Transforming conflict through social and economic development: Practice and policy lessons from Northern Ireland and the Border Counties 9781526112316

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Transforming conflict through social and economic development Practice and policy lessons from Northern Ireland and the Border Counties

SANDRA BUCHANAN

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Transforming conflict through social and economic development

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Transforming conflict through social and economic development Practice and policy lessons from Northern Ireland and the Border Counties Sandra Buchanan

Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave Macmillan

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Copyright © Sandra Buchanan 2014 The right of Sandra Buchanan to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed exclusively in Canada by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for isbn 978 0 7190 8823 0 hardback First published 2014 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not  guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset in Sabon by Koinonia, Manchester

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Contents

List of figures and tables page vii Acknowledgements ix xi List of abbreviations Introduction 1

Part I  Setting the context 1 Conflict transformation – towards a theoretical framework 2 Social and economic context of the Northern Ireland conflict

23 50

Part II  Examining the impacts 3 Conflict transformation programmes outlined 87 4 Impacts of the tools on conflict transformation practice 103 Part III  Learning and recommendations 5 Lessons learned, implications and recommendations for practice 199 6 Conclusion 246 Appendix 1 Peace II – funding delivery mechanisms Appendix 2 Peace I – priorities and measures Appendix 3 Peace II – priorities and measures Appendix 4 INTERREG I (1991–1993) – sub-programmes and measures Appendix 5 INTERREG II (1994–1999) – sub-programmes and measures Appendix 6 INTERREG IIIA (2000–2006) – priorities and measures

255 257 259 261 262 263

Bibliography 264 Index 282

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List of figures and tables

Figures 1.1 Lederach’s peacebuilding ‘pyramid’ 2.1 Northern Ireland unemployment levels 1992–2010 2.2 Northern Ireland long-term unemployed as percentage of total unemployed 1992–2010 (+2011)

page 30 60 60

Tables 2.1 Persons aged 15 years and over in each Border County, classified by principal economic status (unemployed, having lost or given up previous job), compared to the state 2.2 Comparison of long-term unemployed in ROI and NI 2.3 Persons aged 15 years and over in the labour force classified by ILO economic status for the border region 2.4 Unemployment rates for those with Leaving Certificate compared to those without Leaving Certificate (ROI) 2.5 Persons aged 15 years and over classified by age at which full-time education ceased – 1996, 2002 and 2011 compared 2.6 Persons aged 15 years and over classified by highest level of ­education completed – 1996, 2002 and 2011 compared 2.7 Persons aged 15–64 years in the state and the border region ­classified by long-term unemployment and highest level of education attained 3.1 Percentage of funding awarded to Peace I priorities 3.2 Actual funding allocated to Peace I priorities 3.3 Percentage of funding awarded to Peace II priorities 3.4 Actual funding allocated to Peace II priorities 3.5 Peace III funding allocations 3.6 INTERREG I and II funding allocations compared 3.7 INTERREG IIIA funding allocation

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61 62 63 66 67 68 69 95 95 96 96 97 100 100

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Acknowledgements

I owe my deepest thanks and gratitude to a number of people: to Professor Paul Arthur and Dr Stephen Ryan of the University of Ulster’s Magee Campus for their invaluable guidance and support during the six years through which this research was carried out; to my previous employer, County Monaghan Vocational Education Committee (VEC), particularly its former CEO Larry McCluskey, whose appetite for cross-border, European and international projects and partnerships introduced me to the three tools examined in this book, planting the idea for it and providing practical experience during the almost seven years prior to beginning the research which I’ve been able to continue with County Donegal VEC (now Donegal Education and Training Board); to the CSO and NISRA for the extraction and provision of information and to all those who so kindly gave of their time for interviews, insights, conversations and comments – they are too numerous to list but this research would not have happened without them. Sincere thanks to Dr Cillian McGrattan for advice and guidance and particularly to Dr Maria Power for proofreading, guidance and encouragement. Thanks to Taylor and Francis Group (Informa UK Limited) for permission to reproduce research in Chapter 4, previously published as ‘Transforming Conflict in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties; Some Lessons from the Peace Programmes on Valuing Participative Democracy’, Irish Political Studies, 23:3 (2008), 387–409, and to Liverpool University Press for permission to reproduce research in Chapter 5, previously published as ‘Examining the Peacebuilding Policy Framework of the Irish and British Governments’, in M. Power (ed.), Building Peace in Northern Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), pp. 172–90. Permission was also sought from the United States Institute of Peace Press to reproduce John Paul Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid (fig. 1.1) from Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997) – sincere thanks to Professor John Paul Lederach for his permission to do so and also for providing permission to use his article ‘The Challenge of the 21st Century. Justpeace’, in People Building Peace. 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), pp. 27–36. Thanks also to the staff at Manchester University Press for their assistance. Finally, huge thanks to my family, particularly Holly and Isabella for the breaks and laughs, but most of all to my husband Paul, for his listening ears and constant support; without them I would not have completed this book.

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List of abbreviations

ADM BMW CAWT CBI CCLTF CDB CFNI

Area Development Management Border, Midlands and Western (region of Ireland) Cooperation and Working Together Confederation of British Industry County Council Led Task Force County Development Board Community Foundation for Northern Ireland (formerly known as the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust) Combat Poverty Agency CPA Community Relations Council CRC CSO Central Statistics Office Community Workers Co-operative CWC Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment DETI Department of Finance and Personnel (Belfast) DFP DUP Democratic Unionist Party East Border Region Committee EBRC ECA European Court of Auditors European Regional Development Fund ERDF ESF European (Structural)/Social Fund Freedom of Information FOI GAA Gaelic Athletic Association GCSE General Certificate of Secondary Education GVA Gross Value Added ICBAN Irish Central Border Area Network IFB Intermediary Funding Body IFI International Fund for Ireland ILO International Labour Organisation INTERREG EU Programme for inter-regional and cross-border cooperation LSPs Local Strategy Partnerships MEP Member of the European Parliament Member of the Legislative Assembly MLA NAPS National Anti-Poverty Strategy NESF National Economic and Social Forum NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

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xii NICVA NISRA NIVT

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NWRCBG NUTS OFMDFM OP PCIA P/CROs Peace I Peace II Peace III PUP SEUPB UUP

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List of abbreviations Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action Northern Ireland Social Research Agency Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust (now known as the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland) North West Region Cross Border Group Nomenclature of Territorial Statistical Units (geographical scales which Eurostat uses for statistical purposes) Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister Operational Programme peace and conflict impact assessment Peace/Conflict Resolution Organisations EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (1995–99) EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (2000–04) EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (2007–13) Progressive Unionist Party Special EU Programmes Body Ulster Unionist Party

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Introduction

A number of long-term conflict transformation funding programmes or tools have been operating in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties since 1986 under the guise of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), the EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation and the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace I, Peace II and Peace III), since 1994 and the INTERREG I, II and III programmes, since 1991. All have facilitated the conflict transformation process in the region specifically through social and economic development.1 Collectively, having contributed over €3.25 billion to the process, they have been responsible for a huge increase in transformation practice, particularly at the grassroots level, prompting previously unforeseen levels of citizen empowerment and local ownership of the peace process, consequently highlighting the intrinsic value of grassroots participatory democracy.2 Despite relatively little in-depth research on their contribution to the transformation process in the region, these tools have enabled significant levels of learning to take place, albeit more so at the grassroots than the top levels of society, providing a suitable context for exploring conflict transformation in action and presenting post-ceasefire Northern Ireland and the Border Counties as a case ripe for lesson sharing. Conflict transformation and socioeconomic development Conflict transformation is a relatively unexplored and largely misunderstood concept within the broadly defined field of conflict management. It is also generally misunderstood within peace and conflict research, international relations and politics. Even less understood is the transformation of conflict through social and economic development, at both a theoretical and policy level, particularly in terms of the Northern Ireland conflict. Although interest has increased in recent years this has not necessarily produced a parallel growth in clarification or accuracy, as reflected in the theoretical and practitioner discourses. The term ‘conflict

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Transforming conflict through social and economic development

transformation’ is often used interchangeably with the terms ‘conflict resolution’ or ‘settlement and peacebuilding’, often referring to the same approach and usually, mistakenly, located within a post-conflict frame of reference. Conflict transformation draws on a number of concepts inherent in conflict management (conflict resolution and settlement), democracy (citizen empowerment/participatory democracy) and development. In viewing conflict as a catalyst for social change, transformation is primarily concerned with overcoming direct, cultural and structural violence over the long-term. However, in moving from violence to peace, most practical (and theoretical) efforts have concentrated on the removal of direct violence only, usually over the short-term. Herein lies the crux of its conceptual difficulties – its emergence from a number of pre-existing traditions has left it theoretically misunderstood and conceptually confused, resulting, in practice terms (as this book will demonstrate), in ‘a relative absence of consensus among governments on the question of appropriate implementation’.3 This is starkly illustrated by Ryan who notes quite simply that ‘there is no single model of transformation’,4 which leaves a considerable challenge: the core difficulty it faces is that ‘its jump to prominence … has outpaced the development of its meaning in clearly understood policy and operational terms’.5 This has been clearly evident in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties especially when one considers the numerous weaknesses associated with the Peace programmes, for example their complexity, excessive bureaucracy, sustainability issues and low uptake from the Protestant community. On an international level this was starkly illustrated by the chaos which afflicted post-conflict Iraq, whereby the US and UK governments made next to no plans for the post-conflict reconstruction of the country when planning their invasion: the US government set up its post-conflict reconstruction office barely eight weeks before the invasion with staff only entering the country twelve days after the fall of Saddam Hussein, while in the UK, the Department of International Development looked for a reading list on post-conflict reconstruction in the days before the invasion. This behaviour has been described as ‘criminally negligent’ by Dr Toby Dodge, one of those from whom the UK government sought advice.6 Conceptually, conflict transformation was first mooted by Johan Galtung in 1976 when he set out his tripartite classification of conflict management strategies: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. His contribution had already widened understandings of violence (as more than just direct violence), by introducing the groundbreaking concept of structural violence or ‘social injustice’7 (which viewed the

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Introduction

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absence of direct violence as negative peace and the absence of structural violence as positive peace). But he went further than this by presenting methods for achieving a positive peace, hence addressing the root causes of conflict, a core conflict transformation value. This was followed by the introduction of the concept of cultural violence, defined as ‘those aspects of culture … that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence’.8 Innovatively, Galtung defined peace as ‘nonviolent and creative conflict transformation … to know about peace we have to know about conflict and how conflicts can be transformed, both nonviolently and creatively’.9 Until Galtung’s introduction of the notion of conflict transformation, the management of conflict was previously conceptualised merely in terms of peacemaking and peacekeeping, normally associated with the United Nations. Indeed it was 1992 before the term ‘peacebuilding’ entered the UN’s lexicon when the then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali briefly discussed it in his report An Agenda for Peace. Its entrance, however, was misleadingly defined in terms of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding – action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’10 – though in the follow-up 1995 report Supplement to an Agenda for Peace this understanding was widened to also encompass preventative actions. Importantly, both reports alluded to the potential of social and economic development to contribute to peacebuilding, suggesting that ‘social peace is as important as strategic or political peace’.11 Consideration of this potential is crucial to clearly understand one of the central components of conflict transformation – that of dealing with the root causes of conflict. Väyrynen, in expanding Galtung’s conceptualisations, notes that: Violence is embedded in structures … violence and conflicts may be managed by instrumental action, but they can be eliminated only by identifying their root causes. Those causes and their functions are, however, ever changing with the economic and social transformation of societies. That is why any argument that a conflict has been solved for good, that history has ended, is based on an ahistorical illusion. The only historically viable approach is to aim to eliminate the violence in present conflicts and to trace the new socioeconomic transformations which create new sources of violence.12

Thus, while the potential role of social and economic development has certainly been alluded to by some researchers, attempts at providing an in-depth understanding of this potential have largely been avoided by political scientists, leaving economists to bridge the gap. Work by Collier and Stewart and Brown, for example, has been crucial in addressing

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this issue. Collier’s research on the economic causes of conflict has found that ‘because the economic dimensions of civil war have been largely neglected, both governments and the international community have missed substantial opportunities for promoting peace’.13 Economists have further highlighted the complexities of the role of social and economic development as a cause of conflict (and consequently in transforming conflict). For example, Stewart and Brown argue that ‘economic and social HIs [horizontal inequalities] provide the conditions that lead to dissatisfaction among the general population and, consequently, give rise to the possibilities of political mobilization, but it is political exclusion that is likely to trigger a conflict … there is also often a provocative cultural dimension’.14 Moreover: the horizontal inequalities explanation of conflict is based on the view that when cultural differences coincide with economic and political differences between groups, this can cause deep resentments that may lead to violent struggles … Horizontal inequalities are multidimensional, involving access to a large variety of resources along economic, social, and political vectors or dimensions.15

Experience has therefore shown ‘not only that increasing socioeconomic HIs have preceded the emergence of violent conflict, but that ­reductions in socioeconomic HIs, such as occurred in Northern Ireland in the 1980s, may contribute to the conditions for a peaceful resolution of such conflicts’.16 Nevertheless, key contributions to the development of transformational theory by Azar, in examining social conflicts, suggest that ‘effective conflict management involves consensus-building augmented by socio-economic development, a perspective which is compatible with the view that politics is about community building and is thus an inclusive enterprise’.17 Explored in conjunction with the work of Kriesberg et al.18 which examines the transformation of intractable conflicts, we can go some way towards understanding the dynamics of conflict transformation through social and economic development in a case such as Northern Ireland. The costs of any conflict are largely social and economic, with civilians bearing the brunt of the consequences in terms of lives lost, displacement and loss of possessions, disruption of education, loss of employment/ income, psychological trauma, health deficiencies, destruction of infrastructure and redirection of investment. These are felt long after conflict has ended, usually in terms of a lasting legacy of structural violence manifested through poverty. However, the definitional morass alluded to earlier presents its own difficulties when considering conflict transformation through social and economic development. The World Bank rightly argues that without definitional clarity there is a tendency for funders to

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Introduction

5

‘risk labelling all socio-economic development efforts in a conflict setting as peacebuilding … [which] should improve conditions for economic reconstruction, development and democratization, but should not be equated or confused with these efforts’.19 This dilemma is replicated in the conflict transformation research to date which has struggled to understand the links between social and economic development and its potential for transforming conflict, usually, imprudently, examining economic development in isolation from social development. Having received little scholarly attention for many years, Collier’s introduction of the greed versus grievance perspective dominated early debates on the economics of conflict.20 However, this has since proved problematic and scholars have continued to struggle with what role, if any, economics plays as a cause of conflict, in sustaining and prolonging conflict, in transforming conflict and whether social and economic development should be considered separately, while reaching no firm conclusions.21 Killick et al. have found that ‘to date … the international community has been slow to recognise the private sector’s potential, focusing almost exclusively on business as an agent of economic development rather than peacebuilding’.22 Economic development’s contribution to conflict transformation can be simply divided into two schools of thought – those who believe it can transform conflict and those who believe it cannot. A resolute belief in either is somewhat foolish; economic development, properly implemented, contains huge potential for transforming conflict but is a complex issue. Indeed, it should be noted that the argument that conflict is caused by economics is not a wise approach to take either; Ballentine and Nitzschke, in discussing the research findings of Ballentine and Sherman,23 state that: one of the principal findings of this research was that among the cases studied, economic factors, whether construed as greed, grievance or something else, were nowhere the sole cause of conflict, but in some instances did play a signal role in shaping the character and duration of hostilities as well as posing obstacles for effective resolution. For this reason, they need to be taken into account by those policymakers seeking ways to achieve sustainable peace.24

Thus contributors to the former school far outweigh those contributing to the latter. In considering transformation through economic development, Rupesinghe provides a devastatingly simple but accurate observation: ‘the survivors of violent conflicts cannot eat peace! We have to invest money, material and people to sustain peace. We need to look at investment in the reconstruction of infrastructure, in fair trade, and job creation.’25

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Transforming conflict through social and economic development

However, part of the problem with existing research is that it examines the role of economic development in isolation: neglecting to examine it conjunctionally with social (and indeed political) development will almost certainly create difficulties at best or ensure its failure at worst. Collier, in exploring determinants of economic growth in (civil) war-ravaged countries, has found in post-conflict situations that ‘social policy is relatively more important and macroeconomic policy is relatively less important … than in normal situations … relative to the strategies normally adopted, social policy should be given somewhat more weight’.26 This is significant because, as we shall see later in the current context, those at the top level on both sides of the Irish Border were scathing of social inclusion projects receiving priority consideration (and funding) under Peace I, attaching more importance to economic development in post-ceasefire Northern Ireland and its Border Counties. Research emerging from the transformation community is beginning to highlight the fundamental requirement to understand the role of this critical component,27 not least because ‘there are sufficient examples of the local private sector contributing constructively to peace … to suggest it remains one of the underestimated and underused peacebuilding actors’.28 Indeed, Smith’s peacebuilding palette and Hamber and Kelly’s definition of reconciliation demonstrate that social and economic development are fundamental transformational components that require deeper consideration; both are intimately intertwined and their separation and exclusion from the transformation process would be detrimental.29 If tackling structural violence is central to conflict transformation, the role and contribution of social and economic development therefore requires further extensive research. Citizen empowerment What sets conflict transformation apart from other management processes is its inclusion of those at the grassroots, concentrating on empowering ordinary citizens who make up civil society and suffer most during conflict. However, like other conceptual understandings within conflict transformation, there is no commonly agreed definition of what constitutes civil society, neither in the academic nor practitioner communities. Those that do exist are blurred, ranging from the grassroots masses to well-organised and established (international) non-governmental organisations (NGOs), based mainly on Western conceptualisations. Pugh notes that ‘the social-civil dimension of regeneration has been a poor relation in peacebuilding’30 and by asking who owns peacebuilding he asserts the need to develop ‘the idea of regeneration through peacebuilding as

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Introduction

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a concept that fosters “local ownership”, engagement with local norms and values and integrated social development processes to underpin the non-violence in societies’.31 This is an area which has gained considerable currency in recent years, due in part to the comprehensive contribution of John Paul Lederach’s 1997 thesis, which contends that outsiders (usually Track I actors) cannot create a sustainable peace; they can assist in brokering peace and contributing financially but its long-term sustainability depends on those directly affected by it (local or Track III actors) taking ownership by leading its creation, implementation and sustainability. For Lederach, conflict transformation, in seeking constructive and sustainable social change, is the art of ‘how to move from that which destroys toward that which builds’,32 requiring ‘a long-term view that focuses as much on the people in the setting of conflict building durable and flexible processes, as it does specific solutions’.33 However, as Donais observes, ‘while the principle of local ownership enjoys broad rhetorical acceptance it has proven inherently difficult to operationalize’.34 In the Northern Ireland context, this increasing interest in civil society transformation activities has not been matched by an increase in research: very few publications deal explicitly with the link between conflict transformation and citizen empowerment. This is despite empowerment practice having received sizeable attention among the grassroots over the years, albeit without official recognition from the top.35 It has also received extensive recognition through the Peace programmes. In the Irish context, the issue of social capital gained some currency a number of years ago,36 but this was driven more by a rising concern in the Republic about shrinking levels of active citizenship (or volunteering), as expounded by Robert Putnam, than by a concern about the transformation of conflict, and certainly not the transformation of the conflict on its doorstep.37 The difficulty with the Northern Ireland case study is that for too long academia has largely concentrated on elite-level politics and solutions with little or no attention given to the critical role of the grassroots. While Williamson et al. have provided some local understanding of the role of community and voluntary action in the post-ceasefire context,38 Cochrane and Dunn’s contribution (and, to a lesser extent, Williams, Farrington and Power)39 in extensively examining the role of community and voluntary peace/conflict resolution organisations (P/ CROs) in the Northern Ireland conflict stands alone in representing the first serious attempt to address this deficit, rightly highlighting how little is known about P/CROs and their contribution to the social and political development of Northern Ireland, despite the work they have carried out. It is at the macro level that the significance of such organisations, if taken together, can be found:

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While it is difficult to point to a concrete cause and effect with regard to the P/CRO sector and the peace process in Northern Ireland, and although its impact on the political process has been peripheral rather than central, it would be reasonable to conclude that Northern Ireland would have been a lot worse off without its contribution to peace and conflict resolution over the last thirty years. This sector filled a vacuum left by the political actors in the 1970s and 1980s, and created a visible tier of people who presented some alternative to the political nihilism exhibited within the constitutional debate for most of the period from 1969 until the early 1990s.40

Grassroots organisations also often provided the means for top-level actors to interact when they were unable to do so in public. Moreover, Cochrane and Dunn maintain that ‘there is tangible evidence that the ideas and ethos promoted by the NGO sector have impacted directly on the political structures of Northern Ireland’41 – institutional recognition of the role of civil society was provided by the Good Friday Agreement which resulted in the creation of the Civic Forum comprising representatives of civil society ‘[to] act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues’.42 While Cochrane and Dunn argue that ‘this novel institution would not have been created without the intellectual contribution by the P/CRO sector during the duration of the conflict’,43 Bell’s examination of its short life (October 2000–October 2002, when it was suspended) highlights the difficulties faced by grassroots actors in having their voice heard, particularly by those at the top.44 Crucially Cochrane and Dunn have highlighted that ‘within the P/CRO sector in Northern Ireland there is a very underdeveloped analysis of the causes of the conflict’.45 This is important because, as shall be seen later, the three programmes examined here have provided a limited response to addressing this issue despite its centrality to successful conflict transformation. However, this has been a fault of the transformation process in the region as a whole, not just the P/CRO sector or certain transformation tools. As important as Cochrane and Dunn’s contribution has been, its focus has been on those organisations specifically involved in peace and reconciliation work, which in itself has been a relatively limited section of the grassroots, in essence those already converted. The programmes examined in this book have been catalysts for an unprecedented level of participation and empowerment of ordinary citizens by using social and economic development to enable the wider involvement of the grassroots in the transformation process; the academic literature has simply not examined in-depth this extraordinary level of empowerment from a conflict transformation perspective or indeed a political perspective in terms of participatory democracy. This examination has largely been left

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Introduction

9

to practitioners to undertake, albeit mainly in relation to the work of the Peace programmes, thus presenting a deficit to be addressed.

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The Northern Ireland conflict and the Border Counties The Northern Ireland conflict has been extensively analysed historically and politically. However, this is just one aspect of the conflict; there has been little assessment of the conflict’s financial, psychological, emotional, social and economic costs. Moreover, the region’s overall conflict transformation process, particularly through social and economic development, has received little academic attention. While components have been alluded to, with the macro-political component receiving generous coverage, a comprehensive treatment of the overall process has remained elusive. Neither have any explicit attempts been made to transformationally examine any of the three programmes. Certainly Byrne has provided some analysis of the impacts of the IFI and Peace I in terms of building peace through economic aid,46 while some analysis exists on the contribution the programmes have made to cross-border cooperation.47 However, in spite of a growing volume of implementation, programme evaluation, audit and annual reports, there is a serious dearth of research on the overarching impact these programmes have had on the transformation of the Northern Ireland conflict or on their implications as transformation tools for conflict management, transformation and peacebuilding practice in this border region and elsewhere, either individually or collectively. Doubtless much of this is due to the infancy of the programmes, as they are still in their implementation stage, yet the academic and transformation communities appear, erroneously, to be waiting for them to run their course before engaging in serious assessments. However, a lack of analysis from the beginning can prove problematic when it comes to long-term process planning, sustainability and success. Nevertheless, the advent of the Peace programmes in particular has seen an increase in research focusing on the transformation process from the perspective of the tools themselves and, more generally, in terms of explorations of aspects of the process rather than thorough treatments. On both counts, the greatest amount of analysis of the transformation process has been generated by the non-academic community48 with the largest analytical base provided by those directly involved with the administration and evaluation of the Peace programmes, the various Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs), with grassroots-based IFBs, drawn from the community and voluntary sector and those charged with carrying out the mid-term and ex-post evaluations voicing the most criticism; both sources provide very useful insights into the transformation tools and

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by extension, the transformation process. The IFBs in particular have not been afraid to bite the hand that feeds them or, indeed, unlike the academic community, to assess a live process, providing some extremely valuable and scrupulous judgements. Significantly, research by Hillyard et al., which resulted directly from the Peace programmes, examines poverty and conflict from an international perspective to extract the lessons and implications. This study, as the only one in the context of the region’s conflict transformation process to seriously examine poverty (including social and economic issues) as a cause and consequence of conflict and relate it to Northern Ireland and the Border Counties, rightly highlights that internationally ‘at the level of policy there is increasing emphasis on ensuring that all forms of intervention are integrated around the objective of conflict reduction and that tackling poverty is an essential part of this’.49 Crucially, it highlights the complexity of the poverty–conflict relationship and how little has changed for some in the region; thus ‘the key challenge now is to “mainstream” peace-building and conflict resolution within anti-poverty strategies and reconstruction programmes’.50 Finally, remarkably few references have been made to the Border Counties when discussing the conflict’s impact, other than referring to its political origins, despite their centrality to the transformation process. As O’Dowd and McCall postulate, ‘whatever else the Northern Ireland conflict is about, it is certainly about borders in both a material and a metaphorical sense’.51 Although Channel Research astutely observes that ‘while the significance of the border has changed over time, it has nevertheless been a core issue in the conflict and will have a central role to play in any sustainable peace process’,52 worryingly: both governments seem to have agreed that the future development of the peace process is now dependent on agreement between the political parties representing both traditions in the North. While clearly such agreement is critical, what seems to be lacking is an adequate appreciation, or a sense of urgency, vis-à-vis the role of the cross-border dimension in building peace and reconciliation and in facilitating the improvement of intercommunal relations within Northern Ireland.53

Policy context In a policy context, neither the Irish nor UK governments possess conflict transformation policies relating to the conflict on their doorstep; their strategies in this regard have been firmly placed within the (international) development cooperation arena.54 In doing so a serious contradiction emerges: on the one hand, they obviously see a need for laying out their

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Introduction

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position on international peacebuilding (however disjointedly) by articulating its role through addressing international conflicts; on the other hand, from this perspective, they do not relate conflict transformation to their own internal conflict. The only policy pronouncement from the Irish government is from a development cooperation perspective. Its position in this regard was laid out for the first time in its 2006 White Paper on Irish Aid, which argues that ‘poverty and underdevelopment can be at once a cause and a consequence of conflict … More broadly, most of the work of Irish Aid can be seen as removing or reducing the causes of conflict.’55 However, this makes no reference whatsoever to a conflict transformation policy (international or domestic) or to the Northern Ireland conflict other than in terms of lessons learned: Ireland is well placed to play a more active role in international conflict prevention and resolution. Our own history, and the positions we have traditionally taken on issues such as decolonisation, disarmament and the Middle East, have resulted in considerable international goodwill … We are committed to seeking to play a greater role, where appropriate and possible, in facilitating or assisting peace processes and in supporting countries or regions emerging from conflict.56

Thus the Irish government’s contradictory view of its conflict sees it as an internal matter and not appropriate for inclusion in its pronouncements on conflict management; yet it was a conflict that was internationalised by the government for many years as it sought political and financial support and solutions. Certainly many lessons have been learned that can be shared with others, but it would be a mistake to think that the conflict on its own doorstep has been totally transformed and therefore does not merit further articulation from a policy perspective. Similarly, Smith highlights how the UK does not, as such, have a peacebuilding policy, but rather ‘a plethora of statements about aspects of their policy approaches’,57 again placing it firmly within the international development cooperation arena and again making no reference whatsoever to the conflict on its doorstep in Northern Ireland. As shall be seen later, this has had serious implications for conflict transformation practice in the region. Research methodologies The book develops its theoretical framework through the e­ xploration of current debates on conflict transformation, focusing primarily on the ­theoretical contributions of Johan Galtung and John Paul Leder­ach (particularly his interdependence, justice and process–­ structure     gap

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12

t­heories), creating a number of criteria against which the three pro­­ grammes are assessed. A large number of semi-structured interviews were conducted across the complete range of Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid (see chapter 1), including individuals involved as project promoters who implemented projects funded by the programmes (normally) at a grassroots level (Track III actors); those at the middle level, involved in implementing and managing the tools (Track II actors); and those at the top level, politicians (Track I actors), some of whom were involved (unusually) in project promotion or in programme implementation, management and policy development.58 There was an abundance of actors to interview regarding the Peace programmes due to their recent and widespread nature, with fewer actors familiar with the IFI. Serious difficulties in this regard related to the INTERREG programmes: actors with direct experience of INTERREG I and II, such as staff, have since moved on and institutional memory has been lost in the process as programme activity had long ceased, while the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) staff who manage INTERREG IIIA and IV have no knowledge of these previous programmes. Moreover, activity spread generated by INTERREG was not as widespread as that of Peace. Additionally, some interviewees presented difficulties through their lack of understanding of conflict transformation, understanding conflict transformation as conflict resolution, reflecting the definitional and conceptual morass surrounding the field. This book also draws on my own experience as a project promoter in the Border Counties and on a cross-border basis for almost fifteen years with the IFI, Peace I, II and III and INTERREG I and II. Lederach views this as the universal sharing of the personal, noting that: In the professional world of writing, we view with caution, even suspicion, the appearance of the personal, and lend a higher accent of legitimacy to models and skills, theory, well-documented case studies, and the technical application of theory that leads toward what we feel is the objectivity of conclusion and proposal. In the process, we do a disservice to our professions, to the building of theory and practice, to the public, and ultimately to ourselves.59

Bearing in mind the tenuous relationship between practice, research and theory to date and difficulties in accurately assessing the transformational impacts of individual projects or, indeed, an individual conflict transformation tool or process, it is in this spirit that the ‘personal’ is utilized. Understanding conflict transformation through social and economic development in this region requires an understanding of the effects of the conflict on social and economic development on both sides of the

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Introduction

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border. Two data sources are therefore needed – raw data and statistics in terms of the economy, unemployment, educational disadvantage, social exclusion and poverty combined with an analysis of the conflict’s effects on these issues.60 Raw data is abundantly available from a range of official sources including the Censuses of Populations North and South and various government departments and agencies, supported by deprivation indicators for Northern Ireland (Noble indicators)61 and the Republic (Haase indicators).62 However, in trying to understand the effects of the conflict on social and economic development, it must be remembered that in some respects the nature of the divided society (both within Northern Ireland and across two jurisdictions) makes this difficult to measure with accuracy. In the Northern Ireland context, for example, the Census of Population provides a lot of information. However, unlike the Republic of Ireland, where the Census takes place every five years, with a full range of variables recorded every ten, thus providing a consistently comprehensive overview of the population on that side of the border, the Northern Ireland Census is only carried out every ten years.63 At critical times it is not even possible to make direct comparisons as, for example, in relation to the Northern Ireland Census, there were extensive changes made to definitions between the 1971 and 1981 censuses, while many simply did not answer the questions posed (e.g. those relating to religion), estimated at up to 74,000 for the 1981 Census. Cook et al. provide a comprehensive discussion of the problems associated with the various data sources currently available on both sides of the border, the difficulties surrounding the conceptual distinction between the terms poverty, deprivation and social exclusion, the problems with multiple deprivation indices and the spatial framework; they conclude, however, that ‘the only feasible sources of information for a comparative study, even within either of the two jurisdictions, are the small area data derived from the census of population’.64 The obvious limitation in using this approach in one jurisdiction is that one is confined to using the variables for which census data is available. In drawing a comparison between two jurisdictions, the limitations are multiplied. One of the main problems identified by Cook et al. is that of the non-overlap of specifics, whereby ‘even when both censuses provide information on the same topic, the way in which the information is classified or presented may inhibit direct comparisons’.65 The Peace III documentation also highlights this problem.66 Ultimately this does not bode well for translating theory into practice; Hillyard et al., experienced researchers in this field, have found that ‘at the basic level of social and economic data, comparisons between North and South, and between specific parts of Northern Ireland and the South, such as border areas, are still not readily

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Transforming conflict through social and economic development

and routinely available to inform the policy process’.67 Nevertheless, using multiple information sources and research methods went some way towards overcoming this difficulty.

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Conclusion This book is concerned with providing greater conceptual and theoretical clarification of conflict transformation, specifically from a social and economic perspective. It seeks to examine the practical lessons learned in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties and their consequent impacts and implications for practice, with the aim of making a number of practice-based recommendations for other regions emerging from violent conflict. It aims to integrate theory and practice by linking reflections on practical experience with conceptual ideas from the current debates on conflict transformation. By combining this with a theoretical framework, a deepened understanding of conflict transformation and an expanded assessment of the impacts of the three tools will be provided. It argues that deep structural violence remains, and while the nature of the three programmes ensured that valuable grassroots capacity has been equally as instrumental as mid-level actors in delivering and sustaining conflict transformation, particularly where the political has failed, tools such as these are limited in what they can achieve on their own. This is particularly so when the lessons learned have not always been applied. The book is structured in three parts. A conceptual and theoretical examination is provided in chapter 1 in an attempt to offer some definitional clarification and create a theoretical framework. In particular, the theories of John Paul Lederach and, to a lesser extent, Johan Galtung, will be closely examined, along with the related concepts of citizen empowerment, development aid and economic development. The emergent theoretical framework, consisting of a working definition of conflict transformation together with five criteria, will be used to evaluate the capabilities of the three transformation tools. While conflict transformation encompasses a wide range of features, issues and approaches, this book is particularly interested in conflict transformation through social and economic development, since the political elements of the process have been examined ad nauseam. Thus, while chapter 2 examines the conflict itself, it does not discuss it in detail from a political perspective. Conflict transformation is a multifaceted task, requiring an understanding of the context in which it operates. The chapter is therefore concerned with its impact on the region from a social and economic perspective; while little has been written about this and much disputed, without this context, the impact of the three programmes on the trans-

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Introduction

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formation process will not be appreciated and consequent lessons and implications for others not fully drawn out. In the second section, after a short examination of the background, administrative structures and activities of the three programmes in chapter 3, their impacts in terms of conflict transformation practice are discussed in chapter 4. The third section then looks at some of the numerous lessons learned from the conflict transformation process instigated by these tools, highlighting a number of serious implications for conflict transformation policy and practice and illustrating that the central role that social and economic development has to play in the transformation of conflict has yet to be fully grasped. A range of recommendations are then made for others preparing for transformational change. The concluding chapter returns to the conceptual and theoretical examination outlined in chapter 1 to assess the extent to which Lederach’s interdependence, justice and process–structure gaps have been narrowed by the three programmes examined. It is hoped that this book will contribute to the growing conceptual and theoretical literature base on conflict transformation in general, particularly transformation through social and economic development and consequently to actual practice and indeed policy. This is set against the backdrop of the fact that ‘there exists no single most promising technical approach to the study and transformation of intractable conflicts. Instead, analysts ought to be familiar with a variety of approaches and be flexible in their application of any specific one.’68 In this case, we will become familiar with the approach of social and economic development offered by these three particular tools. Notes 1 While the Peace programmes are separate programmes in their own right and are discussed in this book in this manner, they are actually transformationally understood here as phases of the one programme which will be alluded to in this manner from time to time. This also applies to the INTERREG programmes. The Border Counties are the six counties in the Republic of Ireland which straddle the border with Northern Ireland – Donegal, Sligo, Leitrim, Cavan, Monaghan and Louth.   2 See S. Buchanan, ‘Transforming Conflict in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties: Some Lessons from the Peace Programmes on Valuing Participative Democracy’, Irish Political Studies, 23:3 (2008), 387–409. 3 J.G. Cockell, ‘Conceptualising Peacebuilding: Human Security and Sustainable Peace’, in M. Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 16. 4 S. Ryan, The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 2.

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5 Cockell, ‘Conceptualising Peacebuilding’, p. 16. 6 No Plan, No Peace – The Inside Story of Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos, BBC 1, 28–29 October 2007. 7 J. Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, Journal of Peace Research, 6:3 (1969), 171. 8 J. Galtung, ‘Cultural Violence’, Journal of Peace Research, 27:3 (1990), 291. 9 J. Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (Oslo/London: International Peace Research Institute/Sage, 1996), p. 9. 10 B. Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peace Keeping’, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (New York, 17 June 1992), paragraph 21. Emphasis added. 11 B. Boutros-Ghali, ‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace’, UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (New York, 3 January 1995). 12 R. Väyrynen, ‘To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts’, in R. Väyrynen (ed.), New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation (London: Sage, 1991), p. 23. 13 P. Collier, ‘Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy’, in C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson and P. Aall (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War. Conflict Management in a Divided World (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), pp. 197–218. 14 F. Stewart and G. Brown, ‘Motivations for Conflict: Groups and Individuals’, in Crocker et al. (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War, p. 223. 15 Ibid., p. 222. See also P. Collier, ‘Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy’, in C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson and P. Aall (eds), Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), pp. 143–62. 16 Ibid., p. 223. 17 E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict. Theory and Case (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1990), p. 1. 18 L. Kriesberg, T.A. Northrup and S.J. Thorson (eds), Intractable Conflicts and their Transformation (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1989). 19 World Bank, Civil Society and Peacebuilding. Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors, Social Development Department, Sustainable Development Network, Report No. 36445-GLB, 20 December 2006, pp. 23–4. 20 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars, Policy Research Paper No. 2355 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000); P. Collier, ‘Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective’, in M. Berdal and D.M. Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp. 91–111. 21 In terms of the problems associated with this perspective, see K. Ballentine and H. Nitzschke, ‘The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation’, in M. Fischer and B. Schmelzle (eds), Transforming War Economies. Dilemmas and Strategies, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No.  3 (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management,

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Introduction

17

2005), pp.  11–33. 22 N. Killick, V.S. Srikantha and C. Gündüz, The Role of Local Business in Peacebuilding (Berlin: Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005), p. 17. 23 K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 24 K. Ballentine and H. Nitzschke, ‘Reply to Our Discussants’, in Fischer and Schmelzle (eds), Transforming War Economies, p. 70. 25 K. Rupesinghe, ‘Conflict Transformation’, in K. Rupesinghe (ed.), Conflict Transformation (London: St Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 90. 26 P. Collier, V.L. Elliot, H. Hegre, A. Hoeffler, M. Reynal-Querol and N. Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. A World Bank Policy Research Report (Washington, DC: World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 155. 27 See, for example, Killick et al., The Role of Local Business, p. 17, who argue that ‘an advantage of the private sector in comparison with NGOs lies in its greater access and influence, particularly at the political level’, and Fischer and Schmelzle (eds), Transforming War Economies. 28 Killick et al., The Role of Local Business, p. 21. 29 D. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), p. 28 (socioeconomic foundations are one of four general headings which make up Smith’s peacebuilding palette); B. Hamber and G. Kelly, A Place for Reconciliation? Conflict and Locality in Northern Ireland, Democratic Dialogue Report No. 18 (Belfast: Democratic Dialogue, 2005), p. 38. 30 M. Pugh, ‘Introduction: The Ownership of Regeneration and Peacebuilding’, in Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies, p. 9. 31 Ibid., p. 5. 32 J.P. Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 42–3. 33 Ibid., p. 47. 34 T. Donais, Peacebuilding and Local Ownership. Post-Conflict Consensus Building (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 1. 35 Underlined by the suspension of the Civic Forum in 2002. 36 The National Economic and Social Forum, The Policy Implications of Social Capital. Forum Report No. 28 (Dublin: NSEF, 2003). 37 Taskforce on Active Citizenship, Report of the Taskforce on Active Citizenship (Dublin: Taskforce on Active Citizenship, 2007). 38 A. Williamson (ed.), Beyond Violence. The Role of Voluntary and Community Action in Building a Sustainable Peace in Northern Ireland (Belfast/University of Ulster: Community Relations Council/Centre for Voluntary Action Studies, 1995). See also N. Acheson, E. Cairns, M. Stringer and A. Williamson, Voluntary Action and Community Relations in Northern Ireland. A Report of a Research Project funded by the Community Relations Council

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Transforming conflict through social and economic development

and the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (University of Ulster: Centre for Voluntary Action Studies, 2007). 39 S.A. Williams, ‘The Changing Role of Civil Society in Political Transition: The Experience of Cambodia, South Africa and Northern Ireland’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Ulster, 2005; C. Farrington (ed.), Global Change, Civil Society and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Implementing the Political Settlement (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); M. Power (ed.), Building Peace in Northern Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011). 40 F. Cochrane and S. Dunn, People Power? The Role of the Voluntary and Community Sector in the Northern Ireland Conflict (Cork: Cork University Press, 2002), p. 173. 41 Ibid., p. 179. 42 Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations (Belfast, 1998), p. 10. 43 Cochrane and Dunn, People Power?, p. 181. 44 V. Bell, ‘In Pursuit of Civic Participation: The Early Experiences of the Northern Ireland Civic Forum, 2000–2002’, Political Studies, 52:3 (2004), 565–84. Moreover the Forum struggled with what it meant to be a consultative forum. In June 2007 the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister initiated a review of the Forum. As yet, however, no progress has been made. 45 Cochrane and Dunn, People Power?, pp. 94–5. 46 S. Byrne, Economic Assistance and the Northern Ireland Conflict. Building the Peace Dividend (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2009). 47 D. Birrell and A. Hayes, Cross-Border Co-operation in Local Government. Development, Management and Reconciliation. A Report by the Centre for Cross Border Studies (Armagh: Centre for Cross Border Studies, 2001), and contributions in J. Coakley and L. O’Dowd, (eds), Crossing the Border. New Relationships between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), particularly L. O’Dowd and C. McCall, ‘The Voluntary Sector: Promoting Peace and Cooperation’, pp. 125–51, for an analysis of the contribution of Peace II to cross-border cooperation. 48 See, for example, B. Harbor and P. Morris, ‘Partnership, Democracy and Economic Development’, in B. Harbor, P. Morris and I. McCormack (eds), Learning to Disagree: Peace and Economic Development in Ireland (London/ Dublin: UNISON/IMPACT, 1996), p. 12. 49 P. Hillyard, B. Rolston and M. Tomlinson, Poverty and Conflict in Ireland: An International Perspective (Dublin: CPA and the Institute of Public Administration, 2005), p. 3. 50 Ibid., p. xxii. 51 O’Dowd and McCall, ‘The Voluntary Sector’, pp. 144–5. 52 Channel Research, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Across the Border. Evaluation of the Impact of the Cross Border Measures 5.3 and 5.4 of the European Union Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 2000–2006 (Monaghan/Belfast: Channel Research for the Cross Border Consortium, July 2007), p. 2.

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Introduction

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3 O’Dowd and McCall, ‘The Voluntary Sector’, p. 132. 5 54 See Government of Ireland, White Paper on Irish Aid (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2006), and Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework. It should be noted, however, that neither government actually has a conflict transformation strategy, as the remainder of this sub-section will show. 55 Government of Ireland, White Paper on Irish Aid, p. 56. Irish Aid is Ireland’s official international aid programme. 56 Ibid., p. 58. 57 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 23. 58 Extracts from these interviews are quoted as they were transcribed, with only minor authorial amendments for clarification where necessary. 59 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, p. viii. 60 It is recognised that social and economic development covers a vast range of areas: it is simply not possible, however, to explore all of them here. Moreover, to examine them from the perspective of both sides of the border is quite a complex task, due in no small way to uneven data sources. Those outlined possess greater quantities of data and are the areas with which I am most familiar. 61 Contained in the Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measure 2001 Report or the Noble indicators, which were preceded by the Robson Measure of Relative Deprivation (1994) and based on the 1991 Census of Population and other sources of information. The Noble indicators are the product of a review and update of the Robson measures, which give ‘information on the spatial pattern of deprivation across Northern Ireland at three geographic levels, based upon local government boundaries’; NICVA, Noble Index of Deprivation. Summary of the New Northern Ireland Deprivation Measures (Belfast: NICVA, 2002). 62 C. Curtin, T. Haase and H. Tovey (eds), Poverty in Rural Ireland, A Political Economy Perspective (Dublin: CPA and Oak Tree Press, 1996) – known as the Haase indicators and based on the 1994 Census of Population in the Republic of Ireland. 63 The 2001 Northern Ireland Census of Population and the 2002 Republic’s Census are the most comparable, along with the 2011 in both jurisdictions, although none of the Northern Ireland 2011 results were available at the time of writing. 64 S. Cook, M.A. Poole, D.G. Pringle and A.J. Moore (ADM/CPA and NIVT), Comparative Spatial Deprivation in Ireland. A Summary Guide (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 2000), p. 4. 65 Ibid., p. 6. 66 SEUPB, Operational Programme for PEACE III. Annex A. Socio-Economic Profile of Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (Belfast: SEUPB, 2007), p. 18. 67 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, p. 170. 68 S.J. Thorson, ‘Introduction: Conceptual Issues’, in Kriesberg et al. (eds), Intractable Conflicts, pp. 9–10.

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part i

Setting the context

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1

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Conflict transformation – towards a theoretical framework

In view of the theoretical confusion and associated definitional morass surrounding conflict transformation, it is necessary to preface this book with some conceptual clarification. This will enable an appropriate assessment of conflict transformation through social and economic development, specifically through the impacts of the tools under consideration here, loosely pertaining to a peace and conflict impact assessment. Accordingly, this chapter examines the place of conflict transformation within the conflict management discourse and conflict cycle and explores a number of existing definitions, all serving to highlight its distinctiveness. The wider but related areas of citizen empowerment, development aid and economic development are also explored. Understanding key transformational characteristics will shape the formation of a theoretical framework comprising a working definition and five criteria against which the impacts of the three programmes will later be assessed. First an understanding of conflict would be useful. Conflict can be viewed simply as ‘the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups’.1 Lederach’s view of conflict as ‘a socially constructed cultural event [which] do[es] not “just happen” to people, [but rather] people are active participants in creating situations and interactions they experience as conflict’2 means that a key component of conflict is ‘social knowledge, the meaning that people attach to events and issues, and what, correspondingly, is appropriate response and action to take’.3 Thus, Northern Ireland’s paramilitaries saw their actions as the appropriate response to the wrongs as they defined them and, as the conflict progressed, as a means of protecting their own communities. Conflict is often viewed destructively as ‘primarily a problem of political order’4 and consequently a negative occurrence to be avoided at all costs. More radically it is, constructively, ‘a catalyst for social change or … a non-violent struggle for social justice’5 and hence very much a positive occurrence, bringing about necessary changes in the structural and cultural make-up of society. These themes of positive and negative peace are important: structural

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violence is central to the concept of positive peace as it denies social justice or economic equity, since ‘conflict often grows in the seedbed of deprivation and exclusion’.6 Thus, Azar viewed protracted social conflict as ‘the progressive effort to satisfy human needs that sustains development (broadly defined to include political and human development as well as economic), which in turn sustains peace’.7 Moreover: to respond to these grievances … structural development is essential. This may include reducing structural inequalities (political, economic and social), altering development strategies to focus on correcting regional, sectoral and communal imbalances, and progressive reforms in socio-political structures … Peace, as a sustainable end-process … requires balanced economic and political development.8

Despite criticisms that structural violence is sometimes seen as independent of the perceptions of the participants in conflict or that such a broad definition makes ‘violence ubiquitous and therefore meaningless’,9 it was clearly a central component of the Northern Ireland conflict, indicating the need to acknowledge social and economic development in the transformation process. Conflict: to settle, resolve or transform? Conflict transformation has received increasing attention in recent years. However, as Ryan notes, ‘the growth in the use of the term has not always been matched by greater precision and clarity’.10 Its emergence from a number of pre-existing traditions within the broad field of conflict management has created a definitional morass: in most of the academic literature, ‘the terms conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation are often used loosely and interchangeably, in many cases referring to the same strategies’.11 While no single conflict transformation model can be identified, some conceptual clarification can be provided if the overall conflict management framework of conflict settlement, resolution and transformation is considered. Within this framework12 conflict settlement implies that conflict is a zero-sum game and peace is viewed in purely negative terms, with no set objective of longer-term positive peace or social justice. The ultimate aim is a cessation of violence that will lead to some sort of political settlement, involving top-level (Track I) actors such as political, military and religious leaders. As a strategy purely concerned with a final result or settlement of the conflict and not with its underlying root causes it is problematic, presenting a conflict of interest – if the root causes are not resolved the final result with which conflict settlement is concerned will not be sustainable.

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Conflict transformation

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Conflict resolution aims not to eliminate conflict as such but to eliminate the violent and destructive manifestations of conflict that can be traced back to the unmet needs and fears of the conflicting parties. It is primarily concerned with the promotion of horizontal relationships between actors of relatively equal status, principally mid-level (Track II) actors. However, this strategy is also problematic: being mainly concerned with the elimination of the causes of conflict rather than with the actual conflict itself, while only involving one level of society, will not ensure sustainability. A sustainable strategy is required that eliminates both the root causes of conflict and the conflict itself while involving all levels of society. Conflict transformation builds upon these strategies through its concern to address the root causes of conflict over the long-term and, more particularly, to promote conditions that create cooperative horizontal and vertical relationships, principally by furthering vertical relationships between conflicting actors of relatively unequal status. Its particular focus on empowering grassroots (Track III) actors sets it apart from other conflict management methods. A sense of local ownership is critical to any long-term sustainment of peace, achieved ‘by local people, with “outsiders” taking a supporting or facilitating role’.13 Viewed this way, protracted violent conflicts are primarily the result of unequal and suppressive social and political structures (structural violence) and conflict is therefore seen as a positive agent for fundamental social change; conflict transformation occurs ‘when violent conflict ceases and/ or is expressed in non-violent ways and when the original structural sources (economic, social, political, military and cultural) of the conflict have been changed in some way or other’.14 It is about the challenge of: devising ways and means of empowering citizens and societies so that they can transform violent relationships. At the same time it is necessary to ensure that economic, political and social institutions are developed (or changed when they are demonstrably incapable of achieving their purposes) in order to minimize the prospects of violence in future and guarantee these processes through time.15

Thus the Berghof Handbook comprehensively views transformation as: a generic, comprehensive concept referring to actions that seek to alter the various characteristics and manifestations of conflict by addressing the root causes of a particular conflict over the long-term with the aim to transform negative ways of dealing with conflict into positive constructive ways. The concept of conflict transformation stresses structural, behavioural and attitudinal aspects of conflict. It refers to both the process and the structure of moving towards ‘just peace’.16

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Setting the context

Galtung’s groundbreaking categorisation of violence as direct, structural and cultural provides a clear understanding of three separate and dynamic but interrelated forms of violence. He notes that ‘much direct violence can be traced back to vertical structural violence, such as exploitation and repression, for liberation, or to prevent liberation. In the background is cultural violence legitimising both the structural violence and direct violence to undo it and to maintain it.’17 This expanded categorisation was necessary because of the incorrect assumption that if there is no visible direct violence, then there is no conflict, resulting in a lack of recognition of other forms of violence such as structural and cultural. However, each will continually enable and reinforce the other providing ‘recognition that there are different ways of dealing with conflicts and that violence is only one possible approach … vital if we are to search and find more creative, more constructive and more viable approaches to dealing with conflict’.18 In distinguishing conflict from violence, Galtung developed the conflict triangle consisting of A – attitudes (feelings and thinking about the conflict), B – behaviour (actions in conflict) and C – contradictions (issue(s) and what the conflict is all about). If contradiction is at the root of conflict, conflict transformation requires contradictions/issues to be ‘identified and addressed in a way that leaves all parties feeling included in the solution and which doesn’t deny, ignore or reject the basic needs of any involved’.19 This requires involvement from all such that ‘sustainability has to be … rooted inside the formation. If outside parties … use carrots and sticks … then there is no real acceptability or sustainability, unless one assumes that the “mediators” are parts of the conflict formation, not outside, and certainly not “above”.’20 For Galtung ‘all conflicts are equal’,21 but as conflict is a constantly changing phenomenon ‘the most naïve view one can possibly have of a conflict is to believe that a conflict is solved once the elites from the parties of the conflict transformation have accepted the solution, as indicated by their signatures on some document outlining the new formation’22 – a process that characterises conflict resolution. Thus, while settlement implies a final end and resolution implies the process of finding a solution to a problem, to transform implies deeply profound change of the conflict or the sociopolitical system in which it is rooted. Admittedly, it does present a difficulty in defining a successful outcome which is more obvious and simpler under conflict settlement or resolution. Nevertheless, conflict transformation, rather than conflict resolution or settlement, is much more useful for transforming societies immersed in protracted social conflict into societies which embrace a relative peace. While the place of conflict transformation in the conflict cycle is debatable in terms of which phase of conflict it applies to (pre-, mid-

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or post-conflict), the previously dominant position of strict post-conflict applicability asserted by Paris or the UN in ‘An Agenda for Peace’ no longer holds true.23 Certainly the post-conflict context is the most widely understood and referred to within the literature and media. However, this is misleading, as post-conflict implies an absolute cessation of violence and fails to take account of continuing structural violence such as extreme poverty, which can be ignored in policies developed from a post-conflict perspective. Smith, like Cockell, therefore believes ‘peacebuilding activities … may be carried out during armed conflict, in its wake or to prevent a conflict from escalating violently’.24 As a longterm process, conflict transformation is better viewed (and defined) not linearly but in terms of its activities, which seek to address and remove the root causes of conflict and ensure its non-recurrence. Its applicability to conflict therefore lies within all three phases, particularly when it is arguable whether the Northern Ireland case is truly post-conflict – it may be more accurate to refer to it as a transitional society between war and peace. In the context of this research, only one of the three tools, the Peace programmes, is specifically of a post-conflict nature. Conflict transformation: towards a deeper understanding Lederach’s conceptual and theoretical understanding of the transformation discourse is particularly useful for exploring the Northern Ireland context because of his more descriptive rather than prescriptive analytical approach. His emphasis on key characteristics such as the longterm nature of the process, grassroots involvement and the relevance of culture, along with his interdependence gap, justice gap and process– structure gap theories, support a constructive framework. For Lederach, conflict resolution does not ‘adequately describe the ongoing nature of conflict in the relational ebb and flow over time, or its usefulness in the construction of peace’.25 Conflict transformation, however, is much more descriptive, referring to the (destructive or constructive) effects that social conflict produces, as well as being prescriptive, referring to deliberate interventions to effect systemic change, thus representing ‘a comprehensive set of lenses for describing how conflict emerges from, evolves within and brings about changes in the personal, relational, structural and cultural dimensions and for developing creative responses that promote peaceful change … through nonviolent mechan­ isms’.26 As the term involves a wide range of activities, peace is therefore ‘a dynamic social construct’ – a never-ending building process. However, Lederach incisively observes ‘significant gaps in our capacity to build and sustain peace initiatives … the gaps emerge from a reductionism

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Setting the context

focused on techniques driven by a need to find quick fixes and solutions to complex, long-term problems rather than a systemic understanding of peace-building as a process-structure’.27 Certainly, this has been the case with the Northern Ireland conflict, as is indicated by its own list of failed ‘solutions to complex, long-term problems’ – for example the 1973/74 power-sharing Executive, rolling devolution (1982–86) and the 1991/92 Brooke–Mayhew initiative, which Bloomfield gloomily describes as ‘a courageous if unsuccessful attempt at negotiating a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict … ultimately producing little result’.28 Indeed, an explanation may lie in the fact that these were political solutions only, not concerned with the conflict’s structural causes or the inclusion of those at its core. This is especially disquieting when one considers the critical role of timing: conflict transformation takes place over the longterm, which means ‘that we recognize peaceful transformation takes time and continues well beyond the crisis moments of interest when the media is paying attention’.29 Northern Ireland is a clear example of this – the ceasefires were declared in 1994 while the Good Friday Agreement was agreed in 1998, and society at all levels in the region continues to grapple with the implications of the long-term implementation of the peace process. Why then is it so difficult to sustain peace in the long-term and ultimately transform conflict situations? Furthermore, what part does social and economic development have to play in the transformation of conflict and what role does it have in maintaining a sustainable peace, if any? Evidence suggests that since the beginning of the peace process in 1994, life in certain parts of the region has not improved – paramilitarism remains a threat, youth unemployment is high, the number of interface walls has increased, housing and education remain deeply divided, 25 per cent of children live in relative income poverty and 17 per cent live in workless households, while 26.9 per cent of the workforce remains economically inactive, compared to the UK average of 23.3 per cent.30 Lederach has identified several key gaps that are responsible for our inability to build and sustain peace initiatives, with the most important being interdependence, justice and process–structure, which are very much applicable to the Northern Ireland context. Interdependence gap Interdependence is ‘built on relationships and relationships are the heart and bloodlines of peace-building’.31 While it can take many forms, Lederach refers to the building of new or the rebuilding of broken relationships across the lines of division created through and by conflict as horizontal capacity. Those who actually meet to develop relationships

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are, in the main, those on an equal footing with each other – politicians meet politicians, academics meet academics, local leaders meet local leaders. The interdependence gap therefore lies in ‘the lack of responsive and coordinated relationships up and down the levels of leadership in a society affected by protracted violent conflict – the vertical capacity’.32 From a conflict transformation perspective, leaders at all levels of society usually only realise their interdependence needs when the process is under huge strain. Correspondingly, there is also a limit on the ability to ‘create and sustain [the] vertical and horizontal integration strategically necessary for implementing long-term peacebuilding’.33 Thus: the challenge of horizontal capacity is how to foster constructive understanding and dialogue across the lines of division in a society. The challenge of vertical capacity is how to develop genuine recognition that peacebuilding involves multiple activities at different levels of leadership, taking place simultaneously, each level distinct in its needs and interdependent in its effects. Strategic change in a system requires that horizontal and vertical relationships move in tandem on an equal basis.34

These relationships are aptly illustrated by Lederach’s peacebuilding ‘pyramid’ (fig. 1.1), which highlights the societal actors and processes involved in peacebuilding: What does this tell us about the interdependence gap? In practice ‘the field … has concentrated more of its resources and capacity-building on the horizontal, ignoring the vertical and leaving significant insufficiencies in the structure of the peace process to be sustained’.35 Sustainable peacebuilding requires the development and coordination of both axes. Lederach’s fundamental notion is that ‘there is an interdependence of these levels such that no one level is capable of delivering and sustaining peace by itself. Sooner or later, every level will need every other level for some set of things that they’re engaged in around the change processes.’36 This can be achieved by increasing the recognition that peacebuilding requires relationships and activities coordinated at all levels, making each level aware of the activities and approaches required at the other levels and building relationships before, during and after formal agreements between people who are not like-minded, like-focused or like-situated within the structures of society.37 Within the Northern Ireland context, on the surface at least, it appears that this was recognised in attempts to put this into practice through the work of the Peace programmes at the grassroots, the work of the Civic Forum at the middle and the work of the North South Ministerial Council at the top. However, many middle ground politicians found it difficult to negotiate their groups’ basic human needs while many at the grassroots found it very difficult to engage with those at the middle and/

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Setting the context Types of Actors

Level 1: Top Leadership

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Miltary / political / religious leaders with high visibility

Level 2: Middle-Range Leadership Leaders respected in sectors Ethnic / religious leaders Academics / Intellectuals Humanitarian leaders (NGOs)

Level 3: Grassroots Leadership Local leaders Leaders of indigenous NGOs Community developers Local health officials Refugee camp leaders

Approaches to Building Peace

Few p

Focus on high-level negotiations Emphasizes cease-fire Led by highly visible single mediator

Problem-solving workshops Training in conflict resolution Peace commissions Insider-partial teams

Affected Population

30

Local peace commissions Grassroots training Psychosocial work in postwar trauma

q

Many

Figure 1.1  Lederach’s peacebuilding ‘pyramid’ Source: J.P. Lederach, Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies ­(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 39.

or top levels.38 In the context of the Good Friday Agreement, Farrington contends that it has been: the subject of … overly agential explanations of its conclusion … limited in a number of ways. It is elite centred in that it credits political change in Northern Ireland to a small number of political leaders involved in the negotiations … and as such, leaves little room for secondary levels of politicians and for understanding the implications of the process. It also neglects the role that civil society played in interpreting and selling the peace process among communities most affected … and the context changing factors of the international dimension.39

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Justice gap Conflict and direct violence usually occur when people feel a significant justice or rights grievance with few, if any, remedial options: ‘people who take up direct violence are trying to address the perceived injustice or … “structural violence” … they are trying to achieve systemic changes in the underlying economic, cultural, social and political structures as those are perceived to detrimentally affect their lives.’40 Eventually the use of direct violence to achieve these systemic changes is exhausted ‘when people realize the “system of violence” has become more oppressive than the initial injustice. In other words direct violence added onto the existing latent structural violence creates a situation in which everyone perceives themselves as oppressed and worse off than they were before.’41 People then begin to re-evaluate their goals and the methods used to achieve these goals and move towards and work on negotiations (such as the Good Friday Agreement). However, while a peace agreement halts direct violence there is an expectation that it will also halt structural violence at the same time, which rarely happens: it results in … the ‘justice gap.’ The war is over, formal negotiations concluded, and changes have come usually in terms of increased space for political participation. However, the expectations of social, economic, religious and cultural changes are rarely achieved, creating a gap between the expectations for peace and what is delivered.42

The significance of the justice gap is the challenge presented by the fact that: much greater investment has been expended in the study and development of methodologies and practice for reducing direct violence than in transforming structural violence. The justice gap emerges in part because we have not adequately developed a peacebuilding framework that reduces direct violence and produces social and economic justice.43

This highlights key questions for Northern Ireland – to what extent have the structural problems, which contributed to the conflict and which were exacerbated by it, been solved, if at all? What role, if any, have the three transformation tools played in solving these structural problems and what impact have they had? What are the implications of such programmes for transformation practice in general, and in particular as they relate to Northern Ireland and the Border Counties? These questions will be assessed as we move through the evidence. Process–structure gap The third gap Lederach has identified in our inability to build and sustain peace initiatives is the process–structure gap. In many conflict ­situations,

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Setting the context

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32

once a peace agreement has been reached, the conflict is viewed as resolved when in fact the agreement is only opening the door to a whole new process of relationship building. The term ‘resolution’ implies the end of something undesirable, while the term ‘transformation’ implies that something undesirable is changing:44 ‘resolution brings with it a kind of finality – that it’s over. Transformation is about sustaining the ongoing changes. Transformation includes resolution but resolution doesn’t always include transformation.’45 Adding conflict transformation to peacebuilding enables us to ‘embrace the challenge to change that which has torn us apart and [build] something we desire’.46 This requires a reconsideration of our understanding of the idea of a peace process – process refers to something that is ongoing but it is often assumed that peace is a product: when we think of peace as a process we endlessly fall prey to critique that it is an endless dynamic that leads to no substantive outcome. When we envision peace as a result we fall into the trap that it is an end-state, only to discover that it is neither an ‘end’ nor a ‘state’ and that if we treat it as such our desire to preserve or control it destroy its very essence … Peace is neither a process nor a structure. It is both. Peacebuilding requires us to work at constructing an infrastructure to support a process of desired change and change is permanent.47

This has meant that we have thought about peace as a process up to the point of reaching a peace agreement and assumed the context should suddenly translate into structures. If peace is conceptualised as a process-structure, we move away from focusing on agreements in the short-term towards the long-term commitment of permanent relationship building: ‘relationships are both dynamic and adaptive, yet they also take social and political forms … We have been woefully insufficient in conceptualising social, organisational, political and economic structures as responsive to relational needs and changing environments.’48 These three theories are considerably useful in shaping a theoretical framework for assessing these three tools. An acknowledged weakness of Lederach’s model is ‘the limited attention it gives to the autonomous processes of change that transpire within the political system of the conflict-affected society’:49 in the final analysis, conflicts will be transformed through multi-level political, structural and cultural change. However, this has remained the central focus of much of the literature for too long; structural changes, implemented hand-in-hand with political change, are necessary if a sustainable peace is to be maintained in the long-term.

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Citizen empowerment Pugh highlights how ‘the conceptual baggage of peacebuilding has included the assumption that external actors wield the power and moral authority to bring about the peaceful change that communities have so signally failed to do’.50 Lederach also disputes this notion, arguing that ‘people from the setting and their taken-for-granted knowledge about the setting are the key resources … transformation must be rooted in and built from the context and the people involved’.51 Citizen empowerment therefore asserts that ‘the ownership of peacebuilding needs to be embedded in local communities’.52 While some argue that it remains a vague concept,53 it is, nevertheless, central to the transformational discourse because, as Francis points out, conflict transformation necessitates ‘the transformation of cultural assumptions about exercise of power: the substitution of power with for power over, and the assumption of responsibility by “ordinary people”, individually and collectively, for the things that affect their own lives and those of others’.54 For Schwerin, empowerment encompasses the positive transformation of individuals, groups and structures. Having completed a detailed conceptual analysis of the writings of almost thirty empowerment theorists, he notes eight basic attributes: self-esteem, self-efficacy, knowledge and skills, political awareness, social participation, political participation, political rights and responsibilities, and resources.55 He succinctly combines these attributes to clearly illustrate the interrelationship of the empowerment process: the empowerment process links individual attitudes (i.e. self-esteem and self-efficacy) and capabilities (i.e. knowledge and skills and political awareness) to enable efficacious individual and collaborative actions (i.e. social and political participation) in order to attain personal and collective socio-political goals (i.e. political rights, responsibilities and resources).56

This hints at connecting the micro (individual) and the macro (group) levels of society, reflecting Lederach’s thoughts on the further integration of all levels of society (to successfully build peace) and drawing attention to the gap that exists between the linking of both, practically and theoretically. In echoing the necessity for such integration to ensure successful conflict transformation, Francis contends that conflict transformation work: involves ensuring that those who have been the subjects of structures of domination discover and develop the power to participate in what affects them. It means enacting democracy at all levels of public life … working in ways that increase participation and help people in all sectors of society to find a voice. It means supporting ‘people power’.57

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Setting the context

Citizen empowerment therefore seeks ‘to understand the conflict and its modalities through the eyes of the communities as a key prerequisite for the long-term project of developing sustainable, cross-cultural models in the broader community’.58 In Northern Ireland it took seventeen years of conflict before this was realised, as reflected in the Anglo-Irish Agreement which stated ‘the two Governments affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland’.59 This tenet has since been central to the IFI and Peace programmes by virtue of the fact that project promoters in the main are local communities through which participation in and ownership of the process has been created. Clearly linked to this is the concept of cultural relevance as ‘all cultures and groups develop ways and approaches for handling conflict [which] should be seen as foundational for building a comprehensive transformative framework’.60 It emphasises ‘acknowledging and trying to build on the culture modalities that exist in a setting [and] … it understands outside models … as having intrinsic cultural biases and adaptations and does not blindly accept them as applicable in every given setting’.61 Essentially it involves making optimal use of the roles and resources found within a specific culture even if they have not been directly involved in activities of a peace-making nature. With institutions such as the World Bank and UN now including participation criteria in lending policies, citizen empowerment is clearly gaining acceptance as an essential transformational element. It does, nevertheless, require a comprehensive evaluation so as to be of practical use to practitioners beyond a symbolic meaning. Moreover, its correct use requires monitoring because, while civil society can solve social, economic and political issues, ‘there is a risk that this view overestimates the scope of social actors and neglects the complexity of needs in war-to-peace transition, especially in situations where different processes of transformation overlap’.62 Nevertheless, what it attempts to overcome (the detrimental problems of disempowerment and powerlessness) and what it can assist in achieving and sustaining (long-term sustainable peace) signifies its centrality to conflict transformation practice. Development aid Development aid is usually thought of in terms of international aid to developing countries through (international) NGOs. While this was not a feature of life in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties, many of the concepts inherent in conflict transformation such as citizen empowerment and long-term sustainability are key features of development practice;

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both influence the other’s discourse, prompting a need to examine its theoretical influence. Development and peacebuilding were long considered two different activities, with development largely focused on economic reconstruction/generation and peacebuilding ‘mainly approached as an intangible process of building relationships and trust’.63 However, contemporary development discourse adopts a more expansive view, which includes tackling structural violence through the development of long-term sustainable social, economic and political structures. Bigdon and Korf believe development should focus on ‘supporting measures to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state, as well as aiding the emergence of a strong civil society’:64 in so doing, it clearly links to the concept of citizen empowerment through the facilitation of participatory and empowerment processes and community building. For development agencies in general, building conflict management capacity within countries and the social consequences of this capacity is increasingly important. The World Bank, for example, because of ‘a sharp rise in its volume of lending to conflict-affected countries since the 1980s, reflecting the increasing incidence of violent conflicts’,65 has instigated a change in practice whereby: It has adopted a more holistic view of development and aligned its approach more closely with that of the international donor community … which assumes that structural and social concerns should be accorded equal treatment with macro-economic and financial concerns … based on the premise that the developing country, not the donors, should own its development strategy; that governments need to build partnerships with the private sector, NGOs, donors and civil society organizations; and that a long-term collective vision of needs and solutions capable of popular support should be articulated.66

This stems from a creeping realisation that real progress will only be achieved by development programmes that are sustained by those at the core long after development donors depart. Transforming conflict through development aid can be problematic and shows the potential for negative outcomes if not properly handled. In examining this approach, Goodhand and Atkinson conclude that there is a greater need for careful analysis of the context and, consequently, a need for customised approaches; a need to be realistic about the potential of humanitarian assistance to influence the wider dynamics of peace and conflict; a need to develop greater complementarity between aid and other policy instruments and a need to develop targeted approaches rather than ‘across the board’ negative conditionalities, sanctions and disengagement.67 Success rates, particularly in terms of economic growth, are mixed. Collier et al., in arguing (on

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behalf of the World Bank) that ­development has an important conflict transformation role to play, believe economic development is critical for reducing conflict but, rightly, that ‘this does not mean that the standard elements of development strategy … are sufficient, or even appropriate, to address this problem’.68 Cockell also rightly warns against confusing peacebuilding with development, as this assumes that the aims of both are the same: thus peace may be secured by maintaining established development strategies and programmes for conflict-torn societies without any separate resources allocated for peacebuilding programmes. This … suggests the root causes of protracted violence are in fact apolitical issues such as poverty, resource scarcity, unemployment and so on … [when] the issues involved here are fundamentally political in nature, even if there are aspects of the conflict … which do not initially admit of an overtly political character … the operational objective of peacebuilding should not be expressed in terms which could as easily express the purpose of regular development programming.69

Thus he believes: ‘the overtly political nature of internal conflict ensures that peacebuilding must also ground its integrated responses on the primacy of the political dimension. Social and economic programmes … should be adjusted for their impact on the enabling of a sustainable peace process, a factor not usually present in regular development aid.’70 While there is much in what Cockell says to agree with, his causal conception is hugely problematic: root causes of conflict are not as clear cut as suggested – although the literature provides no solid conclusions on the role of poverty as a cause of conflict, it certainly illustrates a link. Moreover, Anderson argues that ‘aid given during conflict cannot remain separate from that conflict’,71 while Uvin observes that ‘all development aid constitutes a form of political intervention. This holds as much for bilateral and multilateral aid as for nongovernmental development aid … at all levels, from central government to the local community.’72 In the absence of a clear agreement on root causes of conflict, there is obviously a need to link the two so ‘they simultaneously address the material conditions of violence (lack of opportunities) and empower people to resolve their conflicts peacefully’.73 Development aid cannot promote peace on its own but ‘should foster not only economically but also socially sustainable structures. The prevention of violent conflict, therefore, should become an objective of long-term development strategies that include economic, social, political, and environmentally sound development.’74 Thus, the emerging transformational discourse adheres to the belief that development cooperation:

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has the potential to address the structural conditions (or root causes) that reduce violent conflict, such as social exclusion, lack of political participation … It can also support people in creating institutions for the peaceful resolution of social conflict and empower them to become involved in conflict prevention initiatives. Such fundamental social transformations can only be achieved in a long-term perspective.75

This is crucial when one considers ‘the role which development assistance can play in both ameliorating and exacerbating the root causes of violent conflict’,76 not least the horrific role played by development agencies in the financing, creation and development of many of the processes that led to the Rwandan genocide. Uvin’s work is critical in illustrating the destruction aid can create if not implemented in a coherent and coordinated manner. Anderson’s research in particular has been crucial in this respect; in promoting a ‘do no harm’ approach it has revealed how ‘aid agencies have a new and profound opportunity to shape their relief and development work so it accomplishes its intended goals of alleviating human suffering and supporting the pursuit of sustainable economic and social systems and at the same time promotes durable and just peace’.77 Her work provides the most significant insight into the role of aid and peacebuilding, particularly in terms of the harm it can cause – aid affects conflict negatively and positively through resource transfers (theft, market/distributional/substitution and legitimisation effects) and negatively through implicit ethical messages (arms, collaboration, impunity, different value for different lives, powerlessness, belligerence and publicity).78 The implications of these lessons are clear: ‘it is neither inevitable nor excusable that aid should worsen conflict’.79 Development aid clearly has a role to play in transforming conflict in three key areas; 1) long-term conflict prevention, addressing the structural/root causes of violence and empowering people to become involved in conflict-prevention initiatives; 2) supporting peace processes, by supporting citizens in creating a space for dialogue in the early stages of a peace process and later on by providing aid for post-conflict reconstruction; and 3) addressing localised violence.80 Moreover, vital lessons can be learned from development aid, namely that one size does not fit all; aid programmes need to be tailored for each particular conflict situation and it is imperative that aid does not worsen the situation. Economic development and the role of business Relatively little research has been completed on the transformative role of economic development as ‘there has been a tendency to assume that violent conflicts can be resolved at the political and civil society levels

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without paying much attention to the powerful economic motivators and sustainers of violence’.81 Transformational scholars have identified three reasons for this lack of research:

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for one the interplay of economic and political forces in protracted violent conflict is a highly complex matter. Second, few activists of conflict transformation have at their disposal an in-depth understanding of economics. Third, engaging with business and, more importantly, with actors in the illegal economies, may be seen as (morally) dubious by some.82

While the political economy of armed conflict has received closer attention since the late 1990s, ‘the international community has been slow to recognise the private sector’s potential, focusing almost exclusively on business as an agent of economic development rather than [transformation]’.83 Scholarly analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict has, in the main, focused on the negative impacts of economic development, largely limited to the extent of the role played by economic factors in driving and perpetuating the conflict and of the conflict’s effect on the economy, with the transformative potential of economic development remaining under-researched. This limitation is largely the result of an academic fixation with elite-level politics and the complexities it presents to political scientists. However, while recognising this potential in abstract terms is the first step, drawing out this thinking is much more challenging. Nevertheless, some assumptions can be made: ‘when violence breaks out businesses have three general options: withdraw entirely, stay but try to ignore the conflict or remain invested in a country but work to prevent the escalation of violence’.84 As the first two options contribute to worsening conflict through economic collapse or suggesting that it is tolerable, ignoring the positive contribution of economic development to the transformation of conflict is therefore short-sighted. Fitzduff argues that ‘widespread economic development is necessary if structural imbalances … are to be addressed … such imbalances, unless alleviated, will continue to fuel justifications for violence’.85 This is not to say that structural imbalances are seen as the sole justification for violence and by implication, that economic development is seen as the sole solution to transforming violence – structural imbalances are only part of the problem and therefore, by implication, economic development is only part of the solution. Therefore, while some argue that ‘political stability cannot be relegated to a lower priority than – and should actually prevail over – economic efficiency when designing post-conflict policies, for reconstruction activities are nullified if war starts anew’,86 it is also acknowledged that ‘efforts to restore the necessary confidence among investors and consumers to restart economic activity cannot

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succeed without a minimal level of stability and predictability’.87 As a structural source of conflict, business has a huge role to play in the intervention and subsequent transformation processes ‘simply by increasing the level of economic development in a country. Indirectly, without direct intention, the private sector often contributes to peace by reducing the economic sources of conflict. There is a link between general levels of investment, increases in economic development, and long-term improvement in human rights and political stability.’88 Consequently the business sector can get involved in any stage of the conflict cycle with such interventions taking many guises, the most obvious being the contribution it makes to post-conflict reconstruction both in terms of physical infrastructure and in employment creation (the work of the IFI being a prime example of this in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties). Additionally, economic development can take place internally (locally) and externally (internationally). Within Northern Ireland, the corporate sector recognised the major economic impact that conflict was having and actively pushed for peace by acting as a policy think-tank in the early 1990s, issuing the document ‘Peace – A Challenging New Era’ (the ‘Peace Dividend Paper’) with its central message that ‘peace would help spur economic growth and that economic growth would help consolidate peace’.89 It also acted as a lobby group (the Group of 7)90 to develop anti-sectarian guidelines for the workplace and engage in social investment and philanthropic ventures to address pressing social needs such as the work of the Ireland Funds. Externally, the MacBride Principles campaign, although initially controversial, proved a successful example of the American corporate sector addressing human rights and social justice issues through its investment practices. Economic investments were also made by the EU and the US, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand governments through the IFI and Peace programmes, and by the corporate sector through the Ireland Funds and corporate participation in fact-finding missions to Northern Ireland. Economic development has also been discussed in the context of positive incentives which were traditionally viewed as less effective than sanctions. Previous work on this treated incentives as weak sanctions and looked at the issue in terms of reward and punishment – positive and negative sanctions, threats and promises or the choice between carrot and stick. Dorussen concludes that economic incentives and expanded economic exchange have become important policy instruments as they are ‘reasonable and effective tools for encouraging cooperation over the long-term’.91 In Northern Ireland, economic incentives were considered by some to be at the heart of programmes such as the IFI; Tom Foley, former Speaker of the US House of Representatives, asserted that ‘there

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is one overriding reason for US support … The Fund’s emphasis on economic development and employment as a means to peace and reconciliation in Ireland is a powerful alternative to the death and destruction offered by the men of violence who oppose it.’92 It is in the interest of the business/corporate sector to realise its role in transforming conflict, even if it is simply in the interests of bigger profit margins, because ‘as companies continue to expand their influence economically and socially as well as geographically, they will increasingly have cause to address issues such as human rights, social justice and sustainable development. This is not simply because it is necessary or “right” but because it is in their interests to do so.’93 As economic systems at all levels underpin both civil society and state sector levels of activity, Clements rightly argues that: conflict transformers need to become much more aware of ways in which they can catalyse discussions about effective, democratic and incorrupt governance and the economic systems that are required to sustain such processes … The prospects for stable and just peace seem very remote unless this issue is addressed and all that it means in terms of the political and economic inclusion of all key groups with a view to ensuring a dramatic reduction in horizontal inequality. 94

Conflict transformation – a working definition Progressing a theoretical framework requires two distinctive elements – a working definition of conflict transformation and emergent criteria indicating the constituent elements of successful transformation practice, against which the three transformation tools can be assessed. Conflict transformation involves a number of core premises and characteristics useful in forming a working definition, including:   1. Protracted violent conflicts are primarily the result of unequal and suppressive social and political structures.   2. Conflict is viewed as a non-violent struggle for social justice (positive peace).   3. Conflict transformation is applicable to three phases of conflict – the pre-conflict, mid-conflict and post-conflict phases.   4. It is a long-term process.  5. It is concerned with outcome-, process- and structure-orientated processes.   6. It aims to overcome direct, cultural and structural violence.   7. Transforming conflict is not just a political problem – it is also a social and economic problem if sustainable structural change is to occur.

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  8. Transformation strategies address the root causes of conflict, thus enabling a self-supporting peace.   9. All levels of society must be involved, particularly the grassroots. 10. Conflict transformation seeks to further develop and build vertical (between actors of unequal status) as well as horizontal (between actors of equal status) relationships. 11. One size does not fit all – conflict transformation processes must be tailored specifically for each situation. 12. Development aid should not worsen conflict. For the purposes of this book, conflict transformation is therefore understood as a long-term outcome-, procedure- and structure-orientated process concerned with overcoming the root causes of conflict in order to obtain a positive peace through the development and (re)building of vertical and horizontal relationships within all levels of society. Peace and conflict impact assessments Peace and conflict impact assessments (PCIAs) are a separate and complex aspect of the conflict transformation field. Because of this and a ‘lack of consensus in the field about the purposes and ownership of the approach’,95 a detailed examination is outside the scope of this book. However, in assessing the impact of social and economic development on conflict transformation, it is necessary to allude to PCIAs because, as Miall notes ‘conflict ending measured by the end of violence is too final and crude an indicator on which to base the planning and assessment of conflict transformation initiatives. For this, a more finely-grained, differentiated approach is needed. Indicators such as those developed in work on PCIA systems offers one such approach.’96 With increasing activity in the field, critical interest in assessing impacts has also escalated. However, as Hoffman notes: while the number of such evaluations has been increasing, their quality, scope, depth and methodology continue to vary significantly … it is only relatively recently that practitioners … have even bothered with them … while there is considerable anecdotal evidence concerning such practices, we are only just beginning to see the development and consolidation of systematic knowledge regarding the impact of these activities.97

While there are a range of approaches to PCIA methodologies, the most familiar are standard funder evaluations, usually carried out by outside consultants. The criteria most frequently invoked are impact and coverage; relevance and appropriateness; effectiveness and efficiency; timeliness;

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sustainability; and coherence, coordination and ­ complementarity.98 However, the lack of consensus associated with them means they are viewed by many project promoters as a necessary evil. While they help clarify and set project objectives and assumptions underpinning specific interventions and also assist in highlighting the need for a project, they can be problematic; it can be very difficult to identify appropriate indicators, particularly those of a qualitative nature. The overwhelming majority are quantitative and this is one of three huge weaknesses with standard evaluations, the other two being that the vast majority of evaluations are carried out retrospectively and carried out from a funder rather than a funded (i.e. practitioner) perspective. Moreover, Lederach argues that a project-based approach ‘may well limit rather than facilitate peacebuilding’.99 Kenneth Bush made one of the earliest attempts to develop a workable PCIA model.100 For him one of the difficulties with efforts to develop PCIA methodologies is that ‘most approaches tend to view peacebuilding as a specific type of activity rather than thinking of it as an impact’.101 He argued instead for a ‘kaleidoscopic’ set of indicators that better accommodate the varied needs of the different project stakeholders and participants in a user-driven assessment process, believing ‘this is essential if PCIA is to even stand a chance of having an empowering impact on communities affected by outside interventions’.102 To this end he identifies four broad areas in which to explore the wider peacebuilding impacts of a project in post-project evaluations (including whether the project produced substantial or politically significant changes in access to individual or collective material and non-material resources; created, exacerbated or mitigated socioeconomic tensions; produced substantial changes in the material basis of economic sustenance or food security; produced challenges to or changes in the content of or control over existing political, economic and/or social systems)103 and five ‘concrete points of reference’ as an example of a PCIA framework that might lead to looking in the right locations and asking the right questions (including institutional capacity to manage/resolve conflict and to promote tolerance and build peace; military and human security; political structures and processes; economic structures and processes; social reconstruction and empowerment).104 Another model, the Reflecting on Peace Practice project, ‘examined whether criteria could be established that would indicate an intervention’s impact on the progress towards peace writ-large’,105 establishing qualitative indicators that meant peace programmes would appear to be more effective if the effort:

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1. is marked by participants’ sustained engagement over time; 2. has a linking dynamic (upwards or downwards); 3. does something substantive about root and proximate causes of the conflict; 4. is geared towards creating institutional solutions; 5. causes people to respond differently (from before) in relation to conflict.106 It suggests that a project’s contribution will be more effective the more of these criteria it meets. Additionally Gsänger and Feyen contend that a common analytical framework for impact assessment is needed that enables donors and partners to: 1. assess intended as well as unintended impacts; 2. help to understand the processes leading to the observed impacts; 3. stimulate learning processes among beneficiaries, local communities and institutions and the donor community; 4. identify impacts at project, intermediate institutions and policy level; 5. shed light on the nature and dynamics of sectoral inter-linkages; 6. strengthen local ownership and participation; 7. involve stakeholders; 8. guide actions in a transparent manner; 9. remain affordable.107 If the qualitative indicators from the Reflecting on Peace Practice project are combined with Bush’s points of reference, we can go some way towards developing a common analytical framework for impact ­assessment. Conclusion: key issues to be examined, key impacts to be assessed When violence ceases, formal negotiations have concluded and increased space has been created for political participation, have the expectations of social, economic, religious and cultural changes been achieved? Rarely is this the case, it would seem, and thus a gap is created between the expectations for peace and what is actually delivered.108 It is this gap, particularly whether the expectations of social and economic change have been achieved, that this book assesses. In line with Lederach’s contribution, it is specifically interested in finding out if the interdependence gap has been met, if the justice gap has been filled and whether the process–structure gap has been erased. In terms of Bush’s PCIA framework, our concrete points of reference are the economic structures and processes and social reconstruction and empowerment.109 What therefore emerges are a number of issues that need to be addressed by societies

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emerging from conflict if effective conflict transformation is to take place and against which the three programmes will be assessed: 1. An attempt has been made to address the root causes of the conflict, thus bringing about substantial changes in the social and economic structures of society. 2. Vertical and horizontal capacity has been developed and integrated through the involvement of all levels of society in the transformation process, thus enabling the empowerment of the society’s citizens. 3. A long-term view has been taken of the transformation process. 4. The tools used were tailored to suit the particular situation, thus facilitating peacebuilding rather than imposing or dictating terms. 5. The tools have not done any harm. However, as the overall impact of conflict transformation work is still difficult to evaluate, the book proceeds cautiously but with the aim that this framework will provide an understanding of the Northern Ireland context which can be constructively shared. Notes 1 O. Ramsbotham, T. Woodhouse and H. Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), p. 30. 2 J.P. Lederach, Preparing for Peace. Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 9. 3 Ibid., p. 41. 4 C. Reimann, ‘Assessing the State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation – Reflections from a Theoretical Perspective’, in A. Austin, M. Fischer and N. Ropers (eds), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften / GWV Fachverlage GmbH, 2004), p. 48. 5 Ibid. 6 D. Francis, People, Peace and Power. Conflict Transformation in Action (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 36. 7 E. Azar, ‘Protracted Social Conflicts and Second Track Diplomacy’, in J. Davies and E. Kaufman (eds), Second Track / Citizen’s Diplomacy. Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p. 15. 8 Ibid., pp. 29–30. 9 V. Bufacchi, ‘Two Concepts of Violence’, Political Studies Review, 3:2 (2005), 197. 10 S. Ryan, The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 2.

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1 Reimann, ‘Assessing the State-of-the-Art’, p. 42 (emphasis in original text). 1 12 Ibid., pp. 49–55. 13 D. Francis, From Pacification to Peacebuilding. A Call to Global Transformation (London and New York: Pluto Press, 2010), p. 8. 14 K. Clements, ‘Peace Building and Conflict Transformation’, Peace and Con­ flict Studies, 4:1 (1997), www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs (accessed 7 May 2003). 15 K. Clements, ‘Towards Conflict Transformation and a Just Peace’, in Austin et al. (eds), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict, p. 454. 16 M. Fischer and N. Ropers, ‘Introduction’, in Austin et al. (eds), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict, p. 13. 17 J. Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (Oslo/London: PRIO International Peace Research Institute/ Sage, 1996), p. 270. 18 K.F. Brand-Jacobson, ‘Peace: The Goal and the Way’, in J. Galtung, C.G. Jacobson and K.F. Brand-Jacobson, Searching for Peace. The Road to Transcend (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 16–17. 19 Ibid., pp. 20–1. 20 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, p. 89. 21 J. Galtung, Transcend and Transform. An Introduction to Conflict Work (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p. viii. 22 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, p. 89. 23 R. Paris, At War’s End. Building Peace after Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 39; B. Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peace Keeping’, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (New York: UN, 1992). 24 D. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), p. 10; J.G. Cockell, ‘Conceptualising Peacebuilding: Human Security and Sustainable Peace’, in M. Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 18. 25 Lederach, Preparing for Peace, p. 16. 26 J.P. Lederach, Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 83. 27 J.P. Lederach, ‘The Challenge of the 21st Century. Justpeace’, in European Centre for Conflict Prevention, People Building Peace. 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), p. 28. 28 D. Bloomfield, Political Dialogue in Northern Ireland. The Brooke Initiative, 1989–1992 (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 196–7. 29 J.P. Lederach, ‘Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework’, in K. Rupesinghe (ed.), Conflict Transformation (London: St Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 214. 30 P. Nolan, Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report Number One (Belfast: Community Relations Council, 2012), pp. 8–11, 83–4. See also Chapter 2, below.

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1 Lederach, ‘The Challenge of the 21st Century. Justpeace’, p. 29. 3 32 Ibid., p. 30. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 J.P. Lederach, author interview, 16 April 2003. 37 Lederach, ‘The Challenge of the 21st Century. Justpeace’, pp. 30–1. 38 In the Border Counties, for example, many feel that state agencies and government departments only paid lip-service to their potential contribution to and role in the peace process (comments made by Peace I & II project promoters focus group participants, 2003). 39 C. Farrington, ‘Unionism and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland’, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 8:2 (2006), 277. 40 Lederach, ‘The Challenge of the 21st Century. Justpeace’, p. 31 (emphasis in original text). 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., p. 32 (emphasis in original text). 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid., p. 33. 45 Lederach, author interview, 16 April 2003. 46 Lederach, ‘The Challenge of the 21st Century. Justpeace’, p. 33. 47 Ibid., p. 34. 48 Ibid., p. 35. 49 H. Miall, ‘Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task’, in Austin et al. (eds), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict, p. 74. 50 M. Pugh, ‘Introduction: The Ownership of Regeneration and Peacebuilding’, in Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies, p. 3. 51 Lederach, ‘Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts’, p. 212. 52 M. Pugh, ‘The Social-Civil Dimension’, in Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies, p. 129. 53 See, for example, C. Bigdon and B. Korf, ‘The Role of Development Aid in Conflict Transformation: Facilitating Empowering Processes and Community Building’, in Austin et al. (eds), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict, p. 352. Moreover, they make a clear distinction between empowerment and capacity building, arguing that ‘capacity building is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of empowerment’ (pp. 352–3). 54 Francis, People, Peace and Power, p. 7 (emphasis in original text). 55 E.W. Schwerin, Mediation, Citizen Empowerment and Transformational Politics (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), pp. 61–71. 56 Ibid., p. 81. 57 Francis, People, Peace and Power, p. 8. 58 Lederach, Preparing for Peace, p. 112. 59 Anglo-Irish Agreement, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/aiadoc.htm#a (acces­­­ sed 30 December 2011). 60 Lederach, ‘Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflict’, p. 213. 61 Ibid.

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62 M. Fischer, Civil Society in Conflict Transformation: Ambivalence, Potentials and Challenges (Berlin: Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006), p. 14. 63 M. Leonhardt, ‘The Challenges of Linking Aid and Peacebuilding’, in L. Reychler and T. Paffenholz (eds), Peace Building. A Field Guide (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 242. 64 Bigdon and Korf, ‘The Role of Development Aid’, p. 345. 65 V. Bojicié-Dzelilović, ‘World Bank, NGOs and the Private Sector in PostWar Reconstruction’, in E. Newman and A. Schnabel (eds), Recovering from Civil Conflict. Reconciliation, Peace and Development (London: Frank Cass/ United Nations University, 2002), p. 86. 66 Ireland Aid, Report of the Ireland Aid Review Committee (Dublin: Department of Foreign Affairs, 2002), pp. 98–9. 67 J. Goodhand and P. Atkinson, Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuilding Impact of International Engagement. A Synthesis of Findings from Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka (London: International Alert, 2001), p. 7. 68 P. Collier, V.L. Elliot, H. Hegre, A. Hoeffler, M. Reynal-Querol and N. Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy. A World Bank Policy Research Report (Washington, DC: World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 6. 69 Cockell, ‘Conceptualising Peacebuilding’, pp. 17–18 (emphasis in original text). 70 Ibid., p. 26. 71 M.B. Anderson, Do No Harm. How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War (Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 1. 72 P. Uvin, Aiding Violence. The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998), p. 232. 73 Ibid. 74 Leonhardt, ‘Challenges of Linking Aid and Peacebuilding’, p. 239. 75 Ibid., p. 241. 76 C. Gaigals and M. Leonhardt, Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development. A Review of Practice (London: International Alert, Saferworld and International Development Research Centre, 2001). 77 Anderson, Do No Harm, p. 2. 78 M.B. Anderson, ‘Enhancing Local Capacity for Peace: Do No Harm’, in Reychler and Paffenholz (eds), Peacebuilding. A Field Guide, pp. 258–63; Anderson, Do No Harm. 79 Anderson, ‘Enhancing Local Capacity for Peace’, p. 263. 80 Leonhardt, ‘Challenge of Linking Aid and Peace’, pp. 240–2. 81 Clements, ‘Towards Conflict Transformation and a Just Peace’, p. 448. 82 M. Fischer and B. Schmelzle, ‘Introduction: Dilemmas and Options in Transforming War Economies’, in M. Fischer and B. Schmelzle (eds), Transforming War Economies. Dilemmas and Strategies, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No. 3 (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005), p. 6 (emphasis in original text). 83 N. Killick, V.S. Srikantha and C. Gündüz, The Role of Local Business in

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Peacebuilding (Berlin: Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005), p. 17. 84 V. Haufler, ‘Is There a Role for Business in Conflict Management?’, in C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson and P. Aall (eds), Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 663. 85 M. Fitzduff, A Typology of Community Relations Work and Contextual Necessities (Belfast: Community Relations Council, 1991), section 3 – Economic Development. 86 G. Carbonnier, ‘Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy: A Critical Review of the Literature’, War-Torn Societies Project, Occasional Paper, No.  2 (March 1998). 87 Ibid. 88 Haufler, ‘Is There a Role for Business in Conflict Management?’, p. 663. 89 Anon., ‘Local Business Pushing for Peace in Northern Ireland’, in European Centre for Conflict Prevention, People Building Peace, pp. 327–8. 90 In 1996, approximately two years after the peace dividend paper was published, the companies forming the Northern Ireland Confederation of British Industry (CBI) joined with six other trade and business organisations to create the Group of 7. The Group of 7 includes the CBI, the Hospitality Association for Northern Ireland, the Institute of Directors, the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Northern Ireland Growth Challenge, the Northern Ireland Economic Council, and the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. 91 H. Dorussen, ‘Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives’, Journal of Peace Research, 38:2 (2001), 261. 92 Quoted in J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland. Broken Images (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), p. 269. 93 J. Friedman and N. Killick, ‘Introduction: The Partnership Model’, in European Centre for Conflict Prevention, People Building Peace, p. 323. 94 Clements, ‘Towards Conflict Transformation and a Just Peace’, p. 458. 95 M. Leonhardt, ‘Towards a Unified Methodology: Reframing PCIA’, in A. Austin, M. Fischer and O. Wils (eds), Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Critical Views on Theory and Practice, Berghof Handbook, Dialogue Series No 1 (Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2003), p. 53, www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/ dialogue1_leonhardt.pdf (accessed 2 January 2012). 96 Miall, ‘Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task’, p. 85. For a detailed discussion on PCIA methodologies see the series of articles in A. Austin, M. Fischer and O. Wils (eds), Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Critical Views on Theory and Practice, Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Dialogue Series No 1 (Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2003), www.berghof-handbook.net/ dialogue-series/no.-1-peace-and-conflict-impact-assessment.-critical-viewsfrom-theory-and (accessed 2 January 2012).

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97 M. Hoffman, ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology: Evolving Art Form or Practical Dead End?’, in Austin et al. (eds), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict, p. 173. 98 Ibid., pp. 174–5. 99 Lederach, Building Peace, p. 131. 100 K. Bush, A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones, Working Paper No. 1 (Ottawa: The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative & The Evaluation Unit, The International Development Research Centre, 1998). 101 Hoffman, ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology’, p. 177 (emphasis in original text). 102 K. Bush, ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Five Years On: The Commodification of an Idea’, in A. Austin, M. Fischer and N. Ropers (eds), The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001), p. 4. 103 Quoted in Hoffman, ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology’, pp. 179–80. 104 Ibid., p. 181. 105 C. Church and J. Shouldice, The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play (Derry: INCORE, University of Ulster, 2002), p. 24. 106 Ibid., pp. 24–5. 107 Gsänger, H., and C. Feyen, ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology: A Development Practitioner’s Perspective (Response Paper)’, in A. Austin, M. Fischer and O. Wils (eds), Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Critical Views on Theory and Practice, Berghof Dialogue Series No  1 (Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2003), pp. 67–75, www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/ dialogue1_gsaenger_feyen.pdf (accessed 2 January 2012). 108 Lederach, ‘The Challenge of the 21st Century. Justpeace’, p. 32. 109 Hoffman, ‘Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology’, p. 181.

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Social and economic context of the Northern Ireland conflict

Having discussed the difficulties associated with the role of social and economic development in transforming conflict, assessing the conflict driver role of social and economic development and the effects of conflict on such development presents its own difficulties. Despite the domination of an elite-level political discourse, there is no agreement on what the causal factors of the Northern Ireland conflict were. Complex mixes of political, constitutional, economic, social and cultural factors were involved, with government and civil society more often analysing and addressing the symptoms rather than the causes. However, as Thorson notes, ‘the interaction between intractable conflicts and the context in which they occur is highly consequential for any attempts at transforming or resolving them’.1 The literature highlights a divergence of opinion on the role of social and economic development as a contributory cause of the conflict and as a resolutive factor. The causal contribution of social and economic factors is acknowledged by some. At the height of the conflict, Birrell concluded that ‘relative deprivation provides a persistent, underlying cause of disturbances in Northern Ireland’,2 a view supported by Fay et al.3 Ruane and Todd also believe the roots of the conflict are deeply structural:4 the conflict has an economic aspect because ‘at the symbolic and strategic levels the economic, the cultural and the constitutional are inextricably intertwined’5 but they also note that ‘to stress the role of economic factors is not to argue that economic motives have primacy over political’.6 In terms of the border, Morrow argues that ‘if ever there was a demonstration that violence and poverty are linked, it is the Irish border … Not only does poverty promote violence, but violence embeds poverty.’7 McGarry and O’Leary acknowledge the existence of economic factors, but, typifying the dominant political discourse, are quite critical of many of the socioeconomic debates, arguing that ‘this evidence does not mean that the conflict is essentially economic or material, or that economic factors are more important than (or as important as) ethno-­

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national factors’.8 However, transformationally this is ­problematic, as Smith notes: one problem in the academic literature is that usually it focuses attention on the question of which is the most important cause of armed conflict. In most cases, however, this is a misleading way to look at the issue. The question is not which cause is more important than any other, but rather how do the different causes interact? In particular, the attempt to force a choice between economic and political explanations of armed conflict is misguided.9

This book has purposely not set out to promote one view or the other; while the huge level of change in Northern Ireland in recent years has been motivated by political rather than economic or social drivers, economic and social change has been inextricably linked to the political. The extent of this connection is the interest here, as addressing structural violence is crucial to successfully transforming conflict. Taking into account some of the research difficulties outlined previously, this chapter is primarily concerned with providing a baseline against which conflict transformation through social and economic development can be assessed, specifically as the three conflict transformation tools have addressed it. While it is beyond the book’s scope to provide a detailed socioeconomic analysis or indeed historical account of the region, some understanding of the extent of the contributory role of social and economic development in the conflict and an examination of the development of the region’s social and economic make-up will be useful in understanding social and economic development as a transforming factor. To determine this, the effects of the conflict on a number of social and economic indicators on both sides of the border will be explored. Historical socioeconomic overview Following the Plantation of Ulster and the introduction of the 1690 Penal Laws, Ruane and Todd note that ‘Catholics began the eighteenth century from a position of almost complete political powerlessness; their economic base had been gravely weakened, their military capacity had been destroyed, they were totally excluded from the apparatus of state and the alliance between Protestants and the British state was secure.’10 The nineteenth century saw a growing divide not only between the Catholics and Protestants of Ulster but also between Ulster and the rest of Ireland. This was due to the effects of the Industrial Revolution which were confined almost entirely to the north of Ireland and, within Ulster, almost entirely to the east of the province. Moreover, ‘between 1800 and 1830 the proportion of Catholics in Belfast rose from 10 per cent to 30

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per cent and the first signs of serious urban conflict occurred as a result of competition for jobs and for houses’.11 The seeds of social and economic inequality and, in turn, deprivation were sown, ensuring that ‘the structural preconditions existed for the emergence of just two communities … [with] radically conflicting views of the union’.12 The signing of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act formally partitioned Ireland, copper-fastening the existing division. The new entity of Northern Ireland faced two contentious issues: the growing divide between the nationalist and Unionist communities and its relationship with Britain and southern Ireland, both closely related to the economy; ‘the troubles of the 1930s were triggered off by the depression and, indeed, accusations of economic discrimination were among the most bitter reasons for discontent by the Northern minority. And the relationship with southern Ireland and Britain became increasingly dependent on economic ties and divisions.’13 The 1940s and 1950s, however, were relatively peaceful by Northern Ireland standards as they ‘coincided with a growing and deliberate emphasis on economic expansion for the province … so the 1960s started as the decade of hope’.14 Furthermore, Lord Brookeborough was replaced by Terence O’Neill, who appeared open to economic and social reform and in favour of opening up relations with the Republic. However, his failure to deliver on his intentions caused considerable anger, particularly in the west of the province. As the newest region of the UK began to establish itself, inequality between the two communities became further entrenched as Unionist power was built into the major state institutions and used to manipulate the franchise and electoral boundaries, allowing them to take control of most local authorities, which had substantial powers in the areas of housing and education, maintaining control up to 1968. The socioeconomic aspects of this period 1921–68 have been examined by a number of researchers, most notably Whyte’s investigation into discrimination under the Unionist regime; Smith and Chambers’ major study on equality and inequality in Northern Ireland; and the report of the Cameron Commission, set up by O’Neill to investigate disturbances in 1968.15 The Commission commented: it will be clear that the immediate causes of the outbreaks of violence … and their continuance thereafter, arose from a wide variety of sources. Some and not the least powerful … are deep-rooted in the continuing pressure, in particular among Catholic members of the community, of a sense of resentment and frustration at the failure of representations for the remedy of social, economic and political grievances. On the other hand, among Protestants, equally deep-rooted suspicions and fears of political and economic domination by a future Catholic majority in the population calculated to build-up a dangerous, and politically explosive, sectarian division.16

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During this time, Smith and Chambers completed their landmark study of inequality in Northern Ireland, including the questions ‘What, in your opinion, are the main causes of the current Troubles in Northern Ireland that began in the late 1960s? What other causes of the Troubles are there?’ The responses were complex in their detail; a third of respondents referred to political and constitutional issues and a third referred to social or economic problems, which Smith and Chambers found: contradicts one of the main conclusions drawn by Richard Rose from his 1968 survey. It shows that political and constitutional issues are not overwhelmingly the main frame of reference in which people locate the conflict. A substantial proportion of both communities think first and foremost in terms of social and economic conditions and the rights of citizens within Northern Ireland itself, and not in terms of its relations with larger political units.17

This highlights the need to address the root causes of conflict if effective conflict transformation is to take place. What essentially began as a demand for equal recognition and participation in society and its institutions escalated into an all-out constitutional and political war due to government failure to address these issues and implement necessary changes. The civil rights movement was, by and large, an attempt by the grassroots to engage with the government of the day. Clearly, however, this did not happen, with the top level essentially choosing to ignore grassroots efforts. Thereafter, all attempts at trying to resolve the conflict failed, partly due to the government’s non-involvement of the grassroots along with limited efforts to understand and therefore address the root causes in the first place. Effects of the conflict on social and economic development The cost of over thirty years of conflict in Northern Ireland proved seriously detrimental to its social and economic development. Tomlinson estimates the direct financial costs alone as being around €34.5 billion (80.5 per cent fell in Northern Ireland, 12 per cent fell in the Republic and 7.5 per cent fell in the UK).18 Deloitte’s 2007 report explored the impact of the conflict on lost economic opportunities ‘in terms of lost jobs (27,600 from 1983–2000), investment (£225 million Gross Value Added (GVA)) and tourism (£1,461 million 2006 prices)’, with the impact on rural communities largely social.19 The conflict resulted in over 3,600 deaths and 45,000 injuries20 to all communities from both sides of the border, along with substantial direct damage to the physical, social and economic infrastructure. The Cost of the Troubles study found that ‘the wards with the highest intensity of violence stand out.

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These are characterised by low levels of employment, high benefits dependency and respondents with no educational qualifications concentrated in public sector, rented accommodation, for the most part religiously segregated.’21 However, looking for effects related specifically to the conflict is not easy because, as Morrissey notes, ‘it is very difficult to separate out the impact of developments in the international economy, the effects of changes in the British economy, economic problems specific to Northern Ireland and the economic costs of the region’s conflict. All were happening simultaneously and interacting with each other.’22 The state of the economy may certainly have contributed to the emergence of conflict, but the region’s disadvantage may also have been due to its geographical isolation; ‘parts of the region adjoining the border have, because of the political situation, suffered particular problems which further exacerbate the effects of peripherality of border areas. In particular, the policy of road closures which was undertaken for security reasons had direct impacts on the local population in both social and economic terms.’23 The question, however, remains – would the absence of the conflict or a healthier economy have made any difference? At its most basic, it certainly did not help matters. Northern Ireland’s relationship with the Republic of Ireland is of primary importance here, as the effects of the conflict on social and economic development in the Border Counties have been devastating, thus inextricably linking them to the transformation process. Despite remarkably little analysis of this relationship, the effect has been considerable, compounded by the Border Counties displaying ‘many of the socio-economic characteristics and demographic trends of a less advanced rural region (e.g. rural poverty, deprivation and weak infrastructure and an aging population) … [with] the Haase deprivation index … [having] identified all the border counties as relatively deprived with some pockets of sub-regional extreme deprivation’.24 When they were cut off from Northern Ireland by the Boundary Commission, this divide then being cemented by the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, they were also cut off from their natural economic hinterland in Northern Ireland, disrupting socioeconomic development and giving way to physical damage through terrorist attacks. Examining a number of key indicators, namely the economy, employment, education, poverty and social exclusion, will provide a better understanding.

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Economy The picture generally painted of the Northern Ireland economy has been a rather bleak one. Considerable long-term structural problems have persisted, including ‘a worrying share of manufacturing concentrated in low-technology, low-value added industries … difficulties in attracting and maintaining foreign direct investment … significant concentrations of low pay … the highest unemployment rates of UK regions and more of the unemployed are long-term … total factor productivity rates remain relatively low’.25 While the conflict was not the sole cause of economic decline ‘the act of partitioning Ireland created the conditions under which the economy of the Northern state floundered. Cut off from the rest of Ireland and tied to macro-economic decision-making that favoured Britain rather than a peripheral region, the seeds of economic decline were already sown.’26 While the Great War period brought economic prosperity to the whole island, Northern Ireland did particularly well. Its core industries of linen and textile manufacturing, agriculture and shipbuilding boomed. Yet writing in 1985, Kennedy and Ollerenshaw argued that it had remained: a peripheral and disadvantaged region throughout the period since the 1920s. Regional policy has, with varying degrees of success, sought to minimise the disadvantages, not least by creating employment. Yet, even at the peak of the post-war boom, the province lagged far behind more favoured regions of the United Kingdom: in 1967–68, for example, incomes in Northern Ireland were only 83.6% of the national UK average.27

During the 1950s and 1960s GNP rose faster in Northern Ireland than in the Republic or the UK, so much so that ‘at the turn of the 70s, Northern Ireland was more or less a self-reliant region, needing only a tiny fiscal transfer from the Treasury’,28 around 16 per cent of total public expenditure.29 Nevertheless, despite this moderate success, Northern Ireland began the 1960s requiring major policy changes; the textile manufacturing industry, for example, had declined from 64 per cent of total manufacturing employment in 1924 to 41 per cent by the outbreak of the conflict in 1969.30 However, it was not anticipated that ‘the outbreak of civil unrest would make this transformation much more prolonged and difficult than it would have been in a period of peaceful economic transition’.31 In the early 1970s efforts made to create new industry produced little or no results, largely because of an inability to attract inward investment due to the conflict and world economic conditions. As a result the economy: was thrown into turmoil. To have allowed an economic crisis to run alongside the political turmoil would have pushed the region into the abyss. In

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the face of these various economic shocks, successive British governments allowed a big expansion of the public sector. Financing this expansion meant a huge growth in the UK subvention.32

At the beginning of Direct Rule in 1972, the UK subvention was less than £100 million.33 By the mid-1990s it stood at around £3.8 billion.34 The public sector directly employed 40 per cent of the workforce, as well as supporting many other jobs indirectly. Additionally, some 20 per cent of the population relied on unemployment benefits, resulting in taxation supporting three-fifths of the labour force. Even so, GDP per capita was 30 per cent below the UK level.35 Although public sector employment had declined to 33 per cent by 2007, compared with 22 per cent in the UK,36 it remains central to the economy. Simpson has noted that the use of transfers to supplement the economy is often cited to argue that Northern Ireland was fairly treated. However: the degree of social and economic need … stemming from higher unemployment, a greater proportion of family dependents, a poorer stock of social capital in housing and health and lower living standards, was such that the scale of government financial transfers was, until the early 1970s, below the level which might have applied if Northern Ireland had ‘enjoyed’ the scale of spending justified by need.37

Nevertheless, Bradley observes that ‘the size and persistence of British exchequer funding … serves to influence and colour every aspect of the northern economy’,38 in particular masking the true difference between the economies on both sides of the border. Undoubtedly the economy has greatly improved in recent years after its steady post-ceasefire decline (GDP per head in Northern Ireland compared to the Republic declined steadily from 100 per cent in 1994 to 89.8, 75.6 and 68.2 per cent in 1996, 1998 and 1999).39 In 2002 GDP per head was 93 per cent of the EU25 average, while GVA per head increased at the fifth highest rate of all UK regions from 1994–2004.40 Real GDP growth varied from 2.5 per cent in 2003 to 3 per cent in 2004 and 2005, compared to 3.7, 5.1 and 5 per cent in the Republic in the same years and 2.2, 3.1 and 2.5 per cent in the UK in the same years.41 However, productivity remained below the national average at about 80 per cent, the third lowest of all UK regions in 2004, reflecting little real economic change relative to the UK.42 Additionally, persistent structural problems including a continued over-dependence on agriculture and the public sector (in terms of employment and public expenditure), traditional manufacturing industries coming under pressure from low-cost producers in Eastern Europe and Asia and a heavy reliance on manual and lower skilled employment, means there is still a long way to go.

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Northern Ireland, like the Republic, has also suffered from the impact of the global recession and debt crisis since 2007, with no GDP growth, for example, during the first quarter of 2010 or 2011.43 The Republic’s economy has had mixed fortunes over the last century. Unlike Northern Ireland, it performed quite badly from the 1920s until the late 1950s. Echoing Morrissey, Rowthorn notes that the partition of Ireland: damaged the economy of the island and inhibited future development. It disrupted trade flows between North and South and weakened the already somewhat tenuous economic links between the two regions. More fundamentally, partition cemented political divisions in Ireland and prevented the formation of a sense of common purpose and determination to overcome the island’s economic backwardness.44

Its problems were huge: ‘between 1920 and 1924 agricultural prices fell by 44 per cent; the civil war … arrested development; after independence, a significant proportion of the skilled labour force left; and the recession in the UK after sterling’s return to the gold standard in 1925 reduced demand for Irish exports’.45 Economic backwardness, grounded in protectionist economic policies, meant that during the 1930s: the combined effects of protection and the economic war [with Britain] were initially dramatic. Industrial output rose 40 per cent between 1931 and 1936 … Population stabilized standing at 2.93 million in 1931 and 2.94 million in 1938 … but the amount of unemployment soared, almost quintupling between 1931 and 1934, and raising the unemployment rate sharply, to about 14 per cent of the labour force by 1935 … Despite rapid industrial growth, agriculture stagnated, as exports fell sharply […] between 1938 and 1947 national income grew just 14 per cent, compared to 47 per cent in the UK and 84 per cent in Northern Ireland. Where incomes, North and South, were broadly comparable before the war, by 1947 incomes per head in the Republic had fallen to about 40 per cent of the British level, while in the North they had risen to close to 70 per cent.46

The Emergency therefore brought further economic stagnation and decline, considerably widening the economic gap between South and North. Nevertheless, the immediate post-war years saw some improvement; ‘investment recovered … industrial output rose … the census of 1951 … was the first since 1841 to register an increase in population … the main boom was in consumption’.47 However, this was short-lived, with the 1950s becoming a wretched economic decade as the economy remained virtually stagnant. Optimists, however, view this episode as one of transition rather than failure, with Ireland entering a period of sustained economic growth in the late 1950s. The 1960s and 70s saw substantial growth as ‘real product increased by 4.4 per cent per annum

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… emigration ceased, and immigration began. Per capita incomes rose by three-fifths, and kept up with income growth elsewhere in Europe, and significantly outpaced that of Britain and Northern Ireland.’48 However, the late 1970s and into the 1980s saw a continuous growth in unemployment levels, from 7.3 per cent of the labour force in 1979 to 17.4 per cent of the labour force by 1985.49 The mid-1990s to the mid-2000s witnessed a dramatic reversal of fortune in the Republic as a whole, driven in the main by foreign direct investment, European funding and human and social capital investments; GDP and GNP rose by 36.6 per cent and 33.1 per cent respectively between 1987 and 1993, compared to 13.3 per cent in the EU; by the mid-1990s the economy was one of the fastest growing in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and much faster than Northern Ireland or the UK.50 Nevertheless, the economic growth of this period was limited in the Border Counties, with the Border, Midlands and Western (BMW) region falling ‘further and further behind the east and south region in the economic boom’.51 Economic growth was much slower at 43 per cent compared to 51 per cent nationally from 1993–97, while employment growth over the same period was 15 per cent compared to 26 per cent nationally.52 Certainly, there have been improvements more recently; ‘GVA per head in the Border Region … increased from 89.2% to 94.4% of the EU25 average over 1999–2002 … [However], GVA … was the third lowest of all the regions in Ireland and actually experienced a relative decline, falling from 73.1% of the state average in 1999 to 71.0% in 2002.’53 More recently, however, the global economic recession and debt crisis has hit particularly badly; GDP growth by the third quarter of 2009 was just 0.3 per cent, while the EU and the International Monetary Fund were called in to bail out the country in November 2010. Unemployment Unemployment is the most conspicuous economic indicator of societies facing structural violence; Northern Ireland’s unemployment rates have historically been much higher than other UK or Republic of Ireland regions. In 1923 unemployment stood at 18 per cent, falling to 13 per cent in 1927 and rising again to 28 per cent in 1931; throughout the 1930s the rate never fell below 22 per cent.54 However, coinciding with a rapid decline in its traditional shipbuilding and textile manufacturing industries, unemployment steadily increased more than threefold over three decades from 31,980 in 1961 to 100,400 in 1991 (with some estimates suggesting 140,000 in 1991).55 Nevertheless, ‘despite the growing

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intensity of the Troubles, the 1970s saw some of the lowest numbers and rates of unemployment since the creation of the Northern Ireland state’;56 between 1970 and 1974, those unemployed never went above 40,000, dipping below 30,000 in 1974.57 However, the 1970s oil crises and huge job losses in the 1980s substantially increased unemployment: Between 1979 and 1981 unemployment rose by over 60 per cent and continued to increase until 1986, when the official unemployment rate reached 18.1 per cent. This represented a total of 127,800 unemployed people, with over 70 per cent men. Female unemployment nearly doubled, from 6.1 per cent to 11 per cent in the same period. In 1989, official unemployment stood at 15.1 per cent of the workforce, nearly two and a half times the UK rate of 6.3 per cent.58

The extent to which this high unemployment resulted from the conflict is an important consideration, despite the difficulties in assessing the conflict’s effect on unemployment. While there has been practically no sustained study of this relationship, a number of researchers have estimated job losses due to the conflict, thus suggesting a link: Canning et al. estimate job losses of 40,000 during the period 1971 to 1983, while Rowthorn and Wayne estimated 46,000 jobs were lost during the period 1970 to 1985. Gudgin et al. estimate that between 1971 and 1977 job losses attributed to the Troubles amounted to 24,000. DKM suggested that the loss of 46,000 jobs in externally owned companies in the North could be linked to the Troubles.59

While unemployment declined steadily from 18.1 per cent (127,800 persons)60 in 1986, it persistently stayed above the 15 European Union member states average (prior to the EU’s 2004 expansion), standing at 14 per cent in 1993 but declining steadily since, despite pockets of persistently high and increasing levels of unemployment remaining in West Belfast (from 8.6 to 10 per cent), Foyle (8.4 to 11.3 per cent) and West Tyrone (6 to 6.9 per cent) in the early 1990s.61 In 2007 a record low unemployment rate of 3.7 per cent was reached, below the UK’s average rate of 5.4 per cent and considerably lower than the EU27 (7 per cent) for May 2007,62 until the global recession saw unemployment levels begin to rise again, reaching 7.2 per cent in June 2011, compared to 7.7 per cent in the UK and 14.9 per cent in the Republic (February 2011)63 (fig. 2.1). Of this, 45.1 per cent are long-term unemployed.64 This is one of the largest and most persistent challenges facing Northern Ireland over the long-term, as figure 2.2 illustrates, since duration of unemployment is a critical determinant of poverty levels among the unemployed. In the years between the announcement of the ceasefires and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, well over half of Northern Ireland’s unem-

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Settinga the context Figure602.1 Northern Ireland unemployment levels 1992–2010 100,000 80,000 Northern Ireland Unemployed 1992-2010

60,000 40,000

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20,000 0 1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

Figure 2.1  Northern Ireland unemployment levels 1992–2010 Source: Labour Force Survey Key Data Historical Series 1992–2011, Table 2.1, March–May quarters, www.detini.gov.uk/deti-stats-index/stats-surveys.htm (accessed 19 November 2011).

ployed were actually long-term unemployed (LTU), leaving a significant proportion of the population socially excluded. The 2001 Census found that 4.14 per cent of the population were unemployed, of which 40.41 per cent were LTU.65 In 2005 the LTU rate at 40.1 per cent was more than twice the UK’s 20.9 per cent rate.66 In the periods June–August 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 LTU rates, while fluctuating between 39.8, 29.8, 42.6 and 45.1 per cent,67 remained consistently high. Additionally, economic inactivity rates remained significantly higher than other UK regions, standing at 28.2 per cent of the population in 2007, compared to 68 21.4 Ireland per cent,long-term and 27 per cent in 2011, compared to UK’s Figure the 2.2 UK’s Northern unemployed as percentage ofthe total unemployed a 23.3 (+ per2011) cent, the highest of the twelve UK regions.69 While Northern 1992–2010 100% 80% 60% 40%

Northern Ireland Long-Term Unemployed as Percentage of Unemployed

20% 0% 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 Figure 2.2  Northern Ireland long-term unemployed as percentage of total unemployed 1992–2010 (+ 2011)

Source: Labour Force Survey Key Data Historical Series 1992–2011, Table 2.1, March–May quarters, www.detini.gov.uk/deti-stats-index/stats-surveys.htm (accessed 19 November 2011).

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Social and economic context of the Northern Ireland conflict

Ireland did experience growth in employment between 1998 and 2008, the biggest increase in jobs was in the service sector, many of which were low-value, low-wage and part-time. This sector, along with construction and manufacturing, has been severely affected by the economic recession.70 Thus, while Northern Ireland’s unemployment rates have declined substantially, the persistent problem of long-term unemployment and economic inactivity remain serious structural ­difficulties. Comparisons between unemployment rates in Northern Ireland and the Republic have continuously pointed to persistently higher rates south of the border. This was certainly the case for many years after partition but changed dramatically at the beginning of the 1990s when the Republic’s economy entered its ‘Celtic Tiger’ phase and dramatically reduced its unemployment rates, which it maintained at an overall lower level until the global economic recession began in late 2007. In overall economic terms, however, the Republic’s economy has fared much better than that of Northern Ireland vis-à-vis industrial expansion, employment growth and living standards. However, this has been the case mainly for the Republic of Ireland as a whole, not necessarily for the Border Counties, which have always had a propensity to suffer from high levels of unemployment. Successive governments failed to recognise the inherent geographical and infrastructural disadvantage suffered by these counties, which was compounded by the border. Although Census information has been measured on a county basis since partition, making it fairly easy to obtain a clear picture of the Border Counties in comparison to the state as a whole, unemployment rates have only been available on a county basis since 1981. Therefore, unlike the information available for Northern Ireland, the situation before the conflict broke out or during Table 2.1  Persons aged 15 years and over in each Border County, classified by principal economic status (unemployed, having lost or given up previous job), compared to the state

% State Louth Leitrim Sligo Cavan Donegal Monaghan

1981

1986

1991

1996

2002

2006

2011

10.5 13.0 9.5 10.0 8.2 22.1 9.7

17.9 22.7 14.3 15.9 13.7 27.1 15.0

16.9 22.2 13.7 14.8 12.6 25.4 14.2

14.8 18.2 12.6 13.4 11.5 22.2 12.9

8.9 13.2 8.7 8.7 8.0 15.6 9.9

4.4 5.9 4.1 3.7 4.2 6.4 3.9

19.0 23.8 20.3 18.1 21.2 26.2 20.6

Source: Census of Population for 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2002, 2006 and 2011.

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62 Table 2.2  Comparison of long-term unemployed in ROI and NI

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Years

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Republic of Ireland Total long-term Long-term unemployed as percentage of total ­unemployed 125,000 128,000 103,000 103,000 86,000 64,000 40,200 27,100 20,300 20,800 26,200 26,700 29,200 29,200 28,800 33,200 57,300 127,000 164,000

57.0 60.8 58.2 57.7 54.3 50.2 39.8 34.0 29.3 25.3 30.2 30.4 30.5 29.8 27.9 26.2 21.7 43.4 53.9

Northern Ireland Total long-term Long-term unemployed as percentage of total ­unemployed 50,000 47,000 48,000 38,000 31,000 24,000 29,000 20,000 20,000 16,000 18,000 35,000 36,000 34,000 33,000 33,000 50,000 59,000 61,000

58.9 59.1 61.3 55.6 56.4 45.8 53.9 39.8 43.2 37.9 42.8 45.8 43.6 37.4 43.5 29.9 28.0 40.9 48.9

Source: NISRA/Central Statistics Office, Ireland North and South: A Statistical Profile 2002 (Belfast/Dublin: NISRA/CSO, 2003), Table 5.11 (ROI 1993–98, NI 1993–2004); Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Household Survey (ROI 1999–2011); Labour Force Survey Key Data Historical Series 1992–2011, Table 2.1, www.detini.gov.uk/deti-stats-index/stats-surveys.htm (accessed 19 November 2011) (NI 2004–11). Note: Both agencies use the International Labour Organisation’s benchmark definition of long-term unemployment.

the 1970s cannot be gauged. Nevertheless, Table 2.1 provides a clear picture of the unemployment situation in the Border Counties compared to the state over the last twenty-five years, illustrating consistently higher unemployment rates than the national average. The 2002 Census is very telling, having taken place eight years and four years after the ceasefires and the Good Friday Agreement, respectively, enabling one to begin to judge the unfolding transformation process

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Table 2.3  Persons aged 15 years and over in the labour force classified by ILO economic status for the border region

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Years 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Border Counties Unemployment rate % Long-term unemployment rate % 19.1 13.1 17.5 12.3 14.9 10.4 15.3 9.5 15.6 9.2 16.7 9.7 14.6 8.7 11.4 7.1 15.1 9.3 11.8 7.0 10.4 6.1 8.8 4.1 6.8 2.6 5.9 2.4 7.0 2.2 6.2 2.4 5.7 2.2 5.6 1.9 5.5 1.8 5.7 1.6 6.8 1.9 13.4 2.9 13.3 5.6 15.0 7.4

Source: Central Statistics Office, Labour Force Survey (1988–1998); Quarterly National Household Survey 2nd quarter (1999–2011). Note: The CSO defines the labour force as those at work, unemployed, looking for first regular job or unemployed having lost or given up previous job. The CSO uses the International Labour Organisation’s benchmark definition of long-term unemployment.

socially and economically. The Border Counties do not present a very positive picture with a 12 per cent unemployment rate compared to 8.9 per cent nationally, with Counties Donegal and Louth having the highest and third highest unemployment rate in the Republic at 15.6 and 13.2 per cent. Eighty-eight unemployment blackspots (with an average unem-

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Setting the context

ployment rate of 24 per cent compared with 8.8 per cent nationally) were identified throughout the country, eighteen of which were found in Donegal with an average unemployment rate of 25.2 per cent, twelve in County Monaghan (22.6 per cent) and four in Louth (22.1 per cent).71 Fourteen years of the Northern Ireland peace process and indeed the Republic’s economic boom of the 1990s had very little, if any, positive effect on the Border Counties. Long-term unemployment is just as problematic for the Republic as it is for Northern Ireland, as Table 2.2 illustrates. However, unlike the Northern Ireland Census, this particular variable is simply not measured. This information (Table 2.3), specifically requested from the Central Statistics Office (CSO)72 could only be provided regionally (with the six Border Counties making up the border region), as to sample such information on a county basis would prove inaccurate. This particular structural violence is just as magnified in the Border Counties as it is in the Republic itself, with more than half the unemployed classified as long-term unemployed during the latter quarter of the conflict and well after the ceasefires. Educational disadvantage Unemployment rates are invariably linked to educational attainment levels: the higher the educational qualification achieved, the lower the probability of being long-term unemployed. While educational disadvantage levels are declining, Northern Ireland has always maintained higher than normal levels. Northern Ireland’s 2011 Census results were not available at the time of writing. However, the 2011 (July–September) Labour Force Survey Quarterly Dataset showed that 21 per cent of the population (aged 16–64) had no qualifications, while 8 per cent had only obtained other qualifications as far as lower level GCSE, grades D–G.73 The 2001 Census showed 41.64 per cent of those aged 16–74 had no educational qualifications, while 17.23 per cent had only completed their education to lower level GCSE (grades D–G). In 1991, three years before the ceasefires, the percentage of the population with no formal educational qualifications stood at approximately 64.97 per cent of those aged 16 years and over. Ideally a comparison of these rates with the 1981 and 1971 censuses would have provided a good indication of the pattern of educational attainment, particularly among the unemployed, over most of the lifetime of the conflict. However, the 1981 Census did not cover this area,74 while the 1971 Census does not provide information on the population as a whole, only on the economically active population, 86.32 per cent of whom had no qualifications.75 Information on those with no

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qualifications who were unemployed is not available for this period.76 Moreover, approximately 74,000 people were not enumerated for the 1971 Census. However, in general terms, while this information indicates that the percentage of the population as a whole without educational qualifications has declined substantially (from approximately 86.32 per cent in 1971 to 21 per cent in 2011), it still gives considerable cause for concern: Northern Ireland has consistently retained the highest level of the working-age population with no educational qualifications of all the UK regions at a 28 per cent average from 1996–98 and a 21 per cent average from 2006–08, compared to 23 and 14 per cent averages for the North-East of England or 19 and 13 per cent averages for Scotland for the same periods.77 Linked to declining unemployment rates, one would be forgiven for thinking that the social and economic situation of the majority of the population has vastly improved in recent decades. However, when linked to the long-term unemployment rate (40.1 per cent according to the 2001 Census) the picture becomes alarming; in 2003 65 per cent of the long-term unemployed had no formal qualifications, reduced to 34 per cent in 2010.78 This leaves a clear picture of a region struggling to address the difficulties of one of its social indicators, despite more than a decade of relative peace. Comparing qualification levels with the Border Counties is not easy as ‘the categories used for different types of awards varies between jurisdictions’.79 Nevertheless, educational disadvantage in the Border Counties (with its most obvious manifestation being rates of early school leaving and qualification attainment) is of particular importance within the overall context of the region’s conflict transformation process; the advent of Peace I witnessed a concentrated focus on this area, allowing research to be carried out specifically on the Border Counties for the first time in 1998,80 formally putting on record what many in the education sector had known anecdotally for years, that educational disadvantage and early school leaving rates were highest in this region. In terms of the Republic as a whole, a 2002 report by the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) stated that ‘despite the progress … and commitments made by successive Governments, the key priority to eliminate early school leaving has still not been realised. Indeed the issue is becoming more complex as the marginalisation of those leaving school with no qualifications is increased.’81 This conclusion was arrived at five years after the release of its previous report on early school leaving which highlighted that: the number leaving school with no qualifications fell from 10 to 4 per cent of the cohort over the period 1980–1996. In 1999 … almost 13,000 young people left before completion of the Leaving Certificate, of whom 2,400 or

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3.2 per cent left with no formal qualification. However, this group is even more marginalised now than in the past because of … ‘qualifications inflation’ and there is no evidence that this has changed over time.82

This becomes important when linked to economic status by qualification level, as Table 2.4 illustrates. Although this represents a relatively small group, the economic and social consequences are very real for society as a whole, particularly in the long-term. The unemployment rate among those with no qualifications may have been on the decrease, but it remains alarming when compared to the unemployment rate of those who left with their Leaving Certificate. Table 2.4  Unemployment rates for those with Leaving Certificate compared to those without Leaving Certificate (ROI)

1996 1997 1998 1999 2002 2006 2011

Unemployment rate with the Leaving Certificate

Unemployment rate without the Leaving Certificate

11.6%  5.6%  3.7%  3.4%  6.7%  7.5% 20.7%

23.4% 53.4% 41.6% 41.4% 14.9% 15.0% 32.6%

Source: The National Economic and Social Forum, Early School Leavers. Forum Report No. 24 (Dublin: NESF, 2002), p. 34 (1997–99); Census Analysis, Central Statistics Office (1996–2001) (email correspondence 2 and 4 July 2012).

The Border Counties fare quite badly with the national figures for early school leaving. Area Development Management/Combat Poverty Agency (ADM/CPA), using the 1996 Census of Population, showed that 37.1 per cent of the population in the Border Counties left school without any qualification (primary level being the highest completed) compared with 28.6 per cent nationally, of which Donegal had the highest level (42.3 per cent), followed by Cavan, Leitrim and Monaghan with 40.6, 37.6 and 36 per cent. The Border Counties also had a higher percentage rate for those who ceased their full-time education at the age of fifteen and under, at 30.8 per cent compared to 22.8 per cent nationally, clearly showing significantly higher levels of educational disadvantage in the Border Counties compared to the rest of the country. When compared to the figures for the 2002 Census (Tables 2.5 and 2.6), one can see an overall improvement from their 1996 rates. However, the rates remain higher than the national average, both in terms of the age at

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Age 17–18

34.3 19.7

36.6 22.7 12.2 26.5 24.8 15.5 20.7 21.2 15.4

29.2 16.6

26.5 16.4

30.4 17.5 10.4 30.4 26.3 16.8 23.9 23.8 18.6

22.0 12.6

Cavan

Donegal

Leitrim

Louth

Monaghan

Sligo

Age 19–20

Age 20+

Age not stated

8.0

5.7

6.6

5.9

5.7

6.7

6.4

7.1

8.9

7.5

8.3

8.0

7.0

8.6

7.9

8.4

7.2 10.0 13.6

7.7 12.1 14.8

7.7 11.0 15.9

7.4 10.5 13.6

7.2 10.0 13.0

7.9 11.4 14.4

6.7 11.1 14.6 16.5

7.0

6.7

7.5

5.8

7.6

6.6

6.7 11.2 15.8 17.7

5.4 16.2 26.6

2.4 15.0 18.2

3.6 12.1 22.3

4.0 14.2 22.8

3.1 13.8 22.7

2.7 14.4 27.6

3.4 14.0 23.3

4.4 14.9 23.5

Source: S. Rourke and J. Shiels, Educational Disadvantage in the Southern Border Counties of Ireland. A Report to the ADM/ CPA Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Monaghan: ADM/CPA, 1998), p. 9; Central Statistics Office, Census 2002: Principal Socio-Economic Results (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2003); Central Statistics Office, This is Ireland. Highlights from Census 2011, Part 2 (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2012), Table 17A, p. 87.

5.7 23.9 19.9 10.6 29.6 27.9 16.9

8.0 30.3 25.7 14.3 25.3 25.4 17.5

7.9 26.6 23.0 13.7 26.6 27.1 18.5

8.2 24.8 22.9 12.4 24.3 24.4 16.2

9.3 27.2 24.2 14.2 24.3 24.2 16.8

30.8 18.4

Border Counties

6.6 25.7 20.9 11.4 28.8 26.9 17.1

22.8 13.1

National

%

Age 15–16

1996 2002 2011 1996 2002 2011 1996 2002 2011 1996 2002 2011 1996 2002 2011 1996 2002 2011

Age U15

Table 2.5  Persons aged 15 years and over classified by age at which full-time education ceased – 1996, 2002 and 2011 compared

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37.1

40.6

42.3

37.6

32.6

36.0

30.0

Border ­Counties

Cavan

Donegal

Leitrim

Louth

Monaghan

Sligo

22.5

27.8

24.5

27.2

32.2

29.9

27.9

21.1

2002

12.9

17.6

15.0

15.2

21.2

16.5

17.2

12.7

2011

17.4

25.4

23.3

18.7

19.2

19.4

20.7

20.2

1996

20.7

26.8

24.8

23.1

24.2

23.5

24.0

21.6

2002

13.2

18.5

16.2

15.4

15.7

15.8

15.8

13.8

2011

Lower secondary

30.0

24.4

26.7

26.5

22.6

24.5

25.2

29.0

1996

27.9

23.7

26.4

26.2

21.5

24.4

24.5

27.6

2002

28.4

28.4

28.5

29.9

25.3

29.9

27.8

28.6

2011

Upper secondary

18.9

13.0

15.1

13.2

13.1

13.3

14.4

19.1

1996

23.1

16.7

20.6

18.3

17.5

17.5

18.9

24.7

2002

Tertiary

23.3

17.7

20.5

21.6

19.1

17.7

19.8

24.3

2011

3.7

1.6

2.3

4.0

2.8

2.2

2.7

3.1

1996

5.8

5.0

3.6

5.2

4.6

4.7

4.6

5.1

2002

5.1

2.3

3.5

4.3

3.8

4.9

3.9

3.9

2011

Not stated

Source: S. Rourke and J. Shiels, Educational Disadvantage in the Southern Border Counties of Ireland. A Report to the ADM/CPA Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Monaghan: ADM/CPA, 1998), p. 9; Central Statistics Office, Census 2002: Principal Socio-Economic Results (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2003); Central Statistics Office, This is Ireland. Highlights from Census 2011, Part 2 (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2012), Table 18A, p. 90.

28.6

National

%

1996

Primary

Table 2.6  Persons aged 15 years and over classified by highest level of education completed – 1996, 2002 and 2011 compared

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Table 2.7  Persons aged 15–64 years in the state and the border region classified by longterm unemployment and highest level of education attained

Republic

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Year

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Border Region

Primary or below %

Lower secondary %

Primary or below %

Lower secondary %

74.5 75.3 77.8 73.5 70.8 71.8 74.0 72.8 71.1 68.4 65.4 58.6 53.0 47.9 47.0 54.7 49.1 54.0 51.1 47.3 49.7 42.3 58.1 69.3

61.2 63.0 60.9 60.1 56.3 59.0 63.3 60.0 59.5 59.5 52.2 41.2 38.0 33.7 28.4 35.8 34.9 31.8 35.1 33.5 33.7 27.1 50.4 61.2

76.8 77.8 81.0 71.0 68.2 67.0 75.3 72.5 72.8 68.3 70.8 62.7 51.2 55.3 50.0 55.6 53.3 53.3 53.6 48.0 39.4 39.0 64.7 47.1

61.8 65.5 64.2 59.7 58.4 59.8 60.3 65.2 60.5 61.0 57.1 44.2 43.2 53.8 39.3 43.8 48.3 31.0 37.5 34.4 25.6 27.5 43.3 55.3

Source: Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Household Survey and Labour Force Survey. Note: The CSO uses the International Labour Organisation’s benchmark definition of long-term unemployment. The information for the years 1988–97 is based on the Labour Force Survey, while the information for the years 1998–2011 is based on the 2nd quarter of the Quarterly National Household Survey.

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which full-time education has ceased and the highest level of education attained. For example, full-time education had ceased for 18.44 per cent of the population aged under fifteen years in the Border Counties (with Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan at 22.71, 19.71 and 17.45 per cent being the worst) compared to 13.09 per cent nationally, and for 24.17 per cent of those aged 15–16 years in the Border Counties (with Monaghan, Louth and Donegal at 26.25, 25.7 and 24.8 per cent being the worst) compared to 20.86 per cent nationally. In the case of the highest level of education achieved, 27.91 per cent of the Border Counties population only attained primary level education compared to 21.05 per cent nationally (with Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan at 32.15, 29.85 and 27.75 per cent being the worst), while 24.03 per cent of the border population only attained lower secondary level education compared to 21.56 per cent nationally (with Monaghan, Louth and Donegal at 26.78, 24.82 and 24.24 per cent being the worst). More recently, the 2011 Census saw another improvement but the Border Counties again largely remained behind the national level. Unlike Northern Ireland, the Republic’s Census does not measure the educational attainment levels of the unemployed or more importantly of the long-term unemployed (in other words, long-term unemployed early school leaving rates); the CSO could only provide this information in regional terms. Table 2.7 clearly illustrates the extremely high levels of early school leaving among the long-term unemployed. The levels of early school leaving among the long-term unemployed in the border region have been overwhelmingly higher than those of the Republic as a whole. Although the rate has reduced in recent years it is still a matter of great concern as it clearly illustrates the link between early schoolleaving and levels of unemployment. When linked to the information provided earlier in Table 2.4, one can understand the magnitude and significance of the early school-leaving problem as a long-term social and economic issue in the Border Counties. Poverty and social exclusion Added to these structural weaknesses are high concentrations of low income and poverty; average gross weekly household incomes in Northern Ireland were 9 per cent below the UK national average in 2003–04, while it also contained the highest proportion of income support claimants in the UK from 2000 to 2005.83 This figure stood at 84,860 people in November 2010, 56.4 per cent of whom had been claiming for five years or more.84 In 2003 well over one-quarter of households were living in poverty, including more than one-third of children (148,900),85 which

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decreased slightly to more than one in four children (110,000) in 2010, with nearly one in ten living in severe poverty.86 In 2011 more than three-quarters of the UK districts where child poverty levels were most acute were in Northern Ireland,87 with the proportion of children in workless households having risen from 13 to 17 per cent between 2008 and 2011.88 In terms of council areas, Derry, Belfast and Strabane have the highest percentage of children in poverty at 36, 35 and 31 per cent respectively, followed by Limavady and Newry and Mourne and 26 and 25 per cent;89 the UK average is 21 per cent.90 Into this equation creeps social exclusion, a multi-dimensional concept whereby disadvantage is both economic and social: Social exclusion is a much more dynamic concept of the processes of social change than ‘poverty’. Social exclusion draws attention to its underlying causes as much to its manifestations. Social exclusion refers to the structures and processes which exclude persons and groups from their full participation in society. It explains that poverty does not just happen: it flows directly from the economic policies and choices which society makes about how resources are used and who has access to them … it is often the result of the ineffectiveness of policies, of the perverse effect of policies and of the distorting outcomes of decisions.91

This has probably been one of the biggest side-effects of the Northern Ireland conflict. The socially excluded are largely those facing long-term unemployment and educational disadvantage. In 1981 ‘some 25 per cent of households in the province [sic] were in poverty’92 compared to 18 per cent in the North of England. Twenty-four years later in 2005 not a lot had changed; Hillyard et al. highlighted research showing 30 per cent of Northern Ireland households being poor, demonstrating ‘unequivocally that violence and poverty are clearly related’.93 In particular ‘the experience of what has been defined as “extreme violence” is significantly related to poverty’.94 Horgan has noted that disadvantaged children brought up in poverty in Northern Ireland risk being drawn into continuing political violence: the most disadvantaged areas of the region are also areas where the conflict was at its most intense and young people living there are less likely than other young people to gain educational qualifications or to have much hope of a better future … young people being socially excluded even within communities where most young people face some social exclusion is dangerous for all societies. Such young people come to see themselves as outsiders even within their own community and this can make them prey to criminal elements that offer them a role in life.95

Social exclusion in this context is closely linked to and indeed brought about by deprivation factors. Birrell, one of the first researchers to

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examine the conflict from this perspective, defined deprivation in terms of economic, social and political inequalities, with his research concluding that ‘relative deprivation provides a persistent, underlying cause of civil disturbances in Northern Ireland’.96 However, although Northern Ireland has been recognised for years as one of the most deprived regions of the UK, ‘it has not featured strongly in debates over either the measurement of poverty, or poverty alleviation policies’.97 The UK government ‘has no definition of poverty. It publishes two sets of poverty related statistics each year, neither of which includes Northern Ireland.’98 Prior to the Executive’s suspension in 2003 it had not agreed a definition or measure of poverty, nor did its 2006 anti-poverty strategy, choosing instead to define social exclusion. Democratic Dialogue’s comprehensive 2003 social exclusion study confirmed the extent of poverty, including extremely high levels of unemployment, ten years after the ceasefires were first called. While the results are shocking, they should have been expected; until this report was published a variety of data collection methods were used: based on administrative data … chosen for reasons of availability rather than robustness … Considerable effort had been directed to measurement of multiple deprivation on a geographical basis … The spatial mapping of multiple deprivation as a substitute for poverty measurement has been characteristic of social policy in Northern Ireland since the 1970s … [However, it] risks missing the target by avoiding the economic and social structural causes of poverty.99

This suggests these staggering levels of poverty may have been rife for years but, due to the use of a wide variety of data collection methods, were never captured. Does this mean that programmes such as those examined here have become substitutes for tackling the economic and social structural causes of poverty? What is certain is that inequality, the gap between rich and poor, is on the increase. Northern Ireland (and even more so the Republic) is now one of the most unequal societies in the developed world, with growing inequalities in health, housing, taxation and education. For example, while the number of people aged 16–24 without a basic qualification declined from 38.9 per cent in 1992 to 30 per cent in 2001, the proportion of early school-leavers achieving no qualification increased from 2.7 per cent in 1998/99 to 5.2 per cent in 2001/02.100 Of course, tackling social exclusion is at the heart of the three transformation tools for a number of core target groupings, including young people, women, the disabled and ex-political prisoners, particularly in terms of education and employment. There has always been widespread recognition that:

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whatever progress may or may not be made towards a political settlement … there must be tangible changes in people’s lives, particularly for those living in areas which have been the seat of military conflict, if those who have suffered most are to feel hope for the future … [therefore] the issue of social exclusion itself [must] move in from the margins of policy to the heart of government and becomes a long-term policy priority.101

This was attempted through the publication of an anti-poverty and social inclusion strategy in 2006.102 Unfortunately, while some references are made to the conflict, as with other publications ‘policy responses to the conflict have neglected the link between conflict and poverty in the post1998 Agreement period. Despite … substantial EU programmes ostensibly designed to build peace, both economic and social development policies remain remarkably silent on the legacies of the conflict.’103 Although it is beyond the remit of this book to ascertain an exact level of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion in Northern Ireland, the need for a baseline understanding, outlined at the beginning, has been ascertained. It is also clear that, despite almost eighteen years of relative peace, deep structural violence remains within Northern Ireland through pockets of high unemployment, persistently high levels of longterm unemployment and educational disadvantage and with too many of its citizens living in poverty and being socially excluded. Research in the Republic by Watson et al. reaffirmed that ‘poverty is primarily a structural, rather than a spatial, phenomenon’.104 However, their analysis showed the Border Counties in 2000, six years after the ceasefires and two years after the Good Friday Agreement, and in the midst of the Republic’s economic boom, consistently emerging as the most disadvantaged region in the Republic, with the highest poverty rates of 35.5 per cent at the 50 per cent of mean equivalent income line compared to 25.8 per cent nationally, 46.4 per cent at the 60 per cent of mean equivalent income line compared to 32.9 per cent nationally, and a 10.1 per cent consistent poverty rate compared to 6.2 per cent nationally (second to the mid-west region with 10.4 per cent).105 Additionally this region has above average poverty risk rates which in 2001/2002 ranged from 60–70 per cent above average for Donegal (the greatest risk nationally), to 30–40 per cent for Cavan and Leitrim and 10–20 per cent for Louth, Monaghan and Sligo106 and the highest levels of basic and housing deprivation (40 per cent above the national average).107 In terms of household incomes, the Border Counties had the lowest in the country in 1999–2000, with a weekly gross income of €512.24 compared to €666.72 nationally, while in 2002 total income per person in the Border Counties was 10 per cent lower than the Republic.108 In 2004–05 the Border Counties continued to have the lowest average

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weekly gross income in the country at €755.56 compared to the national average (€987.96),109 and they had the lowest (household) expenditure at €617.87, 26% higher than the €490.24 recorded five years earlier. This compares to a national average of €787.12 in 2004–05 and €577.72 in 1999–2000.110 More recently in the BMW region, individual income and poverty rates show a marked increase in deprivation from 18.9 per cent in 2009 to 27.4 in 2010.111 The numbers experiencing deprivation increased from 29.3 per cent in 2009 to 32.5 per cent in 2010, while those finding themselves in consistent poverty decreased from 28.8 per cent in 2009 to 24.8 per cent in 2010.112 During the same period in the Republic, consistent poverty rates rose from 5.5 per cent in 2009 to 6.2 per cent in 2010 and at-risk-of-poverty rates from 14.1 per cent in 2009 to 15.8 per cent in 2010.113 As in Northern Ireland, a significant number of children in the Republic are also living in poverty and deprivation: in 2005 23 per cent lived in households ‘with less than 60 per cent of the median income while at the 70 per cent median income line the risk is 31 per cent’.114 In 2009 nearly 9 per cent (over 96,000) or one in every eleven children aged 0–17 lived in consistent poverty, a significant increase from just over 6 per cent in 2008.115 In 2010 ‘the at-risk-of-poverty rate for children was 20 per cent compared to 16 per cent for the total population […] Some 30 per cent of children were in households experiencing basic deprivation compared to 23 per cent of the general population.’116 Moreover ‘individuals living in households headed by an unemployed person represented 31% of those in consistent poverty in 2009, an increase from 17% in 2008. The proportion of those at risk of poverty who live in households where no person is at work rose from just over 50% in 2008 to almost 63% in 2009.’117 While detailed analysis of the deprivation levels among those who were displaced from Northern Ireland to the Border Counties because of the conflict do not exist, interview data depicts how such displacement had devastating effects as ‘unemployment and lack of an income figured frequently in replies, creating considerable dependency on other family members’.118 There were also few opportunities to attend educational institutions in the Border Counties in the 1970s and 1980s. It is therefore not surprising that social exclusion has become synonymous with the deprivation levels suffered by the Border Counties, exacerbated by the border itself and their close proximity to the conflict. As in Northern Ireland, inequality in the Republic has expanded considerably as the economy has grown in terms of increasing illiteracy levels119 and growing income inequality; ‘despite the recession Ireland remains a country with relatively high income inequality … [sitting] just

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behind the UK near the top of the inequality rankings in Europe’.120 The gap between the richest and the poorest grew by more than 25 per cent in 2010, with the average income of the top 20 per cent of earners 5.5 times greater than those in the lowest 20 per cent, pushing the inequality ratio up from 4.3 the previous year to the highest since it was first measured in 2004.121 While efforts exist nationally and locally to tackle this structural violence per se, they have not been strategically structured in terms of the impact of the conflict and the border on the Border Counties. Nationally, attempts have been made to tackle poverty and social exclusion through the 1997 National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS), its 2002 update and the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion 2007–16, which refers to the continuing challenge faced by both administrations in tackling poverty, social exclusion and deprivation in terms of cross-border work and that funded by Peace and INTERREG. However, neither document specifically connects poverty and the Northern Ireland conflict or analyses these issues in the Border Counties in terms of the distinctiveness of the region. While specific references are made in more recent policy documents (see chapter 5), these do not comprehensively address the relationship between poverty and conflict transformation. Locally, efforts have been made through the County Development Boards (CDBs) which, in 2000, embarked on a process of developing ten-year (2002–12) integrated strategies for their counties. In attempting to overcome poverty and social exclusion, the strategies were a positive element of the transformation process as many put particular emphasis on social inclusion. In bringing together all sectors of the community they went some way towards involving the vertical and horizontal levels at a county basis. However, rather surprisingly and like the national approach, most of them (Monaghan being the exception) made no specific reference to the border and its impact on their disadvantage. Moreover, their now uncertain futures in only developing a follow-up short-term plan (2012–14) jeopardises deeper long-term efforts. While it would therefore appear that the Border Counties have begun the conflict transformation journey, or at a minimum are thinking about their approach towards it, the issue remains as to what extent this has primarily been led by the three transformation tools. Conclusion The conflict transformation process in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties accelerated with the 1994 ceasefires. The 1998 Good Friday Agree­­ ment included significant social and economic considerations

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alongside political considerations: under Strand Two (North/South Ministerial Council) twelve areas for North–South co-operation were agreed (agriculture, education, transport, environment, waterways, social security/social welfare, tourism, relevant EU programmes [Peace, INTERREG, Leader II etc.], inland fisheries, aquaculture and marine matters, health, and urban and rural development); under the agreement on ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity’ the ‘Economic, Social and Cultural’ section discusses the pursuit of policies and strategies to promote economic development and social inclusion and combat unemployment;122 an attempt was also initially made to tackle Lederach’s interdependence gap through the setting up of the Civic Forum for Northern Ireland. Concurrent implementation of regional economic development strategies for Northern Ireland (Strategy 2010) and the Border Counties (National Development Plan 2007–13) also took place. However, strategic policies on either side of the border are so far removed from each other that ‘the unfortunate reality is that both North and South are attempting to improve their competitive advantages largely in isolation from each other’.123 A key consideration, therefore, is whether the ongoing transformation process has made any substantial difference to the social and economic lives of the peoples of this region. The overall evidence presented here suggests that progress for those at the grassroots has been limited, as for many, deep structural violence remains. Garry’s post-2011 Northern Ireland election telephone survey, which asked people whether they thought life had got better or worse over the previous four years (the lifetime of the 2007–11 power-sharing government), confirms this: the difference between the percentage of respondents who thought the economy, education and health had got better and the percentage who thought it had got worse was –52, –43 and –43: the balance of opinion was firmly that it had got worse. In contrast the percentage who thought policing and justice and peace/security/stability had got better was much higher than the percentage who thought it had got worse at +27 and  +39.124 Social and economic development is at the heart of the three tools engaged in the conflict transformation process, suggesting that deprivation, poverty and social exclusion are viewed by the EU and the Irish and British governments as part of the conflict’s legacy. Nevertheless, the extent to which public policy per se is concerned with this is debatable. The link between social and economic factors, acting in the past as contributory causes of the conflict and now as a channel for transforming it, is supported by Gorecki’s argument that within Northern Ireland ‘public policy should be concerned with more than maximising the growth of the economy as measured by GDP … the social dimension

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is crucial if a region is to be considered a success’.125 Yet process sustainability is questionable following sharp reductions in EU structural funds assistance from 2007, the final effects of which will not be understood for decades. Moreover, although there has been a decline in the number of deaths and injuries related to the conflict, the continuing high rate of sectarian, racist and security-related incidents is a worrying aspect of Northern Irish society; there were 1,702 sectarian incidents in 2005/06 and 1,470 crimes recorded, with violent sectarian crime accounting for 47.6 per cent of the total (700 offences); 6,623 incidents were recorded in North Belfast alone from 1996–2004. Additionally, since 1994 there has been an average of five attacks a month on churches, Orange halls, GAA and Ancient Order of Hibernian clubs every year, with an average of 1,378 people a year seeking rehousing because of sectarian, paramilitary or racist intimidation.126 Northern Ireland has also seen a considerable increase in the number of racist incidents recorded by the police, from under 100 in 1999 to around 1,000 in 2009, while self-reported prejudice has also been on the rise; in 1994 one in ten people among respondents to the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey described themselves as prejudiced; a decade later this had risen to one in four and has remained at around one in three in recent years.127 Worryingly, in 2005 almost one-fifth (18 per cent) of respondents to the survey considered themselves to be victims of the Troubles.128 Social and economic factors are neither the main cause of armed conflict nor more important than political or ethno-national factors in transforming conflict. In the Northern Ireland context they were just some of the conflict’s many contributory root causes which now have an integral but crucial role to play in the region’s transformation: social and economic initiatives are of little use as a transformation tool on their own as they cannot act as a panacea for over thirty years of conflict. Nevertheless, with the normalisation of politics in Northern Ireland, the economy has now begun to take centre stage; the transformation process as a whole will not succeed without a specific concentration on social and economic development as a critical component. The projects and activities that the three programmes have funded are partly addressing a long-term element of the transformation process. Additionally, the emergence of local research, often funded by the Peace programmes, on the structural violence local communities have suffered as a direct or indirect result of the conflict suggests that they want ownership of the transformation process in their own communities; the IFI and Peace programmes have proved a useful tool in the provision of this ownership. The social and economic costs of the conflict to this region have been enormous; continuing deep structural violence through high unemploy-

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ment (particularly long-term unemployment) and educational disadvantage rates and increasing levels of sectarianism and racism supports this view. The price of peace is also enormous: if current supports are not continued in some form over the long-term, poverty, social exclusion and inequality levels, including increasing sectarianism and racism, will deepen. This argument will be drawn out in the following chapters. Notes 1 S.J. Thorson, ‘Introduction. Conceptual Issues’, in L. Kriesberg, T.A. North­­ rup, and S.J. Thorson (eds), Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1989), p. 2. 2 D. Birrell, ‘Relative Deprivation as a Factor in Conflict in Northern Ireland’, Sociological Review, 20:3 (1972), 339. 3 M.T. Fay, M. Morrissey and M. Smyth, Northern Ireland’s Troubles. The Human Costs (London: Pluto Press, 1999), pp. 116–17. 4 J. Ruane and J. Todd, ‘The Belfast Agreement: Context, Content, Consequences’, in J. Ruane and J. Todd (eds), After the Good Friday Agreement. Analysing Political Change in Northern Ireland (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 1999), p. 4. 5 J. Ruane and J. Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland. Power, Conflict and Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 177. 6 Ibid., p. 150. 7 D. Morrow, ‘Introduction. Beyond the Emerald Curtain? Cross-Border Peace-Building in Ireland’, in Community Relations Council, Bordering on Peace? Learning from the Cross-Border Experience of Peace II. Learning from Peace II, Volume 4 (Belfast: CRC, 2006), p. 5. 8 J. McGarry and B. O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland. Broken Images (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), p. 282. 9 D. Smith, ‘Trends and Causes of Armed Conflicts’, in A. Austin, M. Fischer and N. Ropers (eds), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook (Wiesbaden: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management/VS-Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), p. 118. 10 Ruane and Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict, p. 38. 11 J. Darby, ‘The Historical Background’, in J. Darby (ed.), Northern Ireland. The Background to the Conflict (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1983), p. 17. 12 Ruane and Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict, p. 36. 13 Darby (ed.), ‘The Historical Background’, pp. 20–1. 14 Ibid., pp. 23–4. 15 J. Whyte, ‘How Much Discrimination Was There Under the Unionist Regime, 1921–1968?’, in T. Gallagher and J. O’Connell (eds), Contemporary Irish Studies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), pp. 1–35; D.J. Smith and G. Chambers, Inequality in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Cameron Commission, Disturbances in Northern Ireland:

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Report of the Commission Appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland (Cmd 532, Belfast, 1969). 16 Cameron Commission, Disturbances in Northern Ireland, p. 55. See pp. 91–100 for a detailed list of the main causes of the disturbances. 17 Smith and Chambers, Inequality in Northern Ireland, p. 69. Rose claimed that ‘Northern Ireland demonstrates that economic differences are not necessarily the most important source of political differences.’ R. Rose, ­Governing Without Consensus. An Irish Perspective (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p.  398. 18 Quoted in B. Harvey, A. Kelly, S. McGearty and S. Murray, The Emerald Curtain. The Social Impact of the Irish Border (Carrickmacross: Triskele Community Training and Development, 2005), p. 61. 19 Deloitte, Research into the Financial Cost of the Northern Ireland Divide (2007), p. 90. 20 P. Hillyard, B. Rolston and M. Tomlinson, Poverty and Conflict in Ireland: An International Perspective (Dublin: CPA and the Institute of Public Administration, 2005), p. xx. 21 M.T. Fay, M. Morrissey, M. Smyth and T. Wong, The Cost of the Troubles Study. Report on the Northern Ireland Survey: the Experience and Impact of the Troubles (Derry: INCORE, 1999), p. 37. 22 M. Morrissey, ‘Northern Ireland: Developing a Post-Conflict Economy’, in M. Cox, A. Guelke and F. Stephen (eds), A Farewell to Arms? From ‘Long War’ to Long Peace in Northern Ireland (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 138. 23 S. Cook, M.A. Poole, D.G. Pringle and A.J. Moore (ADM/CPA and NIVT), Comparative Spatial Deprivation in Ireland. A Cross-Border Analysis (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 2000), p. 19. 24 ADM/CPA Programme for Peace and Reconciliation, Socio-Economic Develop­­ment, Reconciliation and Cross Border Work in the Southern Border Counties of Ireland. A Review of the Operation of the ADM/CPA Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Monaghan: ADM/CPA, 1999), p.  8. 25 Morrissey, ‘Northern Ireland’, p. 136. 26 Ibid., p. 139. 27 L. Kennedy and and P. Ollerenshaw (eds), An Economic History of Ulster 1820–1940 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 239. 28 P. Teague and R. Wilson, ‘Towards an Inclusive Society’, in Democratic Dialogue, Social Exclusion, Social Inclusion, Report No. 2 (Belfast: Democratic Dialogue, 1995), p. 82. 29 J. Simpson, ‘Economic Development: Cause or Effect in the Northern Irish Conflict’, in Darby (ed.), Northern Ireland, p. 94. 30 J. Bradley,‘The Island Economy: Ireland Before and After the Belfast Agreement’, in J. Coakley and L. O’Dowd (eds), Crossing the Border. New ­Relationships between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), p. 70. This had declined still further to 23 per cent in 1996. 31 J. Bradley, ‘The Island Economy: Past, Present and Future’, in J. Bradley and E. Birnie, Can the Celtic Tiger Cross the Irish Border? (Cork: Cork ­University Press, 2001), p. 10.

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2 Teague and Wilson, ‘Towards an Inclusive Society’, p. 82. 3 33 Fay et al., Northern Ireland’s Troubles, p. 109. 34 P. Teague, ‘The European Union and the Irish Peace Process’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34:4 (1996), 552. 35 J. Haughton, ‘The Historical Background’, in J.W. O’Hagan (ed.), The Economy of Ireland. Policy and Performance (Dublin: Irish Management Institute, 1991), p. 47. 36 Bradley, ‘The Island Economy: Ireland Before and After the Belfast Agreement’, p. 72; the figures are 30.4 per cent and 20 per cent according to the SEUPB, Operational Programme for PEACE III. Annex A. Socio-Economic Profile of Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (Belfast: SEUPB, 2007), p. 5. 37 Simpson, ‘Economic Development’, p. 94. 38 Bradley, ‘The Island Economy: Ireland Before and After the Belfast Agreement’, p. 72. 39 ADM, CPA, Co-operation Ireland, The Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, The Special European Union Programmes Body, Building on Peace. Supporting Peace and Reconciliation after 2006 (Monaghan: ADM/ CPA, 2003), p. 92. 40 SEUPB, Operational Programme for PEACE III, Annex A, p. 3. 41 Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Quarterly Economic Review. January 2005 (Belfast: DETI, 2005), p. 3; Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Quarterly Economic Review. May 2005 (Belfast: DETI, 2005), p. 3. 42 SEUPB, Operational Programme for PEACE III, Annex A, p. 3. 43 Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Economic Commentary, June 2010 (Belfast: DETI, 2010), p. 12; Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Economic Commentary, June 2011 (Belfast: DETI, 2011), p. 12. 44 B. Rowthorn, ‘Foreword’, in R. Munck, The Irish Economy. Results and Prospects (London: Pluto Press, 1993), p. viii. 45 Haughton, ‘The Historical Background’, p. 33. 46 Ibid., pp. 35–6. 47 C. Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road. The Irish Economy Since the 1920s (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 22. 48 Haughton, ‘The Historical Background’, p. 40. 49 Ibid., p. 43. 50 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, p. 33. 51 ‘BMW Area “Falling Further Behind”’, Irish Times, 30 May 2006. 52 Harvey et al., The Emerald Curtain, p. 26. 53 SEUPB, Operational Programme for Peace III, Annex A, p. 3. 54 Haughton, ‘The Historical Background’, p. 46. 55 Fay et al., Northern Ireland’s Troubles, p. 113, and Morrissey, ‘Northern Ireland’, p. 140. These figures are unadjusted; changes were made to the unemployment count after 1982, meaning the final figure for 1991 is not comparable with the previous figures, hence the 140,000 figure. 56 Morrissey, ‘Northern Ireland’, p. 140.

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57 Fay et al., Northern Ireland’s Troubles, p. 108. 58 Morrissey, ‘Northern Ireland’, p. 141. 59 J.L.P. Thompson, ‘Deprivation and Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1922–1985’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33:4 (1989), 679. 60 Morrissey, ‘Northern Ireland’, p. 141. 61 ADM et al., Building on Peace, p. 89. 62 www.detini.gov.uk (accessed 16 May 2008). 63 Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, DETI Economic Commentary, June 2011, p. 3. 64 Unadjusted figure, www.detini.gov.uk/deti-stats-index/deti-stats-index-2.htm (accessed 6 November 2011). 65 www.nisra.gov.uk, 2001 Census, Key Statistics Tables (Table KS09a – Economic Activity – All Persons), p. 26 (accessed 19 March 2004). The ILO figures have this much higher at 43.2 per cent – see Table 2.2. 66 SEUPB, Operational Programme for Peace III, Annex A, p. 4. 67 www.detini.gov.uk/deti-stats-index/stats-surveys.htm (accessed 6 November 2011). 68 SEUPB, Operational Programme for Peace III, Annex A, p. 4. Economic inactivity refers to people of working age (16–64 years for males and 16–59 years for females) who are neither in employment nor unemployed. 69 www.detini.gov.uk/deti-stats-index/deti-stats-index-2.htm (accessed 6 Nov­­ em­­­ber 2011). 70 A.M. Gray and G. Horgan, ‘Welfare to Work’, Ark Policy Brief No. 1, June 2010, p. 1, http://www.ark.ac.uk/pdfs/policybriefs/policybrief1.pdf (accessed 1 May 2013). 71 Central Statistics Office, Census 2002: Principal Socio-Economic Results (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2003), p. 15. 72 However, other sources tell us that, in Co. Louth for example, 50.3 per cent of unemployed people in 2002 had not worked in over four years – almost double the national average of 25.3 per cent illustrated in Table 2.2. Louth County Development Board, Louth – Working Together for Our Future. An Integrated County Development Strategy 2002–2012 (2002), p. 24. 73 DETI, Economic and Labour Market statistics, email correspondence, 22 November 2011. 74 This is normally measured by the DETI. NISRA could only provide information on ‘Economically Active Population 18 Years of Age and Over: Occupation by Educational Attainment by Sex’ which contained information on ‘Total without higher qualification’ (1981 Census of Northern Ireland, Table 3, p. 6). This does not necessarily translate as those with no educational qualifications, making its consideration misleading. 75 1971 Census of Northern Ireland, Table 3 ‘Economically Active Population 18 Years of Age and Over by Educational Attainment, Sex and Occupation’, p. 15. 76 Past information is available in Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Northern Ireland Labour Force Survey. Historical Supplement Spring 1984 to Winter 2001/02 (London: National Statistics Publication, 2002).

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Qualification levels of the unemployed are only measured from spring 1989 onwards as ‘qualification data is only available on a consistent basis from Spring 1989 onward’ (Table 5b). However, although it shows a continuous decline in the level of those with no qualifications who are unemployed from 47,000 in 1989 to 18,000 in the winter of 2001, this information is not that useful when provided in isolation from the overall population numbers. 77 G. Palmer, The Impact of Devolution. Indicators of Poverty and Social Exclusion (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2010), p. 34. 78 Labour Force Survey, Annual Dataset, January–December 2010, DETI, Economic and Labour Market statistics, email correspondence, 22 ­November 2011. 79 SEUPB, Operational Programme for Peace III, Annex A, p. 18. 80 S. Rourke and J. Shiels, Educational Disadvantage in the Southern Border Counties of Ireland. A Report to the ADM/CPA Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Monaghan: ADM/CPA, 1998). 81 The National Economic and Social Forum, Early School Leavers. Forum Report No. 24 (Dublin, 2002), p. 5. One can only assume that this situation is even worse in the Border Counties, given the extremely high rates of unemployment and long-term unemployment, as educational attainment more often than not determines access to employment. 82 Ibid., p. 31. 83 SEUPB, Operational Programme for Peace III, Annex A, p. 18. 84 www.northernireland.gov.uk/index/media-centre/news-departments/newsdsd/news-dsd-120811-latest-income-support.htm (accessed 13 November 2011). 85 See Democratic Dialogue, Bare Necessities. Poverty and Social Exclusion in Northern Ireland, Report No. 16 (Belfast: Democratic Dialogue, 2003), p.  29. 86 www.savethechildren.org.uk/where-we-work/united-kingdom/northern-ireland (accessed 13 November 2011). 87 ‘Action on Child Poverty Demanded’, Irish Times, 10 January 2012. 88 End Child Poverty, Child Poverty Map of the UK, January 2012, p. 13, www. endchildpoverty.org.uk/files/childpovertymap2011.pdf (accessed 20 May 2012). 89 Ibid., p. 36. 90 www.endchildpoverty.org.uk/why-end-child-poverty/poverty-in-your-area#indicator (accessed 20 May 2012). 91 A. Kilmurray, ‘Beyond the Stereotypes’, in Democratic Dialogue, Social Exclusion, Social Inclusion, p. 36. 92 R.I.D. Harris, Regional Economic Policy in Northern Ireland 1945–1988 (Aldershot: Avebury, 1991), p. 2. 93 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, pp. 139, 144. 94 Ibid., p. 148. 95 G. Horgan, ‘Child Poverty in Northern Ireland – Cause for Concern’, http:// news.ulster.ac.uk/releases/2010/4815.html (accessed 13 November 2011). 96 Birrell, ‘Relative Deprivation’, pp. 318, 339. 97 Democratic Dialogue, Bare Necessities, p. 13.

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98 Ibid. p. 17. 99 Ibid., p. 18. 100 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, pp. 105–6. See pp. 100–8 for a discussion on inequality in both Northern Ireland and the Republic. 101 Democratic Dialogue, Social Exclusion, Social Inclusion, p. 5 (emphasis in original text). 102 Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, Lifetime Opportunities: Government’s Anti-Poverty and Social Inclusion Strategy for Northern Ireland (Belfast: OFMDFM, 2006). 103 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, p. 8. 104 D. Watson, C.T. Whelan, J. Williams and S. Blackwell, Mapping Poverty: National, Regional and County Patterns (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration/CPA, 2005), p. xxvi. 105 Ibid., pp. 61–2. This was based on the 2000 Living in Ireland Survey. It should be noted that there are numerous difficulties associated with measuring poverty including varying interpretations. See also Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, pp. 92–100. 106 Watson et al., Mapping Poverty, pp. 65–7. This information was based on the National Survey of Housing Quality conducted in 2001/2002. 107 Ibid., pp. 98–113. This was based on the 2001/2002 National Survey of Housing Quality. Hillyard et al. have also highlighted the border region as being the most deprived in the Republic (Poverty and Conflict, pp. 92–100). 108 SEUPB, Operational Programme for Peace IIII, Annex A, p. 18. This data on income is obtained from the Household Budget Survey, which is undertaken every five years. The results of the 2010 HBS were not available at the time of writing. 109 Central Statistics Office, Household Budget Survey 2004–2005 Final Results (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2007), p. 18. 110 Ibid., p. 10. 111 Central Statistics Office, Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC), Preliminary Results 2010 (Dublin/Cork: Stationery Office, 2011), Table 1 ‘Individual income and poverty rates demographic characteristics and, by year’, p. 7. 112 Ibid., Table 7 ‘Profile of population at risk of poverty, experiencing deprivation and in consistent poverty by demographic characteristics and year’, p. 13. 113 C. O’Brien, ‘Rich–Poor Gap Grew by Over One Quarter in 2010’, Irish Times, 28 March 2012. 114 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, p. 97. 115 End Child Poverty Coalition, Child Poverty: Ireland in Recession (April 2011), p. 3., www.endchildpoverty.ie/publications/documents/EndChildPovertyCoalitionChildPoverty-IrelandinRecession.pdf (accessed 20 November 2011). 116 D. Watson, B. Maître and C.T. Whelan, Understanding Childhood Deprivation in Ireland. Social Inclusion Report No. 2 (Dublin: Department of Social Protection, Economic and Social Research Institute, 2012), pp. ii–iii.

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117 End Child Poverty Coalition, Child Poverty, p. 3. 118 Ralaheen Ltd Dublin, with EXPAC Monaghan and Stratagem Belfast, All Over the Place. People Displaced to and from the Southern Border Counties as a Result of the Conflict 1969–1994 (Monaghan: ADM/CPA, 2005), p. 62. It is virtually impossible to estimate the number of such displaced people, although this report (p. 5) has conservatively guessed around 11,000. 119 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, p. 101. 120 R. Layte, ‘Should We be Worried about Income Inequality in Ireland?’, ESRI Research Bulletin 2011/2/3, www.esri.ie/UserFiles/publications/ RB20110203.pdf (accessed 20 November 2011). 121 O’Brien, ‘Rich-Poor Gap Grew by Over One Quarter in 2010’. 122 Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations (Belfast, 1998), p. 22. 123 Bradley, ‘The Island Economy: Ireland Before and After the Belfast Agreement’, p. 82. 124 J. Garry, ‘Is Political Accountability Possible for Voters under “Very Unclear” Consociational Conditions?’, paper presented at the Political Studies Association of Ireland Annual Conference, 21 October 2011. 125 P. Gorecki, ‘Conclusion’, in Democratic Dialogue, Hard Choices: Policy, Autonomy and Priority-Setting in Public Expenditure, Report No. 10 (Belfast: Democratic Dialogue, Eastern Health and Social Services Board, Northern Ireland Economic Council, 1998), p. 93. 126 SEUPB, Operational Programme for Peace III, Annex A, p. 5. 127 N. Jarman, ‘Research Update No. 63, Prejudice and Tolerance in Northern Ireland’, November 2009, www.ark.ac.uk/publications/updates/update63. pdf (accessed 17 November 2011). 128 SEUPB, Operational Programme for Peace III, Annex A, p. 5.

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part ii

Examining the impacts

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Conflict transformation programmes outlined

Of the three conflict transformation programmes which Northern Ireland and the Border Counties have benefited from, two, the IFI and the Peace programmes, were specifically tailored for the region. Together with the INTERREG I, II and III(A) programmes, they have directly contributed over €3.25 billion to the region since 1986. While intricate in their makeup, they illustrate how ‘economic and social goals are interdependent and [can] work simultaneously to achieve peace and reconciliation’,1 highlighting a fine line between standard socioeconomic activities and those aimed at transforming conflict. Effectively analysing their impact on the conflict transformation process in the region necessitates comprehending their complex backgrounds, administrative structures and activities. International Fund for Ireland Article 10(a) of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement signed by the British and Irish governments states that ‘the two governments shall co-operate to promote the economic and social development of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered from the consequences of the instability of recent years, and shall consider the possibility of securing international support for this work’.2 Through a supplemental treaty signed by the two governments on 18 September 1986, the IFI was established and came into existence on 12 December 1986. This was one of the first formal recognitions of the role that social and economic development was to play in finding an alternative to the conflict, as its twin objectives illustrate: ‘to promote economic and social advance, to encourage contact, dialogue and reconciliation between Nationalists and Unionists throughout Ireland’.3 Funding is provided by the USA, the EU, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The USA has been by far the largest donor, followed by the EU. While the Fund has contributed €869m/£695m to the region to date,4 its total cumulative funding provision to date has been considerably higher,

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estimated in 2006 to have levered further support ‘from the public, private and voluntary sectors on a ratio of more than 1:2, producing a total investment of more than £1.5/€2.25b’.5 In comparison to the amount of funding that the USA provides to Israel (approximately $72 billion between 1971 and 2005)6 or Egypt ($28 billion development aid since 1975),7 for example, the sum is minuscule but ‘the fund’s symbolic importance, as an earnest of international goodwill, was significant’.8 Management and administration The IFI has a fairly complex management structure. The British and Irish governments jointly appoint a chairman and a six-member Board (for a three-year term), representative of the communities on both sides of the border, which meets alternately North and South, overseeing its direction and operation. The Fund’s coordination and administration, however, is carried out by a secretariat, based in Dublin and Belfast, of civil servants seconded from the British and Irish administrations and led by joint director-generals. The Board is assisted by an advisory committee of officials appointed by and representative of the two governments which meets prior to Board meetings to prepare advice for the Board on projects that have been put forward for decisions and other issues. The joint chairmen of the advisory committee or their deputies then attend Board meetings. The IFI’s programmes are administered by a joint programme team, which brings together relevant expertise from government departments and specialist agencies, North and South, which act as administering agents for the IFI, under the direction of designated Board members. The IFI has also put in place a team of ten locally based development consultants to liaise with local communities in identifying suitable projects and formulating proposals. Those appointed by the governments, and particularly the Board itself, are independent of the governments. They are ‘not to receive instructions from the two governments as to the exercise of their powers; and their independence is guaranteed’.9 Hence each donor country provides an observer at each of the Board’s meetings to independently observe its work. Activities Since its inception the IFI has pursued its objectives through a multifaceted range of social and economic development programmes. The Fund’s annual reports illustrate how the programmes have changed and adapted over the years as changing circumstances necessitated. During its early years, the Fund’s main priority was to bring fresh economic energy to disadvantaged areas. While its activities were driven from the bottom-up by local communities, they were largely of an economic nature as its

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1991 annual report illustrates. It began to increase activities aimed at building community capacities when it restructured its programmes in 1995 to include an overall programme on communities initiatives. This saw the introduction of the Communities in Action programme to provide support to the most disadvantaged areas, working to break the cycle of deprivation with children, young people and women wanting to return to work, and the Building Bridges programme (which replaced the community relations programme), focusing on reconciliation and conflict resolution, alongside a Community Leadership (training) programme. Further restructuring in 1999 saw all its programmes placed under three strands, Regeneration of Deprived Areas, Community Capacity Building and Economic Development. Of particular note was the increased activity under the Community Capacity Building strand, particularly with young people. In 2006, with the launch of its five-year exit strategy, its activities were restructured again under four broad headings of Building Foundations, Building Bridges, Integrating and Leaving a Legacy. Of particular note was the Fund’s foray into education and plans to address the issue of flags, emblems and sectarian symbols under the Integrating strand. As the social, economic and indeed political environment it found itself working within changed, the Fund was not afraid to create new programmes or dispense with or redevelop old ones. This restructuring allowed it to move towards leaving a lasting legacy within communities as it began to wind down its presence. Peace I, II and III Peace I was set up in the wake of the IRA and Loyalist ceasefires in 1994, when the European Commission created a special task force charged with exploring further ways of giving practical assistance and showing commitment to the peace and reconciliation process in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties, in consultation with both governments. After considering the new opportunities arising from the ceasefires and the nascent peace process, it concluded that the EU had a clear interest in supporting the region’s transition to a more peaceful and stable society, not only for the region itself, but for the EU as a whole. Thus, the Commission implemented Peace I in the form of a Community Initiative under the Structural Funds programme from 1995–99, providing €500m. Along with additional government funding of €167m, a total of €667m was shared between Northern Ireland (80 per cent) and the Border Counties (20 per cent). In drawing up the programme’s operational guidelines, extensive consultations took place through conferences, written submissions and

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meetings with the voluntary and community sector. A number of areas were combined to provide the rationale for the programme, namely, ‘the overwhelming need to maintain the momentum for peace, the prevailing economic and social conditions in the eligible areas, the priorities set for the Initiative by the Commission, the results of the prior appraisal and the outcome of the consultation arrangements’.10 At a European level, it was considered that the main constraint on the economic and social development of Northern Ireland was the conflict. Moreover: the importance of the socio-economic difficulties in the context of the Peace Initiative is that disadvantage often feeds and sustains conflict: it is frequently the most deprived areas which have suffered most and been most involved in conflict. It is axiomatic, therefore, that socio-economic difficulties must be tackled if the peace process is to be embedded. Chief among these difficulties are high levels of unemployment and social deprivation.11

Thus, the strategic aim of the programme, ‘to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation by increasing economic development and employment, promoting urban and rural regeneration, developing cross-border co-operation and extending social inclusion’,12 was implemented through two strategic objectives: ‘to promote the social inclusion of those who are at the margins of social and economic life; to exploit the opportunities and address the needs arising from the peace process in order to boost economic growth and advance social and economic regeneration’.13 Peace I was centrally concerned with addressing social and economic conditions in the context of the conflict rather than focusing wholly on the most immediate outcomes of the conflict itself. Moreover, social inclusion was considered essential by the majority of those consulted, being recognised as ‘the pathway to peace and reconciliation, the condition for a new beginning, the prerequisite for success in all other priorities. More than a priority, it was seen as a value – the fundamental value which must underpin the entire programme and for many, against which all other actions should be audited.’14 But this created a significant divergence of opinion (in Northern Ireland in particular) as to which measures merited the most funding – productive investment/industrial development or social inclusion. Both of these needs, however, are reflected in the strategic objectives and in each of the measures and their objectives.15 Peace II was essentially a continuation of Peace I, providing a further €835m to the region for five years (2000–04), €531m from the EU and €304m from both governments. In February 2005 a further two-year extension was announced to cover the period up to the end of 2006, providing a further €160m during these two years, €78m from the EU

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and €82m from both governments. However, unlike Peace I, which was a new Community Initiative devised as a stand-alone programme after a new Structural Funds programming period (1994–99) had come into effect, Peace II was integrated as an Objective 1 Programme within the Community Support Frameworks of both Northern Ireland and the Republic. As with Peace I, extensive consultations took place, with preparatory consultations through written submissions and more targeted consultations including two conferences in 1999. Additionally in Northern Ireland ‘a Core Consultative Group of key economic and social partner bodies was established to facilitate ongoing consultation’.16 Crucially, the Peace II consultations also benefited from input from the new Northern Ireland Assembly whereby consultations took place with the Assembly parties and were fed into the core consultative group. Although the consultations were carried out separately North and South to take account of differing needs, joint and continuing consultation was facilitated through the establishment of the Peace II Monitoring Committee, chaired by the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB), which ensured joint consultation and dialogues and more focused consultations with various sectoral representatives. The programme rationale was therefore based on the continuing need to support the peace process, taking into account the continuing economic and social needs of the region and the outcomes of the consultations. Its strategic aim, ‘to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation’,17 echoed that of the Peace I programme. However, the achievement of this aim was to be pursued through two strategic objectives which were more finely tuned than previously; Peace II was more closely integrated with other Structural Funds support as it operated within the clear strategic parameters of both Community Support Frameworks. These were: ‘addressing the legacy of the conflict’ i.e. by addressing the specific problems generated by the conflict in order to assist the return to a normal peaceful and stable society ‘taking opportunities arising from peace’ i.e. by encouraging actions which have a stake in peace and which actively help to promote a stable and normal society where opportunities for development can be grasped.18

To ensure that the programme was an inclusive process, the theme of ‘paving the way to reconciliation’ ran throughout, with a number of horizontal themes informing all priorities.19 Peace III, the development of which was also the subject of extensive consultations led by SEUPB, provided a further €333m over the period 2007–13, with €225m provided through the European Regional

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Development Fund (ERDF) and €108m provided by both governments. It continued with the strategic aim of Peace II, focusing on two strategic priorities – 1) reconciling communities (through building positive relations at the local level and acknowledging and dealing with the past); and 2) contributing to a shared society (through creating shared public spaces and developing key institutional capacities).20 Management and administration The delivery and management structures for Peace I, II and III are the most complicated of all three programmes; Peace II, for example, has been described as ‘excessively complex, particularly in relation to its structures and processes’.21 Because of the unique nature of the funding, the delivery mechanisms had to be innovative to ensure the fullest local involvement in the most direct way possible. The funding was therefore delivered through a complex mix of centralised government departments, (decentralised) intermediary funding bodies (IFBs) and newly established local delivery mechanisms in the form of District Partnerships in Northern Ireland and county council-led task forces (CCLTFs) in the Border Counties, with sixty-four separate implementing bodies in total involved. While the programme was jointly managed by the Department of Finance in Dublin and the Department of Finance and Personnel in Belfast, it was instrumental in pioneering the use of IFBs (bodies independent of the state which were invited to take on the role of delivering certain priorities and/or their sub-measures according to their area of expertise, such as childcare, youth work, community relations/ development, rural development, combating poverty) on a large scale on both sides of the border. One of the more innovative mechanisms set up in Northern Ireland was that of the district partnerships which allowed for the involvement of individuals, organisations and sectors at the local level; such partnerships were not a new phenomenon in the Republic of Ireland, as the government there had been using social partnership arrangements from the mid-1980s. They were set up in each of the twenty-six district council areas, consisting of one-third elected council members, one-third community/voluntary sector representatives and one-third trade union and business representatives. Each received funding according to their area’s population and relative level of deprivation. They were responsible for developing an action plan (including a reconciliation strategy) to meet identified needs in their areas with four themes to be prioritised – social inclusion, urban and rural regeneration, productive investment and employment. These plans were submitted for approval to the Northern Ireland Partnership Board, an independent supervisory body

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responsible for overseeing Priority 6 and providing the District Partnerships with support and guidance. In the Border Counties, six CCLTFs were set up to undertake a similar local delivery role, although they were only responsible for administering 10.6 per cent of the programme. They consisted of elected representatives, social partners, local development agencies engaged in the delivery of similar activities, ADM/CPA and council officials, and were tasked with identifying and approving urban and rural regeneration projects in line with the programme complement. Under Peace II they became sub-committees of the County Development Boards (CDBs), which were set up in early 2000 in each of the county councils in the Republic to integrate and coordinate various elements of development and service delivery at local level, and their work was overseen by the Border Regional Authority (one of eight regional authorities established in 1994 under the provisions of the Local Government Act 1991, covering the six Border Counties, primarily to promote coordination of the provision of public services in the region). Additionally, at project level projects were required to set up management committees to manage project finances, administration and staff and were representative of the local communities that generated the project application. A number of changes were made to the delivery structures for Peace II, partly because the programme moved from being a Community Initiative to a Community Operational Programme, partly because of lessons learned from Peace I and partly because of the influence of the newly established Assembly. In terms of complexity, the huge number of agencies involved in programme delivery continued, with a slight reduction to fifty-five.22 However, the biggest change came with the addition of another (centralised) management layer in the form of the SEUPB as the programme’s overall managing authority. SEUPB was set up under Strand Two of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement as one of the six North/ South implementation bodies to manage certain EU Structural Funds, including Peace and INTERREG. It also chaired the programme’s supervisory Monitoring Committee. The District Partnerships also saw a change in their structure and role, evolving as a new model of Local Strategy Partnerships (LSPs) within each district council area, based upon a more integrated and sustainable approach to planning and managing available resources. The equal tripartite membership of the partnerships under Peace I became bipartite, consisting of local government and the main local level statutory agencies and social partners (private sector, trade unions, community and voluntary sectors and the agricultural and rural development sectors). This increase in the role of the district councils emanated from the newly

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established Assembly and the local authorities. The Northern Ireland Partnership Board, which oversaw the work of the District Partnerships under Peace I, was replaced by the Regional Partnership Board. The Peace III management structures were further centralised. The SEUPB continued as the managing authority, assuming responsibility for the Joint Technical Secretariat, which became the principal delivery mechanism for the programme, and corporate services, while continuing to chair the programme’s supervisory Monitoring Committee. A crossborder Steering Committee was set up to select projects. Only one other IFB was appointed to implement the theme ‘acknowledging and dealing with the past’, Border Action (previously known as ADM/CPA) in the Republic and the Community Relations Council in the North. The six CCLTFs in the Border Counties became known as Peace Partnerships, assuming a much greater role than previously, having responsibility for implementation. In Northern Ireland the local authorities continued their role and were encouraged to be cognisant of the new proposed council areas. These local partnership approaches were aimed at promoting ‘strategic models of partnership between public, private and community sectors’.23 Activities Peace I funded activities under six priorities: Employment, Urban and Rural Regeneration, Cross-Border Development, Social Inclusion, Productive Investment and Industrial Development and District Partnerships (in the North only), with a seventh priority, Technical Assistance, supporting the whole programme. They consisted of twenty-four measures,24 many of which were similar to those addressed by the IFI, with the recurrent themes of employment, education and training and social inclusion running throughout. The relative importance placed on these priorities is clearly indicated by the percentage of funding each received, outlined in Table 3.1; social inclusion was by far the largest priority. Table 3.2 illustrates the actual funding awarded to each. Peace II was a further consolidation of the work carried out by Peace I, illustrated by the tightening up of the programme priorities, which comprised thirty-four measures.25 The relative importance placed on each is again clearly illustrated by the percentage of funding received (Table 3.3), with economic development being by far the largest priority. Table 3.4 illustrates the actual funding awarded. As outlined earlier, Peace III was a much smaller programme as reflected in its two priorities, which carried on with key aspects of Peace II, and a smaller budget outlined in Table 3.5.

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Conflict transformation programmes outlined Table 3.1  Percentage of funding awarded to Peace I priorities

Priorities

Central government

Intermediary bodies

Employment Urban and rural regeneration Cross-border development Social inclusion Productive investment and industrial development Technical assistance

8.8 13.5 7.6 7.0

5.1 3.1 7.4 16.5

6.5

3.4 1.6

11.2

2.7

17.4 1.6

Total

41.8

43.5

14.7

100

District partnerships (NI only)

Total

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% 2.7 2.8

16.6 19.4 15.0 30

Source: European Structural Funds, Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland 1995–1999 (n.d.), p. 37.

Table 3.2  Actual funding allocated to Peace I priorities

Priority

Northern Ireland (ECUm) 37.39 (15%) 18.95 (8%) 18.95 (8%) 22.50 (9%) 57.33 (24%) 36.89 (16%)

Ireland (ECUm) (Border Counties)

Employment Urban regeneration Rural regeneration Cross-border development Social inclusion Productive investment and industrial development Partnerships (NI only) Technical assistance

4.38 (7%) 12.00 (20%)

44.21 (18%) 3.79 (2%)

0.93 (2%)

Total

240 (100%)

60 (100%)

22.50 (37%) 13.13 (22%) 7.06 (12%)

Source: European Structural Funds, Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland 1995–1999 (n.d.), pp. 38–9.

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96 Table 3.3  Percentage of funding awarded to Peace II priorities

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Priorities

Central government

Locally Interbased mediary delivery bodies

SEUPB

Total

Economic renewal Social integration, inclusion and reconciliation Locally based regeneration and development strategies Outward and forward looking region Cross-border co-operation Technical assistance

24.4

% 7.7

32.1

7.7

17

24.7

4.7 2.4

0.4

Total

39.2

19.8

19.4

19.4

9.3

0.1 3.4 3.5

5.2 15.1 3.5

34

7.0

100

Source: ADM, CPA, Co-operation Ireland, The Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, The Special European Union Programmes Body, Building on Peace. Supporting Peace and Reconciliation after 2006 (Monaghan: ADM/CPA, 2003), p. 129.

Table 3.4  Actual funding allocated to Peace II priorities

Priority

Northern Ireland (€m)

Border Region (€m)

Total

Economic renewal Social integration, inclusion and reconciliation Locally based regeneration and development Outward and forward looking region Cross-border co-operation Technical assistance Total

153.7 (36.1%) 17.1 (16.3%) 107 (25.1%) 24.5 (23.3%)

170.7 (32.2%) 131.5 (24.8%)

86.1 (20.2%)

17 (16.1%)

103 (19.4%)

25 (5.9%)

2.5 (2.4%)

27.5 (5.2%)

39.7 (9.3%) 14.5 (3.4%) 426 (100%)

39.7 (9.3%) 4.3 (4.1%) 105 (100%)

79.4 (15%) 18.8 (3.5%) 531 (100%)

Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I and MidTerm Evaluation of Peace II, Final Report (Belfast: PwC, 2003), p. 153.

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Conflict transformation programmes outlined Table 3.5  Peace III funding allocations

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Priorities

EU ­contribution (€)

National governments’ contribution (€)

Total

Reconciling communities 128,952,254 (Building positive relationships/ Acknowledging and dealing with the past) Contributing to a shared society 82,402,656 (Creating shared public spaces/ Key institutional capacities are developed for a shared society) Technical assistance 13,490,738

 61,966,046

190,918,300 (57.35%)

 39,597,344

122,000,000 (36.64%)

  6,482,769

Total

108,046,159

19,973,507 (5.99%) 332,891,807 (100%)

224,845,648

Source: SEUPB, European Union Programme for Territorial Co-operation, Peace III, EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 2007–2013, Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland, Operational Programme (Belfast/Omagh/Monaghan: SEUPB, n.d.), pp. 117–18.

INTERREG I, II and III(A) The INTERREG programme, an EU Community Initiative, was devised in response to the implications of the single market in recognition of the relatively disadvantaged situation of border regions throughout the Community which would find it difficult to compete with other member states in a single market due to greater unemployment, underinvestment and underdevelopment problems. It was argued that ‘member states have consistently stressed the mutual economic benefits which cross-border co-operation can bring’.26 INTERREG I (1991–93) therefore proposed to provide ‘support for economic development in less developed border regions and given the limiting factors to such development engendered by borders, to set such development within a cross-border focus’.27 Thus it had two aims: to assist internal border areas of the Community in overcoming the special development problems arising from their relative isolation within national economies and within the Community as a whole in the interests of the local population and in a manner compatible with the protection of the environment; and

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to promote the creation and development of networks of co-operation across internal borders and, where relevant, the linking of these networks to wider Community networks, in the context of the completion of the internal market of 1992.28

These aims were particularly relevant to Ireland, ‘where violence [had] exacerbated existing problems of peripherality, low incomes, high unemployment, a high dependency on agriculture and a lack of any strong industrial tradition’.29 All NUTS III areas were eligible for funding under this programme (ECU82.2m), which covered all of Northern Ireland (except for the Greater Belfast area) and the Border Counties. The INTERREG II programme (1994–99) did not differ greatly from its predecessor. It allocated ECU2.6 billion of Community funds to fiftynine projects across Europe, with the Ireland/UK (Northern Ireland) programme receiving the second largest amount (ECU156.95m), categorising it as a large programme. Its aims remained the same as INTERREG I, postulating that: the regions on either side of the border in the island of Ireland suffer from levels of unemployment and levels of income per head which are considerably worse than the average for the EU. In addition, both parts of the island are carrying very substantial economic costs – direct and indirect – on account of the violence of the past 25 years. While these costs have had severe consequences for both economies, their economic impact on Northern Ireland, arising from compensation for loss of life and damage to property, has been particularly acute.30

INTERREG III (2000–06), however, was restructured for implementation under three broad strands related to promoting integrated regional development (Strand A), harmonious territorial integration (Strand B) and transnational and interregional co-operation (Strand C). While Northern Ireland and the Border Counties benefited under all three strands, Strand A was of central importance in the context of this research; it provided fifty-three projects across the EU with €3.3 billion, of which €179.4m was allocated to Northern Ireland and the Border Counties, again one of the largest IIIA programmes in Europe. Its rationale was that: the eligible area suffer[s] disadvantage as a result of the existence of the border. In particular … the border areas of both jurisdictions remain relatively disadvantaged and are still characterised by relatively high unemployment, low incomes, an over-dependence on agriculture, a low level of industrial activity and an over-dependence on declining manufacturing activity.31

Thus, its primary objective was to ‘strengthen economic and social cohesion in the Community by promoting cross-border, transnational and interregional co-operation and balanced development of the Community

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territory’.32 Within this context, the overall aim of the programme was ‘to promote sustainable integrated regional development across the eligible region by building on the progress made under previous INTERREG Programmes and by concentrating on the strategic dimension of crossborder development which involves and benefits local communities’.33 While all three programmes were developed on the back of consultations with local interests, those for INTERREG III were much more extensive than for the first two. For INTERREG II, a joint North–South consultation conference took place, followed by the circulation of the programme proposal to a wide range of bodies. For INTERREG III, the SEUPB carried out six months of consultations with over 800 organisations and individuals. Management and administration INTERREG I and II were highly centralised. They were jointly managed by the Department of Finance in Dublin and the Department of Finance and Personnel in Belfast, which provided joint chairs and secretariats for the programmes’ Monitoring Committees. The measures were implemented by joint sectoral departmental working groups. INTERREG III, however, took a slightly more bottom-up approach to implementation in a similar vein to the Peace programmes, in that each of the four priorities were administered by various implementation bodies, albeit remaining largely within the remit of central government.34 The management framework of the programme consisted of a managing authority (SEUPB, Monaghan Office); paying authority (SEUPB, Belfast Office); Joint Technical Secretariat (SEUPB); programme Monitoring Committee, Joint Steering Committee (both chaired by the SEUPB); and implementation bodies. Activities The activities of INTERREG I, like the early days of the IFI, were mainly of an economic nature, containing five sub-programmes, Tourism, Human Resource Development, Environmental Protection, Agriculture/ Fisheries/Forestry and Regional Development, made up of sixteen measures in total.35 INTERREG II deviated little from INTERREG I, continuing, for the most part, with this economic development agenda, pursued under five sub-programmes, Regional Development, Human Resource Development, Infrastructure, Agriculture/Fisheries/Forestry and Environmental Protection through thirteen measures,36 with funding increased for its most people-focused strand, Human Resource Development. A comparison of the funding allocations for each programme (Table 3.6) shows how little this differentiation was.

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Table 3.6  INTERREG I and II funding allocations compared

Sub-programme

INTERREG I (ECUm)

INTERREG II (ECUm)

Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Human Resource Development

14.1 (17.1%)   4.9 (5.9%)

14.5 (9.2%) 14.1 (9.0%)

Environmental Protection Regional Development Infrastructure (II only) Total Tourism (I only)

16.9 (20.6%) 34.9 (42.5%) 11.4 (13.9%) 82.2 (100%) 16.5

33.6 (21.4%) 43.7 (27.9%) 51.0 (32.5%) 156.9 (100%)

Source: B. Laffan and D. Payne, Creating Living Institutions. EU Cross-Border Co-operation After the Good Friday Agreement (UCD/Armagh: Institute for British-Irish Studies/A Report by the Centre for Cross Border Studies, 2001), p. 63; European Structural Funds, INTERREG Programme. Ireland and Northern Ireland 1994–1999. Programme Summary (n.d.), p. 6 (Tourism, INTERREG 1 only). Note: The funding allocations are discussed in terms of ECUs not euros; for INTERREG II the exchange rate was UK£1.29 and IR£1.25 (European Structural Funds, INTERREG Programme, p. 3). In euros INTERREG I totalled approximately €83.5m and INTERREG II totalled approximately €159.43m. Table 3.7  INTERREG IIIA funding allocation

Priority

INTERREG IIIA (€m)

Integrated Local Development Strategies Supporting Physical Infrastructure and Environment Civic and Community Networking Technical Assistance Total

69.01  80.89  19.17  10.33  179.4 

(51.76 ERDF) (60.52 ERDF) (14.38 ERDF) (7.75 ERDF) (134.41 ERDF)

Source: INTERREG Programme Ireland and Northern Ireland, INTERREG III Programme 2000–2006 Ireland/Northern Ireland Operational Programme (2002), pp. 62–3.

INTERREG IIIA refocused its structure; its overall aim translated into three specific priorities – Integrated Local Development Strategies, Supporting Physical Infrastructure and the Environment and Civic and Community Networking, comprising nine measures in total.37 However, while INTERREG IIIA continued to be largely an economic development programme, it substantially increased its focus on social development (although this remained the smallest part of the programme in overall terms) compared to INTERREG I and II. Table 3.7 outlines its funding divisions. Moreover, while the measures were open to ­applications from

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any type of organisation, activities were largely carried out by local authorities on both sides of the border, thus maintaining its centralised influence.

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Conclusion This chapter has highlighted the complexity of the structures of each of the three programmes in terms of their background, management, administration and activity areas, a complexity which largely increased rather than decreased as they progressed. The impact of these structures on the region’s transformation process and their implications for transforming conflict through social and economic development will be the focus of in-depth analysis in the following chapters, as they are assessed against the five criteria established earlier. Notes 1 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Peace II Qualitative Assessment of the Economic Measures. The EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace II) (Belfast: SEUPB, 2005), p. 29. 2 Anglo-Irish Agreement, p. 5, quoted from the CAIN website, www.cain.ulst. ac.uk/events/aia/aiadoc.htm#a (accessed 25 July 2004). 3 International Fund for Ireland, Annual Report and Accounts 2005 (Dublin/ Belfast: IFI, 2006), p. 1. 4 International Fund for Ireland, Annual Report and Accounts 2011 (Dublin/ Belfast: IFI, 2012). 5 International Fund for Ireland, Annual Report and Accounts 2005 (Dublin/ Belfast: IFI, 2006), p. 5. If this figure were to be matched to the Fund’s own contribution to date it would obviously be much higher. 6 C.R. Mark, ‘Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance. CRS Issue Brief for Congress’, The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, updated 26 April 2005, p. 1, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB85066.pdf (accessed 22 March 2008). This averages over $2 billion per year. 7 http://egypt.usaid.gov/en/aboutus/Pages/budgetinformation.aspx (accessed 16 October 2011). 8 P. Arthur, Special Relationships. Britain, Ireland and the Northern Ireland Problem (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2000), p. 219. 9 International Fund for Ireland, Annual Report. 1986/1988 (Dublin/Belfast: IFI, 1988), p. 3. 10 European Structural Funds, Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland 1995–1999 (n.d.), p. 13. 11 Ibid., p. 14. 12 Ibid., p. 31. 13 Ibid., pp. 33–4.

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14 Ibid., p. 16. 15 See Appendix 2. 16 ADM, CPA, Co-operation Ireland, The Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, The Special European Union Programmes Body, Building on Peace. Supporting Peace and Reconciliation after 2006 (Monaghan: ADM/ CPA, 2003), p. 126. 17 EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland 2000–2004, Operational Programme (n.d.), p. 30. 18 Ibid., p. 31. 19 See Appendix 3. 20 SEUPB, European Union Programme for Territorial Co-operation, Peace III, EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 2007–2013, Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland. Operational Programme (Belfast/Omagh/ Monaghan: SEUPB, n.d.), p. 43. 21 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I and Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II. Final Report (Belfast: PwC, 2003), p. 204. 22 See Appendix 1. IFBs were asked to tender for the role under Peace II. 23 SEUPB, Peace III, p. 69. 24 See Appendix 2. 25 See Appendix 3. 26 European Structural Funds, INTERREG Programme. Ireland and Northern Ireland 1994–1999. Programme Summary (n.d.), p. 1. 27 INTERREG Programme Ireland and Northern Ireland, INTERREG III Programme 2000–2006 Ireland/Northern Ireland Operational Programme (2002), p. 2. 28 INTERREG Programme, Application for Financial Assistance – Notes for Guidance (1991–1993) (n.d.), p. 1. 29 INTERREG Programme Ireland and Northern Ireland, INTERREG III, p. 2. 30 European Structural Funds, INTERREG Programme, p. 1. 31 INTERREG Programme Ireland and Northern Ireland, INTERREG III, p.  53. 32 Ibid., p. 4. 33 Ibid., p. 61. 34 The implementation bodies included ADM/CPA, Co-operation Ireland, Cooperation and Working Together, SEUPB and the INTERREG IIIA (cross-border) Partnerships; Irish Central Border Area Network, the North West Region Cross Border Group and the East Border Region Committee, representing the ‘Border Corridor’. This involved cooperation between local authorities on both sides of the border, composed of half local authority/ district council members and half (social pillar) members representing trade unions, business, rural and voluntary/community representatives. In 2003 a fourth partnership was set up in the North East region of Northern Ireland, the North East Partnership. 35 See Appendix 4. 36 See Appendix 5. 37 See Appendix 6.

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Impacts of the tools on conflict transformation practice

In referring to the Peace programmes, it has been argued that ‘if nothing else, they have provided a substantial injection of funds at a key point in the transition from war to peace’.1 While all three tools have supported thousands of projects and initiatives socially and economically, they have also had to bear the brunt of much criticism, like many funding programmes: A particularly weak aspect of policy at the international level is the limited attention given to, and funding for, qualitative social development – so-called ‘soft programmes’. Yet these are critical for any long-term social development, especially for transformation based on local ownership … The dominant funding culture … is to prefer concrete schemes, often literally, because these are more open to accountancy, reports and standardised formats … funders ‘like to go for big visual proof – doing up things along the road and then putting stickers on’, but having little concept of the social impact of the process.2

Although this criticism by Pugh refers to Bosnia, it is equally applicable to Northern Ireland and the Border Counties. A further criticism is that ‘the rationale for, and modus operandi of, the donor regime are projects. They offer a formalised process for allocating generally fixed sums for specific tasks to be completed during an agreed period and which can be audited in a particular way … The emphasis on projects has tended to reinforce a donor-centred, top-down approach to needs assessment and evaluation.’3 Has this been the case with the three tools under consideration here? Experience and initial observations appear to suggest so, but the evidence of the extent of their effectiveness needs to be assessed in more detail. Some general observations will first be provided about each tool largely in terms of strengths and weaknesses. Each will then be assessed against the five criteria developed earlier in terms of impacts.

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The International Fund for Ireland – general observations Difficult beginnings The Fund did not have an easy start. It initially appears that little of its work went any way towards attempting to address the five areas outlined as necessary for effective transformation to take place, even during the conflict. It encountered some serious problems when it was first set up, as an intense debate developed in the US Congress over donations after the USA made its first contribution, sharpened by a growing national deficit and reports that the IFI was funding inappropriate projects. C.E.B. Brett, the Fund’s first chairman (1986–89), wrote shortly after his chairmanship, ‘I do not think that the purpose or potentialities of the Fund had been at all clearly worked out even before it came into existence. Its objects and functions were diffuse; even the primary objectives … constituted a tall order, on a not unlimited budget.’4 Moreover, despite his belief that ‘discord, conflict and violence flourish in conditions of economic instability and disadvantage; and contributions to “viable and self-sustaining growth” may provide a foundation upon which a more peaceful and prosperous society can be built’,5 the background to the Fund’s development seemed ambiguous, even to him: ‘it is unclear who was the inventor of this unique, tax-exempt, international institution, of which almost nobody in Britain has ever heard … I suspect that its conception was influenced by a muddled, but benevolent, desire to believe that money could buy peace, even in Ireland.’6 This desire automatically discounted any notion of a long-term approach, as the publication of the IFI’s first annual report aroused criticism from all sides that quicker results were not visible, with five main criticisms levelled at the Board; ‘that it tended to help rich rather than poor; that it assisted frivolous ventures while neglecting serious ones; that too little money went to the most disadvantaged areas; that the civil servants who administered the Fund on the Board’s behalf did not do so fairly; and that the Board was too subservient to the British and Irish governments’.7 Like INTERREG I and II, very little consultation had taken place beforehand – there had been no vertical or horizontal capacity development or integration, nor were the Fund’s activities tailored to suit the particular situation it was facing. However, by the end of its third year, the first Board had in some respects answered its critics, in some respects gone out to meet them and had succeeded in re-establishing its credibility. Success stories were, at long last, beginning to appear on the ground; expenditure was taking visible form; there was a markedly more realistic public appreciation of the constraints within which the Fund must operate.8

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Nevertheless, one of the main issues the Fund had to contend with from the beginning was strong hostility and criticism from the Unionist community, which saw the funding invariably as a ‘slush fund’ and ‘American blood-money’,9 firmly believing it to be an attempt to bribe ‘the community to accept an agreement’.10 The Fund faced continuous criticism from the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 until after it was activated in September 1986, with Unionist leaders even going as far as to canvass against it in the USA,11 and criticism continued unabated well after the Fund had found its feet.12 While these criticisms suggest that the Fund did not involve all levels of society in the transformation process, they have been strongly (and consistently) denied by former IFI chairman William McCarter, who pointed to the findings of an independent assessment of the Fund’s work carried out by KPMG Management Consulting in May 1995 that claimed the very opposite: ‘IFI is project-driven and welcomes all applications, particularly from disadvantaged areas, but it can only respond to applications which it receives. Regrettably, during the early years, the Unionist community was actively discouraged from submitting applications. I am glad to say that the chill factor has now largely evaporated.’13 Interviewees with detailed knowledge of the day-to-day operations of the Fund and other independent reports, as the next section shows, have also refuted these claims. Unfortunately it was very much the case that, in its early years, Unionists were actively discouraged from getting involved with or applying to the Fund for grants and therefore missed out extensively, leading many later on to point out the discrepancies between the nationalist and Unionist communities in relation to the Fund.14 Growing optimism The IFI’s annual reports since 1986 present an optimistic assessment of the Fund’s work, an optimism that grew as each year passed; its 1996 report, which looked back over a decade of work, observed that the Fund ‘has achieved a great deal over the last ten years. Many communities have renewed confidence and improved prospects for the future. Thousands of individuals have had experiences of cross-community contact which would not otherwise have been available. Many jobs now exist in businesses which owe their survival and growth to the Fund’s activities.’15 Furthermore, in its 2004 annual report, its chairman stated: there are many factors underlying the positive changes that have taken place in the economic, political and social arenas over the period since the Fund was established. I believe that the Fund is one of those factors and that it can share in the credit for what has been achieved … The Fund has … promoted economic development and social advance in disadvantaged

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areas and contributed to making progress in cross-community reconciliation. The results of this work can be seen in almost every city, town and village in Northern Ireland and in the border counties in the South.16

Four independent assessments of the Fund’s work have all been extremely favourable towards its achievements; the 1998 assessment concluded that ‘both our survey and the case studies leave us in no doubt that the Fund is making a real and distinctive contribution to tackling division and disadvantage … and to promoting meaningful cross-border contact. Our overall conclusion is that the Fund is a distinctive and focused organisation which has had a range of substantial impacts on the communities and economies of Northern Ireland and the Border Counties.’17 The Fund pioneered a funds-management model which the EU adopted for its various funding programmes for Northern Ireland. The importance of IFI funding to Northern Ireland is clear when compared to other EU funding. In terms of cross-border development for example: The total EU contribution proposed for INTERREG II is approximately £110 million over the (effective) five year period 1995–1999, equivalent to an annual level of grant support of about 55% of the level of expenditure of the IFI. However, assistance towards community based and cross border developments could occur under measures in the proposed programme with an allocation of EU funds of just over UK£30 million over the next five year period – equivalent on an annual basis to approximately 15% of total IFI expenditure … therefore … the difference in emphasis between the IFI … and INTERREG II and [Peace] mean that the IFI makes a more than proportionately greater contribution to projects intended to promote cross border contact, dialogue and reconciliation.18

A 2005 external review revealed that to 30 September 2004, the Fund had supported over 5,236 projects; 65 per cent (3,402) were supported under the Economic Development priority, 87 per cent (4,575) were located in disadvantaged areas and 33 per cent (1,735) were cross-border, all funded by a total of £465 million directly from the IFI, or £1.4 billion including leverage funds, with 39,009 direct jobs and 54,883 indirect jobs created as a result.19 This would seem to be quite an achievement, which has surely gone quite some way towards assisting with the transformation of the conflict. Indeed, the 1995 KPMG independent assessment glowingly concluded that the Fund was: a highly distinctive organisation which is able to target disadvantage and social exclusion by creating private investment in disadvantaged communities and by targeting cross-community and cross-border divisions. A particular feature … is its unique ability to build long-term relationships with organisations at local level in disadvantaged areas … This ability arises from the flexibility which the Fund’s independent Board provides

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and by the avoidance of excessive bureaucracy. This enables the International Fund to develop and support innovative projects on a flexible but accountable basis.20

Brett therefore pointed out at the end of his chairmanship: ‘I think that the International Fund has made a significant contribution to prosperity, and so … to the reconciliation of the two communities, within the twelve northern counties of Ireland. Its most important achievement may prove to be to have broken down some of the barriers between people of different traditions and loyalties, at many levels.’21 European praise The European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the European Commission published reports on the IFI in 2000 and 2001, with the ECA report highlighting a number of relevant findings in terms of conflict transformation, namely that ‘the IFI pioneered the joint management and delivery of programmes between Ireland and Northern Ireland and was innovative in giving priority to disadvantaged areas for funding … as the first funder of projects [it] enabled grant recipients to gain access to other funding’.22 Moreover, ‘the establishment of the Fund predated the reform of the Structural Funds and thus initiated certain principles which would later become the main elements of the reform such as the programmed approach to economic development and the importance of cross-community partnership’.23 This remark hints at the importance placed by the Fund on the development of vertical and horizontal capacity as an essential component of successful transformation. The Commission report was a wide-ranging review of the IFI’s activities, past assessments24 and the EU’s own involvement, noting that these reports ‘have unanimously recognised the very positive contribution of the IFI’s activities and its innovative approach in fulfilling its objectives, i.e. to promote economic and social advance, and to encourage contact, dialogue and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland’.25 The IFI’s consistent targeting of the region’s most disadvantaged areas is supported by two studies carried out by the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) in a detailed analysis of the Fund’s geographical distribution of commitments in terms of economic and social deprivation and community background. Commenting on the reports, the European Commission noted how ‘the IFI continues to target the most disadvantaged areas (70% of its commitments); the correlation between the IFI’s commitments and deprivation at District Council level remains high; and the commitments between the Protestant and Catholic communities overall is well balanced in the designated areas, although a significant imbalance remains within the non-deprived areas.’26

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The evidence presented so far points to the important role the IFI has played in the transformation of the conflict in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties. Its impacts as a conflict transformation tool will now be assessed in much greater detail under each of the five criteria. An attempt has been made to address the root causes of the conflict thus bringing about substantial changes in the social and economic structures of society Those involved with the IFI (whether funders/top-middle level or funded/ grassroots) are firmly of the belief that the Fund has very much made an attempt to address the root causes of the conflict, beyond what was anticipated when it was initially set up, which one interviewee believes the Fund saw as being partly a product of the economic difficulties that the border created; moreover, ‘to deal with the problems of borders any other way than through economics would miss what is probably an established international point anyway’.27 Certainly representatives of the IFI recognised that the root causes of the conflict are debatable; ‘if you’re talking about disadvantage and unemployment and that kind of thing, yes, the Fund has attempted to address those issues’.28 Nevertheless, ‘about 90 per cent of IFI resources have gone into the areas of highest disadvantage in order to back the community leaders of those areas to try to achieve the regeneration’.29 These changes have instilled confidence in communities by providing funding that they simply would have been unable to otherwise access; through the support of so many countries, it has brought massive international recognition and support to communities through its approach of ‘economics with a purpose, not economics purely for job creation. In order for those seven jobs to have occurred there’s been a huge amount of inter- and intra-community activity that will survive way beyond the jobs and as part of that engagement process to back into probably participatory democracy and ideally into representative democracy.’30 However, while there is a belief that the Fund brought about changes in the social and economic structures of the region, opinion is divided as to whether these changes have been substantial or not. On the one hand, while the Fund has certainly focused the agendas of government, it is ultimately the job of government to sort these things out and not the IFI. It has contributed towards a whole lot of changes in association with government … And it has been fortunate in that it has been able or allowed to take risks more than government, it’s been a sort of a leader in the change process but the substantial benefit has been a collaborative one between it and other organisations, always. So it has contributed to it but not substantially.31

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Furthermore: there’s no doubt that there are still a lot of areas of deprivation but the situation has got a lot better … That doesn’t say that the problem is solved by any means and it doesn’t say that the Fund is a major player, but the Fund has been a tremendous catalyst in this because there were a lot of areas that government couldn’t really operate in; in the early days the Fund was the means by which government was able to get into areas, particularly republican areas and it was only because the Fund was able to work with community leaders, got trusted and was then able to pass on the trust, that very dedicated civil servants were able to come into areas on the back of [trust] the Fund had established with communities.32

On the other hand, it has been argued that the changes made in social and economic structures have indeed been ‘quite substantial’: ‘the very fact actually that the Fund was absolutely rejected and treated with great hostility by Unionism, whereas now, at least half of our applications come from Unionist and Loyalist communities, some of them really quite hard line in their views, shows that there has been a change and that it has actually been largely brought about by the way in which the Fund did its work.’33 This divergence of opinion mirrors existing divisions within the research in general in relation to the extent of the causal contribution of social and economic factors towards the conflict. The point has been made that the uneven wealth distribution in Northern Ireland in the 1950s and 1960s produced quite a number of deprived areas. Thus when violence erupted in 1969 there was ‘very fertile ground for sowing the seeds of people feeling very aggrieved about their economic and social circumstances and that was tinder to the political violence’.34 It has been further argued that ‘the barriers vis-à-vis the two parts of the island were very substantially contributed to by economic decisions and not political decisions at all’.35 In other words, economics reinforced the political. Yet for some who are funded, depending on political persuasion, social and economic factors, as a contributory cause of the conflict, are overplayed. What is clear is that the Fund’s flexibility has proved to be its lynchpin in attempting to address the root causes of the conflict ‘simply because there was less bureaucracy and less red tape and they were more flexible at responding to the needs especially in responding to the needs of the people down in the communities’.36 The independence of the IFI was also critical in that it was not viewed as being aligned to government policy and dictates. The strongest indication of the IFI having addressed this issue, as far as it can, is its putting a five-year exit strategy in place, which suggests that the Fund (and the two governments) has concluded that its work,

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in terms of addressing the root causes of the conflict and subsequently bringing about change in the social and economic structures, is nearing completion and, more importantly, is sustainable. However, while a clear exit strategy has been adopted,37 thinking on the transformational process beyond this has been uncertain, reflecting the implications of the non-existence of a conflict transformation policy from either government, an issue discussed in the next chapter. Vertical and horizontal capacity has been developed and integrated through the involvement of all levels of society in the transformation process thus enabling the empowerment of the society’s citizens In assessing the impact of the IFI in terms of developing and integrating vertical and horizontal capacity, there are two issues to be examined – the level of involvement of the various levels of society in the transformation process and the extent to which it has empowered those at the grassroots, particularly when one considers that the IFI was a top-down, rather than a bottom-up, creation resulting from the Anglo-Irish Agreement. When one also considers the barrage of criticism it faced in its early years, it would appear that very little consultation had taken place prior to setting it up, which would have subsequently resulted in very little involvement or empowerment of the region’s citizens taking place and, by extension, very little development or integration of vertical and horizontal capacity. In examining the first issue, the obvious source of such involvement would be consultations with the various levels of society in the design and establishment of the Fund and, thereafter, throughout its lifetime. Many of those interviewed agreed that very little consultation had taken place prior to the Fund’s establishment ‘because they were different days to now, where the political, the terrorist situation was very, very difficult … There would have been an exercise done among some key people but I don’t think there was a hell of a lot done.’38 It appears, therefore, that even if the governments had wanted to consult those on the ground, it would have been next to impossible for them to do so, hence the utilisation of development consultants ‘to go to places where central government wouldn’t go’.39 Moreover, interviewees agreed that the Fund was a top-down creation (which was primarily responsible for this lack of consultation), ‘but I suppose you wouldn’t have got a decision if it wasn’t top-down because the culture was very, very centralised in the South and it is in the North as well so it couldn’t have been any other way then’.40 It would appear, however, that consultation might not necessarily always be a good thing. The extensive consultations that went into the Peace programmes are viewed as having gone too far:

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because you ultimately can’t close anything off that way either. Eventually if you’ve consulted everybody about everything, unless you’re really very, very astute at how you do it, you create expectations that can never be satisfied; there’s an assumption that everyone has to be consulted without ever taking on board the point that people must have the ability to consult … I know in one way you should but there’s an obligation on those who want to be consulted to inform themselves on what it is.41

However, a lack of consultation inevitably creates difficulties – ‘another thing that certainly was my criticism, the way [in] which they decreed what was best for our communities’.42 Finding the balance is key: when one considers that the Fund emerged from a very politically difficult environment, with neither formal nor informal consultations being the experiential norm, it appears to have done its best not to abandon the consultation process altogether through its use of development consultants, charged from the beginning with consulting communities and thus creating the link between Lederach’s grassroots, middle and top levels. Moreover: The Fund would not have been nearly as open [to] holding open meetings mainly because … funds were always limited. If you try to involve everybody you raise expectations far too high, relative to the amount of money you have or relative to actual programmes that you can deliver. The Fund didn’t try to be all things to all people because it couldn’t, so it developed what we called this programmatic approach, was very focused on that through its development consultants, through a variety of structures.43

Despite this recognition of a lack of formal consultation, interviewees were of the firm belief, in terms of involvement of the various levels of society in the transformation process, that ‘the way that we work is very much to involve the grassroots in the communities where there is, as yet, no real social infrastructure and would mentor them over a very long period. We’re not about imposing projects on communities that don’t want them; we help communities to identify themselves what they want and then try to seek a support for that.’44 In further examining levels of involvement in the transformation process, to some it has been evident during the Fund’s tenure that it did a lot more than it was ever given credit for certainly at the time, because the Fund tried to reach out to these communities but because of the political situation it was very difficult. Some of us have spent a long time trying to build bridges with everybody, reaching out to all communities and over a period of years … the Fund has been able to reach into every community in Northern Ireland … the Fund would have been able to link grassroots with the middle to the politicians because frequently politicians both locally and nationally would have approached the Fund to do something, either to

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institute a programme or to look at something in their area; that process … would engage everybody in looking at a particular area to get stuff done. The Fund was quite good at making this kind of linkage throughout.45

Claims of discrimination against Protestant communities have been dismissed outright and consistently denied by the IFI’s management. Indeed, what is less well known is that, in its early days, it also faced opposition from Republican communities. Thus, in overall terms, while its ability to involve all levels of society was fraught, this process was persevered with and built upon from the beginning. On the second issue, the extent to which the Fund has empowered those at the grassroots, the consensus is that it has, as viewed from the middle level by ‘giving people a stake in their own community, by giving people the vehicle and the means to create kind of shared spaces in their own local areas’,46 and as viewed from the grassroots: there’s no doubt that their efforts, bearing in mind not just their own money, but the leverage money that it has created as well, did a massive amount for the building of confidence, community development; it has empowered the vast majority of our communities now to be able to stand on their own two feet and to articulate their case, to seek the resources for their communities that wasn’t being delivered by central government. Certainly, for those of us that are in that empowerment game and seeking resources, the IFI was a major boost for us.47

This development and integration of capacity in the region has worked on a number of levels, both horizontally and vertically, ‘especially in the early days and before SEUPB was operating, the Fund actually had contributed greatly to bringing people together from both sides and that was vertical and horizontal’.48 While the impact of the Wider Horizons, Learning and Educating Together (LET) and Knowledge through Enterprise for Youth (KEY) programmes on over 33,100 young people are cited as examples of horizontal capacity development at the grassroots, along with the opportunities created by the IFI for people to come together and to work in community economic regeneration, its vertical capacity development and integration efforts, particularly at the middle and top levels, must not be underestimated in terms of groups of civil servants from various government departments on both sides of the border working together to administer the Fund and its programmes. The extent of the IFI’s role in this empowerment process is clear when one considers the stark difference that existed between Northern Ireland and the Border Counties prior to the IFI being set up. In the Border Counties, clientelism ‘played a very important role because people engaged with their politicians. And once you engage with your politician,

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you engage with government.’49 However, in Northern Ireland, for many years, people at the grassroots level had no relationship with their political representatives; ‘they didn’t have to, the paramilitary organisations were the real holders down of their communities for a really long time: if you wanted something done that’s who you went to, but the price was that you engaged [with them]’.50 This lack of engagement with political representatives left people bereft of any empowerment and this extended to the top levels, to the extent that even today it has been argued that civil servants in the North do not fully understand parliamentary or representative democracy, finding it very difficult to deal with political representation. However, it is also argued that organisations such as the Fund have obliged them to grapple with it and ensured empowerment, with politicians having to be much more transparent with their constituents. As the Fund sees it, ‘if good community leaders are developed in areas and they have the confidence then they can strongly influence government then to start looking at the other parts of that community; politics is still a dependency relationship and I would like to think that the Fund has addressed that dependency relationship to make it more of a collaborative partnership relationship.’51 A long-term view has been taken of the transformation process Earlier evidence suggested that when the Fund was initially set up, a long-term view was not taken. Certainly the Fund ‘didn’t start out with a long-term view of the process [but] through a series of pressures from the bottom … the Fund has had to revisit projects and … has been led into a more long-term relationship than it really intended’.52 Moreover, ‘people across the board probably thought that there could be short-term solutions to things, but as time went on, more and more people realised this is a long-haul here, there are no quick fixes around’.53 Therefore, ‘once it got into this process … it found that it couldn’t disengage because it had really started something that it just couldn’t walk away from’.54 Consequently, as it has developed, one of the Fund’s key strengths has become its commitment to social and economic development on a longterm basis, a critical transformation strategy evidenced by its relatively long existence and supported by the 2001 independent assessment of the Fund’s work. This highlighted a range of distinctive characteristics including its long-term nature and flexibility by which it seeks to build long-term developmental relationships and partnerships.55 Central to the provision of this long-term approach has been the enablement of the Fund’s work by the continuous annual funding it received from its donors, though this has, at times, come under threat because of its dependency on the United States as its largest donor: ‘every year we

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have to go back to the US and lobby and it is a strain for us at times but that’s really the way government budgeting processes work’.56 This is particularly difficult when, for example, ‘some people in the United States have asked where are we getting the money from to meet the [hurricane Katrina] damage that was done last year in the Southern States? And the IFI was targeted. We operate with no guarantees.’57 Nevertheless, the Fund has implemented its work, in financial terms, on a long-term future planning basis, which essentially ensured that the short-term (annual) nature of EU and US funding never became an issue. Alternatives to this funding process, such as the likes of USAID delivering a programme on the ground with no local input would, in the main, be detrimental as this would essentially go against the fundamental principles of a long-term view: ‘so while it [lobbying annually for funding] has its disadvantages, the Fund actually is a very good vehicle because the two governments are more in touch with the priorities on the ground and are able to do it better’.58 It is worth noting that the Fund’s long-term focus has not been undermined by a need to achieve rapid successes in order to safeguard follow-up funding, as is so often the case: a lot of our successes have been really over the long-term, our Wider Horizons programme which is running for nearly twenty years and really it’s now that the benefits of that programme are beginning to be realised. Our donors have been quite understanding about the long-term dimension of the work. What’s much more likely to affect our funding actually is domestic budgetary pressures in the US, not a lack of short-term successes on our part. And again with the EU, they understand because the EU has lengthy experience in reconstruction and regeneration of societies that have been affected by conflict as well; there is an understanding that it takes some time and that it has to be a sustained and programmatic process.59

A key long-term ingredient has therefore been to ensure that people are happy with the Fund’s progress, which appears to be the case to judge by the Fund’s observers and independent and annual reports: ‘if people didn’t have a long-term view that the Fund has been performing reasonably well, then I think you’d have problems’.60 In further assessing the long-term nature of the work of the Fund, it could be construed that, despite its longevity, its programmes are of a short-term nature, which would bring into question the Fund’s long-term view of the transformation process. This is not how it is seen by those on the inside: the overall approach of the Fund has been a very long-term thing but there are different approaches from time to time, different needs, and the Fund is transitioning with less emphasis on economic things now to more people-orientated things like Wider Horizons, like the KEY programme,

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like the LET programme … [thus] … everybody connected with the Fund would take the view that what they’re engaged in is a very long-term project.61

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A key feature of the long-term nature of the Fund’s work is its flexibility: by virtue of the way it’s organised, it’s inherently a much more flexible outfit than either EU programmes as a whole or government because you have an independent Board that, provided neither government think that what the Fund is doing is outside its economic, social or political principles, that can do anything it likes with donor money provided it doesn’t give it to paramilitaries. The Board has the power to put money first on the table … it doesn’t need government or anybody else’s sanction to do it … And that is a very flexible way.62

As it is not linked to any of the EU’s Community Initiatives nor is solely dependent on EU Structural Funds for support, the Fund has been much better placed than the Peace and INTERREG programmes to address the long-term requirements of a successful transformation process, as it is not bound by the same strict procedural regulations: that has enabled us to nurture projects and sustain them over the long-term because certainly our experience would tell us that [it] takes more than two years sometimes to get a project involving outreach and reconciliation in very hardened, marginalised communities … off the ground … and the fact that we haven’t been bound by these N+2 rules has allowed us to do that.63

The imposition of the N+2 rule, which stipulates that commitments on which no payment has been made within the two years following the year in which the commitment was made are cancelled automatically, although understandable in accounting terms, is ‘not to understand fully the needs of groups on the ground’.64 Moreover the Fund doesn’t have an open and closing date so it can allow communities to take their time: ‘It’s sat with communities and if things have been going wrong, it’s sort of held back and said we’ll take a year and work [it] out whereas Peace may have been forced to pull away so it has been able to … allow the time frame to go on and take account of how ready they were to move and just work things out.’65 This flexibility has meant that especially for groups ‘where there is weak infrastructure, no background or experience of seeing a project through, we’ve stuck with that through thick and thin and we’ve taken criticism for that, in my view, unmerited and unwarranted criticism for doing that’.66 The IFI firmly believes that anything other that a long-term view is detrimental to the overall impact being sought: if you do the stop start thing of giving the group eighteen months and if they haven’t got it up and running you pull the funding away, well, it does

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two things. Number one, it prevents the groups from doing it and number two it doesn’t help you to spend your money any more quickly: you’ve the same money, you’ve got to spend it all over again, you’ve got to find somebody else. What you start doing is, approving projects that’ll be spent quickly rather than projects that can make a difference.67

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Its direct experience of the difficulties this creates has further reinforced this belief: whenever groups have got their funding package together, they have come back to us and drawn down the European money first so they can meet an N+2 target and our money has remained unspent until the end of the project. Now that’s what the IFI has been able to do, that’s what its ethos was set up to do … The difficulty is that you then have changes of personnel in Brussels who don’t remember why it was set up. They just suddenly come into a regime which says N+2 is a good thing, here’s an organisation that’s not complying with N+2 – this must be a bad organisation. That’s their logic. And so we’re now dealing with officials from Brussels who haven’t been with us the whole way through and they are now saying to us you can’t spend your money quickly enough and it’s a criticism that we’re taking, it’s a criticism that needs to be understood, it’s one feature of the IFI that not only have we stuck with good projects, we’ve actually enabled [EU] Structural Funds to be spent … and then been criticised afterwards for holding the money for a long period: you need a funding organisation somewhere in the system that has got a degree of flexibility to fund a project … and to leave its money there for long enough to allow the project to take place in the first place. That’s a unique feature of the IFI which is not well understood and it’s difficult always to defend because it seems reasonable that if there is a need, you should be able to meet that need quickly, you need somebody who can do that, otherwise you just simply don’t get the projects that are needed in those communities.68

The IFI’s structure and long-term vision has been so successful that some of the intermediary funding bodies (IFBs) for the Peace programmes argued in 2003 that this should be the way forward for a possible Peace III – to have a Europe-wide programme for such work, not linked to any particular Community Initiative which restricts its timeframe and activities.69 The objective of long-term support and implementation has also been recognised by the Fund’s second largest donor, the EU, as a necessary requirement for conflict transformation. The Commission’s 2000 report argued: the European Union’s long standing support to a peace process in Northern Ireland has been best exemplified by its commitment to the IFI since 1989 … The Berlin European Council in March 1999 … recognised the longterm nature of the peace process’s objectives, which have been widely supported over the years by the European Parliament, the Council and

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the ­Commission. Today’s threats to the future of Northern Ireland’s institutions and political settlements, and the continuing levels of violence and division in the region, suggest that efforts need to be sustained … Moreover, the IFI is supported by the international community who, by doing so, demonstrates its involvement in the peace process in the area. It is therefore important for the EU to be seen as being equally committed.70

The Fund announced a five-year exit strategy in 2006 as it was recognised that ‘the Fund was never conceived as a permanent funding mechanism and that present levels of international support cannot be maintained indefinitely’.71 Nevertheless, the IFI has been in existence since 1986 as a conflict transformation tool both throughout and post-conflict, very much enshrining the principle of taking a long-term view of the conflict transformation process. The tools used were tailored to suit the particular situation thus facilitating peacebuilding rather than imposing or dictating terms When the Fund was first set up ‘nobody had any model to go on and it literally did start off with a plain sheet of paper but it rapidly then did develop a structure, programmes that were geared to what people needed and has been responsible and flexible’.72 Nevertheless, the IFI always aimed to facilitate conflict transformation by funding projects in areas where people faced serious social and/or economic problems. To this end it formally adopted a list of ‘designated disadvantaged areas’ in 1988, which was revised in 1995. The six Border Counties were confirmed as a priority under this. In Northern Ireland the definition of disadvantage was based on various social and economic deprivation indicators in local government wards (which included partial use of the Robson index) based on the 1991 Census data. This definition was then widened to include a number of areas of significant disadvantage which would not be classified as disadvantaged on an overall basis. According to the European Commission, ‘the IFI has thus progressively increased the emphasis which it gives to Designated Disadvantaged Areas … It is now estimated that 90.5% IFI funding goes to [these areas].’73 In addition the Commission pointed out that one of the key challenges facing the IFI was the adaptation of these designations as social and economic indicators changed. This challenge was met by taking account of newly available indicators (the Noble index), complemented by the results of the 2001 Census. A second challenge faced by the IFI was ‘complementing this approach with criteria … directly linked to the source of the conflict in Northern Ireland (which are not economic and social in nature)’.74 This issue was addressed by Peace I, which targeted those ‘belonging to areas, sectors, groups or communities that have

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been “most affected by the conflict” and which do not necessarily correspond to those areas, groups or sectors which have been most deprived in economic and social terms’.75 In initiating a joint management and delivery model prioritising disadvantaged areas, the Fund also ensured a tailored programmatic approach. Top- and middle-level actors have no doubt that, while the barrage of criticism faced by the Fund in its early days suggested that it was far from tailored to suit the Northern Ireland conflict, it has nevertheless developed progressively to tackle this: it’s one thing to portray it as the British and Irish governments attempting to buy peace but … there was a recognition by the governments that poverty, if it wasn’t the root cause of the conflict, certainly it was exacerbating it and it was what was contributing to the likelihood of, particularly young men, becoming involved in paramilitary activity and that it was really an attempt to address that; the terrorist campaign and the Troubles was having a very damaging effect on the economy of Northern Ireland but also the economy of the Border Counties.76

Grassroots actors, moreover, believe that ‘in fairness to them [IFI Board] it was a very genuine attempt to deal with the problem. They weren’t too far wrong in most of what they put together for community development; it would have been wrong to throw the baby out with the bathwater simply because there were bits and pieces that weren’t altogether right, generally they got most of it right.’77 John Hume, in discussing the IFI, the Peace programmes and the INTERREG programmes, posits that: the fact is that the funds were set up and they were positive, just think if they weren’t, if they hadn’t have been set up what would have been the situation? You see, the political problems were being dealt with but it was necessary then to speed up [dealing with] the socio-economic problems because that brought home to the people on the ground that we were developing a new society in which the terrible things of the old society were being removed – unemployment and poverty.78

As a tailored programme, a key feature in facilitating rather than imposing or dictating terms is the Fund’s ability to programmatically adapt to the changing needs of communities and changing circumstances that it found itself facing.79 This adaptability was clear from its annual reports (for example, when the Fund no longer needed a tourism programme it was closed, ‘whereas certainly in the early nineties it was desperately needed’)80 and through its exit strategy, which aimed to launch the Fund ‘on a final phase of activity aimed at promoting cross-community and cross-border reconciliation. This has meant closing long-standing economic programmes which had successfully fulfilled their function, in

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order to make resources available for new priorities.’81 This was needed because of the continued segregated housing and education systems:

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you have to ask is that a good thing? And of course the Fund isn’t going to solve that. But … we want to start addressing that to see what can be done to make people feel secure enough to live wherever they wish to choose regardless of their new background and to be educated wherever they and however they choose regardless of the existing structures.82

The Fund recognises that ‘building a lasting peace is not just about a reduction in violence, nor is it solely about communities coming to terms with their neighbours. As long as the structural divisions in our society remain, the ultimate goal will be more difficult – if not impossible – to achieve.’83 Nevertheless, its impact and influence on the transformation process as a tailored tool that has facilitated rather than imposed or dictated terms has clearly been substantial. The tools have not done any harm This research indicates that the IFI has generally not done any harm. While ‘that’s not to say that every project has been successful’,84 this did not appear to be the case in its early years, when it funded what were deemed by some to be inappropriate projects such as golf courses and hotels,85 when it had undertaken very little consultation beforehand and, worse, when it was accused of favouring one community over the other. This latter issue has been acknowledged as ‘a regrettable aspect’ of the Fund’s work in the early days, though driven in large part by the Unionist community’s own leaders, as discussed earlier. Indeed, the viewpoint adopted by one member of the Loyalist community is that the Fund has ‘not really done any harm, once they were accepted by the vast bulk of the Protestant people’.86 An assessment of the impact of the Fund in terms of harm done must be considered in the widest sense. Thus, one harmful feature of its work (and indeed of the work of all three programmes) has been the unsustainable dependency culture it has created among community and voluntary-sector project promoters: ‘it is something we have been trying to be very careful about as we reach the end, to ensure that projects are going to be sustainable if we withdraw funding and we’ve refused funding to groups on that basis’.87 This is partly related to a limited number of experiences over the years whereby the Fund ‘may have directed communities into areas that they never wanted to go into and should probably never have been in, [sometimes taking] the community organisation through a process at a speed and at a level that really wasn’t fair’.88 The somewhat unsympathetic viewpoint has also been expressed that:

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when the day comes and structural funds and the IFI are no longer here there’s going to be a big shock out there because there’s an awful lot of people, they almost feel it’s their right to get money from the IFI and its very hard to say there is no right. Yes the Board has a duty to be even handed but the dispersion of the money is at the discretion of the Board and the people have really no right to make a demand for that.89

However, no matter what format a transformation tool takes, the development of a dependency culture and expectations of a right to funding will always be a risk, particularly when governments lack a transformation policy framework (which the Peace programmes will further highlight) and sometimes lever their own activities through such tools. In further assessing whether the Fund, as a transformation tool, has done any harm, we return to Pugh’s criticisms quoted at the beginning of this chapter. The Fund could certainly be accused of both of the failings he outlines, as it was very comfortable with capital projects. However, in its defence it has been argued that: there is a reason for acquiring agreed periods and audit and very often the reason is to ensure that funds are not diverted for the wrong purposes. In Northern Ireland the conflict continually demanded resources to keep it going so obviously funders had to be very, very careful to ensure that the money was properly spent and accounted for because nothing would have been more damaging than to have had the accusation levelled at us the money was being siphoned off into misguided or bad-minded organisations. Having said that, it is very difficult of course for small community organisations to deliver democracy or capacity-building projects and I would think for that reason the Fund … as well as having project-based approaches, it has had a programmatic approach as well so that [it] has attempted to address that by training people to become community leaders and to run community organisations properly in a way that can actually deliver results.90

Furthermore, ‘for the Fund, or anybody like the Fund, who’s in receipt of funds from Europe or the US, because they have huge auditing functions, I don’t know if there’s any way out of it’.91 However, despite leaving its visual mark across Northern Ireland and the Border Counties in terms of bricks and mortar, the Fund has been very much aware of the social impact of this, as it was local communities who identified these needs and were the drivers behind them. Thus ‘all of the Fund’s bricks and mortar projects all have tremendous community interweaving within, it’s part and parcel of the process that the Fund has engaged in with the community at large’.92 This process has been further enhanced through the experience provided to people, from running a project, through sourcing, managing and drawing down further funding from other

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sources. Nevertheless, the IFI has, in recent years, begun to move more towards an agenda to develop integrated housing and education. Like the other tools, the Fund could be accused of having become a substitute for government action, in terms of some of its economic development programmes, for example. However, it is argued that this has not been the case with the Fund, as it has been ‘specifically charged with no substituting for government money’.93 While this is in practice, admittedly, a fine distinction, ‘the Fund has always tried to avoid substitution so that everything that the Fund would be doing would be additional, particularly when you have donor observers who are looking at the kinds of projects that are being done and who’s funding what’.94 Notwithstanding these criticisms, the positive contributions of the Fund far outweigh any possible harm it has created. From the beginning, the Fund has been a key mechanism in generating leverage funding; by 2005 it had ‘achieved an overall leverage ratio of 1:2.01. In other words, for every one pound of IFI money spent a further £2.01 is raised from other sources. Overall, the total funds committed to IFI funded projects is now almost £1.4 billion.’95 This ability to provide projects with initial funding, enabling communities to access additional funding sources, has been a key feature of how the Fund operates. At the core of its achievements has been the facilitation of relationship building ‘at the interface between community and government [whereby] it has brought the communities nearer to government and brought government and its agents a bit nearer to the community’,96 a key aspect of Lederach’s conflict transformation model: it has brought a lot of people from both communities in North and South together in working relationships that helped to create a much more stable society at local level and hopefully at national level. A thing that is not generally realised [is] the Fund has generally joint programme teams that are pooled from the public service both North and South. It also has an advisory committee that’s drawn from senior civil servants from both governments, that whole process of having public servants working together over that period of time, long before North–South bodies or EU programmes, brought a lot of the public service together to develop working relationships and some very good friendships as well. The Fund also was able to kick-start things like the joint marketing and tourism of North and South, what is now Tourism Ireland where the joint marketing is taken as a given. Similarly the kind of things that InterTrade Ireland does, the Shannon–Erne waterway, the basis for the Waterways [Ireland], linking up universities North and South and R&D projects and a whole host of things that the Fund has actually pioneered and got going and then moved onto other things. So the Fund facilitated a lot of relationship building and networking.97

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Essentially, one of its most significant contributions to the conflict transformation process has been that ‘certainly in this part of the world partnership [and] interagency collaborative development was pioneered by the Fund’.98 In overall terms the annual average budget of the IFI is not huge when compared to government department budgets, but what has been significant is that ‘it has all been project orientated. There’s not many government departments actually that have £30 million to spend on projects to be undertaken. So it’s big in those terms. [Thus] it played its part at a time when it was needed and crucial.’99 The Fund’s significant contributions to the conflict transformation process have been numerous, both quantitatively and qualitatively: obviously it has created a lot of jobs over the years … not all of them are long-term jobs but they were still experience for people who would not otherwise have had that opportunity. Thousands of young people have done our Wider Horizons programme and a lot of them have reported significant attitude changes, but also again, significant employment opportunities that would not otherwise have been possible. The Fund undoubtedly, and I think we can be proud of it, has contributed to the built environment, North and South, in a very positive way … But most importantly really is we have given confidence to communities whose morale was absolutely destroyed and … if it’s the confidence to build a community centre and a few local shops in an area which would have previously reported one of the highest crime and drug rates in the North … that is a very, very significant achievement.100

This confidence-building aspect was particularly significant when government was afraid to come into local communities or provide funding. The IFI, in doing so, ‘made us less dependent on central government. It has given us the freedom to respond to what we need rather than what government thinks we need. There is stuff kids would never have had, we wouldn’t have got it off central government, without a shadow of a doubt.’101 As evidenced at the beginning of this assessment, the IFI was quite far removed from the necessary characteristics of a transformation tool in its early days. However, by embracing the long-term aspect of its work it has become a tool that now exemplifies the transformation of conflict through social and economic development, particularly at a grassroots level. Perhaps the most significant impact of all has been the fact that it has been active at both the mid-conflict and post-conflict stages, acutely aware all the time of the amount of work to be done and not being static in its work commitments or complacent in its success to date.

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Peace I and Peace II – general observations The Peace programmes were never intended as exclusive peacebuilding instruments but were designed to complement the mainstream (political) peacebuilding effort. Nevertheless, the advent of a specifically designed transformation tool provided those at all levels of society in the region, but particularly those at the grassroots, with an opportunity for the first time for meaningful involvement in the transformation of their society on an unprecedented level. Peace I alone received more than 31,000 applications and funded 48 per cent of them,102 with over 800,000 people estimated to have benefited from the programme;103 Peace II received over 10,155 applications, funding 5,708, and the Peace II Extension received 3,348 applications, funding 1,396. Peace III had received 574 applications and funded 209 by May 2012.104 One of the main differences between the programmes is that Peace I had a more social inclusion focus, whereas Peace II had more of an economic focus. Despite emerging as the region’s first specifically designed transformation tools, the programmes were not without their problems. However, in comparison to the other tools, they contained a number of innovative features, including, inter alia, widespread grassroots consultation, a central role for social inclusion and administration of the funding through decentralised and local delivery mechanisms, all of which were central to its success. Moreover, in stark contrast to the other two, the Peace programmes have created a wealth of commentary, opening up the debate on peacebuilding for the first time to a much wider audience on both sides of the border. Strengths Consultation As indicated earlier, and again in stark contrast to the other two tools, extensive consultations took place during the design of the Peace programmes, particularly with grassroots community and voluntary organisations, enabling them to strongly influence the final shape of the first programme in favour of social inclusion. Thus, it was recommended that ‘ongoing consultation at a “grass roots” level should form an important element of the Programmes as it progresses’,105 ensuring an extensive consultation process in preparation for the Peace II Extension and Peace III. Harvey notes however, that some of Northern Ireland’s Westminster MPs and the opposition deputies from the Border Counties were quite critical of the first programme, perhaps feeling sidelined by the consultation process. What was most striking about their criticisms was that both

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sets of elected representatives were of the opinion that, while social inclusion was laudable, it ‘should not overshadow the more fundamental aims of job creation and industrial infrastructure as it would not leave a lasting legacy’.106 This opinion, particularly in Northern Ireland, combined with the influence of the newly established Assembly, ensured that Peace II had a much stronger economic focus, but reflected a clear lack of understanding of the intricacies of conflict transformation by those top-level actors charged with managing and implementing the Peace programmes. Social inclusion One of the undisputable success stories of Peace I was its facilitation of the considerable expansion of social inclusion activities, particularly among the grassroots, which otherwise would not have been as extensive. Despite the existence of low community capacity and a weak infrastructural support base107 there was huge demand for funding. Of the 15,000 applications funded from the 31,000 received, over 60 per cent were in designated disadvantaged areas while over 5,000 had a social inclusion remit reaching over 800,000 participants,108 or almost 38 per cent of the Northern Ireland and Border Counties population. Additionally the provision of small seeding grants (£3,000 or less) by Peace I was quite prominent, accounting for almost a third of all grants awarded in Northern Ireland and over a quarter of grants awarded in the Border Counties. While this represented only 2 per cent of the overall programme expenditure (approximately 18,000 grants), it played an important role in facilitating a wide variety of marginalised groups such as the long-term unemployed, women, young people/children, people with disabilities, ex-prisoners and victims of the Troubles to access such funding for the first time. Indeed, 46 per cent of overall programme expenditure went to projects targeting these groups,109 covering activities such as education, community development and childcare, thus facilitating the empowerment and capacity-building of a huge number of less-developed groups and enabling small-scale cross-community (two-thirds of all projects) and cross-border work (over 50,000 participants engaged in cross-border activities for the first time). Additionally, the community and voluntary sector in particular received a very strong employment boost with over 6,000 posts funded by the programme.110 The decision not to promote flagship projects received very little criticism. Those who criticised the use of small grants argued that they ‘do not achieve economies of scale, lead to wasteful administrative duplication and do not make a long-term impact’.111 However, it is questionable whether a few large projects are necessarily better than many small ones in light of the need to develop and integrate vertical and

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horizontal grassroots capacity to facilitate transformation. Rather, they had a greater impact as they ‘allowed people to establish themselves’,112 enabling the necessary building of previously non-existent capacity within many communities. Those central to the programme’s management and implementation noted that ‘there was some very useful small grant work done’,113 recommending this particular operational set-up for similar programmes in other post-conflict regions, as it is recognised that real change requires a bottom-up approach which small seeding grants encourage.114 Unfortunately this innovation was effectively done away with under the Peace II programme, which funded a much smaller number of larger projects.115 Nevertheless, the main IFB in the Border Counties called for the facilitation of small grants across all measures in its submission to the Peace II Extension consultations,116 a request which was granted in theory. These social inclusion activities facilitated local ownership of the conflict transformation process. The level of applications and involvement along with the high rate of targeted activities demonstrated an extraordinary level of citizen empowerment. The CPA, prior to becoming one of the joint IFBs in the Border Counties, asserted as far back as 1994 in its submission to the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation that poverty and social exclusion are important contributory factors which exacerbate and perpetuate violence, and that ‘a purely political and constitutional solution will not be sufficient. As long as widespread poverty and social exclusion persist, they will undermine the building of a stable, pluralistic society that will have the confidence to accommodate political and cultural differences.’117 This reflected consultation responses received by the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust (NIVT), the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) and the Rural Community Network in Northern Ireland in October 1994 in ascertaining post-ceasefire conflict transformation priorities. Chief among these were enhancing the contribution of community groups and development to community regeneration; promotion of capacity-building; training; education and employment for the long-term unemployed; supporting social justice work and community forums in facilitating participatory democracy; and constructive consideration of social, cultural, political and economic issues.118 Indeed the CPA was quite critical of traditional models of development, stating that: the agency is concerned that an over-concentration on infrastructural projects and on conventional investment priorities, for example by the International Fund for Ireland, has resulted in the most needy communities being largely by-passed and excluded. It is increasingly clear across Europe that this elite model of development, which depends on the ­benefits

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of economic growth trickling down to the most needy individuals and communities, does not work. In fact, it often reinforces social exclusion.119

A decade later it reiterated the need to further consider addressing social exclusion issues, as ‘there is a complex inter-relationship between poverty and conflict and this needs to be better understood and reflected in a greater focus on addressing poverty and inequality in peace-building … tackling poverty and social exclusion needs to be a core element of any agreement and be given a high-priority focus.’120 As noted earlier, the Community Relations Council (CRC) believed the link between poverty and violence was clearly demonstrated by the border: ‘the causality flows in two directions. Not only does poverty promote violence, but violence embeds poverty’,121 a view supported by others straddling Lederach’s bottom and middle levels: it’s the poor people that suffer … the really dangerous area is where the segregation between the communities meets poverty and marginalisation in the poor areas of Belfast and Derry and to a certain extent along the border, you have a meeting of disfranchised, disempowered people. That’s a significant element and so to that extent the way to overcome conflict must be to concentrate your resources in overcoming conflict in those areas.122

However, while the CRC cautiously recognised that transforming the Northern Ireland conflict ‘requires a variety of processes and approaches which are designed to facilitate social inclusion, regeneration and economic renewal’,123 it also warned ‘that economic development and new employment would not of themselves create peace. A segregated, rather than cross-community approach to economic development would create the suspicion that “the other side” benefited more from the programme and would, as a result, create more division.’124 Unfortunately, however, as we shall see later, the Peace programmes, like the IFI, did not manage to escape the Protestant/Unionist demon of suspicion. Without a doubt social inclusion was the clear winner in budgetary terms in Peace I, reflecting views expressed in the extensive consultation process: while receiving the highest funding allocation of 30 per cent of the overall budget, it eventually provided just under 35 per cent of the total value of all projects approved.125 The mid-term review concluded that ‘social inclusion has made the strongest contribution to date in respect of peace and reconciliation impacts and social inclusion impacts [and] has been to the fore in fostering the bottom-up approach’.126 Critically, however, Harvey believes that Peace I ‘provided significant economic and social regional investment … but raised serious doubts about its effectiveness as an instrument for peace building and in confronting core issues arising from the conflict, as well as about the

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systems of accountability’.127 Moreover, ‘in effect, a significant part of the programme was a plan for reinvestment … but without a vision as to how this might contribute to peace and reconciliation’.128 Part of the problem lay in the fact that although the programme was certainly consultative of many levels of society as to its make-up and composition, ‘it is questionable as to whether it was reflective and explored sufficiently how this type of package could best incorporate concepts of innovative peace-building’.129 It was certainly true to say that the relationship between social inclusion and reconciliation was not well understood at all; while it was believed that ‘reconciliation would not take place without social inclusion … it was also recognized that social inclusion of itself will not deliver reconciliation’.130 Unsurprisingly, this morass was inherited by the Peace II programme, despite its stronger theoretical peacebuilding framework, which placed a greater emphasis on peacebuilding distinctiveness and reconciliation. It appears that simply not enough time was spent on teasing out the finer details of the programme, certainly not on making a connection between the promotion of peace and reconciliation and social inclusion, economic investment and cross-border activity (much of which, it has been argued, was a barely disguised extension of existing s­ tructural funds programmes).131 Sustained programme discussions would always run the risk of being labelled talking shops, but this particular programme was rushed through in record time (less than three months compared to the usual eighteen).132 It could also be suggested that this was just another programme with measures similar to those of the IFI or INTERREG (around thirty-five). However, the initial optimism and goodwill created by the ceasefires may well have evaporated if any more time had been spent in discussion, as ‘actually getting the Programme agreed was an achievement in itself which can’t be overlooked, so getting an agreed vision within that might have been just a step too far’.133 One can only speculate that ‘the design of a programme based on the presupposition of stability may have been different to a design which might have emerged to support exploratory and developmental approaches to peace’.134 Nevertheless, the Peace I ex-post evaluation concluded that ‘the stronger linkages with peace and reconciliation came through the social inclusion strand than through the economic growth/regeneration strand’,135 a conclusion shared by funders and funded alike; ‘person to person contact was a greater driver for reconciliation than some of the economic projects’.136 Decentralised and local delivery mechanisms In terms of delivery structures, the role played by the decentralised IFBs North and South and local delivery mechanisms in administering

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the funding and devising plans for strategic development and funding expenditure was unique in funding implementation terms and hugely successful, as their work on the ground facilitated a truly bottom-up approach despite complex bureaucratic requirements. In discussing the IFBs, the Peace I ex-post evaluation noted that ‘the decentralised mechanisms proved as effective as Government Departments when measured by rates of expenditure achieved over the life of the Programme … the Peace I Programme could not have been delivered without the additional capacity represented by the [IFBs]’.137 Certainly the programme presented many of the IFBs with a considerable organisational challenge, but within a relatively short space of time they put in place systems of promotion, advertisement, assessment, appraisal, allocation and payment. Project promoters were largely satisfied with their modus operandi. Although more costly when ‘considered solely on the criterion of unit delivery costs … that is, the cost per £ of funds available to projects is higher for the decentralised mechanisms’,138 the European Court of Auditors recognised ‘this innovative “bottom-up” approach was deemed politically necessary for the overall success of the programme despite the risk of management difficulties and delays in implementation’.139 It noted how, ‘in spite of the considerable difficulties encountered, the P&R gained acceptance by both communities through the work of community-based funding bodies, thus contributing to the overall objective of improving social and economic conditions through the direct involvement of local communities’.140 However, it was also quite critical of the number of IFBs, of their widely differing administrative practices and of their appraisal procedures (or the lack of them). Nevertheless, satisfaction with them continued under Peace II, thus acknowledging that their strengths in conflict transformation terms far outweighed their weaknesses, which were largely measured in administrative terms.141 Local delivery mechanisms, in devising plans for the strategic development of their areas and expenditure of Peace I funding, were particularly successful due to their innovative membership structure (which was previously unheard of), their terms of reference (which were implemented regardless of the disruptions at the top level) and their effectiveness in terms of expenditure rates equal to government departments given the risk involved in utilising previously unknown delivery mechanisms. In Northern Ireland the District Partnerships consisted of one-third elected council members, one-third community/voluntary sector representatives and one-third trade union and business representatives. As such ‘the work of the partnerships has been almost universally praised, not only for drawing in a much wider range of people into the programme but for the processes whereby local areas agree focused plans following

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a structured, inclusive, democratic process’.142 Moreover, despite the breakdown of the IRA ceasefire in February 1996 and the tensions at Drumcree that summer, they managed to go some way towards meeting the democratic deficit as they continued with their work, maintaining the involvement of all political parties, including those that did not attend the constitutional talks.143 In providing genuinely bottom-up involvement in the programme delivery they did ‘much to underpin the peace process by providing close co-operation between civil society organisations and political leaders at the local level’.144 Peace II saw a markedly different composition of the partnerships in Northern Ireland, which became known as Local Strategy P ­ artnerships (LSPs). The number of seats increased but the number of places given to the grassroots voluntary and community sector was reduced. The Northern Ireland Executive set up a Regional Partnership Board to govern the LSPs in place of the Northern Ireland Partnership Board, which, it has been suggested, was perhaps ‘seen as too independent and developmental in its approach. The District Partnerships may have been perceived as more beholden to the board than to their own parent district council.’145 The Border Regional Authority was charged with influencing the work of the county council-led task forces (CCLTFs) in the Border Counties. However, by 2005, while both had been operational for two years, neither had made any significant impact on the work of the LSPs and CCLTFs.146 The partnership model ‘has now become an established form of governance and service delivery in both Northern Ireland and Ireland’.147 Weaknesses Complexity and excessive bureaucracy As stated earlier, this tool was not without its problems. One of the major weaknesses of the first programme was its inability to provide clear and basic programme and monitoring information. Clearly, financial accountability and transparency were essential. However, auditing and gathering monitoring information became one of the main thorns in the sides of project promoters. It increased (and changed) as the programme progressed, often frustratingly required (by the EU and their managing agents) on a retrospective basis, not only for project promoters mid-project, but also for IFBs, some years after projects had been completed. Worse, these audits were required whether the grant was £5,000 or £50,000. The onerous and time-consuming nature of the monitoring and reporting requirements, which worsened considerably under Peace II (and III), came to dominate and acted as a deterrent to many prospective applicants. They were so excessive that they ran the risk of undermining the programmatic aims and became a source of disempowerment

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for many. The Peace II mid-term evaluation concluded that ‘aspects of the Programme to date appear to have diluted its overall impacts. In particular … the potential for adding value has become clouded by the complexity and perceived bureaucracy with the Programme.’148 Many grassroots actors came to the conclusion that unless a huge amount of funding was sought, it was quite simply not worth applying due to the arduous reporting requirements. Evidence from NICVA suggested that ‘many community-based peace-building projects did not apply … because of the [administrative] difficulties involved … The level of concern about these issues in the voluntary and community sector should not be underestimated. In its poll in late 2003, NICVA found an overwhelming conviction that the administrative arrangements for Peace II were unnecessarily complicated (91.9% took this view).’149 As one grassroots project promoter noted ‘they are a nightmare, absolute and total nightmare, the bureaucracy that’s involved in them, a ludicrous situation. Peace II has lost the plot in bureaucracy.’150 Some of the Peace I programme measures were described by the prior appraisal as complex and untidy: they were not well understood and there was a multiplicity of delivery bodies for both programmes with different application periods, criteria and points of access along with different focus points for either side of the border. The wide range of decentralised and locally based delivery mechanisms, on top of numerous government departments, in comparison to the much simpler set-up in the Border Counties, seemed totally unnecessary. Peace II saw no improvement, amounting to an ‘appalling complexity’.151 This excessive bureaucracy also presented itself in the application process. The application forms were excessively long (between forty and one hundred pages), complex and repetitive. There was also an absurd requirement to complete part of the application online, which was quite simply unrealistic for those without the resources and skills to do so (a huge issue with many grassroots actors); those who had the resources encountered many difficulties with accessing the website and system crashes. The frustration and sense of disempowerment felt by many was effectively articulated by the House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee which concluded that: the creation and dissemination of these forms was a shambles. As far as we have been able to ascertain, no one person or department took responsibility for the overall requirements being put upon the bodies seeking grants: but many organisations seem to have had a hand in adding to and complicating the application forms. Although European requirements must be met, they must be met in a way which is not ultimately wasteful of the Programme’s and community’s resources.152

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The available information was of a poor quality and there was a lack of support for applicant groups; ‘although some IFBs and LSPs appear to have done a very good job in supporting groups, the picture of support is very patchy’.153 The lack of capacity in the voluntary and community sector and the need for adequate and properly trained support was simply not adhered to under Peace II: IFBs were forced to admit that ‘for many communities and sectors in the early stages of development the challenge of accessing Peace II funding was too great. In particular, the onerous application and project selection criteria often prevented the involvement of low capacity groups and sectors most in need of support.’154 Moreover, ‘a high proportion of technical assistance went into auditors and finance people so you had no money left to work with groups and developmental work’:155 the percentage costs devoted to administration, auditing, accounting and reporting rose from 1.6 per cent for Peace I to between 9 and 10 per cent for Peace II.156 As there was less funding available under Peace II than under Peace I, the argument was that this money would have been better spent on projects and support. However, top-level actors have rejected these claims, pointing out that under Peace I administration costs were buried within the Measures; under Peace II projects themselves began to look for increased administrative assistance, which, while simply reflecting the increased level of bureaucracy that came with Peace II, meant that the real (worst case) scenario was that the IFBs were costing around 12 per cent in administration costs and the LSPs around 15 per cent. Thus, ‘given the rules and regulations, it probably is justified but I’m not sure the rules and regulations are justified’.157 Nevertheless, one sceptical IFB claimed that ‘there are some features of the regulatory system which could be much more cost effective. It would be interesting to obtain a financial breakdown of just how much Programme money was spent in meeting audit and external economic appraisal requirements – and to what overall purpose.’158 Paradoxically, despite being partly responsible for this bureaucracy, this IFB concluded mid-way through Peace II that: there are important questions to be asked about how the nuts and bolts of the implementation process may sabotage the overall concept and objective of the Peace II Programme. This has often posed a quandary for Intermediary Funding Bodies who are faced with the potentially contradictory demands of being bold and imaginative in their funding policies, while being cautious and overly regulatory in their administrative procedures. One of the clear differences between the Peace I Programme and Peace II is that funding bodies … are being left with little independence in deciding on the administrative procedures to be adopted.159

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It quite simply appeared that little effort was made to learn from the experiences of IFBs, resulting in a centralised and controlled approach to form and process design. Limited learning This last point was illustrative of the missed learning opportunities within the Peace programmes. Despite the excessive requirements for documentation from project promoters, there was a clear lack of documentation of the good practice of Peace I by some IFBs. Certainly some maintained very detailed records of their activities and achievements, but this does not appear to have been the case for government-led measures or the District Partnerships. Indeed, the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland (CFNI) felt strongly ‘that more could have been done to record and learn the policy lessons of the work funded under the Special Support Programme – an evaluative learning that must go beyond the dictates of monitoring’.160 As many staff moved on from Peace I there was a ‘loss of institutional memory between the two programmes. There does not seem to have been a system whereby the lessons arising from Peace I were assembled, collated, synthesized and fed into the design of the new programme.’161 Good practice was therefore not passed on about the Partnership Board, the consultative forum or the value of small seeding grants operating in the social inclusion measures, for example. Real learning comes from recognising and acknowledging practice successes and failures. Moreover, the final evaluation of Peace I was only published in November 2003 – three years after Peace II officially commenced, ‘leaving little opportunity for productive and connective learning between the two Programmes’,162 which ideally should have been the starting point for the Peace II programme. It appeared to some that there was never any intention that the learning, insights or consultations of Peace I should be taken on board, or consideration given to how this could be transferred to communities and policy makers.163 This situation was not remedied under Peace II as the programme moved on to its third phase, Peace III. Sustainability Sustainability is a further issue which dogged the Peace programmes from the beginning: provision was not made for sustaining the transformation efforts in the region. Efforts by the CFNI to raise the issue of appropriate exit strategies for Peace I proved fruitless. It attempted to reference this in the first draft of its Memorandum of Understanding relating to the termination of Peace I, stating that it:

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understands that both the European Commission and the relevant Government Departments will address the need for appropriate exit strategies … In addition to this the Trust understands that such policy conclusions and issues that emerge from the work funded by the Programme will receive active consideration by the European Commission, and both Irish and British Government Departments, as appropriate.164

However, this paragraph disappeared from the Memorandum’s second draft, leaving it to conclude that sustainability was to be left to individual projects and IFBs. Moreover, the CFNI found that the biggest demand from groups who had availed themselves of Peace I funding ‘was for an extension of their current work on the basis that the initial funding time period was unrealistic to address issues of social exclusion and peacebuilding in any realistic manner’.165 Their experience starkly highlighted the reality for many project promoters who viewed sustainability as ‘an unrealistic objective for social inclusion projects’.166 The sustainability issue highlights the lack of an overarching government conflict transformation policy (whether the government is in Belfast, Dublin or London), an issue further discussed in the next chapter. Economic development Peace II saw economic development emerge as the clear winner in budgetary terms, with the proportional contribution to economic activities increasing from 17 per cent (under Peace I) to 31 per cent. However, ‘voluntary and community organisations, social inclusion and civil society lost. Although the changes were not enormous, there were significant shifts. Funding for social inclusion was down from 30% to 25% and the local strategy partnerships had a narrower remit than their precursors.’167 Some argued that, in effect, ‘the community development approach appears to have been airbrushed out completely’,168 as the political and administrative establishment felt that Peace I had been captured by the community and voluntary sector. There was pressure to push back the gains of this sector, which were resented by some elected representatives, when the second programme was being designed, as Harvey’s research reveals: there was strong pressure from the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and from the Confederation of British Industry for a more economic focus. Informal comments were made that Peace I had supported ‘dodgy social projects’ and that Peace II should go for substantial, sustainable, long-lasting economic projects that would take advantage of the improved political and economic environment. One leading UUP representative reportedly told the monitoring committee that the new programme must be ‘economically driven’, with no more ‘waste’ of money on voluntary and community sector projects.169

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It was found that ‘the private business sector has become largely disengaged from the programme … reflected in attendance at the Monitoring Committee meetings and at some Local Strategy Partnership meetings’.170 In turn, this was reflected in the programme’s outcomes where ‘the economic growth impacts of the Programme were perhaps less than anticipated’,171 and this continued to be the case two years later when it was found that ‘there is a degree of uncertainty over what economic measures and projects have contributed to peace and reconciliation … there appears to have been limited discussion in the private business sector of their role in contributing to peace and reconciliation through economic activity’.172 While this non-engagement may have been partly explained by the suspension of the Assembly, a more likely explanation would be that the programme’s bureaucracy had a large part to play, the result of which was that ‘the business community has just cut themselves off’.173 Nevertheless, research has found that ‘in many instances, the social economy and entrepreneurship projects funded under Measure 1.1a would not be funded by another government department or agency or would satisfy the economic conditions set under more conventional pro­­­grammes’,174 establishing that in overall terms ‘economic initiatives can impact on Peace and Reconciliation on a number of different levels, directly [by facilitating processes of engagement] and indirectly [by increasing prosperity]’.175 The CRC also concluded that ‘there is no doubt … that any viable model of peace-building must take seriously the possibilities and opportunities created by trade and economic activity’.176 However, this sentiment comes with the warning that ‘the lurking danger behind an economic approach to peace-building is that partnership emerges around the distribution of money, but vanishes once the money itself disappears’.177 Nevertheless, it has been noted that ‘the input of the private sector will be particularly important as projects seek to achieve more sustainability and as the lessons from the Peace II Programme are taken forward and transferred into other peace building initiatives and EU funded initiatives’.178 Low uptake from the Protestant community Like the early days of the IFI, the early days of Peace I also suffered from a low uptake from the Protestant community. An evaluation of Peace I by Northern Ireland’s three MEPs highlighted their agreement that one of the many general problems was that ‘for historical and cultural reasons, the Protestant community has not had the sort of localised structures which would have enabled them to plug in, without delay, to the mechanisms of the various sub-programmes’.179 Research indicates that the Catholic proportion of Peace I funding was greater that the Protestant

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proportion partly because of ‘the disproportionate number of Catholics living in disadvantaged areas [and] … the greater propensity of people in predominantly Catholic areas to apply for funding’.180 The situation did not seem to improve under Peace II, at least in the eyes of some Unionist parties. The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), for example, claimed that ‘community groups who are perceived to be aligned to our party … experience difficulty in securing funding for projects from statutory bodies and many Local Strategy Partnerships’.181 The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) MEP Jim Allister accused Peace II of ‘rewarding those who were the perpetrators of heinous acts of violence [which] merely serves to undermine the confidence of mainstream society in the entire Peace II Programme. The ongoing and institutionalised discrimination in funding against the Unionist community must end immediately.’182 However, independent analysis of the Peace II funding uptake and distribution has concluded the opposite, finding that it ‘achieved greater recognition from within the Protestant community, when compared with Peace I, and that Programme funding is more evenly distributed in this respect’.183 A further independent analysis of Measure 2.7, ‘Developing Weak Community Infrastructure’, delivered in Northern Ireland by the CFNI also found that on the basis of analysis by applicant postcodes, ‘51% of approvals are from applicants located in Protestant areas … 49% of approvals, by value, are from applicants located in Protestant areas … 54% of small grant approvals, by value, are from applicants located in Protestant areas’.184 Nevertheless, the DUP’s Foyle MLA, Willie Hay, continued to challenge the evidence, believing that there was no doubt Protestant areas in Northern Ireland were losing out.185 Although such accusations cannot be ignored, in terms of Peace I ‘the distribution of approved funding appears to be more focused on the most disadvantaged areas. This suggests that the allocation mechanisms of … [Peace I] have successfully targeted funds on disadvantaged areas, an assessment which holds true for both Catholic and Protestant funding’.186 In terms of Peace II, the greater estimated uptake of funding by the Catholic community reflects both the higher levels of deprivation in Catholic areas and greater tendency of people living in these areas to apply for funding. Most importantly, there is no residual direct effect from the religious composition of an area to the amount of funding received, thus clearly showing that there is no bias in the distribution of funds.187

If one of the measures of success of a programme is the number of applications it receives, Peace I was wildly successful to the extent that it was oversubscribed by 208 per cent in the Border Counties and 351 per cent in Northern Ireland,188 with the total funding requested in

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Northern Ireland alone, £1,656 million, clearly in excess of the funds actually available. Despite criticism from certain parts of the Protestant community, the programme ‘achieved a very impressive geographical coverage throughout Northern Ireland’189 with nearly all areas benefiting from funded activities. In the case of funding allocated by the CFNI, for example, detailed analysis exhibited ‘a strong correlation between those areas most affected by the conflict of the Troubles (as measured by death rate) and the level of funding’.190 Peace I and Peace II – impacts To fully understand the impacts of the Peace programmes as a conflict transformation tool, they will now be assessed in more detail against each of the five criteria. It should be borne in mind, however, that there have been no coordinated attempts to gauge the impact of the entire programme across the various component elements (and this is unlikely to happen, if it happens at all, until well after the Peace II Extension or even Peace III has been completed); and that there are complexities associated with evaluating the economic aspects of the programmes due to difficulties in understanding the concepts of peace and reconciliation and the intangible nature of their impacts. An attempt has been made to address the root causes of the conflict thus bringing about substantial changes in the social and economic structures of society Harvey notes that what was remarkably clear after the first Peace programme was that ‘any successor programme had to operate in an environment in which the most basic issues of the troubles remained unresolved. Indeed, a striking feature of the foundation documents of both programmes is how little they discussed this core issue.’191 Thus Morrissey highlights how ‘it’s hard to see in programme documents of Peace II either a comprehensive understanding of the situation in which it was located or a strategic sense of its niche, i.e. where it could do most good’.192 Democratic Dialogue also noted its failure to address the causes of the conflict. It was of the firm belief that what was needed was ‘a sharply focused programme specifically addressing the causes and consequences of the prolonged conflict. This must leave a legacy of lasting peace at the grass roots and create the conditions for sustainable economic development, in particular in those areas and amongst those people most affected by the troubles.’193 Morrow argued insightfully that: While there is no doubt that a decision was made in Northern Ireland to move from open conflict to negotiation in 1994, the Agreement made in 1998 has not proven to be the decisive and definitive end to political

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mistrust that its supporters hoped … critical elements of the deal … were subject to uncertainty … The Peace II Programme has inevitably been challenged by this ambivalent and changing context. Instead of playing a supportive role within a wider and agreed political framework, Peace II became an inter-governmental and international means to invest in the future, sustaining the vision of a shared peaceful future through practical change even while the legacy of the past continued to create major political difficulties.194

These criticisms largely echo the commentary of those with direct experience of the programmes: while the programmes certainly attempted to address the root causes of the conflict, they really did not succeed ‘because there’s so many different views as to the causes of the conflict’.195 Moreover, ‘if there was no structured identification of what the root causes were, that probably would be very difficult to do. [Nevertheless,] a lot of the projects have been looking at very basic issues of need, equality issues, human rights issues but it’s not done in any kind of structured way.’196 A more nuanced insight notes, however, that ‘there was an attempt in the Peace I programme to take a risk … looking outside of the box with regard to the causes and that effectively is probably taken for granted now as run of the mill. [However,] it didn’t do it in a well thought out [way] underpinned by a very clear rationale.’197 While this failure is generally accepted, it is somewhat qualified by examining the context within which this particular tool found itself: you have to start sometimes where people are at and sometimes maybe it’s better to try and get people into the same room and get them doing things together or to get them thinking about why they’re in the room and what they’re doing and then only when people are comfortable with that are they then more ready to try and look at some of the causes, it’s a whole process.198

Not addressing the causes of the conflict is ‘probably not surprising, given the fact that the Good Friday Agreement talks didn’t address it either, perhaps because the politicians at that stage realised they would never get to agreement if they did start [discussing the causes of the conflict], perhaps the Peace programme reflected it’.199 However, for those on the frontline of the conflict, particularly in working-class Protestant areas, this has been disappointing: nobody wanted to attack the real problem … yes there was good work done through the Peace I money in the fact that it did build capacity within communities to try and address issues like poor housing, unemployment, perhaps on the fringes of poverty, but it never actually looked at the real causes of conflict … There was lip-service paid too; while there was a lot of money given out and there was a lot of good work done, the basic problem of conflict here has never been examined.200

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Certainly the Peace programmes, particularly Peace I, brought those at the grassroots ‘a sense of ownership of their area and brought people a sense of working together to try and look at a problem; [however,] the underlying problem is we still have poverty, we still have unemployment’.201 Nevertheless, the Peace programmes made a considerable contribution towards addressing the root causes of the conflict; ‘it has acted as a mechanism through which a process of change and engagement has been facilitated’.202 They have certainly enabled substantial changes to take place in terms of the involvement and empowerment of those at the grassroots by ‘making a substantial impact in promoting reconciliation, in terms of attitudes and local effects in creating conditions that allow social actors [to] work together in a way I don’t think would have been the practice here had the European Programmes not existed’.203 However, the same cannot be said in terms of changes in the social and economic structures of the region, particularly when one considers the significant numbers of the population on both sides of the border still living in poverty, with high rates of long-term unemployment and early school leaving. The programmes have brought about significant changes in these structures, but not substantial ones. Certainly there are visible infrastructural changes and increased levels of prosperity but substantial social and economic structural change is a government remit: ‘for any significant impact to be made on poverty what you want is stronger mainstream programmes supplemented by area based programmes such as Peace that work at a local level to make those realities real for people’.204 However, in practice, particularly in the Border Counties, this is somewhat problematic, as: there’s a tension that exists between the responsibility of governments to actually deliver and respond to that particular situation and what the contribution of the EU can be to actually address that. There’s been a huge amount of work done to build up communities with a view to addressing and dealing with the problems that exist but there isn’t actually parallel work being done with Departments and others in order to see and accept the fact; the reality is with support from the Peace Programme recognising that additional support is needed is OK, but that’s not really where the recognition needs to come from.205

In reality this has not happened; thus the work enabled by the Peace programmes has tended to be piecemeal: ‘the Peace programme is supporting something which the structure isn’t there for things to be mainstreamed, for more investment to be put in areas where issues have been identified. So you’re looking at the issues and causes and putting in structures which communities are saying they need but it’s a small

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programme, it’s a drop in the ocean in terms of what needs to be [done].’206 Quite simply political will is also required to ensure that substantial changes are brought about. However, in the Border Counties this has proved difficult; top-level meetings in late 2004 clearly illustrated this: what effectively is being said … is that it is difficult to address the [disadvan­­ taged] situation as outlined in [a Border County] at the moment with regard to economic and social development, for one reason and for one reason only: that if we seek to give support, substantial support to that here … in terms of the [Good Friday] Agreement and what’s taking place in the Agreement at the moment, it could be viewed that there’s back to back development taking place and it’s against the whole principle of what the whole thing is about … substantial social and economic development is being halted on the basis that there has to be an agreement and that we can’t be shown in the south to be giving support in [a Border County] if, in the [Good Friday] Agreement, there isn’t an equivalent amount of support going into [a Northern Ireland county]. I mean, that’s a huge shift, a huge shift.207

While a range of conclusions could be drawn from this, in the context of this discussion it is questionable why this was not examined and allowed for at a much earlier stage – first when the Good Friday Agreement was being put in place, and secondly when the Peace programmes themselves were being negotiated, particularly in light of Harvey’s viewpoint that Peace I was a reinvestment plan for the region but without a vision as to how this might contribute to peace and reconciliation. For some it was simply a case of conflict transformation not receiving much (if any) thought at all; a vision of sorts may have existed, ‘what they didn’t envisage was (a) how complicated the peace process was going to be and (b) how long-term it was going to be’.208 For others an understanding of transformation simply did not exist: ‘it may have been too early to really engage in full blown peacebuilding because it was just post-ceasefire, it was needing to bring up the capacity of the area which had been neglected for many, many years and was very low for many years’.209 Moreover, ‘if people are still battling with poverty and still battling with everyday issues in life, peacebuilding can seem far away’.210 A broad brush approach was taken in terms of economic development. Thus ‘it’s quite possible some of the measures undertaken with an economic focus might have been detrimental to building peace. So that link with things having to be peace-proofed wasn’t there.’211 Nevertheless, in contributing towards addressing the causes of the conflict, the Peace programmes unfortunately were used as substitutes for government action, particularly in terms of the community and voluntary sector but also within the statutory sector. Viewpoints vary, however, on the extent of this substitution. Some certainly feel that the

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tool became ‘a back filler for programmes government wouldn’t fund or didn’t want to fund, in a sense government took advantage of the European money. A lot of stuff that they should have done has simply gone through European money.’212 This was certainly the case on the economic development side: what it did was top up a lot of programmes that government was probably involved in anyway, in terms of encouraging small business, new start-ups and stuff like that, training initiatives. And in some cases sometimes Peace I actually did top them up probably unnecessarily; the Invest Northern Ireland as it is now, but the IDB at the time, getting advance factories in Strabane and places like that arguably, I mean, that should have been mainstreamed.213

While some believe Peace allowed for additional government action rather than substitution, ‘it can still be used as an excuse not to direct more mainstream funding into those areas’,214 particularly when ‘there is very little at government level that changes in terms of what they support and what they don’t support’.215 Certainly some IFBs were ‘aware of things we would have funded, that if the Peace funding hadn’t existed the government could have been funding it’,216 which presented them with a dilemma as to whether they should fund what was somebody else’s responsibility, and having done so find that ‘there definitely [were] times that government funding was withdrawn and Peace funding did substitute for what government should be doing’.217 What was most noticeable about Peace II was that most of the cross-border work it facilitated, a crucial support factor in transforming the context within which the conflict operated, was driven by the private and voluntary sectors, with government visibly absent; ‘where it’s a cross-border issue, it’s left to INTERREG or to the Peace programme to kind of tackle them’.218 The experience of the CFNI was also that in terms of Peace II there was an issue over ‘the lack of core funding from the statutory sector for some of those areas of work in the voluntary sector which had previously been carried out under Peace I. Community development and work with women were two such areas identified as relying on EU funding – often because there was no other option.’219 Indeed, the social economy, certainly in Northern Ireland, was, during this period, almost wholly funded by the Peace programmes. However, regardless of whether the programmes have become a substitute for government action, the real test will come once the programme ends: ‘the thing that’s failing is a level of interaction with government around what is actually taking place and the change in perspective that might be needed in order to continue to support it, because there is a view that once this is over, the Peace [programme], that’s that sorted’.220 While the Peace programmes have shown that they are effective in changing attitudes,221

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the real impact of the programme can only be realised when those changes in attitudes ripple out from projects into wider society. Not only does that take time, it also depends on civic and political leadership and a conducive wider environment. Often these other ingredients are missing, and therefore the full potential of the Programme to impact on reconciliation goes unrealised.222

Most commentators accept there is no general agreement on the causes of the conflict and without this agreement it is very difficult to provide a panacea. The programmes could never have completely addressed or solved the root causes on their own: ‘it couldn’t achieve any more or any less because … if you were to really find what caused this conflict, you were committed to changing major structures in society. So within the structures it existed under, it probably achieved all that it set out to achieve … [to expect] … any one programme [to] address inherent disadvantage and inequality in our society is expecting far too much.’223 This is particularly the case when some do not actually think ‘anybody’s ever really discovered why the Troubles happened, why they became so vicious’.224 Thus: while it is important to acknowledge that the Peace II Programme cannot seek to build peace and reconciliation on its own in isolation from other initiatives (at political and policy level) … there is a clear need to promote economic and social development in Northern Ireland and the border counties to address issues of social segregation, isolation and lack of integration. This is particularly important as trends are showing a shift in emphasis of the conflict towards broader sectarian violence.225

Vertical and horizontal capacity has been developed and integrated through the involvement of all levels of society in the transformation process thus enabling the empowerment of the society’s citizens In assessing the impact of the Peace programmes on the development and integration of vertical and horizontal capacity, as with the IFI, there are two issues to be examined – the extent of involvement of the various levels of society in the transformation process, on both a vertical and a horizontal basis, and the extent to which the programmes have empowered those at the grassroots. In terms of the first issue, at an overall micro level it is clear that the Peace programmes, particularly Peace I, went further than the other two tools with their ‘agenda and themes … built in an unusually consultative manner’.226 They were instrumental in targeting the local and taking account of local variations, showing that ‘the European Union was making a wider commitment to engaging all of the key social and political partners in peacebuilding and a broader commitment to building new partnership-based models of stakeholding and

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­ articipation’.227 Indeed, in analysing the success of the first programme p at the top (political) level, Northern Ireland’s three MEPs were of the generous opinion that ‘its contribution to the political process can be measured, above all, by the fact that all elected representatives across the entire spectrum of the political parties support it; are participating in it; and unanimously and unequivocally wish to see it continue’.228 At its most basic, projects funded under Peace I were widely dispersed geographically with ‘an estimated 96% of 566 Census wards in Northern Ireland, containing 97% of the population, [receiving] one or more Peace Programme approval’.229 Similar information is not available for the Border Counties but ADM/CPA data indicates that the funding was fairly evenly distributed across each of the six counties. Moreover more than 20 per cent of projects involved marginalised groups and local ­communities in the development and management of projects, a central component of transformation practice.230 The CFNI estimated, for example, that ‘over 10,000 people across Northern Ireland were involved in the Management Committees of the projects that were in direct receipt of funding under the Peace I Measures administered by the Foundation as only one of a number of Intermediary Funding Bodies’.231 One of the most tangible forms of dispersal and involvement was that of the District Partnerships and the IFBs, which allowed for the involvement of representatives from all three levels of Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid, many of whom had never formerly been part of local decision-making processes, an involvement which is so essential in supporting and reinforcing conflict transformation at the political level. Such innovativeness ensured that the partnership model and approach is now embedded in the transformation process and is centrally accepted in Northern Ireland in particular, thus guaranteeing that ‘participative democracy is now recognised as having an inherent value, which complements that of representative democracy’.232 In terms of discrimination against the Protestant community, the research discussed previously has shown this not to have been the case, despite this being challenged by some, most notably the DUP.233 Nevertheless, in avoiding complacency, the SEUPB’s awareness of this perception ensured particular emphasis on those who had not previously applied, including those within Protestant working-class areas.234 While the District Partnerships continued as LSPs under Peace II, the geographical coverage achieved was not as widespread as under Peace I, partly due to the noticeable absence of the European Commission from the second programme, the more centralised management structures of the SEUPB and the influence of the newly established Assembly, eager to push its economic agenda: ‘the Europeans, not the British and Irish,

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really wanted the money to be spread out … and that led to widespread involvement and widespread consultation; since then they’ve pulled back on that, the governments have more had their way. Peace II was given to fewer and larger groups, so that very wide involvement of civil society, that’s gone now.’235 By way of ensuring programme transparency and accountability and in also going some way towards safeguarding the involvement of all levels of society, a consultative forum was set up under Peace I ‘with the right to be consulted by the Monitoring Committee about amendments to the programme, to draw the attention of the Monitoring Committee to any issues or concerns and to comment on the annual report’.236 The European Court of Auditors believed it ‘ensured representation from a wide range of partners’,237 while both the mid-term and final reviews noted that the forum was an innovative feature. However, this was not continued under Peace II, without any explanation in either the operational programme or the programme complement. Although the SEUPB was unable to comment on this as ‘we weren’t party to that decision. That was before we were established. I think the view was that the Monitoring Committee was strong and that was the job of the Monitoring Committee’,238 comments from others on this matter suggest that those at the top level were not in favour of it; it was done away with ‘simply because the political will wasn’t there, they never wanted it in the first place and the first opportunity they got they done away with it’.239 Perhaps a more accurate reason was that: it was a threat to the Special EU Programmes Body and they didn’t want to have to listen to them, government departments wouldn’t have wanted the consultative forum [either]. They’re too much of a thorn in their side, they really performed the role they were meant to perform in relation to checking out what was happening and feeding that back in; the consultative forum were outspoken, honest, open and they were shafted, no doubt about that.240

Transformationally this represented a serious step backwards. Nevertheless, the Peace II mid-term evaluation asserted that ‘the partnership approach to working has become embedded in Peace II’.241 The use of IFBs and District Partnerships/LSPs as delivery mechanisms for the programmes ensured the provision of locally based decision-making which brought about and reinforced the bottom-up approach through the close involvement of the local community. Despite this micro-level progress, on a macro level the development and integration of vertical and horizontal capacity by involving all levels of society is not quite as clear cut. Certainly the programmes have enabled the development and integration of horizontal capacity at

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both the grassroots level, through the various projects and community/ voluntary participation in the programme, and the middle level, with ‘good links between decision making bodies and some of the semi-states and some of the civil service and there’s been a lot of understanding and offers of ways of working and even structures’.242 The programmes also enabled the development and integration of vertical capacity between these two levels through ‘a lot of understanding and interlinking between the middle tier and the bottom tier’.243 Yet the capacity development and integration of the top level, on both a horizontal and vertical basis, has been questionable, as the consultative forum has demonstrated. Vertically ‘to some extent they devise the programmes and they sign off on the programmes but to what extent they’re actually involved in receiving of the programmes, if you want to put it like that, is limited’;244 while horizontally ‘there’s much less involvement on what you’d call the upper echelons of government’.245 This situation is clear to those at the coalface of programme delivery and management in the Border Counties: the vertical is certainly happening at the bottom level and perhaps now more so than ever. But I don’t think that the county structures that have been set up [CDBs] are necessarily facilitating that in the way that it could, that vertical kind of linking could take place between all the projects and yet it’s not: who facilitates that? People are ready for it, the [middle] level, I’m not sure it has been developed at the same pace as the bottom level. At the top level I don’t think there is a focus really on what we’re about here, the focus is more on the [Good Friday] deal. Now in terms of it being vertical, if you take it in terms of the Border Counties, it’s a difficult one to apply, but the CDB is meant to be the structure that has them all together; if that’s not really working then there’s an issue.246

In developing and integrating grassroots vertical and horizontal capacity, the programmes have made genuine attempts to reach the most disadvantaged, but this has been difficult. While Peace I certainly ensured that ‘the opportunity was there to be involved, in some communities there was more capacity to do that’,247 and this issue has proved to be one of the biggest challenges facing the programmes. IFBs found that: There still is an issue about whether the most disadvantaged can a­ ctually manage the project funding or indeed the audit requirements and project requirements that the Peace programme demanded. Particularly in communities that were internally divided among themselves or groups where there might have been literacy problems or whatever, as a funder sometimes you were standing back saying, well should we encourage this group or not? Are you actually setting them up to fail? They might be better looking for funding elsewhere … and that was much truer of Peace II than Peace I.248

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This lack of capacity, while evident for years, particularly within the Protestant community, was certainly not helped by those at the top level; ‘Mr Paisley and his party very often tell you that Protestants didn’t get their fair share of the money. It wasn’t to do with getting a fair share of the money, there was no capacity to use it.’249 Thus the conclusion has been drawn that ‘there’s a whole different thinking in both communities. And a lot of that must be down to our politicians, to the Protestant politicians, they have to accept the fact that they’ve been preaching defeat for the last thirty-five years and everybody knows if you tell a child long enough it’s stupid, it’ll begin to believe it.’250 Despite the success of the District Partnerships, many grassroots actors believe that ‘politicians have contributed least to peacebuilding’.251 The SEUPB’s public consultation on the Peace II Extension in 2004 revealed a simmering anger among grassroots actors at central government, with many in Northern Ireland believing that one of the major weaknesses of the Peace II programme was the fact that government departments were allowed to administer 45 per cent of the funding which, it was argued, ‘shouldn’t be allowed to continue; central government getting money to build roads is wrong. It is essential that community-based peacebuilding is the core for going forward.’252 A glance through a sample of the consultation submissions supports this,253 with comments such as ‘funding should not be allocated to support government departments in the delivery of their existing statutory obligations’254 being typical of grassroots resentment against central government. This criticism was again voiced at other SEUPB public discussions on Peace III when one participant stated that ‘I don’t think government bodies should administer any Peace money [as they] hijack it for what they should be doing.’255 Unfortunately this issue has been ongoing since the early days of Peace I, and is one that the three MEPs were made aware of seven years earlier when they stated in their own evaluation that: government departments are not perceived as playing a leading role in implementing the programme … Suspicions were often expressed that projects undertaken by departments and funded by the Peace and Reconciliation Special Programme did not really fall within the aims and objectives of that programme and should more appropriately have been funded from the relevant department’s own budget.256

Why then, has this continued to be the case? From a Border Counties perspective it appears that ‘the politicians have played a distant role as it relates to the programme; that has worked well in the Border Counties because there actually hasn’t been any political involvement in the programme’.257 Moreover,

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in the North that’s supposed to be their day job, it’s supposed to be their life and what is more important to politics in the North only rebuilding peace? [However], their efforts seem to be about competition between parties and scoring points over each other and scoring points over parties that are of the same political persuasion and parties across the political divide.258

Without a doubt, the absence of the Assembly was very harmful in this regard. The clear message was one of more support for both decentralised and local delivery mechanisms than for central government departments which were essentially seen as ‘reinforcing the situation as was; because of their long history of neglect they should not reinforce a system that did not work well for us’.259 This implies an inherent danger in trying to transform a society that disengages from government; while balance is needed, many felt that the right balance did not exist, and that ‘leaving the burden of peace and reconciliation to those with the least resources allows large state institutions off the hook’.260 Nevertheless, the mid-term evaluation concluded that it was evident that Peace II had played a vital role in supporting transformation activities and strategies: In the absence of such a programme the responsibility of building peace and advancing reconciliation would be consigned primarily to the politicians and civil servants with no involvement of civil society, and potentially no interaction with the wider community. Peace II has made it possible for the community, the social partners and the general public to become actively engaged in the search for an agreed and peaceful community.261

When all of this is taken into consideration, the extent to which the programmes have empowered those at the grassroots is clear. However, while this applied most obviously to those who got involved with the programmes, in having ‘given a lot of people a capacity to do work which they would never have had before’,262 the programmes also allowed people ‘to look at the effects of the conflict and to take a step back … the Programme has forced communities and individuals to start looking at the effects and causes of the conflict in their immediate area or with their lives’.263 The downside has been that ‘once communities have been given the capacity to recognise, then how do they address it afterwards, what tools can we give the communities in order for them to be able to move onto the next step?’264 Nonetheless, this empowerment has provided capacity that previously did not exist to deal with a range of other community issues. The highly complex delivery structures of the Peace programmes made the task of maintaining consistency and quality across them quite a difficult one, leading to questions about whether they have been worth it when the benefits of partnership, social inclusion and a bottom-up approach

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to consultation and control are balanced against the process required to achieve this. Certainly, for those on the ground, including IFBs, the bureaucracy was a real disincentive: ‘seven eighths of the bureaucracy that’s there could have been cut out. You can’t justify the bureaucracy and duplication and rubbish that’s been going on [in] this programme, you can’t justify it by saying that. There have been a lot of good things, but that could all have been achieved in a lot simpler ways.’265 However, a range of outcomes have emerged from Peace II which can be identified as having impacted under this particular criterion, namely that: Projects … are impacting on the most marginalised sections of society by developing activities; contributing towards facilitating increased engagement between the two main communities in Northern Ireland and the border region; established new alliances and partnerships between the statutory, private and voluntary/community sector; supported a range of local groups that have become involved in developing economic and social activities and engaging in broader networking opportunities. This has increased the skills of project participants and helped to establish relationships and networks that can be utilised or transferred for future development; … has enhanced cross border development by helping to establish the skills, networks and capacity for co-operation among implementing bodies and project beneficiaries.266

A long-term view has been taken of the transformation process The holding of a long-term view has not been the case with the Peace programmes, especially in terms of seamless implementation. An initial glance would suggest that the programmes have taken a long-term view of the transformation process since 1994 as they moved through five phases. However, closer scrutiny reveals this has not been the case. Three issues in particular arise here. First, for a programme that was specifically tailored to deal with a transforming society, it had a very short life-span, funded in the first instance for only three of its projected five years (Peace I) and active for only four of its projected six-year life-span during the second phase, due to its late start. This latter delay ‘in formulating and implementing the Peace II Programme has created implications in terms of placing immediate pressures on N+2 targets and restricting time to simplify the application form’.267 The European Court of Auditors singled out the first shortcoming for criticism, asserting that: the Commission’s initial funding decision, which allocated only three years’ funding to a five-year programme was badly devised … the uncertainty over future funding caused difficulty in the planning and management of the subprogrammes and measures. This … contributed to the delays ­experienced

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in the selection of actions for funding. Delays in the programme’s execution resulted in a lack of use of appropriations by the P&R. Significant amounts of the commitment appropriations were cancelled at the end of 1996 and 1997.268

Moreover, IFBs such as the CFNI found in terms of Peace I that not only did the pressure to ensure rapid expenditure create workload pressures for staff, it also caused difficulties for projects in terms of the unrealistic timeframe it created for those at the grassroots, particularly those communities with weak community infrastructure ‘where few groups existed to make applications for funding and where capacity to deliver activities on the ground was low’.269 This capacity requires time to develop and grow and is not something that can be completed within a two-year financial timeframe. Secondly, there was a long and confusing period between the end of Peace I in 1999 and the effective commencement of Peace II in 2002. Although some organisations did receive gap funding, it was far from a smooth process; ‘the cumulative effects of repeated delays in initiating the Peace II programme and the subsequent short-term nature of the gap/interim funds have had many detrimental effects on voluntary and community sector organisations’,270 not least that any gains made under Peace I were lost and many groups which had become largely or wholly dependent on the availability of the funding were threatened with closure. The difficulties created by the gap period impacted on a number of areas including ‘the demotivation and high turn-over of staff; loss of expertise, experience and knowledge; loss of impetus of the project; deviation from the purpose of the project; and organisations feeling insecure, undermined and undervalued’.271 In essence, ‘the stop start nature actually almost destroyed some groups and a lot of the work because people were leaving jobs for other jobs, there was no long-term commitment, management committees were turning over, the seats were being lost, it was just chaos’.272 In addition, the transition between the two programmes was characterised by discontinuity with changes among many of the personnel on the European and governmental side. The House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee again articulately summarised the effect: It is sad, if not a little ironic, that having done so much to build capacity and confidence through the voluntary and community sector, the transition from Peace I to Peace II should have created in that same sector many of the problems the programme seeks to address in wider society … it would appear that little attention was paid to the importance to the overall success of the Peace Programme of managing the gap as Peace I and Peace II themselves were, and are, managed.273

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Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the long-term sustainability of projects and organisations funded by this particular tool should be considered, as this is a core element of the transformation process. Research has shown that ‘local initiatives had made a significantly higher impact where the project had run from Peace I through to Peace II’.274 If project sustainability is not possible then successful transformation becomes questionable. Thus it has been argued in terms of Peace I that ‘the focus on inclusion to the relative marginalisation of productive investment, and the rapid boost to employment in the community/voluntary sector raises concerns about sustainability’.275 The mid-term evaluation of Peace II asserted that 44 per cent of Peace I projects had completed their task, 31 per cent were sustained through additional funds, 10 per cent were mainstreamed, 9 per cent became self-sustaining and 6 per cent came under the category of others (continued on a smaller scale). This compares with 23 per cent of Peace II projects to November 2003 being already sustainable, 48 per cent requiring funding from alternative sources and 4 per cent having to close, showing that ‘a higher proportion of Peace II projects are relying on obtaining other [funding] sources (48%) than Peace I (41%)’.276 If this project breakdown is analysed further according to organisation-type, it becomes evident that: most projects would not be able to become self-sustaining, particularly those which are targeted at disadvantaged groups … (56% of voluntary and charitable organisations funded through Peace II would require funding from other sources, compared with 49% of local community groups and 29% of private sector organisations) … The potential implications for both governments are significant if a large number of projects require further funding to exist beyond Peace II.277

Clearly sustainability is a serious challenge which ‘cannot be left to the end of the Peace II Programme as it is simply not a “closure” issue. Resources will have to be identified otherwise much of what has been created under Peace II will simply disappear.’278 However, while a number of the Peace II measures became sustainable by virtue of the fact that they were taken on by government departments and agencies, it had become evident that ‘many of the projects and activities will not be continued after the life of the Peace II Programme’.279 Moreover, while many grassroots actors had long ago accepted that some of the best and mostneeded projects were not sustainable, attempts, particularly by IFBs, to get those at the top level to accept this were not so easy; ‘a lot of them should and could be taken on in mainstream government programme[s], in the health sector, in the education sector, in the community sector and so on but that’s a real challenge to try and get existing authorities, organisations, agencies to try and take that on board’.280 Critically ‘the biggest

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issue is the fact that there isn’t that mainstream budget line, there isn’t an acknowledgement for the need for specific peacebuilding work: people will want to categorise it in what they know, rather than in something new and it’s going to be a real issue going forward’.281 This is a view with which others concur : ‘it’s huge that sustainability was never questioned, the question was asked of community groups about sustainability – I don’t think that the same question was put to either governments around how they would be assisting their investment. So government investment and sustainability I don’t believe is there.’282 Moreover, ‘when the Peace money goes away government is going to be left with a lot of groups here who are never going to be able to self-sustain; community development and innovations by its very nature is not self-sustaining, you don’t make a programme sustainable in three, four, five years. You have to be in it for the long haul.’283 Furthermore, although the Peace programmes were not set up to fund the voluntary and community sector, a fact that was recognised by them,284 it would appear that they often had little choice but to rely on it, particularly in Northern Ireland. There is no doubt that this was quite damaging, not only to this sector, but to the overall success of the Peace programmes. In the Border Counties, for example, it took Peace funding money, in a lot of instances, to allow the community/voluntary sector to develop and then when Peace I, Peace II started getting withdrawn, they didn’t have anywhere else to go, so certainly there would have been a certain level of dependency developed on the Peace programme … [as] … intervention from government support hasn’t been forthcoming.285

The cat-and-mouse game played by government departments, in terms of the long-term sustainability of the process, clearly illustrates the difficulties faced by the community and voluntary sector and IFBs alike which attempted to progress sustainability: you try to address sustainability, you send in groups to push hard to talk to [the Department of] Social, Community and Family Affairs or to Department of Health. So their sustainability strategy is that they’ve had negotiations or made a statutory body or government Department aware of the project or made an application and involved the Department on their management committee; they’re involved with the Department on the assumption or the hope that they then take over the funding and it might be a verbal commitment. But then with government cutbacks it never happens … then we [IFB] get blackmailed into giving it for another year because you’re still hoping they’re going to get this, you’re still hoping it’s going to be mainstreamed. So … there’s been a lot of hope of and verbal half commitments on mainstreaming and I don’t know whether groups

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are fooling us or the Department probably knows that it won’t be giving funding. The group probably knows that it won’t get funding but it hopes that it might and we hope that it might. It’s that bit of hope that maybe ensures that the funding keeps coming on a drip sort of feed from the Peace programme; a lot of that has been going on. I’d say it’s probably across the whole region as well there is just no other structure there to fund.286

This is clearly symptomatic of a lack of strategic thinking by government on this issue – neither government has a conflict transformation policy. Subsequently the region’s conflict transformation process is dependent on hope and European efforts, rather than a strategically tangible government policy. Thus, in terms of Peace: the governments’ short-term view from the start and the management of that in some ways became ad hoc, it began to be directed partly by the projects. But what the projects would identify needed to be known at the beginning of the process not the middle. So the amount of potential changes that could be made were limited, so in a sense you’re working within a framework that has its limitations no matter what you do, so that it’s very difficult for it to have that kind of long-term view.287

Furthermore, its progress was not helped by bureaucratic thinking at the top level: the [Peace I] projects were supposed to be sustainable [but] people didn’t really believe that their letters of offer couldn’t exist beyond 2001. It had to end because that’s when funds ended and there was no assurance of another programme. But projects did not act and that’s where the fault was: projects were not sufficiently clear that there would be no more money if there was more money, this would be a real bonus. People had applied their own expectations to this, so you had these people who thought it was the Peace programme’s job to fund the community and voluntary sector, the child care sector, the social economy sector and it wasn’t the Peace programme’s job to do any of those things.288

Despite these issues, most of those involved in the Peace programmes, whether funders or funded, recognise the long-term nature of the work, as ‘the key lessons learned from the many excellent schemes is that peace building is a slow and long-term process. It is critically important therefore, to continue this work to make real and lasting progress.’289 In bearing this in mind, it has also been suggested that the ‘expectations surrounding what the Programme can achieve in Northern Ireland and the border counties need to be managed’.290 While it could be suggested that perhaps those at the grassroots believed the Peace programmes were a solution to the social and economic deficits of the region after the ceasefires were announced, and as such had little appreciation of the

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long-term nature of the work that lay ahead since ‘a lot of groups didn’t see the whole debate that we’re now involved in, what is real peacebuilding work and how long does it take for this sort of transformation to happen’,291 one has to bear in mind that this tool, like the others, is limited in what it can achieve on its own. Its potential has certainly not been helped by the absence of parallel political developments or strategic government policy. The three issues just discussed highlight a number of dilemmas, notably the lack of government thinking on conflict transformation and subsequent policy development, and the appropriateness of EU funding for this type of work, taking into account its operational structures and regulations. Nevertheless, in light of the previous assessment, one of the most sustainable legacies of the programmes may be the local and decentralised delivery models which will probably last beyond the life of this particular transformation tool. Indeed ‘this is an example of where one of the key outcomes of the programme can be adapted into the reshaping of local government remitted under the Public Administration Review’.292 However, government responsibility also has to be recognised: in the long-term it has to be them that’s responsible for addressing it and [not] necessarily the EU Programmes [as] they’re not going to solve the issue. They are going to be supportive of the peace process, they are going to provide extra resources, more flexibility in some ways, money that isn’t labelled as either coming from here or there; they need to be part of a long-term process but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they in themselves should be long-term because that would let the governments off the hook.293

The tools used were tailored to suit the particular situation thus facilitating peacebuilding rather than imposing or dictating terms Of all three programmes, the Peace programmes appear, on a macro level at least, to have been best tailored to suit the post-ceasefire situation of Northern Ireland and the Border Counties, in order specifically to facilitate peacebuilding. Both programme designs were based on extensive consultations294 with a view to maximising impact at the local level, which facilitated peacebuilding by enabling the transformation of local communities and fostering huge gains in social inclusion. However, appearances can be deceptive, and on a micro level a slightly different story emerges. As noted earlier, the first programme was designed on a very rushed basis without much consideration about how the various sub-programmes would contribute to peace and reconciliation. Although serious strides were made to remedy this for Peace II, those with direct experience of the second programme believe, to a certain extent, that this

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continued to be the case. For some, however, this limitation was one that was acceptable – in coming out of a conflict such as this:

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there needed to be investment, something needed to happen quickly on the ground and so the infrastructure type stuff is something that can be seen. Sometimes people need to see something before they can even take that step forward; it’s very hard – do you build capacity first or does there need to be something there for people to start coming around and seeing that they can start to work?295

Such an open interpretation was innovative in allowing peacebuilding in its widest sense to evolve and be shaped by those at the grassroots: ‘we were moving into the ceasefires and hopefully into some kind of political situation and the people at the top were anxious to support that, they were also anxious to see a lot of grassroots commitment to it at that time and perhaps it wasn’t well thought out but it was done with the best of motives in Peace I’.296 This evolving process was also helped by the innovative system of small seeding grants put in place during the first programme. However, it was only twelve years after Peace I was first implemented, as the programme moved out of its extended second phase and into its third phase (Peace III), that a working definition of reconciliation was developed and provided to guide not only (potential) project promoters but also IFBs, LSPs, government departments and, indeed, the SEUPB itself.297 While this was a welcome development, it was also a matter for concern: if this had been addressed from the beginning, or at least some time soon after Peace I had begun, many of the issues highlighted here could have possibly been avoided, perhaps softening the blame sometimes apportioned by those at the top level to project promoters; ‘there were a number of projects under Peace I … funded by virtue of being unstructured, when it came to Peace II, didn’t get money and couldn’t understand why things have moved on and they haven’t moved with it’.298 Nevertheless, if one accepts that conflict transformation requires a longterm view, the first programme gave people the time to do other things ‘before they could actually focus on the peacebuilding side of things’.299 In this sense, consideration of how the various sub-­programmes would contribute to conflict transformation was there as far as possible, highlighting particularly the importance of how the IFBs undertook their work; ‘the vision was partly there in so far as it could be, the Peace II vision unfortunately didn’t have that. Peace II ended up having the vision of civil servants and government ministers.’300 This was the crux of the criticisms laid at the door of the programme: ‘Peace II was much more tailored from the top down; there wasn’t any sense that the new mecha-

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nisms that were there centrally to control Peace II [SEUPB] were taking that learning on board.’301 Many of the lessons that could have been learned from Peace I were quite simply being ‘very much lost or not listened to, more to the point’.302 Furthermore, a key issue for Peace I was that there was ‘no systematic evaluation plan from the start, compromising the potential for robust retrospective appraisal’.303 This gaping hole has also been vigorously highlighted with regard to Peace II: there’s no strategic evaluation, there’s no evaluation of whole programmes, each project has this little evaluation which I’ve got no evidence that anybody actually reads; there’s very sophisticated financial accounting models but nobody to my knowledge is thinking in any strategic way about the learning from these projects for peacebuilding. It’s a terrible thing but they’re starting to do it now, very late, like nine years into the thing, you know, they’re [only] now starting to think what can we learn from it, what’s the sustainability element. They’re floundering as well about what does sustainability mean and what does long-term mean and how should we feed into long-term peacebuilding. Nobody’s done that kind of thinking.304

Moreover, very little consideration was given to the impact the programme’s bureaucracy would have, not only on those at the grassroots, to the extent of being disempowering, but also, surprisingly, on some of the IFBs, despite their causal role. One IFB manager spoke of the bureaucracy being demotivating and frustrating, particularly when (in terms of the development and subsequent simplification of Peace II): you thought you’d made representations [to the SEUPB], you thought people had listened to you and you thought you were sensible. I do think we’re a fairly compliant organisation in relation to making sure that the t’s are crossed and making sure the funds are vouched but there’s no sense put to thing[s]; we have people there and they’re stamping and the invoice could be for anything as long as it’s an invoice. The whole thing has moved to a state of covering backsides as opposed to looking behind what things are. There’s no reality behind a lot of [it]; it’s just gone to one extreme and auditors are just seeing that all the signatures are there, they’re not seeing the real issues.305

The IFBs found that under Peace II a whole other level of bureaucracy was introduced, which they had previously managed to cushion groups from under Peace I. However, they have not been in a position to continue to do this, the implication being that the SEUPB believed progress had been made and everything had moved on, and groups should have moved on as well. The reality, however, is that ‘that’s not the case. There are still capacity issues.’306 This created a disquieting factor whereby those

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charged with delivering the programme on the ground began asking ‘is it worth it to actually continue to administer a programme when in effect you are now part of the problem, not part of the solution?’307 While the accusations of excessive bureaucracy that enveloped Peace II were tackled to an extent when it proved overly complex and onerous (by simplifying and slightly reducing the size of the application form halfway through the programme and reducing the number of implementing bodies from sixty-four to fifty-five), in the main this was only done in going forward into the Peace II Extension. Additionally, the mid-term evaluation recommended the amalgamation of ‘all sub-Measures in Northern Ireland into a single Measure with one implementing body made responsible and accountable for each Measure in each jurisdiction with respective contracts amended accordingly’,308 a recommendation adopted for the Extension. Ironically, however, this gave rise to concerns that ‘the removal of some implementing bodies in the Peace II Extension may cause confusion for clients and affect demand as they may have a track record and an established client constituency’.309 The wide range of IFBs in Northern Ireland probably stemmed from a desire to involve as many as possible at the grassroots and draw on the legacy of the non-statutory sector left by Peace I, but in comparison to the much simpler set-up in the Border Counties, it seemed like an unnecessary complexity, reflecting Northern Ireland’s existing unwieldy public sector and local government structures: ‘the competition between agencies that wanted to get involved, that wanted to put a stake in it had a much bigger influence on how the Peace programmes looked in the end: there was a big effort made on keeping everybody happy’.310 It could cynically be questioned whether this reduction came about in order to reduce the complexity burden on project promoters, or whether it was forced (or inevitable) because the amount of funding available under the Peace II Extension was considerably less and would not have allowed for the same number of Measures and implementing bodies. One suspects that the answer lay somewhere in the middle. The first programme was also rightly criticised for ‘being too broad and so generous in what it could fund as to be indistinguishable from mainstream structural fund programmes. The European Commission would have found it difficult to defend such an unfocussed programme a second time and for that reason insisted on it being “distinctive” to the conflict in the region.’311 Both were short-term programmes with very long-term goals which in itself would not normally be a problem, but the context within which the programmes were created was as unique as the tools themselves. While the bureaucracy, having largely been imposed by the SEUPB, gave rise to serious questions about the applicability of this ­centralised

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approach to implementing and managing a conflict transformation process and proved quite problematic (in contrast to the much more positive effect this approach had on implementing and managing the INTERREG programme), it was largely a product of the source of Peace II funding. There are questions about the suitability of EU Structural Funding for implementing such a process, as ‘the bureaucracy surrounding European funds, of their very nature, is very difficult for people to operate and some of that was our fault in the sense [of] the [complicated] system that we imposed in the application forms, but a lot of it’s driven by the bureaucracy attaching to the funds themselves’.312 One of the programme’s key aims was targeting social need. In this respect, what proved important in terms of overall impact in the case of Peace I was that it was found that ‘the funding bodies appear to have had a small but positive influence on the distribution of funds in that they improved targeting towards the most disadvantaged areas. This applies equally to both Catholic and Protestant funding.’313 In the case of Peace II it was found that ‘the successful channelling of funds towards disadvantaged areas is seen as making an important contribution towards peace and reconciliation’.314 In particular, ‘the allocation mechanisms of the Peace II Programme have successfully targeted funds at disadvantaged areas, an assessment which holds true for both Catholic and Protestant funding’.315 Nonetheless, it has been argued that ‘there is no overwhelming reason why the focus of Peace II [economic] should not have been changed from the focus for Peace I [social] and, if alternative sources of funding had been available to continue work initiated under Peace I, it is unlikely that this change would have prompted disagreement. But the alternatives were extremely limited.’316 This contributed to problems for both the authorities at the top and middle levels and grassroots project promoters in managing change, as they were used to the open, innovative and relatively simplistic approach of the Peace I programme. This led to the inevitable barrage of criticism. The truth, however, is that ‘the Assembly took a view that the Peace [II] programme needed to be more economically driven’,317 once again highlighting the problematic outcomes that arise when governments do not have a conflict transformation policy framework in place. Morrissey has noted the extent of the public sector in Northern Ireland, with the huge dependence on publicsector spending having been ‘the most noticeable economic effect of the Troubles. [Thus] from that perspective, the economic emphasis in Peace II makes sense.’318 However, while it was well meaning it was far from tailored, as it was:

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strategically lost amidst a series of processes and interventions to which it only tangentially related. The problem was not its economic emphasis but its lack of fit with what else was going on in Northern Ireland, with the exception of the mainstream EU structural funds programme. However, this has to be qualified – the major roles in making peace in Northern Ireland were already assigned, so that the EU had at best, a very limited responsibility – structurally, it’s hard to see what else the EU could do but make available ESF or ERDF funds since these are its standard forms of intervention – the scale of resources was considerable but was dwarfed by the level of existing public spending already taking place.319

Critics of the move of emphasis from social to economic concluded that its biggest impact was that ‘[those] faced with some of the severest social exclusion problems suffered from the diminished emphasis on the social inclusion objective; it was more difficult for the victims of socio-economic exclusion to fulfil the peacebuilding requirement, despite the fact that there has arguably been an increase in racist attacks and in certain other aspects of exclusion since the downturn in sectarian violence’.320 While Peace I ‘was open and broad and left a lot of scope for learning to happen, the big mistake was made in that transition from Peace I to Peace II where the step was just too far’.321 However, in further assessing the impact of social versus economic, it should be noted that assessments that simplistically judge social projects as good and economic projects as bad are ‘not only unhelpful but profoundly misguided’.322 Economics have a critical contribution to make to peacebuilding, as: The overlap between economic investment and peace comes when both are aimed at underpinning our shared future by generating an economy which incentivises and underpins a culture of tolerance, interdependence and mutuality. The key for a peace programme is to identify the areas of overlap and to emphasise those parts of the permanent social inclusion and economic growth agendas which are most critical for the successful establishment of peace: economic prosperity is not the end in itself of a peace programme, but the tool and the potentially decisive outcome.323

There is room for both social and economic development to help transform conflict; ‘business people here have made a commitment to Northern Ireland and after all we can’t survive without that. They also have to be in some way brought into the equation.’324 Economic development is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The progressing of the region’s conflict transformation process pro­­ vided the programmes with the space required to adapt their approach to the developing and changing situation they had to deal with. This they achieved to a limited extent on a macro level by amending the definitions

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of the distinctiveness criteria that projects had to meet in order to qualify for funding, which set the programmes apart from all other European programmes. On a micro level, however, the Peace programmes had adapted their approach ‘arguably too much’:325 many lessons were not learned in moving from Peace I to Peace II. The effects of those that were is still not totally clear. It must be recognised that the Peace programmes have without a doubt acted as a catalyst for an engagement that would not ­otherwise have happened, and for many have been the manifestation of the conflict transformation process on the ground thus facilitating ‘a sense of engagement and a broader sense of ownership of the peace process’.326 The Peace II mid-term evaluation asserted in 2003 that ‘the need for the Peace II Programme is higher now than at the time the Programme was developed’327 as ‘some 92% of Peace II projects yielded additional impacts that would not otherwise have accrued. This compares with an estimate of 95% under Peace I.’328 The Peace programmes are certainly the most tailored of the three tools under examination, despite the many issues they have given rise to. Given the environment in which they found themselves, there is no doubt that they facilitated transformation in the region rather than imposing or dictating it. The tools have not done any harm Towards the end of 2005 one of the emerging outcomes of the Peace II programme was that it was ‘contributing towards facilitating increased engagement and building peace and reconciliation between the two main communities in Northern Ireland and the border region’.329 However, while the Peace programmes have not done any harm per se, they have created a number of unforeseen side-effects. One of the most unfortunate is that they have ‘let mainstream funding and mainstream Departments of the hook’.330 This echoes the earlier comment on the programmes having substituted for government action, and does not reflect well on the lack of government policy in this area, which has in large part relied on the imagination and goodwill of the European Union. Surprisingly, some have also argued that ‘it has probably created more conflict; some of the projects, in actually undertaking their work, had created and got people to revisit and to resurrect issues of the past. Maybe that’s not harm but it certainly has opened up things again and has meant people have to face things which not always people want to do.’331 Consequently expectations have been created whereby ‘you’ve got a situation where people are starting to confront the past and the hurt and then the structure isn’t there to support or develop [that] and that’s

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just a big gap in it that there isn’t support there for that to allow groups to work through’.332 Expectations were also created whereby the grassroots in particular became dependent on the funding, in terms of paid staff, for example, particularly in moving forward through each phase, from Peace I to Peace II to the Peace II Extension and Peace III; ‘they have raised expectations that are never going to be fulfilled because a lot of the social economy has been built around the Peace programmes – everything can’t be mainstreamed and there’s going to be that whole let down of expectations’.333 Sustainability, in other words, has become a burden. Nevertheless, a lot of the activities realised through the programmes were never financially sustainable, therefore the view exists that ‘groups need to realise that the fact that you got funding, and in some instances easy funding for a period of time, it shouldn’t be seen as a negative thing when it stops’.334 Thus, in putting the dependency argument in perspective one has to consider that ‘at the end of the day, in the absence of the Peace Programme, a lot less would have happened and that you’re going to have to take a few risks and not everything is going to work perfectly’.335 However, this once again highlights the difficulties created by non-existent policy framework, which, if in place, could guide future progress and expectations. Concerns were also expressed that the programmes created the risk of ‘overly bureaucratising [the] community and voluntary sector which is potentially dangerous because a lot of the vibrancy of the sector was its innovation and its ability to take risks and try things out’.336 This relates not only to those community and voluntary organisations that acted as IFBs but also to those who accessed the funding. Those at the top level have been wilful in using the programmes for political point scoring: ‘it’s not the fault of the Peace Programme but it is the fault of the politicians that the availability of high profile funds for local communities have been used in a divisive way, calculating how much has gone to Protestant areas against Catholic areas; there is a danger that that would be highly divisive but that was the fault of our zero sum game politics’.337 In returning to Pugh’s criticisms outlined earlier, the Peace programmes certainly cannot be accused of giving limited attention to soft programmes; the complete opposite has been the case. Of all three tools assessed here, this is the only one in a position to claim this: it’s hard to imagine how strongly we were criticised at the time of the soft approach that we seemed to be taking. People wanted something similar from the programmes that were already there – we took a lot of flak because we didn’t fund flagship [or] capital projects straight off [or] existing projects that were rejected by another programme. The thing that

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we most focused on was the social and maybe too much because we probably weren’t the greatest at making allies as a result of that; people were disgusted if you asked them around the process.338

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Furthermore, while Peace II certainly was ‘an economically-led Pro­­ gramme’,339 the programmes have shown that ‘commercial benefit is not necessarily the enemy of peace [but] a reliance on economic prosperity alone does not in itself unpick hostility’.340 The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, for example, found that: Economic Revitalisation has been one of the success stories of the Peace II Programme. The funding is already making a difference to the economic infrastructure and social climate in some of the areas in Northern Ireland that have been most adversely affected by the conflict. The majority of our projects are already actively engaged in promoting peace building on a cross-community basis illustrating that economic projects are more than capable of meeting both social and reconciliation objectives. There is now clear evidence that economic measures do effectively meet social needs.341

Nevertheless, there is a constant reminder that ‘mainstream economic and social development needs should be addressed through core Government programmes’.342 In terms of the rationale for and modus operandi of funders being projects, the Peace programmes are equally as guilty as the other two tools, not on the basis of reinforcing a ‘donor-centred, top-down approach to needs assessment and evaluation’,343 but to the extent that they fostered the formalised processes that are attached to projects. This was not so much the case for Peace I, which as a special programme had more flexibility to enable groups to obtain core funding, but it was for Peace II which was very project driven: that meant you were very much in danger of having, say in a community centre where the Coordinator’s post was running out of funding, yet the project was going on for another two years but no Coordinator there so it was just a bit silly. And it also meant that a lot of organisations, when they didn’t have core funding sources there would have been shortfalls in the running costs and things like that, so it didn’t look at things holistically. But that was a problem where Peace II had to meet the requirements of the European Social Fund or the regional fund.344

Thus, many project promoters found themselves led by funding requirements rather than the funding being led by needs on the ground. Once again this highlights the difficulties associated with funding this type of work through European Structural Funds. However, the viewpoint has been taken that projects are not necessarily a bad thing if they can become programmes:

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somebody has to start with an idea, they have to go to government or another funding agency to try and develop that idea on a pilot basis. Then the government or another funder has to decide is it worth developing it further … then after whatever, maybe five years, you’re in a position that you are a programmatic organisation because there is a need for it and people don’t want you to go away.345

However, this programmatic transition has not been very forthcoming with Peace, as sustainability has been problematic: ‘if there had been more thought given around peacebuilding then … you would have been able to … identify action-related rather than necessarily project-related work that needed done’.346 More thought could have been given to conflict transformation by government through a specific policy: there is no process for the good ones to come through, the ones that really provide learning. [Peace] threw themselves into these difficult areas of peacebuilding and reconciliation and mutual understanding without refining the concepts so that they gave out a lot of money to people, organisations, who … may be right for other work but they weren’t right for peacebuilding because they didn’t think sufficiently about what was needed to build the peace in Ireland across the border between the communities – that’s a mistake they made at the beginning. And the mistake they made into the programme was that they didn’t think through sustainability.347

Moreover: It’s the bridge between the visionary Europeans who said we’ll set up a Peace Programme to help the Irish peace process and the hard nosed British and Irish who don’t want to spend extra money – there’s no link between the first saying to the second ‘we’ve spent a billion euros on this thing over the last ten years. Could you now at least take the successful examples of this and bring them on further with your money?’ It is extraordinary that the Irish government which is supposed to be committed in its constitution to Irish unity, had got no thoughts about this area, there’s no thoughts about the long-term. This is work towards Irish unity however you define it, unity of people coming together. You don’t have to be a Provo or a Republican and there is no thinking in Dublin about this.348

Simply put, there was no commitment to peacebuilding beyond a narrow political framework. Despite these issues, the good that emanated from the Peace pro­­ grammes far outweighed any possible harm they may have created, an opinion shared by all those interviewed, across all three levels of Lederach’s pyramid. As with many transformation tools, there have been concrete benefits in terms of employment creation, educational opportunities and some infrastructure. However, the overwhelming benefit has been the tens of thousands of projects which enabled hundreds of thou-

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sands of people to become involved with the transformation process. A lot of disadvantaged groups have been brought in from the margins, thus raising grassroots confidence, giving them a sense of pride and subsequently having ‘a stabilising effect on Northern Ireland’:349 ‘if the political fails, then the whole thing can fail, whereas at least if stuff is still going on at the grassroots level the top level can falter a few times but you don’t have an outbreak of war … people don’t want it back where they were, they want to keep going forward even though it’s more difficult’.350 The programmes have also enabled the transformation of how people think; ‘people [are] starting to shift their thinking to long-term peace and peacebuilding and reconciliation and seeing this is the way forward, not just even in the local sense but in the broader sense. Now people are really starting to get a vision.’351 Ultimately the programmes have acted as a conduit whereby local communities have been facilitated to build relationships and start looking at conflict transformation within their areas and groups; ‘it’s given people a chance to be involved that would never have been involved, [giving] trust in the political process’.352 INTERREG I, II and IIIA – general observations While INTERREG was initially ‘intended to prepare frontier regions for the completion of the single market and [aimed] to resolve the specific economic development programmes of the Community’s internal and external border regions’,353 it is considered a key transformation tool in terms of progressing the social and economic development aspects of conflict transformation, by virtue of being a tailored tool in a prime position to facilitate peacebuilding rather than impose or dictate terms as it aimed to tackle the problems created by borders. It thus went some way towards attempting to address the root causes of the region’s conflict. Moreover, having operated over four phases since 1990, it is a tool that has taken a long-term approach, finally making progress in terms of developing and integrating vertical and horizontal capacity. Despite this, those in key implementation positions have objected that ‘INTERREG wasn’t designed as a conflict resolution tool’.354 The INTERREG pro­­ gramme certainly is not a conflict resolution tool, as earlier deliberations on the terms conflict settlement, resolution and transformation illustrate. However, this further highlights the fundamental problem at the heart of this field, that of definitional confusion, and, more disturbingly, the lack of understanding of the concept and process by those charged with managing and implementing the transformation process in this region; this unfamiliarity is not helped by the lack of a government policy ­framework.

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Lack of consultation The INTERREG programme, at first glance, appeared to have all the characteristics of a transformation tool, particularly as it was, in the main, contributing economically towards addressing the root causes of the conflict. However, like the IFI, it did not have an easy start, though unlike the IFI it took a lot longer to learn from its mistakes. The first INTERREG programme built on the EU’s tentative efforts in the 1980s at promoting cross-border cooperation. This could be seen as a move towards addressing the root causes of the conflict. However, one of its biggest failings was that there was no attempt to involve all levels of society in the transformation process, particularly the grassroots. O’Dowd and Corrigan’s research on economic cooperation in the border area at the end of INTERREG I found that many respondents felt a ‘lack of consultation, information and technical assistance were features of the centralised management of INTERREG I’.355 These criticisms were supported by the official INTERREG I evaluation and Laffan and Payne, particularly the lack of local consultations: although the programme document claimed that there ‘was extensive consultation with local bodies internally by both governments’ in the preparation of the programme and that ‘both governments took into consideration comments and submissions made at local level’, there was in fact very little involvement by those living in the border area in the design and management of the first INTERREG programme. Nor did it reflect any agreed cross-border strategy for overcoming the obstacles to economic development.356

The INTERREG II mid-term evaluation argued that the failings of INTERREG I to consult locally were not a feature of INTERREG II: the nature of the objectives of INTERREG II suggests the importance of local consultation/involvement in the Programme … 43.4% of applicants were satisfied or very satisfied with the level of local consultation and input to the planning of INTERREG II. While 56.6% were not satisfied, it is clear that significant levels of local consultation did apply prior to the implementation of the Programme.357

This seems quite positive in comparison to the lack of consultation for INTERREG I, but is a strange assertion to make when more than half the applicants were not satisfied. Limited cross-border cooperation INTERREG I was also criticised for its limited cross-border cooperation. The European Court of Auditors’ 1994 Annual Report noted that ‘an examination of the OPs [Operational Programmes] showed that

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little of the planned expenditure directly related to transfrontier cooperation measures. Most grouped together measures located on both sides of the border and which often did not involve any inter-regional cooperation in their implementation.’358 Particular criticism was directed at the Ireland/Northern Ireland INTERREG programme: ‘only 39 of the 270 projects of which the OP consisted were of a transfrontier nature and were receiving joint financing from two Member States on the basis of this’.359 Effectively many of them took the form of ‘parallel rather than related projects on either side of the border with little direct connection between them and [were] heavily biased towards infrastructural development’.360 Like Laffan and Payne, O’Dowd et al. also concluded that, in this case, ‘the whole process has little direct democratic accountability to national electorates, and especially not to those living in border areas’.361 Essentially ‘cross-border co-operation remained weakly institutionalised and INTERREG I achieved limited results’.362 My own experience of this particular phase of this tool would testify to the more rhetorical rather than substantive cross-border cooperation that took place through back-to-back rather than fully integrative project implementation on either side of the border. The official response from the European Commission to these criticisms was to admit to it and to comment that ‘some of the Member States felt that it would be premature to develop transfrontier cooperation in their underprivileged regions, and preferable to introduce it gradually, after an initial development stage’.363 Although there certainly was a lack of tradition of cooperation before the introduction of INTERREG, and such cooperation would take time to develop, Laffan and Payne argue that this was simply a case of one institution justifying its actions to another. They posit that ‘there is evidence to suggest that those in the Commission engaged with the INTERREG initiative were unhappy with some of the programmes and project work being financed by the programme’.364 Significantly, the EU Court of Auditors report was too late to have any serious influence on INTERREG II, which constituted a continuation of INTERREG I with minor modifications. Centralised management approach This lack of development of vertical and horizontal capacity appeared to continue with INTERREG II, despite the best efforts of the Commission. The centralised top-heavy implementation and management process continued. However, a development officer was appointed to support project proposals and assist in the creation of cross-border links. Moreover, as part of the rules governing the agreement for INTERREG II,

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a programme Monitoring Committee was established. The committee was initially very restricted as it only comprised representatives from the relevant government departments (top-level actors) and public agencies on either side of the border (middle-level actors), along with a European Commission representative. During the negotiations for the second programme the Commission had sought wider representation of the social partners (grassroots-level actors) on the committee. The Irish government was also ‘willing to extend the INTERREG Monitoring Committee membership to reflect the kind of broad partnership model being widely adopted in the Republic’,365 but this was strongly rejected in Northern Ireland by a number of government departments, particularly the Department of Finance and Personnel. Nevertheless, the Commission eventually achieved this wider representation, the catalyst being ‘the relative success of Peace, compared with INTERREG II, in attracting and promoting cross-border projects’366 and the Peace I Monitoring Committee providing for representation of the key social partners, private business sector and public authorities, which ‘was perceived as having stronger potential for facilitating a wider partnership, particularly at the local community level.’367 Effectiveness of INTERREG II In terms of the actual effectiveness of INTERREG II, the mid-term evaluation found that cross-border cooperation was again lacking. It pointed out that ‘effective cooperation stems from a mutual understanding of the respective political, legislative and institutional cultures which requires a long lead-in time [therefore] with respect … it could be argued that INTERREG I provided the pilot exercise for cooperation and INTERREG II is an attempt to realise the benefits of this exercise’.368 Greater cross-border cooperation would therefore have been expected through INTERREG II. However, the evaluation found that ‘the extent of cooperation is mixed … Also it appears that there is still a minority of genuine cross-border projects.’369 Rather worryingly, in social and economic development terms, it also found that projects generated limited employment opportunities; infrastructural projects generally tend to produce employment opportunities of a short-term nature. Nevertheless, on a Europe-wide basis, while there were considerable outputs and results across all thematic areas, particularly in the fields of transport and tourism, ‘results in other fields have been more limited … business-to-business cooperation and generally private sector involvement was far from widespread’,370 which was disappointing, as this was one of the key roles of the programme. Once again, justification emerged from the lack of a tradition of cross-border cooperation in the

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early 1990s. Furthermore ‘Strand IIA, despite its long experience, did not attain a particularly high level of integration in programme management structures and procedures [but] as regards the impact of INTERREG IIA on improving the “economic fabric” and “quality of life” in crossborder areas, the medium-sized and smaller programmes, in particular, have achieved the most visible and significant impact.’371 This positive appraisal did not include the Ireland/Northern Ireland programme, however, as it was considered a large programme. Despite these criticisms, the ex-post evaluation report concluded: there have been important external factors in several border areas which have favoured the changes supported by the INTERREG interventions (notably the Peace process in Ireland/UK-N. Ireland). On the other hand, the value of the contribution of INTERREG should not be underestimated since the ex-post evaluation has demonstrated a sound longer-term evolution of INTERREG strategies which ensure a longer-term support and influence by INTERREG … Overall, INTERREG IIA has evolved into a worthwhile policy tool that has filled an important gap in the existing regional, national and European instruments.372

A slow start and limited consultations for INTERREG IIIA The planned programme period for INTERREG IIIA covered 2000–06. However, it was not launched until November 2002, losing almost three years of implementation time. Moreover, practically no expenditure had taken place by 30 September 2003.373 INTERREG IIIA did, however, engage in a much more extensive consultation process than the previous programmes, consisting of a questionnaire, a major conference, which, for many, was probably their main involvement in the process, and the establishment of an advisory group. In theory this consisted of fifty-two people representing the civil service, the social partners, the three crossborder networks, intermediary funding bodies and others, but in reality ‘over half of the members came from the government departments and state agencies in Belfast, Dublin and Monaghan’.374 Therefore while the consultation process was slightly more extensive than those undertaken for the previous programmes, it was really more symbolic in nature as opposed to a genuine attempt to develop and integrate vertical and horizontal capacity.  ecentralised management D The overall management and implementation of the INTERREG III programme saw a number of significant changes take place, reflecting the changed political, institutional and policy environment, with one of the most striking characteristics being ‘the extent to which the network

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of actors [involved] has widened to include several new actors’.375 Significantly its management was transferred from the two departments of finance to the SEUPB, thus providing a more decentralised management format in response to demands for a more bottom-up approach. This particular change was not initially welcomed, as: there was a well-established bureaucratic apparatus in the two finance departments for the development and implementation of EU programmes in both jurisdictions [and] it implied that civil servants from different administrative cultures would have to work in a co-operative process. Moreover, the SEUPB as an organisation would be beyond the direct control of either jurisdiction.376

Despite these reservations, the departments ‘transferred their joint roles as the central secretariat, monitoring, research, evaluation, technical assistance and development elements with respect to INTERREG (and Peace) to the new body’.377 Furthermore, the delivery and implementation of the programme was undertaken by a number of implementing agents, not just government departments as was previously the case, including the three cross-border (local authority) partnerships (the North West Region Cross Border Group [NWRCBG], Irish Central Border Area Network [ICBAN] and East Border Region Committee [EBRC]), ADM/CPA and Cooperation and Working Together (CAWT). This departure, particularly the considerably increased involvement of the three cross-border partnerships, was significant, as they had had a minimal role in the preparation of INTERREG II with participation limited to project promotion. Based on this experience and encouragement from the European Commission, their vision for further involvement in INTERREG III became ambitious and saw them jointly prepare a report on a ‘Border Corridor Strategy’ in 1998, outlining how they saw INTERREG III being implemented. However, the ability of the groups to persuade the two governments to give them a greater role would depend in some measure on the capacity for internal change in the partnerships involving wider civil society [which] posed a considerable challenge to the Border networks. They were originally established as local authority networks and all their experience was in the local tier of government.378

This demand was met with reservations from civil servants, local groups and other funding bodies, who voiced concerns about ‘capacity, control and the interaction between national policy and cross-border policy. There was also concern that the networks might follow a narrow local authority agenda and not represent the wider societal interest in their

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regions.’379 In 2001 an Action Team established to consider this role recommended a number of principles that would underlie future arrangements for the partnerships and, crucially, indicated support for them in a developmental, decision-making, consultative, representative and implementing role.380 Certainly there were a number of capacity issues to address but the importance of their consultative role in particular was demonstrated in practice ‘by the way in which the INTERREG IIIA programme is built around the Border Corridor Strategy’.381 Additionally, and probably due to the management decentralisation, the programme appeared to have a much stronger cross-border basis for its implementation due to ‘high levels of communications between Implementing Agents throughout the implementation of the Programme both through measure level meetings and to a lesser extent through attendance at the multi-level meetings’.382 This could only be a positive development, as the point has been made that ‘we’ve come across people in government departments, North and South, in the same departments, same names, same activities, same responsibilities, who had been implementing INTERREG I and INTERREG II and they didn’t know each other’.383 This decentralised management approach and increase in local involvement in the implementation of the programme lent itself to a considerable improvement in the development and integration of vertical and horizontal capacity, suggesting that ‘there is a real attempt to facilitate greater local level actor involvement in the management and delivery of the INTERREG III programme’.384 Moreover, the mid-term evaluation concluded positively that ‘the Partnerships represent a unique feature of the implementation of INTERREG IIIA. They offer a bottom-up approach to implementation, an increased awareness of the programme and provide the opportunity to address issues in the Border Corridor through a partnership approach.’385 While increasing the number of implementing agencies could give rise to complex administration arrangements, this did not appear to create any real difficulties for INTERREG III. In terms of the Monitoring Committee, its wide representation, established under INTERREG II to oversee the programme, was continued with INTERREG III, with twenty-eight members representing a broad range of actors from both sides of the border. Flexible funding The funding allocations between the various measures of INTERREG III moved away from large-scale infrastructural projects towards flexible funding of economic and social/community development. However, the evaluators struggled with the softer Measure focusing on Social and

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Community Infrastructure, as ‘the objectives of this Measure are less tangible than some of the other Measures and this makes it difficult to quantify its objectives’;386 this reflects Pugh’s criticisms of the existing funding culture’s preference for concrete schemes and outputs. The limited implementation of the programme following on from such a late start was a worrying feature. Additionally, up to 30 September 2003 there was a very high rejection rate of applications received, with 61 per cent rejected. Although there was an improvement on INTERREG II in terms of the number of genuinely cross-border projects approved, the mid-term evaluation pointed out that ‘it appears that there remains some ambiguity in relation to the term “cross border”’.387 This was in spite of attempts by the SEUPB to make people aware of the criteria.388 Indeed, in terms of the number of applications received up to that date, 124 were made by lead partners of projects from Northern Ireland, forty-one from those in the Border Counties and ten from ‘other’ areas of Dublin.389 Thus, ‘an implication arising from the slow start of the Programme is that it tends to lead to the selection of projects which can be implemented and completed quickly. This can have a tendency to limit the potential for a strategic approach to the implementation of Measures.’390 INTERREG I, II and IIIA – impacts INTERREG will now be assessed in more detail against the five criteria in order to fully understand its impacts as a conflict transformation tool, bearing in mind that a detailed assessment is not easily ascertained when the difficulties outlined earlier are considered. An attempt has been made to address the root causes of the conflict thus bringing about substantial changes in the social and economic structures of society While INTERREG may be the weakest of the three tools in terms of its conflict transformation ability, it has, nevertheless, gone some way towards attempting to address the root causes of the conflict through its social and more particularly economic targeting, as it has been ‘purely focused on dealing with social and economic disadvantage in the border region. And one of the causes of conflict has been the disadvantage. So INTERREG, in dealing with the disadvantage has made a significant impact on it.’391 However, as highlighted earlier, not all agree that INTERREG had a role in addressing conflict transformation, much less the root causes of the conflict: it’s been helpful but again it goes back to the fact that INTERREG wasn’t designed as a conflict resolution tool. I think it’s fortunate that as we’re coming out of conflict that INTERREG’s about. The key criteria is not

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about addressing the issues of conflict, it’s about dealing with the social and economic disadvantage [that] people in border regions suffer from. It’s coincidental that people have suffered greatly from the conflict socially and economically but you don’t have to have suffered from conflict to benefit from INTERREG. It’s not a necessary requirement.392

This position surely stems from an unfamiliarity with the nuances of the conflict management discourse; here INTERREG is considered a tool of transformation not resolution. Therefore, despite being ‘entirely designed to tackle the economic conditions that the border created’,393 it is nonetheless argued that the programmes have gone some way towards attempting to address the root causes and bring about substantial changes in the social and economic structures of a border region. This, however, has only begun to show now with the third (and fourth) phases of the programme, as the first two programmes were much more economic in nature. The mid-term evaluation of INTERREG II highlighted the limited employment opportunities produced by projects, particularly the temporary opportunities associated with public-sector infrastructural projects,394 thus epitomising Pugh’s criticisms – project-dominated concrete schemes with big visible outputs. This infrastructural concentration was justified by pointing to the existence of an infrastructural deficit because of the imposition of a physical international border; INTERREG I and II laid the foundations to allow the necessary change and development required for INTERREG IIIA to begin tackling social development. Moreover, as each phase of the programme evolved, it provided for the ‘continued formalisation of quite ad hoc kind of thinking so that we have a statement of the kind of projects that we expect to represent true cross-border projects, we’re much clearer about that now; it would have been much less formalised going back’.395 In attempting to change the social and economic societal structures, INTERREG, like the other two tools, does not exist ‘to displace or replace the responsibilities of the national authorities. It’s natural that neighbours should be talking … should be doing business with each other … should be about free movement both politically and socially. For one reason or another that has not happened and we’re hopefully trying to change that.’396 Having said that, it is clear that the programme has at times become a substitute for government action in tackling the social and particularly the economic structural causes of poverty, an issue which, unusually, elicited a candid response from those at the top level; ‘sometimes I do detect a little bit of an attitude in the cross-border working – where it’s a cross-border issue, it’s left to INTERREG or Peace to kind of tackle them’.397

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The changes achieved by INTERREG in terms of structures are pro­­ ducing changes, particularly in terms of INTERREG IIIA, which is ‘creating an opportunity for hot housing changes that could be hugely significant. I think the scope for making really long-term effects on how we are operating are extreme and if we can do it, nobody else has solved this yet, and that can be rolled out in other areas throughout Europe, the effects can be enormous.’398 Vertical and horizontal capacity has been developed and integrated through the involvement of all levels of society in the transformation process thus enabling the empowerment of the society’s citizens The difficulties experienced by INTERREG in terms of developing and integrating vertical and horizontal capacity, particularly in its early days, were documented earlier and for the most part were similar to, if not worse than, the IFI experience. This was largely due to INTERREG’s highly centralised management set-up. Having learned from this difficulty, albeit slowly, the programme’s third phase has gone a considerable way towards enabling this capacity. In assessing INTERREG I–III two points must be made in relation to the development aims of INTERREG I. First, Laffan and Payne note that: a key phrase in the guidelines was that the programme should address the ‘interests of the local population.’ This was the first expression of a need to concentrate on the local, and is echoed in the second aim of creating and developing linkages and networks across borders and between communities. These are the beginnings of what would later become the emphasis on a ‘bottom-up’ approach … [and secondly] over the course of INTERREG, these two tenets of ‘bottom-up’ mobilisations and ‘genuine cross-border’ evolved and became central to Commission thinking on the use of these funds. In essence INTERREG was perceived in the Commission as the Union’s policy instrument to create the capacity within border regions for ‘bottom-up’ development. The key features of its model of capacity building encompassed the identification of obstacles and limits, multi-annual programming, local mobilisation and institutionalisation.399

Furthermore, the official ex-post evaluation report of the (European) INTERREG II initiative supports the notion of involving all levels of society as it states: both the formal partnership (Monitoring Committee, steering committee and working groups, joint secretariat) and the overall (informal) crossborder cooperation ‘culture’ are of crucial importance. The former should be as broad and inclusive (enlarged partnership) in terms of the categories of actors involved, and should achieve a high degree of joint decision-making at strategic level, and joint action at operational level. The formal structures

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and procedures should be underpinned by a strong and well established ‘cooperation culture’ between citizens, businesses and institutions in order to succeed.400

From a transformational perspective, these sentiments are impressive. However, in practice, the first INTERREG programme quite simply failed to develop and integrate any vertical capacity or, to a lesser extent, horizontal capacity, as it largely failed to meet its own programme aims and those of the Commission, partly because all of this was fiercely resisted by the two government departments of finance, which maintained a highly centralised control of the programme and resisted the inclusion of the widest representation of society on the Monitoring Committee of the second programme. The charge that there was a lack of local consultation at the grassroots level, despite the INTERREG I programme documentation stating otherwise, was described by one top-level actor as ‘an interesting proposition … if the document said that … [they] consulted and everybody signed up to it then that [the charge] appears to be a total lie’;401 this response was justified by a further comment that the charge of a lack of consultation indicated ‘an interesting view about what the INTERREG programme was for. It’s a much less community focused programme, it’s about bigger infrastructural-type actions.’402 Certainly, INTERREG I was implemented some time before these top-level actors were in place. However, in questioning the validity of the notion that there was a connection between the lack of local consultation and the lack of genuine cross-border projects and the limited results achieved by INTERREG I, this commentary provides an illuminating insight into centralised government thinking. The lack of vertical and horizontal capacity development and integration was maintained in the second programme as the decision-making process continued to be of a highly centralised nature, with ‘generally no involvement from wider ­societal interests’.403 Indeed the experiences of the cross-border networks (NWRCBG, ICBAN and EBRC) bear testimony to this, in terms of how they had to fight to gain a substantial role in the delivery of INTERREG III. Moreover, Europewide, ‘Strand IIA … did not attain a particularly high level of integration in programme management structures and procedures.’404 Nevertheless, the Commission plan that the programme should become its instrument for bottom-up development was finally adhered to under INTERREG III, as the Monitoring Committee had a broad representation from all sectors of the community and there was greatly increased communication between the implementing agents, as outlined earlier.405 This was further reinforced because the programme measures for INTERREG IIIA were delivered by a range of agencies (the three cross-border partnerships, ADM/CPA and Co-operation Ireland, CAWT

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and six government departments); this much more decentralised mechanism was a highly improved development from the earlier centralised delivery method. In addition, the SEUPB’s role as the managing authority (as well as the paying authority and the joint secretariat) for INTERREG IIIA enabled a culture change to take place ‘in terms of how organisations work together’.406 Its sole dedication to implementing INTERREG (and Peace) ensured a degree of specialism and knowledge that provided a commitment to the process that may not have existed beforehand: there is a high degree of scepticism about the workings of government, that it’s invisible. The lack of transparency [and] secrecy around decision making has created a great deal of scepticism about whether government departments are fair in what they do and the transparency that’s in the decision making process. People really dislike the fact that many decisions in government lack transparency and they don’t know who makes the decisions, they don’t know who takes too long. I mean there’s a certain validity in the way government departments operate [but] I do think that our separateness from them helps in a lot of different ways. And also if you are a civil servant in Northern Ireland in DFP or a civil servant in DOF, you’re still only operating in one jurisdiction, cooperating [with] somebody in another. We’re working across the two jurisdictions so we’re seeing [and] … working with those differences on a day-to-day basis … that does help as well in understanding how things operate, we can be a driver for change.407

On the whole, despite taking the long way round, INTERREG has now certainly impacted on the development and integration of vertical and horizontal capacity across the various levels of society, thus enabling the empowerment of the region’s citizens in the transformation process: we’ve a very inclusive Monitoring Committee from both parts of the island and across all sectors ... We also have the Steering Committee … which makes the decisions which again is very inclusive. And then at a lower level we have a very inclusive and engaging system particularly through the INTERREG IIIA partnerships, where again social partners are assessing and making recommendations; so at all levels, Monitoring Committee, Steering Committee and [cross-border] partnerships; local people best know the local problems and best know the local solutions. So they make a very valuable and a very valid contribution.408

A long-term view has been taken of the transformation process A micro approach to the INTERREG programme would view its overall long-term nature as questionable. Unlike the IFI, INTERREG is a Community initiative; despite the fact that it has been in existence for a long period (since 1990), this has been by virtue of its linkage to the EU’s Structural Funds. Therefore, although it has had all the ­characteristics

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of a long-term programme in theory, in practice its future has been in doubt as each programme has come to an end and negotiations for a new programme have had to be waited out. In itself the programme was constrained by the European regulations that created and governed it. However, in questioning whether the three years lost by INTERREG IIIA from 2000 to 2002 damaged the long-term prospects of the programme, while it is accepted that ‘it hadn’t been to its benefit and it’s regrettable that it took so long to get it up, partly as a result of the political situation in Northern Ireland … there won’t be any loss in terms of resources to the Border Region, those resources will be more concentrated’.409 Unfortunately this goes against the grain of long-term transformation thinking, and as INTERREG, unlike the Peace programmes, does not ‘core fund organisations, there isn’t that tendency on the direct funding that there might have been in other programmes’;410 there is no feeling of urgency in terms of continuity or sustainability, thus ensuring a persistent unfamiliarity with the nuances of conflict management within this particular top level. Discussions with the managing authority on the long-term aspect of INTERREG in terms of conflict transformation illustrated (disturbingly) an unfamiliarity with the nuances of conflict transformation and the difficulty thus created in trying to assess its impact on this issue. Moreover, the authority’s perception of ‘long-term’ clearly lay within a narrow literal understanding of bureaucratic regulations for an operational plan. Nevertheless, a macro approach would suggest the opposite point of view. The managing authority was never in doubt about follow-on programmes, nor felt that INTERREG’s long-term focus was undermined by a need to achieve rapid successes in each phase of the programme in order to safeguard follow-up funding: because we’re part of this European-wide programme, there’s a sense of security in the fact that we know, across Europe, that programmes are running and being implemented quite successfully and that current thinking at Commission level means that there will be another programme so there isn’t that imperative to be that successful other than the fact that we want to be successful within the programme objectives. So no, we don’t have fear of saying well where is our next programme coming from?411

The tools used were tailored to suit the particular situation thus facilitating peacebuilding rather than imposing or dictating terms The barrage of criticism that INTERREG faced in its early years would suggest that it had not been tailored to suit the particular situation that was the Northern Ireland conflict. By way of an overall defence the point has been made that:

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the INTERREG [III] programmes since then have established guidelines for, there was fifteen, now twenty-five countries, all with their own particular set of circumstances, so the best anyone can be relied on to do is to establish that framework and then within that framework you try and tailor it to your specifics. In terms of Ireland/Northern Ireland I think the specifics were very different from the rest of Europe. So it’s impossible to tailor it specifically and even within the framework under which everybody had to operate, that was the situation in Ireland/Northern Ireland.412

The Europe-wide INTERREG II ex-post evaluation report found that: In programmes that achieved significant results and impacts an ‘appropriate’ strategy was clearly visible. In the context of Strand A, such strategies had the following characteristics: joint development; good focus on a small number of objectives and priorities; a realistic approach in terms of the resources available and the preparedness of potential project promoters; fitting the programme into a longer-term strategy (from INTERREG I to II and beyond) with both the necessary element of continuity and a gradual evolution of objectives and priorities (from reducing isolation and strengthening cooperation, to launching common actions for economic development and improvements to the quality of life).413

This suggests a tailored programme which suited the particular situation and was in a position to facilitate a transformation process. This was the case for the smaller programmes across Europe; the Ireland/ Northern Ireland programme, unfortunately, was considered a larger programme. Moreover, the mid-term evaluation report of the Ireland/ Northern Ireland INTERREG II programme revealed that a significant percentage of applicants had problems with the programme; 47 per cent found the completion of the application process difficult or intractable, over 54 per cent found the extent of the feedback/consultation since submitting their application to be poor or very poor, 40 per cent found it difficult to obtain information and over 74 per cent felt that publicity and awareness locally of INTERREG II was less than adequate.414 These issues reflected the bureaucratic difficulties experienced at the grassroots under the Peace programmes, again suggesting a far from tailored tool. Added to this, the managing authority: don’t believe any particular part of the INTERREG II programme was unsuccessful; all the money was expended, all the projects and programmes were oversubscribed, all the projects delivered on their objectives or the vast majority, so it was successful in each of the sectors. From our perspective, one of the failures of it was the fact that it wasn’t true cross-border but it was cross-border in the way that cross-border was defined in those times.415

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This precisely coincides with the ‘tick-box’ culture that Pugh criticised, again reflecting the lack of understanding among top-level actors of conflict transformation theory and practice. Nevertheless, it appears that, as INTERREG has developed, it has learned to adapt its approach more to the changing situation that it has found itself in. The INTERREG II ex-post evaluation found that within Ireland/Northern Ireland (a large project category) there were ‘positive changes in the state of isolation: improved permeability across land border, better external connections, improved public transport [along with] qualitatively improved formal cooperation’;416 these were largely minor changes to the existing state of isolation, characterised as ‘links available but day-to-day contact not feasible’, and the existing state of cooperation, characterised as ‘informal cooperation and partial formal cooperation in programme design/management’.417 In its third phase it finally came to grips with the true meaning of the term ‘cross-border’ with regard to the projects it funded and its cross-border management structures:418 ‘we’re dealing with the social and structural disadvantage that was in the border region. I think we have learned certainly from our experience … Our objectives have changed, we have moved from the totally physical investment through to the physical and people investment. There was no people investment in those days [INTERREG I & II], it went all into the structural.’419 Overall, despite the various criticisms of INTERREG I and II and the issues that arose, probably their greatest impact was the basis they provided for more genuine conflict transformation to take place in the post-ceasefire stage in terms of preparing the groundwork and giving people experience. Vertical capacity has been achieved through the inclusion of a wider range of social partners in the Monitoring Committee and implementing agencies, and horizontal capacity through the decentralised management set-up and the fact that those within government departments now dialogue with each other: ‘public servants for generations have been used to doing things to people, for people and now it’s very much and because I think the structural funds and the type of impact that they’re having, they’re doing things with people.’420 The tools have not done any harm On the whole, INTERREG has not done any harm per se in terms of the actual projects it has funded. However, in terms of social and particularly economic development, this is not the case: like the other tools considered here it has created the expectation that there will always be an INTERREG programme of sorts, as ‘it has created expectations in the community and voluntary sector in particular which may not endure,

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which may not buy into mainstreaming or other activities, other sources of funds and that might be harmful’.421 This issue affects not just the grassroots but the middle as well: ‘what you have there is local partnerships on a cross-border basis, local councillors, local partnerships, working together with social partners … it’s very integrated, very local and very involved and if INTERREG disappeared then that driving force of local democracy would have no hope on a cross-border basis’.422 As to whether the termination of the INTERREG programme would precipitate the total disintegration of these cross-border relationships it is difficult to judge, since some of them have been operational for years: Councils have always been helping each other, for the last twenty years they’ve been talking to each other – when you’ve got Donegal Council and Derry [City] Council willing to meet in the Council chamber and discuss what the issues are … When they’ve got those choices and that really makes them talk, it makes them engage, it makes them understand what the issues are in other people’s areas, it’s not as strange and then that makes them think, it makes that engagement all the more possible. So a possible harm would be if that disappeared, it would lose that interest.423

The centralised, top-down approach of using government departments to manage and implement INTERREG I and II was more harmful than the decentralised bottom-up approach of the SEUPB, an issue which is magnified when compared to the operational support provided by the SEUPB for INTERREG III: European funding is an addition to this and so therefore it wasn’t the core priority, whereas it is our number one priority … we’re very close to our constituency, we understand the problems and we can interpret the problems in a way that some down in Dublin haven’t got the time to do. We can coordinate then, on a programme wide-basis because what had happened in the past is each government department were doing a wee bit but they didn’t talk to each other and there was no coordination. What we do is we still have those folks involved but we have them all in here under us and we make sure that they talk to each other … It helps people deliver better services, to know what someone else is doing and that’s been a significant development between INTERREG II and INTERREG III brought about by us being here.424

This sea change has certainly not been easy: In the operational aspects of government departments, they did find it very difficult to accept what we did. They also found it very difficult to accept that we had the right to go in and audit what they do, monitor government, audit government departments. It was culturally very different – they were very shocked by it [but] our engagement has changed the relationship. It drives better projects and we’ve got better decision making, much quicker

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decision making. Particularly in INTERREG, I think government departments have found this really difficult that their decisions had to go to [the Steering Committee] and the Steering Committee overturned many, many decisions which government departments [made].425

Although the managing authority felt that INTERREG has not done any harm, it was pointed out that ‘the whole point about European funds is that they skew funding; they set priorities that may be different from national priorities. They focus money in different ways and INTERREG is a non-additional programme so it actually skews its expenditure and if that’s harm, it’s harm that’s done.’426 In returning to Pugh’s criticism of donors reinforcing a funder-centred top-down approach in terms of fixed projects, it was further argued ‘that’s consistent with what I’m saying, it skews the money towards the agenda of the Programme and … towards the agenda of the donor because each of the funds has got its own rules’.427 In further addressing Pugh’s other criticism of the limited attention given to social development type projects, it was argued that: if you go back to what its objectives are, the structures are put in place [to] allow us to meet the objectives of INTERREG, so if we’re guilty of that we’re guilty of the objectives that are established. INTERREG is not a programme for social reconstruction, INTERREG is dealing with, particularly the physical infrastructure, some issues are on social infrastructure so all our tasks and all our energies are delivering it. So I suppose yes, we are guilty of it but not guilty because we’re doing the wrong thing, but guilty because we’re doing what we are supposed to do right.428

This is certainly true if one looks at INTERREG strictly through an economic development lens. However, in examining the programme as a transformation tool, INTERREG has, in the past, been guilty of the shortcomings identified by Pugh. Again, it is postulated that the programme, like the others, has, at times, been used as a substitute for government action, particularly in terms of the infrastructural projects it has funded. Nevertheless, the benefits, particularly of phase III, far outweigh any possible harm that may have been created. At a minimum, projects have contributed immensely to the transformation of the conflict through social and economic d ­ evelopment: I think you start to see benefits. I think the waste ad[vertisement] [Race Against Waste] is a very good example of the kind of thing that’s good – the disposal of waste cuts across all boundaries. It’s no good having the jurisdiction-only response; that kind of logic of breaking down the barrier of only being able to act in your own back yard and being able to act cooperatively with others to solve the same problem I think is the good effects of the INTERREG point of view – that’s all through the whole island so that kind of thing’s a good response. Things like the technology,

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the ­telecommunications and IT and health, they are just so stunning in their simplicity and huge potential application all through the whole [island].429

The management of the programme by the SEUPB has also provided for transformational changes at the top levels of society, such as ‘the perspective of the governments involved: we have struggled hard to appear as a blip on their horizon because some of the money we’re talking about is beyond the decimal point in their budgets. We are so small in terms of their overall budget but to try and create an agenda that recognises that there is value in cross-border working. The Programmes have contributed greatly to that.’430 Furthermore, as INTERREG has developed it has ‘facilitate[d] the development of the citizen to participate in the activities of the state and cross-border’.431 These two achievements alone have ensured that INTERREG has played its role in impacting on the development and integration of vertical and horizontal capacity, which, although there is a considerable way to go, is now at an unprecedented level in this region. Conclusion Northern Ireland and the Border Counties have experienced a variety of approaches to conflict transformation through social and economic development under these three tools. In assessing their impacts on practice the overwhelming consensus of those at all three levels of Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid is that social and economic development is one of the essential elements of the transformation process, for ‘we cannot have constitutional stability without political stability and you can’t have political stability without economic stability. It just doesn’t happen.’432 When it does happen, however, it happens because ‘it’s the communities who make that peace, it’s certainly not the politicians on their own’.433 By extension, the belief is also held that (crucially in some cases) social and economic cooperation can spill over into political cooperation, but only if it is done properly. At its most simplistic, nationally and internationally, the example of the European Union itself has been highlighted: ‘what has happened in the European idea where they started with economics because that was the most neutral thing that people could buy into but because the economics worked, they were able to proceed politically’.434 More locally, however, ‘the setting up of the Partnership Boards was some useful social engineering when it brought people from different sides together’.435 Initial observations and experiences hinted at the three programmes, at least in their early days, being open to Pugh’s earlier criticisms; this

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e­xamination suggests otherwise. The tools have evolved considerably during their lifetimes, despite meeting resistance to change from some quarters (more usually than not from top-level actors – governments, politicians and civil servants). The Peace programmes always funded both social and economic projects, with Peace I having a more social focus and Peace II having a more economic focus, while the INTERREG programmes (to a limited extent) and the IFI have moved from big concrete projects to softer projects and processes. While the Republic’s ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy created increased business opportunities for many Northern businesses and softened many long-held Unionist viewpoints of the Republic, all three programmes have enabled this process to take place. The three programmes have demonstrated positive and negative aspects in their practice and, consequently, impacts. On the one hand, the voice, involvement and ownership given to communities have been key strengths of the Peace programmes and the IFI, with the use of IFBs and District Partnerships/LSPs to implement the transformation process proving to have been the shining lights of the Peace programmes, while the ‘first money on the table’ approach of the IFI has been key to its success. On the other hand, we have seen the difficulties that complex structures, excessive bureaucracy and top-heavy centralised management approaches can create; the lack of consultation in the early days of INTERREG proved to be its Achilles heel. Difficulties in terms of sustainability and creating a dependency culture have also been highlighted. More disturbing, however, has been the fundamental lack of understanding of conflict transformation displayed by those charged with managing these transformation tools and, by extension, the region’s transformation process. All these issues point to unnecessary difficulties being created by the lack of a government conflict transformation policy framework and the continuing definitional morass that surrounds conflict transformation theoretics. Some of the tools have begun the process of looking to the future; the IFI has set out its future vision through its exit strategy while a number of the Peace programme IFBs, in looking beyond the lifetime of Peace II for example, through extensive consultations have endeavoured to ascertain what future support might look like in this context. While a tool such as the Peace programmes has a limited impact when faced with continuing social and political problems, not least fragile political institutions, it does clarify that ‘economic growth and social inclusion are vital elements of any public policy agenda in the modern era but they cannot simply be subsumed within a peace programme and funded out of the pot of support for peace-building’.436 Quite simply, the programmes show

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how investment in infrastructure and service development, training and engagement is essential for the social and economic reconstruction of societies emerging from conflict. They have also created ‘an environment where applicants have had to think about other communities and the needs that exist there’.437 The three tools have highlighted that the conflict transformation process in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties is far from perfect. However, without them, ‘the entire responsibility of peace would be consigned exclusively to the politicians and civil servants with no involvement of civil society, no interaction with the wider community, with political parties alone holding an active stake in the peace process’.438 While a limited understanding of the impact of conflict transformation activities makes them difficult to evaluate, one thing is certain – these three tools are just some of the chapters in a much larger and more complex story that has yet to reach its conclusion. Despite that conclusion being many years away, the impact assessments provided here are sufficient to allow an examination of the implications of using social and economic development as part of the conflict transformation process, and to develop recommendations that can be transferred to other societies engaging in conflict transformation practice. Notes 1 ADM, CPA, Co-operation Ireland, The Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, The Special European Union Programmes Body. Building on Peace. Supporting Peace and Reconciliation after 2006 (Monaghan: ADM/ CPA, 2003), p. 183. This would equally apply to the IFI and INTERREG. 2 M. Pugh, ‘The Social-Civil Dimension’, in M. Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 115. 3 Ibid., pp. 119–20. 4 C.E.B. Brett, ‘The International Fund for Ireland 1986-1989’, Political Quarterly, 61 (1990), 431. 5 International Fund for Ireland, Annual Report 1986/87 (Dublin/Belfast: IFI, 1988), p. 3. 6 Brett, ‘The International Fund for Ireland’, p. 431. 7 Ibid., p. 436. 8 Ibid., p. 439. 9 See articles, editorials and letters in the News Letter from 1985–86. 10 ‘Blood Money Not Acceptable’, News Letter, 30 November 1985. The agreement referred to was the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 11 ‘McCusker Blasts US Aid Package During Visit’, News Letter, 24 June 1986. 12 ‘US Consul is Told IFI is Failing Protestants’, Derry Journal, 8 September 1995; ‘Fund Rejects Report of Bias against Unionists’, Irish Times, 3 November 1995.

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13 ‘IFI is Fully Accountable’, Sunday Independent, 12 November 1995. William McCarter was chairman of the IFI from 1992 until February 2005. 14 KPMG Management Consulting, The International Fund for Ireland. Assessment of the Fund’s Impact on Contact, Dialogue and Reconciliation Between the Communities and on Employment (May 1995), pp. 17, 22; Commission of the European Communities, Report on the International Fund for Ireland Pursuant to Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 214/2000 (Brussels: European Commission, 2001), p. 13. 15 International Fund for Ireland, Annual Report 1996 (Dublin/Belfast: IFI, 1997), p. 18. 16 International Fund for Ireland, Annual Report and Accounts 2004 (Dublin/ Belfast: IFI, 2005), p. 6. 17 KPMG Consulting, Colin Stutt Consulting and NIERC, The International Fund for Ireland. Assessment of the Impacts of the International Fund for Ireland 1987–1997. Executive Summary (October 1998), p. iii. 18 KPMG, The International Fund for Ireland, p. 16. 19 Deloitte MCS Limited, International Fund for Ireland, External Review, Final Report (Belfast, April 2005), pp. 14–18. 20 KPMG Consulting, in association with Colin Stutt, Colin Stutt Consulting; Raymond Burke, Raymond Burke Consulting and Maureen O Reilly, Northern Ireland Economic Research Centre, The International Fund for Ireland. Assessment of the Fund’s Impacts to 30 September 2000 (October 2001), p. 9 (emphasis in original text). 21 Brett, ‘The International Fund for Ireland’, pp. 437–40. 22 Court of Auditors (European), Special Report No. 7/2000 Concerning the International Fund for Ireland and the Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland (1995 to 1999), Together with the Commission’s Replies (Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors, 2000), p. 3. 23 Ibid., p. 7. 24 These included the KPMG Impact Assessments (May 1995, October 1998 and October 2001) and the ECA special report previously discussed, along with the 1999 Commission report to the EC Budget Authority, the 2000 USAID audit, audits by the European Commission services, 2001 NISRA Impact Study on Northern Ireland and a draft audit report by PricewaterhouseCoopers. 25 Commission of the European Communities, Report on the International Fund for Ireland, p. 14. 26 Ibid., p. 13. 27 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 28 Middle/top-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2006. 29 Middle/top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 30 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 31 Ibid. 32 Top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 33 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006.

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4 Top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 3 35 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 36 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 13 January 2005. 37 International Fund for Ireland, Sharing This Space. A Strategic Framework for Action 2006–2010 (Dublin/Belfast: IFI, 2006). The IFI’s exit strategy does not necessarily imply that it has ceased to be active. Although it is working towards an eventual exit in winding down all expenditure, it has, for example, launched a Strategic Framework for Action 2012–15, while recognising that its pre-2010 levels of financial support cannot be maintained. 38 Top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 39 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 13 January 2005. The interviewee is referring to funders in general, not the IFI exclusively. 43 Top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 44 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 45 Top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 46 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2006. 47 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 13 January 2005. 48 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2006. 49 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 54 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 55 KPMG Consulting et al., The International Fund for Ireland. 56 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 57 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2006. 58 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 59 Ibid. 60 Top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 64 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2006. 65 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 66 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2006. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 See ADM et al., Building on Peace. 70 Commission of the European Communities, Report on the International Fund for Ireland, p. 23. 71 International Fund for Ireland, Sharing this Space, p. 1. 72 Top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005.

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73 Commission of the European Communities, Report on the International Fund for Ireland, p. 18. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. (emphasis in original text). 76 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 77 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 13 January 2005. 78 John Hume, author interview, 27 July 2006. 79 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 80 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 81 International Fund for Ireland, Annual Report & Accounts 2005 (Dublin/ Belfast: IFI, 2006), p. 4. 82 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2006. 83 International Fund for Ireland, Annual Report and Accounts 2011 (Dublin/ Belfast: IFI, 2010), p. 4. 84 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 85 However, it has been argued that ‘people are maybe suffering a little bit from short-term memory loss … because there really was not a single hotel open at one point in Northern Ireland as a result of the economic campaign that was waged by the IRA and it had an absolutely devastating effect on communities North and South of the border; in the long-term the Fund will actually be able to stand over a lot of those decisions, in that it brought jobs and hope and opportunities to those regions that would otherwise have been wiped out. It’s very easy now to criticise the IFI when you look at Ireland North and South and see a proliferation of golf courses and hotels – you would think well, what on earth would any organisation have wanted to subsidise that for? But that was not what it was like in the late eighties at all.’ Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 86 Top/middle-level actor, author interview, 13 January 2005. 87 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 88 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 89 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2006. 90 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 91 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 92 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 93 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2005. 94 Top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 95 Deloitte MCS Limited, International Fund for Ireland, p. 17. 96 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 97 Top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 98 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 99 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2006. 100 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 101 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 13 January 2005. 102 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Update of Peace II Programme, Executive Summary (Belfast: PwC, 2005), p. 5. 103 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I and

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Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II, Final Report (Belfast: PwC, 2003), p. 57. 104 SEUPB information request, 28 May 2012. This is based on a download of the SEUPB central database dated 30 September 2010. The PEACE III information is based on internal SEUPB information, accurate at 28 May 2012 but subject to change as the programme continues through to 2013. 105 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. 293. 106 B. Harvey, Report on Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (York: Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 1997), pp. 10, 66. 107 ADM/CPA Programme for Peace and Reconciliation, Socio-Economic Development, Reconciliation and Cross Border Work in the Southern Border Counties of Ireland, A Review of the Operation of the ADM/CPA Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Monaghan: ADM/CPA, 1999), p. 17; ADM et al., Building on Peace, p. 120. 108 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, pp. xi–xii, 60. 109 Ibid., p. 39. 110 Ibid., p. 49. 111 See Harvey, Report on Programme, p. 44. 112 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 113 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 114 Middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 115 Technically, small grants were available under Peace II. However, the huge application process and monitoring and reporting requirements were the same for a grant of €3,000 as for a grant of €300,000, ensuring that ‘it was just an impossible application process for small grants: nobody said you couldn’t apply but it wasn’t worth the effort. There was no structures to allow it to happen’ (middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005). 116 ADM/CPA, Response to SEUPB Consultation on Peace II Extension (Monaghan: ADM/CPA, August 2004), p. 7. 117 CPA, Tackling Poverty. A Priority for Peace. Submission to the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation (Dublin: CPA, 1994), p. 3. 118 Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust, Peace: An Opportunity for Change. Responses to the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust Community Priority Survey (Belfast: NIVT, 1995), pp. 14–15. 119 CPA, Tackling Poverty, p. 5. 120 H. Johnston, ‘Peace Process Needs to Focus on Poverty and Inequality’, Irish Times, 1 September 2004. Johnston was director of the CPA at the time. 121 D. Morrow, ‘Introduction. Beyond the Emerald Curtain? Cross-Border Peace-Building in Ireland’, in Community Relations Council, Bordering on Peace? Learning from the Cross-Border Experience of Peace II. Learning from Peace II, Volume 4 (Belfast: CRC, 2006), p. 5. 122 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 11 April 2005. A number of other interviewees expressed a similar opinion. 123 Community Relations Council, Growing Better, Together. Pathways to Reconciliation (Belfast: CRC, n.d.), p. 10. 124 Quoted in Harvey, Report on Programme, p. 16.

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125 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. 30. 126 Coopers & Lybrand, Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland 1995-1999. Mid-Term Evaluation Final Report (July 1997), p. xxiii. 127 B. Harvey, Review of the Peace II Programme (York: Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2003), p. 12. 128 B. Harvey, Report on Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. Summary of the Report for the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (York: Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 1997), p. 3. 129 Harvey, Report on Programme, p. 20. 130 P. Logue, ‘Cross-Border Reconciliation and Development’, in Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks for Peace II (Belfast: CFNI, 2002), p. 88. 131 Harvey, Summary of the Report, p. 3. 132 Harvey, Report on Programme, p. 19. 133 Middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 134 D. Morrow, ‘Foreword. The Churches and Peace Building in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties: Learning from Peace II’, in Community Relations Council, Beyond Sectarianism? The Churches and Ten Years of the Peace Process. Learning from Peace II, Volume 1 (Belfast: CRC, 2004), p. 7. 135 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. xiii. 136 Top/middle-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 137 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. 110. 138 Ibid. 139 Court of Auditors (European), Special Report No 7/2000, p. 10. 140 Ibid., p. 13. P & R is another name for Peace I. 141 See PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, pp. 110–13 for a detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the IFBs. 142 Harvey, Report on Programme, p. 65. 143 Ibid. 144 B. Harvey, A. Kelly, S. McGearty and S. Murray, The Emerald Curtain. The Social Impact of the Irish Border (Carrickmacross: Triskele Community Training and Development, 2005), p. 129. 145 Harvey, Review of the Peace II Programme, p. 45. 146 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Update of the Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II 2000–2006. Final Report (Belfast: PwC, 2005), p. 16. 147 Ibid., p. 65. 148 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. 278. 149 NICVA, in association with the Community Workers Co-operative, Designing Peace III (Belfast, April 2004), p. 20. 150 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 13 January 2005. 151 House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Peace II. Seventh Report of Session 2002–03 Volume 1 (London: Stationery Office, 2003), p.  14. 152 Ibid., p. 31. 153 Ibid., p. 29.

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154 P. McGinn, ‘Delivering Peace at Local Level – The Practical Experience’, in Community Relations Council, Shaping and Delivering Peace at Local Level? Learning from the Experience of Peace II. Learning from Peace II, Volume 3 (Belfast: CRC, 2005), p. 22. This comment relates specifically to the Border Counties. 155 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 156 Harvey, Review of the Peace II Programme, p. 9. 157 Middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 158 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks, p. 31. 159 Ibid., p. 5. 160 Ibid. 161 Harvey, Review of the Peace II Programme, p. 53. 162 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks, p. 83. 163 Grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 December 2004. 164 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks, p. 12. 165 Ibid., p. 22. 166 Ibid. 167 Harvey, Review of the Peace II Programme, p. 8. 168 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks, p. 82. 169 Harvey, Review of the Peace II Programme, p. 34. 170 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. 209. 171 Ibid., p. 124. 172 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Peace II Qualitative Assessment of the Economic Measures. The EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace II) (Belfast: SEUPB, 2005), p. 19. 173 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 174 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Peace II, p. 46. 175 Ibid., p. 5. 176 D. Morrow, ‘Introduction. Rebuilding the Marketplace: Peace II and Economic Investment’, in Community Relations Council, Prosperity: A Part of Peace? Learning from the Economic Experience of Peace II. Learning from Peace II, Volume 2 (Belfast: CRC, 2005), p. 5. 177 Ibid., p. 6. 178 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Update of the Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II, p. 77. 179 Northern Ireland’s MEPs, Ian Paisley, John Hume, Jim Nicholson, Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland Revisited. Report to Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission (October 1997), p. 5. 180 T. Haase in association with J. Pratschke, Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. An Estimate of Community Uptake (Dublin, 2003), p. 37.

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181 Progressive Unionist Party, Rebuttal of the First Report of the International Monitoring Committee (Belfast: PUP, 2004), para. 3.4. It has been pointed out that this goes back to the ‘Hurd principles … when Douglas Hurd was Secretary of State [and] any group that applied for funding and had any connection whatsoever to a paramilitary group, no matter when it was, wouldn’t have got through. And those Hurd principles then were done away … but a lot of people were of the impression that privately that’s one of the problems that perhaps it’s the backdoor of the Hurd principles’ (top/ grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2006). 182 J. McAllister, Consultation Submission, SEUPB – ‘Peace II Extension 2005– 2006’ (Belfast, 2004), www.seupb.org (accessed 15 November 2004). 183 HELM Corporation in association with T. Haase and J. Pratschke, Community Uptake Analysis of Peace II. Special EU Programmes Body. A Study Undertaken for the Special European Union Programmes Body (Belfast: SEUPB, 2005), p. 5. 184 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Independent Review of the Community Uptake of Measure 2.7 of the Peace II Programme (Belfast: PwC, 2005), p.  30. 185 ‘Report Says Protestants Not Missing Out’, Derry Journal, 21 October 2005. 186 Haase and Pratschke, Special Support Programme, p. 18. 187 HELM Corporation, Community Uptake Analysis, p. 7. 188 Harvey, Review of the Peace II Programme, p. 40. 189 Haase and Pratschke, Special Support Programme, p. 8. 190 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks, p. 15. 191 Harvey, Review of the Peace II Programme, p. 22. 192 M. Morrissey, ‘The Role of Economic Development in Peace Building: Some Thoughts on Peace II’, in Community Relations Council, Prosperity: A Part of Peace?, p. 35. 193 Democratic Dialogue, ‘Structurally Unsound: The Northern Ireland Bids for Further EU Monies’, briefing paper (Belfast: Democratic Dialogue, 2000), p. 5. 194 Morrow, ‘Foreword. The Churches and Peace Building’, p. 6. 195 Top/middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 196 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 197 Middle-level actor, author interview, 3 December 2004. 198 Top/middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 199 Top/middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 200 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 201 Ibid. 202 SEUPB, Telling the Story of Peace II. An Assessment of the Impact of Peace II Funding in Strabane, East Belfast and Cavan (Belfast: SEUPB, 2004), p. 77. 203 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 204 Top/middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 205 Middle-level actor, author interview, 3 December 2004. 206 Ibid.

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207 Private information. 208 Top/middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 209 Top/middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 210 Middle-level actor, author interview, 3 December 2004. 211 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 212 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 213 Top/middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 214 Top/middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 215 Middle-level actor, author interview, 3 December 2004. 216 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 217 Ibid. 218 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 219 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks, p. 29. 220 Middle-level actor, author interview, 3 December 2004. 221 See SEUPB/Peace II Monitoring Committee, Attitudinal Survey. A NISRA Report for the Distinctiveness Working Group (Belfast: SEUPB, 2004). 222 S. Henry, ‘Shaping and Delivering Peace at Local Level – Learning from the Experience of Peace II’, in Community Relations Council, Shaping and Delivering Peace, p. 9. 223 Grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 December 2004. 224 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 225 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Update of the Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II, p. 22. 226 Harvey, Report on Programme, p. 21. 227 D. Morrow, ‘Introduction. Shaping our Shared Future’, in Community Relations Council, Shaping and Delivering Peace, p. 5. 228 Northern Ireland’s MEPs, Special Support Programme, p. 3. 229 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. 35. 230 Ibid., p. 60. 231 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks, p. 21. 232 Henry, ‘Shaping and Delivering Peace at Local Level’, p. 11. 233 See HELM Corporation, Community Uptake Analysis, p. 23. 234 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Update of Peace II, p. 6. 235 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 11 April 2005. 236 Harvey, Report on Programme, p. 29. 237 Court of Auditors (European), Special Report No 7/2000, p. 10. 238 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 239 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. This viewpoint was shared by a number of other interviewees. 240 Private information. 241 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. 244. 242 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 243 Ibid. 244 Middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004.

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245 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 246 Middle-level actor, author interview, 3 December 2004. 247 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 248 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 249 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 250 Ibid. 251 Participant comment at the SEUPB, ‘Peace II Extension 2005 to 2006 Consultation’, Derry, 7 September 2004. 252 Ibid. 253 See, for example, responses/submissions from Ards Borough Council, Belfast; Damien Conway, Dundalk; West Belfast Economic Forum etc. (www.seupb.org, accessed 28 September 2004). 254 Response from West Belfast Economic Forum to SEUPB, ‘Peace II E ­ xtension 2005 to 2006 Consultation’ (www.seupb.org, accessed 28 September 2004). 255 Participant comment at SEUPB public discussion meeting on the European Territorial Co-operation Programmes 2007–2013 (Peace III and INTERREG IV), Derry, 15 June 2006. 256 Northern Ireland’s MEPs, Special Support Programme, pp. 6–7. 257 Middle-level actor, author interview, 21 July 2005. 258 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 259 Participant comment at the SEUPB ‘Peace II Extension 2005 to 2006 Consultation’, Derry, 7 September 2004. 260 Participant comment at ‘Peace II Cross-Border Consortium IFB’s Seminars for Project Promoters’ (ADM/CPA, Co-operation Ireland & Community Foundation for NI) No. 3 – Hopes for Peace, Dundalk, 3 September 2004. 261 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. 280. 262 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 11 April 2005. 263 Middle-level actor, author interview (1), 3 December 2004. 264 Middle-level actor, author interview (2), 3 December 2004. 265 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 266 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Update of Peace II, pp. 7–8. 267 Ibid., p. 9. 268 Court of Auditors (European), Special Report No 7/2000, pp. 8–9. 269 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks, p. 25. 270 NICVA, Assessment of the Impact of Gap/Interim Funding on the Sustainability of Voluntary and Community Sector Organisations (Belfast: NICVA, 2002), p. 3. There were in fact two rounds of gap funding allocated, which the CFNI refers to as gap I and gap II (Community Foundation for N ­ orthern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks, pp. 25–6). 271 Ibid. 272 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 273 House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Peace II, pp. 23–4. 274 S. Pettis, ‘Round Table Reflections’, in Community Relations Council, Shaping and Delivering Peace, p. 34. 275 F. Gaffikin, ‘Coping with Conflict in Peace Programmes’, in Community

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Relations Council, Shaping and Delivering Peace, p. 37. 276 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, pp. 224–5. 277 Ibid., pp. 226–7. 278 Ibid. 279 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Update of Peace II, p. 8. 280 Middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2005. 281 Middle-level actor, author interview, 21 July 2005. 282 Grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 December 2004. 283 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. In terms of social inclusion, one interviewee even questioned ‘why would you expect them to be sustainable in the first place?’ (middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005). 284 See statement by NICVA referred to in House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Peace II, p. 19. This viewpoint was concurred with by practically all of those interviewed. 285 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 286 Ibid. 287 Grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 December 2004. 288 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 289 Johnston, ‘Peace Process Needs to Focus on Poverty and Inequality’. 290 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Update of the Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II, p. 64. 291 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 292 Gaffikin, ‘Coping with Conflict’, p. 49. 293 Middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 294 Although some would argue that in the case of Peace II the final programme document did not represent what was espoused at the consultations. One interviewee claimed that ‘there was a lot of consultation around it but whether actually anything was actually taken out of it or not I don’t really know’ (top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005). Another stated ‘I was very involved through the consultative forum in Peace I and thought the consultation and the key recommendations of that were not reflected in Peace II. I don’t know why they bother doing it’ (grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 December 2004). 295 Middle-level actor, author interview, 21 July 2005. 296 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 297 B. Hamber and G. Kelly, ‘A Working Definition of Reconciliation’, in SEUPB, Preparation of Operational Programmes for the EU Programme for Cross Border Territorial Cooperation and the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 2007-2013. Discussion Document. (Belfast/ Omagh/Monaghan: SEUPB, 2006), p. 16. Originally developed by Hamber and Kelly for Democratic Dialogue in June 2004, this working definition contains five interconnected strands. 298 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 299 Middle-level actor, author interview, 21 July 2005. 300 Ibid.

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301 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 302 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 303 Gaffikin, ‘Coping with Conflict’, p. 37. 304 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 11 April 2005. 305 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 306 Middle-level actor, author interview, 21 July 2005. 307 Ibid. 308 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. 287. 309 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Update of the Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II, p. 11. 310 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 311 Harvey, Review of the Peace II Programme, p. 53. Gaffikin has also pointed out that ‘a central weakness in Peace I was that it seemed indistinguishable from a traditional European regeneration and anti-poverty programme.’ See Gaffikin, ‘Coping with Conflict’, p. 37. 312 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 313 Haase and Pratschke, Special Support Programme, p. 37. 314 HELM Corporation, Community Uptake Analysis, p. 25. 315 Ibid., p. 27. 316 House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Peace II, p. 19. 317 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 318 Morrissey, ‘The Role of Economic Development’, p. 32. 319 Ibid., p. 35. 320 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks, p. 77. 321 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 322 Morrow, ‘Introduction: Rebuilding the Marketplace’, p. 6. 323 Ibid. 324 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 325 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 326 Henry, ‘Shaping and Delivering Peace at Local Level’, p. 12. 327 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I, p. 160. 328 Ibid., p. 273. 329 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Update of the Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II, p. 58. 330 Middle-level actor, author interview (1), 21 July 2005. 331 Ibid. 332 Middle-level actor, author interview (2), 21 July 2005. 333 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005 (also top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005). 334 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 335 Middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 336 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 337 Ibid. 338 Middle-level actor, author interview, 21 July 2005. The ‘programmes that were already there’ refers to the IFI and the INTERREG programmes.

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339 J. Dennison, ‘Preface’, in Community Relations Council, Prosperity: A Part of Peace?, p. 4. 340 Morrow, ‘Introduction. Beyond the Emerald Curtain?’, p. 5. 341 H. Keery, ‘Economically Focused Peace Building – The Practical Experience. How Economic Projects Can Aid Peace and Reconciliation’, in Community Relations Council, Prosperity: A Part of Peace?, p. 22. 342 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks for Peace, p. 7. 343 Pugh, ‘The Social-Civil Dimension’, p. 120. 344 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 345 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 11 April 2005. 346 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 347 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 11 April 2005. 348 Ibid. 349 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 350 Middle-level actor, author interview, 14 December 2004. 351 Middle-level actor, author interview, 21 July 2005. 352 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 353 Official Journal of the European Communities, Court of Auditors Annual Report Concerning the Financial Year 1994, C 303, Volume 38 (14 November 1995), p. 114. 354 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 355 L. O’Dowd and J. Corrigan, ‘Buffer Zone or Bridge: Local Responses to Cross-Border Economic Co-operation in the Irish Border Region’, Administration, 42:4 (1995), 346. 356 B. Laffan and D. Payne, Creating Living Institutions. EU Cross-Border Co-operation After the Good Friday Agreement (UCD/Armagh: Institute for British-Irish Studies/Centre for Cross Border Studies, 2001), p. 47. 357 Coopers & Lybrand/INDECON International Economic Consultants/ Department of Finance/Department of Finance and Personnel, Mid-Term Evaluation of INTERREG II. Final Report to INTERREG Monitoring Committee (May 1997), p. 176. 358 Official Journal of the European Communities, Court of Auditors Annual Report, p. 116. 359 Ibid. 360 L. O’Dowd, J. Corrigan and T. Moore, ‘Borders, National Sovereignty and European Integration: The British-Irish Case’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 19:2 (1995), p. 280. 361 Ibid., p. 284. The process referred to is that of cross-border cooperation. 362 Laffan and Payne, Creating Living Institutions, p. 58. 363 Official Journal of the European Communities, Court of Auditors Annual Report, p. 126. 364 Laffan and Payne, Creating Living Institutions, p. 31. 365 Ibid., p. 72. 366 Ibid. 367 Ibid., p. 73.

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368 Coopers & Lybrand et al., Mid-Term Evaluation of INTERREG II, p. 139. 369 Ibid., p. 146. 370 LRDP Ltd, in association with IfG Institut for Græseregionsforskning (DK); ÖIR Österreichisches Institut für Raumplanung (AT); KANTOR Management Consultants s.a. (GR); IDOM Ingenieria y Consultoria (ES) and in cooperation with Levón Institute, University of Vaasa (FIN); Research voor Beleid International (NL); Gruppo Soges S.p.A. (I); Agence Europeénne “Territoires et Synergies” (FR) and EUR CONSULT s.a. (L), Ex-Post Evaluation of the INTERREG II Community Initiative (1994–99). Brief Report (London: LRDP, December 2003, revised), p. 13 (this is the ex-post evaluation report for the Europe-wide INTERREG II programme, not specifically the Ireland/Northern Ireland programme for which a report was not commissioned). This comment did not relate to Ireland/Northern Ireland which was characterised as being in a medium state of isolation with links available but day-to-day contact not feasible due to time, distance, frequency of services, cost etc.; its state of cooperation was defined as informal cooperation with partial formal cooperation in programme design/ management (pp. 15–16). 371 Ibid., pp. 13–14. 372 Ibid., p. 17. 373 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Evaluation of INTERREG IIIA. Final Report (Belfast: PwC, 2003), p. 88. 30 September was the cut-off date for the mid-term evaluation research, making commentary on the achievements of the programme at that stage very difficult. 374 Laffan and Payne, Creating Living Institutions, p. 108. 375 Ibid., p. 110. 376 Ibid., p. 89. 377 Ibid., p. 90. 378 Ibid., p. 102. Inclusion of Unionist political representatives has also been problematic; see, for example, ‘Unionist Wants Funding Halted to Cross-Border Group’, Derry Journal, 2 June 2006, which refers to complaints by UUP MEP Jim Nicholson about Unionist under-representation on ICBAN. 379 Ibid., p. 105. 380 Ibid., p. 120. 381 Ibid., p. 125. 382 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Evaluation of INTERREG IIIA, p. 37. 383 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 384 Laffan and Payne, Creating Living Institutions, p. 115. 385 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Evaluation of INTERREG IIIA, p. 37. 386 Ibid., p. 67. 387 Ibid., p. 95. 388 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 389 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Evaluation of INTERREG IIIA, p. 73.

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390 Ibid., p. 89. 391 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 392 Ibid. 393 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 394 Coopers & Lybrand et al., Mid-Term Evaluation, p. 162. 395 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 396 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 397 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 398 Ibid. 399 Laffan and Payne, Creating Living Institutions, pp. 29–30. 400 LRDP et al., Ex-Post Evaluation of the INTERREG II, p. 24. 401 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 402 Ibid. 403 Laffan and Payne, Creating Living Institutions, p. 85. 404 LRDP et al., Ex-Post Evaluation of the INTERREG II, p. 13. 405 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Evaluation of INTERREG IIIA, p. 37. 406 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 407 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 408 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 409 Ibid. 410 Ibid. 411 Ibid. 412 Ibid. 413 LRDP et al., Ex-Post Evaluation of the INTERREG II, p. 24. 414 Coopers & Lybrand et al., Mid-Term Evaluation, Table 9.15, p. 183. 415 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 416 LRDP et al., Ex-Post Evaluation of the INTERREG II, p. 15. 417 Ibid. 418 CSES/Panteia, Ex-Post Evaluation of the INTERREG III ­Community Initiative Task 5: In-Depth Analysis of a Representative Sample of Pro­­gram­­­­­mes, Programme: INTERREG IIIA Ireland – Northern Ireland (CSES, 2009), p.  6. 419 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 420 Ibid. 421 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 422 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 423 Ibid. 424 Ibid. 425 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 426 Ibid. 427 Ibid. 428 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 429 Top-level actor, author interview, 4 January 2005. 430 Ibid. 431 Top-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005.

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432 Grassroots/middle­-level actor, author interview, 13 January 2005. 433 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 434 Middle/top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 435 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 436 SEUPB, Telling the Story, p. 77. 437 G. McCullough, ‘Telling the Story of Peace II. An Assessment of the Impact of Peace II Funding in Strabane, East Belfast and Cavan’, in Community Relations Council, Shaping and Delivering Peace, p. 30. 438 Logue, ‘Cross-Border Reconciliation and Development’, p. 90.

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part iii

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Learning and recommendations

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5

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Lessons learned, implications and recommendations for practice

This assessment to date has delivered some stark insights: conflict is a costly experience with no quick-fix solutions to sustainable conflict transformation. Transforming a violent society into one that allows societal structures and levels to co-exist peacefully is a complex, multi-faceted and long-term task. It is worth noting that ‘social and economic issues cannot be simply divided and pursued separately … there is no such thing as a simple social or economic programme, but … change in one can have profound impact on the other. Both involve people and relationships, and neither has a tidy edge where one begins and the other ends.’1 Disturbingly, however, the collective work of the three tools, particularly that of the Peace programmes, illustrates how ‘there is still a lack of systematic thinking about how social and economic policy can be used to promote peace and a perceptible weakness in theoretical knowledge about the precise links between economic development, social inclusion and reconciliation’.2 This is despite practitioners believing that social and economic development has a central role to play, arguing that: where there is economic instability and deprivation, then that can always be manipulated for even malevolent political purposes. You want to try and remove that as a fundamental basis and then allow normal political dialogue to take place. All you can do is create the conditions whereby you prevent disadvantage being the reason for not cooperating in other areas of life.3

This is supported by a belief among interviewees that economic (and social) development can spill over to political cooperation. Key to this is the building of relationships that often did not previously exist, as the INTERREG III Steering Committee demonstrates: ‘every investment we make is on a cross-border basis and every decision is made by … working together and making decisions on every project for the greater good and … the fact that people recognise disadvantage outside their garden and being big enough to deal with it’.4 However, translating economic cooperation into political cooperation means that political

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Learning and recommendations

structures are required in order to make policy decisions: ‘ideally if the Good Friday structures were working then you would have structures which would allow economic and social cooperation to be translated into political cooperation; people would find that by cooperating on things for mutual benefit in the areas of the economy, education, health, environment, energy, it will allow them to make the political decisions to cooperate at other levels’.5 This type of cooperation has to be ‘done properly’.6 The partnership boards under Peace could be considered ‘useful social engineering when it brought people from different sides together. And equally in terms of our work with groups we are funding, we had to provide a peacebuilding programme alongside that to bring those groups together and they came together because we were funding them.’7 When all of this is considered, together with changes in the region’s local post-ceasefire environment (the period 2000 until 2004 witnessed significant political upheaval, namely the collapse of the Assembly, which was suspended from October 2002 until May 2007, deepening community divisions in Northern Ireland and seeing the emergence of a more thuggish element and continuing economic structural challenges in the Border Counties),8 the need for a tailored, resourced and supported conflict transformation programme that respects the long-term nature of the process is further reinforced. What lessons, then, have been learned from these programmes? What are the implications of these lessons for those charged with implementing and managing conflict transformation processes? What recommendations can be made to other societies emerging from conflict and seeking successful and sustainable transformation? While all three tools are only part of this region’s overall conflict transformation process, they have been critical catalysts for change in enabling greater organisational capacity at the local level to contribute to the overall process.9 While the tools have shared a number of common problems, their combined experiences have reinforced the necessity of the five requirements outlined earlier for a successful conflict transformation process. A number of key lessons will now be examined in turn. International Fund for Ireland The implementation structures at the heart of the IFI have been its most valuable lesson. Its unique set-up, with an independent Board that could not be dictated to by government, with independent funding, the flexibility to draw up its own programmes and to decide on the timescale over which to spend its funding, has been crucial to its success in carrying out

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its work in a neutral manner, thus giving ‘a community in its own right, a negotiating position on its own behalf’.10 These structures allowed it to engage stakeholders at all levels of society ‘from the community, to agents on behalf of government, to government, to politicians; its [design] made sure that all parties were engaged and they were engaged in things that were of themselves not threatening so no one was giving up anything in order to sit at the table’.11 The international sources of the IFI’s funding and the initial difficulties it encountered in understanding its raison d’être highlight the absolute necessity of being unambiguous about what the basis of support for conflict transformation is about. This will avoid accusations of attempts to buy peace, while also ensuring that the emphasis is not placed on actions for which a consensus and outputs are easily acquired (usually economically based) at the expense of more difficult areas (usually socially or reconciliation based). The Fund’s flexibility and independent decision-making powers have ensured that in the main its work has been needs-led rather than funding-led; it has adapted when necessary to meet the ever-changing needs of communities. A key feature of this has been its ‘first money on the table’ or leverage role: this is ‘an absolutely key feature of the Fund and if it were to be replicated anywhere else, that should be a key feature because the people who are able to put the first money on the table are the key to get[ting] a lot of projects rolling’.12 In placing its trust in communities to be able to manage substantial amounts of money for the first time ‘it made us less dependent on central government. It has given us the freedom to respond to what we need rather than what government thinks we need.’13 This partnership approach has been crucial to its success. Another key feature of the IFI has been the importance it has placed on horizontal and vertical relationship building. While both are equally important, the Fund initially concentrated more on the horizontal at the grassroots and middle level during the mid-conflict phase (highlighting ‘the degree of support and personal interaction that is required often to get a community group on its feet’).14 The vertical gained more value in the post-ceasefire phase, particularly in Northern Ireland, as such relationships were considered ‘much more advanced for obvious reasons in the South than in the North [but] you’re beginning to get vertical integration in the North.’15 This increased development of vertical relationships, particularly at the top levels, which played out in the joint management and delivery of programmes, has begun to trickle through to government thinking, as reflected in the publication of a number of key economic reports and plans.16

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The experience of the IFI has also been fundamental in highlighting the absolute necessity of a long-term commitment to conflict transformation work if it is to be successful: ‘on the programmes for young people we’ve learned that it’s really not enough to offer short school exchanges over a short period of time; you need a sustained programme, one that goes on for several months for the participants but one also that goes on for decades in terms of making a real impact on attitudes’.17 Valuable lessons have also been learned from an operational perspective regarding a number of issues that could not have been foreseen by those setting up the Fund and that others would do well to consider in terms of practical implementation. For example, the Fund is now exempt, after a struggle, from the Freedom of Information Act, but this caused it enormous difficulty in the past. The Fund was set up before this legislation was introduced in 1997 (amended in 2003) in the Republic and 2000 in the UK, but thereafter it was obliged to operate across two different jurisdictions with two different FOI regimes. This had serious implications for its venture capital companies, for example, which invest in stock and take equity in companies, information about which is commercially sensitive but which nonetheless might have been subject to enquiries through the FOI. British and Irish membership of the EU has also caused difficulties for the Fund, since this raised questions around competition laws, the funding of an organisation engaged in commercial practice in terms of state aid regulations and EU jurisdiction over US money. The evidence presented has also highlighted the importance of local consultation and the inclusion of the most disadvantaged and marginalised if the root causes of conflict are to be tackled. However, while local conditions should determine specific actions, central guidelines are necessary to ensure the generation of creative actions while also remaining focused on the transformation process. Operational difficulties aside, the IFI produced a very successful model, valuable for whole or partial replication elsewhere. Peace I, II and III The Peace programmes have provided the richest source of experiences from which to draw lessons. While one of their central difficulties was a lack of understanding of the root causes of the conflict, this was not their raison d’être. The combined efforts of the first two programmes highlighted a serious flaw in the region’s overall conflict transformation process – a clear lack of strategic thinking and planning on the fundamentals of conflict transformation from government about what

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such a process would look like, what it would require and how it would develop. The programmes also illustrated the implementation difficulties that arise when the basic terminology, intricacies and nuances of such processes are not well understood, either by those managing the process or by those implementing it on the ground: ‘a wide divergence exists among funding bodies over their understanding and interpretation of the [Peace II distinctiveness] criteria … research … has identified a spectrum of interpretations in the application of the criteria that stretches from general or undemanding interpretation … to those that insist on specific, measurable actions directed towards reconciliation’.18 The implications are serious; while having a large number of IFBs ensures the necessary and positive involvement of wider society in the process, it is questionable whether such numbers are progressive if, for example, interpretations of basic criteria remain unclear. This lack of understanding could have been remedied by engaging expertise at a much earlier stage, whereby pre-design: you get in the John Paul Lederachs and you put them to work saying ‘we need to devise a peace programme so we want to get the concepts right, we want to get the definitions right, we want to get the categories right. Now we’re going to give you serious money to spend the next year doing that for us’. Politicians don’t work like that. If you were doing it again you’d also put some money aside to plan this programme for the next five or ten or twenty years. Plan it.19

More so than the other tools, the Peace programmes have demonstrated that consulting widely (at all levels), at the design stage of the tool is crucial to the success of its implementation and consequently the overall transformation process. While the lessons highlighted from the IFI’s experience of local consultations are also true for the Peace programmes, a more critical lesson is that those consultations must be listened to – a two-way dialogue needs to be undertaken, not just consultations for consultation’s sake: people really need to look closely and listen to what people are saying and evaluate it properly and not allow the [design] process to be influenced by politicians and parliaments. We were put back a few years by moving from Peace I to Peace II. If it had been done in a more progressive sort of a way we’d have a lot more people involved. We narrowed the involvement in the Programmes far too much.20

The design and development of such programmes therefore needs freedom from government interference, which Peace II was felt by many to have been the victim of:

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that’s what affected the whole form of Peace II. It was the two departments in the North who had their print on it; its been very much led by the Department of Finance and they have a very strong economic focus and they’re politically motivated … they have to pander to the Unionist party and to the SDLP to a lesser extent but there was always this focus where you’d see a dividend going to economic development to keep the political powers happy, the key political parties at that time.21

This lessened the essence of the transformation mandate within Peace II. To objectively implement the transformation process, managing authorities need to maintain their independence from government, a critical success factor for the IFI. While there is certainly a need for government involvement, particularly in terms of sustainability, it has to be on an equal footing, with a participatory partnership approach maintained between the grassroots and top levels at all times, rather than a top-down only approach. Equally, a careful balance needs to be struck between social and economic development. Within Peace I: there was a lot of wishy-washy programmes but you had to expect some of them to be. It was meant to be a programme of risk, it was meant to take risks and understanding that some of them mightn’t work. But in that there was a whole wealth of really good projects and they could have been developed and brought forward into Peace II but they just couldn’t, it had become far too tight, far too much focus on the economic.22

A further fundamental consideration for the tool’s success is its source of funding. One of the lessons from the IFI that is also highlighted by the Peace programmes should be reiterated – the absolute necessity to be unambiguous about the basis of funding support for conflict transformation, to ensure that the responsibilities of tackling the more difficult areas of the transformation process are met, thus contributing to strategic thinking and planning about the process. The failure to do this can result in a variety of interpretations of basic criteria as highlighted earlier: Peace II highlighted the intricacies of this consideration in terms of the use made of EU Structural Funds to support the transformation effort. This funding was not ideal for this work as the regulations governing use and accountability stifled risk-taking, innovative and creativity. Mainstream Structural Funds certainly have advantages with regard to the level of funding available, but this has to be balanced against the level of complexity attached to it in terms of detailed bureaucracy and an inability to provide a tailored funding solution for conflict ­transformation: Greater flexibility is needed to allow the programme’s objectives to be met. Many of the day-to-day problems which have dogged Peace II have arisen

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as a consequence of the difficulty in creating a programme which provides a radical, customised ‘bottom-up’ solution to Northern Ireland’s specific problems and which is simultaneously a ‘top-down’ structural funds programme like any other for the purposes of monitoring and administration. One aspect has been grafted onto the other and it is not a perfect fit … It would be helpful if the European Council would recognise the special difficulties attached to the implementation of this radical scheme through its unique and diffuse partnership structure.23

EU structural funding, with its pedantic monitoring and reporting requirements (even when funding a conflict transformation tool), is not suitable for transformation actions such as small grants provision, certainly not when it is being accessed by those sectors with a weak community infrastructure – larger, more experienced organisations are better placed to meet stringent EU reporting requirements. This contrasts sharply with the IFI’s non-dependence on bureaucratic Structural Funds (and its associated bureaucracy) and consequent flexibility. The Peace programmes also clearly demonstrated that continuous and strategic evaluation is an essential part of the process in order to maintain an understanding of what is and is not working and to assist with future planning; individual evaluations of projects and various aspects of the programmes were carried out, but in a rather ad hoc way that was insufficiently coordinated. This knowledge needs to be used when developing future programmes; the experience of those involved with the Peace programmes has been that this was a weak aspect of the evaluation system, with IFBs pointing out that the learning that was captured was not implemented, while grassroots actors believed ‘an awful lot of the learning is fed back into a system that can’t really take it on board. It hasn’t the capacity and it can’t use it.’24 My own experience also testifies to this necessity; a huge oversight in the design of individual project evaluations funded by Peace II emerged retrospectively whereby ADM/CPA had to evaluate the reconciliation and human rights aspects of projects, since this was not an explicit requirement of compulsory project evaluations carried out by individual promoters. This was a glaringly obvious error which should not have happened with a conflict transformation tool having reconciliation as its central focus. A further lesson presented by the Peace programmes is the difficulty associated with the monitoring and evaluation of such a tool: one of the greatest challenges has been the ability to measure success (or otherwise) at a local level. Indicators easily show high levels of activity, huge numbers of jobs created, thousands participating in funded projects and receiving accreditation. However, transformational and reconciliation indicators are not as clear. Transformationally, it is critical that ‘investment should

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measure change – in structures, relationships, social capital and integration of economy and society – not outputs’.25 Thus the experience in the Border Counties has highlighted two fundamental considerations: Firstly, time and context are important factors in assessing the success of projects, initiatives and policies in peacebuilding and reconciliation. Peacebuilding is a long-term process and this will vary depending on a number of factors such as the stage of the peacebuilding process, history, location, and previous levels of violence. Secondly, qualitative, attitudinal and impact indicators are more important than quantitative and output indicators.26

Like the IFI, horizontal and vertical relationship building has been at the core of the transformational practice of the Peace programmes and has been another critical factor in their success, demonstrated by the successful use of bottom-up local and decentralised delivery mechanisms; ‘the bottom-up approach that was developed to deliver Peace I [and II] was important in encouraging the most marginalised in the community to participate, empowering them to build a new community infrastructure’.27 The lesson is blunt – the use of local delivery mechanisms is crucial to allowing a grassroots-led approach to transformation so that local ownership is taken of the process and progress and success are ensured, since: governments don’t have the trust of local communities, they’re too far removed geographically and everything else; civil servants sitting in offices in Belfast and Dublin, you can’t access … If you’re going to have funding programmes, it has to be done through people on the ground. You’re not going to achieve that unless you have intermediary structures.28

District Partnerships/LSPs have also provided an element of stability when the political faltered, as demonstrated during the tensions created by the marching seasons of the mid-1990s and with the disbandment of devolution from 2002–07; ‘so successful has the partnership approach proved throughout the region that many people, without prejudice to negotiations about an overall political settlement, have drawn attention to its longer term possibilities’.29 This relates particularly to proposed (but delayed) local government restructuring in Northern Ireland: ‘it is important that the skills and experience of the current partnerships are captured and transferred to the new structures, to maximise the effectiveness of the new local authorities in addressing issues of division and reconciliation’.30 However, the use of IFBs must be carefully managed on a number of fronts. First, their number should be restricted, since it was excessive in Northern Ireland for both programmes. However, this restriction should not be to the point of complete elimination, as Northern Ireland’s

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three MEPs would have preferred when, in comparing the usefulness of the District Partnerships to IFBs in 1997, they argued that ‘if it had been realised at the outset that the District Partnerships could become so effective, would so many intermediary funding bodies have been established? The answer is almost certainly “no”.’31 Seeking containment of the District Partnerships only, which are largely based within local government structures, is simply to miss the point of a bottom-up approach to transformation that enables the involvement of wider civil society. Eighteen LSPs operated under Peace II, too many for a region the size of Northern Ireland, reflecting the unwieldy local government structures. However, this issue should be approached cautiously, rather than going to the opposite extreme; the Peace III implementation structures essentially eliminated IFBs in favour of a much-enhanced role for local authorities and the SEUPB in terms of leading on its implementation. While this proposal was naturally welcomed by the local authorities,32 it created great concern within the community sector in terms of the operation of partnership in relation to their participation in the programme. In theory statutory bodies support the principle of partnership. The practice, however, has been somewhat different: the experiences of operating in partnership with the statutory sector in particular has left the vast majority of community sector organisations extremely wary and apprehensive about how it will operate in Peace III. The greatest concerns centred on the role of Local Authorities and Integrated Partnerships in the key area of Building Positive Relationship at the Local Level … partnership to date has not been experienced as a partnership of equals … the experience of participating in structures such as the County Development Boards has been of being a very small minority voice that has had difficulty being heard.33

Secondly, prudent consideration should be given to which organisations actually take on this role, being careful not to exclude community-based or non-governmental organisations well qualified to do so; it was disquieting that the implementation arrangements put forward for Peace III proposed a much more centralised approach which concentrated on statutory agencies and other government-led IFBs, such as the CCLTFs in the Border Counties which, it was maintained, ‘have built up a significant amount of capacity in applying the funds available from Peace II to local needs. [Thus] it is important that this capacity is retained and built on.’34 Thus the principal delivery mechanism for the programme is a Joint Technical Secretariat (SEUPB) which makes calls for proposals and assesses applications and presents them to the Steering Committee. The Monitoring Committee delegates responsibility for the selection of projects to Steering Committees which are constituted on

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a cross-border basis. The community and voluntary sector feared that: the task of assessing applications will become the job of Public Servants within the SEUPB who do not have direct knowledge and experience of groups working on the ground […] By far the greatest concern is the apparent lead role being given to the County Council Led Task Forces … giving a lead role to a Local Authority body will result in Local Authority led thinking. The lack of confidence of community groups in Local Authorities having a lead role in local partnerships may lead to a lack of participation in the programme. The capacity of these bodies to lead the implementation of peacebuilding initiatives is questioned.35

The reasoning for this change in delivery arrangements was given as ‘a widespread desire expressed for a decrease in the number of delivery bodies and the overall simplification of the Programme structures. In addition, the reduced overall budget … and the stipulation that a maximum of 6% can be allocated to Technical Assistance.’36 It was perhaps, on this occasion, a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Thirdly, the complexity of the structures put in place needs to be minimised – when the benefits of partnership, social inclusion and a bottom-up approach to consultation and control are balanced against the process required to achieve this – the complex delivery structures and practice – one has to ask whether the end result is worth it. Ultimately, in terms of transforming a society embedded in a protracted conflict into a society at peace with itself, the answer has to be yes and this was the overwhelming feeling among those involved in and who made use of the delivery structures. Furthermore, while it is certainly an expensive method of implementing the transformation process, it is an absolutely vital one if accessibility to the process is to be facilitated. Enabling the involvement of grassroots actors, particularly those citizens and communities considered marginal and disadvantaged, requires transformation tools to be accessible and the language of accessibility to be applied, hence the importance of tailoring the programmes to suit the particular situation. Such accessibility, applied correctly, enables the facilitation of transformation rather than its imposition. Certainly the IFBs and partnerships addressed the needs of targeted groups and communities, promoting ownership of activities; however, some felt there was still a need to ‘work proactively with the most marginalised groups but in a way that is more developmental perhaps than the Peace programme allowed us to do’.37 One of the more valuable ways of achieving this is by operating a small grants programme as Peace I did or working through development officers as some of the IFBs did. The excessive bureaucracy that plagued Peace II, and worsened during Peace III, has highlighted how crucial it is to avoid complexity; at the very

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least, the level of bureaucracy that typified the Peace programmes needs to be minimised as much as possible. Thus a decentralised approach to programme management and implementation is essential; the much simpler decentralised approach adopted for managing Peace I contrasted sharply with the centralised approach embraced by the SEUPB for Peace II, which increased under Peace III. Like the IFI, the Peace programmes have reinforced the need for conflict transformation to be a long-term process, highlighting the requirement for transformation tools that are long-term in defiance of the short-term of politics. The programmes have therefore been crucial in highlighting the necessity for government to have a conflict transformation policy which spans the long-term and consequently addresses the sustainability issue from the outset, during the design stage, not when the programme has begun and certainly not after it has moved on to further phases. The very nature of this type of work often does not allow for projects to be sustained. However, many good projects and the excellent transformation work they have undertaken have slipped through the sustainability net, causing unnecessary and untold damage to progress painstakingly nurtured and developed within communities. Again the necessary expertise would be invaluable: ‘You have to have conversations and discussions and negotiations with government so that the learning is taken into mainstream practice. In these areas that government works in that hasn’t [happened] … there’s no evidence of it; that just hasn’t been done.’38 Clearly, bridging the gap between the necessity for long-term sustainable peacebuilding and short-term government politics and foresight is a hugely difficult issue, but is an issue that nevertheless has to be addressed.39 This combination of lessons have led the Community Relations Council (CRC) to highlight how the Peace programmes have given rise to: three potentially very different models of peacebuilding … operating simultaneously, although in different proportions in different localities … [a] reconstruction [model with a] presupposition that economic prosperity is both a key dividend of peace and key driver to sustain peace […] [a] social inclusion [model for which] social inclusion is critical to peace … [and a] Shared Future [model whereby …] Europe’s £1bn act of solidarity … was and is based on a presumed commitment to a shared future based on non-violence, the rule of law, cross-border and international relations, power-sharing, equality and human rights. To take the money and not be committed to this is, in reality, to threaten bad faith.40

While this presents its own issues, a balanced combination of the three models, taking into account the lessons just outlined, would be worth striving for.

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INTERREG I, II and IIIA The experiences of the INTERREG programmes as a conflict transformation tool were less positive than those of the IFI and the Peace programmes. Nevertheless, they provide equally valuable lessons, serving to reinforce, in particular, the necessity of tailoring transformation tools to suit the particular situation. Key among these lessons has been the necessity of consulting those at all levels, particularly the grassroots. More so than the other two programmes, INTERREG I and II highlighted the difficulties that can arise when consultation is undertaken for consultation’s sake and not pursued as a shared dialogue: this lesson had clearly been taken on board as this tool moved into its fourth phase, adopting the same strategy as Peace III – preliminary consultations on INTERREG IV showed a need for local involvement if the tool was to impact locally. Through this a sense of ownership is given to the process, which is necessary for ensuring better success at both the micro and macro levels. The INTERREG programmes have also highlighted how a partnership approach, ensuring the joint development, management and implementation of programme activities, is crucial; this was clearly lacking in the early phases of the tool, resulting in extremely limited cross-border cooperation with inadequate accountability. This limited cooperation stemmed from a deficiency in strategic vision, a consequence once again of a lack of government policy in the area. This clearly highlights what many have bemoaned – a dependence on Europe rather than local government to provide strategic vision. Adopting a more strategic approach to investment has now been highlighted as a key lesson by the SEUPB,41 learning that was taken on board for INTERREG IIIA, which claims that ‘the inclusive nature of getting all the sectors involved is the legacy: the system and the process that we have developed of participation and local decisions’.42 During its fourth phase, participation requires joint activity in at least two of the areas of development, implementation, staffing or financing.43 Two related lessons have been the need to involve those at all levels in the management and implementation of the tool and the necessity of striking the correct balance in terms of management structures. INTERREG I and II were centrally managed and implemented by government, resulting in the restricted development of vertical and horizontal capacity and consequently reduced regional impacts. The onset of Peace I, with its wider societal involvement and a decentralised management structure, acted as a catalyst for change within INTERREG. Its centralised management structures became decentralised as it moved from the control of government departments to the SEUPB, subsequently creating

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a number of administrative structures which previously did not exist (the Joint Technical Secretariat and the Steering Committee) and giving grassroots actors increased involvement in monitoring through the inclusion of social partners on the Monitoring Committee and the widening of its delivery structures through ADM/CPA, Cooperation and Working Together (CAWT) and particularly the three cross-border partnerships. These improved relationships subsequently gave rise to more successful transformation activities, further reflected within INTERREG IIIA: ‘the models that we have of inclusion and decision making which ties everybody in and allows everybody’s voice to be heard, that’s important. We have processes too, when talking to government departments or our agents or whoever, that we talk to everybody at the one time. It allows a model of local democracy and local decision making.’44 However, this lesson also comes with a cautionary note; increased participation in the delivery and implementation structures runs the risk of creating complex administrative arrangements. The correct balance must be found or the difficulties that plagued the Peace programmes could arise. INTERREG, like the Peace programmes, has also been valuable in underscoring the need to maintain consistent follow-through as the tool moves from one phase to the next. The delayed start to INTERREG III (which lost three years), like the delayed start to Peace II, highlighted the damage such hold-ups can create, particularly in terms of diminishing confidence and capacity within communities. This is particularly detrimental when funding is derived from EU Structural Funds, which places unnecessary pressure to meet N+2 spending requirements and further lessens innovation within the process, particularly if projects are then taken on chiefly because they can be easily and quickly implemented. This lesson has been highlighted in the INTERREG IV Operational Programme, which noted the additional pressure this time-lag created in getting the INTERREG III programme up and running, limiting the time available ‘to develop the finer administrative details of the Programme such as producing guidance on the definition of programme co-operation, the absence of which caused much confusion and ambiguity during the initial stages’.45 Moreover, consistent follow-through is essential for assisting with sustainability efforts. The very fact that INTERREG has now moved into its fourth phase underscores the requirement to take a long-term view of the process. Indeed the INTERREG IV Operational Programme pointed out that, while ‘the previous INTERREG Programmes have made an important contribution to facilitating programme cooperation and promoting economic and social development[,] a sustained approach to programme development … is required to build on the progress made

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to date and address the economic and social problems inherent in the eligible region’.46 Unfortunately, this sustained approach does not take into consideration the specific need to address sustainability, reflecting the limited understanding of conflict transformation at the strategic level on the part of the governments of the UK and Ireland, and indeed, to a lesser extent, the European Union. The emphasis that INTERREG and the other two programmes have placed on the building of the capacity of local communities has partly resulted from the need for these communities to sustain the conflict transformation process within themselves. However, ongoing support from government is also required, and this has not been forthcoming. INTERREG has also highlighted the interlinked relationship between economic and social development. While all three phases of INTERREG have had a marked economic influence, this was particularly true for INTERREG I and II. As the tool moved into phase III (and phase IV), it has increasingly taken on projects with a more social dimension, further demonstrating this interlinked relationship. INTERREG also highlighted an aspect of Pugh’s criticisms of the difficulties faced by funding in dealing with qualitative development (‘because peacebuilding does not fit neatly within or between humanitarian relief and development’),47 an aspect that has also bedevilled the IFI and the Peace programmes: the inability of standard monitoring and evaluation to cope with qualitative measures. While this is partly because the basics, in terms of root causes of the conflict for example, cannot be agreed, more often it is because those charged with monitoring and evaluation, such as civil servants or auditors, are not suitably trained or experienced within the specialised transformation field. More use must therefore be made of field expertise to enable continuous learning and improved methods and demonstrate the effectiveness of conflict transformation. Implications for conflict transformation practice The collective lessons of these three transformation tools have serious implications for conflict transformation practice and learning. The most striking is the (often unnecessary) difficulties that can arise at all levels of society, particularly for those charged with the development, management and implementation of the process (and, consequently, for those at the grassroots who bear the brunt of it), because of a lack of specialist knowledge and understanding of conflict transformation theory and processes – the result mainly of the non-existence of a (government) conflict transformation policy coupled with a strategic conflict transformation planning deficit. This means that ‘a major strategic deficit exists between the articulation of policy’48 and efforts to translate existing prac-

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tice and experience into policy. This is all the more striking when one considers that successful conflict transformation is a long-term process. For any long-term process to work, policy guidelines and planning are essential; policy guidelines and planning operating at a strategic level, inclusive of the plethora of individuals and organisational interests at all levels and in both jurisdictions, is even more essential. Critically, however, it is not just a case of a new policy needing to be created; as Smith notes, there is also a requirement within the field for ‘better implementation through better coordination, better instruments and better use of existing ­instruments’.49 Lack of specialist conflict transformation knowledge and understanding It is clear that the definitional morass surrounding the conflict transformation field can seriously impede practice. The lack of any ‘single model of transformation’,50 coupled with multiple definitions and understandings within the literature and among those designing, managing and implementing the process, leaves the prospects for successful implementation open to countless and unnecessary difficulties and dangers, including the risk of failure. Of particular concern is the invitation that a lack of understanding of the conceptual basics gives to governments to shun their responsibilities in relation to meeting some of the fundamental requirements of conflict transformation, including developing a transformation policy framework and strategically planning its management and implementation over the long-term in order to ensure the sustainability of the process. This can leave the door open to a top-down only approach rather than a grassroots-led approach that receives top-level encouragement and support. While it can also act as an excuse for government interference or, worse, inaction, a lack of specialist knowledge and understanding can also lead those who are charged with the management and implementation of the process to believe that they are (or are not) delivering peacebuilding anyway, which can often be more dangerous that inaction. As Hamber and Kelly found with their working definition of reconciliation, the SEUPB: adopted a simplified version of our working definition … [whereby] applicants have to argue how their project furthers reconciliation in relation to at least three of the strands which are scored. The risk of this approach is that a dynamic conceptualisation of reconciliation could become mechanised and compartmentalised, and another ‘tick-box exercise’. We envisaged the five strands of reconciliation as being deeply interdependent and any reconciliation process should consider how it furthers reconciliation holistically and not based on a selection of strands.51

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More disturbingly, Smith has argued that ‘if there is any lack of clarity about peacebuilding, there will be a tendency to slip into a default mode of the concepts, approaches and vocabulary of normal (i.e., peace-time) development. This tendency may be particularly strong if the concepts and terminology of peacebuilding are unclear, as indeed they are.’52 While responsibility for this conceptual and terminological confusion largely lies with the fact that the conflict transformation field is still developing, local clarification in the Irish and British context is a necessity, as it has almost certainly contributed to the strategic policy and planning deficit in the field. Non-existent (government) conflict transformation policy What is glaringly absent from the Northern Ireland and Border Counties case study is an overarching policy structure. The lack of specialist conflict transformation knowledge and understanding discussed previously stems in part from this lack of conceptual transformation thinking due to the non-existence of a governmental policy framework. The criticisms levelled at the Peace programmes for failing to discuss the core issues of the conflict, the gaps in funding, the difficulties surrounding implementation timetables experienced by both the Peace and INTERREG programmes, and Unionist anger at the IFI in its early days all point to the need for both the Irish and British governments to put a conflict transformation policy in place. Moreover, ‘any overview of the plethora of cross-border projects and initiatives cannot fail to be struck by their varied and unsystematic nature. Some projects have been noticeably dynamic, others much less so. This has led organisations like Co-operation Ireland to call regularly for a more coherent, strategic policy framework for such co-operation.’53 At its most basic, both governments have spent billions of euros on each tool individually and collectively, money which, it could be argued, has not been used to full effect because of the lack of a strategic, long-term vision embodied in a transformation policy. A framework is needed if, at a minimum, scarce resources are not to be dissipated and the learning and practice from good projects not lost forever: this lack of a policy framework and institutional support for cross-border co-operation by governments in Belfast, Dublin and London severely limits its impact as a tool for long-term peacebuilding. Without such a framework the kind of shorter-term, capacity-building projects promoted by the Peace programmes will simply disappear into the sand, and much of the crossborder learning gained will go with them.54

When contrasted with other situations, the policy absence is even more disquieting. In examining the peacebuilding experiences of the peoples

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of the German–Dutch border in the aftermath of the Second World War, Pollak notes that ‘one key element that has been present in the German– Dutch drive for cross-border co-operation that is singularly absent in Ireland is some kind of overarching policy framework at government level’.55 This lack of policy has not been lost on those at the coalface of the transformation process either. NICVA and the all-island Community Workers Co-operative (CWC), in examining the scope of a potential Peace III programme, pointed out that ‘there is no body, architecture or system in place to sustain or drive north–south co-operation apart from ad hoc arrangements and the joint north–south bodies, which have important, but specific and limited remits’.56 Thus, Co-operation Ireland argues that: a strategic and developmental approach to the building of a coherent policy for North–South co-operation across all government departments and agencies, alongside a partnership approach with civil society to policy-making, should be adopted so that funding truly addresses need, duplication is avoided and models of best practice are developed. This approach could ensure that we genuinely use the space that structural changes have created to build peace on this island.57

This lack of policy presents serious consequences for the sustainability of the conflict transformation process; while a political framework, in the form of the Good Friday Agreement, was put in place by the two governments with support from all three levels of society, this constituted ‘a particular institutionalisation of three sets of relationships within a constitutional agreement’58 and as such represented only a small component of the transformation process. Thus, the political stalemate that surrounded the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement for four-and-a-half years, from October 2002 until May 2007, along with the increased polarisation of Northern Ireland politics and the financial reductions in the transformation tools, does not bode well for the successful sustainability of the process. Without an overarching framework to guide and indeed ground the process, any hope of it being sustained over the long-term, when the aforementioned factors are weighing heavily on it, risks extinction or, at the every least, is subject to what O’Dowd terms a ‘crisis of sustainability.’59 Simply put, a policy is needed if a piecemeal approach to transformation is to be avoided, sustainability of efforts are to be ensured and indeed maintained and clarity in terms of policy and practice in the conflict transformation field is to be provided. While formal research to date has not examined the consequences of this policy omission in either the Irish or British contexts, the lack of a live peacebuilding policy from the British government has been highlighted by Smith. In discussing the

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peacebuilding practice of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, he found that all countries ‘lack single official statements of their approach to peacebuilding – having, rather, a plethora of statements about aspects of their policy approaches’,60 with the UK not having a peacebuilding policy as such. While this specific study was carried out in the context of development cooperation, and hence did not include Northern Ireland within its frame of reference, it suggests that theoretically ‘a strategic assessment approach to Northern Ireland would be very worthwhile’61 as a basis for practical implementation. In the Irish context, a formal conflict transformation policy is also absent, as reflected by the incidence of brief allusions to peacebuilding mixed up with discussions on conflict resolution and prevention within the development cooperation field,62 which ignores Northern Ireland and highlights the clear lack of specialist knowledge and understanding of the specifics of conflict transformation. Moreover, for conflict transformation to take place over the long-term, it should be embedded in mainstream activities. While this is arguably already taking place in Northern Ireland (in the form of the central Community Relations Unit and the community relations units of each council), there are doubts about the efficacy of these structures. When a separate body like the CRC is established with a relatively small funding base, there are definite limitations on what it can achieve. Indeed, its function may be to legitimate the main departments ignoring the issue … [Thus], the idea … is to rationalise all that existing effort, by demanding that all statutory bodies have a clearly defined obligation to encourage peacebuilding and reconciliation.63

In other words, conflict transformation then becomes everyone’s business and responsibility, with a strategic conflict transformation policy ensuring this. Strategic conflict transformation planning deficit The need for a transformation policy framework also highlights a further linked implication, the need for conflict transformation and related policies to be strategic and therefore part of an overall planning framework. Conflict transformation is a multi-faceted process in which the huge range of activities involved are dependent on many other national, regional and local activities. Peacebuilding activities and conflict transformation processes are not simply stand-alone actions, separate from everyday life: ‘peacebuilding is strategic when resources, actors, and approaches are coordinated to accomplish multiple goals and address multiple issues for the long-term’.64

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The experiences of these three particular transformation tools have overwhelmingly demonstrated the range and depth of difficulties that can arise when clear and strategic thinking and planning are not employed to guide the process. A national government conflict transformation policy, in the same vein as the anti-poverty strategies, for example, strategically connected to national planning guidelines such as the Republic’s National Development Plans would provide for the strategic planning and development of the conflict transformation process. (It should be pointed out that in the context of the relationship between poverty and conflict, this is a two-way requirement – anti-poverty strategies must address the issue of conflict and its impacts.)65 Take, for example, the gap that emerged between Peace I and II; the difficulties faced by project promoters may well have been avoided, as ‘without exception, all respondents commented that if their organisations had known that gap/ interim funding would have run for this length of time [two years], things would have been different in strategic and planning terms’.66 This issue was also highlighted by the mid-term update of Peace II which pointed out that while bottom-up delivery mechanisms have their benefits, they require greater strategic direction; the local delivery bodies and particularly the LSPs ‘lacked strategic focus and faced difficulties in developing integrated local strategies in some cases’.67 Such a lack of strategic focus is to be expected if strategic planning is not shaped and driven at a national level. It has therefore been generally recognised that ‘if the outcomes from the Peace II Programme are to be sustained and reconciliation initiatives are to be developed, future initiatives could benefit from greater strategic linkage and an understanding of how they are located with other government initiatives’.68 The range of what appear to be worsening problems in the wider social, economic and political environment of Northern Ireland in particular have reinforced the argument that ‘any future peace-building programme should be capable of responding to these developments and linking with other policy responses such as the Shared Future Strategy in Northern Ireland and Anti-Poverty Strategy in Ireland’.69 Conflict transformation by its very nature requires a multi-dimensional approach to its implementation; what therefore makes it complex and demanding is the ‘necessity for multi-layered cooperation’.70 Thus, while the current operational programmes (2007–13) for INTERREG IV and Peace III claim to have taken this issue on board by highlighting the complementarity of the programmes (in the case of Peace III, for example, by outlining ‘the ways in which the Peace III Programme complements other relevant programmes and policy initiatives in Northern Ireland and the Border Region … the section identifies

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key strategic linkages and provides an understanding of how the Peace III Programme fits with other broader government initiatives’),71 it is only a highlighting exercise. While the proposed operation of this phase of these particular programmes can be linked to a range of other government policies and initiatives, this range of policies and initiatives do not strategically link themselves with the overall conflict transformation process as such and were not strategically developed with the conflict transformation process in mind (the exception being the proposed links to the IFI). In other words, they were not conflict transformation-proofed. Peace III and INTERREG IV are transformation tools which do not constitute a transformation policy, even less a transformation plan. The rolling out of such programmes over three to seven years, along with gestural references to them in only a couple of government documents and initiatives, goes nowhere near to meeting the existing strategic planning deficit simply because such efforts are not strategically connected within an overarching policy or plan either to efforts in the same field or to social, economic, political, environmental and cultural efforts overall. Such so-called strategic planning has not been properly formalised and written down. Often valuable information that could feed into strategic planning is not sourced or maintained for such purposes; ‘the rotation of personnel means that strategic understanding rotates away as well. Institutional memory seems to go back about three years, four at most; peacebuilding goes on for ten at least’,72 an issue perfectly illustrated by the move from Peace I to Peace II. Practitioners and policy makers alike should not be misled into thinking that ‘an impressive degree of on-the-ground coordination … is a valid substitute for the strategy they have not worked out. Coordination is only strategic if the actions being coordinated are serving joint strategies.’73 However, at the root of the strategic planning deficit is the short-sightedness of governments in general, who find it virtually impossible to see past the next election, a weakness not lost on practitioners such as Pollak, who has pointed out that ‘politicians, with their focus on the short-term electoral cycle, usually find it difficult to understand the importance of sustaining such programmes over the necessary longer term’,74 or theorists such as Ryan, who has observed that: it is remarkable how it [the international community] seems incapable of using this [transformation] knowledge in practice because of political expediency resulting in short-term thinking and not a little arrogance … how often are key post-conflict decisions made by governments because they have one eye on looming elections and what real effort do they make to understand the societies they have decided to intervene in?75

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A fundamental component of any strategic planning implementation and policy development process is the requirement for strategic impacts evaluation to provide learning for future planning and development, both within its own and other contexts, and to ensure that peacebuilding activities are not doing any harm or that resources are not being wasted. Conflict transformation is a painstakingly slow and indeed expensive trust-building exercise; any worthwhile evaluation of its impact must take place over decades rather than after the exhaustion of two- or threeyear funding programmes. However, this too is an area fraught with difficulties. In order to strategically plan for and subsequently evaluate conflict transformation, an analysis of the conflict is first required; ‘it is axiomatic that planning begins with analysis – treatment without diagnosis defies everything we regard as sensible’.76 Yet this analysis has often been lacking,77 and the Peace programmes were heavily criticised for not addressing this issue properly, while the IFI and early INTERREG programmes did not even attempt it. Moreover, ‘when there is analysis it often has clear flaws in the analytical framework and the underlying concepts’.78 Furthermore, conflict analysis is often confused with peace and conflict impact assessments (PCIAs), which come into play when one moves on to strategically evaluating the impact of the process. To add to the list, Smith has identified three major problems in the area of evaluation: ‘doubt about whether anybody pays attention to evaluations … the record of experience is, in general, in a condition that is difficult to access … [and] how to assess the impact of projects in contributing to peaceful relations’.79 The third problem listed is further complicated by the fact that ‘“complicated project implementation structures” also made it difficult to investigate impact … There is a great deal of confusion about peacebuilding evaluation, especially in relation to assessing impact, in part because of the similarity of the term with PCIA.’80 This book does not permit an in-depth discussion of these difficulties; suffice to agree with Smith’s conclusion that there is ‘as yet no science by which it is possible to assess accurately the peacebuilding impact of an individual project’81 or, indeed, an individual conflict transformation process. Moreover, in assessing peacebuilding activities in a number of countries, Smith has found that, rather oddly, there exists: the strange phenomenon of types of projects that seem particularly resistant to taking strategic considerations on board [including] socio-economic projects … economic development can have negative as well as positive effects. To ensure the latter, socio-economic projects need to be tested by a PCIA that connects them to the overall peacebuilding strategy in the beneficiary country.82

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Bush therefore recommends that:

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peace-building should not be regarded as a specific activity but as an impact. There is, therefore, a tremendous need to avoid “ghettoizing” peace-building as a type of project separate from “conventional” development. Rather, all development activities (especially those in environments of potential conflict) should be assessed in terms of their peace and conflict impact.83

Recommendations for conflict transformation practice The lessons learned from this research are innumerable and the implications stark, providing a prime position from which to offer practice-based recommendations to others. This discussion of the shortfalls of local practice in this region has, of course, enjoyed the benefit of hindsight, something that the Irish and British governments did not have – it is crucial that criticisms and the following recommendations are understood in light of this. Other societies emerging from conflict can profit from this region’s experience of years of peace and conflict research and practice, experiences both good and bad. These recommendations are not set in stone; they are living, breathing suggestions, subject to constant review and development, which should be part of the ongoing discourse on best practice. In making these recommendations, one is mindful of Hamber’s warning that ‘although peacemaking is a pragmatic task, peacebuilding is a vision orientated task. If fiscal and political pragmatism is allowed to determine an agenda for peace, peacebuilding is doomed from the outset.’84 Unfortunately this is already a reality in the region; in the Republic, for example, it has been argued that those at the top have come to believe that an increased role in society for those at the grassroots is an ideal that ‘has simply become too costly and inefficient. Rather than seeking to deepen the democratic character of politics and enrich citizen participation, the thrust of much political energy … has been to reduce the role of political participation altogether.’85 Consequently, conflict transformation requirements are pushed off the radar screen. Thus, while the transformation process in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties is far from perfect, with a long way to go in further developing understanding and actual practice of the peace agenda, a lot has been developed that can be shared. However, one is conscious that these recommendations are not of the ‘one cap fits all’ variety; all conflicts are unique, and these recommendations must be treated in the same vein. Nevertheless, most of these proposals are fundamental to successful conflict transformation taking place and need to be carefully considered. Although many

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Recommendations for conflict transformation practice  1

Clear working definitions and understandings are required

 2

The long-term nature of the work ahead needs to be recognised, accepted and planned for accordingly

 2.1

A conflict transformation policy and overarching planning framework is essential

 2.2

Sustainability is crucial and must be built into the transformation process and activities from the beginning

 2.3

Conflict transformation-proofing should be mandatory

 3

An attempt must be made to address the root causes of conflict

 4

Social and economic development are both required, not just one or the other

 4.1

Further research is needed on the role of social and economic issues as a cause of conflict and the link between social and economic development and transformation

 4.2

The debate on the contribution that business can make to conflict transformation needs to begin now

 5

Structured consultations that are listened to are necessary at the design stage of conflict transformation tools and processes

 6

Conflict transformation actions need to be targeted

 7

Assessment, monitoring, recording and evaluation must be properly thought out and designed, implemented from the beginning and maintained continuously over the long-term

 7.1

Monitoring indicators need to be transformation friendly

 7.2

Lessons learned need to be recorded for transferability

 8

A holistic partnership approach at all levels is crucial

 8.1

Citizen participation is crucial; participatory democracy is just as important as representative democracy and local ownership essential

 8.2

A middle ground must be fostered

 9

The use and role of local delivery mechanisms must be carefully considered

10

Top-level actors must be cognisant of the limitations they inflict on conflict transformation tools and processes

11

Funding sources must be carefully considered and demarcated for conflict transformation only

12

Transformation tools need to be responsive

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r­ ecommendations could be made, I have limited myself to twelve, albeit with a number of sub-recommendations. 1  Clear working definitions and understandings are required The definitional morass surrounding the conflict transformation field requires clarification in clear workable terms within the literature itself and by all those embarking on transforming conflict; a situation in which such clarity is provided only twelve years into the process, or in which process designers do not provide definitional clarity at the design stage, or in which process implementers lack an understanding of the basic concepts is detrimental to positive progress. There is also a need to ‘provide more explicit guidance to the peacemakers, those who negotiate peace agreements, in how to avoid the pitfalls they may be unwittingly setting up for peacebuilding’.86 From the outset the academic community has an important role to play, both in providing the field with clarity and in transmitting that clarity to practitioners and policy makers: if the basic concepts are ambiguous within the literature what hope is there that practitioners and policy makers will comprehend the complexities of such a process or that the process will succeed? 2  The long-term nature of the work ahead needs to be recognised, accepted and planned for accordingly 2.1  A conflict transformation policy and overarching planning framework is essential Conflict transformation is a long-term process and this needs to be recognised internally and externally by those at all levels of society; ‘external actors continue to assure that rebuilding war-torn societies is a short- to medium-term exercise that can be inserted into pre-defined bureaucratic plans and timetables. As a result assistance is often time-limited, irregular and inflexible.’87 In this region, despite progress to date, there remains a long road ahead and this should be recognised in a policy context. Thus, for any process or activity to succeed over the long-term, strategic policy guidelines and planning are needed, requiring initial and ongoing debate. Moreover, a mainstream budget line must accompany the policy framework if planning implementation is to be feasible. 2.2  Sustainability is crucial and must be built into the transformation process and activities from the beginning Conflict transformation processes and activities must be sustained over the long-term; addressing this issue just as projects or tools are reaching the end of their life cycle is unacceptable. Moreover, ‘long-term support is needed at community level to ensure inclusive local democracy, and

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inter-communal equity of regeneration and reconciliation capacity’.88 While not every action or project is capable of being sustained, the process as a whole must be, as ‘sustainable peace is only available on the basis of sustained effort’.89 The current situation means that analysts such as Hamber are not persuaded that: implicit within current funding strategies is a genuine appreciation of what ‘long-term’ commitment to peacebuilding and reconciliation process is, and what it involves … what is needed is a move away from an obsession with project-driven deadlines and targets with more attention being given to how do we deliver a sustainable, independent, active and cross-community civil society in the years to come. This is the task of funding agencies, government and organisations.90

In moving forward, it will be critical to the sustainability effort that ‘as we look into the future [sustainability] cannot depend entirely on endless grants from Europe … Instead of a single grant-giver, with all of the dangers of dependency and short-termism that that entails, ­sustainability will require a much more varied mix of funding and support ­mechanisms.’91 2.3  Conflict transformation-proofing should be mandatory In a divided society such as Northern Ireland, consideration should be given to conflict transformation-proofing all aspects of government policy development, in the same way that poverty-proofing is now a standard requirement within the social policy realm, if the process is to be embedded at the policy formulation and implementation level and sustainability ensured. Morrissey argues that: there is an overwhelming imperative to address peace and reconciliation issues, not as something extra … (once you have had everything else), but as intrinsic to the whole policy making process. Indeed, the debate over whether social or economic development better favour peace and reconciliation misses the point … What is crucial is how programmes are specifically designed to be peace relevant not whether they are about social inclusion or economic development. Like New TSN [Targeting Social Need], peace and reconciliation outcomes should be considered for every public policy intervention.92

Thus, if a conflict transformation policy had been in place in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties, ‘the key purpose of the [Peace] Programme[s] would be illustrative – testing new forms of intervention and new methods of peace building that are transferable to mainstream provision – i.e. the Programme[s] would be about transforming the public sector to the point where peace and reconciliation was part of its core business’.93 A combination of these three recommendations would provide for dealing with wider societal difficulties that many transformational

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tools aim to address during the process, ensuring that ‘any future peacebuilding programme should be capable of responding to these developments and be established within the context of other policy responses such as the “Shared Future Strategy” and the “Economic Vision for Northern Ireland” and the “Anti-Poverty Strategies” in Ireland’.94 Crucially, however, the requirement for conflict transformation-proofing to be mandatory would ensure that governments would be unable to go ahead with substantial expenditure or other policy development with little or no regard for the transformation of conflict. 3  An attempt must be made to address the root causes of conflict Many peace processes ‘concentrate on the manifestations of conflicts and often deflect attention away from the real business of peacemaking … yet despite micro-level changes, it is perfectly possible for the macrolevel dynamics of the conflict to survive largely unchanged’.95 Moreover, while direct violence may dissipate, structural violence often continues unabated; Northern Ireland has been no exception – a consensus has never been reached on the conflict’s underlying or immediate root causes. However, for the transformation process to succeed, an attempt must be made to address root causes, as this will guide and shape the transformation process and tools; dealing with direct violence only while paying minimal attention to structural violence will ensure the persistence of Lederach’s justice gap rather than the sustainability of peace. For conflict to be truly transformed those caught up in it must focus on ‘how to create and sustain a platform capable of generating adaptive change processes that address both the episodic expression of the conflict and the epicenter of the conflictive relational context … The creation of such a platform … is one of the fundamental building blocks for supporting constructive social change over time.’96 While addressing the root causes of conflict is extremely difficult, particularly when more support has been provided for ‘the study and development of methodologies and practice for reducing direct violence than in transforming structural violence’,97 attempts must be made nonetheless. The balance of support provision must be adjusted so that equivalent levels of support are provided for reducing direct violence and transforming structural violence. Moreover, it is crucial that all levels move towards integrating ‘social justice building with direct violence reducing processes’.98 4  Social and economic development are both required, not just one or the other Social and economic development both have critical contributions to make to the transformation of conflict; neither are clear-cut separate

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entities that can be pursued independently – ‘economic aid on its own is not a panacea to resolve ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland but it can be a part of an overall peacebuilding process that tackles structural inequalities that contribute to the protracted nature of ethnopolitical conflicts like Northern Ireland’,99 an issue that is receiving growing acknowledgement at the international level. Thus a careful balance must be struck between social and economic needs; as we saw with the Peace programmes, economic needs lost out to social needs in the first programme and vice versa in the second one, while a heavy concentration on economics by the IFI gave way to a better balance with social development in its latter years. While a combination of the latter phase activities of all three programmes would be ideal, efforts to provide and integrate both are currently limited due to a gap in theoretical knowledge. Consequently, a further recommendation is made: 4.1  Further research is needed on the role of social and economic issues as a cause of conflict and on the link between social and economic development and transformation Hillyard et al. note that ‘violence has disproportionately impacted on deprived areas and groups in Northern Ireland … the results suggest a complex relationship between poverty and the conflict … the experience of what has been defined as “extreme violence” is significantly related to poverty. In the face of such evidence it is hard to deny the importance of socio-economic factors.’100 Axiomatically, to sustain peace, poverty, social exclusion and deprivation must be tackled. However, the serious dearth of information on this needs to be addressed, as some argue that there is very little objective evidence ‘to suggest the extent of the connection between socio-economic conditions and the conflict’.101 Nevertheless, while the relationship between poverty and conflict is complex, it is fundamental within conflict transformation. Most of the research on Northern Ireland has concentrated on the political while there has been much less focus on the role of social and economic issues. Noticeably ‘one of the significant gaps in peace-building has been the lack of systematic research into the links between poverty and conflict. Ireland (South) can rightly claim to be a leader in the development of an anti-poverty policy, but Ireland (North and South) has paid little attention to poverty/ conflict linkages.’102 The need for a transformation policy framework is therefore clear: ‘in a society where both [poverty and conflict] coexist, attempts to tackle one cannot be carried out in the absence of policies to counteract the other. Nowhere is this more evident than in the post-conflict or transitional phase when reconstruction is paramount.’103

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4.2  The debate on the contribution that business can make to conflict transformation needs to begin now Business has a powerful role to play, directly and indirectly, in the transformation of conflict but this role is not well enough understood as there has been limited discussion within the sector itself; the early days of the IFI and the INTERREG programmes, and more recently Peace II, have highlighted this element of uncertainty. Knox and Quirke have argued that the business sector in Northern Ireland ‘has tended to make statements supportive of political progress in the knowledge that instability damages the economy – beyond that, they have not gone’.104 The sector therefore needs to embark on a detailed discussion, supported by further research, particularly when long-term sustainability is unclear, since ‘one of the problems with Peace II will be that we will see a lot of buildings, physical regeneration, but we won’t see any actual life going on in it and the problem will be then that how do you sustain that once Peace II goes?’105 Thus, ‘the linkage between peace strategies and general economic initiatives will remain crucial as economic prosperity provides an important basis for developing the conditions for increased engagement and building peace and reconciliation’.106 5  Structured consultations that are listened to are necessary at the design stage of conflict transformation tools and processes The difficulties experienced by the early INTERREG programmes and the change of direction between Peace II and Peace I highlighted the necessity to consult all levels of society, particularly the grassroots, at the design stage. While such consultations need to be structured, it is crucial they are also listened to. Often consultation is viewed as something the powerful do to the powerless; meaningful dialogue must be engaged in, not just consultation for consultation’s sake. Peace II, for example, was perceived to ‘have been constructed behind closed doors without taking into account the views expressed in the consultation’.107 Certainly it is not feasible for every citizen to be consulted on every aspect of the process or tool; moreover, not every citizen will want to be consulted or indeed will be capable of being consulted. Nevertheless widespread and meaningful consultations can be achieved by working through grassroots community and voluntary organisations, being ‘extensive in nature, small in scale and local in focus’.108 Consultations will provide ownership of the transformation tool and process and greatly assist with the empowerment of civil society and the inclusion of those previously marginalised within society. Moreover, the dialogue begun with design stage consultations should be continued throughout the life of the process to maintain a sense of inclusion and ownership.

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6  Conflict transformation actions need to be targeted While some would dispute this recommendation,109 a conflict transformation process that does not address the impacts of the conflict on those most affected cannot be assured success. Therefore the tools employed need to ensure that their actions are inclusive of the most marginalised by specifically targeting particular groups (e.g. victims of conflict, young people, women, long-term unemployed, ex-prisoners), sectors (e.g. tourism, arts, enterprise) and areas (e.g. cross-border, interface areas) within all three levels of Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid for inclusion in their activities. The Peace programmes have found that sector and area targeting ‘facilitated the development of services, infrastructure, training and engagement that would otherwise not have happened or at the very least, not happened as quickly’,110 while group targeting has meant that ‘projects … are impacting on the most marginalised sections of society by developing activities for individuals and groups’.111 At the same time, targeting must not become excessive as this runs the risk of conflict transformation becoming exclusive to certain groups only, diluting innovation and risk-taking. 7  Assessment, monitoring, recording and evaluation must be properly thought out and designed, implemented from the beginning and maintained continuously over the long-term Conflict transformation is a complex, long-term, multi-dimensional process. Therefore transformationalists ‘need to be observant enough to see change when it happens, aware enough to understand how change happens, innovative enough to create change, and strategic enough to create change where it can make a difference. Monitoring and evaluation have much to contribute in strengthening our capacity to work with change.’112 Consequently ‘successful and unsuccessful peacebuilding programs that do not translate their experiences into knowledge miss an important opportunity to help others learn from that experience … monitoring and evaluation can help practitioners know when to give up and abandon ineffective programs and when to invest energy and resources into initiatives that truly will help’.113 Such knowledge is fundamental for future policy development. Thus efforts must be made not only to measure and assess impacts (perhaps by making conflict impact assessments a compulsory requirement) and learn from what is and is not working, but to do so continuously and strategically over the long-term rather than on a one-off basis: ‘evaluation should be seen less as a validation or invalidation exercise pegged only to credibility, and more as a process where learning is extracted from practice and incorporated in new planning and thinking’.114 ­Moreover,

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‘building in reflection and self-evaluation is crucial for on-going work and sustainability’.115 Therefore evaluations must be linked to ongoing monitoring and involve those directly affected by the tools and processes. However, having already discussed some of the myriad difficulties that surround this aspect of the process, one must be cognisant of ‘the difficulty of measuring and quantifying [the] impact[s] of peace and reconciliation activities’.116 It is difficult, for example, to ‘widely measure the contribution of cross border co-operation to reconciliation within the context of the Peace [II] programme, as arguably money can cloud the issue’.117 Additionally, conventional evaluation methods may not always be appropriate for assessing such work, often because ‘there seem to be shortfalls in the basis in knowledge and the methodologies of project evaluation’.118 Thus, careful indicators and evaluation frameworks that clearly articulate the tool’s aims, guide the process and facilitate detailed analysis are crucial; ‘more sophisticated models of evaluating the impact of social interventions are needed from funders’.119 This requires a move away from largely quantitative tick-box evaluations to more representational qualitative evaluations: ‘those who fund and evaluate peacebuilding should concentrate less on results as the primary standard of success and failure. Those results, mostly forms of counting … produce data that look impressive on paper but lend little to the deeper learning process.’120 More importantly, ‘to achieve sustainable development, the evaluation/learning process must be owned by the partners/recipients … in this respect, evaluation is like any other peacebuilding activity: It requires participatory, inclusive approaches that are respectful of local realities.’121 Local research has argued that ‘implementing bodies must use a common evaluation reporting framework if Distinctiveness Reports are going to be used to measure the overall Peace and Reconciliation impact at programme level’.122 The early adoption of a common framework is also crucial if consistent quality is to be maintained. Strategically planning the design and incorporation of such a framework is necessary; best practice in this area needs to be further examined. Peace III consultation submissions suggested that this could work best by reporting at a number of levels; the project level, which would record what actually happened and what people learned; the macro level, which would look at attitudes and behaviours on a regular basis; and the multi level, which would utilise the concept of social capital.123 Two other related recommendations arise from this:

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7.1  Monitoring indicators need to be transformation friendly One of the greatest challenges experienced by the three programmes has been correctly measuring success at the local level, because at times ‘it appears that the funding environment is overly determined by technical language that favours outcomes over supporting process and longterm engagement. Often the method of evaluation and verification of funded work inadvertently drives the agenda, rather than the other way around.’124 Moreover, ‘donor agencies have a natural tendency to focus on the short-term and the easily measurable and therefore tend to concentrate on the physical infrastructure of civil society … Few have attempted to move beyond projectised approaches into supporting strategies and processes.’125 This was particularly true of the programmes examined here; ‘while indicators in the border region show a high level of activity having taken place, hundreds of jobs having been created, hundreds of thousands of participants receiving training and accreditation, the outcomes that are directly related to Peace Building and reconciliation are less clear’.126 Indeed, Cochrane and Dunn have argued that in terms of the work carried out by peace/conflict resolution organisations (P/CROs), ‘in reality, much of the most useful activity in this field is conducted invisibly and is not tied to particular events; it is often not appreciable when it is carried out, its value only becoming apparent in combination with other events and actions when viewed over time. Consequently, it is impossible to measure the impacts of P/CROs quantitatively, other than in the most basic terms.’127 While the EU has recognised that ‘in contrast to traditional aid, peacebuilding is centred on participative processes rather than on outputs … Sometimes, it may be more important to sustain the process than to prematurely insist on concrete ends’,128 the transformation tools examined here have shown that the rhetoric does not always match reality. Thus ‘more consideration needs to be given to developing a monitoring and evaluation framework that can capture the more intangible outcomes of peace and reconciliation’.129 Central to this is a requirement to involve those who are affected by the evaluation, the key stakeholders in the transformation process, while developing indicators that are context-specific. Conflict-transformation indicators ‘enable us to work with many intangible issues that are often at the root of the conflict. Success in selecting and developing good indicators is directly related to the depth of the conflict analysis, the understanding of the context and expertise in designing effective interventions.’130 In developing indicators, a word of warning is needed against universality – every conflict is unique and so therefore is every conflict transformation process; to use the same off-the-shelf monitoring and evaluation

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indicators would not be good practice. This does not mean that new indicators need to be developed every time, but ‘rather, they need to be modified and made contextually relevant’.131 7.2  Lessons learned need to be recorded for transferability This was highlighted as a particular problem under the Peace programmes, whereby key lessons were not recorded for transferring from Peace I to Peace II, which would have met the challenges presented by institutional memory loss through key people and indeed organisations (in the form of IFBs) moving on. Moreover, this issue in itself was not well remedied under Peace II: Existing systems for applying learning within Peace II are weak. For example, there are … no virtuous circles of learning between the Local Strategy Partnerships in Northern Ireland and the County Council led Task Forces in the Republic … No-one has yet pulled together materials that try to answer the questions: What works? What has been learned? What methods have been successful?132

Furthermore, the EU: runs rehabilitative and reconstruction programmes in countries such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Serbia, East Timor and South Africa … it is regrettable that there were not opportunities for the experiences of this family of programmes to be shared and tested with the designers of the Peace II programme. Had they been so, the [design] outcomes might have been quite different. The European Commission, one of the creative designers of the Peace I programme, was virtually absent this time.133

However, missed opportunities for recording learning have not been unique to this region. National surveys of peacebuilding in other countries have highlighted this issue particularly in terms of storage of project documentation, highlighting a challenge for those involved in evaluation – the need ‘to take responsibility as the guardian of the body of peacebuilding experience, for without reference to a body of experience there is little chance of learning from experience’.134 8  A holistic partnership approach at all levels is crucial The development of vertical and horizontal relationships across all levels is one of the central components of any conflict transformation process, as ‘no one group – be it a government, a group of citizens or an international NGO – can bring peace alone’.135 The positive experience of the decentralised and local delivery mechanisms in Northern Ireland, easily one of the most transferable aspects of the Peace programmes, was an excellent example of this. They clearly demonstrated Lederach’s

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belief that ‘constructive change, perhaps more than anything else, is the art of strategically and imaginatively weaving relational webs across social spaces within settings of protracted violent conflict’.136 Partnership, however, implies a relationship based upon equality and respect, to the mutual benefit of those involved. Partnership can only work where there is an equality of resources or an equality of esteem between the partners. If there is not equality of resources then partnership can work if the stronger partners accord parity of esteem. It is clear that the community sector does not have the resources of the other partners and is mostly dependent upon them for what resources they have.137

Therefore, ‘while accepting the importance of building positive cross-community and cross-border relationships, it is important to recognise that positive relationships also need to be built within communities and between communities and institutions of governance at different levels as part of the peace building and reconciliation process’.138 Two further but closely related recommendations follow from this: 8.1  Citizen participation is crucial; participatory democracy is just as important as representative democracy and local ownership is essential The three programmes have demonstrated just how important and necessary citizen participation is for facilitating successful conflict transformation. Participatory democracy, therefore, is just as important as representative democracy: ‘partnership principles and bottom-up approaches require that those affected by the decisions must be part of the decision-making process. “Consultation” without effective participation in decisions is not enough. Partnership structures should include representatives of the Programme’s target groups.’139 Indeed, it has been found in the Republic that ‘one of the primary drivers for the democratisation of local governance is the desire by communities to gain some measure of control over the social and economic processes that impact on their lives’.140 Thus actions such as the ‘first money on the table’ provided by the IFI to local communities; consulting the grassroots and making use of the consultation feedback in the design of Peace I; the mass inclusion of grassroots community peacebuilding projects in the implementation of the process in Peace I and II; the setting up of the District Partnerships/LSPs within both Peace programmes; and the insistence on equal cross-border partnership in INTERREG III all assisted with facilitating the growth of participatory democracy in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties, which was previously not a feature of the search for peace. The Peace programmes in particular have:

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pioneered new forms of participatory governance and have also made significant moves towards addressing the democratic deficit. Pre-Peace I in Northern Ireland, the notion of significant programmes of public expenditure being undertaken by organisations entirely independent from Central Government was unheard of. The role of IFBs as sectoral specialists with their own Boards of Directors and advisory panels drawn from the communities designated as beneficiaries of the Programmes, can only be seen as a radical departure.141

However, a tension exists between representative democracy at the top and participatory democracy at the bottom, or, to put it another way, between those who view peace as a product (getting a deal, that is, in the Northern Ireland context, the Good Friday Agreement) and those who view peace as a process (which is largely a grassroots or community-based viewpoint) – a tension highlighted, for example, by the move away from mainly social development projects funded by Peace I towards more economic development projects funded by Peace II and the unexplained demise of the consultative forum after Peace I. While representative democracy and participatory democracy are not mutually exclusive, sufficient contact does not occur within the existing context; much work will be required to ensure that participatory democracy is equally as valued as representative democracy through its acceptance from those at the top level, thus ensuring its inclusion in the transformation process. In asking who owns peacebuilding, Pugh has argued that: the conceptual baggage of peacebuilding has included the [arrogant] assumption that external actors wield the power and moral authority to bring about peaceful change that communities have so signally failed to do … If international diplomacy had failed to prevent the onset of conflict, then, so the presumption follows, external actors should at least make concerted efforts to pick up the pieces and regenerate societies in ways that will inhibit relapses into violence.142

However, for conflict transformation to succeed, not only is citizen participation crucial, but the process must belong to those directly responsible for creating conflict and equally to those directly affected by conflict. Local ownership of any conflict transformation process is essential for its success and fundamental to ensuring a long-term, sustainable process as ‘the operational effectiveness of peacebuilding programmes will be best secured through promoting the idea that the indigenous authors of a peace process are also its owners, who will have a vested interest in maintaining its long-term stability’.143 Moreover, at the international level ‘prolonged support from the international community can often restrict the emergence of indigenous processes of conflict management, and

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encourage the conflict protagonists to presume the mediating presence of the international community. This is unsustainable in both resource as well as political terms, and weakens the development of new processes and institutions of political exchange and participation.’144 Thus citizen participation and local ownership begin with process conceptualisation; a peace that is ‘self-supporting … is thus participatory in design. Such a participatory process will also facilitate the critical transition from international peacebuilding support to indigenous successor programme and institutions, the key to a true “exit strategy” for external actors.’145 Therefore ‘a crucial aspect of peace negotiations is the decision about who should be at the table, in order that peacebuilding processes respond to the needs of all segments of society’146 and continues with the management and development of projects and activities and onwards throughout the implementation stage. While the experience in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of citizen participation in and local ownership of the conflict transformation process has been largely positive, this recommendation comes with a word of warning in terms of the need to keep a watchful eye on who the local actually is; ‘a failure to recognise the reality of the conflict context might make a simple commitment to local ownership almost fatal to hopes of successful peacebuilding’.147 Often, as in this region, protagonists of the conflict come from the local community and, when violence has ceased, they go back to the local community. If this involvement is not carefully nurtured and managed, local ownership: risks being a code for working with the most powerful and most opportunistic sectors of society. The lines of division that led to conflict escalation normally survive the peace process: if war is continuation of politics by other means, peace is generally the resumption of the same politics, often by the same pre-war means. Groups with the capacity to own projects are usually connected to those political divisions or active parts of them.148

One must also be wary of the criticism of local ownership as ‘a vision to strive towards, but not a practical objective within international funding and working structures’;149 there is no room here for an in-depth discussion of this issue. However, as this region has found, if opportunities are created for citizen participation ‘grounded in the reality of their immediate areas, addressing real issues and real problems for local communities … [then] the sense of control, ownership and community confidence created by this impetus can readily be linked as a contribution to reconciliation’.150 

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8.2  A middle ground must be fostered As conflicts are often fought between polarised communities, conflict transformation requires a fostering of the middle ground which will put in place structural changes to tackle social and economic disadvantage: for years the focus of the equality agenda in Northern Ireland has been on the relative position of the Protestant and Catholic communities … [there] is increasing evidence that the most serious forms of disadvantage are not due to communal factors or differences but to more general social and economic factors … dealing with these problems is likely to require action in all sections of the community and may not be identified or advanced by maintaining the primary focus on comparisons between Protestants and Catholics.151

Hadden has therefore argued that the constant reproduction of facts and figures about the two communities and the practice of the Equality Commission in continuing to allocate as many of us as they can to one or other of the two communities does not help. This approach was necessary thirty years ago. But it is not a good longterm strategy. Leading thinkers and policy makers in conflict resolution … are now highlighting the need to encourage and foster the middle ground in divided societies as a way of avoiding the perpetuation or escalation of conflict. This is especially needed in a place like Northern Ireland where the numbers in the two main communities are becoming more equal and there is a real risk of renewed conflict over the prospect of constitutional change. Encouragement and incentives for those who wish to move away from a single assigned communal identity and to create a kind of buffer between the two main communal blocks may prove an important aspect in reserving the current peace process.152

If an attempt is not made to foster the middle ground, polarisation will seep into the transformation tools themselves, which happened to an extent within the Peace programmes, in terms of calculating the level of funds going to each community, for example. 9  The use and role of local delivery mechanisms must be carefully considered One of the most successful aspects of this region’s conflict transformation process has been the use of decentralised delivery mechanisms in the form of IFBs for the implementation of the programmes to encourage citizen participation in and local ownership of the process, thus increasing citizen empowerment and trust in the overall political process. This is certainly recommended to other societies. However, in light of a range of issues outlined earlier, careful consideration must be given to the number and type of IFBs that are taken on, in terms of being representative and, more importantly, in terms of being up to the job.

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Considerable ­experience is required to ensure that the systems they put in place are not overly complex and are accessible to those at the grassroots. However, this challenge should not be used as an excuse to rule out the use of grassroots organisations as IFBs. 10  Top-level actors must be cognisant of the limitations they inflict on conflict transformation tools and the process In this region, while the programmes in themselves did not do any harm per se, the wider political stagnation proved detrimental to them reaching their full potential. In the case of the Peace programmes, for example, the Regional Partnership Board (previously the Northern Ireland Partnership Board), apart from having a more reduced operational role than was intended, had its ‘ability to influence government … hampered by the absence of the two Junior Ministers in the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), who would have been able to provide proactive leadership and act as a focal point for integration across government’.153 Moreover, interference by government in the design of the Peace II programme was a serious setback to the hardearned achievements and lessons learned from Peace I, which stood in sharp contrast to the free rein given by government to the work of the IFI. The implications of being funding-led rather than project-led can be serious, as Smith has found at the international level: donor government policies in peacebuilding are subject to the dictates of political fashion, in ways that have nothing to do with the exigencies of peacebuilding … Getting the money while the inevitably short-lived attention of the major leaders is focused on the country makes sense. It would be useful then to have a trust fund mechanism that allows it to be spent at a different rate that is more responsive to the needs of peacebuilding.154

Attempts were made in this region to set up an endowment fund with some of the Peace I funding, from which it was intended to fund future peacebuilding activities, but this was thwarted by EU financial regulations. A further complicating factor in peacebuilding and development is ‘the dominance of political and international actors working in the background of this field. International actors often focus solely on military and geo-political conflict dynamics and not on the broader interactions and consequences of conflict in general.’155 They need to look at and engage with the bigger picture: ‘disarmament alone is useless without economic measures to provide ex-combatants with a livelihood’.156

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11  Funding sources must be carefully considered and demarcated for conflict transformation only Funding sources for conflict transformation must be carefully considered, as demonstrated in this case by the contrasting experiences between the less bureaucratic, and as such much more flexible, government-funded but independent sources of the IFI and the rigid, time-bound and bureaucracy-laden EU sources of the Peace and INTERREG programmes. In the European context, mainstream EU Structural Funds can certainly provide extensive large-scale funding but this also places limitations on conflict transformation in terms of restricting risk-taking, innovation and flexibility for further elaboration (see the next recommendation). Moreover, ‘one of the key problems of time-bound funding programmes is the possibility that the lessons learned of real innovations can be lost when the funding regime stops’.157 This is a growing problem: as funding levels decrease, the rules and regulations attached to their use increase, which is not supportive of creative and innovative practice. Therefore the role of tools such as the Peace programmes, as with any funding linked to this field, should be to pioneer innovative work that can be mainstreamed; in developing transformation tools, the balance between funding availability and activity restrictions must be carefully considered. In addition, consideration should be given to requiring either the programmes themselves to be eventually mainstreamed or, at the very least, some of their activities, learning and good practice. However, [t]here are few examples to be found in practice of peace-building/conflict transformation being mainstreamed by major donor agencies … they are happier with stand-alone, projectised approaches … by creating a separate sphere called conflict transformation and peacebuilding, which is delinked from issues like justice and democratisation, politics and power are leached out of the process. Peacebuilding, therefore, is depoliticised.158

Furthermore, conflict transformation tools funded to address social and economic aspects of the transformation process must not be used by governments as substitutes for funding mainstream government activities in these areas; conflict transformation activities must be clearly demarcated. Again, an overarching government policy framework, the conflict transformation-proofing of proposed activities and strong civil society involvement at the design stage would counteract this. 12  Transformation tools need to be responsive Conflict transformation is a continuous process; conflict transformation tools therefore must be responsive to the ever-changing environment they are placed in by maintaining the ability to change as the context

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changes. Such responsiveness was a key characteristic of the programmes supported by the IFI, in marked contrast to the first two phases of the INTERREG programme, whereby INTERREG II largely followed on from INTERREG I, remaining static in its activity provision. The difficulty here is created by placing conflict transformation activities within the realm of project delivery. As Lederach succinctly points out: We have accepted and primarily oriented our work around the concept of projects. Projects are the way we propose, define, and fund peacebuilding. In essence, projects are activities conducted under a broad, often vague purpose aimed at producing amazingly concrete results in a discrete time frame, most typically one to three years … It is important to recognise that the projects mentality assumes two important but rarely accurate truisms: (1) Social change in linear; and (2) social change is best measured by visible and verifiable results.159

Thus, viewing peace as a process rather than a product becomes the issue: those who fund and evaluate peacebuilding should concentrate less on results as the primary standard of success and failure. Those results, mostly forms of counting … produce data that look impressive on paper but lend little to the deeper learning process. Practitioners, funders, and evaluators should participate together in the far more complex process of exploration: How did change happen or not happen? … What unexpected insight was gained along the way that had little or nothing to do with the original proposal? … Serendipity nudges us toward the art of social change. It asks us to be attentive to how things are connected. It opens our eyes to the great learnings along the way that were not originally expected or intended.160

While projects certainly allow a starting point for conflict transformation to begin and initial learning to take place which can then further shape the process, a balance must be struck which allows for flexibility, innovation and risk-taking. Conclusion This chapter has examined the lessons learned from three tools which have been facilitating conflict transformation through social and economic development in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties over a long period. While this examination was informed by a theoretical framework, the lessons themselves have largely been of a practical nature, a necessity for making workable recommendations to others. Moreover, from these lessons emerged a number of serious problems for conflict transformation practice and learning, namely a lack of specialist knowledge and understanding of the theory and processes, partly owing to the non-existence of a national conflict transformation policy and further

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reinforced by a strategic planning deficit, with the latter two requiring a strategic analysis and impact evaluation. The lessons learned and the resultant implications demonstrate that it is not realistic to expect such transformation tools ‘to resolve the totality of the problems resulting from civil conflict’.161 This assessment has also highlighted that, while the minutiae of the relationship between social and economic development and conflict transformation are unclear – due in part to the associated difficulties of evaluating conflict transformation activities along with the dearth of research examining the role of social and economic development and its relationship to both conflict as a cause and peace as a strategic aim – the necessity for such a relationship is obvious: it is absolutely critical for successful conflict transformation. In seeking to build constructive social change, the challenge for all levels of society is ‘how to move from that which destroys towards that which builds’.162 Tackling the structural violence that gives rise to conflict in the first place is a crucial component of any transformation process, as ‘political legitimacy is likely to lapse quickly if economic improvement is not forthcoming, but may become sustainable political stability on the basis of an economic recovery’.163 Furthermore, at the heart of any conflict transformation process is the people within, as ‘change and conflict … are about people not things’;164 as such, conflict transformation ‘requires a long-term view that focuses as much on the people in the setting of conflict building durable and flexible processes as it does specific solutions’.165 Notes 1 D. Morrow, ‘Introduction. Beyond the Emerald Curtain? Cross-Border Peace-Building in Ireland’, in Community Relations Council, Bordering on Peace? Learning from the Cross-Border Experience of Peace II. Learning from Peace II, Volume 4 (Belfast: CRC, 2006), p. 5. 2 Morrow, Wilson and Eyben, cited in Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks for Peace II (Belfast: CFNI, 2002), p. 78. 3 Middle-level actor, author interview, 15 August 2005. 4 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 5 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 11 April 2005. 6 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 7 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 8 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Update of the Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II 2000–2006. Final Report (Belfast: PwC, 2005), p. iv. 9 See case studies presented in SEUPB, Telling the Story of Peace II. An Assessment of the Impact of Peace II Funding in Strabane, East Belfast and Cavan (Belfast: SEUPB, 2004) and K. Walsh, Learning Peace by Piece. An Analysis

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of the Learning from Case Studies Supported by ADM/CPA and funded under the EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Monagha: ADM/CPA, 2001). 10 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 11 Ibid. 12 Middle/top-level actor, author interview, 15 February 2005. 13 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 13 January 2005. 14 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. 15 Middle-level actor, author interview, 29 March 2005. 16 Department of Foreign Affairs/Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, Comprehensive Study on the All-Island Economy (Dublin/Belfast: DFA/OFMDFM, 2006); Government of Ireland, Ireland National Development Plan 2007–2013. Transforming Ireland. A Better Quality of Life for All (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2007), which included for the first time a chapter on the all-island economy. 17 Middle-level actor, author interview, 13 July 2006. The interviewee was referring to the Wider Horizons programme. 18 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Peace II Qualitative Assessment of the Economic Measures. The EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace II) (Belfast: SEUPB, 2005), p. 34. 19 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 11 April 2005. 20 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Peace II. Seventh Report of Session 2002–03 Volume 1 (London: Stationery Office, 2003), p.  50. 24 Grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 December 2004. 25 See D. Morrow, ‘Introduction. Shaping our Shared Future’, in Community Relations Council, Shaping and Delivering Peace at Local Level? Learning from the Experience of Peace II. Learning from Peace II, Volume 3 (Belfast: CRC, 2005), p. 7. 26 P. McGinn, ‘Delivering Peace at Local Level – The Practical Experience’, in Community Relations Council, Shaping and Delivering Peace at Local Level?, p. 24. 27 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I and Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II. Final Report (Belfast: PwC, 2003), p. 147. 28 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 29 Northern Ireland’s MEPs, Ian Paisley, John Hume, Jim Nicholson, Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland Revisited. Report to Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission (October 1997), pp. 16–17. 30 S. Henry, ‘Shaping and Delivering Peace at Local Level – Learning from the Experience of Peace II’, in Community Relations Council, Shaping and Delivering Peace at Local Level?, p. 11. 31 Northern Ireland’s MEPs, Special Support Programme, p. 11. 32 See County Council Led Task Forces, Southern Border County Councils

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Submission on the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation Programme (Peace III) (March 2007). 33 Community Workers Co-operative, Community and Voluntary Sector Consultation on the Draft Peace III Operational Programme (Galway/ Letterkenny, 2007), pp. 7–8 (emphasis in original text). 34 SEUPB, European Union Programme for Territorial Co-operation Peace III, EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace III) 2007–2013. Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland. Operational Programme (Belfast/Omagh/Monaghan: SEUPB, n.d.), p. 92. 35 Community Workers Co-operative, Community and Voluntary Sector Consultation, pp. 12–13. 36 SEUPB, EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation 2007–2013, p. 92. 37 Middle-level actor, author interview, 28 January 2005. 38 Middle/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 11 April 2005. 39 See S. Buchanan, ‘Examining the Peacebuilding Policy Framework of the Irish and British Governments’, in M. Power (ed.), Building Peace in Northern Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), pp. 172–90. 40 Morrow, ‘Introduction. Shaping our Shared Future’, pp. 6–7. 41 SEUPB, INTERREG IVA Cross-Border Programme for Territorial Cooperation 2007–2013. Northern Ireland, Border Region of Ireland and Western Scotland. Operational Programme (Belfast/Omagh/Monaghan: SEUPB, n.d.), p. 30. 42 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 43 SEUPB, INTERREG IVA Cross-Border Programme, p. 44. 44 Middle-level actor, author interview, 7 January 2005. 45 SEUPB, INTERREG IVA Cross-Border Programme, p. 29. 46 Ibid., p. 37. 47 M. Pugh, ‘The Social-Civil Dimension’, in M. Pugh, (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 114. 48 D. Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), p. 9. 49 Ibid., p. 19. 50 S. Ryan, The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 2. 51 B. Hamber and G. Kelly, ‘Reconciliation: Time to Grasp the Nettle?’, Scope. Social Affairs Magazine (February 2007), p. 14. 52 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 42. 53 L. O’Dowd, ‘The Future of Cross-Border Co-operation: Issues of Sustainability’, Journal of Cross Border Studies in Ireland, 1 (2006), 10. 54 A. Pollak, ‘How Does Cross-Border Co-operation Contribute to Peace Building in Ireland?’, in Community Relations Council, Bordering on Peace?, p. 31. 55 Ibid., p. 31. 56 NICVA, in association with the Community Workers Co-operative, Designing Peace III (Belfast, April 2004), p. 8. 57 T. Kennedy and C. Lynch, ‘Towards an Island at Peace with Itself: An NGO

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View of North-South Co-operation’, in The Centre for Cross Border Studies, Year 5 (Armagh: Centre for Cross Border Studies, 2003), p. 11. 58 O’Dowd, ‘The Future of Cross-Border Co-operation’, p. 5. 59 Ibid., p. 15. 60 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 23. 61 Dan Smith, Secretary General, International Alert, correspondence with the author, 25 April 2005. 62 Government of Ireland, White Paper on Irish Aid (Dublin, 2006), pp. 56–8. Lederach notes that ‘transformation is about sustaining the ongoing changes and I think transformation includes resolution but resolution doesn’t always include transformation’ (author interview, 16 April 2003). 63 ADM, CPA, Co-operation Ireland, The Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, The Special European Union Programmes Body, Building on Peace. Supporting Peace and Reconciliation after 2006 (Monaghan: ADM/ CPA, 2003), p. 203. 64 L. Schirch, The Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2004), p. 9. 65 See P. Hillyard, B. Rolston and M. Tomlinson, Poverty and Conflict in Ireland: An International Perspective (Dublin: CPA and the Institute of Public Administration, 2005), pp. 160–71. 66 NICVA, Assessment of the Impact of Gap/Interim Funding on the Sustainability of Voluntary and Community Sector Organisations (Belfast: NICVA, 2002), p.  20. 67 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Update of Peace II Programme, Executive Summary (Belfast: PwC, 2005), p. 9. 68 Ibid. 69 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Update of the Mid-Term Evaluation, p. iv. 70 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 41. 71 SEUPB, EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace III) 2007–2013, p. 101. 72 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 43. 73 Ibid., p. 58. 74 Pollak, ‘How Does Cross-Border Co-operation Contribute to Peace Building in Ireland?’, p. 28. 75 Ryan, The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict, p. 155. 76 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 45. 77 See A. Galama and P. van Tongeren (eds), Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice. On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Practices and Aid & Conflict (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2002), p. 37. 78 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 57. 79 Ibid., p. 51. 80 Ibid., p. 52. 81 Ibid., p. 56. 82 Ibid., p. 53. 83 K. Bush, A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones, Working Paper No. 1 (Ottawa:

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The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative & The Evaluation Unit, The International Development Research Centre, 1998), quoted in ADM/CPA, Response to SEUPB Consultation on Peace II Extension (Monaghan, 2004), p. 5. This is not to suggest that all development activities are considered peacebuilding activities. 84 B. Hamber, ‘Peacebuilding Post-2006. The Need for a More Expansive View of Peacebuilding in Ireland’, keynote address to the Peacebuilding Post-2006 Workshop, Fairways Hotel, Dundalk, Co. Louth, 4 February 2003. 85 D. Ó Broin, ‘Democratising Local Governance in Ireland’, in D. Jacobson, P. Kirby and D. Ó Broin (eds), Taming the Tiger. Social Exclusion in a Globalised Ireland (Dublin: tasc at New Island, 2006), p. 172. 86 E. Babbitt, ‘Afterword. What Do We Know About Peacebuilding?’, in T.A. Borer, J. Darby and S. McEvoy-Levy, Peacebuilding After Peace Accords. The Challenges of Violence, Truth and Youth. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), p. 75. 87 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, pp. 80–1. 88 F. Gaffikin, ‘Coping with Conflict in Peace Programmes’, in Community Relations Council, Shaping and Delivering Peace at Local Level?, p. 49. 89 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 55. 90 Hamber, Peacebuilding Post-2006. 91 Morrow, ‘Introduction. Beyond the Emerald Curtain?’, p. 7. 92 M. Morrissey, ‘The Role of Economic Development in Peace Building: Some Thoughts on Peace II’, in Community Relations Council, Prosperity: A Part of Peace? Learning from the Economic Experience of Peace II. Learning from Peace II, Volume 2 (Belfast: CRC, 2005), p. 39. 93 Ibid., p. 40. 94 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Mid-Term Update of Peace II, p. 3. 95 J. Darby and R. MacGinty (eds), Contemporary Peacemaking. Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 3. 96 J.P. Lederach, The Moral Imagination, The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 47. 97 J.P. Lederach, ‘The Challenge of the 21st Century. Justpeace’, in European Centre for Conflict Prevention, People Building Peace. 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World. (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), p. 32. 98 Ibid. 99 S. Byrne and C. Irvin, ‘Economic Aid and Policymaking: Building the Peace Dividend in Northern Ireland’, Policy and Politics, 29:4 (2001), 425. 100 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, p. 148. This viewpoint has also been demonstrated internationally in the conflicts of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. See R. Paris, At War’s End. Building Peace after Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 112–34. 101 ADM et al., Building on Peace, p. 154. 102 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, p. 1.

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103 Ibid., p. 149. 104 C. Knox and P. Quirk, Peace Building in Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa: Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 201. This was also illustrated by the experience of Peace II. 105 Top/grassroots-level actor, author interview, 6 January 2005. 106 PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Peace II Qualitative Assessment of the Economic Measures. The EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace II) (Belfast: SEUPB, 2005), p. 19. 107 NICVA, Designing Peace III, p. 11. 108 Ibid., p. 23. 109 Hamber, Peacebuilding Post-2006. 110 SEUPB, European Union Programme for Territorial Cooperation. EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace III) 2007-2013. Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland. Draft Operational Programme (Belfast/Omagh/Monaghan: SEUPB, 2007), p. 19. 111 SEUPB, EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace III) 2007– 2013, p. 26. 112 C. Church and M.M. Rogers, Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs (Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground, 2006), p. 23. 113 Ibid., p. 9. 114 Galama and van Tongeren, Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice, p. 21. 115 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks for Peace, p. 32. 116 Co-operation Ireland, EU Programme for Peace & Reconciliation. Peace III 2007–2013 Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland. Response to Consultation Document (2007), p. 4. 117 S. Pettis, ‘Round Table Reflections: Highlighting the Key Issues’, in Community Relations Council, Bordering on Peace? Learning from the Cross-Border Experience, p. 23. 118 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 57. 119 Hamber, Peacebuilding Post-2006. 120 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, p. 125. 121 Galama and van Tongeren, Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice, p. 22. 122 McClure Watters, in association with Brandon Hamber, Special EU Programmes Body. Developing an Impact Evaluation for the Peace II Programme. Final Report (Belfast: McClure Watters, 2006), p. 7. 123 ADM et al., Building on Peace, pp. 207–8. 124 Hamber, Peacebuilding Post-2006. 125 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, p. 71. 126 McGinn, ‘Delivering Peace at Local Level – The Practical Experience’, p.  24. 127 F. Cochrane and S. Dunn, People Power? The Role of the Voluntary and Community Sector in the Northern Ireland Conflict (Cork: Cork University Press, 2002), p. 151. 128 EU statement, quoted in Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, p. 75.

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129 Border Action, Response to SEUPB Consultation on Peace III Programme (Monaghan, 4 April 2007), p. 7. 130 Church and Rogers, Designing for Results, p. 45. 131 Ibid., p. 59. 132 NICVA, Designing Peace III, p. 13. 133 B. Harvey, Review of the Peace II Programme (York: Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2003), pp. 54–5. 134 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 14. 135 John McDonald, founder and chairman of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, quoted in Galama and van Tongeren, Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice, p. 135. 136 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, p. 84. 137 Community Workers Co-operative, Community and Voluntary Sector Consultation, pp. 8–9. See also M. Morrissey, P. McGinn and B. McDonnell, Report on Research into Evaluating Community-Based and Voluntary Action in Northern Ireland. Final Report (Belfast: Voluntary and Community Unit/Community Evaluation Northern Ireland, 2003), pp. 9–10. 138 Border Action, Response to SEUPB Consultation, p. 8 (emphasis in original text). 139 Ibid., p. 11. 140 Ó Broin, ‘Democratising Local Governance’, p. 174. 141 ADM et al., Building on Peace, p. 159. 142 M. Pugh, ‘Introduction: The Ownership of Regeneration and Peacebuilding’, in Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies, p. 3. 143 J.G. Cockell, ‘Conceptualising Peacebuilding: Human Security and Sustainable Peace’, in Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies, p. 23. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid., pp. 22–3. 146 Babbitt, ‘Afterword’, p. 75. 147 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 26. 148 Ibid., p. 27. 149 H. Reich, ‘“Local Ownership” in Conflict Transformation Projects. Partnership, Participation or Patronage?’, Berghof Occasional Paper No. 27 (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, September 2006), p. 7, www.berghof-center.org/uploads/download/ boc27e.pdf (accessed 6 January 2007). 150 ADM et al., Building on Peace, p. 162. 151 T. Hadden, ‘New Equalities’, Fortnight, 445 (June/July 2006), 13. 152 Ibid., p. 14. 153 Henry, ‘Shaping and Delivering Peace at Local Level’, p. 11. 154 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 54. 155 Galama and van Tongeren, Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice, p. 30. 156 Pugh, ‘Introduction’, p. 6. 157 ADM et al., Building on Peace, p. 206. 158 Hillyard et al., Poverty and Conflict, p. 71. 159 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, pp. 124–5.

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160 Ibid., pp. 125–6. 161 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks for Peace, p. 32. 162 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, pp. 42–3. 163 Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework, p. 14. 164 C.F.J. Spies, ‘Resolutionary Change: The Art of Awakening Dormant Faculties in Others’, in D. Bloomfield, M. Fischer and B. Schmelsle (eds), Social Change and Conflict Transformation, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No. 5 (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006), p. 52. 165 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, p. 47.

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Conclusion

This book has highlighted the vastness and complexity of the conflict transformation field. While the Northern Ireland conflict is one of the most heavily researched conflicts in the world, research focusing on its conflict transformation process, particularly through social and economic development, is not readily available. Specifically, no attempt has been made to systematically and comprehensively review and analyse the conflict transformation process on both sides of the border or from the perspective of the IFI, Peace and INTERREG programmes, which have greatly facilitated the process among grassroots actors. The introduction alluded to the definitional morass surrounding transformation theory and highlighted one of its core values, that of citizen empowerment. A theoretical exploration ascertained the differences between conflict settlement, resolution and transformation from which core theoretical components emerged. It was argued that the usual understanding of transformation theory as applying to the post-conflict stage only was too restrictive, since its true essence encompasses all three phases of conflict. An examination of Lederach’s interdependence, justice and process–structure gaps, alongside the core concepts of citizen empowerment, development aid and social and economic development, provided a working definition of conflict transformation along with five criteria outlining the essential requirements for successful conflict transformation. Together they provided the conceptual and theoretical framework from which the region’s conflict transformation process, facilitated by the three tools, was assessed. An overview of the conflict and its effects on social and economic development on both sides of the border argued that, despite the ceasefires and political agreement, deep structural violence remains. Operational details of the three programmes were provided, setting the scene for an assessment of their impacts on the transformation process through some general observations and against the theoretical framework. Finally, and most importantly, a range of lessons learned from the three tools high-

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lighted several serious implications for transformational practice and policy, providing a number of practice and policy recommendations for other societies emerging from conflict. In drawing this book to a close it is apposite to return to the conceptual and theoretical framework which primarily informed and shaped this assessment, Lederach’s exploration of the interdependence, justice and process–structure gaps, to assess the extent to which they have been narrowed by the three programmes. At the core of Lederach’s conceptual framework is the interdependence of relationships which is central to successful transformation; no one level or set of relationships has the capacity to deliver and sustain peace on its own. However, because efforts have mainly been concentrated on developing horizontal rather than vertical capacity, a horizontal interdependence has developed while a vertical interdependence gap has emerged between the top, middle and grassroots levels and in terms of the strategic integration of horizontal and vertical capacity. Successful conflict transformation requires us to avoid the error of linear thinking by thinking about ‘multiple processes going on simultaneously and then think[ing] about relational spaces than link them’.1 Lederach therefore posits that ‘citizen-based peacemaking must be seen as instrumental and integral, not peripheral, to sustaining change’,2 which he believes lies within the middle range of actors. Lederach understands the approach offered by the middle range as a web approach to constructive social change, finding that with the web approach ‘political negotiation is not the primary nor the exclusive measure of the meditative capacity of a conflict-ridden society to promote the broader change processes that must take place. Sustained change, this approach posits, lies with the capacity to mobilize the web.’3 While the middle range is certainly critical, in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties the nature of the three tools ensured that valuable grassroots capacity has been equally instrumental in delivering and sustaining conflict transformation, particularly when the political failed. This clearly demonstrates the intrinsic importance of participatory democracy to representative democracy; while the top level struggled with this concept, the grassroots have come to recognise that ‘what is required is an effective and inclusive strategy of societal peacebuilding that can underpin the peacemaking that must take place at the representative political level. One, without the other, is in danger of taking place in a vacuum.’4 Thus, as ‘individual demands for escape from economic and social disadvantages spilled over into collective demands for a change in political status … the disadvantaged … had more success in overcoming their problems of economic disadvantage and social discrimination than … in changing the political status’.5 While the three programmes, particu-

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Learning and recommendations

larly the IFI and Peace, were unable of themselves to completely close the interdependence gap, they made a considerable contribution towards narrowing it, particularly in terms of developing vertical capacity, through their implementation structures and programmes. This was evidenced by the considerable increase in citizen empowerment which enabled a previously unattainable level of local ownership of the process, reinforcing the notion that ‘the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the longterm is always rooted in the local people and their culture’,6 and highlighting the need to add linking social capital to Putnam’s bridging and bonding social capital, which connects groups and individuals to others in a different position. While it has been argued that ‘the road to peace starts with democracies that are inclusive’,7 it may be more accurate to argue that it starts with communities that are inclusive. A further conceptual focus for Lederach has been the justice gap; failing to invest sufficiently in the development of our understanding, methods and practices to simultaneously reduce structural violence when reducing direct violence could prove detrimental to the direct violence reduction already achieved. To succeed in addressing the justice gap and attaining a positive peace, practitioners at all three levels need to increase their capacity ‘to integrate social justice building with direct violence reducing processes, two highly interdependent energies and foci, that are rarely held together at the same time’.8 Moreover, investments in understanding, methods and practices also need to be refocused in order to close this gap. It is fair to conclude that the three tools assessed here have played a key role in reducing the region’s structural violence, thus going some way towards narrowing the justice gap. While there is still some way to go, without them efforts would have been more diluted and the region would almost certainly not have progressed to its present stage in terms of direct and structural violence reduction levels. The final conceptual focus of Lederach’s peacebuilding framework was the process–structure gap. Viewing peace as a process (which can be endless with no real outcome) or as a product (or end-state, which it is not, and which suggests a need to control it and destroy its very fundamentals) highlights the limitations of language to capture the essence, creating ‘a paradoxical hiatus reflected both in our theory and practice, the process–structure gap’.9 To address the process–structure gap, ways must be found to understand peace as a process of change, focus support structures more on adapting and responding to relational needs rather than peace agreements and re-imagine peace structures to be responsive to adaptation. While the three programmes have been weakest at addressing this particular gap (evidenced, for example, by a lack of conceptual and theoretical understanding), they have made a

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contribution nonetheless, though they have not narrowed this gap to the same extent as that achieved for the interdependence and justice gaps. Certainly among grassroots actors, while strides have been made towards addressing this gap, the tools’ bureaucratic restrictions have imposed limitations, while attempts within the top level have proved more elusive. The five criteria that emerged formed the definitional and theoretical framework from which this book has taken its approach. In trying to marry theory to practical experience, a further issue requiring critical consideration for the long-term sustainability of conflict transformation emerged – the need for the worlds of practice and theory to relate to each other in a language that both understand; the underlying implication being that practice would certainly suffer without theory, while theory could be made redundant if it is not having a practical effect. One can only speculate about whether this region would have reached its current state much earlier or whether Lederach’s gaps could have been narrowed further if the conflict transformation process and practice had been better informed theoretically. It is noticeable that practitioners in the region have only begun to use the language of conflict transformation in recent years, albeit in a limited manner. The language of peacebuilding has certainly gained in currency; however, while conflict transformation constitutes peacebuilding, not all peacebuilding constitutes conflict transformation. Perhaps, however, this is to be too pedantic and the progress reached to date should be warmly welcomed. Nevertheless, this ‘artificial separation’ between theorists and practitioners has been discussed by Paris, who has highlighted how ‘too often, the practitioners of peacebuilding dismiss academic theorizing as overly abstract and detached from the practical challenges of running field operations. At the same time, many theorists of international relations and comparative politics make too little effort to translate their findings into recommendations for policymakers.’10 Lederach therefore reminds us that we need to bear in mind that ‘theory is not writing perfectly defined but intangible explanations of social realities. It is about the common sense of how things are connected, how they influence each other and how they may relate to desired change.’11 This is the road theory and practice need to walk together. The challenge now is for governments, policymakers and funders to take up these recommendations, and it is a considerable challenge, which needs to avoid what Richmond describes as: a virtual peace, masking deeper cultural, social and economic realities of violence […] To reach an agreement between officials, or to win a war, is one thing, but to change a social, political, and economic landscape is

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another … the minimal resources provided … for this project is … telling. This is often peace on the cheap, a moral succour, flimsy and transient, dependent upon the capacity of its agents, and the will and interests of its donor. Those working in conflict and post-conflict zones know this; most importantly, those living and enduring in them are fully aware of it too. Simple comparisons between financial costs of peace being constructed in a post-conflict environment compared to the cost of war make this explicit.12

All conflicts are unique; so, therefore, are the processes that bring about their transformation – there is no overall formula. The learning that has taken place in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties over the period discussed here has been immense. However, like many conflicts, the lessons learned have not always been applied, with the situation in Iraq exemplifying this. Conflict transformation should not be viewed as something completely separate from everyday life, but nonetheless the funding of conflict transformation processes has to be additional. One of the biggest fears expressed by those submitting comments on the draft operational programme for Peace III, for example, was that ‘all funded activity should be wholly additional and must not be used to fund activities that can be supported currently or in the future by Government Departments, the National Development Plan (ROI) and the NI Shared Future Strategy’.13 In addition, in a region such as this, the border cannot be ignored – to talk about Northern Ireland without the Border Counties, in terms of conflict transformation at least, is to discuss only half the story. There is no doubt that two decades on from the terrorist ceasefires the conflict transformation process in this region is still very much a work in progress; the long-run lessons have yet to be revealed and it will be many years before this happens. Lederach suggests that we are ‘still in our infancy in reference to shaping and sustaining a positive justpeace, the rebuilding of genuine community in areas that have suffered from great division and violence. The difficulties of attaining a durable peace in contexts of protracted violence suggest we know more about how to end something painful and damaging to everyone but less about how to build something desired.’14 Many will continue to question ‘the seriousness with which social and economic programmes can ever really tackle the human obstacles of peacebuilding’.15 The cost of conflict, in terms of lost lives and social and economic destruction, will remain devastating. However, as today’s world faces growing social and economic conflict, we can be certain that the price to be paid for building peace without the wholehearted consideration and inclusion of social and economic development as a strand of the conflict transformation matrix that is as necessary as the polit-

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ical, cultural, spiritual or psychological will be even more devastating: ‘conflicts are not transformed by agreements alone … agreements on paper mean very little if people are still suffering from the consequences of war and if the inequities that gave rise to it are left unaddressed’.16

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Notes 1 J.P. Lederach, interview with the author, 16 April 2003. 2 J.P Lederach, Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 94. 3 J.P. Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 97. 4 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, Taking ‘Calculated’ Risks for Peace II (Belfast: CFNI, 2002), p. 53. 5 G. Stevenson, Parallel Paths: The Development of Nationalism in Ireland and Quebec (Montreal and Livingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), p. 339. 6 Lederach, Building Peace, p. 94. 7 H. Clinton, ‘Peace and Reconciliation in the Modern World’, Tip O’Neill Chair of Peace Studies Lecture, University of Ulster, Magee Campus, 26 August 2004. 8 J.P. Lederach, ‘The Challenge of the 21st Century. Justpeace’, in European Centre for Conflict Prevention, People Building Peace. 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World, (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999), p. 32. 9 Ibid., p. 34. 10 R. Paris, At War’s End. Building Peace After Civil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 9. 11 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, p. 125. 12 O.P. Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 205–6. Paris has also highlighted the perils of peace on the cheap; Paris, At War’s End, p. 232. 13 Border Action, Response to SEUPB Consultation on Peace III Programme (Monaghan: Border Action, 2007), p. 15. 14 Lederach, The Moral Imagination, p. 41. 15 Community Relations Council, Beyond Sectarianism? The Churches and Ten Years of the Peace Process. Learning from Peace II, Volume 1 (Belfast: CRC, 2004), p. 8. 16 P. van Tongeren, M. Brenk, M. Hellema and J. Verhoeven (eds), People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), p. 21.

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Appendices

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appendix i

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Peace II – funding delivery mechanisms

*

Northern Ireland (45) Government Departments/Agencies Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) Department for Regional Development (DRD) Department for Social Development (DSD) Department of Employment and Learning (DEL) Department of Education (DE) Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI) Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs) Co-operation Ireland Community Relations Council (CRC) Education and Guidance Service for Adults (EGSA) Northern Ireland Preschool Playgroup Association (NIPPA) Community Foundation for Northern Ireland (CFNI) Playboard PROTEUS Rural Development Council (RDC) Southern Education and Library Board (SELB) Training for Women Network (TWN) Local Delivery Mechanisms – Local Strategy Partnerships Antrim Ards Armagh *  PricewaterhouseCoopers/SEUPB, Ex-Post Evaluation of Peace I and Mid-Term Evaluation of Peace II, Final Report (Belfast: PwC, 2003), p. 171.

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Ballymena Ballymoney Banbridge Belfast Carrickfergus Castlereagh Coleraine Cookstown Craigavon Derry Down Dungannon Fermanagh Larne Limavady Lisburn Magherafelt Moyle Newry Newtownabbey North Down Omagh Strabane Border Counties (10) Government Departments/Agencies Department of Education and Science (DES) Department of Culture, Marine and Natural Resources (DCMNR) Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (DCRGA) Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs) Area Development Management/Combat Poverty Agency (ADM/CPA) Local Delivery Mechanisms – County Council Led Task Forces (CCLTFs) Cavan Donegal Leitrim Louth Monaghan Sligo

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Peace I – priorities and measures

Priority 1: Employment Measure 1 Boosting Growth and Retraining for Peace Measure 2 Action for Jobs Measure 3 Improving the Accessibility and Quality of Training, Education and Employment Services Measure 4 Accompanying Infrastructure and Equipment Support Priority 2A: Urban Regeneration (Northern Ireland) Measure 1 Urban Regeneration for Peace and Reconciliation – Belfast and Londonderry Measure 2 Urban Regeneration for Peace and Reconciliation – RegionWide Priority 2B: Rural Regeneration (Northern Ireland) Measure 1 Community-Based Actions Measure 2 Rural Economic Development Measure 3 Fisheries and Aquaculture and Water-Based Tourism Priority 2C: Urban and Rural Regeneration (Border Counties) Measure 1 Urban and Village Renewal and Tourism Measure 2 Community-Led Development Priority 3: Cross-Border Measure 1 Business and Cultural Links Measure 2 Infrastructure Measure 3 Cooperation between Public Bodies Measure 4 Cross-Border Reconciliation

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Priority 4: Social Inclusion Measure 1 Developing Grass-Roots Capacities and Promoting the Inclusion of Women Measure 2 Preventing Exclusion Measure 3 Promoting the Inclusion of Children and Young People Measure 4 Promoting the Inclusion of Vulnerable Groups and Improving the Accessibility and Quality of Services Aimed at these Groups Measure 5 Promoting Pathways to Reconciliation Measure 6 Accompanying Infrastructure and Equipment Support Priority 5: Productive Investment/Industrial Development Measure 1 Investment Promotion Measure 2 New Industrial Development Services Measure 3 Trade Development Priority 6: District Partnerships [Northern Ireland only] Priority 7: Technical Assistance

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Peace II – priorities and measures

Priority 1: Economic Renewal Measure 1.1 Business Competitiveness and Development Measure 1.2 Sustainable Tourism Development Based on Shared Natural and Cultural Resources (NI) Measure 1.3 New Skills and New Opportunities Measure 1.4 Promoting Entrepreneurship Measure 1.5 Positive Action for Women Measure 1.6 Training for Farmers (NI) Measure 1.7 Diversification of Agricultural Activities and Activities Close to Agriculture to Provide Multiple Activities or Alternative Incomes (NI) Measure 1.8 Technology Support for the Knowledge-Based Economy (NI) Measure 1.9 Investment in Agricultural Holdings (NI) Measure 1.10 Basic Service for the Rural Economy and Population (NI) Priority 2: Social Integration, Inclusion and Reconciliation Measure 2.1 Reconciliation for Sustainable Peace Measure 2.2 Developing Children and Young People Measure 2.3 Skilling and Building the Social Economy Measure (NI) Measure 2.4 Pathways to Inclusion, Integration and Reconciliation of Victims Measure 2.5 Investing in Childcare (NI) Measure 2.6 Promoting Active Citizenship Measure 2.7 Developing Weak Community Infrastructure Measure 2.8 Accompanying Infrastructure and Equipment Support Measure 2.9 Renovation and Development of Villages and Protection and Conservation of the Rural Heritage (NI) Measure 2.10 Encouragement for Tourist and Craft Activities (NI) Measure 2.11 Area-Based Urban Regeneration – Belfast, Londonderry and Regional Towns (NI)

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Priority 3: Locally Based Regeneration and Development

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3.1 Local Economic Initiatives for Developing the Social Measure   Economy (NI) Measure 3.2 Locally Based Human Resource, Training & Development Strategies (NI) Measure 3.3 Building Better Communities (Border Region) Measure 3.4 Improving Our Rural Communities (Border Region) Priority 4: Outward and Forward Looking Region Measure 4.1 Networking in Europe and Beyond Measure 4.2 Marketing the Region as a Tourist Destination Priority 5: Cross-Border Co-operation Measure 5.1 Increasing Cross-Border Economic Development Opportunities Measure 5.2 Improving Cross-Border Public Sector Co-operation 5.3 Developing Cross-Border Reconciliation and Cultural Measure   Under­­­­­standing Measure 5.4 Promoting Joint Approaches to Social, Education, Training and Human Resource Development Measure 5.5 Education, Cross-Border School and Youth Co-operation Measure 5.6 Agriculture and Rural Development Co-operation Measure 5.7 Cross-Border Fishing and Aquacultural Co-operation

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INTERREG I (1991–1993) – sub-programmes and measures

Sub-Programme 1: Tourism Measures: Natural resources tourism and supporting facilities Cultural and historical heritage tourism Sporting and activity tourism Joint and cooperative marketing Sub-Programme 2: Agriculture/Fisheries/Forestry Measures: Agriculture Fisheries Forestry Sub-Programme 3: Human Resource Development Measures: Vocational and other general training Further and higher (including adult) education Sub-Programme 4: Environmental Protection Measures: Water Quality – the Erne System Water Quality – Catchment and Estuary of Lough Foyle Lough Neagh Catchment Area Other Action to Protect the Environment Sub-Programme 5: Regional Development Measures: Community Development Infrastructure Provision and Improvement Economic Development

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INTERREG II (1994–1999) – sub-programmes and measures

Sub-Programme 1: Regional Development Measures: Economic Development Tourism Community Economic Development Technical Assistance Sub-Programme 2: Human Resource Development Measures: Training and Education (ESF) Human Resource Development (ERDF) Sub-Programme 3: Infrastructure Measures: Roads and Transport Infrastructure Energy and Telecommunications Sub-Programme 4: Agriculture/Fisheries/Forestry Measures: Agriculture Fisheries (FIFG) Fisheries (ERDF) Forestry Sub-Programme 5: Environmental Protection Measures: Shared and Related Catchments

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INTERREG IIIA (2000–2006) – priorities and measures

Priority 1: Integrated Local Development Strategies Measure 1 Business and Economic Development Measure 2 Knowledge Economy Measure 3 Human Resource Development and Skilling Measure 4 Rural Development Initiative Priority 2: Supporting Physical Infrastructure and the Environment Measure 1 Inter-Regional Economic Infrastructure Measure 2 Environmental Protection and Management Measure 3 Renewable Energy/Energy Efficiency Priority 3: Civic and Community Networking Measure 1 Social and Community Infrastructure Measure 2 Health and Well-Being Priority 4: Technical Assistance Measure 1 Management, Monitoring and Financial Control Measure 2 Programme Evaluation, Information and Publicity

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Index

Note: ‘n.’ after a page reference indicates the number of a note on that page and page numbers in italics refer to illustrations. activities 7, 15, 27, 29, 34, 35, 41, 77, 87, 181, 208, 216, 219–28 passim, 233–8 passim, 242n.83, 250 International Fund for Ireland 88, 89, 104, 105, 107 INTERREG I, II and III 99–101, 168, 177, 179, 210, 211 Peace I, II and III 93, 94–7, 116, 120, 124, 125, 132, 133, 136, 146, 147, 148, 149, 159 actors 6, 8, 12, 25, 29, 30, 34, 38, 41, 138, 167, 168, 171, 216 external 33, 222, 232, 233 grassroots 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 25, 27, 29, 30, 41, 53, 76, 108, 110–30 passim, 138–65 passim, 172, 175, 177, 201–13 passim, 220, 226, 231, 232, 235, 246, 247, 249 grassroots capacity 14, 125, 247 international 235 middle level 12, 14, 25, 29, 30, 108, 111, 112, 118, 126, 144, 156, 165, 177, 201, 247 top level 1, 6, 8, 29, 30, 53, 108, 111, 112, 113, 118, 124, 128, 131, 142–80 passim, 201–49 passim civil servants 88, 104, 109, 112, 113, 121, 146, 153, 167,

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180, 181, 206, 212 politicians 12, 29, 30, 111, 112, 113, 137, 145, 146, 159, 179, 180, 181, 201, 203, 218 Track I 7, 12, 24 Track II 12, 25 Track III 7, 12, 25 Agenda for Peace 3, 27 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace 3 Anglo-Irish Agreement 34, 87, 105, 110, 181n.10 Area Development Management (ADM) 66, 93, 94, 102n.34, 142, 167, 172, 205, 211 border, the 10, 13, 19n.60, 50–6 passim, 61, 70, 74, 75, 76, 88, 92, 98, 101, 102n.34, 108, 112, 123, 126, 130, 138, 161–70 passim, 184n.85, 246, 250 see also cross-border Border Corridor Strategy 167, 168 Border Counties 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15n.1, 31, 34, 39, 46n.38, 54, 58, 61–6 passim, 63, 67, 68, 82n.81, 70–94 passim, 95, 98, 103, 106, 108, 112, 117–30 passim, 135, 138–55 passim, 169, 179, 181,

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Index 187n.154, 200, 206, 207, 214, 220, 223, 231, 233, 237, 247, 250 border area(s) 13, 54, 97, 98, 163, 164, 166 border region 9, 58, 63, 64, 69, 70, 83n.107, 96, 97, 147, 158, 162, 169, 170, 171, 174, 176, 217, 229 Border, Midlands and Western (BMW) 58, 74 Border Regional Authority 93, 129 Bosnia 103 bottom-up (approach) 88, 99, 110, 125, 126, 128, 129, 143, 146, 167, 168, 171, 172, 177, 205, 206, 207, 208, 231 Boundary Commission 54 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 3 Brett, C.E.B. 104, 107 British government 56, 76, 87, 88, 104, 118, 133, 214, 215, 220 bureaucracy 109, 128, 130, 131, 134, 147, 151, 154, 156, 167, 174, 175, 204, 205, 209, 222, 236, 249 excessive 2, 107, 129, 130, 155, 180, 208 ceasefires 28, 59, 62, 64, 72, 73, 75, 89, 127, 129, 151, 153, 246, 250 post- 1, 6, 7, 56, 125, 139, 152, 176, 200, 201 Celtic Tiger 61, 180 central government 36, 95, 96, 99, 110, 112, 122, 145, 146, 201, 232 Central Statistics Office (CSO) 63, 64, 69, 70 census of population 13, 19n.61, 19n.62, 19n.63, 66 citizen empowerment 1, 2, 6, 7, 14, 23, 33, 34, 35, 125, 234, 246, 248 Civic Forum 8, 17n.35, 18n.44, 29, 76

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283 civil society 6, 7, 8, 30, 34, 35, 37, 40, 50, 129, 133, 143, 146, 167, 181, 207, 215, 223, 226, 229, 236 clientelism 112 Combat Poverty Agency (CPA) 66, 93, 94, 102n.34, 125, 142, 167, 172, 185n.120, 205, 211 Community Foundation for Northern Ireland (CFNI) 96, 132, 133, 135, 136, 140, 142, 148 Community Relations Council (CRC) 94, 126, 134, 209, 216 community/voluntary (sector) 7, 9, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94, 102n.34, 119–33 passim, 139, 140, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 159, 176, 207, 208, 226, 231 Community Workers Co-operative (CWC) 215 complementarity 35, 42, 217 Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 48n.90, 133 conflict analysis 219, 229 cycle 23, 26, 39 management 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 23, 24, 25, 35, 170, 174, 232 post- 2, 3, 6, 27, 37, 38, 39, 40, 117, 122, 125, 218, 225, 246, 250 prevention 11, 36, 37, 216 protracted 24, 25, 26, 29, 36, 38, 40, 208, 225, 231, 250 resolution 2, 7, 8, 10, 12, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 89, 162, 169, 216, 229, 234 (root) causes of 3, 4, 8, 11, 24, 25, 27, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 50, 52, 53, 76, 77, 108, 109, 110, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 146, 162, 163, 169, 170, 202, 212, 221, 224 settlement 2, 24, 26, 162, 246

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284 transformation definitional morass 4, 23, 24, 180, 213, 222, 246 lack of specialist knowledge 212, 213, 214, 216, 237 piecemeal approach 138, 215 policy framework 120, 156, 159, 162, 180, 213, 214, 215, 216, 222, 225, 236 practice 1, 11, 15, 31, 34, 40, 142, 181, 212, 220, 221, 237 proofing 221, 223, 224, 236 working definition 14, 23, 40, 221, 222, 246 theoretical framework 11, 14, 23, 32, 40, 237, 246, 247, 249 consultation 208, 221, 226, 231 International Fund for Ireland 104, 110, 111, 119, 202, 203 INTERREG I, II and III 99, 163, 166, 172, 175, 180, 210 Peace I, II and III 89, 90, 91, 123, 125, 126, 132, 143, 145, 147, 152, 191n294, 228 consultative forum 18n.44, 132, 143, 144, 191n.294, 232 Cooperation and Working Together (CAWT) 167, 172, 211 Co-operation Ireland 102n.34, 172, 214, 215 Core Consultative Group 91 County Council Led Task Force (CCLTF) 92, 93, 94, 129, 207, 208, 230 County Development Boards (CDBs) 75, 93, 144, 207 criticism International Fund for Ireland 104, 105, 110, 111, 115, 116, 118, 121 INTERREG I, II and III 163, 164, 166, 174, 176 Peace I, II and III 9, 103, 123, 124, 136, 137, 145, 147, 153, 156, 214 see also Pugh, Michael

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Index cross-border 10, 12, 75, 94, 95, 106, 118, 124, 127, 140, 147, 167–79 passim, 199, 208, 211, 214, 227, 231 cooperation 9, 90, 96, 97, 98, 102n.34, 163, 164, 165, 210, 215, 228 cross-community 105, 106, 107, 118, 124, 126, 160, 223, 231 cultural violence 3, 26 delivery mechanisms 92, 94, 123, 127, 128, 130, 143, 146, 206, 207, 217, 221, 230, 234 structures 93, 127, 146, 208, 211 see also implementing agencies; intermediary funding body democracy 33, 120, 177, 211, 222 participatory 1, 2, 8, 108, 125, 142, 221, 231, 232, 247 representative 108, 113, 142, 221, 231, 232, 247 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 135, 142 Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI) 160 Department of Finance (DF) 92, 99 Department of Finance and Personnel (DFP) 92, 99, 165, 204 dependency (culture) 119, 120, 150, 159, 180, 223 deprivation 13, 19n.61, 24, 52, 54, 71–6 passim, 89, 92, 107, 109, 117, 135, 199, 225 relative deprivation 19n.61, 50, 72 social deprivation 90, 107 see also poverty, and deprivation development aid 14, 23, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 88, 246 devolution 28, 206 direct violence 2, 3, 26, 31, 224, 248 disadvantaged areas 71, 88, 89, 104, 105, 106, 107, 117, 118, 124, 135, 156 displaced (people) 74, 84n.118

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285

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District Partnerships 92, 93, 94, 95, 128, 129, 132, 142, 143, 145, 180, 207, 231

157, 160, 173, 176, 204, 205, 211, 236 European Union (EU) 39, 56, 58, 59, 73, 76, 77, 87, 89, 90, 97, East Border Region Committee 98, 106, 107, 114, 115, 116, (EBRC) 102n.34, 167, 172 117, 121, 129, 134, 138, economic development 5, 6, 14, 140, 141, 152, 157, 158, 36–40 passim, 76, 89, 90, 94, 163, 167, 179, 202, 205, 97–107 passim, 121, 126, 212, 229, 230, 235, 236 133, 136, 139, 140, 157, 162, rehabilitative and reconstruction 163, 175, 176, 178, 199, 204, programmes 230 219, 223, 232 evaluation 9, 34, 41, 42, 103, 134, transformative role/potential 37, 145, 154, 160, 163, 165, 38 167, 205, 212, 219–38 see also social and economic develpassim opment ex-post 9, 127, 128, 166, 171, Economic Vision for Northern Ireland 175, 176, 194n.370 224 final 132, 143 economy 13, 38, 52, 54, 157, 206, indicators 42, 43, 54, 205, 206, 239n.16 221, 228, 229, 230 Border Counties 118 mid-term 9, 126, 130, 143, British 54 146, 149, 155, 158, 163, Northern Ireland 54, 55, 56, 76, 165, 168, 169, 170, 175, 77, 118, 200, 226 194n.373, 217 political 38 monitoring 34, 129, 132, 167, Republic of Ireland 57, 58, 61, 74 185n.115, 205, 211, 212, social 134, 140, 151, 159 221, 227, 228, 229 educational disadvantage 13, 64–70 qualitative 42, 43, 206, 212, 228 passim, 71, 73, 78 quantitative 42, 206, 228, 229 Border Counties 65–70 passim reporting requirements 129, 130, early school leaving 65, 66, 70, 138 185n.115, 205 Northern Ireland 64–5 passim equality 52, 76, 137, 209, 231, 234 foreign direct investment 55, 58 European Commission 89, 90, 107, funding 1, 6, 56, 58, 87–94 passim, 116, 117, 133, 142, 147, 155, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 164, 165, 167, 171, 172, 174, 101–68 passim, 174, 177, 230 178, 188n.181, 190n.270, European Court of Auditors (ECA) 200–19 passim, 223, 229, 107, 128, 143, 147, 163, 164 233, 235, 236, 250 European Currency Unit (ECU) 95, culture 103, 169 98, 100 gap 148, 190n.270 European Regional Development mainstream 140, 158 Fund (ERDF) 92, 100, 157 sources 121, 149, 160, 221, 236 European Structural/Social Funds (ESF) 77, 89, 91, 93, 107, Galtung, Johan 2, 3, 11, 14, 26 115, 116, 120, 127, 155, 156, conflict triangle 26

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286 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) 8, 28, 30, 31, 59, 62, 73, 75, 93, 137, 139, 215, 232 ‘Economic, Social and Cultural’ 76 political stalemate 215 Strand Two 76, 93 government departments 13, 46n.38, 88, 92, 112, 122, 128, 130, 133, 143, 145, 146, 149, 150, 153, 165–78 passim, 210, 211, 215, 250 Government of Ireland Act 52, 54 greed versus grievance 5 Group of 7 see Confederation of British Industry Haase indicators 13, 19n.62 deprivation index 54 harm 37, 44, 119, 120, 121, 158, 161, 176, 177, 178, 219, 235 horizontal capacity 28, 44, 107, 112, 125, 162, 164, 166, 171, 176, 210 inequalities 4, 40 integration 29, 104, 110, 141, 143, 144, 168, 172, 173, 179, 247 relationships 25, 29, 41, 201, 206, 230 House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 130, 148 housing 28, 52, 56, 72, 73, 77, 119, 121, 137, 171 impacts 9, 12, 14, 15, 23, 38, 54, 103, 179, 180, 181, 217, 219, 227, 228, 229, 246 International Fund for Ireland 106, 108–22 INTERREG I, II and III 169–79, 210 Peace I, II and III 126, 130, 134, 136–62 see also Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments

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Index implementation structures 200, 207, 211, 219, 248 implementing agencies 168, 176 see also delivery, mechanisms; delivery, structures; intermediary funding body inequality 40, 52, 53, 72, 74, 75, 78, 83n.100, 126, 141 innovation 125, 150, 159, 211, 227, 236, 237 integration 33, 96, 98, 104, 112, 141, 166, 172, 206, 235 see also horizontal; vertical intermediary funding body (IFB) 9, 10, 92, 94, 95, 96, 102n.22, 116, 125–59 passim, 166, 180, 186n.141, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 230, 232, 234, 235 complexity 2, 93, 101, 129, 130, 155, 204, 208 number of 93, 128, 142, 155, 167, 180, 203, 208, 234 see also delivery, mechanisms; delivery, structures; implementing agencies international community 4, 5, 38, 117, 218, 232, 233 International Fund for Ireland (IFI) activities 88, 89 annual reports 88, 89, 104, 105, 114, 118 Board 88, 104, 106, 115, 118, 120, 200, 232 development consultants 88, 110, 111 exit strategy 89, 109, 110, 117, 118, 180, 183n.37 flexibility 106, 109, 113, 115, 116, 200, 201 independent assessment(s) 105, 106, 113 leverage 106, 112, 121, 201 International Labour Organisations (ILO) 62, 63, 69, 81n.65 INTERREG I, II and III

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Index activities 99, 100, 101 design 162, 163, 169, 170, 194n.320 infrastructural projects 165, 168, 170, 178 measures 99, 100, 101, 106, 164, 168, 169, 172 Steering Committee 99, 171, 173, 178, 199, 211 INTERREG IV 210, 211, 217, 218 Iraq 2, 250 Irish Central Border Area Network (ICBAN) 102n.34, 167, 172, 194n.378 Irish government 11, 76, 87, 88, 104, 118, 161, 165, 214, 220 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 89, 129, 184n.85

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just peace 25, 37, 40, 250 learning 1, 43, 132, 154, 157, 161, 205–37 passim, 250 Lederach, John Paul 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 23, 27–43 passim, 30, 76, 111, 121, 126, 142, 161, 179, 203, 224, 227, 230, 237, 241n.62, 246–50 passim lessons 10, 11, 14, 15, 37, 93, 132, 134, 151, 154, 158, 200–12 passim, 220, 221, 230, 235, 236, 237, 238, 246, 250 local level 92, 93, 106, 121, 129, 138, 152, 163, 168, 200, 205, 207, 229 Local Strategy Partnerships (LSPs) 93, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 142, 143, 153, 180, 206, 207, 217, 230, 231 long-term approach 104, 113, 162 view 7, 44, 113, 114, 115, 117, 147, 151, 173, 211, 238 Loyalist community 109, 119

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287 MacBride Principles 39 McCarter, William 105, 182n.13 management centralised 93, 142, 163, 164, 171, 180, 210 committees 93, 142, 148, 150 decentralised 166, 167, 168, 176, 210 structure 88, 92, 94, 166, 172, 176, 210 marginalised communities 115, 206 groups 124, 142, 208 Member of the European Parliament (MEP) 134, 135, 142, 145, 207 middle ground 29, 221, 234 N+2 115, 116, 147, 211 National Development Plan 76, 217, 250 National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) 65, 82n.81 Nationalist community 52, 87, 105, 107 Noble indicators/index 13, 19n.61, 117 non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 6, 8, 17n.27, 30, 35, 230 international NGOs 6, 34 Northern Ireland Assembly 91, 93, 94, 124, 134, 142, 146, 156, 200 Cameron Commission 52 civil rights movement 53 Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) 125, 130, 191n.284, 215 deaths and injuries 53, 77 financial costs 53, 250 historical socioeconomic overview 51–3 local government 19n.61, 93, 117, 152, 155, 206, 207, 210 Ministerial Council 29, 76

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288 Partnership Board 92, 94, 129, 132, 179, 200, 235 public sector 54, 56, 155, 156, 170, 223 Social Research Agency (NISRA) 81n.74, 107 structural problems 31, 55, 56 UK subvention 56 Voluntary Trust (NIVT) 125 see also Community Foundation for Northern Ireland North West Region Cross Border Group (NWRCBG) 167, 172 NUTS III areas 98

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Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) 18n.44, 235 ownership 33, 34, 41, 77, 138, 158, 180, 208, 210, 226 local 1, 7, 25, 43, 103, 125, 206, 221, 231, 232, 233, 234, 248 paramilitaries 23, 28, 77, 113, 115, 118, 188n.181 Paris, Roland 27, 249, 251n.12 partnership model 129, 142, 165 partition 52, 55, 57, 61 peace 2–8 passim, 24–43 passim, 65, 73, 76, 78, 87, 89, 90, 91, 103, 104, 118, 119, 126, 127, 134–60 passim, 179, 181, 199, 201, 208, 209, 214–50 passim agreement 31, 32, 222, 248 as a process 32, 232, 237, 248 negative 3, 23 positive 3, 23, 24, 40, 41, 248 process 1, 8, 10, 11, 28, 29, 30, 32, 36, 37, 46n.38, 64, 89, 90, 91, 116, 117, 129, 139, 152, 158, 161, 166, 181, 224, 232, 233, 234 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIAs) 23, 41, 42, 43, 219

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Index peace/conflict resolution organisations (P/CROs) 7, 8, 229 Peace Dividend Paper 39, 48n.90 Peace I, II and III activities 93, 94–7, 124, 125, 132, 133, 136, 146–9, 159, 250 design 123, 132, 133, 152, 203, 205, 209, 226, 230, 231, 235 measures 90, 92, 94, 125, 127, 130, 131, 132, 134, 139, 142, 147, 149, 155, 160, 187n.164 II Extension 123, 125, 136, 145, 155, 159 Peace Partnerships 94 peacebuilding 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17n.29, 27–37 passim, 30, 42, 44, 117, 123, 126, 127, 130, 133, 134, 139–62 passim, 174, 179, 180, 200, 206, 208, 209, 212–37 passim, 241n.83, 247, 248, 249, 250 policy 11, 215, 216 peacekeeping 2, 3 peacemaking 2, 3, 220, 224, 247 planning deficit 212, 214, 216, 218, 238 see also strategic, planning Pollak, Andy 215, 218 poverty 4, 10, 11, 13, 27, 28, 36, 54, 59, 71–8 passim, 83n.105, 92, 118, 125, 126, 137, 138, 139, 170, 192n.311, 225 anti-poverty strategy/policy 10, 72, 73, 75, 217, 224, 225 Border Counties 50, 54, 73–5 passim children 28, 70, 71, 74 and conflict 10, 11, 36, 73, 75, 126, 217, 225 and deprivation 13, 73, 74, 75, 76 Northern Ireland 59, 70–3 passim proofing 223 and social exclusion 13, 54, 70–8 passim, 125, 126, 225

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Index see also social, exclusion and violence 4, 50, 71, 126 private sector 5, 6, 17n.27, 35, 38, 39, 93, 134, 149, 165 programmatic approach 111, 118, 120 Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 135, 188n.181 project promoters 12, 34, 42, 46n.38, 119, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 153, 155, 156, 160, 175, 217 Protestant community 145 discrimination against 112, 142 low uptake 2, 134–6 working class 137, 142 public servants 121, 176, 208 Pugh, Michael 6, 33, 103, 120, 159, 169–79 passim, 212, 232 racism 77, 78, 157 recommendations 15, 173, 181, 191n.294, 200, 249 practice-based 14, 220–37, 247 reconciliation 6, 8, 10, 40, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 106, 107, 115, 118, 126, 127, 134–46 passim, 152, 153, 156–62 passim, 199, 201, 203, 205, 206, 213–33 passim working definition 153, 191n.297, 213 reconstruction 2, 5, 10, 35–44 passim, 114, 178, 181, 209, 225, 230 Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) 42, 43 Regional Partnership Board 94, 129, 235 republican 109, 112, 161 Robson measures/index 19n.61, 117 Rose, Richard 53, 79n.17 Rural Community Network 125 Ryan, Stephen 2, 24, 218 sanctions 35, 39

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289 sectarianism 39, 52, 77, 78, 89, 141, 157 Shared Future Strategy 209, 217, 224, 250 single market 97, 162 small grants 124, 125, 185n.115, 205, 208 Smith, Dan 6, 11, 17n.29, 27, 51, 213–19 passim, 235 Smith, David and Chambers, Gerald inequality study 52, 53, 79n.17 social capital 7, 56, 58, 206, 228, 248 change 2, 7, 23, 25, 51, 71, 224, 237, 238, 247 engineering 179, 200 exclusion 37, 106, 133, 157 see also poverty, and social exclusion inclusion 6, 73, 75, 76, 90, 92, 94, 95, 123–7 passim, 132, 133, 146, 152, 157, 180, 191n.283, 199, 208, 209, 223 justice 23, 24, 39, 40, 125, 224, 248 social and economic development 1–15 passim, 19n.60, 23, 24, 28, 41, 50, 51, 53, 54, 76, 77, 87, 88, 101, 113, 122, 139, 157, 162, 165, 178, 179, 181, 199, 204, 221, 224, 225, 237, 238, 246, 250 see also economic development Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) 12, 91, 93, 94, 96, 99, 102n.34, 112, 142, 143, 145, 153, 154, 155, 167, 169, 173, 177, 179, 185n.104, 207, 208, 209, 210, 213 centralised management (approach/structures) 93, 94, 142, 155, 163, 164, 171, 172, 180, 207, 209, 210

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290 Joint Technical Secretariat 94, 99, 207, 211 Monitoring Committee 91, 93, 94, 99, 133, 134, 143, 165, 168, 171, 172, 173, 176, 207, 211 statutory sector 139, 140, 207 strategic aim(s) 90, 91, 92, 238 approach 169, 210 deficit 212, 214, 216, 218, 238 framework 183n.37, 214 objective(s) 90, 91 planning 217, 218, 219 policy 76, 152, 216, 222 priorities 92 structural violence 2, 3, 4, 6, 14, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 35, 40, 51, 58, 64, 73, 75, 76, 77, 224, 238, 246, 248 structures 3, 29, 32, 33, 36, 71, 111, 141, 144, 151, 155, 171, 178, 180, 185n.115, 199, 205, 206, 207, 208, 216, 231, 233, 248 economic 31, 32, 42, 43, 44, 108, 109, 110, 136, 138, 169, 170 political 8, 25, 31, 32, 35, 40, 42, 200 social 25, 31, 32, 35, 40, 44, 108, 109, 110, 136, 138, 169, 170 socio-economic 4, 5, 54, 90, 118, 157, 219, 225 socio-political 24, 33 substitute for government action 121, 139, 140, 158, 170, 178, 218, 236 sustainability 2, 7, 9, 25, 26, 34, 42, 77, 132, 133, 134, 149, 150, 154, 159, 161, 174, 180, 204, 209–15 passim, 221–8 passim, 249

INTERREG I, II and III 162, 174–6 Peace I, II and III 147, 152, 153, 156, 158 technical assistance 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 131, 163, 167, 208

tailored (tool) 37, 41, 44, 87, 200, 204 International Fund for Ireland 104, 117, 118, 119

White Paper on Irish Aid 11, 19n.54, 241n.62 World Bank 4, 34, 35, 36

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unemployed 55, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 70, 74, 81n.68, 81n.72, 82n.36 long-term unemployed 55, 59, 60, 60, 62, 64, 65, 70, 124, 125, 227 unemployment 13, 36, 55–77 passim, 60, 63, 66, 80n.55, 82n.81, 90, 97, 98, 108, 118, 137, 138 Border Counties 61–4 passim Northern Ireland 58–62 passim long-term unemployment 61, 63, 64, 65, 69, 71, 73, 78, 82n.81, 138 youth unemployment 28 Unionist 87, 107, 126, 180, 194n.378, 204 anger 214 community 52, 105, 109, 119, 135 United Nations (UN) 3, 27, 34 United States of America (USA) 87, 88, 104, 105, 113, 114 USAID 114, 182n.24 vertical capacity 29, 44, 104, 107, 110, 112, 141, 143, 144, 162–79 passim, 210, 247, 248 integration 29, 104, 110, 141, 143, 144, 168, 172, 173, 179, 201, 247 relationships 25, 29, 41, 201, 206, 230

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