Understanding State Constitutions 9780691188553, 0691070660, 0691011125

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Understanding State Constitutions

Understanding State Constitutions G. Alan Tarr

P R I N C E T O N

U N I V E R S I T Y

P R I N C E T O N

A N D

O X F O R D

PRESS

Copyright © 1998 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 3 Market Place, Woodstock, Oxfordshire 0X20 1SY A l l Rights Reserved Second printing, and first paperback printing, 2000 Paperback ISBN 0-691-07066-0 The Library of Congress has cataloged the cloth edition of this book as follows Tarr, G. Alan (George Alan) Understanding state constitutions / G. Alan Tarr. p.

cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-691-01112-5 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Constitutional law—United States—States. history—United States—States. KF4550.Z95T37

1998

2. Constitutional

I . Title.

342.73'02—dc21

98-12782

This book has been composed in Sabon The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (R1997) {Permanence of Paper) www.pup.princeton.edu Printed in the United States of America 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

For Susan

Contents

INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER 1

T h e Distinctiveness o f State C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m

6

CHAPTER 2

E x p l a i n i n g State C o n s t i t u t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t CHAPTER

29

3

Eighteenth-Century State C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m

60

CHAPTER 4

N i n e t e e n t h - C e n t u r y State C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m

94

CHAPTER 5

T w e n t i e t h - C e n t u r y State C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m

136

CHAPTER 6

State C o n s t i t u t i o n a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n

173

Bibliography

211

Index

237

Understanding State Constitutions

Introduction

A M E R I C A N S live u n d e r a system o f d u a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , b u t one w o u l d h a r d l y k n o w i t . L e a d i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l - l a w t e x t s — e v e n those t h a t p r o ­ c l a i m as t h e i r subject the generic " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w " o r " A m e r i c a n c o n ­ stitutional law"—focus

exclusively o n the U n i t e d States C o n s t i t u t i o n

and

So t o o d o m o s t c o n t e m p o r a r y

its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

commentaries and constitutional

1

constitutional histories.

theories

Constitution—the

that

actually

r o u g h equivalent

2

constitutional

Legal scholars

encompass

of propounding

only

announce

the

federal

a literary theory

t h a t pertains t o a single n o v e l . Small w o n d e r , t h e n , t h a t a l m o s t h a l f the 3

See, e.g., William B. Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, Jesse H . Choper, and Steven H . Shriffrin, Constitutional Law: Cases—Comments—Questions, 7th ed. (St. Paul: West, 1991); Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, and Sotirios A . Barber, American Constitutional Interpreta­ tion, 2d ed. (Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1995); and even Ralph A . Rossum and G. Alan Tarr, American Constitutional Law, 4 t h ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1995). Leading constitutional commentaries w i t h an exclusively federal focus include Law­ rence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineóla, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1988); and Richard J. Rotunda, John E. N o w a k , and J. Nelson Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law (St. Paul: West, 1986). Major constitutional histories that share this federal focus include Leonard W. Levy, American Constitutional History (New York: Macmillan, 1989); Alfred H . Kelly, Winfred A . Harbison, and Herman Belz, The American Constitution: Its Origin and Development, 7th ed. (New York: N o r t o n , 1991); and Kermit L . Hall, Major Problems in American Constitutional History, 2 vols. (Lexington, Mass.: D . C. Heath, 1992). A somewhat broader perspective is found in Paul W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History: Se If-Government in American Constitutional Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); and in Stephen M . Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). Illustrative of the early constitutional-theory literature, w i t h its exclusively federal focus, are Ronald D w o r k i n , Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Hu­ man Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); and Sotirios Barber, On What the Constitution Means (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). Most of the more recent contributions to the literature continue the federal focus: Sanford Levinson, Consti­ tutional Faith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); M a r k V. Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1991); and Earl M . Maitz, Rethinking Constitutional Law: Originalism, Interventionism, and the Politics of Judicial Review (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994). 1

2

3

For an initial attempt to elaborate the implications o f the constitutional-theory literature to state constitutions, see G. Alan Tarr, "Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation," Rutgers Law Journal 22 (summer 1991): 8 4 1 - 6 1 .

2

•

Introduction

respondents i n a recent survey d i d n o t even realize t h a t their state had a constitution. 4

W h y have state c o n s t i t u t i o n s been so neglected? One o b v i o u s reason is t h a t scholars have tended t o gravitate t o w a r d " w h e r e the a c t i o n is," and for m o s t o f the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y t h a t has been the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l arena, as the federal g o v e r n m e n t and the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n have i n ­ creasingly d o m i n a t e d A m e r i c a n p u b l i c life. I n a d d i t i o n , the success o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n has e n d o w e d i t w i t h a n o r m a t i v e d i m e n s i o n . As C a r o l Rose t a r t l y observed, " [ T ] h e federal C o n s t i t u t i o n has the status o f w h a t m i g h t be called the ' p l a i n v a n i l l a ' b r a n d — a b r a n d so f a m i l i a r t h a t i t is assumed correct for every occasion. T h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n is the s t a n d a r d by w h i c h w e u n d e r s t a n d and judge other c o n s t i t u t i o n s , as for e x a m p l e those o f states and l o c a l i t i e s . " T h i s likewise has discouraged research o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s ; for t o those e n a m o r e d o f the federal m o d e l , m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s appear decidedly " n o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . " State c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s j u x t a p o s e b r o a d statements o f p r i n c i p l e w i t h p r o v i s i o n s o n subjects as m u n d a n e as ski trails and h i g h w a y routes, p u b l i c holidays and m o t o r vehicle revenues. T h i s a p p a r e n t l y h a p h a z a r d l u m p i n g together o f the f u n d a m e n t a l and the prosaic i n a single d o c u m e n t has prevented m a n y scholars f r o m t a k i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s seriously. Indeed, one recent critic charged t h a t a people t h a t w o u l d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e a " l i b e r t y t o s k i " is " s i m p l y a f r i v o l o u s people w h o are unable t o d i s t i n g u i s h between things t h a t are t r u l y i m p o r t a n t and things t h a t are n o t . " Finally, whereas 5

6

7

In a 1991 survey, 52 percent of respondents knew that their state had its o w n constitu­ tion, 11 percent believed that it did not, and 37 percent did not know or gave no answer. These results are reported in Changing Public Attitudes on Governments and Taxes, 1991 (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1991), 14, table 15. A similar question in 1988 produced even fewer respondents who were aware of their state constitution. See Changing Public Attitudes on Governments and Taxes, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1988), 6, tables 5 and 6. The problem is not limited to the general public. A n eminent public-law scholar began a recent book review in the American Political Science Review w i t h the confession, " I barely have a clue as to what my state constitution provides. I w i l l bet that most persons who read this book review are in the same foggy state of mind about their o w n state constitution's provisions." See Bradley C. Canon, review of Constitutional Politics in the States, American Political Science Review 91 (March 1997): 200. Carol M . Rose, "The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on 'Monarchism' to Modern Localism," Northwestern University Law Review 84 (1989): 74. O n ski trails, see New York Constitution, art. 14, sec. 1; on the routes of highways, see Minnesota Constitution, art. 14, sec. 2; on the establishment of Huey Long's birthday as a state holiday, see Louisiana Constitution of 1921, art. 19, sec. 22; and on motor vehicle revenues, see California Constitution, art. 19. James A . Gardner, "The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism," Michigan Law Review 90 (February 1992): 819-20. 4

5

6

7

Introduction

•

3

the d u r a b i l i t y a n d relative unchangeability o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n inspire reverence, the frequent a m e n d m e n t a n d replacement o f state c o n ­ stitutions have precisely the opposite effect for b o t h scholars a n d the general p u b l i c . Yet the d i s d a i n f o r state c o n s t i t u t i o n s is u n f o r t u n a t e ; for one c a n n o t m a k e sense o f A m e r i c a n state g o v e r n m e n t or state p o l i t i c s w i t h o u t under­ standing state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . A f t e r a l l , i t is the state c o n s t i t u t i o n — a n d n o t the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n — t h a t creates the state g o v e r n m e n t , largely determines the scope o f its p o w e r s , a n d distributes those p o w e r s a m o n g the branches o f the state g o v e r n m e n t a n d between state a n d l o c a l i t y . I t is likewise the state c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t structures p o l i t i c a l conflict w i t h i n the state a n d provides mechanisms f o r its r e s o l u t i o n . A n d i t is the state c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n t h a t a r g u a b l y embodies the aims a n d aspirations o f the state's c i t i z e n r y . Efforts d u r i n g the 1990s t o devolve a d d i t i o n a l responsibi­ lities o n state governments m e a n t h a t these g o v e r n m e n t s — a n d their c o n s t i t u t i o n s — a r e l i k e l y t o assume increased i m p o r t a n c e . 8

9

10

State c o n s t i t u t i o n s are as significant for w h a t they reveal as for w h a t they prescribe. T h e y comprise a c r u c i a l scholarly resource f o r historians a n d p o l i t i c a l scientists, because p o l i t i c a l disputes i n the states have often h a d a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n , a n d the texts o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s r e c o r d those conflicts a n d their outcomes. As L a w r e n c e F r i e d m a n has n o t e d , " A n observer w i t h n o t h i n g i n f r o n t o f h i m b u t the texts o f these c o n s t i t u t i o n s c o u l d learn a great deal a b o u t state p o l i t i c s , state laws, and social life i n A m e r i c a . " M o r e o v e r , because the states have regularly 1 1

O n the reverence accorded the federal Constitution, see Levinson, Constitutional Faith; and M a x Lerner, "Constitution and Court as Symbols," Yale Law Journal 46 (June 1937): 1290-1319. The mystique of the Constitution and its framers distinguishes the federal Constitution not only from American state constitutions but also from the constitu­ tions of most other countries. See Robert A . Goldwin and A r t Kaufman, eds., Constitution Makers on Constitution Making: The Experience of Eight Nations (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1988). The difference in popular attitudes toward the rela­ tively unchanged federal Constitution and the frequently altered state constitutions recalls James Madison's comments on the inadvisability of frequent referral of constitutional issues to the people. See The Federalist no. 49. See Donald S. Lutz, "The Purposes of American State Constitutions," Publius 12 (win­ ter 1982): 2 7 - 4 4 . It must be admitted that the federal Constitution, by assigning certain powers to the national government and denying some powers to the states, helps determine what powers state governments may exercise. Chapter 2 deals w i t h the influence of the federal Constitution on state constitutions in greater detail. However, state constitutions primarily determine what powers state governments can exercise. Daniel J. Elazar, "The Principles and Traditions Underlying American State Constitu­ tions," Publius 12 (winter 1982): 11-25. For dissenting views, see Gardner, "Failed Dis­ course," 824-27; and Paul W. Kahn, "Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutional­ ism," Harvard Law Review 106 (March 1993): 1159-60. Lawrence M . Friedman, A History of American Law, 2d ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 120. 8

9

1 0

1 1

4

•

Introduction

amended a n d replaced their c o n s t i t u t i o n s , successive versions o f a state c o n s t i t u t i o n m i r r o r the p o l i t i c a l a n d social changes t h a t have o c c u r r e d i n the state. C o m p a r i s o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s over t i m e a n d a m o n g states thus reveals patterns i n A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l development. O r as James Bryce p u t i t almost a c e n t u r y ago, state c o n s t i t u t i o n s are "a m i n e o f i n ­ s t r u c t i o n f o r the n a t u r a l h i s t o r y o f democratic c o m m u n i t i e s . " 1 2

I t m i g h t even be suggested t h a t some o f the factors t h a t have discour­ aged scholarly i n q u i r y i n t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d actually have i n v i t e d i t . T h e differences between state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , as w e l l as between the state a n d federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ex­ periences, raise i n t r i g u i n g questions t h a t go t o the heart o f A m e r i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . W h y has c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n the states occurred largely t h r o u g h the f o r m a l mechanisms o f a m e n d m e n t a n d r e v i s i o n , w h i l e federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change has o c c u r r e d p r i m a r i l y outside these f o r m a l channels? I f the n a t i o n i n fact reveres the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h y have state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s rejected m a j o r elements o f the fed­ eral m o d e l a n d embraced quite different c o n s t i t u t i o n a l models? W h y s h o u l d a distinctive c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n have developed at the state level at a l l , a n d w h y has i t persisted over t i m e despite the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f m u c h o f A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l life? Finally, h o w s h o u l d the distinctive elements o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s affect h o w one understands a n d interprets those documents? E x p l a i n i n g the distinctiveness o f the state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l experience a n d assessing its i m p l i c a t i o n s b o t h for state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g A m e r i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m are the tasks o f o u r b o o k . Chapter 1 identifies the distinctive features o f A m e r i c a n state c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n s a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development. Chapter 2 c r i t i c a l l y as­ sesses various explanations t h a t have been p r o p o s e d t o account for these distinctive features. Chapter 3 undertakes a m o r e detailed e x a m i n a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g d u r i n g the late eigh­ teenth century. Chapters 4 a n d 5 c o n t i n u e this e x a m i n a t i o n f o r the nine­ teenth a n d t w e n t i e t h centuries. These chapters reveal t h a t state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l p o l i t i c s has been d o m i n a t e d by three r e c u r r i n g issues. O n e is the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r a m o n g groups a n d regions w i t h i n the i n d i ­ v i d u a l states, reflected i n conflicts over a p p o r t i o n m e n t a n d the franchise. A second is the scope o f state g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y w h a t sorts o f substantive or p r o c e d u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s s h o u l d be i m p o s e d o n state James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 2 vols. (Chicago: Charles H . Seagal, 1891), 1:434. One enthusiastic turn-of-the-century commentator went even further, claim­ ing: "One might almost say that the romance, the poetry, and even the drama of American politics are deeply embedded in the many state constitutions" (James Q. Dealey, Growth of American State Constitutions from 1776 to the End of the Year 1914 [Boston: Ginn and Company, 1915; rpt. New York: Da Capo, 1972], 11). 1 2

Introduction

•

5

legislatures. A t h i r d is the r e l a t i o n o f the state t o economic activity, i n ­ c l u d i n g b o t h the extent o f direct g o v e r n m e n t a l s u p p o r t f o r enterprise a n d the a p p r o p r i a t e balance between p r o m o t i o n a n d r e g u l a t i o n o f economic development. I n t r a c i n g the development o f these a n d other issues pecu­ liar t o p a r t i c u l a r states o r eras, these chapters clarify h o w understandings o f politics a n d o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m i n the states have changed over t i m e . T h e y also identify patterns i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m a n d clarify the dy­ namics o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. Chapter 6 examines the i m p l i c a ­ tions o f these findings for the practice o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l interpreta­ t i o n . M o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t considers h o w the distinctive development a n d design o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s pose p r o b l e m s f o r those i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e m , assesses the usefulness o f c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y for ad­ dressing those p r o b l e m s , a n d sketches an a p p r o a c h t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l interpretation. M y research o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s began almost t w o decades ago, a n d over the course o f t h a t p e r i o d a n u m b e r o f persons a n d organizations have encouraged a n d s u p p o r t e d m y w o r k . For m u c h o f this p e r i o d , the Rutgers U n i v e r s i t y Research C o u n c i l has u n d e r w r i t t e n m y research o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h t i m e l y grants. I n 1 9 8 7 the N a t i o n a l E n d o w m e n t for the H u m a n i t i e s a w a r d e d me a F e l l o w s h i p for College Teachers t h a t enabled me t o pursue research o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d i n 1996 i t again a w a r d e d me a F e l l o w s h i p , enabling me t o devote a year t o c o m p l e t i n g m y research a n d w r i t i n g this b o o k . F o r over a decade a n d a half, I have benefited immensely f r o m discussions w i t h t w o friends a n d c o l l a b o r a ­ tors, M a r y C o r n e l i a Porter a n d R o b e r t F. W i l l i a m s . T h e y have read ear­ lier versions o f this m a n u s c r i p t i n its entirety a n d have offered b o t h t h o u g h t f u l suggestions a n d encouragement. I have also benefited over the years f r o m discussions w i t h n u m e r o u s other scholars, a m o n g t h e m D a n ­ iel Elazar, Susan F i n o , C h r i s t i a n F r i t z , R i c h a r d H a r r i s , Russell H a r r i s o n , D i c k H o w a r d , Ellis K a t z , J o h n K i n c a i d , a n d E a r l M a i t z . F r o m 1993 t o 1 9 9 7 , 1 p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the D e l a w a r e Valley C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Seminar, orga­ nized by D a n i e l Elazar, a n d the discussions o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s at these meetings were a great help i n c l a r i f y i n g m y t h o u g h t s a n d suggesting n e w avenues t o e x p l o r e . Colleagues a n d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s at Rutgers U n i v e r s i t y - C a m d e n have p r o v i d e d a v i b r a n t intellectual atmosphere for c o n d u c t i n g research, a n d the secretary o f the D e p a r t m e n t o f Political Sci­ ence, K a r e n M c G r a t h , has been an u n f a i l i n g source o f assistance. T w o students, N a n c y Leso a n d Jay Keesler, have p r o v i d e d helpful research assistance. M y w i f e , Susan, a n d m y sons, B o b a n d A n d y , have made a l l the w o r k w o r t h w h i l e .

C H A P T E R

1

The Distinctiveness of State Constitutionalism

I N 1 9 8 2 , five years before the n a t i o n celebrated the bicentennial o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , Georgia a b a n d o n e d its c o n s t i t u t i o n o f six years d u ­ r a t i o n a n d a d o p t e d a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e 1 9 8 2 replacement, the state's t e n t h c o n s t i t u t i o n , was over f o u r times as l o n g as the federal C o n s t i t u ­ t i o n . W i t h i n a decade i t h a d been amended m o r e times t h a n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n has been i n over t w o h u n d r e d years. Georgia's experience, t h o u g h extreme, is h a r d l y u n i q u e . W h e t h e r one examines the structure o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , the range o f topics they address, the level o f detail they encompass, the changes they have undergone, o r the p o l i t i c a l per­ spectives u n d e r l y i n g t h e m , the c o n c l u s i o n remains the same: state consti­ t u t i o n s are different. These differences reveal t h a t the U n i t e d States has not just a system o f d u a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m b u t d u a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i ­ t i o n s . T h i s chapter documents differences i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l practice t h a t have developed at the state a n d n a t i o n a l levels. Its survey o f the structure a n d substance o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s lays the g r o u n d w o r k for chapter 2 , w h i c h assesses various explana­ tions t h a t have been p r o p o s e d t o account f o r this state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l distinctiveness. 1

STATE C O N S T I T U T I O N A L D E S I G N

Power

and

Purpose

Because i t furnishes w h a t has become the s t a n d a r d account o f A m e r i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , McCulloch v. Maryland provides a convenient s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r i d e n t i f y i n g w h a t is distinctive a b o u t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . I n u p h o l d i n g the congressional c r e a t i o n o f a n a t i o n a l b a n k a n d s t r i k i n g d o w n a state t a x o n i t , Chief Justice J o h n M a r s h a l l a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n g r a n t e d o n l y l i m i t e d p o w e r s t o the n a t i o n a l gov­ e r n m e n t . B u t this l i m i t e d delegation d i d n o t restrict Congress t o o n l y those p o w e r s expressly g r a n t e d t o i t ; for i t was p r o b a b l y impossible a n d c e r t a i n l y undesirable t o p r o v i d e " a n accurate d e t a i l o f a l l the s u b d i v i ­ sions o f w h i c h [the C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s ] great p o w e r s w i l l a d m i t , a n d o f a l l the 2

Information on Georgia's constitutional experience is drawn from Melvin B. H i l l Jr., The Georgia State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994). McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 1

2

Distinctiveness of Constitutions

•

7

means b y w h i c h they m a y be c a r r i e d i n t o e x e c u t i o n . " T o d o so w o u l d require t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n " p a r t a k e o f the p r o l i x i t y o f a legal code," w h i c h was i n a p p r o p r i a t e for a charter o f g o v e r n m e n t . Rather, i t was suf­ ficient t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s "great outlines be m a r k e d , its i m p o r t a n t objects designated, a n d the m i n o r ingredients w h i c h compose those o b ­ jects be deduced f r o m the nature o f the objects i t s e l f . " Put differently, because the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n was created t o achieve certain b r o a d ends, its grants o f p o w e r were t o be i n t e r p r e t e d as c a r r y i n g w i t h t h e m the subsidiary p o w e r s necessary for the achievement o f those ends. I f there were any d o u b t s o n this score, the g r a n t t o Congress o f i m p l i e d powers t h r o u g h the necessary a n d p r o p e r clause effectively r e m o v e d t h e m . T h u s , i n McCullocb the failure specifically t o g r a n t t o Congress the p o w e r t o create a b a n k d i d n o t determine the bank's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y , because the C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s language, as w e l l as its o v e r a l l character, bespoke a w i l l ­ ingness t o p e r m i t Congress b r o a d discretion i n d e t e r m i n i n g h o w the C o n ­ stitution's aims were t o be achieved. As M a r s h a l l c o n c l u d e d : " L e t the end be l e g i t i m a t e , let i t be w i t h i n the scope o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d a l l means w h i c h are a p p r o p r i a t e , w h i c h are p l a i n l y adapted t o t h a t end, w h i c h are n o t p r o h i b i t e d , b u t consist w i t h the letter a n d spirit o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n , are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . " 3

4

W h a t is s t r i k i n g a b o u t M a r s h a l l ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l analysis is h o w little o f i t applies t o A m e r i c a n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Whereas M a r s h a l l recog­ nized t h a t the federal g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d exercise o n l y those legislative p o w e r s g r a n t e d t o i t by the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , state governments have h i s t o r i c a l l y been u n d e r s t o o d t o possess p l e n a r y legislative p o w e r s — t h a t is, those residual legislative p o w e r s n o t ceded t o the n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t or p r o h i b i t e d t o t h e m b y the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . As the Kansas Su­ preme C o u r t has observed: " W h e n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f a statute is i n v o l v e d , the question presented is, therefore, n o t w h e t h e r the act is au­ t h o r i z e d by the c o n s t i t u t i o n , b u t w h e t h e r i t is p r o h i b i t e d t h e r e b y . " State governments are n o t restricted i n the purposes f o r w h i c h they can exer­ cise p o w e r — t h e y can legislate comprehensively t o p r o t e c t the p u b l i c w e l f a r e — a n d because o f this, state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a n n o t 5

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 and 407 (1819). 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420. State ex rei Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (Kan. 1978). The plenary charac­ ter of state legislative power has long been recognized: see Thomas M . Cooley, Constitu­ tional Limitations: A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Leg­ islative Power of the States of the American Union, 8th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1927), 175-79 for discussion and a listing of supporting cases. For indications that the situation may be more complicated than it initially appears, see Robert F. Williams, "State Constitu­ tional Law Processes," William and Mary Law Review 24 (winter 1983): 178-79; and Walter F. Dodd, "The Functions of a State Constitution," Political Science Quarterly 30 (1915): 205. 3

4

5

8

•

Chapter 1

proceed i n terms o f a state g o v e r n m e n t ' s " i m p o r t a n t o b j e c t s " a n d

"minor

i n g r e d i e n t s . " F u r t h e r m o r e , whereas M a r s h a l l v i e w e d grants o f p o w e r as 6

c a r r y i n g w i t h t h e m s u b s i d i a r y p o w e r s , w h a t appear as grants o f p o w e r i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t y p i c a l l y do n o t operate i n t h a t f a s h i o n . T h e state p r o ­ visions m a y

be i n c l u d e d for emphasis, i n d i c a t i n g p o w e r s t h a t the

state

g o v e r n m e n t can exercise, w i t h o u t e n l a r g i n g those p o w e r s . O r t h e y 7

d i r e c t state legislatures t o exercise p o w e r s t h a t they c o m m a n d . may

serve t o o v e r r u l e j u d i c i a l decisions l i m i t i n g

may

O r they

legislative p o w e r ,

e l i m i n a t e questions o f a u t h o r i t y w h e r e state p o w e r was i n d i c a t e exceptions t o

8

constitutional prohibitions on

d o u b t f u l , or the

to to

legislature.

9

M o s t o f t e n , however, these a p p a r e n t " g r a n t s o f p o w e r " f u n c t i o n as l i m ­ i t a t i o n s . For i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n o f p l e n a r y legislative p o w e r s , an a u t h o r i z a That state governments possess the "police power"—the power to protect the health, safety, welfare, and morals of their citizens—has long been recognized in judicial rulings, both federal and state. Pertinent federal rulings include Hammer v. Dagenbart, 247 U.S. 2 5 1 , 276 (1918); United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895); and Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123, 135 (1877). Illustrative state rulings include Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1851); Hingham and Quincy Bridge and Turnpike Corp. v. County of Norfolk, 88 Mass. 353 (1863); and Commonwealth v. Strauss, 191 Mass. 545 (1906). The scope of state legislative activity under the police power is surveyed in William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel H i l l : University of N o r t h Carolina Press, 1996). Even legal commentators eager to restrain state legislative power have recognized the breadth of the police power; see Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 829-32. However, for an argument that the concept of the police power has no place in state constitutional law because—despite its breadth—it implies limitations on a plenary state legislative power, see Hans A . Linde, " W i t h o u t 'Due Process': Unconstitutional Law in Oregon," Oregon Law Review 49 (February 1970): 125-87. See, for example, the Illinois Constitution, art. 8, sec. 2(b), recognizing the authority of the General Assembly to appropriate funds. See, for example, the New Jersey Constitution, art. 8, sec. 4, par. 1, directing the legislature to provide a "thorough and efficient education" for all students. Examples of amendments designed to overrule judicial decisions include California Constitution, art. 1, sec. 27, which instituted capital punishment after it was outlawed in People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972); California Constitution, art. 1, sec. 7a, forbidding the use of busing to achieve racial balance in public schools in the absence of prior intentional discrimination, partially overturning Crawford v. Board of Education, 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976); and Massachusetts Constitution, part 1, art. 26, reinstituting capital punishment in the wake of District Attorney for the Suffolk District v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980). N e w Jersey furnishes a prime example of a provision designed to eliminate doubt about the scope of legislative authority. After the state supreme court upheld a bus transportation program for parochial students in Everson v. Board of Education, 44 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1945), a provision was added to the state constitution (New Jersey Constitution, art. 8, sec. 4, par. 3) to prevent the judiciary from later reversing or limiting its holding. For an example of a provision crafting an exception to a prohibition on the legislature, see Idaho Constitution, art. 7, sec. 5, which requires uniformity in taxation but authorizes the legislature to create exemptions as are "necessary and just." 6

7

8

9

Distinctiveness of Constitutions

•

9

t i o n t o pursue one course o f a c t i o n m a y by negative i m p l i c a t i o n serve t o preclude p u r s u i n g alternative courses t h a t were available i n the absence o f the " g r a n t , " under the f a m i l i a r legal c a n o n o f expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 10

Length

and

Detail

A l t h o u g h C h i e f Justice M a r s h a l l c a u t i o n e d t h a t a c o n s t i t u t i o n

should

a v o i d the p r o l i x i t y o f a legal code, state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s have largely i g n o r e d his counsel o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m i n i m a l i s m .

1 1

Indeed, for those u n ­

f a m i l i a r w i t h state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , p r o b a b l y their m o s t s t r i k i n g feature is their length. State c o n s t i t u t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those a d o p t e d d u r i n g the late nineteenth century, are replete w i t h " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n , " p r o ­ visions t h a t i n their length a n d detail are indistinguishable f r o m statutes b u t t h a t nonetheless have been elevated t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s .

12

During

the t w e n t i e t h century, state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reformers have attacked the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislation as the p r i m a r y flaw i n state con­ stitutions a n d c a m p a i g n e d t o p r u n e their state charters o f such p r o v i ­ sions. I n several states these reformers have prevailed, a l t h o u g h i n none d i d they succeed i n r e d u c i n g the state c o n s t i t u t i o n t o the dimensions o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . Even a r e f o r m c o n s t i t u t i o n such as N e w Jer­ sey's, a d o p t e d i n 1 9 4 7 , is three times as l o n g as its federal c o u n t e r p a r t . M o r e o v e r , i n other states c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m has proceeded s l o w l y — Louisiana's c o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 9 2 1 b a l l o o n e d t o over 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 w o r d s be­ fore i t was finally replaced i n 1 9 7 4 — o r has failed a l t o g e t h e r .

13

Finally,

those states t h a t have the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e have f o u n d their constiSee the discussions in Frank P. Grad, "The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time," Virginia Law Review 54 (May 1968): 928, 9 6 7 - 6 8 ; and Williams, "State Constitutional Law Processes," 178-79 and 2 0 2 - 3 . Some recent state constitutions have attempted to forestall this interpretation of the "grants" they contain. For example, the Alaska Constitution, art. 12, sec. 8, states: "The enumeration of specified powers in this constitution shall not be construed as limiting the powers of the State." It should be noted that Marshall's view of what was appropriately included within a constitution and what was more appropriate for a statute was hardly idiosyncratic. James Madison, for example, in responding to a complaint that the Philadelphia convention had not secured the common law, argued that they could not have done so without importing antirepublican and even ecclesiastical doctrines and that " i f they had undertaken a discrimi­ nation fas some of the states had done], they would have formed a digest of laws, instead of a Constitution" (James Madison to George Washington, Oct. 18, 1787, in Galliard Hunt, ed. The Writings of James Madison, 12 vols. [New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1900-1910], 5:14; emphasis added). As of 1997, more than half the states—twenty-six in all—were operating under con­ stitutions adopted during the second half of the nineteenth century. Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), 16. 1 0

1 1

1 2

1 3

10

•

Chapter 1

t u t i o n s increasing i n length, p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g the late t w e n t i e t h cen­ t u r y , as groups have used the i n i t i a t i v e t o c i r c u m v e n t the legislature a n d enact legislation via c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t . C u r r e n t l y , the una­ m e n d e d t e x t o f the t y p i c a l state c o n s t i t u t i o n remains over three times as l o n g as t h a t o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n s o n aver­ age c o n t a i n over 120 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t s . 14

T o some extent this greater length o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s can be a t t r i ­ b u t e d t o the plenary character o f state legislative power. Because legisla­ tive p o w e r exists i n the absence o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s a n d because state courts have characteristically interpreted such l i m i t a t i o n s n a r r o w l y , m a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s have believed i t necessary t o detail the l i m i t a t i o n s they sought t o impose o n their state legislatures. T o some extent, t o o , this greater length derives f r o m the i n c l u s i o n o f elements n o t f o u n d i n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . D o n a l d L u t z has argued t h a t the brev­ i t y o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d the length o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s are r e l a t e d . A c c o r d i n g t o L u t z , the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n is an " i n c o m p l e t e c o n s t i t u t i o n , " w h i c h depends for its o p e r a t i o n o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t " c o m p l e t e " a n d consequently f o r m a p a r t o f the n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . F o r example, the o r i g i n a l federal C o n s t i t u t i o n d i d n o t need t o define v o t ­ i n g qualifications because state c o n s t i t u t i o n s h a d already done so. Even today, i t can say n o t h i n g a b o u t e d u c a t i o n a n d local g o v e r n m e n t — t o choose b u t t w o examples—because state c o n s t i t u t i o n s deal w i t h such matters. 15

Yet neither the plenary character o f the state legislative p o w e r n o r the incompleteness o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n f u l l y explains the l e n g t h o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . For i f these shared features were decisive, t h e n a l l state c o n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d be r o u g h l y s i m i l a r i n l e n g t h . B u t i n fact they v a r y w i d e l y . T h e longest c u r r e n t state c o n s t i t u t i o n (Alabama's) is m o r e t h a n t w e n t y - s i x times as l o n g as the shortest (Vermont's), a n d nine state c o n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t a i n over f o r t y t h o u s a n d w o r d s , w h i l e eleven c o n t a i n less t h a n fifteen t h o u s a n d . F u r t h e r m o r e , state c o n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n i n d i ­ v i d u a l states have v a r i e d e n o r m o u s l y over t i m e i n b o t h their length a n d 16

1 7

Data on contemporary state constitutions are drawn from Janice C. May, "State Con­ stitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 , " in The Book of the States, 1994-95 (Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, 1994), 19, table 1.1. Donald S. Lutz, "The United States Constitution as an Incomplete Text," Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science 496 (March 1988): 2 3 - 3 2 . In making this claim, Lutz draws upon a long tradition of constitutional analysis. Even the strongly nation­ alist justice Joseph Story observed that "the state governments are, by the very theory of the constitution, essential parts of the general government. They can exist without the latter, but the latter cannot exist without them" (Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States [1833; Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1987], sec. 258). Chapter 2 considers other explanations for the length of state constitutions. May, "State Constitutions, 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 , " 19, table 1.1. 1 4

1 5

1 6

1 7

Distinctiveness of Constitutions

•

11

their contents. M a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d u r i n g the nation's first halfcentury resembled the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n i n their l e n g t h a n d absence o f p o l i c y prescriptions, b u t p o s t - C i v i l W a r c o n s t i t u t i o n s g r e w t o e n o r m o u s lengths. F o r example, the revised c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n M a r y l a n d ( 1 8 6 7 ) , A r ­ kansas ( 1 8 7 4 ) , a n d M i s s o u r i ( 1 8 7 5 ) a l l exceeded their predecessor c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n s by over ten t h o u s a n d w o r d s . M o r e substantively, whereas nineteenth-century c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d e d lengthy p r o v i s i o n s dealing w i t h l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t a n d financial matters, m o s t recent c o n s t i t u t i o n s have eschewed t h e i r predecessors' detailed t r e a t m e n t o f those topics. 1 8

Structure

and

Substance

Since at least the late nineteenth century, m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s have shared a m o r e or less u n i f o r m structure a n d have dealt w i t h a c o m m o n set o f issues ( w h i l e differing i n the detail o f their t r e a t m e n t o f those issues a n d i n the range o f other issues addressed). I n certain s t r u c t u r a l features these state c o n s t i t u t i o n s resemble their federal c o u n t e r p a r t . A l l fifty state c o n s t i t u t i o n s have eschewed a p a r l i a m e n t a r y system, established a t r i p a r ­ tite d i v i s i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t a l power, p r o v i d e d for regular elections, a n d guaranteed a range o f f u n d a m e n t a l rights, w h i l e a l l b u t Nebraska's have created a b i c a m e r a l legislature. H o w e v e r , closer inspection o f the struc­ ture a n d substance o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s h i g h l i g h t s m a n y features t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m f r o m the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 9

RIGHTS GUARANTEES

I n contrast t o the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , the i n i t i a l article o f the state c o n s t i t u t i o n ( f o l l o w i n g the preamble) is t y p i c a l l y a d e c l a r a t i o n (or bill) o f r i g h t s . T h i s o r d e r i n g o f rights a n d powers dates f r o m the earliest state 2 0

Sister M . Barbara McCarthy, The Widening Scope of American Constitutions (Wash­ ington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1928), 25. As Daniel J. Elazar has noted, "There are scientific principles involved in the making of constitutions, as the fathers of the United States Constitution of 1787 demonstrated in their reliance on the 'new science of politics,' which had discovered such vital principles of republican regimes as separation of powers, federalism, and the institution of the presi­ dency. But the combination of those elements and their adaptation to the constituency to be served is an art." See Daniel J. Elazar, "Constitution-Making: The Pre-eminently Political Act," in Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon, eds., Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 232. The examination of the structure of state constitutions that follows does not address provisions on elections and suffrage, which are discussed in detail in chapters 3 - 5 , nor various minor features of state constitutions such as the delineation of state boundaries and the schedule for transition from one constitution to the next. Preceding the initial article is a preamble, which indicates the general purposes for which the people established the constitution. However, the preamble does not create 1 8

1 9

2 0

12

•

Chapter 1

c o n s t i t u t i o n s , some o f w h i c h expressly d i v i d e d their basic l a w i n t o a dec­ l a r a t i o n o f rights a n d a c o n s t i t u t i o n , o r frame o f g o v e r n m e n t ( a l t h o u g h they t y p i c a l l y contained provisions emphasizing t h a t the d e c l a r a t i o n was p a r t o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d hence o b l i g a t o r y ) . M a n y o f the early bills o f rights i n c l u d e d p r o v i s i o n s t h a t w o u l d n o t be u n d e r s t o o d as rights guar­ antees today. V i r g i n i a ' s famous D e c l a r a t i o n o f Rights, for example, m a n ­ dated a separation o f p o w e r s a n d a d m o n i s h e d citizens t o treat each other w i t h " C h r i s t i a n forbearance, love, a n d c h a r i t y . " Pennsylvania's Decla­ r a t i o n o f Rights r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t the legislature "consist o f persons m o s t n o t e d for w i s d o m a n d v i r t u e " a n d urged citizens t o " p a y p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o these points i n electing officers a n d l e g i s l a t o r s . " A n d the Massachusetts D e c l a r a t i o n o f Rights r e q u i r e d local governments t o " m a k e suitable p r o v i s i o n " for "the s u p p o r t a n d maintenance o f p u b l i c Protestant teachers o f piety, r e l i g i o n , a n d m o r a l i t y i n a l l cases w h e r e such p r o v i s i o n shall n o t be made v o l u n t a r i l y . " D u e t o the w i d e s p r e a d inter­ state b o r r o w i n g t h a t has characterized state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g , b o t h the precedence given t o rights a n d the i n c l u s i o n o f " n o n r i g h t s " m a t e r i a l have been carried over t o c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n other states. 2 1

22

2 3

A l t h o u g h some states have retained their o r i g i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a n ­ guage, over t i m e state bills o f rights have come t o resemble m o r e closely the federal B i l l o f R i g h t s . Still, i m p o r t a n t differences r e m a i n . M a n y state guarantees are m o r e specific t h a n their federal c o u n t e r p a r t s . For example, i n a d d i t i o n t o p r o h i b i t i n g g o v e r n m e n t a l establishment o f r e l i ­ g i o n , nineteen states specifically bar religious tests for witnesses o r j u r o r s , a n d t h i r t y - f i v e p r o h i b i t expenditures for " a n y sectarian p u r p o s e . " Sev2 4

2 5

powers or confer them on the state government. Some states do include short articles before their declaration of rights. Article 1 of both the Arizona and Arkansas constitutions, for example, give the state boundaries. But few state constitutions have followed the federal practice of appending the declaration of rights to the end of the constitution. Interestingly, the preambles of nineteenth-century state constitutions differ from those of earlier state constitutions in including an acknowledgment of God's existence and beneficence. The i m ­ plications of this reference to the Deity for the interpretation of state guarantees of religious liberty are explored in G. Alan Tarr, "Church and State in the States," Washington Law Review 64 (winter 1989): 8 7 - 8 8 . Virginia Constitution of 1776, art. 1, sees. 5 and 16. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, art. 1, sees. 7 and 14. Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. 3. It may be more correct to say that the federal Bill of Rights resembles state protec­ tions. As Donald S. Lutz observes, "Almost every one of the twenty-six rights in the U.S. Bill of Rights could be found in two or three state documents [i.e., declarations of rights], and most of them i n five or more" (Lutz, "The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U . S. Bill of Rights," Publius 22 [spring 1992]: 28). For an encyclopedic overview of state constitutional guarantees and their interpretation, see Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigat­ ing Individual Rights, Claims, and Defenses, 2d ed. (Charlottesville, Va.: Michie, 1996). See Ronald K . L . Collins Jr., "Bills and Declarations of Rights Digest," in The Ameri2 1

2 2

2 3

2 4

2 5

Distinctiveness of Constitutions

•

13

eral state c o n s t i t u t i o n s n o t o n l y f o r b i d cruel a n d unusual punishments b u t also b a n unnecessary r i g o r i n punishments, require t h a t penalties be p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o the offense, a n d / o r establish r e h a b i l i t a t i o n as an a i m o f p u n i s h m e n t ; w h i l e others expressly authorize c a p i t a l p u n i s h m e n t . In a d d i t i o n , m a n y state bills o f rights c o n t a i n protections t h a t have n o fed­ eral analogue. T h u s , t h i r t y - n i n e states guarantee access t o a legal remedy t o those w h o suffer injuries, a n d eleven expressly protect a r i g h t t o p r i ­ 26

v a c y . F u r t h e r m o r e , i n contrast w i t h federal practice, states have n o t treated their bills o f rights as sacrosanct b u t have amended t h e m w i t h some frequency. F r o m 1986 t o 1 9 9 3 , for example, the states adopted fifty-two amendments t o their declarations o f r i g h t s . Some o f these amendments served t o e x p a n d r i g h t s — f o r example, fourteen states added " l i t t l e E R A s " t o their c o n s t i t u t i o n s between 1 9 7 1 a n d 1 9 7 6 . O t h e r served t o c u r t a i l t h e m — T e x a s , for instance, has amended its b i l l o f rights t o restrict the r i g h t t o b a i l a n d C a l i f o r n i a t o p e r m i t the use o f illegally o b t a i n e d evidence i n c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s . Finally, a l t h o u g h the federal B i l l o f Rights o n l y protects against g o v e r n m e n t a l invasions o f rights, some state guarantees p r o h i b i t p r i v a t e v i o l a t i o n s o f rights as w e l l . A few, like the L o u i s i a n a C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s b a n o n private d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , d o so e x p r e s s l y . O t h e r guarantees leave themselves open t o extension t o p r i v a t e a c t i o n by n o t specifying t h a t they are directed against g o v e r n m e n ­ tal v i o l a t i o n s . A case i n p o i n t are those state free-speech guarantees t h a t affirmatively protect freedom o f speech w i t h o u t specifying against w h o m . These p r o v i s i o n s have been used t o protect speech rights o n p r i ­ vate p r o p e r t y open t o the p u b l i c , such as s h o p p i n g m a l l s . 2 7

2 8

2 9

30

31

3 2

can Bench, 3d ed. (Sacramento: Reginald Bishop Forster and Associates, 1985-86), 2 5 0 0 2501; and Tarr, "Church and State," 9 3 - 1 0 0 . Collins, "Bills and Declarations Digest," 2510. O n the state constitutional right to a remedy, see David Schuman, "The Right to a Remedy," Temple Law Review 65 (winter 1992): 1197-1227; state provisions are listed at 1201 n. 25. O n the state constitutional right to privacy, see Ken Gormley and Rhonda G. Hartman, "Privacy and the States," Temple Law Quarterly 65 (winter 1992): 1279-1323; state provisions are listed and discussed at 1282-83. May, "State Constitutions, 1992-93," 7, table B. O n state guarantees of gender equality, see G. Alan Tarr and M a r y Cornelia Porter, "Gender Equality and Judicial Federalism: The Role of State Appellate Courts," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 9 (summer 1982): 953, table A . The Texas amendment restricting the right to bail is Texas Constitution, art. 1, sec. 11(a). The California amendment, adopted in 1982, is California Constitution, art. 1, sec. 28, part (d). Louisiana Constitution, art. 1, sec. 12. Altogether, forty-four states have such provisions. The Kansas Constitution, art. 1, sec. 1 1 , is representative: "The liberty of the press shall be inviolate; and all persons may freely speak, write or publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such rights." State free-speech provisions have spawned considerable litigation 2 6

2 7

2 8

2 9

3 0

3 1

3 2

14

•

Chapter 1

GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND T H E DISTRIBUTION O F POWER

The

Separation

of Powers.

B o t h federal a n d

state c o u r t s recognize

the s e p a r a t i o n o f p o w e r s as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e , b u t f r o m the outset several states w e r e n o t c o n t e n t t o leave the p r i n c i p l e t o

implication.

3 3

C u r r e n t l y , f o r t y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s expressly m a n d a t e a s e p a r a t i o n o f p o w e r s , rejecting d u a l o f f i c e - h o l d i n g a n d r e s t r i c t i n g each b r a n c h t o

the

p o w e r s a p p r o p r i a t e t o i t . A t the same t i m e , m a n y o f these c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n t i c i p a t e t h a t the state m a y n o t m a i n t a i n a strict s e p a r a t i o n o f p o w e r s , p e r m i t t i n g departures f r o m i t i f a u t h o r i z e d elsewhere i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n . W y o m i n g ' s article 2 is representative: The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct de­ partments: The legislative, executive, and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged w i t h the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or p e r m i t t e d .

34

T h e i n c l u s i o n o f such s e p a r a t i o n - o f - p o w e r s p r o v i s i o n s i n state c o n s t i ­ t u t i o n s serves t o i l l u s t r a t e the i n t e r e s t i n g questions t h a t arise i n i n t e r p r e t ­ i n g state charters. Federal c o u r t s enforce a s e p a r a t i o n o f p o w e r s even w i t h o u t an

e x p l i c i t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m a n d a t e , as

do

some state c o u r t s ,

t r e a t i n g the r e q u i r e m e n t as i m p l i c i t i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e s i g n .

3 5

What,

concerning speech rights on private property. These cases are surveyed and discussed in G. Alan Tarr, "State Constitutionalism and 'First Amendment' Rights," in Stanley Friedelbaum, ed., Human Rights in the States (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988); John A . Ragosta, "Free Speech Access to Shopping Malls under State Constitutions: Anal­ ysis and Rejection,"Syracuse Law Review 37 (1986): 1-42; and Todd F. Simon, "Indepen­ dent but Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of Freedom of Expression," Uni­ versity of Kansas Law Review 33 (winter 1985): 305-43. For more general discussions of whether federal state-action requirements are relevant to the interpretation of state consti­ tutions, see Daniel D . Devitt, "State Action in Pennsylvania: Suggestions for a Unified A p ­ proach," Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 3 (1990): 87-114; and Robert Skover, "The Washington Constitutional 'State Action' Doctrine: A Fundamental Right to State Action," University of Fuget Sound Law Review 8 (winter 1985): 2 2 1 - 8 2 . Whereas the federal Constitution's separation of powers derives from the vesting of powers in the various branches in Articles 1-3, several of the original states expressly constitutionalized the separation of powers in their initial constitutions. As James Madison documented in Federalist no. 47, however, this constitutionalization did not necessarily betoken a willingness to maintain such a separation. Wyoming Constitution, art. 2. For a discussion of the variations among state separation-of-powers provisions, see John Devlin, "Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions," Temple Law Review 66 (winter 1993): 1 2 3 6 - 4 1 . Representative federal cases include Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). State cases in the absence of an express constitutional require3 3

3 4

3 5

Distinctiveness of Constitutions

•

15

t h e n , is the effect o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g the separation o f powers? Some state courts, l o a t h t o h o l d t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l language has n o effect, have suggested t h a t the state p r o v i s i o n s m u s t impose a m o r e stringent separation t h a n is established by the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h u s , the West V i r g i n i a C o u r t o f Appeals has insisted t h a t the r e q u i r e m e n t " m u s t be strictly construed a n d closely f o l l o w e d , " h o l d i n g t h a t "the p l a i n language o f [the separation-of-powers p r o v i s i o n ] calls n o t f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n , b u t only for obedience." O t h e r courts, r e l u c t a n t t o a t t r i b u t e a different m e a n i n g t o the p r i n c i p l e o f the separation o f p o w e r s at the state a n d federal levels, have read the state p r o v i s i o n s as mere t r u i s m s a n d gener­ ally rejected c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenges raised under t h e m . However, even these courts have been o b l i g e d t o recognize t h a t the p r o v i s i o n s i m ­ pose some restrictions o n the range o f legislative p o w e r s t h a t can be exer­ cised by the state's executive a n d j u d i c i a l b r a n c h e s . A further question arises: i f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g the separation o f p o w e r s has an effect o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h a t is the effect o f n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g it? Or, p u t differently, given the i n c l u s i o n o f separation-of-powers p r o v i ­ sions i n m a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , w h a t i m p l i c a t i o n s — i f a n y — s h o u l d be d r a w n f r o m the fact t h a t a state's c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s chose n o t t o i n ­ clude such a p r o v i s i o n ? 36

3 7

38

These questions reveal some o f the c o m p l e x i t i e s i n v o l v e d i n interpret­ i n g a state c o n s t i t u t i o n i n the c o n t e x t o f other c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t have treated the same issue. State

Governmental

Institutions.

T h e n e x t three articles f o u n d i n

state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t y p i c a l l y establish the legislative, executive, a n d j u d i ­ cial branches o f the state's g o v e r n m e n t .

39

L i k e A r t i c l e s 1-3 o f the federal

ment of a separation of powers include State v. A.L.LV.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alas. 1980), and State ex rei. Stephan v. House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984). State ex rei. Queich v. Daugherty, 306 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1985). For a review of one set of pertinent cases, see L . Harold Levinson, "The Decline of the Legislative Veto: Fed­ eral/State Comparisons and Interactions," Publius 17 (winter 1987): 1 1 5 - 3 2 . Thus, in Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572, 577 (N.J. 1972), the N e w Jersey Supreme Court denied that the inclusion of an express requirement of a separation of powers made any difference: "There is no indication that our State Constitution was intended, w i t h re­ spect to the delegation of legislative power, to depart from the basic concept of distribution of powers of government embodied in the Federal Constitution. I t seems evident that in this regard the design spelled out in our State Constitution w o u l d be implied in constitutions which are not explicit in this regard." See G. Alan Tarr and Russell Harrison, "Legitimacy and Capacity in State Supreme Court Policymaking: The N e w Jersey Supreme Court and Exclusionary Z o n i n g , " Rutgers Law Journal 15 (spring 1984): 5 4 1 . Some state constitutions—for example, California's and Georgia's—insert an article dealing w i t h voting and elections before the discussion of the three branches. Chapters 3-5 deal w i t h state constitutional provisions on these matters. 3 6

3 7

3 8

3 9

16

•

Chapter 1

C o n s t i t u t i o n , these articles create offices a n d prescribe the qualifications, terms, a n d m o d e o f selection for their occupants. H o w e v e r , the state a r t i ­ cles differ i n i m p o r t a n t respects f r o m their federal c o u n t e r p a r t s . A r t i c l e 1 o f the federal charter grants a set o f enumerated p o w e r s t o Congress; b u t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d o n o t delineate state legislative p o w e r s , because (as n o t e d previously) state legislative p o w e r is considered t o be plenary. T h i s has i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s for state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n d e t e r m i n i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r s a m o n g the branches o f state gov­ e r n m e n t , the u n d e r l y i n g premise m u s t be t h a t the p o w e r s o f the executive a n d j u d i c i a l branches are defined by the c o n s t i t u t i o n , whereas the legisla­ ture's are n o t , so a l l p o w e r s n o t clearly granted t o those branches are reserved t o the legislature. T h u s , under state c o n s t i t u t i o n s i m p l i e d p o w e r s reside i n the legislature rather t h a n the g o v e r n o r o r the c o u r t s . I n a d d i t i o n , i n contrast w i t h federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h i c h h i s t o r i c a l l y has focused o n the i m p l i e d p o w e r s o f Congress, the funda­ m e n t a l interpretive issue under state c o n s t i t u t i o n s is the i m p l i e d l i m i t a ­ t i o n s ( i f any) o n state legislative p o w e r . 40

4 1

4 2

T h e legislative article i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s focuses p r i m a r i l y o n the l i m i t a t i o n s o n the state legislature's p o w e r s . Some o f these l i m i t a t i o n s are substantive. State legislatures are enjoined f r o m u n d e r t a k i n g various ac­ t i o n s , such as l e n d i n g the credit o f the state, o r a d o p t i n g laws o n certain topics, such as l o t t e r i e s . T h e y are also p r o h i b i t e d f r o m enacting certain 43

For more detailed discussions of distinctive aspects of the states' division of powers among the three branches, see Devlin, "Toward State Constitutional Analysis"; Harold H . Bruff, "Separation of Powers under the Texas Constitution," Texas Law Review 68 (June 1990): 1337-67; Scott M . Matheson Jr., "Eligibility of Public Officials and Employees to Serve in the State Legislature: A n Essay on Separation of Powers, Politics, and Constitu­ tional Policy," Utah Law Review 1988:295-377; and John V. O r t h , "Forever Separate and Distinct: Separation of Powers Law in N o r t h Carolina," North Carolina Law Review 62 (October 1983): 1-28. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court has observed: "Since the adoption of the consti­ tution, this court has consistently held that the powers of both the Crown and Parliament reside i n the Legislature, unless that power has been subsumed by the Constitution of the United States, or has been removed from the General Assembly by the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island Because the General Assembly does not look to the State Con­ stitution for grants of power, we have invariably adhered to the view that the General Assembly possesses all powers inherent i n the sovereign other than those that the constitu­ tion textually commits to the other branches of state government {City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A . 2 d 40, 44 [R.I. 1995]). For further elaboration of the character of state legislative power, see Michael Besso, "Connecticut Legislative Power in the First Century of State Constitutional Government," Quinnipiac Law Review 15 (spring 1996): 1-56; and Robert F. Williams, "Comment: O n the Importance of a Theory of Legislative Power under State Constitutions," Quinnipiac Law Review 15 (spring 1996): 5 7 - 6 4 . 4 0

4 1

Walter F. Dodd, "Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law," Yale Law Journal 29 (December 1919): 137-62. See, for example, N e w Jersey Constitution of 1947, art. 4, sees. 6 and 7. 4 2

4 3

Distinctiveness of Constitutions

•

17

types o f special l a w s — t h e list can be very l o n g — s u c h as laws g r a n t i n g divorces o r changes o f name, a n d f r o m passing special laws w h e n m o r e general enactments are p o s s i b l e . O t h e r l i m i t a t i o n s o n state legislatures are p r o c e d u r a l , r e g u l a t i n g the process o f legislation i n order t o ensure a m o r e o p e n a n d o r d e r l y deliberative process. These p r o c e d u r a l require­ ments have n o c o u n t e r p a r t i n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . F o r example, m a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s prescribe the f o r m t h a t bills m u s t take, l i m i t the range o f subjects a single b i l l can encompass, a n d specify the procedures by w h i c h a b i l l is t o be considered a n d a d o p t e d . These requirements m i g h t p r o v e onerous i f they were consistently enforced. H o w e v e r , state courts usually have a l l o w e d state legislatures t o police t h e i r o w n obser­ vance o f these requirements, a n d thus the requirements have seldom i m p e d e d the legislative p r o c e s s . 44

4 5

46

L i k e A r t i c l e 2 o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , the state executive article enumerates the p o w e r s o f the executive. H o w e v e r , u n l i k e t h e i r federal c o u n t e r p a r t , m o s t state executive articles establish a n o n u n i f i e d execu­ tive. O n l y N e w Jersey has n o elected executive-branch officers b e y o n d the governor, a n d m a n y states have several independently elected execu­ tive officers w h o u n d e r t a k e i m p o r t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e responsibilities a n d w h o need n o t share the governor's p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n . A s late as 1 9 2 0 , over three-quarters o f the states elected their secretary o f state, state a u d i ­ tor, a n d a t t o r n e y general; a n d even today, m o r e t h a n t w o - t h i r d s o f the states have at least f o u r independently elected executive o f f i c i a l s . State executive articles therefore m u s t delineate the sphere o f a u t h o r i t y o f each executive officer a n d the d i v i s i o n o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a m o n g t h e m , as w e l l as the extent t o w h i c h the g o v e r n o r o r other officials can exercise a u t h o r i t y over t h e i r f e l l o w executive officers. T h e executive article m a y i n a d d i t i o n a t t e m p t t o ensure a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y b y l i m i t i n g the n u m b e r o f executive departments i n state g o v e r n m e n t . Finally, state executive a r t i ­ cles m a y create a n d independently e m p o w e r executive agencies: Florida's Game a n d Fresh W a t e r Fish C o m m i s s i o n is a p r i m e e x a m p l e . T h i s c o n 47

48

4 9

See, for example, Nebraska Constitution of 1875, art. 3, sec. 15. Michael W. Catalano, "The Single Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian Logroll­ ing," Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 3 (1990): 7 7 - 8 6 ; M i l l a r d H . Ruud, " N o Law Shall Embrace M o r e Than One Subject," Minnesota Law Review 42 (January 1958): 389-452; and Robert F. Williams, "State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement," Publius 17 (winter 1987): 9 1 - 1 1 4 . Williams, "State Constitutional Limits," 1 0 6 - 1 2 . This contrasts w i t h state courts' willingness to intervene in the process of constitutional amendment, discussed later in this chapter. McCarthy, Widening Scope, 5 2 - 5 5 ; and "The Executive Branch," Book of the States, 1996-97 (Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, 1996), 35, table 2.10. See, for example, N e w York Constitution, art. 5, sec. 2. Florida Constitution, art. 4, sec. 9. 4 4

4 5

4 6

4 7

4 8

4 9

18

•

Chapter 1

s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f executive agencies o b v i o u s l y l i m i t s the alternatives available i n r e o r g a n i z i n g the state's executive b r a n c h . I t also creates a rather a n o m a l o u s s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h rules a d o p t e d b y the agencies i n pursuance o f their c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y g r a n t e d a u t h o r i t y are superior t o statutes enacted by the l e g i s l a t u r e . 50

Finally, i n contrast w i t h A r t i c l e 3 o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , several states have chosen t o set u p t h e i r entire j u d i c i a l system by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s c r i p t i o n rather t h a n by statute. T h e j u d i c i a l articles i n these states establish a l l state courts, specify each court's j u r i s d i c t i o n , delineate the boundaries o f the districts i n w h i c h the courts shall operate, a n d p r o v i d e for the selection o f judges t o serve o n t h e m . State j u d i c i a l articles m a y also institute an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e office o f the courts, create j u d i c i a l disci­ pline commissions, a n d p r o v i d e for officials such as c o u r t clerks, pros­ ecuting attorneys, coroners, a n d s h e r i f f s . For some state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , n o d e t a i l appears t o o m i n o r f o r i n c l u s i o n . T h e N e w Y o r k C o n s t i t u t i o n specifies the q u o r u m f o r its C o u r t o f Appeals, the N e v a d a C o n s t i t u t i o n regulates h o w judges charge juries, a n d the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n es­ tablishes guidelines f o r the p u b l i c a t i o n o f j u d i c i a l o p i n i o n s . N o t sur­ prisingly, the detailed prescriptions o f state j u d i c i a l articles have p e r i ­ o d i c a l l y r e q u i r e d a m e n d m e n t t o a c c o m m o d a t e p o p u l a t i o n shifts a n d changes i n the d e m a n d f o r legal s e r v i c e s . O f t e n , however, c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l amendments have merely exacerbated existing p r o b l e m s a n d have themselves been subject t o a m e n d m e n t . Since W o r l d W a r I I , m a n y states have r e f o r m e d their judiciaries by u n i f y i n g courts a n d c e n t r a l i z i n g ad­ m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l i n the state supreme c o u r t . Others have i n s t i t u t e d intermediate courts o f appeal, thereby increasing the d i s c r e t i o n o f the 51

5 2

53

5 4

Illustrative of the implications for executive-branch reorganization of a nonunified executive is Wyoming Constitution, art. 4, sec. 14, which had to be amended to eliminate the position of state examiner as part of a governmental reorganization effort. O n the relationship between constitutionalized agencies and the state legislature, see Florida De­ partment of Natural Resources v. Florida Game and Fresh Water Commission, 342 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1977), and Whitehead v. Rogers, 223 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1969). For the creation of the administrative office of the courts, see New Jersey Constitu­ tion, art. 6, sec. 7; for judicial disciplinary commissions, see New York Constitution, art. 6, sec. 22; for clerks of court, see Wyoming Constitution, art. 5, sees. 9 and 13; and for coroner and sheriff, see Louisiana Constitution, art. 5, sees. 29 and 27. O n the quorum in New York appellate courts, see the New York Constitution, art. 6, sec. 2; on the charging of juries, see the Nevada Constitution, art. 6, sec. 12; and on the publication of opinions, see the California Constitution, art. 6, sec. 14. This paragraph follows the analysis i n G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial Policymaking (St. Paul: West, 1994), 4 9 - 5 3 . See Larry Charles Berkson and Susan B. Carbon, Court Unification: History, Politics, and Implementation (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978); and G. Alan Tarr, "Court Unification and Court Performance: A Preliminary Assessment," Judicature 64 (March 1981): 358. 5 0

5 1

5 2

5 3

5 4

Distinctiveness of Constitutions states' supreme courts a n d lessening t h e i r w o r k l o a d .

5 5

•

19

A l t h o u g h these

changes have c o n t r i b u t e d t o sleeker, less detailed state j u d i c i a l articles i n some states, these articles r e m a i n a m o n g the least successful—and m o s t heavily r e v i s e d — p r o v i s i o n s i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Local

Government.

T h e federal C o n s t i t u t i o n altogether ignores local

g o v e r n m e n t , b u t i t was also largely i g n o r e d by early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . These c o n s t i t u t i o n s accepted the a u t h o r i t y o f e x i s t i n g l o c a l governments a n d the l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e i r prerogatives, i n some instances even establish­ i n g representation f o r these governments i n state legislatures. H o w e v e r , the state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l silence a b o u t local p o w e r ended d u r i n g the m i d nineteenth century, w h e n N e w Y o r k a d o p t e d the first c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o ­ visions expressly r e g u l a t i n g cities. O t h e r states soon f o l l o w e d

New

Y o r k ' s lead. T h e shift i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design resulted f r o m a reconcept u a l i z a t i o n o f the legal status o f local governments. L o c a l governments came t o be u n d e r s t o o d as entities " w h o s e p o w e r s are d e r i v e d f r o m a n d subject t o the sovereign state legislature" rather t h a n as c o m p o n e n t units o f a quasi-federal state g o v e r n m e n t .

5 6

T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the state as

a u n i t a r y sovereign a n d l o c a l governments as subordinate units was for­ m a l i z e d i n legal d o c t r i n e as " D i l l o n ' s r u l e , " under w h i c h m u n i c i p a l i t i e s c o u l d exercise o n l y those p o w e r s t h a t were expressly g r a n t e d by the state or t h a t were indispensable t o a c c o m p l i s h the declared purposes o f the municipal c o r p o r a t i o n .

5 7

T h e effects o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design re­

s u l t i n g f r o m this changed u n d e r s t a n d i n g were d r a m a t i c . I f units o f local See Roger D . Groot, "The Effects of an Intermediate Appellate Court on the Supreme Court Work Product: The N o r t h Carolina Experience," Wake Forest Law Review 7 (Octo­ ber 1971): 5 4 8 - 7 2 ; Victor Eugene Flango and Nora F. Blair, "Creating an Intermediate Appellate Court: Does It Reduce the Caseload of a State's Highest Court?" Judicature 64 (August 1980): 7 4 - 8 4 ; and John M . Scheb and John M . Scheb I I , " M a k i n g Intermediate Appellate Courts Final: Assessing Jurisdictional Changes in Florida's Appellate Courts," Judicature 67 (May 1984): 4 7 4 - 8 5 . See Daniel J. Elazar, "State-Local Relations: Reviving Old Theory for New Practice," in Stephanie Cole, ed., Partnership within the States: Local Self-Government in the Federal System (Urbana, 111.: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, 1975); James E. Herget, "The Missing Power of Local Government: A Discrepancy between Text and Practice in Our Early State Constitutions," Virginia Law Review 62 (June 1976): 1001-5; Michael E. Libonati, "Home Rule: A n Essay on Pluralism," Washington Law Review 64 (January 1989): 5 1 - 7 1 ; and Michael E. Libonati, "Intergovernmental Relations in State Constitu­ tional Law: A Historical Overview," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 496 (March 1988): 107-16. Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad, 24 Iowa 455, 476 (1868); see also generally John Forest Dillon, A Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., 5 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911). A useful overview of the transformation is Gerald E. Frug, "The City as a Legal Concept," Harvard Law Review 93 (April 1980): 1 0 5 9 1154. 5 5

5 6

5 7

20

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Chapter 1

g o v e r n m e n t o w e d t h e i r p o w e r s a n d t h e i r very existence t o the state, t h e n the state h a d t o establish procedures f o r creating units o f l o c a l g o v e r n ­ m e n t a n d determine the structure a n d p o w e r s o f those units i n consider- " able d e t a i l . E n s h r i n e d i n the local g o v e r n m e n t articles o f state c o n s t i t u ­ tions, these provisions often came t o resemble m u n i c i p a l codes. Moreover, these codes g r e w a n d grew, as n e w eventualities r e q u i r e d adjustments i n the p o w e r s granted t o p a r t i c u l a r localities o r the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r a m o n g the various units o f l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t . C o m p l a i n t s a b o u t legisla­ tive interference, together w i t h the d r a i n o n state legislative energies t h a t detailed supervision o f localities r e q u i r e d , soon p r o m p t e d efforts t o re­ place

micromanagement

by the

state g o v e r n m e n t

with

local

self-

g o v e r n m e n t . M i s s o u r i i n 1875 pioneered one s o l u t i o n w i t h the a d o p t i o n o f a " h o m e r u l e " p r o v i s i o n , w h i c h g r a n t e d greater a u t o n o m y t o l o c a l governments, a n d m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s eventually f o l l o w e d souri's l e a d .

5 8

Mis­

Indeed, a few recent c o n s t i t u t i o n s have altogether reversed

" D i l l o n ' s r u l e , " a u t h o r i z i n g local governments t o t a x , regulate, a n d o t h ­ erwise deal w i t h matters o f l o c a l c o n c e r n , unless specifically p r o h i b i t e d by s t a t u t e .

59

These h o m e - r u l e p r o v i s i o n s have h a d a significant effect o n

state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , because the broader the g r a n t o f local self-rule, the shorter a n d less detailed the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s o n l o c a l g o v e r n ­ m e n t need t o be. I n a d d i t i o n , fifteen states have a d o p t e d

amendments

r e q u i r i n g the state g o v e r n m e n t t o f u n d p r o g r a m s t h a t they require l o c a l governments t o u n d e r t a k e .

60

I n 1995 Congress f o l l o w e d the states' lead

i n c u r b i n g u n f u n d e d mandates, a l t h o u g h i t pursued by statute a g o a l f o r w h i c h the states, w i t h their greater ease o f a m e n d m e n t , h a d sought a constitutional s o l u t i o n .

6 1

PUBLIC POLICY

Relatively few p r o v i s i o n s o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n d i r e c t l y address p u b l i c - p o l i c y issues, a l t h o u g h the C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s grants o f p o w e r can be i n t e r p r e t e d as suggesting the purposes f o r w h i c h n a t i o n a l p o w e r is t o be exercised. State c o n s t i t u t i o n s , i n contrast, deal d i r e c t l y w i t h matters o f p u b l i c policy, sometimes i n considerable d e t a i l . State governments share

Missouri Constitution, art. 9, sees. 2 0 - 2 5 (1875). The circumstances surrounding the adoption of these provisions are discussed in Joseph D . McGoldrick, Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule, 1916-1930 (New York: A M S Press, 1967). See, e.g., Illinois Constitution, art. 7; and Alaska Constitution, art. 10. See, for example, Michigan Constitution, art. 9, sec. 29. The judicial interpretation of this provision is discussed in Susan P. Fino, The Michigan State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 207-9. For an overview of constitu­ tional provisions requiring the funding of mandates, see Joseph F. Zimmerman, "State Mandate Relief: A Quick Look," Intergovernmental Perspective 28 (spring 1994): 2 8 - 3 2 . Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C, secs. 621-56. 5 8

5 9

6 0

6 1

Distinctiveness of Constitutions

•

21

c o m m o n p o l i c y responsibilities, and these are reflected i n state c o n s t i t u ­ tions. T h u s , m a n y state charters c o n t a i n separate articles o n finance, o n t a x a t i o n , o n c o r p o r a t i o n s , a n d o n education. O t h e r p o l i c y provisions re­ flect p r o b l e m s t h a t are peculiar t o a r e g i o n — f o r example, eight western states a d o p t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n s o n the e m p l o y m e n t o f c h i l d r e n i n mines d u r i n g the late nineteenth a n d early t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . Still other p o l i c y provisions are distinctive t o p a r t i c u l a r states. A few deal w i t h salient aspects o f a state's economy: for example, Idaho's C o n s t i t u ­ t i o n has articles o n w a t e r rights a n d o n livestock, a n d C a l i f o r n i a o n w a ­ ter resources d e v e l o p m e n t . Others, such as N e w M e x i c o ' s article deal­ i n g w i t h b i l i n g u a l education, reflect the social c o m p o s i t i o n o f the s t a t e . Some p o l i c y provisions are a p r o d u c t o f the p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l move­ ments regnant d u r i n g the era i n w h i c h they were a d o p t e d . For instance, the t a x r e v o l t o f the late 1970s added t o the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n a r t i ­ cles dealing w i t h t a x l i m i t a t i o n s a n d government spending l i m i t s , w h i l e the e n v i r o n m e n t a l m o v e m e n t o f the late 1960s p r o m p t e d I l l i n o i s t o i n ­ clude an article o n the e n v i r o n m e n t i n its 1970 c o n s t i t u t i o n . Finally, some state p o l i c y provisions are s i m p l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d statutes. A r t i ­ cle 10B o f the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h is entitled the M a r i n e Re­ sources P r o t e c t i o n A c t o f 1 9 9 0 , is a case i n p o i n t . 62

63

64

6 5

6 6

Policy provisions i n state constitutions m a y c o n t a i n direct p r o h i b i t i o n s o n legislative a c t i o n , such as the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l bans o n the use o f p u b l i c funds i n s u p p o r t o f any religious i n s t i t u t i o n or for any sectarian pur­ p o s e . P r o h i b i t i o n s i n finance a n d t a x a t i o n articles, w h i c h m a y range f r o m l i m i t a t i o n s o n the i m p o s i t i o n o f ad v a l o r e m taxes by local govern­ ments t o bans o n state assumption o f local government debt, tend t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y detailed a n d s p e c i f i c . Policy provisions i n state c o n s t i t u ­ tions m a y also take the f o r m o f p o l i c y directives. T h e y m a y directly enact p o l i c y — t h e C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s establishment o f an eight-hour w o r k d a y o n p u b l i c w o r k s is an example. O r they m a y establish p o l i c y guidelines for legislative enactments. I n some instances legislative enact­ m e n t m a y still be discretionary, as w h e n the I l l i n o i s C o n s t i t u t i o n listed 6 7

68

See Arizona Constitution, art. 18, sec. 2; Colorado Constitution, art. 16, sec. 3; Idaho Constitution, art. 13, sec. 4; Montana Constitution, art. 18, sec. 3; New Mexico Constitu­ tion, art. 17, sec. 2; N o r t h Dakota Constitution, art. 17, sec. 209; Oklahoma Constitution, art. 23, sec. 3; and Wyoming Constitution, art. 9. Idaho Constitution, arts. 15-16, and California Constitution, art. 10A. New Mexico Constitution, art. 12, sec. 8. California Constitution, arts. 13B-13C, and Illinois Constitution, art. 1 1 . California Constitution, art. 10B. See, for example,, Connecticut Constitution, art. 7, sec. 1 and art. 8, sec. 2; Florida Constitution, art. 9, sec. 6; and Missouri Constitution, art. 9, sec. 8. See, for example, Florida Constitution, art. 7, sec. 9(b), and Nevada Constitution, art. 9, sec. 4. 6 2

6 3

6 4

6 5

6 6

6 7

6 8

22

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Chapter 1

the types o f p r o p e r t y t h a t the General Assembly c o u l d exempt f r o m p r o p e r t y taxes, restricting the range o f possible exemptions b u t leaving the legislature free t o decide w h e t h e r t o g r a n t those e x e m p t i o n s . More often, however, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l directives for legislative enactments are m a n d a t o r y , r e q u i r i n g legislative a c t i o n a n d presumably p e r m i t t i n g j u d i ­ cial enforcement i f the legislature fails t o a c t . 69

7 0

Finally, the p o l i c y p r o v i s i o n s i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s m a y be statements o f p r i n c i p l e , c o m m i t t i n g the state t o achieve p a r t i c u l a r e n d s . T h e c o n ­ trast between the language o f these articles a n d the t e x t o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n is c r u c i a l . A l t h o u g h the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n grants C o n ­ gress various p o w e r s , i t never requires t h a t these p o w e r s be exercised— for example, Congress d i d n o t regulate commerce a m o n g the several states i n any substantial w a y for almost a century after the r a t i f i c a t i o n o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d i t failed t o enact a p p r o p r i a t e legislation t o enforce the equal p r o t e c t i o n clause o f the F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t despite o b ­ vious v i o l a t i o n s by southern states. I n contrast, state c o n s t i t u t i o n s i m ­ pose specific duties o n state governments. T h u s , N e w Jersey is r e q u i r e d t o ensure a " t h o r o u g h a n d efficient system o f free p u b l i c schools" for a l l c h i l d r e n i n the state; I l l i n o i s m u s t " p r o v i d e a n d m a i n t a i n a healthful envi­ r o n m e n t for the benefit o f this a n d future generations"; A l a s k a m u s t " p r o v i d e for the p r o m o t i o n a n d p r o t e c t i o n o f p u b l i c h e a l t h " ; a n d I d a h o is o b l i g e d " t o pass a l l necessary laws t o p r o v i d e for the p r o t e c t i o n o f livestock against the i n t r o d u c t i o n or spread" o f various diseases. A l ­ t h o u g h these p r o v i s i o n s are n o t framed as rights protections a n d are n o t c o n t a i n e d i n state declarations o f r i g h t s , they serve as the f u n c t i o n a l equivalent o f positive rights. Even i f these p r o v i s i o n s d o n o t specifically direct legislative a c t i o n , they m a y be self-executing, p r o v i d i n g a cause o f a c t i o n w h e n g o v e r n m e n t fails t o meet its affirmative r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . I f 71

72

73

California Constitution, art. 14, sec. 2; and Illinois Constitution, art. 9, sec. 6. A useful discussion of mandatory and directory provisions is found in Williams, State Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, 2d ed. (Charlottesville, Va.: Michie, 1993), 4 1 2 2 1 . State legal standards governing litigants' standing to sue tend to be far more liberal than federal standards, thereby facilitating constitutional challenges to failures by state legisla­ tures to meet their constitutional responsibilities. See Tarr and Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 4 2 - 4 5 . James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Lawmakers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), 246. N e w Jersey Constitution, art. 8, sec. 4; Illinois Constitution, art. 1 1 , sec. 1; Alaska Constitution, art. 7, sec. 4; and Idaho Constitution, art. 15, sec. 1. For a useful discussion, see Richard A . Goldberg and Robert F. Williams, "Farm­ workers' Organizational and Collective Bargaining Rights in N e w Jersey: Implementing Self-Executing State Constitutional Rights," Rutgers Law Journal 18 (summer 1987): 729-63. N o t all constitutional language is self-executing and thus subject to judicial enforcement. 6 9

7 0

7 1

7 2

7 3

Distinctiveness of Constitutions

•

23

they are, they p r o m p t l i t i g a n t s t o recast w h a t w o u l d be r i g h t s claims u n d e r the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n i n terms o f o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t the state g o v ­ e r n m e n t owes its c i t i z e n s .

7 4

I f the p r o v i s i o n s are n o t self-executing, they

s t i l l impose r e q u i r e m e n t s o n conscientious legislators a n d g o v e r n o r s w h o w i s h to remain faithful to their constitutional obligations.

STATE C O N S T I T U T I O N A L

PRACTICE

Perhaps the m o s t s t r i k i n g c o n t r a s t w i t h federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l practice is the states' reliance o n the f o r m a l mechanisms o f r e v i s i o n (replacement o f one c o n s t i t u t i o n b y a n o t h e r ) a n d a m e n d m e n t (the a l t e r a t i o n o f an exist­ i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n b y the a d d i t i o n o r s u b t r a c t i o n o f m a t e r i a l ) t o p r o m o t e constitutional change.

7 5

Since 1 7 9 1 , w h e n the a d o p t i o n o f the B i l l o f

R i g h t s c o m p l e t e d the task o f f o u n d i n g the federal g o v e r n m e n t , the fed­ eral C o n s t i t u t i o n has been a m e n d e d less t h a n once per decade. M o r e o v e r , the m o s t d r a m a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l developments, such as the g r o w t h o f n a t i o n a l p o w e r a n d the e x p a n s i o n o f p r e s i d e n t i a l prerogatives, have oc­ c u r r e d largely w i t h o u t f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t .

7 6

I n contrast,

the A m e r i c a n states have r e g u l a r l y revised a n d a m e n d e d t h e i r c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s . O n l y nineteen states s t i l l r e t a i n t h e i r o r i g i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d a m a j o r i t y o f states have established three o r m o r e .

7 7

Louisiana's c u r r e n t

c o n s t i t u t i o n is the state's eleventh, a n d Georgia's its t e n t h . T h e level o f For example, in the Louisiana constitutional convention of 1973, educators persuaded dele­ gates to insert in the constitution hortatory language regarding the importance of education (Louisiana Constitution, art. 8, preamble). However, this language was interpreted i n Sim­ mons v. Sowela Technical Institute, 470 So.2d 913 (La. 1985), as establishing moral duties rather than creating the basis for legal claims. See, for example, N e w Jersey's school finance cases—Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), and Abbott v. Burke, 575 A . 2 d 359 (N.J. 1990)—in which the educational-equality claim was based on the New Jersey Constitution's requirement that the state provide a "thorough and efficient education" for all children. M o r e generally, see Jonathan Feldman, "Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts i n an Era of Positive Government," Rutgers Law Journal 24 (summer 1993): 1057-1100. This usage differs somewhat from the state judicial interpretation o f the distinction between revision and amendment, which is employed primarily i n determining whether or not a constitutional change can be adopted by constitutional initiative. O n this latter distinction, see Williams, State Constitutional Law, 9 3 8 - 5 8 . This has led some authors—most recently, Bruce Ackerman—to conclude that the federal Constitution can be amended outside the mechanisms suggested i n Article 5. See Ackerman, We the People; and more generally, Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Im­ perfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Unless otherwise indicated, data i n this paragraph on the number of state constitu­ tions and on state constitutional amendment are drawn from "State Constitutions," Book of States, 1996-97. 7 4

7 5

7 6

7 7

24

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Chapter 1

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t likewise underscores the states' willingness t o i n i t i a t e f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. As o f 1 9 9 6 , over 9,500 amend­ ments h a d been p r o p o s e d t o the states' c u r r e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d over 5,900 a d o p t e d — a n average o f almost 120 amendments per s t a t e . T h e A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 9 0 1 has been amended over 5 8 0 times, a n d the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 7 9 almost 5 0 0 times. Even these figures, impressive as they are, substantially underestimate the states' p r o p e n s i t y for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t i n k e r i n g , because they o m i t amendments a n d p r o ­ posed amendments t o the states' earlier c o n s t i t u t i o n s . F o r example, i n 1 9 8 0 , three years before a d o p t i n g a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n , Georgia s u b m i t t e d t o its voters 1 3 7 p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t s — 1 6 general amendments a n d 1 2 1 l o c a l amendments; a n d Louisiana's c o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 9 2 1 was amended 5 3 6 times before its replacement i n 1 9 7 4 . 78

7 9

W h i l e certain aspects o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n — f o r e x a m p l e , the B i l l o f R i g h t s a n d the t r i p a r t i t e g o v e r n m e n t a l structure—have been v i e w e d as t o o f u n d a m e n t a l for a m e n d m e n t , n o s i m i l a r reticence has m a r k e d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. T h e states have n o t o n l y r e g u l a r l y replaced their c o n s t i t u t i o n s b u t have also s u b m i t t e d sets o f amendments t o the voters t h a t , t a k e n together, have substantially altered the basic character o f the state g o v e r n m e n t . M o r e o v e r , the issues addressed b y state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments are as diverse as the subjects treated i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . F o r e x a m p l e , a survey o f amendments f r o m 1 9 8 6 t o 1993 f o u n d t h a t 13 percent concerned bills o f rights a n d suffrage, 4 2 percent dealt w i t h the structure o f state g o v e r n m e n t , 35 percent i n v o l v e d p o l i c y matters, a n d 10 percent concerned miscellaneous other m a t t e r s . 8 0

81

The data are derived from Janice C. May, "Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited," Publius 17 (winter 1987): 162, updated on the basis of "State Constitutions," 3, table 1.1. See George D . Busbee, " A n Overview of the N e w Georgia Constitution," Mercer Law Review 35 (fall 1983): 3; and M a r k T. Carleton, "Elitism Sustained: The Louisiana Consti­ tution of 1974," Tulane Law Review 54 (April 1980): 560. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution, the nation's oldest written constitution, was dramatically changed by waves of amendments in 1821 (nine amendments) and 1 9 1 7 18 (nineteen amendments). The New Jersey Constitution of 1844 was altered by the adop­ tion of twenty-eight amendments in 1875. A n d the Hawaii Constitution was fundamentally changed w i t h the ratification of twenty-two amendments in 1968, only eighteen years after its adoption, and thirty-three more in 1978. For discussion of the changes in Hawaii, see Anne Feder Lee, The Hawaii State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 1 1 - 2 0 . 7 8

7 9

8 0

These percentages were computed from data reported by M a y in "State Constitu­ tions, 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 , " 7, table B. For earlier analyses that produced comparable figures, see May, "Constitutional Amendment and Revision," 165 n. 52; and Elmer E. Cornwell Jr., "The American Constitutional Tradition: Its Impact and Development," in Kermit L . H a l l , H a r o l d M . Hyman, and Leon V. Sigal, eds., The Constitutional Convention as an Amend­ ing Device (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association and American Political Science Association, 1981), 2 6 - 2 8 , table 2. 8 1

Distinctiveness of Constitutions

•

25

Whereas Congress has o r i g i n a t e d a l l the amendments t o the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , the states have devised a n d u t i l i z e d a v a r i e t y o f mechanisms t o propose c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e . M o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amend­ ments have been p r o p o s e d by state legislatures. I n recent years, the p r o ­ posed amendments have often o r i g i n a t e d i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l commissions, groups o f experts a n d notables a p p o i n t e d b y the legislature o r executive t o develop proposals either f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the legislature o r — i n the 82

case o f F l o r i d a — f o r direct submission t o the people f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , f o r t y - o n e state c o n s t i t u t i o n s expressly authorize the legislature t o convene c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s — i n d e e d , fourteen require t h a t the legislature periodically p o l l the populace o n whether t o call a c o n v e n t i o n — a n d state legislatures have assumed the p o w e r t o call conventions even i n the absence o f express c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i z a t i o n . Altogether, over 2 3 0 state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions have been h e l d t o create, revise, or amend state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Finally, eighteen states have a d o p t e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e , w h i c h e m p o w e r s citizens t o propose amendments by p e t i t i o n d i r e c t l y t o the voters (sixteen states) o r t o the legislature before submission t o the voters (Massachusetts a n d M i s s i s s i p p i ) . 83

T h e use o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e illustrates another key differ­ ence between federal a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l practice r e g a r d i n g c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l change. Whereas the federal a m e n d m e n t process provides n o m e c h a n i s m f o r direct p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the states have structured the process o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change t o m a x i m i z e such p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the i n i t i a t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change occurs n o t o n l y t h r o u g h the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e b u t t h r o u g h p o p u l a r votes o n legislative proposals t o call c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions a n d o n the selec­ t i o n o f delegates t o those c o n v e n t i o n s . T w e l v e states require t h a t 8 4

85

This paragraph relies on May, "Constitutional Amendment and Revision," 153-179; May, "State Constitutions"; Walter F. Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State Consti­ tutions (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1910; rpt. New York: Da Capo, 1970); and Roger Sherman Hoar, Constitutional Conventions: Their Nature, Rowers, and Limita­ tions (Boston: Little, Brown, 1919). Florida Constitution, art. 1 1 , sec. 2. For discussion of the commission mode of amendment, see Robert F. Williams, "Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The Increasing Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change," Hofstra Journal of Public Policy 1 (1996): 1-26. For a useful discussion of the popular role in state constitutional change, see Harry L. Witte, "Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of Constitutionalism: The Processes of Consti­ tutional Change in Pennsylvania," Widener Journal of Public Law 3 (1993): 383-476. American state practice is far more typical of the practice of constitutional change worldwide—see David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds., Referendums around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1994). Two points should be noted about the extent of popular control over state constitu­ tional conventions. First, in electing delegates, voters may be choosing among candidates put forward by the state's political parties. In Arizona, the selection of delegate candidates 8 2

8 3

8 4

8 5

26

•

Chapter 1

a m e n d m e n t s be p r o p o s e d by m a j o r i t i e s i n t w o

successive legislatures,

g i v i n g citizens an o p p o r t u n i t y t o express t h e i r views o n p r o p o s e d c o n s t i ­ t u t i o n a l changes i n the i n t e r v e n i n g e l e c t i o n .

8 6

F u r t h e r m o r e , i n every state

except D e l a w a r e , the people r a t i f y a l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes, h o w e v e r p r o p o s e d , by r e f e r e n d u m . A

final

8 7

d i s t i n c t i v e feature o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l practice r e g a r d i n g

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change is the i n v o l v e m e n t o f state c o u r t s i n overseeing the process o f change. T h e reliance o n f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n states has

the

p r o m p t e d o p p o n e n t s o f p r o p o s e d changes t o challenge t h e i r

l e g a l i t y i n the c o u r t s . Whereas the U n i t e d States Supreme C o u r t has dis­ missed procedural challenges t o the federal amendment process as " p o l i t i ­ cal q u e s t i o n s , " state c o u r t s have p r o v e d q u i t e w i l l i n g t o address a w i d e range o f issues associated w i t h

state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e .

8 8

Several

state c o u r t s have r u l e d o n w h e t h e r the state legislature can c a l l a c o n v e n ­ t i o n despite the absence o f express a u t h o r i z a t i o n i n the state c o n s t i t u ­ tion.

8 9

O t h e r s have considered the v a l i d i t y o f mechanisms designed t o

facilitate r a t i f i c a t i o n o f a m e n d m e n t s i n states t h a t r e q u i r e d e x t r a o r d i n a r y m a j o r i t i e s for a p p r o v a l or the v a l i d i t y o f p o p u l a r consent t o an a m e n d -

by party conventions ensured that they were "pledged to particular constitutional goals," and this facilitated party control. Whether it ensured popular control is open to question. See John D . Leshy, The Arizona State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 4. Second, some states do not require that convention calls be submitted for popular approval. Also, on occasion—most recently in Louisiana i n 1992— state legislatures have called themselves into session as constitutional conventions. The legitimacy of such a step is open to question, however, and generally such conventions have had little success in gaining popular support for their proposals. See Hoar, Constitutional Conventions, 7 9 - 8 0 . See "State Constitutions," 5, table 1.2. Three other states—Connecticut, Hawaii, and N e w Jersey—permit submission of amendments either by an extraordinary legislative majority or by a majority vote in a second session following an intervening election. Although it has been the standard practice since the early nineteenth century to sub­ mit constitutional changes to the people, there have been exceptions. For example, the latenineteenth-century conventions in Virginia, Mississippi, and Louisiana did not submit their proposed constitutions to the voters because their aim was to deprive African-Americans and poor whites of the vote, and they feared voters would fight their disenfranchisement. See D o d d , Revision and Amendment, 6 7 - 6 8 . The leading federal case is Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). For an overview of state activity, see Michael G. Colatuono, "The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change," California Law Re­ view 75 (July 1987): 1473-1512. O n the relative unimportance of the "political questions" doctrine i n state constitutional law, see Tarr and Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation, 4 4 - 4 5 . See, e.g., Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100 (1854); State v. American Sugar Co., 137 La. 407 (1915); State v. Dahl, 6 N . D . 81 (1896); and In Re Opinion to the Governor, 178 A . 433 (R.I. 1935). 8 6

8 7

8 8

8 9

Distinctiveness of Constitutions

•

27

m e n t w h e n p u b l i c i t y a b o u t its content a n d effects h a d been m i s l e a d i n g . T h e I n d i a n a Supreme C o u r t i n v a l i d a t e d the legislature's a t t e m p t t o c o n ­ vene itself as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n , a n d the I o w a Supreme C o u r t struck d o w n p o p u l a r l y a p p r o v e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments because the p r o p o s e d amendments were n o t entered i n t o the legislative j o u r n a l s as r e q u i r e d by the state c o n s t i t u t i o n . Some state c o n s t i t u t i o n s restrict amendments t o a "single subject," a n d i n those states courts have heard challenges c l a i m i n g t h a t w i d e - r a n g i n g amendments encompassed m o r e t h a n a single s u b j e c t . State c o n s t i t u t i o n s also restrict the use o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e t o amendment, n o t r e v i s i o n , a n d so state courts have h a d t o consider w h e t h e r the far-reaching changes i n t r o d u c e d by some amendments c o n s t i t u t e d revisions o f the state c o n s t i t u t i o n . Some state c o n s t i t u t i o n s impose a d d i t i o n a l restrictions o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e t h a t have likewise p r o m o t e d l i t i g a t i o n . T a k e n altogether, these cases reveal t h a t state judges are active p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the process o f f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. 90

9 1

92

9 3

9 4

CONCLUSION

T h i s chapter's d e s c r i p t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change has h i g h l i g h t e d w h a t is distinctive i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l practice. Some o f the distinctive features, such as the p l e n a r y character o f state legislative power, reflect the f u n d a m e n t a l premises o f the nation's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system. F o r w h e n legislative p o w e r is d i v i d e d i n a federal system, one g o v e r n m e n t m u s t receive grants o f p o w e r a n d the other retain residual power. M o s t o f the distinctive features o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , however, arise f r o m p o l i t i c a l choices by the states. A l t h o u g h state legislatures' possession o f plenary legislative p o w e r m a y reflect the character o f the nation's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l system, the states r e m a i n free t o choose w h a t sorts o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t s t o impose O n mechanisms for facilitating ratification, see State ex rei. Thompson v. Winnett, 78 Neb. 379 (1907); State v. Lay liti, 69 Ohio St. 1 (1903); and May and Thomas Hardward Co. v. Birmingham, 123 Ala. 306 (1898). On misleading publicity and popular consent, see Bedner v. King, 272 A.2d 616 ( N . H . 1970). Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336 (1912); and Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543 (1883), and State v. Brookhart, 113 Iowa 250 (1901). See, e.g., Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990); Amador Valley School District v. State Board of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978); and Evans v. Firestone, 457 So.2d 1351 (Fla. 1984). See, e.g., Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990); Adams v. Gunter, 238 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1970); and McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948). For example, the Alaska Constitution, art. 1 1 , sec. 7, forbids the use of the initiative to enact local or special legislation, leading to constitutional challenges in Walters v. Cease, 388 P.2d 263 (Alas. 1964), and Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456 (Alas. 1974). 9 0

9 1

9 2

9 3

9 4

28

•

Chapter 1

o n t h a t power. A n d the states over t i m e have s w u n g f r o m few l i m i t a t i o n s i n the late eighteenth century, t o extensive a n d detailed restrictions i n the late nineteenth century, t o s o m e w h a t fewer restrictions by the late t w e n ­ t i e t h century. A l t h o u g h the incompleteness o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n i n a sense requires t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s deal w i t h local g o v e r n m e n t , i t does n o t determine h o w state c o n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l d o so. T h u s , the states have chosen over t i m e t o deal w i t h local g o v e r n m e n t i n various w a y s , r a n g i n g f r o m i m p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n o f local c o m m u n i t i e s ' r i g h t t o selfg o v e r n m e n t , t o detailed r e g u l a t i o n o f the structure a n d p o w e r s o f local governments, t o b r o a d grants o f h o m e r u l e . A l t h o u g h the nation's consti­ t u t i o n a l system assigns t o the states the p o w e r t o structure their state governments, i t does n o t determine w h e t h e r the states w i l l f o l l o w the federal m o d e l o r w i l l depart f r o m i t . N o r does i t determine w h e t h e r states w i l l revise a n d a m e n d their c o n s t i t u t i o n s frequently o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e p o l i c y matters o r establish mechanisms for direct p o p u l a r r u l e . T h i s chapter has f o r the m o s t p a r t treated state c o n s t i t u t i o n s as a u n i t , i g n o r i n g v a r i a t i o n s a m o n g state charters. O b v i o u s l y , these differences can be substantial. As chapters 3 - 5 w i l l show, c o m p a r i s o n o f state c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n s a d o p t e d i n different eras reveals significant v a r i a t i o n s i n struc­ t u r e , substance, a n d u n d e r l y i n g p o l i t i c a l theory. Yet even t h o u g h the states' p o l i t i c a l choices have v a r i e d over t i m e , the extent a n d character o f the differences a m o n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s are less substantial t h a n those between state a n d federal charters. Succeeding chapters elaborate the dis­ t i n c t i v e features o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , trace h o w they have devel­ o p e d , a n d assess the various explanations p r o p o s e d t o account f o r t h e m . I t is t o these explanations t h a t w e n o w t u r n .

CHAPTER 2

Explaining State Constitutional Development

I F STATE C O N S T I T U T I O N S differ f r o m the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d f r o m each other as w e l l , the o b v i o u s question is w h y . Perhaps the most salient difference between state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m a n d n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ­ ism, as w e l l as the one w i t h the broadest i m p l i c a t i o n s , is the frequency o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change t h r o u g h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t a n d con­ s t i t u t i o n a l revision. Several explanations have been advanced t o account for the states' propensity f o r f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. T h e frequency of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change m i g h t be a t t r i b u t a b l e t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n favor­ able t o such change w i t h i n the states. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the relative ease o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l revision a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t i n the states m i g h t e x p l a i n the states' greater reliance o n f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change, w i t h interstate v a r i a t i o n s i n the frequency o f a m e n d m e n t a n d revision reflect­ ing interstate differences i n the legal requirements g o v e r n i n g a m e n d m e n t a n d revision. O r the frequency o f f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change m i g h t indicate t h a t the states have failed t o solve the basic p o l i t i c a l problems c o n f r o n t i n g t h e m , necessitating r e c u r r i n g efforts t o deal w i t h those p r o b ­ lems. T h e i n i t i a l section o f this chapter surveys the arguments a n d the evidence s u p p o r t i n g these alternative explanations o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. T h e second section o f this chapter is premised o n the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d o n o t exist i n i s o l a t i o n , t h a t they m a y be influenced i n their structure, i n the substance o f their provisions, a n d i n the changes they have undergone b y constitutions a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l developments b e y o n d the borders o f their states. I t therefore seeks t o identify the v a r i ­ ous mechanisms o f interstate a n d nation-to-state influence a n d assesses their i m p a c t o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development. I n a d d i t i o n t o its i n t r i n ­ sic interest, this account o f the influence o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l developments i n state a n d n a t i o n serves t o clarify the differences between n a t i o n a l a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s . T h e c o n c l u d i n g section o f the chapter makes e x p l i c i t the various per­ spectives o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development t h a t underlie m u c h o f the scholarly literature o n the t o p i c a n d assesses the usefulness o f those per­ spectives. O n e v i e w is t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s are best analyzed t h r o u g h the lens o f p o l i t i c a l theory, w i t h each d o c u m e n t u n d e r s t o o d as reflecting the state's p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , the d o m i n a n t o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d politics a n d g o v e r n m e n t i n the state. A n o t h e r v i e w is t h a t state constitutions are best

30

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Chapter 2

u n d e r s t o o d t h r o u g h the lens o f history, w i t h each d o c u m e n t reflecting the set o f issues a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l prescriptions prevalent d u r i n g the era i n w h i c h i t was created. A final v i e w is t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s are best seen t h r o u g h the lens o f " o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c s , " w i t h the c o n s t i t u t i o n reflecting neither an o v e r a r c h i n g p o l i t i c a l v i s i o n n o r an h i s t o r i c a l m o m e n t b u t r a t h e r the c o n t i n u a t i o n i n another arena o f the conflicts a m o n g p o l i t i c a l g r o u p s t h a t generally d o m i n a t e state p o l i t i c s . As shall be seen, a l t h o u g h none o f these accounts f u l l y explains state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development, each does c o n t r i b u t e t o an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s .

A C C O U N T I N G F O R STATE C O N S T I T U T I O N A L C H A N G E

Attitudinal

Explanations

Some scholars have a t t r i b u t e d the frequency o f f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n the states t o p o l i t i c a l attitudes w i t h i n the states. O n i n i t i a l inspection, this c l a i m m a y seem t r i v i a l : state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments a n d p r o p o s e d state c o n s t i t u t i o n s are ratified by referendum, so i t w o u l d seem t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes c o u l d h a r d l y occur w i t h o u t p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . (As shall be seen, t h a t m a y n o t be as clear as i t i n i t i a l l y ap­ pears.) H o w e v e r , the a t t i t u d i n a l e x p l a n a t i o n for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change becomes m o r e interesting i f the c l a i m is t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change is connected n o t o n l y t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n a b o u t specific measures b u t also t o established p u b l i c perspectives o n the desirability o f frequent c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l change. T h i s i n fact is the c l a i m advanced by h i s t o r i a n M o r t o n Keller, w h o has suggested t h a t the frequent revision a n d a m e n d m e n t o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s reflect the c o n j u n c t i o n o f t w o p o p u l a r attitudes: a dis­ satisfaction w i t h the performance o f state g o v e r n m e n t a n d an o p t i m i s m t h a t t i n k e r i n g w i t h its i n s t i t u t i o n a l m a c h i n e r y can correct its deficien­ cies. Such c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes as the i m p o s i t i o n o f checks o n state p o w e r t o c o n t r a c t debt i n mid-nineteenth-century c o n s t i t u t i o n s , after i m ­ p r u d e n t p r o m o t i o n a l efforts h a d b r o u g h t several states t o the b r i n k (or over the b r i n k ) o f b a n k r u p t c y , appear t o buttress Keller's thesis. So t o o 1

2

3

Since the 1820s, it has been standard practice to submit proposed state constitutions to the state electorate for ratification. Currently, only Delaware does not require that constitu­ tional amendments be ratified by popular referendum. The main departures from the prac­ tice of popular ratification occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when some Southern constitutions designed to disenfranchise African-Americans and poor whites were promulgated without popular ratification in order to forestall organized oppo­ sition to them. See D o d d , Revision and Amendment, 6 2 - 7 1 . M o r t o n Keller, "The Politics of State Constitutional Revision, 1820-1930," in H a l l , H y m a n , and Sigal, Constitutional Convention, 6 7 - 6 8 . O n the movement in New York, which led to the creation of the 1846 constitution, see L. Roy Gunn, The Decline of Authority: Public Economic Policy and Political Develop1

2

3

State Constitutional Development

•

31

does the absence o f a " c u l t o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n , " w h i c h m i g h t i m p e d e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change, i n the states. A l s o consistent w i t h Keller's thesis 4

are the t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms

i n several states de­

signed t o ease legal r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a m e n d i n g t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s the states' increased reliance

o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t since

and the

1950s, b o t h o f w h i c h suggest a p o s i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e . M a n y studies o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n specific states l i k e w i s e 5

p o s i t a c o n n e c t i o n between p u b l i c attitudes a n d the general o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n the state. F o r e x a m p l e , the c o n t i n u a t i o n of

Georgia's e x t r a o r d i n a r y

propensity

for constitutional

amendment

even after the a d o p t i o n o f a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n i n 1 9 8 2 suggests t h a t the state c i t i z e n r y has c o n c l u d e d t h a t this is h o w p o l i t i c s s h o u l d be c o n ­ ducted.

6

I n c o n t r a s t , a c c o r d i n g t o L a w r e n c e Schlam, the infrequency o f

f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n I l l i n o i s b o t h before a n d after the a d o p ­ t i o n o f the 1 9 7 0 c o n s t i t u t i o n reflected a " d i s u n i f i e d , i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , a n d f a c t i o u s " p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e t h a t discouraged f u n d a m e n t a l basis o f simple m a j o r i t i e s .

change o n the

7

Nevertheless, the c o n n e c t i o n between p u b l i c attitudes a n d state c o n s t i ­

m i in New York, 1800-1860 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), especially 1 8 3 - 9 1 . M o r e generally, see A . James Heins, Constitutional Restrictions against State Debt (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963). O n the persistence of this cult at the federal level, see Levinson, Constitutional Faith, chap. 1. M y o w n experience confirms that there is no cult of the state constitution. I applied for a grant from the New Jersey Historical Commission to convene a conference i n 1987, mark­ ing the fortieth anniversary of the highly successful New Jersey Constitution. This coincided w i t h the bicentennial of United States Constitution, which directed attention to constitu­ tional matters. Although I eventually received the grant, at the time of the application, the Historical Commission, whose responsibility it was to foster an interest in the history of the state, was altogether unaware that an important anniversary of the state constitution was approaching. For a general discussion of the movement to facilitate state constitutional change, see Colatuono, "Revision of State Constitutions." A t the general election of 1980, 16 general amendments and 121 local amendments were submitted to Georgia's voters. This was not atypical. From 1945 until the effective date of the state's 1982 constitution, 1,530 amendments were proposed to the constitution of Georgia, and 1,174 were ratified. O f the adopted amendments 974 were local amend­ ments, affecting only a single jurisdiction w i t h i n the state. The adoption of the state's 1982 constitution eliminated the need for local amendments but scarcely slowed the pace of general amendments. From 1984 to 1992, Georgia voters considered 52 proposed amend­ ments and ratified 39 of them. See H i l l , The Georgia State Constitution, 2 0 - 2 3 , and Busbee, "Overview of Georgia Constitution," 3. Lawrence Schlam, "State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study i n Constitutional Stagnation," DePaul Law Review 43 (winter 1994): 269-378. See also Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie: The Metropolitan Frontier and American Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1970), chap. 7. 4

5

6

7

32

•

Chapter 2

t u t i o n a l change is b o t h m o r e c o m p l e x a n d m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c t h a n i t i n i ­ t i a l l y appears. A l t h o u g h one m i g h t assume t h a t p o p u l a r r a t i f i c a t i o n o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t indicates p u b l i c agreement w i t h the change, this m a y be a rash c o n c l u s i o n . V o t e r k n o w l e d g e a b o u t , a n d interest i n , m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments is q u i t e l i m i t e d , as i n d i c a t e d b o t h by t u r n o u t figures a n d , w h e n other elections are o c c u r r i n g s i m u l ­ taneously, by b a l l o t f a t i g u e . A m e n d m e n t s have been ratified i n L o u i s i ­ ana b y as few as 6 percent o f registered voters, a n d figures f r o m other states are n o t m u c h better. I n such circumstances one c a n n o t infer m u c h a b o u t p o p u l a r sentiment f r o m voter endorsement o r d i s a p p r o v a l o f p r o ­ posed amendments. F u r t h e r m o r e , even w h e n voters d o cast ballots f o r o r against an a m e n d m e n t , the c o n t e x t i n w h i c h an a m e n d m e n t is p r o p o s e d m a y be just as i m p o r t a n t as p u b l i c attitudes i n d e t e r m i n i n g its fate. I n F l o r i d a , f o r example, a p r o p o s e d r i g h t - t o - p r i v a c y a m e n d m e n t was de­ feated i n 1 9 7 8 , largely because i t was o n the b a l l o t w i t h other u n p o p u l a r proposals, b u t was a d o p t e d h a n d i l y o n l y t w o years later w h e n those p r o ­ posals were n o t o n the b a l l o t . Voters i n other states have likewise v o t e d for o r against unrelated p r o p o s e d amendments as a p a c k a g e . This means t h a t the p o p u l a r v e r d i c t o n an a m e n d m e n t m a y reflect s o m e t h i n g other t h a n s t r o n g agreement o r disagreement w i t h i t . 8

9

1 0

11

A n o t h e r p r o b l e m w i t h a t t i t u d i n a l e x p l a n a t i o n s o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change is t h a t they rarely specify w h o constitutes the " p u b l i c " whose attitudes are alleged t o be decisive. Yet b o t h the h i s t o r y o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change a n d the process by w h i c h i t occurs underscore the need for c l a r i t y o n this p o i n t . O v e r the course o f the nation's history, the impetus f o r f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n the states has shifted d r a m a t i c a l l y . D u r ­ i n g the first h a l f o f the nineteenth century, campaigns f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n were t y p i c a l l y p o p u l a r movements, opposed at times by officials The problem of meaningful consent is also raised by the politics surrounding proposed amendments. Particularly interesting is Bedner v. King, 272 A.2d 616 ( N . H . 1970), in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that voters' consent to an amendment was not invalid merely because publicity about its content and effects was misleading. Carleton, "Elitism Sustained," 564; and Janice C. May, The Texas Constitutional Re­ vision Experience in the '70s (Austin, Tex.: Sterling Swift Publishing, 1975), 24. Rebecca Mae Salokar, "Creating a State Constitutional Right to Privacy: Unlikely Alliances, Uncertain Results," in G. Alan Tarr, ed., Constitutional Politics in the States: Contemporary Controversies and Historical Patterns (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 7 3 - 9 7 . See, for example, Hawaii's adoption of all thirty-four proposed amendments in 1978 and Louisiana's rejection of all fifty-three amendments in 1970. Lee, The Hawaii State Constitution, 18; and Carleton, "Elitism Sustained," 561-63. It should also be noted, in light of the Florida turnaround, that in recent years in Mississippi twelve of the thirty constitutional amendments that initially failed succeeded when reintroduced. See John W. Winkle I I I , The Mississippi State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 14-15. 8

9

1 0

1 1

State Constitutional Development

•

33

w h o feared (often q u i t e r i g h t l y ) t h a t a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d d i m i n i s h their p o w e r s .

1 2

Yet by the latter h a l f o f the t w e n t i e t h century, c a m p a i g n s

for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m w e r e generally i n i t i a t e d and m a n a g e d by p o l i t i ­ cal elites a n d " g o o d g o v e r n m e n t " g r o u p s , often i n the face o f p u b l i c apa­ t h y or h o s t i l i t y .

1 3

D u r i n g the

rejected p r o p o s a l s for 1980

1970s, for e x a m p l e , voters i n eight states

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s , and

state electorates r a t i f i e d o n l y three o f the eight n e w

p r o p o s e d by c o n v e n t i o n s .

1 4

from

1965

to

constitutions

Even p o p u l a r c a m p a i g n s f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

change, such as the t e r m l i m i t a t i o n s m o v e m e n t , have q u i c k l y come u n d e r the

c o n t r o l o f professional p o l i t i c a l o p e r a t i v e s .

15

I n l i g h t o f this shift,

Keller's c l a i m o f a p r e v a i l i n g " p u b l i c " a t t i t u d e i n f a v o r o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change appears p r o b l e m a t i c at best. M o r e o v e r , as the reference t o

con-

In Virginia, for example, when population growth in the interior prompted demands for reapportionment, the state legislature for several years refused to call a convention. See M e r r i l l D . Peterson, ed., Democracy, Liberty, and Property: The State Constitutional Con­ ventions of the 1820's (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), 2 7 1 - 7 5 . In Maryland, when the legislature refused to call a convention, reformers responded by taking steps to convene an extralegal convention, and the legislature eventually capitulated. See John Alexander Jameson, A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions: Their History, Powers, and Modes of Proceeding, 4th ed. (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1887; rpt. N e w York: Da Capo, 1972), 216. In Rhode Island the legislature's refusal to sanction a convention did lead to the convening of an extralegal convention and the Dorr Rebellion. See M a r v i n E. Gettleman, The Dorr Rebellion: A Study in American Radicalism, 1823-1849 (New York: Random House, 1973). In N e w York, the Council of Revision vetoed legislation that made direct provision for a convention. See Hurst, Growth of American Law, 207. A n d in N o r t h Caro­ lina the legislature sought to control constitutional change by strictly limiting the sorts of amendments that could be proposed by the constitutional convention rather than risking an unlimited convention. See John V. O r t h , The North Carolina State Constitution: A Refer­ ence Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 8. For an overview, see G. Alan Tarr, "State Constitutional Politics: A n Historical Perspective," in Tarr, Constitutional Poli­ tics in States, 3 - 2 3 . 1 2

The centrality of elite reformers in state constitutional reform during the twentieth century is exemplified by the efforts of the National Municipal League to spur constitu­ tional change. See its Model State Constitution and its many publications—e.g., John P. Wheeler Jr., Salient Issues of Constitutional Reform (New York: National Municipal League, 1961)—extolling constitutional change. The League's efforts are discussed in chap­ ter 5. The popular suspicion of constitutional reform can be seen in the frequency w i t h which voters have rejected either proposals to call conventions or the constitutions submit­ ted to them by conventions. See Elmer E. Cornwell Jr., Jay S. Goodman, and Wayne R. Swanson, State Constitutional Conventions (New York: Praeger, 1975), 187 and passim; Tip H . Allen Jr., and Coleman B. Ransome Jr., Constitutional Revision in Theory and Prac­ tice (University: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1962), 152-54; and—for an illuminating case study—John P. Wheeler, Magnificent Failure: The Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968 (New York: National Municipal League, 1972). Albert L . Sturm, "The Development of American State Constitutions," Publius 12 (winter 1982): 8 1 - 8 4 . See John David Rausch Jr., "The Politics of Term Limitations," in Tarr, Constitutional Politics in States, 98-127. 1 3

1 4

1 5

34

•

Chapter 2

flicts between advocates a n d o p p o n e n t s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change sug­ gests, state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change is a multistage process, a n d the groups t h a t c o n t r o l the i n i t i a t i o n o f change often differ f r o m those t h a t f o r m u ­ late the changes or r a t i f y t h e m . T h e c o m p l e x i t y o f the process, w i t h dif­ ferent groups d o m i n a n t at its v a r i o u s stages, further complicates efforts t o d r a w a c o n n e c t i o n between p u b l i c attitudes a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. Finally, there is a r i s k t h a t a t t i t u d i n a l explanations o f state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l change m a y become t a u t o l o g i c a l . F o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes are alleged t o occur, or fail t o occur, because o f p o p u l a r attitudes t o w a r d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. H o w e v e r , often the p r i m a r y evidence o f these a t t i ­ tudes is the presence o r absence o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. A t a m i n i m u m , these p r o b l e m s suggest t h a t one s h o u l d be cautious a b o u t a t t r i b u t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments or revisions t o p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for such change a n d s h o u l d recognize the c o m p l e x i t i e s i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p u b l i c attitudes a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m .

Legal

Requirements

Some c o m m e n t a t o r s have m a i n t a i n e d t h a t the frequency o f f o r m a l c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l change i n the states reflects state legal requirements, w h i c h i n m o s t states m a k e i t relatively easy t o a m e n d o r revise the state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n . Eighteen states c u r r e n t l y p e r m i t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments t o be p r o p o s e d b y a simple m a j o r i t y i n each house o f the legislature, five m o r e by simple majorities i n t w o sessions w i t h an i n t e r v e n i n g election, a n d nine b y a three-fifths vote i n each h o u s e . I n f o r t y - f o u r states, o n l y a simple m a j o r i t y vote i n a referendum is r e q u i r e d t o r a t i f y p r o p o s e d amendments, a n d i n D e l a w a r e p o p u l a r r a t i f i c a t i o n is n o t even r e q u i r e d . I n a d d i t i o n , i n eighteen states voters can propose c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amend­ ments directly, w i t h t h i r t e e n p e r m i t t i n g r a t i f i c a t i o n o f those proposals b y a simple m a j o r i t y o f those v o t i n g o n the m e a s u r e s . Finally, fourteen states require a p e r i o d i c p o p u l a r vote o n c a l l i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conven­ t i o n , w i t h o n l y a simple m a j o r i t y necessary t o convene one. Yet even i f states can t o d a y alter their c o n s t i t u t i o n s rather easily, this does n o t m e a n t h a t p r i o r state c o n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t a i n e d s i m i l a r l y per­ missive p r o v i s i o n s f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. I n fact, five p r e - 1 8 0 0 c o n s t i t u t i o n s — t h o s e o f N e w Y o r k , V i r g i n i a , N o r t h C a r o l i n a , Pennsylva16

17

Data on the methods of constitutional change in the various states are found i n May, "State Constitutions, 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 , " 2 1 - 2 5 , tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. See "Comment: California's Constitutional Amendomania," Stanford Law Review 1 (January 1949): 2 7 9 - 8 8 ; and James M . Fischer, "Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 11 (fall 1983): 4 3 - 9 0 . 1 6

1 7

State Constitutional Development

•

35

nia ( 1 7 9 0 ) , a n d N e w Jersey—failed t o specify any m e c h a n i s m at all for their a m e n d m e n t or r e v i s i o n . D u r i n g the nineteenth century, m a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s i m p o s e d burdensome a m e n d m e n t requirements. A l a ­ bama's c o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 1 9 , for example, p r o v i d e d for legislative p r o ­ posal a n d p o p u l a r a p p r o v a l b u t left i t t o the succeeding legislature t o determine i f the a p p r o v e d a m e n d m e n t s h o u l d take e f f e c t . N e w Y o r k ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 2 1 prescribed t h a t amendments h a d t o pass t w o succes­ sive legislatures, first by a m a j o r i t y o f elected members, second by t w o t h i r d s o f the elected members o f each house, before they c o u l d be ratified at a general e l e c t i o n . Several other states retained similar requirements u n t i l the 1850s, w h e n they began t o dispense w i t h the r e q u i r e m e n t o f a second legislative a p p r o v a l . Pennsylvania, N e w Jersey, a n d Tennessee a l l o w e d amendments t o be p r o p o s e d o n l y at certain intervals, and N e w H a m p s h i r e o n l y by means o f a c o n v e n t i o n . Finally, A l a b a m a , N e ­ braska, O h i o , a n d Tennessee discouraged c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t by r e q u i r i n g t h a t amendments be ratified by e x t r a o r d i n a r y electoral major­ i t i e s . I f legal requirements are decisive i n d e t e r m i n i n g the rate o f consti­ t u t i o n a l change, one w o u l d expect t h a t the rate o f a m e n d m e n t i n the 18

19

2 0

2 1

2 2

23

Dealey, Growth of State Constitutions, 3 2 - 3 3 . The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 and the Vermont Constitution of 1793 each provided for constitutional amendment only through the operation of a Council of Revision. The problem of missing mechanisms for constitutional change persisted into the nineteenth century: for example, the Virginia constitutions of 1830 and 1851 likewise made no provision for amendment. Alabama Constitution (1819), art. 6. For a discussion of constitutional amendment through state legislatures, see Dodd, Revision and Amendment, 1 2 0 - 2 1 . New York Constitution (1821), art. 8, sec. 1. This cumbersome mode of amendment limited amendments to eight in twenty-five years. New York's 1846 constitution substan­ tially liberalized the process of amendment. See Gunn, The Decline of Authority, 171 and 195-96; and Peter J. Galie, The New York State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), 13-14. The provisions for amendment in the Tennessee Constitution of 1834 and the Con­ necticut Constitution of 1818, to cite but t w o examples, resembled N e w York's: proposal by t w o sessions of the state legislature. Tennessee retained this mode of amendment in its 1870 constitution. See Lewis L. Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990), 10 and 18. M o r e generally, see Dodd, Revision and Amendment, 131. Dodd, Revision and Amendment, 2 6 6 - 6 7 . Dodd, Revision and Amendment, 196-97; Robert D . M i e w a l d and Peter J. Longo, The Nebraska State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 15; Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution, 10 and 18; and Allen and Ransome, Constitutional Revision, chap. 2. The Alabama Constitution of 1875 required ratification by a majority of the qualified electors in the state. The Ohio Constitution of 1851 and the Nebraska Constitution of 1875 demanded ratification by a majority of all those casting ballots at the election at which the amendment was submitted for approval. The Tennessee Constitution required approval by a majority of as many citizens of the state as last voted for representatives. 1 8

1 9

2 0

2 1

2 2

2 3

36

•

Chapter 2

v a r i o u s states w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d t o the ease o r difficulty o f i n s t i t u t i n g such a m e n d m e n t s .

24

Some anecdotal evidence supports this c o n c l u s i o n .

T h e effectiveness o f legal barriers t o a m e n d m e n t is best s h o w n b y the Tennessee C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h — b u r d e n e d w i t h cumbersome procedures for p r o p o s i n g a n d r a t i f y i n g 1870 to 19'53.

25

amendments—remained

unaltered

from

Yet legal barriers t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change have n o t a l ­

w a y s p r o v e d insuperable, as some states have f o u n d ingenious w a y s t o c i r c u m v e n t burdensome c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements. Faced w i t h ratifica­ t i o n requirements s i m i l a r t o those i n Tennessee, enterprising officials i n A l a b a m a , N e b r a s k a , a n d O h i o redesigned the b a l l o t t o place the onus o n voters t o voice their d i s a p p r o v a l o f a m e n d m e n t s .

26

I n other instances,

state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements were f r a n k l y i g n o r e d . T h e N o r t h C a r o ­ l i n a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 7 6 , for e x a m p l e , w h i c h governed the state u n t i l 1 8 6 0 , h a d n o p r o v i s i o n f o r amendment; b u t the state legislature called a c o n v e n t i o n i n 1 8 3 5 , w h i c h p r o p o s e d several amendments t h a t were t h e n s u b m i t t e d t o the voters for r a t i f i c a t i o n .

2 7

A c c o r d i n g t o one a u t h o r i t y ,

twenty-seven state conventions m e t d u r i n g the nineteenth century w i t h ­ o u t any a u t h o r i t y i n their c o n s t i t u t i o n s for a s s e m b l i n g .

28

I n the first systematic e x a m i n a t i o n o f the issue, D o n a l d L u t z c o n f i r m e d the influence o f state legal requirements o n the frequency o f f o r m a l c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l change or, m o r e specifically, o n the rate o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l The rate of amendment—that is, the average number of amendments per year since the state's constitution came into effect—is a better measure than the total number of amendments, given the differing duration of state constitutions. Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution, 1 8 - 1 9 , and Allen and Ransome, Constitu­ tional Revision, chap. 2. Illinois faced similar difficulties until it adopted a "gateway amendment"—see Schlam, "State Constitutional Amending," 3 5 3 - 7 6 . Dodd, Revision and Amendment, 196-97. In Alabama, voters were required to sig­ nify their rejection of an amendment by removing a statement of approval from the ballot. In Nebraska and Ohio, political parties were permitted to endorse amendments, and voters who voted a straight party ticket would thus automatically endorse proposed amendments. D o n E. Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slaveholding South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 5 - 6 . Jameson, Treatise on Constitutional Conventions, chap. 4. During the twentieth cen­ tury, the Rhode Island Supreme Court overruled precedent and held that the legislature could summon a convention, even though the state constitution did not expressly authorize it. In Re Opinion to the Governor, 178 A . 433 (R.I. 1935). When constitutional requirements for amendment could not be circumvented, state offi­ cials sometimes ignored constitutional mandates. I n Illinois, Governor Adlai Stevenson ac­ knowledged that such action was a practical necessity in order to avoid "anachronisms." See Peter Suber, The Paradox of Self-Amendment: A Study of Logic, Law, Omnipotence, and Change (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 17. I n N e w York, judges have approved various devices developed to circumvent constitutional debt restrictions and "contort[ed] and strainjed]" provisions on housing to keep them "abreast of changing housing needs." See Galie, New York State Constitution, 165-66 and 2 6 6 - 6 8 . 2 4

2 5

2 6

2 7

2 8

State Constitutional Development

•

37

a m e n d m e n t i n the s t a t e s . A n a l y z i n g the effects o f the m o d e o f a m e n d ­ m e n t o n the rate o f a m e n d m e n t f o r a l l fifty c u r r e n t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , L u t z discovered t h a t the difficulty o f the a m e n d m e n t process, together w i t h the l e n g t h o f the state c o n s t i t u t i o n , " l a r g e l y e x p l a i n e d " the variance i n a m e n d m e n t rates a m o n g the s t a t e s . Lutz's study represents a signifi­ cant advance i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t . Never­ theless, i t leaves several questions unanswered. First, because L u t z f o ­ cuses exclusively o n the a m e n d m e n t o f c u r r e n t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , his study does n o t determine w h e t h e r legal requirements were e q u a l l y i m p o r ­ t a n t d u r i n g earlier periods i n A m e r i c a n history. Second, L u t z does n o t examine the effect o f changes i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements f o r a m e n d ­ m e n t o n a m e n d m e n t rates w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l states. I f Lutz's t h e o r y is correct, one w o u l d expect t h a t the rate o f a m e n d m e n t w o u l d v a r y i n response t o changes i n legal requirements. B u t i f states develop a settled p u b l i c o p i n i o n w i t h regard t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t , as other scholars have suggested, t h e n one m i g h t expect changes i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements t o have very l i m i t e d effects ( a l t h o u g h perhaps the change i n a m e n d m e n t requirements c o u l d itself indicate a shift i n state p u b l i c o p i n ­ i o n ) . Finally, even i f the ease o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change substantially i n f l u ­ ences the rate o f such change, i t is n o t altogether clear w h a t c o n c l u s i o n s h o u l d be d r a w n f r o m this. T h e question remains as t o w h y some states have i n s t i t u t e d stringent requirements a n d others m o r e lenient ones. T h e establishment o f legal requirements t h a t either encourage or discourage f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change is itself an i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l choice, so Lutz's findings u l t i m a t e l y direct i n q u i r y back t o the p o l i t i c a l forces p r o ­ m o t i n g or r e t a r d i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e . 29

30

31

Political

Failures

Some c o m m e n t a t o r s have c o n c l u d e d t h a t the frequency o f state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l change reflects the i n a b i l i t y o f the states t o deal adequately w i t h the p r o b l e m s besetting t h e m . P o l i t i c a l scientist C l e m e n t Vose, for e x a m ­ ple, has argued t h a t frequent state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t a n d revi­ sion indicate t h a t the states' "leadership a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s are s i m p l y infe­ r i o r i n q u a l i t y . " M a n y t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reformers have 3 2

Donald S. Lutz, "Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment," American Politi­ cal Science Review 88 (June 1994): 3 5 5 - 7 0 . Lutz, "Theory of Constitutional Amendment," 365. For a recent attempt to address this question, see Schlam, "State Constitutional Amending." Vose's quotation is found in "Discussion of 'The American Constitutional Tradition: Its Impact and Development,' " in H a l l , Hyman, and Sigal, Constitutional Convention, 50. 2 9

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agreed, a t t r i b u t i n g the states' frequent recourse t o revision a n d a m e n d ­ m e n t t o a r e c u r r i n g need t o update their o v e r l y detailed c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n order t o keep t h e m abreast o f the needs o f c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i e t y . F r o m this perspective, then, revision a n d a m e n d m e n t are best u n d e r s t o o d as alternative means—comprehensive versus piecemeal—for m o d e r n i z i n g o u t d a t e d state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 33

A l t h o u g h the failure o f state governments t o c o n f r o n t p r o b l e m s , i n p a r t because o f o u t d a t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n s , was a f a m i l i a r refrain o f m i d t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y reformers, this refrain m a y itself be o u t d a t e d as a re­ sult o f recent changes i n state governments a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . I n any event, the available evidence o n l y p a r t i a l l y supports the reformers' claims a b o u t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l obsolescence a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. D o n a l d Lutz's findings d o c o n f i r m a connec­ t i o n between the length o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d the frequency w i t h w h i c h they are amended, a l t h o u g h c o r r e l a t i o n alone c a n n o t p r o v e the reformers' c l a i m t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l length produces a " n e e d " for consti­ t u t i o n a l change. Yet i f the reformers were correct, one m i g h t expect t h a t older c o n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d be amended m o r e frequently because they w o u l d be less up-to-date t h a n m o r e recent charters. T h i s is n o t the case: L u t z f o u n d t h a t the older the c o n s t i t u t i o n , the l o w e r its a n n u a l rate o f a m e n d m e n t . I n fact, i n recent years the newest state charters have been a m e n d e d m o r e frequently t h a n have the oldest o n e s . 34

3 5

36

Finally, c o n t r a r y t o the reformers' assumptions, revision a n d a m e n d -

In making this claim, he is, of course, echoing a sentiment that has existed at least since the Constitutional Convention of 1787. See, for example, W. Brooke Graves, ed., Major Problems in State Constitutional Revision (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1960); and Wheeler, Salient Issues. See, for example, Alan Rosenthal and Maureen Moakley, eds., The Political Life of the American States (New York: Praeger, 1984); A n n O ' M . Bowman and Richard C. Kearney, The Resurgence of the States (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1986); and Ann O ' M . Bowman, "The Resurgence of the States: Laboratories under Pressure," i n Franz Gress, Detlef Fechtner, and Matthias Hannes, eds., The American Federal System: Federal Balance in Comparative Perspective (Frankfurt am M a i n : Peter Lang, 1994), 111-39. The change i n state government effectiveness has prompted calls even from liberals for devolu­ tion of functions to the states. See Alice M . Rivlin, Reviving the American Dream (Washing­ ton, D.C.: Brookings, 1992). Lutz, "Theory of Constitutional Amendment," 360, table 1. Lutz hypothesizes that a low rate of amendment, combined w i t h a low replacement rate, indicates that the process of revision is dominated by a judicial body. However, he offers no evidence on this point. The average rate of amendment since ratification for the six constitutions adopted since 1970 is 1.60 amendments per annum, whereas the rate of amendment since 1970 for constitutions adopted prior to 1850 is 1.37 amendments per annum. These figures are computed from data supplied by Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making: 19381968 (New York: National Municipal League, 1970), 2 9 - 3 1 , table 5; and by May, "State Constitutions, 1992-93," 19, table 1.1. 3 3

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m e n t have n o t served as alternative mechanisms for dealing w i t h consti­ t u t i o n a l obsolescence. I f they h a d , one w o u l d expect t h a t frequent r e v i ­ sion o f a state's organic l a w w o u l d preclude frequent a m e n d m e n t , a n d vice versa. Yet often states t h a t have a d o p t e d m u l t i p l e c o n s t i t u t i o n s have also amended t h e m frequently. For example, Louisiana's t e n t h c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n , a d o p t e d i n 1 9 2 1 , was amended over 5 3 0 times before being re­ placed i n 1 9 7 2 , a n d its replacement has itself been amended over fifty times. I n contrast, R h o d e Island's o n l y c o n s t i t u t i o n has been amended just t h i r t y - s i x t i m e s . T h i s suggests t h a t m o r e is i n v o l v e d i n state consti­ t u t i o n a l change t h a n merely failures o f p o l i t i c a l leadership or the de­ m a n d s o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n . I n some states, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change m a y be a standard aspect o f its p o l i t i c s , a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n a n d amend­ m e n t thus represent the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f o r d i n a r y state p o l i t i c s by other means, invested w i t h n o m o r e s o l e m n i t y t h a n other f o r m s o f l a w m a k ­ i n g . I n other states, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n a n d a m e n d m e n t m a y reflect the emergence o f n e w p o l i t i c a l forces, w h i c h have sought c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f their numbers a n d their interests. I n still others, they m a y p r o v i d e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o pose basic choices a b o u t the principles a n d p o l i ­ cies t h a t w i l l guide the state. T h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f purposes served by for­ m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n the states contrasts w i t h a m e n d m e n t o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d underscores the distinctive character o f state constitutional politics. 3 7

3 8

T h i s is n o t t o deny, o f course, t h a t a state c o n s t i t u t i o n m a y be i n f l u ­ enced by the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n or by other state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . I t is t o the character a n d extent o f such influences t h a t this chapter n o w t u r n s .

CONSTITUTIONAL C O M M O N A L I T I E S A N D INFLUENCES F R O M B E Y O N D STATE BORDERS

Imposition

of Federal

Requirements

on State

Constitutions

A D M I S S I O N O F N E W STATES

T h e p o t e n t i a l for direct federal influence o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s is great­ est w h e n states are a p p l y i n g f o r a d m i s s i o n t o the U n i o n , because the C o n s t i t u t i o n , by e m p o w e r i n g Congress t o a d m i t n e w states t o the U n i o n , i n effect gives i t the p o w e r t o establish the c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h they Data are drawn from May, "State Constitutions, 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 , " 19, table 1.1; and Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, 1 6 - 1 7 . For an overview that confirms the anec­ dotal evidence, see Lutz, "Theory of Constitutional Amendment," 360, table 2. Thus, James Dealey observed that the frequency of amendment in some states "so confuses the distinction between fundamental and statutory law, that in such states the constitutions represent a kind of statutory law altered by a somewhat more difficult procedure than that used in the case of ordinary statutes." See Dealey, Growth of State Constitutions, 120. 3 7

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w i l l be a d m i t t e d . I n the enabling acts by w h i c h i t authorizes prospec­ tive states t o devise c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d a p p l y for statehood, Congress can impose c o n d i t i o n s as t o the substance o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s m u s t meet those c o n d i t i o n s i n order t o secure a fa­ v o r a b l e vote o n a d m i s s i o n . M o r e o v e r , i f a p r o p o s e d c o n s t i t u t i o n c o n ­ tains p r o v i s i o n s o f w h i c h Congress o r the president disapproves, either can refuse t o a p p r o v e legislation a d m i t t i n g the state u n t i l the offending 3 9

40

p r o v i s i o n s are altered or r e m o v e d . Finally, r e c o g n i t i o n o f this congres­ sional a n d executive power, together w i t h the states' eagerness t o a t t a i n s t a t e h o o d , m a y deter c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s f r o m i n c l u d i n g a n y t h i n g i n their charters t h a t is l i k e l y t o excite o p p o s i t i o n i n Congress. Some o f the c o n d i t i o n s for admission t h a t Congress has imposed o n prospective states have been general a n d n o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l . E n a b l i n g acts o f the late nineteenth century, for example, r e q u i r e d t h a t state g o v e r n ­ ments be " r e p u b l i c a n i n f o r m " a n d " n o t be r e p u g n a n t t o the C o n s t i t u ­ t i o n o f the U n i t e d States o r the principles o f the D e c l a r a t i o n o f Indepen­ d e n c e . " O t h e r requirements, likewise s t a n d a r d i n enabling acts o f the late nineteenth century, i n v o l v e d m o r e substantive matters. T h u s , consti­ t u t i o n a l conventions were instructed t o secure a "perfect t o l e r a t i o n o f religious sentiment" a n d t o p r o v i d e for "the establishment a n d m a i n t e ­ nance o f systems o f p u b l i c schools . . . free f r o m sectarian c o n t r o l . " T h i s latter requirement, a p r o d u c t o f conflicts between Protestants a n d Catholics over p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n , ensured t h a t m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s 4 1

4 2

The main provision dealing w i t h the admission of new states is Article 4, section 3 of the United States Constitution. Further constitutional support for congressional conditions on admission is provided by section 4, which directs the federal government to "guarantee to each State in the Union a Republican Form of Government." In addition to imposing conditions on prospective states, Congress also supervised the constitutions that Southern states adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War, requiring an acceptable constitution as a condition for "readmission." However, the effects of these congressional efforts were short-lived as most Southern states repudiated their Reconstruc­ tion constitutions as soon as they could, typically replacing them w i t h documents that by the late nineteenth century entrenched white political control. These developments are dis­ cussed i n chapter 4. Some states—for example, Wyoming in 1889—called conventions and drafted con­ stitutions even without congressional authorization. In such circumstances, however, Con­ gress still had to approve the proposed constitution and confer statehood. O n the Wyoming example, see Robert B. Keiter and T i m Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 4 - 5 . See, for example,, the Enabling Act of 1864 (13 Stat. 30), which authorized the people of Nevada to form a constitution and apply for admission; and the Enabling Act of 1889 (25 Stat. 676), which authorized the Dakotas, Montana, and Washington to form constitu­ tions and apply for admission. These enabling acts are reprinted in William F. Swindler, Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions, 10 vols. (Dobbs Ferry, N . Y . : Oceana, 1976), 6:261 and 64. Swindler, Sources and Documents, 6:261 and 64. 3 9

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i n c o r p o r a t e d m o r e stringent a n d specific checks o n g o v e r n m e n t a l sup­ p o r t f o r r e l i g i o n t h a n were f o u n d i n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . Finally, some states have been o b l i g e d t o a d o p t or eliminate p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n s as the price f o r statehood. As a c o n d i t i o n f o r admission, Congress i n 1906 r e q u i r e d O k l a h o m a t o locate its c a p i t a l i n G u t h r i e u n t i l 1 9 1 3 . A n d after A r i z o n a p r o p o s e d a c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t i n c l u d e d the recall o f judges, President Taft vetoed the statehood b i l l , f o r c i n g A r i z o n a t o delete the provision. 4 3

4 4

T h e i m p a c t o f these congressional mandates s h o u l d n o t be overesti­ m a t e d . M a n y o f the congressional requirements were p r o b a b l y super­ fluous: p r e s u m a b l y n o prospective state w o u l d have a d o p t e d a n o n r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n , or one b l a t a n t l y inconsistent w i t h the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , even i n the absence o f congressional directives. Even some m o r e specific congressional requirements m a y have been unnecessary. For example, even w i t h o u t congressional u r g i n g , the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f m o s t e x i s t i n g states i n the late nineteenth century p r o v i d e d for a system o f p u b l i c schools a n d banned sectarian influences i n those schools. M o r e ­ over, as the U n i t e d States Supreme C o u r t ' s decision i n Coyle v. Smith ( 1 9 1 1 ) i n d i c a t e d , states—once admitted—possessed " a l l o f the powers o f sovereignty a n d j u r i s d i c t i o n w h i c h p e r t a i n t o the o r i g i n a l S t a t e s . " T h e y were therefore free t o repudiate any i n c o n v e n i e n t restrictions placed o n t h e m under Congress's p o w e r t o a d m i t states t o the U n i o n . T h u s , O k l a h o m a m o v e d its c a p i t a l three years p r i o r t o the date specified by Congress, a n d A r i z o n a r e i n s t i t u t e d the recall o f judges i m m e d i a t e l y u p o n admission t o the U n i o n . 45

4 6

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandates affecting the structure a n d o p e r a t i o n o f state governments m a y also influence state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , either re­ s t r i c t i n g the range o f choice f o r state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s or i n d u c i n g states t o alter their c o n s t i t u t i o n s t o b r i n g t h e m i n t o c o n f o r m i t y w i t h fed­ eral requirements. T h e o r i g i n a l C o n s t i t u t i o n directed the federal g o v e r n For discussion of these conflicts, see Tarr, "Church and State"; and Robert F. Utter and Edward J. Larson, "Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 15 (spring 1988): 451-78. Leshy, The Arizona State Constitution, 17-18; and Stephen Botein, " 'What We Shall Meet Afterwards in Heaven': Judgeship as a Symbol for Modern American Lawyers," in Gerald L . Geison, ed., Professions and Professional Ideologies in America (Chapel H i l l : University of N o r t h Carolina Press, 1983), 55. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). Requirements imposed by Congress that are not based on its power to admit states, even i f contained in the enabling act, do continue in force and cannot be ignored by the states. See Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 790 P.2d 242 (Ariz. 1990). 4 3

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m e n t t o "guarantee t o every State i n this U n i o n a R e p u b l i c a n F o r m o f G o v e r n m e n t " a n d u p h e l d the supremacy o f federal l a w w i t h i n its sphere over " a n y T h i n g i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n o r L a w s o f any S t a t e . " Subsequent a m e n d m e n t s have added t o the federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l restrictions o n the states. Yet these federal requirements have h a d o n l y selective a n d episodic effects o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . 47

The Guarantee Clause. T h e guarantee clause, w h i c h obliges the fed­ eral g o v e r n m e n t t o guarantee t o every state a r e p u b l i c a n f o r m o f g o v e r n ­ m e n t , appears t o offer a basis f o r close federal supervision o f state consti­ t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s . Yet this "sleeping g i a n t , " as Charles Sumner once described i t , seems t o have h a d l i t t l e effect o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ­ i s m . I n p a r t , this reflects the U n i t e d States Supreme Court's refusal t o use the clause as a basis for r e v i e w i n g the structure a n d o p e r a t i o n o f state governments. I n Luther v. Borden ( 1 8 4 9 ) , the C o u r t r u l e d t h a t the deter­ m i n a t i o n as t o w h e t h e r a state h a d a r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t was a p o l i t i ­ cal question, assigned by the C o n s t i t u t i o n t o Congress, a n d t h a t c o n ­ gressional determinations o n the m a t t e r were b i n d i n g o n a l l other b r a n c h e s . I t reaffirmed this p o s i t i o n i n Pacific States Telephone & Tele­ graph Co. v. Oregon ( 1 9 1 2 ) , i n w h i c h i t rejected a challenge under the guarantee clause t o Oregon's use o f the i n i t i a t i v e f o r l a w m a k i n g , a n d i n Baker v. Carr ( 1 9 6 2 ) , even as i t i n d i c a t e d its willingness t o address the issue o f legislative a p p o r t i o n m e n t u n d e r the equal p r o t e c t i o n clause o f the F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t . 48

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5 1

United States Constitution, Article 4, section 4, and Article 6, section 2. These provi­ sions are generally known as the guarantee clause and the supremacy clause. There is little evidence that other restrictions on the states—such as those found in Article 1, section 10 of the federal Constitution—have affected state constitutions. However, one commentator, Deborah Jones Merritt, has read the guarantee clause as restricting federal power to interfere w i t h state autonomy, based on the assumption that the clause promises the states a "republican form of government," i.e., the right to structure their o w n political processes, provided that they structure them in a republican manner. See her "The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy," Columbia Law Review 88 (January 1988): 1-78; and "Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A N e w Role for the Guarantee Clause," University of Colorado Law Review 65 (1994): 815-33. Congressional Globe, 40 Cong., 1 sess., 614 (12 July 1867), quoted in William M . Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), 2. Wiecek's volume provides the most thorough consideration of the clause and its place in American constitutional law. Luther v. Borden, 7 H o w a r d 1 (1849). For critiques of the Supreme Court's inter­ pretation of the guarantee clause, see Philippa Strumm, The Supreme Court and "Political Questions": A Study in Judicial Evasion (University: University of Alabama Press, 1974); and Wiecek, Guarantee Clause. Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 4 7

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I n p a r t , t o o , the desuetude o f the guarantee clause reflects a m o r e gen­ eral federal reluctance t o oversee the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s o f the states. D u r i n g the first h a l f o f the nineteenth century, opponents o f slavery argued t h a t the clause p r o h i b i t e d Congress f r o m recognizing any n e w states t h a t per­ m i t t e d slavery; b u t perhaps because o f the presence o f slave states already i n the U n i o n , this a r g u m e n t d i d n o t succeed. P r i o r t o the C i v i l War, the clause h a d effect o n l y i n the u n i q u e circumstances o f the D o r r R e b e l l i o n , w h e n the federal g o v e r n m e n t h a d t o determine w h i c h o f t w o c o m p e t i n g governments was i n fact the g o v e r n m e n t o f R h o d e I s l a n d . D u r i n g the C i v i l War, congressional Republicans considered using the clause as the basis f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p o l i c y ; b u t the clause served this f u n c t i o n o n l y b r i e f l y . By 1 8 6 7 , " [ t ] h e effective i m p a c t o f the guarantee clause began t o dissipate," as the R a d i c a l R e p u b l i c a n consensus b e h i n d i t dissolved, a n d Congress sought other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l bases for its R e c o n s t r u c t i o n e f f o r t s . A l t h o u g h state c o n s t i t u t i o n s were a d o p t e d i n the South under congressional supervision, they were a b a n d o n e d w h e n R e c o n s t r u c t i o n ended, as the Southern states q u i c k l y a d o p t e d n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n s or fun­ d a m e n t a l l y revised their R e c o n s t r u c t i o n c h a r t e r s . I n the early t w e n t i e t h century, o p p o n e n t s o f the i n i t i a t i v e a n d referendum i n v o k e d the clause, b u t the courts consistently rejected their c l a i m s . Since t h e n , the clause has h a d n o effect o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t . 5 2

53

54

55

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The Supremacy Clause. T h e supremacy clause o f the federal C o n s t i ­ t u t i o n confirms t h a t w i t h i n its sphere federal l a w is superior t o state law, O n antislavery interpretations of the guarantee clause, see Wiecek, Guarantee Clause, chap. 5. O n the controversy in Rhode Island, see Gettleman, The Dorr Rebellion. See Herman Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy during the Civil War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), chaps. 6 - 8 ; Harold M . Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution (New York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1973), chaps. 26-28; and Eric Foner, Reconstruction: Americas Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper and Row, 1988). Wiecek, Guarantee Clause, 210. See Michael Perman, The Road to Redemption: Southern Politics, 1869-1879 (Chapel H i l l : University of N o r t h Carolina Press, 1984), chap. 9. These developments are discussed in chapter 4. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan v. City of Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912); State ex rei. Topping v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445 (1913); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913); State ex reí. Toóte v. Board of Commissioners, 93 Kans. 405 (1914); and Ohio ex rei. Davis v. Hildebrant, 245 U.S. 565 (1916). In recent years, however, some state judges and legal scholars have argued that the guarantee clause should be resuscitated as a check on the use of the initiative and referen­ dum in the states. See the dissent of Justice Hans A. Linde in State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136, 1197; Hans A . Linde, "When Is Initiative Lawmaking N o t 'Republican Government'?" Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 17 (fall 1989): 159-73; and, more generally, the symposium on the guarantee clause in University of Colorado Law Review 65 (1994): 709-946. 5 2

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Chapter 2

t h a t federal enactments—be they c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s , statutes, o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s — t a k e precedence over state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s i n cases o f conflict. D u r i n g the nation's first century, collisions between federal l a w a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n s were r a r e — n o t u n t i l 1 8 6 7 , w h e n the Supreme C o u r t i n Cummings v. Missouri o v e r t u r n e d a M i s s o u r i l o y a l t y - o a t h r e q u i r e m e n t , was a state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n i n v a l i ­ dated as inconsistent w i t h the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . Even so, the fear o f conflicts w i t h inchoate federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements, such as those p e r t a i n i n g t o w a t e r r i g h t s , at times constrained state c o n s t i t u t i o n makers. D u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century, federal p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s i n ­ creased the o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r conflict between federal policies a n d state policies, i n c l u d i n g policies enshrined i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Even m o r e i m p o r t a n t have been the a d o p t i o n o f the F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t , the i n c o r p o r a t i o n under i t o f m o s t p r o v i s i o n s o f the federal B i l l o f R i g h t s , a n d the m o r e aggressive r e v i e w o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s by the federal j u d i ­ ciary. T h u s , the U.S. Supreme C o u r t has struck d o w n a C o l o r a d o consti­ t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t affecting the rights o f homosexuals as a denial o f equal p r o t e c t i o n o f the l a w s , a M a r y l a n d religious test f o r state officials as a v i o l a t i o n o f the First A m e n d m e n t , a n d an Arkansas l i m i t a t i o n o n the consecutive terms that a member o f Congress c o u l d serve under the quali­ fications clause o f A r t i c l e l . O f t e n the effects o f such r u l i n g s o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s have extended b e y o n d the p r o v i s i o n s t h a t have been i n v a l i ­ dated. T h e y have also rendered unenforceable analogous p r o v i s i o n s i n other state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d encouraged states t o a m e n d their c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s t o eliminate p r o v i s i o n s inconsistent w i t h federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. 5 8

5 9

60

6

1

6 2

Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867); Foner, Reconstruction, 272. Donald J. Pisani, From Family Farm to Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade in Cali­ fornia and the West, 1850-1931 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 159. For examples of federal legislation preempting state constitutions, see North Carolina ex rei. Morrow v. Calif ano, 445 F.Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), and Utility Workers of America v. Southern California Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1988, cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1078 [1989]). For an example of federal common law preempting a state constitution, see Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). Even federal regulations override state provisions—see Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Associa­ tion v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982). For an excellent overview, see W i l ­ liams, State Constitutional Law, 117-44. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). For example, in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Hawaii in 1968 constitutionalized the right of indigent defendants to have counsel provided by the state (Hawaii Constitution, art. 1, sec. 14). See Lee, The Hawaii State Constitution, 61-62; and Norman Meiler, With an Understanding Heart: Constitution-Making in Hawaii (New York: National Municipal League, 1971), 97-98. 5 8

5 9

6 0

6 1

6 2

State Constitutional Development

•

45

Federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments affecting v o t i n g a n d a p p o r t i o n ­ m e n t have h a d the m o s t p r o n o u n c e d effect o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e federal C o n s t i t u t i o n o r i g i n a l l y left v o t i n g qualifications a n d a p p o r t i o n ­ m e n t t o the states, a n d disputes over those issues became a r e c u r r i n g source o f p o l i t i c a l conflict i n the s t a t e s . T h e federalization o f v o t i n g l a w began w i t h the a d o p t i o n o f the Fifteenth A m e n d m e n t , r e q u i r i n g t h a t states n o t discriminate i n their v o t i n g qualifications o n the basis o f race, a n d c o n t i n u e d w i t h the a d o p t i o n o f the N i n e t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t (women's suffrage), the T w e n t y - F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t ( p o l l t a x ) , a n d the T w e n t y - S i x t h A m e n d m e n t (eighteen-year-old v o t e ) . These amendments i m p o s e d u n i f o r m n a t i o n a l standards for v o t i n g , r e m o v i n g a m a j o r source o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t r o v e r s y f r o m state c o n t r o l . M a n y states subse­ q u e n t l y b r o u g h t their c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the federal re­ quirements, either excising inconsistent provisions or a d o p t i n g amend­ ments analogous t o the federal a m e n d m e n t s . Beginning i n the 1960s, the F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t s p a w n e d successful challenges t o state sys­ tems o f legislative a p p o r t i o n m e n t a n d t o state regulations o f v o t i n g , such as p o l l taxes a n d residency r e q u i r e m e n t s . Congress also enacted the V o t i n g Rights A c t o f 1965, a n d this act—together w i t h its 1982 a m e n d m e n t s — d r a m a t i c a l l y e x p a n d e d a n d intensified federal supervision 63

6 4

6 5

66

67

See, inter alia, James A . Henretta, "The Rise and Decline of 'DemocraticRepublicanism': Political Rights in New York and the Several States, 1800-1915," in Paul Finkelman and Stephen E. Gottleib, eds., Toward a Usable Past: Liberty under State Consti­ tutions (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 5 0 - 9 0 ; Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage: Prom Property to Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establish­ ment of the One-Party South, 1880-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). These disputes are discussed in greater detail in chaps. 3 - 5 . Although it had little effect at the time and has since become an historical artifact, section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment penalized states that denied the right to vote to "any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States . . . except for participation in rebellion, or other crime." Even after the adoption of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, states theoretically could enfranchise those under the age of eighteen; however, this has not become a serious consti­ tutional issue in any state. When the states failed to change their constitutions in line w i t h federal constitutional requirements, federal courts invalidated the state constitutional requirements. See, for ex­ ample, Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). The leading state legislative-apportionment case is Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Key later cases include Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983); and Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Decisions of the United States Supreme Court invalidating state constitutional or legislative regulations of voting include Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax); Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (property-ownership requirements); and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (resi­ dency requirements). 6 3

6 4

6 5

6 6

6 7

46

•

Chapter 2

over state electoral laws a n d practices. Yet these federal interventions have n o t altogether p r e c l u d e d an independent state r o l e . For example, m a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s require t h a t l o c a l boundaries be respected i n d i s t r i c t i n g decisions, a n d state a p p o r t i o n m e n t commissions a n d state courts have c o n t i n u e d t o enforce t h a t r e q u i r e m e n t , insofar as i t can be reconciled w i t h the federal "one person, one v o t e " s t a n d a r d . Nonethe­ less, the federal actions have t r a n s f o r m e d a field t h a t h a d once been cen­ 68

t r a l t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s i n t o a considerably less i m p o r t a n t aspect o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m .

The Force

of Federal

Example

D i r e c t federal i m p o s i t i o n o f u n i f o r m standards, as o c c u r r e d w i t h the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f v o t i n g qualifications a n d a p p o r t i o n m e n t f r o m matters o f state t o federal law, is quite rare. T h e federal C o n s t i t u t i o n has exerted its greatest influence o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s b y p r o v i d i n g a m o d e l f o r e m u ­ l a t i o n . Yet i t is difficult t o measure this influence w i t h any p r e c i s i o n . M a n y features o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n — s u c h as protections o f r i g h t s , p o p u l a r r u l e , a separation o f p o w e r s , a n d an independent j u d i c i a r y — a r e likewise f o u n d i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s ; so w h e n a n e w state c o n s t i t u t i o n incorporates these features, i t is difficult t o determine w h e t h e r the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n o r its state counterparts p r o v i d e d the m o d e l . Even the pres­ ence o f t e x t u a l similarities between the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d subse­ quent state c o n s t i t u t i o n s is n o t d e t e r m i n a t i v e . I n some instances federal c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s derived their f o r m u l a t i o n s f r o m earlier state char­ ters, a n d these rather t h a n the federal d o c u m e n t m a y have g u i d e d later state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s as w e l l . 69

7 0

Despite these caveats, there are instances i n w h i c h i t is clear t h a t states m o d e l e d t h e i r p r o v i s i o n s o n those i n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . A t times, i m m e d i a t e e m u l a t i o n o f the federal m o d e l reveals the direct federal i n f l u ­ ence. F o r example, Pennsylvania, D e l a w a r e , N e w H a m p s h i r e , a n d K e n ­ t u c k y a l l a d o p t e d the federal m o d e o f j u d i c i a l selection w i t h i n a decade

See Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 610 A . 2 d 153 (Conn. 1992); and, more generally, Robert M . Sukol, "Developments in State Constitutional Law, 1992: Legis­ lative Branch Reapportionment: Decennial State Constitutional Controversies," Rutgers Law Journal 24 (summer 1993): 1 1 0 6 - 3 2 . I t may be, of course, that the difficulty in documenting patterns of causation is less important than establishing those instances i n which the state and federal constitutions share common principles. See, for example, Lutz, "State Constitutional Pedigree"; and, more generally, Thurston Greene, The Language of the Constitution (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991). 6 8

6 9

7 0

State Constitutional Development

•

47

after the C o n s t i t u t i o n was r a t i f i e d . A t times t o o , distinctive federal l a n ­ guage reappears i n state charters. F o r example, t w e n t y - t h r e e states have a d o p t e d language patterned after the freedom o f speech a n d press p r o v i ­ sions o f the First A m e n d m e n t ; t w e l v e have equal p r o t e c t i o n clauses s i m i ­ lar t o the F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t ' s ; a n d eleven p r o h i b i t religious estab­ lishments i n terms c o m p a r a b l e t o the First A m e n d m e n t ' s establishment c l a u s e . I n fact, i n at least one instance, state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s m o d ­ eled their p r o v i s i o n s o n a federal p r o v i s i o n t h a t failed o f a d o p t i o n . F r o m 1968 t o 1 9 7 6 , at the same t i m e t h a t the equal-rights a m e n d m e n t t o the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n was under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , fourteen states adopted t h e i r o w n " l i t t l e E R A s . " T h e language o f these p r o v i s i o n s tracks the fed­ eral a m e n d m e n t , a n d their legislative histories reveal a desire t o p r o v i d e c o m p a r a b l e p r o t e c t i o n s i n the state a n d federal d o c u m e n t s . 7 1

72

73

Nevertheless, assertions t h a t the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n is central t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design are s i m p l y w r o n g . T h e y ignore the fact t h a t m a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s have n o federal analogue a n d t h a t even those t h a t d o often differ substantially f r o m federal p r o v i s i o n s . Such as­ sertions also ignore the fact t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s c o n f r o n t dis­ t i n c t i v e p r o b l e m s f o r w h i c h the experience o f federal c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s offers n o guidance. M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , they ignore the t e s t i m o n y o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s themselves, w h o have i n d i c a t e d t h a t they l o o k e d t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n s rather t h a n t o the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n f o r d i r e c t i o n a n d f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l models. As C h r i s t i a n Fritz has demonstrated, dele­ gates t o nineteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions v i e w e d c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g as a progressive enterprise, i n w h i c h succeeding genera­ tions b u i l t u p o n the experience o f their predecessors a n d readjusted past practices t o present r e q u i r e m e n t s . I m p l i c i t i n this v i e w was an under7 4

75

James Schouler, Constitutional Studies: State and Federal (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1897), 286. Ronald K . L . Collins, "Bills and Declarations Digest," 2503, 2492, and 2 4 9 8 - 9 9 . I n none of these instances was the federal constitutional language derivative from the language of prior state constitutions. One should recognize the divergent conclusions that can be drawn from these figures. The figures also indicate that twenty-seven states have speech and press guarantees quite different from the First Amendment's, thirty-eight have equality guarantees dissimilar to the equal protection clause, and thirty-nine have guarantees of a separation of church and state that differ from the federal establishment clause. Tarr and Porter, "Gender Equality"; and Barbara A . Brown, A n n Freedman, Harriet Katz, and A n n Price, Women's Rights and the Law (New York: Praeger, 1977). This is only true in the sense that the incompleteness of the federal Constitution pro­ vides the agenda for state constitution-makers, requiring them to fill in the gaps in the federal Constitution. See Lutz, "Constitution as Incomplete Text"; and Kermit L . Hall, "Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of American State Constitutions," in Finkelman and Gottlieb, Toward a Usable Past, 3 9 3 - 9 5 . See Christian G. Fritz, "The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Prelimi7 1

7 2

7 3

7 4

7 5

48

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Chapter 2

standing t h a t " c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g i n the past—even i n the g l o r i o u s R e v o l u t i o n a r y p e r i o d o f A m e r i c a n h i s t o r y — w a s less perfect a n d possibly even crude w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h ' m o d e r n ' ideas o f d r a f t i n g f u n d a m e n t a l l a w . " G i v e n this j u d g m e n t a b o u t federal c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s a n d given the quite different p r o b l e m s c o n f r o n t i n g their state successors, i t is h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the influence o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n o n state charters has been l i m i t e d . 7 6

T h u s i t is i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n rather t h a n i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design t h a t one w o u l d expect the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n t o exert its greatest influence, a n d this is i n fact the case. I n civil-liberties cases, state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has l o n g been influenced by federal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , even w h e n the texts o f the state a n d federal guarantees are quite dissimi­ lar. P r i o r t o the emergence o f the " n e w j u d i c i a l federalism" i n the 1970s, attorneys a n d state judges oftentimes assumed t h a t state a n d federal rights guarantees s h o u l d be interpreted as a f f o r d i n g equivalent protec­ t i o n s . I n fact, w h e n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues arose, state courts were p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y t o l o o k t o federal precedent for d i r e c t i o n . Even after the emergence o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism, state judges t y p i c a l l y c o n ­ f r o n t e d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claims framed i n terms o f federal doctrines a n d precedents w i t h w h i c h they were already f a m i l i a r a n d c o m f o r t a b l e . So i t is h a r d l y surprising t h a t the categories a n d conceptions o f federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w have decisively influenced the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state rights g u a r a n t e e s . Indeed, i n some instances states have i n c o r p o r a t e d the concepts a n d rulings o f federal decisional l a w d i r e c t l y i n t o their c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n s . C a l i f o r n i a has o u t l a w e d the use o f busing b e y o n d t h a t re7 7

7 8

79

nary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West," Rutgers Law Journal 25 (summer 1994): 9 4 5 - 9 8 , for a particularly trenchant treatment of this issue. The discussion in this section to a considerable extent follows Fritz's. Fritz, "American Constitutional Tradition Revisited," 973. See Robert Force, "State 'Bills of Rights': A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance," Valparaiso University Law Review 3 (1969): 125-82; Shirley S. Abrahamson, "Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law," Texas Law Review 63 ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1985): 1141-93; Shirley S. Abrahamson and Diane S. Gutmann, "The N e w Federalism: State Constitutions and State Courts," Judicature 71 (August-September 1987): 8 8 - 9 9 ; Shirley S. Abrahamson, "Divided We Stand: State Con­ stitutions in a M o r e Perfect Union," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 18 (summer 1991): 7 2 3 - 4 4 ; and G. Alan Tarr, "The Past and Future of the N e w Judicial Federalism," Publius 24 (spring 1994): 6 3 - 7 9 . 7 6

7 7

Peter K . Harris, "The Communication of Precedent among State Supreme Courts," Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1980, 145. Tarr and Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation, 2 1 - 2 2 . Indeed, the influ­ ence of federal constitutional law extends beyond the civil-liberties realm. See, for example, Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572 (N.J. 1972), and—more generally—William F. Swindler, "State Constitutions for the Twentieth Century," Nebraska Law Review 50 (1971): 593-96. 7 8

7 9

State Constitutional Development q u i r e d t o r e m e d y v i o l a t i o n s o f the e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n clause o f the Constitution.

8 0

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49

federal

F l o r i d a has r e q u i r e d t h a t its search-and-seizure p r o v i s i o n

"be c o n s t r u e d i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t t o the U n i t e d States

Constitution,

Court."

8 1

And

as

interpreted

by

the

United

States

H a w a i i by a m e n d m e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the

p r e m e C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n Gideon

v.

Supreme U.S.

Su­

Wainwright.

82

T h e influence o f federal d o c t r i n a l developments o n state c i v i l - l i b e r t i e s l a w is, however, o n l y p a r t o f the story. M a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l cases do n o t i n v o l v e c i v i l liberties, a n d outside t h a t r e a l m , federal j u d i c i a l d o c t r i n e has exerted c o n s i d e r a b l y less influence o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w .

8 3

Nor

is this s u r p r i s i n g . State c o n s t i t u t i o n s encompass a w i d e r range o f subjects t h a n does the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d

t h u s state c o u r t s are

called

issues i n v o l v i n g t a x a t i o n ,

upon

to

address c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

regularly the

p o w e r s o f l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t , a n d state or l o c a l indebtedness (to name b u t a few) never addressed by federal c o u r t s .

8 4

The inclusion o f " s t a t u t o r y "

m a t e r i a l i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s also requires state c o u r t s t o devise c o n s t i California Constitution, art. 1, sec. 7. Florida Constitution, art. 1, sec. 12. H a w a i i Constitution, art. 1, sec. 14, constitutionalizing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Lee, The Hawaii State Constitution, 6 2 - 6 3 . A study of state supreme court caseloads from 1870 to 1970 found that cases based "on provisions peculiar to state constitutions" made up the majority of the constitutional cases in those courts from 1870 to 1900. I n later periods, the percentage of constitutional cases devoted to these provisions declined, as the number involving "the procedural due process rights of criminal defendants" increased. These latter cases, however, typically in­ volved issues of federal rather than state constitutional law. See Robert A . Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M . Friedman, and Stanton Wheeler, "The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970," Stanford Law Review 30 (November 1977): 150. 8 0

8 1

8 2

8 3

A more recent study of the caseloads of six state supreme courts, including the activist California and New Jersey Supreme Courts, found that in 1975 roughly 60 percent of their state constitutional cases involved rights claims. See Susan R Fino, The Role of State Supreme Courts in the New Judicial Federalism (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987) , 69, fig. 4 . 1 . Even cases associated w i t h civil liberties in federal courts may be quite different in state courts. Fino discovered that almost 20 percent of state equal-protection cases involved challenges to various forms of commercial regulation, and almost 39 per­ cent concerned general rules of civil and criminal procedure. See Susan P. Fino, "Judicial Federalism and Equality Guarantees in State Supreme Courts," Publius 17 (winter 1987): 51-67. The distinctive features of state constitutions are discussed in chapter 1. Representa­ tive cases concerning the listed topics include, for tax policy, McBurney v. Ruth, 527 So.2d 1265 (Ala. 1988), and City of Phoenix v. Popkin, 378 P.2d 242 (Ariz. 1963); for local government powers, California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. City of Los Angeles, 812 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1991), and City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 865 P.2d 821 (Id. 1984); and for state indebtedness, New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Carey, 369 N.E.2d 558 (N.Y. 1976), and State Bond Commission v. All Taxpayers, 525 So.2d 521 (La. 1988) . Both the distinctive topics of state constitutional law and the cases arising under them could be multiplied almost indefinitely. 8 4

50

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t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w . Even w h e n state courts c o n f r o n t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues also addressed b y federal c o u r t s — f o r example, separation-of-powers issues—the influence o f federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e is l i m i t e d . ' I n p a r t , this reflects judges' r e c o g n i t i o n o f differences i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l design between the federal n d state governments—state legislatures' possession o f inherent ( n o n enumerated p o w e r s ) , l i m i t e d legislative sessions, a n o n u n i t a r y executive, a n d so f o r t h . I n p a r t t o o , i t m a y reflect the t i m i n g o f l i t i g a t i o n . I n c o n ­ trast w i t h civil-liberties cases, state courts have often c o n f r o n t e d separation-of-powers issues a n d developed their o w n analyses p r i o r t o l i t i g a t i o n i n federal courts. F o r example, f o u r state supreme courts h a d already i n v a l i d a t e d the legislative veto before the U n i t e d States Supreme C o u r t decided Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha ( 1 9 8 3 ) , a n d Chadha affected neither the d i r e c t i o n o f subsequent state decisions n o r the g r o u n d s o n w h i c h the courts r u l e d . B u t w h a t e v e r the reasons, the fact remains t h a t federal influence o n state civil-liberties l a w is n o t i n d i c a t i v e o f the o v e r a l l influence o f federal r u l i n g s o n state consti­ tutional interpretation. 8 5

8 6

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Interstate

Influences

There is n o r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s a d o p t p r o v i s i o n s s i m i l a r t o those i n other states o r t h a t state judges adhere t o c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l r u l i n g s or doctrines developed b y other states' courts. Yet as the l i t e r a t u r e o n the diffusion o f i n n o v a t i o n s suggests, states r e g u l a r l y l o o k t o other states f o r solutions t o the c o m m o n p r o b l e m s they f a c e . T h i s h o r i z o n t a l federalism has certainly affected state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l develop89

See, for example, Davis v. City of Berkeley, 794 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1989) on the siting of public housing; Centennial Associates v. Clark, 384 So.2d 616 (Ala. 1980) on banks' inter­ est rates; and Rubio v. Carlsbad Municipal School District, 744 P.2d 919 ( N . M . 1987) on compulsory school attendance. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that state governments need not con­ form to the same strictures on the separation of powers that bind the federal government. See, for example, Prentiss v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 211 U.S. 210, 255 (1908); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957); and Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937). Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Intercourt influence i n legislative-veto cases is discussed i n Levinson, "Decline of Legislative Veto." Major contributions to this literature include Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Inno­ vations among American States," American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 880-89; Virginia Gray, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study," American Political Science Review 67 (December 1973): 1174-85; and "Symposium: Policy Diffusion i n a Federal System," Publius 15 (fall 1985): 1-132. 8 5

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ment. H o w e v e r , the mechanisms by w h i c h i t has o c c u r r e d a n d the ex­ tent t o w h i c h i t has imposed a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l u n i f o r m i t y o n the A m e r i c a n states deserve consideration. 9 0

Interstate b o r r o w i n g affected state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design f r o m the very outset. F o r those d r a f t i n g the i n i t i a l state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , the u n f a m i l i a r i t y of the task, t i m e constraints, a n d the pressing demands o f w a r a n d gover­ nance encouraged reliance o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l models developed i n other states. T h e C o n t i n e n t a l Congress facilitated this process by p r o v i d i n g a venue for the exchange o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ideas. T h u s , w h e n representa­ tives o f V e r m o n t came t o l o b b y for r e c o g n i t i o n o f their statehood, the drafters o f the Pennsylvania c o n s t i t u t i o n passed copies o f i t t o the Ver­ monters. A n d w h e n N o r t h C a r o l i n a was ready t o draft a c o n s t i t u t i o n , one o f its delegates t o the C o n t i n e n t a l Congress collected a n d sent t o the state legislature the plans o f g o v e r n m e n t f r o m several s t a t e s . A l s o facil­ i t a t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b o r r o w i n g was the c i r c u l a t i o n after 1780 o f c o m ­ p i l a t i o n s o f e x i s t i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . N o t surprisingly, t h e n , similar p r o v i s i o n s appeared i n a n u m b e r o f early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 9 1

92

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I f a n y t h i n g , the passage o f t i m e has increased interstate b o r r o w i n g . D u r i n g the nineteenth century, some states seeking congressional ap­ p r o v a l for their admission t o the U n i o n sought t o a v o i d controversy by m o d e l i n g their c o n s t i t u t i o n s o n those o f existing states. I n a d d i t i o n , set­ tlers carried c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ideas west w i t h t h e m — i n d e e d , some delegates t o western conventions h a d p r e v i o u s l y served as delegates i n the states f r o m w h i c h they e m i g r a t e d — a n d reproduced i n their n e w homes the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements w i t h w h i c h they were f a m i l i a r . C o m m o n p r o b l e m s also led t o c o m m o n solutions. T h u s , J o h n H i c k s has n o t e d t h a t 9 4

For general discussions of the operation of horizontal federalism, see M a r y Cornelia Porter and G. Alan Tarr, introduction to Porter and Tarr, eds., State Supreme Courts: Poli­ cymakers in the Federal System (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), x x i - x x i i (here­ after cited as Policymakers); and Tarr and Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Na­ tion, 2 7 - 4 0 . This section draws upon those earlier treatments. Robert F. Williams, "The Influence of Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution on American Constitutionalism during the Founding Era," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biog­ raphy 112 (January 1988): 35. Choosing between the Pennsylvania and New York consti­ tutions in designing their own charter, Vermonters modeled their constitution on Pennsylva­ nia's. See William C. H i l l , The Vermont State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), 4 - 6 . Fletcher M . Green, Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 17761860: A Study in the Evolution of Democracy (Chapel H i l l : University of N o r t h Carolina Press, 1930), 67; and Orth, North Carolina State Constitution, 2. Fritz, "American Constitutional Tradition Revisited," 976. See Christian G. Fritz, "Rethinking the American Constitutional Tradition: National Dimensions in the Formation of State Constitutions," Rutgers Law Journal 26 (summer 1995): 983. 9 0

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d u r i n g the late nineteenth c e n t u r y several western states, seeking t o p r o ­ m o t e m i n i n g a n d i r r i g a t i o n , a d o p t e d s i m i l a r l y expansive p r o v i s i o n s o n e m i n e n t d o m a i n t o encourage those a c t i v i t i e s . A n d M o r g a n Kousser has described h o w i n the South d u r i n g the same p e r i o d the interstate exchange o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ideas a n d legal materials furthered a " p u b l i c c o n s p i r a c y " t o restrict s u f f r a g e . Finally, o n several occasions c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l i n n o v a t i o n s i n one o r a few states unleashed a c o n t a g i o n o f emula­ tive change. T h e t r a n s i t i o n t o an elective j u d i c i a r y illustrates the process: after I o w a a n d N e w Y o r k i n 1846 made a l l judges elective, eleven other states also d i d so ( i n w h o l e or i n p a r t ) over the n e x t f o u r years, a n d nine m o r e d i d so i n the succeeding d e c a d e . 95

96

97

W h e t h e r i n n e w states o r o l d , c o n v e n t i o n delegates d u r i n g the nine­ teenth century relied heavily o n c o m p i l a t i o n s o f existing state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s , w h i c h clarified the progress o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h i n k i n g a n d p r o ­ v i d e d models for e m u l a t i o n . Delegates frequently referred t o other states' c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n c o n v e n t i o n debates. D u r i n g the N e w Y o r k c o n ­ v e n t i o n o f 1 8 2 1 , f o r example, various delegates cited the experience o f other states o n subjects as diverse as the C o u n c i l o f R e v i s i o n , the ap­ p o i n t i v e power, a n d suffrage q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . As a delegate t o the W y o ­ m i n g c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 8 9 p u t i t , " [ S ] o far as nine-tenths o f o u r l a b o r is concerned, w e have o n l y t o exercise an i n t e l l i g e n t a n d d i s c r i m i n a t i n g j u d g m e n t i n o u r study o f the w o r k o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l builders w h o have preceded u s . " Interstate a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f w h o l e p r o v i s i o n s was c o m m o n . F o r example, the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 4 9 i n c o r p o r a t e d I o w a ' s stringent r e g u l a t i o n o f c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d its p r o h i b i t i o n o f banks o f issue, as w e l l as N e w Y o r k ' s p r o h i b i t i o n o f special legislative char­ ters. A n d the M i s s o u r i C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1875 c o n t a i n e d over t h i r t y sections o f detailed restrictions o n the state legislature, almost a l l o f w h i c h were c o p i e d f r o m the I l l i n o i s c o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 7 0 a n d the Pennsyl­ vania C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 7 3 . T h e extent o f this b o r r o w i n g led one dele9 8

99

1 0 0

1 0 1

1 0 2

John D . Hicks, The Constitutions of the Northwest States (Lincoln: University of Nebraska University Studies, 1923), 146-47. Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 39-40. Henry Hitchcock, American State Constitutions: A Study of Their Growth (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1887), 5 0 - 5 4 . The analysis in this paragraph follows that of Fritz, "American Constitutional Tradi­ tion Revisited," 975-84. Merrill D . Peterson, Democracy, Liberty, and Property, 145, 177-78, 188-90, 1 9 7 99, and 217-18. Quoted in Hicks, Constitutions of Northwest States, 34. David Alan Johnson, Founding the Far West: California, Oregon, and Nevada, 1940-1890 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), 102 and 124. Hitchcock, American State Constitutions, 35. For further examples, see Robert B. 9 5

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gate t o w a r d the end o f the C a l i f o r n i a c o n v e n t i o n o f 1849 t o l a m e n t his colleagues' lack o f o r i g i n a l i t y , insisting t h a t the preamble at least s h o u l d c o n t a i n "a few lines o f o u r o w n m a n u f a c t u r e . " Developments d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century have facilitated the process o f interstate b o r r o w i n g . A m o n g the m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f these is the i n ­ creased use o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l commissions, w h i c h have the resources o f staff, t i m e , a n d expertise necessary t o study the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f other 1 0 3

states before they suggest c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t s . F r o m 1939 t o 1969 alone, fifty such commissions were established i n t h i r t y - t w o states. L i k e w i s e i m p o r t a n t has been the practice o f establishing pre­ p a r a t o r y commissions t o assemble p e r t i n e n t i n f o r m a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g an­ alyses o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f other states, for delegates t o state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l conventions. I l l u s t r a t i v e o f this was the w o r k o f the Legislative Reference Bureau o f the U n i v e r s i t y o f H a w a i i , w h i c h p r e p a r e d seventeen b a c k g r o u n d studies r e v i e w i n g the experience o f other states a n d r e l a t i n g t h a t experience t o the s i t u a t i o n i n H a w a i i . Finally, the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s has also c o n t r i b u t e d t o interstate b o r r o w ­ i n g . Interest g r o u p s have become increasingly i n v o l v e d i n p r o m o t i n g c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l changes n a t i o n w i d e , w h i c h has p r o m p t e d a transfer o f infor­ m a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g the substance o f p r o p o s e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms, f r o m state t o state. T h e a d o p t i o n o f v i c t i m s ' rights amendments a n d t e r m l i m i t s amendments illustrates this process. I n s u m , the professionalizat i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m has increased the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f i n f o r m a t i o n o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l experiences o f other states. 1 0 4

105

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T h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f models p r o v i d e d by other states' c o n s t i t u t i o n s , however, has prevented interstate b o r r o w i n g f r o m degenerating i n t o a passive c o p y i n g process. Rather, state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s have been o b l i g e d , i n the w o r d s o f the W y o m i n g delegate q u o t e d earlier, t o "exer­ cise an i n t e l l i g e n t a n d d i s c r i m i n a t i n g j u d g m e n t " i n c h o o s i n g w h i c h p r o v i ­ sions t o a d o p t . Sometimes these choices have been influenced by the fa­ m i l i a r i t y o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements. Western pioneers, for example,

Dishman, State Constitutions: The Shape of the Document, rev. ed. (New York: National Municipal League, 1968), 8-10. Quoted in Fritz, "American Constitutional Tradition Revisited," 9 8 1 . Useful descriptions of state constitutional commissions and their operation, which also detail the increased reliance on such commissions since the 1930s, include Sturm, Thirty Years, chap. 3; and Williams, "Things of the Past?" Updated figures on the use of constitutional commissions are found in Sturm, "Development of State Constitutions," 86, table 7, and the annual chapters on state constitutions in the Book of the States (Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, various years). Sturm, Thirty Years, 3 5 - 3 6 , table 6. Sturm, Thirty Years, 6 8 - 6 9 . 1 0 3

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b r o u g h t w i t h t h e m certain c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ideas a n d sought t o reproduce the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f their h o m e states ( t h o u g h often the ideas were m o d ­ ified as a result o f i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h settlers f r o m other states, changed circumstances, a n d the influence o f p r e v a i l i n g ideas o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l era). A t other times the choices reflected the delegates' desire t o a v a i l themselves o f the m o s t up-to-date t h i n k i n g o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l matters b y c o n s u l t i n g the m o s t recent c o n s t i t u t i o n s . A t still other times conven­ t i o n delegates d r e w u p o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f n e i g h b o r i n g states t h a t shared s i m i l a r circumstances a n d p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n s . B u t frequently the c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s ' choices were eclectic. Delegates b o r r o w e d c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l ideas f r o m a v a r i e t y o f states a n d created a n e w synthesis. I n a d d i t i o n , they frequently adapted the p r o v i s i o n s they b o r r o w e d t o the circumstances o r p o l i t i c a l perspectives o f their state. Pennsylvania's Dec­ l a r a t i o n o f Rights o f 1 7 7 6 offers a p r i m e example. A l t h o u g h i t largely f o l l o w e d the V i r g i n i a D e c l a r a t i o n o f R i g h t s , the Pennsylvania d e c l a r a t i o n a c k n o w l e d g e d the presence o f Quakers i n the state b y expressly recogniz­ i n g the rights o f conscientious o b j e c t o r s . I t also gave a m o r e demo­ cratic t h r u s t t o the state g o v e r n m e n t by a d d i n g the r i g h t t o i n s t r u c t repre­ sentatives a n d p e t i t i o n f o r redress o f g r i e v a n c e s . 1 0 7

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110

A v a r i e t y o f factors have affected the extent a n d character o f interstate b o r r o w i n g . One factor, o f course, is the nature o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o b ­ l e m being addressed. Some p r o b l e m s are so state-specific t h a t n o other state's experience is h e l p f u l , whereas others are c o m m o n t o several o r t o a l l states. I n the f o r m e r case, n o b o r r o w i n g occurs, whereas i n the latter b o r r o w i n g is likely. A second factor is the stage i n a state's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development. W h e n states a d o p t their i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s , they are par­ t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y t o l o o k b e y o n d their borders, either t o p r o f i t f r o m the experience o f other states o r t o i m p o r t standard f o r m u l a t i o n s . W h e n states revise their c o n s t i t u t i o n s , however, they usually d o so n o t t o effect a t o t a l change b u t rather t o address specific p r o b l e m s . T h e y therefore t e n d t o r e t a i n n o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l p r o v i s i o n s f r o m t h e i r previous charter w i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g alternatives f r o m other states. A t h i r d factor is the salience o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue being addressed. I f the issue is n o t salient o r c o n t r o v e r s i a l , t h e n the tendency is t o b o r r o w w i t h l i t t l e e x a m Elazar, "Principles and Traditions," 18. ios Fritz, "American Constitutional Tradition Revisited," 9 7 3 - 7 4 . Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 8; retained in the constitution of 1790, art. 6, sec. 2. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 16. For discussion of other differences, see J. Paul Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: A Study in Revolutionary Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936), 1 7 8 - 7 9 . The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 eliminated the power of instructing representatives—see Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, art. 9, sec. 20. 1 0 7

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i n a t i o n r e a d i l y available c o n s t i t u t i o n a l language. T h i s explains the sim­ ilarities a m o n g the preambles o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d a m o n g some p r o ­ visions o f state declarations o f r i g h t s . I f the issue is a salient a n d c o n t r o ­ versial one, however, delegates t e n d t o debate at l e n g t h the a p p r o p r i a t e r e s o l u t i o n a n d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l language i n w h i c h i t w i l l be f r a m e d . A l t h o u g h the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f other states are l i k e l y t o be consulted, often they w i l l offer c o n f l i c t i n g models; so delegates w i l l have t o craft a solu­ t i o n adapted t o the circumstances a n d p o l i t i c a l divisions i n the state t h a t , w h i l e perhaps d r a w i n g o n the f o r m u l a t i o n s o f other states, reflects a c o n ­ sidered j u d g m e n t rather t h a n mere a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f convenient t e x t .

B R O A D E R PERSPECTIVES O N STATE C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I S M Political

Culture

I m p l i c i t i n m o s t p r i o r research o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g m u c h o f the w o r k surveyed i n this chapter, are certain broader perspectives o n , or comprehensive understandings of, state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d state c o n s t i t u ­ tional development. O n e such perspective, identified m o s t closely w i t h D a n i e l Elazar a n d his students, emphasizes the i m p o r t a n c e o f p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e for u n d e r s t a n d i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . A state's p o l i t i c a l c u l ­ ture reflects the "persistent patterns o f u n d e r l y i n g p o l i t i c a l attitudes a n d v a l u e s — a n d characteristic responses t o p o l i t i c a l c o n c e r n s " — f o u n d i n the s t a t e . T h i s is c r u c i a l t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g a state's c o n s t i t u t i o n , Elazar argues, because the p r e d o m i n a n t p o l i t i c a l forces i n the state t e n d t o en­ shrine t h e i r basic p o l i t i c a l values i n the state c h a r t e r . T h u s , state c o n ­ stitutions e m b o d y " p r a c t i c a l p u b l i c expressions o f p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y a n d the purposes o f g o v e r n m e n t , " reflecting " p u b l i c conceptions o f the 1 1 1

1 1 2

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p r o p e r roles o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d p o l i t i c s . " Elazar acknowledges t h a t this aspect o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s m a y n o t be i m m e d i a t e l y apparent; some effort m a y be r e q u i r e d t o e x t r a c t the u n d e r l y i n g p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y f r o m a 1 1 4

The analysis in this section elaborates an earlier treatment of these themes in Tarr, "State Constitutional Politics," 4 - 5 . Elazar, Cities of the Prairie, 256; see also Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, 3d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1984). For treatments of politi­ cal culture that differ from Elazar's, see Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Stephen Welch, The Concept of Political Culture (New York: St. Martin's, 1993). For a political-culture approach to state constitutions dis­ tinct from Elazar's, see Johnson, Founding the Far West. In states with competing political cultures, such as Illinois, the state constitution may reflect a compromise between political forces. See Elazar, Cities of the Prairie, 288-89. Elazar, "Principles and Traditions," 1 1 . 1 1 1

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c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s resolutely p r a c t i c a l p r o v i s i o n s . M o r e o v e r , states w i t h dif­ ferent p o l i t i c a l cultures m a y a d o p t s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s f o r quite different reasons. Nevertheless, the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f Elazar's p o s i t i o n are clear: i f states have different p o l i t i c a l cultures, the contrast s h o u l d be reflected i n the f o r m a n d substance o f their c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d i f the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e o f a state changes, so t o o s h o u l d the state's c o n s t i t u t i o n . Elazar views the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e as a synthesis o f three m a j o r p o l i t i c a l subcultures—the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , m o r a l i s t i c , a n d t r a d i t i o n a l i s t i c — f o u n d i n the A m e r i c a n s t a t e s . H e identifies three c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s ( W h i g , federalist, a n d managerial) associated w i t h these p o l i t i c a l subcul­ tures a n d six c o n s t i t u t i o n a l patterns reflecting the i n t e r p l a y o f c o n s t i t u ­ tional traditions and historical d e v e l o p m e n t s . Some c o m m e n t a t o r s have c r i t i c i z e d Elazar's categories, a r g u i n g (for instance) t h a t the m a t c h between p o l i t i c a l subcultures a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s is n o t ex­ act. O t h e r s have m o d i f i e d Elazar's i n v e n t o r y o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l pat­ terns. O u r c u r r e n t concern is less w i t h the adequacy o f Elazar's cate­ gories t h a n w i t h his a p p r o a c h , w h i c h suggests t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s can be analyzed as coherent statements o f p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e . 1 1 5

116

117

1 1 8

1 1 9

National

Political

Forces

A second perspective, best exemplified i n the research o f A l b e r t S t u r m , emphasizes the influence o f n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l movements a n d h i s t o r i c a l forces, rather t h a n distinctive state p o l i t i c a l cultures, o n state c o n s t i t u ­ tional development. A c c o r d i n g t o S t u r m , factors such as the m o v e ­ m e n t w e s t w a r d o f the early nineteenth century, the concern f o r p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m o f the early t w e n t i e t h century, a n d the r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t r e v o l u ­ t i o n o f the 1960s have p r o v i d e d the impetus f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e . T h e y have also determined the issues t h a t m o s t concerned c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k e r s a n d the sorts o f solutions t h a t were devised f o r dealing w i t h t h e m . T h u s , state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s can be v i e w e d as n a t i o n a l p o l i ­ tics w r i t s m a l l . A c c o r d i n g l y , one w o u l d expect a c o n s t i t u t i o n adopted d u r i n g the m i d d l e t h i r d o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y t o reflect the values o f 1 2 0

1 2 1

Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie Revisited: The Closing of the Metropolitan Frontier (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 104-5. Elazar, American Federalism, 93-120. Elazar, "Principles and Traditions," 12-22. See Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, Cultural Theory, 2 4 1 . See, for example, Hall, "Mostly Anchor." Sturm, "Development of State Constitutions." Other studies that emphasize the peri­ odicity of state constitutions include Hall, "Mostly Anchor"; and Hurst, Growth of Ameri­ can Law. Sturm, "Development of State Constitutions," 63 and 72-73. 1 1 5

1 1 6

1 1 7 1 1 8

1 1 9

1 2 0

1 2 1

State Constitutional Development

•

57

Jacksonian democracy a n d one a d o p t e d d u r i n g the early t w e n t i e t h cen­ t u r y t o e m b o d y the prescriptions o f the Progressive m o v e m e n t .

" O rdinary

Po lit ics "

A t h i r d perspective, seldom made e x p l i c i t , views state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l de­ v e l o p m e n t as merely a c o n t i n u a t i o n i n a n e w arena o f the o r d i n a r y p o l i ­ tics o f the s t a t e . A c c o r d i n g t o this view, because the process o f consti­ t u t i o n a l change is a p o l i t i c a l one, change can o n l y occur i f i t reflects the p r e v a i l i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l forces i n the state. T h i s is m o s t o b ­ vious i n the case o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments, w h i c h i n m o s t instances are p r o p o s e d by the state l e g i s l a t u r e . (The a d o p t i o n o f amendments by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e changes, b u t does n o t eliminate, the p o l i t i c a l as­ pects o f the process.) H o w e v e r , i t is also true o f the c r e a t i o n o r r e v i s i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . People w h o are active i n state p o l i t i c s usually serve as delegates t o the conventions t h a t draft state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d their de­ liberations are affected by the same interest groups t h a t exert influence i n the legislative a n d executive arenas. A successful r a t i f i c a t i o n c a m p a i g n requires s u p p o r t f r o m g o v e r n m e n t officials, b o t h p o l i t i c a l parties, a n d established p o l i t i c a l groups, none o f w h o m are l i k e l y t o s u p p o r t a d o c u ­ m e n t t h a t threatens their p o w e r o r takes u n p o p u l a r stands o n divisive issues. I n s u m , the same groups a n d o p i n i o n s t h a t d o m i n a t e o r d i n a r y politics i n the state can be expected t o d o m i n a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s as well. 1 2 2

123

124

A l t h o u g h this v i e w o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m bears some resemblance t o Elazar's, w h a t distinguishes i t is its u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f state p o l i t i c s . T h e o r d i n a r y - p o l i t i c s perspective conceives o f p o l i t i c s as a c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g groups seeking t o advance their interests or t o secure s h o r t - t e r m advantage. I n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s this often takes the f o r m o f a conflict Illustrative of this perspective are Cornwell, Goodman, and Swanson, State Consti­ tutional Conventions: The Politics of the Revision Process in Seven States (New York: Praeger, 1975); and Charles Press, "Assesssing the Policy and Operational Implications of State Constitutional Change," Publius 12 (winter 1982): 9 9 - 1 1 1 . This is reflected in W i l l i a m Havard's analysis of the process of constitutional change in Florida, which concluded that "the legislature was extremely careful to avoid losing control of the revision process at any point." See William C. Havard, "Notes on a Theory of State Constitutional Change: The Florida Experience," Journal of Politics 21 (February 1959): 103. Studies of the membership of constitutional conventions confirm the political back­ ground of most delegates. See, for example, Cornwell, Goodman, and Swanson, State Con­ stitutional Conventions, chap. 3. When the normal participants in the political process do not serve as delegates to a constitutional convention, the document produced by the con­ vention is likely to lack the political support needed for ratification. See, for example, Wheeler, Magnificent Failure. 1 2 2

1 2 3

1 2 4

58

•

Chapter 2

between the forces o f r e f o r m a n d those defending the status q u o . T h i s perspective depreciates the role o f ideas o r conceptions o f the p u b l i c g o o d as factors i n p o l i t i c s , disparaging the "statesman m o d e l " o f c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l development as u n r e a l i s t i c . G i v e n this u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g , one w o u l d n o t expect the p r o d u c t s o f this process t o e m b o d y a coherent design o r an o v e r a r c h i n g perspective o n politics any m o r e t h a n one w o u l d expect i t o f a c o l l e c t i o n o f state statutes. Rather, state c o n s t i t u t i o n s register the result o f g r o u p conflict w i t h i n the state at the p o i n t at w h i c h t h e i r v a r i o u s p r o v i s i o n s were a d o p t e d . 1 2 5

Building

upon

the

Perspectives

Each o f these perspectives affords valuable insights i n t o state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t — o r , m o r e negatively, none o f t h e m by itself provides a f u l l y adequate u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . M o s t likely, any comprehensive account o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m m u s t i n c o r p o r a t e elements o f a l l three perspectives. Such a synthesis is possible i n p a r t because, a l t h o u g h the preceding d e s c r i p t i o n h i g h l i g h t e d the distinctive­ ness o f each perspective, there are also c o m m o n elements a n d overlaps a m o n g t h e m . T h e indigenous p o l i t i c a l forces emphasized b y the o r d i n a r y - p o l i t i c s perspective, for e x a m p l e , m a y w e l l reflect the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e o f the state o r m i r r o r p o l i t i c a l cleavages f o u n d t h r o u g h o u t the n a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l developments can influence the p o ­ l i t i c a l c u l t u r e o f a state or affect the fortunes o f p o l i t i c a l forces w i t h i n i t . T h e p o l i t i c a l - c u l t u r e a n d o r d i n a r y - p o l i t i c s perspectives b o t h emphasize the i m p o r t a n c e o f intrastate factors, whereas the national-forces perspec­ tive o b v i o u s l y views n a t i o n a l factors as decisive. Yet because adjacent states often share a c o m m o n p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , b o t h the p o l i t i c a l - c u l t u r e a n d national-forces perspectives, i n contrast w i t h the o r d i n a r y - p o l i t i c s perspective, l o o k for interstate similarities i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l politics a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design. Finally, the p o l i t i c a l - c u l t u r e perspective suggests t h a t a state c o n s t i t u t i o n t y p i c a l l y manifests a coherent v i e w o f p o l i t i c s , whereas the national-forces perspective expects coherence o n l y a m o n g p r o v i s i o n s a d o p t e d w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r era, a n d the o r d i n a r y - p o l i t i c s per­ spective expects none at a l l . 1 2 6

T h e n e x t three chapters examine the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l experience o f the A m e r i c a n states w i t h these perspectives i n m i n d . C h a p t e r 3 considers See, for example, Cornwell, Goodman, and Swanson, State Constitutional Conven­ tions, 3 3 - 3 4 ; and Press, "Assessing the Policy," 111. This should not be taken as criticism of the authors identified w i t h the three perspec­ tives. I n order to clarify the various perspectives, this analysis has treated them as ideal types, ignoring various nuances and qualifications offered by the authors. 1 2 5

1 2 6

State Constitutional Development

•

59

State c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m d u r i n g the A m e r i c a n F o u n d i n g , the m o s t i n t e n ­ sively studied p e r i o d o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development. C h a p t e r 4 ex­ amines state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development d u r i n g the nineteenth century, the era o f greatest c o n s t i t u t i o n a l revision. Chapter 5 surveys state consti­ t u t i o n a l i s m d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century, an era m a r k e d by a decline i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n , a rise i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t , a n d a n e w reliance o n j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as a mechanism o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development.

CHAPTER

3

Eighteenth-Century State Constitutionalism

T H E L A S T Q U A R T E R o f the eighteenth century was a p e r i o d o f intense c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g a c t i v i t y i n the A m e r i c a n states. By 1 8 0 0 , the sixteen states t h a t c o m p r i s e d the U n i o n h a d a d o p t e d t w e n t y - f o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d f o u r other state c o n s t i t u t i o n s were p r o p o s e d b u t rejected (see table 3.1). ( I n contrast, o n l y eighteen amendments t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n s were a d o p t e d d u r i n g the p e r i o d , a n d ten states d i d n o t a m e n d their c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s at a l l . ) P r i o r t o independence, some colonies v i e w e d the f r a m i n g o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s as a mechanism for p r o m o t i n g a d i s s o l u t i o n o f ties w i t h Great B r i t a i n . T h u s , w h e n Massachusetts a p p l i e d t o the C o n t i n e n t a l Congress i n M a y 1775 for the " m o s t e x p l i c i t advice, respecting the t a k ­ i n g u p a n d exercising the p o w e r s o f c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t , " i t d i d so largely t o p r o d Congress t o w a r d decisive a c t i o n . Similar p e t i t i o n s f r o m N e w H a m p s h i r e a n d South C a r o l i n a i n the fall o f 1775 exerted further pres­ sure o n Congress, w h i c h equivocated, r e c o m m e n d i n g t h a t each state de­ vise w h a t e v e r f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t i t deemed necessary " d u r i n g the C o n ­ tinuance o f the present dispute between Great B r i t a i n a n d the c o l o n i e s . " F o l l o w i n g this advice, N e w H a m p s h i r e i n J a n u a r y 1776 drafted a consti­ t u t i o n ; a n d three other states—South C a r o l i n a , V i r g i n i a , a n d N e w Jersey—also d i d so p r i o r t o the D e c l a r a t i o n o f Independence. T h e Decla­ r a t i o n accelerated the process o f c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g , so t h a t b y m i d - 1 7 7 7 ten o f the o r i g i n a l states h a d a d o p t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n s . T w o states, C o n n e c t i c u t a n d R h o d e I s l a n d , retained their c o l o n i a l charters w i t h o n l y m i n o r m o d i f i c a t i o n s as their f u n d a m e n t a l l a w i n t o the nine­ teenth century. Massachusetts t o o k longer t o devise its c o n s t i t u t i o n , re­ jecting an i n i t i a l version i n 1778 before a d o p t i n g i n 1 7 8 0 the c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t i t has retained t o the present day. 1

2

3

Some early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s were a d m i t t e d l y p r o v i s i o n a l : N e w Jer­ sey's, f o r instance, i n c l u d e d a section under w h i c h the c o n s t i t u t i o n be-

The amendments to the early state constitutions are collected in Swindler, Sources and Documents. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: N o r t o n , 1969), 1 2 9 - 3 1 . Quoted in Wood, Creation of American Republic, 130. The Continental Congress may have refrained from imposing a single framework of government out of a fear that some states would not abide this imposition. 1

2

3

Eighteenth Century

•

61

TABLE 3.1

State Constitutions, 1776-1800 Year(s) of

State Connecticut Delaware Georgia Kentucky Maryland Massachusetts New Hampshire New Jersey New York N o r t h Carolina Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina Tennessee Vermont Virginia

Adoption

Retained colonial charter (1818) 1776 1792 1777 1789 1798 1792 1799 1776 1780 1776 1784 1776 1777 1776 1776 1790 Retained colonial charter (1842) 1776 1778 1790 1796 1777 1786 1793 1776

came inoperative i n the event o f a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h B r i t a i n . O t h e r early c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a l t h o u g h n o t designed as t e m p o r a r y , p r o v e d t o be so. W i t h i n t w o decades after a d o p t i n g their i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s , six states h a d replaced t h e m ; a n d by 1800 Georgia, South C a r o l i n a , a n d V e r m o n t were o n their t h i r d c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Yet nine constitutions framed before 1800 survived m o r e t h a n fifty years. Six states revised their charters f r o m 1788 t o 1 8 0 0 , a n d K e n t u c k y a n d Tennessee devised their i n i t i a l constitutions d u r i n g the 1790s, g i v i n g these states the o p p o r t u n i t y t o d r a w u p o n the m o d e l p r o v i d e d by the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . 4

5

These eighteenth-century documents differed f r o m later state c o n s t i t u ­ tions i n b o t h their length a n d their contents. I f one excludes the oftenlengthy preambles t o these constitutions, several o f the i n i t i a l documents The New Jersey Constitution of 1776, article 23, stated: "Provided always, and it is the true Intent Meaning of this Congress, that i f Reconciliation between Great Britain and these Colonies should take place, and the latter be again taken under the Protection and Govern­ ment of the C r o w n of Great Britain, this Charter shall be null and void, otherwise to remain firm and inviolable." Similar provisions are found in the preambles of the New Hampshire and South Carolina constitutions framed prior to independence. Some of the earliest state constitutions proved the most durable. Four constitutions framed in 1776—those of New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, and N o r t h Carolina—all lasted over half a century. Their durability challenges the assumption that over time the states' experience in constitution making led to greater expertise and produced better results. 4

5

62

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Chapter 3

w e r e even shorter t h a n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . For the m o s t p a r t these 6

c o n s t i t u t i o n s confined themselves t o c r e a t i n g the state's g o v e r n m e n t a l i n ­ s t i t u t i o n s , defining the processes by w h i c h these i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d oper­ ate, o u t l i n i n g h o w a n d by w h o m state offices w o u l d be

filled,

and

delin­

e a t i n g r i g h t s . M a n y features characteristic o f later state c o n s t i t u t i o n s w e r e severely c i r c u m s c r i b e d or altogether absent. T h e early c o n s t i t u t i o n s r a r e l y a t t e m p t e d t o set p u b l i c p o l i c y or t o prescribe m a t t e r s o f p u b l i c finance.

7

T h e y d i d n o t define either the s t r u c t u r e or p o w e r s o f l o c a l g o v ­

e r n m e n t s , a l t h o u g h m o s t used counties or t o w n s as basic u n i t s i n appor­ t i o n i n g one

or b o t h houses o f the state l e g i s l a t u r e .

8

They imposed

few

r e s t r i c t i o n s o n those legislatures b e y o n d those c o n t a i n e d i n t h e i r declara­ t i o n s o f r i g h t s , a n d f o u r state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d i d n o t even i n c l u d e declara­ tions of rights.

9

Finally, six state c o n s t i t u t i o n s failed t o prescribe

procedures for t h e i r a m e n d m e n t or r e v i s i o n .

any

1 0

Although these early constitutions—like their successors—were heavily criticized, their critics seldom complained that the constitutions included excessive detail or constitutionalized matters that did not warrant inclusion in a constitution. The only such criticism involved the state declarations of rights, which, according to Alexander H a m i l t o n in Feder­ alist no. 84, consisted largely of "aphorisms . . . which w o u l d sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government." See Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961), 513. There were inevitably some instances of constitutional legislation. Some states dealt w i t h naturalization in their constitutions: see Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sec. 42; N o r t h Carolina Constitution of 1776, art. 40; N e w York Constitution of 1777, art. 42; and Vermont Constitution of 1777, sec. 38. Vermont outlawed slavery, and t w o other N e w England states included provisions that set them on the path to abolition: Vermont Consti­ tution of 1777, Declaration of Rights, art. 1; Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Declara­ tion of Rights, art. 1; and N e w Hampshire Constitution of 1784, Bill of Rights, arts. 1 and 2. Several states also dealt, albeit briefly, w i t h public education: see, for example, Pennsyl­ vania Constitution of 1776, sec. 44; N o r t h Carolina Constitution of 1776, art. 4 1 ; Vermont Constitution of 1777, sec. 40; and Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, chap. 5, sec. 2 (which was copied in the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784). The most extensive con­ stitutional policymaking involved state policy toward religion. Pertinent state constitutional provisions are discussed in Chester J. Antieau, Phillip M . Carroll, and Thomas C. Burke, Religion under the State Constitutions (Brooklyn: Central Book Company, 1965); Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Leonard W. Levy, The Establish­ ment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment (New York: Macmillan, 1986), chaps. 1 2; and W i l l i a m Lee Miller, The First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic (New York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1986). 6

7

For competing explanations of this omission, see Herget, "Missing Power"; and Libonati, "Home Rule." Those states without formal declarations of rights in their initial constitutions include N e w Hampshire, South Carolina, N e w Jersey, and N e w York. Several of these constitutions did include some rights guarantees in the body of the document. Connecticut and Rhode Island, which were governed under their charters, also had no declarations of rights. Those states without formal procedures for amendment or revision in their initial 8

9

1 0

Eighteenth Century

•

63

T h e pressure o f events explains some o f these omissions. T h e N e w Y o r k legislature, for example, was almost constantly o n the r u n f r o m the B r i t i s h f o r c e s — t w o members w r y l y suggested t h a t i t m i g h t be better "first t o endeavour t o secure a State t o g o v e r n , before w e established a f o r m t o g o v e r n i t b y " — a n d fear o f i n v a s i o n p r o m p t e d the N e w Jersey legislature t o frame a n d a d o p t a c o n s t i t u t i o n i n less t h a n t w o w e e k s . Inexperience i n c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g m a y also have been a factor. Three of the first f o u r states t o draft c o n s t i t u t i o n s o m i t t e d declarations o f rights a n d mechanisms for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change, whereas m o s t later c o n s t i t u ­ tions i n c l u d e d t h e m . H o w e v e r , some omissions reflected deliberate choices. N o n e o f the states t h a t a d o p t e d their c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n the 1780s o r 1790s o r t h a t revised their c o n s t i t u t i o n s d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d i n c l u d e d p r o v i s i o n s o n l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t o r o n p u b l i c finance. A n d n o state i m ­ posed detailed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s o n state legislative p o w e r u n t i l w e l l i n t o the nineteenth c e n t u r y . T h u s , the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l design clearly differed f r o m t h a t o f later eras. 1 1

1 2

13

14

Some scholars have argued t h a t the p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y o f the early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s differs f u n d a m e n t a l l y f r o m t h a t o f the federal C o n s t i t u -

constitutions included New Hampshire, South Carolina, Virginia, New Jersey, N o r t h Caro­ lina, and New York. In addition, Connecticut and Rhode Island had no established proce­ dures in the charters they initially relied upon as fundamental law. See Hoar, Constitutional Conventions, 8. The t w o delegates are quoted in W i l l i Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era (Chapel H i l l : University of N o r t h Carolina Press, 1980), 8 5 - 8 6 . Allan Nevins speculated that the haste of N e w Jersey's constitution-makers was due in part to the news that "Howe had landed at Sandy Point." See Nevins, The American States during and after the Revolu­ tion (New York: Macmillan, 1924), 139. For a more detailed analysis of constitution mak­ ing in New Jersey, see Charles Erdman Jr., The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929). Virginia, the third state to adopt a constitution, did develop a declaration of rights, but it was framed and adopted separately from the "Constitution or Form of Government." The Kentucky constitutional convention of 1792, for example, rejected a major effort to constitutionalize tax policy. See Joan Wells Coward, Kentucky in the New Republic: The Process of Constitution Making (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1979), 3 5 - 3 6 . Article 1, section 27 of the Tennessee Constitution of 1796 contained the first hint of state constitutional regulation of public finance, forbidding taxation on goods manufactured in the state. The Georgia Constitution of 1789 was amended in 1795 to limit the state legislature to those powers expressly enumerated in the constitution. However, article 1, section 22 of the Georgia Constitution of 1798 reversed this, indicating that "[tjhe general assembly shall have power to make all laws and ordinances which they shall deem necessary and proper for the good of the State, which shall not be repugnant to this constitution." For discussion of these developments, see Donald S. Lutz, Popular Consent and Popular Control: Whig Political Theory in the Early State Constitutions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 164 n. 23. 1 1

1 2

1 3

1 4

64

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tion.

Chapter 3 1 5

State c o n s t i t u t i o n s , they insist, e m b o d i e d c i v i c - r e p u b l i c a n p o l i t i ­

cal t h e o r y , w h i c h emphasized a p a r t i c i p a t o r y p o l i t i c s a n d the sacrifice o f p r i v a t e interests a n d r i g h t s i n the service o f the c o m m o n g o o d . I n c o n ­ t r a s t , the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n e m b o d i e d Federalist p o l i t i c a l theory, w h i c h recognized t h a t m o s t people w e r e m o t i v a t e d by self-interest a n d success i n the p r i v a t e sphere a n d created a p o l i t i c s t h a t w o u l d guarantee the p r o ­ t e c t i o n o f r i g h t s o f i n d i v i d u a l s . H o w e v e r , o t h e r scholars have denied t h a t a m a j o r shift o c c u r r e d i n A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l t h o u g h t d u r i n g the late eigh­ teenth c e n t u r y .

1 6

W h a t is clear is t h a t those a t t e n d i n g the

convention of 1787 t i v e , m o d e l s for

Philadelphia

v i e w e d m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s as seriously defec­

avoidance r a t h e r t h a n e m u l a t i o n .

1 7

T h i s was

hardly

Wood, Creation of American Republic. Wood's account of state constitutions is at the heart of the scholarly controversy over civic republicanism. Other scholars of the American Founding who have insisted that there was a fundamental ideological divide during the Founding, w i t h civic republicanism and Lockean liberalism as the competing alternatives, include Bernard Bailyn and J. G. A. Pocock. See Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1967); and Pocock, The Machiavellian Mo­ ment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). For analyses of early state constitutions informed by Wood's account, see Elazar, "Principles and Traditions"; and Lutz, Popular Consent. 1 5

Some scholars have denied that there is a fundamental disjunction between Lockean liberalism and civic republicanism. Works elaborating this position include Thomas L . Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Michael Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Paul A . Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the Ameri­ can Revolution (Chapel H i l l : University of N o r t h Carolina Press, 1992). A k h i l Reed Amar has taken a different tack, arguing that civic-republican themes are found in the federal Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights. See A k h i l Reed Amar, "The Bill of Rights as a Constitution," Yale Law Journal 100 (March 1991): 1131-1210. Finally, Marc Kruman has insisted that the political theory of the federal Constitution is likewise evident in the earliest state constitutions. See Marc W. Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America (Chapel H i l l : University of N o r t h Carolina Press, 1997). In a July 4 address attended by the delegates to the convention, Benjamin Rush sug­ gested that the authors of the early state constitutions "understood perfectly the principles of liberty" but most "were ignorant of the forms and combinations of power in republics." Quoted i n Edward S. Corwin, "The Progress of Constitutional Theory between the Decla­ ration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention," in Richard Loss, ed., Corwin on the Constitution, vol. 1 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), 58. James Madison in Federalist no. 47 echoed these sentiments, observing that the state consti­ tutions "carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed." See The Federalist Papers, 307. For negative assessments of state consti­ tutions at the Philadelphia convention, see M a x Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 1:26-27, 48, 1 3 3 36, 360, 424, 5 1 1 - 1 3 , 525, 533, 5 7 1 ; 2:35, 74, 112-13, 285, 288. It is thus no surprise that the Founders' task has been described as "saving the revolution." See Charles R. Kesler, Saving the Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding (New York: Free Press, 1987). 1 6

1 7

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65

s u r p r i s i n g , for several state c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n s t i t u t e d a n n u a l elections, eschewed checks a n d balances, s t r i p p e d the executive o f m e a n i n g f u l p o w e r s , a n d / o r concentrated almost a l l p o w e r i n the legislature. H o w ­ ever, n o t a l l state c o n s t i t u t i o n s shared these objectionable features. Some a n t i c i p a t e d the strengthened executive, the checks a n d balances, the ex­ tended legislative terms, a n d other features o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n ; i n fact they m a y have served as models for federal c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s . A l t h o u g h i t is conceivable t h a t the state a n d federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s a d o p t e d the same p r o v i s i o n s for different reasons, the diversity a m o n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d the resemblance between some o f t h e m a n d the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n c a u t i o n against b l a n k e t statements a b o u t differences i n p o l i t i c a l perspective between state a n d federal charters. 18

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A N OVERVIEW

T h e i n i t i a l years o f A m e r i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g were u n i q u e i n A m e r i ­ can c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development. A l l the states faced a c o m m o n agenda o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o b l e m s inherent i n the f o r m a t i o n o f n e w governments: j u s t i f y i n g the change o f regime, establishing the a u t h o r i t y o f their n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n s , d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t elements i n the p o p u l a t i o n w o u l d partic­ ipate i n g o v e r n i n g , creating p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d safeguarding rights. As n o t e d i n chapter 1, h i s t o r i c a l l y three issues—the intrastate d i s t r i b u ­ t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l power, the scope o f state g o v e r n m e n t a l power, a n d the r e l a t i o n o f the state t o economic a c t i v i t y — h a v e d o m i n a t e d state consti­ t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . H o w e v e r , o n l y the first o f these emerged as a m a j o r concern d u r i n g the eighteenth century. T h i s was n o t f o r lack o f c o n t r o ­ versy over the exercise o f state p o w e r o r over state economic policies ( a l t h o u g h the exigencies o f w a g i n g w a r tempered c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conflicts i n m o s t states d u r i n g the R e v o l u t i o n ) . Rather, i t was s i m p l y t h a t these p o l i t i c a l issues d i d n o t become state constitutional issues. T h e v i c t o r s i n state p o l i t i c s rarely w r o t e t h e i r economic prescriptions i n t o the state c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n . State policies were t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues, b u t 1 9

2 0

Both the text and design of the federal Constitution reveal the extent to which the Philadelphia convention borrowed from state constitutions. For a detailed survey, see Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 1:609-13. A notable exception was Pennsylvania, which experienced fierce conflict over the state constitution from 1776 to 1790. For an account of this conflict, see Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution ofl 776. Yet even in Pennsylvania the conflict centered—at least overtly—more on structural features of the constitution, such as unicameralism and the separation of powers, than on qualifications for political participation, regional rivalries, or economic policy. O n the economic conflicts in the states during the late eighteenth century, see Nevins, American States; Jackson Turner M a i n , The Sovereign States, 1775-1783 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1973); and Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981). 1 8

1 9

2 0

66

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Chapter 3

this o c c u r r e d at the n a t i o n a l level. Abuses o f p o w e r by state legislatures a n d unjust state economic policies were a m o n g the p r i m a r y c o m p l a i n t s o f the delegates t o the Philadelphia c o n v e n t i o n , a n d they ensured t h a t the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n addressed itself t o these i s s u e s . 21

Some o f the similarities f o u n d a m o n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f the era can be traced t o the states' c o m m o n experience o f B r i t i s h t y r a n n y , w h i c h they u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f a shared r e p u b l i c a n p o l i t i c a l theory. T h e recogni­ t i o n t h a t they c o n f r o n t e d c o m m o n p r o b l e m s also p r o m p t e d states t o c o n ­ sult the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f a l l the other states, a n d their inexperience i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design encouraged extensive b o r r o w i n g . V e r m o n t , f o r ex­ a m p l e , copied m a j o r p o r t i o n s o f Pennsylvania's 1776 c o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d states as diverse as N o r t h C a r o l i n a , Massachusetts, a n d Pennsylvania a l l i n c o r p o r a t e d most protections o f the V i r g i n i a D e c l a r a t i o n o f R i g h t s i n t o t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s . W h a t v a r i a t i o n d i d exist a m o n g state governments o f the p e r i o d c o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d p r i m a r i l y t o t w o factors. O n e was the states' r e t e n t i o n o f distinctive i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements a n d practices f r o m t h e i r c o l o n i a l governments. These m i g h t include, depending o n the state, the structure o f the c o u r t system, the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f l o c a l g o v e r n ­ m e n t , suffrage requirements, a n d the system o f a p p o r t i o n m e n t . Even dis­ t i n c t i v e features, such as the u n i c a m e r a l legislature i n Pennsylvania, h a d t h e i r o r i g i n s p r i o r t o i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e other factor was the develop­ m e n t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y i n the states i n response t o p o l i t i c a l experi­ ence. A c c o r d i n g t o D o n a l d L u t z , this e v o l u t i o n was reflected i n three " w a v e s " o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g . D u r i n g the first w a v e ( i m m e ­ diately p r i o r t o a n d f o l l o w i n g independence), a r e a c t i o n t o abuses by the C r o w n led c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s t o concentrate p o w e r i n state legislatures. T h e states' greater experience i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design, together w i t h their a d m i t t e d l y brief experience w i t h unchecked legislative power, p r o m p t e d a second w a v e o f c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g , b e g i n n i n g w i t h the N e w Y o r k C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 7 7 , i n w h i c h executive p o w e r was augmented. F o l l o w ­ i n g 1 7 8 7 , the n e w m o d e l f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design offered by the federal Constitution inaugurated a t h i r d wave of constitutional reform. Thus, a c c o r d i n g t o this view, the diversity a m o n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s reflects the d i f f e r i n g views o f a p p r o p r i a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design at their dates o f o r i ­ g i n . A l t h o u g h o u r analysis w i l l q u a l i f y s o m e w h a t the sharp distinctions t h a t L u t z d r a w s , there is n o d e n y i n g the e v o l u t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h o u g h t d u r i n g the late eighteenth century. 22

2 3

Article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution grants certain commercial and monetary powers to Congress that had previously been exercised by state governments; Article 1, section 10 prohibits state governments from exercising various powers. See Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 1 8 3 - 8 4 . Lutz, Popular Consent, 4 4 - 5 2 . 2 1

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T H E PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY

A pressing issue c o n f r o n t i n g those w h o framed the i n i t i a l state c o n s t i t u ­ tions was j u s t i f y i n g the states' assumption o f g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y . T o some extent, they c o u l d p o i n t t o the a u t h o r i z a t i o n f r o m the C o n t i n e n t a l Congress as justification for the states' actions. Yet f o r the m o s t p a r t their justification was based o n the doctrine o f p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d o n consent theory. State c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s thus also h a d t o e x p l a i n h o w they c o u l d c l a i m the a u t h o r i t y t o speak a n d act for the people o f the state. T h e i r r e s o l u t i o n o f these issues i n t u r n influenced their a p p r o a c h t o for­ m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change.

The Assumption

of Governmental

Authority

T h e f o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n s adopted p r i o r t o independence justified the as­ s u m p t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y as a t e m p o r a r y expedient necessi­ tated by the b r e a k d o w n o f government i n the colonies. T h e N e w H a m p ­ shire C o n s t i t u t i o n adopted i n January 1776 established a government " f o r the preservation o f peace a n d g o o d order, a n d for the security o f the lives a n d properties o f the inhabitants o f this c o l o n y " t h a t was " t o c o n ­ tinue d u r i n g the present u n h a p p y a n d u n n a t u r a l contest w i t h Great B r i t ­ a i n . " T h e South C a r o l i n a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1776 insisted t h a t reconcilia­ t i o n w i t h B r i t a i n was " a n event w h i c h . . . w e still earnestly desire," and—as n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y — t h e N e w Jersey C o n s t i t u t i o n i n c l u d e d an es­ cape clause rendering the c o n s t i t u t i o n inoperative i n the event o f such a reconciliation. 2 4

25

After the D e c l a r a t i o n o f Independence, the constitutions framed i n late 1776 i n c l u d e d lengthy preambles justifying independence a n d the f o r m a ­ t i o n o f n e w governments o n the basis o f social-compact t h e o r y . T h e y asserted t h a t " a l l p o l i t i c a l p o w e r is vested i n a n d derived f r o m the people o n l y " a n d t h a t the people consequently have " a n incontestable, unalien­ able, a n d indefeasible r i g h t " t o " r e f o r m , alter, o r t o t a l l y change [govern­ m e n t ] w h e n their p r o t e c t i o n , safety, prosperity, a n d happiness require i t . " Indeed, several insisted t h a t even B r i t i s h rule over the colonies h a d 26

2 7

New Hampshire Constitution of 1776, par. 2. South Carolina Constitution of 1776, Preamble. This is made most explicit in the preamble of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which states: "The body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole people covenants w i t h each citizen and each citizen w i t h the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." See also Vermont Constitution, Preamble; Virginia Constitution, Declaration of Rights, sec. 1; and Delaware, Declaration of Rights, art. 1. O n political power as rooted in consent, see, for example, N o r t h Carolina Constitu2 4

2 5

2 6

2 7

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Chapter 3

its basis i n consent. C o n n e c t i c u t , w h i c h retained its Charter g o v e r n m e n t , m a i n t a i n e d t h a t the " f o r m o f C i v i l G o v e r n m e n t " was " c o n t a i n e d " i n the C h a r t e r received f r o m Charles I I b u t " a d o p t e d by the People o f the S t a t e . " W i t h this theoretical u n d e r p i n n i n g i n place, the preambles re­ v i e w e d the t y r a n n i c a l actions a n d v i o l a t i o n s o f rights by the k i n g a n d P a r l i a m e n t t h a t h a d led the A m e r i c a n people t o w i t h d r a w their consent. T h e N e w Y o r k C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 7 7 even i n c o r p o r a t e d v e r b a t i m ex­ tended excerpts f r o m the D e c l a r a t i o n o f Independence i n its preamble. T h i s catalog o f offenses made sense f r o m a social-compact perspective, because the c r e a t i o n o f a n e w c o m p a c t r e q u i r e d e x p l a n a t i o n o f w h y the o l d one was n o longer b i n d i n g . T h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t p r o d u c e d by the w i t h d r a w a l o f p o p u l a r consent r e q u i r e d the f o r m a t i o n o f a n e w g o v e r n m e n t t h a t w o u l d " p r o m o t e their safety a n d happiness." Some pre­ ambles defined this safety a n d happiness i n terms o f the exercise o f i n d i ­ v i d u a l r i g h t s . T h e Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 7 6 , f o r example, saw the f o r m a t i o n o f a n e w g o v e r n m e n t as necessary " f o r the security a n d p r o t e c t i o n o f the c o m m u n i t y as such, a n d t o enable the i n d i v i d u a l s w h o compose i t t o enjoy their n a t u r a l rights, a n d the other blessings w h i c h the A u t h o r o f existence has bestowed o n m a n . " A n d the Massachusetts C o n s t i t u t i o n declared t h a t the end o f g o v e r n m e n t was " t o secure the existence o f the b o d y - p o l i t i c , t o p r o t e c t i t , a n d t o f u r n i s h the i n d i v i d u a l s w h o compose i t w i t h the p o w e r o f e n j o y i n g , i n safety a n d t r a n q u i l l i t y , t h e i r n a t u r a l rights a n d the blessings o f l i f e . " O t h e r states' preambles spoke i n m o r e general terms, seeking a c o n s t i t u t i o n " m o s t conducive t o [the people's] happiness a n d p r o s p e r i t y " o r one t h a t w o u l d "best c o n ­ duce t o the safety a n d happiness o f their c o n s t i t u e n t s . " By the t i m e the states revised their o r i g i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s , they n o longer needed t o justify 28

2 9

3 0

31

tion of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 1; Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Preamble; and N e w Hampshire Constitution of 1784, Bill of Rights, art. 1. The most detailed declara­ tion of the right of the people to alter their governments is found i n the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, art. 7. For discussion of these provisions, see Lutz, Popular Consent, chaps. 2 - 3 ; and A k h i l Reed Amar, "The Consent of the Governed," Columbia Law Review 94 (March 1994): 4 5 7 - 5 0 8 . A more general overview is provided by Christian G. Fritz, "Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 24 (winter 1997): 2 8 7 - 3 5 7 . Connecticut Constitutional Ordinance of 1776, Preamble. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Preamble. See also Vermont Constitution of 1777, Preamble; and Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Preamble. Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Preamble. Maryland Constitution of 1776, Preamble; and Georgia Constitution of 1777, Preamble. 2 8

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69

the c r e a t i o n o f governments, so m o s t deleted these justifications f r o m their c o n s t i t u t i o n s . The Authority

32

to Frame

a

Constitution

I f a l l p o l i t i c a l p o w e r was "vested i n a n d derived f r o m the p e o p l e , " t h e n the question became h o w the people c o u l d exercise t h a t power. A l t h o u g h legislative assemblies a d o p t e d the earliest state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , almost i m ­ mediately questions arose a b o u t t h e i r a u t h o r i t y t o act f o r the p e o p l e . T h e n o t i o n t h a t a legislature, even i f "a f u l l a n d free representation o f the p e o p l e , " m i g h t lack sufficient a u t h o r i t y reflected a r e c o g n i t i o n , present f r o m the outset, t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n s differed f r o m o r d i n a r y statutes a n d t h a t greater p o p u l a r i n p u t a n d c o n t r o l were r e q u i r e d f o r their adop­ t i o n . I n the absence o f an established m e c h a n i s m f o r ensuring this p o p ­ u l a r i n p u t a n d c o n t r o l , the states e x p e r i m e n t e d w i t h various alternatives. A m o n g those states t h a t drafted c o n s t i t u t i o n s , every state except V i r g i n i a a n d South C a r o l i n a called f o r special elections for the bodies t h a t w o u l d draft the documents, i n order t o secure a u t h o r i z a t i o n a n d canvass p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t . South C a r o l i n a scheduled a year o f p u b l i c discussion before d r a f t i n g its 1778 c o n s t i t u t i o n . D e l a w a r e pioneered the idea o f a distinct b o d y for f r a m i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n . Georgia a n d Massachusetts abandoned the t a x p a y i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n for v o t i n g i n order t h a t the entire people c o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e i n the c r e a t i o n o f their c o n s t i t u t i o n s . A f t e r the a d o p t i o n o f its c o n s t i t u t i o n , N e w Jersey o r d e r e d t h a t one t h o u s a n d copies be p r i n t e d a n d " d i s p e r s e d ] " a m o n g the c i t i z e n r y f o r their c o n s i d e r a t i o n . M a r y l a n d , N o r t h C a r o l i n a , a n d Pennsylvania t o o k a step further, d i s t r i b ­ u t i n g copies o f their c o n s t i t u t i o n s t o the people for their response before 33

3 4

35

36

For example, the preamble to the South Carolina Constitution of 1778 is about onesixth the length of the preamble to the state's 1776 constitution. Illustrative of the contemporary recognition of the problem is "The Alarm: or, an Address to the People of Pennsylvania on the Late Resolve of Congress," reprinted in Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz, eds., American Political Writing during the Founding Era, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1983), T.321-27. The present account draws primarily on Adams, The First American Constitutions, chap. 3; Green, Constitu­ tional Development, 61-62; Wood, Creation of American Republic, chap. 8; Lutz, Popular Consent, chap. 3; and Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, chap. 2. Kruman empha­ sizes that the legislative assemblies were typically not state legislatures but revolutionary bodies and thus more likely to involve something approximating a direct representation of the people. South Carolina Constitution of 1776, art. 1. Several other early constitutions also emphasized the representative character of the body that adopted them. See Fritz, "Alterna­ tive Visions," 322-34. Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, 20. Erdman, New Jersey Constitution, 38. 3 2

3 3

3 4

3 5

3 6

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final passage. Eventually, o f course, p o p u l a r i n p u t i n t o a n d c o n t r o l over c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g were i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d t h r o u g h p o p u l a r election o f conventions specially e m p o w e r e d t o draft c o n s t i t u t i o n s , w i t h r a t i f i c a t i o n b y referendum. H o w e v e r , n o t u n t i l 1 7 8 0 w i t h the a d o p t i o n o f the Massa­ chusetts C o n s t i t u t i o n were these t w o elements c o u p l e d i n the process o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l creation, a n d p r i o r t o 1800 o n l y one other state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n (the N e w H a m p s h i r e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1784) was framed using this procedure. 3 7

These various efforts t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e a p o p u l a r role i n c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g underscore the states' r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a constitution's a u t h o r i t y rested o n consent. T h e eventual a d o p t i o n o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conven­ t i o n a n d referendum as the mechanisms t o ensure such consent also t y p ­ ifies the process o f interstate b o r r o w i n g o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n n o v a t i o n s . Such i n n o v a t i o n s usually gain acceptance o n l y gradually, as states experi­ m e n t w i t h alternative solutions t o a c o m m o n p r o b l e m before eventually a d o p t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r a p p r o a c h , a n d this is w h a t occurred i n this case.

Implications

for Constitutional

Change

T h e shared u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t the people are the source o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y alerted the states t o a further p r o b l e m : i f a legislature c o u l d n o t create a c o n s t i t u t i o n , then neither c o u l d i t re-create the c o n s t i t u t i o n by a l t e r i n g i t . I n particular, a legislature c o u l d n o t enhance the p o w e r s t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n g r a n t e d t o i t n o r exercise those w i t h h e l d f r o m i t . B u t for this stricture t o be effective, there h a d t o be some means o f ensur­ i n g t h a t the legislature—and other branches as w e l l — a b i d e d by the constitution. I n a d d i t i o n , i n order t o discourage c i r c u m v e n t i o n o f 3 8

3 9

I t may not be coincidental that popular ratification developed i n t w o N e w England states, where the institution of t o w n meetings provided a mechanism for assessing the w i l l of the people. For an examination of how this worked i n practice, see Oscar Handlin and M a r y Handlin, eds., The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massa­ chusetts Constitution of 1780 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1966). Submission of constitutions to the people for approval did not become an established practice until 1829. See D o d d , Revision and Amendment, 6 4 - 6 5 . The delay in adopting the Massachusetts model may have reflected a general satisfaction w i t h the adequacy of other means of secur­ ing popular consent. This is not to deny that state legislatures sometimes acted as i f they had authority to change state constitutions unilaterally. For examples, see Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 2 7 4 - 7 5 . Yet Wood's examples involve either unimportant transgressions—for example, the N e w Jersey legislature substituting "state" for "colony" i n the constitution following independence—or actions taken in wartime emergencies. N o legislature pro­ claimed a general power to alter the state constitution. Indeed, the N e w Jersey legislature refused to undertake revision of the state constitution three times during the 1790s because it viewed that as beyond its power. See Erdman, New jersey Constitution, 7 6 - 7 7 . 3 7

3 8

3 9

This analysis emphasizes legislative overstepping of constitutional bounds because the

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c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s , there also h a d t o be avenues f o r legitimate c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change, w h e n such change was needed. ENSURING CONSTITUTIONAL FIDELITY Several early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s sought t o encourage c o n s t i t u t i o n a l fidel­ i t y by e x h o r t a t i o n , declaring t h a t the legislature " s h a l l have n o p o w e r t o a d d t o , alter, a b o l i s h , or infringe any p a r t o f this C o n s t i t u t i o n . " Some demanded oaths o f state officials t h a t they w o u l d n o t v i o l a t e their consti­ t u t i o n a l t r u s t . Yet t y p i c a l l y these oaths asked t o o l i t t l e o r t o o m u c h . A n example o f the f o r m e r was the r e q u i r e m e n t f o u n d i n the N e w Jersey C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t legislators swear n o t t o enact laws t h a t w o u l d " a n n u l o r repeal" the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements o f a n n u a l legislative sessions, religious freedom, a n d j u r y t r i a l . T h i s left one t o w o n d e r w h e t h e r other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements c o u l d be v i o l a t e d w i t h i m p u n i t y . A n example o f the latter was the o a t h demanded o f officeholders by the Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n , p l e d g i n g t h e m n o t t o " d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y d o any act or t h i n g p r e j u d i c i a l o r i n j u r i o u s t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n o r g o v e r n m e n t thereof." O p p o n e n t s o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n attacked the p r o v i s i o n , a r g u i n g t h a t i t i n ­ fringed o n t h e i r r i g h t t o seek c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change, a n d the v a l i d i t y o f their c o m p l a i n t was recognized b y a l l o w i n g t h e m t o annex a reservation t o the o a t h . 4 0

4 1

4 2

Some early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d i d propose i n s t i t u t i o n a l devices for en­ f o r c i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s . T h e m o s t famous o f these was the C o u n c i l o f Censors, established under the Pennsylvania a n d V e r m o n t c o n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e c o u n c i l , w h i c h met every seven years, was charged w i t h r e v i e w i n g w h e t h e r v i o l a t i o n s o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n h a d occurred or w h e t h e r experience h a d exposed deficiencies i n the state's c o n s t i t u t i o n . H o w e v e r , because i t was f o r the m o s t p a r t l i m i t e d t o r e c o m m e n d i n g ac­ t i o n by the legislature, the effectiveness o f its r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s depended 43

early state constitutions tended to concentrate powers in the legislature. I n the words of James Wilson, "[T]he executive and the judicial as well as the legislative authority was now the child of the people; but, to the two former, the people behaved like step-mothers. The legislature was still discriminated by excessive partiality; and into its lap, every good and precious gift was profusely thrown." Quoted in Charles C. Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789: A Study in Constitutional History (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1922), 27. See also Federalist nos. 4 7 - 4 8 . N o r t h Carolina Constitution of 1776, art. 44; Maryland Constitution of 1776, Decla­ ration of Rights, art. 59; Delaware Constitution of 1776, art. 30; Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sec. 9; Georgia Constitution of 1777, art. 7; and Vermont Constitution of 1777, sec. 8. New Jersey Constitution of 1776, art. 23. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sec. 40; Nevins, American States, 257. The best recent discussion of this institution is found in Lutz, Popular Consent, chap. 6. James Madison discusses the Council of Censors in Federalist nos. 48 and 50. 4 0

4 1

4 2 4 3

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o n p o p u l a r pressure for a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n . S i m i l a r l y ineffective were c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s m a n d a t i n g a separation o f p o w e r s . A l t h o u g h these p r o v i s i o n s decreed t h a t n o b r a n c h s h o u l d exercise the p o w e r s p r o p ­ erly b e l o n g i n g t o another, the experience o f the states s h o w e d t h a t "a mere d e m a r c a t i o n o n p a r c h m e n t o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t s o f the several departments [was] n o t a sufficient g u a r d against encroachments." Those state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t made governors dependent o n legislatures a n d s t r i p p e d t h e m o f weapons t o counter legislative encroachments actu­ ally facilitated legislative v i o l a t i o n s o f the separation o f p o w e r s . O n l y those c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t granted governors independent a u t h o r i t y a n d ad­ equate p o w e r s p r o d u c e d a durable separation o f p o w e r s . 44

4 5

I n t e n t i o n a l l y o m i t t e d f r o m this list o f enforcement mechanisms is j u d i ­ cial enforcement o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements. T h e n o t i o n t h a t judges c o u l d i n v a l i d a t e a l l g o v e r n m e n t a l actions inconsistent w i t h their inter­ p r e t a t i o n o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n was s i m p l y u n k n o w n i n the 1770s a n d early 1780s a n d w o u l d have been considered far b e y o n d the scope o f legiti­ m a t e j u d i c i a l p o w e r . O n l y three states expressly granted the j u d i c i a r y a role i n r e v i e w i n g legislation: N e w Y o r k t h r o u g h j u d i c i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h the executive o n the C o u n c i l o f R e v i s i o n , a n d N e w H a m p s h i r e a n d Massachusetts t h r o u g h advisory o p i n i o n s o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . H o w e v e r , the decisions o f the C o u n c i l o f R e v i s i o n c o u l d be o v e r r i d d e n by t w o t h i r d s o f the legislature, a n d the a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n s o f judges i n N e w H a m p s h i r e a n d Massachusetts were n o t b i n d i n g . M o r e o v e r , state j u d i ­ ciaries were t y p i c a l l y t o o subservient t o state legislatures t o p r o v i d e a consistently effective check. M o s t judges were elected by the legislatures, some f o r quite l i m i t e d terms, a n d i n several states they c o u l d be r e m o v e d o n address by a m a j o r i t y o f the l e g i s l a t u r e . Indeed, w h e n a R h o d e Is4 6

4 7

48

Federalist no. 48, 313. O n early state governors, see Thach, Creation of the Presidency, chap. 2; and Wood, Creation of American Republic, chaps. 4 and 10. The powers of state executives were considerably enhanced during the 1780s and 1790s. Even scholars w i t h quite different understandings of the development of judicial power concur in this assessment, viewing the alleged state "precedents" for judicial review during the 1780s as involving practices quite distinct from modern judicial review. See, for example, Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), chap. 2; and Robert L . Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), chap. 3. N e w York Constitution of 1777, art. 3; Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, chap. 3, art. 2; and N e w Hampshire Constitution of 1784, part 2, "Judiciary Power." Judicial advi­ sory opinions seem to serve the same purpose as the findings of the Council of Censors, an example of somewhat different institutions serving a common function. See Wood, Creation of American Republic, 1 5 2 - 6 1 . State constitutions were slow to mark off the judiciary as a distinct branch of government. N e w Jersey, for example, did not even vest ultimate judicial authority in the courts; rather, the governor and Legislative Council served as the state's "Court of Appeals in the Last Resort." See the N e w Jersey Constitution of 1776, art. 9; and, more generally, Friedman, History of American Law, 4 4

4 5

4 6

4 7

4 8

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l a n d c o u r t refused t o enforce a statute, the judges were called before the legislature t o e x p l a i n their r u l i n g a n d threatened w i t h r e m o v a l , a n d at the n e x t j u d i c i a l election a l l b u t one lost their s e a t s . 49

State c o n s t i t u t i o n s therefore relied p r i m a r i l y o n the state's citizenry for enforcement o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s , w i t h a n n u a l election o f legisla­ tors the key element o f this p r o c e s s . Several c o n s t i t u t i o n s encouraged a "frequent recurrence t o f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s , " a n d some a d m o n i s h e d voters t o " p a y p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o these p r i n c i p l e s " i n choosing repre­ sentatives. T h i s reliance o n p o p u l a r enforcement o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guidelines c o m p o r t e d w i t h the s t r o n g l y p o p u l a r character o f early state governments, w h i c h w i l l be discussed shortly. I t also reflected an assump­ t i o n t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s resulted p r i m a r i l y f r o m officials' devia­ tions f r o m the p o p u l a r w i l l rather t h a n f r o m u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l aims a m o n g the populace. T h i s i n t u r n was based o n the n o t i o n t h a t the m a j o r p o l i t i c a l conflict was between governors a n d governed rather t h a n a m o n g c o m p e t i n g groups w i t h i n the p o p u l a t i o n . 50

51

FORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

T h e emphasis o n p o p u l a r a u t h o r i t y i n early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s is also apparent i n h o w they dealt w i t h f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. Seventeen c o n s t i t u t i o n s p r i o r t o 1800 specified mechanisms for their a m e n d m e n t or revision, most f a v o r i n g p o p u l a r l y elected c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions for b o t h . Provisions for conventions ranged f r o m a u t h o r i z a t i o n o f a single c o n v e n t i o n fifteen years after r a t i f i c a t i o n (Massachusetts), t o a u t h o r i z a t i o n o f a c o n v e n t i o n by t w o - t h i r d s o f the C o u n c i l o f Censors (Pennsylva­ nia a n d V e r m o n t ) , t o legislative c o n v e n i n g o f a c o n v e n t i o n at its discre­ t i o n (Tennessee a n d K e n t u c k y , a m o n g o t h e r s ) . Three s t a t e s — M a r y l a n d , 52

139-40. Although there was some effort to increase the independence of the judiciary in the 1780s and 1790s, one commentator has concluded that "[sjtate constitutions after 1789 would pay lip service to the Federalist principle, but four of the seven constitutions written in the third wave w o u l d still make the judiciary a complete creature of the legislature." Lutz, Popular Consent, 97. Snowiss, Judicial Review, 22, recounting Trevett v. Weeden (1786), an unpublished decision described in James M . Varnum, The Case of Trevett v. Weeden (Providence: John Carter, 1787). For a study of the uneven development of judicial independence in one state, see G. S. Rowe, Embattled Bench: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Forging of a Democratic Society (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1994). For a listing of the terms of office of legislators under eighteenth-century state consti­ tutions, see Lutz, Popular Consent, 88, table 4. See, for example, Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. 18; Vermont Constitution of 1777, Declaration of Rights, sec. 16; and Virginia Constitution, Declaration of Rights, sec. 15. The authority of the Council of Censors to call a convention appeared to include the power to set the agenda for the convention, although there is some question as to whether this was intended. See Cecilia M . Kenyon, "Constitutionalism in Revolutionary America," 4 9

5 0

5 1

5 2

74

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Chapter 3

D e l a w a r e , a n d South C a r o l i n a ( 1 7 7 8 ) — p e r m i t t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amend­ m e n t by the state legislature b u t r e q u i r e d e x t r a o r d i n a r y majorities t o a d o p t the amendments. Seven states at one t i m e o r another h a d a consti­ t u t i o n t h a t d i d n o t specify a procedure f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change, a n d five o f those c o n s t i t u t i o n s r e m a i n e d i n effect i n 1 8 0 0 . B u t their failure t o specify a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change was n o t m e a n t t o preclude such change. Rather, i t reflected either inadvertence or, m o r e inter­ estingly, the v i e w t h a t such p r o v i s i o n s were unnecessary. W h a t eighteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d i d include was an e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t p o l i t i c a l p o w e r came f r o m the people, f r o m w h i c h they c o n c l u d e d , i n the w o r d s o f the V i r g i n i a D e c l a r a t i o n o f R i g h t s , t h a t "the c o m m u n i t y h a t h an i n d u b i t a b l e , unalienable, a n d indefeasible r i g h t t o r e f o r m , alter, or abolish g o v e r n m e n t i n such m a n n e r as shall be by t h a t c o m m u n i t y j u d g e d m o s t conducive t o the p u b l i c w e a l . " T h i s c o n f i r m e d t h a t the people d i d n o t require a m e n d m e n t o r r e v i s i o n p r o v i s i o n s t o change the c o n s t i t u t i o n ; such p r o v i s i o n s d i d n o t g r a n t a p o w e r b u t merely specified a procedure by w h i c h i t c o u l d be exercised. C e r t a i n l y the establishment o f the states' i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s , u n d e r t a k e n i n the ab­ sence o f legal a u t h o r i z a t i o n , i l l u s t r a t e d t h a t very p o i n t . Perhaps less o b v i ­ ously, i t also i m p l i e d t h a t the people's a u t h o r i t y t o institute c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change was u n d i m i n i s h e d even i n states t h a t d i d specify a m e n d m e n t p r o ­ cedures; those procedures were s i m p l y one means b y w h i c h c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l change c o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n . State c o n s t i t u t i o n a l practice d u r i n g the late eighteenth century (and beyond) c o i n c i d e d w i t h this understand­ i n g : Georgia i n 1788 a n d Pennsylvania i n 1 7 9 0 i g n o r e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y specified procedures i n revising t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s , j u s t i f y i n g t h e i r ac­ tions as based o n the inherent a u t h o r i t y o f the people t o change their form of government. 5 3

5 4

55

I n a sense, these declarations o f p o p u l a r a u t h o r i t y t o alter the c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n m i g h t be said t o have domesticated the L o c k e a n r i g h t t o r e v o l u t i o n . By recognizing the r i g h t o f the people t o change the c o n s t i t u t i o n peacein J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Constitutionalism (New York: N e w York University Press, 1979), 1 0 5 - 6 . Virginia Declaration of Rights, art. 3. Most other state constitutions included compa­ rable language: see, for example, Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 5; Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Preamble, and Declaration of Rights, art. 7; N e w Hampshire Constitution of 1784, Bill of Rights, art. 10; and Georgia Constitution of 1776, Preamble. Amar, "Consent of the Governed," and Fritz, "Alternative Visions." Dodd, Revision and Amendment, chap. 2; and—more generally—J. Franklin Jameson, Treatise on Constitutional Conventions. I n "The Consent of the Governed," A k h i l Amar argues that Federalist no. 40 also supports the idea of popular authority to revise constitutions without following constitutionally prescribed forms. 5 3

5 4

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ably, t h e y r e d u c e d the necessity o f recourse t o v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n t o secure g o o d g o v e r n m e n t . Yet i n a n o t h e r sense, the declarations w e n t considera­ b l y b e y o n d L o c k e . Serious v i o l a t i o n s o f r i g h t s or a p l a n t o t y r a n n i z e w e r e n o t necessary t o t r i g g e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n ; c h a n g i n g p o p u l a r v i e w s o f w h a t w o u l d p r o d u c e effective g o v e r n m e n t w e r e a sufficient justifica­ t i o n for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e .

5 6

RIGHTS T h e V i r g i n i a D e c l a r a t i o n o f R i g h t s i n a u g u r a t e d the practice o f i n c l u d i n g separate p r o t e c t i o n s for r i g h t s i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d after its a d o p ­ t i o n , o n l y f o u r states failed t o i n c l u d e a d e c l a r a t i o n o f r i g h t s i n t h e i r constitutions.

5 7

Subsequent d e c l a r a t i o n s a d d e d t o V i r g i n i a ' s i n v e n t o r y o f

r i g h t s — P e n n s y l v a n i a , for e x a m p l e , i n c l u d e d the r i g h t t o i n s t r u c t repre­ sentatives a n d t o p e t i t i o n for redress o f grievances, and Tennessee a r i g h t t o navigate the M i s s i s s i p p i R i v e r — o r dealt i n greater d e t a i l w i t h topics such as

church and

state.

5 8

Nevertheless, the

similarities a m o n g

the

states' d e c l a r a t i o n s o f r i g h t s are s t r i k i n g . A l l p r o c l a i m the same p o l i t i c a l principles and

p r o t e c t the

same set o f basic r i g h t s . M o r e o v e r , because

A similar argument is made by Fritz, "Alternative Visions," 2 9 4 - 9 6 . O n the derivation of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (and other state declarations of rights), see A . E. Dick H o w a r d , The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitu­ tionalism in America (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1968); and Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 62. New Jersey's constitution-makers, who completed w o r k on the state's constitution only twenty days after the Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted, did not have the Virginia declaration available to them. The New Jersey Constitution omitted a declaration of rights, although some rights—for example, the right to counsel in criminal cases, religious liberty, and the right to trial by jury—were protected in the body of the document, and the common law continued i n operation. See New Jersey Constitution, arts. 16-19, 22. Other states without a declaration of rights in their constitutions are Georgia (1777, 1789), South Carolina (1776, 1778, and 1790), and New York (1777). Georgia embedded a few rights in its first t w o constitutions and added a declaration of rights to its 1798 charter. See Georgia Constitution of 1777, arts. 56 and 5 8 - 6 1 , and Georgia Constitu­ tion of 1789, art. 4, sees. 3 - 6 . South Carolina's earliest constitution antedated the Virginia declaration, and its later constitutions protected some rights in the body of the document but failed to create a full-fledged declaration of rights. See South Carolina Constitution of 1778, sees. 4 0 - 4 3 , and South Carolina Constitution of 1790, arts. 8-9. The New York Constitution recognized the importance of protecting rights—according to the preamble, its aim was formation of a government "best calculated to secure the rights and liberties of the good people of this State"—but included only guarantees of religious liberty and trial by jury, together w i t h a ban on bills of attainder. It did, however, guarantee the continued operation of the common law, which presumably afforded further protections. See New York Constitution of 1777, arts. 35, 38, 4 1 . 5 6

5 7

See Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 16; and Tennessee Constitution of 1796, art. 1 1 , sec. 3 1 . 5 8

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they a l l d r a w u p o n the V i r g i n i a declaration, their protections often m a t c h each other w o r d for w o r d .

The

Distinctiveness

of State Declarations

of

Rights

E a r l y state declarations o f rights differ f r o m the federal B i l l o f Rights i n several r e s p e c t s . One difference is the frequent ( t h o u g h n o t consistent) use o f the h o r t a t o r y ought, rather t h a n the m o r e m a n d a t o r y shall, i n the state declarations. T h e V i r g i n i a D e c l a r a t i o n o f Rights, for example, de­ clares t h a t "excessive bail ought n o t t o be r e q u i r e d " ; the Pennsylvania D e c l a r a t i o n t h a t " f r e e d o m o f the press ought n o t t o be restrained"; the N e w H a m p s h i r e D e c l a r a t i o n t h a t " [ a ] l l penalties ought t o be p r o p o r ­ t i o n e d t o the nature o f the offense"; a n d the Massachusetts D e c l a r a t i o n t h a t " [ a ] l l elections ought t o be f r e e . " A l t h o u g h this usage declined i n the 1790s, perhaps reflecting the influence o f the federal B i l l o f R i g h t s , some constitutions framed d u r i n g t h a t decade retained the earlier h o r t a ­ t o r y l a n g u a g e . A second difference is the state declarations' i n c l u s i o n o f general statements o f p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e n o t susceptible t o j u d i c i a l en­ forcement. T h e Pennsylvania D e c l a r a t i o n o f Rights, for instance, de­ clared t h a t " g o v e r n m e n t is, o r o u g h t t o be, i n s t i t u t e d for the c o m m o n benefit, p r o t e c t i o n a n d security o f the people, n a t i o n o r c o m m u n i t y ; a n d n o t f o r the p a r t i c u l a r e m o l u m e n t o r advantage o f any single m a n , f a m i l y or set o f m e n , w h o are a p a r t o n l y o f t h a t c o m m u n i t y . " Similarly, the D e l a w a r e D e c l a r a t i o n o f Rights asserted t h a t "a w e l l regulated M i l i t i a is the proper, n a t u r a l a n d safe Defense o f a free G o v e r n m e n t " ; a n d the V i r g i n i a D e c l a r a t i o n o f Rights t h a t " a l l m e n are by nature equally free a n d independent, a n d have certain inherent r i g h t s , o f w h i c h , w h e n they enter i n t o a state o f society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive o r divest their p o s t e r i t y . " Even p r o v i s i o n s t h a t m i g h t be enforceable some­ times i n c l u d e d e x p l a n a t o r y o r justificatory verbiage—Delaware's guar­ antee o f suffrage rights, for example, began by n o t i n g t h a t "the R i g h t i n 59

6 0

61

6 2

63

Despite these differences, the influence of the state declarations of rights was substan­ tial: of the twenty-seven guarantees i n the federal Bill of Rights, all but one (the N i n t h Amendment) appeared in pre-178 7 state declarations of rights. See Lutz, Origins of Ameri­ can Constitutionalism, 62. 60 Virginia Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 9; Pennsylvania Constitu­ tion of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 12; N e w Hampshire Constitution of 1784, Bill of Rights, art. 18; and Massachusetts Constitution, part 1, art. 9. Emphasis added in all instances. See Lutz, Popular Consent, 67, table 3. The constitutions of Kentucky and Tennessee, newly framed i n the 1790s, also consistently employed shall rather than ought. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 5. Delaware Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 18; and Virginia Constitu­ tion of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 1. 5 9

6 1

6 2

6 3

Eighteenth Century

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77

the People t o participate i n the Legislature, is the F o u n d a t i o n o f L i b e r t y a n d o f a l l free G o v e r n m e n t . " A t h i r d difference is the i n c l u s i o n o f c o m m u n i t y , as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l , concerns w i t h i n state declarations o f rights. O n e such p r o v i s i o n is the Massachusetts article recognizing the r e l a t i o n between r e l i g i o n a n d c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t a n d p e r m i t t i n g the people t o authorize their legislature t o s u p p o r t r e l i g i o n . Others include the l i m i t a t i o n s f o u n d i n several state c o n s t i t u t i o n s o n abuses o f the freedom o f the press a n d o n religious prac­ tices c o n t r a r y t o the g o o d order o f the s o c i e t y . Several early c o n s t i t u ­ tions even include the police p o w e r w i t h i n their declarations o f r i g h t s . A f o u r t h difference is the tendency t o frame w h a t are t o d a y u n d e r s t o o d as i n d i v i d u a l rights i n terms o f protections f o r the p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y . T h u s , the V i r g i n i a D e c l a r a t i o n o f Rights asserts t h a t "the freedom o f the press is one o f the great b u l w a r k s o f liberty, a n d can never be restrained b u t by despotic g o v e r n m e n t s , " a n d the D e l a w a r e D e c l a r a t i o n o f Rights t h a t " T r i a l by J u r y o f Facts where they arise is one o f the greatest Securi­ ties o f the Lives, Liberties a n d Estates o f the P e o p l e . " A final difference is the apparent m i x t u r e o f s t r u c t u r a l a n d rights p r o v i s i o n s . Some matters o f g o v e r n m e n t a l structure a n d procedure are f o u n d i n state declarations o f rights, w h i l e w h a t t o d a y w o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d as rights guarantees occasionally appear i n the b o d y o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Examples o f the f o r m e r include p r o v i s i o n s for j u d i c i a l tenure d u r i n g g o o d behavior, for executive r o t a t i o n i n office, a n d for a separation o f powers i n state decla­ rations o f r i g h t s . Examples o f the latter include the bans o n excessive b a i l , o n sanguinary laws, a n d o n i m p r i s o n m e n t for b a n k r u p t c y i n the b o d y o f Pennsylvania's c o n s t i t u t i o n . 6 4

6 5

66

6 7

68

6 9

7 0

W h a t accounts f o r these u n f a m i l i a r features i n early state declarations o f rights? Some scholars have suggested t h a t the early state guarantees reveal an inexperience a n d ineptitude i n c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g , w h i c h was overcome by the t i m e o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . L e o n a r d Levy, for exDelaware Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 6. Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, part 1, art. 3. See, for example, Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, art. 9, sec. 7; and New Hamp­ shire Constitution of 1784, art. 1, sees. 4 - 5 . See, for example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Bill of Rights, art. 3; and the Delaware Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 4. 68 Virginia Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 12; and Delaware Constitu­ tion of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 13. O n judicial tenure during good behavior, see Maryland Constitution of 1776, Decla­ ration of Rights, art. 30; and N e w Hampshire Constitution of 1784, Declaration of Rights, art. 35. O n executive rotation, see Maryland Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 3 1 . O n the separation of powers, see Virginia Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 5; and Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. 30. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sees. 28, 29, and 38. 6 4

6 5

6 6

6 7

6 9

7 0

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a m p l e , l o o k i n g t o the frequent s u b s t i t u t i o n o f ought f o r shall, derided state guarantees as " f l a b b y " a n d " n a m b y - p a m b y . " F r o m this p o i n t o f view, the federal B i l l o f Rights's e l i m i n a t i o n o f the a d m o n i t o r y a n d h o r t a ­ t o r y language characteristic o f state declarations o f r i g h t s , as w e l l as its separation o f s t r u c t u r a l a n d rights p r o v i s i o n s , m a r k e d an u n q u a l i f i e d ad­ vance i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design. H o w e v e r , i f one views state declarations o f r i g h t s i n the l i g h t o f r e p u b l i c a n p o l i t i c a l theory, they appear neither p r i m i t i v e n o r u n u s u a l . Rather, the declarations o f rights l i t e r a l l y served t o declare the f u n d a m e n t a l p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t were t o guide the gov­ e r n m e n t a n d t o ensure t h a t these p r i n c i p l e s were made effectual. T h a t was w h y they t y p i c a l l y preceded the " f r a m e o f g o v e r n m e n t " t h a t created political institutions and distributed powers among them. To accomplish these purposes, the state declarations necessarily i n c l u d e d a m i x t u r e o f s t r u c t u r a l concerns, p o l i t i c a l m a x i m s , a n d rights guarantees. M o r e o v e r , the i n s u s c e p t i b i l i t y o f v a r i o u s p r o v i s i o n s t o j u d i c i a l enforcement was n o t a flaw, because the declarations w e r e addressed n o t t o the state j u d i c i a r y p r i m a r i l y b u t t o the people's representatives, w h o were t o be g u i d e d by t h e m i n legislating, a n d even m o r e t o the l i b e r t y - l o v i n g a n d v i g i l a n t c i t i ­ zenry t h a t was t o oversee the exercise o f g o v e r n m e n t a l power. 7 1

7 2

For those w h o drafted the state declarations o f r i g h t s , this reliance o n p o p u l a r majorities t o secure rights posed n o p r o b l e m because they be­ lieved t h a t the m a i n threats t o r i g h t s , b o t h collective a n d i n d i v i d u a l , were despotic officials and those seeking special privileges, rather t h a n the people as a w h o l e . M i n o r i t y f a c t i o n , n o t m a j o r i t y f a c t i o n , posed the greatest danger. T h u s , even w h e n declarations o f rights a d m o n i s h e d the people t o "a firm adherence t o justice, m o d e r a t i o n , temperance, frugality, a n d vir­ t u e , " this was done t o secure "free g o v e r n m e n t " a n d "the blessings o f l i b e r t y " f o r the " p e o p l e , " n o t t o restrain m a j o r i t y t y r a n n y . T o p r o t e c t 7 3

Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 184. See also Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 204; and Bernard Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 9 0 - 9 1 . This sentiment is not limited to contemporary observers. I n his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, book 3, chap. 44, sec. 979, Justice Joseph Story remarked, "That a bill of rights may contain too many enumerations, and especially such as, more correctly belong to the ordinary legislation of a government, cannot be doubted. Some of our state bills of rights contain clauses of this description, being either i n their character and phraseology too loose, and general, and ambiguous." See Lutz, Popular Consent, chap. 3; and Robert C. Palmer, "Liberties as Constitu­ tional Provisions: 1776-1791," in William E. Nelson and Robert C. Palmer, Liberty and Community: Constitution and Rights in the Early American Republic (New York: Oceana, 1987), 61-86. The succeeding analysis draws heavily on both these sources. Virginia Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 15. The contrast w i t h Fed­ eralist no. 10, as well as with modern rights theory—for example, D w o r k i n , Taking Rights Seriously—could hardly be more striking. 7 1

7 2

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79

against officiai threats t o liberty, the declarations emphasized p o p u l a r c o n t r o l o f g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h was u n d e r s t o o d as the basis f o r a l l other rights. T o some extent this c o n t r o l was achieved t h r o u g h direct p o p u l a r i n v o l v e m e n t i n g o v e r n i n g : the r i g h t t o a j u r y t r i a l was the o n l y r i g h t p r o t e c t e d i n every state c o n s t i t u t i o n . H o w e v e r , p o p u l a r rule also d e m a n d e d — a n d the declarations o f rights c h a m p i o n e d — f r e q u e n t and " e q u a l " elections, w i t h p a r t i c i p a t i o n by " a l l m e n , h a v i n g sufficient evi­ dence o f p e r m a n e n t c o m m o n interest w i t h , a n d a t t a c h m e n t t o , the c o m ­ m u n i t y . " Officials were t o be strictly " a c c o u n t a b l e " a n d " a m e n a b l e " t o the people, w h o c o u l d instruct t h e m , p e t i t i o n t h e m for redress o f griev­ ances, and u l t i m a t e l y "reduce [ t h e m ] t o a p r i v a t e s t a t i o n . " Dangerous p o w e r s , l i k e the p o w e r t o suspend laws, were assigned t o the "represen­ tatives o f the p e o p l e , " w h o p r e s u m a b l y c o u l d be c o n t r o l l e d by the p o p u ­ l a c e . M o r e o v e r , these representatives were t o be closely w a t c h e d , a process facilitated by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements t h a t the legislature reg­ u l a r l y p u b l i s h votes a n d p r o c e e d i n g s . L i m i t s o n r e e l i g i b i l i t y for office and other s t r u c t u r a l p r o v i s i o n s f o u n d i n state declarations o f rights served t o p r o m o t e an i d e n t i t y o f interests between the people a n d their representatives. So t o o d i d the requirements i n a l l b u t t w o states t h a t representatives be residents o f the districts they r e p r e s e n t e d . I f a l l else failed, the declarations recognized t h a t "a well-regulated m i l i t i a , c o m ­ posed o f the b o d y o f the people, t r a i n e d t o arms, is the proper, n a t u r a l , and safe defense o f a free s t a t e . " 7 4

7 5

7 6

7 7

78

79

80

William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 96. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. 15, pro­ vided that "this method of procedure shall be held sacred." Virginia Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 6; see also Delaware Con­ stitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 6, and Vermont Constitution of 1777, Decla­ ration of Rights, arts. 7 - 8 . Having established the principle that those w i t h sufficient stake in the community should participate in governing, the declaration of rights left specification of that principle to statute or to the body of the constitution, and the states differed consid­ erably in their determination as to what constituted a sufficient stake. 76 Virginia Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sees. 2 (accountability of magis­ trates) and 5 (removal of officials by election). Four states—Massachusetts, N o r t h Caro­ lina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont—included a right to instruct representatives in their con­ stitutions; see Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 24. Virginia Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 7. As Marc Kruman has noted, this requirement represented a change in practice from colonial times, when assemblies in the name of legislative independence generally deliber­ ated in private. See his Between Authority and Liberty, 8 1 . Edmund S. M o r g a n has emphasized the importance of this deviation from British practice. See his Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America (New York: N o r t o n , 1988), 247. so Virginia Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 13. 7 4

7 5

7 7

7 8

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P o p u l a r g o v e r n m e n t a n d r o t a t i o n i n office l i k e w i s e guarded against special privileges, against g o v e r n m e n t c o n d u c t e d for the benefit o f the few instead for the p u b l i c g o o d . T h u s several state c o n s t i t u t i o n s em­ phasized t h a t g o v e r n m e n t was i n s t i t u t e d f o r the c o m m o n g o o d rather t h a n f o r the g o o d o f a segment o f the society. T h e Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u ­ t i o n o f 1 7 7 6 made e x p l i c i t the c o n n e c t i o n between c o m m i t m e n t t o the c o m m o n g o o d a n d suspicion o f special privilege, r e q u i r i n g r o t a t i o n i n office so t h a t "the danger o f establishing an i n c o n v e n i e n t aristocracy w i l l be effectually p r e v e n t e d . " State declarations o f rights supplemented these safeguards w i t h m a n d a t o r y language f o r b i d d i n g hereditary offices a n d l i m i t i n g "exclusive o r separate e m o l u m e n t s o r privileges f r o m the c o m m u n i t y " t o those w h o h a d earned t h e m t h r o u g h " p u b l i c s e r v i c e s . " Some states also i n c l u d e d , either i n their declarations o f rights o r i n the bodies o f their c o n s t i t u t i o n s , p r o v i s i o n s designed t o prevent the f o r m a ­ t i o n o f an a r i s t o c r a c y — w h a t R o b e r t Palmer has called the " s t r u c t u r a l necessities f o r the basic l i b e r t y o f r e p u b l i c a n i s m . " A m o n g these were bans o n sanguinary laws, p r o t e c t i o n s f o r the l i b e r t y t o f o w l a n d h u n t , and prohibitions of entails. Finally, state declarations o f rights ac­ k n o w l e d g e d the r i g h t o f the people t o " r e f o r m , alter, o r a b o l i s h " g o v e r n ­ ments t h a t failed t o serve the p u b l i c g o o d . 8 1

82

83

8 4

85

T h e declarations' emphasis o n m a j o r i t y r u l e , together w i t h their use o f the less emphatic ought i n delineating r i g h t s , m i g h t seem t o indicate a l a c k o f c o m m i t m e n t t o i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . Indeed, some scholars have c o n ­ c l u d e d t h a t eighteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n s " s u b o r d i n a t e the i n d i ­ v i d u a l t o s o c i e t y . " B u t this c o n c l u s i o n fails t o d i s t i n g u i s h between v i o ­ l a t i o n s o f rights a n d legitimate restrictions o n t h e m . I t also assumes a f u n d a m e n t a l i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between m a j o r i t y rule a n d the p r o t e c t i o n o f r i g h t s , as w e l l as between i n d i v i d u a l rights a n d the c o m m o n g o o d . These d i s t i n c t l y m o d e r n assumptions were n o t shared b y those w h o f r a m e d the early declarations o f r i g h t s . As R o b e r t Palmer has observed, " T h e rights i n the D e c l a r a t i o n o f Rights were n o t guarantees at a l l , b u t were serious principles o f g o v e r n m e n t b y w h i c h g o v e r n m e n t was expected t o 86

8 7

O n the importance of antipathy toward aristocracy and privilege i n the political thought of the era, see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), parts 1 and 3. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 19. Virginia Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 4. Palmer, "Liberties as Constitutional Provisions," 67. See, for example, Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sees. 38, 43, and 37. For discus­ sion of these, see Palmer, "Liberties as Constitutional Provisions," 66-67; and Wood, Cre­ ation of American Republic, 410. See, for example, Ronald M . Peters Jr., The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 193-94. See Novak, The People's Welfare, chap. 1, for further elaboration of this point. 8 1

8 2

8 3

8 4 8 5

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abide. Precisely because they were principles, however, they were subject to q u a l i f i c a t i o n for the c o m m u n a l w e l l - b e i n g . " T h e key question t h e n became w h e t h e r government was a b i d i n g by those principles, w h e t h e r rights were being qualified o n l y for the c o m m o n g o o d . For state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s , the answer was n o t t o make rights absolute b u t t o create a g o v e r n m e n t w i t h a propensity t o respect rights a n d t h e n t o make t h a t g o v e r n m e n t answerable t o those w i t h an interest i n safeguarding rights. I n short, the u l t i m a t e s o l u t i o n for p r o t e c t i n g rights was r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t itself. 8 8

State Declarations

of Rights

in the

1790s

T h e federal B i l l o f Rights, o f course, largely dispensed w i t h the p o l i t i c a l m a x i m s , s t r u c t u r a l guidelines, a n d h o r t a t o r y a n d e x p l a n a t o r y language characteristic o f early state declarations o f r i g h t s . But state constitutionmakers for the most p a r t d i d n o t f o l l o w the federal lead. A l l state declara­ tions o f rights adopted d u r i n g the 1790s guaranteed some specific rights n o t f o u n d i n the federal B i l l o f Rights. A l t h o u g h the language o f some state protections was identical t o t h a t o f federal guarantees, i t is as l i k e l y t h a t b o t h b o r r o w e d f r o m earlier state guarantees as t h a t there was a b o r r o w i n g f r o m the federal B i l l o f Rights. Indeed, w h a t is s t r i k i n g is t h a t n o state declaration o f rights spoke o f "respecting an establishment o f r e l i g i o n " or " a b r i d g i n g the freedom o f speech or o f the press" or em­ p l o y e d other f o r m u l a t i o n s t h a t appeared for the first t i m e i n the federal d o c u m e n t . M o r e o v e r , n o state sought t o c o n f o r m t o the federal m o d e l by deleting statements o f p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e f r o m their declarations o f rights w h e n they revised t h e m i n the 1790s; a n d K e n t u c k y a n d Tennessee, the t w o n e w states, w i t h o u t controversy i n c o r p o r a t e d some o f these state­ ments i n t o their declarations, c o p y i n g directly f r o m the V i r g i n i a Declara­ t i o n o f Rights. T h e federal m o d e l m a y have p r o m p t e d D e l a w a r e a n d Pennsylvania t o substitute shall for ought t h r o u g h o u t their revised decla­ rations, a n d K e n t u c k y a n d Tennessee also copied the federal C o n s t i t u ­ tion's m a n d a t o r y phraseology, possibly t o facilitate admission t o the U n i o n . But N e w H a m p s h i r e a n d V e r m o n t retained the earlier h o r t a t o r y l a n g u a g e . A l t h o u g h i t is difficult t o k n o w w h e t h e r the states' r e t e n t i o n of elements f r o m pre-1790 declarations o f rights represented conscious choice or inertia, i t is clear t h a t the federal m o d e l h a d o n l y a l i m i t e d effect on state declarations o f rights a d o p t e d i n the 1790s. As shall be seen, the 89

90

Palmer, "Liberties as Constitutional Provisions," 66. For an account that stresses the continuities between state and federal bills of rights, uncovering majoritarian and structural features in the federal guarantees, see Amar, "Bill of Rights." See Lutz, Popular Consent, 67, table 3. 8 8

8 9

9 0

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influence o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n o n other aspects o f state c o n s t i t u ­ tions was likewise l i m i t e d .

GOVERNMENTAL

Republican

DESIGN

Government

A l l state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s endorsed r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t , t h o u g h they differed s o m e w h a t i n t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t t h a t entailed. T h e Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 7 6 — " t h e m o s t w i d e l y p u b l i c i z e d , praised, a n d condemned o f a l l the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f the R e v o l u t i o n " — illustrates h o w far some state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s w e n t i n a t t e m p t i n g t o e l i m i n a t e the gap between p o p u l a r w i l l a n d g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t i o n . T h e Pennsylvania charter concentrated v i r t u a l l y a l l g o v e r n m e n t a l p o w e r i n a u n i c a m e r a l legislature, g r a n t i n g i t — i n a d d i t i o n t o specific grants o f p o w e r — " a l l other p o w e r s necessary f o r the legislature o f a free state o r c o m m o n w e a l t h . " T h i s assembly was t o be a p p o r t i o n e d o n the basis o f the n u m b e r o f taxable i n h a b i t a n t s — " t h e o n l y p r i n c i p l e w h i c h can at a l l times secure liberty, a n d m a k e the voice o f a m a j o r i t y o f the people the l a w o f the l a n d " — a n d its members were elected a n n u a l l y i n order t o ensure a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o the p e o p l e . I n order t o prevent a g u l f between rulers a n d ruled, the Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n prescribed the same q u a l i ­ fications for h o l d i n g office as f o r v o t i n g , a b o l i s h i n g p r o p e r t y qualifica­ t i o n s b u t r e t a i n i n g a t a x - p a y i n g r e q u i r e m e n t . I t also prescribed a r o t a t i o n i n office f o r the assembly a n d the executive c o u n c i l , b o t h t o a v o i d "the danger o f establishing an i n c o n v e n i e n t aristocracy" a n d t o ensure t h a t " m o r e m e n w i l l be t r a i n e d t o p u b l i c b u s i n e s s . " Finally, i t w o v e various plebiscitary elements i n t o the g o v e r n m e n t . P o p u l a r c o n t r o l over l a w m a k 9 1

9 2

93

94

Williamson, American Suffrage, 92. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sec. 9. The contrast w i t h the other branches of Pennsylvania government was striking. The plural executive, popularly elected i n districts for staggered three-year terms (sec. 20), could appoint some officers and had a limited pardoning power, but its main responsibility was carrying out the legislative w i l l . The "judges of the supreme court of judicature" were appointed by the executive council for seven-year terms (sec. 23) but remained dependent on the legislature, since they were "re­ movable for misbehaviour at any time by the general assembly" (sec. 23). Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sec. 17. The apportionment provision actually went into effect only seven years after the framing of the constitution, but the distribution of seats i n the state legislature even during the interim period reflected the distribution of population far better than the apportionment of Pennsylvania's colonial legislature. See Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty, 7 3 - 7 4 . The franchise extended not only to taxpayers but to the adult sons of freeholders, even i f they did not pay taxes. Qualifications for office were the same as for the vote—see Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sec. 6; on rotation in office, see sees. 8 and 19. 9 1

9 2

9 3

9 4

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83

i n g was t o be enforced b y r e q u i r i n g a p e r i o d for p o p u l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f p r o p o s e d l e g i s l a t i o n , w i t h "the reasons a n d motives for m a k i n g such laws . . . f u l l y a n d clearly expressed i n the preambles." Except " o n occa­ sions o f sudden necessity," laws w o u l d n o t take effect p r i o r t o the elec­ t i o n o f a n e w assembly, thereby creating an o p p o r t u n i t y t o install legisla­ tors c o m m i t t e d t o r e v o k i n g u n p o p u l a r l e g i s l a t i o n . T h i s , c o m b i n e d w i t h the r i g h t o f the people t o " i n s t r u c t t h e i r representatives," served t o rein­ force the p o i n t t h a t "the people o f this State have the sole, exclusive, a n d inherent r i g h t o f g o v e r n i n g " a n d t h a t " a l l officers o f g o v e r n m e n t . . . are their trustees a n d s e r v a n t s . " 95

96

O t h e r eighteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n s were, like Pennsylvania's, eloquent o n the p o w e r o f the people t o institute a n d c o n t r o l g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y also embraced a n n u a l elections as a key element o f r e p u b l i c a n gov­ ernment: a l l the o r i g i n a l states except South C a r o l i n a established a n n u a l elections f o r t h e i r l o w e r houses, a n d South C a r o l i n a b o w e d t o this c o n ­ sensus i n 1 7 7 8 . Even the " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n " o f 1 7 9 0 i n Pennsylvania d i d n o t t o u c h a n n u a l election f o r the l o w e r house. A l ­ t h o u g h the Massachusetts C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 8 0 is often v i e w e d as the antithesis o f the Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 7 6 , i t established a n n u a l elections n o t o n l y f o r the l o w e r house o f the legislature b u t f o r the upper house a n d the executive as w e l l . I n fact, o f the t w e l v e states w i t h b i ­ cameral legislatures p r i o r t o 1 7 8 9 , seven i n s t i t u t e d a n n u a l elections for members o f the upper house; a n d b y 1 7 8 9 eleven o f the fourteen states, i n c l u d i n g three o f the f o u r w i t h p o p u l a r election o f executives, h a d oneyear terms for t h e i r governors. 9 7

M o s t states also f o l l o w e d Pennsylvania's lead i n seeking t o l i n k repre­ sentation t o p o p u l a t i o n , at least f o r the l o w e r houses o f t h e i r legislatures. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sec. 15. Staughton Lynd described the require­ ment that legislation be published for popular consideration before taking effect as "bicam­ eralism from below." See Staughton Lynd, Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism (New York: Pantheon, 1968), 171. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, arts. 16, 3, and 4. This accords with the view of Donald Lutz, w h o wrote: "The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution was the most important one written between 1776 and 1789 because it em­ bodied the Whig theory of republican government, which came to dominate state level politics; the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution was the second most important because it embodied the strongest alternative" (Lutz, Popular Consent, 129). For similar assessments, see Kenyon, "Constitutionalism in Revolutionary America"; J. R. Pole, Political Represen­ tation in England and the Origins of the American Republic (New York: St. Martin's, 1966), part 3; Williamson, American Suffrage, 104; and Wood, Creation of American Re­ public, 2 1 7 - 3 1 . Both the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts constitutions have received book-length discussions and have been featured in discussions of constitution making dur­ ing the period. See Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776; and Peters, Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. For a detailed discussion of the influence of the Pennsylvania Consti­ tution, see Williams, "Influence of Pennsylvania's Constitution." 9 5

9 6

9 7

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T o some extent, the early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d i d c o m p r o m i s e f u l l e q u a l i t y by c o n t i n u i n g the c o l o n i a l practice o f t y i n g representation t o units o f l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t — t o w n s i n N e w E n g l a n d , counties o r a c o m b i n a t i o n o f t o w n s a n d counties elsewhere. H o w e v e r , this l i k e l y reflected t r a d i t i o n a n d convenience, given the i n i t i a l u n a v a i l a b i l i t y o f census data, m o r e t h a n a v i e w o f the states as confederations o f t o w n s or c o u n t i e s . For whereas a true confederation w o u l d i n v o l v e equal representation f o r each c o m p o n e n t u n i t , m o s t states superimposed representation b y n u m ­ bers o n t h a t system. T h e N e w Y o r k C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 7 7 p r o v i d e d b o t h for districts w i t h equal numbers o f people a n d f o r p e r i o d i c r e d i s t r i c t i n g t o adjust for p o p u l a t i o n shifts, a n d b y 1 7 9 0 several states h a d a d o p t e d s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s . " I n some states, however, sectional rivalries a n d the search f o r p o l i t i c a l advantage prevented a p r i n c i p l e d r e s o l u t i o n o f the issue o f representation. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n these states t y p i c a l l y are m a r k e d b y a detailed d e l i n e a t i o n o f h o w representatives were t o be ap­ p o r t i o n e d a m o n g e x i s t i n g l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t a l units. 98

Finally, a l t h o u g h n o other state c o p i e d the array o f plebiscitary devices pioneered b y Pennsylvania, m a n y early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d i d a d o p t some o f the measures i t i n s t i t u t e d t o forestall a gap f r o m developing be­ t w e e n governors a n d governed. T h u s five state c o n s t i t u t i o n s f o l l o w e d Pennsylvania's i n expressly a u t h o r i z i n g the i n s t r u c t i o n o f representatives, a n d the practice was widespread even i n states t h a t d i d n o t expressly recognize i t i n their c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Several state c o n s t i t u t i o n s also f o l ­ l o w e d Pennsylvania i n r e q u i r i n g r o t a t i o n i n office. Six states i n t h e i r i n i ­ t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s set t e r m l i m i t s f o r governors, three f o r senators, a n d seven for v a r i o u s l o c a l officials. 1 0 0

Yet t h e i r shared c o m m i t m e n t t o r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t d i d n o t pre­ vent i m p o r t a n t differences between the Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d those i n other states, as w e l l as a m o n g those other c o n s t i t u t i o n s . W h i l e the states a l l accepted the standard t h a t citizens s h o u l d have a sufficient stake i n the c o m m u n i t y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n g o v e r n i n g , they differed consid­ erably as t o w h a t c o n s t i t u t e d a sufficient stake, w i t h m o s t s o u t h e r n c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n s defining electorates less t h a n h a l f the size o f those i n N e w

The confederation argument is most persuasively advanced by Elazar, "State-Local Relations." Lutz, Popular Consent, 109. 100 Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. 19. See John Phillip Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), chap. 8; Kenneth Bresler, "Rediscovering the Right to Instruct Legislators," New England Law Review 26 (winter 1991): 355-94; and Margaret E. Monsell, " 'Stars in the Constellation of the Commonwealth': Massachusetts Towns and the Constitutional Right of Instruction," New England Law Review 29 (winter 1995): 285-309. 9 8

9 9

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85

England. M o s t states assumed their preindependence p r o p e r t y q u a l i ­ fications for v o t i n g were an adequate measure o f stake i n the c o m m u n i t y : o n l y three i n t h e i r i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s f o l l o w e d Pennsylvania's lead i n r e d u c i n g p r o p e r t y qualifications f o r v o t i n g , a l t h o u g h none j o i n e d Massa­ chusetts i n " r o u n d i n g u p w a r d " the p r o p e r t y r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t existed prior to independence. 1 0 1

102

I n m a r k e d contrast t o Pennsylvania's suspicion o f " a n i n c o n v e n i e n t aristocracy," several states sought t o create w h a t G o r d o n W o o d has t e r m e d "repositories o f classical r e p u b l i c a n h o n o r a n d w i s d o m , w h e r e superior talent a n d d e v o t i o n t o the c o m m o n g o o d w o u l d be recognized a n d re­ w a r d e d b y the p e o p l e . " However, identifying and giving institutional f o r m t o this n a t u r a l aristocracy p r o v e d difficult. L a c k i n g alternative mea­ sures, states fastened o n w e a l t h as an i n d i c a t o r o f w i s d o m a n d v i r t u e . T h u s , m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s ( u n l i k e Pennsylvania's) established higher p r o p ­ erty qualifications f o r h o l d i n g office t h a n for v o t i n g , i n s t a l l i n g a graduated system o f p r o p e r t y requirements t h a t increased f r o m l o w e r house t o upper house t o g o v e r n o r . N o r t h C a r o l i n a a n d N e w Y o r k even i m p o s e d m o r e stringent p r o p e r t y qualifications for v o t i n g f o r their upper h o u s e s . A l l b u t three state c o n s t i t u t i o n s created b i c a m e r a l legislatures, expecting t h a t the higher p r o p e r t y r e q u i r e m e n t for senators w o u l d p r o d u c e a b o d y w i t h a distinctive i n s t i t u t i o n a l ethos a n d a broader u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the p u b l i c g o o d . Yet this rarely o c c u r r e d . Instead, quite q u i c k l y the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for g i v i n g an i n s t i t u t i o n a l voice t o w e a l t h shifted: whereas o r i g i n a l l y w e a l t h h a d been u n d e r s t o o d as an i n d i c a t o r o f w i s d o m a n d v i r t u e , i t came t o be seen as a separate interest i n society t h a t deserved representation. T h i s is best reflected i n Massachusetts' establishment o f an upper house specifi1 0 3

1 0 4

1 0 5

1 0 6

Lutz, Origins of American Constitutionalism, 58; and Williamson, American Suf­ frage, chap. 6. 102 p survey of legal qualifications for voting, see Adams, The First American Consti­ tutions, 293-307. The retention of preindependence voting qualifications must be seen in context; some states that retained property requirements had liberalized them in the decade prior to independence. Moreover, inflation had the effect over time of reducing voting quali­ fications expressed in terms of local currency—see Williamson, American Suffrage, 1 2 1 . Finally, scholars have concluded that even Massachusetts' new property qualification disen­ franchised relatively few adult males. See Pole, Political Representation, 2 0 8 - 9 ; Handlin and Handlin, Popular Sources, 34-39; and Robert E. Brown, Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955). 103 Wood, Creation of American Republic, 209. Typically, the property qualification for a seat in the upper house was roughly twice as high as for one in the lower house. Virginia and Delaware, however, did not establish different qualifications for their upper and lower houses. See Lutz, Popular Consent, 90, table 5. Lutz, Popular Consent, 9 1 , table 6. The best discussion of this failure is Jackson Turner M a i n , The Upper House in Revolutionary America (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967). 1 0 1

o ra

1 0 4

1 0 5

1 0 6

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cally t o represent p r o p e r t y , w i t h senators a p p o r t i o n e d a m o n g counties o n the basis o f the a m o u n t o f taxes p a i d . These differences a m o n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s reflect different under­ standings o f the o p e r a t i o n o f r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t a n d o f the p o t e n t i a l threats t o liberty. J o h n A d a m s , the m a i n architect o f the Massachusetts C o n s t i t u t i o n , t o o k social s t r a t i f i c a t i o n as a given a n d recognized t h a t one s t r a t u m i n society m i g h t seek t o t y r a n n i z e over another. H e therefore d r e w o n the t r a d i t i o n o f m i x e d g o v e r n m e n t , w i t h different i n s t i t u t i o n s representing different strata o f the society, seeking t o c o n s t r u c t a g o v e r n ­ m e n t t h a t w o u l d n o t o n l y m i n i m i z e the l i k e l i h o o d o f t y r a n n y b u t also pursue the c o m m o n g o o d . O v e r t i m e , m o s t states agreed, seeking t o re­ flect the diversity o f t h e i r societies i n their i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e m a i n h o l d o u t , at least u n t i l 1 7 9 0 , was Pennsylvania. T h e framers o f the Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1776 were n o t so naive as t o assume t h a t there were n o divisions w i t h i n the state; indeed, the fourteen years t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i o n was i n effect were m a r k e d by e x t r a o r d i n a r y t u r m o i l between p r o p o n e n t s a n d opponents o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n . H o w e v e r , they believed t h a t p o p u l a r differences were t o be overcome, subsumed rather t h a n represented, a n d t h a t p o l i t i c a l conflict was a p r o b l e m t o be solved rather t h a n an endemic feature o f p o l i t i c a l life. O r they m a y have believed t h a t , given the social h o m o g e n e i t y i n A m e r i c a , the f u n d a m e n t a l differences d i v i d i n g the soci­ ety were n o t a m o n g the people b u t between the people a n d aristocratic elements seeking t o defeat the p o p u l a r w i l l . W h a t e v e r the e x p l a n a t i o n , the Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n e m b o d i e d the n o t i o n t h a t simple democ­ racy, the direct t r a n s l a t i o n o f the p o p u l a r w i l l i n t o g o v e r n m e n t policy, c o n d u c e d t o the p u b l i c g o o d . 1 0 7

1 0 8

Governmental

Structure

1776-1777 T h e state c o n s t i t u t i o n s f r a m e d d u r i n g 1 7 7 6 a n d early 1 7 7 7 concen­ t r a t e d v i r t u a l l y a l l g o v e r n i n g p o w e r i n state legislatures. Instead o f p r o ­ v i d i n g f o r an executive b r a n c h t h a t c o u l d safely be entrusted w i t h execu­ tive p o w e r s , the c o n s t i t u t i o n s s i m p l y transferred

many

traditionally

Wood, Creation of American Republic, chap. 6. N e w Hampshire copied Massa­ chusetts' apportionment scheme in devising its own senate. The understanding of popular government underlying the Massachusetts Constitu­ tion is elaborated in Peters, Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, chap. 4; and in Wood, Creation of American Republic, 197-222. The first view of the understanding underlying the Pennsylvania Constitution is found in Selsam, Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 2 0 7 15, and the second in Wood, Creation of American Republic, 2 3 0 - 4 4 . 1 0 7

1 0 8

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87

executive p o w e r s t o the l e g i s l a t u r e s . M o s t , for instance, l o d g e d the a p p o i n t m e n t p o w e r i n the legislature. O n l y South C a r o l i n a gave the gov­ ernor a v e t o , a n d i t w i t h d r e w the p o w e r t w o years later. Even those p o w e r s g r a n t e d t o the executive often were subject t o r e g u l a t i o n a n d c o n t r o l by the legislature. T h e M a r y l a n d C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 7 6 , f o r e x a m ­ ple, g r a n t e d the g o v e r n o r the p o w e r o f p a r d o n a n d reprieve "except i n such cases w h e r e the l a w shall otherwise d i r e c t , " a n d the N o r t h C a r o l i n a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 7 6 a u t h o r i z e d the g o v e r n o r t o exercise executive p o w e r s o n l y " a c c o r d i n g t o the laws o f the s t a t e . " I n every state the weakened executive was also h e m m e d i n b y an executive c o u n c i l , w h i c h i n m o s t instances were chosen by state legislatures. Yet the m o s t funda­ m e n t a l check o n executive p o w e r came f r o m the executive's dependence o n the legislature f o r selection a n d c o n t i n u a t i o n i n office. I n eight o f the nine states t h a t a d o p t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n s d u r i n g this p e r i o d , governors were elected by the legislature, a n d i n seven they served o n l y a one-year t e r m . I n such circumstances, i t was almost superfluous f o r the V i r g i n i a a n d M a r y l a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n s t o insist t h a t the executive s h o u l d n o t " u n d e r any pretense" exercise " a n y p o w e r o r prerogative by v i r t u e o f any law, statute, or c u s t o m o f E n g l a n d . " 109

1 1 0

1 1 1

1777-1787 T h e N e w Y o r k C o n s t i t u t i o n i n a u g u r a t e d the second w a v e o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g b y p r o v i d i n g a m o d e l for r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t w i t h a substantially enhanced executive. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n secured the i n ­ dependence o f the g o v e r n o r by p r o v i d i n g f o r election b y the people for a three-year t e r m a n d m a k i n g the g o v e r n o r eligible f o r reelection. I t also g r a n t e d the g o v e r n o r executive p o w e r s , such as the p o w e r t o g r a n t par­ dons a n d t o convene a n d p r o r o g u e the l e g i s l a t u r e . T h e g o v e r n o r c o u l d d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n the legislative process by r e p o r t i n g o n the state o f the state a n d r e c o m m e n d i n g measures conducive t o its w e l l - b e i n g . Fi­ nally, the g o v e r n o r exercised substantial powers i n concert w i t h other officials, serving w i t h members o f the j u d i c i a r y o n a C o u n c i l o f R e v i s i o n 112

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Thach, Creation of the Presidency, 27; Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The American Constitution, 73; and M . J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Ox­ ford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 133-46. Maryland Constitution of 1776, art. 33; and N o r t h Carolina Constitution of 1776, art. 19. Virginia Constitution of 1776 (no section specified); and Maryland Constitution of 1776, art. 33. New York Constitution of 1777, art. 18. New York Constitution of 1777, art. 19. 1 0 9

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t h a t h a d the p o w e r t o veto legislation a n d w i t h members o f the senate o n a C o u n c i l o n A p p o i n t m e n t t h a t a p p o i n t e d executive o f f i c e r s . 1 1 4

T h e five other state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a d o p t e d d u r i n g this p e r i o d are m a r k e d b y a struggle t o decide w h e t h e r i t was possible t o reconcile a s t r o n g , independent executive w i t h r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t . Four states d i d f o l l o w N e w Y o r k i n p r o v i d i n g for popular election o f the execu­ t i v e , b u t three o f these gave the executive a one-year t e r m , a n d none gave h i m a t e r m o f office longer t h a n t h a t o f the l o w e r house o f the legislature. T h e executives established by the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f South C a r o l i n a (1778) a n d N e w H a m p s h i r e (1784) b o t h resembled those o f the preceding era, exercising l i m i t e d p o w e r s a n d constrained by legislatively elected c o u n ­ cils. V e r m o n t a t t e m p t e d t o solve the p r o b l e m o f executive power, i n b o t h its 1 7 7 7 a n d 1 7 8 6 c o n s t i t u t i o n s , w i t h a p l u r a l executive, consisting o f a g o v e r n o r a n d a t w e l v e - m e m b e r c o u n c i l t h a t were p o p u l a r l y elected state­ w i d e f o r the same (single-year) t e r m . T h i s executive was given the p o w e r s o f a p p o i n t m e n t a n d p a r d o n , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f f a i t h f u l e x e c u t i o n o f the l a w s , a n d — u n d e r the 1 7 8 6 c o n s t i t u t i o n — a suspensory veto over legisla­ tion. Finally, Massachusetts i n 1 7 8 0 created a s t r o n g governor, the first state executive t o possess a veto unencumbered by a c o u n c i l o f r e v i ­ sion o r executive c o u n c i l . 1 1 5

1 1 6

1788-1800 D u r i n g the decade f o l l o w i n g the a d o p t i o n o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , the states h a d the o p p o r t u n i t y t o revise their c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d m o d e l t h e m o n the federal charter. Yet a l t h o u g h six states a d o p t e d seven n e w state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d other states amended their c o n s t i t u t i o n s , w h a t is s t r i k i n g is h o w l i m i t e d an i m p a c t the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n h a d o n the structure o f state governments d u r i n g this p e r i o d . T h e state legislatures offer a p r i m e example. After the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n established a t w o year t e r m f o r representatives, o n l y one state (South C a r o l i n a ) a b a n d o n e d a n n u a l election o f the l o w e r house, a n d i t merely r e t u r n e d t o a p o s i t i o n i t h a d first a d o p t e d i n 1 7 7 6 . T h e federal influence o n senatorial terms was N e w York Constitution of 1777, arts. 3 and 23. John Jay, who proposed the Council of Appointment, intended for the governor to make all appointments and the senators to confirm or reject them, but the provision did not explicitly state this. A convention called in 1801 to resolve the division of responsibility on the council concluded that the power to nominate was a concurrent right of both the governor and the council, thus weakening gubernatorial power. See Galie, New York State Constitution, 4 - 6 . M . J. C. Vile has observed that "[t]he history of constitutional doctrine in the decade between the Constitution of Georgia and the Federal Constitution is, in part at least, the history of a search for a rationale for dealing w i t h the former prerogatives of the C r o w n . " See his Constitutionalism and Separation, 143. Vermont Constitution of 1777, chap. 2, sees. 1 7 - 1 8 ; and Vermont Constitution of 1786, chap. 2, sees. 10, 1 1 , and 16. 1 1 4

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s o m e w h a t greater. W h i l e eleven o f the seventeen c o n s t i t u t i o n s a d o p t e d p r i o r t o 1 7 8 7 h a d one-year terms for senators, t w o o f the first f o u r c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n s a d o p t e d after 1 7 8 7 — t h e Georgia C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 8 9 a n d the Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1790—established senates f o r the first t i m e , w i t h longer terms o f office; a n d the other t w o , the South C a r o l i n a a n d D e l a w a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n s , c o n t i n u e d m u l t i y e a r senatorial terms. T w o n e w states, K e n t u c k y a n d Tennessee, also i n t r o d u c e d m u l t i y e a r terms i n the 1790s. H o w e v e r , the N e w H a m p s h i r e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 7 9 2 a n d the V e r m o n t C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1793 c o n t i n u e d t o p r o v i d e f o r the a n n u a l elec­ t i o n o f senators, a n d the Georgia C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1798 reversed the deci­ sion o f nine years previous a n d p r o v i d e d f o r a n n u a l election o f sena­ tors. Finally, n o state emulated the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s system o f i n d i r e c t selection o f senators. P r i o r t o 1 7 8 7 , o n l y one state, M a r y l a n d , e m p l o y e d i n d i r e c t election; a n d i t u l t i m a t e l y a b a n d o n e d the system i n the face o f u n r e l e n t i n g c r i t i c i s m t h a t i t was u n d e m o c r a t i c . Although Ken­ t u c k y i n 1 7 9 2 o p t e d f o r a system o f i n d i r e c t election, i t l o o k e d t o the M a r y l a n d C o n s t i t u t i o n rather t h a n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n f o r d i r e c t i o n , c o p y i n g the exact language o f the M a r y l a n d p r o v i s i o n . Seven years later i t t o o a b a n d o n e d t h a t system i n favor o f direct election. 1 1 7

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T h e story is m u c h the same f o r state executives. K e n t u c k y i n 1792 d i d a d o p t the federal m o d e l : the g o v e r n o r was i n d i r e c t l y elected, served a four-year t e r m , was indefinitely reeligible, a n d possessed extensive p o w e r s . H o w e v e r , seven years later i t e l i m i n a t e d i n d i r e c t election a n d g u b e r n a t o r i a l r e e l i g i b i l i t y a n d reduced the vote necessary t o override the governor's veto. Elsewhere, the federal m o d e l p l a y e d l i t t l e role i n the development o f the state executive. A l t h o u g h some state c o n s t i t u t i o n makers, like their federal counterparts, sought t o establish an indepen­ dent executive, they relied o n direct p o p u l a r election f o r t h a t purpose, c o n t i n u i n g the m o v e m e n t a w a y f r o m legislative selection t h a t h a d pre­ ceded the federal c o n v e n t i o n by a decade. F r o m the federal c o n v e n t i o n t o 1 8 0 0 , o n l y t w o e x i s t i n g states—Georgia a n d P e n n s y l v a n i a — f o l l o w e d the federal example a n d lengthened the governor's t e r m o f office. A l s o , as n o t e d previously, by the t i m e o f the federal c o n v e n t i o n , g u b e r n a t o r i a l p o w e r s h a d already been strengthened i n some states, w i t h the i n t r o d u c ­ t i o n o f the veto p o w e r a n d g u b e r n a t o r i a l c o n t r o l over a p p o i n t m e n t s . T h e m o s t s t r i k i n g enhancement o f g u b e r n a t o r i a l p o w e r was f o u n d i n the Lutz, Popular Consent, 88, table 4. More generally, see M a i n , Upper House. The initial attacks on the Maryland Senate are discussed in Wood, Creation of Amer­ ican Republic, 2 5 1 - 5 4 . Later attacks prompted a compromise in 1801, by which the indi­ rect election of senators was temporarily salvaged in return for extension of the suffrage to all white males. See Williamson, American Suffrage, 149. The transition to a directly elected senate in 1837 is described in Green, Constitutional Development, 240-48. Coward, Kentucky in New Republic, 28. 1 1 7

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Massachusetts C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d d u r i n g the last decade o f the eighteenth century, i t was this c o n s t i t u t i o n — a n d n o t the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n — t h a t served as the p r i m a r y m o d e l f o r state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s . 120

T h e l i m i t e d influence o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n suggests t h a t a dis­ t i n c t i v e state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m c o n t i n u e d even after 1 7 8 7 . States f o u n d t h a t t h e i r sister states shared s i m i l a r p r o b l e m s a n d were therefore a better source o f i n s t r u c t i o n t h a n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s apparently d i d n o t share the dissatisfaction w i t h ex­ i s t i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s voiced by various Federalists. Indeed, m a n y A m e r i c a n s appeared quite satisfied w i t h the state governments they h a d , as the comments o f leading Anti-Federalists i l l u s t r a t e . Finally, i t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d i d change considerably i n the decade f o l l o w i n g independence, so m a n y o f the p r o b l e m s w i t h the i n i t i a l state c o n s t i t u t i o n s h a d already been addressed by 1 7 8 7 . 1 2 1

CONCLUSIONS Some scholars have argued t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s reflect the c o m p r o ­ mises a n d s h o r t - t e r m solutions o f day-to-day state p o l i t i c s rather t h a n o v e r a r c h i n g p o l i t i c a l principles. For eighteenth-century state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s , however, this is s i m p l y n o t accurate. O n e can c e r t a i n l y detect i n t h e m the p u s h a n d p u l l o f o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c s , p a r t i c u l a r l y as they deal w i t h a p p o r t i o n m e n t a n d other aspects o f the intrastate d i v i s i o n o f p o l i t i c a l power. Yet w h a t is m o s t s t r i k i n g is the w a y they e m b o d y p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s — c o h e r e n t understandings o f the nature o f r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n ­ m e n t , the sources o f p o l i t i c a l conflict, a n d the threats t o l i b e r t y — a n d the efforts o f their framers t o craft processes a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s t o effectuate those p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s concern for p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e m i g h t be a t t r i ­ b u t e d i n p a r t t o factors peculiar t o the f o u n d i n g o f p o l i t i c a l societies, such as the theoretical self-consciousness characteristic o f those i n v o l v e d i n the act o f f o u n d i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , standards o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design d u r i n g the late eighteenth century encouraged the i n c l u s i o n o f justifica­ t o r y a n d e x p l a n a t o r y m a t e r i a l i n preambles a n d state declarations o f 1 2 2

120 This paragraph draws on Lutz, Popular Consent, 93-95; Thach, Creation of the Presidency; Adams, The First American Constitutions, 266-74; and Wood, Creation of American Republic, 435-53. See Herbert F. Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist, 7 vols. (Chicago: Univer­ sity of Chicago Press, 1977), 2:138-39, 179-80, 263; 4:72-73, 77, 109; 5:149. These comments are not intended to deny the usefulness of the ordinary-politics perspective. Even if one accepts the notion that state constitutions reflect a coherent politi­ cal perspective, the ordinary-politics view is a valuable reminder of the political character of constitution making and alerts one to the possibility that anomalous provisions may reflect a need to accommodate competing interests. 1 2 1

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rights. T h i s m a y have p r o m o t e d a m o n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s an awareness o f the theoretical u n d e r p i n n i n g s o f their w o r k , a l t h o u g h the i n c l u s i o n o f e x p l a n a t o r y a n d justificatory m a t e r i a l c o u l d as l i k e l y have reflected t h a t awareness as created i t . Finally, the states' reliance o n revi­ sion rather t h a n a m e n d m e n t for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change fostered a c o m p r e ­ hensive perspective o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d reduced the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t theoretically inconsistent elements w o u l d be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e m . W h a t e v e r the e x p l a n a t i o n , a concern for a n d consensus o n basic issues o f p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e d i d exist, a n d this c o n t r i b u t e d t o the similarities a m o n g early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . So t o o d i d the sense o f c o m m o n purpose a m o n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s i n various states as they sought t o give shape a n d a u t h o r i t y t o n e w governments t h a t were consistent w i t h re­ p u b l i c a n principles, protective o f r i g h t s , a n d c o m m i t t e d t o the p u b l i c g o o d . Indeed, the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t their counterparts i n other states h a d addressed m a n y o f the same p r o b l e m s encouraged inexperienced c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s t o l o o k b e y o n d their borders for solutions. T h i s i n ­ terstate b o r r o w i n g led t o the transfer n o t o n l y o f p a r t i c u l a r provisions b u t also o f conceptions o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design. T h i s reveals itself b o t h i n w h a t is said a n d i n w h a t is left unsaid i n eighteenth-century state consti­ t u t i o n s . By a n d large, the states c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the same p o l i t i c a l c o n ­ cerns a n d refrained f r o m c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g others. I n n o state was there significant debate a b o u t w h a t s h o u l d o r s h o u l d n o t be i n c l u d e d i n a c o n ­ stitution. W i t h i n the consensus i n favor o f r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t , there was o f course r o o m for differences a m o n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . These differences generally d i d n o t f o l l o w regional lines, a n d thus distinctive state p o l i t i c a l cultures, t y p i c a l l y associated w i t h r e g i o n , were n o t c r u c i a l i n c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g d u r i n g the eighteenth c e n t u r y . Instead, given the e v o l u t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h o u g h t d u r i n g the p e r i o d , the date o f a constitution's a d o p t i o n is usually a better i n d i c a t o r o f its content t h a n the r e g i o n i n w h i c h i t o r i g i n a t e d . Nevertheless, attempts t o identify various " w a v e s " o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g r u n the risk o f d i s t o r t i o n , because c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l development i n the states d i d n o t proceed i n linear fashion. C o n s t i ­ t u t i o n a l i n n o v a t i o n s i n t r o d u c e d i n a single state often f o u n d acceptance o n l y gradually, as states experimented w i t h alternative solutions t o a p r o b l e m o r c l u n g for a w h i l e t o past practices. T h i s p a t t e r n can be seen i n the responses t o N e w Y o r k ' s c r e a t i o n o f a strong executive a n d t o Massa­ chusetts' a d o p t i o n o f a c o n v e n t i o n a n d p o p u l a r r a t i f i c a t i o n for c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n m a k i n g . O t h e r initiatives attracted s u p p o r t i n o n l y a f e w states a n d 1 2 3

This is not to say that political culture played no role. There are clear differences in constitutional style between Massachusetts, say, and Georgia, even when the constitutions created similar institutions. 1 2 3

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u l t i m a t e l y were abandoned. Cases i n p o i n t are Pennsylvania's establish­ m e n t o f a u n i c a m e r a l legislature a n d its C o u n c i l o f Censors. Finally, some i n n o v a t i o n s attracted n o s u p p o r t at a l l b u t c o n t i n u e d w i t h i n a single state. M a r y l a n d ' s i n d i r e c t election o f its state senate is a p r i m e example. T h u s , the patterns o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change a m o n g the states were m o r e c o m p l e x — a n d the dynamics m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g — t h a n p e r i o d i z a t i o n m i g h t suggest. T h i s chapter's survey o f eighteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n s has doc­ u m e n t e d changes i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h o u g h t a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design, best u n d e r s t o o d as revealing an e v o l u t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l t h o u g h t rather t h a n as reflecting a d i s j u n c t i o n between W h i g t h e o r y at the state level a n d Federalist t h e o r y at the n a t i o n a l . T h e g r o w i n g a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the sep­ a r a t i o n o f p o w e r s , o f checks a n d balances, a n d o f the need f o r a m o r e v i g o r o u s executive f o u n d i n various state c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f the late 1770s a n d early 1780s represented a shift i n r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theory. M a n y o f the changes i n t r o d u c e d i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n t i c i p a t e d fea­ tures o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . Nevertheless, i t w o u l d be a mistake t o v i e w early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s as n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n precursors o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . Even after its a d o p t i o n , the states f o r the m o s t p a r t w e n t t h e i r o w n way, l o o k i n g t o sister states a n d t o their o w n p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s i n designing or revising their c o n s t i t u t i o n s rather t h a n emulat­ i n g the federal charter. 1 2 4

T h i s tendency t o l o o k t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n s rather t h a n t o the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n f o r guidance reflected a belief t h a t there was s o m e t h i n g dis­ t i n c t i v e a b o u t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a theme i n t r o d u c e d i n chapter 1. B u t the g r o u n d s f o r this distinctiveness are q u i t e different f r o m those t y p ­ ically used t o d i s t i n g u i s h c o n t e m p o r a r y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s f r o m the fed­ eral C o n s t i t u t i o n . C o n t e m p o r a r y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s are distinguished p r i m a r i l y b y t h e i r l e n g t h , their d e t a i l , a n d the frequency w i t h w h i c h they have been revised a n d amended. Yet several eighteenth-century state c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n s were shorter a n d less detailed t h a n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n ; o n l y three states a d o p t e d m o r e c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a n the n a t i o n a l g o v e r n ­ m e n t d i d d u r i n g the late eighteenth century, a n d none was m o r e fre­ q u e n t l y amended. Rather, the p e r c e p t i o n t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s were distinctive rested o n a sense t h a t the p r o b l e m s a n d responsibilities o f the states were different f r o m those o f the federal g o v e r n m e n t . Scholars such as D o n a l d L u t z w i t h this difference i n m i n d have spoken o f the U n i t e d States C o n s t i t u t i o n as an " i n c o m p l e t e c o n s t i t u t i o n . " A l t h o u g h this char­ a c t e r i z a t i o n o f the federal charter is accurate, the f o r m u l a t i o n implies

The idea of a disjunction between state and federal constitutional theory, between civic-republican (Whig) theory and Federalist theory, underlies the influential analysis in Wood, Creation of American Republic. 1 2 4

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t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s fill i n the gaps i n the federal d o c u m e n t . T h i s chap­ ter suggests, however, t h a t the character a n d focus o f the early state c o n ­ stitutions were established p r i o r t o 1 7 8 7 , a n d the existence o f earlier state p r o v i s i o n s t o some e x t e n t — f o r example, w i t h regard t o v o t i n g qualifications a n d a p p o r t i o n m e n t — p r e c l u d e d federal i n v o l v e m e n t . T h e r e v i s i o n o f the Georgia C o n s t i t u t i o n i n 1798 c o n c l u d e d an era o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l creativity. The success o f these efforts can be seen i n the fact t h a t over the n e x t t w o decades n o state revised its consti­ t u t i o n . Yet this served merely as a respite i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g . D u r i n g the nineteenth century, t h i r t y - o n e states framed their first consti­ t u t i o n s , a n d the states revised their c o n s t i t u t i o n s s i x t y - f o u r t i m e s — o n average, a n e w state c o n s t i t u t i o n was a d o p t e d almost every year. T h i s century o f e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y active c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g is the subject o f the next chapter.

CHAPTER

4

Nineteenth-Century State Constitutionalism

I N N O P E R I O D is the divergence between the state a n d federal c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l experiences clearer t h a n i n the nineteenth century. T h e federal C o n s t i t u t i o n was amended o n l y f o u r times d u r i n g the entire c e n t u r y — once t o correct a defect revealed by the presidential election o f 1 8 0 0 a n d three times i n the a f t e r m a t h o f the C i v i l War. I n contrast, campaigns f o r p o l i t i c a l change t h a t the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n a c c o m m o d a t e d w i t h o u t a m e n d m e n t — s u c h as Jacksonian democracy, the Granger m o v e m e n t , a n d P o p u l i s m — p r o d u c e d f u n d a m e n t a l shifts i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e a n t e b e l l u m p e r i o d has been described, quite accurately, as " a n era o f p e r m a n e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n " i n the states (see fig. 4 . 1 ) . F r o m 1 8 0 0 t o 1 8 6 0 , thirty-seven n e w state c o n s t i t u t i o n s were a d o p t e d . Fifteen o f the t w e n t y - f o u r states i n the U n i o n b y 1 8 3 0 revised their c o n s t i t u t i o n s by 1 8 6 0 , t w o o f t h e m t w i c e (see table 4.1). I n fact, d u r i n g one decade, f r o m 1 8 4 4 t o 1 8 5 3 , m o r e t h a n h a l f the existing states h e l d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s . D u r i n g the last h a l f o f the nineteenth century, w h e n a c o n ­ cern f o r c o n t i n u i t y d o m i n a t e d n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theory, state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g was epidemic, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the S o u t h . F r o m 1 8 6 1 t o 1 9 0 0 , t w e n t y states revised their c o n s t i t u t i o n s , some several times, a d o p t i n g forty-five n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n a l l . Even this figure under­ estimates the level o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g ; f o r voters also rejected several p r o p o s e d c o n s t i t u t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g six f r o m 1 8 7 7 t o 1 8 8 7 . O f those states t h a t j o i n e d the U n i o n f r o m 1800 t o 1 8 5 0 , o n l y t w o h a d n o t revised t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s by century's end; altogether, n i n e t y - f o u r state c o n s t i t u t i o n s were a d o p t e d d u r i n g the nineteenth century. 1

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M o r e t h a n the frequency o f f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change distinguished federal a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m i n the nineteenth century. D i f f e r e n t

Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics since Indepen­ dence (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 93. Altogether, fifty constitutional conventions were held during the period, and those states that did not revise their constitutions amended them, some extensively. Massa­ chusetts adopted sixteen amendments, Maine nine, and Connecticut eight. See Dealey, Growth of State Constitutions, 4 8 - 5 1 . Rodgers, Contested Truths, 94. Kahn, Legitimacy and History, chap. 4. M o r t o n Keller, Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America (Cam­ bridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977), 320. 1

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issues d o m i n a t e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l agendas o f state a n d n a t i o n . Issues salient i n m a n y states i n c l u d e d the extension o f the franchise, the c u r t a i l ­ m e n t o f legislative power, state g o v e r n m e n t a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p r o m o t i n g economic development a n d a l l o c a t i n g n a t u r a l resources, a n d the rela­ tions between state a n d l o c a l governments. N o n e o f these issues figured p r o m i n e n t l y i n federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . Even w h e n b o t h state a n d federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s addressed an issue, often the state a p p r o a c h was distinctive. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r e a t m e n t o f the rights o f A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s illustrates this. D u r i n g the a n t e b e l l u m era, r e g i o n a l differ­ ences precluded an effective federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l response t o the p r o b ­ l e m o f slavery, b u t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s b o t h n o r t h a n d s o u t h dealt w i t h slavery and w i t h the rights o f free b l a c k s . A f t e r the C i v i l War, the T h i r ­ teenth, F o u r t e e n t h , a n d Fifteenth A m e n d m e n t s were added t o the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n t o secure the rights o f A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s . Yet w h i l e these amendments left m u c h t o subsequent legislation, state c o n s t i t u t i o n s de­ fined i n detail the rights o f A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s t o vote, t o h o l d office, t o attend integrated schools, t o c o n t r a c t i n t e r r a c i a l marriages, a n d so o n . 6

The primary attempt by the federal government to craft a solution to the problem of slavery was the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Scott v. Sandford, 19 H o w a r d 393 (1857). The treatment of slavery in antebellum Southern constitutions and the voting rights of free blacks are discussed later in this chapter. 6

1821-1840

Arkansas Delaware Florida Michigan Mississippi New York Pennsylvania Tennessee Virginia Total: 9 Original: 3

1801-1820

Alabama Connecticut Illinois Indiana Louisiana Maine Mississippi Missouri Ohio Total: 9 Original: 9 California Illinois Indiana Iowa ( 2 ) Kansas Kentucky Louisiana ( 2 ) Maryland Michigan Minnesota New Jersey New York Ohio Oregon Rhode Island Texas Virginia Wisconsin Total: 2 0 Original: 8

1841-1860

Nineteenth Century State Constitution-Making

TABLE 4 . 1

Alabama ( 4 ) Arkansas ( 4 ) California Colorado Florida (3) Georgia ( 4 ) Illinois Louisiana ( 4 ) Maryland ( 2 ) Mississippi Missouri ( 2 ) Nebraska ( 2 ) Nevada N o r t h Carolina Pennsylvania South Carolina (3) Tennessee Texas (3) Virginia West Virginia ( 2 ) Total: 4 2 Original: 4 Confederacy: 2 9

1861-1880 Delaware Florida Idaho Kentucky Louisiana Mississippi Montana New York N o r t h Dakota South Carolina South Dakota Utah Washington Wyoming Total: 1 4 Original: 7 Confederacy: 4

1881-1900

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A n d whereas the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n was, at least i n the decades f o l l o w ­ ing the C i v i l War, c o m m i t t e d t o guaranteeing the rights o f A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s , state c o n s t i t u t i o n s differed w i d e l y i n their a t t i t u d e t o w a r d the p r o t e c t i o n o f those r i g h t s , sometimes even w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l states. T h u s , Louisiana's c o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1868 forbade d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n p u b l i c educa­ t i o n , whereas the c o n s t i t u t i o n i t a d o p t e d i n 1879 was silent o n the sub­ ject a n d its 1898 c o n s t i t u t i o n m a n d a t e d r a c i a l l y segregated s c h o o l s .

7

A further difference i n v o l v e d the p r e v a i l i n g attitudes t o w a r d the fun­ d a m e n t a l l a w o f state a n d o f n a t i o n . D u r i n g the nineteenth c e n t u r y the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n achieved an almost sacred status as the c r o w n i n g w o r k o f an e x t r a o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c a l g e n e r a t i o n . I n the states, reverence for the founders o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d their h a n d i w o r k was n o t a b l y l a c k i n g , as the o r g y o f nineteenth-century c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g attests. T h e v e n e r a t i o n o f the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n rested u p o n the belief t h a t i t e m b o d i e d a p o l i t i c a l w i s d o m t h a t future generations were b o u n d t o pre­ serve. State c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s , i n contrast, came t o v i e w c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g as a progressive enterprise, r e q u i r i n g the constant readjustment o f past practices a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements i n l i g h t o f changes i n circumstance a n d p o l i t i c a l t h o u g h t . T h e social a n d d e m o g r a p h i c trans­ f o r m a t i o n s t h a t m a n y states u n d e r w e n t w i t h i n decades o f their admission t o the U n i o n made the a r g u m e n t o f changed circumstances p a r t i c u l a r l y persuasive. I n a d d i t i o n , state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s believed t h a t the ex­ perience o f self-government h a d expanded the f u n d o f k n o w l e d g e a b o u t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design, so t h a t later generations were better situated t o frame c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a n were their less experienced, a n d hence less ex­ pert, predecessors. G i v e n this a t t i t u d e , i t is h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t state 8

9

10

Louisiana Constitution of 1868, title 7, art. 135; and Louisiana Constitution of 1898, art. 248. For discussion of these changes, see Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, 9-12. Numerous commentators have remarked on the extraordinary veneration accorded to the Constitution. See, inter alia, Kahn, Legitimacy and History, chap. 2; Michael Kämmen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), chap. 5; Levinson, Constitutional Faith, chap. 1; and Lerner, "Con­ stitution and Court." The population of California, for example, increased seventeenfold during the thirty years between the adoption of its first and second constitutions, and the population of Tennessee more than sixfold in the three decades immediately preceding the revision of its 1796 constitution. See Carl Brent Swisher, Motivation and Political Technique in the Cali­ fornia Constitutional Convention, 1878-79 (New York: Da Capo, 1969), 6; and Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution, 7. For thoughtful consideration of the social, economic, and demographic changes in a set of western states and their constitutional consequences, see Johnson, Founding the Far West, chaps. 7 - 9 . Rodgers, Contested Truths, 9 1 ; Fritz, "American Constitutional Tradition Revisited," 971-75; and Christian G. Fritz, "Constitution Making in the Nineteenth-Century Ameri­ can West," in John McLaren, Hamar Foster, and Chet Orloff, eds., Law for the Elephant, 7

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c o n s t i t u t i o n s d u r i n g the nineteenth century reflected, as James Bryce has suggested, "the n a t u r a l h i s t o r y o f [the] democratic c o m m u n i t i e s " they governed. 11

C O N S T I T U T I O N A L C O M M O N A L I T I E S A N D T H E I R CAUSES Horizontal

Federalism

T h e same factors t h a t p r o d u c e d distinctive c o n s t i t u t i o n a l experiences i n state a n d n a t i o n have tended t o p r o m o t e similarities i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l experiences o f the states. T h e belief i n the progress o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e is a case i n p o i n t . T h i s belief n o t o n l y led states t o revise their f u n d a m e n t a l l a w i n order t o benefit f r o m advances i n k n o w l e d g e b u t also influenced where they l o o k e d f o r guidance. T h e inter­ est i n " m o d e r n " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design discouraged b o r r o w i n g f r o m older c o n s t i t u t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d encouraged a p p r o ­ p r i a t i n g p r o v i s i o n s a n d ideas f r o m the m o s t recently revised state consti­ t u t i o n s . C o n v e n t i o n delegates i n M a i n e i n 1 8 2 0 , f o r example, largely i g n o r e d the Massachusetts C o n s t i t u t i o n under w h i c h they h a d l i v e d a n d l o o k e d instead t o C o n n e c t i c u t , D e l a w a r e , I n d i a n a , K e n t u c k y , a n d N e w H a m p s h i r e for c u r r e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l w i s d o m . A delegate t o the c o n ­ v e n t i o n t h a t framed the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1849 e x p l a i n e d the delegates' reliance o n the I o w a C o n s t i t u t i o n as a m o d e l by n o t i n g t h a t " i t was one o f the latest a n d s h o r t e s t . " T h e ready a v a i l a b i l i t y o f c o m p i l a ­ t i o n s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s by the m i d d l e o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y enabled delegates t o search n a t i o n w i d e for p e r t i n e n t p r o v i s i o n s , r e d u c i n g the i n ­ fluence o f r e g i o n a n d p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e o n state charters. T h u s , those w h o drafted the Texas C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1876 l o o k e d f o r i n s p i r a t i o n t o the M i s ­ s o u r i C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1875 a n d the Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 7 3 , a n d the drafters o f the W y o m i n g C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1889 t o the C o l o r a d o , Pennsylvania, I l l i n o i s , a n d M o n t a n a c o n s t i t u t i o n s . O v e r t i m e , this bor­ r o w i n g p r o d u c e d a degree o f u n i f o r m i t y a m o n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , be­ cause c o n s t i t u t i o n s drafted d u r i n g the same era tended t o d r a w u p o n the same models. Still, T h o m a s Cooley's d e s c r i p t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s at the close o f the nineteenth century as " l i t t l e better t h a n p r o o f impressions 1 2

13

14

Law for the Beaver: Essays in the Legal History of the North American West (Regina, Sask.: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1992), 302-4. Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 1:434. Marshall J. Tinkle, The Maine State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), 4. Quoted in Christian G. Fritz, "More Than 'Shreds and Patches': California's First Bill of Rights," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 17 (fall 1989): 18-19. Janice C. May, The Texas State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 14; and Keiter and Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution, 4. 1 1

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o f a single o r i g i n a l " exaggerates their s i m i l a r i t i e s . G i v e n changes over t i m e i n the p r e v a i l i n g models for state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , substantial differ­ ences r e m a i n e d between c o n s t i t u t i o n s f r a m e d early i n the c e n t u r y a n d those f r a m e d later. C a r r y o v e r p r o v i s i o n s f r o m earlier charters, as w e l l as p r o v i s i o n s reflecting state-specific p r o b l e m s or p o l i t i c s , further differenti­ ated even those c o n s t i t u t i o n s drafted d u r i n g the same era. 15

The State Constitutional

Agenda

T h e c o m m o n agenda o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues also p r o m o t e d sim­ ilarities a m o n g nineteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . I n p a r t , this shared c o n s t i t u t i o n a l agenda resulted f r o m the d i v i s i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l respon­ s i b i l i t y between state a n d n a t i o n . Because the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n d i d n o t establish n a t i o n a l qualifications f o r v o t i n g , these qualifications be­ came a h o t l y contested issue i n m o s t states. T h e federal C o n s t i t u t i o n also left t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n s the task o f defining the scope o f state legislative power, a n d this t o o emerged as a m a j o r concern. Finally, the n a t i o n a l government's reluctance f o r over a c e n t u r y t o become i n v o l v e d i n the r e g u l a t i o n o f economic enterprise o b l i g e d the states t o deal w i t h funda­ m e n t a l questions o f p o l i t i c a l economy. 1 6

I n p a r t t o o , the states' shared c o n s t i t u t i o n a l agenda reflected the i n f l u ­ ence o f political movements active i n the various states. These movements— such as Jacksonian democracy a n d P o p u l i s m — i d e n t i f i e d p r o b l e m s re­ q u i r i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s o l u t i o n a n d defined the range o f acceptable so­ l u t i o n s t o t h e m . T h e campaigns f o r extension o f the franchise a n d f o r restrictions o n the p o w e r o f r a i l r o a d s a n d other c o r p o r a t i o n s e x e m p l i f y this p h e n o m e n o n . A l t h o u g h their effects were n a t i o n a l i n scope, these movements for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m i n v o l v e d p a r a l l e l state-based c a m ­ paigns rather t h a n n a t i o n a l organizations. T h e g r a d u a l e l i m i n a t i o n o f i m p e d i m e n t s t o w h i t e m a n h o o d suffrage i n almost a l l the states d u r i n g the first h a l f o f the nineteenth century, f o r example, o c c u r r e d w i t h o u t n a t i o n a l strategy or d i r e c t i o n . T h u s , rather t h a n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s being n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s w r i t s m a l l , the exact opposite was t r u e . Yet u n d e r l y i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conflicts over the intrastate d i s t r i b u ­ t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l power, the state's role i n the economy, a n d other matters 1 7

North Dakota Convention Debates, 66, quoted in Hicks, Constitutions of Northwest States, 33. Donald S. Lutz has referred to the (intentional) failure of the federal Constitution to address certain matters and their consignment to the states as the "incompleteness" of the federal Constitution. See the discussion in chapter 1 of his "Constitution as Incomplete Text," 2 3 - 3 2 . O f course, the matters consigned to the states had typically been addressed by the state constitutions that preceded the drafting of the 1787 federal Constitution. Green, Constitutional Development, 199-200. 1 5

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was a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l question, namely, h o w t o secure r e p u b l i c a n gov­ ernment. A l t h o u g h state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s seldom a r t i c u l a t e d their u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t , one can infer i t f r o m the c o n ­ cerns and disputes that dominated nineteenth-century constitutional p o l i ­ tics i n the states. First o f a l l , r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t r e q u i r e d p o p u l a r r u l e , w h i c h nineteenth-century c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s u n d e r s t o o d as entail­ i n g m o r e democratic arrangements t h a n their predecessors h a d c o n t e m ­ p l a t e d . M i n i m a l l y , p o p u l a r rule r e q u i r e d t h a t a l l p o l i t i c a l l y relevant people have the o p p o r t u n i t y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n g o v e r n i n g , so over t i m e state c o n s t i t u t i o n s extended the franchise a n d r e m o v e d e l i g i b i l i t y require­ ments f o r office. Popular rule also i m p l i e d a responsiveness t o the p o p u ­ lar w i l l t h r o u g h o u t the g o v e r n m e n t , w h i c h state c o n s t i t u t i o n s sought t o achieve t h r o u g h p o p u l a r election o f m o s t officeholders a n d t h r o u g h equi­ table systems o f representation ( t h o u g h at times a concern for safeguard­ i n g e x i s t i n g advantages tempered the enthusiasm f o r equitable represen­ t a t i o n ) . H o w e v e r , nineteenth-century c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s u n d e r s t o o d r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t t o e n t a i l n o t o n l y g o v e r n m e n t by the people b u t also g o v e r n m e n t for the people. State c o n s t i t u t i o n s recognized—some e x p l i c i t l y , others i m p l i c i t l y — t h a t there was a g o o d c o m m o n t o the soci­ ety as a w h o l e , w h i c h g o v e r n m e n t was o b l i g e d t o p u r s u e . T h i s c o m m o n g o o d was defined less by w h a t i t was t h a n by w h a t i t was n o t , namely, rule b y o r o n behalf o f a segment o f s o c i e t y . Nineteenth-century c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s believed t h a t p o w e r f u l m i n o r i t i e s , rather t h a n t y r a n ­ n i c a l m a j o r i t i e s , posed the m o s t serious threat t o liberty, a n d so they i n c l u d e d n u m e r o u s p r o v i s i o n s designed t o p r o t e c t the m a n y against the special privileges a n d advantages o f the w e a l t h y or well-connected f e w . 1 8

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This point was nicely summarized by Ernst Freund early in the twentieth century: "For over a hundred years the American people have experimented upon the problem of how to give correct and adequate expression to that elusive political factor, the popular w i l l . A n abiding faith in popular government has been accompanied by an ever-renewed dissat­ isfaction w i t h the forms and organs through which it was sought to be realized." Freund, Standards of American Legislation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917), 148. See, for example, N o r t h Carolina Constitution of 1868, art. 1, sec. 2; N o r t h Dakota Constitution of 1889, art. 1, sec. 2; Ohio Constitution, art. 8, sec. 1; and Oregon Constitu­ tion of 1857, art. 1, sec. 1. For a revealing discussion, see Novak, The People's Welfare, especially chap. 1. See Rush Welter, The Mind of America: 1820-1860 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 7 7 - 7 8 : "The whole thrust of Jacksonian thought was i n the first instance negative, an effort to eliminate institutions and practices. . . . The 'aristocracy' that Jacksonians complained of consisted of selective access to power, prosperity, or influence. A t bot­ t o m it was a political rather than a social or economic concept: in Jacksonian eyes, an 'aristocrat' was someone who was empowered by law to affect the economic and social welfare of his contemporaries, or who enjoyed legal privileges that he could turn to his o w n account i n an otherwise competitive economy." See also Hurst, Growth of American Law, 2 4 1 . This Jacksonian thrust carried over into the latter half of the nineteenth century. See, for example, Ohio Constitution of 1851, art. 1, sees. 2 and 1, and art. 8, sees. 4 1 8

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To investigate m o r e closely h o w a c o m m i t m e n t t o r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n ­ m e n t affected state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development, i t is useful t o t u r n t o those r e c u r r i n g issues—the intrastate d i s t r i b u t i o n o f power, the r e l a t i o n between the state a n d the economy, a n d the scope o f state legislative p o w e r — t h a t d o m i n a t e d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l politics d u r i n g the nine­ teenth century. H o w e v e r , three observations s h o u l d preface this discus­ sion. First, the c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s ' c o m m i t m e n t t o r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n ­ m e n t was h a r d l y new. T h e concern f o r i m p a r t i a l g o v e r n m e n t , f o r g o v e r n m e n t seeking the g o o d o f a l l rather t h a n o f a select few, echoed a theme p r o m i n e n t i n eighteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , thus u n ­ derscoring the c o n t i n u i t i e s i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h o u g h t . Nonethe­ less, this concern emerged w i t h p a r t i c u l a r force i n the nineteenth century, as the size a n d p o w e r o f economic entities increased a n d as the expansion o f the states' role i n encouraging a n d d i r e c t i n g economic development increased the o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r f a v o r i t i s m t o these entities a n d the bene­ fits d e r i v i n g f r o m such f a v o r i t i s m . Second, a l t h o u g h state c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k e r s ' c o m m i t m e n t t o r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t was genuine, at times p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e conflicted w i t h p o l i t i c a l advantage, a n d i n such i n ­ stances c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s n o t i n f r e q u e n t l y i g n o r e d the demands o f p r i n c i p l e or a t t e m p t e d t o redefine t h e m t o meet the p o l i t i c a l needs o f the m o m e n t . Finally, state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s ' endorsement o f r e p u b l i c a n principles raised as m a n y questions as i t resolved. To take b u t one e x a m ­ ple, their endorsement o f p o p u l a r r u l e o b l i g e d t h e m t o define w h o consti­ t u t e d the p o l i t i c a l l y relevant " p e o p l e , " and—as conflicts over the p o l i t i ­ cal rights o f blacks a n d w o m e n revealed—this r e m a i n e d a p o l i t i c a l l y charged issue t h r o u g h o u t the c e n t u r y . 2 2

23

T H E INTRASTATE D I S T R I B U T I O N O F P O L I T I C A L POWER

C o n f l i c t over the intrastate d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r d u r i n g the nineteenth century focused o n the a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f state legislatures and o n v o t i n g qualifications. Reformers appealed t o the r i g h t o f "the p e o p l e " t o g o v e r n i n order t o justify r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t a n d expansion o f the fran5; Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873, art. 3; and South Carolina Constitution of 1868, art. 1, sees. 36 and 39. Other such provisions w i l l be identified in the succeeding discussion. See, for example, Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 5; and, more generally, the examples discussed in chapter 3. Over the course of the antebellum period, most state constitutions effectively defined African-Americans as not part of the politically relevant portion of the American people, denying even free blacks the right to vote. I n most states women were also excluded from suffrage for most of the century. I n the aftermath of Reconstruction, African-Americans were again denied equal membership i n the political community, particularly in the South. Only late in the nineteenth century were women admitted to political equality in a few states. This topic is addressed in detail later in the chapter. 2 2

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chise, w h i l e their o p p o n e n t s stressed the need t o p r o t e c t diverse interests a n d t o l i m i t the franchise t o those w h o h a d a sufficient stake i n the soci­ ety o r t o the members o f a p a r t i c u l a r r a c e . These arguments were n o t o n l y "a m a t t e r o f p r i n c i p l e b u t also an i n s t r u m e n t o f p o l i t i c s . " As a delegate t o the V i r g i n i a c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 2 9 a c k n o w l e d g e d , " a l l o u r metaphysical reasoning a n d o u r p r a c t i c a l rules, a l l o u r scholastic l e a r n i n g a n d p o l i t i c a l w i s d o m , are b u t the arms e m p l o y e d . . . i n a contest f o r p o w e r , " p i t t i n g p r e v i o u s l y excluded or underrepresented groups against those advantaged by the p r e v a i l i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r . 2 4

2 5

2 6

Apportionment A t the b e g i n n i n g o f the nineteenth century, seven state c o n s t i t u t i o n s p r o ­ v i d e d f o r equal representation o f p o l i t i c a l subdivisions i n one house o f the legislature; a n d a l l state c o n s t i t u t i o n s guaranteed some representation t o counties o r t o w n s , regardless o f p o p u l a t i o n , i n at least one h o u s e . I n N e w E n g l a n d , where t o w n s f o r m e d the geographical basis f o r represen­ t a t i o n , p o p u l a t i o n shifts aggravated the i n i t i a l inequalities, even w h e n c o n s t i t u t i o n s p r o v i d e d for some adjustments f o r p o p u l a t i o n disparities a m o n g t o w n s . By 1 8 4 0 i n R h o d e I s l a n d , f o r example, a m a j o r i t y o f seats i n the l o w e r house were c o n t r o l l e d by r u r a l districts w i t h o n l y o n e - t h i r d o f the state's p o p u l a t i o n . I n several southern a n d M i d - A t l a n t i c states, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y prescribed a p p o r t i o n m e n t schemes ensured the d o m i ­ nance o f coastal regions despite p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h i n the interior. D e l a ­ w a r e , M a r y l a n d , V i r g i n i a , a n d N o r t h C a r o l i n a a l l prescribed the appor­ t i o n m e n t o f their legislatures i n their i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s , w i t h n o p r o v i s i o n f o r r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t i n response t o d e m o g r a p h i c c h a n g e s . Even w h e n p o p u l a t i o n was the basis f o r a p p o r t i o n m e n t , conflict arose as t o the p o p u l a t i o n base t o be used i n d e t e r m i n i n g representation. I n south­ ern states, residents o f s l a v e - o w n i n g areas w a n t e d t o c o u n t the n u m b e r o f t o t a l i n h a b i t a n t s or at least t o use the "federal r a t i o " o f w h i t e i n h a b i t a n t s plus three-fifths o f enslaved i n h a b i t a n t s ; whereas residents o f non-slaveo w n i n g areas sought t o base representation solely o n the n u m b e r o f 2 7

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29

See Rodgers, Contested Truths, chap. 3. Pole, Political Representation, 254. Chapman Johnson, quoted in Peterson, Democracy, Liberty, and Property, 285. See Robert G. Dixon, Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 62-63, chart 1. Williamson, American Suffrage, 246. Delaware Constitution of 1792, arts. 3 - 4 ; Maryland Constitution of 1776, arts. 2, 4, 5, and 14-16; Virginia Constitution of 1776, arts. 12-13; and N o r t h Carolina Constitu­ tion of 1776, arts. 2 - 3 . For discussion of these provisions and attempts to change them, see Green, Constitutional Development; Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism; and Orth, North Carolina State Constitution, 2 - 1 2 . 2 4

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w h i t e i n h a b i t a n t s , w h i c h w o u l d have substantially increased t h e i r seats i n the state l e g i s l a t u r e . 30

Because state c o n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t r o l l e d the a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f state legis­ latures, o n l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m c o u l d redress the grievances o f those dissatisfied w i t h the system o f representation. Campaigns f o r c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l conventions developed independently i n several o f the early states. I n some, legislators eventually b o w e d t o the intense pressures for change a n d called c o n v e n t i o n s . Yet because the representation at these conven­ tions t y p i c a l l y reflected the p r e v a i l i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r i n the state, the demands o f underrepresented areas seldom were f u l l y met. T h u s , the C o n n e c t i c u t c o n v e n t i o n o f 1818 altogether i g n o r e d e x i s t i n g disparities, w h i c h c o n t i n u e d t o increase over t i m e , a n d conventions i n V i r g i n i a i n 1829 a n d 1 8 5 0 so d i s a p p o i n t e d the western parts o f the state t h a t they eventually resolved the representation issue by w i t h d r a w i n g a n d f o r m i n g West V i r g i n i a . I n a few states, such as N o r t h C a r o l i n a , state legislatures p r o p o s e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments t o address c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t m a l ­ a p p o r t i o n m e n t rather t h a n risk a c o n v e n t i o n . Finally, i n still other states legislative intransigence led dissatisfied groups t o threaten or c o n ­ vene extralegal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions t o address their concerns. For example, w h e n the R h o d e Island legislature a d a m a n t l y refused even t o sanction a c o n v e n t i o n , insurgent elements under the leadership o f T h o m a s D o r r called one anyway, devised a c o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d held elec­ tions under the n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n , so t h a t the state t e m p o r a r i l y h a d t w o competing governments. 3 1

3 2

33

T h e early states' failure t o deal successfully w i t h legislative a p p o r t i o n ­ m e n t d u r i n g the first h a l f o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y meant t h a t the issue c o n t i n u e d t o fester, p r o v o k i n g p e r i o d i c efforts t o remedy inequities. Yet m o s t states a d m i t t e d t o the U n i o n d u r i n g the nineteenth c e n t u r y also based representation i n one or b o t h houses at least i n p a r t o n p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s . L o u i s i a n a a n d M o n t a n a r e q u i r e d equal representation for geographic units i n their senates. O t h e r states, such as M i s s o u r i , 34

35

Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 12-14. See Wesley W. Horton, The Connecticut State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 11-14; A . E. Dick Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1974); and Rob­ ert M . Bastress, The West Virginia State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), 3 - 9 . Orth, North Carolina State Constitution, 8 - 1 1 . O n the events in Rhode Island, see Gettleman, The Dorr Rebellion. O n extralegal conventions in other states, see Henretta, "Rise and Decline," 62-63; and, more generally, Jameson, Treatise on Constitutional Conventions. For a summary of apportionment formulas in the original state constitutions, see Dixon, Democratic Representation, 72-75, chart 3. Louisiana Constitution of 1812, art. 2, sec. 10; and Montana Constitution of 1889, art. 6, sec. 4. 3 0 3 1

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e m p l o y e d p o p u l a t i o n as the p r i m a r y c r i t e r i o n b u t capped the representa­ t i o n o f u r b a n c o u n t i e s . M a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s assigned representa­ tives o n the basis o f p o p u l a t i o n b u t m a n d a t e d t h a t each c o u n t y s h o u l d have at least one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . T h i s use o f counties f o r representation let states a v o i d the difficulty a n d expense o f d r a w i n g e q u i p o p u l o u s dis­ t r i c t s . I n m o s t m i d w e s t e r n a n d western states, the use o f counties m a y also have seemed p o l i t i c a l l y n e u t r a l , because those states d i d n o t i n h e r i t the severe conflicts between settled areas a n d f r o n t i e r regions or between u r b a n a n d r u r a l interests f o u n d i n the eastern states. These factors made reliance o n p o l i t i c a l subdivisions r e l a t i v e l y n o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l , at least i n i ­ tially, a m a t t e r o f convenience rather t h a n o f p r i n c i p l e . 36

37

3 8

Nevertheless, by the end o f the nineteenth century, b o t h older states a n d newer states were experiencing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conflicts r o o t e d i n the repre­ sentation o f p o l i t i c a l subdivisions. Some o f these conflicts reflected the u n a n t i c i p a t e d i m p a c t o f p o l i t i c a l changes. F o r example, the Kansas C o n ­ s t i t u t i o n guaranteed one seat i n the l o w e r house f o r each county, w i t h the r e m a i n i n g seats d i s t r i b u t e d a c c o r d i n g t o p o p u l a t i o n . T h i s i n i t i a l l y p r o ­ duced relatively m i n o r p o p u l a t i o n disparities, because the state h a d o n l y 34 counties. B u t w h e n the n u m b e r o f counties rose t o 1 0 5 , w i t h o u t a c o r r e s p o n d i n g expansion i n the size o f the legislature, the n u m b e r o f seats a p p o r t i o n e d o n the basis o f p o p u l a t i o n fell drastically, even w i t h the same a p p o r t i o n m e n t f o r m u l a , a n d the resulting p o p u l a t i o n disparities p r o m p t e d calls f o r r e f o r m . M o r e frequently, however, conflicts resulted f r o m p o p u l a t i o n shifts t h a t accentuated u r b a n - r u r a l divisions. As the dis­ parities i n p o p u l a t i o n a m o n g legislative districts increased, so t o o d i d the resistance o f r u r a l legislators, w h o recognized t h a t r e m e d y i n g the dis­ parities w o u l d entail a m a j o r loss o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r . I n the late nine­ teenth century, r u r a l legislators i n the East f o u n d allies a m o n g R e p u b l i c a n reformers, w h o insisted t h a t r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t r e q u i r e d t h a t r u r a l 3 9

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Missouri Constitution of 1865, art. 4, sec. 2. This formula originated in an 1848 amendment to the Missouri Constitution of 1820, art. 3, sees. 2 and 4, and was retained in the Missouri Constitution of 1875, art. 4, sec. 2. See, for example, Arkansas Constitution of 1874, art. 8, sec. 1; Idaho Constitution of 1889, art. 19, sec. 2; and Michigan Constitution of 1835, art. 4, sees. 3 - 4 . This was not true across the board. Politics in a few of these states—California and Illinois, among others—was dominated by north-south cleavages, which aggravated con­ flicts over apportionment. For an insightful analysis, see Hurst, Growth of American Law, 238-40. See Gordon E. Baker, State Constitutions: Reapportionment (New York: National Municipal League, 1960), 4. Delaware, for example, constitutionalized its system of malapportionment. Article 2, section 2 of its 1897 constitution specified legislative districts in detail, on an undemocratic basis, and made no provision for reapportionment. See Dealey, Growth of State Constitu­ tions, 97. 3 6

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c o m m u n i t i e s n o t be o v e r w h e l m e d b y the legislative p o w e r o f u r b a n areas dominated by (Democratic) party machines. These c o a l i t i o n s — m o r e marriages o f convenience t h a n p r i n c i p l e d p a r t n e r s h i p s — n o t o n l y b l o c k e d r e m e d i a l a c t i o n b u t i n some instances a d o p t e d n e w a p p o r t i o n m e n t for­ mulas designed t o l i m i t further the p o w e r o f u r b a n areas. T h e N e w Y o r k C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 9 4 , f o r example, increased the n u m b e r o f representa­ tives assigned t o each county, decreased those assigned o n the basis o f 41

p o p u l a t i o n , a n d capped representation f o r u r b a n areas i n b o t h houses o f the l e g i s l a t u r e . 42

Political

Participation

C o n s t i t u t i o n a l disputes c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h o u t the century over the c o m ­ p o s i t i o n o f state electorates. T h e o r i g i n a l t h i r t e e n states restricted the franchise t o either freeholders or taxpayers. Some states a d m i t t e d t o the U n i o n f r o m 1 8 0 0 t o 1 8 2 0 , such as O h i o , c o n t i n u e d t h a t practice; w h i l e others, such as A l a b a m a , i n s t i t u t e d w h i t e m a n h o o d s u f f r a g e . F r o m the 1820s t o R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , p r o p e r t y a n d t a x p a y i n g requirements came u n ­ der sustained attack i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions. A delegate t o the Pennsylvania c o n v e n t i o n o f 1838 s u m m a r i z e d the basic argument: "does p r o p e r t y , merely, elevate the character o f an i n d i v i d u a l ? — d o e s i t b r i g h t e n the i n t e l l e c t u a l v i s i o n o r fit the possessor i n any degree, for the better discharge o f the duties o f a c i t i z e n ? " A n i m a t e d b y this Jackso­ n i a n f a i t h i n the c o m m o n m a n (and i n some southern conventions by appeals t o r a c i a l u n i t y as w e l l ) , delegates demolished the last barriers t o w h i t e m a n h o o d s u f f r a g e . Even conservative delegates, fearful o f being b r a n d e d o p p o n e n t s o f p o p u l a r rule, j o i n e d the a s s a u l t . I n some sparsely p o p u l a t e d states eager t o attract settlers, w h i t e aliens were also enfran­ 43

4 4

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46

chised as soon as they expressed their i n t e n t i o n t o become citizens, a n d Henretta, "Rise and Decline," 66-67; and Richard L . McCormick, From Realign­ ment to Reform: Political Change in New York State, 1893-1910 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981). New York Constitution of 1894, art. 5, sees. 3 - 4 . For discussion of these changes, see / McCormick, From Realignment to Reform. Ohio Constitution of 1802, art. 4, sec. 1; and Alabama Constitution of 1819, art. 3, sec. 5. Quoted in Rosalind L . Branning, Pennsylvania Constitutional Development (Pitts­ burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1960), 25. O n the connection between racial unity and suffrage expansion, see Williamson, American Suffrage, 233, 262. Some constitutions of the period even prohibited property requirements for voting. For examples of such prohibitions, see Mississippi Constitution of 1832, Bill of Rights, sec. 20; Minnesota Constitution of 1857, art. 1, sec. 17; and Kansas Constitution of 1859, Bill of Rights, sec. 20. These battles are discussed in Rodgers, Contested Truths, chap. 3, and in Williamson, American Suffrage, chaps. 10-14. 4 1

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M i n n e s o t a also extended the vote t o I n d i a n s " w h o have a d o p t e d the l a n ­ guage, customs, a n d habits o f c i v i l i z a t i o n . " O n l y N e w England op­ posed the t r e n d t o w a r d franchise expansion: R h o d e I s l a n d i m p o s e d a p r o p e r t y r e q u i r e m e n t for v o t i n g i n its 1 8 4 2 c o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d amend­ ments i n the 1850s t o the C o n n e c t i c u t a n d Massachusetts c o n s t i t u t i o n s established literacy tests for v o t i n g . 4 7

4 8

I r o n i c a l l y , the c a m p a i g n t o e x t e n d the franchise t o w h i t e males was paralleled b y an effort t o disenfranchise A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s a n d other people o f color. M o s t eighteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d i d n o t list race as a v o t i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n ; b u t i n the early nineteenth century, states entering the U n i o n began t o restrict the vote t o w h i t e s . I n some states, the decision t o exclude A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s was made by p o p u l a r referen­ d u m , as states s u b m i t t e d black suffrage as a separate referendum i t e m a c c o m p a n y i n g a p r o p o s e d c o n s t i t u t i o n . I n others, c o n v e n t i o n delegates f o l l o w e d the developing practice o f disenfranchisement i n revising their c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Even n o r t h e r n states such as M i c h i g a n a n d M i n n e s o t a i n ­ sisted o n w h i t e m a n h o o d suffrage i n their i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d O r e ­ g o n specifically excluded Chinese residents f r o m v o t i n g as w e l l . Dele­ gates t o the N e w Y o r k c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 2 1 i m p o s e d m o r e stringent v o t i n g requirements o n blacks t h a n w h i t e s after n a r r o w l y defeating a disenfranchisement p r o p o s a l , a n d those requirements were retained i n 4 9

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See, for example, Minnesota Constitution of 1857, art. 7, sec. 1; Nebraska Constitu­ tion of 1866, art. 2, sec. 2; and Oregon Constitution of 1857, art. 2, sec. 2. See D o n E. Fehrenbacher, "Constitutional History, 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 6 1 , " in Levy, American Constitutional History, 96; and Dealey, Growth of State Constitutions, 150. See Patrick T. Conley, Democracy in Decline: Rhode Island's Constitutional Develop­ ment, 1776-1841 (Providence: Rhode Island Historical Society, 1977); and Schouler, Con­ stitutional Studies, 2 3 4 - 4 1 . The only constitution as of 1800 w i t h racial qualifications for voting was the South Carolina Constitution of 1790, art. 1, sec. 4. I n some other states, such as Kentucky, which extended the franchise to "free male citizens," free blacks were not considered citizens and were excluded from voting. See Kentucky Constitution of 1792, art. 3, sec. 1; and Lowell B. Harrison, Kentucky's Road to Statehood (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1992), 122. For an early example of the shift to racial qualification i n northern constitutions, see Ohio Constitution of 1802, art. 4, sec. 1. For general discussions of the phenomenon of racial exclusion from the franchise, see Rodgers, Contested Truths, chap. 3; Henretta, "Rise and Decline," 5 2 - 5 4 ; and Eric Foner, "From Slavery to Citizenship: Blacks and the Right to Vote," in Donald W. Rogers, ed., Voting and the Spirit of American Democracy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990). For an example of a referendum provision, see Iowa Constitution of 1846, art. 1 1 , sec. 14. More generally, see Ellis Paxon Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America (New York: Da Capo, 1971), 119-20. Michigan Constitution of 1835, art. 2, sec. 1; Michigan Constitution of 1850, art. 7, sec. 1; Minnesota Constitution of 1857, art. 7, sec. 1; and Oregon Constitution of 1857, art. 2, sec. 2. For discussion of the debate over exclusion of Chinese from the franchise, see Johnson, Founding the Far West, 1 8 0 - 8 1 . 4 7

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the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 4 6 . O n l y the N e w E n g l a n d states ( w i t h the excep­ t i o n o f C o n n e c t i c u t ) refused t o impose r a c i a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y qualifica­ tions f o r v o t i n g , so t h a t by 1 8 6 0 o n l y five states p e r m i t t e d free blacks t o vote. T h e decade f o l l o w i n g the C i v i l W a r m a r k e d the h i g h p o i n t o f suffrage e x p a n s i o n . T h e r a t i f i c a t i o n o f the Fifteenth A m e n d m e n t i n 1 8 7 0 led N o r t h e r n states t o eliminate express legal restrictions o n b l a c k suffrage, a l t h o u g h some b o r d e r states c o n t i n u e d efforts t o c o n t a i n the black vote. A n 1 8 7 0 a m e n d m e n t t o the M a r y l a n d C o n s t i t u t i o n , for e x a m p l e , added a p r o p e r t y q u a l i f i c a t i o n for v o t i n g , w h i c h was expected t o fall m o r e heavily o n A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s . R e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n the South endorsed universal m a n h o o d suffrage even before the a d o p t i o n o f the Fifteenth A m e n d m e n t . Some o f these c o n s t i t u t i o n s disenfranchised unregenerate rebels, t h o u g h the b r e a d t h o f the exclusions v a r i e d f r o m state t o state a n d t y p i c a l l y lasted less t h a n a decade. O t h e r Reconstruc­ t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n s excluded few o r n o Confederates, despite concerns a b o u t t h e i r r e c l a i m i n g p o l i t i c a l power, because d e n y i n g the vote t o a class o f citizens seemed t o c o n v e n t i o n delegates inconsistent w i t h t h e i r p r i n c i ­ pled c o m m i t m e n t t o m a n h o o d s u f f r a g e . 5 2

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T h e last decades o f the nineteenth century witnessed a m a j o r shift i n perspective a n d i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . W i t h the end o f Reconstruc­ t i o n , Southern states embraced the p o s i t i o n o f a delegate t o the Georgia c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 7 7 , w h o boasted: " I w i l l fix i t so t h a t the people shall rule a n d the N e g r o shall never be heard f r o m . " N i n e f o r m e r members o f the Confederacy h e l d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions f r o m 1 8 7 4 t o 1 9 0 2 , seeking t h r o u g h literacy tests, p o l l taxes, a n d other devices t o achieve w h a t h a d been p u r s u e d earlier t h r o u g h violence a n d i n t i m i d a t i o n . H o r ­ i z o n t a l federalism facilitated this " p u b l i c conspiracy," w i t h Southern 5 7

5 8

See Henretta, "Rise and Decline," 52-55. Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 (Chi­ cago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 91-94. For discussion of these and other attempts to limit the extent or effect of black suf­ frage, see Foner, Reconstruction, 319-23, 422. For a useful study of the process of franchise extension in one state, see Phyllis F. Field, The Politics of Race in New York: The Struggle for Black Suffrage in the Civil War Era (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982). Foner, Reconstruction, 324. Quoted in Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 209. Note the implicit definition of the white population as "the people." The best account of the transformation of voting requirements is Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics. Other helpful works include Perman, The Road to Redemption; Joel Williamson, The Crucible of Race: Black-White Relations in the American South since Emancipation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Malcolm Cook M c M i l l a n , Constitutional Development in Alabama, 1798-1901: A Study in Politics, the Negro, and Sectionalism (Chapel H i l l : University of N o r t h Carolina Press, 1955). 5 2

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states freely b o r r o w i n g suffrage-reduction mechanisms a n d c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l language f r o m sister states. As J. M o r g a n Kousser has n o t e d , There was a slight pause after the first enactment of any particular mechanism, perhaps to test the reaction of Northerners and the state's o w n electors. When Congress did not intervene, and when voters did not rise up against the disenfranchisers, legislators in other states felt free to write similar l a w s .

59

T h e late-century m o v e m e n t t o restrict the franchise was n o t l i m i t e d t o the S o u t h . D i s f a v o r e d groups were also singled o u t f o r disenfranchisem e n t i n some western states: the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 7 9 disen­ franchised Chinese residents, a n d the I d a h o C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1889 b o t h Chinese a n d M o r m o n s . I n the East, the m a i n concern was i m m i g r a n t voters a n d the p o l i t i c a l machines t h a t they s u p p o r t e d , a l t h o u g h suffrage reformers t y p i c a l l y p o r t r a y e d their goals as r a i s i n g the q u a l i t y o f the v o t ­ i n g p u b l i c a n d e l i m i n a t i n g c o r r u p t i o n a n d f r a u d i n elections. Some o f the qualifications for v o t i n g inserted i n n o r t h e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n s t o l i m i t the i m m i g r a n t vote paralleled those e m p l o y e d i n the South. T h u s , i n the last t w o decades o f the nineteenth century, several states a d o p t e d e d u c a t i o n a l requirements for v o t i n g — u s u a l l y r e q u i r i n g an a b i l i t y t o read a n d w r i t e English—and Rhode Island imposed a poll tax. N o r t h e r n constitutions e x p e r i m e n t e d w i t h other suffrage restrictions as w e l l . T h e N e w Y o r k C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 9 4 , for example, i n t r o d u c e d secret v o t i n g a n d the use o f v o t i n g machines i n place o f paper ballots, b o t h o f w h i c h r e q u i r e d v o ­ ters t o be able t o read the names o f candidates, a n d i m p o s e d burdensome r e g i s t r a t i o n requirements a n d a ninety-day w a i t i n g p e r i o d f o r n a t u r a l i z e d citizens before v o t i n g . Several states also w i t h d r e w the franchise f r o m aliens seeking c i t i z e n s h i p . 6 0

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T h e sole e x c e p t i o n t o the m o v e m e n t for suffrage c o n t r a c t i o n was the c a m p a i g n f o r w o m a n s u f f r a g e . W o m e n seeking the vote early o n ap­ p r o p r i a t e d the arguments for p o p u l a r sovereignty used t o enfranchise 63

Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 40. California Constitution of 1879, art. 2, sec. 1; and Idaho Constitution of 1889, art. 6, sec. 3. O n the role of race in the California convention of 1879, see Swisher, Motivation and Political Technique, chap. 6; and Johnson, Founding the Far West, 252-56. O n antiChinese and anti-Mormon sentiment in Idaho, see Donald Crowley and Florence Heffron, The Idaho State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994), 6 - 7 ; and Dennis Colson, Idaho's Constitution: The Tie That Binds (Moscow: Uni­ versity of Idaho Press, 1991), chap. 8. See McCormick, From Realignment to Reform, 53-54; and Keller, Affairs of State, 527. These states included Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Alabama, Colorado, and N o r t h Dakota. See Keller, Affairs of State, 527. This chapter's account of the campaign for women's suffrage relies on Alan P. Grimes, The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Bev­ erly Beeton, Women Vote in the West: The Woman Suffrage Movement, 1869-1896 (New York: Garland, 1986); and Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The Women's Rights Movement in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1975). 5 9

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w h i t e males, an i r o n i c t w i s t o n the insistence by conservatives t h a t m a n ­ h o o d suffrage was unreasonable because i t w o u l d l o g i c a l l y lead t o w o m a n suffrage. A f t e r the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h century, few c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s escaped c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the issue. I n i t i a l l y , as the N e w Y o r k c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 6 7 a n d the C a l i f o r n i a c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 7 9 i l l u s t r a t e , o v e r w h e l m i n g majorities rejected the vote for w o m e n , a l t h o u g h a few states d i d p e r m i t t h e m t o vote o n school issues o r other m a t t e r s . By the late nineteenth century, however, the suffrage m o v e m e n t began t o achieve some n o t a b l e successes, b e g i n n i n g i n the western states. C o l o r a d o , I d a h o , U t a h , a n d W y o m i n g a l l a d o p t e d w o m e n ' s suffrage i n the last decade o f the nineteenth century, the latter t w o by i n c l u d i n g w o m a n suffrage i n their original c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 6 4

65

STATE A N D E C O N O M Y

T h e reluctance o f Congress t o fashion n a t i o n a l economic p o l i c y d u r i n g the nineteenth century, together w i t h p r e v a i l i n g economic theories a b o u t the need f o r p r o m o t i o n a l efforts a n d r e g u l a t i o n , v i r t u a l l y ensured state i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the e c o n o m y a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conflicts arising o u t o f the scope a n d character o f t h a t i n v o l v e m e n t . T h e character o f this interven­ t i o n revealed the states' ambivalence a b o u t economic development a n d its prerequisites. States eagerly sought economic p r o s p e r i t y f o r their c i t i ­ zens; yet they r e m a i n e d suspicious o f groups a n d organizations whose economic success seemed t o u n d e r m i n e the social order, t o threaten the economic prospects o f others, o r t o rest o n advantages n o t available t o the general citizenry. T h e y therefore sought, w i t h some t r e p i d a t i o n , t o r e i n i n those whose success appeared t o rest o n u n f a i r advantage, a l l the w h i l e fearful o f the consequences o f i m p e d i n g economic development. N i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s reflect this ambivalence.

Economic Promotion and the Dual on Economic Activity

Perspective

ECONOMIC PROMOTION IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA D u r i n g the early nineteenth century, i t was w i d e l y assumed t h a t m a n y i m p o r t a n t economic functions, p a r t i c u l a r l y the development o f transpor­ t a t i o n a n d i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , w o u l d n o t occur w i t h o u t the

encouragement

See Galie, New York State Constitution, 15; Joseph P. Grodin, Calvin R. Massey, and Richard B. Cunningham, The California State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 14; and Dealey, Growth of State Constitutions, 152-53. These developments are discussed i n Gordon Morris Bakken, Rocky Mountain Con­ stitution Making, 1850-1912 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987), chap. 8. 6 4

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and support of g o v e r n m e n t . State governments therefore offered a w i d e a r r a y o f inducements t o encourage economic development. South­ ern states b o r r o w e d funds t o enlarge b a n k i n g facilities and s u p p o r t r a i l ­ r o a d development, issuing state bonds t o supply w o r k i n g c a p i t a l . M a n y n o r t h e r n and m i d w e s t e r n states constructed canals and other p u b ­ lic w o r k s , often i n p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h p r i v a t e concerns, i n o r d e r t o facilitate the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f goods t o m a j o r m a r k e t s . The states also g r a n t e d special charters t o p r i v a t e c o r p o r a t i o n s — s u c h as t u r n p i k e c o r p o r a t i o n s , bridge c o r p o r a t i o n s , and r a i l r o a d c o r p o r a t i o n s — a n d enlisted t h e m i n de­ v e l o p i n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n links by dispensing benefits r a n g i n g f r o m subsidies t o o u t r i g h t grants o f m o n o p o l y rights. The Jacks o n i a n o p p o s i t i o n t o federal s u p p o r t for i n t e r n a l i m p r o v e m e n t s as be­ y o n d the p o w e r s g r a n t e d t o Congress by the C o n s t i t u t i o n , helps e x p l a i n w h y the states t o o k the lead i n these p r o m o t i o n a l efforts. So t o o does the p r e v a i l i n g m e r c a n t i l i s t a s s u m p t i o n t h a t development depended o n special p r o t e c t i o n s for enterprises p o t e n t i a l l y u n p r o f i t a b l e w i t h o u t t h e m . Cor­ r u p t i o n o f state legislatures by p o t e n t i a l recipients o f state largesse u n ­ d o u b t e d l y p l a y e d a role as w e l l . B u t p a r t i c u l a r l y influential i n p r o m o t ­ i n g the states' often-reckless p r o m o t i o n a l efforts were the hope o f e c o n o m i c w i n d f a l l s — w h a t M a r v i n M e y e r s has called "the g a u d y m i d thirties d r e a m o f sudden f o r t u n e " — e n c o u r a g e d by the spectacular suc­ cess o f the Erie C a n a l , and the fear o f being left b e h i n d , as other states c o u r t e d p r o s p e r i t y w i t h speculative v e n t u r e s . As J. W i l l a r d H u r s t has 6 6

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Our account of state economic boosterism relies on Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948); Oscar Handlin and M a r y Flug Handlin, Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1969); Heins, Constitutional Restrictions against Debt; and Gunn, The Decline of Authority. For a thorough examination of policy in one state, see M i l t o n Sydney Heath, Con­ structive Liberalism: The Role of the State in Economic Development in Georgia to 1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 37-38; and Hartz, Economic Policy, chap. 3. The mechanisms of corruption took various forms. I n Pennsylvania, "[anticipating demand for particular types of [corporate] charters, lobbyists not uncommonly put through the charters, then offered them for sale to the interested parties. . . . The legislature at times helped these hucksters of 'floating' charters by refusing to enact charters for persons wish­ ing to incorporate so that they would have to purchase at enhanced prices charters already authorized" (Branning, Pennsylvania Constitutional Development, 42). For data on the economic consequences of the completion of the Erie Canal, see Reginald McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and American State Debts (New York: Mac­ millan, 1935), 5. The quotation is drawn from M a r v i n Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), 114. 6 6

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n o t e d , " A l l h a d i n c o m m o n a deep f a i t h i n the social benefits t o flow f r o m a r a p i d increase i n p r o d u c t i v i t y ; a l l shared an impatience t o get o n w i t h the j o b b y w h a t e v e r means f u n c t i o n a l l y adapted t o i t , i n c l u d i n g the law." C o e x i s t i n g i n some tension w i t h this enthusiasm f o r the release o f p r o ­ ductive forces, however, was a suspicion o f special p r i v i l e g e . T h i s suspi­ c i o n was reflected i n eighteenth-century c o n s t i t u t i o n a l demands f o r i m ­ 7 1

p a r t i a l g o v e r n m e n t , f o r a " g o v e r n m e n t . . . i n s t i t u t e d f o r the c o m m o n benefit, p r o t e c t i o n a n d security o f the people, n a t i o n o r c o m m u n i t y ; a n d n o t for the p a r t i c u l a r e m o l u m e n t o r advantage o f any single m a n , family, o r set o f m e n . " Such p r o v i s i o n s were n o t an expression o f class antago­ nisms. Rather, they reflected a j u d g m e n t a b o u t the f o r m s a n d sources o f w e a l t h . N i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y A m e r i c a n s f r a m e d the d i s t i n c t i o n i m p l i c i t i n this j u d g m e n t i n v a r i o u s w a y s . Jacksonians t y p i c a l l y contrasted the "real p e o p l e , " whose stable i n c o m e resulted f r o m honest, sober w o r k , w i t h the " m o n e y p o w e r , " whose w e a l t h arose f r o m financial m a n i p u l a t i o n a n d special p r i v i l e g e . A n t e b e l l u m economists distinguished " p r o d u c e r s , " w h o created true w e a l t h a n d therefore deserved economic r e w a r d s , b o t h f r o m laborers a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , f r o m " c a p i t a l i s t s , " w h o used their p r i v i l e g e d m a r k e t a n d legal p o s i t i o n t o create false paper-money w e a l t h . Yet w h a t e v e r the f o r m u l a t i o n , the p r e v a i l i n g belief was t h a t one's economic success s h o u l d reflect one's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the real w e a l t h o f the society. 7 2

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C o n s t i t u t i o n a l efforts t o reconcile the release o f economic energies w i t h the avoidance o f special privilege began early i n the nineteenth cen­ tury. N e w Y o r k , concerned t h a t the process o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n h a d become t o o p o l i t i c i z e d , i n 1 8 2 1 r e q u i r e d a t w o - t h i r d s vote o f each house t o create or renew a c o r p o r a t e c h a r t e r . D e l a w a r e i n 1 8 3 1 pioneered the use o f reservation clauses, under w h i c h states retained the r i g h t t o a m e n d i m ­ p r u d e n t o r c o r r u p t grants t o p r i v a t e entities a n d regulate grantees i n the p u b l i c interest. A n u m b e r o f states f o l l o w e d Delaware's lead. Several states also a d o p t e d a n t i m o n o p o l y p r o v i s i o n s o r e q u a l i t y guarantees de­ signed t o safeguard the m a j o r i t y f r o m m i n o r i t y p r i v i l e g e . T h e m a i n impetus f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change came f r o m the economic collapse o f 75

7 6

James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), 7. Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 5. Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion, chaps. 2 and 5. Tony A. Freyer, Producers versus Capitalists: Constitutional Conflict in Antebellum America (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994). New York Constitution of 1821, art. 7, sec. 9. Robert F. Williams, "Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law," Texas Law Review 63 ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1985): 1195-1224. 7 1

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1 8 3 7 , w h e n nine states defaulted o n their debts. I n its a f t e r m a t h , state c o n s t i t u t i o n s were revised o r amended t o c u r t a i l legislative p r o m o t i o n o f economic development a n d remove p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y f r o m a l l o c a t i o n de­ cisions. As a delegate t o the O h i o c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 5 0 - 5 1 p l a i n t i v e l y p u t i t , " I w i s h t o see the State G o v e r n m e n t b r o u g h t back t o its simple a n d a p p r o p r i a t e functions, [leaving] r a i l r o a d , canal, t u r n p i k e a n d other cor­ p o r a t e associations, t o get a l o n g o n their o w n credit, w i t h o u t any c o n ­ n e c t i o n o r partnership w i t h the State w h a t e v e r . " The N e w York Con­ s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 4 6 , for example, forbade l e n d i n g o f the state's credit a n d r e q u i r e d direct p o p u l a r a p p r o v a l for n e w d e b t . M o s t existing states a d o p t e d similar p r o v i s i o n s , a n d a l l states entering the U n i o n after 1845 w r o t e some sort o f debt r e s t r i c t i o n i n t o their c o n s t i t u t i o n s . M a n y states also m a n d a t e d general i n c o r p o r a t i o n laws, either f o r b i d d i n g special i n ­ c o r p o r a t i o n laws ( w i t h their privileges a n d incentives) o r p e r m i t t i n g t h e m only, as i n N e w Y o r k , w h e n "the objects o f the c o r p o r a t i o n c a n n o t be a t t a i n e d under general l a w s . " The Virginia Constitution of 1851 sought t o prevent legislative c o r r u p t i o n by p r o h i b i t i n g employees o f banks f r o m serving i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . T h e I l l i n o i s C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 4 8 , w h i c h directed the general assembly t o "encourage internal improvement, by passing l i b e r a l laws o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n f o r t h a t p u r p o s e , " exemplified the effort t o secure economic development w i t h o u t special p r i v i l e g e . T w o aspects o f these c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes are p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t e w o r ­ thy. First, the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms were n o t confined t o those states t h a t h a d suffered f r o m overzealous efforts t o p r o m o t e economic develop­ m e n t . Rather, the experience i n those states served a c a u t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n , i n d u c i n g other states t o construct c o n s t i t u t i o n a l barriers t o prevent such abuses f r o m o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n their borders. Second, w h i l e t w e n t i e t h century reformers have attacked state c o n s t i t u t i o n s as excessively l o n g 77

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a n d detailed, the h i s t o r y recounted here suggests t h a t some o f the length a n d detail o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s represented a considered response t o real p r o b l e m s . State legislatures h a d p r o v e d u n w o r t h y o f trust, a n d i t was therefore deemed necessary t o restrict their p o w e r s . Because state legisQuoted in Kermit L . H a l l , The Magic Mirror: Law in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1 0 3 - 4 . N e w York Constitution of 1846, art. 7, sec. 9. N e w York Constitution of 1846, art. 3, sec. 18. For a thorough analysis of this consti­ tution's economic provisions, see Gunn, The Decline of Authority, 183-89. Virginia Constitution of 1851, art. 4, sec. 7. Illinois Constitution of 1848, art. 10, sec. 6. Yet the constitution prefaced this exten­ sion of the opportunity to obtain corporate status in sections 1-5 w i t h severe restrictions on corporations w i t h banking powers or privileges. Among these was a requirement that any statute authorizing such corporations not go into effect unless approved by popular referen­ dum, thus underscoring the notion that the citizenry could be trusted to veto unwarranted privilege. 7 7

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latures possessed plenary legislative power, successful r e s t r i c t i o n r e q u i r e d p r o h i b i t i o n s a n d l i m i t a t i o n s t h a t were specific a n d detailed. M u c h o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislation t h a t swelled state c o n s t i t u t i o n s d u r i n g the a n t e b e l l u m p e r i o d thus reflected n o t a lack o f s k i l l i n c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g or a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m b u t rather a d e t e r m i n e d at­ t e m p t t o restrict state legislative forays i n t o economic boosterism a n d favoritism. ECONOMIC PROMOTION IN THE POSTWAR ERA T h e same cycle o f p r o m o t i o n a l enthusiasm f o l l o w e d b y retrenchment t h a t h a d characterized the a n t e b e l l u m era repeated itself i n the decade or so after the C i v i l War. I n the South, delegates t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions h o p e d t o resurrect a n d redirect their ravaged economies b y a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i c y o f subsidy a n d p r o m o t i o n . Indeed, even before a d j o u r n i n g , dele­ gates t o the N o r t h C a r o l i n a c o n v e n t i o n o f 1868 v o t e d over $2 m i l l i o n i n financial assistance t o r a i l r o a d s . Every R e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n per­ m i t t e d direct subsidies t o r a i l r o a d s a n d other p r i v a t e entities, m o s t a u t h o ­ rized the l o a n o f state credit as w e l l , a n d some f o r the first t i m e established l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y f o r c o r p o r a t e stockholders. A t the same t i m e , these consti­ t u t i o n s d i d a t t e m p t t o forestall a n t i c i p a t e d abuses. T h u s , Arkansas banned all special acts o f a i d a n d i n c o r p o r a t i o n ( w h i l e p e r m i t t i n g general a i d a n d general i n c o r p o r a t i o n l a w s ) ; A l a b a m a r e q u i r e d a t w o - t h i r d s vote i n b o t h houses t o l e n d the state's credit t o any c o m p a n y ; a n d N o r t h C a r o l i n a r e q u i r e d t h a t n e w debts be covered b y taxes or state b o n d s . T h e p r o m o ­ t i o n a l t h r u s t o f these documents affected other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s as w e l l . F o r instance, delegates i n several conventions rejected arguments t o repudiate state debts i n c u r r e d after secession o u t o f a concern t o m a i n t a i n business confidence i n their s t a t e s . 8 2

8 3

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T h e economic crisis o f 1873 sharpened c r i t i c i s m o f g o v e r n m e n t expen­ ditures a m o n g w h i t e southerners a n d swelled demands f o r t a x relief, leading t o a shift o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n i n the South. I f the economic keynote o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n s was economic r e v i v a l , the a i m o f p o s t - R e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n s was, i n the w o r d s o f a delegate t o the A l a b a m a c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 7 5 , " t o g o v e r n as little as p o s s i b l e . " Even 85

Our account of postwar economic policy in the South primarily relies on M a r k W. Summers, Railroads, Reconstruction, and the Gospel of Prosperity: Aid under the Radical Republicans, 1865-1877 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Perman, The Road to Redemption; and Foner, Reconstruction. Arkansas Constitution of 1868, art. 5, sec. 48; Alabama Constitution of 1868, art. 4, sees. 32 and 33; and N o r t h Carolina Constitution of 1868, art. 5, sec. 5. Summers, Railroads, Reconstruction, 23-24. For an illustrative provision, see N o r t h Carolina Constitution of 1868, art. 1, sec. 6. Quoted i n Perman, The Road to Redemption, 2 0 1 . 8 2

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before the a d o p t i o n o f n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n s , amendments c u r t a i l e d state p r o m o t i o n a l efforts. T h u s , a F l o r i d a a m e n d m e n t forbade the use o f p u b ­ lic credit for the benefit o f any i n d i v i d u a l or c o r p o r a t i o n , a n d a South C a r o l i n a a m e n d m e n t made loans o f credit c o n d i t i o n a l o n r e f e r e n d u m s u p p o r t by t w o - t h i r d s o f a l l v o t e r s . Delegates t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n ­ ventions o f the m i d - 1 8 7 0 s also a t t e m p t e d t o preclude future efforts t o subsidize economic g r o w t h . T h e A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 7 5 , f o r ex­ a m p l e , e l i m i n a t e d the post o f commissioner o f i n d u s t r i a l resources a n d i m p o s e d an absolute b a n o n state, county, o r l o c a l a i d t o c o r p o r a t i o n s f o r i n t e r n a l i m p r o v e m e n t s . Delegates i n Georgia a n d L o u i s i a n a r e p u d i a t e d r a i l r o a d bonds a n d tightened legislative strictures against t h e i r repay­ ment. Those w h o c h a m p i o n e d these c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes assumed either t h a t frugal g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d attract investment t o their states o r t h a t a g r i c u l t u r e , rather t h a n industry, was basic t o the states' economic revival. 8 6

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I n the N o r t h , the renewed p r o m o t i o n a l zeal was constrained some­ w h a t b y the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l restrictions a d o p t e d i n the 1840s. N o n e t h e ­ less, a c c o r d i n g t o H a r r y Scheiber the p o s t w a r era was "the h i g h - w a t e r m a r k o f m u n i f i c e n t . . . p u b l i c a i d t o r a i l r o a d c o r p o r a t i o n s . " State gov­ ernments s k i r t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l restraints o n state a i d by a p p r o v i n g l o c a l a i d t o r a i l r o a d companies. F r o m 1 8 6 6 t o 1 8 7 3 , state legislatures ap­ p r o v e d over eight h u n d r e d proposals t o g r a n t local a i d t o r a i l r o a d c o m ­ panies. N e w Y o r k , I l l i n o i s , a n d M i s s o u r i together a u t h o r i z e d over $ 7 0 million worth of a i d . T h e O h i o C o n s t i t u t i o n b a r r e d b o t h state a n d l o c a l a i d ; b u t voters i n C i n c i n n a t i , eager for a r a i l l i n k t o the upper South, v o t e d bonds f o r the p u b l i c c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d o p e r a t i o n o f the r a i l line, a n d other m u n i c i p a l i t i e s f o l l o w e d s u i t . N o t surprisingly, w h e n the eco­ n o m i c crisis o f 1873 struck, l o c a l governments f o u n d themselves overc o m m i t t e d . As M o r t o n Keller has observed, " n o t h i n g so clearly illus­ trates the c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p o f r a i l r o a d s t o the p o l i t y as does [the] shift f r o m eager c o m p e t i t i o n f o r r a i l r o a d development t o desperate ef­ forts t o a v o i d the ensuring legacy o f d e b t . " I n the w a k e o f this change o f a t t i t u d e , further restrictions were added t o n o r t h e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n s t o prevent a r e p e t i t i o n o f reckless p r o m o t i o n a l efforts. 8 9

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Summers, Railroads, Reconstruction, 285. Alabama Constitution of 1875, art. 4, sec. 54. For discussion of these developments, see M c M i l l a n , Constitutional Development in Alabama, 196-200. Perman, The Road to Redemption, 2 0 6 - 9 . Harry N . Scheiber, "Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789-1910," Law and Society Review 10 (fall 1975): 110. Keller, Affairs of State, 165. Keller, Affairs of State, 167. Keller, Affairs of State, 423. 8 6

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REGULATION AND CORPORATE POWER

T h r o u g h o u t the a n t e b e l l u m era, state governments h a d b y statute a n d the c o m m o n l a w pervasively regulated economic a c t i v i t y t o ensure fair c o m p e t i t i o n a n d safeguard p u b l i c safety, h e a l t h , a n d m o r a l s . I n the af­ t e r m a t h o f the C i v i l War, however, the states faced a n e w r e g u l a t o r y c h a l ­ lenge, because the n a t i o n h a d entered a n e w economic era, one i n w h i c h large c o r p o r a t i o n s , such as r a i l r o a d s , w i e l d e d significant economic a n d p o l i t i c a l p o w e r . T h e threat posed b y these c o r p o r a t e giants p r o m p t e d farmers a n d laborers, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the M i d w e s t , t o organize t o c o m b a t their influence. Because farmer a n d l a b o r groups distrusted state govern­ ments, w h i c h they believed (often correctly) were d o m i n a t e d or cor­ r u p t e d by c o r p o r a t e w e a l t h , they l o o k e d t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m for re­ lief, h o p i n g t o achieve their goals t h r o u g h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n . Illinois's " G r a n g e r c o n s t i t u t i o n " o f 1 8 7 0 , w i t h its detailed p r o v i s i o n s o n g r a i n elevators a n d its r e g u l a t i o n o f r a i l r o a d s , exemplifies their e f f o r t s . Late i n the nineteenth century, several western states also drafted their i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s or revised their early c o n s t i t u t i o n s as a response t o the rise o f large c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d their economic a n d p o l i t i c a l power. 9 3

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95

State c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s d u r i n g the late nineteenth a n d early t w e n ­ t i e t h centuries reaffirmed the inalienable p o w e r o f the legislature t o regu­ late c o r p o r a t i o n s for the p u b l i c g o o d a n d devised a w i d e v a r i e t y o f mech­ anisms t o c u r t a i l the abuse o f corporate p o w e r . First, they i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o their c o n s t i t u t i o n s detailed legislation r e g u l a t i n g r a i l r o a d s a n d other c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d p r o t e c t i n g consumers a n d l a b o r . Idaho's 1 8 8 9 charter declared r a i l r o a d s t o be p u b l i c h i g h w a y s a n d subjected t h e i r rates t o leg­ islative r e g u l a t i o n . T h e M o n t a n a a n d W y o m i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n s a b r o 9 6

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The best overview of state regulation during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century is Novak, The People's Welfare. Indications of this concern about corporate power surfaced even prior to the Civil War. See Johnson, Founding the Far West, 122-25, for an account of the debate over corporate power in the California convention of 1849. Illinois Constitution of 1870, art. 13, sees. 1-4. Some Granger provisions were chal­ lenged as violations of the federal Constitution, but the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the challenge in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). For a discussion of the Illinois Constitu­ tion and its provisions protecting farmers, see Friedman, History of American Law, 349-50. See, for example, Montana Constitution of 1889, art. 15, sec. 3. In fact, the constitutionalization of detailed economic legislation can be traced as far back as the Florida Constitution of 1839, whose banking article was patterned after a N e w York statute of the previous year. The provision was sufficiently detailed and complete that the Florida legislature did not need to enact a state banking law. See Freund, Standards of American Legislation, 163. 9 3

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Idaho Constitution, art. 1 1 , sec. 5. For discussion of the development of the corpora­ tions article of the Idaho Constitution, see Colson, Idaho's Constitution, chap. 7. 9 8

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gated the " f e l l o w - s e r v a n t " r u l e , a c o m m o n - l a w d o c t r i n e t h a t prevented w o r k e r s f r o m c o l l e c t i n g i n c o u r t l i t i g a t i o n f o r w o r k - r e l a t e d injuries; the W y o m i n g charter also forbade l a b o r contracts t h a t released employers f r o m l i a b i l i t y f o r injuries suffered b y w o r k e r s ; a n d the N o r t h D a k o t a C o n s t i t u t i o n forbade the exchange o f w o r k e r " b l a c k l i s t s " between cor­ p o r a t i o n s . " Second, c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s created i n s t i t u t i o n s designed t o m o n i t o r a n d , where necessary, c u r b i l l i c i t practices a n d abuses. T h u s , the I d a h o C o n s t i t u t i o n established a l a b o r commissions, a n d the W y o m i n g C o n s t i t u t i o n an inspector o f m i n e s . T h i r d , c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s specif­ ically w i t h d r e w legislative a u t h o r i t y t o enact statutes t h a t m i g h t advan­ tage c o r p o r a t e interests. T h e I d a h o a n d M o n t a n a c o n s t i t u t i o n s , f o r i n ­ stance, b o t h specifically forbade enactment o f retroactive laws favorable to r a i l r o a d s . Finally, state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s a t t e m p t e d t o prevent c o r r u p t i o n o f state officials b y c o r p o r a t e interests b y establishing consti­ t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s o n the gifts a n d other benefits t h a t those officials c o u l d accept f r o m t h e m . 1 0 0

1 0 1

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Yet c o n v e n t i o n records reveal t h a t m a n y delegates opposed stringent restrictions o n c o r p o r a t i o n s . T h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o r e g u l a t i o n was n o t c o n ­ fined t o apologists " o w n e d " by the c o r p o r a t i o n s . F o r i f c o r p o r a t i o n s were feared as a source o f c o r r u p t i o n a n d oppression, t h e i r i m p o r t a n c e as a source o f c a p i t a l f o r economic development was also recognized. C o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s a c k n o w l e d g e d , albeit reluctantly, t h a t the prosper­ i t y o f t h e i r states was i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d t o the success o f large " f o r e i g n " c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d feared t h a t excessive restrictions m i g h t d r i v e those cor­ p o r a t i o n s f r o m the state. Western delegates i n p a r t i c u l a r perceived this c o n n e c t i o n a n d , w h i l e i m p o s i n g some restrictions, rejected m o r e s t r i n ­ gent ones a n d offered i m p o r t a n t concessions designed t o attract c o r p o r a ­ t i o n s . O n e such concession, i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the C o l o r a d o a n d I d a h o c o n s t i t u t i o n s , p e r m i t t e d the t a k i n g o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y for p r i v a t e as w e l l

Montana Constitution of 1889, art. 15, sec. 16; Wyoming Constitution of 1889, art. 9, sec. 4, and art. 10, sec. 4; and N o r t h Dakota Constitution of 1889, art. 17, sec. 212. For discussion of these provisions, see Hicks, Constitutions of Northwest States, 92-95; Bakken, Rocky Mountain Constitution Making, 80 and 85; and Keiter and Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution, 188-89 and 193-96. Idaho Constitution of 1889, art. 13, secs. 1 and 8; and Wyoming Constitution of 1889, art. 9, sec. 1. For discussion of these provisions, see Bakken, Rocky Mountain Consti­ tution Making, chap. 7; Colson, Idaho's Constitution, 127-29; and Hicks, Constitutions of Northwest States, 92-95. Idaho Constitution, art. 1 1 , sec. 12; and Montana Constitution of 1889, art. 15, sec. 13. The Idaho provision is discussed i n Colson, Idaho's Constitution, 125; and Crowley and Heffron, The Idaho State Constitution, 206. For surveys of pertinent provisions, see Hicks, Constitutions of Northwest States, 56-63; and Friedman, History of American Law, 349-50. 9 9

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as p u b l i c use, p r o v i d e d t h a t just c o m p e n s a t i o n was p a i d . Such p r o v i ­ sions s u p p o r t e d the development o f m i n i n g interests i n those states, par­ t i c u l a r l y large-scale, capital-intensive q u a r t z m i n i n g . A n o t h e r signi­ ficant concession was Nevada's e l i m i n a t i o n o f t a x a t i o n o n mines. O p p o n e n t s o f the e x e m p t i o n charged t h a t its beneficiaries w o u l d be "foreigners—aliens, w h o w i s h us n o g o o d . " Proponents conceded the p o i n t b u t successfully m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t a x a t i o n o f mines w o u l d d r i v e a w a y the " f o r e i g n " c a p i t a l t h a t was essential t o d e v e l o p i n g the o n l y re­ source the state possessed. These same arguments were reiterated as other conventions considered w h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l restrictions t o place o n c o r p o r a t i o n s . I n M o n t a n a , for example, a p r o p o s a l t o m a k e c o r p o r a t i o n directors a n d stockholders j o i n t l y liable for c o r p o r a t e debts was defeated after a delegate argued t h a t i t w o u l d " n o t o n l y d r i v e a l l f o r e i g n c a p i t a l invested i n the state a w a y b u t w o u l d prevent a l l future i n q u i r i e s . " I n C o l o r a d o , another l i m i t a t i o n was defeated after a delegate charged t h a t i f a d o p t e d , " n o t another m i l e o f r a i l r o a d [ w o u l d ] be b u i l t " i n the s t a t e . 1 0 3

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The Scope and Distribution

of State

Power

T h e p o w e r o f state legislatures is c i r c u m s c r i b e d o n l y b y the grants o f p o w e r t o the federal g o v e r n m e n t a n d b y l i m i t a t i o n s f o u n d i n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n o r i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Eighteenth-century state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s i m p o s e d few restrictions o n state legislatures b e y o n d those i n c l u d e d i n their declarations o f r i g h t s , a n d even these were t y p i c a l l y framed as a d m o n i t o r y principles rather t h a n as specific legal restraints. T h i s ab­ sence o f detailed l i m i t a t i o n s m a y have reflected a belief t h a t there was l i t t l e t o fear f r o m a b o d y t h a t represented the people; alternatively, i t m a y have i n d i c a t e d a confidence t h a t b r o a d suffrage, frequent elections, a n d the p o w e r t o i n s t r u c t representatives afforded sufficient checks o n legisla­ tive abuses. W h a t e v e r the e x p l a n a t i o n , experience w i t h an a l m o s t unfet­ tered legislative p o w e r d u r i n g the nineteenth c e n t u r y soon dispelled those n o t i o n s . Loss o f f a i t h i n the j u d g m e n t a n d p r o b i t y o f legislators led state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s t o impose increasingly stringent p r o c e d u r a l a n d sub­ stantive restrictions o n state legislatures a n d t o transfer p o w e r s f r o m state legislatures t o other officials or t o the people directly. D u r i n g the nineteenth c e n t u r y also, m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a b a n d o n e d a n n u a l elec­ t i o n a n d extended the t e r m o f office f o r state legislators, perhaps i n d i c a t 1 0 3

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Colorado Constitution, art. 2, sec. 14; and Idaho Constitution, art. 1, sec. 14. Colson, Idaho's Constitution, 6 4 - 6 5 . Quoted in Johnson, Founding the Far West, 224. Quoted in Bakken, Rocky Mountain Constitution Making, 78. Bakken, Rocky Mountain Constitution Making, 77.

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i n g less confidence i n the electoral c o n n e c t i o n as a check o n legislative abuses. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON STATE LEGISLATURES

I n 1835 A l e x i s de Tocqueville observed t h a t "the legislature o f each state is faced by n o p o w e r capable o f resisting i t . " B u t b e g i n n i n g i n the 1830s, state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s sought t o impose l i m i t s o n these su­ preme legislatures. I n i t i a l l y , their restrictions focused o n the process o f legislation. Some state c o n s t i t u t i o n s r e q u i r e d e x t r a o r d i n a r y majorities t o 1 0 8

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), 89. Tocqueville's more general criticisms of nineteenth-century state constitutions and his insistence on the superiority of the federal Constitution are w o r t h detailed consideration. First, Tocqueville notes that "the federal constitution differs essentially from that of the states i n its intended aims, but it is very similar in the means of attaining those aims" (151). This observation underscores the different responsibilities of nation and state, which might account for constitutional differences. Although Tocqueville suggests the means for achiev­ ing the aims are "very similar," he is referring to the "form of government." He detects substantial differences in the powers of the various branches, nation and state, as well as i n the constitutions' views of popular rule. Second, Tocqueville suggests that the superiority of the federal Constitution derives in part from the fact that the federal constitution-makers benefited from the (negative) experi­ ence of state constitution-makers. He notes that this, of course, does not explain the federal Constitution's superiority to state constitutions of newly admitted states nor to new consti­ tutions adopted by the original states. In both these instances, state constitution-makers could presumably have benefited from the federal constitutional experience. Tocqueville argues, however, that these state constitution-makers did not look to the federal model for direction. Instead, they "have almost always exaggerated rather than diminished the defects in the earlier constitutions" (152). T h i r d , Tocqueville sees as the major defect of state constitutions their excessively popu­ lar character. I n contrast w i t h the federal Constitution, which makes the people merely the source of governmental powers, state constitutions tie legislators to "the slightest wishes of their constituents" by short terms of office. In addition, bicameral state legislatures offer no check to popular whims, since the " t w o parts of the legislature were composed of the same elements elected in the same manner" (153). Related to this is the tendency to concentrate power in these legislatures, w i t h the executive "just a blind and passive tool of its w i l l " and the judiciary less independent because of limited tenure and insecure emoluments. Tocqueville's comments thus confirm that a different constitutional perspective animates state constitutions. State constitutions are different in their aims. They are also different in their institutional features. Although state institutions appear similar to those of the federal government, their character is quite distinct. These dissimilarities did not diminish w i t h the creation of post-1787 constitutions; rather, they continued both in states that had begun their constitutional experience w i t h independence and in states newly admitted to the Union. Finally, state constitutions are different in their understanding of the role of the citizenry in government. Whereas the federal Constitution sees the populace as the source of power but views representation as a necessary corrective for popular passions, state consti­ tutions are much more willing to allow the citizenry to direct the policy of the state government. 1 0 8

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a d o p t c e r t a i n types o f legislation, under the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i t w o u l d be m o r e difficult t o m a r s h a l such majorities for d u b i o u s e n d e a v o r s . Others i m p o s e d p r o c e d u r a l restrictions designed t o prevent d u p l i c i t y a n d p r o m o t e greater openness a n d d e l i b e r a t i o n , assuming t h a t greater trans­ parency i n the legislative process w o u l d deter legislative abuses or at least increase a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t h e m . T h u s , state c o n s t i t u t i o n s m a n d a t e d t h a t all bills be referred t o c o m m i t t e e , t h a t they be read three times p r i o r t o enactment, t h a t t h e i r titles accurately describe t h e i r contents, t h a t they embrace a single subject, t h a t they n o t be altered d u r i n g t h e i r passage so as t o change their o r i g i n a l purpose, a n d so o n . O t h e r p r o v i s i o n s r e q u i r e d t h a t the a m e n d m e n t or r e v i s i o n o f laws n o t proceed by mere reference t o their titles, t h a t statutes be phrased i n p l a i n language, t h a t t a x i n g a n d spending measures be enacted o n l y by recorded v o t e , a n d — m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y — t h a t n o special laws be enacted w h e r e a general l a w was possible. By the end o f the nineteenth century, m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n c l u d e d several o f these p r o c e d u r a l requirements. 109

1 1 0

Even m o r e i m p o r t a n t were the substantive restrictions i m p o s e d o n state legislatures. These c o n s t i t u t i o n a l restrictions, l i k e w i s e designed t o prevent legislative p a r t i a l i t y , seemed t o r e f l e c t — i n the w o r d s o f a latenineteenth-century observer—a "belief t h a t legislatures are b y nature ut­ terly careless o f the p u b l i c welfare, i f n o t hopelessly c o r r u p t . " Consti­ t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n s o n l o a n i n g the credit o f the state t o p r i v a t e entities a n d the bans o n special c o r p o r a t i o n acts, discussed earlier, e x e m p l i f y these concerns. So t o o does the i m p o s i t i o n i n m o s t states f r o m 1840 t o 1 8 7 0 o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t o f equal a n d u n i f o r m t a x a t i o n , re­ s t r i c t i n g the unfettered legislative discretion t h a t h a d p r e v i o u s l y pre­ vailed. I n the w a k e o f the C i v i l War, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n s o n 1 1 1

1 1 2

See, for example, N e w York Constitution of 1821, art. 7, sec. 9; and Mississippi Constitution of 1832, art. 7, sec. 8. For illustrative provisions, see reference of bills to committee—Pennsylvania Consti­ tution of 1873, art. 3, sec. 2; three readings of bills before enactment—North Carolina Constitution of 1876, art. 2, sec. 23; title of bills to accurately reflect contents—Ohio Constitution of 1851, art. 2, sec. 16; bills to embrace only a single subject—South Carolina Constitution of 1868, art. 3, sec. 17; no change in the purpose of a bill during passage— Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873, art. 3, sec. 1; no revision or amendment of bills by reference—Oregon Constitution of 1857, art. 4, sec. 22; bills to be phrased in plain language—Oregon Constitution of 1857, art. 4, sec. 2 1 ; enactment by recorded vote— Virginia Constitution of 1851, art. 4, sec. 27; and general laws rather than special laws— Missouri Constitution of 1875, art. 4, sec. 53. For discussion of these restrictions, see Williams, "State Constitutional Limits"; Ruud, " N o Law Shall Embrace"; and Charles C. Binney, Restrictions upon Local and Special Legislation in State Constitutions (Phila­ delphia: Kay and Brother, 1894). Binney, Restrictions upon Legislation, 9. See, for example, Ohio Constitution of 1851, art. 12, sec. 2; and Oregon Constitu­ tion of 1857, art. 9, sec. 1. For discussion of this change and its implications, see M o r t o n J. 1 0 9

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legislative a c t i o n p r o l i f e r a t e d . For example, as late as 1 8 6 0 , M i s s o u r i ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n imposed o n l y three subject-matter restrictions o n the legisla­ t u r e , b u t its 1875 c o n s t i t u t i o n c o n t a i n e d

fifty-six.

113

M o s t restrictions

were designed t o c o m b a t special privilege a n d the threat o f c o r r u p t i o n by f o r b i d d i n g legislators f r o m enacting special o r l o c a l laws i n specific areas of public p o l i c y .

1 1 4

T h u s , state legislatures were f o r b i d d e n t o g r a n t d i ­

vorces, change names, r e m i t fines o r forfeitures, r e f u n d m o n e y p a i d i n t o the state treasury, change the rules o f evidence i n any j u d i c i a l proceeding, change c o u n t y seats, a n d o n a n d o n .

1 1 5

T h e I l l i n o i s C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1870

p r o h i b i t e d the state legislature f r o m addressing t w e n t y fields o f l o c a l o r p r i v a t e concern, the Pennsylvania C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1873 forty, a n d the C a l i f o r n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1879 t h i r t y - t h r e e .

1 1 6

M o r e o v e r , once a l i m i t a ­

t i o n was enshrined i n a few c o n s t i t u t i o n s , the interstate b o r r o w i n g o f provisions

v i r t u a l l y guaranteed its appearance i n others as w e l l ,

constitution-makers

as

sought t o a v o i d g r a n t i n g " t o o l a x a discretion t o

transient representatives o f the p e o p l e . "

1 1 7

A delegate t o South D a k o t a ' s

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s u m m a r i z e d the p r e v a i l i n g v i e w : " T h e object o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s is t o l i m i t the

legislature."

118

Finally, nineteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n s l i m i t e d the

frequency

a n d l e n g t h o f legislative sessions. A t the outset o f the century, state c o n H o r o w i t z , The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 (New York: Oxford Univer­ sity Press, 1992), 2 1 - 2 3 ; and, more generally, Wade J. Newhouse, Constitutional Unifor­ mity and Equality in State Taxation, 2d ed. (Buffalo: W i l l i a m S. Hein, 1984). Henry Hitchcock, American State Constitutions (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1887), 35. Local and private laws dominated legislative business in the late nineteenth century. In Kentucky in 1883-84, for example, 94 percent of statutes concerned local or private matters. See Sheryl G. Snyder and Robert M . Ireland, "The Separation of Governmental Powers under the Constitution of Kentucky: A Legal and Historical Analysis of L.R.C, v. Brown/' Kentucky Law Journal 73 (1984-85): 168. For data on Pennsylvania, see Keller, Affairs of State, 111; for New York, see Gunn, The Decline of Authority, 187-88. These local laws, especially those awarding trolley, water, gas, or other franchises, were widely recognized as a "perennial fountain of corruption" (Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 1:542). For a discussion of the political understanding underlying the restrictions on state legislatures, see Williams, "Equality Guarantees"; and Donald Marritz, " M a k i n g Equality Matter (Again): The Prohibition against Special Laws i n the Pennsylvania Constitution," Widener Journal of Public Law 3 (1993): 161-215. These examples are all drawn from Binney, Restrictions upon Legislation, 131-80. Keller, Affairs of State, 112. For a comprehensive catalog of the constitutional re­ strictions on state legislatures, see Binney, Restrictions upon Legislation, 131-80. Schouler, Constitutional Studies, 210 n. 2. Some state-specific limitations were also imposed in response to abuses w i t h i n particular states. For example, after the Kentucky legislature raided the common school fund during a recession, the state's 1851 constitution mandated that the fund be used only for education. See Kentucky Constitution of 1851, art. 11, sec. 1. Quoted in Hicks, Constitutions of Northwest States, 52. 1 1 3

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1 1 7

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s t i t u t i o n s i m p o s e d n o l i m i t s o n legislative sessions, a n d a n n u a l sessions were the n o r m . As early as 1 8 3 5 , however, the N o r t h C a r o l i n a C o n s t i t u ­ t i o n l i m i t e d the legislature t o b i e n n i a l regular sessions, a n d the V i r g i n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 5 1 m a n d a t e d t h a t the legislature meet b i e n n i a l l y " a n d n o t oftener," w i t h sessions l i m i t e d t o n i n e t y d a y s . A f t e r the C i v i l War, there was a n a t i o n w i d e m o v e m e n t t o c u r b legislative sessions. A delegate t o the C a l i f o r n i a c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 7 9 even proposed t h a t " [ t ] h e r e shall be n o legislature convened f r o m a n d after the a d o p t i o n o f this C o n s t i t u t i o n , . . . a n d any person w h o shall be g u i l t y o f suggesting t h a t a Legislature be h e l d , shall be p u n i s h e d as a felon w i t h o u t benefit o f c l e r g y . " A l t h o u g h l i m i t i n g legislative sessions served the reformers' g o a l o f e c o n o m y i n gov­ ernment, equally i m p o r t a n t was their a s s u m p t i o n t h a t shorter sessions gave legislators less o p p o r t u n i t y t o d o h a r m . By 1 9 0 0 , t h i r t y - t h r e e state c o n s t i t u t i o n s l i m i t e d the l e n g t h o f legislative sessions, a n d o n l y six state legislatures met a n n u a l l y . 1 1 9

1 2 0

1 2 1

POPULAR RULE A l t h o u g h nineteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s believed t h a t the m a i n threat t o effectual p o p u l a r rule came f r o m those seeking t o o b t a i n or r e t a i n special advantages, they also recognized the need t o re­ m o v e legal barriers t o p o p u l a r r u l e . T h i s i n v o l v e d m o r e t h a n s i m p l y the extension o f the vote t o p r e v i o u s l y disenfranchised groups. D u r i n g the first h a l f o f the nineteenth century, almost a l l states, a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e was n o t confined t o the w e a l t h y o r the o r t h o d o x , also abolished p r o p e r t y a n d religious qualifications for o f f i c e h o l d i n g . Even m o r e i m p o r t a n t , they d r a m a t i c a l l y expanded the range o f offices subject t o p o p u l a r election a n d c o n t r o l . A l l states entering the U n i o n d u r i n g the nineteenth c e n t u r y o p t e d for p o p u l a r election o f their governors, as d i d m o s t existing states w h e n they revised their c o n s t i t u t i o n s . By 1860 o n l y South C a r o l i n a retained legislative s e l e c t i o n . N i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s made other executive offices elective as w e l l — b y 1 8 8 0 , over t w o - t h i r d s o f the states elected their secretary o f state, their state 1 2 2

123

O n the N o r t h Carolina debate, see Green, Constitutional Development, 2 3 0 - 3 1 ; for Virginia, see the Virginia Constitution of 1851, art. 4, sec. 8. More generally, see Dealey, Growth of State Constitutions, 52-53. Quoted in Keller, Affairs of State, 114. Dealey, Growth of State Constitutions, 186-87. Some states did retain belief in God as a requirement for holding office. See, for example, Maryland Constitution of 1867, Declaration of Rights, art. 57. For an overview of religious qualifications for office and their elimination, see Antieau, Carroll, and Burke, Religion under State Constitutions, chap. 5. See, for example, New Jersey Constitution of 1844, art. 5, sec. 2; and Virginia Con­ stitution of 1851, art. 5, sec. 2. It is noteworthy that Virginia retained legislative selection of the governor in its 1829 constitution. 1 1 9

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treasurer, their auditor, a n d their a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l . Even technical of­ fices such as state surveyor, canal commissioner, a n d p r i s o n inspector were made subject t o p o p u l a r e l e c t i o n . As a delegate t o the K e n t u c k y c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 5 0 c o m p l a i n e d , " [ W ] e have p r o v i d e d f o r the p o p u l a r election o f every p u b l i c officer, save the d o g catcher, a n d i f the dogs c o u l d v o t e , w e s h o u l d have t h a t as w e l l . " M o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s also shifted f r o m a p p o i n t m e n t t o election o f sheriffs a n d other key l o c a l offi­ 1 2 4

1 2 5

1 2 6

cials. Finally, every state e n t e r i n g the U n i o n f r o m 1 8 4 6 t o 1 9 0 0 i n s t i t u t e d p o p u l a r election o f judges, a n d m a n y e x i s t i n g states a b a n d o n e d legisla­ tive o r executive a p p o i n t m e n t . Indeed, i n the fourteen years after the i n f l u e n t i a l I o w a a n d N e w Y o r k c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f 1846 i n s t i t u t e d p o p u l a r election o f judges, t w e n t y states m o v e d f r o m a p p o i n t m e n t t o election for some o r a l l o f their judges; so t h a t b y 1 8 6 1 , t w e n t y - f o u r o f the t h i r t y - f o u r states selected judges b y election rather t h a n b y a p p o i n t m e n t . 1 2 7

P o p u l a r election o f state a n d local officials d i d m o r e t h a n e m p o w e r the p o p u l a c e . I t also reduced the p o w e r o f state legislators, w h o i n m o s t states h a d c o n t r o l l e d the a p p o i n t m e n t o f executive officers, l o c a l officials, a n d judges. I n a d d i t i o n , p o p u l a r election o f state officials signaled a shift i n the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p o p u l a r g o v e r n m e n t , as p o p u l a r a u t h o r i t y was vested n o t o n l y i n the legislature b u t i n a l l branches o f state g o v e r n m e n t . As a result o f p o p u l a r election, executive officials c o u l d c l a i m t h a t they h a d just as strong a c o n n e c t i o n t o the people, the source o f a l l p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , as d i d the legislature. T h i s p o p u l a r p o l i t i c a l base was essential for judges as w e l l , because they were expected t o m a k e p u b l i c policy. A delegate t o the N e w Y o r k c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 4 6 n o t e d t h a t restrictions o n the legislature i n v i t e d an e x p a n s i o n o f j u d i c i a l p o w e r : " I n r e o r g a n i z i n g the legislative d e p a r t m e n t w e have made i t less p o w e r f u l f o r general legis­ l a t i o n . . . [thus] a large share o f j u d i c i a l legislation w i l l be inevitable, a n d w e m u s t endeavor t o supply i t . " 1 2 8

INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS ON STATE LEGISLATURES Paralleling this m o v e m e n t t o w a r d p o p u l a r election o f executive offi­ cials a n d judges was an effort t o enhance the a u t o n o m y a n d p o w e r s o f g o v e r n o r s , so t h a t they c o u l d better check legislative abuses. By 1 8 6 0 , N e w Y o r k h a d e l i m i n a t e d its C o u n c i l o f R e v i s i o n a n d C o u n c i l o f A p ­ p o i n t m e n t ; M a r y l a n d , R h o d e I s l a n d , V e r m o n t , a n d V i r g i n i a h a d jetMcCarthy, Widening Scope, 52-55. New York Constitution of 1846, art. 5, sees. 2 and 3. Quoted in Kermit L. Hall, "The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860," Historian 44 (May 1983): 3 4 0 - 4 1 . O n the election of judges, see Philip L. Dubois, From Ballot to Bench: judicial Elec­ tions and the Quest for Accountability (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), chap. 1; and Hall, "The Judiciary on Trial." Quoted i n Hall, "The Judiciary on Trial," 3 5 0 - 5 1 . 1 2 4 1 2 5

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tisoned t h e i r cumbersome governor's councils; a n d n o state entering the U n i o n after 1 8 2 0 established any b o d y w i t h w h o m the g o v e r n o r exer­ cised executive p o w e r . A l l states entering the U n i o n after 1 8 0 0 except O h i o a n d West V i r g i n i a gave t h e i r g o v e r n o r a veto over legislation i n their o r i g i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d b y 1 8 6 0 m o s t o f the o r i g i n a l states h a d likewise done so w h e n they revised t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s . I n the after­ m a t h o f the C i v i l War, efforts t o enhance g u b e r n a t o r i a l p o w e r c o n t i n u e d i n m o s t states. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n South C a r o l i n a , Tennes­ see, a n d V i r g i n i a a l l established g u b e r n a t o r i a l v e t o e s . N e w Y o r k and Pennsylvania a p p r o v e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments t h a t increased t o t w o - t h i r d s o f the t o t a l m e m b e r s h i p (as opposed t o t w o - t h i r d s o f those v o t i n g ) the legislative m a j o r i t y needed t o override a g u b e r n a t o r i a l veto. By 1 9 0 0 , a n u m b e r o f states h a d given their governors the i t e m veto, extended the governor's t e r m o f office, a n d / o r h a d m a d e governors eligible for r e e l e c t i o n . Yet at the same t i m e t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n makers were strengthening the governor's role vis-à-vis the legislature, they were u n d e r c u t t i n g the governor's a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y by dis­ persing executive p o w e r t h r o u g h p o p u l a r election o f executive officers a n d the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f independent state a g e n c i e s . 1 2 9

1 3 0

131

1 3 2

1 3 3

134

After the C i v i l War, elected state judges also were increasingly w i l l i n g t o check state legislatures. T h e N e w Y o r k C o u r t o f Appeals, w h i c h h a d r u l e d o n l y sixty-five laws u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i o r t o the C i v i l War, struck d o w n almost t w o h u n d r e d f r o m 1870 t o 1 9 0 0 ; a n d the Supreme J u d i c i a l C o u r t o f Massachusetts, w h i c h h a d i n v a l i d a t e d o n l y ten laws p r i o r t o 1 8 6 0 , struck d o w n t h i r t y - o n e f r o m l 8 6 0 t o 1 8 9 3 . T h e O h i o Supreme 1 3 5

O n the changes in New York, see Galie, New York State Constitution, 6-10; on the changes in Maryland and Vermont, see Dealey, Growth of State Constitutions, 53, and H i l l , The Vermont State Constitution, 14-15. Illinois adopted a Council of Revision modeled after New York's in its 1818 constitution (art. 3, sec. 19) but abandoned it in favor of a gubernatorial veto in its 1848 constitution (art. 4, sec. 21). As of 1860, the only states that retained gubernatorial councils were in New England (Maine, New Hampshire, and Massa­ chusetts). See Schouler, Constitutional Studies, 272-73. John A. Fairlie, "The Veto Power of the State Governor," American Political Science Review 11 (August 1917): 473-93. South Carolina Constitution of 1868, art. 4, sec. 23; Tennessee Constitution of 1870, art. 3, sec. 18; and Virginia Constitution of 1870, art. 4, sec. 8. James A. Henretta, "Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition," Rutgers Law Journal 22 (summer 1991): 824. For an incisive overview of the development of state executive branches during the nineteenth century, see Henretta, "Rethinking State Constitutional Tradition," 821-26. In New York, for example, there were only ten state agencies in 1800 but eighty-one in 1900. See Larry Sabato, Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie: The American Governorship Transformed, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1983), 6. Edward S. Corwin, "The Extension of Judicial Review in New York: 1783-1905," Michigan Law Review 15 (February 1917): 283-85; and Keller, Affairs of State, 362. 1 2 9

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C o u r t struck d o w n fifty-seven statutes f r o m 1 8 8 0 t o 1 9 0 0 , a n d the V i r ­ g i n i a Supreme C o u r t i n v a l i d a t e d r o u g h l y o n e - t h i r d o f a l l state statutes b r o u g h t before i t i n the late nineteenth c e n t u r y . I n p a r t , this n e w j u d i ­ cial a c t i v i s m stemmed f r o m the m o r e detailed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s i m p o s e d o n state legislatures; for w h e n states i m p o s e d p r o c e d u r a l a n d substantive l i m i t a t i o n s , state courts became the o b v i o u s f o r u m f o r en­ forcing t h e m . Indeed, the M i s s o u r i C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 7 0 specifically a u t h o r i z e d state judges t o resolve conflicts over w h e t h e r the legislature h a d passed a special l a w w h e n a general l a w was possible, a n d an a m e n d ­ m e n t t o the Kansas C o n s t i t u t i o n d i d l i k e w i s e . I n p a r t , however, the unprecedented j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n reflected a n e w j u d i c i a l willingness t o rule o n the v a l i d i t y o f the state economic regulations t h a t p r o l i f e r a t e d i n the late nineteenth century. M a n y scholars have dismissed the c o u r t s ' r u l i n g s as merely reflecting a j u d i c i a l aversion t o legislation t h a t inter­ fered w i t h laissez-faire c a p i t a l i s m . T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n , however, fails t o e x p l a i n w h y courts u p h e l d some statutes w h i l e i n v a l i d a t i n g others. M o r e recent scholars have recognized t h a t state courts distinguished between v a l i d e c o n o m i c regulations a n d i n v a l i d class legislation, based o n w h e t h e r they believed the challenged statutes served the p u b l i c welfare o r merely p r o m o t e d the n a r r o w interests o f a p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p o r c l a s s . I n draw­ i n g this d i s t i n c t i o n , the courts were a t t e m p t i n g t o reinforce a basic theme o f nineteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , namely, t h a t g o v e r n m e n t m u s t g o v e r n i n the interest o f a l l . T h u s , the sameconcern for effectual r e p u b l i c a n g o v e r n m e n t t h a t m o t i v a t e d state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s appears t o have m o t i v a t e d the judges e n f o r c i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guidelines. 1 3 6

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Keller, Affairs of State, 362. Friedman, History of American Law, 355-62. Missouri Constitution of 1875, art. 4, sec. 53, clause 32; and Kansas Constitution, 1906 amendment to art. 2, sec. 17. For a discussion of the background of the amendment and the judiciary's responsibilities under i t , see Anderson v. Board of Commissioners of Cloud County, 95 P. 583 (Kan. 1908). See, for example, Carl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Development (Bos­ ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1943); Loren P. Beth, The Development of the American Constitu­ tion, 1877-1917 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); and William F. Swindler, Court and Constitution in the Twentieth Century: The Old Legality, 1889-1932 (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1969). A recent excellent presentation of this position is H o w a r d Gillman, The Constitution Besieged (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993). Other revisionist accounts include Alan Jones, "Thomas M . Cooley and 'Laissez-Faire' Constitutionalism: A Reconsidera­ tion," Journal of American History 53 (March 1967): 7 5 1 - 7 1 ; Michael Les Benedict, "Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism," Law and History Review 3 (fall 1985): 2 9 3 - 3 3 1 ; and David M . Gold, The Shaping of Nineteenth-Century Law: John Appleton and Responsible Individualism (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990). 1 3 6

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DIRECT POPULAR GOVERNMENT As a general r u l e , the states have n o t been nearly as sanguine as has the federal g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t the advantages o f representative g o v e r n m e n t over direct democracy. T h u s , a n u m b e r o f states have p e r i o d i c a l l y sought t o ensure t h a t the p o p u l a r w i l l w o u l d p r e v a i l by o u t f l a n k i n g the state legislature, b y s u b s t i t u t i n g direct p o p u l a r rule for rule b y p e r m a n e n t gov­ e r n m e n t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . D u r i n g the heyday o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions i n the nineteenth century, some delegates c l a i m e d t h a t the conventions displaced n o r m a l g o v e r n m e n t a n d restored p o l i t i c a l p o w e r d i r e c t l y t o the people. As an I l l i n o i s delegate enthused i n 1 8 4 7 , " W e are w h a t the people o f the State w o u l d be, i f they were congregated here i n one mass meet­ ing." Based o n this t h e o r y o f p o p u l a r sovereignty t h r o u g h c o n v e n t i o n sovereignty, delegates o n occasion assumed the responsibilities o f legisla­ tors, i m p o s i n g taxes a n d enacting l a w s . Indeed, the South C a r o l i n a c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 6 0 d i d n o t r e l i n q u i s h its a u t h o r i t y t o the state legislature u n t i l a year a n d a h a l f i n t o the C i v i l War. 1 4 1

1 4 2

M o r e generally, distrust o f state legislatures led conventions t o seek t o supplant state legislatures by inserting detailed p o l i c y prescriptions i n t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n s themselves. T h i s eagerness f o r p o p u l a r legislation p r o m p t e d n o t o n l y a p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions b u t also an easing o f procedures f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t d u r i n g the latter h a l f o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y . One impetus f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legisla­ t i o n was a concern a b o u t official c o r r u p t i o n . T h u s , the I l l i n o i s C o n s t i t u ­ t i o n o f 1848 m a n d a t e d t h a t p u b l i c contracts for fuel a n d stationery be given t o the lowest bidder, a n d the A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1875 for­ bade r a i l r o a d s f r o m a w a r d i n g free passes t o state o r m u n i c i p a l offi­ cials. B u t as G o v e r n o r A r t h u r M e l l e t t e recognized i n presenting the case for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislation at the South D a k o t a c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 8 9 , a broader u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p o p u l a r g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r l a y these efforts: 1 4 3

1 4 4

If it is right, if you know what is the proper thing to embrace in your legisla­ tion, the more there is in the constitution the better for the people. One of the greatest evils is excessive legislation—the constant change every two years of the laws, and the squabbles and debates over the different questions that conQuoted in Rodgers, Contested Truths, 98. For surveys of these forays into legislation by constitutional conventions, see Rodgers, Contested Truths, 9 2 - 1 0 1 ; and Dodd, Revision and Amendment, chap. 3. For a major challenge to the legal authority of conventions to supersede state legislatures, see Jameson, Treatise on Constitutional Conventions. See Dodd, Amendment and Revision, chap. 4. Illinois Constitution of 1848, art. 4, sec. 25; and Alabama Constitution of 1875, art. 13, sec. 23. 1 4 1

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stantly arises. It is wise, in my judgment, after the people have decided i n which direction their interests lie, to embody them in the fundamental law of the land and make it permanent. 145

Because c o n v e n t i o n delegates t y p i c a l l y v i e w e d themselves as p e c u l i a r l y representative o f the people, they assumed t h a t their deliberations were u n t a i n t e d b y the n a r r o w p a r o c h i a l i s m a n d p a r t i s a n "squabbles" t h a t p l a g u e d state legislatures. T h e y therefore believed i t their d u t y t o include extensive legislation i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n , where i t w o u l d n o t be easily sub­ ject t o change by p o l i t i c a l factions. T h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislation i n ­ c l u d e d b o t h b r o a d p o l i c y directives a n d detailed prescriptions. T h e level o f d e t a i l is i l l u s t r a t e d by the M i s s o u r i C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 7 5 , w h i c h r a n k o r d e r e d the state's p r i o r i t i e s f o r the e x p e n d i t u r e o f p u b l i c funds (first, interest o n debt; n e x t , the s i n k i n g f u n d ; n e x t , e d u c a t i o n ; n e x t , costs o f assessing a n d collecting revenue, etc.), a n d the I l l i n o i s C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 7 0 , w h i c h even dealt w i t h the covert m i x i n g o f t w o grades o f g r a i n i n the same e l e v a t o r . O n e m a y w e l l question w h e t h e r such p r o v i s i o n s banished f a c t i o n a l p o l i t i c s f r o m p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n o r merely i n v i t e d i t i n t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e a l m . Nevertheless, the longer, m o r e prescriptive a n d p r o s c r i p t i v e state c o n s t i t u t i o n s characteristic o f the late nineteenth c e n t u r y reflected a desire t o assert a p u b l i c interest against o r d i n a r y politics. 146

D I F F E R E N C E S A M O N G STATE C O N S T I T U T I O N S

A l t h o u g h this n a r r a t i v e has h i g h l i g h t e d the c o m m o n a l i t i e s i n nineteenthc e n t u r y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development, there are dif­ ferences a m o n g t h e m as w e l l . Some o f these differences reflect distinctive o r i e n t a t i o n s t o w a r d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design. L o u i s i a n a is a p r i m e example, a d o p t i n g a series o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t resembled "the basic c i v i l codes o f E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s — l o n g , detailed, a n d n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y r e v e r e d " — rather t h a n the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f its sister s t a t e s . I n other instances, issues distinctive t o a state o r salient o n l y w i t h i n its borders have at times d o m i n a t e d its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . Examples include the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f I n d i a n lands at the M i s s i s s i p p i c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 3 2 , the state l o t t e r y at the L o u i s i a n a c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 7 9 , a n d M o r m o n i s m at the I d a h o conven147

Quoted in Hicks, Constitutions of Northwest States, 54. Missouri Constitution of 1875, art. 4, sec. 43; and Illinois Constitution of 1870, art. 13, sec. 2. The Illinois Constitution, in fact, contained an entire article on warehouses. Needless to say, the examples of constitutional legislation could easily be multiplied. Elazar, "Principles and Traditions," 2 1 . William Swindler, in his ten-volume collec­ tion of all state constitutions, was obliged to devote an entire volume to Louisiana constitutions. 1 4 5

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tion of 1 8 8 9 . Yet the m o s t s t r i k i n g differences a m o n g state c o n s t i t u ­ tions d u r i n g the nineteenth century were r e g i o n a l . State c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development i n N e w E n g l a n d a n d i n the South illustrates b o t h the range a n d character o f these r e g i o n a l v a r i a t i o n s . 1 4 8

1 4 9

New

England

W h a t was distinctive a b o u t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development i n N e w E n g l a n d was the region's relative i s o l a t i o n f r o m several o f the century's m a j o r movements f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. M o s t states r e g u l a r l y altered their c o n s t i t u t i o n s d u r i n g the nineteenth century, b u t n o N e w E n g l a n d state revised its c o n s t i t u t i o n d u r i n g the p e r i o d , thus m i n i m i z i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o b o r r o w f r o m c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n other regions. T h e N e w E n g l a n d states were also less affected t h a n other states b y Jacksonian d e m o c r a c y . As a result, whereas m o s t states embraced w h i t e m a n h o o d suffrage p r i o r t o the C i v i l War, Massachusetts, N e w H a m p s h i r e , a n d R h o d e Island re­ stricted the vote i n state elections t o taxpayers, M a i n e a n d V e r m o n t d i d so for t o w n meetings o r l o c a l elections, and—as n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y — o n l y C o n n e c t i c u t established a racial q u a l i f i c a t i o n for v o t i n g . A n d whereas m o s t states p r o v i d e d f o r the p o p u l a r election o f judges a n d executive officials, the N e w E n g l a n d states largely b u c k e d these trends. M a i n e , Massachusetts, N e w H a m p s h i r e , a n d R h o d e I s l a n d a l l retained j u d i c i a l selection by the g o v e r n o r o r the legislature, a n d C o n n e c t i c u t d i d so for appellate j u d g e s . T h e N e w E n g l a n d states also c o n t i n u e d t o a l l o w their legislatures t o a p p o i n t m o s t executive o f f i c i a l s . Perhaps m o s t i m 1 5 0

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Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution, 5 - 6 ; Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, 9 - 1 0 ; and Crowley and Heffron, The Idaho State Constitution, 5 - 7 . For penetrating accounts that emphasize regional differentiation in constitutional development, see Elazar, "Principles and Traditions"; and H a l l , "Mostly Anchor." For ac­ counts organized around particular regions, see Bakken, Rocky Mountain Constitution Making; Hicks, Constitutions of Northwest States; and Johnson, Founding the Far West. 150 p general overview, see Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel H i l l : University of N o r t h Carolina Press, 1966). A useful single-state study is Donald B. Cole, Jacksonian Democracy in New Hampshire, 1800-1851 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). Massachusetts rejected an amendment to establish manhood suffrage in 1853, N e w Hampshire did so in 1851, and Rhode Island's 1842 constitution restricted the suffrage to native-born taxpayers and foreign-born freeholders. Maine and Vermont limited local suf­ frage to taxpayers. See Williamson, American Suffrage, 198, 265, 268, 2 7 1 , 277. Hall, "The Judiciary on Trial," 337 n. 2. I n fact, constitutional conventions in Mas­ sachusetts and N e w Hampshire during the 1850s specifically rejected popular election of judges. By constitutional amendments i n 1850 and in 1870, Vermont adopted popular election of inferior court judges and then appellate judges. See, for example, Connecticut Constitution of 1818, art. 4, sees. 19-20; Maine Con­ stitution of 1819, art. 5, sec. 3, par. 1, and sec. 4, par. 1; and Rhode Island Constitution, art. 8, sec. 1. 1 4 8

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p o r t a n t l y , the N e w E n g l a n d states d i d n o t j o i n the m o v e m e n t t o l o n g c o n s t i t u t i o n s replete w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislation a n d restrictions o n state legislatures. Instead, t h r o u g h o u t the century they c o n t i n u e d t o dem­ onstrate considerable f a i t h i n the use o f p u b l i c p o w e r for the p u b l i c g o o d , i m p o s i n g few restrictions o n their legislatures a n d a d o p t i n g l i t t l e consti­ tutional legislation. 1 5 4

Nevertheless, one s h o u l d n o t exaggerate the distinctiveness o f c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l development i n N e w E n g l a n d — o r i n any other r e g i o n . A l t h o u g h n o N e w E n g l a n d state revised its c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h r e e — C o n n e c t i c u t , M a i n e , a n d R h o d e I s l a n d — d i d draft their i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s d u r i n g the nineteenth century. Massachusetts p r o p o s e d a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n i n 1853 a n d R h o d e Island one i n 1 8 9 8 , a l t h o u g h neither was ratified by the v o ­ ters. M o r e o v e r , the N e w E n g l a n d states d i d a d o p t a significant n u m b e r o f constitutional amendments. T h e n a r r o w focus o f these amendments rarely p r o v i d e d an occasion for d r a w i n g u p o n models f r o m b e y o n d the r e g i o n o r f o r b o r r o w i n g p r o v i s i o n s f r o m other states. H o w e v e r , w h e n R h o d e I s l a n d a d o p t e d its c o n s t i t u t i o n i n 1 8 4 2 , the charter responded, just like others a d o p t e d d u r i n g the era, t o the collapse o f o v e r a m b i t i o u s p u b l i c attempts t o p r o m o t e economic development. I t c o n t a i n e d a debt l i m i t a t i o n , the requirement o f an e x t r a o r d i n a r y m a j o r i t y t o a p p r o p r i a t e funds for l o c a l or private purposes, a n d the requirement o f an i n t e r v e n i n g election before the legislature acted o n a b i l l o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n . These features underscore h o w the era i n w h i c h a c o n s t i t u t i o n is a d o p t e d c r u ­ c i a l l y affects its contents. 1 5 5

1 5 6

The

South

D u r i n g the a n t e b e l l u m era, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development i n the South largely resembled t h a t i n other r e g i o n s . T h e frequency o f c o n s t i t u 1 5 7

This faith in the exercise of public power is reflected in the New England states' involvement in the direction and management of productive enterprise in the late eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century. See Handlin and Handlin, Common­ wealth. It is reflected more generally in the moralistic political culture that reigns in the region. See Elazar, American Federalism; and Elazar, "Principles and Traditions," 18-19. During the nineteenth century, Connecticut adopted twenty-nine amendments, Mas­ sachusetts thirty-six, Maine twenty-nine, Rhode Island sixteen, and Vermont twenty-six. See, in addition to the texts of the constitutions, Tinkle, The Maine State Constitution, 13; and McCarthy, Widening Scope, 15. Rhode Island Constitution of 1842, art. 4, sees. 13, 14, and 17. The leading student of antebellum Southern constitutionalism has concluded, "Per­ haps the outstanding feature of state constitutional development in the slave-holding South was its similarity to such development elsewhere." See D o n E. Fehrenbacher, Sectional Crisis and Southern Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), x v i i . 1 5 4

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t i o n a l change i n the South was n o greater t h a n i n the N o r t h . F r o m 1 8 0 0 t o 1 8 6 0 , the seven e x i s t i n g slaveholding states a d o p t e d nine c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s , w h i l e the ten existing free states a d o p t e d t w e l v e ; a n d o n l y t w o o f the slaveholding states a d m i t t e d d u r i n g the p e r i o d revised their c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s , w h i l e five o f the ten free states t h a t were a d m i t t e d d i d s o . M o r e o v e r , s o u t h e r n a n d n o r t h e r n states generally c o n f r o n t e d the 1 5 8

same c o n s t i t u t i o n a l agenda—suffrage expansion, a p p o r t i o n m e n t , eco­ n o m i c development, e t c . — a n d a d o p t e d m o r e or less the same c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l solutions t o those p r o b l e m s . W h a t m o s t distinguished a n t e b e l l u m southern c o n s t i t u t i o n s was, o f course, their treatment o f slavery; yet this issue was less salient than m i g h t have been expected. The antebellum constitutions o f six southern states— F l o r i d a , L o u i s i a n a , N o r t h C a r o l i n a , South C a r o l i n a , a n d Tennessee— never m e n t i o n e d slavery. M o s t o f those t h a t d i d so s i m p l y b o r r o w e d or adapted p r o v i s i o n s f r o m the M i s s i s s i p p i C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 8 1 7 , w h i c h banned the uncompensated e m a n c i p a t i o n o f slaves, r e q u i r e d t h a t slaves be treated w i t h h u m a n i t y , a n d a u t h o r i z e d the legislature t o b a n the i m ­ p o r t a t i o n o f slaves as merchandise i n t o the s t a t e . I t m a y be t h a t the l i m i t e d a t t e n t i o n t o slavery i n most southern c o n s t i t u t i o n s reflected a lack o f controversy a b o u t the i n s t i t u t i o n . Indeed, i t was precisely i n those states i n w h i c h slavery was c o n t r o v e r s i a l t h a t c o n v e n t i o n delegates p r o ­ v i d e d the strongest c o n s t i t u t i o n a l protections f o r i t . T h u s , V i r g i n i a , whose antislavery western counties were increasing i n p o l i t i c a l power, a n d K e n t u c k y , w h i c h h a d elected antislavery delegates t o its 1792 c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n , i n c l u d e d safeguards f o r slavery i n their constitutions. 1 5 9

1 6 0

A n o t h e r o f t - r e m a r k e d feature o f a n t e b e l l u m s o u t h e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n s was their tendency t o circumscribe the a u t o n o m y a n d a u t h o r i t y o f state

Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 5. Mississippi Constitution of 1817, sec. 6, "Slaves," pars. 1-3. Similar provisions are found in Alabama Constitution of 1819, art. 6, "Slaves," sec. 1; and Arkansas Constitution of 1836, art. 7, "Emancipation of Slaves," sec. 1. The Mississippi Constitution of 1832 banned the interstate slave trade (art. 6, "Slaves," sec. 2). O n the controversy in Kentucky, see Coward, Kentucky in New Republic, 3 6 - 4 5 . The pertinent constitutional provisions are the Kentucky Constitution of 1792, art. 9, and the Kentucky Constitution of 1799, art. 8, sec. 1. The Virginia Constitution of 1851 (art. 3, sees. 19-21) forbade free blacks from remaining in the states for more than a year after obtaining their freedom, under penalty of reenslavement; forbade the legislature from emancipating slaves; and authorized it to restrict or impose conditions on private emancipa­ tions. It is noteworthy that the constitutional defense of slavery in Virginia coincided with changes in apportionment that increased the political influence of non-slave-owning areas and raised concern about the imposition of taxes on slaves. See Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 28. 1 5 8

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governors. C e r t a i n l y there is evidence o f this. N o r t h C a r o l i n a retained legislative selection o f its g o v e r n o r u n t i l 1 8 3 5 , V i r g i n i a u n t i l 1 8 5 2 , a n d South Carolina until I 8 6 0 . N o r t h C a r o l i n a , South C a r o l i n a , Tennes­ see, a n d V i r g i n i a d i d n o t g r a n t t h e i r governors a veto; w h i l e i n A l a b a m a , A r k a n s a s , a n d F l o r i d a , vetoes c o u l d be o v e r r i d d e n by simple majorities i n each h o u s e . Yet n o t a l l southern c o n s t i t u t i o n s encouraged guber­ n a t o r i a l impotence. T h e i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f L o u i s i a n a , M i s s i s s i p p i , a n d Texas a l l p r o v i d e d for p o p u l a r election o f the g o v e r n o r a n d r e q u i r e d a t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y t o override g u b e r n a t o r i a l v e t o e s . In addition, the L o u i s i a n a a n d Texas charters granted the g o v e r n o r the p o w e r t o ap­ p o i n t key officials, w h i l e the M i s s i s s i p p i charter placed n o l i m i t o n guber­ natorial reelection. T h u s , the differences a m o n g southern state c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n s were as great as those between southern a n d n o n s o u t h e r n charters. 1 6 1

1 6 2

1 6 3

1 6 4

1 6 5

C o n s t i t u t i o n a l development i n the South i n the decades f o l l o w i n g the C i v i l War, however, was d r a m a t i c a l l y different f r o m t h a t i n other regions. Eschewing reliance o n their previous charters, the ten southern states t h a t devised n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n s d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n r e p u d i a t e d t h e i r consti­ t u t i o n a l past i n favor o f a n e w perspective a n d frame o f r e f e r e n c e . This was hardly surprising; for the enfranchisement o f African-Americans, the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n o f unregenerate Confederates, a n d boycotts by c o n ­ servative Democrats ensured t h a t insurgent elements d o m i n a t e d the c o n ­ ventions t h a t framed the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n s . These charters guaranteed the rights o f A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s . H o w e v e r , they d i d m u c h 166

1 6 7

See, for example, Fehrenbacher, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 16. 162 N o r t h Carolina Constitution of 1776, art. 15, amended in 1835; Virginia Constitu­ tion of 1830, art. 4, sec. 1, and Virginia Constitution of 1851, art. 5, sec. 2; and South Carolina Constitution of 1790, art. 2, sec. 1. M o r e generally, see Fehrenbacher, Constitu­ tions and Constitutionalism, 16. Alabama Constitution of 1819, art. 4, sec. 16; Arkansas Constitution of 1836, art. 5, sec. 16; and Florida Constitution of 1838, art. 3, sec. 16. Louisiana Constitution of 1812, art. 3, secs. 1 and 20; Mississippi Constitution of 1817, art. 4, secs. 1 and 15; and Texas Constitution of 1845, art. 5, sees. 2 and 17. Louisiana Constitution of 1812, art. 3, sec. 9; and Texas Constitution of 1845, art. 5, sees. 16 and 23. This is not to say that Reconstruction constitution-makers did not retain noncontroversial constitutional provisions from preceding constitutions. See Michael Les Benedict, "The Problem of Constitutionalism and Constitutional Liberty in the Reconstruction South," in Kermit L . H a l l and James W. Ely Jr., eds., An Uncertain Tradition: Constitu­ tionalism and the History of the South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 2 4 1 42. The analysis i n this paragraph, unless otherwise noted, relies on Benedict's article and on Foner, Reconstruction, 316-33. Only i n Virginia and N o r t h Carolina, among states for which the votes were pub­ lished by race, did over 40 percent of registered white voters even cast a ballot in the elections to hold conventions. Benedict, "Problem of Constitutionalism," 232. 1 6 1

1 6 3

1 6 4

1 6 5

1 6 6

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m o r e . T h e y encouraged g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t for economic enterprise a n d substantially e x p a n d e d the scope o f g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i t h p r o ­ visions f o r state-funded p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n , p o o r relief, a n d the establish­ m e n t o f penitentiaries a n d a s y l u m s .

1 6 8

Several conventions l o o k e d o u t ­

side the r e g i o n f o r d i r e c t i o n , r e c o n s t i t u t i n g t a x p o l i c y o n the basis o f a general p r o p e r t y t a x as i n the N o r t h , r e c o n s t r u c t i n g l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t t o dislodge l o c a l oligarchies a l o n g N e w E n g l a n d lines, a n d so o n .

1 6 9

A D e m o c r a t i c newspaper predicted t h a t the r a d i c a l changes i n t r o d u c e d by these R e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d "last just as l o n g as the bay­ onets w h i c h ushered t h e m i n t o being, shall keep t h e m i n existence, a n d n o t one day l o n g e r . "

1 7 0

T h e p r e d i c t i o n p r o v e d accurate, as nine southern

states a d o p t e d n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n s f r o m 1875 t o 1 9 0 2 .

1 7 1

Even after the

c o m p r o m i s e o f 1876 led t o the w i t h d r a w a l o f federal t r o o p s , fears o f federal i n t e r v e n t i o n a n d the presence o f a sizable black electorate delayed direct efforts t o r e i n t r o d u c e w h i t e s u p r e m a c y .

172

N o t until

1890-1902

d i d southern states h o l d conventions whose m a i n purpose was t o disen­ franchise A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n s . Southern conventions o f the 1870s instead focused o n r e o r i e n t i n g the p o l i t i c s o f their states b y rejecting the activist role f o r state g o v e r n m e n t espoused i n R e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n s .

1 7 3

Some o f the stringent restrictions o n g o v e r n m e n t i m p o s e d b y these n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n s , such as bans o n state o r l o c a l a i d t o p r i v a t e enterprises, paralleled those a d o p t e d i n the N o r t h d u r i n g the late nineteenth century. H o w e v e r , s o u t h e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n s w e n t considerably further i n a t t e m p t i n g t o s h r i n k a n d redirect g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y reduced g o v e r n m e n t budgets by m a n d a t i n g extremely l o w t a x rates, c u r t a i l i n g g o v e r n m e n t b o r r o w i n g , and capping expenditures.

174

T h e y also a t t e m p t e d t o l o w e r the cost o f

Illustrative provisions include Alabama Constitution of 1867, art. 4, sec. 34 (poor relief); Louisiana Constitution of 1868, title 7, art. 135 (public education); and Florida Constitution of 1868, art. 1 1 , sees. 1-2 (asylums and penitentiaries). Foner, Reconstruction, 328. Quoted in Foner, Reconstruction, 333. Even prior to their replacement, many white southerners did not accord legitimacy to the Reconstruction constitutions. Although N o r t h Carolina did not adopt a new constitution, it likewise undertook major constitutional changes, adopting eight amendments in 1873 and thirty more, affect­ ing thirty-six separate sections of its constitution, in 1876. See O r t h , North Carolina State Constitution, 1 5 - 1 7 . Some states did seek to circumscribe black political power, albeit indirectly. Faced w i t h black electoral majorities, Democrats in coastal regions of N o r t h Carolina pressed for a constitutional amendment to enable them to regain control of their local governments. The amendment, adopted in 1876, ensured white control by eliminating popular election of county officials, authorizing the state legislature to appoint justices of the peace, who in turn would appoint county commissioners. See Perman, The Road to Redemption, 198-99. The analysis in this paragraph draws particularly upon Perman, The Road to Re­ demption, chap. 9; and M c M i l l a n , Constitutional Development in Alabama, chaps. 11-13. Arkansas, for example, set a tax rate of 1 percent for state government and 0.5 1 6 H

1 6 9

1 7 0

1 7 1

1 7 2

1 7 3

1 7 4

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g o v e r n m e n t by r e d u c i n g the l e n g t h a n d frequency o f legislative sessions a n d b y a b o l i s h i n g offices they deemed unnecessary. Sometimes the e l i m ­ i n a t i o n o f offices served a d u a l purpose: the A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1875 e l i m i n a t e d the state b o a r d o f e d u c a t i o n a n d commissioner o f indus­ t r i a l resources, posts created i n 1868 t o further the key R e c o n s t r u c t i o n goals o f e d u c a t i o n a n d economic d e v e l o p m e n t .

1 7 5

Southern c o n s t i t u t i o n s

o f the 1870s also slashed salaries f o r state offices. Georgia, f o r example, c u t the governor's salary by a quarter; L o u i s i a n a reduced executive sal­ aries b y over 5 0 percent; a n d w h e n a delegate t o the Texas c o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 7 6 a t t e m p t e d t o r i d i c u l e the c a m p a i g n for e c o n o m y i n g o v e r n m e n t by p r o p o s i n g t h a t legislators receive a salary o f t w o dollars per day, his p r o ­ posal was a d o p t e d .

1 7 6

Aside f r o m race, perhaps the m o s t c o n t r o v e r s i a l issue c o n f r o n t i n g s o u t h e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s was state debt, w h i c h h a d g r o w n enor­ m o u s l y d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Some state c o n s t i t u t i o n s f o r t h r i g h t l y re­ p u d i a t e d the debt i n c u r r e d d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . O t h e r states, w h i l e n o t d i r e c t l y endorsing r e p u d i a t i o n , a d o p t e d p r o v i s i o n s e x e m p t i n g the state f r o m c i v i l suit, thereby i m m u n i z i n g themselves i n the event o f a future r e p u d i a t i o n o f state d e b t .

1 7 7

R e p u d i a t i o n was attractive t o state

c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s for several reasons. I t relieved their states f r o m c r u s h i n g financial burdens, s y m b o l i c a l l y renounced the policies t h a t h a d p r o d u c e d those burdens, a n d ensured t h a t investment c a p i t a l w o u l d n o t be available i n the future t o u n d e r w r i t e i n d u s t r i a l e x p a n s i o n , thus b y default r e o r i e n t i n g state economic development i n an a g r a r i a n d i r e c t i o n .

CONCLUSIONS

D u r i n g the nineteenth century, state c o n s t i t u t i o n s became m o r e polished a n d professional, as their framers b u i l t u p o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e x p e r i ­ ence o f t h e i r o w n states a n d developments i n sister states. T h e shape o f the documents a n d their contents also changed. O v e r the course o f the century, state c o n s t i t u t i o n s increasingly became instruments o f g o v e r n ­ m e n t rather t h a n merely f r a m e w o r k s for g o v e r n m e n t . Whereas early state c o n s t i t u t i o n s — a n d the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n — e n g a g e d i n l i t t l e de-

percent for county governments. See Arkansas Constitution of 1874, art. 16, sees. 8-9. Alabama capped the state appropriation for education at one hundred thousand dollars, and constitutional limits on local taxation made it difficult for local governments to supple­ ment it. Alabama Constitution of 1875, art. 10, sec. 7, and art. 12, sec. 5. M c M i l l a n , Constitutional Development in Alabama, 180. The Alabama Constitu­ tion also eliminated the office of lieutenant governor, likewise created by the Alabama Constitution of 1868. Perman, The Road to Redemption, 2 0 5 - 1 0 . See, for example, Arkansas Constitution of 1874, art. 5, sec. 20. 1 7 5

1 7 6

1 7 7

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133

t a i l e d p o l i c y m a k i n g , m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s b y m i d c e n t u r y h a d begun t o specify w h a t state legislatures c o u l d n o t d o a n d h o w they w o u l d c o n ­ d u c t t h e i r business. By the end o f the nineteenth century, restrictions o n state legislatures h a d p r o l i f e r a t e d a n d h a d been supplemented by s i m ­ i l a r l y detailed p r o v i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t , plus a h e a l t h y — o r , according t o twentieth-century constitutional reformers—unhealthy dose o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislation. As a result, m o r e m a j o r issues were resolved by c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s a n d by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l interpreters. T h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f state p o l i t i c s o c c u r r e d i n p a r t because p o ­ l i t i c a l parties a n d interest groups recognized t h a t i f they were b l o c k e d i n the legislature, they c o u l d advance their aims i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arena. T h u s , underrepresented regions i n R h o d e I s l a n d , V i r g i n i a , a n d other states sought c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s , as d i d Granger forces i n I l l i n o i s a n d other states after the C i v i l War. T h e a t t r a c t i o n was n o t merely an alternative f o r u m b u t also a p r o m i s e o f permanency. By e n s h r i n i n g their policies i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , groups h o p e d t o forestall p o l i t i c a l change. T h u s , even after statutes h a d effectively c u r t a i l e d black suffrage i n the South, its opponents still sought t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e black disenfranchisement so t h a t , i n the w o r d s o f Congressman T h o m a s H a r d w i c k , "the N e g r o shall n o t be left a r o u n d the corner, a w a i t i n g the a w a k e n i n g h a n d o f the c o r r u p t i o n i s t whenever d i v i s i o n shall again break the w h i t e ranks." 1 7 8

1 7 9

H o w e v e r , the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f state p o l i t i c s i n v o l v e d m o r e t h a n a search for g r o u p advantage. For c o n s t i t u t i o n a l regulations o f legislative procedures a n d l i m i t a t i o n s o n special legislation, w h i c h accounted f o r m u c h o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g r o w t h , seldom served the agendas o f either p o l i t i c a l p a r t y or o f interest groups. Rather, these p r o v i s i o n s were de­ signed precisely t o l i m i t the influence o f such groups, t o c o m b a t p o l i t i c s as usual, t o change the w a y i n w h i c h p o l i t i c s was c o n d u c t e d a n d the policies t h a t i t p r o d u c e d . K e r m i t H a l l has suggested t h a t the restrictions i n nineteenth-century c o n s t i t u t i o n s reflected an " a n t i g o v e r n m e n t bias," b u t i t m a y be m o r e accurate t o characterize this bias as an o p p o s i t i o n t o a p a r t i c u l a r w a y o f c o n d u c t i n g g o v e r n m e n t rather t h a n t o g o v e r n m e n t per s e . T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n served as the key i n s t i t u t i o n for the c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f state p o l i t i c s . I n the eyes o f the delegates a n d their supporters, these conventions p r o v i d e d the o p p o r t u n i t y t o escape p o l i t i c s as usual a n d pursue the p u b l i c g o o d . Consequently, as James Bryce has n o t e d , the delegates "neither w i s h e d n o r cared t o d r a w a line o f distinc1 8 0

1 7 8

1 7 9

1 8 0

H a l l , "Mostly Anchor." Quoted i n Kousser, Shaping of Southern Politics, 2 2 1 . H a l l , "Mostly Anchor," 405.

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t i o n between w h a t is p r o p e r f o r a c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d w h a t o u g h t t o be left t o be dealt w i t h by the state l e g i s l a t u r e . " F o r i n replacing legislative p o l i c y m a k i n g w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i c y m a k i n g , they believed, they were r e p l a c i n g a p o l i t i c s o f c o r r u p t i o n a n d p a r o c h i a l advantage w i t h a p o l i t i c s o f the p u b l i c interest. Instead o f o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c s penetrating i n t o consti­ t u t i o n m a k i n g , they sought a p e n e t r a t i o n o f the m o r e pristine p o l i t i c s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g i n t o the r e a l m o f legislation. 1 8 1

I t is a mistake t o dismiss these views as s i m p l y self-serving o r naive. T h e p r o b l e m s o f legislative c o r r u p t i o n a n d ill-considered legislation t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s c o n f r o n t e d were quite real p r o b l e m s , p r o b l e m s t h a t the o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c a l process h a d n o t solved a n d m a y i n fact have created. T h u s the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f state p o l i t i c s was appealing be­ cause i t offered the hope o f c i r c u m v e n t i n g the n o r m a l p o l i t i c a l process a n d r e s t r i c t i n g its o p e r a t i o n . T o a large extent, this hope o f c o u n t e r i n g a n d c o n t a i n i n g state legislative excesses was n o t realized. A l t h o u g h the o v e r a l l level o f state legislation d i d fall i n the late nineteenth century f o l l o w i n g a d o p t i o n o f the substantive restrictions o n state legislatures, M o r t o n Keller, a leading h i s t o r i a n o f the era, has c o n c l u d e d t h a t the legis­ latures nonetheless enacted " a n increasing n u m b e r o f laws t h a t t o u c h e d o n i m p o r t a n t areas o f A m e r i c a n social a n d economic l i f e . " A n d ac­ c o r d i n g t o W i l l a r d H u r s t , a l t h o u g h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l restrictions gave " s t r o n g - m i n d e d judges" a w e a p o n f o r c a l l i n g legislators t o account, state legislatures easily c i r c u m v e n t e d m o s t p r o c e d u r a l requirements a n d trans­ f o r m e d at least some substantive l i m i t s , such as bans o n l o c a l legislation, i n t o "matters o f draftsman's f o r m . " T h u s despite the efforts t o r e i n i n legislative power, James Bryce's c o n c l u s i o n at the end o f the nineteenth c e n t u r y echoed Tocqueville's earlier assessment t h a t "the legislature . . . is so m u c h the strongest force i n the several states t h a t w e m a y almost call it the G o v e r n m e n t a n d ignore a l l the other a u t h o r i t i e s . " 1 8 2

1 8 3

1 8 4

T h e v e r d i c t o f t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reformers was even m o r e harsh. A c c o r d i n g t o these reformers, the detailed restrictions a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislation o f late-nineteenth-century state c o n s t i t u t i o n s n o t o n l y failed t o solve the p r o b l e m s o f state g o v e r n m e n t ; they aggra­ v a t e d those p r o b l e m s b y r e d u c i n g legislative d i s c r e t i o n a n d p r e v e n t i n g 181 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 1:394. Keller, Affairs of State, 110-15 and 321. Hurst, Growth of American Law, 234; and James Willard Hurst, Law and Social Order in the United States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 88-97. I n con­ trast, Ernst Freund has suggested that the prohibitions on special legislation and on public aid to private corporate enterprise were "undoubtedly beneficial and probably constitute the most important achievements of American public policy in dealing w i t h private enter­ prise." See Freund, Standards of American Legislation, 174. 184 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, vol. 1, chaps. 40, 4 1 , and 44. 1 8 2 1 8 3

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state governments f r o m responding t o changing c o n d i t i o n s a n d emerging p r o b l e m s . Indeed, by h a m s t r i n g i n g state government, these c o n s t i t u t i o n s encouraged a transfer o f p o w e r t o the federal g o v e r n m e n t , whose very different C o n s t i t u t i o n posed little obstacle t o p o l i c y i n n o v a t i o n . As the n e x t chapter reveals, these attacks, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h other factors, w o u l d lead t o d r a m a t i c changes i n the character o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s .

C H A P T E R

5

Twentieth-Century State Constitutionalism

I F the nineteenth century was the acme o f wholesale state c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g , the t w e n t i e t h century is its nadir. O n l y t w e l v e states revised their c o n s t i t u t i o n s f r o m 1 9 0 1 t o 1 9 9 7 , a l t h o u g h five others d i d a d o p t their first—and o n l y — c o n s t i t u t i o n s d u r i n g the p e r i o d (see table 5 . 1 ) . T h e U n i t e d States Supreme Court's decisions r e q u i r i n g the a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f b o t h houses o f state legislatures o n a "one person, one v o t e " basis spar­ k e d a b u r s t o f a c t i v i t y — f r o m 1965 t o 1 9 7 4 seven states a d o p t e d n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n s — b u t l o n g stretches o f i n a c t i v i t y were far m o r e c o m m o n . F r o m 1 9 2 2 t o 1 9 4 4 , n o state revised its f u n d a m e n t a l law, a n d f r o m 1 9 7 7 t o 1 9 9 7 , o n l y one d i d so. Even i n the decade f o l l o w i n g the Supreme C o u r t ' s r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t r u l i n g s , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reformers enjoyed o n l y m i x e d success. F r o m 1965 t o 1 9 7 4 , voters rejected six c o n s t i t u t i o n s p r o ­ posed by conventions a n d three others s u b m i t t e d by state legislatures. State electorates have been reluctant even t o c o n t e m p l a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n . Whereas i n the nineteenth century states held 144 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions, d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y they have held o n l y sixty-four. O f these, m o r e t h a n a q u a r t e r were p r o m p t e d by the Court's r e a p p o r t i o n ­ m e n t r u l i n g s , five others were necessary t o draft the i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s for n e w states, a n d a significant p r o p o r t i o n o f the rest were l i m i t e d c o n ­ ventions called t o propose amendments rather t h a n t o revise state consti­ t u t i o n s . Voters i n recent years have r e g u l a r l y defeated proposals t o h o l d 1

2

3

4

Altogether, twenty-three state constitutions were adopted in the twentieth century, w i t h Georgia and Louisiana each adopting three and Michigan and Virginia each adopting t w o . Unless otherwise indicated, data on constitution making and constitutional amend­ ment used in this and succeeding paragraphs are drawn from May, "State Constitutions, 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 , " 19, table 1.1. The most important Supreme Court ruling compelling reapportionment of state legis­ latures was Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The states in which constitutions proposed by conventions were rejected include A r ­ kansas (1970), Maryland (1968), New Mexico (1969), New York (1967), N o r t h Dakota (1972), and Rhode Island (1968). States in which constitutions submitted by legislatures were rejected include Idaho (1970), Kentucky (1966), and Oregon (1970). See Sturm, "De­ velopment of State Constitutions," 73. For a study of several constitutional conventions of the period, see Cornwell, Goodman, and Swanson, State Constitutional Conventions. For example, New Hampshire has held eight conventions since 1900, but none was concerned w i t h constitutional revision; until 1964, a constitutional convention was the only authorized means for amending the state constitution. Tennessee has convened five conven1

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TABLE 5.1

State Constitution-Making in the Twentieth Century 1961-1980

1901-1920 Alabama Virginia Oklahoma Michigan Arizona New Mexico Louisiana

1901 1902 1907* 1908 1911* 1911* 1913

1921-1940 Louisiana

1921

1941-1960 Georgia Missouri New Jersey Hawaii Alaska a

Michigan Connectticut Florida Illinois N o r t h Carolina Virginia Montana Louisiana Georgia

1963 1965 1968 1970 1970 1970 1972 1974 1976

1980-1996 Georgia

1982

1945 1945 1947 1950* 1956*

T h e state's initial constitution.

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s . I n fact, the o n l y state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conven­ t i o n o f the last decade was called w i t h o u t voter a p p r o v a l . I n 1992 the L o u i s i a n a legislature designated itself as a c o n v e n t i o n , b u t voters disap­ p r o v e d o f the ploy, o v e r w h e l m i n g l y defeating a l l its proposals at the polls. T h e relative infrequency o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l revision is s o m e w h a t surprising, given the e x t r a o r d i n a r y changes i n A m e r i c a n government and politics d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century, even i f m a n y o f those changes have i n v o l v e d a " b u m p i n g u p " o f issues t o the n a t i o n a l level. I t is likewise surprising i n v i e w o f the sustained efforts o f p o l i t i c a l elites t o p r o m o t e state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m . T h e leading r e f o r m g r o u p , the N a t i o n a l M u ­ 5

6

tions, but these likewise proposed only amendments. Altogether, from 1938 to 1968, twelve of twenty-six conventions were limited conventions. See Sturm, Thirty Years, 5 6 - 6 0 , table 1 1 . From 1950 to 1968 state legislatures proposed twenty-two conventions, but in only eleven instances were the convention calls approved. See Sturm, "Development of State Constitutions," 8 1 ; Sturm, Thirty Years, 5 6 - 6 0 , table 1 1 ; and May, "State Constitutions, 1992-93." The constitutional revision was defeated by a margin of 62 percent to 38 percent. See May, "State Constitutions, 1992-93," 4. 5

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n i c i p a l League, i n a u g u r a t e d a c a m p a i g n for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n 1 9 2 1 , p u b l i s h e d its M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n three years later, and c o n ­ t i n u e d t o c h a m p i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m for over h a l f a c e n t u r y . As the e x p a n s i o n o f federal a u t h o r i t y altered the r e l a t i o n s h i p between n a t i o n a n d state, the league was j o i n e d by other " g o o d g o v e r n m e n t " g r o u p s , w h i c h insisted t h a t the states c o u l d n o t meet the demands o f m o d e r n 7

g o v e r n m e n t w i t h o u t f u n d a m e n t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change, and by state leg­ islatures, w h i c h established c o n s t i t u t i o n a l commissions t o r e c o m m e n d r e f o r m s . Some groups also p r o p o s e d m a j o r s t r u c t u r a l reforms i n state governments t h a t m i g h t have led t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n . B u t despite these efforts, few states i n i t i a t e d comprehensive changes. Instead, other mechanisms for state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t assumed greater i m p o r ­ tance. States e x p a n d e d t h e i r use o f piecemeal a m e n d m e n t t o address c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l p r o b l e m s . I n a d d i t i o n , d u r i n g the latter decades o f the t w e n ­ t i e t h century, p o l i t i c a l activists rediscovered the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e , e m p l o y i n g i t t o restructure a n d c o n s t r a i n state g o v e r n m e n t , as w e l l as t o pursue specific p o l i c y objectives. Finally, b e g i n n i n g i n the 1970s, state c o u r t s assumed a m o r e p r o m i n e n t role i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l develop­ m e n t , r e l y i n g o n state declarations o f rights t o p r o v i d e m o r e expansive p r o t e c t i o n s for rights t h a n were available under the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , a p h e n o m e n o n c o m m o n l y k n o w n as the n e w j u d i c i a l f e d e r a l i s m . 8

9

10

Altogether, the National Municipal League published six versions of its Model State Constitution, w i t h the initial version appearing in 1924 and its revised sixth version in 1968. See A Model State Constitution (New York: National Municipal League, 1924), and Model State Constitution, 6th ed. (New York: National Municipal League, 1968). These model constitutions are discussed later in the chapter. During the 1950s, the key document advocating state constitutional reform was the report of the Kestenbaum Commission: Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, A Report to the President for Transmittal to the Congress (Washington, D.C., June 1955), 3 7 - 3 8 . During the 1960s, state constitutional reform was championed by the Committee for Economic Development in several of its publications: Modernizing Local Government (1966), Modernizing State Government (1967), and A Fiscal Program for a Balanced Feder­ alism (1967). For discussion of the establishment of constitutional commissions and their contributions to reform, see Sturm, Thirty Years, chap. 3. These include the campaigns for reorganization of state executive branches and for the unification of state courts. O n the former, see Arthur E. Buck, The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938); James L . Garnett, Reorganizing State Government: The Executive Branch (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980); and Thomas E. Kynerd, Administrative Reorganization in Mississippi Government: A Study in Politics (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1978), chap. 1. O n the latter, see Berkson and Carbon, Court Unification; and G. Alan Tarr, "The Effect of Court Unifi­ cation on Court Performance: A Preliminary Assessment," judicature 64 (March 1981): 356-68. The literature on the new judicial federalism is vast. Overviews are provided by M a r y Cornelia Porter, "State Supreme Courts and the Warren Court: Some O l d Inquiries for a N e w Situation," in Porter and Tarr, Policymakers; "Developments in the Law—The Inter7

8

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T h i s chapter surveys these developments a n d assesses their i m p l i c a ­ tions f o r state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . I t focuses i n i t i a l l y o n the piecemeal t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s b y amendments a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r o n the e v o l u t i o n d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century o f t w o e n d u r i n g issues i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , the intrastate d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r a n d the r e l a t i o n between the state a n d the economy. N e x t , i t traces the develop­ m e n t o f the n a t i o n a l m o v e m e n t f o r state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m , analyzes the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i s i o n u n d e r l y i n g the reformers' prescriptions, a n d as­ sesses the effects o f t h a t m o v e m e n t o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . I t then de­ scribes a c o m p e t i n g v i s i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d state g o v e r n m e n t t h a t emerged i n the late t w e n t i e t h century a n d its p r o p o n e n t s ' use o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e t o give effect t o t h a t view. Finally, i t traces the emergence o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism i n the 1970s a n d analyzes w h a t this d e v e l o p m e n t suggests a b o u t the character o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m i n the t w e n t i e t h century.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

D u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century, f o r m a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n the states has occurred p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t . M o s t states have amended their c o n s t i t u t i o n s far m o r e frequently d u r i n g the t w e n ­ t i e t h century t h a n i n previous e r a s . A l t h o u g h some amendments have been p r o p o s e d b y conventions a n d others b y i n i t i a t i v e , the vast m a j o r i t y have o r i g i n a t e d i n state legislatures, a n d the r a t i f i c a t i o n rate o f amend­ ments p r o p o s e d b y state legislatures has far surpassed t h a t o f c o n s t i t u 11

pretation of State Constitutional Rights," Harvard Law Review 95 (April 1982): 1 3 2 4 1502; Ronald K . L . Collins, Peter J. Galie, and John Kincaid, "State H i g h Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation since 1980: A Judicial Survey," Publius 16 (summer 1986): 141-62; and Tarr, "Past and Future." Comprehensive data on the amendment of state constitutions during the nineteenth century has yet to be compiled, but the comments of observers and studies o f individual states confirm the increase i n amendment during the twentieth century. Writing in 1910, Walter F. D o d d observed that "[t]he proposal of numerous constitutional amendments has been to a large extent a development of the past twenty years, but the amending process has been used most frequently during the last decade" (see his Revision and Amendment, 269 and—for supporting data—268-70). Studies of individual states also document the i n ­ creasing reliance on constitutional amendment. I n N o r t h Carolina, for example, there were only four proposed amendments to the state's constitution during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and one of those failed of adoption ( O r t h , North Carolina State Consti­ tution, 17). I n Connecticut from 1818 to 1913, there were thirty-five amendments; i n Maine from 1849 to 1912, twenty-eight; and in Rhode Island from 1854 to 1911, sixteen (McCarthy, Widening Scope, 15). O f course, given the diversity of the states, there are a few exceptions. For example, Vermont ratified twenty-six amendments prior to 1900 but only twenty-four during the twentieth century ( H i l l , The Vermont State Constitution, 2 2 - 2 3 ) . 1 1

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t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e s . F r o m 1 9 7 0 t o 1 9 9 3 , for e x a m p l e , voters overall ap­ p r o v e d 68 percent o f 4 , 2 8 4 p r o p o s e d amendments, b u t o n l y 39 percent of the eighty-six c o n s t i t u t i o n a l initiatives p u t f o r t h i n twelve states d u r i n g the p e r i o d . A s the c e n t u r y has progressed, the pace o f state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t has q u i c k e n e d . As o f 1 9 4 5 , o n l y ten states h a d aver­ aged at least one a m e n d m e n t per year since a d o p t i n g their c u r r e n t consti­ t u t i o n s . B u t by 1 9 6 0 , fifteen states h a d done so; by 1 9 7 5 , despite a spate of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l revision, t w e n t y had; a n d by 1 9 9 0 , t w e n t y - e i g h t . Data f r o m i n d i v i d u a l states c o n f i r m the t r e n d . F r o m 1 9 0 0 t o 1 9 5 0 , N e b r a s k a ratified o n l y fifty-nine amendments; b u t f r o m 1 9 5 0 t o 1 9 9 0 , i t ratified 134. F r o m 1912 t o 1 9 6 9 , N e w M e x i c o a d o p t e d seventy-three amend­ ments, b u t f r o m 1969 t o 1 9 9 5 , n i n e t y - e i g h t . F r o m 1877 to 1945, a m e n d m e n t - p r o n e Georgia a d o p t e d 3 0 1 amendments, b u t f r o m 1946 t o 1 9 8 2 , 1 , 1 7 4 . A l s o increasing over t i m e has been the r a t i f i c a t i o n rate for p r o p o s e d amendments. For e x a m p l e , N e w M e x i c o ratified o n l y 35 per­ cent o f p r o p o s e d amendments f r o m 1 9 1 2 t o 1945 b u t 65 percent thereaf­ t e r . A n d i n M i s s i s s i p p i voters a p p r o v e d 65 percent o f amendments f r o m 1 8 9 0 t o 1 9 6 0 b u t 9 1 percent t h e r e a f t e r . 12

1 3

1 4

15

1 6

17

1 8

1 9

20

T w o states developed other mechanisms for the proposal of constitutional amend­ ments. For most of the nineteenth century in Vermont, amendments were proposed by the Council of Censors (Hill, The Vermont State Constitution, 12-18). The Florida Constitu­ tion of 1969 authorized the constitutional commission it created to submit proposals di­ rectly to the people for ratification (see Florida Constitution of 1969, art. 9, sec. 2). For discussion of this feature, see Talbot D'Alemberte, The Florida State Constitution: A Refer­ ence Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), 146-47. Book of the States 1980-81 (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1980), 3, table B; and David B. Magleby, "Direct Legislation in the American States," in Butler and Ranney, Referendums around the World, 2 5 1 , table 7-5. The 39 percent adoption rate for constitutional initiatives from 1970 to 1993 is actually unusually high; the overall rate from 1898 to 1992 is 36 percent. See David B. Magleby, "Let the Voters Decide? A n Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process," University of Colorado Law Review 66 (1995): 26, table 2. One scholar has estimated that from 1900 to 1935, about twenty-five hundred amendments were submitted and about fifteen hundred ratified. See Charles C. Rohlfing, "Amendment and Revision of State Constitutions," Annals of the American Academy of Folitical and Social Science 181 (September 1935): 180-87. I n comparison, data from 1970 to 1993 reveal that 4,284 amendments were proposed and 2,900 approved. See May, "State Constitutions, 1992-93," 2, table A . These figures were computed from data in the Book of the States (Chicago: Council of State Governments, various years). These volumes also provide data on the number of amendments proposed and adopted in each biennium. M i e w a l d and Longo, The Nebraska State Constitution, 22, table 1. Chuck Smith, The New Mexico Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), 15-24. H i l l , The Georgia State Constitution, 11 and 2 1 , table 1. Smith, New Mexico State Constitution, 1 6 - 2 3 . See Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution, 14, table 1. 1 2

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Politics

As r e p o r t e d i n chapter 2 , the frequency w i t h w h i c h state c o n s t i t u t i o n s are amended is correlated w i t h their l e n g t h a n d w i t h t h e i r ease o f amend­ m e n t . T h i s finding is consistent w i t h the expectations o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reformers, w h o have a t t r i b u t e d the increased reliance o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t t o the deficiencies o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . According to these reformers, the decision o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s i n the late nine­ teenth century t o b u r d e n their state charters w i t h detailed prescriptions a n d p r o s c r i p t i o n s n o t o n l y lengthened the c o n s t i t u t i o n s b u t also, by b u i l d i n g r i g i d i t i e s i n t o the documents, l i m i t e d the states' capacity t o a d a p t t o c h a n g i n g situations o r address emerging p r o b l e m s . T h e states have therefore been o b l i g e d t o alter their c o n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t i n u a l l y merely i n order t o g o v e r n . Oftentimes, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g i d i t i e s i n a few key areas have r e q u i r e d repeated a t t e n t i o n , because amendments solved i m ­ mediate p r o b l e m s w i t h o u t addressing the u n d e r l y i n g deficiencies. For example, N e w Y o r k a d o p t e d eight amendments t o its j u d i c i a l article f r o m 1 9 6 7 t o 1 9 9 0 , w h i l e t h i r t e e n o f the s i x t y - s i x amendments t o the West V i r g i n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n have been a d o p t e d s i m p l y t o a u t h o r i z e the state t o sell b o n d s . Certainly, the m o s t heavily amended sections o f state consti­ t u t i o n s are those whose restrictions are the m o s t severe. F r o m 1 9 7 0 t o 1 9 9 3 , f o r e x a m p l e , state p r o v i s i o n s dealing w i t h finance a n d t a x a t i o n — n o t o r i o u s f o r t h e i r detail a n d restrictiveness—were the m o s t heavily amended p r o v i s i o n s i n every b i e n n i u m b u t o n e . 21

2 2

23

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2 5

For a representative presentation of the reform critique, see Wheeler, Salient Issues. The connection between ease of amendment and frequency of amendment also figures in here. Throughout the twentieth century states have undertaken to ease requirements for constitutional amendment, either by adopting amendment by initiative or simplifying the process of legislative proposal. As one commentator noted in 1935: " I t is highly significant that of the seven constitutions adopted since 1907, all have abandoned the time-consuming requirement that amendments must be approved by t w o successive legislatures, and five of the seven permit amendments to be initiated by petition." See Rohlfing, "Amendment and Revision," 183. As Frank Grad has observed, "Whenever a narrowly limiting provision is amended by adding an exception to the limitation, the general scope of the provision is likely to become even more narrowly limited in that the stated exception may be taken by implication to disallow other exceptions not expressly stated. Every detailed constitution thus develops certain sore points, which become the foci for veritable clusters of constitutional amend­ ments" (Grad, "The State Constitution," 4 4 - 4 5 ) . Galie, New York State Constitution, 29; and Bastress, The West Virginia Constitu­ tion, 2 1 . Book of the States, various years. The sole exception was 1986-87, in which amend­ ments to finance and taxation provisions ranked second behind amendments to legislative articles. See May, "State Constitutions, 1 9 9 2 - 9 3 , " 7, table B. The connection between detail and frequency of amendment is particularly strong even when finance and taxation 2 1

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T h u s , m o s t t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y amendments have facilitated the opera­ t i o n o f state governments, m a k i n g adjustments i n an existing b o d y o f l a w r a t h e r t h a n i n t r o d u c i n g g r a n d c h a n g e s . Seldom has this process o f c o n ­ t i n u i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l adjustment excited m u c h p u b l i c interest—one ob­ server described voters as " m i l i t a n t l y i n d i f f e r e n t " t o such c h a n g e s . Yet legislators and g o v e r n m e n t a l officials have been a n y t h i n g b u t indifferent, because these amendments c o u l d c r u c i a l l y affect their p o s i t i o n s , p o w e r s , a n d prospects. As a result, a m e n d m e n t p o l i t i c s has t y p i c a l l y been a " p o ­ l i t i c a l i n s i d e r " p o l i t i c s . State legislatures have usually p r o p o s e d a m e n d ­ ments n o t i n response t o a p u b l i c o u t c r y b u t because o f p r o b l e m s i d e n t i ­ fied i n the course o f g o v e r n i n g . Even i n p o l i t i c a l l y c o m p e t i t i v e states, p r o p o s e d amendments have often enjoyed b i p a r t i s a n s u p p o r t . Voters have sometimes i g n o r e d the p r o p o s e d amendments or o n occasion have v o t e d against a set o f amendments because o f o p p o s i t i o n t o a single c o n ­ t r o v e r s i a l p r o p o s a l . Nevertheless, given the infrequency o f organized op­ p o s i t i o n t o amendments p r o p o s e d by state legislatures, a b o u t 70 percent o f t h e m are ratified, albeit often by a small percentage o f the p o t e n t i a l electorate. 26

27

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30

Some states have resorted t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments for m o r e t h a n t u n i n g up the m a c h i n e r y o f g o v e r n m e n t . C a l i f o r n i a , Georgia, and L o u i s i ­ ana i n p a r t i c u l a r have chosen t o shift m a n y o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c a l disputes t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e a l m , using c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t as legislation by other means. Indeed, a c c o r d i n g t o one c o m m e n t a t o r , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t i n L o u i s i a n a is "sufficiently c o n t i n u o u s t o justify i n c l u d i n g i t are not the prime target of amendments. In New York, for example, where amendments have focused on the judiciary, the judicial article comprises about one-fourth of the N e w York Constitution. See Gerald Benjamin and Melissa Cusa, "Constitutional Amendment through the Legislature in New Y o r k , " in Tarr, Constitutional Politics in States, 65. Another common form of legislative adjustment is the removal of deadwood from the state constitution. This can occur through constitutional amendment or through constitu­ tional revision. For examples of the former, see Francis H . Heller, The Kansas State Consti­ tution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), 35; Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution, 25; and May, Texas Constitutional Revision Experience, 4. For an example of the latter, see Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, 17-18. May, Texas Constitutional Revision Experience, 183. Illustrative of the process is how states deal w i t h amendments affecting a single juris­ diction, so-called local amendments. In Georgia, the legislature automatically adopted pro­ posed local amendments if they were supported by legislators from the locality, a form of "legislative courtesy," a process that greatly facilitated constitutional adjustments. From 1946 to 1982, 974 of the 1,174 amendments to the Georgia Constitution were local amend­ ments. See H i l l , The Georgia State Constitution, 2 1 - 2 2 . For an enlightening study of the way one legislature separates the proposed amend­ ments it supports from those it does not, see Benjamin and Cusa, "Constitutional Amend­ ment," 4 7 - 7 0 . May, "State Constitutions, 1992-93," 2, table A. 2 6

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w i t h M a r d i Gras, f o o t b a l l , a n d c o r r u p t i o n as one o f the p r e m i e r c o m p o ­ nents o f state c u l t u r e . " I n some instances states have o p t e d t o a m e n d their c o n s t i t u t i o n s because i t was easier t h a n legislating. I n G e o r g i a , the practice o f legislative courtesy encouraged the a d o p t i o n o f l o c a l amend­ ments, whereas legislation affecting a l o c a l i t y r a n the risk o f guber­ n a t o r i a l v e t o . A n d i n I d a h o , creating exceptions by a m e n d m e n t t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s debt l i m i t a t i o n s o n l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t p r o v e d easier t h a n meeting the p r o v i s i o n ' s s u p e r m a j o r i t y r e q u i r e m e n t f o r i n c u r r i n g d e b t . I n other instances interest groups a n d factions w i t h i n the legislature have c h a m p i o n e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments t o enshrine p o l i c y decisions i n the f u n d a m e n t a l l a w , h o p i n g thereby t o m a k e i t m o r e difficult f o r t h e m t o be o v e r t u r n e d . ( O f course, i f e n s h r i n i n g p o l i c y b y a m e n d m e n t was n o t d i f f i c u l t — a n d h i g h - a m e n d m e n t states seldom impose d e m a n d i n g re­ quirements f o r a m e n d m e n t — t h e n u n e n s h r i n i n g i t s h o u l d be n o m o r e dif­ ficult.) Even state legislatures less p r o n e t o a m e n d m e n t have sometimes referred c o n t e n t i o u s issues t o the electorate. Finally, i n some states the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f amendments has established c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t as an accepted p o l i t i c a l o p t i o n , thereby p r o m o t i n g further amendments. 3 1

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W h e t h e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments enable states t o m a k e the neces­ sary adjustments f o r effective g o v e r n m e n t depends o n the willingness o f voters t o endorse the p r o p o s e d adjustments. W h e n such adjustments have been rejected, there has been a tendency t o r e i n t r o d u c e t h e m , i n the hope t h a t they w o u l d be a d o p t e d the second t i m e a r o u n d . T h i s tactic has often succeeded. I n M i s s i s s i p p i , for example, t w e l v e o f the t h i r t y amend­ ments rejected f r o m 1 8 9 0 t o 1 9 9 0 were r e s u b m i t t e d a n d r a t i f i e d . B u t resubmission has n o t always w o r k e d . For example, since 1 9 2 0 , N e b r a s k a voters have rejected t h i r t e e n p r o p o s e d amendments t h a t w o u l d have 3 5

Carleton, "Elitism Sustained," 560. Other commentators have described New York's use of amendment as "integrated into the overall political process more fully and explicitly than in other states." See Cornwell, Goodman, and Swanson, State Constitutional Conven­ tions, 20. H i l l , The Georgia State Constitution, 22. This situation changed with the adoption of the 1983 constitution. Michael C. Moore, "Constitutional Debt Limitations on Local Government in Idaho—Article 8, Section 3, Idaho Constitution," Idaho Law Review 17 (fall 1980): 5 5 85. See also Crowley and Heffron, The Idaho State Constitution, 169-74. Friedman, History of American Law, 118-19; and Carleton, "Elitism Sustained," 561. It is thus hardly coincidental that Lewis Froman found a correlation between interest group strength and the number of amendments proposed and adopted. Lewis A. Froman Jr., "Some Effects of Interest Group Strength in State Politics," American Political Science Review 60 (December 1966): 952-62. Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution, 14. For a detailed listing of submissions and resubmissions in one state over three decades, see James K. Pollock, The Initiative and Referendum in Michigan (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1940), 78-86, appen­ dix 3. 3 1

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raised the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y prescribed salary f o r state l e g i s l a t o r s . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , voters p e r i o d i c a l l y have rejected n o t merely a p a r t i c u l a r a m e n d m e n t b u t the entire p a t t e r n o f adjustment-by-amendment o n w h i c h the system rested. W h e n t h a t has o c c u r r e d , i t has o b l i g e d state legislators t o s u m m o n conventions t o undertake m o r e systematic r e f o r m . T h u s , i n L o u i s i a n a , the legislature called the c o n v e n t i o n o f 1972 after voters rejected a l l fifty-three p r o p o s e d amendments i n 1 9 7 0 a n d t h i r t y six o f f o r t y - t w o p r o p o s e d amendments i n 1 9 7 2 . I n Georgia, c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l r e v i s i o n resulted i n p a r t f r o m the voters' defeat o f 118 o f 133 amendments i n 1 9 7 8 . 36

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Issues

in State Constitutional

Politics

P r i o r chapters have d o c u m e n t e d t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c s involves n o t o n l y issues specific t o p a r t i c u l a r states a n d periods b u t also e n d u r i n g concerns such as the intrastate d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l power, the rela­ t i o n o f the state t o the economy, a n d the scope o f state g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s section examines state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l controversies over the

intrastate

d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r a n d over the r e l a t i o n o f the state t o the economy, n o t i n g b o t h the concern for p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e a n d the i n t e r p l a y o f c o m p e t i n g interests. A later section o n t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l r e f o r m describes the c o n t i n u i n g debate over the scope o f state gov­ ernment. THE INTRASTATE DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL POWER T o some extent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change d u r i n g the early t w e n t i e t h cen­ t u r y c o n t i n u e d a n d c o m p l e t e d developments begun i n the preceding cen­ t u r y . F o r example, the A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 9 0 1 a n d the V i r g i n i a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 9 0 2 represented the c u l m i n a t i o n o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l phase o f southern efforts t o reestablish w h i t e supremacy i n the a f t e r m a t h o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . O t h e r Southern states amended their c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n the early t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y t o disenfranchise blacks a n d some p o o r w h i t e s — N o r t h C a r o l i n a , f o r example, a d o p t e d amendments i n s t i t u t i n g a literacy test ( w i t h a grandfather clause) a n d a p o l l t a x . O n a happier note, the campaigns f o r w o m e n ' s suffrage begun i n the western states spread eastward a n d enjoyed increasing success. A l t h o u g h t w e l v e states 39

4 0

Miewald and Longo, The Nebraska State Constitution, 22. Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, 16. H i l l , The Georgia State Constitution, 19. M c M i l l a n , Constitutional Development in Alabama; and Ralph Chipman McDaniel, The Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901-1902 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1928). Orth, North Carolina State Constitution, 18. 3 6

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rejected suffrage amendments d u r i n g the first t w o decades o f the century, twelve a d o p t e d amendments establishing w o m e n ' s suffrage p r i o r t o 1 9 2 0 , i n c l u d i n g eight t h a t h a d p r e v i o u s l y rejected i t . T h i r t e e n m o r e en­ acted w o m e n ' s suffrage b y statute, several i n response t o the failure o f a m e n d m e n t e f f o r t s . W i t h the r a t i f i c a t i o n o f the N i n e t e e n t h A m e n d ­ m e n t i n 1 9 2 0 , the franchise issue disappeared f r o m state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l agendas a n d d i d n o t reemerge u n t i l the 1960s. B o t h the absence o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n for m u c h o f the c e n t u r y a n d the flurry o f a c t i v i t y f o l l o w i n g the Supreme Court's r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t r u l ­ ings testify t o c o n t i n u i n g conflicts over the intrastate d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r . For the m o s t p a r t , these conflicts i n v o l v e d a c o m p e t i t i o n for advantage rather t h a n a clash o f p r i n c i p l e s . I n the late nineteenth a n d early t w e n t i e t h centuries, r u r a l interests a n d a n t i m a c h i n e forces c o m ­ b i n e d t o reduce the use o f p o p u l a t i o n as a basis f o r a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f state legislatures a n d t o diffuse representation t h r o u g h o u t the s t a t e s . O n e a p p r o a c h , pioneered by D e l a w a r e , was t o specify legislative districts i n d e t a i l i n the state c o n s t i t u t i o n , w i t h n o p r o v i s i o n for r e a p p o r t i o n ­ m e n t . A n o t h e r , e m p l o y e d i n several other states, was t o reconstruct the upper house a l o n g the lines o f the U.S. Senate, i n t r o d u c i n g equal repre­ sentation f o r geographic u n i t s , a l t h o u g h occasionally w i t h m i n o r m o d ­ ifications for p o p u l a t i o n disparities. U r b a n i z a t i o n a n d shifts i n p o p u l a ­ t i o n subsequently m a g n i f i e d the i n i t i a l disparities created by these changes. Once the a p p o r t i o n m e n t f o r m u l a s were established, however, concern a b o u t l o s i n g p o w e r led legislators f r o m r u r a l areas t o oppose c o n v e n t i o n calls, lest their d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e representation i n state legis­ latures be threatened. F o r example, i n 1 9 3 6 i n R h o d e I s l a n d , t h o u g h the D e m o c r a t i c Party h a d made a c o n v e n t i o n a " p r i m e p a r t y objective," D e m o c r a t i c senators f r o m several c o u n t r y t o w n s s t r o n g l y resisted a c o n ­ v e n t i o n b i l l . I n N e w Jersey, efforts at c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m stalled f o r three decades because o f disagreement a b o u t the a p p o r t i o n m e n t issue, a n d t a b l i n g the issue was the price exacted for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n i n 1947. I n some states d e t e r m i n e d citizens were able t o force reappor41

4 2

43

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Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, ed., One Woman, One Vote: Rediscovering the Woman Suffrage Movement (Troutdale, Ore.: NewSage Press, 1995), 375-77, appendix 1. For useful general discussions, see Dixon, Democratic Representation, 82-89; and Robert B. McKay, Reapportionment: The Law and Politics of Equal Representation (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1965), 460-75. For useful case studies of this phenomenon, see Henretta, "Rise and Decline"; and McCormick, From Realignment to Reform. This topic is also addressed i n chapter 4. Dealey, Growth of State Constitutions, 97. Hurst, Growth of American Law, 239. See Richard J. Connors, The Process of Constitutional Revision in New Jersey: 19401947 (New York: National Municipal League, 1970); and Richard N . Baisden, Charter for 4 1

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t i o n m e n t , b u t even t h e n legislators usually l i m i t e d r e d i s t r i c t i n g t o mar­ g i n a l shifts i n seats, w h i l e b l o c k i n g an o v e r a l l r e a l l o c a t i o n . Even w h e n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s m a n d a t e d representation o n the basis o f p o p u l a t i o n , some states s i m p l y i g n o r e d requirements t o r e a p p o r t i o n . As o f 1 9 6 0 , twelve state senates a n d t w e l v e l o w e r houses h a d n o t been reap­ p o r t i o n e d f o r over t h i r t y years, w i t h the A l a b a m a a n d Tennessee legisla­ tures unchanged since 1 9 0 1 . Yet n o t a l l deviations f r o m "one person, one v o t e " reflected legislative resistance o r obsolescent a p p o r t i o n m e n t f o r m u l a s . Between 1 9 5 2 a n d 1 9 6 2 , M i c h i g a n , C a l i f o r n i a , W a s h i n g t o n , a n d C o l o r a d o a l l rejected initiatives t h a t w o u l d have increased the i n f l u ­ ence o f p o p u l a t i o n o n the a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f their upper h o u s e s . These outcomes suggest t h a t sometimes m o r e t h a n the self-interest o f w e l l placed m i n o r i t i e s s u p p o r t e d the states' decision t o give d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e representation t o r u r a l areas. T h e U.S. Supreme Court's r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t r u l i n g s r e q u i r e d f o r t y - s i x states t o redistrict, a b a n d o n i n g their c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l requirements o f geographic representation a n d other m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f the p o p u l a t i o n p r i n c i p l e , i n order t o c o m p l y w i t h the Court's stan­ dard. D u r i n g the 1960s a n d 1970s, Supreme C o u r t r u l i n g s a n d c o n ­ gressional legislation i n v a l i d a t i n g other state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l regulations o f the franchise, such as extended-residency requirements, p o l l taxes, a n d literacy tests, further d i m i n i s h e d state c o n t r o l over the intrastate d i s t r i b u ­ tion of political power. Federal i n t e r v e n t i o n d i d n o t i m m e d i a t e l y end disputes over the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l power, b u t i t d i d t r a n s f o r m t h e m . A p p o r t i o n m e n t p o l i t i c s n o longer i n v o l v e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i ­ sions o r c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i t i c a l principles. Instead, freed f r o m the need t o respect geographic or p o l i t i c a l boundaries by the Court's insistence o n i n t e r d i s t r i c t equality i n p o p u l a t i o n , i t shifted t o a s u b c o n s t i t u t i o n a l search for partisan o r g r o u p advantage t h r o u g h the a r t f u l c r e a t i o n o f legislative districts. Yet the Supreme C o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t these d i s t r i c t i n g decisions likewise were subject t o federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l scrutiny, inter­ v e n i n g t o invalidate partisan g e r r y m a n d e r i n g a n d race-conscious d i s t r i c t 47

4 8

49

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5 1

New; Jersey: The New Jersey Constitutional Convention of 1947 (Trenton: N e w Jersey Department of Education, 1952). O n the limited character of most of reapportionments prior to the 1960s, see Baker, State Constitutions, 16-17. D i x o n , Democratic Representation, 84. D i x o n , Democratic Representation, 89-90. Leroy Hardy, Alan Heslop, and Stuart Anderson, "Introduction," i n Hardy, Heslop, and Anderson, eds., Reapportionment Politics: The History of Redistricting in the 50 States (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981), 19. O n residency requirements, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), which in­ validated article 4, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution; on poll taxes for voting i n state elections, see Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); and on literacy tests, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 4 7

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By century's end, the federalization o f v o t i n g qualifications a n d

j u d i c i a l supervision o f a p p o r t i o n m e n t h a d i n effect eclipsed the intrastate d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r as an i m p o r t a n t issue i n state c o n s t i t u ­ tional politics.

5 3

STATE AND ECONOMY Some t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s dealing w i t h eco­ n o m i c concerns reflect the success o f interest groups seeking benefits or advantages, w h i l e others reflect an a t t e m p t t o serve the economic needs o f a l l state residents a n d t o o r i e n t the state t o w a r d a p a r t i c u l a r v i e w o f the p u b l i c interest. T h e d i s t r i b u t i v e policies b u i l t i n t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n s differ little i n t h e i r substance or p o l i t i c a l origins f r o m those f o u n d i n state statutes; they reflect the state-enforced p o w e r o f groups seeking eco­ n o m i c a d v a n t a g e . These c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d statutes have t a k e n m a n y f o r m s , r a n g i n g f r o m Louisiana's guarantee o f c o m p e n s a t i o n for l a n d ­ o w n e r s o n whose p r o p e r t y levees were constructed t o p r o t e c t t h e m , t o Alabama's amendments p r o m o t i n g development o f the c o t t o n , g r a i n , a n d catfish industries, t o N e w M e x i c o ' s p r o p e r t y t a x e x e m p t i o n s for heads o f families a n d for v e t e r a n s . T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f g r o u p economic interests was designed t o place t h e m b e y o n d the reach n o t o n l y o f i n c o n ­ stant legislators b u t also o f state judges. T h i s was an i m p o r t a n t consider­ a t i o n because state courts c o n t i n u e d t o i n v a l i d a t e state economic legisla­ t i o n o n due-process a n d e q u a l - p r o t e c t i o n g r o u n d s , even after federal courts a b a n d o n e d their supervision o f economic l e g i s l a t i o n . H o w e v e r , g r o u p s ' use o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t t o p r o t e c t their interests c o u l d also be i n t e r p r e t e d , at least i n p a r t , as a testament t o the success o f p r o v i ­ sions p r o h i b i t i n g legislators f r o m c o n f e r r i n g special advantages. C o n s t i ­ t u t i o n a l bans o n special legislation, o n state investment i n p r i v a t e c o n ­ 54

55

56

cerns, a n d o n g r a n t i n g the credit o f the state t o p r i v a t e entities m a y have o b l i g e d economic groups t o pursue their interests via c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); and Miller v. Johnson, 513 U.S. 1071 (1995). But see Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 610 A.2d 153 (Conn. 1992). John A. Hetherington, "State Economic Regulations and Substantive Due Process of Law," Northwestern University Law Review 53 (1979): 248-49. Louisiana Constitution, art. 14, sec. 32; Alabama Constitution, amendments 388, 453, and 492; and New Mexico Constitution, art. 8, sec. 5. Peter J. Galie, "State Courts and Economic Rights," Annals of the American Acad­ emy of Political and Social Science 496 (March 1988): 76-87; James C. Kirby Jr., "Expan­ sive Judicial Review of Economic Regulations under State Constitutions," in Bradley McGraw, ed., Developments in State Constitutional Law (St. Paul: West, 1985); and Susan P. Fino, "Remnants of the Past: Economic Due Process in the States," in Friedelbaum, Human Rights. 5 2

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Some state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s reflect a broader concern f o r the p r o p e r o p e r a t i o n o f the e c o n o m y a n d f o r the economic w e l l - b e i n g o f the state's i n h a b i t a n t s . As chapter 4 has s h o w n , d u r i n g the late nineteenth century, i t was w i d e l y believed t h a t the m a i n t h r e a t t o this w e l l - b e i n g was the p o w e r o f r a i l r o a d s a n d other large c o r p o r a t i o n s . T h i s concern c a r r i e d over i n t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f the Progressive E r a . T h e m o s t s t r i k i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n o f this was the set o f amendments a d o p t e d i n C a l i f o r n i a i n 1 9 1 1 t h a t established a r a i l r o a d c o m m i s s i o n t o regulate a l l p u b l i c u t i l ­ ities, revised the t a x system t o shift m o r e o f the b u r d e n t o c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d banks, a n d p r o v i d e d f o r e m p l o y e r s ' l i a b i l i t y , a m i n i m u m wage, a n d enhanced p o w e r s o f eminent d o m a i n . Provisions a d o p t e d d u r i n g the same p e r i o d i n other states also emphasized the p r o t e c t i o n o f w o r k e r s f r o m e x p l o i t a t i o n . T h u s , I d a h o i n 1 9 0 2 amended its c o n s t i t u t i o n t o re­ q u i r e the legislature t o enact laws p r o t e c t i n g the h e a l t h a n d safety o f w o r k e r s i n factories a n d mines; M o n t a n a i n 1 9 0 4 p r o h i b i t e d e m p l o y ­ m e n t o f c h i l d r e n i n mines a n d prescribed an e i g h t - h o u r day f o r miners; a n d W y o m i n g i n 1 9 1 4 established a W o r k i n g m e n ' s C o m p e n s a t i o n State F u n d . T h e concern f o r p r o t e c t i n g w o r k e r s surfaced again d u r i n g the N e w D e a l . I n 1 9 3 8 , s h o r t l y after the passage o f the W a g n e r A c t , N e w Y o r k added t o its d e c l a r a t i o n o f r i g h t s a " b i l l o f rights f o r l a b o r , " constit u t i o n a l i z i n g p r e e x i s t i n g s t a t u t o r y policies establishing a r i g h t t o orga­ nize a n d b a r g a i n collectively a n d fixing m a x i m u m h o u r s a n d guarantee­ i n g p r e v a i l i n g wages f o r p u b l i c e m p l o y e e s . B y 1 9 5 0 b o t h N e w Jersey a n d H a w a i i h a d f o l l o w e d N e w Y o r k ' s lead i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g the r i g h t t o b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y . H o w e v e r , other states d u r i n g the p o s t w a r era 5 7

5 8

59

60

See Dealey, Growth of State Constitutions, 107-8; Spencer C. Olin Jr., California's Prodigal Sons: Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911-1917 (Berkeley and Los A n ­ geles: University of California Press, 1968), 12-17; and Grodin, Massey, and Cunningham, The California State Constitution, 16-18. The railroad commission replaced an earlier commission that had been co-opted by the Southern Pacific Railroad; see George E. M o w r y , The California Progressives (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1951), 18. For discussion of parallel developments i n other states, see Hurst, Growth of American Law, 2 4 0 - 4 6 . For the Idaho amendment, see Idaho Constitution, art. 13, sec. 2; and for background on its development, see Crowley and Heffron, The Idaho State Constitution, 2 1 8 - 1 9 . For the Montana amendments, see Montana Constitution, art. 18. For the Wyoming amend­ ment, see Wyoming Constitution, art. 10, sec. 4; and for background on its development, see Keiter and Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution, 193-96. For a survey of state provisions affecting labor, see McCarthy, Widening Scope, 106. N e w York Constitution, art. 1, sec. 17. For elaboration of the origins and significance of these provisions, see Galie, New York State Constitution, 63-65. Earlier New York had safeguarded the right to damages for wrongful death and overrode a judicial ruling prevent­ ing the establishment of a system of workers compensation. See N e w York Constitution, art. 1, sees. 16 and 18, the latter overruling Ives v. South Buffalo Railroad Co., 94 N . E . 431 (N.Y. 1911). N e w Jersey Constitution, art. 1, sec. 19; and Hawaii Constitution, art. 13, sec. 1. 5 7

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v i e w e d the a p p r o p r i a t e balance between management a n d l a b o r quite differently. F l o r i d a a n d M i s s o u r i balanced their r e c o g n i t i o n o f the r i g h t t o organize w i t h a r e c o g n i t i o n o f the " r i g h t t o w o r k , " w h i l e A r i z o n a , Arkansas, a n d South D a k o t a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the r i g h t t o w o r k b u t d i d n o t m e n t i o n collective b a r g a i n i n g . 61

A l t h o u g h some early state provisions c o u l d be construed as recogniz­ i n g a p u b l i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for aspects o f social welfare, N e w Y o r k p i ­ oneered i n this field by c o m m i t t i n g itself e x p l i c i t l y t o p r o v i d i n g for the social welfare o f its r e s i d e n t s . I n 1938 i t a d o p t e d a set o f five amend­ ments recognizing t h a t "the a i d , care a n d s u p p o r t o f the needy," "the p r o t e c t i o n a n d p r o m o t i o n o f the health o f the i n h a b i t a n t s o f the state," a n d "the care a n d t r e a t m e n t o f persons suffering f r o m m e n t a l disorder o r defect," were a l l p u b l i c c o n c e r n s . I t also a u t h o r i z e d the state t o p r o ­ vide h o u s i n g for l o w - i n c o m e c i t i z e n s . These p r o v i s i o n s d i d n o t em­ p o w e r the state t o p r o v i d e for social welfare, a l t h o u g h they d i d remove any d o u b t s t h a t the state's plenary legislative p o w e r extended t o those responsibilities. Rather, like earlier state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions re­ g a r d i n g e d u c a t i o n , these p r o v i s i o n s a r t i c u l a t e d an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the p u b l i c interest a n d c o m m i t t e d the state t o a course o f a c t i o n i n p u r s u i t o f i t . H o w e v e r , u n t i l the 1960s a n d 1970s, o n l y H a w a i i f o l l o w e d N e w Y o r k i n g i v i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status t o a b r o a d array o f positive r i g h t s . T h e n , w i t h a shift i n the focus o f p o l i t i c a l concern, several state c o n s t i t u ­ tions o b l i g e d state governments t o p r o v i d e for the e n v i r o n m e n t a l w e l l being o f their citizens. Indeed, every state c o n s t i t u t i o n s w r i t t e n f r o m 1959 t o the present has c o m m i t t e d the state t o p r o t e c t i o n o f the en­ v i r o n m e n t , a n d six states have also amended their c o n s t i t u t i o n s t o 62

63

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Hawaii drafted its constitution in 1950, although it did not become a state until 1959. On the impact of the N e w Jersey provision, see Goldberg and Williams, "Farmworkers' Bar­ gaining Rights." O n the impact of the Hawaiian provision, see Lee, The Hawaii State Constitution, 1 8 1 - 8 2 . Missouri Constitution, art. 1, sec. 29; Florida Constitution, art. 1, sec. 6; Arizona Constitution, art. 25; Arkansas Constitution, amendment 34; and South Dakota Constitu­ tion, art. 6, sec. 2. The "right to w o r k " refers to the right not to be denied employment even if one does not belong to a labor union. For a survey of state constitutional provisions arguably concerned w i t h positive rights, see Burt Neuborne, "State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights," Rutgers Law Journal 20 (summer 1989): 8 8 1 - 9 0 1 . N e w York Constitution, art. 17, secs. 1, 3, 4. See Galie, New York State Constitution, 25 and 2 6 3 - 6 5 . N e w York Constitution, art. 18, sec. 1. The Hawaii Constitution did not frame its provisions in terms of rights; rather, it expressly recognized the legislature's power to enact laws in various areas of public health and welfare. See Hawaii Constitution, art. 9. It should be noted that although most states did not constitutionalize their commitment to social welfare, they did of course enact legis­ lation on the topic. 6 1

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d o s o . T a k e n together, these positive-rights p r o v i s i o n s signaled a re­ o r i e n t a t i o n o f state economic policy, f r o m r e g u l a t i n g the m a r k e t t o en­ sure t h a t i t w o r k e d w e l l t o i n t e r v e n i n g t o achieve results n o t l i k e l y t o be o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h the operations o f the m a r k e t . H o w e v e r , the i m p a c t o f these p r o v i s i o n s s h o u l d n o t be exaggerated. Despite the economic dis­ locations o f the t w e n t i e t h century, m o s t states d i d n o t change their eco­ n o m i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s . M o r e o v e r , even i n states t h a t d i d , courts have often been r e l u c t a n t t o enforce the n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . Finally, the flow o f p o w e r over economic p o l i c y t o the n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y has reduced the significance o f state r e g u l a t i o n o f the economy. 6 6

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STATE C O N S T I T U T I O N A L R E F O R M M a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t i n u e t o reflect the perspective o n p o l i t i c s a n d g o v e r n m e n t t h a t u n d e r l a y their c r e a t i o n , despite the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f a m e n d m e n t s . T w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s for the m o s t p a r t o w e t h e i r v i s i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d p o l i t i c s t o the m o v e m e n t f o r state consti­ t u t i o n a l r e f o r m t h a t arose d u r i n g the Progressive Era b u t enjoyed its greatest success i n the decades f o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r I I . Yet i n the late t w e n t i e t h century, the reformers' successes spawned a n e w m o v e m e n t f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m , p u r s u i n g a very different agenda.

The

Progressive

Era and Constitutional

Reform

T h e Progressive m o v e m e n t arose i n the late nineteenth c e n t u r y i n re­ sponse t o the p r o f o u n d changes o c c u r r i n g i n America's economy, society, a n d g o v e r n m e n t . M a n y Progressives believed t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms were c r u c i a l t o c o m b a t i n g the p r o b l e m s o f the emerging u r b a n - i n d u s t r i a l society a n d achieving their goals o f enhanced democracy, i n s t i t u t i o n a l For examples of state environmental provisions, see Illinois Constitution, art. 11; and Pennsylvania Constitution, art. 1, sec. 27. For overviews of these provisions, see Barton H . Thompson Jr., "Environmental Policy and the State Constitution: The Role for Substantive Policy Guidance," in Bruce E. Cain and Roger G. N o l l , Constitutional Reform in Califor­ nia: Making State Government More Effective and Responsive (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1995); Margaret J. Fried and Monique J. Van Damme, "Envi­ ronmental Protection i n a Constitutional Setting," Temple Law Review 68 (fall 1995): 1369-1401; and A . E. Dick Howard, "State Constitutions and the Environment," Virginia Law Review 58 (February 1972): 193-229. See Feldman, "Separation of Powers"; and Jose L . Fernandez, "State Constitutions, Environmental Rights Provisions, and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Ques­ tion?" Harvard Environmental Law Review 17 (1993): 333-87. For a somewhat less pessimistic conclusion, see Peter J. Galie, "Social Services and Egalitarian Activism," in Friedelbaum, Human Rights. 6 6

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r a t i o n a l i t y , a n d social justice. T h e y sought t o free p o l i t i c a l decision­ m a k i n g f r o m the d o m i n a n c e o f special interests t h r o u g h direct democ­ racy, c h a m p i o n i n g the i n i t i a t i v e , referendum, a n d recall. T o ensure t h a t direct democracy w o u l d p r o m o t e g o o d g o v e r n m e n t , they emphasized ele­ v a t i n g the q u a l i t y o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n t h r o u g h e d u c a t i o n , t h r o u g h p o l i t i c a l leadership, a n d — f o r some Progressives—through literacy tests a n d other restrictions o n the franchise. H a v i n g c o n c l u d e d t h a t " p a r t y bosses" were responsible f o r m u c h o f the waste a n d c o r r u p t i o n i n g o v e r n m e n t , the reformers a t t e m p t e d t o l i m i t t h e i r p o w e r t h r o u g h n o n p a r t i s a n elections or i n p a r t i s a n elections t h r o u g h the selection o f candidates i n p r i m a r i e s . Finally, Progressive reformers a t t e m p t e d t o revitalize g o v e r n m e n t by re­ s t r u c t u r i n g p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t o remove obstacles t o effective leader­ ship a n d concerted a c t i o n . C h i e f a m o n g these obstacles, they believed, were the separation o f p o w e r s a n d checks a n d balances f o u n d i n A m e r i ­ can c o n s t i t u t i o n s ; accordingly, they a t t e m p t e d t o reduce the influence o f these c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mechanisms i n order t o facilitate m o r e effectual gov­ e r n m e n t a l a c t i o n . T h e y also p r o p o s e d the c r e a t i o n o f a bureaucracy t h a t , freed f r o m p o l i t i c s , w o u l d have b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n t o use its n e u t r a l exper­ tise t o a d m i n i s t e r p o l i c y i n the p u b l i c interest. A n d , perhaps m o s t i m p o r ­ tantly, they f a v o r e d a s t r o n g executive i n w h o m p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y a n d responsibility c o u l d be c o n c e n t r a t e d . 68

I n i t i a l l y , the Progressives focused o n r e f o r m i n g m u n i c i p a l g o v e r n m e n t . T h u s i t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t eventually spear­ headed the c a m p a i g n f o r state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m i n the t w e n t i e t h cen­ t u r y , the N a t i o n a l M u n i c i p a l League, was f o r m e d i n 1 8 9 4 o u t o f the N a t i o n a l Conference f o r G o o d C i t y G o v e r n m e n t . H o w e v e r , d u r i n g the early t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y the Progressives also pursued at the state level their three goals o f enhanced democracy, i n s t i t u t i o n a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , a n d social justice. Between 1 9 0 2 a n d 1 9 1 8 , t h i r t e e n states a d o p t e d the i n i t i a t i v e , a n d m o r e initiatives were p r o p o s e d a n d a d o p t e d f r o m 1 9 1 0 t o 1919 t h a n i n any subsequent d e c a d e . I n 1 9 1 8 , r e s p o n d i n g t o r e f o r m 6 9

70

This account of the Progressive agenda is drawn from Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1968); Robert H . Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: H i l l and Wang, 1967); Arthur S. Link and Rich­ ard L . McCormick, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, 111.: Harlan Davidson, 1983); Ben­ jamin Parke De Witt, The Progressive Movement (New York: Macmillan, 1915); M a r t i n J. Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in America, 1800-1920 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977); and Vile, Constitutionalism and Separation, chap. 10. Frank M a n n Stewart, A Half Century of Municipal Reform: A History of the Na­ tional Municipal League (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950), chap. 2. The historical treatment of the league relies primarily on this volume. For a listing of the states that adopted the initiative and the years of adoption, see Janice C. May, "The Constitutional Initiative: A Threat to Rights?" in Friedelbaum, Hu6 8

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efforts spurred by President Taft's C o m m i s s i o n o n E c o n o m y a n d Effi­ ciency, Massachusetts amended its constitution t o reorganize and consoli­ date state agencies, a n d N e w Y o r k a n d V i r g i n i a d i d the same i n the 1920s. T w e n t y - t h r e e other states reorganized a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d their ex­ ecutive branches b y 1 9 3 7 w i t h o u t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t . Finally, as n o t e d previously, several western states i n w h i c h Progressivism was s t r o n g a d o p t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s specifically designed t o p r o t e c t 71

w o r k e r s a n d r e i n i n the p o w e r o f large c o r p o r a t i o n s . Nevertheless, comprehensive r e f o r m o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s emerged as an issue o n l y i n the w a n i n g years o f the Progressive Era. T h e n , the recog­ n i t i o n t h a t m u n i c i p a l r e f o r m r e q u i r e d b r o a d h o m e - r u l e p o w e r s led the N a t i o n a l M u n i c i p a l League t o e x p a n d its agenda t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n . I n 1919 the league sponsored a m o c k state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n ­ v e n t i o n t o address the p r o b l e m s o f state g o v e r n m e n t , a n d this led t o the p r o m u l g a t i o n o f a M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n i n 1 9 2 1 a n d t o the p u b l i c a ­ t i o n o f t h a t d o c u m e n t w i t h e x p l a n a t o r y articles three years l a t e r . T h i s m o d e l c o n s t i t u t i o n i n c o r p o r a t e d standard Progressive reforms, such as the i n i t i a t i v e a n d referendum, as w e l l as p r o v i s i o n s o n m u n i c i p a l h o m e r u l e , a merit-based c i v i l service, a n d the r e f o r m o f c o u n t y g o v e r n m e n t . D r a w i n g o n p a r l i a m e n t a r y models, i t also p r o p o s e d a r a d i c a l restructur­ ing o f state legislatures a n d executives t o reduce i n t e r b r a n c h a n d i n t r a b r a n c h conflicts a n d t o p r o m o t e v i g o r o u s g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t i o n . T h u s , the first M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n called for a u n i c a m e r a l legislature w i t h 72

73

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man Rights, 164. For data on the use of the initiative, see Magleby, "Direct Legislation, 232, fig. 7-2. Early initiatives were used for purposes as diverse as instituting the executive budget (California in 1922) to changing the basis for apportionment of the state legislature (Arizona i n 1912). For an overview of the uses of the initiative, see David D . Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 15-20. Basing his estimate on figures from 1990 to 1992, Magleby has pro­ jected that the use of the initiative from 1990 to 1999 w i l l surpass that from 1910 to 1919. O n state administrative reorganizations, see Buck, Reorganization of State Govern­ ments; Garnett, Reorganizing State Government; and Kynerd, Administrative Reorganiza­ tion in Mississippi. A Model State Constitution (1924). Model State Constitution, sees. 3 3 - 4 0 (initiative and referendum); sees. 78-85 (home rule); sec. 90 (civil service); and sees. 86-89 (county government). Thus, in defending the proposals for the legislature, H . W. Dodds insisted that they only seemed radical within the American context, because they drew on "successful experi­ ence elsewhere" and "certain recognized advantages enjoyed by other English speaking people." H . W. Dodds, "The Legislature," in A Model State Constitution (1924), 20. John A. Fairlie also likened the proposals for the executive to the practice " i n most European and other foreign countries" and suggested that the league refrained from suggesting parliamen­ tary governments for the states largely because "for some time to come such a reversal of established American methods will not be approved." John A. Fairlie, "The Executive," in A Model State Constitution (1924), 25 and 26. 7 1

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p r o p o r t i o n a l representation, for the g o v e r n o r a n d m a j o r d e p a r t m e n t heads t o sit i n the legislature, for the c r e a t i o n o f a "legislative c o u n c i l " composed o f the g o v e r n o r a n d legislative leaders t o p l a n a n d manage the legislative agenda, a n d f o r r e m o v a l o f the g o v e r n o r u p o n a vote o f n o confidence by t w o - t h i r d s o f the l e g i s l a t u r e . I n a d d i t i o n , i n order t o pre­ vent deadlocks over policy, voters were i n v i t e d t o decide by referendum the fate o f measures passed by the state legislature b u t vetoed by the g o v e r n o r or p r o p o s e d by the g o v e r n o r b u t rejected by less t h a n t w o t h i r d s o f the l e g i s l a t u r e . 75

76

W i t h the decline o f Progressivism i n the 1920s, such r a d i c a l proposals h a d l i t t l e appeal. Even Nebraska's a d o p t i o n o f a u n i c a m e r a l legislature i n 1 9 3 4 o w e d m o r e t o the s u p p o r t o f Senator George N o r r i s t h a n t o the proposals o f the N a t i o n a l M u n i c i p a l L e a g u e . Perhaps the m o s t p o i n t e d c o m m e n t a r y o n the indifference t h a t greeted the i n i t i a l M o d e l State C o n ­ s t i t u t i o n is the fact t h a t for t w e n t y - o n e years after its p u b l i c a t i o n , n o state revised its c o n s t i t u t i o n . 77

Postwar

Constitutional

Reform

I n the decades f o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r I I , the m o v e m e n t f o r state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l r e f o r m attracted n e w adherents. P o l i t i c a l c o m m e n t a t o r s j o i n e d the chorus o f c r i t i c i s m o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , d e n o u n c i n g t h e m as the states' "greatest shame" a n d a r g u i n g t h a t they bore " n o m o r e resemblance t o a c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a n a garbage d u m p does t o a p a r k . " So t o o d i d official bodies, such as the federal K e s t e n b a u m C o m m i s s i o n , a n d groups such as the C o m m i t t e e for E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t . B u o y e d by this s u p p o r t , state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reformers enjoyed some notable successes. F r o m 1945 t o 1 9 6 0 , N e w Jersey, H a w a i i , a n d A l a s k a a l l a d o p t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t were extensively influenced by the M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n . I n N e w Jersey the m a i n groups s u p p o r t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n , as w e l l as the c o m m i s s i o n p r e p a r i n g materials for delegates, d r e w extensively o n the M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d N a t i o n a l M u n i c i p a l League personnel i n 7 8

7 9

Model State Constitution, sec. 13 (unicameral legislature); sec. 47 (executive partici­ pating in legislative sessions, although not voting); sees. 2 9 - 3 2 (legislative council); and sec. 48 (legislative removal of executive). Although the governor and department heads could participate in legislative debate, they could not vote on bills. Model State Constitution, sec. 27. Miewald and Longo, The Nebraska State Constitution, 19. Robert S. Allen, ed., Our Sovereign State (New York: Vanguard, 1949), xv, xvi. An­ other influential popular critique of state constitutions was Terry Sanford, Storm over the States (New York: M c G r a w - H i l l , 1967). Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Report to the President; and Commit­ tee for Economic Development in several of its publications: Modernizing Local Govern­ ment, Modernizing State Government, and Fiscal Program. 7 5

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d r a f t i n g their proposals; a n d the delegates relied o n these i n f r a m i n g the 1 9 4 7 c o n s t i t u t i o n . F o r H a w a i i a n d A l a s k a , w h i c h were d r a f t i n g their i n i t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d thus were n o t shackled by past versions, the M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n encapsulated the best i n constitutional thought, replacing the need t o consult a l l other states' c o n s t i t u t i o n s , as h a d been the practice i n n e w states i n the nineteenth c e n t u r y . I n the decade f o l ­ l o w i n g Reynolds v. Sims ( 1 9 6 4 ) , w h e n several states revised their consti­ t u t i o n s , the M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n again served t o frame the c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l debate a n d p r o v i d e a n o n p a r t i s a n m o d e l for c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s . State c o n s t i t u t i o n a l commissions, groups o f experts f o r m e d t o prepare materials f o r the delegates, p l a y e d a c r u c i a l role i n disseminating the re­ f o r m perspective. I n a study o f seven c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conventions d u r i n g this p e r i o d , E l m e r C o r n w e l l a n d his associates f o u n d t h a t a l l the revised state c o n s t i t u t i o n s m o v e d closer t o the M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n , some dramatically s o . 8 0

81

8 2

T h e version o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m a d o p t e d by p o s t w a r c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k e r s , however, differed f r o m earlier versions. Perhaps stung by the indifference t h a t greeted the p u b l i c a t i o n o f its i n i t i a l M o d e l State C o n s t i ­ t u t i o n , the N a t i o n a l M u n i c i p a l League jettisoned m a n y o f its m o s t r a d i ­ cal r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . T h u s , the f o u r t h e d i t i o n , p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 4 1 , re­ m o v e d the g o v e r n o r f r o m the legislative c o u n c i l , thereby enhancing the separation o f powers; a n d the s i x t h e d i t i o n , p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 6 8 , e l i m i ­ n a t e d the legislative c o u n c i l , p r o p o r t i o n a l representation, a n d the refer­ e n d u m o n stalled l e g i s l a t i o n . These changes reflected as w e l l a shift i n the reformers' frame o f reference. T h e i n i t i a l M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n h a d d r a w n heavily o n f o r e i g n p a r l i a m e n t a r y models, p r e s u m a b l y based o n the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o n l y such systems c o u l d ensure effective govern­ m e n t . Later versions, however, p o r t r a y e d r e f o r m as choosing the best 83

The main groups supporting constitutional revision were the New Jersey Committee for Constitutional Revision and the League of Women Voters. For analysis of the influence of the Model State Constitution on the New Jersey Constitution, see Connors, Process of Constitutional Revision, 136-38 and 2 0 2 - 4 . Both Hawaii and Alaska relied on the Model State Constitution directly and, when they looked to the New Jersey Constitution for guidance, indirectly. O n constitution mak­ ing in Hawaii, see Meiler, With an Understanding Heart; on constitution making in Alaska, see Gerald A . McBeath, The Alaska State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997), and Alaska's Constitution: A Citizen's Guide, 3d ed. (Juneau: Alaska Legislative Research Agency, 1992). See Cornwell, Goodman, and Swanson, State Constitutional Conventions, 156-59. Parallels between the Model State Constitution and revised state constitutions do not, of course, prove that delegates consulted it i n drafting their documents—correlation is not causation. I t is more likely that delegates sought to avail themselves of the best understand­ ing of state constitutional design, and this understanding had been decisively influenced over time by the Model State Constitution. Model State Constitution, 4th ed. (New York: National Municipal League, 1941); and Model State Constitution, 6th ed. 8 0

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f r o m e x i s t i n g A m e r i c a n i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d practices. T h u s , b e g i n n i n g w i t h the f o u r t h e d i t i o n , the M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n h i g h l i g h t e d e x i s t i n g state a n d federal p r o v i s i o n s t h a t resembled its r e c o m m e n d e d p r o v i s i o n s or f r o m w h i c h they were p u r p o r t e d l y derived. T h i s change was m o r e t h a n cosmetic. T h e federal government's response t o the Great Depres­ sion a n d its successful c o n d u c t o f W o r l d W a r I I h a d c o n v i n c e d state c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l reformers t h a t the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e d a f r a m e w o r k for effective g o v e r n m e n t . T h u s , this c o n s t i t u t i o n — a n d state c o n s t i t u ­ tions t h a t resembled it—became the standard for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l re­ f o r m . O f course, f e w state c o n s t i t u t i o n s measured u p t o t h a t standard. T h i s was i m p l i c i t i n the frequently v o i c e d c l a i m t h a t the inadequacies o f state governments h a d i m p e l l e d citizens t o take their concerns t o Wash­ i n g t o n , w h e r e p r e s u m a b l y they encountered n o such obstacles t o effective action. Postwar r e f o r m p u b l i c a t i o n s , therefore, emphasized the dis­ parities between the federal a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d u r g e d states t o emulate the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n i n revising their c h a r t e r s . 8 4

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I n endorsing this idealized federal m o d e l because o f its p r o m i s e o f ef­ fective g o v e r n m e n t , p o s t w a r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reformers i n effect embraced the efficiency strand o f Progressive t h o u g h t w h i l e a b a n d o n i n g the others. Progressives h a d c a m p a i g n e d f o r social justice f o r w o r k e r s , b u t given the emphasis o n e l i m i n a t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislation, this perhaps under­ standably h a d never p l a y e d a significant p a r t i n the M o d e l State C o n s t i ­ t u t i o n . W h a t d i d figure p r o m i n e n t l y i n the i n i t i a l M o d e l State C o n s t i t u ­ t i o n b u t was a b a n d o n e d by the p o s t w a r reformers was the Progressive concern f o r p r o m o t i n g direct democracy a n d c o r r e c t i n g abuses o f power. Indeed, by the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the s i x t h e d i t i o n o f the M o d e l State C o n s t i ­ t u t i o n , the legislative i n i t i a t i v e a n d referendum, key elements o f the Pro­ gressive agenda, h a d altogether disappeared. 8 7

T h e M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t d o m i n a t e d p o s t w a r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform best fits w h a t Daniel Elazar has labeled the "managerial p a t t e r n . " A c c o r d i n g t o this view, the m a i n p r o b l e m facing state c o n s t i t u t i o n 88

See, for example, Dishman, State Constitutions; Model State Constitution, 6th ed., viii; and Wheeler, Salient Issues. For similar sentiments from other constitutional reformers, see Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Report to the President, 37-38. See, for example, Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Report to the Presi­ dent, 37; and Sturm, Thirty Years, 2 - 4 . The claim can be traced as far back as the beginning of the twentieth century. See Henry Jones Ford, "The Influence of State Politics in Expand­ ing Federal Power," Proceedings of the American Political Science Association (Washing­ ton, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1908). See, for example, Wheeler, Salient Issues; Graves, Major Problems; and John E. Bebout, introduction to Model State Constitution, 6th ed. The fourth edition of the Model State Constitution did contain a public-welfare arti­ cle, which was retained in the fifth edition but excised from the sixth edition. See Elazar, "Principles and Traditions," 22. For elaboration of Elazar's point, see Hall, "Mostly Anchor," 407-10. 8 4

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makers was s t r u c t u r i n g state g o v e r n m e n t t o act v i g o r o u s l y o n the p r o b ­ lems c o n f r o n t i n g the states. Such a p r o a c t i v e state g o v e r n m e n t r e q u i r e d "a flexible a n d adaptable i n s t r u m e n t w h i c h helps us i n the s o l u t i o n o f today's p r o b l e m s " a n d w h i c h w o u l d be "flexible a n d adaptable, w i t h o n l y m i n o r m o d i f i c a t i o n s , i n m a n a g i n g t o m o r r o w ' s tasks as w e l l . " T h i s flexibility a n d a d a p t a b i l i t y came f r o m strengthening the executive a n d r e m o v i n g i m p e d i m e n t s t o legislative a c t i o n . I n order t o p r o m o t e effective 8 9

a c t i o n by state executives, reformers p r o p o s e d c o n c e n t r a t i n g p o l i t i c a l au­ t h o r i t y i n the hands o f the g o v e r n o r by e l i m i n a t i n g the independent elec­ t i o n o f other executive-branch officers, c o l l e c t i n g the m y r i a d independent boards a n d agencies i n t o a manageable n u m b e r o f executive depart­ ments, a n d enhancing the governor's p o w e r over budgetary matters t h r o u g h the executive budget, the i t e m v e t o , a n d other devices. I n order t o p r o m o t e effective legislative a c t i o n , reformers p r o p o s e d a b o l i s h i n g vir­ t u a l l y a l l p r o c e d u r a l a n d substantive l i m i t s o n legislative a c t i o n . As the i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the s i x t h M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n p u t i t , " T h e l i m i t a ­ tions o n state a n d local g o v e r n m e n t a c t i o n were devised f o r the m o s t p a r t d u r i n g an age w h e n less was demanded o f g o v e r n m e n t t h a n is the case t o d a y . " Insofar as they recognized abuse o f p o w e r m i g h t pose a danger, the reformers seemed t o assume t h a t p e r i o d i c elections were a sufficient check o n such abuses. T o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e l i m i t s o n legislative power, a c c o r d i n g t o one leading reformer, was " d i f f i c u l t t o reconcile . . . w i t h a real belief i n d e m o c r a c y . " 9 0

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T h e a i m o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reformers, t h e n , was t o encourage the states t o modernize their c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d their governments, thereby p r o m o t i n g a "resurgence o f the states," e n a b l i n g t h e m t o p l a y the same positive role p l a y e d by the federal g o v e r n m e n t . Even t h o u g h voters rejected several p r o p o s e d c o n s t i t u t i o n s , the reformers achieved m a n y o f t h e i r goals. By the late 1970s forty-seven states h a d extended the guber­ n a t o r i a l t e r m t o f o u r years, a n d m a n y h a d strengthened the g o v e r n o r s ' a p p o i n t m e n t , personnel, a n d budget p o w e r s , a l t h o u g h few h a d signifi9 2

Grad, "The State Constitution," 4. See also David Fellman, "What Should a State Constitution Contain?" in Graves, Major Problems. Model State Constitution, 6th ed., i x . Frank M . Landers, "Taxation and Finance," in Graves, Major Problems, 225. The phrase is taken from Bowman and Kearney, Resurgence of the States. Other key sources dealing with this resurgence include John Kincaid, "The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism," Rutgers Law Journal 26 (summer 1995): 913-48; U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Question of State Government Capability (Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1985); and Mavis M a n n Reeves, "The States as Polities: Reformed, Reinvigorated, Re­ sourceful," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 509 (May 1990): 83-93. 8 9

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c a n d y reduced the n u m b e r o f separately elected state-level o f f i c i a l s . Several states h a d also professionalized their legislatures, c o n s o l i d a t e d their bureaucracies, a n d r e f o r m e d t h e i r j u d i c i a l s y s t e m s . T h u s state governments were p r e s u m a b l y e q u i p p e d t o assume a leadership role i n p o l i c y development alongside the federal g o v e r n m e n t . 93

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Yet the t i m i n g o f the reformers' success c o u l d h a r d l y have been worse. T h e y celebrated activist g o v e r n m e n t at a t i m e w h e n citizens were becom­ i n g increasingly skeptical a b o u t the efficiency a n d effectiveness o f g o v e r n ­ m e n t a l p r o g r a m s . T h e y praised the professionalization o f state g o v e r n ­ m e n t at a t i m e w h e n citizens were p r i m a r i l y concerned a b o u t the responsiveness o f p u b l i c officials a n d a b o u t their ties t o special interests. A n d they encouraged state governments t o emulate the federal g o v e r n ­ m e n t at a t i m e w h e n citizens increasingly rejected the idea o f " t h e i r legis­ lature [as] a ' l i t t l e Congress,' their g o v e r n o r [as] a ' l i t t l e president,' or their h i g h c o u r t [as] a ' l i t t l e W a r r e n C o u r t . ' " 9 5

N o t surprisingly, t h e n , the resurgence o f state g o v e r n m e n t p r o m o t e d by the reformers p r o m p t e d a r e a c t i o n , an effort t o c u r t a i l w h a t were seen as o v e r l y expensive a n d p o w e r f u l state governments t h a t were insulated f r o m p o p u l a r concerns a n d p o p u l a r c o n t r o l . D i s t r u s t o f g o v e r n m e n t i n general a n d state legislatures i n p a r t i c u l a r has, o f course, p r o v i d e d an impetus for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m t h r o u g h o u t A m e r i c a n history. So i n a sense the c o m p l a i n t s o f these " n e w r e f o r m e r s , " as they m i g h t be called, were n o t h i n g new. H o w e v e r , the c o n t e x t i n w h i c h they operated was q u i t e different. P r i o r reformers h a d usually sought t o m a k e g o v e r n m e n t m o r e responsive by e x p a n d i n g the electorate, by c h a n g i n g the intrastate d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l power, or b y r e s t r u c t u r i n g g o v e r n m e n t . B u t by the 1970s, w i t h the extension o f the franchise, the r e a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f state legislatures, a n d the m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f state executive branches, i t was clear t h a t such reforms c o u l d n o t dispel concerns a b o u t unresponsive g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s c o n v i n c e d the n e w reformers t h a t representation d i d

Thad Beyle, "Governors: The Middlemen and Women in Our Political System," in Virginia Gray and Herbert Jacob, eds., Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, 6th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1996); and Sabato, Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie, 61-63. Kincaid, "New Federalism Context," 927; and Advisory Commission on Intergovern­ mental Relations, Question of State Capability. Kincaid, " N e w Federalism Context," 929. O n the decline of trust in government during the late 1960s and the 1970s, see Seymour M a r t i n Lipset and William Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind (New York: Free Press, 1983). 9 3

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n o t solve the p r o b l e m o f p o p u l a r g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y therefore sought t o lodge p o l i c y m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t l y i n the people, t o reverse policies enacted b y the established i n s t i t u t i o n s o f g o v e r n m e n t , a n d t o l i m i t the p o w e r s a n d tenure o f g o v e r n m e n t officials. T w o aspects o f this n e w r e f o r m agenda stand o u t . First, the emphasis o n direct p o p u l a r rule as a response t o unresponsive g o v e r n m e n t h a r k ened back t o Progressive t h o u g h t , reemphasizing an aspect o f t h a t t h o u g h t i g n o r e d b y p o s t w a r reformers. Second, the n e w reformers' agenda was largely a negative one, concerned w i t h p r e v e n t i n g o r c o m b a t ­ i n g i m p o s i t i o n s b y g o v e r n m e n t . G i v e n this focus, i t is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the n e w reformers d i d n o t organize a n a t i o n w i d e m o v e m e n t f o r c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n ; indeed, they d i d n o t concern themselves w i t h consti­ t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n at a l l . Rather, w h a t the n e w reformers p r o d u c e d was a series o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments t h a t , t a k e n together, f u n d a m e n ­ t a l l y altered the character a n d p o w e r s o f state governments by l i m i t i n g the tenure o f g o v e r n m e n t a l officials, r e d u c i n g t h e i r p o w e r s , a n d transfer­ r i n g p o l i c y m a k i n g responsibilities t o the people. 96

T h e p r i m a r y m e c h a n i s m f o r a c c o m p l i s h i n g these changes was the c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e . T h e n u m b e r o f such i n i t i a t i v e s has increased dra­ m a t i c a l l y i n recent years: f r o m 1 9 7 0 t o 1 9 7 9 , o n l y t w e n t y - o n e state c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l amendments were citizen initiatives, b u t f r o m 1 9 8 0 t o 1 9 8 9 , t h i r t y - t h r e e i n i t i a t i v e amendments were ratified, a n d f r o m 1 9 9 1 t o 1 9 9 5 , f o r t y - t w o . T h e n e w reformers relied o n the i n i t i a t i v e p r i m a r i l y i n order t o bypass state legislatures, w h i c h generally opposed t h e i r p r o p o s a l s . I n d o i n g so, they v i n d i c a t e d the Progressives' hope t h a t the i n i t i a t i v e offered a means f o r c i r c u m v e n t i n g entrenched p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s . Yet the use o f 9 7

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I t is hardly surprising that during this era Ronald Reagan was twice elected president, campaigning on the idea that government was the problem, not the solution. These data are drawn from Albert L. Sturm, "State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision: 1978-79 and the 1970s," Book of States, 1980-81, 3, table B; Janice C. May, "State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision: 1988-89 and the 1980s," Book of the States, 1990-91 (Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, 1990), 30; and succeeding volumes of the Book of the States. Reformers have relied on the initiative because, as Thomas Gais and Gerald Benjamin have noted, "legislators resist fundamental revisions because many of the demands for reform are i n fact aimed at state legislatures and threaten the interests of their members." See Gais and Benjamin, "Public Discontent and the Decline of Deliberation: A Dilemma in State Constitutional Reform," Temple Law Review 68 (fall 1995): 1298 and passim. Some critics have charged that these entrenched political forces are merely replaced by political entrepreneurs, w h o exploit the initiative process for their o w n purposes. For studies documenting the entrepreneurial character of the initiative process, see Candace McCoy, "Crime as a Bogeyman: W h y Californians Changed Their Constitution to Include a 'Victims Bill of Rights' (and What I t Really D i d ) , " i n Tarr, Constitutional Politics in States, and Rausch "Politics of Term Limitations." However, a large percentage of initia­ tives fail to make the ballot or are defeated at the polls—for data, see Magleby, "Direct 9 6

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this " p o l i t i c a l o u t s i d e r " a p p r o a c h l i m i t e d r e f o r m p r i m a r i l y t o the eigh­ teen states t h a t have i n s t i t u t e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e . If, as the n e w reformers believed, state g o v e r n m e n t was u n a c c o u n t a b l e a n d beholden t o special interests, t h e n i t was i m p o r t a n t t o l i m i t its p o w e r by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g p o l i c y choices a n d c i r c u m s c r i b i n g officials' free­ d o m o f a c t i o n . T h u s the n e w reformers i n i t i a l l y sought t o l i m i t the funds 1 0 0

t h a t g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d raise a n d s p e n d . I n 1978 C a l i f o r n i a a d o p t e d P r o p o s i t i o n 13, w h i c h p e r m a n e n t l y l i m i t e d p r o p e r t y t a x rates; a n d a year later, i t c u r b e d increases i n state expenditures, t y i n g t h e m t o changes i n the rate o f i n f l a t i o n a n d i n the p o p u l a t i o n . I n the decade after Proposi­ t i o n 13, reformers i n other states also placed tax and/or expenditure l i m i ­ t a t i o n s o n the b a l l o t , a l t h o u g h few proposals were as r a d i c a l as Proposi­ t i o n 13. T h e y achieved some n o t a b l e victories, such as Massachusetts' P r o p o s i t i o n 2V2, b u t suffered several defeats as w e l l . D u r i n g the 1990s, a n e w w a v e o f "plebiscitary b u d g e t i n g " began, w i t h initiatives i n three states r e q u i r i n g a supermajority i n the legislature for the enactment o f t a x increases, initiatives i n t w o others t y i n g increases i n spending t o the rate o f i n f l a t i o n a n d p o p u l a t i o n increases, a n d an i n i t i a t i v e i n C o l o ­ r a d o (labeled by its p r o p o n e n t s the Taxpayer's B i l l o f Rights) r e q u i r i n g voter a p p r o v a l for a l l n e w t a x e s . 1 0 1

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Legislation," 233, fig. 7-3. This suggests that only ballot proposals that tap into strongly felt dissatisfactions tend to succeed. 100 Perhaps it is not coincidental that four states have adopted the constitutional initia­ tive w i t h i n the last three decades. For a listing of states w i t h the constitutional initiative, see Book of States, 1994-95, 23, table 1.3. Limitations on revenues also had an effect on spending because state balancedbudget provisions prohibiting deficit spending, although the effectiveness of these provi­ sions is open to question. See Richard Briffault, Balancing Acts: The Reality behind State Balanced Budget Requirements (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996). 102 p accounts of the origins and effects of Proposition 13, see A l v i n Rabushka and Pauline Ryan, The Tax Revolt (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1982); Robert Kuttner, Revolt of the Haves: Tax Rebellions and Hard Times (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980); David O. Sears and Jack Citrin, Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); and William A . Fischel, " H o w Serrano Caused Proposition 13," Journal of Law and Politics 12 (fall 1996): 5 2 1 - 5 3 . The pertinent provisions are California Constitution, arts. 13a and 13b. For a survey of these efforts, see John L . Mikesell, "The Path of the Tax Revolt: Statewide Expenditure and Tax Cutting Referenda since Proposition 13," State and Local Government Review 18 (1986): 5-13; Jack Citrin, introduction to Terry Schwadron, ed., California and the American Tax Revolt: Proposition 13 Five Years Later (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); and Rabushka and Ryan, The Tax Revolt, 186-94. The supermajority requirements are found in Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, sec. 33; Arizona Constitution, art. 9, sec. 22; and Nevada Constitution, art. 4, sec. 18. The spending limits are found in Colorado Constitution, art. 10, sec. 20; and Washington Revised Code, sec. 43.135.035 (1994). The requirement of popular approval for all new taxes is found in 1 0 1

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T h i s " t a x r e v o l t " i n v o l v e d m o r e t h a n a concern a b o u t taxes. As one leader o f the r e v o l t p u t i t , " O u r fight is n o t m a i n l y a b o u t money. It's a b o u t c o n t r o l . T h e y have t o learn once a n d f o r a l l t h a t it's o u r g o v e r n ­ ment." T o exert t h a t c o n t r o l , the n e w reformers i n the 1990s also i m p o s e d restrictions o n the tenure a n d p o w e r s o f state officials. I n 1990 O k l a h o m a a d o p t e d a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e l i m i t i n g the l e n g t h o f legis­ lative service t o t w e l v e years, a n d by 1 9 9 4 , t w e n t y other states h a d also 1 0 5

i m p o s e d t e r m l i m i t s o n state legislators. Eleven simultaneously i m p o s e d such l i m i t a t i o n s o n governors, thereby reversing earlier reformers' efforts t o ensure the indefinite r e e l i g i b i l i t y o f the e x e c u t i v e . California com­ plemented this attack o n i n c u m b e n c y w i t h the a d o p t i o n o f P r o p o s i t i o n 1 4 0 , w h i c h p r o h i b i t e d legislators f r o m earning state r e t i r e m e n t benefits a n d r e q u i r e d m a j o r reductions i n legislative agencies a n d s t a f f . And Texas a n d O k l a h o m a i n 1990 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ethics commissions t h a t w o u l d investigate official m i s c o n d u c t . 1 0 6

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I n the late nineteenth century, c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s inserted p o l i c y p r o ­ visions i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , because they d i d n o t t r u s t state legislatures t o represent the interests o f the people. T h e a d o p t i o n o f the i n i t i a t i v e has made i t possible t o c i r c u m v e n t representative i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d enact c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l legislation at any t i m e , n o t just d u r i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n m a k i n g . Yet the character o f i n i t i a t i v e p o l i t i c s is itself c o n t r o v e r s i a l . Popular m a ­ jorities t h a t have been s t y m i e d i n the legislature have availed themselves o f this o p t i o n , i n effect r e p u d i a t i n g the n o t i o n t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d confine themselves t o fundamentals. B u t so t o o have interest g r o u p s , w h i c h have used their resources t o m o u n t campaigns f o r their concerns. A n d so have a s p i r i n g p o l i t i c i a n s , w h o have encouraged i n i t i a ­ tives as a w a y o f a d v a n c i n g their careers. I n recent years the focus o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l initiatives i n several states has shifted f r o m questions o f g o v e r n m e n t a l structure, responsiveness, a n d expense t o questions o f sub­ stantive policy. H i g h l y contentious economic a n d social issues a v o i d e d b y legislatures have come t o d o m i n a t e the agenda, exacerbating splits a m o n g the populace. T h u s F l o r i d a has h a d initiatives o n t o r t l i a b i l i t y , g a m b l i n g , the rights o f gays, a n d the c r e a t i o n o f an official language; C o l o r a d o o n the rights o f gays a n d p a r e n t a l rights; a n d C a l i f o r n i a o n

Colorado Constitution, art. 10, sec. 20. Interestingly, Colorado's "Taxpayer's Bill of Rights" was adopted in 1992 after being rejected in 1988 and 1990. Quoted in Citrin, introduction, 7. O n the development of term limitations, see Gerald Benjamin and Michael J. M a l ­ bin, eds., Limiting Legislative Terms (Washington, D.C.: C Q Press, 1992); Rausch, "Poli­ tics of Term Limitations"; Samuel C. Patterson, "Legislative Politics i n the States," in Gray and Jacob, Politics in American States; and Beyle, "Governors." California Constitution, art. 4, sec. 1.5. Texas Constitution, art. 3, sec. 24a; and Oklahoma Constitution, art. 29. 1 0 5

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I n a d d i t i o n , the n e w

reformers i n several states have used the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e t o re­ verse j u d i c i a l r u l i n g s , i l l u s t r a t i n g the c o n c e r n t o check i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t m a k e p o l i c y b u t are perceived as outside p o p u l a r c o n t r o l .

1 1 0

The prolif­

e r a t i o n o f b a l l o t questions d u r i n g the 1990s suggests t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m b y i n i t i a t i v e w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be an i m p o r t a n t aspect o f state c o n ­ stitutional

development.

T H E N E W JUDICIAL FEDERALISM A m o n g the m o s t h e r a l d e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l developments i n recent years has been state judges' increased reliance o n state declarations o f r i g h t s t o secure r i g h t s u n a v a i l a b l e u n d e r the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n .

1 1 1

This new judi­

c i a l federalism, as i t has been labeled, emerged d u r i n g the early 1970s, f o l l o w i n g the a p p o i n t m e n t

o f C h i e f Justice W a r r e n Burger t o succeed

E a r l W a r r e n o n the U.S. Supreme C o u r t , a n d was encouraged by Justice W i l l i a m B r e n n a n , a s t a l w a r t o f the W a r r e n C o u r t .

1 1 2

T h u s , w h e n state

c o u r t s began t o rely o n t h e i r state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , critics c h a r g e d t h a t they were merely a t t e m p t i n g t o evade Burger C o u r t r u l i n g s a n d safeguard the c i v i l l i b e r t a r i a n gains o f the W a r r e n C o u r t .

1 1 3

T h i s c r i t i c i s m lost force,

109 p general discussion, see David Kohler and Robert M . Stern, "Initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s," Book of the States, 1994-1995, 2 7 9 - 9 3 . For a case study of the chang­ ing use of the initiative in a single state, see Daniel R. Gordon, "Protecting against the State Constitutional Law Junkyard: Proposals to Limit Popular Constitutional Revision in Flor­ ida," Nova Law Review 20 (fall 1995): 4 1 3 - 3 5 . Illustrative of this use of the constitutional initiative are California Constitution, art. 1, sec. 27, overruling People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (1972); California Constitution, art. 1, sec. 28, overruling a large number of defendants' rights rulings; Florida Constitution, art. 1, sec. 12, narrowing the state exclusionary rule; and Massachusetts Constitution, Dec­ laration of Rights, art. 26, overruling District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980). For an early useful guide to the literature on the new judicial federalism, see Earl M . Maitz, Robert F. Williams, and Michael Araten, "Selected Bibliography on State Constitu­ tional Law, 1980-1989," Rutgers Law Journal 20 (summer 1989): 1093-1113. For an examination of the legal community's response to the new judicial federalism, see Tarr, "Constitutional Theory," 843-50. Justice William H . Brennan Jr. initially endorsed the new judicial federalism in his oft-cited "State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights," Harvard Law Re­ view 90 (January 1977): 4 8 9 - 5 0 4 . For criticism of the new judicial federalism as reactive and result-oriented, see Earl M . Maitz, "The Political Dynamic of the 'New Judicial Federalism,' " Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 2 (1989): 2 3 3 - 3 8 ; Steven J. Twist and Len L . Munsil, "The Dou­ ble Threat of Judicial Activism: Inventing N e w 'Rights' in State Constitutions," Arizona State Law Journal 21 (winter 1989): 1005-65; and George Deukmejian and Clifford K . Thompson, " A l l Sail and N o Anchor—Judicial Review under the California Constitution," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 6 (summer 1979): 975-1010. Even some propoo r a

1 1 0

1 1 1

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1 1 3

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however, as the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism spread, a n d c o u r t s i n every state a n n o u n c e d r u l i n g s based o n the r i g h t s guarantees o f t h e i r state c o n s t i t u ­ tions.

1 1 4

Some state c o u r t s even i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d

address state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claims first and

henceforth

consider federal c o n s t i t u ­

t i o n a l c l a i m s o n l y w h e n cases c o u l d n o t be resolved o n state g r o u n d s .

1 1 5

By the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , t h e n , the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism h a d become an estab­ lished feature o f A m e r i c a n federalism and, m o s t likely, a p e r m a n e n t

The

New

Judicial

Federalism

in Historical

one.

Perspective

T h e j u d i c i a l i n v o l v e m e n t i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t t h a t has

re­

sulted f r o m the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism m a r k s a m a j o r shift i n the r o l e o f state c o u r t s .

1 1 6

For

a l t h o u g h state c o u r t s occasionally c o n t r i b u t e d

to

state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t p r i o r t o the 1970s, state judges o v e r a l l have been far less aggressive t h a n t h e i r federal c o u n t e r p a r t s i n p r o m o t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. T h i s reticence is p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p a r e n t i n the c i v i l liberties r e a l m . Some c o m m e n t a t o r s have s o u g h t t o p o r t r a y the n e w

judi­

c i a l federalism as a " r e d i s c o v e r y " o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d state declara­ t i o n s o f r i g h t s , i n s i s t i n g t h a t u n t i l the 1930s state c o n s t i t u t i o n s w e r e nec­ essarily the p r i m a r y vehicle for p r o t e c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s .

1 1 7

The claim

nents of the new judicial federalism viewed it as evasive. See the three articles by Donald E. Wilkes Jr., "The N e w Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court," Kentucky Law Journal 62 (1974): 4 2 1 - 5 1 ; " M o r e on the N e w Federalism in Crim­ inal Procedure," Kentucky Law Journal 63 (1975): 873-94; and "The N e w Federalism in Criminal Procedure Revisited," Kentucky Law Journal 64 (1976): 7 2 9 - 5 2 . For an early effort to develop standards for assessing the legitimacy for state judicial activism, see Porter, "State Supreme Courts." The criticism of state constitutional law as result-oriented and the responses to this charge are discussed in the next chapter. O n the spread of the new judicial federalism, see Collins, Galie, and Kincaid, "State H i g h Courts"; and John Kincaid, "State Court Protections of Individual Rights under State Constitutions: The New Judicial Federalism," Journal of State Government 61 (SeptemberOctober 1988): 163-69. Annual surveys of state constitutional cases are found in the Rutgers Law Journal. These states include Oregon {Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 [Ore. 1981]); Washing­ ton (State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353 [Wash. 1984]); Maine (State v. Gadman, 476 A . 2 d 114 [Me. 1984]); and Vermont (State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336 [ V t . 1982]). This approach was cham­ pioned by Justice Hans E. Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court; see his " W i t h o u t Due Process." For further documentation of the argument of this section, see Tarr, "Past and Fu­ ture," 6 4 - 6 9 ; and G. Alan Tarr, "The N e w Judicial Federalism in Perspective," Notre Dame Law Review 72 (May 1997): 1097-1118. The assumption of these scholars is that there were three eras of rights protection in the states. For the first 140 years of the nation's history, state courts served as the primary protectors of civil liberties. From the 1930s to the early 1970s, the incorporation of provi­ sions of the Bill of Rights and increased federal judicial activism made federal courts the primary, almost exclusive, protectors of civil liberties. W i t h the rise of the new judicial 1 1 4

1 1 5

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Twentieth Century

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163

has a certain p l a u s i b i l i t y . U n t i l the 1930s state governments h a d m o r e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o invade rights, given the l i m i t e d scope o f the federal gov­ e r n m e n t , a n d federal remedies for such invasions were l a c k i n g because the protections o f the B i l l o f Rights h a d n o t been i n c o r p o r a t e d , so the o n l y legal recourse was t o be f o u n d i n state courts. U n f o r t u n a t e l y for those seeking a pedigree for state j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m , however, their c l a i m is m o r e edifying t h a n accurate. A l t h o u g h c o n d i t i o n s m a y have seemed ripe for the development o f state civil-liberties l a w dur­ i n g the nineteenth a n d early t w e n t i e t h centuries, n o such development occurred. State c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i t i g a t i o n d u r i n g this p e r i o d was rare a n d seldom i n v o l v e d civil-liberties i s s u e s . A l t h o u g h isolated civil-liberties rulings can be f o u n d (and have been cited over a n d over by advocates o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism), p r i o r t o the 1930s state courts failed t o de­ velop a coherent b o d y o f l a w r e l a t i n g t o freedom o f speech, religious liberty, the rights o f defendants, o r other civil-liberties c o n c e r n s . Con­ t e m p o r a r y state c o u r t s ' failure t o uncover early civil-liberties precedents o n w h i c h t o base their rulings underscores the p o i n t . T h u s , u n t i l the ad­ vent o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism, state c o u r t s ' c o n t r i b u t i o n t o develop­ i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l protections for c i v i l liberties was m i n i m a l . 118

1 1 9

T h i s h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d raises t w o questions: w h y d i d state courts n o t p l a y an i m p o r t a n t role i n p r o t e c t i n g rights p r i o r t o the n e w j u d i c i a l feder­ alism, a n d w h a t changes led t o the emergence o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federal­ i s m , t o a m o r e rights-protective role for state courts, i n the 1970s? The key t o answering these questions lies i n the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t state consti­ t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n occurs i n the c o n t e x t o f — a n d is influenced b y — a broader A m e r i c a n j u d i c i a l t r a d i t i o n . T h i s is n o t t o deny differences 1 2 0

federalism in the early 1970s, state and federal courts have shared the responsibility of protecting rights. For an account of the three eras focusing on criminal justice, see Abrahamson, "Criminal Law." For extension of this notion to civil liberties more generally, see Abrahamson and Gutmann, "The New Federalism"; and Abrahamson, "Divided We Stand." For my o w n ill-considered endorsement of the notion, see Tarr, "State Constitu­ tionalism," 3 8 - 3 9 . Nevertheless, some commentators on the new judicial federalism did recognize that, until recently, state constitutions never provided a major basis for protecting rights. See Judith S. Kaye, "Foreword: The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as Full Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights," Rutgers Law Journal 23 (summer 1992): 7 2 7 - 5 2 . Two studies by Robert A . Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M . Friedman, and Stanton Wheeler confirm this: "Business of Supreme Courts"; and "The Evolution of State Supreme Courts," Michigan Law Review 76 (May 1978): 961-1005. Frequently cited cases include Carpenter v. Dane, 9 Wis. 249 (1859); and State v. Sheridan, 96 N . W . 730 (Iowa 1903). For a survey of state civil-liberties rulings prior to 1930, see Tarr, "Past and Future," 6 6 - 6 9 . For an overview of this tradition, which recognizes the contributions of state judges to its development, see G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). For a thoughtful 1 1 8

1 1 9

1 2 0

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Chapter 5

a m o n g states o r a m o n g h i s t o r i c a l eras. Rather, the p o i n t is t h a t the stan­ dards o f a p p r o p r i a t e j u d i c i a l practice—best u n d e r s t o o d as p r e s c r i b i n g a range o f legitimate behavior rather t h a n r i g i d rules g o v e r n i n g j u d i c i a l practice—change over t i m e . State judges, like t h e i r federal counterparts, p a r t i c i p a t e i n creating those standards a n d respond t o t h e m . G r a d u a l l y , judges become educated as t o the p r e v a i l i n g standards; t h a t is, they learn h o w t o a p p r o a c h a n d i n t e r p r e t t h e i r state c o n s t i t u t i o n s by w a t c h i n g h o w other courts ( b o t h federal a n d state) i n t e r p r e t t h e i r o w n c h a r t e r s . Liti­ gants also ensure t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e claims a n d arguments, pioneered i n other j u d i c i a l arenas, are b r o u g h t before t h e m . T h u s , i t was n o t surpris­ i n g t h a t i n the late eighteenth a n d early nineteenth centuries, state courts l o o k e d t o e x t r a t e x t u a l sources i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e i r state c o n s t i t u t i o n s ; other courts were d o i n g l i k e w i s e . N o r was i t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i n the late nineteenth century, state courts began t o i n v a l i d a t e legislation t h a t trespassed o n economic l i b e r t y ; they h a d such a course urged o n t h e m by i n f l u e n t i a l legal treatises a n d a u t h o r i z e d b y the example o f sister courts. Similarly, i t was n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t , i n the 1970s, state courts began t o emulate the W a r r e n C o u r t i n g i v i n g b r o a d readings t o t h e i r states' rights guarantees. 1 2 1

1 2 2

1 2 3

Put differently, the existence o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees a n d the absence o f federal i n v o l v e m e n t appeared t o a f f o r d an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r j u d i c i a l initiatives p r i o r t o the 1930s, b u t this was n o t e n o u g h . W h a t was missing was a m o d e l o f h o w state judges c o u l d , even i f they w i s h e d t o , go a b o u t d e v e l o p i n g a civil-liberties jurisprudence. Because A m e r i c a n s h a d n o t come t o rely o n courts t o vindicate c i v i l liberties, state courts t h r o u g h o u t the nineteenth a n d early t w e n t i e t h centuries gained l i t t l e ex-

analysis that links state and federal traditions, see Lawrence M . Friedman, "State Constitu­ tions and Criminal Justice in the Late Nineteenth Century," in Finkelman and Gottlieb, Toward a Usable Past. These patterns of interaction between state and federal courts and among state courts have been labeled vertical judicial federalism and horizontal judicial federalism. See Porter and Tarr, introduction to Policymakers, x i x - x x i i ; and Tarr and Porter, State Supreme Courts in State and Nation, chap. 1. O n extratextualism in state constitutional interpretation, see Suzanna Sherry, "The Early Virginia Tradition of Extratextual Interpretation," in Finkelman and Gottleib, To­ ward a Usable Past; and Suzanna Sherry, "State Constitutional Law: Doing the Right T h i n g , " Rutgers Law Journal 25 (summer 1994): 9 3 5 - 4 4 . O n extratextual interpretation of the federal Constitution, see Suzanna Sherry, "The Founders' Unwritten Constitution," University of Chicago Law Review 54 (fall 1987): 1127-77; Thomas Grey, " D o We Have an Unwritten Constitution?" Stanford Law Review 27 (February 1975): 8 4 3 - 9 3 ; and W i l l i a m E. Nelson, "The Impact of the Anti-Slavery Movement upon Styles of Judi­ cial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America," Harvard Law Review 87 (January 1974): 5 1 3 - 6 4 . See Galie, "State Courts." 1 2 1

1 2 2

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Twentieth Century

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165

perience i n i n t e r p r e t i n g civil-liberties guarantees. N o r c o u l d they l o o k t o federal courts for guidance i n i n t e r p r e t i n g their c o n s t i t u t i o n a l protec­ t i o n s . T h e federal courts t o o decided few civil-liberties cases, a n d their rulings often revealed little s y m p a t h y f o r rights c l a i m a n t s . Only when circumstances b r o u g h t a c o m b i n a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arguments, plus an example o f h o w a c o u r t m i g h t develop c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees, c o u l d a state civil-liberties jurisprudence emerge. T h u s , w h e n the Burger C o u r t ' s a n t i c i p a t e d — a n d t o some extent a c t u a l — r e t r e a t f r o m W a r r e n C o u r t a c t i v i s m encouraged civil-liberties litigants t o l o o k elsewhere for redress, the experience o f the preceding decades h a d l a i d the f o u n d a t i o n for the development o f state civil-liberties law. 1 2 4

Paradoxically, t h e n , the a c t i v i s m o f the W a r r e n C o u r t , w h i c h has often been p o r t r a y e d as d e t r i m e n t a l t o federalism, was a necessary c o n d i t i o n for state judges b e c o m i n g active i n p r o t e c t i n g c i v i l liberties under state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e p r o t e c t i o n o f c i v i l liberties was n o t a zero-sum game, i n w h i c h increased a c t i v i t y by one j u d i c i a r y necessitated decreased activ­ i t y by the other. Rather, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the federal a n d state judiciaries i n v o l v e d a sharing o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d a process o f m u t u a l l e a r n i n g , such t h a t a change i n o r i e n t a t i o n b y one set o f courts was over t i m e reflected i n the other set o f courts.

The

Scope and Impact

of the New judicial

Federalism

W r i t i n g i n 1 9 8 6 , Justice W i l l i a m H . B r e n n a n Jr. enthused t h a t the " [ r e d i ­ scovery by state supreme courts o f the broader p r o t e c t i o n s afforded their o w n citizens by their state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . . . is p r o b a b l y the m o s t i m p o r ­ t a n t development i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l jurisprudence i n o u r t i m e . " Brennan's c l a i m is s u p p o r t e d by the d r a m a t i c upsurge i n state c o u r t s ' reliance o n state declarations o f rights i n civil-liberties cases over the past t w e n t y five years. F r o m 1950 t o 1 9 6 9 , i n o n l y ten cases d i d state judges rely o n state guarantees t o a f f o r d greater p r o t e c t i o n t h a n was available under the 1 2 5

I n free-speech cases, "the Supreme Court, with one exception, uniformly found against free speech claimants." See David M . Rabban, "The First Amendment in Its Forgot­ ten Years," Yale Law Journal 90 (January 1981): 520. For further documentation, see Russell B. Nye, Fettered Freedom: Civil Liberties and the Slavery Controversy, 1830-1860 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963); Norman L . Rosenberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel (Chapel H i l l : University of N o r t h Carolina Press, 1986); and Alexis J. Anderson, "The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory," American Journal of Legal History 24 (January 1980): 56-75. Whether or not correctly decided, the U.S. Supreme Court's religion rulings likewise reveal little sympathy for religious minorities. See, for example, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). National Law Journal, 29 September 1986, Special Section at S-l. 1 2 4

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federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . H o w e v e r , f r o m 1970 t o 1 9 8 6 , they d i d so i n over three h u n d r e d c a s e s . M o s t o f these rulings dated f r o m 1 9 7 7 o n w a r d , revealing an increasing p r o p e n s i t y t o rely o n state g u a r a n t e e s . One also finds s u p p o r t for Brennan's c l a i m i f one examines the substance o f the state r u l i n g s . O v e r the past q u a r t e r century, state courts have under­ t a k e n m a j o r initiatives i n v o l v i n g school finance, e x c l u s i o n a r y z o n i n g , the rights o f defendants, a n d the r i g h t t o privacy. I n several instances the state courts intervened because the U.S. Supreme C o u r t h a d refused t o g r a n t relief, and thus the initiatives w o u l d have been impossible w i t h o u t the n e w j u d i c i a l f e d e r a l i s m . 126

127

1 2 8

Yet this is n o t the w h o l e story. I f one is t o assess the i m p a c t o f this n e w state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l jurisprudence, one m u s t also e x a m i n e its overall ef­ fect o n civil-liberties l i t i g a t i o n . T h i s includes h o w often litigants b r o u g h t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claims before state courts, h o w often those courts based t h e i r rulings o n state rather t h a n federal law, a n d t o w h a t extent t h e i r reliance o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s resulted i n broader p r o t e c t i o n s for rights t h a n was available under the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e evidence o n these issues cautions against b l i t h e acceptance o f Justice Brennan's assessment. P r o p o n e n t s o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism have c l a i m e d t h a t i t i n ­ creased challenges t o state laws o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g r o u n d s i n lieu o f — o r , at a m i n i m u m , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h — f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l chal­ lenges. A l t h o u g h this is correct, a recent study revealed t h a t litigants chal­ lenged state statutes solely o n state g r o u n d s i n o n l y 2 2 percent o f the Collins, Galie, and Kincaid, "State High Courts," 142, table 1; and Ronald K . L . Collins and Peter J. Galie, "Models of Post-incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions," Publius 16 (summer 1986): 111. During 1990, for example, state supreme courts decided over 140 civil-liberties cases based either exclusively on state protections of rights or on a combination of federal and state protections. See "Developments in State Constitutional Law: 1990," Rutgers Law Journal 22 (summer 1991): 906-1033. The pertinent Supreme Court ruling on education is San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). For a survey of state initiatives on school finance, see "Symposium: Investing in Our Children's Future: School Finance Reform in the '90s," Harvard Journal of Legislation 28 (summer 1991): 293-568. The Supreme Court's ruling on exclusionary zoning is Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). For an analysis of state initiatives, see Tarr and Harrison, "Legitimacy and Capacity," 542-56. For surveys of Burger Court's rulings on the rights of defendants, see Richard Y. Funston, Constitutional Counterrevolution? (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1977); and Vincent Blasi, ed., The Burger Court: The Counter-revolution That Wasn't (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). For state rulings, see Barry Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991). O n the right to privacy under state constitutions, see M a r y Cornelia Porter w i t h Robyn M a r y O'Neill, "Personal Autonomy and the Limits of State Authority," in Friedelbaum, Human Rights. For an overview of state civil-liberties rulings, see Williams, State Constitutional Law. 1 2 6

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Twentieth Century

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167

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l cases c o m i n g before state supreme c o u r t s . M o s t o f these cases i n v o l v e d n o n - c i v i l - l i b e r t i e s issues, such as restrictions o n special legislation, spending a n d debt l i m i t a t i o n s , a n d the l i k e . I n over h a l f the c o u r t s ' civil-liberties cases, litigants c o n t i n u e d t o challenge state laws ex­ clusively o n the basis o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d i n o n l y 17 percent o f those cases d i d they challenge state laws exclusively o n state c o n s t i t u ­ tional g r o u n d s . T h u s , despite the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism, litigants c o n t i n u e t o rely p r i m a r i l y o n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n i n f r a m i n g their rights claims. 1 2 9

1 3 0

Proponents o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism have n o t e d t h a t state judges have increased their use o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees t o i n v a l i d a t e state statutes. Nonetheless, decisions based o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s r e m a i n a rather small p r o p o r t i o n o f state criminal-justice a n d civil-liberties r u l ­ ings. A study o f state r u l i n g s f r o m 1 9 8 1 t o 1985 f o u n d t h a t less t h a n 2 0 percent o f c r i m i n a l a n d b i l l - o f - r i g h t s cases were decided exclusively o n state law, a n d o n l y 2 0 percent m o r e o n a c o m b i n a t i o n o f state a n d federal law. O t h e r studies, focusing o n instances w h e n state courts h a d an o p p o r t u n i t y t o rely o n either federal or state guarantees, have r e p o r t e d similar findings. I n a study o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l cases decided by six state supreme courts i n 1 9 7 5 , Susan F i n o f o u n d t h a t o n l y 17 percent were resolved o n the basis o f state l a w . H e r analysis o f a l l e q u a l - p r o t e c t i o n cases decided by state supreme courts f r o m 1975 t o 1 9 8 4 f o u n d t h a t less t h a n 7 percent rested exclusively o n state guarantees, a n d these were m o s t l y cases i n v o l v i n g t r a d i t i o n a l state concerns, such as bar r e g u l a t i o n cases, Sunday-closing cases, inheritance cases, a n d the l i k e . I n another article, M i c h a e l Esler discovered t h a t despite the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f analo­ gous state a n d federal guarantees, state judges based their r u l i n g s e x c l u ­ sively o n federal l a w i n 78 percent o f the s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n cases they decided f r o m 1 9 8 1 t o 1 9 8 6 . T h u s , even i n recent decades, state judges have c o n t i n u e d t o rely p r i m a r i l y o n federal l a w i n r e s o l v i n g civil-liberties cases. 1 3 1

1 3 2

1 3 3

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Finally, p r o p o n e n t s o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism, f o l l o w i n g Justice B r e n n a n , have assumed t h a t reliance o n state declarations o f rights

Craig F. Emmert and Carol A n n Traut, "State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions, and Judicial Policymaking," Justice System Journal 16 (1992): 3 7 - 4 8 . Emmert and Traut, "State Supreme Courts," 44, table 2 (computed from "criminal rights" and " b i l l of rights" cases). Data in this paragraph are derived from Emmert and Traut, "State Supreme Courts," 42, table 1; 44, table 2; and 46, table 3. Fino, Role of Supreme Courts, 142. Fino, "Judicial Federalism and Equality," 6 1 . Michael Esler, "State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law," Judicature 78 (July-August 1994): 2 5 - 3 2 . 1 2 9

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w o u l d result i n greater p r o t e c t i o n for rights t h a n was available under the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . B u t i f state judges c o n f o r m their interpretations o f state guarantees t o federal precedent, t h e n reliance o n state g r o u n d s t o decide cases need n o t translate i n t o m o r e r i g h t s - a f f i r m i n g d e c i s i o n s .

135

In

a study o f state supreme c o u r t r u l i n g s i n c r i m i n a l - p r o c e d u r e cases de­ cided o n the basis o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , B a r r y Latzer f o u n d t h a t f r o m the late 1960s t o 1989 state judges r o u t i n e l y i n c o r p o r a t e d U.S. Supreme C o u r t doctrines i n t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w — i n d e e d , they a d o p t e d the C o u r t ' s reasoning i n over t w o - t h i r d s o f their c r i m i n a l - p r o c e d u r e sions.

1 3 6

deci­

Some o f the states t h a t were m o s t w i l l i n g t o base their rulings

o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees, such as C o n n e c t i c u t a n d N e w H a m p ­ shire, were also a m o n g those m o s t w i l l i n g t o endorse U.S. Supreme C o u r t doctrine.

1 3 7

M e a n w h i l e , C a l i f o r n i a a n d F l o r i d a , t w o states t h a t actively

rejected Supreme C o u r t d o c t r i n e , w e r e " b r o u g h t i n t o l i n e " d u r i n g the 1980s by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendments t h a t c o m p e l l e d c o n f o r m i t y w i t h federal l a w and, thereafter, substantially reduced their

opposition.

1 3 8

Based o n these findings, Latzer c o n c l u d e d t h a t there was a " h i d d e n c o n ­ s e r v a t i s m " i n the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism because state judges, instead o f independently developing state c i v i l liberties law, tended t o construe state a n d federal guarantees i d e n t i c a l l y .

1 3 9

I n s u m , w h e n state judges began t o t u r n t o their state declarations o f Proponents of the new judicial federalism have decried such a "lockstep" approach to state constitutional interpretation. O n the undesirability of lockstep analysis, see Robert F. Williams, " I n the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result," South Carolina Law Review 35 (1984): 3 5 3 - 4 0 4 . For a defense of lockstep analysis, see Earl M . Maitz, "Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 496 (March 1988): 9 8 - 1 0 6 . This issue is analyzed i n chapter 6. Latzer, State Constitutions, 1 6 0 - 6 1 , table 1. Unless otherwise indicated, data in this paragraph are drawn from that table. Latzer, State Constitutions, 165. The pertinent amendments are found in California Constitution, art. 1, sec. 28; and Florida Constitution, art. 1, sec. 12. For an in-depth analysis of the effects of the California amendment and of personnel changes that also contributed to the California Supreme Court's change in orientation, see Barry Latzer, "California's Constitutional Counterrevolu­ t i o n , " in Tarr, Constitutional Politics in States. M o r e impressionistic studies have supported Latzer's conclusion. Various commen­ tators have noted the failure of most state courts to develop a broader protection for speech and press than is available under the federal Constitution. See Susan Davis and Taunya Lovell Banks, "State Constitutions, Freedom of Expression, and Search and Seizure: Pros­ pects for State Court Reincarnation," Publius 17 (winter 1977): 1 3 - 3 1 ; and Simon, "Inde­ pendent but Inadequate." A study of state rulings in speech and religion cases found that they "continued to reflect the assumption that consideration of these issues should begin and, i n most instances, end w i t h federal precedent" and that state courts "characteristically relied on federal precedent and doctrine i n interpreting the state provisions" (Tarr, "State Constitutionalism," 39). 1 3 5

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rights i n the early 1970s, they were n o t recovering a t r a d i t i o n b u t creat­ i n g one. T h e i r u n f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h state guarantees, the absence o f a state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l jurisprudence, the easy a v a i l a b i l i t y o f federal d o c t r i n e a n d precedent, a n d qualms a b o u t the l e g i t i m a c y o f j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m a l l w o r k e d against the development o f state civil-liberties law. Yet, w i t h the occasional encouragement o f the U.S. Supreme C o u r t a n d the example o f a few p i o n e e r i n g state courts, state judges began t o rely m o r e frequently o n state declarations o f rights i n deciding c a s e s . State l a w d i d n o t displace federal l a w : f o r m o s t litigants a n d m o s t state courts, federal c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l l a w r e m a i n e d the p r i m a r y p r o t e c t i o n f o r r i g h t s a n d the p r i ­ m a r y source o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e . B u t state l a w d i d serve as a c o m ­ p l e m e n t t o — a n d occasionally an a n t i d o t e t o — f e d e r a l p r o n o u n c e m e n t s . Even this i n t e r m i t t e n t reliance o n state guarantees represented a m a j o r shift i n state j u d i c i a l practice. T h e r e i n v i g o r a t i o n o f a p p a r e n t l y obsoles­ cent state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s p r o d u c e d n o t o n l y l a n d m a r k rulings b u t also a changed j u d i c i a l perspective. 140

I n the future one can expect state judges t o p l a y an increasingly p r o m i ­ nent role i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development. For one t h i n g , the concern a b o u t the l e g i t i m a c y o f reliance o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees, w h i c h plagued the early years o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism, has largely been put to r e s t . For another, the e x p a n d i n g use o f the i n i t i a t i v e w i l l l i k e l y encourage a defensive resort t o state courts a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n s by the losers i n this n e w m a j o r i t a r i a n p o l i t i c s . S t a t u t o r y i n i t i a t i v e s m a y be chal­ lenged as v i o l a t i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d even c o n s t i t u t i o n a l initiatives m a y r u n a f o u l o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements g o v e r n i n g such i n i t i a ­ tives. T h e successful challenge t o California's P r o p o s i t i o n 115, w h i c h w o u l d have b a r r e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the state c o n s t i t u t i o n t o extend rights t o defendants b e y o n d those f o u n d i n the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n , reveals the p o t e n t i a l p a y o f f f r o m such l i t i g a t i o n . Finally, the increasingly c o n ­ servative d i r e c t i o n o f the U.S. Supreme C o u r t under C h i e f Justice R e h n ­ quist w i l l p r o m o t e an increased reliance o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , especially where distinctive state p r o v i s i o n s p r o m i s e a prospect o f success. O n e l i k e l y area for the e x p a n s i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i t i g a t i o n is c h u r c h state relations. Whereas the R e h n q u i s t C o u r t has signaled a n e w w i l l i n g 1 4 1

1 4 2

For examples of encouragement by the U.S. Supreme Court, see PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); for less encouraging signals from the Court, see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). But cf. Robert F. Williams, " I n the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Meth­ odology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudica­ tion," Notre Dame Law Review 72 (May 1997): 1015-64. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). For discussion, see Latzer, "Cali­ fornia's Constitutional Counterrevolution," 167-68. 1 4 0

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ness t o p e r m i t p u b l i c a i d t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t a i n thus encouraging l i t i g a n t s t o vouchers a n d other proposals

benefits r e l i g i o u s l y affiliated schools, m o s t stringent p r o v i s i o n s b a n n i n g such a i d , m o u n t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenges t o t o channel funds t o p a r o c h i a l s c h o o l s . 1 4 3

CONCLUSIONS Several sometimes-conflicting patterns emerge f r o m o u r d e s c r i p t i o n o f t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development. Perhaps the m o s t s t r i k i n g t r e n d is t o w a r d the p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. I l l u s t r a t i v e o f this shift is the decline o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n ­ v e n t i o n . I n the nineteenth c e n t u r y conventions served as a m e c h a n i s m f o r p o p u l a r influence o n p o l i t i c s , often called b y reluctant officials i n re­ sponse t o p o p u l a r pressures. B u t i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y far fewer c o n ­ ventions have been called, a n d t h e i r character has changed. Typically, i t has been p o l i t i c a l elites a n d professional reformers w h o have campaigned for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n , w i t h the populace reduced t o rejecting c o n ­ v e n t i o n calls a n d p r o p o s e d c o n s t i t u t i o n s t o register its distrust o f a p r o ­ cess t h a t i t n o longer feels i t c o n t r o l s . T h e professionalization o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change is also evident i n the increasing use o f c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l commissions, expert bodies established w i t h o u t p o p u l a r i n p u t , t o set the agenda o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change, i d e n t i f y i n g the p r o b l e m s t h a t deserve a t t e n t i o n a n d the a p p r o p r i a t e solutions t o those p r o b l e m s . Finally, the increased reliance o n piecemeal change p r o p o s e d by the legislature—constitutional amendment rather than constitutional r e v i s i o n — h a s also p r o d u c e d a shift i n p o w e r t o p o l i t i c a l professionals, w h o d o m i n a t e this largely invisible process. 1 4 4

Yet c o u n t e r i n g this shift t o the p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change d u r i n g the late t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y has been the renewed reliance o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e . O n e m a y w e l l debate the w i s d o m o f some o f the changes i n t r o d u c e d b y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e . Nevertheless, as the t e r m - l i m i t s a n d t a x - r e v o l t movements demonstrate, the i n i t i a t i v e does p r o v i d e a m e c h a n i s m f o r c i r c u m v e n t i n g the p o w e r o f p o l i t i c a l elites w i t h i n state g o v e r n m e n t , just as its early p r o p o n e n t s h a d expected. Still, its effectiveness i n ensuring p o p u l a r rule s h o u l d n o t be overstated. Less t h a n h a l f the states have a d o p t e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e . M o r e o v e r , there is a n ever-present danger t h a t the i n i t i a t i v e process m a y be c a p t u r e d For illustrative Supreme Court cases, see Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dis­ trict, 509 U.S. 1 (1993); and Agostini v. Felton, 118 S.Ct. 40 (1997). For discussion of state constitutional provisions banning aid to religious schools, see Tarr, "Church and State"; and Friesen, State Constitutional Law, chap. 4. I n recent years, of course, political elites have also ceased to campaign for constitu­ tional conventions, presumably fearful of the radical changes that might result. 1 4 3

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by interest groups o r b y entrepreneurial p o l i t i c i a n s b a c k i n g (and some­ times i n i t i a t i n g ) proposals a n d thus cease t o reflect p o p u l a r concerns. A second m a j o r change d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y has been the i n ­ creased influence o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l practice o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . I n p a r t , the greater i m p o r t a n c e o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n has o c c u r r e d t h r o u g h displacement. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y were matters o f state concern, such as qualifications for the franchise, the a p p o r t i o n m e n t o f legislative power, a n d c r i m i n a l procedure, are n o w largely c o n t r o l l e d by federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l standards. So t o o t o a considerable extent are p o l i c y issues, such as economic regula­ t i o n , t h a t were t r a d i t i o n a l l y state matters. These developments have ren­ dered v a r i o u s state p r o v i s i o n s either insignificant o r superfluous. I n p a r t t o o , the greater federal influence has resulted f r o m endorsement o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n as the preferred m o d e l f o r state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l revi­ sion. T h i s elevation o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n is reflected b o t h i n the later prescriptions f o r comprehensive r e v i s i o n o f the N a t i o n a l M u n i c i p a l League a n d i n specific reforms, such as the c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f state executive branches, sought by reformers. A l l states t h a t have revised t h e i r c o n s t i t u ­ tions d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y have m o v e d closer t o the federal m o d e l , a n d m a n y states t h a t d i d n o t revise their c o n s t i t u t i o n s nonetheless i n a u g u ­ rated changes (e.g., c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f their executive branches) consistent w i t h t h a t m o d e l . T h u s the structure o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s over t i m e has become m o r e u n i f o r m . Finally, even as state judges asserted t h e i r p o w e r t o i n t e r p r e t their c o n s t i t u t i o n s independently o f the r u l i n g s o f the U.S. Su­ preme C o u r t , t h e i r a p p r o a c h t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n increasingly m i r r o r e d t h a t o f federal judges. T h i s influence was p a r t i c u l a r l y clear w i t h regard t o the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism, w h i c h was spawned i n r e a c t i o n t o the Burger C o u r t a n d e m b o d i e d the m o d e l o f j u d i c i a l a c t i v i s m pioneered by the W a r r e n C o u r t . T a k e n altogether, t h e n these developments have fueled w h a t L a w r e n c e F r i e d m a n has described as "a t r e n d t o w a r d a single legal c u l t u r e — a t r e n d t h a t is persistent, genuine a n d s i g n i f i c a n t . " 1 4 5

Yet just as the states' e m u l a t i o n o f federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l structure a n d practice has its l i m i t s , so t o o does the m o v e m e n t t o w a r d a c o m m o n legal c u l t u r e . These l i m i t s are reflected i n the states' u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o depart t o o m u c h f r o m e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d practices, as demonstrated by p o p u l a r refusal t o authorize c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n s , by voters' rejec­ t i o n o f several r e f o r m c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d b y the l i m i t e d changes i n t r o ­ duced by m a n y charters t h a t were a d o p t e d . Even i n the late t w e n t i e t h 1 4 6

Friedman, History of American Law, 663. For a discussion of the politics of state constitution-making as a conflict between reform and status quo forces, and for an analysis of the consequences of this for constitu­ tional reform, see Cornwell, Goodman, and Swanson, State Constitutional Conventions. 1 4 5

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century, few state c o n s t i t u t i o n s m i r r o r the M o d e l State C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e l i m i t s o n state e m u l a t i o n o f federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m are also reflected i n the recent shift i n p o p u l a r views a b o u t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m . T h e n e w state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reformers d i d n o t get t h e i r ideas f r o m the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n ; rather, they disparaged t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n or, at least, the g o v e r n m e n t created by i t . Instead, the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms they pur­ sued were designed t o p r o d u c e m o r e chastened state governments. I r o n ­ ically, d u r i n g the 1980s a n d 1990s i t was state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t p r o ­ v i d e d the m o d e l f o r p r o p o n e n t s o f n a t i o n a l reforms such as the balancedbudget a m e n d m e n t , the line i t e m veto, a n d t e r m l i m i t a t i o n s . I f federal a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m are t o g r o w closer, the m o v e m e n t m a y be o n b o t h sides rather t h a n o n the state side alone. Finally, the states have persisted i n practices t h a t are w i t h o u t federal analogue, such as their frequent recourse t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. To some extent, the conflicting trends described i n this chapter reflect the fact t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y has been i n i t i a t e d i n a variety o f p o l i t i c a l arenas. T h e groups a n d perspectives be­ h i n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes i n i t i a t e d i n one a r e n a — f o r example, a state l e g i s l a t u r e — m a y w e l l differ f r o m those b e h i n d changes p r o p o s e d by c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l conventions, state supreme courts, o r the i n i t i a t i v e process. W h e t h e r the changes are comprehensive o r piecemeal, necessary adjust­ ments o r shifts i n p o l i c y w i l l also depend o n the arena i n w h i c h they are i n t r o d u c e d . Indeed, different understandings o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l de­ sign m a y also, i m p l i c i t l y o r e x p l i c i t l y , underlie changes u n d e r t a k e n i n different arenas. For example, p r o p o n e n t s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n t y p ­ ically seek t o a d o p t a brief f r a m e w o r k f o r g o v e r n m e n t t h a t w i l l p r o m o t e v i g o r o u s g o v e r n m e n t , whereas those s u p p o r t i n g initiatives are a t t e m p t ­ ing t o include p o l i c y p r o v i s i o n s i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d thereby reduce legislative d i s c r e t i o n . These m u l t i p l e i n p u t s c o m p l i c a t e the task o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l interpreta­ t i o n . Interpreters o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , whatever their differences i n a p p r o a c h , share the belief t h a t the d o c u m e n t has a f u n d a m e n t a l coher­ ence, such t h a t one can interpret i n d i v i d u a l p r o v i s i o n s i n the l i g h t o f the o v e r a l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design. For interpreters o f a state c o n s t i t u t i o n , given the document's m u l t i p l e sources, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l coherence remains an o p e n question. O t h e r interpretive p r o b l e m s arise f r o m the p e r i o d i c r e v i s i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l states, f r o m the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d f r o m the tendency o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s t o b o r r o w p r o v i s i o n s f r o m other c o n s t i t u t i o n s . I t is t o these distinctive p r o b l e m s o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t this v o l u m e n o w turns.

CHAPTER

6

State Constitutional Interpretation

T H E E M E R G E N C E d u r i n g the early 1970s o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism, the increasing reliance by state courts o n state declarations o f rights, co­ incided w i t h a r e v i v a l o f interest i n j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l concerns a m o n g c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l s c h o l a r s . T h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f these developments m i g h t have p r o v e d f o r t u i t o u s . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y c o u l d have offered guidance t o jurists a n d scholars as they u n d e r t o o k the task o f i n t e r p r e t i n g state c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n s ; w h i l e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists c o u l d have benefited f r o m e x p a n d i n g their focus b e y o n d the U n i t e d States C o n s t i t u t i o n . U n f o r ­ tunately, the dialogue between c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists a n d state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l scholars never developed, however. State c o n s t i t u t i o n a l scholars have largely i g n o r e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theory, a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists have c o n t i n u e d t o focus almost exclusively o n the U n i t e d States Constitution. 1

2

T h i s chapter bridges the gap between c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w by o u t l i n i n g an a p p r o a c h t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n f o r m e d by the insights o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists. I n do­ ing so, i t demonstrates the usefulness for state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l interpreta­ t i o n o f c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theories. A t the same t i m e , by iden­ t i f y i n g distinctive concerns a n d p r o b l e m s associated w i t h the interpreta­ t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , i t clarifies the l i m i t a t i o n s o f those c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l theories and thus serves a c a u t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n . I n i t i a l l y , the chapter assesses challenges t o the legitimacy o f state courts r e l y i n g o n state c o n ­ stitutions t o strike d o w n g o v e r n m e n t a l actions. N e x t , i t responds t o claims t h a t i t is impossible t o develop a coherent state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u ­ risprudence. Finally, i t examines h o w the frequency o f state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l change, the level o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e t a i l , the o p e r a t i o n o f h o r i z o n Major contributions to the constitutional-theory literature include Ely, Democracy and Distrust; Robert Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: Free Press, 1990); Ronald Dworkin, Takings Rights Seriously, and A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard Uni­ versity Press, 1985); Perry, The Constitution, the Courts; Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue; Barber, What the Constitution Means; Levinson, Constitutional Faith; and Leslie Friedman Goldstein, In Defense of the Text: Democracy and Constitutional Theory (Savage, M d . : Rowman and Littlefield, 1991). Exceptions include Hans A . Linde, "E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts," Georgia Law Review 18 (winter 1984): 165-200; David R. Keyser, "State Consti­ tutions and Theories of Judicial Review: Some Variations on a Theme," Texas Law Review 63 ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1985): 1051-80; and Tarr, "Constitutional Theory." 1

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t a l federalism, a n d a v a r i e t y o f other factors associated w i t h the design a n d development o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s create n o v e l p r o b l e m s f o r state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l interpreters. I n its e x a m i n a t i o n o f these p r o b l e m s , the chapter suggests an a p p r o a c h t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t is g u i d e d by, b u t n o t d e t e r m i n e d by, c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theories.

L E G I T I M A C Y A N D STATE C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I N T E R P R E T A T I O N

The Legitimacy

Issue in State Constitutional

Law

C o n s t i t u t i o n a l scholars have l o n g devoted almost as m u c h a t t e n t i o n t o l e g i t i m a c y concerns ( w h e n m a y judges substitute their j u d g m e n t f o r t h a t o f other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l interpreters, a n d w i t h w h a t deference t o the views o f those other interpreters?) as they have t o substantive ones ( w h a t is the m e a n i n g o f p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s ? ) . Concerns a b o u t the l e g i t i m a c y o f j u d i c i a l rulings under the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n have arisen p r i m a r i l y w h e n the U.S. Supreme C o u r t has i n v a l i d a t e d the actions o f Congress o r state legislatures, p u r p o r t e d l y m o r e democratic bodies, espe­ c i a l l y w h e n the C o u r t i n d o i n g so has a r g u a b l y gone " b e y o n d the value j u d g m e n t s established by the framers o f the w r i t t e n C o n s t i t u t i o n . " H o w e v e r , this " c o u n t e r - m a j o r i t a r i a n d i f f i c u l t y " has been a less significant c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w . Perhaps this is because state judges have by a n d large been less aggressive t h a n t h e i r federal counter­ parts i n i n v a l i d a t i n g state legislation o r because the relative ease o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t has made u n p o p u l a r rulings easier t o over­ t u r n . O r i t m a y s i m p l y be t h a t m a n y state judges are p o p u l a r l y elected 3

4

5

The classic account of the legitimacy issue dates from the nineteenth century: James Bradley Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review 7 (October 1893): 129-56. Subsequent accounts have tended to coincide w i t h periods in which the Supreme Court has announced controversial rulings. See, for example, Alexander M . Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962); Eugene V. Rostow, The Sovereign Prerogative: The Supreme Court and the Quest for Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," Har­ vard Law Review 73 (September 1959): 1-35; and the works cited i n note 1. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, i x . Such rulings are controversial because of the widely shared belief that "society consents to be governed undemocratically [only] within defined areas by certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution." See Robert Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," Indiana Law Journal 47 (fall 1971): 1-35. This is not to say that commentators have failed to raise the specter of countermajoritarianism. See, for example, Earl M . Maitz, "The Dark Side of State Court Activism," Texas Law Review 63 ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1985): 995-1023; Paul S. Hudnut, "State Constitu­ tions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint," Denver University Law Re­ view 63 (1985): 85-108; and Twist and Munsil, "Double Threat." 3

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a n d thus can c l a i m t o be at least s o m e w h a t accountable t o the p e o p l e . W h a t e v e r the reason, debate a b o u t the legitimacy o f state j u d i c i a l r u l i n g s , at least i n recent years, has focused o n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between state courts a n d the U.S. Supreme C o u r t . T h e m a i n issue has i n v o l v e d w h e n state courts are justified i n i n t e r p r e t i n g their state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t o reach results different f r o m those o b t a i n e d by the Supreme C o u r t i n interpret­ i n g the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . Just as advocates o f j u d i c i a l restraint at the n a t i o n a l level have argued t h a t judges s h o u l d defer t o the j u d g m e n t s o f the people's representatives, so their c o u n t e r p a r t s at the state level have insisted t h a t state judges s h o u l d defer t o the interpretations o f the Su­ preme C o u r t a n d construe state p r o v i s i o n s i n line w i t h the interpretations t h a t the Supreme C o u r t has given t o analogous p r o v i s i o n s o f the federal Constitution. 6

7

There are o b v i o u s parallels between the l e g i t i m a c y debates i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w a n d i n federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. I n b o t h instances, the key issue is w h e t h e r a p r e s u m p t i o n o f v a l i d i t y s h o u l d be given t o the n o n a u t h o r i t a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u d g m e n t o f a p r i o r interpreter a n d , i f so, h o w strong t h a t p r e s u m p t i o n s h o u l d be. I n b o t h instances as w e l l , the j u s t i f i c a t i o n offered for j u d i c i a l deference emphasizes the p o s i t i o n occu­ p i e d by the p r i o r interpreter. I n federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law, the legislature t h a t enacted the challenged statute can c l a i m the m a n t l e o f p o p u l a r sover­ eignty; i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law, the U.S. Supreme C o u r t is recognized as the highest c o u r t i n the l a n d . M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , the concern u n d e r l y ­ i n g the legitimacy controversy i n b o t h federal a n d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w is the same: t o ensure t h a t j u d g m e n t s are g r o u n d e d i n l a w rather t h a n i n the judges' p o l i c y preferences. W h e n t w o sets o f interpreters reach the same o u t c o m e i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l case, this increases confidence t h a t the

Supreme court justices in twenty-three states are selected in either partisan or nonpar­ tisan elections. Justices in twenty other states are chosen through "merit selection" and thus must run in retention elections after a period on the bench. For data on modes of judicial selection, see Tarr, Judicial Process, 67, table 3-1. In some states not only are judges elected but the state constitutions explicitly confer on them the power of judicial review. See, for example, Colorado Constitution, art. 2, sec. 15; Georgia Constitution, art. 1, sec. 2, par. 5; and N o r t h Dakota Constitution, art. 6, sec. 4. Major contributions to the literature on this problem include Robert F. Williams, " I n the Shadow," "Methodology Problems i n Enforcing State Constitutional Rights," Georgia State University Law Review 3 (fall-winter 1987): 143-77, and "Glare of Supreme Court"; Ronald K . L . Collins, "The Once and Future 'New Judicial Federalism' and Its Critics," Washington Law Review 64 (January 1989): 5 - 1 8 ; Hans A . Linde, "Without Due Process," "Are State Constitutions Common Law?" Arizona Law Review 34 (summer 1992): 2 1 5 - 2 9 , and "E Pluribus"; Robin B. Johansen, "The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution," Stanford Law Review 29 (January 1977): 2 9 7 - 3 2 1 ; Maitz, "Dark Side of Activism"; and Friesen, State Constitutional Law, chap. 1. 6

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result is r o o t e d i n l a w rather t h a n i n w i l l . B u t w h e n their interpretations diverge, t w o conclusions are possible. I t m a y be t h a t the issue is one o n w h i c h there is n o r i g h t answer, i n w h i c h case advocates o f j u d i c i a l re­ s t r a i n t at b o t h the federal a n d state levels w o u l d , given the p o s i t i o n o f the i n i t i a l interpreter, o p t for deference. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i t m a y be t h a t one o f the interpreters has i n t e r p r e t e d the p e r t i n e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n w r o n g l y by mistake or by design i n order t o p r o m o t e the interpreter's o w n value preferences. T o ensure t h a t the disagreement does n o t result f r o m i l l e g i t i m a t e j u d i c i a l p o l i c y preferences, advocates o f restraint w o u l d require later interpreters t o p r o v i d e persuasive arguments t h a t an earlier i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was m i s t a k e n before o v e r r i d i n g i t . I f the later interpreters were unable t o d o so, they w o u l d be o b l i g e d t o defer t o t h a t interpreta­ t i o n . T o d o otherwise w o u l d fuel the suspicion t h a t their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was r o o t e d i n w i l l rather t h a n i n j u d g m e n t . 8

9

I t is w o r t h emphasizing t h a t the m a i n l e g i t i m a c y debate i n state consti­ t u t i o n a l l a w does n o t extend t o a l l state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l i n g s . F o r this l e g i t i m a c y p r o b l e m t o arise, state courts m u s t be i n t e r p r e t i n g state p r o v i ­ sions t h a t are analogous t o those i n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n o r t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e principles, such as the separation o f p o w e r s , t h a t are i m ­ p l i c i t i n the federal charter. M a n y state p r o v i s i o n s — f o r example, those dealing w i t h t a x a t i o n o r c o r p o r a t i o n s or local g o v e r n m e n t — h a v e n o fed­ eral c o u n t e r p a r t , a n d thus their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n raises n o issue o f legit­ imacy. I n a d d i t i o n , f o r the question o f l e g i t i m a c y t o arise, the Supreme C o u r t m u s t have i n t e r p r e t e d the p e r t i n e n t federal p r o v i s i o n p r i o r t o the state c o u r t being called u p o n t o i n t e r p r e t the analogous state p r o v i ­ sions. I f a state c o u r t h a d i n t e r p r e t e d a state p r o v i s i o n p r i o r t o the Supreme C o u r t r u l i n g o n the analogous federal p r o v i s i o n , a n d i f defer­ ence t o the Court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w o u l d require the a b a n d o n m e n t o f an 1 0

11

See Robert M . Cover, "The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation," William and Mary Law Review 22 (summer 1981): 6 3 9 - 8 2 . Some constitutional theorists deny that there is no right answer, even in difficult cases. See, for example, D w o r k i n , A Matter of Principle, chap. 5. However, if there is no right answer, then the later interpreter has the discretion to impose additional requirements be­ yond those imposed by the initial interpreter. A t this point, however, the argument for judicial restraint in order to allow a wider scope for popular government may also play a role. See Maitz, "Lockstep Analysis," 1 0 1 - 2 . The secondary legitimacy issue in state constitutional law—whether state judges should overturn legislative enactments whenever they believe the enactments to be inconsis­ tent w i t h the state constitution or should defer to the judgment of the people's representatives—could arise in a wider range of cases. However, this paragraph ignores that issue to concentrate on the more fundamental legitimacy issue. Robert F. Williams has referred to such cases as "second-look" cases. See the discus­ sion i n Williams, " I n the Shadow," 356. 8

9

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established b o d y o f state law, p r e s u m a b l y t h a t w o u l d raise a rather differ­ ent q u e s t i o n . 12

T h e c o n d i t i o n s allegedly j u s t i f y i n g deference t o Supreme C o u r t r u l i n g s are met m o s t frequently w h e n state courts are i n t e r p r e t i n g their state declarations o f r i g h t s . Indeed, the l e g i t i m a c y debate i n state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n emerged p r i m a r i l y because o f changes i n c i v i l liberties l i t i g a t i o n . T h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f various p r o v i s i o n s o f the federal B i l l o f R i g h t s , w h i c h began i n the 1920s a n d accelerated d u r i n g the 1960s, t r a n s f o r m e d the Supreme Court's agenda a n d led i t t o elaborate c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e o n issues such as freedom o f speech, equality, and the rights o f defendants. T h e Court's receptivity t o civil-liberties claims also encouraged litigants t o direct their claims t o federal rather t h a n state t r i b u n a l s , thereby decreasing o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o develop state civil-liberties law. Even w h e n civil-liberties claims arose i n state f o r u m s , as often they d i d i n c r i m i n a l cases, defendants tended t o base their claims o n the fed­ eral B i l l o f R i g h t s , assuming t h a t state protections at best merely d u p l i ­ cated federal guarantees. As a result, w h e n state courts began t o interpret their states' civil-liberties guarantees i n the 1970s, they d i d n o t w r i t e o n a b l a n k slate. Rather, federal l a w " f u r n i s h e d the intellectual baggage, the doctrines a n d precedents, t h a t state courts judges b r o u g h t w i t h t h e m i n c o n f r o n t i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s . T h u s , the emergence o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism t o o k place i n the c o n t e x t o f an existing b o d y o f federal civil-liberties l a w a n d an almost t o t a l absence o f state c i v i l liberties law. 1 3

14

Attacks

on the Legitimacy

of State

Constitutional

Rulings

A l t h o u g h i t is n o t u n c o m m o n for dissenting justices o r other c o m m e n t a ­ tors t o attack j u d i c i a l decisions as r o o t e d i n the p o l i t i c a l views o f their a u t h o r s rather t h a n i n the law, the attacks o n state civil-liberties rulings have been p a r t i c u l a r l y frequent a n d s h a r p . I n p a r t , the n o v e l t y o f the 1 5

There have in fact been instances in which state courts have interpreted their state guarantees and later changed their interpretations to bring them into line w i t h subsequent Supreme Court interpretations of federal provisions. See, for example, Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. A p p . 1983), and State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983). More typical, however, is the position taken by the N e w York Court of Appeals in People v. Class, 494 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1986). Other analogous provisions are found in state executive and legislative articles. For a useful examination of the influence of federal constitutional law on state constitutional law in a non-civil-liberties field, see Levinson, "Decline of Legislative Veto." Tarr and Porter, State Supreme Courts, 2 1 - 2 2 . Illustrative of state judicial opinions attacking reliance on state constitutional law are State v. Miller, 630 A . 2 d 1315, 1328 (Conn. 1993) (Callahan, J., concurring in part and 1 2

1 3

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rulings explains this: state c o u r t s ' recurrence t o a n d reliance o n state rights guarantees i n the 1970s was, quite literally, u n p r e c e d e n t e d . State courts h a d never developed a b o d y o f state civil-liberties l a w . A n d f o r decades they h a d l o o k e d t o federal l a w a n d federal precedent t o resolve civil-liberties issues, either i g n o r i n g their state guarantees altogether o r assuming w i t h o u t serious reflection t h a t the p r o t e c t i o n s conferred by those guarantees c o i n c i d e d w i t h those available under federal p r o v i s i o n s . Yet n o v e l t y alone c a n n o t e x p l a i n the r e a c t i o n ; f o r despite the p r o l i f e r a ­ t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l i n g s i n the 1980s a n d 1990s, l e g i t i m a c y concerns have r e m a i n e d a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o some c o m m e n t a t o r s , g r o w n even m o r e s e v e r e . 16

1 7

18

E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t i n r a i s i n g l e g i t i m a c y concerns were the t i m i n g a n d the t e n o r o f early state r u l i n g s under the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism. State courts discovered state declarations o f rights o n l y after personnel shifts o n the U.S. Supreme C o u r t h a d c h a n g e d — o r threatened t o change—the C o u r t ' s o r i e n t a t i o n . Indeed, m o s t early n e w j u d i c i a l federalism cases i n v o l v e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claims b y defendants i n c r i m i n a l cases, an area i n w h i c h the Burger C o u r t gave early evidence o f r e t r e n c h m e n t . Defen­ dants u r g e d state courts either t o e x t e n d the precedents o f the W a r r e n C o u r t o r t o c i r c u m v e n t the Burger C o u r t ' s erosion o f W a r r e n C o u r t pre­ cedents b y i n t e r p r e t i n g state guarantees m o r e b r o a d l y t h a n the Burger C o u r t h a d i n t e r p r e t e d analogous federal p r o t e c t i o n s . F o r example, after the U.S. Supreme C o u r t i n Harris v. New York ( 1 9 7 3 ) p e r m i t t e d the i n ­ t r o d u c t i o n o f illegally o b t a i n e d confessions f o r i m p e a c h m e n t purposes, defendants i n ten states called o n state courts t o bar the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f such evidence under their state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d f o u r state courts ac1 9

20

dissenting in part); People v. Scott and People v. Keta, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1356 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 2 8 3 - 8 4 (Cal. 1976) (Rich­ ardson, J., dissenting); People v. Norman, 538 P.2d 237, 245 (Cal. 1975) (Clark, J., dissent­ ing); People v. Cannon, 310 N.E.2d 673 (111. 1974); and State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202 (Ore. 1974). For confirmation of the novelty of the new judicial federalism, see Tarr, "Past and Future," 64-69. For a state-by-state survey of selected aspects of civil-liberties law that confirms that assessment, see "Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights," Har­ vard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 8 (March 1973): 323-50. Williams, "Glare of Supreme Court." O n the anticipated and actual consequences of the shift from the Warren Court to the Burger Court, see James F. Simon, In His Own Image: The Supreme Court in Richard Nixon's America (New York: David McKay, 1973); Funston, Constitutional Counterrevolution? and Blasi, The Burger Court. O f course, state courts' new attention to state declarations of rights was a response to the arguments of litigants, w h o were fearful of Supreme Court review of their cases. See Latzer, State Constitutions; and Abrahamson, "Criminal Law." 1 6

1 7

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1 9

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cepted the i n v i t a t i o n . A n d after the Burger C o u r t reversed W a r r e n C o u r t d o c t r i n e o n issuing search w a r r a n t s predicated o n i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m i n f o r m a n t s , courts i n t h i r t y states addressed the issue, w i t h eleven rejecting the Burger C o u r t p o s i t i o n . I n cases n o t i n v o l v i n g the rights o f defendants, the arguments advanced by p l a i n t i f f s likewise h a d a l i b e r a l tenor, u r g i n g state courts t o extend protections unavailable under the federal charter. E a r l y rulings i n v o l v i n g p u b l i c - s c h o o l finance a n d e x c l u ­ sionary z o n i n g illustrate the p o i n t . T h e consistently l i b e r a l t h r u s t o f r u l i n g s under the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism led critics t o charge t h a t justices o n state courts were r e l y i n g o n state l a w merely t o advance a l i b e r a l policy agenda. 2 1

2 2

2 3

24

These suspicions were fueled by the i n t e r m i t t e n t a n d reactive character o f state c o u r t s ' early reliance o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . M o s t state courts c o n t i n u e d t o rely o n federal l a w t o resolve m o s t civil-liberties cases, re­ v e r t i n g t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w o n l y w h e n i t w o u l d y i e l d a result u n o b ­ tainable under federal l a w . Even w h e n r u l i n g o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g r o u n d s , state courts seldom developed distinctive c o n s t i t u t i o n a l argu­ ments, instead r e l y i n g o n federal precedents a n d federal d o c t r i n a l catego­ ries i n i n t e r p r e t i n g state guarantees. Indeed, they n o t i n f r e q u e n t l y em­ braced the views o f C o u r t dissenters as the bases for their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 2 5

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). For a listing and discussion of these cases, see Latzer, State Constitutions, 9 1 - 9 2 . Two of the states that rejected Harris—California and Pennsylvania—subsequently had their positions reversed by constitutional amendments. In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the Warren Court announced a complex "two-pronged" test for determining the validity of a warrant issued based on information from an informant. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Burger Court replaced this was a "totality of circumstances" approach. For a listing of state cases and discussion of them, see Latzer, State Constitutions, 58-59. The initial challenge to public school finance on state constitutional grounds was Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A . 2 d 273 (N.J. 1973). Reliance on state constitutions was neces­ sary after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a challenge under the equal protection clause in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). For an overview of school finance litigation, see "Symposium: Investing in Children's Future." The initial challenge to exclusionary zoning was Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.R v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A . 2 d 713 (N.J. 1975). Reliance on state constitutions was necessary after the Supreme Court's ruling in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), denying standing to sue to litigants complaining of exclusionary practices. See David L . Kirp, John P. Dwyer, and Larry A . Rosenthal, Our Town: Race, Housing, and the Soul of Suburbia (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1995). See, for example, Maitz, "Political Dynamic." This is consistent w i t h the position argued by many scholars and jurists, who have viewed state declarations of rights as supplementary to the federal Bill of Rights. See, for example, Stewart G. Pollock, "State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights," Rutgers Law Review 35 (September 1983): 7 0 7 - 2 2 . This "interstitial approach" is discussed below. 2 1

2 2

2 3

2 4

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o f state p r o v i s i o n s , thus l o o k i n g t o federal rulings b u t using t h e m t o reach results different f r o m those o f the Supreme C o u r t . T h e legal literature e x t o l l i n g the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism also p r o m p t e d concerns t h a t j u d i c i a l reliance o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s was o p p o r t u n i s t i c r a t h e r t h a n p r i n c i p l e d . M a n y early advocates o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federal­ i s m were r e m a r k a b l y b l a t a n t i n their r e s u l t - o r i e n t a t i o n . T h u s , D o n a l d W i l k e s a p p l a u d e d state c o u r t s ' use o f their state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t o "evade" Burger C o u r t r u l i n g s , a n d articles i n leading l a w reviews encouraged judges t o t u r n t o state p r o v i s i o n s t o reach desired r u l i n g s . Even Justice W i l l i a m Brennan's famous endorsement o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism m a d e clear t h a t its purpose was an end r u n a r o u n d conservative Supreme C o u r t r u l i n g s . I n such circumstances, i t was easy for critics t o a t t r i b u t e t o state judges the motives o f the litigants a n d c o m m e n t a t o r s w h o urged t h e m t o embrace state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law. 2 6

2 7

Dealing

with

Legitimacy

Concerns

THE LOCKSTEP APPROACH

O b v i o u s l y , one w a y t o banish legitimacy concerns is for state courts t o eschew independent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l analysis a n d c o n f o r m their rulings t o federal precedent. A c c o r d i n g t o its p r o p o n e n t s , such a "lockstep ap­ p r o a c h " also has the advantage o f p r o m o t i n g a desirable n a t i o n a l unifor­ m i t y a n d s i m p l i f y i n g the task o f officials seeking t o u n d e r s t a n d a n d a p p l y the l a w . F l o r i d a by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t i n 1982 m a n d a t e d just such a "lockstep a p p r o a c h " i n search-and-seizure cases, r e q u i r i n g t h a t the state guarantee "be construed i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the 4 t h A m e n d m e n t t o the U n i t e d States C o n s t i t u t i o n , as interpreted by the U n i t e d States Su­ preme C o u r t . " Even i n the absence o f s i m i l a r amendments, some state 2 8

2 9

Donald E. Wilkes Jr. presented his position in a series of three articles: " N e w Federal­ ism," " M o r e on New Federalism," and " N e w Federalism Revisited." The other relevant articles are "Project Report," 3 1 3 - 1 5 ; and "Note: Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions," Yale Law Journal 90 (November 1980): 165-88. A proponent of the new judicial federalism, nonetheless critical of this result-orientation, derided the use of state bills of rights as "little more than a handy grab bag filled w i t h a bevy of clauses that may be exploited in order to circumvent disfavored United States Supreme Court deci­ sions." See Ronald K. L . Collins, "Reliance on State Constitutions—Away from a Reac­ tionary Approach," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 9 (fall 1981): 2. 2 6

Brennan, "State Constitutions," 503. For a critical assessment of Justice Brennan's view of federalism, see Earl M . Maitz, "False Prophet—Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 15 (spring 1988): 429-49. For a convenient summary of these arguments, see Friesen, State Constitutional Law, 13-17. Florida Constitution of 1968, art. 1, sec. 12. See Christopher Slobogin, "State Adop2 7

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courts have c o n c l u d e d t h a t state guarantees m i r r o r analogous federal protections. I n Brown v. State ( 1 9 8 3 ) , for example, the Texas C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l Appeals c o n c l u d e d t h a t the search-and-seizure p r o v i s i o n s o f the Texas a n d federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s "are, i n a l l m a t e r i a l aspects, the s a m e . " A n d i n State v. Jackson ( 1 9 8 3 ) , the M o n t a n a Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t its state guarantee against s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n "affords n o greater p r o t e c t i o n t h a n t h a t o f the Federal c o n s t i t u t i o n " a n d t h a t " [ t ] h e o p i n i o n s o f the 3 0

U n i t e d States Supreme C o u r t , therefore, delineate the m a x i m u m b r e a d t h o f the privilege o f s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n i n M o n t a n a . " 3 1

Yet absent a p r o v i s i o n like Florida's l i n k i n g state a n d federal inter­ p r e t a t i o n , neither the desire t o reduce legitimacy concerns n o r p r u d e n t i a l arguments for u n i f o r m i t y can justify the lockstep a p p r o a c h ; for t h a t ap­ p r o a c h is inconsistent w i t h the nation's c o m m i t m e n t t o d u a l c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l i s m . U n d e r the system o f d u a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , state supreme courts have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f p r o v i d i n g the a u t h o r i t a t i v e interpreta­ t i o n o f their state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d they c a n n o t legitimately delegate t h a t responsibility t o the Supreme C o u r t by b i n d i n g themselves t o its r u l i n g s . I n a d d i t i o n , the system o f d u a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m was o r i g i n a t e d t o p r o v i d e a " d o u b l e security" for rights, a n d t h a t security w o u l d be lost i f states abdicated their responsibility t o interpret their declarations o f r i g h t s . O b v i o u s l y , some state guarantees m i r r o r federal p r o t e c t i o n s — i t 3 2

3 3

tion of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's 'Forced Linkage' Amendment," Uni­ versity of Florida Law Review 39 (summer 1987): 653-732. California attempted to adopt an even broader forced-linkage amendment, requiring thirteen separate guarantees to be interpreted no more broadly than the federal Bill of Rights, but that amendment was struck down by the California Supreme Court in Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). For discussion of this provision, see Latzer, "California's Constitutional Counterrevolution. " Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 260 (Mont. 1983). For a discussions of Jackson, see Abrahamson, "Criminal Law," 1166-68; and Collins, "Reliance on State Constitutions." The prudential arguments for uniformity of interpretation are questionable. Take, for instance, the claim that uniformity would simplify the task of officials, such as police offi­ cers, responsible for applying the law. The fact that legal standards are derived from t w o documents does not increase the difficulty of applying those standards. A single standard (the most rights-protective) is applied, whether its source is the state constitution, its federal counterpart, or both. In addition, state courts' adoption of the federal standard produces clarity only i f the federal standard is by definition clearer than possible state standards. Yet there is little reason to believe that i n theory or to expect that in practice, especially given the Supreme Court's well-documented difficulties in such fields as religious liberty and search-and-seizure. Responses to the other prudential arguments for the lockstep approach are summarized in Friesen, State Constitutional Law, 1 3 - 1 7 . 3 0

3 1

3 2

The importance of dual constitutionalism as a double security for rights is addressed in Federalist no. 5 1 . O n the danger of state abdication, see Collins, "Reliance on State Constitutions." 3 3

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w o u l d be e x t r a o r d i n a r y i f "independent state c o n s t i t u t i o n s share[d] n o principles w i t h their federal c o u n t e r p a r t . " Yet the lockstep a p p r o a c h renders state rights guarantees superfluous, a d u b i o u s result given the deliberate a d o p t i o n o f these guarantees by state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s , i n some instances even after Supreme C o u r t rulings h a d made clear t h a t the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n protected against state v i o l a t i o n s o f rights. I n s u m , d u a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m obliges state supreme courts t o c o n d u c t an inde­ pendent i n q u i r y t o discover the principles e m b o d i e d i n their state consti­ t u t i o n s before considering w h e t h e r the state principles p a r a l l e l those f o u n d i n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . I n u n d e r t a k i n g this independent i n ­ q u i r y , a state c o u r t m a y o f course consult h o w the Supreme C o u r t has i n t e r p r e t e d analogous federal p r o v i s i o n s , just as i t m a y consult h o w other state courts have interpreted their c o u n t e r p a r t guarantees. B u t i f a state c o u r t decides t o c o n f o r m its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a state p r o v i s i o n t o the Supreme Court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f an analogous federal p r o v i s i o n , this decision has t o be based o n the persuasiveness o f the C o u r t ' s a r g u m e n t rather t h a n o n the Court's p o s i t i o n i n the legal hierarchy. M o r e o v e r , the state's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f its c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y n o t change thereafter even i f the Supreme C o u r t altered its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the fed­ eral C o n s t i t u t i o n . 3 4

3 5

THE SUPPLEMENTAL/INTERSTITIAL APPROACH

E q u a l l y unsuccessful i n dealing w i t h legitimacy concerns is a second a p p r o a c h t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the supplemental o r inter­ stitial a p p r o a c h . T h i s a p p r o a c h seeks t o m i n i m i z e l e g i t i m a c y questions by l i m i t i n g the frequency o f rulings based o n state declarations o f rights. T h u s , under this a p p r o a c h , w h e n state laws or officiai actions are chal­ lenged o n b o t h federal a n d state g r o u n d s , state courts w o u l d address the federal c l a i m first. O n l y i f r e s o l u t i o n o f the federal c l a i m d i d n o t resolve the case w o u l d the state supreme c o u r t supplement this i n q u i r y i n t o fed­ eral l a w w i t h an e x a m i n a t i o n o f applicable state principles. T h e supple­ m e n t a l a p p r o a c h also seeks t o allay legitimacy concerns by r e d u c i n g the frequency o f divergent interpretations o f analogous state a n d federal p r o ­ visions t h r o u g h a p r e s u m p t i o n o f correctness f o r the Supreme C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f federal guarantees. U n d e r the supplemental a p p r o a c h , state departures f r o m federal decisional l a w have t o be justified; a n d i n the absence o f specific factors j u s t i f y i n g such a departure, state courts are o b l i g e d t o c o n f o r m their interpretations t o federal precedent. T o ensure t h a t such departures are p r i n c i p l e d rather t h a n o p p o r t u n i s t i c , p r o p o n e n t s Ellen A . Peters, "State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradi­ t i o n , " Michigan Law Review 84 (February-April 1986): 5 8 9 - 9 0 . Abrahamson, "Criminal Law," 1169. 3 4

3 5

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183

o f the supplemental a p p r o a c h have identified c r i t e r i a f o r divergence f r o m federal r u l i n g s i n those instances i n w h i c h state courts address state c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l issues, a n d they have c o m m i t t e d t o reaching divergent results i n subsequent cases o n l y w h e n those criteria are m e t . T h i s supplemental a p p r o a c h actually aggravates, rather t h a n allevi­ ates, l e g i t i m a c y concerns. Recall t h a t those concerns arose i n p a r t be­ cause courts relied o n state guarantees i n t e r m i t t e n t l y , o n l y w h e n they sought t o diverge f r o m Supreme C o u r t precedent. Yet the supplemen­ t a l a p p r o a c h produces behavior indistinguishable f r o m such reactive d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g by encouraging courts t o l o o k t o state guarantees o n l y w h e n a case c a n n o t be resolved o n federal g r o u n d s . I n a d d i t i o n , the es­ t a b l i s h m e n t o f c r i t e r i a j u s t i f y i n g divergent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n does n o t e l i m i ­ nate disagreement a n d accusations o f result-oriented r u l i n g s , because jus­ tices m a y still disagree a b o u t the a p p l i c a t i o n o f those c r i t e r i a i n specific cases. A l l t h a t the c r e a t i o n o f c r i t e r i a has done is i m p l y t h a t there is s o m e t h i n g d u b i o u s a b o u t independent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s . Finally, like the lockstep a p p r o a c h , the supplemental a p p r o a c h f o ­ cuses a t t e n t i o n o n the r e l a t i o n between state a n d federal interpretations rather t h a n o n the m o r e i m p o r t a n t question o f the best i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the state charter. As f o r m e r Justice H a n s L i n d e o f the O r e g o n Supreme C o u r t has observed: " [ T ] o ask w h e n t o diverge f r o m federal doctrines is quite a different question f r o m t a k i n g a p r i n c i p l e d v i e w o f the state's c o n s t i t u t i o n ; i n fact, this supplemental or i n t e r s t i t i a l a p p r o a c h prevents coherent d e v e l o p m e n t o f the state's l a w . " 3 6

3 7

THE PRIMACY/"FIRST THINGS FIRST" APPROACH N o such c r i t i c i s m can be made o f the final a p p r o a c h , the p r i m a c y ap­ p r o a c h , since i t largely ignores federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . H a n s L i n d e , the foremost e x p o n e n t o f this a p p r o a c h , has n o t e d t h a t federal r e v i e w o f alleged state v i o l a t i o n s o f rights t y p i c a l l y arises under the due The New Jersey Supreme Court announced a set of criteria for divergence from Su­ preme Court rulings in 1982, and justices in at least six other states subsequently endorsed the supplemental approach. State cases in which justices have endorsed the supplemental approach include New Jersey: State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982); Washington: State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986); Illinois: People v. Levin, 623 N.E.2d 317 (111. 1993), and People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (111. 1984); Kentucky: Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Michigan: Doe v. Department of Social Services, 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992), and Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993) ; Massachusetts: Guiney v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 582 N.E.2d 523 (Mass. 1991), and Commonwealth v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1990); and Connecticut: State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225 (Conn. 1992), and State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994) . For a thorough review of these cases and the difficulties with the supplemental approach, see Williams, "Glare of Supreme Court." Linde, "E Pluribus," 178. 3 6

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process a n d equal p r o t e c t i o n clauses o f the F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t . These "state-failure" p r o v i s i o n s authorize federal i n t e r v e n t i o n o n l y i f a state fails t o meet its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l responsibilities. Yet one c a n n o t determine w h e t h e r a state has failed t o meet its responsibilities, has v i o l a t e d r i g h t s , u n t i l the state's a c t i o n is c o m p l e t e d . T h i s entails n o t o n l y the a c t i o n o f the state legislature o r executive b u t also j u d i c i a l r e v i e w o f the legitimacy o f t h a t a c t i o n under the state c o n s t i t u t i o n . O n l y w h e n a l l p e r t i n e n t organs o f state g o v e r n m e n t , i n c l u d i n g the courts, have a p p r o v e d the a c t i o n is i t a p p r o p r i a t e t o consider i f the a c t i o n is consistent w i t h federal guidelines. T h u s , L i n d e argues, state courts s h o u l d always r e v i e w challenged actions o n the basis o f state law, b o t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d s u b c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , before t u r n i n g t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . 3 8

A l t h o u g h L i n d e has been described as the godfather o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism, few courts have a d o p t e d his r i g o r o u s p r i m a c y a p p r o a c h , a n d fewer still have adhered t o i t c o n s i s t e n t l y . T h i s is u n f o r t u n a t e ; f o r o n l y the p r i m a c y a p p r o a c h encourages t h a t independent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h is a p p r o p r i a t e t o a system o f d u a l c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l i s m . I n a d d i t i o n , the p r i m a c y a p p r o a c h deals quite effectively w i t h l e g i t i m a c y concerns. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l concern was t h a t state judges w o u l d use state c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n s t r u m e n t a l l y , i n order t o pursue their p o l ­ icy goals. U n d e r the p r i m a c y a p p r o a c h , however, the decision t o consult the state c o n s t i t u t i o n does n o t depend o n the a c t i o n o f the U.S. Supreme C o u r t o r the judges' v i e w o f a p a r t i c u l a r case. I n fact, the a p p r o a c h a l t o ­ gether eliminates state c o u r t s ' discretion over w h e t h e r t o rely o n state guarantees as an alternative t o federal law. Recurrence t o state l a w is an o b l i g a t i o n , n o t a choice. Paradoxically, by r e q u i r i n g t h a t state c o n s t i t u ­ tions be interpreted m o r e frequently, this a p p r o a c h allays concerns a b o u t state c o u r t s ' reliance o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s ( t h o u g h one m a y o f course still disagree w i t h a court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ) . 39

Justice Linde's articles elaborating this approach include "Without Due Process" and "First Things First: Rediscovering the State's Bill of Rights," University of Baltimore Law Review 9 (spring 1980): 3 7 9 - 9 6 . One critic of the primacy approach has argued that it w o u l d logically "preclude federal court jurisdiction until the challenged state action had been ratified by the state's highest court." See "Project Report," 288. This description initially appeared in Jeffrey Toobin, "Better Than Burger," New Re­ public, M a r c h 4, 1985, at 1 1 . States that have embraced the "first-things-first" approach include Oregon (Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Lund Corp., 653 P.2d 970 [Ore. 1982]); Maine {State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 [Me. 1984]); and N e w Hampshire (State v. Ball, 471 A . 2 d 347 [ N . H . 1983]). However, the consistency of their adherence to this approach has been questioned; see "Comment, Principled Interpretation of State Constitutional Law: W h y Don't the 'Primacy' States Practice What They Preach?" University of Pittsburgh Law Review 54 (summer 1993): 1019-50. O f the courts that have endorsed "first-things-first," the N e w Hampshire Supreme Court has been the most consistent i n adhering to that approach. 3 8

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Nevertheless, the p r i m a c y a p p r o a c h seems t o d e m a n d heroic efforts o n the p a r t o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l interpreters. F o r instead o f p e r m i t t i n g courts t o rely o n convenient federal d o c t r i n e a n d precedent, the p r i m a c y a p p r o a c h requires t h e m t o begin anew, c o n s t r u c t i n g a state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l jurisprudence t h a t is f a i t h f u l t o the state's o w n charter rather t h a n merely " r e p l a c i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h generic Supreme C o u r t f o r m u l a s . " T h i s demands an a t t e n t i o n t o the specifics o f t e x t a n d h i s t o r y ( a m o n g other matters), a n d because those specifics differ f r o m c o n s t i t u t i o n t o c o n s t i t u t i o n , i t m a y p r o d u c e considerable p a r t i c u l a r i t y i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Yet h o w t o u n d e r t a k e this a p p r o a c h — a n d , indeed, w h e t h e r such an ap­ p r o a c h is i n fact possible or a p p r o p r i a t e — a r e matters o f considerable debate. 4 0

T H E P O S S I B I L I T Y O F STATE C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I N T E R P R E T A T I O N

Some c o m m e n t a t o r s , m o s t n o t a b l y James G a r d n e r a n d Paul K a h n , are skeptical a b o u t the prospects for independent state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l inter­ p r e t a t i o n . G a r d n e r asserts t h a t a l t h o u g h state courts i n recent decades have a n n o u n c e d n u m e r o u s decisions based o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , the c o u r t s ' o p i n i o n s have been largely d e v o i d o f coherent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a r g u m e n t . I n fact, he characterizes state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w as "a vast w a s t e l a n d o f confusing, c o n f l i c t i n g , a n d essentially u n i n t e l l i g i b l e p r o ­ nouncements." F o r this failure t o develop a coherent state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l jurisprudence, G a r d n e r blames n o t state judges b u t state c o n s t i t u ­ tions themselves. " A c o n s t i t u t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o o u r legal a n d social c o n v e n t i o n s , is a d o c u m e n t meant t o identify a p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y and t o set o u t some o f the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l principles a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h the members o f the c o m m u n i t y w i s h t o live their l i v e s . " Few, i f any, state c o n s t i t u t i o n s fit this d e s c r i p t i o n . Instead, a c c o r d i n g t o Gardner, state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t y p i c a l l y are the p r o d u c t s o f c o m p r o m i s e a n d l o g r o l l ­ i n g rather t h a n c o m m i t m e n t t o p r i n c i p l e , a n d their p r o v i s i o n s m o r e often reflect m u n d a n e o r t r i v i a l concerns t h a n f u n d a m e n t a l values. P r o p e r l y speaking, they are n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n s at a l l ; a n d thus i t is h a r d l y sur­ p r i s i n g l y t h a t these ersatz c o n s t i t u t i o n s c a n n o t sustain the "discourse o f distinctiveness" t h a t independent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n re­ q u i r e s . Perhaps surprisingly, G a r d n e r concludes t h a t this is f o r t u n a t e : i f 4 1

42

4 3

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Linde, "State Constitutions Common Law?" 225. Gardner, "Failed Discourse"; and Kahn, "Interpretation and Authority." Gardner, "Failed Discourse," 763. Gardner, "Failed Discourse," 7 6 9 - 7 0 . The notion of state constitutions as ersatz constitutions is borrowed from Barry Latzer, " A Critique of Gardner's 'Failed Discourse,'" Rutgers Law Journal 24 (summer 1993): 1009. 4 0

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state c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n fact e m b o d i e d f u n d a m e n t a l values inconsistent w i t h n a t i o n a l values, t h a t w o u l d threaten n a t i o n a l unity. Several scholars have challenged Gardner's negative assessment o f state c o u r t s ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l i n g s , insisting t h a t some state courts have developed a coherent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u r i s p r u d e n c e . T h e p r i m a r y p r o b ­ lem w i t h Gardner's c r i t i q u e , however, is its u n d u l y n a r r o w v i e w o f consti­ t u t i o n a l i s m . A l t h o u g h G a r d n e r asserts t h a t " o u r legal a n d social conven­ t i o n s " require t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n s e m b o d y the p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y a n d f u n d a m e n t a l c o m m i t m e n t s o f a p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y , one is left w o n d e r ­ i n g t o w h o m the " o u r " refers. For i f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s fail t o meet this s t a n d a r d , t h e n A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l practice registers a diversity o f views a b o u t w h a t a c o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d be l i k e . F u r t h e r m o r e , even the m o s t detailed a n d frequently amended state c o n s t i t u t i o n serves c e r t a i n basic functions t h a t one expects o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t establishes the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f g o v e r n m e n t , distributes p o l i t i c a l p o w e r a m o n g t h e m , defines their modes o f o p e r a t i o n , a n d l i m i t s p o l i t i c a l p o w e r . I t also l i k e l y enunciates basic principles a n d c o m m i t m e n t s o f the state, albeit c e r t a i n l y n o t i n a l l its p r o v i s i o n s , thereby d i s t i n g u i s h i n g itself f r o m o r d i n a r y legislation. A state's d e c l a r a t i o n o f r i g h t s , for e x a m p l e , defines the rights t h a t the state deems f u n d a m e n t a l a n d affirms the state's c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e i r preserva­ t i o n . Provisions o n the franchise a n d o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change reflect the state's c o m m i t m e n t t o p o p u l a r g o v e r n m e n t a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty, w h i l e a state c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s p r o v i s i o n s o n e d u c a t i o n a n d other aspects o f p u b l i c p o l i c y reflect the state's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the needs o f its citizens a n d its c o m m i t m e n t t o secure t h e m . A n d so o n . 45

4 6

G a r d n e r also contends t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t are n o t concise frame­ w o r k s o f g o v e r n m e n t , t h a t are frequently changed, i n c l u d e " s t a t u t o r y " p r o v i s i o n s , a n d reflect the t u g a n d p u l l o f o r d i n a r y p o l i t i c s , c a n n o t sup­ p o r t independent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Yet even the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h G a r d n e r holds u p as a m o d e l , w o u l d fail his test, since i t — l i k e its state c o u n t e r p a r t s — w a s the p r o d u c t o f c o m p r o m i s e a n d p o l i t i c a l strife a n d contains c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislation d e a l i n g w i t h slavery, search w a r r a n t s , the i n c o m e t a x , a n d other m a t t e r s . F a i l i n g grades w o u l d also have t o be assigned t o m o s t other n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h resemble A m e r i c a n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , far m o r e t h a n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , i n t h e i r l e n g t h 4 7

See, for example, David Schuman, " A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism," Michigan Law Review 91 (November 1992): 2 7 4 - 8 0 ; and Ronald L . Nelson, "Welcome to the 'Last Frontier,' Professor Gardner: Alaska's Independent Approach to State Constitu­ tional Interpretation," Alaska Law Review 12 (1995): 1 - 4 1 . See the discussions in Lutz, "Purposes of State Constitutions," and in chapter 1 of this volume. Earl M . Maitz, "James Gardner and the Idea of State Constitutionalism," Rutgers Law Journal 24 (summer 1993): 1019-24. 4 5

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a n d level o f d e t a i l . Yet these alleged deficiencies have n o t prevented t h e m f r o m being recognized as c o n s t i t u t i o n s or precluded the develop­ m e n t o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l jurisprudence i n their c o u n t r i e s . I n a d d i t i o n , as the earlier chapters o n nineteenth- a n d t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l development have s h o w n , the detail f o u n d i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s has often reflected n o t a lack o f s k i l l o r seriousness b u t rather a deliberate decision t o remove i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l decisions f r o m the hands o f u n ­ t r u s t w o r t h y state officials. State c o n s t i t u t i o n s thus differ f r o m the federal m o d e l p r i m a r i l y because t h e i r framers v i e w e d t h a t m o d e l as inadequate t o deal w i t h the distinctive p r o b l e m s c o n f r o n t i n g the states. Gardner claims t h a t independent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n requires a d o c u ­ m e n t t h a t resembles the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , b u t the opposite seems t r u e . A "discourse o f distinctiveness" is possible o n l y insofar as state c o n s t i t u t i o n s are d i s t i n c t i v e . 4 8

49

T h e second m a j o r critic o f independent state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l inter­ p r e t a t i o n , Paul K a h n , acknowledges t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t a i n some p r o v i s i o n s t h a t are o f " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n , " as w e l l as m o r e prosaic p r o v i s i o n s . T h e p r o v i s i o n s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n include "the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n s o f liberty, equality, a n d due process, as w e l l as the s t r u c t u r i n g o f p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t a i m simultaneously t o realize these values a n d t o represent constituent i n t e r e s t s . " T h e t e x t o f these p r o v i s i o n s varies f r o m one c o n s t i t u t i o n t o another, b u t accord­ i n g t o K a h n , such differences d o n o t i n a n d o f themselves justify distinc­ tive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Indeed, even the absence o f a specific guarantee is n o t decisive: " [ N ] o state c o n s t i t u t i o n is indifferent t o the p r i n c i p l e o f equality, even i f the state t e x t does n o t have an equal p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e . " Indeed, a c c o r d i n g t o K a h n , the a t t e m p t t o base divergent r u l ­ ings o n " u n i q u e state sources" is anachronistic i n late-twentieth-century A m e r i c a , because A m e r i c a n s n o w a d a y s i d e n t i f y w i t h a n a t i o n a l c o m m u ­ n i t y a n d share c o m m o n f u n d a m e n t a l values t h a t are expressed i n a c o m m o n A m e r i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . Yet these c o m m o n values d o 50

51

52

Daniel J. Elazar, " A Response to James Gardner's 'The Failed Discourse of State Con­ stitutionalism,' " Rutgers Law journal 24 (summer 1993): 9 7 5 - 8 4 ; and Goldwin and Kauf­ man, Constitution Makers. For the texts of these constitutions, see Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H . Flanz, Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1993). For a convenient collection of single-countries studies and pertinent bibliography, see C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, eds., The Global Expansion of judicial Rower (New York: N e w York University Press, 1995). Kahn, "Interpretation and Authority," 1159 n. 52. Kahn, "Interpretation and Authority," 1159-60. Kahn's argument here recalls Ronald Dworkin's distinction between "concept" and "conception" and is subject to the same criticisms. See Tarr, "Constitutional Theories," 101-4. 4 8

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n o t lead h i m t o endorse the lockstep a p p r o a c h . H e is m o r e sanguine t h a n Gardner a b o u t state courts p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the " i n t e r p r e t i v e enter­ prise," apparently because they are g i v i n g voice n o t t o state values b u t t o t h e i r " u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the values a n d principles o f the n a t i o n a l community." " T h e diversity o f state c o u r t s , " he concludes, "is best u n d e r s t o o d as a diversity o f interpretive bodies, n o t as a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f representatives o f distinct s o v e r e i g n s . " Kahn's argument glosses over c r u c i a l differences between state a n d federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s , s u b s t i t u t i n g generic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l analysis for the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f identifiable state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . H i s distinc­ t i o n between those features o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t are o f c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n a n d those t h a t are n o t is p a r t i c u l a r l y revealing. U n d e r Kahn's f o r m u l a t i o n , w h a t is o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n is w h a t is f o u n d i n b o t h state a n d federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s , namely, rights guarantees a n d p r o v i s i o n s s t r u c t u r i n g g o v e r n m e n t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . H o w e v e r , state consti­ t u t i o n s ' d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r w i t h i n the state is n o t o f c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n . N e i t h e r is their s t r u c t u r i n g o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between g o v e r n m e n t a n d the e c o n o m y n o r their d e l i n e a t i o n o f such c o n s t i t u t i o n a l aims as a t h o r o u g h a n d efficient education o r a clean e n v i r o n m e n t n o r their decision w h e t h e r t o institute the recall o r the i n i t i a t i v e or t e r m l i m i t s . L i k e w i s e i n s u p p o r t a b l e is Kahn's h o m o g e n i z a t i o n o f state a n d federal guarantees under the r u b r i c o f shared n a t i o n a l values. State c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s debated a m o n g various f o r m u l a t i o n s o f rights, c o m ­ p e t i n g versions d r a w n f r o m the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f other states, because they expected their choice o f language t o m a k e a difference. T o speak o f a n a t i o n a l value f o r b i d d i n g cruel punishments, for example, ignores the fact t h a t some states have chosen t o ban " u n d u l y h a r s h " punishments as w e l l as " c r u e l a n d u n u s u a l " ones, w h i l e others have e x p l i c i t l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d c a p i t a l p u n i s h m e n t . State c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s have also de­ bated w h e t h e r t o include p a r t i c u l a r guarantees. Yet Kahn's p o s i t i o n w o u l d seem t o m a k e the a d o p t i o n o r n o n a d o p t i o n of, say, a " l i t t l e E R A " irrelevant because " n o state c o n s t i t u t i o n is indifferent t o the p r i n c i p l e o f equality." Finally, Kahn's premise o f a n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y w i t h c o m m o n values exaggerates the level o f consensus o n these values. Even o n m a t ­ ters t h a t K a h n deems o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i m e n s i o n , such as due process a n d equality, states i n recent years have demonstrated a considerable range o f o p i n i o n . Some states have adopted amendments restricting r i g h t s — C o l o r a d o ' s antigay a m e n d m e n t , Florida's l i m i t s o n the e x c l u ­ sionary rule, a n d California's v i c t i m s ' rights a m e n d m e n t — w h i l e others 5 3

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have rejected s i m i l a r a m e n d m e n t s . These disparate outcomes suggest t h a t one s h o u l d be cautious i n ascribing c o m m o n values t o a l l A m e r i c a n s . U l t i m a t e l y , G a r d n e r a n d K a h n seem t o be addressing the concerns o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists rather t h a n those o f actual c o n s t i t u t i o n a l inter­ p r e t e r s . Nevertheless, they d o i d e n t i f y features o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t c o m p l i c a t e their independent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d thus need t o be addressed. 55

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T H E P R A C T I C E O F STATE C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I N T E R P R E T A T I O N

The Diversity

of State

Constitutional

Provisions

O n e c o m p l i c a t i o n for state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n stems f r o m the diversity o f state p r o v i s i o n s . W h i l e state c o n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t a i n statements o f b r o a d p r i n c i p l e , they also c o n t a i n a range o f other p r o v i s i o n s o f vary­ i n g detail a n d specificity, i n c l u d i n g some t h a t resemble statutes. T h i s raises the question w h e t h e r a single interpretive a p p r o a c h is a p p r o p r i a t e for the disparate p r o v i s i o n s . T h e p r o b l e m is n o t unique t o state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n s . T h e federal C o n s t i t u t i o n t o o contains h i g h l y specific provisions dealing w i t h such matters as qualifications for federal office a n d the en­ actment o f legislation. Still, the p r o b l e m is m o r e serious at the state level. N o one, for instance, w o u l d ever accuse the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n o f being a " s t a t u t o r y b a n k v a u l t w i t h i n w h i c h favored schemes, phobias, a n d i n ­ terests o f the p r e v a i l i n g elite c o u l d be secured i n t o the future b e y o n d the reach o f fickle legislatures a n d ungrateful

governors."

5 7

Colorado Constitution, amendment 2 (adopted in 1992), invalidated by the U.S. Su­ preme Court in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Florida Constitution, art. 1, sec. 12; and California Constitution, Proposition 115 (adopted in 1990), invalidated by the Califor­ nia Supreme Court in Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). Consider the perceptive criticism of Randall T. Shepard, "The M a t u r i n g Nature of State Constitutional Jurisprudence," Valparaiso Law Review 30 (spring 1996): 437. Ac­ cording to Chief Justice Shepard, "Kahn's strategy is to ratchet up the level of abstraction at which American constitutionalism is defined to a level which virtually assures similitude. Gardner's approach is to insist that legitimate constitutionalism be 'epic' or 'near-mythical' and then to dismiss all that state constitutional text without federal analog as the product of 'political deals among interest groups' about which one cannot 'plausibly claim a meaning rooted in political theory, or justice, or the framers' deliberations on fundamental princi­ ples.' " Their theories are thus subject to the same criticism that Robert E Nagel has leveled against other "fundamental values" approaches to constitutional theory: "The exalted na­ ture of the values is also a corollary to assumptions about constitutionalism itself: the Constitution necessarily must address the most serious public concerns and must achieve a result that can be seen as virtuous in order to be worthy of its fundamental status" (Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989], 111). 5 5

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Carleton, "Elitism Sustained," 5 6 1 .

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Some judges a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l scholars have p r o p o s e d dealing w i t h this p r o b l e m t h r o u g h a d u a l a p p r o a c h t o state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l interpreta­ tion. U n d e r this a p p r o a c h , the "great o r d i n a n c e s " o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d receive different interpretive t r e a t m e n t t h a n w o u l d those p r o v i ­ sions t h a t a n n o u n c e d " n o p r i n c i p l e o f g o v e r n m e n t " b u t merely c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d m a t e r i a l t h a t m i g h t o r d i n a r i l y have appeared i n a s t a t u t e . Presumably, the "great ordinances" w o u l d be interpreted as befits consti­ t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s , a n d a state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l jurisprudence b u i l t a r o u n d t h e m , w h i l e the other p r o v i s i o n s w o u l d be interpreted like s t a t u t e s . A l t h o u g h a step i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , this d u a l a p p r o a c h t o state consti­ t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is t o o simple t o solve the p r o b l e m . 5 8

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For one t h i n g , dispensing w i t h "lesser" p r o v i s i o n s i n b u i l d i n g a state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l jurisprudence is h i g h l y questionable, because w h a t a state chooses t o include i n its c o n s t i t u t i o n is i m p o r t a n t evidence o f the v i s i o n u n d e r l y i n g the d o c u m e n t . I n a d d i t i o n , the sharp b i f u r c a t i o n o f c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s reintroduces i n another c o n t e x t Gardner's d u b i o u s dis­ t i n c t i o n between w h a t is t r u l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d w h a t is n o t . I t is n o coincidence t h a t the most t h o u g h t f u l e x p o n e n t o f this d u a l a p p r o a c h feels c o m p e l l e d t o distinguish between p r o v i s i o n s t h a t are constitutional a n d those t h a t are " m e r e l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . " M o r e o v e r , n o simple d i ­ c h o t o m y can d o justice t o the diversity o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . W h i l e some state p r o v i s i o n s can easily be placed i n one category o r an­ other, a n u m b e r o f p r o v i s i o n s cannot. Proponents o f the d u a l a p p r o a c h have recognized this, p r o p o s i n g c r i t e r i a f o r d e t e r m i n i n g i n t o w h i c h cate­ g o r y t o place those p r o v i s i o n s t h a t are " i n the m i d d l e . " Yet the p r o p o s e d c r i t e r i a differ f r o m one c o m m e n t a t o r t o another a n d have themselves been subjected t o t e l l i n g c r i t i c i s m . T h e p o i n t is n o t t h a t better criteria m u s t be developed; rather, the d u a l a p p r o a c h itself needs r e t h i n k i n g . 6 1

6 2

I n reconsidering their interpretive approaches, state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n ­ terpreters s h o u l d take their cues f r o m those c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists w h o have already addressed this p r o b l e m i n the c o n t e x t o f i n t e r p r e t i n g the

The major case endorsing a dual approach to state provisions is Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825 (N.J. 1977). Compare also Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413 N.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992), with Riser v. Riser, 385 S.E.2d 487 (N.C. 1989). The foremost scholarly exposition of this position is James Gray Pope, " A n Approach to State Constitu­ tional Interpretation," Rutgers Law Journal 24 (summer 1993): 985-1008. Vreeland v. Byrne, at 832. Schuman, "Failed Critique," 277-78. Pope, "Approach to Constitutional Interpretation," 986. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Vreeland bases its distinction on breadth of princi­ ple and constitutional subject matter. Pope rejects subject matter as a criterion and substi­ tutes enactment by the people. For a telling criticism of Pope's criteria, see James A. Gard­ ner, "What Is a State Constitution?" Rutgers Law Journal 24 (summer 1993): 1033 n. 38. 5 8

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federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . Despite their m a n y differences, these theorists agree t h a t " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions exist o n a spectrum r a n g i n g f r o m the rela­ tively specific t o the extremely o p e n - t e x t u r e d . " Some are " d r a f t e d . . . i n language a d m i t t i n g o f o n l y one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " w h i l e others require " a l m o s t p u r e p o l i t i c a l j u d g m e n t t o i n t e r p r e t , " a n d still others fall i n be­ tween. G i v e n this diversity, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t respect each provision's character, rather t h a n f o r c i n g the p r o v i s i o n i n t o a preexisting set o f interpretive a p p r o a c h e s . Interpreters m a y differ as t o w h e r e o n the s p e c t r u m a p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n fits, as scholarly de­ bate o n the m e a n i n g o f the E i g h t h a n d F o u r t e e n t h amendments r e v e a l s . Yet these disputes merely suggest the necessity o f closer e x a m i n a t i o n o f the provision's t e x t , generating history, a n d place i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design, the very factors p r o p o s e d as bases for the independent interpreta­ t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . 6 3

6 4

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66

Constitutional

Coherence

A l t h o u g h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists disagree a b o u t the n a t u r e o f the U n i t e d States C o n s t i t u t i o n , they largely agree t h a t i t embodies a coherent p o l i t i Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 13. Ronald D w o r k i n , Law's Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 367 and 357. The character of most state provisions w i l l encourage a narrow interpretation. As W i l l i a m Swindler has noted: "Because state constitutions are all too detailed and explicit, there is a built-in orientation toward strict construction in the majority of states" ("State Constitutions," 593). One basis for this dispute involves whether specific provisions are broad statements of principle or deserve narrow construction as "terms of art" or as a result of historical fac­ tors. Compare, for example, the contrasting interpretations of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments offered by Ronald D w o r k i n and Raoul Berger: D w o r k i n , Taking Rights Seriously, and Raoul Berger, Death Penalties: The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). This "level of generality" problem also explains much of the disagreement about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. For varying perspectives, see Judith A . Baer, Equality under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth Amendment (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Four­ teenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Durham, N . C . : Duke University Press, 1986); Earl M . Maitz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and Congress, 1863-1869 (Lawrence: Uni­ versity Press of Kansas, 1990); W i l l i a m E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Po­ litical Principle to Judicial Doctrine (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); and Michael P. Zuckert, "Toward a Corrective Federalism: The United States Constitution, Fed­ eralism, and Rights," in Ellis Katz and G. Alan Tarr, eds., Federalism and Rights (Lanham, M d . : Rowman and Littlefield, 1996). For a thoughtful treatment of this "level of generality" problem, see Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue, chap. 1. 6 3

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cal t h e o r y a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e s i g n . Some theorists have discovered this coherence i n the structure o f the g o v e r n m e n t t h a t was created. T h u s , m a n y originalists v i e w the C o n s t i t u t i o n as basically a m a j o r i t a r i a n d o c u ­ m e n t a n d understand c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rights guarantees as exceptions t o the document's p r i m a r y emphasis o n p o p u l a r g o v e r n m e n t . O t h e r theo­ rists have also relied o n the o v e r a l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design, albeit t o justify j u d i c i a l p r o t e c t i o n o f unexpressed r i g h t s . Still others have appealed be­ y o n d the t e x t o f the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n , a r g u i n g t h a t w h a t unites the var­ ious p r o v i s i o n s are certain unexpressed assumptions a n d value j u d g ­ ments a b o u t p o l i t i c s a n d p o l i t i c a l life. W a l t e r M u r p h y , f o r instance, has argued t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n "includes a t r a d i t i o n o f ideals a n d practices t h a t evidence values a n d principles as v i t a l as those f o r m a l i z e d i n the actual d o c u m e n t . " T h o m a s Grey has urged judges t o consult "basic n a t i o n a l ideals o f i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y a n d fair t r e a t m e n t , even w h e n the c o n t e n t o f these ideals is n o t expressed as a m a t t e r o f positive l a w i n the w r i t t e n C o n s t i t u t i o n . " A n d Justice W i l l i a m B r e n n a n has asserted t h a t a concern f o r " h u m a n d i g n i t y " underlies the C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d s h o u l d guide its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . For present purposes, w h a t is i m p o r t a n t is n o t the source or character o f the U.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s coherence b u t the func­ t i o n t h a t this n o t i o n o f coherence serves i n these diverse c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theories. I f the C o n s t i t u t i o n embodies a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l design or a set o f shared values, t h e n t h a t design or those values can guide the inter­ p r e t a t i o n o f specific c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s a n d the e l a b o r a t i o n o f i m ­ p l i e d p o w e r s a n d / o r unexpressed r i g h t s . T h u s , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists can i n t e r p r e t the parts i n l i g h t o f the w h o l e , because they have c o n c l u d e d t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n is t r u l y a w h o l e . 67

68

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7 0

7 1

7 2

Previous chapters have described the p o l i t i c a l understandings u n d e r l y ­ i n g the state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a d o p t e d i n various eras. Nevertheless, i t w o u l d be a mistake t o assume t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s e m b o d y the same coher­ ence o f perspective t h a t one finds i n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . As n o t e d previously, m a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s include extensive " s t a t u t o r y " mate­ r i a l . O n e w o u l d n o t expect t o encounter a coherent p o l i t i c a l perspective William F. Harris I I , "Bonding Word and Polity: The Logic of American Constitu­ tionalism," American Political Science Review 76 (March 1982): 34-49. Bork, The Tempting of America; William Rehnquist, "The N o t i o n of a Living Consti­ tution," Texas Law Review 54 (May 1976): 693-706; and Berger, Government by judiciary. Ely, Democracy and Distrust; and Charles L . Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1969). Walter Murphy, " A n Ordering of Constitutional Values," Southern California Law Review 53 (January 1980): 705. Grey, " A n Unwritten Constitution?" 706. William Brennan, "The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifica­ tion," South Texas Law journal 27 (fall 1986): 436. 6 7

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i n a b o d y o f s t a t u t o r y l a w enacted over a p r o l o n g e d p e r i o d , so i t m a y also be unrealistic t o expect i t i n a state c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e d over t i m e a range o f detailed p o l i c y prescriptions via amendments o r succes­ sive revisions. Related t o this is w h a t m i g h t be called the " l a y e r i n g " i n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . F o r m o s t state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , u n l i k e the federal C o n ­ s t i t u t i o n , i t is inaccurate t o speak o f a single set o f " f o u n d e r s " or even o f a "founding epoch." Rather, the states' frequent recourse t o amend­ m e n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century, undermines any n o t i o n o f the state c o n s t i t u t i o n as an organic w h o l e ; a n d the p o l i t i c a l perspective a n d aims o f those a m e n d i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n m a y w e l l differ f r o m those o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s i n i t i a l r a t i f i e r s . Indeed, previous chapters have d o c u m e n t e d the influence o f disparate p o l i t i c a l movements, such as Jack­ sonian democracy a n d Progressivism, o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s a d o p t e d d u r i n g various eras. T h e a m e n d m e n t process often involves nei­ ther d e l e t i o n n o r replacement b u t rather the a d d i t i o n o f p r o v i s i o n s ; a n d like a geologist, a state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l scholar can study the various layers o f p r o v i s i o n s t h a t have been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the d o c u m e n t a n d the p o l i t i c a l movements t h a t spawned t h e m . N o r does c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e v i s i o n altogether dispose o f this difficulty. Because dissatisfaction w i t h certain key features o f a state's c o n s t i t u t i o n usually provides the impetus for revision, c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s focus o n those features, often leaving u n ­ t o u c h e d other p r o v i s i o n s t h a t have n o t excited controversy. Indeed, the a t t e m p t t o change t o o m u c h runs the risk o f a l i e n a t i n g diverse c o n s t i t u ­ encies t h a t c o u l d coalesce i n o p p o s i t i o n t o a p r o p o s e d c o n s t i t u t i o n . As a result, even c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t have undergone r e v i s i o n t y p i c a l l y r e t a i n " l a y e r s " o f p r o v i s i o n s , a n d this defeats—or at least c o m p l i c a t e s — t h e search for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l coherence. 7 3

74

Finally, one m u s t consider the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the fact t h a t different eras o f c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s m a y have been m o t i v a t e d by quite different p o l i t i c a l theories a n d / o r understandings o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . Even i f a state c o n s t i t u t i o n i n i t i a l l y e m b o d i e d a p r i n c i p l e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l perspec­ tive, i t might—because o f changes over t i m e — c o m e t o c o n t a i n key p r o ­ visions reflecting d i s t i n c t a n d perhaps inconsistent c o n s t i t u t i o n a l per­ spectives. For a judge seeking c o n s t i t u t i o n a l coherence, the task becomes O f course, although commentators often speak of a single set of founders for the federal Constitution, this is an oversimplification of the constitutional experience at the federal level as well. See Ackerman, We the People. This constitutional "layering" is related to the inclusion of "statutory" material in state constitutions, in that efforts by early constitution-makers to safeguard policies by constitutionalizing them have prompted amendments designed to replace those policies w i t h others favored by subsequent majorities. However, "layering" may involve "consti­ tutional" provisions as well, especially those constitutionalized by distinct political movements. 7 3

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one o f c o n s t r u c t i o n rather t h a n discovery: t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l changes " f u n d a m e n t a l l y alter the terms o f the interpretive p r o b ­ l e m , " o b l i g i n g judges t o synthesize "the higher l a w m a k i n g efforts" o f m o r e t h a n a single g e n e r a t i o n . Bruce A c k e r m a n has t h o u g h t f u l l y sur­ veyed the difficulties i n v o l v e d i n recasting the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t were p r o d u c e d by the change i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l regime f o l l o w i n g the C i v i l W a r . For state judges, the p e n e t r a t i o n o f the state c o n s t i t u t i o n by suc­ cessive p o l i t i c a l movements makes the task o f p r o d u c i n g coherence even m o r e difficult t h a n i t has been for federal judges seeking coherence i n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n . Insofar as a state c o n s t i t u t i o n does n o t reflect a single perspective, an interpreter cannot always l o o k t o the w h o l e t o i l l u m i n a t e the m e a n i n g o f its various parts. T h u s , one a p p r o a c h w i d e l y utilized by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n seems i n a p p l i c a b l e — o r at least less frequently a p p l i c a b l e — t o state constitutions. Instead, some­ t h i n g m u c h closer t o "clause-bound" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is r e q u i r e d , t h o u g h exactly w h a t the interpretive a p p r o a c h m i g h t be remains a q u e s t i o n . 75

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Textualism,

Originalism,

and State

Constitutions

THE ORIENTATION TOWARD TEXTUALISM AND ORIGINALISM Those scholars and jurists w h o have supported the independent inter­ p r e t a t i o n o f state constitutions have argued f o r a close a t t e n t i o n t o the specifics o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t e x t a n d t o its generating history. So t o o have advocates o f the supplemental approach. T h e arguments o f b o t h camps thus coalesce i n s u p p o r t o f a p a r t i c u l a r interpretive approach t o state constitutions. I f the distinctiveness o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guaran­ tees justifies independent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , then state jurists are encouraged t o emphasize t e x t u a l analysis and, m o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y , a t e x t u a l analysis t h a t operates at the level o f the specific c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n . I f the distinctive origins or purpose o f a p r o v i s i o n justifies independent inter­ p r e t a t i o n , then state jurists m u s t pay p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o the i n t e n t o f the framers a n d t o the h i s t o r i c a l circumstances o u t o f w h i c h the c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n arose. Some c o m m e n t a t o r s , i t is true, have encouraged state judges t o seek their o w n best i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state p r o v i s i o n s , even w h e n an i d e n t i t y o f language i n state and federal guarantees suggests t h a t Ackerman, We the People, 87 and 88. Ackerman, We the People, especially chap. 4. The distinction between "clause-bound" and broader originalism (or, as he calls i t , "interpretivism") derives from John Hart Ely, who defines "clause-bound interpretivism" as giving content to a provision solely on the basis of its language and surrounding legisla­ tive history {Democracy and Distrust, 12). 7 5

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Constitutional Interpretation they m a y share a c o m m o n m e a n i n g .

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Yet even these c o m m e n t a t o r s rec­

ognize t h a t this "best i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " is as l i k e l y t o be f o u n d i n the t e x t as i n e x t r a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l values—their concern is n o t t o disparage t e x t u a l ism b u t t o ensure t h a t a fresh a p p r o a c h t o the t e x t is n o t p r e c l u d e d b y the Supreme C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f c o u n t e r p a r t language. T h u s , the j u s t i ­ fications

offered f o r independent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , together w i t h a need t o

be able t o defend their r u l i n g s against accusations o f illegitimacy, have o r i e n t e d state judges t o w a r d a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l jurisprudence emphasizing textualism and original intent. T h i s t e x t u a l emphasis s h o u l d pose l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y — i n d e e d , as one c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m e r p u t i t , "[B]ecause state c o n s t i t u t i o n s are a l l t o o de­ t a i l e d a n d e x p l i c i t , there is a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d strict construc­ t i o n [i.e., t e x t u a l a n a l y s i s ] . "

7 9

Some c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists, however,

have argued t h a t proposals for an o r i g i n a l i s t jurisprudence face an insur­ m o u n t a b l e p r a c t i c a l p r o b l e m : the available h i s t o r i c a l materials d o n o t p r o v i d e an adequate basis for such a j u r i s p r u d e n c e .

80

Focusing o n the

federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , they p o i n t o u t t h a t the r e c o r d o f the

Founders'

views a n d o f the h i s t o r y b e h i n d various p r o v i s i o n s is at best i n c o m ­ plete.

81

M o r e o v e r , given the difficulty o f d e t e r m i n i n g collective as o p ­

posed t o i n d i v i d u a l i n t e n t , even a detailed h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d w o u l d n o t necessarily

dispel dispute a b o u t the i n t e n t i o n s o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s

framers (or ratifiers). Finally, even i f one conceded t h a t i t was possible t o discover the Founders' b r o a d i n t e n t i o n s , one c o u l d n o t determine their i n t e n t i o n s a b o u t m a n y o f the specific p r o b l e m s faced today, because the Founders never addressed t h e m . O r i g i n a l i s t s have, o f course, challenged the v a l i d i t y o f this c r i t i q u e .

8 2

But w h a t e v e r its v a l i d i t y w i t h regard t o the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , the dis­ t i n c t i v e character a n d development o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s suggest t h a t the

See, for example, Williams, " I n the Shadow"; Linde, "E Pluribus"; and Kahn, "Inter­ pretation and Authority." Swindler, "State Constitutions," 593. The foremost presentation of this position is Paul Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding," Boston University Law Review 60 (March 1980): 204-54. Other major critiques include D w o r k i n , Law's Empire, chap. 10; Ely, Democracy and Dis­ trust, chaps. 1-2; and Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution (New York: Macmillan, 1988). For an overview of the problems with the documentary record, see James H . Huston, "The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record," Texas Law Review 65 (November 1986): 1-39. Gregory Bassham, Original Intent and the Constitution: A Philosophical Study (Sav­ age, M d . : Rowman and Littlefield, 1992); Berger, Government by Judiciary; Bork, The Tempting of America; Richard S. Kay, "Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitu­ tional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses," Northwestern University Law Re­ view 82 (winter 1988): 228-92; and Maitz, Rethinking Constitutional Law. 7 8

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c r i t i q u e does n o t a p p l y — o r at least does n o t a p p l y w i t h equal f o r c e — t o efforts t o develop an o r i g i n a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s .

83

F o r one t h i n g , given the frequency o f a m e n d m e n t a n d r e v i s i o n , m a n y state c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d state p r o v i s i o n s are relatively recent. T h e m o r e recent a p r o v i s i o n , the m o r e l i k e l y t h a t there is an extensive d o c u m e n t a r y record—preconvention

studies, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n records, v o ­

ters' pamphlets, a n d the l i k e — b e a r i n g o n its m e a n i n g ; a n d the greater a v a i l a b i l i t y o f these materials facilitates the discovery o f the o r i g i n a l i n ­ tent.

8 4

I n a d d i t i o n , the m o r e recent the p r o v i s i o n , the m o r e l i k e l y i t is

t h a t those w h o a d o p t e d i t foresaw a n d discussed the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues c u r r e n t l y arising under i t . T h u s , one m a y find i n the h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l discussion n o t o n l y o f b r o a d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l principles b u t also o f h o w those principles w o u l d a p p l y t o c o n t e m p o r a r y p r o b l e m s .

8 5

Finally, the

l o n g - s t a n d i n g preference a m o n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s f o r detailed a n d specific language has the advantage o f f a c i l i t a t i n g an o r i g i n a l i s t state jurisprudence. Indeed, state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s m a y have used clear a n d specific language i n order t o fix the m e a n i n g o f p r o v i s i o n s . Even where i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is r e q u i r e d , the greater detail o f state p r o v i s i o n s often re­ w a r d s attempts t o use close t e x t u a l analysis t o discover o r i g i n a l i n t e n t . TAKING TEXTUALISM AND ORIGINALISM SERIOUSLY

But w h a t w o u l d state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n based o n t e x t u a l i s m a n d / o r o r i g i n a l i s m l o o k like? T o answer t h a t question, w e offer three examples o f w h a t such an a p p r o a c h m i g h t e n t a i l . T h e O r e g o n Supreme C o u r t ' s a p p r o a c h t o freedom o f expression illustrates the p o t e n t i a l o f clause-bound i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s ; f o r the O r e g o n c o u r t Surprisingly enough, James Gardner is among those who contend that state sources are sufficient for an originalist state constitutional jurisprudence. See Gardner, "Failed Dis­ course," 811-12. It should be noted that the importance of state constitutional history does not depend on whether one subscribes to an originalist jurisprudence. As Stephen E. Gottleib has noted: "For those who reject a jurisprudence of original intent, constitutional his­ tory nevertheless helps us to preserve the lessons embodied i n the drafting of the provisions at issues and to explore the consequences of the language chosen." See Gottleib, "Fore­ word: Symposium on State Constitutional History: In Search of a Usable Past," Albany Law Review 53 (winter 1989): 258. Pertinent state constitutional materials are cataloged in Cynthia Browne, State Con­ stitutional Conventions, from Independence to the Completion of the Present Union, 1776-1959: A Bibliography (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973); and Bonnie Can­ ning, State Constitutional Conventions, Revisions, and Amendments, 1959-1976 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977). A constitutional history for each state is contained i n the volumes of the series Reference Guides to State Constitutions of the United States, likewise published by Greenwood Press. See, for example, Paul G. Cassell, "The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules under State Constitutions: The Utah Example," Utah Law Review 1993:751-873. 8 3

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197

has developed a distinctive jurisprudence based o n the language a n d gen­ erating h i s t o r y o f the state's guarantee o f free e x p r e s s i o n . T h e p e r t i n e n t p r o v i s i o n reads: " N o l a w shall be passed restraining the free expression o f o p i n i o n , o r r e s t r i c t i n g the r i g h t t o speak, w r i t e , o r p r i n t freely o n any subject whatever; b u t every person shall be responsible f o r the abuse o f this r i g h t . " A c c o r d i n g t o the O r e g o n Supreme C o u r t , the p r o v i s i o n o n its face protects expression o n a l l subjects equally, a f f o r d i n g n o special p r o t e c t i o n t o p o l i t i c a l s p e e c h . Instead o f e m u l a t i n g the U.S. Supreme C o u r t ' s b a l a n c i n g a p p r o a c h , the O r e g o n c o u r t has read the p r o v i s i o n t o p r o h i b i t laws against speech o r expression as such, unless the restraint falls w i t h i n a clear h i s t o r i c a l e x c e p t i o n t h a t was w e l l established w h e n the c o n s t i t u t i o n was a d o p t e d a n d t h a t the p r o v i s i o n was n o t meant t o e l i m i n a t e . O n this basis, the O r e g o n c o u r t has i n v a l i d a t e d statutes ban­ n i n g the d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f p o r n o g r a p h y , p r o h i b i t i n g the use o f obscene language i n p u b l i c , a n d p l a c i n g z o n i n g restrictions o n " a d u l t busi­ nesses." H o w e v e r , i t has i n t e r p r e t e d the p r o v i s i o n t o p e r m i t laws a i m e d at the i n j u r i o u s effects o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s rather t h a n at the c o m m u n i c a ­ tions themselves, thus u p h o l d i n g laws against threats o f violence, harass­ m e n t , a n d i n t i m i d a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o the O r e g o n c o u r t , h i s t o r i c a l evi­ dence reveals t h a t the "responsible f o r the abuse" clause o f the p r o v i s i o n was inserted t o preserve l i a b i l i t y f o r d e f a m a t i o n suits. T h u s , speakers can be h e l d responsible for the actual harms caused b y their speech or expres­ sion. H o w e v e r , the clause l i m i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o c o m p e n s a t o r y l i a b i l i t y a n d does n o t authorize either p u n i t i v e damages o r c r i m i n a l p u n i s h m e n t for speech-generated h a r m s . 86

8 7

88

8 9

90

9 1

9 2

Utah's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n o f w a t e r rights illustrates h o w the search f o r the o r i g i n a l i n t e n t o f state p r o v i s i o n s can benefit f r o m h i s t o r i ­ cal a n d c o m p a r a t i v e analysis. By its very terms, Utah's p r o v i s i o n directs a t t e n t i o n t o the l a w affecting the o w n e r s h i p a n d use o f w a t e r t h a t existed at the t i m e the c o n s t i t u t i o n was a d o p t e d . I t reads: " A l l e x i s t i n g rights t o the use o f any o f the waters i n this State for useful or beneficial purpose, Our analysis in this paragraph draws upon Friesen, State Constitutional Law, chap. 5; and Rex Armstrong, "Free Speech Fundamentalism: Justice Linde's Lasting Legacy," Ore­ gon Law Review 70 (winter 1991): 855-94. Oregon Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8. State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 589 (Ore. 1982). State v. Robertson, at 576. The historically excluded classes of speech include perjury, fraud, and solicitation. State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9 (Ore. 1987); State v. Spencer, 611 P.2d 1147 (Ore. 1980); and City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242 (Ore. 1988). State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Ore. 1985); State v. Garcías, 679 P.2d 1354 (Ore. 1984); State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569 (Ore. 1982); and State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Ore. 1992). Wheeler v. Green, 593 P.2d 777, 788-89 (Ore. 1979). 8 6

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are hereby recognized a n d c o n f i r m e d . " T h e distinctive features o f the e x i s t i n g l a w are clarified by c o n t r a s t i n g t h e m w i t h the l a w i n the eastern a n d m i d w e s t e r n states t h a t h a d a d o p t e d the r i p a r i a n d o c t r i n e g o v e r n i n g w a t e r r i g h t s . C o m p a r i s o n o f Utah's p r o v i s i o n w i t h c o m p a r a b l e p r o v i ­ sions i n s u r r o u n d i n g states further clarifies its m e a n i n g . T h e delegates at the U t a h c o n v e n t i o n h a d as p o t e n t i a l models C o l o r a d o ' s 1876 c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n , w h i c h designated u n a p p r o p r i a t e d w a t e r o f n a t u r a l streams as "the p r o p e r t y o f the p u b l i c . . . dedicated t o the use o f the people o f the State," a n d W y o m i n g ' s 1 8 9 0 c o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h declared w a t e r o f n a t u r a l streams the " p r o p e r t y o f the state." T h e delegates' rejection o f b o t h o f those models underscores their c o m m i t m e n t t o ensuring the sanctity o f the p r i v a t e r i g h t t o water, a n d t h a t c o m m i t m e n t m u s t therefore guide the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Utah's p r o v i s i o n r e g a r d i n g w a t e r rights. 9 3

9 4

Finally, nineteenth-century state equality guarantees reveal the neces­ sity o f i n t e r p r e t i n g state p r o v i s i o n s i n l i g h t o f the p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y under­ l y i n g t h e m . These state e q u a l i t y p r o v i s i o n s f o r the m o s t p a r t antedated the F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t , w i t h its emphasis o n p r o t e c t i n g m i n o ­ rities against m a j o r i t a r i a n abuse. T h e y can also be distinguished f r o m eighteenth-century e q u a l i t y p r o v i s i o n s , w h i c h recognized the n a t u r a l e q u a l i t y o f a l l m e n , a n d f r o m t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y guarantees o f gender e q u a l i t y a n d p r o h i b i t i o n s o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n the exercise o f c i v i l rights. I n contrast t o the c o u n t e r m a j o r i t a r i a n equal p r o t e c t i o n clause, the state guarantees p r i m a r i l y served t o protect the m a j o r i t y against legislative cre­ a t i o n o f special privileges o r e x e m p t i o n s t h a t destroyed e q u a l i t y under the l a w . T h u s , O h i o ' s 1 8 5 1 c o n s t i t u t i o n declared, " G o v e r n m e n t is i n ­ s t i t u t e d f o r . . . [ a l l people's] . . . equal p r o t e c t i o n a n d b e n e f i t . " Ore­ gon's 1859 c o n s t i t u t i o n specifically banned legislative f a v o r i t i s m : " N o l a w shall be passed g r a n t i n g t o any citizen or class o f citizens privileges o r i m m u n i t i e s w h i c h , u p o n the same terms, shall n o t equally belong t o a l l c i t i z e n s . " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n s o n special l a w a n d l o c a l laws, w i d e l y a d o p t e d d u r i n g the nineteenth century, reflected a s i m i l a r concern. 9 5

9 6

97

98

Utah Constitution, art. 17, sec. 1. The analysis of this provision relies on Jean Bickmore White, The Utah State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Green­ wood Press, forthcoming). For an elaboration of the various approaches to water rights in the western states and their influence on state constitutions, see Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848-1902 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992), chaps. 1-3; and Bakken, Rocky Mountain Constitution Making, chap. 6. The treatment of state equality provisions in this paragraph relies on the analysis i n Williams, "Equality Guarantees." For a more detailed discussion of state equality guaran­ tees, see Tarr, "Constitutional Theory," 8 5 9 - 6 1 . Williams, "Equality Guarantees," 1205-7. Ohio Constitution of 1851, art. 1, sec. 1, par. 2. Oregon Constitution of 1859, art. 1, sec. 20. 9 3

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199

A n d the m a n d a t e f o r a " t h o r o u g h a n d efficient e d u c a t i o n " f o u n d i n sev­ eral c o n s t i t u t i o n s served t o ensure t h a t a l l c h i l d r e n w o u l d benefit equally f r o m the system o f p u b l i c e d u c a t i o n , w h i l e the r e q u i r e m e n t o f u n i f o r m i t y i n t a x a t i o n g u a r d e d against any citizen o r g r o u p o f citizens escaping the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the s u p p o r t o f the state. Some state judges, recognizing f a m i l i a r equality language, have read the nineteenth-century

state guarantees as m i n i a t u r e equal p r o t e c t i o n

c l a u s e s . " H o w e v e r , such

an a h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n distorts

their

m e a n i n g : these state guarantees were designed t o remedy o r prevent dif­ ferent evils a n d were premised o n a different u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the threats to e q u a l i t y .

1 0 0

T h a t the guarantees h a d this character was h a r d l y surpris­

i n g ; for m o s t dated f r o m the Jacksonian era, w h e n w a r was being w a g e d against pockets o f entrenched privilege, o r f r o m the p o s t - C i v i l W a r era, w h e n p o p u l a r distrust o f legislatures was at its h e i g h t .

1 0 1

W h a t this ex­

ample demonstrates, however, is t h a t fidelity t o the o r i g i n a l i n t e n t o f state p r o v i s i o n s oftentimes requires a t t e n t i o n t o the p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y regnant at the t i m e they were a d o p t e d . I t also suggests t h a t an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f a i t h f u l t o t h a t i n t e n t w o u l d have t o be consistent w i t h t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f equality.

Interpretation

in a Universe

of

Constitutions

THE PERTINENCE OF OTHER CONSTITUTIONS

O n e distinctive aspect o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is t h a t i t o c c u r s — a n d state judges perceive i t as o c c u r r i n g — i n the c o n t e x t o f w h a t m i g h t be called "a universe o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s . " A l t h o u g h justices o f the U.S. Supreme C o u r t consult the Court's o w n precedents i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , they rarely pay close a t t e n t i o n t o h o w state judges have dealt w i t h s i m i l a r state p r o v i s i o n s or t o h o w foreign jurists have interpreted analogous p r o v i s i o n s i n their n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n s . T h u s , the justices t e n d t o act as i f the t e x t they are i n t e r p r e t i n g , a n d the 1 0 2

See, for example, Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982). More gener­ ally, see Fino, "Judicial Federalism and Equality." Thus Hans Linde has noted that article 1, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution and the federal equal protection clause "were placed in different constitutions at different times by different men to enact different historic concerns into constitutional policy." See Linde, "Without Due Process," 141. See the discussion in chapter 4 of this volume. But see William J. Brennan Jr., "State Supreme Court Judge versus United States Supreme Court Justice: A Change in Function and Perspective," University of Florida Law Review 19 (fall 1966): 2 2 5 - 3 7 ; and J. Skelly Wright, " I n Praise of State Courts: Confes­ sions of a Federal Judge," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 11 (winter 1984): 165-88. 9 9

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1 0 1

1 0 2

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interpretive p r o b l e m s they are c o n f r o n t i n g , are u n i q u e . I n contrast, i n i n t e r p r e t i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s , state judges r e g u l a r l y i n q u i r e i n t o h o w sister courts, b o t h state a n d federal, have interpreted s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s . As n o t e d previously, the o p i n i o n s o f these sister courts are a p r i m e source o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e , a n d their r u l i n g s often serve as persuasive p r e c e d e n t . 103

T h i s reliance o n precedent f r o m other j u r i s d i c t i o n s is h a r d l y surprising. F o r i n l o o k i n g b e y o n d the state's borders f o r guidance i n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e i r state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , state judges are merely e x t e n d i n g t o the r e a l m o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a m o d e o f decision m a k i n g t h a t they have l o n g e m p l o y e d i n c o m m o n - l a w cases. Yet differences i n the interpretive project render this extension p r o b l e m a t i c . I n e l a b o r a t i n g the c o m m o n law, state supreme c o u r t judges proceed w i t h o u t an a u t h o r i t a t i v e legal t e x t . T h e absence o f an a u t h o r i t a t i v e t e x t p e r m i t s judges t o c o n s u l t — a n d perhaps f o l l o w — t h e r u l i n g s o f sister courts w i t h o u t r i s k i n g s l i g h t i n g w h a t is distinctive i n the l a w o f their o w n state. M o r e o v e r , the sense o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a c o m m o n enterprise likewise encourages i n t e r c o u r t bor­ r o w i n g i n the e l a b o r a t i o n o f the c o m m o n law. B u t i n i n t e r p r e t i n g a state c o n s t i t u t i o n , a state c o u r t is i n t e r p r e t i n g a u n i q u e c o l l e c t i o n o f p r o v i s i o n s w i t h a distinctive generating history. B o r r o w i n g f r o m other states be­ comes m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c , because even c o u n t e r p a r t p r o v i s i o n s f r o m other states m a y differ i n their language, the h i s t o r i c a l circumstances o u t o f w h i c h they arose, or b o t h . As Justice H a n s L i n d e has p u t i t , "[S]tate courts find themselves p u l l e d between fidelity t o the state's o w n charter a n d the sense t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w is a shared e n t e r p r i s e . " T h e dif­ ferences a m o n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s thus raise questions a b o u t the extent t o w h i c h judges s h o u l d b o r r o w d o c t r i n e or rely o n precedent f r o m other j u r i s d i c t i o n s i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l cases. I f the U.S. Supreme C o u r t ' s inter­ pretations o f c o u n t e r p a r t federal p r o v i s i o n s are n o t a u t h o r i t a t i v e for state judges i n t e r p r e t i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e n one is t e m p t e d t o c o n ­ clude t h a t neither are the interpretations by judges i n other states o f their c o u n t e r p a r t state p r o v i s i o n s . 104

T h e s i t u a t i o n , however, is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n i t m i g h t i n i t i a l l y ap­ pear. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n a universe o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s obliges state courts t o accord p a r t i c u l a r w e i g h t t o some c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t o the j u d i c i a l r u l i n g s i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e m . M o s t states have a d o p t e d m o r e t h a n one c o n s t i t u t i o n , 103 p studies of the use of precedent from other courts, see Peter Harris, "Difficult Cases and the Display of Authority," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1 (spring 1985): 2 0 9 - 2 1 , and "Structural Change in the Communication of Precedent among State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970," Social Networks 4 (September 1982): 201-22; and Gregory A . Caldeira, "The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme Courts," American Political Science Review 79 (March 1985): 178-93. Linde, "State Constitutions Common Law?" 228. o r

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a n d the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a state's c u r r e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n m u s t take account o f h o w c u r r e n t p r o v i s i o n s relate t o those i n p r i o r c o n s t i t u t i o n s . I n a d d i ­ t i o n , m o s t states i n devising their c o n s t i t u t i o n s have b o r r o w e d p r o v i s i o n s f r o m the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f other states; a n d i n i n t e r p r e t i n g those b o r r o w e d p r o v i s i o n s , judges m u s t take i n t o account their origins i n other state c o n ­ stitutions a n d j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f those other c o n s t i t u t i o n s . To these c o m p l i c a t i o n s w e n o w t u r n . THE RELATION TO PRIOR CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE

I n d e t e r m i n i n g the m e a n i n g o f a state c o n s t i t u t i o n , one m u s t first o f a l l consider the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d the state's past c o n s t i t u t i o n s . A l t h o u g h the a d d i t i o n o f altogether n e w p r o v i s i o n s raises n o unusual interpretive difficulties, b o t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change a n d c o n ­ s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t i n u i t y raise p e r p l e x i n g issues. W h e n a state revises its c o n s t i t u t i o n , one must examine h o w provisions have changed i n order t o interpret the c u r r e n t c o n s t i t u t i o n . I f the t e x t was changed, one m u s t assume t h a t the change was i n t r o d u c e d for a purpose. Occasionally, a change m a y merely i n v o l v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l housekeeping, an a t t e m p t t o eliminate c o n v o l u t e d language or t o deconstitutionalize essentially " s t a t u t o r y " p r o v i s i o n s . I n L o u i s i a n a i n 1 9 7 4 , for example, c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s substantially pared their charter by excis­ i n g p r o v i s i o n s a n d reenacting t h e m as s t a t u t e s . M o r e frequently, h o w ­ ever, alterations i n language are designed t o produce changes i n m e a n i n g . T h e m e a n i n g o f a state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t e x t thus c a n n o t be considered i n the abstract; the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d s is determined i n p a r t by w h a t they have replaced. T h u s , the c o n s t i t u t i o n includes n o t o n l y the c u r r e n t p r o v i ­ sion b u t also, as a reference p o i n t , the previous version o f the p r o v i s i o n a n d the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n given t o t h a t previous version. 105

T w o examples serve t o illustrate the p o i n t . T h e first involves N e w Jer­ sey's guarantee t h a t " [ a ] 11 persons are by nature free a n d independent, a n d have certain n a t u r a l a n d inalienable rights. . . . " O n initial i n ­ spection the guarantee seems n o m o r e t h a n a r e c o g n i t i o n o f n a t u r a l rights, presumably i n t r o d u c e d i n the state's first c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d carried over t o its successors. H o w e v e r , w h e n one compares this guarantee w i t h its predecessor i n N e w Jersey's 1 8 4 4 c o n s t i t u t i o n , one notes an i m p o r t a n t difference. Whereas the 1844 version a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t " m e n " pos­ sessed various n a t u r a l r i g h t s , the 1 9 4 7 version recognized t h a t the rights 1 0 6

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Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, 18. 106 N e w Jersey Constitution, art. 1, sec. 1. The counterpart provision in N e w Jersey's 1844 constitution (art. 1, sec. 1) read: " A l l men are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural inalienable rights . . . ." 1 0 5

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p e r t a i n t o a l l "persons." By s u b s t i t u t i n g the gender-neutral "persons" for the gendered " m e n , " the c o n s t i t u t i o n emphasized t h a t w o m e n enjoyed the same rights as m e n . H o w e v e r , l o o k i n g at the 1 9 4 7 p r o v i s i o n i n the abstract, one w o u l d h a r d l y recognize t h a t i t was designed t o p r o t e c t women's rights. 1 0 8

T h e second example likewise involves gender equality. W h e n W a s h i n g ­ t o n a d o p t e d a " l i t t l e E R A " i n 1 9 7 2 , the W a s h i n g t o n Supreme C o u r t m i g h t w e l l have f o l l o w e d the lead o f other courts t h a t h a d interpreted s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s t o establish gender as a suspect c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . T h i s , however, the c o u r t refused t o d o . Instead, i t n o t e d t h a t even p r i o r t o a d o p t i o n o f the a m e n d m e n t , W a s h i n g t o n courts h a d already recognized gender as a suspect c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Since the c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s w o u l d n o t have altered the c o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h o u t purpose, the c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t the state's citizens, by r a t i f y i n g the equal-rights a m e n d m e n t , m u s t have sought t o p r o v i d e greater p r o t e c t i o n for gender e q u a l i t y t h a n h a d existed p r e v i o u s l y . I n other w o r d s , the c o n s t i t u t i o n i n c l u d e d n o t o n l y the t e x t b u t the b o d y o f decisions w i t h i n w h i c h the t e x t fit. T h e c o u r t therefore r u l e d t h a t the equal-rights a m e n d m e n t r e q u i r e d a m o r e s t r i n ­ gent level o f r e v i e w t h a n suspect c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 109

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W h a t often goes unrecognized, given the understandable a t t e n t i o n de­ v o t e d t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change, is the extent o f c o n t i n u i t y between states' o l d a n d n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Several factors m i g h t account f o r the states' tendency t o r e t a i n features a n d p r o v i s i o n s f r o m earlier c o n s t i t u t i o n s — a m o n g t h e m , the l i m i t e d t i m e a n d energy o f m o s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conven­ t i o n s , a general satisfaction w i t h m o s t aspects o f the previous c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n , a n d the delegates' apprehension t h a t t o o r a d i c a l a change c o u l d endanger r a t i f i c a t i o n by f a c i l i t a t i n g a c o a l i t i o n a m o n g those opposed t o v a r i o u s elements o f the p r o p o s e d c o n s t i t u t i o n . W h a t e v e r the reasons f o r

Robert F. Williams, The New Jersey State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990), 29; Karen J. Kruger, "Rediscovering the New Jersey E.R.A.: The Key to Successful Sex Discrimination Litigation," Rutgers Law Journal 17 (winter 1986): 2 5 3 - 8 1 ; and Robert F. Williams, "The New Jersey Equal Rights Amend­ ment: A Documentary Sourcebook," Women's Rights Law Reporter 16 (winter 1994): 70-125. Washington's guarantee of gender equality is found in Washington Constitution, art. 3 1 , sec. 1. The state's experience under that provision is discussed in Patricia L. Proebsting, "Washington's Equal Rights Amendment: It Says What It Means and It Means What I t Says," University of Puget Sound Law Review 8 (winter 1985): 4 6 1 - 8 4 . For surveys of state supreme court interpretation of state equal-rights amendments, see Tarr and Porter, "Gender Equality"; and Friesen, State Constitutional Law, chap. 3. Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975). See, for example, Hanson v. Hütt, 517 P.2d 599 (Wash. 1973). Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 889. Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 893. 1 0 8

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c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t i n u i t y , i t poses u n i q u e p r o b l e m s f o r state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l interpreters. T h e nature o f these p r o b l e m s can best be u n d e r s t o o d by c o n s i d e r i n g analogous situations t h a t arise i n s t a t u t o r y interpreta­ tion. W h e n a c o u r t decides a case under a statute, i t offers an inter­ p r e t a t i o n o f the statute's m e a n i n g . I n theory, s h o u l d the legislature be­ lieve the court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m i s t a k e n , i t can correct the e r r o r by a m e n d i n g the statute t o clarify h o w i t s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d . Some c o m ­ m e n t a t o r s a n d judges have argued t h a t , given this o p p o r t u n i t y t o reverse the court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the legislature's failure t o a m e n d the statute s h o u l d be construed as agreement w i t h the court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d s h o u l d fix the m e a n i n g o f the statute f o r subsequent l i t i g a t i o n . How­ ever, other c o m m e n t a t o r s have m a i n t a i n e d t h a t , given the difficulties o f enacting legislation a n d the array o f issues d e m a n d i n g legislators' atten­ t i o n , one can d r a w n o conclusions f r o m legislative i n a c t i o n . Whatever the merits o f the latter a r g u m e n t , the c l a i m t h a t the legislature has en­ dorsed the j u d i c i a r y ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is u n d o u b t e d l y strengthened w h e n the legislature reenacts a statute after i t has been i n t e r p r e t e d b y the j u d i c i ­ ary, because the legislature has t h e n acted affirmatively rather t h a n merely failed t o act. T h u s , a standard source o n s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n has c o n c l u d e d t h a t " w h e r e the legislature adopts an expression w h i c h has received j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is p r i m a facie evidence o f legislative i n t e n t . " Yet other c o m m e n t a t o r s have insisted t h a t d r a w ­ i n g conclusions f r o m reenactment is u n w a r r a n t e d . 1 1 4

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W h e n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n has been carried over unchanged i n t o a n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n , the s i t u a t i o n is i n some respects analogous t o the reenactment o f a statute: i n b o t h instances the relevant g o v e r n i n g author­ i t y has acted affirmatively. T h e question t h e n becomes w h e t h e r p r i o r j u ­ d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the " o l d " (and unchanged) p r o v i s i o n determines The literature addressing the relation between earlier and later statutory enactments is extensive. See, inter alia, Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975); William N . Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); and Edward H . Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). See Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 5th ed. (Deerfield, 111.: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1992), sec. 49.10; Frank E. Horack Jr., "Congressional Si­ lence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy," Texas Law Review 25 (January 1947): 254-55; and Lawrence H . Tribe, "Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congres­ sional and Constitutional Silence," Indiana Law Journal 57 (1982): 524-29. See Dickerson, Interpretation and Application, 179-83; Eskridge, Dynamic Statu­ tory Interpretation, 241-52 and 309-15; Ernst Freund, "Interpretation of Statutes," Uni­ versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 65 (January 1917): 214-15; and John C. Grabow, "Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into 'Speculative Unrealities,'" Boston University Law Review 64 (July 1984): 740. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 69. See, for example, Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 243-45 and 311-12. 1 1 4

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the m e a n i n g o f the " n e w " p r o v i s i o n . I f such reenactment constitutes en­ dorsement o f the j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the p r o v i s i o n , t h e n arguably the c o n s t i t u t i o n n o t o n l y includes the reenacted t e x t o f the p r o v i s i o n b u t also makes a u t h o r i t a t i v e the b o d y o f case l a w developed under the previous c o n s t i t u t i o n . M o r e o v e r , i n c l u s i o n o f the unchanged p r o v i s i o n w o u l d t h e n fix its m e a n i n g so t h a t neither judges n o r other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l interpreters c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y diverge f r o m the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t h a d been ratified by reenactment. T h e r e is some case l a w t h a t supports this c o n c l u s i o n . However, i f one compares the p o l i t i c a l realities o f legislating a n d revising a c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n , the analogy between reenactment o f a statute a n d c a r r y i n g over a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n breaks d o w n . Indeed, the differences seem sub­ stantial e n o u g h t o justify v i e w i n g p r i o r j u d i c i a l interpretations o f a p r o v i ­ sion as n o t i n c l u d e d i n the n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n . Because a statute embraces a single subject, a n d because o f the level o f specialization characteristic o f state legislatures, i t is reasonable t o expect t h a t those legislators m o s t concerned w i t h reenactment o f a l a w w i l l be f a m i l i a r w i t h its content, as w e l l as w i t h its i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n d its interpretive history. Therefore, d r a w i n g conclusions f r o m reenactment m a y n o t be i n a p p r o p r i a t e . H o w ­ ever, a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n does n o t have the professionalized m e m b e r s h i p , the established expertise d e r i v i n g f r o m specialization over t i m e , o r the i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e m o r y o f a legislature. U n l i k e a legislature, a c o n v e n t i o n has o n l y l i m i t e d discretion i n deciding w h a t subjects t o address—for example, a c o n v e n t i o n c o u l d h a r d l y decide n o t t o address l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n i t was devising. M o r e o v e r , because the c o n v e n t i o n delegates m u s t address a w i d e array o f matters w i t h i n a short time-frame, they are less l i k e l y t o be k n o w l e d g e a b l e a b o u t the m e a n i n g a n d interpretive h i s t o r y o f a l l the p r o v i s i o n s they consider. Cer­ tainly, w h a t is true o f the delegates is even t r u e r o f the r a t i f y i n g p u b l i c , those w h o give the c o n s t i t u t i o n its a u t h o r i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , even i f c i t i ­ zens d i d possess such k n o w l e d g e , they c o u l d n o t vote i n d i v i d u a l l y o n specific c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions b u t instead have t o accept o r reject the c o n s t i t u t i o n as a w h o l e . Therefore, the r a t i f i c a t i o n o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n does 1 1 9

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See, for example, Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1960); and Hitchcock v. State, 131 A.2d 714 ( M d . 1957). As the N e w Jersey Supreme Court observed in Gangemi v. Berry, 134 A . 2 d 1, 9 (N.J. 1957), "[T]he Constitution derives its force, not from the Convention which framed it, but from the people w h o ratified it; and the intent to be arrived at is that of the people." The position taken by the N e w Jersey court is a standard one, at least on the rhetorical level, among constitutional interpreters and has an impressive lineage. See the remarks of James Madison on the floor of Congress in 1796: "As the instrument came from them [the dele­ gates at the federal Constitutional Convention], it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people" [Annals of Congress, 5:776). 1 1 9

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n o t have t h a t character o f active endorsement o f specific p r o v i s i o n s f o u n d i n the reenactment o f statutes. I n s u m , one c a n n o t safely conclude t h a t either delegates o r ratifiers intended t o include the j u d i c i a l inter­ p r e t a t i o n o f a carried-over p r o v i s i o n as p a r t o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n . Yet i t h a r d l y seems reasonable t o say t h a t s o m e t h i n g is i n c l u d e d i n the c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n unless i t was i n some sense m e a n t t o be i n c l u d e d . I t therefore seems a p p r o p r i a t e t o treat p r i o r j u d i c i a l r u l i n g s i n t e r p r e t i n g the unchanged p r o ­ v i s i o n just as one w o u l d treat other precedents; namely, as entitled t o considerable w e i g h t b u t n o t a u t h o r i t a t i v e . THE RELATION TO THE CONSTITUTIONS OF OTHER STATES

Earlier chapters have d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t those w h o d r a f t state c o n s t i t u ­ tions have as often been b o r r o w e r s — o r even unabashed plagiarists—as creators. Indeed, i t is precisely because o f this t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m m e n t a t o r s have placed such emphasis o n t e x t u a l d i f f e r e n c e s . If i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f p r o v i s i o n s f r o m other j u r i s d i c t i o n s is the rule, then d i ­ vergence f r o m their f o r m u l a t i o n s m u s t signify something. C o n s t i t u t i o n makers have frequently l o o k e d t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n s o f sister states, per­ haps because those states shared a s i m i l a r heritage a n d p o l i t i c a l o u t l o o k or because they already h a d developed solutions f r o m p r o b l e m s the c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s c o n f r o n t e d . H o w e v e r , the states have also o n occa­ sion l o o k e d t o the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y t o its i n s t i t u t i o n a l design, t h o u g h the e m u l a t i o n o f the federal m o d e l has been far f r o m complete. Finally, the states have at times t a k e n d i r e c t i o n n o t f r o m the t e x t o f the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n b u t f r o m p r o p o s e d amendments or f r o m j u d i c i a l decisions i n t e r p r e t i n g i t . T h u s , as n o t e d earlier, several states d r e w i n s p i r a t i o n for their " l i t t l e E R A s " f r o m the p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t t o the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d some states have redesigned their criminal-justice guarantees i n l i g h t o f Supreme C o u r t r u l i n g s . T h e fre121

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See, for example, Collins, "Reliance on State Constitutions," 18-19; Robert D o w l u t and Janet A . Knoop, "State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms," Okla­ homa City University Law Review 7 (summer 1982): 177-80; Pollock, "Constitutions as Separate Sources," 7 0 8 - 1 7 ; Williams, " I n the Shadow," 369; and "Developments in the Law—Interpretation," 1359-62. O n the relation between the federal equal-rights amendment and state guarantees of gender equality, see Lujuana Wolfe Treadwell and Nancy Wallace Page, "Comment: Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience under State Constitutions," California Law Review 65 (September 1977): 1087-88; and Tarr and Porter, "Gender Equality," 9 2 8 - 2 9 . From 1970 to 1985, six states adopted constitutional amendments reducing the size of trial juries in criminal cases, at least in part in response to Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1980), which held that there is no constitutional requirement for a twelve-person jury. In addition, Louisiana constitutionalized the warnings from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Florida tied the interpretation of Florida's search-and-seizure provision to var1 2 1

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quency a n d extent o f this b o r r o w i n g raises questions a b o u t exactly w h a t is i n c o r p o r a t e d as p a r t o f a state's o w n c o n s t i t u t i o n . I n b o r r o w i n g a p r o ­ v i s i o n f r o m another c o n s t i t u t i o n , does a state thereby a d o p t the m e a n i n g o f t h a t p r o v i s i o n ? Or, m o r e t o the p o i n t , does i t endorse the m e a n i n g given t o the p r o v i s i o n by the o r i g i n a t i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n , so t h a t this inter­ p r e t a t i o n becomes p a r t o f the state c o n s t i t u t i o n ? 1 2 3

These questions have arisen m o s t frequently w h e n state courts have been called u p o n t o i n t e r p r e t rights guarantees framed i n the same l a n ­ guage as f o u n d i n the federal B i l l o f R i g h t s . I n such circumstances, advo­ cates o f the lockstep a p p r o a c h have suggested t h a t state courts s h o u l d c o n f o r m t h e i r interpretations t o those made by the U.S. Supreme C o u r t . Such c o n f o r m i t y , they have argued, accords w i t h the " a r t i f i c i a l c a n o n o f c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t i d e n t i c a l language i n t w o instruments s h o u l d be inter­ preted i d e n t i c a l l y " a n d protects against state judges w r i t i n g their o w n p o l i t i c a l preferences i n t o the l a w . M o r e o v e r , such c o n f o r m i t y seems consistent w i t h the n o t i o n t h a t i n m a k i n g another j u r i s d i c t i o n ' s p r o v i s i o n its o w n , a state adopts n o t o n l y the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l language b u t also its m e a n i n g . W h e n t h a t m e a n i n g is a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y elaborated by the Su­ preme C o u r t , t h e n state judges are o b l i g e d t o accept the Court's d e t e r m i ­ nations a n d rule accordingly. 1 2 4

T h i s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t the states m o d e l e d their identical p r o v i s i o n s o n those c o n t a i n e d i n the federal C o n s t i t u t i o n is n o t altogether accurate: some state p r o v i s i o n s antedated their federal c o u n t e r p a r t s . Even w h e r e state a n d federal guarantees are i d e n t i c a l , a state m a y have m o d ­ eled its p r o v i s i o n o n one f o u n d i n a n o t h e r state c o n s t i t u t i o n . M o r e f u n ­ damentally, even i f the m e a n i n g o f i d e n t i c a l federal a n d state p r o v i s i o n s is the same, i t does n o t f o l l o w t h a t state judges m u s t treat the Supreme Court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f those p r o v i s i o n s as c o n t r o l l i n g . As argued p r e v i ­ ously, this f o l l o w s o n l y i f one assumes t h a t the Supreme C o u r t c a n n o t err i n its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , o r t h a t the C o n s t i t u t i o n is merely w h a t the Supreme C o u r t says i t i s . B u t once one accepts t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s have m e a n i n g independent o f h o w they have been interpreted, t h e n state judges' o b l i g a t i o n t o f o l l o w the Supreme Court's r u l i n g s ceases. Instead, 125

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ious U.S. Supreme Court rulings. See Louisiana Constitution, art. 1, sec. 13; and Florida Constitution, art. 1, sec. 12. See Fritz, "American Constitutional Tradition Revisited," 9 7 5 - 8 4 . Keyser, "State Constitutions and Review," 1063. See Lutz, "State Constitutional Pedigree"; Williams, "Equality Guarantees"; and chapter 3 of this volume. This, of course, recalls Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes's famous observation that "we are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is." Quoted i n M e r l o J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 2:204. 1 2 3

1 2 4

1 2 5

1 2 6

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207

they m u s t determine whether the C o u r t has a r r i v e d at the true m e a n i n g o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n a n d f o l l o w the Court's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o n l y w h e n they conclude t h a t i t is correct. Therefore, the Court's rulings do n o t constitute a u t h o r i t a t i v e pronouncements but are merely accounts o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions entitled t o respectful consideration by state judges independently seeking the m e a n i n g o f their state c o n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e s i t u a t i o n is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d , however, w h e n U.S. Supreme C o u r t r u l i n g s — o r i n the case o f b o r r o w i n g f r o m other states, state j u d i c i a l p r o n o u n c e m e n t s — a n t e d a t e a state's a d o p t i o n o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i ­ sion b o r r o w e d f r o m another j u r i s d i c t i o n . I n contrast w i t h a state's reen­ actment o f previously adopted provisions, where t e x t u a l change requires m o r e serious consideration t h a n does n o change, the i n i t i a l decision t o a d o p t a p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n , usually f r o m a m o n g several possible ver­ sions, involves a clear choice. M o r e o v e r , i f decisions exist i n t e r p r e t i n g the p r o v i s i o n , then a state i n a d o p t i n g the p r o v i s i o n k n o w s w h a t the conse­ quences o f the choice are. One chooses n o t o n l y the t e x t b u t the conse­ quences o f t h a t t e x t u a l f o r m u l a t i o n , as indicated by the j u d i c i a l decisions i n t e r p r e t i n g the t e x t . T h u s , w h e n H a w a i i chose t o m o d e l its guarantee o f freedom o f speech o n the First A m e n d m e n t , i t thereby i n c l u d e d w i t h i n its c o n s t i t u t i o n the rulings o f the Supreme C o u r t to that point interpret­ i n g the p r o v i s i o n . 1 2 7

1 2 8

N o t e , however, the p r o v i s o . I n a d o p t i n g a p r o v i s i o n f r o m another j u ­ r i s d i c t i o n , a state adopts the same m e a n i n g o f t h a t p r o v i s i o n . W h e r e the meaning has n o t been elaborated, the state is free t o develop its o w n independent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the p r o v i s i o n . W h e r e the b o r r o w e d p r o v i ­ sion has been a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y interpreted, the state is u n d e r s t o o d t o have adopted the p r o v i s i o n as interpreted, t o have i n c l u d e d w i t h i n its c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n the a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the m e a n i n g o f the p r o v i s i o n . H o w e v e r , n o state can k n o w h o w another state w i l l interpret a p r o v i s i o n i n the future, a n d the b o r r o w i n g state is n o t b o u n d by whatever changes i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m i g h t occur subsequent t o r a t i f i c a t i o n . A l t h o u g h the analogy is n o t exact, state p r i v a c y provisions help t o illustrate the p o i n t . W h e n states began a d o p t i n g p r i v a c y protections u n ­ connected t o search a n d seizure i n the late 1960s, their understanding o f the r i g h t t o p r i v a c y was clearly influenced by the federal r i g h t t o privacy, as elaborated i n Griswold v. Connecticut. T h u s , i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the 129

State constitution-makers have sometimes expressly indicated their recognition that the provisions being borrowed came w i t h a baggage of constitutional rulings elaborating their meaning. See Fritz, "American Constitutional Tradition Revisited," 9 8 3 - 8 4 . H a w a i i Constitution, art. 1, sec. 4. From 1968 to 1980, eight states—Alaska, California, Florida, H a w a i i , Illinois, Loui­ siana, Mississippi, Montana, and South Carolina—amended their constitutions to incorpo­ rate an explicit right to privacy. In some instances, the scope of this right was exceedingly 1 2 7

1 2 8

1 2 9

208

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Chapter 6

state r i g h t t o p r i v a c y i n those states, Griswold

can serve as the s t a r t i n g

p o i n t . H o w e v e r , state guarantees, i f a d o p t e d p r i o r t o 1 9 7 3 , d o n o t neces­ sarily i n c l u d e the r i g h t t o t e r m i n a t e a pregnancy, the r i g h t recognized i n Roe v. Wade, or exclude the r i g h t t o be free o f g o v e r n m e n t a l interference i n one's i n t i m a t e relationships, the issue i n Bowers w h e t h e r o r n o t a d o p t e d after Roe,

v. Hardwick.

130

Nor,

d o they i n c o r p o r a t e the restrictions

t h a t the Supreme C o u r t subsequently placed o n a b o r t i o n r i g h t s .

CONCLUSION

T h e earliest p r o p o n e n t s o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism were m o r e i n c l i n e d t o e x t o l the virtues o f r e l y i n g o n state c o n s t i t u t i o n s t h a n t o e x p l a i n h o w one s h o u l d go a b o u t i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e m . T h i s celebrational posture c o u l d n o t last, a n d i n recent years state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has been beset b y naysayers. C o n t e m p o r a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists b y t h e i r ne­ glect have i m p l i c i t l y denied t h a t state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is w o r ­ t h y o f serious a t t e n t i o n . C r i t i c s o f the n e w j u d i c i a l federalism have c o n d e m n e d the independent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n s as ille­ g i t i m a t e o r undesirable. C o m m e n t a t o r s such as James G a r d n e r a n d Paul K a h n have denied t h a t independent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is possible. These skeptics are w r o n g . D o u b t s a b o u t the v i a b i l i t y o f state c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l jurisprudence have n o t prevented its development. State courts have c o n t i n u e d , as i n the past, t o decide cases based o n distinctive state p r o v i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g taxes a n d finance, local g o v e r n m e n t a n d schools. A l t h o u g h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f state declarations o f rights has aroused m o r e controversy, some states have begun t o develop independent inter­ pretations o f their rights guarantees as w e l l . T h i s chapter focused o n O r e ­ gon's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l safeguard f o r freedom o f expres­ sion, b u t i t c o u l d as easily have h i g h l i g h t e d t h a t state's distinctive a p p r o a c h t o search a n d seizure o r C a l i f o r n i a ' s r e l i g i o u s - l i b e r t y j u r i s p r u ­ dence. Certainly, t o o m a n y states c o n t i n u e t o rely a u t o m a t i c a l l y o n fed­ eral l a w w h e n c o n f r o n t e d w i t h r i g h t s issues. Even w h e n they i n t e r p r e t state guarantees, t o o m a n y frame their analysis i n federal d o c t r i n a l cate­ gories, m a k i n g state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w merely a p o o r r e l a t i o n , stuck w i t h i l l - f i t t i n g h a n d - m e - d o w n s . Yet over t i m e the p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f independent narrow—Mississippi's guarantee, for example, merely upheld victims' privacy rights by excluding the public from trials involving sex crimes. I n some states—for example, Louisi­ ana and South Carolina—the right was incorporated into provisions protecting against illicit searches. But in five states—Alaska, California, Florida, H a w a i i , and Montana—the privacy guarantee was a "free-standing" protection. The federal ruling recognizing a right to privacy implicit in the penumbras of various constitutional guarantees was Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 1 3 0

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209

state interpretations is l i k e l y t o have a positive effect. Just as the diversity o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions enabled state c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k e r s t o choose the m o d e l t h a t best fit their needs, so the development o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e can be expected t o p r o v i d e alternatives t o the re­ flexive a d o p t i o n o f federal d o c t r i n e . M o r e o v e r , the necessity o f choosing a m o n g these alternatives s h o u l d stimulate state courts t o examine m o r e closely the t e x t a n d h i s t o r y o f their c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s , t o deter­ m i n e w h i c h a l t e r n a t i v e — i f any—best captures the m e a n i n g o f the state's provision. T h i s is n o t t o deny the difficulty o f the enterprise o f state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . State constitutions are distinctive documents, a n d the ap­ p r o a c h t o their i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must take account o f t h a t distinctiveness. C o n t e m p o r a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y can assist i n the development o f a state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l jurisprudence, b u t state interpreters nevertheless c o n ­ f r o n t a host o f problems for w h i c h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theorists supply no solutions. Yet these problems are n o t insuperable. T h r o u g h a t t e n t i o n t o the t e x t o f state p r o v i s i o n s , t o their generating history, t o their place i n the state's o v e r a l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l design, a n d t o their r e l a t i o n t o earlier state provisions as w e l l as provisions i n other states, state interpreters can develop a b o d y o f l a w t h a t reflects the distinctive t r a d i t i o n s o f state constitutionalism.

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Index

Ackerman, Bruce, 23n76; on constitu­ tional change, 194 Adams, John: on stratification, 86 Adaptability, 156 Admission of states, 4 1 ; requirements for, 4 1 - 5 5 ; vote on, 40 Admonitory language, 76, 78 Agenda, state constitutional, 9 9 - 1 0 1 Alabama Constitution (1819), amend­ ments to, 35 Alabama Constitution (1875), 1 3 2 n l 7 5 ; corporate aid and, 114; legislative con­ trol and, 125; ratification and, 35n23; on unnecessary offices, 132 Alabama Constitution (1901): amend­ ments to, 24; white supremacy and, 144 Alaska Constitution, M o d e l State Consti­ tution and, 153, 154, 154n81 Amar, A k h i l Reed: civic republicanism and, 6 4 n l 6 ; on popular authority, 74n55 Amendments, 29, 53, 59, 60, 94n2, 174, 196; adjustment-by, 144; average num­ ber of, 24; constitutional length and, 38; local, 142n28, 143; by petition, 141n22; piecemeal transformation by, 139; politics of, 142; procedures for, 17n46, 23, 26n86, 35, 37, 62; proposal of, 36, 57, 1 4 0 n l 2 ; rate of, 3 5 - 3 6 , 36n24, 37, 38n36, 140, 141, 141n25; ratification of, 2 6 - 2 7 , 32, 3 2 n l l , 36, 36n26, 74, 139, 1 3 9 n l l , 140, 141; re­ jection of, 3 2 n l l , 36n26, 143-44; re­ liance on, 3 1 , 38, 141; resubmission of, 143-44; state legislatures and, 25, 143; voter knowledge about/interest i n , 32. See also Constitutional changes Anti-Federalists, state government and, 90 Apportionment, 45, 46, 82n93, 8 6 n l 0 7 , 93, 102-5, 129, 136; formulas for, 102, 145; judicial supervision of, 147; prob­ lems dealing w i t h , 1 0 3 - 4 , 145-46; tax­ ation and, 86. See also Reapportionment Aristocracy, 85, 100n20

Attitudinal explanations, constitutional changes and, 3 0 - 3 4 Authority: assumption of, 6 7 - 6 9 ; problem of, 6 7 - 7 1 . See also Popular authority Baker v. Carr (1962), 42 Balanced-budget amendment, 172 Bankruptcy, 30, 77 Benjamin, Gerald: on reformers/initiatives, 158n98 Berger, Raoul: on Eighth Amendment, 191n66 Bills of rights, 13, 24; judicial federalism and, 180n26; labor, 148; state law and, 167. See also Federal Bill of Rights Blacks: disenfranchisement of, 106, 131, 144; political rights for, 1 0 1 , 101n23, 1 3 1 n l 7 2 ; rights for, 97 Black suffrage, 95, 95n6; limiting, 107; struggle for, 106 Borrowing, 65, 66, 68, 70, 98, 2 0 1 ; con­ stitutional, 5 1 , 5 2 - 5 3 , 54; ex­ tent/character of, 54; interpretation and, 206, 2 0 7 - 8 Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 208 Brennan, William H . , Jr., 161; on human dignity/Constitution, 192; judicial feder­ alism and, 166, 1 6 7 - 6 8 , 180; on state supreme courts/constitutions, 165 Brown v. Heymann (1972), 15n37 Brown v. State (1983), 181 Bryce, James, 4; on constitutionalization of politics, 133-34; on 19th-century constitutions, 98 Budgets: plebiscitary, 159; reducing, 131-32 Burger, Warren, 161 Burger Court: civil-liberties cases and, 161, 165; Illinois v. Gates and, 179n22; judicial activism and, 171; retrenchment by, 178; on search warrants, 179; state constitutions and, 180; state guarantees and, 178 California Constitution: Article 10B of, 2 1 ; on eight-hour workday, 2 1 ; on judi-

238

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Index

California constitution (cont. ) cial opinions, 18; on water resource de­ velopment, 21 California Constitution (1849): corporate regulation in, 52; inspiration for, 98 California Constitution (1879), 120; amendments to, 24; Chinese and, 108 California constitutional convention: legis­ lative restrictions and, 121; woman suf­ frage at, 109 Capitalists, producers and, 111 Charter government, 60, 68 Checks and balances, 65, 92, 151 Chinese, disenfranchisement of, 106, 108 Civic republicanism, 64, 6 4 n n l 4 , 16 Civil-liberties cases, 50, 166, 177; federal law and, 48n79, 167; resolving, 178; state constitutional interpretation and, 48, 49; state courts and, 164-65 Civil-liberties laws, 163, 178; interpreting, 165; judicial activism and, 169; legit­ imacy of, 177; state, 50, 165 Clause-bound interpretivism, defined, 194n77 Coherence, 191-94 Collective bargaining, 148, 149 Colorado Constitution (1876): on private property, 116-17; on water rights, 198 Commission on Economy and Efficiency, reorganization/consolidation and, 152 Committee for Economic Development, 153 Commonalities, constitutional, 3 9 - 5 5 , 98-101 Communication, developing, 110 Community, 8 1 ; concerns for, 77; private interests and, 64; special privilege and, 80 Connecticut Constitution (1818), amend­ ments to, 35n21 Connecticut constitutional convention, ap­ portionment issue at, 103 Constitutional amendments. See Amendments Constitutional changes, 59, 67, 9 1 , 93, 128, 136, 136n4, 196, 2 0 1 ; accounting for, 3 0 - 3 9 ; advocates/opponents of, 34, 138n8, 172; amendment for, 172; au­ thority for, 74; formal, 2 6 - 2 7 , 29, 7 3 75, 9 4 - 9 5 , 139; implications for, 7 0 7 1 ; movement for, 33, 139, 1 5 0 - 6 1 ;

patterns of, 92; post-World War I I , 153-54; procedure for, 23, 26n87, 34, 37, 62, 74; professionalization of, 170; public attitudes and, 34; rate of, 29, 3 5 - 3 6 , 137-38; reliance on, 9 1 ; rights violations and, 75; by state legislatures, 70n38; transformational, 194. See also Amendments Constitutional commissions, 25, 5 3 n l 0 4 , 170 Constitutional continuity, concern for, 94 Constitutional conventions, 25, 26n85, 33, 3 3 n l 2 , 94n2, 136-37, 196; cam­ paigns for, 103, 1 7 0 n l 4 4 ; constitu­ tionalization of politics and, 133-34; convening of, 73, 136-37n4; member­ ship of, 5 7 n l 2 4 ; popular control over, 25-26n85, 73; power of, 125; state leg­ islatures and, 125 Constitutional development, 30; 18thcentury, 6 5 - 6 6 ; judicial involvement in, 162; 20th-century, 170 Constitutional doctrine, 50, 8 8 n l l 5 ; state courts and, 200 Constitutional fidelity, 199; ensuring, 7 1 73 Constitutional flexibility, 156 Constitutionalism, 4, 5, 209; broader per­ spectives on, 5 5 - 5 9 ; constitutionmakers and, 193; 18th-century, 6 0 - 9 3 ; 19th-century, 9 4 - 1 3 5 ; 20th-century, 136-72; understanding, 58. See also Dual constitutionalism Constitutional legislation, 1, 62n7; prob­ lems w i t h , 134; as shared enterprise, 200; state courts and, 168 Constitutional length, 92; amendments and, 38; concerns about, 9 - 1 1 ; increase in, 10 Constitutional meaning: borrowing and, 206; interpretation and, 207 Constitutional minimalism, 9 Constitutional provisions: antimonopoly, 111; balanced-budget, 1 5 9 n l 0 1 ; bifur­ cation of, 190; borrowed, 2 0 1 ; constitu­ tional, 193, 193n74; corporation, 176; diversity of, 1 8 9 - 9 1 ; reinterpretation of, 204; statutory, 186 Constitutional restrictions, 28; problems w i t h , 134; on initiatives, 27; legislative, 1 6 - 1 7 , 52, 95, 1 1 8 - 2 1 , 122-24, 125, 133; zoning, 166, 179, 179n23, 197

Index Constitutional theorists, 208; on federal Constitution, 191-92; interpretation by, 192, 194; originalism and, 195 Constitutional theory, 1, 5; contemporary, 209; ignoring, 173; interpretation and, 174; state constitutions and, 173 Constitution-makers: borrowing by, 54; constitutionalism and, 193; direction for, 47, 209; republican government and, 100 Constitution-making, 12, 58; control over, 70; initial years of, 65; 19th-century, 95 (fig.), 96 (table); ordinary politics and, 134; popular role i n , 70; 20th-century, 137 (table); waves of, 66, 87, 91 Continental Congress, 60, 60n3, 67; state­ hood and, 51 Cooley, Thomas: on 19th-century state constitutions, 9 8 - 9 9 Cornwell, Elmer: M o d e l State Constitu­ tion and, 154 Corporate debts, liability for, 113, 117 Corporations: charters for, 110, 110n69, 111; regulation of, 52, 115-17; municipal, 19 Corruption, 110, 112, 120; mechanisms of, 110n69; party bosses and, 151; poli­ tics of, 134 Council of Appointment, 8 8 n l l 4 , 122 Council of Censors, 72n47, 73, 92; amendment proposals by, 1 4 0 n l 2 ; con­ stitutional conventions and, 73-74n52; meeting of, 71 Council of Revision, 3 5 n l 8 , 52, 72, 8 7 88,122,123nl29 Coyle v.Smith (1911), 41 Criminal cases, 171; state law and, 167 Cummings v. Missouri (1867), 44 Declaration of Independence, 40, 60; bor­ rowing from, 68; constitutions follow­ ing, 67 Declarations of rights, 12, 13, 22, 55, 62, 75, 138, 169; adding, 75n57; civilrights cases and, 165; distinctiveness of, 7 6 - 8 1 ; Federal Bill of Rights and, 179n25; influence of, 76n59; interpreta­ tion of, 208; justificatory/explanatory materials in, 9 0 - 9 1 ; legitimacy and, 178; popular control of government

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239

and, 79; republican political theory and, 78; rulings on, 177, 182 Defendants rights, 166, 177 Delaware Declaration of Rights, 76, 77 Design, 63, 98; governmental, 82, 90; shift i n , 19 Detail, concerns about, 9 - 1 1 Dillon's rule, 19, 20 Direct democracy, 125-26; good govern­ ment and, 151 Disenfranchisement: black, 106, 131, 144; Chinese, 106, 108; M o r m o n , 108. See also Franchise; Suffrage; Voting Distinctiveness, discourse of, 185, 187 Divergence, from Supreme Court, 183, 183n36, 187 Dodd, Walter F.: on amendments, 1 3 9 n l l Dorr, Thomas, 103 Dorr Rebellion, 3 3 n l 2 , 43 Dual constitutionalism, 1, 6, 181n33, 190; commitment to, 181; primacy approach and, 184 Due process, 49n83, 147, 183-84, 188 D w o r k i n , Ronald: on concept/conception, 187n52; on Eighth Amendment, 191n66 Economic development, 129, 164; consti­ tutional provisions on, 2 1 ; dual perspec­ tive on, 109-17; post-Civil War, 1 1 3 14; pre-Civil War, 109-13; promotion of, 112, 128; regulation of, 115; reor­ ienting, 132; state and, 95, 99, 101, 109-17, 139, 147-50 Economic policy: controlling, 150; contro­ versy over, 65; group, 147; judicial rul­ ings on, 124; reorientation of, 150; unjust, 66 Education, 62n7, 108, 131, 199; conflicts over, 40; Progressives and, 151. See also Schools Eighth Amendment, 191; cruel and un­ usual punishment and, 191n66 Elazar, Daniel: on managerial pattern, 155; on ordinary politics, 57; on politi­ cal theory/culture, 55-56 Elections: establishment of, 83; participa­ tion i n , 79; partisan/nonpartisan, 151; special, 69. See also Voting Ely, John Hart: on clause-bound interpretivism, 194n77

240

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Index

Eminent domain, enhancing, 148 Enabling acts, 40, 40n41 Enforcement mechanisms, 72, 73 Equality, 177, 188, 198n95; compromis­ ing on, 84; gender, 202, 2 0 2 n l 0 9 ; un­ derstanding of, 199 Equal protection, 49n83, 147; homosex­ uals and, 44; state supreme courts and, 167 Equal protection clause, 22, 42, 47, 184, 198; state, 199 Equal-rights amendment. See Little ERAs Erie Canal, 110 Esler, Michael, 167 Ethics commissions, 160 Exclusionary zoning, 166, 179; challenges to, 179n23 Executive agencies, empowerment of, 17, 18 Executive branches: modernization of, 18n50, 138n9, 157; strong, 151 Executive officials: appointment of, 127; popular election of, 121-22, 127, 1 3 1 n l 7 2 ; powers of, 17 Explanatory material, 8 1 , 9 0 - 9 1 Fairlie, John A . , 152n74 Federal Bill of Rights, 12, 23, 24, 44, 163, 206; borrowing from, 8 1 ; claims on, 177; incorporating provisions of, 1 6 2 n l l 7 ; influence of, 76, 8 1 ; state constitutions and, 12n24, 13; state dec­ larations of rights and, 179n25. See also Bills of rights Federal Constitution: amendments to, 25, 38, 94; black rights and, 97; borrowing from, 65; constitutional reform follow­ ing, 66, 88; incompleteness of, 10, 92, 9 9 n l 6 ; influence of, 7, 6 1 , 90, 98, 1 1 8 n l 0 8 ; interpretation of, 199, 2 0 6 - 7 ; legitimacy and, 175; length of, 1 0 - 1 1 ; political theory of, 64; state constitu­ tions and, 92, 171, 172, 186-87, 188; state legislative power and, 99 Federalism, l l n l 9 ; horizontal, 9 8 - 9 9 , 1 0 7 - 8 . See also Judicial federalism Federalists, state government and, 90 Federalist theory, 9 2 n l 2 4 ; W h i g theory and, 92 Federal law: civil-liberties cases and, 167; rights and, 169

"Fellow-servant" rule, 116 Fifteenth Amendment, 45, 95, 107 Finance, 63; prohibitions i n , 2 1 ; provi­ sions on, 141, 141n25 Fino, Susan: on constitutional cases/state law, 167 First Amendment, 44, 47n72, 207; equal protection clause and, 47 First things first approach, 183-85, 184n39 Florida Constitution (1839), economic leg­ islation a n d , 1 1 5 n 9 7 Fourteenth Amendment, 45, 45n64, 47, 95, 184, 191, 191n66; adoption of, 44; equal protection clause of, 22, 42; m i ­ nority protections i n , 198 Fourth Amendment, 49, 180 Framing, authority for, 6 9 - 7 0 Franchise: aliens and, 108; expansion of, 82n94, 100, 1 0 1 - 2 , 106-7; limitations on, 102, 108; qualifications for, 171. See also Disenfranchisement; Suffrage; Voting Free press, 47n72, 77; protecting, 13n32; state courts and, 1 6 8 n l 3 9 Free speech, 47n72, 177, 196, 207; pro­ tecting, 13, 13-14n32, 197; state courts and, 1 6 8 n l 3 9 Freund, Ernst, 1 3 4 n l 8 3 ; on popular gov­ ernment, 1 0 0 n l 8 Friedman, Lawrence: on legal culture, 171; on state constitutions, 3 Fritz, Christian, 47 Froman, Lewis A.: on interest groups/amendments, 143n34 Gais, Thomas: on reformers/initiatives, 158n98 Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission (Florida), 17 Gangemi v. Berry (1957), 2 0 4 n l 2 0 Gardner, James: constitutional theorists and, 189; on interpretation, 185, 208; lockstep approach and, 188; originalist jurisprudence and, 196n83; on state court rulings, 186; on U.S. Constitution, 186 Georgia Constitution (1798): amendments to, 24, 3 1 , 31n6, 6 3 n l 4 , 142n28; Fed­ eral Constitution and, 8 8 n l l 5 ; revision of, 93; on senatorial terms, 89

Index Georgia Constitution (1982), adoption of, 6 Gideon v. Wainright (1963), 44n62, 49 "Good government" groups: direct de­ mocracy and, 151; reform and, 33, 138 Governors: indirect selection of, 89, 121, 127, 130; length of term for, 89; limita­ tions on, 160; popular election of, 87, 121, 123, 130; powers for, 8 9 - 9 0 , 123, 156. See also Executive officials Grad, Frank, 141n23 Granger constitution. See Illinois Constitu­ tion (1870) Granger movement, impact of, 94 Great ordinances, interpretation of, 190 Grey, Thomas, 192 Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 2 0 7 - 8 , 208nl29 Guarantee clause, 4 2 - 4 3 , 42n47 H a l l , Kermit: on antigovernment bias, 133 Hamilton, Alexander: on declarations of rights, 62n6 Harris v. New York (1973), 178; rejection of, 179n21 Havard, William: on constitutional change, 5 7 n l 2 3 Hawaii Constitution (1968): amendments to, 24n80; indigent defendants and, 44n62; Model State Constitution and, 153, 154, 154n81; on public health/welfare, 149n65 Health, protection/promotion of, 22, 115, 148, 149 Hicks, John, 5 1 - 5 2 Home rule, 20, 28 Homosexuals: amendment against, 188; equal protection and, 44; rights of, 160 Horizontal federalism, 9 8 - 9 9 , 107-8. See also Interstate influences Hortatory language, 76, 8 1 ; state declara­ tions of rights and, 78 Hughes, Charles Evans: on judges/federal Constitution, 2 0 6 n l 2 6 Hurst, J. Willard, 1 1 0 - 1 1 , 134 Idaho Constitution (1889): Chinese and, 108; labor commissions and, 116; on private property, 116-17; railroad regu­ lation and, 116; on water rights/livestock, 21

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241

Idaho constitutional convention, M o r ­ mons and, 126-27 Illinois Constitution (1848): incorporation laws and, 112, 112n81; legislative con­ trol and, 125 Illinois Constitution (1870), 115, 126, 126n46; legislative restrictions i n , 120 Illinois v. Gates (1983), 179n22 Immigrants, rights of, 161 Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983), 50 Incorporation laws, 112, 128 Indiana Supreme Court, constitutional convention and, 27 Initiatives, 158n99; adoption of, 1 4 0 n l 3 , 160; judicial, 164; rediscovery of, 138; reformers and, 158n98; restrictions on, 27; statutory, 169; use of, 2 5 - 2 6 , 151 Intent: collective/individual, 195; legisla­ tive, 203. See also Original intent Interpretation, 173-209; approaches to, 181n32, 189, 191n65; borrowing and, 206, 2 0 7 - 8 ; clause-bound, 194; com­ plications of, 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ; constitutional theory and, 174; independent, 208; ju­ dicial, 59, 203, 204; legitimacy and, 174-85; meaning and, 207; separation of powers and, 15; state constitutional, 185-89, 189-208, 209 Interstate influences, 5 0 - 5 5 . See also Hor­ izontal federalism Interstitial approach, 179n25, 182-83 Iowa Constitution (1846): influence of, 98; judicial elections and, 122 Iowa Supreme Court, constitutional amendment and, 27 Jacksonian democracy, 127, 193; aristoc­ racy and, 100n20; federal support and, 110; influence of, 94, 99; political par­ ticipation and, 105; special privilege and,111 Jay, John: on Council of Appointment, 88nll4 Judges: election of, 122, 123, 127, 1 2 7 n l 5 2 ; indirect selection of, 4 6 - 4 7 , 127; interpretation by, 199; state consti­ tutional development and, 169 Judicial activism, 124; state civil-liberties law and, 169

242

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Index

Judicial federalism, 138, 138nlO; emer­ gence of, 48, 139, 161-70, 177; hidden conservatism of, 168; in historical per­ spective, 162-65; horizontal/vertical, 1 6 4 n l 2 1 ; legitimacy and, 178; liberal policy agenda of, 179; proponents of, 166-68, 208; scope/impact of, 165-70; state bills of rights and, 180n26 Judicial independence, 46, 73nn48, 49 Judicial restraint, 176 Judicial systems: constitutional prescrip­ tion for, 18; reform of, 157; standards for, 164 Kahn, Paul: constitutional theorists and, 189; on divergence, 187; on interpreta­ tion, 185, 208; on state constitutions, 187, 188 Kansas Constitution (1870): apportion­ ment and, 104; on special laws, 124 Kansas Supreme Court, on constitu­ tionality, 7 Keller, M o r t o n , 3 1 , 134; on "public" atti­ tudes, 33; on railroad development/public aid, 114; on revision/amendment, 30 Kentucky Constitution (1851), on educa­ tion, 1 2 0 n l l 7 Kentucky constitutional convention, 122; antislavery delegates at, 129 Kestenbaum Commission, 153 Kousser, J. Morgan, 52; on suffragereduction mechanisms, 108 Kruman, Marc, 79n78; on federal Consti­ tution/state constitutions, 6 4 n l 6 Labor commissions, establishment of, 116 Labor contracts, liability for, 116 Latzer, Barry, 1 6 8 n l 3 9 ; on judicial feder­ alism, 168; state judges/ constitutional law and, 168 Layering, constitutional, 193, 193n74 Legislative courtesy, 142n28, 143 Legislative power, 16; apportionment of, 171; constitutional limits of, 156; plen­ ary character of, 10 Legislative Reference Bureau (University of Hawaii), 53 Legislatures: amendments and, 25; author­ ity of, 69; constitutional changes by, 70n38; power for, 65, 66, 86-87; pro-

fessionalization of, 157; restrictions on, 16-17, 95, 1 1 8 - 2 1 , 122-24, 125, 133 Legitimacy: constitutional interpretation and, 174-85; dealing w i t h , 1 7 5 - 8 1 ; fundamental/secondary, 1 7 6 n l 0 ; mini­ mizing questions of, 182; state constitu­ tions and, 174-77 Levy, Leonard: on ought/shall, 7 7 - 7 8 Liability, 148; corporate, 117; labor con­ tract, 116; limited, 113, 197; tort, 160 Linde, Hans: on constitutional law, 200; on divergence, 183; judicial federalism and, 184; on Oregon Constitution/federal equal protection clause, 1 9 9 n l 0 0 ; primacy approach and, 183, 184 Literacy tests, 106, 144, 146, 151 Little ERAs, 13, 47, 188, 202, 205 Local government, 28, 176; limitation of, 156; powers of, 19, 62 Locke, John, 75; civic republicanism and, 6 4 n n l 4 , 16 Lockstep approach, 1 8 0 - 8 1 , 181n32, 188; state rights guarantees and, 182; supplemental approach and, 183 Lotteries, 16, 126 Louisiana Constitution (1868), on dis­ crimination/education, 97 Louisiana Constitution (1921), amend­ ments to, 24, 38 Louisiana Constitution (1972): amendments to, 38; on private discrimination, 13 Luther v. Borden (1849), 42 Lutz, Donald S., 1 0 n l 5 , 36; on amend­ ment rate, 37; on Bill of Rights/state constitutions, 12n24; on constitutional change, 37, 38; on constitution-making waves, 66; on incompleteness, 10, 92, 99nl6 Lynd, Staughton, 83n95 Madison, James, 3n8, 9 n l l , 6 4 n l 7 , 204; on separation of powers, 14n33 Marine Resources Protection Act (1990), 21 Marshall, John, 9 n l l ; constitutional anal­ ysis by, 6, 7; constitutional minimalism and, 9; on grants of power, 8 Maryland Constitution (1776): on par­ don/reprieve, 87; on property qualifica­ tions, 107

Index Massachusetts Constitution (1780): adop­ tion of, 70; amendments to, 24n80; Declaration of Independence and, 68; elections and, 83; influence of, 83n97, 90, 98; social-compact theory and, 67n26 Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 12, 76 McCulloch v. Maryland, 7; state constitu­ tionalism and, 6 Mellette, Arthur, 125 Merritt, Deborah Jones, 42n48 Meyers, M a r v i n , 110 Minorities: majority privilege and, 111; problems w i t h , 78 Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 2 0 5 n l 2 2 Mississippi Constitution (1817), slavery and, 129 Missouri Constitution (1870), on special/state laws, 124 Missouri Constitution (1875): inspiration for, 98; legislative restrictions i n , 52, 120; on public funds expenditure, 126 Models, 118nl08; Federal constitution and, 6 1 ; multiplicity of, 5 3 - 5 4 ; 19thcentury, 9 8 - 9 9 Model State Constitution, 138n7, 152-53, 155n87, 156; constitutional revision and, 154n82; constitution-makers and, 154; development of, 138; influence of, 153-57, 172; initial, 155 Montana Supreme Court, State v. Jackson and, 181 Municipal corporations, 19 Municipal government, reforming, 1 5 1 52 Murphy, Walter: on federal Constitution, 192 Nagel, Robert F.: on fundamental values approach, 189n56 National Conference for Good City Gov­ ernment, 151 National Municipal League, 3 3 n l 3 , 151, 171; M o d e l State Constitution by, 1 3 7 38, 138n7, 152, 154; unicameral legis­ lature and, 153 Natural resources, 2 1 ; state control of, 95. See also Water rights Nebraska Constitution (1875), ratification of, 35n23

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243

Nevins, Allan, 6 3 n l l New England, constitutional development in, 127-28 N e w Hampshire Constitution (1776), 67 New Hampshire Constitution (1784), 70; executive branch and, 88 New Hampshire Constitution (1792), on senatorial terms, 89 N e w Hampshire Supreme Court: amend­ ments and, 32n8; first-things- first ap­ proach and, 184n39 New Jersey Committee for Constitutional Revision, 154n80 New Jersey Constitution (1776), 6 1 , 67; adoption of, 63; declaration of rights and, 75n57; oaths in, 71 New Jersey Constitution (1844): amend­ ments to, 24n80; on natural rights, 201 New Jersey Constitution (1947), 31n4; length of, 9; M o d e l State Constitution and, 153, 154n81; on natural rights, 2 0 1 - 2 ; women's rights and, 202 New Jersey Supreme Court: divergence criteria by, 183n36; Gangemi v. Berry and, 2 0 4 n l 2 0 ; Vreeland and, 190n62 N e w York Constitution (1777), 87; Decla­ ration of Independence and, 68; on ex­ ecutive power, 66; on redistricting, 84 New York Constitution (1821), amend­ ments to, 35 N e w York Constitution (1846): economic development and, 112; judicial elections and, 122; legislative restrictions in, 122 New York Constitution (1894), 105; se­ cret voting and, 108 New York constitutional convention, woman suffrage at, 109 New York Court of Appeals, 18; legisla­ tive restrictions by, 123 Nineteenth Amendment, 45, 145 Norris, George, 153 North Carolina Constitution (1776); amend­ ment to, 36; on executive powers, 87; leg­ islative restrictions in, 121 Oaths, 44, 71 Ohio Constitution (1851): corporate aid and, 114; on equal protection, 198; rat­ ification and, 35n23 Ohio Supreme Court, legislative control by, 124

244

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Index

One person, one vote, 46, 136, 146 Ordinary politics, 30, 5 7 - 5 8 , 90, 9 0 n l 2 2 ; constitution-making and, 134 Oregon Supreme Court, on freedom of ex­ pression, 196, 197 Original intent, 199; emphasizing, 195, 196 Originalism, 196n83; broader/clause bound, 194n77; considering, 196-99; intent and, 196; orientation toward, 194-96; state constitutions and, 1 9 4 99; textualism and, 195 Ought, 80; shall and, 76, 78 Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon (1912), 42 Palmer, Robert: on Declaration of Rights, 8 0 - 8 1 ; on liberty of republicanism, 80 Pardon, power of, 87, 88 Participation, 79, 100; dispute over, 1 0 5 9; judicial, 72; limits on, 105, 106; pop­ ular, 25 Pennsylvania Constitution (1776), 82; amendments to, 3 5 n l 8 ; on common good/special privilege, 80; Declaration of Independence and, 68; elections and, 83; importance of, 66, 83n97; oaths i n , 7 1 ; republican government and, 84; simple democracy and, 86 Pennsylvania Constitution (1790), on sen­ atorial terms, 89 Pennsylvania Constitution (1873), 120; i n ­ spiration for, 98 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 12, 54, 76 Plebiscitary devices, 84, 159 Political culture, 55-56, 58; role of, 9 1 , 91nl23 Political elites: initiative process and, 158n99; reform and, 33 Political principles: concern for, 90; con­ sensus on, 91 Political questions, 26, 26n88, 186 Political subdivisions, 103; representation of, 104 Political theory, 55; early, 6 3 - 6 4 ; original intent and, 199 Politics: amendment, 142; apportionment, 146; constitutional, 65, 133-34, 1 4 1 44, 144-50; forestalling change i n , 133; initiative, 160; new science of, l i n i 9

Poll tax, 45, 108, 144, 146 Popular authority, 73; declaration of, 7 4 75 Popular rule, 79, 121-22, 125, 186; em­ phasis on, 158; participation i n , 100 Population growth: apportionment and, 102, 104; constitution-making and, 97n9 Population principle, modifications of, 146 Populism, 94, 99 Positive rights, 22, 149, 149n62; provi­ sions of, 150 Power: concerns about, 65, 66, 99; distri­ bution of, 14-20, 99, 117-18, 146, 186; economic, 115; executive, 66, 87, 88, 8 9 - 9 0 , 123; intrastate distribution of, 101-9, 139, 144-47; legislative, 10, 16, 156, 171; limitations on, 1 6 - 1 7 , 87; plenary character of, 10; political, 69, 74, 115, 144-47, 186; separation of, 1 1 , 46; sources of, 83; state, 1 1 7 18; state constitutions and, 3n8, 6 - 9 . See also Separation of powers Preambles, justificatory/explanatory mate­ rials i n , 9 0 - 9 1 Precedent, reliance on, 200 Primacy approach, 183-85; criticism of, 184n38; dual constitutionalism and, 184 Privacy rights, 32, 166, 2 0 7 - 8 , 2 0 7 8nl29 Private interests: common good and, 64; public credits for, 119 Producers, capitalists and, 111 Progressive Era, 148; constitutional re­ form during, 150-53 Progressives/Progressivism, 57, 193; de­ cline of, 153; government revitalization by, 151; social justice and, 155; thought of, 158 Property requirements, 106, 107; abolition of, 82; attacking, 105; reducing, 85; for upper/lower house, 8 5 n l 0 4 Property taxes, 22, 147; limitations on, 159 Proposition 2Vi (Massachusetts), 159 Proposition 13 (California), 159 Proposition 115 (California), challenges to, 169 Proposition 140 (California), 160

Index Public policy, 2 0 - 2 3 , 134 Punishments, 13, 188 Purpose, of state constitutions, 6 - 9 Qualifications. See Requirements Radical Republicans, Reconstruction and, 43 Railroad commissions, 148, 148n57 Railroads, 110; aid for, 113, 114; eco­ nomic/political power of, 115; regula­ tion of, 115-16, 117 Ratification, 35n23, 207; popular, 3 0 n l , 32, 34, 70n37; rate of, 140; of state constitutions, 3 0 n l , 2 0 4 - 5 ; successful, 57 Reagan, Ronald, 158n96 Reapportionment, 1 0 1 - 2 , 104n40, 136, 145; blocking, 146. See also Apportionment Reconstruction, 43, 144; constitutional bases for, 43; state debt during, 132 Reconstruction constitutions, 107, 1 3 1 , 1 3 1 n l 7 0 ; black rights and, 130; eco­ nomic development and, 113; railroad subsidies i n , 113 Referendum, 153, 161; ratification by, 30, 30nl Reformers, 1 0 1 - 2 , 1 5 7 - 6 1 ; constitutional changes and, 38; control and, 160; ini­ tiatives and, 158n98 Regulation: corporate, 52, 115-17; eco­ nomic, 115; opposition to, 116; rail­ road, 1 1 5 - 1 6 , 1 1 7 Rehnquist, William, 169 Rehnquist Court, state constitutions and, 169-70 Religion, 40, 4 1 ; civil government and, 77; lockstep approach and, 181n32; of­ fice holding and, 1 2 1 n l 2 2 ; state policies toward, 62n7, 1 6 8 n l 3 9 Representation: apportionment of, 102; population and, 83 Republican government, 66, 8 2 - 8 6 , 100; commitment to, 101; consensus for, 9 1 ; key elements of, 83 Requirements, 171; for constitutional re­ form, 3 4 - 3 7 ; extended- residency, 146; loyalty-oath, 44; property, 82, 85, 8 5 n l 0 4 , 105, 106, 107; removing, 100 "Responsible for the abuse" clause, 197

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245

Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 154 Rhode Island Constitution (1898), 128 Rhode Island Supreme Court, on grants of power, 16n41 Rights, 11-13; guarantees of, 1 8 1 , 192; majorities and, 78; natural, 2 0 1 - 2 ; pro­ tecting, 46, 7 5 - 8 2 , 75n57, 162; state violations of, 183 Right to organize, 149 Right-to-privacy amendment, 32 Right to work, 149, 149n61 Robinson v. Cahill (1973), 179n23 Roe v. Wade (1973), 208 Rose, Carol: on federal Constitution, 2 Rush, Benjamin: on state constitutions, 64nl7 Safety, protecting, 115, 148 Salaries, 132, 144 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), 179n23 Scheiber, Harry: on railroads/public aid, 114 Schlam, Lawrence: on constitutional change, 31 Schools: financing, 166, 179, 179n23; in­ tegrated, 95; provisions on, 22; sec­ tarian interests and, 40; segregated, 97; women and, 109. See also Education Scott v. Sandford (1857), 95n6 Search-and-seizure cases, 180; lockstep ap­ proach and, 181n32 Search-and-seizure provisions, 49, 181, 205-6nl22 Self-government, 20; constitutional design and, 9 7 - 9 8 ; right to, 28 Self-incrimination, 167, 181 Senators: indirect selection of, 89; terms for, 89 Separation of powers, l i n i 9 , 50, 50n87, 6 5 n l 9 , 77, 92, 1 5 1 , 176; enforcing, 14, 14n33; mandate for, 72; i n state consti­ tutions, 14-15 Shall, ought and, 76, 78 Shepard, Chief Justice: on Kahn, 189n56 Slavery, 62n7; constitutional treatment of, 129, 1 2 9 n l 6 0 ; opposition to, 43 Social-compact theory, 67 Social justice, 1 5 1 , 155 Social welfare, 149, 149n65 South, constitutional development i n , 128-32

246

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Index

South Carolina Constitution (1776), 67 South Carolina Constitution (1778), 69n32; discussion before, 69; executive branch and, 88; on rights, 75n57 South Dakota constitutional convention, legislative restrictions and, 120 Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel (1975), 179n23 Special laws, 110, 167; bans on, 119, 147, 198; general laws and, 119; limitations on, 133 Special privilege, 112, 159; common good and, 80; popular government and, 80; suspicion of, 111 State constitutions: constitutional theory and, 173; development of, 6-23, 29-30, 57, 127-28; differences among, 126-32; 18th-century, 61 (table); federal Constitu­ tion and, 92, 186-87, 188; as frameworks of government, 132; influence on, 29, 3 9 46, 47, 172; initial, 6 1 , 62n6; as instru­ ments of government, 132-33; interpreta­ tion of, 173, 191, 196, 201, 208; longest/shortest, 10; neglect for, 2 - 3 , 2n4; other states and, 205-6; pertinence of, 199-201; prior, 201-5; ratification of, 3 0 n l , 60, 204-5; rejection of, 60; signifi­ cance of, 3-4; textualism/originalism and, 194-99 State courts: constitutional doctrine and, 200; constitutional law and, 168; d i ­ versity of, 188; religion cases and, 1 6 8 n l 3 9 ; reorganization of, 138n9; rights-affirming decisions by, 168; rights protection by, 163, 1 6 3 n l l 7 , 164-65; speech/press protections and, 1 6 8 n l 3 9 ; state constitutions and, 173; state decla­ ration of rights and, 177; U.S. Supreme Court and, 175 State government, 15-19; limitation of, 135, 156; professionalization of, 157; resurgence of, 157 Statehood, 4 1 , 5 1 ; application for, 40 State law: constitutional cases and, 167; criminal/bill-of-rights cases and, 167; reliance on, 184 State officials: limits on, 187; popular election of, 122 State rights guarantees, 164; lockstep ap­ proach and, 182

Statesman model, 58 State supreme courts: equal-protection cases and, 167; state constitutions and, 165 State v.Jackson (1983), 181 Statutes, 2 0 1 ; amending, 203; reenactment of, 203, 204, 205 "Statutory" material, 4 9 - 5 0 , 193n74 Stevenson, Adlai, 36n28 Story, Joseph, 1 0 n l 5 , 78n71 Structure, of state constitutions, 1 1 - 2 3 , llnl9 Sturm, Albert, 56 Substance, of state constitutions, 11-23 Suffrage, 24, 76, 8 9 n l l 8 ; black, 95, 95n6, 106, 107; broadening, 117, 129; con­ trolling, 52, 108, 1 2 7 n l 5 1 ; universal manhood, 107, 109; white manhood, 99, 105, 106, 127, 1 2 7 n l 5 1 ; woman, 45, 101, 101n23, 108-9, 144-45. See also Disenfranchisement; Franchise; Voting Sumner, Charles: guarantee clause and, 42 Supplemental approach, 182-83, 183n36, 194; lockstep approach and, 183 Supremacy Clause, 42n47, 4 3 - 4 4 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, legislative restrictions by, 123 Taft, William H o w a r d , 4 1 , 152 Taxation, 49, 6 3 n l 3 ; ad valorem, 2 1 ; at­ tacking, 105; apportionment and, 86; equal/uniform, 119; mine, 117 Taxation provisions, 176; amendment of, 141, 141n25; prohibitions i n , 2 1 Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, 159 Tax revolt, 160, 170 Tennessee Constitution (1796), on public finance, 6 3 n l 3 Tennessee Constitution (1834): amend­ ments to, 35n21, 36; ratification of, 35n23 Term limitations, 170, 172; borrowing, 53 Texas Constitution (1876), inspiration for, 98 Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Brown v. State and, 181 Textualism: intent and, 196; originalism and, 195; state constitutions and, 1 9 4 99 Thirteenth Amendment, 95

Index Tocqueville, Alexis de, 134; on constitution-makers, 118-19; on federal Constitution, 1 1 8 n l 0 8 ; on state consti­ tutions, 118nl08 Transportation, developing, 110 Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 45 Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 45, 45n65 U.S. Constitution. See Federal Constitution U.S. Supreme Court: on districting de­ cisions, 146-47; divergence from, 183, 183n36, 187; federal guaran­ tees and, 182; interpretations by, 171, 174n3, 1 7 7 n l 2 , 182, 199, 2 0 6 - 7 ; judicial federalism and, 166; judicial rulings and, 174; lockstep approach and, 181n32; state courts and, 175 Unfunded mandates, curbing, 20 Unicameral legislature, 6 5 n l 9 , 153 Upper houses: establishment of, 8 5 86; property qualifications for, 85nl04 Vermont Constitution (1793): amend­ ments to, 3 5 n l 8 ; length of, 10; on sen­ atorial terms, 89 Vetoes: gubernatorial, 123, 130, 156; line item, 172 Victims' rights amendments, 53, 188 Vile, M . J. C : on constitutional doctrine, 88nll5 Virginia Constitution (1830), amendments to, 3 5 n l 8 Virginia Constitution (1851): amendments to, 3 5 n l 8 ; corruption and, 112; on free blacks, 1 2 9 n l 6 0 ; legislative restrictions in, 121 Virginia Constitution (1902), white su­ premacy and, 144 Virginia Declaration of Rights, 12, 6 3 n l 2 , 75, 75n57, 76; borrowing from, 66, 8 1 ; on freedom of the press, 77; on political power, 74

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247

Virginia Supreme Court, legislative control by, 124 Vose, Clement: on constitutional amend­ ments, 37 Voting, 45; requirements for, 69, 82, 85, 8 5 n l 0 2 , 93, 105, 1 0 6 - 7 , 127, 147; se­ cret, 108. See also Disenfranchisement; Elections; Franchise; Suffrage Voting Rights Act (1965), federal supervi­ sion and, 4 5 - 4 6 Wagner Act, 148 Warren, Earl, 161 Warren Court: civil-liberties cases and, 161, 165; judicial activism and, 171; on search warrants, 179; state guarantees and, 164, 178 Warth v. Seldin (1975), 179n23 Washington Supreme Court, on little ERAs, 202 Water rights, protection of, 197-98 West Virginia Constitution, on bond sales, 141 West Virginia Court of Appeals, on sep­ aration of powers, 15 Whig theory, 9 2 n l 2 4 ; Federalist theory and, 92 Wilkes, Donald: on state constitutions/Burger Court, 180 Williams, Robert F.: on second-look cases, 176nll Williams v. Florida (1980), 2 0 5 n l 2 2 Wilson, James: on popular rule, 71n39 Woman suffrage, 45, 101, 101n23; cam­ paign for, 1 0 8 - 9 , 144-45 Wood, Gordon: on aristocracy, 85; on civic republicanism, 6 4 n l 4 Workingmen's Compensation State Fund (Wyoming), 148 Wyoming Constitution (1889): inspector of mines and, 116; inspiration for, 98; on water rights, 198 Zoning restrictions, 166, 179, 197; chal­ lenges to, 179n23