Understanding Contemporary Africa 9781685850241

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UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY

AFRICA

UNDERSTANDING

Introductions to the States and Regions of the Contemporary World Donald L. Gordon, series editor Understanding Contemporary Africa, 3rd edition edited by April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon Understanding Contemporary China edited by Robert E. Gamer Understanding Contemporary Latin America, 2nd edition edited by Richard S. Hillman Understanding the Contemporary Middle East edited by Deborah J. Gerner

THIRD EDITION

UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY

AFRICA edited by April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon

LYN N E RIENNER PUBLISHERS BOULDER L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 2001 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 2001 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Understanding contemporary Africa / edited by April A. Gordon and Donald L. G o r d o n . — 3 r d ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-850-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Africa—Politics and g o v e r n m e n t — 1 9 6 0 - 2. Africa—Social c o n d i t i o n s — 1 9 6 0 - I. Gordon, April A. II. Gordon, Donald L. D T 3 0 . 5 . U 5 3 6 2001 960.3'2—dc21 2001019095 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

Contents List of

IX

Illustrations

xi

Preface 1

Introduction

April A. Gordon

2

Africa: A G e o g r a p h i c P r e f a c e The Moving ITCZ Natural Regions

Jeffrey

Thomas 24

Political Patterns of the Past The Colonial Period

7

W. Neff

23

O'Toole

31 41

48

53

African Politics

Donald

L. Gordon

The Impact of Colonialism

55

58

Nationalism and the Politics of Independence The Transfer of Power Independence

61

66

67

The Centralization of State Power

68

Patronage, the Patrimonial State, and Personal Rule Military Intervention

State and Society in Crisis

77

80

Structural Adjustment and the Reordering of the State Beyond Autocracy

83

86

T h e E c o n o m i e s of A f r i c a Precolonial Economies

Virginia

DeLancey

101

The Influence of Colonialism

103

Postcolonial Development Strategies Current Issues

73

76

The Political Economy of Decline

5

1

11

Trade, Exploration, and Conquest

4

Gordon

7

T h e Historical C o n t e x t The Peopling of Africa

Conclusion

L.

9

Continents Adrift 3

& Donald

112

v

106

101

Contents

vi

6

A f r i c a n International Relations Peter J. Schraeder The Dependency-Decolonization Debate 144 The Formulation and Implementation of African Foreign Policies 145 Pan-Africanism and the Organization of African Unity 150 Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration 155 The Role of Foreign Powers in African International Relations 160 The United Nations and International Financial Institutions 170 The Changing Equation of Military Intervention 175 Toward the Future 180

143

7

Population, Urbanization, and A I D S April A. Gordon Precolonial and Colonial Periods 192 Postindependence Trends 195 Family Planning 199 Urban Population Policy 202 AIDS in Africa 207

189

8

A f r i c a ' s E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o b l e m s Julius E. Nyang'oro The Environment in Africa 219 Contemporary Problems of the African Environment 221 Development and the Environment 233 Other Issues of Environmental Concern 235 Conclusion 238

217

9

Family and Kinship Eugenia Shanklin African Kinship and Marriage 250 New Areas of Study and Holdovers from the Past in Contemporary African Societies 258 Challenges to Contemporary African Kinship Systems

245

262

10

W o m e n and D e v e l o p m e n t April A. Gordon Women in Precolonial Africa 272 European Penetration 276 The Postindependence Period 278 Women in the Economy 279 Women and Politics 284 Prospects for African Women 290

271

11

Religion in A f r i c a Ambrose Moyo African Traditional Religions 301 Christianity in Africa 308 Islam in Africa 318 Conclusion 325

299

Contents 12

African Literature

viï

George Joseph

African Oral Literature

331

332

Written Literature in African L a n g u a g e s African Literature in European L a n g u a g e s Conclusion

13

South Africa

338 339

364

Patrick J. Furlong

The Peopling of South A f r i c a

371

373

The Roots of Racial Discrimination The Advent of the British Factor The Mineral Revolution

378

The United Settler State

380

374

375

Nationalist Rule and the Creation of the Apartheid State The Attempt to Modernize Apartheid Dismantling the Apartheid State

392

The Tortuous Road to a New South A f r i c a Conclusion

14

Poverty Reduction

April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon

409

411

412

Trade and Investment Aid

395

401

Trends and Prospects Debt

384

388

414

416

Information Technology

List of Acronyms Glossary Basic Political Data The Contributors Index About the Book

417

421 425 439 457 459 All

Illustrations • 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 7.1 11.1 13.1

•

MAPS Major Physical Features and Regions Natural Regions and ITCZ Location Linkages and Resources Early States and Empires Africa in 1914 Countries and Capitals HIV in Africa Islam in Africa South Africa, 1991

TABLES

5.1 Africa's Commodity Dependence 7.1 Urban Growth in African Cities 7.2 Crude Birthrates, Total Fertility Rates, and Contraceptive Usage Rates

•

17 18 19 20 21 22 209 326 372

108 190 197

PHOTOGRAPHS

Pastoralists in the unpredictable environment of the Sahel The semi-arid Sahel Improving infrastructure Herding societies in Africa Much African agriculture is hoe-farming Most Africans have long relied on decentralized, kinship-based political systems Great Zimbabwe Independence rally in Luanda, Angola Headquarters of the Z i m b a b w e ruling party Z A N U - P F The military is an important political actor in most African states ix

8 10 13 28 28 32 38 62 72 76

X

Illustrations

In 1990 multiparty elections were held in Cote d ' l v o i r e African economies are highly dependent on export crops Much of the infrastructure of roads, railways, and ports has deteriorated G o v e r n m e n t control over prices paid to farmers The informal sector Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic committed large-scale atrocities Nairobi has experienced explosive population growth Children are a vital economic resource in extended family systems Squatters construct their homes in a settlement in Lusaka, Zambia Mothers and their young children are at high risk of getting AIDS G r o w i n g land scarcity is leading to deforestation, soil erosion, and desertification Commercial logging Desertification threatens many areas of Africa Scenes of human suffering are becoming commonplace in Africa In some African countries, elephant populations are growing Bridewealth and polygyny reflect the vital productive contributions of w o m e n to the family A self-employed father teaches his son to make charcoal burners Many people have been forced to rely on relief organizations during recent droughts and civil war African women play vital economic roles as well as being mothers Women preparing food and fetching water Women grow most of the food in Africa In Senegal, the government is trying to encourage families to educate their girls W o m e n ' s contributions to national development are receiving greater attention in many African countries Masks are used to represent ancestors and other spiritual figures A cathedral in Bangui, Central African Republic A m o s q u e in Nairobi, Kenya The Wolof griot Yoro M ' B a y e A selection of African literature The Sharpeville massacre in South Africa Nelson Mandela addresses well-wishers in New York City Mounting violence in South A f r i c a ' s black townships threatened to derail the peace process Voters in line at a polling station in South Africa, 1994

87 110 114 123 128 146 164 191 198 205 208 222 222 227 229 238 257 263 265 274 280 281 282 291 300 311 319 333 340 386 393 396 398

Preface

T

he first edition of Understanding Contemporary Africa was the culmination of nearly three years of collaborative thought, research, and writing by a dedicated group of Africanist scholars and teachers. On the basis of informal conversations, and then in a broader survey of other Africanists teaching at the undergraduate level, we discovered that most of us were finding it difficult to locate a good, up-to-date text on sub-Saharan Africa to use in our introductory courses. Available texts were, for the most part, too discipline-oriented—created especially for history, anthropology, or political science courses; they were too advanced for students with little prior background; or they were dated. On the other hand, some introductory texts on the market tried to do too much; they were so broad in scope that they lacked the theoretical base or scholarly depth we were looking for. This left professors compelled to use multiple readings from several different books and periodicals to cover their topics. We decided that for us, as well as for many other teachers of "Introduction to Africa" courses, the availability of a single text designed to address important contemporary topics and to provide background from a variety of academic subject areas would be an attractive alternative. It would save many of us from lengthy searches for material, time wasted with library reserve procedures, or an expensive panoply of required book purchases. Addressing the above concerns provided the rationale for this book. The success of the book since the first edition in 1992 confirms our belief that Understanding Contemporary Africa, with its broad scope, up-to-date and in-depth chapters, and attention to readability for undergraduate students, is a valuable text for both general African studies courses and discipline-based courses. It covers many of the most important topics and issues needed for a grasp of the reality of sub-Saharan Africa in the early twentyfirst century—for example, the environment, women's roles, population, AIDS, and urbanization—that get little or no treatment in other texts. The information in each chapter of the book represents the best of the current research and thinking in various fields of study, providing students and professors with a useful background on Africa, and also presenting major issues in a way students can understand. And, although each chapter is designed to stand alone, the authors have produced a well-integrated xi

xii

Preface

volume, referring in their own chapters to complementary ideas discussed elsewhere in the book. This allows instructors to assign readings to meet their needs—by chapter or by topic, for instance—at the same time that the book helps students to see the connections among issues or events and reinforces what they may have read earlier. In the introduction that follows this preface, the scope and themes of the book are discussed. Next, chapters on the geography and history of sub-Saharan Africa provide the background necessary for understanding what follows. (Readers should refer to the maps in the geography chapter when reading later chapters of the book.) The remaining chapters cover major institutions and issues confronting sub-Saharan Africa today. While each chapter provides historical background, the emphasis is on the vital concerns facing Africa now and in the future. Central among these concerns are African political and economic systems and issues, which are discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Tied closely to political and economic policies and trends are population growth, urbanization, AIDS, and environmental problems, as covered in Chapters 7 and 8. Next we address African family and kinship systems; without an awareness of how Africans understand kinship, issues like "tribalism" and corruption are difficult to comprehend and often misconstrued by outsiders. Women in Africa are the focus of Chapter 10; as this chapter shows, social change in Africa is affecting women much differently than it is men, and often to the disadvantage of women and Africa as a whole. In Chapters 11 and 12, on African religion and literature, the focus shifts to the ideological sphere—to how Africans explain and attempt to grapple with the complexities of their world and their place in it. Chapter 13 is different from the others because it deals with one country, South Africa. In the 1980s and 1990s, South Africa captured the attention of the outside world as its black majority struggled to break the shackles of centuries of racist oppression. Although white-ruled South Africa was in many ways an anomaly on the continent, we think it is important that students understand the history of apartheid, the liberation struggle, and current efforts to create a new democratic South Africa in which people of all races can live together and prosper. With its unique and diverse mixture of Western, African, and Asian ethnic groups and identities, South Africa is considered to be a test case of the extent to which Western-style democracy evolves—or fails—in Africa (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:157). As such, we feel it continues to merit its own place in the book. In a brief chapter on trends and prospects, which follows the discussion of South Africa, we assess where sub-Saharan Africa may be heading. While we do not attempt to predict any specific outcomes, we do note that many African countries are attempting political and economic reform; some are making real progress while others are teetering on the brink of disaster. In all countries, new leaders are emerging, replacing those who assumed power at independence. Whether the new generation shaping the

Preface

xiii

A f r i c a of the future will improve on the record of the past still remains very much an open question. *

*

*

Writing and editing this book has left us indebted to a n u m b e r of people. Our research was aided especially by summer research grants from the University of Florida A f r i c a n Studies Center under the direction of Hunt Davis, to whom we are most grateful. Prior research at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex and help from Charles Harvey were also important and appreciated. In a different way each of us is obligated to Mark D e L a n c e y of the University of South Carolina. Mark's leadership and professionalism as an Africanist are well known. For us both, a Fulbright program in Cameroon under M a r k ' s direction was an academic high point. For April Gordon, M a r k ' s introduction to A f r i c a was the inspiration for a career focused on the continent. In addition, April owes much to several people at Winthrop University. The moral support, release time, and staff aid generously given by Jack Tucker, chair of the Sociology Department, were vital. Furthermore, A1 Lyles, f o r m e r dean of arts and sciences, and Betsy Brown, the current dean, approved s u m m e r stipends and release time; the Winthrop Research Council provided additional financial assistance; and former dean Robin Bowers was kind enough to f u n d a 1994 Council for International Education Exchange trip to Zimbabwe. Most recently, in 2000, April was awarded sabbatical leave, which allowed her to spend six weeks in southern Africa to gather material for this new edition of the text. Don Gordon is obliged to m a n y people at Furman University. A special debt is owed to Jim Guth, former chair of the Department of Political Science, for his help in arranging blocks of time for Don to concentrate on this book, and for his advice as a professional editor. In addition, Don is grateful to the former dean of Furman University, John H. Crabtree Jr., and the current dean, A. V. Huff, for their strong support for research trips to Z i m b a b w e and Malawi and for Africa Study Programs in Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania, and southern Africa. D o n ' s research and travel were also underwritten by the Research and Professional Growth Committee of Furman University. While the impetus for writing this book came f r o m many sources, m u c h of it can be traced to Don G o r d o n ' s long-term association with the National Model Organization of African Unity Simulation directed by Michael Nwanze at Howard University. We are both indebted to Michael, to Jack Parson of the College of Charleston, to Ed Baum of O h i o University, and to the other highly committed Africanist professors who made this educational event so successful and f r o m w h o m we have learned much about how undergraduates learn about Africa.

xiv

Preface

We extend our thanks to Mary Lou Ingram at the World Bank for her generosity in providing us with most of the photographs we used in the book. Our gratitude to our chapter authors and other contributors to this book is as broad as the African continent. We thank them for their expertise and for their commitment to expanding an appreciation for Africa, not only in this book but in their work in the classroom. Foremost, we thank our family: our sons, Aaron and Jared, were young children when the first edition of this book was being written. They are now old enough to realize that the time and energy the book took (sometimes away f r o m them) was well spent. Indeed, Aaron recently read our book as the textbook in his university introductory course on Africa! Last, we thank Lela, whose fifty years in the classroom are a model to us all. —April A. Gordon, Donald L. Gordon

B

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal D a l o z . 1999. Africa Instrument. Oxford: J a m e s Curry.

Works:

Disorder

as

Political

1 Introduction April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon

M

ost people know very little about sub-Saharan A f r i c a , and most of what they do know is only partially correct or based on stereotypes or an inadequate historical or conceptual framework for understanding and interpretation. For instance, it is not uncommon to find people who believe that Africa is a land of primitive stone-age hunters and gatherers living in the jungle (the Africa of Tarzan movies). Another idea is that Africans are an especially violent people who practice cannibalism, believe in cruel religions and gods, and conduct endemic tribal warfare. At the other extreme are images of Africans as innocents unaware of modern life, like the "Bushm a n " hero of the movie The Gods Must Be Crazy. The media tend to reinforce these perceptions, especially with their almost exclusive focus on negative news, such as drought and famine, civil war, or widespread poverty. While these phenomena certainly exist, there is far more to Africa and its people. Moreover, where A f r i c a is s u f f e r i n g f r o m problems like drought, civil war, and poverty, it is important to know why and what has been or should be done about such tragedies. Understanding Contemporary Africa has been written to provide the basic concepts, theoretical perspectives, and essential information that are necessary for understanding the dynamic, as well as troubled, region that is Africa today. This book is mainly about sub-Saharan Africa, Africa south of the Sahara. While some mention is made of North Africa, A f r i c a ' s Asiatic communities, and white settlers (especially in South Africa), those interested in these topics will need to consult additional sources. The authors have written in depth on the most important issues and institutions in Africa. Although these writers are from different disciplines and each chapter is more or less self-contained, a broad portrait of sub-Saharan Africa is discernible. Geographically, Africa is a massive continent, roughly three and a half times larger than the United States. Africa's range of climates, topography,

1

2

April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon

and physical beauty have created conditions conducive to the formation of an immense diversity of peoples and cultures. Africa is in fact the " h o m e " of h u m a n k i n d , in which every means of livelihood f r o m gathering and hunting to industrialism can be found. At the same time, the enormity of the continent and its often harsh ecological conditions, such as extremes of oppressive heat, vast deserts, marginal soils, and expanses of subtropical vegetation, left m a n y groups relatively isolated f r o m other parts of the world until the last few centuries and limited the concentrations of population and resources that led to the more technologically c o m p l e x societies of the "old w o r l d " and industrial Europe. Despite this relative isolation, some societies had contact with regions as distant as North A f r i c a , India, and even China. Regardless, all developed intricate cultures with rich religious and artistic traditions and complex social and kinship relations. As is true of other areas of the world, sub-Saharan A f r i c a ' s history is fraught with episodes of upheaval, violence, and cultural challenges generated f r o m both internal and external forces. For instance, m o v e m e n t s of people within the continent led to cross-cultural exchange of ideas, goods, and people as well as to conflict. Foreign religions, mainly Christianity and Islam, were carried by outsiders and resulted in challenges and conflicts not only with local religious beliefs but with long-established customs and ways of life. At the same time, these religions have been incorporated into African societies, changing both in the process. There have also been periods of peace and prosperity in which Africans could live out their lives in relative security and contentment, partly because most lacked the extreme class stratification and state structures that led to so much oppression and exploitation in so-called civilized areas of the world. Beginning in the 1500s, A f r i c a ' s history began to c o m m i n g l e with that of an expansionist West in pursuit of trade, booty, and exotic lands and people to conquer. This eventuated in the most cruel and disruptive period in African history, starting with the slave trade and culminating in colonial domination of the continent. This reached its most extreme form in South Africa, whose A f r i c a n majority was ruled until recently by the white descendants of its European colonizers. Along with its other effects, the Western penetration of Africa exposed A f r i c a n s to the material riches and culture of the West. As B o h a n n a n and Curtin (1995:15) observe, Africans were not deprived before Western penetration of their societies. Many lived fulfilling lives of great dignity, content without the "trappings of Western civilization." H o w e v e r , once exposed to the possibilities of Western civilization, the lure has proven to be almost irresistible in Africa and elsewhere. The influence of the West and Western culture is the major transformative force in Africa today. By responding to the promise of acquiring Western affluence, Africans across the continent, to varying degrees, are being integrated into the worldwide network of trade and productive relationships

Introduction

3

sometimes called "the global capitalist economy." This global e c o n o m y is dominated for the most part by the few rich, politically and militarily powerful countries of Europe and by the United States—countries that initially gained much of their p r e e m i n e n c e f r o m the exploitation of A f r i c a n s (and other Third World people). As slaves or colonial subjects, A f r i c a n s ' labor and resources (usually obtained directly or indirectly by coercion) provided many of the low-cost raw materials for Western factories and affluent consumer lifestyles. Since colonialism, African cash crops, minerals, and fuels have continued to be transported overseas, while Western m a n u f a c t u r e d goods, technology, financial capital, and Western lifestyles are imported to Africa. So far, the "integration" of A f r i c a into the global e c o n o m y has largely gone badly for most countries on the continent as the cost of Western imports compared to the prices of A f r i c a n exports has b e c o m e increasingly unfavorable to Africa, leaving almost all countries in debt, their e c o n o m i e s a shambles, and living standards spiraling d o w n w a r d . Only a minority of Africans have been able to acquire more than a few tokens of the promised life the West symbolizes. Another import from the West is Western political systems. Like a handm e - d o w n suit never fitted to its new wearer, Western multiparty political systems, hastily handed over to A f r i c a n s experienced mainly in colonial despotism, did not "fit." Most degenerated into one-party states or military dictatorships riddled with corruption and inefficiency. Opposition to the state was either co-opted or ruthlessly repressed. Expected to be the architects of development for their people, African states instead became largely self-serving, bloated bureaucracies alienated f r o m the masses f o r w h o m "development" became a more remote prospect as economies began deteriorating from the 1970s on. Making things worse were the unprecedented growth of population in A f r i c a and the rapid expansion of urban areas. In part, these t w o related trends both reflected and exacerbated e c o n o m i c and political problems. Certainly, agrarian societies like A f r i c a ' s value large families. Nonetheless, African family sizes are considerably in excess of those found in most other developing regions. In Africa, inadequate investment in farming, especially in food crops grown mostly by w o m e n , keeps most agriculture highly "labor intensive" (dependent on labor rather than machines). Since mainly it is men who migrate to cities for work, women need children more than ever to help them with farm chores. Moreover, as patronage relationships based on ethnicity and kinship are often vital to gaining access to resources (such as jobs, schooling, or money), children are valuable assets even in affluent urban families. For many Africans resources are shrinking because of mounting political and e c o n o m i c problems. Structural adjustment programs (SAPs), designed ostensibly to c o m b a t these p r o b l e m s , often compound the hardships instead. The neglect of agriculture and lack

4

April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon

of opportunity in rural areas along with the expansion of wage j o b s in cities inevitably attract j o b seekers. Unfortunately, their n u m b e r s are far greater than the capacity of cities to e m p l o y them or adequately service their needs. The resulting discontent of urbanités is frequently the basis of political opposition to whatever regime is in power and contributes to the problems of political repression and instability. T h e way Africans have tried to develop their economies, often on the basis of Western development advice, has indirectly promoted population growth and urbanization by favoring industry, export production, and cities over rural areas. It has also discriminated against w o m e n and neglected their interests as producers, mothers, and individuals, with detrimental effects on the economy and social welfare. It has also contributed to environmental degradation, especially soil erosion, deforestation, and desertification. Land scarcity is affecting growing n u m b e r s of poor farmers and pastoralists. Lack of resources or technology to improve m e t h o d s of production, along with lack of opportunity to make a living elsewhere, leaves many people with little recourse to cultivating or grazing their cattle on fragile or marginal land and destroying trees. Western multinational corporations and development agencies, often in league with African business or state elites, have also been guilty of pursuing economic "growth" and profits at the expense of the environment. As gloomy as this picture of Africa looks, we must r e m e m b e r that African independence is less than forty years old for most countries. Africans are a practical and adaptive people, as their history and cultures clearly show. Africans have not been locked in hopelessly outmoded traditions, as stereotypes sometimes suggest. Rather, they have always taken from other traditions and cultures what they perceived to be valuable for their own. African resilience and flexibility are in evidence now as in the past. A f r i c a n s have been experimenting for well over a thousand years with Islam and Christianity and more recently with secular religions such as socialism, capitalism, and Marxism-Leninism, blending them in often quixotic stews with indigenous African practices. That such experimentation produces mixed results should be expected. As Goran Hyden (1983) notes in the title of his book on Africa, there are "no shortcuts to progress," a hard lesson being learned by many Africans whose expectations for quick development have been sharply downscaled as a result of recent trends. A f r i c a n cultures remain vibrant and are playing a leading role in the efforts to cope with and assess the forces affecting African societies. Questions of personal and collective identity and meaning f r e q u e n t l y c o m e to the fore as well as discontent with political oppression, foreign exploitation, and e c o n o m i c inequality and poverty. These concerns are clearly manifested in new f o r m s of religious expression, literature, and political m o v e m e n t s for democratization. T h e extended family remains a vital

Introduction

5

r e f u g e for most A f r i c a n s , although the Western nuclear family and challenges to male dominance are growing. Until recently, it was easy and convenient to blame A f r i c a ' s problems on the West, and for the most part accurate. The negative legacy of colonialism has been especially profound. Many scholars still contend that the role A f r i c a has been assigned in the global e c o n o m y as a p r o d u c e r of c h e a p raw materials continues to prevent it f r o m achieving its e c o n o m i c potential. At least partial blame for A f r i c a ' s political problems such as coups d ' é t a t and authoritarian rule could be laid at the West's doorstep. A f t e r all, the West often has had a m a j o r role in deciding who came to power or stayed in power. Typically, Western interference in African politics has been determined mostly by geopolitical or e c o n o m i c interests rather than by such lofty goals as democracy or good government. This is apparent in the support accorded dictators like f o r m e r president Mobutu Sese S e k o (now deceased) of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of C o n g o ) as well as Western complicity (until recently) in maintaining the brutal apartheid system in South Africa. As the colonial period recedes in time, more critical attention is being f o c u s e d on A f r i c a n s themselves, especially their leaders. This represents, for the most part, a growing awareness that Africans are not simply pawns in the machinations of self-interested Western multinational corporations, bankers, or governments. More Africans are acknowledging that they must address their own shortcomings and institute reforms, be they political, e c o n o m i c , social, or religious renewal. By themselves, such r e f o r m s are unlikely to overcome all the inequities of the global economic and political order over which Africa has little control; but only an enlightened and competent African leadership can hope to mobilize the energy and commitment of its people lor the challenges that lie ahead. One of the greatest of these challenges is the HIV/AIDS crisis sweeping m a n y countries. Most of the w o r l d ' s victims of this dreadful disease are in Africa, and AIDS continues to spread. Even with a massive commitment of resources to combat AIDS (which currently does not exist), much of the improvement Africa has experienced economically and in extending the life and well-being of its people will be undermined as AIDS continues to run its relentless course. As A f r i c a enters the first decade of the twenty-first century, we must keep some historical perspective to avoid pessimism about the continent's prospects. We must r e m e m b e r that p r o f o u n d societal t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s are under way and that such change often entails considerable suffering, alienation, and disruptions that may take generations to resolve. Mao Zedong, the leader of postrevolutionary China, was once asked by author Edgar Snow what he thought was the significance of the French Revolution. M a o ' s sage reply was, "I think it's a little too early to tell" (in Whitaker,

April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon

6

1 9 8 8 : 1 2 ) . A f t e r little m o r e than o n e g e n e r a t i o n o f i n d e p e n d e n c e , it is certainly "too early to tell" about A f r i c a .

•

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bohannan, Paul, and Philip Curtin. 1995. Africa and Africans. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Hyden, Goran. 1983. No Shortcuts to Progress. Berkeley: University of California Press. Whitaker, Jennifer Seymour. 1988. How Can Africa Survive? New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.

2 Africa: A Geographic Preface Jeffrey 1/1/. Neff

O

f all the places of the world for which we can c o n j u r e up a mental map, Africa is frequently the "blankest." For this reason, some introduction to the geography of this vast and varied continent is needed (Map 2.1, at the end of this chapter). This chapter and the m a p s it includes will be useful reference sources as locations and features are mentioned in subsequent chapters. A student of geography can appreciate the size of the United States (3.6 million square miles/9.5 million square kilometers) and the cultural diversity of its very large (275 million) population. Consider this, however: Three countries the size of the United States could fit into the landmass area of Africa, with a little room to spare! In addition, more than 800 million people live in A f r i c a (over three-fourths of them in sub-Saharan Africa). A f r i c a ' s population is not only three times larger than that of the United States, but it displays a greater degree of cultural complexity. Of all the world's known languages, over one-third are spoken in A f r i c a (deBlij and Muller, 1998:343). The perception of Africa as a wild, untamed land— vast herds of wild animals, spectacular gorges and waterfalls, towering mountains, trackless forests, great deserts—needs some revision in light of these basic population characteristics.

•

THE MOVING ITCZ

Most Africans are engaged in some form of agriculture or pastoralism, either at a subsistence level (the great majority) or in commercial agriculture (a very small minority). T h e A f r i c a n e c o n o m y is f u r t h e r driven by 7

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Jeffrey W. Neff

other products harvested or extracted directly from nature, such as forest products and minerals. Nature wields a much heavier hand in Africa in directly influencing the welfare of hundreds of millions of people than it does in the industrialized world where, at least up to now, people have been insulated to some degree from the effects of drought, flood, plagues, and other natural hazards. To understand contemporary Africa, the student of Africa needs a basic knowledge of natural phenomena and processes. In my estimation, the single most powerful environmental mechanism that affects life and survival in Africa south of the Sahara is something called the Intertropical Convergence Zone, or the ITCZ (Map 2.2). The ITCZ represents a meteorological phenomenon whereby largescale airflows from generally opposite directions converge or meet, creating a relatively constant updraft of displaced air. The vertical movement is supplemented by buoyant heated air from the sun-soaked, warm surface conditions of the tropical regions. This rising air cools off rapidly, causing atmospheric water vapor (if present) to condense into droplets first, then precipitation (Strahler and Strahler, 1979:100-111). At least, this is the ideal chain of events, and the ITCZ is the primary rainmaking mechanism not only in Africa but throughout the tropical world. Rainfall often occurs as daily thunderstorms and can be torrential during the rainy season.

Pastoralists in the unpredictable environment of the Sahel move their cattle in search of food and water.

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Note two very important features of Map 2.2. First, the ITCZ shifts pronouncedly from June to January. (The shift is caused by changing earth-sun relationships during the year and by the inclination of the earth's axis.) This motion is crucial for the delivery of rainfall to almost all of sub-Saharan Africa and gives most of Africa its wet-and-dry seasonality. When the ITCZ is stationed at its northward June position, the rainy season is on—or should be—and southern Africa is dry. The southward migration of the ITCZ signals rain for the south and the onset of the dry season in the north. And so it has gone, century after century. Some regions, such as the tropical forest belt, get longer rainy seasons and more rain than others, and some regions face greater unpredictability, or precipitation variation (the semi-arid Sahel). Sometimes the ITCZ "misbehaves" and does not shift when it's normally expected to or move where it usually should, bringing stress to the life that depends on it. Generally, though, farming societies throughout Africa continue to coordinate planting and harvesting with the ITCZ's rainmaking mechanism. Pastoralists move their cattle, and herds of wild animals migrate in similar response to seasonal moisture availability. Nature and people have adjusted to a life rhythm tied to this slow, unending, writhing dance of the ITCZ back and forth across the length and breadth of the continent.

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NATURAL REGIONS

Map 2.2 also reveals, in a highly generalized rendition, the natural environments of Africa as depicted by vegetative patterns. The natural vegetation represents the long-term adjustment of complex plant communities to the conditions of the African climate. From a human perspective, these environmental regions possess very different capacities for life support (or carrying capacity). Awareness of the potentials and the problems of these life zones is crucial for survival; exceeding their carrying capacities promises serious penalties for the occupants, as Julius Nyang'oro details in Chapter 8. Trouble spots abound in the drier margins. The semi-arid, grassy steppe of the Sahel and the East African desert (parts of Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia), plagued by an unpredictable ITCZ and burgeoning populations, have been the scenes of human misery periodically during the last two decades. The specter of mass starvation brought on by drought and desertification in the semi-arid regions of the Dry Savanna has been prominent and publicized but not surprising. Tropical wet-and-dry climates have always been problematic for their human occupants. By the twenty-first century, an exploding population had exceeded beyond all reason the ability of the more fragile, marginal zones to support it. Even the "humid" tropical forest of Africa is not immune from trouble. Here, drought and desertification are removed as threats to be replaced by

The semi-arid Sahel is becoming increasingly vulnerable to drought and desertification, putting villages like this one in Burkina Faso at growing risk.

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rampant deforestation, primarily for hardwood harvest and plantation expansion. At current rates of cutting, much of the easily accessible forests of coastal West and East Africa will be gone early in the twenty-first century. Probably only the relatively insulated interior forests of the eastern Congo Basin will survive the first several decades of the century. Without controls, they too could disappear by mid-century. The "friendlier" Wet Savanna will come under increasing pressure as population growth and the movement of environmental refugees from the deteriorating Dry Savanna place undue strains on its carrying capacity. But almost all of tropical Africa is marked by poor, infertile, sometimes sterile soils, and the Wet Savanna has only limited agricultural potential. Only temperate South Africa is soil "rich"; however, it cannot sustain more than a fraction of Africa's future food needs. Sub-Saharan Africa's natural regions are fragile and seem destined for continuing problems. If predicted global climatic changes affect the already erratic character and behavior of the ITCZ, the human carrying capacity of these natural regions could be reduced rapidly and massively. This is not a pleasant prospect to contemplate, but every student of Africa should be aware of the possibility. In the midst of the Sahelian drought of 1968-1974, for example, unusually large numbers of adult males in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Niger left their villages to search for jobs in more favored agricultural areas to the south or in large towns such as Abidjan and Lagos in the richer coastal countries. Such sudden movements placed heavy burdens on the meager support services and social balances of the destination areas (Caldwell, 1977:95-96). Elsewhere, human suffering caused by drought was recently compounded by armed conflict over boundary alignments between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The dispute, commencing in 1998, severely reduced the ability of each country to respond effectively to the famine perpetuated by this lethal mix of natural and human factors.

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CONTINENTS ADRIFT: AFRICA, THE "MOTHER" OF LANDMASSES

There is another geographic attribute crucial to the understanding of Africa, and most students who have had some earth science are aware of it. Until about 100 million years ago, the earth's landmasses were bound together as a supercontinent known as Pangaea. The southern landmasses constituted Gondwana, with present-day Africa the keystone. Through the phenomenon of plate tectonics, or continental drift, Africa's "children" began to leave the nest and scatter to their present positions: North and South America, Antarctica, Australia, and India all moved away from "mother" Africa, leaving her with her distinctive present-day shape and

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configuration. More important, it left her with relatively sharp, steep edges on all sides where the other plates tore away. (The presence of deep rift valleys in eastern Africa suggests that this continental separation process is not yet complete; Africa may be further fractured and split along the rift zone. The Red Sea is an expanding "rift," and eastern Africa could eventually pull away from the continent.) This steep edge is known generally as the Great Escarpment, and it is very prominent in eastern and southern Africa and somewhat less pronounced, but evident, in western Africa. It commences its sharp ascent just a few miles inland from the coast and, once topped, a high plateau-like landscape unfolds. Broad coastal lowlands are generally absent (Church et al., 1977:23, 26). There are several interesting, important, and unique phenomena associated with this continental morphology that have had direct, powerful impacts on human history and activity in Africa.

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Carriers and Barriers

"Carriers and barriers" refers to phenomena that influence, control, channel, restrict, or enhance various human spatial processes. An analysis of the pattern of railways and navigable waterways reveals the incomplete and unconnected nature of these linkages (Map 2.3). Oddly, except for the Nile River and the lower Niger River, most river transport does not connect with the coast. Why not? Primarily because of the barriers of falls and rapids created where major rivers fall over or break through the Great Escarpment in their escape to the sea. The most navigable stretches of water occur on interior sections of African rivers. Water access f r o m the sea to Africa's interior is now and always has been physically restricted. Nor does the Great Escarpment stimulate railway and road building between coast and interior. Some stretches of the escarpment tower 2,000 to 4,000 feet and more above the adjacent coastal lowland, especially in southern Africa (e.g., the Drakensberg). Construction is difficult and very expensive; some rail lines were built only where access to valuable raw materials warranted the effort. Note too the dearth of natural harbors and major ports along Africa's steep, smooth, and regular coastline, highlighting the difficulty of access to the interior. Movement within Africa has been easier, and in regions such as western Africa, a fairly lively intraregional trade developed over the centuries prior to European contact, as both Thomas O'Toole and Virginia DeLancey document in later chapters. In fact, most of the significant states and empires that evolved within Africa through the centuries did so in the interior of the continent, not along the coastal margins (Map 2.4). By geographic edict, Africa's insular tendency was established long ago and was only slightly reoriented with the beginnings of the slave trade, first by the Arabs in eastern Africa, then more violently by the Europeans (sixteenth century) in western and equatorial

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T h e relative isolation of the A f r i c a n interior f r o m t h e coast w a s reinforced d u r i n g colonial times, w h e n t r a n s p o r t a t i o n links w e r e d e t e r m i n e d by colonial interests. I m p r o v i n g infrastructure, such as roads, has been a major priority since i n d e p e n d e n c e .

Africa. Still, for three centuries European contact and interest remained peripheral; the walls of "Fortress A f r i c a " were violated and p e r m a n e n t l y breached by these "invaders" only in the nineteenth century. T h e Berlin C o n f e r e n c e of 1 8 8 4 - 1 8 8 5 and the ensuing partitioning of A f r i c a a m o n g the European powers symbolized the inevitable geographic reorientation of A f r i c a and A f r i c a n s and a wholesale dismantling of their states, societies, and livelihoods, to be replaced by E u r o p e a n m o d e l s (Betts, 1972). By the eve of World War I, a new type of fragmentation, as powerful in its own way as the G o n d w a n a breakup 100 million years earlier, had c h a n g e d the f a c e of "the M o t h e r of C o n t i n e n t s " f o r e v e r ( M a p 2.5). T h e historical and political d y n a m i c s of these periods are treated in great detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

m The Resource Base T h e huge, high block of mostly m e t a m o r p h i c rock that b e c a m e postG o n d w a n a A f r i c a may have hindered outside penetration, but geologic forces created some p o w e r f u l attractions for European exploiters. The ancient metamorphic rock of Africa is highly "mineralized." Map 2.3 reveals

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the occurrence and location of some of these mineral resources, coveted by an industrial world. In several categories of industrial raw materials and minerals, Africa contains some highly-ranked producing countries and regions. A copperladen zone straddling the borders of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and extending southward through Zimbabwe and South Africa accounts for about 4 percent of the world's output of that mineral, making it the sixth-ranked production region in the world. Zambia and the DRC also account for slightly more than one-third of the world's output of cobalt, a critical ferroalloy in jet and rocket engines, and provide the United States with nearly a fourth of its cobalt needs (USGS, 2000). Other important resource producers would include Guinea, which is second only to Australia in bauxite production (for aluminum); South Africa and Zimbabwe, which together provide nearly half of the global output of chromite, a strategic metallic mineral crucial to steel manufacturing in the industrial world (USGS, 2000); and Nigeria, which has consistently been among the top five exporters of crude oil to the United States and is A f r i c a ' s top petroleum producer, ahead of both Algeria and Libya (API, 2000). As previously mentioned, many transportation lines exist primarily to provide access to these resources, not to interconnect Africa. Furthermore, many mineral sites were revealed only after the European partitioning process was completed and several mineral zones were divided between opposing states (e.g., the Copperbelt between Zaire and Zambia), contributing to tension and conflict in postcolonial Africa. Although rich in metallic ores, A f r i c a ' s geology yields only a few favored fossil fuel occurrences (coal, oil, and gas are normally associated with sedimentary rather than metamorphic rock), namely, the petroleum of the Niger River Delta, Gabon, Angola, and Algeria/Libya, and the coal of South Africa. Thus, Africa exports its metallic ores and imports much of its energy. Another resource that exists in great potential abundance in Africa is directly related to the problematic topography of the landmass itself: water power. Although deficient in fossil fuel energy resources (Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, and South Africa are exceptions), sub-Saharan Africa is "rich" in hydroelectric potential. The specific sites of this potential are where major rivers experience impressive drops—and therefore rapids and falls—in their escape routes f r o m the continent's interior. Electricity generation at these sites could conceivably enhance economic development over large regions. Several noteworthy projects have been completed for just this purpose: the Nile's Aswan High Dam in Egypt; the Zambezi's Kariba Dam, shared by Zambia and Zimbabwe; and the Volta's Akosombo Dam in Ghana. In fact, Africa possesses the greatest hydroelectric potential of any continent, and the intent of these projects has been to tap some of it.

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M o r e intriguing than the presence of such projects, however, is their small number in Africa. Most rivers are not being harnessed for power generation, and few hydroelectric facilities exist. Resource abundance, large "reserves" of power, and seemingly infinite potential have not been reconfigured into actual use for a very basic economic reason: lack of markets. Africans use very little electricity. They are predominantly farmers and laborers—and they are income-poor. Industry, a big potential user of electrical power, is not a significant part of Africa's economic mix. Cities are also viable concentrated electricity markets, but most A f r i c a n s are village dwellers, not urbanites. A huge capital investment is required to build dams and generating facilities, to transport the electricity great distances, and to distribute it in regional grids. Achieving a reasonable return on such an investment in Africa would be extremely difficult; therefore, this particular component of the continent's resource base remains greatly underexploited. The long exposure of the ancient African landmass to the tropical sun and rain—and to the force of gravity—has also removed much of the original surface material by erosion. T h e poor tropical soil that remains holds little fertility, and alluvial soils (the deep, rich, stream-deposited sediments found on floodplains and deltas) and rich volcanic soils are u n c o m m o n on the high plateau surface. (The fertile soils of the alluvial Inland Niger Delta between Segou and Timbuktu in Mali and the volcanically derived soils of Cameroon and the Kenya highlands are examples of exceptions to this generalization.) Many of the better coastal sites are held by large plantation operations geared to products for export. As previously mentioned, nontropical southern Africa is richer in soil fertility and can be considered an exception to the African rule of low soil productivity. Cooler temperatures mark this projection of the African landmass into the middle latitudes of the Southern Hemisphere. Latitudinal position and the high elevation of South Africa's Highveld combine with lower rainfall to reduce the leaching of soil nutrients, while simultaneously allowing for a thicker accumulation of organic material (humus), which is a critical factor in soil fertility. The resulting greater productivity of South African soil has supported the development of a diverse agricultural economy that is relatively free of tropical disease vectors and is grain and livestock-based (corn, wheat, sheep, and cattle). The shifting cultivation practices so typical of tropical Africa, described in Chapter 8 by Julius Nyang'oro, are replaced here by permanent and prosperous small family farms. For most A f r i c a n s , however, agriculture r e m a i n s subsistence, and f o o d supply p r o b l e m s have increased with the g r o w i n g p o p u l a t i o n , an issue treated more fully in later chapters on the e c o n o m y , e n v i r o n m e n t , and population. Nature, history, and the global economic system have combined to deprive Africans of much potential wealth and well-being. In many instances, the artificially imposed unity of the colonial era exacerbated conflict.

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S u p r a n a t i o n a l i s m — m u l t i s t a t e p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n to i d e n t i f y and p r o m o t e shared o b j e c t i v e s — r e m a i n s h i g h l y e l u s i v e , frustrated b y a d i s j o i n t e d transportation s y s t e m , ethnic/tribal c o n f l i c t s , and an i l l o g i c a l p o litical g e o g r a p h y o f t o o m a n y f r a g m e n t e d n a t i o n - s t a t e s ( M a p 2 . 6 ) . A p r o b l e m a t i c e n v i r o n m e n t , an e x p l o d i n g p o p u l a t i o n , and the p o l i t i c a l - g e o g r a p h i c r e a l i t i e s o f e a r l y - t w e n t y - f i r s t - c e n t u r y A f r i c a m a y u l t i m a t e l y c o n s p i r e to q u i c k l y drain this vast c o n t i n e n t o f the v i t a l i t y and e n e r g y that is still there in the f o r m o f raw material w e a l t h , f o o d - p r o d u c t i o n capacity, and r e s o u r c e ful h u m a n spirit. T h e s e i s s u e s and others w i l l b e a d d r e s s e d in the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s , w h i c h e x p l o r e the p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , e n v i r o n m e n t a l , and s o c i a l forces determining Africa's destiny.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

API ( A m e r i c a n P e t r o l e u m Institute). 2 0 0 0 . " E n e r g y F a c t s . " Available online at http://www.api.org/fags/. April. Best, Alan C. G., and Harm J. deBlij. 1977. African Survey. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Betts, R a y m o n d F. 1972. The Scramble for Africa: Causes and Dimensions of Empire. Lexington, M A : D. C. Heath. C a l d w e l l , J. C. 1977. " D e m o g r a p h i c A s p e c t s of D r o u g h t : An E x a m i n a t i o n of the African Drought of 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 4 . " Pp. 9 3 - 9 9 in D. Dalby, R. J. H. Church, and F. Bezzaz (eds.). Drought in Africa. L o n d o n : International African Institute. C h u r c h , R. J. H „ John I. C l a r k e , P. J. H. C l a r k e , and H. J. R. H e n d e r s o n . 1977. Africa and the Islands. N e w York: John Wiley and Sons. deBlij, Harm J., and Peter O. Muller. 1998. Geography: Realms, Regions, and Concepts. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Strahler, Arthur N., and Alan H. Strahler. 1979. Elements of Physical Geography. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Turner, H o w a r d . 1986. Africa South of the Sahara. Burnt Mill, H a r l o w (Essex), England: L o n g m a n . U d o , R e u b e n K. 1978. A Comprehensive Geography of West Africa. N e w York: Africana. United States Central Intelligence A g e n c y . 1999. " T h e World F a c t b o o k , 1999." Available online at h t t p : / / w w w . o d c i . g o v / c i a / p u b l i c a t i o n s / f a c t b o o k / c o n c o p y . html. January. U S G S (United States Geological Survey). 2 0 0 0 . "Minerals I n f o r m a t i o n . " Available online at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals. May 4.

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Map 2.1

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I

j

N A T U R A L REGIONS A N D ITCZ L O C A T I O N (Intertropical C o n v e r g e n c e

Zone)

t I

\ ... . _ i W e t Savanna

["•::':; .1 M e d i t e r r a n e a n [_ J(Forest & Scrub)

I

1 Dry S a v a n n a

j

ITCZ:

JUNE

j vege'tTtlon -V

JAN.

Map 2.2

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Map 2.3

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I

Map 2.4 Adapted from Alan C. G. Best and Harm J. deBlij, African Survey, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977, p. 64; and Reuben K. Udo, A Comprehensive Geography of West Africa, New York: Africana, 1978, p. xiv.

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A F R I C A IN I! 1 :: j-ll FRANCE BELGIUM |

| GERMANY

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1914

II I 1 II ITALY 1®!

SPAIN

(::

PORTUGAL

[SS&] GREAT BRITAIN |

| INDEPENDENT

Map 2.5 Adapted from R. F. Betts, The Scramble for Africa: ington, MA: D. C. I/Ieath, 1972, p. xiv.

Causes and Dimensions

of Empire,

Lex-

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Map 2.6 Abuja, Dodoma, and Yamassoukro are the new legal capitals of Nigeria, Tanzania, and Cote d'lvoire, respectively; but most government activities continue to be conducted and foreign embassies maintained in the traditional capital cities, Lagos and Abidjan. The official capital of Tanzania is still Dar es Salaam, but some governmental offices have been moved to Dodoma, which is planned as the eventual capital city; the National Assembly now meets there on a regular basis. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 1999 (online at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/concopy.html).

3 The Historical Context Thomas O'Tooie

A

s was m a d e clear in the previous chapter, A f r i c a is a huge and geographically diverse continent more than three times as large as the United States and several times larger than Europe. The continent's physical size, the scale of its h u m a n mosaic, and its geological and biological diversity defy both generalization and full coverage. In this chapter, I focus on the history of Africa south of the Sahara, though for thousands of years contacts between Mediterranean Africa and sub-Saharan A f r i c a have been extensive. Because the histories of sub-Saharan A f r i c a are distinctive in many ways f r o m those of northern Africa, they warrant separate treatments (in the same way that South Asia and Southeast Asia are studied separately f r o m other areas of the Asian continent). I have rather arbitrarily separated eastern, central, and western A f r i c a as foci in this chapter. In the south of A f r i c a , I have set the L i m p o p o River as the limit (see M a p 2.1), since South Africa is covered in depth in Chapter 13.

I have also set some pragmatic limits on the time focus of this chapter. I begin about 400,000 years ago, because our species, Homo sapiens, is definitely present on the continent by then (Iliffe, 1995:8). I conclude the chapter with the end of colonialism, since the postindependence period is discussed thematically by other scholars in the remaining chapters of the book. In this chapter, I present a general historical background on A f r i c a to help readers better understand the issues treated in subsequent chapters. M a n y present-day conflicts and p r o b l e m s in A f r i c a stem f r o m e c o n o m i c , environmental, political, and social changes associated with the establishment of European colonial rule. However, as important as colonialism is, patterns and identities established over the millennia of precolonial African history i n f l u e n c e d the colonial experience and continue to be a p o w e r f u l force shaping postcolonial Africa. To see Africa in its historical context is to grasp the complexity of the continent and to appreciate the ingenuity

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and dynamism of its people as they respond to the challenges posed by history. Clearly, while Africans created and continue to create their own history, they still exist under conditions that, in many cases, they do not control.

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THE PEOPLING OF AFRICA

S

The Cradle of Humankind

The African savannas of mixed grasslands and scattered trees, which developed as part of a worldwide cooling and drying trend about 4 to 6 million years ago, are the ancestral homeland of all humankind. The toolmaking and fire-using genus Homo habilis emerged on these savannas more than 2 million years ago. At that time, the earliest forms of stone tool-using members of the genus Homo, to which all humans belong, were using cultural adaptations to adjust to growing savanna and shrinking forest environments. Living in small cooperative groups, maybe even family groups, they foraged the savannas for plant food and small animals, and they occasionally fed on the carcasses of large animals killed by predators. By at least 1.7 million years ago, a hominid, called Homo erectus, appeared in eastern and southern Africa. This species spread to northern Africa and beyond into Eurasia. Very early fossils of Homo sapiens have been found in Tanzania and Ethiopia. By about 200,000 years ago, Homo sapiens populations existed widely in Africa and gradually spread out to other parts of the world. These peoples had begun to develop regionally specialized cultural complexes and to use sophisticated stone tools. By about that time, groups of intensive fishing and hunting peoples were concentrated along the Nile. From approximately 18,000 years ago, these groups of people in the Nile Valley were collecting large numbers of tubers and, by 15,000 years ago, large quantities of wild cereals (Schick, 1995:63). By 10,000 years ago, two distinct gathering and hunting cultures were emerging on the southern border of the Mediterranean basin and in the savanna regions of eastern and southern Africa, with only slightly different adaptations to their savanna habitats. A third cultural complex adapting to the tropical forest environment probably was also evolving on the eastern and southern fringes of the central African forests. Some scholars identify, in a general way, three major linguistic groups in Africa with these three cultural complexes, which had been established by about 12,000 years ago. The Mediterranean cultural complex can be associated with the Afro-Asiatic language family, while the eastern and southern savanna cultures generally correspond to the Khoisan ("click") language family. The tropical rainforest cultural complexes can be linked

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to the Niger-Congo family. A fourth m a j o r linguistic group, the NiloSaharan, can probably be associated with another cultural complex, highly adapted to fishing, which flourished in the entire central, south-central, and southeastern Sahara between 4,000 and 7,500 years ago, when the Sahara received far more rainfall than it does now (Ki-Zerbo, 1990:89-121).

tt

Gathering and Hunting

In general, Africans, like all other humans, made their living by gathering and hunting until about 7,000 years ago, when increasing populations and the climatic shift, which would ultimately create the Sahara Desert, m a d e f o o d cultivation and animal herding necessary. Archaeological evidence and comparisons with surviving gathering and hunting peoples indicate that African gatherers and hunters adapted their tools and ways of life to three basic A f r i c a n environments: the moist tropical rainforests with h a r d w o o d s and small game; the more open savannas with a diversity of large game living in grasslands, woods, and gallery forests along the rivers; and riverbank and lakeside ecologies found along m a j o r water courses or around lakes and ponds. I must point out, though, that rainforest, savanna, and waterside habitats differed greatly f r o m place to place, and the societies f o u n d in them differed more among themselves and were far more complex than this general overview might imply. I could easily devote a whole chapter to pointing out, in each habitat, some d i f f e r e n c e s in ways and styles of life that were the products of ceaseless change over millennia. The political, social, and e c o n o m i c histories of each specific society, along with its history of ideas, values, and ideology, could fill whole volumes. With such diversity it is obvious that savanna dwellers, rainforest dwellers, and people in waterfocused societies were not so perfectly adapted to a single environment as to be incapable of leaving one for the other. These three environmental niches are simply explanatory categories. In the real world, environments merge gradually into others, as do the societies living within them. Despite the myriad of habitats and diversity a m o n g their inhabitants, as well as the internal differences that existed within these habitats, it still makes sense to generalize about rainforest societies. Many forest dwellers, well into the twentieth century, lived in bands of thirty to fifty individuals. Their pursuit of game and harvesting of a variety of insect, stream, and plant foods kept them on the m o v e in a rather fixed cycle as various foods came into season at different locations in their foraging areas. Consequently, they constructed only temporary shelters of leaves and poles, very functional for a life in which more permanent structures would have been useless. Drawing upon both vegetable and animal food sources, with the men specializing in hunting and the w o m e n in gathering, they had little need f o r contact with outsiders or for exploration beyond the c o n f i n e s of

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their own regular territories. As in most gathering and hunting societies, w o m e n ' s e c o n o m i c functions, along with childbearing, were absolutely crucial. Women typically generated more food through gathering than did the men, w h o hunted animals or looked for g a m e that had already been killed. Gathering and hunting societies appear to have developed delicately balanced social relationships that permitted necessary group d e c i s i o n s without the need for clearly defined leaders. Quite likely, their moral, ethical, and artistic sensitivities resembled those of their modern descendants, the Mbuti or M ' B a k a (so-called pygmies), who still live in the rainforests of equatorial Africa (Turnbull, 1983). Savanna-dwelling gatherers and hunters led similarly mobile lives but often specialized in the collection of wild cereals that grew on the grassy plains and the occasional hunting of large grass-eating a n i m a l s — g i r a f f e , zebra, warthog, and many species of antelope. In particularly favorable circumstances, savanna dwellers might congregate in groups of 300 or more during the rainy seasons, when vegetation was lush and g a m e p l e n t i f u l . They dispersed in groups of 30 to 100 during the dry months to gather and to hunt, first with sticks and g a m e pits, and later with nets, b o w s and arrows, and poisons. As populations grew, their contacts with other g r o u p s intensified until relatively fixed territories were established, and exotic shells, stones, feathers, and other less durable items were passed in sporadic trade over distances of hundreds of miles. Their history consisted of the gradual refinement of gathering and hunting techniques, a slow spread of new inventions f r o m one group to another, and, probably, the very slow growth of population. Historian John Iliffe offers an environmental thesis as an important element in the relatively slow growth of population and the subsequent lack of pressure to turn to the more labor-intensive raising of crops. In his view, A f r i c a ' s physical setting, climate, topography, and soils placed very real limits on human populations (Iliffe, 1995:1, 21).

•

Fishing

M a j o r fishing c o m m u n i t i e s in Africa probably predate the development of techniques of growing f o o d crops and taming animals. Many settlements were clustered around the lakes and rivers of what are n o w the dry southern reaches of the Sahara. During the last great wet period in A f r i c a ' s cl imate, f r o m about 5,000 to 11,000 years ago, Lake Chad rose to cover a huge area m a n y times its present size and may well have overf l o w e d southwestward into the Benue-Niger rivers, which e m p t y into the Atlantic Ocean. This huge lake was fed by rivers from the Tibesti Plateau in the central Sahara. Lake N a k a r u in present-day Kenya may have overf l o w e d into the Great Rift Valley, while Lake Turkana was 85 meters above its present level. T h e inland delta of the Niger in present-day Mali was far m o r e vast and held e n o r m o u s quantities of water in p e r m a n e n t lakes (Iliffe, 1995:13).

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In these lands of lakes and rivers, p e o p l e lived in thriving fishing c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e y c a r v e d intricate h a r p o o n b a r b s and f i s h h o o k s out of b o n e , fired s o m e of the earliest pottery in A f r i c a , probably w o v e baskets and nets of reeds, and hunted crocodile, h i p p o p o t a m u s , and w a t e r f o w l . M o r e important, t h e s e f i s h i n g p e o p l e s s u p p o r t e d t h e m s e l v e s w i t h o u t c o n s t a n t m o v e m e n t and at m u c h h i g h e r p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t i e s than g a t h e r i n g and h u n t i n g w o u l d allow. T h e need to c o o p e r a t e in o r d e r to fish e f f i c i e n t l y e n c o u r a g e d p e o p l e to settle in larger and m o r e p e r m a n e n t villages. T h e centralized coo r d i n a t i o n required in these larger settlements led to m o r e f o r m a l i z e d leade r s h i p s t r u c t u r e s than w e r e n e c e s s a r y f o r g a t h e r e r s and h u n t e r s . In t h e s e r i v e r i n e a n d lacustrine v i l l a g e s , e x p e r i e n c e d e l d e r s or single a r b i t r a t o r s p r o b a b l y m a d e the d e c i s i o n s . S o m e i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d , f o r the first t i m e , gain m o r e wealth in the f o r m of f i s h i n g e q u i p m e n t and h o u s e s than others in the v i l l a g e . T h e s e f i s h i n g p e o p l e s p r o b a b l y t r a d e d d r i e d fish f o r plant a n d a n i m a l p r o d u c t s o f f e r e d by their g a t h e r e r - h u n t e r n e i g h b o r s . L o c a l c o m m e r c i a l n e t w o r k s d e v e l o p e d , and n e w ideas s p r e a d m o r e r a p i d l y to larger areas. F i s h i n g p e o p l e s p r o b a b l y p l a y e d a crucial role in the transition f r o m g a t h e r i n g and h u n t i n g to m o r e settled w a y s of life ( S h i l l i n g t o n , 1995:12-13). It

Crop Raising and Herding

M o s t scholars o v e r g e n e r a l i z e w h e n they s u g g e s t that the e f f e c t of the c r o p - r a i s i n g revolution was a great step f o r w a r d for h u m a n k i n d . Only with the i n v e n t i o n of crop cultivation could the h u m a n species create the e l a b o rate social and cultural patterns with which most p e o p l e today w o u l d be familiar. F u r t h e r m o r e , it is in a d v a n c e d h o e - f a r m i n g and a g r i c u l t u r a l societies that the separation b e t w e e n rulers and ruled, inequality b e t w e e n m e n a n d w o m e n , and the institution of slavery e v o l v e d . In m o s t of A f r i c a , the shift to c r o p raising e v o l v e d m u c h m o r e s l o w l y in most p l a c e s than it did in s o u t h w e s t Asia, for e x a m p l e . And o u t s i d e the E t h i o p i a n h i g h l a n d s , there w a s n o a n i m a l - d r a w n p l o w b e f o r e c o n t a c t with E u r o p e a n s . A f e w very f u n c t i o n a l gathering and h u n t i n g societies h a v e c o n t i n u e d into the t w e n t y first c e n t u r y in a variety of A f r i c a n n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t s . T h o u g h c r o p raising a l l o w s larger p o p u l a t i o n s than g a t h e r i n g and h u n t i n g , the e n v i r o n m e n t a l realities of A f r i c a limit a g r i c u l t u r a l p o t e n t i a l in m o s t p l a c e s . Bec a u s e of the c o n t i n e n t ' s location on the equator, A f r i c a g e n e r a l l y has very f i x e d wet a n d dry seasons. T h i s limits a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n a n d a n i m a l p a s t u r i n g during the six or seven dry m o n t h s . T h r e e - f i f t h s of the continent is d e s e r t , m u c h of the rest has large a r e a s of p o o r soils, and the m o r e h u m i d a r e a s are h o m e to the m a l a r i a - c a r r y i n g m o s q u i t o a n d the p a r a s i t i c i n f e c t i o n - c a r r y i n g tsetse fly. A f r i c a ' s r e l a t i v e l y light p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t y t h r o u g h o u t history d e m o n s t r a t e s the very real limits the c o n t i n e n t ' s physical e n v i r o n m e n t p l a c e d on the d e v e l o p m e n t of settled f a r m i n g . In A f r i c a , the r a i n f a l l and soils o f t e n m e a n t that f a r m i n g a n d h e r d i n g p e o p l e s w e r e

Herding societies have existed in Africa for thousands of years.

Much African agriculture is hoe-farming. Agriculture was most likely invented thousands of years ago by women.

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more exposed to the dangers of famine caused by natural disasters such as drought or flood. In most A f r i c a n h o e - f a r m i n g c o m m u n i t i e s , gathering, hunting, and especially fishing have r e m a i n e d important sources of f o o d and general livelihood (McCann, 1999:15-19). For some scholars of Africa, a m a j o r question is why A f r i c a n s ever turned to farming at all, given the effectiveness of the hunting and gathering lifestyles (Lee, 1993). Studies of surviving gatherers and hunters, combined with archaeological evidence, convincingly r e f u t e any arguments about the short, nasty, and brutish lives of such people. Even in the harsh environment of the Kalahari Desert ecosystems, a larger percentage of people living there today are older "pensioners" and children than is typical in the crop-growing area of Africa. Gatherers and hunters in the Kalahari know agricultural techniques perfectly well but have no reason or desire to adopt them. A logical, schematic reconstruction of what happened to cause many African people to adopt crop growing might be m a d e based on several explanations, but none are based on direct k n o w l e d g e . One, which I find quite persuasive, is given here as an example. The fishing cultures, which evolved near lakes and rivers in the African savannas between the Sahara and the forests and in eastern Africa after the last Ice Age, allowed relatively large stationary settlements with new skills to grow. At the same time, these peoples began to domesticate animals, especially cattle, using skills acquired f r o m hunting game that gathered near watering places. Five or six thousand years ago the Sahara was drying up, pushing to its margins large populations that could not adapt to the change without moving. Much African agricultural innovation apparently was forced upon people by the population pressures that grew along the waterways to the south and east of this e x p a n d i n g desert (Bohannan and Curtin, 1995:140-144). How agriculture developed is much easier to guess at than it is to ascertain why it developed. Women, the gathering specialists, became aware of where particularly good food supplies, especially grains, grew, and they camped on sites where these foods were plentiful. Over time, the harvested seeds were planted, and larger and more firmly attached seed heads evolved. In the widespread African savanna, millets and sorghums were domesticated. In the Ethiopian highlands and the Futa Djallon, teff and fonio, grasslike grains with tiny kernels, became the respective staples. In the marshlands of the interior delta of the Niger River in present-day Mali, a type of rice was cultivated. Many East Africans probably planted ensete, a crop related to the banana ( M c C a n n , 1 9 9 9 : 4 5 - 4 6 , 94). Other root crops and the native oil palm of western Africa enabled agriculturists to penetrate the forests (McCann, 1999:114-128). Yet, for most gathering and hunting populations of southern and central Africa, there was little pressure to change from a way of life that had proven quite satisfactory for thousands of years. Likewise, fluctuating rainfall patterns, soils with ephemeral fertility,

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and relatively low populations allowed, and perhaps necessitated, swidden or slash-and-burn cropping techniques to persist into the present in many parts of Africa. With iron hoes and other iron tools, more efficient cropping techniques became possible. The growth of population, which accompanied the slow shift to agriculture, and later the use of iron, set in motion another important process in African history.

9;. Bantu Migrations Early in the twentieth century, scholars were struck by the remarkable similarities in the languages and cultures of peoples living throughout the vast area stretching east f r o m present-day C a m e r o o n to Kenya and on south to the Republic of South Africa. All these peoples spoke languages having the word-stem ntu, or something very similar to it, meaning "person." T h e prefix ba denotes the plural in most of these languages so that ba-ntu means, literally, " p e o p l e . " T h e source of these languages and the f a r m i n g and herding cultures associated with them and how they became so widespread in Africa were m a j o r questions by the mid-twentieth century. One plausible—though still speculative—answer was based on linguistics, archaeology, and studies of plant origins. According to this account, about 3,000 years ago near the Benue River in the western African savannas, fairly large-scale settlements guided by councils of lineage elders evolved based on fishing with dugout canoes, nets, fishhooks, traps, and harpoons. Cultivating yams and oil palms and raising goats, these peoples, speaking Bantu languages, were better able to survive drought and misfortune than the small pockets of cultivators that might have developed by then in and south of the tropical rainforests of central Africa. Having long mastered the art of firing pottery, these Bantu speakers were smelting iron for spears, arrows, hoes, scythes, and axes more than 2,500 years ago. Population pressures grew along the Benue as Saharan farmers slowly moved south to escape the gradually drying desert. Pushed by growing populations, the Bantu fishing peoples moved south and east. After reaching the C o n g o tributaries, they spread up the rivers of central Africa to the Z a m bezi and on south to the tip of Africa. Bantu-speaking groups intermarried with, conquered, or pushed out the Khoisan speakers and other populations they encountered. As ihey slowly migrated, these Bantu-speaking peoples learned to cultivate Asian yams and bananas, which had been introduced to eastern A f r i c a by Malayo-Polynesian sailors who colonized the island of Madagascar about 1,800 years ago. In some cases, the Bantu-speaking migrants became large-scale cattle keepers. By 1,000 years ago, most of central and southern A f r i c a was populated by iron-smelting, Bantu-speaking villagers who had virtually replaced all but scattered pockets of the original gathering and hunting peoples (Lamphear and Falola, 1995:86-94).

The Historical Context •

POLITICAL PATTERNS OF THE PAST

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Until the 1960s, most historians relied on written sources, so most history tended to be about societies with writing. Since most African societies did not develop writing, the historical record was sparse, gleaned f r o m accounts of n o n - A f r i c a n travelers, usually Muslims, and archaeological remains. In the past forty years, specialists in African history have learned to use historical linguistics, oral traditions, and other sources to overcome the apparent lack of evidence and d e v e l o p a far better understanding of A f r i can history. Nevertheless, many writers of world history texts continue to treat h u m a n societies without writing as "prehistoric." This is rather ironic given that even in those complex urban-centered societies called civilizations, which have had written records f o r more than 5,000 years, only a small minority of people were literate and most people did not live in cities. Certainly in A f r i c a this prehistoric-historic distinction has little value. Most historians of A f r i c a realize that a f o c u s on written sources alone would m e a n virtually ignoring the histories of the vast majority of A f r i c a ' s peoples, who were able to a c h i e v e — t h r o u g h kinship, ritual, and other means—relatively orderly and just societies without centralized governments or states. In fact, until about 2,500 years ago, virtually all A f r i c a n s living south of the Sahara were able to avoid relying on bureaucratic organizations or "states" to carry out the political requirements of their societies. Even large groups created social systems based on lineage (kinship) with no single center of power or authority. Ideally, such systems could a c c o m m o d a t e several million people. On the local level, lineage systems depended on a balance of power to solve political problems. People in these societies controlled conflict and resolved disputes through a balance of centers of cooperation and opposition, which appear to have been almost universal in human societies. (Eugenia Shanklin discusses kinship and lineage m o r e fully in Chapter 9.) This human ethic of cooperation was especially crucial in herding and agricultural societies that existed in the o f t e n challenging physical environments of Africa (Turnbull, 1973:233-255). Variations of lineage systems also helped A f r i c a n s resist European colonial domination. For example, colonial attempts to divide A f r i c a into districts, cantons, and even "tribes" were d o o m e d to failure when most of the continent south of the Sahara was really a kaleidoscope of lineage fragments, scattering and regrouping as the need arose. T h r o u g h marriage alliances and various f o r m s of reciprocal e x c h a n g e s , these n e t w o r k s could expand almost indefinitely. As an example, European officials erroneously assumed that their control of an important African authority figure ensured

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Most Africans have long relied on decentralized, kinship-based political systems. In Burkina Faso, male family heads meet to discuss a rural development project. the " p a c i f i c a t i o n " of a given territory. T h e A f r i c a n s , on the other hand, could simply turn to another m e m b e r of a kinship linkage and continue their struggle against the outsiders. A f r i c a ' s past demonstrates the truly remarkable ability of African peoples to resist incorporation into state political and economic organizations right up to the present (Hyden, 1980). This represents one of the most unusual aspects of the history of the continent's peoples. Many Africans still rely on extended f a m i l y organizations and call upon kinship b e h a v i o r to maintain justice and cultural and territorial integrity, not only in domestic but also in wider spheres (see Mair, 1974). And, as in the past, many Africans see any state without at least some symbolic lineage-based authority as inherently tyrannical. The continuing desire to seek and find order in institutions other than the state is very understandable in the African context. An important aspect of persisting kinship n e t w o r k s that is still very important in A f r i c a is the degree to which p e o p l e within such systems could mobilize w o m e n ' s labor and childbearing capacities. T h e formation of alliances b e t w e e n lineages was facilitated by marriage. This does not m e a n that w o m e n were simply p a w n s ; in a good n u m b e r of locations, w o m e n controlled many resources and could operate almost independently of their h u s b a n d s ' lineage. Quite o f t e n , though, especially where cattle keeping—almost always a male-dominated activity—was important, women

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had m a n y of the crop-producing responsibilities as well as household and child-rearing duties. When colonial labor d e m a n d s r e m o v e d men even farther f r o m household economies, this imbalance was often exacerbated (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1997:9-20). For those accustomed to state forms of organization, African social organization based on kinship seems chaotic, and nonstate societies are seen as less civilized or lacking in sociopolitical development. To dispel the notion that A f r i c a lacked civilization, many dedicated Africanists have focused almost exclusively on the relatively unrepresentative centralized states w h e n portraying A f r i c a ' s past. This has s o m e t i m e s obscured, h o w ever, the important role of local kinship relations in maintaining peace and harmony in most African societies. But since state societies as well as nonstate societies have a long history in Africa, I e x a m i n e next the significance of state societies in the history of Africa.

if

State Societies

By the late 1960s, most scholars had rejected the essentially racial determinist views that Africans were incapable of organizing stable "civilizations" or states without external leadership. The once c o m m o n l y accepted premise that the first states in Africa were the result of c o m m o n patterns of divine kingship diffused from Egypt or elsewhere have been gradually abandoned by most knowledgeable scholars of A f r i c a n history. The rigid distinction between state and stateless societies, though, continues to exist in the literature. Such categories were created by social anthropologists (mostly British) in response to colonial administrators' needs to classify the political structures of the peoples over whom they ruled. Most scholars now realize that African states, like states elsewhere in the world, arose from a variety of causes and most often resulted from internal forces present in various areas of the continent. (See Map 2.4 for early states and empires.) In many parts of Africa, control over long-distance trade was an important aspect of the origin of states. Control of military force for conquest and protection was also generally present. In most cases, African states or k i n g d o m s typically retained an element of kinship-based social organization. In fact, the process of state-building was usually a long one in which rulers gradually established special privileges for their own lineages and created a superlineage basis for authority. This caused a certain reciprocity of mutual obligations between the subjects and their rulers that persisted for generations in all but the most authoritarian states. Rulers brought prosperity to their people and organized the military to protect them, while the ruled supported their rulers with subsistence goods, labor, and even service in the military. It is quite likely that the first regional states in Africa were those that united independent farming communities growing up below the first cataract

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in Egypt about 5,500 years ago. Here the gradual drying of the Sahara Desert had forced together growing populations f r o m the desert into a diminishing crop-growing area dependent upon the annual Nile floods. From this time until Egypt was conquered by the armies of Alexander the Great, the pharaohs, priests, and nobility of Egypt were able to extract surplus wealth f r o m the cultivators of the valley and to war with, trade with, and interact with the Nubians south of the cataract. T h e Egyptian ruling elite controlled irrigation and other public works and justified their rule through claims that the pharaoh was a god-king incarnate (Lamphear and Falola, 1995:79-80). Farther to the south, in a land once called Kush by Egyptians, another independent political entity (though not continuously so) developed by about 3,800 years ago. Kush achieved its greatest power between 2,700 and 2,800 years ago, and its history was closely linked to that of Egypt. In fact, Kushite kings ruled Egypt from about 7 0 0 to 500 B.C. Driven f r o m Egypt about 2,500 years ago, the Kushite leaders pushed farther south into M e r o e , where a vast iron industry flourished. T h e causes of the rise of Kush and the extent to which its political ideas and metallurgical techniques spread are still open to considerable discussion. Meroe's successor states adopted Coptic Christianity from Axum (the ancestor of today's Ethiopia) as a court religion in the first centuries of the Christian era, but this was replaced by Islam more than 1,000 years ago. Four hundred years ago the Sennar kingdom imposed unity over much of this area, forcing peasants to pay heavy taxes to subsidize their rulers' households. A large, literate merchant class established itself in numerous towns and played a crucial role in deepening the Islamic cultural influence so important in the northern part of the present-day Republic of Sudan (Leclant, 1 9 8 0 : 2 9 5 - 3 1 4 ; H a k e m , 1980:315-346). Still farther south in the Ethiopian highlands, Axum, dating back more than 2,000 years, rose to challenge Kush. The founders of A x u m migrated f r o m southern Arabia as much as 2,100 years ago and later extended their authority over the northern half of what are now Ethiopia and eastern Sudan. Two thousand years ago they controlled ports on the Red Sea and maintained trade relations with merchants f r o m the eastern end of the Mediterranean who came to buy ivory, gold, and incense from the African interior. Four hundred years later, A x u m ' s rulers became Christians and expanded to control other lesser-known states that had also arisen in the central and southern highlands of Ethiopia. T h e leaders of a state led by A m h a r i c - s p e a k i n g peoples, which arose in the north-central area of the Ethiopian highlands about 700 years ago, claimed some ties to the longcollapsed A x u m . This state was based on an expanding landowning class. It flourished 500 to 600 years ago, broke up, and was then substantially reunited in the eighteenth century (Shillington, 1995:68-71). State formation in the savannas of western A f r i c a lagged after the R o m a n defeat of the Phoenician-founded city of Carthage (in Tunisia).

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This city-state had conducted a flourishing trans-Saharan trade with subSaharan A f r i c a n s through Berber partners between 2,500 to 2,800 years ago. Gradually, k i n g d o m s created by h o r s e - m o u n t e d forces establishing control over small agricultural communities developed in the Senegambia and the middle Niger as early as 2,000 years ago. One of the first of these western African states was Tekrur on the Senegal River (mentioned by later travelers writing in Arabic). Eleven hundred years ago, Muslim traders f r o m northern Africa also described Ghana, a state centered somewhat north and east of Tekrur. The location of G h a n a ' s consecutive capitals, K u m b i Saleh and Walata, in southern Mauritania on the northern edge of cultivation, became crucial to the rulers of these cities. Serving as staging places to assemble and equip the caravans carrying gold shipments north, these cities flourished as the gold trade between northern A f r i c a and the sources farther south was reestablished. Archaeological evidence suggests that G h a n a was already hundreds of years old when it was visited 1,000 years ago by Arab traders searching for profits, especially this gold. T h e writings of these traders and other travelers about G h a n a and the subsequent western African savanna kingdoms of Mali and Songhai provide little knowledge of those crucial aspects of western African society not of direct interest to commercial travelers. G h a n a ' s decline and ultimate sacking by Berber Muslims were part of a larger shift in sub-Saharan trade centers. Trade shifted south as the spreading desert made food production around Walata much more difficult, and Muslim groups pushing into the western desert prompted a shift eastward. Trade and power passed first to Mali, a k i n g d o m of M a n d e - s p e a k i n g groups on the upper Niger River. Founded, according to oral traditions, between A.D. 1230 and 1235 by Sundiata Keita, Mali not only extracted e n o u g h grain f r o m local f a r m e r s to maintain a standing army but also traded gold and other goods for the necessary salt f r o m the desert and other c o m m o d i t i e s f r o m the larger Muslim world. O n e of Mali's rulers, Mansa Musa, established a reputation for wealth as the result of the splendor of his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324. From 1468 on, the power of Mali passed to Songhai, located yet farther east on the Niger, under its king Sonni Ah. The leaders of Songhai, who controlled the river by military canoes, were able to dominate the trading cities of T i m b u k t u , Djenne, and G a o until the Battle of Tondibi in April 1591, when Moroccan invaders decisively d e f e a t e d an empire already in decline (Bohannan and Curtin, 1995:166-169). With origins going back to a past almost as remote as that of G h a n a , Kanem, a state near the desert edge in modern Chad, may have served as a trading entrepot for centuries. Rulers of this state were in close contact with North A f r i c a and, possibly, even with southwest Asia by 1,500 years ago. Arabic sources of more than 500 years ago referred to a strong successor state called Bornu, southwest of Lake Chad in what is today northern Nigeria. This southward shift probably reveals a deepening control over a

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fixed population of cultivators. And though Bornu elites had no gold to sustain a large trade-based kingdom, they did exploit tin and copper resources (Lange, 1984:238-265). Two very interesting savanna states, which actually prospered as the trade north declined, were the highly centralized non-Islamic kingdoms of Mossi (Mori-speaking) peoples in present-day Burkina Faso and the Bambara k i n g d o m s of Segu and Kaarta (in the present-day nation of Mali). Though the Mossi kingdoms date back in some form more than 500 years, both of these clusters of states probably had economies based on the slave trade at the height of their power (Izard, 1984:211-237). By 4 0 0 years ago, the most dynamic political systems in the entire western African savanna were the Hausa city-states west of Bornu. In the area in which these states arose, a high water table and numerous river valleys permitted year-round irrigated cultivation. The resulting food supply permitted an exceptionally dense population, which established a thick network of walled settlements and an extensive, specialized, commodity-production e c o n o m y by about 1,000 years ago. Influenced by Islamized people f r o m the Mali empire, one of the city-states, Kano, had b e c o m e quite powerful 500 to 600 years ago. Other Hausa states such as Gobir and Katsina, and even Bornu, contended with Kano for dominance. Iron deposits, the availability of charcoal-producing woods, and trade in kola nuts, slaves f r o m the south, and surplus dyed textiles and leather goods supplied a substantial long-distance trade (Iliffe, 1995:73-74). Elsewhere in A f r i c a there were a number of m a j o r state clusters, but few, if any, date back much more than 1,000 years. About 700 years ago, a process of state formation began in the region of the Great Lakes of eastern Africa. T h o u g h this process was long portrayed as the creation of Kushite- and Nilotic-speaking pastoralists imposing their rule over Bantuspeaking agriculturists, such a simplistic and essentially racist view is now largely rejected. It would appear that all of these states came into being as a conjuncture of the economic importance of salt, cattle, and iron and the d e m o g r a p h i c possibilities allowed by fertile soils and crops such as bananas. Unfortunately, the persistence of beliefs by an older generation of scholars contributed to much of the twentieth-century suffering in Rwanda and Burundi. Clearly, there were peoples whose ancestors came f r o m the south, west, and east as well as the north into the Great Lakes region. Descending f r o m ancestors speaking Kushite, Nilotic, and Bantu languages, the rulers of centralized kingdoms rose to power through a variety of factors, the least of which was their genetic heritage. A state such as Buganda, which occupied the fertile plains northwest of Lake Victoria Nyanza is typical. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the kabaka, the ruler of the Buganda, extended his authority over much of modern Uganda by gradually taking over the prerogatives of all the Ganda lineages. Besides plentiful supplies of bananas, the economic base of this state also appeared to be a lively trade in handicraft production (Lamphear and Falola, 1995:91-94).

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Other states have existed south of the equator for centuries. Near the mouth of the river of the same name lay the K o n g o k i n g d o m . W h e n the Portuguese first arrived in the late fifteenth century, this kingdom, ruled by Nzinga N k u w u , had already existed for several generations. In 1506, Nzinga N k u w u ' s son Affonso, who had converted to Catholicism, defeated his brother to become manicongo (ruler) of this kingdom. His ascension to power marked the beginning of the k i n g d o m ' s decline, since much of the ruler's authority depended upon local religious values (which were undermined by his conversion). The missionaries w h o surrounded him, and the expanding Portuguese influence as slave traders, further reduced his authority (Iliffe, 1995:80). Another cluster of centralized polities lay far inland in a basin where salt and iron deposits assisted the d e v e l o p m e n t of long-distance trade. In the present-day Shaba province of Congo, a huntsman hero, Ilunga Kalala, had founded a dynasty among the Luba in the early 1400s. Other states of the southern savanna in what are now the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Angola established the superiority of their ruling lineages by associating their f o u n d i n g legends with the Luba. The Lozi state in the upper Zambezi floodplain of western Z a m b i a , which unified only in the nineteenth century, is one such example (Shillington, 1995:140-146). Great Zimbabwe (in the modern country of the same name), the center of extensive and complex archaeological remains, dates back at least 800 years. The impressive stone ruins called Z i m b a b w e (Great House) were built by people ancestral to m o d e r n - d a y Shona speakers. This complex probably served as a capital for an empire that stretched from the Zambezi to the L i m p o p o , had linkages with widespread Indian Ocean trade networks, and e n c o m p a s s e d an area of rich gold works. The sophisticated stone architecture of this state indicates a complex economic and political system. T h e organization of the necessary labor to build these structures suggests a sophisticated and complex social, economic, and political organization. Oral histories and firsthand descriptions of early Portuguese visitors to the area also confirm the existence of a strong centralized political system. Though the original Shona state probably broke up because of intergroup warfare after Indian Ocean traders found alternative African partners in the Zambezi valley, a successor state was established by 1420 or so under a northern Shona, Nyatsimbe Mutota, using the title Mwene Mutapa (Iliffe, 1995:101-103). As elsewhere in the world, many African states derived great stimulus from outside forces. The oldest and best examples of these externally influenced states were the trading states of the coast of eastern Africa. Evolving from previously existing coastal fishing towns linked to farming peoples in the interior, these trading entrepots had contacts with the G r e c o - R o m a n world as early as a . d . 100 (Iliffe, 1995:53-55). Beginning gradually in the ninth century, these city-states rose and fell in concert with both the Islamized maritime cultures of the Indian Ocean and the A f r i c a n political

The Historical Context

39

systems that supplied the ivory, gold, and slaves for trade. By a.d. 1000 these local African towns, from Mogadishu (Somalia) to Sofala (Mozambique), were deeply involved in overseas commerce. Some, like Kilwa in southern Tanzania, which drew upon the Shona-controlled goldfields of Zimbabwe, traded extensively with China, India, and the Islamic world. These city-state-based, coastal-trading societies were influenced by Arab and Persian immigrants and developed a unique Swahili culture derived from both African and southwest Asian sources (Connah, 1987:150-182). The kingdoms of Benin and Oyo in present-day Nigeria have historical origins dating back hundreds of years. Yet, it was not until 1500, when trade with Europeans on the coast contributed to the increase in the scale of organization, that other centralized political systems developed in the forests and savannas closer to the Atlantic coast of western Africa. For example, the Asante of modern Ghana rose to power after 1680 when the Asantehene (king of the Asante) Osei Tutu and his adviser and priest, Okonfo Anokye, forcefully united three smaller states into a confederation dominated by Akan-speaking peoples. The rise of the Asante state owed much to the control of the goldfields in central Ghana. The major factor, though, was the growth of military activity connected with the slave trade and the imported guns that came with this trade. The Asante fought to protect the trade to the coast in much the same way that the leaders of the United States intervened in Kuwait to maintain control of the oil, which they considered a vital resource (Shillington, 1995:191-196). Four hundred years ago, the dominant state behind the coast in western Africa was the savanna-based Yoruba state of Oyo. With far-ranging cavalry, Oyo was poised to respond to the growing demand for slaves by French, English, Portuguese, and other traders at ports such as Whydah, Porto Novo, and Badagry. By 1730, Dahomey, a tributary state of Oyo, became a major slave-trading power in its own right under King Agaja and dominated the major routes to the sea until the slave trade declined in the nineteenth century. Faced with the rise of the Muslim Sokoto caliphate to the north and the breaking away of better-armed Yoruba satellite states to the south, Oyo then declined (Shillington, 1995:191-192). A very different series of events, the jihads (holy wars) of the western Sudan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was directly inspired by Islamic reforming movements introduced from northern Africa and the Arabian peninsula and by the large-scale shift in trade and production brought about by European commercial interests pressing in from the coast. The jihads of western Africa began in the highlands of the Futa Djallon in present-day Guinea when Fulbe (Fulani) pastoralists, supported by Muslim traders, revolted against their farming rulers and created a Fulbedominated Islamic state by about 1750 under the leadership of Ibrahima Sori. By 1776, the Fulbe had produced a shari'a-ru\ed (based on Islamic law) state on the lower Senegal led by Abd al-Qadir. In the early nineteenth

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O'Toole

c e n t u r y , a similar F u l b e - i n s p i r e d r e v o l u t i o n , l a u n c h e d by U t h m a n dan F o d i o against the H a u s a k i n g d o m s f a r t h e r east, c r e a t e d the S o k o t o caliphate with a p o p u l a t i o n of about 10 million p e o p l e and the Ilorin emirate, O y o ' s rival, in the 1830s. This j i h a d was e x t e n d e d into northern C a m e r o o n by o t h e r F u l b e l e a d e r s . A n o t h e r F u l b e j i h a d , inspired by that of U t h m a n dan Fodio, was led by Seku A h m a d u in Macina in present-day Mali. Beginning in 1852, a l - H a j j U m a r f o r m e d a n o t h e r e m p i r e on the upper N i g e r that united previously existing B a m b a r a k i n g d o m s until it fell to the French in the 1890s (Shillington, 1 9 9 5 : 2 2 6 - 2 3 2 ) . S e v e r a l o t h e r s t a t e - b u i l d i n g p r o c e s s e s , the result of both i n d i g e n o u s and external forces, o c c u r r e d in the past 300 years. O n e originated in what is n o w South A f r i c a and had such a large i n f l u e n c e as far afield as M a l a w i that I m e n t i o n it h e r e , e v e n t h o u g h it is c o v e r e d in the c h a p t e r on S o u t h A f r i c a . T h i s Zulu s t a t e - b u i l d i n g p r o c e s s in South A f r i c a set in m o t i o n the M f e c a n e , a period of wars and d i s t u r b a n c e s that led to migrations and conq u e s t of t h o u s a n d s of p e o p l e . T h e M f e c a n e , w h i c h in the Z u l u l a n g u a g e m e a n s "the era of the c r u s h i n g or b r e a k i n g , " m a y have been directly influe n c e d by the p r e s e n c e of e x p a n d i n g white settlement in South A f r i c a . But the c o n d i t i o n s m a k i n g the rise of the Z u l u k i n g d o m p o s s i b l e were the result of m o r e p r o f o u n d c h a n g e s , i n c l u d i n g p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h , longd i s t a n c e trade in slaves and ivory, and the introduction of m a i z e (corn) by the P o r t u g u e s e centuries b e f o r e . Until the nineteenth century, the necessities of defense, irrigation, trade, and o t h e r f a c t o r s , w h i c h led to the c r e a t i o n of states e l s e w h e r e in A f r i c a , w e r e a p p a r e n t l y not as i m p o r t a n t f a r t h e r s o u t h . E c o l o g i c a l p r e s s u r e s a n d perhaps the activities of P o r t u g u e s e and C a p e C o l o n y slave traders c a u s e d an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of rivalries b e t w e e n small political g r o u p i n g s in the region b e t w e e n the D r a k e n s b e r g M o u n t a i n s and the Indian O c e a n about 2 0 0 years ago. In that struggle f o r p o w e r , the most successful leader to e m e r g e was Shaka. He r e f i n e d and i m p r o v e d local w a r f a r e techniques and consolidated authority so e f f e c t i v e l y that b e t w e e n 1819 and 1828 he was able to create a m i l i t a r y state that set in m o t i o n a series of m i g r a t i o n s and c o n q u e s t s resulting in the c r e a t i o n of m a n y k i n g d o m s t h r o u g h o u t s o u t h e r n A f r i c a . T h i s e x t r a o r d i n a r y individual trained an a r m y that was very e f f e c tive and able to e x p a n d rapidly. He was able to do this by t r a n s f o r m i n g the e x i s t i n g s y s t e m of initiation g r o u p s (an a g e - g r a d e s y s t e m ) into c r o s s l i n e a g e g r o u p s , w h i c h he then was able to c e n t r a l l y control. T h i s r e v o l u tionary social organization a l l o w e d him to mobilize an entire generation of y o u n g m e n to f i g h t f o r h i m w h i l e the w o m e n w o r k e d to p r o d u c e f o o d to support t h e m . T h i s f o r g i n g of a Zulu n a t i o n p u s h e d other p e o p l e s , d e s p e r a t e to replace cattle stolen by the Z u l u , into the interior g r a s s l a n d s of m o d e r n - d a y South A f r i c a and far b e y o n d , creating new political f o r m a t i o n s in what are n o w Z i m b a b w e , M a l a w i , M o z a m b i q u e , Z a m b i a , and Tanzania. T h e S o t h o

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kingdom of present-day Lesotho and the Ndebele kingdom of modern Zimbabwe were among the results of the Mfecane (Omer-Cooper, 1994:52-81).

•

TRADE, EXPLORATION, AND CONQUEST Slavery

Apologists for the slave trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries argued that slavery was intrinsic in backward African societies. They also claimed that slavery in the " C h r i s t i a n " Americas was probably better for Africans than their situation had been in their " p a g a n " homelands. Abolitionists essentially agreed with these negative stereotypes about indigenous A f r i c a n societies. Most abolitionists supported " l e g i t i m a t e " trade, missionary activities, and ultimately colonialism, because these intrusions would put an end to slavery and the slave trade and begin the process of redeeming this " p a g a n " continent. A f r i c a n nationalists and d e f e n d e r s of A f r i c a n culture in the twentieth century argued that A f r i c a n civilizations, extending back to the glories of ancient Egypt, had been deformed and barbarized by the effects of the Atlantic slave trade. Some argued that the Atlantic slave trade had enriched the West at the expense of A f r i c a and was largely responsible for Africa's relative economic backwardness (Manning, 1990:8-26). Slavery in Africa, as elsewhere, is as old as civilization. From the Egyptian dynasties through the Carthaginian and Greek trading states to the Roman Empire, a small n u m b e r of black Africans were always part of trans-Saharan commerce. By the time the Arabs overran northern Africa in the middle of the seventh century, bondage and the slave trade were already fixtures of this part of the world as elsewhere. War prisoners f r o m the Sudan—in Arabic hi lad a I-Sudan, "the land of the b l a c k s " — w e r e sold north from at least 1,300 years ago. The demand for slaves in the Mediterranean world kept a persistent and substantial movement of black humans as trade goods f l o w i n g across the desert (with many more dying on the journey) well into the twentieth century (Manning, 1990:27-37, 149-164). Clientship, p a w n i n g , and the sale of individuals to pay for food in times of f a m i n e have existed in human societies—in A f r i c a and elsew h e r e — f r o m at least the beginning of crop production. Conquered peoples were absorbed into the victors' societies, often serving in a lowly status with few rights and privileges for generations before prerogatives and status distinctions between slave and free blurred. In some A f r i c a n states, plantation, quarry, mining, and porterage slavery were important parts of the economic base. Slave-soldiers were found in the C a y o r kingdom of Senegal in the fifteenth century, and slavery is still present in Sudan (Meirs and Kopytoff, 1977:3 ff.; Shillington, 1995:172-180).

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While recent historical research no longer maintains, as serious scholars once did, that as many as 50 million Africans were taken from western A f r i c a as part of the Atlantic slave trade, the economic and human loss to A f r i c a of the 10 million or more slave immigrants who reached the New World was serious enough (Manning, 1990:5). More important to understand are the broader negative e f f e c t s that the slave trade, the conflicts connected with it, and the rise of slavery within Africa associated with the trade had on A f r i c a n culture. At a time when European and North American populations were growing rapidly, A f r i c a ' s was in decline. While Europe and North America were industrializing, Africa, largely as a result of the slave trade, was involved in an exploitative and unproductive system of trade (Bah, 1993:79-84). Focus on the Atlantic slave trade should not result in less attention being paid to the Indian Ocean slave trade. This trade, though it never matched the massive n u m b e r s of the Atlantic slave trade, had disastrous consequences as far inland as the shores of Lake Malawi and those areas of the Democratic Republic of C o n g o west of Lake Tanganyika. T h e centuries-old, though relatively small, trade in A f r i c a n humans to south and southwest Asia for plantation and mine workers, soldiers, and concubines reached substantial proportions beginning in the middle decades of the eighteenth century as d e m a n d for slaves grew. This trade continued very actively into the nineteenth century, supplying slaves for Brazil, for the clove plantations on the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar off the coast of eastern Africa, and for the sugar plantations on the Indian Ocean islands. T h e nineteenth-century A f r o - A r a b slavers and ivory hunters penetrated swiftly and deeply inland, causing proportionately as great a loss of life and disruption in eastern African societies as the Atlantic slave trade did at its height (Alpers, 1975). Clearly the various slave-trading patterns had economic, political, and social impacts on both African and other Atlantic societies. The profits of European merchants in the Atlantic slave trade from the mid-seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century were immense. It should be noted, though, that these profits diminished considerably for Europeans as African traders established a dominant position in the trade. The profits f r o m the slave trade may well have helped lay the foundation for the Industrial Revolution and the expansion of capitalism in Europe and North America. The slave trade from Kilwa and the offshore island of Zanzibar reached tremendous proportions in the late eighteenth century, furnishing labor to the French plantations on the fertile and previously unpopulated islands of Mauritius and Réunion in the Indian Ocean. It turned African enterprise, over a wide geographic area, from more productive pursuits and influenced the rise of more authoritarian rulers. By the end of the eighteenth century, slaves were being delivered by Africans to the coast from regions as far away as the Hausa states and Katanga (Shaba) in Congo (Iliffe, 1995:127-158).

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"Legitimate" Trade B y the end o f the eighteenth century, the world p r i c e o f sugar was dec l i n i n g b e c a u s e o f o v e r p r o d u c t i o n . At the s a m e t i m e , the p r i c e o f s l a v e s w a s rising b e c a u s e o f stiffer c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g A f r i c a n suppliers in western A f r i c a . A s a result, the p o w e r and i n f l u e n c e o f plantation o w n e r s f r o m the British West Indies was d e c l i n i n g in the British P a r l i a m e n t . T h e Industrial R e v o l u t i o n was s p a w n i n g a new d o m i n a n t c l a s s o f industrialists in G r e a t Britain who were finding it i n c r e a s i n g l y n e c e s s a r y to s e e k new markets abroad for the c l o t h i n g , pottery, and metal g o o d s they were producing in g r o w i n g quantities. T h e s e industrialists saw that A f r i c a n s in A f r i c a c o u l d provide E u r o p e a n p r o d u c e r s with both n e c e s s a r y raw materials and n e w m a r k e t s f o r their c h e a p l y p r o d u c e d m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s ( B o h a n n a n and Curtin,

1995:213-214).

T h e Haitian r e v o l u t i o n , the a b o l i t i o n m o v e m e n t , the F r e n c h d o m i n a tion o f the sugar industry, and, p e r h a p s , s o m e g r o w i n g a c c e p t a n c e o f the e g a l i t a r i a n principles o f the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n and the U . S . W a r o f Indep e n d e n c e led the British, with the strongest navy in the world, to abandon the slave trade. Having transported half the captives from western A f r i c a at the end o f the eighteenth century, the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t set up an " a n t i s l a v e r y s q u a d r o n " and b e g a n using f o r c e to stop the trade by 1 8 0 7 ( M a n ning,

1990:149-157).

B e g i n n i n g in the 1 7 9 0 s , trade in p a l m oil f o r use in s o a p , c a n d l e s , c o o k i n g products, and lubricants for looms, in return for g o o d s produced in E u r o p e , had begun in western A f r i c a . B y the 1 8 3 0 s , the c o m m e r c i a l production o f peanuts for the European market was well under way in western A f r i c a . T h o u g h slaving and the " l e g i t i m a t e " trade in these c o m m o d i t i e s , as well as gold, timber, gum arabic, skins, and spices, c o e x i s t e d through midcentury, it b e c a m e apparent that greater profits e x i s t e d in " l e g i t i m a t e c o m m e r c e " than in slaves after the markets in the United S t a t e s were c l o s e d in the first d e c a d e o f the n i n e t e e n t h century. T h e B r a z i l i a n and C u b a n m a r kets dried up by the 1 8 7 0 s . L a r g e E u r o p e a n trading f i r m s w e r e s o o n to s q u e e z e out a n u m b e r o f smaller-scale entrepreneurs in A f r i c a . A m o n g those squeezed out were Eura f r i c a n s , groups o f p e o p l e o f m i x e d E u r o p e a n and A f r i c a n a n c e s t r y f r o m the S e n e g a m b i a who had p r o m o t e d the peanut trade a l o n g the c o a s t to the south and other E u r a f r i c a n s and f o r m e r A f r i c a n s l a v e r s f r o m L i b e r i a to C a m e r o o n w h o had b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y i n v o l v e d in p a l m oil c o m m e r c e . Arab, Indian, and L u s o - A f r i c a n ( o f Portuguese and A f r i c a n a n c e s t r y ) interm e d i a r i e s from A n g o l a to S o m a l i a , w h o had s w i t c h e d f r o m trading s l a v e s to trading ivory, gum a r a b i c , c o p r a , c l o v e s , and o t h e r c o m m o d i t i e s , a l s o s u f f e r e d . S o m e o f these i n t e r m e d i a r i e s w e r e r e d u c e d to b e c o m i n g a g e n t s for the European c o m p a n i e s , while others were s i m p l y driven out o f business. T h e c l o t h , a l c o h o l , t o b a c c o , and f i r e a r m s i m p o r t e d by the E u r o p e a n

Thomas O'Toole

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trading houses did little to strengthen African economies, and as competition grew more fierce, European trading monopolies backed by their governments fought even harder to cut out all the African intermediaries and their European competitors. This growing European trading competition played a major role in the European "scramble for Africa" in the 1870s and 1880s (Azevedo, 1993:103-110).

a

Exploration

It is ironic that people continue to credit European explorers of the nineteenth century with the " d i s c o v e r y " of rivers, waterfalls, and such in A f r i c a when it is obvious that A f r i c a n s living there already knew these things existed. Obviously, discovery simply meant that a European had verified in writing the existence of something long known to others. With the exception of the Portuguese and perhaps a few A f r i k a a n s speaking people, the systematic exploration of Africa between the Limpopo River and the Sahara Desert by Europeans can be dated to M u n g o Park's first expedition to the Niger in 1795. By 1885, crossings of the continent from east to west had been thoroughly documented, the extent of the Sahara was known to the European and North American public, and the m a j o r rivers in A f r i c a had been followed and mapped by Europeans. To most Africans, though, this was of little importance, and most African rulers by the latter part of the nineteenth century were ceasing to w e l c o m e wandering white men. These rulers had begun to fear the outside influence and rivalry that might weaken their control over trade or, as in the case of the Afro-Arab slave traders in central and eastern Africa, bring it to an end. M u n g o Park, for example, traveled up the Gambia River in 1795 to determine if it was linked to the Niger River, which appeared on some maps of the period as rising near Lake Chad and flowing west to the Atlantic. He did find the Niger and determined that it flowed eastward, not westward, thereby disproving the Gambia-Niger connection. Since he was then unable to follow the river to its mouth, he returned in 1805 bent on proving that the Niger actually was the Congo River. He died on this expedition, and only in 1830 did Richard Lander demonstrate that the Niger flows into the Gulf of Guinea. In the first half of the nineteenth century, other explorers like René Caillé, Hugh Clapperton, and Heinrich Barth traversed the western parts of Africa recording information that might be of interest to the governments, scientific groups, and missionary organizations that sponsored them. Not until the second half of the century were the sporadic efforts of Portuguese and Arab explorers penetrating equatorial Africa really taken up by Europeans. The first of these explorers, I presume, was the most f a m o u s of all, David Livingstone.

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Livingstone was sent to Africa by the London Missionary Society. He arrived in Cape Town, South Africa, in 1841 and then traveled north. He roamed the interior for years, reaching the O k a v a n g o s w a m p and delta complex in Botswana in 1849, crossing Angola to L u a n d a in 1854, and reaching Victoria Falls in 1855. In 1858, he traveled up the Zambezi from its mouth and then turned north up the Shire River to Lake Malawi. His death south of Lake Bangweulu in 1873 inspired a great deal of European interest in this part of Africa, especially because of the writings of Henry Morton Stanley, who had " f o u n d " Livingstone in 1871. For the majority of people in Europe and North America, the exploits of these explorers meant little more than excitement and drama set on an exotic stage. For small minorities, the diaries of these explorers and those of others, such as Richard Burton and John Speke w h o sought the source of the Nile, did much to arouse their interest. Church groups and members of missionary societies were interested in "saving" the Africans. Also interested were the new monied classes spawned by the Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America. T h e s e entrepreneurs and investors urged their respective governments to act in their behalf to establish control of the "newly f o u n d " riches and regions (Shillington, 1995:294-300).

African Americans in Africa During the 1800s, as European expansion into Africa increased, many former African slaves and their descendants were reestablishing ties with their African homeland in western Africa. While most attention has been paid to the activities of whites in Africa, attention should also be given to the role of African Americans as missionaries, explorers, settlers, and political opponents of colonialism. Many ex-slaves from the Americas and some w h o never reached the Americas returned to Africa. For example, ex-slaves from Brazil began arriving in what are now Nigeria, Benin, and Togo in the 1840s. They became active in commerce and the skilled trades and, by the 1880s, dominated the inland trade from the French post in Dahomey (now Benin). The Brazilian architectural styles they brought with them can still be seen in some older homes in western Nigeria. In Freetown, Sierra Leone, Africans freed from slavery by British antislavery patrols were released. They were joined by A f r i c a n Americans returning from Jamaica and British North America. These Africans of many origins eventually f o r m e d a mixed African-Western " K r i o " (Creole) culture. They too specialized in trade both along the coast and into the interior. Many people of Yoruba ancestry returning f r o m Brazil moved to Lagos and Badagry in western Nigeria. When the British annexed Lagos in 1861, Krios b e c a m e officials in the new colony (Bohannan and Curtin, 1 9 9 5 : 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 ) . Liberia was another

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r e f u g e for people of African ancestry, in this case from the United States. In 1822, the American Colonization Society transported freed slaves from the Carolinas to Monrovia, named after then-president James Monroe. Alexander Crummell, a leading nineteenth-century African American intellectual, migrated to Liberia in the 1850s, and Bishop H. M. Turner was one of the leading black advocates of immigration to Africa for African Americans at the turn of the century. All along the Guinea coast—especially in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and L i b e r i a — A f r i c a n s and African Americans joined the Christian missionary effort. Many were Krios f r o m Sierra Leone or Nigeria. A f r i c a n American missionaries also met with considerable success in other parts of western Africa, Congo, and as far as South Africa. A f r i c a n Americans helped to explore the continent. Notably, the National Emigration Convention of Colored Men sent out an all-black exploring party headed by Martin Delany, a physician, to explore the Niger valley f r o m the coast shortly before the American Civil War ( O h a e g b u l a m , 1993:219-231). The combined activities of African Americans and Westernized Africans were, in fact, slowly transforming many areas of Africa before European conquest and rule were imposed. As Bohannan and Curtin point out, many progressive changes that had been occurring in A f r i c a during the 1800s were reversed during the colonial period. With the colonial period, E u r o p e a n s reasserted their authority over the m i s s i o n a r y m o v e m e n t . E u r o p e a n s r e p l a c e d m o s t of the A f r i c a n s w h o h a d h e l d h i g h p o s t s in g o v e r n m e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s , a n d t h e l i k e . T h e A f r i c a n m i d d l e c l a s s of t r a d e r s in S e n e g a l , S i e r r a L e o n e , L i b e r i a , a n d e l s e w h e r e f o u n d it i n c r e a s i n g l y h a r d to c o m p e t e w i t h l a r g e E u r o p e a n f i r m s in the e x p o r t t r a d e to E u r o p e , t h o u g h A f r i c a n s c o n t i n u e d to fill the r o l e of m i d d l e m e n b e t w e e n the A f r i c a n p r o d u c e r s a n d the E u r o p e a n f i r m s . In the c o l o n i a l s e t t i n g , W e s t e r n i m p a c t i n c r e a s e d i m m e n s e l y , but w i t h A f r i c a n s p l a y i n g a d i m i n i s h e d role as r e s p o n s i b l e p a r t i c i p a n t s in the p r o c e s s . ( B o h a n n a n and C u r t i n , 1 9 9 5 : 2 1 8 )

Finally, the role of African Americans in the anticolonial struggle should be mentioned. The "back to A f r i c a " movement in the United States in the early 1800s later spawned the idea that all people of A f r i c a n descent should unite to promote their c o m m o n interests and fight racism. The panAfrican movement in the late 1800s and early 1900s protested the abuses and racism affecting Africans in such areas as Rhodesia and South Africa. While lacking the power to change colonialism, the m o v e m e n t was useful because it publicized alternative perspectives on colonialism to the people of the world. African A m e r i c a n s influential in the p a n - A f r i c a n m o v e m e n t included the West Indian, and later Liberian, diplomat E d w a r d Wilmot Blyden and Jamaican-born Marcus Moziah Garvey. In 1914 in New York,

The Historical Context

47

Garvey founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association, whose influence was widespread in Africa. Perhaps the most famous m e m b e r of the p a n - A f r i c a n m o v e m e n t was W. E. B. Du Bois, w h o was a f o u n d e r of the National Association for the A d v a n c e m e n t of Colored People ( N A A C P ) . Du B o i s ' s ideas on p a n - A f r i c a n i s m influenced many A f r i c a n s , including U.S.-educated K w a m e Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana. A great student of African history, Du Bois became a citizen of Ghana and was buried in Accra (Ohaegbulam, 1993:226-232).

f

Conquest and Resistance

Aided by missionaries who appealed to their h o m e g o v e r n m e n t s for various degrees of political or military "protection," by explorers w h o touted the riches to be found in the interior of A f r i c a if only the local inhabitants could be "pacified," and by the owners of trading companies who wanted to eliminate competition, the political and military support for the takeover of Africa was not difficult to find in most European countries by the last decades of the nineteenth century. By 1884, at the Berlin Conference, the leaders of most European states came together and agreed on ground rules for dividing up Africa. Unfortunately, the political boundaries they drew on their largely inaccurate m a p s cut apart ethnic groups, kingdoms, and historically linked regions in ways that continue to cause conflicts in Africa today (Freund, 1998:73-90). The push of the British, French, German, and other European powers into Africa in the last quarter of the nineteenth century required considerable effort. A good majority of the people of Africa, whether living in states or small-scale lineage-based societies, opposed European occupation through force of arms or nonviolently (Freund, 1998:91-96). Well-organized, if poorly armed, Muslim armies filled with a spirit of jihad resisted British advances in Sudan, and the full subjugation of the region was not completed until the late 1890s. In western Africa, Ahmadu Seku, the leader of the Tukolor state, and the Maninka leader, Samory Toure, fought the French into the 1890s. Rabih, a Muslim leader from the upper Nile, resisted French expansion in what are today Chad and the Central African Republic until 1900 (O'Toole, 1986:18-20). Dahomey, a kingdom in present-day Benin, was not conquered by Europeans until 1894. And even then the French were able to do it only with the help of Senegalese troops. Leaders of numerous groups in the forests of Cote d ' l v o i r e resisted the French for twenty years. The British had to invade the Asante in Ghana in 1874 and 1895-1896 and again in 1900 before they could establish the Gold Coast colony. In Nigeria, the British had to launch major offensives to defeat the various peoples: Ilorin in Yorubaland held out until 1897 as did the oba, or leader, of Benin City; and the Sokoto caliphate was not completely overcome until 1903. In Uganda, the Bunyoro

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used guerrilla w a r f a r e against the B r i t i s h until 1 8 9 8 ; S w a h i l i s p e a k e r s on the c o a s t o f K e n y a s u c c e s s f u l l y resisted the B r i t i s h for most o f 1 8 9 5 and 1 8 9 6 ; Nandi and o t h e r K e n y a n p e o p l e s fought the B r i t i s h well into the 1900s (Shillington,

1995:313-316).

F a r t h e r south in N y a s a l a n d ( M a l a w i ) , Y a o , C h e w a , and Nguni f o r c e s f o u g h t the B r i t i s h in the 1 8 9 0 s ; the G a z a e m p i r e and the B a r w e k i n g d o m fought the Portuguese in M o z a m b i q u e ; and the N a m a resisted the G e r m a n s in S o u t h - W e s t A f r i c a ( N a m i b i a ) . A s is demonstrated in C h a p t e r 13, S o u t h A f r i c a n groups resisted the imposition o f British control as well. E v e n after the c o l o n i a l r e g i m e s seemed to have been well e s t a b l i s h e d , attempts to r e a s s e r t i n d e p e n d e n c e b r o k e out throughout A f r i c a . In the 1 8 9 0 s , the S h o n a and N d e b e l e rose up against the B r i t i s h in S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a ( Z i m b a b w e ) , the p e o p l e o f T a n g a n y i k a ( T a n z a n i a ) f o u g h t the G e r m a n s in the M a j i M a j i r e s i s t a n c e in 1 9 0 5 - 1 9 0 6 , and the H e r e r o and N a m a p e o p l e s l a u n c h e d open warfare against the G e r m a n s in S o u t h - W e s t A f r i c a in 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 0 7 . T h r o u g h o u t c o l o n i a l A f r i c a , t h e s e and o t h e r strugg l e s , such as the K o n g o War in the present-day Central A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c (then part o f F r e n c h E q u a t o r i a l A f r i c a ) , c o n t i n u e d as late as the ( O ' T o o l e , 1 9 8 4 : 3 2 9 - 3 4 4 ; Freund,

1930s

1998:140-142).

In the end, though, the superior military technology, logistic and organ i z a t i o n a l skills, and r e s o u r c e s o f the E u r o p e a n s won out. All t o o o f t e n , A f r i c a n leaders found that their inability to unite various ethnic groups and f a c t i o n s against their c o m m o n E u r o p e a n e n e m i e s led to defeat. M o s t o f A f r i c a north o f the L i m p o p o R i v e r fell under European rule b e t w e e n 1 8 8 0 and 1 9 0 5 .

•

THE COLONIAL PERIOD

fe Colonial Rule T h e two m a j o r European powers to establish colonial systems in A f r i c a were Britain and F r a n c e . A f t e r World War I, the limited amount o f G e r m a n territory in A f r i c a was r e d i s t r i b u t e d , in most c a s e s to F r a n c e or B r i t a i n , w h i l e the B e l g i a n s and P o r t u g u e s e m a i n t a i n e d s m a l l e r areas under t h e i r n o m i n a l c o n t r o l . W h e r e v e r and w h e n e v e r c o l o n i a l rule was e s t a b l i s h e d , it was essentially a paternalistic, bureaucratic dictatorship. Yet, given the vast a r e a s o c c u p i e d and the variety o f A f r i c a n c o m m u n i t i e s e n c o u n t e r e d , the c o l o n i a l i s t s were f o r c e d to r e c o g n i z e or to c r e a t e a c l a s s o f i n t e r m e d i a r i e s to assist them. S o m e w h a t o v e r s i m p l i f i e d , c o l o n i a l p o l i c i e s c a n be divided into direct and indirect rule, with the B r i t i s h portrayed as i n d i r e c t rulers and the F r e n c h as direct rulers ( S h i l l i n g t o n , 1 9 9 5 : 3 5 4 - 3 5 7 ) . C o l o n i a l rule f r o m the standpoint o f c o l o n i a l e c o n o m i c interests in d i f f e r e n t r e g i o n s o f A f r i c a is discussed in other chapters.

The Historical

Context

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T h e British, in particular, were often convinced that ruling through "traditional tribal" authorities was the most efficient way to govern and to extract whatever revenue possible. This indirect rule policy, theoretically, interfered as little as possible so that A f r i c a n s could advance along "their own lines." In reality, even in northern Nigeria, one place where this form of colonialism c a m e quite close to working, the traditional authorities could o f t e n use their positions to extort substantial incomes, though their f r e e d o m to rule was very circumscribed. They often faced resistance f r o m their own subjects. And any traditional ruler not acceptable to the colonial p o w e r w a s deposed and replaced by British appointees w h o were more amenable to the colonial regime. T h e British tried to use indirect rule in several other places by reintroducing m o n a r c h y to Benin (in southern Nigeria), by restoring the Asantehene in central G h a n a (Gold Coast), and by attempting to reestablish the O y o e m p i r e a m o n g the Yoruba in Nigeria. They also were instrumental in maintaining m o n a r c h i e s in Swaziland, Lesotho, Uganda, and Barotseland in what was then Northern Rhodesia. T h e French were relatively disinterested in indirect rule, though they too utilized the old ruling classes when it seemed a d v a n t a g e o u s . The French typically established administrative units that cut across traditional boundaries, created a transethnic elite, and used the French language at all levels of administration. At its extreme, French policy held that all A f r i cans were to be completely assimilated and made equal citizens of France. More o f t e n , the highly centralized French administration maintained the necessity of deliberately creating an African elite who would accept French standards and then become "associated" with French rulers in the work of governing the colonies. T h e authors of Belgian policy, like the French and the Portuguese, never displayed a great interest in indirect rule. Initially, the Belgians ruled through private companies, which were responsible for areas of administration. This was changed to direct rule by the 1910s because of the gross abuses c o m m i t t e d by the c o m p a n i e s against the local people under their control. The Belgians, unlike the French, deliberately limited African education to the primary levels and geared it entirely to semiskilled occupational training. Rather ironically, local political realities, coupled with a lack of f i n a n c e for developed systems of bureaucratic control, meant that the French, Belgians, and Portuguese were often forced to rule through traditional elites in ways little different from the British. Overall, the French colonies were as despotically ruled as any, but they did have the anomaly of the quatre communes, the f o u r towns of Senegal—Dakar, Saint Louis, Gorée, and R u f i s q u e — w h e r e all locally born residents had the legal rights of French citizenship f r o m the time of the French Revolution and were represented, after 1848, in the French chamber of deputies. Likewise, f r o m 1910 to 1926, the P o r t u g u e s e allowed a

Thomas

50

O'Toole

few Portuguese-speaking A f r i c a n Catholics from Angola, M o z a m b i q u e , and Guinea-Bissau to be represented in the Portuguese parliament. The major differences in colonial policies were regionally based rather than based on the particular colonial power that controlled the land. In most of western Africa, both the French and British refused to allocate land to European settlers or companies, since local suppliers produced enough materials for trade. By contrast, in parts of British East and Central Africa, as well as in French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo, land was taken from Africans and sold to European settlers and companies to ensure sufficient production for export. This difference caused a number of grave political problems in the nationalist era (Freund, 1998:97-144, 217-232).

s£

Toward Independence

As is noted in other chapters, Africans became increasingly involved in the world economy during the colonial period. For the seventy-plus years that countries of Europe held both political and economic control in Africa, the economies of African countries were shaped to the advantage of the colonizers. Cash crops such as coffee, rubber, peanuts, and cocoa were grown for European markets. Mining also increased during colonial times. Most cash crop economies benefited European owners of large plantations rather than African farmers, and almost all mines produced for European companies. In both the French- and the British-ruled areas of Africa, Westerneducated African elites were active participants in some form of local government from the early decades of the twentieth century. In the 1920s, reform m o v e m e n t s developed in British West Africa, which, apart f r o m South Africa, were probably the earliest nationalist m o v e m e n t s in Africa (unless one includes Liberia and Ethiopia, where European colonial rule was never fully established). These movements, like those led earlier by such men as J. E. Casely H a y f o r d and John Mensah Sarbah in the Gold Coast and Samuel Lewis in Sierra Leone, originated among urban, highly Westernized populations in the cities of the coast and were directed primarily at abuses of the rights of these elites caused by the colonial system. Nowhere before World War II did the idea of actual political independence f r o m colonial rule gather m u c h m o m e n t u m (Bohannan and Curtin, 1995: 240-250). World War II, though, helped to raise African political consciousness. African soldiers fought in most of the same areas as their European masters. In cooperation with Charles de Gaulle and his "Free French," French West A f r i c a n s and French Equatorial A f r i c a n s joined in the fight against Nazi racialism. During the war the Atlantic Charter was proclaimed, and in 1945 the United Nations was created. The ideas therein contributed to the new visions of the right to f r e e d o m from colonial rule that Africans began

The Historical

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51

to voice. After the war, national political parties took hold all over Africa. Initially, the strongest parties to emerge were those in West Africa, where no large European settler class blocked demands. From 1945 to 1960, African nationalist parties under men such as K w a m e Nkrumah, Sékou Touré, N n a m d i Azikiwe, Léopold Senghor, and Félix H o u p h o u ë t - B o i g n y developed m a s s support, won local elections, and pressured for more political rights and ultimately for independence (Freund, 1998:167-203). In 1957, Ghana became the first black African nation to become independent in the twentieth century. From the capital, Accra, Ghana's first president, K w a m e N k r u m a h ( 1 9 0 9 - 1 9 7 2 ) , set about creating a nation from the former British colony of Gold Coast. He was faced with a cocoa monoculture export economy and Asante nationalism dating back to the resistance against British imperialism by the Asantehene Prempeh I in the nineteenth century. N k r u m a h ' s advocacy of pan-African unity was never sufficient to overcome the influences of competing nationalisms and economic dependency that worked against unity (Shillington, 1995:374-377). In eastern Africa, the presence of European settlers made the struggle for independence even more difficult. In Kenya, colonized by the British between 1895 and 1963, a peaceful evolution to independence was ruled out by white settler opposition. Waiyaki Wa Hinga, a Gikuyu leader, initially w e l c o m e d Europeans and even entered into "blood b r o t h e r h o o d " with one early colonial administrator in 1890. Waiyaki was killed in 1892 by officials of the Imperial East African Company when he objected to the building of an unsanctioned fort in his area. Harry Thuku, Kenya's pioneer nationalist, also tried peaceful means to resist British colonialism. C o n cerned with improving the economic lot of Africans, he founded in 1921 a broad-based organization known as the East African Association. Advocating civil disobedience as a political weapon, he was arrested for disturbing the peace in February 1922. His arrest led to riots and the deaths of several Africans (Freund, 1998:145). I n d e p e n d e n c e for most settler colonies was won only through armed struggle. Like the Algerians, who fought a bitter eight-year freedom struggle against the French, Kenyans too found it necessary to resort to arms to achieve independence. The national liberation struggle in Kenya, called Mau Mau by the British, began in the late 1940s and was most strongly supported by the Gikuyu. J o m o Kenyatta (a London-educated anthropologist married to a white E n g l i s h w o m a n ) was imprisoned by the British between 1953 and 1961 as the alleged brains behind the m o v e m e n t , though the actual fighting was done by such "forest f i g h t e r s " as Dedan Kimathi, who was captured and executed in 1957. During the struggle, as many as 10,000 Africans (mostly Gikuyu) were killed. A growing sense of national unity against the British resulted from this conflict, and the British finally granted independence to Kenya in 1963 (Shillington, 1995:387-389).

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A m o n g the last African nations to achieve independence north of the Limpopo were the former colonies of Portugal: Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. After more than two decades of armed struggle, independence for the three colonies came quickly when the Portuguese government was overthrown by a military coup in 1974. Faced with South A f r i c a n - and U.S.-backed guerrilla oppositions, the people of Angola have never found a peace settlement possible. M o z a m b i q u e also faced armed opposition financed by South A f r i c a n and ultraconservative groups f r o m the United States well into the 1990s (Freund, 1998:231-234). Both Z i m b a b w e and Namibia achieved black majority rule even later. T h e people of A f r i c a n ancestry in Z i m b a b w e defeated the white settler government after a long liberation war, and Zimbabwe became an internationally recognized independent state in 1980. With the support of the United Nations, N a m i b i a achieved its i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m South A f r i c a n control in 1990 after a protracted armed struggle. In 1994, A f r i c a ' s last "colony," South A f r i c a , finally attained black majority rule after Nelson Mandela was elected president in the country's first racially inclusive democratic elections (Freund, 1998:234-236). Independence did not usher in a golden era. In almost all countries, the bright hopes of democracy soon degenerated into authoritarianism. Throughout the continent, economic decline is almost universal, and population, health, and environmental problems persist. These and other issues are discussed in the chapters that follow. Virtually all of A f r i c a ' s postcolonial "nation-states" began their existence with arbitrarily drawn borders. From their origins, little more than a century ago, as conquest dictatorships, few African countries have achieved long-lasting popular legitimacy. The past does not determine the future, and I have always questioned the utility of simply blaming the widespread anarchy in Africa on colonialism. In fact, the present widespread " w a r l o r d " conditions in Africa may well represent a global f u t u r e rather than a historical h a n g o v e r in Africa. As the nationstate gives way to global entrepreneurs w h o have no allegiance to any institutions beyond their own interests, more countries in the world may become pawns in global power games. In this case, ex Africa semper ali quid novi (out of A f r i c a always something new) may be that the collapse of weak nation-states in A f r i c a represents a f o r e s h a d o w i n g of the future of much of the rest of the world. Yet, while the present appears bleak in many respects, most historians of A f r i c a are wise e n o u g h to avoid hazarding too many predictions about the future. As Coquery-Vidrovitch stated so well: In twenty years every aspect that defines Africa today will have undergone an alteration that cannot be foretold by our present means of analysis. The pessimism undeniably called for in the short term, then, cannot validly be extended to the longer term. (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1988:318)

The Historical

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Context

53

CONCLUSION

A f r i c a n history in the first d e c a d e of the t w e n t i e t h - f i r s t century is quite d i f f e r e n t f r o m what it was w h e n A f r i c a n studies was e x p a n d i n g rapidly in the early 1960s. It is no longer necessary to prove that Africans have histories. The racist and antihistorical synthesis that Africa was "disc o v e r e d " by or " s a v e d " by E u r o p e , though still reflected in m u c h socalled c o m m o n knowledge, has been eliminated as an acceptable view by most respectable scholars of A f r i c a . P r o f e s s i o n a l historians have written h u n d r e d s of works about virtually every part of the c o n t i n e n t . T h e r e are specific studies of individual African nations; regional introductory histories of eastern, western, central, and southern Africa; and general histories of the whole continent. In this chapter I have discussed four basic concept-centered goals that I have developed through my teaching, reading, and writing on the broad subject of African history. The first goal is to enhance the long time span and wide geographical area involved in African history. T h e second is to increase understanding of the great diversity of A f r i c a ' s past. The third is to m a k e clear that both change and continuity have been integral parts of the h u m a n experience in A f r i c a . T h e fourth goal I have sought to weave into this chapter is a heightened awareness that all events of history have more than one cause and that the interwoven h a p p e n i n g s that produce a given outcome are the result of complex chains of events. You, as students of Africa, ought personally to pursue a fifth goal—not explicitly focused on in this chapter—as you read the other chapters in this text. That goal is to sharpen your awareness of the role A f r i c a has played in world history. To deal with today's global realities, a marriage between the past and the present is needed. On the one hand, one needs to be introduced to h u m a n i t y ' s collective memory, a large part of which flows f r o m Africa. On the other hand, one needs to be sensitized to the current world. People must realize that what happens in Africa is linked to what happens to them, wherever they may live, and vice versa. As was true 300,000 years ago, everyone on earth shares a c o m m o n humanity as m e m b e r s of one race—the human race. And, while only a few of us were actually born in Africa, our destinies are still linked.

•

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alpers. Edward. 1975. Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa. London: Heinemann. Azevedo, Mario. 1993. "European Exploration and Conquest." Pp. 1 0 3 - 1 1 6 in Mario Azevedo (ed.). Africana Studies. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Bah, M. Alpha. 1993. "Legitimate Trade, Diplomacy, and the Slave Trade." Pp. 6 5 - 8 5 in Mario A z e v e d o (ed.). Africana Studies. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

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B o h a n n a n , Paul, and Philip Curtin. 1995. Africa and Africans, 4th ed. P r o s p e c t Heights, IL: Waveland Press. C o n n a h , G r a h a m . 1987. African Civilizations. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press. Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. 1988. Africa: Endurance and Change South of the Sahara. Translated by David Maisel. Berkeley: University of California Press. . 1997. African Women. Translated by Beth Gillian Raps. Boulder: Westview Press. F r e u n d , Bill. 1998. The Making of Contemporary Africa, 2d ed. Boulder: L y n n e Rienner Publishers. Hakem, A. 1980. "La civilisation de Napata et de Meroé." Pp. 3 1 5 - 3 4 6 in G. Mokhtar (ed.). Histoire Générale de l'Afrique II. Paris: U N E S C O (Jeune Afrique). H y d e n , G o r a n . 1980. Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry. L o n d o n : H e i n e m a n n . Iliffe, John. 1995. Africans: The History of a Continent. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press. Izard, M. 1984. "The Peoples and K i n g d o m s of the Niger Bend and the Volta Basin f r o m the 12th to the 16th Century." Pp. 2 1 1 - 2 3 7 in D. T. Niane (ed.). General History of Africa. Vol. 4. London: Heinemann. Ki-Zerbo, J. 1990. General History of Africa. Vol. 1, Methodology and African Prehistory. Berkeley: University of California Press. L a m p h e a r , John, and Toyin Falola. 1995. " A s p e c t s of Early A f r i c a n H i s t o r y . " Pp. 7 3 - 9 6 in Phyllis M. Martin and Patrick O ' M e a r a (eds.). Africa, 3d ed. B l o o m ington: Indiana University Press. L a n g e , D. 1984. " T h e K i n g d o m s and Peoples of C h a d . " Pp. 2 3 8 - 2 6 5 in D. T. Niane (ed.). General History of Africa. Vol. 4. London: Heinemann. Leclant, J. 1980. " L ' e m p i r e de K o u s h : Napata et M e r o é . " Pp. 2 9 5 - 3 1 4 in G. M o k h t a r (ed.). Histoire Générale de l'Afrique II. Paris: U N E S C O (Jeune Afrique). Lee, Richard G. 1993. The Dobe Jul'hoansi. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers. Mair, Lucy. 1974. African Societies. Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press. Manning, Patrick. 1990. Slavery and African Life. Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press. M c C a n n , J a m e s C. 1999. Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land. Portsmouth, N H : Heinemann. Meirs, S u z a n n e , and Igor K o p y t o f f (eds.). 1977. Slavery in Africa. M a d i s o n : University of Wisconsin Press. O h a e g b u l a m , F. U g b o a j a . 1993. " C o n t i n e n t a l A f r i c a n s and A f r i c a n s in A m e r i c a . " Pp. 2 1 9 - 2 4 0 in Mario A z e v e d o (ed.). Africana Studies. Durham, N C : Carolina A c a d e m i c Press. O m e r - C o o p e r , J. B. 1994. History of Southern Africa, 2d ed. P o r t s m o u t h , N H : Heinemann. O ' T o o l e , T h o m a s . 1984. " T h e 1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 1 G b a y a Insurrection in U b a n g u i - S h a r i : Messianic M o v e m e n t or Village Self D e f e n s e ? " Canadian Journal of African Studies 1 8 : 3 2 9 - 3 4 4 . . 1986. The Central African Republic: The Continent's Hidden Heart. Boulder: Westview Press. Schick, Kathy D. 1995. "Prehistoric Africa." Pp. 4 9 - 7 2 in Phyllis M. Martin and Patrick O ' M e a r a (eds.). Africa, 3d ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Shillington, Kevin. 1995. History of Africa, rev. ed. N e w York: St. M a r t i n ' s Press. T u r n b u l l , Colin. 1983. The Mbuti Pygmies: Change and Adaptation. N e w York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. (ed.). 1973. Africa and Change. New York: Alfred A. K n o p f .

African Politics Donald L. Gordon

O

n A u g u s t 12, 1 9 9 8 , t h e s o o n t o b e p r e s i d e n t o f S o u t h A f r i c a , T h a b o Mbeki, delivered a speech that would challenge African politicians

a n d politics at the d a w n of the t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y . An ill wind has blown me across the face of Africa. I have seen the poverty of Orlando East and the wealth of Morningside in Johannesburg. In Lusaka (Zambia) I have seen the poor of K a n y a m a t o w n s h i p and the prosperous residents of Kabulonga. I have seen the slums of Sirulere in Lagos (Nigeria) and the Opulence of Victoria Island. I have seen the faces of the poor in Mbare in Harare (Zimbabwe) and the quiet wealth of Borrowdale. And I have heard the stories of how those w h o had access to power, or access to those w h o had access to power, of how they have robbed and pillaged and broken all laws and all ethical norms to acquire wealth. It is out of this p u n g e n t m i x t u r e of g r e e d , d e h u m a n i z i n g poverty, o b s c e n e wealth, and e n d e m i c public and private corrupt practice, that m a n y of A f r i c a ' s coups d'état, civil wars, and situations of instability are born and entrenched. Surely there must be politicians and business people, youth and w o m e n activists, trade unionists, religious leaders, artists and professionals f r o m the C a p e to Cairo, f r o m M a d a g a s c a r to C a p e Verde who are sufficiently enraged by A f r i c a ' s condition in the world to join the mass crusade for A f r i c a ' s renewal. It is to these that we say, without equivocation, that to be a true A f r i c a n is to be a rebel in the c a u s e of the A f r i c a n R e naissance, whose success in the new century and the millennium is one of the greatest challenges of our time, (le Pere and van Nieuwkerk, 1999:205) T h e " i l l w i n d " b l o w i n g at t h e e n d o f t h e l a s t d e c a d e of t h e t w e n t i e t h

c e n t u r y c o n t r a s t s s h a r p l y w i t h t h e " w i n d s of p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e " t h a t s w e p t t h r o u g h A f r i c a at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e 1 9 9 0 s . B e c a u s e t h e n , a f t e r m o r e t h a n t h i r t y y e a r s o f p r e d o m i n a n t l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n r u l e , a p e r i o d of m a s s i v e p o l i t i cal r e f o r m virtually e x p l o d e d across the continent, c h a n g i n g the political

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landscape and electrifying the imagination of the African people. Beginning with Benin in 1989 and gathering m o m e n t u m throughout the early 1990s, A f r i c a n citizens m o v e d to challenge autocratic rule. Motivated by stifling, deteriorating economies, and domestic revolutions in the f o r m e r Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (among other circumstances), A f r i c a n s d e m a n d e d multiparty political systems, expanded civil liberties, accountable political officials, and f r e e elections. In a wide variety of countries across the continent, existing regimes allowed opposition parties to f o r m and open national elections to take place. By the end of 1997, only four of the forty-eight states in sub-Saharan Africa had not held a competitive, multiparty national election (Diamond, 1999:xi). Indeed, " A f r i c a in the early 1990s appeared poised to join fully the apparent ' w a v e ' of democratization sweeping the globe" (Villalón, 1998:1). The extent of the political transformation is marked by the fact that by 1994 not a single de jure (created by law) one-party state remained on the continent (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:8). Yet by the middle of the 1990s, this wave had crested (Bratton, 1999:18). And as the twentieth century came to an end, the promises of immediate and sustained democratization were ended for many A f r i c a n countries as powerful incumbents armed with superior resources moved to regain control of African states. As Leonardo Villalón points out, In c o u n t r y a f t e r c o u n t r y e f f o r t s to r e s t r u c t u r e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m s a l o n g d e m o c r a t i c lines q u i c k l y f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s e n t a n g l e d in p o w e r s t r u g g l e s as inc u m b e n t e l i t e s s t r u g g l e d to p r e s e r v e w h a t t h e y c o u l d of t h e i r p r i v i l e g e s . E v e n in t h o s e c a s e s w h e r e a u t o c r a t i c i n c u m b e n t s w e r e d i s l o d g e d in t h e initial w a v e of c h a n g e , e n s u i n g s t r u g g l e s d e m o n s t r a t e d c l e a r l y that t h e r e w a s little c o n s e n s u s o n h o w p o w e r s h o u l d be d i s t r i b u t e d or on the d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s c o n t e s t i n g it. D e m o c r a c y w a s n o t to c o m e e a s i l y in Africa. (Villalón, 1998:1)

For many who study Africa, the beginning of the 1990s— marked by moves toward political liberalization, reform, and apparent democratization and the energy, euphoria, and hope that accompanied t h e m — w e r e highly reminiscent of the anticolonial struggle and the early days of independence f r o m colonial rule. For then as in the early 1990s, there were expectations of immediate and substantial changes not only in the political systems but also in the daily lives of A f r i c a n s . The transfer of p o w e r to A f r i c a n decisionmakers was expected to end political repression and allow the perceived wealth of the former colony, siphoned off to Europe, to bring quick relief and instant economic progress to African professionals, businesspeople, artisans, and the huge ranks of the poor. However, this j o y o u s anticipation that marked the late 1950s and early 1960s soon disappeared as the new leadership grappled with the sobering aftermath of colonial rule.

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O v e r t i m e , m o r e than f i f t y i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a n states e m e r g e d . T h e variety of g o v e r n m e n t s t r u c t u r e s and r e g i m e s virtually c o v e r e d the s c o p e of possibilities. By the 1980s in Africa, one could find m o n a r c h i e s and dictatorships, military regimes and civilian governments, revolutionary systems and d e m o c r a c i e s , populist administrations, and authoritarian m o d e s of rule ( C h a z a n et al., 1988:3—4). Yet, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the diversity of structures, v a r i a t i o n s in political style, and p r o f e s s e d ideological d i f f e r e n c e s ( f r o m M a r x i s m to capitalism), the political evolution of A f r i c a n states since indep e n d e n c e was characterized by patterns that were strikingly similar. W i t h s o m e e x c e p t i o n s , A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y authoritarian. This trend was m a r k e d by the concentration of p o w e r in single political parties and, in m a n y cases, in personal rule by the national president. Centralization of p o w e r was a c c o m p a n i e d by the elimination of c o m petitive elections, greater reliance on administrative b u r e a u c r a c i e s , and intolerance of dissent. T h e s e systems of rule were o f t e n unstable and subject to c o u p s d ' é t a t . Stable or unstable, most were also characterized by inefficiency, m i s m a n a g e m e n t , and corruption. H o w a n d w h y did all of this d e v e l o p ? W h y w e r e m o s t A f r i c a n states u n a b l e to sustain d e m o c r a t i c , m u l t i p a r t y political s y s t e m s ? W h a t c o n s e q u e n c e s has this had on A f r i c a ' s p e o p l e and on e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t ? T h e s e are s o m e of the c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n s to be e x a m i n e d in this chapter. A n d as I will d e m o n s t r a t e , the structures and p r o b l e m s of A f r i c a n societies h a v e not only been s h a p e d by the s y s t e m s of politics that h a v e e v o l v e d , but they, in turn, h a v e also been s h a p i n g the c h a n g e s in the politics of A f r i c a that w e are n o w o b s e r v i n g . B e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g , h o w e v e r , readers need to be a w a r e of what this chapter does not discuss as well as what it does. First, my remarks are of necessity relatively abstract and general, as it is a difficult task to synthesize given the variation and complexity of A f r i c a ' s many countries. Moreover, although an attempt has been m a d e to e x a m i n e and link together the most important p r o c e s s e s and trends, significant issues are inevitably b o u n d to be left out or to be insufficiently detailed. Perhaps the most important issue I h a v e not discussed in m o r e length is the role of foreign political and econ o m i c interests in s h a p i n g — o r m i s s h a p i n g — A f r i c a n political r e g i m e s and processes since independence. While foreign governments have regularly intervened to topple or support A f r i c a n rulers or to i n f l u e n c e their policies, I have chosen to focus on A f r i c a n s as political actors rather than as p a w n s of, say, superpower politics, multinational corporations, or Western development agencies. I h a v e also largely omitted A f r i c a n s ' political dealings both with each other, through such organizations as the Organization of African Unity ( O A U ) , and with the international c o m m u n i t y outside A f r i c a . T h e r e a d e r should refer to Chapter 6 for a discussion of these topics. In sum, this chapter is an introduction to A f r i c a n politics rather than an exhaustive survey.

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THE IMPACT OF COLONIALISM

It is surprising to many students that most of Africa was under European control for less than a century and that the Berlin C o n f e r e n c e of 1 8 8 4 - 1 8 8 5 , which initiated the European scramble for Africa, took place just over 100 years ago. Yet, in that relatively short period massive changes took place on the continent that not only established the immediate context for African politics but also continue to constrain and shape its future. To begin, the political m a p inherited by the new states of A f r i c a was based largely on the expedient economic and political strategies of imperial Europe. S u p e r i m p o s e d over the continent were highly divergent and artificial geographical f o r m s and the distortion of traditional social and e c o n o m i c patterns. For one, the physical map of Africa contrasts such sprawling giants as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Algeria with the ministates of Djibouti and Gambia (see Map 2.6). Diminutive, Gambia (4,127 square miles) could fit into Sudan more than 240 times! Substantial diversity was and is also apparent in population sizes. Nigeria, now estimated at over 120 million people, and Equatorial Guinea, with only 443,000, provide extreme examples (World Bank, 2001:278, 316; Sullivan, 1989). With the creation of these artificial boundaries, cohesive social groups were separated, and logical and well-established trading areas were divided. Geographical units were developed that were landlocked or contained few if any resources or enveloped existing diverse and highly competitive cultural and political systems. As a result of these and other circumstances, the political m a p inherited at independence created huge d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g the various African countries in their potentials for nation-building, economic development, and stability. While the colonial economic history of Africa and its c o n t e m p o r a r y impact is complex and variegated, European strategies and actions during the period were generally quite similar. African colonies were made politically and economically subordinate to European needs. The recently industrialized states of Europe, particularly Britain and France, required cheap raw materials and desired captive markets for manufactured goods. Over time, these governments integrated their African colonies into what many call the "international capitalist system." African territories supplied inexpensively produced agricultural commodities such as palm oil, rubber, and cotton, and such minerals and metals as copper and gold to the industries of Europe. Manufactured textiles, household goods, and farm implements sold to Africans at high profit completed the integrated economic system. But there were differences as well as similarities in the forms colonialism took to extract A f r i c a ' s wealth. Samir Amin ( 1 9 7 2 : 5 0 3 - 5 2 1 ) argues that regional differences in colonial political and economic policies were determined by the nature of exploitable resources.

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F o r i n s t a n c e , in the coastal t e r r i t o r i e s of F r e n c h a n d British West A f r i c a , A m i n ' s " A f r i c a of the c o l o n i a l t r a d e e c o n o m y , " the c o l o n i a l state a t t e m p t e d to pay for itself and to satisfy the n e e d s of E u r o p e a n industry by p r o m o t i n g cash cropping a m o n g the i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n . In Senegal, the I v o r y C o a s t ( C o t e d ' l v o i r e ) , the G o l d C o a s t ( G h a n a ) , and N i g e r i a , m a n y t r a d i t i o n a l s u b s i s t e n c e f a r m e r s ( g r o w i n g f o o d c r o p s f o r their o w n use) s w i t c h e d to p r o d u c i n g such export c r o p s as p a l m oil, rubber, cotton, cocoa, and peanuts. A m i n ' s " A f r i c a of the labor r e s e r v e s " d e s c r i b e s such colonial territories as M a l a w i , M o z a m b i q u e , and U p p e r Volta ( B u r k i n a Faso), w h i c h h a d f e w easily t a p p e d material r e s o u r c e s or h a d limited p o t e n t i a l f o r p e a s a n t or s e t t l e r - p r o d u c e d agricultural e x p o r t s . A s a r e s u l t , t h e s e c o l o n i e s r a t h e r q u i c k l y b e c a m e reservoirs of labor m i g r a n t s , primarily for the m i n e s of the Belgian C o n g o (Democratic Republic of C o n g o , or D R C ) , Northern R h o d e sia (Zambia), and South Africa, and f o r the white settler plantations of sections of Kenya, Tanganyika (Tanzania), and Southern Rhodesia ( Z i m b a b w e ) . T h e f o r m e r French colonies of G a b o n , C o n g o , and the Central A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c and the Belgian C o n g o ( n o w the D R C ) are l a b e l e d by A m i n as " A f r i c a of the c o n c e s s i o n - o w n i n g c o m p a n i e s . " E n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n s t r a i n t s a n d low p o p u l a t i o n densities that p r o h i b i t e d p r o f i t a b l e c a s h c r o p p i n g p r o m p t e d t r a n s f e r of most of these areas to c o n c e s s i o n a r y c o m p a n i e s . Exploitation of available resources in the c o n c e s s i o n areas w a s characterized by low i n v e s t m e n t and brutality. A fourth m a c r o r e g i o n , " w h i t e settler A f r i c a " (parts of K e n y a , Tanganyika until 1918, and Southern and Northern Rhodesia), was, like western Africa, characterized by colonial concentration on the production of agricultural exports. Aided by colonial authorities, Europeans quickly expropriated m o s t of the r e g i o n ' s fertile land, d i s p l a c i n g traditional A f r i c a n f a r m i n g g r o u p s such as the Gikuyu in K e n y a , the C h a g g a in T a n g a n y i k a , and the S h o n a in S o u t h e r n Rhodesia. Peasant f a r m e r s w e r e either legally shut off f r o m growing most cash crops as in K e n y a or deprived of suitable land. N o matter what specialized impact colonial e c o n o m i c decisions had on particular geographical areas, the p r o f i t - c e n t e r e d activities of E u r o p e a n industrial and c o m m e r c i a l firms, settlers, and supportive colonial administrators clearly disregarded African d e v e l o p m e n t . In n o case, even a f t e r World War II, w h e n the pressures of w o r l d o p i n i o n and d e c o l o n i z a t i o n w e r e heavy, did E u r o p e a n colonizers invest in c o g e n t , rational p r o g r a m s of dev e l o p m e n t d e s i g n e d to m a k e A f r i c a n states s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . W i t h o u t j o i n i n g the d e b a t e a b o u t w h e t h e r E u r o p e a c t u a l l y " u n d e r d e v e l o p e d " A f r i c a , it is o b v i o u s that colonial policies w o r k e d to h a n d i c a p i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a ' s economic future. O n departure, colonial administrations left A f r i c a with w e a k , malinteg r a t e d , s e v e r e l y distorted e c o n o m i e s . T h e s e realities and o t h e r s p l a c e d

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most of A f r i c a into a multifaceted and tenacious dependency relationship with more economically advanced states. T h e decisions, strategies, and even sovereignty of emergent Africa would be contingent on foreign markets, industry, finance, and expertise. (A m o r e detailed discussion of the impact of colonial economic policy on Africa is found in Chapter 5.) It is important to note that the end of colonial rule by the British and French was accomplished with almost the same speed that had characterized its initial imposition. The achievement of independence by G h a n a in 1957 and Guinea in 1958 came quickly and was for many observers unexpected (Liebenow, 1986:21). With very few exceptions, British, French, and Belgian colonies had been granted independence by 1966, over twenty between 1960 and 1964. Independence, therefore, was not the culmination of a long process of preparation in which the end was long known and the means carefully developed. A m o n g the colonizing powers, only the British and French made attempts to bequeath to A f r i c a n s the administrative and executive skills requisite for governing the new states (Hodder-Williams, 1984:84). Furthermore, decisions allowing Africans the possibility of more participation in voting for legislative councils with relatively significant power came almost entirely after 1950 (Hayward, 1987:7). Within this context, the democratic governmental models d e v e l o p e d by the French and British for their colonies were essentially alien structures hastily superimposed over the deeply ingrained political legacies of imperial rule. The real political inheritances of African states at independence were the authoritarian structures of the colonial state, an accompanying political culture, and an environment of politically relevant circumstances tied heavily to the nature of colonial rule. Imperial rule f r o m the beginning expropriated political power. U n c o n c e r n e d with the needs and wishes of the indigenous population, the colonial powers created governing apparatuses primarily intended to control the territorial population, to implement exploitation of natural resources, and to maintain themselves and the European population. For all European colonizers—British, French, Belgian, Portuguese, German, Spanish, and Italian—power was vested in a colonial state that was, in essence, a centralized hierarchical bureaucracy. Specifically, colonial rule was highly authoritarian and backed by police forces and colonial troops. Under this circumstance, power did not rest in the legitimacy of public c o n f i d e n c e and acceptance. There was no doubt where power lay; it lay firmly with the political authorities. Long-term experience with the colonial state also shaped the nature of ideas bequeathed at independence. Future A f r i c a n leaders, continuously exposed to the milieu of authoritarian control, were accustomed to government justified on the basis of force. The idea that government was above self-interested political activity (which only served to subvert the public's welfare) was communicated by colonial administrators. As a result, notions

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that authoritarianism was an appropriate mode of rule were part of the colonial political legacy (Kasfir, 1983:34). Furthermore, at independence the politics of the new states would be shaped by at least four heavily influential societal circumstances either set in motion or amplified by colonial political decisions. First, virtually all colonial territories experienced growing inequalities between social classes as both the actions of and the location of colonial administrations created opportunities for some and obstacles for others. Second, in most colonies, particularly those under the British model of "indirect" rule through socalled tribal rulers, heightened identification with and competition between ethnic groups took place. (See the comparison of direct and indirect rule in Chapter 3.) This "tribalism" would especially mark the politics of the early independence period. Third, the context of postcolonial politics in many new states would include dramatic shifts of population from rural areas to the primary administrative city. Finally, as a result of discriminatory colonial educational policies that provided little money for or access to education for most Africans until after World War II, African countries entered independence ill-equipped to staff either the agencies of government or private business and development organizations. (For the best accounts of the colonial state in Africa see Young, 1994; 2000:23-39).

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NATIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE

For most African states freedom from colonial rule has come only within the last forty years. For some, it is far more recent. The former Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique achieved independence in 1974-1975, the former French colony of Djibouti in 1977, and Zimbabwe in 1980. After years of illegal subjugation by South Africa, Namibia became independent in 1990. And while not a colony, South Africa attained majority black rule only in 1994. African states are thus very young. The nature of the imperial response to African nationalism and the way in which power was eventually transferred to Africans influenced the ideological orientations, political practices, and economic possibilities of the new African states. Especially important here is whether the transfer of power came as a result of peaceful confrontation or whether independence was achieved only after a violent armed struggle. Our understanding of contemporary African politics requires us to look, if only briefly, at nationalism in Africa and at the politics of the independence period. To begin, the term nationalism widely applied to African struggles for independence is somewhat misleading. The term was borrowed from European history, where it referred to nineteenth-century political movements in

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Independence rally in Luanda, Angola.

which people with a c o m m o n culture, language, and historical tradition claimed the right of self-determination. As B o h a n n a n and Curtin (1995: 2 4 0 - 2 4 2 ) f u r t h e r state, " E u r o p e a n s began with the nation which then wanted to b e c o m e an independent state. The A f r i c a n s had states—the existing colonial units through which the Europeans ruled—and they wanted i n d e p e n d e n c e for the units so that they could b e c o m e nations." Yet, it is important to note that, at least initially, very few A f r i c a n s pushing for aut o n o m y f r o m the European colonizers thought in terms of building a nation. T h e struggle that would b e c o m e k n o w n as A f r i c a n nationalism was essentially an anticolonial struggle, and its intensity was a reflection in large part of the degree of colonial impact on groups and individuals. Anticolonial feelings, criticism of, and actions against imperial rule were present in Africa from the very beginnings of colonialism. Where European e c o n o m i c and political penetration was d e e p e s t — t h e white settler areas and mining centers of eastern and southern Africa—worker-initiated petitions, strikes, and m i n o r sabotage began in the early 1900s. For the most part, however, these work actions were localized attempts to protest low wages, hard work, and harsh discipline. T h e y were not part of a nationalist independence movement (Tangri, 1985:4-9). In nonsettler A f r i c a , especially in the British territories of western A f r i c a , objections to colonial rule were primarily articulated by a small core of educated and professional Africans kept f r o m good jobs and access

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to political p o w e r by the racially d i s c r i m i n a t o r y practices of colonial rule. In f a c t , until w h a t F r e u n d ( 1 9 8 4 : 1 9 1 ) r e f e r s to as the " s e c o n d o c c u p a t i o n of A f r i c a , " b e g i n n i n g m a i n l y a f t e r World W a r II, m o s t o b j e c t i o n s and actions against colonial rule were attempts to r e f o r m the system, to open it to participation by A f r i c a n s . T h e great m a s s e s of A f r i c a n s , mostly e n g a g e d in s u b s i s t e n c e a g r i c u l t u r e and r e l a t i v e l y u n a f f e c t e d by c o l o n i a l authority, were virtually u n i n v o l v e d in anticolonial activity. T h e end of the Great D e p r e s s i o n and World War II m a r k e d the beginning of a period of rapid c h a n g e and intense p r e s s u r e on A f r i c a . U n a b l e to p r o v i d e f o r their industrial and f o o d r e q u i r e m e n t s b e c a u s e of the war, Eur o p e a n s turned to their colonial h o l d i n g s . At w a r ' s e n d , and even m o r e so by the late 1940s, f o o d c r o p and c a s h c r o p a g r i c u l t u r e w o u l d be d r a m a t i cally increased; roads, bridges, railways, and ports w o u l d be i m p r o v e d and e x p a n d e d ; and large n u m b e r s of additional b u r e a u c r a t s w o u l d be a d d e d to the rolls of A f r i c a n colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . T h e s e e x t r a o r d i n a r y c h a n g e s in A f r i c a n s o c i e t y set the stage f o r e x p a n d e d a n t i c o l o n i a l activity. T h e c h a n g e s greatly i n f l u e n c e d the c r e a t i o n of n e w g r o u p s and c l a s s e s a m o n g A f r i c a n s and h e l p e d s h a p e the c o n d i t i o n s , o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and relationships f r o m w h i c h the new nationalist l e a d e r s h i p e m e r g e d . I n c r e a s e d colonial activity in A f r i c a after World War II took place in a c h a n g e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a n d a m o n g the c h a n g i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s of a g r o w i n g n u m b e r of A f r i c a n s . A substantial n u m b e r of A f r i c a n soldiers f r o m such British and French c o l o n i e s as S e n e g a l , the Gold Coast, K e n y a , and the R h o d e s i a s h a d f o u g h t in the war. T h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s in battle a n d k n o w l e d g e of J a p a n e s e s u c c e s s e s against Western f o r c e s in the A s i a n theater c h a l l e n g e d ideas of white superiority. T h e w a r itself had been j u s t i f i e d on the g r o u n d s of r e j e c t i o n of racial superiority and the rights of national i n d e p e n d e n c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , m a n y A f r i c a n s were a w a r e of the new United Nations Charter, which a d v o c a t e d political s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Within this a t m o s p h e r e of new expectations, E u r o p e a n colonial a d m i n istrators b e g a n to p u s h n e w rules and r e g u l a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y into rural areas of A f r i c a . In eastern A f r i c a , particularly, a series of n e w r e g u l a t i o n s i m p o s i n g Western-oriented agricultural m e t h o d s were f o r c e d on rural f a r m ers and cattle herders. Ostensibly i m p o s e d to protect resources, these alien m e a s u r e s , such as c o n t o u r p l o w i n g and cattle d e s t o c k i n g , w e r e o f t e n coercively e n f o r c e d . T h o u g h less a f f e c t e d , w e s t e r n , c e n t r a l , a n d s o u t h e r n A f r i c a n f a r m e r s were subject to new agricultural orders that p r o v o k e d cons i d e r a b l e d i s c o n t e n t . In the G o l d C o a s t ( G h a n a ) , the " s w o l l e n shoot p r o g r a m " required the cutting of h u g e n u m b e r s of c o c o a trees. In the Belgian and P o r t u g u e s e colonies, f o r c e d c r o p production and resettlement of f a r m ers took place. T h e s e and other n e w colonial o p e r a t i o n s c a u s e d m a s s rural discontent across m u c h of s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a (Tangri, 1985:18). T h i s w a t e r s h e d period i m m e d i a t e l y after World War II m a r k e d the beginning of true African nationalism. T h e nature and pace of political activity

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was dramatically transformed. A n t i c o l o n i a l activity f o c u s e d on i n f l u e n c i n g p o l i c i e s within the c o l o n i a l system rapidly b e c a m e e f f o r t s aimed at political liberation. T h e prewar a s s o c i a t i o n s o f A f r i c a n elites (owners o f small b u s i n e s s e s , p h y s i c i a n s , l a w y e r s , and other p r o f e s s i o n a l s in West A f r i c a , t e a c h e r s and c l e r k s in E a s t A f r i c a ) were limited in size and s c o p e . C o m p o s e d m a i n l y o f W e s t e r n - e d u c a t e d " n o t a b l e s " with s o m e a c c e s s to c o l o n i a l

authorities,

these groups were m a i n l y c o n f i n e d to urban administrative centers such as L a g o s ( N i g e r i a ) , A c c r a ( G h a n a ) , and N a i r o b i ( K e n y a ) . T h e i r central c o n c e r n s were the c o m m o n interests o f a relatively privileged minority. N e w and m o r e militant groups were f o r m e d by y o u n g e r activists f r o m a m o n g what M a r x i s t a n a l y s t s refer to as the " p e t t y b o u r g e o i s i e " — t r a d e r s , farmers, and low-level civil servants. Stimulated by the enthusiasm o f those in the n e w m o v e m e n t s , m a n y o f the old prewar elite a s s o c i a t i o n s w e r e t h e m s e l v e s transformed into nationalist organizations (Tangri, 1 9 8 5 : 1 5 - 1 7 ) . T h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f b o u r g e o i s i e (the e l i t e s ) and petty

bourgeoisie

groups was central to the eventual attainment o f independence. T o b e c o m e formidable opponents o f c o l o n i a l rule, e m b r y o n i c elite-led nationalist organizations had to tie t h e m s e l v e s to the rural (and increasingly urban) m a s s e s o f A f r i c a n s . A s R o g e r T a n g r i ( 1 9 8 5 : 1 8 ) i n d i c a t e s , a litany o f c o m p l a i n t s was tapped by the nationalist p o l i t i c i a n s . T h e s e included not only the disgust o f s u b s i s t e n c e and c a s h c r o p f a r m e r s o v e r o n e r o u s n e w agricultural rules but a l s o w o r k e r unrest, c o m p l a i n t s against c o l o n i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on small b u s i n e s s e s and c o o p e r a t i v e s , a n t i - p o l l tax agitation, and the general revulsion over the white m a n ' s racist b e h a v i o r and racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . It must be noted that in very few instances were nationalist groups part o f a unified and highly integrated m o v e m e n t . In fact, in most c o l o n i e s the A f r i c a n nationalist c a m p a i g n was a relatively loose linking o f "different ele m e n t s r e p r e s e n t i n g s o m e t i m e s interrelated, but often d i v e r s e , e c o n o m i c , ethnic, and regional interests temporarily united in a struggle for independ e n c e " (Tordoff, 1 9 8 4 : 5 3 ) . D u r i n g the late 1 9 4 0 s and early to m i d d l e 1 9 5 0 s , a s e r i e s o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s led the F r e n c h and B r i t i s h to c o n s i d e r and then b e g i n the p r o c e s s o f d e c o l o n i z a t i o n . T h e d e c a d e o f the 1 9 5 0 s saw substantial shifts in c o l o nial p o l i c i e s o v e r m u c h o f the continent. A m o n g other f a c t o r s , rising c o s t s o f administering the territories, pressure f r o m the United Nations, and the growth o f nationalism influenced p o l i c y m a k e r s , e s p e c i a l l y in F r a n c e , E n g land, and B e l g i u m . In 1 9 5 6 , the F r e n c h granted independence to the North A f r i c a n territories o f M o r o c c o and T u n i s i a and instituted the L o i - C a d r e for c o l o n i e s in sub-Saharan A f r i c a . T h e L o i - C a d r e allowed for d o m e s t i c autono m y but not i n d e p e n d e n c e . In 1 9 5 7 , the B r i t i s h granted i n d e p e n d e n c e to the G o l d C o a s t ; and by 1 9 5 9 , a l o n g with the B e l g i a n s , they had a c c e p t e d the i m m i n e n c e o f A f r i c a n self-rule for all territories ( Y o u n g , 1 9 8 8 a : 5 2 - 5 3 ) .

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As colonial authorities began to allow consultative forums and Africanelected councils to form before independence, many of the nationalist organizations placed emphasis on e x p a n d i n g their influence. Many, if not most, b e c a m e full-fledged political parties bent on mobilizing mass support and promoting agitational politics. "As independence neared, demonstration of numerical strength became indispensable to validate the claims of a nationalist party to succeed to p o w e r " (Young, 1988b:516). It should be noted that the ideas, characteristics, and activities of politicians leading the nationalist organizations would have a significant impact on the nature of A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s after independence. Their position in the social and e c o n o m i c hierarchy, the m e t h o d s used to recruit support, and indeed the personal goals of A f r i c a ' s new nationalist leadership would all set patterns for future political activity. Remember that only a few Africans lived outside the bounds of poverty and material deprivation during the colonial period. Although most of the nationalist leaders, especially in West Africa, were educated and somewhat better off than the masses, they were poor compared to low-level European administrators and settlers. Many were low-salaried teachers or clerical e m p l o y e e s of the colonial government or foreign business. Others were small-time traders, contractors, or shopkeepers. Given these circumstances, a significant number of the new leaders from this economic class hoped to convert their leadership positions into social and economic gain. C o m m o n among these were, as Wolpe (1974:118) says, " m e n on the m a k e , " their political activities motivated by freedom from colonial domination and the desire f o r individual mobility. Those that rose to the top were usually charismatic, fluent speakers with organizational skills. After independence, many nationalist leaders, recognizing that political office was the only vehicle available to escape poverty, would not easily relinquish such powerful positions (see Kasfir, 1987; Tangri, 1985). Political parties and individual politicians recognized that mass protest and wide support would not only hasten independence but also work to secure political advantage or even to ratify leadership positions at independence. Securing mass support in the circumstances African nationalists faced was not easy. Lack of money, poor communications facilities, transportation problems, and widely spread populations were obvious obstacles. Partly as a result, but more so because of familiarity and social access, politicians appealed for support from individuals and groups from their home villages and regions and from their ethnic groups. (Perhaps the best discussion of political parties in the nationalist period is found in Hodgkin, 1957.) The networks of political affiliation that resulted would have at least two important consequences f o r the postindependence period. For one thing, in most of A f r i c a this pattern of political recruitment and support worked to create political parties along "natural" lines of social cleavage.

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Perhaps the most blatant e x a m p l e of this pattern was Nigeria, where the three main parties were sharply divided along ethnic and regional lines: the Northern P e o p l e ' s C o n g r e s s ( N P C ) in the predominantly Hausa-Fulani north, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons ( N C N C ) in the heavily Ibo east, and the Action G r o u p in the mainly Yoruba west (Diam o n d , 1 9 8 8 : 3 3 - 3 9 ) . A second result of this f o r m of " l i n k a g e " d e v e l o p e d during the preindependence period. Promises of material aid to supporters for their backing or for votes created the basis for patronage relationships after independence. Called "patron-client n e t w o r k s " by social scientists, these political webs would b e c o m e the m a j o r form of political interaction for many African countries in the postcolonial era.

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THE TRANSFER OF POWER

W h e n the British, French, and Belgians decided to relinquish power to their African colonies, they did so with deliberate speed. In part, the rapidity of transition reflected practical difficulties of control. Riots in the Gold Coast (Ghana) in 1948, the Mau M a u rebellion in Kenya in the early 1950s, and a b r e a k d o w n of law and order in Nyasaland (Malawi) in the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s were strong hints to the British that containing nationalism would be very expensive. For the French, the defeat at Dien Bien Phu (in Vietnam) in 1954, the failure at Suez in 1956, and the Algerian rebellion were most influential (Hodder-Williams, 1984:78-79). Many observers, however, point to more politically advantageous reasons for the colonial p o w e r s ' quick exit. T h e main goal was to retain as much political and especially economic control as possible. Rapid decolonization lowered the level of conflict between the colonial rulers and nationalist leaders. By creating a basically smooth transition to independence (especially in West Africa), the British and French prevented the creation of radicalized political leaders and the formation of segregated, militant, and broadly based nationalist organizations. While not having complete f r e e d o m during the transfer period, the imperial powers were the dominant actors (Hodder-Williams, 1984:80-83). Essentially, they maneuvered to exclude elements of the nationalist m o v e m e n t s perceived to be dangerous and to aid those leaders and parties friendlier to European economic interests (see Freund, 1 9 8 4 : 2 0 2 - 2 2 4 ; Tangri, 1 9 8 5 : 2 0 - 2 3 ) . One e x a m p l e is Cameroon, where the French essentially eliminated the Union des Populations Camerounaises (UPC), a radical m o v e m e n t that played a leading role in the Cameroonian nationalist struggle. The politicians who eventually inherited power in Cameroon were moderate and conservative leaders whose roles in the struggle were insignificant (Joseph, 1977:2-3). This strategy of a quick transition coupled with active promotion of moderate nationalist leaders had generally favorable results for the British and French. Influenced heavily by their own class and personal goals, most

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nationalist leaders endorsed the legitimacy of private property and other tenets of capitalism. As a consequence, in most countries the economic interests of the European powers were largely preserved (see Young, 1988b: 5 3 - 5 5 ; Tangri, 1985:23). In contrast, during the 1960s and early 1970s, Portuguese refusal to grant independence to Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique led to armed revolt. A protracted liberation struggle provoked mass mobilization of farmers and urban workers. A revolutionary consciousness evolved that rejected most elements of Portuguese colonialism, including the capitalist economy. In addition, mass involvement of destitute populations in F R E L I M O (Frente de Liberta?ao de Mo9ambique) and the M P L A (Movimento Popular de Liberta?ao de Angola) presented obstacles to leaders bent on personal gain through entrepreneurial activity (Saul, 1975:330; Tangri, 1985:24). For the first wave of African countries to receive independence, a final legacy of colonial rule was bequeathed at independence—formal structures of democratic rule. British colonies received negotiated variations of the basic Westminster parliamentary type of g o v e r n m e n t in which a prime minister is chosen from elected members of parliament and in which executive and legislative powers are fused. The French model was a presidentcentered form in which the legislative and executive branches are separate. Both instituted a democratic election process, political parties, separate judiciaries, and protection for citizens' rights. The first period of decolonization, roughly 1 9 5 7 - 1 9 6 9 , which saw more than thirty new African states obtain sovereignty, came at the end of more than a decade of rising commodity prices. In the words of Crawford Young (1988a:56), "The extraordinary prosperity of the 1950s contributed heavily to [a] mood of optimism and good feeling. . . . T h e metropolitan states looked forward to fruitful continuing partnerships with their erstwhile a p p e n d a g e s and turned over the keys to the k i n g d o m in a veritable orgy of self-celebration."

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INDEPENDENCE

The early days of f r e e d o m f r o m colonial rule were charged with excitement and full of hope. The immediately obvious burdens of racist imperial rule were gone. New flags flew over g o v e r n m e n t offices, A f r i c a n s rather than Europeans held political control, and the world recognized the new states as sovereign. Yet, the excitement of i n d e p e n d e n c e m a s k e d an enormous set of problems the leadership had to confront promptly. From the beginning, internal conflict plagued the parties that assumed leadership at independence. The anticolonial organizations that the nationalist movements comprised differed along ethnic, regional, and ideological lines. At independence, with the overarching bond of opposition to colonial oppression weakened or removed, intraparty and interparty conflicts emerged. One

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divisive issue was access to positions of power in the government and ruling political party. Offices in government (whether at the national or local level) meant access to influencing decisions, to power over resources, and to personal profit (Tangri, 1985:28-33). T h e anticolonialist leaders w h o became the national leaders in the elections of the decolonization period faced a fragile national unity. T h e geographical areas ruled by the colonizers were superimposed over diverse cultures, language groups, political entities, and trading areas. During the colonial period, little attempt was made to integrate or unify peoples within the colonies. Rather, as a method of control, ethnic groups were often pitted against each other. T h e reality of African life, heavily oriented toward subsistence f a r m ing and tied to the land, was that most Africans identified primarily with their village and clan and secondarily to a "tribal" or ethnic group. At independence subnational loyalties were far more important than the new state, f o r which there were no national traditions, no national symbols, and no national consciousness. While A f r i c a n s did not necessarily identify with the new state or its leadership, their expectations about what should come f r o m the end of colonialism were high. They wanted education f o r their children, hospitals and health care, drinkable water, farm-to-market roads, better prices for their crops, and an instantly better life. No matter what policy orientations the new leadership pursued, all faced bleak economic circumstances and little available capital. Most of the new states had an underdeveloped industrial structure, if any at all. Almost all states would depend on the sale of one or a very limited number of export commodities to make up their treasury. But many of the new states had few natural resources. And all were in an economically dependent relationship with Europe and the industrial countries (Ake, 1981:90-114). In addition to this environment of meager economic resources, external vulnerability, high demands and expectations, and a political arena in flux, the new governments were shackled with inexperience. "Localization," the placing of Africans into civil service clerical positions, increased (rapidly in parts of nonsettler West Africa) immediately prior to independence. Yet, in areas of technical expertise (accounting, engineering, health), on which the new states would heavily depend, the colonial powers had provided Africans with little training. Furthermore, "the new leaders themselves had earned the ir positions as a result of their ability to organize and capitalize upon colonial protest. They had little, if any, experience in governing even a small area, let alone an entire country" (Chazan et al., 1999:42-44).

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THE CENTRALIZATION OF STATE POWER

F r o m the outset, the leadership of most new states f e l t — a n d indeed were—politically insecure. With some exceptions (such as Tanzania), most

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of the new g o v e r n m e n t s h a d only a thin b a s e of s u p p o r t a f t e r the unraveling of the a n t i c o l o n i a l a l l i a n c e s left t h o s e in p o w e r with l i m i t e d b a c k i n g ( o f t e n of only their o w n ethnic g r o u p s and regions). A n y e x p a n s i o n of support would have to c o m e f r o m a quick and m e a n i n g f u l response to the high e x p e c t a t i o n s and d e e p social and e c o n o m i c n e e d s of the p o p u l a t i o n . T h e f a c t is that m o s t states s i m p l y did not h a v e the r e v e n u e s to m e e t social n e e d s . W h i l e m o s t c o m m o d i t y prices r e m a i n e d relatively high during the early i n d e p e n d e n c e period, the e n o r m o u s neglect of A f r i c a n s during the c o l o n i a l era w o u l d r e q u i r e d e c a d e s f o r s u b s t a n t i a l i m p r o v e m e n t . E x t r e m e poverty and the high e x p e c t a t i o n s of most A f r i c a n s led to e n o r m o u s d e m a n d s on the leadership. F o r m e d or heavily e x p a n d e d d u r i n g the o p e n n e s s of the w a n i n g colonial period, o r g a n i z e d interest g r o u p s (especially trade unions, rural c o o p e r a t i v e s , and s t u d e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s ) b e c a m e i n c r e a s i n g l y v o c a l and insistent on g o v e r n m e n t help and action. In m a n y countries, d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and strikes a m o n g an increasing n u m b e r of associational g r o u p s soon f o l l o w e d . In reality, m a n y of the n e w g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e f o r c e d to s p e n d m u c h of their time, energy, and m o n e y on simply m a i n t a i n i n g order ( C h a z a n et al., 1999:46^*7). Most threatening to the n e w state rulers d u r i n g the early i n d e p e n d e n c e period were organizations b a s e d on the m o b i l i z a t i o n of regional, religious, g e n e r a t i o n a l , c l a s s , a n d ( e s p e c i a l l y ) e t h n i c interests. D u r i n g the c o l o n i a l period, e c o n o m i c and social d i s p a r i t i e s w e r e c r e a t e d in a variety of w a y s . People living close to colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centers, E u r o p e a n m e r c a n t i l e centers or plantations, or s h i p p i n g and port facilities h a d o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r w a g e labor or l o w - l e v e l p u b l i c or p r i v a t e clerical p o s i t i o n s or as lowranked foot soldiers in the colonial military. C l o s e p r o x i m i t y and e m p l o y ment also led to facility in E u r o p e a n languages. For some, especially a f t e r World War II, it led to e d u c a t i o n in g o v e r n m e n t - or m i s s i o n - s p o n s o r e d schools. S u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s not only c r e a t e d an e m b r y o n i c political elite with t r e m e n d o u s a d v a n t a g e s to gain o f f i c e at i n d e p e n d e n c e but also left most other individuals and g r o u p s d i s a d v a n t a g e d . W h a t e v e r g r o u p or coalition of a n t i c o l o n i a l g r o u p s a t t a i n e d p o w e r at i n d e p e n d e n c e , e i t h e r as a d o m i n a t i n g single party such as the T a n g a n y i k a A f r i c a n National U n i o n or a w i n n i n g party a m o n g several c o n t e n d e r s , w i n n e r s and losers w e r e created. Debilitating p o v e r t y and the u n d e r s t a n d i n g that the only m e c h a n i s m f o r e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p e r s o n a l gain w a s the state itself h a d p r o m p t e d the p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of e t h n i c i t y d u r i n g the p r e i n d e p e n d e n c e election period. T h e rapidly f o r m i n g structures of p o w e r a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e , in which the a s c e n d a n t l e a d e r s h i p w a s easily i d e n t i f i a b l e by g r o u p and reg i o n , w e r e p e r c e i v e d g e n e r a l l y to b r i n g instant e c o n o m i c a n d political p o w e r for particular ethnic g r o u p s . At the same time, those g r o u p s not represented in the l e a d e r s h i p g r o u p or on its p e r i p h e r y felt i m m e n s e l y threatened with the loss of " t h e i r " share of the g o v e r n m e n t pie. S u c h c o n d i t i o n s caused t u m u l t u o u s political activity. G r o u p s j o c k e y e d for p o w e r within the

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ruling party, and often new parties were formed representing specific ethnic or regional interests (see Rothchild, 1981; Horowitz, 1985). Under the circumstances, the choices confronting the governing elites were limited. They could use their positions to strengthen themselves politically, or they could operate within the colonially positioned democratic political structures and risk electoral defeat. No matter what motivations prevailed a m o n g the political elites of the continent—personal greed or selfless nationalism or some combination—there was no option. With few exceptions, the independence leadership quickly moved to consolidate power and expand political control. Across the continent, the early years of independence witnessed a strikingly similar transformation of inherited governmental and political structures. Concentration of political power and control was achieved primarily through (1) limiting or eliminating opposition and (2) expanding the bureaucratic agencies and the security (military and police) organizations, which passed to the new leadership at independence. (The works of Zolberg, 1966; Wunsch and O l o w u , 1990; and Chazan et al., 1999:46-54 are particularly instructive.) A variety of justifications for centralizing state power was offered by African independence leaders. Fundamentally, most leaders believed that a strong central government was essential to national unity and economic development. If political competition along the ethnic, regional, and religious (in areas of heavy Islamic concentration) fault lines of society were not eliminated, the resulting antagonisms would "shred the precious fabric of national accord" (Young, 1988b:495). Wunsch and Olowu (1990:44) point to other influential factors in the movement toward centralization: 1. It was part of the colonial legacy of an administrative state. 2. Outside development consultants from both Western countries and the Eastern bloc were heavily emphasizing central direction and long-term planning. 3. It complemented the expectation of potential donor agencies for "rational" planning and management of assistance programs. 4. It provided a possible solution for the very real challenges African leaders faced. T h e m a n n e r in which opponents to regimes lost power and access to government involved a variety of actions and mechanisms, with regimes differing on the emphasis and degree of restrictiveness. At the outset, the main targets of government moves to eliminate political competition were rival political parties. Some states, such as Guinea and Ghana, simply declared local political parties illegal and contrary to the national interest; others (e.g., Cameroon) made it virtually impossible for opposition parties to exist. In Uganda, Angola, and Mozambique, coercive force was used to eliminate opposition parties. In any event, as Astride Zolberg's (1966:66— 76) classic work Creating Political Order points out:

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1. C o m p e t i n g political p a r t i e s w e r e e l i m i n a t e d a n d the g o v e r n ment party f o r t i f i e d . 2. Political o p p o n e n t s w e r e c o - o p t e d (drawn in by various inducem e n t s ) , i n t i m i d a t e d , d e t a i n e d , or o t h e r w i s e e l i m i n a t e d (impriso n m e n t , exile, or, m u c h m o r e rarely, m u r d e r ) . 3. Electoral s y s t e m s w e r e m o d i f i e d to m a k e c o m p e t i t i o n unlikely or i m p o s s i b l e . 4. C o n s t i t u t i o n s w e r e c h a n g e d to g i v e w i d e a u t h o r i t y to restrict the p o w e r of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a s s e m b l i e s , including national parliaments and provincial and local a s s e m b l i e s . By the late 1960s, thus, the m o s t c o m m o n political organization of the n e w states was the single-party state. Arguably, only B o t s w a n a and G a m b i a were true multiparty exceptions. But transformation of the democratic political structures b e q u e a t h e d by E u r o p e a n political p o w e r s involved considerably m o r e than the s y s t e m a t i c d i s m a n t l i n g of institutions of representation a n d interest e x p r e s s i o n — o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , p a r l i a m e n t s , p r o v i n c i a l a n d state a s s e m b l i e s , and local district and city councils. M o t i v a t e d by the desire f o r m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e political control, f o r r e g i m e security, and f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c i e s , r u l i n g g r o u p s m o v e d hastily to f o r t i f y three m a i n structures of g o v e r n m e n t : a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b u r e a u c r a c i e s , the military and police, and the e x e c u t i v e . B u i l d i n g on the legacy of e f f e c tive colonial bureaucracies and security forces (passed on virtually intact in m a n y i n s t a n c e s a n d c o n t a i n i n g the m a i n r e s e r v o i r of skilled p e r s o n n e l in all A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s ) , the n e w r e g i m e s e x p a n d e d b o t h the size and f u n c tion of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e n c i e s ( C h a z a n et al., 1 9 9 9 : 5 4 - 5 8 ) . W h i l e the n u m b e r and size of a l m o s t all a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o d i e s i n c r e a s e d d u r i n g the i m m e d i a t e p o s t i n d e p e n d e n c e y e a r s , the m o s t d r a m a t i c increases were created in the ministries of e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g , transportation, e d u c a t i o n , and social s e r v i c e s , e s p e c i a l l y the latter t w o . G r e a t l y e x p a n d e d t o o w e r e g o v e r n m e n t b u r e a u c r a c i e s and parastatals (relatively a u t o n o m o u s , s t a t e - o w n e d c o r p o r a t i o n s ) i n v o l v e d in b u y i n g a n d m a r k e t i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l and m i n e r a l c o m m o d i t i e s , p r o d u c i n g b e e r and cigarettes, and controlling railroads, airlines, and electric power. K e p t s m a l l and u n d e r h e a v y E u r o p e a n c o n t r o l (all o f f i c e r s and m a n y n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d o f f i c e r s w e r e E u r o p e a n ) d u r i n g the c o l o n i a l p e r i o d , the p o l i c e and e s p e c i a l l y the m i l i t a r y w e r e e x p a n d e d . In N i g e r i a , K e n y a , U g a n d a , S u d a n , and the D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c of C o n g o (until r e c e n t l y Z a i r e ) , w h e r e p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g r e g i o n a l or e t h n i c interests e i t h e r chall e n g e d the g o v e r n m e n t or w e r e p e r c e i v e d to be an i m m e d i a t e threat to the r e g i m e , the g r o w t h of c o e r c i v e e l e m e n t s was most rapid. P e r h a p s m o s t important in the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n and a u g m e n t a t i o n of administrative institutions was the concentration of legitimate authority in the executive. Virtually all new states in the first decolonization w a v e were left with m e c h a n i s m s to limit, disperse, or check executive power. Yet, beginning

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in the early p o s t i n d e p e n d e n c e period, strong executiv/e presidencies (supported by the creation of single-party states and the preemption of regional and local politics by bureaucracies) began to displace all independent legislative authority (Wunsch and O l o w u , 1990:55-56). By the late 1960s, in governments such as Malawi, Cameroon, Mali, Tanzania, Togo, Zaire, and Zambia, presidential decree had replaced meaningful legislative debate. T h e relative ease with which early p o s t i n d e p e n d e n c e A f r i c a n leaders consolidated power through shutting off avenues of access to government, gutting representative bodies, and extending the hold on society of the administrative branches came as a surprise to many Western observers. A f t e r all, in the 1950s E u r o p e a n s had e x p a n d e d social services to A f r i c a n s ; opened the lower branches of colonial g o v e r n m e n t to A f r i c a n clerks; allowed trade unions, political parties, and other associations to flourish; and " g i v e n " the gift of d e m o c r a c y to A f r i c a n s . Critics b l a m e d ( a m o n g other

MMHNMI

A l t h o u g h Z i m b a b w e is not officially a single-party state, t h e ruling party, ZANU-PF, w h o s e h e a d q u a r t e r s are pictured here, has virtually m o n o p o l i z e d p o w e r under President R o b e r t M u g a b e since i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1980.

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things) the "intelligence of A f r i c a n s " and the "incomplete job of 'Europeanization' of A f r i c a n s . " Others saw in the anti-imperial slogans of the nationalist period and in the extension of the state an anticapitalist bias. When coupled with the "abandoning" of democratic institutions and heavy expansion of the state, many, Americans especially, saw the specter of socialism (easily equated in the Cold War period with communism). Ironically, while lamenting the antidemocratic trend in Africa, the United States was at the same time supporting such dictators as Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now DRC) and other nondemocratic regimes so long as they were avowedly anticommunist. In reality, the ease and speed with which authoritarian regimes were created were rooted in the social and economic by-products of colonial rule. Long-term colonial economic policies oriented toward commodity production and keeping labor cheap left most African states with huge peasant farmer populations overlaid by very small middle classes and minuscule upper classes. Effective opposition to the monopolization of power by political elites is most often associated with a strong middle class with investments to protect and with sources of economic and political power independent of the state. Only a large middle class would have the educational and organizational skills, the motivation, and the monetary resources to successfully challenge government actions. Furthermore, the colonial system, highly capitalistic in an international context, created conditions that made accumulation of wealth by local individuals and groups virtually impossible. Without considerable amounts of savings, significant private investment in production of new resources and goods for society cannot take place. In effect, colonial rule thwarted local capitalism; consequently, independent centers of economic and political power were severely limited. Only the new African state itself, through its taxing and revenue-creating powers, could aggregate money to finance development of the country. Those who controlled the state, therefore, not only had little effective political opposition but controlled the only source for the attainment of wealth.

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PATRONAGE, THE PATRIMONIAL STATE, AND PERSONAL RULE

The rulers and their associates who dismantled the democratic structures left at independence were attempting to stay in power. The creation of centralized single-party systems of governance was an attempt to consolidate control over the political actions of rival interest groups. By centralizing power under the executive, the regimes also were acting to obtain compliance with government policies. Yet, the constriction of the political arena, the often ruthless manner with which single-party governments were imposed on the populations, and the fact that the party and the central organs of government were usually

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closely tied to the ethnic and regional support base of the ruling elite did little to d a m p e n opposition. Politicians who lost out in the moves that restricted access to decisionmakers and limited participation in the political process found it relatively easy to mobilize ethnic and other groups not associated with or f a v o r e d by the ruling elite. As Sandbrook ( 1 9 8 5 : 7 7 - 8 1 ) makes clear, ethnic politicization, or "tribalism," increased throughout the first decade of independence as ethnicity became the main vehicle for expressing grievances by those outside the system. To maintain themselves in power, therefore, A f r i c a n leaders had to construct stronger bases of social support. Given the virtual m o n o p o l i z a tion of scarce economic resources by the new regimes and the elimination of restrictions on the leaders of most A f r i c a n countries, the answer lay in the discretionary distribution of patronage and the development of "clientelistic" ties to key individuals and groups (see Eisenstadt and L e m a r chand, 1981; Fatton, 1986; Chazan et al., 1 9 9 9 : 1 8 5 - 1 8 7 ) . While patronclient relations quickly b e c a m e the main f o r m of political e x c h a n g e in postindependence Africa, "clientelism" and the swapping of favors for support were rooted in the politics of anticolonialism. Local leaders were drawn into various nationalist movements with promises of personal office and gain of aid to their villages and regions at independence. In any event, most A f r i c a n rulers m o v e d to build support and d e f u s e opposition by a wide variety of patronage devices made possible by their control of the state. Key figures were co-opted into government by appointment to high political offices or important positions in the administrative branch or in parastatals (state-owned corporations). Among other kinds of patronage used to bind support for the regimes and rulers were importexport licenses, g o v e r n m e n t contracts, m o n o p o l i e s over certain kinds of business, tax exemptions, the use of government houses and automobiles, and subsidizing of university educations. The fact is that patron-client relationships permeate most African governments. Citizens "tie" themselves to patrons (from their kinship line, village, or ethnic or regional group) in g o v e r n m e n t who can help them in some way. Lower-level patrons invariably are clients themselves to a more important patron w h o may have been responsible for securing his ethnic " b r o t h e r ' s " j o b in the first place. At the upper end of patron-client networks are " m i d d l e m e n " clients of the ruling elite. Using political clout, p o w e r f u l positions, and access to g o v e r n m e n t monetary resources m a d e available by the rulers, these m i d d l e m e n - p a t r o n s not only supply j o b s in government but money for schools, health clinics, wells, storage facilities, roads, and other favors to their ethnic groups and regions. Patronage binds local constituencies not only to their network of patronage but also to support for the regime itself. Emanating f r o m the country leader may be literally hundreds of patron-client linkages that fix support of other elites to the country's leadership and create substantial support for the regime. Acting

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also as a system of control, state patronage and " c l i e n t e l i s m " served to consolidate regimes by offering access to state resources in exchange for political acquiescence (Boone, 1990b:37). Following Max Weber, social scientists generally refer to the political process in which government office is bestowed in return for political support and personal loyalty and service as " p a t r i m o n i a l i s m " (Bendix, 1 9 6 2 : 3 3 4 - 3 3 5 ) . The essence of patrimonial rule is the personalization of power by a country's ruler. By the end of the first decade of independence, most A f r i c a n political systems were characterized by varying degrees of personal authoritarian rule. In some countries, such as Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) under Mobutu in the early to mid-1970s, the personal authority of a strongman ruler became virtually s y n o n y m o u s with government itself. (For Zaire, see Callaghy, 1984; Young and Turner, 1 9 8 5 : 1 6 6 - 1 8 4 ; Leslie, 1993; for personal rule generally, see Jackson and Rosberg, 1982.) A most illustrative "portrait" of a personal authoritarian ruler is one described by Richard Sandbrook: T h e strongman, usually the president, o c c u p i e s the center o f political life. Front and center s t a g e he is the central f o r c e around w h i c h all e l s e rev o l v e s . N o t o n l y the c e r e m o n i a l head o f state, the p r e s i d e n t is a l s o the c h i e f political, military and cultural figure; head of g o v e r n m e n t , c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f o f the armed f o r c e s , head of the g o v e r n i n g party (if there is o n e ) and e v e n c h a n c e l l o r of the local university. H i s aim is t y p i c a l l y to identify his person with the "nation." H i s physical self is omnipresent: as in O r w e l l ' s 1984, B i g Brother is plastered on public w a l l s , billboards and e v e n private h o m e s . His portrait a l s o adorns stamps, c o i n s , paper m o n e y and e v e n T-shirts and buttons o f t e n distributed to the party " f a i t h f u l . " S c h o o l s , h o s p i t a l s and s t a d i u m s are n a m e d after h i m . T h e m a s s m e d i a herald his e v e r y w o r d and a c t i o n , n o matter h o w i n s i g n i f i c a n t . ( S a n d brook, 1 9 8 5 : 9 0 )

Personal rule, of course, depends on the combination of patronage and coercion. Regimes varied in the degree of repressiveness and in the size of those sharing the resources of government. In Cameroon under Ahidjo and Cote d'lvoire under Houphouet-Boigny, broad and relatively genuine ethnically balanced elite networks created long periods of stability. The more autocratic the personal ruler, the more likely the spoils were to be distributed only among the politically important: top bureaucrats, party officials, local notables, national and regional politicians, military officers, and trade union officials (Sandbrook, 1985:94-95). In Idi A m i n ' s Uganda, patronage was limited to the ruler's band of close associates and his numerically small cultural group, and violent repression became virtually the only method of political and social control. In any event, what must be understood is that maintaining patronage networks and forces of coercion requires a huge amount of money. And in short order, African rulers found that to keep clients secure and the system stable, governments had to commit increasing

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amounts of money to patronage or allow increasing opportunities for those in government to use their positions for personal gain.

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MILITARY INTERVENTION

As African leaders shut down rival political parties and representational bodies and closed off access to government for the vast majority of their citizens, they also increased the size of their armed forces. First used as symbols of national sovereignty and independence throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the military increasingly became a part of the ruling group's enforcement apparatus. Although the actual growth of the military and its relationship to African rulers varied, the armed forces in most countries became politically powerful entities (Chazan et al., 1999:58-61). As a result of their organization and control of weaponry, the armed forces were uniquely positioned to overthrow civilian regimes. As the good feeling and political openness of the nationalist period quickly disappeared in the actuality of single-party government, a variety of factors created conditions that "justified" military intervention in politics. Certainly, the amount and speed of economic improvement was not even close to public expectations. Animosity toward the government grew among those touched by increasingly repressive personal rule. Furthermore, conspicuous spending on palaces, airplanes, and personal luxury items by many of the ruling elite,

T h e military is an important political actor in most African states.

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contrasting with the general poverty of the masses of citizens, created resentment. While military takeovers have occurred to rid countries of unpopular and corrupt regimes, most are probably better explained by other factors such as the personal ambitions of military officers or attempts by the military to deal with low pay, poor conditions, or neglect (see Decalo, 1976; Cox, 1976). In any event, between the 1952 overthrow of King Farouk by Egyptian colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and 1984, seventy successful coups took place in thirty African countries (McGowan and Johnson, 1984:633-666). According to Samuel Decalo ( 1 9 8 9 : 5 4 7 - 5 4 8 ) , "If during the 1960s the coup d'état emerged as the most visible and recurrent characteristic of the African political experience, by the 1980s, quasi-permanent military rule, of whatever ideological hue, had become the norm for most of the continent. At any one time, 65 percent of all of A f r i c a ' s inhabitants and well over half of its states are governed by military administrations." Since independence, Benin, Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), Ghana, and Nigeria have had five or more successful coups d'état, and just twelve African states have never had civilian rule disrupted by military intervention. As late as 1996, only Côte d'Ivoire and Malawi had not yet experienced an attempted or successful coup d'état (see Chazan et al., 1999:225230). While military regimes have normally claimed to be "caretakers" who would "clean up the mess" and "return to the barracks," most instead have moved to consolidate power. It is important to note that almost invariably military regimes have tended to operate much like the civilian regimes that preceded them (Ball, 1981:576-580; Young, 1988a:496-497; Meroe, 1980). Most have adopted the single-party political organization, and, usually from a small ruling group, a single ruler emerges. Furthermore, and highly important for an understanding of the continent, most military rulers share with their civilian counterparts both the use of patronage as a mechanism for gathering political support and the use of coercion to control or eliminate opposition. They also share an overall preoccupation with increasing their own economic position. Nigeria's military ruler from 1993 to 1998, General Sani Abacha, is a case in point. Along with crushing all political opposition, Abacha and his corrupt military cronies diverted vast oil revenues for patronage and their own aggrandizement. Abacha is alleged to have stolen a billion-dollar fortune for himself (Beran, 1995:19). Finally, military and civilian rulers alike have pursued almost identical economic development policies and have reaped similar results. (For an exhaustive review of the military in Africa, see Luckham, 1994:13-75.)

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECLINE

For ordinary Africans, development is seen in personal terms. It means additional money for children's schoolbooks, usable roads that allow farm-

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ers to get their produce to market, electric lights in the village, affordable rice and flour, or a health clinic within walking distance. Development too is measured by access to land, jobs, and better housing. But most A f r i c a n s experienced little real e c o n o m i c progress in the postcolonial period. Resources needed for effective, broad-scale development were drained away, among other reasons, to support regime efforts to consolidate power. As we have seen, attempts by African regimes to enhance control over the political arena and to strengthen and extend bases of support led to remarkably similar actions. State patronage and clientelism emerged as the main m e t h o d s of political control and governance. State resources that could have been committed to development were used to pull into the system the elite f r o m a variety of politicized factions (ethnic, regional, workers' groups, student associations, w o m e n ' s groups). In reality, private appropriation of state resources and the use of government money to build and expand personal rule lay at the very heart of the process by which most postcolonial regimes sought to govern (Boone, 1990b:36-37). In large part because of p a t r o n a g e - b a s e d rule, the 1960s and 1970s (and beyond) were marked by the rapid growth of the political branch, the bureaucracies, and the parastatals. In fact, during the 1960s, the civil service in A f r i c a grew at a rate of 7 percent per year, a rate that doubled the n u m b e r of e m p l o y e e s in ten years. T h e result was that by 1970 over 60 percent of all African wage earners were government employees. By 1980, at least half of all African government expenditures were allocated simply to pay the salaries of government employees. Furthermore, the expansion of government corporations during the first two decades borders on phenomenal. Parastatals were developed to deal with a broad range of government activities. For example, state-owned companies were created to handle the control and m a r k e t i n g of agricultural products, provide banking services, run airlines and railroads, m a n u f a c t u r e products, and m a n a g e retail stores. As an extreme example of their number and range in a particular country, Nigeria (in the mid-1970s) had over 250 state-owned corporations (Chazan et al., 1999:56). The patronage-based elaboration of the state, the expansion of the armed forces, and economic development of a country depended on the availability of substantial amounts of money. Especially needed was foreign exchange to purchase petroleum, trucks, buses, industrial parts, and a vast menu of items Africans could not produce. While some money began to flow f r o m donor nations, most government activities would depend on money aggregated locally. Given the scarcity of indigenous private savings from which to borrow, the lack of established middle- and upper-income groups on which income taxes could be levied, the absence of an industrial base, and a heavy dependency on technologically advanced countries, most African regimes turned to the profits to be made f r o m the export of mainly agricultural commodities.

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Catherine Boone's description of how African regimes moved to control highly productive areas of postcolonial commerce is highly relevant. "Building on the regulatory apparatus of the colonial state, post-colonial governments licensed wholesalers and importers, controlled imports through tax and tariff regimes and fixed the process of agricultural commodities, agricultural imports, and staple consumer goods" (Boone, 1990b:26). The result was that throughout most of the continent, substantial profits were "earned" by A f r i c a n regimes by paying rural agricultural commodity producers low prices and marketing the commodities at considerably higher prices (Bates, 1981). T h e consequence for farmers and rural areas of Africa was that the promise of development turned into the harsh reality of subsistence living. For increasing numbers, the hope for a better life centered on the already well-traveled path of migration to the cities. In fact, government economic policies that handicapped farmers were heavily reinforced by the reactions of rulers to major population growth in urban areas. By the early 1960s, "primate cities" (capitals and ports) often were growing at rates as high as 10 percent per year. For example, between 1958 and 1970, the population of Kinshasa, Zaire, increased from 389,000 to 1,323,000 (Young and Turner, 1985:81), and Douala, C a m e r o o n , grew from 5 4 , 0 0 0 in 1957 to over 313,000 in 1976 (Government of C a m e r o o n , 1977). Early within the first decade of independence in most African capitals, massive conglomerations of under- and unemployed Africans existed in sprawling squatter settlements with no city services. In some instances, they already formed the bulk of cities' populations. (An analysis of urbanization and population growth in Africa is found in April G o r d o n ' s Chapter 7.) From the earliest days of independence, African leaders were aware of the potential danger of large urban concentrations of the poor and unemployed. Many regimes had experienced urban-based strikes, demonstrations, and even violence during moves to centralize the state or as disappointment grew over slow progress toward meeting the needs and expectations of various interest groups. As a result, most leaders acted to cut the potential of "instability" of large concentrations of urban poor by holding d o w n f o o d prices in the cities. In effect, urban areas were subsidized by requiring food crop f a r m e r s (mostly women) to accept low prices f r o m government monopoly wholesalers or by setting price caps on food sold in urban areas. In order to extract profits from rurally produced agricultural commodities and to keep food costs low for urban residents, g o v e r n m e n t policies caused the deterioration of rural economies, pushed the rate of rural to urban migration dramatically upward, and added to the growing inequality between rural and urban areas. Furthermore, f a r m e r s , in large n u m b e r s where access was available, began to sell their crops in the black market economy outside government control (see Bates, 1981). For m u c h of Africa, then, d e v e l o p m e n t of the rural areas was sacrificed to finance patrimonial states. These patronage-based systems created

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opportunities for all those connected to government through patron-client networks. For the elite, appointed by rulers to the highest party, administrative, and parastatal positions, state office and political influence created amazing legal and illegal advantages for personal gain. And in virtually all states, those in positions of p o w e r (and their patrons) m o v e d to use their influence for economic profit (Young, 1988b:503). It is the way in which the state-based elite used their profits that is most important for an understanding of a political economy of decline. For the most part, money legally or illegally secured from government position was either used to buy luxury import items or placed into speculative real estate d e v e l o p m e n t , taxis and trucks, or retail and wholesale c o m m e r c i a l ventures (Boone, 1990a:427). For a variety of reasons, very little investment took place in ventures that created substantial employment, boosted industrial capacity, or generally helped develop the country (see Sandbrook, 1985). Given the circumstances of government economic policies that virtually devastated rural areas and pushed urbanization, the expansion of the state and the huge costs of personnel and patronage, and the essentially nonproductive and wasteful use by the elite of public resources, almost all A f r i c a n states were in e c o n o m i c decline by the early 1970s. During the mid- to late 1970s, a c o m b i n a t i o n of external and internal political, economic, and social factors moved the continent f r o m decline into crisis.

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STATE AND SOCIETY IN CRISIS

T h e political agendas that created costly government superstructures and siphoned money into the hands of a relatively nonproductive elite class inhibited the development of most African countries. In many regimes, inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption wasted public resources. Moreover, most of the wealth that flowed to the dominant classes was not spent on capital investments, investments that help a country to produce more and that ultimately promote development. As a result of these and other factors, the economic growth rate of the continent declined. Data taken from Nafziger ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 6 - 3 4 ) help chart the path of African economic stagnation and descent. From a growth rate of approximately 1.3 percent per year in the decade prior to independence, economic growth dropped to 0.2 percent yearly for the period f r o m 1965 through 1984. Between 1980 and 1985, Africa's real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita fell an average of 2.3 percent yearly. By the mid-1980s, the "great descent" had become an internationally recognized tragedy of crisis proportions. While the economic impact of political decisions by African rulers was a m a j o r factor in creating crisis conditions, other factors generally outside the control of rulers contributed substantially.

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T h e relatively h i g h p r i c e s that c o m m o d i t i e s b r o u g h t in the w a n i n g c o l o n i a l years b e g a n to d r o p in the early i n d e p e n d e n c e period. D u r i n g the 1970s, a n d c o n t i n u o u s l y since, prices f o r virtually all of the c o n t i n e n t ' s m a i n a g r i c u l t u r a l and m i n e r a l c o m m o d i t i e s h a v e d e c l i n e d . At the s a m e time, costs of g o o d s i m p o r t e d f r o m the m o r e technologically sophisticated c o u n t r i e s h a v e risen steadily. M a c h i n e p a r t s , a u t o m o b i l e s and t r u c k s , industrial tools, and luxury items have b e c o m e increasingly m o r e e x p e n s i v e . E v e n m o r e d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s c h a n g e s in the " t e r m s of t r a d e " f o r A f r i can states w e r e c a u s e d by the oil s h o c k s f r o m the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s to the early 1980s. W i t h the e x c e p t i o n of oil p r o d u c e r s such as N i g e r i a , A n g o l a , and G a b o n , s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a n states w e r e staggered by the high costs of pet r o l e u m products. W h i l e c h a n g e s in the international e c o n o m y placed most A f r i c a n c o u n tries in increasing j e o p a r d y , p o p u l a t i o n c h a n g e s within A f r i c a created cond i t i o n s that w o u l d h i n d e r any h o p e of e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s . F r o m the relatively slow p o p u l a t i o n increases of the colonial period, p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h rates in i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a simply e x p l o d e d . By the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , the continental population g r o w t h a v e r a g e rose to a yearly rate of over 3.0 percent. At this rate of g r o w t h , p o p u l a t i o n s d o u b l e in size in little m o r e than twenty years (World Bank, 1990a:229). T h e s c o p e of the crisis c a n be u n d e r s t o o d by the n u m b e r of A f r i c a n s r e l e g a t e d to a b s o l u t e p o v e r t y (living on o n e d o l l a r per day or less). By 1985, the n u m b e r of a b s o l u t e p o o r h a d g r o w n to 180 m i l l i o n p e o p l e — 4 7 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n . By 1998 rapid p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h and slow econ o m i c g r o w t h c o m b i n e d to i n c r e a s e the n u m b e r of p o o r by an a d d i t i o n a l 111 m i l l i o n . T h i s m e a n s that at the d a w n of the t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y A f r i c a n s c o n s t i t u t e d 25 p e r c e n t of all the p o o r in the d e v e l o p i n g w o r l d as c o m p a r e d to only 16 p e r c e n t in 1985 (World B a n k , 1 9 9 0 b : 5 , 29; 2 0 0 1 : 4 , 23). (A c o m p r e h e n s i v e d e s c r i p t i o n and a n a l y s i s of the c u r r e n t e c o n o m i c crisis is f o u n d in C h a p t e r 5.) In any e v e n t , the f a c t is that by the early 1980s m o s t A f r i c a n states s i m p l y did not h a v e the c a p a c i t y to m e e t r a p i d l y g r o w i n g b u d g e t a r y req u i r e m e n t s . Most o f t e n , a m o n g other results, there w a s an overall w e a k e n ing of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s ability to carry out essential public services. O v e r t i m e , r o a d s and rail s y s t e m s d e t e r i o r a t e d . S e r v i c e s to a g r i c u l t u r e w e r e a b a n d o n e d . S c h o o l s y s t e m s (already s h o c k e d by h u g e i n c r e a s e s in the u n d e r - f i f t e e n p o p u l a t i o n ) f o u n d little m o n e y available f o r school c o n s t r u c tion or teacher salaries. F u r t h e r m o r e , as the state " s o f t e n e d " ( H y d e n , 1983: 6 0 - 6 3 ) , e v e n the m o s t essential g o v e r n m e n t tasks, such as tax c o l l e c t i o n , became problematic. As the administrative capacity of g o v e r n m e n t s decreased, decay within r e g i m e s i n c r e a s e d . In m a n y states, c o r r u p t p r a c t i c e s a m o n g s t r a t e g i c a l l y p l a c e d politicians and b u r e a u c r a t s b e c a m e so habitual as to be institutionalized. U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c i t i z e n s e x p e c t e d to pay b r i b e s ; a n d

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they viewed politicians' raiding of government treasuries as simply "the way things are done." The term kleptocratic has been applied to states such as the f o r m e r Zaire, where corruption was systematically practiced at all levels (Young and Turner, 1985:183). Yet, even in countries with a traditionally professional civil service, the economic crisis created conditions or " s t r u c t u r e d " incentives for corruption. In Ghana, for example, " w h e r e hyper-inflation rapidly outran increases in salaries, demanding a bribe (or a higher one than previously) was an understandable reaction of junior or middle-ranking government officials to the problem of feeding their families" (Jeffries, 1989:80). For individual A f r i c a n s , strategies for survival are registered in such rational acts as the following: a decision to sell cocoa not to the official government agency but on the black market for twice the g o v e r n m e n t price; a move to avoid the possibility of losing money on an export peanut crop by "retreating" into subsistence agriculture (for one's own use); or the decision (made by m a n y ) to invest time and work in one or a variety of mutual aid organizations that operate to help finance a f a r m e r ' s seeds, repair a road, build a school, or even protect a village from thieves. Since the early 1980s, the actions of individual Africans combined to have a substantial impact on African regimes. Basically, two major patterns emerged. First, although varying by country and regime, large numbers of A f r i c a n s disengaged themselves f r o m the state or were at least partially successful in avoiding state laws and officials (see Rothchild and Chazan, 1988). Second, a resurgence and expansion of voluntary organizations and associations occurred, even within coercive states (see Bratton, 1989b; Fatton, 1992; and Harbeson, Rothchild, and Chazan, 1994). While both develo p m e n t s had significant ramifications for African regimes, withdrawal from the state and its power to tax were most difficult for rulers to control and added most immediately to the state in crisis. Disengagement f r o m the state denies regimes their expected revenues in two significant ways. First, the economic foundation of most A f r i c a n states rests on revenues produced from selling agricultural exports. W h e n f a r m e r s simply stop growing export crops, the fiscal base of regimes (already weakened by a continuing slide in commodity prices) is further eroded. Certainly, less foreign exchange is accrued and the economic crisis deepens. Disengagement from the state also takes place when people turn to clandestine e c o n o m i c transactions for survival or profit. These black market activities are remarkably alike throughout the continent and primarily involve: 1. Hoarding and exchanging scarce goods above both official and justified market prices; 2. Smuggling lucrative cash crops, precious metals, or m a n u f a c t u r e d foods, either into or out of the country; and

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3. E n g a g i n g in illegal currency transactions to avoid monetary exchange controls or exchange rates. These and other activities are a major part of the parallel or informal economy, which creates incomes and assets that largely escape government regulations and taxes. African governments lose huge amounts of money in this manner, weakening the fiscal basis of the state even further (MacGaffey, 1988:177-185; Lemarchand, 1988:160-166; Sandbrook, 1985:139-149). In any event, as revenues stagnated or declined, as treasuries were drained, and as terms of trade for imported goods and services became increasingly disadvantageous, A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s borrowed heavily to maintain themselves. Unfortunately, many commercial loans were secured when rates were high. Because of A f r i c a ' s heavy d e p e n d e n c e on Europe, Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other industrial nations for money, sub-Saharan Africa had by 1990 compiled debts so huge that over 4 0 percent of export earnings needed to be spent each year simply to pay interest (World Bank, 1990b). Economists generally agree that with economies further deteriorating, few African states have the ability to ever pay debt principal, and a significant n u m b e r cannot meet interest payment schedules. Under these circumstances, e c o n o m i c credit f r o m virtually all m a j o r lenders dried up, which left only the World Bank/International Monetary Fund loan packages with their grinding austerity m e a s u r e s to ward off the virtually complete economic collapse of many (if not most) African governments.

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STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE REORDERING OF THE STATE

For the first twenty to twenty-five years, independent rule in most A f r i c a n states was based on a relatively standard political and e c o n o m i c structure. In the most simple terms, an autocratic leader emerged and consolidated political control through patronage and a heavily expanded state. As a result of government employment and opportunities, connections, and favors, a dominant group formed. Over time, as this urban-based group coalesced, g o v e r n m e n t policies increasingly f o c u s e d on maintaining their support. P a t r o n a g e networks, massive bureaucracies, and the e c o n o m i c needs of a d o m i n a n t class require a large and steady stream of money. As the e c o n o m i c crisis of the late 1970s reached cataclysmic proportions in the mid-1980s, most African regimes were forced into the desperate gamble of "structural adjustment" loans f r o m the International Monetary Fund (IMF). What must be understood is that African regimes have consistently avoided IMF loans. Conditions tied to them require countries essentially to

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reorder society by adjusting the structure of internal economic relationships. Structural adjustment is controversial in Africa, as Virginia DeLancey discusses in Chapter 5, and for authoritarian patrimonial states, they are truly last-ditch agreements. Most such agreements require countries to: 1. Devalue currencies so that exports will be cheaper to foreign buyers; 2. Reduce deficits by freezing government salaries; 3. Quit setting agricultural prices and eliminate subsidies to urban consumers; 4. End import restrictions; 5. Privatize state-owned enterprises; and 6. Increase bank interest rates to encourage savings to generate capital investment. Countries that received these loans accepted close surveillance of their economies by the Bank. Lofchie (1989:122) states that "at the level of government officer, structural adjustment has transferred effective operational authority f r o m A f r i c a n civil servants to staff m e m b e r s of these international lending agencies." By 1989, all but five of f o r t y - f o u r sub-Saharan African states were borrowers f r o m the IMF (Kraus, 1991:211-212). From a political standpoint, the significance of these d e v e l o p m e n t s should not be underestimated, because for most countries the sweeping e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s required to receive I M F monies change the context of political relations not only between the rulers and the ruled but within regimes themselves. At the outset, structural adjustment policies had a major impact on the urban areas, which rulers often pacified by subsidizing foodstuffs. Deregulating agricultural prices caused food costs to rise dramatically. In the major cities, where relatively little food is grown for personal use, price increases for such staples as rice, flour, and meal are often devastating. While the vast urban population made up largely of nonsalaried, underemployed, or unemployed poor feels the full effect of structural adjustment austerity, lowerand middle-range government employees are also affected substantially. Across the continent, opposition to food price increases has been especially bitter and led to demonstrations and riots in many countries. While allowing agricultural prices to rise and eliminating subsidies increased the scope and intensity of opposition to many African regimes and further undermined any remaining legitimacy, other austerity measures associated with structural adjustment threatened to unravel the very basis of regime existence. As governments f r o z e salaries and sold off government corporations, money for patronage was drastically reduced, and positions connected to the system were eliminated. Furthermore, virtually bankrupt regimes slashed services and were increasingly unable to meet the pay schedules of teachers, public health workers, and other low- and medium-

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level civil s e r v a n t s . In o t h e r w o r d s , the p a t r o n a g e s y s t e m s that in m o s t A f r i c a n states tied together and supported an essential socioeconomic-political elite were e i t h e r substantially w e a k e n e d or b e g a n to break apart. (See C h a k o a d z a , 1993; O l u k o s h i , 1993; O n i m o d e , 1989; and Ponte, 1995 for the social and political impact of structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s , or SAPs.) In m a n y A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s by the late 1980s, r e g i m e s in political and e c o n o m i c retreat f a c e d variations of an increasingly c o m m o n scenario: 1. A s s o c i a t i o n a l g r o u p s such as s e l f - h e l p o r g a n i z a t i o n s , c o o p e r a t i v e s , c h u r c h e s , v i g i l a n t e g r o u p s , and p r o f e s s i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w h i c h had i n c r e a s e d as the e c o n o m i c crisis w o r s e n e d , e x p a n d e d f u r t h e r under structural a d j u s t m e n t . D e e p l y rooted in society, these g r o u p s f o r m e d the basis of p o p u l a r dissent t o w a r d the r e g i m e (see Bratton, 1989a, 1 9 8 9 b : 2 9 - 3 3 ; H y d e n , 1 9 8 9 : 4 - 5 ; Shaw, 1990). 2. Civil s e r v a n t s a n d t r a d e u n i o n m e m b e r s — w h o s e living s t a n d a r d s and i n c o m e s were most t h r e a t e n e d by the e c o n o m i c crisis and austerity m e a s u r e s — b e g a n d e m a n d i n g political r e f o r m s ( " A C h a n c e for A f r i c a , " 1991:2; N e a v o l l , 1991:40; Press, 1991:4; Henry, 1991). 3. C o l l e g e s t u d e n t s , g r a d u a t e s , and p r o f e s s o r s f a c i n g c u t b a c k s a n d p o o r j o b p r o s p e c t s a c t i v e l y w o r k e d against the r e g i m e ( M o r n a , 1990, 1991). They, along with civil servants and trade unionists, led p o p u l a r d e m o n s t r a t i o n s against the g o v e r n m e n t . A s a u t o n o m o u s c e n t e r s of p o w e r f o r m e d a n d o p p o s i t i o n to r e g i m e s inc r e a s e d , m a n y r e g i m e s f a c e d a d d i t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s f r o m o u t s i d e the continent as well. T h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y political u p h e a v a l that b r o u g h t d e m o c r a t i zation to the Soviet U n i o n and Eastern E u r o p e resulted in political accord b e t w e e n the s u p e r p o w e r s and e n d e d the Cold War. U n d e r these new c o n d i tions, the s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e of A f r i c a w a s greatly d i m i n i s h e d . A m o n g the c o n s e q u e n c e s , the United States and the Soviet Union b e g a n to c o o p e r ate in f o r e i g n p o l i c y and to r e d u c e both m i l i t a r y a n d e c o n o m i c aid. (See C h a z a n et al., 1 9 9 9 : 4 4 9 - 4 5 1 . ) C o u n t r i e s tied to the Soviet U n i o n and Eastern E u r o p e a n states f o r aid a n d t e c h n o l o g y ( s u c h as M o z a m b i q u e , E t h i o pia, and A n g o l a ) h a d m o n i e s cut off and w e r e p r e s s u r e d to a c c o m m o d a t e political change. For client states of the United States (especially Zaire and K e n y a ) , c u t b a c k s in U.S. aid a n d the c o n s e q u e n t new attention paid by the U n i t e d States to h u m a n rights a b u s e s b r o u g h t n e w and h e a v y p r e s s u r e on rulers (see Hull, 1 9 9 1 : 1 9 3 - 1 9 6 , 2 3 3 - 2 3 4 ) . A s C r a w f o r d Young points out, " B y 1990 U.S. p o l i c y w a s a g g r e s s i v e l y p r o m o t i n g d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n , aided by the e f f o r t s of u n u s u a l l y o u t s p o k e n a m b a s s a d o r s in C a m e r o o n , the C e n tral A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c , Z a i r e , and K e n y a " ( Y o u n g , 1999a:69). In West A f r i c a , f o r m e r F r e n c h c o l o n i e s ( B e n i n , G a b o n , C o t e d ' l v o i r e , and C h a d ) l o n g d e p e n d e n t on F r e n c h aid a n d F r e n c h t r o o p s to s u p p o r t s i n g l e - p a r t y states and authoritarian rulers w e r e subject to c h a n g e in the foreign policy

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of France. New assistance from France apparently would require regimes to be responsive to citizens' demands for political reform (Whiteman, 1991; Clark, 1997:2; see also Chapter 6). During 1991, the United Kingdom, the European Community, and Japan linked future aid to African countries to such "political conditionalities" as respect for human rights, a free press, democratization, and "honest" government (Clapham, 1996:194195; Khadiagala, 2000:93). More importantly for some countries, influential voices within the World Bank began to call for political reform as a necessary component to economic aid (Young, 1999a:69). All of these events created an atmosphere for change and heightened expectations Africans had for political transformation. Under these circumstances, the last decade of the twentieth century began.

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BEYOND AUTOCRACY: POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA

By late 1989, in countries as different as Algeria and Zaire, Gabon and Madagascar, and Benin and Togo, open challenges to incumbent regimes became commonplace. At first, spontaneous demonstrations, strikes, and riots were focused on government austerity measures. Shortly thereafter, protest escalated rapidly into widespread and strident demands for the end of single-party rule, for accountable political officials, and for free elections (Bratton and van de Walle, 1992:27-38). Most African regimes responded first with repression. However, shaken by the scope and intensity of protest and pressured by conditions and countries outside the continent, many African rulers moved reluctantly to actual or promised reform (see Kraus, 1991). Beginning approximately with the new decade (1990), a period of remarkable political change began to take place. Within eighteen months, a large number of states had either publicly committed themselves to a multiparty political system or already allowed opposition parties to form. Among those that had legalized multiple political parties by late 1991 were Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zaire, and Zambia. Two others, Cote d'lvoire and Gabon, had allowed competitive elections with opposing parties to take place by late 1990. Also during this period. President Robert Mugabe retreated from his attempts to impose one-party rule on multiparty Zimbabwe, and the Nigerian military government announced the formation of a two-party system (though initial presidential elections were annulled) (.African Demos, 1991:vols. 1, 2, 4; Diamond, 1995:458). During 1990 and 1991, several authoritarian regimes fell as the result of either wars of liberation or peaceful elections. For example, after decades of illegal occupation and rule by South Africa and a bloody liberation struggle,

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The democratization movements sweeping Africa are resulting in multiparty elections for the first time in many years. In 1990 multiparty elections were held in Cote d'lvoire. Namibia (formerly South-West Africa) received independence in March 1990. And in the Horn of Africa, the highly repressive regimes of Siad Barre in Somalia and Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia fell to liberation movements during the first half of 1991. In West Africa, political pressures led to open democratic presidential elections in February and March 1991 in Cape Verde, Sào Tomé and Principe, and Benin. In each case, a new president was elected over the former ruler, and a peaceful transfer of power took place ( A f r i c a n Demos, 1991:vol. 4:8). In November 1991, Kenneth Kaunda, leader of Zambia since independence, was soundly defeated in a relatively problem-free presidential election by trade union leader Frederick Chiluba. And, most remarkably, on May 10, 1994, Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress (ANC), was sworn in as South Africa's first black president. Altogether between 1990 and 1995, over thirty competitive national elections were held across the continent, fourteen of which resulted in peaceful transfers of power (Doro, 1995:245). Clearly, by the end of 1994 significant political changes had taken place on the African continent. In a wide variety of states power was decentralized, political liberties expanded, and new individuals and groups entered the political arena. This thrust toward political reform and democratization was strengthened by the loss of credibility of ideologies that legitimated autocracy (particularly by the Leninist version of Marxism); by

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the growth of local African and international human rights movements; and by expectations and the will to act prompted by democratic revolutions elsewhere in the world. These were heady days across the continent, the world was democratizing, and, to many, the continent of Africa seemed destined to fulfill a global democratic imperative. H

The Political Trajectory of Democratic Reform

Yet, notwithstanding the democratic impulse, the social and economic context that shaped the political trajectory of Africa over the past forty years remains substantially intact. Illiteracy and disease abound, unemployment and poverty continue unabated, and inequalities between classes are far worse than at independence. Furthermore, in most countries, divisive ethnic, regional, religious, and even subethnic cleavages tear at the social fabric (see Adediji, 1995:134). Interclan civil war in Somalia, genocide in Rwanda, and religious tensions in Nigeria are notable cases in point. Therefore, as promising as these movements toward democratization in Africa might appear, it is premature to conclude that genuinely competitive multiparty democracies can easily be built or, with Africa's myriad problems, that they can survive. To understand the problems associated with achieving democracy in Africa it is important to be clear on what is meant by democracy and how we determine if a country is democratic. Many political scientists, especially f r o m Western industrial democracies such as the United States, broadly define democracy to describe a government chosen in open and fairly conducted elections, where citizens of the country are protected by a code of civil liberties, and where election results are accepted as legitimate by all contestants. The term consolidated democracy is used to indicate the widespread acceptance (by both political elites and by ordinary citizens) of rules guaranteeing political participation, open competition, and human rights (Bratton, 1999:18). The reality is that at the dawn of the twenty-first century, all across Africa are signs that the apparent democratic gains of 1990 to 1994 are eroding (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). "The euphoria that marked the early 1990s has long since evaporated and even the most optimistic observers concede that democratization in Africa will be gradual, messy, fitful, and slow with many imperfections along the way" (Young, 1999b:25). While in many African states political reforms were substantial and real, movement toward democracy was decidedly uneven across the continent. Indeed, for many Africans gains in political freedom were very limited or nonexistent. In 1997 only sixteen of Africa's fifty-three states were categorized as "relatively democratic," a term that indicates a multiparty state in which elections are relatively fair and that at least one change in the national leadership has taken place (Young, 1999b:27). Bratton and van

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de Walle note that while almost all African regimes "opened up" to some degree in the flurry of reform between 1990 and 1994, the paths of political change were distinctive and divergent. About 40 percent of the fortyfour sub-Saharan African states became relatively democratic, but the majority did not (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:116). In twelve countries (including Cameroon, Kenya, Gabon, and Ghana) regime incumbents allowed the formation of opposition parties, but "exploited the powers of incumbency to dictate the rules of the political game by manipulating electoral laws, monopolizing campaign resources, or interfering with the polls. In an additional twelve countries (such Uganda, Guinea, and Zaire) incumbent strongmen made insincere and tactical concessions while under pressure to reform, but never intended to give up power (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:121).

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The Political Economy of Democratization

Africa's divergent transitions toward political reform and democratization are the result of a variety of factors that have an impact on the actions and policies of those in power in African states at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The general context within which domestic politics takes place in Africa includes the colonial legacies of poverty and dependent economies, patron-client-based political systems, and the increasing impact of external political and economic forces (such as the World Bank/ International Monetary Fund). It is to the changing circumstances of Africa's external environment that we now turn. To begin, African states and their political systems operate within an international environment in constant transition. The favorable combination of factors that formed the context of dramatic political change in the early 1990s changed. As a result, many African leaders seeking to remain in power took advantage of the new circumstances and were able to halt what seemed to be a democratic destiny across the continent. Almost from the start of A f r i c a ' s precipitous economic decline that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, African economic and political systems have been increasingly influenced by donor nations and especially by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Operating on assumptions that only a major restructuring of the economic (and later) political systems of African countries would save them from complete economic destitution, these lenders required variations of structural adjustments programs outlined on page 84. These assumptions centered on the belief that African countries could only build strong economies by focusing on increased export sales of primary products (unprocessed raw agricultural and mineral products). Sale of export crops and minerals would give African countries a comparative advantage over other states in that low labor costs would allow African states to export these products at very

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competitive prices, especially to industrial states. A second goal of the World Bank/IMF lending agencies was to open African states to investment f r o m the outside and particularly f r o m the wealthy industrial states, such as the United States, Japan, and Germany. Removal of tariffs (developed in part to protect fragile African industries) and other obstacles to investment would lure companies f r o m the industrialized world to the low labor costs and cheap raw materials of Africa. Additional investment would be secured as government corporations (state-owned enterprises) were sold to either domestic or foreign businesses or individual investors. (For a more detailed discussion on Africa's changing economic environment, see Chapter 5.) According to the World B a n k / I M F the benefits of structural adjustment would m o v e to quickly revive and " m o d e r n i z e " A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s and, indirectly, would promote the d e v e l o p m e n t of business and civic groups, which would provide a check on government and help contain or prevent autocratic regimes. In other words, political reform and democracy would be promoted. The reality was decidedly different. To work as anticipated, the World B a n k / I M F economic r e f o r m s depend on ready markets for exports and substantial investment from industrial countries. For the most part, neither happened. As the Cold War ended and Russia and the new states of Eastern Europe democratized, Western industrial states and their huge multinational corporations looked east rather than south for profitable investment. Eastern Europe and Russia, with their more highly educated populations, relatively well-off domestic markets, and better infrastructure (roads, railroads, and communications technology), provided a superior investment opportunity with less risk and more chance for profit than any African state (with the exception of South Africa). With the addition of Russia and such states as the Czech Republic and Poland to newly industrializing democratic states in Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, for example) and the so-called Asian Tiger states (including Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand), little attention was paid to Africa. (The lack of investment in Africa is discussed in more detail in Chapter 14.) Nor was the anticipated huge increase in export revenues available to A f r i c a n states. T h e " c o m p a r a t i v e a d v a n t a g e " formula for driving A f r i c a n economies was used as a model for e c o n o m i c growth not only among the developing countries of Africa, but also for other nonindustrial states around the world. For African states and economies, the results were reminiscent of the days after independence when the new states of Africa with huge needs rapidly expanded their export crops. The result then and during the 1990s was to flood the world markets, resulting in falling prices for many cash crops. Under these circumstances, economic stagnation and decline continued for most African states throughout the 1990s. As John Clark points out, Currency devaluation, the revocation of government subsidies, and privatization [of government-owned corporations] whatever their long term

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merits, lead to j o b losses, declining standards of living, and economic despair in the short term. Ironically, though these social costs can be the source of huge opposition to autocratic regimes, they make consolidation of democratic regimes that follow them difficult. For besides creating outright antipathy for new governments, economic concentration quite often creates class and ethnic conflicts as people vie for scarce goods, which in turn undermines the consolidation of democracy. (Clark, 1997:29)

A s the 1990s p r o g r e s s e d , A f r i c a w o u l d be f u r t h e r m a r g i n a l i z e d . D u r ing the Cold War, A f r i c a ' s location near the M i d d l e East and the sea lanes of the South Atlantic and Indian O c e a n s , a n d its m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s created what political scientists refer to as " g e o s t r a t e g i c " i m p o r t a n c e f o r the continent. A c o n s i d e r a b l e p o r t i o n of aid and g r a n t s to A f r i c a (both e c o n o m i c a n d m i l i t a r y ) h a d c o m e f r o m the U n i t e d S t a t e s and, to a m u c h lesser e x tent, f r o m the Soviet Union. With the b r e a k - u p of the Soviet Union and the end of Soviet control of Eastern E u r o p e , A f r i c a was far less important. Aid was cut not only to U.S. client states, such as Zaire and K e n y a , but to other A f r i c a n states as well. T h e e n d of the C o l d War also r e d u c e d the d e m a n d for A f r i c a ' s strategic minerals, while m a k i n g alternative sources of supply a v a i l a b l e f r o m R u s s i a and E a s t e r n E u r o p e , f u r t h e r i n t e n s i f y i n g the e c o n o m i c marginalization of the continent ( C l a p h a m , 1996:164). A s T o m C a l l a g h y m a k e s clear ( 2 0 0 0 : 4 4 - 4 5 ) , " A f r i c a g e n e r a t e s a dec l i n i n g share of the w o r l d o u t p u t . T h e m a i n c o m m o d i t i e s it p r o d u c e s are e i t h e r b e c o m i n g less i m p o r t a n t or b e i n g m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y p r o d u c e d by other d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . " A n d , as A f r i c a b e c o m e s increasingly m a r g i n alized it b e c o m e s increasingly d e p e n d e n t on the industrial countries. T h e s e u n f a v o r a b l e e c o n o m i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s f o r m e d the b a c k g r o u n d for an evolution in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l political a r e n a t a k i n g place in the s e c o n d half of the 1990s. Since the " g l o b a l c o n j u n c t u r e " ( 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 9 0 ) that h e l p e d create c o n d i tions for e x p l o s i v e political r e f o r m in A f r i c a , the international political arena has e v o l v e d in s i g n i f i c a n t w a y s (Young, 1999a:28). By N o v e m b e r 1991, French president François M i t t e r r a n d had already retreated f r o m the strong support he had given to A f r i c a n d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n at the F r a n c o A f r i c a n S u m m i t at L a B a u l e , F r a n c e , in J u n e 1990 (Clark, 1997:3, 34). Benin, which led the m o v e to d e m o c r a c y in A f r i c a in 1989, actually saw a decline in French aid the year f o l l o w i n g its transition, while continuing authoritarian regimes in Togo, C a m e r o o n , and Zaire all benefited f r o m French aid increases during the s a m e period ( C l a p h a m , 1996:241). T h o u g h largely sponsoring attempts to p r o m o t e political liberalization in A f r i c a , the United States was d e c i d e d l y u n e v e n in its a t t e m p t s to p r o m o t e d e m o c r a c y on the c o n t i n e n t . A s the s a m e t i m e as the U n i t e d States e x p a n d e d its A g e n c y for International D e v e l o p m e n t ( U S A I D ) to include d e m o c r a c y and g o v e r n a n c e officers, other U.S. efforts toward political r e f o r m and democratization were at o n c e limited and "contradictory." Pressures for democratization were not applied toward Egypt where security and strategic concerns ranked high, nor

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toward Algeria where the cancellation of elections that would have put the Islamic Salvation Front in power drew no protests from the United States. Further, little pressure toward democratic reform was applied to such countries as U g a n d a and G h a n a , which were getting high marks for econ o m i c liberalization f r o m the United States through moves toward " f r e e r markets" (Young, 1999b:28). Where they have commercial interests, Western industrial democracies appear less likely to push heavily (if at all) for political r e f o r m . As e x a m p l e s , Bratton and van de Walle point to the British and French giving in to questionable elections in Kenya and Cameroon, where incumbent regimes used state power to return Presidents Daniel arap Moi (Kenya) and Paul Biya (Cameroon) to power. Indeed, it seems clear that whatever their level of commitment to political liberalization and democratic rule in Africa, all Western governments have other interests and priorities on the continent. Of these, the most important is political stability. If they have to m a k e a choice, the Western industrial democracies will apparently choose stability for an African state rather that democratic rule (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:114, 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 ) . (For a more detailed analysis of Africa's international relations, see Chapter 6.)

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Prospects for Democracy in Africa

It is within this context of economic decline, weakened capacity (for states to foster d e v e l o p m e n t ) , and decreased political importance in the global community that domestic politics in African countries takes place at the beginning of the twenty-first century. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, only about one-third of African countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century have b e c o m e "relatively d e m o c r a t i c , " that is, countries with political systems that have had relatively free and open national elections after which those who lost the election accepted the loss and did not try to overthrow the winning group. Only two (Libya and Sudan) are authoritarian. Almost all the rest had undergone some degree of political reform, but were still n o n d e m o c r a t i c in 2001. Why have some A f r i c a n countries been able to implement and sustain democratic reforms and others have not? While it is difficult to generalize, certain patterns appear to be associated with political reforms leading to democratic elections and, at least for now, to relatively democratic governments in Africa Bratton and van de Walle's important comparative analysis of forty-two sub-Saharan African countries is instructive. Successful transitions (from authoritarian regimes) toward democratization were found to be highly influenced by the degree of freedom allowed by the preceding authoritarian regime. Those authoritarian regimes that allowed relatively more political freedom (participation and competition) were more likely to have more frequent political protests that would lead to regime transitions during the early 1990s. Further, these transitions were more likely

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to lead to political liberalization than in countries w h o s e regimes were m o r e a u t o c r a t i c . Finally, h i g h e r levels of p a r t i c i p a t i o n (even if j u s t to vote f o r h a n d - p i c k e d g o v e r n m e n t c a n d i d a t e s ) and c o m p e t i t i o n (as m e a s u r e d by the a m o u n t of opposition tolerated by the authoritarian regime) were associated with higher levels of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n a f t e r the fall of the authoritarian gove r n m e n t (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Despite s u c c e s s f u l transitions to relatively d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t f o r s o m e A f r i c a n states d u r i n g the early 1990s, the s e c o n d part of the d e c a d e w a s m a r k e d by a drop in international pressure on A f r i c a n states to d e m o c ratize. A s the W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s b a c k e d a w a y f r o m e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n s , m a n y A f r i c a n leaders w e r e able to stay in p o w e r by a l l o w i n g the e m e r g e n c e of " s e m i - d e m o c r a c i e s " or "virtual d e m o c r a c i e s " (Young, 1999b:35; J o s e p h , 1 9 9 9 : 6 0 - 6 1 ) . In less than a d e c a d e a f t e r Western d e m o c r a c i e s enc o u r a g e d A f r i c a n states to d e m o c r a t i z e or risk h a v i n g aid cut off or red u c e d , these s e m i c o m p e t i t i v e s y s t e m s h a v e b e c o m e seen as exhibiting sati s f a c t o r y political p r o g r e s s . In t h e s e s y s t e m s , political parties m a y be a l l o w e d to f o r m , but not c o m p e t e f o r o f f i c e ( U g a n d a ) , i n d e p e n d e n t n e w s p a p e r s m a y p u b l i s h , but be s u b j e c t to h a r a s s m e n t or r e s t r i c t e d ( Z a m b i a ) , a n d e l e c t i o n s m a y be r e g u l a r l y h e l d , but o p p o s i t i o n parties m a y be subj e c t e d to restrictions and e l e c t i o n results a p p a r e n t l y f a l s i f i e d as in C a m eroon, Togo, and Niger (Joseph, 1999:62). In a relatively small n u m b e r of A f r i c a n states, such as Sierra L e o n e , Liberia, and Zaire, politicians used far more drastic strategies and actions to retain power. In these already administratively weak and economically destitute states, where to retain p o w e r required using resources to retain important allies, the political leader simply shut down costly government agencies (such as health and education) and, using valuable resources (diamonds), financed private armies to control either all or parts of the country. In areas where government control was weak or nonexistent, other political leaders with armies financed through similar means often took control. K n o w n as "shadow states" controlled by "warlords," they, along with Somalia, are essentially collapsed states, neither interested in nor accountable to those living under their control (see Reno, 1998; Clapham, 1996:249-252; a n d Z a r t m a n , 1995). The quick and dramatic political c h a n g e s that m a r k e d the b e g i n n i n g of the 1990s h a v e s l o w e d or s t o p p e d . M o v e s t o w a r d political l i b e r a l i z a t i o n h a v e e n d e d f o r m a n y A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , and f o r m o s t , real " c o n s o l i d a t e d " d e m o c r a c i e s s e e m unlikely. Further, m a n y l e a d e r s d e t e r m i n e d to stay in p o w e r have been able to reverse d e m o c r a t i c gains m a d e earlier. It is within this context that a frustrated but h o p e f u l President T h a b o M b e k i issued his call for A f r i c a n s to r e c a p t u r e the t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y f r o m t h o s e w h o s e personal greed w o u l d block an A f r i c a n R e n a i s s a n c e . Yet, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the a p p a r e n t e n d of m o v e m e n t t o w a r d political r e f o r m in m o s t countries (or even erosion in s o m e ) , for m a n y A f r i c a n s rem a r k a b l e political c h a n g e s h a v e taken place since 1989. W h i l e obstacles to

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democratization abound, there have been fundamental reforms made in the structures of politics at all levels in most African states. Across the continent virtually all countries have undergone political liberalization and with rare exceptions the single-party state has disappeared. While most Africans could only read state-owned newspapers a decade ago, most countries now have a variety of independent newspapers available to citizens. The number of independent radio stations has increased across much of the continent and computer usage, though in its infancy, is increasing, especially in Kenya and Ghana. Since independence, and especially over the last decade, literacy rates have risen across Africa. It is clear, however, that the main social impact of liberalization in Africa has been in the large number of associations and groups that have formed in virtually all countries across the continent. The rapid proliferation of groups (civil society) in response to political openings may be the most noteworthy legacy of the early 1990s (Young, 1999b:35). To set in motion the processes of political liberalization and democratization in Africa did not require a particular level of economic achievement or class structure. Per capita incomes in most African states are among the lowest in the world and the number of Africans with personal incomes and education levels high enough to be categorized as middle or upper class is very small. But, once democracies are established, economic constraints substantially shape the prospects for consolidation (sustaining the democracy). The chances of a democracy surviving are greater the better-off the country is economically (Young, 1999b:34; Przeworski et al., 2 0 0 0 : 7 8 139). As William Reno says, "yet the current wealth of a country is not entirely decisive. . . . If they succeed in generating development, democracies may survive in even the poorest countries" (Young, 1999b:34). And, both education and a balance of power between political groups may help them survive independently of income (Przeworski et al., 2000:137). It is important to remember that political liberalization in Africa is only about a decade old. While the new democracies on the continent are both very young and unconsolidated, they are not necessarily d o o m e d to failure by poverty and backwardness. They need "time to work with and become habituated to democratic institutions, to shape them to fit particular cultural and political circumstances, and to allow them to sink deep roots of commitment among all the major players and the public at large" ( D i a m o n d , 1999:xxv-xxvi). Democratic or not, however, no African state will long survive without a measurable and sustainable improvement in economic development for its long-suffering people.

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. 1991. "Cutting Back on C a m p u s . " Africa Report 36 ( M a r c h - A p r i l ) : 6 1 - 6 3 . Nafziger, Wayne F. 1988. Inequality in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Neavoll, George. 1991. " A Victory for D e m o c r a c y . " Africa Report 36 (May-June): 39^10, 42. Nel, Philip, and Patrick J. M c G o w a n (eds.). 1999. Power, Wealth, and the Global Order. C a p e Town: University of C a p e Town Press. O l u k o s h i , A d e b a y o (ed.). 1993. The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria. Portsmouth, N H : H e i n e m a n n . O n i m o d e , Bade (ed.). 1989. The IMF, the World Bank and the African Debt: The Social and Political Impact. Vol. 2. London: Zed. P o n t e , S t e f a n o . 1994. " T h e World Bank and A d j u s t m e n t in A f r i c a . " Review of African Political Economy 22, no. 66 ( D e c e m b e r ) : 5 3 9 - 5 5 8 . Press, Robert M. 1991. " A f r i c a ' s Struggle for D e m o c r a c y . " The Christian Science Monitor (March 21 ):4. P r z e w o r s k i , A d a m , and M i c h a e l A l v a r e z , José A n t o n i o C h e i b u b , and F e r n a n d o Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development. Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press. Przeworski, A d a m , and F e r n a n d o L i m o n g i . 1997. " D e v e l o p m e n t and D e m o c r a c y . " Pp. 1 5 5 - 1 8 3 in A. H a d e n i o u s (ed.). Democracy's Victory and Crisis. C a m bridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press. Reno, William. 1998. Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Rothchild, Donald, and N a o m i C h a z a n (eds.). 1988. The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa. Boulder: Westview Press. Rothchild, Joseph. 1981. Ethnopolitics. New York: C a m b r i d g e University Press. Sandbrook, Richard. 1985. The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . 1993. The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press. Saul, John. 1975. "The Revolution in Portugal's African Colonies: A Review Essay." Canadian Journal of African Studies 9 : 3 2 1 - 3 4 0 . Shaw, Timothy M. 1990. " P o p u l a r Participation in N o n - G o v e r n m e n t Structures in Africa: Implications for D e m o c r a t i c D e v e l o p m e n t . " Pp. 5 - 2 2 in Africa Today. Denver: A f r i c a Today Associates. Sklar, Richard L., and C. S. Whitaker. 1991. African Politics and Problems in Development. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Sullivan, Jo. 1989. Global Studies: Africa. G u i l f o r d , CT: D u s h k i n P u b l i s h i n g Group. Tangri, Roger. 1985. Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa. L o n d o n : J a m e s C u r r e y and Heinemann Educational B o o k s . Tordoff, William. 1984. Government and Politics in Africa. B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press. van de Walle, Nicolas. 1995. " C r i s i s and O p p o r t u n i t y in A f r i c a . " Pp. 1 5 3 - 1 6 6 in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.). E'onomic Reform and Democracy. Baltimore: Johns H o p k i n s University Press. Vilallón, L e o n a r d o A. 1998. " A f t e r the Wave: The Democratic Question and State R e c o n f i g u r a t i o n in the F r a n c o p h o n e Sahel." Paper presented at the forty-first annual meeting of the A f r i c a n Studies Association, Chicago, O c t o b e r 2 9 - N o vember 1. Whiteman, Kaye. 1991. " T h e Gallic Paradox." Africa Report 36 (January-February): 17-20. Wolpe, Howard. 1974. Urban Politics in Nigeria: A Study of Port Harcourt. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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World Bank. 1990a. World Debt Tables, 1989-1990: Supplemental Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. . 1990b. World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. . 2001. World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. Wunsch, James S., and Dele Olowu. 1990. The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa. Boulder: Westview Press. Young, Crawford. 1988a. "The African State and Its Colonial Legacy." Pp. 2 5 - 6 6 in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.). The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa. Boulder: Westview Press. . 1988b. "Politics in A f r i c a . " Pp. 4 8 7 - 5 3 8 in Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (eds.). Comparative Politics Today: A World View. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman. . 1989. "Beyond Patrimonial Autocracy: The African Challenge." Pp. 2 2 - 2 4 in Beyond Autocracy in Africa. Atlanta: The Carter Center of Emory University. . 1994. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press. . 1999a. "Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet." In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.). Democratization in Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. . 1999b. "The Third Wave of Democratization in A f r i c a . " Pp. 1 5 - 3 8 in Richard Joseph (ed.). State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. . 2000. "The Heritage of Colonialism." Pp. 23^12 in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.J. Africa in World Politics. Boulder: Westview Press. Young, Crawford, and T h o m a s Turner. 1985. The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Zartman, I. William (ed.). 1995. Collapsed States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Zolberg, Aristide R. 1966. Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa. Chicago: Rand McNally.

The Economies of Africa Virginia DeLancey

M

PRECOLONIAL ECONOMIES

The earliest economies in sub-Saharan Africa were based on hunting, fishing, and gathering food. Economic activity varied, however, depending upon geographic location. In some regions of the continent, populations moved continually to search for food as the seasons changed. In regions where conditions were favorable year-round, populations were relatively sedentary (Clark, 1962:211-214). (See Chapter 2 for more on the relationship between Africa's geography and economic activities.) Hunting and gathering societies persist today, such as the San of the Kalahari Desert in southern Africa and the Mbuti and the M'Baka of equatorial Africa. Pastoral societies are even more prevalent, particularly in the Sahel (areas bordering the Sahara Desert) and the savanna lands (grasslands) throughout the continent. The Fulani (Fulbe) of West Africa and the Maasai, the Somali, and the Turkana of East Africa are examples of pastoral peoples. Nevertheless, over time, populations became increasingly sedentary. As livestock and crops, especially cereals such as millet and sorghum, became domesticated, populations began to permanently occupy lands that previously could support only temporary settlements. Their economies became based upon agriculture or on agro-pastoralism (Wickins, 1986:33-36).! Although societies became more sedentary over time, they did not necessarily become more isolated. On the contrary, the change to crop cultivation and/or livestock management meant that it was no longer necessary to search constantly for food. It provided both the opportunity to produce surplus food and the possibility to specialize in the production of food or other commodities for exchange in the market. It also allowed time to develop commercial networks. As a result, although many economies

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were basically self-sufficient—producing all necessary food, clothing, household objects, and farm equipment—many economies also included trade. M a r k e t s developed for the exchange of food crops and livestock as well as f o r household and f a r m equipment within local e c o n o m i e s and a m o n g n e i g h b o r i n g c o m m u n i t i e s . Trade developed over very great distances as well. Gold f r o m western Africa was traded internationally beginning as early as the eighth century (Fage, 1959:15, 47; Herskovits and Harwitz, 1 9 6 4 : 2 9 9 - 3 0 0 ) . Spices and tropical products were traded between eastern A f r i c a and the M i d d l e East. During the Middle Ages, gold, salt, and slaves, as well as m a n y other products, continued to be traded along the trans-Saharan caravan routes that connected sub-Saharan Africa, especially western A f r i c a , with northern Africa ( N e u m a r k , 1 9 7 7 : 1 2 7 - 1 3 0 ) . Clearly, A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s were interdependent and based on longdistance trade long b e f o r e contact with the Europeans (Davidson, 1972: 84). It was not until the 1400s, when Europeans began to explore the coasts of Africa, that A f r i c a n economies began to have m a j o r interaction with the economies of Europe. Precolonial contacts with the international economy beyond the continental borders d e v e l o p e d in eastern Africa as a result of trade along the perimeter of the Indian Ocean with the Middle East and Asia. Some of the earliest references to this trade occurred about A.D. 150. Because of the use of sea transport rather than camels, the products traded were less restricted to luxuries, although ivory was the most important c o m m o d i t y until the end of the nineteenth century. Other African commodities that entered the trade were slaves, 2 m a n g r o v e tree poles for house construction, iron, and gold (Austen, 1987:59). Beginning about 1500, first the Portuguese and then the O m a n i attempted to control the Indian Ocean trade along the coast of eastern Africa, although other countries continued to trade as well (Austen, 1987:60-62). In the nineteenth century, the British succeeded in gaining political dominance over the coast of eastern Africa. They attempted to destroy the slave trade but were not successful immediately. However, ivory, resins, cloves, and other " l e g i t i m a t e " products were also exported f r o m as far south on the continent as M o z a m b i q u e through Zanzibar in exchange f o r m a n u f a c t u r e d goods f r o m Britain, France, and the United States. During this time, there was considerable expansion of trade far into the interior of the continent in c o m m o d i t i e s such as f o o d s t u f f s , iron (and iron implements), copper, salt, and other export goods such as cloves, cowries, gum copal, copra, and cereals (Austen, 1987:60-63). In western Africa, the Portuguese voyages of exploration, beginning in the fifteenth century, brought the coastal societies into contact with the international economy. Over time, economic relations increased f r o m Senegal to Angola, although Europeans seldom settled on this part of the continent because of the harsh climate and the associated health risks. Instead,

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European traders, who relied on African intermediaries to reach the hinterland, established permanent trading posts, called "factories," on shipboard (Austen, 1987:81-84). Although certain c o m m o d i t i e s such as ivory, timber, gum, and wax were staple exports from the African continent, there were other commodities that were especially important at different periods of time. The Portuguese, then later the Dutch, British, and the Danish, came to search f o r gold. The trade in gold reached its peak in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and then declined, either because of the inability to mine additional gold with the technology of that era or because of the increase in demand for slaves. The demand for slaves arose with the development of European-owned sugar plantations. A f t e r 1600, as the Dutch, British, and French opened plantations in the N e w World, the d e m a n d for slaves increased rapidly, reaching its peak in the 1800s. Between 1810 and 1870 the slave trade was declared illegal for Europeans and North Americans, although it continued for many more years. The most immediate economic impact of the slave trade was the loss of an enormous source of productive human labor and the resultant redistribution of the population of the continent. The civil disruption associated with slaving also had economic effects. Many of those who were not captured died during the raids or went into hiding to escape being caught. Agricultural production must have decreased, in part because of the difficulty of farming during the raids. In addition, the strongest young men and women were forced to leave their farms or disappeared on their own initiative until danger subsided. Health was also affected as a result of new diseases such as cholera and smallpox, which were introduced by the movement of peoples through the continent. Susceptibility to disease also increased, resulting from the poor diets and reduced food consumption that occurred with the disruption of agriculture. This surely lowered productivity for physical reasons as well as for psychological reasons. "Legitimate" trade of vegetable oils such as palm oil, palm kernels, and peanuts began to increase f r o m the beginning of the nineteenth century, while trade of wild rubber developed later in the century. T h e Industrial Revolution continuing in Europe during the nineteenth century provided the opportunity for shifting f r o m the illegal trade in slaves to trade in the raw materials that were needed for European industry (Austen, 1987:85-87).

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THE INFLUENCE OF COLONIALISM

The partition of Africa among the European powers in the late 1800s had both economic and political origins. Although imperialism may have spread to protect strategic transport routes and to demonstrate national power

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and prestige, p e r h a p s its m o s t i m m e d i a t e purpose was to protect e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s that h a d b e e n d e v e l o p i n g o v e r the past several c e n t u r i e s . T h e Berlin C o n f e r e n c e of 1 8 8 4 - 1 8 8 5 m a r k e d the b e g i n n i n g of this new era of e c o n o m i c as well as political relationships b e t w e e n E u r o p e and A f r i c a . T h e e c o n o m i c i m p a c t of c o l o n i a l i s m was significant and varied. It aff e c t e d p r o d u c t i o n , d i s t r i b u t i o n , and c o n s u m p t i o n on the c o n t i n e n t . A s the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n s p r e a d t h r o u g h o u t E u r o p e , i n c r e a s e d q u a n t i t i e s of r a w m a t e r i a l s w e r e r e q u i r e d f o r the g r o w t h of p r o d u c t i o n in the recently e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t o r i e s . T h e t r a d e in p r i m a r y c o m m o d i t i e s that h a d b e g u n earlier in the century e x p a n d e d to include other c o m m o d i t i e s as a result of s u c c e s s f u l e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n w i t h c r o p s i n t r o d u c e d f r o m o t h e r parts of the w o r l d . A m o n g t h e s e w e r e c o t t o n and other fibers i n t r o d u c e d for export to the n e w E u r o p e a n textile mills. C o f f e e , tea, and c a c a o were introduced for the p r o d u c t i o n of b e v e r a g e s and s w e e t s for wealthy E u r o p e a n s . Cultivation of these export crops b r o u g h t m a n y A f r i c a n f a r m e r s into the cash e c o n o m y either as s m a l l h o l d e r s or as w a g e e m p l o y e e s on plantations. F o l l o w i n g the E u r o p e a n a s s u m p t i o n that only m e n w e r e f a r m e r s , production of these crops w a s i n t r o d u c e d mainly to m e n , even though A f r i c a n w o m e n h a v e a l w a y s b e e n i m p o r t a n t f a r m e r s . As a result, A f r i c a n m e n bec a m e the most important export c r o p producers, while w o m e n continued to p r o d u c e f o o d crops to sustain their f a m i l i e s . H o w e v e r , w h e n w o m e n were able to p r o d u c e a surplus of f o o d crops, they o f t e n sold t h e m in local markets to earn extra cash. T h i s pattern has persisted until today and has continued to affect the sexual division of labor in A f r i c a n agriculture, as April G o r d o n discusses in C h a p t e r 10. W h e r e c l i m a t e a n d o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s were f a v o r a b l e , s o m e E u r o p e a n s m i g r a t e d to A f r i c a . T h e y e s t a b l i s h e d their o w n f a r m s or p l a n t a t i o n s , settling s o m e of the best, most fertile land, particularly in eastern, central, and s o u t h e r n A f r i c a . T h i s h a s h a d b o t h e c o n o m i c and political r e p e r c u s s i o n s o v e r time, with South A f r i c a r e p r e s e n t i n g the e x t r e m e (see C h a p t e r 13). T h e E u r o p e a n f a c t o r i e s c r a v e d not only agricultural c r o p s but also m i n e r a l s . C o p p e r , d i a m o n d , a n d gold m i n e s , as well as m i n e s f o r cobalt, m a n g a n e s e , and o t h e r m i n e r a l s , w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d , m a i n l y in central and s o u t h e r n A f r i c a . T h e d e m a n d f o r l a b o r in these m i n e s led to distinct patterns of m i g r a t i o n to supply that labor. Young m e n left h o m e and even migrated across b o r d e r s to work in the m i n e s of the R h o d e s i a s a n d S o u t h A f r i c a . M a n y y o u n g m e n also m i g r a t e d f r o m the poor, l a n d l o c k e d h i n t e r l a n d to work f o r w a g e s on the c o a s t a l plantations in western A f r i c a . T h e y went either permanently or for long periods of time, a l t e r n a t i n g with short visits h o m e . T h i s c h a n g e d the role of the w i v e s and f a m i l i e s w h o w e r e o f t e n left behind. T h e w o m e n a t t e m p t e d to f a r m without the a s s i s t a n c e of their m e n , o f t e n taking o v e r the agricultural tasks f o r m e r l y d o n e by m e n . S o m e t i m e s they received seasonal assist a n c e f r o m the m e n w h e n t h e y w e r e able to take leave f r o m their w a g e

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employment to return home to help with the heaviest work of preparing the land for the next farming season or harvesting the crops. Where migration did not occur naturally, the movement of people was sometimes " a s s i s t e d . " Forced labor was not uncommon; it was often demanded by colonial governments to build roads and railroads or to work on the plantations. The increased production o f export commodities not only caused population movement but also affected the infrastructure o f the continent. It led to the development o f new distribution systems. Roads and railroads were built to evacuate the commodities from the hinterland to the coast for export to Europe. However, they did not connect and integrate countries on the continent. This too is a pattern that persists today and has been a constraint upon the ability of countries to implement regional economic integration. ( S e e Map 2 . 3 . ) Colonialism affected consumption as well. T h e new industries of Europe sought not only sources of raw materials from their colonies but also markets for the products they produced. Colonies provided "captive consumers"; the special trade preferences that were often set up between the colonial powers and their colonies remain strong today. As African workers entered the money economy, they began to desire imported consumer goods that were not produced domestically or luxuries such as b i c y c l e s and radios. Increasing numbers of Africans entered the money economy during the colonial years either as cash crop farmers or as wage earners. They worked to earn income not only to purchase goods but also to pay required taxes. B e c a u s e colonial administrations were responsible for financing much o f their budget in each country, they had to find sources of revenue. As a result, various forms of taxation were instituted, including taxation o f individuals as well as taxation o f export production and imports. In sum, colonialism did not originate to assist African countries to develop economically. It originated to benefit European countries. That is not to say that African countries did not receive any benefits, but the growth or development that occurred in those countries was mainly peripheral to the growth and development o f Europe. Only as it became clear that the colonies would soon seek independence did European countries begin to guide some o f their colonies toward the goal of developing their own economies. In doing so, they began to establish a few domestic industries (usually fledgling import-substitution industries for simple-to-produce goods such as matches, plastic shoes, beer and soft drinks, and textiles) in addition to continuing production of primary commodities for export. These efforts were minimal, however, and did little to make African economies self-sufficient. B y the 1960s, the colonial administrations were being dismantled rapidly across the continent—but many economic ties to the former colonial powers remained.

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POSTCOLONIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

In the years following World War II, European countries realized that soon they would have to grant their colonies independence and began to take definite steps toward the conclusion of their political rule. Britain and France especially began to draw up long-term development plans for their colonies. Following independence in the 1960s, nearly every sub-Saharan A f r i c a n country continued to prepare (with mixed success) m e d i u m - to long-term e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t plans, usually covering time spans of three to five years. In the early days of independence, Africans were optimistic that the plans would succeed in achieving the objective of promoting rapid economic growth as well as economic development within a few years. Alas, as the First D e v e l o p m e n t D e c a d e ended at the close of the 1960s, it was clear that the objective was not much closer to being achieved than at the beginning of the decade. This was especially difficult to accept, as it had been widely believed at the time of independence that as soon as the colonial powers left the continent and countries were able to take charge of their own economies, they would prosper. It was difficult to deal with rising aspirations that were not being satisfied. There were several reasons why initial development efforts failed to bring about the desired results. Recent experience in rebuilding Europe after World War II showed the success of the Marshall Plan in channeling large quantities of foreign aid to the European countries, but Europe had already been developed prior to its destruction. The infrastructure and capital had already existed. There was an educated, skilled labor force and experienced management. Foreign aid was used simply to rebuild and replace what had already existed. In Africa the situation was different. The physical infrastructure during colonial days was minimal and was designed mainly to produce and export primary commodities to Europe and to support the colonial administration. Thus, new road systems had to be built as well as water, electric, and telephone networks. Furthermore, appropriate educational systems had to be designed and human resources trained. Not only was the literacy level low, but the educational system that existed then, and that exists in many countries even today, was not relevant to the needs of society. In addition, few A f r i c a n s had been trained in management or public administration, and few had much experience in the practical aspects of running a government or operating a large-scale business or industry. At independence, most countries were still agrarian. However, it was widely believed at that time that industrialization was the best strategy to achieve development. As a result, the agricultural sector was ignored in many development plans and e m p h a s i s was placed upon building industries. Most of the initial attempts were aimed at setting up import-substitution industries to produce previously imported goods. It was believed that

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this would be beneficial because it would save foreign exchange. It was forgotten, however, that if these industries took the place of industries that could produce for export, the countries would lose the opportunity to earn foreign exchange, which was required to import necessary capital (e.g., technology) for development. In addition, import-substitution industries do not always save foreign exchange as planned, because they often must import the required production equipment, spare parts, and sometimes even the raw materials to go into the production process. Consequently, the emphasis on industrialization did not necessarily improve the economies of Africa. T h e drive to industrialize, in fact, hurt the e c o n o m i e s of many countries, particularly the agricultural sectors. It stimulated rural-urban migration, yet there were insufficient jobs in the cities to absorb those who had left the countryside. And, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the net emigration rate f r o m the rural areas was one of the causes of the decrease in food production that has led to the continentwide food crisis. During the Second (1970s) and Third (1980s) D e v e l o p m e n t Decades, African countries began to recognize that there were problems in the agricultural sector, but few of t h e m invested heavily in that sector. During those decades, many African countries also recognized that political independence was a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for taking control of their destiny. They realized that it was necessary to have economic independence but that they had not been able to achieve it. Latin American economists had been the first to develop the theory of economic "dependency," but African countries soon discovered that it was applicable to them as well. For example, they were still tied to their former colonial powers through preferential trade agreements and bilateral aid. That is, their exports continued to be primary commodities, and trade (both exports and imports) was still directed toward the former colonizers. In addition, many countries had monocrop economies, where they depended primarily on one commodity for their export earnings; this continues even today. For example, in 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 5 the Seychelles received 91 percent of the value of its exports from fish and shellfish, Uganda received 83 percent f r o m coffee, Malawi received 66 percent f r o m tobacco, Réunion received 62 percent f r o m sugar, and Burkina Faso received 57 percent f r o m cotton. Other countries gained most of their foreign earnings f r o m a single mineral export. Algeria, Angola, Libya, and Nigeria, for example, received more than 90 percent of their export earnings from crude petroleum, gas, and petroleum products ( U N C T A D , 1 9 9 9 : 1 7 4 - 1 9 1 ) . In 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 1 , Guinea received 82 percent of its export earnings f r o m n o n f e r r o u s ores, Z a m b i a received 88 percent form copper, and Niger received 72 percent f r o m uranium (UNCTAD, 1994:196-218). Such undiversified e c o n o m i e s left A f r i c a n countries at the mercy of not only their f o r m e r colonial masters but also the w h i m s of the international market. W h e n the international price of their m a i n export product

Table 5.1 Africa's Commodity Dependence, 3 Selected Countries Algeria ($9.0 billion) Crude petroleum Gas Petroleum products Angola ($2.8 billion) Crude petroleum Precious/semiprecious stones (diamonds) Petroleum products Burkina Faso ($0.2 billion) Cotton Gold Vegetables (fresh/preserved)

45.9 30.7 18.4 91.7 3.7 2.9 56.8 17.5 8.1

Burundi ($0.1 billion) Coffee Gold Tea

61.2 19.1 6.1

Cameroon ($1.5 billion) Crude petroleum Wood, rough Coffee

30.7 15.6 8.8

Central Afr. Rep. ($0.1 billion) Precious/semiprecious 35.2 stones Natural abrasives 34.6 Cotton 13.9 Congo ($1.1 billion) Crude petroleum Precious/semiprecious stones Wood, rough

64.9 13.7 11.1

Cote d'lvoire ($3.0 billion) Cocoa Coffee Wood, shaped

39.9 10.7 10.0

Egypt ($3.5 billion) Crude petroleum Petroleum products Textile yam

21.9 14.5 10.3

Ethiopia ($0.4 billion) Coffee Leather Hides, skins

62.2 8.6 8.3

Gabon ($2.6 billion) Crude petroleum Wood, rough Base metal ores

78.5 13.4 4.9

Ghana ($1.7 billion) Cocoa Precious/semiprecious stones Aluminum

30.6 17.4 16.7

Guinea ($0.6 billion) b Base metal Precious/semiprecious stones Live animals

Rwanda ($0.04 billion) Coffee Tea Gold

58.2 16.1 8.0

Kenya ($1.7 billion) Tea 21.4 Coffee 16.0 Crude vegetable materials 5.9

Senegal ($0.5 billion) Inorganic elements, oxides Petroleum products Vegetable oils

19.6 15.5 13.2

Libya ($11.7 billion) Crude petroleum Petroleum products Gas

78.4 12.5 2.2

Seychelles ($0.02 billion) Fish Shellfish Special transactions

87.3 3.7 2.6

Madagascar ($0.3 billion) Coffee Spices (cloves) Shellfish, fresh/frozen

23.9 17.2 16.9

Malawi ($0.4 billion) Tobacco Tea Sugar, honey

Sierra Leone ($0.1 billion) Precious/semiprecious stones (diamonds) Base metal ores Vegetable oils

45.1 26.9 4.4

65.8 7.6 6.0

Mauritania ($0.5 billion) Iron ore Shellfish Fish

49.3 39.4 8.2

Mauritius ($1.4 billion) Clothing Sugar, honey Cotton fabrics

53.0 24.2 2.4

Morocco ($4.4 billion) Inorganic elements, oxides Shellfish Fertilizers, manufactured goods

82.2 6.7 2.3

11.7 10.1 7.2

South Africa ($26.7 billion) Special transactions Precious/semiprecious stones (diamonds) Coal

32.0 9.4 5.4

Sudan ($0.5 billion) Cotton Crude vegetable materials Seeds for vegetable oil

24.6 11.4

Tanzania ($0.5 billion) Coffee Cotton Fruit, nuts

20.8 17.6 9.2

Togo ($0.2 billion) Fertilizers Cotton Coffee

35.2 15.0 13.6

31.6

Mozambique ($0.2 billion) Shellfish Cotton Fruits, nuts

43.6 9.7 9.4

Niger ($0.03 billion) b Uranium Live animals Coffee

Tunisia ($5.0 billion) Clothing Crude petroleum Vegetable oils

29.4 7.3 5.3

71.7 13.5 1.0

Nigeria ($11.9 billion) Crude petroleum Cocoa Petroleum products

Uganda ($0.4 billion) Coffee Fish Hides, skins

82.7 4.0 3.4

90.5 1.8 1.7

Réunion ($0.2 billion) Sugar, honey Shellfish Fish

62.2 4.2 3.7

Zambia ($0.8 billion) b Copper Nonferrous base metals Precious/semiprecious stones Zimbabwe ($1.9 billion) Tobacco Pig iron Maize

87.5 5.2 1.5 29.4 8.6 4.7

Source: U N C T A D , Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1993:196-218; 199611997:174—191. Notes: a. Value of total exports and percentage of total exports of three leading items 1994/95. b. Data for these countries are f r o m 1990-1991.

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dropped, the revenues for their development plan suffered. In addition, over time the international "terms of trade" for their exports deteriorated. That is, African countries found that they had to export more and more of their primary commodities simply to earn enough foreign exchange to purchase the same quantity of manufactured goods as in the past. Not only did these former colonies remain dependent upon their former colonizers, but they also became dependent upon the wealthy, developed nations in general. Because of the unequal and exploitative power relationships in the international capitalist system that dominates the world, according to dependency theory or center-periphery models of development, the wealthy, developed countries (the "center") prevent the poor countries (the "periphery") from developing. Instead, the gap between the rich and poor countries remains or even widens as most of the benefits of trade go to the already developed countries. Moreover, within the peripheral countries, the members of certain elite groups, especially government officials, military leaders, and certain entrepreneurs, cooperate with the institutions of the p o w e r f u l center such as multinational corporations, as well as bilateral and multilateral foreign aid donors. In doing so, the elite promote their own interests, especially financial interests, but they also help to maintain themselves and their country in a dependent relationship with those powerful international institutions. As the 1980s began and African countries entered the Third Development Decade without much progress toward achieving their goals, considerable controversy arose as to the direction that renewed development efforts should take. Determined to take the initiative for their continent's development and to have some input into the development strategy for the next United Nations Development Decade, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Monrovia Declaration in 1979. The strategy emphasized self-reliant development. In April 1980, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). It identified actions that needed to be taken to implement the objectives of the Monrovia Declaration. More specifically, the LPA set food self-sufficiency as its primary goal. It also urged self-reliance in industry, transport and communications, human and natural resources, and science and technology. The Final Act of Lagos (FAL) pressed for subregional economic integration with the goal of establishing an African Economic Community by the end of the century. In the fall of 1979, while the LPA was being finalized, the African finance ministers, in their capacity as the African governors of the World Bank, sent a m e m o r a n d u m to the president of the World Bank. They requested that a special report be written on the economic problems of subSaharan African countries—a report that would include suggestions for solving those problems. The result was the preparation of Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (World Bank,

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African economies are highly dependent on export crops, like tea, whose prices have fallen drastically since the 1970s. 1981), more c o m m o n l y k n o w n as the Berg Report (after Elliot Berg, the coordinator of the group that wrote the report). T h e Berg Report stated that it accepted the long-term objectives of A f r i c a n d e v e l o p m e n t as expressed in the Lagos Plan of Action (based on the M o n r o v i a Declaration); however, it f o r e s a w the need for alternative short- and m e d i u m - t e r m action to respond to A f r i c a ' s e c o n o m i c difficulties. O n e of its most important r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s urged that aid in real terms be doubled in order to stimulate a renewal of economic growth. The central theme of the Berg Report stressed that more efficient use of scarce r e s o u r c e s — h u m a n and capital, managerial and technical, domestic and f o r e i g n — w a s essential for improving economic conditions in most A f r i c a n countries. It pointed out that public sector organizations would have to build the infrastructure and provide education, health care, and other services. That would create e n o r m o u s d e m a n d for capable administrators and m a n a g e r s , the scarcest resources in those countries; therefore, the report recommended that African governments seek ways to m a k e public sector organizations more efficient and place greater reliance on the private sector to fulfill those needs. The report also emphasized the interdependency of countries throughout the world and maintained that A f r i c a n countries should pursue their "comparative advantage" by striving to improve production of their export products. In effect, this meant that A f r i c a n countries should continue to

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export primary c o m m o d i t i e s like c o f f e e and use their foreign e x c h a n g e earnings to import essential m a n u f a c t u r e d goods and even their food requirements. This was unacceptable to African governments, and it initiated a heated debate. African governments believed that implementation of such a policy would most certainly leave their countries in a permanent state of dependency and poverty and prevent them from solving their ever increasing problems of feeding their rapidly growing populations. Pursuing their comparative advantage in production and export of primary commodities would make them dependent upon the developed world for their food supplies as well as for capital goods (e.g., technology) and many m a n u f a c tured c o n s u m e r goods. Even worse, those capital and other m a n u f a c t u r e d goods were becoming increasingly expensive as long-term deterioration in the terms of trade between manufactured goods and primary commodities occurred. Even the cost of imported food requirements, such as wheat, was becoming increasingly expensive. In response to criticism of the Berg Report by A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s , the World Bank issued several f o l l o w - u p reports, 3 including Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (World Bank, 1989b:xi—xii). The latter affirmed: 1. Most A f r i c a n countries have embarked upon structural a d j u s t m e n t programs designed to transform their e c o n o m i e s and m a k e them more competitive. 2. To achieve f o o d security, provide jobs, and improve living standards, A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s must achieve an annual growth rate of 4 - 5 percent. 3. For growth to be sustainable, major efforts must be made to protect the environment. 4. E c o n o m i c growth must be based upon agriculture f o r at least the next decade. 5. Agriculture must expand twice as fast as at present in order to feed the rapidly growing population and decrease malnutrition. 6. The key to f o o d security is to develop and apply new technology while slowing population growth rates. An important theme of the report is that sound m a c r o e c o n o m i c policies and an efficient infrastructure are necessary for the productive use of resources, but that they are not sufficient to t r a n s f o r m the structure of African economies. Major efforts are needed to build African capacities; to produce a better-trained, healthier population; and to strengthen the institutional f r a m e w o r k within which development can take place. T h e report supports the call m a d e by the U N E C A , the United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Programme ( U N D P ) , and the United Nations International C h i l d r e n ' s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) for a human-centered development strategy.

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The report also stresses that good governance is important, that there must be an efficient public service, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public. There must be a better balance between the government and the governed. (Donald Gordon explains in Chapter 4 how African political systems have hindered economic development.) The report contains proposals to give ordinary people, and especially women, greater responsibility for improving their lives. This can be achieved best through grassroots organization that nurtures rather than obstructs informal sector enterprises and that promotes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intermediary bodies. In other words, development must be more bottom-up and less top-down; it must include more participation, particularly in the planning stages, by those who will benefit f r o m it. Because the difficulties facing Africa are so formidable, the report encourages joint action among all the partners in development—African governments and multilateral institutions, the private sector and the donors, official and n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations. It maintains that by working together, African governments will be able to achieve more rapid progress toward regional cooperation and integration, the central theme of the Lagos Plan of Action as well as the African Development Bank. The earlier World Bank reports as well as this one call for increased aid. They note, however, that aid must be accompanied by improved policies because, in the long run, dependency on aid must be reduced and eliminated. Moreover, in the short run, ways must be found to mobilize resources, including measures to reduce African debt (World Bank, 1989b:xii).

•

CURRENT ISSUES

Since the 1960s, when most sub-Saharan African countries gained political independence, the continent has experienced persistent economic problems. These economic problems, in turn, have affected the social aspects of development, that is, the health, education, and general quality of life. Throughout the continent, economic growth 4 has occurred, but the rate of growth has varied by country. The existence of economic growth, even rapid economic growth, however, does not m e a n that e c o n o m i c development is also occurring. For e x a m p l e , e c o n o m i c growth may increase inc o m e inequality within countries if the wealthy control the resources and reap the benefits of increased production. Economic growth may also result in environmental degradation in the race to increase production. Neither of these c o n s e q u e n c e s of e c o n o m i c growth can be considered economic development. Neither of these consequences improves the overall quality of life of the people in terms of reducing poverty, increasing the equality of income distribution, and decreasing unemployment, some of the most important goals of economic development. Yet, if economic growth is

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slow, it is more difficult to achieve the goals of development. This is particularly true if population growth is also rapid. It would be extremely difficult to achieve development if population growth is more rapid than economic growth, because this would cause the gross national product (GNP) per capita to actually decline. In fact, the worst scenario has occurred in subSaharan Africa; overall economic growth has decreased over the decades since independence while the population growth rate has increased. Economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa has also varied over time. From 1961 to 1972, per capita income increased. Those were optimistic years immediately after independence when there was a net positive inflow of foreign investment and assistance, and when population growth was lower than it is today. From 1973 to 1982, economies stagnated, at least partly from the impact of adverse external factors. For example, in 1973 when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) agreed to a dramatic increase in oil prices, it immediately affected the supply of foreign exchange of African countries. The increased prices benefited the few African petroleum exporters (Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, and Congo) by increasing their supply of foreign exchange. However, it was an economic disaster for most African countries. It severely depleted their reserves of foreign exchange or increased their already heavy burden of debt as they attempted to continue to maintain imports of petroleum necessary for continuing their previously determined development plans. The impact of the oil crisis was compounded by a severe drought that stretched across the entire Sahelian region in 1972-1973. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled the drought-stricken areas, flocking to the cities or seeking new pastures, often crossing borders into other countries. Agricultural production decreased drastically, and livestock starved to death. The affected countries required immediate supplies of imported food and food aid to prevent mass starvation of their populations. This put a further burden on foreign exchange reserves and increased the debt of many countries. These mainly external factors in combination with domestic policy shortcomings resulted in a slowing of economic growth. A similar oil crisis in 1978 and declining world prices for the primary commodity exports of Africa, along with continued domestic policy deficiencies, led to a period of actual economic decline in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. Estimates of annual GNP per capita growth from 1980 to 1993 vary from - 0 . 8 percent to - 1 . 8 percent (Katsouris and Bentsi-Enchill, 1995:1, 10; World Bank 1995:163; UNDP, 1995:195). In 1994, sub-Saharan Africa began to recover, and by 1995, the region achieved positive growth of per capita income for the first time in many years. This was repeated in 1996 and again in 1997— a result of better weather conditions, fewer armed conflicts in a number of countries, and strong growth in export earnings that improved the trade and current account balances, as well as debt and debt servicing ratios (UNCTAD,

In many African countries, much of the infrastructure of roads, railways, and ports has deteriorated—a symptom of the economic crisis gripping the continent.

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1998:124). By 1998, however, G N P per capita declined by 4.8 percent. This setback was due mainly to the Asian crisis that occurred during those years. The value of exports fell because c o m m o d i t y prices collapsed, and export volumes also declined. In addition, industrial growth rates dropped, and fiscal budget deficits rose ( U N C T A D , 1999b:6; World Bank, 2000a: table 2.19; 2 0 0 0 b : 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 ) . Today, sub-Saharan Africa is in the depths of an economic crisis. This crisis is characterized by weak agricultural growth, a decline in industrial output, poor export production, disintegration of the productive and infrastructural facilities, unsupportable levels of debt, deteriorating social indicators and institutions (especially education, public health and sanitation, housing, and potable water), destruction of the environment, and the invasive impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic (World Bank, 1989b:2; United Nations, n.d.:i). As a result of this crisis, the standard of living of most A f r i c a n s has declined in recent years, and there is increased poverty throughout the continent. Some of the most important issues that have affected sub-Saharan African economies in the 1980s and 1990s, and which continue to have an impact in the new millennium, include the following: • • • • • • • • • • •

The impact of HIV/AIDS The debt crisis Rapid population growth and declining per capita income Weak agricultural growth rates and the food crisis Urbanization and unemployment Deforestation and environmental degradation The marginalization of women in the development process The role of the public sector: state-owned corporations, investment, and control of the price system Economic integration Domestic and international conflicts Structural a d j u s t m e n t : the role of the World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations, and the OAU

While some of these topics are discussed in other chapters (see especially Chapters 4, 6, 7, 8, and 10), each will be discussed briefly below to emphasize its economic significance.

V

The Impact of HIV/AIDS

In Chapter 7, April Gordon discusses the impact of AIDS on A f r i c a ' s population. AIDS exerts one of the most important negative impacts on the economies of sub-Saharan African countries today. T h e most recent data f r o m U N A I D S , the Joint U N P r o g r a m m e on H I V / A I D S , indicates that

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there are currently 34.3 m i l l i o n adults and children living with H I V / A I D S w o r l d w i d e , of w h i c h 2 4 . 5 m i l l i o n (71 p e r c e n t ) are living in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a . N e a r l y all of t h o s e w h o h a v e c o n t r a c t e d the i n f e c t i o n are in the 1 5 - 4 9 a g e g r o u p ( 2 3 . 4 m i l l i o n ) , the m o s t e c o n o m i c a l l y p r o d u c t i v e a g e group, with w o m e n representing m o r e than 5 0 percent (12.9 million) of the total. A p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 m i l l i o n c h i l d r e n u n d e r the age of 15 are i n f e c t e d , a n d 12.1 m i l l i o n h a v e b e c o m e o r p h a n s o v e r the y e a r s ( U N A I D S , 2 0 0 0 ) . T h e s e i n f e c t i o n rates h a v e p r o f o u n d c u r r e n t and f u t u r e e c o n o m i c c o n s e q u e n c e s for A f r i c a . T h e e c o n o m i c i m p a c t of H I V / A I D S is b r o a d a n d m u l t i f a c e t e d . Initially, the g r e a t e s t i m p a c t w a s at the m i c r o ( h o u s e h o l d ) level, but the impact has n o w r e a c h e d the m a c r o (national) level in m a n y countries. 1. Initially, t h o s e w h o are H I V p o s i t i v e m a y h a v e to deal with the s t i g m a of the i n f e c t i o n and s u b s e q u e n t d i s e a s e , not only a f f e c t i n g f r i e n d ships and f a m i l i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but also m a k i n g it d i f f i c u l t or i m p o s s i b l e to obtain e m p l o y m e n t . 2. Within the h o u s e h o l d , the death of a s p o u s e m a y c a u s e f a m i l y inc o m e to d e c r e a s e d r a m a t i c a l l y , and it m a y also alter the d i v i s i o n of labor, requiring the r e m a i n i n g s p o u s e either to take over the h o u s e h o l d duties of the deceased spouse her/himself or find a substitute. T h e latter m a y be paid h o u s e h o l d labor or a m e m b e r of the e x t e n d e d f a m i l y , w h o m u s t still be c o m p e n s a t e d in s o m e way, w h i c h will increase the e x p e n s e s of the surviving spouse. 3. B e c a u s e of the h e t e r o s e x u a l t r a n s m i s s i o n , there is a strong likelih o o d of both h u s b a n d and w i f e d y i n g , l e a v i n g i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r s of orp h a n s . T h i s has a f u r t h e r i m p a c t on the c h i l d r e n ' s s t a n d a r d of living and c h a n c e s f o r e d u c a t i o n , a n d it p l a c e s an i n c r e a s e d b u r d e n on the f a m i l y m e m b e r s w h o a b s o r b t h e m into their h o u s e h o l d s . 4. As the n u m b e r of i n f e c t e d w o m e n increases, the p e r c e n t a g e of children born H I V positive is i n c r e a s i n g , and the n u m b e r of children d y i n g as a result of this is increasing. 5. T h e largest n u m b e r s of A I D S c a s e s tend to be a m o n g m e n a n d w o m e n in the m o s t p r o d u c t i v e a g e g r o u p s . A s the d i s e a s e c o n t i n u e s to s p r e a d , it has b e g u n to h a v e a p r o f o u n d i m p a c t on the supply of labor, red u c i n g the size and p r o d u c t i v i t y of the labor f o r c e , i n c l u d i n g the h i g h l y trained sector. In Z i m b a b w e , f o r e x a m p l e , it has been r e p o r t e d that busin e s s e s are g o i n g b a n k r u p t b e c a u s e of the d e a t h s of skilled, e d u c a t e d staff m e m b e r s , and in Z a m b i a the n u m b e r of new teachers trained is just keeping pace with the n u m b e r of teachers w h o are dying of A I D S ( U N A I D S , 2000). 6. In rural areas, there m a y be a reduction of the n u m b e r of adults w h o can p r o d u c e f o o d , and there m a y be a s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e in the g e n d e r based division of labor on the f a r m . T h e death of a spouse m a k e s it difficult for either remaining spouse to f a r m by her/himself. It has been reported that

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in countries like Z i m b a b w e , for instance, where 2,000 people die each week of A I D S , agricultural production in the aggregate is falling (UNAIDS, 2000). 7. In general, the age distribution of the population in some countries is changing with more people in their sixties and seventies than there are in their thirties and forties. This is altering the overall dependency ratio, requiring a smaller percentage of the productive population to support a larger proportion of the elderly w h o are b e y o n d normal retirement age (UNAIDS, 2000). 8. Hospitals are o v e r w h e l m e d by A I D S patients. M a n y have inadequate supplies of even basic antibiotics to fight the pneumonia, tuberculosis, or mouth f u n g u s that a c c o m p a n y A I D S , let alone the sophisticated drugs that have eased suffering in wealthy countries. Thus, the increased costs of hospital or outpatient care and medicine and the cost of education campaigns are driving up the health care costs of individuals as well as the national budget requirements of many countries ( U N A I D S , 2000). M

The Debt Crisis

Along with AIDS, the debt crisis perhaps has the greatest negative impact on d e v e l o p m e n t in A f r i c a today. T h e debt crisis is not unique to African countries; however, it has affected their economies particularly severely. T h e actual amount of debt has increased rapidly and by a significant amount. Debt in sub-Saharan Africa increased from $6 billion in 1970 to $60.9 billion in 1980, $166.4 billion in 1990, and $219.4 billion in 1997. It is estimated to have reached $225.8 billion in 1998. T h e latter is equal to 68.3 percent of sub-Saharan A f r i c a ' s G N P in that year and 232.1 percent of its export earnings (World Bank, 19889a:20; 1994b:216; 1999a: 200). The debt/export ratio varies significantly, however, a m o n g the individual countries. For example, it has ranged from 42.9 percent in Lesotho to 2850.9 percent in Guinea-Bissau, and twenty-eight countries had debt/ export ratios of over 200:1 by the end of 1994 (World Bank, 1995:206-207; Katsouris, 1995:11). Most sub-Saharan African countries have had great difficulty servicing their debt. 5 Despite the problem, creditors have not taken much action until recently. This is because much of the debt is public debt, owed to other governments or international organizations. It is also because A f r i c a ' s commercial debt is only a small percentage of that of total developing country debt, too little to threaten the international banking system. Overall, debt service payments were 14.9 percent of export revenues in 1998 (World Bank. 1999b:38). That is, about 15 percent of the income earned f r o m exports was used simply to make annual payments of principal and interest on the debt. W h i l e this seems like a rather small percentage, it is misleading because it indicates actual rather than required transactions; countries have

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b e e n a c c u m u l a t i n g a r r e a r s rather t h a n m e e t i n g their entire d e b t s e r v i c e obligation each year. By 1998, they had a c c u m u l a t e d arrears of $ 1 8 . 3 million on interest p a y m e n t s and $37.9 million on principal p a y m e n t s (World B a n k , 1999b:38). T h e debt of A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s o r i g i n a t e d in the s a m e way as that of other highly indebted countries. It resulted f r o m a c o m p l e x c o m b i n a t i o n of events: 1. In 1973/74 and again in 1979/80, O P E C m e m b e r s a n n o u n c e d u n e x pected, sharp increases in the price of oil. A s m e n t i o n e d above, these price increases were beneficial to the f e w oil-exporting countries of s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a ; h o w e v e r , they were a c a t a s t r o p h e for the m a j o r i t y of countries that are oil i m p o r t e r s . For t h o s e f e w p e t r o l e u m e x p o r t e r s on the c o n t i n e n t , the increase in the price of oil led to b a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s surpluses; h o w e v e r , it led to h u g e b a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s d e f i c i t s f o r m o s t of the c o u n t r i e s that had to continue to import oil to keep their e c o n o m i e s on a growth path. 2. T h e e c o n o m i e s of the o i l - i m p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s s l o w e d d o w n . T h e s e included the e c o n o m i e s of s o m e of the industrialized countries. A s the latter c o u n t r i e s s o u g h t to r e s t r u c t u r e their o w n e c o n o m i e s to r e d u c e the bala n c e of p a y m e n t s and i n f l a t i o n a r y i m p a c t s of the oil price increases, they r e d u c e d e x p e n d i t u r e s on n o n e s s e n t i a l i m p o r t s , f o r e i g n travel, and f o r e i g n aid. T h e s e c u t b a c k s h a d r e p e r c u s s i o n s on the e c o n o m i e s of s u b - S a h a r a n Africa. 3. A s f o r e i g n aid f r o m the o i l - d e p e n d e n t d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s w a s red u c e d , c o m m e r c i a l b a n k credit was m a d e readily a v a i l a b l e . T h i s r e s u l t e d f r o m a large p o r t i o n of the oil p r o f i t s of the oil e x p o r t e r s being d e p o s i t e d into bank accounts; those f u n d s were then recycled as " p e t r o d o l l a r " loans, particularly to less d e v e l o p e d countries ( L D C s ) . During the 1970s, A f r i c a n countries turned to such c o m m e r c i a l loans, at market rates of interest. T h i s w a s not m u c h of a p r o b l e m d u r i n g the late 1970s b e c a u s e interest rates w e r e low, often negative in real terms. 6 4. S o m e of those loans w e r e used for n o n p r o d u c t i v e p u r p o s e s such as the i m p o r t of n o n e s s e n t i a l c o n s u m e r g o o d s or for i n v e s t m e n t in p r o j e c t s with low rates of return, e s p e c i a l l y p u b l i c sector i n v e s t m e n t s . T h i s use of the loans failed to g e n e r a t e the f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e required to s e r v i c e the debts. 5. In a d d i t i o n , d u r i n g the 1980s the t e r m s of trade of s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a n countries d e c l i n e d as a result of both low world m a r k e t prices for the p r i m a r y c o m m o d i t i e s e x p o r t e d by A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s and rising import prices. 7 O v e r a l l , by 1986 the t e r m s of trade (using 1980 as the base year) h a d d e c l i n e d f r o m 100 to 72. B y 1988 they h a d d e c l i n e d to 65, a n d by 1993 they w e r e d o w n to an e s t i m a t e d 58 ( U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 1994:46). T h e significance of the declining t e r m s of trade is that it began to take a greater and greater quantity of A f r i c a n e x p o r t s (usually primary c o m m o d i t i e s such

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as a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s and m i n e r a l s ) to pay f o r their imports. T h o s e imports included p e t r o l e u m p r o d u c t s , m a n u f a c t u r e d goods, and capital g o o d s r e q u i r e d for f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t . Facing low or negative real interest rates, A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s c o n t i n u e d to s u c c u m b to the t e m p t a t i o n to b o r r o w f r o m c o m m e r c i a l sources that were actively c o m p e t i n g for their business. 6. T h e e c o n o m i c stabilization p o l i c i e s of d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s c o n t i n ued to affect A f r i c a n countries d u r i n g the 1980s. By 1984, f o r e i g n aid had s t a g n a t e d at $7 billion. D u r i n g that s a m e year, net private i n v e s t m e n t d e c r e a s e d by $ 4 8 0 million (Todaro, 1989:596). As a final blow, interest rates rose, c a u s i n g the debt s e r v i c e b u r d e n of b o r r o w e r s to i n c r e a s e . 8 T h i s w a s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s b e c a u s e , by that t i m e , they had a m u c h greater proportion of their debt f r o m c o m m e r c i a l and other private sources. S i n c e b a n k s operate on the principal of profits, they r e q u i r e d regular debt s e r v i c e p a y m e n t s . T h e c o m b i n a t i o n of increased debts and increased debt s e r v i c e burdens led rapidly to a debt crisis. S u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a n countries, a l o n g with other L D C s , s u d d e n l y f o u n d that they were u n a b l e to c o n t i n u e to m a k e their s c h e d u l e d p a y m e n t s . M e x i c o was the first to a n n o u n c e the inability to service its d e b t in 1982, but A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s f o l l o w e d s o o n after. Unable to pay their debts, most A f r i c a n countries were c o m p e l l e d to s e e k v a r i o u s f o r m s of debt relief and to i m p l e m e n t structural a d j u s t m e n t programs (SAPs). O v e r the years, various f o r m s of debt relief have been p r o p o s e d by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y , i n c l u d i n g the T o r o n t o t e r m s , the L o n d o n t e r m s ( e n h a n c e d T o r o n t o t e r m s ) , the N a p l e s t e r m s , and the Lyon t e r m s , as imp r o v e m e n t s i m p l e m e n t e d in each f o r m of relief p r o v e d i n a d e q u a t e to resolve the p r o b l e m . O n e of the reasons is that the a b o v e p r o p o s a l s e x c l u d e d m u l t i l a t e r a l debt f r o m debt r e d u c t i o n and c o n c e n t r a t e d on bilateral debt. Yet m u l t i l a t e r a l debt a c c o u n t e d for an i n c r e a s i n g p r o p o r t i o n of total d e b t b e c a u s e countries began to borrow heavily f r o m multilateral sources in the 1980s in o r d e r to f i n a n c e debt s e r v i c i n g to private c r e d i t o r s and also to s u p p o r t I M F / W o r l d Bank structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s . E c o n o m i c perf o r m a n c e did not i m p r o v e f o r m a n y countries u n d e r the S A P s ; thus m u c h of the b o r r o w i n g was not r e p a y a b l e . T h e H e a v i l y I n d e b t e d P o o r C o u n t r i e s ( H I P C ) Initiative l a u n c h e d in 1996 by the World Bank and the I M F is one of the most recent attempts by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y to relieve the debt b u r d e n s of the p o o r e s t c o u n t r i e s . Initially, there w e r e so m a n y c o n d i t i o n s to be m e t in o r d e r to q u a l i f y u n d e r the H I P C Initiative, that by July 1999 only f o u r c o u n t r i e s h a d b e e n g r a n t e d actual debt r e d u c t i o n , t w o of w h i c h w e r e A f r i c a n ( U g a n d a and M o z a m b i q u e ) , and only three m o r e (including B u r k i n a Faso, Mali, and C o t e d ' l v o i r e ) w e r e to b e n e f i t by 2001. T h u s the m a j o r creditor c o u n t r i e s a g r e e d to the C o l o g n e Initiative in 1999 as an e n h a n c e d H I P C p a c k a g e , designated H I P C - 2 , w h i c h relaxed the strict criteria for eligibility

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and m a d e a clearer link between debt relief followed by poverty reduction programs. For example in 2000, under the new conditions of HIPC-2, the World Bank and I M F approved Mauritania for debt relief after it reaches m a c r o e c o n o m i c targets and prepares a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) (Katsouris, 1999:1; Katsouris, 2000:6). While progress has been made toward granting debt relief through HIPC1 and HIPC-2 and by some bilateral creditors (Paris Club), it has been slow and incomplete. Thus, Jubilee 2000, an international coalition of N G O s , has called for the total cancellation of poor country debt. Because thirty-three of the original HIPC countries were African, Jubilee 2000 has made sub-Saharan Africa's debt burden its major focus (Collins, 1999:16-17).

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Rapid Population Growth and Declining Per Capita Income

In precolonial and colonial days, birthrates were high in A f r i c a , as they were in Europe and the United States when the latter economies were still mainly agrarian. Since World War II, and especially since independence, many new medicines have been developed, public health measures have been expanded (such as providing clean water), and African populations have slowly gained greater access to trained health officials and medical facilities. As a result, death rates dropped dramatically across the continent, although this was more true in urban than in rural locations. Birthrates have remained high, however, producing increased population growth rates in some countries until c o n f o u n d e d by the impact of A I D S related deaths, which have increased relentlessly in recent years One of the important economic implications of high population growth rates is that it is difficult for countries to maintain or increase the amount of food production per person. That is, if population grows at a rate faster than that of f o o d production, people will experience a decrease in the amount of food they can consume unless countries begin to import food or resort to food aid. If countries attempt to close the food gap by importing food, they must pay for it with f o r e i g n exchange, which presents further problems, because most A f r i c a n countries already suffer f r o m severe balance of payments problems and thus shortages of foreign exchange. In addition, if countries resort to f o o d aid, they increase their d e p e n d e n c y on other countries. A second economic implication of high population growth rates is that they require an expansion in services and infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and roads as well as supplies of water and electricity. Yet, A f r i c a n governments have had difficulty maintaining the services and infrastructure that now exist. A third e c o n o m i c implication of high population growth rates is that G N P must be divided among an increasing number of people if the growth

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rate of the population is greater than that of the GNP. Although a declining G N P per capita does not necessarily mean that development is decreasing, it suggests that development may be increasingly difficult to achieve. For example, if one goal of development is to increase the equality of incomes throughout the economy, then it may be necessary to redistribute income f r o m the rich to the poor if national income is not growing, a politically difficult task. Similarly, if another goal is to decrease unemployment, it may be difficult to find new j o b s for individuals if production is not increasing. In general, it will be more difficult to eradicate poverty in a stagnant or declining economy. In fact, from 1988 to 1998, twenty of the fortyfive sub-Saharan African countries for which data are available showed negative growth rates of GNP per capita, and eight others had growth rates lower than 1 percent. Thus, nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of the countries had either stagnant or declining economies on a per capita basis during that time period. It should not be unexpected, then, that the average growth rate of G N P per capita from 1988 to 1998 for sub-Saharan countries was also negative ( - 0 . 6 percent) (World Bank, 2000a:table 1.1).

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Weak Agricultural Growth Rates and the Food Crisis

Although the economies of most sub-Saharan African countries remain based upon agriculture, their agricultural sectors are not healthy. They have recorded weak growth rates of agricultural production. In fact, the overall growth rate of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa has been less than that of population. While the growth rate of population from 1990 to 1997 was 2.7-3.0 percent, depending on the source of data, the overall growth rate of agricultural production was approximately 2.1-2.6 percent. At the country level, the findings are similar. Among the individual countries, eleven out of forty-two had a negative average annual growth rate of agricultural production over the period 1990-1997. Moreover, the growth rate of agriculture was greater than that of population in only fifteen countries for which data are available; it was lower than that of population in seventeen of those countries (World Bank, 2000b:235, 251; 2000a:table 1.2, table 2.2). In effect, agricultural production per capita declined during those years, although it showed some recovery, with positive per capita growth, in 1998 (UNCTAD, 1999b:6). Within the agricultural sector, food production also was weak. The food production per capita index for sub-Saharan Africa in 1997 was 94 ( 1 9 8 9 1991 = 100). Thus on the average, individuals had access to only 94 percent as much food in 1997 as they did during the base years of 1989-1991. The average annual percentage growth of food production per capita was - 1 . 5 percent from 1975 to 1984. It improved to 0.4 percent between 1985 and 1989, but then decreased again to - 0 . 8 percent from 1990 to 1997. The growth rate in the latter period was negative for thirty countries, zero for

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two countries, and positive for only twelve countries (World Bank, 2000a: table 8.5). Moreover in 1998, there were localized food shortages in thirteen countries, due either to drought or civil strife (UNCTAD, 1999b:7). In the United States, only 2 percent of the labor force produces enough food to feed the U.S. population, sell large quantities on the world market, and still supply food aid to other countries, including many in Africa. The percentage of the labor force working in agriculture in Africa has decreased from 78 percent in 1965 to 68 percent in the 1990s (UNDP, 1995: 177; World Bank, 2000a:table 11.14). This is a problem, however, because those remaining have been unable to produce enough to feed the populations of their countries. Every country in sub-Saharan Africa imported cereals in 1993, and the total amount imported had more than tripled to 13,157,000 metric tons f r o m 4,108,000 metric tons in 1974 (World Bank, 1990:184; 1 9 9 5 : 1 6 8 - 1 6 9 ) . Furthermore, nearly every country (for which data were available) received f o o d aid in cereals in 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 5 , totaling 2,592,000 metric tons (World Bank 2000a:table 5.36). There are many reasons why agricultural production is weak. Ruralurban migration, discussed below, is only symptomatic of deeper problems that exist in the agricultural sector. Reasons for weak agricultural production include low levels of rural services such as access to water, cooking fuel, and electricity, and deficient infrastructure, particularly farm-to-market roads and other marketing channels. Other reasons for low agricultural production include lack of sufficient and relevant agricultural research and extension of the results of that research, especially new agricultural methods and technology. The reasons include, as well, uncertainty brought about by recent changes in land tenure legislation and the risk-averse reaction of reluctance to invest in the land. Finally, they include continued lack of attention to the important role of women in African agriculture, especially in food production for domestic consumption, and consequent failure to assist women farmers to increase their production. G o v e r n m e n t m a c r o e c o n o m i c policies have also hurt the agricultural sectors of African countries. Development policies in the past have emphasized other sectors of the economy to the neglect of agriculture. Recall that in the 1960s, development policies emphasized industrialization. W h e n it was realized that industrialization did not necessarily lead to development, governments began to pay lip service to promoting the Green Revolution in agriculture, though they continued to initiate development projects in the cities. It is not u n c o m m o n for the agricultural sector in many less developed countries to contribute a higher percentage of G N P than is invested in that sector. In sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, agriculture on the average contributed 20 percent of gross domestic product in 1997, although it ranged as high as 58 percent in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 55 percent in Ethiopia, 54 percent in the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau, 53 percent in Burundi, and 50 percent in Sierra

Government control over prices paid to farmers has been a major factor in declining food and export crop production.

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Leone (UNDP, 1999:184-187). Yet in the past, national investment in agriculture did not approach that percentage. One study of development plans in the late 1980s, which provided reasonably comparable data for seventeen sub-Saharan African countries, found that in thirteen of them the agricultural sector contributed a higher percentage to G D P than was reinvested in that sector. Planned investment was greater than the percentage contributed by that sector to G D P in only four of them (Metra Consulting, 1988). Other studies suggest that in many sub-Saharan countries, much of the public investment expenditure in agriculture was externally financed, often in the form of integrated rural development projects, but such expenditure has been decreasing in recent years. Available evidence indicates that the percent of government expenditure going to agriculture has remained under 10 percent, on average (UNCTAD, 1998:171). In sum, throughout sub-Saharan Africa, rural areas have often been exploited for the benefit of the urban areas, not only during colonial times but also since independence. Investing heavily in the urban areas makes political sense. It is difficult for farmers who are physically separated from each other and distant f r o m the urban-based politicians to form a united front to lobby for improved services and infrastructure and for higher prices for their products. The ever increasing numbers of urban constituents have immediate access to the government to pressure for their interests, including low food prices. Government policies to regulate the prices and marketing channels of agricultural products, especially for export crops and domestic staples, have affected production as well. In colonial days, government marketing boards were set up for individual crops to consolidate the export production of individual producers for sale on the international market. The marketing boards were designed to serve a price stabilization function as well. That is, when prices were high on the world market, they paid farmers a fixed price for their crop that was lower than the world market price. T h e difference between the producer price and the world market price was to be invested in the development of that crop and its marketing channels, and some was to be set aside in a price stabilization fund. When world market prices were low, the stabilization fund was to be used to maintain the prices paid to the farmers by supplementing the world market price. These marketing boards were maintained after independence, but their price stabilization function seldom worked well. The prices paid to farmers have nearly always been below the world market prices for the products, even when world market prices were low. Large proportions of the resources received from export sales have often been channeled into the development of urban areas rather than into the stabilization fund or into rural development in general. Many of these marketing boards have n o w been dismantled.

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It has also been common to regulate prices and marketing channels for domestic staples such as rice and maize. Governments know that farmers must receive prices that are high enough to provide the incentive to produce. They also know that if those higher prices are passed on to the consumers, a small increase in urban food prices might touch off riots that could topple the government. Heavy pressure in the urban areas to maintain low food prices has generally been translated into low incomes for the farmers (often women) who produce that food, and the farmers have responded. Fanners are rational, price-responsive human beings. When they fail to receive prices for their crops that will provide them with a minimal standard of income, they refuse to produce those crops. Some alter their production and plant other crops that are more lucrative. Government price policies may even encourage a trade-off of production from domestic food crops to export crops, even though producer prices for exports are also exploitative. The trade-off may occur if the prices paid for export crops are raised relative to those paid for domestic food crops. However, feeling exploited in general, some farmers simply give up farming altogether and try to find other ways of earning a living, or they migrate to the city. These are some of the important reasons there is a food crisis throughout Africa today, insufficient food is being produced to feed African populations, and there has been increasing dependence on food imports and food aid.

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Urbanization and Unemployment

Young people, especially educated young men, have been leaving the rural areas and moving to the cities in increasing numbers. By 1997, 32.3 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa lived in urban areas, and the urban population has been increasing at an annual rate of at least 4.7 percent since 1989 (World Bank, 2000a:320). This is not only because life is difficult and incomes are low in the countryside but also because the migrants expect that conditions will be better in the city. Development strategies emphasizing industrialization have caused many to leave the countryside in hopes of finding employment in industry, which is usually located in or near the cities. But industry has succeeded neither in achieving economic development for most countries nor even in providing employment for all the hopeful applicants. In fact, it has been found that a small increase in the number of jobs available may stimulate migration to such an extent that unemployment actually increases as a result. In sum, providing employment for labor-abundant economies is particularly difficult when capital-intensive (highly mechanized) industrialization strategies are pursued. Not only does migration to the cities not always provide the migrants with anticipated benefits, but it has often exacerbated the problems in the agricultural sector.

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As urbanization has interacted with high rates of population growth, economies have been unable to create sufficient jobs in the cities. For lack of other formal wage employment opportunities, uncounted numbers have looked for survival to the informal sector, where petty trading, commodity production, or services afford a typically meager income. Many have also migrated to other countries. This may be beneficial if it relieves unemployment at home, increases the standard of living of those who migrate, and provides remittances to family members who remain at home. But it may also be detrimental, particularly if those who migrate are the most skilled or the most educated, thus creating an international brain drain. It may also be a disaster if external events, such as wars, cause the migrants to flee back to their country of origin, causing an immediate unemployment crisis. Many of those who are unemployed in the cities are those who have migrated from the rural areas. Although they may have migrated because they concluded that their expected income in the city would exceed that in the rural areas, according to one prominent theory of migration, 9 they now find themselves without an income, unable to produce their own food, and required to purchase food from the rural areas. But it is becoming increasingly difficult for those who remain in the rural areas to maintain food production, as the most able young people are the ones who departed for the cities, leaving the farming to their aging parents or to wives who remain behind. Consequently, while there is an increasing need for food in the cities, there are fewer people remaining in the countryside to produce it; and many of those who continue to farm are becoming older and potentially less productive.

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Deforestation and Environmental Degradation

As population increases, forests are cut down for urban expansion, new farmlands, and household uses such as cooking fuel. But in sub-Saharan Africa, deforestation is also taking place in many countries because of the economic crisis. In an effort to increase exports to earn foreign exchange, to reduce the international debt burden, and to maintain imports, forests are being slashed, and rough unprocessed timber is being exported, with little enforcement of reforestation laws where they exist. While estimates indicate that the rate of deforestation has been declining in recent years, it remains significant. The highest rate from 1990 to 1995 was in Sierra l eone (3 percent), but rates in Angola, Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, and Togo all exceeded 1 percent (World Bank, 1998:364-365). The destruction of the forests has multiple repercussions on the economies of countries. The trees that are most valuable are the tropical hardwoods. Once gone, they cannot be replaced in the near future. Moreover, removal of the forests leads to problems of soil erosion and general degradation of the land, as well as to changes in climate, which in turn affect

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a g r i c u l t u r e . D e f o r e s t a t i o n also a f f e c t s rural d w e l l e r s , w h o m a y d e p e n d on the f o r e s t s f o r subsistence products such as c o o k i n g f u e l , f o o d , m e d i c i n e s , and b u i l d i n g materials. In a d d i t i o n to d e f o r e s t a t i o n , t h e r e are a l s o o t h e r e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n c e r n s . O n e of the m o s t i m p o r t a n t in s o m e c o u n t r i e s , such as N i g e r i a , h a s b e e n the p o l l u t i o n of land a n d w a t e r r e s u l t i n g f r o m p r o d u c t i o n of p e t r o l e u m , and the threat of pollution c o n t i n u e s , for e x a m p l e , with the intended d e v e l o p m e n t of a C h a d - C a m e r o o n pipeline. T h e s e and other e n v i r o n m e n t a l issues are e x a m i n e d by Julius N y a n g ' o r o in C h a p t e r 8. W h i l e current disregard f o r the e n v i r o n m e n t o f t e n reflects short-term e c o n o m i c interests, in the long run, e n v i r o n m e n t a l degradation will be ruinous for A f r i c a ' s future. In its 1992 D e v e l o p m e n t R e p o r t , the W o r l d B a n k ( 1 9 9 2 : 1 7 8 ) a r g u e s that e c o n o m i c e f f i c i e n c y and s o u n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l m a n a g e m e n t g o h a n d in h a n d . T h e B a n k and other a g e n c i e s , such as the U.S. A g e n c y f o r I n t e r n a tional D e v e l o p m e n t ( U S A I D ) , recognize, however, that e c o n o m i c pressures on g o v e r n m e n t s , poverty, and rapid p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h are the root p r o b l e m s that m u s t be a d d r e s s e d if A f r i c a ' s e n v i r o n m e n t is to be p r e s e r v e d to sustain the e c o n o m i c needs of f u t u r e generations (see Green, 1994).

81 The Marginalization of Women in the Development Process W o m e n ' s e c o n o m i c productivity and independence is a long-established tradition in m u c h of Africa. Not only do w o m e n g r o w most of the food and assist with cash crops, they are also actively involved in m a r k e t i n g f o o d stuffs. In the informal sector, w h e r e m a n y nonagricultural w o r k e r s p u r s u e their livelihood, w o m e n can be found providing valuable e c o n o m i c services and products. In the markets of West Africa, for instance, s o m e w o m e n have b e c o m e wealthy as cloth merchants, and s o m e of them have used their profits to b e c o m e o w n e r s of vehicles for l o n g - d i s t a n c e transport services. In wage j o b s in the formal economy, w o m e n help support themselves and their families. D e s p i t e the i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s w o m e n h a v e m a d e to A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s , the role of w o m e n is o f t e n underrated in o f f i c i a l e c o n o m i c statistics, and w o m e n ' s interests are ignored, if not p u r p o s e l y u n d e r m i n e d , by A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s and the international financial and d o n o r c o m m u n i t y . T h e n e g l e c t of w o m e n has e s p e c i a l l y hurt a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n , but it also n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t s other areas of the e c o n o m y , as sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n lessens w o m e n ' s o p p o r t u n i t i e s to c o n t r i b u t e their talents a n d skills to the development effort. T h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e calculates the H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t Index (HDI) each year for 174 countries to try to indicate the level of d e v e l o p m e n t of countries m o r e accurately than by simply using the size of GNP. T h e H D I m e a s u r e s a v e r a g e a c h i e v e m e n t s in life e x p e c t a n c y ,

The informal sector

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e d u c a t i o n a l a c h i e v e m e n t , and i n c o m e , but it d o e s not d i s a g g r e g a t e t h e s e indicators to reflect g e n d e r d i f f e r e n c e s in h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t . To address this d e f i c i e n c y , the U N D P d e v e l o p e d t w o n e w i n d i c e s in 1995 to c a p t u r e g e n d e r inequalities. O n e of the n e w indices is the G e n d e r - R e l a t e d D e v e l o p m e n t Index (GDI). It m e a s u r e s d e v e l o p m e n t in the s a m e way as the HDI, but it adjusts the results for g e n d e r inequality. T h e closer a c o u n t r y ' s G D I is to its H D I , the less g e n d e r disparity there is; h o w e v e r , the data s h o w that the G D I for each country is lower than its HDI, implying that there is g e n d e r inequality in every society. T h e HDI for all countries of sub-Saharan A f r i c a is .463 ( c o m p a r e d to .919 for industrialized countries). For sub-Saharan Africa, it ranges f r o m a high of .764 for Mauritius, .755 for the Seychelles, and .695 for South Africa, to a low of .254 for Sierra Leone and .298 for Niger (UNDP, 1999:134-137). T h e G D I for all countries of s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a is .454, less than the c o m p a r a t i v e H D I , and thus i n d i c a t i n g g e n d e r i n e q u a l i t y in the r e g i o n . It ranges f r o m a high of .754 for Mauritius, .751 for the Seychelles, and .681 f o r South Africa, to a low of .287 for Ethiopia and .286 for Niger. Overall, in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a , life e x p e c t a n c y is g r e a t e r f o r w o m e n ( 5 0 . 3 y e a r s ) than for men (47.5 years), but the other m e a s u r e s c o m p r i s i n g the G D I reveal the inequalities. O n l y 4 9 . 6 percent of adult w o m e n are literate, while 65.9 p e r c e n t of adult men are. T h e gross e n r o l l m e n t rate s h o w s that only 39 percent of eligible girls were actually enrolled in school, while 4 9 percent of boys were enrolled. Finally, the real G N P per capita for sub-Saharan w o m e n is only $1,063, c o m p a r e d to that of $ 2 , 0 0 4 for men ( U N D P , 1999: 138-141). The second new index is the G e n d e r E m p o w e r m e n t M e a s u r e ( G E M ) . It attempts to capture gender inequality in key areas of e c o n o m i c and political participation and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , f o c u s i n g on w o m e n ' s o p p o r t u n i t i e s rather than capabilities as in the G D I . T h e G E M m e a s u r e s these opportunities in t e r m s of w o m e n ' s share of p a r l i a m e n t a r y seats, p r o f e s s i o n a l j o b s , administrative positions, and i n c o m e . Of the 102 c o u n t r i e s t h r o u g h o u t the world f o r w h i c h the G E M w a s c a l c u l a t e d , only o n e ( N o r w a y ) a c h i e v e d a v a l u e g r e a t e r than .800. N i g e r r a n k e d lowest with a score of .120 and T o g o w a s third l o w e s t with .185. S o u t h A f r i c a a c h i e v e d the h i g h e s t score of .582 of the t w e n t y - o n e subS a h a r a n A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s f o r w h i c h the G E M w a s c a l c u l a t e d , and it w a s the only one of them to achieve a value of greater than .500. In only one of the s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s w e r e m o r e than 2 8 . 4 p e r c e n t ( S o u t h A f r i c a ) of p a r l i a m e n t a r y seats held by w o m e n or were there m o r e than 33.4 p e r c e n t ( L e s o t h o ) f e m a l e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d m a n a g e r s . O n l y in the category of professional and technical workers did any of the s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s a c h i e v e a v a l u e g r e a t e r than .600; S w a z i l a n d a c h i e v e d .612 (UNDP, 1 9 9 9 : 1 4 2 - 1 4 5 ) .

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The World Bank summarizes well the economic plight of w o m e n : " M o d e r n i z a t i o n " has s h i f t e d the b a l a n c e of a d v a n t a g e against w o m e n . T h e legal f r a m e w o r k and the modern social sector and producer s e r v i c e s d e v e l o p e d by the independent A f r i c a n n a t i o n s (and a l s o m o s t e x t e r n a l l y sponsored d e v e l o p m e n t projects) have not served w o m e n well. L e g a l syst e m s h a v e d i s c r i m i n a t e d in land titling. . . . It is o f t e n m o r e d i f f i c u l t for w o m e n to g a i n a c c e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n and t e c h n o l o g y , r e s o u r c e s , and credit. Agricultural e x t e n s i o n and formal financial institutions are b i a s e d toward a male clientele. . . . There is a w i d e gender gap in education. . . . A s a result, w o m e n are less w e l l e q u i p p e d than m e n to take a d v a n t a g e of the better i n c o m e - e a r n i n g opportunities. . . . In industry and trade w o m e n h a v e b e e n c o n f i n e d to s m a l l - s c a l e o p e r a t i o n s in the informal sector; . . . despite the trading e m p i r e s built up by the m o s t s u c c e s s f u l f e m a l e entrepreneurs, w o m e n ' s average i n c o m e s are r e l a t i v e l y low. W o m e n are a l s o handicapped in a c c e s s to formal sector j o b s by their l o w e r educational attainments, and t h o s e w h o s u c c e e d are p l a c e d in l o w e r - g r a d e , l o w e r - p a i d j o b s . (World Bank, 1 9 8 9 b : 8 6 - 8 7 )

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The Role of the Public Sector: State-Owned Corporations and Control of the Price System

Postindependence development strategies emphasized industrialization in most A f r i c a n countries. In order to achieve industrialization, however, the state became increasingly involved in the industrial sector, especially through the establishment of state-owned corporations (often called parastatals). The World Bank maintains that, in general, public sector employment is one-half of all modern sector e m p l o y m e n t in sub-Saharan Africa, c o m p a r e d to only one-third in Asia. Furthermore, controlling for country size, state-owned corporations are more numerous than in most other developing countries, and they have been involved in a wider range of activities. In the past, public investment accounted for the bulk of investment in the formal sector (World Bank, 1986:21). For e x a m p l e , by the 1970s the proportion of public entrepreneurial capital formation was 50 percent in Côte d ' I v o i r e , 37 percent in K e n y a , and 74 percent in Tanzania (Austen, 1987:238). Furthermore, in Senegal and Tanzania, state-owned corporations produced more than 75 percent of annual output in natural resources. In Ethiopia they contributed more than 60 percent of value added in manufacturing. Overall, they produced 20 to 30 percent of domestic output in Senegal and Guinea and almost 40 percent of output in Ghana and Zambia (World Bank, 1983:figs. 5.4, 5.5). Even today, the share of public investment in total investment in A f r i c a r e m a i n s high (28.9 percent in 1990— 1996) ( U N C T A D 1998:126). There are many reasons state-owned corporations have been established in developing countries. One of the most important reasons is to promote investment when it is believed that private savings are very low. A

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second r e a s o n is that it is believed that private investors are reluctant to invest b e c a u s e of h i g h risks, e s p e c i a l l y if the m a r k e t is s m a l l or s o u r c e s of supply are unreliable. Related to these first t w o r e a s o n s is that there was an " i n v e s t m e n t p a u s e " as a result of the A s i a n crisis in the 1990s and also that the private investment response to structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s has been w e a k . T h u s , the a v e r a g e ratio of private i n v e s t m e n t to G D P d u r i n g 1995— 1997 w a s only slightly m o r e than the rate d u r i n g the early 1990s, and less than in o t h e r d e v e l o p i n g regions of the world; at a p p r o x i m a t e l y 17 percent of GDP, total i n v e s t m e n t in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a ( S S A ) was b e l o w the average rate in the n e w l y industrialized e c o n o m i e s of Asia (about 33 percent of G D P ) , as well as in Latin A m e r i c a ( m o r e than 2 0 p e r c e n t of G D P ) ( U N C T A D , 1998:125). S o m e s t a t e - o w n e d c o r p o r a t i o n s are e s t a b l i s h e d to m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l over strategic sectors of the e c o n o m y such as d e f e n s e , t r a n s p o r t , utilities, and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , or to prevent m o n o p o l i z a t i o n by multinational corporations. O t h e r s are created to p r o d u c e g o o d s that h a v e a high social b e n e f i t but that the state w i s h e s to price at b e l o w cost. T h e y m a y be established in certain sectors or g e o g r a p h i c l o c a t i o n s to i m p r o v e national distribution of i n c o m e . T h e y m a y also be set u p to take o v e r i m p o r t a n t private industries that h a v e r e c e n t l y g o n e b a n k r u p t . I d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n of the g o v e r n m e n t is a n o t h e r f a c t o r ( T o d a r o , 1 9 8 9 : 5 6 7 - 5 6 8 ) . O n c e e s t a b l i s h e d , they, along w i t h the civil s e r v i c e i n s t i t u t i o n s , h a v e o f t e n b e e n u s e d to a b s o r b surplus l a b o r to r e d u c e the o f f i c i a l , open u n e m p l o y m e n t rate. A l t h o u g h t h e r e are m a n y r e a s o n s f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e m , s t a t e - o w n e d e n t e r p r i s e s o f t e n h a v e been a c c u s e d of c o n s t r a i n i n g e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e W o r l d B a n k , o n e of the m o s t p o w e r f u l critics, h a s m a i n t a i n e d that the r a p i d g r o w t h of the p u b l i c sector, a l o n g w i t h its i n e f f i c i e n t m a n a g e m e n t a n d o v e r a m b i t i o u s i n v e s t m e n t p r o g r a m s , is an i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n f o r the e c o n o m i c d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s . It a l s o h a s m a i n tained that the s c o p e of public sector activities a n d the operating subsidies of these e n t e r p r i s e s have acted to stifle private e n t e r p r i s e in agriculture, industry, and c o m m e r c e (World B a n k , 1986:21). S t a t e - o w n e d e n t e r p r i s e s h a v e b e e n a c c u s e d of w a s t i n g r e s o u r c e s and o p e r a t i n g i n e f f i c i e n t l y with low p r o f i t a b i l i t y or e v e n f i n a n c i a l d e f i c i t s . In fact, it m a y be difficult for t h e m to p u r s u e both profitability targets as well as the social b e n e f i t goals of the g o v e r n m e n t . C e n t r a l i z e d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g o f t e n l e a v e s little o p p o r t u n i t y f o r m a n a g e r s to e x e r c i s e f l e x i b i l i t y in d a y to-day operations. M a n a g e r s and laborers, as state e m p l o y e e s , o f t e n receive little incentive to increase their productivity. A t t e m p t s to resolve the u n e m ployment p r o b l e m by increasing e m p l o y m e n t in the public sector h a v e also resulted in an increase in u n d e r e m p l o y e d p e r s o n s w h o f u r t h e r contribute to i n e f f i c i e n t b u r e a u c r a c i e s a n d u n p r o f i t a b l e p u b l i c sector e n t e r p r i s e s . It is not s u r p r i s i n g , t h e n , that a 1983 study of f o u r A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s ( G h a n a , Senegal, T a n z a n i a , ^nd Z a m b i a ) f o u n d that m o s t s t a t e - o w n e d c o r p o r a t i o n s

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in those countries were showing losses (Killick, 1983:57-88). Not only were labor and capital productivity lower than in the private sector, but the use of capital-intensive technology prevented achieving the goal of decreasing unemployment. There is now evidence, however, that public and private investments are c o m p l e m e n t a r y to each other. A study of fifty-three developing countries, including ten in sub-Saharan Africa, in the 1980s, indicates that public investment appears to have been generally more productive than private investment. This was explained by a shift of public investment projects to more productive uses, as well as by a reduction in the productivity of private investment resulting f r o m insufficient complementary public investment (UNCTAD, 1998:131). Nevertheless, the World Bank and many other foreign donors continue to emphasize privatization of the public sector. This is based on the belief that private enterprise promotes greater economic efficiency through market-oriented competition, with resultant increased production and lower costs. Donors, too, have continued to emphasize privatization as a condition for additional aid. T h e total n u m b e r of privatization transactions in SSA through 1998 was 3,165, with 1,582 taking place prior to 1994, followed by 352 in 1994. They peaked with 485 in 1995, then began to decline in number with 4 2 2 in 1996, 240 in 1997, and only 53 in 1998. By sector, the greatest number of privatizations took place in manufacturing (826), followed by agricultural production and processing (655), and services (636) (World Bank, 2000a:table 10.1). African countries have challenged the unconditional d e m a n d for increased privatization by donors. While they have recognized the economic drain of many inefficient state-owned enterprises, they continue to see a role for them under certain circumstances. They recommend establishing a pragmatic balance between the public and private sector, with the main criteria being the availability of local entrepreneurial capability and the optim u m social and e c o n o m i c rates of return on investment (United Nations, n.d.:35). They note that there are areas in which the public sector has a role to play. These include the building of the physical, human, and institutional infrastructure; e n v i r o n m e n t a l protection and conservation; and the provision of essential services. At the same time, they agree that where the state has overextended itself, particularly in n o n - s o c i a l service and p.onstrategic sectors, selective privatization should be considered.

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Economic Integration

Since independence, A f r i c a n countries have realized that o n e of the most important m e a n s of achieving greater economic independence is through regional integration of economies on the continent of Africa. 1 0 A

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major step toward integrating the economies of the entire continent was taken at the OAU summit in Abuja, Nigeria, in June 1991. African leaders adopted a treaty to establish an African Economic Community by the year 2025 (Harsch, 1991:12). This treaty became effective on May 12, 1994 (Harsch, 1994:30). Further steps were taken at the OAU summit in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000. The leaders of the OAU signed an accord to transform the fiftythree-nation group into one modeled on the European Union. Formal establishment of the union, which would replace the OAU, will not occur until two-thirds of OAU member nations have ratified the accord. Although the structure of the new African Union would resemble that of the current OAU, the accord also envisions a pan-African parliament, a court of justice, a central bank, an African monetary fund, and an investment bank (Washington Post, July 13, 2000:A19). It is essential for Africa to counterbalance the increasing economic power of the developed world, as Peter Schraeder discusses in Chapter 6 on African international relations. This is especially important as Europe becomes more united in the twenty-first century. However, as seen from the failure of many previous attempts at integration in Africa (e.g., the East African Community, or the proposed Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union), it is not easy to distribute the benefits of integration to the satisfaction of the constituent countries, and it is not easy for a sovereign nation to relinquish prerogatives to a superimposed governing body. Nevertheless, most countries of sub-Saharan Africa know that they must begin to make sacrifices now for their long-run survival, and integration has continued slowly over the years.

•

Domestic and International Conflicts

Much of the progress toward development in many sub-Saharan African economies and much of the potential for progress has been destroyed as a result of domestic and international conflicts. Major conflicts have occurred in recent years in Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan, to name a few, and at the time of writing other countries such as Nigeria and Zimbabwe are on the verge of civil strife over religious and land issues. Domestic and international conflicts impose many negative impacts on a country. For example, the national budget is drained for military purposes rather than invested in development or used to service the international debt. Cities may be destroyed along with industrial complexes, and environmental degradation may occur in the countryside where battles take place. Agriculture suffers, as it becomes difficult for farmers to anticipate whether it will be possible to harvest crops if they plant them, or whether harvested crops might be destroyed in battle, confiscated by the military, or even stolen by scavenging soldiers in the countryside. Thus farmers become

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r e l u c t a n t to i n v e s t in t h e i r f a r m s . In the social sector, c h i l d r e n o f t e n f i n d their education terminated and hospitals b e c o m e o v e r w h e l m e d with the s i c k a n d t h e i n j u r e d . E v e n t h e i n c i d e n c e of H I V / A I D S i n c r e a s e s , as t h e m i l i t a r y in m o s t c o u n t r i e s i n c u r s a h i g h e r rate of i n f e c t i o n than o t h e r s e c t o r s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n . A l s o , it b e c o m e s a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e to r e s t r u c t u r e t h e e c o n o m y in any m e a n i n g f u l w a y to p r o m o t e e c o n o m i c e f f i c i e n c y a n d s u p p o r t g r o w t h and d e v e l o p m e n t . Finally, the n e g a t i v e impact of d o m e s t i c a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t lasts l o n g a f t e r the c o n f l i c t c e a s e s , w h i l e c o u n tries s t r u g g l e to rebuild w h a t t h e y p r e v i o u s l y d e s t r o y e d .

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Structural Adjustment Programs: The Role of the World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations, and the OAU

T h e W o r l d B a n k , s u p p o r t e d by b i l a t e r a l a n d m u l t i l a t e r a l f o r e i g n aid d o n o r s , stresses that the s o l u t i o n s to s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a ' s e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s m u s t b e s o l v e d by l o n g - r u n s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s . M o r e over, m o s t d o n o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s require i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of structural a d j u s t m e n t p o l i c i e s p r i o r to n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r v a r i o u s f o r m s of d e b t relief a n d b e f o r e p r o v i s i o n of i n c r e a s e d loan s u p p o r t . T h e m a i n o b j e c t i v e s of W o r l d B a n k S A P s i n c l u d e the f o l l o w i n g : • • • •

R e d u c t i o n in the size of the p u b l i c s e c t o r and i m p r o v e m e n t s in its management. E l i m i n a t i o n of price d i s t o r t i o n s in v a r i o u s s e c t o r s of the e c o n o m y . I n c r e a s i n g trade l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . P r o m o t i o n of d o m e s t i c s a v i n g s in the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e sectors.

T h e m a i n p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t s the W o r l d B a n k and the I M F h a v e u s e d to a c h i e v e the a b o v e o b j e c t i v e s are: • •

E x c h a n g e rate a d j u s t m e n t , e s p e c i a l l y d e v a l u a t i o n . Interest rate policies to e n c o u r a g e d o m e s t i c s a v i n g s and a c h i e v e app r o p r i a t e a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s .

• •

C o n t r o l of m o n e y s u p p l y and credit. F i s c a l p o l i c i e s to r e d u c e g o v e r n m e n t financing.

• •

Trade and payments liberalization. D e r e g u l a t i o n of t h e p r i c e s of g o o d s , services, and f a c t o r inputs.

expenditures

and

deficit

M o s t A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s h a v e r e c o g n i z e d the p r o b l e m s that such p o l i cies c r e a t e , at least in the short run. T h e s e i n c l u d e i n c r e a s e d c o s t s f o r imports, i n c l u d i n g essential i m p o r t s of r e s o u r c e s , supplies, and capital to p r o m o t e e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . T h e y a l s o i n c l u d e i n c r e a s e d p r i c e s of d o m e s t i c

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goods after subsidies are removed and prices are deregulated. The increased prices of domestic goods often have immediate impact on the welfare of the poorest m e m b e r s of society, especially if they affect food prices, costs of education, and payment for medical services, and they have an especially negative impact on w o m e n , who most often deal with such domestic issues. In many cases, price increases have led to political instability as citizens express their dislike of the changes. African countries fear that they may never have the opportunity to enjoy the promised long-term benefits of structural adjustment programs if they are unable to survive the short-run problems that are certain to occur. T h e y believe, therefore, that they must move at a deliberate pace if they agree to proceed with structural adjustment, because their constituencies generally will not allow such extensive changes at one time. In March 1989, a World B a n k - U N D P report concluded that the more than thirty sub-Saharan African countries that adopted SAPs were performing better than those that had not (World Bank, 1989a:iii). A f r i c a n countries disagreed. They believe that the World Bank used a biased analysis to push through "doctrinaire privatization" and promote "excessive dependence on market forces." Moreover, they believe that the SAPs have been unduly harsh in effect and that they have not been producing the desired results. They complain that World Bank SAPs as well as IMF stabilization programs f o l l o w only one f o r m u l a , rather than individualizing programs for each country. As a result, SAPs do not meet the needs of the people or the differing conditions of their economies. They believe that many World Bank policy prescriptions are not appropriate and that they will never lead to self-sustained growth and development but only to continued marginalization and dependency. On the basis of these criticisms, African countries have jointly prepared programs that counter the policy prescriptions and provide alternatives to those of the World Bank. The first of those m a j o r programs was the Lagos Plan of Action, discussed earlier, which emphasized self-reliant development. In 1985, A f r i c a n countries devised another alternative, Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER), which was adopted by the O A U . In APPER, Africans took some of the responsibility for their economic failures and stressed the need for economic policy reforms, but of their own design. This was the African contribution to the more general UN P r o g r a m m e of Action for A f r i c a n E c o n o m i c Recovery and Development ( U N P A A E R D ) , under which developed countries agreed to support African efforts, especially with increased aid (approximately $46 billion) and greater debt relief. U N P A A E R D initially was considered by donors and African countries alike to be a m a j o r breakthrough in providing increased d e v e l o p m e n t assistance for Africa. E c o n o m i c performance, however, continued to be poor, and the final reviews of U N P A A E R D determined that it was a failure. It had little impact on

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A f r i c a n economies, and A f r i c a n s were poorer in 1991 than they were in 1986. In 1989, under the auspices of the UNECA, African countries prepared yet another document, this one entitled African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP). It looked beyond short-term adjustment and proposed a long list of policy intended to direct countries eventually toward long-term, balanced development and fulfillment of human needs. It recommended, for example, greater limits on debt service payments, multiple exchange rates, selective subsidies and price controls, and a decrease in defense expenditures. It also advocated differential export subsidies and limited use of deficit spending for productive and infrastructural investments. As in the earlier documents, it emphasized that African governments must take responsibility f o r determining their own economic programs rather than allowing donor agencies to dictate them (United Nations, n.d.). Another attempt by sub-Saharan African countries to solve their own problems developed at a c o n f e r e n c e organized by the U N E C A and N G O s in Arusha, Tanzania, in February 1990. Participants unanimously agreed that the absence of full democratic rights was the primary cause of Africa's decade-long economic crisis (Lone, 1990:1). Thus, the African Charter for Popular Participation in D e v e l o p m e n t and Transformation, which was adopted at the conference, states that "there must be an opening up of political processes to a c c o m m o d a t e f r e e d o m of opinion, and tolerate differences. In this regard, it is essential to establish independent people's organizations that are genuinely grassroot and democratically administered." On December 18, 1991, the international community renewed the commitment to Africa it made five years earlier in the UNPAAERD by entering into a stronger accord, the U N New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF). The agenda set specific goals, including: • •

•

•

Average real growth rate of G D P of 6 percent per year. Provision of $30 billion in net Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 1992, with 4 percent growth of that amount in each succeeding year. Preparation of a study on the need for and feasibility of a "diversification f u n d " to help f r e e A f r i c a n economies f r o m heavy dependence on exports of primary commodities. Solution to the A f r i c a n debt crisis by c o m m i t m e n t of creditors to further cancellation or reduction of O D A debt, additional relief for official bilateral debt, and encouragement to write off or swap commercial debt.

For their part, A f r i c a n countries promised to transform the structure of their economies by continuing with necessary r e f o r m s and pursuing

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i m p r o v e m e n t of d o m e s t i c e c o n o m i c m a n a g e m e n t , i n c l u d i n g e f f e c t i v e m o bilization a n d utilization of d o m e s t i c resources. T h e y w o u l d d o the f o l l o w ing ( L o n e , 1991:1, 1 8 - 2 3 ) : •

• • • • •

P u r s u e regional and s u b r e g i o n a l e c o n o m i c c o o p e r a t i o n and integration with the u l t i m a t e g o a l of e s t a b l i s h i n g the A f r i c a n E c o n o m i c Community. I n t e n s i f y the p r o c e s s of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n . C r e a t e an e n a b l i n g e n v i r o n m e n t to attract f o r e i g n and d o m e s t i c inv e s t m e n t and p r o m o t e the participation of the private sector. Protect the e n v i r o n m e n t t h r o u g h sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t . C o n t i n u e to integrate population factors into d e v e l o p m e n t programs. I m p r o v e p o l i c i e s to s u p p o r t a g r i c u l t u r e , rural d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d f o o d security.

S u b s e q u e n t l y , in the midst of generally d i s c o u r a g i n g e c o n o m i c indicators for A f r i c a , the World B a n k (1994a) p u b l i s h e d another study of A f r i c a , Adjustment in Africa. T h a t study f o c u s e d on t w e n t y - n i n e s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s that h a d a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s in p l a c e d u r i n g 1 9 8 7 1991. It c o n c l u d e d that in the c o u n t r i e s that had u n d e r t a k e n and sustained m a j o r p o l i c y r e f o r m s , a d j u s t m e n t w a s w o r k i n g ; of the t w e n t y - n i n e c o u n tries, the six with the most i m p r o v e m e n t in m a c r o e c o n o m i c policies during the periods 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 6 and 1 9 8 7 - 1 9 9 1 (Ghana, Tanzania, G a m b i a , Burkina F a s o , N i g e r i a , a n d Z i m b a b w e ) e n j o y e d the s t r o n g e s t r e s u r g e n c e in e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e in t e r m s of G D P per capita g r o w t h . T h e countries were m o r e s u c c e s s f u l in i m p r o v i n g their m a c r o e c o n o m i c , trade, and agricultural policies than their public and f i n a n c i a l sectors, and n o A f r i c a n country had a c h i e v e d a s o u n d m a c r o e c o n o m i c p o l i c y stance, m e a n i n g i n f l a t i o n u n d e r 10 p e r c e n t , a very low b u d g e t d e f i c i t , and a c o m p e t i t i v e e x c h a n g e rate. M o r e o v e r , the r e f o r m s that w e r e u n d e r t a k e n were f r a g i l e and w e r e m e r e l y r e t u r n i n g A f r i c a to the s l o w - g r o w t h path of the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, the report m a i n t a i n e d that while a d j u s t m e n t can work in A f r i c a , a d j u s t m e n t alone will not put countries on a sustained, p o v e r t y - r e d u c i n g g r o w t h path, b e c a u s e l o n g - t e r m d e v e l o p m e n t a l s o r e q u i r e s m o r e i n v e s t m e n t in h u m a n capital (i.e., p e o p l e ) , i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , and institution b u i l d i n g , a l o n g with better g o v e r n a n c e (World B a n k , 1994a: 1 - 2 ) . At n e a r l y the s a m e t i m e , at a M a y 1994 c o n f e r e n c e of the U N E C A , the A f r i c a n m i n i s t e r s of e c o n o m i c a n d social d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p l a n n i n g approved a " F r a m e w o r k A g e n d a f o r Building and Utilizing Critical C a p a c ities in A f r i c a , " a n d m a n d a t e d the p r e p a r a t i o n of a f i n a n c i n g p l a n f o r the 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 5 first p h a s e of an a c t i o n p r o g r a m at n a t i o n a l , s u b r e g i o n a l , a n d regional levels. T h e F r a m e w o r k A g e n d a identified eight priority areas that h a v e b e e n integral to p r e v i o u s d e v e l o p m e n t s t r a t e g i e s o v e r the past t w o d e c a d e s . T h e s e i n c l u d e b u i l d i n g critical c a p a c i t i e s that s u p p o r t g o o d

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governance, human rights, and political stability; creating capacities for effective socioeconomic policy analysis and management; developing entrepreneurship for public and private sector management; building and utilizing physical infrastructure; building capacities to exploit natural resources and diversify African economies into processing and manufacturing; strengthening food security and self-sufficiency; and mobilizing and efficiently allocating domestic and external financial resources (Harsch, 1994:1, 30). By mid-1995, action to support the c o m m i t m e n t s of the international c o m m u n i t y for the earlier U N - N A D A F were very weak. As a result, in March 1996, the U N agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions launched the System-Wide Special Initiative on Africa, a decade-long effort to operationalize, rather than replace, the U N - N A D A F . This is a multibillion dollar program of concrete actions to accelerate African development. The bulk of the resources are to be devoted to expanding basic education and improving health care, promoting peace and better governance, improving water and food security, increasing the continent's competitiveness in world trade, and making available new information technology. These components are also based on themes reflecting A f r i c a ' s development priorities as expressed in the O A U ' s 1995 Cairo Agenda for Action (Novicki, 1996b:8-9). As the international c o m m u n i t y began to see progress resulting f r o m the Special Initiative on Africa, plans were made for the October 1998 Second Tokyo International Conference on African Development ( T I C A D II; T I C A D I was held in October 1993). T h e c o n f e r e n c e also developed an Agenda for Action based on issues of serious concern to Africa—including the development of infrastructure, the solution of A f r i c a ' s external debt problem, and support to A f r i c a ' s industrial development—and was primarily sponsored by Japan and supported by the O A U . It aimed to foster cooperation between African and Asian countries and stronger South-South cooperation, in general (Mwaura, August 1998:3). In summary, A f r i c a n countries have m a d e a critical examination of their constraints on development and have evaluated the recommendations or d e m a n d s made by international donors. While recognizing the external causes of u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t and admitting their own responsibility f o r lack of development, they continue to propose strategies for achieving development. By doing so, they hope to p r o m o t e economic development of their own countries on their own terms. We must now look to the future to observe whether such initiatives will be successful.

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NOTES

1. Agro-pastoralists cultivate crops during the growing season but move with their livestock during the dry season, in sometimes well-established patterns of transhumance, in search of pasturage.

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2. It has been estimated that about 5 million slaves were exported f r o m eastern A f r i c a b e t w e e n the years 650 and 1500 (Austen, 1987:59). 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress Report on Development Prospects and Programs, 1983, and Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action, 1984. 4. G r o w t h of GNP, m e a s u r e d by g r o w t h of the value of all g o o d s and services p r o d u c e d by a country within a year. 5. Debt service is a c o m b i n a t i o n of the periodic: (a) r e p a y m e n t of principal (amortization) of a loan, as well as (b) p a y m e n t of interest on it. 6. T h e real interest rate is equal to the market rate of interest minus the rate of inflation. 7. T h e " t e r m s of t r a d e " for a country usually r e f e r s to the ratio of an index of its export prices to an index of its import prices. T h e r e f o r e , if the terms of trade decline, it m e a n s that the ratio d e c r e a s e s as a result of either the index of e x p o r t prices declining and/or the index of import prices rising. 8. D e b t s e r v i c e is the r e q u i r e d r e p a y m e n t of p r i n c i p a l a n d interest on a loan. 9. A c c o r d i n g to the Todaro theory, the decision to migrate depends upon expected urban-rural real wage differentials, where the expected differential is determined by the interaction of t w o variables, the actual urban-rural w a g e differential and the probability of s u c c e s s f u l l y obtaining e m p l o y m e n t in the urban sector (Todaro, 1 9 8 9 : 2 7 8 - 2 8 1 ) . That is: Expected income = (actual w a g e or salary) X (probability of finding a job). 10. M a n y attempts at regional integration in A f r i c a have been m a d e over the years, some m o r e successful than others. T h e m a j o r groups at this time are: CEPGL (ECGLS)

C o m m u n a u t é E c o n o m i q u e des Pays des Grands Lacs (Economic C o m m u n i t y of the Great L a k e s States): B u r u n d i , D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c of Congo, Rwanda COMESA C o m m o n Market for Eastern and S o u t h e r n A f r i c a ( M a r c h é C o m m u n d ' A f r i q u e de l'Est et d ' A f r i q u e Australe): Angola, Burundi, C o m o r o s , D e m o c r a t i c Republic of C o n g o , Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, R w a n d a , Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Z i m b a b w e EAC East A f r i c a n C o - O p e r a t i o n : Kenya, Tanzania, U g a n d a ECCAS E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y of Central A f r i c a n States ( C o m m u n a u t é Eco(CEEAC) n o m i q u e des Etats d e l ' A f r i q u e C e n t r a l e ) : A n g o l a , B u r u n d i , C a m e r o o n , Central A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c , C h a d , D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c of C o n g o , Equatorial G u i n e a , G a b o n , R e p u b l i c of C o n g o , R w a n d a , Sâo T o m é and Principe ECOWAS E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y of West A f r i c a n States ( C o m m u n a u t é Eco( C E D E A O ) n o m i q u e des Etats de l ' A f r i q u e de l'Ouest): Benin, Burkina Faso, C a p e Verde, Côte d ' I v o i r e , G a m b i a , Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo Entente C o u n c i l of the E n t e n t e : B e n i n , B u r k i n a Faso, C ô t e d ' I v o i r e , Niger, Togo InOC Indian Ocean C o m m i s s i o n : Comoros, France (for R é u n i o n ) , M a d a g a s car, Mauritius, Seychelles SACU Southern African C u s t o m s Union: Botswana, Lethoso, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland SADC Southern African Development Community (Communauté de Développement de l'Afrique Australe): Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of

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UDEAC

UEMOA (WAEMU) UMA (AMU)

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Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe Union Douanier et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa): Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union): Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo Union du Maghreb Arabe (Arab Maghreb Union): Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia

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"African Leaders Agree to Form a New Union." 2000. Washington Post (July 13): A19. Austen, Ralph. 1987. African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency. London: James Currey; Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Clark, J. Desmond. 1962. "The Spread of Food Production in Sub-Saharan Africa." Journal of African History 3. Reprinted in Z. A. Konczacki and J. M. Konczacki (eds.). An Economic History of Tropical Africa. Vol. 1. Pp. 3-13. London: Frank Cass, 1977. Collins, Carole. 1999. "Break the Chain of Debt." Africa Recovery 13 (September): 16-17. Davidson, Basil. 1972. Africa: History of a Continent. New York: Macmillan. Fage, J. D. 1959. Ghana: A Historical Perspective. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Green, Cynthia P. 1994. Sustainable Development: Population and the Environment. Washington, DC: USAID. Harsch, Ernest. 1991. "Africa Seeks Economic Unity." Africa Recovery 5 (June): 12-13, 32. . 1994. "Building Africa's Economic Capacity." Africa Recovery 8 (AprilSeptember):!, 30-31. Herskovits, Melville J., and Mitchell Harwitz. 1964. Economic Transition in Africa. Chicago: Northwestern University Press. Katsouris, Christina. 1995. "Naples Debt Deal Falls Short of Needs." Africa Recovery 9 (June): 11-12. . 1999. "Creditors Making 'Major Changes' in Debt Relief for Poor Countries. "Africa Recovery 13 (September): 1, 12-15. . 2000. "New Conditions Slow Debt Relief." Africa Recovery 14 (April):6- 7. Katsouris, Christina, and Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill. 1995. "Africa Under Pressure from Falling Aid, Rising Debt." Africa Recovery 9 (June):l, 10, 12. Killick, Tony. 1983. "The Role of the Public Sector in the Industrialization of African Developing Countries." Industry and Development 7:57-88. Lone, Salim. 1990. "Africans Adopt Bold Charter for Democratization." Africa Recovery 4 (April-June): 14-17. . 1991. "New Africa Agenda Adopted at U.N." Africa Recovery 5 (December):!, 18-23. Metra Consulting. 1988. Handbook of National Development Plans. 2 vols. London: Graham and Trotman.

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Mwaura, Peter. 1998. "Action on African Priorities in Tokyo." Africa Recovery 12 (August):3. Neumark, S. Daniel. 1977. "Trans-Saharan Trade in the Middle Ages." Pp. 127— 131 in Z. A. Konczacki and J. M. Konczacki (eds.). An Economic History of Tropical Africa. Vol. 1. London: Frank Cass. Reprinted from Daniel Neumark. PerspecForeign Trade and Economic Development in Africa: An Historical tive. Stanford: Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1964. Novicki, Margaret A. 1996a. "UN System Launches Special Initiative to Spur Africa's Development." Africa Recovery 1 0 ( M a y ) : l , 10-12. . 1996b. "A New Impetus for African Development." Africa Recovery 10 (May):8-9. Todaro, Michael P. 1989. Economic Development in the Third World. New York: Longman. UN AIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS). 2000 (June). Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic. Available online at http://www.unaids.org/ epidemic_update/report/Epi_report.htm. United Nations. Conference on Trade and Development. 1994. Handbook of international Trade and Development Statistics 1993. New York and Geneva: United Nations. . Conference on Trade and Development. 1998. Trade and Development Report, 1998. New York: United Nations. . Conference on Trade and Development. 1999a. Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1996/1997. New York: United Nations. Developed . Conference on Trade and Development. 1999b. The Least Countries 1999 Report. New York: United Nations. . Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). N.d. African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP). E/ECA/CM. 15/6/Rev. 3. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1995. Human Development Report 1995. New York: Oxford University Press, for the UNDP. . 1999. Human Development Report 1999. New York: Oxford University Press, for the UNDP. Wickins, Peter. 1986. Africa 1880-1980: An Economic History. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. World Bank. 1981. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. Washington, DC: World Bank. . 1983. World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. 1986-90. . 1986. Financing Adjustment with Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC: World Bank. . 1989a. Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s. Washington, DC: World Bank. . 1989b. Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A LongTerm Perspective Study. Washington, DC: World Bank. . 1990. World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. . 1992. World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. . 1994a. Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead. A World Bank Policy Research Report. New York: Oxford University Press. . 1994b. World Debt Tables 1994-95. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: World Bank. . 1995. World Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press. . 1998. African Development Indicators 7998-99. Washington, DC: World Bank.

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—. 1999a. Global Development Finance 1999. Analysis and Summary Tables. Washington, DC: World Bank. — . 1999b. Global Development Finance 1999. Country Tables. Washington, DC: World Bank. — . 2000a. World Bank Africa Data Base 2000. African Development Indicators. CD ROM. Washington, DC: World Bank. —. 2000b. World Development Report 1999/2000. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank.

African International Relations Peter J. Schraeder

S

everal watershed events have t r a n s f o r m e d A f r i c a n international relations since the late nineteenth century. In the a f t e r m a t h of the Berlin C o n f e r e n c e of 1 8 8 4 - 1 8 8 5 , independent A f r i c a (except for Ethiopia and Liberia) ceased to exist, and African international relations were controlled by the European colonial powers. A second watershed event—the extended global conflict of World War II ( 1 9 3 5 - 1 9 4 5 ) — h e r a l d e d the decline of Europe as the most p o w e r f u l region of the world and the e m e r g e n c e of A f r i c a n nationalist m o v e m e n t s intent upon achieving independence f r o m colonial rule. This period marked the beginning of the end of colonial rule and the return of control over A f r i c a n international relations to A f r i c a n s . The outbreak and intensification of the Cold War ( 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 8 9 ) transformed the newly independent A f r i c a n countries into proxy battlefields between the unparalleled s u p e r p o w e r s of the p o s t - W o r l d War II era: the United States and the former Soviet Union. African conflicts often having little (if anything) to do with the ideological concerns of c o m m u n i s m or capitalism threatened to become East-West flashpoints in the face of growing U.S.Soviet involvement. The fourth watershed event—the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989—signaled the end of the Cold War but not the end of international rivalry in Africa. T h e ideologically based Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union was replaced by a Cold Peace, in which the major northern industrialized democracies struggled for e c o n o m i c supremacy in a highly competitive international economic environment. As African leaders continue to guide their countries into the first decade of the new millennium, they must m a n a g e international relations in an environment marked by the growing competition among today's economic superpowers: Germany, Japan, and the United States.

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This chapter is devoted to exploring African international relations in the aftermath of Europe's partition and eventual granting of independence to the fifty-three countries that currently constitute the African continent (Akinrinade and Sesay, 1998; Harbeson and Rothchild, 2000). After briefly outlining the major themes of what has been called the dependencydecolonization debate, I explore in the remainder of the chapter a variety of factors that are critical to understanding the evolution of African international relations. The topics discussed include (1) the formulation and implementation of African foreign policies; (2) pan-Africanism and the Organization of African Unity; (3) regional economic cooperation and integration; (4) the role of foreign powers in African international relations; (5) the United Nations and international financial institutions; and (6) emerging trends related to military intervention on the African continent.

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THE DEPENDENCY-DECOLONIZATION DEBATE

Although the independence of Libya in 1951 marked the beginning of the end of " f o r m a l " colonial rule—a process largely culminating in 1994 when elections in South Africa led to black majority rule 1 —both African and foreign observers began an ongoing debate over the degree to which these newly independent countries truly control their international relations (see Shaw and Newbury, 1979). According to one group of observers who belong to what has become known as the dependency school of thought, the granting of legal independence did little to alter the constraining web of economic, political, military, and cultural ties that continue to bind African countries to their former colonial powers (Amin, 1973). This conceptualization of African international relations—often referred to as neocolonialism (Nkrumah, 1965)—is especially prominent in writings about the relationship between France and its former colonies, primarily due to policies designed to maintain what French policymakers refer to as their chasse gardée (literally, an exclusive hunting ground) in francophone Africa (Suret-Canale, 1975). Even in those former colonies where the European power was either too weak (e.g., Spain) or uninterested (e.g., Britain) to preserve privileged ties, the rise of the Cold War and superpower intervention are said to have ensured the gradual replacement of European neocolonial relationships with a new set of ties dominated by Moscow and Washington (Laïdi, 1990). Simply put, direct colonial rule was merely replaced by a series of neocolonial relationships that permitted the continued external domination—albeit in a more subtle form—of African international relations. A second group of observers who belong to what has become known as the decolonization school of thought argue instead that legal independence was but the first step of an evolutionary process permitting African leaders to assume greater control over their countries' international relations

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(Zartman, 1976; see also Bayart, 2000). According to this school of thought, although external influences were extremely p o w e r f u l in the immediate p o s t i n d e p e n d e n c e era, layer upon layer of this f o r e i g n control is slowly being "peeled a w a y " with the passage of time. While carefully underscoring that individual African countries can follow different pathways, proponents of the decolonization school argue that the most c o m m o n pattern begins with legal independence, followed by efforts to assure national sovereignty in the military, e c o n o m i c , and cultural realms. "In this view, each layer of colonial influence is supported by the others, and as each is removed, it uncovers and exposes the next underlying one, rendering it vulnerable, untenable, and unnecessary," explains I. William Zartman (1976: 3 2 6 - 3 2 7 ) , one of the most prominent proponents of the decolonization school. "Thus, there is a natural progression to the removal of colonial influence: its speed can be varied by policy and effort, but the direction and evolution are inherent in the process and become extremely difficult to reverse." T h e end of the Cold War has ushered in a radically c h a n g e d international environment with important implications for the dependency-decolonization debate. Donald G o r d o n discusses in C h a p t e r 4 how the fall of c o m m u n i s t regimes in the f o r m e r Soviet Union and Eastern E u r o p e — t h e intellectual heartland of single-party r u l e — r e i n f o r c e d a democratization trend in Africa. In many cases this has led to the replacement of authoritarian regimes with newly elected democratic leaders less e n a m o r e d of their former foreign patrons (see Schraeder, 1994b). According to optimistic interpretations of the impact of this transforming event, A f r i c a is undergoing a "second independence" or a "second national liberation" in which a second generation of African leaders will assume greater control over the international relations of their respective countries. However, observers associated with the dependency school equate the end of the Cold War with the rising marginalization of A f r i c a n international relations. T h e y imply that African leaders will enjoy less, rather than more, options in the p o s t - C o l d War international system (e.g., Shaw, 1991). Focusing on aggressive foreign efforts to promote democratization and e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , some observers have even suggested that the "recolonization" or "second scramble" for Africa is occurring (Ake, 1995). Although the dependency-decolonization debate is far from being resolved, the year 2018 will mark a symbolic turning point as the contemporary independence era ( 1 9 5 1 - 2 0 1 8 ) will have lasted as long as the colonial era (1884-1951).

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THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES

The principal theme of early studies of African foreign policy is that foreign policy begins and ends with the desires of African presidents (Korany, 1986; see also Wright, 1998). The primary reason for what has become

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known as the "big m a n " or "big leader" syndrome of A f r j c a n foreign policy is that the m a j o r i t y of the first generation of A f r i c a n presidents, w h o assumed power during the initial i n d e p e n d e n c e d e c a d e of the 1960s, systematically suppressed and dismantled all centers of p o w e r capable of challenging the foreign policy supremacy of the presidential mansion. The various efforts undertaken by this first generation included the stifling of a free press, the suspension of constitutions, the banning of opposition parties, the jailing of vocal political opponents, the dismantling of independent judiciaries, and, finally, the co-optation or jailing of legislative opponents to create "rubber stamp" parliaments (Chazan et al., 1999; see also Clapham, 1996; Schraeder, 2000a: 2 1 7 - 2 4 3 ) . In short, the institutional actors associated with democratic governance who made their voices heard in the foreign policy making process were often marginalized in the name of creating single-party regimes capable of promoting unity and development. The net result of what in essence constituted a highly centralized foreign policy machinery was the promotion of " p e r s o n a l i z e d " foreign policies derivative of the interests and idiosyncrasies of individual presidents (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). In the case of the D e m o c r a t i c Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa; formerly Zaire), for example, Mobutu Sese Seko

Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, leaving the State Department in 1986, after meeting with U.S. secretary of state George Shultz. Autocratic leaders like Mobutu have often maintained their power by seeking assistance from the superpowers.

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assumed p o w e r in 1965 through a military coup d ' é t a t supported by the U.S. government and gradually concentrated all power around the office of the president (Young and Turner, 1989). Often unwilling to listen to his foreign policy experts within the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s and having effectively silenced other potential centers of opposition, most notably by disbanding the Zairian National Assembly, Mobutu was known for declaring policies that created international controversy. During a presidential visit to the United States during 1973, for example, Mobutu made a speech before the United Nations General A s s e m b l y in which he a n n o u n c e d his decision to rupture all diplomatic ties with Israel. This decision was notable in that it was made without any warning to the Nixon White House and effectively derailed State Department efforts to win congressional passage of a Zairian foreign aid bill (Schraeder, 1994b:82). A second outcome associated with the centralization of the foreign policy apparatus is that the first generation of African presidents often pursued foreign policies strongly tied to those of the former colonial powers. In addition to the variety of formal ties (e.g., military treaties) that bound the newly independent countries to the former colonial powers, the primary reason for what proponents of the dependency school would characterize as " d e p e n d e n t " foreign policies (e.g., Shaw and Aluko, 1984) was the shared culture and political values of colonially trained African presidents and their European counterparts. Moreover, although they had actively campaigned for political independence, several first-generation presidents benefited f r o m colonial efforts designed to ensure the victory of leaders sympathetic to European concerns. In the case of Senegal, f o r example, former president Léopold Sédar S e n g h o r — o f t e n described by his critics as more French than Senegalese—married a Frenchwoman, retired to a home in France, and carries the distinction of being the only African to be inducted into France's highly prestigious and selective Académie Française, the national watchdog of French language and culture (see Markovitz, 1969). The most important o u t c o m e of the rise to power of the first generation of African presidents is that these leaders would often be more responsive to the foreign policy concerns of their external patrons than to the popular d e m a n d s of their own peoples. Especially in the case of francophone Africa, the first generation of African presidents signed a variety of defense agreements with France that, rather than ensuring protection f r o m threats f r o m abroad, in reality were designed to ensure their political longevity. F r o m 1963 to 1993, France intervened militarily at least thirty times in its f o r m e r colonies, often at the request of presidents either under threat f r o m internal opposition m o v e m e n t s or seeking to be reinstated in power after being overthrown. Even in cases where pro-French leaders were overthrown by military coups d ' é t a t during the decade of the 1960s, the guiding principle of French involvement was the willingness of a particular leader to support French foreign policy objectives. For example, when

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asked why France did not militarily intervene when David Dacko, the democratically elected president of the Central African Republic, was overthrown in a military coup d'état in 1966, Jacques Foccart (1995:287), architect of France's policies toward francophone Africa under Presidents Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou, noted in his memoirs that the new leader, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, "after all was a very pro-French military man." The combination of the end of the Cold War and the rising strength and intensity of prodemocracy movements is contributing to the "democratization" of African foreign policies (Schraeder, 1997). The importance of this democratization trend—especially in the countries where multiparty elections have ensured a relatively peaceful transfer of power from one ruling elite to another—is its reinforcement of the rise to power of a new generation of African presidents less tied to their former foreign patrons and more willing to pursue increasingly independent foreign policies. In the case of Senegal, for example, President Abdou Diouf (1981-2000), like many of his second-generation counterparts, took advantage of growing economic competition among the industrialized Western democracies in the post-Cold War era to lessen his country's foreign policy dependence on France (Diop and Diouf, 1990). In a sharp departure from past policies, President Diouf withstood intense French pressures and signed contracts with South African and U.S. companies in 1995 to exploit oil fields discovered off the southwestern coast of Senegal. This trend in favor of the diversification of Senegalese foreign policy ties is expected to be strengthened under the democratically elected administration of President Abdoulaye Wade (2000-present). The democratization process has also significantly altered the centralized foreign policy structures in several African countries. In some cases, democratization has been accompanied by the implementation of policies designed to decrease both the size of the military establishment and its involvement in governmental affairs, including in the realm of foreign policy. In South Africa during the 1980s, for example, the military strongly argued in favor of the Afrikaner regime's decision to undertake destabilization policies against its immediate neighbors (Grundy, 1986). In the wake of the country's first multiparty elections in 1994, however, the new government headed by Nelson Mandela undertook a series of reforms designed to restore greater government control over a military force that had become too prominent in both domestic and foreign policies (Bischoff and Southall, 1999). The democratization process has also led to the strengthening of institutional actors, most notably vocal, powerful, and independent national legislatures capable of challenging the presidency in the foreign policy realm. The primary reason behind this newfound legislative role is the creation of democratic political systems that embody the concept of separation of powers between the various branches of government. In the case of

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Benin, the democratic leader of francophone West Africa, the National Assembly in December 1995 refused to ratify highly unpopular legislation that would have permitted the launching of a third structural adjustment program (SAP) promoted by both the administration of President Nicephore Soglo (1991-1996) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. President Soglo's subsequent attempts at breaking the political stalemate between the legislative and executive branches of government (he announced his intention to launch the SAP through the "exceptional power" granted to the executive under Article 68 of the Constitution) was one of the critical factors that strengthened popular discontent to such a degree that he lost the 1996 presidential elections to his autocratic predecessor, President Mathieu Kerekou (1996-present; previously ruled 1972-1991) (Adjovi, 1998:107-139). Soglo had severely underestimated the power of his legislative opponents and their ability to translate deepseated popular resentment of foreign-imposed SAPs into electoral defeat at the ballot box. For perhaps the first time in African political history, a democratically elected National Assembly played a critical role in ensuring the defeat of a previously popular and democratically elected president. The democratization process also portends greater popular input into the foreign policy making process as the policies of the second generation of African leaders are increasingly held accountable to public opinion. Even during the Cold War era, public opinion played an influential, albeit intermittent, role in African foreign policies. For example, it has been argued that public opinion, fueled primarily by radio broadcasts by Radio France Internationale, was the primary factor that led to bloody clashes between Senegal and Mauritania in 1989 (Parker, 1991; see also Pazzanita, 1992). Despite the fact that this conflict was neither desired nor promoted by President Diouf of Senegal or President Ould Taya of Mauritania, both these leaders, despite their best efforts to contain public passions, were confronted by violent clashes that spiraled out of control. In a sense, both leaders, as well as the foreign policies of their respective countries, became "prisoners" of public opinion. The role of religion in African foreign policy, especially the impact of the rise of a variety of Islamist movements, constitutes a final element of civil society increasingly confronting today's African leaders. Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria are three countries in which Islamist movements play a key role either in supporting or opposing government policies in the post-Cold War era. Even during the Cold War, however, religion played a key role in African foreign policies in many countries. In the case of Senegal, Islamic leaders known as marabouts constitute an integral part of the domestic political system and play both informal and formal roles in the making of foreign policy (Villalon, 1995). The marabouts played a critical informal role in reducing tensions between Senegal and Mauritania in the aftermath of the 1989 border conflict by shuttling back and forth across the

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river that separates the two countries. In short, if one wants to completely understand the formulation and implementation of Senegal's foreign policy, as well as that of other African countries with sizable Muslim populations, one must take into account the role of religion. (See Chapter 11 for more on the role of Islam in African politics.)

•

PAN-AFRICANISM AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

Inspired by the anticolonial activities of peoples of African descent living in North America and the West Indies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, African nationalists sought to promote a unified African front against colonial rule. What subsequently became known as the "pan-African ideal" was most forcefully enunciated for the first time at the 1945 meeting of the Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England. There participants adopted a "Declaration to the Colonial Peoples" that affirmed the "rights" of all colonized peoples to be "free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic," and "to elect their own governments, without restrictions from foreign powers" (Ajala, 1988:36). In a separate "Declaration to the Colonial Powers," participants further underscored that if the colonial powers were "still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom" (Ajala, 1988:36). The pan-African ideal gained momentum during the heady independence era of the late 1950s and early 1960s. In an opening address to the first gathering of independent African nations on African soil, held in 1958 in Accra, Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah proclaimed: "Never before has it been possible for so representative a gathering of African Freedom Fighters to assemble in a free independent African state for the purpose of planning for a final assault upon imperialism and colonialism" (in Ajala, 1988:39). According to Nkrumah, the realization of the pan-African ideal required a commitment between African leaders and their peoples to guide their countries through four stages: (1) "the attainment of freedom and independence"; (2) "the consolidation of that independence and freedom"; (3) "the creation of unity and community between the African states"; and (4) "the economic and social reconstruction of Africa" (Ajala, 1988:30). Despite overwhelming agreement among African leaders that panAfricanism constituted a worthy foreign policy goal, sharp disagreement existed over the proper path to ensure such unity. One group of primarily francophone countries known as the Brazzaville Group (named after the capital of Congo-Brazzaville), sought a minimalist approach: the coordination of national economic policies through standard diplomatic practices. Little consideration was given to the possibility of creating continent-wide

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institutions. Nkrumah and other leaders, w h o belonged to what became known as the Casablanca Group (named after the Moroccan city), argued instead that the success of pan-Africanism required a political union of all independent African countries, patterned after the federal model of the United States. In speech after speech, Nkrumah promoted the two key themes that became the hallmark of this international vision: "Africa must unite!" and "Seek ye first the political kingdom!" (see Rooney, 1988). A third group of African leaders, who belonged to what became known as the M o n r o v i a G r o u p (named after the capital of Liberia), rejected the idea of political union as both undesirable and unfeasible, primarily due to the assumption that African leaders would jealously guard their countries' n e w f o u n d independence. They nonetheless sought a greater degree of cooperation than that espoused by the Brazzaville Group. Led by Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Belewa, prime minister of Nigeria, the Monrovia Group instead called for the creation of a looser organization of A f r i c a n states. According to this vision of A f r i c a n international relations, A f r i c a n countries would guard their independence but promote growing cooperation in a variety of functional areas, most notably economic, scientific, educational, and social development. An important component of the Monrovia G r o u p approach was a desire to create continent-wide institutions that would oversee and strengthen policy harmonization. On May 25, 1963, thirty-one African heads of state largely embraced the Monrovia vision of African international relations by launching the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the first pan-African, intergovernmental organization of independent African countries based on A f r i c a n soil. The O A U is headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and is headed by a secretary-general elected by m e m b e r states. All major decisions and resolutions are formally discussed at the annual Assembly of Heads of State and G o v e r n m e n t after the biannual meetings of the Council of Ministers. The sovereign equality of all m e m b e r states is an important guiding principle of the organization and significantly differs from the Great Power domination of the UN, given the special powers conferred upon the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States. Although the creation and continued vitality of the O A U have been described as a "victory for pan-Africanism" (Olusanya, 1988:67), both critics and sympathetic observers have questioned the organization's ability to play an e f f e c t i v e role in A f r i c a n international relations (see also A m a t e , 1986; El-Ayouty, 1994). In a special issue of the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, which assessed the O A U ' s continued relevance on the "Silver J u b i l e e " (twenty-five-year) anniversary of the organization's creation, one Nigerian scholar expressed "sadness" over the fact that, despite the best of intentions, the O A U had failed to live up to the expectations of its original framers (Olusanya, 1988:70).

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T h e O A U ' s e f f e c t i v e n e s s can be tentatively assessed by e x p l o r i n g several e l e m e n t s of the O A U Charter, each of w h i c h holds important implications for the d e p e n d e n c y - d e c o l o n i z a t i o n debate. T h e most important t h e m e of the O A U C h a r t e r is s u p p o r t f o r the territorial integrity of frontiers inherited f r o m the c o l o n i a l era. D u e to the m u l t i e t h n i c nature of m o s t A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s , A f r i c a n l e a d e r s r e m a i n f e a r f u l that c h a n g i n g e v e n one b o u n d a r y will open a P a n d o r a ' s box of ethnically based secessionist m o v e m e n t s and lead to the f u r t h e r " B a l k a n i z a t i o n " of the A f r i c a n continent into ever smaller e c o n o m i c and political units (see D a v i d s o n , 1992). In the c a s e of the N i g e r i a n civil w a r ( 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 0 ) , for e x a m p l e , the O A U not only r e f u s e d to sanction the provision of aid to Biafra, the secessionist s o u t h e a s t p o r t i o n of the c o u n t r y , but voted a series of r e s o l u t i o n s that u n d e r s c o r e d o f f i c i a l s u p p o r t f o r the N i g e r i a n federal g o v e r n m e n t ( B u k a r a m b e , 1988:98). T h i s decision was particularly upsetting to international h u m a n rights activists, as well as several A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s a i d i n g the secessionist g o v e r n m e n t , b e c a u s e the military-dominated Nigerian gove r n m e n t was using very e f f e c t i v e starvation m e t h o d s designed to bring the B i a f r a n s — g o v e r n m e n t a n d g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n a l i k e — t o their k n e e s (see Stremlau, 1977). As ethnic t e n s i o n s and separatist m o v e m e n t s intensify in the p o s t Cold War era, the second generation of African leaders remains firmly c o m mitted to maintaining borders inherited f r o m the colonial era. A l t h o u g h the O A U r e c o g n i z e d the s o v e r e i g n t y of Eritrea in 1993, after a U N - s p o n s o r e d r e f e r e n d u m in that country resulted in o v e r w h e l m i n g popular support for independence, African leaders subsequently noted that this process did not call into question the h a l l o w e d c o n c e p t of the inviolability of frontiers. Unlike the majority of African countries, Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia after ind e p e n d e n c e f r o m colonial rule, and therefore e n j o y e d the legal right to withdraw f r o m that voluntary union (see Iyob, 1995). However, in similar cases of voluntary federation that h a v e unraveled in the p o s t - C o l d War era, such as northern Somalia's 1991 unilateral declaration of independence as the Somaliland Republic, as well as other cases where a disgruntled region, such as the southern Sudan, has sought the right of self-determination, the O A U continues to affirm the concept of territorial integrity (see Omaar, 1994). T h e s e c o n d m o s t i m p o r t a n t g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e of the O A U C h a r t e r is noninterference in the internal affairs of m e m b e r states. In the early years of the organization, A f r i c a n leaders debaied whether to allow military leaders w h o had illegally d e p o s e d their civilian c o u n t e r p a r t s to m a i n t a i n their O A U seats. T h i s d e b a t e w a s r e s o l v e d in f a v o r of r e c o g n i z i n g w h a t e v e r g r o u p controlled the reins of p o w e r within a particular country ( A k i n d e l e , 1 9 8 8 b : 8 2 - 8 5 ) . M o r e s i g n i f i c a n t w a s the silence a m o n g A f r i c a n l e a d e r s c o n c e r n i n g h u m a n rights a b u s e s in O A U m e m b e r states. " I n c r e a s e d repression, denial of political c h o i c e , restrictions on the f r e e d o m of a s s o c i a t i o n , and like e v e n t s o c c u r r e d , w i t h rare m u r m u r s of d i s s e n t , " e x p l a i n s C l a u d e

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Welch, Jr., a specialist on h u m a n rights in Africa. " T h e O A U seemed to function as a club of presidents, engaged in a tacit policy of not inquiring into each o t h e r ' s practices" (Welch, 1991:537). During the 1970s, for example, Ugandan dictator Idi Amin was elected O A U chair despite his personal involvement in "politically sanctioned repression and m u r d e r s " in Uganda (Welch, 1991:538). Although still highly reluctant to criticize their counterparts, African leaders are nonetheless beginning to accept a growing role for the O A U in addressing human rights abuses. In 1981, the annual Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Banjul, Gambia, adopted the African Charter on H u m a n and People's Rights (popularly referred to as the Banjul Charter). This h u m a n rights code officially went into effect in October 1986, and has served as the guiding principle for a variety of human rights groups that emerged during the 1980s (Welch, 1991). In addition to encompassing "first-generation" rights (civil and political liberties) usually associated with the Western world, and "second-generation" rights (economic and social rights) usually associated with the socialist world, the Banjul Charter has been described as "breaking some new ground" through the adoption of "third-generation" rights intended to protect the rights of individual peoples or ethnic groups (Welch, 1991:538-539; see also Shivji, 1989). Despite the ratification of the Banjul Charter, however, the O A U ' s response to events in Nigeria during 1995 demonstrates the continued difficulty of translating human rights rhetoric into policy action. In response to an uprising a m o n g the Ogoni ethnic group in southeastern Nigeria, which began in 1990 over control of that region's vast oil resources, N i g e r i a ' s military regime unleashed a brutal campaign of repression that included the N o v e m b e r 1995 execution of Nobel Peace Prize candidate Ken SaroWiwa and eight other Ogoni activists on t r u m p e d - u p murder charges (French, 1995:E3; see also O s a g h a e , 1995). Although O A U secretarygeneral Salim Ahmed Salim expressed "disappointment" over the fact that the Nigerian generals failed to "respond positively" to O A U appeals for clemency, the organization did not adopt concrete, c o m p r e h e n s i v e m e a sures to punish or to internationally isolate the Nigerian regime (quoted in French, 1995:E3). The peaceful settlement of all disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration constitutes a third guiding principle of the O A U . Yet strict adherence to the first two principles—support for territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs—historically has impeded the O A U ' s ability to mediate either internal conflicts or those between two or more member states. In the case of the 1 9 6 7 - 1 9 7 0 Nigerian civil war, automatic support for the territorial integrity of Nigeria seriously called into doubt (at least f r o m the viewpoint of the secessionist Igbos) the O A U ' s ability to serve as an impartial negotiator. It is precisely for this reason that the OAU C o m m i s s i o n of Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation was

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"stillborn" (Zartman, 1995b), and the majority of African-initiated arbitration efforts have been carried out on an ad hoc basis by African presidents. For example, former Djiboutian president Hassan Gouled Aptidon utilized his country's stature as the headquarters for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to mediate conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. According to Zartman (1995a:241), such efforts have led to success in only 33 percent of roughly twenty-four cases, and this success was often only temporary in nature as warring parties returned to the battlefield. The ability to dispatch p e a c e k e e p i n g or p e a c e m a k i n g forces once a conflict has broken out constitutes a critical aspect of peacefully resolving disputes. The O A U founding fathers attempted to prepare for this eventuality by planning the creation of an African High Command: a multinational military force comprised of military contingents from OAU member states. T h e A f r i c a n High C o m m a n d never m a d e it beyond the planning stage, however, leading once again to a variety of ad hoc measures. In 1981, the O A U sponsored the creation of a short-term, all-African military force designed to resolve an expanding civil war in Chad. Comprised of approximately 4,800 troops from Congo-Kinshasa, Nigeria, and Senegal, the OAU force "failed to achieve any concrete solution" due to financial, logistical, and political difficulties, and within a few months was " f o r c e d to withd r a w " (Gambari, 1995:225) The most notable outcome of the lack of OAU coordination in the military realm has been a variety of military interventions by individual countries and intergovernmental organizations. Four sets of actors periodically have intervened in African conflicts: (1) the United Nations as d e m o n strated by the Security Council's 1991 decision to sponsor a series of U.S.led military operations in Somalia, usually referred to as Operation Restore Hope; (2) African regional organizations, such as the decision of the Economic C o m m u n i t y of West A f r i c a n States (ECOWAS) to sponsor a series of Nigerian-led military operations in Liberia; (3) foreign powers, most notably the f o r m e r Soviet Union, the United States, and France; and (4) African powers, as demonstrated by Nigeria's 1997 dispatch of troops to neighboring Sierra Leone to restore a civilian government to power. From the perspective of pan-Africanists, these four types of intervention are ultimately undesirable: rather than representing the consensus opinion of O A U m e m b e r states, such interventions theoretically are driven by the self-interests of the intervening actor or actors. Two developments underscore the O A U ' s desire to take a more proactive role in African conflicts in the p o s t - C o l d War era. In 1993, the O A U assembly of heads of state and g o v e r n m e n t adopted a resolution creating the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, M a n a g e m e n t , and Resolution: a formal consultative process ideally designed to prevent the outbreak and further spread of conflicts on the African continent (Zartman, 1995a:243).

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The inspiration for this consultative process was a forward-thinking document, "Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa," popularly referred to as the Kampala Document, which was the result of a 1991 conference convened by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo (see also Zartman, 1999). A further development is a new African consensus on the necessity of creating a multinational African defense force capable of responding militarily to African crises. In May 1997, African leaders agreed that such a force should be comprised of existing military units of contributing OAU member states, and that these units would be equipped with the aid of foreign powers, most notably the United States and France. The African Defense Force would remain under the operational command of the OAU. Unresolved issues revolve around which countries should be eligible to contribute forces (e.g., should involvement be limited only to democratic countries) and what type of decisionmaking body should be capable of authorizing when and where to intervene (e.g., should intervention be based on the consensus of all OAU member states or should a smaller body of representative members be responsible). Discussions concerning the African Defense Force remain at an exploratory stage, and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution has yet to be tested in regard to a specific African conflict. The final and most successful principle embodied within the OAU C h a r t e r is t h e unswerving

opposition

to colonialism

and white

minority

rule. Principally concerned with the past existence of minority white-ruled regimes in Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the former Portuguesecontrolled territories of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tomé and Principe, the OAU established a Liberation Committee based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to aid liberation movements with both economic and military assistance (see Akindele, 1988a). Although disagreements often arose over which tactics would best ensure transitions to majority-ruled governments (e.g., should one support "dialogue" with a white regime or fund a guerrilla insurgency), every OAU member expressed public opposition to the continued existence of minority white-ruled regimes. The work of the Liberation Committee largely came to an end in 1994, when South Africa made the transition to a multiracial, multiparty democracy.

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REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

Inspired by the success of the European Union (EU) and encouraged by the UN-sponsored Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the first generation of African leaders sought to

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create regional entities capable of promoting regional cooperation and integration. This vision of African international relations was best captured by the O A U ' s publication in 1981 of a document, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000, which proposed the establishment of an A f r i c a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y (AEC) that would be based on an A f r i c a n C o m m o n Market (ACM). T h e guiding logic of the Lagos Plan of Action is that the creation of intergovernmental e c o n o m i c organizations in each of A f r i c a ' s five major r e g i o n s — N o r t h , East, West, Southern, and Central A f r i c a — i s the best means for ensuring the ultimate creation of a continent-wide A E C . (See Chapter 5 for information on the economic crises that have inspired these efforts.) The flourishing of experiments in regional cooperation and integration throughout the contemporary independence era demonstrated the firm commitment of the first generation of African leaders to the economic dimension of the p a n - A f r i c a n ideal. By the end of the 1980s, it was estimated that at least 160 intergovernmental economic groupings existed on the African continent, with thirty-two such organizations in West Africa alone (Seidman and Anang, 1992:73). Among the most notable and far-reaching economic groupings in each of Africa's major regions (including date of launching) are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, 1975); the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UAM, 1989); the Southern African Development C o m m u n i t y ( S A D C , 1980); the Economic C o m m u n i t y of Central African States (ECCAS, 1983); and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in northeast Africa (1986). These regional organizations are complemented by a few larger groupings, such as the Lomé Convention, which promotes preferential trade links between the European Union and dozens of countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (see Ojo, 1985:146-150). African leaders offer several rationales for seeking regional cooperation and integration. The simplest reason is the firm belief that there is strength in numbers. In order to effectively compete within an increasingly competitive international economic system, dominated by economic superpowers (e.g., the United States and Japan) and powerful regional economic entities (e.g., the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] zone), African countries must band together and pool their respective resources. Second, African leaders desire to promote selfsustaining economic development and particularly the industrialization of the African continent. Struggling with the reality that many of their countries are economically impoverished and lack the tools for the creation of advanced industries, A f r i c a n leaders believe that they can build upon the individual strengths of their neighbors to forge integrated and self-sustaining regional economies. Most important, regional economic schemes are perceived as the best means for creating self-reliant development, thereby reducing and ultimately

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ridding the African continent of the ties of dependency inherited from the colonial era (Asante and Chanaiwa, 1993:741-743). For example, African leaders are rightfully concerned that national control over the evolution of their respective economies is constrained by Africa's trade dependency on Europe, at the expense of intraregional trade links with African countries. It is for this reason that the primary objective of early regional economic schemes was to promote intraregional trade with neighbors who theoretically share a common set of development objectives—either due to special geographic features, historical ties, or a shared religion, such as Islam in North Africa (e.g., see Grundy, 1985). By strengthening these ties with like-minded neighbors, a stronger African economic entity is expected to emerge that will be capable of reducing foreign influence and strengthening Africa's collective ability to bargain with non-African powers on a more equal basis. Early optimism began to wane in the aftermath of the launching of several regional integration efforts, which included the creation of supranational authorities and formal economic unions designed to promote intraregional trade and investment. In the case of the East African Community (EAC), the 1967 decision of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda to create a common market with common services, coordinated by a supranational governing body, collapsed less then ten years later, and was followed in 1978-1979 by Tanzania's military intervention in Uganda to overthrow the dictatorial regime of Idi Amin (Potholm and Fredland, 1980). As explained by Olatunde Ojo (1985), a specialist of regional cooperation and integration in Africa, several factors that contributed to the EAC's decline clarify why other similar efforts, from the 1960s to the 1980s, either failed or demonstrated minimal progress. An initial problem was the polarization of national development and the perception of unequal gains (Ojo, 1985:159-161). As typically occurred in other cases in Africa where the creation of a common market served as the cornerstone of the regional grouping, the most industrialized country (Kenya) usually reaped the benefits of economic integration at the expense of its partners (Uganda and Tanzania). For example, Kenya's share of intracommunity trade increased from 63 percent in 1968 to 77 percent in 1974, whereas Uganda's share decreased from 26 to 6 percent during the same period. In addition, despite the fashioning of a common policy toward the establishment of new operations by multinational corporations (MNCs), the majority of these firms decided to locate their bases of operations in Kenya due to its more advanced economy and workforce, as well as its extensive infrastructural network of roads, railroads, ports, and airports. The EAC also foundered due to the inadequacy of compensatory and corrective measures (Ojo, 1985:161-166). In every integration scheme, some countries inevitably benefit more than others. As a result, policymakers can implement measures, such as the creation of regional development

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banks or the disproportionate sharing of customs revenue, to correct the imbalance and compensate those countries expected to lose out in the short term. In the case of the EAC, a regional development bank was created to disburse f u n d s in the f o l l o w i n g m a n n e r to the three m e m b e r s : K e n y a (22 percent), Tanzania (38 percent), and Uganda (40 percent). However, in this and other cases of integration in Africa, even the richest members are usually incapable of subsidizing bank operations. The actual finances provided to the most needy m e m b e r s therefore never even begin to approach true development needs or completely compensate for losses incurred. A third stumbling block to successful regional integration of the E A C was ideological differences and the rise of economic nationalism (Ojo, 1 9 8 5 : 1 6 8 - 1 6 9 ) . Simply put, ideological d i f f e r e n c e s often ensure a radically different approach to development projects, which in turn can significantly hinder regional integration. In the case of Kenya, a pro-West capitalist regime was very open to private enterprise and foreign investment, particularly the opening of local o f f i c e s of M N C s . T h e socialist-oriented regime of Tanzania, however, opted for a self-help strategy known as ujamaa (the Kiswahili term for brotherhood), which not only denounced private enterprise as exploitative, but also restricted the flow of foreign investment, and strongly controlled the M N C s . When c o m b i n e d with the growing public perception of unequal gains between the two countries, these ideological d i f f e r e n c e s led to often acrimonious public debate between President J o m o Kenyatta of Kenya and President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and to the rise of economic nationalism in both countries. A final element that contributed to the E A C ' s decline was the impact of foreign influences (Ojo, 1 9 8 5 : 1 6 9 - 1 7 1 ) . W h e r e a s Kenya developed close relationships with the Western-bloc nations (e.g., the United States and Great Britain), Tanzania pursued close links with the socialist bloc (particularly the P e o p l e ' s Republic of China), and Uganda sought links with the former Soviet Union and the Arab world. These links ensured that the E A C became embroiled in the Cold War rivalry of the 1960s and the 1970s and contributed to the creation of an outwardly directed "strategic image," which prompted E A C member states to look "outward" toward their foreign patrons rather than "inward" toward their natural regional partners. Beginning in the 1980s, the failure and stagnation of classic integration schemes prompted A f r i c a n leaders to undertake looser f o r m s of regional economic cooperation in a variety of functionally specific areas, such as transportation infrastructure (e.g., regional rail links), energy (e.g., hydroelectric projects on c o m m o n rivers), and t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s (see O n w u k a and Sesay, 1985; Aly, 1994; Lavergne, 1997; Oyejide, Elbadawi, and Collier, 1997). The logic behind pursuing this form of regionalism is that it does not require the creation of supranational authorities, nor does it require policymakers to sacrifice national control over the sensitive areas

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of foreign trade and investment. This looser form of economic cooperation is gathering strength in the p o s t - C o l d War era, particularly as democratically elected elites increasingly assume power and seek to promote cooperation with other democracies within their regions. The 1992 transformation of the Southern African Development Coordination C o n f e r e n c e ( S A D C C ) into the Southern A f r i c a n D e v e l o p m e n t C o m m u n i t y provides a good example of this growing trend in African regional relations. Originally conceived as a vehicle for reducing the economic d e p e n d e n c e of the Frontline States 2 on South A f r i c a during the apartheid era, the newly reformed S A D C now counts South Africa among its members, and is seeking to enhance traditional cooperation in a variety of functional realms, most notably transportation (Khadiagala, 1994). The new S A D C stands poised at "the threshold of a new era," according to a report published by the African Development Bank in conjunction with the World Bank and the D e v e l o p m e n t Bank of South A f r i c a . " A l t h o u g h its effects and the inequities it has embedded will linger for a long time to come, the d e m i s e of apartheid opens up prospects u n i m a g i n a b l e even a few years ago," explains the report. " N e w opportunities have emerged in every sector of economic activity for expanded trade and mutually beneficial exchanges of all kinds among the countries of southern A f r i c a " (Morna, 1995:65). Several factors are essential to understanding the optimism surrounding S A D C ' s n e w f o u n d status as a model for e c o n o m i c cooperation in Africa, particularly in terms of reducing southern A f r i c a ' s d e p e n d e n c e on foreign economic interests and creating the basis for self-sustaining development in the p o s t - C o l d War era (see B l u m e n f e l d , 1992; see also Gibb, 1998). First, the inclusion of a highly industrialized South Africa provides S A D C with an engine for economic growth that will potentially reinvigorate the entire region. In this regard, South A f r i c a may play a leadership role similar to that e n j o y e d by G e r m a n y in the EU, the United States in N A F T A , and, to a lesser degree, Nigeria in E C O W A S . The m a j o r i t y of S A D C m e m b e r s (seven out of ten) also share a c o m m o n British colonial heritage. Although a shared colonial past is not a precondition for effective regional cooperation, it nonetheless facilitates such technical matters as which language should serve as the official language of communication (in the case of both S A D C and the EAC, English). A third facilitating factor is the decline in ideological d i f f e r e n c e s between S A D C m e m b e r states that a c c o m p a n i e d the end of the Cold War. For e x a m p l e , Angola, M o z a m b i q u e , and Z i m b a b w e have discarded in varying d e g r e e s their a d h e r e n c e to Marxist principles of d e v e l o p m e n t , South A f r i c a has officially r e n o u n c e d its apartheid system, and Tanzania and Zambia have dismantled significant portions of their formerly socialist economies. In essence, there exists a growing consensus a m o n g S A D C member states that effective regional economic cooperation must be based

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on a shared c o m m i t m e n t to some variant of the liberal capitalist model of development. S A D C ' s greatest strength is a regional commitment to conflict resolution and to the promotion of shared democratic values (Ohlson and Stedman, 1994). Except for the case of Angola, the Cold War's end and the rise of democratization movements have led to the end of civil wars and the holding of democratic elections throughout the S A D C countries of southern Africa. One of the most important lessons of regional integration theory, which draws upon the success of the European Union, is that the existence of elites with a shared commitment to democracy is the foundation of long-term economic cooperation and development. It is for this reason that the 1992 Windhoek Treaty (named after the capital of Namibia) that consecrated the launching of S A D C underscored the political dimension of regional relationships and its critical role in the continued expansion of economic cooperation. The leaderships of S A D C m e m b e r states recognize that the fruits of pan-Africanism can only be achieved by the settlement of civil war and the promotion of democracy in Angola and other countries throughout the African continent. As a result, conflict resolution remains an important cornerstone of the pan-African ideal at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

•

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN POWERS IN AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Many important policies a f f e c t i n g the future of African politics and society are decided in Paris, Washington, Berlin, and Tokyo—the capitals of the four Great Powers that remain heavily involved throughout Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Aluko, 1987; see also Nielson, 1969). France maintains the most extensive political-military and economic relationships with African countries, most notably in f r a n c o p h o n e Africa, those former French and Belgian colonies where, among a variety of factors, French serves as one of the official languages of administration and/or education (Wauthier, 1995). 3 T h e United States often became the most influential political-military actor in the n o n f r a n c o p h o n e portions of the African continent during the Cold War era, and increasingly has sought to promote economic links in the p o s t - C o l d War era (Schraeder 1994b; 1998). Japan and G e r m a n y emerged during the 1980s as extremely involved economic actors, and have achieved the status of the second or third most important sources of economic aid or trade for individual African countries (often behind the leading roles of France and the United States) (Schulz and Hansen, 1984; Nester, 1992; Hofmeier, 1994; Brune, Betz, and Kuhne, 1994; Morikawa, 1997). Britain's official interest in maintaining privileged colonial ties, once rivaled only by that of France, dramatically waned during the Cold War

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e x c e p t in the case of South A f r i c a (Styan, 1996; Bangura, 1983). E c o n o m i c d e c l i n e f o r c e d British p o l i c y m a k e r s to m a k e difficult decisions as to w h e r e i n c r e a s i n g l y limited e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s w o u l d c o n t r i b u t e the m o s t to British f o r e i g n p o l i c y interests, u l t i m a t e l y l e a d i n g to the d o w n g r a d i n g of British ties with the majority of its f o r m e r colonies. Britain's most noteworthy o n g o i n g involvement with its f o r m e r African colonies takes place within the context of the C o m m o n w e a l t h of Nations, a loose association of f o r m e r British colonies that holds an annual s u m m i t m e e t i n g of h e a d s of state. Other, traditionally less p o w e r f u l colonial p o w e r s , such as Spain, were n e v e r i m p o r t a n t d i p l o m a t i c p l a y e r s d u e to the lack of e x t e n s i v e c o l o n i a l h o l d i n g s ( N a y l o r , 1987; S e g a l , 1989). W e a k e r c o l o n i a l p o w e r s at b e s t d e m o n s t r a t e d only s p o r a d i c interest in their f o r m e r c o l o n i e s d u r i n g t i m e s of crisis, such as B e l g i u m in central A f r i c a and Italy in the H o r n of A f r i c a . A l t h o u g h less actively i n v o l v e d in the political realm, G e r m a n y c o n t i n u e s to f o s t e r u n i q u e trade relationships t h r o u g h o u t A f r i c a (consistently serving as either the s e c o n d or third m o s t important trading partner of the m a j o r i t y of A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s ) ( H o f m e i e r , 1994; 1986). P o r t u g a l , h o w e v e r , has exh i b i t e d a r e n e w e d interest in s t r e n g t h e n i n g c u l t u r a l ties with its f o r m e r c o l o n i e s and p l a y e d an important role in p r o m o t i n g the resolution of civil war in M o z a m b i q u e during the 1990s ( M a c Q u e e n , 1985). D e s p i t e e x t e n s i v e i n v o l v e m e n t d u r i n g the C o l d War era, the f o r m e r c o m m u n i s t - b l o c c o u n t r i e s h a v e drastically r e d u c e d their political-military and e c o n o m i c p r e s e n c e on the A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t . T h e p r e o c c u p a t i o n of R u s s i a n leaders with the e c o n o m i c and political restructuring of the f o r m e r Soviet U n i o n has p r e c l u d e d any m e a n i n g f u l d i p l o m a t i c role in A f r i c a (Patman, 1990). T h e one notable vestige of the previously active foreign policy of the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c of C h i n a ( P R C ) is an o n g o i n g d i p l o m a t i c battle with Taiwan as to which c a p i t a l — B e i j i n g or Taipei—is r e c o g n i z e d by A f r i can g o v e r n m e n t s as the o f f i c i a l seat of the C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t ( L a r k i n , 1971; S n o w , 1988; X u e t o n g , 1988). O t h e r c o m m u n i s t - b l o c c o u n t r i e s that o n c e e n j o y e d p r i v i l e g e d r e l a t i o n s with the A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t e i t h e r c o m pletely d i s a p p e a r e d (e.g., the f o r m e r East G e r m a n y , w h i c h n o w constitutes part of a r e u n i f i e d G e r m a n y ) ( W i n r o w , 1990), or b e c a m e m a r g i n a l i z e d (e.g., C u b a ) d u e to their pariah status within the international s y s t e m and a drastic reduction in aid f o r m e r l y p r o v i d e d by their socialist patrons ( M e s a L a g o and Beikin, 1982). A n important result of socialist-bloc i n v o l v e m e n t in A f r i c a f r o m the 1950s to the 1980s is that it p r o m p t e d extensive U.S. inv o l v e m e n t in c o u n t r i e s p e r c e i v e d as t h r e a t e n e d by c o m m u n i s t i n f l u e n c e ( S c h r a e d e r , 1994b). A s d i s c u s s e d below, these r e l a t i o n s h i p s are s i g n i f i cantly c h a n g i n g as the U n i t e d States attempts to r e f a s h i o n its f o r m e r Cold W a r - o r i e n t e d f o r e i g n policy. A v a r i e t y of m i d d l e p o w e r s play v a r y i n g r o l e s on the A f r i c a n continent. C a n a d a and the N o r d i c countries, most notably S w e d e n , d e m o n s t r a t e a strong h u m a n i t a r i a n interest, particularly c o n c e r n i n g f a m i n e relief in the

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Horn of Africa and southern Africa (e.g., Stokke, 1989). During the height of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel pursued an aggressive policy that exchanged Israeli technical aid for continued or renewed diplomatic recognition of the state of Israel (Peters, 1992; Decalo, 1997). Other Middle Eastern powers, such as Saudi Arabia, pursue religiously based policies regarding the predominantly Muslim states of North and northeast A f r i c a (Creed and M e n k h a u s , 1986). Iran in particular seeks to foster links with Islamist regimes and m o v e m e n t s in Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria; and Iraq's previously e x p a n d i n g relationships with several A f r i c a n countries, most notably Mauritania, were sharply curtailed after Iraq was d e f e a t e d in the 1991 Gulf War (Lesser, 1993). India and Brazil lead their respective regions in seeking to expand economic relations with the African continent (Collins, 1985; Dubey, 1990; Karnik, 1988). The specific impact of foreign powers can be illuminated by analyzing the evolving policies of the two countries—France and the United States— that remain the most active on the African continent. U.S. and French foreign policies were essentially driven by different sets of motivating factors during the Cold War era. U.S. policymakers were principally guided by the ideological interest of containing the former Soviet Union and its c o m m u nist allies (Schraeder, 1994b). A variety of presidential doctrines, beginning with the T r u m a n Doctrine in 1947 and culminating in the R e a g a n Doctrine of the 1980s, declared Washington's self-appointed right to intervene against communist advances throughout the world, including in f r a n c o p h o n e Africa. As a result, pro-West administrations, such as Senegal under President Abdou Diouf, were treated as potential U.S. allies deserving of foreign aid, whereas Marxist administrations, such as Madagascar under Didier Ratsiraka, were isolated. U.S. policymakers also sought special relationships with strategically important regional actors, such as M o r o c c o in North Africa, Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, and South Africa in southern Africa, that offered special military access rights or maintained important U.S. technical facilities (e.g., telecommunications stations) deemed critical to containment policies in Africa (for example, see Lefebvre, 1991). French policymakers sought first and foremost to consolidate and promote the rayonnement (spread) of the most notable aspects of French culture, including the French language and intellectual traditions (Kolodziej, 1974:479). Also referred to as the promotion of la francophonie (a greater French-speaking c o m m u n i t y ) , this policy is best represented by the b i a n nual F r a n c o - A f r i c a n summit attended by the leaders of France and f r a n cophone Africa, the twentieth of which was held in Paris in 1998. E c o nomic interests were perceived by French policymakers as both parallel and integral to the promotion of French culture, as witnessed by the organization of thirteen f o r m e r French colonies and Equatorial Guinea in la zone franc (the f r a n c zone). Created in 1947, the franc zone constitutes a supranational financial system in which France serves as the central b a n k ,

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and a common currency—the C o m m u n a u t é Financière Africaine (CFA) f r a n c — i s tied to the French franc and guaranteed by the French treasury. By wedding its fiscal policy to the franc zone, France has sought to preserve monetary stability and French influence throughout francophone Africa (Vallée, 1989). As long as the United States and France were pursuing fundamentally different but complementary foreign policy interests, Africa remained the chief beneficiary of a "complementary Cold War regime" in which U.S.French relations tended to be balanced, cooperative, and predictable. Regardless of whether France was led by the conservative partisans of Charles de Gaulle or the socialists of François Mitterrand, French policymakers predictably claimed that historical links and geographical proximity justified placing francophone Africa within France's sphere of influence. The implicit assumption of what one observer has referred to as the French version of the Monroe Doctrine is that francophone Africa constituted France's domaine réservé (natural preserve) or chasse gardée (private hunting ground), and therefore remained off-limits to other Great Powers, regardless of whether they were friends like the United States and the other northern industrialized democracies, or enemies such as the former Soviet Union and other radical powers (quoted in Schraeder, 2000b). During the Cold War, this conception of francophone Africa was wholeheartedly accepted and even encouraged by U.S. policymakers. Washington, in particular, expected France and the other European allies to take the lead in their former colonial territories. As succinctly stated by George Ball, undersecretary of state in the Kennedy administration, the United States recognized Africa as a "special European responsibility," just as European nations were expected to recognize "[U.S.] responsibility in Latin America" (Ball, 1968). According to U.S. policymakers, France emerged as the only European power with both the long-term political will and the requisite military force capable of thwarting communist powers from exploiting instability. Much to the chagrin of French policymakers, this perception led some analysts to refer to France as Washington's de facto gendarme (policeman) in francophone Africa (Goldsborough, 1978; Lellouche and Moisi, 1979; see also Hoffman, 1967). The end of the Cold War transformed the international order and set the stage for dramatic changes in Great Power involvement in Africa (see Pastor, 1999; Rusi, 1998). The most notable immediate change was that one superpower, the Soviet Union, ceased to exist, and its successor state, the Russian Federation, was too preoccupied with the economic and political restructuring of its domestic system to play any sort of meaningful role on the African continent. Equally important, Germany and Japan had overcome the defeat of World War II to join the United States and France as the most influential Great Powers on the African continent (see Garten, 1993; Schraeder, 2000b). However, expectations of Great Power cooperation in

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Schraeder

Only after he committed large-scale atrocities against his o w n people, including allegedly beating some schoolchildren to death, did France in 1979 finally turn against and depose " E m p e r o r " Jean-Bedel Bokassa, its client ruler in the Central A f r i c a n Republic.

the p o s t - C o l d War era have been dampened by the emergence of a Cold Peace, in which the northern industrialized democracies compete for markets and influence throughout the African continent. Three specific themes reflective of this emerging Cold Peace are once again nicely illuminated by focusing on U.S. and French involvement in Africa (see also Petras and Mosley, 2000). The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the end of the complementary Cold War regime among the Western democracies and its gradual replacement with a new competitive international environment, in which Great Power policies increasingly are being driven by the same

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f a c t o r : e c o n o m i c s e l f - i n t e r e s t . In the case of F r a n c e , p o l i c y m a k e r s w e r e c o n f r o n t e d by an intensifying e c o n o m i c crisis on the A f r i c a n continent that created rising pressures for c h a n g e within the c a r e f u l l y c r a f t e d w e b of econ o m i c ties that b o u n d the French e c o n o m y to t h o s e of f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a ( S a n d b r o o k , 1993; C a l l a g h y and R a v e n h i l l , 1993). With m a n y of their clients on the verge of financial bankruptcy, F r e n c h p o l i c y m a k e r s initially d e c i d e d to u n d e r t a k e an e c o n o m i c bailout that e n t a i l e d m a s s i v e i n c r e a s e s in foreign aid. French aid to f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a increased f r o m the already s u b s t a n t i a l level of $3.7 billion in 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 2 to $8.2 billion in 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 — a nearly 120 percent increase during a t e n - y e a r period. O n c e it bec a m e clear that the short-term bail-outs were insufficient and that projected aid levels w e r e b e y o n d F r a n c e ' s f i s c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , F r e n c h p o l i c y m a k e r s took the e x t r a o r d i n a r y step in J a n u a r y 1994 of d e v a l u i n g the CFA f r a n c by 50 percent. T h e decision sent s h o c k w a v e s t h r o u g h o u t the CFA f r a n c zone, which had never b e f o r e suffered a devaluation. Most important, the devaluation s i g n a l e d that F r a n c e ' s c o m m i t m e n t to the cultural i m p e r a t i v e of la francophonie no longer took p r e c e d e n c e o v e r the pursuit of e c o n o m i c selfinterest in an increasingly c o m p e t i t i v e , p o s t - C o l d War e n v i r o n m e n t . In the case of the United States, the end of the Cold War fostered the decline of ideologically based policies in f a v o r of the pursuit of trade and investment (Schraeder, 1998). In 1996, the Clinton administration unveiled the first f o r m a l U.S. trade policy for aggressively p u r s u i n g new m a r k e t s throughout A f r i c a , including in f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a ( D e p a r t m e n t of C o m merce. 1996). This report led to the creation of an interagency A f r i c a Trade and Development Coordinating Group, which was jointly chaired by the National E c o n o m i c Council ( N E C ) and the National Security C o u n c i l ( N S C ) . The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, envisioned to stimulate U.S. investment and trade with Africa, and passed by both the House and the Senate in 2000, serves as an important c o m p o n e n t of this e c o n o m i c strategy. T h e l a u n c h i n g of the Clinton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s l o n g - a w a i t e d trade policy was a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e f r o m the C o l d War d e f e r e n c e to E u r o p e a n e c o n o m i c interests in their f o r m e r c o l o n i e s . T h i s p o l i c y w a s p r e c e d e d by the l a u n c h i n g in 1992 of a series of highly p u b l i c i z e d s p e e c h e s r e j e c t i n g W a s h i n g t o n ' s past s u p p o r t f o r F r a n c e ' s p r i v i l e g e d role in f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a in f a v o r of a more aggressive a p p r o a c h to p r o m o t i n g U.S. trade and investment. " T h e African market is open to e v e r y o n e , " explained f o r m e r assistant secretary of state for A f r i c a n affairs H e r m a n Cohen in a 1995 speech in Libreville, G a b o n , explicitly d e s i g n e d to d e n o u n c e the c o n c e p t of a cha.ssc gardee. "We must accept f r e e and fair competition, equality b e t w e e n all actors" (quoted in Schraeder, 2 0 0 0 b ) . T h e most n o t e w o r t h y e x a m p l e of the administration's determination to highlight and a d v a n c e e x p a n d i n g U.S. e c o n o m i c interests on the A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t w a s P r e s i d e n t C l i n t o n ' s decision to m a k e a t w e l v e - d a y presidential trip to A f r i c a in 1998 that included stops in B o t s w a n a , G h a n a , R w a n d a , S e n e g a l , South A f r i c a , a n d U g a n d a .

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For the first time in U.S. history, a sitting U.S. president had led an extended diplomatic mission to Africa intent on improving U.S.-African ties and promoting U.S. trade and investment on the African continent. 4 T h e transformation of foreign policy interests in the p o s t - C o l d War era has contributed to the rise of Great P o w e r economic competition throughout Africa, particularly in the highly lucrative petroleum, telecommunications, and transport industries. In the eyes of French policymakers, the penetration of U.S. and other Western companies constitutes "at best an intrusion" and "at worst an aggression" into F r a n c e ' s chasse gardée. T h e seriousness with which this issue is treated at the highest levels of the French policymaking establishment was demonstrated by the public admission of Minister of Cooperation Michel Roussin that a series of meetings had been held on how best to defend French interests, including those within the economic realm, against those of the United States (Glaser and Smith, 1994; see also Védrine and Moi'si, 2000). Intense competition between the government of Congo-Brazzaville, Elf-Aquitaine (the French oil corporation), and Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy), a U.S.-based oil company, is an excellent example of the potential f u t u r e stakes involved in rising U.S.-French economic competition. Desperately in need of nearly $200 million in order to pay government salaries prior to the holding of legislative elections, one observer has noted that newly elected president Pascal Lissouba "naturally turned for help to Elf-Aquitaine (which controls 80 percent of the country's oil production)." When its French manager refused to approve either a $300 million loan or "a request for a $300 million mortgage on the future production of three promising new o f f - s h o r e oil deposits," Lissouba initiated secret negotiations with the U.S.-based Oxy. An agreement was signed, but ultimately renounced eight m o n t h s later by the Lissouba administration due to "intense French pressure" (quoted in Schraeder, 2000b). The very public war of words between the U.S. State Department and the French Ministry of Cooperation reached a feverish pitch during the fall of 1996, and demonstrated how e c o n o m i c competition had spilled over into the political realm. Minister of Cooperation Jacques Godfrain chided Secretary of State Warren Christopher for his decision to make his first (and last) official visit to A f r i c a approximately four years after assuming office, and literally weeks before the U.S. presidential elections of November 1996. Christopher responded to the perceived diplomatic slight by demanding an official apology. When none was forthcoming, he publicly criticized French policy: "All nations must cooperate, not compete, if we are going to m a k e a positive difference in A f r i c a ' s future," explained Christopher. "The time has passed when Africa could be carved into spheres of influence, or when outside powers could view whole groups of states as their private d o m a i n " (French, 1996a:A5). Not to be outdone, G o d f r a i n responded in kind: "If I were a political or electoral counselor to President

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Bill Clinton, I would advise him to worry more about helping African development after the elections" (French, 1996a:A5). The diplomatic war of words also had important ramifications within international organizations, as witnessed by U.S.-French competition in 1996 over the future leadership of the United Nations. The Chirac administration led a losing battle to reelect Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali for a second term of office. The Clinton administration had vowed early on to utilize its veto right to block Boutros-Ghali's candidacy, and did so at a November 19 meeting of the Security Council. The Chirac administration responded by threatening to veto any candidate from a nonfrancophone country, and strongly promoted the candidacy of Amara Essy, Côte d'lvoire's foreign minister. In the end, Kofi Annan, a native English speaker from Ghana who was perceived among French policymakers as the "American candidate," was chosen by the Security Council on December 13, 1996. The most plausible explanation as to why the Chirac administration ultimately backed away from its earlier support of Essy was the loss of support among francophone African leaders who ultimately rallied around Annan's candidacy. When confronted with the possibility that an extended stalemate between the United States and France might lead to the selection of a non-African Secretary-General, the francophone African leaders placed their common heritage as Africans before their more select common attachment to la francophonie. The emergence of economic competition during the Cold Peace has affected Great Power support for democratization. The end of the Cold War raised expectations that the Western democracies would promote democracy and human rights as the cornerstones of a new democratic international order that would be consistently applied to all regions of the world, including in francophone Africa. Scholars, activists, and policymakers in both the United States and France increasingly coalesced around the Wilsonian concept of making political democratization a precondition for the improvement of economic and political relations with Paris and Washington. However, the simultaneous emergence of prodemocracy movements throughout francophone Africa threatened the very essence of France's carefully crafted francophone network: the potential replacement of staunchly pro-French, undemocratic leaders with opposition candidates less enamored with France and more sympathetic to seeking closer ties with other northern industrialized democracies (Clark and Gardinier, 1997). To the surprise of many, President François Mitterrand initially embraced these democratization movements in a much-quoted speech at the 1990 Franco-African summit held in La Baule, France, and warned his counterparts in francophone Africa that future French aid would be contingent on their willingness to promote true democratic change. What became known as the "La Baule Doctrine" suggested that the promotion of democracy would become the new hallmark of French foreign policy in francophone Africa. The

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bold rhetoric of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n w a s n o n e t h e l e s s forestalled by the reality of o n g o i n g f o r e i g n aid p r o g r a m s d e s i g n e d to k e e p p r o - F r e n c h l e a d e r s in p o w e r ( B a y a r t , 1991; A g i r Ici et S u r v i e , 1995). In the c a s e of C a m e r o o n , F r e n c h aid to the a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e of President Paul B i y a e x p a n d e d f r o m $ 1 5 9 m i l l i o n in 1990 to $ 4 3 6 m i l l i o n in 1992, the y e a r of the c o u n t r y ' s first multiparty presidential elections. T h e primary reason f o r the dramatic increase in F r e n c h aid was to e n s u r e B i y a ' s victory, especially as the most p o p u l a r opposition candidate was John Fru Ndi, an a n g l o p h o n e politician p e r c e i v e d as a threat to French interests in C a m e r o o n . A n y m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s g e n e r a t e d by earlier F r e n c h rhetoric were r e s o l v e d at the 1992 F r a n c o - A f r i c a n s u m m i t held in Libreville, G a b o n . At this m e e t i n g , F r e n c h p r i m e m i n i s t e r P i e r r e B é r é g o v o y p r i v a t e l y stated that w h e n c o n f r o n t e d with the p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g g o a l s of p r o m o t i n g d e m o c r a c y , e n s u r i n g d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d m a i n t a i n i n g security, the leaders of f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a w e r e e x p e c t e d to a d o p t the f o l l o w i n g o r d e r of priorities: a b o v e all, security, f o l l o w e d by d e v e l o p m e n t a n d , finally, d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n ( G l a s e r and Smith, 1994:102) T h e election of J a c q u e s Chirac as president of France in M a y 1995 coi n c i d e d with an i n c r e a s i n g l y t u r b u l e n t period in F r e n c h f o r e i g n p o l i c y ( M a r c h a i , 1995). T h e g r o w i n g c o n t r a d i c t i o n s in F r a n c e ' s d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n p o l i c i e s w e r e d e m o n s t r a t e d by the C h i r a c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s r e s p o n s e to a F e b r u a r y 1996 c o u p d ' é t a t in N i g e r , the first against a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y elected g o v e r n m e n t in F r a n c e ' s f o r m e r colonies since the b e g i n n i n g of the d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n p r o c e s s in 1990. D e s p i t e a c o m m i t m e n t in 1995 by Minister of C o o p e r a t i o n J a c q u e s G o d f r a i n that F r a n c e would i n t e r v e n e to reinstate a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y elected g o v e r n m e n t if a d e f e n s e treaty had b e e n signed with that c o u n t r y , F r a n c e r e f u s e d to intervene in N i g e r and ultim a t e l y d e c i d e d to w o r k with the military r e g i m e headed by C o l o n e l Ibrahim Ma'inassara B a r é (French, 1996b:A3). N o t surprisingly, the d e m o c r a t i cally e l e c t e d f r a n c o p h o n e n e i g h b o r s of N i g e r were w o r r i e d by F r e n c h inaction. In a t h r o w b a c k to an e a r l i e r era of authoritarian rule and h i g h l y q u e s t i o n a b l e d e m o c r a t i c p r a c t i c e s , C o l o n e l Baré a n n o u n c e d that t h e r e w o u l d be multiparty elections in 1996, presented himself as the c a n d i d a t e of the ruling party, and s u b s e q u e n t l y " w o n " inherently f l a w e d elections to the congratulatory toasts of local French diplomats. U.S. d i p l o m a t s h a v e typically been m o r e vocal than their French c o u n terparts in their support for democratization throughout f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a . T h i s v o c a l stance is not due to a g r e a t e r U.S. c o m m i t m e n t to p r o m o t i n g d e m o c r a c y in A f r i c a , relative to that e s p o u s e d by France and the other industrialized d e m o c r a c i e s . In fact, there is a b u n d a n t e v i d e n c e of o n g o i n g contradictions between W a s h i n g t o n ' s pro-democracy rhetoric and its foreign policy actions. For e x a m p l e , p u n i t i v e m e a s u r e s designed to e n f o r c e p r o d e m o c r a c y rhetoric are at best unevenly applied depending on the perceived importance of the A f r i c a n country. A l t h o u g h the Clinton administration w a s

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quick to enforce comprehensive economic sanctions against the mini-state of Gambia, when that country's military took power in a coup d ' é t a t in 1994, it refused to impose c o m p r e h e n s i v e e c o n o m i c sanctions against the military dictatorship of Nigeria (prior to that country's democratic elections of 1999) that would have affected U.S. access to Nigerian oil, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy (although a variety of more limited sanctions, such as the suspension of military cooperation, were nonetheless imposed). T h e unusually vocal stance of U.S. diplomats in f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a are at least partially due to a self-interested calculation that the United States has little to lose and everything to gain by excoriating pro-French elites who impede the transition to a new political order. The logic of diplomatic competition at the local level is based on perceptions of the democratization process as a zero-sum g a m e (i.e., one p e r s o n ' s gain is another's loss). From the perspective of local U.S. ambassadors, for example, promoting multiparty d e m o c r a c y is a low-cost strategy with potentially high returns—namely, the replacement of pro-French elites with new leaders potentially more sensitive to U.S. interests. From the perspective of local French ambassadors, the reverse holds true, which explains why French policymakers tend to emerge as protectors of the status quo. In the case of Benin, for e x a m p l e , N i c é p h o r e S o g l o ' s victory in the first presidential elections to be held after his c o u n t r y ' s transition to democracy in 1991, led to the formation of an administration less dependent on France and more interested in promoting closer foreign ties with the United States (Adjovi, 1998). It is precisely for this reason, argue critics of French policies in Africa, that local French diplomats provided significant support to S o g l o ' s authoritarian predecessor, Mathieu K é r é k o u , who emerged victorious in the 1996 presidential elections. Although he ultimately accepted the 1996 election results, Soglo remained sharply critical of the "northern countries" (read France) who he at least partially blamed for his defeat at the hands of Benin's former dictator of nineteen years. Regardless of France's ultimate role in the 1996 presidential elections, however, Kérékou 's reemergence did not signal a return to the same BeninoisFrench relationship that existed prior to 1991. Rising competition between the United States and France holds important implications for the dependency-decolonization debate. In sharp contrast to the Cold War era when the West (especially the United States) sought to strengthen and enhance F r a n c e ' s privileged role in f r a n c o p h o n e Africa as a bulwark against c o m m u n i s m , the end of the Cold War has heightened Great Power competition within the political and (especially) economic realms among the northern industrialized democracies. As a result. French policymakers increasingly claim that the United States and Japan, and to a lesser degree Germany and Canada, pose economic and political threats to French interests in f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a . A c c o r d i n g to Stephen Smith (1994), the A f r i c a correspondent for the French daily

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Libération, such statements are indicative of a growing duel within the West over Africa, particularly between Washington and Paris. From the viewpoint of the second generation of African leaders, rising economic competition among the Great Powers provides an opportunity to lessen previously privileged ties of dependence and pursue special relationships and especially economic contracts with countries willing to provide the best offer. Although the ultimate resolution in favor of France of the "oil war" in the Congo suggests that the ties of dependency are not automatically broken by the end of the Cold War, the Lissouba government nonetheless was able to obtain a better agreement from the French as a result of "playing the American card." In other cases, such as Senegal's decision to offer lucrative exploration rights to U.S. and South African companies at the expense of previously privileged ties with the French oil industry, the second generation of African leaders are successfully utilizing their increased independence within the international system to acquire the best deals for their respective countries, thereby ensuring future electoral victories in democratic political systems where public support—not authoritarian force—increasingly is the key to power.

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THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The relationship of African countries to the UN and to a host of international financial institutions is critical to understanding the relevance of the decolonization-dependency debate. During the independence era of the 1960s, a variety of factors suggested that membership in the UN was facilitating the ability of the first generation of African leaders to assume greater control over the international relations of their respective countries (Mathews, 1988). In addition to serving as a concrete symbol of African independence, UN membership historically has provided African leaders with an important international forum for promoting African views on a variety of international issues, such as unequivocal support for complete decolonization, opposition to apartheid in South Africa, the promotion of socioeconomic development, and the need for disarmament and attention to regional security. Most important, the UN provides a unique forum for diplomatic negotiations. Financially unable to maintain embassies throughout the world, let alone throughout the African continent, African diplomats take advantage of the fact that almost all countries maintain a permanent mission in New York to carry out the day-to-day business of diplomacy (Mathews, 1988). In an era when it has become fashionable for many Westerners, particularly Americans, to criticize their countries' involvement in the UN as providing few if any tangible economic or political benefits, it is important

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to recognize that UN agencies often play substantial administrative and development roles in many A f r i c a n countries. In several A f r i c a n capital cities, there are a variety of U N o f f i c e s whose budgets and staffs sometimes approach those of their counterparts within the host government. In Dakar, the capital of Senegal, for example, offices represent a variety of UN agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization ( W H O ) , the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ( U N E S C O ) . Capturing the sentiment of African policymakers during the 1960s, a Senegalese diplomat noted that "these agencies were perceived as critical to the fulfillment of African development goals during the initial independence era, and provided a source of hope especially for those impoverished countries lacking both the resources and the expertise to implement the studies and programs pursued by each of these agencies." 5 In the aftermath of the Cold War, however, a highly vocal segment of African leaders and intellectuals is often apt to associate the UN with foreign intervention and the imposition of Western values. The primary reason for this d e v e l o p m e n t is the U N ' s increased involvement in a variety of largely ethnic-based crises, such as in Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Rwanda, which seemingly have intensified in the p o s t - C o l d War era. As succinctly summarized by Zartman (1995a: 1-14), these crises often occur against the backdrop of "collapsed states"—the temporary disintegration of the legitimate, sovereign authority of the nation-state that is responsible for maintaining law and order within its territory. This collapse can be complete, as was the case in Somalia when civil war engulfed the country in the aftermath of the overthrow of Somali dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991; or it can entail the breakdown of effective central authority over the majority of the country despite the existence of a ruling regime, as occurred in the case of C o n g o - K i n s h a s a under the authoritarian rule of Laurent DesireKabila. The cornerstone of debate over the proper role of the U N in the p o s t - C o l d War era revolves around an emerging international consensus that downplays the classic international norms of sovereignty and nonintervention in the affairs of UN m e m b e r states with a new set of norms that focus on h u m a n rights protection and humanitarian intervention, particularly to save r e f u g e e s and other peoples threatened by civil conflict and starvation ( D e n g et al., 1996:5; see also Prendergast, 1996). As s u m m a rized by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:9), " T h e time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty . . . has passed; its theory was never matched by reality." The series of U N - s p o n s o r e d military interventions in Somalia f r o m 1992 to 1995 serves as one of the most notable examples of the U N ' s increasingly interventionist role in African politics and society. At its height,

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the U N military o p e r a t i o n included over 38,000 t r o o p s f r o m t w e n t y c o u n tries, a n d led to the e f f e c t i v e o c c u p a t i o n of southern and central S o m a l i a . T h e intervention was launched in the absence of any official invitation f r o m a legal Somali authority (which, in any case, did not exist), and in direct opposition to heavily a r m e d militia groups who shared a historical mistrust of U N intentions and o p e r a t i o n s d a t i n g back to the colonial era ( H i r s c h and Oakley, 1995). 6 F r o m the perspective of the UN, the collapse of the S o m a l i state and the intensification of a brutal civil war d e m a n d e d U N intervention; the c o n f l i c t w a s not only spilling over into the n e i g h b o r i n g territories of K e n y a , Ethiopia, and Djibouti, but had contributed to the creation of a hum a n i t a r i a n crisis in w h i c h a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 3 0 , 0 0 0 S o m a l i s w e r e at " i m m i nent risk of d e a t h " (Lyons and Samatar, 1995:24). A c c o r d i n g to this logic, the U N could j u s t i f y international intervention, even in the a b s e n c e of an o f f i c i a l invitation by a legally constituted authority, on the g r o u n d s of " a b a t e m e n t " of a threat to international peace (Joyner, 1 9 9 2 : 2 2 9 - 2 4 6 ) . T h e Somali case is part of a g r o w i n g international trend of p r o m p t i n g e v e n internationally r e c o g n i z e d g o v e r n m e n t s to accept U N - s p o n s o r e d hum a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n ( D e n g , 1993; see also P r e n d e r g a s t , 1996). In the c a s e of S u d a n , f o r e x a m p l e , a c o m b i n a t i o n of civil w a r a n d d r o u g h t i n d u c e d f a m i n e , w h i c h led to the d e a t h s of over 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 c i v i l i a n s since 1986, p r o m p t e d the U n i t e d N a t i o n s O f f i c e of E m e r g e n c y O p e r a t i o n s in A f r i c a ( O E O A ) to u n d e r t a k e a humanitarian intervention in 1989 k n o w n as O p e r a t i o n L i f e l i n e S u d a n ( D e n g and Minear, 1992). C o n s t i t u t i n g o n e of the largest p e a c e t i m e h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n s e v e r u n d e r t a k e n in U N history, Operation L i f e l i n e S u d a n was m a d e possible only by m o u n t i n g international p r e s s u r e on the S u d a n e s e r e g i m e to r e c o g n i z e the s c o p e of the p r o b l e m and to a c c e p t U N - s p o n s o r e d intervention. U l t i m a t e a c c e p t a n c e , h o w e v e r , did not e n s u r e u l t i m a t e h a p p i n e s s on the part of the S u d a n e s e r e g i m e . " E v e n w h e n the initial issues of i n v o l v e m e n t are r e s o l v e d , relations b e t w e e n the d o n o r s and the recipient country or population are n e v e r entirely h a r m o n i o u s , " explains a g r o u p of specialists on conflict resolution, led by Francis M. D e n g , a S u d a n e s e national w h o served as Special R e p r e sentative of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Secretary General f o r Internally D i s p l a c e d P e r s o n s . " T h e d i c h o t o m y e x p r e s s e d b e t w e e n ' u s ' a n d ' t h e m ' b e c o m e s ine v i t a b l e as the n a t i o n a l s feel their pride i n j u r e d by their o w n f a i l u r e a n d d e p e n d e n c y , w h i l e the d o n o r s a n d relief w o r k e r s resent the l a c k of gratitude and a p p r e c i a t i o n " (see D e n g et al., 1996:11). A f r i c a n p e r c e p t i o n s of e r o d i n g s o v e r e i g n t y h a v e been r e i n f o r c e d by the rising i n f l u e n c e of international financial institutions in A f r i c a n e c o n o mies ( M k a n d a w i r e and O l u k o s h i , 1995). As Virginia D e L a n c y d i s c u s s e s in C h a p t e r 5, by the b e g i n n i n g of the 1980s, A f r i c a n leaders w e r e s t r u g g l i n g to respond to the e f f e c t s of a continent-wide e c o n o m i c crisis that c o m b i n e d internal e c o n o m i c d e c l i n e with m o u n t i n g international debt. In o r d e r to o b tain n e c e s s a r y i n t e r n a t i o n a l capital, m o s t A f r i c a n leaders h a d little c h o i c e

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but to turn to two international financial institutions: the International Monetary Fund, which issues short-term stabilization loans to ensure economic solvency; and the World Bank, which issues long-term loans to promote e c o n o m i c development. Unlike typical loans that simply require the recipient to m a k e regular scheduled p a y m e n t s over a specific period of time, those of the I M F and the World Bank have included a series of conditionalities designed to restructure A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s and political systems in the image of the northern industrialized democracies (Callaghy and Ravenhill, 1993). The emergence of economic conditionalities was signaled by the 1981 publication of a World Bank study, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. The major conclusion of this report was that misguided decisions of the first generation of African leaders were responsible f o r the m o u n t i n g economic crisis. In order to resolve this crisis, the World Bank and the IMF proposed the linking of all future flows of Western financial capital to the willingness of A f r i c a n leaders to sign and implement structural adjustment programs: e c o n o m i c blueprints designed to radically restructure African economies that demanded an end to food subsidies, the devaluation of national currencies, the trimming of government bureaucracies, and the privatization of parastatals (state-owned corporations). In short, S A P s embodied the liberal e c o n o m i c c o n s e n s u s of the northern industrialized democracies that A f r i c a ' s future economic success depended on the pursuit of an export-oriented strategy of economic growth that systematically dismantled all forms of g o v e r n m e n t a l intervention in national economies (Commins, 1988; Campbell and Loxley, 1989). T h e emergence of political conditionalities in IMF- and World B a n k sponsored SAPs was heralded by the 1989 publication of a World Bank report, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A LongTerm Perspective Study. In addition to claiming that African countries following I M F and World Bank economic prescriptions were p e r f o r m i n g better than those that were not, the 1989 report went beyond previous studies by underscoring that the success of e c o n o m i c r e f o r m s was dependent on the promotion of "good governance." Theoretically inclusive of all types of political systems, the concept of good governance is in reality the establishment of multiparty democratic political systems similar to those in the northern industrialized democracies. The I M F and the World Bank had affirmed that all future flows of Western financial capital were contingent on the willingness of African leaders to promote the democratization of their respective political systems. T h e economic and political conditionalities imposed by the I M F and the World Bank were often challenged by A f r i c a n p o l i c y m a k e r s and academics. During the 1980s, the SAPs were criticized due to their complete disregard for the political realities confronted by African leaders. I M F and World Bank economists failed (and even refused) to take into consideration

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that the cutting of g o v e r n m e n t subsidies of f o o d — o n e of the a b o v e - n o t e d f o u r pillars of private sector r e f o r m always included in S A P s — c o u l d lead to o f t e n violent urban riots. In the case of the S u d a n , for example, the launching of an S A P in 1985 sparked an urban insurrection that contributed to the overthrow of the r e g i m e of G a a f a r M o h a m m e d Nimeiri (Harsch, 1989). The i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the three r e m a i n i n g pillars of private sector r e f o r m also entailed serious political risks, due to their tendency to reinforce short-term e c o n o m i c hardships. T h e devaluation of the national currency m e a n t an imm e d i a t e d e c l i n e in the a l r e a d y m a r g i n a l b u y i n g p o w e r of the a v e r a g e citizen, and the t r i m m i n g of g o v e r n m e n t bureaucracies and the privatization of parastatals triggered significant increases in already high levels of national u n e m p l o y m e n t . In retrospect, the lack of political sensitivity was d u e to the fact that the S A P s were usually formulated by international e c o n o m i s t s with little (if any) political t r a i n i n g or f i r s t - h a n d k n o w l e d g e of the individual A f r i c a n countries their p r o g r a m s were supposed to serve. T h e S A P s of the 1990s w e r e also strongly c h a l l e n g e d by A f r i c a n polic y m a k e r s and a c a d e m i c s d e s p i t e the fact that both the I M F and the World B a n k had undertaken serious e f f o r t s to assess, and w h e n possible incorporate, A f r i c a n s e n t i m e n t s into p o l i c y p l a n n i n g d o c u m e n t s . A f r i c a n s w e r e p a r t i c u l a r l y critical of the c o n s e n s u s of I M F and World B a n k e c o n o m i s t s that e c o n o m i c and political conditionalities w e r e mutually r e i n f o r c i n g , and t h e r e f o r e could be p u r s u e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ( S a n d b r o o k , 1993). A s d e m o n strated by A f r i c a ' s e x p e r i m e n t s with d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n a f t e r the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the creation of d e m o c r a t i c political systems c o m p l e t e with institutional c h e c k s - a n d - b a l a n c e s has h i n d e r e d the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of S A P s . Indeed, d e m o c r a t i c a l l y elected A f r i c a n presidents and c o n g r e s s i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are h e s i t a n t to enact legislation that will place s i g n i f i c a n t e c o n o m i c b u r d e n s on already i m p o v e r i s h e d p o p u l a t i o n s — e s s e n t i a l l y c o m mitting political suicide in f a v o r of their political opponents. T h e end of the Cold War has had a d r a m a t i c effect on the role of cond i t i o n a l i t i e s in the A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s . T h e t e r m s of the d e b a t e h a v e s h i f t e d a w a y f r o m such C o l d W a r - i n s p i r e d q u e s t i o n s as w h e t h e r M a r x i s m or an A f r i c a n variant of socialism is f a v o r able to capitalism, or w h e t h e r single-party or multiparty r e g i m e s can better p r o m o t e the w e l f a r e of their r e s p e c t i v e p e o p l e s . Instead, the I M F and the World B a n k n o w c o n s i d e r h o w to best f a c i l i t a t e the creation of capitalist, multiparty political s y s t e m s t h r o u g h o u t A f r i c a . T h e critical d i l e m m a c o n f r o n t i n g A f r i c a ' s n e w l y elected d e m o c r a t i c leaders is the extent to w h i c h they will a t t e m p t to work with i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l institutions. If they w h o l e h e a r t e d l y e m b r a c e S A P s f o r the f u t u r e e c o n o m i c health of their societies, they are b o u n d to alienate i m p o r t a n t actors within their political s y s t e m s and t h e r e f o r e run the risk of losing subsequent d e m o c r a t i c elections. In the case of Benin, for e x a m p l e , the d e m o cratically elected g o v e r n m e n t of N i c e p h o r e S o g l o was rejected in the 1996

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presidential elections after only one term of office, at least partially as a result of his administration's strong support for externally inspired SAPs. In contrast, if democratically elected African leaders refuse to embrace SAPs, they run the risk of losing access to international capital and contributing to the further decline of their economies. Cautiously optimistic interpretations suggest that reform-minded African leaders and external supporters of change must adopt "realistic, hardh e a d e d " analyses of A f r i c a ' s e c o n o m i c plight that avoid both the A f r o pessimism of critics of c h a n g e and the overly optimistic " c h e e r l e a d i n g " stance of those w h o believe that c h a n g e can be implemented quickly, smoothly, and relatively free of pain (Callaghy and Ravenhill, 1993). According to this viewpoint, although even the best-intentioned and most reform-minded African leaders may find themselves " h e m m e d in" by a variety of international constraints that restrict policy choices, they nonetheless are capable of pursuing paths that may lead to economic success over the long term. More pessimistic interpretations from the dependency tradition nonetheless suggest that African countries "desperate for access to international capital" are now "uniquely v u l n e r a b l e " to the d e m a n d s of the I M F and the World Bank. "While dependency analysts long argued that international capitalist structures provided the context within which development in Africa o c c u r r e d , " explains Reed (1992:85), "it was only as A f r i c a approached the 1990s that international financial institutions—controlled by the leading capitalist powers and designed to bolster the international capitalist e c o n o m y — w e r e able to impose policy prescriptions directly upon African governments." One of the harshest critiques of the impact of conditionalities draws upon the involvement of international financial institutions and donor communities in restructuring the formerly Marxist-inspired political and economic systems of Mozambique: R e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s in M o z a m b i q u e and e l s e w h e r e s u g g e s t that the m o s t l i k e l y s u c c e s s o r to p o s t - c o l o n i a l s o v e r e i g n t y w i l l be n e o - c o l o n i a l v a s s a l a g e , in w h i c h the Western p o w e r s a s s u m e direct and o p e n - e n d e d control o v e r the administration, security, and e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s of "deteriorated" states under the banner of the U N and various donors. T h e interests o f m a n y A f r i c a n s may h a v e been poorly served in nation-states ruled by a i d - s p o n s o r e d despots, but there is no reason to s u p p o s e that they w i l l be better s e r v e d in a w o r l d g o v e r n e d by U N p r o c o n s u l s , U . S . m a r i n e s , and World Bank e c o n o m i s t s . (Plank, 1 9 9 3 : 4 3 0 ; see a l s o Hanlon, 1 9 9 1 )

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THE CHANGING EQUATION OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

The emergence of new security challenges, such as the growing numbers of "collapsed states" (Zartman, 1995a) beset by ethnic, religious, and

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political rivalries, has f o s t e r e d r e n e w e d international debate over the desirability of foreign intervention in A f r i c a at the beginning of the new millenn i u m . T h e potential military role of the United S t a t e s — often referred to as the " s o l e s u p e r p o w e r " with a responsibility to a c t — w a s sharply influenced by a series of U.S.-led military operations in S o m a l i a (often r e f e r r e d to as O p e r a t i o n R e s t o r e H o p e ) , m o s t n o t a b l y a f t e r e i g h t e e n U.S. soldiers were killed and s e v e n t y - e i g h t others were w o u n d e d in O c t o b e r 1993 in a fierce battle in M o g a d i s h u , S o m a l i a (Clark and Herbst, 1997). T h e Somali "debac l e , " as it c a m e to be k n o w n , served as the cornerstone of a May 1994 policy d i r e c t i v e , P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c i s i o n Directive 25 ( P D D - 2 5 ) , that not only rejected any f u t u r e U.S. i n v o l v e m e n t in U N - s p o n s o r e d p e a c e m a k i n g operations d e s i g n e d to militarily i m p o s e peace a m o n g warring parties, but ensured an overly cautious a p p r o a c h to ethnically and religiously based conflicts in A f r i c a . W h e n c o n f r o n t e d in 1994 with rising p o p u l a r d e m a n d s for U.S. intervention in R w a n d a , for example, the Clinton administration, fearf u l of b e i n g d r a w n into " a n o t h e r S o m a l i a , " not only initially b l o c k e d the d i s p a t c h of 5 , 5 0 0 t r o o p s r e q u e s t e d by S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l B o u t r o s - G h a l i , but instructed administration spokespersons to avoid labeling the unfolding ethnic conflict as " g e n o c i d e , " lest such a label f u r t h e r arouse the s y m p a t h y of A m e r i c a n s and lead to d e m a n d s for U.S. intervention, as was the case in S o m a l i a , or trigger U . S . o b l i g a t i o n s under international treaties d e a l i n g with g e n o c i d e and its p r e v e n t i o n (Jehl, 1994; see also L e m a r c h a n d , 1998). T h e e x p e r i e n c e in S o m a l i a also significantly a f f e c t e d the C l i n t o n adm i n i s t r a t i o n ' s a p p r o a c h to conflict resolution, most notably by resolving a debate b e t w e e n t w o currents of thought in the administration. T h e first emphasized the classic belief that A f r i c a n issues unnecessarily distract the adm i n i s t r a t i o n and p o t e n t i a l l y p l u n g e W a s h i n g t o n into u n w a n t e d d o m e s t i c political c o n t r o v e r s i e s . A c c o r d i n g to this v i e w p o i n t , U.S. i n v o l v e m e n t ( e v e n in t e r m s of c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n ) should be restricted to avoid e n t a n g l e m e n t in " f u t u r e S o m a l i a s " (Cason and Martin, 1993:2). A second, more activist a p p r o a c h to c o n f l i c t resolution was also d e r i v a t i v e of the S o m a l i e x p e r i e n c e , but u n d e r s c o r e d that the massive costs associated with Operation R e s t o r e H o p e c o u l d h a v e b e e n a v o i d e d by earlier, p r e v e n t i v e action. " T h e choice is not b e t w e e n intervening or not i n t e r v e n i n g , " explained one p o l i c y m a k e r at the b e g i n n i n g of the Clinton administration, "it is b e t w e e n getting involved early and d o i n g it at a c h e a p e r cost, or being forced to int e r v e n e in a m a s s i v e , m o i e cosily way later" ( C a s o n and M a r t i n , 1993:2). A s witnessed by the Clinton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s cautious a p p r o a c h to the initial stages of the R w a n d a n conflict, the events of O c t o b e r 1993 in S o m a l i a c l e a r l y s t r e n g t h e n e d the p o s i t i o n of those w a r n i n g against getting t o o closely involved in " i n t r a c t a b l e " c o n f l i c t s in A f r i c a . This p o l i c y stance is highly unlikely to c h a n g e u n d e r the Bush administration. France, arguably the m o s t militarily active foreign p o w e r on the A f r i can c o n t i n e n t d u r i n g the C o l d War era, has also recast its military role at

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the beginning of the new millennium (Bourmaud, 2000). The evolving nature of French military intervention was best captured by the Chirac administration's response to a series of crises in the Great Lakes region, most notably the e m e r g e n c e and spread in 1997 of a guerrilla insurgency in C o n g o - K i n s h a s a that successfully sought to overthrow the authoritarian regime of M o b u t u Sese Seko. French p o l i c y m a k e r s perceived the Great Lakes crisis in f r a n c o p h o n e - a n g l o p h o n e terms: the guerrilla insurgency in eastern C o n g o - K i n s h a s a was led by Laurent Désiré Kabila, w h o in turn was strongly supported by and allied with the R w a n d a n government of Paul K a g a m e and the Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni. As a result, the French considered K a b i l a ' s guerrilla m o v e m e n t to be under A n g l o - S a x o n influence, and therefore hostile to France. T h e worst-case scenario envisioned by French policymakers occurred when Kabila's guerrilla army overthrew the Mobutu regime in May 1997 and installed a new government (with Kabila as president) strongly allied with R w a n d a and Uganda, which in turn are closely allied with the United States. According to this vision, Kabila's emergence as the president of Congo-Kinshasa not only constituted a clear victory for Anglo- Saxon influence at the expense of la francophonie, but also raised the possibility that C o n g o - K i n s h a s a might serve as a potential springboard for the f u r t h e r spread of AngloSaxon influence throughout f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a — a fear which was dampened after Kabila had a political falling out with his former Rwandan and Ugandan allies, who subsequently launched a second guerrilla insurgency in 1998 designed to militarily overthrow the Kabila regime. The Chirac administration's attempts at playing a more proactive military role in the Great Lakes region were restrained by a variety of factors, including the lack of interest a m o n g the other Great Powers to authorize a UN-sponsored, multilateral military force; the publicly stated promise of the Rwandan government and Kabila's guerrilla forces to militarily engage and inflict heavy casualties on French forces; and the French military's limited military capability to independently m o v e and sustain the large numbers of troops and e q u i p m e n t that would have been necessary for a long-term e n g a g e m e n t in such a vast military theater. F r a n c e ' s long-term military role in Africa was most dramatically affected, however, by the decision to restructure and downsize the French military that followed in the aftermath of Lionel J o s p i n ' s election as prime minister in 1997 and the emergence of a divided g o v e r n m e n t under C h i r a c ' s conservative political forces (which control the presidency) and J o s p i n ' s Socialist Party and allies (which were responsible for f o r m i n g a new g o v e r n m e n t ) . As part of this general reorganization, the decision was m a d e to both downsize the French military presence in Africa and, in some cases, such as the Central African Republic, to eliminate French military bases completely. The restructuring of French-African military relations is tied to a growing consensus over the long-term impracticality of direct French military

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intervention in A f r i c a — a trend that is captured in ongoing debates within the French foreign policy making establishment between the so-called anciens (the ancients), who favor activist measures (including direct military intervention) to maintain pro-French clients in power, and the modernes (the moderns), who emphasize the need to move beyond France's interventionist past in its former colonies (Bourmaud, 2000). At least as far back as February 1994, when the CFA franc was devalued, moves have been afoot to isolate the old-line d e f e n d e r s of F r a n c e ' s chasse gardée in A f r i c a . No case demonstrated the rising influence of the moderns better than Chirac's rejection of the use of military force to return Henri Konan Bédié to power in Côte d ' I v o i r e — o n e of the linchpins of French foreign policy in francophone A f r i c a — a f t e r his regime had been overthrown in a D e c e m b e r 1999 military coup and replaced with a military regime led by General Gue'i. Indeed, the position of several ancients, most notably Michel Dupuch, presidential advisor for African affairs, of the need to consider using French troops to reinstate Bédié in power, were successfully rejected by the moderns in Paris. The combination of the United States' hesitancy to become directly involved in African conflicts and F r a n c e ' s recognition of the need to decrease its military presence has fostered U.S.-French military cooperation on the African continent. T h e cornerstone of this cooperation (which also includes Great Britain) is the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a military aid program designed to train A f r i c a n armies in the art of peacekeeping and peacemaking so that African countries can take the lead in resolving African conflicts. An earlier version of this initiative, the U.S.-promoted African Crisis Response Force ( A C R F ) , was denounced by France as a unilateral measure that did not take into account French desires (as well as those of African countries that presumably would contribute troops). ACRI, however, has been based on the comparatively harmonious planning between the U.S., British, and French military establishments. Training is now going on, and there has been signal French-U.S. cooperation in multinational military exercises like G u i d i m a k a , which involved Senegalese, Malian, and Mauritanian troops, with French and U.S. support units. While not without friction, this cooperation is based on the recognition of c o m m o n U.S., British, and French military interests, and the unwillingness (and/or inability) of the Great Powers to c o m m i t m a j o r new public (especially military) resources to Africa. The African dimension of an evolving interventionist equation is best captured by two developments. First, a series of successful guerrilla insurgencies fostered the rise during the 1990s of what is often referred to as a "new b l o c " of A f r i c a n leaders that includes Isaias A f w e r k i of Eritrea, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and Paul K a g a m e of Rwanda (Connell and Smyth, 1998; Ottaway, 1999). Successful in their pursuit of power primarily due to their control over strong, disciplined, and

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b a t t l e - t e s t e d g u e r r i l l a a r m i e s , this n e w g e n e r a t i o n of elites d e m o n s t r a t e s varied d e g r e e s of c o m m i t m e n t to create " r e s p o n s i v e and a c c o u n t a b l e " (but not n e c e s s a r i l y d e m o c r a t i c ) g o v e r n m e n t s that significantly reorder the foreign policy relationships p u r s u e d by their p r e d e c e s s o r s — a l t h o u g h they certainly d o not act as a c o h e s i v e bloc, as w i t n e s s e d by the o u t b r e a k s of warf a r e b e t w e e n E t h i o p i a a n d E r i t r e a in 1999 o v e r a d i s p u t e d b o u n d a r y . E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t has been the g r e a t e r w i l l i n g n e s s on the part of A f r i c a n r e g i o n a l p o w e r s , m o s t n o t a b l y N i g e r i a a n d S o u t h A f r i c a , to flex their authority w i t h i n t h e i r s e l f - a n o i n t e d r e g i o n s . I n d e e d , S o u t h A f r i c a ' s s e l f anointed role as leader of the " A f r i c a n R e n a i s s a n c e " — t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of d e m o c r a t i c p r a c t i c e s a n d e c o n o m i c l i b e r a l i z a t i o n t h r o u g h o u t A f r i c a since the fall of the B e r l i n Wall in 1 9 8 9 — i s part of a c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t a m o n g S o u t h A f r i c a n p o l i c y m a k e r s to u n d e r s c o r e their c o u n t r y ' s u n i q u e p o s i t i o n as an i n t e r m e d i a r y b e t w e e n the A f r i c a n continent and leading f o r e i g n p o w ers in all o t h e r regions of the world (Crouzel, 2000). T h e m o s t n o t e w o r t h y i m p a c t of t h e s e t r e n d s h a s b e e n the r i s i n g tendency of A f r i c a n countries to militarily intervene in their n e i g h b o r s against the b a c k d r o p of d e c l i n i n g m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n on the part of the G r e a t P o w e r s . O n e d e c a d e a f t e r the C o l d W a r ' s end, A f r i c a ' s " n e w b l o c " of leaders and o t h e r r e g i o n a l military p o w e r s increasingly are b e c o m i n g the n e w p o w e r b r o k e r s of A f r i c a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s (see f o r e x a m p l e B a y a r t , 1999). T h e validity of this trend is highlighted by several e x a m p l e s : c o o p erative e f f o r t s a m o n g Eritrea, E t h i o p i a , and U g a n d a (at least p r i o r to the o u t b r e a k of the E r i t r e a n - E t h i o p i a n b o r d e r c o n f l i c t ) to u n d e r m i n e S u d a n ' s Islamist r e g i m e ; R w a n d a n military i n v o l v e m e n t in K a b i l a ' s 1997 guerrilla victory in C o n g o - K i n s h a s a ; S o u t h A f r i c a ' s military i n t e r v e n t i o n in n e i g h boring L e s o t h o in 1998; and N i g e r i a ' s military intervention in Sierra L e o n e to restore the democratically elected g o v e r n m e n t of President A h m e d Tejan K a b b a h , w h o w a s returned to p o w e r in M a r c h 1998. T h e m o s t clear-cut e x a m p l e of this new trend is the f a r - r e a c h i n g military conflict in C o n g o - K i n s h a s a that foreign observers n o w c o m m o n l y r e f e r to as A f r i c a ' s "First World W a r " due to the introduction of ground troops by at least f i v e f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s ( A n g o l a , N a m i b i a , R w a n d a , U g a n d a , and Z i m b a b w e ) . In s h a r p contrast to Great P o w e r c o n f l i c t in the region during the 1960s, h o w e v e r , w h e n the U n i t e d States l a u n c h e d a series of very aggressive covert (and overt military) operations to c o u n t e r the spread of perceived " r a d i c a l " i n f l u e n c e s within the region, the d a w n of the n e w millenn i u m had w i t n e s s e d the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n to e m p l o y its U N S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l v e t o to b l o c k the d i s p a t c h of any U N - s p o n s o r e d f o r c e that i n c l u d e d p e a c e m a k i n g in its m a n d a t e ; a c l e a r signal that the U n i t e d S t a t e s ( a n d other G r e a t P o w e r s ) are e i t h e r u n w i l l i n g or p e r c e i v e t h e m s e l v e s as u n a b l e to i m p o s e p e a c e in this vast p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y a r e n a . Peace, a c c o r d i n g to this v i s i o n , c a n only e m e r g e f r o m the e v o l v i n g regional military b a l a n c e s of p o w e r and the political-military and e c o n o m i c

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interests of regional actors. Africa, having provided a Great Power battlefield during the Cold War, provides another for rising African powers intent on dominating the international relations of their respective regions.

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TOWARD THE FUTURE

T h e end of the Cold War and the rise of democratization m o v e m e n t s served as transforming events in the evolution of the international relations of the African continent. These events in turn allow us to draw some tentative conclusions about the d e p e n d e n c y - d e c o l o n i z a t i o n debate. Although neither approach was completely supported or rejected by the analysis, three trends—the democratization of African foreign policies, rising competition a m o n g the Great Powers, and the rising assertiveness of A f r i c a n regional powers—suggest the increased ability of the second generation of African leaders to assume greater control over the international relations of their respective countries. Yet proponents of the dependency approach can point to the increasingly pervasive nature of intervention on the part of the U N and international financial institutions as supportive of their vision of international relations. Moreover, despite some promising d e v e l o p m e n t s related to S A D C and ongoing discussions within the OAU about the possible creation of African regional mechanisms to promote democracy and regional security, neither the O A U ' s pursuit of pan-Africanism nor regional experiments in economic cooperation and integration offer compelling evidence to resolve the d e p e n d e n c y - d e c o l o n i z a t i o n debate. A c o m m o n element in all six of the topics we have discussed, however, is the importance of the democratization process and its impact on the rise of a second generation of African leaders committed to democratic principles. Although it is perhaps too early to tell, one can hypothesize that if democratization succeeds, it will facilitate the peeling away of another layer of dependency and allow the second generation of African leaders to assume greater control over the international relations of their respective countries.

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NOTES

1. T h e o n l y remaining territorial q u e s t i o n s r e v o l v e around the future d i s p o s i tion o f Western ( S p a n i s h ) Sahara (partitioned by M o r o c c o and Mauritania), and Spain's continued control o v e r the e n c l a v e s of Ceuta and Melilla, both of w h i c h are c l a i m e d by M o r o c c o . 2. T h e s e c o u n t r i e s are A n g o l a , B o t s w a n a , L e s o t h o , M a l a w i , M o z a m b i q u e , S w a z i l a n d , Tanzania, Z a m b i a , and Z i m b a b w e . 3. For the p u r p o s e s of this chapter, f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a i n c l u d e s t w e n t y - f i v e independent states from the f o l l o w i n g regions: Central A f r i c a (Burundi, C a m e r o o n , Central A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c , Chad, C o n g o - B r a z z a v i l l e , C o n g o - K i n s h a s a , Gabon, and

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Rwanda); East Africa (Djibouti); Indian Ocean (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles); North Africa or the "Maghreb" (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia); and West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). Our definition of francophone Africa therefore is inclusive of both sub-Saharan and Saharan Africa (i.e., "trans-Saharan" Africa or the entire continent) rather than the more exclusionary set of sub-Saharan African countries. 4. The only exceptions to this trend include President Bush's one-day visit to Somalia in 1993 while in transit to the Middle East, and President Carter's March 29-April 2, 1978 visit to Nigeria. 5. Personal interview, Dakar, Senegal, January 1995. 6. Somali distrust of the UN stems from the decision of that international body to support the reimposition in 1950 of Italian colonial rule over what is currently known as the Republic of Somalia.

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7 Population, Urbanization, and AIDS April A. Gordon

T

he twentieth century was the setting for the most explosive growth of human population in history. Whereas it took about 130 years for population to double f r o m 1 billion in the early 1800s to 2 billion in 1930, it took only 43 years for population to double again to 4 billion in 1973. Over 6 billion people witnessed the dawn of the twenty-first century. Most of this growth has occurred a m o n g the world's so-called developing countries. By contrast, the world's industrial nations have had, with the exception of the post-World War II baby boom, declining growth rates. In fact, most industrial nations are growing at .5 percent or less a year, and some countries of Europe are actually experiencing negative rates of growth (Population Reference Bureau, 2000). A related trend is the revolutionary transition of the w o r l d ' s people from primarily rural agriculturalists to urban dwellers. This change is most advanced in the industrial nations, where 75 percent live in urban areas. Urbanization in the developing countries is not nearly as advanced; only 38 percent are urban (Population Reference Bureau, 2000). The problem is that while industrial societies can provide employment and relatively high living standards for most urban dwellers, the opposite is true in developing countries. Jobs do not expand nearly fast enough to meet the need, and relentless poverty rather than improved living standards is the lot of most. Employment problems are compounded by the rapid rate of urban growth in developing societies, about 3.3 percent per year since 1980 (World Bank, 1995:223). At this rate of growth, cities would double in size every twenty-one years. G o v e r n m e n t s , already strapped f o r resources, find it impossible to expand or even maintain the current stock of houses, infrastructure, or services under such conditions.

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As high as these growth rates are in the Third World as a whole, they are even higher in sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, sub-Saharan A f r i c a ' s population is growing at a rate of 2.5 percent a year, the highest in the world. This compares with an average growth rate of 1.7 percent in the less developed countries as a whole. Consequently, sub-Saharan A f r i c a ' s population will grow from 657 million in 2000 to over 1.3 billion by 2025 (Population Reference Bureau, 2000). The growth rate of sub-Saharan A f r i c a ' s cities is also high, averaging about 4.8 percent a year since 1980. Africa has sixteen of the twenty countries with the fastest rate of urbanization in the world, and the percentage of Africa's population living in urban areas has doubled since 1965—from 14 percent to almost 35 percent today. By 2025, an estimated 5 0 - 5 4 percent of the world's population will live in cities (compared to 45 percent in 2000), and almost all of this increase will c o m e f r o m sub-Saharan A f r i c a (World Bank, 1995:223; Brockerhoff, 2000:7). Most of this growth is occurring in one or two cities within each country rather than being more evenly distributed among cities and towns of varying sizes. One result is that the proportion of urban population living in cities of more than half a million (twentyeight in 1980 versus three in 1960) j u m p e d f r o m 6 percent in 1960 to 41 percent in 1980, and a third of the urban population lives in cities of 1 million or more (often the capital) (World Bank, 1995:223; 1990:239). It is estimated that Africa will have at least thirty cities this size by 2010 (Green, 1994:64). By 2015, Lagos, Nigeria, will be the third largest city in the world with a population of over 23 million people (Brockerhoff, 2000:10). Table 7.1 shows the astonishing price of urbanization in some of A f r i c a ' s major cities. These statistical indicators reveal only the quantitative parameters of A f r i c a ' s population and urban growth trends. They do not reveal why or how the current situation came to be nor what can or should be done about it. There is no consensus on the issues either. For example, there are currently three basic views on the issue of rapid population growth.

Table 7.1

U r b a n G r o w t h in A f r i c a n Cities (size in millions)

City, Country A b i d j a n , Cote d ' l v o i r e Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Kinshasha, Democratic Republic of C o n g o Lagos, Nigeria Luanda, Angola Maputo, M o z a m b i q u e

1965

1990

2015

.3 .6 .2 .8 1.2 .3 .3

2.2 l .8 l .4 3.4 7.7 1.6 l .5

5.1 5.1 4.3 9.4 23.2 4.9 4.7

Source: Martin P. Brockerhoff. 2000. " A n Urbanizing World." Population (September).

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Like most of Africa's large cities, Nairobi has experienced explosive population growth since independence. One view is that f a m i l y planning and education are needed to lower birthrates, slow urban growth, and ease population pressure on the land (see M o n t g o m e r y and Brown, 1990:86). T h e claim is that family planning is the m a j o r reason birthrates have fallen so rapidly in other areas of the Third World ( " R e p r o d u c t i v e , " 1992:11). Also, the fact that A f r i c a has the w o r l d ' s highest birthrates and the lowest rate of contraception usage is seen as evidence that fertility might fall dramatically in A f r i c a if family planning services were more available (Lutz, 1994:14; " R e p r o d u c t i v e , " 1992:8, 10-11). Studies also show that most urban growth in African cities is due to high birthrates rather than migration; therefore, lowering fertility levels would ease the pressure of growth on cities as well as overall population growth rates (Brockerhoff, 2000:18, 34). A n o t h e r view is that e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t is the solution to high rates of population growth. A f t e r all, fertility and population growth rates fell below African levels in other parts of the world long before the advent of modern contraceptives or family planning services (see Sai, 1988). This suggests that poverty and weak e c o n o m i e s are the root causes of high birthrates; f a m i l y planning under such conditions as exist in A f r i c a can achieve only moderate fertility reductions at best. The third view, one expressed by some w o m e n ' s groups, is that the emphasis on population growth as a " p r o b l e m " and birth control as the "solution" puts the blame on women for A f r i c a ' s development woes by implying

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they are having too many children. Framing the issue this way may lead to the sacrifice of w o m e n ' s human and reproductive rights in overzealous efforts to achieve population "control." One suspicion is that such programs, if implemented at the expense of women's overall welfare, become a means for the industrialized world to continue to disproportionately benefit from global economic activities that exploit poor countries and degrade the environment (Lutz, 1994:35; Ashford, 1995:7). Each of these three views has some limited validity, but population issues in Africa are complex, and analyzing current population trends requires some understanding of African history and culture and some understanding of the political and economic constraints on the development of the conditions necessary for a widespread decline of either population growth or urban concentration. Sub-Saharan Africa's population problems are not abstract demographic problems amenable to a technological fix like family planning. Population trends are the result of individual responses to political and economic forces that are both historical and current. The major historical forces still influencing population dynamics include precolonial social institutions (which have survived in modified form to the present day), slavery, and colonialism. Since independence, the fortunes of Africa have been increasingly shaped by highly bureaucratic African states attempting to transform their societies within a global economy in which Africa has faced many disadvantages. It is also true that the extremely high rates of population and urban growth in Africa—far in excess of rates that occurred in industrializing Europe—impose tremendous hardships on struggling countries. It would be irresponsible to ignore the need for conscious efforts to control and manage population as part of an overall development strategy. There is now widespread agreement with this perspective both within and outside of Africa, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

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PRECOLONIAL AND COLONIAL PERIODS

Many people unfamiliar with Africa perceive African societies to have been small and village-based, lacking any urban civilization before Europeans came. African scholars have altered this view by describing the many thriving commercial and/or political centers of considerable antiquity in Africa. Along the east coast from Mogadishu to Sofala, numerous commercial towns were developed by Arabs and Africans with a trading network that extended from the interior of Africa to as far away as China. Many miles from the coast in southern Africa, the massive stone ruins of Great Zimbabwe give witness to an ancient, wealthy state that thrived for centuries before the astonished Portuguese set eyes on it in the sixteenth century. In western A f r i c a ' s Sahel region bordering the Sahara, m a j o r cities—Gao, Djenne, and Timbuktu—flourished along the trans-Saharan trade routes. In the forest regions of western Africa, the artistic and reli-

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gious center of Yorubaland was the city of Ile-Ife, in what is now Nigeria. K a n o in Hausaland was a major m a n u f a c t u r i n g city r e n o w n e d for its textiles and leather goods. Even the slave trade provided the impetus for the growth of towns such as Kumasi, capital of the Asante in Ghana. Sub-Saharan African cities never achieved the great size of the m a j o r industrial cities of Europe, nor did more than a small minority of the population live in towns or cities. Most retained a horticultural or pastoral way of life. The most likely reason for this is that Africa is so vast that population pressure could be released by migrating to new land rather than through intensification of productive technologies or the adoption of new m o d e s of production. Low population densities, difficulties of transport, and the prevalence of largely self-sufficient communities limited the development of markets for goods and services. This, in turn, along with limited productive capacity, limited the growth of cities. The Atlantic slave trade played a role, too, by depopulating many regions and promoting ruinous warfare a m o n g A f r i c a n c o m m u n i t i e s . This, plus a growing reliance on cheap m a n u f a c t u r e d goods f r o m Europe, retarded, if not completely aborted, the industrial d e v e l o p m e n t that would stimulate urbanization (Rodney, 1974; Mahadi and Inikori, 1987; Gupta, 1987; Davidson, 1959). Although data for precolonial A f r i c a are sketchy, there is good evidence that regulation of fertility (childbearing) was a c o m m o n and accepted practice in most African societies, even those few that were huntergatherers such as the San (Bushmen) of the Kalahari. T h e most c o m m o n methods of birth regulation involved an approximate one- to two-year period of postpartum abstinence and extended breast-feeding. The latter is well known to retard the onset of ovulation once a baby is born. Another custom in many societies deemed it unseemly for a grandmother to become pregnant. Since most females married in their mid-teens, this effectively shortened their childbearing years to the middle or late thirties. Age-grade systems in many countries of eastern Africa often led to later ages of marriage due to late male and female initiation. In Tanzania, males usually married between the ages of twenty-five and thirty. The cost of bridewealth also forced many males throughout Africa to marry fairly late. These practices, among others, resulted in effective child spacing and lowered the number of children born per woman to well below the biological maximum. Polygyny (having more than one wife) made these practices workable, since there was less pressure on a woman to be sexually and reproductively active when there was more than one wife in the household. Along with fairly high mortality rates, regulated fertility (high but not m a x i m u m ) resulted in slow population growth (Newman and Lura, 1983; Page and Lesthaeghe, 1981; Jewsiewicki, 1987; Valentine and Revson, 1979). Some scholars contend that the Atlantic slave trade and later colonial policies drastically upset the demographic balance in A f r i c a , promoting both higher birthrates and mortality as well as urban concentration (e.g.,

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O ' B r i e n , 1987; Jewsiewicki, 1987; Page and Lesthaeghe, 1981; D a w s o n , 1987). Slave raiders sometimes captured whole villages and marched their unfortunate captives to the coast where slave ships awaited them. An estimated 10 to 20 million A f r i c a n s were lost to the Americas or to death in transport. Untold others lost their lives resisting the slavers or f r o m the e c o n o m i c and social disruption the slave trade caused. Major migrations and wars occurred as a result of people either escaping from slave raiders or pursuing the trade in human flesh themselves. The prime victims of the traffic in slaves were young men and w o m e n and c h i l d r e n — A f r i c a ' s aborted reproductive and productive future. The disruptions and mixing of peoples also resulted in a rise in disease, including venereal disease, and higher mortality. In central Africa, venereal and other diseases produced high rates of subfecundity and sterility in such countries as present-day C a m e r o o n , G a b o n , D e m o c r a t i c Republic of C o n g o (formerly Zaire), and the Central African Republic. With a reduced stock of young reproductiveage women and depleted populations, greater pressures were put on families—on w o m e n — t o increase their fertility. In the 1800s and 1900s, colonialism further altered the African landscape. W h e r e a s mercantile capitalism in previous centuries valued A f r i c a for its slaves, newly industrializing capitalism abolished the exploitation of slavery, replacing it with the exploitation of Africa's cheap labor and cheap raw materials. T h e colonial system incorporated A f r i c a into the emerging global capitalist economy, but Africa did not yield willingly. Unable to secure voluntary labor for plantations, f a r m s , and mines in a continent of self-sufficient farmers and pastoralists, colonial policies such as the hut tax were used to force young males to leave their farms and migrate to towns or other areas where they could earn cash in the colonial economy. Women were usually left in the rural areas to bear and raise children, to farm, or to occasionally earn cash as farm laborers, petty traders, or commodity producers. With f e w e r men to help with the farm labor, more of the burden fell on women. Cash cropping, introduced to men by the colonialists to supply desired exports for Europe, also increased w o m e n ' s burdens in the fields. Left to grow most of the f o o d by themselves, w o m e n were often compelled to work on their h u s b a n d ' s cash crop f a r m s as well. Forced labor, the loss of male migrant labor, and e m p h a s i s on cash cropping all threatened f o o d production. Rising infant mortality and morbidity (disease) due to f o o d shortages were not u n c o m m o n under the colonial regime (Jewsiewicki, 1987). According to Dawson (1987), mortality rose and population actually declined between 1900 and 1930. The economic pressures created by colonialism created the conditions for higher fertility, children became even more important as sources of farm labor and wages to be remitted to their parents, and high rates of infant and child mortality reinforced high fertility to ensure that some would survive to adulthood.

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E u r o p e a n Christianity and m i s s i o n a r y e d u c a t i o n also i n a d v e r t e n t l y enc o u r a g e d larger f a m i l i e s . M i s s i o n a r i e s , as w e l l as o t h e r c o l o n i a l a g e n t s , p r o m o t e d W e s t e r n Victorian ideas of w o m e n ' s " p r o p e r r o l e " as d e p e n d e n t w i v e s a n d m o t h e r s rather t h a n e n c o u r a g i n g w o m e n ' s p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s o u t s i d e the f a m i l y . C h r i s t i a n i t y a l s o u n d e r m i n e d p o l y g y n y in f a v o r of t h e Western m o n o g a m o u s family. With only one wife to work and reproduce the c h i l d r e n n e c e s s a r y f o r f a m i l y s u r v i v a l , t h e old m e c h a n i s m s of c h i l d s p a c i n g b r o k e d o w n . W e a n i n g o c c u r r e d earlier, and p o s t p a r t u m a b s t i n e n c e w a s i n c r e a s i n g l y ignored or s h o r t e n e d . A g a i n , the result w a s h i g h e r fertility ( T u r s h e n , 1987). C o n t r a r y to the t y p i c a l p a t t e r n in w h i c h u r b a n i z a t i o n (an i n d i c a t o r of " m o d e r n i z a t i o n " ) p r o m o t e s d e c l i n i n g f e r t i l i t y , in A f r i c a t h e o p p o s i t e o c c u r r e d . P r i m a r i l y m a l e m i g r a n t s , t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of c o l o n i a l t o w n s w e r e n o w o f t e n a b l e to earn the b r i d e w e a l t h p a y m e n t n e c e s s a r y to a c q u i r e a w i f e at an e a r l i e r age. C u l t u r a l c o n t r o l s that l i m i t e d a c c e s s to w i v e s a n d h e n c e m o d e r a t e d potential fertility b r o k e d o w n . B e c a u s e of the e x p e n s e of m a i n t a i n i n g m o r e than o n e h o u s e h o l d , m o n o g a m y i n c r e a s e d in t h e t o w n s but so did fertility ( D a w s o n , 1987; T u r s h e n , 1987). R e t e n t i o n of rural h i g h f e r t i l i t y p a t t e r n s also o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e m o s t m i g r a n t s r e t a i n e d l a n d or rights to land back in their villages. R e s i d e n c e in cities w a s u s u a l l y t e m p o rary, as m o s t r e t u r n e d h o m e a f t e r s o m e y e a r s in t h e city ( B r o c k e r h o f f , 2000:18; Montgomery and Brown, 1990:86; El-Shakhs and A m i r a k m a d i , 1 9 8 6 : 1 5 - 1 7 ) . I n d e e d , as m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , m u c h of the g r o w t h of u r b a n areas in A f r i c a has been d u e to h i g h b i r t h r a t e s .

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POSTINDEPENDENCE TRENDS

T h e r e s t r u c t u r i n g of A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s to s e r v e the c o l o n i a l capitalist e c o n o m y p r o d u c e d g r o w i n g p o p u l a t i o n s a n d m i g r a t i o n to c i t i e s . T h e s e t r e n d s m o s t l y r e f l e c t e d h a r d s h i p s i m p o s e d on m o s t A f r i c a n s , not o p p o r t u nities of m o d e r n i z a t i o n a n d d e v e l o p m e n t . A f t e r all, e x t r a c t i n g A f r i c a ' s w e a l t h , not p r o m o t i n g e c o n o m i c p r o s p e r i t y f o r A f r i c a n s , w a s t h e c o l o n i a l goal. T h e e n s u i n g poverty and e x p l o i t a t i o n m a d e f a m i l i e s h i g h l y d e p e n d e n t on their c h i l d r e n both as s o u r c e s of l a b o r a n d i n c o m e a n d as c a r e t a k e r s w h e n t h e y — t h e p a r e n t s — w e r e old. O n e w o u l d expect that i n d e p e n d e n t A f r i c a , t h e c h a i n s of c o l o n i a l o p p r e s s i o n b r o k e n , would e m b a r k u p o n an e c o n o m i c and social t r a n s f o r m a t i o n that w o u l d p r o d u c e the f a b l e d " d e m o g r a p h i c t r a n s i t i o n " to l o w birthrates and low rates of p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of d e v e l o p e d c o u n tries. A c c o r d i n g to transition theory, as u r b a n i z a t i o n a n d o t h e r a s p e c t s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n g r o w and f a m i l i e s b e c o m e less d e p e n d e n t o n c h i l d r e n as a source of labor, s m a l l e r f a m i l i e s b e c o m e the " r a t i o n a l " c h o i c e of parents. E c o n o m i c g r o w t h should h a v e the e f f e c t of altering the p r o n a t a l i s t

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motivational environment as the costs of rearing children (e.g., educational expenses) increase and new wants (e.g., consumer goods) compete with the desire for children. None of this occurred in Africa. Unlike the rest of the developing world since 1965, birthrates and population growth remained high in Africa despite declining mortality (especially infant mortality), higher life expectancy, widespread access to formal education, and rising per capita income (World Bank, 1995:213). Even among the urban middle class, usually at the vanguard of the demographic transition, large families remained the norm, and studies showed little motivation for small families or desire to regulate fertility (see, e.g., Caldwell, 1994; "Reproductive," 1992; World Bank, 1986; Sindiga, 1985; Faruqee and Gulhati, 1983; Olusanya and Purcell, 1981). The main explanation for sub-Saharan Africa's resistance to the demographic transition is that A f r i c a ' s disadvantaged position in the global economy has prevented the widespread societal changes necessary for the demographic transition to occur. Most Africans are still tied to the rural areas even when they live in the city. Traditionally, and even after independence, family survival and prosperity depend on having large families and networks of kin (see Cordell, Gregory, and Piche, 1987; Hyden, 1983). The main question pertaining to Africa is when or whether the expansion of capitalism will transform productive and economic and social relations so that large families are seen as less necessary and desirable. The evidence and arguments so far are mixed. On the one hand, some conclude that Africa is beginning its demographic transition. On the other hand, the conclusion is that any demographic transition in Africa will remain limited. We will examine each position in turn. IS

V i e w 1: Africa's D e m o g r a p h i c Transition Is Under W a y

Evidence for the view that Africa is experiencing its demographic transition is drawn from several kinds of data. For example, recent data show a decline in birthrates and overall population growth along with increased usage of family planning services and contraception. In the mid1990s, crude birthrates in Africa were forty-four births per 1,000 population; in 2000, the rate had dropped to forty-one. In the mid-1990s, overall population growth was nearly 3 percent per year; this has now dropped to 2.5 percent. This drop of .5 percent may look small but its effect on population growth would increase the doubling time of Africa's population from twenty-three to twenty-eight years and lower the overall population size by millions (Population Reference Bureau, 2000:2; World Bank, 1995:213). The declines in fertility are not uniform. Moderate to large declines in fertility are most obvious in Mauritius, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and

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South Africa. But in most of sub-Saharan A f r i c a birthrates remain above forty, although some notable declines are occurring in such countries as Ghana, Cote d'lvoire, and C a m e r o o n (Cohen, 1998). Use of contraception is an important factor in the level of fertility. Those with lower fertility are generally in countries with higher rates of contraception usage, whereas those with the highest rates (above forty) typically are below 10 percent in contraceptive usage (see Table 7.2). Surveys in many African countries show a growing interest in family planning and declining support for large families (Green, 1994:40; Mbacke, 1994:188-189). In East A f r i c a (with the exception of Tanzania), 90 percent of men and women expressed favorable attitudes toward family planning. In Ghana, with the expansion of family planning p r o g r a m s by the government between 1988 and 1993, rising support for family planning, rising contraception usage, and a drop in the n u m b e r of children desired have been reported. In K e n y a , for instance, desired family size dropped f r o m seven children in the 1970s to four in the 1990s. Even in Nigeria and Senegal, where birthrates remain above forty, desired family size has declined from eight to six children. Studies also suggest a growing unmet need for family planning that results in many unwanted pregnancies and abortions (Rosen and Conly, 1998:9-11, 18-19).

Table 7.2

C r u d e Birthrates (CBR), Total Fertility Rates (TFR), a n d C o n t r a c e p t i v e U s a g e Rates ( % ) , in Selected C o u n t r i e s

Country Mauritius South A f r i c a Zimbabwe Botswana Ghana Kenya Country

Lowest C B R a

TFRb

17 25 30 32 34 35

2.0 2.9 4.0 4.1 4.5 4.7

Highest C B R a

TFRb

Niger Democratic Republic of C o n g o Angola Uganda Somalia Ethiopia

54 48 48 48 47 41

7.5 7.2 6.8 6.8 7.0 5.8

Sub-Saharan Africa

41

5.8

Contraceptive U s a g e c 75 56 54 —

22 39 Contraceptive U s a g e c 8 8 —

15 —

18 18

Source: Population Reference Bureau. 2000. World Population Data Sheet. Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau. Notes: a. N u m b e r of births per 1,000 population in a given year. b. Estimated average number of births per woman during her lifetime based on current fertility. c. Percentage of married women using any method of contraception.

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Children are a vital economic resource in Africa's extended family systems. Most women want large families, and only a small percentage use modern forms of contraception. Unfortunately, if a demographic transition is under way in Africa, it does not appear to be driven by growing development as has been the pattern elsewhere in the world. Instead, economic crisis seems to be the major motive for smaller families and family planning. In most of Africa population growth has outstripped e c o n o m i c growth and f o o d production. Estimates are that the average African is 22 percent poorer today than in 1975: 4 0 percent of A f r i c a n s (over 242 million people) live on less than $1.00 per day (Rosen and Conly, 1998:12). With 11 percent of the world's population, A f r i c a p r o d u c e s only 1 percent of the w o r l d ' s goods and services. Formerly, Africans had large families no matter how poor they were. Now, if you have more children than you can afford, you are likely to face criticism f r o m others. This has been f o u n d in such countries as K e n y a , Senegal, Z i m b a b w e , G h a n a , and Nigeria, especially where e c o n o m i c decline and hardship are experienced. In one study in Nigeria, economic hardship was given as the main reason for using contraceptives and delaying marriage. In K e n y a , shortage of land was another factor c o m m o n l y cited for keeping families smaller (Buckley, 1998:A11). To summarize, the evidence, according to view 1, is that "nearly all the traditional supports for high fertility in Africa . . . have been eroding [and] it may be only a matter of time before the fertility transition takes place" ("Reproductive," 1992:8).

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V i e w 2: Africa's Demographic Transition Will Be Limited

According to this viewpoint, the declines in Africa's birth and growth rates and studies showing a desire for somewhat smaller families can produce only limited relief from continuing high population growth. For one, most of the declines are limited to a few countries, mainly the more developed, and those with the best family planning programs. Moreover, the declines in desired family size still indicate a preference for large families of at least four to five children, which will guarantee high rates of growth for the foreseeable future. Many studies also show that men want more children than women do, and are less approving of family planning and the use of contraception. This is important because men typically have greater power in reproductive decisions than women do (Rosen and Conly, 1998: 18-19). Although this situation might be subject to change through aggressive p r o - f a m i l y planning programs, most countries in Africa do not have such programs. Finally, only 18 percent of African married women use any form of birth control and when they do, it is to space children or limit their number to the large number—around six—most Africans desire (Rosen and Conly, 1998:9). The problem is that without a major transformation of African societies in which greater economic and political security are available to more people in both urban and rural areas, large families will remain the norm. This is true even for the more educated and affluent families because children are still seen as essential to the expansion and property of the wider kinship network on which they, as well as the less fortunate, depend (Fapohunda, 1982; Mbacke, 1994).

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FAMILY PLANNING

Whichever view proves to be more accurate depends in part on the degree to which resources and commitment are made to family planning programs. Only since the 1980s have African governments invested much in this area of their countries' development. One reason for the neglect of family planning is that until recently there has been considerable controversy over the impact of high fertility and population growth rates on Africa. Africans pointed out that most African countries have very low population densities and small populations. To increase the labor force and internal markets and to develop their countries' resources required a larger not smaller population (Goliber, 1985). By contrast, development agencies and family planning proponents— mostly from capitalist industrial nations—countered that unless rapid population growth was checked, increasing demands for such necessities as

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f o o d , services, land, and j o b s would overwhelm the fragile e c o n o m i e s of all but a few A f r i c a n countries (World Bank, 1986; 1989a). It was also pointed out that while enormous areas of Africa are sparsely populated and u n d e r d e v e l o p e d , m u c h of this land is unsuitable for intensive human use without costly investment. And given the current population pressure on land and resources in Africa, severe or even irreversible ecological damage was already u n d e r m i n i n g the environment upon which A f r i c a ' s development and future population would depend. Although much of the d a m a g e can be attributed to abuses associated with extractive industries and government policies, the expanding p o o r ' s need for wood for fuel, water, grazing land, income, or land for crops was also part of the equation. S y m p t o m a t i c of the environmental damage were extensive deforestation, destruction of wildlife, desertification, and soil erosion in many parts of Africa, as Julius N y a n g ' o r o discusses in Chapter 8. The pressures of population, it was claimed, threaten to reverse A f r i c a ' s development efforts. Population control measures must be implemented if development is to take place (see Brown and Postel, 1987). Only since the 1970s have any sub-Saharan African governments expressed concern over their population growth rates or requested assistance in developing family planning services. When the International Family Planning Foundation set up the African Regional Council in 1971, only eight countries were involved: Mauritius, Kenya, Tanzania, Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Gambia (Sai, 1988:270). At the 1974 World Population C o n f e r e n c e in Bucharest, only three African countries expressed a desire to slow their population growth—Kenya, Ghana, and Botswana. Only half of sub-Saharan countries supported family planning even as a health measure. None provided extensive services (World Bank, 1986:1). By December 1975, Mauritius, Kenya, Ghana, and Botswana had official policies to reduce growth. A few others, such as Tanzania, Nigeria, and Zaire, issued statements encouraging "responsible parenthood." Notably, Tanzania tried to incorporate population with economic and social planning without an official population policy. This included efforts to promote maternal and child health, birth spacing, increased age of marriage f o r w o m e n (to fifteen years!), and maternity leave (Henin, 1979). By 1976, A f r i c a was receiving 13 percent of United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) f u n d s (Johnson, 1987:263). African g o v e r n m e n t s ' attitudes changed markedly in the 1980s. At the Second A f r i c a n Population C o n f e r e n c e , sponsored by the U N at Arusha, Tanzania, in 1984, the watershed Kilimanjaro Programme of Action on Population was adopted. It recommended that population be seen as a central component in formulating socioeconomic development plans. Governments should ensure access to family planning services to all couples and individuals freely or at a subsidized cost. At the UN International Conference on Population held in Mexico in 1985, African population growth was

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an issue of great concern. Vice-president of Kenya Mwai Kibaki discussed the need to stabilize Kenya's population and recommended that stabilizing world population within the next fifty years should be a m a j o r c o m m i t ment. Also in 1985, leaders from forty African countries met in Berlin with World Bank officials to discuss population control (Johnson, 1987:263). By 1986, only Chad, Cote d'lvoire, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania did not support family planning. By 1989, on the other hand, Ghana, Mauritius, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia had declared target fertility reductions backed by explicit policies (World Bank, 1989a:71). Interest in population growth was at an all-time high in the 1990s. By 1991 about 60 percent of African g o v e r n m e n t s said their population growth was too high (versus only 30 percent in 1976). Even governments unconcerned about population growth now supported family planning as part of broader maternal and child health care (Green, 1994:34). Seventeen countries had formal population policies; many others were in the process of developing them (Population Reference Bureau, 1993). Symbolically important, the 1994 World Population Conference was held in A f r i c a — i n Cairo, Egypt. One hundred and eighty countries, many of them African, agreed to a Program of Action to stabilize world population and to provide universal access to family planning and reproductive health services by 2015 (Ashford, 1995:2, 33). As discussed above, contraceptive use is increasing in at least some sub-Saharan African countries, especially a m o n g more educated urban dwellers. This could be increased if more w o m e n had access to family planning services. The c o m m i t m e n t to family planning does seem to be improving. Almost all African countries now incorporate family planning into their national health services. Francophone countries have been the slowest to change, but even they are changing. For instance, S e n e g a l ' s family planning program (started in 1991) now reaches even small towns and villages. Contraceptive use rose to 13 percent in 1997 (versus 5 percent in 1986). Burkina Faso increased its number of family planning clinics between 1991 and 1996 from ninety to 750. Improvements have also been reported in Benin, Mali, and Niger (Rosen and Conly, 1998:26-28). Some countries are also recognizing the importance of improving the status of women if family planning is to achieve greater reductions in population growth. For example, Ghana's new development plan, Ghana 2020, includes population and family planning goals. Ghana is hoping to reduce its growth rate from 3 to 1.2 percent by 2020. To achieve this goal, it will be vital to improve the status, education, and employment opportunities for women in addition to eliminating discriminatory laws and customs. (These issues are explored in more depth in Chapter 10.) Other countries that include w o m e n ' s empowerment in their population policies are Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania. Kenya's 1995 draft National Population Policy for

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Statistical Development also emphasizes empowering women and eliminating gender discrimination (Center, 1997:37, 159-161). The success of African family planning efforts is heavily dependent on external donor and N G O (nongovernmental organization) funding. This reliance on external f u n d i n g makes Africa vulnerable to cuts determined by outsiders' politics and agendas. About 25 percent of grant assistance for family planning comes from the UNFPA, but it is spread too thin. The majority of donor funding comes from the United States. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) accounts for half of all population aid to A f r i c a . B e t w e e n 1989 and 1996 U.S.-backed f u n d i n g grew f r o m $72 million to $ 1 2 7 million, but U.S. anti-abortion politics have resulted in f u n d i n g cuts in the past. The current Bush administration is attempting f u n d i n g cuts, but as of 2001 was facing opposition from Congress (Rosen and Conly, 1998:57-60). The major problem is not access to family planning and contraception, however. Quite simply, African men and w o m e n want more children than people do elsewhere in the world. The average number of children born to A f r i c a n w o m e n is six compared to 2.8 in both Asia and Latin A m e r i c a (Population Reference Bureau, 2000:2-8). As Green (1994:40) reports, the younger, more educated, urban African w o m e n who are most likely to be contraceptive users still want four to six children. While this is two to three children f e w e r than older women desire, it still represents very high fertility. Until this changes, it seems unlikely that the demographic transition will r e d u c e fertility to the low levels needed to slow population growth much below current levels.

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URBAN POPULATION POLICY

As already discussed, urban population growth from both natural increase (high birthrates) and migration of rural population is continuing at a rapid rate. It far exceeds the wage sector's abilities to absorb it. For this reason, 40 percent or more of an African city's labor force is employed in the informal sector. The oversupply of workers tends to depress wages, making it more difficult to achieve higher living standards. Because the poor have little purchasing power, the private sector fails to respond to their housing or other needs, and government budgets are insufficient to extend most services to more than a lucky minority. Urban environments, especially for the poor, are unhealthy to say the least. Lack of access to clean water, air pollution (including indoor air pollution from the use of wood for cooking), airborne lead, raw sewage, and garbage are common problems in overcrowded cities across the continent (United Nations, 1995:42-43; Hope, 1998:353-355). As bad as conditions have been in most African cities, they are getting worse, not better. As Becker, Hamer, and Morrison observe:

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T h e p r o s p e c t s for A f r i c a ' s c i t i e s appear to be e x c e p t i o n a l l y bleak. Serv i c e s h a v e d e c a y e d terribly; no country c a n p r o v i d e f o r m a l s e c t o r e m p l o y m e n t to m a t c h the g r o w t h in j o b s e e k e r s ; industrial p r o d u c t i o n is s h o c k i n g l y l o w ; any increased d y n a m i s m o f the private sector remains on the distant horizon; and social p r o b l e m s , i n c l u d i n g rising c r i m e and H I V i n c i d e n c e , h a v e b e c o m e i n c r e a s i n g l y p e r v a s i v e . In short, urban l i v i n g standards h a v e fallen greatly in the past d e c a d e , both for the poor and for many o f the wealthy. ( 1 9 9 4 : 2 2 )

At the root of these urban problems are A f r i c a ' s continuing economic and political woes. Economically, A f r i c a has b e c o m e a marginal player in the global economy. Low foreign investment and government mismanagement and budget cutbacks have m a d e it difficult to reverse urban decline. It is difficult f o r urban dwellers to improve the conditions in which they live when on average 41 percent of them live in poverty (see, e.g., Hope, 1998). S o m e new urban problems are being generated by the influx of rural dwellers d u e to insecurity and violent conflict in the rural areas of some countries. Martin Brockerhoff discusses two new types of cities sprouting up in Africa (2000:12-14, 23). One type is "urban villages"—rural villages that have grown into cities of 200,000 to 400,000, but lack even the most basic services. Another type is the " r e f u g e e city." An example of this occurred in Tanzania at the site where r e f u g e e s f r o m the 1994 genocide in Rwanda fled. Within a few days a "city" of more than 250,000 people had sprung up, becoming Tanzania's second largest city. Given such grim realities, there is no consensus about what to do, if anything, about African urban population trends. S o m e f r e e market advocates contend that, however unsalutary such growth appears, it is actually more economical to concentrate population and industry than to decentralize in countries of relatively small population size, such as most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Economies of scale are maximized when businesses have better access to markets and labor, and supportive infrastructure and services are more cheaply provided (Brennan and Richardson, 1986). As incomes and government revenues improve, better housing, services, and so on will increase accordingly. Others add that rapid urban growth is an inevitable consequence of urban economic development and rural stagnation rather than a negative force to be suppressed. Migrants rationally perceive opportunities to be better in the city. Moreover, urban concentration ("primacy") is not excessive in Africa by world standards, as the share of total population in large cities is not usually above 10 percent. Furthermore, such primacy tends to fall as countries b e c o m e more developed (Becker, Hamer, and Morrison, 1994:58-60). Critics counter that such growth may be economical from the standpoint of the foreign firms that dominate so many African countries, but they perpetuate backwardness and inequality for most of the host countries' people.

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Intervention and planning are called for in order to promote more balanced and equitable d e v e l o p m e n t throughout the country (Rondinelli, 1983). Even those less alarmed by urban concentration concede that urban decentralization could be a desirable by-product of current structural adjustment policies designed to promote rural d e v e l o p m e n t , shrink g o v e r n m e n t , and promote exports (Becker, Hamer, and Morrison, 1994:60-61). While not agreeing on what to do about their cities, most African governments recognize that uncontrolled urban growth is problematic. Consequently, various interventionist strategies have been used throughout the continent to deal with rapid urbanization. T h e y fall into two basic categories: (1) m e a s u r e s to discourage migration to the m a j o r cities and (2) policies to improve conditions in the cities. Unfortunately, these two strategies often work at cross-purposes, since improving urban conditions makes cities even more attractive to potential migrants. There are other problems as well, as will be discussed below. Category 1, discouraging migration, includes efforts to upgrade conditions in the rural areas to prevent out-migration to the cities. In Cameroon, for example, after years of neglect of the rural areas, the government in the 1980s began to pay farmers higher prices, provide more training programs, and increase aid to young farmers. The government invested more in such infrastructural improvements as road building, rural electrification, school construction, and e x p a n d e d public health centers (Gordon and G o r d o n , 1988:13). Ethiopia also uses rural d e v e l o p m e n t schemes to get people to stay in the rural areas (Brockerhoff, 2000:33). Although rural development is a desirable goal in its own right, rural d e v e l o p m e n t projects have not been very successful, nor have they had much effect on migration (Stren and White, 1989:307; Brockerhoff, 2000:33). S o m e A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s have tried r e m o v i n g unwanted migrants f r o m the city and destroying squatter settlements as a means of controlling overcrowding and public health hazards. These efforts also failed because migrants typically returned to the city, and their makeshift dwellings were reconstructed on the same or similar sites. Tearing down squatter housing also added to urban overcrowding by putting even more pressure on what housing was available (see Morrison and Gutkind, 1982). Squatter settlements are now m a j o r features of every large African city as the influx of poor people f r o m the countryside continues. Countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Nigeria have attempted resettlement programs as rural development strategies. Some resettlement programs are part of regional development plans designed to promote the growth of towns and cities outside of the one or two main cities. In Ethiopia, industry location policies were used to encourage the growth of medium-sized cities (Brennan and Richardson, 1986). In Cameroon, m e d i u m - s i z e d cities have been p r o m o t e d through the decentralization of g o v e r n m e n t activities to regional cities throughout the country (Gordon

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Squatters construct their homes in a settlement in Lusaka, Zambia

and Gordon, 1988). Some African countries have built new capital cities as a means of decentralizing their urban populations. Examples here are Abuja in Nigeria, Dodoma in Tanzania, and Yamoussoukro in Cote d'lvoire. A b u j a was expected to have 1.6 million people by the year 2000. It was designed to reduce pressures on Lagos, Nigeria's largest city, and to promote more migration to Nigeria's sparsely populated interior. So far, these regional development policies have had little impact on migration to the largest cities (White, 1989; Brockerhoff, 2000:33-34). Under category 2, improving the cities, various policies have been tried in an attempt to maintain the livability of overextended cities. Since independence, much of the investment made by African governments has gone to cities to provide essentials like roads, housing, water and electricity, and sewage disposal. There was, in addition, an "urban bias" in government policies that resulted in cheap imported or locally produced food for urbanites and cheap housing for middle-class civil servants. IMF-imposed structural adjustment programs have forced many governments to cut such subsidies to the cities along with other government spending. Higher prices, declining urban living standards, and deteriorating social services and maintenance of public works have followed (White, 1989:56; O'Connor, 1991:117). Because cities are growing so rapidly, providing simple housing and basic services has become a major problem. Both the government and most

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m i g r a n t s lack the f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s to provide a n y t h i n g but s u b s t a n d a r d , s q u a t t e r h o u s i n g . N e w r e s i d e n t s to the city are o f t e n c o m p e l l e d by their c i r c u m s t a n c e s to settle on u n c l a i m e d or u n o c c u p i e d land and to s c a v e n g e f o r w o o d , c o r r u g a t e d m e t a l , and o t h e r b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s . Basic s e r v i c e s such as p i p e d water, s e w e r s , and electricity are usually lacking. U N data indicate that a large p e r c e n t a g e of A f r i c a ' s urban dwellers lack safe drinking w a t e r and s a n i t a t i o n s e r v i c e s . In the worst c a s e , the Central A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c , only 19 percent of urban residents have safe water; m o r e typical is M a l a w i , w h e r e 4 0 p e r c e n t are without safe water. A d e q u a t e sanitation is u n a v a i l a b l e to 8 6 p e r c e n t of L e s o t h o ' s u r b a n r e s i d e n t s , but even in such countries as G h a n a , Cote d ' l v o i r e , Z a m b i a , and Zaire (now the Republic of C o n g o ) , b e t w e e n 19 and 54 percent of all urban dwellers lacked a d e q u a t e sanitation (United N a t i o n s , 1 9 9 5 : 5 8 - 5 9 ) . A " s i t e s and s e r v i c e s " p o l i c y r e p l a c e d r e m o v a l of m i g r a n t s and des t r u c t i o n of their s e t t l e m e n t s as the p r e f e r r e d way to deal with the u r b a n poor. " S i t e s " are first c l e a r e d for h o u s i n g ; streets and lots are m a r k e d off; then " s e r v i c e s " such as w a t e r points are p r o v i d e d , with electricity h o o k u p s and s e w a g e disposal available. R e s i d e n t s build on these prepared sites, imp r o v i n g t h e m a n d a d d i n g electricity a n d o t h e r i m p r o v e m e n t s as their inc o m e s allow. B e c a u s e of A f r i c a ' s e c o n o m i c crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, h o w e v e r , m o s t g o v e r n m e n t s s t o p p e d p r o v i d i n g f r e e services to the poor. I n d i v i d u a l s and c o m m u n i t i e s w e r e left to f e n d f o r t h e m s e l v e s to p r o v i d e private water c o n n e c t i o n s , self-help housing, and private household electric generators. M a n y of the p o o r must d o without ( W h i t e , 1989:19). U n f o r t u nately, as O ' C o n n o r ( 1 9 9 1 : 1 2 1 ) predicts, " t h e r e is no doubt w h a t e v e r that the h o u s i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r most p o o r p e o p l e in A f r i c a n cities will continue to be appalling for the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . " A f f o r d a b l e f o o d is a n o t h e r concern in urban areas. Improving marketing, storage, and transport facilities and stimulating food production in the rural areas are crucial. Past g o v e r n m e n t subsidies to ensure c h e a p local or i m p o r t e d f o o d are b e c o m i n g a thing of the past. As g o v e r n m e n t s m o v e to increase prices paid to f a r m e r s in order to increase food production, urban dwellers are p a y i n g m o r e f o r their f o o d . T h e hope is that ultimately prices will fall as f o o d supplies b e c o m e m o r e a b u n d a n t . In the m e a n t i m e , d e p e n d e n c e on i m p o r t e d f o o d and f o r e i g n f o o d aid is increasing (see World Bank, 1995:168-169). W e a k e c o n o m i e s , e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e g r a d a t i o n , political c o n f l i c t , and rapid population g r o w t h are all f o r c e s p u s h i n g migration to A f r i c a ' s cities. At the same time, and despite the p r o b l e m s of urban areas, people continue to see m i g r a t i o n to the cities as the best h o p e they have for a better life. Cities generally o f f e r their inhabitants better incomes, better services, better nutrition, a n d less p o v e r t y than the v i l l a g e s and f a r m s they leave behind. N o n e t h e l e s s , A f r i c a p r o b a b l y is m o r e urban than it s h o u l d be based on its c u r r e n t level of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . H i g h birthrates g u a r a n t e e that this g r o w t h will c o n t i n u e ( H o p e , 1998:356). P e r h a p s , as B r o c k e r h o f f

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(2000:34) concludes, the best way to slow urban growth is to provide w o m e n with family planning services, because discouraging migration will almost surely fail.

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A I D S IN A F R I C A

C o m p l i c a t i n g the picture of A f r i c a n population trends is A I D S . T h e statistics on the progression of the disease are staggering. At the end of 1990, the World Health Organization ( W H O ) estimated that there were 8 - 1 0 million people in the world infected with the AIDS virus. Sub-Saharan Africa, with only 10 percent of the world's population, had 2 5 - 5 0 percent of all the AIDS-infected population (Chin, 1990:223). At the Eighth International Conference on AIDS in Africa, held in Marrakech, Morocco, in 1994, the W H O upped the estimated infected population worldwide to over 15 million ( " W H O Address," 1994); the total in Africa had climbed to 10 million ( " W H O Address," 1994). In 1999 the W H O estimated that 34 million were living with HIV/AIDS, of which 70 percent (over 24 million) were in subSaharan Africa (Population Reference Bureau, 2000:1). In all, an estimated 8.5 percent of adults, aged 15-49, is infected (UNAIDS, 2000). (See Map 7.1.) Africa's children and women are disproportionately affected. Of the 1.3 million children under age 15 infected globally, 1 million are in Africa. Almost all of the world's AIDS orphans are in Africa (over 90 percent), and almost 90 percent of the half million children born HIV positive or infected through their mother's breast milk in 1999 were in Africa. Women are more likely to be infected than men; for every ten men there are twelve w o m e n infected ("Africa Increases," 1999; "Closing," 1999:6-7). At the International Conference on AIDS and STDs in Africa (ICASA) held in Z a m b i a in 1999, thirteen A f r i c a n countries were reported to have HIV infection rates of more than 10 percent and as high as 30 percent (Logie, 1999:806). U N A I D S (Joint United Nations P r o g r a m m e on HIV/ A I D S ) data for 1999 indicate that most of the countries with the highest H I V / A I D S rates (for adults aged 15—49) are in southern Africa but eastern and central Africa are also represented. The top ten (by percentage of population infected) are Botswana, Swaziland, Z i m b a b w e , Lesotho, Z a m b i a , South Africa, Namibia, Kenya, the Central African Republic, and M o z a m bique ( U N A I D S , 2000). There are several reasons for why HIV/AIDS is so prevalent in Africa. O n e is the high f r e q u e n c y of sex outside of marriage. M a n y A f r i c a n s believe that males are biologically p r o g r a m m e d to need sex with m a n y women. Also the mobility of the population, especially the excess of males in urban areas, leads to a high level of prostitution among women seeking e c o n o m i c survival and men w h o are away from their wives working. Another factor is the high level of sexually transmitted diseases in Africa (the highest in the world). Untreated sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) are a

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high risk factor making HIV transmission easier. Also cited,is the low incidence of condom use, even in commercial sex. This is especially problematic when statistics for many countries show that a half or more of prostitutes are HIV positive (in Z i m b a b w e 80 percent of prostitutes in major urban areas are reported to be infected with HIV) (Caldwell, 2000:120-125). Contributing to the problem is the denial and shame associated with A I D S on the part of many Africans. This results in inadequate preventive measures. John Caldwell notes that many Africans refuse to discuss AIDS or acknowledge that family m e m b e r s or friends had died (even prostitutes) of A I D S . " T h e silence exists partly because people have been taught that AIDS is a sexually transmitted disease associated with sexual activity outside of marriage. T h e church has taught that this is a s h a m e f u l thing and m a n y believe the infection was a p u n i s h m e n t for sin and are reluctant to disclose that any of their relatives bear such witness." Many people also refuse to discuss or a c k n o w l e d g e the high prevalence of extramarital sex. Even married couples have poor c o m m u n i c a t i o n about sexual matters. M a n y are also reluctant to recognize the reality of widespread adolescent sex, and they believe that providing young people with information about sex or condoms will encourage sexual behavior (Caldwell, 2 0 0 0 : 1 2 7 - 1 2 9 ) . For example, in Zambia, one of the countries most affected by HIV/AIDS, g o v e r n m e n t officials argue that m o n o g a m y is the only protection against

Mothers and their young children in Africa are at high risk of getting AIDS.

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I

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Estimated Percentage of Adults (15-49) Infected with HIV

United Nations, UNAIDS: Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, AIDS in Africa: Country by Country. Africa Development Forum 2000, Geneva, Switzerland, December 2000. (http://www.unaids.org/wac/2000/wad00/files/AIDS_in_Africa.htm).

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A I D S , and c o n d o m s e n c o u r a g e immorality and promiscuity ( " C l o s i n g , " 1999:8). Many Africans, in fact, hold a negative view of condoms. Exemplifying this attitude is the response of young Ghanaian women there. They believe condoms are associated with "bad girls" and "sex maniacs" (Caldwell, 2000:8). G o v e r n m e n t inaction also has contributed to a failure to stop the spread of A I D S . Most g o v e r n m e n t leaders have denied the problem and devoted few resources to education or prevention (other than abstinence), when what is n e e d e d is support f o r c o n d o m use, treatment of S T D s , and aggressive education efforts. Instead, "millions of people are being allowed to die on the grounds that the only way they can be saved is by adopting a more ' m o r a l ' way of life, indeed a way of life that does not c o n f o r m to their morality" (Caldwell, 2000:131). As a result, young people and unmarried people find it almost impossible to get c o n d o m s (or other contraceptives) from health services or family planning clinics (Caldwell, 2000:123). Obstruction on the part of many religious leaders is another reason for the ineffectual response to A I D S . T h e Catholic church forbids the use of condoms. In Nigeria, most Christian leaders think AIDS is divine punishment. Most church leaders believe it is immoral to give condoms to adolescents, even though most are sexually active. As discussed in Chapter 11, African governments do not wish to antagonize the churches, who can mobilize opposition to them. C o n f r o n t i n g the churches on issues they d e f i n e as dealing with morality is seen by many politicians as risky, so few challenge the churches on these issues (Caldwell, 2 0 0 0 : 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 ) . Church opposition is the main reason Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi has not encouraged condom use even after declaring in 1999 that AIDS was a national disaster. (In Kenya at least 2 million of its 30 million people have HIV and 500,000 have died since the epidemic began.) The British government has spent millions of dollars providing dispensaries and family groups with cond o m s to help control the spread of A I D S , but in a special ceremony every year, Catholic bishops burn them in protest ("Kenya," 1999). The widespread belief in witchcraft a m o n g many Christians and Muslims (see Chapter 11) prevents behavior change and effective action against AIDS. Instead, it leads people to accept a fatalistic view toward death and to believe that the cause of A I D S is malevolent forces or divine p u n i s h ment (Caldwell, 2000:121, 125-126). Despite the failures of most g o v e r n m e n t s , some are making r e m a r k able strides in dealing with the crisis. U g a n d a is widely held up as a model. Once one of the most seriously affected countries, Uganda seems to have cut its H I V / A I D S prevalence rate roughly in half (to about 9.5 percent of adults) between 1993 and 1999. Uganda's government was the first in Africa to admit it had an epidemic and to ask for help. Since then a cooperative effort involving g o v e r n m e n t , grassroots organizations, and religious groups led to a p r o g r a m to provide A I D S education, urge delay in

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sexual onset and fewer partners, and promote safe sex. Prevention and treatment of S T D s and use of c o n d o m s are integral parts of the program. Even "soap operas" on radio and T V have characters who promote the use of c o n d o m s (Dervarics, 1999:5; " C l o s i n g , " 1999:8). U g a n d a has recently j o i n e d forces with Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, and R w a n d a to launch a Great Lakes Initiative on AIDS, but it is unclear whether Uganda's partners will be able or willing to approach the issue as effectively as Uganda has, given the opposition of the Catholic church and other conservative religious groups ( U N A I D S , 1999). In predominantly Muslim countries such as Senegal and Mauritania, both m e m b e r s of the clergy and the government are making bold moves to slow the spread of AIDS. In Dakar, Senegal, prostitutes now get a government card to work legally. They must be tested monthly for S T D s and every six months for HIV. Women who test positive are counseled on safe sex to protect their own health, since contracting an STD could be fatal to them. Punitive measures are avoided since they would only drive prostitution underground. The results of these efforts have been impressive. New S T D and HIV infections have fallen and Senegal has one of the lowest HIV infection rates in sub-Saharan Africa. These policies and efforts to promote c o n d o m use a m o n g the general population have the support of both Islamic and Christian leaders (Schoofs, 1999:B2). Senegal's northern neighbor, Mauritania, also has Islamic clergy involved in AIDS prevention programs that advocate condom use ("Closing," 1999:8). Unfortunately, there are too few countries with effective AIDS prevention programs. Even if more follow in the footsteps of Uganda or Senegal, it will take years to slow or halt the spread of H I V / A I D S in Africa. In the meantime, the d e m o g r a p h i c e f f e c t s will be devastating. Sub-Saharan A f r i c a ' s overall population growth will be lower and its age structure will be altered as a result of rising mortality, especially in the countries with the highest infection rates (Gregson et al., 1998). For the thirteen most highly affected countries, their population will be 30 million people smaller than would have b e e n the case without A I D S (Fransen, 1998:3). By 2 0 1 0 life expectancy in these countries is expected to drop by an average of 20 to 25 percent. By 2 0 2 0 average life expectancy will be 43 versus 62 without AIDS. In hard-hit Z i m b a b w e and South Africa, life expectancy may drop to 30 (Gregson et al., 1998:48; Logie, 1999). Higher infant and child mortality add to the problem. About 15 percent of HIV infections in sub-Saharan Africa are due to mother-infant transmission. Since mortality is highest among young adults 2 0 - 4 0 years old, the n u m b e r of orphans with AIDS will also grow. Estimates are that the number of such children will soon be 500,000 in Zimbabwe and 1 million in South Africa, out of a total of 5 million in all of sub-Saharan Africa (Loewenson and Whiteside, 1998:20-22). The consequences of the AIDS epidemic go far beyond the direct demographic effects. Most of the victims are young, working-age adults. Thus

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the labor force that A f r i c a ' s economic recovery depends upon will be sharply reduced. M a n y c o m p a n i e s are already seeing the effects of H I V / AIDS in growing sickness, absenteeism, and death among their employees, with resulting declines in productivity. In Tanzania, there will be 20 percent f e w e r workers in 2 0 1 0 than today, and the mean age will drop f r o m 32 to 28. Remaining workers will be younger, less skilled, and less experienced. Another c o n s e q u e n c e of A I D S is the growing demand for health care for A I D S patients, diverting scarce health care resources away f r o m basic care for the rest of the population (Loewenson and Whiteside, 1998: 2 0 - 2 1 ) . Virginia DeLancey discusses these and other economic impacts of AIDS in Chapter 5. The long-term impact of AIDS in Africa will in part be determined by the response to the crisis on the part of Africans and the international community. The means exist to slow the spread of the disease and to treat its victims. The problem is mobilizing the political will and resources to do the job. Awareness is increasing. There have been three international conferences on HIV/AIDS in Africa since 1999—the International Conference on AIDS and S T D s in Africa in Z a m b i a in September 1999; the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conference on HIV/AIDS in Burkina Faso in May 2000; and the World AIDS Conference in South Africa in July 2000. In December 2000 the UN E c o n o m i c Commission for A f r i c a ( U N E C A ) held a conference in Addis A b a b a , Ethiopia, at the annual African Development Forum. The objective was to facilitate a continent-wide response to the AIDS crisis (Andualem, 2000). These are positive signs that more resources may be devoted to the fight against AIDS in the near future. Recently five of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies, including Glaxo Wellcome, agreed to slash the price of expensive AIDS drugs (AF-AIDS, 2000a), and AIDS vaccines are being developed and tested (in Uganda, for example). Also recently, UN officials called on Western governments to contribute $5 billion over the next five years to fight AIDS in Africa. This amount is only a fraction of the $52 billion a year spent in the United States to fight obesity, according to Peter Piot, head of UNAIDS, but it could be enough to get AIDS under control on the continent (AF-AIDS-UNAIDS/WHO, 2000). These initiatives, plus growing efforts to educate the public and get people to change high-risk sexual practices, will likely increase as the full magnitude of the HIV/AIDS crisis becomes known. Even the most ardent efforts at denial and puritanical moralism will be clearly indefensible.

•

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8 Africa's Environmental Problems Julius E. Nyang'oro

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ost people are now familiar with such terms as acid rain, the greenhouse effect, ozone depletion, toxic waste, and environmental degradation. They remind us of a reality we sometimes forget; that is, the fundamental mutual relationship between the e n v i r o n m e n t and h u m a n k i n d . Lynton Caldwell reminds us of this when he describes the two realities in which humans live: T h e abiding reality is that of earth the p l a n e t — i n d e p e n d e n t of man and his works; the other reality—the transient r e a l i t y — i s that of the world, which is a creation of the human mind. The earth and its biosphere form a grand synthesis of complex interactive s y s t e m s within systems, organic and inorganic, animate and inanimate. The world is the way humanity understands and has organized its o c c u p a n c y of the earth: an expression of imagination and purpose materialized t h r o u g h e x p l o r a t i o n , invention, labor and violence. (Caldwell, 1984:8)

This interconnectedness was one of the m a j o r issues addressed by the UN C o n f e r e n c e on Environment and D e v e l o p m e n t ( U N C E D ) that took place in Rio de Janeiro in July 1992. At this c o n f e r e n c e , often called the Earth Summit, the global community developed a program of action called Agenda 21, which focuses on promoting both a healthy e n v i r o n m e n t and the development of the world's economies and peoples. Such environmental issues as climate change, conservation of forests, and biodiversity were addressed under the umbrella goal of "sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t " 1 (see, e.g.. World Bank, 1996). The purpose of sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t is to meet the needs of today's people without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to meet their needs (see W C E D , 1987). In short, this m e a n s

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p r o t e c t i n g the e n v i r o n m e n t a l base on which all life, including h u m a n life, depends. In this chapter we will consider the issue of the environment in A f r i c a . We will look at the interaction between Africans and their environment both in the past and the present. T h e d i l e m m a for A f r i c a n s , as for people elsew h e r e in the world, is h o w to reconcile human needs (or wants) and activities with sound m a n a g e m e n t of the environment to allow for future sustainability and d e v e l o p m e n t . It is worth noting that the next Earth S u m m i t (in 2002) will be held in South A f r i c a ' s capital of Johannesburg. This should be an opportunity to highlight A f r i c a ' s achievements as well as its p r o b l e m s in p r o t e c t i n g the e n v i r o n m e n t as it tries to o v e r c o m e its p r o b l e m s of rapid population growth, massive poverty, and economic underdevelopment. C o n c e r n over A f r i c a ' s e n v i r o n m e n t is not a new p h e n o m e n o n . A s Ayodele C o l e (1986) has noted, colonial A f r i c a was e n d o w e d with legislation and regulations on e n v i r o n m e n t a l health and sanitation, which were s o m e times vigorously e n f o r c e d in both urban and rural areas if it was d e e m e d to be in the best interests of the colonial g o v e r n m e n t . In another e x a m p l e , as early as 1935, E. P. Stebbing wrote a pioneering article to warn the colonial governments about the "encroaching Sahara" as one of the principal environmental p r o b l e m s f a c i n g the West A f r i c a n colonies. Stebbing's article was concerned about, a m o n g other things, the dwindling fertility of the Sahel as a result of the spread of the Sahara Desert farther south. S o m e of the m e a s u r e s undertaken in the Sahel region to alleviate problems arising f r o m the d r o u g h t of the 1970s, such as the planting of trees and the r e s t r i c t i n g of animal g r a z i n g to protect the t h i n n i n g g r a s s l a n d s , w o u l d have greatly b e n e f i t e d f r o m the historical lessons Stebbing and others addressed m o r e than six d e c a d e s ago. But as it is, international concern o v e r the Sahel r e g i o n s e e m s to h a v e a s s u m e d s i g n i f i c a n c e in the 1970s only w h e n it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t that large p o p u l a t i o n s in West A f r i c a were on the verge of starvation because of dwindling rainfall, reduced soil fertility for c r o p c u l t i v a t i o n , and o t h e r e n v i r o n m e n t a l decay ( E c k h o l m and B r o w n , 1977). Yet, it must be added that in comparative terms, the relative neglect of environmental c o n c e r n s that characterized the Sahel region up to the early 1970s essentially reflected a general neglect of the environment by governm e n t s across the globe (Pirages, 1978). In the context of Africa, g o v e r n m e n t s were more c o n c e r n e d with e c o n o m i c growth than with environmental protection, even though e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t had a direct impact on environmental quality (Dixon et al., 1988; Leonard, 1985). Unfortunately, the need for environmental m a n a g e m e n t has until recently been viewed as a constraint on attempts to achieve rapid economic growth. In many cases, this has led to economic growth being achieved at the cost of the environment, which has resulted in irreparable environmental damage ( W C E D , 1987; Kabeberi, 1988). The viewing of e c o n o m i c development and environmental management as

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t w o c o n f l i c t i n g o b j e c t i v e s raises q u e s t i o n s that are central to the c o n c e r n s about the e n v i r o n m e n t in A f r i c a today ( B e r n t s e n , 1995). T h e 1972 U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e o n t h e H u m a n E n v i r o n m e n t in S t o c k h o l m , S w e d e n , g a v e a m o m e n t u m to a g l o b a l c o n c e r n f o r e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n that has h e l p e d put e n v i r o n m e n t a l m a n a g e m e n t in t h e f o r e f r o n t of both d o m e s t i c and international policy. A s C a l d w e l l has n o t e d : T h e U . N . C o n f e r e n c e o n the H u m a n E n v i r o n m e n t ( 1 9 7 2 ) w a s a w a t e r s h e d e v e n t in h u m a n r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h t h e E a r t h . T h e c o n f e r e n c e e p i g r a m " O n l y O n e E a r t h " s y m b o l i z e d a c h a n g e in h u m a n p e r c e p t i o n t h a t w o u l d b e c o m e a n e w f a c t o r in the d e v e l o p m e n t of e t h i c s a n d in t h e e v a l u a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e s in p o l i c i e s a f f e c t i n g the e n v i r o n m e n t . ( C a l d w e l l , 1 9 8 4 : 1 )

T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s E n v i r o n m e n t a l P r o g r a m m e ( U N E P ) , with its h e a d q u a r t e r s in Nairobi, K e n y a , s h o u l d be s e e n as a r i s i n g d i r e c t l y f r o m the 1972 S t o c k h o l m c o n f e r e n c e . W h a t s h o u l d be of s i g n i f i c a n c e h e r e is the r e c o g n i t i o n that the e n v i r o n m e n t in A f r i c a is c l o s e l y tied to e n v i r o n m e n t s e l s e w h e r e in the w o r l d , a n d t h a t any a t t e m p t at t r e a t i n g o n e part of the g l o b a l e n v i r o n m e n t in i s o l a t i o n f r o m t h e rest w o u l d be grossly i n a d e q u a t e ( B e r n t s e n , 1995).

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THE ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

G e o l o g i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , the A f r i c a n c o n t i n e n t is an old o n e . A c c o r d i n g to L e w i s and Berry ( 1 9 8 8 : 3 6 - 7 0 ) , m a n y of t h e g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s of t h e A f r i c a n l a n d s c a p e h a v e e v o l v e d o v e r long g e o l o g i c p e r i o d s w i t h o u t b e i n g s u b m e r g e d u n d e r c h a n g i n g sea levels, w i t h o u t b e i n g c h a n g e d d r a m a t i c a l l y by g l a c i a t i o n , and w i t h o u t m a j o r t e c t o n i c u p h e a v a l s . In c o m p a r i s o n , E u rope and North A m e r i c a h a v e been a f f e c t e d d r a m a t i c a l l y by g l a c i a t i o n and t e c t o n i c u p h e a v a l s , w h i c h m e a n s that they are m u c h y o u n g e r c o n t i n e n t s . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e in g e o l o g i c history has had s e r i o u s c o n s e q u e n c e s in t e r m s of current e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n c e r n s such as soil e r o s i o n . A c c o r d i n g to L e w i s and Berry ( 1 9 8 8 : 3 6 ) , A f r i c a ' s relative g e o l o g i c stability has a l l o w e d m a n y g e o l o g i c p r o c e s s e s to p r o c e e d f u r t h e r in A f r i c a t h a n in t h e y o u n g e r c o n t i nents. For e x a m p l e , in m o s t of the m i d d l e , t e m p e r a t e latitudes, m u c h of the soil is of r e c e n t o r i g i n , o f t e n d e r i v e d f r o m g l a c i a l a c t i v i t i e s . In m o s t of A f r i c a , h o w e v e r , the soils are of ancient origin a n d h a v e b e e n s u b j e c t to intensive l e a c h i n g of n u t r i e n t s o v e r long p e r i o d s of t i m e . A s a result, A f r i c a n soils tend to lack fertility. T h i s g e o l o g i c fact m e a n s that A f r i c a is a c t u a l l y m o r e v u l n e r a b l e to h u m a n activity than o t h e r c o n t i n e n t s in t e r m s of d e f o r estation, d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n , and soil e r o s i o n . In t e r m s of g e o g r a p h i c location, o v e r 75 p e r c e n t of A f r i c a lies b e t w e e n the tropics, and m u c h of the land b e y o n d the t r o p i c s is e x t r e m e l y dry. T h i s

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land includes the Sahara Desert, which covers most of northern and northwestern Africa, and the Kalahari Desert, which covers large portions of southwestern Africa. About 9 0 percent of the continent is classified as having tropical climates. This means that the average annual temperatures are relatively high over most of the land. The exceptions to this are the northern and southern edges of the continent, which have a Mediterranean type of climate, and areas of high elevation such as the Kenya highlands, which have relatively cooler temperatures. With most of Africa being tropical, the major factor that distinguishes seasons is precipitation, that is, wet and dry seasons. (See Chapter 2 for additional analysis of the geography of Africa, especially Maps 2.1 and 2.2.) Over the centuries, humans have adapted their lives and activities to their environment. Certainly this was the case in Africa. As both Thomas O ' T o o l e and Eugenia Shanklin note in Chapters 3 and 9, Africa is believed to be the first human habitat, going back millions of years. During these vast expanses of time our ancestors were adapting both physically and culturally to the environmental conditions they faced. Most relevant to the study of the African environment in the contemporary period is the shift in human activity from foraging to domesticated food production, which is closely linked to the beginnings of African metallurgy (Austen, 1 9 8 7 : 9 ) . However, historical evidence as to what precisely happened in this shift from "savagery to culture" is still lacking and is open to much debate (Austen, 1 9 8 7 : 1 0 - 1 6 ) . Domesticated food production has been associated with the increase in population, a more predictable existence, and the establishment of communities. Historians have suggested that by the nineteenth century, Africans had long been organized into large numbers of communities. With the possible exception of a few small groups, such as San (in the Kalahari) and Twa (in the Congo rainforest), the economies of true subsistence had largely disappeared (Lewis and Berry, 1988). Probably the most important thing to note is that humans evolved to conform to their environment and that for the greater part of their existence on earth have constantly been molded by that environment. It seems that over a long period of time, the key to survival was not resistance to change but meeting change with change (or adjustment); otherwise, the human race would not have survived. The coming o f colonialism in Africa significantly changed the nature o f existing local or " c o m m u n i t y " economies that often had complex economic systems to deal with food and other crop production, handicrafts, and trade. For the most part, the economies were localized in specific regions. As Virginia DeLancey notes in Chapter 5, one fundamental change that was initiated during the colonial period and persists today was the creation of a new trading system due to the demand for African raw materials such as palm oil, rubber, ivory, and copper. This, in turn, created tremendous pressure on the African environment to respond to these new and increasing

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demands. To get a better picture of the overall pressure on the environment in Africa during the colonial and postcolonial periods, this chapter should be read in conjunction with Chapters 5 and 7.

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CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE AFRICAN ENVIRONMENT

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Deforestation

Deforestation occurs when trees are cut d o w n to provide firewood (a primary energy source) and timber, and to free up space for more crop cultivation or grazing land. Lester Brown has argued that a sustainable s o c i e t y will differ from the o n e w e n o w k n o w in several respects. P o p u l a t i o n s i z e will m o r e or l e s s be stationary, e n e r g y w i l l be used more efficiently, and the e c o n o m y will be f u e l e d largely with renewable sources of energy. ( B r o w n , 1 9 8 1 : 2 4 7 )

Looking at the African environment with regard to maintaining the critical balance between existing forests and human activity, the continent is moving very quickly toward unsustainability. M u c h of the deforestation—like much other environmental degradation—is the result of large n u m b e r s of individuals engaging in decisions that are privately rational but collectively destructive (Bojo et al., 1990). Human activity in Africa, like elsewhere, has altered the landscape of the earth. Forest clearing is one such activity. Deforestation in the tropics has accelerated dramatically in the years since World War II, but estimates of the area covered by tropical forests and rates of deforestation vary widely, mainly because countries use different measures and definitions of "forest" (Silver with DeFries, 1990:117). In spite of problems of measurement, a U N E P study (1990) revealed that globally speaking, just three countries— Brazil, Indonesia, and Zaire (now the D e m o c r a t i c Republic of C o n g o ) — contained a major share of the world's tropical forests. T h e study focused on two basic forest types. The first, closed tropical rainforests, have a relatively tight canopy of mostly broad-leafed evergreen trees sustained by 256 inches or more of annual rainfall. The second, open tropical forests, have a canopy that is not continuous but covers more than 10 percent of the ground. W h e n both types were considered, Brazil contained 26.5 percent of the world total, Zaire 9.2 percent, and Indonesia 6.1 percent. 2 The U N E P study noted that, globally, closed forests are being destroyed at a rate of about 0.6 percent annually. However, in terms of country variation, the problem seems even more serious. In some countries, such as Zaire, deforestation rates were as low as 0.2 percent a year, but in Cote d ' l v o i r e they reached 7 percent. Closed forests are thus expected to

Growing land scarcity in Africa is leading to deforestation, soil erosion, and desertification as farmers clear forests or overuse the land in an effort to feed themselves.

Commercial logging, as in Gabon, is one factor leading to a rapid loss of forests, including rainforests, in Africa as elsewhere in the developing world.

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disappear altogether within t w e n t y - f i v e years in A f r i c a unless effective steps are taken to conserve them. Perhaps the worst case is represented by Madagascar, which in the past f e w decades has lost more than f o u r - f i f t h s of its rainforest to land clearing (Wells, 1989:162). Current estimates are that forested area per capita will be reduced by 50 percent in Africa in less than twenty years (World Bank, 2000:42). A major reason for the deforestation in Africa is poverty and economic underdevelopment. Instead of electricity or other modern f o r m s of energy, 90 percent of the population uses f u e l w o o d for cooking in Africa, and wood and brush supply about 52 percent of all energy sources, and the demand is growing (Agyei, n.d.; A n d e r s o n , 1987:7). Each year Africa loses woodlands area the size of the Netherlands (Rosen and Conly, 1998: 14). These figures by themselves are not astonishing if the continent could devise a system of restoring the stock of trees that are cut down. But, according to Anderson, the current annual rate o f c o n s u m p t i o n is e s t i m a t e d to e x c e e d the m e a n annual incremental g r o w t h ( M A I ) . . . o f local tree s t o c k s and forest res e r v e s by the f o l l o w i n g ( r o u n d e d ) a m o u n t s : in S e n e g a l - 3 5 percent (a slight surplus), in the Sahelian countries 3 0 percent, in Sudan 7 0 percent, in northern N i g e r i a 7 5 percent, in Ethiopia 150 percent, and in N i g e r 2 0 0 percent. ( A n d e r s o n , 1987:7)

It is generally acknowledged that with the rapid increase in the number of people on the continent and higher rates of urbanization, the need for fuelwood as a source of energy will continue to grow. In fact, urbanization seems to have a direct effect on the loss of forests in Africa, because the spread of deforestation is most noticeable near urban areas. According to Anderson (1987:8), the growth of towns and cities brings about increased demands for f u e l w o o d and charcoal and accounts for much of the decline in tree stocks in the surrounding countryside, often for a radius of 8 0 - 1 6 0 kilometers or more. Forest clearing to obtain f u e l w o o d is indeed a m a j o r problem; h o w ever, fuelwood leads to the degradation of open forests only and plays little part in the destruction of closed forests. The m a j o r cause of deforestation in A f r i c a is the clearing of forests for purposes of crop c u l t i v a t i o n — t h e need to expand agricultural land (UNEP, 1990). This problem is also tied to the increase in the n u m b e r of people. Yet, the U N E P report cautions against generalizations that may not hold: B l a m e s h o u l d not be laid at the d o o r of s h i f t i n g agriculture itself. S m a l l strips of forest can be cleared, burnt, planted and left to return to natural f o r e s t again, p r o v i d e d the f a l l o w period is l o n g e n o u g h . [ B u t ] in m a n y p l a c e s it n o longer is. T h e reasons for this are c o m p l i c a t e d . O f t e n , as prod u c t i v e , c u l t i v a b l e land b e c o m e s s c a r c e , s m a l l - s c a l e farmers are p u s h e d into more marginal areas, and shifting agriculturalists o n t o fragile upland

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Julius E. Nyang'oro f o r e s t areas u n a b l e to support their p r a c t i c e s . Fallow periods are then shortened as yields fall and populations increase. It is e s t i m a t e d that s h i f t i n g agriculture n o w a c c o u n t s for 7 0 percent of d e f o r e s t a t i o n in A f r i c a . ( U N E P , 1990:3; e m p h a s i s added)

But the larger point still holds: shifting cultivation is an important agent of deforestation. Shifting cultivation is a practice in which subsistence f a r m ers clear and burn a plot of land in the forest, then grow crops for one or a f e w years before repeating the cycle. This age-old m e t h o d of subsistence agriculture recycles nutrients to the soil and maintains productivity without fertilizers, provided the fallow period is long enough to regenerate the forest growth. But, with increasing population and pressure on the land, in m a n y places the fallow period is cut short. Eventually, the soil b e c o m e s unproductive, crops no longer flourish, and the trees do not grow back. It is important to remember that once forests are cleared for agriculture, grazing, or logging, there is no guarantee that the trees can grow back. This is the d i l e m m a that m a n y A f r i c a n countries face. Pierre Pradervand, w h o spent several years traveling through A f r i c a in a quest to understand the dynamics of change on the continent, s u m m a r i z e d the deforestation problem as follows: B y far the m o s t important c a u s e [of d e f o r e s t a t i o n ] is the o p e n i n g up o f n e w land for agriculture. T h e m o s t striking characteristic of deforestation that e m e r g e d in m y d i s c u s s i o n s with the farmers w a s the s p e e d at w h i c h it is taking p l a c e . In l e s s than a g e n e r a t i o n they h a v e s e e n their w o o d e d e n v i r o n m e n t literally disappear. T h e r e d o e s not appear to be another major area o f the w o r l d w h e r e s u c h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n has b e e n as rapid and severe. (Pradervand, 1 9 8 9 : 3 7 - 3 8 )

Deforestation in A f r i c a has also been attributed to structural adjustment programs (SAPs), now ubiquitous on the continent. Here I will give the example of G h a n a to illustrate the problem. Since the early 1980s, Ghana has been subject to S A P s as dictated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Besides other initiatives, S A P s have promoted the export of timber, G h a n a ' s third most important export commodity. A variety of sources (Development GAP, 1993) have shown that major overseas aid and credit packages have been arranged with foreign e x c h a n g e provided to timber c o m p a n i e s to enable them to purchase new materials and equipment. As a result, f r o m 1983 to 1988, timber exports increased f r o m $16 million to $99 million. Such a quick-fix solution to Ghana's need f o r foreign e x c h a n g e earnings has contributed to the loss of G h a n a ' s already depleted forest resources. Between 1981 and 1985, the annual rate of deforestation was 1.3 percent, and current estimates are as high as 2 percent. G h a n a ' s tropical forest area is now just 25 percent of its original size (Development G A P , 1993:25).

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A growing but often underreported source of deforestation is conflict and the disruptions caused by m o v e m e n t s of large n u m b e r s of people. Africa's civil wars have in some cases produced large numbers of refugees who settle in overcrowded camps, sometimes f o r lengthy periods of time. Dependent on firewood f r o m the local environment, a devastating loss of trees can occur. As an example, Guinea has an estimated 400,000 refugees and has suffered severe deforestation (World Bank, 2000:242). Perhaps more important than the causes of deforestation are its effects on people and the environment as a whole. About 75 percent of the population in most African countries are rural dwellers. In terms of subsistence, rural dwellers depend on forests and trees for a long list of essential products: fuelwood, fodder, fruit, nuts, dyes, medicines, and building materials. Fuelwood and fodder alone are in m a n y societies two of the most essential ingredients for survival; without them, rural life would degenerate quickly into a mere struggle for existence (UNEP, 1990). Indeed, in some places this has already come to pass (Timberlake, 1986). Many rural families also depend on tree products f o r income. Collecting, processing, and selling forest products are often the only ways by which rural w o m e n can obtain cash income. In the past, these activities have been called "minor forest industries." But in no sense are they minor. For example, in Egypt's Fayoum province, 48 percent of w o m e n work in " m i n o r " forest industries. My own research in Mara region in northeastern Tanzania revealed that in at least 50 percent of the households surveyed, one m e m b e r of the household was involved in activities related to the forest industry. It is obvious that when forests are depleted, rural families must survive without either the products on which they depend or the incomes they need. Ghana is a good example. An estimated 75 percent of Ghanaians depend on wild foods to supplement their diet. Stripping the forest has led to a sharp increase in malnutrition and disease. For w o m e n , the food, fuel, and medicines they harvest f r o m the forest provide critical resources, especially in the f a c e of decreased food production, lower wages, and other e c o n o m i c shocks that threaten household food security (Poulsen, 1990:4). Deforestation also has indirect negative e f f e c t s . For instance, loss of trees is a m a j o r factor in land degradation, with serious consequences for food production (which will be discussed below). Desertification, drought, and permanent climate change have also been attributed to the vast loss of tree cover (Rosen and Conly, 1998:14; Development G A P , 1993:25). Deforestation is also largely responsible for the fact that Africa has lost f r o m one-half to two-thirds of its original wildlife habitat (World Bank, 2000:195; Rosen and Conly, 1998:14). Another alarming casualty of deforestation, in association with pollution and soil erosion, is one of A f r i c a ' s most breathtaking freshwater resources—Lake Victoria, the world's second largest lake. It is reportedly b e c o m i n g so badly degraded that it could die

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by 2050 if nothing is done to reverse eutrophication of its waters. Eutrophication is the result of excess nutrients pouring into the lake f r o m local rivers. With the loss of tree cover along the rivers that feed into the lake, there is nothing to prevent sediments and contaminants from washing into the water. Scientists specifically blame "the burning of indigenous forests in Mau and Nandi Hills [Kenya], overgrazing of shallow soils on hill slopes, run-off f r o m fragile soils and plains and gully erosion on escarpm e n t " (Okoko, 2000). For these reasons and others, the present forest situation in Africa is a matter of serious concern. Gunnar Poulsen (1990:4) of U N E P outlined the problem in a report to all A f r i c a n governments. In the report he noted the rapid loss of natural forest resources in Africa, including both flora and fauna. Reforestation efforts c o m p e n s a t e d for no more than 3.5 percent of the forests being destroyed (although this varies by country), and " f o r e s t plantations" did not compensate for the loss of biodiversity.

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Desertification

As you can see, forests are part of a complex and delicate ecosystem. W h e n the balance in the ecosystem is altered through human activities such as the cutting down of forests, a chain reaction occurs leading to the deterioration of other parts of the ecosystem. The problem of increased desertification in Africa has been associated with increased deforestation. As E c k h o l m and Brown have noted, " W h i l e ' d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n ' has b e c o m e something of a catch-all word, the problems usually covered by this term involve ecological changes that sap land of its ability to sustain agriculture and human habitation" (Eckholm and Brown, 1977:7). Timberlake (1986) argues that " d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n " more accurately describes the conversion of productive land into wasteland by human mismanagement: "Crops are overcultivated; rangelands are overgrazed; forests are cut; irrigation projects turn good cropland into salty, barren f i e l d s " (Timberlake, 1986:59). In Africa the declining ratio of mean annual incremental growth of local tree stocks has led to the decreased ability of land to sustain agriculture and human habitation. As with many environmental issues, it is difficult to have an accurate figure on how fast the deserts are spreading in Africa. However, in 1972, the United States Agency for International Development estimated that in the years since World War II, 650,000 square kilometers of land once suitable for agriculture or intensive grazing had been forfeited to the Sahara in its southern fringe (Eckholm and B r o w n , 1977:9). More recent estimates suggest that the problem has become worse. According to new estimates, the continent as a whole is losing an average of 36,000 square kilometers to the desert every year. In 1980 alone, 200,000 square kilometers of arable land were lost (Nnoli, 1990; Skoupy, 1988).

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M.

Desertification threatens many areas of Africa, especially the Sahel.

The situation seems particularly serious in the Sahel zone. 3 But more countries are increasingly being affected. Notable among the affected areas are Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, northern Nigeria, northern Ghana, Senegal, Gambia, Chad, Sudan, and Egypt. From this list, it is obvious that desertification has become a major environmental concern in Africa. To fully comprehend the nature of desertification in Africa, it is important to discuss the problem in a historical and geological context. We noted earlier that geologically Africa is an old continent. This makes the continent more susceptible to natural processes such as soil erosion. It also makes the soil less fertile, with a diminished "carrying capacity" (ability to sustain human activity). There is, o f course, a complex relationship between population and natural/environmental carrying capacity and between population distribution and desertification. The principal point is that, generally speaking, A f r i c a ' s environment has always been fragile, at least in the last few thousand years (Lewis and Berry, 1988). The argument is usually presented as follows. In terms of population settlement, Africa seems, at first glance, a vast and empty continent. But on closer inspection, it appears that many countries in Africa are becoming very crowded. Africa has been described as "underpopulated" because its population density is relatively low. C o m pared with most of Asia, or even Central America, Africa seems uncrowded. Population density, however, is just one side of the populationnatural resource^ balance; land productivity is the other. About 8 0 percent o f the continent cannot be considered arable. Half the potentially arable

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soils are lateritic and thus unsuited for permanent field crop agriculture. Of the land that is arable, only 7 percent has naturally rich alluvial soils (Revell, 1976; Lewis and Berry, 1988). Skoupy (1988:30) points out that arid and semi-arid regions constitute more than 50 percent of tropical Africa and support more than 35 percent of its population. The drylands of tropical Africa extend over twenty-four countries divided in the following way: •

•

•

Largely desert countries with more than 66 percent arid areas: Botswana, Cape Verde, Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia Countries with over 30 percent arid and semi-arid areas: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, G a m b i a , M o z a m b i q u e , Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe Countries with below 30 percent arid and semi-arid areas: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Madagascar, Nigeria, Uganda 4

It should be obvious that much of Africa's drier land can support only economically marginal, land-extensive uses, such as nomadic pastoralism, or at best only one meager grain crop per year. Thus, there are frequently good reasons why vast, unsettled areas have remained so. It was not by chance that they were left until last. Many regions that are unsettled today are empty precisely because they cannot support sustained settlement. 5 Using products of modern science and technology such as fertilizer and irrigation may be one way to save the land f r o m the encroaching desert. Certainly, an increase in f o o d production using m o d e r n scientific m e t h o d s would go a long way toward resolving the population problem. However, there is evidence that doing that would only increase environmental degradation. Tillman (1981) argues that modern technological inputs such as irrigation could improve yields. But this could be achieved only at great financial expense and with high environmental costs and public health risks. As real energy costs rise, so do the costs of irrigated agriculture, which depends on electricity or liquid fuel for pumping, and often upon such energy-intensive inputs as fertilizer and biocides—which create environmental hazards of their own. Weir and Schapiro point to this kind of environmental degradation not just in Africa but throughout the Third World: D o z e n s o f p e s t i c i d e s t o o d a n g e r o u s for unrestricted use in the U n i t e d States are shipped to u n d e r d e v e l o p e d countries. There, lack of regulation, illiteracy, and repressive w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s can turn e v e n a "safe" pestic i d e into a d e a d l y w e a p o n . A c c o r d i n g to the World Health Organization, s o m e o n e in the u n d e r d e v e l o p e d countries is p o i s o n e d by p e s t i c i d e s every minute. (Weir and Schapiro, 1 9 8 1 : 3 )

It would seem, therefore, that continuing desertification makes countries in Africa use pesticides and fertilizers that in the long run are dangerous

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Scenes of human suffering like these are becoming commonplace in Africa as drought and famine force millions of Africans to seek food aid.

both to the environment and the population. Furthermore, excessive irrigation in dry climates often leads to salinization or alkalinization of cropland, so that much of the available water must eventually be used to flush away salts rather than to irrigate crops. Finally, the issue of desertification has to be related to the problem of drought, as the two actually go together, the latter preceding the former. Of course, drought may be a result of either natural decline in rainfall or a change in climatic patterns caused by the clearing away of forests (Eckholm and Brown, 1977). In any case, Gordon Wells (1989:148-192), using earth photographs taken by NASA satellites over the years, presents a devastating picture of the Sahel countries as they have progressively become desert as a result of thirty years of drought conditions (World Bank, 2000: 110). From 1968 to the present, rainfall in the western Sahel (i.e., central Chad, coastal Senegal, and Mauritania) has been below the historical mean recorded from 1931 to 1960. Naturally, the environmental repercussion of the long drought is that it has destroyed the ability of the region to sustain its population. Wells (1989:163-164) gives a compelling description of the effects of drought on the environment where Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon meet on Lake Chad. In June 1966, Wells reports, satellite photographs from the Gemini 9 mission showed Lake Chad to be about 22,000 square kilometers; in the lake were numerous islands. A flourishing economy

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b a s e d on f i s h i n g and c e r e a l p r o d u c t i o n e x i s t e d in the lake area, and vill a g e s w e r e l o c a t e d on the islands. B y the s u m m e r o f 1 9 8 5 , these cultural patterns had c o l l a p s e d due to the e v a p o r a t i o n o f the lake. P h o t o g r a p h s taken by orbiting c a m e r a s in s p a c e indicated the lake had shrunk to only 2 , 5 0 0 square k i l o m e t e r s , although rains in J a n u a r y 1 9 8 6 increased this to 5 , 0 0 0 square k i l o m e t e r s . W a t e r l e v e l s were so low that irrigation p r o j e c t s at the c e n t e r o f r e g i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t plans failed. T h o u s a n d s o f f a r m e r s have b e e n f o r c e d to leave their land and raise crops or cattle along the rec e d i n g l a k e s h o r e l i n e . Current e s t i m a t e s are that 6 0 percent o f A f r i c a is v u l n e r a b l e to drought; 3 0 p e r c e n t is e x t r e m e l y vulnerable (World B a n k , 2 0 0 0 : 1 1 0 ) . D u r i n g the 1 9 9 0 s at least t w e n t y - f i v e c o u n t r i e s f a c e d severe f o o d shortages as a result o f drought ( D a r k o h , n.d.). An area e x p e r i e n c i n g r e c o r d drought s i n c e 1 9 9 8 is K e n y a . W a t e r s h o r t a g e s are o c c u r r i n g in N a i r o b i (the c a p i t a l c i t y ) , as well as in o t h e r areas o f the country. P o w e r rationing and p o w e r outages are p r o b l e m s due to the fact that most o f K e n y a ' s power c o m e s from h y d r o e l e c t r i c dams built on rivers that are now low. In the c o u n t r y s i d e , c r o p s are f a i l i n g , l i v e s t o c k are dying, and s o m e people are starving. E n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s b l a m e m a s s i v e deforestation for the failing rain ( A f r i c a n W i l d l i f e F o u n d a t i o n , 2 0 0 0 : 3 ) .

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Soil Erosion and Degradation

S o i l e r o s i o n , like d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n , is tied in large measure to the problem o f deforestation, reflecting the c o m p l e x interdependence in the e c o s y s tem. A s S i l v e r and D e F r i e s ( 1 9 9 0 : 1 2 0 ) have noted, forests are an important part o f the earth s y s t e m . On a local s c a l e , trees protect the soil from rain and wind that w o u l d o t h e r w i s e wash or b l o w it away. T h e s e two authors further note that despite the i m a g e o f luxuriant growth in tropical forests, m o s t o f the soils that support that g r o w t h are r e m a r k a b l y unproductive. T h i s is the c a s e in A f r i c a . High t e m p e r a t u r e s and rainfall throughout the year e n c o u r a g e l e a c h i n g o f nutrients from the soil, so that few nutrients remain e x c e p t for those held by the plants t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s naturally c a l l s for better m a n a g e m e n t o f topsoils, which includes the need to reduce the clearing o f forests. T h e twin processes o f deforestation and soil erosion, e s p e c i a l l y in tropical A f r i c a , have led to an increased concern to slow down the process. T h i s concern is made more urgent by the nature o f A f r i c a ' s g e o l o g i c f o r m a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y its (old) age and its g e o graphic location in the tropics ( L e w i s and Berry, 1988:iii), which makes the continent m o r e vulnerable to soil e r o s i o n . R i c h a r d Wagner provides a c o n c i s e summary o f why the cutting down o f tropical forests has more serious c o n s e q u e n c e s for the soil than would be the c a s e in temperate rainforests:

In a t e m p e r a t e rain f o r e s t , m o s t o f the m i n e r a l s m a d e a v a i l a b l e by d e c o m p o s i t i o n o f o r g a n i c litter o r d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f the parent r o c k are q u i c k l y

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absorbed by plant roots and incorporated into the vegetation. If you were to stand in an oak-hickory forest in m i d s u m m e r you would find several inches of slowly rotting leaves covering the rich topsoil, itself black with incorporated humus. Conversely a tropical rain forest has such a continuing high rate of organic litter decomposition that no mineral pool has time to accumulate. Directly beneath the most recently fallen debris is a heavy, clay-containing, mineral soil. As a result of this tie-up of all available minerals in the standing vegetation, the cycling of minerals is rapid and direct. As soon as a leaf falls, it is d e c o m p o s e d and its minerals are absorbed by plant roots and channeled into the growth of another leaf. So tight is this cycling process that those few ions not absorbed by plant roots but leached through the soil into the water table, and then out of the system, are replaced by ions picked up by the tree roots from the slowly disintegrating bedrock below. When tropical forest is cut, minerals are suddenly released faster than crop plants or the remaining trees are able to use them. They leach out of the system and fertility drops sharply. If the disturbance covers only a few acres, weeds and short-lived successional species quickly invade the area, shield the soil, and begin to restore the balanced mineral cycle. But when very large areas are cleared, this kind of recovery may be impossible. T h e lateritic nature of the soil also b e c o m e s part of the problem. When the forest is cleared, the heavily leached sesquioxides are exposed to high temperatures, and they bake into pavement-hard laterite. Once formed, laterite is almost impossible to break up and areas that once supported lush forest quickly b e c o m e scrubland at best, supporting only shrubs or stunted trees. (Wagner, 1971:52-53) A l t h o u g h there are m a n y n e g a t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s o i l e r o s i o n , such as the l o s s o f fertility, soil e r o s i o n itself is a natural p r o c e s s . A s S i l v e r and D e F r i e s ( 1 9 9 0 ) note, without it deltas w o u l d not f o r m as soil e r o d e s f r o m the land and travels as s e d i m e n t t h r o u g h s t r e a m s and rivers. But the soil e x p o s e d in a d e f o r e s t e d site g e n e r a l l y a c c e l e r a t e s the natural p r o c e s s , s o m u c h s o that s o m e d a m s in m a n y parts o f the t r o p i c s h a v e f i l l e d w i t h s e d i m e n t far m o r e rapidly than e x p e c t e d . I n d e e d , this p r o c e s s c o u l d be s p e e d e d as h i g h as 1 0 0 t i m e s a b o v e normal. Naturally, the l o s s of fertility l e a d s to s e r i o u s land d e g r a d a t i o n . B e c a u s e o f the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n d e f o r e s t a t i o n — w h i c h is a h u m a n a c t i v i t y — a n d soil e r o s i o n , B l a i k i e and B r o o k f i e l d ( 1 9 8 7 : 1 ) h a v e argued that land d e f o r e s t a t i o n s h o u l d by d e f i n i t i o n be a s o c i a l p r o b l e m , g i v e n the fact that p u r e l y

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p r o c e s s e s such as l e a c h i n g and e r o s i o n o c c u r with or w i t h o u t h u m a n interf e r e n c e . H o w e v e r , for t h e s e p r o c e s s e s to be d e s c r i b e d as "degradation" imp l i e s social criteria that relate land to its actual or p o s s i b l e u s e s . T h i s s e e m s to h a v e b e e n the c a s e in E t h i o p i a , a c o u n t r y that has s u f f e r e d the c o m b i n e d e f f e c t s o f d r o u g h t , f a m i n e , and, m o r e important, s o i l erosion. A c c o r d i n g to o n e source, Ethiopia l o s e s an e s t i m a t e d 1 billion tons o f topsoil per year ( T i m b e r l a k e , 1 9 8 6 : 1 2 9 ) . T h e l o s s results f r o m o v e r c u l t i v a t i o n and lack o f f o r e s t s to p r o v i d e the natural p r o t e c t i o n w h e n h e a v y rains c o m e . In tropical A f r i c a , m o s t rainfall is c o n c e n t r a t e d in short f i e r c e

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storms over a few months only. A good example of this concentration perhaps can be gleaned f r o m c o m p a r i n g London (generally known for its rainy and d a m p weather) and Sokoto in northern Nigeria. Sokoto actually gets 100 millimeters more rain than London, but it falls only in the months of July, August, and September, while in London, the rain is spread throughout most of the year (Timberlake, 1986:66). T h e Sokoto/London comparison is important if we are to comprehend the seriousness of soil erosion in many African countries. To return to the case of Ethiopia: as the topsoil is constantly eroded by rain, the process of cultivation itself b e c o m e s almost an impossible task. Timberlake tells a dramatic story of this tragedy: T h e p e o p l e of h i g h l a n d Ethiopia felt the d e s t r u c t i v e impact of rain on o v e r u s e d soil d u r i n g one week in M a y 1984. I was in Wollo Region [in the northeast] then d u r i n g the third year of drought, and there were suddenly about f o u r days of unseasonal, unexpected, heavy rainfall. T h r o u g h o u t the region, f a r m e r s harnessed up weak oxen and began to sow wheat seeds they had left. But Wollo today is a moonscape of treeless hills and valleys. All the land that an ox can c l i m b or a man stand upon has been cultivated. Farmers even suspend themselves by ropes to sow hillsides too steep to stand on. T h e rains of M a y 1984 b o u n c e d off this c o m p a c t e d , vegetationless w a t e r s h e d soil. T h e w a t e r ran quickly off in f l a s h f l o o d s , carrying a w a y soil and p r e c i o u s seeds t o w a r d s the lowland deserts to the east, or towards the tide basin to the west. After a night of rain, I looked out f r o m a hilltop to see m a s s i v e e r o s i o n , hills looking as if they had been d y n a mited, m u d and r o c k s f r o m the fields of hill f a r m e r s strewn over the fields of valley farmers. (Timberlake, 1986:21-22; emphasis added)

Obviously, the results of this erosion are devastating in terms of soil fertility. The resulting unproductivity of the land has contributed to the decline in Ethiopian agriculture (Dejene, 1987). Soil degradation caused by soil erosion, overgrazing, and poor farming practices is reportedly worse in Africa (and some parts of Asia) than anywhere else in the world. Along with Ethiopia Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe are suffering the worst problems in this area (Brown, 1998:9; Thomas et al., 2000:86-87). The effects on agriculture, especially food production, are already being felt and are likely to grow worse. This is especially true given the apparent inaction on the part of many African governments to deal seriously with the problem (Brown, 1998: 9). Since World War II soil degradation has grown to encompass 850,000 square miles, according to a UN-World Bank study, and has reduced crop yields in Africa by 25 percent (McKenzie, 1999:A4; World Bank, 2000:195). Unfortunately, soil degradation is worsening; at the same time, population is rapidly growing. In the 1990s almost 43 percent of Africans were malnourished (Livernash and Rodenburg, 1998:32). Estimates are that farmers will have to increase food production five times to meet basic food needs by

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2050 (Rosen and Conly, 1998:15). But, as Lester Brown laments, "The next generation of farmers will try to feed not the 719 million people of today, but 1.45 billion in the year 2025—and with far less topsoil" (Brown, 1998:9).

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DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT

In Chapter 5 on economic development, Virginia DeLancey discusses the problems African governments face in their quest to improve the material conditions of their respective societies. In this chapter, I wish to point to some examples where economic development strategies have negatively affected the environment. The first example is that of cash crops, which are crucial as a source of foreign (hard) currency. The second example relates to the oil industry. The production of cash crops has been the primary engine for the generation of foreign exchange in most African countries. When the economies of Africa began a backward slide in the 1970s, the World Bank (1981:6-7) advised African countries to continue producing and improving cash crops such as coffee, cotton, tea, and sugar. In many instances, cash crop production has led to misguided government policies that lead to environmental deterioration while yielding few benefits economically. Timberlake analyzes these conflicting goals African countries in general face and makes reference to the specific case of Sudan: To describe Africa's crisis as "environmental" may sound odd. . . . What have environmental concerns to do with the fact that in 1985 the entire Hadendawa people of north-eastern Sudan faced extinction due to starvation and dispersal? The Sudanese government, with the help of [foreign aid], has put vast sugar and cotton plantations on its best land along the Nile. It has ignored rapidly falling yields from smallholder farming in the 1970s. It seems not to have noticed that the land—the "environment"— upon which eight out of every [ten] Sudanese depend for their livelihoods is s l o w l y perishing due to over-use and misuse. It invested little in dryland regions where people like the Hadendawa live. So when drought came, these pastoralists and peasants had no irrigated settlements in which to take temporary refuge, no government agencies to buy their livestock, no sources of drought-resistant sorghum seeds ready for planting when the rains resumed. But neither have the government's investments in cash crops produced money to pay the nation's way through the drought. The result is starvation and debt: Sudan's external debt in 1985 was estimated at $9 billion. President Nimeiri, overthrown in April 1985, has paid a personal price for leading Sudan to environmental bankruptcy. (Timberlake, 1986:9-10; emphasis added)

The political, economic, and environmental tragedy in Sudan continues even now. A related problem is the use of dangerous agricultural chemicals. Of the estimated 25 million agricultural workers poisoned by pesticides every

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year, 11 million are in A f r i c a , and hundreds of thousands die ( T h o m a s et al., 2000:85). Most of these workers are involved in cash crop agriculture. Deterioration of the e n v i r o n m e n t in A f r i c a is not c o n f i n e d to cash crop p r o d u c t i o n . T h e e x a m p l e of the oil industry in Nigeria is presented here to s h o w h o w w i d e s p r e a d the p r o b l e m is. In o n e of the rare studies of the ecological results of the oil i n d u s t r y in N i g e r i a , E b o e H u t c h f u l ( 1 9 8 5 ) notes the c o m p l e x i t i e s involved in d e v e l o p i n g an oil industry. Oil r e v e n u e s gene r a t e d by the m i n i n g a n d s e l l i n g of oil naturally h a v e increased the c a p a bilities of the N i g e r i a n state, m a k i n g it p o s s i b l e to f i n a n c e m u c h - n e e d e d d e v e l o p m e n t p r o j e c t s . B u t H u t c h f u l c o m m e n t s that these s a m e p r o c e s s e s have generated growing regional inequalities, impoverishment, underemp l o y m e n t , and d e g r a d a t i o n of the N i g e r i a n e n v i r o n m e n t ( H u t c h f u l , 1985: 113). Specifically, H u t c h f u l s h o w s that oil-industry activities—exploration, p r o d u c t i o n , r e f i n i n g , and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n — h a v e caused w i d e s p r e a d social and ecological disturbance. T h e s e include explosions f r o m seismic surveys; p o l l u t i o n f r o m p i p e l i n e leaks, b l o w o u t s , drilling fluids, and refinery e f f l u ents; as well as land alienation and widespread disruption of the natural terrain f r o m c o n s t r u c t i o n of oil-related industrial infrastructure and installations. T h e areas that have b e e n most a f f e c t e d are the oil-producing areas in three states: Rivers, B e n d e l , and Cross River (Hutchful, 1985:113-115). B l o w o u t of rigs is a l w a y s a risk that oil drilling and exploration carry. B l o w o u t s u s u a l l y lead to m a j o r oil spills such as the one that o c c u r r e d at the s o - c a l l e d F u n i w a - 5 l o c a t i o n in e a s t e r n Nigeria. O n J a n u a r y 17, 1980, the F u n i w a well, located about five miles o f f s h o r e in the Niger Delta, blew out d u r i n g o p e r a t i o n . S u b s e q u e n t to the b l o w o u t , it took several d a y s for the operating c o m p a n y and the Nigerian authorities to a c k n o w l e d g e the acc i d e n t and the r e s u l t i n g oil spill, w h i c h c o u l d not be i m m e d i a t e l y c o n tained. A l t h o u g h n o full a c c o u n t of the accident or its effects ever c a m e to light, the e n v i r o n m e n t a l c o n s e q u e n c e s were serious, especially in the ecologically d e l i c a t e N i g e r D e l t a . H u t c h f u l attributes inaction on the part of the g o v e r n m e n t to the e n o r m o u s i n f l u e n c e that foreign oil c o m p a n i e s h a v e on the industry. H e argues that the problem of oil pollution in Nigeria has been exacerbated by the absence of effective regulations and the predatory attitudes of the oil companies. Clearly, as long as the [major oil companies] can maximize the availability of [economic] surplus from oil, the Nigerian state has had little interest in regulating their activities, particularly where such controls may threaten the expansion of production. After many years of widespread exploration and production activities, Nigeria still does not possess a comprehensive or coherent set of anti-pollution legislation. Existing legislation is scattered through a number of statutes limited to specific types of pollution and environment and lacking the backing of detailed regulations. The tendency is to leave considerable discretionary power in the hands of enforcement agencies and corresponding opportunity for the oil companies to evade regulations. (Hutchful, 1985:118)

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Hutchful neglected to mention that discretionary power in the hands of bureaucrats also leads to corruption, because offending companies can always buy off their transgressions. In more recent times, the environmental problems caused by the oil industry in Nigeria have resulted in political conflict between the Nigerian government and the foreign oil companies on the one hand, and the Ogoni people of Rivers state on the other. T h e M o v e m e n t for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), under the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa, was established as a vehicle not only for demanding autonomy f r o m the Nigerian state, but also for protesting the environmental hazards caused by the oil spillage and gas flaring that accompany it. The environmental hazards have led to the Ogoni people being net importers of food because of damage to f a r m l a n d , whereas in years past, the Ogoni had been net f o o d exporters. T h e crisis of the Ogoni led to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others by the Nigerian government in late 1995 on charges that most of the world saw as trumped up (Osaghae, 1995). Recently, the Nigerian government in partnership with the major oil companies released the Niger Delta Environmental Survey as part of its development plan for the region. Only time will tell if this signals a genuine commitment to address what are now acknowledged to be the serious ecological and health damages the oil industry has caused (Njoku and AhiumaYoung. 2000). In conclusion, the two e x a m p l e s f r o m Sudan and Nigeria make the important point that what passes as economic development may have serious environmental consequences that may take years, if not generations, to rectify.

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OTHER ISSUES OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN

In our survey of some of A f r i c a ' s greatest environmental problems, some attention should also be given to the issue of toxic waste dumping in Africa. Although hard data is difficult to c o m e by because most of this trade is underground, what we do know is cause for concern. Most of the trade to African and other poor countries involves hazardous materials such as raw sewage, sludge, incinerated ashes, radioactive wastes, pesticides and other hazardous chemicals, contaminated oils, acids, and poisonous solvents shipped f r o m developed countries. This a m o u n t s to about one-fifth of the total traffic to Africa. The governments of some countries in Africa, desperate for foreign trade and hard currency, find accepting such materials a temptation hard to resist. According to some estimates, the financial gains amount to more than the yearly gross domestic product (GDP) of many poor countries ( O A U , n.d.; Miller, 1 9 9 5 : 8 7 - 8 8 ) . The financial incentives for the industrial w a s t e - p r o d u c i n g countries are even

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greater. Estimates are that the cost for processing these wastes in industrial countries is roughly $ 3 , 0 0 0 a ton; some A f r i c a n countries have accepted these wastes for as little as $5 a ton (OAU, n.d.). T h e s e wastes are a m a j o r threat to the health of millions of A f r i c a n s and their environment. Most of the people do no even know these wastes are in their midst or the hazards they pose. In many cases there is poor handling and disposal of hazardous materials, and long-term safety is highly questionable. For example, in a 1981 case in Nigeria, an illegal arrangement between Italian businessmen and Nigerian officials led to the dumping of five shipments of hazardous materials stored in 8,000 drums in a Nigerian citizen's backyard. S o m e of the d r u m s , containing highly carcinogenic chemicals, were leaking. Luckily, the scheme was exposed and the wastes were removed, but who knows how many such deals are never brought to light (Miller, 1995:88). Concern over the trade in toxic wastes led to efforts to first control and then to ban the trade altogether. In 1987, for instance, U N E P adopted the Cairo Guidelines and Principles for Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes (Miller, 1995:89). In 1988 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) leaders agreed to make it a criminal offense to facilitate dumping dangerous waste and urged developed countries to tighten their regulation of such products. There was an obvious difference of opinion at the conference between those countries (such as Benin) who had accepted such waste (and the money it brought) and those (such as Guinea-Bissau) who were willing to consider regulation (Schissel, 1988:47-49). After other unsatisfactory efforts to regulate the trade in hazardous materials, the Bam a k o Convention was signed in 1991 by ten African countries who agreed to entirely ban toxic wastes to Africa. A ban was also proposed at the 1992 Earth Summit, but it was blocked by the United States and other industrialized countries. Finally, in 1994, the Basel Convention, which banned the shipment of hazardous wastes from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( O E C D ) nations to n o n - O E C D nations, was approved. This would have amounted to the end of such shipments from industrial nations to Africa after 1997. The United States was the only O E C D country that refused to sign the accord (Miller, 1995:89-94). Despite efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to prevent waste trading by its m e m b e r countries, some have violated the ban. A m o n g these countries are Benin. Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Somalia, and Zimbabwe (OAU, n.d.). To date, an illicit trade in toxic wastes continues, with effects that may not be fully appreciated until a major environmental disaster occurs. Another issue that warrants some mention is that of wildlife conservation. Africa is well known for its spectacular wildlife and game parks. Indeed, wildlife is a m a j o r attraction in a lucrative tourist industry for s o m e countries and thus plays a key role in their economic development efforts. For example, 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 visitors spent $ 4 0 0 million in Kenya in 1988 and

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$ 5 1 0 m i l l i o n in 1994 ( K e n y a M i n i s t r y of F i n a n c e , 1995). T o u r i s m - b a s e d w i l d l i f e v i e w i n g a l s o has g r o w i n g p o t e n t i a l f o r c o u n t r i e s such as Z i m b a b w e , B o t s w a n a , Tanzania, and S o u t h A f r i c a . A l t h o u g h w i l d l i f e is an important s o u r c e of f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e , there is c o n t r o v e r s y r e g a r d i n g the killing of w i l d l i f e f o r their f u r (e.g., l e o p a r d s ) , their ivory (e.g., e l e p h a n t s ) , or their h o r n s (e.g., r h i n o s ) . T h i s c o n c e r n is understandable. For example, Kenya's elephant population dropped from 165,000 to 16,000 b e t w e e n 1970 and 1990 as a result of p o a c h i n g (Dickey, 1990:42). O t h e r e n d a n g e r e d a n i m a l s include the black and w h i t e rhino and the m o u n t a i n g o r i l l a . Since 1950 A f r i c a h a s lost m o r e than 9 5 p e r c e n t of its t h e n e s t i m a t e d 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 b l a c k r h i n o ; t o d a y t h e r e are o n l y 2 , 7 0 0 left (World W i l d l i f e F u n d , 2000:4). O n l y 6 2 0 m o u n t a i n gorillas are left (World W i l d l i f e F o u n d a t i o n , 2000:1). In 1990, the A f r i c a n e l e p h a n t w a s p l a c e d on A p p e n d i x I of the C o n v e n t i o n o n International T r a d e in E n d a n g e r e d S p e c i e s ( C I T E S ) in order to g i v e it the m a x i m u m p r o t e c t i o n f r o m p o a c h i n g . In e f f e c t , trade in ivory w a s p r o h i b i t e d in o r d e r to e l i m i n a t e the m a r k e t f o r p o a c h e r s . T h e results w e r e quite s u c c e s s f u l ; p o a c h i n g d r o p p e d sharply and e l e p h a n t p o p u l a t i o n s r e b o u n d e d in m a n y c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g K e n y a . In T a n z a n i a p o a c h i n g fell f r o m as h i g h as 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 e l e p h a n t s a y e a r to less than 100 a y e a r a f t e r the ban (see H i g g i n s , 2000:2). Not all c o u n t r i e s , h o w e v e r , v i e w the e l e p h a n t p r o b l e m in the s a m e way. C o u n t r i e s such as Z i m b a b w e , N a m i b i a , B o t s w a n a , and S o u t h A f r i c a point out that their e l e p h a n t p o p u l a t i o n s h a v e g r o w n as a result of c a r e f u l m a n a g e m e n t a n d c o n t r o l of the p o a c h i n g p r o b l e m . T h e s e c o u n t r i e s h a v e sought to m o v e the elephant to a less protected status and r e o p e n the ivory t r a d e u n d e r c a r e f u l l y m o n i t o r e d c o n d i t i o n s . T h e y a r g u e that d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s n e e d the m o n e y that s e l l i n g ivory on a c o n t r o l l e d basis w o u l d b r i n g . T h i s m o n e y could then be u s e d f o r c o n s e r v a t i o n p u r p o s e s , to provide n e e d e d r e v e n u e for p o o r c o m m u n i t i e s , and to m a n a g e e l e p h a n t h e r d s m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y . T h e y point out that g r o w i n g e l e p h a n t p o p u l a t i o n s are c o m i n g into m o r e conflict with h u m a n s by raiding their crops and destroying their p r o p e r t y (and s o m e t i m e s their lives). In e s s e n c e , the i n c o m e generated f r o m elephants is "essential to secure political and e c o n o m i c support f o r c o n s e r v a t i o n at both the local a n d national l e v e l s " ( W i l d n e t A f r i c a , n.d.a:4). In 1 9 9 7 — d e s p i t e the o p p o s i t i o n of most A f r i c a n countries and c o n s e r vationists—Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia were granted a one-time limited p e r m i t to sell e l e p h a n t p r o d u c t s , such as ivory. T h o s e o p p o s e d to the sale f e a r e d that it w o u l d open the d o o r to illegal ivory sales d u e to ins u f f i c i e n t s a f e g u a r d s to e n s u r e that o n l y legal ivory w a s o n the m a r k e t . T h e y a l s o a r g u e d that the a l l e g e d e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s to local p e o p l e and c o n s e r v a t i o n w o u l d not be f u r t h e r e d by o p e n i n g u p the ivory m a r k e t (Wildnet A f r i c a , n.d.b). T h r e e years later, in 2000, C N N n e w s reported that

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In some African countries, such as Zimbabwe, elephant populations are actually growing.

elephant poaching was on the rise due to the relaxation of the ban. Allan Thornton, chairman of Britain's Environmental Investigation Agency, called this "the biggest conservation blunder of the 1990s." He and m a n y other conservationists are arguing that the elephant be given back its protected status and that further sales be stopped (Higgins, 2 0 0 0 : 1 - 2 ) . Only time will tell how this and other controversies over the use and conservation of A f r i c a ' s cherished wildlife heritage will be resolved. Pressures of population on the land, habitat loss, e n v i r o n m e n t a l degradation, c o m p e t i n g d e m a n d s for scarce financial resources, and the level of commitment to A f r i c a ' s natural e n v i r o n m e n t by A f r i c a n officials and citizens will be the decisive variables.

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CONCLUSION

Studying the e n v i r o n m e n t calls for a c o m p r e h e n s i v e approach that looks at the many-sided aspects of the problem. Our examination of the relationship a m o n g deforestation, desertification, and soil erosion certainly makes this point clear. Central to this comprehensive approach, however, is the role of h u m a n k i n d in the use of natural resources and the e f f e c t s of h u m a n activity on the environment. In Africa, h u m a n activity can be said

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to b e directed at two related o b j e c t i v e s : e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and h u m a n survival. In the last f e w d e c a d e s , the a t t a i n m e n t of both o b j e c t i v e s has bec o m e increasingly questionable as e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t has e l u d e d m a n y A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s and as h u m a n s u r v i v a l at a very low level h a s b e c o m e the order of the day (Danaher, 1994). Yet, there are m a n y t h i n g s that A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s can d o to alleviate the p r o b l e m . F r o m an institutional level, m y studies at U N E P revealed that no A f r i c a n country had c o m p r e h e n s i v e national legislation and a d m i n istrative m a c h i n e r y in the e n v i r o n m e n t a l f i e l d . ( S e e a l s o U N E P , 1987; H u t c h f u l , 1985:118.) M u c h of the legislation on the e n v i r o n m e n t w a s scatt e r e d in d i f f e r e n t areas of c o n c e r n , s u c h as l e g i s l a t i o n c o v e r i n g w a t e r s a f e t y or w i l d l i f e p r e s e r v a t i o n ( K a b e b e r i , 1988). T h e r e h a v e b e e n s o m e p o s i t i v e signs since the 1990s that a c o m m i t m e n t to the e n v i r o n m e n t will increase in the years ahead. For o n e , the international c o m m u n i t y is recogn i z i n g the link b e t w e e n p r o t e c t i n g the e n v i r o n m e n t a n d e v e r y o t h e r p r o g r e s s i v e change it hopes to see in A f r i c a . This is related to the idea of sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t that was i n t r o d u c e d at the b e g i n n i n g of this chapter. T h e m a j o r d e v e l o p m e n t l e n d e r in A f r i c a is the W o r l d B a n k . In its 1996 p u b l i c a t i o n on e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t in A f r i c a , the B a n k writes, " C a r i n g about the e n v i r o n m e n t in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a is not a l u x u r y but a p r i m e n e c e s s i t y " (World B a n k , 1996:ix). F o r s u s t a i n a b l e dev e l o p m e n t to occur issues of the e n v i r o n m e n t , poverty, rapid p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h , and g e n d e r equality ( a m o n g others) m u s t be r e c o g n i z e d and add r e s s e d because they are all interlinked. A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s and nong o v e r n m e n t a l organizations are b e g i n n i n g to get this m e s s a g e . A f r i c a n o w regularly holds an African Ministerial C o n f e r e n c e on the E n v i r o n m e n t sponsored by UNEP, the O A U , and the E C A ( E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n for Africa). Its purpose is to facilitate cooperation between A f r i c a n countries in p r o m o t ing sound environmental policies (UNEP, 2000a). R e g i o n a l g r o u p s such as the S A D C (South African D e v e l o p m e n t C o m m u n i t y ) , with its twelve m e m ber countries, are also turning their e f f o r t s t o w a r d p r o t e c t i n g the e n v i r o n m e n t and w o r k i n g toward s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t (UNEP, 2 0 0 0 b ) . C o u n tries such as K e n y a are d e v e l o p i n g their o w n national policies as well (Center for Reproductive Law, 1997). If these e f f o r t s are b a c k e d by action and resources, African countries m a y h a v e a chance to preserve their priceless environmental heritage, while using it wisely to benefit their people.

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NOTES

1. The concept of "sustainable development" (SD) has now been popularized in recent discussions about the environment. Such is the case in a study by the World Bank, Toward Environmentally Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A World Bank Agenda. 1996. Belghis Badri (1994:2), a Sudanese scholar, writes:

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My understanding of sustainable development, as an African scholar, is that it is not a holistic, non-divisible concept. Rather, I can conceive of it as an amalg a m a t i o n of several indicators that have d e v e l o p e d at various stages since the 1960s. . . . To elaborate, our indicators of sustainable development can be explained in terms of social development, e c o n o m i c development, environmental development, political development, intellectual development, w o m e n ' s develo p m e n t and international development. 2. T h e U N E P study is also discussed in Silver with DeFries (1990). 3. C o u n t r i e s that are generally referred to as f o r m i n g the Sahel region are Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. 4. To get a b r o a d e r p e r s p e c t i v e on the d r y l a n d s p r o b l e m , note that the drylands in Africa, including hyperarid desert, constitute 1,959 million hectares, or 65 percent of the continent and about one-third of the w o r l d ' s drylands. One-third of these African drylands are hyperarid deserts (672 million hectares), which are uninhabited except in oases. T h e remaining two-thirds, or 1,278 million hectares, c o m prise arid, semi-arid, and dry s u b h u m i d areas (Darkoh, 1994). 5. T i m b e r l a k e ( 1 9 8 6 : 3 9 ) p r o v i d e s an interesting c o m p a r a t i v e d i s c u s s i o n of this issue. H e states: " W h e t h e r or not A f r i c a is o v e r - p o p u l a t e d , most of it is certainly not densely populated. T h e average population density of Sub-Saharan Africa is only 16 per square kilometer, m u c h less in rural areas. This c o m p a r e s to 100/sq km in China, and 225/sq km in India."

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

A f r i c a n Wildlife F o u n d a t i o n . 2000. "Virunga Heartland Is Biologically R i c h — b u t E m b a t t l e d . " African Wildlife News 35 (fall): 1, 4. A g y e i , Yvonne. N.d. " D e f o r e s t a t i o n in S u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a . " African Technology Forum 8. Available online at h t t p : / / w e b . m i t . e d u / a f r i c a n t e c h / w w w / a r t i c l e s / deforestation.htm. D e c e m b e r 11, 2000. A n d e r s o n , Dennis. 1987. The Economics of Afforestation: A Case Study in Africa. Baltimore: J o h n s H o p k i n s University Press (for the World Bank). A u s t e n , Ralph A. 1987. African Economic History : Internal Development and External Dependency. London: James Currey. Badri, Belghis. 1994. " S u s t a i n a b l e D e v e l o p m e n t : An Analytical F r a m e w o r k for A g e n d a 2 1 . " In United N a t i o n s N o n - G o v e r n m e n t a l Liaison Service ( N G L S ) , Voices from Africa, no. 5, Sustainable Development. G e n e v a and New York: NGLS. Berntsen, T h o r b j o r n . 1995. " C h a l l e n g i n g Traditional G r o w t h . " Our Planet 7 (1): 11-12. Blaikie, Piers, and Harold Brookfield. 1987. " D e f i n i n g and Debating the P r o b l e m . " Pp. 1 - 2 6 in Piers Blaikie and Harold Brookfield (eds.). Land Degradation and Society. New York: M e t h u e n . B o j o , Jan, et al. 1990. Environment and Development: An Economic Approach. Boston: K l u w e r A c a d e m i c Publishers. Brown, Lester R. 1981. Building a Sustainable Society. New York: W. W. Norton. . 1998. " T h e Future of G r o w t h . " Pp. 3 - 2 0 in Linda Starke (ed.). State of the World. N e w York: W. W. Norton. Caldwell, Lynton Keith. 1984. International Environmental Policy: Emergence and Dimensions. D u r h a m , N C : D u k e University Press.

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O s a g h a e , E g h o s a E. 1995. " T h e O g o n i Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority A g i t a t i o n and the Future of the Nigerian State." African Affairs 9 4 : 3 2 5 - 3 4 4 . Pirages, Dennis. 1978. Global Ecopolitics. North Scituate, M A : Duxbury Press. P o u l s e n , G u n n a r . 1990. Report to the Third Meeting of the Committee of Forests and Woodlands (COFAW) of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment. Nairobi: UNEP. P r a d e r v a n d , Pierre. 1989. Listening to Africa: Developing Africa from the Grassroots. N e w York: Praeger. Revell, Roger. 1976. " T h e Resources Available for A g r i c u l t u r e . " Scientific American 235 (September): 165-178. Rosen, James E., and Shanti R. Conly. 1998. Africa's Population Challenge: Accelerating Progress in Reproductive Health. Washington, DC: Population Action International. Schissel, H o w a r d . 1988. " T h e D e a d l y Trade: Toxic Waste D u m p i n g in A f r i c a . " Africa Report 33 ( S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r ) : 4 7 - 4 9 . Silver, Cheryl S i m o n , with R u t h S. DeFries. 1990. One Earth, One Future: OutChanging Global Environment. Washington, D C : National Academy Press. Skoupy, Jiri. 1988. " D e v e l o p i n g Rangeland Resources in African Drylands." UNEP Desertification Control Bulletin 17:29^10. S t e b b i n g , E. P. 1935. " T h e E n c r o a c h i n g Sahara: T h e T h r e a t to the West A f r i c a n C o l o n i e s . " Geographical Journal 8 5 : 5 0 8 - 5 2 4 . T h o m a s , Vinod, M a n s o o r Dailami, A s h o k D h a r e s h w a r , Daniel K a u f m a n n , Nalin Kishor, R a m o n Lopez, and Yan Wang. 2000. The Quality of Growth. Washington, DC: O x f o r d University Press. Tillman, R. E. 1981. " E n v i r o n m e n t a l G u i d e l i n e s for Irrigation." Washington, D C : U.S. A g e n c y for International D e v e l o p m e n t . Timberlake, Lloyd. 1986. Africa in Crisis: The Causes, the Cures of Environmental Bankruptcy. Washington, DC: Earthscan. United Nations Environmental P r o g r a m m e ( U N E P ) . 1987. New Directions in Environmental Legislation and Administration, Particularly in Developing Countries. Nairobi: UNEP. . 1990. The Disappearing Forests. U N E P Environmental Brief No. 3. Nairobi: UNEP. . 2 0 0 0 a . " A f r i c a n Ministerial C o n f e r e n c e on the E n v i r o n m e n t ( A M C E N ) . Available online at h t t p : / / w w w . u n e p . o r g / p a r t n e r s / r e g i o n a l / a m c e n / h o m e . h t m . D e c e m b e r 11, 2000. . 2 0 0 0 b . " S o u t h e r n A f r i c a n D e v e l o p m e n t C o m m u n i t y ( S A D C ) . Available online at http://www.unep.org/partners/regional/sadc/home.htm. D e c e m b e r 11,

2000. Wagner, Richard. 1971. Environment and Man. New York: W. W. Norton. Weir, David, and Mark Shapiro. 1981. Circle of Poison: Pesticides and People in a Hungary World. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy. Wells, G o r d o n . 1989. " O b s e r v i n g E a r t h ' s E n v i r o n m e n t f r o m Space." Pp. 1 4 8 - 1 9 2 in Laurie Friday and R o n a l d L a s k e y (eds.). The Fragile Environment. The Darwin College Lectures. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press. Wildnet Africa. N.d.a. " A r g u m e n t s for R e - o p e n i n g Trade in African Elephant Products f r o m S o u t h e r n A f r i c a n States with Healthy and W e l l - M a n a g e d E l e p h a n t P o p u l a t i o n s . " Available online at h t t p : / / w w w . w i l d n e t a f r i c a . c o m / c i t i e s / i n f o / iss_013_english.html. D e c e m b e r 11, 2000. . N.d.b. " T h e Case Against C o m m e r c i a l Trade in Elephant Products." Available online at http://www.wildnetafrica.com/cities/info/iss_007_elearguments. html. D e c e m b e r 11, 2000.

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9 Family and Kinship Eugenia Shanklin

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frican kinship, marriage, and child-rearing systems are of interest to us in the West for several reasons. First, they are different f r o m our own in intriguing ways. Not only does Hillary R o d h a m Clinton quote an African p r o v e r b — " i t takes a village to raise a child"—in her book, but many travelers to Africa have had the experience of handing an edible treat to a child in an A f r i c a n city and watching that child immediately turn to the a s s e m b l e d group of children and share the treat with them. These are cultural differences, differences in the ways in which children are taught. But what do they mean? And how are they instilled in young children? A n y o n e w h o has watched A f r i c a n s raise children has been struck by the e m p h a s i s placed on guidance by e x a m p l e . It is the responsibility of all a d u l t s — w h e t h e r in hamlets, villages, or large urban a r e a s — t o teach children how to behave, and children watch as properly socialized adults share with the people around them. The meaning is best expressed, perhaps, in a saying of the Kom people of Cameroon, who believe that children, like animals, are born selfish and only b e c o m e h u m a n when they have been taught to share. Children who do not share, who seize a treat and run off to devour it privately, will be ostracized until they can show, at a later time, that they have learned to share with the group. This model of sharing is a widespread one in A f r i c a n societies and one that m a n y Westerners would like their own societies to emulate. A second reason African systems are of interest to us is that much of what we assume to know about marriage and kinship is what we learn from our own culture and what we often c o m e to believe is just c o m m o n sense. African systems suggest that our own notions of what is c o m m o n sense or human nature may be slightly off base when generalized to the rest of the world. Since anthropologists have done most of the investigations of African kinship and marriage, it is important to know, as a colleague recently put it,

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that "anthropology's purpose is to replace our culture's common sense about Human Nature with profound awareness of the genuine range and variety of human ways around the globe" (Terrell, 2000:10). What we Westerners mean by marriage (monogamy or legitmized mating of one partner of either sex) or kinship (bilateral or bilineal, tracing descent from both parents) are not the norms in Africa, where polygyny (the marriage of one man to more than one woman) and unilineal descent groups (who trace their ancestry through either father or mother) have prevailed, at least until recently. What implications do these different systems have for the people who live with and within them? Studies of African kinship, in particular, reveal that all or most of the possible solutions to the most basic of questions— how shall humans solve the issues of reproduction (who marries whom and produces children with full rights and privileges), filiation or relatedness (how the offspring are considered to be related to the parents), and responsibility for socialization (rights and obligations of parents and children, as well as who will do the teaching of the child)—are found in African systems, often in surprising ways. O n e of my Princeton University students once demanded of his classmates, " W h y do you Americans believe it is required that each person be given c h o i c e s ? " In Ghana, his land of origin, making important choices (whom to marry, where to live) was something to be done by an individual's kin group, not by the individual, especially not by a young, relatively uninformed individual. My student did not consider what Americans think of as freedom of choice as a blessing but rather as a burden. Although in most instances a kinship system is not a microcosm of the society, in Africa, understanding how a kinship system works is one of the best ways to understand how people think. The ideas we take for granted are not necessarily taken for granted in the same ways by other groups. (Philippe Wamba [1999] has published an excellent comparison of his African and American families.) A third reason African kinship is of interest is that while Africans talk about families in the same way we in the United States do, they seem to have in mind something other than our own emphasis on nuclear or conjugal families (families consisting only of parents and their offspring). A number of years ago, while chairing a session at a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ( U N E S C O ) conference, (the conference was on a Cameroon disaster that killed nearly 2,000 people and left more than 5,000 homeless, including more than 2,000 orphans), I remarked that Western solutions to such problems—psychiatrists and boarding s c h o o l s — w e r e being o f f e r e d for A f r i c a n orphans. I added that, since humans had evolved in Africa, it was likely that during eons of evolutionary history, Africans had c o m e up with their own solutions to human problems. The A f r i c a n solution I heard m e n t i o n e d most often in c o n f e r e n c e corridors was "family." As it worked out, the best solution to the problems

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of the orphaned children (and even adult) survivors was to put them into fictive (that is, made-up) families (Shanklin et al., 2001). Several older scientists at that c o n f e r e n c e immediately asked when it had b e c o m e c o m m o n k n o w l e d g e that h u m a n s evolved in Africa and what implications this had for contemporary understandings of human evolution. T h e "Out of A f r i c a " hypothesis began to gain currency in the 1960s and is n o w fully accepted in anthropology and related disciplines. In effect, it m e a n s that all h u m a n s alive today had a "great-great-great . . . grandm o t h e r " in c o m m o n . She lived somewhere in Africa between 140,000 and 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 years ago. All the different groups we see in the world today sprang f r o m her, our 10,000th great-grandmother, and, in some instances, f r o m those of our ancestors who migrated out of Africa many thousands of years ago carrying this w o m a n ' s mitochondrial D N A . Recently, this finding has been given further support by explorations of the human genome, which, most geneticists agree, points to a single human "race" with minor d i f f e r e n c e s in skin color, hair f o r m , and the like (Stringer and M c K i e , 1996; Tattersall, 1998). The idea that we are all closely related through one African female ancestor may be the most important lesson anthropologists have learned recently about human kinship. Long before the Out of A f r i c a idea was advanced, however, other interesting questions were raised about h u m a n marriage and kinship by some of the nineteenth c e n t u r y ' s most creative thinkers. The questions were usually about the purpose(s) of marriage and why incest taboos are universal—that is, are f o u n d in all societies (although what is defined as incest may vary considerably f r o m one society to the next). In the nineteenth century, a number of ideas were advanced— Edward Tylor proposed the idea that "marry out or be killed out" explained why e x o g a m y (marrying out of o n e ' s group) was the rule, not e n d o g a m y (marrying within the group) (Tylor, 1889). Another idea, E. Westermarck's innate aversion theory (1894), was that siblings raised together develop a dislike for one another that precludes sexuality. S i g m u n d Freud believed that incestuous impulses must be repressed in order for families, or more broadly society, to exist h a r m o n i o u s l y (Freud, 1919); Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels claimed that the invention of private property interrupted the c o m m u n a l bliss of human groups (a fantasy that f u e l e d the film The Gods Must Be Crazy) and that the first property was " r i g h t s " in w o m e n through marriage (Engels, 1942). All these ideas were more or less rejected or disproved by decades of research. In the m i d d l e of the twentieth century, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1949) suggested that the universality of incest taboos was related to the h u m a n tendency to form alliances with other groups. O n e could have sex within the family, say, with o n e ' s brother or sister, or one could give a sibling to a neighbor, taking that neighbor's sibling in exchange. 1 Both kinds of unions

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might produce children. If a brother and sister w h o had children together experienced hardships, however, they had only themselves to rely on. If a couple in one of those groups that e x c h a n g e d siblings fell on hard times, they had two sets of built-in allies in the n e i g h b o r h o o d — a n obvious advantage. Levi-Strauss's alliance theory may or may not be the best explanation for why incest taboos exist. What we do know is that most societies forbid some people or categories of p e o p l e — f o r e x a m p l e , all those people you call "brother" or "sister"—as marriage partners and approve others, usually others outside the nuclear or immediate f a m i l y — t h a t is, mother, father, brothers, and sisters. For most (but not all) societies, these rules are based on ideas about who is related to w h o m — k i n s h i p or descent groups, which are culturally invented groups that extend b e y o n d the immediate family (nuclear or conjugal) of mother, father, brothers, and sisters. If people were not to mate randomly or with those closest at hand, rules had to be made to govern which were appropriate m a t e s — i n c e s t taboos (you may not mate with . . . ) and preferential mating patterns (ideally 2 you should mate with . . . ). As will soon b e c o m e apparent, Africa has been h o m e to all sorts of exceptions, and the brother-sister marriage rule is one of those. In Egypt, during R o m a n times, brother-sister marriages were c o m m o n a m o n g nonroyals, and 15 to 20 percent of all marriages may have been contracted between full siblings (Hopkins, 1980; Scheidel, 1996). A main d i f f e r e n c e , it seems to me, between A f r i c a n kinship systems and Euro-American kinship systems is the emphasis placed in Africa on relations between those w h o consider themselves related by blood. EuroAmerican systems tend to e m p h a s i z e relations between husbands and wives—relations created by marriage or in-law relationships (called affinal relations by anthropologists). Many A f r i c a n systems e m p h a s i z e shared " b l o o d " or consanguineal relations—those between a mother and child or children ("children of one w o m b , " as it is often put), a father and his child or children, and between brothers and sisters. And, too, there is an emphasis in Africa on lineages—groups of people considered to be related to one another consanguineally. This emphasis is an ongoing theme in African kinship studies and one we shall see in different guises in different societies. For example, witness this A z a n d e ' s statement about brothers and sisters (which Freud, and perhaps Westermarck, would have liked): W h e n a b o y r e a c h e s puberty he m a y take his sister and with her build their little hut near his m o t h e r ' s h o m e and g o into it with his sister and lay her d o w n and g e t o n top of h e r — a n d they c o p u l a t e . His father then b e g i n s to k e e p a w a t c h o n them to catch them at this and s e i z e s him and g i v e s him a g o o d h i d i n g and asks h i m what he m e a n s by g o i n g after his sister, she is his sister, has he s e e n p e o p l e g o i n g to bed with their sisters? T h e n he is afraid. . . . S o p e o p l e say about it that a man b e g i n s desire for w o m e n with his sisters. S o p e o p l e say that c h i l d r e n are like d o g s , for a b o y will g o after his o w n sister. A f t e r they h a v e b e e n stupid f o r a time,

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when they grow up they get a sense of shame and whenever they see their sister they do not think of going any m o r e with her to the bush. (EvansPritchard 1974:107)

Notice once again the idea shared by the Azande of eastern Africa and the Kom in west-central Africa that unsocialized children are like animals and must be instructed by peers or elders. This widespread notion about the importance of sharing was built into many A f r i c a n systems, although we know little of the specific details of precolonial kinship and marriage systems. In colonial times, all institutions—kinship, religious, economic, and political—were thoroughly studied by Africanist anthropologists, such as E. E. Evans-Pritchard, who studied the Nuer soon after they were "pacif i e d , " as the British put it. E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d ' s studies of the Nuer and the Azande began the heyday of kinship studies in Africa, and much information was collected by many of the best anthropologists—Colson, Douglas, Forde, Fortes, G l u c k m a n , Goody, Kaberry, Richards, T u r n e r — o v e r the next few decades, until independence. The classic in the field of A f r i c a n kinship was A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde's edited volume African Systems of Kinship and Marriage (1950). Postcolonial studies have not focused on kinship systems, by and large, but on contemporary problems, many of which were brought about by the disruption of most, if not all, precolonial and colonial practices. Because of this, and because this book emphasizes contemporary issues, after a brief survey of some classic studies of African kinship, I am going to focus my discussion on contemporary holdovers of African kinship systems, on what Basil Davidson (1980) calls similarities between precolonial and postcolonial systems, and on some changes in African families today. As mentioned, we know little about precolonial times, and what we do k n o w — f o r example, from travelers' descriptions of long caravans of slaves crisscrossing the continent—suggests severe disruptions of daily (and family) life on almost all levels. Archaeological research into the precolonial, p r e - s l a v e raiding era, makes one thing fairly clear: defensive reactions to the slave raiders and their trade led to the formation of kingdoms in places where previously there had been peaceful farming groups (Davidson, 1969, 1980; Ki-Zerbo, 1989; Nkwi and Warnier, 1982). Many such groups probably formed alliances or c o n f e d e r a c i e s to fend off the slave traders; and habits of living, such as valley dwelling, gave way to concealment on the steepest hills. More egalitarian ways of interacting may have given way to authoritarian systems predicated on military discipline. Warfare and slavery had certainly existed in A f r i c a before the Atlantic slave trade began, but the defensive reaction to wide-scale slave hunting may have accelerated the process of centralizing political institutions that offered some protection. As a result, the European colonists who fought, conquered, and divided up African lands a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s may have f o u n d more military kingdoms than existed in p r e - s l a v e raiding times.

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Basil Davidson mentions three precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial similarities: first, while precolonial A f r i c a n systems may have looked much like those of feudal Europe, there was the important d i f f e r e n c e that African land ownership systems did not tie people to the land as the European system of s e r f d o m did, because the lineage systems of A f r i c a interposed and prevented the development of small groups of wealthy landowners surrounded by hordes of landless peasants. Second, in Africa, there was a balance, not a monopoly, of weapons power. The feudal lords of Europe had many weapons and could equip a knight in armor on their own behalf, while the rulers of African lands had to attract people by means other than armed threats. Davidson does not add, but I will, that rulers often had to attract people to them by their generosity. Third, Davidson says, every group in Africa seems to have a migration story. Most believe that their ancestors migrated in f r o m s o m e w h e r e else. These similarities or holdovers will b e c o m e one basis for considering contemporary African f a m i l y systems after we have examined some classic e x a m p l e s of colonial kinship systems. The obvious question we should ask concerning these anthropological studies is, what was their purpose? The answer seems to be that because in stateless societies authority was vested in the lineages, the study of lineages (or, more broadly, kinship) was an administrative key, a way of learning the indigenous rules so that outsiders could govern A f r i c a n s more efficiently.

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AFRICAN KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE: PRECOLONIAL AND COLONIAL EXAMPLES

Mating, as we know, is different f r o m marriage, but both are apt to produce children and, for discussions of kinship, children are the crux of the matter. Once a child is born, there is the question of how it will be considered to be related to the parents and others ( r e m e m b e r that kinship groups are, to some extent, fictitious entities). All cultures affirm the existence of special contributions made by males and females to the reproductive process, although these contributions may be considered very uneven; for example, the Asante believe that a child's blood is contributed only by the mother and that blood determines the child's physical a p p e a r a n c e , while the child's spiritual and temperamental dispositions are determined by the father's semen (Fortes, 1950). Most groups divide the contributions of the parents in different ways, usually in keeping with the e m p h a s i s given in their kinship systems. For instance, groups that trace descent through females (called matrilineal groups) believe that the most important contribution to the fetus is m a d e by the mother; so the matrilineal A s a n t e believe that blood, a most important ritual substance, is contributed by the mother. Groups that trace descent through males, patrilineal groups, often believe that the f a t h e r ' s is the most important contribution. The patrilineal

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N s o ' of Cameroon are one of the few groups who believe that both parents contribute equally to the child's formation in the w o m b (Kaberry, 1969:186). Daryll Forde (1964) stated the issues arising f r o m mating or parenthood succinctly when he noted that "relations arising from parenthood extend in all societies to form a wider system of k i n s h i p " in which inheritance rights, succession rights, and obligations are established. Our bilineal (from both sides) Western system is one way of doing this. That is, kinship is believed to extend f r o m both parents to the child. T h e more usual A f r i c a n way of doing it is called "unilineal"; that is, one line is e m p h a sized and the other is (almost, but not quite) ignored. Unilineal systems can be extended through the father (patrilineal, inheritance f r o m the father's side) or the mother (matrilineal, inheritance from the m o t h e r ' s side) or through both for different purposes (double unilineal descent, inheritance f r o m both sides but usually of different kinds of property—say, land f r o m the f a t h e r ' s side and cattle f r o m the m o t h e r ' s side). Kinship or descent, then, refers to a system in which, for individuals and groups, rights of inheritance and succession and ties of mutual obligation are established on accepted principles (Forde, 1964). A shorter definition of kinship is given by Marvin Harris and Orna J o h n s o n as "relationships based on parentage through descent (consanguineal or ' b l o o d ' relations) or through marriage (affinal or 'in-law relations')" (Harris and Johnson, 2000:147). Anthropological studies have turned up m a n y different examples of kinship systems, but here I am going to follow a lead suggested by Lucy Mair (1979) and concentrate on only the basics, describing some of the classic studies of African groups. Then I return to the question of contemporary holdovers of what may have been the precolonial kinship systems. Mair points out that while the majority of Africans are patrilineal (if one is counting heads or numbers of people), the majority of African societies or ethnic groups are or may have been matrilineal until recently. Although they are more numerous, many of the matrilineal groups in the "matrilineal belt" that extends across central A f r i c a occupy poorer lands and have fewer people than other groups. Marriage is a concept that has recently undergone dramatic changes in many societies, including U.S. society. Marriage, in Kathleen G o u g h ' s (1968) terms, referred to a relationship established between a w o m a n and one or m o r e persons; the relationship ensured that a child born to the w o m a n was accorded full birth rights, provided that the child was conceived and born under certain approved circumstances. Here, A f r i c a provides some f l a m b o y a n t examples and counterexamples. Many Westerners consider that marriage has something to do with heterosexual domestic mates, but in the Nuer " g h o s t " marriage or the Nandi f e m a l e - f e m a l e marriage, neither gender persuasion nor sexuality is an issue. In both cases, a w o m a n takes as a bride another w o m a n who will bear children (by a man chosen either by her or by her new " h u s b a n d " ) in the n a m e of a deceased husband. Both result from extreme applications of the unilineal rule found

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in their patrilineal societies, in which a fertile w o m a n is engaged to bear children in the n a m e of a deceased man w h o will otherwise not be mentioned in prayers or allowed full privileges in the afterlife. Probably Westerners see polyandry (the marriage of one w o m a n to more than one man) as the most "exotic" form of marriage that anthropologists have investigated. Polygyny (the marriage of a man to more than one w o m a n ) is not u n c o m m o n in the world at large, and especially in Africa, but polyandry is u n c o m m o n almost everywhere. Once again, A f r i c a provides a fascinating example. In 1949 and 1953, Mary Douglas studied the Lele of the Kasai in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo. She did not observe polyandry directly, since it had just been outlawed (1947) by the colonial government, but she was told about it by many of her informants who had been participants. T h e Lele are matrilineal, and the usual f o r m of marriage was f o r a girl to be betrothed to a man f r o m her childhood on. The match was arranged according to rules of clan membership, in which a man w h o had " g i v e n " a child to his wife could claim a girl of his wife's lineage, either as his own bride or as the bride of a man he might select, usually his sister's son. The second, polyandrous, form of marriage was one in which a w o m a n became the "village w i f e " and was " m a r r i e d " to the members of an age set group. Male age sets were formed every fifteen years or so, and youths would join up to the age of eighteen through a formal initiation with entrance fees. This group, which in the past had been a military group, would then build a house for its "wife," who might have been captured by them in (past) warfare or, since the banning of warfare, may have, with her parents' collusion, become their captive. Once the village w i f e had borne daughters, these could be claimed as village wives and, Mair points out, "at the time of Douglas's work, the great majority of village-wives were village grand-daughters" (Mair, 1979:71). T h e women were not slaves, although there was coercion in some cases; they were formally installed and received gifts at the time of the marriage. Afterwards, they were not expected to cook or work in the fields f o r a while. W h e n they finally settled down, they chose four or five of the ten to twelve men who had formerly been their husbands, and then did farm work and cooking for the smaller number. Eventually, as men moved away f r o m the village or married other wives, the village wife ended up with no more than two or three husbands. Those village wives to w h o m Douglas spoke pointed out that while some of them had been captured and others had been part of capture by collusion, there was in any event no f r e e d o m of choice in Lele marriage. This rather startling example points out another aspect of African marriage and kinship systems: most usually, they are about preserving lineage choices, not individual choices. A more c o n t e m p o r a r y definition of marriage, acceptable to A f r i c a n s and some Americans, might be that marriage consists of the behavior, sentiments, and rules c o n c e r n e d with mating and reproduction in domestic

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contexts (Harris and Johnson, 2000:135). This definition does not specify either sexual or residential arrangements, but it, like Gough's above and Bronislaw Malinowski's, which follows, emphasizes marriage as being about reproduction. As Malinowski observed, marriage is the licensing of parenthood. That is, the main function of marriage is to legitimize children, but this strikes me as an extremely Western or Euro-American reading. The matrilineal African people I study, the Kom, would disagree strongly with the idea that children need legitimizing since, as they say, no child is born without a mother, regardless of whether or not the birth mother is recognized eventually as the "social" mother. Children born into a matrilineal society cannot be "illegitimate" as they can be in a patrilineal society if an acceptable male does not assume responsibility for them. In Kom, should a man decide not to acknowledge a child as his, 3 the woman's father (the child's maternal grandfather) assumes temporary responsibility for the child until a husband comes to marry the mother. Ideally, this is a temporary arrangement, understood much as a driving permit is understood to lead to a driver's license. The child may "need" a father for ritual purposes, usually those involving healing or staying healthy, but it is assumed that the arrangement will not be permanent. A good husband-to-be will also "buy"—five goats for a boy, ten goats for a girl—the children born to his bride in her father's compound whether he fathered them or not, to avoid splitting up the mother and child group. In the (precolonial) times before school fees and hospital bills, this was a more desirable marriage than one with a childless woman (Shanklin, 1983). Also, and particularly in contemporary Western societies, marriage serves many functions, apart from giving rights and privileges to children. In some systems, like our own, marriage gives individuals rights and privileges with respect to each other—for example, the right to claim damages if one partner is injured or to collect pensions upon death. Still, marriage in many African societies is about producing children for a socially approved line of kin, either traced unilineally through the mother's or the father's side, as noted, or traced through both lines, double (unilineal) descent. Two other points about African forms of kinship and marriage before visiting some specific systems very different from our own: first, the forms and definitions of what constitutes African marriage or kinship/ descent systems may vary all over the place; second, Africans hate all generalizations about Africa, and indeed the continent seems designed to subvert generalizations about itself. We can look at three classic (colonial) examples of African systems: the patrilineal Nuer of Sudan, described by Evans-Pritchard; the matrilineal Plateau Tonga of Zambia, described by Elizabeth Colson; and the double unilineal descent groups of the Yako of Nigeria, described by Forde. Within each, we shall look at relations between brother and sister and at illegitimacy.

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T h e Nuer, about w h o m Evans-Pritchard first wrote in 1940, are a cattleherding p e o p l e o f eastern Africa. T h e y have what are k n o w n as s e g m e n t a r y l i n e a g e s y s t e m s , b a s e d o n clan g r o u p i n g s in e a c h territory. In his work on k i n s h i p and marriage a m o n g the Nuer, Evans-Pritchard ( 1 9 5 1 :v) d e s c r i b e d the n e t w o r k o f k i n s h i p ties w i t h i n any N u e r c o m m u n i t y as reducible, ultimately, to a series o f marriage u n i o n s . N u e r v i l l a g e s are the smallest local g r o u p s and, w h i l e there are ties to n e i g h b o r i n g v i l l a g e s , m o s t activities are carried out w i t h i n the v i l l a g e c o m m u n i t y . T h e strongest t i e s — e c o n o m i c , f e u d i n g a l l i a n c e s — a r e generally with other m e m b e r s o f the village. Further, M e m b e r s of a village are all mar, kin, to one another: any villager can trace kinship to every other person in his village, either by a direct kinship tie or through a third person who is in different ways related both to himself and the other person. Furthermore, he can establish kinship of some kind—real, by analogy, mythological, or assumed—with everybody he comes into contact with during his lifetime and through the length and breadth of Nuerland; and this is necessary if he has frequent dealings with them, for all social obligation of a personal kind is defined in terms of kinship. (Evans-Pritchard, 1951:8) O v e r and over, E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d s t r e s s e s the i m p o r t a n c e not o f k i n s h i p but o f the fact o f l i v i n g together in a small c o m m u n i t y . H e notes, "If a m a n is not a m e m b e r o f the l i n e a g e with w h i c h he lives, he m a k e s h i m s e l f a m e m ber o f it by treating a maternal link as t h o u g h it w a s a paternal o n e or through affinal relationship" (Evans-Pritchard, 1 9 5 1 : 4 8 ) . Thus, the patrilineal N u e r stress l i n e a g e m e m b e r s h i p a b o v e all e l s e , regardless of the links they h a v e to i n v o k e or m a k e up to e s t a b l i s h it. A s for relations b e t w e e n brothers and sisters a m o n g the Nuer, E v a n s Pritchard s a y s that parents d o not take an interest in their c h i l d r e n ' s l o v e affairs but brothers m a y c o n c e r n t h e m s e l v e s w i t h their sisters' liaisons. The only person who may interfere is a brother in an affair of his sister, for her virtue is his responsibility, but he will only do so in certain circumstances. He keeps an eye on his sister and knows who is courting her, but he will only come between her and her lover if he suspects that she is having regular relations with a man without cattle or that she is giving herself to all and sundry. It not infrequently happens that a girl b e c o m e s pregnant while still unmarried. If the young man has cattle he will be expected to marry her, and if she is noi a profligate, he will be glad to do so. If he has insufficient cattle he cannot do so, and though another man will not object to taking her as a wife, he is more likely to take her as a second wife than as a first wife, and he will pay fewer cattle for her bridewealth. It is therefore in the brother's interest to see that this does not happen. It is also in his interest to prevent his sister from becoming a wanton. A man does not expect his bride to be a virgin, but he does not care to marry a jade. A girl of easy virtue may find plenty of lovers but no suitors, and after bearing an illegitimate child is likely to become a concubine for the rest of her life, to the detriment of her family herd. (Evans-Pritchard, 1951:53)

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T h e matrilineal Plateau Tonga of Z a m b i a , formerly Northern Rhodesia, achieve outcomes similar to those among the Nuer—lineage solidarity and close brother-sister relations—by the opposite m e a n s : matrilineages and dispersal, not local groupings. In p r e - E u r o p e a n d a y s a m o n g the T o n g a , p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n as w e k n o w it, with an orderly relationship b e t w e e n groups or statuses intermediated through a set o f o f f i c i a l positions, did not exist. E c o n o m i c organization w a s o f the s i m p l e s t . . . . U n u s e d land w a s a free g o o d , . . . T o n g a r e l i g i o n had neither a priesthood nor any hereditary r e l i g i o u s o f f i c i a l s to g i v e a f o c u s to the general a l i g n m e n t of p e o p l e in g r o u p s . S h r i n e s and their attendant cults were independent of o n e another. ( C o l s o n , 1 9 7 4 : 3 6 )

Before David Livingstone passed through in 1853, the Plateau Tonga had no recorded history; in 1950, at the time of Colson's study, they numbered s o m e w h e r e between 85,000 and 120,000. Colson observes that the most enduring units in Tonga society are the matrilineal clans, which are named, dispersed, exogamous units but not corporate bodies. They do not own property, appoint ritual leaders, or assemble as a group. The corporate groups are m u c h smaller bodies of kinspeople called matrilineal groups; these have a common legal personality, and brothers and sisters share interests in matters of inheritance, succession, vengeance, ritual, and bridewealth compensation. Residence is usually virilocal (that is, patrilocal, with bride and groom residing near the groom's relatives), Colson says, but not otherwise specified. The Plateau Tonga believe that every fully adult man and every fully adult unmarried w o m a n may live wherever they choose. Most people do not remain attached to a single village throughout their lives but m a y m o v e several times. In daily life, m e m b e r s h i p within a n e i g h b o r h o o d or hamlet may be of more importance than m e m b e r s h i p within a matrilineal group. If, for example, there is an unoccupied plot in the neighborhood, anyone may choose to take it over. Hunting, fishing, and other work patterns are neighborhood affairs, not just kinship affairs. Kinspeople are involved in a death and must attend the funerals of matrilineage members, but death is also supposed to be a matter for the neighborhood. Each person should die in the n e i g h b o r h o o d in which he has his hut and his farms, and if he does not, it is an offense against the land, and his kinsmen will have to pay an animal f r o m their h e r d s — t o be c o n s u m e d by members of the offended n e i g h b o r h o o d — i n order to send the dead m a n ' s spirit back into the neighborhood in which he lived. T h e r e f o r e , social groupings a m o n g the Tonga are in two categories. The first, the clan and matrilineal group, is reckoned in terms of birth and matrilineal kinship. T h e second is territorial and determined by choice: neighborhood, village, hamlet, and homestead. In the first, the person's allegiance is settled at birth; in the second, it is settled by marriage if the individual is female, or by choice if the individual is male. All in all, Colson concludes, a dispersed kindred was less vulnerable to local periods of

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scarcity. Indeed, this is how some matrilineal peoples explain their origins: " S o - a n d - s o c a m e here to escape the f a m i n e in such-and-such a place. He liked it here and decided to stay. Then others followed him, and n o w it looks as though we are different f r o m those who stayed in the old area" (Colson, 1974:59). Certain aspects of paternity are much like the practices m e n t i o n e d above in matrilineal Kom, and Colson says that approximately 40 percent of w o m e n will have had a child before marriage (often by the man the w o m a n expects to marry). "But once her pregnancy is discovered, all marriage negotiations must cease until the child is some months old. Whether the lover marries her or not, he is entitled—and today is forced by legal action—to m a k e a payment which establishes him as the legal father of the child, and his paternity is not altered by the m o t h e r ' s subsequent marriage to another m a n " (Colson, 1974:65). Husbands have considerable authority over their wives, although in ways that may not be expected by Westerners. For example, "One of the arguments used to dissuade men f r o m building on their own is the risk they run of beating a wife to death if no one is near to hear her cries and intervene. In a n u m b e r of instances men have actually done this and have then committed suicide when they saw what they had done" (Colson, 1974:69). Forde studied the Yako of Nigeria, among whom the principle of double descent or double unilineal kin-group organization predominates. But "the unilineal tendency itself contains the alternatives of patrilineal and matrilineal reckoning and these are not, as was once assumed, mutually exclusive" (Forde, 1964:86). This system presents some interesting contrasts to those we have just considered, although information on illegitimacy was scarce in the material I consulted. T h e Yako during the time of F o r d e ' s fieldwork had been tempting fate and the authorities by " a c q u i r i n g " children in possibly illicit ways, so it may have been the case that the child's provenance was not a matter of grave concern. Between brothers and sisters of one mother, there was a mystical bond in which fertility was invoked; between m e m b e r s of the same patrilineage, there were material economic concerns. In Yako society, most older men have more than one wife. Each occupies her own house and has an equal claim on the time, attention, and energy of the husband. The man and his wives are normally a single farming unit, but each unit plants and harvests its own yams, with w o m e n acting under the direction of the husband; for lesser crops, the w o m e n control their own harvests. The Yako believe that physiological paternity gives them a right to social fatherhood, but if there is a disagreement, the rights to the child can sometimes be c o n f e r r e d on the adulterer w h o actually fathered the child. (This normally happens if a woman has left her husband and is living with

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Bridewealth and polygyny reflect the vital productive contributions of women to the family. Women kin often work together in the fields and share other work as well.

another man before marriage money has been repaid and the divorce has been recognized.) Outside the compound in which a person grows up, the patrilineage is the most important corporate group. Patrilineal groups are territorially compact, each having a name and a rule of exogamy. From the patrician, members can claim rights in building sites, farmland, oil-palm clusters, and planted trees. The matriclan is not a territorial group, and inheritance is of transferable wealth, especially livestock, currency, or payments made to a woman's kin when she marries. Each child inherits some kinds of property from the father and some from the mother, but funerals and disposal of movable property are the responsibility of the matriclan, as is the right to demand compensation in the case of homicide. Fertility too is in the hands of the matriclan, and each matriclan has an associated fertility spirit, which is propitiated by a matriclan priest on important occasions. These matriclans are not territorial groups but cross-cutting ties that extend considerably beyond the local territory—as when, for example, a matriclan helps a young man with the price he must pay for a bride. Forde adds, "There is usually an intimate relation between a man and his sister's son—the classic relationship which cuts across parental ties in societies stressing matrilineal descent. And among the Yako this relationship is often converted when

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opportunity arises into foster-fatherhood, with subsequent adoption of sisters' sons into the patrician of the mother's brother" (Forde, 1964:113). Note the importance in all three groups of the principles of lineality, whether through the m o t h e r ' s or f a t h e r ' s side or both, and the circumstances in which one or another principle is violated or " f u d g e d " to allow an individual to be included. This lineality and its primary practical outcome—inclusion of nearly all comers—may be one of the most important d i f f e r e n c e s between A f r i c a n kinship systems and others. One lesson learned from the study of lineage systems is that the exclusion of relatives on one side is seldom complete. Of this, Robin Fox says: T h u s in any s o c i e t y with established unilineal d e s c e n t groups, an individual usually has important relationships with relatives other than t h o s e in his o w n d e s c e n t group, the o n e through w h o m he gains his d e s c e n t - g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p . Fortes has c a l l e d this " c o m p l e m e n t a r y filiation." Thus, in a patrilineal society, although a man gains his d e s c e n t - g r o u p status through his father, he is still his m o t h e r ' s child; he therefore has a " c o m p l e m e n tary" relationship w i t h his m o t h e r ' s agnates [ m a l e relatives), and in particular with his m o t h e r ' s brothers. Another w a y of l o o k i n g at this is to see it not as a result of " f i l i a t i o n " — o f being the c h i l d of o n e ' s m o t h e r — b u t as resulting from the marriage tie itself. Thus, w h e n a man marries he sets up an affinal r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n his l i n e a g e and that of his w i f e . His s o n — t h i s is a patrilineal e x a m p l e — i s a m e m b e r of his lineage and s o shares with h i m in this a f f i n a l relationship. T h u s the son d o e s not have s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s with his maternal u n c l e s b e c a u s e they are his m o t h e r ' s brothers, but b e c a u s e they are the brothers o f his father's w i f e . (Fox, 1967:133)

Similarly, questions may be posed about the adaptability of lineage systems in contemporary circumstances; Douglas (1969) asked, "Is Matriliny Doomed in Africa?" and answered that matriliny has exhibited considerable flexibility in urban situations. She concluded that matriliny was no more " d o o m e d " than patriliny, that lineage systems allow a person to call upon a variety of kin ties to enhance life chances and offer opportunities that conjugal or nuclear families do not. This point, first made by Douglas in 1969, is still being debated in the present, nowadays with respect to the impact of globalization on matrilineal systems (Miller, 1996; Peters, 1997a, 1997b).

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NEW AREAS OF STUDY AND HOLDOVERS FROM THE PAST IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN SOCIETIES

Since the golden age of (colonial) anthropological studies of kinship, many new areas of study have arisen (and some have declined). Kinship studies were probably the glory of twentieth-century anthropological studies in Africa because they illustrated better than any other kind of analysis the almost infinite variety of customs that h u m a n s invent. But, as Pauline

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Peters has pointed out (following Fox), where once kinship theory was as central to anthropological theory as the nude was to art, kinship theory has now been chopped into parts—"family, household, relations of production and property, child socialization, group formation, gender relations, sexuality—cannibalized by the changing fashions of ethnographic and theoretical rethinking" (Peters, 1997a: 125). M a n y of these parts have taken on new lives of their own. Currently, the most illuminating and productive parts of what was kinship theory are the studies of sexuality and gender relations, usually from a feminist perspective (see Chapter 10; and Gordon, 1996; James and Etim, 1999; Van Allen, 2000). These areas have yielded m u c h new data on the subjects of domesticity, family power relations, m a l e - f e m a l e relations in urban contexts, and the like. For example, one lesson learned from kinship theory is that, like lineage systems in practice, systems of authority in practice—whether characterized as patriarchal or matriarchal—are seldom one-sided. More common in Africa may have been what Van Allen (1972) called a "dual-sex system," in which each sex governed its own affairs and shared power on m a j o r decisions, such as who would be king or queen mother. Although dual-sex systems probably were characteristic of many African societies, the patriarchal biases of outside investigators may have caused them to be underreported. A favorite quote f r o m an Asante male elder illustrates the European habit of ignoring the importance of the political role of women: "The white man never asked us this: you have dealings with and recognize only the men; we supposed the European considered women of no account, and we know you do not recognize them as we have always d o n e " (Rattray, 1923:84). It is likely that more nuanced analyses of the interplay between m e n ' s and w o m e n ' s political roles will increase in years to c o m e . S o m e are already in the literature: for example, Peters (1997b) has f o c u s e d on w o m e n ' s (once ignored and attacked) authority in matters of inheritance; Kate Crehan (1997) has delineated authority splits between husbands and brothers as important aspects of K a o n d e matriliny in Zambia; and I researched a w o m e n ' s rebellion in Kom (Cameroon) in the early 1950s that was usually described (mostly by men) as an anticolonial protest "masterminded" by men (Shanklin, 1990). Other issues within earlier kinship studies have been largely sidelined in recent anthropological literature and probably will not be revived. One is the discussion of the variables involved in choice of locality after marriage—in other words, where a couple live after they are married: with the groom's parents (patrilocal), with the bride's parents (matrilocal), with the g r o o m ' s m o t h e r ' s brother (avunculocal), or separate f r o m either the bride or groom's parents (neolocal). A similarly moot discussion, one that went on for more than a century in anthropology, concerns the f u n c t i o n s and correlates of kinship t e r m i n o l o g y — t h a t is, whether what one calls o n e ' s

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relatives is associated with or determined by the kinds of productive or inheritance systems in effect (Murdock, 1949, 1959). Another area of debate was the question of whether matriliny preceded patriliny. This issue was dropped largely due to the inconclusiveness of the evidence. However, new information on mother-child bonding in mammals, especially primates, may revive this debate around the question of the oldest forms of affiliation, that is, through the mother. The new findings may be either from a feminist or from a sociobiological/evolutionary psychology perspective (see Hrdy, 1999). An area of interest for those studying contemporary change in kinship customs is that of bridewealth (payment made to a bride's family) or bride service (labor owed to a bride's family). These have long been practiced throughout Africa within practically all types of kinship systems (Bledsoe, 1993; Davies, 1999; Ekong, 1992; Kuper, 1982; Miller, 1999). More interesting than the debates on this subject, although not conclusive, are recent studies of the significance of bridewealth to present-day Africans. For example, Harris and Johnson (2000) report on a study at a South African university in which students were asked their opinion on bridewealth: 88 percent supported the practice (84 percent of men and 90 percent of women). Such prominent people as Nelson M a n d e l a ' s daughter, Makaziwe, w h o holds a doctorate in cultural anthropology f r o m the University of Massachusetts, endorsed the practice of bridewealth: "I have no problem with lobola (bridewealth). It is to solidify the relationship, to give respect to the w o m a n and the child, so the man can in the future take care of the woman and children" (quoted in Harris and Johnson, 2000:230, after M w a m w e n d a and Monyooe, 1997). One area I mentioned above and consider unresolved and perhaps underreported is the importance of brother-sister ties in Africa, regardless of the kind of kinship system practiced. Greater study of this relationship might resolve some of the issues raised in the debate of the "matrilineal puzzle," a debate over whether matriliny presents an insoluble dilemma for men who have to choose between favoring their own offspring or their sister's children (Richards, 1950; Peters, 1997a). Some of the issues relevant to this "matrilineal puzzle" and its reality need further exploration within a feminist theoretical perspective. S o m e of these questions or debates may be resolved in the r e a d e r ' s lifetime, others not. Issues that are still very much open to question, like female genital mutilation as part of initiation rites (sometimes lineage initiations or marital prerequisites, as among the Yako, for whom clitoridectomy is a premarital custom), are apt to be debated for many years to come. For interested students, there is a large body of literature on the subject of f e m a l e genital mutilation, including a discussion in Chapter 10 (see Barstow, 1999; el Dareer, 1982; Hicks, 1993; Jones and Diop, 1999; Lightfoot-Klein, 1989; Sweetman, 1998). Another area of interest, but one that is only just beginning to be fully discussed, is homosexuality, against which many African societies have

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severe sanctions. But other societies practiced h o m o s e x u a l i t y in certain contexts (during adolescence, for example, among the Dahomey), according to Melville J. Herskovits (Murray and Roscoe, 1998), and this entire topic will surely produce a considerable amount of data before its parameters are resolved. A third area of interest, just now being explored, is the connection between witchcraft beliefs and kinship; Peter Geschiere astutely observed that witchcraft is the " f l i p side of kinship," and his own work (1982, 1997) has given rise to a host of other inquiries. (See Chapter 11 for a more detailed discussion of witchcraft.) I noted above that kinship was initially studied as an administrative " k e y " and that anthropologists were looking at the " r u l e s " by which A f r i c a ' s often stateless societies governed themselves. Davidson explored this point at some length and characterized A f r i c a ' s political and kinship systems as a "continuum between extremes." They ranged between formative "communities of pioneers" or stateless societies (in which rule by elders was the norm) and centralized societies. Underlying all, "a web of kinship was spun in varying patterns and appearances," and this web "was present in all these societies, the necessary underfabric of their structures" (Davidson, 1969:83). Davidson believed that African kinship systems continued to provide the template for much that went on in A f r i c a n governments at the time he was writing. The influence or resilience of these kinship systems differed greatly f r o m people to people, and was increasingly s u b m e r g e d or l i m i t e d w h e r e v e r s o c i e t y b e c a m e d e e p l y s t r a t i f i e d , or k i n g s a n d n o b l e s r e i n f o r c e d t h e i r p o w e r . Yet e v e n w h e r e this h a p p e n e d it d i d so as a p a r t i a l p r o c e s s , h e s i t a n t a n d still p r o f o u n d l y m o u l d e d by the p a s t . T h e i n f l u e n c e of the k i n s h i p s t r u c t u r e r e m a i n e d p o w e r f u l e v e n in d e f e a t . T h e s o u r c e of t h i s e n d u r a n c e lay in t h e p o w e r t o r e s o l v e c o n f l i c t o r p r o m o t e c o m m o n action. (Davidson. 1969:83)

It seems to me the question is whether this underlying web of k i n s h i p — what Davidson, the historian (and many anthropologists as well), saw as the necessary underfabric of institutional s t r u c t u r e s — c o n t i n u e s to influence the postcolonial era. Have the colonial and postcolonial disruptions destroyed this web, including the safety net associated with it? Or might there be a regrouping, possibly under the c o n t e m p o r a r y A f r i c a n idiom of family or kinship? The idiom, in my experience, may be ill defined, but it continues to feature inclusiveness as an ideal, at least within ethnic groups and sometimes within regions. This may include in-group solidarity within ethnic groups as well as regions, with its obvious impact on politics. I do not know the answer to this question, and it may be foolish to speculate in light of the highly fragmentary and mixed nature of the evidence to date. We can look again at some precolonial kinship patterns that have been extended into the postcolonial era. For one, lineage systems prevented development of small groups of wealthy landowners. Second, a balance of

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w e a p o n s power prevented the extremes of coercion. And third, migration stories were found in almost all parts of Africa, suggesting that those who objected to the existing arrangements simply m o v e d on. These three factors probably prevented the development of entrenched interest groups or, more loosely, classes in precolonial Africa, but all have now been violated by conditions in the modernizing, globalizing states of Africa, where the gap between rich and poor has grown enormously in the last few decades and where rulers, such as Idi Amin (Uganda) or Mobutu Sese Seko (Democratic Republic of Congo) became pathologically authoritarian and acquisitive b e f o r e being deposed. Also, the role of the military in staging coups d'état and the current barbarous warlordism in some nation-states indicate that the balance of w e a p o n s once in e f f e c t has shifted radically. And the brain drain of many of Africa's most educated and skilled people to Europe and North America exemplifies the continuing role of migration in allowing Africans to escape oppression and seek a better life elsewhere. But the people who once m o v e d on to other parts of A f r i c a are now leaving the continent and the African population altogether. Given the corruption of rulers and the weakening of centuries-old institutions by colonial and now postcolonial states, we might question whether traditional kinship systems can survive or cope with the manifold problems Africans face today. Although there are grounds for pessimism, I think it is much too early to say anything definitive about the current state of affairs. The postcolonial period is only about four decades long, whereas African kinship systems have been in place for thousands of years. Kinship is the means by which Africans coped in the past, and kinship is both intimately intertwined with other institutions that still function in Africa, although perhaps in increasingly limited ways, and is facing new challenges for which few precedents exist. As an e x a m p l e of this, r e m e m b e r that an important part of African traditional religion was reverence for the ancestors who managed the affairs of both the living and the dead, through the lineage or kin group. A role for the ancestors is not included in Christianity, nor are the rules for selecting heirs or allocating property left to a kin group. Modern courts and common law, which often exist side by side with "customary law" in African countries, call into question all or most of the previously unchallenged authority of kin groups. Both Christianity and modern Western legal systems pose a challenge, with as yet undecided outcomes, for the future of African kinship systems.

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CHALLENGES TO CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN KINSHIP SYSTEMS

The effects of colonialism and postcolonial social forces are still under investigation. We can e x a m i n e some of these under the f o l l o w i n g three

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headings: exposure to Western culture (including Christianity, Western education, and capitalist individualism and acquisitiveness); labor migration; and urbanization. All are part of a larger p h e n o m e n o n — g l o b a l i z a t i o n — which results f r o m the expansion of Western capitalism and its values and norms. Globalization has rearranged A f r i c a n social life at all levels, and A f r i c a n kinship systems have not been i m m u n e . A l t h o u g h most scholars note the continued resilience of A f r i c a n kinship systems overall, kinship systems are undergoing modifications in response to the new conditions of life in African societies. In the area of culture, one question is the long-term impact of Christianity on African polygynous marriages. Most research suggests that while monogamy is growing under the influence of Christian ideology (see Gifford, 1998), polygyny has not died out. In many cases it has taken on new f o r m s (fictive m o n o g a m y , to some), with m a n y men having sexual relationships and families outside of the m o n o g a m o u s marriage required of Christians. Other cultural influences are Western norms of romantic love, individualism, and c o n s u m e r i s m spread by the m a s s media and Western education.

A l t h o u g h African societies are c h a n g i n g , the role of families in passing on v a l u a b l e skills t o their children remains important. In u r b a n Zambia, a self-employed f a t h e r is t e a c h i n g his y o u n g son to m a k e charcoal burners.

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These are affecting gender relations both within and outside of marriage. Especially in cities, a more Westernized A f r i c a n middle class is growing, and the marriages and lifestyles of this class are becoming more similar to those of their Western counterparts: more nuclear families and m o n o g a m o u s marriages, more equality in gender relations between husband and wife, and less d e p e n d e n c e on the traditional extended family (see Bates, 1989; Bujra, 1993; Ingstad et al., 1992; von Bulow and Sorenson, 1993; O p p o n g , 1981). This does not mean that Western and African family systems are likely to converge in the near future, but it does indicate that A f r i c a n kinship patterns, like those elsewhere, change and adapt to new conditions. Other impacts of m o d e r n life on A f r i c a n families are more problematic. In both colonial and postcolonial society, migration (primarily of m e n ) to cities away f r o m rural kin has been disastrous, in two ways. For one, it has created a large number of female-headed households in the rural areas, where w o m e n often raise their children and do the farming without the help of their husbands. In the cities, f e m a l e - h e a d e d households increase, largely as a result of men, separated f r o m their rural families, having sex and children with other w o m e n . As in the West, the w o m e n and children in female-headed households are more likely to be poor than their two-parent counterparts. A second reason is that these complex new sexual dynamics are a m a j o r c o m p o n e n t in the A I D S crisis afflicting Africa, an issue discussed at some length in Chapters 5 and 7. Urbanization and globalization also promote economic individualism and acquisitiveness. Some scholars have suggested that capitalism has combined with African kinship customs to promote the politics of thievery, corruption, and patrimonialism that afflict Africa and have stunted its political and economic maturation. Recalling the earlier discussion of African notions of the importance of sharing, one can see the roots of the demands placed on Africa's political and economic elites to use their power and wealth to benefit their extended family, village, region, or ethnic group. While consistent with the kinship norms, such behavior undermines Weberian norms of efficiency, impartiality, and rationality expected of modern governments and economies in a globalized world (see Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Although urbanization is likely to increase, it is unlikely, under current underdeveloped conditions in Africa, to lessen the dependence of most Africans on extended families and ethnic groups. Most studies show that migrants to the city tend to live in quarters close to members of their own kinship or ethnic group, even if mixed with other groups. Kin and ethnic groups in the city support one another, thus making it easier to cope with change and new problems. Most urban dwellers also visit their kin back h o m e regularly and expect to m o v e back to the village at some point. All these things help to reinforce rural-based kinship systems and values (see Peil, 1981; Davison, 1988).

The extended family is a vital safety net during times of crisis. But in Ethiopia, many people have been forced to rely on relief organizations during recent droughts and civil war, because aid from kin was unavailable.

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S o , a l t h o u g h A f r i c a n k i n s h i p s y s t e m s m a y be c h a n g i n g , they are not d y i n g out. D e s p i t e p r o b l e m s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s , f a m i l y r e m a i n s the best h o p e for m o s t A f r i c a n s in a c h a n g i n g w o r l d . T h e o n l y thing w e can say w i t h certainty is that A f r i c a n f a m i l i e s and k i n s h i p s y s t e m s are c h a l l e n g e d as n e v e r b e f o r e . But w e can e x p e c t t h e s e d y n a m i c institutions to adapt and r e s p o n d today as in the past to m e e t the c h a l l e n g e s that lie ahead.

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NOTES

1. Levi-Strauss's argument was originally stated as a formula for men exchanging w o m e n , but the model works either way. Recent primate studies of groups in which females stay put and males are sent out of the group are extremely suggestive. 2. My students always ask what happens if there is no relative in this category; the answer in many societies is that one will be found to "sort o f ' match. For example, if one is supposed to marry o n e ' s f a t h e r ' s sister's daughter and the father doesn't have a sister w h o has an available or marriageable daughter, then a father's sister's daughter's daughter may be chosen instead. 3. This happened most often when the w o m e n of a matrilineage would not allow a marriage, usually because of some problems they foresaw with the groom and his matrilineage. K o m men are very proud of their ability to father children and would almost never deny a child who was said to be their own, but they gain rights in the child only by paying brideprice on the mother. If the mother's matrilineage will not allow him to do so, a man has no claim on the child.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aberle, David F., Urie Bonfenbrenner, Eckhard H. Hess, Daniel R. Miller, David M. Schneider, and James N. Spuhler. 1968. "The Incest Taboo and the Mating Patterns of A n i m a l s . " Pp. 3 - 1 9 in Paul Bohannan and John Middleton (eds.). Marriage, Family and Residence. Garden City, NY: Natural History Press. Barstow, D. G. 1999. "Female Genital Mutilation: The Penultimate Gender Abuse." Child Abuse and Neglect 23:501-510. Bates, Robert H. 1989. Beyond the Miracle of the Market. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bledsoe, Caroline. 1993. Nuptiality in Sub-Saharan Africa: Contemporary Anthropological and Demographic Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. Bujra, Janet. 1993. "Gender, Class and E m p o w e r m e n t : A Tale of Two Tanzanian Servants." Review of African Political Economy 56:68-78. Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford: James Currey. Colson, Elizabeth. 1974. "Plateau Tonga." Pp. 3 6 - 9 5 in David M. Schneider and Kathleen Gough (eds.). Matrilineal Kinship. Berkeley: University of California Press. Crehan, Kate. 1997. "Of Chickens and Guinea Fowl: Living Matriliny in Northwestern Zambia in the 1980s." Critique of Anthropology 17 (2):211-227. Davidson, Basil. 1969. The African Genius: An Introduction to African Cultural and Social History. Boston: Little, Brown.

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. 1980. The African Slave Trade. Boston: Little, Brown. D a v i e s , C. 1999. " A d v o c a c y for G e n d e r Equality: T h e C a s e of B r i d e w e a l t h in U g a n d a . " Promoting Education 6 (2): 13-15, 3 7 - 3 8 , 49. D a v i s o n , Jean (ed.). 1988. Agriculture. Women and Land: The African Experience. Boulder: Westview Press. Divale, William, and Marvin Harris. 1976. "Population, Warfare and the Male Supremacist C o m p l e x . " American Anthropologist 78:521-538. Douglas, Mary. 1969. "Is Matriliny D o o m e d in A f r i c a ? " Pp. 1 2 1 - 1 3 5 in Mary Douglas and Phyllis M. Kaberry (eds.). Man in Africa. L o n d o n : Tavistock. E k o n g , Julia Meryl. 1992. Bridewealth. Women and Reproduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Theoretical Overview. G e r m a n y : Bon Holos. el Dareer, A s m a . 1982. Woman, Why Do You Weep: Circumcision and its Consequences. London: Zed. Engels. Friedrich. 1942. " T h e Origin of Family, Private Property, and the State" in the Light of the Researches of Lewis Morgan. New York: International Publishers. Epstein, Arnold L. 1981. Urbanization and Kinship: The Domestic Domain on the Copperbelt of Zambia, 1950-1956. New York: A c a d e m i c Press. Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1940. The Niter: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political institutions of a Nilotic People. O x f o r d : Clarendon Press. . 1951. Kinship and Marriage Among the Nuer. O x f o r d : Clarendon Press. . 1974. Man and Woman Among the Azande. L o n d o n : Faber and Faber. Forde, Daryll. 1964. Yako Studies. L o n d o n : O x f o r d University Press (for the International African Institute). Fortes, M. 1950. " K i n s h i p and Marriage A m o n g the Ashanti." Pp. 2 5 2 - 2 8 4 in A. R. R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n and Daryll F o r d e (eds.). African Systems of Kinship and Marriage. O x f o r d : International A f r i c a n Institute. Fox, Robin. 1967. Kinship and Marriage. H a r m o n d s w o r t h , England: Penguin. Freud, Sigmund. 1919. Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics. I n t r o d u c e d and translated by A. A. Brill. L o n d o n : G. Routledge. Geschiere, Peter. 1982. Village Communities and the State. London: Kegan Paul. . 1997. The Modernity of Witchcraft: Politics and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa. Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia. G i f f o r d , Paul. 1998. African Christianity: Its Public Role. B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press. G o o d y . Jack. 1968. "A C o m p a r a t i v e A p p r o a c h to Incest and Adultery." Pp. 2 1 - 4 6 in Paul B o h a n n a n and John M i d d l e t o n (eds.). Marriage, Family and Residence. Garden City, N Y : Natural History Press. G o r d o n , April A. 1996. Transforming Capitalism and Patriarchy: Gender and Development in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. G o u g h . Kathleen. 1968. "The Nayars and the Definition of Marriage." Pp. 4 9 - 7 1 in Paul B o h a n n a n and John M i d d l e t o n (eds.). Marriage, Family and Residence. Garden City, NY: Natural History Press. Harden, Blaine. 1990. Africa: Dispatches from a Fragile Continent. New York: W. W. Norton. Harris, Marvin, and Orna Johnson. 2000. Cultural Anthropology. New York: Allyn and Bacon. Hicks, Esther K. 1993. lnfibulation: Female Mutilation in Islamic Northeastern Africa. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Hill, Polly. 1986. Development Economics on Trial: The Anthropological Case for a Prosecution. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press. Hopkins, Keith. 1980. " B r o t h e r - S i s t e r M a r r i a g e in A n c i e n t E g y p t . " Comparative Studies in Society and History 2 2 : 3 0 3 - 3 5 4 .

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Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer. 1999. Mother Nature: A History of Mothers, Infants and Natural Selection. London: Chatto and Windus. Iliffe, John. 1987. The African Poor: A History. C a m b r i d g e : Cambridge University Press. Ingstad, Bendicte, Frank Bruun, Edwin Sandberg, and Sheil Tlon. 1992. " C a r e for the Elderly, Care by the Elderly: T h e Role of Elderly Women in a C h a n g i n g Gerontology 7:379-398. Society." Journal of Cross-Cultural James, Valentine Udoh, and James S. Etim (eds.). 1999. The Feminization of Development Processes in Africa: Current and Future Perspectives. Westport, CT: Praeger. Jones, H., and N. Diop. 1999. " F e m a l e Genital Cutting Practices in B u r k i n a Faso and Mali and T h e i r Negative O u t c o m e s . " Studies in Family Planning 30 (3):219—230. Kaberry, Phyllis M. 1969. "Witchcraft of the Sun: Incest in Nso." Pp. 175-195 in Mary Douglas and Phyllis M. Kaberry (eds.). Man in Africa. London: Tavistock. K e e s i n g , Roger M. 1981. Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Ki-Zerbo, J. (ed.). 1989. General History of Africa. Vol. I. Methodology and African Prehistory. Paris: U N E S C O ; and Berkeley: University of California Press. Kuper, A d a m . 1982. Wives for Cattle: Bridewealth and Marriage in Southern Africa. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1949. Les structures élémentaires de la parente. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Lewis, I. M. 1976. Social Anthropology in Perspective. H a r m o n d s w o r t h , England: Penguin. Lightfoot-Klein, Hanny. 1989. Prisoners of Ritual: An Odyssey into Female Genital Circumcision in Africa. New York: Haworth Press. Mair, Lucy. 1979. African Societies. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press. Miller, David. 1999. " W o m e n ' s Fears and M e n ' s Anxieties: The Impact of Family Planning on G e n d e r Relations in Northern G h a n a . " Studies in Family Planning 30(l):54-66. Miller, Doug. 1996. "Matriliny and Social C h a n g e : How Are the Women of Rural Malawi M a n a g i n g ? " Online at http://www.brocku.ca/epi/casid/rniller.htm. Murdock, George Peter. 1949. Social Structure. New York: Free Press. . 1959. Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture History. New York: McGraw-Hill. Murray, Stephen O., and Will R o s c o e (eds.). 1998. Box-Wives and Female Husbands: Studies of African Homosexualities. New York: St. Martin's Press. M w a m w e n d a , T. S., and L. A. M o n y o o e . 1997. "Status of Bridewealth in an African Culture." Journal of Social Psychology 137:269-272. Nkwi, P. N., and J. P. Warnier. 1982. Elements for a History of the Western Grassfields. Yaounde: University of Yaounde. O p p o n g , Christine. 1981. Middle Class African Marriage. London: G e o r g e Allen and Unwin. Parkin, David, and David N y a m w a y a (eds.). 1987. Transformations of African Marriage. Manchester: M a n c h e s t e r University Press. Peil, Margaret (ed.). 1981. Cities and Suburbs: Urban Life in West Africa. N e w York: A f r i c a n a Publishing. Peters, Pauline E. 1997a. " I n t r o d u c t i o n : Revisiting the Puzzle of Matriliny in South-Central A f r i c a , " Critique of Anthropology 17 (2): 125-146. . 1997b. "Against the O d d s : Matriliny, Land and Gender in the Shire Highlands of Malawi." Critique of Anthropology 17 (2): 189-210.

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P o e w e , Karla. 1980. "Matrilineal Ideology: The E c o n o m i c Activities of Women in L u a p u l a , Z a m b i a . " Pp. 3 3 3 - 3 5 7 in Linda S. Cordell and Stephen B e c k e r m a n (eds.). The Versatility of Kinship. N e w York: A c a d e m i c Press. Pottier, J o h a n n . 1983. " D e f u n c t L a b o r R e s e r v e ? M a m b w e Villages in the PostMigration E c o n o m y . " Africa 5 3 ( 2 ) : 2 - 2 3 . R a d c l i f f e - B r o w n , A. R., and D. Forde (eds.). 1950. African Systems of Kinship and Marriage. London: Oxford University Press (for International African Institute). Rattray, R. S. 1923. Ashanti. O x f o r d : Clarendon Press. R i c h a r d s , A. I. 1950. " S o m e Types of Family Structure A m o n g s t the Central B a n d u . " Pp. 2 0 7 - 2 5 1 in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde (eds.). African Systems of Kinship and Marriage. Oxford: International African Institute. S c h e i d e l , Walter. 1996. " B r o t h e r - S i s t e r and P a r e n t - C h i l d M a r r i a g e Outside Royal F a m i l i e s in Ancient Egypt and Iran: A C h a l l e n g e to the Sociobiological View of Incest A v o i d a n c e ? " Ethology and Sociobiology 17:319-340. Shanklin, Eugenia. 1983. "Ritual and Social Uses of G o a t s in K o m . " Pp. 11-36 in R i v a Berleant-Schiller and E u g e n i a Shanklin (eds.). The Keeping of Animals: Adaptation and Social Relations in Livestock-Producing Communities. Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, O s m u n . . 1990. "Anlu R e m e m b e r e d : The K o m W o m e n ' s Rebellion of 1 9 5 8 - 6 1 . " Dialectical Anthropology 1 5 : 1 5 9 - 1 8 1 ; reprinted pp. 1 3 3 - 1 7 1 in M. J. D i a m o n d (ed.). 1998. Women and Revolution: Global Expressions. Netherlands: Kluwer. S h a n k l i n , E u g e n i a , G e o r g e M b e h , C o l u m b u s Ayaba, and Gilbert M b e n g . 2 0 0 1 . Beautiful Deadly Lake Nyos: A Research Report on the 1986 Explosion of Lake Nyos and Its Aftermath. Limbe, C a m e r o o n : Presbook. Stringer, C h r i s t o p h e r , and Robin M c K i e . 1996. African Exodus: The Origins of Modern Humanity. New York: Henry Holt. S w e e t m a n , Caroline. 1998. Gender. Education and Training. O x f o r d : O x f a m . Tattersall, Ian. 1998. Becoming Human: Evolution and Human Uniqueness. New York: Harcourt Brace. Terrell, John E d w a r d . 2000. "Doing the Devil's Work in Anthropology." Anthropology News (October): 10. Tylor, Edward B. 1889. "On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions: A p p l i e d to Laws of M a r r i a g e and D e s c e n t , " Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 18:245-256, 2 6 1 - 2 6 9 . Van Allen, Judith. 1972. "'Sitting on a M a n ' : Colonialism and the Lost Political Institutions of Igbo W o m e n . " Canadian Journal of African Studies 6 : 1 6 5 - 1 8 2 . . 2000. ' " B a d Future T h i n g s ' and Liberatory M o v e m e n t s : Capitalism, G e n der and the State in Botswana." Radical History Review 7 6 : 1 3 6 - 1 6 8 . Vock, Jane. 1998. " D e m o g r a p h i c Theories and W o m e n ' s Reproductive Labor." Pp. 8 1 - 9 6 in Sharon B. Stichter and Jane L. Parpart (eds.). Patriarchy and Class: African Women in the Home and the Workforce. Boulder: Westview Press. von Bulow, Dorthe, and Anne Sorenson. 1993. "Gender and Contract Farming: Outgrower S c h e m e s in Kenya." Review of African Political Economy 5 6 : 3 8 - 5 2 . W a m b a , Philippe. 1999. Kinship: A Family's Journey in Africa and America. N e w York: Dutton. Westermarck, E. 1894. The History of Human Marriage. N e w York: Macmillan.

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ince E s t e r B o s e r u p ' s ( 1 9 7 0 ) p i o n e e r i n g w o r k on w o m e n a n d d e v e l o p m e n t in the T h i r d W o r l d , s t u d i e s c o n t i n u e to c o n f i r m h e r f i n d i n g s that w o m e n are not e q u a l b e n e f i c i a r i e s with m e n of the f r u i t s of s o - c a l l e d m o d e r n i z a t i o n and d e v e l o p m e n t . S t u d i e s of w o m e n in A f r i c a are c o n s i s t e n t in s h o w i n g that a l t h o u g h t h e r e h a v e b e e n s o m e g a i n s f o r w o m e n , s u c h as g r e a t e r e d u c a t i o n a l parity with m e n or o f f i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n s p r o f e s s i n g support f o r g e n d e r e q u a l i t y , o v e r a l l the p r o s p e c t s f o r w o m e n a r e o m i n o u s in m a n y areas. As in o t h e r parts of the w o r l d , A f r i c a n w o m e n h a v e neither the p o l i t i c a l , l e g a l , e d u c a t i o n a l , n o r e c o n o m i c o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h e i r m a l e c o u n t e r p a r t s . M e n in A f r i c a o v e r w h e l m i n g l y d o m i n a t e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of s o c i e t y a n d h a v e u s e d their p o s i t i o n s m o r e o f t e n than not to f u r t h e r t h e control and a d v a n t a g e s m e n h a v e in both the public and d o m e s t i c a r e n a s . In d i s c u s s i n g the c o n d i t i o n s p e c u l i a r to A f r i c a that a f f e c t w o m e n ' s status and roles, s e v e r a l general f a c t o r s m u s t be kept in f o c u s . O n e is that the o v e r a l l e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m s of A f r i c a m a k e life d i f f i c u l t f o r m o s t A f r i c a n m e n as well as w o m e n . I n e q u a l i t y , o p p r e s s i o n , p o v e r t y , a n d lack of o p p o r t u n i t y are w i d e s p r e a d societal c o n c e r n s . N o n e t h e l e s s , w o m e n as a g r o u p s u f f e r m o r e and h a v e a c c e s s to f e w e r r e s o u r c e s and o p p o r t u n i ties than m e n d o . We must also n o t e that A f r i c a n s o c i e t i e s and g e n d e r roles are h i g h l y d i v e r s e ; this m a k e s e f f o r t s at g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s o m e w h a t t e n t a t i v e and not a p p l i c a b l e to e v e r y society. A l s o i m p o r t a n t is that c l a s s as well as g e n d e r i n f l u e n c e s the s t a t u s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s of i n d i v i d u a l w o m e n . T h a t is, g i r l s b o r n to m o r e elite f a m i l i e s will t y p i c a l l y h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to a c q u i r e a g o o d e d u c a t i o n and p r e s t i g i o u s career, a l t h o u g h they are unlikely to a c h i e v e great political or e c o n o m i c p o w e r on their o w n . H o w e v e r , they are p r i m e c a n d i d a t e s f o r m a r r i a g e to the A f r i c a n m e n w h o d o w i e l d p o w e r a n d i n f l u e n c e . T h i s c o n t r a s t s d r a m a t i c a l l y w i t h t h e m o d e s t or n o n e x i s t e n t p r o s p e c t s t h e i r p e a s a n t or w o r k i n g - c l a s s s i s t e r s h a v e . T h e r e s u l t s are that

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a l t h o u g h w o m e n as a g r o u p s u f f e r f r o m i n e q u a l i t y , the i n t e r e s t s a n d p e r s p e c t i v e s of elite w o m e n o f t e n d i v e r g e f r o m those of p o o r e r w o m e n . Last, t h e f o r m s g e n d e r i n e q u a l i t y take in A f r i c a r e f l e c t i n d i g e n o u s , p r e c o l o n i a l . a n d E u r o p e a n i n f l u e n c e s . E u r o p e a n e x p a n s i o n into A f r i c a d u r i n g the c o l o nial p e r i o d b o t h u n d e r m i n e d s o u r c e s of s t a t u s a n d a u t o n o m y that w o m e n h a d a n d s t r e n g t h e n e d e l e m e n t s of i n d i g e n o u s m a l e d o m i n a n c e or " p a t r i a r c h y . " At the s a m e t i m e , W e s t e r n g e n d e r i d e o l o g y and p r a c t i c e s that p r o m o t e m a l e d o m i n a n c e and f e m a l e d e p e n d e n c y h a v e b e e n s u p e r i m p o s e d on A f r i c a . S i n c e i n d e p e n d e n c e , A f r i c a ' s m a l e l e a d e r s h a v e c o n t i n u e d to a d d l a m i n a t i o n s to t h e p a t r i a r c h a l s t r u c t u r e s they i n h e r i t e d f r o m their c o l o n i z ers, o f t e n so with the support of W e s t e r n international investors and d o n o r s w h o s e " d e v e l o p m e n t " a s s i s t a n c e m o s t l y g o e s to m e n . A s t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n s h o w s , the c u l m i n a t i o n of p r e c o l o n i a l , c o l o n i a l , and p o s t i n d e p e n d e n c e h i s t o r y is the p r o s p e c t that w o m e n in g e n eral will c o n t i n u e to lose g r o u n d e c o n o m i c a l l y , politically, and socially unless c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t s are m a d e b y w o m e n t h e m s e l v e s , A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s , and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y to e n s u r e that the f r u i t s of d e v e l o p m e n t are e x t e n d e d equally to w o m e n and m e n .

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WOMEN IN PRECOLONIAL AFRICA

S u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a is a d i v e r s e c o n t i n e n t w h o s e p r e c o l o n i a l h i s t o r y a n d c u l t u r e m a y n e v e r be a c c u r a t e l y k n o w n , s i n c e little of it w a s w r i t t e n d o w n ; so it is w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e c a u t i o n that w e a t t e m p t t o g e n e r a l i z e a b o u t g e n d e r roles (or a n y t h i n g e l s e ) t o d a y or in the past. T h e a c c u r a c y of r e p o r t s on p r e c o l o n i a l t i m e s m u s t a l s o be q u e s t i o n e d , since m u c h of t h i s w r i t i n g w a s f i l t e r e d t h r o u g h the c u l t u r a l b i a s e s and p e r c e p t i o n s of E u r o p e a n m a l e s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of s l a v e r y or c o l o n i a l i s m . R e f e r r i n g to t h e B r i t i s h , but a p p l i c a b l e to o t h e r E u r o p e a n s as w e l l , H a m m o n d and J a b l o w ( 1 9 7 0 : 1 9 7 ) c o n c l u d e that " f o u r c e n t u r i e s of writing a b o u t A f r i c a h a v e p r o d u c e d a literature w h i c h d e s c r i b e s not A f r i c a but the British r e s p o n s e to it. . . . A s in a m o r a l i t y play, the British a n d the A f r i c a n s are the e x e m p l a r s of c i v i l i z a t i o n a n d s a v a g e r y , r e s p e c t i v e l y . " D e p i c t i o n s of w o m e n as d o m i n a t e d , s e r v i l e b e a s t s of b u r d e n is an e x a m p l e of the k i n d s of d i s t o r t i o n s that h a v e r e s u l t e d f r o m E u r o p e a n e t h n o c e n t r i s m in d e a l i n g w i t h A f r i c a n c u l t u r e s . M o r e o v e r , s i n c e the i 5 0 0 s , b e g i n n i n g w i t h the A t l a n t i c s l a v e t r a d e , A f r i c a n s o c i e t i e s w e r e i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s t o r t e d by c o n t a c t with E u r o peans. E v e n b e f o r e m o s t A f r i c a n s e v e r saw a white m a n , the impact of slavery w a s felt in all parts of the c o n t i n e n t . P o p u l a t i o n m o v e m e n t s , wars, d i s e a s e , loss of p r o d u c t i v e l a b o r p o w e r , a n d a b r e a k d o w n of f a m i l i a r s o c i a l institutions altered i n d i g e n o u s social p a t t e r n s ( C u t r u f e l l i , 1 9 8 3 : 1 4 - 1 6 ) . Despite problems of the reliability of data, some patterns of gender relationships were prevalent, if not universal, in Africa before the period of E u r o p e a n

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penetration. Politically, for instance, African women in most societies have been influential political actors in informal ways, if not through formal political roles. Women varied from being highly subordinated "legal minors" under the control of their menfolk among groups like the Tswana and Shona in southern Africa to holding positions as chiefs among the Mende and Serbro of Sierra Leone and "headmen" among the Tonga of Zambia. In some societies women even had formal roles in male councils. The figure of the queen mother in many societies of western Africa was very influential, and it was she who selected the king. Women warriors fought for the fori (king) of Dahomey, and powerful warrior queens led their people in battle. Notable examples are Queen Amina of Hausaland, who ruled in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and Nzinga of Angola, who led the earliest and most effective resistance against the Portuguese (Parpart, 1988: 208-210). In addition to such important formal roles as these, women's organizations existed that acted as parallel authority structures to those of males. These included w o m e n ' s courts, market authorities, secret societies, and age-grade institutions (Staudt, 1987:195; Parpart, 1988:208-210). Most generally, parallel authority structures allowed men and women to exercise authority over their own sex and activities. These organizations reflected the sexual division of labor and the different spheres of activity for men and women. There was also recognition that men could best make decisions about men's affairs as could women about their own concerns. One example of parallel male-female organizations was societies that conferred honorific titles upon accomplished members of the community. Both titled men and women had a great deal of prestige and exercised considerable influence. The ekwe title, associated with the goddess Idemili, is a case in point. This title is taken by high-status Ibo women of Nigeria, and the most powerful of these women, the agba ekwe, reputedly was the most powerful political figure among her people (Amadiume, 1987). In some cases, goddess-focused religions provided a basis for women to control major religiopolitical functions through societies dedicated to the goddess. Ambrose Moyo. in Chapter 11, points out other religious leadership roles held by women as well as men, such as shaman, diviner, and spirit medium. Even though women did have these positions of influence and power, males typically had more formal authority positions than females, so a degree of male dominance existed. For most women, power was (and still is) exercised indirectly and informally as sisters, mothers, and wives within the extended family system and was closely associated with women's economic power. Where women had rights to land, animals, labor, and the products of their own or others' labor, their status was higher than if such resources were under male control. Enhancing w o m e n ' s position was the critical role they played in the sexual division of labor within their households. Women were producers: they grew most of the family's food, tended

African women play vital economic roles as well as being mothers. This Zambian woman in her maize field exemplifies both roles.

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a n i m a l s , and m a d e tools and other articles used by the family. T h e y c o o k e d , h e l p e d c o n s t r u c t r e s i d e n c e s and o t h e r b u i l d i n g s , h a u l e d w o o d , and so on. In m a n y c a s e s , w o m e n also sold their s u r p l u s in local m a r k e t s , t h u s d o m i n a t ing t h e s e c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t i e s a n d d e m o n s t r a t i n g their b u s i n e s s a c u m e n . W o m e n w e r e a l s o r e p r o d u c e r s in s o c i e t i e s w h e r e c h i l d r e n w e r e w e a l t h , o l d - a g e security, and the g u a r a n t o r s that o n e w o u l d be v e n e r a t e d as an anc e s t o r a f t e r d e a t h a n d not f o r g o t t e n . ( S e e , a g a i n , M o y o ' s c h a p t e r on relig i o n , in w h i c h he d i s c u s s e s the s i g n i f i c a n c e of a n c e s t o r s . ) T h e s e vital roles w e r e n o r m a l l y t r a n s l a t e d into h i g h s t a t u s f o r w o m e n a n d m o r e a u t o n o m y than w a s t y p i c a l f o r w o m e n in m o s t r e g i o n s of the w o r l d . O t h e r m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of this r e l a t i v e a u t o n o m y a n d h i g h s t a t u s of w o m e n are s e e n in m a r r i a g e c u s t o m s . B r i d e w e a l t h , t y p i c a l in A f r i c a , is a c u s t o m that r e q u i r e s a t r a n s f e r of g o o d s and s e r v i c e s f r o m the m a l e ' s f a m ily to that of the b r i d e or to t h e b r i d e h e r s e l f . B r i d e w e a l t h is not to be e q u a t e d w i t h " s e l l i n g " d a u g h t e r s . R a t h e r , it i n d i c a t e s the h i g h v a l u e att a c h e d to w o m e n in A f r i c a n s o c i e t y ; f a m i l i e s m u s t be c o m p e n s a t e d f o r the loss of their d a u g h t e r s and the w e a l t h she will b r i n g to her h u s b a n d ' s f a m ily. B r i d e w e a l t h not only a d d s to t h e p r o s p e c t i v e b r i d e ' s s e n s e of h e r o w n w o r t h but a l s o p r o v i d e s m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s f o r h e r f a m i l y . In f a c t , w o m e n o f t e n work t o g e t h e r both to a r r a n g e suitable m a r r i a g e s and to m a x i m i z e the b r i d e w e a l t h . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , A f r i c a n w o m e n d o not t a k e t h e i r h u s b a n d ' s n a m e w h e n t h e y m a r r y , t h u s r e t a i n i n g their o w n i d e n t i t y w i t h r e s p e c t to their f a m i l y of origin. O n c e m a r r i e d , a w o m a n has the right to leave a h u s b a n d w h o m i s t r e a t s h e r or o n e w i t h w h o m s h e n o l o n g e r c h o o s e s to live. C e r t a i n f a c t o r s , h o w e v e r , d i s c o u r a g e this: her f a m i l y m i g h t h a v e to return the b r i d e w e a l t h , or, in patrilineal f a m i l i e s , the w o m a n m i g h t h a v e to l e a v e her c h i l d r e n with her h u s b a n d and his family. B u t , unlike in m a n y c u l t u r e s , a d i v o r c e d or w i d o w e d A f r i c a n w o m a n usually has little d i f f i c u l t y attracting a n e w s p o u s e , a g a i n a t r i b u t e to the i m p o r t a n c e of w o m e n a n d t h e i r vital c o n t r i b u t i o n s to f a m i l y and c o m m u n i t y . ( F o r m o r e on b r i d e w e a l t h and f a m i l y s y s t e m s , see C h a p t e r 9.) P o l y g y n y , a m a n ' s right to h a v e m o r e t h a n o n e w i f e , has b e e n w i d e l y a c c e p t e d in A f r i c a . O f t e n m i s u n d e r s t o o d b y E u r o p e a n s as a s i g n of w o m e n ' s l o w s t a t u s , p o l y g y n y is m o r e a c c u r a t e l y i n d i c a t i v e of t h e c e n trality of w o m e n to t h e e c o n o m i c w e l l - b e i n g of t h e f a m i l y . S i n c e f a m i l y l a b o r w a s t h e p r i m a r y m e a n s of a c c u m u l a t i n g w e a l t h , a c q u i r i n g w o m e n w a s n e c e s s a r y to f a m i l y p r o s p e r i t y . By h a v i n g m o r e t h a n o n e w i f e , t h e family gained not only her p r o d u c t i v e contributions but also m o r e child r e n . W o m e n in t h e f a m i l y a l s o b e n e f i t e d f r o m t h e g r e a t e r p r o s p e r i t y of their households. Additional wives helped each other with tasks, provided c o m p a n i o n s h i p (often lacking with h u s b a n d s ) , and gave pregnant, n u r s i n g , o r o l d e r w o m e n a n e e d e d r e s p i t e f r o m t h e s e x u a l d e m a n d s of their husbands.

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EUROPEAN PENETRATION: THE COLONIAL LEGACY

By the time outright colonial domination of Africa began in the 1800s, some loss of autonomy for African women may have already occurred. A major reason is that the disease, warfare, and dislocations slavery introduced in earlier centuries put more pressure on women to reproduce and perform maternal functions in order to offset population losses that were occurring (Cutrufelli, 1983:2). Control over women's productive activities in the family may also have intensified. The record is much clearer on the impact of colonialism. African societies were forceably integrated into the expanding global capitalist economy dominated by the European powers. To extract the mineral and commodity wealth of Africa and to ensure a cheap labor supply, radical changes were imposed. The commercialization of agriculture through the introduction of cash crops altered the customary gender division of labor in- ways mostly disadvantageous to women. Men were taught to grow new cash crops such as cocoa and coffee for export, while women continued to grow food crops for the family and local consumption. Men were forced into the wage economy to work in the mines, on the plantations, or in town; most women remained in the rural areas, often assuming the responsibilities their absent menfolk could no longer perform. Schooling and the teaching of new skills were made available primarily to males. All in all, although both men and women were exploited within the colonial economy, men gained some access to important resources such as money, skills, land, and education less available to women. Men also gained political advantages as customary sources of female power were ignored or undermined. Europeans imposed their own prejudices about the proper authority of men over women by dealing only with male leaders. All-male "native authorities" were created in many areas to allow some local government, based on frequently arguable "traditional" or " c u s t o m a r y " laws. Tradition was usually interpreted in ways that favored men's control over women, allowing men to gain at women's expense (see Chanock, 1982). For example, as men were provided new commercial opportunities in cash crop agriculture, they began to assert their customary rights to land and the labor of wives in order to accumulate income for themselves; they were not obligated to share this money with their wives. In some cases, this resulted in great wealth for some enterprising men. For instance, among the Beti in Cameroon, some men married many women in order to get virtually free labor from them on their cash crop farms. By custom, women had to help their husbands for little compensation even though these farms were now commercial ventures bearing little similarity to the subsistence family farms of the past (Guyer, 1984). In the Zambian Copperbelt, wives were required to perform their customary domestic services for their husbands in town, although they were unable to claim any

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share of their h u s b a n d ' s income. Unable to get jobs of their own, w o m e n often had to support themselves by selling sex, food, homebrew, or domestic services to other men (Langley, 1983:94-95). Not only were w o m e n economically responsible for themselves, but the burden of providing for children also fell mostly on w o m e n — a n o t h e r matter of custom f r o m precolonial times. At the same time as their responsibilities were growing, w o m e n ' s rights to land were undermined. Often, the most or the best land was given to the men f o r cash crops, and there were growing pressures to deprive w o m e n of their inheritance rights to land in favor of males in the family (Cutrufelli, 1983:64-69). One of the most damaging colonial land policies for w o m e n involved efforts to introduce private ownership of land. In Kenya in the 1950s, the S w y n n e r t o n Act was to provide deeds to male heads of households, replacing the African land tenure system that ensured e v e r y o n e ' s access to land (Davison, 1 9 8 8 : 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 ) . Such policies have continued in the postcolonial period. They pose a major threat to the economic well-being of women, since land is the crucial resource for survival among the large numbers of Africans who are small farmers. Colonial officials and male elders often worked together to get better control of w o m e n . Frequently, European officials did not want w o m e n in the towns; they wanted only the labor of African men. Therefore, many restrictions were placed on the m o v e m e n t of women (Cutrufelli 1 9 8 3 : 2 2 26). Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) is a good example of colonial regulation of migratory labor in southern Africa. Rural tribal authorities were given the right to prevent unmarried w o m e n and children f r o m moving to the towns, and urban authorities had the power to send those w h o defied such restrictions back to the villages. S o m e women did marry or cohabit with men in the towns, but they had no access to wage labor until late in the colonial period (Hansen, 1987:11-13). A m o n g pastoralists, the introduction of new property and commercial relations also eroded the status of women. Among the Tugen of Kenya and other groups, for instance, w o m e n ' s rights to cattle and the status they once derived f r o m the vital tasks they p e r f o r m e d were undermined as men asserted their right to o w n e r s h i p of animals and other property. O w n e r s h i p rights were redefined in Western commercial terms. This now meant that men, not women, could make decisions and profit from the sale or acquisition of family property. Women themselves became another form of property to be controlled as they lost effective control over their own labor. They had to work for their husbands in order to survive, because they had no rights to own wealth-producing property of their own. C o m p o u n d i n g her e c o n o m i c vulnerability, a w o m a n , if divorced, had no right to the wealth she helped her husband acquire through her labor (Kettel, 1986). (See Lovett, 1989, for a good general discussion of gender and the colonial state.)

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THE POSTINDEPENDENCE PERIOD: DEPENDENCY AND INEQUALITY OF WOMEN

In many ways, the problems of women since independence are a continuation of policies and forces set in motion during the colonial period. Although A f r i c a n gender relations were t r a n s f o r m e d during the colonial period to further European e c o n o m i c and political exploitation of A f r i c a , such distorted and patently unfair practices often continue to be j u s t i f i e d by appeals to " A f r i c a n tradition." Despite w o m e n ' s contributions to the struggle for independence and rhetoric in favor of equality for all, the new A f r i c a n states and social institutions are largely Africanized replicas of their colonial predecessors. Advantages men had gained in access to education, jobs, and property enabled them to gain control of most of the wealth, jobs, and leadership positions in newly independent African countries. Male dominance has been enhanced as many of A f r i c a ' s new Westernized elites, both male and female, have modeled their own gender roles on those of their Western tutors. These roles are, in turn, disseminated to the masses via education, the media, and many government and w o m e n ' s organizations (cf. N w e k e , 1985; Obadina, 1985; N z o m o , 1989; Bujra, 1986). Rather than promoting equal political and economic rights and opportunities for w o m e n in their societies, w o m e n are often encouraged instead to pursue domesticity and economic subordination to a male who is "head of the family" (see Schuster, 1982). Male control of formal political power in Western-style political systems is widely portrayed as a natural extension of such male-dominated A f r i c a n institutions as chieftaincies and councils of elders. While this might appear to be consonant with previous gender roles of African societies in which men and women had distinctly different roles in the division of labor, current role expectations are operating in a very different economic and political environment. As in other parts of the world, access to money and other e c o n o m i c resources (e.g., land, businesses, wage jobs, credit) are vital to survival, social mobility, and status. Moreover, while housewives in the West have a measure of legal protection to c o m p e n s a t e for their e c o n o m i c dependency on their husbands, economically dependent w o m e n in Africa typically do not have guaranteed rights to their h u s b a n d ' s income or property, nor do their children should the husband die or the marriage end in divorce. In addition, male political power is no longer exercised primarily through families and local organizations in which w o m e n have leverage in the d e c i s i o n m a k i n g process. P o w e r is now exercised through the state and bureaucratic institutions whose centralization of p o w e r and control of resources are vastly greater than those of the typical decentralized political institutions of the past. In Chapter 4, Donald Gordon discusses how important access to state power and patron-client relationships are in Africa. If women have few positions in the new institutions of power and men are allowed to make the decisions,

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w o m e n face the risk of being politically, economically, and socially marginalized and their interests neglected within their societies. The minority of Africans who would challenge pervasive male dominance face a double obstacle. Not only must they contend with the structures in their societies that perpetuate existing gender inequality, but the foreign "development establishment" that African nations depend upon for assistance is imbued with many of the same biases against women. Western corporations, lending institutions, governments, and development agencies are all male-dominated institutions f r o m m a l e - d o m i n a t e d societies. Gender inequality has been such an inherent feature of Western culture that the discriminatory effect of seemingly "neutral" policies inevitably occurs. Sometimes it has simply been assumed that men would be the leaders and the beneficiaries of aid and training. In other cases, projects and development assistance that favor men are j u s t i f i e d by the resistance of A f r i c a n s and their cultures to providing equity for women. For example, extension services are often given only to men because they are "heads of households," and they might resist resources being given to their wives. Regardless of the assumptions made, the net results are usually the same: women lose access to the resources necessary to improve their lives and often the lives of their children. With the above general perspectives in mind, three topics will be looked at in more depth: (1) women in the economy, (2) women and politics, and (3) prospects for women.

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W O M E N IN THE E C O N O M Y

Most men and w o m e n in sub-Saharan A f r i c a are still e m p l o y e d in agriculture, but this is especially true of women. Estimates are that women do 7 0 - 8 0 percent of the agricultural labor and produce up to 80 percent of the staple f o o d (Gopal and Salim, 1998:177). T h e y also cultivate about half of all cash crops (Jacobson, 1993:67). In Kenya, for example, women produce 75 percent of the labor on smallholder farms and half the labor on cash crops, while performing 95 percent of the household labor ( M u n yakho, 1994:8; von Bulow and Sorensen, 1993). In Malawi 71 percent of seasonal agricultural work is done by women (Malindi, 1995:121). Despite w o m e n ' s contributions to the agricultural economy, only 7 - 8 percent own land or have leaseholds to land (Gopal and Salim, 1998:177). Labor force statistics underrate the amount of work most women perform. According to the World Bank, women work much more than men; an average w o m a n ' s work day is 50 percent longer. Women work in the fields an average of 1,000 hours per year and spend an additional three to four hours a day preparing food, cooking, and collecting firewood and water. While their husbands also farm in many cases, during the long slack season

Preparing food and fetching water are among the many time-consuming jobs performed daily by women.

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Women also grow most of the food in Africa.

men reportedly spend most of the day drinking or visiting friends and relatives (Faruqee and Gulhati, 1983:36-37). Women commonly complain about the inequitable division of labor, that women work while men sit around and tell them what to do, or that women must carry heavy loads (water, wood, children) while the men carry nothing. They also complain that men do not support their families but spend their money on drink, other women, or goods for themselves. Many men even try to claim for themselves money the woman earns herself (Staudt, 1987:206-207). Although the husband may use his income (including that derived from his wife's labor on his farm) to pay off family debts, pay taxes, buy medicine, and offer gifts to his wife, men often spend more on bikes, watches, and radios for themselves. By contrast, women use most of their income for the household and their children (Blumberg, 1995:6-11; Weekes-Vagliani, 1985:105-106). Most women farmers get little help to ease their burdens. As Virginia DeLancey points out in Chapter 5 on African economies, only a small share of investment has gone to rural development in most African countries, and investments that are made go primarily for cash crops, mechanization, extension services, and resettlement projects that mostly help men. More and more women are managing the family farm alone as men turn to other forrjis of employment. Because farms are likely to be registered to the husband as the sole owner, women are often ineligible for most farm aid available only to farmers with legal title to their land (Picard,

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1995:50; Nwomonoh, 1995:176-177; World Bank, 1989:193). Even worse, without legal title to the farm, a woman stands to lose everything should her husband die or divorce her. Not surprisingly, women as well as men are seeking new employment opportunities in the towns. But here too women often find their opportunities circumscribed. One reason is that women are not given the same education or training opportunities as men. The gap between schooling for males and females remains wide, and in many cases is worsening as a result of Africa's continuing economic crisis. There are 81 girls in primary school for every 100 boys; in secondary school the ratio of girls per 100 boys drops to 72 (World Bank, 1995:219). Fewer than 25 percent of poor rural girls are in school (World Bank, 2000:13). Although about 20 percent of girls in Africa go to secondary school, this is only half the number found in the rest of the developing world. Both males and females have been hurt by the drop in government spending in Africa: from $41 per capita in 1980 to $32 in 1994. However, educating girls is typically sacrificed before boys. The results of the neglect of girls' education is that half the women in Africa are illiterate and more than half have never been to school. Rather than attempting to close the gender gap in education, progress in education for girls since independence is now "at a standstill," according to Rosen and Conly. In some places, such as Madagascar, Nigeria,

In Senegal, the government is trying to encourage families to educate their girls by using the slogan, "I also want to go to school," on billboards such as this one.

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and Tanzania, education for girls relative to boys has actually declined (Rosen and Conly, 1998:19-20). While there are educated w o m e n in good j o b s and professions, most wage jobs for women are in jobs that are, as in the West, typically held by w o m e n , for example, as nurses, teachers, clerks, and secretaries. Most good j o b s are held by men. U g a n d a is an e x a m p l e of the low representation of w o m e n in high-status jobs. Only 2 percent of the f e m a l e working population is in administrative, managerial, and professional occupations. Only .05 percent of senior positions in the civil services are held by w o m e n (Gopal and Salim, 1998:167). Wage j o b s of any kind are hard for women to get, and most find work in the informal (nonwage) sector selling foodstuffs, homebrew, or services (including prostitution) as they did during the colonial period. In much of West A f r i c a , w o m e n still dominate local markets for food. In general, c o m m e r c e has been a major means for women to get ahead, despite the hostility such successful and independent w o m e n often arouse (Vellenga, 1986). In some countries, w o m e n heavily dominate informal economy businesses. In Zimbabwe, for example, women's informal sector businesses are 67 percent of the total; in Lesotho they are 73 percent of the total; and in Senegal they are 84 percent of the total (World Bank, 2001:121). In countries like Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), husbands have had the legal right to take over their wives' business assets in the "interests of the h o u s e h o l d . " This is a significant handicap for women's businesses along with other discriminatory laws. For example, in many countries w o m e n are unable to open a bank account without their husband's permission, and they have found it difficult or impossible to get commercial credit (MacGaffey, 1986). In Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland married w o m e n are under the permanent guardianship of their husbands and have no right to m a n a g e property on their own (World Bank, 2001:118). Only since the 1980s or so have Western development agencies c o m e to realize how their efforts have often hampered rather than helped African women. They erroneously thought that if men were better off, w o m e n and general family welfare would improve as well. Instead, it is now recognized that w o m e n ' s economic opportunities and income more often declined while their workloads increased. Examples include Bernal's (1988) study in northern Sudan and C a r n e y ' s (1988) study in Gambia; both studies found that irrigation schemes frequently result in men gaining control of, if not always title to, land and production decisions at w o m e n ' s expense. Resettlement schemes also tend to give male f a r m e r s land, subsidies, and credit, as in Cameroon (Goheen, 1988) and Zimbabwe (Pankhurst and Jacobs, 1988), although w o m e n are required to work on these f a r m s , continue to grow food for their families, and perform other domestic chores such as cooking and childcare. In the Z i m b a b w e study, several w o m e n reported how the state marketing board paid their husbands for their cash

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crops, and how the men then decided how much to give their wives. If w o m e n complained about the lack of money, they were beaten. S o m e w o m e n resorted to selling their sexual services to other men to get additional money for household expenses. To help address these inequities, women in development (WID) initiatives have been given more attention since the 1970s. For example, to address the inequities in U.S. development aid, the Percy Amendment passed by Congress requires a " w o m e n ' s impact statement" in every U.S. Agency f o r International D e v e l o p m e n t ( U S A I D ) project in developing countries. U S A I D now stresses that improving the education and status of w o m e n is a key element in its objectives of promoting "sustainable development" in Africa (Green, 1994). The UN, European donor agencies, and most m a j o r foundations have developed or expanded w o m e n ' s programs as well (Newland, 1991:124). Since the late 1980s the World Bank in its publications (see, e.g., 1989:103-104; 1996; 2001) has stressed the need to redress the neglect of women's education, health, training, and access to productive resources. In 1987, a W o m e n in Development Division was created, and in 1989, a coordinator for women in development was included in the Bank's four regional complexes, including Africa. More than one-third of all the B a n k ' s 1989 operations in Africa reportedly included actions specifically addressed to women (World Bank, 1990:10). Unfortunately, as will be discussed below, the gap between men and women is growing. Although some change is occurring, more reforms and assistance for women are needed if the goal of sustainable development is to be met. (See Gordon. 2001; also Chapter 8 for more on the concept of sustainable development.)

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WOMEN AND POLITICS

Since independence, women have been excluded from most of the important political positions in African states. For instance, there have been no w o m e n heads of state and w o m e n have held only 6 - 8 percent of the legislative positions in Africa. In only a few states—for example, Rwanda, Cameroon, Malawi, and Senegal—have over 10 percent of legislative positions been filled by women. At cabinet-level or equivalent positions, only 2 percent were held by w o m e n ; in half of A f r i c a ' s states, there were no women at all in cabinet-level positions Women have been only somewhat better represented at local levels of government (Parpart, 1988:8-9; World Bank, 2000:24; Morna, 1995:58). Ruling Africa has been largely a male preserve, but some positive changes have been m a d e to increase w o m e n ' s political participation in a few countries. For example, in South A f r i c a ' s 1994 national elections w o m e n won one-fourth of the seats in the new House of Assembly, by far

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the best record in A f r i c a . A n d , a f t e r the 1999 elections, w o m e n ' s participation i n c r e a s e d to m o r e than 30 p e r c e n t . T h i s was the result of the ruling A f r i c a n National C o n g r e s s ( A N C ) party policies to e n s u r e w o m e n ' s representation on party lists s u b m i t t e d to the voters. This was one aspect of the new black majority g o v e r n m e n t ' s c o m m i t m e n t in the new constitution and in s u b s e q u e n t legislation to g e n d e r e q u a l i t y in a n e w S o u t h A f r i c a (see C e n t e r f o r R e p r o d u c t i v e Law, 1997). U g a n d a also revised its c o n s t i t u t i o n in 1995 by setting aside one-third of all councilor seats at the local governm e n t level for w o m e n (it w a s r a t i f i e d in 1997) ( G o p a l and S a l i m , 1998: 1 6 6 - 1 6 7 ) . T a n z a n i a also h a s set a s i d e a g u a r a n t e e d p r o p o r t i o n of its legislative seats for w o m e n ( M e e n a , 1989). A l t h o u g h such a f f i r m a t i v e action e f f o r t s in the political arena have been s u c c e s s f u l in raising w o m e n ' s participation, they are not e n o u g h to ensure equality as long as w o m e n are unequal in other areas of their societies. In U g a n d a , for e x a m p l e , w o m e n are often poorly e d u c a t e d and lack i n f o r m a t i o n on politics or on the law. F e w realize that o n e - t h i r d of the c o u n c i l o r seats are r e s e r v e d f o r t h e m and the g o v e r n m e n t has d o n e little to i n f o r m t h e m . Also, b e c a u s e m o s t w o m e n have so little access to land, businesses, or w e l l - p a y i n g j o b s , they lack the r e s o u r c e s , status, and c r e d i b i l i t y n e c e s s a r y for s u c c e s s f u l political c a n d i dacy (Gopal and Salim, 1998:173, 177). T h e s e disadvantages limit w o m e n ' s political involvement e l s e w h e r e in A f r i c a . T h e r e are also cultural barriers to o v e r c o m e if w o m e n are to gain m o r e political power. M a n y A f r i c a n s , m a l e and f e m a l e , h a v e a c c e p t e d m a l e d o m i n a n c e in g e n e r a l , i n c l u d i n g political l e a d e r s h i p roles. M a n y A f r i c a n w o m e n are reluctant or feel p o w e r l e s s to assert their rights to an a u t o n o m o u s individual e x i s t e n c e that is seen as c o n t r a r y to their c u l t u r e or national identity (Mikell. 1997a:341). Few of A f r i c a ' s male rulers have done m u c h to c h a l l e n g e these views. Most believe that male d o m i n a n c e is " n a t u r a l " or, at least, c o n f o r m s to African "tradition," neither of which one should attempt to change. For example, when Kenyan w o m e n at the U N International C o n f e r e n c e on W o m e n in Nairobi in 1985 r e c o m m e n d e d that w o m e n be more equitably represented in p a r l i a m e n t , P r e s i d e n t Daniel arap M o i r e s p o n d e d , " G o d m a d e m a n the head of the f a m i l y [and] c h a l l e n g i n g that was t a n t a m o u n t to c r i t i c i z i n g G o d " (Staudt, 1987:50). E v e n w h e n G o d is not invoked, most m a l e politicians want to see w o m e n r e m a i n in their so-called traditional and subordinate roles (Mikell, 1 9 9 7 a : 3 3 8 - 3 3 9 ) . O n e way w o m e n are e m p o w e r i n g t h e m s e l v e s is t h r o u g h g r a s s r o o t s self-help groups often f o r m e d by poor, peasant w o m e n w h o s e n e e d s are so f r e q u e n t l y n e g l e c t e d by g o v e r n m e n t , m o r e elitist w o m e n ' s g r o u p s , or dev e l o p m e n t agencies. T h e s e g r o u p s provide vital e c o n o m i c assistance, such as credit for f a r m i n g or b u s i n e s s v e n t u r e s , or other f o r m s of m u t u a l assistance to m e m b e r s (e.g., c h i l d c a r e , p i p e d water). T h e y h a v e their roots in

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precolonial w o m e n ' s groups where w o m e n worked together and provided each other assistance within the extended family network or in age-based groups (Enabulele, 1985; Safilios-Rothschild, 1990). For many w o m e n , groups are the only way they can get power or the resources they need because husbands have no p o w e r over the group as they do over w o m e n as wives. Group solidarity also builds w o m e n ' s s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e , and m a n y w o m e n feel their efforts have improved their lives and the welfare of their families and communities (Kabira and Nzioki, 1993:62-64, 73). A problem here is that most w o m e n and w o m e n ' s groups have been reluctant to challenge the f u n d a m e n t a l gender roles that subordinate w o m e n to males and extol the sexual division of labor that gives wealth and power primarily to men. This is partly because most national w o m e n ' s organizations are controlled by more-educated, middle-class women who by and large accept a Western " h o u s e w i f e " view of "a w o m a n ' s place." They can more often a f f o r d to imitate the Western h o u s e w i f e role as invented by the West; that is, the w o m a n who m a n a g e s the domestic arena (home and children) is to varying degrees financially dependent on a male breadwinner for money. Such w o m e n ' s interests and perspectives often diverge widely from the masses of less-educated women who must earn their own incomes to survive as well as take care of the home and children, yet who find that discrimination and inequality too often frustrate their efforts. Rather than offend the male ruling establishment, w o m e n ' s groups tend to be antifeminist and promote their own interests in securing more access to their husband's income, seeking more advantageous marriage and divorce laws, and promoting education in the domestic arts or beauty and fashion (Bujra, 1986; Staudt, 1987; Kabira and Nzioki, 1993). Recently, A f r i c a n w o m e n have been developing their own brand of feminism, which they believe is more responsive to African women's interests. They have typically sought to avoid identification with Western feminism, which has been painted as u n - A f r i c a n and too individualistic (Mikell, 1997b:4). W o m e n ' s organizations are growing in number and importance as they struggle for more rights, opportunities, and economic resources for w o m e n . M o r e groups are using the term feminist to describe their activities and goals. They realize they need to address their subordination and that gender equity is needed if national economic and political problems are to be solved. W o m e n have learned that they must challenge the male political leaders who have iimited and exploited women and tried to discredit A f r i c a n w o m e n ' s gender reform efforts (Mikell, 1997b:3-5, 3 1 - 3 2 ) . Elite women are crucial to this effort because they have the knowledge of politics, the ability to mobilize women, and the personal resources to convince others of the importance of improving the status of w o m e n (Toungara, 1997:61). Women are achieving notable success in promoting greater political and economic e m p o w e r m e n t for w o m e n . In K e n y a ' s 1992 elections, a

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record six w o m e n were elected to parliament, largely due to the efforts of the National Committee on the Status of Women (NCSW). N C S W ' s agenda is to increase w o m e n ' s political participation and officeholding, eliminate all discriminatory laws against women, mainstream gender issues in political party documents and programs, and sensitize both men and w o m e n to issues of gender equity ( N z o m o and Kibwana, 1993). W o m e n ' s groups in Kenya also were instrumental in including empowering women and eliminating discrimination against women as goals in the 1995 National Population Policy f o r Sustainable D e v e l o p m e n t (Center for Reproductive Law, 1997:161). T h e importance of gender to sustainable development was also e m p h a s i z e d in the East A f r i c a n C o n f e r e n c e on G e n d e r and Law attended by delegates f r o m Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, and Z i m b a b w e (Gopal and Salim, 1998:1). In South Africa, Albertina Sisulu and other black w o m e n were instrumental in getting the A N C to guarantee one-third of the positions on their parliamentary slate for w o m e n and to appoint w o m e n to high-level g o v e r n m e n t posts (Mikell, 1997b:28). In war-torn Mozambique, the almost all-female, 11,000-member General Union of Cooperatives ( U G C ) has attained remarkable e c o n o m i c success. The union has built 210 farm cooperatives that supply the capital city of Maputo with most of its fruit and vegetables. Recent privatization reforms have allowed the co-op to assist its members to acquire land titles, expand their economic activities, and open their own bank accounts for the first time. C o - o p w o m e n are breaking gender stereotypes by learning new skills for such nontraditional jobs as electrician and mason. These and other accomplishments have increased both the n u m b e r and status of U G C m e m b e r s and leaders (Lima, 1994). Other w o m e n ' s groups are c o n f r o n t i n g such serious social issues as sexual harassment, domestic violence, female genital mutilation ( F G M ) , and abortion rights ( A m p o f o , 1993; Tripp, 1991:28-29; TAMWA, 1993). This has led to some legal reforms. By far, South A f r i c a leads the way in advancing w o m e n ' s reproductive rights and criminalizing violence against women. Its new Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the right to m a k e decisions c o n c e r n i n g reproduction and the right to access to reproductive health services. In 1996, South Africa passed the Choice in Termination of Pregnancy Act, which guarantees abortion on request during the first trimester of pregnancy. In 1993, the Prevention of Family Violence Act outlawed marital and statutory rape (domestic violence is to be punished under assault laws) (Center for Reproductive Law, 1997:94, 98, 104). Almost all other African governments have far more restrictive laws with regard to abortion and limited c o m m i t m e n t to reducing violence against women. Perhaps the most divisive issues is F G M . Here, too, w o m e n are active in e f f o r t s to reform or eliminate the practice. A m a j o r p r o b l e m is that in m a n y countries w o m e n as well as men support F G M ; therefore, banning the practice would likely drive it underground. Most countries are

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trying instead to use education to discourage the practice and raise awareness of its harmful effects. In some cases, the support of the clergy (especially Muslim clergy) is being enlisted in order to counter the belief that there is a religious justification for F G M (see Rosen and Conly, 1998:56; Center for Reproductive Law, 1997:165). G r o w i n g international pressure to include w o m e n in development planning has helped to raise African m e n ' s and w o m e n ' s consciousness that neglecting w o m e n and discriminating against them is hurting the entire development effort. One response has been for many African governments (e.g., in C a m e r o o n , Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, and Z i m b a b w e ) to create special w o m e n ' s bureaus in the government to deal with w o m e n ' s issues and, as in Kenya, to coordinate all w o m e n ' s programs in the country. The problem is that these bureaus are not given much power or funding, and as government organs they cannot be highly critical of government policies or push for radical change (Nzomo, 1989). Most African governments have now signed international accords such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women ( C E D A W ) . This has given w o m e n ' s groups the a m m u n i tion they need to push f o r new measures to promote gender equity at all levels of society. Legal reform in personal law is one such area where change is needed but often difficult to implement or enforce. The reason is that since independence African states actually have had two kinds of laws, often at odds with each other on basic gender issues. Inherited f r o m the West are universalistic, secular, common laws that call for equality before the law for all citizens. Existing alongside such laws are so-called customary laws codified during the colonial period to reflect what were perceived (mainly by men) to be African customs. In Islamic areas these customary laws are often associated with conservative interpretations of Islamic law or shari'a. C u s t o m a r y law and shari'a are applied to such areas as marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance and give men considerable power and privilege over w o m e n . For example, such laws can prevent women f r o m inheriting land or cattle, may allow for arranged marriages of girls without their consent, and often forbid married women from entering into contracts without their h u s b a n d ' s consent. In many instances, married w o m e n have lost all access to marital property, including their homes, if their husbands died without a will naming them as the beneficiary of "his" property. Many r e f o r m s are being made throughout A f r i c a to address these inequalities. In some countries in the 1990s such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, new constitutions declared women's equality and proscribed gender discrimination in such areas as property ownership, employment, or marriage rights. Ghana even includes women's right to maternity leave in its constitution, and Ethiopia includes the right of women to

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plan their f a m i l i e s . Both G h a n a and E t h i o p i a also have constitutional prov i s i o n s against traditional p r a c t i c e s h a r m f u l to w o m e n . T h e s e c o u l d p r o vide a legal b a s i s for e l i m i n a t i n g such p r a c t i c e s as F G M ( C e n t e r f o r R e p r o d u c t i v e Law, 1997:154, 165). S p e c i f i c l a w s h a v e been c h a n g e d to i m p r o v e w o m e n ' s e c o n o m i c and family rights. In Cote d ' l v o i r e , p o l y g y n y and bridewealth are n o w f o r b i d den (World B a n k , 1986:40). In Islamic S e n e g a l , w o m e n can n o l o n g e r legally be m a r r i e d without their consent, m e n cannot take additional w i v e s w i t h o u t their first w i f e ' s c o n s e n t , and m e n can no l o n g e r r e p u d i a t e (div o r c e ) their w i v e s unless a j u d g e grants the d i v o r c e (Sow, 1 9 8 9 : 3 4 - 3 5 ) . S i n c e 1985, G h a n a ' s Intestate S u c c e s s i o n and Property L a w s r e q u i r e that all c u s t o m a r y m a r r i a g e and f a m i l y p r o p e r t y be registered a n d d i s t i n c t i o n m a d e b e t w e e n s e l f - a c q u i r e d and f a m i l y property. If a m a n dies intestate (without a will), his wife and children n o w get t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of his p r o p erty; o n e - q u a r t e r goes to his matrikin. Previously a m o n g G h a n a ' s matrilineal ethnic g r o u p s , most of a m a n ' s estate c o u l d be t a k e n by his m o t h e r ' s side of the family, leaving his w i f e and children with little or n o t h i n g (Dei, 1 9 9 4 : 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 ) . K e n y a ' s 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 6 national e c o n o m i c p r o g r a m calls f o r joint f a m i l y d e c i s i o n m a k i n g on land use and an equal distribution of econ o m i c b e n e f i t s b e t w e e n s p o u s e s . T h e a t t o r n e y general h a s set u p a task f o r c e to r e v i e w all laws a f f e c t i n g the status of w o m e n ( M u n y a k h o , 1994: 8 - 9 ) . Z i m b a b w e ' s 1997 E s t a t e s Act has been called " r e v o l u t i o n a r y . " A m a n ' s s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e and c h i l d r e n are a u t o m a t i c a l l y his b e n e f i c i a r i e s w h e n he dies. T h e m a t r i m o n i a l h o m e r e m a i n s with the s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e along with all h o u s e h o l d goods. A spouse subject to c u s t o m a r y law can inherit f r o m a d e c e a s e d s p o u s e e v e n if he or she dies intestate. M o r e a n d more African g o v e r n m e n t s are working to d e v e l o p more equitable laws " t o facilitate the d e v e l o p m e n t of both men and w o m e n " and to avoid "the risk of losing a n o t h e r generation of girls to a life of inequality and p o w e r l e s s n e s s " (Gopal and Salim, 1998:vi-vii, 109). Unfortunately, too often legal r e f o r m s are poorly e n f o r c e d and c u s t o m ary law is a l l o w e d to take p r e c e d e n c e over m o r e equitable statutory ( c o m m o n ) laws. T h i s is recognized as a p r o b l e m in South A f r i c a , and r e m a i n s a p r o b l e m e l s e w h e r e ( C e n t e r for R e p r o d u c t i v e Law, 1997:104). In Z i m b a b w e , d e s p i t e recent estate r e f o r m , w o m e n are o t h e r w i s e still e x c l u d e d f r o m control o v e r land and cattle, and w o m e n ' s a c c e s s to e c o n o m i c resources largely r e m a i n s through m e n . In legal disputes, j u d g e s tend to side with those u p h o l d i n g patriarchal p r i v i l e g e . " T h e r e s e e m s to be an a l m o s t i m p e n e t r a b l e m e n t a l barrier g r o u n d e d in g e n d e r s o c i a l i z a t i o n that prec l u d e s e v e n liberal male j u d g e s f r o m s t e p p i n g o u t s i d e the i n g r a i n e d n o tions of male superiority and f e m a l e subservience in m a r r i a g e " ( G o p a l and Salim, 1 9 9 8 : 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 ) . Social pressure on w o m e n to consent to c u s t o m a r y law can also prevent w o m e n f r o m exercising the new rights they h a v e been

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g i v e n b y law ( a s s u m i n g t h e y e v e n k n o w a b o u t t h e i r legal rights, w h i c h o f t e n is n o t t h e c a s e ) . In E t h i o p i a , f o r i n s t a n c e , n e w p r o p e r t y r i g h t s f o r w o m e n d o not a p p l y if w o m e n c h o o s e to be g o v e r n e d by c u s t o m a r y o r relig i o u s law. W o m e n f a c e o s t r a c i s m or o t h e r s a n c t i o n s f r o m c o n s e r v a t i v e f a m i l i e s or c o m m u n i t i e s if t h e y d o not c o n s e n t ( G o p a l and S a l i m , 1998: 142-143). In c o n c l u s i o n , s o m e c o u n t r i e s are m a k i n g e f f o r t s to i m p r o v e w o m e n ' s rights and o p p o r t u n i t i e s . T h e rate and e x t e n t of c h a n g e are highly v a r i a b l e a c r o s s the c o n t i n e n t , h o w e v e r , and t h e r e is o f t e n c o n s i d e r a b l e r e s i s t a n c e to r e f o r m s that w o u l d u n d e r m i n e " t r a d i t i o n a l " male d o m i n a n c e over the h o u s e h o l d and m a l e control o v e r e c o n o m i c and political p o w e r and r e s o u r c e s . M o r e o v e r , legal rights, w h i l e i m p o r t a n t , can result in little i m p r o v e m e n t in w o m e n ' s lives if access to education, health and r e p r o d u c t i v e services, training, and p r o d u c t i v e resources are not m a d e more available as well.

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PROSPECTS FOR AFRICAN WOMEN

I began this c h a p t e r by e x p r e s s i n g c o n c e r n f o r the future of the m a j o r i t y of A f r i c a ' s w o m e n . Although having an education and/or affluent parents imp r o v e s w o m e n ' s o p p o r t u n i t i e s , the vast m a j o r i t y of w o m e n are limited by b o t h e c o n o m i c u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t a n d sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y , m o s t w o m e n will, f o r the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e , c o n t i n u e to have a very d i f f i cult e x i s t e n c e as s u b s i s t e n c e f a r m e r s . It is b e c o m i n g r e c o g n i z e d , h o w e v e r , that a c h i e v i n g s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t in A f r i c a will r e q u i r e h e l p i n g w o m e n to b e c o m e m o r e p r o d u c t i v e and e m p o w e r e d m e m b e r s in all areas of social life (see P a l m e r , 1991; G o r d o n , 1996). A s m o r e w o m e n live in t h e b u r g e o n i n g cities of A f r i c a , the n e e d f o r j o b s and b u s i n e s s o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r w o m e n as well as m e n grows. Currently, m o s t w o m e n f i n d only m e a g e r r e m u n e r a t i o n f r o m w h a t is called the " i n f o r m a l s e c t o r " of m i c r o b u s i n e s s e s s p e c i a l i z i n g in services, crafts, repairs, and petty m a n u f a c t u r i n g and trade (cf. R o b e r t s o n , 1995; V u o r e l a , 1992; F r e e m a n , 1993). T h e i n f o r m a l sector, if g i v e n greater support f r o m g o v e r n m e n t , c o u l d be fertile g r o u n d f o r the e x p a n s i o n of i n d i g e n o u s A f r i c a n e n t r e p r e neurial activity a n d e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . T h e informal sector has already been the l a u n c h i n g g r o u n d f o r s u c c e s s f u l A f r i c a n b u s i n e s s w o m e n in such areas as trading, f o o d p r o c e s s i n g , and real estate (cf. G o r d o n , 1996; Tripp, 1992; N e l s o n , 1988; M a c G a f f e y , 1986). If A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s r e m o v e d legal barriers f o r w o m e n e n t r e p r e n e u r s and o b s t a c l e s to their acquiring credit and t e c h n o l o g y , t h u s a l l o w i n g w o m e n to c o m p e t e , t r a d i t i o n a l f e m a l e q u a l i t i e s s u c h as h a r d w o r k , t h r i f t , a n d skills in c o m m e r c e c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y p r o m o t e a large, f e m a l e , small- to m e d i u m - b u s i n e s s class. A l t h o u g h s o m e w o m e n by c h o i c e or n e c e s s i t y are d e p e n d i n g on their o w n b u s i n e s s e s or j o b s f o r survival or personal a d v a n c e m e n t , m a n y socially

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Women's contributions to national development and their need for economic assistance, such as better tools and agricultural extension services, are receiving greater attention in many African countries. mobile women who rationally assess the limited opportunities for women pursue either marriage or an informal sexual relationship with men to get ahead. This is the same strategy most women throughout the world are compelled to "choose" as long as economic and political resources are monopolized by men. Access to the resources of men can provide women with greater economic rewards than trying to earn an independent income in a sex-biased labor market (cf. Nelson, 1988; Dinan, 1983). Tragically, women's need to exchange sex for economic survival is a major factor in the AIDS epidemic in Africa, as discussed in Chapter 7. The dilemma of Africa's women who are trying to survive or get ahead in male-dominated societies is eloquently addressed by two of Africa's bestknown male novelists, Chinua Achebe (Nigeria) and Ngugi wa Thiong'o (Kenya). (See Chapter 12 for more on these two writers and on women writers who are critical of African societies' treatment of women.) While perhaps overstating the case to some extent, their accounts suggest that opportunities for most women are limited to being subordinate wives, "sugar girls," or mistresses (i.e., the "ready-to-yield") to well-to-do men. By the same token, elite men gain status from the number of women they have. In Achebe's Anthills of the Savannah, Beatrice, an educated career woman in a government ministry, had to overcome the socialization of her family, who discouraged her ambition and pressured her to be "feminine"—

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that is, a pleasing and compliant decoration (wife) for some elite man. Beatrice's feminism contrasts with the sexism of her male newspaper-editor friend, Ikem, a champion of the oppressed who nonetheless treats women primarily as sex objects not to be taken seriously. Even more biting than Achebe, Ngugi denounces throughout his satirical novel Devil on the Cross A f r i c a ' s subordination and denigration of women. While focusing generally on the venality and corruption of Kenya's postindependence elites, he castigates men for their treatment of w o m e n . Africa's "bosses," who control the economic opportunities of women, exact a high price for the jobs, homes, and material security they can either provide or withhold from women. Wariinga, the heroine of the story, is a victim of the system. A promising student, Wariinga is seduced by her father's boss with the help of her own father, who essentially sells his daughter in exchange for his own job advancement. Enticed by the boss's car, gifts, and flattery, Wariinga becomes his mistress until she becomes pregnant and he abandons her. Eventually she becomes a secretary, a woman's job that pays low wages and earns women little respect. Women in such jobs are also subjected to the sexual demands of their bosses and have little recourse except submitting or losing their hard-to-get jobs. As Wariinga laments, "Except for the lucky few, most of us can get jobs or keep them only by allowing the likes of Boss Kihara to paw our thighs" (Ngugi, 1982:206). Marriage would seem a more permanent and happy arrangement for women. But this may not be so if women have, as is often the case, no legal rights to their husband's income for themselves or their children. Also, wives often must submit to the indignity of their husbands having "sugar girls," mistresses, or additional, often younger, wives. Divorce or widowhood may leave an ex-wife with little or no financial security or may cost her her children. Even if legal reforms make the economic situation of wives more secure, and even if the dependent housewife role many Westernized Africans admire becomes more widespread, the overall advantage of this role is another issue. As both Achebe and Ngugi see it, the Western housewife role in Africa would further marginalize women from the economic and political life of their societies and reduce affluent women to an existence of superfluity and little purpose b e y o n d conspicuous consumption—all under the guise of "modernization." In Devil on the Cross, at the " d e v i l ' s f e a s t " the w o m e n of wealthy Kenyan men are provided with entertainment reflecting their significance in African development: 1 w o u l d like to remind the w o m e n here, w h e t h e r they are w i v e s , m i s tresses, or g i r l f r i e n d s , that after the c o m p e t i t i o n there will be a f a s h i o n parade, a c h a n c e for you to s h o w o f f your jewellery, your gold, diamonds, silver, rubies, tanzanites, pearls. We must d e v e l o p our culture, and you k n o w very well that it is the w a y that w o m e n dress and the kind of j e w e l l e r y they

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w e a r that indicates the heights a culture has reached. So . . . h a v e ready y o u r necklaces, earrings, rings and b r o o c h e s , so that we can impress our f o r e i g n guests and show them that we too are on the way to modern civilization. (Ngugi, 1982:125)

In a similar vein, Achebe, through the character Ikem, discusses the " w o m a n on a pedestal," once extolled in the West as the ideal domesticated woman. After recounting the original oppression of women in society and myth, Ikem concludes that becoming men's dependents is just a more enlightened form of oppression of women. So the idea came to Man to turn his spouse into the very Mother of God, to pick her up from right under his foot where s h e ' d been since Creation and carry her reverently to a nice, corner pedestal. Up there, her feet completely off the ground she will be just as irrelevant to the practical decisions of r u n n i n g the world as she was in her bad old days. T h e only difference is that now Man will suffer no guilt feelings; he can sit back and congratulate himself on his generosity and gentlemanliness. (Achebe, 1988:89)

As elsewhere in the world, it is unclear what African w o m e n ' s longterm role in development will be or how development (whatever that turns out to be) will alter women's roles. Much will depend on the external environment: the changing global economy and its effects on the division of labor, investments, credit, and development assistance in Africa. Political pressure on multinational corporations, governments, lenders, and international donors by men and women dedicated to gender equality will be vital to ensure that women's interests are not neglected. Within Africa itself, independent and representative women's organizations, from peasant cooperatives and credit associations to large nationwide groups, need to be supported and expanded. Nonsexist education and training for women and men as well as equal access to jobs, property, and leadership positions must be provided. Finally, women's full humanity and citizenship must be legally acknowledged and vigorously protected. Given Africa's critical economic and political problems, it appears increasingly obvious that suppressing the talents and skills of women to protect m e n ' s privileges is an enormous waste of human resources that Africa—with its vast potential—can no longer afford.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Achebe, Chinua. 1988. Anthills of the Savannah. New York: Anchor. A m a d i u m e , Ifi. 1987. Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society. London: Zed. A m p o f o , A k o s u a A d o m a k o . 1993. " C o n t r o l l i n g and P u n i s h i n g W o m e n in G h a n a . " Review of African Political Economy 56 (March): 102-111.

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Bernal, Victoria. 1988. "Losing G r o u n d — W o m e n and Agriculture on S u d a n ' s Irrigated Schemes: Lessons from a Blue Nile Village." Pp. 1 3 1 - 1 5 6 in Jean Davison (ed.). Agriculture, Women, and Land: The African Experience. Boulder: Westview Press. Blumberg, Rae Lesser. 1995. "Introduction: Engendering Wealth and Well-Being in an Era of Economic Transformation." Pp. 1 - 1 4 in Rae Lesser Blumberg, Cathy A. R a k o w s k i , Irene Tinker, and Michael M o n t e o n (eds.). Engendering Wealth and Well-Being: Empowerment for Global Change. Boulder: Westview Press. Boserup, Ester. 1970. Women's Role in Economic Development. London: Allen and Unwin. B u j r a , Jane B. 1986. " U r g i n g W o m e n to R e d o u b l e T h e i r Efforts: Class, Gender, and Capitalist Transformation in A f r i c a . " Pp. 117-140 in Claire Robertson and Iris Berger (eds.). Women and Class in Africa. N e w York: Africana. Carney, Judith A. 1988. " S t r u g g l e s over Land and C r o p s in an Irrigated Rice S c h e m e : The G a m b i a . " Pp. 5 9 - 7 8 in Jean Davison (ed.). Agriculture, Women, and Land: The African Experience. Boulder: Westview Press. C e n t e r for R e p r o d u c t i v e L a w and Policy and the International Federation of Women L a w y e r s (Kenya Chapter). 1997. Women of the World: Laws and Policies Affecting Their Reproductive Lives—Anglophone Africa. New York.: Center for Reproductive Law and Policy. C h a n o c k , M a r t i n . 1982. " M a k i n g C u s t o m a r y Law: M e n , W o m e n , and Courts in Colonial N o r t h e r n R h o d e s i a . " Pp. 5 3 - 6 7 in M a r g a r e t Jean Hay and Marcia Wright (eds.). African Women and the Law: Historical Perspectives. Boston University Papers on Africa 7. Cutrufelli, Maria R. 1983. Women of Africa: Roots of Oppression. London: Zed. Davison, Jean. 1988. " W h o O w n s What? Land Registration and Tensions in Gender Relations of Production in K e n y a . " Pp. 1 5 7 - 1 7 6 in Jean Davison (ed.). Agriculture, Women, and Land: The African Experience. Boulder: Westview Press. Dei, G e o r g e J. Sefa. 1994. " T h e W o m e n of a G h a n a i a n Village: A Study of Social C h a n g e . " African Studies Review 37 (September): 121-145. Dinan, C a r m e l . 1983. " S u g a r Daddies and G o l d - D i g g e r s : The White Collar Single W o m e n in A c c r a . " Pp. 3 4 4 - 3 6 6 in Christine O p p o n g (ed.). Female and Male in West Africa. London: Allen and Unwin. E n a b u l e l e , Arlene Bene. 1985. " T h e Role of W o m e n ' s A s s o c i a t i o n s in N i g e r i a ' s D e v e l o p m e n t : Social Welfare Perspective." Pp. 1 8 7 - 1 9 4 in Women in Nigeria Today. L o n d o n : Zed. Faruqee, Rashid, and Ravi Gulhati. 1983. Rapid Population Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues and Policies. No. 559. Washington, DC: World Bank. Freeman, Donald. 1993. "Survival Strategy or Business Training G r o u n d ? The Sign i f i c a n c e of U r b a n Agriculture for the A d v a n c e m e n t of W o m e n in A f r i c a n Cities." African Studies Review 36 (December): 1 - 2 2 . Goheen, Miriam. 1988. "Land and the Household Economy: Women Farmers of the G r a s s f i e l d s Today." Pp. 9 0 - 1 0 5 in Jean D a v i s o n (ed.). Agriculture, Women, and Land: The African Experience. Boulder: Westview Press. G o p a l , Gita, and M a r y a n n Salim (eds.). 1998. Gender and Law: East Africa Speaks. Washington, DC: World Bank. G o r d o n , April. 1996. Transforming Capitalism ad Patriarchy: Gender and Development in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. . 2 0 0 1 . " W o m e n and S u s t a i n a b l e D e v e l o p m e n t in A f r i c a . " Pp. 2 1 3 - 2 3 7 in O b i o m a M. Iheduru (ed.). Contending Issues in African Development: Advances, Challenges, and the Future. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Green, Cynthia P. (ed.). 1994. Sustainable Development: Population and the Environment. Washington, DC: U S A I D .

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Guyer, Jane I. 1984. Family and Farm in Southern Cameroon. Boston: Boston University, African Studies Center. H a m m o n d , Dorothy, and Alta Jablow. 1970. The Africa That Never Was. New York: Twayne Publishers. Hansen, Karen T. 1987. "Urban Women and Work in Africa: A Zambian C a s e . " TransAfrica Forum 4 (spring):9-24. Jacobson, Jodi L. 1993. "Closing the Gender Gap in Development." Pp. 6 1 - 7 9 in Lester Brown, Gary Gardner, and Brian Halweil (eds.). State of the World. New York: W. W. Norton. Kabira. Wanjiku M., and Elizabeth A. Nzioki. 1993. Celebrating Women's Resistance: A Case Study of Women's Group Movement in Kenya. Nairobi: African Women's Perspective. Kettel, Bonnie. 1986. "The Commoditization of Women in Tugen (Kenya) Social Organization." Pp. 4 7 - 6 1 in Claire Robertson and Iris Berger (eds.). Women and Class in Africa. New York: Africana. Langley, Philip. 1983. "A Preliminary Approach to Women and Development. Getting a Few Facts Right." Pp. 7 9 - 1 0 0 in Gerard M. Ssenkoloto (ed.). The Roles of Women in the Process of Development. Douala, Cameroon: Pan African Institute for Development. Lima, Teresa. 1994. "Women's Co-ops Spur Mozambican Farmers Union." African Farmer (April): 16-17. Lovett. Margot. 1989. "Gender Relations, Class Formation, and the Colonial State in Africa." Pp. 23^46 in Jane L. Parpart and Kathleen A. Staudt (eds.). Women and the State in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. MacGaffey, Janet. 1986. "Women and Class Formation in a Dependent Economy." Pp. 161-177 in Claire Robertson and Iris Berger (eds.). Women and Class in Africa. New York: Africana. Malindi, Grace Margaret. 1995. "Participation of Rural Women in Malawi National Rural D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m . " Pp. 113-131 in Valentine Udoh James (ed.). Women and Sustainable Development in Africa. Westport, CT: Praeger. Meena, Ruth. 1989. "Crisis and Structural Adjustment: Tanzanian W o m e n ' s Politics." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 17 (2) (summer):29-31. Mikell, Gwendolyn. 1997a. "Conclusions: Theorizing and Strategizing About Women and State Crisis." Pp. 3 3 3 - 3 4 8 in Gwendolyn Mikell (ed.). African Feminism: The Politics of Survival in Sub-Saharan Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. . 1997b. "Introduction." Pp. 1 - 5 0 in Gwendolyn Mikell (ed.). African Feminism: The Politics of Survival in Sub-Saharan Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Morna, Colleen Lowe. 1995. "Plus 9a Change." African Report 40 (January-February): 55-59. Munyakho, Dorothy. 1994. "Kenyan Women Press for Land Rights." African Farmer (April):8-9. Nelson. Nici. 1988. "How Women and Men Get By: The Sexual Division of Labor in the Informal Sector of a Nairobi Squatter Settlement." Pp. 183-203 in Josef Gugler (ed.). The Urbanization of the Third World. New York: Oxford University Press. Newland, Kathleen. 1991. "From Transnational Relationships to International Relations: Women in Development and the International Decade for Women." Pp. 122-132 in Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland (eds.). Gender and International Relations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ngugi wa Thiong'o. 1982. Devil on the Cross. London: Heinemann. Nweke. Therese. 1985. "The Role of Women in Nigerian Society: The Media." Pp. 2 0 1 - 2 0 7 in Women in Nigeria Today. London: Zed.

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N w o m o n o h , Jonathan. 1995. " A f r i c a n Women in Production: The E c o n o m i c Role of Rural W o m e n . " Pp. 1 7 1 - 1 8 1 in Valentine U d o h J a m e s (ed.). Women and Sustainable Development in Africa. Westport, CT: Praeger. N z o m o , Maria. 1989. " T h e Impact of the W o m e n ' s D e c a d e on Policies, P r o g r a m s and E m p o w e r m e n t of W o m e n in K e n y a . " Issue: A Journal of Opinion 17 (2) (summer):9-17. N z o m o , Maria, and K i v u t h a K i b w a n a (eds.). 1993. Women's Initiatives in Kenya's Democratization. Nairobi: National C o m m i t t e e on the Status of W o m e n . O b a d i n a , Elizabeth. 1985. " H o w Relevant Is the Western W o m e n ' s Liberation M o v e m e n t for N i g e r i a ? " Pp. 1 3 8 - 1 4 2 in Women in Nigeria Today. L o n d o n : Zed. Palmer, Ingrid. 1991. Gender and Population in the Adjustment of African Economies: Planning for Change. G e n e v a : International Labour Organisation. P a n k h u r s t , D o n n a , and Susie J a c o b s . 1988. " L a n d Tenure, G e n d e r R e l a t i o n s , and Agricultural Production: T h e C a s e of Z i m b a b w e ' s Peasantry." Pp. 2 0 2 - 2 2 7 in Jean Davison (ed.). Agriculture, Women, and Land: The African Experience. Boulder: Westview Press. Parpart, Jane L. 1988. " W o m e n and the State in A f r i c a . " Pp. 2 0 8 - 2 3 0 in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds.). The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa. Boulder: Westview Press. Picard, Mary T h e r e s a . 1995. " L i s t e n i n g to and L e a r n i n g f r o m A f r i c a n W o m e n F a r m e r s . " Pp. 3 5 - 6 2 in Valentine Udoh J a m e s (ed.). Women and Sustainable Development in Africa. Westport, CT: Praeger. R o b e r t s o n , Claire. 1995. " T r a d e , Gender, and Poverty in the Nairobi Area: W o m e n ' s Strategies for S u r v i v a l and I n d e p e n d e n c e in the 1980s." Pp. 6 8 87 in Rae Lesser B l u m b e r g , Cathy A. R a k o w s k i , Irene Tinker, and Michael M o n t e o n (eds.). Engendering Wealth and Welt-Being: Empowerment for Global Change. Boulder: Westview Press. Rosen, James E., and Shanti R. Conly. 1998. Africa's Population Challenge: Accelerating Progress in Reproductive Health. Washington, DC: Population Action International. S a f i l i o s - R o t h s c h i l d , C o n s t a n t i n a . 1990. " W o m e n ' s G r o u p s : An U n d e r u t i l i z e d G r a s s r o o t s Institution." Pp. 1 0 2 - 1 0 8 in The Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa. Vol. 3. Washingtonl, DC: World Bank. Schuster, Ilsa M. G. 1982. "Marginal Lives: Conflict and Contradiction in the Position of F e m a l e T r a d e r s in L u s a k a , Z a m b i a . " Pp. 1 0 5 - 1 2 6 in E d n a G. Bay (ed.). Women and Work in Africa. Boulder: Westview Press. Sow, Fatou. 1989. " S e n e g a l : The Decade and Its C o n s e q u e n c e s . " Issue: A Journal of Opinion 17 ( 2 ) : 3 2 - 3 6 . Staudt, Kathleen. 1987. " W o m e n ' s Politics, the State, and Capitalist Transformation in A f r i c a . " Pp. 1 9 3 - 2 0 8 in Irving L. M a r k o v i t z (ed.). Studies in Power and Class in Africa. New York: O x f o r d University Press. T A M W A (Tanzanian M e d i a W o m e n ' s Association). 1993. " V i o l e n c e Against Women in Tanzania." Review nf African Political Economy 5 6 : 1 1 1 - 1 1 6 . Toungara, Jeanne M a d d o x . 1997. "Changing the Meaning of Marriage: W o m e n and Family Law in Cote d ' l v o i r e . " Pp. 5 3 - 7 6 in G w e n d o l y n Mikell (ed.). African Feminism: The Politics of Survival in Sub-Saharan Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Tripp, Aili Marie. 1991. " W o m e n and Democratization in Africa: Reflections on the Tanzanian C a s e . " Paper presented at the meeting of the African Studies Association, St. Louis, Missouri, N o v e m b e r 2 3 - 2 6 . . 1992. " T h e I m p a c t of C r i s i s and E c o n o m i c R e f o r m on W o m e n in U r b a n T a n z a n i a . " Pp. 1 5 9 - 1 8 0 in L o u r d e s Beneria and Shelley F e l d m a n (eds.).

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Unequal Burden: Economic Crises, Persistent Poverty and Women's Work. Boulder: Westview Press. Vellenga, D o r o t h y D. 1986. "Matriliny, Patriliny, and Class F o r m a t i o n A m o n g W o m e n C o c o a F a r m e r s in T w o Rural Areas of G h a n a . " Pp. 6 2 - 7 7 in Claire R o b e r t s o n and Iris Berger (eds.). Women and Class in Africa. N e w York: Africana. von Bulow, Dorthe, and Anne Sorensen. 1993. " G e n d e r and Contract Farming: Tea O u t g r o w e r S c h e m e s in K e n y a . " Review of African Political Economy 56: 38-52. Vuorela, Ulla. 1992. " T h e Informal Sector, Social Reproduction, and the Impact of the E c o n o m i c Crisis on W o m e n . " Pp. 1 0 9 - 1 2 3 in H o r a c e C a m p b e l l and H o w a r d Stein (eds.). Tanzania and the IMF: The Dynamics of Liberalization. Boulder: Westview Press. Weekes-Vagliani, W i n i f r e d . 1985. " W o m e n , Food, and Rural D e v e l o p m e n t . " Pp. 104-110 in Tore Rose (ed.). Crisis and Recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa. Paris: Organization for E c o n o m i c Cooperation and D e v e l o p m e n t . World Bank. 1986. Population Growth and Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, D C : World Bank. . 1989. Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A LongTerm Perspective Study. Washington, DC: World Bank. . 1990. Women in Development: A Progress Report on the World Bank Initiative. Washington, DC: World Bank. . 1995. World Development Report. New York: O x f o r d University Press. . 1996. Toward Environmentally Sustainable Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A World Bank Agenda. Washington, DC: World Bank. . 2000. Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? Washington, DC: World Bank. . 2001. World Development Report 200012001. New York, NY: O x f o r d University Press.

Religion in Africa Ambrose Moyo

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he importance of religion in any attempt to understand African life in

all its social, economic, and political aspects cannot be o v e r e m p h a sized. Mbiti's (1969:1) observation that African people are "notoriously religious," consciously or unconsciously, is still true of a large majority of people, urban or rural, educated or less educated. Even those who claim to be atheist, agnostic, or antireligion, of w h o m there is a growing number, often have no option but to participate in extended family activities, some of which require the invocation of supernatural powers. Religion permeates all aspects of African traditional societies. It is a way of life in which the whole c o m m u n i t y is involved, and as such it is identical with life itself. Even antireligious persons still have to be involved in the lives of their religious communities, because in terms of A f r i c a n thought, life can be meaningful only in community, not in isolation. Because of the size of the African continent and the great diversity of religious traditions, with variations even within the same tradition, it would be an impossible task to cover the subject of this chapter in one volume, let alone in one chapter of a book. Consequently, this chapter is a survey of the f o l l o w i n g three principal religious traditions on the continent: (1) the A f r i c a n indigenous religious beliefs and practices that, for lack of a better term, have been called in Africa scholarship African Traditional Religions (Idowu, 1971); (2) Christianity, including its expressions in the A f r i c a n indigenous Christian m o v e m e n t s ; and (3) Islam. There are other religious traditions practiced on the continent, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Baha'i, but they are practiced by small minorities that include few indigenous African people (Barrett, 1982:782). The study of the Christian and Islamic traditions poses no insurmountable difficulties with regard to our sources of information. Both have their sacred books, namely the Old and New Testaments for Christianity, and the 299

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Quran for Islam. The f o u n d e r s of these t w o traditions, their primary sources, and their geographical origins remain the same for all the adherents of these faiths regardless of the different interpretations. African Traditional Religions have no sacred books, their b e g i n n i n g s cannot be pinpointed, and each of the many traditions is practiced by one African group with no r e f e r e n c e w h a t s o e v e r to the religion practiced by other groups. Each A f r i c a n group exists as a c o m p l e t e social, e c o n o m i c , religious, and political entity with no missionary designs. With the many basic, c o m m o n elements, there are also some differences in religious beliefs and practices that speak against generalizations. As unrelated and independent as African groups may appear, they nonetheless share some of the same basic religious beliefs and practices. These c o m m o n , basic features suggest a c o m mon background or origin and lead to African Traditional Religions being treated as a single religious tradition, just as Christianity and Islam have many denominations or sects within themselves but continue to be treated as single entities. However, since this chapter is only a survey and an introduction to A f r i c a n religions, the need is to concentrate on the basic, c o m m o n elements and point out some of the significant differences as we go along. Perhaps a question may be raised concerning our sources of information on African Traditional Religions since there are no sacred scriptures or

Many African societies have used masks to represent ancestors a n a other spiritual figures. These dancers are Dogon of Mali.

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clearly defined and documented dogmas. Indeed, many studies have recently appeared on different aspects of African Traditional Religions, but hardly any of them speak from the tradition they present. They are primarily the works of sociologists, anthropologists, and theologians, many of whom have had little or no experience of these religions as their own faith. Consequently, the African arts, paintings, sculptures, music and dance, myths and rituals, archaeological findings, and oral tradition become extremely important as sources of information. We begin our survey with African Traditional Religions, and the examples used will be drawn from the subSaharan region.

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AFRICAN TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS

Although African Traditional Religions have no sacred books or definitive creeds upon which to base any analysis of these religions, from the sources referred to above, the following religious phenomena seem to be basic and common to most of them: (a) belief in a supreme being, (b) belief in spirits/divinities, (c) belief in life after death, (d) religious personnel and sacred places, and (e) witchcraft and magic practices. This section of the survey will focus on these aspects of African Traditional Religions. f-

Belief in the Supreme Being

The African perception of the universe is centered on the belief in a supreme being who is the creator and sustainer of the universe. God, as far as the African traditionalist is concerned, is the ground of all being. Humanity is inseparably bound together with all of God's creation since they both derive their lives from God, the source of all life. This strong belief in God appears to be universal in traditional societies. The question to be asked is: How is this God perceived? Names in African societies tell a whole story about the family—its history, relationships, hopes, and aspirations. African societies have so much to tell about God as they relate to God; hence, each society has many names for the Supreme Being. These names are expressions of the different forms in which God relates to creation. In other words, God in African traditional thought can only be known in the different relationships as expressed in God's names. For example, among my people in Zimbabwe, God is Musikavanhu (creator of humankind) and MusikiluMdali (creator), which affirms that God is the originator of all there is. But Musikavanhu goes beyond the idea of creator to the notion of the parenthood of God. Hence, God is also designated Mudzimu Mukuru (the Great Ancestor). As parent, God is also the sustainer of creation. God's creativity is continuous and is celebrated with every new birth, and each rite of passage is an

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expression of gratitude to God for having sustained the individual and the c o m m u n i t y that far. These n a m e s also affirm the belief in the c o n t i n u o u s creativity of G o d . Similarly, in the names Chidziva Chepo or Dzinaguru, G o d is perceived as the giver and the source of water. Each time it rains, G o d is sustaining creation in a visible way. This explains, in c e r e m o n i e s relating to drought, why people appeal directly to God. So also the n a m e Samasimba ( o w n e r of p o w e r / a l m i g h t y ) affirms God not only as the most powerful being but also as the source and owner of all power. T h e A f r i c a n traditionalist does not perceive God as some s u p r e m e being in merely speculative terms. African thought in general is not given to speculation. That which is real has to be experienced in real-life situations, directly or indirectly. God can, therefore, be real only insofar as God has been experienced in concrete life situations in different relationships with people and the rest of creation. In other words, African traditional thought cannot conceive of God in abstract terms as some being who exists as an idea mysteriously related to this world—distant, unconcerned, uninterested in what goes on here below. African thought can express itself only in concrete and practical terms. Consequently, Africans' view of G o d can arise only out of concrete and practical relationships as God meets their needs. In that way, they experience G o d ' s love and power (see McVeigh, 1974; Mbiti, 1970). In terms of African thought, there can be only one Supreme Being. Interestingly e n o u g h , b e f o r e the encounter with Christianity, some A f r i c a n societies already had some concept of the Trinity. This seems to have been the case in some African societies, as demonstrated by Twesigye (1987:93) in his research into his people's traditional religions in southern and western Uganda. In an interview with an old traditionalist, Mr. Antyeri Bintukwanga, Twesigye uncovered the following information: Before the Europeans came to Uganda and before the white Christian missionaries came to our land of Enkole or your homeland of Kigezi, we had our own religion and we knew God well. We knew God so well that the missionaries added to us little. . . . We even knew God to be some kind of externally existing triplets: Nyamuhanga being the first one and being also the creator of everything, Kazooba Nyamuhanga being his second brother w h o gives light to all human beings so that they should not stumble either on the path or even in their lives. . . . Kazooka's light penetrates the hearts of people and God sees the contents of the human hearts by Kazooba's eternal light. . . . The third brother in the group is Rugaba Rwa Nyamuhanga, who takes what Nyamuhanga has created and gives it to the people as he wishes. . . . You see! We had it all before the missionaries came, and all they did teach us was that Nyamuhanga is God the Father, Kazooba Jesus Christ his son and not his brother as we thought, and that Rugaba as the divine giver is the Holy Spirit. (Twesigye, 1987:93)

In traditional societies, God is believed to be eternal, loving, and just, the creator and sustainer of the universe. G o d ' s existence is simply taken

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for granted, hence the absence of arguments for or against the existence of God. Atheism is foreign to African thought. The most widely used name for God among my people is Mwari, which means literally "the one who is." A question often raised is whether God is actually worshiped in African Traditional Religions. Some Western observers have concluded that African people do not worship God but rather have no religion at all, are animists, or worship ancestor spirits or many gods. This issue will be examined in conjunction with the discussion on ancestors and lesser divinities in the next section.

Belief in Divinities and Spirits The Supreme Being is believed to be surrounded by a host of supernatural or spiritual powers of different types and functions. Their nature, number, and functions vary from region to region, and they may be either male or female, just as God in many African traditions is perceived as being both male and female. The numerous divinities, called orisha among the Yoruba in Nigeria or bosom among the Akan of Ghana (and sometimes referred to as "lesser divinities" in order not to confuse them with the Supreme Being), are found in most western African traditions but generally not in eastern and southern African traditions. These orisha are subordinate to the Supreme Being. They are believed to be servants or messengers of Olodumare (God). God has assigned to each one of them specific areas of responsibility. For example, the divinity Orun-mila is responsible for all forms of knowledge, and he is therefore associated with divination and the oracle at Ile-Ife in Nigeria. The orisha are believed either to have emanated from the Supreme Being or to be deified human beings. Some of the divinities are associated with the sky, earth, stars, moon, trees, mountains, rivers, and other natural elements (see Idowu, 1962). Perhaps more universal among African traditionalists is the belief in ancestor spirits, called vadzimu among the Shona people of Zimbabwe or amadhozi among the Zulu/Ndebele traditions. These are spirits of the deceased mothers and fathers who are recognized in a special ceremony, held usually a year after they have died. This ceremony is called umbuyiso (the bringing-home ceremony) in Zulu/Ndebele or kurova guva by the Zezuru. From that moment, the deceased person becomes an active "living dead" member of the community and is empowered to function as a guardian spirit and to mediate with God and other ancestors on behalf of his or her descendants. Among my own people, it is to these spirits that most prayers and sacrifices are made, but often the prayers are concluded by instructing the ancestors to take the prayers and offerings to Musikavanhu (creator of humankind) or Nyadenga (the owner of the sky/heavens). The significance of ancestors among Africans has led to the common misconception that these spirits are worshiped. Traditionalists will categorically deny that they worship their ancestor spirits but rather worship God

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through them. A n c e s t o r spirits are departed elders. A f r i c a n p e o p l e s in general have a very high respect for elders. If, for e x a m p l e , one has grievously w r o n g e d his or her parents, it w o u l d be utterly d i s r e s p e c t f u l and u n a c c e p t able to g o directly and ask f o r f o r g i v e n e s s . O n e w o u l d have to go t h r o u g h s o m e r e s p e c t a b l e e l d e r l y p e r s o n to w h o m one w o u l d give s o m e t o k e n of r e p e n t a n c e to take to the parent. Similarly, w h e n a y o u n g m a n and his fia n c é e d e c i d e to get m a r r i e d , the p r o s p e c t i v e f a t h e r - i n - l a w will h a v e to be a p p r o a c h e d by the y o u n g m a n ' s parents through a c a r e f u l l y c h o s e n a n d respectable mediator. In the same spirit, one cannot a p p r o a c h a chief or king directly but must have his or her case taken to the chief through a subchief. E v e n m o r e so, G o d — t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t , the g r e a t e s t and m o s t p o w e r f u l being, the Great A n c e s t o r and creator of a l l — m u s t be a p p r o a c h e d t h r o u g h intermediaries. T h e ancestor spirits are believed to be closest to both their living d e s c e n d a n t s and to the S u p r e m e B e i n g and are thus m o s t q u a l i f i e d to f u n c t i o n as intermediaries. A n c e s t o r spirits are not the objects of worship. T h e y are guardian spirits and i n t e r m e d i a r i e s . T h e y are b e l i e v e d to be r e s p o n s i b l e to G o d f o r all their actions. A s f a m i l y elders they must be respected, and if not, they too, just like the living elders, can get angry and d e m a n d that they be a p p e a s e d . Quite o f t e n , the n a m e of the S u p r e m e Being is not m e n t i o n e d in petitions; still, it is believed that G o d is the ultimate recipient of all prayer and sacrifices. A l t h o u g h not w o r s h i p e d , the ancestors in s o m e traditions are closely associated with the S u p r e m e Being, so m u c h so that it b e c o m e s difficult to d e t e r m i n e in s o m e of the p r a y e r s w h e t h e r the a d d r e s s is to G o d or to the ancestor. Take, for e x a m p l e , the following prayer of the Shilluk, who rarely address God directly. N y i k a n g is the f o u n d i n g ancestor of the Shilluk. There is no o n e a b o v e y o u , O G o d (Juok). You b e c a m e the grandfather o f N y i k a n g ; it is y o u N y i k a n g w h o walk with G o d , y o u b e c a m e the grandfather o f man. If f a m i n e c o m e s , is it not g i v e n by y o u ? . . . We praise y o u w h o are G o d . Protect us, w e are in y o u r hands, and protect us. s a v e m e . You and N y i k a n g , y o u are the o n e s w h o created. . . . T h e c o w for sacrif i c e is here for y o u , and the b l o o d will g o to G o d and y o u . (Parrinder,

1969:69) One of my S h o n a informants told m e that, as far as the S h o n a are concerned, God and the ancestors are one; an address to one is an address to the other. This m e a n s that even if at times o n e does not hear the n a m e of G o d mentioned, it does not m e a n the people do not worship God. G o d and ancestors are closely associated and work very closely with each other. For example, they believe that children are a gift of Mwari (God) and the vadzimu (ancestors). So frequently one will hear the people say kana Mwari nevadzimu vachida ("if G o d and the ancestors are willing"). W h e n faced with misfortune, one will say: Ko Mwari wati ndaita sei? ("What crime does God accuse m e o f ? " ) , or they will say mudzimu yafuratira ("the a n c e s t o r s h a v e

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turned their backs"; that is, on the individual or family, hence the misfortune) (Moyo, 1987). There are different categories of ancestor spirits. There are family ancestors, family being understood in its extended sense. These have responsibility over the members of their families only, and it is only to them that the members can bring their petitions, never to the ancestors of other families. Then there are ancestors whose responsibilities extend over the whole tribe and not just over their own immediate families. These relate to the founders of the tribe and are represented by the royal house. These play an active role in matters that affect the entire community or tribe, such as drought or some epidemic. They are called Mhondoros (lion spirits) among the Shona people. Most significantly, ancestor spirits serve as intermediaries. However, there are times when most of the African peoples will pray and make sacrifices to God directly. When, for example, one is in critical danger—faceto-face with some man-eating animal, or when thunder and lightning strike, or drowning—then one would approach God directly.

Belief in Life After Death Death is believed to have come into the world as an intrusion. Human beings were originally meant to live forever through rejuvenation or some form of resurrection. So, most African peoples have myths that intend to explain the origin of death. There are, for example, some myths that depict death as having come in because some mischievous animal cut the rope or removed the ladder linking heaven, the abode of the Supreme Being, and earth, the abode of humankind. Such a rope or ladder allowed people to ascend to and descend from heaven for rejuvenation. Other myths see death as punishment from God for human disobedience. God and human beings lived together until a tragic event that led to the intervention of death, which then separated God and people. Despite the loss of the original state of bliss and the intervention of death, it is generally believed that there is still life beyond the grave, that life may take several forms. In some traditions, the dead may be reincarnated in the form of an animal such as a lion, a rabbit, or a snake. In that form one cannot be killed, and if reborn as a lion, one can protect one's descendants from the danger of other animals. Or the person may be reincarnated in one of his or her descendants. In general, people believe there is a world of the ancestors, and when one dies, one goes on a long journey to get to that world. The world of the ancestors is conceived of in terms of this world; hence, people are buried with some of their utensils and implements. That world is also thought of as overlapping with this world, and ancestors are believed to be a part of the community of the living. The terms living dead or the shades are approximately accurate English

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renderings of those invisible members of the community (see Mbiti, 1969; Berglund, 1976). That there is life after death is also a f f i r m e d in the belief that a dead person can return to punish those who have wronged him or her while still alive. One of the most feared spirits a m o n g the Shona is the ngozi, a v e n g e f u l spirit that will kill m e m b e r s of the family of the person who wronged the individual while still alive until payment or retribution has been made. In general, people believe they are surrounded by a cloud of ancestors with w h o m they must share everything they have, including their joys and frustrations. Their expectation of the hereafter is thought of in terms of what people already k n o w and have experienced. People know there is a future life because they interact with their departed ancestors through spirit mediums.

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Religious Leadership and Sacred Places

There are different types of religious leaders in African Traditional Religions. These can be either male or female. Where the tradition has regular shrines for specific deities, there will be some resident cultic officials. At the shrine at Matongeni in Zimbabwe, for example, the priestly community is made up of both males and females, with roles clearly defined. The Yoruba and the Akan have regular cultic officials presiding at the shrines of their divinities. They o f f e r sacrifices and petitions on behalf of their clients. Among most of the Bantu-speaking peoples, heads of families also carry out priestly functions on matters that relate to their families. Another category of religious leadership, perhaps the most powerful, is that of spirit mediums. These are individual members of the family or clan through whom the spirit of an ancestor communicates with its descendants. They can be either male or female, but most are female. Among these are family spirit m e d i u m s and the tribal or territorial spirit m e d i u m s such as Mbuya (grandmother) Nehanda in Zimbabwe. The territorial spirits wield a great deal of power, and, to use the example of Z i m b a b w e , they played a very significant political role in mobilizing people in their struggles for liberation f r o m colonialism. T h e first war of liberation in Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) was led by Mbuya Nehanda, a spirit medium who was eventually hanged by the colonial regime During the time of the second war of liberation, her mediums as well as other spirit mediums worked very closely with the freedom fighters by mobilizing the people and sanctioning the war. The freedom fighters, most of w h o m claimed to be Marxist-Leninist, soon discovered that they could not wage a successful war without the support of the spirit m e d i u m s (Ranger, 1 9 8 5 : 1 7 5 - 2 2 2 ; Lan, 1985). Thus, the mediums have political as well as religious roles to play. Through these mediums, people discern the will of the ancestors, get an explanation for

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the causes of whatever calamities they may be enduring, or obtain advice on what the family or the tribe should do in order to avert similar danger. M e d i u m s are highly respected m e m b e r s of the c o m m u n i t y f r o m w h o m people seek advice of any nature. The other important category of religious leaders is that of the diviner. Again, diviners may be either male or f e m a l e . C o m m u n i c a t i o n with the spirit world is vital for African Traditional Religions. Through divination, people are able to communicate with their ancestral spirits and the divinities. These are consulted in the event of some misfortune, sickness, death, or calamity. They c o m m u n i c a t e with the spirit world to determine the cause of the problem and to seek possible solutions. There are different methods of divining, using, for e x a m p l e , palm nuts, bones, a bowl of water, wooden dice carved with animals and reptiles, sea shells, or pieces of ivory. Divination would normally be conducted at some location such as a hut set aside for that purpose. In Yorubaland, Ifa divination centered at Ile-Ife is the most famous. The system is very elaborate and uses palm nuts (Awulalu, 1979; Bascom, 1969). Finally, since religion permeates all aspects of life, the kings and the chiefs also carry out some leadership roles. W h e r e the whole nation or tribe is involved, it is the responsibility of the head of the c o m m u n i t y to take the necessary action to consult the national or territorial spirits. It is also their duty to ensure that all the religious functions and observances are carried out by the responsible authorities. With regard to sacred places, reference has already been m a d e to shrines that serve particular divinities such as those among the Yoruba of Nigeria or the Akan of Ghana. A m o n g the Zulus of South Africa, there is a room in each homestead with an elevated portion (umsamu) where rituals to the ancestor spirits are p e r f o r m e d . T h e cattle kraal is also associated with ancestors and is therefore an important place for ritual action. Sacred mountains and caves are almost universal among African peoples. They are often associated with ancestors or any of the divinities. Religious officials will ascend these mountains or go into those caves only on special occasions. Such m o u n t a i n s are also often associated with the abode of the Supreme Being. In Zimbabwe, there are several such mountains that serve as venues for prayer and sacrifice, particularly in connection with prayers for rain in cases of severe drought.

Witchcraft and Magic To c o m p l e t e our study of the A f r i c a n Traditional Religions, it is also necessary to look at the negative forces in these religious traditions. African traditionalists believe that God is the source of all power, which God shares with other beings. The power of the divinities and ancestors, or that derived f r o m medicine, is primarily viewed as positive p o w e r to be

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used for constructive purposes. However, that same power can also be used f o r destructive purposes, in which c a s e it b e c o m e s evil power. W i t c h e s and s o r c e r e r s represent those e l e m e n t s within A f r i c a n s o c i e t i e s that use p o w e r f o r the purpose o f destroying life. (In general, witches are f e m a l e and sorc e r e r s are m a l e . ) W i t c h c r a f t b e l i e f s are w i d e s p r e a d in A f r i c a even a m o n g

educated

C h r i s t i a n s and M u s l i m s . It is g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e d that w i t c h e s c a n fly by night, c a n b e c o m e i n v i s i b l e , delight in eating human flesh, and use f a m i l iar animals such as hyenas or b a b o o n s as their means o f transport. W i t c h e s are b e l i e v e d to be w i c k e d and m a l i c i o u s h u m a n beings w h o s e intention is s i m p l y to k i l l , w h i c h they do by p o i s o n i n g or c u r s i n g their

victims.

W i t c h e s , sorcerers, and angry a n c e s t o r spirits are usually identified as the m a j o r c a u s e s o f misfortune or death in a family. M a g i c has two a s p e c t s : to p r o t e c t or to h a r m . On the one hand, it is used to protect the m e m b e r s o f the family, as well as their h o m e s t e a d , c a t tle, and other property, from witches and other e n e m i e s o f the family or the individual. O n the o t h e r hand, m a g i c c a n a l s o b e used through spells and curses to harm or to kill. B e l i e f s related to m a g i c and witchcraft clearly b e long to the c a t e g o r y o f superstition. T h e y represent ways in w h i c h p e o p l e try to e x p l a i n the c a u s e s o f m i s f o r t u n e or s o c i a l disorders. M i s f o r t u n e , s i c k n e s s , or death m a y also be e x p l a i n e d as an e x p r e s s i o n o f o n e ' s a n c e s t o r s ' d i s p l e a s u r e regarding the b e h a v i o r o f their d e s c e n d a n t s ( s e e E v a n s Pritchard, 1 9 3 7 ) . In c o n c l u s i o n , it must be stated that A f r i c a n Traditional R e l i g i o n s c o n tinue to i n f l u e n c e the lives o f m a n y p e o p l e today, including s o m e o f the h i g h l y e d u c a t e d as well as m a n y A f r i c a n C h r i s t i a n s and M u s l i m s . It must a l s o be pointed out that A f r i c a n r e l i g i o n s are not static. C o n t a c t s with C h r i s t i a n and I s l a m i c traditions h a v e brought about t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s and s y n c r e t i s m in all three. A s B o h a n n a n and Curtin ( 1 9 9 5 : 1 2 4 ) have rem a r k e d , " T h e r e is an a m a z i n g l y c l o s e o v e r l a p b e t w e e n the b a s i c ideas o f I s l a m and C h r i s t i a n i t y , and o f the A f r i c a n r e l i g i o n s . N e i t h e r Islam n o r Christianity is foreign in its e s s e n c e to African religious ideas"; the reverse is also true. Although Christianity and Islam have added distinct e l e m e n t s to A f r i c a n r e l i g i o n s , e a c h has b e e n and c o n t i n u e s to be adapted to and s h a p e d by A f r i c a ' s i n d i g e n o u s r e l i g i o u s h e r i t a g e , as will be s h o w n in the f o l l o w i n g sections.

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CHRISTIANITY IN AFRICA

Christianity is one o f the oldest religions in A f r i c a , and since the 1 8 0 0 s , the number o f Christians and Christian churches has expanded rapidly. A c cording to Barrett ( 1 9 8 2 : 8 ) , the total number o f Christians in 1 9 8 5 was estimated to be c l o s e to 2 5 0 m i l l i o n . B y this e s t i m a t e , Christianity is now the

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largest religion in sub-Saharan Africa. Recently, growth has been most noticeable in the African Independent Churches (denominations or churches that separated from the European-dominated churches) and in foreignbased evangelical Protestant churches. Since so much has been written on Christianity as a religion, it is not necessary for our purpose to deal with its beliefs, so I will focus instead on the historical development of the religion on the African continent. Special attention will be paid to those aspects that give African Christianity its own identity.

Early Christianity in North Africa and Ethiopia Christianity in Egypt dates back to the first century. According to the ancient historian Eusebius, writing about A.D. 311, the Christian church in Egypt was founded by St. Mark, author of the second Gospel and a companion of Paul, a tradition still maintained by the Coptic (Egyptian) church. By the end of the first century, Christianity had penetrated into rural Egypt and had become the religion of the majority of the people. Egypt has one of the oldest Christian churches, surpassed perhaps only by Rome in terms of longevity of tradition and continuity in the same locality (King, 1971:1). Recent discoveries of some Christian and non-Christian documents at the Nag Hammadi caves in Egypt show that quite early in the history of Christianity, Egypt had become a center for many different and even conflicting Christian groups and a center for theological reflection and debate (Robinson, 1982). The city of Alexandria was the home of outstanding theologians such as Origen, Cyprian, Clement of Alexandria, and others, whose writings on the different aspects of the Christian faith have influenced the church throughout the ages. The great "heretic" Arius (died A.D. 336), originally from Libya, provoked a controversy that rocked the church for several decades when he taught that Christ was only a human being. The controversy produced two creeds, namely, the Nicene and the Athanasian creeds, which are used together with the Apostles' Creed as definitive statements of the Christian faith throughout Christendom. The two creeds were formulated at the two great councils of Nicaea in A.D. 325 and of Alexandria in A.D. 362. The Athanasian Creed was named after Athanasius, the bishop of Alexandria, who championed the case against Arius. The recent discoveries from Nag Hammadi show that Egyptian Christians were very open-minded as they searched for an African Christian identity, welcoming and accommodating new ideas in their search for indigenous expressions of their Christian faith. For instance, in its search for an authentic Christian life devoid of all fleshly desires and serving God through a life of self-denial, prayer, and worship, Egypt was the mother of monasticism. The many caves and the nearby desert provided most ideal locations for ascetic pursuits. Christianity continued to be a vibrant religious tradition until Egypt was conquered by the Muslims during the seventh century.

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Christianity has survived, although it has been reduced to a religion of a small minority (Robinson, 1982). Moving south of Egypt, Christianity came to Ethiopia fairly early. The apostle Philip is reported in the Acts of the Apostles to have baptized an Ethiopian eunuch, who returned to his home country to share his n e w f o u n d faith with his people. Independent evidence dates the coming of Christianity to Ethiopia to the fourth century. With the conversion of the emperor, church and state became united. The Ethiopian Orthodox church, which is one of the most thoroughly A f r i c a n churches in its ethos ( O d u y o y e , 1986:30), has continued to the present and has maintained close links with the Coptic church. In " R o m a n A f r i c a , " which comprised the present-day countries of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, Christianity is known to have had a strong following as early as the second century. It produced influential theological thinkers and writers such as Tertullian of Carthage, who was the first person to use the word Trinity in his description of the Godhead, and St. Augustine, the bishop of Hippo, whose ideas on such issues as grace, original sin, and the k i n g d o m of God shaped both Western Catholicism and the Protestant R e f o r m a t i o n . This church did not survive the Arab conquests, and this area today is almost totally Islamic.

St

Christianity South of the Sahara

There is no evidence of attempts by the African churches described above to take Christianity south of the Sahara. The earliest such efforts to Christianize the rest of Africa were those of the Portuguese missionaries of the Jesuit and Dominican orders in the fifteenth century who followed Portuguese traders traveling around the coast of Africa on their way to the East, often going into the hinterland of Africa to trade in gold and ivory. In western Africa, R o m a n Catholic missionaries established Christian c o m munities in C o n g o and Angola beginning in 1490, but these disintegrated after two centuries, in part because of the slave trade. Missionary work was also started in southern A f r i c a at Sofala ( M o z a m b i q u e ) . It was f r o m there that Father Gonzalo da Silveira led a group of Portuguese Jesuit missionaries in 1560 to the people of the vast empire of M w a n a m u t a p a in what is now Zimbabwe. On his way to the capital of the empire, he claims to have baptized 450 persons among the Tonga people. His mission, however, ended with his execution by the emperor, w h o m he had converted and baptized Christian. This was apparently the result of pressure from the e m p e r o r ' s Arab Muslim trading partners, who feared Christian missionaries would open the door for Portuguese traders to threaten their monopoly. Subsequent Portuguese missionary efforts to the empire by both the Jesuits and the D o m i n i c a n s were also u n s u c c e s s f u l . Their missionary efforts in eastern Africa suffered a similar fate.

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Many Christian churches, such as this cathedral in Bangui, Central African Republic, were built by missionaries during the colonial period. A new phase in the evangelization of Africa was introduced by the rise of the antislavery m o v e m e n t in Europe and the United States in the early nineteenth century. T h e result was that the British decided to send freed slaves to Sierra Leone, while the A m e r i c a n s sent their f r e e d slaves to Liberia. In both cases, the freed people who had become Christians in their captivity spread Christianity to their fellow black people. F a m o u s a m o n g these was Samuel Adjai Crowther, w h o was missionary to his own people in Nigeria and later became the first African Anglican bishop. The evangelical m o v e m e n t culminated in a missionary scramble f o r A f r i c a that involved all m a j o r d e n o m i n a t i o n s in E u r o p e and North A m e r i c a . F a m o u s characters in this process included David Livingstone and Robert M o f f a t . M a n y A f r i c a n s were also involved in these missionary e f f o r t s after their conversions, crossing borders in the c o m p a n y of white missionaries or by themselves. As a result of the e f f o r t s of such people, Christianity was firmly established in most of Africa by the beginning of the twentieth century (see Sanneh, 1983).

The Rise of N e w African Christian D e n o m i n a t i o n s The nineteenth-century missionary activities in Africa were a resounding success, in wtyich almost all m a j o r Christian d e n o m i n a t i o n s were involved. These activities were facilitated by the support and protection that

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m i s s i o n a r i e s received f r o m colonial a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . I n d e e d , the C h r i s t i a n ization of A f r i c a went hand in hand with its colonization. The missionaries arrived in m o s t c o u n t r i e s b e f o r e the c o l o n i a l i s t s and learned the l a n g u a g e of the local p e o p l e . T h e y h e l p e d the c o l o n i a l i s t s n e g o t i a t e and d r a f t the a g r e e m e n t s that c h e a t e d A f r i c a n chiefs out of their land and its r e s o u r c e s . To A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s t s , m i s s i o n a r i e s a p p e a r e d to h a v e c o l l a b o r a t e d with the f o r c e s of i m p e r i a l i s m . In what is n o w a f a m o u s a p h o r i s m , the r o l e of Christian missionaries in the colonization of A f r i c a was once described by K e n y a n n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r (and K e n y a ' s first p r e s i d e n t ) J o m o K e n y a t t a : " W h e n the missionaries c a m e the A f r i c a n s h a d the land and the Christians h a d the Bible. T h e y taught us to p r a y with our e y e s closed. W h e n w e o p e n e d t h e m they h a d the land and w e h a d the B i b l e " (in M a z r u i , 1986: 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 ) . (See the d i s c u s s i o n s in C h a p t e r s 3 and 4 f o r m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n on colonialism.) D e s p i t e its association with c o l o n a l i s m , m i s s i o n a r y Christianity had a significant political impact on c o n t e m p o r a r y A f r i c a . W h e r e v e r the missionaries went, they built schools, w h e r e a large m a j o r i t y of the first generation of A f r i c a n leaders w e r e educated (see M a z r u i , 1 9 8 6 : 2 8 5 - 2 8 6 ) . T h e s e institutions helped create an a w a r e n e s s a m o n g o p p r e s s e d black people that bef o r e G o d they w e r e of equal value with their o p p r e s s o r s , and this inspired m a n y to rise up in d e f e n s e of their f r e e d o m or to liberate t h e m s e l v e s . T h e e d u c a t i o n black p e o p l e received f r o m m i s s i o n s c h o o l s gave t h e m a sense of pride and value that the colonial r e g i m e s were not interested in creating. On the other hand, m a n y of the missionaries also stood up for s o m e of the rights of black people. S i n c e i n d e p e n d e n c e , the C h r i s t i a n c h u r c h has c o n t i n u e d to e x p a n d . M a n y c h u r c h e s are taking on new, distinctly A f r i c a n f o r m s . S o m e of these i n d i g e n o u s Christian d e n o m i n a t i o n s are radically d i f f e r e n t in their polity, d o c t r i n e s , and g e n e r a l ethos f r o m their W e s t e r n parent c h u r c h e s . T h e s e n e w d e n o m i n a t i o n s or c h u r c h e s have often been labeled " A f r i c a n I n d e p e n dent C h u r c h e s " or, negatively, " s e c t s , " but they should be viewed m o r e accurately as authentic A f r i c a n e x p r e s s i o n s of the Christian faith. T h e first of these new d e n o m i n a t i o n s a p p e a r e d in western and southern A f r i c a ; t h e r e a f t e r , others e m e r g e d in e a s t e r n and central A f r i c a . R e s e a r c h e r s h a v e traced the b e g i n n i n g s of t h e s e m o v e m e n t s back to a C o n g o l e s e w o m a n n a m e d D o n n a B e a t r i c e , w h o as early as 1700 c l a i m e d to h a v e been p o s s e s s e d by the spirit of St. Anthony. G i v i n g u p all her belongings to the poor, s h e p r o c l a i m e d a m e s s a g e of the c o m i n g j u d g m e n t of G o d . She p r o c l a i m e d that Christ and his apostles were black and that they lived in S a o S a l v a d o r ( p r e s e n t - d a y A n g o l a ) . F o r the first time, we h a v e a cry f r o m B l a c k A f r i c a for an i n d i g e n o u s Christ, an e x p r e s s i o n of a " d e e p y e a r n i n g , " "the y e a r n i n g for a Christ w h o w o u l d identify with the despised A f r i c a n " ( D a n e e l 1987:46). T h e basic q u e s t i o n B e a t r i c e raised and that m a n y of the n e w A f r i c a n C h r i s t i a n c h u r c h e s h a v e been asking is: " H o w

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could the white Christ of the Portuguese images, the Christ of the exploiters—how could he ever help the suffering African, pining for liberty?" (Daneel, 1987:46). By the 1960s, there were at least 6,000 new denominations or African indigenous churches spread throughout most of A f r i c a , including Islamic A f r i c a (Barrett, 1 9 6 8 : 1 8 - 3 6 ) . T h e reasons for the e m e r g e n c e of the new p h e n o m e n o n of African Christianity have been many and varied. Some of them began as revival m o v e m e n t s within the historical churches and had no intention of breaking away. A good example of this is the Kimbanguist church in what is now the D e m o c r a t i c Republic of C o n g o ( D R C ) , which was started by Simon Kimbangu, a great healer and prophet. Since his activities were not acceptable to the missionary church, he was arrested shortly after the start of his ministry and tried f o r subversive activities by the Belgian government. He was sentenced to death, but the sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment; he died in 1951. Today, the Kimbanguist church, officially known as the Eglise de Jésus Christ par le Prophète Simon K i m b a n g u (the Church of Jesus Christ According to the Prophet Simon K i m b a n g u ) , is one of the largest of the new denominations, with followers not only in the D R C but also in other countries in central Africa such as Zambia (see Mazrui, 1986:152-156). The reasons for the emergence of other African Independent Churches have been discussed extensively (see, for e x a m p l e , F a s h o l e - L u k e et al., 1978; Hastings, 1976; Daneel, 1987; Barrett, 1982) and need not detain us here for too long. I shall just highlight some of the m a j o r reasons as summarized by Daneel ( 1 9 8 7 : 6 8 - 1 0 1 ) . First, the A f r i c a n Christians did not find much of an African ethos in the m i s s i o n a r y - f o u n d e d churches. They wanted churches in which they could express their Christian faith in African symbols and images, churches where they could feel at h o m e , so to speak. Christianity as proclaimed by the missionaries was for them not c o m p r e h e n s i v e enough to meet their spiritual needs; hence, many people even today secretly continue to participate in A f r i c a n traditional rituals. There was no serious attempt on the part of the historical churches to understand A f r i c a n traditional spirituality and culture. Instead, many traditional beliefs and practices were simply labeled " h e a t h e n " or "superstitious" and were thus forbidden. Second, as far as the A f r i c a n s were concerned, the missionaries and the colonialists were birds of a feather. A f t e r all, they shared a c o m m o n worldview and a common racist perception of the African. The missionaries tolerated and even practiced racial discrimination to the extent of providing separate entries and sections in sanctuaries, and "by so doing [the church] preached against itself and violated h u m a n rights" (Plangger, 1988:446). Such contradictions in what people heard missionaries preach and what they practiced contributed significantly to the formation of some of the independent churches.

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Third, with the translation of the Bible into A f r i c a n languages, A f r i c a n C h r i s t i a n s c o u l d n o w read and interpret the Bible f o r t h e m s e l v e s . T h e y soon d i s c o v e r e d , for e x a m p l e , that biblical p a r a g o n s of faith such as A b r a h a m and David w e r e p o l y g a m i s t s . They also f o u n d out that the Fifth C o m m a n d m e n t d e m a n d s that p a r e n t s be h o n o r e d and that it is the only c o m m a n d m e n t that c o m e s with a promise, namely, "that your days may be long on e a r t h . " For A f r i c a n p e o p l e s the " p a r e n t s " i n c l u d e the a n c e s t o r spirits. T h e translation of the Bible into A f r i c a n languages is thus one of the m a j o r contributions by the missionaries to the d e v e l o p m e n t of indigenous A f r i c a n C h r i s t i a n spirituality and to the d e v e l o p m e n t of A f r i c a n Christian t h e o l o gies. In the A f r i c a n I n d e p e n d e n t C h u r c h e s , the Bible plays a central role, and in s o m e of the c h u r c h e s , o n e service m a y h a v e as many as five or six s e r m o n s , all of w h i c h are biblically based. T h e t e n d e n c y in these c h u r c h e s is to be f u n d a m e n t a l i s t i c in interpreting the Bible. Fourth, i n d i g e n o u s c h u r c h e s are a r e s p o n s e to the refusal or s l o w n e s s on the part of m i s s i o n a r i e s to r e l i n q u i s h c h u r c h l e a d e r s h i p to the i n d i g e n o u s people; to the m i s s i o n a r i e s ' d i s c o u r a g e m e n t of practices such as faith h e a l i n g , p r o p h e c y , and s p e a k i n g in t o n g u e s ; and, finally, to m i s s i o n a r i e s ' d i s a p p r o v a l of p o l y g a m y , a n c e s t o r v e n e r a t i o n , w i t c h e s , and traditional medicine. S o m e i n d i g e n o u s c h u r c h e s h e a d e d by w o m e n are a reaction to the m a l e d o m i n a n c e f o u n d in Western Christian c h u r c h e s and in A f r i c a n society in general. (See the discussion of male d o m i n a n c e in Africa b e f o r e and a f t e r E u r o p e a n e x p a n s i o n in C h a p t e r 10.) For e x a m p l e , spirit p o s s e s s i o n cults in eastern A f r i c a are d o m i n a t e d by w o m e n . T h e y are considered to be the f e m a l e counterpart of male veneration of lineage ancestors. Again, folk C a t h o l i c i s m in Z i m b a b w e is a largely f e m i n i n e p o p u l a r religion, with an e m p h a s i s on d e v o t i o n to the Virgin Mary, m o t h e r of Jesus (Ranger, 1986: 42, 52, 58). W o m e n have a l s o been leaders in such m o v e m e n t s as Alice L i c h i n a in K e n y a , the N y a b i n g i of K e n y a / U g a n d a , and M a g o i ' s h e a l i n g / p o s s e s s i o n m o v e m e n t in M o z a m b i q u e ( M i k e l l , 1997:26). In s o u t h e r n A f r i c a , w o m e n play important roles as h e a l e r s and diviners, o f t e n m i x i n g i n d i g e n o u s beliefs and practices with Christianity. For example, they o f t e n rely on " p r o p h e c y , speaking in t o n g u e s , ecstatic d a n c i n g , and laying on of h a n d s rather than herbs to h e a l " (Gort, 1 9 9 7 : 3 0 0 - 3 0 1 ) . In f o r m e r l y white-ruled South A f r i c a , for e x a m p l e , independent churches were both a refuge f r o m economic, political, and racial domination by whites and a source of resistance to racist government policies. An e x a m ple is the C h u r c h of the Children of Israel f o u n d e d by Enoch M g i j i m a . In 1921, the congregation refused to m o v e f r o m land that the white government had designated for whites only. South African troops opened fire, killing 163 defenseless people and w o u n d i n g 129 others (Davidson, 1989:26). B e c a u s e of the variety of factors that led to the e m e r g e n c e of the new d e n o m i n a t i o n s , the spiritualities of t h o s e d e n o m i n a t i o n s take d i f f e r e n t

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forms (see Daneel, 1987:43-67). There are basically two types. First, there is what has been called the Ethiopian-type churches. These are essentially protest m o v e m e n t s that broke way f r o m the w h i t e - d o m i n a t e d missionary c h u r c h e s that tended to align t h e m s e l v e s with the oppressive colonial regimes. They identified themselves with the aspirations of oppressed black people and sought to give theological expression and spiritual support to the struggle for liberation. T h e references to Ethiopia in texts such as Psalm 68:31 were, as observed by Daneel (1987:38), "interpreted as a sign that the oppressed Black people have a specially appointed place in G o d ' s plan of salvation." The Ethiopian-type churches are found mainly in southern and eastern Africa, with the majority of them originating toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. They tend to maintain the same doctrine and church polity as the church from which they broke away, and they even use the same hymnbooks; but they have African leaders. They are nonprophetic m o v e m e n t s and do not place a great deal of emphasis on the Holy Spirit and all the extraordinary activities assigned to the Holy Spirit in the other new denominations. The second kind of new d e n o m i n a t i o n is the spirit-type churches. These are often referred to as Zionist churches because the n a m e Zion often appears in the self-designations of these m o v e m e n t s . They are prophetic in character and place a great deal of emphasis on the work of the Holy Spirit, who manifests herself in speaking in tongues, healing, prophecy, dreams, and visions and w h o helps to identify witches and cast out evil spirits. Their worship services include drums and dancing. T h e y are more concerned with the practical benefits that religion can provide in this world than with other-world salvation. At the same time, they forbid their m e m b e r s to have anything to do with traditional A f r i c a n religion (Morrison, Mitchell, and Paden, 1989:76). Zionist churches include the Aladura or " p r a y i n g " churches in Nigeria and the Harris churches in Cote d'lvoire (Ranger, 1986:3). The new d e n o m i n a t i o n s represent a serious attempt to A f r i c a n i z e the Christian faith by responding concretely to the needs and aspirations of the African people. These movements take the A f r i c a n s ' worldview seriously; for instance, if salvation is to be real, it must include liberation f r o m evil spirits, sickness, and disease. For it to be m e a n i n g f u l and relevant, Christianity must o f f e r protection against black magic, sorcery, and witchcraft, all of which are issues of vital concern to A f r i c a n societies (Kiernan, 1995b:23—25). Except for the Ethiopian-type churches, the other m o v e ments are u n c o m p r o m i s i n g l y against participation in the traditional rites and substitute specifically Christian rites to fill the v a c u u m . T h e prophet who is inspired by the Holy Spirit, f o r example, takes the place and assumes the functions of the traditional diviners and spirit mediums; requests for rain are now m a d e directly to G o d through the mediation of Christian leaders rather than through the tribal spirits mediated by traditional leaders.

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According to Jim Kiernan (1995a: 118), currently about 30 percent of A f r i c a ' s population belongs to Zionist and Ethiopian Christian churches, with Zionists being about 80 percent of the total. The Ethiopian churches appeal more to largely poor urban dwellers by helping them to transcend their sense of economic deprivation and personal insecurity and hardship. In addition to the African Independent Churches, new charismatic, evangelical Protestant churches are growing in popularity in many countries. Many of these churches are associated with mission churches of the Pentecostal variety, such as the Assemblies of God, coming from the United States. T h e s e churches are attracting many ambitious, better-educated, younger Africans who want to get rich but find few avenues to success in A f r i c a ' s stagnant economies (cf. Gifford, 1998). These churches also meet the need many A f r i c a n s have to explain their m i s f o r t u n e or discredit the success of others by blaming sorcery or witchcraft. Zionist and Pentecostal churches provide support for such beliefs and promise healing and the mobilization of spiritual forces to promote success or counter witchcraft (cf. Kiernan, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). Many of the new churches are highly fundamentalist and authoritarian in structure. According to Jeff Haynes, new churches are proliferating usually as a response to some kind of social crisis (1996:174). They are founded by a charismatic leader who claims to have a mystical experience and is regarded as a prophet by his/her followers. The churches are often millenarian, that is, expecting the imminent "end of the world," at which time only believers with be saved. Critical or rational thought is discouraged and dissent f r o m what the evangelist says is viewed as opposing God (Gifford, 1998:178). Such views can give rise to extremist religious movements with tragic results, as recently occurred in Uganda. Early in 2000, leaders of the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God killed at least 924 members of their church, the worst cult killing in modern history. Cult leader Joseph Kibwetere, a former teacher, public official, and businessman (and devout Catholic), came under the sway of Credonia Mwerinde (allegedly "the real power"). She claimed that the Virgin Mary appeared to her and told her the end of the world was coming. The motive for the mass murder is unclear, but apparently members of the cult became disillusioned and questioned the leaders' authority (and appropriation of m e m b e r s ' financial assets) (see Maykuth, 2000).

The Political and Economic Role of Christian Churches Christian churches play an important and sometimes contradictory role in postindependence Africa. Politically, some churches have aligned themselves with corrupt, authoritarian regimes. For example, many Pentecostal.

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independent, and evangelical churches in Kenya support Daniel arap Moi despite his record of antidemocratic and corrupt rule. In Liberia before the 1990 civil war, evangelical and Pentecostal churches backed any government, h o w e v e r oppressive, that p r o m o t e d e v a n g e l i s m . Worse by far was the actual complicity and direct involvement of some Catholic clergy and lay persons in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis and moderate Hutu in R w a n d a . Church leaders were mostly Hutu and closely tied to the Hutudominated government (see L o n g m a n , 1998; Gifford, 1998:51-55). It also appears that many of the churches, especially the new Christian churches, are susceptible to co-optation by the g o v e r n m e n t or to corruption. In Kenya, A r c h b i s h o p O n d i e k of the Legio Maria church was M o i ' s Minister of Employment; the church was a Moi supporter. In Zambia, the Chiluba government's anti-democratic and corrupt practices are frequently downplayed or overlooked because Chiluba is an outspoken avowed bornagain Christian who puts potentially critical Christian leaders in positions of influence in the g o v e r n m e n t ( G i f f o r d , 1998:51, 2 0 4 - 2 0 5 , 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 ) . Other church leaders are susceptible to the financial benefits and the prestige that government leaders can bestow on them and their churches (Gifford, 1998:87-88), and those w h o have benefited f r o m political arrangements (both clergy and lay persons) use the churches to organize opposition to reform. By the same token, politicians at all levels cooperate with church personnel and use the churches to increase their power and seek legitimacy (Longman, 1998:68). The current economic crisis has had a m a j o r impact on the role and forms of Christianity currently spreading in Africa. Many mainline churches and African Independent Churches are failing to attract new members compared to the new Pentecostal and evangelical churches allied with overseas churches. Some of these promote a "faith gospel" promising wealth, health, and happiness. Others promise deliverance f r o m d e m o n s and witchcraft. Paul G i f f o r d sees these new churches as a response to the failure of the modernization and d e v e l o p m e n t agenda in A f r i c a ( G i f f o r d , 1998). With conditions worsening for many Africans and opportunities for advancement in the public or private sectors so limited, religion is seem by many as the best avenue for improving their lives. Indeed, churches with external links often have access to jobs, incomes, and other resources unavailable elsewhere. An additional plus is that many of these churches, especially the faith gospel churches, legitimate the accumulation of wealth as " G o d ' s will," thus lessening the risk of the accusation of witchcraft f r o m envious relatives or neighbors. Along with the promotion of sobriety, ambition, education, and hard work, a religious ideology that promotes capital accumulation in Africa could potentially help to accelerate e c o n o m i c growth and d e v e l o p m e n t (Gifford, 1998:308-312, 3 3 7 - 3 4 8 ) . As Gifford remarks, " A f r i c a ' s real parallel economy is now that created by Christian activity" (1998:94).

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Unfortunately, without m a j o r economic and political t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , beliefs in faith and personal endeavor alone as the means to riches or reliance on deliverance f r o m witches as the cure for social problems are unlikely to work for most of A f r i c a ' s suffering people. Nevertheless, some Christian churches, especially the m a i n s t r e a m churches, are advocates for social justice and democracy and critics or corruption (cf. Lungu, 1986; "Churches," 1995). In Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo church leaders have supported political ref o r m s and backed w o m e n ' s and human rights groups. In Burundi, f o r example, t w o Catholic bishops were f o u n d i n g m e m b e r s of the main h u m a n rights group in the country (Longman, 1998).

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ISLAM IN AFRICA

T h e third principal religion in A f r i c a is Islam. T h e total n u m b e r of Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa was estimated at approximately 215 million in 1985 (Barrett, 1982:782) and, like Christianity, it is expanding in numbers. While Muslims can be found in every African country, they are concentrated in areas bordering the Sahara Desert. Islam, which means "submission to G o d , " was f o u n d e d in the seventh century in Arabia by the Prophet M u h a m m a d . Influenced by Judaism and Christianity, Islam established m o n o t h e i s m and a scripturally based religion first a m o n g A r a b tribesmen around the towns of Mecca and Medina. Allah (God) revealed to M u h a m m a d how he wanted his followers to live and structure their communities. This revelation is f o u n d in the Quran and is believed to be the literal word of God. Muslim Arabs, like Jews, believe they are descendants of A b r a h a m , and they respect the Old Testament and the Prophets. Muslims also revere the New Testament and regard Jesus as a prophet. Muhammad, however, is the last and greatest of the Prophets, and the Quran is G o d ' s supreme revelation. Unlike Judaism, both Christianity and Islam are missionary religions; as such they have been the m a j o r contenders for the religious allegiance of Africans. Rather than discussing the faith and doctrine of Islam, this study will f o c u s on the historical d e v e l o p m e n t of the tradition in Africa and its distinctively African features.

The Spread of Islam: The First Wave Soon a f t e r the death of M u h a m m a d in A.D. 632, his f o l l o w e r s embarked on wars of conquest, first among Arabs and then non-Arab peoples in northern A f r i c a and elsewhere. Most of Egypt was taken over by the M u s l i m s by 640. By then, E g y p t ' s rulers supported the B y z a n t i n e Orthodox church, while many Egyptians were Coptic Christians who did not accept the O r t h o d o x c h u r c h ' s teachings or authority. Many w e l c o m e d Arab

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Mosques, with their tall minarets, can be found throughout Africa. This one is in central Nairobi, Kenya. rule as less oppressive than they had experienced under the Byzantines. The Arabs established themselves initially as a ruling and powerful minority, but Christians were treated as "protected people" (dhimmi) who were allowed to practice their faith and regulate their affairs through their own leaders. Still, Christians were second-class citizens required to pay a special tax (jizya) in lieu of military service. Nonetheless, educated Christians often held prominent positions in the new Muslim state. Conversion to Islam was gradual. There was some localized persecution and pressure to convert, but most did so for other reasons—for example, attraction to Islamic tenets, commercial advantage, and desire to avoid the jizya and second-class status. By the end of the eleventh century, Christianity in Egypt had become a minority religion (Mostyn, 1988:190). After Egypt, the Arabs moved on to Roman northern Africa, where they defeated the Christians, who were primarily based in the towns, and the Berbers, who had remained untouched by Christianity in the rural areas. Trimingham observes that the N o r t h A f r i c a n C h u r c h d i e d r a t h e r t h a n w a s e l i m i n a t e d b y I s l a m , s i n c e it n e v e r r o o t e d i t s e l f in t h e l i f e of t h e c o u n t r y . A l t h o u g h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u c h as t h e p r e s t i g e of I s l a m d e r i v e d f r o m its p o s i t i o n as t h e r e l i g i o n of the ruling m i n o r i t y and the special taxation i m p o s e d on C h r i s t i a n s enc o u r a g e d c h a n g e , the primary reasons for their rapid c o n v e r s i o n were the

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Ambrose Moyo less o b v i o u s o n e s d e r i v i n g from w e a k n e s s e s within the Christian c o m m u nities. A m o n g t h e s e w e r e C h r i s t i a n i t y ' s failure to c l a i m the Berber s o u l and its bitter sectarian d i v i s i o n s . (Trimingham, 1 9 6 2 : 1 8 )

The conversion of the pagan Berbers of northern Africa was a slow process. A f t e r their initial military conquests, the Arabs located in the towns. They gradually intermarried with the Berbers, who became increasingly Islamized and Arabized. Many Berbers were incorporated into A r a b armies. This period of conquest and gradual Islamization of northern Africa is reported by the great Arab historian Ibn Khaldun: After the formation of the Islamic c o m m u n i t y the Arabs burst out to propagate their religion a m o n g other nations. Their armies penetrated into the Maghrib and captured all its c a n t o n m e n t s and cities. T h e y endured a great deal in their s t r u g g l e s w i t h the B e r b e r s w h o , as A b u Yazid has told us, a p o s t a t i z e d t w e l v e t i m e s b e f o r e I s l a m g a i n e d a firm h o l d o v e r t h e m . (Trimingham, 1 9 6 2 : 1 8 )

Whereas Islam spread to northern Africa in the aftermath of conquest, the spread of Islam south of the Sahara was primarily the result of peaceful, informal missionary efforts by Arabized Berber merchants who traded m a n u f a c t u r e d goods f r o m the Mediterranean lands in exchange for raw materials such as gold, ivory, gum, and slaves. They followed the established trade routes, many of which had existed long before the rise of Islam. Wherever they went, Muslims established commercial and religious centers near the capital cities. The Nile River provided access to Nubia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. From Sudan, some of the traders went across to western Africa. The introduction of the camel also made it possible to cross the desert from northern Africa and establish contacts with western and central Africa (Voll, 1982:80; Lewis, 1980:15-16). Muslim communities were established fairly early in several states in western Africa. In Ghana, for example, King (1971:18) reports that already by 1076, there was an established Muslim center with several mosques almost competing with each other. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Islam was the religion of the rulers and elites of many large African states such as the Songhai empire (Voll, 1982:14). (See Map 2.4.) Islam appealed to A f r i c a n elites for several reasons. One was its association with ArabMuslim civilization and its cosmopolitanism. Islam was also very compatible with or at least tolerant of African religious and cultural practices such as ancestor veneration, polygamy, circumcision, magic, and beliefs in spirits and other divinities. In fact, most A f r i c a n believers were barely Islamized, perhaps observing the Five Pillars of the faith—belief in one God and that M u h a m m a d is his prophet, alms (zakat) for the needy, prayer five times a day, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and pilgrimage (haj) to M e c c a — b u t often ignoring elements of the shari'a (Muslim law) or other Islamic practices (e.g., veiling w o m e n ) , which they found incompatible

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with local custom (Lewis, 1980:33-34, 6 0 - 6 2 ; Callaway and Creevey, 1994). In eastern Africa, Islam was spread by Persian and Arab merchants beginning in the late seventh century. These merchants established coastal trading towns with local Africans all the way down to southern Africa. Through intermarriage and commercial contacts, a unique Swahili language and culture developed. There was little movement of traders or Islam into the interior until the late tenth century, however, because there were few centralized kingdoms to attract them (Lewis, 1980:7). (See Chapter 3 for additional information on this period.) Islamic civilization contributed much to Africa's own cultural development. Islam is a way of life (dar al Islam) affecting all spheres of human activity. It emphasizes literacy and scholarship, traditions that Islam promoted in previously nonliterate African societies. Islam's stress on the community of believers (umma) demands the subordination of regional and tribal loyalties that often separated Africans and impeded the growth of larger political units. Islamic law (shari'a) as the framework for community life along with Islamic Arab administrative and political structures provided models for Africa's state-builders and gave built-in religious legitimacy to the claims of rulers over the ruled (see Mazrui, 1986:136-137; Davidson, 1991:28-29; Lewis, 1980:37).

The Spread of Islam: The Second Wave By the eighteenth century in western Africa, Islamic consciousness was spreading from the upper classes to the masses. This new wave of Islamization was being carried by African Muslims through militant mass movements under the religious banner of jihad (holy war). The desire of pious Muslim leaders such as Uthman dan Fodio in northern Nigeria (early nineteenth century) was for social, moral, and political reform. The imposition of more rigorously Islamic theocratic states on lax African believers and non-Islamic peoples was the goal. Jihad thus became a religious justification for wars of conquest and political centralization (Mazrui, 1986: 184-185; Voll, 1982:80-81). The new wave of Islamization was not solely- the result of militant movements. Various Sufi (mystical) religious orders or brotherhoods (tariqas) dedicated to a more faithful adherence to Islam were at work. One of the earlier ones (sixteenth century) was the Qadiriyya, introduced to the great Muslim center of learning Timbuktu by an Arab shaikh (leader) (Lewis, 1980:18-19). In the nineteenth century, the Tijaniyya from Fez, Morocco, gained many followers. The Qadiriyya greatly influenced Uthman dan Fodio, whose jihad movement led to the founding of the Muslim caliphate at Sokoto (Voll, 1982:80-81). (Again, see Chapter 3.) Sufi brotherhoods under the inspiration of their religious leaders (marabouts) were able to mobilize large numbers of people for political and eco-

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nomic as well as purely religious ends. A m o n g these ends was resistance to European imperialism in the nineteenth century. Using the ideas of j i h a d and the brotherhood of all believers, Muslims were able to organize resistance on a wider scale than African political units or ethnicity would allow (Mazrui, 1986:284). In Senegal, the Mourides transformed jihad into economic enterprise as marabouts organized their followers to p r o d u c e peanuts on brotherhood land. Even today, the Mourides are a m a j o r political and economic force in Senegal. They attract many followers for practical reasons but also because of their liberalism in enforcing Islamic law (Voll, 1982:249-250). In eastern Africa, M a h d i s m galvanized m a s s religio-political opposition to European imperialism in the Sudan. The Mahdi in Islam is a messianic figure sent by God to save the believers during times of crisis. The Mahdi M u h a m m a d A h m e d and his followers defeated the British at Khartoum in 1885, although the Mahdist forces were eventually d e f e a t e d (Mazrui, 1986:151-152). European colonialism and missionary Christianity did not halt the spread of Islam in A f r i c a . In western Africa, colonial rulers m a d e peace with Muslim leaders by protecting their conservative rule over their people and prohibiting Christian proselytizing or mission schools in Muslim areas (Voll, 1982:247). M u s l i m s won many new converts for a variety of reasons. T h e racism and segregation policies of the Europeans contrasted sharply with the Muslim belief in the equality of believers. Also, in many cases, Muslim army officers under the British and the French treated Africans kindly, dealing with their grievances. They were tolerant in helping fellow Africans adjust African customary law to Islamic law (Zakaria, 1988:203). Indirectly, colonialism promoted Islamic expansion through the introduction of improved c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and rapid social c h a n g e (Voll, 1982:245). Islam proved able to adjust and change as well as to meet new needs and conditions.

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Islam Since Independence

Islamic organizations and practices have undergone remarkable changes in order to cope with Western influences, including Christianity. In some cases the process has involved accommodation and new interpretations of Islam. In other instances, Christianity and Westernization are seen as enemies of Islam and failed experiments, unable to solve Africa's m a n y problems. Such views have spawned a growing n u m b e r of f u n d a m e n t a l i s t movements. Initially after independence, conservative nineteenth-century organizations either died out or transformed themselves. In Sudan, the followers of the Mahdi formed a modern political party that competed in national elections. In Nigeria, also, conservative and reformist Muslims f o r m e d politi-

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cal parties, partly in competition with Christians in non-Muslim sections of the country. Few of these political parties, however, were explicitly Islamic. T h e Mourides of Senegal reorganized and assumed modern economic and political roles to maintain their influence (Voll, 1982:145-250). The spirit of jihad and f o r c e d conversion were largely replaced by a respect for religious pluralism. This was undoubtedly a result of the long history of mutual a c c o m m o d a t i o n b e t w e e n A f r i c a n Traditional Religions and Islam in the past as well as contact with Christianity. In most sub-Saharan African states, Muslims are a minority or, at least, not the only religious community, a fact that tends to reinforce Muslim support for secular states. Muslim leaders readily accepted n o n - M u s l i m leaders such as Leopold Senghor (a Catholic), w h o was president of Senegal for many years. Pluralism is also promoted by the fact that family and ethnic loyalties still take precedence over religious ties for most A f r i c a n s (Zakaria, 1988:204-205). (See Chapter 9 for more on the centrality of the family in Africa.) For the masses of Muslim Africans, African traditional beliefs and practices have continued, although with some adaptations to conform to similar practices in Islam. In writing about the Wolof of Senegal, Mbiti concluded: In spite of the impact of Islam, there is still a m u c h deeper layer of pagan belief and o b s e r v a n c e s . . . . M e n and w o m e n are loaded with a m u l e t s , round the waist, neck, arms, legs, both for protection against all sorts of possible evil, and to help t h e m a c h i e v e certain desires. Most f r e q u e n t l y these contain a paper on w h i c h a religious teacher has written a passage from the Koran, or a diagram from a book on Arabic mysticism, which is then enveloped in paper, glued d o w n and covered with leather, but sometimes they enclose a piece of bone or wood, a powder, or an animal claw. (Mbiti, 1969:245)

These are basically A f r i c a n elements, not Islamic, and are practiced by most African groups. A survey of African indigenous Islamic communities in other parts of Africa also reveals the persistence of A f r i c a n - b a s e d practices. Ancestor veneration, the wearing of amulets to ward off m i s f o r t u n e and to protect cattle and homesteads, and beliefs in magic, witchcraft, and sorcery have continued with little d i s c o u r a g e m e n t . New elements include the use of charms. Also, as Mbiti (1969:249) observed, "In addition to treating human complaints, the medicine men p e r f o r m exorcisms, sometimes using Koranic quotations as magical formulae." African Muslims, as well as African Christians, are seeking to redefine or modify their religion and religious identity in response to modern needs and problems. For many Muslims, this means finding a way to incorporate more orthodox Islamic practices and beliefs into those of their pre-Islamic African religious and cultural heritage. Moreover, many A f r i c a n M u s l i m s

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are seeking new religious responses to meet the political, e c o n o m i c , and social problems they are facing. This has led some Muslims to seek a fundamentalist reaffirmation of Islam, often influenced by f u n d a m e n t a l i s t m o v e m e n t s in North A f r i c a and even Iran (cf. H u n w i c k , 1995; Ilesanmi, 1995; Voll, 1982:250, 337; Brenner, 1993). Adapting to c o n t e m p o r a r y concerns, Sufi brotherhoods have been at the f o r e f r o n t in providing new ways to find a c c o m m o d a t i o n between the demands of Islam and popular aspirations, both religious and secular. One such m o v e m e n t is Hamallism, a branch of the Tijaniyya. H a m a l l i s m is a social and religious reform m o v e m e n t that stresses the full equality of all people and the liberation of women. It opposes the materialism and corruption of conservative Islamic leaders. Before independence, Hamallists opposed those Muslim leaders who cooperated with French colonialism. Hamallism influenced political leaders like Modibo Keita, former president of Mali, and Diori Hamani, former president of Niger (Voll, 1982:254). On the other hand, anti-Sufi movements such as the Izala in Nigeria and Niger (Movement for Suppressing Innovations and Restoring the Sunna) have attracted many f r o m the urban merchant class with their opposition to marabouts and emphasis on individualism and putting wealth into investments (Grégoire, 1993). In Sudan, Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s have gained d o m i n a n t influence over the government. Their efforts to impose the shari'a on the entire country, including the non-Muslim south, have led to an ongoing civil war since 1983 (O'Fahey, 1993). They have virtually obliterated previous nonsectarian, modernist Islamic m o v e m e n t s such as the Republican Brothers, founded by M. M. Taha. The Brothers sought a reform of Islam in light of modern realities, including advocating the equality of men and women. Taha was executed in 1985 for "heresy" (Al-Karsani, 1993). Elsewhere, and similar to the new Christian churches that are searching for a more African Christianity, some Muslims are promoting controversial new f o r m s of Africanized Islam. In East and West A f r i c a , the Ahmadiyya m o v e m e n t (originally f r o m India) owes its modest success to its vigorous missionary efforts. T h e A h m a d i y y a translated the Quran into Swahili and other local languages (the first to do so), since most African M u s l i m s do not know Arabic. Currently, there are at least 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 Ahmadiyya believers in sub-Saharan Africa. Members are often prominent in government and business circles and more secular. They have made significant efforts to promote the status of w o m e n ; for example, w o m e n are allowed to pray in the mosque with men. The Ahmadiyya are seen as heretical by more orthodox believers (Haynes, 1996:195). Also controversial is the Maitatsine movement. In Nigeria in the 1960s and 1970s Cameroonian Mahammadu Marwa claimed to be a new prophet of Islam. Marwa was killed along with 100 other people when his followers sparked a violent confrontation with police in the city of Kano in 1980. Rioting by his followers in

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1990 left 5,000 people dead (Haynes, 1 9 9 6 : 1 8 8 - 1 9 1 ) . Also controversial, the Mourides of Senegal have come to revere the town of Touba, where the brotherhood originated, as a site of pilgrimage rivaling M e c c a in importance (Mazrui, 1986:151-152). In general, Muslim f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , in the form of efforts to create a theocratic state, has not found m a n y supporters in most of Africa (cf. Haynes, 1996:212). As Lamin Sanneh points out in reference to West Africa, adherence to pluralism is strong among the Muslim clergy and people (1997:214-215). There are also popular Islamic movements, such as the Suwarians in Senegambia, who actively reject political or military means of spreading the faith. They also reject the idea of clergy holding political office. Those attracted to fundamentalism are usually marginal groups, mostly university students and intellectuals inspired by the idea of an Islamic state, such as Iran. In Nigeria, Islamic fundamentalism largely reflects political rivalry with Christians and the desire to promote shari'a law in opposition to the secular state (Walker, 1999:56; Haynes, 1996:147). G r o w i n g tensions between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria have resulted in the deaths of 3,000 people between 1987 and 1993 (Haynes, 1996:213J). If unresolved, these conflicts could pose a serious threat to national unity (Hunwick, 1995; Ilesanmi, 1995). Civil war rooted in conflicts between Muslims and Christians over the imposition of shari'a has already devastated one African country—Sudan. This is a fate most Muslims and Christians would not wish to have repeated in their own countries.

•

CONCLUSION

Although it is not possible to do justice to so broad a topic as African religions within the space of a chapter, this survey has, I hope, illustrated the breadth of the continent's religious traditions. African Traditional Religions and Islam have generally been able to a c c o m m o d a t e each other, but there are some strong voices within the Muslim c o m m u n i t y that are becoming more critical of the less than rigorous practices of A f r i c a n Islam. African Christian churches, on the other hand, have been openly negative toward A f r i c a n Traditional Religions, but at the same time have f o u n d ways of adapting some of their rituals and beliefs so that the African Christian has felt at home in the new indigenous denominations. The combined efforts of the early missionary and colonial powers to destroy African cultures and religions have led to a crisis of identity that, ironically, has promoted the continued practice of A f r i c a n Traditional Religions as a m a j o r aspect of African cultures. Bohannan and Curtin (1995:124) predict that African Traditional Religions will dwindle with development and industrialization. Indeed, conversions to Christianity and Islam are growing steadily. This prediction,

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Map 11.1

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however, presupposes that the current economic and political crises of Africa improve and that rural dwellers and the poor in general become situated more securely in the network of relationships and activities we call " m o d ern." Even though African Traditional Religions may dwindle as Africans affiliate with branches of the world's two major religions, Christianity and Islam, Africans will continue to preserve in their new faiths elements of the old, as they have always done. People will embrace religions they feel speak to their experience and their need f o r identity and m e a n i n g , religions that promise some kind of justice and redress of their existential problems. In Africa, a meaningful religion is one oriented toward promotion of human interests in good health, economic well-being, and human development, as well as managing social relations and easing conflict (Kiernan, 1995b:25). After decades of misrule and economic and political decline, people are seeking solutions to, or at least relief from, suffering, lack of progress, uncertainty, and disruptive social change. T h e question in Africa, as well as in many other areas of the world, is whether emancipatory and tolerant religions rather than religions of intolerance and repression are e m b r a c e d as people seek to meet their worldly and spiritual needs.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Al-Karsani, Awad Al-Sid. 1993. "Beyond Sufism: The Case of Millennial Islam in Sudan." Pp. 1 3 5 - 1 5 3 in Louis Brenner (ed.). Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Awulalu, J. Omosade. 1979. Yoruba Beliefs and Sacrificial Rites. Burnt Mill, Harlow (Essex), England: Longman. Barrett, David B. 1968. Schism and Renewal in Africa. Nairobi: Oxford University Press. . 1982. World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in the Modern World 1900-2000. Nairobi: Oxford University Press. Bascom, William. 1969. Ifa Divination: Communication Between Gods and Men in West Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Berglund, Axel-Ivar. 1976. Zulu Thought Patterns and Symbolism. London: C. Hurst. Bohannan, Paul, and Philip Curtin. 1995. Africa and Africans. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Sub-Saharan Brenner, Louis (ed.). 1993. Muslim Identity and Social Change in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Calloway, Barbara, and Lucy Creevey. 1994. Islam: Women, Religion, and Politics in West Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. "Churches Seek 'Critical Distance.'" 1995. Christian Century 112 (April 19):416. Daneel, M. L. 1987. The Quest for Belonging: Introduction to a Study of African Independent Churches. Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo. Davidson, Basil. 1989. Modern Africa: A Social and Political History. London: Longman. . 1991. African Civilization Revisited. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

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Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1937. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fashole-Luke, G., R. Gray, A. Hastings, and G. Tasie (eds.). 1978. Christianity in Independent Africa. London: Rex Collins. G i f f o r d , Paul. 1998. African Christianity: Its Public Role. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Gort, Enid. 1997. "Swazi Traditional Healers, Role Transformation, and Gender." Pp. 2 9 8 - 3 0 9 in Gwendolyn Mikell (ed.). African Feminism: The Politics of Survival in Sub-Saharan Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Grégoire, E m m a n u e l . 1993. "Islam and the Identity of Merchants in Maradi (Niger)." Pp. 106-115 in Louis Brenner (ed.). Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Hastings, Adrian. 1976. African Christianity. New York: Seabury. Haynes, Jeff. 1996. Religion and Politics in Africa. London: Zed. Hunwick, John O. 1995. Religion and National Integration in Africa: Islam. Christianity, and Politics in the Sudan and Nigeria. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Idowu, E. B. 1962. Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief. Ikeja, Nigeria: Longman. . 1971. African Traditional Religion: A Definition. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis. Ilesanmi, Simeon O. 1995. "Recent Theories of Religion and Politics in Nigeria." Journal of Church and State 37 (spring):309-327. Kiernan, Jim. 1995a. "The African Independent Churches." Pp. 116-128 in Martin Prozesky and John de Gruchy (eds.). Living Faiths in South Africa. C a p e Town: David Philip. . 1995b. "African Traditional Religions in South Africa." Pp. 15-27 in Martin Prozesky and John de Gruchy (eds.). Living Faiths in South Africa. Cape Town: David Philip. . 1995c. "The Impact of White Settlement on African Traditional Religions." Pp. 7 2 - 8 2 in Martin Prozesky and John de Gruchy (eds.). Living Faiths in South Africa. Cape Town: David Philip. King, Noel. 1971. Christian and Moslem in Africa. New York: Harper and Row. Lan, David. 1985. Guns and Rains: Guerrilla and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House. Lewis, I. M. 1980. Islam in Tropical Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Longman, Timothy P. 1998. " E m p o w e r i n g the Weak and Protecting the P o w e r f u l : The Contradictory Nature of Churches in Central Africa." African Studies Review 41 (April):49-72. Lungu, Gatian F. 1986. "The Church, Labour and the Press in Zambia: The Role of Critical Observers in a One-Party State." African Affairs 85 (July):385-410. Maykuth, Andrew. 2000. "Signs of Massacre Went Unheeded." Christian Science Monitor, April 2, p. A20. Mazrui, Ali A. 1986. The Africans: A Triple Heritage. London: BBC Publications. Mbiti, John S. 1969. African Religions and Philosophy. New York: Praeger. . 1970. African Concepts of God. New York: Praeger. McVeigh, Malcolm J. 1974. God in Africa: Conceptions of God in African Traditional Religion and Christianity. Cape Cod, MA: Claude Stark. Mikell, Gwendolyn. 1997. "Introduction." Pp. 1 - 5 0 in Gwendolyn Mikell (ed.). African Feminism: The Politics of Survival in Sub-Saharan Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Morrison, Donald G., Robert C. Mitchell, and John N. Paden. 1989. Understanding Black Africa. New York: Irvington Publishers.

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M o s t y n , Trevor. 1988. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa. New York: C a m b r i d g e University Press. M o y o , A m b r o s e . 1987. "Religion and Politics in Z i m b a b w e . " In Kirsten Holst Peterson (ed.). Religion, Development and African Identity. U p p s a l a : S c a n d i n a vian Institute of A f r i c a n Studies. O d u y o y e , Mercy. 1986. Hearing and Knowing: Theological Reflections on Christianity in Africa. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis. O ' F a h e y , R. S. 1993. "Islamic H e g e m o n i e s in the Sudan: Sufism, M a h d i s m , and IsI a m i s m . " Pp. 2 1 - 3 5 in L o u i s B r e n n e r (ed.). Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press. Parrinder, G e o f f r e y . 1969. Religion in Africa. N e w York: Praeger. Plangger, Albert. 1988. " H u m a n Rights: A M o t i v e for M i s s i o n . " Pp. 4 4 1 - 4 5 9 in Carl F. H a l l e n c r e u t z and A m b r o s e M o y o (eds.). Church and State in Zimbabwe. G w e r u , Z i m b a b w e : M a m b o . Ranger, T. O. 1985. Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study. L o n d o n : James Currey. . 1986. "Religious M o v e m e n t s and Politics in Sub-Saharan A f r i c a . " African Studies Review 2 9 : 1 - 7 0 . R o b i n s o n , J a m e s M. 1982. The Nag Hammadi Library. N e w York: H a r p e r and Row. S a n n e h , L a m i n . 1983. Christianity in West Africa: The Religious Impact. M a r y knoll, NY: Orbis. . 1997. The Crown and the Turban: Muslims and West African Pluralism. Boulder: Westview Press. Trimingham, J. S. 1962. A History of Islam in West Africa. London: Oxford University Press. T w e s i g y e , E m m a n u e l K. 1987. Common Ground: Christianity, African Religion and Philosophy. New York: Peter Lang. Voll, John Obert. 1982. Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World. Boulder: Westview Press. Walker, Judith-Ann. 1999. "Civil Society, the Challenge to the Authoritarian State, and the Consolidation of D e m o c r a c y in Nigeria." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 27 (1 ) : 5 4 - 6 2 . Zakaria, R a f i q . 1988. The Struggle Within Islam. London: Penguin.

12 African Literature George Joseph

S

ince 1986, three inhabitants of the continent of Africa have received the N o b e l Prize in literature: N a g u i b M a h f o u z (Egypt), N a d i n e G o r d i m e r (South A f r i c a ) , and Wole Soyinka (Nigeria). T h e s e three A f r i c a n s , however, belong to three different literatures. The work of Mahfouz, who writes in Arabic, belongs to Arabo-Islamic literature, a literature f r o m a cultural space that stretches f r o m M o r o c c o along the M e d i t e r r a n e a n across North A f r i c a into the Middle East and beyond. Nadine G o r d i m e r ' s fiction, written in English, belongs to the settler tradition of South Africa, which in its themes and techniques is representative of a body of literature written by E u r o p e a n colonizers of A f r i c a and their descendants. Wole Soyinka, who also writes in English, combines indigenous A f r i c a n traditions with those of European literature. He represents a tradition that took its impetus f r o m A f r i c a n attempts to tell a story about Africa different from the one told in E u r o p e a n colonial literature. The tradition to which Soyinka belongs extends over a geographical space that stretches from just south of the Sahara to the tip of southern Africa. Most accessible to U.S. students are the national literatures written in E u r o p e a n languages f r o m countries such as Senegal, G h a n a , Nigeria, C a m e r o o n , Kenya, and South Africa, but these literatures are only the tip of a very large iceberg. There are written literatures in African languages, such as Hausa, Swahili, Zulu, Wolof, and Arabic (which has put d o w n roots in Africa), as well as many oral traditions. A chapter of this sort can only give the broadest of outlines, and in keeping with the rest of the volume will concentrate on sub-Saharan Africa. 1 The concept of "literature" most of us hold is of European origin. Typically, literature implies "written letters," but oral traditions in A f r i c a are full-fledged literary traditions regardless of the means of their transmission. I shall use the term oral literature to emphasize the links between oral and

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written literature, while paying careful attention to the specificity of oral traditions. "Literature" can also imply an artistic use of words for the sake of art alone. Without denying the important role of aesthetics in Africa, we should keep in mind that, traditionally, A f r i c a n s do not radically separate art f r o m teaching. Rather than write or sing for beauty in itself, A f r i c a n writers, taking their cue f r o m oral literature, use beauty to help c o m m u n i cate important truths and information to society. Indeed, an object is considered beautiful because of the truths it reveals and the c o m m u n i t i e s it helps 10 build. As someone once said, for an African mask to be beautiful, one must believe in the being for which it stands. The emphasis in this chapter, however, will not be history, ethics, religion, or philosophy but rather the recognized verbal art forms through which the truths of such material are communicated.

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AFRICAN ORAL LITERATURE

It is impossible to give a full account of contemporary A f r i c a n aut h o r s ' debt to oral traditions, not only because m u c h work remains to be done by scholars but also because even a brief account of what is already known is beyond the scope of this chapter. Yet, this debt is widely recognized, and current investigations reveal it to be always greater than previously suspected, even in the case of authors who write in a European language that has few if any visible " A f r i c a n i s m s . " In this section of the chapter, I will introduce aspects of A f r i c a n oral literature with which a reader of written African literature should have some familiarity. These include (1) the status, preservation, and transmission of oral literature in African societies and (2) the genres that have so far been identified.

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The Status and Transmission of Oral Literature in African Society

Although folklore is defined as traditional customs or tales preserved orally among a people, the status of African oral literature is different from that of the folklore of a people with writing. Folklore in countries such as Italy, France, or England stands as popular literature in opposition to the written productions of an elite and indeed may be influenced by the latter. African oral literature, on the other hand, represents the aspirations of an entire people and ranges from sublime religious ideals to everyday practical advice. The constants of African oral traditions are transmitted in a variety of ways. In some societies, such as the Dogon (Mali), whom Marcel Griaule studied, any elder who takes the time can learn oral traditions. At the other extreme is the case of the Wolof (Senegal) griot, who belongs to a hereditary

African

Literature

The Wolof griot Yoro M'Baye

caste a t t a c h e d to a n o b l e f a m i l y . T h e griot learns the t r a d i t i o n s by heart f r o m his or her f a t h e r (there are w o m e n griots, but with a different store of k n o w l e d g e ) f r o m the time he or she can speak. This i n f o r m a t i o n is considered a sacred trust. In precolonial times, a mistake about a f a m i l y ' s lineage could m e a n a griot's life. Since there are a variety of t e r m s to d e s c r i b e the p e r s o n c h a r g e d with the oral tradition t h r o u g h o u t A f r i c a , w e shall use the term bard to r e f e r to all of t h e m . W h a t e v e r the m o d e of t r a n s m i s s i o n , it is the elders w h o are repositories of the treasures of oral tradition, so that it is said, " E v e r y time an old one dies, a library burns d o w n . " Yet, despite c a r e f u l protection and transmission of the constants of oral traditions, any oral f o r m such as an epic, m y t h , tale, or praise s o n g can actually be d i f f e r e n t e v e r y t i m e it is p e r f o r m e d . ( E x c e p t i o n s w o u l d be priestly incantations and prayers, as will be seen below.) A bard will m o d ify his or her material a c c o r d i n g to the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the p e r f o r m a n c e . F o r e x a m p l e , a story will be m a d e less v i o l e n t if it is p e r f o r m e d f o r a w o m a n . C e r t a i n t y p e s of i n f o r m a t i o n are w i t h h e l d f r o m f o r e i g n e r s a n d uninitiated m e m b e r s of a g r o u p , while other types of i n f o r m a t i o n are c o m m u n i c a t e d only in certain social situations such as initiation rites or other i m p o r t a n t c e r e m o n i e s . S t o r i e s a n d m y t h s m a y a l w a y s be m o d i f i e d to acc o m m o d a t e recent events, and there are a l w a y s c h a n g e s to give p l e a s u r e to the audience of the m o m e n t . B e c a u s e a work will c h a n g e according to these

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and other such circumstances, it would seem that a bard learns the skeletal structure of a story, myth, epic, or poem and fleshes it out according to fixed formulas that are dictated by the situation. As a result, a poem such as an epic may be very different when a researcher returns or sends someone else to record another version. Furthermore, the written text of an oral performance is a pale reflection of its original, which may have been chanted, sung, or combined with elements of dance and ritual. A true reproduction of a work of oral literature would have to be a videotaped performance, but even such a record creates a false impression of fixed works. Although the function of oral literature is to provide entertainment and preserve the history, wisdom, and religious beliefs of a society, oral literature takes various forms. The fluidity of the tradition must be kept in mind when reading the following discussion of its relatively fixed characteristics. It should also be kept in mind (1) that the following classification cannot take into account African terms or verbal forms, (2) that our vision of oral literature reflects what researchers have happened to record and informants are willing to give, and (3) that a strict purity of genres is a Western concept. Just as African civilizations tend to be pluralistic in philosophy and religion (they accept the possibility of many versions of truth instead of one), the forms in which they find expression mix poetry and prose, words, dance, and ritual.

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Genres of African Oral Literature

Prose tales. Prose in the African oral tradition is that which tends toward ordinary speech as opposed to chanting or singing, although it may contain elements of the latter. Its principal form on record is the tale, which contains elements of myth, legend, and history. Tales, which are generally performed at night by adults, may include mime, dance, and song; may mix animals, humans, and divine beings; and may exist in related groups or cycles, such as the cycle of the hare or the tortoise or the hyena. There is not the same distinction between human, animal, and divine as in Western cultures, since there is a totemic link between humans and animals, both of whom are manifestations of the divine force that pervades the world. In fact, animals often stand in for specific persons, so as not to embarrass the latter or their descendants. The most widespread theme in this literature is that of the tricksterhero, who recalls the Yoruba (Nigeria) god Eshu-Elegba. (The theme should not be taken to mean that Africans are immoral, since all societies tell tales where cunning overcomes power or advantage.) The trickster may be either a person or an animal. The trickster stands in opposition to the normal order of things. Rather than follow the rules of a society, he gets by on his own cleverness, often against far more powerful opponents. The

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most common animals in the trickster tradition are the hare (ancestor of the African American B r ' e r Rabbit in the tales of Uncle Remus), the hyena, the spider, and the tortoise. An example of such a trickster tale is one in which a tortoise challenges both an elephant and a hippopotamus to a tugof-war and then positions them on opposite sides of a mountain so that they will be tugging against each other. After the resulting stalemate, the two animals gain a new respect for the tortoise. Tales serve many other functions: they can explain a behavior, such as that of a hen scratching the earth; or a geographical detail, such as the two hills called les mamelles outside Dakar, Senegal. The tale pertaining to the latter, by the way, upholds the moral order. The mamelles are actually the humps of a hunchbacked wicked woman. One of the humps is her own. Fairies transfer the other hump to her from the back of a kinder woman. Other tales pose a problem rather than give a clear moral lesson. For example, which of three brothers is the most responsible for saving their father: the first, who magically saw that their father in a distant land was ill; the second, who magically transported the three brothers to their father's side; or the third, who healed their father once they were there? Tales can also explain the founding of a dynasty, the origins of a people, or the behavior of a god. In these latter cases, tales touch on elements of myth (sacred tales that shape belief) and legend (the stories of heroes and dynasties). Yet, since such elements do not make the tales recognized as authoritative sources of history and religious belief, one must assert that myth and legend in prose form do not have the status of more ceremonial religious poems and formal chanted epics. In other words, tales may use elements from myths and legends without necessarily being the source of those myths and legends. Myths. Myth may be defined as a "story or a complex of story elements taken as expressing . . . certain deep-lying aspects of human and transhuman existence" (Wheelwright, 1965:538). Most of the prose narrative myths that we have—such as the great Dogon cosmogonic myth that explains how the universe spirals out from a single seed—were collected in conversations between a field researcher and a native informant. While the content of such myths is doubtlessly authentic as far as it goes, we do not necessarily know it in the fullness and in the form that an initiated Dogon audience would accept as sacred and authoritative. Further research may reveal such texts, but it is possible that a developed formal narrative myth constituting the foundation of belief in the sacred will never be revealed to the uninitiated. Poetry. Poetry in oral literature is distinguished from normal speech by the sustained rhythm and modulation of the voice. It ranges from formal epic chants to informal melodic songs.

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Narrative epic. Usually a chanted f o r m u l a i c narrative that takes several days to p e r f o r m , the epic tells historical legends dealing with conquerors and founders of dynasty. Epics such as the Ozidi epic of the Ijo of southern Nigeria or the Mwindo epic of the M y a n g a people of eastern Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) involve the entire community in dramatic festivities of music, dance, and poetry. Others, such as the f a m o u s Sundiata of Mali, may be chanted from beginning to end by a single bard. Sundiata, the legendary founder of Mali, is a shamanistic hero descended from a woman whose totem animal is the magical buffalo of Do. Although he is lame in his early childhood, when he finally walks he has s u p e r h u m a n strength so that he can uproot trees. He is, nevertheless, driven into exile by his brother, and only after a series of magical exploits that reveal his virtue as well as his strength does he return h o m e to reign over the new empire of Mali. An epic of this sort is a source of history and social relations between families. For example, the coronation scene contains a list of the families w h o are allied to Sundiata and his descendants. Occupational poetry. There are various f o r m s of lyric poetry that accompany all aspects of life. Occupational poetry consists of poetry that belongs to a group exercising a trade such as farming, fishing, or hunting. For example, the Yoruba ijala are songs sung by hunters under the inspiration of the god Ogun of the Yoruba pantheon. They deal with a wide range of subject matter, including human ethics and relations, family lineages, distinguished individuals, mythology, animals, and plants. These are speechlike songs chanted at gatherings for Ogun. Occupational poetry, such as songs of Ewe fishermen and farmers, also includes poems sung during work, not just to relieve drudgery (as do work songs) but also to recall religious functions pertaining to the calling of a group. Cult poetry. Cult poetry is sung during rituals for the divinities and as an aid in the practice of medicine. It is also used for incantations and as a tool for divination. This poetry, which either invokes or celebrates the forces of nature, contains the most conservative texts of oral literature, since its validity d e p e n d s on an exact repetition or precise verbal f o r m u l a s . The human word in this poetry is more than just a sound. It is a p o w e r f u l act that controls forces of the universe. It is the human word, for example, that calls the force of a divinity to live in a wooden statue or mask. Cultic chants consist of an enumeration of the characteristics and accomplishments of a divine being and an invocation for help. Consider, for example, this Tanzanian prayer to Ruwa, or God, that accompanies the sacrifice of a bull: We know you Ruwa, Chief, Preserver. He who united the bush and the plain.

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You, Ruwa, Chief, the elephant indeed, He who burst forth men that they lived. . . . Chief, receive this bull of your name, Heal him to whom you gave it and his children. (Mapanje and White, 1983:119) Praise songs. As cultic chants are to divinities, praise songs can be to rulers and other important men and w o m e n . Although praise songs serve many functions, such as preserving family history or historical values, their words are believed to e m p o w e r a warrior about to go into battle by recalling the forces of that w a r r i o r ' s ancestors of w h o m he is the living representative. Because of their belief in the e m p o w e r m e n t of the word, Wolof rulers are known to have gone into battle with encroaching French invaders against overwhelming odds. The basic units of praise songs are (1) epithets that refer to a town, animal, or other object or event associated with a person or thing praised and (2) the proper name of a person. The latter can be expanded into a genealogy that outlines a whole family history. For example, in the praise song for the Wolof princess Semu of western A f r i c a , instead of naming an important Wolof ruler, the griot lists four of his horses and the battlefields on which they died. In this song, a p e r s o n ' s f o r e n a m e is usually followed by his or her m o t h e r ' s and f a t h e r ' s names. But one can skip one or the other and proceed along either the paternal or the maternal line. Thus, in the song for Semu, the latter is referred to either as Semu Ganka Yaasin Mbaru (Ganka Yaasin being the father and Mbaru a remote paternal ancestor) or Semu Coro Wende (Coro Wende being the mother; see Joseph, 1979). The following are praise names of the great Zulu chieftain Shaka f r o m the southern tip of the continent: He is Shaka, the unshakeable, Thunderer-while-sitting, son of Menzi. He is the bird that preys on other birds, The battle-axe that excels over other battle-axes. He is the long-strided pursuer, son of Ndaba, W h o pursued the sun and the moon. He is the great hubbub like the rocks of Nkandla Where elephants take shelter When the heavens frown . . . 2 There are many other genres of oral literature that are too numerous to mention. A m o n g them are a wealth of love songs, work songs, and children's songs, as well as the epigrams, proverbs, and riddles that sprinkle African speech. As the Ibo of Nigeria say, "Proverbs are the palm oil with which words are eaten." An example of a riddle is the phrase "a house in

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which one does not turn around"; the answer is "a grave." There are yet other forms that incorporate acting and dialogue. For example, while a group of Wolof women are pounding millet, one will give the signal and the others will fall into a patterned conversation that follows the preordained plan of a kind of play. 3

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WRITTEN LITERATURE IN AFRICAN LANGUAGES

Originating not in indigenous oral literature but in the missionary efforts of Islam and Christianity, written literature bore an uneasy relationship to oral traditions. (See Ambrose Moyo's chapter on religion for additional insights into the relationship among African religions, Christianity, and Islam.) African literatures under Islamic influence, such as Wolof, Swahili, and Hausa, were originally written in Arabic script and reflect the spirituality of the Quran—a spirituality sometimes at odds with traditional African cultures. Hausa secular verses in Arabic, for example, worked against sacred praise poetry, which should sing only of the Prophet Muhammad. Literatures in such languages as Sesuto, Xhosa, Zulu, and Yoruba stand in the shadow of translations of the Bible and books such as John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress. Early works such as Thomas M f o l o ' s 1906 Travelers of the East came out on missionary printing presses. Yet, as Christianized writers became interested in indigenous oral traditions, they encountered the hostility of their missionary patrons. Thus, works like Mfolo's Chaka (Shaka), which is about the famous Zulu hero, did not appear in print until 1925, seventeen years after it was written. The tension between Euro-Christianity and African traditions is also apparent in the Yoruba novels of the Nigerian chief Fagunwa. In works such as The Forest of a Thousand Daemons, Fagunwa, nourished by memories of his grandfather's court and a deep knowledge of Yoruba mythology, evokes a traditional world upon which he imposes references to a Christian God. Patterns of latent opposition to Islamization or Christianization have given way to outright resistance to colonization in contemporary African writing in African languages. Writers such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o in Kenya and Ousmane Sembene and Cheikh Anta Diop in Senegal call for a literature in African languages as an essential step in "decolonizing the mind." According to Ngugi wa Thiong'o, it is only "revitalized African languages . . . which will be best placed to give to and receive from the wealth of our common [African and world] culture on an equal basis" (Ngugi, 1990:981). Elsewhere, Ngugi eloquently states the rationale for writing in one's native language: In w r i t i n g o n e s h o u l d h e a r all t h e w h i s p e r i n g s , all t h e s h o u t i n g , all t h e c r y i n g , all t h e l o v i n g a n d all t h e h a t i n g of t h e m a n y v o i c e s in t h e p a s t , and t h o s e v o i c e s will n e v e r s p e a k to a w r i t e r in a f o r e i g n l a n g u a g e . F o r u s

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K e n y a n writers, w e can no longer a v o i d the question, w h o s e l a n g u a g e or history will our literature draw upon. (Zell, Bundy, and C o u l o n , 1 9 8 3 : 4 3 4 )

Cheikh Anta Diop and Ngugi wa T h i o n g ' o see the African writer's situation very much like that of the English or French writer of the Renaissance in the face of Latin cultural imperialism. Just as Renaissance writers had to forge national languages while borrowing from all cultures, so the African writer must encompass the entire range of expression. In Senegal, for example, nationalists are translating major works of literature, arts, and sciences into Wolof. A writer such as the Senegalese Cheikh N ' D a o has written his more recent works in Wolof first, before translating them into French, to give freer rein to his creative genius. Ousmane Sembene increasingly resorts to films in Wolof in order to reach his Senegalese audience. Mazisi Kunene from South Africa writes in Zulu before he translates into English. He has written Zulu Poems (1970) and two epics, Emperor Shaka the Great (1979) and Anthem for the Decades (1981). Although literatures in European languages such as French, English, and Portuguese remain important for the time being, movements such as those in Senegal and South Africa will inevitably change the map of African literature as the production of works in African languages increases.

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AFRICAN LITERATURE IN EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

The following sections on written African literature in European languages deal with two main themes: (1) the African literary response to European accounts about Africa and (2) the shift in the postcolonial era from responding to European literature to addressing problems of the new African nations. Much of the rest of the chapter is also devoted to naming African authors and works to provide a starting point for newcomers to this literature. Written African literature in European languages was born in reaction to European colonial writings intended to explain Africa to other Europeans. The Europeans claimed a privileged, objective knowledge about Africa based on extended study, short voyages, or prolonged residence. Some, such as South A f r i c a ' s Nadine Gordimer and J. M. Coetzee, consider Africa to be their home. European writings take many forms, including novels such as Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness (1902), travelogues such as André Gide's Voyage to the Congo (1927), and reports to various commercial companies intending to set up operations on the continent. Colonial newspapers are also an important source of European views. Much of this writing paints Africa in terms of extremes. Africans are represented either as noble savages in a picturesque exotic setting or as primitive wild beings suffering from disease, devoid of spiritual and moral qualities, and in need of the civilizing benefits of European colonialism.

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A l t h o u g h i n d i v i d u a l a u t h o r s h a v e v a r y i n g p o s i t i o n s , t h e y t e n d to s m o o t h o v e r d i f f e r e n c e s in o r d e r to " i n v e n t " the c o n c e p t of A f r i c a as a p l a c e with c u l t u r a l c o n s t a n t s . E v e n d i s t i n g u i s h e d c o l o n i a l e t h n o g r a p h e r s such as F r o b e n i u s and D e l a f o s s e or i n t e l l e c t u a l s such as the a n t i c o l o n i a l i s t G i d e r e m a i n e d " E u r o c e n t r i c " (i.e., t h e y " s a w " A f r i c a t h r o u g h E u r o p e a n cultural biases). They benefited f r o m colonial power, which domesticated the c o n t i n e n t f o r E u r o p e a n travel, and, in turn, o f t e n u s e d their k n o w l e d g e and i n s i g h t s to f u r t h e r c o l o n i a l p o w e r . F o r e x a m p l e , P l a c i d e T e m p e l s ' s Bantu Philosophy s t u d i e s the r e l i g i o n of b l a c k A f r i c a n s in o r d e r to f a c i l i tate c o n v e r s i o n by C a t h o l i c m i s s i o n a r i e s . T h e F r e n c h g e n e r a l F a i d h e r b e w r o t e d i s t i n g u i s h e d s t u d i e s of the Wolof ( S e n e g a l ) with the intention of inf i l t r a t i n g t h e m and s u b j e c t i n g t h e m to F r e n c h d o m i n a t i o n .

African Literature in French Negritude poetry and pan-Africanism as a response to colonial literature. A f t e r isolated w o r k s such as B a k a r y D i a l l o ' s Force Bonté, which s a n g the praises of the F r e n c h c o l o n i z e r s , A f r i c a n literature in F r e n c h c a m e into its o w n as an alternate voice to E u r o p e a n colonial literature in the late 1940s w i t h the f o u n d i n g of t h e j o u r n a l Presence africaine (1947). O t h e r i m p o r t a n t w o r k s w e r e the p u b l i c a t i o n of L é o p o l d S é d a r S e n g h o r ' s c o l l e c t i o n of p o e t r y entitled Chants d'ombre ( 1 9 4 5 ) a n d his Anthologie de ¡a nouvelle poésie negre et malagache ( 1 9 4 8 ) . w h i c h i n c l u d e d p o e m s by

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other African and A f r o - C a r i b b e a n writers. S e n g h o r ' s p o e t r y — w h i c h also includes Hosties noires (1948), Chants pour Naëtt (1949), Ethiopiques (1956), Nocturnes (1961), Elégie des alizés (1969), and Lettres d'hivernage (1973)—embodies the tenets of the Negritude movement, which was born in the 1930s. 4 At that time, students f r o m f r a n c o p h o n e African countries and A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n writers in exile in Paris discovered their African roots in the context of pan-Africanism. P a n - A f r i c a n i s m , which ultimately harks back to the late-eighteenthcentury effort to return African slaves to the newly created state of Liberia, was forged in a series of congresses held in London, Paris, Brussels, Manchester, Lisbon, and New York between 1900 and 1945. Some of its distinguished early founders included E. W. Blyden and W. E. B. Du Bois. Writings inspired by the p a n - A f r i c a n m o v e m e n t continue the European quest for global constants of an A f r i c a n culture and are often inspired by the work of European ethnographers. But, instead of a privileged European narrator, p a n - A f r i c a n writings call into question E u r o p e a n objectivity by substituting narrators and main characters whose privileged position of authority c o m e s f r o m their identity as A f r i c a n s . According to "Black Orp h e u s , " Jean-Paul Sartre's p r e f a c e to S e n g h o r ' s anthology, such writing turns the tables so that it is the European who is the object of the A f r i c a n ' s objectifying gaze instead of the other way around. N e g r i t u d e defines an A f r i c a n way of being in the world that is antithetical to that of the European. This definition recalls European thinking according to which the European is "intellectual, inventive, violent, steelhard, and asexual"; by contrast, the African is "emotional, uninventive, at peace with nature, h u m a n e , and o v e r s e x e d " ( O w o m o y e l a , 1979:39). But Senghor gives new value to characteristics traditionally attributed to Africans so that "uninventiveness" is attributed to "peace with nature," and what puritanical Europeans consider as " o v e r s e x e d " is seen as a healthy sensuality. Senghor attempts to give his verse " s w i n g and dance in the rhythms of his native Serer" (Beier, Knappert, and Moser, 1974:141). An example of S e n g h o r ' s verse is the f a m o u s " B l a c k W o m a n , " which establishes a canon of black beauty: Naked woman, dark w o m a n Firm-fleshed ripe fruit, sombre raptures of black wine, mouth making, lyrical my mouth. Negritude, with its insistence on working out a definition of A f r i c a n cultural identity, made particular sense in the context of the assimilationist policies of French colonialism, which were designed to m a k e Africans culturally into black French people. For some proponents of Negritude, however, the return to cultural roots is not to be c o n f u s e d with cultural isolationism. Although poetry such as S e n g h o r ' s paints an idealistic picture of

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A f r i c a n traditions, it owes much to Europe. One sees the influence of the poetry of Paul Claudel and St. John Perse. Jean-Paul Sartre's p r e f a c e to S e n g h o r ' s anthology, with its emphasis on ways of being and on the gaze of the black underling, places the anthology squarely under the aegis of existentialism. Poems in the anthology such as those of Aimé Césaire reflect the influence of surrealism and Marxism. Thus, a mixed identity of voice is inherent in Negritude—and, indeed, the entire tradition of written A f r i c a n literature that is the subject of this chapter. As Alioune Diop, the founder of Présence africaine (1947), says: Neither white nor y e l l o w nor black, incapable of returning entirely to the traditions of our origins or to a s s i m i l a t e o u r s e l v e s to Europe, w e have the i m p r e s s i o n of constituting a n e w race of mental mulattoes but a race that has never been revealed in its originality and had hardly e v e r b e e n aware of it. 5

T h e Negritude poets work out their cultural ambiguity in d i f f e r i n g ways. Senghor does not attempt to return to a pure state of Africanness but to give new value to traditions and ways of being African in a world in which Africa and Europe are "joined by the navel" (Owomoyela, 1979:41). Senghor has also written essays on various cultural and political subjects; the best known are the three volumes entitled Liberté I, Il and III. Other poets, such as Birago Diop (Leurres et lueurs, 1967) and David Diop, reject assimilation. David Diop's poetry is particularly forceful: My poor brother in the silk-faced dinner jacket Squealing murmuring and strutting in condescending drawing rooms We pity you. (Quoted in O w o m o y e l a , 1979:45) The Congolese poet Tchicaya U Tamsi is of a younger generation. Although his poetry inherits its surrealism through Aimé Césaire, it is more private and Christian than Césaire's. Tchicaya U Tamsi's collections of poems include Le Mauvais Sang (1955; Bad Blood), Feu de brousse (1957; Brush Fire, 1964), Triche-coeur (1960; A Game of Cheat Heart), Epitomé (1962), Le Ventre (1964; The Belly), and La Veste d'intérieur (1977). U Tamsi's greater freedom is typical of the second generation of African writers. Owing to the establishment of African literature as a fact by their predecessors, later generations are able to pursue more independent approaches that do not deal directly with issues of assimilation. Such is the case in the poetry of Zairiah V. Y. Mudimbe, whose Déchirures (1971) is a collection of love verse. Fiction from colonialism to independence. Like the Negritude poets, the novelists of the 1950s and 1960s established a point of view that is culturally mixed. C a m a r a Laye represents the beauty and h a r m o n y of

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traditional African culture but also the painful necessity of change. His L'Enfant noir (1953; Dark Child) is the autobiography of a young man who has made the decision to study in Paris and who laments the loss of a traditional childhood. Yet, for Laye, assimilation should work both ways, as we see in his second novel, Le Regard du roi (1954; Radiance of the King), where the European Clarence is obliged to learn the ways of his African hosts. Laye's third novel, Dramouss (1966; A Dream of Africa) warns of the dangers of assimilation without respect for African cultural roots. The novel is an account of the author's return home after six years in Paris. The harmonious traditional society of his childhood is now replaced by a society of violence. Cheikh Hamidou Kane's philosophical novel Aventure ambiguë (1961; Ambiguous Adventure) is a more troubling account of assimilation. A f a m ily that embodies the essence of traditional African royalty decides to risk sending one of its sons, Samba Diallo, to school in Europe so that he may help his society open up to European technology. T h e experiment fails, however, when Samba, unable to hold the two cultures together, commits suicide. Two postcolonial novels by V. Y. M u d i m b e also portray the impossibility of holding two cultures together. In Entre les eaux: Dieu, un prêtre, la révolution (1973), a priest, Pierre Landu, fails in his attempt to adapt Catholicism and Marxism for what J. Ngate calls an "anti-colonial and ideal view of j u s t i c e " (Ngate, 1988:13); whereas in L'Ecart (1979), Nara goes mad because of his inability to choose between the West and Africa in either love or intellectual activity. The novels of two f r a n c o p h o n e C a m e r o o n i a n novelists, Ferdinand Oyono and Mongo Beti, embody an aesthetic of politically committed realism at odds with the gentler approach of novels such as L'Enfant noir. T h e works of these novelists present a frankly pessimistic view of cultural assimilation in tones of satiric irony that imply a scathing critique of the French colonial civilizing mission. O y o n o ' s tragicomic novels Une Vie de boy (1956; Boy) and Le Vieux Nègre et la médaille (1956; The Old Man and the Medal) represent heroes w h o c o m e to the p a i n f u l awareness that colonialism and its masters are a sham and that assimilation means humiliation, exploitation, and, in the case of Toundi in Boy, death. Mongo Beti also portrays the failure of the colonial system in his novels. Le Pauvre Christ de Bomba (1956; Poor Christ of Bomba), Mission terminée (1957; Mission to Kala), and Le Roi miraculé (1958; King Lazarus) satirize the work of Christian missionaries and French schools. M o n g o Beti's later novels, written after independence, will be discussed below. O y o n o ' s and Beti's colonial novels, however, stand in the m o v e m e n t of Negritude as part of the opposition. They represent authentic A f r i c a n voices, but voices that explode not only the myths of the European civilizing mission but also the ethnographic constructions of Africa on which so much of the Negritude m o v e m e n t is based. T h e satiric realism of O y o n o

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and Beti has been called pessimistic. Although politically committed to the struggle against colonialism, it portrays contemporary Africans as lost and acculturated with no hope for the future because of the disastrous policies of the colonial masters. Two novels of the 1960s stand as a transition between colonial Negritude fiction and later postcolonial fiction, which deals with problems of African society with little or no reference to Europeans. Yambo Ouologuem's Le Devoir de violence (1966; Bound to Violence) attacks the ethnographically inspired myths of a harmonious precolonial African culture with a representation of the African past as a series of violent episodes. It presents an even more negative view of the African past than do the ironic Oyono and Beti. Ahmadou Kourouma's 1968 Soleils des indépendances (Suns of Independence), features a deposed African prince who attempts to adjust to conditions in a modern African state. What is striking about this novel is its pluralism. Here there is no authoritative voice or privileged perspective, African or otherwise. Rather, events can be partially, but not entirely, explained by various mutually exclusive perspectives provided by Islamic, European, or traditional African spiritual traditions. The language of the novel, which Africanizes French with expressions drawn from the author's native Mandingo, is probably the most original in African francophone fiction. Ousmane Sembene and the Afro-Asiatic movement. Like panAfrican writers, those inspired by Afro-Asianism also replace the European perspective with an African one. These writers assume the role of conscience of their people. Respectful of African traditions but rejecting the Negritude aesthetic altogether, writers in the Afro-Asiatic movement seek to mobilize their people against European colonial domination through a call to Marxist-inspired political struggle rather than a return to cultural purity. Afro-Asianism, which crystallized at the conference of Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, marks a coming together of the African struggles for independence with forces generated by (1) movements of Arab and Asian nationalism, (2) the support of the Soviet Union for colonized peoples against Western imperialism, and (3) the newfound independence of China, India, Egypt, and Indonesia. Ousmane Sembene embodies the Afro-Asiatic aesthetic in both literature and film. 6 His most important novel is the classic Les Bouts de bois de Dieu (1960; God's Bits of Wood), which is the story of the successful 1947 Dakar-Niger railroad strike against the French during the colonial period. The author's role as conscience of his people, holding up the way of liberation, is clear in an author's note that precedes the novel: T h e m e n and w o m e n w h o , f r o m the tenth of October, 1947, to the nineteenth of March, 1 9 4 8 , took part in this s t r u g g l e for a better w a y o f life

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owe nothing to anyone: neither to any "civilizing m i s s i o n " nor to any parliament or p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n . T h e i r e x a m p l e w a s not in vain. Since then, Africa has made progress. 7

Other works include the autobiographical Docker noir (1956) about the author's experiences as a dock worker in Marseille, Oh pays, mon beau peuple (1957), Voltaique (1962; Tribal Scars and Other Stories), L'Harmattan (1964), Le Mandat et Vehi Ciosane (1969; The Money Order with White Genesis), Xala (1973), and Le Dernier de 1'empire (1981). Although God's Bits of Wood was successful in Europe, Sembene was dissatisfied because he was unable to reach his own people. Thus, he took advantage of an offer f r o m the M o s c o w Film School to learn cinema. His first film was Borom saret, which tells the story of the driver of a donkeydrawn taxi cart. From that point on, S e m b e n e , the father of African cinema, has converted many of his short stories into f i l m s in which he uses native Senegalese languages instead of or along with French. The subsequent work of Ousmane S e m b e n e spans the entire gamut of African filmmaking—primarily a phenomenon that emerged in former French colonies in Africa—and will be used to represent African cinema in this chapter. His Emitai (1971) and Camp de Thiaroye (1988) describe colonialist abuses during and immediately after World War II. La Noire de . . . (1965; Black Girl) recounts the travails of a maid who is so mistreated by her French master and mistress that she commits suicide. Other f i l m s explore issues in the precolonial p a s t — n o t to reestablish cultural purity, however, but to m a k e a point about present domination. S e m b e n e ' s film Ceddo (1977) is a study of A f r i c a n resistance to conversion to Islam. This film and Camp de Thiaroye are politically so explosive that they have been either banned or edited by censors in Senegal. Films such as Mandabi (winner of a prize at the Venice Film Festival) and Xala (1974) are socialist-realist denunciations of abuses in postcolonial Senegalese society. Xala—the title means temporary sexual impotence in Wolof—attacks the political, economic, and cultural impotence of the Senegalese black bourgeoisie. This shift from an emphasis on answering European accounts about Africa to a concern to identify problems and issues in contemporary independent Africa is also characteristic of fiction written after French African colonies achieved independence in the early 1960s. Sembene's most recent films in this vein are Guelwaar and Fat'Kine.

Postcolonial fiction in French. Postcolonial fiction explores many different directions. Postcolonial "novels of disillusion" attack the abuses of postcolonial African states: dictatorship, corruption, and misery. This fiction is less clearly didactic in nature. It neither embodies a clear-cut ideology nor does it present authoritative visions of the African past—although the influence of African tradition remains present in many subtle ways.

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Postcolonial fiction, rather, explores reality in order to open new possibilities. This stance was already prepared by the colonial novels of Beti, Oyono, and Kourouma and is embodied in Mongo Beti's later novels: Perpétue ou l'habitude du malheur (1974; Perpetua and the Habit of Unhappiness), Remember Ruben (1974), and La Ruine presque cocasse d'un polichinelle. Another writer in this vein is Sony Labou Tansi, whose novels include La Vie et demie (1979), and L'Etat honteux (1981). More recent fiction abandons political agenda altogether for either a variety of inner adventures, such as Ibrahima Ly's La Toile d'araignée, or a portrait of the decadence of Senegalese society, as in Abasse Ndione's Vie en spirale. W o m e n ' s writing is an important p h e n o m e n o n in Africa. M u c h of it corrects the vision of Africa in m e n ' s writing just as African m e n ' s writing corrected European accounts of Africa. W o m e n ' s writing draws back f r o m authoritative positions as it seeks a new language. For example, M a r i a m a B â ' s Une si longue lettre (1979; So Long a Letter) portrays a w o m a n caught between the rhetoric of the traditional Senegalese family and that of a m o d e r n Europeanized feminism as she struggles, first to create her marriage and then to survive it when it turns unexpectedly polygynous. In this first-person narrative, no voice, including the n a r r a t o r ' s own, suffices to explain events with authority. There is, for e x a m p l e , no explicit call for monogamy. Bâ's second novel, Le Chant écarlate (1981), is similar; it explores the problems e n c o u n t e r e d by a F r e n c h w o m a n in her marriage to a Senegalese man. A m i n a t a Maïga K a ' s two novellas, La Voie du salut and Miroir de la vie (1985), also present w o m e n whose lives diverge f r o m their ways of thinking. Although largely third-person narratives, these pieces taken together artfully reproduce in French the ways of thinking and speaking characteristic of various classes of people. Aminata Maïga Ka's characters typically fail to cope with the realities that overwhelm them. They turn to suicide and alcohol. Such failures are brought about not only by external events but also by the rhetorics of class, honor, and family in which the characters are trapped. Like the novels of Mariama Bâ, these novellas open up new perspectives brought about by w o m e n ' s voices but leave readers to draw their own conclusions. T h e most prolific of Senegalese w o m e n writers is A m i n a t a Sow Fall, who writes in a more pluralistic vein. Her novels include Le Revenant (1976), La Grève des battus ou les déchets humains (1979), and L'Appel des arènes (1982). T h e s e novels not only elaborate a w o m a n ' s language but also explore the contradictions and blind spots of male discourse. For e x a m p l e , A m i n a t a Sow Fall's most recent novel, L'Ex-père de la nation (1987), explores the self-deceptive rhetoric of the male narrator, who is a deposed African head of state in prison thinking back over the events of his rise and fall. What seems at first a language of pretension turns out to be a rhetoric of light, transparency, and cleanliness that ironically blinds

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the narrator to the machinations of power going on inside and outside the presidential palace. A m i n a t a Sow Fall artfully reproduces the various French dialects characteristic of different classes of society.

Theater in French. Theater in French has not been a very successful genre in Africa. The formal setting of theaters contrasts sharply with the setting of the popular village square where much West African oral literature takes place. The strongest Negritude playwright is Martinique's A i m é Césaire, whose plays La Tragédie du roi Christophe (Emperor Jones) and Une Saison au Congo are distinguished by a highly original use of French. Another playwright f r o m the early period is Cheikh N ' d a o , whose Exil d'Albouri dramatizes a moment from the traditional African past. More recently, however, the A f r i c a n stage has been distinguished by the works of Sony Labou Tansi (Conscience de tracteur, 1979; and La Parenthèse de sang, 1981) and Werewere-Liking (La Puissance de UM, 1979; and Une Nouvelle Terre, 1980). Werewere-Liking's Orphée d'Afric/Orphée d'Afrique is a mixed genre, a novel followed by a play. African Literature in Portuguese B e f o r e going on to A f r i c a n literature in English, a word is in order about lusophone (Portuguese) A f r i c a n literature. Poets such as the first president of Angola, A g o s t i n h o Neto, the Angolan José Craveirinha, and the Cape Verdean Baltasar Lopes write in the tradition of pan-Africanism. The works of these writers and others are known to English speakers primarily f r o m Mario de A n d r a d e ' s Antologia de poesia negra de espressâo portuguesa (1958). Fiction writers include José Luandino Vieira (Luuanda, 1963; and A Vida verdadeira de Domingos Xavier, 1961; The Real Life of Domingos Xavier) and Luis Bernard Honwana (Nós natanis a eòo tinhoso, 1964; We Killed Mangy Dog and Other Stories).

African Literature in English African writers in English tend to be more independent than those in French because France had a much more centralized policy of linguistic imperialism than did England. Among other policies, France did not promote the translation of the Bible into African languages, as did Protestant England. For this reason, writers in English tend to be more secure in their identity. For example, the best-known Nigerian writer, Wole Soyinka, has said in reference to Negritude, "A tiger does not proclaim his tigritude, he pounces." He goes on to say that what one should expect from poetry is "an intrinsic poetic quality, not a mere name-dropping" (quoted in Zeli, Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:491). As a result, African literature in English has rich traditions in the novel, poetry, and drama. Unlike French, where most writers tend to write

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in one genre alone, African writers in English practice several genres. The phenomenon is so rich and diverse that it does not yield to so neat a periodization as does French African literature, since novelists of the earlier English African generations already were writing social criticism of African life of the kind common in the third period of French African literature. Nigerian fiction. Aside from scattered beginnings in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Olaudah Equiano and Phillis Wheatley), Nigerian literature in English took its impulse from two sources. One is the popular tradition of Onitsha novels (named after the market where they were sold) that began in the 1940s. The second is the educational infrastructure provided by the founding of the University College of Ibadan in 1948. Now called the University of Ibadan, this institution had more autonomous policies than later French universities, so that African writers could teach there and establish a closer relationship between African culture and writing in English than could writers who used French. The best-known and most prolific writer to come out of the Onitsha tradition is Cyprian Ekwensi. Although a man of considerable education, Ekwensi has written popular novels such as People of the City (1954), Jagua Nana (1961), Divided We Stand (1980), and Motherless Baby (a novella). He has also written several children's books. Ekwensi's novels feature people from various walks of life but often deal with such issues as prostitution, urban lowlife, and political violence. The major Nigerian novelist of this early generation is Chinua Achebe, who has also written poetry (Beware Soul Brothers and Other Poems, 1972), short stories (Girls at War and Other Stories, 1972), and various children's stories. Achebe is a writer from the more learned tradition of Nigerian writing, having completed his studies at the University College of Ibadan in 1953. His great cycle of novels written between 1958 and 1966 spans a period of Nigerian history from the onset of colonialism to the eve of the civil war sparked by the attempt of Biafra to secede from the country in the 1960s. Like French writers, Achebe—whose statements on the role of the writer in Africa have been published in a collection entitled Morning Yet on Creation Day (1975)—originally began to write in order to correct European writings on Africa. He said in a Bill Moyers interview that in college, while reading Conrad's Heart of Darkness, he realized that he was not the white hero but "one of the natives jumping up and down on the beach." It was then that he knew that it was time to write another story. Elsewhere he says, "I would be quite satisfied if my novels (especially ones I set in the past) did no more than teach my readers that their past— with all its imperfection—was not one long night of savagery from which the first Europeans acting on G o d ' s behalf delivered them" (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:345).

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Accordingly, A c h e b e ' s first novel, Things Fall Apart (1958), is the story of the tragedy that the arrival of Christianity and the onset of colonialism represent for the village of U m u o f i a . Thus, the novel frequently leaves the main character, O k o n k w o , in the b a c k g r o u n d in order to give rich descriptions of the traditional village life that is disrupted by the arrival of the Europeans. A c h e b e alludes to the great life cycles implied in planting and harvesting, getting married and dying, and passing the various ceremonial stages of social promotion. A c h e b e ' s third novel, Arrow of God (1964), is set in the 1920s but also deals with the conflict between traditional and modern values. It is the story of the backfire of the project of a village priest named Ezeulu, w h o sends his son Oduche to the mission school to learn the white m a n ' s secrets: O d u c h e converts to Christianity and kills the sacred python of E z e u l u ' s traditional African religion. A c h e b e ' s first and third novels recall the literature of Negritude because of their emphasis on African tradition. His second and fourth novels, which deal with conflicts and tensions in modern Nigeria, prefigure novels of contemporary African literature. No Longer at Ease (1960) is the story of O k o n k w o ' s grandson, who has difficulties adapting to Nigerian society a f t e r he returns f r o m school in England. He falls in love with an outcast w o m a n and succumbs to bribes that ultimately ruin his career. A Man of the People (1964) is a satire on the government of Nigeria. The end of the novel, which evokes a military coup, f o r e s h a d o w s the onset of the civil war over the secession of Biafra. A f t e r a period of more than twenty years, A c h e b e published another novel, Anthills of the Savannah, in 1987. This novel describes the p o w e r plays and corruption of contemporary African society from the perspective of several narrators, including the president of the country, two of his school friends, and their girlfriends. This kaleidoscopic vision leaves the reader to draw conclusions as to the whys and wherefores of the plot. Achebe is a master of the English language and draws heavily on classical European as well as Ibo and Yoruba cultures. For example, the title of Things Fall Apart is derived f r o m W. B. Yeats's " T h e Second C o m i n g . " T h e stately English of A c h e b e ' s early novels is colored with Ibo-inspired proverbs, whereas in Anthills of the Savannah, he reproduces modern spoken Nigerian English, including "pidgin," used by the less educated. A much more extreme experimentation with English is evident in the works of the non-Ibo novelists Amos Tutuola—whose novels, such as The Palm-Wine Drinkard (1952), use speech patterns of the Yoruba language— and Gabriel Okara, who reproduces patterns of his native Ijo syntax in his novels, such as The Voice. Ken Saro-Wiwa's Sozaboy: A Novel in Rotten English (1985), which portrays army life during the civil war, also experiments with language in its mix of pidgin, broken, and standard English. It is the foundation of Saro-Wiwa's literary reputation, which has been overshadowed

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by his execution by the Nigerian military regime in 1995 (Killam and Rowe 2000:257). Like their French-speaking counterparts, women novelists in Nigeria have been productive, writing in voices different from those of male authors. Flora Nwapa is the first published woman novelist in Africa. Her Efuru (1966) and Idu (1969) describe the difficulties women encounter as they come to terms with their expected social roles as wives and mothers. Her Never Again (1976) is a description of an episode in the Nigerian civil war from a w o m a n ' s perspective. Flora Nwapa has also published collections of short stories such as This Is Lagos and Other Stories (1971) and Wives at War and Other Stories (1980). She has founded a publishing house that has published her novel One Is Enough (1981) and children's stories, which she hopes will be read by children the world over. Another major Nigerian woman novelist is Buchi Emecheta, who has been hailed as having given a realistic and complex alternative to the onesided picture of African women found in male fiction. A sociologist who obtained her training while a single parent supporting five children, Emecheta got her start writing a regular column recording her observations of London society for the New Statesman. Her first two novels, the autobiographical In the Ditch (1972) and Second Class Citizen (1974), detail difficulties of African women in England, whereas The Bride Price (1976), The Slave Girl (1977), and Joys of Motherhood (1979) deal with the difficulties encountered by women as they marry, bear children, or find themselves tools for the ambitions of their male relatives. Other novels deal with the civil war (Destination Biafra) and problems in contemporary Nigerian society (Naira Power and The Double Yoke). Emecheta is a powerful writer whose images are metaphors for deep female experience as well as literal descriptions of traditional African supernatural forces. For example, in Joys of Motherhood, the experience of the main character, Nnu Ego, is often explained in terms of water imagery that recalls that she is accursed by her chi, a water deity. Nigerian poetry and theater. Two main forces behind Nigerian literature are the Mbari Club—which is not only a meeting place for writers and artists but also a publishing outlet—and the literary journal Black Orpheus, which has published the work of many Nigerian poets in its pages. Christopher Okigbo (Heavensgate, 1962, and Limits, 1964) was a poet originally published by Mbari. A posthumous collection entitled Labyrinths with Paths of Thunder (1971) came out in London after Okigbo's life was cut short in the civil war. Okigbo, who considered himself a reincarnation of his maternal grandfather—a priest of Idoto—drew on a good background in Western culture as well as the cultures of Nigeria. He has said that his poetic sequence Heavensgate, Limits, and Distances is "like telling the beads of a rosary; except that the beads are neither stone nor agate but

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globules of anguish strung together on m e m o r y " (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:448). An example of his cultural eclecticism is Heavensgate, which is written as an Easter sequence conceived as a Catholic mass o f f e r e d to Mother Idoto. In his 1965 verse collection, A Reed in the Tide, John Pepper Clark, a playwright as well as a poet, calls himself a " m u l a t t o — n o t in flesh but in m i n d " (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:367). His other verse includes Poems, brought out by Mbari in 1962, and Casualties (1968). Clark is also a playwright of distinction whose plays include Song of a Goat (1962), The Masquerade, and The Raft. His Ozidi (1966) is based on an Ijo saga. He subsequently published a book-length edition (The Ozidi Saga, 1977), which in the oral tradition takes seven days to perform. Wole Soyinka, who won the 1986 N o b e l Prize in literature, is the most p r o m i n e n t writer in Nigeria. He is p e r h a p s the best c o n t e m p o r a r y dramatic poet in English, as well as a distinguished novelist, essayist, and playwright. Soyinka's first verse was published in Black Orpheus. His first collection, Idanre, and Other Poems (1967), includes the long poem "Idanre," which was written for the Commonwealth Arts Festival of 1965. "Idanre" is a creation myth of Ogun, the Yoruba god of iron, who, with his aspects of creation and destruction, represents human dualism and is for Soyinka the "symbol figure" of his society. Other collections include A Shuttle in the Crypt (1971), written during Soyinka's civil war imprisonment, and Ogun Abibman (1976), which is a tribute to the African struggle for liberation. Soyinka's first novel, The Interpreters (1965), is the story of a group of university-educated friends who attempt to interpret their role in Nigerian society. The novel has an extremely dense texture of language that recalls J a m e s Joyce. Season of Anomy (1973) incorporates the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice as it tells the quest of Ofeyi for his abducted mistress, Iriyise, the cocoa princess. The novel is a political allegory of the social ills of modern Nigeria that mixes reality and fantasy, African ritual nature myths, and European archetypes. S o y i n k a ' s Ake: The Years of Childhood (1981) is an autobiography of his first twelve years. Soyinka is best known for his more than twenty plays, which use themes concerning African culture and politics as well as the confrontation between Europe and A f r i c a to explore universal constants of the h u m a n mind and metaphysical problems of good and evil. Soyinka sets out his views on writing in a collection of essays entitled Myth, Literature and the African World (1976). In this work, one of his goals is to establish parallels between a classical Yoruba worldview and the Greek tradition in European literature. His essay " T h e Fourth S t a g e " is on the Yoruba concept of tragedy, whereas in " D r a m a and the African World View," he affirms that the d i f f e r e n c e s of European and A f r i c a n drama result f r o m two different world visions:

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Westerners have a c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z i n g habit of thought w h i c h s e l e c t s asp e c t s of human e m o t i o n and e v e n s c i e n t i f i c o b s e r v a t i o n s and "turns them into separatist m y t h s . " African creativity, on the other hand, results from "a c o h e s i v e understanding o f irreducible truths." ( Z e l l , Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:52)

Soyinka is a brilliant satirist. In a lighter vein are his early Lion and the Jewel (1959), which mockingly chronicles the competition between a polygynous, lecherous village chief and a Europeanized schoolteacher for the hand of a village beauty, and The Trials of Brother Jero (1963), which satirizes the syncretistic Christian cults of Nigeria. Other plays written for important occasions unflinchingly attack popular conceptions. A Dance of the Forests, p e r f o r m e d to celebrate Nigerian independence in October 1960, criticizes "the myth of the glorious African past, rejecting the Negritude concept that the revival of African culture must be inspired by the African cultural heritage alone" (Beier, Knappert, and Moser, 1974:142). Kongi's Harvest, written for the 1966 World Festival of Negro Arts in Dakar, relentlessly satirizes African dictatorships. The Road (1965), performed at the C o m m o n w e a l t h Arts Festival (1965), is one of the fullest expressions of Soyinka's tragic view of life. Works such as the satirical sketches gathered in Before the Blackout (1971) and Madmen and Specialists (1971) use theater of the absurd techniques to attack the civil war. Madmen and Specialists, however, uses the events of the civil war as a context to consider the problem of evil, whereas Soyinka's Bacchae of Euripides (1973) combines elements of the Greek play with allusions to public executions on Bar Beach in Lagos during the civil war to conduct a ritualistic exploration of the human mind. Death and the King's Horseman (1975) is based on historical events in which a district officer prevented the Elesin Oba f r o m committing suicide to follow his king into death. According to Soyinka, T h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n in the play is largely m e t a p h y s i c a l , c o n t a i n e d in the h u m a n v e h i c l e w h i c h is Elesin and the universe of the Yoruba m i n d — t h e w o r l d of the l i v i n g , the dead and the unborn, and the n u m i n o u s p a s s a g e w h i c h links all: transition. (Zell, Bundy, and C o u l o n , 1 9 8 3 : 4 8 9 )

(Soyinka, by the way, served as editor of the distinguished cultural and political magazine Transition [Ch'indaba], which he is now in the process of reviving.) Soyinka's Opera Wonyosi (1981) draws on Brecht's Threepenny Opera and John Gay's Beggar's Opera to satirize contemporary Nigerian life. According to Robert MacDowell, Soyinka m a k e s use of fascinating d e v i c e s in his o w n expressionistic plays; dancing, singing, m i m i n g , s p e e c h e s in verse, f l a s h b a c k s ( s o m e t i m e s c o v e r i n g e o n s o f time), and characters from the spirit world. H e e m p l o y s t e c h n i q u e s

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familiar at Nigerian festivals, and utilizes any poetic methods which enforce the emotional and intellectual impact of his dramas; in short he has no slavish attachment to the merely naturalistic level of presentation. (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon 1983:490)

Soyinka is a committed writer but one who has a high conception of his art. At the 1967 African-Scandinavian Writers Conference in Stockholm, he criticized foreign publishers who create reputations for insignificant authors and the African author whom he characterizes as "the most celebrated skin of inconsequence to obscure the true flesh of the African dilemma" (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon 1983:491). He goes on to say that such a writer was content to turn his eye backwards in time and prospect in archaic fields for forgotten gems which would dazzle and distract the present. But never inwards, never truly into the present. . . . The artist has always functioned in African society as the record of the mores and experience of his society and as the voice of vision in his own time. It is time for him to respond to this essence of himself. (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon 1983: 491-492)

Other Nigerian and West African authors. Nigerian authors of the second generation who deserve mention are poets Tanure Ojaide, Odia Ofeimun, Niyi Osundare, and Harry Garuba; the dramatists Femi Osofisan, Ola Rotimi, and Tess Onwueme; and the novelists Kole Omotoso and Festus Iyayi. There is also now a third generation, which includes the poets Afam Akeh, Uche Nduka, Esiaba Irobi, Kemi Atanda-Ilori, and Catherine Acholonu as well as the novelist Wale Okediran. Nigerian literature dominates West African anglophone writing, but some other notable writers are the Gambian poet Lenri Peters and the Ghanaians Kofi Awooner (poet), Efua Sutherland (playwright), Ami Ata Aidoo (playwright and novelist), and Ayi Kwei Armah (novelist). East Africa. East African writing in English has not developed into as full a tradition as West African writing in English. Important writers from East Africa include the Kenyan short story writer Grace Ogot, who incorporates tribal laws and wisdom in her works; the Ugandan poet Okot p'Bitek; and the Somalian novelist and playwright Nruddin Farah. The major East African literary figure to date is Ngugi wa Thiong'o (formerly James Ngugi), whose novels Weep Not Child (1964), The River Between (1965), and A Grain of Wheat (1967) parallel Achebe's novels in Nigeria in that they trace the history of Kenya from the arrival of the British to modern times. According to Andrew Gurr, They start with the alienation of Gikuyu land and end with the alienation of the social and individual psyche of the colonised. The first [novel]

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begins at a time when the G i k u y u have their land, and the colonial prese n c e is little m o r e than o n e of missionaries and mission schools, a f o r c e which divides the people but does not yet dispossess them. In the second novel they are the dispossessed, tenant farmers, landless laborers or fighters seeking to regain the land which is home. In the third novel the white colonial landlords are going, leaving behind them the traumatised victims of the struggle and the new black landlords w h o threaten to perpetuate the system of alienation which colonialism set up. (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:432)

N g u g i ' s Petals of Blood (1977) is a picture of corruption in m o d e r n day Kenya with f l a s h b a c k s to the fight for independence. According to Christopher Ricks, the book b e g i n s with a f i r e — a r s o n ? — i n w h i c h there are killed three p r o m i n e n t , corrupt figures of the new Kenya. It ends with our k n o w i n g exactly what happened and why. But its journey, which has at its heart an actual journey taken by the d r o u g h t - s t r i c k e n p e o p l e of the village of Ilmorog in order to beg for help f r o m the c i t y - w o r l d of its M P and of the national c o n s c i e n c e , takes it b a c k through all the s u f f e r i n g s of the fight for national f r e e d o m . (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:433)

Devil on the Cross (1982) was originally written in Kikuyu on leaves of lavatory paper while the author was in prison for a year but under no charges. T h e novel centers on the heroine Wariinga, who is "fired for ref u s i n g to sleep with her boss, and evicted f r o m her shanty for refusing to pay exorbitant rent" (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:190). Ngugi is one of the most powerful writers in Africa today and one of the leading proponents of writing in A f r i c a n languages. His production also includes several plays (This Time Tomorrow, 1957; The Black Hermit, 1968; The Rebels, 1970; Wound in the Heart, 1970; and I Will Marry When I Want, 1982), short stories (Secret Lives and Other Stories, 1975), and critical essays ( H o m e c o m i n g : Essays on African and Caribbean Literature, Culture and Politics, 1972; Writers in Politics, Essays, 1981; and Detainees: A Writer's Prison Diary, 1981). Literature in South Africa. The f o l l o w i n g account is limited to South African literature written in English because literature in Afrikaans and the other A f r i c a n languages is still not widely accessible to Englishspeaking readers. C o n t e m p o r a r y South A f r i c a n literature is profoundly shaped by the 1948 victory of the Nationalist Party with its platform of apartheid—the policy that different " r a c e s , " White, Black, Coloured, and Asian, would develop separately. Although apartheid policies had long existed in the A f r i k a n e r provinces of the British-dominated Union of South Africa, it was not a national policy and the British-dominated Cape Town province had been more tolerant of racial differences. The Nationalist

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Party held power until 1994, when Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) won the 1994 elections that led to the creation of a multiracial republic. One aspect of the apartheid policy was the generalization of a system of passes (internal passports) that strictly regulated the movements of people of different races. The i n f a m o u s Sharpeville massacre in which sixty-nine A f r i c a n s were killed and 180 injured originated as a demonstration against the pass laws. Another aspect of apartheid was to m a k e A f r i k a n e r (a Dutch creole language) the language of instruction in schools. This policy inspired demonstrations in the black township of S o w e t o on June 16, 1976, by students wanting the g o v e r n m e n t to waive the language requirement. A series of riots followed in which many schoolchildren were shot or imprisoned. The determination of the regime to stay in power through such brutal repression, as well as through constant censorship, led to a fragmentation of South African literature. Writers such as Alex L a G u m a and Dennis Brutus were driven into exile and their w o r k s — a n d mention of their w o r k s — w a s banned. White writers such as Nadine G o r d i m e r or Steven Coetze were able to flourish and, in the case of Gordimer, even take the censors head on. A group of black writers, such as M a t s e m e l a M a n a k a and Sipho Sepamla, inspired by an anti-apartheid opposition m o v e m e n t called Black Consciousness, managed to stay in South Africa and maintain some measure of literary production in spite of the censorship. N o w that apartheid has ended, the future of South A f r i c a n literature remains to be seen. Will exiled writers, who were effectively silenced by censorship, find a place in the literary canon of the new South Africa? Will writers such as Gordimer and Coetze, even with their struggles against apartheid, find a readership in the new republic among black readers? What will the new works of black as well as white authors look like now that apartheid has fallen? Olive Schreiner's Story of an African Farm (1883) is usually credited with initiating the South African novel in English. According to Killam and R o w e (2000:184), The Story of an African Farm received instant recognition, "largely because of its bold criticism of the treatment of w o m e n in the C a p e colony, its exposé of the general mindlessness and anti-intellectualism there, and its unusual multi-generic f o r m . " Nadine Gordimer and J. M. Coetzee are considered to be the principal South African novelists in Schreiner's tradition. Nobel P r i z e - w i n n i n g Nadine G o r d i m e r (b. 1923) has at this writing published twelve novels, including The Lying Days (1953), A World of Strangers (1958), Occasion for Loving (1963), The Late Bourgeois World (1966), A Guest of Honour (1971), The Conservationist (1983), Burger's Daugher (1979), July's People (1981), A Sport of Nature (1987), My Son's Story (1990), None to Accompany Me (1994), and The House Gun (1998). Gordimer has won prestigious prizes for her novels, including the James Tait Black M e m o r i a l Prize, the Booker Prize, the South African C N A (Central N e w s A g e n c y )

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Joseph

Award, and the French Grand Aigle d'Or. She received the Nobel Prize in 1991. Her writings also include: •

•

• •

twelve v o l u m e s of short stories, which include Face to Face (1949), Selected Stories (1975), and Why Haven't You Written: Selected Stories (1950-1972) (1992); essays on literature and politics, including The Black Interpreters (1973), What Happened to Burger's Daugter; or How South African Censorship Works (1980), and The Essential Gesture: Writing, Politics, and Places (1988); South African Writing Today (1967) in collaboration with Lionel Abrahams; and two books in collaboration with photographer David Goldblatt, On the Mines (1973) and Lifetimes: Under Apartheid (1986).

Gordimer writes in a realisitic vein that explores the "interconnectedness of personal emotion, physical desire, and political conviction and action . . . Her importance as a writer has been understood mostly to be in her handling of the novel and story forms as political statement: she has developed an idiosyncratic style, moralistic, clear-sighted, wedded in form to the tradition of Tolstoy and George Eliot" (Killam and Rowe, 2000:108). G o r d i m e r has been criticized for her portrayal of nonwhites as either shady, subaltern characters or sex objects. In this respect she shares the tendency of European colonial writing to portray Africans in terms of extremes. The recognition she has received has also been considered to some extent an ill-gotten gain because of her privileged position as a white middie-class writer able to brave the censors at a time when nonwhite South African writers were forced into silence and/or exile. Furthermore, she has also been considered prejudiced in favor of European forms as opposed to African oral traditions and mythology in her aesthetic criticism of writers such as Flora Nwapa. Nevertheless, Gordimer—aware of the contradictions inherent in her situation and outlook—must be credited with using her position to urge white South A f r i c a n s to recognize the impossibility of apartheid (Killam and Rowe 2000:108). John Maxwell (J. M.) Coetzee (b. 1940) has been credited with writing the first postmodern novel in South Africa, Dusklands (1974), and with introducing an ethical dimension into the style. T h e s e l f - r e f l e x i v i t y of h i s n o v e l s is a m e a n s of s c r u t i n i z i n g the a s s u m p tions of the d i s c o u r s e s that are a v a i l a b l e to h i m , . . . w h i l e not d e n y i n g his i n e v i t a b l e i m b r i c a t i o n in a t r a d i t i o n of w h i t e S o u t h A f r i c a n w r i t i n g ; it is a l s o a m e a n s of d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n to t h e q u e s t i o n of p o s i t i o n a l i t y , a u t h o r ity, a n d a g e n c y , a l w a y s a s k i n g " W h o w r i t e s ? W h o t a k e s u p the p o s i t i o n of p o w e r , p e n in h a n d ? " ( K i l l a m a n d R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 7 1 )

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Coetzee has subsequently published six other novels: In the Heart of the Country (1977), Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), Life & Times of Michael k (1983), Foe (1986), Age of Iron (1990), The Master of Petersburg (1994), and Disgrace (1999), as well as an autobiographical memoir, Boyhood: Scenes from Provincial Life. Coetzee, w h o received a Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin, is a professor of English at the University of C a p e Town w h o has also written a distinguished body of critical works, translations, commentaries on popular culture, and reviews. White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South Africa (1988) is "a collection of critical essays about the European invention of South A f r i c a , " whereas Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews (1992) "gathers his m a j o r critical writing f r o m 1970 to 1990" (Killam and Rowe, 2000:71). Also of note is the white liberal writer Alan Paton (1903-1988), whose Cry, the Beloved Country (1948) and Too Late the Phalarope (1953) evoke South A f r i c a ' s h u m a n and physical landscapes with a spare and uns p a r i n g r e a l i s m , H e m i n g w a y e s q u e but e a r n e s t l y m o r a l , biblical in s o m e of its c a d e n c e s a n d e p i p h a n i e s . S o c l o s e is the fit b e t w e e n the c o u n t r y he d e p i c t s a n d the m o r a l f r a m e t h r o u g h w h i c h he v i e w s it that S o u t h A f r i c a b e c a m e f o r m a n y r e a d e r s i n s i d e a n d o u t s i d e the c o u n t r y a u n i q u e o b j e c t less o n , an i n f a m o u s t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y d i l e m m a . ( K i l l a m and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 1 8 4 )

Just as West and East African writers in European languages began to write in an effort to tell a story about A f r i c a that had been left untold in European colonial writing, nonwhite South African writers in English tell a story that would otherwise remain smothered by apartheid. The earliest of these writers, f r o m the 1920s and 1930s, were often educated in mission schools. They include Thomas Mfolo, whose Chaka, mentioned above, was translated into English as well as other languages, and Solomon T. Plaatje ( 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 3 2 ) , whose Mhudi (1930) was expurgated by the mission-controlled publishers. According to Killam and R o w e (2000:184), the novel centers "on the collision between the Matabele nation and the Voortrekkers moving into the interior, and the plight of the helpless tribes caught in the conflict." The novel also shows how the Christianity of sincere and fervent missionaries undermines native cultures. Later generations of nonwhite writers, often coming f r o m black townships such as S o p h i a t o w n , reflect the conditions of their lives under apartheid: Peter A b r a h a m s , whose novels include Mine Boy (1946), Song of the City (1945), Path of Thunder (1948), Wild Conquest (1950), A Wreath for Udomo (1965), as well as his m e m o i r s Tell Freedom (1954); Todd Matshikiza, Ezekiel Mphahlele, Richard Rive, Alex La G u m a , and Can Themba, who have published short stories in magazines like Drum, Zonk!, Afrika, and Bona; and Ezekiel Mphahlele, whose novel Down Second

358

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Avenue (1959) is an example of autobiographies written by South African writers to denounce the oppression of the white regime. N o n w h i t e writers in South A f r i c a such as Bloke M o d i s a n e , Lewis Nkosi, Casey Motsisi, and Nat Nakasa have worked against enormous odds including censorship, prison, and exile, and the inaccessibility of education. Two of the strongest prose writers in South A f r i c a are Richard Rive and Alex La G u m a . Richard R i v e ' s Emergency (1964), for e x a m p l e , tells the story of the state of emergency declared by the South African government after the Sharpeville massacre. Like most others, Rive is an urban South African who eschews the pastoralism of Negritude in favor of urban t h e m e s — " l i f e in the slums, the c o n s e q u e n c e s of overt protest and the ironies of racial prejudice and color s n o b b e r y " (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:472). According to Bernth Lindfors, Rive's style is "characterized by strong rhythms, daring images, brisk dialogue and leitmotifs (recurring words, phrases, and images) which function as unifying devices within stories" (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:472). Alex La G u m a is also a writer w h o concerns himself with life in the city, prison, and township. The short story A Walk in the Night (1962) tells of Michael Adonis, a coloured boy fired f r o m his j o b and ultimately a fatality of police brutality. And a Threefold Cord (1964) is a novel about life in a ghetto bordering Cape Town. Other novels include The Stone Country (1967), which tells of life in South African jails; In the Fog of the Season's End (1972), dealing with political activism; and Time of the Butcherbird (1979), which recounts the f o r c e d resettlement of whole c o m m u n i t i e s to other townships. According to Lindfors, La G u m a ' s style is "characterized by graphic description, careful evocation of atmosphere and mood, fusion of pathos and humor, colorful dialogue and occasional surprise e n d i n g s " (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon, 1983:402). Unlike these urbanized writers, Bessie Head has settled in rural Botswana. She has published three novels that make up a kind of trilogy: When Rain Clouds Gather (1969), Maru (1971), and A Question of Power (1974). Of Bessie Head's style Arthur Ravenscroft states, "In A question of Power we are taken nightmarishly into the central c h a r a c t e r ' s process of mental breakdown, through lurid cascades of hallucination and a pathological blurring of the frontiers b e t w e e n insanity and any kind of n o r m a l c y " (Zell, Bundy, and Coulon 1983:390). Bessie Head's interest in tradition is reflected in Serowe: The Village of the Rainwind (1981), which is a series of interviews conducted among the villagers of Serowe. In the 1970s and 1980s Black Consciousness poets also wrote important novels. A m o n g these are M o n g a n e Wally Serote's To Every Birth Its Blood (1981), and Sipho Sepamla's The Root Is One (1979) and A Ride on the Whirlwind (1981). Also of note are Laurettta N g c o b o ' s Cross of Gold (1981) and Mbulelo M z a m a n e ' s The Children ofSoweto (1982).

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D u r i n g the last thirty years, e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n in late- a n d p o s t m o d e r n a p p r o a c h e s as well as the intimations of the e n d of apartheid h a v e inspired a n e w g e n e r a t i o n of S o u t h A f r i c a n n o v e l i s t s , i n c l u d i n g S t e p h e n Gray, A h m e d E s s o p , S h e i l a R o b e r t s , P e t e r W i l h e l m , A c h m a t D a n g o r , and R o s e Z w i . O t h e r n e w v o i c e s i n c l u d e Ivan V l a d i s l a v i c (The Folly, 1993), Z o e W i t c o m b (You Can't Get Lost in Cape Town, 1987), M i k e Nicol (The Powers That Be, 1989; This Day and Age, 1922; Horseman, 1994), M e n a n du P l e s s i s (A State of Fear, 1983; Longlive!, 1989), Z a k e s M d a ( W a y s of Dying, 1995), and Ellek B o e h m e r (Screens Against the Sky, 1990) (Killam and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 1 8 5 ) . Theater in South Africa. S t e p h e n Black ( 1 8 8 0 - 1 9 1 3 ) and H. I. E. D h l o m o ( 1 9 0 3 - 1 9 5 6 ) stand as the m o s t i m p o r t a n t p i o n e e r s of c o n t e m p o rary S o u t h A f r i c a n theater. Black created a style, c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f l o c a l l y u n d e r s t o o d , topical refere n c e s updated for e a c h p e r f o r m a n c e , by the d e v e l o p m e n t of a range o f r e c o g n i z a b l y South A f r i c a n stock characters s u c h as the c o l o n i a l maiden, the B o e r patriarch, and the g u l l i b l e native, as w e l l as by skillful e x p l o i t a tion of the g r o w i n g d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of South A f r i c a n E n g l i s h . ( K i l l a m and Rowe, 2000:82)

D h l o m o , w h o h a s b e e n a s s o c i a t e d with the u r b a n b l a c k c u l t u r e that since the 1930s h a s been a d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r of S o u t h A f r i c a n history, f o u n d e d the Bantu D r a m a t i c Society, and " s o u g h t to v i e w rural tribal history in the light of c o n t e m p o r a r y u r b a n black e x p e r i e n c e " ( K i l l a m and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 8 2 ) . The Girl Who Killed to Save: Nongqause the Liberator— the first p u b l i s h e d play by a black S o u t h A f r i c a n — i n a u g u r a t e d an " A f r i c a n - c e n t e r e d , n o n - c o l o n i a l i s t d r a m a [that] s h o u l d be r e g a r d e d as a f o r e r u n n e r of the B l a c k C o n s c i o u s n e s s theater of the late 1 9 7 0 s " ( K i l l a m and R o w e , 2000:83). D u r i n g the a p a r t h e i d era ( 1 9 4 8 - 1 9 9 0 ) , t h e a t e r in S o u t h A f r i c a w a s s h a p e d e i t h e r by the s t a t e - d o m i n a t e d arts c o u n c i l s that f u n d e d w h i t e perf o r m a n c e s or a u t o n o m o u s alternative groups and w o r k s h o p s such as U n i o n Artists, the A f r i c a n M u s i c a n d D r a m a A s s o c i a t i o n , R o b e r t M c L a r e n ' s W o r k s h o p ' 7 1 , T h e C o m p a n y ( 1 9 7 4 ) , the M a r k e t T h e a t r e ( 1 9 7 6 ) , a n d the Junction Avenue Theatre C o m p a n y (1976). The workshops, which often f e a t u r e d f r u i t f u l c o l l a b o r a t i o n s b e t w e e n whites and n o n w h i t e s , p r o v i d e d a m o d e l f o r theater in S o u t h A f r i c a n society a f t e r a p a r t h e i d ( K i l l a m a n d R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 8 3 ) . F o r e x a m p l e , B a r n e y S i m o n ( a u t h o r of Born in the RSA, 1985) c o l l a b o r a t e d with P e r c y M t w a and M b o n g e n i N g e m a to p r o d u c e Woza Albert! in 1980. M t w a later went on to write Bopha! ( 1 9 8 6 ) , and N g e m a p r o d u c e d Asinamali! (1985) and the m u s i c a l s Sarafina! ( 1 9 8 7 ) and Zulu (2000).

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T h e d o m i n a n t f i g u r e in s u c h c o l l a b o r a t i o n s is A t h o l F u g a r d (b. 1932). w h o w a s i n v o l v e d in t h e S e r p e n t P l a y e r s a n d t h e m u l t i r a c i a l S p a c e T h e a t r e in C a p e T o w n . F u g a r d is t h e m o s t p r o m i n e n t S o u t h A f r i c a n p l a y w r i g h t , largely because of his ability to turn apparently regional and local themes into more universal metaphors for his deeply felt liberal concern with humanity and his existential struggle to understand his own life. Making use of a simple and direct form of neo-realism within a "poor theatre" framework, he combines an a c t o r ' s sensitivity for dialogue with a d e s i g n e r ' s eye for the p o w e r f u l visual images generated during live performance, and he uses these qualities to explore relationships between two or three exquisitely drawn individuals. (Killam and Rowe, 2000:100) F u g a r d is i m p o r t a n t n o t o n l y a s a t e c h n i c a l i n n o v a t o r b u t a l s o as an o p p o n e n t of a p a r t h e i d a n d a n e l o q u e n t w i t n e s s t o t h e a t r o c i t i e s of r a c i s m a n d b i g o t r y . F o r e x a m p l e , The Blood

Knot

( 1 9 6 1 ) , o n e of t h e p l a y s h e

w r o t e a n d p e r f o r m e d w i t h f r i e n d s in t h e b l a c k t o w n s h i p s a r o u n d J o h a n n e s b u r g , is a " s e a r i n g a n a l y s i s of t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s of r a c i a l div i s i o n " (Killam and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 8 3 ) . A l t h o u g h a white writer, c r o s s e s r a c i a l b o u n d a r i e s in w o r k s h o p p r o d u c t i o n s s u c h as Sizwe Dead

( 1 9 7 2 ) a n d The Island

Fugard Bansi

Is

( 1 9 7 3 ) , w h i c h m a r k t h e b e g i n n i n g of h i s a s s o -

c i a t i o n w i t h a c t o r s s u c h as J o h n K a n i a n d W i n s t o n N t s h o n a . T h e p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e s e p l a y s , a l o n g w i t h Statements morality

After an Arrest

Under

the Im-

Act ( 1 9 7 2 ) , c r e a t e d F u g a r d ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e p u t a t i o n ( K i l l a m a n d

R o w e , 2 0 0 0 ) . My

Children,

My

Africa!

( 1 9 8 9 ) is a n e l o q u e n t

protest

a g a i n s t p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e in S o u t h A f r i c a . L o o k i n g b e y o n d a p a r t h e i d a r e s u c h p l a y s a s Playland

(1992), w h i c h deals with the need for reconcilia-

t i o n , a n d Valley Song ( 1 9 9 6 ) , w h i c h p o r t r a y s t h e e m o t i o n a l c o m p l e x i t i e s of a d j u s t i n g to s o c i a l c h a n g e . A c c o r d i n g t o K i l l a m a n d R o w e ( 2 0 0 0 ) , Fugard's plays, whose sparseness and economy of means owe much to Samuel Beckett, have been a barometer to the social evolution of his country, witnessing with deep sensitivity to the isolation of the human condition and to the myriad injustices of apartheid alike, profoundly responsive to the nuances of South African language use, and uniquely able to encapsulate conflict in scenes of enormous intensity. W h i l e the w o r k s h o p theaters held out an i m a g e of a p o s s i b l e posta p a r t h e i d m u l t i r a c i a l c o l l a b o r a t i o n , in t h e late 1 9 6 0 s a n d e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s t h r e e companies, inspired by the Black C o n s c i o u s n e s s m o v e m e n t , reflected a m o r e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l stance by blacks but quickly felt the h e a v y hand of t h e c e n s o r . T E C O N ( T h e a t r e C o u n c i l of N a t a l ) w a s b a n n e d ; t h e l e a d e r s of P E T ( P e o p l e ' s E x p e r i m e n t a l T h e a t r e ) a n d M D A L I ( M u s i c , D r a m a , a n d Literature Institute) were detained. M a t s e m e l a M a n a k a a n d M a i s h e M a p o n y a a r e i m p o r t a n t d r a m a t i s t s of a n e w generation f r o m the t o w n s h i p s that b e c a m e active after the S o w e t o

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r i o t s of 1976. T h e i r w o r k reflects the i n f l u e n c e of the " t o w n s h i p m u s i c a l " p e r f o r m e d by an all-black cast, and includes King Kong (1959) and G i b s o n R e n t e ' s How Long? (1971), Too Late (1973), and Sikalo (1976). M a n a k a ( 1 9 5 6 - 1 9 9 8 ) f o u n d e d the S o y i k w a T h e a t r e G r o u p , w h i c h he u s e d to p r o d u c e plays that w e r e " u n u s u a l f o r their innovative synthesis . . . of d r a m a , m u s i c , d a n c e , p a i n t i n g . . . m i m e . . . [a]nd f o r m s of A f r i c a n artistic e x p r e s s i o n long i n a c c e s s i b l e to black S o u t h A f r i c a n s " (Killam and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 8 4 ) . M a n a k a ' s earlier p l a y s r e s p o n d with satire to c o n d i t i o n s of the d a y such as m i g r a n t labor a n d f o r c e d r e m o v a l s ( E g o l i , 1979; Pula, 1982; Children of Asazi, 1984). L a t e r p l a y s , like F u g a r d ' s , look b e y o n d a p a r t h e i d to d e v e l o p a " t h e a t r e f o r social r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " ( K i l l a m and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 ) . Gorée ( 1 9 8 9 ) s y m b o l i c a l l y d e m o n s t r a t e s " t h e f u s i o n of Eur o p e a n and A f r i c a n c u l t u r e s , w h i l e Blues Afrika Café ( 1 9 9 0 ) d e f i n e s an A f r i c a n i d e n t i t y " ( K i l l a m and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 ) . M a p o n y a , f o u n d e r of the B a h u m u t s i T h e a t r e G r o u p , strikes a shriller protest against the policies and practices of apartheid. Remarkable for their abundant theatricality, their indebtedness to Brecht (especially the didacticism of The Measures Taken), their innovative uses of gesture and their frequent recourse to improvisation, Maponya's plays supplement dialogue with choral singing, gumboot dancing, and mimed sequences (as in The Hungry Earth, 1978), call upon actors to p e r f o r m multiple roles (as in UmongikazilThe Nurse, 1982), and deploy telling j u x t a p o s i t i o n s of scenes (interrogation and literary recitiation in Gangsters, 1982). (Killam and Rowe, 2000)

Z a k e s M d a ' s (b. 1948) " p l a y s are distinguished by the c o m b i n a t i o n of close scrutiny of social v a l u e s with e l e m e n t s of m a g i c realism that is even more p r o n o u n c e d in his n o v e l s , " such as Ways of Dying and She Plays with the Darkness ( 1 9 9 5 ) ( K i l l a m and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 1 6 1 ) . His o t h e r w o r k s include t w o collections of plays {We Shall Sing for the Fatherland, 1979, and All the Girls in Their Sunday Dresses, 1993); and a study on the M a r o t h o l i Travelling T h e a t r e in L e s o t h o (When People Play People, 1993). T h e M a r o t h o l i Travelling T h e a t r e , an e x a m p l e of "theater f o r d e v e l o p m e n t , " is o n e of three types of alternative theater that arose d u r i n g the latter years of a p a r t h e i d . M a n a k a ' s literacy play Koma (1986); D o r e e n M a z i b u k o ' s v o t e r - e d u c a t i o n play Moments (1994), and M a p o n y a ' s W i n t e r v e l d project with u n e m p l o y e d squatter c a m p youth all belong to this m o v e m e n t . W o r k e r s ' theater, a s e c o n d type of alternative theater that arose d u r i n g the slates of e m e r g e n c y ( 1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 7 ) , e v o l v e d as a collaborative venture between semi-literate factory workers, white intellectuals and experienced theatre practitioners from groups like Junction Avenue, whose plays such as The Long March, The Sun Shall Rise for the Workers, and Comment sought to mobilize workers and raise political conscience by dramatizing their own experience of the labour struggle

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w h i l e at the s a m e time e x p l o i t i n g A f r i c a n cultural s o u r c e s ( g u m b o o t d a n c i n g , praise s o n g , the Zulu language). ( K i l l a m and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 8 5 )

Theater-in-education, a third type of alternative theater, involved bringing the classics such as Shakespeare to the townships and rural areas, as well as using theater in various educational projects. According to Killam and R o w e (2000:85), by the end of apartheid with the reallocation of resources and the reorganization of the performing arts councils, "the alternative theatres had b e c o m e the mainstream, and the state theatres, still wedded to a discredited ideology, found themselves marginalized" and had to seek redefinition, while the return of exiles from abroad and the end of censorship allowed for new kinds of collaboration such as the J o h a n n e s burg Civic Theatre opening with the Dance Theater of Harlem. Exciting new trends in theater are now being set by Sue Pam G r a n t (Curl Up and Dye, 1989), Paul Slabolepzsy (Saturday Night at the Palace, 1982; and Mooi St. Moves, 1992), and the original experiments such as William Kentridge's Handspring Puppet C o m p a n y ' s multimedia adaptation of Alfred Jarry's Ubu Roi, in Ubu and the Truth Comission (1997, scripted by Jane Taylor). The Grahamstown Festivals of Brett Bailey and the Third World B u n f i g h t ' s iMumboJumbo, The Days of Miricale and Wonder, and Ipi Zombi are "amateur township-based performances full of ritual and ceremony which, if nothing else, suggest that there are forms of theatrical perf o r m a n c e emerging the like of which has not been seen b e f o r e " (Killam and Rowe, 2000:85).

South African poetry. The Scotsman Thomas Pringle ( 1 7 2 9 - 1 8 3 4 ) is considered the first published South A f r i c a n poet, with such works as Ephemerides: Or Occasional Poems, Written in Scotland and South Africa (1828) and African Sketches (1834). Writing in the manner of British colonial poets, Pringle is known for his struggles against the oppressive treatment of indigenous people in such poems as "Afar in the D e s e r t " — " o n e of the most frequently reprinted poems in nineteenth-century Britain" (Killam and Rowe, 2000:230). In the 1870s and 1880s, a body of poetry grew up around the Kimberley diamond mines (called "digger ballads") and Witwatersrand goldfields (Albert Brodrick, "poet laureate" of the Transvaal). With the creation of the Union of South Africa, the Johannesburg-based Veldsingers including Denys Lefebvre, Francis Emley Walrond, and Alice Mabel Alder, worked to create a distinctively South African poetic tradition centered on the pastoral but also exploiting modernist imagism and symbolism (Killam and Rowe, 2000:215). In the early part of their careers William Plomer ( 1 9 0 3 - 1 9 7 3 ) and Roy Campbell (1901-1957) wrote poems attacking racism and created the bilingual literary journal Voorslag (Whiplash), which they f o u n d e d in 1925.

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T h e y m a d e s i g n i f i c a n t m o d e r n i s t c o n t r i b u t i o n s of c r a f t and c o n s c i e n c e to S o u t h A f r i c a n poetry, but left S o u t h A f r i c a b e c a u s e it w a s not r e a d y f o r their voices. In the f o l l o w i n g d e c a d e s , the c o n s e r v a t i v e F r a n c i s C a e r y S l a t e r ( 1 8 7 6 - 1 9 5 8 ) (The Centenary Book of South African Verse, 1925; and The New Centenary Book of South African Verse, 1945) d o m i n a t e d S o u t h A f r i c a n p o e t r y a l o n g with G u y B u t l e r (editor of Oxford Book of South African Verse, 1959). Butler, h o w e v e r , b e l o n g e d to a g r o u p of "liberal hum a n i s t p o e t s , " i n c l u d i n g Alan P a t o n , D a v i d W r i g h t , A n t h o n y D e l i u s , R o y M c N a b , and N . H . Bretell, w h o w e r e critical of rising A f r i k a n e r nationali s m and the i m p o s i t i o n of apartheid. M a n y such as D e l i u s and Wright went i n t o e x i l e in r e s p o n s e to the c e n s o r h i p i m p o s e d on b l a c k c o n t r i b u t o r s to Drum m a g a z i n e (Killam and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 2 1 5 ) . In the w a k e of the Sharpeville m a s s a c r e of 1960, South A f r i c a ' s expulsion f r o m the British C o m m o n w e a l t h in 1981, and the a c c o m p a n y i n g loss of f a c e for liberal values, poets such as Jack C o p e {Contrast), Ruth Miller, S i d n e y C l o u t s , a n d D o u g l a s L i v i n g s t o n e c o n c e n t r a t e d on the c r a f t of p o etry in w h i c h e x p e r i m e n t a l t e c h n i q u e s at times indirectly raised the m o r a l issues of apartheid (Killam and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 2 1 5 , 146). T h e B l a c k C o n s c i o u s n e s s m o v e m e n t g a v e rise to a m o r e c o n f r o n t a tional, political p o e t r y that w a s the hallmark of a n e w black South A f r i c a n literary tradition in the 1970s. T h i s latter tradition w a s seriously h a m p e r e d by a p a r t h e i d c e n s o r s h i p , w h i c h h a d already r e s u l t e d in the b a n n i n g a n d e x i l e of an e a r l i e r g e n e r a t i o n of black poets that i n c l u d e d D e n n i s B r u t u s , K e o r a p e t s e Kgositsile, Mazisi K u n e n e , Daniel P. K u n e n e , K e n n e t h A r t h u r N o r t j e , a n d C o s m o Pieterse. Black C o n s c i o u s n e s s p o e t s such as M o n g a n e Serote w e r e also driven into exile and there r e m a i n e d a spit b e t w e e n poets o u t s i d e the c o u n t r y and t h o s e inside until the 1990s. M a f i k a G w a l a , a " s e m i n a l " t h e o r e t i c i a n of B l a c k C o n s c i o u s n e s s , M o n g a n e S e r o t e , a n d S i p h o S e p a m a l a are considered the three most important poets of the Black C o n s c i o u s n e s s tradition. S i p h o S e p a m a l a is the m o s t p r o m i n i n e n t , h a v i n g won the N o m a Award for Third World Express in 1992. At the s a m e t i m e , A d a m S m a l l and O s w a l d M b u y i s e n i M t s h a l i w e r e creating a f o l l o w i n g with poetry that ran parallel to that of the Black C o n s c i o u s n e s s m o v e m e n t , but c a m e f r o m a d i f f e r e n t i m p e t u s . In 1975 A d a m S m a l l , w h o h a d p r e v i o u s l y written in A f r i k a a n s m i x e d with E n g l i s h , published a c o l l e c t i o n of E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e poetry. S i m i l a r l y , M t s h a l i , in his c o l l e c t i o n Sound of a Cowhide Drum, " o f f e r e d v i v i d c a m e o s of b l a c k urban life and a m e a s u r e of protest, but stopped short of suggesting the redefinition of South A f r i c a n reality p r o p o s e d by Black C o n s c i o u s n e s s " (Killam and R o w e , 2 0 0 0 : 2 1 5 ) . Blac, f o u n d e d by poet J a m e s M a t t h e w s , is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the b l a c k publishing v e n t u r e s that were l a u n c h e d in the 1970s as a c o u n t e r w e i g h t to the w h i t e - r u n literary m a g a z i n e s and small p u b l i s h i n g h o u s e s in w h i c h

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black poets of the early 1970s appeared. White poets "who made small reputations while the new black poetry was claiming the stage" included Wopko Jensma, Patrick Cullinan, Don Maclennan, Christopher Hope, Chirstopher Mann, and "perhaps a dozen more of comparable interest and merit" (Killam and Rowe, 2000:215-216). Under the pressures of censorship and growing crisis (Durban strikes and the rise of the labor movement, the martyrdom of Steve Biko, the Soweto uprising, and the banning of the Black Consciousness organizations) poetry was disseminated through readings in the townships that found a significant black audience while falling under the radar screen of the white censors. There were also many new poets appearing in the literary magazine Staffrider. And poets such as Ingaopele Madingoane, Chris van Wyk, Achmat Dangor, and Donald Parenzee were taking a poetry of protest to the streets of the townships. In the 1980s, with increased political resistance from organizations such as the United Democratic Front, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, and the ANC, performance poetry became an increasingly popular medium in the townships among poets such as Alfred Qabula, Mi Hlatshwayo, Nise Malange, and Mzwakhe Mbuli. Other significant and powerful political works of poetic protest include Jeremy Cronin's Inside (1983), Lesefo Rampolokeng's Horns for Hondo (1990) and Talking Rain (1993), and Stephen Watson's Return of the Moon (1991) (Killam and Rowe, 2000:216). During the 1990s, women poets added their voice to the tradition. According to Killam and Rowe (2000), South African poetry, beginning as a masculinist, colonial project has been subverted and remade by black poets; its next remaking may be a feminizing movement as is indicated by Cecily Lockett's anthology Breaking the Silence: A Century of South African Women's Poery (1990). Other women poets include Ingrid de Kok, Kaen Press, Sue Clark, Jennifer Davids, Blossom Pegram (who also published under the name Amelia House), and Lindiwe Mabuza.

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CONCLUSION

African literature is full of threatened promise. For the time being, oral traditions manage to survive despite serious interruptions in time-honored modes of transmission. The children of griots go to modern schools before their training in oral traditions is complete. Elsewhere, the attraction to modern life turns attention away from traditions conserving the past. Written African literature will continue to turn—as it already has— away from a primarily European audience to an African one. As colonialism has receded in time, and problems of the postindependence period have commanded attention, local issues rather than proving an " A f r i c a n "

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identity to the European world have grown in importance. In addressing these concerns, African writers are incorporating fragile oral traditions into their work to m a k e them accessible to an audience more at ease with oral than with written communication. T h e choice of language is also changing as writers communicate more often in African languages. Because of the political and e c o n o m i c instability in A f r i c a discussed throughout this book, African writers have faced and continue to face very real threats of prison, exile, and death. Moreover, writers must make their way through the labyrinth of the Western-dominated publishing market. Despite such obstacles, writers are developing distinct national literatures in both European and African languages. It is already possible to speak of f u l l - b l o w n Nigerian, Senegalese, C a m e r o o n i a n , and Ghanaian literatures. Other literatures not mentioned in this chapter, such as Zairian and Tanzanian, will also increasingly m a k e their mark. If all goes well, the reader of the twenty-first century will find a rich and highly diverse situation in which the term " A f r i c a n literature" will be as vague a generalization as "European literature" or "Asian literature."

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NOTES

I would like to thank E m m a n u e l Obiechina, O u s m a n e Sene, and T h e l m a Ravell-Pinto for so kindly reading earlier versions of this chapter, and Wlodzimierz Borejsza-Wysocki for his help in obtaining the photograph of printed African works. 1. For f u r t h e r reading in A r a b i c - l a n g u a g e literature, see Killam and R o w e , 2000; Allen 1982; and Hanwick and Fahey, 1994. 2. Trans. Ezekiel Mphahlele, as cited in Beier, Knappert, and Moser, 1974; 140. 3. Anthropologist Judith T. Irvine has graciously shared this information with me. 4. Selections f r o m S e n g h o r ' s poetry have been translated into English as follows: Leopold Sedar Senghor: Selected Poems (1964) and Leopold Sedar Senghor: Prose and Poetry (1965) (both translated by John Reed and Clive Wake), Selected Poems/Poesies cholsies (1976; trans. C r a i g W i l l i a m s o n ) , and Selected Poems of Leopold Sedar Senghor (1977; trans. Abiola Irele). 5. Presence afraicaine 1 (November-December 1947), p. 8. Quoted in Mouralis, 421. My translation. 6. Although the reverse appears in some works, the true order of the a u t h o r ' s name is O u s m a n e S e m b e n e . T h e reversal in m a n y f r a n c o p h o n e a u t h o r ' s n a m e s is due to the fact that in the French schools, the roll was called last name first. 7. S e m b e n e O u s m a n e , God's Bits of Wood, trans. Francis Price ( 1 9 6 1 ) (London: H e i n e m a n n , 1983), page facing p. 1.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Bibliographies and Readers' Guides

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E c h u e r o , M i c h a e l J. C. 1977. Poets, Prophets and Professors. Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press. E g e j u r u , Phanuel A. 1978. Black Writers, White Audience: A Critical Approach to African Literature. Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press. . 1980. Towards African Literary Independence: A Dialogue with Contemporary African Writers. Westport, CT: G r e e n w o o d Press. E r i c k s o n , J o h n D. 1979. Nommo: African Fiction in French South of the Sahara. York, SC: French Literature Publishing. F u c h s , A n n e , and G e o f f r e y V. Davis. 1996. Theatre and Change in South Africa. A m s t e r d a m : Harwood. G a k w a n d i , Shatto Arthur. 1977. The Novel and Contemporary Experience in Africa. London: H E B . G é r a r d , Albert. 1986. European-Language Writing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Budapest: A k a d e m i a i Kiado. G i k a n d i , S i m o n . 1987. Reading the African Novel. L o n d o n : J a m e s Currey; Portsmouth, NH: H e i n e m a n n . . 1991. Reading Chinua Achebe. L o n d o n : J a m e s Currey; P o r t s m o u t h , N H : Heinemann. Gleason, Judith. 1965. This Africa: Novels by West Africans in English and French. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. . 1973. The Black Interpreters: Notes on African Writing. J o h a n n e s b u r g : Ravan Press. G o r d i m e r , N a d i n e . 1995. Writing and Being: The Charles Eliot Norton Lectures. C a m b r i d g e : Harvard University Press, 1995. G u r n a h , Abdulrazak (ed.). 1993. Essays on African Writing: A Re-evaluation. Oxford: H e i n e m a n n . Harrow, K e n n e t h . 1994. Thresholds of Change in African Literature: The Emergence of a Tradition. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann; London: James Currey. . 1996. The Marabout and the Muse: New Approaches to Islam in African Literature. Portsmouth, N H : H e i n e m a n n ; L o n d o n : James Currey. (ed.). 1991. Faces of Islam in African Literature. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Irele, Abiola. 1990. The African Experience in Literature and Ideology. 1981. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. J a h n , J a n h e i n z . 1961. Muntu: An Outline of the New African Culture. New York: Grove Press. . 1966. A History of Neo-African Literature. London: Faber and Faber. J a n M o h a m e d , Abdul. 1983. Manichean Aesthetics: The Politics of Literature in Colonial Africa. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. J o n e s , Eldred, Eustace Palmer, and M a r j o r i e J o n e s (eds.). 1993. Critical Theory and African Literature Today. L o n d o n : J a m e s C u r r e y ; T r e n t o n . NJ: A f r i c a World Press. . 1991. The Question of Language in African Literature. London: James Currey; Trenton. NJ: A f r i c a World Press. Julien, Eileen. 1992. African Novels and the Question ofOrality. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. K a n n e m e y e r , J. C. 1993. A History of Afrikaans Literature. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter. Kern, Anita. 1980. Women in West African Fiction. Washington, DC: T h r e e Continents Press. Kesteloot, Lilyan. 1972. Intellectual Origins of the African Revolution. Translated by A. M b o u k o u . Washington, DC: Black O r p h e u s Press.

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. 1974. Black Writers in French: A Literary History of Negritude. Translated by E. C. Kennedy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Killam, G. D. (ed.). 1972. African Writers on African Writing. London: HEB. . 1984. The Writing of East and Central Africa. Nairobi: Heinemann. Klima, Vladimir. 1969. Modern Nigerian Novels. Prague: Oriental Institute. Klima, Vladimir, Frantisek Ruzicka, and Petr Zima. 1976. Black Africa: Literature and Language. Prague: A c a d e m i a Publishing House. Kurtz, J. Roger. 1998. Urban Obsessions. Urban Fears: The Postcolonial Kenyan Novel. O x f o r d : J a m e s Currey; Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. Larson, Charles R. 1976. The Novel in the Third World. Washington, DC: Inscape. L a u r e n c e , M a r g a r e t . 1968. Long Drums and Cannons: Nigerian Dramatists and Novelists. L o n d o n : Macmillan. Lazarus, Neil. 1990. Resistance in Postcolonial African Fiction. New Haven: Yale University Press. L i n d f o r s , Bernth. 1994. Comparative Approaches to African Literatures. Amsterd a m : Rodopi. L i n d f o r s , Bernth, Ian M u n r o , Richard Priebe, and R e i n h a r d S a n d e r (eds.). 1972. Palaver: Interviews with Five African Writers in Texas. Austin: University of Texas Press. Lo Liyong, Taban. 1990. Another Last Word. Nairobi: H e i n e m a n n Kenya. Muja-Pearce, A d e w a l e (ed.). 1990. The Heinemann Book of African Poetry in English. H e i n e m a n n : O x f o r d . Mnyamba, N. 1988. The East African Narrative Fiction: Towards an Aesthetic and a Socio-Political Uhuru. Lagos: Cross Continent. Madubuike, Ihechukwu. 1980. The Senegalese Novel: A Sociological Study of the Impact of the Politics of Assimilation. Washington, DC: Three Continents Press. Mortimer, Mildred. 1990. Journeys Through the French African Novel. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Mouralis, Bernard. 1984. Littérature et développement: Essai sur le statut, la fonction et la représentation de la littérature négro-africaine d'expression française. Paris: Silex. Moyers, Bill. 1988. "Chinua Achebe Videorecording." Bill Movers' World of Ideas. Alexandria, VA: PBS Video. Ndebele, N j a b u l o S. 1991. Southern African Literature and Culture: Rediscovery of the Ordinary. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Neto, Agostinho. 1979. On Literature and National Culture. Luanda: Angolan Writers Union. Ngara, E m m a n u e l . 1982. Art and Ideology in the African Novel: A Study of the Influence of Marxism on African Writing. London: Heinemann. Ngate, Jonathan. 1988. Francophone African Fiction: Reading a Literary Tradition. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. Ngugi wa T h i o n g ' o . 1981. Writers in Politics: Essays. London: H E B . Litera. 1986. Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African ture. Portsmouth, NH: H e i n e m a n n . . 1990. "Return of the Native T o n g u e . " The Times Literary Supplement No. 4,563 ( S e p t e m b e r 14-20):972, 981. . 1993. Moving the Centre: The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms. London: J a m e s Currey. Obiechina, E m m a n u e l . 1975. Culture, Tradition and Society in the West African Novel. N e w York: C a m b r i d g e University Press. Oiaide, Tanure. 1997. Poetic Imagination in Black Africa: Essays on African Poetry. Carolina A c a d e m i c Press.

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O w o m o y e l a , O y e k a n . 1979. African Literatures: An Introduction. Waltham, M A : Crossroads Press. Peters, Jonathan. 1978. A Dance of Masks: Senghor, Achebe, Soyinka. Washington, DC: Three Continents Press. Roscoe, Adrian. 1977. Uhuru's Fire: African Literature East to South. London and New York: C a m b r i d g e University Press. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1963. Black Orpheus. Translated by S. W. Allen. Paris: Présence Africaine. S h a v a , Pineal Viriri. 1989. A People's Voice: Black South African Writing in the Twentieth Century. L o n d o n : Zed B o o k s ; A t h e n s : Ohio University Press; Harare: B a o b a b Books. Smith, M. Van Wyk. 1990. Grounds of Contest: A Survey of South African English Literature. C a p e Town: Jutalit. Soyinka, Wole. 1976. Myth, Literature and the African World. London: C a m b r i d g e University Press. . 1990. Art, Dialogue and Outrage. Essays on Literature and Culture. 2d ed., edited by B. Jeyifo. L o n d o n : M e t h u e n . Taiwo, Oladele. 1976. Culture and the Nigerian Novel. London: Macmillan. Traore, Bakary. 1972. The Black African Theatre and Its Social Functions. Translated by Dapo Adelugba. Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press. Trump, Martin (ed.). 1990. Rendering Things Visible: Essays on South African Literary Culture. J o h a n n e s b u r g : Ravan Press; Athens: Ohio University Press. U d e n t a , O. 1993. Revolutionary Aesthetics and the African Literary Process. Enugu: Fourth D i m e n s i o n Publications. Vera, Yvonne (ed.). 1999. The Heinemann Book of Contemporary African Women's Writing. O x f o r d : H e i n e m a n n . Wauthier, C l a u d e . 1978. The Literature and Thought of Modern Africa. L o n d o n : HEB. W h e e l w r i g h t , Philip. 1965. " M y t h . " P. 5 3 8 in Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wilentz, Gay Alden. 1992. Binding Cultures: Black Women Writers in Africa and the Diaspora. B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press. Wilkinson, Jane (ed.). 1992. Talking with African Writers: Interviews with African Poets, Playwrights and Novelists. L o n d o n : James Currey.

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outh A f r i c a demonstrates m a n y of the s a m e historical currents that are f o u n d e l s e w h e r e on the A f r i c a n continent. T h e area w a s p o p u l a t e d by b l a c k A f r i c a n s for millennia and w a s s u b j e c t to s i m i l a r d y n a m i c s of cultural c h a n g e and migratory m o v e m e n t s of p e o p l e s . B l a c k A f r i c a n s in South A f r i c a a l s o c a m e into contact with e x p a n s i o n i s t E u r o p e a n countries in s e a r c h o f trade, s l a v e s , and conquest. South A f r i c a w a s a rich area for European colonial exploitation b e c a u s e of its fertile soils, mineral wealth, and t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y l e s s a d v a n c e d p e o p l e who c o u l d be s u b j u g a t e d and converted into cheap labor for the benefit of their foreign masters. At the s a m e time, South A f r i c a is a l s o s o m e t h i n g of an a n o m a l y . A l o n g with a few other c o l o n i z e d a r e a s like K e n y a , Southern R h o d e s i a ( Z i m b a b w e ) , A l g e r i a (in North A f r i c a ) , and South-West A f r i c a ( N a m i b i a ) , S o u t h A f r i c a e x e m p l i f i e s a p h e n o m e n o n known as "settler c o l o n i a l i s m . " In settler c o l o n i a l a r e a s , E u r o p e a n s s o u g h t m o r e than e c o n o m i c enrichment a n d political control. T h e y settled in large n u m b e r s , taking the best land f o r t h e m s e l v e s and d i s p l a c i n g local p e o p l e , w h o were relegated to menial labor or slaughtered if they resisted ( E m m a n u e l , 1 9 8 2 : 9 3 - 9 4 ) . E v e n a m o n g settler c o l o n i a l states, however, S o u t h A f r i c a is unique. Until the advent of black majority rule in 1994, it w a s the only white min o r i t y - d o m i n a t e d state left in A f r i c a . It w a s a l s o the oldest settler colony, with E u r o p e a n settlement dating b a c k to the m i d - 1 6 0 0 s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , m a n y o f the whites h a v e lived in S o u t h A f r i c a f o r g e n e r a t i o n s and no l o n g e r see t h e m s e l v e s as E u r o p e a n s . U n l i k e m o r e recent white settlers in other parts of A f r i c a , many South A f r i c a n s had m o r e at stake in preserving their d o m i n a n c e since they had no mother country to which they could return. It w a s by exerting increasing and eventually a l m o s t total control over its black majority (and by fortuitously taking p o s s e s s i o n of great g o l d and d i a m o n d wealth) that white South A f r i c a n s were able to d e v e l o p the richest

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Map 13.1 South Africa, 1991

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and most industrialized society in Africa. Under the now abolished system of apartheid (apartness), South Africa was a society based on a rigid hierarchy of white racial privilege, on the one hand, and degradation and exploitation of nonwhites on the other. South Africa is currently undergoing a dramatic transition, fraught with many potential problems. To understand what is happening and what the future may bring we must understand this land's complex and tortuous past. In this chapter, we will look first at South Africa before European contact, followed by the impact of Dutch settlers (later called Afrikaners) and British colonialism, the role of capitalism, and the development of apartheid. Finally, we will examine the dismantling of the apartheid state and the establishment of a "nonracial" South Africa. Although, since 1994, South Africa has consisted of nine provinces, most with little relationship to earlier political entities, this chapter will (except in the final sections) refer to the four provinces of pre-1994 South Africa. These reflect more closely the principal political units of the previous two centuries, which came to form a united South Africa in 1910.

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THE PEOPLING OF SOUTH AFRICA

Contrary to a common white South African myth, the country was no empty land when Dutch settlers arrived in the seventeenth century (Thompson, 1985:199-201). The ancestors of the Khoisan-speaking, hunter-gatherer San people (sometimes known as Bushmen) preceded the whites by at least 30,000 years. Over time, some came to own cattle, probably obtained from iron-using Bantu speakers who crossed the Limpopo River into South Africa as early as the fourth century. The cattle-owning Khoisan were called "Khoi" (or, pejoratively, "Hottentots" by the Dutch) as distinct from the hunter-gatherer San (cf. Elphick, 1985:3^-2; Wilson, 1969). (See Chapter 3 for more information on Khoisan- and Bantu-speaking peoples.) The Khoi alone may have numbered 200,000 in the seventeenth century, apart from several million Bantu-speaking mixed farmers in the lusher east. Two centuries later, the whites, in contrast, numbered just over 200,000 (Thompson, 1969:425; Wilson, 1969:68). If South Africa was not empty, neither were its inhabitants fixed ethnic "tribes." The Khoi might become hunter-gatherers in hard times; in times of plenty some San became clients of the Khoi or of Bantu speakers, and trade, marriage, or clientage led to a mixing of both peoples and languages (Elphick, 1985:17-18, 3 0 - 4 2 , 6 2 - 6 7 ) . After A.D. 1000, the Bantu pushed beyond the northern and eastern fringes of South Africa until, by the sixteenth century, they occupied most of the better-watered, eastern two-thirds of the country. With superior iron technology they overwhelmed the San and Khoi, who often withdrew into the arid west or the most remote mountain areas (Hall, 1987:1-45).

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THE ROOTS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: THE DUTCH ERA

The first whites in South A f r i c a were the Portuguese, who knew the coast as early as the fifteenth century; but they did not stay. The thrifty Dutch East India C o m p a n y saw the Cape d i f f e r e n t l y — a s a halfway house to the O r i e n t — a n d in 1652 sent Jan van Riebeeck to found a refreshment station there. Almost f r o m the start it b e c a m e a permanent settler colony. In the first few years the limited numbers of settlers forced the company to grant small plots to its retired officials in order to m a k e the colony m o r e viable. Only a trickle of additional white settlers arrived in an immigration scheme that ended early in the next century, but the nucleus of the Afrikaners already existed. " A f r i k a n e r " was what the descendants of the original, mostly Dutch, but also French Huguenot and G e r m a n settlers came to be called. Because of an unequal sex ratio, which improved only gradually, the men turned for brides or concubines to Khoi and especially slave w o m e n (at the Cape slaves were usually of Malagasy, East Indies Bengali, or Indonesian stock). Thus, the emerging A f r i k a a n s language, a Dutchbased Creole, was shaped as m u c h by the mixed-race " c o l o u r e d " d e s c e n dants of whites, slaves, and Khoi servants as by the settlers themselves. Today it is spoken by 3 million white A f r i k a n e r s and as many coloureds (Elphick and Shell, 1989:184-242). The increasing need for land and labor hastened the conquest of the Cape Town area by 1700 and led to the continued importation of slaves to supplement an allegedly inadequate work force. The best Khoi lands in the southwest were occupied by whites, and white disease and drink took their toll. Many Khoi escaped inland or sought service with white farmers. They did not disappear, as was once held, but their numbers dwindled dramatically. Those not incorporated into the coloureds moved east to b e c o m e clients of the Bantu-speaking Xhosa people or north to live among runaway slaves, renegade whites, and other dispossessed Africans. Colonial guns and horses helped them war against other Africans in the northern Cape and Orange Free State, and they eventually created what were called "Korana" and "Griqua" states along the Orange River (Elphick, 1985; Legassick, 1989). Just behind were the white nomadic cattle farmers, the trekhoers, expanding the colony with each generation. By the 1770s, trekboers confronted the similarly seminomadic Xhosa people. Their encounters on the frontier were not always hostile; both sides traded goods as often as they stole cattle or defended themselves from raids. Some whites cohabited with Xhosa women, allied with one chief against another, or lived over the frontier among the Xhosa (Legassick, 1980). It was not on the frontier but in the western Cape heartland that the racially divided, oppressive face of South Africa first appeared. While miscegenation with slave or Khoi women was common, the offspring usually

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j o i n e d the mother's society and status. Actual marriage with slaves was banned, although masters sometimes freed favored slaves in order to marry them. But as more white women arrived in the colony, racially mixed public unions dwindled in number. By then, however, Asian and African ancestry had already become part of the Afrikaner heritage. Despite their later claims to the contrary and efforts to maintain "racial purity," South African whites never were purely Caucasian (Elphick and Shell, 1989: 194-204; Worden, 1985; Shell, 1994:322-324). Nonetheless, a complex combination of a class- and racially based caste society was developing. Below the senior company officials and the few great landholders, who held many slaves, were the other whites. Next came the free or freed blacks, then Khoi servants, and finally the slaves. Control over the population, white and nonwhite, was maintained by the use of brutal punishments like mutilation, torture, and excruciating execution methods, such as impalement (Ross, 1980). Blacks and slaves, however, faced the most discrimination. Slaves had to carry a pass beyond their master's premises; blacks were subject to a curfew; and even free blacks lost the right to own property (Elphick and Shell, 1989:214-216). Even in the frontier districts, where trekboers often shared their humble dwellings with their Khoi or San servants, by the 1790s a definite sense of a racial hierarchy had emerged (Newton-King, 1999:206-208).

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THE A D V E N T OF THE BRITISH FACTOR: A QUESTIONABLE LIBERALISM

Due to the harsh rule of the Dutch East India Company, with its maze of exploitative and monopolistic regulations, there was little settler resistance to British occupation of the Cape Colony in 1795 and again in 1806, after a brief Dutch interregnum from 1803. British rule meant free trade but no cessation of slavery. Even the 1807 abolition of the overseas slave trade by the British did not halt the flow of slaves into the Cape (Shell., 1994:146). The British tried to assist the old "Cape Dutch" settlers with their labor problem, especially as slave prices rose rapidly after 1807. Slaves taken off ships by the navy were landed as "apprentices," and "apprenticing" soon included the Khoi and even Xhosa near the frontier. Apprentices differed from slaves only in the written contract establishing conditions of employment—which few could read. The issue of dispossessed Khoi was met by an 1809 law forcing free blacks to carry passes when not on their employer's property and by an 1812 law apprenticing Khoi servants' children until they reached adulthood. The new order was not uniformly favorable to the Cape Dutch. By 1830, several thousand British colonists had arrived. Many settled near the

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eastern frontier, but they proved poor farmers and flocked to the towns, increasing competition f o r what limited commercial opportunities existed. T h e s e problems affected the Dutch most sharply; they were angered by English becoming the sole official language and by the British concern to preserve law and order even on the frontier, where farmers had long provided their own rough justice. Now servants could bring complaints against cruel masters, who had to record all punishments. T h e Dutch were equally angered by British vacillation toward the Xhosa. (On Xhosa-settler relations, see Mostert, 1992; Peires, 1982.) When the 1828 Ordinance No. 50 gave legal equality to free blacks, followed in 1833 by the abolition of slavery, many Boers (Dutch farmers) left the Cape. Several thousand Cape Dutch and their Khoi servants and ex-slaves m o v e d across the O r a n g e River in a "Great T r e k " into lands that they regarded as only thinly populated (see Walker, 1960). The interior beyond the Orange River was actually home to thousands of Africans but many were on the run from Shaka, creator of the Zulu empire; f r o m lesser expanding chiefdoms; and f r o m raiders like the Korana. As these r e f u g e e s invaded other populated areas, they set off further r e f u g e e waves of people fleeing their land to seek safety elsewhere. As a result, the Highveld may have seemed depopulated. The impetus for these disruptions is unclear, but it may have been related to pressures caused by drought, an expanding ivory trade, or the growing threat from slavers operating f r o m Portuguese East A f r i c a to the north and also from the Cape Colony (see Ballard, 1986; Wright and Hamilton, 1989; Omer-Cooper, 1993). Using a revolutionary form of warfare, Shaka, chief of the Zulu clan, had completed earlier trends to centralize authority in Natal. He favored a short stabbing spear, a large shield, and close combat tactics based on precision drill and utter ruthlessness. His state gave his subjects a new sense of identity. All b e c a m e " Z u l u , " much as r e f u g e e s in the interior created new "nations," providing the basis for modern South African ethnic identities, which twentieth-century Nationalist politicians used to j u s t i f y their "separate d e v e l o p m e n t " policy of " h o m e l a n d s " for each African "tribe." These ethnic groups included the Zulu, Mzilikazi's Ndebele ( w h o later went to Z i m b a b w e ) , the Tsonga-Shangaan on the T r a n s v a a l - M o z a m b i q u e border, the Swazi, and in the highest parts of the eastern plateau, the Basotho (formed primarily f r o m widely assorted Sotho-speaking refugees) (see Omer-Cooper, 1966). The trekkers thought the sad condition of the Highveld was permanent; some of their descendants would later justify their occupation on that basis. In fact, as conditions improved, many r e f u g e e s came h o m e . In the late 1830s, most trekkers m o v e d into Natal, where they defeated S h a k a ' s less effective successor, Dingane, while allying with his disaffected halfbrother, Mpande. Placing M p a n d e on the Zulu throne, they took control of the devastated land to the south, renaming it the Republic of Natalia. But

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the British could accept neither Boer (trekker) access to the coast nor the B o e r s ' harsh policies toward the X h o s a ' s northern neighbors. By 1843, Britain had annexed Natal, and most trekkers had returned inland to join their cousins in forming several small republics (Ballard, 1989:119-125). The Cape authorities grew worried about the potential for trouble posed by the trekkers, so in 1848 they annexed Transorangia (the land between the Orange and Vaal rivers), and the Transvaal. But London did not f a v o r unnecessary entanglements beyond the already overly large and expensive Cape Colony and, b e t w e e n 1852 and 1854, opted for a cheaper policy of independence for the trekkers in the Transvaal and the O r a n g e Free State (as independent Transorangia was now called). For a generation thereafter, the Boers were left to fight their African neighbors and squabble among themselves (see Galbraith, 1963). Meanwhile, the Cape Colony gained greater internal autonomy. In 1872, the British allowed the C a p e to have its own parliament complete with a prime minister. A theoretically nonracial vote permitted wealthier, more Westernized male Cape blacks to participate, and the several electoral districts with many coloured and African voters had a significant impact on Cape politics. The Dutch- and English-dominated political parties greedily courted black votes, even if the white m e m b e r s of parliament did little to deliver on their promises (Bickford-Smith, 1995:67-72). Although limited, the civil freedoms of Cape blacks, especially voters, were vast compared to those of blacks farther north. In British Natal, only the few male A f r i c a n s who proved they were sufficiently Westernized could be considered for voting rights. The large Indian community, imported in the 1860s to supplement "unreliable" Zulu labor, faced more explicit electoral discrimination. Along with attempts to curb trading and require passes similar to those forced on Natal A f r i c a n s , an 1896 law kept Indians f r o m voting (see Bhana and Brain, 1990:59-60). In the Boer republics, the situation was still worse; Africans could still live on the lands of the white cattle-owning aristocracy, provided they used their agricultural talents to feed their new rulers. But pass laws controlled A f r i c a n s ' m o v e m e n t s , African w o m e n and children were often enslaved, and white supremacy and segregation were constitutionally entrenched (Morton, 1994:173-181). The few Transvaal Indians fared as poorly as in Natal. In the Orange Free State, restrictions barred most Indians f r o m working or residing there, a law repealed only in the 1980s (Bhana and Brain, 1990:96). On the fringes of the Boer states, African k i n g d o m s such as those of the mountain-dwelling Pedi and Venda struggled to survive, but invariably they were forced by the whites into the most desolate, remote parts—the future "reserves." To the south, Moshoeshoe (leader of the Basotho people) held out from his mountain stronghold against the Orange Free State Boers; in 1868, he reluctantly sought British protection. London had no great love

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for M o s h o e s h o e , but imminent ence behind the A f r i c a n s along fore, was forced into a special until modern Lesotho gained its

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B a s o t h o collapse threatened a Boer presthe C a p e Eastern Frontier. Britain, thererelationship with the Basotho that lasted independence in 1966 (Thompson, 1975).

THE MINERAL REVOLUTION: CAPITALISM AND SEGREGATION

The African kingdoms were in disarray before the white advance, and with the discovery of diamonds in 1867, the interior became more valuable. Diggers swarmed around the confluence of the Orange, Vaal, and Harts Rivers, territory claimed by the Boer republics, the Griqua, and the local Tswana people. The British simply annexed most of the area under the guise of protecting Griqua land claims. A decade later the Griqua lands were incorporated by the British into the Cape Colony (Thompson, 1971:253-257). The rapid exhaustion of surface diggings meant that the rich diamondbearing soil could be exploited only by expensive deep-level mining. Kimberley, the central site, was quickly dominated by a few large-scale capitalists. The greatest was Cecil Rhodes, who bought out his competitors and became the kingpin in the De Beers diamond empire. The Cape was suddenly wealthy; railways sprang up, and diggers rushed in to make their fortunes. At first, the mines meant new opportunities for Africans. Cash wages allowed many to obtain guns, while independent African peasants prospered in the eastern Cape, taking advantage of the new market for produce. Others, including many whites, joined the wagon-transport business. But the white authorities soon disarmed the Africans, and railways displaced wagons. Black diggers disappeared quickly because of white pressure and limited funds. To keep prices high, Rhodes's De Beers diamond monopoly emerged. Mine owners ensured huge profits and maximum security by hiring a cheap, black male labor force f r o m the rural areas and requiring them to live in fenced-off, single-sex compounds. Migrants' families remained in the rural areas, subsisting on their small farm plots (cf. Turrell, 1987; Worger, 1987). Conditions deteriorated for rural blacks too as Cape peasants were squeezed off their land and out of the market by white farmers. Both white farmers and mining companies needed to increase the supply of cheap black labor (Bundy, 1988). In response, discriminatory laws and institutions spread across South Africa. Hut, poll, and head taxes were introduced in the rural areas and the residual African lands, or "reserves." Since payment was required in cash, many Africans were forced to seek employment under whites. In the Cape, discrimination intensified as whites sought to increase their control over the many blacks incorporated into the colony as the frontier expanded eastward. Passes regulated A f r i c a n s ' movements more thoroughly than in the past. By 1910, urban A f r i c a n s were segregated in "locations"

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f o r "hygienic" reasons (Swanson, 1977). Enfranchised Africans with traditional "tribal" land tenure lost the vote; then in 1892, income qualifications were raised, disenfranchising many additional Africans and coloureds alike (Bickford-Smith, 1995:69-70). T h e mineral revolution had other results. South A f r i c a was now too potentially wealthy for the British to ignore, but administrative expenses w e r e a concern. A Cape-led settler federation with one "native p o l i c y " would lower administrative costs and end the customs barriers limiting the g r o w t h of an efficient m o d e r n economy. But only Natal, f e a r f u l of the Z u l u , was truly interested in j o i n i n g a federation. T h e Transvaal Boers were the m a j o r obstacle; if they could be subdued, the C a p e and the Free State would surely oblige. In 1877, London annexed the financially ailing Transvaal under the guise of restoring order and destroying the Pedi threat in the northeast; British troops soon subdued the Pedi and, for good measure, the Zulu as well (cf. Delius, 1983; Edgerton, 1988). Britain was if anything too successful. N o w the Transvalers saw no need for British rule, which they overthrew in the first A n g l o - B o e r war ( 1 8 8 0 - 1 8 8 1 ) . And without the Zulu threat, even Natal lost interest in federation (Giliomee, 1989:36-37). Then in 1885, gold was discovered on a low ridge in the southern Transvaal, the Witwatersrand. The Transvaal now attracted far more British interest. Deep-level, capital-intensive (highly m e c h a n i z e d ) mining was again required, centered on the sprawling new city of Johannesburg. Even more so than with diamonds, gold attracted foreign, especially British, capital. Because of the vast amount of gold available, this second phase of the mineral revolution had a greater impact than that induced by diamonds, but the same institutions for exploiting and regulating African labor were used and greatly expanded. Passes, hut and poll taxes, the single-sex compound system, and a wide, racially differentiated wage scale b e c a m e the norm (Wheatcroft, 1987). D i a m o n d m a g n a t e Cecil Rhodes soon m o v e d into gold, allying with the A f r i k a n e r Bond, the Cape Dutch political party. In 1890, he b e c a m e prime minister of the Cape Colony. A union of agriculture and mining interests had advantages: it allowed a united assault on the growing C a p e black vote, limited intrawhite competition for labor, and presented a single face to London in Rhodes's campaign to expand toward the rumored goldfields beyond the Limpopo River. Rhodes had to advance around the Boer republics to the west. The southern Tswana people were annexed, while their northern cousins in B e c h u a n a l a n d (the f u t u r e B o t s w a n a ) received British "protection." From 1890, R h o d e s ' s British South Africa C o m p a n y occupied the trans-Limpopo hinterland, now renamed Southern and Northern Rhodesia (cf. Davenport, 1966; Galbraith, 1974). In addition, mine owners such as Rhodes increasingly resented Transvaal government policies that limited both their profits and their influence.

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F a c i n g p r e s s u r e f r o m R h o d e s and o t h e r B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s t s , L o n d o n d e c i d e d to a n n e x t h e T r a n s v a a l o n c e a g a i n . In late 1899, the B r i t i s h h i g h c o m m i s s i o n e r p r e s e n t e d an u l t i m a t u m r e q u i r i n g T r a n s v a a l p r e s i d e n t Paul K r u g e r to r e n o u n c e all real s o v e r e i g n t y . S u p p o r t e d o n l y by the F r e e State, t h e T r a n s v a a l a t t a c k e d the British, t h u s starting the s e c o n d A n g l o - B o e r w a r ( 1 8 9 9 - 1 9 0 2 ) . M o s t A f r i c a n s , h o p i n g f o r an e x t e n s i o n of the C a p e f r a n c h i s e , s u p p o r t e d t h e B r i t i s h by d e s t r o y i n g i s o l a t e d B o e r h o m e s t e a d s a n d a m b u s h i n g p a t r o l s . W h e n c o n v e n t i o n a l t a c t i c s f a i l e d to s u b d u e the B o e r s , t h e B r i t i s h b u r n e d B o e r f a r m s a n d i n t e r n e d t h e i r f a m i l i e s a n d b l a c k serv a n t s in racially s e g r e g a t e d c o n c e n t r a t i o n c a m p s , w h e r e t h o u s a n d s d i e d of d i s e a s e a n d m a l n u t r i t i o n (cf. P a k e n h a m , 1979; N a s s o n , 1 9 9 9 : 2 1 7 - 2 2 4 ) . A f r i k a n e r a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d t h e E n g l i s h b e c a m e d e e p l y s c a r r e d , but w h e n the Boers finally surrendered, their foes proved conciliatory. The T r a n s v a a l g e n e r a l s L o u i s B o t h a and Jan S m u t s led the large B o e r l a n d h o l d ers w h o d e c i d e d to c o l l a b o r a t e with the n e w order. Both the T r a n s v a a l and O r a n g e F r e e S t a t e w e r e a l l o w e d i n t e r n a l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t in 1907. O n c e again, federation a m o n g the republics was attempted. The all-white Nat i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n of 1 9 0 8 - 1 9 0 9 m e t to d r a w u p a s c h e m e f o r u n i o n . T h e N a t a l E n g l i s h a n d C a p e l i b e r a l s f a v o r e d a l o o s e f e d e r a t i o n , but the n o r t h e r n e r s w a n t e d a u n i t a r y state with limited p r o v i n c i a l p o w e r s and n o e x t e n sion of the C a p e f r a n c h i s e to b l a c k s in the interior. D e s p i t e b l a c k protests, m o s t C a p e d e l e g a t e s c o n c e d e d t h e s e p o i n t s , but s a l v a g e d t h e n o n r a c i a l f r a n c h i s e f o r their p r o v i n c e . Q u a l i f i e d C a p e b l a c k s c o u l d vote at all levels a n d s t a n d f o r m u n i c i p a l or p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e , but t h e y c o u l d not sit in the U n i o n p a r l i a m e n t ( T h o m p s o n , 1960). T h e British p a r l i a m e n t r e f u s e d to b l o c k this f l a w e d c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r a f e w t h o u s a n d potential black voters in the n o r t h e r n c o l o n i e s , and in 1909 it p a s s e d t h e A c t of U n i o n w i t h the p i o u s w i s h that o n e day w h i t e s w o u l d b r o a d e n their d e m o c r a c y . O n M a y 31, 1910, the Union of S o u t h A f r i c a w a s e s t a b l i s h e d . D e s p i t e l o s i n g t h e war, the s e t t l e r s had t r i u m p h e d , w h i l e the British f l a g still f l e w at little cost to L o n d o n . T h e only real losers w e r e the b l a c k m a j o r i t y . L o n d o n c o u l d not see that a racially distorted version of the B r i t i s h W e s t m i n s t e r s y s t e m i l l - s u i t e d so d i v e r s e a society. W i t h o u t U . S . s t y l e c h e c k s a n d b a l a n c e s , e v e n the t o k e n m u l t i r a c i a l i s m of t h e C a p e had little c h a n c e to s u r v i v e , a n d any e x p a n s i o n of l i b e r t i e s w a s i m p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t a Bill of R i g h t s or t h e p r i n c i p l e of j u d i c i a l review.

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THE UNITED SETTLER STATE: THE INTENSIFICATION OF SEGREGATION

T h e n e w U n i o n p a r l i a m e n t w a s d o m i n a t e d by L o u i s B o t h a ' s S o u t h A f r i c a n Party, f o r m e d f r o m t h e u n i o n of s m a l l e r A f r i k a n e r p a r t i e s . T h e m a i n o p p o s i t i o n party, the U n i o n i s t s , r e p r e s e n t e d English s p e a k e r s w a n t i n g

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close ties to Britain. The government advocated white partnership in building a British-protected "nation." Both parties agreed not to tamper with the Cape franchise, but neither would broaden black civil liberties. T h e small Labour Party, representing militant white workers w h o feared black competition for jobs, sought more extensive measures to limit black rights. It pressured parliament to pass the 1911 Mines and Works Act, barring blacks f r o m skilled and semiskilled mine jobs. The devastating 1913 Natives Land Act followed, limiting African landownership to the " r e s e r v e s " — j u s t 6 percent of South A f r i c a — a n d banning sharecropping and squatting on white farms. Only the Cape was later exempted because of its constitutionally protected, property-based voting system. Thousands of Africans were evicted f r o m their homes; only wage laborers working at minimal rates could remain. A vast reservoir of dispossessed black labor was now available—on the whites' terms (Plaatje, 1982). T h e chief author of this law, the O r a n g e Free State general J. B. M. Hertzog, opposed both the Cape franchise for Africans and Botha's policy of reconciliation with the British. He led militant, large-scale A f r i k a n e r f a r m e r s and poorer, mainly A f r i k a n e r whites w h o were migrating to the towns. Hertzog appealed also to embittered A f r i k a n e r s excluded f r o m the best positions in the government bureaucracy (Giliomee, 1989:48-49). In late 1913, he was expelled f r o m the cabinet for his views; in 1914 he f o u n d e d the National Party (NP), the precursor of the party that ruled South Africa f r o m 1948 to 1994. Just two years before, a different nationalism had encouraged African professionals led by the Reverend John Dube to f o r m the South African Natives National Congress ( S A N N C ) to oppose discrimination and push for greater political rights for Africans. The S A N N C , f r o m 1923 the African National Congress ( A N C ) , m a d e no real attempt to reach the masses and limited itself to the failed methods of deputations, petitions to expand the Cape franchise, and polite requests for rights due "civilized m e n " (cf. Walshe, 1970; Meli, 1989). This strategy was used also by the coloured African Peoples' Organization of Dr. A b d u r a h m a n , a m e m b e r of the C a p e Provincial Council. Since 10 percent of the Cape electorate was coloured, white politicians, including Hertzog, did sometimes suggest expanding their f r e e d o m s (Lewis, 1987:64-118). Only the Indians, led by Mohandas K. Gandhi, managed to secure some concessions by mass action. His "passive resistance" prevented more discriminatory measures similar to those applied to Africans, particularly curbs on freedom of movement, from being applied to Indians. However, mass action by his Natal Indian Congress was w e a k e n e d by Gandhi's failure to combine with other oppressed groups and by his departure for India in 1914 (Swan, 1985). Without a unified black political movement, whites could consolidate power. Black miners tried to organize, but they were brutally crushed, as

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were striking white miners. Justice Minister Jan Smuts became known as the " f r i e n d " of capitalists because of his repression of labor militants of all races. W h e n many Afrikaners rebelled in 1914 rather than support involvement in World War I on the side of Britain, Smuts's firm response added to his notoriety as also the f r i e n d of the British. Hertzog reviled Smuts as a traitor (cf. Hancock, 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 6 8 ) . Then in 1922, when white gold miners revolted against a mine o w n e r s ' policy of replacing whites with cheaper black workers, Smuts b o m b e d the rebels in Johannesburg and hanged, jailed, or deported the ringleaders. An outraged L a b o u r Party was happy to arrange a pact with S m u t s ' s political rival Hertzog, and Smuts was defeated in the 1924 elections. Hertzog b e c a m e prime minister and set about strengthening A f r i k a n e r power, increasing South A f r i c a n autonomy f r o m Britain, and protecting white workers (Simons and Simons, 1983:271-299). In 1925, Afrikaans became an official language (replacing Dutch), A f r i k a n e r s were recruited for the civil service, and a new flag and anthem were used beside those of Britain. South A f r i c a ' s status as an independent dominion under the British monarch (along with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) was defined in several conferences and statutes between 1926 and 1934. White w o r k e r s ' interests were secured by a "civilized white labor" policy that replaced thousands of Africans in menial jobs in the government railways and similar occupations with poor whites. New parastatal (government-controlled) companies also were created (Yudelman, 1984:214-262). In all these areas, Hertzog achieved a minor revolution, improving poor whites' conditions without unduly threatening the leading capitalists. His African policy was largely that of Smuts, embodied in the 1923 Natives Urban Areas Act, authorizing municipalities to adopt the strictly regulated system of locations and passes for urban African residents (Rich, 1978). Unsurprisingly, a 1927 law to prohibit extramarital intercourse between whites and Africans had broad bipartisan support (Furlong, 1994:59). Only in one area of racial policy did Hertzog go far beyond Smuts, and that was the Cape nonracial vote, which Hertzog wanted to end. First, by granting white women the vote in 1930, and ending property and educational requirements for white voters in the C a p e and Natal in 1931, he weakened black voting strength. Still lacking the two-thirds majority he needed to change the C a p e A f r i c a n vote, H e r t z o g ' s NP merged with Smuts's followers in 1934 to form the United Party. Then, over anguished black protests, Cape Africans were removed f r o m the common voters' roll in 1936, made possible because Smuts no longer needed their votes. An elaborate compromise salved white consciences: the size of the reserves was doubled and the advisory natives' Representative Council was created. Cape African voters would send three white members to the House of Assembly, and four white senators, representing Africans in all provinces for the first time, would also be elected (Walshe, 1970:118-123).

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But Hertzog did not c o m p r e h e n d the appeal to poorer Afrikaners of a m o r e thoroughly exclusive, segregationist vision than even he had proposed. They did not understand his resistance to segregating also the coloureds from white economic and political life. T h e y wondered why he did little to stop German Jewish refugees from taking precious jobs or why he did not send the Indians " b a c k " to India. Above all, they did not understand why he sat next to Smuts, declaring himself satisfied with the constitutional position of the Union rather than push f o r an Afrikaner-ruled republic. In response to such sentiments, a f o r m e r minister of the A f r i k a n e r Dutch Reformed Church, Daniel Malan, led discontented N P elements into forming the Purified National Party (Stultz, 1974:23-39). Purified Nationalist intellectuals worked to mobilize Afrikaners on an unprecedented scale. Inspired by what many had seen or heard of c h a n g e s under way in Nazi Germany, they proposed a revolution to end the threat of black " s w a m p i n g " and English and Jewish capitalist domination. T h r o u g h their secret, all-male organization, the Afrikaner Broederbond (Afrikaner Brotherhood), these intellectuals set up numerous front organizations to pursue their political objectives (cf. Serfontein, 1978; Bloomberg, 1989). W h e n in September 1939 Smuts convinced a narrow parliamentary m a j o r i t y to support Britain in World War II, most of H e r t z o g ' s followers joined the Purified Nationalists in opposition, f o r m i n g the Reunited National Party the next year. Many Afrikaner nationalists actively worked to undermine the war effort, praying that Hitler's victories would bring them to power (Furlong, 1991:105-119). In contrast, black South Africans wanted to believe Smuts's rhetoric of a war for democracy against the racist Hitler. Led by the A N C , many volunteered for military service, although Smuts refused to give them guns for fear of white reaction. More blacks came to the cities to work in manufacturing, which now boomed. Smuts declared that segregation had fallen on evil days and temporarily suspended the pass laws. For a while, it seemed an Allied victory might bring real changes. S m u t s ' s Afrikaner opponents were eager for changes of another sort. The Broederbond drew up an authoritarian draft constitution, and the "cultural" Ossewabrandwag (Ox-Wagon Guard, or OB) was transformed into a massive paramilitary and semifascist organization. Most of M a l a n ' s Reunited Nationalists belonged to the OB, but its increasing extremism threatened the N P ' s leadership, and the OB went into decline (see Marx, 1994). Malan especially opposed the Stormjaers (Stormtroopers), the O B extreme right wing, who planted bombs and beat up soldiers; there was even a foiled attempt to assassinate Smuts and set up a puppet Nazi government. Malan now turned against the far right, particularly as a Nazi victory became unlikely. In the 1943 election, Smuts's landslide victory overshadowed an ultimately more significant event: Malan trounced all his Afrikaner

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nationalist rivals, f r o m the moderate Afrikaner Party followers of Hertzog ( w h o had died in 1942) to the OB extremists. He was the unchallenged leader in the A f r i k a n e r nationalist battle against Smuts himself (Stultz, 1974:83-91; Furlong, 1991:201-205). The aging Smuts was oblivious to this. He alienated himself f r o m blacks, reinstating the pass laws once he was no longer threatened; he brutally crushed a black m i n e r s ' strike in 1946 and caved in to Natal English supporters in proposing curbs on Indians buying additional property. At the same time, his scare tactics, describing the Nationalists as " M a l a n a z i s , " failed to restrain public anger at continued rationing after the w a r ' s end, at failure to provide j o b s for demobilized soldiers whose places had been taken by black workers, or at the growing role of his liberal lieutenant, Jan H o f m e y r . H o f m e y r ' s influence was seen behind both S m u t s ' s attempts to buy off the angry Indians with an offer of three white representatives in parliament and the government-appointed Fagan C o m m i s s i o n , which reco m m e n d e d in early 1948 that the permanence of the urban black presence be accepted and freehold tenure be granted them (Furlong, 1991:235-239, 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 ; O ' M e a r a , 1996:20-37). In 1948, this smacked of "liberalism." So confident was Smuts about the 1948 election that he was unaware of his United Party's vulnerability and poor organization. All were surprised when M a l a n ' s NationalA f r i k a n e r Party coalition gained a five-seat majority. Malan could not effect all his proposals, such as nationalizing the mines, expelling the Indians, or creating a republic; but he did have the first all-Afrikaner Union cabinet (Stultz, 1974:147-159; Lipton, 1986:274-278).

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NATIONALIST RULE AND THE CREATION OF THE APARTHEID STATE

Having come to power with the slogan " A p a r t h e i d , " Malan set about creating a more systematically segregated society than anything previously conceived. Some have argued that he was really acting in tandem with capitalist business interests to provide more thoroughgoing control over labor in order to maximize profits in the diversified and complex postwar economy (Johnstone, 1976). While this might be true, it is only part of the explanation for apartheid. In truth, Broederbond intellectuals had long toyed with elaborate schemes of racial social engineering. Now they could realize their dreams, particularly as the NP fell under the control of uncompromisingly segregationist leaders. Malan was moderate c o m p a r e d with his blunt successor, J. G. S t r i j d o m , the advocate of baasskap (white bossship), or Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, the coldly brilliant intellectual w h o succeeded Strijdom in 1958 and w h o s e ties to the Broederbond were much closer than those of his predecessors (Serfontein, 1978:83-98). The apartheid

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regime had a very simple aim: to m a k e South Africa safe for a small, relatively poor people new to the city and incapable without state assistance of surviving either English guile and business experience or black competition on an open labor market. The old mechanisms no longer seemed enough. A planned economy, a rigged political system, and a rigidly segregated society provided the desired recipe (Furlong, 1991:240; Lipton, 1986). To this end, the remaining ties to Britain, symbolized by the Union Jack and the governor-general, were eliminated and replaced by a republic in 1961. The civil service and the military high c o m m a n d were purged of non-Nationalists (Posel, 1 9 9 9 : 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 ) ; whites in South A f r i c a n - r u l e d Namibia and those between eighteen and twenty-one were given the vote (they were reliable sources of f u r t h e r Nationalist support); and the A f r i kaner Party was persuaded in 1951 to merge with the NP. A fierce constitutional struggle was fought to remove the Cape coloured voters from the common roll. The token white representatives given in exchange were, like those granted the Africans in 1936, gradually dispensed with. Under a 1950 law the C o m m u n i s t Party was banned; C o m m u n i s t white representatives elected by A f r i c a n voters were ejected f r o m parliament ( O ' M e a r a , 1996:63). A n y o n e suspected of " c o m m u n i s m " (defined broadly enough to include many U.S. liberal Democrats) could be placed by ministerial decree under a five-year banning order, which amounted to house arrest. The paraphernalia of segregation hit coloureds m u c h harder than before, while Africans' lives became particularly miserable. Marriage or sex between whites and nonwhites was banned, procedures for racially classifying (or later reclassifying) all citizens were devised, and residential segregation was rigidly enforced, resulting in mass removals, especially of coloureds and Indians. In 1953, public amenities were segregated under a law that explicitly stated that such facilities need not be equal. The administration of the pass laws was centralized and made more c o m p r e h e n s i v e — A f r i c a n w o m e n and Cape voters were included for the first time. A vast panoply of legislation to control A f r i c a n s ' movements in " w h i t e " South Africa and African labor organizations followed. Universities were segregated and African mission schools were slowly strangled by Verwoerd's state-financed "Bantu education," intended to train Africans for menial tasks rather than c o m m e r c e or the professions (cf. Posel, 1991; Kallaway, 1984). Through all this, white political opposition was minimal. Small groups like the Liberal Party, founded in 1953, and the more conservative Progressive Party (1959) had little success. Even many whites who f r o w n e d at the extremism of new legislation felt it was painfully necessary to maintain law and order. They convinced themselves that the government was sincere in claiming that this " n e g a t i v e " phase of apartheid would be followed by the creation of "positive" institutions for blacks in their own areas.

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Blacks stood aghast at the way things had gone from bad, to worse. The A N C ' s old tactics had long been discredited by their ineffectiveness. During and after World War II, U.S.-educated, A N C president A l f r e d X u m a had sought to modernize and expand the organization, forging links with the C o m m u n i s t Party and the Indian Congress M o v e m e n t (Gish, 2000). Younger A N C members such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo realized mass organization was even more crucial now, and their A N C Youth League pushed the A N C toward mass involvement by adopting their Action Program in 1949 (Gerhart, 1978:45-84; Lodge, 1983:1-32). B o r r o w i n g f r o m the tactics of G a n d h i and in alliance with similar m o v e m e n t s a m o n g Indians, coloureds, and left-wing whites, the A N C (under Chief Albert Luthuli) now spearheaded the Congress M o v e m e n t , using passive resistance on a grand scale. In 1955, the alliance drew up the F r e e d o m Charter, a d o c u m e n t d e m a n d i n g the creation of a nonracial d e m o c r a c y (Suttner and Cronin, 1986). T h e g o v e r n m e n t retaliated massively; passive resistance was punished by f l o g g i n g , and d o z e n s of C o n gress M o v e m e n t leaders were charged with treason. N o n e of the charges stuck, but in the intervening five-year "Treason Trial," the A N C ' s unprecedented strength quickly dissipated (Lodge, 1 9 8 3 : 3 3 - 2 0 0 ; Lazerson, 1994: 161-195). In 1958, frustrated and embittered by A N C failure to achieve meaningful change, some younger m e m b e r s under Robert S o b u k w e broke away in

The Sharpeville massacre resulted in sixty-nine deaths when South African forces fired on protesters demonstrating against the pass laws.

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protest against alleged A N C d o m i n a t i o n by white liberals and white and Indian C o m m u n i s t s . In 1959, they f o u n d e d the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) with the slogan " A f r i c a for the A f r i c a n s . " To e m b a r r a s s the A N C , which had advocated burning passes, the PAC a n n o u n c e d a similar c a m paign a month earlier, in March 1960. T h e result was the Sharpeville (an African t o w n s h i p south of J o h a n n e s b u r g ) massacre, in which policemen fired on an advancing crowd intent on surrendering their passbooks (Gerhart, 1978:124-246; Lodge, 1983:201-230). Unrest now broke out across the country. A state of emergency was declared, and in 1961 the A N C and PAC were banned. Both went underground and into exile; both also reluctantly chose the path of armed struggle since all nonviolent alternatives seemed exhausted. Nelson M a n d e l a organized the A N C armed wing, U m k h o n t o we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), but M a n d e l a ' s capture and trial, along with those of other A N C and PAC leaders, seemed to have forced all active resistance underground by 1964 (Lodge, 1983:231-260; Mandela, 1994:258-261). Verwoerd had a strategy to c o n f u s e international opinion, shocked by the government's brutality. In a cynical imitation of independence and selfgovernment occurring elsewhere in Africa, "positive" apartheid was initiated by the government. Under the guise of "Separate D e v e l o p m e n t , " the reserves were encouraged to d e v e l o p their own legislative assemblies, achieve internal autonomy, and eventually reach " i n d e p e n d e n c e . " In this way, all A f r i c a n s would ultimately b e c o m e citizens of " h o m e l a n d s " but foreigners in South Africa, the land of their birth. On the other hand, white South A f r i c a n s (only 15 percent of the population) would achieve the old dream of a white m a n ' s country in 87 percent of the republic (Kenney, 1980). (Note the location of homelands on M a p 13.1.) The legislative m e c h a n i s m s were enacted in 1959, and in 1963 the largest reserve, Transkei, " h o m e " to most of the Xhosa-speakers, b e c a m e the first self-governing homeland under its malleable chief minister, Kaiser Matanzima. Others followed. Although in every case there was intimidation of anti-independence groups and widespread corruption of homeland leaders and their cronies, by the early 1970s the policy was pursued with increasing determination. While the g o v e r n m e n t poured vast (but in real terms hopelessly inadequate) sums of money into entities such as Bophuthatswana (composed of six separate segments) these new "countries" were never viable. While the small inner circles of blacks dominating the homelands grew wealthy, most residents were desperately poor, because few jobs were available and the land was o f t e n unsuitable for farming (Stultz, 1980; Butler, Rotberg, and Adams, 1977). After Verwoerd's 1966 assassination in the assembly c h a m b e r by an allegedly deranged parliamentary messenger, his successor, B. J. Vorster, a former OB "general," not only realized much of this "grand apartheid" but actively pursued a policy of détente with neighboring black states. "John,"

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as he liked to be called by his English-speaking golfing friends, tried to endear himself to all South African whites while presenting a firm but friendly face to his black neighbors. Yet, only one country, Malawi, was willing to swallow his blandishments wholeheartedly and accept Pretoria's money in exchange for diplomatic relations. The rest of Africa, now predominantly independent of its former colonial masters, was more cautious. For beside the "benevolent" side of separate development was the iron fist inside the velvet glove. Vorster had already introduced detention without trial as Verwoerd's minister of police; he soon made it indefinite in duration (Foster, 1987). Political prisoners began to die mysteriously. Every remaining loophole in the web of earlier petty apartheid legislation was carefully closed, the pass laws were enforced even more strictly, and by the 1970s mass removals of rural A f r i c a n s f r o m "black s p o t s " in white farming areas had b e c o m e widespread. This was necessary to achieve a tidier homelands map and Verwoe r d ' s projected 1977 date for turning back the A f r i c a n influx to "white South Africa." To realize this fantasy, blacks would be transported, voluntarily or otherwise, to the homelands, where farming was increasingly impossible because of overcrowding, soil erosion, inadequate technology, and the migration of so many adult men to South African cities in search of work (Platzky and Walker, 1985).

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THE ATTEMPT TO MODERNIZE APARTHEID

Vorster could not escape some obvious truths. World opinion was beginning to turn against South Africa. One sign of this disapproval was a ban on South African participation in international sporting events. The 1970s also saw an increasingly expensive guerrilla campaign in South A f r i c a n - o c cupied Namibia and the Portuguese revolution of 1974, which led to the granting of independence to M o z a m b i q u e and Angola. These events were accompanied by the tightening stranglehold of sanctions and insurgency against South A f r i c a ' s last white ally, the rebel state Rhodesia. Soon there would be no more buffer states against the tide of black liberation. Internally, economic and political problems were mounting. For one, arms and oil embargoes, plus the 1973 oil crisis, meant this was no booming decade like the previous one. Making things worse, black resistance to apartheid was increasing. In the factories, blacks were resorting to illegal strikes. In the universities, black students led by Steven Biko were forming "black consciousness" groups independent of the old white liberal organizations. In 1976, police reacted violently when Soweto schoolchildren demonstrated against compulsory education in Afrikaans, a new component of "Bantu education" (cf. Hirson, 1979; Woods, 1987). By the end of the year, as many as a thousand youthful protesters had been killed by the police.

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The climate of escalating black resistance and violent white repression underscored for growing numbers of whites that change was needed. Big business especially wanted reforms to accommodate black frustration in order to make white capitalists competitive again and prevent revolution (Torchia, 1988). Realignment in the political arena was one response. The United Party collapsed, and its more liberal members fled to an enlarged Progressive Federal Party (PFP). By 1977, the more reform-minded PFP was the new official opposition party in parliament, dominated by the massive but stagnant NP. The solution to the race problem suggested by the more liberal wing of the N P was simple: as many blacks as possible would be co-opted into the system as junior partners of a thereby strengthened NP-controlled state. The homelands would have to take those Africans who could not be accommodated. Those included in white South Africa would provide the skilled labor needed by a changing, increasingly mechanized economy. The old manual jobs were fewer now. Migratory labor could deal with those needs, but for the factories, well-trained workers with a stake in the system were needed. Capitalists had always borne the Nationalists' whites-only variety of socialism on sufferance. They preferred that black and white workers compete for jobs, thus lowering wages for both. In difficult times, expensive, poorly educated, and inefficient white workers could no longer be carried, even if they meant guaranteed NP votes. Besides, the white working class was shrinking under the weight of relative Afrikaner affluence, because so many had benefited from the selective socialism of Nationalist rule (Kenney, 1991:253-271; van der Berg, 1989). Vorster made some moves in the desired direction, but new leadership was required to push major reforms. Fortuitously, a scandal over Vorster's alleged misuse of government funds led to the election in 1978 of Cape NP leader P. W. Botha as the new party chief and prime minister, replacing Vorster. As leader of the more enlightened wing of the NP, Botha's victory marked a stunning triumph over the mainly conservative Transvalers, who had dominated the party leadership since Malan's retirement in 1954 (cf. Rees, 1980). Botha did not waste time. He appointed a host of investigative commissions, a tried NP method of accustoming voters to major changes. African and nonracial trade unions were legalized, many public amenities were quietly integrated (mainly in the more liberal cities), and Africans were gradually allowed to own property in urban townships or even to do business in central commercial areas of towns. By 1985, even the old "sacred cows," the laws against interracial sex or marriage, had been repealed. The abolition of the pass laws followed in 1986. Henceforth, blacks who could find approved housing (of which there was precious little) would be permitted to work in the urban areas. Thus, big business would have its permanent work force with a stake in the system, organized in carefully

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regulated trade unions that could strike only after elaborate arbitration measures had failed. T h e h o m e l a n d s would m e a n w h i l e be encouraged by all means available to take independence (Kenney, 1991:290-307). Yet, Botha's major contribution was his attempted resolution of a matter Vorster had always tried to paper over: how to fit the coloureds and Indians into the apartheid f r a m e w o r k of government. His solution was a tricameral parliament, with one c h a m b e r for each group, in which all joint decisionmaking would be dominated by the largest chamber, the white assembly. To head this apparatus would be a p o w e r f u l executive president, chosen by an N P - d o m i n a t e d electoral college. Each c h a m b e r w o u l d pass laws affecting its " o w n affairs," but in matters of c o m m o n concern ("general affairs"), the consent of all three c h a m b e r s was required. W h e r e the other chambers disagreed with the assembly, an NP-dominated president's council would provide the convenient break to the deadlock (Lijphart, 1985; Omond, 1986:41^*6). It was easy to find participants in this exercise; those who had previously been involved in the d e f u n c t Coloured Representative Council and South African Indian Council (two largely advisory bodies invented a decade earlier to provide limited consultation with those c o m m u n i t i e s ) jumped at the opportunity. Even the coloured Labour Party, which had previously destroyed its representative council out of frustration with government intransigence, offered to give the new scheme five years to prove itself (Van der Ross, 1 9 8 6 : 3 4 4 - 3 5 3 ; Du Pré, 1994:161-178). Yet, the great majority of the coloured and Indian communities, especially in urban areas, rejected the tricameral system, as did the outraged African population, excluded from even token participation in the central government. Even Gatsha Buthelezi, the conservative leader of the Zulu homeland, Kwazulu, and of the avowedly procapitalist Inkatha m o v e m e n t , scathingly c o n d e m n e d participation in so flawed an experiment (Maré and Hamilton, 1987:161). Botha also found angry right-wing opposition to such p o w e r sharing within his own party, especially in the Transvaal. The hardliners, led by Transvaal N P leader Andries Treurnicht, left the party in 1982. Treurnicht's new, unabashedly white supremacist Conservative Party (CP) soon became the m a j o r far-right voice. B e y o n d the CP, many small groups, such as the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance M o v e m e n t , rapidly emerged (cf. Giliomee, 1982). Although Botha's new constitution was passed in an all-white referendum, barely 20 percent of registered Indian voters and 30 percent of coloured ones bothered to participate in the elections for their new c h a m bers in 1984. The boycott of these elections spawned a giant nonracial umbrella body, the United Democratic Front (UDF), drawing on h u n d r e d s of grassroots organizations devoted to undoing the tricameral system and creating a South Africa based on the A N C Freedom Charter (cf. Barrell, 1984; Davies, O ' M e a r a , and Dlamini, 1988).

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B o t h a h a d e v e n less s u c c e s s with his s u p p l e m e n t a r y p l a n to b u y off u r b a n A f r i c a n s with g r e a t e r e c o n o m i c o p p o r t u n i t i e s ( t h r o u g h e l i m i n a t i n g m o s t r e m a i n i n g statutory j o b d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ) , basic a m e n i t i e s (such as the electrification of S o w e t o ) , and f u l l - f l e d g e d municipalities. A l t h o u g h blacks w e r e n o w a l l o w e d to vote in t o w n s h i p municipal elections, turnout w a s pat h e t i c a l l y low. B y 1985, r e s i s t a n c e to any p a r t i c i p a t i o n in g o v e r n m e n t s p o n s o r e d local political b o d i e s h a d led to such w i d e s p r e a d unrest in the t o w n s h i p s that B o t h a p r o c l a i m e d a state of e m e r g e n c y in m a n y areas ( O m o n d , 1 9 8 6 : 5 1 - 5 2 , 2 4 6 - 2 5 6 ) . In the f o l l o w i n g year, this w a s e x t e n d e d to the w h o l e country. N o n e t h e l e s s , violence increased, and s o m e suspected g o v e r n m e n t i n f o r m e r s w e r e " n e c k l a c e d " with b u r n i n g tires a r o u n d their n e c k s by black militants. T h e A N C called f r o m a b r o a d for the t o w n s h i p s to be rendered u n g o v e r n a b l e and stepped up its sabotage actions. T h e security police a r r e s t e d t h o u s a n d s . A m o n g whites, there w a s g r o w i n g resistance to military conscription, as d r a f t e e s were for the first time sent to garrison the t o w n s h i p s rather than the b o r d e r (see Murray, 1987). M e a n w h i l e , c o r r u p t i o n s c a n d a l s and several c o u p s a n d c o u p a t t e m p t s in the h o m e l a n d s s i g n a l e d the b r e a k d o w n of the tribal h o m e l a n d s c o m p o nent of a p a r t h e i d . B o t h a ' s r e l i a n c e on his g e n e r a l s to c r e a t e a n e w b u f f e r z o n e by f o m e n t i n g a s s a s s i n a t i o n s and civil w a r s in n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s like M o z a m b i q u e , L e s o t h o , B o t s w a n a , and A n g o l a b e c a m e t o o e x p e n s i v e — t h e a r m y was n e e d e d at h o m e , and international opposition was forcing a S o u t h A f r i c a n w i t h d r a w a l f r o m southern A n g o l a and later f r o m longs u f f e r i n g N a m i b i a (cf. H a n l o n , 1986; Grundy, 1986). W h i l e w h i t e , f a r - r i g h t d e a t h s q u a d s t e r r o r i z e d the t o w n s h i p s , m a n y blacks, tired of the v i o l e n c e and n o w able to p a y h i g h e r rents, m o v e d to the inner s u b u r b s of cities like J o h a n n e s b u r g , w h e r e there w e r e h u n d r e d s of e m p t y a p a r t m e n t s . It s e e m e d as t h o u g h the a p p a r a t u s of a p a r t h e i d w a s b r e a k i n g d o w n as c r i m e f i g u r e s shot up, the S o u t h A f r i c a n c u r r e n c y collapsed w i t h the w i t h d r a w a l of key f o r e i g n b a n k l o a n s , and f o r e i g n e c o nomic sanctions bit ever d e e p e r into the pockets of blacks and whites alike (cf. Y u d e l m a n , 1987; L e w i s , 1990). It w a s c l e a r that B o t h a , t r a p p e d by his o w n history, w a s i n c a p a b l e of taking the n e x t vital steps t o w a r d m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l r e f o r m . His S o u t h A f r i c a w a s u n r e c o g n i z a b l e f r o m that of Verwoerd, but the new black m i d dle c l a s s e s h a d not b e e n b o u g h t o f f . Rather, they h a d , like all d i s e n f r a n chised b o u r g e o i s i e s , b e c o m e e v e n m o r e vocal in d e m a n d i n g a central role in g o v e r n i n g the society. At the s a m e time, by the 1987 e l e c t i o n , the farright C o n s e r v a t i v e Party was strong e n o u g h to b e c o m e the m a i n opposition party, d i s p l a c i n g the P r o g r e s s i v e s (van Vuuren et al., 1987). T h e N a t i o n a l Party n o w e n j o y e d a l m o s t as m u c h E n g l i s h as A f r i k a n e r s u p p o r t , w h i l e it seemed that soon m o s t A f r i k a n e r s w o u l d f a v o r the CP. T h e N P ' s " b r o w n " j u n i o r p a r t n e r s , e x a s p e r a t e d by B o t h a ' s r e f u s a l to end what r e m a i n e d of petty a p a r t h e i d , t h r e a t e n e d to e x p o s e the tricameral

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system as unworkable, while even Inkatha's chief Buthelezi refused to negotiate until Botha released all political prisoners and unbanned all antiapartheid organizations. W h i l e the A N C ' s bombs became more frequent, the g o v e r n m e n t ' s chief response was massive press censorship and an effective ban on the U D F and all m a j o r extraparliamentary groups. Big business had lost c o n f i d e n c e in B o t h a ' s neo-apartheid; now, even within the N P there was growing talk of the need for new leadership and a new policy (see Davis, 1987; O ' M e a r a , 1996:372-381).

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DISMANTLING THE APARTHEID STATE

In 1989, Botha, suffering f r o m the effects of a stroke, was forced out as party leader in favor of Transvaal NP leader F. W. de Klerk, a belated convert to a more enlightened approach. He showed a willingness to talk about an expanded f o r m of p o w e r sharing. From prison, Nelson Mandela was quietly attempting to open negotiations between the NP and A N C (Mandela, 1994:501-545). Moreover, there were some signs in a new election held later that year that more than two-thirds of the whites would support de K l e r k - s t y l e reform or the more avowedly liberal policies of the Democratic Party (DP, the new white umbrella parliamentary group on the Nationalists' left). Botha, unwilling to support further reform, was forced by the N P parliamentary caucus to step d o w n as president in favor of de Klerk (Thompson, 1995:244-245). The new president was not entirely altruistic in pursuing a new direction. Regardless of what he did now, the deeply alienated Conservatives would never return to the NP fold, and the 1989 assembly election had consolidated the C o n s e r v a t i v e s ' position in the Transvaal and Free State. Further CP electoral gains threatened the reform effort. The political chessboard had to be remade to preclude this, but that meant going much further toward majority rule than all the previous talk of power sharing. The dismal voter turnout for the two junior chambers of the tricameral parliament, even worse than in the previous election, merely confirmed that there could be no going back. De Klerk, therefore, m o v e d more boldly in February 1990, when he unbanned numerous organizations, including the ANC, PAC, and C o m m u nist Party. He declared his support for negotiations for a new constitution granting political rights to all but protecting the rights of minorities (meaning the whites), and freed Nelson Mandela, the long-imprisoned leader of the ANC, who alone appeared to have the stature to bring blacks together to negotiate with whites (Price, 1991). The A N C - C o m m u n i s t alliance had little choice but to accept the new conditions; after several m o n t h s of hesitation, it renounced the armed struggle and agreed to work toward negotiations. Communist regimes were

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Nelson Mandela addresses well-wishers in New York City four months after his release from prison. collapsing in Eastern E u r o p e , and the Soviet U n i o n had too m a n y p r o b l e m s to continue u n d e r w r i t i n g the e x p e n s i v e A N C c a m p a i g n , while the harsh realities of politics s u g g e s t e d that the West w a s f a r m o r e interested in helping E a s t e r n E u r o p e than in a s s i s t i n g b l a c k liberation. N o r c o u l d A f r i c a n countries be as h e l p f u l as b e f o r e . M a n y old f r i e n d s , such as Z a m b i a ' s K e n neth K a u n d a , f a c e d a n g r y c i t i z e n s tired of e c o n o m i c d e v a s t a t i o n and corruption and d e m a n d i n g an end to o n e - p a r t y rule. T h e p o s i t i v e f e a t u r e s of r e f o r m w e r e soon c l e a r e n o u g h . N a m i b i a a c h i e v e d its l o n g - d e l a y e d i n d e p e n d e n c e early in 1990, n u m e r o u s nearl e g e n d a r y exiled f i g u r e s b e g a n to return to S o u t h A f r i c a , and m a n y of the corrupt h o m e l a n d regimes were o v e r t h r o w n in p o p u l a r revolts and replaced by a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s m o r e s y m p a t h e t i c to the A N C (see B a n k , 1994). In o t h e r c a s e s , such as the T r a n s k e i , e x i s t i n g r e g i m e s t h r e w their s u p p o r t to M a n d e l a . O n l y K w a z u l u ( s t r o n g h o l d of B u t h e l e z i ' s I n k a t h a m o v e m e n t ) a n d " i n d e p e n d e n t " B o p h u t h a t s w a n a r e m a i n e d aloof f r o m the rush to e m brace the A N C , a l t h o u g h the g o v e r n m e n t of Ciskei g r a d u a l l y d i s t a n c e d itself f r o m the liberation m o v e m e n t s . R e l a t i v e l y p e a c e f u l protest m a r c h e s b e c a m e a s t a n d a r d o c c u r r e n c e in m o s t t o w n s , a n d t h e r e w e r e r e p e a t e d m e e t i n g s b e t w e e n m e m b e r s of the g o v e r n m e n t cabinet and the A N C leadership to settle on preliminary details such as the t i m i n g of the release of political p r i s o n e r s , a m n e s t y f o r exiles w h o had compiitted violent acts, and the creation of a climate c o n d u c i v e to n e g o t i a t i o n s for a new constitution.

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In parliament, de Klerk took several steps to show his goodwill, repealing the Separate Amenities Act, the hated 1913 Lands Act, the Population Registration Act (prescribing race classification at birth), and the Group Areas Act, which in many cities was already almost a dead letter. The N P took perhaps the most symbolic step of all when it opened its membership to all races. Polls suggested that a substantial nonwhite minority, especially among more conservative coloureds and Indians, would support the N P now that it p r o f e s s e d support for capitalism and democracy. Not surprisingly, now that the N P had stolen most of the D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y ' s policies, the latter lost support dramatically. At the same time, a strong conservative backlash, even in traditionally more "liberal" seats, suggested that de Klerk had to m o v e rapidly to change the rules of elections or lose his majority in the assembly. Right-wing whites spoke m e n a c i n g l y of resistance, even civil war, if de Klerk sold out to blacks as in Namibia. In some towns, blacks taking advantage of integrated public amenities were severely beaten by white extremists. Mysterious white death squads and agents provocateurs were rumored to be behind g r o w i n g intrablack violence in the townships. T h e r e was evidence of elements in the government being behind at least some of this, particularly of police f a v o r i n g conservative blacks, such as Zulu Inkatha members, against the A N C . As Inkatha tried to expand its membership into the Transvaal townships, the long-simmering and often bloody struggle between Inkatha and A N C - U D F supporters spread. Superficially, intrablack conflict often seemed ethnically based or "tribal," since Inkatha was o v e r w h e l m i n g l y Zulu and many A N C leaders were Xhosa, but the situation was much more complex. Many urban Zulu in particular were A N C supporters, and the struggle was as much between old and young or urban and rural as between different "tribes." G r o w i n g black unemployment, 40 percent or more in places like Soweto, sharpened old hostilities, themselves long encouraged by a government maintained by brute force and divide-and-rule tactics. There had long been tension, for instance, between temporary migrants f r o m the rural areas and the more permanent township residents. In addition, since 1976 the A N C and other liberation groups had placed the youth, often children of ten or twelve years, in the f o r e f r o n t of the struggle. Not yet dependent on white jobs and not yet beaten into submission, this generation had lost the traditional respect shown in African society to o n e ' s elders and had largely a b a n d o n e d formal education f o r the sake of "liberation n o w " (see Love and Sederberg, 1990). With so many older leaders imprisoned or in exile, there o f t e n seemed no other option but to let the children lead the struggle. But the long-term e f f e c t s of this policy were devastating. Older township residents, especially migratory workers f r o m rural areas like Natal, had grown resentful of the insolence of many young

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" c o m r a d e s " and their incessant demands for yet another boycott or strike or for just one more sacrifice for freedom. On top of these considerations, there were serious ideological divides between the nonracial and broadly prosocial democratic ANC and its allies (united around the 1955 Freedom Charter) and the capitalist Inkatha, not to mention the militantly socialist and racially exclusive PAC or its counterpart, the Black Consciousness-inspired Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) movement (see Hirschmann, 1990). Inkatha demanded an equal role in negotiations, which the A N C was reluctant to grant to a "homeland" organization, while the PAC (using the slogan "One Settler, One Bullet!") and A Z A P O criticized the A N C for negotiating when the real issue, from their viewpoint, was transfer of power and land to the majority. These divides were also reflected in the trade union movement. Inkatha had created its own union network, while A Z A P O and the PAC were concentrated in the National African Confederation of Trade Unions (NACTU). The ANC and the Communists were allied with the giant worker arm of the now defunct UDF, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (Marx, 1989). COSATU was by no means synonymous with its two partners, however; it was suspicious that the ANC, dominated by an educated middle-class leadership, might easily ignore worker interests in negotiations, especially as Mandela seemed to drop demands for nationalizing key industries in favor of black empowerment within a primarily capitalist economy (see Nattrass, 1994). In this political environment, township violence grew while police often seemed unwilling or unable to stop the bloodshed. Crimes committed by gangsters taking advantage of the power vacuum struck fear into white hearts and undermined what was left of the fabric of African social life. At the same time, the A N C was having difficulty transforming itself from a secret liberation movement into a mass party. There was local criticism of the exiled leadership, and membership drives delivered only 150,000 members by November 1990. Frustrated ANC members sought to retain public attention by involving the community in mass action, especially a campaign to force remaining black city councillors out of office. But this merely added to the confusion in black areas, while ever more numerous strikes threatened to paralyze an already stricken economy.

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THE TORTUOUS ROAD TO A NEW SOUTH AFRICA

Meanwhile, negotiating the transition to majority rule progressed in fits and starts. Through much of 1991, the opposing sides could not get beyond talks about how to start negotiations. Eventually, rising violence and looming economic disaster forced them to agree to a multiparty preliminary

As black and white leaders negotiated the end of white rule, mounting violence in South Africa's black townships threatened to derail the peace process.

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c o n f e r e n c e . In practice, the Convention for a D e m o c r a t i c South A f r i c a ( C O D E S A ) , which met at last in December, was dominated by the N P and A N C , with Buthelezi's Inkatha (renamed the Inkatha F r e e d o m Party or IFP) in distant third place (Strauss, 1993). By May, C O D E S A had fallen apart as it b e c a m e clear that the A N C wanted a rapid transition to unfettered majoritarian rule, while the N P sought a protracted transition that would retain a key role for itself (Friedman, 1993:21-31). Even private bilateral A N C - N P talks went n o w h e r e as the A N C tried to bolster support among frustrated adherents by approving unprecedented mass action in the f o r m of strikes, marches, and boycotts. A massacre of black township dwellers by masked gunmen in Boipatong, south of Johannesburg, led the A N C to suspend talks. The resulting effort to take mass action into the rural areas culminated in the shooting of dozens of A N C supporters by soldiers of the Ciskei homeland. This shook both sides into returning to the table in September, with the A N C and N P signing a Record of Understanding. The necessary concessions in turn convinced the IFP, right-wing whites, and conservative black leaders of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana that the N P was selling them out. Nonetheless, a revised CODESA-type multiparty forum was convened in April 1993. Despite great tensions, especially after a right-winger assassinated C j m m u n i s t Party secretary-general Chris Hani, the government and A N C drew closer. The A N C ' s "sunset clause," allowing all m a j o r parties a fiveyear role in the cabinet after nonracial elections, and its acceptance of some powers for new provinces, helped here. Late in 1993, after much compromise on all sides, an interim constitution was unveiled, to be implemented after elections in April 1994. For a while, continuing IFP hostility and right-wing white resistance threatened to derail the process. But Buthelezi and more moderate rightwingers, led by several retired Afrikaner generals, were persuaded to parti;ipate in the elections by two last-minute concessions: the Zulu king's rcle in the IFP's Natal stronghold would be honored and the possibility of creating a volkstaat (Afrikaner region) was not ruled out. At the same time, Bophuthatswana, the last homeland holdout, was reincorporated into South Africa after a mass revolt against its unpopular rulers (Friedman and Atkinson, 1994; Kotze and Greyling, 1994:33-36, 6 8 - 8 1 , 2 2 0 - 2 2 7 ) . Against all expectations, the elections were p e a c e f u l . T h e A N C won 62 percent of the vote, including the great m a j o r i t y of A f r i c a n votes, and o n t r o l of seven of the nine newly created provinces. T h e N P trailed with 2) percent, and the IFP surprisingly got nearly 10 percent. T h e other parties did poorly, but proportional representation ensured many of them some representation in the new parliament. Still, the A N C was disappointed at the NP's winning control of the Western Cape provincial legislature (due to extensive support f r o m the coloured majority there) and the I F P ' s victory in Kwazulu-Natal (Reynolds, 1994:182-220; Southall, 1994).

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Voters in line at the polling station in Rosebank, April 27, 1994

N e l s o n M a n d e l a w a s d u l y s w o r n in as p r e s i d e n t , with de K l e r k o n e of t w o d e p u t y p r e s i d e n t s in a " G o v e r n m e n t of N a t i o n a l U n i t y , " c o m p r i s i n g the A N C , NP. and IFP. C o m m u n i s t s , trade u n i o n i s t s , nationalists, Z u l u c o n s e r v a t i v e s , and l o n g t i m e A N C activists sat t o g e t h e r in p a r l i a m e n t , as a n e w b r i g h t l y c o l o r e d f l a g w a s w i d e l y e m b r a c e d as a s y m b o l of this n e w " r a i n bow nation." F r o m the o u t s e t , d a u n t i n g p r o b l e m s f a c e d the n e w g o v e r n m e n t : c o n t i n ued s t r i k e s , the s l o w r e t u r n of f o r e i g n i n v e s t o r s , m a s s i v e u n e m p l o y m e n t , p h e n o m e n a l l y h i g h c r i m e rates, rural A f r i c a n s s t r e a m i n g into u r b a n a r e a s , and the A N C - I F P c o n f l i c t in K w a z u l u - N a t a l . W h i t e s a n d c o l o u r e d s f e a r e d a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n p o l i c i e s g i v i n g A f r i c a n s priority f o r j o b s , w h i t e b u r e a u c r a t s f e a r e d losing their l i v e l i h o o d , w h i t e f a r m e r s f e a r e d losing their large p r o p e r t i e s to l a n d r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , a n d old N P l o y a l i s t s f e a r e d h a v i n g past a b u s e s u n c o v e r e d by an i m p e n d i n g T r u t h C o m m i s s i o n . T h e r e w a s m u c h f r i c t i o n o v e r d e m a r c a t i n g n e w n o n r a c i a l local a u t h o r i t i e s . N o r w a s d r a w i n g

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up a final constitution strife-free. T h e A N C favored a strong central government, whereas the NP, IFP, and DP d e m a n d e d more provincial autonomy. S o m e A N C leaders feared that the new provinces (many coinciding with concentrations of particular ethnic groups, such as the Zulu, Tswana, or coloureds) might provide bases for f u t u r e threats to national h a r m o n y (and A N C control) if given too much independence. The " f i n a l " constitution reflected the A N C preferences for further weakening the federal features of the 1993 constitution. The model adopted in 1996 reduced provincial powers, now f o c u s e d more on implementing than f o r m u l a t i n g policy, and replaced the popularly elected senate with a weaker National Council of Provinces, representing provincial legislatures (Reynolds, 1999:20-24). To the alarm of A N C leaders reluctant to embrace even this very limited federalism, many provincial governments displayed a disturbing level of incompetence and lack of coordination with the central government in delivering services (Van Niekerk and Ludman, 1999:257-259). A tendency to centralize power around the president's office increased after Nelson Mandela retired in 1999, replaced by his deputy T h a b o Mbeki. The A N C returned to p o w e r in a second democratic election that year, gaining nearly two-thirds of the vote. The renamed New National Party (NNP) was reduced to fourth place. N o w a regional party based primarily in the Western Cape, it depended chiefly on conservative coloured and some A f r i k a n e r support. M a n y perceived its youthful new leader, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, as lacking the f o r c e f u l n e s s and charisma of de Klerk, who had retired in 1997. Inkatha held onto most of its voters, but the main surprise was the dramatic growth in support for the liberal Democratic Party, especially among Afrikaners. The D P ' s 10 percent of the vote was, however, dwarfed by massive African, and now also substantial coloured, support for the A N C . A N C leaders expressed outrage when the NNP and the D P forged a coalition to retain opposition control of the Westem Cape; but in Kwazulu-Natal, Inkatha entered a similar alliance with the ANC to keep out the white-led opposition parties (Reynolds, 1999). The latter coalition, along with M b e k i ' s inclusion at the national level of Inkatha in his cabinet, indicated a new willingness to cooperate. H o w ever, this development, alongside the selection of fewer non-African ministers, suggested some shift toward black exclusivism, although the proportion of A f r i c a n ministers reflected their share of the total population (see Reynolds, 1 9 9 9 : 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 ) . A N C electoral success, unlikely to diminish substantially in the short to medium term, makes it susceptible to the temptations of any dominant party, h o w e v e r c o m m i t t e d to democratic values (see Giliomee and Simkins, 1999). It is unlikely that this hegemony will be significantly challenged by the June 2000 agreement between the DP and the N N P to unify as the Democratic Alliance. Mbeki and other A N C leaders have shown impatience with parliamentary and press criticism; the ANC-dominated H u m a n Rights C o m m i s s i o n has threatened to punish the

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alleged racism of the still white-dominated press for exposés of corruption or other misdeeds in government ranks. The A N C national leadership has simply " r e d e p l o y e d " its own popularly elected officials to other positions when they have fallen into disfavor or on the grounds that party needs justified such executive intervention. W h i l e many A N C rank-and-file o f t e n show a healthy willingness to question their leaders' actions, a strong opposition party with broad support among the black majority is essential to developing a lasting pluralistic political culture. T h e emphasis of M b e k i ' s government on fiscal responsibility and investor friendliness ironically places it closer to the N N P and the DP than to the A N C ' s socialist allies in the C o m m u n i s t Party and trade unions. T h e e m b r a c i n g of neoliberal economics, including privatization of parastatal corporations, has engendered considerable tensions inside this alliance; a degree of populist rhetoric may therefore be necessary to placate both the emerging black middle class and the millions of South Africans, primarily black, w h o still live in abject poverty. This partly explains why Mbeki focuses less than M a n d e l a had on placating white fears; he emphasizes instead the need for an A f r i c a n Renaissance, in which black socioeconomic e m p o w e r m e n t is a central theme. Despite occasional rumblings in the unions and the Communist Party, there are as yet few signs of a significant organized political threat to the A N C on its left; the radical PAC and Black C o n s c i o u s n e s s - i n s p i r e d Azanian P e o p l e ' s Organization gained less than 1 percent of the vote between them in 1999. Nevertheless, at the grassroots level the A N C - l e d government faces a profound challenge, given the need to attract investment and create new jobs through economic growth while retaining its popular base. The new South Africa has certainly achieved much. Apartheid is gone, a constitutional court and a bill of rights protect potential victims of political abuse, and political violence is now sporadic rather than endemic. Most f o r m e r supporters of apartheid have a b a n d o n e d racist authoritarianism in f a v o r of liberal democracy, the rule of law, and individual rights. W o m e n are far more visible in public life than in the past. The army and the liberation m o v e m e n t s have been integrated, and the police are learning progressive, c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d methods. Young people of all races are learning about each other at school, and the number of blacks with tertiary degrees or d i p l o m a s has massively expanded. T h e government has built many houses and clinics for the poor, and has brought safe water to thousands of households. E c o n o m i c sanctions belong to the past and South A f r i c a is again a valued m e m b e r of the international c o m m u n i t y (see Harber and L u d m a n , 1995). Despite the many criticisms of the Truth and Reconciliation C o m m i s s i o n , its emphasis on forgiveness in exchange f o r honesty about past misdeeds has offered a morally compelling alternative to the spectacle of show trials of those accused of atrocities under the old regime (see Meiring, 1999).

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Yet, m u c h r e m a i n s to be d o n e . A l l e g a t i o n s of p o l i c e b r u t a l i t y a n d a b u s e of black laborers by white f a r m e r s continue, black s t u d e n t s ' low pass r a t e s in h i g h s c h o o l s r e m a i n a m a j o r c o n c e r n , and e m i g r a t i o n by skilled y o u n g w h i t e s is s u b s t a n t i a l , as in the last y e a r s of a p a r t h e i d . P r e s i d e n t M b e k i himself has a c k n o w l e d g e d that official c o r r u p t i o n is a serious p r o b l e m , a n o t h e r u n h a p p y thread of c o n t i n u i t y with the a p a r t h e i d y e a r s . T h e state b u r e a u c r a c y r e m a i n s b l o a t e d and i n e f f i c i e n t , but it is d i f f i c u l t to imp l e m e n t lean g o v e r n m e n t while u n e m p l o y m e n t r e m a i n s so great a scourge. Vast n u m b e r s of the p o o r also still need h o u s i n g , and violent crime, a m o n g the m o s t prevalent in any society, breeds f e a r in all sections of the c o m m u nity and d i s c o u r a g e s critical i n v e s t m e n t . A I D S p o s e s a still g r e a t e r threat. B y early 2000, the m o s t c o n s e r v a t i v e f i g u r e s s h o w e d at least 10 p e r c e n t of the adult p o p u l a t i o n i n f e c t e d with the v i r u s c a r r y i n g this d e a d l y d i s e a s e . T h e rate of spread is a m o n g the highest in the world, w o r s e n e d by poverty a n d the social d i s l o c a t i o n of the recent past. Scientists and A I D S activists h a v e widely criticized the g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n s e to the crisis. If not c u r b e d , A I D S will w i p e out the g a i n s of r e c e n t y e a r s . T h e m i r a c l e of postapartheid South A f r i c a f a c e s a p r o f o u n d c h a l l e n g e on all these f r o n t s (Van N i e k e r k and L u d m a n , 1 9 9 9 : 4 - 8 , 4 1 - 4 4 , 1 0 6 - 1 0 8 , 2 7 5 - 2 7 6 ) .

•

CONCLUSION

Clearly, the difficulties involved in d i s m a n t l i n g the legacy of apartheid a n d c r e a t i n g a truly d e m o c r a t i c S o u t h A f r i c a r e m a i n f o r m i d a b l e . O v e r m o r e than 300 years, the " f o r w h i t e s o n l y " South A f r i c a n political s y s t e m , e c o n o m y , and racially and e t h n i c a l l y d i v i d e d society w e r e p a i n s t a k i n g l y c o n s t r u c t e d . Racial segregation, the e n c o u r a g e m e n t of black divisions, and white s u p r e m a c y were the c o u n t r y ' s f o u n d a t i o n s . Such an edifice c a n n o t be b r o k e n d o w n o v e r n i g h t , nor can the b i t t e r n e s s , h a t r e d s , a n d p r e j u d i c e s of so w a r p e d a social system be easily c h a n g e d . T h e r e are real questions, even in the current climate of r e f o r m and reco n c i l i a t i o n , c o n c e r n i n g w h e t h e r S o u t h A f r i c a can s u c c e s s f u l l y m a k e the transition not just to a nominal m a j o r i t y rule, but to a lasting d e m o c r a c y , respectful of South A f r i c a ' s diverse minorities and r e s p o n s i v e to the still impoverished black masses. T h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m poses an even greater challenge than constructing an acceptable political system. If the n e w gove r n m e n t c a n n o t deliver on its p r o m i s e s , South A f r i c a ' s d e m o c r a c y will fail in a sea of poverty, disease, h o m e l e s s n e s s , u n e m p l o y m e n t , and crime. A s this chapter has s h o w n , the p r o b l e m is not only that w h i t e s m o n o p o l i z e d political p o w e r f o r t h r e e c e n t u r i e s , but that they s e c u r e d a vastly d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e share of the c o u n t r y ' s w e a l t h . M o s t w h i t e s a c c e p t l o s i n g political control; they fear far m o r e what they must part with for the sake of e c o n o m i c justice. For historical reasons, the e c o n o m y still d e p e n d s heavily

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on their skills, capital, and e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p . W h i t e business leaders theref o r e c a u t i o n a g a i n s t r e d i s t r i b u t i v e s t r a t e g i e s that w o u l d o v e r b u r d e n an already narrow taxpayer base, encourage white emigration, and scare away f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t . In an i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m p e t i t i v e w o r l d , the l o w skills and productivity and e n d e m i c c r i m e and strikes that characterize

South

A f r i c a m a k e it l e s s a t t r a c t i v e t h a n m a n y o t h e r d e v e l o p i n g e c o n o m i e s . At the s a m e time, m a n y b l a c k s u n d e r s t a n d a b l y fear that white insistence on "minority rights" and " f r e e - m a r k e t capitalism" are thinly disguised efforts to retain white control over the e c o n o m y and land, which

would

m a k e it a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e t o i m p r o v e l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s f o r m o s t b l a c k s ( s e e P r i c e , 1 9 9 1 : 5 0 6 , 2 8 7 - 2 8 9 ) . B u t g i v e n t h e w o r l d w i d e c o l l a p s e of c o m m u n i s t e c o n o m i c s y s t e m s a n d the c o m p a r a t i v e s u c c e s s of m o r e

market-oriented

e m e r g i n g e c o n o m i e s , S o u t h A f r i c a c a n h a r d l y turn to the i n t r u s i v e c o l l e c t i v i s t e c o n o m i c s t h a t h a v e f a i l e d e l s e w h e r e . It is t h e s e a n d o t h e r i m p a s s e s that must be resolved before a prosperous, united, integrated, and therefore t r u l y d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y c a n e m e r g e f r o m t h e t r a g i c h i s t o r y of S o u t h A f r i c a .

•

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Nasson, Bill. 1999. The South African War, 1899-1902. New York: Oxford University Press. Nattrass, Nicoli. 1994. "Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy." African Affairs 93:343-359. N e w t o n - K i n g , Susan. 1999. Masters and Servants on the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1760-1803. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O ' M e a r a , Dan. 1996. Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party. 1948-1994. Athens: Ohio University Press. Omer-Cooper, J. D. 1966. The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa. London: Longman. . 1993. "Has the M f e c a n e a Future? A Response to the Cobbing Critique." Journal of Southern African Studies 19:273-294. O m o n d , Roger. 1986. The Apartheid Handbook: A Guide to South Africa's Everyday Racial Policies. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin. Pakenham, Thomas. 1979. The Boer War. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Peires, J. B. 1982. The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Plaatje, Sol. 1982. Native Life in South Africa: Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion. Johannesburg: Ravan. Platzky, Lauren, and Cherry 1 Walker. 1985. The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan. Posel, Deborah. 1991. The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise. Oxford: Clarendon Press. . 1999. "Whiteness and Power in the South African Civil Services: Paradoxes of the Apartheid State." Journal of Southern African Studies 2 5 : 9 9 120. Price, Robert M. 1991. The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rees, Mervyn. 1980. Muldergate: The Story of the Info Scandal. Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa. Reynolds. Andrew (ed.). 1994. Election '94 South Africa. New York: St. Martin's Press. . 1999. Election '99 South Africa. New York: St. Martin's Press. Rich, Paul. 1978. "Ministering to the White M a n ' s Needs: The Development of Urban Segregation in South Africa 1913-1923." African Studies 3 7 : 1 7 7 - 1 9 1 . Ross, Robert. 1980. "The Rule of Law at the Cape of Good Hope in the Eighteenth Century." Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 9 : 5 - 1 6 . Serfontein, J. H. P. 1978. Brotherhood of Power: An Exposé of the Secret Afrikaner Broederbond. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Shell, Robert. 1994. Children of Bondage: A Social History of the Slave Society at the Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1838. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Simons, Jack, and Ray Simons. 1983. Class and Colour in South Africa 18501950. London: International Defense and Aid Fund. Southall, Roger. 1994. "The South African Elections of 1994: Remaking a Dominant-Party State." Journal of Modern African Studies 3 2 : 6 2 9 - 6 5 5 . Strauss, Annette. 1993. "The 1992 Referendum in South A f r i c a . " Journal of Modern African Studies 3 1 : 3 3 9 - 3 6 0 . Stultz, Newell M. 1974. Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934-1948. Berkeley: University of California Press. . 1980. South Africa's Half Loaf: Race Separatism in South Africa. C a p e Town: David Philip.

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14 Trends and Prospects April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon

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n 1996, when the second edition of Understanding Contemporary Africa was published, we asked the question, " W h e r e does A f r i c a appear to be heading?" In formulating a response, we looked at some of Africa's achievements since independence. Especially noteworthy were gains in education, health care, and life expectancy. In the 1990s, we also observed the movement toward democracy and economic reforms after decades of authoritarianism and economic decline. Now that we are in a new century—indeed, a new m i l l e n n i u m — w e can look back to the recent past and into the near future and pose that question once again. We were cautiously optimistic in 1996 that A f r i c a was headed in the right direction. Many of A f r i c a ' s leaders were admitting their failures and the need for m a j o r reforms. With the active participation of ordinary people in a strong civil society, we felt that a dedicated leadership could build stable institutions suitable to A f r i c a n realities. This would be necessary if Africa was to successfully cope with such challenges as rapid population growth and urbanization, the AIDS crisis, environmental problems, violent conflict, and economic stagnation and debt. We also noted the need for external assistance. For decades during the colonial period, foreign powers exploited A f r i c a ' s wealth to advance their own. Since independence, not m u c h has c h a n g e d . With few exceptions, most African countries have remained impoverished exporters of raw materials to m o r e wealthy industrialized countries. A m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e between now and the colonial period is that rich countries exercise most of their control today as a result of massive A f r i c a n debt. This has allowed Western countries, through such international institutions as the World Bank and the IMF, to use e c o n o m i c and political conditionalities to limit the range of policy choices open to Africans. In reality then, aid has been a two-edged sword. While needed to promote development, aid has too often

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b e e n a tool to p r o m o t e i n d u s t r i a l n a t i o n s ' e c o n o m i c and f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , i n c l u d i n g s h o r i n g u p c o r r u p t but c o m p l i a n t a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e s . T h e r e h a v e b e e n h o p e f u l s i g n s that this w o u l d c h a n g e with the e n d of the C o l d War. A " p e a c e d i v i d e n d " c o u l d m a t e r i a l i z e f r o m cuts in m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g that w o u l d be r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d l i f t i n g c o u n t r i e s out of p o v e r t y and h o p e l e s s n e s s . In r e c e n t y e a r s , p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n s h a v e b e e n m o v i n g a w a y f r o m a r i g i d i m p o s i t i o n of s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t a n d t o an e m p h a s i s o n s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p o v e r t y r e d u c t i o n . T h e s e i s s u e s a r e d i s c u s s e d in t h e t e x t , b u t h e r e is w h a t t h e W o r l d B a n k s a i d in a r e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t r e p o r t : " P o v e r t y a m i d p l e n t y is t h e w o r l d ' s g r e a t e s t c h a l l e n g e . W e at t h e B a n k h a v e m a d e it o u r m i s s i o n to f i g h t p o v e r t y w i t h p a s s i o n a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m , p u t t i n g it at t h e c e n t e r of all t h e w o r k w e d o " ( W o r l d B a n k , 2001:v). In a n o t h e r r e c e n t p u b l i c a t i o n , the B a n k e m p h a s i z e s that d e v e l o p m e n t m u s t be m e a s u r e d in q u a l i t a t i v e not j u s t e c o n o m i c a l l y q u a n t i t a t i v e terms: D e v e l o p m e n t is a b o u t i m p r o v i n g the q u a l i t y of p e o p l e ' s l i v e s , e x p a n d i n g t h e i r a b i l i t y to s h a p e t h e i r o w n f u t u r e s . T h i s g e n e r a l l y c a l l s f o r h i g h e r p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e , but it i n v o l v e s m u c h m o r e . It i n v o l v e s m o r e e q u i t a b l e e d ucation and j o b opportunities. Greater gender equality. Better health and nutrition. A cleaner, more sustainable natural environment. A more impartial j u d i c i a l a n d l e g a l s y s t e m . B r o a d e r civil a n d p o l i t i c a l f r e e d o m s . A richer cultural life. (World Bank, 2000b:xxiii)

In a n s w e r to the q u e s t i o n p o s e d in t h e title of a r e c e n t B a n k r e p o r t , " C a n A f r i c a C l a i m the 21st C e n t u r y ? " t h e B a n k ' s a n s w e r is yes, A f r i c a c a n c l a i m the n e w c e n t u r y . But this is a q u a l i f i e d y e s , c o n d i t i o n a l o n A f r i c a ' s a b i l i t y — a i d e d by its d e v e l o p m e n t p a r t n e r s — t o o v e r c o m e the d e v e l o p m e n t traps that kept it c o n f i n e d to a v i c i o u s cycle of u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t , c o n f l i c t , a n d u n t o l d h u m a n s u f f e r i n g f o r m o s t the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ( W o r l d B a n k , 2000a:x). A c c o r d i n g to the r e p o r t , o v e r c o m i n g the " d e v e l o p m e n t t r a p s " of t h e past d e p e n d s on t h r e e f a c t o r s : i n c r e a s i n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d a c c o u n t a b l e g o v e r n m e n t , c h a n g i n g A f r i c a f r o m a C o l d W a r p a w n to a m a g n e t f o r t r a d e a n d i n v e s t m e n t , and u t i l i z i n g t h e b e n e f i t s of g l o b a l i z a t i o n a n d n e w c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t e c h n o l o g y to a c c e l e r a t e d e v e l o p m e n t ( W o r l d B a n k , 2000a:x). In o u r d i s c u s s i o n of t r e n d s a n d p r o s p e c t s f o r A f r i c a , w e h a v e c h o s e n to a d d r e s s not p o l i t i c s but t h e f o l l o w i n g d i m e n s i o n s of t h e i m p l i e d d e v e l o p m e n t a g e n d a in the B a n k ' s s t a t e m e n t s : p o v e r t y r e d u c t i o n , d e b t r e l i e f , trade and investment, aid, and i n f o r m a t i o n technology. Although we discuss t h e s e issues separately, e a c h is r e l a t e d to the overall goal of a c h i e v i n g sust a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t , not j u s t s h o r t - t e r m g r o w t h .

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POVERTY REDUCTION

A f t e r almost three d e c a d e s of economic decline in most of Africa, poverty is a severe and growing problem. In 1987, there were 217 million people in poverty; in 1998, the number had grown to 291 million. Africa's total income is little more than Belgium's. Along with South Asia, sub-Saharan A f r i c a has the highest poverty rates in the world. F r o m 1987 to 1998, we find no reduction in the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty—that is, on less that $1 per day—it remains at 46 percent. In A f r i c a ' s poorest countries, a staggering 6 0 - 8 0 percent are living on less than $1 per day. In the rest of the developing world, the population in extreme poverty has dropped from 28 to 24 percent. Similarly, in 1993, about 51 percent were living on less than one-third of the average consumption level for their countries. G h a n a , Uganda, and Mauritania were among the few countries showing a decline in poverty, but only G h a n a ' s poverty rate (at 29.4 percent) was below 40 percent (World Bank, 2000a: 18; 2001:7, 10, 2 3 - 2 5 ) . T h e prospects for alleviating poverty in the near future are not favorable. According to Bank estimates, Africa must increase its G D P by 5 percent a year just to prevent an increase in the n u m b e r of the poor. Only a few countries, such as Botswana, Mauritius, and Uganda, had growth this high in the 1990s. Current and projected e c o n o m i c growth rates are only 4 - 5 percent (World Bank, 2000a: 18). Other revealing economic statistics are G N P per capita and G N P growth rates between 1998 and 1999. Only sixteen sub-Saharan countries have G N P growth rates near or above 5 percent; the average for the region is only 2 percent. On a per capita basis, A f r i c a ' s income averaged only $500; only four of the sixteen high-growth countries were making this much or more. In other words, most of the countries growing the fastest are growing from a very low base. They will have to grow at this rate or better for many years to m a k e much of a dent in poverty (World Bank, 2 0 0 1 : 2 7 4 - 2 7 5 ) . High rates of poverty extend to the urban population. Over 40 percent of A f r i c a ' s urban dwellers live in poverty. Over half the urban population is poor in Ethiopia, G u i n e a - B i s s a u , Tanzania, Swaziland, and Z a m b i a . Such high rates of urban poverty do not bode well for political or economic stability (World Bank, 2000a:90). Despite these grim statistics, the Bank believes that the goal of reducing poverty in Africa is possible. A f t e r all, in the 1960s, South Korea had similar rates of poverty but is now a model of d e v e l o p m e n t as one of the w o r l d ' s most prosperous newly industrializing countries (NICs) (World Bank, 2000a: 12). A key point to remember is that East Asian countries like South Korea achieved their economic transformation in part through policies designed to reduce poverty and promote equity. Growth alone will not

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ensure that the benefits of growth reach the poor, as the Bank concedes (World Bank, 1997:25). Unfortunately, A f r i c a now rivals Latin A m e r i c a as the region of the world with the greatest inequality between the rich few and the poor (World Bank, 2000a: 10). Nigeria stands as a striking example of this inequality. In spite of its oil wealth, Nigeria is the thirteenth poorest country in the world, with a G N P per capita of only $310. Most of the oil revenues have ended up in the pockets of a small elite of influential businesspeople and politicians. A recent report revealed that Nigeria has six of the world's 100 richest people. All are politically influential. One of them, Harry Akande, is the seventh richest person in the world. Two of the six (Ibrahim B a b a n g i d a and Sani Abacha, now deceased) are f o r m e r generals w h o became presidents of the country as the result of coups (and then managed to get fabulously rich); another one, M o s h o o d Abiola, was a wealthy businessman w h o was elected president, was arrested and imprisoned by Abacha, and then died in jail. These men amassed so much wealth that they could pay off Nigeria's entire foreign debt of $33.5 billion ( " R i c h , " 2000). Inequality of this magnitude is worth pondering in light of the fact that more than 250 million Africans are without access to clean water and more than 200 million lack basic health care (World Bank, 2000a: 10).

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DEBT

A f r i c a is the most indebted region of the world and the most aid dependent (World Bank, 2000a:5), and its external debt has grown over the years. In 1980, external debt was $177 billion; in 1998, this swelled to $230 billion (World Bank, 2001:315). I M F officials tend to blame A f r i c a ' s political leaders for the debt problem. They point to poor m a n a g e m e n t of foreign borrowing and corruption as the main culprits. Although "external shocks," such as rising energy prices, are factors, as are unfavorable terms of trade, one IMF official observed that "African politicians often lived beyond their means, allowing high trade and budget deficits without encouraging savings to cushion their economies." Leaders make things worse by borrowing more money to service earlier debts. This in turn decreases f u n d s available for productive investment, the e c o n o m y slows, and debt servicing becomes even more difficult (Ligomeka, 2000). Z a m b i a provides a good example of the debilitating d o w n w a r d economic spiral associated with unsustainable debt. In 1999, Zambia, one of the world's poorest countries, paid $136 million to service its debt to foreign creditors. With 80 percent of its population living in poverty and with one of the world's highest HIV infection rates, debt servicing is the biggest item in the government's budget. That $136 million could have been spent addressing poverty and AIDS. Elsewhere in Africa, governments are forced

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to spend more on debt repayment than they do on the health and education of their people. E v e n then they may be unable to meet their debt obligations (Booker, 2000b). In Chapter 5, Virginia DeLancey discussed A f r i c a ' s debt problems and the measures suggested to manage them. Clearly, the prospects for many of A f r i c a ' s countries are dim unless they can begin investing more of their earnings in improving the lives of their people than in m a k i n g payments into perpetuity on debts they will never be able to repay. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative is one of the most recent proposals to ease the debt burden in the world's poorest countries. This is a goal consistent with the World B a n k ' s professed c o m m i t ment to poverty reduction, discussed above. So far, the HIPC Initiative appears to be a flawed response to the debt problem. Salih Booker, director of the Africa Policy Information Center, concludes: N e i t h e r the original nor the " e n h a n c e d " v e r s i o n o f the H I P C Initiative adopted at last y e a r ' s G - 7 s u m m i t has s u c c e e d e d in e a s i n g the debt burden o f i m p o v e r i s h e d c o u n t r i e s . In fact, the c o m p l e x i t i e s of the H I P C process, and the harsh structural adjustment programs that have a c c o m p a nied the intervention of international creditors, h a v e served to w o r s e n the debt crisis and h a m p e r the social and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t o f H I P C countries. ( B o o k e r , 2 0 0 0 b )

The international aid organization O x f a m has also been critical. It has called the debt relief package under the H I P C Initiative a " f r a u d . " Although Zambia's debt would be lowered somewhat, the interest it would be required to pay would actually increase from $136 million to $235 million in 2002. O x f a m figures also show that in six A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s — M a l i , Burkina Faso, Tanzania, M o z a m b i q u e , Zambia, and Malawi—debt servicing would be greater than spending on basic education even after the countries completed the debt relief program (Denny, 2000). These and other deficiencies of H I P C debt relief have led Kofi A n n a n , secretary-general of the UN, to conclude that it "does not provide an adequate response" to African debt problems and that "a bolder approach will have to be taken" (Booker, 2000b). For many critics of current debt relief, that bolder approach is to cancel these debts entirely. Salih B o o k e r ' s remarks capture these sentiments: A s A f r i c a ' s debt s e r v i c e o b l i g a t i o n s g r o w each year, and as A f r i c a ' s p e o ple are f o r c e d to repay these debts by m o r t g a g i n g their health, their education and their future, it is time to a c k n o w l e d g e that the c a n c e l l a t i o n of A f r i c a ' s debts represents the o n l y just solution. In a c o n t i n e n t w h e r e the l e g i t i m a c y o f m o s t external d e b t s is q u e s t i o n a b l e to b e g i n w i t h , w h e r e debt repayments have g r o w n exponentially, and where the current debt relief f r a m e w o r k has served o n l y creditors, A f r i c a has clearly paid e n o u g h already. (Booker, 2 0 0 0 b )

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Another group working toward debt cancellation in the world's poorest countries is Jubilee 2000, a coalition of religious and other civil society groups in over sixty-five countries. They report that the IMF agreed on December 1, 2000, to alter its HIPC program for Zambia, but not cancel the debt. Under new repayment terms, however, Zambia would still be forced to make payments (as high as $212 million in 2007) that exceed its spending on education ($70 million) and health ($76 million) (Jubilee 2000, 2000).

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TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Since the 1980s, most African countries have been subject to structural adjustment programs and other measures designed to integrate them more fully in the global capitalist economy. Under what has been called the Washington Consensus, African governments have been called upon to liberalize and open up their economies to more foreign investment and trade. A leader in this effort, the World Bank, has urged Africans to adopt an export-led development strategy. These exports would consist largely of primary products such as agricultural commodities, minerals, and fuels. There is no doubt that Africa needs more trade and investment. Since 1960, A f r i c a ' s share of world trade has dropped to less than 2 percent (World Bank, 2000a:8). This economic marginalization and the relationship it has to poverty are clear. The role of foreign investment is more controversial. The benefit of foreign investment is that it can bring with it much-needed technology, jobs, know-how, and management skills without adding to the debt burden. Unfortunately, despite the huge increase in global trade and investment, little of it has gone to Africa (or to most other less developed countries). Ten countries receive three-fourths of all private investment funds; none of them is in Africa (French, 1998:150-151, 155). In Africa, what foreign investment there is has gone largely toward natural resource extraction, such as oil drilling, farming, logging, and mining. Africa is a treasure house of mineral riches, most of them untapped; it is not surprising that in nineteen African countries, half the exports and a third of tax revenues come from mining (Dunn, 1998). Whereas overall foreign investment was stagnant during the 1990s, spending on exploration for nonferrous minerals tripled between 1994 and 1997 (French, 1998:155). It is likely that such investment will continue to dominate in Africa but with dubious benefits for ordinary Africans. For one, as Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999:121) point out, "Open borders and the export of primary products have not led to sustained development anywhere in the world." Even the World Bank admits that the outlook for Africa's main exports are problematic due to declining demand, growing competition, and

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falling prices (Brown, 1997:194). Another problem is that reliance on extractive industries often takes a severe environmental toll. Moreover, research shows that countries exploiting natural resources for development on average perform worse economically than others. This is due partly to the fact that such industries have few links to the rest of the economy and create relatively few jobs. A better option might be "bioprospecting," such as j o i n t ventures with drug and seed c o m p a n i e s to create new products. This would provide incentives to protect biodiversity, m a k e use of local k n o w l e d g e (especially w o m e n ' s ) , and encourage environmentally sustainable development. Ecotourism utilizing domestic investment is another option (French, 1998:155, 160-167). T h e United States has been a m a j o r architect of current efforts to impose market-oriented reforms on Africa, but it has often been hypocritical. W h i l e requiring weak A f r i c a n countries to open their borders to foreign firms (which can lead to the demise of local infant industries; see Riddell, 1990), the United States and its Western G - 7 allies all use protectionist measures to limit access to their own markets. T h e United States also has made little investment in Africa. In 1999, only 3 percent of its $46 billion foreign direct investment was in Africa. Despite S A D C ' s efforts to court U.S. investment by promoting a favorable investment climate, only three of the top 100 U.S. companies planning overseas investment were looking at S A D C countries for potential investment ("U.S. Pays," 2000). Of potential benefit to A f r i c a is the A f r i c a G r o w t h and Opportunity Act, passed on May 18, 2000. Signed into law by President Bill Clinton, the law calls for increased trade and investment in Africa. On the d o w n side, it includes numerous e c o n o m i c and political conditionalities that could limit its benefits, and A f r i c a n s in turn must open their borders to U.S. firms ("Africa," 1997; Trade Information Center, 2000). Perhaps the greatest question about the advisability of c o n f o r m i n g to the Washington Consensus is whether it will produce the poverty reduction and sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t the World Bank professes as its goals. As William Minter points out, a prosperous and stable Africa requires a mix of public and private investment to promote sustainable and equitable growth. It must also build a more diversified economy, one that ends d e p e n d e n c e on raw materials exports. Production needs to be geared for local and regional consumption, not just for overseas export markets, and there should be support for local entrepreneurs, businesses, and investment in human capital (health care, clean water, education) and infrastructure (electricity, ports, roads) (Minter, 2000:203). It is questionable whether current policies espoused by the West—the United States and the World Bank in particular—are conducive to these ends. Perhaps more promising is the approach of China. At the first ChinaAfrican Cooperation Forum in Beijing in October 2000, China announced it was canceling $1.2 billion in A f r i c a n debt over the next two years in

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o r d e r to a l l e v i a t e p o v e r t y a n d p r o m o t e d e v e l o p m e n t . C h i n e s e c o m p a n i e s are b e i n g e n c o u r a g e d to i n v e s t m o r e in A f r i c a , and C h i n a is s e t t i n g u p an A f r i c a n H u m a n R e s o u r c e s D e v e l o p m e n t f u n d to " t r a i n p r o f e s s i o n a l tale n t s . " C h i n a also p l a n s to e x p a n d its a s s i s t a n c e to A f r i c a in o t h e r w a y s as its e c o n o m y g r o w s ( " C h i n a , " 2 0 0 0 ) .

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AID

A l t h o u g h the World B a n k is c o n v i n c e d that S A P s h a v e p r o d u c e d p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s , t h e y a d m i t that m o s t c o u n t r i e s h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d little or n o growth after undergoing structural adjustment (World Bank, 2 0 0 1 : 6 7 - 6 9 , 1 8 9 - 1 9 3 ) . T h e y a l s o a c k n o w l e d g e that the m a r k e t a l o n e will not p r o d u c e d e v e l o p m e n t ; t h e r e f o r e , a l o n g w i t h an e f f e c t i v e state, t h e B a n k c a l l s f o r m o r e aid f r o m t h e d o n o r c o m m u n i t y . In r e c e n t y e a r s , h o w e v e r , aid t o A f r i c a has actually d e c l i n e d r e l a t i v e to the G N P of d o n o r c o u n t r i e s ( W o r l d B a n k , 2 0 0 1 : 1 8 9 - 1 9 1 ) . A l t h o u g h the U.S. e c o n o m y w a s b o o m i n g , U.S. d e v e l o p m e n t a s s i s t a n c e to A f r i c a d r o p p e d f r o m $ 8 2 6 m i l l i o n in 1991 to $ 6 8 9 m i l l i o n in 1997. F o r 2 0 0 0 , o n l y $ 3 0 5 million in aid w a s r e q u e s t e d f o r the e c o n o m y a n d p r o g r a m s f o r c h i l d r e n , p l u s $ 5 1 3 m i l l i o n f o r the D e v e l o p m e n t F u n d f o r A f r i c a ( M i n t e r , 2 0 0 0 : 2 0 1 - 2 0 3 ) . U.S. aid per c a p i t a in 1998 w a s o n l y $ 1 9 c o m p a r e d to $ 3 2 in 1990 (World B a n k , 2 0 0 0 a : 2 3 6 - 2 3 7 ) . W h e t h e r aid will be i n c r e a s e d a n d r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d d e v e l o p m e n t a l e n d s (as o p p o s e d to political e n d s as in the past) is critical to A f r i c a ' s f u t u r e . A s the B a n k notes, with e f f e c t i v e regional c o o p e r a t i o n and d o n o r s u p p o r t in a " c o o r d i n a t e d , l o n g - t e r m p a r t n e r s h i p , . . . A f r i c a could solve its h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t crisis in o n e g e n e r a t i o n " (World B a n k . 2 0 0 0 a : 3 ) . T h e r e are t w o n o t e w o r t h y m o v e m e n t s in this d i r e c t i o n . O n e is the Int e r n a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t G o a l s f o r the 21st C e n t u r y , a d o p t e d by the g l o b a l development community and many developing country governments. This a g r e e m e n t sets t a r g e t s f o r " p o v e r t y r e d u c t i o n , e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h , g e n d e r equality, and e n v i r o n m e n t a l sustainability by 2 0 1 5 . " O n e goal is to r e d u c e absolute p o v e r t y by cutting in half the n u m b e r of people living on less than $1 p e r d a y ( W o r l d B a n k , 2 0 0 0 a : 15). T h e r e is r o o m f o r d o u b t w h e t h e r t h e G e o r g e W. B u s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n will c o m m i t to any s u c h a m b i t i o u s p r o g r a m of a s s i s t a n c e to A f r i c a . D u r i n g his c a m p a i g n f o r t h e p r e s i d e n c y in 2 0 0 0 , B u s h i n d i c a t e d that A f r i c a w o u l d not be a high priority in his a d m i n istration. B u s h ' s A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n foreign a f f a i r s a p p o i n t e e s , C o l i n P o w e l l a n d C o n d o l e z z a R i c e , a p p e a r to h a v e little interest in A f r i c a n i s s u e s a n d , f r o m all i n d i c a t i o n s , they s u b s c r i b e to traditional c o n c e p t s of U . S . n a t i o n a l interest. T h e s e d o not i n c l u d e s u c h c o m p l i c a t e d i n t a n g i b l e s as s u s t a i n a b l e d e v e l o p m e n t , h u m a n rights, A I D S p r e v e n t i o n , or i n t e r v e n t i o n in g e n o c i d a l c o n f l i c t s (see B o o k e r , 2 0 0 0 b ) . O n l y t i m e will tell if t h e s e early a s s e s s m e n t s are a c c u r a t e .

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Another program of interest is the Millennium A f r i c a Recovery Plan. Although still being developed in 2001, the plan has the support of the United States, the European Union, and Japan. It is being prepared by South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria—three of A f r i c a ' s biggest economies. The goals are to link previously "uncoordinated efforts to promote foreign investment, trade concessions and further flows of aid for Africa and to push for more debt relief." African governments would have to demonstrate support for peace and democracy and fight corruption in order to benefit f r o m the plan. Significantly, these conditionalities are being imposed by Africans themselves, not by outsiders ("Ambitious," 2000; BBC, 2001).

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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

A m o n g the many areas in which A f r i c a lags behind the rest of the world is c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and information infrastructure and technology. While most of the world is traveling "the information superhighway," most Africans do not even have telephones. Only 2 percent of the world's telephones are in Africa. In Mali, Niger, and the D e m o c r a t i c Republic of Congo, there is only one phone line for every 1,000 people (World Bank, 2000a: 154). Even public phones are relatively hard to find in Africa; there is one public phone per 17,000 people in Africa compared to one per 600 in the world and one per 200 in rich countries. As for Internet access, Africa has only 1.5 million Internet users (out of a population of over 780 million). Two-thirds of those are in just one country—South Africa. In North America and Europe, one of every four people are Internet users; the global average is one of thirty-eight. In Africa, the rate is one out of 1,500 people, and most users are white (South African) males who are well educated and associated with N G O s , private companies, or universities (Jensen, 2000:215, 218). In other words, in an increasingly globalized world, the masses of black Africans have never been more isolated than they are today. The information gap could further relegate Africa to the margins of the global e c o n o m y and to nearly p e r m a n e n t b a c k w a r d n e s s . However, some analysts propose that Africa's late start may end up being an advantage. It can bypass increasingly outdated c o m m u n i c a t i o n s infrastructural investments and adopt the latest t e c h n o l o g i e s — w i t h potentially e n o r m o u s economic, social, and political benefits. One trend is that some countries, such as Botswana and Rwanda, are installing the most advanced digital and fiber optic technologies, bypassing the old telephone line infrastructure found in industrialized countries. As a result, Botswana and Rwanda have among the most advanced communications networks in the world: 100 percent of their mainlines are digital. In the rest of A f r i c a , 69 percent of t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s lines are digital, which is close to the world average of 79 percent. Mobile cell phones are

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also growing rapidly. Whereas only six countries had cell phones in the early 1990s, forty-two countries did by 2000 (there are 2 million cell phone users in South Africa alone) (World Bank, 2000a: 154-155; Jensen, 2000:218). Internet use, while small, is growing rapidly. In 1995, only four countries were on the Internet versus fifty in 1999. Access tends to be confined to capital cities, but Internet kiosks, cybercafés, and other public access points are b e c o m i n g more and more c o m m o n (for example, in hotels and business centers). Even in small towns, many public phone shops are adding Internet access (World Bank, 2000a: 155-156). These new technologies will not be enough by themselves to transform the African continent, but the impact is likely to be as revolutionary there as it is proving to be in other parts of the world. A m o n g the likely benefits are new opportunities for education; information sharing; and marketing A f r i c a n products, services, and newspapers and magazines. N e w s p a p e r s and m a g a z i n e s f r o m over forty A f r i c a n countries are currently published on the Internet. African governments also have websites, which can make access to government offices and services more available than ever before. These sites also provide opportunities for countries to promote tourism and business opportunities, which could be a boon to trade and investment (World Bank, 2000a: 156-158; Woodward, 2000). This can benefit smaller A f r i c a n entrepreneurs and craftspeople, not just big formal sector firms. For instance, a West A f r i c a n w o m e n ' s cooperative is reported to have a website to help its 7,350 m e m b e r s market their products, monitor export markets, and negotiate prices with overseas buyers (Jensen, 2000:218). Could i n f o r m a t i o n - a g e technology help to m o v e Africa away f r o m economic dependence on primary products? Rwanda thinks so. It is hoping to m o v e directly into the new knowledge-based service sector e c o n o m y and thinks this is possible within twenty years. Rwandan officials believe R w a n d a could be the " D u b a i of east Africa, providing low-cost o f f s h o r e banking, data entry, and insurance services for small and m e d i u m sized businesses in Europe at a third of the cost" (Woodward, 2000). Educational opportunities are perhaps among the greatest benefits new c o m m u n i c a t i o n s technologies m a k e possible. As budgets for schools, libraries, and teachers are being slashed due to fiscal constraints, satellite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and the Internet can make classroom instruction, library material, and other educational resources available from the most advanced countries in the world. The World Bank is now offering courses and, soon, degrees in c o m p u t e r science, c o m p u t e r engineering, and electrical engineering through the A f r i c a n Virtual University project. Currently twentyfour African universities are linked to overseas classrooms and libraries via satellite (Jensen, 2000:216). Great Britain is assisting R w a n d a ' s educational system through the I m f u n d o project. In 2001, it will help the country's educational institutions link up with each other and with government o f f i c e s . C o m p u t e r and Internet training will be provided to teachers, and

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courses will be developed at teacher training institutions. This and other educational programs are geared to a rapid increase in computer literacy in a country where most people have never seen a c o m p u t e r (Woodward, 2000). Such programs are in their infancy and should be a supplement, not a replacement, f o r A f r i c a n educational institutions. Still, these and other educational links b e t w e e n A f r i c a and the rest of the world will undoubtedly m u s h r o o m in the years ahead and can promote greater cooperation and interchange of ideas to the benefit of all. In conclusion, Africa in the early years of the twenty-first century continues to struggle with many of the same problems it had in the twentieth century. The road ahead will remain difficult, and significant progress is likely to remain elusive for most countries—and most of Africa's people— for decades to come. Just as some countries manage to solve their conflicts (as Eritrea and Ethiopia appear to be doing), other states may yet collapse or a military conflict may break out somewhere else. Most African economies will continue to limp along, although some—and we hope more—will make great strides with a more favorable mix of good leadership, popular participation, and enlightened support f r o m the international community. All in all, progress in A f r i c a is likely to be incremental, with reversals to be sure, but it will come.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Africa: U.S. Economic Proposals (Commentary)." 1997. Online at http://www. africapolicy.org (September 9). "Ambitious Plan to Pull Africa Out of Mire." 2000. Daily Mail and Guardian (South Africa). Online at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/za/business.html (November 27). BBC (British Broadcasting Company). 2001. "Africa's Millennium Plan." Online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid/stm (January 23). Booker. Salih. 2000a. "The Coming Apathy: Africa Policy Under a Bush Administration." Online at http://www.africapolicy.org (December 13). . 2000b. "The Myth of HIPC Debt Relief." Daily Mail and Guardian (South Africa). Online at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/za/archive.html (December 12). Brown, Robert S. 1997. "Alternative Policy Frameworks for African Development in the 1990s." Pp. 186-195 in Robert O. Collins (ed.). Problems in the History of Modern Africa. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers. Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford: James Currey. "China to Cancel $1.2 Billion of Africa Debt." 2000. Daily Mail and Guardian (South Africa). Online at http://www.mg.co.za/za/business.html (October 11). Denny, Charlotte. 2000. "Debt Relief Leaves Africa Worse Off." Daily Mail and Guardian (South Africa). Online at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/za.html (August 29). Dunn. Kate. 1998. "The Loaded Continent." Christian Science Monitor (March 25): 10-11. French, Hilary F. 1998. "Assessing Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries." Pp. 1 4 9 - 1 6 7 in Lester R. Brown et al. State of the World. N e w York: W. W. Norton.

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J e n s e n , Mike. 2 0 0 0 . " M a k i n g the C o n n e c t i o n : A f r i c a and the Internet." Curent History 99 ( M a y ) : 2 1 5 - 2 2 0 . Jubilee 2 0 0 0 Coalition. 2000. " I M F Alters Z a m b i a ' s Payment Schedules but lails to Cancel M o r e D e b t . " O n l i n e at h t t p : / / w w w . j u b i l e e 2 0 0 0 u k . o r g ( D e c e n b e r 12). L i g o m e k a , Brian. 2000. " A f r i c a ' s Debt Due to Bad M a n a g e m e n t . " Daily Mail md Guardian (South Africa). Online at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/za/business/ltml ( D e c e m b e r 13). Minter, William. 2 0 0 0 . " A m e r i c a and Africa: Beyond the D o u b l e S t a n d a r d . " Current History 99 ( M a y ) : 2 0 0 - 2 1 0 . "Rich Men, Poor M e n in Nigeria." 2000. Daily Mail and Guardian (South A f r b a ) . Available online at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/za/news.html (December 20). Riddell, Roger (ed.). 1990. Manufacturing Africa. London: J a m e s Currey. Trade Information Center (U.S. Department of C o m m e r c e ) . 2000. " A f r i c a ' s Grcwth and O p p o r t u n i t y Act of 2 0 0 0 . " Online at h t t p : / / w w w . t r a d e i n f o . d o c . g o v (Dec e m b e r 13). " U . S . Pays Lip Service to A f r i c a I n v e s t m e n t . " 2 0 0 0 . Daily Mail and Guarcian (South A f r i c a ) . Online at h t t p : / / w w w . m g . c o . z a / m g / z a / b u s i n e s s . h t m l (Octtber

11). W o o d w a r d , Will. 2 0 0 0 . "Net Brings New H o p e to R w a n d a . " Daily Mail md Guardian (South A f r i c a ) . O n l i n e at h t t p : / / w w w . m g . c o . z a / p c / 2 0 0 0 / 1 2 / 1 5 2_ r w a n d a w e b . h t m ( D e c e m b e r 13). World Bank. 1997. World Development Report 1997. New York: Oxford Univenity Press. . 2000a. Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? Washington, DC: World Baik. . 2000b. The Quality of Growth. New York: Oxford University Press. . 2001. World Development Report 2000/2001. New York: O x f o r d University Press.

Acronyms

ACM ACRIN AEC AIDS ANC APPER AZAPO CFA CITES CODESA COSATU CP DRC EAC EC ECA ECCAS ECOWAS ESF EU FAL FGM FRELIMO GDI GDP GEM GNP HDI HIPC HIV ICASA IFP

African C o m m o n Market African Crisis Response Initiative African Economic Commission acquired immune deficiency syndrome African National Congress Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery Azanian People's Organization Communauté Financière Africaine Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species Convention for a Democratic South Africa Congress of South African Trade Unions Conservative Party (South Africa) Democratic Republic of Congo East African Community European Community Economic Commission for Africa Economic Community of Central African States Economic Community of West African States Economic Support Funds European Union Final Act of Lagos female genital mutilation Frente de Libertaçào de Moçambique Gender-Related Development Index gross domestic product Gender Empowerment Measure gross national product Human Development Index Heavily Indebted Poor Countries human immunodeficiency virus International Conference on AIDS and STDs in Africa Inkatha Freedom Party 421

422 IGADD ILO IMF ITCZ LDC LPA MNC MOSOP MPLA NACTU NAFTA NCNC NCSW NGO NIC NLTPS NP NPC OAU OB ODA OEDA OPEC PAC PFP PTA RPF SADCC/SADC

SANNC SAP SD SSA STD UAM UDF UGC UNAIDS UNDP UNECA UNEP

Acronyms Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development International Labour Organisation International Monetary Fund Intertropical Convergence Zone less developed country Lagos Plan of Action multinational corporation Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People Movimento Popular de Libertagao de Angola National African Confederation of Trade Unions North American Free Trade Agreement National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons National Committee on the Status of Women (Kenya) nongovernmental organization newly industrializing country national long-term perspective study National Party (South Africa) Northern People's Congress Organization of African Unity Ossewabrandwag (Ox-Wagon Guard) Official Development Assistance United Nations Office of Emergency Operations in Africa Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Pan-Africanist Congress Progressive Federal Party (South Africa) preferential trade area Rwandan Patriotic Front Southern African Development Coordination Conference. Now Southern African Development Community South African Natives National Congress structural adjustment program sustainable development sub-Saharan Africa sexually transmitted disease Union of the Arab Maghreb United Democratic Front General Union of Cooperatives (Mozambique) Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS United Nations Development Programme United Nations Economic Commission for Africa United Nations Environmental Programme

Acronyms UNESCO UNFPA UNHCR UNICEF UN-NADAF UNPAAERD UPC USAID WCED WHO WID ZANU-PF

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United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization United Nations Fund for Population Activities United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund UN New Agenda for the Development of Africa United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development Union des Populations Camerounaises U.S. Agency for International Development World Commission on Environment and Development World Health Organization Women in Development Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front

Glossary African Economic Community: a proposed integration of all the economies on the African continent by 2025. The idea was put forth at the Organization of African Unity ( O A U ) meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1991. African Independent Churches: term applied to a diverse range of Christian d e n o m i n a t i o n s in Africa that themselves are not part of either the Catholic church or any m a j o r Western Protestant organizational structure. As a group, these d e n o m i n a t i o n s generally incorporate A f r i c a n ceremonies, icons, and holy sites and often involve charismatic expressions of faith. A few have also had messianic leaders (people who claim to be the Second Coming of Jesus Christ). These churches have grown especially fast in southern Africa. African Traditional Religions: a very general term given to indigenous African religious practices that predate the arrival of either Christianity or Islam in their respective areas of the continent. Most of these sets of religious practices are characterized by belief in one supreme being, belief in spirits, belief in life after death, the establishment of sacred places, plants, and/or animals, and belief in the existence of witchcraft and magic. Since the arrival of Christianity and Islam, many African Traditional Religions have blended with those faiths. Afro-Asiatic language family: one of the four m a j o r families of A f r i c a n languages. This includes mainly the Semitic languages of the North African states, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Anglo-Boer Wars: the two wars in South A f r i c a between the British and the A f r i k a n e r s . The First A n g l o - B o e r War (the word " B o e r " means " f a r m e r " in the A f r i k a a n s language) was fought in 1880 and 1881, when the A f r i k a n e r s defeated the British and reasserted control over the Transvaal region of northern South Africa. The Second Anglo-Boer War ( 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 0 2 ) was a British victory, and finally gave Great Britain total political control of all of modern-day South Africa. This war saw the killing of many A f r i k a n e r civilians, including at least 20,000 who 425

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died of disease in c o n c e n t r a t i o n c a m p s established by the British in res p o n s e to the A f r i k a n e r t e c h n i q u e of g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e . M u c h of the m o d e r n - d a y hostility b e t w e e n E n g l i s h - and A f r i k a a n s - s p e a k i n g white S o u t h A f r i c a n s can be traced to these wars. See Boers. Apartheid: A f r i k a a n s w o r d that m e a n s " a p a r t n e s s . " This is the n a m e given to the system of racial segregation and white superiority put into place in S o u t h A f r i c a in 1948. In that year, the largely A f r i k a n e r N a t i o n a l Party w o n a w h i t e s - o n l y election, o u s t i n g the pro-British g o v e r n m e n t at the ballot box. T h e apartheid s y s t e m , which was largely u n m o d i f i e d until 1990, r e q u i r e d b l a c k s , whites, m i x e d - r a c e people, and p e o p l e of A s i a n d e s c e n t to live in s e p a r a t e areas, attend s e p a r a t e s c h o o l s , and use s e p a r a t e p u b l i c a m e n i t i e s . A p a r t h e i d also b a n n e d n o n w h i t e s f r o m voting and required b l a c k s to seek g o v e r n m e n t a l permission to live in u r b a n areas a n d h o l d u r b a n j o b s . Further, all of S o u t h A f r i c a ' s rural areas were racially s e g r e g a t e d , with whites given control of 83 percent of S o u t h A f r i c a ' s f a r m l a n d . T h e a p a r t h e i d s y s t e m also b a n n e d interracial marriage and intimate contact, a m o n g m a n y other restrictions on public contact b e t w e e n the races and f r e e d o m of expression and m o v e m e n t . See Boers. Authoritarianism: the political o p p o s i t e of d e m o c r a c y . A u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m is a general m e a n s of g o v e r n i n g that d o e s not allow m e a n i n g f u l c h o i c e s in e l e c t i o n s and u s u a l l y restricts p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m s of m o v e m e n t , speech, and assembly. Authoritarian g o v e r n m e n t s may be military gove r n m e n t s , o n e - p e r s o n dictatorships, o n e - p a r t y systems, or m o n a r c h i e s . S h o r t l y a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e in the era of the late 1950s t h r o u g h the 1960s, m o s t A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s w e r e a u t h o r i t a r i a n in n a t u r e . See Personal rule. Bantu language family: o n e of the f o u r m a j o r f a m i l i e s of A f r i c a n languages, also k n o w n as the N i g e r - C o n g o language family a f t e r its birthp l a c e in West A f r i c a . T h i s is by far the largest set of A f r i c a n lang u a g e s , s p o k e n by the g r e a t m a j o r i t y of p e o p l e in all r e g i o n s of the A f r i c a n continent. See Niger-Congo language family. Bantu migrations: m o v e m e n t s of p e o p l e starting about 2 , 5 0 0 years ago w h e n p o p u l a t i o n p r e s s u r e s in West A f r i c a b e g a n to f o r c e p e o p l e to s l o w l y s p r e a d e a s t w a r d a n d u l t i m a t e l y s o u t h w a r d all a c r o s s the subS a h a r a n region of A f r i c a . T h e s e largely agricultural p e o p l e had develo p e d iron spears, a r r o w s , h o e s , s c y t h e s , and axes. A s a result, the B a n t u m i g r a t i o n s , w h i c h had r e a c h e d all the way to the southern tip of A f r i c a by at least 1,000 y e a r s a g o , s p r e a d a g r i c u l t u r e , iron tools, and the B a n t u l a n g u a g e f a m i l y a c r o s s the vast e x p a n s e of the A f r i c a n

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c o n t i n e n t . Today, the m a j o r i t y of A f r i c a n s are d e s c e n d a n t s of the Bantu migrations. See Bantu language family. Berg Report: the colloquial n a m e for the 1981 World Bank Report Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action. Written u n d e r the s u p e r v i s i o n of e c o n o m i s t Elliot Berg, this d o c u m e n t c a l l e d for the d o u b l i n g of f o r e i g n aid to A f r i c a . M o r e i m p o r t a n t , it called for A f r i c a n n a t i o n s to p u r s u e their " c o m p a r a t i v e a d v a n t a g e " in the world capitalist m a r k e t , that is, the e x p o r t of raw c o m m o d i t i e s . M a n y A f r i c a n s and their g o v e r n m e n t s f o u n d t h e s e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s u n a c c e p t a b l e in light of their desire to industrialize and export v a l u e a d d e d s e c o n d a r y c o m m o d i t i e s (e.g., the e x p o r t of c o t t o n is a p r i m a r y c o m m o d i t y export; the p r o d u c t i o n of textiles is a s e c o n d a r y c o m m o d ity export). The Berg Report also r e c o m m e n d e d that the private sector b e c o m e more involved in A f r i c a n e c o n o m i e s and that the public sector take on a more " e f f i c i e n t " (reduced) e c o n o m i c role. Berlin Conference: a m e e t i n g held in 1884 and 1885 in the G e r m a n capital at which the m a j o r E u r o p e a n p o w e r s with colonial territories in A f r i c a (Britain, France, G e r m a n y , Portugal, Spain, and Italy) agreed on a partitioning of the c o n t i n e n t into imperial s p h e r e s of i n f l u e n c e . T h e current A f r i c a n m a p is a direct result of the B e r l i n C o n f e r e n c e , w h o s e p a r t i c i p a n t s d r e w these colonial b o u n d a r i e s with little k n o w l e d g e of and little interest in creating ethnically h o m o g e n e o u s territories. T h u s , m a n y of t o d a y ' s A f r i c a n n a t i o n s h a v e b o u n d a r i e s that split ethnic g r o u p s between t w o or even several nations. Boers: A f r i k a a n s word m e a n i n g " f a r m e r s , " a n o t h e r n a m e for the A f r i k a n e r p e o p l e of South A f r i c a , w h o are mainly d e s c e n d a n t s of Dutch, F r e n c h , and G e r m a n settlers w h o c a m e to South A f r i c a in the s e v e n t e e n t h and eighteenth centuries. See Anglo-Boer Wars and Apartheid. Bourgeoisie: French w o r d f o r " t h e m i d d l e c l a s s . " T r a d i t i o n a l l y , M a r x i s t s and o t h e r social scientists h a v e used the t e r m to m e a n s h o p k e e p e r s , p r o f e s s i o n a l s ( d o c t o r s , t e a c h e r s , l a w y e r s , etc.), c l e r k s , s m a l l - a n d m e d i u m - s c a l e f a r m e r s , and s m a l l - s c a l e capitalists. S o m e s c h o l a r s , on the other hand, use the term as a general r e f e r e n c e to a n a t i o n ' s elites. Bridewealth: the w i d e s p r e a d traditional p r a c t i c e of a h u s b a n d ' s f a m i l y c o m p e n s a t i n g a w i f e ' s f a m i l y with cattle or m o n e y w h e n a m a r r i a g e takes place. The theory b e h i n d the p a y m e n t of b r i d e w e a l t h by the husb a n d ' s f a m i l y is that the w i f e ' s f a m i l y n e e d s to be c o m p e n s a t e d in s o m e way for the fertility of their daughter. O n l y w h e n b r i d e w e a l t h is paid is a marriage c o n s i d e r e d legitimate. Note h o w this is the o p p o s i t e

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of the H i n d u d o w r y , w h e r e b y the d a u g h t e r ' s f a m i l y p a y s the s o n ' s family to m a r r y the w o m a n . Carrying capacity: a term used by g e o g r a p h e r s and other students of natural r e s o u r c e s to r e f e r to the ability of an e c o s y s t e m to support a certain c o n c e n t r a t i o n of animal life. For e x a m p l e , a pastureland is said to h a v e e x c e e d e d its c a r r y i n g capacity w h e n t o o m a n y cattle graze there a n d the grass is e a t e n u p f a s t e r than it c a n be r e p l e n i s h e d . Further, both rural and urban areas are a s s u m e d to have carrying capacities for a certain n u m b e r of h u m a n s , and if this quantity is e x c e e d e d , the area will soon be u n a b l e to support h u m a n life. Clientelism: also k n o w n as " p a t r o n - c l i e n t n e t w o r k s . " C l i e n t e l i s m is a pattern of social i n t e r a c t i o n s in w h i c h a p o w e r f u l " p a t r o n " d i s t r i b u t e s e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l , a n d / o r social f a v o r s to a g r o u p of s u b o r d i n a t e " c l i e n t s . " T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p , h o w e v e r , is a t w o - w a y street, since if a p a t r o n is t o o h a r s h on his or her c l i e n t s , or d o e s not p r o v i d e e n o u g h b e n e f i t s in e x c h a n g e f o r the c l i e n t s ' s u p p o r t , those p e o p l e will seek a p a t r o n e l s e w h e r e , t h u s u n d e r c u t t i n g the ability of the original patron to wield p o w e r by p a s s i n g out f a v o r s . N o t e that s i n c e the p a s s i n g of f a v o r s and a c q u i e s c e n c e b e t w e e n p a t r o n a n d client is a t w o - w a y r e l a t i o n s h i p , this is not the s a m e p h e n o m e n o n as d i c t a t o r s h i p or despotism. Coup d'état: the c h a n g i n g of a g o v e r n m e n t t h r o u g h m e a n s o u t s i d e the electoral p r o c e s s . T h i s g o v e r n m e n t o v e r t h r o w m a n y be either violent (a " b l o o d y " c o u p ) or p e a c e f u l (a " b l o o d l e s s " coup). Dependency: term g i v e n to a relatively loose set of e x p l a n a t i o n s for distorted capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t in Asia, A f r i c a , and Latin A m e r i c a . T h e D e p e n d e n c y S c h o o l was an influential m o v e m e n t in political e c o n o m y studies in the 1970s, p a r t i c u l a r l y a m o n g s c h o l a r s of Latin A m e r i c a . A c c o r d i n g to dependencistas, the world capitalist e c o n o m y is divided into a " c o r e " of leading capitalist states (the United States, France, the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , etc.) and a " p e r i p h e r y " of d e p e n d e n t client states (Brazil, Chile, N i g e r i a , etc.). T h e e c o n o m i e s of these p e r i p h e r y states are m a i n l y s e r v i n g as s o u r c e s of raw m a t e r i a l s and c h e a p labor f o r w o r l d w i d e capitalist industry, with the c o o p e r a t i o n of local elites in the p e r i p h e r y n a t i o n s w h o r e c e i v e political and e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s f r o m e x p l o i t i n g local labor and natural r e s o u r c e s . T h i s , a c c o r d i n g to the D e p e n d e n c y S c h o o l , is w h y i n d e p e n d e n t i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n has rem a i n e d illusory in the d e v e l o p i n g w o r l d . Critics of the d e p e n d e n c y p e r s p e c t i v e r e s p o n d that this t h e o r y c a n n o t e x p l a i n w h y n a t i o n s such as T a i w a n , S o u t h K o r e a , S i n g a p o r e , and ( m o r e r e c e n t l y ) Chile a n d

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A r g e n t i n a have developed large industrial and technological sectors that rival the best e c o n o m i c outputs the " m e t r o p o l e " nations have to offer. See Metropole and Neocolonialism. East African Community: attempt in the 1970s by the governments of K e n y a , Tanzania, and U g a n d a to form a regional e c o n o m i c union a m o n g their three nations, with the ultimate aim of having a c o m m o n currency, c o m m o n international trade policies, and no tariffs on each o t h e r ' s goods. This attempt at regional economic integration failed because of political tensions between the three nations caused largely by the e c o n o m i c d o m i n a n c e of Kenya as c o m p a r e d to the relatively weaker economies of Uganda and Tanzania. A new East African community was formed in 1999. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): attempt of several nations in West Africa to establish regional economic cooperation. Unlike the abortive East A f r i c a n C o m m u n i t y , E C O W A S is not an attempt at full economic union among its m e m b e r states, but is rather a preferential trade area (PTA) in which the participant nations agree to charge each other reduced taxes on the import of goods. E C O W A S also meets periodically to discuss environmental, military, and political issues facing its m e m b e r states. Ethnicity: one of the major social and political forces in Africa (and the entire world) and a very general term referring to shared characteristics b e t w e e n similar individuals. Ethnicity can be one or more of the following: a c o m m o n language, c o m m o n ancestral ties (bloodlines), a c o m m o n culture (dress, food, social practices, etc.), a common race, or a c o m m o n set of religious beliefs. Foreign debt: debt incurred when a government borrows money from either another government or a bank in another country. The repayment of a foreign debt is usually in the currency of the lender nation. For example, if M a l a w i ' s government borrows money f r o m Chase-Manhattan Bank in New York, the bank will expect to be repaid in U.S. dollars, not in Malawi kwatcha. Foreign exchange: also known as "hard currency," money denominated in a currency that has worldwide acceptance due to the desirability of owning that currency. U.S. dollars, Japanese yen, German marks, French and Swiss francs, and British pounds are examples of foreign exchange. Hard currencies are crucial for African governments, because they are necessary for purchasing imports such as petroleum, automobiles, and machinery. See Foreign debt.

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French Huguenots: Protestants f r o m France who were persecuted by the French government in the seventeenth century. Many of these people left France to settle mostly in the American South and in South Africa. The combination of Dutch and German settlers, along with the French Huguenots, produced the Afrikaners of South Africa. See Boers. Fuelwood: wood that is harvested and burned for cooking purposes. Burning wood is still the major form of energy production in rural Africa. Population density and the cutting of wood for fuel can lead to deforestation. Great Rift Valley: one of the most important geological features on the planet. It is an extremely long and deep fault line that bisects the entire eastern portion of the African continent. The Rift Valley is h o m e to the m a j o r East African lakes, the Red Sea, and an abundance of wildlife unmatched anywhere on earth. Much of the soil in the valley and on its escarpments (sides) is extremely fertile. Gross domestic product (GDP): measures the total output of goods and services produced by both residents and foreigners in a nation. Gross national product (GNP): measures the total output of goods and services produced by residents; it includes income residents receive f r o m abroad. Measured yearly, G N P is often used as an indicator of the size of a nation's economy. Another important economic statistic, G N P per capita, is calculated by dividing a nation's G N P by its population. This indicates national income per person. Homelands: government-designated areas, under South A f r i c a ' s apartheid system, where the different ethnic groups could live. For the black ethnic groups, the apartheid regime created thirteen homelands, which were supposed to be in areas traditionally occupied by those ethnic groups. The ultimate plan, which was never fully realized, was to m o v e all of South A f r i c a ' s blacks to these homelands and grant those " n a tions" independence. Thus, the South Africa the architects of this system planned would ultimately have no black citizens. These homelands were almost all in agriculturally marginal areas and often were not even contiguous. The opposition to the homelands policy was a major c o m ponent of antiapartheid activity in South Africa. See Apartheid. Hut tax: a tax colonialists imposed on villages to acquire f r e e labor. T o p r o v i d e their c o l o n i e s with c h e a p labor, the imperial p o w e r s o f t e n taxed each village, k n o w i n g its people could not pay in c u r r e n c y . T h u s , the colonialists " a c c e p t e d " f r e e labor as p a y m e n t of the h u t tax.

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Import substitution: an economic strategy many developing nations follow. T h e idea behind import-substitution policies is to establish local industries that produce goods that were previously imported (matches, shoes, tools, etc.). Thus, foreign exchange would be saved, since those imports would no longer be required, and hard currency would not have to be spent to acquire them. Unfortunately, when a nation has limited economic resources, following an import-substitution strategy can actually drain foreign exchange, since the focus of industrial output is to produce goods f o r local c o n s u m p t i o n and not for export, which could earn even more foreign currency. Industrialization: a general e c o n o m i c strategy that a country may pursue, along with agriculture and postindustrialism (service and k n o w l e d g e production). Most economists in the 1950s and 1960s (and even today) assumed that nations should focus their economic resources on industries (cars, textiles, furniture, steel, etc.) rather than agriculture. Unfortunately, for nations that are overwhelmingly rural and poor (the case with almost all African countries), rapid industrialization is especially difficult, and too much of a focus on industrialization can lead governments and businesses to neglect the wealth of k n o w l e d g e and experience of rural producers. In the extreme, an all-out drive toward industrialization can produce a national neglect of agriculture that can lead to mass hunger and starvation. Informal sector: general term given to business practices that are outside government regulation and thus i m m u n e to taxes. Also known as the black market, many e c o n o m i s t s estimate that s o m e A f r i c a n n a t i o n s ' e c o n o m i e s are taking place largely in the i n f o r m a l sector. While the i n f o r m a l sector can support m a n y l o w e r - m i d d l e - c l a s s traders and producers, it can also p r o d u c e extremely wealthy individuals and indirectly weaken a g o v e r n m e n t due to the loss of tax r e v e n u e that could o t h e r w i s e be used in antipoverty and other g o v e r n m e n t programs. International Monetary Fund (IMF): loosely associated with the United Nations, a bank of last resort that lends m o n e y directly to governments, usually to either pay off private bank loans or to f u n d general government operations. T h e p r o b l e m is that the IMF, as any lender would when lending money, puts restrictions on the m o n e y ' s use and, more important, d e m a n d s that the recipient nation m a k e m a c r o e c o nomic policy changes, such as reducing the size of g o v e r n m e n t and public debt and scaling back expensive social and antipoverty programs. For this reason, m a n y governments, scholars, and civilians in A f r i c a dislike the IMF, but m a n y nations simply have no e c o n o m i c

432

Glossary choice but to accept the I M F ' s restrictions and policy prescriptions in exchange for the loans.

Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ): the most important meteorological p h e n o m e n o n for A f r i c a , and the primary rain producer for the continent. The ITCZ shifts seasonally around the equator, thus (ideally) creating a rainy season north of the equator around June and in the south around N o v e m b e r . S o m e nations near the equator even receive two rainy seasons. W h e n the ITCZ " m i s b e h a v e s , " droughts occur in the areas it fails to cover. Khoisan language family: one of the four m a j o r families of A f r i c a n languages. T h e Khoisan group is characterized by the " c l i c k " sounds of m a n y of its c o n s o n a n t s . T h e K h o i s a n p e o p l e s o n c e inhabited large stretches of eastern and southern A f r i c a , but the Bantu m i g r a t i o n s and E u r o p e a n p e r s e c u t i o n have reduced the K h o i s a n to a f e w scattered p o c k e t s in southern A f r i c a ' s desert regions. A l m o s t all the cave and rock art of southern A f r i c a is attributed to the Khoisan peoples, and their l a n g u a g e has i n f l u e n c e d some Bantu l a n g u a g e s such as Zulu, X h o s a , and N d e b e l e , which use a subset of the K h o i s a n "clicks." Kinship: an anthropological term referring to the patterns of familial relations shared by a group of people. In most African cultures, kinship goes well beyond the traditional Western concept of the " n u c l e a r " family and even extends to the dead and unborn. Kinship is one of the fundamental social structures in sub-Saharan Africa. Lagos Plan of Action (LPA): a set of general economic goals that most African nations are striving to achieve. Adopted by the United Nations Economic C o m m i s s i o n for A f r i c a in 1980, the LPA seeks food selfsuffiency; self-reliance in industry, transport, and c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; human and natural resources; and science and technology. The Lagos Plan of Action can be viewed as an outline of an African declaration of economic independence. Levitate: a family and marriage practice c o m m o n throughout A f r i c a . Under the levirate, a man assumes responsibility for his dead brother's widow and children. Conversely, under the "sororate," a woman takes the place of her dead or childless sister. Both these practices are designed to produce children, which is one of the primary reasons f o r marriage in largely agricultural Africa. S o m e feminists see both the levirate and the sororate as an onerous burden on women.

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Matriliny: a family organization pattern largely c o n f i n e d to the coastal forests of west and central Africa. Under matriliny, family descent is traced through the mother, and a groom usually leaves his family to live with or near his w i f e ' s family. Resultant children are also raised with the m o t h e r ' s family and in the m o t h e r ' s village area. This is not the same as matriarchy (rule by women), since in most matrilineal societies formal positions of authority are still largely held by men. See Patriliny. Metropole: an international relations term referring to either the capital city of an imperial power (London, Paris, Lisbon, etc.) or, more recently, to world financial centers of power (e.g., Toyko, New York, Geneva). Modernization: a term given to a very broad political-economic concept popular in the 1950s and 1960s a m o n g academics and d e v e l o p m e n t practitioners. U n d e r the assumptions of modernization theory, increased economic growth in Africa, particularly rapid industrialization, would inevitably lead to the creation of democracy, higher educational standards, and widespread wealth. The assumptions of modernization theory were rooted in the idea that since this was the way the Western world developed, then the same process would inevitably take place in Africa. Of course, the facts that the process of " m o d e r n i z a t i o n " took place in the West over a period of several centuries and largely without imperial interference were often overlooked. Still, many of the prescriptions for curing A f r i c a ' s economic and political troubles still seem based on the ideas of linear development contained in m o d e r n ization theory. Multinational corporations (MNCs): a large corporation that has business operations in more than one national territory. Some very large M N C s such as Exxon and DuPont have yearly earnings that are larger than the annual economic output of several African nations. It should be no surprise that M N C s can be very powerful and persuasive economic actors in the developing world. Nationalism: one of the most f u n d a m e n t a l concepts in comparative politics. "Nationalism" can mean different things depending on the context in which the term is used. In the context of A f r i c a n politics and history, nationalism usually denotes the desire and struggle for selfdetermination and independence among the colonized peoples of the continent. The nationalist era in sub-Saharan Africa started after World War II, when parties and interest groups formed with the goal of full national independence for their colonies. For most countries, the nationalist

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era c u l m i n a t e d in i n d e p e n d e n c e in the 1960s, largely u n d e r the political leadership of party and interest g r o u p heads w h o had lobbied Lond o n and Paris f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e or even had led a r m e d struggles against those E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . Negritude: a literary m o v e m e n t of the 1930s a m o n g s t u d e n t s f r o m f r a n c o p h o n e A f r i c a n colonies and A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s in exile in Paris. The N e g r i t u d e writers c o n s c i o u s l y filled their w o r k s with A f r i c a n m o t i f s , t h e r e b y p r o v i d i n g a n e w e x p r e s s i o n of A f r i c a n ideas and society in written French and English literature. See Pan-Africanism. Neocolonialism: the idea that even a f t e r physical and legal colonialism ended in Africa, e c o n o m i c and political dependency on the f o r m e r colonial p o w e r r e m a i n e d . For e x a m p l e , after legal i n d e p e n d e n c e in the 1960s, m a n y f o r m e r British and French colonies in A f r i c a still f o u n d themselves in a position to purchase goods from only British and French transnational corporations. F u r t h e r m o r e , in the f o r m e r French colonies of West A f r i c a , m o s t n a t i o n s are still d e p e n d e n t on the F r e n c h f r a n c to support their o w n national c u r r e n c i e s , which gives the F r e n c h gove r n m e n t and b a n k s m u c h e c o n o m i c leverage over those nations. N e o c o l o n i a l i s m is s i m i l a r to the d e p e n d e n c y school of t h o u g h t , w h i c h a l s o sees an i n e x o r a b l e , c a u s e - a n d - e f f e c t link b e t w e e n p o l i t i c s and e c o n o m i c s . See Dependency. Niger-Congo language family: o n e of the f o u r m a j o r f a m i l i e s of A f r i c a n l a n g u a g e s . T h i s is a l s o k n o w n as the Bantu l a n g u a g e f a m i l y , with its o r i g i n s in West A f r i c a . A s the B a n t u m i g r a t i o n s spread e a s t w a r d and w e s t w a r d to e n c o m p a s s a l m o s t the entire s u b - S a h a r a n r e g i o n of the continent, the N i g e r - C o n g o l a n g u a g e f a m i l y spread as well. Today the m a j o r i t y of A f r i c a ' s p e o p l e speak l a n g u a g e s with roots in this linguistic family. See Bantu language family. Nilo-Saharan language family: o n e of the f o u r m a j o r f a m i l i e s of A f r i c a n l a n g u a g e s . T h i s g r o u p is largely c o n f i n e d to the n o r t h e a s t and eastcentral regions of the continent. It is prevalent a m o n g the h e r d i n g and fishing cultures of the area. E x a m p l e s of groups whose l a n g u a g e s h a v e their roots in this f a m i l y are the D i n k a of S u d a n and the Tutsi of R w a n d a and B u r u n d i . Organization of African Unity (OAU): a regional s u p r a n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a tion e s t a b l i s h e d in the 1960s, with h e a d q u a r t e r s in A d d i s A b a b a , E t h i o p i a . T h e O A U is the U n i t e d N a t i o n s of A f r i c a , in that its m e m b e r s h i p n o w includes all the i n d e p e n d e n t states on the c o n t i n e n t . T h e h e a d s of all the m e m b e r s c o m e t o g e t h e r once a y e a r f o r a s u m m i t

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meeting, and there are several economic, environmental, and cultural committees within the O A U . Of particular note is the pledge of noninterference in the internal affairs of m e m b e r nations that all participating countries take. Further, when the O A U was founded, an agreement was reached that there would be no wholesale reconfiguration of the old colonial boundaries inherited by the independent nations. T h e combination of these two facts, of course, hamstrings the effectiveness of the OAU as a truly pan-African entity. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): an organization comprising the m a j o r oil exporting nations of the world. O P E C is one of the most potentially powerful economic organizations in the history of the planet, o w i n g to industrialization's crucial need for petroleum products. Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola are the three sub-Saharan m e m bers of O P E C . Pan-Africanism: both a literary and political term with similar meanings. In the literary usage, pan-Africanism is a writing style that reverses the latenineteenth- and early-twentieth-century roles of Africans and Europeans in literature. Here, African writers and their characters critically examine European culture and identity. In the political usage, pan-Africanism can refer to any attempt at creating political solidarity or unity among either African nations or Africans on the continent and living elsewhere (the African Diaspora). Both K w a m e Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, and W. E. B. Du Bois, the African American writer and political activist, are associated with pan-Africanism. See Negritude. Parastatals: government-owned or government-controlled corporations. For example, the postal service in almost all nations is a parastatal. Further, telephone, steel, and electricity-producing corporations are often gove r n m e n t - o w n e d or government-operated. Many economists criticize parastatals as wasteful, loss-producing entities. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund are particularly critical of parastatals. Pastoralism: a form of social and economic organization that depends primarily on the herding of livestock (usually camels, goats, and/or cattle) rather than the cultivation of crops in a fixed area (agriculture). This livestock provides food and also stands as a measure of wealth. Pastoralists often live a seminomadic life by necessity, following shifting rainfall and grass growth patterns. Pastoralism is prevalent in the savannah grasslands and semidesert areas of eastern Africa. Patriliny: a pattern of family organization practiced by the majority of A f r i c a ' s people (and the majority of humanity, for that matter). Under

436

Glossary

patriliny, d e s c e n t is t r a c e d t h r o u g h m e n , and w h e n a bride m a r r i e s she g o e s to live in the g r o o m ' s v i l l a g e area. C h i l d r e n w h o are the p r o d u c t s of patrilineal m a r r i a g e s are also c o n s i d e r e d to be p r i m a r i l y part of the f a t h e r ' s f a m i l y line. See Matriliny. Personal rule: a style of a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t prevalent in A f r i c a f r o m t h e late 1960s to t h e late 1980s. U n d e r p e r s o n a l rule, the c o u n t r y ' s l e a d e r s e e k s to i d e n t i f y t h e state w i t h h i m s e l f , o f t e n p l a c i n g his f a c e o n currency, p o s t a g e s t a m p s , and in a l m o s t e v e r y public e s t a b l i s h m e n t . T h e l e a d e r m a y also h a v e s t a d i u m s , a i r p o r t s , streets, a n d s c h o o l s n a m e d a f t e r h i m s e l f . F u r t h e r m o r e , the l e a d e r will o p e r a t e a s y s t e m of patronage, awarding government contracts, concessions, and bureauc r a t i c p o s t s to his p o l i t i c a l f r i e n d s , e s p e c i a l l y to m e m b e r s of his o w n e t h n i c g r o u p . P e r s o n a l rule is a s o m e w h a t logical r e s p o n s e to the w e a k state s y s t e m s a n d relatively s h a l l o w n a t i o n a l i s m that e x i s t e d in A f r i c a i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r i n d e p e n d e n c e . W i t h t h e e m p h a s i s on o r d e r r a t h e r t h a n f r e e d o m , m a n y p e r s o n a l r u l e r s s t a y e d in p o w e r f o r d e c a d e s . It s h o u l d be n o t e d that not all t h e s e p e r s o n a l rulers were tyrants. O n the c o n t r a r y , o n e of t h e m o r e m i l d - m a n n e r e d p e r s o n a l r u l e r s , Z a m b i a ' s K e n n e t h K a u n d a , stayed in p o w e r f o r a l m o s t thirty years. In the 1990s, p e r s o n a l r u l e s t a r t e d to g i v e w a y to e l e c t e d d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t s , but A f r i c a still h a s not s e e n t h e last of this style of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . See Authoritarianism. Poaching: the h u n t i n g or t r a p p i n g of a n i m a l s f o r f o o d or profit that is prohibited by e i t h e r national or i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Polygyny: the p r a c t i c e of h a v i n g m o r e than o n e w i f e at the s a m e t i m e . In s o c i e t i e s that v a l u e the p r o d u c t i o n of c h i l d r e n , p o l y g y n y is w i d e s p r e a d , as it is in A f r i c a . I s l a m p u t s an u p p e r limit of f o u r on the n u m b e r of w i v e s o n e m a n can h a v e at the s a m e time. Public sector: a g e n e r a l t e r m g i v e n to a g o v e r n m e n t , its e m p l o y e e s , a n d any p a r a s t a t a l s that it o w n s . S e e Parastatals. Rainforests: c l o s e d f o r e s t s y s t e m s that r e c e i v e an a b u n d a n t a m o u n t of m o i s t u r e a n d t h u s p r o v i d e a h o m e to an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y h i g h c o n c e n t r a t i o n a n d d i v e r s i t y of p l a n t and a n i m a l life. S i n c e the soil is m o i s t and rather shallow, areas of r a i n f o r e s t that are clear-cut f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l purposes are largely unsuitable for f a r m i n g within a few years. C o n trary to w i d e s p r e a d p o p u l a r m y t h , o n l y a small p r o p o r t i o n of A f r i c a is u n d e r r a i n f o r e s t , with t h e s e areas c o n f i n e d to the coastal r e g i o n s of t h e west and to t h e central inland a r e a s .

Glossary

437

Rural sector: a general term given to public and privately held lands and productive activities that take place in rural areas; farming and ranching. Sharpeville massacre: a seminal event in South African history, which ultimately led to the illegalization of the African National Congress and other political organizations in 1960. In this township south of Johannesburg, protestors were preparing to surrender their passbooks (internal passports people were required to carry at all times) when police opened fire, killing sixty-nine people. The massacre led to the radicalization of many anti-apartheid groups. Southern African Development Community (SADC): an alliance formerly known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference ( S A D C C ) that was originally founded by the nations of southern Africa in an attempt to reduce their economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa. Under British and Portuguese colonial rule, almost all the rail and road transport networks in the region ran in a north-to-south pattern to the ports on South Africa's sea coasts. In the postcolonial era, the apartheid government in South Africa could exert much political and economic leverage on its neighbors by simply threatening to cut off transport routes to the sea. The S A D C C was an attempt primarily to break this transport monopoly held by South Africa and, secondarily, was an attempt at regional economic integration and the pooling of technological and educational resources. On the latter two matters it was largely successful. However, when South Africa elected a popular government in 1994, the whole raison d'être of the S A D C C changed, and soon thereafter South Africa joined. It is not clear whether the new SADC will become a full-fledged economic community or a vehicle for wider South African domination of the subcontinent, albeit under a black majority government. See East African Community and Economic Community of West African States. Soweto uprising: a protest in 1976 by schoolchildren in a township near Johannesburg. (The name Soweto is actually an acronym for Southwest Township.) The children were protesting new legislation that would require them to be instructed in Afrikaans instead of English. In response to the public protests, South African police shot at the demonstrators, ultimately killing several hundred people, almost all of them school students. This led to a further expansion of violent and nonviolent protests against apartheid within South Africa and to worldwide condemnation and limited economic sanctioning of the apartheid government.

438

Glossary

Spirit mediums: members of a family or village who communicate with the dead. Spirit mediums are part of most African Traditional Religions and are often very powerful religious and political leaders. In some cultures, spirit mediums are also healers and tellers of the future, which gives them a revered place in public life. See African Traditional Religions. Squatter settlements: hold title.

urban or rural lands settled by people who do not

Structural adjustment programs (SAPs): International Monetary Fund financial assistance programs. When African governments can no longer pay their debts to either private banks or other nations, they often have little choice but to turn to the I M F for financial aid. A condition f o r this assistance is that the recipient nation adopt a structural adjustment program. T h e World Bank will sometimes give development grants only when a country agrees to implement an SAP. These e c o n o m i c programs, rooted in neoclassical economic assumptions about public debt, interest rates, inflation, and economic growth, require that the lendee reduce the size of the public sector, cut back on social spending, devalue its currency vis-à-vis hard foreign currencies, raise interest rates to reduce inflation, and lift import restrictions so that foreign goods are more freely available. In the short run, at least, such programs often lead to great hardships on urban dwellers and bankruptcies in the private sector. As such, they are wildly unpopular with rank-and-file citizens and governments alike. See International Monetary Fund. Urban sector: a general term given to government and private institutions located in urban areas and the people who live in cities.

Basic Political Data

Algeria Capital City Algiers Date of Independence 5 July 1962 Rulers Since Independence 1. Ahmed Ben Bella, president, 1962-June 1965 2. Col. Houari Boumedienne, president, June 1 9 6 5 - D e c e m b e r 1978 3. Col. Benjedid Chadli, president, February 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 9 2 4. Five-member High Council of State (HCS) fulfills the functions of the head of state until January 1994 5. Gen. Liamine Zeroual, president and minister of defense—appointed January 1994 6. Zeroual elected president N o v e m b e r 1995-April 1999 7. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, president, April 1999Angola Capital City Luanda Date of Independence 11 N o v e m b e r 1975 Rulers Since Independence 1. Antonio Agostinho Neto, founding president, 1975-September 1979 2. José Eduardo dos Santos, president, 20 September 1979— Benin Capital City Porto-Novo Date of Independence 1 August 1960 (formerly Republic of Dahomey, 1960-1975) Rulers Since Independence 1. Hubert Maga, president, December 1 9 6 0 - 0 c t o b e r 1963 2. Col. (later Gen.) Christophe Soglo, president, October 1 9 6 3 January 1964 3. Sourou Migan Apithy, president, January 1 9 6 4 - N o v e m b e r 1965 4. Tahirou Congacou, president, November 1 9 6 5 - D e c e m b e r 1965 5. Gen. Christophe Soglo, president, December 1 9 6 5 - D e c e m b e r 1967 6. Lt. Col. Alphonse Alley, president, December 1967-July 1968 7. Emile-Derlin Zinsou, president, July 1 9 6 8 - D e c e m b e r 1969 439

440

Basic Political

Data

8. Lt. Col. Paul Emile de Souza, president, December 1969-May 1970 9. Hubert Maga, president, May 1970-May 1972 10. Justin Ahomadegbé, president, May 1972-October 1972 11. Col. Mathieu Kerekou, president, October 1972-April 1991 12. Nicephore Soglo, president, April 1991-March 1996 13. Mathieu Kerekou, March 1996Botswana Capital City Gaborone Date of Independence 30 September 1966 Rulers Since Independence 1. Sir Seretse Khama, president, September 1966-July 1980 2. Quett Masire, president, July 1980-April 1998 3. Festus Gontebanye Mogae, president, April 1998Burkina Faso Capital City Ouagadougou Date of Independence 5 August 1960 (formerly Upper Volta; renamed Burkina Faso, August 1984) Rulers Since Independence 1. Maurice Yaméogo, president, April 1959-January 1966 2. Lt. Col. Sangoulé Lamizana, president, January 1966-1980 3. Col. Sayé Zerbo, president, 1980-1982 4. NCO coup, October 1982 5. Maj. Jean Baptiste Ouedraogo, president, January 1983-August 1983 6. Capt. Thomas Sankara, president, Conseil National Révolutionaire (CNR), 1983-1987 7. Capt. Blaise Compaoré, president, CNR, 1987Burundi Capital City Bujumbura Date of Indendence 1 July 1962 Rulers Since Independence 1. (King) Mwami Mwambutsa II, André Muhirwa, 1962-1963. Prime ministers: Pierre Ngendandumwe, 1963; Albin Nyamoya, 1964-1965; Pierre Ngendandumwe, 1965 (assassinated, January 1965); Joseph Bamina, 1965; Leopold Biha, 1965 2. Mwami Ntare V (deposes father, Mwambutsa II, as king); Capt. (later Col.) Michel Micombero, prime minister, July 1966November 1966 3. Micombero declares Burundi a republic, with himself as president, November 1966-November 1976

Basic Political Data

441

4. Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, president, November 1976-September 1987 5. Maj. Pierre Buyoya, chairman, Comité Militaire pour la Salvation Nationale, 1987-1993 6. Melchior Ndadaye, June-October 1993 7. Cyprien Ntaryamire, January-April 1994 8. Interim president Sylvestre Ntibantunganya April-October 1994, president, October 1994—July 1996 9. Ntibantunganya deposed in coup; Pierre Buyoya, interim president, September 1996-June 1998, president June 1998Cameroon Capital City Yaoundé Date of Independence 1 January 1960 (1960-1961: Republic of East Cameroon; October 1961-1972: Federal Republic of Cameroon, composed of the East—former French trust territory—and West— part of former British trust territory; 1972-: United Cameroon Republic) Rulers Since Independence 1. Ahmadou Ahidjo, president, May 1960-November 1982 2. Paul Biya, president, November 1982Cape Verde Capital City Praia Date of Independence July 1975 (in federation with Guinea-Bissau, 1975-January 1981) Rulers Since Independence 1. Aristides Pereira, president, 1975-February 1991 2. Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro, March 1991Central African Republic Capital City Bangui Date of Independence 13 August 1960 (1976-1979: Central African Empire) Rulers Since Independence 1. David Dacko (formerly prime minister), president, November 1960-December 1965 2. Coup led by Field Marshal Jean-Bedel Bokassa, December 1965 3. Bokassa proclaimed "President for Life," March 1972 4. Bokassa crowned emperor, December 1977 5. Bokassa deposed in coup; David Dacko, president, September 1979

442

Basic Political

Data

6. Gen. André Kolingba establishes military regime, September 1981-1993 (chairman of Military Committee for National Recovery) 7. Ange-Félix Patassé, president, October 1993Chad Capital City N ' D j amèna Date of Independence 11 August 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Ngarta (formerly François) Tombalbaye, prime minister; head of state on independence; president, April 1962—April 1975 (killed in military coup) 2. Gen. Félix Malloum, president, April 1975-1979 3. Hissene Habré, appointed prime minister, August 1978 4. Malloum and Habré resign, March 1979; Transitional Government of National Unity 5. Goukouni Oueddei, president, 1979-1982 6. Hissene Habré, president, 1982-December 1990 7. Idriss Déby, December 1990— Comoros Capital City Moroni Date of Independence 6 July 1975 Rulers Since Independence 1. Ahmed Abdallah, president, July 1975-August 1975 2. Coup led by Ali Soilih, August, 1975; president, 1976-1978 3. Ahmed Abdallah, president, reinstated in coup by mercenaries under Bob Denard, 1978-November 1989 4. Bob Denard, November 1989-December 1989 (murdered) 5. Said Djohar, December 1989-1996 6. Mohamad Taki Abdoulkarim, March 1996-October 1998 7. Interim government, Tajiddine Ben Said Massounde, president, November 1998-April 1999 8. Massounde deposed by coup; Col. Azzali Assoumani, president, April 1999Congo, Democratic Republic of Capital City Kinshasa Date of Independence 30 June 1960 (formerly Congo-Kinshasa; named Zaire in October 1971; named Democratic Republic of Congo in May 1997) Rulers Since Independence 1. Patrice Lumumba, prime minister, June-September 1960; Joseph Kasavubu, president, 1960-1965 2. Col. Joseph Mobutu suspends constitution, September 1960. College of Commissioners rules until February 1961 3. Joseph Ileo, prime minister, February-August 1961

Basic Political Data

443

4. 5. 6. 7.

Cyrille Adoula, prime minister, August 1961 —July 1964 Moise Tshombe, prime minister, July 1964-October 1965 Evariste Kimba, prime minister, O c t o b e r - N o v e m b e r 1965 Military coup led by Gen. Mobutu Sese Seko, president, 1965May 1997 8. Laurent Desire Kabila, May 1997-January 2001 9. Joseph Kabila, January 2 0 0 1 -

Congo, Republic of Capital City Brazzaville Date of Independence 15 August 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Foulbert Youlou elected president under pre-independence constitution, N o v e m b e r 1959 2. Military coup August 1963; Alphonse Massamba-Débat, president, December 1 9 6 3 ^ September 1968 3. Governing National Revolutionary Council, formed September 1968, chaired by Capt. Marien Ngouabi. Maj. Alfred Raoul, prime minister and temporary head of state, September 1968December 1968 4. Capt. Marien Ngouabi, president, December 1968-March 1977 5. Ngouabi assassinated, March 1977. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Joachim Yhombi-Opango, president, March 1977-February 1979 6. Col. Denis Sassou Nguesso, president, February 1979-1991 7. André Milongo, prime minister, June 1991-1992 8. Pascal Lissouba, president, August 1992Côte d'Ivoire Capital City Yamoussoukro Date of Independence 7 August 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, prime minister, May 1959; president, N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 0 - D e c e m b e r 1993 2. Henri Konan Bédié, president, December 1 9 9 3 - D e c e m b e r 1999 3. Bédié deposed in coup; Gen. Robert Guei, head, Committee of National Salvation, December 1999-October 2000 4. Laurent Gbagbo, president, October 2 0 0 0 Djibouti Capital City Djibouti Date of Independence 27 June 1977 1. Hassan Gouled, president, June 1977; reelected June 1981, April 1987, and May 1993-April 1999 2. Ismail O m a r Guelleh, president, April 1999-

444

Basic Political Data

E g y p t , A r a b R e p u b l i c of Capital City C a i r o Date of Independence 28 F e b r u a r y 1922 Rulers Since Independence 1. King F a r o u k to 1952 2. C o u p led by Col. G a m a l Abdel N a s s e r and Abdul-al H a k i m . M a j . G e n . N e g u i b , president, June 1 9 5 3 - N o v e m b e r 1954 3. Nasser, head of state, 1 9 5 4 - 1 9 7 0 (president f r o m 1956) 4. Col. A n w a r Sadat, president, 1 9 7 0 - 0 c t o b e r 1981 5. Lt. G e n . Hosni M u b a r a k , president, O c t o b e r 1 9 8 1 Equatorial Guinea Capital City M a l a b o Date of Independence 12 O c t o b e r 1968 Rulers Since Independence 1. F r a n c i s c o M a c i a s N g u e m a , president, S e p t e m b e r 1 9 6 8 A u g u s t 1979 2. Military c o u p led by Lt. Col. Teodoro O b i a n g o N g u e m a M b a s o g o , A u g u s t 1979 3. Lt. Col. T e o d o r o O b i a n g o N g u e m a M b a s o g o , president, O c t o b e r 1980-1989 4. Brig. G e n . T e o d o r o O b i a n g o N g u e m a M b a s o g o , elected president 25 June 1 9 8 9 Eritrea Capital City A s m a r a Date of Independence 24 M a y 1993 Rulers Since Independence 1. Issaias A f w e r k i , a s s u m e s power May 1991; elected president 8 J u n e 1993Ethiopia Capital City A d d i s A b a b a 1. Succession of e m p e r o r s 2. E m p e r o r Haile Selassie, 1 9 3 0 - S e p t e m b e r 1974 3. Lt. G e n . A m a n A n d o m , chairman P M A C (Provisional Military A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Council) until N o v e m b e r 1974 4. Brig. G e n . Teferi Banti, chairman, P M A C . P o w e r actually held by vice c h a i r m a n , M a j . (later Lt. Col.) M e n g i s t u Haile M a r i a m and Lt. Col. A t n a f u Abate. Banti killed, F e b r u a r y 1977 5. M e n g i s t u Haile M a r i a m , chairman of P M A C , head of state, 1 9 7 7 M a y 1991 6. M e l e s Z e n a w i , president, May 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 5 7. N g a s s o G i d a d a , president, August 1 9 9 5 -

Basic Political Data

445

Gabon Capital City Libreville Date of Independence 17 August 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Leon M ' B a , president, 1961-28 November 1967 2. Omar (formerly Albert-Bernard) Bongo, president, December 1967Gambia Capital City Banjul Date of Independence 18 February 1965 Rulers Since Independence 1. Constitutional monarchy with Dawda Jawara, prime minister, 1965-1970 2. Gambia becomes a republic, April 1970. Dawda Jawara becomes first president, April 1970-1994 3. Capt. Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh, proclaimed head of state, July 1994, chairman of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council, 1994— Ghana Capital City Accra Date of Independence 6 March 1957 Rulers Since Independence 1. Constitutional monarchy, 1957-1960; Kwame Nkrumah, prime minister, 1957-1960. Becomes republic, 1960; Nkrumah, president, July 1960-February 1966. 2. Lt. Gen. Joseph Ankrah, chairman of National Liberation Council, February 1966-1969. Replaced in 1969 by Brig. Gen. Akwasi Afrifa 3. Competitive electoral politics: Kofi Busia, prime minister, September 1969-January 1972 4. Lt. Col. (later Gen.) Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, chairman, National Redemption Council, replaced by Supreme Military Council, January 1972-July 1978 5. Lt. Gen. Frederick Akuffo, chairman, Supreme Military Council, July 1978-June 1979 6. Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings, chairman, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, June 1979-September 1979 7. Dr. Hilla Limann, president, September 1979-December 1981 8. Flight Lt. Jerry Rawlings, chairman, Provisional National Defence Council, December 1981; elected president November 1992Guinea Capital City

Conakry

446

Basic Political Data

Date of Independence 2 October 1958 Rulers Since Independence 1. Ahmed Sekou Touré, president, 1958-April 1984 2. Col. Lansana Conté, president, head of Comité Militaire de Redressement National, 19843. Gen. Lansana Conté takes office April 1984; elected December 1993Guinea-Bissau Capital City Bissau Date of Independence 10 September 1974 Rulers Since Independence 1. Luiz De Almeida Cabrai, president, 1974-1980 2. Gen. Joào Bernardo Vieira, president, Council of State, head of government, 1980; elected president in multiparty elections July and August 1 9 9 4 - M a y 1999 3. Vieira deposed in coup; Gen. Ansumane Mane and Koumba Yala, coprésidents of transitional government, May 1999-January 2000 4. Koumba Yala, president, February 2 0 0 0 Kenya Capital City Nairobi Date of Independence 12 December 1963 Rulers Since Independence 1. Constitutional monarchy, 1963-1964; Jomo Kenyatta, prime minister 2. Kenyatta, president, 1964-August 1978 3. Succeeded by Daniel arap Moi, president, 1978Lesotho Capital City Maseru Date of Independence 4 October 1966 Rulers Since Independence 1. Constitutional monarchy under King Motlotlehi Moshoeshoe II 2. Chief Leabua Jonathan seizes power in civilian coup. January 1970-January 1986 3. Maj. Gen. Justin Lekhanya, chairman. Military Council. 1986-April 1991 (military coup) 4. Col. Elias Ramaema, chairman, Military Council, April 1991-April 1993 5. Ntsu Mokhehle, prime minister, April 1993-August 1994 6. King Letsie III dismissed Mokhehle government and assumed role of head of state, August 1 9 9 4 - S e p t e m b e r 1994 7. Mokhehle resumed post as prime minister, September 1994-

Basic Political

Data

447

8. King Moshoeshoe II restored to throne with no legislative or political powers, head of state, January 1995-January 1996 (died) 9. King Letsie III resumed throne, February 1996— Liberia Capital City Monrovia Date of Independence 6 July 1847 Rulers Since Independence 1. Until 1944, eighteen presidents 2. William V. S. Tubman, president, 1944-1971 3. William R. Tolbert, 1971-April 1980 4. M. Sgt. Samuel K. Doe, president, People's Redemption Council, 1980-November 1990 (murdered) 5. Amos Sawyer, president, Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), 1990-1995 6. Transitional executive council, comprising representatives of the former IGNU, the National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL), and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) form the Council of State headed by David D. Kpomakpor, chairman, IGNU, May 1995-August 1997 7. Charles Taylor, president, August 1997Libya Capital City Tripoli Date of Independence 24 December 1951 (from March 1977, named Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) Rulers Since Independence 1. King Idris, 1951-1969 2. Col. Muammar Mohammed Qaddafi, leader of the revolution, September 1969Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Capital City Antananarivo Date of Independence 26 June 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Philibert Tsiranana, president, 1960-May 1972 2. Gen. Gabriel Ramanantsoa, president, 1972-February 1975 3. Col. Richard Ratsimandrava, February 1975 (assassinated) 4. Gen. Gilles Andria Mahazo, National Military Directorate, February 1975 5. Lt. Comdr. Didier Ratsiraka, president, March 1975-1993 6. Prof. Albert Zafy, president, elected to office February 1993, impeached August 1996, resigned October 1996 7. Adm. Didier Ratsiraka, president, February 1 9 9 7 -

448

Basic Political

Data

Malawi Capital City Lilongwe Date of Independence 6 July 1964 Rulers Since Independence 1. Constitutional monarchy, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, prime minister, 1964-1966 2. Banda, president, 1966 3. Banda, "President for Life," July 1971-1994 4. Bakili Muluzi, president, May 1994Mali Capital City Bamako Date of Independence 21 September 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Modibo Keita, president, Mali Federation; president, Soudan government, April 1959; president of Mali, 1960-1968 2. Lt. (later Brig. Gen.) Moussa Traoré, chairman of Military Committee of National Liberation, November 1968-June 1979 3. Gen. Moussa Traoré, president, June 1979-March 1991 4. Lieut. Col. Amadou Toumany Toure, acting head of state, March 1991-April 1991 5. Soumana Sacko, prime minister, April 1991-June 1992 6. Alpha Oumar Konare, president, June 1992Mauritania, Islamic Republic of Capital City Nouakchott Date of Independence 28 November 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Mokhtar Ould Daddah, president, 1961-July 1978 2. Lt. Col. Mustapha Ould Mohammed Salek. president. Comité Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN), July 1978-June 1979 3. Lt. Col. Ahmed Ould Bouceif, prime minister, April 1979-May 1979 (assassinated) 4. Lt. Col. Mohammed Khouna Haidalla. prime minister, May 1979 5. CMSN (formerly C M R N ) forces Salek to resign, June 1979. Lt. Col. Mohammed Mahmoud Ould Louly, president. June 1979January 1980 6. Haidalla ousts Louly, January 1980. Becomes president, head of state, and chairman of CMSN, 1980-1984 7. Col. Maaouya Ould Sidi Ahmed Taya. chairman of the Military Committee for National Salvation, 1984-; elected president January 1992-

Basic Political Data

449

Mauritius Capital City Port Louis Date of Independence 12 March 1968 Rulers Since Independence 1. Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, prime minister, 1968-1982 2. Aneerood Jugnauth, prime minister, 1982— Morocco Capital City Rabat Date of Independence 2 March 1956 Rulers Since Independence 1. King Mohamed V, to 1961 2. King Hassan II, March 1961-July 1999 3. King Mohamed VI, July 1999Mozambique Capital City Maputo Date of Independence 25 June 1975 Rulers Since Independence 1. Samora Moisés Machel, president, 1975-1986 2. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, president, 1986Namibia Capital City Windhoek Date of Independence 21 March 1990 Rulers Since Independence 1. Sam Nujoma, president, March 1990Niger Capital City Niamey Date of Independence 3 August 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Hamani Diori, president, 1960-April 1974 2. Maj. Gen. Seyni Kountché, head of state; president, Supreme Military Council, 1974-1987 3. Col. Ali Seibou, president, Supreme Military Council; head of state, 1987-1991 4. Amadou Cheiffou, head, transitional Council of Ministers, 1991-1993 5. Mahamane Ousmane, president of republic, April 1993-January 1996 6. Ibrahim Mainassara Bare, January 1996-April 1999 (assassinated) 7. Provisional government, Maj. Daouda Mallam Wanke, president, April 1999-December 1999 8. Mamadou Tandja, president, December 1999-

450

Basic Political

Data

Nigeria Capital City A b u j a Date of Independence 1 O c t o b e r 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Alhaji A b u b a k a r T a f a w a B e l e w a , p r i m e minister, 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 6 ; N n a m d i A z i k i w e , president, 1 9 6 3 - 1 9 6 6 2. G e n . J o h n s o n Aguiyi-Ironsi, head, Federal Military G o v e r n m e n t , January 1 9 6 6 - J u l y 1966 3. Lt. Col. Yakubu G o w o n , head, Federal Military G o v e r n m e n t , July 1 9 6 6 - J u l y 1975 4. Brig. G e n . Murtala M o h a m m e d , chief, S u p r e m e Military Council, July 1 9 7 5 - F e b r u a r y 1976 5. Lt. G e n . O l u s e g u n O b a s a n j o , February 1 9 7 6 - O c t o b e r 1979 6. A l h a j i S h e h u Shagari, president, O c t o b e r 1 9 7 9 - D e c e m b e r 1983 7. M a j . G e n . M o h a m m e d Buhari, head of g o v e r n m e n t , D e c e m b e r 1 9 8 3 - A u g u s t 1985 8. M a j . G e n . Ibrahim B a b a n g i d a , president, August 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 3 9. Chief Ernest A d e g u n l e S h o n e k a n , head of g o v e r n m e n t , January 1 9 9 3 - N o v e m b e r 1993 10. G e n . Sani A b a c h a , head of g o v e r n m e n t and c o m m a n d e r in chief of the a r m e d forces, N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 3 - J u n e 1998 11. G e n . A b d u l s a l a m A b u b a k e r , acting head of g o v e r n m e n t , June 1 9 9 8 - M a y 1999 12. O l u s e g u n O b a s a n j o , president, M a y 1 9 9 9 -

Rwanda Capital City Kigali Date of Independence 1 July 1962 Rulers Since Independence 1. G r é g o i r e K a y i b a n d a , president, 1961 —July 1973 2. M a j . G e n . Juvénal H a b y a r i m a n a , president, July 1973—April 1994 3. Dr. T h e o d o r e S i n d i k u b w a b o , interim president of republic. April 1 9 9 4 - J u l y 1994 4. Pasteur B i z i m u n g u , president, July 1 9 9 4 - M a r c h 2 0 0 0 5. M a j . G e n . Paul K a g a m e , interim president, M a r c h - A p r i l 2000: president, April 2 0 0 0 -

Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) Capital City N o n e Date of Independence F e b r u a r y 1982 (admitted as fifty-first m e m b e r of O A U ) Rulers Since Independence 1. M o h a m m e d A b d e l a z i z , president, 1 9 8 2 -

Basic Political Data

451

Sâo Tomé and Principe Capital City Sâo Tomé Date of Independence July 1975 Rulers Since Independence 1. Dr. Manuel Pinto da Costa, president, 1975-April 1991 2. Miguel Trovoada, president, April 1 9 9 1 Senegal Capital City Dakar Date of Independence 20 August 1960 (14 April 1959-20 August 1960: Mali Federation) Rulers Since Independence 1. Léopold Sédar Senghor, president, 1960-January 1981 2. Abdou Diouf, president, January 1981—April 2000 3. Abdoulaye Wade, president, April 2 0 0 0 Seychelles Capital City Victoria Date of Independence 29 June 1976 Rulers Since Independence 1. James Mancham, president, June 1976-June 1977 2. Albert René, president, June 1977— Sierra Leone Capital City Freetown Date of Independence 27 April 1961 Rulers Since Independence 1. Sir Milton Margai, prime minister, 1961-1964 2. Sir Albert Margai, prime minister, 1964-1967 3. Lt. Col. Andrew Juxon-Smith, chairman, National Reformation Council, March 1967-April 1968 4. Siaka Probyn Stevens, prime minister, April 1968 5. Stevens, president of republic, April 1971-October 1985 6. Maj. Gen. Dr. Joseph Saidu Momoh, president, 1985-1992 7. Capt. Valentine E. M. Strasser, chairman, Supreme Council of State, May 1992-January 1996 8. Brig. Gen. Julius Maada Bio, head of government, January 1996— March 1996 9. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, president, March 1996-May 1997 10. Military coup, led by Maj. Johnny Paul Koromah, chairman of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, May 1997— 11. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah reinstated following intervention of Nigerian-led West African (ECOMOG) force, March 1998-

452

Basic Political Data

Somalia Capital City Mogadishu Date of Independence 1 July 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Aden Abdulla Osman, president, 1960-1967; Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke, prime minister, 1960-1964; Abdirazak Hussein, prime minister, 1964-1967 2. Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke, president, 1967-1969; Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, prime minister, 1967-1969 3. Maj. Gen. Mohammed Siad Barre, president, 1969-January 1991 4. Ali Mahdi Mohammed, president, January 1991-1993 5. No functional government 1993-August 2000 6. Abdikassim Salad Hassan, appointed president of interim government at Arta Peace Conference by broad representation of the Somali clans that comprise the Transitional Assembly, August 2000South Africa Capital City Pretoria Date of Independence 31 May 1961 Rulers Since Independence 1. Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, prime minister, 1958-1966 2. B. J. Vorster, president and prime minister, 1966-1978 3. Pieter W. Botha, prime minister, then president, 1978-1989 4. Chris Heunis, acting president, January-September 1989 5. Frederik de Klerk, president, September 1989-May 1994 6. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, president, May 1994-June 1999 7. Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki, president, June 1999Sudan Capital City Khartoum Date of Independence 1 January 1956 Rulers Since Independence 1. Ismail al-Azhari, prime minister, 1956 2. Abdulla Khalil, prime minister, 1956-1958 3. Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud, prime minister, 1958-1964 4. Sir el-Khatim el-Khalifah, prime minister. 1964-1965 5. Muhammed Ahmad Mahgoub. prime minister, 1965-1966 6. Sayed Sadiq el-Mahdi, prime minister, 1966-1967 7. Muhammed Ahmad Mahgoub, prime minister, 1967-1969 8. Abubakr Awadallah, prime minister, 1969 9. Field Marshal Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri, president, May 1969-April 1985 10. Coup, April 1985. Lt. Gen. Abdel Rahman Swar al Dahab, chairman, Transitional Military Council

Basic Political Data

453

11. Ahmed Ali el-Mirghani, president, Supreme Council 1986-June 1989 (military coup) 12. Lt. General Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, prime minister, June 1989-; appointed president Ocober 1993 Swaziland Capital City M b a b a n e Date of Independence 6 September 1968 Rulers Since Independence 1. King Sobhuza II, 1922-September 1982; Queen Mother Dzeliwe, regent, September 1982. Deposed August 1983. Prince Makosetive named as future king, King Mswati III, 1986— Tanzania Capital City D o d o m a Date of Independence 9 December 1962 (of Tanganyika); 10 December 1963 (of Zanzibar); Tanganyika joins with Zanzibar to form United Republic of Tanzania in April 1964 Rulers Since Independence 1. Julius Nyerere, prime minister, December 1961-January 1962 2. Rashidi M. Kawawa, prime minister, January 1962-December 1962 3. Tanganyika becomes a republic, December 1962; Julius Nyerere, president, December 1 9 6 2 - N o v e m b e r 1985 4. Ali Hassan Mwinyi, president, 1 9 8 5 - N o v e m b e r 1995 5. Benjamin Mkapa, president, November 1 9 9 5 Togo Capital City L o m é Date of Independence 27 April 1960 Rulers Since Independence 1. Sylvanus Olympio, president, 1960-January 1963 2. Military coup, January 1963, led by Sgt. (later Gen.) Etienne Eyadema. Nicholas Grunitzky, president, 1963-January 1967 3. Col. Kleber Dadjo, chairman, Comité de Réconciliation Nationale (CRN), January-April 1967 (bloodless coup) 4. Gen. Gnassingbé Eyadema, president, April 1967Tunisia Capital City Tunis Date of Independence 20 March 1956 Rulers Since Independence 1. Habib Bourguiba, prime minister, 1956—July 1957 2. July 1957, becomes a republic. Habib Bourguiba, president, 1957-1987

454

Basic Political Data

3. November 1987, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali accedes to the presidency, November 1987Uganda Capital City Kampala Date of Independence 9 October 1962 Rulers Since Independence 1. Apollo Milton Obote, 1962-1971 (prime minister until 1966; then president) 2. Maj. Gen. Idi Amin, president, 1971—April 1979 3. Y u s u f L u l e , president, Provisional Government, April-June 1979 4. Godfrey Binaisa, chairman, Military Commission of Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and president, June 1979-May 1980 5. Paulo Mwanga, chairman, UNLF, M a y - D e c e m b e r 1980 6. Obote, president, December 1980-July 1985 7. Coup led by Lt. Gen. Tito Okello of Uganda National Liberation Army; president, July 1985-January 1986 8. Yoweri Museveni, National Resistance Army (NRA), president, January 1986Zambia Capital City Lusaka Date of Independence 24 October 1964 Rulers Since Independence 1. Kenneth Kaunda, president, 1964-October 1991 2. Frederik Chiluba, president, November 1991Zimbabwe Capital City Harare Date of Independence 18 April 1980 Rulers Since Independence 1. Canaan Banana, president and head of state, 1980-1987; Robert Mugabe, prime minister, 1980-1987 2. Robert Mugabe, president, December 1987-

Sources: Africa South of the Sahara, 1990 ( L o n d o n : E u r o p a Publications, 1989); Africa Research Bulletin: Political Series (Exeter: A f r i c a R e s e a r c h , J a n u a r y - S e p t e m b e r 1991); Keesing Record of World Events ( L o n d o n : L o n g m a n , J a n u a r y - D e c e m b e r 1990 and J a n u a r y - A p r i l 1991); Sub-Saharan Africa, Daily Report ( W a s h i n g t o n , D C : G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , April 1 - N o v e m b e r 27, 1991); Africa South of the Sahara 1995. Twenty-Fourth Edition Europa Publications Limited ( L o n d o n : E u r o p a P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1994); The Europa World Year Book 1995 ( L o n d o n : E u r o p a P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1995); Financial Times International. M a r c h 18, 1996 © 1996 Financial T i m e s Limited; " B e n i n Vote S u r p r i s e , " by N i c h o l a s Phythian, Reuters 1996 © 1996 R e u t e r s ; " A b d o u l k a r i m Is E l e c t e d , " by A n n i e T h o m a s , A g e n c e F r a n c e - P r e s s e

Basic Political Data

455

1996, © 1996 A g e n c e F r a n c e - P r e s s e ; Political Handbook of the World 1995-1996 (Binghamlon University, State University of N e w York: C S A P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1996); Central I n t e l l i g e n c e A g e n c y , World Factbook 2000, h t t p : / / w w w . c i a . g o v ; U.S. State D e p a r t m e n t , h t t p : / / w w w . o d c i . gov (accessed 20 N o v e m b e r 2000); " B u r u n d i Military Leader S w o m In," Washington Post, 12 J u n e 1998, p. A 2 2 ; " T r o o p s O v e r t h r o w Ivory C o a s t G o v e r n m e n t , " A g e n c e F r a n c e - P r e s s e , New York Times, 2 5 D e c e m b e r 1999, p. A 8 ; D o u g l a s F a r a h , " V i o l e n c e G r e e t s Ivory C o a s t L e a d e r , " Washington Post, 27 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 , p. A24; N o r i m i t s u O n i s h i , "Dictator G o n e , Violence Erupts in Ivory C o a s t , " New York Times, 27 O c t o b e r 2000, p. A l ; " R u l i n g Alliance C a n d i d a t e Elected P r e s i d e n t of D j i b o u t i , " Times Wire S e r v i c e , L o s A n g e l e s , 10 April 1999, p. 3; " G e n e r a l S e e m s to B e B u i l d i n g T o w a r d a C o u p in G u i n e a - B i s s a u , " A g e n c e F r a n c e - P r e s s e New York Times, 24 N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 0 , p. A 2 7 ; " M a d a g a s c a r P r e s i d e n t to Q u i t , " International N e w s Digest, Financial Times. 6 S e p t e m b e r 1996, p. 3; " E x - r u l e r Elected M a d a g a s c a r Presid e n t , " Gazette, 1 F e b r u a r y 1997, p. B8; N o r i m i t s u O n i s h i , " N i g e r i a ' s M i l i t a r y T u r n s O v e r P o w e r to E l e c t e d L e a d e r , " New York Times, 3 0 M a y 1999, p. A l ; Karl Vick, " R w a n d a ' s De F a c t o Chief N a m e d N a t i o n ' s First Tutsi P r e s i d e n t . " Washington Post. 18 April 2000, p. A 3 0 ; "Rwandan P r e s i d e n t R e s i g n s , " R e u t e r s , 23 M a r c h 2 0 0 0 ; W i l l i a m Wallis, " S e n e g a l O f f e r s M o d e l as New L e a d e r S w o r n In," Financial Times, 30 April 2 0 0 0 , p. 10. Note: T h e Basic Political Data a p p e n d i x is based on i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r e d f r o m a variety of sources. It should be noted that o b t a i n i n g c o m p l e t e l y accurate data on A f r i c a n political e v e n t s is difficult. I n c o m p l e t e and c o n f l i c t i n g a c c o u n t s of g o v e r n m e n t actions and dates are c o m m o n a m o n g standard s o u r c e s , and a l t h o u g h all i n f o r m a t i o n on i n d e p e n d e n c e and on p e r i o d s of political l e a d e r s h i p w a s c o r r o b o r a t e d by three or m o r e s o u r c e s , r e a d e r s m a y o c c a s i o n a l l y f i n d d i s c r e p a n c i e s in o t h e r sources.

The Contributors Virginia DeLancey is associate director of international and area studies at Northwestern University. Patrick ./. Furlong Michigan.

is associate p r o f e s s o r of history at A l m a College, in

April A. Gordon is p r o f e s s o r of sociology and coordinator of w o m e n ' s studies at Winthrop University, in South Carolina. Donald L. Gordon is professor of political science and coordinator of the African-Asian program at Furman University, in South Carolina. George Joseph is professor of languages and literature at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, in New York State. Ambrose Moyo in senior lecturer and chair of the Religious Studies Department at the University of Zimbabwe, Harare. Jeffrey W. Neffis associate professor of geography and chair of the Department of Geosciences and Anthropology at Western Carolina University, in North Carolina. Julius E. Nyang'oro is professor and chair of African and A f r o - A m e r i c a n Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Thomas O'Toole is professor of history in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at St. Cloud State University, in Minnesota. Peter J. Schnieder is associate professor of political science at Loyola University, in Chicago. Eugenia Jersey.

Shanklin

is p r o f e s s o r of anthropology at The College of New

457

The

458

•

Contributors

OTHER CONTRIBUTORS

Kevin A. Hill is a s s o c i a t e p r o f e s s o r of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e at F l o r i d a I n t e r n a tional U n i v e r s i t y . Beth

Messersmith

is in the A f r i c a n S t u d i e s g r a d u a t e p r o g r a m at I n d i a n a

University. Mary

Spear

is f o r m e r d i r e c t o r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o g r a m s at St. M a r y ' s C o l -

lege of M a r y l a n d .

Index

AAF-SAP. See African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transofrmation (AAF-SAP) A b a c h a , Sani, 77, 412 A b d u r a h m a n , Dr., 381 Abiola, M o s h o o d , 412 Abolition, 42, 376 Abortion, 197, 287 A b r a h a m s , Peter, 357 A b u j a (Nigeria), 22, 133, 205 Académie Française, 148 Accelerated Development in SubSaharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (World Bank), 109, 173 Accra (Ghana), 47, 64 Achebe, Chinua: works by, 3 4 8 - 3 4 9 Acholonu, Catherine, 353 Action G r o u p , 66 Action Program, 386 Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 151 Africa G r o w t h and Opportunity Act, 165, 415 African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP), 136 African A m e r i c a n s , 4 5 ^ 7 African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and T r a n s f o r m a t i o n , 136 African Charter on H u m a n and People's Rights, 153 African C o m m o n Market ( A C M ) , 156 African Crisis Response Force ( A C R F ) , 178 African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), 178 African D e f e n s e Force, 155

A f r i c a n D e v e l o p m e n t Bank, 112 A f r i c a n E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y , 109, 133, 156 A f r i c a n High C o m m a n d , 154 A f r i c a n Independent C h u r c h e s , 312-316 A f r i c a n National C o n g r e s s (ANC), 87, 381, 383, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397; Freedom Charter, 386, 391, 394; Youth League, 386 A f r i c a n People's Organization, 381, 385 A f r i c a n Regional Council, 200 A f r i c a n Renaissance, 55, 93, 179, 400, 415 A f r i c a n - S c a n d i n a v i a n Writers Conference, 353 A f r i c a n Traditional Religions, 3 0 0 - 3 0 8 African Union, 133 A f r i c a n Virtual University Project, 4 1 8 A f r i c a ' s Priority P r o g r a m m e for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 ( A P P E R ) , 135 Afrikaans, 374, 382, 388 A f r i k a n e r Bond, 379 A f r i k a n e r B r o e d e r b o n d , 383, 385 A f r i k a n e r Party, 385, 386 A f r i k a n e r Resistance M o v e m e n t , 390 Afrikaners, 373, 374, 380, 381 Afro-Asiatic language family, 24 Afro-Asiatic M o v e m e n t , 344 A g a j a , 39 Age-grade systems, 40, 193 Age of Iron (Coetzee), 357 Agriculture, 7, 11, 2 7 - 3 0 , 35, 78, 81, 94, 103-104, 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 , 246, 277; colonial, 59, 63, 1 2 1 - 1 2 5 , 138; and deforestation, 224; and desertification, 224; d e v e l o p m e n t of, 2 7 - 3 0 ; and gross national product, 122; after

459

460

Index

independence, 78, 107; irrigated, 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 ; w o m e n in, 104, 122, 281 A h i d j o , 75 A h m a d i y y a , 324 A h m a d u , Seku, 40 A h m e d , M u h a m m a d , 322 Aid: 85, 4 1 6 ^ 1 1 7 ; French, 91, 165; U.S., 91, 127 Aidoo, Ami Ata, 353 A I D S , 2 0 7 - 2 1 2 , 401; e c o n o m i c impact of, 115-117 Akan, 39, 303, 307 A k a n d e , Harry, 412 Akeh, A f a m , 353 Ake: The Years of Childhood (Soyinka), 351 A k o s o m b o , D a m , 14 Aladura churches, 315 Alexandria (Egypt), 309 Algeria, 14, 58, 66, 86, 92, 372 A m e r i c a n Colonization Society, 56 Amhara, 34 Amin, Idi, 70, 75, 153 A m i n a , Queen, 2 7 3 A N C . See African National Congress Ancestor spirits, 3 0 3 - 3 0 4 , 3 0 5 - 3 0 6 Andrade, Mário de, 347 Angola, 14, 36, 43, 49, 67, 102, 162, 228, 273, 310; independence, 52, 61, 388; oil in, 81; political parties in, 70, 86 A n g l o - B o e r wars, 377, 378, 380 Annan, Kofi, 167, 4 1 3 Anokye, O k o n f o , 39 Anthem for the Decades (Kunene), 339 Anthills of the Savannah (Achebe), 2 9 1 - 2 9 2 , 349 Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malagache (Senghor), 340 Anticolonialism, 62, 344 Antislavery m o v e m e n t , 311 Antología de poesía negra de espressäo portuguesa (Andrade), 347 Apartheid, 373; creation of, 3 8 5 - 3 8 9 , 400; modernizing, 3 8 8 - 3 9 2 ; opposition to, 3 8 6 - 3 8 7 A P P E R . See A f r i c a ' s Priority P r o g r a m m e for E c o n o m i c Recovery 1986-1990 Aptidon, H a s s a n - G o u l e d , 154 Arabs, 39, 42; and Islam, 318, 319,

320; and slave trade, 4 1 - 4 2 ; trade with, 34, 35 Arius, 309 A r m a h , Ayi Kwei, 353 A r m e d forces, 152, 391; coups by, 7 6 - 7 7 ; after independence, 71, 154-155 Arrow of God (Achebe), 349 Asante, 39, 47 Asantehene, 39, 49 Asia, 41, 102 Asinamali! (Ngema), 359 Assimilation: French, 49, 341 A s w a n High D a m , 14 Atanda-Ilori, Kemi, 353 Athanasian creed, 309 Athanasius, 309 Atlantic Charter, 50 Authoritarianism, 57, 61, 7 4 - 7 5 , 93 Aventure amhigue (Kane), 343 Avunculocality, 259 Awooner, Kofi, 353 A x u m (Ethiopia), 34 Azande, 248-249 Azanian People's Organization ( A Z A P O ) , 395, 400 A Z A P O . See Azanian P e o p l e ' s Organization Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 51 Bä, Mariama, 346 Babangida, Ibrahim, 412 Bacchae of Euripides (Soyinka), 352 Badagry, 39, 45 B a h a ' i , 299 B a m a k s Convention, 236 B a m b a r a , 36, 4 0 Banjul (Gambia), 153 Bantu, 30, 306, 373 " B a n t u education," 385, 388 Bantu Philosophy (Tempel), 340 Bare, Ibrahim Mainassara, 168 Barotseland, 49 Barre, M o h a m m e d Siad, 87, 171 Barth, Heinrich, 44 Barwe, 47 Basotho, 376, 377, 378 Battle of Tondibi, 35 Bauxite, 14 Beatrice, Donna, 312 Bechuanaland Protectorate, 374, 379 Before the Blackout (Soyinka), 352

Index B e l e w a , Alhaji A b u b a k a r T a f a w a , 151 Belgian C o n g o , 50, 59. See also Democratic Republic of C o n g o ; Zaire B e l g i u m , 48, 49, 60, 63, 64, 66, 160 B e m b a , 226, 228 Bengalis, 374 Benin, 39, 49, 56, 77, 85, 87, 91, 149, 169, 236 Benin City, 47 B e n u e River, 30 Berbers, 35, 319, 320 Bérégovoy, Pierre, 168 Berg, Elliot, 110 Berg Report, 110 Berlin C o n f e r e n c e , 13, 47, 58, 104, 143 Beti, 276 Beti, M o n g o , 3 4 3 - 3 4 4 , 346 lieware Soul Brothers and Other Poems (Achebe), 348 Biafra, 152 Bible, the, 312, 314 Biko, Steve, 385 Bioprospecting, 4 1 5 Birth control, 191, 199 Birthrates, 120, 197 Biya, Paul, 168, 192 Black Hermit, The (Ngugi), 354 Black Interpreters, The (Gordimer), 356 Black market, 82 "Black O r p h e u s " (Sartre), 341 Black Orpheus (journal), 350 Black, Stephen, 359 "Black W o m a n " (Senghor), 341 Blood Knot, The (Fugard), 3 6 0 Blues Africa Café (Manaka), 361 Blyden, Edward Wilmot, 46, 341 Boehmer, Ellek, 359 Boers, 373, 375, 376 Boer War. See A n g l o - B o e r wars Bokassa, J e a n - B e d e l , 148, 164 Bopha! (Mtwa), 359 B o p h u t h a t s w a n a , 393, 397 Born in the RSA (Simon), 359 Bornu, 35 Borom saret (Sembene), 345 Botha, Louis, 380, 382 Botha, P. W„ 389 Botswana, 71, 207, 237, 391 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 167 Bouts de hois de Dieu, Les ( S e m b e n e ) , 344

461

Boyhood: Scenes from Provincial Life (Coetzee), 357 Brain Drain, 126, 262 Brazzaville G r o u p , 150, 151 Brazil, 42, 43, 162 Bride Price, The (Emecheta), 350 Bride service, 260 Bridewealth, 193, 260, 275, 289 British South A f r i c a Company, 374, 379 British West Indies, 42 Brutus, Dennis, 355 B u d d h i s m , 299 B u g a n d a , 36 B u n y a n , John, 338 B u n y o r o , 47 Burger's Daughter (Gordimer), 355 B u r k i n a Faso, 36, 59, 77, 86, 201 Burton, Richard, 4 4 Buthelezi, Gatsha, 390, 392 Byzantine O r t h o d o x Church, 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 Cacao. See C o c o a Caillé, R e n é , 4 4 C a m e r o o n , 15, 66, 197, 228, 245, 246, 331; authoritarianism in, 75; politics in, 86, 89, 93 Camp de Thiaroye (Sembene), 345 Canada, 161 C a p e Colony, 40, 373, 374, 376, 377 C a p e T o w n , 374 C a p e Verde, 87, 228 Carrying capacity, 9, 11, 227 Carthage, 31, 34, 41, 310 C a s a b l a n c a G r o u p , 151 Casualties (Clark), 351 Catholicism, 36, 310, 314 Cattle raising, 29 Cayor k i n g d o m , 41 Ceddo ( S e m b e n e ) , 345 Central A f r i c a n Republic, 47, 48, 59, 148, 201 Césaire, Aimé, 342, 345, 347 Chad, 35, 47, 85, 201, 227 C h a d - C a m e r o o n Pipeline, 127 C h a g g a , 59 Chaka ( M f o l o ) , 338 Chant écarlate, Le (Bâ), 346 Chants d'ombre (Senghor), 340 Chants pour Naëtt (Senghor), 340 C h e w a , 47 Children

ofAsazi

(Manaka), 361

462

Index

Children of Soweto, The ( M z a m a n e ) , 358 Chiluba, Frederick, 87, 317 China, 39, 161, 415 Chirac, Jacques, 158, 167, 168 Christianity, 2, 4, 39, 195, 263, 299, 3 0 8 - 3 0 9 ; and colonialism, 312; Coptic, 34, 309, 318; early, 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 ; missionaries and, 46, 302, 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 , 312; new d e n o m i n a t i o n s and, 312-316 C h r o m i t e , 14 Church of Jesus Christ According to the Prophet Simon Kimbangu, 313 C h u r c h of the Children of Israel, 313 Ciskei, 393, 397 Cities. See Urban sector Civil service, 85 Civil society, 94 Clapperton, H u g h , 4 4 Clark, John Pepper, 351 Claudel, Paul, 342 Clientelism, 74, 75 Climate, 24; characteristics of, 7 - 9 Coal, 14 Cobalt, 14, 104 Cocoa, 50, 63, 82, 104, 276 Coetze, Steven, 355 Coetzee, J. M., 355, 356 C o f f e e , 50, 104, 276 C o h e n , Herman, 165 Cold War, 73, 85, 143, 144, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163 Colonialism, 2, 3, 23, 4 7 - 5 0 , 69, 220, 302, 343, 344; e c o n o m i c s of, 1 0 3 105; and Islam, 322; literature of, 3 3 9 - 3 4 0 ; opposition to, 47; policies of, 194, 218; role of, 4 - 5 ; systems of, 5 8 - 5 9 ; w o m e n and, 2 7 6 - 2 7 7 Coloured Representative Council, 390 Coloureds, 374, 387, 390, 399 C o m m o d i t i e s , 102, 108(tab.); export of, 105, 106, 107 C o m m u n a u t é Financière Africaine (CFA), 163; franc, 163, 165 C o m m u n i s t Party, 385, 392, 395, 400 Concessionary C o m p a n i e s , 59 Conflicts, 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 C o n g o , 59, 86, 113, 166, 3 1 0 Congo-Brazzaville. See C o n g o Congo-Kinshasa. See D e m o c r a t i c Republic of C o n g o ; Zaire

C o n g o River. See Zaire River Congress M o v e m e n t , 386 Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 395 Conrad, Joseph, 339 Conscience de tracteur (Tansi), 347 Conservationist, The (Gordimer), 355 Conservative Party (CP), 390, 391 Continental drift, 11 Contraceptives, 191, 197 Convention for a Democratic South A f r i c a ( C O D E S A ) , 397 Convention on International Trade in E n d a n g e r e d Species (CITES), 237 Convention on the Elimination of All F o r m s of Discrimination Against W o m e n ( C E D A W ) , 288 Cooperatives, 85 Copper, 14, 104 Copperbelt, 14, 276 Corruption, 8 1 - 8 2 C O S A T U . See Congress of South A f r i c a n Trade Unions Côte d ' I v o i r e , 47, 58, 163, 222, 288, 315; politics in, 62, 74 Cotton, 58, 104 C o u p s d ' é t a t , 5, 57, 77 CP. See Conservative Party Craveirinha, José, 347 Cross of Gold (Ngcobo), 358 Crowther, Samuel Adjai, 3 11 C r u m m e l l , Alexander, 46 Cry the Beloved Country (Paton), 357 Cuba, 43 D a c k o , David, 148 D a h o m e y , 39, 45, 47, 273 Dakar (Senegal), 49. 206 Dance of the Forests, A (Soyinka), 352 Dangor, Achmat, 359 Death, 3 0 5 - 3 0 6 Death and the King's Horseman (Soyinka), 352 De Beers diamond empire, 378 Debt crisis, 117-120; relief of, 134-135 Debts, 8 2 - 8 3 , 4 1 2 - 4 1 4 Déchirures (Mudimbe), 342 Decolonization, 64, 67, 338; school of thought, 144-145 Deforestation, 11, 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 , 2 2 1 - 2 2 6 ; and crop cultivation, 2 2 3 - 2 2 4

Index

DeGaulle, Charles, 50, 148, 163 Delafosse, 340 Delany, Martin, 46 Democratic Alliance, 399 Democratic Party (South Africa), 392, 394 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 14, 42, 58, 73, 75, 146-147, 179, 313; tropical forests, 221. See also Zaire Democratization, 56; growth of, 85, 8 6 - 8 9 , 167 Demographic transition, 195-198, 199 D e n m a r k , 104 Dependency: economic, 59, 68, 83, 91, 107, 109; school of thought, 144-145 Dernier de 1'empire, Le (Sembene), 345 Desertification, 9; causes of, 224, 2 2 6 - 2 3 0 ; impacts of, 2 3 2 - 2 3 4 Destination Biafra (Emecheta), 350 Detainees: A Writer's Prison Diary (Ngugi), 354 Development, 59, 78, 105, 137-138, 172, 410; and environment, 233-235; plans for, 106-112; rural, 79, 204; sustainable, 137; women and, 127-130, 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 , 239, 2 8 3 - 2 8 4 , 290 Devil on the Cross (Ngugi), 2 9 2 - 2 9 3 , 354 Devoir de violence. Le (Ouologuem), 344 Dhlomo, H. I. E„ 359 Diallo, Bakary, 340 Diamonds, 93, 104, 378 Dictatorships, 3, 5, 72 Dingane, 376 Diop, Alioune, 342 Diop, Birago, 342 Diop, Cheikh Anta, 338 Diop, David, 342 Diouf, Abdou, 148, 149 Direct rule, 48, 144 Disgrace (Coetzee), 357 Distances (Okigbo), 350 Divided We Stand (Ekwensi), 348 Divination, 307 Divinities: belief in, 3 0 3 - 3 0 5 Djénné, 35, 192 Djibouti, 58, 172, 228 Docker noir (Sembene), 345

463

Dodoma (Tanzania), 22, 205 Dogon, 274, 332, 335 Douala (Cameroon), 79 Double Yoke (Emecheta), 350 Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews (Coetzee), 357 Down Second Avenue (Mphalele), 357 Drakensberg, 12, 40 Dramouss (Laye), 343 Drought, 13, 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 , 376 Dry Savanna, 11 Ducklands (Coetzee), 356 Dube, John, 381 Du Bois, W. E. B„ 46, 341 Du Plessis, Menân, 359 Dutch: in South Africa, 373, 374, 376, 377. See also Netherlands Dutch East India Company, 374, 375 Earth Summit, 217, 218, 236 East African Association, 51 East African Community, 133, 157 Ecart, L' (Mudimbe), 343 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 156 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 154, 156, 236 Economies, 4, 7, 7 7 - 8 0 ; colonial, 58-59, 103-105; global, 2 - 3 , 5, 4 8 - 4 9 ; precolonial, 101-103; regional, 132-133; slavery and, 4 1 ^ 2 ; w o m e n ' s role in, 2 7 3 - 2 7 5 , 279-284 Ecotourism, 415 ECOWAS. See Economic Community of West African States Education, 69, 2 8 2 - 2 8 3 , 312, 418^119 Efuru (Nwapa), 350 Egoli (Manaka), 361 Egypt, 34, 77, 91, 227; Christianity in, 33-34, 309 Ekwensi, Cyprian, 348 Elégie des alizés (Senghor), 341 Elephants, 2 3 7 - 2 3 8 Elf-Aquitane, 166 Elites, 64, 109, 272, 278, 286; governing, 70, 74; investment by, 80 Emecheta, Buchi, 350 Emergency (Rive), 358 Emitaï (Sembene), 345 Emperor Shaka the Great (Kunene), 338

464

Index

Empires, 12, 2 0 ( m a p ) Enfant noir, L' (Laye), 343 England. See United K i n g d o m English language: literature in, 347-364 Entre les eaux: Dieu, un prêtre, la révolution ( M u d i m b e ) , 343 Environment, 2, 217, 220; degradation of, 4, 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 , 209, 2 1 8 - 2 1 9 ; d e v e l o p m e n t and, 2 3 3 - 2 3 5 ; influence of, 7 - 8 , 2 4 - 2 5 ; m a n a g e m e n t of, 219; and oil industry, 2 3 4 - 2 3 5 Epics, 336 Epitome (U Tamsi), 342 Equatorial Guinea, 58, 162 Equiano, Olaudah, 348 Eritrea, 152 Erosion: impacts of, 126, 2 3 1 - 2 3 3 Essential Gesture: Writing, Politics, and Places, The (Gordimer), 356 Essop, A h m e d , 359 Etat honteux, L' (Tansi), 346 Ethiopia, 9, 27, 34, 87, 152, 220, 310, 330; erosion in, 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 Ethiopian Orthodox Church, 310 Ethiopian-type churches, 315, 316 Ethiopiques (Senghor), 341 Ethnic groups, 47, 61, 65, 68, 69, 264 Ethnicity, 66, 69, 166, 376. See also Tribalism Eurafricans, 4 3 Eurocentrism, 339 Europe, 3, 82, 104, 148; colonial expansion by, 13, 4 7 - 4 8 ; exploration by, 43—44; trade with, 39, 4 2 - 4 3 , 102-103 European E c o n o m i c Community, 86 European Union (EU), 155, 156, 159 Evangelism, 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 Evolution: of h u m a n s , 2 3 - 2 4 , 220, 247 E w e , 336 Exil d'Albouri ( N ' d a o ) , 347 Ex-pere de la nation, L' (Fall), 346 Exploration, 4 4 - 4 5 , 46 Face to Face (Gordimer), 356 Fagan C o m m i s s i o n , 384 F a g u n w a , 338 Faidherbe, 340 FAL. See Final Act of Lagos Fall, Aminata Sow, 346

Families, 246; extended, 264; sizes of, 3, 197, 199 Family planning, 191, 197, 198, 199-201 Famine, 29 Farah, Nruddin, 3 5 3 Farms, 188, 276, 283 Farouk, 77 Fat Kine (Sembene), 345 Female genital mutilation ( F G M ) , 260, 2 8 7 - 2 8 8 , 289 Feminism, 286 Fertility, 191, 193, 195; soil, 220, 231 Fertilizers, 228 Feu de brousse (U Tamsi), 342 Fez (Morocco), 321 Films, 345 Final Act of Lagos (FAL). 109 Fishing, 26, 94, 228 Fodio, Uthman dan, 39, 321 Foe (Coetzee), 357 Folly, The (Vladislavic), 359 Fonio, 29 Food, 79, 84, 121-125, 206; and women, 104, 279 Force Bonté (Diallo), 340 Forest of a Thousand Daemons, The (Fagunwa), 338 Forests, 7; industries in, 225; tropical, 220, 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 France, 40, 85, 102; colonialism of, 40, 4 8 - 5 0 , 60, 337, 342; decolonization, 64, 66; foreign policy, 8 5 - 8 6 , 160, 161-162, 176-178; slave trade with, 39, 42 Franco-African Summit, 91. 168 Freetown (Sierra Leone), 45 FREL1MO. See Frente de Libertaçâo Moçambique French Equatorial Africa, 50 French Huguenots, 374 French language, 3 4 6 - 3 4 7 ; literature in, 3 4 5 - 3 4 7 French Revolution, 42 French West Africa, 50 Frente de Libertaçâo M o ç a m b i q u e ( F R E L I M O ) , 67 Frobenius, 340 Fuelwood, 223 Fugard, Athol, 360 Fulani (Fulbe), 39, 101 Futa Djallon, 29, 39

Index G a b o n , 14, 59, 81, 86, 89, 165 G a m b i a , 58, 71, 200, 228 G a m b i a River, 44 G a n d a , 36, 381 G a n d h i , M o h a n d a s K „ 381 C.ao, 35, 192 G a r u b a , Harry, 353 Garvey, Marcus Moziah, 46 Gathering, 25, 101; history of, 2 4 - 2 6 G a z a empire, 44, 48 Gender: inequality of, 272; precolonial patterns of, 2 7 2 - 2 7 5 ; colonialism and, 2 7 6 - 2 7 7 ; postindependence period and, 2 7 8 - 2 9 3 G e n d e r e m p o w e r m e n t measure (GEM), 129 Gender-related development index (GDI), 127, 129 Geography, 1 - 2 , 17-22(maps); and transportation, 12-13 G e r m a n s , 374, 383 Germany, 143, 160; colonialism, 4 8 - 4 9 , 60; Nazi, 383, 384 Ghana, 14. 35, 39, 47, 59, 70, 82, 89, 201, 224, 245; British colonialism, 48, 49; independence of, 51; 2020 d e v e l o p m e n t plan, 201 Gide, André, 339 Gikuyu, 51, 59 Girl Who Kilted to Save: Nongqause the Liberator, The (Dhlomo), 359 Girls at War and Other Stories (Achebe). 348 Gobir, 36 God: beliefs in, 3 0 1 - 3 0 3 Gold, 3 4 - 3 5 , 37, 58, 102, 103, 104, 379 Gold Coast, 47, 49, 60, 63, 64, 66. See also G h a n a G o n d w a n a l a n d , 11, 13 Gordinier, Nadine, 331, 355 Gorée ( M o n a k a ) , 361 Gorée (Senegal), 49 Grain of Wheat, /I (Ngugi), 353 Grant, Sue Pam, 362 Gray, Stephen, 359 Great Britain. See United Kingdom Great Escarpment, 12 Great Lakes, 36 Great Lakes Initiative on AIDS, 211 Great Rift Valley, 27 Great Trek, 375

465

Great Z i m b a b w e , 37, 192 Greece, 40 Grève des battus ou les déchets humains, La (Fall), 346 Griots, 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 , 337 Group Areas Act, 394 Guest of Honor, A (Gordimer), 355 Guelwaar (Sembene), 345 Guinea, 14, 39, 86, 89 Guinea-Bissau, 49, 67; independence of, 52, 61; toxic waste in, 236 Haiti, 43 Hamallism, 324 Hamani, Diori, 324 Hani, Chris, 397 Harmattan, L ( S e m b e n e ) , 345 Harris churches, 315 Harts River, 378 Hausa, 40, 331, 338 Hausaland, 36, 273 Hayford, J. E. Casely, 50 Head, Bessie, 358 Heart of Darkness (Conrad), 339, 349 Heavensgate (Okigbo), 350 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), 119-120, 413, 4 1 4 Herding, 2 7 - 3 0 . See also Pastoralism Herero, 47 Hertzog, J. B. M „ 381, 382, 383 Hinduism, 299 HIV. See H u m a n i m m u n o d e f i c i e n c y virus Hofmeyer, Jan, 384 Homecoming: Essays on African and Caribbean Literature, Culture, and Politics (Ngugi), 354 Homelands, 387, 388, 390, 393 H o m o erectus, 24 H o m o habilis, 24 H o m o sapiens, 2 3 - 2 4 Homosexuality, 2 6 0 - 2 6 1 Honwana, Luis Bernard, 347 Horseman, The (Nicol), 359 Hosties noires (Senghor), 341 Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 75 House Gun, The (Gordimer), 355 How Long? (Kente), 361 Human development index (HDI), 127, 129 Human i m m u n o d e f i c i e n c y virus (HIV), 115-117, 134, 2 0 7 - 2 1 2 , 2 1 0 ( m a p )

466

Index

Human rights, 85, 87, 318 Hunting, 25, 101; history of, 2 5 - 2 6 Hut tax, 194 Ibo. See Igbo Idanre, and Other Poems (Soyinka), 351 Idu (Nwapa), 350 Igbo, 88, 153, 273, 337, 349 Ijala, 336 Ijo, 349 Ile-Ife, 193, 303 Ilorin, 40, 47 Ilunga Kalala, 37 IMF. See International Monetary Fund Imperial East African Company, 51 Imperialism, 103 Import substitution, 106-107 Independence, 4, 5 9 - 6 0 ; movements toward, 5 0 - 5 2 ; politics of, 6 1 - 6 6 Indian Ocean, 39, 40, 102 Indians, 44; in South Africa, 377, 381, 384, 385, 386, 387, 390 Indirect rule, 4 8 - 4 9 , 61 Indonesia, 221, 223 Industrialization, 106-107, 156 Industrial Revolution, 42, 103, 104 Industry, 4, 34, 104, 189 Informal sector, 126, 202, 290 Infrastructure, 104, 109, 111, 158 Inkatha, 394, 397, 399 Interest groups, 69 Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), 156 International Conference on AIDS (ICASA), 207 International Conference on Women, 285 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 8 3 - 8 4 , 8 9 - 9 0 , 119-120, 134-138, 173-174 International relations, 160-170 Interpreters, The (Soyinka), 351 Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), 8 - 9 , 18(map) In the Ditch (Emecheta), 350 In the Fog of the Season's End (La Guma), 358 In the Heart of the Country (Coetzee), 357 Investment, 4 1 4 - ^ 1 6 ; by elites, 80; private, 72

Irobi, Esiaba, 353 Iron, 30, 34, 36, 102, 373 Irrigation, 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 Islam, 2, 4, 299, 308; influence of, 35, 39; movements in, 149-150, 3 2 1 - 3 2 2 ; spread of, 3 1 8 - 3 2 2 Islamic Salvation Front, 92 Island, The (Fugard), 360 Italy, 60 ITCZ. See Intertropical Convergence Zone Ivory, 33, 39, 102, 237-238, 376 Ivory Coast. See Côte d'Ivoire I Will Marry When I Want (Ngugi), 354 Iyayi, Festus, 353 Izala, 324 Jagua Nana (Ekwensi), 348 Jamaica, 45 Japan, 83, 86, 138, 143, 146 Jesuits, 310 Jews, 383 Jihads, 39, 47, 321, 322, 323 Johannesburg, 379 Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 115 Joys of Motherhood, The (Emecheta), 350 Jubilee 2000, 120, 414 Judaism, 299 July's People (Gordimer), 355 Ka, Aminata Maïga, 346 Kaarta, 36 Kabbah, Ahmed Tejan, 179 Kabila, Laurent Désiré, 171 Kagame, Paul, 178 Kalahari Desert, 29, 101, 193 Kampala Document, 155 Kane, Cheikh Hamidou, 343 Kanem, 35 Kano (Nigeria), 36, 193 Kaonde, 259 Kariba Dam, 14 Katsina, 36 Kaunda, Kenneth, 87, 393 Keita, Modibo, 324 Kente, Gibson, 361 Kenya, 9, 15, 59, 71, 89, 157-158, 197, 198, 237, 371; anticolonialism in, 48, 63; independence movement in, 51

Index Kenyatta, J o m o , 51, 158, 312 Kerekou, M a t h i e u , 149, 169 Kgositsile, Keorapetse, 355 Khaldun, Ibn, 319 K h a r t o u m (Sudan), 321 Khoi, 373, 374, 375, 376 Khoisan language family, 24, 373 Kibaki, M w a i , 201 Kibwetere, Joseph, 316 Kikuyu. See G i k u y u K i l l i m a n j a r o P r o g r a m m e of Action on Population, 200 Kilwa (Tanzania), 39, 42 Kimathi, D e d a n , 51 K i m b a n g u , S i m o n , 313, 316 Kimbanguist church, 313 Kimberley (South Africa), 378 K i n g s h i p s / k i n g d o m s : d e v e l o p m e n t of, 3 8 - 4 0 ; divine, 3 3 - 3 4 ; savanna, 34-35 Kinshasa (Zaire), 79 Kinship, 245, 246; systems, 2 4 8 - 2 5 0 , 251 Kleptocracy, 82 Klerk, F. W. de, 392, 393, 394 Kom, 245, 256, 259 Kongi's Harvest (Soyinka), 352 Kongo War, 4 8 Korana, 376 Kourouma, A h m a d o u , 344 Krios, 4 5 - 4 6 Kruger, Paul, 380 Kumasi, 193 Kumbi Saleh (Ghana), 35 Kunene, Mazisi, 339 Kush, 34 Kwazulu, 390, 393, 397 LaBaule Doctrine, 167 Labor, 3, 59, 195, 277, 375; migration of, 104; in South Africa, 377, 378; of women, 388, 389 Labour Party (South Africa), 381, 382 Labyrinths with Paths of Thunder (Ökigbo), 350 Lagos (Nigeria), 45, 64, 190, 205 Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), 109, 110, 112, 135 La G u m a , A l e x , 355, 357 Lake B a n g w e u l u , 44 Lake Chad, 26, 35, 44, 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 Lake Malawi, 41, 44

467

Lake N a k u r u , 26 Lake Turkana, 26, 2 2 0 Lake Victoria, 2 2 5 - 2 2 6 Lake Victoria N y a n z a , 36 Land, 2 1 9 - 2 2 0 ; desertification of, 2 2 6 - 2 3 0 ; o w n e r s h i p of, 48, 66 Lander, Richard, 4 4 Lands Act, 394 Late Bourgeois World, The (Gordimer), 355 Laye, C a m a r a , 342 Legio Maria Church, 317 Lele, 252 Lesotho, 41, 49, 129, 306, 373, 378 Letters to Martha (Brutus), 355 Lettres d'hivernage (Senghor), 341 Leurres et lueurs (Diop), 342 Liberal Party, 385 Liberia, 4 5 - 4 6 , 9 3 , 3 1 1 Liberté (Senghor), 342 Libya, 92, 309 Lichina, Alice, 314 Life & Times of Michael k (Coetzee), 357 Lifetimes: Under Apartheid (Gordimer), 356 Limits (Okigbo), 350 L i m p o p o R., 23, 44, 48, 373 Lineage systems, 3 1 - 3 8 Linguistic groups, 24 Lion and the Jewel (Soyinka), 352 Lissouba, Pascal, 166 Literature, 3 3 1 - 3 3 2 ; in African languages, 3 3 8 - 3 3 9 ; in French, 3 4 5 - 3 4 7 ; oral, 3 3 2 - 3 3 8 ; Nigerian, 3 4 8 - 3 5 0 ; in Portuguese, 347; South African, 3 5 4 - 3 5 9 Livingstone, David, 4 4 ^ 1 5 , 311, 451 Loi-Cadre, 64 L o m é Convention, 156 L o n d o n Missionary Society, 44 Longlive! (du Plessis), 359 Lopes, Baltasar, 347 Lozi state, 37 LPA. See Lagos Plan of Action Luba, 37 Luso-Africans, 43 Luthuli, Albert, 386 Luuanda (Vieira), 347 Ly, Ibrahima, 346 Lying Days, The (Gordimer), 355

468

Index

Maasai, 101, 225 Macina, 40 Madagascar, 30, 162, 223 Madmen and Specialists (Sonyika), 352 Magic, 307, 308 Majoi, 314 Mahdism, 322 Mahfouz, Naguib, 331 Maitatsine movement, 324 Maize, 40 Maji Maji resistance, 48 Malagasy, 374 Malan, Daniel, 383, 384, 385 Malaria, 27 Malawi, 40, 47, 59, 72, 77, 202, 285, 388 Malayo-Polynesians, 30 Mali, 15, 35, 72, 227, 324, 346; kingdom of, 35, 38, 336 Manaka, Matsemela, 355, 360 Mandabi, 345 Mandat et Véhi dosane. Le (Sembene), 345 Mandela, Nelson, 52, 87,148, 386, 392, 393, 398 Mande speakers, 35 Manganese, 104 Mangroves, 102 Man of the Place (Achebe), 349 Mansa Musa, 35 Maponya, Maishe, 360 Mara (Tanzania), 225 Marabout, 149, 324 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 87 Marketing boards, 124 Marriage, 247, 2 5 1 - 2 5 3 ; as alliance, 2 4 7 - 2 4 8 ; women and, 292 Maru (Head), 358 Marwa, Mahammadu, 324 Marxism-Leninism, 4, 87 Masquerade, The (Clark), 351 Master of Petersburg, The (Coetzee), 357 Matanzima, Kaiser, 387 Matashikiza, Todd, 357 Matongeni (Zimbabwe), 306 Matriliny, 250, 251, 258, 260 Matrilocality, 259 Mau Mau rebellion, 51, 66 Mauritania, 149, 201, 228 Mauritius, 42, 200 Mauvais Sang, Le (U Tamsi), 342

M ' B a k a , 26, 101 Mbari Club, 350 Mbecki, Thabo, 55, 93, 399, 400, 401 Mbuti, 26, 101 Mda, Zakes, 359, 361 Mende, 273 Meroe, 34 Mfecane, 4 0 - 4 1 Mfolo, Thomas. 338 Mgijima, Enoch, 314 Mhudi (Plaatje), 357 Migration(s), 9, 30, 195; labor, 59, 104, 272, 378; urban, 79, 117, 120-121, 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 , 205 Military. See Armed forces Millennium Africa Recovery Plan, 417 Mine Boy (Abrahams), 357 Minerals, 14; in South Africa, 3 7 8 - 3 8 0 Mining, 50, 59, 104, 378, 379 Miroir de la vie (Ka), 346 Missionaries, 46, 302; Christian, 36, 46, 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 ; Islamic, 3 1 9 - 3 2 0 Mission terminée (Beti), 343 Mitterand, François, 148, 160, 163, 167 MNCs. See Multinational corporations Modernization, 195 Modisane, Blake, 358 Moffat, Robert, 311 Mogadishu, 39, 192 Moi, Daniel arap, 92, 210, 285. 317 Monroe, James, 46 Monrovia, 46 Monrovia Declaration. 109. 110 Monrovia Group, 151 Mori speakers, 36 Morning Yet on Creation Day (Achebe), 348 Morocco, 64, 310 Moscow Film School. 345 Moshoeshoe, 377 Mossi, 36 Motherless Baby (Ekwensi), 348 Motsisi, Casey, 358 Mourides, 322, 323, 325 Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments, 316 Movimiento Popular de Libertaçâo de Angola (MPLA), 67 Mozambique, 39, 40, 162, 287; anticolonialism in, 48. 67; colonial rule in, 50, 59; independence of, 52, 61, 388; political parties in, 70, 86

Index M p a n d e , 376, 377 M p h a h l e l e , Ezekiel ( E s ' k i a ) , 357 M P L A . See M o v i m i e n t o Popular de Libertagäo de Angola M t w a , Percy, 359 M u d i m b e , V. Y„ 342 M u g a b e , Robert, 86 Multinational corporations ( M N C s ) , 131, 158 M u s e v e n i , Yoweri, 178 M w a n a m u t a p a , 310 Mwene Mutapa, 36 M w e r i n d e , Credonia, 316 Mwindo epic, 336 M y a n g a , 336 My Children, My Africa! (Fugard), 360 My Name is Afrika (Kgositsile), 355 Myth, Literature and the African World (Soyinka), 351 My Son's Story (Gordiner), 355 Myths, 335 M z a m a n e , Mbulelo, 358 N A C T U . See National A f r i c a n C o n f e d e r a t i o n of Trade Unions Nag H a m m a d i caves, 209 Naira Power (Emecheta), 350 Nairobi (Kenya), 64 Nakasa, Nat, 358 N a m a , 48 Namibia, 48, 52, 237, 385; independence of, 61, 87, 394 Nandi, 47, 251 Nasser, G a m e l Abdel, 77 Natal (South Africa), 313, 376, 378, 394 National A f r i c a n C o n f e d e r a t i o n of Trade Unions ( N A C T U ) , 395 N a t i o n a l - A f r i k a n e r Party, 381 National Association for the A d v a n c e m e n t of Colored People ( N A A C P ) , 47 National C o m m i t t e e on the Status of W o m e n ( N C S W ) , 287 National Council of Nigeria and the C a m e r o o n s ( N C N C ) , 66 National Emigration Convention of Colored M e n , 46 Nationalism, 50, 61, 63, 64 Nationalist leaders, 65 Nationalist m o v e m e n t s , 5 0 - 5 2 Nationalist organizations, 6 4 - 6 5

469

National Party (NP), 381, 384 Native authorities, 2 7 6 Natives Land Act, 381 Natives Urban Areas Act, 382 N C N C . See National Council of Nigeria and the C a m e r o o n s N ' D a o , C h e i k h , 339, 347 Ndebele, 48, 303, 376; kingdom, 41 Ndione, Abasse, 346 N d u k a , U c h e , 353 Negritude, 340; themes of, 3 4 0 - 3 4 2 , 343 N e h a n d a , M b u y a , 306 Netherlands, 104, 373, 374 Neto, Agostinho, 347 Never Again ( N w a p a ) , 350 N e w National Party, 399 New Statesman, 350 N g c o b o , Lauretta, 358 N g e m a , M b o n g e n i , 359 N G O s . See N o n g o v e r m e n t a l organizations Nguni, 47, 376 Ngugi wa T h i o n g ' o , 3 3 8 - 3 3 9 ; works of, 3 5 3 - 3 5 9 Nicaea, 309 Nicene creed, 309 Nicol, Mike, 359 Niger, 86, 93, 129, 168, 2 2 5 - 2 2 6 , 324 N i g e r - C o n g o language family, 24 Niger Delta Environmental Survey, 235 Nigeria, 14, 35, 39, 46, 59, 66, 78, 236, 315, 325, 412; civil war in, 152-153; colonialism in, 47, 48; desertification in, 227; literature in, 3 4 8 - 3 5 0 ; oil in, 81, 113; political parties in, 66, 71,

86 Niger River, 12, 35, 40, 44, 4 6 Niger River Delta, 14, 26, 30, 234 Nile River, 12, 24, 34, 49, 320 Nilo-Saharan language family, 25 Nimeiri, Jafar, 174 Nkosi, Lewis, 358 N k u m a h , K w a m e , 47, 51, 150, 151 N k u w u , A f f o n s o , 36 Nocturnes (Senghor), 341 Noir de . . . . La ( S e m b e n e ) , 345 No Longer at Ease (Achebe), 349 None to Accompany Me (Gordimer), 355 N o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations ( N G O s ) , 112

470

Index

Northern People's C o n g r e s s (NPC), 66 Northern Rhodesia, 4 9 , 59, 64, 277, 379. See also Z a m b i a Nos natanis a cäo tinhoso ( H o n w a n a ) , 347 NP. See National Party N P C . See Northern P e o p l e ' s Congress N s o ' , 251 Nubia, 320 Nubians, 34 Nuer, 251, 254 N w a p a , Flora, 350 Nyabingi, 314 Nyasaland, 47, 66. See also Malawi N y a t s i m b e Mutota, 37 Nyerere, Julius, 158 Nyikang, 304 Nzinga, N k u w u , 37 Nzinga, Queen, 273 O A U . See Organization of African Unity O B . See O s s e w a b r a n d w a g O b a , Elesin, 352 O b a s a n j o , Olusegun, 155 Occasion for Loving (Gordimer), 355 Occidental Petroleum Corporation, 166 O f e i m u n , Odia, 353 Ogoni, 153, 235 Ogot, Grace, 353 Ogun Abibman (Soyinka), 351 Oh pays, mon beau peuple (Sembene), 345 Oil, 14, 81, 166; e n v i r o n m e n t and, 2 3 4 - 2 3 5 ; prices of, 118 Ojaide, Tanure, 353 Okara, Gabriel, 349 O k a v a n g o , 44 Okediran, Wale, 353 Okigbo, Christopher, 350 Olduvai Gorge, 220 O m a n i , 102 O m o t o s o , Kole, 353 One is Enough (Nwapa), 350 Onitsha (Nigeria), 348 On the Mines (Gordimer), 356 O n w u e m e , Tess, 353 O P E C . See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Opera Wonyosi (Soyinka), 352 O r a n g e Free State, 373, 374. 377, 379, 380 O r a n g e River, 374, 378

Organization of African Unity ( O A U ) , 109, 133, 138, 151-155, 236; Charter, 155 Organization of Petroleum E x p o r t i n g Countries (OPEC), 113, 118 Orphée d' AfriclOrphée d' Afrique (Werewere-Liking), 347 O s o f i s a n , Femi, 353 O s s e w a b r a n d w a g (OB; O x - W a g o n Guard), 383 Osundare, Niyi, 353 O u o l o g u e m , Yambo, 344 Oyo, 39^10, 49 O y o n o , Ferdinand, 343 Ozidi epic, 336 Ozidi Saga, The (Clark), 351 PAC. See Pan-African C o n g r e s s Palm oil, 43, 58, 103 Palm Wine Drinkard, The (Tutuola), 349 Pan-African Congress (PAC), 150, 387, 395 P a n - A f r i c a n i s m , 46, 51, 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 , 340, 341 Pangaea, 11 Parastatals, 71. 78; role of, 1 3 0 - 1 3 2 Parenthèse de sang. La (Tansi), 347 Park, M u n g o , 44 Pass laws, 377, 385 Pastoralism, 7, 9, 29, 101 Path of Thunder (Abrahams), 357 Paton. Alan, 357 Patriliny, 250, 251, 258 Patrilocality, 259 Patrimonialism, 75 Patronage, 66, 7 3 - 7 6 Patron-client networks, 66, 7 4 - 7 5 Pauvre Christ de Bomba, Le (Beti), 343 p ' B i t e k , Okot, 353 Peanuts, 43, 50, 58, 82 Pedi, 377, 379 Pemba, 42 Pentecostal churches, 316, 317 People of the City (Ekwensi), 348 Percy A m e n d m e n t , 284 Perpétue ou I'habitude du malheur (Beti), 346 Perse, St. John, 342 Personal rule, 75, 78 Pesticides, 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 , 2 3 3 - 2 3 4 Petals of Blood (Ngugi), 354

Index Peters, Lenri, 353 Petroleum. See Oil Phoenicians, 34 Pilgrim's Progress (Bunyan), 338 Places and Bloodstains (Kgositsile), 374 Plantations, 42, 50, 59, 103, 104 Playland (Fugard), 360 Plaatje, Solomon T., 357 P o a c h i n g , 238 Poems (Clark), 351 Poems from Algiers (Brutus), 355 Poetry, 333, 3 3 6 - 3 3 7 , 353; in French, 341, 342, 343; Nigerian, 3 5 0 - 3 5 1 ; South A f r i c a n , 3 6 2 - 3 6 4 Political parties, 51, 86, 93, 340; after independence, 6 5 - 6 6 ; single, 7 1 - 7 2 Pollution, 127, 202, 225 Polygyny, 193, 252, 275, 289 P o m p i d o u , Georges, 148 Population growth, 3, 27, 39, 81, 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 , 190 Population Registration Act, 394 Populations: 2, 7. See also Population growth Porto Novo, 39 Portugal, 37, 162, 273, 374; colonialism of, 4 8 - 5 0 , 60, 63, 67; missionaries from, 3 1 0 - 3 1 1 ; slave trade with, 37, 39, 40; trade with, 102, 103 Poverty, 69, 81; urban, 203, 4 1 0 , 411—412, 416 Power: centralization of, 47, 6 0 - 7 3 ; political, 57, 58, 6 1 - 6 2 Powers That Be, The (Nicol), 359 Precipitation, 8 - 9 Prempeh I, 51 Present Is a Dangerous Place to Live, The (Kgositsile), 355 Private property, 66. See also Land, o w n e r s h i p of Private sector, 109, 1 3 0 - 1 3 2 Progressive Federal Party (PFP), 385 Prose: oral tradition, 3 3 4 - 3 3 5 Prostitution, 208, 211 Puissance de UM, La (WerewereLiking), 347 Pula (Manaka), 361 Purified National Party (South A f r i c a ) , 383 Pygmies. See Mbuti

471

Qadir, A b d al-, 39 Qadiriyya, 321 Question of Power, A (Head), 358 Quran, 300, 318 Rabih, 47 Raft, The (Clark), 351 Railways, 11 Rainforests, 2 3 0 - 2 3 1 Rainforest societies, 24, 25 Ratsiraka, Didier, 162 Rebels, The (Ngugi), 354 Reed in the Tide, A (Clark), 351 R e f u g e e s , 203, 225, 376 Regard du roi, Le (Laye), 343 Remember Reuben (Beti), 346 Republicans of M a h m u d M u h a m m a d Taha, 324 Republic of Natalia, 376 Resources, 2, 3, 19(map) Reunion, 42 Reunited National Party (South Africa), 383 Revenant, Le (Fall), 346 Rhinos, 237 Rhodes, Cecil, 309, 379, 380 Rhodesia, 47, 104, 388. See also Northern Rhodesia; Southern Rhodesia Ride on the Whirlwind, A (Sepamla), 358 Riebeeck, Jan van, 374 Rive, Richard, 357 River Between, The (Ngugi), 353 Road, The (Sovinka), 352 Roads, 12, 106 Roberts, Sheila, 359 R o m a n Catholicism. See Catholicism Root Is One, The (Sepamla), 358 Rotimi, Ola, 36 R u b b e r production, 50, 58, 103 R u f i s q u e (Senegal), 49 Ruine presque cocasse d'un polichinelle, La (Beti), 346 Russia, 90 R w a n d a , 87, 164, 165, 176, 4 1 8 Sacred places, 3 0 6 - 3 0 7 S A D C . See Southern A f r i c a n Development Community S A D C C . See S o u t h e r n A f r i c a n Development Coordination Conference

472

Index

Sahara Desert, 25, 33, 101, 218 Sahel, the, 9, 101, 113, 227, 229 Saint Louis (Senegal), 49 Salim, Salim A h m e d , 153 Salt production, 36, 101 San, 101, 220, 373, 375 S A N N C . See South African Natives National Congress Sâo Tomé and Principe, 87 SAPs. See Structural adjustment programs Sarafina! (Ngema), 359 Sarbah, John Mensah, 50 Saro-Wiwa, Ken, 153, 235, 349 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 341, 342 Saudi Arabia, 162 Savannas, 9, 11, 24, 101 Savanna societies, 24, 2 5 - 2 6 , 3 4 - 3 5 Schreiner, Olive, 355 Screens Against the Sky (Boehmer), 359 Second Class Citizen (Emecheta), 350 Secret Lives and Other Stories (Ngugi), 354 Segregation. See Apartheid Segu, 15, 36 Selected Stories (Gordimer), 356 Seku, A h m a d u , 47 S e m b e n e , O u s m a n e , 338, 3 4 4 - 3 4 5 S e m u , 337 Senegal, 39, 49, 58, 59, 63, 147, 148. 149, 201, 211; desertification in, 227; Islam in, 322 Senegal River, 36 S e n e g a m b i a , 35, 4 3 Senghor, Léopold Sédar, 51, 147, 323, 340, 341 Sennar, 34 Sepamla, Sipho, 355, 358 Separate Amenities Act, 394 Serbro, 273 Serote, M o n g a n e Wally, 358, 363 Serowe (Botswana), 358 Serowe: The Village of the Rainwind (Head), 358 Sese Seko, Mobutu, 73, 1 4 6 - 1 4 7 Sesuto, 338 Shaba province, 37 Shaka, 40, 337, 338, 376 Shan a, 39, 288, 321, 324, 325 Sharpeville massacre, 387 She Plays with the Darkness (Mda), 361

Shilluk, 304 Shire River, 4 4 Shona, 37, 48, 59, 273; ancestor spirits of, 303, 304 Shuttle in the Crypt, A (Soyinka), 351 Sierra Leone, 44, 46, 86, 93, 311 Sikalo (Kente), 361 Silveira, G o n z a l o de, 310 S i m o n , Barney, 359 Simple Lust (Brutus), 328 Sirens, Knuckles, and Boots (Brutus), 355 Sisulu, Albertina, 387 Sisulu, Walter, 386 Sizwe Bansi Is Dead (Fugard), 360 Slapolepzsy, Paul, 362 Slave Girl, The (Emecheta), 350 Slavery, 28, 4 1 ^ 2 Slaves returning, 46^4-7; in South Africa, 374, 375 Slave trade, 2, 12, 35, 4 1 - 4 2 , 102, 103, 192, 1 9 3 - 1 9 4 , 249; d e v e l o p m e n t of, 39; and O y o , 3 9 - 4 0 ; to South Africa, 375 Smuts, Jan, 380, 381, 382, 383 S o b u k w e , Robert, 387 Sofala ( M o z a m b i q u e ) , 39, 192, 310 Soglo, Nicephore, 149, 169 Soils, 15, 219, 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 Sokoto, 39. 47, 321 Soleils des independences (Kourouma), 344 Somalia. 39. 43. 87. 93, 152, 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 , 176 Somaliland Republic. 152 Songhai, 35. 39, 320 Song of a Goat (Clark), 351 Song of the City ( A b r a h a m s ) , 357 Sonni Ali, 35 Sori, Ibrahima, 39 Sotho k i n g d o m , 3 9 - 4 0 Sotho speakers, 376 South Africa, 2, 14, 46, 48, 52, 55, 59, 129, 237, 3 7 2 ( m a p ) , 399; apartheid in, 373; literature of, 331. 3 5 4 - 3 6 4 ; minerals in, 3 7 9 - 3 8 0 South A f r i c a n Indian Council, 390 South A f r i c a n Natives National Congress ( S A N N C ) , 381 South A f r i c a n Party, 380 South African Writing Today (Gordimer), 356

Index Southern A f r i c a n D e v e l o p m e n t C o m m u n i t y ( S A D C ) , 156, 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 , 239,415 Southern A f r i c a n D e v e l o p m e n t Coordination Conference (SADCC), 159 Southern R h o d e s i a , 48, 59, 63, 371, 379. See also Z i m b a b w e South-West A f r i c a , 48, 371, 372. See also N a m i b i a Soviet Union, 83, 85, 143 S o w e t o , 388 Soyinka, Wole, 331, 347; works by, 350-352 Spain, 60 Speke, John, 4 4 Spices, 102 Spirit m e d i u m s , 3 0 6 - 3 0 7 Spirit possession cults, 314 Spirits: belief in, 3 0 3 - 3 0 5 ; c o m m u n i c a t i o n with, 3 0 6 - 3 0 7 Spirits Unchained (Kgositsile), 355 Sport of Nature, A (Gordimer), 355 Stanley, Henry Morton, 4 4 State(s), 2, 12, 20(map); d e v e l o p m e n t of, 33—41 State of Fear, A (du Plessis), 359 Statements After an Arrest Under the Immorality Act (Fugard), 360 St. Augustine, 310 Stebbing, E. P., 218 Steppe, 9 Stone Country, The (La G u m a ) , 358 S t o r m j a e r s , 384 Story of an African Farm, The (Schreiner), 355 Strains (Brutus), 355 Strijdom J. G., 384 Structural a d j u s t m e n t p r o g r a m s (SAPs), 4, 84, 90, 119, 1 3 4 - 1 3 8 , 1 7 3 - 1 7 4 , 205, 2 2 4 Students, 85 Suh-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (World Bank), 92, 111 Sudan, 34, 39, 40, 41, 58, 71, 172, 204, 227; d e v e l o p m e n t in, 233, 260; jihads in, 39, 4 0 Sufis, 321, 323, 324 Sugar industry, 42 Sundiata, 35, 336 Sundiata epic, 336

473

S u p r e m e being: beliefs in, 3 0 1 - 3 0 3 Sutherland, A f u a , 353 Suwarians, 325 Swahili, 39, 47, 321 Swaziland, 49, 129 Swynnerton Act, 277 Taha, M a h m u d M u h a m m a d , 324 Tambo, Oliver, 386 Tanganyika, 46, 59. See also Tanzania Tanganyika A f r i c a n National Union, 69 Tansi, Sony Labou, 346 Tanzania, 39, 40, 62, 68, 72, 1 5 7 - 1 5 8 , 237 Taya, Ould, 149 Tea, 104 Technology, 4 1 7 - 4 1 9 Teff, 29 Tekrur, 35 Tell Freedom (Abrahams), 357 Tempel, Placide, 340 Tertullian, 310 Theater: Nigerian, 3 5 1 - 3 5 3 ; South African, 359-362 T h e m b a , Can, 357 Things Fall Apart (Achebe), 348 This Day and Age (Nicol), 359 This is Lagos and Other Stories ( N w a p a ) , 350 This Time Tomorrow (Ngugi), 354 Threefold Cord, And a (La G u m a ) , 358 T h u k u , Harry, 51 Tibesti Plateau. 26 Tijaniyya, 321 T i m b u k t u , 15, 35, 321 (La G u m a ) , Time of the Butcherbird 358 Tobacco, 86 To Every Birth Its Blood (Serote), 358 Togo, 45, 72, 86, 87, 93, 129 Toile d'araignée, La (Ly), 346 Tonga, 255, 310 Too Late (Kente), 361 Too Late the Philarope (Paton), 357 Touba (Senegal), 325 Touré, Samory, 47 Touré, Sekou, 51 Tourism, 2 3 6 - 2 3 7 Toxic waste, 2 3 5 - 2 3 6 Trade, 37, 44, 1 0 5 - 1 0 7 ; d e v e l o p m e n t of, 102-103; with Europe, 4 2 ^ 3 ; global, 414—416; in gold, 3 4 - 3 5 ;

474

Index

long-distance, 32, 33, 35, 37, 102; savanna dwellers, 26-21. See also Slave trade Trade unions, 85, 390 Tragédie du roi Christophe, La (Césaire), 347 Transkei, 389, 393 Transorangia, 376 Transvaal, 373, 3 7 6 - 3 7 7 , 391 Travelers of the East ( M f o l o ) , 338 Trekboers, 376 Treurnicht, Andries, 390 Trials of Brother Jero, The (Soyinka), 352 Tribalism, 61, 74, 3 9 3 - 3 9 4 Triche-coeur (U Tamsi), 342 Truth C o m m i s s i o n , 398, 4 0 0 Tsetse fly, 27 Tsonga-Shangaan, 376 Tswana, 273, 378 Tugen, 277 Tukolor empire, 47 Tunisia, 34, 64, 310 Turkana, 101 Turner, H. M., 46 Tutu, Osei, 39 Tutuola, A m o s , 349 Twa, 220 UDF. See United D e m o c r a t i c Front Uganda, 36, 46, 47, 70, 75, 93, 107, 189, 210, 283 Umar, al-Hajj, 40 U m k h o n t o we Sizwe, 387 UNDP. See United Nations Development Programme U N E C A . See United Nations E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n for A f r i c a U n e m p l o y m e n t , 121, 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 Une Nouvelle Terre (Werewere-Liking), 347 UNEP. See United Nations Environmental P r o g r a m m e Une si longue letter (Bâ), 346 Une Vie de boy (Oyono), 343 UNFPA. See United Nations Fund for Population Activities UNICEF. See United Nations International C h i l d r e n ' s E m e r g e n c y Fund U n i o n des Populations C a m e r o u n a i s e s (UPC), 66

Union of South Africa. See South Africa Union of the Arab Maghreb ( U A M ) , 156 United Democratic Front (UDF), 390, 391 United K i n g d o m , 86, 158, 160-161; and C a p e Colony, 375, 376, 377; colonialism of, 47^49, 60; independence f r o m , 5 0 - 5 1 ; slave trade by, 39; trade with, 43, 102, 103 United Nations, 50, 52, 64, 170-172; Charter, 63 United Nations C o n f e r e n c e on the H u m a n Environment, 219 United Nations Development Decade, 109 United Nations Development P r o g r a m m e ( U N D P ) , 111, 127, 129, 171 United Nations E c o n o m i c C o m m i s s i o n for A f r i c a ( U N E C A ) , 109, 111, 136, 137 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ( U N E S C O ) , 171 United Nations Environmental P r o g r a m m e ( U N E P ) , 219 United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), 201 United Nations High C o m m i s s i o n e r for R e f u g e e s ( U N H C R ) , 171 United Nations International C h i l d r e n ' s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), 111. 171 United Nations International C o n f e r e n c e on Population. 200, 201 United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s ( U N N A D A F ) , 136, 138 United Nations Office of Emergency Operations in Africa ( O E O A ) , 172 United Nations P r o g r a m m e of Action for A f r i c a n E c o n o m i c Recovery and Development ( U N P A A E R D ) , 135, 136 United Party (South Africa), 382 United States, 3, 42, 45, 46, 52, 83, 85, 143, 176, 236; foreign policy of, 91, 165-166, 176, 236, 416 United States Agency for International Development ( U S A I D ) , 91, 127, 202

Index Universal N e g r o I m p r o v e m e n t Association, 4 6 University of Ibadan, 348 U N P A A E R D . See United Nations P r o g r a m m e of Action for A f r i c a n E c o n o m i c Recovery and Development U P C . See Union des Populations Camerounaises U p p e r Volta, 59. See also Burkina Faso Urbanization, 4, 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 , 2 0 2 - 2 0 7 , 223 U r b a n sector, 84, 117-118, 124; birthrates in, 195; discontent in, 3 ^ ; growth in, 79, 190, 2 0 2 - 2 0 7 ; migration to, 79, 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 , 217; poverty in, 203, 411; in South A f r i c a , 383, 394 U S A I D . See United States A g e n c y for International D e v e l o p m e n t U Tamsi, Tchicaya, 342 Vaal River, 377 Valley Song (Fugard), 360 Vegetation: patterns of, 9 - 1 1 , 18(map) Veldsingers, 362 Venda, 377 Ventre, Le (U Tamsi), 342 Verwoerd, Hendrik, 384, 386, 387 Veste d'intérieur, La (U Tamsi), 342 Victoria Falls, 44 Vida verdadeira de Domingos Xavier, A (Vieira), 347 Vie en spirale (Ndione), 346 Vie et demie, La (Tansi), 346 Vieira, José Luandino, 347 Vieux Nègre et la médaille, Le (Oyono), 343 Vladislavic, Ivan, 359 Voice, The (Okara), 349 Voie du salut, La (Ka), 346 Volkstaat, 336 Voltaïque (Sembene), 345 Vorster, B. J „ 387, 388 Voting rights; in South Africa, 376, 377, 378, 381, 382, 384 Voyage to the Congo (Gide), 339 Waiting for the Barbarians 357 Waiyaki Wa Hinga, 51 Walata (Ghana), 35

(Coetzee),

475

Walk in the Night, -4 (La G u m a ) , 358 Warlords, 93 Washington Consensus, 414 Water-based societies, 24 Ways of Dying (Mda), 359 Weep Not Child (Ngugi), 353 Werewere-Liking, 347 We Shall Sing for the Fatherland (Mda), 361 Wet Savana, 9, 11 What Happened to Burger's Daughter; or How South African Censorship Works (Gordimer), 356 Wheatley, Phillis, 348 When the Rain Clouds Gather (Head), 358 White Writing: On the Culture of Letters in South Africa (Coetzee), 357 W H O . See World Health Organization W h y d a h , 39 Why Haven't You Written: Selected Stories (Gordimer), 356 Wild Conquest (Abrahams), 357 Wildlife, 2 3 6 - 2 3 8 Wilhelm, Peter, 359 Windhoek Treaty, 160 Witchcraft, 210, 3 0 7 - 3 0 8 Witwatersrand, 379 Wives at War and Other Stories (Nwapa), 350 Wolof, 322, 332; oral traditions of, 337 Women, 26; in agriculture, 104, 122, 281; and birth control, 191, 199; and bridewealth, 173, 260, 275, 289; in development (WID), 2 8 3 - 2 8 4 ; and e c o n o m i e s , 127, 2 7 3 - 2 7 5 , 2 7 9 - 2 8 4 ; and education, 2 8 2 - 2 8 3 ; elite, 278, 286; in forest industries, 225; labor of, 388; literature by, 3 4 6 - 3 4 7 , 350; marginalization of, 1 2 7 - 1 3 0 ; and politics, 2 8 4 - 2 9 0 ; precolonial, 2 7 2 - 2 7 4 ; and religion, 306, 307, 312, 314 W o m e n ' s groups, 2 8 5 - 2 8 8 World A I D S C o n f e r e n c e , 212 World Bank, 83, 86, 8 9 - 9 0 , 109, 119-120, 1 3 4 - 1 3 8 , 1 7 3 - 1 7 5 , 224, 285, 4 1 0 World Festival of N e g r o Arts, 352 World Health Organization ( W H O ) , 171

476

Index

World of Strangers, A (Gordimer), 355 World War I, 382 World War II, 58, 59, 61, 63, 143, 383 Wound in the Heart (Ngugi), 354 Wreath for Udomo, A (Abrahams), 357 Writers in Politics, Essays (Ngugi), 354 Xala, 345 Xhosa, 338, 373, 374, 375, 394 Xuma, Alfred, 386 Yako, 256-258, 260 Yamassoukro (Cote d'lvoire), 205 Yao, 47 Yoruba, 39, 45, 49, 66, 338, 349, 351; oral tradition of, 334, 336; religion of, 303, 307 Yorubaland, 47, 307 You Can't Get Lost in Cape Town (Witcomb), 359

Zaire, 14, 73, 75, 82, 89, 93, 146, 179; tropical forests, 221. See also Democratic Republic of Congo Zaire River, 30, 45 Zambezi River, 14, 30, 39, 45 Zambia, 14, 40, 62, 72, 116, 208-210; political reform in, 86, 87, 93 Zanzibar, 42, 102 Zenawe, Meies, 178 Zezuru, 303 Zimbabwe, 14, 39, 40, 52, 59, 61, 86, 116, 117, 208, 227, 237, 371. See also Great Zimbabwe Zionist churches, 315, 316 Zulu, 338, 339, 379, 397, 390; expansion of, 376; religion of, 303, 307 Zulu kingdom, 40-41, 376, 377 Zulu (Ngema), 359 Zulu Poems (Kunene), 339 Zwi, Rose, 359

About the Book The authors provide up-to-date, thorough analyses not only of history, politics, and economics, but also of international relations, environmental issues, family and kinship, the role of women, religious beliefs, and literature. Each topic is covered with reference to the latest available scholarship. All of the chapters in this third edition have been fully revised and updated. Maps, a glossary, and a table of basic political data enhance the text, which has already made its place as the best available introduction to this diverse and complex continent.

April A. Gordon is professor of sociology and director of the W o m e n ' s Studies Program at Winthrop University. Donald L. Gordon is professor of political science and director of African-Asian Programs at Furman University. All of the contributors to the book, in addition to being experts in their fields, have extensive experience teaching in undergraduate institutions.

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