merely coincidental. thus, sorainen’s assumption, which unjustly gives the impression that Kierkegaard was a rather ungifted translator who needed to seek help from his predecessors, proves to be unfounded.25 like every other student of theology, Kierkegaard naturally knew and used the vulgate, that is, Jerome’s latin translation of the Bible.26 he clearly made use of it during his entire work on the translations but, to be sure, in such a manner that he was always in a critical dialogue with it. this means that as a rule he writes something different from what is found in the vulgate, or he introduces its suggested translation as one possibility on a par with that which he devised himself. it is more the exception than the rule when he completely accepts the text of the vulgate, and when he does so, it does not seem to happen because he wants to make the work easier for himself but rather because a better solution did not appear or perhaps did not exist.

Kalle sorainen, “einige Beobachtungen im Bezug auf die lateinischen Übersetzungen søren Kierkegaards aus dem griechischen neuen testament,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 56–74. 23 Cf. the facsimile edition Erasmus von Rotterdam, Novum Instrumentum, Basel 1516: Faksimile-Neudruck mit einer historischen, textkritischen und bibliographischen Einleitung, ed. by heinz holeczek, stuttgart: Frommann-holzboog 1986. on Kierkegaard and erasmus see further Finn gredal Jensen, “erasmus of rotterdam: Kierkegaard’s hints at a Christian humanist,” in Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Traditions, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 5), pp. 111–27. 24 Kierkegaard owned Castellio’s translation in the 1778 edition: Biblia Sacra, ed. by sebastian Castellio, leipzig: Breitkopf 1778 (ASKB 2). 25 an investigation of pierre sabatier’s Itala edition (Bibliorum Sacrorum Latinæ Versiones Antiquæ seu Vetus Italica, reims: Florentain 1743) has likewise not given us any reason to believe that Kierkegaard knew or used this work. 26 it is unknown which edition he used. the vulgate, however, is not in the Auctioneer’s Sales Record. to judge from an entry in the Journal NB23, he also did not possess a copy in 1851, when he wrote: “Ψ 10, 14. the vulgate should translate in this way: Tibi (namely, Deo) derelictus pauper.” SKS 24, 296, nB23:191 / JP 3, 2325. this “should” is to be understood as to mean that he has his information about the vulgate’s text second hand, namely from scriver’s Seelen-Schatz, which he refers to in the entry. see Christian scriver, Seelen-Schatz, vols. 1–5, magdeburg and leipzig: Christoph seidels 1723, vol. 1, p. 35 (ASKB 261–263). the subject of the following entry, SKS 24, 297, nB23:192 / JP 3, 2327, is also a translation problem in regard to the old testament. 22

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IV. A Principle of Ambiguity in a danish marginal note to acts of the apostles 3:20–1, Kierkegaard contemplates the relevant translation and its relation to the original text: i have taken pains to include an ambiguity in my translation. one can say either: “whom it behoves to take [his place in] heaven” (“ham bør det at indtage Himlen”) (as it is in the danish), or “whom it behoves heaven to take,” (“Himlen bør det at modtage ham”), which seems to have more of a meaning for dogmatics, since the work of Christ was not completed before his return, and to that extent heaven takes him up, i.e., he returned to where he was before, in order subsequently to take dominion over heaven.27

Kierkegaard’s well-known sense for ambiguity does not fail here: he precisely reproduces the ambiguous formulation ὃν δεῖ οὐρανὸν μὲν δέξασθαι in acts 3:21 with quem oportet coelum possidere, where it is also unclear whether possidere is derived from possideo (“to possess”) or possido (“to take possession of”). here Kierkegaard is in agreement with professor Jens møller (1779–1833), who writes: it is necessary that a publically authorized translation be made the foundation for the Christian people’s instruction, and this must keep as faithfully as possible to the original...thus, the highest degree of precision must be its main characteristic...in such textual passages where learned and practiced exegetes are of differing opinions, the translation, if the different genius of the languages allowed it, ought to keep so close to the original that the expression of the translation could allow the reader to bring forth the different interpretations already present in the original text. this especially goes for passages which are of significance for dogmatics.28

st. augustine had already suggested that it is possible to interpret the same textual passage in different ways when in his Confessions he stated the following: For this reason, although i hear people say “moses meant this” or “moses meant that,” i think it more truly religious to say “why should he not have had both meanings in mind, if both are true? and if others see in the same words a third, or a fourth, or any number of true meanings, why should we not believe that moses saw them all? there is only one god, who caused moses to write the holy scriptures in the way best suited to the minds of great numbers of men who would all see truths in them, though not the same truths in each case.” For my part i declare resolutely and with all my heart that if i were called upon to write a book which was to be vested with the highest authority, i should prefer to write it in such a way that a reader could find re-echoed in my words whatever truths he was able to apprehend. i would rather write in this way than impose a single true meaning so explicitly that it would exclude all others, even though they contained no falsehood SKS 17, 149, CC:1.h / KJN 1, 142–3; a facsimile of the journal page is found in SKS K17, 283 / KJN 1, 438. 28 Jens møller, “Bidrag til en oversættelsestheorie med nærmest hensyn til de bibelske skrifter; og adskillige oversættelsesprøver som Bilag,” in Theologisk Bibliothek, ed. by Jens møller, vol. 1, 1811, pp. 218–93; p. 237 (ASKB 326–335). 27

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even so, Johann august ernesti (1707–81) in his textbook for latin Bible translators Institutio Interpretis Novi Testamenti (1761) rejected this view as an error and demanded relentless unambiguity.30 Kierkegaard owned a copy of the second edition from 1765, but it is unclear what influence this textbook had on his Bible translations.31 V. A Closer Look at the Latin Translations if we turn towards the organization of the latin translations themselves, then they can also be best described as—to use one of Kierkegaard’s favorite words—dialectical. this should be understood in the sense that in many places in the latin text he has given several possibilities for translation, when they were at hand. the ideas which he himself has or which he takes from the vulgate and from his indispensible Bretschneider, are displayed in the middle of the latin text, and they, together with Kierkegaard’s many corrections of his text, give us a good insight into the richness of considerations regarding both language and content which were the basis for the composition of the latin translations.32 Characteristically, it is often difficult to determine which solution he preferred in the individual cases, or if he even made a augustine, Confessiones, 12.31; the translation is from st. augustine, Confessions, trans. by R.S. Pine-Coffin, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1961, p. 308. The Latin reads: Ita cum alius dixerit: hoc sensit, quod ego, et alius: immo illud, quod ego, religiosius me arbitror dicere: cur non utrumque potius, si utrumque verum est, et si quid tertium et si quid quartum et si quid omnino aliud verum quispiam in his verbis videt, cur non illa omnia vidisse credatur, per quem deus unus sacras litteras vera et diversa visuris multorum sensibus temperavit? ego certe, quod intrepidus de meo corde pronuntio, si ad culmen auctoritatis aliquid scriberem, sic mallem scribere, ut, quod veri quisque de his rebus capere posset, mea verba resonarent, quam ut unam veram sententiam ad hoc apertius ponerem, ut excluderem ceteras, quarum falsitas me non posset offendere. nolo itaque, deus meus, tam praeceps esse, ut hoc illum virum de te meruisse non credam. sensit ille omnino in his verbis atque cogitavit, cum ea scriberet, quidquid hic veri potuimus invenire, et quidquid nos non potuimus aut nondum potuimus, et tamen in eis inveniri potest. 30 J.a. ernesti, Institutio Interpretis Novi Testamenti ad usus lectionum, leipzig: weidmann & reich 1761, p. 9. 31 J.a. ernesti, Institutio Interpretis Novi Testamenti ad usus lectionum, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann & reich 1765 (ASKB 101). 32 a few examples will be given from the rich material which is provided in the critical apparatus of the edition of the text in SKS. in Jas 4:9, κλαύσατε (“weep”) is translated with plorate (“lament”), but first Kierkegaard had written ejulabitis (“wail”). he translates heb 5:1 καθίσταται τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν (“is appointed in the things in regard to God”) first in a long-winded manner with constituitur ad ea, quæ pertinent ad deum (“is constituted in regard to the things that pertain to God”), which he then simplifies to proficitur rebus divinis 29

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decision at all. For example, ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης (“radiance of the glory”) in hebrews 1:3 is translated as follows: imago (splendor) gloriæ (dei) perfectissima.33 here Kierkegaard gave the word splendor (“radiance”) as a synonym for imago (“image”),34 which is the vulgate’s translation of ἀπαύγασμα, and he added dei (“of god”) to gloriæ (“of the glory”) by way of explanation. Finally, he designated perfectissima (“most perfect”) as a characterization of imago, an explanation which is based on Bretschneider’s analysis.35 Kierkegaard normally follows very precisely the greek text in Knapp. the underlinings in the critical apparatus, however, show that he gives careful consideration to Knapp’s text, and in a few cases one can say that he construes his own text in that he adopts a reading from the critical apparatus. For example, in 1 timothy 1:4 Knapp has οἰκονομίαν θεοῦ τὴν ἐν πίστει (“god’s plan in faith”), but Kierkegaard rejects the reading οἰκονομίαν (“management” or “plan”) and replaces it with οἰκοδομίαν (“edification”) from the critical apparatus, which he translates as ædificationem. the entire passage vv. 3–4 then runs as follows: Quemadmodum rogavi te, ut maneres Ephesi, in Macedoniam iter faciens, ut preciperes nonnullis, ne false docerent, neve animum adverterent mythis et genealogiis infinitis, quæ disquisitiones magis præbeant quam ædificationem dei, quæ est in fide (“as i asked you to stay in ephesus, when i went to macedonia, so that you may instruct some not to teach false doctrine and not to turn their minds toward myths and endless genealogies that cause speculations rather than God’s edification which is in faith”).36 in hebrews 11:11 he makes use of the textual variant ἔτεκεν (“gave birth”), which he translates as peperit and puts in parentheses in order to note his reservations about this less satisfactory, unnecessary reading: Fide et ipsa S[ara] vim ad concipiendum…[accepit] et præter tempus ætatis (peperit) quoniam fidelem habuit qui promiserat (“By faith also sarah herself received the power to conceive, and (she gave birth) beyond the age of child-bearing, because she considered him faithful who had promised”).37 in a few places (e.g., acts 1:12 and acts 26:23)38 Kierkegaard left lines blank for notation of untranslated passages. now and then he forgets verses entirely or in part (e.g., Colossians 3:14; 1 thessalonians 2:20; 1 timothy 4:15),39 and frequently individual words are missing, most often ones which are less significant. By contrast, one can occasionally observe that Kierkegaard inserts words which are not found in the original text, for example, fratres mihi dilecti (“my beloved brothers”) for (“is advanced in divine matters”). For phil 2:26 he changes his misleading translation of ἀδημονῶν (“troubled”) from incertus (“uncertain”) to anxius (“anxious”). 33 there is a facsimile of the relevant journal page in SKS K17, 268 / KJN 1, 455. 34 he frequently notes synonyms above the line, not seldom in brackets. a further frequent practice is his placing of synonyms or alternatives in brackets just after the word or expression in question. 35 For this compare Bretschneider, vol. 1, pp. 114–15, s.v. ἀπαύγασμα. 36 SKS 17, 171.14–18, CC:6 / KJN 1, 163. 37 SKS 17, 191.14–16, CC:10 / KJN 1, 182. 38 SKS 17, 145.20, CC:1 / KJN 1, 139. SKS 17, 155.17, CC:1 / KJN 1, 148. 39 SKS 17, 164.24, CC:3 / KJN 1, 157. SKS 17, 167.9, CC:4 / KJN 1, 159. SKS 17, 173.30, CC:6 / KJN 1, 165.

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ἀδελφοί μου (“my brothers”), philippians 3:1;40 similis ei etiam morte cruenta (“like him even in his bloody death”) for συμμορφιζόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ (“being conformed to his death”), philippians 3:10;41 and exemplar eorum, qui post me fidem habituri sunt ei in vitam æternam (“as a pattern for the ones after me coming to believe in him to eternal life”) for πρὸς ὑποτύπωσιν τῶν μελλόντων πιστεύειν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον (“for a pattern for the ones coming to believe in him to eternal life”), 1 timothy 1:16.42 there are also examples of Bretschneider’s explanations of words finding their way into the text: this is true, for instance, for the above-mentioned passage hebrews 11:11, where concipiendum (καταβολὴν σπέρματος, or “conception of seed”) is explained with “(al[ii] facultatem prolis faciendæ)” (“others: the faculty of having offspring”);43 2 thessalonians 3:1, where currat (τρέχῃ, “may run”) is provided with the gloss “(sine dubio per varias regiones propagetur)” (“without a doubt may be extended through various regions”);44 and titus 2:3, where in vestitu honestas (ἐν καταστήματι ἱεροπρεπεῖς, “reverent in demeanor”) is provided with “(vestitus pium decens)” (“attire decent for a pious”).45 hebrews 2:10 is rendered as follows: decuit enim illum, ob quem omnia et per quem omnia, multos filios in gloriam ducentem, ducem salutis nostræ per afflictiones consummare (perfectum facere servatorem) (“For it was fitting that he, for whom and through whom all things exist, in bringing many sons to glory, should perfect the author of our salvation through sufferings (make the savior perfect)”). the verb consummare was apparently the occasion for some considerations, and Kierkegaard put a question mark above it in the manuscript; later he added in brackets the beginning

SKS 17, 160.12, CC:2 / KJN 1, 153. SKS 17, 160.27, CC:2 / KJN 1, 153. 42 SKS 17, 171.35, CC:6 / KJN 1, 164. 43 SKS 17, 191.14–15, CC:10 / KJN 1, 182; cf. Bretschneider, vol. 1, p. 634, s.v. καταβολή: “Alii: iniectio seminis virilis, et vertunt: ad semen iniectum recipiendum, i.e. ad concipiendum” (“others: injection of virile seed, and they explain it as reception of injected seed, i.e., for conception”). 44 SKS 17, 170.23–4, CC:5 / KJN 1, 163: Ceterum, rogate fratres, de nobis, ut verbum domini currat (sine dubio per varias regiones propagetur) et celebretur, ut etiam apud vos (“Finally, pray for us, brothers, so that the word of the lord may run (without a doubt may be extended through various regions) and be glorified, even as it is among you”); cf. Bretschneider, vol. 2, p. 527, s.v. τρέχω: “τρέχει videlicet per varias regiones; sensus: celeriter propagatur” (“ ‘runs,’ namely through various regions; signification: is extended swiftly”). 45 SKS 17, 179.25–8, CC:8 / KJN 1, 171; titus 2:1–3: Tu vero loquere quæ decent sanæ doctrinæ, senes sobrios esse, honestos, temperantes, sanos fide, amore, patientia, anus similiter, in vestitu honestas (vestitus pium decens) non calumniatrices, non vino multo laborantes, boni magistras... (“But speak what befits healthy doctrine: that elderly men be sober, honest, temperate, sound in faith, in love, in patience; that elderly women be reverent in demeanor (attire decent for a pious), not slanderers, not enslaved to much wine, teaching what is good...”); cf. Bretschneider, vol. 2, p. 582, s.v. ἱεροπρεπής, who suggests pium decens or honestus and translates ἐν καταστήματι ἱεροπρεπεῖς as habitu Christianam decente (“with a character decent for a Christian woman”). 40 41

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of Bretschneider’s explanation of διὰ παθημάτων τελειῶσαι (“to perfect through sufferings”) and thus hinted at an alternative translation.46 genuine translation errors are rare. For example, in titus 2:9 there is the construction servos suis dominis obediant (“servants obey their masters”), which must presumably be ascribed to haste; servos is based on Kierkegaard’s initial attempt to follow the construction of the original accusative with infinitive (δούλους ἰδίοις δεσπόταις ὑποτάσσεσθαι, “slaves be obedient to their own masters”), which is governed by the imperative παρακάλει (“exhort”) in v. 6, that is translated with jube (“order”).47 Kierkegaard is so steeped in the text that he is tempted to write tibi (“you”) instead of the illi (“him”) which the original text in hebrews 1:5 (cf. 2 samuel 7:14) demands: ἐγὼ ἔσομαι αὐτῷ εἰς πατέρα, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔσται μοι εἰς υἱόν (“i will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a son”) becomes ego ero tibi in patrem, et ille erit mihi in filium (“i will be to you a father, and he shall be to me a son”).48 the mistranslation ne fures (“do not steal”) in James 2:11, where a ne occidas (μὴ φονεύσῃς, “do not murder”) would have been correct, may be explained by the fact that Kierkegaard here had in mind the order of the commandments in exodus 20:14–15 (vulgate: “Non occides. Non moechaberis. Non furtum facies,” i.e., “do not kill. do not commit adultery. do not steal”).49 the mistakes and inconsistencies in Kierkegaard’s latin translations at times rest on misunderstandings of the greek text. this is the case, for example, with hebrews 10:5, where he incorrectly translates the greek aorist form κατηρτίσω (“you have prepared”) with the future form parabo (“i will prepare”).50 there occurs an error of the lexicographical sort in the translation of hebrews 4:13 πρὸς ὃν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος (“to whom we must render an account”), where Kierkegaard by writing sermo (“talk” or “conversation”) instead of ratio (“account”), shows that he lost his way when reading the long dictionary entry for λόγος: neque est ulla creatura invisibilis coram illo, contra omnia sunt nuda et resupinata occulis ejus, de quo sermo noster (“and there is no creature hidden from his sight, but all are naked and open to the eyes of the one of whom we talk”).51 the confusion of two almost

SKS 17, 182.31, CC:10 / KJN 1, 174; cf. Bretschneider, vol. 2, p. 501, s.v. τελειόω 2: “perfectum facere servatorem per παθήματα, quibus didicit et nostris παθήμασι succurrere” (“to make the savior perfect through sufferings, by which he learnt also to relieve our sufferings”). in the quoted verse, heb 2:10, Kierkegaard wrote passiones above the line as synonym for afflictiones (“sufferings”). 47 SKS 17, 179.34 and 31, CC:8 / KJN 1, 171. 48 SKS 17, 181.34–5; CC:10 / KJN 1, 173. One expects to find in Kierkegaard a chiasmus corresponding to the original: ego/illi—ille/mihi; the surprising translation of αὐτῷ with tibi is presumably based on the effect of the foregoing address to the son: υἱός μου εἶ σύ, ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε (“You are my son, today i have begotten you”), cf. ps 2:7. 49 SKS 17, 196.2, CC:11 / KJN 1, 186. 50 SKS 17, 189.21, CC:10 / KJN 1, 180. 51 SKS 17, 184.20–2, CC:10 / KJN 1, 176; cf. Bretschneider, vol. 2, p. 23, s.v. λόγος: “cui (Deo) ratio est reddenda. Alii: cum quo sumus arcte coniuncti” (“to whom (god) an account must be given. others: with whom we are strictly connected”). the vulgate has: ad quem nobis sermo (“to whom we must give a speech”). 46

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indistinguishable words, ποιμήν (“shepherd”) and ποίμνη (“herd”), explains why in hebrews 13:20 he wrote gregem ovium instead of pastorem ovium: Deus vero pacis, qui eduxit ex mortuis gregem ovium magnum in sanguine foederis æterni, dominum nostrum J[esum] (“the god of peace, who brought forth from the dead the great herd of sheep through the blood of his eternal covenant, our lord Jesus”).52 it happens frequently that Kierkegaard confuses the Greek indefinite and interrogative pronoun τις/τίς (“any one” or “some one”/“who?” or “which?”), for instance, in hebrews 1:5: Alicui enim angelorum quondam dixit (“For to some one of the angels he once said”) (Τίνι γὰρ εἶπέν ποτε τῶν ἀγγέλων, “For to which of the angels did he ever say...?”),53 and the personal pronouns in the first and second person plural ἡμεῖς/ὑμεῖς (“we/you”), for example, in Colossians 2:13: nos, qui mortui eramus (“we who were dead”) (ὑμᾶς νεκροὺς ὄντας, “you being dead”).54 in 1 timothy 4:3 one comes across the greekism abstinere cibis, quæ deus creavit (“abstaining from foods which god created”), where the surprising neuter of the relative pronoun is directly taken over from the original text, where is refers to βρώματα (ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων ἃ ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν, “abstaining from foods which god created”).55 an analogous incongruity appears in hebrews 11:30: Fide conciderunt muri J[ericho], circumdata per septem dies (“By faith the walls of Jericho fell, surrounded for seven days”), where Kierkegaard renders κυκλωθέντα (“having been encircled”), that refers to τὰ τείχη (“the walls”), without taking into account that the correlate in latin is muri.56 one reads with surprise in 2 timothy 2:3 bonus milites for bonus miles (“good soldier”), until one understands that milites is formed by analogy with στρατιώτης (“soldier”) in the greek original.57 the latin translations contain many examples of orthography which deviate from the norm. there occur cases of a reduplication of consonants (e.g., opportet, misserunt, immitatores), the failure to reduplicate consonants (e.g., flama, surexit, imposibile) and the disappearance of the letters c and p in the consonant groups -nct, -mps- and -mpt- (e.g., santa, sumsimus, redemtionem). Kierkegaard consistently writes recipisco for resipisco (“to recover”) and by analogy recipiscentia for resipiscentia (“recovery”).58 Kierkegaard’s latin follows in all the essentials the rules which are valid for the morphology and syntax of classical latin. therefore it belongs to the exceptions when there appear private word constructions such as exacerberatio

SKS 17, 194.17–18, CC:10 / KJN 1, 185. SKS 17, 181.33, CC:10 / KJN 1, 173. 54 SKS 17, 163.30–1, CC:3 / KJN 1, 156. 55 SKS 17, 173.14–15, CC:6 / KJN 1, 165. 56 SKS 17, 192.2, CC:10 / KJN 1, 182. 57 SKS 17, 176.25, CC:7 / KJN 1, 168. 58 SKS 17, 148.36, CC:1 / KJN 1, 142 (Acts 3:19) and a few other passages. One finds this error also some years later in the Journal KK in the seventh entry from 1839–40, in Kierkegaard’s exegesis of the letter to the romans where he, in a latin marginal note, uses the form recipiscant, SKS 18, 361.14, KK:7 / KJN 2, 444. 52 53

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(i.e., exacerbatio, “exasperation”),59 exacerbero (i.e., exacerbo, “exasperate”)60 and diviter (as a translation of πλουσίως, “richly”)61 along with forms of which no instance has been found in classical latin, for example, beneficientia (i.e., beneficentia, “beneficence”) and effusit (for effudit, “shed”), which is formed from the stem of the supine.62 it must be attributed to haste when in a few places he forms the perfect tense with the help of the present stem and the personal endings of the perfect: inciperunt (i.e., inceperunt, “began”), considerunt (i.e., consederunt, “sat together”), conjicierunt (i.e., conjecerunt, “turned to flight”), and accedistis (i.e., accessistis, “approached”).63 a special phenomenon is the consistent use of ambulo (“walk”) in the passive; in acts 3:12 peter says to the people: Viri Israelitæ cur hoc admirationem vestram movet; aut cur nos intentis oculis adspicitis vos, quasi propria vi et pietate fecerimus, ut ille ambularetur? (“men of israel, why do you marvel at this, or why do you stare at us with eager eyes, as though by our own power or piety we had made him walk?”). Kierkegaard succeeds in the impossible here, since he uses the verb of motion in the passive in order to express that the person “was made to walk.”64 a few examples will serve to illustrate Kierkegaard’s originality and independence as a Bible translator. in acts 4:26 where psalm 2:2 is quoted, he translates κατὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ αὐτοῦ from the original as adversus unctum ejus (“against his anointed”) and here he turns against the traditional Christus, which is in harmony with the new testament, in favor of a historically or philologically better founded translation.65 in acts 26:11 τιμωρῶν (“punishing”) is translated cruciavi (“tortured” or “crucified”), thereby giving clear associations to the imitatio Christi: Et per omnes synagogas sæpe cruciavi illos, et coegi illos ut maledicerent, vehementius etiam furens adversus illos, persecutus sum eos ad urbes usque extra positas (“and throughout all the synagogues i often tortured them and tried to force them to blaspheme, and even

SKS 17, 183.19, CC:10 / KJN 1, 175 (heb 3:8). SKS 17, 183.30, CC:10 / KJN 1, 175 (heb 3:15). the error exacerberatio is also found in a draft of Philosophical Fragments; cf. SKS K4, 189. 60 SKS 17, 183.30, CC:10 / KJN 1, 175 (heb 3:16). 61 SKS 17, 164.26, CC:3 / KJN 1, 157 (Col 3:16), and elsewhere. 62 SKS 17, 174.33, CC:6 / KJN 1, 167 (1 tim 6:2). SKS 17, 180.15, CC:8 / KJN 1, 172 (titus 3:6). Both forms are found in the middle ages. 63 SKS 17, 146.15–16, CC:1 / KJN 1, 140. SKS 17, 155.27, CC:1 / KJN 1, 147. SKS 17, 192.8, CC:10 / KJN 1, 182. SKS 17, 193.8, CC:10 / KJN 1, 183. 64 SKS 17, 148.24–6, CC:1 / KJN 1, 155. Cf. the vulgate: fecerimus hunc ambulare (“had made this man walk”). the passive use of ambulo is also found later in the Journal CC (SKS 17, 163.21, CC:3 / KJN 1, 156. SKS 17, 168.8, CC:4 / KJN 1, 160. SKS 17, 194.2, CC:10 / KJN 1, 184), where, however, it is not clear how the passive is to be understood. it is possible that Bretschneider’s suggestion to translate περιπατέω (“walk about”) with the deponent versor has misled Kierkegaard; Bretschneider, vol. 2, p. 268. 65 SKS 17, 150.15–16, CC:1 / KJN 1, 144. it should be noted that Χριστοῦ in Knapp’s edition has a capital Χ, whereas modern editions use the lower case letter. the vulgate translates: adversus Christum eius (“against his Christ”), and the danish translation of the new testament of 1819 is based upon the same idea. 59

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furiously raging against them i persecuted them to foreign cities”).66 in philippians 2:13 surprisingly he renders τὸ θέλειν (“the will”) with esse (“being”): deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et esse et perficere prouti ei placitum fuerit (“for god is the one who operates in you, both to be and to work according to his good pleasure”),67 and in philippians 3:17 συμμιμηταί μου (“followers of me”) with latores mei (“those who carry me”): latores mei estote, et observate qui ita ambulant, ut habetis nos typum (“Be those who carry me, and observe those who so walk, as you have an example in us”).68 in 1 timothy 4:8 physical exercise is designated as useful ad nihil (“for nothing”), whereas the original text merely has πρὸς ὀλίγον (“for little”),69 and in hebrews 11:25 ἀπόλαυσις (“pleasure”) is identified with carnis (“flesh”).70 in Knapp philippians 4:13 reads: πάντα ἰσχύω ἐν τῷ ἐνδυναμοῦντί με [Χριστῷ] (“i am able to do everything in him who strengthens me, Christ”); Kierkegaard has emphatically turned this around to Omnia in me corroborante Chr[isto] (“everything (is) in me when Christ gives strength”).71 as mentioned earlier, Kierkegaard is in a constant dialogue with the vulgate, which he ambitiously strives to surpass. in general one can say that his project was successful. the Bible translations bear witness to the fact that Kierkegaard was both an insightful exegete and an excellent latinist, who—in the words of michael nielsen—had an “unusual mastery of the written handling of the latin language.”72 Translated by Jon Stewart

SKS 17, 154.30–2, CC:1 / KJN 1, 148. Bretschneider, vol. 2, p. 516, s.v. τιμωρέω 3, suggests for this passage torqueo (“to harass”) and crucio (“to torture”). 67 SKS 17, 159.23–4, CC:2 / KJN 1, 152. the vulgate has: velle (“to will”). 68 SKS 17, 160.35–6, CC:2 / KJN 1, 153. Kierkegaard originally wrote simulatores mei (“simulators of me”), but later crossed out simu, by which he gives one to understand that one is to read latores mei, i.e., portatores mei (“carriers of me”). the vulgate has here: imitatores mei (“imitators of me”). 69 SKS 17, 173.21, CC:6 / KJN 1, 165. 70 SKS 17, 191.34, CC:10 / KJN 1, 182. 71 SKS 17, 161.27, CC:2 / KJN 1, 154. 72 Cf. Encounters with Kierkegaard, p. 29. 66

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Relevant for the Latin Translations arnesen, paul, Græsk-Dansk Ordbog, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1830 (ASKB 993). Baden, Jacob, Dansk-Latinsk Ordbog, 3rd ed., Copenhagen: gyldendal 1831 (ASKB 1013). Biblia Sacra, ed. by sebastian Castellio, leipzig: Breitkopf 1778 (ASKB 2). Bretschneider, Karl gottlieb, Lexicon Manuale Graeco-Latinum in libros Novi Testamenti, vols. 1–2, 2nd ed., leipzig: Barth 1829 [1824] (ASKB 73–74). ernesti, Johann august, Institutio Interpretis Novi Testamenti ad usus lectionum, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann & reich 1765 (ASKB 101). Kraft, Friedrich Karl, Deutsch-Lateinisches Lexikon, 3rd ed., leipzig and merseburg: ernst Klein 1829–30 (ASKB 1021–1022). Krebs, Johann philipp, Anleitung zum Lateinischschreiben in Regeln und Beispielen zur Uebung, nebst einem Antibarbarus. Zum Gebrauche der Jugend, 7th ed., Frankfurt am main: heinrich ludwig Brönner 1834 (ASKB 1005). møller, Jens, “Bidrag til en oversættelsestheorie med nærmest hensyn til de bibelske skrifter; og adskillige oversættelsesprøver som Bilag,” in Theologisk Bibliothek, ed. by Jens møller, vol. 1, 1811, pp. 218–93 (ASKB 326–335). ῾Η καινὴ διαθήκη: Novum Testamentum Graece, ed. by georg Christian Knapp, vols. 1–2, 4th ed., halle: libraria orphanotrophei 1829 [1794] (ASKB 14–15 and 16). ῾Η καινὴ διαθήκη: Novum Testamentum Graece, ed. by J.a.h. tittmann, leipzig: tauchnitz 1828 (ASKB 19). [roth, Karl ludwig and Karl Friedrich von nägelsbach], Uebungen des lateinischen Stils mit Commentaren und Hinweisungen auf die Zumptische und Schulzische Grammatik, nürnberg: schrag 1829 (ASKB 1008). scheller, immanuel Johann gerhard, Deutsch-Lateinisches Lexicon, vols. 1–2, 3rd revised and enlarged ed., leipzig: Caspar Fritsch 1805 (ASKB 1014–1015). —— Lateinisch–Deutsches Lexicon, vols. 1–5, 3rd ed., leipzig: Caspar Fritsch 1804 (ASKB 1016–1020). schneider, Johann gottlob, Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch, vols. 1–2, 3rd ed., leipzig: hahn 1819 (ASKB 994–995). zumpt, C.g., Opgaver til Oversættelse fra Dansk paa Latin, uddragne af de bedste nyere latinske Forfattere. Til Brug for de lærde Skolers høiere Klasser, ed. and trans. by Frederik Christian olsen, Copenhagen: a. soldin 1826 (ASKB 1011).

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II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Latin Translations of the New Testament Bruun, niels w. and Finn gredal Jensen, “die lateinischen Übersetzungen søren Kierkegaards aus dem neuen testament,” Neulateinisches Jahrbuch / Journal of Neo-Latin Language and Literature, vol. 4, 2002, pp. 17–30. Bruun, niels w. and Finn gredal Jensen, “Kierkegaard’s latin translations of the new testament in the Journal CC,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2001, pp. 443–52. Jensen, Finn gredal, “erasmus of rotterdam: Kierkegaard’s hints at a Christian humanist,” in Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Traditions, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 5), pp. 111–27. Kirmmse, Bruce h., ed. and trans., Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, princeton: princeton university press 1996, p. 12; pp. 14–15; p. 29; and p. 273. sorainen, Kalle, “einige Beobachtungen im Bezug auf die lateinischen Übersetzungen søren Kierkegaards aus dem griechischen neuen testament,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 56–74.

Kierkegaard’s use of the new testament: intratextuality, indirect Communication, and appropriation timothy h. polk

Kierkegaard’s claim seems incontestable, even if it comes by way of a pseudonym, that he always kept the Bible at his bedside and that it was his most read book.1 how otherwise could he have so thoroughly internalized it, the new testament in particular? Certainly, Jesus’ own fondness of parable fed Kierkegaard’s metaphorical appetite so that parables like the good samaritan, the pharisee and the tax Collector, and the Lilies in the Field would feature significantly in Kierkegaard’s writings.2 new testament passages would also sponsor an entire book, Works of Love; 16 of its 18 chapters take specific texts as their title or point of departure.3 likewise, though more complexly, Practice in Christianity is built around new testament passages, while the brief letters of James and 1 peter occur in disproportionate frequency in the edifying literature. perhaps most impressive are the roughly 140 references to the new testament, most of which are subtle allusions, that occur in the pseudonymous Concluding Unscientific Postscript.4 the allusions themselves attest to the high degree of internalization, or what we might call Kierkegaard’s spontaneity in his use of scripture. at the opposite end of the spectrum from spontaneity, the new testament as a whole appears as the major player in the intensely polemical attack upon Christendom,5 and there are 67 journal entries addressing the new testament, many of these no doubt having served as rough drafts for the attack. overall, nearly 3,000 new testament verses and passages appear with varying explicitness in the see SKS 6, 214 / SLW, 230. the pseudonym in question is Frater taciturnus. see “what we learn from the lilies in the Field and from the Birds of the air,” in SKS 8, 258–307 / UD, 155–212; “the Joy of it that it is not the road that is hard but that hardship is the road,” in SKS 8, 385–98 / UD, 289–305; “look at the Bird of the air; look at the lily in the Field,” in SKS 11, 13–25 / WA, 4–20; “the tax Collector,” in SKS 11, 263–9 / WA, 127–34. 3 the two chapters not based on a new testament text are “the work of love in recollecting one who is dead” and “the work of love in praising love.” even so, the thesis of the former is drawn from an apocryphal text, sirach 22:11, and an old testament text, ps 137:5–6. 4 see l. Joseph rosas, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994, pp. 166–9. 5 see volume XXiii of Kierkegaard’s Writings: The Moment and Late Writings. 1 2

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Kierkegaard corpus.6 In the few pages that follow, I wish to highlight five aspects of Kierkegaard’s use of the new testament: his intratextuality, his perspective on the issue of historical criticism in relation to “the paradox,” his view of prevalent misuses of the text, his understanding of the role of indirect communication, and his call for personal and passionate appropriation of the biblical texts. I. Intratextuality Kierkegaard’s intratextual use of the new testament is athletic. “intratextual” here points to Kierkegaard’s habit of combining, juxtaposing, and paralleling passages from different parts of the biblical canon, interpreting one passage in the light of others, under the governing assumption that scripture can function as a complex whole. he can scarcely think of one passage without thinking of another, then working them together in a perfectly coordinated harmony. Consider chapter iii a of the First series of Works of Love: in the exposition of romans 13:10, “love is the Fulfilling of the Law,” Kierkegaard re-tells the parable found in the Gospel of matthew of the man with two sons (matthew 21:28–31) but introduces it by means of the lukan parable of the prodigal son (luke 15:11ff.).7 less overt are the seven references to other passages in the sermon “the high priest: hebrews 4:15.”8 these are only two of a legion of examples of Kierkegaard’s use of multiple biblical passages to reciprocally illumine one another. more technically speaking, “intratextuality” refers to a conception of scripture as a “semiotic code,” a network of mutually conditioning signifiers the sense of any one of which depends on its place in the overall system.9 taken by itself, “intratextuality” implies neither a positive nor a negative relation among the parts of the larger text one reads, only that some relation exists among them, even one of pure contradiction. the term relates closely to a view of scripture as canon, which denotes the normative and paradigmatic status of the textual system. the common factor shared by “intratextuality” and “canon” is the emphasis on scripture as somehow constituting a literary whole. For the sort of reading that Kierkegaard practices, “canon” implicitly qualifies “intratextuality.” The tensions among the various canonical books should not be construed as unbridgeable chasms, to the point that the authority of any of them would be denied. Because the canonical books were ruled by the early church to be a whole, all of them oriented to god’s plan of

6 there is broad agreement between the 1953 index compiled by paul minear and paul morimoto (Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, princeton, new Jersey: princeton theological seminary 1953) and the 2000 index to biblical references in Kierkegaard’s writings compiled by nathaniel hong, Kathryn hong, and regine prenzil-guthrie (Cumulative Index to Kierkegaard’s Writings, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 2000, KW, vol. 26). 7 SKS 9, 97 / WL, 91–2. 8 SKS 11, 251–9 / WA, 115–24. 9 george lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Doctrine in a Postliberal Age, philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press 1984, pp. 33–4; p. 62; pp. 113–15.

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salvation, the new testament can be read intratextually and for theological purposes should be, as Kierkegaard consistently does. perhaps one anticipates a collision here, since intratextuality of this sort means interpreting the various canonical voices in light of each other no matter how different they are genetically. By regarding the diverse biblical texts as constituting a canon, the final form of the text is privileged over against the earlier forms that discrete sources and units of tradition may have had. For Kierkegaard, and exegetes as far back as origen, the different tradition histories of pauline, petrine, Jamesian, and gospel materials do not preclude reading the diverse materials ensemble once they were included, formally or informally, in the canon of the new testament. this vigorous intratextualism thus partially motivates Kierkegaard’s polemic against the ideological tendencies of historical criticism. Kierkegaard was familiar with the rise of the reading strategies associated with the historical criticism of the new testament, reading strategies that undermined intratextual construals of the biblical texts. his awareness of this lamentable aspect of historical criticism was fed by several different sources. during the winter term of 1832–33 Kierkegaard heard lectures by henrik nicolai Clausen (1793–1877) who taught new testament at the university of Copenhagen, and later took copious notes on Clausen’s biblically saturated lectures on dogmatics in 1833–34.10 moreover, he owned Clausen’s Hermeneutics of the New Testament,11 as well as Clausen’s commentary on the synoptic gospels.12 Clausen was a moderate rationalist, suspicious of anything other than the moral significance of putative biblical miracles,13 whose anti-supernaturalistic approach to theology and new testament studies had been seasoned by schleiermacher’s concern for religious subjectivity.14 Clausen, like most “higher” biblical critics of his generation, sought to identify the plurality of traditions behind the received biblical texts, establish the unique features of each of the gospels, and determine the chronological sequence of their composition. this tendency to dissect the new testament books into discrete literary units was also communicated to Kierkegaard through the works of wilhelm martin leberecht de wette (1780–1849) who sought to analyze the books of the new testament in terms of the original contexts and theological agendas that informed their composition.15 Both authors were concerned with the issues of the original provenance and intended audience of the new testament writings, the identity of the authors, their reliance upon one another or earlier oral and written traditions, and the accuracy of their accounts of historical events. such interpreters of scripture tended to equate the meaning of a literary unit of scripture with a genetic account of how that unit originated and was transmitted. this orientation promoted an interpretive SKS 19, 7–85, not1:1–9. henrik nicolai Clausen, Det nye Testaments Hermeneutik, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1840 (ASKB 468). 12 henrik nicolai Clausen, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850, pp. 1–98 (ASKB 106–107). 13 SKS 18, 120, gg:3 / KJN 2, 111–12. 14 Clausen, Det nye Testaments Hermeneutik, pp. 25–9; pp. 60–3. 15 see wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, vol. 2, pp. 70–203 (ASKB 80). 10 11

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atomism, in which divergent sources and traditions were identified in the biblical texts and then treated in isolation from one another. this approach, Kierkegaard feared, prevented the reader from hearing the texts in a holistic manner that preserved their capacity to function as a cohesive theological construal of human life. II. Historical Criticism vs. the Paradox Kierkegaard was not ignorant of other significant aspects of the historical criticism of the Bible developed by scholars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, including the characteristic “mythic” emphases of the tübingen school. Kierkegaard became familiar with the interpretive orientation of this diverse group of new testament critics, particularly their positive utilization of the category “myth,” through a variety of channels. he owned a volume on the nature of myth by andreas Frederik Beck (1816–61), the primary danish champion of tübingen-style hermeneutics.16 From Clausen he heard a critical account warning of the liabilities of this mythic approach to new testament studies.17 Kierkegaard also owned a copy of a volume by Carl emil scharling (1803–77), another professor at the university of Copenhagen, who critiqued the new testament scholarship of tübingen theologian Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860).18 if not deeply familiar with Baur’s new testament work,19 Kierkegaard was acquainted with david Friedrich strauss’ (1808–74) notorious Life of Jesus. in 1838 Kierkegaard took copious notes20 on Julius schaller’s critique of strauss’ attempt to reconstruct Jesus’ life and to interpret the gospel accounts of Jesus mythically.21 George Pattison aptly observes that Strauss “typified what Kierkegaard found disturbing in [the left-hegelian] movement”22—namely, the lingering Kantian tendency to reduce the religious life to the ethical.23 that is one way that Johannes Climacus would have voiced Kierkegaard’s dissatisfaction with the tübingen school. most basically, Kierkegaard objected to strauss’ abstract mythologizing of the god16 andreas Frederik Beck, Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse Aands Form, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1842 (ASKB 424). 17 Clausen, Det nye Testaments Hermeneutik. 18 Carl emil scharling, De Paulo ejusque adversariis, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1836 (ASKB 105). 19 see david d. possen, “F.C. Baur: on the similarity and dissimilarity between Jesus and socrates,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 26–7. possen observes that Kierkegaard was familiar with three of Baur’s works preceding the piece on the new testament. 20 SKS 18, 318–37, KK:2 / KJN 2, 292–308. 21 Julius schaller, Der historische Christus und die Philosophie. Kritik der Grundidee des Werks das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss, leipzig: otto wigand 1838 (ASKB 759). 22 george pattison, “d.F. strauss: Kierkegaard and radical demythologization,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, p. 235. 23 C. stephen evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus, atlantic highlands, new Jersey: humanities press 1983, p. 174.

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man into a symbol for universal humanity’s identity with the divine.24 the doctrine of the incarnation of god in Christ is detached from the particular identity of Jesus of nazareth and becomes a pictorial expression of the race’s general unity with god. Feuerbach’s materialistic twist on strauss might even have been ironically enjoyed by anti-Climacus. the idea that god was merely man’s projection of himself was actually a good description of the unfortunate way that the paradox of the incarnation fared in Christendom.25 reacting against the theological trajectory represented at least in part by such biblical scholars as strauss and implicitly espoused by the denizens of Christendom, anti-Climacus writes: If men are first permitted to run together in what Aristotle calls the animal category—the crowd—then this abstraction, instead of being less than nothing, even less than the most insignificant human being, comes to be regarded as being something—then it does not take long before this abstraction becomes god. and then, philosophice [philosophically viewed] the doctrine of the god-man is correct.26

Kierkegaard was surely thinking of the paradox when he observed in a journal entry that “we humans pretend to be unable to understand the n.t.; we do not want to understand it. here Christian scholarship has its place. Christian scholarship is the human race’s prodigious invention to defend itself against the n.t., to ensure that one can continue to be a Christian without letting the n.t. come too close.”27 the paradox of the incarnation, that the particular, unique individual Jesus of nazareth was both fully god and fully man, was really what was at stake for Kierkegaard in his critique of the “mythic” emphasis in the tübingen historical-critical agenda. the particularity of the Incarnation could not be sacrificed, and it was a category mistake for historical critics to try either to justify or to expunge it. in short, nothing is more essential to Kierkegaard’s understanding of the new testament than is the paradox. For Kierkegaard, the incarnation is the very core of the kerygma, and the paradox is by definition a matter of faith, faith or offense— god’s very existence being objectively indemonstrable. Because of this objective uncertainty, faith necessarily involves a total investment of the self. its truth is subjectivity, Climacus would insist; faith is a matter of passionately concerned selfknowledge.28 the determinations of historical criticism, on the other hand, can only be approximations of certainty. under his own signature Kierkegaard reiterated this theme, pointing out that historical research inevitably raises complex questions of authorship and authenticity, with all conclusions subject to revision in the light of new SKS 7, 199 / CUP1, 218. SKS 11, 229 / SUD, 117. 26 ibid. 27 SKS 23, 241, nB17:102 / JP 3, 2872. 28 Climacus puts it this way: “The way of objective reflection turns the subjective individual into something accidental and thereby turns existence into an indifferent, vanishing something. the way to the objective truth goes away from the subject, and while the subject and subjectivity become indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent, and that is precisely its objective validity, because the interest, just like the decision, is subjectivity” (SKS 7, 177 / CUP1, 193). 24 25

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evidence and more compelling arguments; consequently, making a decision to take action on the textual injunctions can be indefinitely postponed.29 the impossibility of closure infects all efforts to determine the authenticity of the biblical books, the apostolicity of the texts, and the reliability of the authors. Furthermore, no objective criteria are available to conclusively adjudicate the claims of the plethora of possible interpretations. thus the two modes of knowing, the objectivity typical of historical research and the subjectivity characteristic of faith, are incommensurable. But this is not to say that Kierkegaard has no regard at all for the “objective” historicity of the new testament events. the actuality of the incarnation requires a commitment to certain historical affirmations. For example, it must be affirmed that Jesus lived a human life. He had disciples. He taught, fed, healed, and was crucified. accordingly, Kierkegaard takes the gospels literally, aligning himself with the early church as we see in this journal entry: think of one of the older Church Fathers—and let him be an eyewitness to the way we read the new testament! we leave out everything existential, literally act as if it were not there at all—this we literally do; the early Christians took what they read there absolutely literally. i am so much closer to the early Christians than to the average Christians of today that i acknowledge that it is in the n.t. and make an admission.30

the word “existential” is our tip-off in this passage. For Kierkegaard the term “literally” really has little to do with the text’s historicity as the scholar assesses it; rather, it has almost everything to do with the text’s performative power, its capacity to occasion a transformation within the reader.31 For Kierkegaard, the “literal” sense of a text is not the one-to-one correspondence of its words to alleged historical referents but is its potential to catalyze a revolution in the individual’s passional life. Consequently, nothing is proved by the critical attempts to prove (or disprove) an account’s veracity except the critic’s unwillingness to allow their own capacitation. Kierkegaard is not above satirizing the sterility of the effort to grasp Christian convictions objectively: how “god in heaven must sit and wait for the decision on his fate, whether he exists, and finally he comes into existence with the help of a few demonstrations”; with enough testing the scholar might even “reach the point where god became the creator.”32 in the same way, Kierkegaard would regard the historical critic’s reading of the text as a misreading, more precisely, as a grave misuse. III. The Misuses of Scripture to be fair, for Kierkegaard historical criticism has no monopoly on “misreading” the new testament. historical criticism is not the root of all hermeneutical evil. much SKS 13, 53-4 / FSE, 25–6. SKS 13, 61-2 / FSE 34–5. SKS 24, 263–4, nB23:118 / JP 3, 2886. 31 For a precise analysis of Kierkegaard’s view of the “literal sense” of scripture, see Jolita pons, Stealing a Gift: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms and the Bible, new York: Fordham university press 2004, pp. 59–63. 32 SKS 5, 241 / EUD, 242. 29 30

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more frequent—and dangerous—are the misuses within the church, misuses that scripture itself cannot disallow without violating the freedom of the gospel. one of the most egregious of these misuses is hypocrisy. the Christian’s temptation is to identify with the humble or virtuous folks in Jesus’ encounters and parables rather than with the secret sinners of pride and judgmentalism. in Christendom this self-congratulatory reading strategy has become severe to the point of insufferable. through an exercise of intratextuality spanning both testaments, Kierkegaard uses an old testament passage (2 samuel 12:1–7) in conjunction with one of Jesus’ parables (luke 10:30–37) to expose this misuse of scripture. 33 By so doing, Kierkegaard warns the reader of the danger of automatically identifying with the heroes of Jesus’ parables rather than with the villains.34 he reminds the reader how the prophet nathan attempted to bring King david to a recognition of his royal crime in killing uriah and taking Bathsheba. nathan tells the story of a rich man who takes a poor man’s only possession, a lamb, which was like an only child to him. upon hearing the tale, david turns livid with indignation at the rich man’s lack of compassion and pronounces royal judgment, at which point nathan directly announces to King david, “You are the man!” so also when hearing the parable of the good samaritan (luke 10:30–37), the reader should identify with the priest and the levite who fail to assist the half-dead man who had been assaulted by robbers, rather than with the merciful samaritan.35 the hypocritical tendency to see the reader’s own self as a hero of the biblical stories is by no means the only prevalent misuse of the Bible. in general, reading the new testament in inappropriate ways, ways that stress its obscurity and undecidability, can be strategies of evasion. these misuses of new testament research are not so much due to flaws internal to the academic discipline itself as they are due to the human propensity to escape from the radical demands of the gospel. Kierkegaard writes: the matter is quite simple. the new testament is very easy to understand. But we human beings are really a bunch of scheming swindlers; we pretend to be unable to understand it because we understand very well that the minute we understand we are obligated to act accordingly at once….here Christian scholarship has its place.36

the ultimate problem is not the methods and tools of new testament scholarship, but the sinfully evasive uses to which people put them. IV. Indirect Communication the reader might well wish that the stories and parables in the new testament more directly and clearly addressed the reader, just as Nathan the prophet finally directly addressed King david. Yet how can one presume the sagacity, Kierkegaard asks, 33 34 35 36

SKS 13, 62-6 / FSE, 36–40. ibid. SKS 13, 67-9 / FSE, 40–2. SKS 23, 241, nB17:102 / JP 3, 2872.

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to modify the scripture so as to pre-empt the temptation to misuse it? he warns that such a presumption “can only be the idea of a sickly shrewdness, a conceited sagacity.”37 For this very reason, the new testament itself, always communicating the paradox and always allowing the reader the option of offense and misuse, is a form of indirect communication. it follows that Kierkegaard’s use of the new testament takes that form of indirection as well. For Kierkegaard, the most one person can do for another is prod them to make sense of the text and sense of their own life for themselves. But exactly how does Kierkegaard’s use of the new testament take the form of indirect communication, especially when he himself makes the sharp distinction between his own works of indirect communication and those of direct? ultimately, Kierkegaard’s point is less about the difference between pseudonymous and nonpseudonymous authorship than it is about the difference between what the reader learns and how the reader learns it. virtually everything Kierkegaard writes from Either/Or onward marks the line between that what and how of the reader’s selfknowledge. Kierkegaard, like the new testament itself, is always seeking the reader’s appropriation—appropriation by the imitation of Christ. V. Indirect Communication for Appropriation the importance of the concept of appropriation for Kierkegaard’s use of the new Testament cannot be exaggerated. Climacus warns, “Let the scientific researcher labor with restless zeal, let him even shorten his life in the enthusiastic service of science and scholarship; let the speculative thinker spare neither time nor effort— they are nevertheless not infinitely, personally, impassionedly interested.”38 such passionately interested appropriation is at the heart of Kierkegaard’s biblical hermeneutic; it is a prerequisite for making religious sense of religious texts. what Kierkegaard means by appropriation is a deeply personal process of reading and knowing. it is the how of reading the new testament which accepts the fact that you are not exegeting the text but are being exegeted by the text; that in it you are addressed by god and that you are being addressed with a call. in regard to every new testament text, the reader must say “it is i” that it is about and “it is i” whom it is addressing.39 the operative principle informing appropriation is that, where a relationship with god is concerned, knowing entails doing, a doing in response to god’s call. For Kierkegaard, your response to that call matters more than anything else in life. moreover, the response cannot be merely something episodic. the fact that the call comes as a command—“follow me” or “go and do likewise” or “love your enemy” or “feed my sheep” or “judge not that ye be not judged”—means that the appropriation is a daily imitation of Christ, a daily taking hold of “the actuality of time and of temporality and of earthly life with its adversities and sufferings,”40 all 37 38 39 40

SKS 11, 263–4 / WA, 127–8. SKS 7, 38 / CUP1, 21. SKS 13, 69 / FSE, 42–3. SKS 12, 200 / PC, 187.

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the while recognizing that such imitation requires joyful improvisation, a persistently passionate imagination suited for receiving one’s life anew in each new moment.41 and how does Kierkegaard and his use of the new testament function in this re-birthing process? Quite simply, he is the midwife.

david J. gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, new York: peter lang 1989 (American University Studies, series v, Philosophy, vol. 71), p. 254; p. 256. gouwens adds, “the ideal of Christ embodies in imaginative form what is contrary to idealization: suffering throughout an entire life” (p. 255). 41

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Relevant for the Interpretation of the New Testament Bauer, Bruno, “der alt-testamentliche hintergrund im evangelium des Johannes,” Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Bruno Bauer, Berlin: dümmler 1836–38, vol. 1, no. 2, 1836, pp. 158–204 (ASKB 354–357). Baur, Ferdinand Christian, Das Christliche des Platonismus, oder Socrates und Christus, tübingen: Fues 1837 (ASKB 422). Beck, andreas Frederik, Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse Aands Form, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1842 (ASKB 424). Billroth, Christian, Commentar zu den Briefen des Paulus an die Corinthier, leipzig: weidmann 1833 (ASKB 104). [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: gustav eichler 1833–34 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Det nye Testaments Hermeneutik, Copenhagen: schultz 1840 (ASKB 468). —— Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850 (ASKB 106–107). ernesti, Johann august, Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti, leipzig: weidmann 1765 (ASKB 101). hase, Karl, Das Leben Jesu, leipzig: leich 1829 (ASKB a i 37 and ASKB u 51). lücke, Friedrich, Commentar über die Briefe des Evangelisten Johannes, 2nd ed., Bonn: weber 1836 (ASKB 110). olshausen, hermann, Die Briefe Pauli an die Römer und Korinthier, Königsberg: unzer 1837 (ASKB 103). —— Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments zunächst für Prediger und Studirende, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–44 (ASKB 96–100). schaller, Julius, Der historiche Christus und die Philosophie: Kritik der Grundidee des Werks das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss, leipzig: otto wigand 1838 (ASKB 759) scharling, Carl emil, Hvad er Hensigten, Betydningen og Resultaterne af Theologernes videnskabelige Undersögelser om det Ny Testamentes Skrifter?, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1833 (ASKB 761). —— De Paulo apostolo ejusque adversariis commentatio quam ad summos in theologia honores inter publica solennia ecclesiæ ante trecentos annos in dania reformatæ rite obtinendos, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1836 (ASKB 105).

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schleiermacher, Friedrich daniel ernst, Der christliche Glaube, vols. 1–2, 3rd ed., Berlin: reimer 1835 (ASKB 258). tholuck, Friedrich august gotttreu, Auslegung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer, 3rd ed., Berlin: dümmler 1831 (ASKB 102). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten and Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833 (ASKB 80). —— Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836 (ASKB 108). —— Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 109). —— Kurze Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte, leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 111). —— Kurze Erklärung des Briefes an die Römer, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 112). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Use of the New Testament Craddock, Fred B., Overhearing the Gospel: Preaching and Teaching the Faith to Persons Who Have Heard It All Before, nashville: tennessee: abingdon press 1978. elrod, John, Kierkegaard and Christendom, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 1981. evans, C. stephen, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus, atlantic highlands, new Jersey: humanities press 1983. gouwens, david J., Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, new York: peter lang 1989 (American University Studies, series v, philosophy, vol. 71). guillamore hansen, p., Søren Kierkegaard og Bibelen, Copenhagen: p. haase 1924. Jacobsen, otto ludvig thune, “Kierkegaard og Bibelkritikken,” Gennem Modsætninger. Et Forsøg paa at forstaa Tiden og Livet, Copenhagen: gad 1905, pp. 121–94. lindbeck, george, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Doctrine in a Postliberal Age, philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press 1984. mcCracken, david, The Scandal of the Gospels: Jesus, Story, and Offense, new York: oxford university press 1994. oden, thomas C., Parables of Kierkegaard, princeton, new Jersey: princeton university press 1978. pattison, george, “d.F. strauss: Kierkegaard and radical demythologization,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 233–57. paulsen, anna, “das verhältnis des erbaulichen zum Christlichen,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 6, 1966, pp. 97–106.

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pedersen, Jørgen, “Kierkegaard’s view of scripture,” in The Sources and Depths of Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2), pp. 27– 57 (originally as “søren Kierkegaards bibelsyn,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 23–55). pons, Jolita, Stealing a Gift: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms and the Bible, new York: Fordham university press 2004. possen, david d., “F.C. Baur: on the similarity and dissimilarity between Jesus and socrates,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 23–38. roberts, Kyle a., “the Bible as god’s edifying discourse: toward a Kierkegaardian hermeneutic of appropriation,” ph.d. thesis, trinity evangelical divinity School, Deerfield, Illinois 2006. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Soren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994. schmitz, elaine Katherine, “soren Kierkegaard’s use of scripture in Fear and trembling and three edifying discourses,” ph.d. thesis, regent College, vancouver, British Columbia 1977. snodgrass, Klyne r., Stories with Intent: A Comprehensive Guide to the Parables of Jesus, grand rapids, michigan: eerdmans 2008.

Kierkegaard’s Biblical hermeneutics: imitation, imaginative Freedom, and paradoxical Fixation Joel d.s. rasmussen

I. Introduction it seems fair to say that despite the depth, breadth, insight, and verve of søren Kierkegaard’s biblical imagination, his reputation as an interpreter of scripture remains obscured by his renown as a writer of literary, philosophical, theological and, not least, edifying works. ironically, most of these literary, philosophical, theological, and edifying works can justly be read as exercises in biblical interpretation. as a rule, Kierkegaard’s signed writings (both the explicitly Christian variety and the edifying discourses generally) read as meditations on various biblical passages and themes. so, too, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship unfolds the world of the biblical in a variety of imaginative ways: Fear and Trembling explores the relationship between faith and understanding through an engagement with the narrative of abraham’s binding of isaac; Repetition contains a refracted reflection on Job’s ordeal; The Concept of Anxiety is a study of the genesis story of adam and the Christian notion of sin; Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript both focus on the new testament doctrine of the incarnation; The Sickness Unto Death and Practice in Christianity seek to develop a conception of selfhood appropriate to a life lived in the light of the gospel; and so on with the later signed works, among which we find in For Self-Examination a programmatic statement of how Kierkegaard thinks one should read the Bible if it is to become for the reader “god’s word.” even Either/Or (although less concerned with biblical interpretation) concludes with a sermon on luke 19:41–8, and in Stages on Life’s Way Kierkegaard has the pseudonym Frater taciturnus write: “the Bible lies on my table at all times and is the book in which i read the most.”1 one can well imagine Kierkegaard could have said the same thing in his own voice. despite his biblical repertoire, however, Kierkegaard is not widely regarded as an important biblical interpreter, at least not among most biblical scholars. whereas critical studies of nineteenth-century scandinavian literature, of post-Kantian continental philosophy, and of modern protestant theology regularly include considerations of Kierkegaard’s works and influence, when one turns to intellectual1

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historical studies of the development of modern biblical interpretation, such works generally pass over Kierkegaard in silence. and, when one does occasionally encounter cursory comment, such remarks are rarely commendatory. as John Barton remarks in The Nature of Biblical Criticism, for example, “within protestant circles Kierkegaard’s ghost still lingers, calling in question the very possibility of a truly critical approach to the Bible on the part of a true believer.”2 From this perspective, Kierkegaard’s approach to the Bible has little to recommend it to a modern critical readership.3 granted, Kierkegaard’s approach to reading the Bible is what he would have called “unscientific,” but this was meant to be a corrective to the “scientific” scholarship of his day, and is hardly a feature derided in the postfoundational scholarship of our own age. Barton, for his part, argues persuasively that biblical criticism should be conceived primarily as a literary operation and, when also historical, should avoid the positivist tendencies of some proponents of old-school “historical-criticism.” nonetheless, even biblical scholars sympathetic to Kierkegaard’s manner of reading the Bible recognize him as something of a misfit among the great nineteenth-century biblical interpreters. Richard Bauckham, for example, whose recent commentary on the epistle of James is so far as i can tell unique among biblical commentaries for the way it brings Kierkegaard into the critical conversation, nevertheless agrees that Kierkegaard “is not an exegete, at least in the modern sense.”4 on this view, Kierkegaard can be regarded as a powerful interpreter of the Bible, although not one who reads the Bible in line with the standards of modern scholarship. and yet, in recent decades the very understanding of what it means to be a biblical exegete or critic “in the modern sense” has itself come under considerable critical scrutiny by proponents of so-called “post-liberalism,” especially in connection with either the more “positivist” tendency sometimes to equate the disciple with a singleminded application of historical-critical methods on the one hand, or with the more “hermeneutical” tendency to conceive the discipline in terms of the articulation of general structures of the human understanding, on the other. while Kierkegaard might well have satirized certain post-liberal tendencies toward scholasticism and party identity, and although he enjoyed a poetic freedom with the biblical text not characteristic of post-liberalism, it is nonetheless arguable that in his approach to 2 John Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism, louisville, Kentucky: westminster John Knox press 2007, p. 141. 3 This claim requires some qualification. Alongside a number of Kierkegaard-specific articles (see bibliography below), the last two decades have seen the appearance of three monographs on Kierkegaard’s reading and use of the Bible, and these have been a boon to Kierkegaard’s readership (see l. Joseph rosas, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville, tennessee: Broadman & holman 1994; timothy h. polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997; and Jolita pons, Stealing a Gift: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms and the Bible, new York: Fordham university press 2004). my point, however, is that despite such recognition of Kierkegaard as a biblical thinker, more general works treating the reading and use of the Bible in modernity typically pass over Kierkegaard in silence or at best mention him only in passing. 4 richard Bauckham, James: Wisdom of James, Disciple of Jesus, london: routledge 1999, p. 161.

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the Bible he adumbrates a position in many ways consonant with the post-liberal critiques of modern biblical criticism; he calls into question the value (“for faith”) of historical-critical scholarship, and he denies that the meaning of the Bible (when read as “god’s word”) is to disclose any universal features of the human understanding. given this, it seems remarkable that hans Frei’s The Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics—a landmark text in post-liberal theology and, indeed, one of the great studies of modern biblical hermeneutics generally—nowhere in its compass of almost 350 pages mentions Kierkegaard.5 granted, in terms of the history of reception Kierkegaard might be said to belong more to the twentieth century than to the nineteenth, and more to theology and philosophy than to biblical hermeneutics. But it is difficult to account for the omission of Kierkegaard in connection with a study of figures like Lessing, Kant, schleiermacher, hegel, Baur, Bauer, and strauss, along with an occasional nod to twentieth-century figures like Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth (both of whom acknowledged the influence of Kierkegaard on their biblical interpretation). Now, given that Frei acknowledges Barth’s theology as one of the key influences to the development of his own thinking on hermeneutics, the fact that Kierkegaard plays no explicit role in his study of the biblical hermeneutics of the period—is not even cast as the voice of one crying in the wilderness—would itself seem to warrant the characterization of an “eclipse.” or, to revert back to Barton’s metaphor, one might have thought that in such an intellectual-historical study “Kierkegaard’s ghost” would have haunted the pages somewhat more prominently. the issue here goes deeper than historiographical questions of adequate “coverage,” however. For one feature of the present article is to show how in his Christian hermeneutics of the imitation of Christ, Kierkegaard advocates a form of “realistic” reading that is exemplary of the type of hermeneutics Frei shows to have been eclipsed by the main figures in modern biblical criticism. in this respect, what i want to demonstrate has something in common with one of the few monographs on Kierkegaard’s biblical hermeneutics. timothy houston polk’s The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith (1997) is a tour de force in post-liberal narrative interpretation of Kierkegaard’s biblical hermeneutics. i think Kierkegaard could well agree with polk’s assertion (the seminal statement of which in contemporary hermeneutics he attributes to hans Frei) that the authentic Christian hermeneutics is one in which “scripture defines the world, not the other way around.”6 and i think polk offers an insightful set of close readings focused on oft-neglected texts from Kierkegaard’s “second literature.” i’m unable, however, to i should advertise here that (on a much smaller scale) the present essay has a key feature in common with Frei’s work, in that his opening line could easily serve as mine too: “this essay falls into the almost legendary category of analysis of analyses of the Bible in which not a single text is examined, not a single exegesis undertaken” (hans Frei, The Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics, new haven, Connecticut: Yale university press 1974, p. vii). my aim in this article is to analyze some of the hermeneutical assumptions and practices Kierkegaard brings to his reading of the Bible; I leave specific questions of exegesis to specialists in the discipline of biblical criticism. 6 polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, p. 79. 5

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follow polk into the theory-laden anachronism of enrolling Kierkegaard as a “canoncontextual” reader of the Bible for whom the church’s role is that of “interpretive community.” while it is surely right that all interpretations imply some interpretive community, it nonetheless seems problematic to enlist as a proponent of a canoncontextual ecclesiology the very writer whose ideal Christian pseudonym (antiClimacus) declares, in connection with the idea of church, that “ ‘fellowship’ is a lower category than ‘the single individual,’ ”7 and who under his own name writes, “the person who is not alone with god’s word is not reading god’s word.”8 in connection with this, i think it is important to address more fully than polk does the centrality of Kierkegaard’s insistence on the individual “imitation of Christ,” even if we find this individualism problematic. Granted, Polk does acknowledge Kierkegaard’s emphasis on being conformed to Christ, but his attempt to excavate the sociality of Kierkegaard’s views leads Polk to obscure Kierkegaard’s own fixation on individual imitation. interestingly enough, it is precisely on this theme of imitation that i also disagree with the author of another monograph devoted to Kierkegaard’s hermeneutics. Jolita pons’ Stealing a Gift: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms and the Bible (2004) is an astoundingly erudite study of Kierkegaard’s general hermeneutics (especially in connection with such major twentieth-century practitioners as hans-georg gadamer and paul ricoeur), along with an examination of Kierkegaard’s use of biblical quotations in his pseudonymous works. i am thoroughly persuaded by her claim that the Bible’s “presence” in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings “could be called a kind of invisible omnipresence.”9 and the suggestion that the paradox of the incarnation “provides a horizon for the hermeneutical study of biblical quotations in Kierkegaard’s works” is a point i will echo below.10 But with regard to what i take to be a criterion of Kierkegaard’s hermeneutics of imitation—namely, the interpretation of the Bible qua god’s word as a pattern for an individual’s actual existence—it seems to me that pons breaks off shy of the mark. true, she acknowledges that Christian imitation “begins for Kierkegaard with imitation of the word,”11 but she later glosses this quite textually to mean Kierkegaard’s “imitation of the Bible” in his writing strategies.12 the plausibility of this literary conception of Kierkegaard’s “imitation of the Bible” derives from the way Kierkegaard configures and reconfigures the Bible “in a kind of spiral movement of imitation through deviations and reduplications— without authority.”13 and i agree with pons that Kierkegaard’s own imitation of Christ can be said to begin in his non-identical reduplication of the Bible in his prayerful literary productivity. i nonetheless think that she pulls up short, however, by ignoring the fact that such discipleship has as its criterion the love of the neighbor one meets SKS 12, 237 / PC, 223. SKS 13, 58 / FSE, 30. 9 Jolita pons, Stealing a Gift: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms and the Bible, new York: Fordham university press 2004, p. xv. 10 ibid., p. 131. 11 ibid., p. xii. 12 ibid., p. 146. 13 ibid., p. 135. 7 8

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when one walks away from pen and paper and encounters another individual in the flesh: “when you open the door that you shut in order to pray to God and go out the very first person you meet is the neighbor, whom you shall love.”14 the reason i make this point here is because i am persuaded that Kierkegaard’s biblical hermeneutics entails more than the indefinite play of the text; the conception of discipleship he develops out of the Bible aims to move beyond textuality—from literary imitation to existential imitation. in view of this, the problem for biblical hermeneutics is that one comes to such a conception of Christ and of discipleship through an encounter with the biblical text, and yet the standard processes of interpretation—at least merely intellectual interpretation—“cannot fasten down anything,” as Kierkegaard says.15 indeed, in a way that anticipates (and challenges) post-structuralist metaphors of textiles, textuality, and differance, Kierkegaard’s anti-Climacus alleges that merely intellectual interpretations “sew without fastening the end and without knotting the thread, and this is why, wonder of wonders, it can go on sewing and sewing, that is, pulling the thread through. Christianity, on the other hand, fastens the end by means of the paradox.”16 Corresponding to this view that the paradox of the god-man is the truth announced by new testament Christianity, Kierkegaard completes the image by insisting that the only way to come into a right relationship with the paradox is to seek (in faith) to conform one’s own actual life to his—“only imitation can tie the knot at the end.”17 what, then, should we make of the fact that, on the one hand, Kierkegaard does, as pons and polk both rightly say, freely turn and turn the biblical text, “kaleidoscopically” refracting its imbricated themes and figures in his authorship, yet, on the other hand, he insists, “god’s word is given in order that you shall act according to it, not that you shall practice interpreting obscure passages”?18 here i want to capitalize on Kierkegaard’s willingness to make “a distinction between reading and reading”19 in order to venture the proposal that within Kierkegaard’s authorship he actually operates with multiple interrelated biblical hermeneutics. i already claimed above that Kierkegaard advocates a “realistic” biblical hermeneutics that fosters the existential imitation of Christ in a reader’s actual existence. But this hermeneutics of imitation is contextualized both by what i want to call a hermeneutics of imaginative freedom and a hermeneutics of paradoxical fixation, respectively. These hermeneutics are configured dialectically, I argue, such that (1) the interpretive freedom Kierkegaard exhibits in reconfiguring biblical texts in the aesthetic works is preserved even when (2) he fixes his attention specifically in terms of the intellectual interpretability of “the absolute paradox” in the Johannes Climacus works. Finally (3), both the imaginative freedom of the first hermeneutics 14 SKS 9, 58 / WL, 51. Kierkegaard’s discussion turns on mt 22:39. the synoptic parallels are mk 12:31 and lk 10:27. each individual coram Deo has the responsibility to love the neighbor, as Kierkegaard explicates the love commandment, although he never equates this mutuality with “fellowship.” 15 SV1 Xii, 464 / JFY, 196. 16 SKS 11, 206 / SUD, 93. 17 SV1 Xii, 464 / JFY, 196. 18 SKS 13, 57 / FSE, 29. 19 SKS 13, 56 / FSE, 28.

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and the paradoxical fixation of the second hermeneutics are preserved when he latterly comes to articulate the hermeneutics of the existential imitation of Christ that he seeks to make real in the life of the follower of the life of Christ as attested in the new testament. This configuration is not without its complications! Kierkegaard requires much of his readers, and even if one is able to maintain a kind of interpretive equilibrium as one reads across his authorship in this way, it is not always obvious what weight to give the different features in view of his gift for irony. moreover, as i mentioned above, Kierkegaard viewed his “unscientific” approach to the Bible as a “corrective” to the ostensibly “scientific” excesses of modern biblical criticism, and so we should maintain a lookout for places where his penchant for polemic overcorrects his judgment that “the great mass of interpreters damage the understanding of the new Testament more than they benefit an understanding of it.”20 nonetheless, in what follows i think i am able to sketch the broad outlines of this threefold hermeneutics of imaginative freedom, paradoxical fixation, and Christian imitation in such a way that shows how Kierkegaard seeks to enter into the world of the Bible through “a passage which is not yet blocked.”21 II. Kierkegaard’s Hermeneutic Context Coming to an understanding of Kierkegaard’s biblical hermeneutics entails understanding much that is not immediately obvious in his own writings. we need to know something about the background and context as well. this relationship between text and context is itself a central feature of the so-called hermeneutical circle, and one clearly adumbrated by the “father of biblical criticism,” desiderius erasmus (1466/69–1536). Recognized as a key figure in the emergence both of Reformation protestantism and renaissance humanism, erasmus was a pioneer in the attempt to restore access to the original meaning of Scripture and was among the first to insist upon the importance of recognizing how meaning is always embedded in a specific context. Thus, with respect to the biblical text, Erasmus writes, “it happens that not a little light is thrown on the understanding to the sense of scripture if we weigh up not only what is said, but also by whom it is said, to whom it is said, in what words it is said, at what time, and on what occasion; what precedes, and what follows.”22 erasmus devoted his considerable philological expertise in greek, latin, and hebrew to preparing critical editions and reliable translations of scripture and of the early church fathers. motivated by a rather deep aversion to scholasticism, he sought to “return Christian thinking to its scriptural, evangelical roots.”23 and, in order to perceive the true “spiritual” meaning beyond the “letter” of the text, erasmus believed one needed to read it in its original so as to achieve an “undistorted Pap. i a 54 / JP 1, 202. ibid. 22 desiderius erasmus, Ratio seu Methodus compendio perveniendi ad veram theologiam, quoted in Barton, The Nature of Biblical Criticism, p. 128. 23 louis dupré, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture, new haven, Connecticut: Yale university press 1993, p. 195. 20 21

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contact” with the message of the gospel.24 this concern for the recovery of original sources was to prove decisive for a number of erasmus’ reform-minded readers. martin luther (1483–1546) drew upon erasmus’ philology in preparing his german translation of the new testament (1521) and, indeed, the well-known protestant principle of sola scriptura can be regarded as a lutheran radicalization of the humanist motto ad fontes—that is, an emphasis on the importance of returning “to the sources” of the Christian faith.25 alongside this emphasis, luther insisted that the biblical concept of the spiritual priesthood of all believers meant that each Christian had the right to interpret scripture for himself or herself, adding that the power to “test and judge what is right or wrong in matters of faith” did not belong exclusively to the clerical estate.26 i mentioned already the circular co-implication of text and context. here now is another rotation of that circle: luther’s understanding of how an individual is to test and judge in matters of faith entails a distinction between the “letter” and the “spirit” such that the spiritual meaning “can only be understood by an interpreter who has opted already for the spiritual mode of existence beforehand. Yet, the decision for this mode of being is provoked by the reading of the scriptures itself.”27 luther’s theological commitment to the Christological coherence of the Bible’s spiritual meaning (namely, justification of the sinner through the graceful action of god in Christ), secured for him a criterion by which to discern the word of god in the words of the Bible. on this basis, luther distinguished the rank of the new testament books according to their Christological substance: the “true kernel and marrow of all the books” consists of the gospel according to John, 1 John, the pauline letters (especially romans, galatians, and ephesians), and 1 peter; a second tier includes the synoptic gospels, the acts of the apostles, 2 peter, and 2 and 3 John; in the third division luther lumps the letter to the hebrews, the letter of Jude, the revelation to John and, most famously, that “epistle of straw” the letter of James.28 thus, when parts of the Bible seem to luther to lack the Christological substance that defines his conception of Christian faith, he feels justified in marginalizing them relative to his Johannine and pauline “canon within the canon.” what is of central importance for luther’s biblical hermeneutics is that the word of god in Christ speaks to the reader/auditor in such a way that the words become the word anthony levi, Renaissance and Reformation: The Intellectual Genesis, new haven, Connecticut: Yale university press 2002, p. 288. 25 It should be noted that Luther was somewhat loath to admit this influence, and fellow reformer ulrich zwingli (1484–1531) recorded irritation that luther was so unwilling to acknowledge his debt not just to erasmus, but to humanists like pellican, reuchlin, and valla as well. see mark edwards, Jr., Luther and the False Brethren, stanford: stanford university press 1975, pp. 99–100. 26 see luther, Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, in Luther’s Works, vols. 1–55, ed. by Jaroslav pelikan, helmut t. lehmann, hilton C. oswald, et al., st. louis: Concordia 1955–86, vol. 44, p. 135. 27 werner Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance, london: sCm press 1994, p. 33. 28 luther, “preface to the new testament” in Luther’s Works, vol. 35, p. 362. see also hugh pyper, “Kierkegaard’s Canon: the Constitution of the Bible and of the authorship in Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2005, p. 58. 24

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addressed specifically to the individual: “That alone can be called Christian faith, which believes without wavering that Christ is the saviour not only to peter and to the saints but also to you.”29 Kierkegaard’s view of luther is rather complicated (due partly to the fact that his “canon within the canon” draws forward the letter of James and the synoptic gospels over against luther’s pauline and Johannine prioritization, about which more later). nonetheless, luther’s emphasis on the subjective appropriation of the word was enough to elicit from Kierkegaard the rather enthusiastic response, “wonderful! the category ‘for you’ (subjectivity, inwardness) with which Either/Or concludes (only the truth which builds up [opbygger] is truth for you) is luther’s own.”30 that Kierkegaard was gratified to see in Luther a forerunner for his own well-known emphasis on subjectivity is clear here. But he also has some appreciation for the philological insights of the reformer, as well as those of erasmus. For example, in a note on the relationship of imagination to philology in biblical interpretation, Kierkegaard argues that prior to the sixteenth century “the Bible was reflected imaginatively in imagination” and this made possible “the whole range of allegorical interpretation.”31 according to Kierkegaard, the danger here is that when allegory becomes the “primary interpretation” of scripture, interpreters lose sight of the fact that “Christ was a particular human being, the apostle a particular human being who amid prodigious activity tossed a few words on a scrap of paper for a congregation.”32 erasmus and the reformation instigated “a sounder philological interpretation,”33 Kierkegaard maintained, and this helped to return interpretation to an understanding of scripture as testimony by individual human beings about god’s role in their actual lives. the historical trajectory of the new philology was not entirely advantageous, however, and Kierkegaard complains that in the post-reformation era and through the enlightenment the discipline became so engrossed in its methods that, as he says, “now we are veritably drowning…in scientific philology,” and “it is readily forgotten that the Bible is holy scripture.”34 as Kierkegaard sees it, the problem is that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries philology became preoccupied with propositions that might either be verified or falsified, and tended to read the books of the Bible as “doctrinal treatises.”35 the outcome of this, he objects, was that Luther, “Sermon on Matthew 21:1–9, the first Sunday in Advent,” in Sermons of Martin Luther, vols. 1–8, ed. by John nicholas lenker, grand rapids, michigan: Baker Book house 1983, vol. 1, p. 21. 30 SKS 20, 274–5, nB3:61 / JP 2, 2463. Kierkegaard indicates here that he was reading the “Sermon on Matthew 21:1–9, the first Sunday in Advent” from which I have just quoted. see [martin luther], En Christelig Postille, sammendragen af Dr. Morten Luthers Kirke- og Huuspostiller, new danish trans. by Jørgen thisted, Copenhagen: den wahlske Boghandling 1828, p. 28 (ASKB 283). 31 SKS 23, 148, nB16:78 / JP 4, 4781. 32 ibid. 33 ibid. 34 ibid. 35 ibid. it was “the seventeenth Century,” Kierkegaard asserts, “which in a strict sense began to conceive of holy scriptures as doctrine.” SKS 23, 148, nB16:78.a / JP 4, 463. 29

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the testimonies of scripture were “evaporated into teachings, doctrine,” and biblical interpretation was objectified away from the imaginative process of reflecting oneself into the text: “preoccupied with the piece of paper paul sent out, we completely forget paul, and we treat it now in a most un-pauline way.”36 notably, the enlightenment thinker to whom Kierkegaard was most obviously intellectually indebted, gotthold ephraim lessing (1729–81), was clearly committed to just such a propositional hermeneutics.37 lessing—who in his day might have been “the only one,” according to Kierkegaard, to have “freely and openly posed the problem of doubt in relation to Christianity”38—is remembered in this connection both for publishing fragments from the unpublished dissertation Apology for Rational Worshippers of God by h.s. reimarus (1694–1768), and for alerting readers to the “ugly, broad ditch” that separates “the narrative of the evangelists” and “accidental historical truths” on the one side, from metaphysical and moral truths on the other.39 lessing is willing to admit, if rather ironically, that he has “no objection to the statement that…Christ himself rose from the dead.”40 But resurrection, miraculous as that would be, could be no proof of the man’s divinity. and so, lessing wonders, “why must i therefore accept it as true that this risen Christ was the son of god?”41 the central claim here is that “historical truth cannot be demonstrated.”42 that is to say, a historical report about something someone professes to have witnessed cannot be cast syllogistically in terms of a necessary truth of reason that would remain true in an indubitable extra-historical sense. “The problem is that reports of fulfilled prophecies are not fulfilled prophecies; that reports of miracles are not miracles,” lessing says, and the claim about god’s incarnation in Christ is not the sort of thing that admits of either verification or falsification through “reports.”43 thus, with the rise of enlightenment criticism, philological sophistication did not yield the “undistorted contact” with the spiritual meaning of scripture for which erasmus had hoped. instead, increased critical awareness of the biblical text as a historical document made for an intellectual climate in which, as Kierkegaard complains, “it is readily forgotten that the Bible is holy scripture.”44 granted, Kierkegaard’s statement here is rather totalizing, but it seems clear that the enlightenment partition between “truths of reason” and “historical truths” seriously SKS 23, 148, nB16:78 / JP 4, 4781. while lessing’s importance for Kierkegaard’s authorship is undeniable (see, for example, the section entitled “something about lessing” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript), it is important to note that Kierkegaard developed a more critical attitude toward lessing in his later years. in 1849, for example, he suggests that lessing ridiculed Christianity without being “sufficiently developed dialectically to know what he was doing.” SKS 22, 97, nB11:165 / JP 3, 2377. 38 Pap. v B 64 / JP 2, 1637. 39 gotthold lessing, “on the proof of the spirit and of power,” in Lessing’s Theological Writings, trans. by henry Chadwick, stanford: stanford university press 1956, pp. 53–5. 40 ibid., p. 54. 41 ibid. 42 ibid. 43 ibid., p. 52. 44 SKS 23, 148, nB16:78 / JP 4, 4781. 36 37

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destabilized the referential plausibility of the biblical Weltanschauung, and it was perceived to undermine the Bible’s authority to contour human lives. lessing, for example, bristled at the expectation that one should form all “metaphysical and moral ideas” according to “something against which my reason rebels.”45 effectively, lessing’s rationalism amalgamates the epistemology of g.w. leibniz (1646–1716), with its strict dichotomy between necessary truths of reason and contingent truths of experience, and the hermeneutics of Baruch spinoza (1632–77), with its thesis that a historical narrative cannot make available the knowledge of god, since such knowledge could only ever be derived from indubitable universal ideas.46 and david Friedrich Strauss (1808–74), in his turn, drew upon all these figures and more, most notably the speculative philosophy of g.w.F. hegel (1770–1831), in formulating his mythical interpretation of the Bible in The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined (1835–36).47 in the year in which strauss’ Leben Jesu was published, Kierkegaard was a theology student at the university of Copenhagen. while he never addressed strauss’ famous work directly, Kierkegaard clearly became familiar with its narration of the history of biblical interpretation, along with its program of demythologization which “summarily declares Christianity to be a myth,” from the subscription he held between 1835 and 1838 to the Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, a journal edited by the prominent left-wing proponent of hegelianism, Bruno Bauer (1809–82).48 additionally, Kierkegaard refers to Leben Jesu in notes connected with the university lectures on dogmatics that he attended by hans lassen martensen (1808–84).49 But martensen, although he defended a version of speculative philosophy, critiqued the more radical dimensions of strauss’ work. alongside martensen, Copenhagen university’s theology Faculty had its detractors of speculative philosophical trends as well, the most notable of whom was Kierkegaard’s new testament professor, henrik nicolai Clausen (1793–1877). a moderate rationalist by intellectual temperament, Clausen had followed the Berlin lectures of Friedrich schleiermacher (1768–1834), the theologian regarded by many lessing, “on the proof of the spirit and of power,” p. 54. For an analysis of the contextual circumstances that precipitated the enlightenment partition between “truths of reason” and “historical truths,” see stephen toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Chicago: university of Chicago press 1990. toulmin argues that the emergence of factionalism in western Christianity triggered the desire in many enlightenment intellectuals to decontextualize rationality from the contingencies of history. 47 david Friedrich strauss, Das Leben Jesu: Kritisch bearbeitet, 3rd ed., tübingen: C.F. osiander 1835–36. 48 Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Bruno Bauer, Berlin: dümmler 1836–38 (ASKB 354–357). see SKS 7, 199 / CUP1, 218. on Kierkegaard’s relationship to strauss, see george pattison, “d.F. strauss: Kierkegaard and radical demythologization,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 233–53. on his relationship to Bauer, see david James and douglas moggach, “Bruno Bauer: Biblical narrative, Freedom and anxiety,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, pp. 1–21. 49 SKS 18, 318ff., KK:2 / KJN 2, 292ff. 45 46

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as the “father of modern hermeneutics”; in his own New Testament Hermeneutics (1840) Clausen attempted to unify schleiermacher’s emphasis on the affective dimension of human experience with a “scripturalism” that would balance theology, philology, and historical criticism. But this unification can only be expected within the “boundaries of the Church, where the text has a validity as holy scripture,”50 for otherwise when we speak of “interpretation” the new testament is “an object only for scholarship, not for faith.”51 this work was a follow-up to Clausen’s more famous Catholicism and Protestantism: Their Church Constitutions, Doctrines, and Rites (1825), in which Clausen takes the standard line that the criterion of Catholicism is the “principle of the Church” while the criterion of protestantism is the “principle of scripture,” with the primary feature distinguishing Clausen’s view from orthodox lutheranism being his rationalist position that the biblical witness must be rationally comprehensible in order to be considered revelation.52 this stock distinction between a more ecclesial tradition and a more scriptural tradition, along with Clausen’s implication that the adjudicatory role of what counts as revelation should fall to rationalist professors, was perhaps regarded as innocuous by some readers, but the view outraged the dynamic pastor, poet, and historian nikolai Frederik severin grundtvig (1783–1872), who in the same year published The Church’s Reply.53 grundtvig castigated Clausen’s “exegetical popery” and contrasted it with his own “matchless discovery” of the “ecclesiastical view,” namely, that the criterion of the Christian faith is the oral tradition—“the living word”—embodied in the lord’s prayer, the baptismal and eucharistic words of institution, and the creedal formulations that predate the Bible, and to which the Bible itself attests. this hermeneutical skirmish gained for both parties not a little notoriety. in their own time, the notoriety stemmed chiefly from Clausen’s successful libel suit against grundtvig, but over the longer haul what has preserved it is the satirical treatment grundtvig and his “matchless discovery” receive in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript: “the matchless discovery in its matchless absoluteness bears the unmistakable imprint of grundtvigian originality.”54 it is an open question whether Clausen fared any better in Kierkegaard’s eyes. hugh pyper has suggested that Clausen’s importance for Kierkegaard is “still underestimated”55 and, indeed, Kierkegaard doubtless learned a thing or two from attending Clausen’s lectures on the synoptic gospels in 1832–33, and on the acts of the apostles in 1833–34, along with

henrik nicolai Clausen, Det Nye Testaments Hermeneutik, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1840, p. 69 (ASKB 468). 51 ibid., p. 64. 52 henrik nicolai Clausen, Catholicismens og Protestantismens Kirkeforfatning, Lære og Ritus, Copenhagen: andreas seidelin 1825. 53 nikolai Frederik severin grundtvig, Kirkens Gienmæle [1825], vol. 2 in Værker i Udvalg, vols. 1–10, ed. by georg Christensen and hal Koch, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1940– 49, pp. 317–49. 54 SKS 7, 43 / CUP1, 36. 55 pyper, “Kierkegaard’s Canon: the Constitution of the Bible and of the authorship in Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” p. 60. 50

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other lectures on biblical exegesis by Clausen’s colleagues in the theology faculty.56 nonetheless, as we shall see, in none of his works could Kierkegaard ever endorse the rationalist view that divine revelation can be adjudicated by human reason. neither would he abide either the ecclesiastical view that the church’s witness vouchsafes scripture, nor the speculative view that scripture mythically represents the general features of a universal system. indeed, Kierkegaard’s lifelong dissatisfaction with the whole enterprise of modern biblical criticism in its various guises is clear even from his students days, for it is in the year after he attended Clausen’s lectures on acts that he penned in his journal, “the whole great mass of interpreters damage the understanding of the New Testament more than they benefit an understanding of it.”57 the threefold hermeneutics operative in Kierkegaard’s authorship, therefore, constitutes his attempt “to overlook them, if possible”—that is, to enter into the world of the Bible without relying upon the commentators whom he thinks simply “block” the way. whether or not we should judge his attempt successful is a matter i address in my concluding remarks. First, however, let me elucidate just how i think Kierkegaard seeks to circumvent the dominant hermeneutical alternatives of his day. III. Kierkegaard’s Critique of Historical-Critical Scholarship From Kierkegaard’s earliest writings, he approached the Bible with imaginative freedom. instead of following any methodological principals or rules for understanding and applying biblical texts, he inscribes verses and figures from the Bible in his own works such that the variety of ways he alludes to the Bible—both directly and obliquely—makes finding any one criterion of interpretation challenging. often “Kierkegaard does not so much talk about the Bible as kaleidoscopically use it,”58 as polk has remarked, and this feature frustrates hurried attempts to discern any one normative configuration of how Kierkegaard interprets the Bible. We might think of the multiple intertextual relationships as rather “like the boxes in a Chinese puzzle,” as the pseudonym victor eremita says of the various sections of Either/ Or.59 pons persuasively argues that Kierkegaard’s biblical imagination so suffuses his writing that its “invisible omnipresence”60 in his authorship constitutes a kind of “imitation of the Bible.”61 read this way, just as the Bible itself contains “repetitions of phrases and sentences that can be considered as ‘quotations’ [inscribing earlier texts within later ones] in which the exact original wording is rare,”62 so too Kierkegaard’s “imitation of the Bible” configures and reconfigures the Bible “in a 56 wolfdietrich von Kloeden, “Biblestudy,” in Kierkegaard’s View of Christianity, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 1), pp. 20–6. 57 Pap. i a 54 / JP 1, 202. 58 polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, p. 17. 59 SKS 2, 16 / EO1, 9 60 pons, Stealing a Gift, p. xv. 61 ibid., p. 146. 62 ibid., p. 104.

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kind of spiral movement of imitation through deviations and reduplications—without authority.”63 the exposition of the rank upon rank of these allusions and deviations in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship is exemplary in pons’ study, so i refer readers to her work for a full exposition of this quotational strategy. one example is enough to illustrate this practice in the present article, and arguably its locus classicus is the opening of Fear and Trembling. the central narrative of Fear and Trembling turns on the genesis 22 story of abraham’s binding of isaac, but in the introductory “exordium” and the “eulogy on abraham” Johannes de silentio, the pseudonymous author, scripts five “Abraham” stories. Or, rather, as John Lippitt puts it, de silentio depicts four “sub-abrahams” who represent conceivable responses to the trial of the divine command, and one “real” abraham whom de silentio valorizes as the “knight of faith.”64 But, while it is arguable that de silentio’s “real” Abraham reflects the abraham of genesis 22 more recognizably than the four “sub-abrahams,” de silentio nonetheless writes his “real” abraham into the text of Fear and Trembling in ways that betray an interest in “the beautiful tapestry of imagination,” despite his protestation to the contrary.65 in de silentio’s hands, the narrative of abraham’s binding of isaac connects up with modern philosophical problems of “doubt,” “the ethical,” and the possibility of “going beyond faith” in ways that imaginatively refract (and contest) nineteenth-century intellectual concerns that are nowhere obvious in the genesis account. moreover, with good reason Fear and Trembling is also often read in terms of Kierkegaard’s own biography (another nestled box in the puzzle).66 But by using Genesis 22 to interpret Kierkegaard’s willingness to sacrifice his engagement to regine olsen in the hope that their relationship might somehow be preserved, what the “real” abraham’s faith has come to mean in Fear and Trembling is quite different from what it meant for the Elohist who first transcribed the story from oral tradition.67 is this a problem? the question revolves around whether Fear and Trembling so emphasizes what the narrative has (or can) “come to mean” that “what it meant” gets neglected.68 modern biblical criticism has tended to prioritize the ostensibly objective historical-critical matter of ascertaining what a text meant in its original Sitz im Leben. But, de silentio rhetorically questions, “what is the value of going to the trouble of remembering that past which cannot become a present?” 69 his priority, therefore, seems to be that of ascertaining the different ways a past can become reconfigured as a present reality for an interpreter.

ibid., p. 135. John lippitt, Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling, london: routledge 2003, p. 23. 65 SKS 4, 105 / FT, 9. 66 see lippitt, Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling, pp. 5–7; pp. 138–9. 67 regarding the attribution of gen 22:1–19 to the elohist, see terence e. Fretheim, “genesis,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible, vols. 1–13, ed. by leander e. Keck et al., nashville: abingdon press 1994–2004, vol. 1, p. 494. 68 Krister stendahl’s hermeneutical model proposes this distinction between “what a text meant” and “what it might come to mean.” see Krister stendahl, “Biblical theology: a program,” in Meanings: The Bible as Document and Guide, philadelphia: Fortress press 1984, pp. 11–44. 69 SKS 4, 126 / FT, 30. 63 64

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it is surely with such a theme in mind that paul ricoeur speaks of “appropriation” as “the existential category par excellence,” and it seems plausible that Kierkegaard would agree with ricoeur’s characterization.70 But if that is the case, then surely one is justified in asking whether it is not possible to appropriate the Bible in just about any fashion one likes. and then we might also wonder whether there is any point to talking about hermeneutics at all (where the goal is to arrive at the most fitting interpretation—one where it makes sense to say interpretation X is better than Y), and say instead that “interpretation” is nothing but free and imaginative play and deferral. Kierkegaard clearly imagines this possibility, for he has the aesthete of Either/Or pen the words: “my life is utterly meaningless. when i consider its various epochs, my life is like the word Schnur in the dictionary, which first of all means a string, and second a daughter-in-law. all that is lacking is that in the third place the word Schnur means a camel, in the fourth a whisk broom.”71 one might derive a sense of exhilaration from the insight that meaning is not definitely fixed, and that one is therefore at liberty to reconfigure inherited assumptions through the exercise of one’s own imagination. But here we see that such heady freedom also has a shadow side. For on the fatalistic view of the aesthete, the Schnur of his life (definition 1) is simply “one of the threads” which the Fates have “spun into the calico of life.” and once he comes to regard this fabric of his life as “utterly meaningless” (since it can mean anything and, thus, nothing in particular) he would just as soon “cut the thread.”72 As I mentioned in the first section, Kierkegaard uses this textile metaphor in other contexts as well and, notably, such meaninglessness is not a risk run by aesthetic ironists alone. on the contrary, six years after the publication of Either/ Or, Kierkegaard’s preeminently Christian pseudonym anti-Climacus maintains that earnest scholars face the problem of the never-ending deferral of meaning as well. this is because when it comes to the matter of interpretation one can “sew without fastening the end and without knotting the thread, and this is why, wonder of wonders, [one] can go on sewing and sewing…pulling the thread through” without ever reaching any definite meaning.73 what then might provide a criterion of meaningfulness? what might be an appropriate candidate for the kind of focal “concern” that constitutes an individual’s “relation to life?”74 in The Sickness unto Death, Anti-Climacus affirms that Christianity is discontinuous with the conventions of merely human interpretation. “Christianity,” he says, “fastens the end by means of the paradox.”75 in Christianity, on this view, we are supposed to discover the knot that holds; the bright center for the kaleidoscopic play of light; the solution—for faith, and contrary to human expectation—to the puzzle of life’s meaning. in its paul ricoeur, “philosophical hermeneutics and Biblical hermeneutics,” in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II, trans. by Kathleen Blamey and John B. thompson, evanston, illinois: northwestern university press 1991, p. 99. 71 SKS 2, 45 / EO1, 36. 72 SKS 2, 40 / EO1, 31. 73 SKS 11, 206 / SUD, 93. 74 SKS 11, 117 / SUD, 5. 75 SKS 11, 206 / SUD, 93. 70

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biblical specification, “the paradox” is the Word made flesh, the eternal in time, the god-man—Christ. in Practice in Christianity, anti-Climacus insists that Jesus Christ as attested in the new testament “is the paradox that history can never digest or convert into an ordinary syllogism.”76 since a focus on Christ as paradox is said to “fasten” biblical interpretation somehow—yet through some means other than either historiography or syllogistic reasoning—it is here that we should fix our attention. Kierkegaard develops the conception of “the paradox” most fully in the Johannes Climacus works, Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. indeed, envisioned as “the absolute paradox,” the god-man is at the very heart of the Johannes Climacus works.77 the challenge that Climacus’ conception of the absolute paradox poses for new testament hermeneutics, however, is that it seems to be fastened only ever so loosely to the biblical text. For on Climacus’ view, “even if the contemporary generation had not left anything behind except these words, ‘we have believed that in such and such a year the god appeared in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among us, and then died’—this is more than enough.”78 Polk refers to this as Climacus’ “notorious reduction of the significance of the historical material in the gospels,” which easily reads as an “implicit trivialization…of the four-fold character of the canonical story.”79 granted, polk goes on to argue that it would be a mistake to regard Climacus’ “notorious reduction” as Kierkegaard’s own; the relationship between Kierkegaard and this pseudonym is more complicated than that, and Kierkegaard does not wish to trivialize the new testament story. But it is equally mistaken, i think, to move too quickly beyond Climacus’ reduction and overlook the fact that Kierkegaard articulates one of his key hermeneutical positions through Climacus. this “notorious reduction” serves as a caveat to remind the reader that no matter how significant any historical material in the Gospels might be, it can never be so significant as to warrant on “objective” grounds (that is, either historical-critically or in terms of the logic of speculative philosophy) the paradoxical conclusion that Jesus was the eternal god temporally incarnate. Climacus addresses this “objective issue of the truth of Christianity” in part one of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, which he subdivides into two chapters, one treating “the historical point of view,” and another “the speculative point of view.” the former of these is subdivided into three further sections entitled, respectively, “holy scripture,” “the Church,” and “the evidence of the Centuries for the Truth of Christianity.” Only the first of these addresses biblical hermeneutics explicitly, but since he sets up the other discussions in order to explore possible alternatives to the first, a quick review is appropriate here. SKS 12, 35 / PC, 30. regarding the relationship between Johannes Climacus, anti-Climacus and himself, Kierkegaard writes, “Johannes Climacus and anti-Climacus have several things in common; but the difference is that whereas Johannes Climacus places himself so low that he even says he himself is not a Christian, one seems to be able to detect in anti-Climacus that he considers himself to be a Christian on an extraordinarily high level….i would place myself higher than Johannes Climacus, lower than anti-Climacus.” SKS 22, 130, nB11:209 / JP 6, 6433. 78 SKS 4, 300 / PF, 104. 79 polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, p. 17. 76 77

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Climacus opens the first chapter with the claim that “nothing is easier to perceive than this, that with regard to the historical the greatest certainty is only an approximation, and an approximation is too little to build [one’s] happiness on and is so unlike an eternal happiness that no result can ensue.”80 thus, whether one places one’s hope for objective results in the ostensibly “secure stronghold” of biblical research (where, as for Clausen and other modern critics reviewed in the previous section, “the important thing is to secure scripture historically-critically”81), or in the “living word” of the Church (where, as for grundtvig and his followers, the burden of proof is to be able to demonstrate that the Church has not changed decisively over time, that “the present Church, is the apostolic Church”82), or even in the supposed reliability of the longevity of the Christian hypothesis in history (where the difficulty is to demonstrate that “habit and routine” have not actually become “a diversionary power that is extremely distracting,”83 so that people “do not notice the secret that their talk about their eternal happiness is an affectation because it is devoid of passion, and therefore it might as well be built on matchstick arguments”84), the “objective issue” remains that in each of these three historical perspectives one receives nothing decisive for faith; “alas, the trouble is that in relation to a historical fact i can obtain only an approximation.”85 Considered from “the speculative point of view” the issue is somewhat different, but not decisively so with respect to the subjective appropriation of the biblical claim about god in Christ. the speculative thinker is not interested in the biblical text on its own terms (and perhaps for this reason Climacus does not explicitly address the issue of the speculative interpretation of the Bible itself). rather, the speculative thinker conceives of the biblical witness as one among many historical expressions of spirit (even if it is also the consummate expression), and thinks this “in such a way that finally Christianity itself is the eternal thought.”86 here Climacus implicates “the hegelian notion that the outer is the inner and the inner the outer”87 in his critique of the speculative thinker as an individual so concerned with ascertaining the logic of absolute spirit’s objective manifestations in and through “the necessity of a historical phenomenon”88 that such a thinker neglects his own subjective spirit and, with this, his personal relationship to the divine. in this way, according to Climacus, a speculative thinker manages not even “to raise the issue we are discussing, because as a speculative thinker he becomes precisely too objective to concern himself with his eternal happiness.”89 at this point a speculative thinker, were one so inclined, might wish to reply that such a merely subjective concern for one’s eternal happiness falls rather short of SKS 7, 30 / CUP1, 23. SKS 7, 31 / CUP1, 24. 82 SKS 7, 45 / CUP1, 39. Climacus explicitly declines speaking about roman Catholicism in this connection. see SKS 7, 41 / CUP1, 34. 83 SKS 7, 53 / CUP1, 47. 84 ibid. 85 SKS 7, 49 / CUP1, 44. 86 SKS 7, 54 / CUP1, 50. 87 SKS 7, 58 / CUP1, 54. 88 SKS 7, 58 / CUP1, 53. 89 SKS 7, 60 / CUP1, 55. 80 81

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the full witness to Spirit’s objectification in history which Christianity is supposed to represent. But Climacus gives no quarter on the matter: “Christianity cannot be observed objectively, precisely because it wants to lead the subject to the ultimate point of his subjectivity, and when the subject is thus properly positioned, he cannot tie his eternal happiness to speculative thought.”90 To what, then, can one “tie” one’s eternal happiness? As Climacus first states in Philosophical Fragments and then repeats verbatim in Concluding Unscientific Postscript: as is well known, Christianity is the only historical phenomenon that despite the historical—indeed, precisely by means of the historical—has wanted to be the single individual’s point of departure for his eternal consciousness, has wanted to interest him otherwise than merely historically, has wanted to base his happiness on his relation to something historical.91

the paradox of faith that corresponds (subjectively) to the absolute paradox of the incarnation is that this “something historical” which is to secure one’s eternal consciousness and, indeed, happiness, cannot be observed “historically-critically” by any individual in their role as a biblical “research scholar.”92 all “objective” attempts to secure knowledge of the truth or (falsity) of Christianity fail here, according to Climacus, because by focusing objectively on the Bible (or the church, or Christianity’s historical longevity and influence, or “the System”) one approaches the matter in a way that can never correspond to the kind of truth Christianity is supposed to instantiate. on Climacus’ analogy, such an objective approach is rather like someone who seeks to discover whether or not they love their marriage partner by examining “its mark in the external world.”93 one can, of course, evaluate a marriage this way, for a marriage “constitutes a phenomenon in existence (on a smaller scale, just as Christianity world-historically has left its mark on all of life).”94 But one is not thereby grasping the subjective experience of “married love” for, no matter how many historical effects it produces, the inter-subjective relationship “is not a historical phenomenon.”95 Consequently, the question of whether or not the relationship is one of “true love” cannot even arise as an “objective issue.” moreover, just as we say two individuals “tie the knot” by affirming the invisible love of and for the other in their marriage covenant, so too, on this view, one who wishes to become a Christian secures their eternal consciousness (subjectivity) through a leap of trust beyond understanding that ties eternal happiness to a paradoxical love relationship with Jesus Christ who truly becomes for the believer god’s word incarnate. if this vision of true love for the divine is definitive of Christianity, as Climacus maintains, then all appeals to objectivity in the matter are misleading.

90 91 92 93 94 95

SKS 7, 60 / CUP1, 57. SKS 4, 305 / PF, 109. SKS 7, 24 / CUP1, 15. SKS 7, 31 / CUP1, 24. SKS 7, 58 / CUP1, 54. ibid. ibid.

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IV. History Transfigured as Sacred History the preceding overview has sketched the Kierkegaardian view of how not to interpret the Bible if one seeks in Christianity to secure one’s eternal consciousness and, indeed, happiness. But beyond these negative historical-critical results, can Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms commend anything positive for biblical hermeneutics? how does one transition from reading the Bible as a purely historical text (“objective as calico,”96 something on which interpreters can “sew without fastening the end”97) to reading the Bible as “god’s word”? in order to discover this, we need to ascertain both the similarities and differences between Climacus’ biblical hermeneutics and Kierkegaard’s own. polk is clearly right when he says that Climacus reduces “the significance of the historical material in the Gospels,” whereas Kierkegaard places considerable emphasis “on the imitation of Christ when he writes under his own name in the religious discourses.”98 But i want to cavil a bit about polk’s assertion that the former “belies” the latter, if by “belies” he means that Climacus and Kierkegaard disagree about what “the historical material in the gospels” demonstrates. on this issue i think both Climacus and Kierkegaard agree: “historical material” demonstrates nothing for paradoxical faith in so far as no historical material could ever validate the Christian witness that Jesus was the incarnate word of god, and it is in terms of that Christological witness that one concerned with “becoming a Christian” is first and foremost interested in the man Jesus. in Kierkegaard’s own words, “however paradoxical it is, it is true and it is Christian that with regard to Christ the historical details are not nearly so important as with socrates and the like, simply because Christ is Christ, an eternally present one [en evig Nærværende] for he is true god.”99 this claim is made even more starkly by anti-Climacus, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym who is supposed to represent Christianity in the eminent sense. in a section of Practice in Christianity headed by the question, Can One Come to Know Something about Christ from History? anti-Climacus answers: no. why not? Because one cannot know anything at all about Christ; he is the paradox, the object of faith, exists only for faith. But all historical communication is the communication of knowledge; consequently one can come to know nothing about Christ from history. For if one comes to know little or much or something about him, he is not SKS 13, 66 / FSE, 39. SKS 11, 206 / SUD, 93. 98 polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, p. 17. the entire passage reads as follows: “Climacus’ notorious reduction of the significance of the historical material in the Gospels to the simple claim that at such and such a time and place one Jesus of nazareth lived and died—and his implicit trivialization thereby of the four-fold character of the canonical story—belies the emphasis Kierkegaard places on the imitation of Christ when he writes under his own name in the religious discourses.” we might note here that, in fact, Climacus “reduces” the historical material even more than polk suggests, for the passage in question makes no mention of “Jesus of nazareth,” but simply reads, “even if the contemporary generation had not left anything behind except these words, ‘we have believed that in such and such a year the god appeared in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among us, and then died’—this is more than enough.” SKS 4, 300 / PF, 104. 99 SKS 20, 328–9, nB4:81 / JP 1, 318. 96 97

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the one he in truth is. thus one comes to know something about him that is different from what he is. one comes to know nothing about him or one comes to know something incorrect about him—one is deceived. history makes Christ into someone else than he is in truth, and thus from history we come to know much about—Christ? no, not about Christ, for about him nothing can be known; he can only be believed.100

Beneath this disavowal of historical knowledge about Christ lies a more fundamental distinction between “world history” and “sacred history,” where the former is the ostensibly objective sort, and the latter begins not in historical observations or scholarly research but in the subjective appropriation of faith, and so is “qualitatively different from history in general.”101 But this distinction only serves to reinforce the epistemological skepticism of Johannes Climacus’ “notorious reduction” and, consequently, Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard, and anti-Climacus all seem to agree that Christ “is the paradox that history can never digest or convert into an ordinary syllogism.”102 Given this threefold agreement about the insignificance of the “historical material” for faith, it seems Kierkegaard would wish to resist the suggestion that his mature emphasis on “the imitation of Christ” builds upon any “historical material” about the life of Christ qua “history.”103 granted, as polk says, in Kierkegaard’s engagement with the Bible his interpretive praxis outstrips his hermeneutical theory.104 But this does not mean that Kierkegaard’s interpretive praxis ever contradicts his views about the insignificance of the Gospels qua “historical material” in the objective sense. in fact, Kierkegaard can be just as sardonic as his pseudonym on the matter: look, perhaps there are several variations [of any given book of the Bible], and perhaps a new manuscript has just been found—good lord!—and the prospect of new variations, and perhaps there are five interpreters with one opinion and seven with another and two with a strange opinion and three who are wavering or have no opinion, and “i myself am not absolutely sure about the meaning of this passage, or, to speak my mind, i agree with the three wavering interpreters who have no opinion” etc.105

But if Kierkegaard and anti-Climacus agree with Johannes Climacus with respect to what historical scholarship can and cannot establish about Christ, does this mean i wish to lump them together and say of all three what polk says of Climacus, namely, that their works tend toward an “implicit trivialization…of the four-fold character of the canonical story”?106 no, for such a reading would have no way to account for the fuller and more explicit testimonial use of gospel material in the signed works and in Practice in Christianity. Clearly there are hermeneutical differences between SKS 12, 30–1 / PC, 25–6. SKS 12, 35 / PC, 30. 102 ibid. 103 as anti-Climacus remarks within the context of Practice in Christianity, “here and throughout the book, ‘history’ is to be understood as profane history, world history, history directly understood in contradistinction to sacred history.” SKS 12, 30 / PC, 25. 104 polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, p. 17. 105 SKS 13, 59 / FSE, 32. 106 polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard, p. 17. 100 101

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Climacus, on the one hand, and Kierkegaard and anti-Climacus, on the other. But these differences are different not by virtue of how they evaluate the significance of historical scholarship for faith, but by virtue of how they engage scripture despite the insistence that such scholarship demonstrates nothing for faith. we might imagine that something like the distinction adumbrated in Fear and Trembling between the “knight of infinite resignation” and the “knight of faith” might also be appropriate here, mutatis mutandis. readers will recall that the knight of infinite resignation is one who is prepared to resign his claim on cherished finite things when this is demanded of him: the act of resignation does not require faith, for what i gain in resignation is my eternal consciousness. this is a purely philosophical movement that i venture to make when it is demanded and can discipline myself to make, because every time some finitude will take power over me, i starve myself into submission until i make the movement, for my eternal consciousness is my love for god, and for me that is the highest of all.107

the “knight of faith,” on the other hand, is described as one who “does exactly the same as the other knight did….But then the marvel happens; he makes one more movement even more wonderful than all the others, for he says: nevertheless i have faith.”108 this account of the “double movement” of faith appears to include and absorb the knight’s resignation into “something far higher.”109 whereas “through resignation i renounce everything,” the “far higher” double movement of faith incorporates and relativizes the resignation: “By faith i do not renounce anything; on the contrary, by faith i receive everything exactly in the sense in which it is said that one who has faith like a mustard seed can move mountains.”110 the reference here is, of course, to the parable Jesus tells in matthew 17:20, and de silentio immediately follows this with a reference to the parable of the rich young man who came to Jesus and asked what he must do to inherit the kingdom of heaven: “By virtue of resignation, that rich young man should have given away everything, but if he had done so, then the knight of faith would have said to him: By virtue of the absurd, you will get every penny back again—believe it!”111 is this rather dizzying dynamic of sublation operative elsewhere in Kierkegaardian biblical hermeneutics as well? on the analogy i wish to propose, Johannes Climacus can be read as a knight of infinite resignation: he renounces all the historical claims about the life of Christ, but does not “get it all back” in terms of “paradoxical faith.” Like de silentio, Johannes Climacus is “infinitely interested” in what the Bible attests. He is fixated on the absolute paradox. He denies, however, that he has Christian faith.112 on the other hand, Kierkegaard (as one who speaks from the position of one who is “becoming a Christian”) and anti-Climacus (as one who is a Christian in the eminent sense) both incorporate the insight that the historical material demonstrates 107 108 109 110 111 112

SKS 4, 142 / FT, 48. SKS 4, 141 / FT, 46. SKS 4, 142 / FT, 47. SKS 4, 143 / FT, 48–9. SKS 4, 143 / FT, 49. see mt 19:16–22; mk 10:17–22; lk 18:18–23. SKS 7, 560 / CUP1, 617.

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nothing about the incarnation, but in faith they appropriate the biblical material nonetheless. In this sense, they “get it all back” not as “history,” but transfigured into “sacred history.” or, in Kierkegaard’s more direct language, they appropriate the biblical material as “god’s word.” V. The Subjective Appropriation of the Text it is precisely as “god’s word” that Kierkegaard speaks of the Bible in For SelfExamination. although not as well known as the discussion of biblical scholarship in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the first section of For Self-Examination constitutes Kierkegaard’s most robust and sustained discussion of biblical interpretation, and indicates the manner in which he thinks a faithful reader “gets the Bible back,” as it were. Building upon an introductory section in which he claims that “true lutheranism” paradoxically entails “works and nevertheless grace,”113 Kierkegaard proposes to counterbalance the reformation emphasis on the “major premise” of grace with a renewed attention to the “minor premise” of works. thus, whereas in an age when “everything had become works” luther believed the apostle James needed to “be shoved aside,”114 Kierkegaard viewed his contemporary era as one in which “the apostle James must be drawn forward a little, not for works against faith…but for faith, in order, if possible…to prevent grace, faith and grace as the only redemption and salvation, from being taken totally in vain, from becoming a camouflage even for a refined worldliness.”115 thus, in posing the question contained in his title, “What is Required in Order to Look at Oneself with True Blessing in the Mirror of the Word?” Kierkegaard orients his reflection vis-à-vis a passage from the epistle of James that emphasizes works: But be doers of the word, and not merely hearers who deceive themselves. For if any are hearers of the word and not doers, they are like those who look at themselves in a mirror; for they look at themselves and, on going away, immediately forget what they were like. But those who look into the perfect law, the law of liberty, and persevere, being not hearers who forget but doers who act—they will be blessed in their doing. if any think they are religious, and do not bridle their tongues but deceive their hearts, their religion is worthless. Religion that is pure and undefiled before God, the Father, is this: to care for the orphans and widows in their distress, and to keep oneself unstained by the world.116

arguably, the clearest sense of this passage is at the moral level where readers are enjoined to conform their actions to what they profess to be true in their words. But the text contextualizes this ethical injunction in a theological register that indicates that “the word” to which readers’ actions must conform is “the implanted word that has the power to save your souls.”117 the “word,” then, is the gospel attesting to god’s 113 114 115 116 117

SKS 13, 46 / FSE, 17. SKS 13, 44-5 / FSE, 15–16. SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24. SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24. Jas 1:22–27. Jas 1:21.

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word in Christ. and, as Kierkegaard notes in his journals in the publication year of For Self-Examination, the difference between scholarship and faith “is the same with the concept ‘god-man’ as with the concept ‘holy scripture,’ ” for the transition of faith by which one sees in Jesus the word of god is the same as that by which one reads the Bible and encounters god’s word.118 in For Self-Examination, Kierkegaard seeks to uncover “what is required” in order for this transition to transpire. how, then, should an earnest reader regard the Bible? over the course of the discourse, Kierkegaard sets out three requirements which each refer back to the image of the mirror taken from James’ epistle: The first requirement is that you must not look at the mirror, observe the mirror, but must see yourself in the mirror.119 The second requirement is that in order to see yourself in the mirror when you read God’s Word you must (so that you actually do come to see yourself in the mirror) remember to say to yourself incessantly: It is I to whom it speaking; it is I about whom it is speaking.120

and Finally, if you want to look at yourself in the mirror with true blessing, you must not promptly forget how you looked, you must not be the forgetful hearer (or reader) of whom the apostle says: He looked at his bodily face in a mirror but promptly forgot how he looked.121

the subjective dimension of this set of requirements is plain to see here. once again, what is at stake is not the “objective issue,” but the truth of god’s word “for you.” indeed, the reader who reads objectively in a “scholarly” fashion is said not to read god’s word at all: “if you are a scholar, remember that if you do not read god’s word in another way, it will turn out that after a lifetime of reading god’s word many hours every day, you nevertheless have never read—god’s word.”122 as we have seen, Kierkegaard is not unaware of the various complicating hermeneutical issues—historical-critical questions such as, “how much belongs to ‘god’s word’? which books are authentic? are they really by the apostles, and are the apostles really trustworthy? have they personally seen everything, or have they perhaps only heard about various things from others? as for ways of reading, there are thirty thousand different ways.”123 But these questions and different ways of reading—critical as they might be for scholarship (and Kierkegaard insists that he does “not disparage scholarship”124)—are misleading insofar as it can seem “as if all this research and pondering and scrutinizing would draw god’s word very close to me; the truth is 118 119 120 121 122 123 124

SKS 24, 149, nB22:86 / JP 4, 3860. SKS 13, 53 / FSE, 25. emphasis original. SKS 13, 62 / FSE, 35. emphasis original. SKS 13, 70 / FSE, 44. emphasis original. SKS 13, 60 / FSE, 33. SKS 13, 53 / FSE, 25. SKS 13, 56 / FSE, 28.

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that this is the very way, this is the most cunning way, to remove god’s word as far as possible from me.”125 he seems to be saying here that the prolixity of biblical scholarship too easily heaps on layer after layer of human words about the biblical texts, rather than simply allowing god’s word to speak to the reader through the words of the Bible. or, to use the image of the mirror: examining the mirror itself leads away from rightly seeing oneself in the light of god’s word, whereas it is only by examining oneself in the mirror that god’s word can actually speak to the reader and about the reader. But is the meaning of this image still somewhat opaque? after all, we tend not to encounter mirrors that speak (apart from fairy tales), and it is not clear that this metaphor alone could be adequate to “god’s word.” it is perhaps for this reason that Kierkegaard supplements the apostle’s mirror metaphor with another of his own. he asks us to “imagine a lover who has received a letter from his beloved—i assume that god’s word is just as precious to you as this letter is to the lover. i assume that you read and think you ought to read god’s word in the same way the lover reads this letter.”126 to the objection that his metaphor fails because the Bible is written in a foreign language, Kierkegaard remarks that it is “really only scholars who need to read holy scripture in the original language.”127 But if one insists upon reading scripture in the original, then he is willing to develop his metaphor such that one “distinguishes between reading and reading, between reading with a dictionary and reading the letter from his beloved.”128 In the first instance, one is not yet reading the letter, but simply working through the “scholarly preliminaries as a necessary evil” to come to the point of reading the letter.129 thus, Kierkegaard allows that a case can be made for the use of a dictionary in getting the letter into readable form. what he cannot abide is the idea of involving others in the process of reading the letter. he sketches a scenario in which an acquaintance drops by as the lover is translating the letter and casually observes, “well, so you are reading a letter from your beloved.” to this the lover responds: have you gone mad? do you think this is reading a letter from my beloved! no, my friend, i am sitting here toiling and moiling with a dictionary to get it translated. at times i am ready to explode with impatience; the blood rushes to my head and i would just as soon hurl the dictionary on the floor—and you call that reading—you must be joking! No, thank God, I am soon finished with the translation and then, yes, then, I shall read my beloved’s letter; that is something altogether different….i would ever so much like to have you stay, but, to be honest, i have no time. there is still something left to translate and i am so impatient to begin reading it—therefore do not be angry, but please go so I can finish!130

125 126 127 128 129 130

SKS 13, 62 / FSE, 35. SKS 13, 54 / FSE, 26. ibid. SKS 13, 55 / FSE, 27. ibid. SKS 13, 55 / FSE, 27.

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And then, after the translation is finished, the lover says to himself, “I will make sure that it does not happen [again]; before i begin such a thing [sc. reading the letter in the proper sense], i lock my door and am not at home. i want to be alone, uninterruptedly alone with the letter; if i am not, then neither am i reading the letter from my beloved.”131 although there is a humorous dimension to this imagined scenario, it is probably impossible to overestimate how earnest Kierkegaard is about the need to be alone with the text in order to read god’s word. indeed, the views of others are to be scrupulously avoided. in a journal entry penned as he prepared the text of For Self-Examination, he characterized his “principal rule” for reading the Bible as follows: above all, read the n.t. without a commentary. would it ever occur to a lover to read a letter from his beloved with a commentary! in connection with everything which qualitatively makes a claim of having a purely personal significance to me, a commentary is a most hazardous meddler. if the letter from the beloved were in a language i do not understand—well, then i learn the language—but i do not read the letter with the aid of commentaries by others. i read it, and since the thought of my beloved is vividly present and my purpose in everything is to will according to her will and wishes, i understand the letter all right. it is the same with the scriptures. with the help of god i understand it all right. every commentary detracts. he who can sit with ten open commentaries and read the holy scriptures—well, he probably is writing the eleventh, but he deals with the scriptures contra naturam. 132

Kierkegaard’s explicit “principal rule” for reading the Bible, then, is that each individual (“suppose now that this letter from the lover has the distinctiveness that every human being is the beloved”133) should simply take it up and read it as “an expression of affection”134 from god, without taking recourse to the counsel of others. we might wonder, of course, whether Kierkegaard followed this principal rule in his own actual practice since, after all, he did own quite a few volumes in biblical theology, although he does not often refer to them after his student days.135 moreover, we might question whether such a rule is stricto sensu practicable, since any reader’s own assumptions and commitments will inevitably develop in various dynamic configurations of conformity and tension with the views and practices (living “commentaries,” lato sensu) of the various communities to which one belongs. thus, for example, even while Kierkegaard criticizes danish “Christendom” for the way “the majority” regards the Bible as “an obsolete ancient book” and “a minority read it more or less learnedly, that is, nevertheless do not read god’s word,”136 he still appeals to “the excellent lutheran doctrine”137 that in large part shapes the interpretive horizon he shares with his contemporaries. i think Kierkegaard might 131 132 133 134 135 136 137

SKS 13, 58 / FSE, 30. SKS 23, 151, nB16:84 / JP 1, 210. SKS 23, 442, nB20:88 / JP 1, 213. SKS 13, 55 / FSE, 27. see the bibliography below for a list of such texts owned by Kierkegaard. SKS 13, 60 / FSE, 33. SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24.

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have been willing to acknowledge such considerations, but i expect he also would have wished to claim that they nonetheless miss his point. For his aim is not to deny that we read in terms of interpretive horizons, but rather to insist that god’s word establishes a subjective relationship with the Divine Lover that reconfigures one’s horizon and gives a new perspective on every other feature of life. and what of the various complications one sometimes meets in interpreting the Bible? Kierkegaard, we saw already, was well aware of such difficulties and anticipated this question: “But,” you perhaps say, “there are so many obscure passages in the Bible, whole books that are practically riddles.” to that i would answer: Before i have anything to do with this objection, it must be made by someone whose life manifests that he has scrupulously complied with all the passages that are easy to understand; is this the case with you? Yet this is how the lover would respond to the letter—if there were obscure passages but also clearly expressed wishes, he would say, “i must immediately comply with the wish—then i will see about the obscure parts. how could i ever sit down and ponder the obscure passages and not comply with the wish, the wish that i clearly understood.”138

here Kierkegaard returns to the opening line of the passage from the letter of James: “Be doers of the word, and not merely hearers who deceive themselves” (James 1:22). and he maintains the love letter metaphor by asking us to assume that the letter communicates “not only an expression of affection,” but that it communicates also “clearly expressed wishes.”139 interestingly, Kierkegaard does not mention the clearly expressed wishes communicated in the final verse of the James passage, but supplies a list comprised of various other wishes expressed in god’s word: “it is all too easy to understand the requirement contained in god’s word (‘give all your goods to the poor.’ ‘if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the left.’ ‘if anyone takes your coat, let him have your cloak also.’ ‘rejoice always.’ ‘Count it sheer joy when you meet various temptations’ etc.).”140 in other words, Kierkegaard really does not think it matters much whether or not one understands all the ambiguous and cryptic elements in scripture. indeed, the history of scholarship would seem to demonstrate clearly enough that the process of ascertaining the meanings of various obscurities in scripture will always remain one of approximations and contested interpretations. But the “tragic misuse of scholarship,”141 according to Kierkegaard, is that it encourages readers to think they need to discover the meaning of what they do not understand before they can act upon what they do understand. what is more, he suggests that one reason readers focus attention on the obscure passages is precisely in order to avoid the inconvenience and difficulty of having to act on what is easily understood: SKS 13, 57 / FSE, 29. ibid. 140 SKS 13, 61 / FSE, 34. See Mt 19:21, 5:39–40; 1 Thess 5:16; and Jas 1:2. The final verse of the James passage (1:27) reads: “Religion that is pure and undefiled before God, the Father, is this: to care for orphans and widows in their distress, and to keep oneself unstained by the world.” 141 SKS 13, 60 / FSE, 32. 138 139

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i cunningly shove in, one layer after another, interpretation and scholarly research, and more scholarly research (much in the way a boy puts napkins or more under his pants when he is going to get a licking)….i shove all this between the word and myself and then give this interpreting and scholarliness the name of earnestness and zeal for the truth, and then allow this preoccupation to swell to such prolixity that i never come to look at myself in the mirror.142

ignoring the fact that this parenthetical reference to a boy expecting a “licking” seems somewhat jarring alongside the metaphor of the love letter, I find it hard to deny that he makes a point here. if one does not wish to give to the poor, turn the other cheek, rejoice in adversity, and the rest, well, then a reader can at least tell himself he takes scripture seriously if he nonetheless spends some time trying to understand what it reveals about social conditions in the ancient near east, for example, or the relationship between the Book of genesis and antecedent mesopotamian creation myths, or the historical formation of the new testament canon, and so on. there are more than enough “layers” to explore, and having the freedom to explore them is in many respects more attractive that being asked to imitate Christ. But the key difference between “scholarly research” and “reading god’s word” as Kierkegaard sees it is not the “layering” itself, but rather the direction in which the layering orients the reader. after all, Kierkegaard depicts a multi-layered process as well: interpreting the words of the Bible is said to disclose “god’s word,” most fully attested in the “word made flesh,” and communicated in a “love letter” that expresses not only affection but also the exhortation to “do the word,” along with the instruction to see one’s reflection in the “mirror of the word,” which presumably reveals either that one’s life reflects the life of Christ or that one’s reflection of the Word is dim and distorted. So, whereas the layers of research are said to distance the reader from the biblical text in order to gain a more “objective” perspective, Kierkegaard’s metaphorical layers mean to involve the reader in such a way as to focus one’s reading in terms of a “subjective” appropriation of the text as “god’s word.” additionally, Kierkegaard here again makes allusion to his textile metaphor of the knot at the end of one’s interpretation: “if you do not read god’s word in such a way that you consider that the least little bit you do understand instantly binds you to do accordingly, then you are not reading god’s word.”143 the second series of For Self-Examination makes this explicit when he writes, “only imitation can tie the knot at the end.”144 VI. Imitation, Imaginative Freedom, and Paradoxical Fixation Kierkegaard develops the practical implications of appropriating god’s word in the Bible through imitating god’s word in Christ under such titles as Works of Love and Practice in Christianity. But even in the concise first section of For SelfExamination, it is clear that this hermeneutics of imitation—of doing the word, and of viewing oneself in terms of the Word—stands as a significant exception to the 142 143 144

SKS 13, 62 / FSE, 35. SKS 13, 57 / FSE, 29. SV1 Xii, 464 / JFY, 196.

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tendency toward an “eclipse of biblical narrative” in modern hermeneutics. as i mentioned in the first section, Frei never picks up this Kierkegaardian thread in his classic study of hermeneutics, but ludwig wittgenstein, in a series of comments penned while reading Kierkegaard in 1937, elucidates this realistic narratival view quite accurately: Christianity is not based on a historical truth; rather, it offers us a (historical) narrative and says: now believe! But not, believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather: believe, through thick and thin, which you can do only as the result of a life. Here you have a narrative, don’t take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives! make a quite different place in your life for it. —there is nothing paradoxical about that!145

Kierkegaard’s emphasis on Christian imitation draws upon the full resources of the biblical narrative (receiving back in faith what Johannes Climacus renounces in resignation), but does so not in order to make a historical argument for the reasonableness of subjective assent to the absolute paradox, but rather to contour Christian life in the light of the divine life incarnate. still, if it is possible to read this feature of Kierkegaard’s hermeneutics in a straightforward manner—and by “straightforward” i mean that one can read it as though there is “nothing paradoxical” about it—then one might wonder whether Kierkegaard’s emphasis on imitation has come to eclipse the other important features of what i have called his threefold biblical hermeneutics. that is, given the apparent prioritization of the hermeneutics of imitation, does Kierkegaard’s mature conception of biblical interpretation obscure the hermeneutics of imaginative freedom and the hermeneutics of paradoxical fixation that contour the development of his authorship through the Johannes Climacus works and even, to some extent, beyond? Comments in For Self-Examination make it clear that by 1851 Kierkegaard was wrestling intellectually with certain post-reformation receptions of the lutheran heritage, and trying to understand how best to cast his own understanding of god’s word relative to this tradition. in some ways, the view he articulates is quite lutheran and, as we saw above, he goes so far as to say, “lutheran doctrine is excellent, is the truth.”146 Kierkegaard appreciates luther’s emphasis on the necessity of subjective appropriation of the Bible as god’s word, 147 and he additionally views the reformation ad fontes dictum as a salutary corrective to the assumptions his contemporaries were making about modern intellectual progress: “following the path of commentaries is often like travelling to london; true, the road leads to london, but if one wants to get there, he has to turn around.”148 nonetheless, as Kierkegaard narrates the return trip “to the sources” in his journal, he comes to identify the easy ludwig wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. by g.h. von wright and trans. by peter winch, Chicago: university of Chicago press 1980, p. 32. 146 SKS 13, 52 / FSE, 24. 147 “wonderful! the category ‘for you’ (subjectivity, inwardness) with which Either/Or concludes (only the truth which builds up [opbygger] is truth for you) is luther’s own.” SKS 20, 274–5, nB3:61 / JP 2, 2463. 148 Pap. i a 55 / JP 1, 203. 145

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grace of modern Christendom increasingly with what he regards as luther’s own insufficiently dialectical prioritization of grace; Luther’s view is not “what the new testament understands by Christianity” but, to the contrary, his view “alters new testament Christianity.”149 thus, instead of leading a return to new testament Christianity, as Kierkegaard sees it, luther “reduced Christianity.”150 Kierkegaard attributes this deficiency in Luther’s biblical interpretation to an excessive emphasis on the letters of paul: luther’s preaching of Christianity changes Christianity’s life-view and world-view. he has one-sidedly appropriated “the apostle” and goes so far—as he frequently does with this yardstick (turned the wrong way)—that he criticizes the gospels. If he does not find the apostle’s teaching in the gospel he concludes ergo this is no gospel. luther does not seem to see that the apostle has already relaxed in relation to the gospels. and this wrong tack luther made has been continued in protestantism, which has made luther absolute. when we found the apostle to be more rigorous (which he is) than luther, we concluded: here the apostle is wrong, this is not pure gospel. in this way we have systematically, step by step, cheated—that is, attempted to cheat god out of the gospel by turning the whole relationship around.151

what should we make of the way Kierkegaard explicates this “step by step” reduction of the gospel? he is certainly correct that luther prioritizes paul’s letters (although not all of them) over the synoptic accounts of the gospel, and luther does so according to a criterion of Christological coherence that defines his conception of Christian faith (namely, the graceful saving action of god in Christ) and that ostensibly allows him to discern god’s word in the words of scripture. But does it seem odd that Kierkegaard suggests that luther prioritizes the letters of paul over “the gospel”? luther believes “the gospel” (god’s graceful action in Christ) is that to which paul’s letters witness. and the fact that alongside the gospel according to John he ranks the letter to the romans as “the truest gospel”152 in terms of Christological coherence shows that he thinks the gospel should not be identified with the narrative genre of the first four “gospels.” Still more odd, Kierkegaard’s claim that “the apostle has already relaxed in relation to the gospels” lands him in the awkward position of suggesting that somehow paul (as well as luther) has reduced the strenuous requirement of “new testament Christianity,”153 despite the fact that it is difficult to imagine what a phrase like “New Testament Christianity” can mean if paul’s letters are not partly constitutive of it. in fact, since scholars now date the composition of the pauline epistles to an earlier period than any of the four canonical gospel accounts, we might wish to ask how paul could have “already relaxed” in relation to gospel accounts that were not yet in circulation? read in this light, Kierkegaard’s association of paul with a reduction of the gospel seems to put SKS 25, 476, nB30:112 / JP 3, 2551. ibid. 151 SKS 26, 167, nB32:67 / JP 3, 2554. 152 luther, “preface to the new testament” in Luther’s Works, vol. 35, p. 365. 153 SKS 25, 476–7, nB30:112 / JP 3, 2551. see also Pap. Xi-2 a 403 / JP 3, 2921: “as early as ‘the apostle’ the scaling down process begins.” 149 150

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him in a dubious position vis-à-vis the textual tradition to which he appeals. of course, in order to make this last point one must be able to appeal to historical-critical “commentaries” which, as we know, Kierkegaard was loath to do. our willingness to do so, however, could help us avoid tying the knot in the wrong place. at this point, a sympathetic interpretation of Kierkegaard’s biblical hermeneutics will underscore the fact that Kierkegaard often advertises his work in terms of a “corrective,” so that when he makes an argument that seems so clearly extreme, one can defend him by saying that he viewed the claim as necessary in order to correct for an imbalance in the dialectic. if we read with a hermeneutics of suspicion, on the other hand, then it seems equally plausible to criticize Kierkegaard for the “loss of this dialectical dimension,” and to maintain that in his later rants about the “mess called Christendom” he seems to develop a “mad” theology.154 how do we adjudicate this matter? Bearing in mind Kierkegaard’s insight that how one interprets a text often discloses as much about the interpreter as it does about the text, i wish to suggest that we should read Kierkegaard sympathetically, but take what he says about biblical interpretation cum grano salis whenever it risks losing the dialectical dimension. like the Bible, Kierkegaard’s authorship is plurivocal rather than univocal. and even if in his journal he risks eclipsing the lively interplay of his biblical hermeneutics by prioritizing works over grace—st. James over st. paul—he nonetheless in his published work maintains that although it looks like “foolishness” to all the world, the paradox of Christianity (and, indeed, of “true lutheranism”) is that it entails “works and nevertheless grace.”155 additionally, a reading that preserves the dialectical and plurivocal character of Kierkegaard’s biblical hermeneutics better accounts for the whole of his authorship when viewed synoptically. For, as i have sought to demonstrate in this article, Kierkegaard’s hermeneutics of imitation is contextualized both by a hermeneutics of imaginative freedom and a hermeneutics of paradoxical fixation, respectively. and it is possible to regard these elements as dialectically configured such that the imaginative freedom with which he reconfigures biblical texts generally is preserved when he fixes his attention on the incomprehensibility of “the absolute paradox” in the Climacus works, and such that both the imaginative freedom of the first and the paradoxical fixation of the second are preserved when he emphasizes the existential imitation of Christ that makes the gospel narrative real in the life of the follower. having proposed a more sympathetic than suspicious reading, i should quickly add that i also think we should ignore his request when he writes, “do not busy yourself with criticizing the speaker or the speech.”156 if we look to his writings for any guidance in reading the Bible, we must also be entitled to say how his own views appear deficient or one-sided in important respects. in particular, how should we respond to Kierkegaard’s “principal rule” of foreswearing all biblical commentaries? in the context of an era dominated by the assumption that researchers could and should establish historical events objectively— Joakim garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, trans. by Bruce h. Kirmmse, princeton: princeton university press 2000, p. 715. 155 SKS 13, 46 / FSE, 17. 156 SKS 13, 71-2 / FSE, 46. 154

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wie es eigentlich gewesen [ist], to cite the well-known phrase of leopold von ranke (1795–1886)—Kierkegaard’s satire of the “crush of scholars and opinions” with their “thirty thousand different ways” of reading the Bible reads as a valuable caveat.157 Contemporary scholarship tends to operate on different assumptions, however, and few now would claim to be able to narrate history objectively, as it actually happened. today it is more common than not for biblical critics to acknowledge openly the (inter)subjective role of the interpreter in reading the Bible. But this acknowledgement does not yet fully meet Kierkegaard’s objection. acknowledgment of the subjective dimension in reading the Bible is only one necessary condition for hearing god’s Word, as Kierkegaard sees it; it is certainly not a sufficient condition. what about Kierkegaard’s insistence that commentaries prevent one from being “alone with god’s word”? in his journal he muses, “suppose…that this letter from the lover has the distinctiveness that every human being is the beloved—what then? is it the intention now,” he asks, “that they should sit and confer with one another, not to speak of dragging along the scholarly apparatus of countless generations?”158 well, we can concede that much of the “scholarly apparatus” through history and, indeed, much of what goes on in the present day at our conferences and perhaps even in our classrooms is not conducive to hearing god’s word in the words of the Bible. as george steiner aptly observes, “it is not, as ecclesiastes would have it, that ‘of making many books there is no end.’ it is that ‘of making books on books and books on those books there is no end.’ ”159 Kierkegaard would surely agree. But, we might ask, did he not consider his beloved Friday Communion services an opportunity to hear (and do) god’s word together with others? and we might further ask, should we not regard his own discourses as commentaries of a sort, aimed to come alongside his reader in an encounter with the Bible as god’s word? Certainly, Kierkegaard affirms an important spiritual discipline in encouraging the willingness to be alone with scripture, but here again he risks losing the dialectical dimension if he so allegorizes the discipline that one must neglect ordinary existence and be “uninterruptedly alone with the letter” to hear god’s word.160 after all, as we saw above, part of Kierkegaard’s critique of allegory as the primary mode of interpretation is that the allegorical imagination obscures the actuality that “Christ was a particular human being, the apostle a particular human being who amid prodigious activity tossed a few words on a scrap of paper for a congregation.”161 moreover, these scraps of paper often incorporated and commented upon earlier scraps of paper that were already regarded by the community as scripture (thus giving the Bible its internally dialogical character), and were addressed to specific congregations who often read and interpreted these scraps of paper aloud and together (thus continuing within the early Christian community the Jewish practice of reading the Tanakh in which they would, in fact, “sit and confer with one another”162). and surely, if one of the 157 158 159 160 161 162

SKS 13, 53 / FSE, 25. SKS 23, 442, nB20:88 / JP 1, 213. george steiner, Real Presences, Chicago: university of Chicago press 1989, p. 48. SKS 13, 58 / FSE, 30. SKS 23, 148, nB16:78 / JP 4, 4781. SKS 23, 442, nB20:88 / JP 1, 213.

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distinctive features of this “love letter” is that it is supposed to be addressed to every human being as “the beloved,” then we can hardly fault a recipient for wishing to discover how his neighbors are interpreting it as well; indeed, we might think him rather obtuse, were he simply to ask to borrow a dictionary. Quibbling and cheeky remarks aside, however, it must be said that Kierkegaard’s interpretive practice corrects for many of the deficiencies of his explicit hermeneutical theory. his free and imaginative talent for enlivening biblical images across his pseudonymous and veronymous writings, together with his fixation on the New testament paradox which human understanding “can never digest or convert into an ordinary syllogism,”163 serve as a practical reminder of the open-endedness of interpretation, even when subjective commitment is secured through one’s decision to receive, respond, and seek to embody the gift of god’s word in Christ. and if when reading “in a scholarly way” we wish to maintain that reading the Bible well is an ongoing process that includes engaging the dialogical tensions within the Bible with the helpful insights of other interpreters, allowing the “world of the text” to unfold as fully as possible within the various constraints on interpretation, all in order to understand, reconstruct, and reappropriate one’s own living identity vis-àvis the world of the Bible, then Kierkegaard also adumbrates a corrective to any overreliance on such hermeneutical theory, for no interpretive method can ensure us that “in all this learned reading” we are actually reading god’s word.164 the transition by which the words of the Bible might become for us the word of god remains ever a divine gift, as the Bible text Kierkegaard calls his “first love”165 makes plain: “every generous act of giving, with every perfect gift, is from above....”

163 164 165

SKS 12, 35 / PC, 30. SKS 13, 56 / FSE, 29. Pap. Xi–3 B 291:4 / JP 6, 6965.

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Relevant for Biblical Hermeneutics Baader, Franz, Ueber das Leben Jesu von Strauss, munich: georg Franz 1836 (ASKB 407). —— Ueber den Paulinischen Begriff des Versehenseyns des Menschen im Namen Jesu vor der Welt Schöpfung. Sendeschreiben an den Herrn Professor Molitor in Frankfurt, vols. 1–3, würzburg: in Commission der stahel’schen Buchhandlung 1837 (vols. 1–2, ASKB 409–410) (vol. 3, ASKB 413). Bauer, Bruno, ed., Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–3, Berlin: dümmler 1836-38 (ASKB 354–357). Billroth, gustav, Commentar zu den Briefen des Paulus an die Corinther, leipzig: weidmann 1833 (ASKB 104). [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: eichler 1833–34 (ASKB 92-95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Quatuor evangeliorum tabulæ synopticæ, Copenhagen: andreas seidelin 1829 (ASKB 467). —— Det Nye Testaments Hermeneutik, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1840 (ASKB 468). —— Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850 (ASKB 106–107). ernesti, Johann august, Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1765 [1761] (ASKB 101). grundtvig, nikolai Frederik severin, En liden Bibel-Krønike for Børn og Menigmand, Copenhagen: J.h. schubothe 1814 (ASKB 185). hersleb, svend Borchmann, Lærebog i Bibelhistorien, 3rd printing, Copenhagen: F. Brummer 1826 (ASKB 186–187). Kalkar, Christian andreas hermann, Forelæsninger over den bibelske Historie, vols. 1–2, odense: s. hempel 1837–39 (ASKB 188). Kanne, Johann arnold, Christus im alten Testament: Untersuchungen über die Vorbilder und Messianischen Stellen, vols. 1–2, nürnberg: riegel und wießner 1818 (ASKB 590–591). [luther, martin], Luthers Werke. Vollständige Auswahl seiner Hauptschriften. Mit historischen Einleitungen, Anmerkungen und Registern, vols. 1–10, ed. by otto v. gerlach, Berlin: eichler 1840–41 (ASKB 312–316). lücke, Friedrich, Commentar über die Briefe des Evangelisten Johannes, 2nd ed., Bonn: eduard weber 1836, vol. 3 [vol. 1, 1820; vol. 2, 1834] (ASKB 110).

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møller, rasmus, Veiledning til en andægtig og forstandig Læsning af det Nye Testamente, især for ulærde Læsere, vols. 1–3, 2nd enlarged ed., Copenhagen: andreas seidelin 1824–26 (ASKB 81–83). nielsen, rasmus, Evangelietroen og den moderne Bevidsthed. Forelæsninger over Jesu Liv, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1849 (ASKB 700). olshausen, hermann, Die Briefe Pauli an die Römer und Korinthier, Königsberg: unzer 1837 (ASKB 103). —— Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments zunächst für Prediger und Studirende, vols. 1–4, 3rd revised ed., Königsberg: august wilhelm unzer 1837–44 (ASKB 96–100). rückert, leopold immanuel, Christliche Philosophie oder: Philosophie, Geschichte und Bibel nach ihren wahren Beziehungen zu einander. Nicht für Glaubende, sondern für wissenschaftliche Zweifler zur Belehrung, vols. 1–2, leipzig: C.h.F. hartmann 1825 (ASKB 748–749). rosenmüller, ernst Friedrich Karl, Scholia in vetus testamentum in compendium redacta, vol. 1, Scholia in pentateuchum continens, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1828 (ASKB 85). schaller, Julius, Der historische Christus und die Philosophie. Kritik der Grundidee des Werks das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss, leipzig: otto wigand 1838 (ASKB 759). scharling, Carl emil, Hvad er Hensigten, Betydningen og Resultaterne af Theologernes videnskabelige Undersögelser om det Ny Testamentes Skrifter?, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1833 (ASKB 761). —— De Paulo apostolo ejusque adversariis commentatio quam ad summos in theologia honores inter publica solennia ecclesiæ ante trecentos annos in Dania reformatæ rite obtinendos, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1836 (ASKB 105). tholuck, Friedrich august gotttreu, Auslegung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer nebst Auszügen aus den exegetischen Schriften der Kirchenväter und Reformatoren, 3rd revised ed., Berlin: F. dümmler 1831 (ASKB 102). —— Das Alte Testament im Neuen Testament. Ueber die Citate des Alten Testaments im Neuen Testament und Ueber den Opfer- und Priesterbegriff im Alten und im Neuen Testamente, hamburg: F. perthes 1836 (ASKB 832). usteri, leonhard, Udvikling af det Paulinske Lærebegreb i dets Forhold til det Ny Testamentes bibelske Dogmatik. Et exegetisk-dogmatisk Forsøg, trans. by wilhelm Johan Jacob Boethe, Copenhagen: philipsen 1839 (ASKB 850). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 (in 1 tome), 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833 (ASKB 80). —— Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836 (ASKB 108). —— Kurze Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte, leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 111). —— Kurze Erklärung des Briefes an die Römer, 2nd enlarged ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 112). —— Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 109).

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winer, georg Benedikt, Biblisches Realwörterbuch zum Handgebrauch für Studirende, Kandidaten, Gymnasiallehrer und Prediger, vols. 1–2, 2nd revised ed., leipzig: Carl heinrich reclam 1833–38 (ASKB 70–71). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Biblical Hermeneutics Bartels, Cora, Kierkegaard receptus I. Die theologiegeschichtliche Bedeutung der Kierkegaard-Rezeption Rudolf Bultmanns, göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht 2008, pp. 32–9. Bauckham, richard, James: Wisdom of James, Disciple of Jesus, london: routledge 1999, pp. 159–74. Cain, David, “Death Comes In Between: Reflections on Kierkegaard’s For SelfExamination,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 15, 1991, pp. 69–81. dewey, Bradley rau, “Kierkegaard and the Blue testament,” Harvard Theological Review, vol. 60, 1967, pp. 391–409. dollinger, robert, “sören Kierkegaard und das alte testament,” Die Junge Kirche, vol. 9, 1941, pp. 188–97. dunstan, J. leslie, “the Bible in Either/Or,” Interpretation, vol. 6, 1952, pp. 310– 20. engelke, matthias, Kierkegaard und das Alte Testament. Zum Einfluß der alttestamentlichen Bücher auf Kierkegaards Gesamtwerk, rheinbach: Cmzverlag 1998 (Arbeiten zur Theologiegeschichte, vol. 3), pp. 165–71; pp. 177ff.; pp. 259–79. Fishburn, Janet Forsythe, “søren Kierkegaard, exegete,” Interpretation, vol. 39, 1985, pp. 229–45. Frawley, matthew J., “the existential role of the holy spirit in Kierkegaard’s Biblical hermeneutic,” in Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication, ed. by poul houe and gordon d. marino, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 2003, pp. 93–104. gouwens, david J., “Kierkegaard’s hermeneutics of discipleship: Communal and Critical uses of scripture in the 1854–55 attack,” in Søren Kierkegaard and the Word(s): Essays on Hermeneutics and Communication, ed. by poul houe and gordon d. marino, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 2003, pp. 81–92. guillamore hansen, p., Søren Kierkegaard og Bibelen: Udtalelser af Søren Kierkegaard i hans Efterladte Papirer vedrørende Bibelord og Bibelske Fortællinger, Copenhagen: p. haase 1924. Jones, Joe r., “some remarks on authority and revelation in Kierkegaard,” The Journal of Religion, vol. 7, no. 3, 1977, pp. 232–51. Kallas, endel, “Kierkegaard’s understanding of the Bible with respect to his ‘age,’ ” Dialogue, vol. 26, 1987, pp. 175–9. lønning, per, Samtidighedens Situation. En studie i Søren Kierkegaards kristendomsforståelse, oslo: Forlaget land og Kirke 1954, pp. 213–17. malantschuk, gregor, Frihed og Eksistens. Studier i Søren Kierkegaards Tænkning, ed. by niels Jørgen Cappelørn and paul müller, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1980, pp. 96–100.

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mcKinnon, alastair, “Kierkegaard’s perception of the Bible,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1980, pp. 132–47. minear, paul s. and paul s. morimoto, Kierkegaard and the Bible: An Index, princeton: princeton theological seminary 1953. müller, mogens, “historikerens Jesus, den historiske Jesus og kirkens Kristusforkyndelse,” Dansk teologisk Tidsskrift, no. 38, 1975, pp. 81–104, see pp. 92– 101. parkov, peter, Bibelen i Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1983. pedersen, Jørgen, “Kierkegaard’s view of scripture,” in The Sources and Depths of Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. by niels thulstrup and maria mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 2), pp. 27–57. perry, edmund, “was Kierkegaard a ‘Biblical’ existentialist?” The Journal of Religion, vol. 36, no. 1, 1956, pp. 17–23. polk, timothy h., The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading Kierkegaard by the Rule of Faith, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1997. pons, Jolita, Stealing a Gift: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms and the Bible, new York: Fordham university press 2004. Pyper, Hugh S. “The Apostle, The Genius and the Monkey: Reflections on Kierkegaard’s ‘the mirror of the word,’ ” in Kierkegaard on Art and Communication, ed. by george pattison, london: macmillan 1992, pp. 125–36. —— “Kierkegaard’s Canon: the Constitution of the Bible and of the authorship in Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook 2005, pp. 53–70. rosas, l. Joseph, Scripture in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, nashville: Broadman & holman 1994. —— “søren aabye Kierkegaard,” in Historical Handbook of Major Biblical Interpreters, ed. by donald K. mcKim, downers grove, illinois: intervarsity press, 1998, pp. 330–6. ruttenbeck, walter, Sören Kierkegaard. Der christliche Denker und sein Werk, Berlin: trowitzsch & sohn 1929, pp. 212–16. schrempf, Christoph, “sören Kierkegaards stellung zu Bibel und dogma,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, vol. 1, 1891, pp. 179–229. —— Auseinandersetzungen, vol. 4, Sören Kierkegaard. Eine Biographie. Dritter Teil, stuttgart: Frommans verlag 1935 (vol. 12 in Christoph schrempf, Gesammelte Werke, vols. 1–16, stuttgart: Frommans verlag 1930–40), pp. 72–115. schulz, heiko, “ ‘er ist geglaubet in der welt.’ erkenntnistheoretische aspekte in Kierkegaards Christlichen Reden,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2007, pp. 337–80, see pp. 343–4. sorainen, Kalle, “einige Beobachtungen im Bezug auf die lateinischen Übersetzung søren Kierkegaards aus dem griechischen neuen testament,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 56–74. torrance, alan J. “Can the truth Be learned?” in Scripture’s Doctrine and Theology’s Bible: How the New Testament Shapes Christian Dogmatics, ed. by markus Bockmuehl and alan J. torrance, grand rapids, michigan: Baker academic 2008, pp. 143–63.

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viallaneix, nelly, “Kierkegaard, l’ancien testament et israël,” Études Théologiques et Religieuses, vol. 54, 1979, pp. 547–77. von Kloeden, wolfdietrich, “ausformung und vertiefung von Begriffen bei s. Kierkegaard als Folge seines Bibelstudiums,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 75–83. —— “Biblestudy,” in Kierkegaard’s View of Christianity, ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1978 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 1), pp. 16–38. watkin, Julia, “the letter from the lover: Kierkegaard on the Bible and Belief,” in For Self Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed by robert l. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 287–313. wolf, herbert C, “Kierkegaard and the Quest of the historical Jesus,” in Lutheran Quarterly, vol. 16, 1964, pp. 3–40. —— Kierkegaard and Bultmann: The Quest of the Historical Jesus, minneapolis: augsburg 1965.

Kierkegaard and eighteenth- and nineteenth-Century Biblical scholarship: a Case of incongruity mogens müller

when søren Kierkegaard initiated his authorship in 1838 with the publication of From the Papers of One Still Living, biblical scholarship in the preceding 60–70 years had experienced a dramatic development. this development had taken place primarily in germany, the country from which danish theology and philosophy received their strongest inspiration. to anticipate our conclusion, however, it must be admitted that Kierkegaard was not in any substantive way influenced by what was going on in this field. nevertheless, the purpose of offering here an overview of the various developments in critical biblical scholarship is to describe the context in which Kierkegaard’s use of the Bible occurred. the points of view and insights that Kierkegaard did not opt to use are part of this picture. such sketches of the history of scholarship inevitably, however, bear the marks of belated wisdom. only when the dust had settled after the various methodological revolutions did it become clear which options were the milestones that would influence the future.1 I. Introduction of a Historical-Critical Approach to the Bible during the eighteenth century the orthodox view of the Bible as verbally inspired began to yield ground to an ever more historical-critical understanding of the formation and compilation of the biblical books. (an intermediate position developed in pietism with its emphasis of the role of faith in the personal appropriation of meaning, this overview builds on the available works concerning the history of biblical research: hans-Joachim Kraus, Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments, 2nd ed., neukirchen: neukirchener verlag 1969 [1956]; werner georg Kümmel, Das Neue Testament. Geschichte der Erforschung seiner Probleme, 2nd ed., Freiburg and munich: Karl alber 1970 [1958] (english translation: The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of Its Problems, trans. by s. maclean gilmour and howard C. Kee, london: sCm press 1973); otto merk, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments in ihrer Anfangszeit, marburg: n.g. elwert verlag 1972 (Marburger Theologische Studien, vol. 9); william Baird, History of New Testament Research, Volume One: From Deism to Tübingen, minneapolis: Fortress press 1992. most of the various references in the following i owe to these works. 1

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which implied the need for an individual to make up his or her own mind about the significance of the Bible. This implication was clearly seen by Kierkegaard’s older contemporary nikolai Frederik severin grundtvig (1783–1872), for example.2) an essential presupposition for the growth of german enlightenment theology was english deism, a movement already evolving during the end of the seventeenth and the first decade of the eighteenth centuries. English Deism was not a university phenomenon. its approach to biblical criticism was primarily a challenge to the conviction that the Bible was endowed with special authority. illumined by the bright light of reason, the Bible’s traditional authority was exposed as being illusory and began to crumble away. according to the deists, it could be demonstrated that the Bible is not infallible, but on the contrary is full of absurdities. with deism the two main arguments for the truth of Christianity were undermined, namely, the alleged proofs from the fulfillment of scriptural prophecy and the testimony of the miracles of Jesus. during the eighteenth century deism was domesticated in german university theology and became an essential presupposition for the religious thought of the enlightenment period. in this german appropriation of deism, Johann salomo semler (1725–91) was a pioneer. semler came from a strong pietistic environment but through his studies became familiar with rationalism, especially the variety associated with the philosopher Christian wolff (1679–1754) that dominated german philosophy until Kant. in many ways semler belonged to the phase of the german Enlightenment that is often called “Neology.” While confident in the powers of human reason, neology was characterized by the continuing adherence to a belief in a supernatural revelation. semler’s project was to harmonize revelation and reason, which he attempted to do by construing revelation as a personal experience. he shared the enlightenment’s optimism by treating Christianity as an ongoing revelation. this involved interpreting primitive Christianity as a temporary stage in the evolution of the perception of truth, a process that gradually would lead to the full realization of the truth. thus the Bible was not as such normative. semler especially gained significance in biblical scholarship through his problematizing of the concept of “canon.” He exerted this influence upon the scholarly world through his book series, Treatise on the Free Investigation of the Canon, which appeared in four volumes from 1771 to 1775.3 semler argued that since the canon came into existence through grundtvig had a keen eye for the connection between pietism and rationalism. in Kort Begreb af Verdens Krønike i Sammenhæng (Copenhagen: a. seidelin 1812), he developed this theme in his discussion of the pietistic church historian gottfried arnold (1666–1730). Because of arnold’s notorious Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie: von Anfang des Neuen Testaments biß auff das Jahr Christi 1688 (vols. 1–4, Frankfurt am main and leipzig: Fritsch 1699–1700), grundtvig writes that rationalism was an understandable consequence of Pietism because “in Pietism lay the beginning of unbelief, first and last inspiring to works, and when first man lies about an internal enlightenment which is going to be the judge of Scripture there is but a short step to make reason divine….” this is my translation of n.F.s. grundtvig, Værker i Udvalg, vols. 1–10, ed. by georg Christensen and hal Koch, Copenhagen: gyldendal nordisk Forlag 1940–49, vol. 1, p. 380. 3 Johann salomo semler, D. Joh. Salomo Semlers Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Canons, vols. 1–4, halle: Carl hermann hemmerde 1771–75. The first 128 pages exist 2

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a historical process and was the product of human decisions, it must be investigated with the tools of critical historical research. this assertion implied a critique of the canon’s content, for quite possibly not all parts of the canon would have been included for the same reasons and therefore would not have the same value; indeed, extensive portions of the old testament were regarded as obsolete for Christians. the word of god and the canon of scripture, therefore, are not identical entities. For semler the teaching of Jesus must be the overall measure of what counts as the word of god. semler concludes: The only proof that completely satisfies an upright reader is the inner conviction brought about by the truths that confront him in this holy scripture (but not in all parts and individual books). this has been called elsewhere in a brief and biblical but somewhat obscure phrase, the witness of the holy spirit in the soul of the reader.4

For the neologist semler, while the new testament contains the universal, clear, and eternal religion, the old testament portrays a national Jewish religion typical of the ancient world. Consequently the Christian does not need to believe in the Bible as an infallible authority, and its devotional use must be in agreement with the results of historical research. By his contributions Semler became the most influential advocate of the historical investigation of the Bible. his work also made it clear that the consequence of regarding the study of the Bible as a purely historical science was the relativization of the authority of scripture. semler’s contemporary Johann david michaelis (1717–91), “the most singular and probably also most outstanding scholar of the eighteenth century…in the field of old testament Bible research”5 and from 1746 professor of oriental languages at göttingen, also presented the methodology of new testament studies as a historically formed discipline. he popularized this approach in the fourth and greatly enlarged 1788 edition of his Introduction in the Divine Writings of the New Covenant, which had grown from one to two volumes.6 here he differentiated between genuine and spurious books of the Bible in accordance with the original principles that had been used in deciding which books should be included in the canon; consequently, the in a linguistically slightly revised edition in Johann salomo semler, Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung des Canon, ed. by h. scheible, gütersloh: gütersloher verlagshaus 1967 (Texte zur Kirchen und Theologiegeschichte, vol. 5), pp. 1–128. 4 semler, Abhandlung von freier Untersuchung, vol. 2, p. 39 (translation quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 64). 5 Kraus, Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung, p. 97. J.d. michaelis published translations with explanatory notes of both the old testament (in 13 parts, 1769–83) and the new testament (in six parts, 1790–92), all of which appeared in a danish translation: Johann David Michaelis Oversættelse af det gamle Testament med Anmærkninger, vols. 1–3, trans. by Jens Bech, Copenhagen: gyldendal 1785–91, and Johann David Michaelis Oversættelse af det Nye Testamente med Anmærkninger, vols. 1–2 (in four parts), Copenhagen: gyldendal 1793–97. through this vehicle the most recent german critical research was presented to the danish public. it was this same michaelis who inspired the king, Frederik v, to implement the famous Carsten–niebuhr expedition to arabia Felix in 1761–67. 6 Johann david michaelis, Einleitung in die göttlichen Schriften des Neuen Bundes, 4th ed., göttingen: vandenhoeck und ruprecht 1788 [1750].

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books that had been included because of mistaken assumptions should no longer be reckoned as canonical. the historical question thus became the determinative factor in determining canonicity, and therefore the methodology of new testament studies became decisive for dogmatic theology. the basic ideas of english deism were employed in a much more radical manner in the writings of semler’s slightly older contemporary, hermann samuel reimarus (1694–1768), professor of semitic languages at the academic Gymnasium in hamburg. his literary activities were conducted in two different spheres: a public one and a private one. publicly he adhered to a moderate rationalism à la the philosopher Christian wolff, as is evident in his book The Noblest Truth of Natural Religion.7 his outstanding position in the history of theology, however, is due to his private work Apology or Defence for the Rational Worshippers of God, written some time after 1736 and before reimarus’ death in 1768. out of consideration for his public reputation and that of his family, reimarus did not publish this radical piece of biblical criticism, but let it circulate only among his friends. in his last will he stipulated that it should be published only when the time was ripe for it, and he was certain that such a time would occur.8 in the years 1774–78, however, gotthold ephraim lessing (1729–81) published seven fragments of reimarus’ Apology or Defence. a daughter of reimarus, elise, had allowed lessing to do so on the condition that the anonymity would be preserved. lessing pretended that it was an anonymous manuscript, found in the ducal library in wolffenbüttel, where he had been engaged for a period. For this reason the author was referred to as der Wolffenbüttelsche Ungenannte, that is, “the unknown from Wolffenbüttel,” until the unmasking of Reimarus’ authorship in 1814. The two first fragments, On the Toleration of Deists and On the Decrying of Reason from the Pulpit, function together as a defense of natural theology and rational religion. the third, The Impossibility of a Revelation which All Men Can Believe on Rational Grounds, argues that an alleged revelation that requires external evidence in order to convince people of its veracity is not at all a genuine divine revelation. the fourth fragment, The Passage of the Israelites through the Red Sea, is inspired in its style by english deism and attempts to expose the absurdity of the Exodus story. The fifth, That the Books of the Old Testament Were Not Written to Reveal a Religion, advocates the view that any interpretation of biblical texts requires an understanding of what the biblical authors wanted to effect through their writings. the sixth, On the Resurrection Narrative, points out the many discrepancies in the gospel resurrection stories and poses the question of how faith could ever be based on four such historically remote testimonies that contradict each other. hermann samuel reimarus, Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natüralischen Religion, hamburg: Johann Carl Bohn 1754. the third enlarged ed of 1766 was reprinted: hermann samuel reimarus, Die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natüralischen Religion, göttingen: vandenhoeck and ruprecht 1985. 8 hermann samuel reimarus, Apologie oder Schutzschrift der vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes; the full text was first published in 1972: Apologie oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes. Im Auftrag der Joachim-Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften Hamburg, vols. 1–2, ed. by gerhard alexander, Frankfurt am main: insel 1972. after lessing’s death the fragments were published together as Fragmente des Wolffenbüttelschen Ungenannten, ed. by g.e. lessing, Berlin: arnold wever 1784. 7

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originally, however, this sixth fragment was a continuation of the seventh, which was published as the last one, On the Intention of Jesus and His Disciples.9 this fragment became the one that especially aroused furor. the author here repeated the same arguments and themes that the deist thomas woolston (1669–1733) had articulated in his notorious essays, Six Discourses on the Miracles of our Saviour (1727–30).10 woolston became the spokesman of the view that Christianity is due to a fraud. Following woolston, reimarus proposed that it was the disciples who had removed the dead body of Jesus from the tomb in order to continue the relatively carefree life that they had enjoyed with Jesus, living on donations and expecting to reign together with Jesus in an earthly messianic kingdom. according to this view, Jesus had only considered himself to be an earthly messiah and had even called himself “son of man” to stress his humility. when he also designated himself “son of god” it was only to suggest that he was the messiah who was especially beloved by god. on the whole, Jesus’ preaching was articulated within the conceptual framework of Judaism. after the catastrophe of his crucifixion his disciples waited until his corpse was no longer recognizable. Then they proclaimed Jesus as a spiritual messiah who had died to make atonement for the sins of humanity and to attain the glory to which he had been destined. according to the disciples, he was resurrected from the dead on the third day and afterwards ascended to heaven in order to manifest his glory. the disciples here employed the expectation of a messiah found in daniel 7, where one like “a son of man coming on the clouds of heaven” is described, to whom all power is to be conveyed. By this daring fraud they avoided the need to return to the humble work of their previous careers as fishermen. in developing this argument reimarus introduced a distinction that would become fundamental for the exegetical and theological agenda. Reimarus proposed, “I find great cause to separate completely what the apostles say in their own writings from that which Jesus himself actually said and taught, for the apostles were themselves teachers and consequently present their own views.”11 with this positing of an essential difference between what the apostles claimed in their own writings and what Jesus as a man had said and taught, a distinction was drawn between Jesus’ religion and the Christian religion. in many variations this distinction became fundamental for theology and continues to be so, as is evident in the persistence of the question of the relationship between the historical Jesus and the church’s proclamation of Christ. reimarus’ own solution to this problem, however, was purely negative. according to his view the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith fundamentally have nothing to do with each other. moreover, reimarus could not ascribe to Jesus’ own preaching or religion any special value because he considered it to be nothing more than a type of Judaism. The significance of Reimarus, however, is not primarily due to his specific conclusions, but rather to his methodology. thus albert schweitzer, in The Quest of the [hermann samuel reimarus], Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger, ed. by gotthold lessing, Braunschweig: n.p. 1778. 10 thomas woolston, Six Discourses on the Miracles of Our Saviour, london: n.p. 1727–30. 11 Quoted in Baird, History of New Testament Research, p. 171. (english translation quoted from Reimarus: Fragments, ed. by Charles h. talbert, trans. by ralph s. Fraser, philadelphia: Fortress press 1970, p. 64.) 9

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Historical Jesus claims, “his work is perhaps the most splendid achievement in the whole course of the historical investigation of the life of Jesus, for he was the first to grasp that the world of thought in which Jesus moved historically was essentially eschatological.”12 Because of the recognition of the historically conditioned eschatological nature of Jesus’ message, that message could no longer be identified with eternal and universal moral truths. Consequently, Jesus’ central role in the history of revelation was undermined. at the same time, the removal of any sort of supernaturalism from the story of Jesus contributed to a further erosion of its significance. Reimarus did not even have an appreciation for what semler described as Jesus’ openness to the subjective experience of a divine revelation. however, the historical understanding of reimarus suffered from certain flaws. David Friedrich Strauss drew attention to these limitations when he wrote in his book about reimarus, “the eighteenth century was unhistorical, it essentially only understood itself. But the more clearly it knew what it would and should be.”13 it is now clear that reimarus’ understanding of Jesus owed a great deal more to the assumptions of deism than schweitzer acknowledged. of course Kierkegaard was aware of the existence of the wolfenbüttel Fragments, but in his published works he never engaged in a sustained analysis or critique of their content.14 lessing had not published reimarus’ fragments because he agreed with everything in them. rather, he made them public because he wanted to provoke a discussion of the foundations of Christianity. the provocation was successful, in fact, almost too successful. It proved to be difficult to keep the ensuing debate civil and reasonable. as had happened earlier and would happen again, indignation was allowed to serve as an argument. Because the anonymity concerning the authorship of the fragments was preserved, the agitation was soon directed against their publisher. lessing for his part did not stand back but answered his critics willingly and polemically, as is evident in his series of written contributions to the debate. the deeper intention behind lessing’s publication of reimarus’ fragments was to show that Christianity is not based on historical evidence. as he argued in the treatise Eine Duplik from 1778, assertions about historical events, including the miracles of Jesus, do not conclusively prove anything of theological significance. Historical claims are nothing but scaffoldings, not the building itself. scaffoldings are removed as soon as the building is finished. With a rhetorical flourish Lessing posed the issue: “When are they going to stop wanting to hang nothing less than the whole of eternity on the

albert schweitzer, Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung, tübingen: mohr (siebeck) 1913, p. 23 (quoted from The Quest of the Historical Jesus, ed. by John Bowden, london: sCm press 2000, p. 22). 13 david Friedrich strauss, Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes, leipzig: Brockhaus 1862, p. 2 (reprinted, strauss, Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes, hildesheim: georg olms 1991, p. 2). 14 thus they are mentioned in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript in connection with the treatment of lessing, but it is not their content but only the question of why lessing published them that is dealt with (SKS 7, 104 / CUP1, 105–6). 12

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cobweb of a spider!—No: scholastic dogmatics has never inflicted such deep wounds on religion as historical exegesis now daily inflicts upon it.”15 it is interesting that lessing immediately detected the danger in identifying empirical claims that are purported to be historically verifiable with the content of faith. To him religion is something far greater than the evidence that allegedly attests to its validity. thus in Axiomata, an article from 1778 that responded to one of his most severe critics, “hauptpastor” goeze in hamburg, lessing straightforwardly asked if there had ever been a period when the Christian religion was already widespread and had already won many converts, but when not a single letter yet existed of those writings which have been included in the canon. if this has ever been true, then it is also possible that everything that the evangelists and apostles had written could be lost again, and that the religion that they had taught would nevertheless endure.16 the “unparalleled discovery” of grundtvig (see below) is here anticipated. lessing’s view is most clearly expressed in the treatise On the Proof of the Spirit and Power from 1777.17 here he exposes the weak spot, or more precisely, the missing component in the attempted historical demonstrations of the Bible’s truth. lessing admits the hypothetical cogency of proofs from the fulfillment of scriptural prophecy and from miracles, including the resurrection of Jesus, if an individual were to experience these phenomena directly. he confesses that if he had experienced any of these things, he would have been convinced by them. But when the evidence is only available at second-hand, presented through the medium of questionable historical traditions, the arguments based on the miracles and the alleged fulfillment of prophecy lose all their probative force. as lessing phrases this point in his famous dictum: “accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason.”18 For lessing the movement from one category of truths to the other involves an impossible leap. no one can base metaphysical and moral concepts on historical probabilities. The current inability to produce evidence that would disconfirm the resurrection is not a sufficiently firm basis for the acceptance of eternal truths. If such an attempted movement from historical probability to metaphysical certainty is not a jump into another category, then lessing cannot imagine what aristotle meant by the phrase μέταβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. lessing writes, “this is the ugly ditch which i cannot overcome, although i often and earnestly have tried the jump.”19 therefore, for lessing gotthold ephraim lessing, Eine Duplik, Braunschweig: Buchhandlung des Fürstl. waisenhauses 1778 (reprinted in Lessings Werke, ed. by g. witkowski, vols. 1–7, leipzig and vienna: Bibliographisches institut 1911, vol. 7, pp. 99–178, see p. 111). (english translation in gotthold ephraim lessing, Theological Writings: Selections in Translation with an Introductory Essay, ed. by henry Chadwick, stanford, California: stanford university press 1957.) 16 gotthold ephraim lessing, Axiomata, Braunschweig: n.p. 1778. see Axiomata, reprinted in Lessings Werke, vol. 7, pp. 191–226, especially pp. 207–8. 17 gotthold ephraim lessing, Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft, Braunschweig: n.p. 1777. 18 lessing, Über den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft, reprinted in Lessings Werke, vol. 7, pp. 79–85, see p. 82 (translation quoted from Chadwick, Lessing’s Theological Writings, p. 53). 19 see Lessings Werke, vol. 7, p. 84, my translation. 15

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the only thing that supports belief is the content of the teaching itself. it should be no surprise that Kierkegaard admired lessing for his rejection of any “approximation” of historical certainty as a support for faith. This shifting of meaning from the domain of historically unverifiable events to spiritual truths of another category alleviated some of the anxiety generated by the suspicion that the gospel stories, and biblical narratives in general, might not be historically trustworthy. in the opinion of lessing, the biblical writings should be read as human products, that is, as expressions of the limited understanding of their authors. however, the result of this distinction that lessing drew between the religion of Jesus on the one hand, and the Christian religion, on the other, was that the two would remain unintegrated. in the little fragment “Christ’s religion” belonging to his posthumous works,20 lessing wrote enthusiastically about the religion that Jesus knew and practiced as a man and which was spiritually elevated and thoroughly admirable. it is, however, a different matter with “the other, the Christian religion, …the religion which holds it to be true that he was more than man and for that reason has made him an object for its adoration.”21 lessing continues, “how both of these religions, Christ’s religion as well as the Christian religion can get their justification in one and the same person that is incomprehensible.”22 in this way the motivation became evident for the attempt to get behind the gospels’ proclamation of Jesus as the Christ and back to the historical figure. Another of lessing’s posthumous works, “new hypothesis Concerning the evangelists regarded as merely human historians,”23 tried to demonstrate the existence of an original gospel (Urevangelium) written in hebrew soon after the death of Jesus. lessing sought to build his argument on the remarks of Jerome about a nazarene gospel. this Urevangelium, then, was available to the author of the gospel of matthew, a book that lessing dated to about thirty years after the death of Jesus. according to lessing, the gospels of luke and mark later also utilized this hypothetical early gospel. however, the gospel of John belongs to its own very different context, for its intended audience was the gentile world. Concerning the gospel of John lessing writes: it was only his gospel which gave the Christian religion its true consistency. we have only this gospel to thank if the Christian religion, despite all attacks, [continues] in this consistency and will probably survive as long as there are men who think they need a mediator between themselves and the deity: that is, for ever.24

in line with another trajectory that originated with reimarus and others, another “ugly ditch” was discovered, this time between Jesus and his apostles. lessing and other theologians following him could not regard paul and the authors of the gospels as trustworthy interpreters of the message of Jesus because they feared that in the new ibid., pp. 353–4. ibid., my translation. 22 ibid., my translation. 23 lessing, “neue hypothese über die evangelisten als bloß menschliche geschichtschreiber betrachtet,” in Lessings Werke, vol. 6, pp. 392–416. 24 see Lessings Werke, vol. 6, p. 415, § 63 (translation quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 77). 20 21

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testament Christology had emancipated itself from the concerns of Jesus. according to lessing, the speculative way of understanding Jesus as the son of god did not function as an interpretation of Jesus’ message but had become an article of faith in itself. By suggesting this, a part of the foundation was laid for the development of the resentment, if not hatred, directed against paul that was to become characteristic of much theology in the nineteenth century and also in the twentieth century. in this context Johann gottfried herder (1744–1803) should also be mentioned because of his two smaller theological essays, Of the Redeemer of Men. According to Our First Three Gospels of 1796,25 and Of the Son of God, the Savior of the World. According to the Gospel of John of 1797.26 in the latter essay herder not only distinguished the picture of Jesus in the synoptic gospels from the portrayal of Jesus in the gospel of John, but also opposed any harmonization of the synoptic gospels. he exclaimed, “there are four evangelists, and let each retain his special purpose, complexion, time, and locale.”27 Before the gospels were written down there had existed an oral proclamation of Jesus as the messiah. this oldest gospel did not exhibit any biographical interest. this oral Urevangelium was more faithful to the Jesus tradition than were the later written ones. the gospel of mark is the oldest of these later texts and is the most primitive, while the gospel of matthew is an extended version of the primal gospel intended to show that Jesus was the messiah according to Jewish expectations. the gospel of luke exhibits an awareness of the additions in the gospel of matthew and presents itself as an actual historical account. the gospel of John written some forty years later echoes the earlier gospels in a more elevated manner. herder concludes, “therefore, before any of our gospels was written, the gospel was there in the proclamation of Christ and of the apostles.”28 herder also expressed appreciation for Jesus’ deeds, saying: “for work it was, not just teaching. to bring a kingdom of god to the nations, in other words, a real order and disposition that would be worthy of both god and men, that was his calling; that was his purpose.” For this reason “the Christian religion” was no degeneration: “the so-called religion about Jesus must necessarily change with the passage of time into a religion of Jesus, and do so imperceptibly and irresistibly. his god, our god, his Father, our Father!”29

Johann gottfried herder, Vom Erlöser der Menschen. Nach unseren drei ersten Evangelien, in Herder’s Sämmtliche Werke, ed. by Berhard suphan, vols. 1–33, Berlin: weidmann 1877–1913, vol. 19 (1880), pp. 135–252. 26 Johann gottfried herder, Von Gottes Sohn, der Welt Heiland. Nach Johannes Evangelium, in Herder’s Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 19 (1880), pp. 253–424. the last mentioned treatise exists in a danish translation, see C.g. zahle, J.G. Herder om Guds Søn, Verdens Frelser. Efter Johannis Evangelium. Samt en Forskrivt, at bringe vore Evangelier i Harmonie, i Følge deres Oprindelse og Orden, Copenhagen: n. p. 1799. 27 Herder’s Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 19, p. 416, note (translation quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 79). 28 Herder’s Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 19, pp. 196–7 (translation quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 80). 29 Herder’s Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 19, p. 250 (translation quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 83). 25

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II. The Liberation of Exegesis from Dogmatic Theology The most significant person from the world of scholarly exegesis who articulated the necessary consequences of the new approach to biblical scholarship was Johann philipp gabler (1753–1824). in 1787 gabler set a new standard in his inaugural lecture in altdorf entitled “on the proper distinction between Biblical and dogmatic theology and the proper determination of the goals of each.”30 in this lecture both the advances and the limitations of the new biblical theology became apparent. gabler proposed: Biblical theology bears a historical character in that it hangs on what the sacred writers thought about divine things; dogmatic theology, on the other hand, bears a didactic character in that it teaches what every theologian through use of his reason philosophizes about divine things in accordance with his understanding, with the circumstances of the time, the age, the place, the school [to which he belongs], and similar matters of this sort.31

in spite of this difference, however, gabler thought that historical investigation could reveal the themes in the Bible that retain eternal and universal significance by removing the mythological clothing typical of the times in which they were written. For example, historical investigation could help differentiate the truly divine aspects of the sayings of the apostles from whatever is accidental and purely human. when scholarly exegesis has accomplished this differentiation, the results are to be adopted by dogmatic theology as the foundation of its work. gabler writes: in this the main task is to investigate which ideas are of importance to the permanent form of Christian doctrine and consequently apply to us, and which were spoken only for the people of a given age or were intended for a given form of instruction. it is acknowledged, surely, that not all matter in holy writ is intended for people of every sort. on the contrary, a large part of it by god’s decree is intended rather for a given time, a given place, and a given sort of people.32

like semler, gabler thus distinguished between religion and theology, claiming that the books of the old testament and the books of the new testament were produced in different epochs of the development of religion. Johann philipp gabler, “Oratio de iusto discrimine theologiae biblicae et dogmaticae regundisque recte utriusque finibus,” in Jo. Phil. Gableri Opuscula Academica, vols. 1–2, ulm: stettin 1831, vol. 2, pp. 179–98. (german translation in otto merk, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments, pp. 273–84.) reprint in Das Problem der Theologie des Neuen Testaments, ed. by georg strecker, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1975, pp. 32–44. 31 gabler, “Oratio de iusto discrimine theologiae biblicae et dogmaticae regundisque recte utriusque finibus,” in Jo. Phil. Gableri Opuscula Academica, vol. 2, pp. 183–4 (translation quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, pp. 98–9; german translation in merk, Biblische Theologie, p. 275). 32 gabler, “Oratio de iusto discrimine theologiae biblicae et dogmaticae regundisque recte utriusque finibus,” in Jo. Phil. Gableri Opuscula Academica, vol. 2, pp. 190–3 (translation quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 100; german translation in merk, Biblische Theologie, p. 280). 30

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A significant further step in the development of critical biblical scholarship was taken by the old testament scholar Johann gottfried eichhorn (1752–1827), a pioneer in the study of the historical background of the old testament. his major contribution to the new discipline was his critical discussion of the origin of the various books of the Bible. in his interpretation of the biblical protohistory eichhorn employed the understanding of the concept “myth” that had been formulated by Christian gottlieb heyne (1729–1812), a classical philologist in göttingen. in Commentary on the Works of Appollodorus—And at the Same Time on the Universe of Mythical Literature heyne developed the psychological-genetic argument that myths and their legendary trappings belonged to the childhood of humanity.33 in this period it was not yet possible for humanity to distinguish between historical and unexplainable incidents. heyne’s often quoted dictum was: A mythis omnis priscorum hominum eum historia tum philosophia procedit (“throughout history all philosophy proceeds from the myths of ancient men”). 34 the foundational presupposition of heyne was that myths precede every poetic creation and are a preliterary expression of the primitive experience of reality. For this reason allegory must be categorized as a later literary product developed as a strategy to interpret the myths.35 the mythic core therefore must be separated from every later literary accretion; most importantly, it must be separated from the allegories it had absorbed. to be able to do so, the interpreter must know what the characteristics of preliterary myths are. these characteristics can be determined by understanding myths historically as the form of thought and expression that typifies the earliest versions of the history of a people, preceding every poetic treatment. By separating the original myths from later embellishments in this way heyne was able to classify myths into two categories, namely, historical myths about the foundation of cities and the deeds of significant people, and philosophical myths, called Philosopheme, which essentially involve speculations about gods, the world, and humanity. however, heyne can also speak about a third category, “the poetical myth,” which can be associated with historical or with philosophical myths as literary embellishments. By this classification heyne makes it clear that myths are not mere fanciful fables, and by distinguishing between preliterary and literary myths he attempted to separate the original myth from its poetic clothing. eichhorn’s Urgeschichte originally was published in two parts in 1779. however, the book first became influential when Gabler reissued it with an extensive introduction and annotations in 1790–92.36 according to eichhorn, myth was not merely poetry (as herder, for instance, thought) nor was it only accommodation to the values and sensibilities of a period (as semler, for example, proposed). rather, myth was a form of Christian gottlieb heyne, Commentatio de Apollori bibliotheca—simulque universe de litteratura mythica, 2nd ed., göttingen: dieterich 1803 [1783]. 34 ibid., p. xvi. 35 For an account of heyne, see merk, Biblische Theologie, pp. 54–5. 36 Johann gottfried eichhorn, Urgeschichte, vols. 1–2, introduction by Johann philipp eichhorn, altdorf: monath and Kutzler 1790–92; see merk, Biblische Theologie, pp. 55–8; see also hans-Joachim Kraus, Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung, pp. 147–51. 33

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speech, thought, and conceptualization prevalent in an age when people were not able to express themselves in any other way because their knowledge was limited. such myths as the ones found in the first three chapters of Genesis are not to be taken literally as if they were descriptions of real historical events. later eichhorn also applied this concept of myth to a new testament text, namely, the story of the liberation of peter from prison narrated in acts 12:3–11 in which totally natural events are described as the effects of supernatural intervention.37 thus eichhorn and gabler deepened the ditch which semler had already dug between dogmatic theology and biblical scholarship. their intention in so doing was clear. as gabler pointedly stated, “dogmatics must depend on exegesis and not exegesis on dogmatics.”38 like semler, gabler also did not think that critical exegesis should be taken up in the pulpit or used in the teaching of the laity. in such contexts the minister should only preach religion. gabler advised, “preach religion to the people and let the lectern have the subtle theology.”39 as an adherent of the enlightenment, gabler also shared the view that humanity’s progressive journey to the eternal and unchangeable truth has passed through many preliminary “truths” that have been left behind. gabler wrote: as the development of the human intellect has been stepwise, thus the divine revelation also has had to pass the same way. to be sure, centuries before it has conveyed many truths which the human mind later would have reached by itself but only in a form suiting the actual age. thus also the various economies of religion are to be understood. the truth itself is eternal and unchangeable. But the shape of the truth (its mode) is subjected to an ongoing change and variation. in this respect lessing’s On the Education of Mankind deserves to be read and studied.40

III. Biblical Theology as a Historical Discipline gabler’s program was realized in the discipline of “biblical theology,” which was now regarded as a purely historical endeavor. The first scholar to write such a biblical theology was georg lorenz Bauer (1755–1806) in heidelberg. in 1796 Bauer published Biblical Theology of the Old Testament or a Sketch of the Religious Concepts of the Old Hebrews, From Oldest Times until the Beginning of the Christian Epoch41 and in 1800–02 followed it up with Biblical Theology of the New Testament Johann gottfried eichhorn, “versuch über die engels-erscheinungen in der apostelgeschichte,” Allgemeine Bibliothek der biblischen Litteratur, vol. 3, 1790, pp. 381ff., see pp. 396–9. see also merk, Biblische Theologie, pp. 69–81, where the distinction is drawn between “exposition” and “explanation.” The first relates to the investigation of the meaning in the historical-literary context, while the second pertains to the elucidation of the essential matter itself. 38 gabler, “introduction,” in Urgeschichte, vol. 1, p. xv. 39 ibid. 40 eichhorn, Urgeschichte, vol. 2, p. 62, note 26. see also Kraus, Geschichte, p. 150. 41 georg lorenz Bauer, Theologie des alten Testaments oder Abriß der religiösen Begriffe der alten Hebräer. Von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf den Anfang der christlichen Epoche, leipzig: weygand 1796–1801. 37

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in four volumes.42 the Bible could no longer be treated as one book. with this volume the division of theological disciplines that was soon to effectively fragment scholarship made its appearance. if gabler was a “late-neologist,” then Bauer was a rationalist. Bauer developed the discipline of “introduction,” which discusses the provenience of the various writings and thereby lays the foundation for a description of biblical religion in its stepwise development. this approach to the texts suggests that the old testament expresses a significantly different religion from that of the New Testament. The theory that biblical religion developed progressively implied for Bauer that old testament religion was incomplete in itself. Jesus functioned as a reformer of Judaism by taking the best from the Old Testament and refining it into a higher religion; in more biblical language, he actualized the new covenant which is promised in the old testament. whereas for gabler the historical dimension was regarded as secondary in respect to the essential dogmatically valid content, for Bauer there was only one level, the historical. thus Bauer would not distinguish between biblical theology and the history of dogma in the way that gabler did. For Bauer the history of dogma begins in the biblical books, and historical investigation must get behind all the unfamiliar concepts and get back to “the religious theory of the Jews prior to Christ and of Jesus and his apostles, a development traced from the writings of the sacred authors and presented in terms of the various periods and the various viewpoints and levels of understanding they reflect.”43 with the careful distinction between truth and error in the interpretation of biblical texts it will be possible to approach a decision about the question “whether Christianity is a rational and divine religion.”44 an unbiased investigation of the biblical texts is able to ascertain the truth or falsity of Christianity’s truth claims. Bauer maintained that the writings of the new testament seek to present what the Christian theory of religion actually is, how Jesus wishes himself to be regarded, and for what reasons he demands that we believe in him….For only after having honorably carried out such research can one who accepts nothing without first having tested it, but who at the same time also keeps his ear open to the voice of truth, determine whether to accept or reject Christianity.45

in addition to this, Bauer expressed the opinion that Jesus accommodated his proclamation to contemporary concepts. he also proposed that “John’s manner of teaching and tone, taken as a whole, approach more closely the teaching manner and tone of Jesus” than did the other evangelists.46

georg lorenz Bauer, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, leipzig: weygand 1800–02. 43 Bauer, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments, vol. 1, p. 6 (translation quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 105). 44 ibid. 45 Bauer, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments, vol. 1, p. 6 and pp. iv–v (translation quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 105). 46 Bauer, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments, vol. 2, p. 284 (translation quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 105). 42

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where this paradigm was allowed to rule, the Bible became regarded as a historical collection of books. Because it was an articulation of concepts from past ages, direct access to its meaning was excluded. the various books had to be understood in the context of the presuppositions that were prevalent during their time of origin. Consequently, the old testament was seen to represent a historically distant religion. a concise expression of this attitude is to be found in Friedrich daniel ernst schleiermacher’s (1768–1834) On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, published anonymously in 1799. in the second speech he writes: You are right in despising the wretched echoes who derive their religion entirely from another, or depend on a dead writing, swearing by it and proving out of it. every sacred writing is in itself a glorious production, a speaking monument from the heroic times of religion, but, through servile reverence, it would become merely a mausoleum, a monument that a great spirit once was there, but is now no more. did this spirit still live and work, he would look with love, and with a feeling of equality upon his work which yet could only be a weaker impress of himself. not every person has a religion who believes in sacred writing, but only the man who has a lively and immediate understanding of it, and who, therefore, so far as he himself is concerned, could most easily do without it.47

schleiermacher’s understanding involves not only a relativization of scripture as a whole but even more so a denigration of the old testament in particular. according to schleiermacher, the old testament only became part of the Christian Bible because the new testament writings invoke it, and because the Christian worship service arose out of the prayerful practices of the Jewish synagogue. in The Christian Faith) of 1821–22, schleiermacher concludes that it is impossible to separate the more valuable parts of the old testament from the less valuable portions; therefore, one cannot object to the inclusion of the whole old testament in the Christian canon along with the new testament. he observes: nonetheless, the real meaning of the facts would be clearer if the old testament followed the new as an appendix, for the present relative position of the two makes the demand, not obscurely, that we must first work our way through the whole of the Old Testament if we are to approach the new by the right avenue.48 Friedrich schleiermacher, Über die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, original anonymous edition, Berlin: Johann Friedrich unger 1799, pp. 121–2; see also the edition in Philosophische Bibliothek, vol. 255, hamburg: Felix meiner 1958, pp. 67– 8 (quoted from Friedrich schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. by John oman, new York: harper & row 1958, p. 91). two editions of this book are found in The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s library, see Ueber die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, 5th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1843 (ASKB 271) and schleiermacher, Ueber die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, 3rd ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1821 (ASKB a i 40). 48 Friedrich schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsäzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt, vols. 1–2, Berlin: reimer 1830–31 [1821–22], vol. 2, § 132, p. 383 (quoted from Friedrich schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. by h.r. mackintosh and J.s. stewart, philadelphia: Fortress press 1976, p. 611). Kierkegaard owned the third edition of this work, see schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube 47

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Schleiermacher also addressed more specific problems in New Testament interpretation. his lectures collected in Introduction to the New Testament were only published posthumously.49 prior to this he had published treatises aimed at showing that 1 timothy was not an authentic pauline letter (1807),50 and that the gospel of luke was not written by an eyewitness but obviously had been created by a collector and redactor of older documents (1817).51 in his lectures on new testament interpretation schleiermacher argued that the acts of the apostles could not have been written by a traveling companion of paul because the chronology of this writing is irreconcilable with that of the pauline letters. as was usual during that period, schleiermacher reckoned that the gospel of John was older than the synoptic Gospels, a view that he believed was confirmed by the fact that John includes the story of the raising of lazarus, an important episode that the other gospels seem to have forgotten. Concerning all the Catholic epistles, schleiermacher observed “that it is not possible to claim that it would be a greater damage if this whole part of our canon was missing.”52 he also contended that the letter to the hebrews could not have been written by paul. schleiermacher could exhibit such freedom in regard to historical questions because of his foundational assumption that the faithful Christian has direct access to Jesus’ essential consciousness. For him, this access was the all-determining point of departure for the Christian faith. accordingly, near the end of the Introduction he writes: if Christianity had not had the ground of its unique essence in the person of Christ, and had not emerged from his own presentation of himself, but if it had arisen, as many have wanted to view it, through reflection, study or natural refinement, which other conceptions underwent, when they pass through a purer individual; then it would have been nothing more than a modified Judaism.53

during Kierkegaard’s lifetime wilhelm martin leberecht de wette (1780–1849) summarized and further developed this historical critical scholarship concerning both the Old and the New Testaments. De Wette was strongly influenced by schleiermacher. the reciprocal nature of their relationship is evident in the fact that Schleiermacher dedicated his treatise on Luke to de Wette. De Wette, a prolific nach den Grundsä[t]zen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt, vols. 1– 2, 3rd unchanged ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1835–36 [vols. 3–4, in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämmtliche Werke, Erste Abtheilung. Zur Theologie, vols. 1–11, Berlin: g. reimer 1834–64 (some of the volumes were published in Berlin: august herbig)] (ASKB 258). 49 Friedrich schleiermacher, Einleitung ins neue Testament, Berlin: g. reimer 1845. 50 Friedrich schleiermacher, Über den sogenannten ersten Brief des Paulos an den Timotheos, reprinted in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämmtliche Werke, Erste Abtheilung. Zur Theologie, vol. 2 (1836), pp. 221–320. 51 Friedrich schleiermacher, Über die Schriften des Lukas, ein kritischer Versuch, reprinted in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämmtliche Werke, Erste Abtheilung. Zur Theologie, vol. 2 (1836), pp. xi–220. (english translation: A Critical Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke, trans. by Connop thrilwall, london: J. taylor 1825.) 52 schleiermacher, Einleitung ins neue Testament, p. 431. 53 schleiermacher, Einleitung ins neue Testament, p. 481 (quoted from Baird, History of New Testament Research, p. 215).

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author, also published theological books on many other subjects. his basic theological position was opposed to both vulgar rationalism and to the church orthodoxy of the “awakening.” his theology is articulated in a didactic novel, Theodore, or the Skeptic’s Conversion. in this text he asserts: “the essence of religion is feeling. in moral actions, this feeling is expressed only in a limited degree, and imperfectly. still less can it be contained and expressed by doctrines and opinions. there remain then, only poetry and art, as suitable means of expressing the religious sentiment.”54 in the novel scripture is said to have authority only by being a testimony to Christ. theodore the protagonist says, “it is not a revelation, but it contains the oldest and truest accounts concerning it. revelation itself came to pass in the incarnation of Christ, and in what he did and suffered on earth.”55 In the preface to the first edition of An Historico-Critical Introduction to the Canonical Books of the New Testament de wette cautiously writes about the necessity of criticism: I would gladly have arrived at results more definite and more in harmony with the views generally received in the Church; but the truth can alone decide. that is no genuine love of Truth which is not ready to sacrifice its inordinate curiosity where certainty is unattainable, as well as its pious prejudices. The value of criticism I place chiefly in the activity to which it excites the spirit of inquiry, but this spirit of inquiry can never harm a genuine Christian piety.56

For de wette this historical approach resulted in a division of the books of the new testament into three parts according to the theology which they represented.57 the first category is the Jewish-Christian set of writings to which belongs the Synoptic gospels, the acts of the apostles, the letters of peter, the letter of James, the letter of Jude, and the revelation of John. these books are characterized by an intimate connection between Christianity and Jewish theology. the second category is the alexandrine or hellenistic writings that include the gospel of John, the letters of John, and the letter to the hebrews. these texts are characterized by the concept of Jesus as the logos, the absence of palestinian superstition, and by a mythical use of the old testament. the third category included the pauline letters and the parts of the acts wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Theodor, oder des Zweiflers Weihe, Berlin: g. reimer 1822 (quoted from Baird, History of New Testament Research, p. 223, using de wette, Theodore, or the Skeptic’s Conversion, trans. by James Clarke, vols. 1–2, Boston: hilliard, gray, & Co. 1841, vol. 1, pp. 230–1). 55 de wette, Theodor, oder des Zweiflers Weihe, vol. 2, p. 23. 56 wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die kanonischen Bücher des Neuen Testaments, 5th revised ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1848 [1826] (quoted from Baird, History of New Testament Research, p. 224, using de wette, An Historico-Critical Introduction to the Canonical Books of the New Testament, trans. by Frederick Frothingham, Boston: Crosby, nichols, & Co. 1858, p. v). Kierkegaard owned the edition entitled Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes vols. 1–2, in 1 tome, 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833 (ASKB 80). 57 see wilhelm martin leberecht de wette, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik in ihrer historischen Entwicklung dargestellt. Erster Theil. Die biblische Dogmatik Alten und Neuen Testaments. Oder kritische Darstellung der Religionslehre des Hebraismus, des Judenthums und Urchristenthums, Berlin: g. reimar 1813. 54

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of the apostles that were marked by the teaching of the divinity of Jesus, pauline universalism, and opposition to Jewish regulations and Jewish justification by works. de wette distinguished between the teaching of Jesus and the evangelists’ perception of that teaching. thus he did not believe that the church’s teaching about atonement can be supported by the sayings of Jesus, and proposed that the death of Jesus was first imbued with theological significance by the apostles. He remarked: the genuine Christian independence was lost in part by the apostles, due to the fact that, although filled with the Spirit, they could not free themselves entirely from faith in authority. the principle of their religion is consequently revelation faith and Christolatry. to be sure, to the extent that they freely took over and developed Jesus’ teaching, their independence had still some elbowroom, but for later Christians this became increasingly restricted. one unhappy consequence of this religious attitude even as early as the times of the apostles was the dogmatic mythological treatment of religion.58

de wette is reported to have been rather skeptical about the possibility of recovering the historical Jesus. For him, it was the living Christ who was essential for faith.59 Kierkegaard possessed more books by de wette than by any other historical-critical exegete, among them a general introduction to the biblical books and several new testament commentaries.60 De Wette’s high standing and influence in Danish theology is evident in the fact that translations of two commemorative works on the occasion of his death appeared in Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur.61 Finally, attention should be drawn to the first attempt to provide a systematical exposition of paul’s theology, namely the work of leonhard usteri (1799–1833),

ibid., p. 252 (quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 107). de wette, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmatik, pp. 223–4; pp. 211–12; see also Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 423, note 146. 60 namely, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten und Neuen Testamentes; Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836 (ASKB 108); Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 109); Kurze Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte, leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 111); Kurze Erklärung des Briefes an die Römer, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 112); Die allgemeine Sittenlehre, vols. 1–2 [part 1 of his Vorlesungen über die Sittenlehere], Berlin: g. reimer 1823 (ASKB a i 30–31); Die besondere Sittenlehre, vols. 1–2 [part 2 of his Vorlesungen über die Sittenlehere], Berlin: g. reimer 1824 (ASKB a i 32–33); Christliche Sittenlehre, vols. 1–3, Berlin: g. reimer 1819–23 (ASKB u 110) (C.e. scharling’s translation of this volume, see Lærebog i den christelige Sædelære og sammes Historie, Copenhagen: n.p. 1835 (ASKB 871)); and Lehrbuch der hebräisch-jüdischen Archäologie nebst einem Grundrisse der hebräisch-jüdischen Geschichte, 3rd revised ed., leipzig: vogel 1842 (ASKB 872). Finally, The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s library also lists by wette: Predigten, theils auslegender theils abhandelnder Art, sammlungen 1–2, Basel: neukirch 1825–27 [sammlungen 3–4, Basel: neukirch 1833–42] (ASKB a i 85). 61 d. schenkel, “w.m.l. de wette og hans theologies Betydning for vor tid,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, vol. 18, 1850, pp. 335–426; F. lücke, “til erindring om dr. w.m.l. de wette,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, vol. 18, 1850, pp. 715–58. 58 59

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The Development of Pauline Doctrine.62 By 1851 this book had gone through six editions, and in 1839 a danish translation appeared, a volume that was contained in Kierkegaard’s library.63 IV. Biblical Hermeneutics Becomes an Independent Discipline the early nineteenth century was also the period in which “biblical hermeneutics” became an independent discipline. Kierkegaard owned Johann august ernesti’s (1707–81) Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti,64 which, however, belonged to the pre-critical period. ernesti was of the opinion that although only the literal understanding of the biblical texts was correct and should not be subjected to dogmatic considerations, the Bible was nevertheless infallible because the authors wrote under inspiration of the holy spirit. as a consequence of this conviction, no questions were allowed to be raised concerning the identities of the alleged authors of the various biblical books. such an orthodox prejudgment was abandoned in georg lorenz Bauer’s Sketch of a Hermeneutic of the Old and New Testament from 1799, advocating a grammaticalhistorical understanding. Bauer wrote: the only valid principle of interpretation, whether the author be profane or biblical, is this: every book must be explained in accordance with the linguistic peculiarities that characterize it; this means grammatical interpretation and results in a literal understanding of the text, and the presentation and clarification of the ideas that appear in it, ideas dependent on the costumes and ways of thinking of the author himself and of his age, his nation, sect, religion and so forth, is the task of what is called historical interpretation. only when the meaning of the author has been ascertained can the work of philosophy begin.…65

however, in An Outline of New Testament Hermeneutics and Its History from 1817 a pupil of schleiermacher, Friedrich lücke (1791–1854), opposed positions such as Bauer’s. lücke asserted, “he, in whom the genuinely Christian mind and truly systematic spirit are not so combined as Christian philology’s loftiest task requires,

leonhard usteri, Die Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs, zürich: orell, Füssli, und Compagnie 1824. 63 leonhard usteri, Udvikling af det Paulinske Lærebegreb i dets Forhold til det Ny Testamentes bibelske Dogmatik. Et exegetisk-dogmatisk Forsøg, trans. by wilhelm Johan Jacob Boethe, Copenhagen: philipsen 1839 (ASKB 850). this had earlier appeared in extracts in danish translation, see leonhard usteri, “udvikling af det paulinske lærebegreb i dets Forhold til det nye testamentes bibelske dogmatik,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, vol. 1, no. 2, 1833, pp. 47–108. 64 Johann august ernesti, Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1765 [1761] (ASKB 101). 65 georg lorenz Bauer, Entwurf einer Hermeneutik des Alten und Neuen Testaments. Zu Vorlesungen, leipzig: weygandschen Buchhandlung 1799, p. 20 (quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 112). 62

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can neither…recognize nor carry out the idea of new testament theology.”66 the biblical books are not to be interpreted in the same way as all other books but, on the contrary, must be interpreted in an entirely different manner. according to lücke, a special biblical hermeneutic must be practiced in order to do justice to the unique nature of the sacred texts. Kierkegaard owned a copy of lücke’s commentary on the letters of John.67 V. The First Steps in the Life of Jesus Research reimarus had introduced a distinction between the historical Jesus and the apostolic preaching which openly posited a rupture with no essential continuity between the two. lessing found the Christ of faith to be incomprehensible and also to be unnecessary. in the staunch rationalist exegete, the so-called “non-apostle” (nicht-Apostel) heinrich eberhard gottlob paulus (1761–1851) of heidelberg, the historical Jesus and his teaching became the very foundation of theology. the miraculous elements in the gospels’ narration were dismissed as the most inane sort of explanations of natural phenomena. in the two volumes entitled The Life of Jesus, as the Foundation of a Purely Historical Study of Primitive Christianity,68 paulus contends that no spiritual truth can ever be proven by a miracle of nature and declares: “the miraculous about Jesus is he himself.”69 Jesus is genuinely worthy of imitation in that he proclaimed that salvation is only obtainable through spiritual uprightness, a conviction that he himself practiced under the threat of death. that such a lofty spirit has appeared in a human body is indeed something extraordinary. Jesus’ faithful pursuit of his goal, a pursuit that created a new spiritual community of those virtuous individuals among his contemporaries who remained committed to decency in spite of persecution, is the miracle. in this regard the person of Jesus does not have any parallel in the history of humankind. paulus concludes: the truth that is to become an active conviction for us through the medium of the primitive church is twofold. it concerns in part the person of Jesus and in part the religious content of his teaching, portrayed also by his life and death. the truth of the latter is self-evident, demonstrated by its inner spirituality, to the extent that it concerns piety or conformity to God’s will. The reverent esteem of Jesus’ person, however, rests in the first instance on the very fact that Jesus reveals as no other, such a divine doctrine, so different from that current in his day, not in words and ideas only, but also in deeds and sufferings. in Friedrich lücke, Grundriß der neutestamentlichen Hermeneutik und ihrer Geschichte. Zum Gebrauch für akademische Vorlesungen, göttingen: vandenhoeck and ruprecht 1817, p. 168 (quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 118). 67 Friedrich lücke, Commentar über die Briefe des Evangelisten Johannes, 2nd ed., Bonn: weber 1836 (ASKB 110). 68 heinrich eberhard gottlob paulus, Das Leben Jesu als Grundlage einer reinen Geschichte des Urchristenthums. Die Geschichtserzählung nach den vier vereint geordneten Evangelien in Beziehung auf eine wortgetreue, erklärende, synoptische Ueberlieferung derselben, vols. 1–2, heidelberg: C.F. winter 1828. these two volumes consist of two parts with their own pagination. 69 paulus, Das Leben Jesu, vol. 1, pp. x–xi. 66

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addition, however, account must be taken of his other personal qualities, which justify the summary statement. he who had the qualities to show forth a divine life among men was properly accorded the dignity of the messianic name. 70

according to paulus, Jesus’ idea of the messiah was a spiritualization of the Jewish view. such an idea does not represent what has already been actualized by humanity but points to a perfect ideal that humanity is beginning to approximate.71 in this way h.e.g. paulus epitomizes a pious rationalism, sharply differentiating the historically reconstructed Jesus from the canonical Christ. The possibility that the first Christians and the authors of the gospels may have been developing themes present in the Jesus tradition was beyond paulus’ conception. The first “Life of Jesus” that sought to be a rigorously historical account of the evolution of Jesus’ self-understanding was written by the church historian Karl hase (1800–90). in The Life of Jesus from 1829 hase attempted to draw a historicalpsychological picture of Jesus.72 as many before had him done, hase reckoned the gospel of John to be the gospel most faithful to the historical person of Jesus, particularly in its symbolic understanding of the return of Jesus. according to hase, this gospel writer also disclosed his status as an eyewitness through his reports concerning the miracle of the turning of water into wine at Cana and the raising of lazarus. the new historical-psychological approach assumed that there had been changes in Jesus’ conceptual world and understanding of his own ministry during his active life. Kierkegaard possessed a copy of this attempted biography of Jesus, and also other writings by the same author.73 very different from hase’s work was the example of the “life of Jesus” genre that would, especially and in an epoch-making way, influence the debate about Jesus, the two-volume work of david Friedrich strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined.74 strauss maintained that the synoptic gospels and the gospel of John cannot both be reliable sources of the life of Jesus; the choice of John or the synoptics cannot be a “both-and,” but can only be an “either-or.” according to strauss, the gospel of John shows an advanced mythologizing of the tradition and must be discarded

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p. 92).

paulus, Das Leben Jesu, vol. 1, pp. xiii–xiv (quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament,

ibid., vol. 2, p. xi. Karl hase, Das Leben Jesu. Ein Lehrbuch zunächst für akademische Vorlesungen, leipzig: leich 1829 (ASKB a i 37 and ASKB u 51). 73 Karl hase, Kirkehistorie, vols. 1–7, trans. by C. winther and and t. schorn, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1837 (ASKB 160–166); Karl hase, Hutterus Redivivus oder Dogmatik der evangelische-lutherischen Kirke, 4th ed., leipzig: sühring 1829 (ASKB 581); Libri symbolici ecclesiae evangelicae sive concordia, ed. by Karl hase, leipzig: Klinkhardt 1837 (ASKB 624). 74 david Friedrich strauss, Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, vols. 1–2, tübingen: osiander 1835–36. it also appeared in danish, see david Friedrich strauss, Jesu Levned. Kritisk bearbejdet, vols. 1–2, translated after the 4th ed. by Frederik schaldemose, Copenhagen: C. steen 1842–43. 71 72

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when trying to reconstruct the historical Jesus.75 this understanding of the gospel of John opened the path for construing the evangelists as independent interpreters of tradition and not only as the transmitters of tradition. strauss’ freedom in his historical treatment of the gospels was rooted in his interpretation of the historical dimensions of the gospels as being the contingent material used to illustrate “the idea.” in this strauss was inspired by hegel. polemizing against schleiermacher, who had proposed a complementary relation between historical and dogmatic considerations, strauss maintained that the concept of the unique actualization of the idea in a single person still belonged to the mythical phase in the spirit’s history. radical historical criticism unveils the mythical elements as the clothing of the idea, a type of clothing that was typical of the period. the idea, however, could also be known through its continuing unfolding in history. thus, according to strauss, the historical Jesus was wholly contextualized in his contemporary Judaism. it is only possible to consider him as an accidental occasion for the rise of the Christian faith. while schleiermacher claimed that it is the archetypical dimension of Jesus that is reflected in the faith, Strauss considered such a faith to be a result of the myth-creating activity of the Christian community. as strauss says in the “Concluding dissertation”: this is the key to the whole of Christology, that, as subject of the predicate which the Church assigns to Christ, we place, instead of an individual, an idea; but an idea which has an existence in reality, not in the mind only, like that of Kant. in an individual, a god-man, the prophecies and functions which the Church assigns to Christ contradict themselves, in the idea of the race, they perfectly agree.76

in humanity the divine and human natures are united and in the course of the history of humanity the spirit progressively transforms both internal and external nature. imperfection thus only exists in the individual and is suspended in the generations and their history. strauss writes, “it is humanity that dies, rises, and ascends to heaven, for from the negation of its phenomenal life there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a personal, national, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the heavens.”77 thus humanity is justified before God by faith in Christ, namely, by actualizing the idea of humanity, by participating in the spirit’s negation of the sensible and thereby in the development of the divine-human life of the generations. that this absolute content of Christology is attached to the person and history of a single individual, Jesus of nazareth, is only due to its historical form. the speculative view represented by Strauss ascribed little more significance to the historical person of the Savior than did ebionitism, the ancient view that Jesus was merely human. Following hegel,

Cf. Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 152: “Thereby Strauss became the first to pose research in the traditions about Jesus with the alternative, ‘synoptists or John,’ an alternative that new testament research from then on could no longer evade.” 76 strauss, Das Leben Jesu, vol. 2, p. 734 (quoted from strauss, The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, trans. by george eliot, new Jersey: sigler press 1994, p. 780). 77 strauss, Das Leben Jesu, vol. 2, p. 734 (strauss, The Life of Jesus, p. 780). 75

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strauss claimed that the sensible history of the individual is only a point of departure for the spirit and that this history of spirit alone is ultimately trustworthy: But mind having once taken occasion by this external fact, to bring under its consciousness the idea of humanity as one with god, sees in the history only the presentation of that idea; the object of faith is completely changed; instead of a sensible, empirical fact, it has become a spiritual and divine idea, which has its confirmation no longer in history but in philosophy.78

in this manner the sensible history of Jesus was subjected to the essential idea of divine-human unity; the concrete life of Jesus “becomes as the faint image of a dream which belongs only to the past, and does not, like the idea, share the permanence of the spirit which is absolutely present to itself.”79 on the basis of these presuppositions strauss was able to depict the historical Jesus as a person who only gradually became aware of himself as the messiah. The first to interpret Jesus this way, strauss proposed that Jesus in the beginning of his career proclaimed the Son of Man as a figure other than himself, and only towards the end of his ministry did he identify himself with this son of man.80 in view of the central position of strauss’ Life of Jesus in the theological discussion after its appearance,81 it is remarkable that the book played practically no role in the writings published by Kierkegaard.82 apparently he did not possess a copy. when the issues raised by strauss are treated, Kierkegaard’s knowledge seems to be either indirect, through the work of Julius schaller,83 or based on strauss’ later work The Christian Faith in Its Historical Development and in Its Strife with Modern Science,84 strauss, Das Leben Jesu, vol. 2, pp. 734–5 (strauss, The Life of Jesus, pp. 780–1). strauss, Das Leben Jesu, vol. 2, p. 735 (strauss, The Life of Jesus, p. 781). 80 see strauss, Das Leben Jesu, vol. 1, pp. 487–91 (strauss, The Life of Jesus, pp. 281–3). 81 For examples of this, see in Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur the following selections: david Friedrich strauss, “d.F. strauss: Jesu liv, kritisk bearbejdet,” vol. 4, 1836, pp. 80–221; august neander, “dr. neanders erklæring og Betænkning om dr. strauss’s Bog,” vol. 4, 1836, pp. 221–30; C. ullmann, “dr. strauss’s ‘Jesu liv’ bedømt,” vol. 4, 1836, pp. 447–90; C.h. weisse, “om det philosophiske grundlag for strauss’s ‘Jesu liv,’ ” vol. 5, 1837, pp. 88–106; august tholuck, “den evangeliske histories troværdighed, tillige en Kritik over strauss’s ‘Jesu liv,’ ” vol. 5, 1837, pp. 107–79; C.h. weisse, “om den evangeliske histories troværdighed,” [a review of tholuck’s writing], vol. 6, 1838, pp. 36–79. 82 according to the index of a. ibsen in Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker, 2nd ed., vol. 15, in addition to Kierkegaard’s notes on schaller’s exposition of strauss, strauss appears in three places in Kierkegaard’s writings: in a note in From the Papers of One Still Living (1838) in a quotation from hans Christian andersen: “there began in her the straussian evaporation of everything historical into myths” (SKS 1, 49 / EPW, 94); in an (indirect) reference to The Life of Jesus in The Concept of Irony (SKS 1, 113 / CI, 52); and in his complaint about being described in an article in Fædrelandet (1842) as being in the same category as “strauss, Feuerbach, vatke, Bruno Bauer …” (SV1 Xiii, 405 / COR, 10). 83 Julius schaller, Der historische Christus und die Philosophie. Kritik der Grundidee des Werks das Leben Jesu von Dr. D.F. Strauss, leipzig: otto wigand 1838 (ASKB 759). see Kierkegaard’s notes on this book in SKS 18, 318–37, KK:2 / KJN 2, 292–308. 84 david Friedrich strauss, Die christliche Glaubenlehre in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampfe mit der modernen Wissenschaft dargestellt, vols. 1–2, 78 79

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which Kierkegaard owned in a danish translation. the themes that strauss articulated in the “Concluding dissertation” of his Life of Jesus are presented again in this book.85 VI. Ferdinand Christian Baur and the Tübingen School At least in retrospect the most important figure in New Testament exegesis during the time of Kierkegaard was Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860), the scholar who spawned the so-called tübingen school. Baur developed the positions that made him famous—or notorious—only gradually. Baur began as a supranaturalist and a conservative; it was only after 1833 that the influence of Hegel had an impact upon him and became the determining factor in Baur’s interpretation of the earliest history of Christianity. apparently, Kierkegaard seems to have been acquainted with Baur only through some of his books that did not directly focus on the new testament.86 Baur’s role in the origin of the Tübingen School is first visible in his treatise from 1831, “the Christ party in the Corinthian Community, the opposition between petrine and pauline Christianity in the most ancient Church, the apostle peter in rome.”87 this essay portrays a radical antagonism between paul and the judaizing adherents of peter who would not recognize paul as a genuine and legitimate apostle. Baur here detects a clash of interests between Christians of pagan origin and Jewish Christians. Baur later summarized his studies of paul in the two volumes of Paul, tübingen: osiander, 1840–41. For an extensive exposition of Kierkegaard’s indirect access to strauss through Julius schaller see george pattison, “d.F. strauss: Kierkegaard and radical demythologization,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 233–57. 85 david Friedrich strauss, Fremstilling af den christelige Troeslære i dens Udvikling og i dens Kamp med den moderne Videnskab, vol. 1–2, trans. by hans Brøchner, Copenhagen: h.C. Klein 1842–43, vol. 1, p. 174 (ASKB 803–804). 86 Kierkegaard owned three books by Ferdinand Christian Baur: Die christliche Gnosis oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie, tübingen: C.F. osiander 1835 (ASKB 421); Das Christliche des Platonismus, oder Socrates und Christus, tübingen: ludwig Friedrich Fues 1837 (ASKB 422); and Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung, tübingen: C.F. osiander 1838 (ASKB 423), none of which focused on the new testament. the two last-mentioned were excerpted in Ferdinand Christian Baur, “det Christelige i platonismen eller sokrates og Christus. en religionsphilosophisk undersøgelse,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, vol. 5, 1837, pp. 485–533 and in Ferdinand Christian Baur, “den christelige lære om Forsoningen i dens bibelske udvikling fra den ældste tid indtil den nyeste,” vol. 7, 1839, pp. 247–329. Das Christliche des Platonismus plays a role in Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony, where it is repeatedly quoted and made an object of parodying; cf. david d. possen, “F.C. Baur: on the similarity and dissimilarity between Jesus and socrates,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries. tome ii, Theology, pp. 23–38. see SKS 1, 75–7 / CI, 13–15. SKS 1, 93 / CI, 31– 2. SKS 1, 113 / CI, 52. SKS 1, 122 / CI, 62. SKS 1, 128 / CI, 69–70. SKS 1, 153–4 / CI, 99–100. 87 Ferdinand Christian Baur, “die Christuspartei in der korinthischen gemeinde, der gegensatz des petrinischen und paulinischen Christenthums in der ältesten Kirche, der apostel petrus in rom,” Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie, vol. 4, 1831, pp. 61 ff. (reprinted in Ausgewählte Werke in Einzelausgaben, vols. 1–5, ed. by Klaus scholder, stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: F. Frommann 1963–75, vol. 1, pp. 1–146.

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the Apostle of Jesus Christ: His Life and Activity, His Letters and His Teachings: a Contribution to a Critical History of Primitive Christianity in which he argued that only the four “big” letters of paul: romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and galatians were to be considered genuine.88 later Baur provided an account of his gospel criticism in Critical Studies of the Canonical Gospels, Their Relation to Each Other, Their Character and Origin in which he maintained that the gospel of John cannot be used as a source for the life of Jesus.89 originally, Baur had been in agreement with schleiermacher in considering the gospel of John to be of equal worth with the synoptic gospels in this respect. inspired by hegel’s speculative perception of history, Baur made use of “tendency criticism,” the attempt to identify the basic purpose and point of view of each biblical book, in order to situate the various new testament authors in relation to each other. in his view of the dialectical development of the new testament writings, the thesis was that the original Jewish Christianity was represented in the revelation of the apostle John. the antithesis was the “pagan” Christianity represented by the four “big” letters of paul. the synthesis from the Jewish Christian perspective was found in the letter of James, while from the pauline perspective it was present in the “small” pauline letters, the letter to the hebrews, the pastorals, and 1 peter. the gospel of John is to be located at the point of transition to the Catholic tradition. the decisive advance in Baur’s construction, a proposal whose particular points can be and have been contested, is the suggestion that the various new testament theologies are not to be regarded as separate phenomena but are to be perceived as stations in an ongoing process of essential change. Most significantly, the religion of Jesus was transformed into a theology in which the significance of his teaching is rooted in the circumstance that it is his teaching. Jesus never himself made his person the direct object of his teaching. Jesus’ teaching depended on its inherent truth rather than on the authority of his person. as Baur later on summarized his position: he has only come in order, by the moral demands he made on men, to introduce “the kingship of god,” to invite them to enter it, and thereby to open it. the “gospel” as such, the proclamation of the “kingship of god” as a morally religious community based on the teaching of Jesus, is here all that counts. From the standpoint of the apostle, on the other hand, the actual center of gravity of the Christian consciousness, the basis on which everything rests, is not the teaching of Jesus but his person, the central question does not concern what Jesus taught, in order by his teaching to lead men to blessedness, but what he did and suffered to become their redeemer. in this way, then, the simple moral content of Jesus’ teaching first became a doctrine that had been formulated and developed by theology. the main facts of the history of Jesus, his death, his resurrection, his ascension, and his celestial activity, are the content in similar fashion as many dogmas to which, as to the substantial elements, all else has been subjoined.90 Ferdinand Christian Baur, Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi. Sein Leben und Wirken, seine Briefe und seine Lehre. Ein Beitrag zu einer kritischen Geschichte des Urchristenthums, stuttgart: Becher and müller 1845. 89 Ferdinand Christian Baur, Kritische Untersuchungen über die kanonischen Evangelien, ihr Verhältnis zu einander, ihren Charakter und Ursprung, tübingen: l.F. Fues 1847. 90 Ferdinand Christian Baur, Vorlesungen über neutestamentliche Theologie, ed. by Ferdinand Friedrich Baur, leipzig: l.w. reisland 1864, pp. 123–4 (reprinted as Vorlesungen 88

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VII. Settlement of the Mutual Relationship of the Gospels: The Triumphal Progress of the Markan Hypothesis the same period also witnessed essential changes in the perception of the gospels as sources for the reconstruction of the historical Jesus. until then the dominant view had been that the Four gospels were independent witnesses. in the last decades of the eighteenth century, however, the question about the mutual relationship of the gospels again was raised.91 Before this, augustine had been practically alone in advocating the view that a literary relation existed between the gospels. according to augustine, the gospels had been written in the order in which they appear in the new testament and the authors of the later gospels had known the writings of their predecessor(s) (see augustine, De consensus evangelistarum, i). to be sure, a series of hypotheses had been proposed by scholars that did not presuppose any literary relationship. these theories included the primal gospel hypothesis that explained the synoptic parallels by positing the common use of an earlier aramaic writing (lessing, eichhorn), the fragment or diegesis hypothesis that presumed the existence of written records dating from the time of Jesus (h.e.g. paulus, F. schleiermacher), and the tradition hypothesis that proposed the existence of an oral primal gospel (J.g. herder). a fourth view arose, the utilization hypothesis, which assumed a literary dependence of the later gospels on the earlier ones. this last-mentioned hypothesis soon replaced the others. until this time the understanding of the order of the gospels had been dominated by the assumption that the gospels of matthew and John had been written by eyewitnesses while the gospels of mark and luke had been produced by pupils of the apostles. at the end of the eighteenth century, however, the theory was proposed by Johann Benjamin Koppe (1750–91) and gottlob Christian storr (1746–1805) that the gospel of mark was the oldest gospel and had been one of the sources for both the gospel of matthew and the gospel of luke.92 in 1835 the scholar Karl lachmann (1793–1851) combined this hypothesis with the proposal that the author of the gospel of matthew had combined material from the gospel of mark with a collection of Jesus’ sayings.93 in 1838 Christian gottlob wilke (1786–1854)94 and Christian hermann weisse (1801–66)95 independently of one another reached the conclusion that the gospel of mark was the common source of the other and therefore later gospels über neutestamentliche Theologie, introduced by werner georg Kümmel, darmstadt: wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1973, pp. 123–4; quoted from Kümmel, The New Testament, p. 142, where the greek expressions in Baur’s orginal text are transcribed). 91 For further details with regard to this summary see Kümmel, The New Testament, pp. 74–88. 92 Johann Benjamin Koppe, Marcus non epitomator Matthei, göttingen: n.p. 1782; gottlob Christian storr, Über den Zwek der evangelischen Geschichte und der Briefe Johannis, tübingen: Jakob Friedrich heenbrandt 1786, pp. 249ff. 93 Karl lachmann, “de ordine narrationum in evangeliis synopticis,” Theologische Studien und Kritiken, vol. 8, 1835, pp. 570–90. 94 Christian gottlob wilke, Der Urevangelist, dresden and leipzig: g. Fleischer 1838, pp. 684ff. 95 Christian hermann weisse, Die evangelische Geschichte kritisch und philosophisch bearbeitet, vols 1–2, leipzig: Breitkopf and härtel 1838, vol. 1, pp. 83ff.

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of matthew and luke. weisse developed the further hypothesis that the gospels of matthew and luke had utilized another common source consisting of Jesus’ sayings in order to account for the material which these two later gospels shared and which they did not get from the gospel of mark.96 in this way he not only endorsed the socalled marcan hypothesis but also developed the so-called two-sources hypothesis. VIII. Contemporary Danish Contributions to Biblical Research punctuated by intervals when other subjects engaged him, søren Kierkegaard studied theology at the university of Copenhagen from 1830 until 1840 when he graduated. during this period the disciplines of old and new testament were not especially strong.97 matthias hagen hohlenberg (1797–1845), after having been privatdocent (1825), lecturer (1827), extraordinary professor (1828), at last became ordinary professor in the old testament in 1831. he succeeded the thorough rationalist Claus Frees hornemann (1751–1830) who at his death had been a professor at the university for 54 years. hohlenberg did not produce any substantial authorship but apparently represented a form of historical-philological exegesis. at his death he was succeeded by Christen hermansen (1806–82), from 1845 professor of semitic philology but from 1848 professor of old testament studies, who also did not publish much. in the discipline of new testament studies henrik nicolai Clausen (1793–1877) functioned as lecturer from 1821 and from 1822 to 1874 as professor, teaching both New Testament and dogmatics. In the field of exegesis he first published a synoptic overview of the Four gospels and later a Hermeneutics of the New Testament,98 a two-volume commentary on the synoptic gospels,99 and an interpretation of the gospel of John,100 books which Kierkegaard, except for the last one, had in his library. representing the so-called “theology of mediation,” Clausen avoided extreme positions. he maintained a distance from both theological conservatism and the radicalism of the tübingen school, polemicizing against the mythic interpretation of the new testament in both his Hermeneutics and in his commentary on the synoptic gospels. Kierkegaard’s utilization of Clausen’s Hermeneutics as a work of reference for the history of biblical interpretation can be seen in his journals. From 1834 to 1876 Carl emil scharling (1803–77) was also a professor of new testament studies, functioning side by side with h.n. Clausen. Before his assignment scharling had documented his exegetical interest in the treatise What is the Purpose, the Meaning, extracts from the relevant contribution of Christian hermann weisse were printed in translation as “den evangeliske historie, kritisk og philosophisk behandlet,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, vol. 1, no. 6, 1838, pp. 275–396. 97 Cf. leif grane, “det teologiske Fakultet 1830–1925,” in Københavns Universitet 1479–1979, vol. v, Det teologiske Fakultet, ed. by leif grane, Copenhagen: gad 1980, pp. 325–499. 98 henrik nicolai Clausen, Det nye Testaments Hermeneutik, Copenhagen: schultz 1840 (ASKB 468). 99 henrik nicolai Clausen, Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850 (ASKB 106–107). 100 henrik nicolai Clausen, Johannesevangeliet fortolket, Copenhagen: gad 1855. 96

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and the Results of the Theologians’ Scientific Investigations of the Writings of the New Testament?101 in his dissertation of 1831, scharling critically assessed F.C. Baur’s article about the Christ party in the Corinthian community, trying to discredit the claim that a strong antagonism existed between paul and the other apostles.102 Kierkegaard possessed a copy of both of these writings.103 this was not the case with scharling’s other exegetical contributions, commentaries on 2 Corinthians and the letters of James and Jude and treatments of questions related to the introduction to the new testament’s historical context. this became scharling’s main area of research as he engaged in an ongoing discussion with Baur concerning the tübingen school’s late dating of most new testament writings as well as its various claims about pseudepigraphy.104 Concerning other danish exegetical literature from the period, it must be noted that according to the auction protocol Kierkegaard did not own the commentary on romans by rasmus nielsen (1809–84).105 Nielsen first became significant in Kierkegaard’s life sometime in 1848, and became more important because of the “crisis” connected with the publishing of nielsen’s “big book,” The Evangelical Faith and Modern Consciousness. Lectures on the Life of Jesus, a sort of Kierkegaard-inspired refutation of strauss’ Life of Jesus.106 Kierkegaard felt that he had been misused by nielsen and not even duly credited.107 Kierkegaard did possess The Concept of Myth or the Form of the Religious Spirit by the probably best-known danish representative for the tübingen school, andreas Frederik Beck (1816–61).108 Carl emil scharling, Hvad er Hensigten, Betydningen og Resultaterne af Theologernes videnskabelige Undersøgelser om det Ny Testamentes Skrifter, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1833 (ASKB 105). 102 Carl emil scharling, De Paulo ejusque adversariis, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1836 (ASKB 761). 103 Kierkegaard also owned scharling’s large church history monograph, Michael de Molinos, et Billede fra det 17de Aarhundredes Kirkehistorie, Copenhagen: trykt hos Kgl. hofbogtrykker Bianco luno 1852 (ASKB 762). 104 this is the case with his rectory lecture on the occasion of the king’s birthday, september 18, 1843, Paastanden om den christelige Kirkes Ebionitisme gjennem de tvende förste Aarhundreder historisk og kritisk belyst, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1843, and one more university program from the following year, Commentatio, in qua quæritur, num quas res auctor Evangeliii Johannei memoriæ tradiderit, iis fidem et auctoritatem historicam vindicare voluerit, Copenhagen: seidelin 1844. Kierkegaard did not subscribe to the journal, Theologisk Tidsskrift, which scharling together with the church historian Christian thorning engelstoft (1805–89) started to publish in 1837 (from 1850 entitled Nyt theologisk Tidsskrift). 105 rasmus nielsen, Pauli Brev til Romerne, Copenhagen: eget Forlag 1841. 106 rasmus nielsen, Evangelietroen og den moderne Bevidsthed. Forelæsninger over Jesu Liv, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1849. 107 Kierkegaard possessed, however, nielsen’s dissertation, De speculativa historiae sacrae tractandae methodo, havniae: Fabritius de tengnagel 1840 (ASKB 697), but not the danish translation by B.g. Bøggild, Den speculative Methodes Anvendelse paa den hellige Historie, Copenhagen: h.C. Klein 1842. already in this early writing the former hegelian could criticize hegel. 108 andreas Frederik Beck, Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse Aands Form, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1842 (ASKB 424). 101

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IX. Kierkegaard’s Exegetical Library the nature of the books that were published by danish professors suggests that during Kierkegaard’s lifetime exegetical research at the university was predominantly concerned with questions related to the historical introduction to the new testament, including the age of the biblical writings, their provenience, the accuracy of traditional ascriptions of their authorship, and their general historical reliability. the manifest lack of danish outlines of biblical theology and hermeneutics (except for Clausen’s Hermeneutics from 1840) is probably reflected in Kierkegaard’s collection of exegetical literature. attention to the biblical writings in their original language is well attested by Kierkegaard’s ownership of a good selection of editions of hebrew and greek texts and a greater selection of translations (ASKB 1–33; 84; 86–88; 89–91) as well as relevant reference books (ASKB 34–79). however, Kierkegaard’s exegetical library contained few books on biblical theology, but rather consisted mainly of commentaries, older as well as newer ones. even these commentaries were not represented in impressive numbers.109 according to various remarks in his journals, Kierkegaard was not very fond of commentaries, to put it mildly (cf. below). only one biblical theological treatise is mentioned, Christ in the Old Testament. Investigations in the Messianic Sayings by Johann arnold Kanne (1773–1824), a romantic orientalist from erlangen.110 however, Kierkegaard’s exposure to biblical theology could have been supplemented with the content of the journal Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, which h.n. Clausen and m.h. hohlenberg started to publish in 1833 and to which Kierkegaard subscribed.111 among the older category belongs John Calvin’s commentaries on the whole of the new testament, Johannis Calvini Commentarii in novum testamentum, 7 parts in vols. 1–4, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: g. eichler 1833–34 (ASKB 92–95); among the newer ones— besides those already mentioned by de wette and lücke—belong the conservative hermann olshausen (1760–1839), Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–40 (ASKB 96–100), which includes an extra copy of the part containing romans and 1 and 2 Corinthians; hermann olshausen, Die Briefe Pauli an die Römer und Korinthier, Königsberg: unzer 1837 (ASKB 103); the likewise conservative Friedrich august gotttreu tholuck (1799–1877), Auslegung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer, 3rd ed., Berlin: Ferdinand dümmler 1831 (ASKB 102); and Christian Billroth, Commentar zu den Briefen des Paulus an die Corinthier, leipzig: weidmann 1833 (ASKB 104) which Kierkegaard may have noticed through the translated extracts in C. Billroth, “Commentar over pauli Breve til Korinthierne: af Fortalen samt 1. Kor. ii, 10–16; Xv, 12–51,” Tidsskrift for udenlandsk theologisk Litteratur, vol. 3, 1835, pp. 389–96 and pp. 477–512. the only old testament commentary in Kierkegaard’s library is ernst Friedrich Karl rosenmüller (1768–1835), Scholia in Pentateuchum, leipzig: sumptiibus J.a. Barth 1828 (ASKB 85). 110 Johann arnold Kanne, Christus im Alten Testament. Untersuchungen über die Messianischen Stellen, vols. 1–2, nürnberg: riegel und wiessner 1818 (ASKB 590–591). 111 That the “Kierkegaard, stud. theol.” in the list of subscribers for the first volume is in fact Søren Kierkegaard is confirmed by the change to “cand.theol.” for volume 8 (1848). while the volumes up to 1850 contain many and extensive exegetical contributions— as we have seen not least those pertaining to the strauss-debate—there is practically nothing in the following volumes up to 1855. only a few contributions have been adduced 109

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X. Preliminary Summary historical-critical Bible research in the days of Kierkegaard had taken decisive steps forward in the direction of a historical understanding of the Bible. this approach situated the biblical texts in past cultures with conceptual worlds that were decidedly different from those of modern times. moreover, this research had made it clear that the Bible in general and the new testament in particular were the products of theological reflection that developed in the various scriptural writings and continued beyond the borders established by canon. usually the heritage of the enlightenment influenced this research. In the spirit of the Enlightenment scholars thought that it was possible to distinguish between the eternal core of a biblical text and the culturally conditioned form in which it was clothed. this could either appear as the differentiation of the simple teachings of Jesus from the dogmas about Jesus developed by paul and the other apostles, or, as in the hegelian inspired speculation, as the theory of the idea’s progressive step-like development in history in which the identification of the full revelation of the Spirit with a single person is relegated to the world-view of a distant age. the expectation was that historical-critical research would uncover the historical foundation of Christianity which theology and faith could then be built upon. however, this strategy encouraged the perception that the biblical writings only express human theological opinions and concepts, a perspective that had difficulty in gaining a foothold. Lessing had pointed to the problem by asserting the unfitness of accidental historical truths to serve as proofs of the eternal truths of reason. lessing had found another source of authority, namely reason itself, of which Jesus was nothing more than an outstanding representative. the most pressing problem in the first part of the nineteenth century was to secure an authoritative role in theology for the apostolic testimony, particularly for the writings of paul. the problematic status of paul can be clearly seen in the circumstance that, partly as a reaction to strauss, the “life of Jesus” research became a dominant factor within much theology. it was assumed that faith had to be based on the rightly understood historical Jesus. XI. Kierkegaard’s Attitude how little or how much Kierkegaard was cognizant of this whole dramatic development in biblical research is difficult to determine. Besides purchasing books, Kierkegaard also borrowed them. But if a conclusion can be drawn from his book above in connection with the mention of the relevant authors or writings. other articles of interest for our topic because of their content or their author include: august neander, “Jesu Christi liv, fremstillet i dets historiske sammenhæng og udvikling,” vol. 5, 1837, pp. 591–661; d.F. strauss, “monolog om det Forgængelige og det Blivende i Christendommen,” [from Zwei friedliche Blätter], vol. 7, 1839, pp. 330–49; d.F. strauss, “den christelige troeslære i sin historiske udvikling og i Kamp med den moderne videnskab,” vol. 9, 1841, pp. 181–267; J.h.a. ebrard, “videnskabelig Kritik af den evangeliske historie,” vol. 12, 1844, pp. 637–701; g.F. oehler, “prolegomena til det gamle testamentes theologie,” vol. 13, 1845, pp. 452–99; F.C. Baur, “paulus, Jesu Kristi apostel,” vol. 14, 1846, pp. 317–434.

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collection and his various utterances in his published writings and in his journals, most of this research engaged him only peripherally. the whole relativization of the content of the Bible and the contextualization of its concepts in a past world which was a consequence of the historical-critical project did not play any role in Kierkegaard’s use of the Bible. nor did the prospect of a further development of revelation, an idea with which the historical-critical view was sometimes combined, attract him. viewed in this context he seems to have been remarkably unaffected by developments in contemporary biblical scholarship. it is, however, also possible to understand Kierkegaard’s attitude as his reaction to every attempt to make the decision of faith dependent on the results of historical inquiry. acknowledging lessing’s achievements and limitations in this matter, Kierkegaard demonstrated the hopelessness implicit in this process of approximation to historical certainty because of its unending nature. approximation can never produce the desired certainty because faith belongs to another category. Kierkegaard here operates with the concept of authority. the counterpart to the concept of authority is the free experience of faith, which one person may have through the encounter with the proclamation, while another person may not. this experience, however, cannot be forced and all external coercive power must be altogether excluded. the truth is first effective in the subjective appropriation of the proclamation. Historical knowledge cannot pretend to be a short-cut to faith. XII. The Relation to the Historical Exemplified in the Figure of Jesus in this context Kierkegaard, or more correctly, his pseudonyms, formulated the concept of the paradoxical character of revelation. this theme was articulated especially in Philosophical Fragments from 1844, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments from 1846, both published by the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, and Practice in Christianity from 1848, published by the pseudonym anti-Climacus. the preoccupation with lessing and his formulation of the problem is clearly seen in the motto to Philosophical Fragments: “Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal consciousness; how can such point of departure be of more than historical interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical knowledge?”112 Climacus clearly assumed that the divine is not directly recognizable. he observes, “the form of the servant was not something put on, and therefore he must expire in death and in turn leave the earth.”113 Later he clarifies the paradox even further, claiming that the servant form of the god is not something put on but is actual, not a parastatic but an actual body, and the god, from the hour when by the omnipotent resolution of his omnipotent love he became a servant, he has himself become captive, so to speak, in his resolution and is now obliged to continue (to go on talking loosely) whether he wants to or not.114 112 113 114

SKS 4, 213 / PF, 1. SKS 4, 240 / PF, 33–4. SKS 4, 258 / PF, 55.

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in this context Climacus develops his understanding of revelation as paradoxical. the paradox is that which thought cannot think but which thought also cannot refrain from passionately desiring to grapple with. the difference of the divine from everything else, however, cannot be grasped by thought because it lacks any distinctive marks. thus Climacus associates this principal, absolute difference, with its being unrecognizable. he writes: there exists [existere], then, a certain person who looks like any other human being, grows up as do other human beings, marries, has a job, takes tomorrow’s livelihood into account as a man should. it may be very beautiful to want to live as the birds of the air live, but it is not permissible, and one can indeed end up in the saddest of plights, either dying of hunger—if one has the endurance for that—or living off the goods of others. this human being is also god. how do i know that? well, i cannot know it, for in that case i would have to know the god and the difference, and i do not know the difference, inasmuch as the understanding has made it like unto that from which it differs. thus the god has become the most terrible deceiver through the understanding’s deception of itself. the understanding has the god as close as possible and yet just as far away.115

it was not an option for the god to send another in his place. the most he could do was to send one to draw attention to his coming. however, Climacus explains that this forerunner could not know anything about what the god was going to teach: because the god’s presence is not accidental to his teaching but essential. the presence of the god in human form—indeed, in the lowly form of a servant—is precisely the teaching, and the god himself must provide the condition…otherwise the learner is unable to understand anything.116

this is the crucial link in Climacus’ thinking. the teacher may be able to draw attention to himself, but everything that may draw attention to him cannot be anything but an occasion, socratically understood. it is, however, clear that a historical point of departure is an issue for the contemporary follower.…the contemporary follower, too, obtains a historical point of departure for his eternal consciousness, for he is indeed contemporary with the historical event that does not intend to be a moment of occasion, and this historical event intends to interest him otherwise than merely historically, intends to be the condition for his eternal happiness.117

the question of how the learner comes, not to understand, but to an understanding with this paradox, now receives the answer that it occurs when the understanding and the paradox happily encounter each other in the moment, when the understanding steps aside and the paradox gives itself, and the third something in which this occurs…is that happy passion….we shall call it faith. this passion, then, must be that abovementioned condition that the paradox provides.118 115 116 117 118

SKS 4, 250 / PF, 45–6. SKS 4, 258 / PF, 55–6. SKS 4, 261 / PF, 58. SKS 4, 262 / PF, 59.

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Therefore not even the most comprehensive knowledge is sufficient to enable an individual to become a follower. not even an eyewitness could base faith on directly obtained information about the teacher, “because in contrast to an eternal understanding of oneself, knowledge about the teacher is contingent and historical knowledge, a matter of memory. as long as the eternal and the historical remain apart from each other, the historical is only an occasion.”119 this does not mean that the follower loses all interest in the historical existence of the teacher. the object of faith is “the paradox—but the paradox specifically unites the contradictories, is the eternalizing of the historical and the historizing of the eternal.”120 this faith is not any sort of knowledge, because knowledge must either be of the eternal, dismissing temporal and historical matters as irrelevant, or of contingent historical matters. Knowledge cannot have as its object the absurd claim that the eternal is present in the historical. and because the teaching is not to be detached from the teacher, the follower has to remain in faith eternally concerned with the historical existence of the teacher. Climacus explains, “Faith, then, must constantly cling firmly to the teacher. But in order for the teacher to be able to give the condition, he must be the god, and in order to put the learner in possession of it, he must be man. this contradiction is in turn the object of faith and is the paradox, the moment.”121 For the follower, the external form of the teacher is indeed a matter of consequence, because it is the way that the follower has experienced the teacher. at the same time it is the case that the external form is not sufficient by itself, for the follower only is a follower because the god opened the follower’s eyes of faith. Because of this, faith also is a paradoxical phenomenon. Direct contemporaneity cannot suffice as a foundation for faith, because direct contemporaneity is only able of conveying historical knowledge. only the act of believing is essentially contemporary, namely, in “the autopsy of faith” (meaning the personal act of seeing). Climacus continues, “But in this autopsy every noncontemporary (in the sense of immediacy) is in turn a contemporary.”122 in the “appendix” to the “interlude” Climacus elaborates the theme that the assumption in Philosophical Fragments that “the god has been” is a historical fact only for faith. after the “interlude” the rest of the treatise is concerned with “the follower at second hand.” Climacus rejects the claim that there is a decisive difference between the contemporary and the later follower. he writes: the absolute fact is a historical fact and as such the object of faith. the historical aspect must indeed be accentuated, but not in such a way that it becomes absolutely decisive for individuals.…But the historical must not be removed, either, for then we have only an eternal fact. Just as the historical becomes the occasion for the contemporary to become a follower—by receiving the condition, please note, from the god himself (for otherwise we speak socratically)—so the report of the contemporaries becomes the occasion for everyone coming later to become a follower—by receiving the condition, please note, from the god himself.123 119 120 121 122 123

SKS 4, 262 / PF, 60. SKS 4, 263 / PF, 61. SKS 4, 264 / PF, 62. SKS 4, 270–1 / PF, 70. SKS 4, 297 / PF, 100.

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the presupposition of faith is that the god himself offers the condition, a conviction that implies that nobody is able to decide to have faith on the basis of the testimony of another person. Because what is going to be communicated can only be an object of faith, it is only possible to communicate it in the shape of faith. this prevents another individual from directly perceiving that which is communicated. Climacus explains that the contemporary cannot supply the condition to later believers, for then the later believers would need to believe in the power of contemporary. it is not at all possible to be a follower at second hand, for the genuine believer must see with the eyes of the believer’s own faith, and not through someone else’s eyes. thus there is a foundational difference between communicating what has happened historically and what an individual believes. Climacus writes: thus, if i say that this and this occurred, i speak historically; but if i say, “i believe and have believed that this happened, although it is foolishness to the understanding and an offense to the human heart,” i have in the very same moment done everything to prevent anyone else from making up his mind in immediate continuity with me and to decline all partnership, because every single person must conduct himself exactly the same way.124

thus it is true for Climacus that “the heart of the matter is the historical fact that the god has been in human form, and the other historical details are not even as important as they would be if the subject were a human being instead of the god.”125 accordingly, the often-quoted conclusion of Climacus is: even if the contemporary generation had not left anything behind except these words, “we have believed that in such and such a year the god appeared in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among us, and then died”—this is more than enough. the contemporary generation would have done what is needful, for this little announcement, this world-historical nota bene, is enough to become an occasion for someone who comes later, and the most prolix report can never in all eternity become more for the person who comes later.126

Climacus’ answer to the question posed in the opening of the book is: Christianity is the only historical phenomenon that despite the historical—indeed, precisely by means of the historical—has wanted to be the single individual’s point of departure for his eternal consciousness, has wanted to interest him otherwise than merely historically, has wanted to base his happiness on his relation to something historical.127

in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, also attributed to the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard further develops some of the themes outlined in the “project” in Philosophical Fragments. in part one, “the objective issue of the truth of Christianity,” Climacus distinguishes between historical truth and philosophical truth in a way that more or less approximates grundtvig’s distinction between true 124 125 126 127

SKS 4, 299 / PF, 102. SKS 4, 300 / PF, 103–4. SKS 4, 300 / PF, 104. SKS 4, 305 / PF, 109.

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Christianity and the truth of Christianity.128 while historical truth like all other empirical truth is to be discovered “by a critical consideration of the various reports etc.,” philosophical truth is a question of “the relation of a doctrine, historically given and verified, to the eternal truth.”129 For the inquiring subject it is the case “that with regard to the historical the greatest certainty is only an approximation, and an approximation is too little to build his happiness on and is so unlike an eternal happiness that no result can ensue.”130 this also applies to holy scripture. Climacus warns that “even with the most stupendous learning and perseverance, and even if the heads of all critics were mounted on a single neck, one would never arrive at anything more than an approximation, and that there is an essential misrelation between that and a personal, infinite interestedness in one’s own eternal happiness.”131 if an individual wants to secure himself historical-critically and to treat the issue of faith as an objective matter, he will lose himself in “in the parenthesis of his labor,”132 as Climacus characterizes the work preceding a decision concerning faith, but never will he transcend the “nearly but not quite” inconclusiveness of historical research. Continuing this argument, Climacus criticizes grundtvig’s “unparalleled discovery” that the church as a present entity implies that historical research cannot be of decisive importance for faith. Over against the definition of Christianity as what the church confesses in the Creed, Climacus objects that if the predicate “Christian” is to signify something more than the attributes of the contemporary church, then “predicated on the present Church, it designates pastness, consequently a historicity in quite the same sense as that of the Bible.”133 Consequently, the problem of the approximate character of historical knowledge arises again. Climacus writes: if the historical aspect of the Creed (that it is from the apostles etc.) is to be decisive, then every iota must be infinitely insisted upon, and since this can be attained only approximando [by approximation], the individual finds himself in the contradiction of tying, that is, wanting to tie his eternal happiness to it and not being able to do so because the approximation is never finished. From this it follows in turn that he will not manage in all eternity to tie his eternal happiness to it but will tie it to a less passionate something.134

in part two, “the subjective issue, the subjective individual’s relation to the truth of Christianity, or Becoming a Christian,” Climacus explicitly utilizes lessing. Climacus produces a nearly ten-page long laudatio of lessing, praising him for having seen that “the course of development of the religious subject has the peculiar quality that the pathway comes into existence for the single individual and closes 128 see especially nikolai Frederik severin grundtvig’s twin articles “om den sande Christendom” and “om Christendommens sandhed” from 1826–27, reissued as the book Om den sande Christendom og om Christendommens Sandhed, Copenhagen: Karl schønberg 1865. 129 SKS 7, 29 / CUP1, 21. 130 SKS 7, 30 / CUP1, 23. 131 SKS 7, 31 / CUP1, 24. 132 SKS 7, 35 / CUP1, 28. 133 SKS 7, 45 / CUP1, 39. 134 SKS 7, 49 / CUP1, 43.

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up behind him.” “and,” Climacus adds, “why should the deity not know how to maintain his price!”135 But with all due respect for lessing, Climacus laments the absence of any emphasis of “the dialectical issue whether it could be more than an occasion, which the historical report can also be.”136 Climacus also could not be reconciled with lessing’s “accidental historical truths” because historical truths can only be accidental. he also wanted to understand lessing this way because if this was not his opinion, then “lies here the entire misunderstanding that recurs time and again in modern philosophy: to make the eternal historical as a matter of course and to assume an inability to comprehend the necessity of the historical.”137 But in that case “the incommensurability between historical truth and the eternal decision” is obscured, for between the historical and the eternal a gap remains that can only be traversed by a leap.138 in “the halt” in Practice in Christianity the pseudonym anti-Climacus adduces similar points concerning the impossibility of comprehending Jesus’ identity on the basis of historical data. that could only be possible if Jesus’ incognito, the paradox, were removed. anti-Climacus asserts that Jesus Christ “is not and does not want to be for anyone the person one has to come to know something about incidentally from history (world history, history directly understood in contradistinction to sacred history) and nothing more than that, because we can learn nothing from history about him inasmuch as there is nothing at all that can be ‘known’ about him.”139 in line with this, anti-Climacus further claims that “with regard to a human being, it is true that the results of his life are more important than his life.”140 this is, however, not the case with Christ. if “we consider the results of his life, we then eo ipso make him into a human being, a human being who like other human beings must take his examination in history.”141 in this regard Christ is “un-historical” and thus absolute; it is this quality of absoluteness that makes possible the “contemporaneity with Christ.” anti-Climacus writes, “in relation to the absolute, there is only one time, the present; for the person who is not contemporary with the absolute, it does not exist at all. and since Christ is the absolute it is easy to see that in relation to him there is only one situation, the situation of contemporaneity.”142 XIII. Kierkegaard’s Failing Sense of Faith’s Transformation of the Historical Kierkegaard’s project, or more correctly the projects of Johannes Climacus and anti-Climacus, do not allow the testimony of the contemporary of Jesus to have any independent weight in the communication of any insight or interpretation of faith to SKS 7, 68 / CUP1, 67. SKS 7, 95 / CUP1, 97. 137 SKS 7, 96 / CUP1, 98. 138 ibid. 139 SKS 12, 38 / PC, 23. 140 SKS 12, 43 / PC, 29. 141 ibid.; see also the section “is the result of Christ’s life more important than his life?,” SKS 12, 45–6 / PC, 31–2. 142 SKS 12, 75 / PC, 63. 135 136

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another individual. For Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, the paradoxical dimension of revelation is bound to its content as a historical event that cannot be grasped purely historically. the god must offer the condition for understanding this as something different from and more than an ordinary historical event. the function of the historical as an occasion for faith obviously does not create any space for a historical process of faith’s interpretation, creative reception, or mythologizing of the story of Jesus. Kierkegaard feared that attaching significance to any such historical process of reception and interpretation of the story of Jesus would reduce the miracle to a historical event on a par with other such events. of course, Jesus’ own statements about himself must be regarded as direct communication, and not as the beginning of a process of historical interpretation. any appreciation of the conclusion of the developing discipline of exegetical and historical research that a distinction must be drawn between the teaching and preaching of the historical Jesus and its reworking in the apostolic preaching lies outside Kierkegaard’s horizon. similarly, he ignores contemporary efforts to reconstruct the individual theological perspectives and programs of the various gospel authors in their depictions of Jesus. in this regard grundtvig also ignored the boundary between the historical Jesus and the apostolic testimony to him. By relying upon faith’s interpretation of Christ, grundtvig allowed the theme of the continuity of the historical Jesus and the Christ of the apostolic tradition to totally drown any discontinuity. thus “the unparalleled discovery” of the primacy of the historic Christian community over scripture did not have liberating consequences, but, thanks to the principle of contradiction, became a binding power. essentially the result is the same in Kierkegaard’s work. For him any historical-critical effort to discover the likely origins of the Jesus traditions is theologically suspicious, for it is an attempt at an approximando to secure the historical basis of faith. the authority of proclamation is not based on the assumption that everything can be proven to be historically correct. in general, Kierkegaard did not support any historical relativization of the Bible. For instance, he did not want to encourage the notion that the authors of the gospels may have exercised independent creativity in their portrayals of Jesus. XIV. Kierkegaard’s Animosity toward Exegetical Research throughout his work Kierkegaard expresses an overt animosity toward exegetical research in general and professors in particular. he also expresses an outspoken intention to consider the Bible not only as an infallible revelation but also as infallible in itself.143 in a journal note from 1850 with the heading “Bible interpretation,” the following “principal rule” is articulated: 143 this is also the conclusion in the few other investigations of Kierkegaard’s use of scripture that have been done. see Jørgen pedersen, “søren Kierkegaards bibelsyn,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 23–55; iben damgaard, “Kierkegaard og Bibelen,” in Skriftsyn og metode, om den nytestamentlige hermeneutik, ed. by sigfred pedersen, Århus: aarhus university press 2007, pp. 170–94, see especially p. 172.

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above all, read the n.t. without a commentary. would it ever occur to a lover to read a letter from his beloved with a commentary! in connection with everything which qualitatively makes claim of having purely personal significance to me, a commentary is a most hazardous meddler. if the letter from the beloved were in a language i do not understand—well, then i learn the language—but i do not read the letter with the aid of commentaries by others. i read it, and since the thought of my beloved is vividly present and my purpose in everything is to will according to her will and wishes, i understand the letter all right. it is the same with the scriptures. with the help of god i understand it all right. every commentary detracts. he who can sit with ten open commentaries and read the holy scriptures—well, he probably is writing the eleventh, but he deals with the scriptures contra naturam.144

as if this passage were not clear enough, Kierkegaard adds in a marginal note: this is, while reading the letter you are occupied with yourself and your relation to the beloved, but you are not objectively occupied with the beloved’s letter, that this passage, for example, may be interpreted in ten ways—oh, no, the important thing for you is to begin to act as soon as possible. Besides, should it not mean something to be the lover, should it not give you what the commentators do not have? everyone is the best interpreter of his own words, it is said. and next comes the lover, and in relation to god the true believer. Pereat the commentators!145

throughout its pages the same volume contains numerous extreme caricatures of professors, who are said to devote themselves to learned questions and thereby deprive themselves of genuine understanding.146 Thus it is not surprising that we find a note with the heading “a new proof for the divinity of the Bible” without much trace of irony. scripture does not intend to be direct communication but through its many obvious imperfections it provides the ambiguity that faith requires: god surely knows what it is “to believe,” what it means to require faith, that it means the rejection of direct communication, the positing of an ambiguity. now we are getting to the point! precisely because god wants holy scripture to be the object of faith and an offense to any other point of view, for this reason there are carefully contrived discrepancies (which, after all, in eternity will be easily dissolved into harmonies), therefore it is written in bad greek etc., etc.147

the presupposition that “the historical” can only be an occasion for faith evidently erodes Kierkegaard’s interest in the verification of any historical details. However, to say that the holy scripture should be the object of faith necessarily seems to assume its historical trustworthiness as a source for the events recounted. But Kierkegaard was not interested in providing positive assurance about the historical detail. Certitude does not precede faith but emerges from it and is, in fact, an aspect of faith. 144 145 146 147

SKS 23, 151, nB16:84 / JP 1, 210. SKS 23, 151, nB16:84.a / JP 1, 211. SKS 23, 200–1, nB17:59 / JP 3, 3568. SKS 23, 301–2, nB18:72 / JP 3, 3571. SKS 23, 432–3, nB20:70 / JP 3, 2877.

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in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript Climacus speaks about “the dialectical” that should not be excluded from Christian faith. In fact, the infinite reflection, the subjectivity in which the individual worries about their own eternal blessedness, is recognizable by one feature, namely, “that it is everywhere accompanied by the dialectical.”148 the experience of scripture’s authority arises in this subjective appropriation of its paradoxical content. although this content can be presented in an objective manner through human testimony (through sermons, and the like), nevertheless it can only be understood through subjective appropriation. thus Kierkegaard is able to claim that the situation of contemporaneity with Christ essentially has no connection with physical contemporaneity with the historical Jesus. Because Christ meets the individual in the authoritative word no quantity of intervening centuries makes any difference. it has often been pointed out that Kierkegaard never thematizes Jesus’ resurrection as an event.149 however, it is exactly this “event” quality that asserts itself in every situation of contemporaneity. the fact that every moment possesses this capacity reinforces the theme of the unimportance of physical contemporaneity. Faith depends on what the eye of faith sees, not on what a reporter is able to report. in this context it is interesting that in the little treatise “on the difference between a genius and an apostle” written in 1847 and published as the second of Two Ethical-Religious Essays by h.h. in 1849, the apostle serves as a counterpoint to the genius. in contrasting the two, Kierkegaard treats the apostle paul as if he exercised an authority comparable with Christ’s authority. even if the authority is said to operate objectively, it is maintained through the apostle’s own statements about himself. the apostle’s statements about himself function in a manner similar to Jesus’ own statements about himself. thus, when it is said—even in italics—that “Authority is a specific quality that enters from somewhere else and qualitatively asserts itself precisely when the content of the statement or the act is made a matter of indifference esthetically,”150 then the authority in question is not rooted in any faith experience but is an authority maintained by the person speaking. it is as if a clergyman quotes a saying of Jesus and adds: these words are by the one to whom, according to his own statement, all power is given in heaven and on earth. You, my listener, must now in your own mind consider whether you will submit to this authority or not, accept and believe these words or not. But if you refuse, then for god’s sake do not accept the words because they are brilliant or profound or wondrously beautiful—because this is blasphemy, this is wanting to criticize god.151

here a tension may have developed in Kierkegaard’s thought, for the ascription of authority seems to be a function of the direct communication of the speaker rather than a function of the individual’s experience of faith. see the footnotes SKS 7, 41 / CUP1, 34–5. see also SKS 7, 31–2 / CUP1, 24. i owe Arne Grøn thanks for directing my attention to the significance of these utterances in this context. 149 surprisingly nobody seems to have treated this question at great length. 150 SKS 11, 102 / WA, 179. 151 SKS 11, 108 / WA, 185. 148

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XV. Conclusion Taking all this into account, it is difficult to deny that Kierkegaard treats the Bible as a closed universe in which questions of historical detail do not have any significance. he has no interest in the possibility that the various biblical writings, including the gospels, may be theological reworkings of traditions that do contain historical memories. To Kierkegaard Jesus is indiscriminately the figure—we would say, the figures—performing in the New Testament Gospels. Kierkegaard thereby avoids the historical-psychological orientation of the “life-of-Jesus” research. in order to do so he pays the price of dismissing the question of how the gospels came into existence. However, Kierkegaard’s reflections did contain the potential to combine the theme of the paradoxical character of revelation,152 with the concept of authority as being rooted in the experience of faith. in this way the two themes could have been related dialectically. this dialectic could have been combined with grundtvig’s “unparalleled discovery,” interpreted as meaning that the testimony of the believing community is the shape of faith which illuminates the historical memory and thereby creates a third: faith’s interpretation of that which is remembered. But instead we find in Kierkegaard—just as in Grundtvig—an unhistorical coincidence of history and revelation. Kierkegaard assumes that the old testament is not revelation, but can only function as such when the kernel is purged of the elements typical of its historical context. in general, as the holy writ of Judaism, it is the necessary presupposition for understanding the positive features in the new testament by way of contrast. read in the light of the new testament, the old testament acquires a different significance. Kierkegaard explains this hermeneutical issue in a journal note: This cannot be emphasized enough, because in Christendom one finds that almost all of the more pious errors are connected with elevating the old testament to the level of equality with the new testament, instead of the new testament always presupposing the old testament in order to make itself negatively recognizable. in this sense the new testament cannot be properly understood without the old, for the repulsion of offense is its dialectical sign and the mark of its spiritual elevation.153

Kierkegaard’s emphasis of revelation’s paradoxicality and his proposal about the sufficiency of the world-historical nota bene as an occasion for faith were obviously incommensurable with contemporary biblical scholarship. perhaps it could be concluded that Kierkegaard did not refute or transcend historical-critical scholarship, but he merely disregarded it. he did so, to be sure, by developing an understanding For older discussions of these issues see n.h. søe, “søren Kierkegaards lære om paradokset,” in Nordisk teologi. Ideer och män, Festskrift till Ragnar Bring, lund: gleerup 1955, pp. 102–21; hermann Fischer, Die Christologie des Paradoxes. Zur Herkunft und Bedeutung des Christusverständnisses Sören Kierkegaards, göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht 1970, and for a newer discussion see david James, “the absolute paradox: Kierkegaard’s argument against hegel’s account of the relation of Faith to philosophy,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 24, 2007, pp. 102–20. 153 SKS 25, 365, nB29:102 / JP 2, 2225. 152

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of the character of the biblical books as occasions for the faith of individuals. this alone was not really a response to the questions raised by biblical scholarship. However, Kierkegaard succeeded in drawing attention to a significant problem. The distinction that most of the contemporary biblical scholarship sought to maintain between the eternal and the temporal, and between true faith and superstition, made it difficult to maintain that the biblical texts are authoritative while treating them basically as human testimonies and thus as human interpretations.

Bibliography I. Works in the auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard’s Library Relevant for Contemporary Biblical Scholarship Bauer, Bruno, “der mosaische ursprung der gesetzgebung des pentateuch,” Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vols. 1–3, ed. by Bruno Bauer, Berlin: dümmler 1836–38, vol. 1, no. 1, 1836, pp. 140–81 (ASKB 354–357). —— “der alt-testamentliche hintergrund im evangelium des Johannes,” Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vol. 1, no. 2, 1836, pp. 158–204. —— “die neueren Commentare zu den psalmen,” Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vol. 2, no. 1, 1837, pp. 217–52. —— “die prinzipien der mosaischen rechts- und religions-verfassung nach ihrem inneren zusammenhangen entwickelt,” Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vol. 2, no. 2, 1837, pp. 297–353. —— “der Begriff der göttichen gerechtigkeit im zweiten theil des Jesaias,” Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vol. 2, no. 2, 1837, pp. 78–487. —— “die urgeschichte der menschheit nach dem biblischen Berichte der genesis, kritisch untersucht,” Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vol. 3, no. 1, 1837, pp. 125–210. —— “apologetisches und Kritisches zum biblischen Bericht urgeschichte der menschheit,” Zeitschrift für spekulative Theologie, vol. 3, no. 2, 1838, pp. 435– 54. Baur, Ferdinand Christian, Das Christliche des Platonismus, oder Socrates und Christus, tübingen: ludwig Friedrich Fues 1837 (ASKB 422). Beck, andreas Frederik, Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse Aands Form, Copenhagen: p.g. philipsen 1842 (ASKB 424). Billroth, Christian, Commentar zu den Briefen des Paulus an die Corinthier, leipzig: weidmann 1833 (ASKB 104). [Calvin, John], Ioannis Calvini in novum testamentum commentarii, vols. 1–7, ed. by august tholuck, Berlin: g. eichler 1833–34 (ASKB 92–95). Clausen, henrik nicolai, Det Nye Testaments Hermeneutik, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1840 (ASKB 468). —— Fortolkning af de synoptiske Evangelier, vols. 1–2, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1850 (ASKB 106–107). ernesti, Johann august, Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti, leipzig: weidmann 1765. hase, Karl, Das Leben Jesu. Ein Lehrbuch zunächst für akademische Vorlesungen, leipzig: Johann Friedrich leich 1829 (ASKB a i 37 and ASKB u 51).

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lücke, Friedrich, Commentar über die Briefe des Evangelisten Johannes, 2nd ed., Bonn: eduard weber 1836 (ASKB 110). olshausen, hermann, Biblischer Commentar über sämmtliche Schriften des Neuen Testaments, vols. 1–4, 3rd ed., Königsberg: unzer 1837–40 (ASKB 96–100). —— Die Briefe Pauli an die Römer und Korinthier, Königsberg: august wilhelm unzer 1837 (ASKB 103). rosenmüller, ernst Friedrich Karl, Scholia in Pentateuchum, leipzig: J.a. Barth 1828 (ASKB 85). scharling, Carl emil, De Paulo ejusque adversariis, Copenhagen: J.h. schultz 1836 (ASKB 105). —— Hvad er Hensigten, Betydningen og Resultaterne af Theologernes videnskabelige Undersøgelser om det Ny Testamentes Skrifter, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1833 (ASKB 761). schleiermacher, Frederich daniel ernst, Der christliche Glaube, vols. 1–2, 3rd ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1835 (ASKB 258). —— Über die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, 3rd ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1821 (ASKB a i 40); —— Ueber die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern, 5th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1843 (ASKB 271). tholuck, Friedrich august gotttreu, Auslegung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer, 3rd ed., Berlin: Ferdinand dümmler 1831 (ASKB 102). wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de, Lehrbuch der historisch-kritischen Einleitung in die Bibel Alten and Neuen Testamentes, vols. 1–2 in 1 tome, 4th ed., Berlin: g. reimer 1833, vol. 2 (ASKB 80). —— Kurze Erklärung der Evangelien des Lukas und Markus, leipzig: weidmann 1836 (ASKB 108). —— Kurze Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte, leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 111). —— Kurze Erklärung des Briefes an die Römer, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 112). —— Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums Matthäi, 2nd ed., leipzig: weidmann 1838 (ASKB 109). —— Lehrbuch der hebräisch-jüdischen Archäologie, 3rd ed., leipzig 1842 (ASKB 872). II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Relation to Contemporary Biblical Scholarship damgaard, iben, “Kierkegaard og Bibelen,” in Skriftsyn og metode, om den nytestamentlige hermeneutik, ed. by sigfred pedersen, aarhus: aarhus university press 2007, pp. 170–94. engelke, matthias, Kierkegaard und das Alte Testament. Zum Einfluß der alttestamentlichen Bücher auf Kierkegaards Gesamtwerk, rheinbach: Cmzverlag 1998, pp. 66–79.

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Fishburn, Janet, “søren Kierkegaard: exegete,” Interpretation, vol. 39, 1985, pp. 229–45. Fischer, hermann, Die Christologie des Paradoxes. Zur Herkunft und Bedeutung des Christusverständnisses Sören Kierkegaards, göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht 1970. Kirmmse, Bruce h., Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, Bloomington, indiana: indiana university press 1990, pp. 38–44; pp. 119–24; pp. 169–238. pattison, george, “d.F. strauss: Kierkegaard and radical demythologization,” in Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 233–57. pedersen, Jørgen, “søren Kierkegaard’s view of scripture,” ed. by niels thulstrup and marie mikulová thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.a. reitzel 1974 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9), pp. 23–55. pons, Jolita, Stealing a Gift: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms and the Bible, new York: Fordham university press 2004, pp. 50–68. possen, david d., “F.C. Baur: on the similarity and dissimilarity between Jesus and socrates,” Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries, tome ii, Theology, ed. by Jon stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 23–38.

index of persons

abelard, peter (1079–1142), French theologian and logician, 157. abraham, 10, 190, 196, 249, 261. adam, 10, 249. anna, 3–14, 44, 181. annet, peter (1693–1769), english deist, 170, 191. andrew, 79, 80. anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), scholastic philosopher, 153, 157. aquinas, thomas (ca. 1225–74), scholastic philosopher and theologian, 17, 36. aristotle, 241, 291. augustine of hippo (354–430), church father, 34, 36, 227, 309. Barth, Karl (1886–1968), swiss protestant theologian, 251. Barton, John, 250, 251. Bathsheba, 243. Bauckham, richard, 250. Bauer, Bruno (1809–82), german theologian, philosopher and historian, 251, 258. Bauer, georg lorenz (1755–1806), german protestant theologian, 172, 192, 296, 297, 302. Baur, Ferdinand Christian (1792–1860), german theologian, 35, 143, 172, 173, 193, 211, 240, 251, 307, 308, 311. Beck, andreas Frederik (1816–61), danish theologian, 240, 311. Beza, theodor (1519–1605), French protestant theologian, 226.

Bretschneider, Karl gottlieb (1776–1848), german protestant theologian, 143, 151, 225, 228–31. Bugenhagen, Johannes (1485–1558), german protestant reformer, 3. Bultmann, rudolf (1884–1976), german protestant theologian, 251. Calvin, John (1509–64), French protestant theologian, 4–6, 10, 11, 13, 34, 38, 39, 126. Castellio, sebastian (1515–63), French preacher and theologian, 226. Christ, 3–8, 11, 17–30, 33–50, 75, 76, 79–90 passim, 93–6 passim, 98–101, 102, 103, 107, 110–13, 116, 118, 125–35 passim, 139–47 passim, 151–65, 169–85, 191–7 passim, 199–205 passim, 210, 215, 232, 240–4, 251–7 passim, 263–70 passim, 274–9 passim, 287–93 passim, 297–324 passim. Chrysostom, saint John (ca. 345–407), church father, 34. Clausen, henrik nicolai (1793–1877), danish theologian and politician, 6, 7, 41, 152, 195, 221, 223, 239, 240, 258–60, 264, 310, 312. david, 118, 243. eichhorn, Johann gottfried (1752–1827), german protestant theologian and orientalist, 34, 192, 210, 295, 296, 309. engelstoft, Christian thorning (1805–89), danish theologian, 224.

330

Kierkegaard and the Bible

erasmus of rotterdam, i.e., desiderius erasmus roterodamus (1466/69– 1536), dutch humanist, 226, 254–7. ernesti, Johann august (1707–81), german protestant theologian, 228, 302. Ferreira, Jamie, 190, 200. Feuerbach, ludwig (1804–72), german philosopher, 241. Fishburn, Janet Forsythe, 190, 204. Francke, august hermann (1663–1727), german protestant theologian, 193. Frei, hans (1922–88), 251, 275. gabler, Johann philipp (1753–1826), german protestant theologian, 294–7. gadamer, hans-georg (1900–2002), german philosopher, 252. goethe, Johann wolfgang von (1749–1832), german poet, author, scientist and diplomat, 174. goeze, Johann melchior (1717–86), german protestant theologian, 173, 291. gouwens, david, 190. grotius, hugo (1583–1645), dutch jurist, 142. grundtvig, nikolai Frederik severin (1783–1872), danish poet and theologian, 259, 264, 286, 291, 317, 318, 320, 323. hamann, Johann georg (1730–88), german philosopher, 96. hase, Karl (1800–90), danish theologian, 304. hegel, georg wilhelm Friedrich (1770– 1831), german philosopher, 251, 258, 264, 305, 307, 308, 312. heidegger, martin (1889–1976), german philosopher, 56. hengstenberg, ernst william (1802–69), german protestant theologian, 143.

herder, Johann gottfried (1744–1803), german philosopher, 5, 34, 171, 193, 201, 211, 293, 295, 309. hermansen, Christen (1806–82), danish theologian, 310. heyne, Christian gottlieb (1729–1812), german classical philologist, 295. hohlenberg, matthias hagen (1797–1845), danish theologian, 310, 312. hornemann, Claus Frees (1751–1830), danish theologian, 310. hume, david (1711–76), scottish philosopher, 17. isaac, 249, 261. James, 79, 80, 277. Jerome (347–420), 226, 292. Jesus, see “Christ.” Job, 81, 249. John, 79, 80, 139–47, 297. John the Baptist, 18, 22. Joseph, 3, 5, 11. Kanne, Johann arnold (1773–1824), german historian, 312. Kant, immanuel (1724–1804), german philosopher, 251, 286, 305. Kierkegaard, søren aabye (1813–1855), From the Papers of One Still Living (1838), 285. The Concept of Irony (1841), 173, 182, 183. Either/Or (1843), 244, 249, 256, 260, 262. Repetition (1843), 249. Fear and Trembling (1843), 10, 11, 97, 98, 109, 190, 196, 249, 261, 268. Two Upbuilding Discourses (1843), 8. Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843), 42, 46, 124, 126, 198. Four Upbuilding Discourses (1843), 8, 44, 127, 213. Two Upbuilding Discourses (1844), 7, 8, 11–14 passim, 44.

Index of Persons Three Upbuilding Discourses (1844), 200. Four Upbuilding Discourses (1844), 334, 139, 140. Philosophical Fragments (1844), 19, 29, 126, 132, 162, 249, 263, 265, 314–17. The Concept of Anxiety (1844), 42, 114, 146, 174, 182, 249. Stages on Life’s Way (1845), 126, 249. Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), 20, 21, 46, 47, 110, 117, 129, 173, 237, 249, 259, 263, 265, 269, 314, 317–19, 322. The Book on Adler (ca. 1846–47), 190, 205. Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (1847), 7, 43, 49, 62, 129, 139, 141, 158, 177, Works of Love (1847), 30, 99, 116, 131, 139, 141, 142, 144, 153, 154, 158, 189, 190, 199–202, 212, 213, 237, 238, 274. Christian Discourses (1848), 43–5, 80, 99, 126, 154–6, 160, 164, 175, 178, 199, 212. The Sickness unto Death (1849), 19, 47, 139, 144, 146, 147, 152, 249, 262. Two Ethical-Religious Essays (1849), 180, 196, 197, 322. The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air: Three Devotional Discourses (1849), 156. Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays (1849), 18, 128, 133, 134. Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays (1849), 101, 108, 113, 124, 128, 130, 145, 146. An Upbuilding Discourse (1850), 7, 124, 128, 131, 133. Practice in Christianity (1850), 21, 22, 25, 28, 30, 45, 47, 72, 82, 97, 110, 124, 127, 128, 133, 134, 153, 158–64 passim, 179, 237, 249, 263, 266, 267, 274, 314.

331

For Self-Examination (1851), 48, 49, 128, 134, 155–60 passim, 163, 193, 213, 215, 249, 269–75 passim. Two Discourses (1851), 130. Judge for Yourself! (1851–52, published posthumously in 1876), 8, 117, 159, 161, 163, 164. The Moment (1855), 46, 48, 176. The Changelessness of God (1855), 47. Journals, notebooks, Nachlaß, 7, 8, 20, 21, 25, 28, 30, 42, 44, 83, 101, 109–11, 114–16, 123, 139, 144, 145, 151–7 passim, 176, 183, 221–34, 237, 241, 242, 270, 272, 278, 310, 311, 320, 321. Kivelä, Jyrki, 18. Knapp, georg Christian (1753–1825), german protestant theologian, 225, 229, 234. Kolthoff, ernst vilhelm (1809–90), danish theologian, 224. Koppe, Johann Benjamin (1750–91), german protestant theologian, 309. lachmann, Karl (1793–1851), german philologist, 309. lazarus (the resurrected), 19, 139–47, 142–7, 175–7, 299, 304. lazarus (the beggar), 139–42, 147. leibniz, Baron gottfried wilhelm von (1646–1716), german philosopher and mathematician, 258. lessing, gotthold ephraim (1729–81), german writer and philosopher, 21, 23, 93, 171, 173, 251, 257, 258, 288–93 passim, 296, 303, 309, 312, 314, 318, 319. lippitt, John, 261. lücke, Friedrich (1791–1855), german protestant theologian, 144, 152, 302, 303. luther, martin (1483–1546), german religious reformer, 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 36–40 passim, 43–50 passim,

332

Kierkegaard and the Bible 102, 118, 158, 203, 204, 210–14 passim, 255, 256, 269, 275, 276.

marheineke, philipp (1780–1846), german theologian, 173. martensen, hans lassen (1808–84), danish theologian, 173, 192, 258. martens, paul, 190, 199. martha, 19, 139. mary, 3–8 passim, 11, 139. mary magdalene, 126, 170. melanchthon, philipp (1497–1560), german theologian, 38, 40. michaelis, Johann david (1717–91), german biblical scholar, 170, 192, 211, 287. minear, paul (1896–2007), 108, 109. morgan, thomas (d. 1743), english deist, 191. møller, Jens (1779–1833), 227. morimoto, paul, 108, 109. moses, 37, 43, 45, 103, 227, 228. nathan, 243. neander, Johann august wilhelm (1789–1850), german protestant theologian, 42, 111, 144, 172, 173, 194, 195, 211. nielsen, michael (1776–1846), principal of the Borgerdyd school, 223. nielsen, rasmus (1809–84), danish philosopher, 311. nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900), german philosopher, 63, 70. noah, 7. olsen, regine (1822–1904), 129, 205, 261. olshausen, hermann (1796–1839), german protestant theologian, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 35–50 passim, 93, 99, 111, 125, 126, 140, 143, 152, 173, 185, 194, 195, 213. origen (ca. 185–ca. 254), church father, 239.

pattison, george, 190, 240. paul, 5, 6, 38, 39, 140, 189–205, 210, 211, 215, 257, 276, 277, 292, 293, 299, 307, 308, 312, 322. paulus, heinrich eberhard gottlob (1761–1851), german protestant theologian, 143, 171, 303, 304, 309. peter, 79–90, 110, 154, 157, 191, 193, 211, 233, 256, 296, 307. pilate, 154, 155, 161, 162. plato, 182, 183. polk, timothy, 189, 251, 253, 260, 263, 266, 267. pons, Jolita, 252, 253, 260, 261. pyper, hugh, 259. ranke, leopold von (1795–1886), german historian, 278. reimarus, hermann samuel (1694–1768), german philosopher, 170, 173, 191, 257, 288–90, 292, 303. ricoeur, paul (1913–2005), French philosopher, 252, 262. rosas, l. Joseph, 189, 198. rückert, leopold immanuel (1797–1871), german protestant theologian, 195. sandelin, Kalle (1893–1983; after 1936 under the name Kalle sorainen), Finnish Kierkegaard scholar, 226. sarah, 229. schaller, Julius (1810–68), german philosopher, 41, 173, 306. scharling, Carl emil (1803–77), danish theologian, 195, 212, 224, 240, 310, 311. schleiermacher, Friedrich (1768–1834), german theologian, 5, 6, 34, 40, 111, 125, 143, 172, 173, 194, 239, 251, 258, 259, 298, 299, 305, 308, 309. schweitzer, albert (1875–1965), Francogerman physician and theologian, 289, 290.

Index of Persons semler, Johann salomo (1725–91), german protestant theologian, 171, 191, 192, 286, 287, 290, 294–6. shakespeare, william (1564–1616), english dramatist, 174. simeon, 3–14. socrates, 183, 266. solomon, 141. sorainen, Kalle, see “sandelin, Kalle.” spener, philipp Jacob (1635–1705). german protestant theologian, 192. spinoza, Baruch (1632–77), dutch philosopher, 258. steiner, george, 278. storr, gottlob Christian (1746–1805), german protestant theologian, 309. strauss, david Friedrich (1808–74), german theologian, historian and philosopher, 35, 39, 41, 45, 143, 172, 173, 240, 241, 251, 258, 290, 304–7, 311, 312. tholuck, Friedrich august gotttreu (1799–1877), german theologian, 34, 42, 195, 200. usteri, leonhard (1799–1833), swiss protestant theologian, 195, 301.

333

watkin, Julia (1944–2005), British Kierkegaard scholar, 135. weisse, Christian hermann (1801–66), german protestant theologian, 309. werner, Friedrich ludwig zacharias (1768– 1823), german poet and preacher, 109, 110, 176. westphal, merold, 146. wette, wilhelm martin leberecht de (1780–1849), german theologian, 5, 6, 10, 35, 39, 41, 45, 140, 143, 152, 172, 173, 185, 194, 195, 210, 212, 239, 299, 300, 301. wilke, Christian gottlob (1786–1854), german protestant theologian, 309. winer, georg Benedict (1789–1858), german protestant theologian, 212. wittgenstein, ludwig (1889–1951), austrian-British philosopher, 275. wolff, Christian (1679–1754), german philosopher, 170, 286, 288. woolston, thomas (1669–1733), english skeptic, 170, 289. zacchaeus, 109, 110. zwingli, huldreich (1484–1531), swiss protestant reformer, 38, 40.

index of subjects

abasement, 75, 159, 160, 164, 179. absurd, the, 18, 23, 24, 26, 29–30, 109, 268. aesthetics, 61, 62. anabaptism, 36, 38. anxiety, 66, 141, 144, 146, 182. appropriation, 108, 114, 120, 156, 157, 244, 256, 262, 267, 269–74, 275, 285, 322. approximation, 264, 292, 314, 317. ascension, 18, 22, 308. atonement, 85, 133, 134, 144, 145, 151–7 passim, 164, 289, 301. authority, 30, 35, 50, 65, 72, 103, 110, 129, 180, 190-8 passim, 205, 252, 261, 301, 308, 313, 314, 320-3. autonomy, 58. baptism, 176. Beatitudes, the, 33, 36, 37, 39, 42–5. Bible, old testament, genesis, 7, 261, 274, 296, exodus, 231, 288, leviticus, 5. samuel, 231, 243. Kings, 141. psalms, 118, 233. ecclesiastes, 278. isaiah, 116. daniel, 289. new testament, matthew, 5, 11, 12, 20-4 passim, 27, 28, 33–50, 55–76, 95, 96, 103, 107, 110, 113, 124, 141, 153–64 passim, 169, 175–81 passim, 238, 268, 292, 293, 309, 310.

mark, 28, 124, 152, 156–64 passim, 169, 182, 292, 293, 309. luke, 3–7, 10, 11, 13, 22, 27, 28, 33–5, 42, 55–76, 94, 98, 100-2, 107–16 passim, 119, 123–35, 139, 152–64 passim, 169, 180, 182, 238, 243, 249, 292, 293, 299, 309, 310. John, 19–21, 26, 93, 99, 139, 152, 154, 155, 158–64 passim, 169, 174–7, 182, 191, 194, 255, 276, 292, 293, 299, 300, 304, 305, 308–10. acts, 175, 181, 191, 223, 227, 229, 233, 259, 260, 296, 299, 300. romans, 192, 195, 201, 202, 203, 238, 255, 276, 308, 311. Corinthians, 140, 154, 160, 189, 190, 192, 195, 198, 200-2, 308, 311. galatians, 174, 190, 204, 212, 224, 255, 308. ephesians, 6, 183, 195, 197, 224, 255. philippians, 163, 178, 180, 223, 224, 230, 234. Colossians, 223, 224, 229, 232. thessalonians, 223, 224, 229, 230. timothy, 223, 224, 229, 230, 232, 234, 299. titus, 223, 224, 230, 231. philemon, 223, 224. hebrews, 113, 192, 194, 223, 224, 229–32, 234, 238, 255, 299, 300, 308. James, 189, 190, 193, 194, 196, 201, 209–15, 223, 224, 231, 237,

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255, 256, 269, 270, 273, 300, 308, 311. 1 peter, 124, 189, 190, 212, 237, 255, 300, 308. 2 peter, 212, 255, 300. 1 John, 255, 300, 303. 2 John, 300, 303. 3 John, 255, 300, 303. Jude, 212, 255, 300, 311. revelation, 178, 255, 300, 308. blood witnesses, 163. Borgerdyd school, 222. catharsis, 25. Catholicism, 259. Christendom, 21, 48, 79, 80, 83, 84, 95, 96, 97, 108, 111, 120, 181, 203, 210, 214, 215, 237, 241, 243, 272, 276, 277. Christology, 113, 293, 305. Classicism, 193. communication, direct, 22, 25, 108, 320-2. indirect, 25–9, 108, 114–20 passim, 190, 237–45. contemporaneity, 316, 319, 322. crowd, 241. crucifixion, 6, 20, 30, 80, 84, 86, 151–65, 180, 289. death, 4, 84, 85, 135, 139–47 passim, 152–4, 158, 159, 163, 175, 176, 181. defiance, 103. deism, 286, 288, 290. despair, 9, 13, 74, 87, 116, 146, 147, 175. devil, 38. double-mindedness, 108, 111, 116, 213. doubt, 8, 20, 49, 79, 80, 82, 90, 257, 261. enlightenment, 170, 256, 257, 286, 296, 313. established order, 110. eternal happiness, 21, 178, 181, 200–2, 264, 265, 315, 318. eternal life, 176.

eternity, 12, 45, 66, 76, 141, 146, 147, 164, 176, 178, 179. and temporality, 146. expectancy, 3–14. faith, 17–30, 79–82, 85–9 passim, 110, 126, 147, 153, 157, 175, 180, 192–4, 196, 198–205, 210, 211, 214, 241, 249, 261–70 passim, 285, 291, 292, 301, 303, 312, 314–24 passim, and works, 200, 205, 211, 213. finitude, 146. freedom, 24, 26, 58, 60, 64, 74, 141. Frue Kirke, 145. fullness of time, 174. gift, 124, 127, 134, 212, 214. god-man, 23, 26, 29, 30, 82, 85, 87, 89, 113, 151, 180, 215, 240, 253, 263, 270, 305. good samaritan, the, 142, 237, 243. grace, 4, 5, 36–9 passim, 43, 47, 70, 73, 81, 82, 89, 126, 127, 131, 134, 135, 140, 147, 156, 157, 191–4, 198–205 passim, 209, 210, 214, 215, 269, 276, 277. guilt, 28, 39, 43, 58, 84, 87, 99, 102, 116, 118, 126, 144, 146, 152, 155, 156, 160, 163, 195. high priest, 113, 130, 145, 159, 238. history, 266–9, 308, 312. hope, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 87. humility/humiliation, 30, 41, 114, 115, 158, 160, 163, 180, 184, 202, 212, 215, 289. humor, 96. imitation, 49, 76, 118, 128, 151, 163, 164, 178, 184, 195, 215, 244, 251–4, 261, 266, 267, 275, 277, 303. immanence, 75, 76, 196. immortality, 172, 175, 180-3. incarnation, 7, 158, 241, 242, 249, 252, 265, 269, 300.

Index of Subjects incognito, 26, 30, 159, 162, 319. indesluttethed, 76. infinity, 24, 146. intratextuality, 238–40. inwardness, 95, 98, 102, 107–20, 142, 202, 214, 256. irony, 96, 254. Judaism, 93, 97, 118, 172, 191, 192, 194, 289, 297, 305, 323. kerygma, 241. κίνησις, 6, 71, 74, 158. kingdom of heaven, 25, 37, 268. knight of faith, 268. leap, 319. lilies and birds, 33, 55–76, 141, 237. logos, 143, 300. lord’s prayer, 39, 40, 43. love, 6, 11, 28, 30, 36–41 passim, 48–50, 72, 73, 80, 82, 83, 86–9, 95, 97, 99, 100, 126, 127, 130-5 passim, 142, 144, 145, 147, 151–62 passim, 179, 184, 192, 193, 194, 200-3, 205, 212, 213, 265, 314. maieutics, 27. marriage, 181, 182, 265. mercy, 4, 99, 118, 140, 142. messiah, 6–14 passim, 39, 44, 80, 82, 97, 161, 170, 289, 293, 304, 306. miracles, 17–30, 143, 170, 239, 257, 286, 291, 304, 320. moment, the, 174, 175, 316. myth, 240, 258, 295, 296. nunc dimittis, 3. offense, 6, 18, 22, 24, 26, 29–30, 38, 47, 49, 82–4, 110, 157, 160-2, 241, 244, 321, 323. paganism, 70.

337

paradox, 18, 22–4, 26, 29–30, 107, 115, 197, 198, 238, 240-4 passim, 252, 253, 262–8 passim, 275, 277, 279, 314–16, 319. passion, 80, 129, 151–8 passim, 163, 164, 169, 172, 178, 180. patience, 3–14, 181. pelagianism, 4. persecution, 37, 44–50 passim, 164, 177, 198, 201, 205. pharisees, the, 40, 93–103, 108, 113, 116, 117, 119, 125, 131, 132, 237. pietism, 191–5 passim, 200, 205, 211, 285. poverty, 11, 28, 39, 48, 66–9, 139, 141, 145. prophecy, 286, 291. protestantism, 254, 259, 276. prototype, 43, 79, 82, 85, 87, 100, 113, 114, 118, 123, 127–9, 130-5 passim, 151, 162–4, 169, 178, 180. purity of heart, 37, 43, 47, 116, 117, 213. rationalism, 191, 194, 211, 258, 286, 288, 300, 304. redemption, 8, 214. redoubling, 27. reformation, 3, 214, 254, 256, 269, 275. renunciation, 11, 12, 14, 36, 80, 81. repentance, 27, 47, 86, 88, 89, 118, 127, 156, 159, 213. repetition, 26–8, 129. resurrection, 22, 80, 85, 87, 169–85, 257, 291, 308, 322. revelation, 205, 259, 260, 286, 288, 290, 300, 312, 314, 315, 320, 323. romanticism, 57, 193. sacrifice, 5, 30, 83, 118, 151, 153–5, 160-4 passim, 192, 202, 300. salvation, 4, 37, 49, 76, 81, 126, 158, 178, 181, 203, 204, 214, 269, 303. self-deception, 116, 118. sermon on the mount, 33–50. sickness, 19, 27, 28, 146, 147, 175. sign of contradiction, 7, 24, 159, 162, 180. silence, 60.

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sin, 4, 6, 27, 28, 36, 37, 42, 45, 47, 67, 69, 73, 75, 81, 98–101, 108, 115, 116, 123, 130-2, 135, 144, 146, 151, 152–8, 175, 177, 195, 249. single individual, the, 120, 129, 130, 252, 265, 318. solipsism, 76. sophists, the, 94. soteriology, 62, 75, 76. spiritual trial, 26. stumbling block, 6, 80, 162. subjectivity. suffering, 6–8, 11, 30, 38–40, 44–9 passim, 61, 63, 66, 82–8 passim, 110, 135, 139, 140, 145, 146, 151–64, 176–80 passim, 184, 197, 198, 201, 202, 205, 230, 231. supernaturalism, 170.

tax collector, 94, 98, 101–3, 107–20, 130, 237. temptation, 48. ten Commandments, 37, 43. thorn in the flesh, 140, 198, 205. transcendence/immanence, 58, 60, 62, 65, 71, 73, 75, 76, 147, 196. tübingen school, 179, 184, 191, 240, 307–8, 310, 311. university of Copenhagen, 221, 223, 258, 310. vulgate, 3, 226, 228, 229, 231. witness, 86, 198, 259, 260, 266. woman in sin, 93, 98–100, 102, 123–35.