Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change [2 ed.] 0582424003, 9780582424005

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Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change

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Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change Second Edition

Jonathan Tonge University of Salford

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Routledge Taylor & Francis Group• --

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1998 by Prentice Hall Europe Second edition 2002

Published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

'Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 1998, 2002, Taylor & Francis. The right of Jonathan Tonge to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter in­ vented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or re­ trieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notices Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical treatment may become necessary. Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments de­ scribed herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a profes­ sional responsibility. To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein. ISBN : 978-0-582-42400-5 (pbk) British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record is available from the Library of Congress Typeset in 11/12pt Adobe Garamond by 35

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Contents

L i s t of Preface L i s t of

tables abbreviations

Introduction The basis of the problem History and politics

xi xiii XV

1 1 2

Chapter 1 A divided island 1.1 The roots of modern problems 1.2 Home Rule for Ireland 1.3 The growth of Ulster unionism 1.4 The rise of Irish nationalism 1.5 The partition of Ireland 1.6 Civil war in Ireland 1.7 Was partition inevitable? 1.8 Conclusion

4 4 6 8 11 13 15 16 18

Chapter 2 A n 'Orange state'? Northern Ireland 1921-68 2.1 An insecure state 2.2 Electoral discrimination 2.3 Discrimination in employment 2.4 Discrimination in housing 2.5 The extent of discrimination 2.6 Explanations of discrimination 2.7 Political stagnation 2.8 The threat from the South? 2.9 Conclusion

19 19 20 22 23 24 27 30 31 34

Chapter 3 From civil rights protests to insurrection 3.1 The modernisation of unionism 3.2 The birth of the civil rights campaign 3.3 The demands of the civil rights movement 3.4 Unionist responses 3.5 The arrival of the British Army

35 35 36 37 38 39 vii

viii

3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11

Contents

Unionist fragmentation The formation of the Provisional IRA The civil rights movement and the IRA The growth of Loyalist paramilitary groups The abolition of Stormont Conclusion

40 41 44 46 47 49

Chapter 4 Unionist and Loyalist politics 4.1 The party system in Northern Ireland 4.2 The nature of unionism Devolution and unionism 4.3 4.4 Forms of unionism Unionist parties 4.5 4.6 'New Loyalist' parties The political centre 4.7 4.8 Conclusion

50 50 51 52 54 54 61 62 63

Chapter 5 Nationalist and Republican politics Nationalist themes 5.1 5.2 Republicanism's core ideas Nationalism and republicanism compared 5.3 5.4 The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Sinn Fein 5.5 5.6 Republican ultras Conclusion 5.7

65 65 66 67 69 71 73 74

Chapter 6 Governing Northern Ireland 6.1 'Old Stormont': Northern Ireland's parliament 1921—72 6.2 Direct rule 1972-98 'New Stormont': Northern Ireland's Executive and Assembly 6.3 6.4 The Northern Ireland Assembly and its committees The North-South Ministerial Council 6.5 6.6 The British-Irish Council and British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference The role of the European Union 6.7 6.8 Northern Ireland's new consociational democracy? Conclusion 6.9

75 75 76 77 79 81 81 82 83 84

Chapter 7 Policing Northern Ireland The legacy of the Troubles 7.1 7.2 The critique of the R U C The Patten Commission Report 7.3 7.4 Implementing Patten Policing parades 7.5 7.6 The British Army Ulsterisation and criminalisation 7.7 7.8 Conclusion

86 86 88 90 91 92 93 95 97

Contents

Chapter 8 The roles of religion

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9

The extent of religiosity Protestant churches and beliefs Orangeism The Catholic Church in Ireland The political influence of the Catholic Church Educational segregation Societal segregation Religion and conflict Conclusion

ix

98 98 99 101 103 105 106 108 110 112

Chapter 9 Political failures 1972-84 9.1 Policy approaches 9.2 Power-sharing 9.3 The Council of Ireland 9.4 The Ulster Workers' Council strike 9.5 The Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention 9.6 Non-politics 1976-9 9.7 The early Thatcher years 9.8 Rolling devolution 9.9 The New Ireland Forum Report 9.10 Conclusion

113 113 115 116 119 120 121 122 124 125 126

Chapter 10 The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement 10.1 Origins 10.2 Terms 10.3 The Unionist dilemma 10.4 Unionist responses 10.5 Nationalist responses 10.6 After the Anglo-Irish Agreement 10.7 Lasting significance 10.8 Conclusion

127 127 128 130 132 135 136 138 139

Chapter 11 The logic of the peace process: changes in republicanism

11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.10 11.11

Militarism versus politics Recognition of the Irish Republic Dialogue with constitutional Nationalists The Brooke Initiatives The revival of Hume—Adams Changes in the Republican agenda Entering Stormont Interpretations of changes in republicanism International influences The influence of Loyalist paramilitaries Conclusion

140 141 143 144 145 147 148 149 150 151 152 153

X

Contents

Chapter 12 The development of the peace process 12.1 The Downing Street Declaration 12.2 Interpretations 12.3 Paramilitary ceasefires 12.4 The Framework Documents: Part I 12.5 The Framework Documents: Part II 12.6 Political responses 12.7 The Irish-American lobby 12.8 The role of the American government 12.9 Conclusion

154 154 156 157 158 160 162 164 165 167

Chapter 13 War and peace: the long road to negotiations 1995-7 13.1 (Non)-Movement towards multi-party talks 1995-6 13.2 The Mitchell Principles of Non-Violence 13.3 The Northern Ireland Forum elections 1996 13.4 Nationalist objections 13.5 The Forum election results 13.6 Stagnation, sectarianism and IRA violence 13.7 Sectarian boycotts 13.8 New Labour: new peace process 13.9 Conclusion

168 168 169 171 172 173 175 177 178 180

Chapter 14 The Good Friday Agreement 14.1 The contents of the Agreement 14.2 Negotiating change: party positions 14.3 Mixing old and new: central themes of the Agreement 14.4 The Good Friday Agreement referenda and Assembly elections 14.5 Decommissioning and Executive formation 14.6 Republican 'dissidents' 14.7 Conclusion

182 182 183 185

Chapter 15 Political stability in Northern Ireland? 15.1 The problem in context 15.2 Alternatives to the Good Friday Agreement? 15.3 Public attitudes 15.4 The micro-agenda 15.5 Conclusion

198 198 199 206 208 209

Conclusion The sceptical view The pursuit of conflicting goals Divided unionism Ethnic bloc politics

211 212 212 213 214

Chronology Further reading References Index

215 218 223 237

190 192 195 196

List of tables

2.1 2.2 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 8.2 8.3 9.1 9.2 12.1 12.2 13.1 14.1 14.2 15.1 15.2 15.3

Electors and elected in Deny 1967 Views on discrimination in Northern Ireland in 1968 Differences between Republican paramilitary organisations 1970-72 Protestant identity in Northern Ireland 1968-89 (%) Election results in Northern Ireland 1982-2001 Voting in the Ulster Unionist Party leadership contest 2000 by the Ulster Unionist Council members, according to Orange Order membership (%) Voting in the Good Friday Agreement referendum by the Ulster Unionist Council, according to age Ulster Unionist Council solutions for Northern Ireland Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland 1972-2001 The Northern Ireland Executive 1999 (shown in running order of choice of portfolio) Main emergency measures introduced Perceptions of the R U C (%) Deaths in the Northern Ireland conflict 1969-99 Religious denominations in Northern Ireland Protestant denominations in Northern Ireland Religious attitudes of Protestants in Northern Ireland British policy approaches 1972—84 Northern Ireland Assembly election results 1973 Chronology of the peace process 1993—9 The 1995 Framework Documents' proposals for a North—South body Northern Ireland Forum election results 1996 The Good Friday Agreement referenda 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly elections 1998 Constitutional preferences for Northern Ireland The extensiveness of unionism and nationalism in Northern Ireland British attitudes to the constitutional future of Northern Ireland

21 24 43 52 55 57 58 59 76 78 87 88 88 99 99 101 113 116 155 161 175 190 191 206 207 207 xi

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Preface

This book is aimed at students of the politics and history of Northern Ireland. It should also benefit the lay reader with an interest in the subject matter. The book combines an examination of the historical context of the conflict in Northern Ireland with an exploration of the contemporary political situation. It provides a detailed account of the attempts to create a lasting peace in Northern Ireland, assessing whether barriers to the resolution of the conflict have been removed. The disappearance of my home office amid mountains of press cuttings over the last six years should have sufficed as a warning that the production of a second edition was tantamount to writing a new book. The extent of change in Northern Ireland over the last few years has been extraordinary. In attempting to record and assess these changes, this second edition contains a large number of rewritten chapters, a division of the party chapter into separate Unionist and Nationalist chapters (as per the Good Friday Agreement. . . ) and new chapters on policing and the Good Friday Agreement. A large number of debts have been incurred in production of this book. I wish to thank Emma Mitchell, ex-Pearson, for suggesting a second edition. Thanks are also due to the Economic and Social Research Council, for the research awards New Nationalism in Northern Ireland (R000222668); The Role of Extra Constitutional Parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly (L327253058), with Professor J McAuley; and Third Traditions in Northern Ireland (R000223414). Whilst this book is not the primary outlet for findings from the projects, the research does inform part of the chapter on political parties and some comments on responses to the Good Friday Agreement. I am grateful to all the political figures and party administrators who have co-operated for this book and other projects. The list is too long to be exhaustively reproduced here, but special thanks must go to Mitchel McLaughlin, Alex Maskey and Dawn Doyle (Sinn Fein); Tim Attwood and Gerry Cosgrove (SDLP); Dr Stephen Farry (Alliance); Hazel Legge and David Boyd (UUP). Thanks are also due to the large range of organisations assisting in the bi-annual University of Salford study tour to Northern Ireland, encouraging discussion and debate among visiting students. The interest in the subject displayed by Salford students rarely fails to impress. Special thanks are due to Sinn Fein and the PUP for their roles as 'hosts'. To the parties already mentioned above, I wish to record thanks to the DUP, the R U C , George Patton, xiii

xiv

Preface

Chief Executive of the Orange Order, and Professor Paul Bew, Queen's University. The staff in the Political Collection at the Linenhall Library in Belfast are always helpful and I am especially grateful to Yvonne Murphy and Allan Leonard. On the academic side, I am heavily indebted to my colleague at the University of Salford, Dr Jocelyn Evans, for his data analysis and perceptive comments. I also wish to thank Andy Mycock and Penny Pardoe for their help. Professor Jim McAuley at the University of Huddersfield offered valuable insights into Loyalist politics. I also wish to thank participants in 'The New Northern Irish Politics' seminar series at the University of Salford in autumn 2000, all of whom provided illuminating insights. They included Professor Henry Patterson (Ulster); Professor Steve Bruce (Aberdeen) and Dr Feargal Cochrane (Lancaster). On a personal note, I wish to thank Maria Gearing, Anita Hopkins and my son Connell, who, rightly, remains unimpressed by the amount of time his father devotes to Northern Ireland. This second edition is dedicated to my parents, Stanley and Brenda Tonge. Finally, I wish to add the obvious disclaimer. The numerous citations above in no way constitute an attempt to scatter blame for this work. Any errors, distortions or downright dissembling are my own responsibility. Jonathan Tonge is Professor of Politics at the University of Salford. Publisher's Acknowledgements We are grateful to the following for permission to reproduce copyright material: Map (p. vi) from Politics UK, 4th Edition, Longman (Jones et aL, 2001), Pearson Education Limited. Whilst every effort has been made to trace the owners of copyright material, in a few cases this has proved impossible and we take this opportunity to offer our apologies to any copyright holders whose rights have been unwittingly infringed.

List of abbreviations

AIA AOH APNI CEC CIRA CSJ DSD DUP EU GAA GFA ICD ICTU INLA IRA IRB LAW LVF MEP MLA MP NICRA NICS NIHE NILP NIO NIUP NIWC NORAID OIRA PIRA PSNI PUP RIR RIRA

Anglo-Irish Agreement Ancient Order of Hibernians Alliance Party of Northern Ireland Campaign for Equal Citizenship Continuity Irish Republican Army Campaign for Social Justice Downing Street Declaration Democratic Unionist Party European Union Gaelic Athletic Association Good Friday Agreement International Commission on Decommissioning Irish Congress of Trade Unions Irish National Liberation Army Irish Republican Army Irish Republican Brotherhood Loyalist Association of Workers Loyalist Volunteer Force Member of the European Parliament Member of the Legislative Assembly Member of Parliament Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association Northern Ireland Civil Service Northern Ireland Housing Executive Northern Ireland Labour Party Northern Ireland Office Northern Ireland Unionist Party Northern Ireland Women's Coalition Irish Northern Aid Committee Official Irish Republican Army Provisional Irish Republican Army Police Service of Northern Ireland Progressive Unionist Party Royal Irish Regiment Real Irish Republican Army XV

xvi

RSF RUC SAS SDLP SF STV TD UDA UDP UDR UFF UKUP UPNI UUC UUP UUUC UVF UWC

List o f abbreviations

Republican Sinn Fein Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Air Service Social Democratic and Labour Party Sinn Fein Single Transferable Vote Teachta Dala (member of the Dail) Ulster Defence Association Ulster Democratic Party Ulster Defence Regiment Ulster Freedom Fighters United Kingdom Unionist Party Unionist Party of Northern Ireland Ulster Unionist Council Ulster Unionist Party United Ulster Unionist Council Ulster Volunteer Force Ulster Workers' Council

Introduction

The basis of the problem Political conflict and change have coincided in Northern Ireland during recent decades. Between 1969 and 2000, the conflict in Northern Ireland produced a death toll exceeding 3,600. The vast majority of Northern Ireland's 1.6 million inhabitants have always desired peace, yet conflict was endemic from 1969 until the mid-1990s and sporadic thereafter. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, prospects looked the brightest for many years for the management, if not the resolution, of the political problems of Northern Ireland. The main paramilitary groups had been on ceasefire for most of the period since 1994. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement offered a historic compromise between the Unionist and Nationalist traditions in Northern Ireland. The political problem in Northern Ireland is based upon the assertion of competing national identities. There is a majority population in Northern Ireland which sees itself as British. There is a minority of people in Northern Ireland who see their identity as Irish. From these competing identities stem the aspects of the conflict that have proved so difficult to resolve. The majority of people within Northern Ireland wish to retain governing structures in Northern Ireland based upon the political expression of their identity. This majority adopts a Unionist position, desiring the maintenance of the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the retention of Northern Ireland's place within the United Kingdom. Many of the minority population are Irish Nationalists. They see themselves as part of a wider population, the overall Irish majority on the island of Ireland. They aspire to the political assertion of this Irish identity through the creation of a united Ireland or, in the interim, a strong role for the Irish government within Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement attempted to balance these competing claims by keeping Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, whilst allowing the Irish government some say in the affairs of Northern Ireland and permitting some economic activity to be organised on an all-Ireland basis. The division over who should ultimately govern is problematic enough. It is deepened by the religious, cultural and social divide which often coincides with the political divide. Protestants form just over half the population in Northern Ireland. A n overwhelming majority see themselves as politically and culturally British. Catholics form 40 per cent of the population. Many see 1

2

Introduction

themselves culturally as Irish. A large number desire political expression of that Irishness, although there is less unanimity amongst Catholics over constitutional politics compared to that found amongst Protestants. The consequence of the main division of British versus Irish, allied to a religious divide, is a fracturing of society, reflected in some areas by residential segregation between communities most often identified as Protestant and Catholic. Ethnic division, based upon nationality and religion, is marked by the strongest linkage between religious affiliation and party bloc choices in western Europe. Competing political aspirations provide the basis of the modern problems of Northern Ireland. The peace process of the 1990s, culminating in the Good Friday Agreement, emphasised that Northern Ireland's politics are undergoing change. Ethnic bloc politics may still dominate, but are not frozen. Residual paramilitarism is still evident, but at a fraction of its former scale. The title of this work, Conflict and Change, is designed to reflect that whilst a political conflict endures, the conduct of that conflict has altered. This book aims to provide the reader with an overview of the problem, whilst examining recent changes in policy and attitudes amongst the population, the Unionist and Nationalist parties, the British and Irish governments and the paramilitary organisations. The death toll during previous decades reminds all of the seriousness of the conflict. Northern Ireland has never been a consensual society. Nonetheless the first-time visitor to Northern Ireland is sometimes surprised at its apparent normality. The political and religious divide in Northern Ireland may dominate society, but the conflict has ebbed and flowed and, even during its worst periods, was rarely in evidence in many parts. History and politics The aim of this book is to explore what gives the political contest its longevity, whilst also examining the subtle shifts in the politics and society of Northern Ireland during recent times. It attempts this through a systematic examination of the history and politics of Northern Ireland. The book pays considerable attention to the peace process of the 1990s as an illustration of how political transformation is difficult but attainable. The first three chapters explore the creation and evolution of Northern Ireland as a state. Chapter 1 examines the reasons why the territorial division of Ireland emerged as a supposedly 'least evil' compromise designed to accommodate separate political and religious identities. Critics of the creation of Northern Ireland alleged that the first 50 years of its existence were built upon sectarian discrimination and political partisanship. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the validity of such claims and explore the fragility of the Northern state in response to challenges in the 1960s. Following this historical account, the focus is mainly upon contemporary aspects of Northern Ireland. Chapters 4 and 5 examine party ideologies, organisations and aspirations. Chapter 6 analyses the form of governance created for Northern Ireland under the Good Friday Agreement. Chapter 7 assesses

History and politics

3

the problem of policing Northern Ireland, a state which has never enjoyed the full loyalty of all its citizens. Chapter 8 attempts to define the role of religion in respect of Northern Ireland's political divide and within society. Religious labels have always been used to identify communities in Northern Ireland. The remainder of the book is devoted primarily to an analysis of attempts at resolving the conflict. Chapter 9 provides an overview of such attempts before 1985. The following chapter discusses the lasting significance of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It argues that the Agreement was of great importance in its own right and as a necessary forerunner of the peace process of the 1990s. Chapters 11 to 13 analyse that peace process, emphasising the importance of the development of a Nationalist coalition and changes within republicanism. The chapters detail the delicate balancing acts which led to the construction of a fragile peace process, climaxed by the production of the Good Friday Agreement after exhaustive multi-party and governmental negotiations. Chapter 14 offers an analysis of the policy learning represented within the Agreement. The final chapter discusses whether there are any alternatives to the Good Friday Agreement, and examines three aspects. First, what, if any, alternatives exist? Second, what are the main barriers to such alternatives? Third, do such alternatives carry any cross-community support? It is worth explaining two sets of terms which are often used interchangeably in a manner which might confuse the novice reader. First, it has been claimed that a book could be written over the extent to which the terms Catholic and Nationalist, Protestant and Unionists interchanged (Pollak, 1993). To simplify: most Catholics are Irish Nationalists, but some are not. Overwhelmingly, Protestants are British Unionists. In this book, when talking about the politics of Northern Ireland, the terms Nationalist and Unionist are employed. When talking about religion, religious labels are used. Only when examining discrimination or relying upon the survey data of others are the terms regularly interchanged. Second, the terms Unionist and Loyalist, Nationalist and Republican are often interchanged. Again, at the risk of gross oversimplification, the terms Unionist and Loyalist both refer to supporters of the maintenance of the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The term Loyalist is normally applied to those Unionists seen as more working-class and loyal not only to the Union, but also to Ulster, or at least the six counties of Ulster which make up Northern Ireland. Irish Nationalists and Irish Republicans share many beliefs but, again, there are some differences. Both support a united Ireland, but Republicans place greater emphasis upon the political and cultural independence of that Ireland. Some might quibble with these definitions, but an entirely satisfactory outline of minor differences has yet to be achieved.

Chapter 1

A divided island

The problems of Northern Ireland are rooted in the struggle for an independent Ireland and the division of Ireland emerging from support or hostility to that struggle. This chapter examines the balance of political forces - Irish Nationalist and British Unionist - which led to the partition of Ireland earlier this century. Until the seventeenth century, Ireland existed as a largely autonomous, but disunited country, under loose British rule. Centuries earlier, the Normans attempted to exert some form of central government, but this effort had a limited geographic and administrative remit. Political control, in so far as it existed, was exercised by Gaelic chiefs, such as the O'Donnells and O'Neills. Each had the ability to mobilise small private armies, or clans, used to preserve local dominance. In areas around Dublin, a more direct English authority was exerted, following Henry VIU's defeat of an Irish Army in 1534. 1.1 The roots of modern problems The origins of the current political problems of Northern Ireland lie in historical conflicts between Planter and Gael. Pre-plantation, the hegemony of the clans was strongest in Ulster, the province which traditionally comprised nine counties: Antrim, Armagh, Deny, Down, Fermanagh, Tyrone, Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan. Only much later, with the partition of Ireland, was Ulster redefined to become a political-administrative unit excluding the latter three counties. Attracted by close geographical proximity and exploitative opportunities, large numbers of Scottish Protestants undertook the Plantation of Ulster in 1609. Resentment towards the newly arrived landowners was created by two factors. Firstly, there was considerable displacement of the resident Irish from their land. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the native Irish owned only 14 per cent of the land (Darby, 1983: 14). Secondly, there existed cultural and religious hostility to the new Protestant arrivals from the indigenous, Catholic population. This hostility translated into rebellion in 1641, an uprising crushed by Cromwell within a decade. Catholic aspirations of retaking territory were revived by the accession to the English throne of their co-religionist James II in 1685. Deposed in the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688 by William of Orange, James II raised an army supported by many Irish Catholics and the two protagonists clashed at the 4

1.1

The roots o f modern problems

5

Battle of the Boyne in Ireland in 1690. Annual celebration of King William's victory on 12 July remains important for many Ulster Protestants. Over a century later, the foundation of the Orange Order provided a forum for Protestants determined to resist the threat of 'Popery'. Celebration of historical landmarks, such as the Battle of the Boyne, arguably risks overstating the role of religion in conflict within Ireland. Irish history has never been a straightforward tale of conflict between native Catholic Irish versus Protestant Scottish and English settlers. One irony is that William of Orange received the tacit support of the Pope in his struggle with James II. After 1690 there was considerable hostility between Protestants and Presbyterians, a tension later reduced through the establishment of an alliance in the Orange Order, a religious and cultural organisation closed to Catholics. It was a Presbyterian, Wolfe Tone, who in 1798 led the Irish rebellion against British rule. Tone's United Irishmen comprised Presbyterians and Catholics, engaged in a fruitless series of risings against colonial governance. At the time of the formal establishment of the Union of Great Britain and Ireland, religious and national affiliations were by no means interchangeable. Many Irish Catholics supported the Union, whilst the Orange Order was in opposition (Connolly, 1990). The development of a Catholic Nationalist movement arose from the oppressive anti-Catholic laws which impinged upon civil rights. The link between religion and national identity grew as Ireland was 'governed in many respect as a crown colony because it was seen as a security problem' (Ward, 1993). Beneficial effects of Catholic emancipation in 1829 were offset in Ireland by the impact of the famine a decade later, which helped foster an embryonic national liberation movement. Caused by a combination of the failure of the potato crop and the indifference of Ireland's authorities, the famine halved Ireland's population. Death or emigration were more common results than constitutional agitation. Nonetheless, the forerunner of the IRA, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, initially known as the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, was formed in 1858, with the ambition of ending British rule in Ireland. Agrarian conflict was common during the nineteenth century. The most important organisation during this period was the Tenant League, which attempted to secure better rights for struggling tenant farmers. In its advocacy of change, the League was confronted by differing demands from farmers. Whilst all wanted increased rights, farmers in the west wanted more land to farm, to increase their returns. Elsewhere the primary concern was to lower rents. If the initial response of the British Prime Minister Gladstone, the Land Act of 1870, satisfied few, his 1881 Act was more successful in establishing fairer rents and greater freedom for farmers. Within Ulster, the impact of the famine was much less marked. Here, the impact of the industrial revolution was evident, reinforcing perceptions of the 'separateness' of Ulster, a distinctiveness of identity that has also been portrayed in geographic terms Bardon, 1992). It might be added that this latter notion of uniqueness has been derided elsewhere as somehow suggesting that 'the origins of the Loyalist parade are to be found in geology' (Ryan, 1994: 104).

6

A divided island

What cannot be disputed is that a prosperous skilled working-class, overwhelmingly comprising Protestants, had emerged in Ulster by the close of the nineteenth century, based upon the shipbuilding and engineering industries. Compared to rural Ireland, Belfast, the heartland of this labour aristocracy, appeared to have much more in common with large mainland British ports. 1.2 Home Rule for Ireland Persistent internal conflicts over land and rights emphasise that the 'ancient Irish nation is only a cherished myth' (Wilson, 1989: 20). Nonetheless, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, it appeared to the British government that there existed sufficient Irish national consciousness to demand a political response. This was based upon the granting of Home Rule to the entire island of Ireland. The rise of nationalism was not confined to Ireland. Instead its development was a feature of most European states. According to the plans of the British government, a parliament in Dublin would be created to give the Irish limited autonomy over domestic matters, whilst the Westminster parliament would continue to legislate on defence and foreign policy, along with most economic affairs. In introducing the first Home Rule Bill in Parliament in 1886, Gladstone could be accused of political expediency. Through such action, the Liberal Party garnered the support of the Irish Parliamentary Party, founded by Isaac Butt in 1874 and led by Charles Stewart Parnell after 1880. The capture of 85 seats by Parnell's party in the 1885 election left it holding the balance of power, a factor not unimportant in Gladstone's new advocacy of Home Rule. Nonetheless, Liberal Party support for devolution was not merely a product of political calculation. Firstly, Gladstone possessed a genuine belief in selfgovernment, which exonerates him from charges of self-interest. Secondary absolution is provided when one examines the consequences for the Liberal Party of Gladstone's beliefs. Divided between Gladstone Home Rule supporters and Liberal Unionists, many of whom later joined the Conservative Unionists, the party was dealt a blow which contributed significantly to its later rapid demise and exclusion from office. A further reason for support for Home Rule was the desire to placate constitutional Irish Nationalists. With tension already evident between a fundamentalist wing of Irish nationalism and its constitutional proponents, the onus was on the British government to make concessions to parliamentary supporters of partial Irish autonomy. Friction between 'respectable' and 'radical' routes to Irish independence was to become a recurring theme in Irish political history. Parnellites favoured constitutional approaches, but did not inevitably eschew more radical approaches and retained links with some Fenians who preferred a two-tier strategy (Hachey, 1984). Indeed, Parnell was briefly jailed in 1880 following opposition to land measures which appeared to offer little prospect of ownership to tenant farmers. Schism within the Liberal Party contributed to the defeat of the 1886 Home Rule Bill. Its 1893 successor, a weaker variant proposing the transfer of

1.2

Home Rule for Ireland

7

fewer powers, was defeated in the House of Lords, during a period in which the Irish Parliamentary Party had temporarily split following the citation of Parnell in a divorce case. Liberal Party stances on Home Rule varied according to leader, oscillating between the hostility of Rosebery to the enthusiasm of Campbell Bannerman. Despite the latter's belief in the idea and the achievement of a large Liberal majority at the 1906 election, there had been a post-Gladstone 'policy of disengagement' from Irish self-government (Kee, 1976: 165). The third attempt at Home Rule in 1912 was partly a product of political arithmetic. The Liberals, now led by Asquith, had enjoyed Irish parliamentary support for the passing of the 'People's Budget' of 1909 and the ending of the permanent veto of legislation held by the House of Lords in 1911. Operating with a slender majority after the two elections of 1910, Asquith, a reluctant supporter of Home Rule, reintroduced legislation. Although offering only constrained autonomy for Ireland, the Bill appeared to satisfy the Nationalist ambitions of Irish MPs. Liberal support for Home Rule polarised the parties in the House of Commons. The Conservative Party indicated its willingness to defend the Union in its current form, fearing that the granting of autonomy to Ireland would weaken Britain's colonial governance elsewhere. Indeed, as Patrick O'Farrell declares of the Home Rule era, the 'essence of Conservative Party policy was Unionism as the nexus of imperial power and of the imperial ethos' (O'Farrell, 1975: 97). Liberal Party calculations were also centred upon the most appropriate means of preserving the British Empire, but hinged upon a more concessionary approach. In opposing any weakening of the Union, the Conservative leader from 1902 until 1911, Arthur Balfour, preferred a policy of'killing home rule with kindness' by addressing Irish grievances rather than revising constitutional arrangements (quoted in Wilson, 1989: 35). For more strident Conservatives, opposition to Home Rule meant advocacy of the extra-parliamentary activity undertaken by the people of Ulster. As early as the introduction of the first Home Rule Bill, Lord Randolph Churchill, in endorsing the playing of the 'Orange Card', suggested that 'Ulster will Fight and Ulster will be Right'. Churchill's polemic was partly attributable to his party-leadership aspirations. He identified that a significant body of Conservative opinion was prepared to back any measures used by Ulster Unionists to oppose Home Rule. By the time of the Third Home Rule Bill, opposition in the House of Commons was advanced with particular vehemence by Bonar Law, a Conservative leader of Ulster Presbyterian stock. Bonar Law declared that he could 'imagine no length of resistance' to which Ulster could go which would break his support for its cause. Further endorsement of military resistance to Home Rule was again suggested by his assertion that 'there are things stronger than parliamentary majorities' (quoted in Phoenix, 1994: 112). Not until 1912 was the partition of Ireland discussed in public, 'even as a distasteful possibility' (Laffan, 1983: 33). By the outbreak of World War I, however, it was evident that Home Rule was unlikely to embrace all of Ireland, given the strength of hostility to the measure within Ulster. The British Prime

8

A divided island

Minister Asquith favoured an option by which individual counties in the North would be able to opt out from Home Rule for six years. Rejected by Unionists as a stay of execution, the plan was modified to allow for permanent opt-outs for the four counties with Protestant majorities. Unionists, prepared to abandon their colleagues in most Southern counties, wanted a six-county opt-out. Although the Home Rule Bill was passed in 1914, war intervened, preventing its enactment. Special legislation was promised in respect of Ulster's constitutional position. As differing arrangements for sectors of the island were now to be devised, the eventual formal division of Ireland was inevitable. 1.3 The growth of Ulster unionism Although Conservative support for their cause was useful, it was not the decisive factor in encouraging Ulster's Protestants to resist Home Rule. Defiance would have been the norm whatever the stances of mainland parliamentary parties. Indeed, amongst some Unionists there was suspicion over the solidity of the alliance, at least until the establishment of Bonar Law as Conservative Party leader. Both the embryonic Irish Nationalist movement and the British government underestimated the amount of hostility proposals for Home Rule would engender in the north of Ireland. A common dismissal of the threat of selfgovernment for Ulster if Home Rule was imposed was that of 'Orangeade'. Whilst it was true that as late as 1885, over half of Ulster's 33 parliamentary seats were won by the Home Rule Party, rioting in Belfast over the Home Rule Bill of 1886 offered an early portent of the ramification of any all-Ireland measure. Furthermore, the 1886 polling reverse served merely to end the earlier complacency of Unionists. Opposition to Home Rule revived the Orange Order in the late 1800s. By 1905, cohesive Unionist politics developed through the creation of the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC). For the first time, the political, religious and cultural forces of unionism were fused in a single organisation, the political homogeneity of which was enhanced by the unity of defensive resistance to Home Rule. At its foundation, the U U C comprised 200 representatives, consisting of 100 from Ulster Unionist constituency associations, 50 from the Orange Order and 50 co-opted members. Doubling in size by 1918, the U U C 'fostered a partitionist mentality' as it emphasised that Ulster could not form part of any imposed all-Ireland settlement (Jackson, 1994: 42). Indeed, more militant sections of Protestant opinion, such as the Apprentice Boys of Deny, continued to swell the numbers on the Council. Opposition to Home Rule amongst Unionists was based upon three factors. Firstly, Ulster had prospered under British rule. Sections of the Province's skilled workforce represented an advanced section of the working-class on any international comparison. This marginal superiority permitted the development of an alliance between workers and employers, the latter emphasising common cause. Economic conflicts were by no means unknown, but they did not fracture political and religious alliances. If this proved the despair of the

1.3 The growth o f Ulster unionism

9

small non-sectarian organisations of the left, it was nonetheless hardly surprising. Protestantism was not only a useful faith for securing a passage to heaven, but opened shipbuilding gates in addition to the pearly type. By 1911, 93 per cent of Belfast's shipbuilders were Protestants, compared to 76 per cent of the population (Farrell, 1980). Secondly, there was the strong religious component to the formation of attitudes. Partial separation from Britain would lead to eventual incorporation within a 'Papist' Ireland which would offer little tolerance towards Protestant dissidents. Again, hostility towards Catholicism as a religious creed transcended social classes. The Presbyterian and Methodist Churches, along with the Church of Ireland, were active in the campaign against Home Rule. Indeed, the Presbyterian Church described resistance to Home Rule as a 'sacred duty' (Phoenix, 1994: 113). Finally, the assertion of Ulster Protestants of their British identity was reinforced by a Gaelic revival in the south of Ireland. This merely emphasised Ulster's cultural distinctiveness, although it should be noted that Protestants have always played a part in the development of Gaelic culture. Set alongside political developments, the revival fostered the perception that Ulster was the 'antithesis of Irishness' (Jackson, 1994: 44). These three mutually reinforcing elements of an Ulster identity were hardened by the defensiveness of a siege mentality, as the Union with Britain was threatened. Popular opposition to Home Rule was pervasive in Ulster, led by the Dublin lawyer Edward Carson and organised by the Northern businessman James Craig. Assuming leadership of the Ulster Unionists in 1910, Carson realised that opposition to Home Rule for Ireland as an entirety was not viable. Accordingly, he concentrated his efforts to ensure a veto of what he described as the 'most nefarious conspiracy that has ever been hatched against a free people' within the 'Protestant province of Ulster' (quoted in Hachey, 1984: 74-6). Rebellion against Home Rule had mass support to the extent that a Solemn League and Covenant rejecting the measure was signed by 471,000 individuals on Ulster Day in September 1912. Signatories pledged to 'use all means that may be found necessary' to defeat Home Rule. Indications of what 'all means' actually meant became evident the following year, with the creation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Drilled mainly in Orange Halls, the U V F attracted cross-class support throughout Ulster, with commanders often landowners (Stewart, 1967). Operating as the military wing of unionism, the U V F amounted to a 100,000 strong male force of Covenant signatories, pledged to fight for the 'mutual protection of all loyalists'. The term 'Loyalist' is important as it is indicative of the location of allegiances of Unionists. For the UVF, it was the Liberal government that was engaged in a treasonable activity, by threatening the transfer of Ulster to the partial jurisdiction of an alien parliament. According to the Solemn Covenant of 1912, the principal aim of Ulster citizens was merely 'equal citizenship in the United Kingdom'. Ostensibly engaged in rebellion, Unionists were in effect acting as 'more royalist than the King' in maintaining allegiance to the Crown, against the political expediency of His Majesty's government. That

10

A divided island

formal British sovereignty over Ireland remained intact under the proposed Home Rule settlement was a constitutional nicety which unimpressed Loyalists. They perceived a loosening of the British link in the South as the forerunner of Irish independence. The U V F provided the military backing by which any provisional Unionist government would be able to ignore absorption within a fledgling Irish unitary state, albeit one with a highly constrained autonomy. By its presence, the U V F indicated the inevitability of the partition of Ireland, unless the British government was prepared to either countenance civil war between the U V F and Nationalist Irish Volunteers in the South, or face down the Unionist rebellion using the British Army. The strength of the UVF ensured that Unionists would not be obliged to accept compromise positions, such as Asquith's proposal that each county of Ulster would have an opt-out clause for six years before joining the remainder of Ireland. Unionists were adamant in their rejection of recognition of a Dublin parliament, proving impervious even to suggestions that Ulster could be over-represented within that assembly. Remote anyway, prospects for a quelling of Ulster's threatened rebellion by the British Army disappeared entirely following the Curragh Mutiny of 1914. Ordered by the commander-in-chief of British military forces in Ireland to prepare to take action against the Ulster Volunteer Force, local commanders at Curragh Camp, led by Brigadier-General Hubert Gough, indicated that they were not prepared to take military action against Loyalists. This defiance was partly in recognition of close cultural ties and in some cases because officers were of Ulster birth or descent. Furthermore, it was recognised that any British offensive would lead to bloody conflict with scant support for the Army from the indigenous population. It remains uncertain whether the British government would have initiated any such action. Indeed, the mutiny has been described as no more than a 'misunderstanding' (Hachey, 1984: 88). Nonetheless, the resignation of 58 officers at Curragh was indicative of the divided loyalties felt by many serving soldiers. As a symbolic gesture of solidarity and a further deterrent to an already reluctant government, the Curragh Mutiny emphasised the impossibility of any holistic Irish solution. Indeed, by mid-1914, the ambiguous approach of the British government to the Ulster rebellion had allowed the U V F to become a powerful armed militia. On a single night in April that year, 24,000 rifles and three million rounds of ammunition were smuggled into the port of Larne. In common with other arms shipments, no arrests were made. This tacit official acceptance of activity contrasted with the later British treatment of rebels in the South. Unionism's mandate within the traditional province of Ulster was narrow. In the 1910 election, 103,000 Unionist votes were recorded against 94,000 in favour of Home Rule. A slim majority in one province of Ireland created the formal division of Ireland into two states. Intensity of commitment rather than national extensiveness of support characterised the Unionist position. The narrow geographical parameters of majority unionism ensured a political

1.4 The rise o f Irish nationalism

11

redrawing of the geographical entity of Ulster, to enshrine a permanent Unionist majority within six counties (Antrim, Armagh, Deny, Down, Fermanagh and Tyrone), which would form the new statelet of Northern Ireland. In their defiance of the British government, Unionists were aided and abetted by the Conservative Party and sympathetic sections of the British Army. Unsurprisingly, the success of the threat of force did not go unnoticed elsewhere in Ireland. 1.4 The rise of Irish nationalism Revolutionary Irish nationalism was subordinate to constitutional approaches until 1916. Although the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, soon renamed the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), had been in existence since 1858, there appeared to be little agitation for armed resistance to British rule. Initially attracting participants in the 1848 Rising, the IRB's main recruits were those interested in the recreational pursuits it offered (Comerford, 1981). Increased attention to constitutional issues followed the replacement of the outlawed Land League by the Irish National League. Remnants of agricultural unrest, some of which subsided after the 1881 Land Act, coincided with the articulation of broader political concerns by the Irish parliamentary party. Even the strident Nationalists of the IRB were prepared to support 'Home Rulers' within parliament. In part, this was due to the willingness of the latter to use obstructionist tactics. Moreover, it was a recognition of the much wider mandate and legitimacy of the elected vehicle of change, exemplified by the success of the Nationalist Party in the 1885 general election. Although never more than a 'marriage of convenience' the extent of the accord between the IRB and parliamentary Nationalists was exemplified by the election of one of the latter, Joseph Biggar, to the Supreme Council of the IRB (Hoppen, 1980). Defeat for the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 increased pressure upon the constitutional wing of nationalism. Anxious to maintain Liberal Party support for Home Rule, the Irish Nationalists were seen as 'clinging to nurse for fear of something worse' with little immediate benefit (Hoppen, 1980: 131). Meanwhile, the establishment of an Irish identity continued to receive sporting and cultural sustenance through the development of organisations such as the Gaelic Athletic Association and the Gaelic League. Politically, the establishment of Sinn Fein (meaning Ourselves) offered a bolstering of Nationalist approaches that merged constitutionalism in an uneasy alliance with revolutionary violence. Founded in 1905 by Arthur Griffith, an advocate of non-violence, Sinn Fein was a largely urban-based party with little support prior to World War I. It offered a manifesto of limited independence in which English and Irish citizens would retain a joint monarch. Despite the tensions surrounding the 1912 Home Rule Bill, Sinn Fein's membership remained static. Many of its members did, however, join the Irish Volunteers, the South's militia insistent upon independence for Ireland. If unable to procure arms to the extent of Carson's Unionist forces, the formation of the Irish Volunteers nonetheless

12

A divided island

indicated the likelihood of a bloody civil war if the future of Ireland could not be resolved by Asquith's government. If the advent of World War I was seen by some Nationalists as 'England's danger, Ireland's opportunity' the perception was not overwhelming. O f 181,000 Irish Volunteers, only 11,000 persisted with the national liberation struggle, the remainder preferring to join Britain's fight with Germany. Here marked the point of departure between constitutional and physical force approaches to nationalism. The primary advocate of the former was John Redmond, the leader of the Irish parliamentary party. Redmond boasted of the allegiance of Irishmen to the British Crown, whilst a rump of Irish volunteers were plotting the Easter Rising designed to overthrow British rule. Greeted with incredulity by the British government and Irish populace alike, the 1916 Easter Rising was a revolt by 1,600 Irish volunteers, mainly from the IRB core, who had assumed control of the organisation. Capturing landmarks in Dublin, the rebels were quelled after a week of conflict in which 450 people were killed. The proclamation of independence read by Padraic Pearse outside the General Post Office in Dublin attracted indifference from a public more concerned with the damage caused to the city. A transformation in popular attitudes towards the rebellion was effected by the reaction of the British government. Concerned not to legitimise armed struggle by granting prisoner-of-war status to those arrested, the government executed a number of rebels for treason. The benefit of the new martyr status of Ireland's attempted liberators was Sinn Fein. Although not involved in an official capacity in the Rising, the party offered a political outlet to supporters of an independent, united Ireland. Such was the backlash over the execution of the rebels that Sinn Fein won a decisive victory at the 1918 General Election. Standing on an abstentionist pledge, the party captured 73 of the 105 seats. Had all seats been contested, Sinn Fein would undoubtedly have won an overall majority of votes cast. These elections remain of importance to many Irish Nationalists. Firstly, they amounted to the most widely franchised elections held in the country, as women over 30 were granted the vote for the first time. Secondly, they were to be the last time that all citizens of the island of Ireland could vote as a unit. Thirdly, and most crucially, they offered a democratic mandate for the establishment of a thirty-two-county independent Ireland. For Sinn Fein, this contest assumed almost talismanic significance as the last elections to have ever 'counted'. The subsequent division of Ireland is thus seen as undemocratic and unlawful. This refusal to accept the validity of partition is why the terms 'six counties' and 'twenty-six counties' are used by Republicans instead of 'Northern Ireland' and 'Southern Ireland'. It is a moot point whether the 1918 elections should be interpreted as a decisive mandate for a unitary independent state. The Sinn Fein share of the vote was exaggerated in terms of seats. Almost one-quarter of the seats gained were uncontested (O'Leary and McGarry, 1996). Furthermore, the success of the party was partly due to residual hostility towards Britain over its handling of participants in the 1916 Rising. It is difficult to perceive the vote as an

1.5 The partition o f Ireland

13

endorsement of Sinn Fein's agenda for a new Ireland as this had scarcely been formulated. Additionally, the electorate could not vote to accept or reject partition in a referendum-type contest. Nonetheless, for Irish Nationalists and Republicans today, the elections are indicative of the illegitimacy of the separate Northern state, with Union with Britain endorsed by a minority of the island's population. The creation of Northern Ireland was perceived as a triumph of the threat of Unionist force over democratic procedures and thus served only to legitimise the use of subsequent Nationalist violence. Following its election victory, Sinn Fein established the Irish parliament, Dail Eireann, in 1919, an institution which remained unattended by Unionists and Home Rule parliamentarians. The Irish Volunteers became the Irish Republican Army, defenders of the embryonic Irish Republic proclaimed in the 1916 Rising. They were determined to end British rule in Ireland and rejected plans for the division of the country. Led by Michael Collins, the IRA fought an effective and brutal guerilla war against the special auxiliary forces of the British government, known colloquially as the 'Black and Tans'. As both sides traded atrocities and fought each other to a standstill, there was growing unease in Britain over the conduct of Crown forces. A Labour Party commission established by Arthur Henderson condemned aspects of British military policing. 1.5 The partition of Ireland The formal division of Ireland was enacted through the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which superseded the Home Rule provisions of 1914. The 1920 Act established two parliaments under British jurisdiction, one based in Dublin, the other located in Belfast. The former was to control certain affairs of the 26 counties of what became known as Southern Ireland. The latter parliament was to exercise limited authority over six counties in north-eastern Ulster. Each parliament was to be bi-cameral, comprising a lower chamber directly elected by proportional representation and an indirectly elected upper chamber. The division of the island was based upon politics rather than geography. At the tip of the Southern state, County Donegal lay further north than any part of Northern Ireland. The exclusion of three counties of Ulster — Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan - from the Northern state appeared to diminish claims of the distinctiveness of the ancient province of Ulster. Instead, Ulster's boundaries were redrawn to ensure the creation of a Northern state with a decisive, in-built Protestant and Unionist majority, immune from the threat posed by higher Catholic birth rates. Incorporation of all nine counties of Ulster within Northern Ireland would have produced a vulnerable 56 per cent to 44 per cent Protestant to Catholic ratio (Buckland, 1981). Within the six counties selected, Protestants comprised two-thirds of the population. Initially, the 1920 Act pleased neither Nationalists nor Unionists. Objections from the latter were overcome by recognition that partition was the least unfavourable option, given Westminster's unwillingness to continue to rule Ireland directly and the fear of Unionists of absorption within a unitary Irish state. Thus, Home Rule was granted to the opponents of Home Rule. Nonetheless,

14

A divided island

Unionists accepted the deal, which gave them a parliament with limited jurisdiction within their preferred size of state. The previous three Bills had been a product of combined Liberal and Nationalist political forces. This final effort bore the hallmarks of Conservative and Unionist dominance (Laffan, 1983). For Nationalists, the weak parliament offered under the Act was an unacceptable substitute for independence. In common with its Northern counterpart, the Southern parliament would have control of domestic matters, but the Westminster parliament would determine defence and foreign policy, in addition to taxation. Opposition to the modest scale of autonomy provided the primary motivation for the War of Independence continued by the IRA until 1921. Hostility to partition was but one dimension of the conflict. The 1920 Act had offered Nationalists a modicum of an all-Ireland settlement. It proposed the creation of a Council of Ireland to facilitate matters of mutual co-operation between the two new parliaments, but the measure never came to fruition. Forced to reconsider its approach in respect of the Dublin parliament, the British government negotiated the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921, which amounted to a 'compromise between the ideal of Irish unity and the reality of Northern Ireland's position' (Buckland, 1981: 38). The treaty created the Irish Free State, which granted greater autonomy to the South, affording it dominion status. This meant that Southern Ireland would remain part of the British Empire. The Anglo-Irish Treaty compared the status of the new state with that granted to Canada, similar in that the political leaders of both countries pledged allegiance to the Crown, who appointed a Governor General to oversee constitutional and political arrangements. Both states also formed part of the British Commonwealth. Under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, the division between north and south had been seen as ultimately reconcilable. By allowing the South greater autonomy from Britain under the 1921 treaty, between Northern and Southern Ireland 'partition was confirmed' (Follis, 1995: 186). Northern Ireland soon acquired its own political and social system distinct from that of the rest of the island. Even common features, such as proportional representation in elections North and South, were soon at variance, with Unionists in the North abandoning the method in favour of a first-past-the-post system, diminishing Nationalist representation. Republicans were divided over whether dominion status could be viewed as a sufficient step towards full independence. The Anglo-Irish Treaty did offer a more substantial parliament than that proposed in the Government of Ireland Act one year earlier. Sinn Fein won 124 of the 128 seats in that parliament, but did not take up its places, occupying only its own Dail (parliament) as the 'true' legislative body of Ireland. Accordingly, the 1920 parliament in reality failed to exist. The debate over internal constitutional arrangements deflected some attention from partition for a short time. Eventually, the Dail's narrow acceptance of the treaty, by 64 votes to 57, led to the resignation of de Valera as Ireland's first president and the polarisation of forces around the issue of partition.

1.6 Civil war in Ireland

15

In attempting to resolve the problem of the division of Ireland, the AngloIrish Treaty was obliged to balance the competing claims of Nationalists and Unionists. Its solution was to establish the Irish Free State as the holder of nominal authority over the island of Ireland, but concede Northern Ireland the right to opt out in favour of its own state, an option that, to the surprise of no one, was immediately and permanently exercised. Superficially at least, the Anglo-Irish Treaty appeared to bolster the prospect of a united Ireland by establishing a Boundary Commission to assess the validity of the borders of Northern Ireland, redrawing them when necessary. For Nationalists, this offered the prospect of the disestablishment of the Northern state, as it could be reduced below viable size by future Commissions. Furthermore, the Free State would be able to nominate one of the three Commissioners. For Unionists, the prospect of rapid dismemberment of their embryonic state was real, but potential change to the boundaries of Northern Ireland was rapidly sidelined. Firstly, the terms of reference of the Commission were highly ambiguous. It was to determine boundaries in 'accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants', but no guidance was provided as to the unit of expression of these wishes, be it the Northern state, Southern state, local county or electoral ward (Wall, 1966). Secondly, the Northern Ireland representative for the Commission declined to co-operate. Thirdly, the recommendations of the Commission offered no succour to Nationalists, offering a net population gain to the Free State of only 23,500. The Boundary Commission proved such a failure for Nationalists because it argued that the onus of proof fell upon those desirous of change. Substantial majorities were needed for alteration. Furthermore, the Commission believed its task was based upon assessment of the settlement of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, not the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 (Laffan, 1983: 101). Ultimately, its modest proposals for boundary change were ignored and Nationalists also lost the Council of Ireland created via the 1920 Act. Uncertainty surrounding the impact of the 1921 treaty had earlier increased violence in all parts of the island. An IRA campaign developed in the North to complement the earlier guerilla war of independence in the South. Sectarian tensions led to riots. Co-operation between the Northern and Southern political administrations would be difficult to achieve, even though regular meetings were a declared ambition of the treaty. A n initial meeting between de Valera and James Craig, the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, ended in discord and there ended dialogue for many decades. A boycott of Belfast goods by the Southern state in the early days of Northern Ireland did little to assist the cordiality of relationships. 1.6 Civil war in Ireland It was in the South that the worst violence erupted, as the previous unity of Republicans concerning the national question disintegrated into a civil war between pro- and anti-treaty forces. Previous alliances disintegrated into deadly

16

A divided island

conflict as politics became a 'kaleidoscope of shifting emotions and ambivalences' (Keogh, 1994: 3). Sinn Fein's domination of the Dail Eireann between 1919 and 1921 produced 'simplistic one-dimensional politics which ill-fitted its participants for the experience of treaty negotiations' (Fanning, 1983: 2). Now Nationalists were divided over whether to accept the compromise of a semi-autonomous, twenty-six-county Irish Free State. A pro-treaty provisional government of the Irish Free State quickly superseded the authority of the Dail. The military arm of this government was the Free State Army, pitted against some former colleagues such as de Valera, operating in the anti-treaty IRA. Compromises between pro- and anti-treaty forces were attempted by the pro-treaty leader of the provisional government, Michael Collins. In the election of June 1922, only 36 anti-treaty Sinn Fein candidates were elected to the 128-seat Dail, despite an electoral pact between pro- and anti-treaty Sinn Fein candidates which allowed over half of the treaty opponents to be returned uncontested. With the IRA reviving the Easter Rising tactic of occupying buildings, pro-treaty forces engaged in military action against the organisation. In these operations the Free State Army was aided by loans of weapons from the British government. Superior equipment, greater numbers, wider support and the backing of the Roman Catholic Church were all factors which made victory inevitable for the Free State forces. This success was achieved at a considerable price: 11,000 suspected IRA activists and supporters were interned by the close of the conflict, whilst 77 had been executed purely as reprisal measures for the killing of pro-treaty supporters. Michael Collins was executed by the IRA in his native Cork. His successor, William Cosgrave, merely increased the military offensive, declaring that Free State forces might be obliged to eliminate 10,000 Republicans to establish self-government in Ireland according to the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty (Lawlor, 1983). Again, military force was seen as the most useful tool of resolution of political issues. Not until 1927 were constitutional politics fully restored in the South, as de Valera led the newly formed Fianna Fail party into the Dail, to oppose Cumann na Gaedheal, renamed Fine Gael in 1933. The politics of the civil war were to dominate the South for several decades. 1.7 Was partition inevitable? Political historians are allowed the luxury of hindsight in assessing whether partition was the most appropriate attempt to resolve the Irish problem. Despite the advantage of being able to analyse consequences, there remains division over whether the splitting of Ireland into two states was the only realistic approach. What then were the options open to the British government? 1.7.1 Partition as undertaken An orthodox approach is that the division of Ireland was indeed the least worst option to be undertaken. The immoveable object of Unionists' demands for

1.7 Was partition inevitable?

17

retention of their British connection was ranged against the irresistible force of Irish nationalism. Given the coexistence of conflicting identities within a single land mass, it was, as Tom Wilson puts it, 'indeed the case that there had to be some losers' (Wilson, 1989: 40). In this case, the obvious loser was the Nationalist minority trapped in an alien Northern state and a much smaller Unionist minority in a similar position in an Ireland heading for full independence. Partition was designed to satisfy partially, or least offend, the aspirations of as many people as possible. The onus was now placed upon Nationalists to accept that there was a democratic basis for the Northern state. The British government could not be expected to foresee the inequitable treatment of this minority that lay ahead. 1.7.2 The creation of a single Irish parliament controlling all of Ireland The establishment of a semi-independent, united Irish state might be justified on a utilitarian basis, in that it would have created the greatest happiness for the greatest number within Ireland. However, this is to ignore the qualitative element attached to such a solution. The strength of hostility of Unionists to incorporation within a united Ireland was stronger than the desire of most Irish citizens for their inclusion. Furthermore, the Unionist perception that the Southern state would eventually shed its British connections was vindicated. The strongest argument against the imposition of self-government for all of Ireland was nonetheless the threat of force. Undoubtedly there would have been considerable conflict if the British government had attempted this settlement. Given the possible reluctance of the British Army to engage with conflict with Unionists, it would have been difficult to impose Home Rule. 1.7.3 The creation of a unified Irish state, but with devolution for the North Exercise of this option would, like the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, have also created two parliaments, but with the Irish parliament as the overseer. Most of the problems attached to the creation of a single Dublin parliament remained with this option. Although Lloyd George raised the possibility of a devolved Belfast parliament for the North within an all-Ireland settlement, it was rejected by Unionists as undermining their right to remain full British citizens. Any such solution made a Dublin parliament superior to its Belfast counterpart. Significant opt-outs for the latter would undermine Republican aspirations of a unified state. In other words, this solution would have pleased few, but was entirely unacceptable to Unionists. 1.7.4 The continuation of the Union between Britain and Ireland Political pressure for change in the relationship between Britain and Ireland had been growing for some time. Although two Home Rule Bills had been

18

A divided island

defeated, the demand for a weakening of British control was irrepressible by the time of the third Bill and the final, post-World War I version. Successive Irish elections had confirmed the need for the creation of self-government. The Government of Ireland Act was a minimal recognition of the aspirations most clearly expressed by Sinn Fein's 1918 election victory. 1.7.5 The creation of a deliberately vulnerable Northern Ireland If Northern Ireland had been created on geographic logic, a nine-county state would have emerged, embracing all of Ulster. It is just possible that such a state might have been 'sold' to Unionists. Within a few decades, the growing Nationalist population might have voted the state out of existence. Any such settlement would have accentuated political tensions to such an extent that the state would probably have been ungovernable. 1.8 Conclusion Even the Conservative leader of Britain's governing coalition, Austen Chamberlain, doubted the logic and legitimacy of partition. Whilst to many it was an indefensible flawed compromise, it was to others understandable, borne primarily of the fear of Ulster Unionist reaction to the imposition of Home Rule. The division of Ireland enshrined the threat of violence as the ultimate arbiter of Irish politics. One of the signatories to the treaty which divided Ireland, Michael Collins, asked: 'Will anyone be satisfied at the bargain?' (Lyons, 1973: 439). Whilst many in the South did accept the treaty, the bigger challenge would be found in Northern Ireland. For partition to have at least some chance of succeeding, tolerance of minority identities was now required. Here was a new state where the aspirations of the Nationalist minority could not be wholly fulfilled, but needed to be sated.

Chapter 2

An 'Orange state'? Northern Ireland 1921-68

The big test for Protestants within the new state of Northern Ireland concerned their ability to treat fairly a dissident minority Catholic population. A n inbuilt Protestant and Unionist majority had been created. This could have led to displays of either magnanimity or triumphalism towards the sector of the population dissatisfied with the new settlement. In the event, the latter option was exercised, resulting in considerable discrimination against the Catholic Nationalist population. 2.1 An insecure state From the outset, Northern Ireland was an insecure state, persistently under threat, even if such threats were more rhetorical than real. The obvious threat came from a Catholic and mainly Nationalist minority population that resented the creation of what it saw as an artificial state devoid of geographical, historical or political logic. Suppression of symbols of the Irish identity of the Nationalist minority was commonplace. Commemorations of the 1916 Easter Rising were banned. Prohibition of displays of the tricolour, the Irish national flag, was also introduced. Northern Ireland's viability as a separate entity faced potential challenges as both Unionist and Nationalist populations regarded themselves as sub-sets of other national groupings. Unionists pledged allegiance to the British state. The creation of Northern Ireland was the least worst option in terms of reflecting this loyalty. Nationalists saw themselves as trapped in an illegitimate, Britishheld part of an Irish state temporarily partitioned. An abject lack of consensus was immediately reflected in internal security arrangements. With over 400 people killed and 2,000 injured in conflict in the first two years of the state's existence, the Special Powers Act was introduced in 1922, which suspended normal legal processes. The Act provided sweeping powers of search, arrest and detention. Designed to last one year, it endured until 1972, its longevity reflecting the absence of consensus within the state. Primary operators of the Special Powers Act were the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the reserve police force, the Ulster Special Constabulary, or 'B' Specials. Both armed, their creation fuelled the perception that Northern Ireland, an immature sub-state, had 'institutionalized violence' (Townshend, 1983: 384). The R U C failed to attract a proportionate one-third Catholic 19

20

A n 'Orange s t a t e ? Northern Ireland 1 9 2 1 - 6 8

membership. The actual figure peaked at 17 per cent and such recruitment averaged 10 per cent. The 'B' Specials were a part-time force seen by many Catholics as a sectarian militia, being exclusively Protestant, often ill-trained and partisan. Its recruitment was based upon Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) structures so closely that entire U V F units transferred into the reserve police force (Farrell, 1980). Orange lodges provided an alternative source of recruitment. Few Catholics were willing volunteers to what was often perceived as an illegitimate police force. Some potential recruits were also subject to discouragement from their own community. Aside from self-exclusion, Catholics were unwanted within the 'B' Specials. Policing within Northern Ireland was not perceived as neutral, but instead was viewed by Nationalists as based upon the reduction of their political threat. For many Protestants, Catholic absence from the security forces was confirmation of the disloyalty of the Nationalist population. Catholic alienation from the legal apparatus of Northern Ireland was compounded by the exclusion of Nationalists from many senior posts in the judiciary. Even the jury system disproportionately excluded Catholics as juries comprised ratepayers. In the early years, much police activity was directed against the Nationalist population, despite the most common source of disturbance arising from Loyalist attacks upon Catholic areas, forcing thousands to flee their homes. O f the 457 people killed between July 1920 and July 1922, the majority were Catholics (Farrell, 1980). Civil war in the South ensured that much IRA activity was diverted elsewhere. Despite this, 16 battalions of British troops were stationed in the Province to consolidate Unionist rule, along with a regular police force, 19,000 'B' Specials and other auxiliary policing groups, including over 5,000 full-time reservists. Internment (detention without trial) was introduced in 1922, ceasing in 1924 after over 500 people had been held, mainly Catholics. In other aspects of the Northern Irish polity, the exclusion of Catholics appeared to confirm the notion of an 'Orange state' run for the self-preservation of the Unionist population. Discrimination was abetted by two features of Northern Ireland. First, the Province enjoyed considerable political autonomy, due to the disinterest in the Province displayed by the British government. Second, however, there was little financial room for manoeuvre. Almost 80 per cent of Northern Ireland's income was determined by Westminster, to which revenue from income tax and customs and excise accrued. As the economy of Northern Ireland declined, so competition for economic dividends became more fervent. Obvious losers in such a contest were to be the Catholic minority. Discrimination was alleged in three particular areas: elections, employment and housing. 2.2 Electoral discrimination Perhaps the most overt forms of discrimination were found in the arena of electoral practices. For many Nationalists, discrimination was in-built, as a Protestant Unionist majority had been contrived and could not be challenged.

2.2 Electoral discrimination Table 2.1

Electors and elected in Derry 1967

Ward

Voters

Derry North Waterside Derry South

Source:

21

Elected

Catholic

Non-Catholic

2,530 1,852 10,047

3,946 3,697 8,781

8 Unionists 4 Unionists 12 Unionists 8 Nationalists

adapted from Darby (1976).

Under the conditions of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, elections in Northern Ireland were to be conducted using a system of proportional representation, designed to achieve representation for the Nationalist minority. Yet by 1922, this had been abolished by the Unionist government in favour of a 'first-past-the-post' system in local elections, a measure repeated in 1929 in respect of contests for the Northern Ireland parliament. Perpetuation of single-party government was guaranteed. Voting qualifications were also based upon finance, disproportionately disenfranchising Catholics. For elections to local councils, only homeowning ratepayers could vote. Poorer Protestants were also affected, but greater proportionate reliance amongst Catholics upon public housing meant that many forfeited their right to elect local representatives. Property requirements made a significant impact upon the size of the local electorate. For Westminster and Stormont elections, the number of voters approached 900,000. Local electoral contests were determined by an electorate of only 600,000. Catholics were also disadvantaged by the existence of business franchises, by which companies could hold up to six extra votes, exercised through nominees. As businesses were more frequently owned by Protestants, this device tended to favour Unionist candidates. One other anomaly was the award of four seats in Stormont to Queen's University, at the time largely Protestant, with the consequence that Unionist candidates were easily the most successful contestants, winning 75 per cent of the seats. Most blatant of all electoral devices was gerrymandering, a term which refers to the manipulation of electoral boundaries. Within Northern Ireland, it was used to considerable effect to reinforce Unionist electoral dominance. Local electoral ward boundaries were devised to ensure Unionist council majorities, even in predominantly Nationalist areas. Most notorious was the example of Derry, where, as Table 2.1 indicates, a substantial Catholic majority was not reflected in terms of returned councillors. In Derry, Unionist votes were in effect worth almost double those cast for Nationalists. Even allowing for a small Catholic Unionist vote, the Council should have been dominated by a substantial Nationalist majority. Instead, Catholics were crammed into a large ward yielding a number of Nationalist councillors. Much smaller areas were used to create similar numbers of

22

A n 'Orange state'? Northern Ireland 1 9 2 1 - 6 8

Unionist councillors, permanently in control of the Council. It was apparent, therefore, that Unionist control was 'too consistent for too long to be anything other than deliberately contrived (Lyons, 1973: 756). Gerrymandering was repeated elsewhere. Towns such as Dungannon and Omagh saw Nationalist population majorities turned into representational minorities. Newry and Strabane were rare examples of significant councils controlled by Nationalists. Overall, Unionists controlled 85 per cent of councils, even though they amounted to only 66 per cent of the population (Buckland, 1981). ,

2.3 Discrimination in employment There are three main strands to the allegation that Roman Catholics were victims of employment discrimination. 2.3.1 Discrimination in industrial location decisions The contention was that Catholics were disproportionately adversely affected by the location of most industries in the east of the Province. This part of Northern Ireland was more Protestant and Unionist than the West. Even those who dispute that systematic discrimination occurred accept that Catholic areas of the Province were often losers from locational decisions. Areas with Catholic majorities received only three-quarters of the amount of employment location awards enjoyed by Protestant areas between 1949-63 (Wilson, 1989). A consequence was a growing disparity in employment typology between the industrialised East of Northern Ireland and the more rural West. 2.3.2 Discrimination in employment prospects At the time of the suspension of the Northern Ireland parliament in 1972, almost one-third of Catholic males were unskilled. Overall, Catholic males were twice as likely to be unskilled as Protestants (Quinn, 1993). Unemployment was much more acute amongst Catholics than Protestants. Indeed, even after reforms of employment laws in the 1970s and 1980s, substantial differences remained. Amongst Catholic and Protestant groups in Northern Ireland sharing the same set of circumstances, being skilled, but without formal qualifications, aged 25-44 with two children, Catholic rates of unemployment were twice as high (Smith and Chambers, 1991). 2.3.3 Discrimination in public-sector appointments The exclusion of Catholics from the public and private sectors appeared to receive official sanction. Basil Brooke, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from 1943-63, had declared that 'we would appeal to Loyalists . . . to employ Protestant lads and lassies'. Given such polemic, it was scarcely surprising if what resulted was a 'consistent and irrefutable pattern of deliberate discrimination against Catholics' (Darby, 1976: 78).

2.4 Discrimination in housing

23

Exclusion was particularly marked in three areas of public activity. First, the avowedly sectarian nature of the security services discouraged Catholics. Second, the civil service contained few Catholics in the highest positions. Only one Catholic permanent secretary could be found within the service by the late 1950s. Third, local councils, when Unionist-controlled, frequently excluded Catholics from jobs. In 1928, only 5 per cent of the workforce of Belfast Corporation was Catholic, although Catholics amounted to onequarter of the population of the city (Johnson, 1985: 215). In the mid-1960s, Derry Council employed 177 workers, of whom only 32 were Catholic (Coogan, 1995: 32). The Cameron Report found that Unionist councils used their power of appointments in a way which benefited Protestants (Cameron, 1969). 2.4 Discrimination in housing Both Catholic and Protestant communities endured poor housing, partly as a result of the antipathy towards housebuilding held by many councils in the Province. Only 50,000 houses were built between the wars. A reluctance to build houses need not in itself have led to poor housing, as Northern Ireland's pre-war population remained static, a consequence of high Catholic emigration rates (Johnson, 1985). After World War II, discrimination increased as competition developed for quality new housing. Three dimensions to discrimination existed. Firstly, there was a tendency to allow Catholics to continue to reside in slum dwellings. Despite amounting to the poorer sector of the population, they were less likely to be rehoused. Secondly, Catholics perceived themselves as victims of the arbitrary allocation decisions of councils. U.nlike mainland Britain, housing was determined by ad hoc arrangements within individual councils. Thirdly, the primary aims of councils often appeared to be the preservation of residential segregation or the absorption of rehoused Nationalists within overwhelmingly Unionist areas. Numerous examples of apparent favouring of Protestants occurred. For example, of the 1,048 houses built in Fermanagh between 1945 and 1967, 82 per cent were allocated to Protestants, even though Catholics amounted to the majority population (Farrell, 1980: 87). In Dungannon in 1965, 194 new houses were all used to rehouse Protestants. A particular grievance was the rehousing of single Protestants, ostensibly at the expense of Catholic families. Slum conditions affected both communities. Discrimination was a device which affected the chance held by an individual of removal from such squalor. Even amongst those hostile to the Republican agenda of a united Ireland, there was sympathy for the plight of Northern Nationalists. Thus, Conor Cruise O'Brien wrote that what occurred in Northern Ireland was the formation of an 'institutionalized caste system with Protestants in control (O'Brien, 1972: 129). The hierarchy of the Catholic Church regularly lamented discrimination against its followers. 5

A n 'Orange state'? Northern Ireland 1 9 2 1 - 6 8

24

2.5 The extent of discrimination There remains disagreement over whether discrimination occurred and controversy over its extent. Nearly 50 years after the creation of an alleged 'Orange state', there was scant accord over whether Catholics were being victimised within Northern Ireland, as Table 2.2 indicates, based upon the views of respondents in 1968. This lack of public consensus over whether discrimination was a reality was replicated in political and academic circles and did not augur well for problem resolution. A Unionist rejection of the premise that Catholics were being treated unfairly was perhaps unsurprising. Protestant superiority was seen as the natural order, justified by the need for eternal vigilance against suspect Catholics. Electoral hegemony for Unionists was not seen as unjust, but rather as a justifiable product of the creation of Northern Ireland, with its attendant demographic and religious balance. Without doubt, some Catholics have exaggerated the pervasiveness and degree of discrimination against the Nationalist population. This approach is seen most clearly in those accounts of the state which compare the plight of Catholics in Northern Ireland to that endured by blacks in the United States {see for example, O'Dochartaigh, 1994). Amongst Protestants, there are those who claim that discrimination was largely 'religion-blind' as the working-class as an entirety was disadvantaged. Systematic discrimination did not occur. Differences between the Protestant and Catholic communities were 'not deliberate injustices perpetrated by a Unionist administration' (Campbell, 1996). Accordingly, much subsequent 'anti-discrimination' legislation has been ill-judged, erroneously attempting to redress a problem that did not exist. The result has been that Protestants are the modern victims of discrimination (Campbell, 1987; 1995). Orthodox views lie somewhere between these two poles, with the debate over the extent of discrimination centred upon three themes: (a) the 'politics of denial' in respect of discrimination which has emerged from some Unionist quarters (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995: 106); (b) the degree of self-exclusion by the Catholic population; (c) the perception of 'disloyal' Catholics. Table 2.2

Views on discrimination in Northern Ireland in 1968

Proposition: . . in parts of Northern Ireland Catholics are treated unfairly. Do you think this is true or not?' Religion (%)

Yes No Don't know Source-,

adapted from Rose (1971).

Protestant

Catholic

18 74 8

74 13 13

2.5 The extent o f discrimination

25

2.5.1 The politics of denial The refutation by some Unionists that discrimination occurred on a widespread scale might be dismissed as predictable. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in a formal, legalistic sense, it should have been impossible for Northern Ireland to operate as a sectarian state. Stewart (1977) claims that Stormont did not itself pass discriminatory laws, being forbidden to do so by the Government of Ireland Act 1920. Discrimination, if it occurred, must have occurred as consequence of local actions, whether committed by councils, employers or individuals. Indeed, the Unionist regime was not as homogeneous as might be assumed. There were debates within the Unionist Party concerning the appropriate means of treating Catholics (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 1996). Nonetheless, sectarian urges sometimes held sway. Whatever the constitutional obligations of Unionists, it was apparent that Catholics were disadvantaged within Northern Ireland. Stormont did not act positively to eradicate discrimination. Instead, Catholic deficiencies were sometimes blamed. In 1955, one academic asserted that Catholics 'often were inferior, if only in those personal qualities that make for success in competitive economic life' (Wilson, 1955: 208-9). Such an argument suggested a greater economic competence amongst the Unionist population, based upon a combination of the Protestant work ethic and superior schooling. More subtle supply-side explanations also influence modern Unionist accounts of differences in status between the two communities. Perceptions of the inferiority of Catholics have been displaced by stress upon the accidental nature of disparities between the two communities. Catholics question why the gap in skills training was not rectified. More subtle than inferiority arguments was the denial of discrimination in some of the aspects of the state about which Catholics complained. Electoral discrimination has been denied, in that the Unionist majority produced at each election to the Northern Ireland parliament merely reflected the political balance of forces within Northern Ireland (Barritt and Carter, 1962). In local elections, the Protestant working-class also suffered disenfranchisement through property qualifications. Accordingly, it is claimed that this was not a device of deliberate religious discrimination. In housing, it has been pointed out that the proportion of Catholics living in council housing was higher than that found within the Protestant sector (Calvert, 1972). Catholics did not, therefore, suffer from an unwillingness of the state to deal with their housing difficulties. Furthermore, both Protestants and Catholics acquiesced in the residential segregation perpetuated by councils. Equally, claims of locational discrimination have been questioned. For example, Wilson (1989: 105) argues that 'the widely held belief that Londonderry was the victim of sectarian discrimination in industrial promotion cannot be sustained'. This argument dismisses the idea that the East of the Province was systematically favoured over the predominantly Catholic West. Although Catholics comprised a higher proportion of the population in the West, threefifths nonetheless lived in the three eastern counties of Northern Ireland. Any

26

A n 'Orange state'? Northern Ireland 1 9 2 1 - 6 8

deliberate favouring of this eastern area would, therefore, have helped the majority of the Catholic population. Differences in wealth and status between Protestants and Catholics were acknowledged. Indeed, the terms 'lower class', 'labourers' and 'poor' were used as synonyms for Catholics by Protestants (Harris, 1986: 153). If use of these terms was partly stereotypical and derogatory, there was sufficient empirical evidence to indicate the existence of a residual Catholic underclass of casualised, unskilled labour. 2.5.2 Catholic self-exclusion It has been suggested that whilst Catholics were the victims of discrimination, 'exclusion was often self-imposed' (Buckland, 1981: 66). Catholics were seen as having withdrawn from Northern Ireland. Self-exclusion possessed several features. Firstly, the Nationalist Party engaged in long periods of abstention from Stormont, with a sole overriding policy of anti-partitionism. Only by 1965 did the Nationalist Party agree to become the official opposition. Secondly, there was an unwillingness to apply for certain public-sector appointments, notably in administration and the police. Thirdly, Catholics were alleged to have withdrawn from the state by their insistence upon their own system of education. Critics of the final argument suggest that agreement to educate a community as it desires is the baseline of a liberal, pluralist society. In no sense does it represent withdrawal from the state, nor is such a departure seen in negative terms elsewhere in the United Kingdom. The two previous arguments are also problematic. A political system based upon majoritarianism rendered the Nationalist party politically impotent, leading to prolonged abstentionism. There appeared to be no attempt to recognise the validity of the political aspirations of the Nationalist population. This inhibited some Catholics from applying to join the institutions of state, as they might become participants within an alien political system. Prospects for advancement within such institutions were in any case highly constrained. The two communities were also divided on cultural grounds. Social meetings were rare, partly because so many events were centred upon the respective churches. Some Catholics attempted to preserve Gaelic culture and language. Sport acted as one community marker. Catholics generally favoured Gaelic games, whilst Protestants played sports such as soccer and rugby. Many Catholics also enjoyed the latter and the extent of the wider cultural divide can be overstated. The idea that Catholics engaged in cultural self-exclusion by maintaining traditions is highly problematic. 2.5.3 Perceptions of disloyal Catholics For many Unionists, Catholics were essentially disloyal citizens within the state. Overwhelmingly Nationalist, perhaps more so than nowadays, the Catholic population was seen as holding an external allegiance. This loyalty, to an Irish

2.6 Explanations o f discrimination

27

state claiming sovereignty over Northern Ireland, was for many Protestants incompatible with full acceptance of Catholics as citizens of Northern Ireland, with the attendant economic benefits which accrued, relative to the South of Ireland. According to Unionists, Nationalist disloyalty led to self-exclusion, as Catholics refused to co-operate with what they regarded as an illegitimate state. Additionally, it has been suggested that councils held by Nationalists pursued allocative discrimination with even greater vigour than their Unionist rivals (Rose, 1971). Against these arguments, it should be noted that Nationalist control of councils was rare. Furthermore, Catholics saw themselves as unwelcome within the Northern state and were immediately excluded from influence. For Nationalists, partition legitimised sectarianism by creating a majoritarian political system designed to favour those holding a particular religious creed and ethnic identity. Although perceived as disloyal, Nationalists were essentially non-rebellious subjects between 1921 and 1968. This weakens the argument that Catholics were necessarily excluded because they were engaged in some form of permanent revolution designed to bring about the collapse of Northern Ireland. Despite the discrimination to which they were subject, the Nationalist response was one of sullen, tacit acquiescence, not determined state overthrow. 2.6 Explanations of discrimination Explanations of why discrimination occurred differ over three main issues: 1. the value of Protestant privileges; 2. the extent of Protestant unity across social classes; 3. the role, if any, of the British government, in promoting sectarianism. Nationalists believed that discrimination was an endemic feature of the sectarian state of Northern Ireland. An artificial state based upon Protestant triumphalism was certain to exercise discrimination against Catholics. For Protestants, union with Britain was now justified on democratic grounds by the creation of a twoto-one Unionist majority. All that seemed to be needed was regular reassurance from London that this majority would guarantee Northern Ireland's place within the United Kingdom. The British government appeared, if not anxious, at least willing enough to confirm the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. For example, it responded to the withdrawal of Ireland from the Commonwealth and the creation of an Irish Republic in 1949 by asserting that there could be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of Stormont. Given constitutional guarantees, a large in-built majority and relative peace in Northern Ireland, in what sense was discrimination functional? One explanation of discrimination was that it centred upon economic factors. Unionist hegemony was reinforced by uniting the Protestant middle and working-classes in an organic relationship. Protestants enjoyed economic

28

A n 'Orange s t a t e ? Northern Ireland 1 9 2 1 - 6 8

superiority over their Catholic counterparts. Until the 1960s, there was only a small Catholic middle-class. Marginal superiority characterised the position of the Protestant working-class, which, although poor, enjoyed a slightly better standard of living than the Catholic working-class. The latter suffered greater unemployment and casualisation of labour. Although advantages were slight, economic superiority was useful in maintaining the loyalty of working-class Protestants to the Unionist regime. Internal dissent was neutered by the token privileges offered by the perpetually governing Unionist Party to its supporters. These arguments are necessary but insufficient, as working-class unionism also possessed a non-material basis. It is possible to assert that marginal economic superiority produced a largely unquestioning brand of unionism, in which loyalty to Ulster, its leaders and the British Crown overrode potential class antagonisms. Enjoyment of superior economic fortune derived partly from the nature of Northern Ireland's economy, which remained internalised, as the activities of multinational companies were not in evidence. Instead there were three pillars of Northern Ireland's economy: agriculture, linen and shipbuilding, which combined accounted for almost half the workforce in the Province up to World War II (Johnson, 1985: 191). Many of these concerns were locally owned, with employers displaying a tendency to employ co-religionists. Such Orange clientelism was difficult to challenge in an era which predated detailed fair employment legislation. Largely a product of Marxist or Republican analyses, imperial or colonial explanations of discrimination emphasise the usefulness of sectarian discrimination in the perpetuation of British rule. These approaches often perceive Northern Ireland as one of Britain's last colonies. Discrimination in favour of a sector of the indigenous population was designed to bolster and legitimise colonial rule, by boosting local support for colonial dominance. Republican approaches tend to imply that the Protestant working-class was the victim of false consciousness. Duped into supporting unionism through the benefits of marginal superiority, Protestants would have been better served by making common cause with working-class Catholics in challenging British economic domination. According to Irish Republicans, Britain was held as ultimately responsible for the preservation of a sectarian state, in which a contrived majority was allowed certain privileges, as reward for the preservation of British interests. Marxist Republicans, such as James Connolly, had argued that the partition of Ireland would inevitably create a sectarian state based upon sectional interest. British policy was seen as based upon divide and rule, as the fracturing of working-class interests was seen as functional for capital by reducing the impact of labour organisations. Competition for scarce resources amongst groups divided by religious affiliation prevented the development of class antagonisms. Criticisms of such arguments centre upon the extent to which sectarianism was of use to British interests and the value of the economy of Northern Ireland. Sectarianism might instead be viewed as a consequence of the failure

2.6 Explanations o f discrimination

29

of the Unionist leadership to 'rise to the challenge of political maturity (Quinn, 1993: 14). British capital had minimal use for sectarianism, whilst British political elites had little interest in religious bigotry beyond mild disdain. Northern Ireland was run at one remove from the rest of the United Kingdom, with its internal affairs a minimal concern of a section of the Home Office. Indeed, as Follis (1995: 123) notes, the relationship between the 'imperial government' and local Loyalists was rarely convivial, insisting that: 'Far from being close allies of the British Government, the Ulster Unionists heartily reciprocated London's resentment and suspicion'. Equally, the latter criticism concerning the economic value of the 'Orange state' suggests that sectarianism was largely internally devised. Britain had little interest in the perpetually declining economy of Northern Ireland. Against this, it should be noted that Northern Ireland possessed a strong economy when the decision to partition Ireland was undertaken. After 1921, however, the economy declined sharply, with unemployment averaging 27 per cent during the 1930s. Accordingly, the economic exploitation of Northern Ireland produced diminishing returns. Others, who might be described as left-wing Unionists, fuse economic and political explanations and produce an analysis based upon social class (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 1996). They reject the view of Republicans or many other Marxists that the Protestant working-class had its identity 'bought' by favours. National loyalty was important, but the Protestant working-class was less deferential to its leaders than has been claimed. In 1932, Protestant workers from the Shankill district of Belfast rioted in support of impoverished Catholics in the Falls area. Sectarianism was useful for the state as it prevented this solidarity becoming permanent. Capitalists could threaten Protestant workers with the loss of national identity and the removal of privileges. Although British loyalty to Northern Ireland was not wholehearted, the national loyalties of the citizens in the Province outweighed class affiliations. The Unionist middle-class ascendancy remained unthreatened by serious challenge from below by poorer co-religionists. Protestants prepared to engage in such agitation were seen as damaging the state. Ironically, the Catholic Church provided an ally to Protestant hegemony, in denouncing agitation on social issues as inspired by Communists. Non-economic explanations of why discrimination was prevalent within Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1968 lie in the perception of political threat to the state. O f all explanations, this relies the most exclusively upon an internal rationale, based upon the siege mentality of unionism. Each aspect of Unionist discrimination was designed to allay concerns over the threat of absorption of the six-county Northern state within a united Ireland. The abolition of proportional representation and gerrymandering of local electoral boundaries can be explained within this framework. Local elections had offered the greatest potential Nationalist resistance. Indeed, immediately after the creation of Northern Ireland, rebel councils declared allegiance to the Southern state. Abolition of proportional representation reduced the numbers of rebel bodies. Gerrymandering consolidated the switch to Unionist control.

30

An 'Orange s t a t e ? Northern Ireland 1 9 2 1 - 6 8

Protestants were fearful of the entry of Catholics into the security apparatus of the state or the upper echelons of society, due to their doubtful loyalty. Catholic adherence to the symbols of the Irish Republic, such as the flying of the illegal tricolour and the commemoration of the Easter Rising, served to emphasise Unionist fears. Thus, Protestants were unsure how to treat the Catholic population. The police force was torn between a desire to attract Catholics and integrate them into the state and the desire to act decisively against 'traitors'. One result was that there were, in effect, two police forces. One, the 'B' Specials, was nakedly sectarian. The main police force, the RUC, spent its time 'teetering uncertainly between impartiality and partisanship' (Whyte, 1983: 29). Finally, the political fears of Protestants were reinforced by hostility to the doctrines of Roman Catholicism and the perception of a 'Popish conspiracy' (Elliott and Hickie, 1971: 40). Discrimination was necessary against followers of an expansionist religion, in order to defend a Protestant state. Yet, purely religious discrimination was rare. What occurred was political and social discrimination against an Irish nationalist population who were Catholics. The rights of Catholics to practise their religion and educate their children in the faith were scrupulously defended by the Protestant Unionist regime. A cynic might suggest that this zeal owed something to the usefulness of the perpetuation of sectarian division. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that whilst sections of the Protestant population were contemptuous of the religion held by their fellow citizens, systematic discrimination that occurred was an attempt to secure the state from the challenges of Irish nationalism. Unsystematic discrimination, extending even to the sectarian murder of Catholics purely because of their religious label in the early years of the state, also occurred. 2.7 Political stagnation Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Northern Ireland during this period of endemic discrimination was the lack of challenge to the state. From 1922 to 1955, there were 97 political murders. The Border Campaign of the IRA between 1956 and 1962 killed six R U C personnel. That particular phase of violence ended with a statement from the IRA lamenting the lack of support from Nationalists in Northern Ireland. Periodic campaigns saw the reintroduction of stringent security measures. Internment was reintroduced on both sides of the border during the 1950s campaign. By the late 1950s, some prosperous Catholics were prepared to accept the permanency of Northern Ireland. Indeed, many enjoyed the benefits of a much more comprehensive system of welfare than that available in the Republic, introduced by the 1945-51 Labour government against initial Unionist opposition. Whilst condemning partition, Catholic bishops were unyielding in their hostility to armed republicanism, denouncing as a mortal sin membership of organisations committed to such activities.

2.8

The threat from the South?

31

Despite the passivity of Nationalist responses to their subordinate position, there remained little attempt to integrate Catholics within political structures. Unionists were reluctant to make even slight concessions to Nationalist demands as they feared that such moves would be seen as a sign of Unionist weakness and that further demands would follow. Nationalists, therefore, found it impossible to make political progress. An Anti-Partition League created in 1945 attempted to unite different shades of Nationalist opinion. For some time, sections of the League did not pursue an abstentionist stance, but little was achieved. The League had particular support in rural areas and was influenced by the clergy. Radical urban Catholics might have supported the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) which held progressive social stances. However, constitutional politics dominated and the NILP suffered a decline in Nationalist support when it developed a Unionist position on the border question. As a gesture of frustration with the lack of political progress, the Nationalist population occasionally supported more militant Republican candidates. A member of the fringe Republican party, Saor Uladh, was successful in Tyrone in a Stormont General Election in 1953. Two Sinn Fein candidates were elected in the 1955 General Election. If Unionists interpreted such results as evidence of the continuing disloyalty of Catholics, the success of Sinn Fein owed more to the absence of rival Nationalist candidates on that occasion. 2.8 The threat from the South? Within Unionist demonology, the twenty-six-county state in the South of Ireland posed a direct threat to the security of Northern Ireland for two reasons. Firstly, the Southern state was overtly hostile to the division of Ireland. Secondly, the hegemonic role of the Catholic Church within that state inhibited Protestant securities. For Unionists, events in the South following partition vindicated their belief that Home Rule would indeed have ensured Rome rule. Accordingly, it was necessary for Unionists to maintain eternal vigilance against the perceived threat of territorial encroachment from the South. Indeed, as Northern Ireland consolidated its Protestant British identity, Southern Ireland attempted to enshrine a Catholic, Gaelic lifestyle amongst its populace. The conclusion of the Irish Civil War in 1923 facilitated the development of an immature democracy within the 26 counties of the Irish Free State. Three problems confronted the new state. Firstly, there was a need to assert Irish nationality despite continuing British ties and partition. Secondly, there lay the difficulty of maintaining the claim to jurisdiction over the northeastern corner of Ireland. Finally, economic strength needed to be developed. Attempts at resolving these dilemmas succeeded only in strengthening Unionist hostility towards the South and fostering the 'No Surrender' mentality within Northern Ireland. By 1927, the creation of a new opposition party, Fianna Fail ('warriors'), by Eamon de Valera allowed a recognisable system of government and opposition to emerge. Fianna Fail represented the anti-partition wing of republicanism

32

A n 'Orange state'? Northern Ireland 1 9 2 1 - 6 8

defeated in the Irish Civil War. It rose to power in 1932 on rhetorical pledges to end partition and emphasise Ireland's status as a sovereign nation. This attempt to free Ireland from imperial ties was confirmation for unionists that limited autonomy for the south would result eventually in full independence. An explicit assertion of Irish identity was established in the 1937 constitution, which confirmed the links between the Irish state and the Roman Catholic Church. The 1937 constitution: 1. 2. 3. 4.

created a new state: Eire, or Ireland; laid the foundations for the establishment of an Irish Republic in 1949; rejected the permanency of partition; enshrined the position of the Catholic Church.

Separatism, unity and theocracy were the core themes of the new settlement in Southern Ireland. The first theme concerned the establishment of Ireland as a genuine nation in its own right, beyond the status of'West Britain'. From the outset, de Valera attempted to steer the Free State towards the status of a republic. This was achieved by 1949, as Ireland withdrew from the Commonwealth. As the South weakened its British links, the British government sought to reassure Unionists in the North by declaring that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of Stormont. Commitments to Irish unity expressed within the Irish Republic were largely rhetorical, as there was little that the Irish government could do to achieve this goal. Fianna Fail's strong pledges to the aspiration of a united Ireland nonetheless had some electoral value, whilst helping to ensure that the South of Ireland would remain entombed in civil war politics for several generations. Furthermore, under the 1937 constitution, it became a constitutional imperative of all Irish governments, irrespective of political persuasion, to seek means of creating Irish unity. Article 2 declared that the national territory consists of 'the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas'. Article 3 recognised the de facto reality, declaring that 'pending the reintegration of the national territory. . . the laws of the state would only apply to the Free State area'. Territorial claims to the North were obviously anathema to Unionists, who were also alienated by the extent of influence held by the Catholic Church in the South. In developing a Catholic state and aspiring to Irish unity, Unionist sensitivities were not of primary concern to the Dublin government. The motivations of de Valera stemmed from his belief in the need to establish Ireland as an independent and secure state, based upon the moral certainties which arose from his personal piety. As Murphy argues, Ulster was viewed merely as Ireland's fourth green field, held under alien capture (Murphy, 1995). There was no attempt to forge any kind of understanding or accommodation with Northern Unionists. As both governments on the island developed political arrangements which reflected their insecurities, any lingering hopes for dialogue between the two evaporated. De Valera did take strong action against the IRA during its periodic revivals. However, even internment without trial and executions did little to assuage

2.8 The threat from the South?

33

Unionists who believed such measures were enacted for the internal security of the Republic. A theocracy can be defined as government by God directly or through a priestly class. The 1937 constitution attempted both as it empowered the Catholic Church whilst its introduction invoked 'the name of the Holy Trinity from whom is all authority'. From the liberal and secular 1922 model, the Irish constitution moved towards a theocratic 1937 model which indirectly provided the Catholic Church with significant input within the polity (Whyte, 1980). The shift was preceded by ecclesiastical censorship and prohibition in various aspects of life. Even certain forms of dancing or dress were seen as morally incorrect (Hoppen, 1980). Most explicit was Article 44 which recognised the 'special position' of Roman Catholicism as the 'religion of the great majority of the citizens'. Article 41 insisted that 'no law shall be enacted providing for the dissolution of marriage'. The same Article confirmed the patriarchal nature of society, by insisting that 'mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home'. The moral dimensions of the Irish constitution need not have offended Protestants in Northern Ireland, many of whom shared the conservative social stances of the Catholic Church. Theological differences and an outright hostility to the Catholic Church were of greater importance. Catholic moralism was based upon absolutist beliefs which impinged upon the political arena. This was seen in social policy in 1951, when the Catholic Church opposed the creation of limited forms of state welfare, arguing that they were the responsibility of families. It was the viewpoint of the Catholic Church which triumphed over the proposals of Dr Noel Browne, the government minister. In both North and South, theological underpinnings to society were abetted by the absence of a significant party of the left. In the Irish Republic, also lacking an urban proletariat, this helped to prevent the development of anti-clerical sentiment. Political independence permitted the development of legislation designed to consolidate symbols of national identity. The relative weakness of the Irish language allowed the Catholic Church a central role as the symbol of that identity. It remains doubtful whether the nature of Northern Ireland was influential upon the manner in which Southern Ireland developed, although polarisation was increased. An 'Orange state' may have existed in the North even if the Republic had been a beacon of liberal pluralism. Nonetheless, perceptions remained important. The special position of the Catholic Church in the South deepened Unionist hostility. In 1983, a survey found that 74.5 per cent of Protestants cited 'fear of the power of the Roman Catholic Church' as a reason for being Unionist (Moxon-Browne, 1983: 38). If the influence of the Church was an irritant to Unionists, so was the constitutional claim of the Irish Republic to Northern Ireland. This provided an excuse for a siege mentality. The Republic had no possibility of exercising its claim, as the North was well aware. As Wichert (1991: 151) asserts, the belief in a united Ireland 'grew into mere ideology and became part of the

34

A n 'Orange state'? Northern Ireland 1 9 2 1 - 6 8

national identity, much used in political speeches and manifestos, but not something that was thought in practice attainable or politically desirable'. Protestants in the South were actually disproportionately wealthy, represented in significant numbers within the professions. There was, however, a decline in the South's Protestant population, from 10 per cent in 1911 to 4 per cent by 1971, partly arising from the demand of the Catholic Church that children raised in mixed marriages be brought up as Catholics. Overall, the Republic provided scant economic incentives for acceptance of Irish unity, offering a backward, agrarian economy. In order to protect Irish agriculture, de Valera engaged in protectionism, imposing tariffs upon imports. Always unsuccessful, the measure reinforced an image of a garrison state Ireland, attempting to insulate itself from the external world. During the Second World War, the Irish Free State remained neutral. The geographic value of the Southern state to Britain rendered Northern Ireland's position within the United Kingdom expendable. Britain offered de Valera a declaration of support for a United Ireland in principle, which would become an 'accomplished fact' after the war (Fisk, 1983: 178). In return, Britain required that Eire either join Britain in the war against Germany, or as a minimum become non-belligerent rather than neutral, a move which would, for example, allow British use of the Irish naval ports it relinquished in 1938. In rejecting the proposal, de Valera pointed out that an attachment indicated that the consent of the Unionist government at Stormont would be required for its implementation, agreement unlikely to be forthcoming. Of equal concern was the desire to protect Irish neutrality. Finally, de Valera believed at the time of the offer that Britain was likely to lose the war. Infamously, a telegram of condolence was sent to the German embassy upon the death of Hitler. Unsurprisingly, the gesture served only to strengthen the bond between Northern Ireland and the remainder of the United Kingdom, even though the British government had scarcely confirmed the link in its proposals to the Free State. 2.9 Conclusion By the 1960s, many of the old certainties of the 'Orange state' remained intact. Unionist hegemony was seemingly assured. However, this picture of relative tranquillity was illusory. Weaknesses within the economy were evident, making it more difficult to retain the privileges of Orangeism. Divisions within unionism between modernisers and fundamentalists were emerging. Above all, preservation of the old order depended upon a lack of challenge from below. A common aspect of rebellion is that it stems from challenge to relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970). As Nationalists switched from sullen acquiescence to protest against their condition, the old order collapsed, never to return.

Chapter 3

From civil rights protests to insurrection

During the 1960s, debate was growing within the Unionist and Nationalist communities. Unionists pondered the best means of advancing their cause, particularly after the rise to the leadership of the relative moderate, Terence O'Neill, in 1963. The new Unionist leader believed that the best way to secure political dominance was to treat the Catholic minority on a more equitable basis. Nationalists meanwhile pondered the most appropriate means of rectifying their inequitable treatment in a polity in which they exerted scant influence. The political stagnation of the 1950s was about to be displaced by challenge and confrontation. 3,1 The modernisation of unionism O'Neill was only the fourth Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. He wished to modernise the Province and the party in perpetual government. Along with other enlightened Unionists, O'Neill recognised that there was scope for the introduction of a more liberal form of governance in the 1960s. A member of the Orange Order, in common with others in the Unionist hierarchy, O'Neill did not envisage more pluralistic forms of decision-making in Northern Ireland. Power-sharing with Nationalists was not envisaged. What was seen as useful on the basis of Unionist rational self-interest was the development of a more tolerant, co-operative regime. This strategy amounted to the granting of limited concessions to Catholics in order to achieve greater consensus within society. The reformism of O'Neill was a broad agenda, designed to secure the economic and political futures of Northern Ireland. Economically, Northern Ireland was neither prosperous nor ailing. The gross domestic product, for example, rose at a faster rate than elsewhere in the United Kingdom in the 1950s and 1960s, although this amounted to only a moderate international performance (Wilson, 1989). In an era characterised by centralised planning, the Wilson Plan attempted to find ways to modernise the economy and generate sufficient jobs to curb the persistently high unemployment endured in the Province (Wilson Report, 1965). O'Neill (1972: 67) was to lament: 'We had all the benefits of belonging to a large economy. . . but we threw it all away in trying to maintain an impossible position of Protestant ascendancy at any price'. 35

36

From civil rights protests to insurrection

A moderate patrician, O'Neill believed that Catholics could be 'civilised' through economic concessions. By refusing to support the Border Campaign of the IRA from 1956—62, Catholics had indicated their willingness to accept the constitutional status quo, at least for the foreseeable future. This acceptance might be strengthened if they were now treated with tolerance and fairness. For O'Neill, intolerance was not a symbol of the political virility of loyalism. Stressing the pragmatic basis of the link with Britain, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland eschewed Protestant triumphalism, whilst nonetheless reaffirming stereotypes of the superiority of the creed. Thus, he declared that 'if you treat Roman Catholics with due consideration and kindness, they will live like Protestants' (Belfast Telegraph, 10 May 1969). What was proposed was a modest package of reforms. They amounted to the politics of minimalism and concession, not the politics of equality or assimilation. The main reform proposals were: 1. 2. 3. 4.

the suspension of Derry City Corporation; a review of local government; reform of the franchise for local elections; appointment of an ombudsman to investigate complaints against local maladministration.

It was believed that such reforms would be sufficient to appease the Catholic minority. Concentration upon discrimination in local government did target one of the most obvious arenas of discrimination. There were no proposals for reform of employment law nor for changes in policing. 3.2 The birth of the civil rights campaign As Unionists examined their future strategy, Nationalists began to do likewise. Abstentionism and non-co-operation with the state, whilst often enforced by exclusion from power, amounted to the politics of futility. Middle-class Catholics, in particular, began to wonder aloud whether there might be more appropriate political strategies, hinting that anti-partitionism might be subordinated to more immediate agendas. Some Catholics argued that there was a duty to co-operate with the civil authority. Reformism displaced rebellion as the primary vehicle of change. Two factors underpinned the shift in Catholic attitudes. First, the minority community enjoyed a growing self-confidence. Catholics assumed prominent positions of authority elsewhere, not least in the United States, where Kennedy had been elected as president in 1963. Catholics again looked to the United States as an example of how to conduct a civil rights campaign. Although there were numerous differences in their standards of treatment, parallels were drawn between the blacks' struggle in the USA and the possibilities for the 'liberation' of Catholics in Northern Ireland. Relatively liberal papal declarations in Vatican II had seen the removal of some of the mystique and suspicion attached to Catholicism. Tentative ecumenism even developed in Northern Ireland as relationships thawed slightly between the major churches.

3.3 The demands o f the civil rights movement

37

Second, despite discrimination, there emerged a growing Catholic middleclass. This should not be overstated. At the end of the 1960s, it was still dwarfed by the Protestant middle-class (Aunger, 1983). Nonetheless it was influential. Prominent members of the civil rights campaign, such as John Hume, emerged from the growing Catholic section of the population who were articulate products of grammar schools, unwilling to acquiesce in the relative deprivation of their co-religionists. In 1964, an embryonic civil rights campaign began with the establishment of the Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ). Formed by a Dungannon doctor, the organisation attempted to attract interest in the plight of the minority in Northern Ireland. Two features of the campaign are worthy of note. Firstly, it primarily engaged in the standard pressure-group activities of lobbying and the raising of issues, rather than civil disobedience. Secondly, the main appeal of the group was to British Labour MPs at Westminster. Appeals to British MPs for internal reforms within Northern Ireland indicate that, at its outset at least, the civil rights campaign was not welded to the Irish Republican ideal. The CSJ was unconcerned with traditional Nationalist border politics of anti-partitionism. If the raising of consciousness was a primary goal, the CSJ was a success. Within a year, the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster was formed, comprising Labour MPs anxious to end discrimination in the Province. Some, such as the Manchester M P , Paul Rose, were extremely active in highlighting the inequitable treatment of Catholics. Traditional nationalism was far from dead, as the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising was celebrated with as much vigour as the state permitted in 1966, a year also marked by the sectarian assassination of two Catholics by a reborn Ulster Volunteer Force. However, the desire for internal change was now at the forefront of Catholic politics. Middle-class Catholic resentment had been increased by the decision in 1965 to locate Ulster's second university in (Protestant) Coleraine rather than (Catholic) Derry. By 1967, civil rights activity was growing to the extent that the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was formed, operating as an umbrella group for the different forms of activity. Although an essentially moderate organisation, NICRA was prepared to extend earlier pressure-group activity into civil disobedience. A difficulty with the pressuregroup approach is that it operates in a pluralist political framework which assumes a basic degree of consensus in society. As the activities of N I C R A were to highlight, no such consensus existed. 3.3 The demands of the civil rights movement N I C R A sought specific redress of grievances, via the following demands (Connolly, 1990: 50): 1. one man, one vo.e to be extended to local elections; 2. cessation of gerrymandering; 3. equitable housing allocations, via a points system;

38

From civil rights protests to insurrection

4. abolition of the Special Powers Act; 5. disbandment of the 'B' Specials; 6. introduction of complaints mechanisms in local government. Equally significant was what was not included. There were no demands for an end to partition, nor calls for a review of the border. Also absent was an insistence upon power-sharing. Toleration and fair treatment were desired as a precursor to participation in the Ulster polity. Moderation characterised the movement and its set of demands, which amounted to an extension of O'Neill's modernisation programme (Probert, 1978). Furthermore, the very title of the Civil Rights Association implied a tacit recognition of the state. Use of the term 'Northern Ireland' was a departure for those Nationalist elements who previously referred to the country as the 'Six Counties'. Nor was the movement inspired by Communists, as claimed by some opponents. According to one radical member of the civil rights movement: 'NICRA was a reformist organisation, out for limited change within the North, not an end to the northern state, much less a transformation of Irish society north and south' (McCann, 1992: 179). 3.4 Unionist responses Despite the moderation of the civil rights agenda, Unionists were divided between 'reformers and resisters' (Quinn, 1993: 24). Neither wished to see Unionist domination undermined, but differed on the pragmatic means of consolidation. Reformers held sympathy with several of the aims of NICRA. Resisters viewed all challenges to aspects of the state either as unnecessary, as discrimination did not exist, or as the conduct of war by other means by the republican movement. A tough response was, therefore, required. Catholic resentment was fuelled in January 1968 by a widely publicised case in Dungannon involving the allocation of a council house to a single Protestant woman in seeming preference to a homeless Catholic family. A defence of the actions of the local council was based upon the fact that the Catholic family were squatters from another area, whereas the Protestant was local. The case, although extreme, was not unique, but received particular attention due to the involvement on behalf of the family by the local Nationalist M P , Austin Currie. NICRA staged a large march in August 1968. Two months later, a second proposed demonstration was rerouted by the Home Affairs Minister, William Craig. Invoking the Special Powers Act, Craig used legislation from which Orange marches had appeared exempt. Using physical force, the R U C prevented the marchers from entering the city centre. Although a programme of reforms was announced in November 1968, the situation continued to deteriorate. In January 1969, Peoples Democracy, a radical, mainly student, element of the civil rights movement, which enjoyed some support from non-Catholics, staged a march from Belfast to Deny. Loyalists attacked the march at Burntollet, aided and abetted, it was claimed, by off-duty 'B' Specials (Farrell, 1980).

3.5 The arrival o f the British A r m y

39

It was evident that the summer 'marching season' in Ulster, in which hundreds of mainly Loyalist parades take place, might lead to further escalation of conflict. In August, Catholics attacked the police following the Protestant Apprentice Boys' march in Derry. Two nights of rioting ensued as the police attempted to force entry into the Catholic Bogside. Sectarian violence spread to Belfast, with hundreds forced to flee their homes. Four-fifths of those made homeless were Catholics (Wichert, 1991: 111). Eight Catholics and two Protestants were killed in the violence. Bogside became part of 'Free Derry', a self-policed, 'no-go' area for the security forces until the entry of the British Army in Operation Motorman in 1972. The Cameron and Scarman Reports into police conduct praised the police, but acknowledged that there had been serious breaches of discipline (Cameron, 1969; Scarman, 1972). Nationalists were less sanguine concerning the capabilities of the police, particularly the 'B' Specials. Instead, they had welcomed the arrival of British troops as peacekeepers who would prevent attacks by Protestant mobs. Sympathy, but little else, was granted to Northern Nationalists by the Irish Prime Minister, Jack Lynch, who declared that his government 'could not stand by' whilst sectarian pogroms continued. Field hospitals were set up near the border. 3.5 The arrival of the British Army Understandably, most interpretations perceived the conflict in Northern Ireland in 1969 as one of intercommunal strife. Underlying tensions had manifested themselves in sectarian conflict. In response, the British government sent in British troops to restore order. A long-term objective was to stabilise British rule in Ulster. Other than a handful of diehard Republicans, few in Nationalist areas of Belfast and Derry were overly concerned with long-term strategies in 1969. Rather, the arrival of British troops was welcome after the collapse of any lingering trust in the internal policing arrangements in the Province. Although remarkable in view of subsequent events, scenes of unbridled hospitality for arriving troops were common in Catholic ghettos. Cordiality was fostered by a Home Secretary, James Callaghan, not unsympathetic to the demands of the civil rights movement, backed by a British Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, who had little love for the Unionist regime. After the surprise election of a Conservative government in June 1970, Nationalists found themselves dealing with a somewhat less sympathetic Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling. A n early indication of Maudling's approach to the nuances of Irish politics may have been provided by his alleged comment as he boarded the return flight after an initial visit: 'Bloody awful country; give me a whisky'. Sage elements within the British Army realised, with some prescience, that their honeymoon period could not be sustained. Few doubted that without political progress, the Army would be placed in a conflictual position. For some Nationalists, the response of sections of the state to the civil rights

40

From civil rights protests to insurrection

campaigns illustrated that reforms would have to be imposed upon Unionists. If the intervention of the Army was seen as a device to reinforce the status quo, it was likely that confrontation would ensue. Similarly, the Army would need to deal gingerly with local residents. A permanent presence might create perceptions of the Army as a surrogate R U C . According to some critics, a 'succession of mistakes in security policy made a major contribution to the escalation of the conflict' (Boyle and Hadden, 1994: 83). This interpretation lays great stress upon the reactive nature of developments. Armed conflict developed partly as a response to the errors of the Army. Untrained as peacekeepers, the Army alienated the Nationalist working-class by using powers of search and detention. In April 1970, the Army fired baton rounds against Catholics in Ballymurphy. Two months later, the growing estrangement of the Army from Nationalists was virtually complete, following the imposition of a thirty-six-hour curfew upon the Lower Falls in Belfast, as part of an arms search. The introduction of detention without trial during the following year merely reinforced hostility. Internment appeared an inept military tactic, largely based upon uncertain information. Two reasons explain the hardline approach. Internal conflicts within unionism made it necessary for the Unionist Party leadership to be seen to be taking a tough stance against Nationalist disquiet (Guelke, 1988). Second, the close relationship between the Conservative and Unionist parties ensured that Westminster sanctioned a firm approach. Most disastrous of all were the events of Bloody Sunday in January 1972, in which 13 unarmed Catholics were shot dead by the British Army, an event which even stirred passions in the Irish Republic to the extent that the British Embassy in Dublin was incinerated. Nationalists of different hues rejected the subsequent Widgery Report which alleged that the British Army had come under sniper fire from the IRA (Widgery, 1972). Nearly three decades later, events were reinvestigated by the Saville Inquiry. Two developments occurred as relationships between Nationalists and the Army grew poisonous. Firstly, Unionism fragmented. Secondly, the IRA, derided in ghetto graffiti as the organisation that 'ran away' in 1969, splintered but gained in strength. 3.6 Unionist fragmentation Despite the robustness of the initial response to civil rights agitation displayed by the security forces, the Unionist leadership was criticised internally for its weakness. Increasingly, O'Neill became caught in a political pincer, trapped on his left by the demands of the civil rights movement and scorned on his right by those who equated moderation with treason and opposed all concessions. Fear of change and loss of position provided two motivations for resistance to reform. As Probert (1978: 79) suggests, 'O'Neill inevitably came into conflict with those elements of the Unionist alliance who sought to preserve the traditional privileges . . . the local bourgeoisie and the Protestant labour aristocracy'.

3.7 The formation o f the Provisional IRA

41

Devoid of the clear support of local business owners and confronted by increasing Protestant working-class hostility to the patrician approach of Orange grandees, O'Neillism was clearly in trouble as a reformist political project. As O'Neill attempted to defend his agenda, he dismissed William Craig as M i n ister for Home Affairs, after the latter had begun to make sympathetic gestures towards the idea of an independent Ulster. Hardliners such as Craig believed that sections of the Unionist Party were too conciliatory towards both the Westminster government and the civil rights movement. The establishment of the Cameron Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances in the Province had angered hardline Unionists. Two cabinet ministers resigned in protest, whilst several Unionist MPs now demanded a change of Party leadership. An election to Stormont was called in February 1969, which confirmed the emergence of fault lines within unionism. At the forefront of calls for the replacement of O'Neill was the Reverend Ian Paisley, who challenged the Prime Minister in his own Bannside constituency and polled only 5 per cent fewer votes. The Protestant Unionist Party, which had existed on the margins of Ulster politics since the late 1950s, now emerged as a credible challenger to the official Unionist Party. Indeed, the election was marked by the disintegration of the political homogeneity of Unionism. Once a solid, united force, Unionists divided along bizarre lines. Official Unionist candidates were either pro- or anti-O'Neill, depending upon the affiliation of their constituency party. Against Official anti-O'Neill Unionist candidates stood Independent pro-O'Neill Unionists. Similarly, Independent Unionists stood against pro-O'Neill Official Unionists. Although moderates emerged from the elections with credible results, the position of the Unionist leadership had been fatally weakened. During the following month, O'Neill received a very lukewarm vote of confidence, by 338 votes to 263, from the Ulster Unionist Council. Whilst Paisley and Major Ronald Bunting, the two principals in the organisation of anti-civil rights protests, began short gaol sentences, O'Neill resigned. He was replaced by his cousin James Chichester-Clark, proof that Orange family dynasties had not totally expired, but an inadequate response to a deteriorating situation. 3.7 The formation of the Provisional IRA The crisis in unionism over responses to the civil rights campaign deepened with the re-emergence of the IRA. Moribund and marginalised since the abject failure of the Border Campaign, Unionist responses to the civil rights campaign had provided the tiny organisation with a new lease of life, whilst simultaneously highlighting internal frictions which led to a split. Although the core aim of the establishment of an independent, thirty-twocounty socialist Irish republic remained, differences in strategy were apparent within the IRA during the late 1960s. Republicans were divided over the extent to which economic, electoral and military agendas should be prioritised. Between 1962 and 1969, the IRA was very weak. Demoralised by failure, its recruitment was minimal and it was devoid of a military strategy. Social

42

From civil rights protests to insurrection

and economic agitation was seen as the most viable future strategy. This involved the creation of a broad liberation front, embracing trade unionists and disaffected groups in coalitional strategies. Under the leadership of Cathal Goulding, the organisation became increasingly Marxist and political, to the chagrin of vaguely socialist militarists within its ranks (MacStiofain, 1975). Concurrently, the IRA became almost as much concerned with the nature of the Southern state and its alleged cultural domination by Britain, as it was with partition. This departure enraged traditionalists concerned with the primacy of 'Brits Out'. Above all, the IRA leadership misread the situation in Northern Ireland. Involved in the civil rights campaign from the outset, but as marginal actors, the IRA nonetheless issued a document, Ireland Today, as late as 1969, arguing that 'the 26 counties is the area in which the greatest anti-imperialist unity is possible' (Republican Education Department 1969: 5, quoted in Patterson, 1989: 105). Given that the citizens of the Irish Republic were showing minimal interest in 'anti-imperialism', it was a curious interpretation, particularly at a time of considerable unrest in Northern Ireland. Despite the backlash amongst many Unionists, the IRA argued that political reform created by the civil rights movement would change the attitudes of the Protestant working-class, allowing it to make common cause with its Catholic counterpart. The fracturing of unionism was optimistically seen as supportive evidence (Patterson, 1989). Marxist theorising carried little clout amongst several of the small number of remaining IRA personnel in the North. They formed part of communities bearing the brunt of sectarian attack from Loyalists. Whilst they might agree with the position of the leadership that orangeism formed part of a wider British imperial strategy, they were more concerned with the immediate need of resisting Loyalist attacks. Such individuals did respond to these attacks with what tiny firepower they could muster, one example being when they opened fire on a Loyalist mob attacking a Catholic Church in Belfast in August 1969. Men of personal piety such as Sean McStiofain and Ruairi O'Bradaigh formed part of the new group of leadership critics. Denounced as bigots by Goulding, the Northern remnants of the IRA were tiring of the social approach and downgrading of military action by the IRA leadership. A final decision to split came when the leadership decided to end abstentionism. In the (unlikely) event of Sinn Fein candidates winning sufficient support, they would be allowed to take their seats in the Dail. It was hoped that this would boost urban working-class support for Sinn Fein in the Republic. This downgrading of the military in favour of the political was too much for the traditionalist militarists in the movement. In January 1970 at the Sinn Fein ard fheis (conference) they formed the Provisional IRA as a breakaway organisation from what now became known as the 'Official' IRA. A limited amount of support for the Provisionals came from nationalistic elements within the Fianna Fail ruling party in the Irish Republic. Such elements desired a return to green republicanism rather than the red Marxist republicanism and Communist agitation of the Official IRA. Indeed, the

3.7 The formation o f the Provisional IRA

43

Provisionals lay within the tradition of armed sacrifice for 'Mother Ireland' from which Fianna Fail had emerged. Sections of the party were relieved that the Provisionals were much more interested in military action in the North than pursuing social agendas in the South. The extent to which aid from Southern Nationalists was significant in the formation of the Provisional IRA is disputed. Patterson (1989) argues the role of Fianna Fail had some significance, an argument rejected by Bishop and Mallie (1987). Coogan (1995) leans to the latter view. Although 'relief money' headed northwards from sympathetic Nationalists, he claims that the one consignment of arms smuggled to the North through Fianna Fail went to the Officials. Two cabinet ministers in the Republic, Charles Haughey and Neil Blaney, were charged with gun-running, but later acquitted. Fianna Fail helped to set up the strongly Nationalist Voice of the North newspaper. Members of the Official IRA, the recipients of much less funding from the South, were critical of the basis of support for the Provisionals. The differences between the two IRAs could be exaggerated. Despite the magnitude of the split, 'there was little to choose in tactics or intentions' (Bowyer-Bell, 1989: 374). Indeed, some of the most brutal killings were carried out during this period by the Official IRA, including the bombing of the Parachute Regiment barracks at Aldershot, as a reprisal for Bloody Sunday. The bomb killed cleaners and a chaplain. The Officials called a ceasefire in 1972, having alienated sympathisers in Deny by killing a local soldier on leave from the British Army. At the risk of caricature, the differences of emphasis between the two IRA organisations can be seen in Table 3.1. Devoid of assistance from politicians, the British Army's peacekeeping procedures undermined its initial welcome. Nationalist hostility grew rapidly, a process accelerated by increasing IRA activity which in turn led to greater repression. The Provisional IRA recruited at speed. Some areas of Belfast, such as the Lower Falls and Markets, remained loyal to the old IRA leadership, as did parts of Deny. In many other places, the uncomplicated approach of the Provisionals appealed. As the campaign of the Provisionals switched to an offensive in February 1971, with the killing of the first British soldier, there was a belief in the potential of a short, sharp war approach in speedily obtaining a united Ireland. Certainly IRA activity increased enormously after the introduction of Table 3.1

Differences between Republican paramilitary organisations 1970-72

Official IRA

Provisional IRA

Marxist Atheist Belief in need for Protestant working-class support Social and political agenda

Socialist Catholic Defence of Nationalist area an initial priority Military agenda; abstentionism

44

From civil rights protests to insurrection

internment and following the upsurge in anti-British sentiment after Bloody Sunday. Detention without trial had been opposed by the British Army on the basis that it possessed insufficient knowledge. Political posturing overrode subject knowledge and a largely useless haul of terrorist suspects was conducted in Nationalist areas. Allegations of ill-treatment of detainees fuelled hostility. The Compton Committee of Inquiry conceded that prisoners had been ill-treated whilst rejecting claims that systematic brutality had occurred (Compton Report, 1971). In 1972, there were over 10,000 shootings in Northern Ireland. Much of the city centre of Belfast was bombed, sometimes in a concerted series of explosions, as occurred on 'Bloody Friday' that year. Fifteen devices were detonated separately in a seventy-five minute period, killing nine people, mostly civilians. Such was the ferocity with which armed insurrection displaced civil rights protests that the Provisional IRA appeared to have bombed its way to the negotiating table when invited to secret talks by the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, in July 1972. A delegation, which included Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams, engaged in fruitless 'negotiations'. The IRA's belief that it might win through a quick campaign would slowly begin to change to a strategy of 'long war'. 3.8 The civil rights movement and the IRA In the eyes of some Unionists, the transition from civil rights demands to an IRA offensive appeared relatively seamless, vindicating suspicions over the true nature of the original campaign. The following two very broad categories of explanation have been forwarded to explain how demands for civil rights eventually translated into armed insurrection. 3.8.1 The 'trojan horse' thesis This alleges that the civil rights movement was a forerunner of a new IRA campaign, directly linked to the organisation, which at the time had opted for an unarmed strategy. In effect, the thesis defines the civil rights movement by outcomes. A n IRA campaign emerged at a later date. As such, the civil rights movement must have been instrumental in fermenting that campaign. Exponents of this idea do not deny the presence of non-violent idealists within the civil rights movement, but suggest that it was used as a flag of convenience by those with wider political agendas. This assessment can still be found. According to David Trimble, the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, 'the behaviour and tactics, of civil rights, the civil rights movement, soon clarified the matter . . . this was really just the Republican movement in another guise' (quoted in Coogan, 1995: 63). Estimates of the IRA's strength varied greatly. The British government believed it had 3,000 members by 1966, whilst the Irish government offered a more realistic estimate of 1,000 {Irish Post, 11 January 1997). The Irish government believed that recruitment was increasing, but that this was not indicative of an imminent armed campaign.

3.8 The civil rights movement and the IRA

45

Undoubtedly, the civil rights movement amounted to an uneasy coalition. Moderates, such as John Hume and Ivan Cooper, within the Derry Citizens' Action Committee mingled with radicals, such as Michael Farrell and Eamon McCann, in Peoples Democracy and the Derry Housing Action Committee. The movement was united in its hostility to discrimination and its contempt for the 'green Toryism' of the Nationalist Party upon which the community had long relied. Radicals were particularly critical of Orange and Green (Protestant versus Catholic) politics and contemptuous of the sectarian state. They regarded the Nationalist Party as a confessional party, influenced by the clergy and sectarian in outlook (Farrell, 1980). Civil rights demands did undermine the state and attacks upon the civil rights movement were partly responsible for the formation of the Provisional IRA. However, these two statements combined do not prove that the civil rights movement was a trojan horse for armed republicanism. Certainly there were those within the Republican movement who saw the possibilities that might arise from a civil rights campaign (MacStiofain, 1975). Indeed, the leader of the IRA, Cathal Goulding, claimed to have been directly involved in the creation of NICRA. Purdie (1988; 1990) points to the presence of longstanding Republican agitators, including IRA personnel, within the civil rights movement. Although purporting to demand civil rights for all, demonstrations featured the singing of Irish rebel songs and Nationalist ballads. Finally, those who claim a direct link point to the fact that most of the demands of the civil rights movement were met between 1968 and 1972, yet violence increased dramatically, proof that Nationalists were disinterested in internal reforms. 3.8.2 The 'separate entities' thesis This refutes the claim of a direct lineage between the civil rights movement and the rebirth of the IRA. Despite the assertion of Goulding, the IRA appears to have played little active role within a movement centred upon internal reform. Some IRA members did become involved in citizens' defence committees, but otherwise played little part (McCann, 1980). Broadly, the separate entities thesis is based upon the following contentions. Firstly, the creation of the Provisional IRA occurred partly because the civil rights movement had no wider agenda. Secondly, the IRA revived partly because the Unionist response to the civil rights movement was so hostile, forcing the IRA into attempting a defensive role within Nationalist areas against the police and ad hoc Loyalist mobs. Later, the IRA enlarged in response to the actions of the British Army. Thirdly, to speak of the civil rights movement as an IRA front' is fallacious given the state of the latter organisation at the time of civil rights protests. Coogan (1995: 55) argues: 'there was no IRA activity. And for a very good reason: there was no IRA'. Fourthly, the political culmination of the civil rights movement was not the formation of the IRA but the creation of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, established in 1970 as a moderate Nationalist party with a commitment to progressive social policies. C

46

From civil rights protests to insurrection

Quinn (1993: 24) bridges differing perspectives arguing:' "Provoism" was a response to the fear of a loyalist backlash against reform of civil rights. In effect the IRA hijacked the civil rights movement and redirected it towards old-fashioned physical force'. This argument rejects the idea that the civil rights movement was a Republican vehicle. It nonetheless sees a link between the two forms of political activity that occurred, if only because the IRA 'captured' hitherto peaceful protest. Unionist fears were justified in the sense that they believed the civil rights movement would result in a challenge to the state. It was incorrect, however, to assert that it was simply the Republican movement adopting new tactics. NICRA contained a large middle-class element characterised by moderation. 3.9 The growth of Loyalist paramilitary groups As both wings of the IRA began to recruit, a concurrent development was the rise of Loyalist paramilitaries within working-class areas, particularly in Belfast. A forerunner of such activity was the establishment of the Ulster Protestant Volunteers in 1966, linked to Ian Paisley. The most prominent group to emerge was the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). It was formed in 1971 as an amalgamation of large local defence forces, such as those already functioning in the Shankill and Woodvale districts of Belfast. In mounting roadblocks and attempting limited forms of self-policing, the U D A acted as a reactive force, attempting to imitate the 'no-go' Nationalist areas of Deny. Pledged to defend Ulster by all means necessary, the U D A saw itself as a defensive, non-sectarian organisation designed to resist Republican aggression. Loyalty was stronger to Ulster than to Britain. Few olive branches were to be offered to the Nationalist community, according to an early U D A newsletter: . . . the Roman Catholic population do not regard themselves as part of Ulster. They regard themselves as part of the Republic of Ireland. They are on the side of murder, terrorism, intimidation, and the total destruction of loyalists. The exceptions are so very, very few that we simply cannot trust any of them . . . ( U D A 1971, quoted in Guelke, 1988: 64).

Attractive as a defensive mechanism within an increasingly beleaguered Protestant population, the U D A attracted considerable support, claiming 35,000 members in 1972. Its size was one reason why it was difficult to ban. Another was that its sectarian assassinations of Catholics were carried out under the title of the Ulster Freedom Fighters, unlike the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) which claimed responsibility for its killings. Having murdered two people in 1970, Protestant paramilitaries killed 20 more in 1971. Besides fundraising, there were three main dimensions to U D A activity: 'respectable' community development, paramilitary parades and sectarian assassination (Bruce, 1994). As the IRA launched its offensive in February 1971, other large Protestant organisations were to emerge. One was the West Ulster Unionist Council, led by Harry West, operating on behalf of conservative elements within the Unionist Party. Another was the Loyalist Association of Workers, led by Billy Hull, with strong roots within the trade-union movement.

3.10 The abolition o f Stormont

47

More significant than either was the Ulster Vanguard, created by William Craig. Despite his disenchantment with the Ulster Unionist leadership, Craig had remained a party member. Desirous of a broader, more resolute form of unionism, Craig established the Vanguard movement as a coalition of Unionist forces determined to resist threats to Ulster. A populist movement was indeed created, incorporating prominent Unionists such as Martin Smyth, a leading figure within the Orange Order. Veering between constitutional and extra-constitutional approaches, the Vanguard movement tapped into the fears of Protestants to the extent that it proved capable of mobilising up to 60,000 people at rallies. Vanguard had links with paramilitary organisations and with trade unions, the latter providing the useful weapon of industrial action in protest at unpopular Westminster actions (Crawford, 1987). From the plethora of Loyalist associations, it was the mainly constitutional loyalism of Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party, formed in 1971, that was to emerge as the main challenger to the Unionist Party. This development has been ascribed to four factors. First, the party, in its earlier guise as the Protestant Unionist Party, had been the first to challenge O'Neill. Second, the party had relative clarity in policy, helped perhaps by. the near-absence of internal democracy. Vanguard mooted the notion of an independent Ulster without clarifying the idea. Later, Vanguard lost support by appearing to favour powersharing with Nationalists. Third, it was difficult for coalition movements such as Vanguard to convert into political parties. The establishment of the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party in 1973 split the movement. Finally, paramilitary associations had different aims from constitutional parties and had difficulty in attracting support outside working-class districts. 3.10 The abolition of Stormont As Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups gathered in strength, Northern Ireland became increasingly ungovernable. The IRA waged a virulent campaign of violence, initially against economic targets, but increasingly against security personnel. Although both sides officially eschewed sectarian violence, no-warning bombs in pubs frequented by members of the 'other' community undermined such denials. Internal reforms continued, but did not satisfy Catholics and angered hardline Protestants. The abolition of the 'B' Specials in late 1969 was a particular source of disquiet, only partly assuaged by the establishment of a replacement, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). As part of the British Army, it had been hoped that the U D R would project a more neutral image than its predecessor. Disenchantment with the British Army amongst Nationalists rendered that hope forlorn. Some Catholic recruitment was attained in its formative years, but this declined sharply as it was targeted by Republicans. Another reform was the creation of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive in 1972, which removed the ability of local authorities to operate discretionary, sometimes discriminatory, housing policies.

48

From civil rights protests to insurrection

Unable to procure further substantial security commitments from the British government, Chichester-Clark resigned in March 1971, to be replaced by Brian Faulkner. Instrumental in the introduction of internment, Faulkner demanded tougher security measures, suggesting to the British government that failure to act would lead to his resignation and the risk of the demagogic Ian Paisley as Prime Minister. Faulkner appeared to misread historical lessons in his faith in internment, which originated from its apparent success against the IRA in the 1950s. A lack of political support amongst Nationalists defeated the IRA in that campaign, not internment. Until the introduction of detention without trial in August 1971, 34 people had been killed during the previous seven months. The death toll in the remaining five months was 140. Hundreds of Protestants were forced to flee the Ardoyne area of Belfast following rioting, whilst Catholics evacuated other areas. As geographic and political polarisation increased, Faulkner engaged in one conciliatory gesture by appointing a Catholic, G.B. Newe, to his Cabinet. Newe, who had instigated a debate on the appropriateness of Catholic participation in the state back in 1958, was the first Catholic to hold such office in a Northern Ireland government. Tougher security measures under Faulkner failed to reduce levels of violence and the British government decided it should assume direct responsibility for security in Northern Ireland. Undermined by this action, the Unionist government resigned, replaced by direct rule by the Westminster government. In effect, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland assumed the powers of the former Prime Minister of the Province, assisted by a small team of ministers. A Northern Ireland Office was created, based in London and Belfast, to oversee administration. Unsurprisingly, the abolition of Stormont upset Unionists. After all, it was their parliament, which had presided over a statelet of comparative tranquillity until recent years. A huge strike was called to coincide with the final days of the parliament. For many Nationalists, the imposition of direct rule might have been welcome in earlier years as a means of alleviation of sectarian discrimination. Now, however, it was the 'old' enemy of the British government which had resurfaced as the target of wrath. Imposing direct rule held advantages and disadvantages for the Westminster government. A positive feature from a Westminster viewpoint was that it allowed direct control of all security issues. Clinging to the notion of neutrality, the British government also hoped that a non-discriminatory form of direct rule might be more acceptable to Catholics than the sectarian excesses of devolved Unionist government. There was also some optimism that it might be easier to develop political initiatives through bypassing a Unionist administration. On the debit side, the abandonment of the 'arm's-length' distance provided by devolved approaches meant that unrest could no longer be presented simply as one between two warring communities. Rather, the British government was

3.11 Conclusion

49

now engaged in direct conflict with Irish Republicans, a conflict that it believed it had eliminated through partition 50 years earlier. Furthermore, the suspension of Stormont amounted to a tacit acceptance that Unionist government had not worked. How, therefore, was its restoration ever to be justified? 3.11 Conclusion By 1972, the terms 'ungovernability' and 'Northern Ireland' had become synonymous. Limited options existed in the early 1970s for the prevention of conflict, but these rested upon a rapid pace of reform and trust amongst Nationalists concerning the role of the British Army. These options disappeared by 1972. Designed as a temporary measure, direct rule proved enduring. Its imposition represented the death of traditional unionism, which had proved unable to deal with challenges to its ascendancy. Demands for internal reform had been construed from the outset by Unionists as rebellion and had translated into such within the Nationalist community. Republicans believed that removal of the Stormont regime represented a triumph en route to the establishment of a united Ireland. However, the removal of a government was not tantamount to the seizure of power.

Chapter 4

Unionist and Loyalist politics

The first three chapters of this book examined the historical basis for political difficulties in Northern Ireland. The focus now switches to the current politics and governance of the state, before assessing attempts to manage political problems. This chapter and Chapter 5 analyse the ideology and organisation of the main political parties, on which there remains surprisingly little information, despite the voluminous literature on the politics of Northern Ireland. 4.1 The party system in Northern Ireland Ethnic bloc politics characterise Northern Ireland. The major parties in Northern Ireland are divided into two main groupings, Unionist and Nationalist, drawing the overwhelming majority of their support and members from, respectively, British Protestants and Irish Catholics. The link between religious denomination and choice of political party has led to the labelling of political parties in Northern Ireland as confessional parties. The divide between unionism and nationalism does not exist because of the stances of political parties on religious questions. Such stances do not exist. All parties claim to welcome support from Catholic, Protestant and dissenter. The link between denomination and political grouping derives from the different positions held by Unionists and Nationalists on the constitutional future of Northern Ireland. Despite the ethnic bloc polarity of Northern Ireland's politics, intra-ethnic rivalries are also very important. Competition between and within parties inside the Unionist and Nationalist 'family' represents a vital dynamic to Northern Ireland's politics, highlighted by the ongoing divisions within unionism over the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. An optimistic interpretation of the Good Friday Agreement was that it might contribute to a thawing of ethnic bloc politics, as Catholics and Protestants voted outside their ethnic party bloc. The single transferable vote (STV) system of proportional representation is used for non-Westminster elections in Northern Ireland. This might allow voters to at least transfer their lower preference votes to candidates from the rival ethnic bloc. Thus, a pro-Agreement Unionist might wish to vote for as many pro-Agreement candidates as possible, even if this means lower preference voting for the SDLP. This could lead to a realignment of politics, with a new cross-community centrist bloc emerging, embracing moderate pro-Agreement parties. A pessimistic interpretation of 50

4.2 The nature o f unionism

51

the Agreement was that the ethnic bloc divide would increase through the reinforcement of 'Green' (Nationalist) and 'Orange' (Unionist) politics, as parties attempt to persuade their 'own' electorate that they can get the best deal for unionism over nationalism and vice versa. 4.2 The nature of unionism At the core of unionism lies a determination that Northern Ireland will remain as part of the United Kingdom. Arising from this are demands placed upon the British government that it secures the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. Equally, unionism rejects the claims of Irish nationalism that the geographic unity of Ireland must necessarily translate into political unity. Unionists view Northern Ireland as a legitimate entity, historically, culturally and politically part of the United Kingdom. Unionists see themselves historically, politically and culturally as British. They, therefore, support continued union with Great Britain and vote for Unionist parties, in a similar manner to the way that Nationalists see themselves as Irish and so support Nationalist parties which promote the political advancement of that Irish identity. Some Unionists also see Protestantism as an integral part of a British identity. Whilst support for parties stems from a political logic, politics in Northern Ireland are nonetheless often perceived as sectarian. There are three main charges comprising this allegation. First, the main Unionist parties have formal or informal links to Protestant organisations or churches. Second, Nationalist parties remain rooted in 'green' politics and make little attempt to attract support from the Protestant community. Thirdly, the unwillingness of 'mainland' British political parties to organise in Northern Ireland creates a political vacuum in which sectarian politics flourish. Although there is evidence to support all these charges, the basic political divide would exist even in a secular (non-religious) Northern Ireland. Seventy-one per cent of Protestants 'think of themselves' as Unionists, and seventy per cent of Catholics 'think of themselves' as Nationalists (Murphy and Totten, 2000: 295). The polarity in respect of Protestants voting for Unionist parties and Catholics voting for Nationalist parties is even starker. Unionism has been identified with a conditional loyalty towards Britain (Miller, 1978). Whilst support for the Crown has endured, loyalty to other British political institutions has been provided partly on the basis of Unionist self-interest. When decisions have been taken against the perceived interests of Unionists, disobedience has followed. Historical examples are provided by the refusal to accept Home Rule and the workers' strike which ended the powersharing executive of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974. Critics of the conditional-loyalty thesis point out that the loyalty of citizens is always conditional upon effective, consensual governance (Coulter, 1994). Conditional loyalty is, therefore, not exclusive to unionism. Also, it is argued that it is loyalty to Unionists which has been conditional, due to the British government's refusal to secure an unequivocal, permanent place for Northern

52 Table 4.1

Unionist and Loyalist politics Protestant identity in Northern Ireland 1968-89 (%)

British Ulster Irish Northern Irish

1968

1989

39 32 20 n/a

68 10 3 16

Note: the category of Northern Irish did not appear in the 1968 survey. Source: adapted from Moxon-Browne (1991).

Ireland within the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland's place is subject to the agreement of the majority within Northern Ireland, a condition not applied to other parts of the Kingdom. Only 5 per cent of the Ulster Unionist Council, the ruling body of unionism's largest party, believe that the Westminster government can be trusted on the future of Northern Ireland (Tonge and Evans, 2001a). Unionism is also sometimes seen as a form of British nationalism. Unionists are sometimes perceived by outsiders as 'more British than the British'. Few other British citizens engage in vivid displays of the symbols of Britishness found in many Loyalist areas of Northern Ireland. This symbolism is associated with the siege mentality of Unionists, dwelling in a contested part of British territory. Critics see the repositories of loyalty, such as the Crown and Protestantism, as part of a bygone era. Others see symbolic displays merely as patriotism. What can be asserted is that unionism asserts a particular type of Britishness, with variations such as Orangeism rarely found elsewhere. Until Unionists lost their own parliament in 1972, most saw their primary identity as Ulster citizens. British identity was important, but faced less of a challenge and was thus not as salient. After the challenge to Northern Ireland's position arose in the early 1970s, identity shifted, as Table 4.1 demonstrates. 4.3 Devolution and unionism Unionism has been an ideology constructed upon resistance, whereas nationalism has been an 'active ideological force' (Aughey, 1994: 54). This is because Ulster unionism is an ideology upon the defence of the status quo. Maintenance of the Union with Britain has demanded greater thought under sustained challenge. Prior to the civil rights challenges of the late 1960s, unionism was largely stagnant. The mantras of 'A Protestant parliament for a Protestant people' and 'What we have we hold' sufficed for political philosophy (Quinn, 1993: 61). Not everyone agrees that unionism was devoid of dynamism during that era. Evidence has been supplied of a continually evolving unionism, in which there was considerable friction between the Orange leadership and the Protestant working-class, whatever the veneer of Unionist unity (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 1996).

4.3 Devolution and unionism

53

What is not disputed is that internal debates within unionism increased after the loss of Stormont and imposition of direct rule from Westminster in 1972. Following the loss of their own parliament, Unionists were obliged to rethink the optimum means of governing Northern Ireland. Debates within unionism have increased in volume since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, with a clear division evident between Unionist supporters and opposers. Until 1998, a key debate within unionism was between those who wanted full integration into the United Kingdom and those who wished for devolved government to be returned to Northern Ireland. Some Unionists believed that full integration was the most appropriate method of guaranteeing the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. The integrationist wing is still alive within the Ulster Unionist Party, with nearly half its ruling council supporting the idea, despite the wider restructuring of the United Kingdom. Integration might end continuing uncertainty over the future of Northern Ireland by allowing it to be treated like any other part of the United Kingdom. Integrationists have been sub-divided, between electoral and administrative integrationists. Electoral integrationists wish to see the Conservative and Labour parties contest elections in Northern Ireland. Forty per cent of the Ulster Unionist Council support this idea. Supporters of electoral integration believe that it will be beneficial for two main reasons. Firstly, allowing mainland parties to stand will enfranchise the people of Northern Ireland who are at present debarred from voting for the party which forms the British government. Secondly, permitting non-sectarian parties to stand will lessen the polarisation of politics. Both the Conservative and Labour parties have been reluctant to organise in Northern Ireland. Local Conservatives have contested elections since 1989, but have not attracted large support. Neither party sees much gain through involvement, which would represent a further drain upon resources. Until the 1980s, the Conservative Party was formally attached to the Ulster Unionist Party, whilst the Labour Party is linked to the Social Democratic and Labour Party. The latter link has been criticised by some Unionists within the Labour Party who denounce the SDLP as the 'ugly sister'. Devolutionists achieved their goal with the creation of devolved assembly under the Good Friday Agreement. British government policy since direct rule aimed to return some powers to local politicians in Northern Ireland through a devolved, power-sharing adminstration. Devolutionists believe that many of the internal affairs of Northern Ireland will be dealt with more effectively this way, whilst the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom will not be weakened. Autonomy is limited, as major issues of foreign, defence and economic policies, plus security issues, continue to be determined by the Westminster parliament as reserved powers. Unionists have long rejected any Nationalist fears that a devolved assembly could return to the discriminatory pre-1972 Stormont regime. Most, although not all, Unionists accept the concept of enforced power-sharing with Nationalists. Unionists have differed over the best method of protecting the rights of the Nationalist minority. Some devolutionists have argued for a bill of rights as the appropriate mechanism. Those less keen on enforced power-sharing

54

Unionist and Loyalist politics

believe that proportionality throughout government will suffice through the responsible exercise of power. 4.4 Forms of unionism Porter (1996) has argued the existence of three types of unionism — cultural, liberal and civic - each with its own distinctive characteristics. The Good Friday Agreement is designed to move unionism towards a civic form, embracing Nationalists and nationalism to an unprecedented extent. Cultural Unionism offers an exaggerated sense of Protestant Britishness. According to Steve Bruce, unionism and Protestantism are inextricably linked. This is because 'beyond evangelical Protestantism, no secure identity is available' (Bruce, 1986: 258). This argument suggests that Protestants in Northern Ireland form a distinctive ethnic group, whereas Catholics are an integral part of the Irish nation. For Unionists such as Ian Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party, this association of religion and politics is indeed acknowledged and desired. It is the duty of Unionists to oppose a united Ireland. This opposition 'takes on a political character because of the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in the Republic of Ireland and the attempts to reunify the North with the South' (Maclver, 1987: 361). Others argue that unionism is not reducible to a core Protestantism. Severance of unionism from its connections with Protestant sectarianism would allow unionism to develop as a political creed centred upon the principles of liberty and justice. Liberal unionism argues a rational, contractarian case for the Union, condemnatory of the sectarian excesses of previous generations. The rational case for the Union is based upon the principle of majority consent for the status quo in Northern Ireland, but also suggests that the United Kingdom offers an appropriately liberal and enlightened environment for all the citizens of Northern Ireland. Unionism offers progressive values, freedom and equality. Critics of such arguments question the assumed superiority of the British state and citizenship. These assumptions may remain even though the Irish Republic has moved from a Catholic theocracy to a liberal, secular democracy. Civic unionism is the most ambitious Unionist project, attempting to reconcile a stout defence of the Union with an acknowledgement, even embrace, of the rival claims of nationalism. Civic unionism endorses a plurality of identities and political ambitions in Northern Ireland. It accepts the Irishness of the majority and the need for political recognition of this through the Irish dimension of limited cross-border institutions. The consent principle keeps Northern Ireland within the Union, but the pursuit of a (peaceful) Nationalist political project should not be a bar to a stake in Northern Ireland's political institutions. 4.5 Unionist parties 4.5.1 The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) Sometimes known as the Official Unionist Party, the U U P is the largest political organisation in Northern Ireland. It holds more seats than its rivals at

4.5 Table 4.2

55

Unionist parties

Election results in Northern Ireland 1982-2001

Election

1982 Assembly 1983 General 1984 European 1985 Local 1987 General 1989 Local 1992 General 1993 Local 1994 European 1996 Forum 1997 General 1997 Local 1998 Assembly 1999 European 2001 General 2001 Local

Percentages UUP

DUP

SDLP

SF

Other

29.7 34.0 21.5 29.5 37.9 30.4 34.5 29.4 23.8 24.2 32.7 27.8 21.3 17.7 26.8 23.0

23.0 20.0 33.6 24.3 11.7 18.7 13.1 17.3 29.2 18.8 13.1 15.6 18.1 28.5 22.5 21.5

18.8 17.9 22.1 21.1 21.1 21.0 23.5 22.0 28.9 21.4 24.1 20.7 22.0 28.2 21.0 19.4

10.1 13.4 13.3 11.4 11.4 11.2 10.0 12.4 9.0 15.5 16.1 16.9 17.6 17.4 21.7 20.7

18.4 14.7 9.5 13.7 17.9 18.7 19.9 18.9 19.1 20.1 14.0 19.0 21.0 8.2 8.0 15.4

Sources: adapted from Connolly (1990); Aughey and Morrow (1996); Arthur and Jeffery (1996); Irish News, 24 May 1997; Belfast Telegraph, 13 May 2001.

Westminster and Stormont. Table 4.2 confirms how the UUP regularly attracts the most votes in elections, exceptions being European contests and the 1998 Assembly election. The dominance of the UUP, until 2001 at least, was most apparent at Westminster elections, when the first-past-the-post system is used. The use of STV for other contests encourages smaller parties to contest local elections and has perhaps accelerated the fragmentation of unionism. Until the late 1960s, the leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party contained wealthy patricians, although it was supported by Protestants across different social classes. The UUP's attachment to the Conservative Party was such that it enjoyed full voting rights at Conservative Party conferences (Flackes, 1983). This relationship declined sharply following the introduction of direct rule in 1972, as Ulster Unionists opposed many of the political initiatives introduced by the Westminster government. Subsequent relationships between the U U P and the parties at Westminster have varied in cordiality. These variations have been ascribed to the fickleness of British political parties in their attitudes to Northern Ireland (Dixon, 1994). In 1973, the Ulster Unionists rejected the Sunningdale Agreement on power-sharing with a Council of Ireland, leading to the resignation of the party leader, Brian Faulkner. During the mid-1970s, the UUP formed part of the United Ulster Unionist Coalition. This again opposed power-sharing with Nationalists in the 1975 Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention.

56

Unionist and Loyalist politics

In 1982, the party did participate in the Northern Ireland Assembly, but only on the basis that it enhanced scrutiny of aspects of direct rule. The U U P strongly opposed the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which gave the Republic a definite but limited say on certain political matters in Northern Ireland. The 1995 Framework Documents also provoked a hostile reaction from the UUP, for similar reasons, but, by 1998, the limited cross-border and intergovernmental arrangements of the Good Friday Agreement were deemed acceptable by a majority within the party. Elected party leader in 1995, David Trimble wished to reappraise relations with the Dublin government. He met the Irish Taoiseach for talks shortly after becoming leader, the first such meeting for 30 years. This event was designed to emphasise the view of the U U P that friendly relations with the South were possible. In return, the party states that 'these relationships must preserve the political independence and territorial integrity of states which are fundamental principles of international law' (Ulster Unionist Information Institute, 1995). The UUP's mid-1990s policy document, The Democratic Imperative, tacitly accepted that an entirely internal settlement in Northern Ireland would be impractical. Nonetheless, the role of the Irish government would be highly circumscribed (Ulster Unionist Party, 1996). The U U P made clear its wish to place any settlement with an Irish dimension within a confederal context. The establishment of a Council of the British Isles, comprising elected representatives and designed to examine matters of common interest between Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, became an important plank of the UUP's demands in the negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement. Although traditionally more integrationist than its main rival, the Democratic Unionist Party, the UUP broadly welcomed the return of devolved government to Northern Ireland in 1999. The UUP's integrationist phase occurred under the leadership of James Molyneaux from 1979 to 1995, although, even during this period, some devolution of political authority to Northern Ireland was supported. The UUP was less keen than Nationalist parties on government through a Northern Ireland Executive, knowing that Sinn Fein would form part of that body. The UUP was, however, obliged to shift ground from its belief that governance should take place through a committee system, based upon the electoral strengths of parties and reflecting existing departments of government in Northern Ireland. Structurally, the most striking feature of the UUP is its decentralisation. It is, in effect, 18 constituency parties within a party. There is a central executive and a party standing committee, but they exert little authority over these local parties, which guard their autonomy. The lack of central writ has been exacerbated by the divisions within the ruling 858-member Ulster Unionist Council over whether to support the Good Friday Agreement. The Council contains a wide range of representatives, although three-quarters come from constituency parties. The Protestant Orange Order has 122 representatives on the U U C which determined the new party leader and 18 representatives on the party's standing committee of 300. A further 12 members of the Council are from the Association of Loyal Orange Women. Orange delegates must also be

57

4.5 Unionist parties Table 4.3

Voting in the Ulster Unionist Party leadership contest 2000 by the Ulster

Unionist Council members, according to Orange Order membership (°/o)

Trimble voters Smyth voters

Orange Order members

Non-Orange Order members

48.7 67.9

51.3 32.1

N = 295 Chi square = 11.02, ldf, p < .001. Source,

author's survey, 2000. See Tonge and Evans (2001a).

individual members of the U U P . Over half (51 per cent) of the members of the U U C are members of the Orange Order; fewer than 1 per cent are Roman Catholics. Eighty-six per cent of U U C members claim to be practising members of their religion. The party Council elects the executive of the party. The annual party conference debates policy. The 'broad church' that makes up the U U P , united by defence of the Union rather than bound by rigid structures or ideas, has led to the labelling of the organisation as more of a movement than a party (Hume, 1996). Initially, David Trimble was seen as a hardline U U P leader. He courted the Orange vote, being proactive in supporting the right of the Orange Order to march unfettered at Drumcree in 1995. He was the founder of the Ulster Society, to which 500 Orange lodges are affiliated. Subsequently, however, Trimble spoke of the need to redefine the UUP's link with the Orange Order, aimed at reducing its influence. The link was already in decline, although all leaders of the U U P have been members of the Order. Some members of the party have questioned whether the U U P should be closely linked with an exclusively Protestant organisation (McDowell, 1995). The U U C is divided almost equally over whether to end the link, with Orange Order membership a significant attitudinal variable (Tonge and Evans, 2001a). Trimble's attempt to move unionism from its ethnic to a civic form has structural and political problems. The decentralised basis of his party means that it difficult to act against sources of dissent. In playing out its divisions, the Ulster Unionist Council met on a large number of occasions after the Good Friday Agreement in an attempt to tie the party to a tougher stance on IRA decommissioning. In 2000, Trimble was challenged for the party leadership by the Rev. Martin Smyth. The leader resisted the challenge by the uncomfortably narrow majority of 57 per cent to 43 per cent. As a former Grand Master, Smyth picked up many Orange votes among the U U C , but many fewer from outside the Order {see Table 4.3). Trimble's modernisation project is also confronted by the difficulty that his support base is found among older members of the U U C . Younger members of the Council are much more inclined towards 'No' unionism, apparent from a breakdown by age of U U C voting in the Good Friday Agreement referendum {see Table 4.4).

58

Unionist and Loyalist politics

Table 4.4

Voting in the Good Friday Agreement referendum by the Ulster Unionist

Council, according to age

Age

15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+

Vote Yes

No

0.0 45.5 66.7 68.7 79.3 76.1 81.6

100.0 54.5 33.3 31.3 20.7 23.9 18.4

N = 293 Chi square = 35.01, 6df, p < .001. Source:

author's survey, 2000. See Tonge and Evans (2001a).

The difficulty for Trimble lies, according to one assessment, in resisting 'stupid unionism, locked in the mental world of the 1950s' (Bew, 1998). From the (limited) evidence of U U C voting, it appears, however, that older Unionists are readier to embrace change than their younger counterparts. Trimble's insistence, in September 1998, that the Northern Ireland Assembly would be a 'pluralist parliament for a pluralist people' was a direct repudiation of unionism's past conduct of a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people. Apparently the confirmation of Northern Ireland's place in the United Kingdom, the return of devolved government, the sight of former militant Republicans at Stormont and unparalleled economic prosperity are insufficient to convince sceptics within the U U C . Only 27 per cent believed that the U U P had achieved most of its objectives in the Good Friday Agreement. Nearly 70 per cent voted 'yes' in the Good Friday Agreement referendum, but, within two years, only 44 per cent were prepared to say that they would do likewise. Aside from preservation of the Union and rejection of joint British-Irish sovereignty, the U U C is divided on what constitutes the best solution for Northern Ireland, as Table 4.5 indicates. The modernisation of the U U P is a long-term project dependent upon substantial internal reform and a consolidation of devolved government. Part of the uncertainty derives from short-term issues such as decommissioning and policing, but there remains considerable debate over the most appropriate form of devolved power-sharing. 4.5.2 The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Founded in 1971, the D U P attracted many initial recruits from the Protestant Unionist Party which existed for a brief period during 1969-71. Sharing the core beliefs of the UUP, the D U P is regarded as the advocate of a more

4.5 Unionist parties Table 4.5

Ulster Unionist Council solutions for Northern Ireland

Solution

Power-sharing W I T H cross-border bodies Power-sharing W I T H O U T cross-border bodies Full integration into the U K Direct British rule Joint sovereignty United Ireland Source:

59

Agree/Strongly agree

Disagree/Strongly disagree

Neither agree nor disagree

35.7

60.7

3.6

44.2 55.6 18.3 3.1 3.7

42.4 29.9 66.1 95.5 95.5

13.4 14.5 15.6 1.4 0.8

author's survey, 2000. See Tonge and Evans (2001a).

hardline unionism. This includes persistent demands for vigorous security policies and a refusal to deal with Sinn Fein, except where unavoidable, within local councils and in the Assembly. At its formation, the D U P claimed that it would be right-wing on constitutional issues but left-wing on social policies, an appeal designed especially for working-class Loyalists. Opposed to power-sharing in the Sunningdale Agreement and the Constitutional Convention of the mid-1970s, the party benefited from the proposal of its rival for working-class votes, the Vanguard Party, to form a temporary partnership with the Nationalist-oriented Social Democratic and Labour Party. This idea led to the destruction of the Vanguard Party and the consolidation of the D U P as the UUP's main rival. After participating in the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1982, the D U P strongly opposed the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. It has been a persistent critic of the peace process, arguing that it was a flawed attempt to pacify insatiable Republican demands. As such, the party took no part in the negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, even though it is desirous of devolved government for Northern Ireland. The party highlighted political and moral objections to the Agreement, with concerns over prisoner releases, policing changes and the presence of Sinn Fein in government all prominent. The party rotated its ministers within the Northern Ireland Executive, adding to the sense of impermanence sometimes associated with the new political institutions. Having outlined its objections from the outset, the D U P believed it could capitalise on increasing Unionist disillusionment with the Good Friday Agreement and reassert its role as the stoutest defender of the interests of the Unionist bloc. The D U P is insistent upon the need for the British government to end ambiguity over the future of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. It is also vocal in its denunciation of the Irish Republic's involvement in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, the party treats Anglo-Irish political manoeuvres with suspicion. According to the DUP, the internal political workings of Northern Ireland need to be routinised before even limited co-operation with

60

Unionist and Loyalist politics

the Republic can be developed. The D U P has moved away from its old belief in a system of majoritarianism (majority rule) within devolved government, in favour of power-sharing and participation for the Nationalist minority (but not Sinn Fein). This would be achieved through a guaranteed role for constitutional Nationalists on legislative committees proportionate to their electoral strength. There was a certain irony in the absence of the D U P from the negotiations leading to devolved government for Northern Ireland, as no party is more desirous of a strong Assembly with a full range of functions (Hazleton, 2001). Led by the Rev. Ian Paisley from the outset, the D U P has relied heavily upon his enduring appeal. Regarded as a demagogue by detractors, Paisley emerges as the most popular political figure in European elections where Northern Ireland is treated a single constituency. Paisley's mix of politics and fundamental religion provides a populist agenda. He is seen as the most fervent defender of his people from the spectre of a united, Catholic Ireland. Paisley tends to combine matters political and spiritual for the benefit of domestic audiences. For example, although he opposes the alleged threat of a European Catholic super-state, he rarely mentions God or religion in the European Parliament (Moloney and Pollok, 1986). Paisley's hold over the D U P is unchallenged. Indeed, in the early days of the DUP, it was admitted even by Paisley's colleagues that the D U P was 'Paisley's fan club . . . there was no Party' (Bruce, 1986: 107). Paisley was viewed by some supporters as a leader 'chosen by God to protect Ulster' (Connolly, 1990: 104). The leader insists that his politics stem from his religion. He argues that the law should be obeyed unless it contravenes the laws of the gospel. Thus, although Paisley is a constitutional politician who condemns the actions of Loyalist paramilitaries, he has occasionally been prepared to defy the British government should it attempt to deliver Ulster's Protestants into a united Ireland. In 1981, 500 of Paisley's supporters gathered on a hillside in Antrim to wave firearms certificates. This form of activity was labelled the Carson Trail, in which normal respecters of the law indicate their willingness to defend Ulster by various means, in the manner that Edward Carson threatened to oppose Home Rule earlier this century. Many within the D U P also fuse politics and religion. The party comprises a disproportionately high number of Free Presbyterians amongst its activists. In the 1970s and 1980s, 64 per cent of party activists were members of the Free Presbyterian Church (Bruce, 1987: 644). Less than 1 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland are members of the Free Presbyterian Church, founded by Paisley in 1951. For some Free Presbyterian members of the DUP, the problems of Northern Ireland can be attributed to the expansionism of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite the informal links between Church and party, support for the D U P is much more broadly based. Non-religious loyalists lend the party considerable electoral support. In East Belfast, for example, Peter Robinson is regularly returned as a D U P M P , although the area contains a relatively high number of citizens who are, at most, only nominally Protestant. The D U P is successful

4.6

'New Loyalist' parties

61

in eliciting support from a combination of rural, often fundamentalist, Protestants and much less religiously committed working-class Loyalists, impressed by the stout defence of Ulster offered by the party. 4.5.3

Other Unionist parties

Whilst the UUP and DUP capture the vast majority of Unionist votes, other Unionist parties attract limited support. The U K Unionist Party (UKUP), led by Robert McCartney, adopts the most integrationist stance of all Unionist parties. Its primary aspiration is for Northern Ireland to be treated in the same manner as any other part of the United Kingdom. The party wishes unionism to shed its association with religious sectarianism. The U K U P was highly critical of the Good Friday Agreement, arguing that it weakened Northern Ireland's place in the United Kingdom. Having achieved a respectable five seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly, on a 4.5 per cent vote share, the party promptly split, with the majority of its Assembly members forming the Northern Ireland Unionist Party, led by Cedric Wilson. The split appeared to owe more to personality than politics, which remained rigidly anti-Agreement. Also found among the anti-Agreement forces are the three elected members of the United Unionist Assembly Party, which polled a combined 23,000 votes (2.9 per cent) in the 1998 Assembly elections. 4.6

'New Loyalist' parties

Two parties linked to Loyalist paramilitaries have gained a small amount of electoral support. Both parties were instrumental in establishing a Loyalist ceasefire in 1994 and in delivering the support of a section of the Loyalist working-class (especially in Belfast) for the Good Friday Agreement in the 1998 referendum. The willingness of these parties to break with the old 'no surrender' shibboleths of unionism and the propensity of either to criticise established Unionist political forces, in particular the DUP, has led to their labelling as 'new Loyalist' parties. Close to the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) is the more electorally significant of the two Loyalist parties. It possesses a radical socialist agenda, whilst supporting the constitutional status quo. Critical of the previous treatment of Catholics by Unionist regimes, the PUP rejects the notion of a Protestant ascendancy, arguing that the working-class of both communities was mistreated by the Unionist leadership (McAuley, 1997). One of the PUP's leaders, David Ervine, declared that the 'ruling elite of Unionism practised discrimination and we stood by and let it happen. We didn't treat our minority properly and were comfortable to receive a few crumbs from the table' (Irish World, 5 April 1996). Aside from a belief in community-based socialism, the PUP is radical in three other respects. Firstly, it endorses dialogue with Republicans inside and outside the Northern Ireland Assembly. The party argues for a new realism, recognising the need for an accommodation with nationalism (Moore and

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Patterson, 1995). Change can only occur, however, with the consent of Unionists. Secondly, the party accepts an Irish dimension to the identity of Unionists, using the expression 'Irish but peculiarly British' (Price, 1995: 67). Thirdly, the PUP is critical of the sectarian connotations of unionism. It prefers a secular approach. The party even campaigns on issues not normally associated with Northern Ireland's politics, such as abortion and gay rights (McAuley, 2001). Linked to the paramilitary Ulster Defence Association, an organisation outlawed in 1991, the Ulster Democratic Party combines a progressive social agenda with the promotion of the idea of an Ulster identity. The idea of an independent Northern Ireland once formed part of U D A thinking, articulated in the policy document, Beyond the Religious Divide (New Ulster Political Research Group, 1979). By the 1980s, the idea of independence had been abandoned. The political representatives of the U D A now advocated that Northern Ireland should remain British. The policy document Common Sense provided a weaker variant of the idea of a common Ulster nationality (Ulster Defence Association, 1987). Politically, it suggested this could be fostered by proportionality in government. Unionists and Nationalists would fill positions in government according to their level of electoral support. Mainstream unionists are hostile to fringe Loyalists. This is especially true of the D U P whose urban electoral base the PUP and U D P have attempted to erode. This antipathy is reciprocated. Fringe Loyalists regard Paisleyism as tribalism, with Paisley the 'Grand Old Duke of York' marching Loyalists up the hill only to retreat again (Bruce, 1994: 34). Scepticism over whether the concept of new loyalism really existed increased in 2000 when a Loyalist feud led to seven deaths. The dispute between the U D A and U V F highlighted longstanding tensions over territory and activity. The failure of the U D P to win seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly diminished the enthusiasm of that wing of 'new loyalism' for the Good Friday Agreement, to the point where by summer 2001 the U D A was no longer supportive. 4.7 The political centre The political centre in Northern Ireland is included in the chapter on unionism as its main electoral representative, the Alliance Party (APNI), is latently Unionist, in that it supports the constitutional status quo of Northern Ireland remaining in the United Kingdom, based upon majority consent. The political centre in Northern Ireland occupies narrow, diminishing ground. Although it may create a new cross-community centre forged from several moderate parties, the Good Friday Agreement has not helped the existing centre party, by reducing it to the label of 'other' party within a Unionist-Nationalist political framework. Formed in 1970, the Alliance Party's electoral support has ebbed gently from its high-water mark of 14.4 per cent in 1977. The party has a tendency to perform better in opinion polls than in elections (Whyte, 1991). Nowadays,

4.8 Conclusion

63

the party averages around 7 per cent of the vote and its support is mainly confined to the East of Northern Ireland. Led by Sean Neeson, Alliance holds six seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly, but does not hold a seat within the Executive. It has operated as a bi-confessional party amid a confessional party system (McAllister and Wilson, 1978; Leonard, 1999). Alliance attracts support among Protestants and Catholics, although Protestant support tends to be higher. Approximately 10-12 per cent of Protestants voted Alliance in the mid-1990s (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995: 200). However, this figure has fallen slightly. O f the party's 1,000 members, 66 per cent are Protestants, 18 per cent Catholics and 13 per cent do not claim any religion (Tonge and Evans, 2000b). Alliance's aim is to create a distinctive third tradition, designed to overcome the Unionist versus Nationalist zero-sum politics which it believes infests Northern Ireland. Having long argued for devolved power-sharing government, the party strongly supports the Good Friday Agreement, even though it has reservations about some aspects which legitimise competitive politics between Unionists and Nationalists. In the words of one senior party figure, 'compromise is an honourable necessity' (Ford, 1996). In addition to support for power-sharing, the central themes of the party are participation, accountability and transparency (Alliance Party, 1995). Although Alliance's innate unionism has deterred some Catholic support, the party believes that the variety of identities in Northern Ireland need not be a barrier to the overcoming of crude Unionist and Nationalist politics. Indeed, Alliance members possess a variety of primary identities. Thirty-one per cent see themselves as British, 29 per cent as British-Irish, 19 per cent as Northern Irish and 17 per cent as Irish. Although Alliance is a non-sectarian party, there are differences according to religion in respect of lower preference vote transfers among members. Protestants are less likely to vote transfer to Nationalist parties. The other centre party represented in the Assembly has a shorter history. Founded in 1996, the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC) won two Assembly seats in 1998, on a 1.6 per cent vote share. The N I W C was formed to 'highlight the dearth of women in politics and, specifically, around the negotiating table' (Fearon, 2000: 155). The party has attempted to raise the profile of women in a polity in which gender issues have often appeared subordinate to constitutional questions (Ward, 1997). Fully supportive of the Good Friday Agreement, the NIWC's key negotiating roles were to consolidate women's rights and to draft review procedures for the Agreement. The N I W C also added to the inclusiveness of the Agreement dealing with reconciliation and victims of violence. 4.8 Conclusion Politics in Northern Ireland remain polarised between Unionists and Nationalists, although the internal divisions between pro- and anti-Good Friday Agreement Unionists are arguably of equal importance. The Good Friday Agreement recognises and legitimises the stark Unionist—Nationalist divide. Its

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initial concern is to ensure that neither bloc has the upper hand. The withering of blocs through cross-community voting may eventually happen, but only in the long term. Whilst there are instances of Protestants voting for Nationalist parties and Catholics voting for Unionist parties, they are exceptional, not prolonged. Class and issue politics are still downplayed in favour of traditional ethnic bloc politics of the constitution, despite the insistence of the British government that the status of Northern Ireland cannot change without the consent of the majority. Class politics are evident and deserve greater consideration (Coulter, 1999). However, this type of politics tends to develop separately within Loyalist and Republican communities with little connection. Much of the dynamic of politics arises from the ongoing debates within Unionist parties rather than between the political groups. Meanwhile, the non-sectarian centre ploughs infertile ground. It is difficult to dissent strongly from the assertion that in Northern Ireland, the middle ground 'has continued to remain mythicar (Arthur and Jeffery, 1996: 51). It remains questionable whether a new, cross-community, centrist bloc of pro-Good Friday Agreement forces, probably comprising moderate U U P and SDLP elements, can ever be forged.

Chapter 5

Nationalist and Republican politics

5.1 Nationalist themes Nationalist interpretations of Northern Ireland have many nuances. Nonetheless, four core themes can be identified. These are: 1. the partition of Ireland was unjust; 2. politics in Ireland should, therefore, concentrate upon the rectification of this injustice; 3. a purely internal settlement is impossible in Northern Ireland; 4. self-determination for the Irish people is necessary. Nationalists believe that the settlement produced by the Government of Ireland Act 1920 was illogical, impractical and unfair. They also note that partition was designed as a temporary measure. The state of Northern Ireland had minimal historical rationale and was scarcely viable as an economic entity. Built upon Protestant triumphalism, its most enduring feature was religious sectarianism, with discrimination against Catholics endemic. This sectarianism was inevitable in a state founded upon a contrived Protestant, pro-British majority. In response, Irish nationalism attempts a political, moral and practical agenda. Attempting to redress a perceived wrong, nationalism rejected the partition of Ireland as divisive and unnecessary. Politics in the Irish Republic were characterised by anti-partitionist rhetoric from the outset. In the 1980s, Charles Haughey, the leader of Fianna Fail, the main Republican party in the South, described Northern Ireland as a Tailed political entity'. Nationalist parties in the North have periodically been less interested in making Northern Ireland work than with boycotting the state or seeking its dismantling. Nationalists advocate the ultimate creation of a unitary Irish state. In the interim measure, they insist that attempts at purely internal solutions are futile. Instead, there must be guarantees that the Irishness of nationalists in Northern Ireland must be recognised using the Irish Republic as a guarantor. Nationalism rejects the idea that a conversion to Britishness is attainable amongst the minority Northern population. Whilst full unity remains the optimum Nationalist solution, a Nationalist compromise was evident in the overwhelming support given by that community to the Good Friday Agreement, which gave an Irish dimension to political arrangements in Northern Ireland, but fell short of joint authority or Irish unity. 65

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Nationalist and Republican politics

Linked to the rejection of a settlement confined to Northern Ireland is the insistence of Nationalists upon self-determination for the Irish people. This means that all people within the island of Ireland need to resolve the Irish question without outside interference. In the New Ireland Forum 1984, Nationalist parties on both sides of the border agreed that a solution had to be 'freely agreed to by the people of the north and by the people of the south' (New Ireland Forum Report, 1984: 27, para 5.2(3)). The Good Friday Agreement was a partial move towards self-determination, being ratified by the populations in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. 5.2 Republicanism's core ideas The core aim of Irish republicanism has remained unchanged throughout the existence of the organisation. The establishment of a thirty-two-county, united, democratic, socialist Irish republic has been a permanent goal. Drawing upon the ideas of the French Revolution of liberty, equality and fraternity, Republicans wish to establish a united Ireland of equal treatment for Catholic, Protestant and dissenter. Such an aspiration involves the eventual withdrawal of Britain from Northern Ireland and an end to partition. During most periods, these aims were to be achieved by force if necessary. During the Troubles, the use of force was designed to render Northern Ireland ungovernable, sapping the British will to remain. Recruits to the IRA were given the Green Book which declared that 'war is morally justified and that the Army is the direct representative of the 1918 Dail Eireann parliament, and that as such they are the legal and lawful government of the Irish Republic' {see Coogan, 1987). Most modern Republicans have abandoned the idea of the IRA representing a government-in-waiting as entirely outdated and irrelevant to the vast majority of Irish citizens, although a few 'purists' within Republican Sinn Fein still cling to this view. Seven core ideological undercurrents underpinned the political and military thinking of the IRA (Coogan, 1987): republicanism, nationalism, militarism, romanticism, socialism, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. 5.2.1 Republicanism The British presence in Northern Ireland prevents the development of a true Irish Republic. Such a state, embracing all Irish people, can only develop after the end of partition. Traditionally, the role of the Southern authorities and constitutional Nationalists in Northern Ireland in 'collaborating' with British rule was seen as 'treasonable'. 5.2.2 Nationalism According to the Green Book given to IRA volunteers, the nationhood of all Ireland has been a recognised fact for more than 1,500 years. There is a belief in a distinctive Irish nation state.

5.3 Nationalism and republicanism compared

67

5.2.3 Militarism The right to engage in 'armed struggle' to overthrow British rule in Ireland has been central to the IRA's approach. It is justified on an historical basis. The organisation claims that this war has evolved over 800 years and thus has strong justifying antecedents. 5.2.4

Romanticism

In addition to the belief in an identifiable and definable Irish nation state, the Republican movement has emphasised the need for the cultural assertion of Irishness. The promotion of Gaelic culture has been stressed as a means of overcoming 'West Britishness'. Furthermore, the IRA has also fostered the notion of the necessity of 'blood sacrifice' to achieve its goals. Martyrdom and commemoration of the dead are recurring themes. 5.2.5 Socialism Although it has fluctuated between differing strands of the ideology, the IRA has always claimed to be a socialist organisation, arguing for common ownership and equality within a united Ireland. 5.2.6 Anti-imperialism Opposition to the perceived economic exploitation of a colonial, imperialist aggressor has been an important dimension of the attitudes of the IRA. The economic value of Northern Ireland was seen as a contributory factor in the division of the island. 5.2.7

Anti-colonialism

The IRA's Green Book described the six counties of Northern Ireland as a 'directly-controlled old-style colony'. It was seen as a remnant of Britain's colonial Empire. The Southern state was seen as subject to the continuing social, economic and cultural domination of London, according to the Green Book. As such, it was viewed as a neo-colonial state. Tactically, these ideological undercurrents were translated during the Troubles into a belief in the necessity of a 'long war', the fusion of economic and military campaigns, propaganda offensives and the exercise of 'discipline' upon the Nationalist community. 5.3 Nationalism and republicanism compared There are different strains of nationalism. Many Nationalists see themselves as Republicans and vice versa. Generally, Republicans are more critical of the British role in Ireland and their variety of Nationalist politics reflects this critique. The main differences of emphasis amongst Nationalists rest upon the following issues.

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5.3.1 The extent to which the Irish people are a single nation Traditionally, Irish Nationalists and Republicans saw Ireland as a single geographical and political unit, populated by one identity. As Quinn (1993: 65-6) puts it: 'anti-partitionists relied on simple ethno-geographical determinism: the people of Ireland were one, the island of Ireland was one, therefore the governance of Ireland should be one'. Influenced by revisionist historians, some Nationalists began to question this assumption. Modern Nationalist dialogue speaks of the need to reconcile the two traditions in Ireland. There was a need to recognise the British identity of Protestants in the North of Ireland. Nationalism needed to switch focus from a territorial claim towards a rethinking of Irish identity. This had to be 'pluralist and inclusive' in order to embrace Northern Unionists (Fitzgerald, 1996: 6). The Irish Republican tradition within nationalism has a somewhat different approach. Republicans believe that all the peoples within the island are essentially Irish, whilst acknowledging differing cultural expressions of that Irishness. They argue that partition prevents the full development of Irish nationhood. 5.3.2 The degree to which the British government is responsible for the problem of Northern Ireland Nationalists blame the British government for the partition of Ireland. They point out that it was imposed against the wishes of the majority of the people of Ireland. Socialist Irish Republicans, in particular, stress the value of partition in protecting Britain's economic interests in the North-East of the island (Bambery, 1990). In gratitude for the maintenance of her colony, Britain then rewarded that section of the indigenous population that favoured her continued rule - the Northern Unionists - with a series of economic favours. Many Republicans continue to support this view of Britain as an imperial power. Constitutional Nationalists are less convinced. They suggest that Britain has become increasingly neutral on the future of the Union, a position acknowledged in recent political initiatives such as the 1993 Downing Street Declaration and the Good Friday Agreement. This neutrality was perhaps borne of the huge cost to the British government of its presence in Northern Ireland. An underlying theme of republicanism is that Britain will eventually withdraw. The belief in the inevitability of victory has sustained the 'armed struggle'. Thus, according to Smith (1995: 227), 'Republican ideology is teleological - it sees an end to history. Republicans see history as one of continued advance to a pre-destined goal'. 5.3.3 The necessity of Unionist consent for constitutional change At the heart of the problem of Northern Ireland lies the issue of whether the consent of Unionists should be a prerequisite for constitutional change. Should Unionists be obliged to accept a united Ireland against their will? Traditionally,

5.4 The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)

69

Irish Republicans believed that once realigned in a united Ireland, former Unionists would realise that their true interests lay in acceptance and cooperation. Protestants 'would need to have their understandable but misguided fears about civil and religious liberties answered' (Adams, 1985: 9). Present arrangements allow Unionists an undemocratic veto over progress, according to Republicans. Constitutional Nationalists believe that Unionists must be persuaded rather than coerced into a united Ireland. This has led to attempts to address the fears of Unionists, mainly through cultural, social and economic reforms in the Irish Republic. 5.3.4 The use of force to establish a united Ireland For much of the twentieth century, Nationalists opposed partition with vigorous rhetoric, but offered few practical ideas as to how it was to be ended (O'Halloran, 1987). During the final third of the century, the physical-force tradition of republicanism was used as a device alongside political strategies. Constitutional Nationalists always argued that the use of terrorism was morally wrong and tactically counter-productive. They argued that violence was a barrier to Irish unity as it further alienated Unionists. Militant Republicans argued that the use of violence, whilst incapable in isolation of achieving a united Ireland, maintained the issue on the political agenda. 5.4 The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Established in 1970 following the civil rights campaign, the SDLP was, until the 2001 elections, the largest Nationalist party in Northern Ireland. In 2001, it had three Westminster MPs and 24 MLAs. The party was founded in an attempt to bring a new dynamism to Nationalist politics, which had frequently been stagnant under the abstentionism of the old Nationalist Party. From the outset, the SDLP has favoured a united Ireland, to be achieved through peaceful means. Its 1972 policy document, Towards a New Ireland, desired a declaration of British withdrawal, preceded by the establishment of joint British-Irish sovereignty over Northern Ireland as an interim measure (Social Democratic and Labour Party, 1972). In its early years, the party fused nationalism with left-of-centre politics. It had aspirations for cross-class unity and readily countenanced power-sharing within Northern Ireland, provided that this was accompanied by a significant all-Ireland dimension. The presence of a Council of Ireland encouraged the SDLP to participate in the power-sharing executive in 1974, which lasted a mere five months following the Sunningdale Agreement. By the 1980s, the SDLP favoured joint Anglo-Irish government initiatives as a means of advancing constitutional change in Northern Ireland. Under electoral pressure from Sinn Fein, the party was an architect of the New Ireland Forum in 1983-4. Constitutional Nationalist parties throughout Ireland combined to propose solutions to the problem of Northern Ireland. Although

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each was rejected, the role given to the Irish government in Northern Ireland through the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 bolstered the fortunes of the SDLP. Emphasising the need for an agreed Ireland, the SDLP accepts that Unionists cannot be coerced into a united Ireland. Instead, a new Ireland needs to be forged on the basis of a consensus between North and South. The party recognises that all responsibility for the Irish problem cannot be placed upon the British government. As the party leader argued, 'it was the people who were divided, not the territoly (quoted in Irish Times, 6 November 1998). Rather than self-determination, what is required is co-determination (Farren, 1996). The people of Ireland, North and South, would together determine the future of Ireland. Neither the population of the North, nor that in the South, would be able to impose its will alone. In establishing co-determination as the basis for future settlements, the SDLP attempts to set up institutional arrangements which straddle the border. North-South co-operative bodies are seen as one mechanism to do this. These organisations would exist in economic, political and cultural arenas. The party insists that these bodies would not be a 'trojan horse' for a united Ireland (Farren, 1996: 45). The other co-operative mechanism is a formal East-West relationship between the London and Dublin governments. Virtually all of this thinking was evident in the Good Friday Agreement. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to claim that the Agreement is an SDLP document (Murray, 1998). Unsurprisingly, therefore, a substantial majority (82 per cent) of the SDLP's claimed 3,000 members believed that the party obtained most of its objectives in the Good Friday Agreement. Seventy per cent believed that the Good Friday Agreement made a united Ireland more likely, but, irrespective of the ultimate direction of the Agreement, two-thirds of members accepted the proposition that power-sharing was more important to the SDLP than Irish unity (author's survey, 2000). Critics have suggested that the SDLP has betrayed its original ambition of operating as a 'red' socialist party, in favour of the adoption of a 'green' Nationalist stance. Before accepting a place in the House of Lords, the party leader, Gerry Fitt, resigned in 1979 over this policy shift, as the party became less enamoured with the prospect of an internal settlement in Northern Ireland. The shift towards nationalism appeared to gather pace under the leadership of John Hume. A greening of the SDLP took place after the collapse of consociational, power-sharing arrangements in 1974. A new type of member, more Nationalist than hitherto, was attracted to the party. Indeed, there exists a 'Catholic' wing to the party disinterested in the party's original socialist leanings which is closer to the party mainstream than those members identifying themselves as socialist (Evans, Tonge and Murray, 2000). The SDLP membership strongly supported early paramilitary prisoner releases and radical policing changes, while strongly opposing Orange Order parades in Nationalist areas. Half of the party membership favours electoral pacts with Sinn Fein (Evans, Tonge and Murray, 2000). Two-thirds of SDLP vote transfers are to Sinn Fein (O'Kelly and Doyle, 2000). ,

5.5 Sinn Fein

71

Theoretically, determination of policy rests with the party conference, which also elects the senior leadership and executive. A majority of party members feel they have little influence within the party. Major party initiatives have often been launched by the party leader. Regarded as instrumental in the establishment of the peace process in the 1990s, John Hume began an intermittent dialogue with the leader of Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams, in 1988. In addition to promoting the need for an IRA ceasefire, the talks were designed to shift Sinn Fein's position towards acceptance of the need for Unionist consent if a united Ireland were to be created. The subsequent Downing Street Declaration, Framework Documents and Good Friday Agreement all bore the hallmarks of the SDLP's unity by consent approach. Despite the achievement of party objectives, the SDLP faces problems. As the percentage of Catholics in Northern Ireland's population has increased, the party's vote has held firm. Indeed, the party became the largest in terms of votes cast in the 1998 Assembly elections. Nonetheless, Sinn Fein overtook the SDLP in the 2001 Westminster and local elections and has occupied much of the SDLP's political ground. If Nationalist voters are impressed by 'green' ethnic bloc politics, the gap may increase. The average age of an SDLP member is 57. 5.5 Sinn Fein Once regarded as merely the political wing of the IRA, Sinn Fein has long emerged as a significant electoral and political force in its own right. It is the only significant all-Ireland party, holding 2,600 members in its 246 branches in the Irish Republic (Lyons, 1999). Sinn Fein now polls a majority of the Nationalist vote in Northern Ireland. Its electoral rise began after the Republican hunger strikes in the 1980s, when it developed as an organisation to provide a political outlet for the military campaign of the IRA. Sinn Fein's electoral support in Northern Ireland increased to record levels in the second half of the 1990s, allowing the party to capture four seats in the 2001 General Election. During the 1970s, Sinn Fein operated as little more than a welfare adjunct to the IRA's military campaign. The IRA believed it could force a British withdrawal through a military campaign. As Ryan (1994) demonstrates, this belief permeated the Republican movement and was relayed optimistically in propaganda. As the limitations of a military campaign became apparent, more astute Republicans sought complementary strategies. Sinn Fein moved leftwards in the late 1970s, attempting to fuse republicanism and socialism (Patterson, 1997). Its leaders were dismissive of Loyalists who claimed to be arguing for socialism within the unit of Northern Ireland. According to Adams, such 'socialists' were guilty of 'parochialism of the municipal gasworks and waterworks' variety (Adams, 1995: 128). The struggles for national independence and socialism were seen as interdependent. The link between the paramilitary role of the IRA and the political campaigns of Sinn Fein was amplified by the latter's director of publicity, Danny Morrison. Speaking at the party's ardfheis (annual conference) in 1981, Morrison outlined

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the dual strategy, asking ardfheis: will anyone here object if with a ballot paper in this hand and an armalite in this hand we take power in Ireland?'. Sinn Fein supported 'armed struggle' to remove the British presence from Ireland. Assisted by a considerable residue of sympathy arising from the deaths of ten Republican hunger strikers during the same year, the new electoral approach made inroads into the Nationalist vote held by the SDLP. In the 1983 General Election, the party captured the seat of West Belfast. The victor, Gerry Adams, became president of Sinn Fein later that year. Adams refused to take his seat in the Westminster parliament, continuing the tradition of abstentionism held by the party. Sinn Fein refused to participate in the Northern Ireland Assembly during 1982-6, arguing that it attempted to inspire an internal settlement in Northern Ireland and, therefore, legitimise partition. Until the mid-1980s, the principle of abstentionism was applied also to the Dail, the Dublin parliament. Sinn Fein believed the last 'true' Irish parliament was that established in 1919, following the all-Ireland elections of 1918 when the party won a majority of seats. The parliament created in the South after partition was derided by Sinn Fein: The only thing Irish about the Irish Parliament in Leinster House is its name - the Dail, otherwise it is a British parliamentary system handed down by ex-colonial rulers (Adams, 1985: 8).

The decision to end abstentionism was a symbolic shift of huge importance. The extent of subsequent change in republican politics is detailed in Chapter 10. What follows here is a brief outline. Following the bolstering of constitutional nationalism in the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, the electoral fortunes of Provisional Sinn Fein ebbed for several years, despite a considerable amount of effort put into community politics. With stalemate also evident in the IRA's campaign, fresh political approaches were sought. These involved, in 1986, the abandonment of abstentionism in the event of Sinn Fein winning a seat in the Southern parliament and tentative moves towards pan-nationalist dialogue in Northern Ireland by 1988. As talks between the leaders of the main Nationalist parties took place, Sinn Fein hinted that seemingly fundamental demands might be the subject of compromise. Towards a Lasting Peace i n Ireland suggested that indications of a British withdrawal might provide sufficient basis for negotiation (Sinn Fein, 1992). At Sinn Fein's ard fheis in 1992, it was agreed that 'the combined forces of Irish nationalism' would 'be the main vehicle for national liberation' (O'Brien, 1999: 225). Armed struggle was being downplayed. Towards a Lasting Peace indicated revised thinking on unionism. The party declared that the consent of Unionists was essential for a lasting peace, but it remained doubtful whether this consent was required in advance of fundamental constitutional change. Sinn Fein's new strategy centred upon urging the British government to act as a persuader to Unionists for a united Ireland. It argued for national self-determination, defined as all the people of Ireland determining their political arrangements as a single unit. Sinn Fein remained linked to the Provisional IRA. The two organisations have separate organisational structures, but are historically and politically linked

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73

with some overlap of personnel. During the peace process in the mid-1990s, prior to the collapse of the first IRA ceasefire, Gerry Adams insisted that the IRA 'haven't gone away'. Concurrently, he put distance between the two organisations by insisting that 'Sinn Fein is not the IRA. Sinn Fein is not involved in armed struggle. Sinn Fein does not advocate armed struggle' (Irish Times, 20 June 1996). Unionist critics have argued that the two organisations are inseparable, whilst to other critics, Sinn Fein/IRA links provide a 'good cop, bad cop' approach to politics. Nonetheless, to the Nationalist electorate PIRA increasingly meant Peaceful IRA, and Sinn Fein became increasingly constitutional in its approach to politics. After the IRA renewed its ceasefire in 1997, Sinn Fein was admitted to multi-party negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998. The Republican movement had helped destroy Unionist party rule at Stormont in 1972 and believed it was halfway to an independent Irish Republic. With the forging of the Good Friday Agreement, the party leadership decided to end abstentionism in respect of Stormont, a move overwhelmingly supported by party members at the party's ardfheis in 1998. A new, pragmatic and constitutional republicanism had emerged from a former revolutionary movement, committed to the Good Friday Agreement. It sought accommodation with Unionists and offered a much more participatory version of republicanism than hitherto. New republicanism moved beyond its old war against British rule and its 'no concessions to Loyalists' approach of the 1980s. Instead, Adams insisted by 2001 that: I think it's a mistake for people to look at it (the political problem) in terms o f unionism and nationalism. I think the [Good Friday] agreement carved out a new majority, not unionist or nationalist. Without reneging on republicanism, we have to find accommodation with our opponents ( G u a r d i a n , 30 A p r i l 2001).

5.6 Republican ultras Given the extent and speed of change, perhaps the most remarkable achievement of Adams was to avoid a major split. A small number of Republican 'dissidents', 'ultras' or 'purists' nonetheless emerged, divisible into three categories. A few ideological purists, led by the deposed president, Ruairi O'Bradaigh, formed a small breakaway group - Republican Sinn Fein - after the decision to end abstentionism from the Dail in 1986. Republican Sinn Fein adopts the policy positions held by Provisional Sinn Fein in the 1970s. This includes a demand for British withdrawal from Northern Ireland within the lifetime of a parliament and support for the Eire Nua programme of a federal Ireland comprising parliaments in each of its four historic provinces. Each parliament, including that in Ulster, would be granted considerable autonomy. Republican Sinn Fein is linked to the Continuity IRA. The Real IRA was formed in the autumn of 1997. It comprised defectors from the Provisional IRA. These dissidents were unhappy at the resumption of an IRA ceasefire, given the British government's public insistence that any political agreement would be based upon consent within Northern Ireland.

74

Nationalist and Republican politics

Any hopes held by the Real IRA of attracting large numbers of defectors disappeared with its killing of 29 people at Omagh in August 1998, the worst atrocity of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein condemned the bombing unequivocally and the action appeared to confirm the futility of 'armed struggle' to the Provisional IRA and many other Republicans. Nonetheless, the Real IRA, which called a ceasefire in the immediate aftermath, appeared to have revived somewhat by late 2000. Its political outlet is the 32 County Sovereignty Committee, withering in its criticism of the Provisionals' 'sell-out' and promotion of the equality agenda within Northern Ireland. Its vicechairwoman, Bernadette Sands-McKevitt, sister of Bobby Sands, insisted that her brother 'did not die for cross-border bodies with Executive powers. He did not die for nationalists to be equal within the Northern Ireland state' (quoted in Hennessy, 2000: 112). Unlike Sinn Fein, however, the 32 County Sovereignty Committee lacked an urban base and the killing of a rare Real IRA figure in Belfast in 2000 by the Provisionals further discouraged its spread (Breen, 2000b). Parallels with the 1956-62 IRA low-level Border Campaign, lacking in public support, might be drawn with Real IRA activity. Its weaponry and militarism suggest that a limited form of Republican armed campaign may endure. The final category of Republican dissidents offers a peaceful rejection of Sinn Fein's strategy. Comprised mainly, but not exclusively, of former Provisional IRA members, the Irish Republican Writers' Group uses its publication, Fourthwrite, to criticise Sinn Fein's entry to Stormont, whilst rejecting a return to an armed campaign. 5.7 Conclusion Nationalist parties have made considerable electoral gains in recent years, as the vote shares of the SDLP and Sinn Fein have risen. The SDLP has also achieved many of its political objectives, having contributed substantially to the three Strands of the Good Friday Agreement, achieved an Irish dimension and had the future of Northern Ireland co-determined by the people of Ireland, North and South. Sinn Fein has been obliged to compromise its Republican principles to maintain its electoral rise and has moved from being a supporter of armed struggle to a constitutional political party. The party insists such a change is merely tactical, designed to further the overall objective of Irish unity. Pan-nationalism, a constructor of the peace process, has been displaced by even greater electoral competition within the Nationalist bloc.

Chapter 6

Governing Northern Ireland

The 1998 Good Friday Agreement fundamentally altered the mode of governance for Northern Ireland. From the suspension of Stormont in 1972 until 1998 (apart from the first five months of 1974) Northern Ireland was governed directly from Westminster, by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Direct rule imposed neo-colonial governance upon Northern Ireland. Legislative proposals were either approved or rejected by the Westminster parliament. When approved, policy was administered through the Northern Ireland Office and a number of public agencies. Administration of policy was undertaken by the 30,000 members of the Northern Ireland Civil Service (Carmichael, 2001). Local government, being particularly weak in Northern Ireland, did not offer democratic compensation. The Good Friday Agreement reintroduced devolved government for Northern Ireland. It was introduced as part of the Labour government's overall strategy of 'democratising' the United Kingdom through a programme of devolution embracing Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, although there were important differences within each country. The consociational principles underpinning the Agreement are designed to ensure that Unionists and Nationalists are obliged to share power. These principles prevent the domination of one community by the other. 6.1 'Old Stormont': Northern Ireland's parliament 1921-72 Prior to the abolition of Stormont in 1972, Northern Ireland was run as an adjunct of the Home Office, administered by a section also responsible for the licensing of London taxi cabs. Disinterest characterised the attitude of the British government to Northern Ireland. This lack of concern did not extend to the award of financial autonomy. Instead, Northern Ireland had few fundraising powers in its own right. Devolution of powers to Northern Ireland was an arrangement that suited Unionists and the British government. The latter did not have to involve itself in a region about which it had minimal concern. Unionists enjoyed the relative autonomy of their own parliament, buttressed by the Ireland Act 1949 which guaranteed the permanence of Northern Ireland's place in the United Kingdom, subject to the will of that unionist bastion. Northern Ireland thus possessed its own parliament, cabinet, civil service and police force. These were seen by the minority population as sectarian 75

76

Governing Northern Ireland

institutions from which they were excluded. Yet, although most powers outside the spheres of foreign, defence and economic policy were accredited to Stormont, the broad thrust of domestic policy mirrored that arising from Westminster. For example, the principles of the welfare state developed in Northern Ireland at a broadly similar pace to that elsewhere in the United Kingdom, although separate Acts were required. The Northern Ireland economy had to bear much of the strain of generating social security payments, most of which were locally financed. What frequently differed in Northern Ireland was the application of policy. It was this diversity of approach that was often seen by the minority community as arbitrary and discriminatory. 6.2 Direct rule 1972-98 Supposedly a transient measure, the introduction of direct rule in 1972 endured beyond expectation. In ending 50 years of Unionist rule, the British government assumed full responsibility for future events, pending the development of a constitutional settlement. That direct rule was envisaged as a holding operation is indicated by the title of its accompanying legislation, the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act. Power resided with a succession of Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland, shown in Table 6.1. Direct rule was described as a 'semi-colonial' form of administration (Wichert, 1991: 179). Acting as a Governor-General, the Secretary of State presided over Northern Ireland and did not necessarily require the consent of local political parties for decisions. Powers invested in the post were much greater than those afforded to the Secretaries of State for Scotland or Wales. All political and security matters were under the control of the Secretary of State, although operational matters were determined by the Chief Constable of the R U C and the commanding officer of the British Army. Members of Table 6.1

Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland 1972-2001

Secretary of State

Duration of office

Government

William Whitelaw Francis Pym Merlyn Rees Roy Mason Humphrey Atkins James Prior Douglas Hurd Tom King Peter Brooke Patrick Mayhew Mo Mowlam Peter Mandelson John Reid

1972-3 1973-4 1974-6 1976-9 1979-81 1981-4 1984-5 1985-9 1989-92 1992-7 1997-9 1999-2001 2001-

Conservative Conservative Labour Labour Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative Labour Labour Labour

6.3 'New Stormont': Northern Ireland's Executive and Assembly

77

Parliament in Northern Ireland were largely excluded from policy-making in respect of the Province. Orders in Council approved by the Secretary of State could not be amended, only approved or rejected outright (Hazleton, 1994). This process was labelled governance by 'ministerial decree' (McGarry and O'Leary, 1995: 95). Some services, such as housing, became the responsibility of regional agencies, or joint boards. Many of these were removed from local-authority control in 1972. Whilst changes in local government were undertaken throughout Britain, the removal of powers from local authorities in Northern Ireland owed much to the association of those bodies with sectarian discrimination. Such was the emasculation of local government that it became responsible for little more than 'bins and burials'. Greater scrutiny of legislation and government departments was facilitated by the creation of a select committee on Northern Ireland Affairs in 1994. Although favoured by the Ulster Unionist Party for some years, the decision to proceed with the establishment of the committee followed the support of Ulster Unionists for the Conservative government in tight parliamentary votes on the Maastricht Treaty. Both sides denied a deal had been enacted. In 1996, the bolstering of the Northern Ireland Grand Committee was announced. This committee would provide MPs with a mini-debating chamber, allowing certain powers of pre-legislative scrutiny. Despite its considerable responsibilities, the job of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was often regarded as an outpost within the British cabinet. During the 1980s, the position was awarded as a punishment to the troublesome James Prior, with Margaret Thatcher anxious to enforce an exile which meant his banishment from other policy arenas. The office holder was nonetheless granted considerable autonomy within cabinet. 6.3 'New Stormont': Northern Ireland's Executive and

Assembly The return of devolved government to Northern Ireland was always going to be on a fundamentally different basis from the form of governance seen under the previous devolved administration. New political institutions attempt to harness the rival forces of unionism and nationalism on the basis of historic compromise. Internal power-sharing with an attendant Irish dimension characterise the new politics of Northern Ireland, reflected in an interlocking set of institutions. The type of devolved government seen in Northern Ireland is unusual. The Executive was formed using the system devised by a Belgian mathematician, Viktor D'Hondt. At the head of government are First and Deputy Ministers, elected on a cross-community basis. One cannot remain in office without the other. Two junior ministers were appointed to assist the First and Deputy First Ministers. Below these ministers is an Executive of ten ministers. These are not chosen by the First Minister, as is the norm elsewhere. Instead, parties are entitled to seats within the Executive according to the number of seats

78 Table 6.2

Governing Northern Ireland The Northern Ireland Executive 1999 (shown in running order of choice of

portfolio)

Minister

Party

Portfolio

Reg Empey Mark Durkan Peter Robinson Martin McGuinness Sam Foster Sean Farren Nigel Dodds Michael McGimpsey Bairbre de Bruin Brid Rodgers

UUP SDLP DUP SF UUP SDLP DUP UUP SF SDLP

Enterprise, Trade and Development Finance and Personnel Regional Development Education Environment Higher and Further Education; Employment Social Development Culture, Arts and Leisure Health, Social Services and Public Safety Agriculture and Rural Development

won in the election to the Assembly. The UUP, as the largest party with 28 seats after the 1998 assembly elections, thus chose the first executive portfolio. Its number of seats was then divided by two, giving the party 14 seats. This allowed the SDLP, D U P and Sinn Fein, in order of seats won, to select their ministerial portfolios. Each party then had its number of seats divided by two upon accepting a post. After all four parties had accepted their first ministerial post and thus had their number of seats divided by two, each still had more seats than any other parties, such as Alliance. Thus, the UUP, SDLP, D U P and Sinn Fein were all entitled to a second position in the Executive. After taking this second post, each party's remaining number of seats was again divided by two. The UUP's remaining 14 seats were thus divided again by two, leaving seven. This still left the U U P with more seats than its nearest rivals, followed by the SDLP, giving these parties the final two seats in the Executive. The running order of choices and the personnel filling the posts for the first set of ministerial portfolios are shown in Table 6.2. The outcome of the D'Hondt system of allocation is proportionality throughout government in Northern Ireland. Unionists and Nationalists are obliged to share executive power, although the Executive is not a formal coalition. Similarly, Unionists and Nationalists, along with the two Assembly parties (Alliance and the Women's Coalition) designated 'other', are responsible for the scrutiny of Executive actions, via the committee system. The anti-Agreement D U P rotated its ministers, as part of the party's strategy to collapse the Good Friday Agreement by undermining its institutions. Nonetheless, the Executive, by 2000, had assumed responsibility for producing programmes of legislation and drafting the budget (Wilford, 2001). The Executive is responsible for administering expenditure totalling £9 billion. With its cross-party formation, the Executive is, at most, an informal coalition and, at worst, a divided and disparate body. Inter-party tensions remain, most evident with the D U P declining to work alongside Sinn Fein. As such, concern for the good governance of Northern Ireland rests uneasily alongside historical

6.4 The Northern Ireland Assembly and its committees

79

enmity, all contained within the same government. In addition to the residual tension spilling into post-conflict government, the Executive was concerned with several problems. As examples, it had to address poor public health and a very weak public transport system. Yet the parties in the Executive have, on occasion, acted as government and opposition, appearing to support draft legislative proposals within the Executive whilst opposing them within the Assembly. 6,4 The Northern Ireland Assembly and its committees The Northern Ireland Assembly, which met for the first time in July 1998, is extraordinarily large. The 108 members, elected under the single transferable vote system of proportional representation, represent an electorate of 1.6 million. The Assembly is nearly twice the size of the sixty-member Welsh counterpart, despite Northern Ireland having a smaller population. Given the Welsh Assembly's lack of powers, a starker example of the extent of overrepresentation is evident in the contrast with the Scottish parliament, which contains only 129 members, although it has tax-raising powers, a strength not given to the Northern Ireland Assembly. One of the reasons for the large size of the Assembly was to ensure that as many different shades of opinion as possible could be represented. The amount of power devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly is considerable, although power in Northern Ireland has been devolved to a wider range of institutions than in the devolved settlements for Wales and Scotland. Ironically for a party that has long desired the return of devolved government, the UUP's demands were modest in respect of the powers to be devolved. Indeed, the party proposed a devolved arrangement not dissimilar from the minimalist devolution awarded to Wales (Hazleton, 2000). The actual powers devolved are closer to the Scottish model, with the assembly possessing the capacity to initiate and pass primary legislation. The 'North Down' question, Northern Ireland's version of the West Lothian question in Scotland, could be raised. Why should Northern Ireland's MPs be able to sit in Westminster and vote on legislation affecting England, when Northern Ireland possesses its own Assembly, devoid of English representatives? The answer is that any such problem is much less acute. Northern Ireland's MPs rarely vote (or even attend debates) on issues unrelated to their country. They are somewhat more regular voters at Westminster on 'moral' issues. From its creation, the First Minister indicted his wish for the Northern Ireland parliament to be a 'pluralist parliament for a pluralist people'. Oneparty Unionist hegemony had vanished with the collapse of Stormont in 1972. Decisions within the Northern Ireland Assembly can be taken on the basis of a simple majority. However, for key decisions, consociational principles, enforcing cross-community consensus, are applied. Decisions designated as 'key' items involve the election of the First and Deputy First Ministers and Assembly Chair, standing orders and budget allocations. If 30 members demand that a decision be designated as 'key', it can be added to these items.

80

Governing Northern Ireland

Cross-community consensus is needed according to either of the following rules: • parallel consent, in which majorities among all those voting, among Unionists and among Nationalists, must all occur; or • weighted majority, in which a measure commands the support of 60 per cent of Assembly members present and voting, including at least 40 per cent of Unionists and 40 per cent of Nationalists. The first two years of the Assembly approved only small amounts of legislation. Indeed, its early legislative programme induced a certain cynicism over how the sectarian divide was being healed. The opening two items of legislation increased financial allowances to Assembly members and political parties. The D'Hondt system is also used for allocation of Committee Chairs and Deputy Chairs. Ordinary committee membership is allocated in proportion to party strengths in the Assembly. There are 10 Departmental Committees, and five standing committees The Departmental Committees have responsibility for scrutiny and policy development, whilst the standing committees are concerned mainly with procedures, finance and conduct. The committees perform the following main functions: • • • •

advice on budget allocations for the Department; policy formulation; approval of secondary legislation; committee stage approval of primary legislation.

The committees tend to be consensual, with parties co-operating in a manner not always evident in the wider Assembly chamber. They issue reports which are usually unanimous for debate by the entire Assembly, although members of committees have on occasion returned to the party fold in opposing their own unanimous committee report. The relationship between committees and the ministers they shadow is still unfolding. One of the difficulties within the Executive-Committee structure lies in the mechanism to remove incompetent ministers. The full Assembly has the right to remove such a minister, on the basis of cross-community consensus. Given that such consensus may not be forthcoming, it may be difficult to hold ministers to account. Ministers can ignore committee proposals and be insulated from censure by sectarian, ethnic bloc voting within the Assembly. These problems notwithstanding, ministerialcommittee relationships have been broadly consensual. Northern Ireland's new political institutions are not confined to elected representatives. A consultative civic forum was also established under the Good Friday Agreement, designed to act as consultative body on social, economic and cultural issues. The Forum was supported by parties such as the Women's Coalition, which believed that it had the potential to infuse the new Assembly with fresh views. Its representatives are drawn mainly from the business, voluntary and trade-union sectors. Sinn Fein and the PUP have argued that there is insufficient working-class representation.

6.6 The British—Irish Council

81

6.5 The North-South Ministerial Council Established under Strand 2 of the Good Friday Agreement, the North-South Ministerial Council brings together ministers from the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish government on a regular basis to develop consultation, co-operation and policy implementation on agreed matters. The North-South Council has proved a controversial aspect of the new political agenda. Its first meeting was held in December 1999, attended by 10 ministers from Northern Ireland and 16 from the Irish Republic. This and subsequent meetings were boycotted by D U P members. The Unionist case was thus presented by a mere four (UUP) representatives amongst the 26 attenders of the first all-island meeting of ministers since partition. The lack of progress on IRA decommissioning led to the First Minister, David Trimble, attempting to prevent Sinn Fein's ministers from attending meetings, a measure rejected in the courts. As required as a minimum under the Agreement, the Council agreed to establish six new North-South implementation bodies and identify six areas for co-operation between government departments and bodies, North and South. The six new North-South implementation bodies are: • • • • • •

Waterways Ireland; The Food Safety Promotion Board; The Trade and Business Development Body; The Special European Union Programmes Body; The Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission; The North-South Language Body.

Whatever the fears of Unionists, the North-South Council is not a freestanding expansionist body. Its position is ringfenced by the requirement in the Good Friday Agreement that any further North—South implementation bodies must be agreed by the Irish parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. Consent from the Northern Assembly is barely conceivable in the short and medium terms for political reasons, irrespective of any economic logic. Unionist parties will oppose such a development. Even if Nationalists were to obtain a majority within the Assembly, the requirement for cross-community consensus would prevent approval for the expansion of all-Ireland bodies. A more realistic fear is that the North—South implementation bodies adopt a broader remit than at present, due to ambiguity over their precise role. Furthermore, Unionists might fear that agreed co-operation between government bodies in the six, fairly broad, areas agreed could become incremental, leading to all-island implementation in related areas. 6.6 The British-Irish Council and British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference Strand 3 of the Good Friday Agreement established the mildly confederal dimension of the British-Irish Council, bringing together representatives of the devolved institutions in Britain and Ireland and the British and Irish governments. The Council has no formal powers, but endeavours to reach

82

Governing Northern Ireland

agreement on matters of mutual interest. It met for the first time in December 1999. Five ministers from Northern Ireland, four from the Irish Republic and three from the British government were joined by three ministers from Scotland and Wales. In each case, the Prime Minister or First Minister was in attendance. Two representatives were also present from the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey. The Council has identified co-operation on drugs, social exclusion, the environment and transport as initial priority areas. The Council may develop as an arena in which best practice is identified, rather than as a significant policy-maker. The British-Irish Intergovernmental conference is a significant body, as it acts as a forum for bilateral co-operation between the British and Irish governments. Ministers from Northern Ireland can attend. 6.7 The role of the European Union Northern Ireland has been part of the European Community since 1973. Its population voted narrowly in favour of continued membership in the 1975 referendum, with the 'yes' vote of 52 per cent substantially less than the average two-thirds affirmative elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Such lukewarm support was partly explained by the disdain of the main Unionist parties for the Community, although the SDLP has always been supportive. Subsequently, Northern Ireland has received considerable financial assistance through its status as an Objective 1 peripheral region, attracting maximum E U support. In 1987, Community funds for the regions doubled. Greater assistance for rural development, allied to agricultural support averaging £47 million annually during the first 17 years of Community membership, has aided Northern Ireland's economy. The proportion of employees working in agriculture is double that found elsewhere in the United Kingdom (Bew and Meehan, 1994). Under the Community Support Framework, the region was awarded £550 million from 1989-93, rising to £940 million between 1994-9. The main areas of assistance thus far have been employment, industrial development, transport, agriculture and tourism. Subsidies still fail to match those found in the Irish Republic, which enjoys the largest per head benefits in the E U . Although Northern Ireland may be included in general British representations within the Council of Ministers, the region is also reliant upon specific lobbying. This was performed by the Northern Ireland Office, but will increasingly become a feature of Executive activity. There is a European Commission office in Belfast, whilst local councils, notwithstanding their domestic weaknesses, have also begun to discover the possibilities of European networking. Significant lobbying is performed by Northern Ireland's three MEPs, drawn from the SDLP, U U P and DUP. Each of these parties sees the potential economic benefits of E U membership. All parties lay stress on the special regional conditions which exist in Northern Ireland to attract E U funding to the area (Greer, 1996). Indeed, political cooperation produced effective lobbying to the extent that the Community's first Integrated Developments Operation was set up in Belfast (Laffan, 1994).

6.8 Northern Ireland's new consociational democracy?

83

Nonetheless, Unionists suspect that the promotion of a federal Europe of the regions might lead to a withering of the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. These fears are heightened by European Union support for cross-border institutions. The D U P is suspicious of aspects of E U funding directed at cross-border subjects, claiming the existence of a wider agenda. The Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation contains crossborder aspects (Meehan, 2000). The establishment of the E U Special Programmes all-island implementation body accentuated such fears and added to the history of such concerns. In 1984, the Haagerup Report, initiated by the European Parliament and produced by a Danish MEP, advocated a greater role for the European Community in Northern Ireland. Whilst insisting that it was not the role of the Community to propose constitutional change, the Haagerup Report advocated power-sharing and increased intergovernmental co-operation (Haagerup, 1984). Indeed, as early as 1973, the SDLP's manifesto, A New North, A New Ireland, had envisaged the cementing of Northern Ireland's links with the Republic in a European Community context (SDLP, 1973; McAllister, 1977). The leader of the SDLP, John Hume, argues that E U membership has provided 'a new and positive context for the discussion of sovereignty' (Hume, 1993: 229). Elements within the D U P are also hostile to the perceived influence of the Church of Rome within the Christian-democratic traditions of the Community, a problem seemingly undetected by all other European political parties. 6.8 Northern Ireland's new consociational democracy? With cross-community power-sharing, proportionality in government, equality and veto rights for the minority, the Good Friday Agreement clearly brought consociational principles to the governance of Northern Ireland (O'Leary, 1999). The new political institutions in Northern Ireland, established by statute in November 1998, got off to an uncertain start, mainly due to the prolonged dispute over paramilitary decommissioning. The diffusion of power to a range of interlocked institutions created problems, even though 80 of the 108 Assembly members were pro-Good Friday Agreement and a clear majority of Northern Ireland's population held goodwill towards the new political dispensation. Indeed, the electorate displayed a high level of knowledge of aspects of the Good Friday Agreement (Evans and O'Leary, 1999). The aims of the settlement were obvious: to locate previously violent differences within an exclusively political arena, to uphold the constitutional status quo whilst formally acknowledging the aspirations of Nationalists, and to cement the idea of the totality of relationships between Britain and Ireland. For a consociational deal to succeed, any lingering external threat, rhetorical or otherwise, to the status of Northern Ireland needed to be removed. Changes to Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution by the Dublin government, ending the territorial claim to Northern Ireland, created space for the deal. In return, the role of the Irish government in the affairs of Northern Ireland was cemented by the establishment of new cross-border bodies, which, although

84

Governing Northern Ireland

in benign areas, did have executive powers. In this respect, the bi-national approach to the problem of Northern Ireland evident since Sunningdale in 1973, but cemented in the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, had achieved its aim of lessening mutual suspicions of the intentions of the British and Irish governments (Needham, 1999). There were occasional returns to older forms of rhetorical republicanism from the Fianna Fail government in Dublin. The Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, believed that Ireland would be united in his lifetime due to the 'irresistible dynamic' of the Good Friday Agreement {Daily Telegraph, 23 November 1998). The main criticisms of the Agreement, that it failed to deliver a united Ireland or, more commonly, that it had almost done so, could be dismissed as mere partisanship (O'Leary, 1999). The main intellectual criticism was one hostile to the entire concept of consociational governance. It was argued that a common humanity was denied in Northern Ireland by the rigid division of its politics and parties into two ethnic blocs. Parties were obliged to designate themselves as Unionist, Nationalist or other, legitimising a form of zero-sum politics that a new political dispensation ought to overcome. Yet it was far from clear that such a segregationist approach would be needed on most decisions taken by the Assembly. Weighted majority rules assumed that either community might wish to dominate the other, an assumption which grounded Unionist and Nationalist thinking in the 1920—72 era, despite the public commitment of all parties to power-sharing. Yet many of the contentious decisions, such as policing parades and decommissioning, which impinged upon the early progress of the Assembly were outside its area of competence. Sectarian division was sometimes evident on other issues. As one example, a Sinn Fein Assembly member argued that differences in committee with the PUP on housing arose from a Loyalist 'need to defend territory' (interview with Michelle Gildernew M L A , 28 June 2000). Nonetheless, much Assembly business was characterised by a dull civility and a fair degree of consensus. Ethnic bloc politics were evident, but inter-ethnic bloc rivalries were sometimes less than intra-bloc rivalries, not that either form of competition assisted the development of a focused Executive. Supporters of the Agreement could point to the manner in which ancient enmities were played out amid the relative cordiality of the Assembly, with growing institutional and interpersonal relationships contributing to political progress, often overshadowed by continuing dispute over the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. 6.9 Conclusion After the Good Friday Agreement, the role of the Secretary of State was reduced, but it remains substantial. The minister retains control of reserved and excepted matters. These non-devolved functions are substantial, including policing, security and taxation. Devolved government has partly rectified the democratic deficit evident under direct rule. Although the devolved settlement established a complex set of bi-national links, Strand 1 governance, centred upon the Northern Ireland Assembly, is the most important aspect of the new

6.9 Conclusion p o l i t i c a l dispensation. Nonetheless, the v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f N o r t h e r n

85 Ireland's

p o l i t i c a l institutions was evident i n their suspension b y the Secretary o f State f r o m February to M a y 2 0 0 0 . G i v e n nearly 3 0 years o f conflict a n d the a b n o r m ality o f the state, p r e l i m i n a r y difficulties were to be expected.

Chapter 7

Policing Northern Ireland

Changes to the p o l i c i n g o f N o r t h e r n Ireland have been h i g h l y controversial. M o s t security functions are n o w undertaken b y the P o l i c e Service o f N o r t h ern Ireland ( P S N I ) , formerly the R o y a l U l s t e r C o n s t a b u l a r y ( R U C ) . A n Independent C o m m i s s i o n o n P o l i c i n g , chaired b y C h r i s Patten, was established under the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t , leading to the creation o f the P S N I . I n some border areas the police are still assisted b y the B r i t i s h A r m y . T h e A r m y ceased u r b a n patrols b y 1998, b u t is still occasionally redeployed i n such areas i n times o f h i g h tension. A s examples, the A r m y returned briefly to the S h a n k i l l area o f Belfast i n 2 0 0 0 d u r i n g a Loyalist feud a n d was d e p l o y e d i n N o r t h Belfast i n 2 0 0 1 as a response to over 5 0 p i p e b o m b attacks u p o n C a t h o lics d u r i n g the first m o n t h o f that year.

7.1 The legacy of the Troubles D u r i n g the T r o u b l e s , p o l i c i n g support was p r o v i d e d b y the U l s t e r Defence R e g i m e n t a n d , f r o m 1992, the R o y a l Irish R e g i m e n t . T h e U D R attracted considerable h o s t i l i t y f r o m some N a t i o n a l i s t s . A s the replacement for the o l d ' B ' Specials, i t was often seen as a sectarian force. I n i t i a l success i n attracting C a t h o l i c members q u i c k l y subsided as the conflict escalated. C o n v i c t i o n s for offences a n d alleged c o l l u s i o n w i t h Loyalist paramilitaries l e d to calls for the regiment's disbandment. Paramilitary activity a n d a more general lack o f support for the police a n d a r m y amongst N a t i o n a l i s t s l e d to a plethora o f emergency security measures, o u t l i n e d i n T a b l e 7 . 1 . ' U n o f f i c i a l ' security-force measures c o n t r i b u t e d to hostility. Ill-treatment o f suspects under interrogation was acknowledged i n the C o m p t o n R e p o r t (1971). I n 1976, the E u r o p e a n C o u r t o f H u m a n R i g h t s f o u n d the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t g u i l t y o f u s i n g i n h u m a n a n d degrading treatment. M e t h o d s i n c l u d e d h o o d i n g , a l o n g w i t h f o o d a n d sleep d e p r i v a t i o n . T h r e e years later, the B e n n e t t R e p o r t (1979) c o n f i r m e d allegations o f mistreatment o f prisoners. T h e R U C c l a i m e d that injuries were self-inflicted, b u t the R e p o r t insisted that this was true o n l y i n certain cases. I n t e r n m e n t w i t h o u t trial p r o v e d a disastrous measure. U t i l i s e d against the advice o f the A r m y , u n h a p p y that its intelligence was inadequate, a t r a w l o f suspected republicans was undertaken despite scant i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e tactic served m a i n l y to boost recruitment to the I R A . T w o - t h i r d s o f the

86

7.1 The legacy of the Troubles Table 7.1

Main emergency measures introduced

Year

Measure

Feature

1971 1973 1974

Internment Trial without jury Prevention of Terrorism Act Broadcasting ban

Detention without trial of IRA suspects (ended 1975) Single judge decides court case Extended detention: exclusion orders

1988 1998

87

Emergency powers legislation

Prohibition on direct television transmission of statements from paramilitary groups (ended 1994) Extension of powers of arrest and detention (following Omagh bombing)

2 , 3 5 7 detainees were released after interrogation d u r i n g the first six m o n t h s o f i n t e r n m e n t ( H i l l y a r d , 1983). T h e D i p l o c k R e p o r t (1972) r e c o m m e n d e d the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f trial w i t h o u t jury, taking place i n what became k n o w n as ' D i p l o c k courts'. T h e i r i n t r o d u c t i o n was designed to c i r c u m v e n t the p r o b l e m o f i n t i m i d a t i o n o f jurors. F o u r m a i n criticisms o f the courts system were levelled. Firstly, some d o u b t e d the neutrality o f the j u d i c i a r y . S e c o n d l y , the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f juryless courts p r o d u c e d a h i g h c o n v i c t i o n rate o f over 9 0 per cent i n cases i n v o l v i n g offences related to p a r a m i l i t a r y activity. T h i s contrasted w i t h almost u n a n i m o u s acquittals o f the security forces d u r i n g the early years o f D i p l o c k courts (Boyle et aL, 1980). T h i r d l y , there were difficulties over the admissibility o f uncorroborated evidence, n o t a b l y i n 'supergrass' trials, i n w h i c h the prosecution relied u p o n the evidence o f informers. T h e c o n v i c t i o n rate i n such trials fell as 10 proceeded between 1983 a n d 1 9 8 5 , y i e l d i n g a n overall c o n v i c t i o n rate o f less t h a n h a l f the n u m b e r o f defendants (Greer, 1987: 5 2 5 ) . F i n a l l y , after 1988, judges were a l l o w e d t o d r a w negative conclusions i f a defendant exercised the right to silence. A p p l i e d n a t i o n a l l y f o l l o w i n g the B i r m i n g h a m p u b b o m b i n g s i n 1 9 7 4 , the P r e v e n t i o n o f T e r r o r i s m A c t was framed to prevent the transfer o f I R A activity to the B r i t i s h m a i n l a n d . It extended the m a x i m u m d e t e n t i o n o f suspects to seven days a n d l e d t o the b a n n i n g f r o m the m a i n l a n d o f several m e m b e r s o f p o l i t i c a l parties l i n k e d to paramilitaries. T h e 1978 E m e r g e n c y P r o v i s i o n s A c t p r o v i d e d a further legal basis for the checkpoints a n d searches already used b y the security forces. A s early as 1973, 7 5 , 0 0 0 house searches h a d been c o n d u c t e d , a m o u n t i n g to a search o f one i n every five homes ( H i l l y a r d , 1 9 8 3 : 4 1 ) . F r o m 1973 to m i d - 1 9 8 7 , 5 7 4 , 0 1 2 such searches were c o n d u c t e d ( D i c k s o n , 1 9 9 1 : 1 6 1 - 2 ) . F i n a l l y , the broadcasting b a n u p o n the advocacy o f v i o l e n c e r e m o v e d the direct transmission o f speakers f r o m parties representative o f p a r a m i l i t a r y groups. T h e p r o h i b i t i o n d i d n o t a p p l y d u r i n g election campaigns. D e s i g n e d to d e n y the 'oxygen o f p u b l i c i t y ' , the b a n p r o v i d e d w o r k for a n u m b e r o f actors whose voices were d u b b e d over interviews. T h i s f o r m o f e m p l o y m e n t appeared somewhat less lucrative w h e n L o y a l i s t paramilitaries i n d i c a t e d that surrogate S i n n F e i n speakers w o u l d be targets. T h e broadcasting b a n was lifted i m m e d i a t e l y after the I R A ' s a n n o u n c e m e n t o f a ceasefire i n 1 9 9 4 .

88

Policing Northern Ireland

7.2 The critique of the RUC O n e o f the most obvious illustrations o f the problems o f N o r t h e r n Ireland is the lack o f consensus over p o l i c i n g . M o s t U n i o n i s t s were h i g h l y supportive o f the R U C a n d m a n y felt change was unnecessary. T h e U l s t e r U n i o n i s t P a r t y leader, D a v i d T r i m b l e , p o i n t e d to the c o n c l u s i o n o f the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s Select C o m m i t t e e o n N o r t h e r n Ireland Affairs that 'there is n o clear reason to m a k e a special case o f the R U C b y c h a n g i n g its name' {The Times, 2 7 A u g u s t 1999). M a n y N a t i o n a l i s t s believed that drastic changes were needed. A large n u m b e r o f N a t i o n a l i s t s v i e w e d the R U C as instinctively U n i o n i s t , the a r m e d w i n g o f an illegitimate state. N i n e t y - f o u r per cent o f S D L P members desired radical reform o f the R U C (author's survey, 1999); S i n n F e i n d e m a n d e d its disbandment. O n e survey i n d i c a t e d that two-thirds o f C a t h o l i c s favoured disbandment ( H a d d e n etal, 1996). T h e Police A u t h o r i t y o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's o w n figures i n d i c a t e d the differences i n o u t l o o k between the two c o m m u n i t i e s (Table 7.2). M a n y U n i o n i s t s argued that the R U C h a d impossible tasks i n a t t e m p t i n g to appear even-handed a n d i n c o m b a t t i n g a guerilla war w i t h o u t alienating the c o m m u n i t y f r o m w h i c h the I R A gathered support. T h e p o l i c e force c o u l d h a r d l y be anti-state. Part o f the role o f any police force, argued defenders o f the R U C , is to u p h o l d the state. S u c h supporters argued that the sensitivities a c c r u i n g to n o r m a l liberal p o l i c i n g techniques were inapplicable to N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e n u m b e r o f R U C officers k i l l e d between 1969 a n d 1999 was 3 0 3 {see T a b l e 7.3). D u r i n g the same period, 8,728 officers were injured {Sunday Times, 12 A u g u s t 1999), a n d 7 0 officers c o m m i t t e d suicide {The Times, 2 6 A u g u s t

Table 7.2

Perceptions of the RUC (%)

Perception

Protestant

Catholic

Total

Treat Catholics better Treat Protestants better Treat both equally Don't know/Refused to answer

8 15 69 8

0 64 26 9

5 35 51 9

Source: adapted from Police Authority for Northern Ireland, 1997: 39.

Table 7.3

Deaths in the Northern Ireland conflict 1969-99

Civilians RUC British Army UDR/RIR Republican paramilitary Loyalist paramilitary Other Source: adapted from McKittrick et aL, 1999: 1474.

2,038 303 503 206 392 144 158

7.2 The critique of the

RUC

89

1999). T h e R U C was responsible for 53 deaths {Guardian, 2 6 A u g u s t 1999). T h e R U C , however, was criticised even b y some Loyalists w h o argued that it was 'too m u c h a police force a n d n o t a police service' ( E r v i n e , 1996). T h e difficulty, however, lay i n g a i n i n g the c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y acceptance w h i c h m i g h t a l l o w such a development. D u r i n g the early 1980s, N a t i o n a l i s t distrust o f the R U C increased f o l l o w i n g allegations that the force was p u r s u i n g a ' s h o o t - t o - k i l l ' p o l i c y against suspected R e p u b l i c a n paramilitaries. A p p o i n t e d to investigate the accusations, the D e p u t y C h i e f Constable o f Greater Manchester, J o h n Stalker, was inexplicably r e m o v e d f r o m the i n q u i r y . Stalker's r e m o v a l was f o l l o w e d b y a concerted b u t unsuccessful attempt to denigrate his character (Stalker, 1988). A l t h o u g h the B r i t i s h government accepted that a cover-up h a d been attempted b y elements w i t h i n the R U C , it r u l e d out prosecutions. T h r o u g h o u t the T r o u b l e s , the R U C was reliant u p o n core elements i n its fight against terrorism: intelligence, informers a n d c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h the G a r d a Siochana (Irish police). Relations between the two police forces i m p r o v e d m a r k e d l y , paralleled b y intergovernmental co-operation o n the e x t r a d i t i o n o f suspected terrorists. A n x i e t y to foster g o o d relations p r o m p t e d l i m i t e d change b y the R U C o n the issue o f accountability. It issued a n n u a l reports a n d p r o d u c e d a C h a r t e r i n 1 9 9 3 . W h i l s t operational decisions r e m a i n e d the prerogative o f the C h i e f C o n s t a b l e , the N o r t h e r n Ireland P o l i c e A u t h o r i t y assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for senior a p p o i n t m e n t s , finance a n d s c r u t i n y o f c o m p l a i n t s procedures. A p p o i n t ments to the P o l i c e A u t h o r i t y were made b y the Secretary o f State. T h i s l e d to accusations o f bias. C o n n o l l y (1990) makes the p o i n t that the targeting o f appointees b y the I R A d i d not improve the balance o f c o m m u n i t y representation. O t h e r t h a n for a few m o n t h s f o l l o w i n g the H u n t R e p o r t ( 1 9 6 9 ) , the R U C has always been armed. T h e R U C c o n t i n u a l l y under-recruited C a t h o l i c s , a p r o b l e m partly explained b y i n t i m i d a t i o n f r o m the I R A . H o w e v e r , to blame I R A activity for the permanent failure o f R U C to recruit C a t h o l i c s i n accordance w i t h the p o p u l a t i o n balance is ' s i m p l y n o t h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n v i n c i n g ' ( M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y , 1999: 16). T h r o u g h o u t the h i s t o r y o f N o r t h e r n Irel a n d , C a t h o l i c s displayed a reluctance to j o i n the R U C , seen as part o f the apparatus o f a sectarian state ( E l l i s o n a n d S m y t h , 1999). D u r i n g the first I R A ceasefire o f the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , one i n five applicants to the R U C was C a t h o l i c , resulting i n 16.5 per cent o f n e w recruits b e i n g o f that r e l i g i o n ( B e w a n d G i l l e s p i e , 1996). T h i s recruitment figure nonetheless represented less t h a n h a l f the percentage o f C a t h o l i c s w h o o u g h t to be recruited, given the p o p u l a t i o n balance. I n 1 9 9 8 , the religious i m b a l a n c e w i t h i n the R U C was as acute as at any p e r i o d i n the h i s t o r y o f the force: 8 8 . 3 per cent o f its officers were Protestant, w i t h C a t h o l i c s a m o u n t i n g to a mere 8.3 per cent (Patten R e p o r t , 1999: 8 2 ) . T h e C h i e f C o n s t a b l e o f the R U C i n d i c a t e d his belief that a c o m b i n a t i o n o f threats a n d peer pressure were the m a i n deterrents to C a t h o l i c s j o i n i n g the force (Flanagan, 1998). D u r i n g the 1 9 9 7 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n , L a b o u r p r o m i s e d measures to strengthen confidence i n p o l i c i n g ( R a n d a l l , 1998). C a t h o l i c applications h a d increased substantially b y 2 0 0 1 .

90

Policing Northern Ireland

7.3 The Patten Commission Report T h e Independent C o m m i s s i o n o n P o l i c i n g (the Patten C o m m i s s i o n ) established under the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was given the task o f e n s u r i n g that N o r t h e r n Ireland's police service attracted support a n d m e m b e r s h i p across the c o m m u n i t y . T h e Patten C o m m i s s i o n ' s report, p u b l i s h e d i n September 1 9 9 9 after 3 6 meetings w i t h the p u b l i c , acknowledged that the R U C enjoyed overall h i g h levels o f p u b l i c support, b u t that significant a t t i t u d i n a l v a r i a t i o n existed between Protestants a n d C a t h o l i c s . M a n y C a t h o l i c s believed that the police force was t o o clearly associated w i t h the defence o f the state. T h e police force was seen b y such critics as t o o U n i o n i s t a n d t o o Protestant. T h e R U C was also seen as l a c k i n g accountability. Patten proposed measures designed to change the culture, ethos, religious balance a n d a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o f the force, w h i l s t p r u n i n g its size i n the n e w post-Troubles dispensation. T h e m a i n proposed changes were: 1. the r e n a m i n g o f the police force, to become the N o r t h e r n Ireland P o l i c e Service (later changed to the Police Service o f N o r t h e r n Ireland); 2. the r e m o v a l o f associations w i t h Britishness o r Irishness (i.e. the C r o w n a n d S h a m r o c k o n the force badge), w i t h the force to fly its o w n flag, rather than the U n i o n Jack, above b u i l d i n g s ; 3. the creation o f a n e w P o l i c i n g B o a r d , to replace the Police A u t h o r i t y ; 4. the establishment o f D i s t r i c t P o l i c i n g Partnership Bodies, to replace C o m m u n i t y a n d Police L i a i s o n C o m m i t t e e s ; 5. a r e d u c t i o n i n the size o f the force f r o m 13,000 to 7 , 5 0 0 ; 6. future recruitment to be o n a 5 0 - 5 0 Protestant a n d C a t h o l i c basis; 7. the integration o f Special B r a n c h w i t h i n n o r m a l p o l i c i n g roles; 8. officers to swear a n oath o f c o m m i t m e n t to h u m a n rights. M u c h o f the Patten R e p o r t was concerned w i t h decentralisation, a riposte to the centralising tendencies f o u n d i n respect o f p o l i c i n g t h r o u g h o u t the U n i t e d K i n g d o m ( M c G a r r y , 2 0 0 0 ) . H o w e v e r , the R e p o r t was fervently o p p o s e d b y U n i o n i s t s , w i t h their h o s t i l i t y supported to a l i m i t e d extent b y some C o n servative M P s at W e s t m i n s t e r . F o r U n i o n i s t s , radical reform o f the R U C a m o u n t e d to yet m o r e difficult e m o t i o n a l baggage associated w i t h the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . M a n y feared the negative i m p a c t u p o n p o l i c i n g o f a n emasculation o f the force, either t h r o u g h a n i n a b i l i t y to cope w i t h a n y revival o f p a r a m i l i t a r y activity, o r t h r o u g h the increase i n o r d i n a r y c r i m e l i k e l y to arise f r o m a decline i n p a r a m i l i t a r i s m . I n 2 0 0 0 , the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t C o u n c i l instructed the U U P n o t to re-enter the N o r t h e r n Ireland Executive unless the title o f R U C was retained. Fewer than o n e i n five members o f the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t C o u n c i l backed full i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the Patten proposals ( T o n g e a n d Evans, 2001a). T h e lack o f cross-community consensus o n p o l i c i n g changes was such that sectarian divisions were evident even i n the a v o w e d l y n o n sectarian A l l i a n c e Party. Seventy-seven per cent o f its C a t h o l i c members d e m a n d e d full i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the changes proposed b y the Patten C o m m i s s i o n , b u t o n l y h a l f o f the party's Protestant members s u p p o r t e d reform ( T o n g e a n d Evans, 2 0 0 1 b ) .

7.4 Implementing Patten

91

A s i d e f r o m religious imbalance, Patten was vexed b y the lack o f accountability o f the force. N a t i o n a l i s t s boycotted the P o l i c e A u t h o r i t y a n d C o m m u n i t y P o l i c e - L i a i s o n committees, w h i c h came to be seen as p r o - U n i o n i s t a n d p r o - R U C . T h e o n l y other potential vehicle o f change, H e r Majesty's Inspectorate o f C o n s t a b u l a r y , tended to make o n l y m i n o r r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for change to address fundamental l o n g - t e r m problems. I n response to the clear religious imbalance i n the force, the Inspectorate proposed the 'establishment o f a w o r k i n g g r o u p ' to m o n i t o r religious representation, i n response to w h i c h the R U C i n d i c a t e d it was 'establishing a focus g r o u p ' ( R U C C h i e f Constable's R e p o r t , 1996: 7 3 ) . T h e Patten C o m m i s s i o n w i s h e d to start afresh i n terms o f scrutiny o f the R U C . T h e new, nineteen-member P o l i c i n g B o a r d p r o m i s e d a variety o f p o l i t i c a l inputs, b e i n g c o m p o s e d o f ten representatives o f parties w i t h i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland Executive (but n o t Executive members) a n d n i n e members d r a w n f r o m other organisations, a p p o i n t e d b y the First a n d D e p u t y First M i n i s t e r s . T h e D i s t r i c t P o l i c i n g Partnership Boards ( D P P B s ) were designed to offer local accountability. T h e y w o u l d act as committees o f district c o u n c i l s , f r o m w h i c h a majority o f their members w o u l d be d r a w n . T h e D P P B s w o u l d act as a consultative f o r u m (unlike the P o l i c i n g B o a r d , w h i c h h a d a m o r e f o r m a l supervisory role) a n d a l l o w greater e x p l a n a t i o n o f p o l i c e activity, w i t h the force requested to account for its actions o n a regular basis. Patten, however, offered a n imprecise d e s c r i p t i o n o f w h a t these n e w arrangements w o u l d constitute i n terms o f operational independence for the C h i e f C o n s t a b l e o f the n e w force, leaving this o p e n to interpretation a n d c i r c u m stance ( D i c k s o n , 2 0 0 0 ) .

7.4 Implementing Patten T h e creation o f local p o l i c i n g boards alarmed U n i o n i s t s fearful o f substantial i n p u t f r o m S i n n Fein's elected representatives. S i n n F e i n w o u l d also be entitled to two seats o n the P o l i c i n g B o a r d , reflecting its n u m e r i c a l representation i n the A s s e m b l y Executive. F o r m e r p a r a m i l i t a r y members w o u l d n o t , however, be p e r m i t t e d to j o i n the n e w l y constituted police force. U n i o n i s t s resented the s y m b o l i c r e m o v a l o f 'trappings o f Britishness' w h i c h the n e w force w o u l d be o b l i g e d to endure. T h e N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y rejected the Patten R e p o r t by 5 0 votes to 4 2 , a meaningless gesture given that p o l i c i n g r e m a i n e d a reserved p o w e r c o n t r o l l e d b y the Secretary o f State. T h e award o f the G e o r g e C r o s s to the R U C , seen b y critics as a n almost p o s t h u m o u s tribute, d i d little to assuage c r i t i c i s m o f the proposals for the n e w force. I n January 2 0 0 0 , the B r i t i s h government a n n o u n c e d that it accepted the Patten R e p o r t , a l t h o u g h the name o f the n e w force w o u l d be s l i g h t l y different: the P o l i c e Service o f N o r t h e r n Ireland ( P S N I ) . It was emphasised that the change o f name d i d n o t mean the d i s b a n d m e n t o f the R U C . T h e B i l l w h i c h passed t h r o u g h parliament, however, was sufficiently different f r o m the o r i g i n a l report for o n e m e m b e r o f the Patten C o m m i s s i o n to c l a i m that i t 'dismantles the foundations o n w h i c h the Patten C o m m i s s i o n ' s p l a n was b u i l t ' ( C l i f f o r d Shearing, Guardian, 14 N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 0 ) . T h e thrust o f Shearing's argument was that the Patten

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R e p o r t h a d been d i l u t e d to a police B i l l rather than a p o l i c i n g B i l l , i n that i t w o u l d alter operational aspects o f police w o r k w i t h o u t c h a n g i n g the ethos o r a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's police force. M a n y changes to the police a n d modes o f p o l i c i n g proceeded, i n c l u d i n g the merger o f Special B r a n c h a n d the C I D , the d i s m a n t l i n g o f interrogation centres a n d reductions i n size, w i t h 5 0 0 officers leaving b y A p r i l 2 0 0 0 . A n independent agency was placed i n charge o f recruitment. A Police O m b u d s m a n , w i t h a staff o f 105, replaced the Independent C o m m i s s i o n for P o l i c e C o m p l a i n t s . H o w e v e r , there were large discrepancies f r o m the Patten p r o posals, shifts l i n k e d to the role o f N o r t h e r n Ireland Office officials i n drafting legislation ( O ' L e a r y , 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e powers o f the P o l i c i n g B o a r d a n d the D i s t r i c t Boards were weaker than originally envisaged. Belfast was n o t to be d i v i d e d i n t o four district p o l i c i n g boards, the original proposal under w h i c h S i n n F e i n w o u l d have exercised m u c h influence i n west a n d n o r t h Belfast. T h e n e w oath, n o t r e q u i r i n g allegiance to the Q u e e n , was to be s w o r n o n l y b y new officers. T h e Secretary o f State was given powers over flag displays, emblems a n d the force's name. T h e r e d u c t i o n i n numbers swearing the n e w o a t h was justified b y the Secretary o f State o n the basis that 'existing officers have already been attested as constables a n d cannot be required to take the n e w o a t h ' ( N o r t h e r n Ireland Office, 2 0 0 0 : 3 ) . T h e Secretary o f State assumed responsibility for n o m i n a t i o n s o f non-elected members o f the P o l i c i n g B o a r d , n o t the First M i n i s t e r a n d D e p u t y First M i n i s t e r s proposed b y Patten. S i n n F e i n refused to r e c o m m e n d that N a t i o n a l i s t s j o i n the force a n d d e c l i n e d places o n the P o l i c i n g B o a r d . T h e a b n o r m a l i t y o f N o r t h e r n Ireland was thus evidence b y the refusal o f government ministers (from S i n n F e i n ) refusing to back the state's police force. T h e S D L P backed the n e w force, after the B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t p r o m i s e d further i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the Patten proposals.

7.5 Policing parades O n e o f the m o r e difficult problems c o n f r o n t i n g N o r t h e r n Ireland's police force i n the latter h a l f o f the 1990s became that o f p o l i c i n g the ' m a r c h i n g season'. Between Easter a n d the e n d o f A u g u s t each year, nearly 3,000 parades take place. M o s t o f these are O r a n g e O r d e r marches, a few o f w h i c h pass t h r o u g h areas p o p u l a t e d b y N a t i o n a l i s t s . S o m e C a t h o l i c s object to w h a t they perceive as displays o f Protestant t r i u m p h a l i s m . After i n i t i a l l y b a n n i n g a n O r a n g e parade t h r o u g h parts o f D r u m c r e e i n 1996, the R U C reversed its decision, o u t r a g i n g local C a t h o l i c residents, w h o c l a i m e d the force h a d given i n to the threat posed by O r a n g e disobedience. A s serious r i o t i n g erupted across N o r t h e r n Ireland, the r e t i r i n g C h i e f C o n s t a b l e , H u g h A n n e s l e y , declared that the R U C was i n an 'impossible p o s i t i o n ' . O n e m o n t h later, the Secretary o f State, a c t i n g o n the advice o f the C h i e f C o n s t a b l e , d e c i d e d to prevent the Protestant A p p r e n t i c e B o y s ' m a r c h f r o m p a r a d i n g a l o n g the full length o f D e r r y ' s walls, to c o m memorate the Siege o f D e n y . O p e r a t i o n a l decisions acquired a political flavour. A p p o i n t e d i n 1996, the C h i e f Constable, R o n n i e Flanagan, pledged to assist local c o m m u n i t i e s i n resolving disputes over contentious parades. N e g o t i a t i o n s

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were i m p a i r e d b y suspicions o n b o t h sides. T h e O r a n g e O r d e r has been reluctant to deal w i t h residents' groups, a r g u i n g they are S i n n F e i n 'fronts' a n d c i t i n g the c o m m e n t s o f S i n n Fein's president, G e r r y A d a m s , to a n internal party conference that 'three years o f h a r d w o r k ' w e n t i n t o creating D r u m c r e e a n d other confrontations ( H a d d i c k - F l y n n , 1 9 9 9 : 3 4 8 ) . R e p u b l i c a n s stress the diverse m e m b e r s h i p o f residents' groups a n d widespread o p p o s i t i o n t o sectarian parades. F o l l o w i n g the furore over parades i n 1995 a n d 1996, the B r i t i s h government set u p a committee o f Review o f Parades a n d M a r c h e s , c o m p r i s i n g two members o f the clergy a n d chaired b y the vice-chancellor o f O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , D r Peter N o r t h . A f t e r receiving 3 0 0 submissions a n d h o l d i n g 9 3 meetings w i t h 2 7 0 people, the N o r t h R e v i e w p r o p o s e d that: 1. a Parades C o m m i s s i o n s h o u l d adjudicate disputes arising f r o m the route o r c o n d u c t o f marches; 2. i t s h o u l d be a c r i m i n a l offence i f the C o m m i s s i o n ' s decisions were i g n o r e d ; 3. the R U C w o u l d have the right o f appeal to the N o r t h e r n Ireland Secretary i n respect o f a d e c i s i o n o f the Parades C o m m i s s i o n ; 4. the R U C w o u l d retain the p o w e r to halt a n a p p r o v e d parade o n p u b l i c order grounds. T h e N o r t h R e p o r t reduced the role o f the R U C i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h parades c o u l d proceed, b u t also p r o v i d e d a f o r m o f veto b y w h i c h the R U C c o u l d m a k e its views k n o w n i n advance o f a parade b y appealing against a d e c i s i o n b y the c o m m i s s i o n . T h e R U C w o u l d still r e m a i n i n charge o f the event o n the day a n d w o u l d thus retain operational c o n t r o l , w h i c h b y i m p l i c a t i o n m i g h t involve rerouting. I n s u p p o r t i n g the establishment o f a Parades C o m m i s s i o n , the L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t elected i n 1997 appeared keen to place the q u e s t i o n o f consent for parades o n a m o r e f o r m a l , systematic basis. E q u a l l y anxious to be relieved o f direct responsibility for l i c e n s i n g parades, the R U C also s u p p o r t e d the N o r t h proposals. O f the 3 , 1 6 0 parades i n 1 9 9 6 , the N o r t h R e p o r t f o u n d that 2 0 h a d been b a n n e d o r declared illegal; 31 were either re-routed o r made subject to c o n d i t i o n s , a n d 15 l e d to disorder. U n i o n i s t s argued that the presence o f a C o m m i s s i o n w o u l d merely create a 'grievance factory' ( T r i m b l e , 1997: 15). L o c a l a c c o m m o d a t i o n s w o u l d become less likely, as residents' groups w o u l d insist u p o n referral to the adjudicating b o d y . O v e r the next few years, the Parades C o m m i s s i o n resolved some disputes over parades t h r o u g h its adjudications, a l t h o u g h a n u m b e r o f O r a n g e marches a n d Parades C o m m i s s i o n decisions r e m a i n e d the subjects o f controversy.

7.6 The British Army T h e presence o f the B r i t i s h A r m y i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was s y m p t o m a t i c o f the absence o f p o l i c i n g b y consensus. Between 1969 a n d 1 9 9 9 , the A r m y suffered 5 0 3 losses a n d inflicted 3 1 8 deaths {Guardian, 26 August 1999; M c K i t t r i c k et al, 1 9 9 9 : 1474). I n total, the security forces were responsible

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for a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10 per cent o f the deaths d u r i n g the T r o u b l e s . R e p u b l i c a n s c o m m i t t e d 6 0 per cent o f the killings a n d Loyalists were responsible for 2 6 per cent. T h e B r i t i s h A r m y ' s presence i n d i c a t e d h o w the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland is a p r o d u c t o f b o t h endogenous a n d exogenous factors ( O ' L e a r y , 1985; M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y , 1995). E n d o g e n o u s factors are problems internal to N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h u s , i n 1969 the B r i t i s h A r m y was sent to the P r o v i n c e p r i m a r i l y to halt a n apparent conflict between Protestants a n d C a t h o l i c s . D u r i n g this early p e r i o d o f the T r o u b l e s , m a n y saw the p r o b l e m as o n e o f c o m p e t i n g religious d o m i n a t i o n s engaged i n feuding based u p o n religious sectarianism. T h i s particular b r a n d o f endogenous explanation justified the peacekeeper role o f the B r i t i s h A r m y . Alternative endogenous explanations soon emerged. These emphasised that conflict was based u p o n the struggle between t w o c o m m u n i t i e s over w h o governed N o r t h e r n Ireland. U n i o n i s t s w i s h e d the P r o v i n c e to r e m a i n B r i t i s h . Nationalists sought u n i t y w i t h the remainder o f Ireland. U n d e r such explanations the B r i t i s h A r m y c o u l d not be seen as a neutral peacekeeper. Its role was to u p h o l d the status q u o b y defeating the a r m e d rebellion against B r i t i s h rule w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. D u r i n g the course o f its duties, the A r m y was also o b l i g e d to confront Loyalist 'ultras' w h o waged w a r to defend the B r i t i s h presence, b u t this was insufficient for the A r m y to be perceived as neutral. Exogenous, or external, explanations also u n d e r m i n e d the neutrality argument. S u c h explanations frequently saw N o r t h e r n Ireland as the site o f a t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h versus Irish conflict over territory. F o r R e p u b l i c a n s , the T r o u b l e s were the final leg o f a centuries-old c o l o n i a l struggle to remove B r i t a i n f r o m Ireland. B r i t i s h soldiers represented a visible foreign enemy to be confronted. F r o m its arrival i n N o r t h e r n Ireland i n A u g u s t 1969, the A r m y , under the c o m m a n d o f G e n e r a l Ian Freeland, o p e n l y recognised the l i m i t s o f its role as a buffer force. G e n e r a l Freeland insisted that a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n was required i f amiable relations w i t h the C a t h o l i c c o m m u n i t y were to be prolonged. W i t h i n a year, the deterioration i n relations was almost complete a n d b y 1 9 7 2 , 2 2 , 0 0 0 B r i t i s h troops were based i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e n u m b e r o f troops was reduced substantially f o l l o w i n g the p a r a m i l i t a r y ceasefires i n 1994. W i t h i n one year, the A r m y ended regular patrols i n Belfast a n d overall, a r m y patrols fell b y 75 per cent. H o w e v e r , the temporary fracture o f the I R A ceasefire i n 1996 saw the n u m b e r o f troops return briefly to the levels o f the 1970s, before falling substantially after the renewal o f the I R A ceasefire i n 1997 a n d the 1998 G o o d F r i d a y Agreement. O t h e r personnel have supported regular units o f the police a n d army. T h e y i n c l u d e Special B r a n c h , the intelligence services a n d the Special A i r Service ( S A S ) . A l l these bodies were engaged i n gathering i n f o r m a t i o n regarding the activities o f param i l i t a r y organisations. I n some cases covert operations were carried out as part o f a ' d i r t y w a r ' o n a semi-autonomous basis, u n k n o w n to the Regular A r m y a n d police force. T h e p e r i o d 1 9 8 1 - 9 4 was one o f active counter-insurgency. R i v a l r y between the Special B r a n c h i n L o n d o n a n d the R U C ' s o w n version c o n c e r n i n g the h a n d l i n g o f informants created internal tensions between organisations w o r k i n g towards the same objectives ( D i l l o n , 1990).

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Present i n N o r t h e r n Ireland since 1969, the S A S s u p p o r t e d the security forces i n counter-insurgency. It participated alongside the R U C i n the k i l l i n g o f eight I R A members at L o u g h a l l i n 1987, the biggest losses sustained b y the Provisionals i n a single i n c i d e n t . Its final killings o f I R A personnel o c c u r r e d i n 1992. O n e h i g h l y critical account claims various phases o f S A S activity have occurred: intelligence-gathering, support for Protestant paramilitaries, a sustained offensive i n S o u t h A r m a g h , stakeouts a n d s h o o t - t o - k i l l ( M u r r a y , 1990). U r b a n (1992) suggests that the clandestine operations o f the S A S assumed greater i m p o r t a n c e f o l l o w i n g the advent o f the p o l i c e - p r i m a c y strategy i n 1976. F r o m this p o i n t u n t i l 1987, the S A S a n d the A r m y ' s elite surveillance u n i t , 14 Intelligence C o m p a n y , k i l l e d 3 2 members o f R e p u b l i c a n p a r a m i l i t ary organisations. Despite its far greater n u m e r i c a l strength, the Regular A r m y u n d e r t o o k 11 such killings. N o Loyalists were k i l l e d d u r i n g this p e r i o d . S h r o u d e d i n secrecy, members o f the S A S rarely attended inquests. T h e A r m y engaged i n a war o f attrition against the I R A . It faced the p r o b l e m o f engaging i n m i l i t a r y actions against a b a c k g r o u n d o f a c o n t i n u e d h y b r i d o f n o r m a l a n d emergency law a n d w i t h i n a h i g h l y sensitive political context. A s the B r i t i s h A r m y a n d the I R A appeared incapable o f s c o r i n g a n o u t r i g h t m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y , the n o t i o n o f a n 'acceptable level o f violence' developed, i n w h i c h the n o n escalation o f violence was deemed a relative success. P r o v i s i o n a l I R A violence c o n t i n u e d u n t i l 1994, revived briefly i n 1 9 9 6 - 7 . O n l y w i t h the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a political s o l u t i o n was the m i l i t a r y impasse b r o k e n .

7.7 Ulsterisation and criminalisation After the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s , the basis o f government p o l i c y was to emphasise that members o f p a r a m i l i t a r y groups were c o m m o n c r i m i n a l s . T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t , however, tacitly recognised paramilitary offenders as prisoners o f war, p e r m i t t i n g their release w i t h i n t w o years o f the e n d o f the conflict, irrespective o f the actions c o m m i t t e d . Post-ceasefire, there has also been a d e t e r m i n e d attempt to normalise p o l i c i n g . E v e n d u r i n g the T r o u b l e s , the R U C h a d l o n g undertaken most duties, w i t h the A r m y usually o p e r a t i n g i n a s u p p o r t i n g role. T h e process b y w h i c h the management o f security was undertaken increasingly b y the local force o f the R U C was k n o w n as ' U l s t e r i s a t i o n ' , o r police p r i m a c y . T h e treatment o f members o f p a r a m i l i t a r y groups as c o m m o n c r i m i n a l s was k n o w n as c r i m i n a l i s a t i o n . These responses were seen as the most appropriate means o f ' k e e p i n g the l i d o n ' i n terms o f the security situation. B o t h responses began under the Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland, M e r l y n Rees. H e was assisted b y a partially observed I R A ceasefire i n 1 9 7 5 , w h i c h led to a decline i n the strength o f the organisation. D u r i n g this p e r i o d , contacts between the B r i t i s h government a n d the I R A were facilitated b y the establishment o f a n u m b e r o f i n c i d e n t centres. T h e I R A believed its m i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n made B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l i m m i n e n t . Indeed, the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t encouraged such t h i n k i n g as a means o f p r o l o n g i n g the ceasefire ( B e w a n d Patterson, 1985).

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I n ' n o r m a l i s i n g ' life i n the P r o v i n c e , the B r i t i s h government released those detained under i n t e r n m e n t b y 1975. D e t e n t i o n w i t h o u t trial was the m o s t manifest s y m b o l o f the a b n o r m a l i t y o f the security situation. F u r t h e r m o r e , i t h a d been h i g h l y ineffective a n d its a b a n d o n m e n t was w e l c o m e d b y the security forces. Selective detention orders ensured that i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d be arrested a c c o r d i n g to the decree o f a senior a r m y officer a n d detained indefinitely. U n d e r the n e w criminalisation approach, those arrested a n d convicted w o u l d be treated i n a m a n n e r similar to ' O D C s ' - o r d i n a r y decent c r i m i n a l s , i n the parlance o f the security forces. A plethora o f anti-terrorist laws was i n t r o d u c e d . Security p o l i c y began to operate under a set o f defined rules, rather than o n the ad hoc basis that characterised the approach pre-1974. A s part o f the Ulsterisation process, the R U C w o u l d n o r m a l l y assume responsibility for u n d e r t a k i n g arrests a n d processing the case against the accused. C r i t i c s argued that this was a false attempt at n o r m a l i s i n g procedures, given the presence o f juryless courts a n d special interrogation centres. Previously, the award o f special-category status i n 1972 was o f considerable s y m b o l i c a n d practical value to the paramilitary groups. It appeared to c o n f i r m their role as 'soldiers' engaged i n struggle. Special-category status also a l l o w e d detainees free association, ensuring that c o m m a n d structures were easily retained w i t h i n p r i s o n . These features d i d n o t entirely v a n i s h w i t h the a b o l i t i o n o f special status. C o m m a n d hierarchies were m a i n t a i n e d w i t h i n p a r a m i l i t a r y groups. T h e B r i t i s h government was determined to remove symbols o f l e g i t i m acy to the ' a r m e d struggle'. I n 1975, the G a r d i n e r C o m m i t t e e argued that the award o f special-category status h a d been a n error a n d its r e m o v a l was swift ( G a r d i n e r R e p o r t , 1975). T h e removal o f special-category status was f o l l o w e d b y attempts to portray the I R A leadership as 'godfathers' a n d racketeers. Ulsterisation a n d c r i m i n a l i s a t i o n were c o n t i n u e d i n yet stronger fashion b y Rees' successor, R o y M a s o n . H e was unimpressed b y the calibre o f local politicians a n d believed that there was little p o i n t i n attempting to break the p o l i t i c a l stalemate w h i c h h a d f o l l o w e d the collapse o f power-sharing i n 1974. M a s o n concentrated attention u p o n policies designed to m i n i m i s e the i m p a c t o f p a r a m i l i t a r y activity, believing that t o u g h security measures c o u l d defeat the I R A . T h e r e was a scant peace d i v i d e n d arising f r o m the n e w security approach. I n 1976, there were 2 9 7 deaths related to the T r o u b l e s . O n l y 1972 y i e l d e d a h i g h e r death t o l l . T h e B r i t i s h A r m y suffered far fewer losses, however, as R e p u b l i c a n violence was 'funnelled inwards i n t o internecine feuding, sectarian m u r d e r a n d gangsterism' ( B i s h o p a n d M a l l i e , 1988: 2 7 5 ) . A l t h o u g h the rate o f deaths fell sharply i n 1977 a n d 1978, a series o f p r o m i n e n t I R A atrocities i n 1979 i n d i c a t e d the l i m i t s o f strategies p r o m o t i n g n o r m a l i t y . D u r i n g that year, 18 soldiers were k i l l e d i n a massacre at W a r r e n p o i n t . L o r d M o u n t b a t t e n was m u r d e r e d i n the Irish R e p u b l i c a n d the Conservative Party S h a d o w N o r t h ern Ireland Secretary, A i r e y N e a v e , was b l o w n u p b y a b o m b p l a n t e d b y the Irish N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n A r m y , a left-wing offshoot o f the I R A . A l t h o u g h the overall level o f violence was reduced, U l s t e r i s a t i o n a n d c r i m i n a l i s a t i o n also revealed the d u r a b i l i t y o f the terrorist c a m p a i g n , despite the pledge

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o f M a s o n to squeeze the I R A 'like a tube o f toothpaste' (quoted i n U r b a n , 1992: 11). Ulsterisation a n d c r i m i n a l i s a t i o n d i d n o t offer p o l i t i c a l solutions. F u r t h e r more, their a d o p t i o n was far f r o m total. W h i l s t ' n o r m a l ' p o l i c i n g resumed, there was c o n c u r r e n t l y a n increased reliance u p o n the undercover operations o f the S A S . I n a d d i t i o n to u n c o m p r o m i s i n g security policies, M a s o n placed faith i n e c o n o m i c development. H e resolved to attract i n w a r d investment a n d provide assistance for industry, a l t h o u g h the reality was that even heavy subsidies d i d little to prevent the rate o f u n e m p l o y m e n t c o n t i n u i n g to be the highest i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . G i v e n the m o r e casualised nature o f u n e m p l o y m e n t amongst C a t h o l i c s , considerable e c o n o m i c disparities r e m a i n e d between the two c o m m u n i t i e s . Ulsterisation was a n attempt to return to internal security. B y r e m o v i n g the army from frontline operations, it was h o p e d that antagonism w o u l d be reduced. It a m o u n t e d to a s w i t c h f r o m c o l o n i a l counter-insurgency techniques towards an attempt to place crisis p o l i c i n g w i t h i n a liberal d e m o c r a t i c framework (Newsinger, 1995). U s e o f a local police force i n place o f the A r m y m i g h t have been a successful tactic i f it were a case o f p o l i c i n g w i t h consent. H o w e v e r , mistrust o f the R U C amongst sections o f the N a t i o n a l i s t p o p u l a t i o n m e a n t that the p r i m a c y o f the R U C achieved little. N u m b e r s o f troops fell f r o m 2 1 , 0 0 0 i n 1972 to 13,500 b y 1978, b u t this was compensated b y increased recruitment to the R U C a n d U D R . T h e o r e t i c a l l y at least, the R U C n o w c o n t r o l l e d security activity i n N o r t h e r n Ireland.

7.8 Conclusion D e c o m m i s s i o n i n g apart, reform o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's p o l i c e force has been as controversial as a n y aspect o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . T h e R U C was l i k e d a n d supported b y most U n i o n i s t s , b u t criticised b y m a n y N a t i o n a l i s t s a n d loathed b y some. Its religious imbalance a n d lack o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y made change inevitable. S u c h changes alienated some U n i o n i s t s a n d were t o o marginal to satisfy R e p u b l i c a n s . A s such, p o l i c i n g i n N o r t h e r n Ireland remains h i g h l y p o l i t i c i s e d a n d non-consensual, clear indicators o f the insecurity o f the state.

Chapter 8

The roles of religion

R e l i g i o n continues to play a n influential role i n society i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. L a b e l l i n g b y religious d e n o m i n a t i o n remains the most convenient m e t h o d o f identifying the d i v i s i o n between the c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e terms C a t h o l i c a n d Protestant are preferred to N a t i o n a l i s t a n d U n i o n i s t , o r R e p u b l i c a n a n d Loyalist, as they embrace the vast majority o f people a n d are less p r o b l e m a t i c than other labels. A p p l i c a t i o n o f the label N a t i o n a l i s t to a c o m m u n i t y implies that all members o f that c o m m u n i t y support Irish u n i t y . T h i s is n o t necessarily the case. T h e use o f religious labels to describe c o m m u n i t i e s is also unsatisfactory. S u c h m e t h o d o l o g y fails to distinguish the extent o f religious c o m m i t m e n t a n d m a y i n c l u d e non-believers w h e n a p p l i e d to a geographical area. O t h e r c o m m u n i t i e s are also ignored, such as the A s i a n c o m m u n i t y i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, w h i c h has also e n d u r e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . I n a n imperfect w o r l d , use o f the C a t h o l i c a n d Protestant religious labels has remained c o m m o n o n l y through a lack o f suitable alternatives.

8.1 The extent of religiosity A l t h o u g h N o r t h e r n Ireland has n o t been exempt f r o m the trend towards secularism w i t h i n western E u r o p e , i t has remained perhaps the most resistant region. O v e r h a l f o f the p o p u l a t i o n attends c h u r c h weekly. T h e o v e r w h e l m i n g majority o f members o f the major p o l i t i c a l parties c l a i m to practise their religious faith. N o n - c h u r c h weddings are rare, w h i l s t N o r t h e r n Ireland has a substantially lower rate o f births outside marriage than elsewhere i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . T h e provisions o f the 1967 A b o r t i o n A c t p e r m i t t i n g a b o r t i o n have n o t been extended to N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e o v e r w h e l m i n g majority o f people identify themselves as either C a t h o l i c or Protestant, as T a b l e 8.1 indicates. R e l i g i o u s labels are so pervasive that the ancient joke over whether o n e is a Protestant o r a C a t h o l i c atheist still has some resonance. M a n y believe that the n u m b e r o f C a t h o l i c s w i l l o u t g r o w the figure for Protestants, a l t h o u g h there is considerable dispute over w h e n this w i l l occur. H i g h e r C a t h o l i c b i r t h rates d u r i n g previous decades closed the gap. P a r i t y o f n u m b e r s m i g h t already have occurred h a d there n o t been persistently h i g h rates o f C a t h o l i c emigration. U n i o n i s t s fear this d e m o g r a p h i c change, as recent

98

8.2 Protestant churches and beliefs Table 8.1

99

Religious denominations in Northern Ireland Percentage 50.6 38.4 37 7.3

Protestant Catholic None Not stated

Source: adapted from Northern Ireland Census 1991, Religion Report.

p o l i t i c a l agreements have stressed that legislation w i l l be enacted to p r o v i d e for a u n i t e d Ireland i f that is w h a t the majority o f the p o p u l a t i o n o f N o r t h e r n Ireland desire. Nonetheless, i t is u n l i k e l y that a majority i n favour o f v o t i n g the state o f N o r t h e r n Ireland o u t o f existence w i l l emerge for at least another century. T h e r e remains a significant m i n o r i t y o f C a t h o l i c s w h o d o n o t w i s h this scenario. It is, o f course, possible that i f C a t h o l i c s d o become a majority, these 'dissident' C a t h o l i c s m a y support u n i t y as they m i g h t feel i t h a d a m o r e d e m o c r a t i c basis.

8.2 Protestant churches and beliefs It is m i s l e a d i n g t o describe the Protestant C h u r c h as i f i t were a singular entity. T a b l e 8.2 shows the strength o f the m a i n Protestant C h u r c h e s i n terms o f their p r o p o r t i o n o f the entire p o p u l a t i o n o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e Presbyterian C h u r c h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland dates back to the Scots settlers o f the early seventeenth century. It began t o f o r m part o f a coherent Protestant ' f a m i l y ' o f churches i n the 1800s. L o o s e l y c o n t r o l l e d b y a G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y w h i c h oversees the system o f synods, presbyteries a n d congregations, the Presbyterian C h u r c h enjoys the support o f nearly h a l f the Protestant p o p u l a t i o n i n N o r t h e r n Ireland.

Table 8.2

Protestant denominations in Northern Ireland

Denomination

Percentage of the population (entire)

Presbyterian Church of Ireland Methodist Baptist Congregationalist Free Presbyterian Others Total

21 18 4 1 1 1 4 50

Source: adapted from Northern Ireland Census 1991, Religion Report.

100

The roles of religion

T h e C h u r c h o f Ireland is perhaps the most liberal o f the Protestant churches, i n terms o f religion a n d p o l i t i c a l o u t l o o k . A c c o r d i n g to one c o m m e n t a t o r , it is the Protestant m o v e m e n t most l i k e l y to overcome U n i o n i s t h o s t i l i t y to greater p o l i t i c a l association w i t h the rest o f Ireland (Irvine, 1991). D r R o b e r t Eames, head o f the C h u r c h o f Ireland, performed a m e d i a t i o n role i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the peace process i n the 1990s, a l t h o u g h this task was carried o u t i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the R e v . R o y M a g e e , a representative o f the m o r e religiously a n d p o l i t i c a l l y conservative Presbyterian C h u r c h . O r g a n i s e d o n a n all-Ireland basis, the C h u r c h is headed b y 12 bishops, the most senior o f w h o m is the primate o f all Ireland. O n c e the Established C h u r c h i n Ireland a n d part o f the A n g l i c a n c o m m u n i t y , its forms o f w o r s h i p are nonetheless distinct f r o m the h i g h - c h u r c h A n g l o - C a t h o l i c i s m sometimes f o u n d i n E n g l a n d . A l t h o u g h sometimes associated w i t h more prosperous sections o f society, support for the C h u r c h o f Ireland straddles the social classes. M a n y o f the Protestant churches have co-operated i n the e c u m e n i c a l m o v e m e n t designed to achieve greater C h r i s t i a n u n i t y . B a c k e d b y assistance f r o m A m e r i c a n Presbyterian churches, a n u m b e r o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n initiatives have been undertaken. These began w i t h the i n t e r - c h u r c h C o r r y m e e l a C o m m u n i t y project i n 1965 a n d m o r e recently have i n v o l v e d n e i g h b o u r h o o d r e c o n c i l i a t i o n schemes i n Belfast a n d D e n y (Beerman a n d M a h o n y , 1993). A s a creed, Protestantism has a n u m b e r o f core themes. A t the considerable risk o f oversimplification, these m i g h t be s u m m a r i s e d as: 1. all h u m a n s are sinners; 2. G o d exists a n d eternal salvation is possible to w i p e away sins; 3. t o achieve salvation, the w o r d o f G o d must be followed; 4. the B i b l e is the true w o r d o f G o d ; 5. because the B i b l e is the true w o r d , there is n o need for mass, priests o r 'false w o r s h i p ' . F e w Protestants elsewhere i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m w o u l d have m u c h regard for p o i n t five. Indeed, leaders o f the m a i n churches i n N o r t h e r n Ireland meet regularly a n d generally enjoy c o r d i a l relations. T h e r e exists a b r o a d d i v i s i o n between liberal a n d evangelical wings o f Protestantism. I n Belfast, they are fairly equally represented w i t h i n the Presbyterian a n d M e t h o d i s t churches. Smaller churches tend to c o n t a i n higher p r o p o r t i o n s o f fundamentalists. S u c h churches often base teachings u p o n a literal reading o f scripture. Fundamentalists w i t h i n the Presbyterian C h u r c h are m u c h less enthusiastic towards e c u m e n i s m . T h e i r beliefs are rooted i n Scottish C a l v i n i s m , i n w h i c h salvation is undeserved, b u t m a y be awarded b y G o d . B e l i e v i n g that the B i b l e is the d i v i n e w o r k o f G o d , they argue that o n l y those w h o respond to the gospel message w i l l be saved. G o o d behaviour is n o t sufficient as it is predestined as to whether they are to be saved o r otherwise (Bruce, 1986). Fundamentalists are usually Sabbatarians, p l a c i n g great stress u p o n strict religious observance o n S u n d a y , allied to l i m i t a t i o n u p o n the pursuit o f leisure. W i t h i n this creed there exists the n o t i o n o f the C h o s e n People, destined to be delivered f r o m h e l l . Fundamentalists a n d evangelicals differ, therefore, f r o m the universalism

8.3 Orangeism

101

Table 8.3 Religious attitudes of Protestants in Northern Ireland Issue

Party supported DUP

Willing to share worship with Catholics Aim for unity with Catholic Church Aim for greater religious and social co-operation School to be entirely Protestant Happy for child to marry Catholic

5 4 21 53 2

UUP Alliance (Percentage agreeing) 22 4 45 31 7

66 19 64 7 41

Source-, adapted from Lambkin (1996). o f liberal Protestantism u n d e r w h i c h all C h r i s t i a n s m a y be saved whatever the central tenets o f their faith. M o s t fundamentalist o f all is the Free Presbyterian C h u r c h , a tiny c h u r c h even t h o u g h its m e m b e r s h i p its g r o w i n g . Free Presbyterianism has been described as a 'subspecies o f conservative evangelicalism' (Bruce, 1986: 2 0 0 ) . Its s p i r i t u a l leader, the Rev. Ian Paisley, has d e n o u n c e d C a t h o l i c i s m a n d used his o w n c h u r c h , p o l i t i c a l party a n d newspaper to d e n o u n c e the 'false gods' o f R o m e . H e has declared: Through Popery the Devil has shut up the way to our inheritance. Priestcraft, superstition and papalism with all their attendant vices of murder, theft, immorality, lust and incest blocked the way to the land of gospel liberty' (Protestant Telegraph, 4 January 1967, cited in Coogan, 1995: 45). Paisley a n d his followers campaign against any 'watering-down' o f the principles o f Protestantism a n d have demonstrated against co-operative e c u m e n i c a l gestures. Paisleyites d o n o t see their o w n approach as a n t i - C a t h o l i c . Indeed, Paisley believes it is his d u t y to represent i n d i v i d u a l C a t h o l i c s w i t h i n his p o l i t i c a l constituency. Instead, his religious f u n d a m e n t a l i s m is a n t i - C a t h o l i c C h u r c h , v i e w i n g the P o p e as the A n t i c h r i s t . T h e e c u m e n i c a l m o v e m e n t has h a d less o f an i m p a c t i n N o r t h e r n Ireland than elsewhere i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . O n l y a m i n o r i t y o f Protestants w o u l d be w i l l i n g to share w o r s h i p w i t h C a t h o l i c s , a l t h o u g h it s h o u l d be n o t e d a majority o f Protestants also d i s d a i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n w o r s h i p w i t h Free Presbyterians ( B o a l et al, 1991). A t t i t u d e s amongst Protestants differ greatly a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h p o l i t i c a l party they support. T h e non-sectarian A l l i a n c e Party contains the highest n u m b e r o f liberal Protestants relatively u n c o n c e r n e d over integration w i t h C a t h o l i c s . T h e D e m o c r a t i c U n i o n i s t Party contains the highest n u m b e r o f those professing distrust o f closer co-operation. T h e s e attit u d i n a l differences are i n d i c a t e d i n T a b l e 8.3.

8.3 Orangeism Religious divisions i n N o r t h e r n Ireland are heightened b y the p r o m i n e n c e o f church-based social activity. Protestants m a y attend S u n d a y S c h o o l , the B o y s '

102

The roles of religion

Brigade a n d B i b l e study groups, activities rarely undertaken b y C a t h o l i c s . O t h e r t h a n the churches themselves, the m a i n Protestant i n s t i t u t i o n is the L o y a l I n s t i t u t i o n o f Ireland, otherwise k n o w n as the O r a n g e O r d e r . It is headed b y the G r a n d M a s t e r , R o b e r t Saulters, a n d is organised i n t o c o u n t y , district a n d local lodges. Established i n 1795 f o l l o w i n g the Battle o f D i a m o n d between

Protestants

a n d C a t h o l i c s , the O r a n g e O r d e r commemorates the victory o f the Protestant K i n g W i l l i a m III, P r i n c e o f O r a n g e , over the C a t h o l i c K i n g James i n 1 6 9 0 . T h i s t r i u m p h is celebrated a n n u a l l y o n 12 J u l y . T e n s o f thousands participate, w i t h hundreds o f parades feeding to 2 0 centres, where religious a n d p o l i t i c a l speeches are heard. T h e day is a p u b l i c h o l i d a y i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e O r a n g e O r d e r views the victory as a historic t r i u m p h for c i v i l a n d religious liberty, w h i c h it pledged to defend. T h e m a i n aims o f the O r d e r are: 1. to u p h o l d belief i n G o d ; 2. to m a i n t a i n the Protestant C r o w n ; 3. to defend the Protestant faith; 4. to oppose the C h u r c h o f R o m e ; O r a n g e O r d e r members are required to oppose the 'fatal errors a n d doctrines o f the C h u r c h o f R o m e ' ( K e n n e d y , 1995: 3). T h e y must also resist any attempt by the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h to extend its power. F o r b i d d e n f r o m m a r r y i n g a C a t h o l i c , a m e m b e r o f the O r a n g e O r d e r is also barred f r o m p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a C a t h o l i c act o f w o r s h i p . C r i t i c s argue that the O r d e r fosters religious sectarianism, w h i c h m i g h t be defined as bigotry o r narrow-mindedness i n f o l l o w i n g one's d e n o m i n a t i o n . O n e study o f the O r d e r attests that 'its references to "popery" m u s t be seen as crudely i n s u l t i n g , n o t just to the C a t h o l i c religion b u t to neighbours a n d fellow citizens w h o espouse that r e l i g i o n ' ( H a d d i c k - F l y n n , 1999: 3 5 3 - 4 ) . G u e l k e (1988: 38) argues that O r a n g e marches are 'an assertion o f the physical d o m i n a n c e o f the Protestant c o m m u n i t y ' . I n refuting these charges, the O r d e r points o u t that a n O r a n g e m a n is required to be 'ever abstaining f r o m all u n charitable words, actions o r sentiments towards his R o m a n C a t h o l i c brethren'. A sympathetic account o f the O r a n g e O r d e r argues that i t is a c o m m u n i t y 'misrepresented a n d traduced' ( D u d l e y E d w a r d s , 1999: x i i ) . A l t h o u g h the O r a n g e O r d e r is a global i n s t i t u t i o n , N o r t h e r n Ireland is the o n l y real centre o f O r a n g e i s m . Elsewhere, the O r d e r has sizeable n u m b e r s o n l y i n the west o f S c o t l a n d a n d , to a m u c h lesser extent nowadays, o n Merseyside. It possesses 4 , 0 0 0 members i n the Irish R e p u b l i c . M e m b e r s h i p i n N o r t h e r n Ireland is estimated at 8 0 , 0 0 0 . T h e r e is also a small A s s o c i a t i o n o f L o y a l O r a n g e w o m e n a n d a separate Independent O r a n g e O r d e r . P r i m a r y functions o f the O r a n g e O r d e r have been to achieve u n i t y across the different Protestant d e n o m i n a t i o n s a n d support amongst various social classes. T h e O r d e r has t r a d i t i o n a l l y attracted support amongst b o t h Presbyterians a n d members o f the C h u r c h o f Ireland. It appeals even to those w h o are n o t churchgoers, as D o u d s ( 1 9 9 5 : 14) describes:

8.4 The Catholic Church in Ireland

103

The Order still has a pivotal role within Ulster. Protestantism and all the Protestant Churches are to some extent influenced by h . The urban working-class have been lost to the main Protestant denominations for some years now and the only contact these people are likely to have with any vaguely religious body is the Order. T w o s i m i l a r Protestant institutions exist. F o u n d e d i n 1814, the A p p r e n t i c e B o y s o f D e n y organisation contains 12,000 members. N e w recruits are i n i t i ated w i t h i n the walls o f the c i t y o f D e n y . T h e A p p r e n t i c e B o y s celebrate the l i f t i n g o f the Siege o f D e n y i n A u g u s t 1689, w h e n W i l l i a m o f O r a n g e arrived to relieve the 13 apprentice boys w h o h a d s l a m m e d shut the gates o f D e n y to keep o u t the C a t h o l i c K i n g James. S i x o f the eight Parent C l u b s w i t h i n the organisation are n a m e d after leaders o f the Siege. A p p r e n t i c e B o y s see their parades, i n c l u d i n g the m a i n A u g u s t c o m m e m o r a t i o n o f the Siege, as a celebration o f a v i c t o r y for c i v i l a n d religious liberties. C a t h o l i c s , w h o f o r m a majority i n D e r r y , t e n d to be critical o f w h a t they see as t r i u m p h a l i s t parades. I n 1 9 9 5 , the A p p r e n t i c e B o y s revived their t r a d i t i o n o f w a l k i n g the length o f the c i t y walls, reopened for the first t i m e since the start o f the T r o u b l e s . O p p o s i t i o n f r o m N a t i o n a l i s t residents o f the nearby Bogside l e d to the A p p r e n t i c e B o y s b e i n g b a n n e d f r o m a section o f the walls i n A u g u s t 1996. Since then, however, a n a c c o m m o d a t i o n has usually been reached between the A p p r e n t i c e B o y s a n d local groups. E a c h D e c e m b e r , the A p p r e n t i c e B o y s stage a smaller parade c o m m e m o r a t i n g the closure o f the gates o f the city. A n effigy o f C o l o n e l L u n d y is b u r n t . L u n d y a t t e m p t e d to negotiate a surrender o f the defiant Protestants, a n d the t e r m ' L u n d y ' is a t e r m m e a n i n g traitor w i t h i n the Protestant c o m m u n i t y . A s part o f a n attempt to lessen the tension caused b y its a n n u a l c o m m e m o r a t i o n , the N a t i o n a l i s t c o n t r o l l e d D e r r y C i t y C o u n c i l a n d the C o m m u n i t y Relations C o u n c i l have encouraged c u l t u r a l celebrations o f the Siege o f D e r r y . I n d o i n g so, they believed that i t p r o v i d e d respect for the Protestant t r a d i t i o n . O v e r a l l , D e r r y has n o t e n d u r e d the extent o f sectarian tensions suffered i n Belfast. O f t e n regarded as the 'elite' o f the O r a n g e O r d e r , the R o y a l B l a c k Preceptory is sometimes k n o w n as the R o y a l B l a c k I n s t i t u t i o n , o r as the I m p e r i a l G r a n d B l a c k C h a p t e r o f the B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h . M e m b e r s h i p t h r o u g h o u t N o r t h ern Ireland is estimated at 3 0 , 0 0 0 . T h e headquarters o f the organisation is based i n L u r g a n , A r m a g h . A i m s a n d principles o f the I n s t i t u t i o n are s i m i l a r to those h e l d b y the O r a n g e O r d e r . ' B l a c k m e n ' m u s t also be members o f the O r a n g e O r d e r . T h e Preceptory stages its m a i n parade o n the final Saturday i n A u g u s t .

8.4 The Catholic Church in Ireland O r g a n i s e d o n a n all-Ireland basis, the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h is easily the biggest single i n s t i t u t i o n i n Ireland, as 9 5 per cent o f the p o p u l a t i o n s o u t h o f the border c l a i m m e m b e r s h i p , i n a d d i t i o n to 4 0 per cent i n the N o r t h . T h e leader o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h i n Ireland is based i n the ecclesiastical capital o f the island, A r m a g h . H e is at the apex o f a hierarchy o f priests a n d bishops organised i n t o various dioceses.

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The roles of religion

U n t i l the 1980s, the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h enjoyed a h e g e m o n i c role w i t h i n the Irish R e p u b l i c . P o l i t i c a l independence a l l o w e d the development o f legislation i n support o f a s y m b o l o f that independence. Religious i d e n t i t y was seen as a central s y m b o l o f nationality and, therefore, politics. T h e absence o f a significant party o f the left, o r a n u r b a n proletariat, prevented the development o f the anti-clerical sentiment w h i c h developed i n some E u r o p e a n countries. T h e teachings o f the C h u r c h were reflected i n laws p r o h i b i t i n g divorce, c o n t r a c e p t i o n a n d a b o r t i o n . I f N o r t h e r n Ireland was a Protestant state for a Protestant people, so the R e p u b l i c was u n d o u b t e d l y a m i r r o r image, a C a t h o l i c state for a C a t h o l i c people. I n 1 9 7 2 the special p o s i t i o n o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h was r e m o v e d from A r t i c l e 4 4 o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n , b u t the strength o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h was a c k n o w l e d g e d b y a papal visit i n 1979. O n e - t h i r d o f the entire p o p u l a t i o n o f the R e p u b l i c greeted P o p e J o h n P a u l II o n arrival. N o t u n t i l the f o l l o w i n g decade d i d the fusion o f C a t h o l i c social teaching a n d legislative restrictions c o m e under serious challenge. N o r were these ' C a t h o l i c ' laws swept away en masse b y a tide o f liberalisation. I n 1 9 8 3 , a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a n o n a b o r t i o n was i n t r o d u c e d , w h i l s t the b a n o n divorce was u p h e l d i n 1986. E v e n the 1995 referendum w h i c h led to the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f divorce was passed b y the narrowest o f margins. T h e v i c t o r y for 'yes' campaigners o w e d m u c h to the scandals i n w h i c h the C h u r c h h a d become engulfed i n the 1990s, w e a k e n i n g its authority. These scandals i n v o l v e d paedophile cases a n d the use o f C h u r c h m o n e y to pay for i l l e g i t i m ate c h i l d r e n fathered b y clergy. T h e vote to p e r m i t divorce was described as the biggest defeat for the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h since the creation o f the R e p u b l i c ( M i n o g u e , 1996). O p p o s i n g the change, D r D e r m o t C l i f f o r d , B i s h o p o f Cashel, stated that divorcees were heavier drinkers a n d smokers, recipients o f higher eating disorders a n d even three times more likely to be involved i n car accidents (quoted i n D o y l e , 1995: 13). M u c h o f the 1980s a n d 1990s were characterised b y batdes between reformers a n d fundamentalists. T h e latter often c o m p r i s e d lay groups, often seen as part o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h , a l t h o u g h they were, i n defence o f its stances, seen as ' m o r e C a t h o l i c than the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h ' . Indeed, the C h u r c h attempted a less overt stance i n some referenda o n social a n d m o r a l issues, n o t a b l y the final referendum o n the liberalisation o f the divorce laws. Increasi n g l y , the R e p u b l i c h a d become a liberal, pluralist society b y the e n d o f the twentieth century. T h e decline i n the influence o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h i n the Irish R e p u b l i c was m a t c h e d b y a reduction i n its n u m e r i c a l strength n o r t h a n d south. Between 1970 a n d 1 9 8 9 , the n u m b e r o f religious personnel fell f r o m 2 5 , 1 7 2 to 15,634 (Hussey, 1995: 3 7 3 ) . Fewer people entered vocations, resulting i n a n ageing clergy. A t t e n d a n c e at S u n d a y M a s s , c o m p u l s o r y for C a t h o l i c s , remains substantial b u t is falling, particularly i n urban areas; a n d religiosity, i f measu r e d c r u d e l y b y c h u r c h - g o i n g , m a y be higher i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. Since the S e c o n d V a t i c a n C o u n c i l o f the 1960s, the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h has adopted m o r e liberal attitudes. T h e alternative C h r i s t i a n i t y o f Protestant C h u r c h e s was recognised w i t h participation i n ecumenical projects encouraged.

8.5 The political influence of the Catholic Church

105

In 1970, the 1908 Ne temere decree was relaxed. I n a marriage o f a C a t h o l i c a n d a Protestant, this was a requirement that the C a t h o l i c attempt the conversion o f the Protestant a n d that the c h i l d r e n o f the marriage be b r o u g h t u p as C a t h o l i c s . W h i l s t the d e m a n d s o f Ne temere h a d e n o r m o u s i m p a c t u p o n marriages i n v o l v i n g C a t h o l i c s elsewhere, its i m p a c t i n Ireland was o n l y slight. In the S o u t h , m i x e d marriages were rare d u e to the lack o f a substantial Protestant p o p u l a t i o n . I n the N o r t h , divisions between the Protestant a n d C a t h o l i c c o m m u n i t i e s meant that m i x e d marriages were unusual even before the onset o f the T r o u b l e s . Between 1 9 4 3 - 8 2 , o n l y 6 per cent o f marriages were m i x e d i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, less than one-tenth o f the figure for marriages i n v o l v i n g a C a t h o l i c i n E n g l a n d a n d W a l e s ( F u l t o n , 1 9 9 1 : 1 9 9 ) .

8.5 The political influence of the Catholic Church W h i l s t the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h w o u l d c l a i m that its p r i m a r y roles are spiritual a n d pastoral, it has sometimes been seen as p e r f o r m i n g a p o l i t i c a l role. I r o n i c a l l y , U n i o n i s t s a n d R e p u b l i c a n s have b o t h criticised the C h u r c h , for different reasons. M i l i t a n t U n i o n i s t s , m a i n l y Paisleyites, have argued that the C h u r c h is a supporter o f Irish r e p u b l i c a n i s m . R e p u b l i c a n s c l a i m e d that the C h u r c h failed to support Irish u n i t y and was too c o n d e m n a t o r y o f paramilitary attempts to achieve a u n i t e d Ireland. T h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland conflict came m a i n l y i n t w o forms. Firstly, it spoke against perceived injustices a n d was vocal i n its c o n d e m n a t i o n o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d violence. Secondly, it sometimes offered a brokerage role i n attempts to resolve issues w i t h i n the broader conflict. C r i t i c i s m s b y Paisleyites have centred u p o n several contentions. T h e y believe that the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h is expansionist a n d supportive o f Irish u n i t y . Previous cardinals, such as T h o m a s O ' F i a i c h , were indeed N a t i o n a l i s t s . Paisleyites p o i n t e d o u t that the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority o f members o f the I R A were C a t h o l i c s . P r o m i n e n t members o f S i n n F e i n , such as M a r t i n M c G u i n n e s s a n d G e r r y A d a m s , are practising C a t h o l i c s , a n d A d a m s has l o n g argued that C a t h o l i c i s m a n d republicanism are reconcilable (Bishop a n d M a l l i e , 1988). F u r t h e r m o r e , the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h refused to e x c o m m u n i c a t e members o f the I R A d u r i n g the T r o u b l e s . M a n y R e p u b l i c a n s adopted a n entirely different view. T h e C a t h o l i c C h u r c h was seen as a hostile critic, a l t h o u g h friction d e c l i n e d m a r k e d l y d u r i n g the peace process o f the 1990s. G i v e n the religious allegiance o f the N a t i o n a l i s t p o p u l a t i o n , c r i t i c i s m f r o m the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h was taken seriously. A l t h o u g h some local priests were viewed as sympathetic to R e p u b l i c a n ideals, the C h u r c h hierarchy attracted R e p u b l i c a n o p p r o b r i u m for its vociferous d e n u n c i a t i o n o f I R A violence. T h e C h u r c h rejected the c l a i m that R e p u b l i c a n s were engaged i n a just war against a n oppressor. E q u a l l y , the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h stressed there were n o 'legitimate targets' for paramilitary action. A l t h o u g h critical o f partition, the C h u r c h c o n d e m n e d the war against its maintenance. T h e P o p e c o n d e m n e d violence d u r i n g his 1979 visit, w h i l s t appearing to acknowledge that its perpetrators sought justice. It was once c o m m e n t e d that w h e n the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h

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c o n d e m n s violence, i t becomes ' i n a u d i b l e ' to its flock ( O ' B r i e n , 1972: 3 1 0 ) . Nonetheless, a majority w i t h i n the C a t h o l i c c o m m u n i t y always rejected violence, a l t h o u g h some w i t h i n that c o m m u n i t y , w h i l s t t a k i n g their r e l i g i o n f r o m the p u l p i t , l o o k e d elsewhere for a p o l i t i c a l lead. C a t h o l i c i s m has n o t relied u p o n the support o f organisations s t r a d d l i n g religion a n d politics. Instead, it has relied u p o n the strength o f u n i t y o f the C h u r c h . T h e C a t h o l i c equivalent o f the O r a n g e O r d e r , the A n c i e n t O r d e r o f H i b e r n i a n s ( A O H ) , has been a very pale shadow o f its Protestant counterpart. T h e A O H h a d i n f o r m a l links w i t h the o l d N a t i o n a l i s t Party. A l t h o u g h i t has organised parades for m a n y years, lack o f power a n d patronage have seen the A O H decline f r o m what was always a m a r g i n a l p o s i t i o n . In its brokerage role, the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h has attempted to mediate between different v i e w p o i n t s w i t h i n a n d between the c o m m u n i t i e s . Its negotiating role means that the confidence o f interested parties has to be gained. A demonstrat i o n o f internal m e d i a t i o n w i t h i n the N a t i o n a l i s t c o m m u n i t y was seen i n the 1 9 8 0 - 1 hunger strikes undertaken b y I R A a n d I N L A prisoners w i t h i n T h e M a z e i n a n attempt to o b t a i n prisoner-of-war status. T h e C a t h o l i c C h u r c h refused to c o n d e m n the hunger-strikers. It also d e c l i n e d to label the deaths o f prisoners as suicide. T h i s refusal was i m p o r t a n t as it a l l o w e d the hungerstrikers to be b u r i e d i n sacred g r o u n d . T h e o l o g i c a l l y the stance was justified o n the basis that it c o u l d n o t be ascertained that death was i n t e n d e d . M e a n w h i l e , the C h u r c h , urged b y some o f the prisoners' families, pleaded w i t h the hunger-strikers to e n d their actions, alienating some i m p r i s o n e d R e p u b l i c a n s (Stevenson, 1996). Indeed, the C h u r c h played a n instrumental role i n the cessation o f the strike. T h e stance o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h contrasted w i t h the attitude o f the Protestant churches, w h i c h declared that deaths arising from hunger strikes were self-inflicted and, therefore, suicide. T h e Protestant churches c l a i m e d that there were n o prisoners o f conscience i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e hunger strikes were an example o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h a d m i n i s t e r i n g the needs o f its flock, w h i l s t acting i n a d o u b t f u l p o l i t i c a l role a c c o r d i n g to critics. T h e C h u r c h o f Ireland was critical o f w h a t i t saw as seeming e q u i v o c a t i o n b y the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h . I n 1974, a group o f Protestant clergymen m e t leaders o f the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A i n a n unsuccessful attempt to e n d violence. M o r e recently, the churches c o m b i n e d i n a negotiating role. T h e c l i m a x o f this was the i n v o l v e m e n t o f representatives o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h a n d the Presbyterian C h u r c h i n b r i n g i n g about the peace process o f the 1990s. T h e churches have also liaised w i t h c o m m u n i t y groups i n controversies over the routes o f O r a n g e parades.

8.6 Educational segregation C a t h o l i c a n d Protestant s c h o o l c h i l d r e n are usually educated separately. T h i s d i v i s i o n weakens at the further education stage w i t h the existence o f integrated further education colleges a n d ends at university level. C a t h o l i c s c h o o l c h i l d r e n are educated m a i n l y i n p r i m a r y a n d secondary schools established b y the R o m a n C a t h o l i c C h u r c h . C a t h o l i c schools receive 8 0 per cent o f their

8.6 Educational segregation

107

f u n d i n g f r o m grants f r o m the state. T h e intake a n d staff o f such schools are o v e r w h e l m i n g l y C a t h o l i c . O t h e r state schools are often labelled Protestant because few C a t h o l i c s attend. Protestant clergy sit o n the m a n a g e m e n t boards o f such schools. Fewer than seven per cent o f c h i l d r e n attend integrated schools, the first o f w h i c h , Lisnareagh C o l l e g e , was o p e n e d i n the secondary sector i n 1984. T h e charter o f the college prevents its ratio o f P r o t e s t a n t - C a t h o l i c e n r o l m e n t f r o m shifting b e y o n d 6 0 - 4 0 (Hughes, 1994). A p r i m a r y a i m o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h i n the establishment o f a separate system o f s c h o o l i n g is to teach the C a t h o l i c faith to pupils. T h e r e w o u l d be little p o i n t i n the creation o f such schools otherwise. I n defence o f educational segregation, the C a t h o l i c hierarchy points o u t that r e l i g i o n is n o t the m a i n source o f d i v i s i o n , w h i l s t a r g u i n g that a C a t h o l i c e d u c a t i o n increases tolerance (Irish E p i s c o p a l Conference, 1984). R e l i g i o u s educational segregation is replicated i n other countries, b u t c r i t i c i s m is largely peculiar to N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e m a i n contentions o f s u c h criticisms are: 1. divisions i n education lead to later segregation; 2. there is a lack o f awareness o f other faiths, creating religious intolerance; 3. differences i n the c u r r i c u l u m , particularly i n the teaching o f B r i t i s h a n d Irish history, create a n d reinforce antagonisms. Efforts have been made to reduce historical misunderstandings. T h e C o m m u n ity Relations C o u n c i l , a n organisation w h i c h replaced the o r i g i n a l C o m m u n i t y Relations C o m m i s s i o n founded i n 1969, exists to b r i n g Catholics a n d Protestants together. It encourages the development o f j o i n t c o m m u n i t y projects. I n 1994, it declared that schools i n N o r t h e r n Ireland 'stand separately as s y m b o l i s i n g people's need to protect their particular b r a n d o f beliefs a n d history as distinct from others' (Frazer a n d Fitzduff, 1994: 33). T r a d i t i o n a l l y , but less so nowadays, Protestant schools emphasised B r i t i s h historical glories. C a t h o l i c schools tended to concentrate u p o n Irish history. A c c o r d i n g l y , s c h o o l i n g has been h e l d responsible for the historical justification o f U n i o n i s t o r N a t i o n a l i s t positions. I n 1989, the D e p a r t m e n t o f E d u c a t i o n for N o r t h e r n Ireland i n t r o d u c e d c o m p u l s o r y cross-curricular themes o f C u l t u r a l H e r i t a g e a n d E d u c a t i o n for M u t u a l U n d e r s t a n d i n g . A s part o f what became k n o w n as the Opposite Religions* project, a s m a l l n u m b e r o f teachers were asked to devise n e w teaching materials for use i n all schools i n the teaching o f history a n d religious e d u c a t i o n . T h e a i m was to p r o d u c e objective, i m p a r t i a l material w h i c h w o u l d p e r m i t students to consider all evidence before d r a w i n g conclusions c o n c e r n i n g the development o f history a n d r e l i g i o n i n Ireland. A s part o f the project, a survey was undertaken o f the k n o w l e d g e o f s c h o o l c h i l d r e n c o n c e r n i n g the 'opposite' r e l i g i o n ( L a m b k i n , 1996). T h i s c o n c l u d e d that: 1. religion is o f great i m p o r t a n c e to s c h o o l c h i l d r e n ; 2. k n o w l e d g e o f r e l i g i o n is weak a n d distorted; 3. a majority o f s c h o o l c h i l d r e n , u n l i k e adults, believed that the conflict was caused b y r e l i g i o n ; 4. nearly h a l f o f s c h o o l c h i l d r e n t h o u g h t that the conflict c o u l d be ended b y b r i d g i n g the religious d i v i d e ;

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5. Protestant o r C a t h o l i c i d e n t i t y appeared o f m o r e i m p o r t a n c e t h a n j o i n t l y h e l d C h r i s t i a n identity. T h e survey c o n f i r m e d the existence o f religious a n d historical m y t h s amongst s c h o o l c h i l d r e n . M a n y f o u n d i t difficult to accept the n o t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y due to the extent o f d i v i s i o n between C a t h o l i c s a n d Protestants. I n 1992, the O p s a h l C o m m i s s i o n was established to i n q u i r e i n t o ways forward for N o r t h e r n Ireland. It was a n independent C o m m i s s i o n , chaired b y Professor T o r k e l O p s a h l , designed to examine the submissions o f citizens i n w h a t was k n o w n as the Initiative 9 2 citizens' i n q u i r y (Pollak, 1993). Receivi n g 5 5 4 submissions, the O p s a h l C o m m i s s i o n presided over one o f the largest consultative process ever undertaken i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e remit o f the C o m m i s s i o n was to examine a l l aspects o f life i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e leadership o f the three m a i n Protestant churches responded. Responses f r o m the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h were c o n f i n e d to submissions f r o m i n d i v i d u a l priests a n d c h u r c h groups. Submissions c o n c e r n i n g the i m p a c t o f religion varied c o n siderably. It was argued that r e l i g i o n was used as a means o f c u l t u r a l defence a n d h a d c o n t r i b u t e d to the idea h e l d b y b o t h c o m m u n i t i e s that they were V i c t i m s ' . A process o f d e m o n i s a t i o n o f the other t r a d i t i o n h a d taken place, assisted b y increased segregation. A rare area o f consensus amongst m a n y o f the submissions was the favouring o f the extension o f integrated education. T h i r t y - s i x such submissions were received, a l t h o u g h few dealt w i t h h o w to extend integration i n a segregated society (Pollak, 1993). T h e pressure group, A l l C h i l d r e n Together, emphasised i n its s u b m i s s i o n that integrated education d i d n o t s i m p l y m e a n that C a t h o l i c a n d Protestant s c h o o l c h i l d r e n were taught together i n the same b u i l d i n g for certain 'non-controversial' subjects. R e l i g i o u s education w i t h i n schools s h o u l d also be taught to integrated groups. T h e O p s a h l C o m m i s s i o n made a n u m b e r o f r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s designed to reduce conflict i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. I n the i n t e r t w i n e d areas o f r e l i g i o n , culture a n d identity, the seven commissioners proposed the f o l l o w i n g measures: 1. the establishment o f a p u b l i c i n q u i r y i n t o the role o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h i n Ireland; 2 . the r e d u c t i o n o f barriers to m i x e d marriages; 3. the relaxation o f rules c o n c e r n i n g i n t e r c o m m u n i o n ; 4. the development o f s u m m e r festivals as alternatives to controversial O r a n g e marches; 5. increased integration o f education a n d h o u s i n g ; 6. Protestants to recognise themselves as Irish w i t h B r i t i s h citizenship; C a t h o l i c s to respect c u l t u r a l Britishness.

8.7 Societal segregation F o l l o w i n g the onset o f the T r o u b l e s , the extent o f residential segregation between the t w o c o m m u n i t i e s increased. A l t h o u g h m a n y areas r e m a i n m i x e d , it is far f r o m u n c o m m o n for areas to be the preserve o f residents o f a single

8.7 Societal segregation

109

religion. Segregation owes at least as m u c h to m u t u a l h o s t i l i t y over p o l i t i c a l matters as r e l i g i o n , b u t the latter remains the ethnic marker. Segregation means that the t w o c o m m u n i t i e s are often d i v i d e d p o l i t i c a l l y , religiously, culturally, a n d finally physically f r o m each other. I n Belfast, a majority o f electoral wards are segregated, i n that fewer than 10 per cent o f the inhabitants o f an area b e l o n g to the 'other' r e l i g i o n . A l t h o u g h a majority o f residents disagree w i t h segregation, over h a l f o f the p u b l i c - h o u s i n g schemes i n N o r t h e r n Ireland are n o n - m i x e d (Boyle a n d H a d d e n , 1994). Areas are easily identified b y flags, w a l l murals a n d the p a i n t i n g o f kerbstones. Segregation rather than reintegration has been the n o r m . T h e r e is p e r i o d i c i n t i m i d a t i o n w i t h i n these c o m m u n i t i e s . S o m e Protestants c l a i m that ethnic cleansing has o c c u r r e d i n rural border areas as N a t i o n a l i s t s have r e m o v e d local o p p o s i t i o n . F o r m a n y years, part-time soldiers i n the U l s t e r Defence R e g i m e n t , often local farmers, were p r i m e I R A targets. T h e N o r t h e r n Ireland H o u s i n g Executive ( N I H E ) sometimes f o u n d that estates were more manageable i f segregated. T h e N I H E d i d n o t endorse segregation, b u t at times o f crisis favoured p o p u l a t i o n m o v e m e n t rather than attempts at integration. T h e spread o f segregation is c o m m o n to b o t h rural a n d urban areas. I n o u t l y i n g areas, villages have become increasingly single r e l i g i o n . Segregation i n u r b a n areas is m u c h more c o m m o n i n working-class districts. C a t h o l i c s a n d Protestants, N a t i o n a l i s t s a n d U n i o n i s t s , coexist w i t h o u t tension i n the m o r e prosperous districts o f Belfast, particularly the south o f the city, a n d w o r k a n d share leisure i n the c i t y centre, w h i c h has l o n g appeared prosperous. D i v i s i o n s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland permeate some aspects o f d a i l y life. R e l i g i o u s segregation i n education a n d , to a lesser extent, w o r k is often replicated i n leisure. C a t h o l i c s a n d Protestants play soccer a n d , to a lesser extent, rugby. G a e l i c sports, such as camogie, h u r l i n g a n d gaelic football, are almost exclusively c o n f i n e d to the C a t h o l i c p o p u l a t i o n . T h e p l a y i n g o f G a e l i c games has revived amongst C a t h o l i c s since the T r o u b l e s , as the c o m m u n i t y has ' t u r n e d i n o n itself a n d rediscovered its s p o r t i n g heritage' ( C r o n i n , 1994: 15). A c c o r d ingly, G a e l i c games clubs have acted as centres for the c o m m u n i t y . G a e l i c sports are organised b y the G a e l i c A t h l e t i c A s s o c i a t i o n ( G A A ) . It maintains a ban u p o n the security forces, a p r o h i b i t i o n seen as sectarian b y critics. T h e G A A views the p l a y i n g o f G a e l i c games as a n assertion o f Irishness, a n express i o n o f a u n i q u e c u l t u r a l identity. H o w e v e r , the b a n u p o n members o f the G A A p l a y i n g ' B r i t i s h ' sports, such as soccer, was i g n o r e d b y members a n d eventually a b a n d o n e d . T h e p o l i t i c a l beliefs o f the G A A are clear. Its charter aspires to Irish u n i t y , referring to a t h i r t y - t w o c o u n t y Ireland. Spectating w i t h i n certain sports is also characterised b y d i v i s i o n . T h e a l l Ireland rugby team attracts some Protestant followers, m a n y o f w h o m play the sport i n school. H o w e v e r , i n soccer, sectarianism persists. T h e N o r t h e r n Ireland soccer team is supported m a i n l y b y Protestants, a l t h o u g h the team i n v a r i a b l y also comprises C a t h o l i c s . Sectarian chants are still audible at international h o m e matches at W i n d s o r Park, despite a c a m p a i g n b y the Irish F o o t b a l l A s s o c i a t i o n . C a t h o l i c s generally support the R e p u b l i c o f Ireland. A t c l u b level,

110

The roles of religion

sectarian r i o t i n g is n o t u n k n o w n . A s a consequence, t w o clubs supported t C a t h o l i c s , Belfast C e l t i c a n d D e r r y C i t y , w i t h d r e w f r o m the Irish League, i 1949 a n d 1971 respectively. L i n f i e l d , for m a n y years the premier soccer teai i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, is supported b y Protestants, a l t h o u g h the team n o fields C a t h o l i c s a n d Protestants. Cliftonville, a ' m i x e d ' team, attracts the suppo o f C a t h o l i c soccer fans. S u p p o r t for leading E n g l i s h Premiership clubs cuts across the sectaria d i v i d e . H o w e v e r , the m a i n soccer teams i n G l a s g o w , C e l t i c a n d Ranger attract considerable support from N o r t h e r n Ireland. N u m e r o u s supporters' clul i n N o r t h e r n Ireland organise travel to games. C e l t i c has a n o v e r w h e l m i n g C a t h o l i c f o l l o w i n g , a l t h o u g h the team has always been o f m i x e d religioi Rangers, despite h a v i n g signed C a t h o l i c s since the late 1980s, continues i attract almost exclusively Protestant support.

8.8 Religion and conflict It is evident that the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority o f N a t i o n a l i s t s are C a t h o l i c s . A less substantial majority o f C a t h o l i c s are N a t i o n a l i s t s . M o s t U n i o n i s t s are Protestants. These overlaps have led to the association o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland conflict w i t h r e l i g i o n . H o w e v e r , these linkages d o n o t prove that r e l i g i o n is central to the conflict. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f religion i n N o r t h e r n Ireland has l e d some to describe i t as the central p r o b l e m ( H i c k e y , 1 9 8 4 ; B r u c e , 1 9 8 6 ; C r a w f o r d , 1987). B r u c e wrote (1986: 2 4 9 ) : The Northern Ireland conflict is a religious conflict. Economic and social differences are also crucial, but it was the fact that the competing populations i n Ireland adhered and still adhere to competing religious traditions which has given the conflict its enduring and intractable quality. I n support o f his c l a i m , B r u c e later emphasises that he perceives the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland as o n e o f ethnic conflict (Bruce, 1994). H e suggests that Protestants i n N o r t h e r n Ireland a m o u n t to a n ethnic group rather than a n a t i o n . C e n t r a l to their ethnic identity is their Protestant religion. E v e n m o d e r ate U n i o n i s t s m a y be prepared to support fundamental Protestants such as Ian Paisley, a m a n for w h o m r e l i g i o n is foremost a n d politics subordinate. M a r s h a l l i n g his evidence, B r u c e points to M o x o n - B r o w n e ' s 1983 survey w h i c h f o u n d that 74.5 per cent o f Protestants cited fear o f the power o f the R o m a n C a t h o l i c C h u r c h as a reason for b e i n g u n i o n i s t ( M o x o n - B r o w n e , 1983). H e also points o u t that it is difficult for others m o v i n g i n m o r e secular circles to c o m p r e h e n d the salience o f r e l i g i o n to the lives o f o r d i n a r y people i n N o r t h ern Ireland. C r i t i c s o f the idea that r e l i g i o n is central to the conflict argue that the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland concerns claims to its territory a n d reluctance to be B r i t i s h i n a n Irish state, o r Irish i n a B r i t i s h state, contests u n c o n c e r n e d w i t h d e n o m i n a t i o n a l superiority ( M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y , 1995). T h e y p o i n t o u t that M o x o n - B r o w n e ' s 1983 survey f o u n d that more people o p p o s e d a u n i t e d Ireland because o f fear o f l o s i n g their B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y t h a n

8.8 Religion and conflict

111

because o f the fear o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h . I f the conflict was dependent u p o n religion, it ought to have lessened i n recent years, as the p o w e r o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h i n the R e p u b l i c has d i m i n i s h e d markedly. F e w , however, w o u l d attribute the development o f a peace process i n the 1990s to the decline o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h i n the Irish R e p u b l i c . Far more w o u l d associate the r e d u c t i o n i n tension w i t h the willingness to c o m p r o m i s e p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . T h e question that needs to be asked is whether the claims o f Irish R e p u b licans to N o r t h e r n Ireland are i n any w a y dependent u p o n r e l i g i o n , given that m u c h o f the conflict for three decades emanated f r o m the v i o l e n t exercise o f that c l a i m . T h e use o f violence was c o n d e m n e d b y the C a t h o l i c a n d P r o testant churches. T h e r e has never been a h o l y w a r i n Ireland between the rival churches. O n l y two clerics were k i l l e d d u r i n g the conflict, one b y accident. V i o l e n t Irish r e p u b l i c a n i s m has always existed i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h . R i v a l territorial claims to N o r t h e r n Ireland are fundamental to the p r o b l e m . These exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the d e p t h o f religious fervour a n d thus appear i m p e r v i o u s to co-operative o r e c u m e n i c a l projects. A study o f attitudes at the integrated Lisnareagh C o l l e g e supports this argument ( H u g h e s , 1994). It was f o u n d that most C a t h o l i c s a n d Protestants, w h i l s t educated together, insisted u p o n different national identities. R e l i g i o n is nonetheless i m p o r t a n t as a c o m p o n e n t o f collective identity, even t h o u g h i t is n o t a necessary aspect, n o r a m o d e r n cause, o f e t h n o - n a t i o n a l conflict. R e p u b l i c a n s believe that the N o r t h e r n state is sectarian a n d liable to discriminate against the N a t i o n a l i s t p o p u l a t i o n . E v i d e n c e o f this d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is usually presented i n statistics using Protestant a n d C a t h o l i c labels. Nationalists believe that o n l y t h r o u g h the creation o f a unified Ireland c a n a n Ireland be created w h i c h treats C a t h o l i c , Protestant a n d dissenter w i t h equal respect. T h e association o f religion w i t h p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n has, i r o n i c a l l y , reinforced d i v i s i o n amongst C h r i s t i a n s . A c c o r d i n g to L a m b k i n ( 1 9 9 6 : 1 9 3 ) : One effect of the conflict i n Northern Ireland has been to sustain the attachment of people to the Catholic and Protestant religious traditions. After the conflict, the 'native speakers' o f Catholicism and Protestantism will be exposed increasingly to the dominant European 'language' o f secularism. A g a i n , the i m p a c t o f religion is a n effect o f a pre-existent conflict, n o t a cause. F o r m a l legislation does exist to o u t l a w sectarianism, consolidated b y the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . Previously, legislation was used sparingly. F o r example, the P r e v e n t i o n o f I n c i t e m e n t to H a t r e d A c t (1970) l e d to a lone p r o s e c u t i o n f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n o f a n t i - C a t h o l i c lyrics i n a Loyalist s o n g b o o k i n 1 9 7 1 . T h e trial ended i n the acquittal o f the three defendants. T h e r e has always been a n i m p o r t a n t l i n k between Protestantism a n d u n i o n i s m as a p o l i t i c a l creed. T h e question begged is whether u n i o n i s m c o u l d transcend this. I f one accepts that the most fundamental tenet o f u n i o n i s m is the retention o f the l i n k to G r e a t B r i t a i n , there appears little reason w h y it c o u l d n o t exist p u r e l y as a p o l i t i c a l creed. H o w e v e r , the historical l i n k s w i t h the defence o f the Protestant faith i l l u m i n a t e u n i o n i s m to m a n y adherents a n d w o u l d disappear o n l y slowly. It m a y be impossible for Paisleyism to

112

The roles of religion

achieve such a change as it does n o t attempt to separate politics f r o m r e l i g i o n . H o w e v e r , Paisleyism, a l t h o u g h popular, is a m i n o r i t y U n i o n i s t taste.

8.9 Conclusion R e l i g i o n m a y reinforce rather than

create the N o r t h e r n Ireland conflict.

M i s t r e a t m e n t o f the C a t h o l i c p o p u l a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e d to the b i r t h o f the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A , although such mistreatment was also due to the p o l i t i c a l avers i o n o f unionists to Irish n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f religious affiliation is acknowledged even b y those w h o deny its centrality to the conflict. It enhances a sense o f c o m m u n i t y a n d provides u n i t y o f goals. C a t h o l i c s o f differing shades o f N a t i o n a l i s t o p i n i o n m a y unite i n o p p o s i t i o n to O r a n g e parades. U n i o n i s t s are r e m i n d e d o f their Protestant heritage b y the O r a n g e O r d e r a n d the fusion o f r e l i g i o n a n d politics apparent i n b o t h the m a i n U n i o n i s t p o l i t i c a l parties. It is a n o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n to c l a i m that the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland has n o t h i n g to do w i t h religion. H o w e v e r , given the permanence a n d independence f r o m r e l i g i o n o f c o m p e t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l aspirations for respect o f N o r t h e r n Ireland, i t is difficult to sustain the argument that religious differences are the root cause o f m o d e r n problems.

Chapter 9

Political failures 1972-84

F o l l o w i n g the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f direct rule i n 1972, the search began for a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n to the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. Initiatives were n o w the prerogative o f the Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland. A n y remedies h a d to be acceptable to the majority U n i o n i s t c o m m u n i t y a n d the N a t i o n a l i s t m i n o r i t y . Proposals, therefore, h a d to fuse reassurance for U n i o n i s t s w i t h some a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f the a m b i t i o n s o f N a t i o n a l i s t s , scarcely a n easy task.

9.1 Policy approaches B r i t i s h p o l i c y between 1972 a n d 1984 c a n be d i v i d e d i n t o phases, each w i t h its o w n d i m e n s i o n s . These are listed i n T a b l e 9 . 1 . F r o m the outset, p o l i t i c a l initiatives were d o m i n a t e d b y a belief that p o w e r s h o u l d be shared between the t w o c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e logical consequence o f this perception was a return to devolved government, g r a n t i n g powers to local p o l i t i c a l parties. T h i s d i d n o t reflect a n enthusiasm for d e v o l u t i o n w i t h i n the B r i t i s h government, b u t rather a n anxiety to shed direct responsibility at the earliest o p p o r t u n i t y . O f equal i m p o r t a n c e was the r e c o g n i t i o n b y the B r i t i s h government that there c o u l d be n o return to the ' b a d o l d days' o f one-party rule at S t o r m o n t . A n e w f o r m o f d e v o l u t i o n was required, based u p o n c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y co-operation, n o t single-party t r i u m p h a l i s m . T h e decline o f U n i o n i s t u n i t y was

Table 9.1

British policy approaches 1972-84

Period

Approach

Features

1972-4

Devolution with power-sharing and an Irish dimension Devolution with minimal allIreland dimension Ulsterisation and criminalisation

Power-sharing Executive and Council of Ireland by 1974, collapsed after five months Constitutional Convention: unworkable

1975 1976-9 1980-4

Rolling devolution without an all-Ireland dimension

'Non-polities'; normalising problem via treatment of terrorism as criminality Northern Ireland elected Assembly: boycotted by Nationalists and ended by 1986

113

114

Political failures 1972-84

seen as beneficial i n that i t prevented the d o m i n a n c e o f a single party f r o m that c o m m u n i t y . A n u m b e r o f U n i o n i s t parties emerged i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h each other, f o l l o w i n g the fragmentation o f u n i o n i s m i n the late 1960s. A g a i n s t this, there was little evidence that less moderate U n i o n i s t s were w i l l i n g to share p o w e r w i t h N a t i o n a l i s t s . N a t i o n a l i s t desires for a greater voice i n the affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland were natural given their exclusion f r o m influence throughout the previous 5 0 years. T h e B r i t i s h government h o p e d that U n i o n i s t a n d N a t i o n a l i s t parties m i g h t set aside their differences over the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l future o f N o r t h e r n Ireland, i n order to govern N o r t h e r n Ireland together. A w o r k a b l e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was to be created w h i c h offered s o m e t h i n g for a l l . T h e failure o f talks between the Secretary o f State a n d the I R A i n 1 9 7 2 made the search for a s o l u t i o n even m o r e crucial. O n l y w i t h a durable d e v o l v e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o u l d the B r i t i s h government possess even a s l i m chance o f m a r g i n a l i s i n g the paramilitary organisations. B r i t i s h p o l i c y was based u p o n a 'carrot a n d stick' approach. U n i o n i s t s c o u l d enjoy a return to the devolved government they so desired, p r o v i d e d they were w i l l i n g to countenance power-sharing w i t h N a t i o n a l i s t s . N a t i o n a l ists c o u l d share power w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, p r o v i d e d that they accepted the state as a legitimate p o l i t i c a l entity. N a t i o n a l i s t s were also to be rewarded w i t h the first acknowledgement b y the B r i t i s h government o f the need for some all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n to any future settlement. G i v e n this, alongside the prospect o f power-sharing, it was obvious that N a t i o n a l i s t s were the p r i m a r y gainers f r o m the n e w p o l i c y approach. It c o u l d h a r d l y be otherwise, given that N a t i o n a l i s t s were starting f r o m a base o f zero i n terms o f their p o l i t i c a l p o w e r a n d influence i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e attempt at power-sharing i n 1974 represented the first effort to establ i s h consociational democracy i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. Inherent w i t h i n the p r o posals o f the B r i t i s h government was a n attempt to b u i l d a grand c o a l i t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l elites amongst c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l organisations to act as a n e w Executive. T h e r e was r e c o g n i t i o n o f the extent to w h i c h society was d i v i d e d . T h e absence o f consociationalism risked the return to the e x c l u s i o n i s m w h i c h characterised politics i n N o r t h e r n Ireland under the o l d S t o r m o n t regime. I n O c t o b e r 1 9 7 2 , the B r i t i s h government p r o d u c e d a consultative G r e e n Paper, The Future of Northern Ireland ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1972). T h e Paper envisaged devolved government for N o r t h e r n Ireland, power-sharing and, most significantly, some acknowledgement that the R e p u b l i c o f Ireland h a d the right to be listened to regarding N o r t h e r n Ireland. It argued that it was desirable that a n y n e w arrangements for N o r t h e r n Ireland be accepted b y the R e p u b l i c o f Ireland. T h i s was a significant step, given that three years earlier the R e p u b l i c h a d been given short shrift b y the B r i t i s h government w h e n i t attempted to articulate its concern for the p l i g h t o f N o r t h e r n N a t i o n a l i s t s . F o r m a l proposals were p u b l i s h e d d u r i n g the f o l l o w i n g year i n the W h i t e Paper, Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1973). T h i s f o r m e d the basis o f the legislation c o n t a i n e d i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y A c t , passed at some speed i n M a y 1973. T w o m o n t h s later, the o l d system o f g o v e r n i n g N o r t h e r n Ireland t h r o u g h S t o r m o n t was finally

9.2 Power-sharing

115

abolished. T h e legislative measures made p r o v i s i o n for the f o l l o w i n g items to be enacted: 1. enforced power-sharing t h r o u g h the creation o f a power-sharing executive - to prevent U n i o n i s t d o m i n a n c e ; 2. arrangements for c o n s u l t a t i o n a n d co-operation w i t h the Irish g o v e r n m e n t t h r o u g h a C o u n c i l o f Ireland — to pacify N a t i o n a l i s t s ; 3. retention b y the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t o f most security responsibilities - to attempt to m a i n t a i n order; 4. c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees for the status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland - to reassure Unionists.

9.2 Power-sharing T h e elected A s s e m b l y was to: 1. c o n t a i n 7 8 seats, m a k i n g it o f s i m i l a r size to S t o r m o n t ; 2. be elected b y p r o p o r t i o n a l representation, N a t i o n a l i s t representation;

thereby

ensuring

adequate

3. a l l o w for the f o r m a t i o n o f a m i n i s t e r i a l executive, d r a w n f r o m the m e m b e r ship o f the A s s e m b l y . C r o s s - c o m m u n i t y power-sharing was i n t r o d u c e d . T h e n e w proposals for governance offered substantial n u m e r i c a l representation a n d the prospect o f shares for each c o m m u n i t y i n g o v e r n m e n t a n d legislative scrutiny. These were to be achieved through the e n d i n g o f straightforward majority rule a n d the use o f an A s s e m b l y committee system. A s part o f an attempt to compensate U n i o n i s t s for the loss o f their h e g e m o n i c p o s i t i o n , plebiscites (referenda) were c o n d u c t e d regularly, asking whether N o r t h e r n Ireland s h o u l d r e m a i n part o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . G i v e n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the state, 'yes' votes were inevitable. A n o v e r w h e l m i n g 'yes' vote o f 97.8 per cent recorded i n M a r c h 1973 reflected the i n - b u i l t U n i o n i s t majority a n d the u n w i l l i n g n e s s o f N a t i o n a l i s t s to participate i n such exercises. O n l y 5 7 per cent o f the electorate voted. O n l y 6 , 0 0 0 v o t e d against, c o m p a r e d to 5 9 1 , 0 0 0 f a v o u r i n g the retention o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's p o s i t i o n i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . S u c h a boycott ensured that the election result acquired the appearance o f a contest i n the o l d Soviet U n i o n . I n defence o f the p o l l , it was later c l a i m e d that u p to 2 5 per cent o f C a t h o l i c s h a d t u r n e d out to register support for the U n i o n {Irish Times, 2 2 February 1974). I f true, this i n d i c a t e d that a n extremely l o w t u r n o u t o f Protestants h a d o c c u r r e d . T w o m o n t h s after the plebiscite, elections to local c o u n c i l s t o o k place, the first such elections for six years. D e s p i t e calls for a boycott f r o m the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A a n d Peoples D e m o c r a c y , there was a g o o d t u r n o u t . T h e S D L P p e r f o r m e d w e l l , a l t h o u g h a n t i - U n i o n i s t s f o r m e d a n o u t r i g h t majority o n o n l y one o f the 2 6 c o u n c i l s , N e w r y a n d M o u r n e . E n c o u r a g e d b y levels o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the local contest, the B r i t i s h government proceeded w i t h elections to the A s s e m b l y i n J u n e 1 9 7 3 . U n i o n i s t s were sharply d i v i d e d . T h e U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Party, l e d b y F a u l k n e r , s u p p o r t e d power-sharing. W i t h i n the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Party, however, m a n y dissented a n d made their p o s i t i o n clear d u r i n g the c a m p a i g n .

116 Table 9.2

Political failures 1972-84 Northern Ireland Assembly election results 1973 Votes

%

Seats

Pro-power-sharing Faulkner Unionists SDLP Alliance NILP Others Total

191,729 159,773 66,541 18,675 17,053 453,771

26.5 22.1 9.2 2.6 2.4 62.8

23 19 8 1 0 51

Anti-power-sharing Non-Faulkner Unionists DUP Vanguard Republican Clubs Others Total

89,759 78,228 75,759 13,064 11,660 268,470

12.5 10.8 10.5 1.8 1.6 37.2

11 8 7 0 1 27

Source: adapted from Rose (1976). R a n g e d against power-sharing were the D e m o c r a t i c U n i o n i s t Party a n d the V a n g u a r d U n i o n i s t Progressive Party. T h e latter h a d been f o r m e d b y W i l l i a m C r a i g as a response to his failure to ensure that the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t C o u n c i l rejected power-sharing ( B e w et aL, 1996). O t h e r smaller Loyalist groups also opposed power-sharing. T h e A l l i a n c e Party was u n s u r p r i s i n g l y i n favour. A l s o supportive were the S D L P a n d the N o r t h e r n Ireland L a b o u r Party ( N I L P ) . R e p u b l i c a n C l u b s (the p o l i t i c a l w i n g o f the O f f i c i a l I R A ) opposed. T h e results y i e l d e d a majority i n favour o f power-sharing, as T a b l e 9.2 indicates. It was apparent that a large majority o f N a t i o n a l i s t s were i n support. Nonetheless, the overall majority i n favour o f power-sharing was scarcely overw h e l m i n g a n d amongst U n i o n i s t s i t a m o u n t e d to a m i n o r i t y taste. W i t h i n the Assembly itself, there was n o w a substantial m i n o r i t y opposed to its continuation. A n Executive f o r m e d f r o m A s s e m b l y members came i n t o b e i n g o n 1 J a n u ary 1974. It c o m p r i s e d F a u l k n e r as the U n i o n i s t C h i e f Executive, the S D L P ' s G e r r y F i t t as his N a t i o n a l i s t d e p u t y a n d n i n e ministers. These n i n e i n c l u d e d five U n i o n i s t s , three members o f the S D L P a n d o n e representative f r o m the A l l i a n c e Party. T h e U n i o n i s t s h a d pledged to share p o w e r o n l y w i t h those groups whose p r i m a r y object was n o t to break the l i n k w i t h G r e a t B r i t a i n ( B u c k l a n d , 1981). I n co-operating w i t h the S D L P , they clearly h a d a perc e p t i o n that the m a i n N a t i o n a l i s t party favoured p o l i t i c a l stability above its declared objective o f Irish u n i f i c a t i o n .

9.3 The Council of Ireland U n i o n i s t o p p o s i t i o n to the power-sharing project hardened w i t h the establishm e n t o f the A s s e m b l y . I n January 1974, F a u l k n e r resigned f r o m the U l s t e r

9.3 The Council of Ireland

117

U n i o n i s t Party. H e was defeated due to the increasing h o s t i l i t y o f his party to the all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n w h i c h also f o r m e d part o f the agenda o f the B r i t i s h government. S o m e previous supporters o f power-sharing rejected any a d d i t i o n a l arrangements w h i c h d i d n o t p e r m i t a settlement entirely i n t e r n a l to N o r t h e r n Ireland. It was these w h o deserted F a u l k n e r , w h o was forced to f o r m his o w n U n i o n i s t Party o f N o r t h e r n Ireland ( U P N I ) . O n e m o n t h later, Faulkner's n e w party was trounced i n the G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n , w i n n i n g o n l y 13 per cent o f the vote. I n contrast, anti-power-sharing c a n d i d ates captured 51 per cent a n d 11 o f the 12 parliamentary seats i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. M a n y o f the antis were o p p o s e d to p o w e r - s h a r i n g per se, b u t it was the proposed C o u n c i l o f Ireland w h i c h increasingly became the focus o f o p p o s i t i o n . A l t h o u g h the n e w L a b o u r government at W e s t m i n s t e r s u p p o r t e d the p o l i c y approach o f its Conservative predecessor, the q u e s t i o n begged was whether the p o l i c y c o u l d be enforced u p o n an increasingly reluctant populace. I n its original W h i t e Paper, the B r i t i s h government h a d left o p e n to negotiat i o n the precise format for the establishment o f A n g l o - I r i s h c o - o p e r a t i o n . Discussions t o o k place at S u n n i n g d a l e , Berkshire, i n D e c e m b e r 1973 between the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y Executive a n d the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments. T h e y agreed that the C o u n c i l o f Ireland w o u l d c o n t a i n the f o l l o w i n g elements: 1. a C o u n c i l o f M i n i s t e r s c o m p r i s i n g seven representatives o f the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t a n d seven f r o m the R e p u b l i c o f Ireland, to meet o n 'matters o f substantial m u t u a l interest'; 2. a C o n s u l t a t i v e A s s e m b l y , c o m p r i s i n g 3 0 members elected b y the D a i l a n d the same n u m b e r elected b y the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y . Part o f the a n t a g o n i s m towards the C o u n c i l o f Ireland lay i n the mystery s u r r o u n d i n g the extent o f its remit. B e w a n d Patterson ( 1 9 8 5 : 57) suggest that the o r i g i n a l proposals f r o m the B r i t i s h government were ' i m p l i c i t l y m i n i m a l i s t ' i n respect o f the Irish d i m e n s i o n . O p e r a t i n g f r o m a p o s i t i o n o f strength f o l l o w i n g the A s s e m b l y elections a n d the necessity o f its i n c l u s i o n i n arrangements, the S D L P forced the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t to concede further g r o u n d . U n d e r revised plans, the C o u n c i l o f Ireland was to enjoy some executive a n d h a r m o n i s a t i o n functions, rather t h a n a p r i m a r i l y consultative role w i t h some executive functions. A r g u a b l y , the lack o f clarity over the C o u n c i l ' s role was deliberate, as a m b i g u i t y m i g h t lessen o p p o s i t i o n . T h e R e p u b l i c was to be afforded a say i n p o l i c i n g strategies, i n c l u d i n g i n t e r n m e n t a n d a p p o i n t m e n t s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h i s was g r o u n d w h i c h h a d to be c o n c e d e d b y the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t i n return for increased c o - o p e r a t i o n f r o m the G a r d a (Irish police) a n d the enactment o f e x t r a d i t i o n laws, a l l o w i n g I R A suspects to be h a n d e d over to the B r i t i s h authorities. F o r the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l N a t i o n a l i s t s o f the S D L P , the establishment o f the C o u n c i l o f Ireland represented substantial progress. Indeed, one m e m b e r o f the party p u b l i c l y expressed the v i e w that the C o u n c i l was 'the vehicle w h i c h w i l l trundle U n i o n i s t s i n t o a u n i t e d Ireland' (quoted i n C o o g a n , 1 9 9 5 : 177). Indeed, the A s s e m b l y a n d C o u n c i l proposals c o n t a i n e d most o f the essential ingredients for the S D L P a n d p r o v i d e d a 'greenprint' for the approaches o f

118

Political failures 1972-84

the party i n the peace process t w o decades later. A N o r t h - S o u t h d i m e n s i o n was p r o v i d e d b y the consultative assembly o f p o l i t i c a l representatives f r o m the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y a n d the D a i l ; a n E a s t - W e s t ( L o n d o n - D u b l i n ) l i n k was p r o v i d e d b y the instigation o f regular meetings between ministers o f the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments. Satisfaction w i t h the n e w arrangements w i t h i n the S D L P was such that the party ended its rent a n d rate strike, w h i l s t c o n t i n u i n g to call for a n e n d to internment. R e p u b l i c a n s t o o k a far less o p t i m i s t i c view. A c c o r d i n g to Farrell ( 1 9 8 0 : 307) the proposals were a device to sideline rebellion: The W h i t e Paper was a neat summary of Westminster policy on Northern Ireland: a share i n power and patronage for the Catholic middle-class and an Irish dimension' to satisfy D u b l i n , i n return for support i n the campaign against the I R A and acceptance o f the North's constitutional position. A classic piece of neo-colonialism. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee c o n c e r n i n g the future status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland c o n t a i n e d the assertion o n b e h a l f o f the R e p u b l i c ' s government that there c o u l d be n o change i n the status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland u n t i l a majority o f the people o f N o r t h e r n Ireland desired such a change. F o r its part, the B r i t i s h government declared that i f the majority o f the people o f N o r t h e r n Ireland were to indicate a w i s h to become part o f a u n i t e d Ireland, the B r i t i s h governm e n t w o u l d support that w i s h . T h e B r i t i s h government's declaration u p d a t e d the 1949 Ireland A c t w h i c h h a d affirmed that there w o u l d be n o change i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h o u t the consent o f its parliament. A s S t o r m o n t h a d been abolished, a n e w guarantee was required. It was just possible to v i e w the n e w declaration as a t i n y shift towards greater neutrality. A permanent U n i o n i s t majority was m a r g i n a l l y less assured amongst the p o p u l a t i o n than i t h a d been w i t h i n the o l d parliament. M o r e i m p o r t a n t was the fact that the aspiration for a u n i t e d Ireland was n o w acknowledged, a l t h o u g h i t was advanced little b y w h a t was o n offer. A n y constitutional guarantee for N o r t h e r n Ireland was a n anathema to Republicans. A p o l i t i c a l project w h i c h consolidated o r legitimised the 'illegitimate' N o r t h e r n state was b o u n d to be opposed, given the nature o f r e p u b l i c a n i s m d u r i n g this period. Indeed, there were doubts over whether the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the R e p u b l i c o f Ireland p e r m i t t e d a n y government i n the R e p u b l i c to accept the N o r t h e r n state. Articles 2 a n d 3 suggested the non-existence o f N o r t h e r n Ireland as a distinct p o l i t i c a l entity a n d i n d i c a t e d a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l imperative to seek reunification. T h e R e p u b l i c ' s willingness to endorse the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland was, therefore, tested i n the courts. T o a great extent, the judges p r e s i d i n g over the case sympathised w i t h the arguments o f the c h a l lenger, K e v i n B o l a n d , w h i l s t quashing his case. T h e i r verdict was that acceptance o f the S u n n i n g d a l e A g r e e m e n t b y the Irish government was n o t illegal, as it a m o u n t e d o n l y to a de facto r e c o g n i t i o n o f the existing reality o f the f o r m a l existence o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h i s d i d n o t a m o u n t to a de jure c o n f i r m a t i o n . H a d this been the case, the judges i m p l i e d that the challenge w o u l d have been u p h e l d .

9.4 The Ulster Workers' Council strike

119

9.4 The Ulster Workers' Council strike It was n o t a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge i n the R e p u b l i c o f Ireland that was to defeat power-sharing w i t h a n Irish d i m e n s i o n . Instead, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d extra-constitutional Loyalist o p p o s i t i o n crushed the project. P o p u l a r o p p o s i t i o n to the S u n n i n g d a l e A g r e e m e n t grew r a p i d l y i n 1974, u n d e r the auspices o f the U n i t e d U l s t e r U n i o n i s t C o u n c i l , a c o a l i t i o n o f the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s , D U P a n d V a n g u a r d Parties. T h i s c o a l i t i o n was d e t e r m i n e d to b r i n g d o w n the p o w e r sharing Executive, seeking its replacement i n a return to S t o r m o n t a n d c o n t r o l over p o l i c i n g . A l t h o u g h a m i n o r i t y w i t h i n the A s s e m b l y , S u n n i n g d a l e ' s o p p o n e n t s possessed external strength. T h i s l a y i n the U l s t e r W o r k e r s ' C o u n c i l ( U W C ) , a successor to the Loyalist A s s o c i a t i o n o f W o r k e r s ( L A W ) . T h e L A W h a d attempted to b u i l d a mass working-class m e m b e r s h i p . T h e U W C was also c o n c e r n e d w i t h this, b u t concentrated u p o n k e y industries such as p o w e r stations, It recruited shop stewards a n d u n i o n members i n these industries w h i c h were staffed m a i n l y b y Loyalists. B y M a y 1974, the U W C h a d acquired sufficient strength to m o b i l i s e against the power-sharing Executive. A m o t i o n placed before the A s s e m b l y c a l l i n g for the scrapping o f the Executive was defeated. S u p p o r t e d b y L o y a l i s t param i l i t a r y groups, the U W C a n n o u n c e d the staging o f a n indefinite general strike, o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l stoppage, as i t was labelled. Assisted b y a c o m b i n a t i o n o f support a n d i n t i m i d a t i o n , the strike grew. T h e U W C c o n t r o l l e d p e t r o l supplies and, most crucially, the power stations. A m i d a deteriorating situation, offers o f c o m p r o m i s e , such as the p o s t p o n e m e n t o f the executive functions o f the C o u n c i l o f Ireland, w e n t largely unheeded. D u r i n g the strike, the U D A k i l l e d 3 3 people t h r o u g h n o - w a r n i n g car b o m b s i n D u b l i n a n d M o n a g h a n , the largest death t o l l o f the entire T r o u b l e s . T w o back-to-work marches organised b y the Irish Congress o f T r a d e U n i o n s ( I C T U ) attracted s m a l l turnouts a n d m u c h d e r i s i o n . T h e I C T U perceived the strike as little more than a display o f reactionary U l s t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , rather than an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f progressive class solidarity against capitalist U n i o n i s t a n d B r i t i s h government 'masters'. Loyalists believed their actions were justifiable, as their loyalty to B r i t a i n was c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n B r i t a i n acting i n their interests. M o r e significant i n h a r d e n i n g o p i n i o n was the d e n u n c i a t i o n b y the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , H a r o l d W i l s o n , o f sections o f the Loyalist c o m m u n i t y as 'spongers'. B y n o means u n s y m p a t h e t i c to the idea, i f n o t the practicality, o f a u n i t e d Ireland, W i l s o n h a d little t i m e for m i l i t a n t l o y a l i s m . H i s adviser, Joe H a i n e s , r e m o v e d the w o r d 'sponger' f r o m the o r i g i n a l transcript o f the speech. T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r reinserted the label ( P i m l o t t , 1992). F u r i o u s over the attempt to r u i n the proposals a n d 'set u p a sectarian a n d u n d e m o c r a t i c state', W i l s o n also asked, ' W h o d o these people t h i n k they are?'. T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s attack, c o n t a i n e d i n a n emergency televised broadcast, caused some Loyalists to sport sponges i n their lapels the f o l l o w i n g day. It achieved little i n the short t e r m , a l t h o u g h its u n d e r l y i n g message was that B r i t a i n ' s loyalty to N o r t h e r n Ireland m i g h t be c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n ' g o o d behaviour' f r o m Loyalists.

120

Political failures 1972-84

I n desperation, the Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland, M e r l y n Rees, ordered the use o f troops to m a i n t a i n essential supplies and, i n effect, t o break the strike. Ironically, this was urged b y the N a t i o n a l i s t S D L P , critics o f other forms o f B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y activity. A l t h o u g h the troops o c c u p i e d a n u m b e r o f petrol stations, their i n t e r v e n t i o n worsened affairs. T h e U W C threatened t o cease maintenance o f emergency services f r o m power stations i f the a r m y intervened further. T h e B r i t i s h government was u n w i l l i n g to sanction greater action against the strikers. Power-sharing was supported b y the B r i t i s h government, b u t some d o u b t whether it was a crucial part o f its strategy (Bew a n d Patterson, 1985). A c c o r d ingly, this adjunct to p o l i c y c o u l d be d i t c h e d i f i t became t o o i n c o n v e n i e n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , there was reluctance even a m o n g some members o f the powersharing Executive to support c o e r c i o n o f the strikers. A b o v e a l l , there was insufficient consent for power-sharing b o t h w i t h i n a n d outside the A s s e m b l y . T h i s was a c k n o w l e d g e d b y F a u l k n e r w h e n he resigned f r o m the Executive o n 28 M a y , along w i t h U n i o n i s t colleagues. Power-sharing h a d collapsed. F a u l k n e r h a d been h i g h l y critical o f the obstructionist tactics o f Loyalists t h r o u g h o u t the short life o f the Executive. I a n Paisley, described as the ' d e m o n doctor, preaching goodness k n o w s what', was a particular target o f Faulkner's w r a t h . Y e t Paisley alone c o u l d n o t be b l a m e d for the d o w n f a l l o f power-sharing. A l t h o u g h fellow Loyalists, several o f the organisers o f the U W C strike were critical o f Paisleyite rhetoric, preferring deeds to words. M a n y U n i o n i s t s were o p p o s e d to power-sharing a n d h a d already registered their d i s d a i n v i a the ballot box. T h e r e was i n t i m i d a t i o n d u r i n g the strike. W o r k e r s at H a r l a n d a n d W o l f f ' s s h i p y a r d were t o l d that any cars still i n the car park i n the afternoon w o u l d be b u r n t (Bruce, 1992). A s the U W C celebrated its v i c t o r y , i t appeared to critics that a Loyalist veto existed over the internal p o l i t i c a l arrangements a n d external relations o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. O p p o n e n t s o f power-sharing h a d their majority p o s i t i o n c o n f i r m e d i n the O c t o b e r 1974 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n , w h e n the U n i t e d U l s t e r U n i o n i s t C o u n c i l w o n 58 per cent o f the vote. P r i o r to the 1998 G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t , A r t h u r a n d Jeffery (1996: 12) wrote that the creation o f the power-sharing executive was 'the most successful o f B r i t i s h initiatives w i t h i n the P r o v i n c e so far'. G i v e n the abject political failures w h i c h followed for the next two decades, this m i g h t be seen as d a m n i n g w i t h faint praise.

9.5 The Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention ' S o n o f A s s e m b l y ' was s o o n attempted f o l l o w i n g the debacle o f M a y 1974. T h i s t o o k the f o r m o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n , a very pale i m i t a t i o n o f its predecessor. L i k e the ill-fated A s s e m b l y , the C o n v e n t i o n also c o n t a i n e d 7 8 members. T h e m a i n difference f r o m its predecessor was that the C o n v e n t i o n a m o u n t e d to n o m o r e than a consultative elected assembly. Its r e m i t was to discover what f o r m o f government i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was l i k e l y to c o m m a n d the most widespread acceptance ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1974). N o s u c h discovery was made. A s Q u i n n ( 1 9 9 3 : 3 2 ) argues, the C o n v e n t i o n

9.6 Non-politics 1976-9

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p r o d u c e d a 'dialogue o f the deaf \ C a n d i d a t e s f r o m the U n i t e d U l s t e r U n i o n ist C o u n c i l w o n 5 5 per cent o f the vote i n the first a n d final C o n v e n t i o n elections. H o l d i n g 4 7 o f the 7 8 seats, they d o m i n a t e d proceedings, a l t h o u g h proceedings were scarcely w o r t h d o m i n a t i n g . I n calling for a return o f S t o r m o n t , the U U U C r e m a i n e d adamant i n its o p p o s i t i o n t o p o w e r - s h a r i n g a n d the i m p o s i t i o n o f any all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , there was n o m e e t i n g o f m i n d s w i t h the S D L P , n o r even the A l l i a n c e o r U P N L O n e significant d e v e l o p m e n t d i d emerge, however, w i t h i n the U U U C . W i l l i a m C r a i g , the leader o f the hitherto h a r d l i n e V a n g u a r d Party, surp r i s i n g l y changed his v i e w a n d advocated a temporary, non-statutory f o r m o f c o a l i t i o n w i t h the S D L P as part o f a g r a n d design to defeat terrorism. A l t h o u g h C r a i g d i d n o t use the t e r m power-sharing, this was h o w the p l a n was inevitably interpreted. T h e idea h a d few supporters. T h e U U U C a n d C r a i g ' s o w n party were o p e n l y hostile. T h e V a n g u a r d P a r t y fragmented, w i t h m a n y members deserting to f o r m a breakaway g r o u p , the U n i t e d U l s t e r U n i o n i s t M o v e m e n t , l e d b y Ernest B a i r d . C r a i g ' s p o l i t i c a l career d e c l i n e d a n d i n the 1979 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n he lost his seat as M P for East Belfast to the D U P . B y late 1 9 7 5 , the U U U C appeared to advocate a return to S t o r m o n t . M o d i f i c a t i o n o f the o l d p r e - 1 9 7 2 system o f g o v e r n i n g N o r t h e r n Ireland was offered o n l y . i n respect o f the a l l o c a t i o n o f some parliamentary c o m m i t t e e chairs to the N a t i o n a l i s t m i n o r i t y . U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , this p l a n was rejected b y n o n - U U U C parties. W h a t was o n offer to t h e m was i n c l u s i o n o n l y i n departm e n t a l committees, whereas the 1 9 7 4 N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y offered such parties posts i n cabinet. T h e m i n o r parties issued their o w n m i n o r i t y reports, w h i l s t the L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t argued that the U U U C proposals w o u l d fail to create widespread acceptance. B y this, the g o v e r n m e n t meant c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y acceptance. A s the C o n v e n t i o n meandered aimlessly, the Secretary o f State chose t o e n d proceedings i n M a r c h 1 9 7 6 . A s B e w , G i b b o n a n d Patterson assert ( 1 9 9 6 : 200) the C o n v e n t i o n was best v i e w e d as a means o f k e e p i n g local p o l i t i c a l forces harmlessly o c c u p i e d w h i l s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n was given to a possibility o f some n e w departure i n p o l i c y ' . c

9.6 Non-politics 1976-9 T h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t appeared unable to t h i n k o f any n e w p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t ive between 1 9 7 6 a n d 1 9 7 9 . U l s t e r i s a t i o n a n d c r i m i n a l i s a t i o n acted as substitutes for p o l i t i c a l thought. T h e p e r i o d was significant p o l i t i c a l l y i n that i t h i g h l i g h t e d that alliances w i t h i n l o y a l i s m were o n l y temporary. W h a t e v e r the images o f the U W C strike o f 1974, Loyalists were n o t i n quite the i m p r e g n able p o s i t i o n suggested b y that display o f strength. I n 1 9 7 7 , a n attempt was made to repeat the Loyalist strike o f 1 9 7 4 , this t i m e i n order to o b t a i n a tougher security p o l i c y f r o m the B r i t i s h government. T h e strike was l e d b y the U n i t e d U l s t e r A c t i o n C o u n c i l , headed b y I a n Paisley. F r o m its outset, the strike was d o o m e d . It l a c k e d the clear aims o f its predecessor. T h e m a i n U n i o n i s t party o p p o s e d the a c t i o n , m a i n l y d u e to the

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i n v o l v e m e n t o f Loyalist p a r a m i l i t a r y groups, w h i l s t the strikers were confronti n g a tougher Secretary o f State i n Rees' replacement, R o y M a s o n . M a n y amongst the U n i o n i s t c o m m u n i t y v i e w e d his security p o l i c y as a n i m p r o v e m e n t u p o n those c o n d u c t e d b y his predecessors. T h e y were u n w i l l i n g to lose i n c o m e b y engaging i n strike a c t i o n . T h o s e reluctant to j o i n the strike were assisted b y the greater willingness o f security personnel to confront those engaging i n i n t i m i d a t i o n . A f t e r 10 days, the strike was abandoned. P o l i t i c a l impact d u r i n g this p e r i o d nonetheless d i d come f r o m the grassroots, w h i c h attempted to fill the p o l i t i c a l v a c u u m created b y the lack o f government initiatives. T h e rise o f the Peace People i n 1976 threatened briefly to lead a citizens' revolt against terrorist activity. T h e catalyst was a n i n c i d e n t i n w h i c h three c h i l d r e n were k i l l e d after a car crash i n v o l v i n g a n I R A driver shot b y B r i t i s h troops. H u g e peace demonstrations were l a u n c h e d t h r o u g h o u t the second h a l f o f 1976. These i n c l u d e d a m a r c h o f u p to 3 0 , 0 0 0 demonstrators i n the Loyalist, working-class S h a n k i l l a n d W o o d v a l e districts. M a n y w i t h i n N a t i o n a l i s t areas displayed s i m i l a r enthusiasm. F o r a t i m e , large sections o f the p o p u l a t i o n p u b l i c l y demonstrated their o p p o s i t i o n to p o l i t i c a l violence. E n j o y i n g such large support across the p o l i t i c a l divide, the Peace People l a u n c h e d a d o c u m e n t , Strategy for Peace, c a l l i n g for the creation o f a n o n p o l i t i c a l assembly o f c o m m u n i t y groups (Peace People, 1976). Idealism a n d enthusiasm straddled the social classes a n d the movement's leaders were awarded the 1976 N o b e l Peace Prize. T h e award was to be the c l i m a x o f the movement's success, before the onset o f feuding, sparked b y rows over h o w the prize m o n e y s h o u l d be spent. I n t i m i d a t i o n o f the Peace People w i t h i n b o t h c o m m u n i t i e s i m p a i r e d the activities o f the movement. Republicans d e m a n d e d that the m o v e m e n t criticise the security forces; some Loyalists were suspicious o f w h a t they saw as a N a t i o n a l i s t tinge to the leadership. M e a n w h i l e , the difficulty o f sust a i n i n g 'non-polities' also l e d to the m o v e m e n t b e c o m i n g a spent force b y 1978.

9.7 The early Thatcher years M a r g a r e t T h a t c h e r ( 1 9 9 3 : 3 8 5 ) declared her instincts to be ' p r o f o u n d l y U n i o n i s t ' . O n the question o f N o r t h e r n Ireland, as i n m a n y aspects o f her early p r e m i e r s h i p , she nonetheless t o o k a pragmatic approach. She c o n t i n u e d the t o u g h l i n e o n security issues a n d gave few concessions to the special category status d e m a n d e d b y republican prisoners i n the hunger strikes o f the early 1980s. T h e r e was, however, r e c o g n i t i o n o f the l i m i t a t i o n s o f the lack o f p o l i c y initiatives u n d e r M a s o n . A series o f atrocities i n 1979 sharpened this feeling. I n separate incidents, killings i n c l u d e d those o f A i r e y N e a v e , the S h a d o w N o r t h e r n Ireland spokesman; 18 B r i t i s h soldiers at W a r r e n p o i n t ; a n d L o r d M o u n t b a t t e n , h o l i d a y i n g i n the Irish R e p u b l i c . O n non-constitutional issues, not all o f the Thatcherite policies i m p l e m e n t e d elsewhere i n B r i t a i n were a p p l i e d to N o r t h e r n Ireland. O n e p o l i c y analysis suggests that T h a t c h e r i s m adopted a m u c h m o r e 'soft a p p r o a c h ' o n social a n d e c o n o m i c p o l i c y i n the region ( G a f i k i n a n d M o r r i s e y , 1 9 9 0 : 6 2 ) . T h i s m o r e relaxed p o l i c y style was a r e c o g n i t i o n o f the hardships e n d u r e d b y a c o n t i n u i n g

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a b n o r m a l security situation a n d a maintenance o f the belief that better standards o f l i v i n g m i g h t reduce terrorism. U p o n assuming office i n M a y 1979, the Conservative g o v e r n m e n t began to zsscss prospects for p o l i t i c a l advancement. Its election manifesto advocated the return o f devolved government, b u t i f this was n o t f o r t h c o m i n g , the possibility o f the establishment o f one o r m o r e regional c o u n c i l s h a d been m o o t e d . T h i s i m p l i e d a revival o f local government. P r o c e e d i n g cautiously, the n e w Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland, H u m p h r e y A t k i n s , called a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Conference o f the m a i n p o l i t i c a l parties, between J a n u a r y a n d M a r c h 1980. I n order to ensure at least some U n i o n i s t participation, discussions c o n c e r n i n g a n Irish d i m e n s i o n were c o n f i n e d to a parallel conference. T h e D U P , S D L P a n d A l l i a n c e participated, b u t again disagreed over the most appropriate f o r m o f d e v o l v e d government. I n a re-run o f the discussions o f the 1970s, the D U P insisted u p o n majority rule, w h i l s t the other t w o parties advocated power-sharing. T h e C o n f e r e n c e was n o t attended b y the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s , o n the g r o u n d that i t w o u l d achieve little, a v i e w w h i c h p r o v e d correct as the C o n f e r e n c e was abandoned. A t k i n s suggested a replacem e n t A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l c o m p r i s i n g local p o l i t i c i a n s , b u t the idea floundered. A more important development occurred i n December 1980. Thatcher and Charles H a u g h e y , the Irish P r i m e M i n i s t e r , agreed to set u p j o i n t A n g l o - I r i s h studies o n matters o f c o m m o n concern. T h e studies w o u l d examine the 'totality o f relationships w i t h i n these islands'. T h e phraseology was significant as i t heralded the onset o f i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l i s m w h i c h w o u l d characterise later p o l i t i c a l initiatives. Indeed, the report o f the studies i n N o v e m b e r 1981 p r o posed the establishment o f an intergovernmental c o u n c i l o f ministers to examine p o l i c y i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. I f T h a t c h e r was ' p r o f o u n d l y U n i o n i s t ' , H a u g h e y was ' p r o f o u n d l y R e p u b l i c a n ' at least i n terms o f rhetoric, arguing that N o r t h e r n Ireland was a 'failed p o l i t i c a l entity'. H e t o o possessed a pragmatic streak. Intergovernmental studies p r o v i d e d a means b y w h i c h he c o u l d be seen to e x p o u n d his r e p u b l i c a n credentials. Politics i n N o r t h e r n Ireland became even more polarised d u r i n g the f o l l o w i n g two years. B u o y e d b y success i n the E u r o p e a n elections i n 1 9 7 9 , the D U P h a d been a w i l l i n g player i n initiatives i n 1 9 8 0 . F o l l o w i n g the Thatcher—Haughey declaration, its p o s i t i o n hardened. I a n Paisley i n d i c a t e d the willingness o f his supporters to p h y s i c a l l y resist r e m o v a l i n t o a u n i t e d Ireland. A m o n g s t N a t i o n alists, s y m p a t h y for the I R A swelled w i t h the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the h u n g e r strikes, i n d i c a t e d b y the by-election v i c t o r y o f the i m p r i s o n e d hunger-striker, B o b b y Sands. A f t e r his death t h r o u g h starvation, Sands' election agent, O w e n C a r r o n , t r i u m p h e d i n the ensuing by-election. S u c h was the i m p a c t o f the a c t i o n that hunger-strikers even w o n seats i n the Irish parliament. I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l i s m was t e m p o r a r i l y reversed. T h i s was i n part d u e to the conflict o f o p i n i o n over the resolution o f the h u n g e r strike, as the Irish government, a l o n g w i t h several i n t e r n a t i o n a l organisations a n d the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h , d e m a n d e d concessions f r o m the B r i t i s h government. It was exacerbated b y the friction between T h a t c h e r a n d H a u g h e y over the latter's neutrality i n B r i t a i n ' s war w i t h A r g e n t i n a over the F a l k l a n d Islands.

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9.8 Rolling devolution G i v e n the u n p r o m i s i n g b a c k g r o u n d , i t was perhaps surprising that a n y p o l i t ical initiative emerged. Less startling was the realisation that the ' n e w initiative' was m e r e l y a v a r i a t i o n o n a n o l d theme. James P r i o r became Secretary o f State i n September 1981 w i t h some reluctance, fearing (correctly) that his selection was a f o r m o f internal exile. G r a d u a l o r r o l l i n g d e v o l u t i o n was the p o l i c y that emerged f r o m P r i o r ' s deliberations. I f politicians w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland were prepared to c o operate, they were to be granted a restoration o f devolved government. I n t r o d u c e d through the N o r t h e r n Ireland A c t 1982, the p l a n contained the f o l l o w i n g elements: 1. the election o f a 78-seat consultative A s s e m b l y ; 2 . scrutiny powers w o u l d be given to the A s s e m b l y ; 3. selected legislative powers w o u l d be transferred to the A s s e m b l y i f 7 0 p e r cent o f members approved. M a n y U n i o n i s t s h a d opposed d e v o l u t i o n w i t h a n all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n i n the 1970s. N o w i t was the t u r n o f the N a t i o n a l i s t S D L P to boycott proceedings, given the absence o f any such d i m e n s i o n . E q u a l l y , the S D L P was c o n c e r n e d over the lack o f f o r m a l power-sharing c o n t a i n e d i n the proposals. T h e develo p m e n t o f the A s s e m b l y i n legislative terms was dependent u p o n consensus, but this d i d n o t equate fully w i t h f o r m a l power-sharing. B y n o w the S D L P was c o o l i n g slightly o n the idea o f power-sharing. U n d e r the leadership o f H u m e , i t was m o v i n g away f r o m the idea o f a n y internal settlement a n d towards the e m b r y o n i c intergovernmentalism d e v e l o p i n g i n A n g l o - I r i s h talks. Elections to the A s s e m b l y t o o k place i n O c t o b e r 1 9 8 2 . B o t h the m a i n U n i o n i s t parties participated i n the elections a n d the A s s e m b l y . T h i s a p p r o v a l came despite their unhappiness about the 7 0 per cent w e i g h t e d majority v o t i n g required for the a c q u i s i t i o n o f powers. U n i o n i s t s believed such a n arrangement was t a n t a m o u n t to power-sharing. T h e m o r e integrationist U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s w o n 2 6 seats a l t h o u g h the party was m o r e reluctant t h a n the D U P , w i n n e r o f 21 seats, c o n c e r n i n g the overall p l a n . T h e D U P h o p e d that the p r o v i s i o n o f scrutiny powers m i g h t herald a return to genuine d e v o l v e d government. W h i l s t contesting the elections, the S D L P a n d S i n n F e i n , w i n ners o f 14 a n d five seats respectively, made clear that they h a d n o i n t e n t i o n o f t a k i n g their seats. S i n n Fein's vote o f 10.1 per cent, a m o u n t i n g to a t h i r d o f the N a t i o n a l i s t vote, alarmed the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments, w h i c h p o n d e r e d h o w to bolster the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l n a t i o n a l i s m o f the S D L P . D e v o i d o f N a t i o n a l i s t i n p u t , d e v o l u t i o n failed to r o l l . T h e A s s e m b l y became little m o r e t h a n a U n i o n i s t t a l k i n g shop. Its committees d i d p r o v i d e the first serious s c r u t i n y o f legislation under direct rule undertaken b y elected politicians. I n this task, the committees p r o v i d e d a means o f U n i o n i s t a n d A l l i a n c e P a r t y co-operation. B e y o n d this, the l i m i t a t i o n s o f the A s s e m b l y h a d been exposed l o n g before its d i s b a n d m e n t i n J u n e 1986. T h e m a i n legacy o f the r o l l i n g d e v o l u t i o n p l a n was that i t a m o u n t e d to a rejection b y the Conservative government o f the integrationist approach h e l d

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b y some U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s a n d elements w i t h i n the Conservative Party. T h e W h i t e Paper i n t r o d u c i n g the proposals made this clear, d e c l a r i n g that ' N o r t h ern Ireland's d i v i d e d c o m m u n i t y , its geography a n d the history o f its politics all make it impracticable to treat the P r o v i n c e as t h o u g h i t were i n all respects identical to the rest o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m ' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1 9 8 2 : para 6). I n accepting that N o r t h e r n Ireland was indeed a place apart, the B r i t i s h government paved the w a y for later agreements w h i c h w o u l d attempt its governance t h r o u g h n o v e l mechanisms. T h e 1982 declaration was designed to pave the w a y for devolved government i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. Its effect, a l o n g w i t h the N a t i o n a l i s t boycott, was to provide the death k n e l l for attempts at p u r e l y internal solutions to the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland.

9.9 The New Ireland Forum Report F o r m a n y years, the p o l i c y o f successive governments i n the Irish R e p u b l i c consisted m a i n l y o f h o p i n g that U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s w o u l d one day wake u p a n d realise that they h a d been m i s g u i d e d all a l o n g i n w a n t i n g to be B r i t i s h citizens. C a l l s for reunification regularly p r o v o k e d the loudest cheers at F i a n n a F a i l conferences, a l t h o u g h all present k n e w that little was to be d o n e i n practical terms. Strident demands for a ' n a t i o n once again' were surrogates for p o l i t i c a l thought. E n c o u r a g e d b y the b r i e f a n d u n l i k e l y T h a t c h e r - H a u g h e y c o - o p e r a t i o n , the government o f the R e p u b l i c o f Ireland became m o r e confident i n asserting its views c o n c e r n i n g N o r t h e r n Ireland t h r o u g h recognised A n g l o - I r i s h channels. T h i s development c o n t i n u e d u n d e r the F i n e G a e l government l e d b y G a r r e t Fitzgerald, b u t w e n t further i n the establishment o f the F o r u m for a N e w Ireland. T h e F o r u m i n v i t e d all interested parties i n Ireland to discuss their positions i n respect o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n o f the i s l a n d a n d attracted over 3 0 0 submissions. B o y c o t t e d b y U n i o n i s t parties i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, the F o r u m enjoyed participation f r o m the m a i n parties i n the R e p u b l i c , i n a d d i t i o n to the S D L P i n the N o r t h . Its creation reflected the desire o f F i t z g e r a l d to p r o d u c e a positive agenda for u n i f i c a t i o n , rather than the green N a t i o n a l i s t rhetoric o f o l d , w h i c h p a i d little m o r e than lip-service to the fears o f U n i o n ists. E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the F o r u m c o i n c i d e d w i t h Fitzgerald's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l crusade, designed to r i d the R e p u b l i c o f those elements o f C a t h o l i c theocracy unattractive to U n i o n i s t s . C r i t i c s believed that the project was a n irrelevance i n respect o f prospects for u n i t y . E v e n i f C a t h o l i c influence was reduced, U n i o n i s t s w o u l d n o t be enticed i n t o a u n i t a r y state. Partly d u e to differences amongst participants, the New Ireland Forum Report, p u b l i s h e d i n 1984, h a d a m u t e d i m p a c t ( N e w Ireland F o r u m , 1984). It criticised the B r i t i s h government for r e i n f o r c i n g U n i o n i s t supremacy i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, stressed the need for r e c o g n i t i o n o f the existence o f t w o traditions o f equal validity o n the island o f Ireland a n d recognised the Britishness o f U n i o n i s t s . Y e t , w h i l s t c l a i m i n g a consensual approach to Irish u n i t y , n o n e

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o f the conclusions o f the F o r u m was l i k e l y to be acceptable to U n i o n i s t s . Indeed, its proposals were seen b y some as a reassertion o f old-style n a t i o n a l i s m , whatever the o r i g i n a l a m b i t i o n s o f Fitzgerald ( O ' H a l l o r a n , 1987). It was argued that the proposals were unrealistic, b u t emerged as a consequence o f a p o l i t i c a l b a c k g r o u n d shaped b y concern over the rise o f S i n n F e i n i n N o r t h e r n Ireland (Boyle a n d H a d d e n , 1984). T h r e e o p t i o n s were offered b y the F o r u m Report: 1. a u n i t e d Ireland, achieved t h r o u g h consent; 2. a federal o r confederal state; 3. j o i n t authority. A u n i t e d Ireland was the favoured o p t i o n , b u t there was n o sign o f the required 'agreement a n d consent' unless the majority v i e w o n the entire island was used as the means o f measurement. T h e federal s o l u t i o n offered the prospect o f devolved, largely a u t o n o m o u s , governments w h i c h m i g h t leave U n i o n i s t s i n charge o f most o f their o w n affairs. Guarantees for different traditions w o u l d have been reinforced b y a w i d e r confederation o f B r i t a i n a n d Ireland, i n w h i c h the t w o countries were loosely l i n k e d . J o i n t a u t h o r i t y i n v o l v e d the c o n t r o l o f N o r t h e r n Ireland b y b o t h B r i t a i n a n d Ireland o n the basis o f equal, shared responsibility. A brusque response followed from Margaret Thatcher. T h e reply to 12 months o f effort a n d consideration was more succinct than the w e i g h t y F o r u m R e p o r t . S p e a k i n g at a press conference i n D e c e m b e r 1984, she insisted: I have made it clear . . . that a united Ireland was one solution that was out. A second solution was confederation o f two states. That is out. A third solution was joint authority. That is out (quoted i n Connolly, 1990: 147).

9.10 Conclusion T h e search for p o l i t i c a l agreement amongst politicians i n N o r t h e r n Ireland between 1972 a n d 1984 p r o v e d fruitless as the recurring theme was a lack o f consensus o n the issues o f enforced power-sharing a n d the all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n . A l l parties agreed that there c o u l d be n o return to the b a d o l d days o f S t o r m o n t , b u t for N a t i o n a l i s t s , the s u s p i c i o n r e m a i n e d that this was the closet project envisaged b y U n i o n i s t s , especially those w i t h i n the D U P , i n their d e m a n d for d e v o l u t i o n . U n i o n i s t s feared that the all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n d e m a n d e d b y N a t i o n a l i s t s a m o u n t e d to a trojan horse for a u n i t e d Ireland. I f the brevity o f M a r g a r e t T h a t c h e r ' s dismissal o f the F o r u m R e p o r t appeared a setback for A n g l o - I r i s h relations, the reversal was to prove o n l y temporary. B y 1 9 8 5 , the B r i t i s h government h a d decided to bypass local p o l i t i c a l forces b y u s i n g a n intergovernmental A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement.

Chapter 10

The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement

T h e 1984 N e w Ireland F o r u m R e p o r t c o n f i r m e d the v i e w o f most parties i n the Irish R e p u b l i c that a p u r e l y internal settlement i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was impossible. T h e B r i t i s h government believed a l i m i t e d role was possible for the Irish government i n the affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. Y e t these conclusions were set against the rejection b y U n i o n i s t s o f any interference b y the Irish R e p u b l i c . P o l i t i c a l paralysis appeared the certain result o f any attempt to seek agreement o n this issue amongst local p o l i t i c i a n s . I n response, the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t d e c i d e d to bypass local politics i n favour o f an intergovernmental agreement i n 1 9 8 5 . A c c o r d i n g l y , the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t was signed at H i l l s b o r o u g h Castle, C o u n t y D o w n , o n 15 N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 5 . T h e A g r e e m e n t effectively w e n t over the heads o f local politicians a n d placed the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h i n a co-operative A n g l o - I r i s h intergovernmental framework.

10.1 Origins A b o m b w h i c h e x p l o d e d at the G r a n d H o t e l i n B r i g h t o n d u r i n g the C o n servative Party conference i n O c t o b e r 1984 m i g h t have k i l l e d m a n y members o f the cabinet. T h e event emphasised the need for adequate security responses to the p r o b l e m o f terrorism. T h e B r i t i s h A r m y a n d the R U C c o n t i n u e d to exert m a x i m u m pressure u p o n R e p u b l i c a n paramilitaries i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. Y e t the Irish R e p u b l i c c o n t i n u e d to be v i e w e d as a relatively safe haven for I R A personnel. Greater c o - o p e r a t i o n between the B r i t i s h a n d Irish security forces was required. I n return, the Irish government c o u l d be awarded i n p u t to p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. S u c h calculations partly explain the origins o f the A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement. T h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t was prepared to shift its p o s i t i o n f r o m its 1969 declarat i o n at the onset o f the T r o u b l e s that the affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland were purely a matter for domestic consideration. It was prepared to accept the Irishness o f the m i n o r i t y i n N o r t h e r n Ireland i n the hope that the Irish government w o u l d help ensure that expressions o f m i n o r i t y interests were n o n - v i o l e n t . Yet, f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the N e w Ireland F o r u m R e p o r t i n 1984, it appeared i n i t i a l l y that the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t was prepared to m a k e few c o n cessions. U n i o n i s t s were adamant i n their o p p o s i t i o n to n o t o n l y the F o r u m R e p o r t but also the findings o f the K i l b r a n d o n R e p o r t ( 1 9 8 4 ) . C h a i r e d b y L o r d K i l b r a n d o n , the R e p o r t was an unofficial response to the N e w Ireland

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128

F o r u m R e p o r t a n d U n i o n i s t counter-proposals, p r o d u c e d b y a c o m m i t t e e o f interested i n d i v i d u a l s , i n c l u d i n g academics a n d politicians. It released its p r o posals o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l future o f N o r t h e r n Ireland a few days before T h a t c h e r ' s w i t h e r i n g rejection o f the N e w Ireland F o r u m . T h e K i l b r a n d o n R e p o r t rejected the models o f a unitary or confederal state p r o d u c e d i n the N e w Ireland F o r u m R e p o r t . It also refused to endorse the o p t i o n o f j o i n t authority. Nonetheless, the K i l b r a n d o n R e p o r t d i d countenance the n o t i o n o f a definite say for the Irish R e p u b l i c i n the affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. A l t h o u g h the C o m m i t t e e disagreed over conclusions, its majority report argued for a c o operative d e v o l u t i o n w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. A t the head o f government w o u l d be a five-person executive, c o m p r i s i n g the Secretary o f State for N o r t h ern Ireland, the Irish F o r e i g n minister a n d three locally elected politicians. C o - o p e r a t i o n between each party was to be encouraged b y the risk that a boycott w o u l d be overridden b y j o i n t L o n d o n - D u b l i n rule, b y the t w o ministers o n the executive. O t h e r measures favoured i n c l u d e d a B i l l o f Rights, m o d i f i c a t i o n o f the juryless D i p l o c k courts, a n d j o i n t authorities i n areas o f e c o n o m i c co-operation, such as t o u r i s m a n d transport. U n i o n i s t rejection was unsurprising. I n a d d i t i o n to o p p o s i t i o n to a role for the D u b l i n government at the apex o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , U n i o n i s t s objected t o the proposed r e d u c t i o n i n the size o f the U l s t e r Defence R e g i m e n t a n d the legalisation o f the flying o f the Irish t r i c o l o u r . T h e D U P was particularly scathing over the origins o f the C o m m i s s i o n Report i n the findings o f the F o r u m R e p o r t . Its deputy leader, Peter R o b i n s o n , argued: I f y o u have to c o m m e n t o n a d o c u m e n t that is absolute nonsense — as the N e w Ireland F o r u m R e p o r t was — then naturally y o u r d o c u m e n t w i l l be nonsense' (quoted i n K e n n y , 1986: 81). A m o r e influential set o f proposals came f r o m B o y l e a n d H a d d e n (1985). T h e authors argued for the exercise o f authority i n b o t h B r i t a i n a n d Ireland b y j o i n t authorities i n certain instances. I n p r o p o s i n g a draft A n g l o - I r i s h treaty, they advocated r e c o g n i t i o n o f the f o l l o w i n g : 1. that a special relationship exists between B r i t a i n a n d Ireland; 2 . that b o t h c o m m u n i t i e s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland need t o be able t o express their identity; 3. that the o n l y democratic w a y o f d e t e r m i n i n g to w h i c h state N o r t h e r n Ireland s h o u l d b e l o n g is v i a the votes o f its p o p u l a t i o n . T h e authors w e n t o n to propose m a n y o f the specific measures w h i c h w o u l d give effect to these principles. T h e y i n c l u d e d rights o f Irish citizenship a n d c u l t u r a l expression, j o i n t parliamentary memberships a n d greater f o r m a l p o l i c e co-operation. S u c h features were to f o r m a n integral part o f the A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement.

10.2 Terms T h e A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t was registered as a n international treaty u n d e r U n i t e d N a t i o n s C h a r t e r 102, a l t h o u g h i t referred to the internal w o r k i n g s o f a sovereign state. It c o n t a i n e d the f o l l o w i n g m a i n themes w i t h i n its 13 A r t i c l e s .

10.2 Terms

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10.2.1 Constitutional guarantees for the status of Northern Ireland A r t i c l e 1 o f the A g r e e m e n t was designed to reassure U n i o n i s t s . It affirmed that any change i n the status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d o n l y c o m e about w i t h the consent o f a majority o f its people. Further, i t a c k n o w l e d g e d that the 'present w i s h o f a majority o f the people o f N o r t h e r n Ireland is for n o change i n the status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland'. Simultaneously, A r t i c l e 1 attempted to offer hope to N a t i o n a l i s t s that future demographic changes, leading to a N a t i o n a l i s t majority, w o u l d produce a u n i t e d Ireland. Paragraph (c) p r o m i s e d to i n t r o d u c e legislation i n the B r i t i s h a n d Irish parliaments to give effect to that w i s h i f there was clear majority i n favour. A n i m p o r t a n t aspect o f the A g r e e m e n t was that it d i d n o t define the state purely i n territorial terms. Instead, its existence was c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n the consent o f its people ( G u e l k e , 1988). N o r m a l l y , such a c o n d i t i o n is a p p l i e d o n l y to a particular government, n o t the state itself.

10.2.2 A limited role for the Irish government in certain affairs in Northern Ireland B y far the most controversial section o f the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t was the establishment o f a n intergovernmental conference. T h i s was set u p under A r t i c l e 2 , w i t h i n the framework o f the A n g l o - I r i s h Intergovernmental C o u n c i l created i n 1 9 8 1 . T h e Intergovernmental Conference was to deal w i t h the following: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

p o l i t i c a l matters; security a n d related matters; legal matters, i n c l u d i n g the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f justice; cross-border co-operation.

I n accepting that the Irish government was entitled to p u t forward views a n d proposals i n respect o f each o f the above, it insisted that there was ' n o derogation o f sovereignty'. E i t h e r c o u n t r y was to r e m a i n the ultimate arbiter o f decisions taken w i t h i n its o w n sovereign territory. T h e B r i t i s h government suggested that the activity o f the Conference w o u l d be c o n f i n e d to matters n o t already the responsibility o f a devolved a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. A s n o such a d m i n i s t r a t i o n existed a n d w o u l d n o t be created w i t h i n the i m m e d i a t e future, this was scarcely a r e d u c t i o n i n the extent o f i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l i s m . Insertion o f this p r o v i s i o n i n the A g r e e m e n t was a h i n t to politicians i n N o r t h e r n Ireland that they needed to co-operate i f powers were ever to be restored locally. Subsequent Articles i n the A g r e e m e n t attempted to define w h a t the Intergovernmental C o n f e r e n c e w o u l d comprise a n d clarify w h a t it w o u l d discuss. Serviced b y a secretariat, based at M a r y f i e l d near Belfast, the C o n f e r e n c e was to meet at m i n i s t e r i a l level, j o i n t l y chaired b y the p e r m a n e n t Irish M i n i s t e r i a l Representative a n d the Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h i s emphasised that the Conference w o u l d n o t be c o n f i n e d to low-level discussions.

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Articles 7 a n d 8 dealt w i t h security a n d legal matters. T h e r e was a C o n f e r ence review o f existing extradition procedures, under w h i c h terrorist suspects c o u l d be transferred f r o m the Irish R e p u b l i c to the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . M o r e contentious was the possibility raised i n A r t i c l e 8 o f the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f ' m i x e d courts' to c o n t a i n j u d i c i a l representatives f r o m b o t h countries. A r t i c l e 9 dealt w i t h cross-border co-operation between the police forces, stressing that operat i o n a l responsibilities w o u l d r e m a i n w i t h the respective forces o f the R U C a n d the G a r d a S i o c h a n a . A r t i c l e 10 referred unspecifically to cross-border arrangements i n other spheres o f activity. A r t i c l e 12 m o o t e d the possibility o f a n A n g l o - I r i s h parliamentary body, c o n t a i n i n g representatives o f b o t h parliaments.

10.2.3 Recognition of the minority tradition within Northern Ireland T h e Intergovernmental Conference was to concern itself w i t h the 'rights a n d identities o f the t w o traditions i n N o r t h e r n Ireland'. T h i s i n c l u d e d matters such as c u l t u r a l heritage a n d election arrangements, i n a d d i t i o n to e c o n o m i c a n d social d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . M o s t significantly, there was a n acceptance that the government o f the Irish R e p u b l i c was to be given a guaranteed role i n respect o f the N a t i o n a l i s t c o m m u n i t y . It w o u l d be p e r m i t t e d to p u t forward views i n proposals for major legislation a n d p o l i c y issues 'where the interests o f the m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t y are significantly o r especially affected'.

10.3 The Unionist dilemma I n a critique o f the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t , A u g h e y (1989) outlines the four assumptions o f the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t u p o n w h i c h i t was predicated: 1. N o r t h e r n Ireland is different f r o m any other part o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m a n d must, therefore, be treated differently; 2 . the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland need n o t f o r m part o f debate i n the B r i t i s h parliament, as the P r o v i n c e is a place apart; 3. the logic o f history suggests Irish u n i t y ; 4. stability w i l l o n l y be achieved b y a balance o f p o l i t i c a l forces. A u g h e y goes o n to o u t l i n e the assumptions that u n d e r p i n n e d the Irish R e p u b l i c ' s approach to the Agreement. These can be condensed to t w o . Firstly, Irish u n i t y was b o t h inevitable a n d desirable. Secondly, i t was n o t i m m i n e n t , n o r was i m m i n e n t change desirable, as the Irish government d i d n o t w i s h to i n h e r i t one m i l l i o n dissident U n i o n i s t s . T o these u n d e r p i n n i n g s needed to be added the realities o f politics i n N o r t h e r n Ireland i n the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s . A t t e m p t s to achieve d e v o l v e d government h a d been a n abject failure. T h e r e was scant prospect o f a c h i e v i n g a p u r e l y i n t e r n a l settlement w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. W h a t was needed, therefore, was an arrangement w h i c h w o u l d p r o v i d e the assurances required b y U n i o n i s t s w i t h o u t d e m o l i s h i n g the aspirations o f N a t i o n a l i s t s . U n i o n i s t s were enraged b y the A g r e e m e n t . O p i n i o n polls i n d i c a t e d that o n l y 10 per cent o f Protestants supported a d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g role for the

10.3 The Unionist dilemma

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D u b l i n government i n the affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland ( C o x , 1 9 8 7 : 3 3 9 ) . O p p o n e n t s saw the influence afforded to D u b l i n as a prelude to Irish u n i t y . B r i t i s h sovereignty over N o r t h e r n Ireland c o u l d n o longer be absolute, as the Irish government was to be given a say i n the internal affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. A c c o r d i n g l y , the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reassurances p r o v i d e d w i t h i n A r t i c l e 1 were seen as meaningless, as the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n o f N o r t h e r n Ireland h a d been altered w i t h o u t the consent o f the majority. F o r m a n y U n i o n i s t s , a l l o w i n g the Irish government a defined role i n the governance o f N o r t h e r n Ireland was tantamount to j o i n t authority, even t h o u g h that h a d been rejected b y M a r g a r e t T h a t c h e r after the N e w Ireland F o r u m R e p o r t . U n i o n i s t responses were described as 'outrage, p a n i c a n d hysteria' (Harkness, 1996: 109). O t h e r s criticised U n i o n i s t reaction to a n ' e m i n e n t l y reasonable a n d m i n i m a l i s t ' A g r e e m e n t ( K i l b y , 1 9 9 6 : 18). T h e difficulty for U n i o n i s t s lay i n the fact that the A g r e e m e n t appeared ' i m p e r v i o u s to b o y c o t t ' ( A r t h u r , 1 9 9 6 : 119). T h e p o l i t i c a l strike w h i c h ended the power-sharing Executive o f 1 9 7 4 meant that the Loyalist c o m m u n i t y 'believed i t c o u l d literally p u l l the p l u g o n a n y p o l i t i c a l arrangement constructed b y the B r i t i s h government w h i c h d i d n o t suit t h e m ' ( A r t h u r a n d Jeffery, 1996: 14). T h e power-sharing Executive h a d a m o u n t e d to a failed attempt b y local politicians to govern o n the basis o f consensus. A s n o consensus h a d been f o u n d , the p o l i c y - m a k i n g base h a d shifted. T h e A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t was a n accord between t w o governments. T h e A g r e e m e n t also enjoyed i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a c k i n g f r o m interested parties, n o t a b l y the U n i t e d States government, w h i c h p r o v i d e d financial support for N o r t h e r n Ireland d u r i n g the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the A g r e e m e n t . S u c h support was approved b y the A m e r i c a n Congress i n M a r c h 1986, p r o v i d e d that h u m a n rights were respected i n N o r t h e r n Ireland ( C o o g a n , 1987). T h e A g r e e m e n t was devised partly d u e to pressure f r o m the I r i s h - A m e r i c a n l o b b y a n d the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y , n o t least u p o n B r i t i s h a n d Irish c i v i l servants ( C o n n o l l y a n d L o u g h l i n , 1986). I f local p o l i t i c a l parties a n d the w i d e r p o p u l a t i o n d i d n o t like it, they c o u l d protest b u t their dissenting actions need n o t be heeded. M e e t i n g s between government ministers a n d officials w o u l d c o n t i n u e apace. V i o l e n c e m i g h t have p r o d u c e d a rethink, b u t the Loyalist paramilitaries instead l o o k e d to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l politicians for their lead. U n i o n i s t M P s possessed little c l o u t . W i t h a majority o f over 100 i n the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s , the Conservative government d i d n o t require their support o n domestic p o l i t i c a l issues. S u p p o r t for the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t was cross-party, reflected i n the o v e r w h e l m i n g H o u s e o f C o m m o n s approval b y 4 7 3 votes to 4 7 . W h a t e v e r the strength o f their historic l i n k s , few inside the Conservative Party h a d m u c h s y m p a t h y for the p o s i t i o n o f U l s t e r U n i o n i s t s . A m o n g s t those t a k i n g exception to the A g r e e m e n t o n the right o f the party was I a n G o w , a T r e a s u r y m i n i s t e r later m u r d e r e d b y the I R A , w h o resigned f r o m the governm e n t over the s i g n i n g o f the accord. C o m m i t t e d since 1981 to a p o l i c y o f Irish u n i t y b y consent, the L a b o u r o p p o s i t i o n gladly endorsed the principles o f the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t a n d i n 1988 p r o m i s e d to enlarge the w o r k o f its secretariat ( L a b o u r Party, 1988).

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O v e r w h e l m i n g parliamentary approval for the A g r e e m e n t heightened the p r o b l e m for U n i o n i s t s o f d e t e r m i n i n g a strategy o f resistance w h i c h w o u l d n o t further u n d e r m i n e the U n i o n w i t h G r e a t B r i t a i n . A s loyal citizens, they felt o b l i g e d to accept the w i l l o f the sovereign parliament. Indeed, the d e m a n d for equal citizenship u n d e r the laws o f parliament was central to their protest. Y e t U n i o n i s t loyalty was c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n that parliament a c t i n g i n the best interests o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. U n i o n i s t loyalty was c o n d i t i o n a l , i n the same m a n n e r that loyalty f r o m the U n i t e d K i n g d o m appeared c o n d i t i o n a l . I f U n i o n i s t s were to engage i n protest w h i c h enraged the remainder o f B r i t a i n , the U n i o n m i g h t be u n d e r m i n e d t o a n even greater extent. U n i o n i s t s believed that they were b e i n g pushed to the edge o f the U n i o n a n d that the A g r e e m e n t represented their deeds o f transfer. Fearful for their future i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , U n i o n i s t s were u n h a p p y i n regard t o the logic o f the A g r e e m e n t . B r i t a i n , i n effect, h a d given u p o n b e i n g a persuader for Nationalists to accept that they were British citizens. R e c o g n i t i o n o f the c u l t u r a l heritage a n d i d e n t i t y o f the m i n o r i t y exacerbated the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland b y encouraging loyalty to be transferred elsewhere. A foreign state was t o be the overseer o f their rights. T h i s willingness t o a l l o w influence f r o m another state was seen as a d v a n c i n g the Irish R e p u b l i c ' s territorial c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland. W h a t e v e r the official insistence that there was to be n o r e d u c t i o n i n B r i t i s h sovereignty over N o r t h e r n Ireland, the R e p u b l i c h a d n o t been o b l i g e d t o w i t h d r a w its c l a i m t o the six counties. U n i o n i s t s ' outrage was heightened b y the fact that they h a d been w i l l i n g players i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y established i n 1982. P o l i t i c i a n s often seen as obstructive, such as I a n Paisley, h a d been strong supporters o f the A s s e m b l y . S i n n F e i n a n d the S D L P h a d b o y c o t t e d proceedings a n d h a d appeared to rule o u t the prospect o f devolved government i n N o r t h e r n Irel a n d . N o w i t appeared to U n i o n i s t s that the S D L P was to be rewarded w i t h the e n d i n g o f attempts at r o l l i n g d e v o l u t i o n . T h e a b a n d o n m e n t o f a party-led approach i n favour o f government-based initiatives appeared, i n U n i o n i s t eyes, to treat the co-operative forces o f u n i o n i s m w i t h c o n t e m p t .

10.4 Unionist responses D e s p i t e the p r o b l e m s o f m o u n t i n g a c a m p a i g n o f o p p o s i t i o n , a huge peaceful m o b i l i s a t i o n nonetheless occurred, t h r o u g h o v e r l a p p i n g organisations. T h e U l s t e r C l u b s began the c o - o r d i n a t i o n o f o p p o s i t i o n , p r o v i d e d b y a n e t w o r k o f local protest groups. T h e y d e m a n d e d full B r i t i s h citizenship a n d defence o f the Protestant heritage. A u g h e y (1989) acknowledges that the t w o demands appeared contradictory, i n that the latter created a n unnecessary c o n d i t i o n o f citizenship. T h e Ulster Resistance movement was formed, designed to provide disciplined o p p o s i t i o n to the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the A g r e e m e n t . A s w i t h h i s p u r s u i t o f the C a r s o n T r a i l i n the display o f firearms certificates i n 1 9 8 1 , so Paisley again offered the prospect o f c i v i l disobedience, w i t h the i m p l i e d threat o f even greater m i l i t a n c y . Paisley's sense o f betrayal was such that h e urged redress

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f r o m another quarter. A d d r e s s i n g his congregation i n N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 5 , s h o r t l y after p u b l i c a t i o n o f the A g r e e m e n t , he i m p l o r e d : W e pray this night that T h o u wouldst deal with the Prime Minister o f our country. W e remember that the Apostle Paul handed over the enemies o f truth to the Devil that they might learn not to blaspheme. In the N a m e o f thy blessed Self, Father, Son and H o l y Ghost, we hand this woman Margaret Thatcher to the Devil, that she might learn not to blaspheme. W e pray that thouds't make her a monument o f T h y divine vengeance; we pray that the world will learn a lesson through her fall and will learn a lesson through the ignominy to which she will be brought. . . O G o d , i n wrath take vengeance upon this wicked, treacherous lying woman . . . take vengeance upon her O Lord and grant that we shall see a demonstration o f thy power, (quoted i n Smyth, 1987: 192). I n the event, vengeance u p o n M a r g a r e t T h a t c h e r came exactly five years later, a l t h o u g h her r e m o v a l f r o m p r i m e m i n i s t e r i a l office has been m o r e closely associated b y most c o m m e n t a t o r s w i t h a devilish p o l l tax a n d divisions over E u r o p e rather than celestial forces. T h e extent o f anger w i t h i n a l l sections o f the U n i o n i s t c o m m u n i t y was visible o n 2 3 N o v e m b e r 1986 w h e n a n astonishingly large t u r n o u t o f 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 attended a n ' U l s t e r Says N o ' protest rally at the C i t y H a l l i n Belfast. T h e rally was attended b y 2 0 per cent o f the entire Protestant p o p u l a t i o n . A s i m i l a r l y p r o p o r t i o n a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n i n E n g l a n d w o u l d have p r o d u c e d a t u r n o u t o f four m i l l i o n . U n i o n i s t s emphasised the need for a u n i t e d protest. T o this effect, a l l 15 U n i o n i s t M P s resigned their seats a n d contested by-elections i n J a n u a r y 1 9 8 6 . In a n u m b e r o f seats, a d u m m y candidate called Peter Barry, the n a m e o f the Irish F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , was entered. T h e device was used to give the i m p r e s s i o n o f a referendum, i n w h i c h those i n favour c o u l d vote for a p r o - A g r e e m e n t candidate. In the event, the i m p a c t o f the referendum p o l i c y was m u t e d for several reasons. F r o m a N a t i o n a l i s t perspective, the i n - b u i l t U n i o n i s t m a j o r i t y i n N o r t h e r n Ireland gave all electoral contests a n air o f unreality. M o r e specifically i n this case, the tactic backfired as the U n i o n i s t s were returned i n o n l y 14 o f the 15 seats f r o m w h i c h they h a d resigned. M e d i a focus was concentrated u p o n the loss o f N e w r y - A r m a g h to Seamus M a l l o n o f the S D L P . O v e r a l l , the total n u m b e r o f votes against the A g r e e m e n t cast for U n i o n i s t candidates totalled 4 1 8 , 2 3 0 . T h i s a m o u n t e d to three-quarters o f those p o l l e d , a l t h o u g h less t h a n h a l f o f the electorate. E v e n i f the votes o f S i n n F e i n were a d d e d to the ' a n t i ' cause, a h i g h l y d u b i o u s p r o p o s i t i o n given the entirely different basis o f its o p p o s i t i o n , less t h a n h a l f o f the electorate b o t h e r e d to record a vote against the A g r e e m e n t . U n i o n i s t h o s t i l i t y to the A g r e e m e n t was i n d e e d intense, b u t the referendum device was perhaps n o t the clearest means o f its expression. U n i o n i s t disaffection was n o w translated i n t o actions w h i c h affected the governance o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. W i t h the exception o f E n o c h P o w e l l , U n i o n ist M P s b o y c o t t e d proceedings at W e s t m i n s t e r . A p e t i t i o n o f protest attracted over 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 signatures. D i s r u p t i o n o f c o u n c i l business, a protest b e g u n after

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the election o f 59 S i n n F e i n c o u n c i l l o r s i n M a y 1985, was n o w extended to each o f the 18 councils c o n t r o l l e d b y U n i o n i s t s . N o t all c o u n c i l l o r s were h a p p y over the w i t h d r a w a l f r o m p u b l i c d u t y . T h e decision o f U n i o n i s t councils n o t to set a rate a n d to adjourn meetings i n d e f i n itely p r o m p t e d some disquiet. U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Party c o u n c i l l o r s i n N o r t h D o w n chose to ignore the party edict a n d c o n t i n u e d to c o n d u c t c o u n c i l business. T h e r e was d i v i s i o n over whether c o u n c i l l o r s s h o u l d resign o r s i m p l y refuse to c o n d u c t certain aspects o f c o u n c i l activity. G e n e r a l l y U n i o n i s t s rem a i n e d u n i t e d . M o s t thought that w i t h d r a w a l tactics w o u l d be persuasive i n e l i c i t i n g a change o f heart f r o m the B r i t i s h government, b u t the T h a t c h e r government remained u n m o v e d a n d rates for dissenting c o u n c i l s were set b y the N o r t h e r n Ireland Office. T h e r e was some official r e c o g n i t i o n o f the need to appear to i m p l e m e n t the A g r e e m e n t w i t h sensitivity. F o r example, n o action was taken against those c o u n c i l l o r s failing to set a rate. T h i s contrasted w i t h actions pursued against c o u n c i l l o r s engaging i n p o l i t i c a l strikes o n the m a i n l a n d , as disqualified a n d surcharged councillors i n L i v e r p o o l a n d L a m b e t h c o u l d testify. T h e Taoiseach (Irish P r i m e M i n i s t e r ) , Garret Fitzgerald, argued that the m a i n i m p a c t o f the U n i o n i s t response was to force the B r i t i s h government to play d o w n the i m p o r t a n c e o f the A g r e e m e n t , thereby underselling to N a t i o n a l i s t s the 'remarkable n u m b e r o f changes effected through its mechanisms' (Fitzgerald, 1 9 9 1 : 575). T h e refusal o f the B r i t i s h government to budge o n the A n g l o Irish A g r e e m e n t h e l d firm even w h e n U n i o n i s t s m o d i f i e d their negotiating p o s i t i o n to call for its suspension, rather than entire a b a n d o n m e n t , p e n d i n g talks about d e v o l u t i o n . A n e w difficulty for U n i o n i s t s was d e c i d i n g w h a t p o l i t i c a l stance to adopt as the n e w reality d a w n e d . T h e affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d never again lie i n the exclusive d o m a i n o f the B r i t i s h government, nor w o u l d they reside solely amongst politicians i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. A general strike o n 3 M a r c h 1986 also failed to move the B r i t i s h government. T h e r e were numerous allegations o f i n t i m a t i o n made against the organisers o f the strike. A s R U C officers attempted to remove barricades, attacks b y Loyalists increased u p o n 'their' police force. I n the six m o n t h s f o l l o w i n g the A g r e e m e n t , 3 0 0 attacks o n the homes o f officers h a d occurred, causing 5 0 officers to be rehoused away f r o m staunchly Loyalist areas, previously considered relatively safe. U n i o n i s t s feared correctly that violence w o u l d increase as a result o f the A g r e e m e n t . F o r all their criticisms o f the content o f the accord, S i n n F e i n believed that a n y political gains were nonetheless a l l their w o r k . T h e I R A c a m p a i g n h a d forced the B r i t i s h government to concede a permanent p o l i t i c a l role for the Irish government. T h i s gave effect to the R e p u b l i c ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m to the N o r t h a n d m o v e d the prospect o f Irish u n i t y a little closer. T h e B r i t i s h government appeared to shift towards a n assumption o f the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f Irish u n i t y , w h i l s t c o n c e d i n g that i t was impossible to achieve at present. I n their desperation to get r i d o f the Agreement, t w o U n i o n i s t s even challenged its v a l i d i t y i n the Irish R e p u b l i c . T h e y argued that i t v i o l a t e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland f o u n d i n Articles 2 a n d 3 o f the

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135

R e p u b l i c ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n . I n rejecting the case, M r Justice B a r r i n g t o n declared that A r t i c l e 1 o f the A g r e e m e n t a m o u n t e d merely to a r e c o g n i t i o n o f the existi n g p o l i t i c a l reality i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, i n that consent for a u n i t e d Ireland was n o t i m m e d i a t e l y available. It was n o t t a n t a m o u n t to a r e n u n c i a t i o n o f the R e p u b l i c ' s c l a i m that the Irish n a t i o n consisted o f the entire i s l a n d o f Ireland. P u r s u i t o f this c o n s t i t u t i o n a l imperative was u n i m p a i r e d . T h e verdict echoed that recorded after the challenge to the S u n n i n g d a l e A g r e e m e n t a decade earlier.

10.5 Nationalist responses T h e S D L P was delighted b y the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t . It m o l l i f i e d the desire o f the party for a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l

approach w h i c h

reflected that the N o r t h e r n N a t i o n a l i s t m i n o r i t y was Irish, n o t B r i t i s h . T h i s m i n o r i t y saw the R e p u b l i c as a guarantor o f its rights, a n aspiration recognised i n the accord. T h e Irish g o v e r n m e n t

c l a i m e d a 'special r e l a t i o n s h i p ' w i t h

N a t i o n a l i s t s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland ( C o n n o l l y , 1990: 6 8 ) . It h a d n o w secured a n A g r e e m e n t w h i c h 'reflected the u p w a r d trajectory o f D u b l i n influence' ( C o o g a n , 1995: 183). F r o m the outset, the S D L P h a d p r o p o s e d that the A n g l o - I r i s h Intergovernm e n t a l C o u n c i l established i n 1981 s h o u l d deal w i t h issues o f security a n d n a t i o n a l i t y . C o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n needed to be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n a B r i t i s h Irish context ( W h i t e , 1984). T h e A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t p r o v i d e d a suitable framework. T h e S D L P ' s enthusiasm

o u t s h o n e even that h e l d b y the Irish

government. A u g h e y ( 1 9 8 9 : 59) describes this as the ' S D L P tail w a g g i n g the Irish d o g ' . T w o other aspects o f the A g r e e m e n t d e l i g h t e d the S D L P . Firstly, the A g r e e m e n t h a d a 'green tinge' i n that i t a c k n o w l e d g e d the aspiration o f Irish u n i t y , w i t h o u t i m m e d i a t e l y a d v a n c i n g its i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . T h i s was sufficient for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l N a t i o n a l i s t s , w h o recognised that a n 'agreed I r e l a n d ' c o u l d o n l y be achieved w i t h the consent o f a majority i n the N o r t h . W h a t was needed was e x p l i c i t reassurance that the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d facilitate a u n i t e d Ireland w h e n sufficient consent arrived. F e w i n the S o u t h desired a n i m m e d i ate transfer o f overall r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h i s further a n n o y e d U n i o n i s t s w h o believed that the A g r e e m e n t gc.ve the S o u t h p o w e r w i t h o u t responsibility. S e c o n d l y , p e n d i n g the arrival o f N o r t h e r n consent for u n i t y , w h a t was r e q u i r e d was a w e l d i n g together o f i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the i s l a n d o f Ireland. B y p r o v i d i n g a f r a m e w o r k o f co-operative relationships, the S D L P h o p e d that the border m i g h t w i t h e r as a n irrelevance. O p t i m i s t i c a l l y , there was a b e l i e f a m o n g some N a t i o n a l i s t s that U n i o n i s t s m i g h t be dissuaded o f the necessity o f the preservation o f the B r i t i s h l i n k b y a n e c o n o m i c rationale, i f t r a d i n g l i n k s were developed w i t h the R e p u b l i c a n d E u r o p e . A deliberate a i m o f the A g r e e m e n t was the bolstering o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l n a t i o n a l i s m o f the S D L P at the expense o f the m i l i t a n t r e p u b l i c a n i s m o f S i n n F e i n . B o t h the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments

h a d been c o n c e r n e d b y the

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electoral rise o f the latter. I n the 1983 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n , S i n n F e i n achieved o n l y 4.5 per cent fewer votes than the S D L P . W h i l s t i t r e m a i n e d u n l i k e l y that support for the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a r i a t i o n o f n a t i o n a l i s m w o u l d be relegated t o a m i n o r i t y taste w i t h i n the N a t i o n a l i s t c o m m u n i t y , i t was n o w a possibility. S i n n Fein's support was n o t merely a p r o d u c t o f increased N a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c a l support for the I R A ' s ' a r m e d struggle'. R e s i d u a l s y m p a t h y f r o m the hunger strikes a n d the i n v o l v e m e n t o f S i n n F e i n c o u n c i l l o r s i n c o m m u n i t y w o r k also boosted the party's f o l l o w i n g . After the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t was signed, S i n n Fein's electoral support w a n e d for a time, a l t h o u g h i t is difficult to identify w i t h precision the extent to w h i c h this decline can be attributed to the treaty. I n the 1987 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n a n d 1989 E u r o p e a n contest, S i n n F e i n trailed the S D L P b y 10 per cent o f the vote. S i n n F e i n saw little merit i n a n A g r e e m e n t w h i c h it believed consolidated the six-county state a n d p r o v i d e d a U n i o n i s t veto over change. T h e party saw the m a i n m o t i v a t i o n u n d e r p i n n i n g the A g r e e m e n t as the f o r m a t i o n o f an a n t i R e p u b l i c a n consensus ( R y a n , 1994). I n a l l o w i n g the aspiration o f Irish u n i t y or even j o i n t authority to be quashed b y the B r i t i s h government, the Irish government h a d settled for a pale i m i t a t i o n , based a r o u n d p e r i o d i c consultat i o n . T h e A g r e e m e n t appeared to recognise B r i t i s h sovereignty over N o r t h e r n Ireland. C o n c u r r e n t l y , increased B r i t i s h influence u p o n the activities o f the government i n the R e p u b l i c a m o u n t e d to a partial recolonisation o f Ireland. R e p u b l i c a n s v i e w e d the m a i n role granted to the Irish government as the prevention o f terrorism. T h e Irish government was b e i n g asked to d o the ' d i r t y w o r k ' o f the B r i t i s h government i n p r o p p i n g u p the N o r t h e r n state. C r o s s - b o r d e r p o l i c i n g initiatives were designed as a counter-offensive against the I R A . E v e n some c o n s t i t u t i o n a l N a t i o n a l i s t s w i t h i n the island o f Ireland d i d n o t favour the A g r e e m e n t . I n the R e p u b l i c , Charles H a u g h e y , the leader o f F i a n n a F a i l , the m a i n o p p o s i t i o n party, c o n d e m n e d the accord. H e shared the v i e w o f G e r r y A d a m s , the president o f S i n n F e i n , that the A g r e e m e n t 'copper-fastened p a r t i t i o n ' , t h r o u g h its refusal t o change the status o f N o r t h ern Ireland w i t h o u t majority consent. F o r H a u g h e y , the 'failed p o l i t i c a l entity' o f N o r t h e r n Ireland was illegitimate a n d artificial. H a u g h e y ' s party forced a close vote i n the D a i l , b u t the A g r e e m e n t was passed b y 8 8 votes to 7 5 . Faced w i t h p o l i t i c a l difficulties arising f r o m the p o p u l a r i t y o f the A g r e e m e n t amongst the electorate o f the R e p u b l i c , H a u g h e y subsequently t o n e d d o w n his o p p o s i t i o n .

10.6 After the Anglo-Irish Agreement W h i l s t the intensity a n d extent o f protest against the A g r e e m e n t was considerable i n the short t e r m , b y m i d - 1 9 8 6 the c a m p a i g n was already i n decline. A l t h o u g h i t was to be some t i m e before all councils resumed n o r m a l business, Belfast C i t y C o u n c i l n a r r o w l y v o t e d to e n d its protest a n d resume business i n M a y 1 9 8 6 . A 1988 review o f the A g r e e m e n t a m o u n t e d t o little m o r e t h a n a renewal ( C o c h r a n e , 1993). A search was underway amongst U n i o n i s t s for p o l i t i c a l alternatives.

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O n e such alternative was Common Sense, p u b l i s h e d b y the U D A i n 1 9 8 7 . T h e U D A ' s a b a n d o n m e n t o f the idea o f an independent U l s t e r i n favour o f a retention o f B r i t i s h c o n t r o l was received favourably i n U n i o n i s t circles. W h i l s t the U D A supported independence, i t was seen b y fellow Loyalist critics as some k i n d o f ' P r o d S i n n F e i n ' (Bruce, 1994: 104). N o w the U D A was seen as ' s o u n d ' o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d its ideas o f devolved government, w i t h all parties represented a c c o r d i n g to electoral support, steered an acceptable course between enforced power-sharing a n d majority rule. In order to c o n t i n u e the c a m p a i g n against the A g r e e m e n t a n d search for alternatives, the U n i o n i s t T a s k Force was established i n February 1987, again emphasising u n i t y between different strands o f u n i o n i s m . S u c h u n i t y was reinforced i n the J u n e 1987 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n i n w h i c h the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Party a n d D e m o c r a t i c U n i o n i s t Party d i d n o t fight each other i n parliamentary constituencies. O n e U n i o n i s t d i s t u r b i n g this c o m m o n approach was R o b e r t M c C a r t n e y , the H e a d o f the C a m p a i g n for E q u a l C i t i z e n s h i p ( C E C ) a n d later the leader o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m U n i o n i s t Party. T h e C E C «was established i n the wake o f the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t to c a m p a i g n for full electoral integration, M c C a r t n e y refused to accept the ' n o contest' edict a n d was expelled f r o m the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Party. It was the v i e w o f the C E C that the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t h i g h l i g h t e d the need for full integration. O n l y b y a l l o w i n g the citizens o f N o r t h e r n Ireland to participate fully i n selecting a B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d they be treated equally w i t h i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . Ulster u n i o n i s m also needed to shed its sectarian image a n d embrace C a t h o l i c s to a greater extent. A t odds w i t h the devolutionist D U P , M c C a r t n e y w e n t m u c h further than the seemingly integrationist approach o f the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t leader, James M o l y n e a u x . M c C a r t n e y w a n t e d total integration, rather than the ' m i n i m a l i s t u n i o n i s m ' o f c o m p r o m i s e between the integrationist a n d d e v o l u t i o n i s t w i n g s o f the Ulster U n i o n i s t Party practised b y M o l y n e a u x (Bew a n d Patterson, 1987). T h e J o i n t U n i o n i s t M a n i f e s t o devised for the 1 9 8 7 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n concentrated most o f its efforts u p o n a scathing critique o f the A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement, exemplified by the title o f the document To Put Right a Great Wrong. U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , the d o c u m e n t d e m a n d e d the suspension o f the A g r e e m e n t as a precursor to the f o r m a t i o n o f a viable alternative. T h e electoral pact y i e l d e d 3 8 0 , 0 0 0 votes, over h a l f the total cast. M o s t coverage nonetheless centred u p o n the o u s t i n g o f the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t E n o c h P o w e l l b y the S D L P i n S o u t h Down. In a n attempt to m o v e forward after the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t , U n i o n i s t s p r o d u c e d the report An End to Drift ( J o i n t U n i o n i s t T a s k Force, 1987). W h i l s t favouring d e v o l u t i o n as the l o n g - t e r m o p t i o n , the R e p o r t rejected this as a means o f a b o l i s h i n g the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t . It argued that the A g r e e m e n t h a d placed t o o m a n y constraints u p o n a devolved settlement, t h r o u g h the w o r k i n g s o f the A n g l o - I r i s h Conference. M o r e surprisingly, the R e p o r t appeared to suggest a d o o m s d a y scenario, h i n t i n g that U n i o n i s t s s h o u l d prepare for d e v o l u t i o n outside the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , a defeatist n o t i o n w h i c h alarmed other U n i o n i s t s (Aughey, 1989).

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The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement

10.7 Lasting significance T h e A g r e e m e n t h a d huge i m p l i c a t i o n s for the c o n d u c t o f N o r t h e r n Ireland p o l i c y , henceforth b i - n a t i o n a l . I n the shorter term, there were legislative items arising as a consequence o f the A g r e e m e n t , such as the repeal o f d i s c r i m i n atory legislation a n d changes i n security structures. O n e such change was the a b o l i t i o n o f the Flags a n d E m b l e m s A c t w h i c h forbade the display o f the Irish t r i c o l o u r . A n o t h e r was the merger o f the U l s t e r Defence R e g i m e n t ( U D R ) w i t h the R o y a l Irish R e g i m e n t . W h e t h e r this made any i m p a c t w i t h i n N a t i o n alist c o m m u n i t i e s is d o u b t f u l . M a n y N a t i o n a l i s t s v i e w e d this force, whatever its title, as a successor to the o l d ' B ' Specials. O t h e r measures were r e h o u s i n g schemes, p r o m o t i o n o f the status o f the G a e l i c language a n d the i n i t i a t i o n o f fair e m p l o y m e n t legislation ( C o c h r a n e , 1993). Part o f the fair e m p l o y m e n t legislation was based u p o n the ' M a c B r i d e P r i n c i p l e s ' n a m e d after the N o b e l Prize w i n n e r , Sean M a c B r i d e . F i r m s investing i n N o r t h e r n Ireland were m o n i t o r e d i n a n attempt to eliminate religious d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n recruitment a n d w o r k p l a c e policies. U n i o n i s t s believed that the Agreement d i d not succeed i n eliciting substantial progress o n extradition procedures. T h e 2 4 7 deaths arising f r o m the T r o u b l e s i n the three years i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g the A g r e e m e n t represented a 2 7 per cent increase o n the total for 1 9 8 3 - 5 . R e p u b l i c a n violence increased as the electoral gains o f S i n n F e i n were halted. Loyalist paramilitaries revived. L i t t l e change was effected internally i n the Irish R e p u b l i c . O p t i m i s t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l crusaders, such as Fitzgerald, believed that reform w o u l d m a k e the R e p u b l i c a m o r e attractive p r o p o s i t i o n for U n i o n i s t s . These campaigners received a rebuff i n 1986, w h e n a referendum o n whether to o v e r t u r n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a n o n divorce i n t r o d u c e d i n the 1937 C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o d u c e d a two-to-one majority i n favour o f the status q u o . T h e v i c t o r y was w e l c o m e d b y the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h b u t i t d i s a p p o i n t e d the C h u r c h o f Ireland, w h i c h argued for greater separation o f c h u r c h f r o m state p o l i c y . A further n i n e years elapsed before this result was overturned. F e w i n N o r t h e r n Ireland saw the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t as a panacea. I n 1988, a very substantial majority i n b o t h c o m m u n i t i e s believed that the A g r e e m e n t h a d failed to benefit Nationalists o r U n i o n i s t s . Despite their protests against the p r i n c i p l e o f the A g r e e m e n t , o n l y 28 per cent o f Protestants c l a i m e d that i t benefited N a t i o n a l i s t s (Boyle a n d H a d d e n , 1989: 19). W h a t , therefore, was a l l the fuss about? Perhaps m o r e i m p o r t a n t than the specific measures p r o d u c e d was the m o d e l o f intergovernmental co-operation w h i c h u n d e r p i n n e d the A g r e e m e n t . I n a t t e m p t i n g to resolve the N o r t h e r n Ireland conflict, the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t was the u n d o u b t e d forerunner o f the peace process o f the 1990s. Parties were n o longer the m a i n arbiters o f politics i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, u n t i l they c o u l d agree to co-operate. G o v e r n m e n t s were n o w the k e y players. Agreements p r o d u c e d i n the peace process o f the 1990s were framed b y governments, a n d then shaped, i n terms o f detail, b y p o l i t i c a l parties. B r i t a i n ' s relationship w i t h Ireland was n o w m u c h m o r e crucial to the i m m e d i a t e future o f N o r t h e r n

10.8 Conclusion

139

Ireland than local politics. A s A r t h u r a n d Jeffery ( 1 9 9 6 : 2) n o t e d , the i m p l i c a t i o n was that 'a m u c h greater onus is placed o n the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l process than heretofore'. E q u a l l y , even n o n - U n i o n i s t c o m m e n t a t o r s a c k n o w l e d g e d that the A n g l o Irish A g r e e m e n t 'signalled a decline i n B r i t i s h enthusiasm for the U n i o n ' ( R y a n , 1994: 3 ) . T h i s lack o f enthusiasm was to become further evident i n future. E a c h recent agreement, b e g i n n i n g w i t h the A n g l o - I r i s h a c c o r d , was to indicate that the future o f u n i o n i s m h a d n o m o r e s o l i d base t h a n the demographics o f the t i m e . I f they were to change a n d a N a t i o n a l i s t majority were to emerge, the B r i t i s h government w o u l d e n d its i n v o l v e m e n t i n N o r t h ern Ireland. S u c h d e m o g r a p h i c change was nonetheless a remote prospect.

10.8 Conclusion T h e A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t p r o v i d e d a forerunner to the peace process w h i c h developed i n the 1990s. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g his party's official stance o f o p p o s i t i o n , a senior m e m b e r o f S i n n F e i n c o n c e d e d i n private that 'as a r e s u l t . . . the B r i t i s h government p o s i t i o n has changed a n d changed irrevocably' ( M i t c h e l M c L a u g h l i n , q u o t e d i n M a l l i e a n d M c K i t t r i c k , 1996: 3 6 ) . T h e changes were thus. Firstly, a n y l i n g e r i n g prospect o f a return to a p r e - 1 9 7 2 U n i o n i s t veto over internal change i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was ended. S e c o n d l y , B r i t a i n h a d declared herself b r o a d l y neutral o n the future o f the U n i o n . T h i r d l y , the Irish g o v e r n m e n t was the n e w c u s t o d i a n o f the rights o f N a t i o n a l i s t s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees that the f o r m a l status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland c o u l d not be changed w i t h o u t the consent o f U n i o n i s t s meant that the A n g l o Irish A g r e e m e n t was unacceptable to R e p u b l i c a n s , w h o also rejected its crossborder security measures. W h a t R e p u b l i c a n s sought was some discussion o f the n o t i o n o f self-determination for a l l l i v i n g o n the island o f Ireland, n o t merely a requirement for U n i o n i s t consent to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. I f the I R A was to be weaned away f r o m violence, s u c h 'green language' was r e q u i r e d i n future agreements. W i t h gathering m o m e n t u m , the search began for n u a n c e d phraseology.

Chapter 11

The logic of the peace process: changes in republicanism

B y the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , there was a m i l i t a r y stalemate i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. O u t r i g h t defeat o f the I R A appeared u n l i k e l y . E q u a l l y , it was apparent that the I R A c o u l d n o t force a B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l . T o e n d its c a m p a i g n , the I R A needed to be c o n v i n c e d that B r i t a i n h a d no particular desire to stay i n N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d m i g h t w i t h d r a w at some p o i n t i n the future. I f B r i t a i n gave a strong i n d i c a t i o n o f w i t h d r a w a l , there was a risk o f Loyalist violence. C o u l d this d i l e m m a be resolved a n d a peace process created? G i v e n the I R A ' s assessment t h r o u g h o u t the T r o u b l e s that it was fighting an a n t i - c o l o n i a l war, persuading the organisation that violence served n o positive f u n c t i o n i n the cause o f Irish u n i t y w o u l d not be easy. Nonetheless this was the task u p o n w h i c h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l N a t i o n a l i s t s e m b a r k e d i n the late 1980s. T h i s persuasion was designed to create a logic o f peace. It represented the i n f o r m a l stage one o f what became k n o w n as the peace process. Stage t w o , based u p o n formal government declarations, was to follow. Stage three b r o u g h t about m u l t i - p a r t y negotiations, c u l m i n a t i n g i n the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . T h i s chapter analyses the development o f the first stage, a r g u i n g that the peace process was b u i l t m a i n l y u p o n changes w i t h i n Irish r e p u b l i c a n i s m . T h i s is not to underplay the roles o f other actors, notably the British a n d Irish governments, the U n i t e d States government, the S D L P a n d the U n i o n i s t s . E a c h n u a n c e d their stance i n respect o f N o r t h e r n Ireland, but remained c o m m i t t e d to the core p r i n c i p l e o f consent for change i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. A l l groups shifted, b u t S i n n F e i n shifted most, i n d e v e l o p i n g a peace process. R e p u b l i c a n i s m has never been entirely cohesive. Indeed, throughout the history o f the I R A , B r e n d a n B e h a n once remarked, the first i t e m o n the agenda was the split. After the Official I R A called a ceasefire i n 1972, it was the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A w h i c h soon became the I R A , c o n t i n u i n g a m i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n against B r i t i s h rule. S o m e former supporters o f the O f f i c i a l I R A became strident critics o f the Provisionals w i t h i n the W o r k e r s Party or the D e m o c r a t i c Left. O t h e r s t o o k a different course a n d j o i n e d the Irish N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n A r m y ( I N L A ) , or its p o l i t i c a l w i n g , the Irish R e p u b l i c a n Socialist Party. T h e I N L A was c o m m i t t e d to violence as a means o f establishing a t h i r t y - t w o c o u n t y Irish R e p u b l i c . It engaged i n a murderous feud w i t h r e m a i n i n g members o f the O f f i c i a l I R A d u r i n g the 1970s. A v o w e d l y socialist a n d non-sectarian, the I N L A nonetheless engaged i n a h i g h n u m b e r o f sectarian acts a n d c o m m i t t e d several o f the worst atrocities d u r i n g the T r o u b l e s . I f a peace process

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11.1 Militarism versus politics

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was to develop, i t was i m p o r t a n t , firstly, that most R e p u b l i c a n s , n o t a b l y S i n n F e i n a n d the I R A , were 'onside' a n d , secondly, that a serious R e p u b l i c a n split d i d n o t emerge. A n y peace process w h i c h failed to deliver the t r a d i t i o n a l goals o f r e p u b l i c a n i s m risked s p l i t t i n g the R e p u b l i c a n m o v e m e n t .

11.1 Militarism versus politics T h e i n i t i a l belief o f the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A that B r i t a i n c o u l d be r a p i d l y ejected f r o m Ireland t h r o u g h force peaked i n 1 9 7 2 . It appeared that the organisation h a d b o m b e d itself to the negotiating table. A delegation o f I R A members m e t the N o r t h e r n Ireland Secretary W i l l i a m W h i t e l a w for talks. A straightforward 'Brits o u t ' p o l i c y characterised the I R A ' s approach. T h e n o n - n e g o t i a b i l i t y o f this d e m a n d c o n t r i b u t e d to the r a p i d collapse o f the talks, as d i d alleged infringements o f the ceasefire called d u r i n g their d u r a t i o n . Y e t , b y the t i m e o f the fruitless 1972 talks, the I R A c a m p a i g n h a d already peaked. U n d e r increasing pressure f r o m the security forces, the offensive w a n e d under a series o f ceasefires, internecine feuds, a descent i n t o sectarian k i l l i n g s a n d the lack o f a p o l i t i c a l outlet for activity. B y the late 1970s, the I R A was not beaten, b u t i t h a d been c o n t a i n e d . D u r i n g the era that p a r a m i l i t a r y activity was seen as likely to t r i u m p h , politics were subordinate. T h e o n l y p o l i t i c a l strategy that existed was based u p o n the f o r m a n e w Ireland w o u l d take w h e n the B r i t i s h w i t h d r e w . P o l i t i c s as a route towards a c h i e v i n g the r e m o v a l o f the B r i t i s h presence was regarded b y m a n y w i t h c o n t e m p t . A n e w Ireland was to develop a l o n g the lines o f the socialist r o m a n t i c i s m o f E i r e N u a , the p o l i c y o f S i n n F e i n . T h i s was based u p o n the f o l l o w i n g ideas: 1. the creation o f a federal Ireland; 2. the establishment o f four federal parliaments, based u p o n the historic four provinces o f the island; 3. the d e v e l o p m e n t o f i n d u s t r i a l a n d f a r m i n g co-operatives. In effect, w h a t was proposed was a garrison Ireland, w h i c h w o u l d , for example, w i t h d r a w f r o m the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y . O u t s i d e the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A a n d its supporters, the proposals attracted little interest. W i t h i n Ireland, p o w e r w o u l d be d e v o l v e d to each parliament. A c c o r d i n g to supporters, a particular advantage w o u l d be that U n i o n i s t s w o u l d r e m a i n largely i n c o n t r o l o f their o w n destiny w i t h i n a n i n e - c o u n t y U l s t e r parliament ( O ' B r a d a i g h , 1996). A s the l i m i t a t i o n s to its m i l i t a r y strategy became apparent, S i n n F e i n sought to bolster its p o l i t i c a l role. I n 1 9 8 1 , it rejected the E i r e N u a strategy i n favour o f a unitary Irish state. T h i s d i d n o t represent the a d o p t i o n o f a m o r e m o d e r ate p o l i t i c a l approach. Rather, E i r e N u a was a b a n d o n e d because, a c c o r d i n g to S i n n F e i n , ' a n y s o l u t i o n that left p o w e r i n the hands o f Loyalists w o u l d n o t have succeeded i n b r e a k i n g the p o l i t i c a l presence o f the B r i t i s h i n this country' (Morrison, 1985: 87). S i n n F e i n began to c a m p a i g n m u c h m o r e actively i n elections f o l l o w i n g the hunger strikes b y R e p u b l i c a n prisoners i n 1980 a n d 1 9 8 1 . A s N a t i o n a l i s t

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sentiment was aroused, so election successes began for Republicans. T h e election o f the I R A ' s B o b b y Sands i n a W e s t m i n s t e r by-election was f o l l o w e d b y the election o f his agent, O w e n C a r r o n , i n the by-election caused b y Sands' death f r o m starvation. R e p u b l i c a n prisoners were also elected to the Irish Parliament. W i t h i n S i n n F e i n , these developments l e d to greater parity for a p o l i t i c a l approach, alongside the I R A ' s c o n t i n u i n g m i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n . T h i s strategy was i n d i c a t e d b y the director o f p u b l i c i t y for S i n n F e i n , D a n n y M o r r i s o n , at the 1981 ard fheis: W h o here really believes that we can w i n the war through the ballot box? But w i l l anyone here object i f with a ballot paper i n this hand and an armalite i n this hand we take power i n Ireland?. S i n n Fein's difficulty was, o f course, that a great m a n y people outside the conference h a l l w o u l d have objected. Nonetheless, the party's d u a l strategy p r o v e d successful i n m o b i l i s i n g support. A resurgent I R A , organised i n t o cells, was capable o f l a u n c h i n g countless 'spectacular' operations, even i f the overall level o f activity was reduced f r o m that o f the early 1970s. P o l i t i c a l support for a r m e d r e p u b l i c a n i s m , i f measured i n terms o f votes for S i n n F e i n , was at its highest level since p a r t i t i o n . D e s p i t e this, the R e p u b l i c a n m o v e m e n t faced t w o particular difficulties b y 1986. Firstly, i t h a d a lack o f a decisive mandate amongst the N a t i o n a l i s t p o p u l a t i o n . F o l l o w i n g the s i g n i n g o f the A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement, the S D L P ' s electoral support h a d stabilised a n d i t appeared that S i n n F e i n w o u l d r e m a i n the m i n o r i t y voice o f Irish n a t i o n a l i s m . A senior party figure, M i t c h e l M c L a u g h l i n , wrote i n 1 9 8 5 , i n a n internal party d o c u m e n t , that there were positive aspects to the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t a n d that i t m a r k e d a change i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y . M c L a u g h l i n later c l a i m e d that his d o c u m e n t was designed as a p o l e m i c to 'stimulate debate' (interview w i t h author, 2 8 J u n e 2 0 0 0 ) . H e achieved his objective, as R e p u b l i c a n s considered alternative strategies. I n the Irish R e p u b l i c , S i n n F e i n secured o n l y w o e f u l election results. S e c o n d l y , the I R A was c o m i n g under considerable pressure f r o m the security forces a n d f r o m revived Loyalist p a r a m i l i t a r y groups. U n d e r n e w leaderships, the latter concentrated u p o n the removal o f suspected R e p u b l i c a n s . P o l i t i c a l l y stalled, there was a realisation amongst m a n y leading figures w i t h i n S i n n F e i n a n d the I R A that m i l i t a r y pressure alone w o u l d be insufficient to remove B r i t a i n f r o m N o r t h e r n Ireland. W h i l s t the I R A h a d e n o u g h w e a p o n r y t o c o n t i n u e its c a m p a i g n for the foreseeable future, it was prepared to countenance a shift i n p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i o n . After the b o m b i n g o f a R e m e m brance D a y c o m m e m o r a t i o n i n E n n i s k i l l e n b y the I R A , there was even a b r i e f p e r i o d w h e n E n g l i s h p u b l i c o p i n i o n was so enraged that i t favoured k e e p i n g troops i n N o r t h e r n Ireland (Hayes a n d M c A l l i s t e r , 1996). S i n n F e i n ' s p o l i t ical message was h a v i n g little impact, a p r o b l e m worsened b y the broadcasting b a n i m p o s e d u p o n supporters o f paramilitary activity i n 1988. A strategic rethink was begun. T h i s involved three developments: acceptance o f the twentys i x - c o u n t y Irish R e p u b l i c , dialogue w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l N a t i o n a l i s t s a n d a r e d u c t i o n i n i m m e d i a t e p o l i t i c a l demands.

11.2 Recognition of the Irish Republic

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11.2 Recognition of the Irish Republic A central p r o b l e m for S i n n F e i n was h o w to assert its d e m a n d for a u n i t e d Ireland i n the face o f the persistent assertion f r o m the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t that there c o u l d be n o change i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l future o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h o u t the consent o f a m a j o r i t y o f its p o p u l a t i o n . F o r S i n n F e i n to significantly advance its p o s i t i o n , i t m i g h t m e a n m o v e m e n t f r o m seeing itself as the sole 'liberator' o f Ireland. T h i s is itself w o u l d be a significant step, given that the t e r m Sinn Fein means 'ourselves'. C o o g a n (1995) suggests that the origins o f the 1990s peace process date back to the first i n d i c a t i o n o f S i n n F e i n ' s a b a n d o n m e n t o f the 'go-it-alone' strategy. T h i s shift began shortly after the papal visit t o Ireland i n 1 9 7 9 . D u r i n g his visit, the P o p e c o n d e m n e d violence. Exasperated b y the refusal o f the C a t h o l i c hierarchy, i n R o m e a n d Ireland, to support w h a t he regarded as a just war, G e r r y A d a m s engaged i n . dialogue w i t h c h u r c h leaders, seeking clarification o f their p o s i t i o n . D u r i n g the latter h a l f o f the 1980s, a m o r e substantial a l i g n m e n t o f p o l i t i c a l forces began to take shape, t h r o u g h the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a so-called ' p a n nationalist' front. T h e t e r m was often used i n a derogatory sense b y U n i o n i s t s . It meant that N a t i o n a l i s t s o f differing shades o f green were t o c o m e together to t r y t o achieve c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change i n respect o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e leadership o f S i n n F e i n perceived that the best w a y to advance its cause m i g h t be to e n d p o l i t i c a l i s o l a t i o n . I f this meant that the f o r m e r l y despised D u b l i n government s h o u l d act as a voice for N o r t h e r n N a t i o n a l i s t s , so be i t . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c o a l i t i o n o f forces w o u l d be based u p o n i n c r e m e n t a l i s m . I f it became apparent that one set o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l N a t i o n a l i s t s were prepare t o engage i n discussions w i t h S i n n F e i n , i t was assumed that others w o u l d f o l l o w . A first major step away f r o m p o l i t i c a l wilderness came i n 1 9 8 6 . A t the party's ard flheis, S i n n F e i n delegates v o t e d b y 4 2 9 votes to 161 t o e n d the p o l i c y o f abstentionism i n elections to the D a i l . F r o m n o w o n , i n the event o f S i n n F e i n candidates b e i n g elected t o the p a r l i a m e n t o f the Irish R e p u b l i c (an u n l i k e l y prospect at the time) they w o u l d take their seats. C r u c i a l l y , the m o v e was s u p p o r t e d b y the G e n e r a l A r m y C o n v e n t i o n , the ultimate a u t h o r i t y o f the I R A . Its meetings are extremely rare, stressing the i m p o r t a n c e o f the 1 9 8 6 decision. S i m i l a r events have been staged i n 1969 at the f o r m a t i o n o f the Provisionals; i n 1996, w h e n future strategy was debated after the e n d o f the I R A ceasefire; a n d i n 1998 i n respect o f the d e c i s i o n t o enter S t o r m o n t . T h e G e n e r a l A r m y C o n v e n t i o n elects the A r m y E x e c u t i v e w h i c h i n turns chooses an A r m y C o u n c i l o f seven members. G e n e r a l Headquarters Staff, b e l o w the A r m y C o u n c i l i n the hierarchy, co-ordinates p a r a m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . T h e d e c i s i o n t o e n d abstentionism h a d considerable s y m b o l i c i m p o r t a n c e . H a v i n g been f o u n d e d partly as a result o f their ideologically pure abstentionist stance, the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A was reversing p o l i c y . N o longer was i t c l a i m i n g that the s h o r t - l i v e d 1918 p a r l i a m e n t created after the Easter R i s i n g was the o n l y legitimate Irish parliament. O n election t o the party presidency i n 1 9 8 3 , G e r r y A d a m s d e n i e d that he sought a n e n d t o a b s t e n t i o n i s m (An Phoblachtl

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Republican

News, 17 N o v e m b e r 1983). H o w e v e r , change appeared logical a n d

A d a m s m o v e d swiftly i n this d i r e c t i o n , n o t least because he a c k n o w l e d g e d that the citizens o f the Irish R e p u b l i c accepted their state institutions as legitimate. Indeed, i t h a d already been a c k n o w l e d g e d that failure to recognise this was to ' b l i n k e r r e p u b l i c a n polities' (An Phoblacht/Republican

News, 2 3 J u n e 1983).

T h e e n d o f abstentionism enraged traditionalists, w i t h a n u m b e r leaving to f o r m their o w n organisation, R e p u b l i c a n S i n n F e i n , p r o c l a i m i n g that i t was the direct lineal descendant o f the 1918 D a i l E i r e a n n . I n effect, S i n n F e i n was recognising the S o u t h e r n , twenty-six-county state, w h i c h u n t i l this p o i n t i t h a d d e n o u n c e d as a n e o - c o l o n i a l 'puppet'. R e c o g n i t i o n o f the state made i t easier for the Irish government to embrace some o f the aspirations o f S i n n F e i n . S h o r t l y after the ard fheis decision, the Irish government began l i m i t e d contacts w i t h S i n n F e i n .

11.3 Dialogue with constitutional Nationalists B y the late 1980s, S i n n F e i n ' s search for allies was gathering pace. G e r r y A d a m s argued that 'the politics d e m a n d e d the b u i l d i n g o f a consensus. S i n n F e i n h a d b y that p o i n t developed a p o s i t i o n w h i c h saw dialogue as the m a i n vehicle for resolving this p r o b l e m ' (quoted i n M a l l i e a n d M c K i t t r i c k , 1 9 9 6 : 7 2 ) . T h e S D L P h a d always taken this view. Its leader, J o h n H u m e , believed that dialogue w i t h S i n n F e i n m i g h t m o v e the I R A away f r o m violence. I n 1988, the H u m e - A d a m s talks began. Facilitated b y figures w i t h i n the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h , i n c l u d i n g a Belfast priest, Father A l e c R e i d , a series o f meetings between the leaderships o f the S D L P a n d S i n n F e i n t o o k place i n 1988. T h e dialogue t o o k place a m i d g r o w i n g debate a m o n g R e p u b l i c a n s , although p u b l i c l y their demands remained unaltered. A p o l i c y d o c u m e n t issued b y S i n n F e i n i n M a y 1987, Scenario for Peace, offered an u n c o m p r o m i s i n g reassertion o f the basic principles o f armed r e p u b l i c a n i s m : 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

B r i t a i n m u s t w i t h d r a w f r o m N o r t h e r n Ireland; the use o f a r m e d force to eject B r i t a i n is legitimate; the ' a r m e d struggle' is a war against a c o l o n i a l aggressor; B r i t i s h security forces, n a m e l y the R U C a n d U D R , must be disbanded; all R e p u b l i c a n prisoners must be released u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y ; U n i o n i s t s m u s t accept a u n i t e d Ireland.

W h a t e v e r Scenario for Peace was, i t was n o t a basis for negotiation. A r g u a b l y , it was the last gasp o f u n c o m p r o m i s i n g r e p u b l i c a n i s m f r o m S i n n F e i n . D e s p i t e this, the H u m e — A d a m s talks began i n A p r i l 1 9 8 8 a n d exchanges o f p o l i c y d o c u m e n t s c o n t i n u e d u n t i l September 1988. H u m e attempted three things. First, he strove to persuade A d a m s o f the futility o f c o n t i n u e d violence. S e c o n d , he attempted to c o n v i n c e S i n n F e i n o f B r i t i s h neutrality. F i n a l l y , he argued that S i n n F e i n needed to develop m u c h greater consideration o f the Unionist position. A l t h o u g h the i n i t i a l H u m e - A d a m s dialogue ended w i t h o u t agreement, the fact that the meetings o c c u r r e d at all was perhaps m o r e significant. S i n n F e i n

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was n o longer a p o l i t i c a l leper a n d other furtive p o l i t i c a l contacts c o u l d begin w i t h i n the ' N a t i o n a l i s t f a m i l y ' . W h i l s t H u m e h a d been unable to c o n v i n c e A d a m s that a b a n d o n m e n t o f v i o l e n c e b y the I R A was the appropriate w a y forward, there was agreement u p o n the idea that the Irish question c o u l d o n l y be resolved t h r o u g h n a t i o n a l self-determination. I n other w o r d s , all the people o n the island o f Ireland must be i n v o l v e d i n the resolution o f the p o l i t i c a l future o f the island. T h e debate was to m o v e o n to the question o f h o w that self-determination c o u l d most fairly be exercised. A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f some o f H u m e ' s arguments was apparent w i t h i n S i n n F e i n t h i n k i n g b y 1 9 9 2 . D u r i n g that year, S i n n F e i n p r o d u c e d a d o c u m e n t m o r e c o n c i l i a t o r y than Scenario for Peace. Instead, Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland appeared to indicate a shift i n R e p u b l i c a n analysis, w h i c h d i d n o t envisage the role o f the B r i t i s h government merely as o n e o f 'surrender a n d w i t h d r a w a l ' (Bean, 1995: 3 ) . Significantly, the d o c u m e n t urged B r i t a i n to become a persuader to U n i o n i s t s to accept the need for a u n i t e d Ireland. S u d d e n l y , U n i o n i s t attitudes, as distinct f r o m the B r i t i s h presence, appeared to be the central p r o b l e m . R e p u b l i c a n s h o p e d that B r i t a i n w o u l d a d o p t the p o s i t i o n of, for example, de G a u l l e i n p e r m i t t i n g self-determination for A l g e r i a , despite the presence o f a F r e n c h m i n o r i t y w i t h i n the c o u n t r y . O t h e r s argued that there were fewer s i m i l a r strategic advantages for B r i t a i n i n a d o p t i n g a 'persuader' role ( W r i g h t , 1987). U r g i n g N a t i o n a l i s t u n i t y , Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland o u t l i n e d the need for Irish self-determination. A l l the people o n the island o f Ireland were to determine their future together i n a process o f n a t i o n a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . T h e r e was a d o w n g r a d i n g o f emphasis u p o n the need for ' a r m e d struggle' a n d less stridency over the need for i m m e d i a t e B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l . Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland a m o u n t e d to a n appeal to all o f N a t i o n a l i s t Ireland to f o r m a c o m m o n approach towards c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. A t the same t i m e , the role o f a r m e d struggle was b e i n g reconsidered, w i t h a l e a d i n g R e p u b l i c a n , J i m G i b n e y , u r g i n g R e p u b l i c a n s n o t to be 'deafened b y the deadly s o u n d o f their o w n gunfire' (quoted i n Patterson, 1 9 9 7 : 2 4 0 ) . A s r e p u b l i c a n i s m m o v e d tentatively towards c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , i t a i m e d to achieve two things. First, U n i o n i s t s w o u l d be left as a n even smaller m i n o r i t y waged against the c o m b i n e d N a t i o n a l i s t forces o f the Irish government, Irish A m e r i c a a n d N o r t h e r n N a t i o n a l i s t s . B r i t i s h neutrality w o u l d be insufficient to shore u p their p o s i t i o n , particularly as the attitude o f the B r i t i s h p u b l i c was unsympathetic to the U n i o n i s t p o s i t i o n . S e c o n d l y , i t was h o p e d that R e p u b licans w o u l d then enter i n t o a 'historic handshake' w i t h the B r i t i s h government i n a m a n n e r reminiscent o f that between the S o u t h A f r i c a n President de K l e r k a n d N e l s o n M a n d e l a i n 1989 ( T o o l i s , 1995: 3 2 9 ) .

11.4 The Brooke Initiatives I n appearing to endorse the idea that B r i t a i n s h o u l d j o i n the persuaders, S i n n F e i n was encouraged b y the attitude o f Peter B r o o k e , a p p o i n t e d Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland i n J u l y 1989. B r o o k e encouraged the I R A to call a

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ceasefire, p r o m i s i n g 'imaginative steps' i n response. I n a speech i n his c o n stituency i n N o v e m b e r 1990, the N o r t h e r n Ireland Secretary gave perhaps the baldest assertion o f B r i t i s h neutrality thus far w h e n he insisted that B r i t a i n h a d n o 'selfish strategic o r e c o n o m i c interest' i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. B r o o k e ' s statement was based u p o n his exasperation from reading copies of An Phoblacht (Republican News) w h i c h ' d i d go o n a n d o n a n d o n about it b e i n g a colonialist struggle a n d the m o t i v a t i o n o f the B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t b e i n g i m p e r i a l i s t ' (quoted i n M a l l i e a n d M c K i t t r i c k , 1996: 108). T h e minister also engaged i n two initiatives, o n e p u b l i c , the other private. P u b l i c politics were based u p o n a tentative search for a replacement for the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t . A n y replacement w o u l d need to incorporate the three d i m e n s i o n s o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's politics: i n t e r c o m m u n i t y relationships, intergovernmental negotiations, a n d co-operation between N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d the Irish R e p u b l i c . T a l k s i n v o l v i n g the m a i n constitutional parties o n the internal government o f N o r t h ern Ireland (Strand 1 talks) were to be followed b y discussion o f N o r t h - S o u t h relationships (Strand 2) a n d intergovernmental arrangements (Strand 3). A s a concession to U n i o n i s t sensitivities, the Intergovernmental Conference enshrined i n the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t was suspended t e m p o r a r i l y w h i l s t a n agenda for talks was framed. W h a t e v e r the potential for such talks, they broke d o w n before progressing b e y o n d arguments over agendas. Disputes over the timetable for each S t r a n d a n d the choice o f a c h a i r m a n for the S t r a n d 2 talks u n d e r m i n e d the B r o o k e Initiative. T h e p u b l i c B r o o k e Initiative, therefore, w i t h e r e d b y m i d - 1 9 9 1 . A c r i m o n i o u s debates over procedural matters had, i n effect, left the p o l i t i c a l parties i n N o r t h e r n Ireland powerless. W h i l s t a c k n o w l e d g i n g the possibilities raised by the B r o o k e Initiative, A r t h u r ( 1 9 9 2 : 114) nonetheless describes the attitudes o f the participants o f the 1 9 9 0 - 1 non-discussions as the 'equivalent o f two b a l d m e n fighting over a c o m b ' . A similar f o r m o f initiative instigated b y B r o o k e ' s successor, P a t r i c k M a y h e w , floundered i n similar circumstances a year later. M o r e significant was B r o o k e ' s private s a n c t i o n i n g o f a secret line o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n to the R e p u b l i c a n leadership, k n o w n as the B a c k C h a n n e l . Established i n 1990, the B a c k C h a n n e l was n o t new, i n that lines o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n to the I R A h a d existed d u r i n g previous crises. Its role n o w was to establish the c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h the I R A m i g h t call a ceasefire. Discussions t o o k place between authorised B r i t i s h intelligence personnel a n d R e p u b l i c a n leaders. T h e contacts t o o k place o n a basis that their existence c o u l d be denied. T h e precise extent a n d content o f the Back C h a n n e l discussions was disputed. S i n n Fein's account argued that the B r i t i s h representatives agreed that Irish u n i t y was inevitable ( S i n n F e i n , 1994). T h e B r i t i s h government c l a i m e d that the I R A h a d initiated the contacts b y asserting that the conflict was effectively over. W h a t e v e r the veracity o f either account, the existence o f the Back C h a n n e l was embarrassing for the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , J o h n M a j o r , w h o h a d p u b l i c l y insisted that he was u n w i l l i n g to talk to S i n n F e i n . W h a t was apparent was that b o t h sides were serious i n their intent to e n d p o l i t i c a l stalemate. Secret discussions c o n t i n u e d after B r o o k e left his post. T h e

11.5 The revival of Hume-Adams

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departure f o l l o w e d a bizarre i n c i d e n t i n w h i c h he was a d m o n i s h e d b y U n i o n ists for b e i n g lured i n t o s i n g i n g ' M y D a r l i n g C l e m e n t i n e o n the G a y B y r n e s h o w o n Irish television, i n the sensitive aftermath o f a R e p u b l i c a n atrocity. C o n t a c t w i t h the I R A survived even the revulsion felt after the organisation's k i l l i n g o f two y o u n g boys i n W a r r i n g t o n i n 1 9 9 3 . A m o r t a r b o m b attack u p o n D o w n i n g Street a n d a large b o m b attack u p o n the C i t y o f L o n d o n also o c c u r r e d d u r i n g the p e r i o d o f secret c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . 5

11.5 The revival of Hume-Adams W h i l s t the B a c k C h a n n e l c o n t i n u e d secretly, the H u m e - A d a m s talks were resuscitated a n d this t i m e p r o d u c e d a more substantial o u t c o m e . I n A p r i l 1993, the two leaders issued a j o i n t statement reiterating their c o m m i t m e n t to the achievement o f self-determination for the Irish people. Part o f the statem e n t declared: . . . we accept that an internal settlement is not a solution because it obviously does not deal with all the relationships at the heart of the problem. W e accept that the Irish people as a whole have the right to national self-determination. This is a view shared by a majority of the people of this island, though not by all its people. The exercise o f self-determination is a matter for agreement between the people o f Ireland. Assisted b y changes w i t h i n S i n n Fein's strategy h i g h l i g h t e d i n Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland, the talks gathered m o m e n t u m . T h e two party leaders were prepared to engage i n a N a t i o n a l i s t - l e d initiative w h i c h l o o k e d to the L o n d o n a n d D u b l i n governments for brokerage. T h e tortuous attempt to b u i l d a ceasefire appeared threatened i n O c t o b e r 1993 w h e n a n upsurge o f violence c l a i m e d 2 5 lives, i n c l u d i n g nine deaths i n a n I R A b o m b i n g o f a fish shop o n the S h a n k i l l a n d a Loyalist m a c h i n e - g u n n i n g o f seven people at Greysteel. A d a m s bore the coffin at the funeral o f the S h a n k i l l b o m b e r , k i l l e d i n the e x p l o s i o n . S u r v i v i n g these crises, the H u m e - A d a m s dialogue a n d e m b r y o n i c peace process c o n t i n u e d apace. T h e t w o leaders p r o d u c e d a draft d o c u m e n t , a n a m e n d e d f o r m o f w h i c h was to f o r m the basis for the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a ration i n D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 3 . E i g h t Articles were c o n t a i n e d i n the draft. A r t i c l e 5 declared: the democratic right of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with the agreement and consent o f the people o f N o r t h ern Ireland . . . (quoted in Sunday Tribune, 28 August 1995). T h a t S i n n F e i n was prepared to discuss consent i n respect o f the u n i t o f N o r t h e r n Ireland was a significant step. U n t i l this p o i n t , the existence o f N o r t h e r n Ireland was n o t recognised. Nonetheless, the phraseology masked c o n t i n u i n g differences between the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l n a t i o n a l i s m o f the S D L P a n d the r e p u b l i c a n i s m o f S i n n F e i n . D e b a t i n g the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n at S i n n Fein's national internal conference at L e t t e r k e n n y i n J u l y 1994, S i n n F e i n passed the f o l l o w i n g m o t i o n s :

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1. the exercise o f national self-determination is a matter for agreement between the people o f Ireland; 2. the consent a n d allegiance o f U n i o n i s t s are essential ingredients i f a lasting peace is to be established; 3. the U n i o n i s t s cannot have a veto over B r i t i s h p o l i c y o r over p o l i t i c a l progress i n Ireland.

11.6 Changes in the Republican agenda T o w h a t extent h a d the agenda o f S i n n F e i n a n d the I R A really changed? N a t i o n a l i s t s o f different shades o f o p i n i o n were u n i t e d i n their insistence that the N o r t h e r n Ireland state h a d failed i n its previous a n d present forms. T h e peace process therefore needed to be predicated u p o n the a s s u m p t i o n that the pursuit o f a n internal settlement w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was futile. In a r g u i n g that the consent a n d allegiance o f U n i o n i s t s were 'essential ingredients for a lasting peace', S i n n F e i n was n o t stipulating that U n i o n i s t consent was a precursor for the exercise o f self-determination. Rather, S i n n F e i n was, i n effect, a c k n o w l e d g i n g that the o u t c o m e o f the exercise o f selfd e t e r m i n a t i o n c o u l d o n l y be successful once i t enjoyed the allegiance o f U n i o n i s t s . I n refusing to sign u p to the principles o f the F o r u m for Irish Peace a n d R e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n 1995, S i n n F e i n c o n f i r m e d its refusal to accept that U n i o n i s t consent was a prerequisite for Irish u n i t y . S i n n Fein's historical v i e w appeared to r e m a i n intact, n a m e l y that U n i o n i s t consent a n d allegiance w o u l d be a consequence o f the creation o f Irish u n i t y . F o r the S D L P , such consent was a prerequisite for the establishment o f a u n i t e d Ireland. W h a t h a d softened was the language o f R e p u b l i c a n s . D e m a n d s for 'Brits O u t ' h a d been superseded b y calls for 'constructive disengagement' ( S i n n F e i n , 1995a: 7 ) . S i n n F e i n h a d changed its v i e w i n c a l l i n g o n B r i t a i n to act as a persuader for U n i o n i s t s , a l t h o u g h the goal o f the party, the exercise o f n a t i o n a l selfd e t e r m i n a t i o n , r e m a i n e d constant. T h e m o r e explicit statement o f the need for U n i o n i s t consent i n the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n , c o n t a i n e d i n the reference to self-determination exercised o n a N o r t h a n d S o u t h basis, was m o r e than S i n n F e i n c o u l d accept. A s i d e f r o m the i m p o r t a n t question o f U n i o n i s t consent, debate over the extent o f genuine change rested u p o n whether the I R A n o w believed i n a tactically u n a r m e d strategy o r a totally u n a r m e d approach. A briefing paper circulated b y the R e p u b l i c a n leadership i n 1994 argued that i t was possible to create a d y n a m i c w h i c h m i g h t lead to a totally u n a r m e d struggle. S i n n F e i n believed that for the first t i m e all N a t i o n a l i s t forces were r o w i n g i n the same d i r e c t i o n . T h i s consensus a i m e d at d i v i d i n g U l s t e r Loyalists f r o m the B r i t i s h government. F o r S i n n F e i n , B r i t i s h i n v o l v e m e n t breached the p r i n c i p l e o f n a t i o n a l self-determination. T h e a i m o f R e p u b l i c a n s was to enter i n t o a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h U n i o n i s t s , but still w i t h i n a u n i t a r y framework T h e n o t i o n o f covenantship was raised, w i t h S i n n F e i n insistent that R e p u b l i c a n s :

11.7 Entering Stormont

149

will do everything possible to ensure full consultation and equal citizenship for Protestants in a new Ireland . . . W e covenant that we will insist on full recognition of the Protestant identity i n the new Ireland. The right o f those i n Ireland who wish to retain a British passport must be guaranteed (Hartley, 1994: 3). A c c e p t a n c e o f d u a l citizenship represented a n e w departure i n R e p u b l i c a n strategy i n that it gave a l i m i t e d f o r m o f o p t - o u t for i n d i v i d u a l U n i o n i s t s i n a u n i t e d Ireland. Nonetheless, the central p r o b l e m r e m a i n e d o f h o w entry i n t o a covenant w o u l d be possible w i t h U n i o n i s t s d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s e d to the a m b i t i o n s o f Irish r e p u b l i c a n i s m . S i n n F e i n c o n t i n u e d to insist u p o n 'respect for the integrity o f the l a n d mass o f Ireland' ( S i n n F e i n , 1995b: 4). Effectively this meant that the achievement o f self-determination c o u l d be based o n l y u p o n a territorial, all-Ireland basis. S i n n F e i n also argued that i t was ' o n l y i n the context o f the absence o f B r i t a i n that the p r o b l e m c a n then be reduced to a question o f rival attitudes b e i n g given equal respect a n d treatment' ( S i n n F e i n , 1 9 9 5 b : 6 ) . A n o b v i o u s difficulty here was that the rival ( p r o - U n i o n ) attitude w o u l d have been overl o o k e d b y the establishment o f a u n i t e d Ireland, n o t given equal treatment. U n i o n i s t s were i n v i t e d to ' j o i n w i t h the rest o f the people o f Ireland i n f o r m u l a t i n g a n agreed future' ( S i n n F e i n , 1995c: 4 ) .

11.7 Entering Stormont I f the end o f abstentionism from the D a i l m a r k e d a fundamental change i n S i n n F e i n i n 1986, this was m i n o r c o m p a r e d to the willingness to enter S t o r m o n t as part o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t i n 1998. R e p u b l i c a n purists, such as R u a i r i O ' B r a d a i g h , h a d l o n g argued that entry to the N o r t h e r n 'partitionist' parliament w o u l d i n e v i t a b l y f o l l o w the 1986 d e c i s i o n , as the t w o horses o f abstentionism a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m c o u l d n o t be r i d d e n simultaneously. T h e debates i n 1998 i n d e e d m i r r o r e d those o f 1986. T h e r e were denials f r o m the leadership o f entry to the parliament, exemplified b y S i n n Fein's m o b i l i s a t i o n o f supporters i n 1997 i n a ' n o return to S t o r m o n t ' c a m p a i g n . W h e n entry became a live issue, the justification t o o k t w o forms. O n e was the practical electoral value o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , increasing the mandate for S i n n F e i n a n d a l l o w i n g R e p u b l i c a n s a voice i n parliament. S e c o n d , the p o i n t was made that abstentionism h a d been elevated to a fundamental R e p u b l i c a n p r i n c i p l e w h e n it was a mere tactic. F o r M i t c h e l M c L a u g h l i n , even abstentionism f r o m W e s t m i n s t e r is ' n o t a fundamental R e p u b l i c a n p r i n c i p l e . It is s i m p l y that there is n o strategic value i n t a k i n g seats there' (interview, 2 8 J u n e 2 0 0 0 ) . B y 1997, it was evident that S i n n Fein's 'persuader' strategy o f the early 1990s h a d r u n its course. T h e n e w L a b o u r government was n o t g o i n g to act as a p u b l i c persuader to U n i o n i s t s for a u n i t e d Ireland. It w o u l d n o t declare that it favoured Irish u n i t y as a l o n g - t e r m s o l u t i o n , a stance w h i c h h a d been L a b o u r party p o l i c y f r o m 1981 to 1994. P a n - n a t i o n a l i s m w o u l d n o t shift the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t f r o m a r i g i d adherence to the c l a i m e d neutrality o f the consent p r i n c i p l e . T h e best deal o n offer to S i n n F e i n was, therefore, a n

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agreement offering some i n s t i t u t i o n a l persuasion to U n i o n i s t s that a u n i t e d Ireland need n o t be feared a n d m i g h t even be e c o n o m i c a l l y attractive. H e n c e , a n u m b e r o f cross-border bodies w i t h executive powers f o r m e d part o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . N o n - e x p a n s i o n i s t , they a m o u n t e d to a m i n i m a l i s t all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n , b u t at least o n e w h i c h w o u l d n o t be reduced. S i n n Fein's other hope was to c o n t i n u e to m a x i m i s e its vote to become the largest N a t i o n a l i s t party i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. W i t h a swelling aggregate N a t i o n a l i s t vote d u e to d e m o g r a p h i c change c o n f r o n t i n g a d i v i d e d u n i o n i s m , N a t i o n a l i s t parties c o u l d effect change w i t h i n S t o r m o n t . C o n c u r r e n t l y , a n increase i n the n u m b e r o f S i n n F e i n T D s i n the Irish R e p u b l i c c o u l d leave the party h o l d i n g the balance o f power. A t its 2 0 0 0 ard fheis, the party h e l d its first debate o n whether to enter i n t o c o a l i t i o n i n the event o f such a scenario. I f electoralism c o u l d n o t achieve a u n i t e d Ireland, neither c o u l d m i l i t a r i s m , n o r even a c o m b i n a t i o n o f the t w o . A deal i n v o l v i n g the p a i n o f entering S t o r m o n t was sweetened b y prisoner releases. T h i s legitimised the I R A ' s c l a i m to have been an a r m y fighting a w a r a n d assisted those otherwise facing incarceration for p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n w h a t appeared to m a n y to be a n u n w i n n a b l e conflict.

11.8 Interpretations of changes in republicanism T h e changes w i t h i n r e p u b l i c a n i s m have b r o u g h t c o m p e t i n g interpretations. A c c o r d i n g to some U n i o n i s t s a n d , ironically, S i n n F e i n , there has been n o d i l u t i o n o f principles, merely tactical adjustments. T h e core goals o f S i n n F e i n r e m a i n unchanged: B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l a n d Irish u n i t y . T h e P r o v i s i o n a l I R A remains, w i t h its w e a p o n r y intact. O c c a s i o n a l bursts o f unreconstructed r e p u b l i c a n i s m c o u l d still be heard from the Provisionals. T h u s , one p r o m i n e n t R e p u b l i c a n , B r i a n K e e n a n , t o l d his audience i n February 2 0 0 1 : Those who say the war is over, I do not know what they are talking about. T h e revolution can never be over until we have our country, until we have British imperialism where it belongs, the dustbin o f history (quoted i n Daily Telegraph, 27 February 2001). E v e n this speech, however, designed as reassurance that goals r e m a i n e d intact, was a n appeal for political strength. O t h e r s insist that the r e p u b l i c a n agenda has changed substantially a n d w h a t S i n n F e i n offers is, i n effect, n o longer republicanism. F o r example, R y a n (1995) suggests that the softening o f approach heralds the death o f r e p u b l i c a n i s m , as S i n n F e i n a n d the I R A have 'repudiated their k e y p r i n c i p l e s ' ( R y a n , 1 9 9 5 : 2 7 ) . H e claims that the d o w n g r a d i n g o f emphasis u p o n a u n i t e d Ireland, the agreement that the consent o f U n i o n i s t s is vital, a n d the calls for parity o f esteem between the N a t i o n a l i s t a n d U n i o n i s t traditions a m o u n t to a h i s t o r i c c o m p r o m i s e w i t h B r i t a i n , out o f step w i t h the traditional R e p u b l i c a n approach. R y a n ' s argument is that S i n n F e i n has, i n effect, become a mere N a t i o n a l i s t party, representing n o m o r e than a m i n o r i t y i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. A g a i n s t this argument, S i n n F e i n , u n d o u b t e d l y n o w a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d electoral force, is the o n l y party w i t h a significant vote i n b o t h parts o f the island a n d clearly

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required a fresh mandate rather than the eighty-year-old c l a i m to l e g i t i m a c y that u n d e r p i n n e d ' f u n d a m e n t a l ' r e p u b l i c a n i s m . Ryan's v i e w that r e p u b l i c a n i s m has been b l u r r e d b y p a n - n a t i o n a l i s m finds some s y m p a t h y i n the w r i t i n g s o f Bean ( 1 9 9 5 ; 2 0 0 1 ) a n d M c l n t y r e (1995). T h e latter offers a slightly different emphasis i n a r g u i n g that the R e p u b l i c a n m o v e m e n t has always been vulnerable to changes i n B r i t i s h state strategy. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the m o v e m e n t became enmeshed i n a peace process d e v o i d o f exit strategies. B r e e n (2000a) argues that S i n n F e i n have accepted the type o f A g r e e m e n t previously scorned: Certainly the Agreement represents advancement i n many areas for Catholics i n the N o r t h - but within the existing constitutional arrangements. W h a t is sad is that this deal was on offer i n 1974 but the Provos categorically rejected it and rejoiced when the Sunningdale power-sharing executive was brought down. In the intervening years, around 2,000 people died . . . If it wasn't for the appalling loss of life, it would be side-splittingly funny that it was SF recently demanding 'Bring Back Stormont'. A l t h o u g h the l i m i t a t i o n s o f ' a r m e d struggle' h a d l o n g been exposed, the f o r m u l a t i o n o f alternative approaches was difficult. S i n n Fein's peace strategy o f the 1990s c o u l d be derided, but the alternatives, o f c o n t i n u i n g I R A activity or N o r t h e r n abstentionism, were equally p r o b l e m a t i c . T h i s was apparent f r o m the c o m m e n t s o f a m e m b e r o f S i n n Fein's ard chomhairle (executive): Some in our own movement have been less than welcoming to the current strategy . . . M y reply to those in our movement who are critical o f our strategy is to say: ' W e l l find another one . . . give me a better one' (Alex Maskey, quoted i n Labour Left Briefing, June 1996: 16).

11.9 International influences R e p u b l i c a n s were also influenced b y external forces. T h e C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the U n i t e d States facilitated the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a pan-nationalist alliance, gave respectability to S i n n F e i n a n d acted as a n honest b r o k e r for the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments. C o x (2000) attributes a significant a m o u n t o f the change i n r e p u b l i c a n i s m to the e n d o f the c o l d war, a l t h o u g h , as he p o i n t s out, the e n d o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland conflict is n o t reducible to a single factor. C o x argues 'it was inevitable that as the tide o f global r a d i c a l i s m began to retreat after 1989, this w o u l d feed i n t o r e p u b l i c a n t h i n k i n g ' ( 2 0 0 0 : 2 5 1 ) . U n d o u b t e d l y S i n n F e i n d r o p p e d m u c h o f its left-wing agenda, a fusion o f radical socialism w i t h l i n g e r i n g G a e l i c Irish n a t i o n a l i s m a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m , d u r i n g the early 1990s. T h e counter-argument is that two o f the most fundam e n t a l shifts f r o m fundamental to pragmatic r e p u b l i c a n i s m , the e n d i n g o f abstentionism f r o m the D a i l a n d the search for pan-nationalist alliances, o c c u r r e d before the collapse o f the B e r l i n W a l l . G u e l k e ( 1 9 9 4 : 106) argues that the e n d o f the c o l d war has 'less significance for N o r t h e r n Ireland than for S o u t h A f r i c a o r the M i d d l e East as the m a i n source o f assistance for the I R A was e t h n i c a l l y based support i n the superpower that survived, the U n i t e d

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States', n o t Soviet Russia. S i n n F e i n was encouraged b y the success o f peace processes elsewhere, n o t a b l y i n S o u t h A f r i c a a n d the M i d d l e East, as evidence that historic goals c a n either be achieved o r c o n t i n u e to be pursued, w i t h i n a n e w p o l i t i c a l framework. T h e collapse o f the peace process i n the Basque c o u n t r y a n d the return to violence b y the I R A ' s erstwhile allies, E T A , offered a less auspicious example.

11.10 The influence of Loyalist paramilitaries Loyalist paramilitary groups also h a d a n i n p u t to the development o f the peace process, albeit n o t o n the scale o f the changes i n r e p u b l i c a n i s m . T h e nature o f Loyalist violence changed i n the late 1980s, w i t h members o f S i n n F e i n often the targets. F r o m the late 1980s u n t i l the late 1990s, Loyalist paramilitaries set aside differences o f political emphasis. T h e g r o w t h o f p a n - n a t i o n a l i s m raised n e w fears amongst the U l s t e r V o l u n t e e r Force ( U V F ) a n d the U l s t e r F r e e d o m Fighters ( U F F ) . T h e latter group was, i n effect, the Ulster Defence A s s o c i a t i o n ( U D A ) operating under another name. T h e U D A insisted that b o t h the S D L P a n d S i n n F e i n f o r m e d part o f a 'pan-nationalist' front. C l a i m i n g ancestry as the defenders o f U l s t e r earlier this century, the U V F h a d none o f the mass support enjoyed by its historical predecessor. A r i s i n g f r o m the citizens' defence committees o f the 1970s, the U D A c l a i m e d a shorter history, b u t attempted, t h r o u g h a more political role, to develop i n t o a broader social m o v e m e n t ( B r u c e , 1994). Nonetheless, politics was subordinate to v i o l ence d u r i n g the 1970s, partly at the insistence o f the U D A ' s leader d u r i n g that p e r i o d , A n d y T y r i e ( N e l s o n , 1976). Despite the political overtures to N a t i o n a l i s t s c o n t a i n e d i n the p o l i c y d o c u ments o f the U D A , Loyalist paramilitaries nonetheless engaged i n frequent r a n d o m k i l l i n g s o f C a t h o l i c s d u r i n g the T r o u b l e s . T h e idea that ' a n y T a i g [Catholic] w i l l d o ' appeared to u n d e r p i n m a n y o f the murders, o n the basis that it was w i t h i n the N a t i o n a l i s t c o m m u n i t y that support for the I R A c o u l d be f o u n d . M o s t n o t o r i o u s o f all killings were those undertaken b y the S h a n k i l l Butchers i n the 1970s. T h e I R A c l a i m e d it was w a g i n g a w a r against ' C r o w n Forces', a l t h o u g h these forces o n l y accounted for slightly over h a l f the deaths attributed to the I R A . Loyalists h a d less visible targets at w h i c h to a i m . A s a result, o f over 5 0 0 C a t h o l i c s k i l l e d b y Loyalist paramilitaries, o n l y a handful were members o f R e p u b l i c a n paramilitary groups. It is c l a i m e d that targeting o f the latter has been abetted b y periodic bouts o f collusion w i t h the security forces (Newsinger, 1995). B y 1993, the Loyalist paramilitaries were k i l l i n g at a faster rate than the I R A . G a n g s t e r i s m a n d racketeering h a d been displaced i n favour o f a p a r a m i l i t a r y 'offensive' against the n e w threat o f a c o m b i n e d all-Ireland n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e targeting o f R e p u b l i c a n s l e d to 13 deaths o f members o f S i n n F e i n between 1989 a n d 1992 ( O ' M u i l l e o i r , 1999). T h e U D A a n d U F F believed they were ' w i n n i n g the war' ( C r a w f o r d , 2 0 0 1 : 16). M e a n w h i l e , the upsurge i n sectarian attacks against C a t h o l i c targets was m a t c h e d b y m o r e progressive p o l i t i c a l

11.11 Conclusion

153

developments a n d left-wing p o l i t i c a l reasoning. I n o n e sense this was n o t h i n g new. A s M c A u l e y argues, Loyalist p a r a m i l i t a r y organisations have ' p r o v i d e d an i m p o r t a n t c h a n n e l for a r t i c u l a t i n g social grievances a n d for r e p r o d u c i n g sectarian ideology w i t h i n the Protestant working-class' ( M c A u l e y , 1 9 9 1 : 4 5 ) . Despite the upsurge i n Loyalist violence, there were also hints o f c o n c i l i a t i o n . A t the outset o f the B r o o k e Initiative m i l i t a r y activities were suspended for the d u r a t i o n o f the talks. T h e r e s u m p t i o n o f hostilities was c o u n t e r e d b y a statem e n t i n 1992 b y the c o m b i n e d p a r a m i l i t a r y groups offering N a t i o n a l i s t s full p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a reconstructed N o r t h e r n Ireland. B y 1994, as the I R A m o v e d towards a ceasefire, it became obvious that the Loyalist paramilitaries w o u l d respond w i t h their o w n m i l i t a r y cessation. It was i n any case regarded as easier for Loyalist groups to cease activity. Firstly, for all the outrage amongst some U n i o n i s t s over B r i t a i n ' s disinterest towards N o r t h e r n Ireland, it r e m a i n e d part o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m for the foreseeable future. S e c o n d , L o y a l i s t v i o l ence h a d t r a d i t i o n a l l y been seen m a i n l y as reactive, activated p r i m a r i l y as a response to R e p u b l i c a n p a r a m i l i t a r y activity. T h i s is a n o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , i n that Loyalist offensives, o r the threat o f such, have been i m p o r t a n t ever since the prospect o f p a r t i t i o n developed. Nonetheless, it appeared a logical step for the Loyalist paramilitaries to call a ceasefire i n response to the suspension o f I R A activity. Satisfied that n o secret deal h a d been d o n e between the B r i t i s h government a n d Irish R e p u b l i c a n s , Loyalists have h e l d their ceasefire since 1994, feuds a n d dissidents apart. Loyalists sold the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t as a reasonable deal, securing the U n i o n to their constituency, a n d the Progressive U n i o n i s t Party, l i n k e d to the U V F , sits i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y .

11.11 Conclusion T h e logic o f the peace process o f the 1990s was based u p o n three m a i n factors. Firstly, there was g r o w i n g r e c o g n i t i o n o f the futility o f I R A activity. Secondly, the l i m i t a t i o n s o f S i n n Fein's p o l i t i c a l approach, constructed i n 1918 a n d largely u n c h a n g e d , were visible. T h i r d l y , a c o a l i t i o n o f N a t i o n a l i s t forces emerged, e n d i n g the p o l i t i c a l i s o l a t i o n o f R e p u b l i c a n s . T h e s e forces c o m b i n e d i n a n attempt to create the m o m e n t u m for a n Irish-led peace initiative, based u p o n a n i n f o r m a l N a t i o n a l i s t alliance. H o w e v e r , the success or otherwise o f any peace process w o u l d also clearly d e p e n d u p o n the f o r m a l agreements a n d activity undertaken b y the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments.

Chapter 12

The development of the peace process

I f p o l i t i c a l agreement was to be achieved i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, i t was evident that this w o u l d o c c u r o n l y i n the context o f p a r a m i l i t a r y ceasefires. A u n i q u e c o a l i t i o n o f N a t i o n a l i s t forces e m b r a c i n g the Irish government, the S D L P , S i n n F e i n a n d Irish A m e r i c a was n o w i n place, a l l o w i n g a series o f peace initiatives to develop. T h e B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments e m b a r k e d u p o n a peace process, headed b y p r i m e ministers w h o b o t h declared a personal interest i n resolving the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. A heady phase o f p o l i t i c s began, m a r k e d b y a j o i n t governmental declaration for peace i n 1993 a n d R e p u b l i c a n a n d Loyalist ceasefires i n 1994. E v e n i f prospects for a p e r m a n e n t resolution o f the conflict r e m a i n e d uncertain, m a n y w e l c o m e d w h a t appeared to be the first substantial p o l i t i c a l progress for t w o decades. T h i s chapter concentrates u p o n the attempts at conflict resolution w h i c h created a peace process.

12.1 The Downing Street Declaration B y D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 3 , sufficient c o m m o n g r o u n d was f o u n d for the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments to produce a J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n for Peace, otherwise k n o w n as the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n . T h e D e c l a r a t i o n , made o n 15 D e c e m b e r b y the B r i t i s h P r i m e M i n i s t e r , J o h n M a j o r , a n d the Irish Taoiseach, A l b e r t R e y n o l d s , formalised the peace process b y o u t l i n i n g the approach o f the t w o governments to the removal o f conflict a n d represented the start o f a series o f initiatives, o u t l i n e d i n T a b l e 1 2 . 1 . Input to the D o w n i n g Street Declaration came f r o m a variety o f sources. T h e H u m e - A d a m s discussions o n the principles o f n a t i o n a l self-determination, b y w h i c h a l l the Irish people w o u l d determine their o w n future together, p r o v i d e d early drafts. T h e Irish government added its formulations. A l t h o u g h c o n c e r n e d that the origins o f the d o c u m e n t i n H u m e - A d a m s discussions w o u l d a m o u n t to a 'kiss o f death' i n terms o f U n i o n i s t responses, the B r i t i s h government acted as a rewriter o f the numerous drafts. W i t h Protestant c h u r c h m e n a c t i n g as intermediaries, even representatives o f the m a i n U n i o n i s t party a n d L o y a l i s t p a r a m i l i t a r y groups h a d some i n p u t ( C o o g a n , 1 9 9 5 ; M a l l i e a n d M c K i t t r i c k , 1996).

154

12.1 The Downing Street Declaration Table 12.1

155

Chronology of the peace process 1993-9

Year

Event

1993

Downing Street Declaration (Joint Declaration for Peace) issued by the British and Irish governments. Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups announce ceasefires. Joint Framework Documents issued by the British and Irish governments. Mitchell Principles of Non-Violence declared, with all parties pledging their support. IRA ceasefire temporarily ends. Elections to a Northern Ireland (Peace) Forum, designed to produce preliminary party negotiating teams. IRA ceasefire restored. Good Friday Agreement is forged after months of multi-party negotiations, supported in referenda in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly take place. Six new cross-border bodies are agreed. Power is devolved to a cross-community Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly. The North-South Ministerial Council and British-Irish Council meet for the first time.

1994 1995 1996

1997 1998

1999

W i t h i n the D e c l a r a t i o n , the B r i t i s h government pledged the f o l l o w i n g : 1. It w o u l d ' u p h o l d the d e m o c r a t i c w i s h o f a greater n u m b e r o f the people o f N o r t h e r n Ireland o n the issue o f whether they w i s h to support the U n i o n or establish a sovereign u n i t e d Ireland'. 2. It h a d n o 'selfish, strategic o r e c o n o m i c interest i n N o r t h e r n Ireland'. 3. It is 'for the people o f the island o f Ireland alone, b y agreement between the t w o parts respectively, to exercise their right o f self-determination o n the basis o f consent, freely a n d c o n c u r r e n t l y given, N o r t h a n d S o u t h , to b r i n g about a u n i t e d Ireland'. F o r its part, the Irish government a c k n o w l e d g e d the f o l l o w i n g : 1. 'It w o u l d be w r o n g to attempt to impose a u n i t e d Ireland, i n the absence o f the freely given consent o f a majority o f the people o f N o r t h e r n Ireland'. 2. T h e 'presence i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the R e p u b l i c o f elements w h i c h are deeply resented b y N o r t h e r n U n i o n i s t s ' . 3. ' I n the event o f a n overall settlement, the Irish G o v e r n m e n t w i l l , as part o f a balanced c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a c c o m m o d a t i o n , p u t f o r w a r d a n d support proposals for change i n the Irish c o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h w o u l d fully reflect the p r i n c i p l e o f consent i n N o r t h e r n Ireland'. B o t h governments also declared their r e c o g n i t i o n o f the v a l i d i t y a n d rights o f the different traditions i n the i s l a n d o f Ireland. E x p r e s s i o n o f these rights was perfectly acceptable, p r o v i d e d that they were exercised b y 'peaceful a n d legitimate means'. T h e B r i t i s h government was also anxious to emphasise what was not i n c l u d e d i n the D e c l a r a t i o n . A list o f omissions, o r N o t the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n ,

The development of the peace process

156 was attached

to the real t h i n g , w i t h the contents o f the n o n - D e c l a r a t i o n

reiterated b y J o h n M a j o r i n the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s . T h e B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t declared i n this context: 1. that i t w o u l d n o t act as a persuader for a u n i t e d Ireland; 2. that i t d i d n o t set a n y timescale for a u n i t e d Ireland, n o r assert its value; 3. that i t d i d n o t contemplate j o i n t authority over N o r t h e r n Ireland shared b y the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments; 4. that i t h a d n o t reduced B r i t i s h sovereignty over N o r t h e r n Ireland.

12.2 Interpretations T h e D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n h a d to appeal to b o t h c o m m u n i t i e s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. It was designed to give hope to N a t i o n a l i s t s a n d reassurance to U n i o n i s t s . A c c o r d i n g l y , i t was b o u n d to represent a mass o f 'necessary ambiguities' ( M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y , 1995: 4 1 4 ) . A n o p i n i o n p o l l c o n d u c t e d i m m e d i a t e l y after the D e c l a r a t i o n f o u n d that 8 7 per cent o f N a t i o n a l i s t s w e l c o m e d its assertions, c o m p a r e d to o n l y 4 3 per cent o f U n i o n i s t s (Irish News, 2 2 D e c e m b e r 1993). Effectively, the Irish government acted as the spokesperson for the N a t i o n alist c o a l i t i o n forged since the 1980s. A s i n the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t eight years earlier, the legitimacy o f the N a t i o n a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was recognised. T h e D e c l a r a t i o n went somewhat further i n g i v i n g vent to N a t i o n a l i s t aspirations. It c o n t a i n e d the first explicit guarantee f r o m the B r i t ish government that the expression o f Irish self-determination was legitimate. P o l i t i c a l structures i n N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d the R e p u b l i c were to be determ i n e d t h r o u g h agreement amongst the people o f Ireland. O v e r a l l , the tone o f the D e c l a r a t i o n was one o f B r i t i s h neutrality c o n c e r n i n g the future o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e B r i t i s h government d e c l i n e d to act as persuaders to U n i o n i s t s that their true interests lay i n a u n i t e d Ireland, a n act w h i c h w o u l d i n any case have needed a selling feat surely b e y o n d the smoothest salesperson. B r i t a i n ' s lack o f interest i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was nonetheless c o n f i r m e d . It rated equally the aspiration for a u n i t e d Ireland a n d the status q u o o f the lack o f majority i n N o r t h e r n Ireland for such a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change. H o w e v e r , the n u m b e r o f rejoinders added to the d o c u m e n t f r o m the o r i g i n a l drafts o f H u m e - A d a m s meant that R e p u b l i c a n s c o u l d n o t f o r m a l l y accept its contents. S i n n F e i n rejected the U n i o n i s t consent elements o f the D e c l a r a t i o n at a special conference at L e t t e r k e n n y i n 1994. W h i l s t w e l c o m i n g the seeming embrace b y the B r i t i s h government o f the concept o f Irish self-determination, there were too m a n y qualifications to this for Republicans. T h e phrase r e q u i r i n g that consent for a u n i t e d Ireland must be 'freely a n d c o n c u r r e n t l y given, n o r t h a n d s o u t h ' meant to R e p u b l i c a n s that a ' U n i o n i s t veto' over the n a t i o n a l exercise o f self-determination m i g h t c o n t i n u e . R e p u b l i c a n s sought clarification o f the D e c l a r a t i o n , n o t least over h o w national self-determination o u g h t best to be exercised. F o r R e p u b l i c a n s , n a t i o n a l self-determination was n o t the same

12.3 Paramilitary ceasefires

157

as the d u a l n a t i o n a l self-determination ( N o r t h and South) o n offer i n the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n . T h e U l s t e r U n i o n i s t P a r t y offered a m i l d reaction to the D e c l a r a t i o n a n d a c k n o w l e d g e d the stress u p o n the need for consent w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland for constitutional change. W h i l s t concerned b y the green tinge to the d o c u m e n t , the m a i n U n i o n i s t party was also reassured b y the p r o d u c t i o n b y the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t o f its list o f exclusions f r o m the D e c l a r a t i o n . Less sanguine was the D e m o c r a t i c U n i o n i s t Party, w h i c h argued that the D e c l a r a t i o n was a further m o v e towards the e x p u l s i o n o f U n i o n i s t s f r o m the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . T h e leader o f the D U P also d e n o u n c e d the B r i t i s h government's attempt t o clarify the D e c l a r a t i o n for the benefit o f S i n n F e i n as a m o u n t i n g t o a 'twenty-one page love letter to G e r r y A d a m s ' . C r i t i c a l U n i o n i s t s p o i n t e d to the lack o f specific guarantees f r o m the R e p u b l i c for any replacement o f A r t i c l e s 2 a n d 3 l a y i n g c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e R e p u b l i c h a d still to p l a y its h a n d i n respect o f its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m .

12.3 Paramilitary ceasefires A l t h o u g h R e p u b l i c a n s were l u k e w a r m i n their response to the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n , the a m b i g u i t y o f its content, allied to the m o m e n t u m for peace created elsewhere, p r o v i d e d enough grounds for a ceasefire. O n 31 A u g u s t 1994, the I R A a n n o u n c e d a 'complete cessation o f m i l i t a r y operations'. Briefly, there appeared to be a m o o d o f e u p h o r i a i n R e p u b l i c a n areas. T h e q u e s t i o n begged was w h a t response w o u l d n o w f o l l o w f r o m the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments. F r o m the B r i t i s h government, S i n n F e i n d e m a n d e d i n c l u s i o n i n all-party talks o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n . F r o m the Irish government, the party sought b a c k i n g for this entry. S i n n F e i n also sought the early release o f R e p u b l i c a n prisoners. S i n n F e i n envisaged a procedure i n w h i c h various shades o f p o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n i n N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d be i n v i t e d to r o u n d table talks, after p r e l i m i n a r y bilateral talks i n w h i c h each party m e t g o v e r n m e n t official a n d ministers o n a separate basis. T w o s t u m b l i n g blocks were i m m e d i a t e l y apparent. First, the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t was u n h a p p y over the exclusion o f the w o r d ' p e r m a n e n t ' f r o m the I R A ' s ceasefire a n n o u n c e m e n t . S e c o n d , the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t preferred to operate a 'quarantine' p e r i o d , d e l a y i n g entry i n t o talks w i t h S i n n F e i n w h i l s t w a i t i n g to be c o n v i n c e d o n the d u r a b i l i t y o f the ceasefire. It appeared that all-party talks were a distant prospect. Bilateral discussions were less p r o b l e m a t i c . I n D e c e m b e r 1994, a S i n n F e i n delegation h e l d its first m e e t i n g w i t h g o v e r n m e n t officials at S t o r m o n t to discuss aspects o f the peace process. T h e Irish g o v e r n m e n t was m u c h m o r e f o r t h c o m i n g . W i t h i n a week o f the I R A ceasefire, the Irish T a i o s e a c h s h o o k hands w i t h G e r r y A d a m s outside the M a n s i o n H o u s e , the Taioseach's office. It was a m o m e n t pregnant w i t h s y m b o l i s m , the first s u c h m e e t i n g between m i l i t a n t a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Irish Republicans since the Irish civil war. F o l l o w i n g the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n , the Irish g o v e r n m e n t lifted its broadcasting b a n o n S i n n F e i n . A f t e r the a n n o u n c e m e n t o f an I R A ceasefire, the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t lifted its p r o h i b i t i o n . A s i n d i c a t e d i n the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n , the Irish g o v e r n m e n t also

158

The development of the peace process

established the F o r u m for Peace a n d R e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n O c t o b e r 1994. It i n v i t e d submissions f r o m all parties interested i n resolving the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o b l e m i n Ireland. H o w e v e r , the o n l y non-nationalist party i n N o r t h e r n Ireland prepared to contribute was A l l i a n c e . I n D e c e m b e r 1994, the Irish government ordered the early release o f n i n e I R A prisoners. U p o n the a n n o u n c e m e n t o f an I R A ceasefire, graffiti appeared i n Loyalist areas 'accepting the u n c o n d i t i o n a l surrender o f the I R A ' , a l t h o u g h Loyalist paramilitaries were slightly more cautious. Forty-three days elapsed

before

the C o m b i n e d Loyalist M i l i t a r y C o m m a n d , representing the U D A , U F F a n d U V F , a n n o u n c e d its o w n indefinite suspension o f violence, emphasising that it was c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n R e p u b l i c a n s desisting f r o m the use o f force. Loyalist paramilitaries h a d been influenced b y the argument o f their representatives i n the U D P a n d P U P that n o deal h a d been struck w i t h the I R A b y the B r i t i s h government. A c c o r d i n g l y , the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f violence was pointless. T h e P U P saw the ceasefires as a shift away f r o m armed conflict towards dialogue, but not necessarily as part o f a process o f conflict resolution, declaring that 'the implacable opposites o f n a t i o n a l i s m a n d u n i o n i s m are irreconcilable' ( R o w a n , 1995: 157). B y D e c e m b e r 1994, the U D P a n d P U P were engaged i n exploratory d i a logue w i t h B r i t i s h government officials at S t o r m o n t . Initially, the B r i t i s h government appeared reluctant to concede formal i n v o l v e m e n t o n peace talks to the two parties, although they were to be i n f o r m a l l y consulted. H o w e v e r , the i m p o r t a n c e o f m a i n t a i n i n g a Loyalist ceasefire meant that the two parties were i n d e e d consulted o n a regular basis, despite their small electoral support. I n the first year o f the ceasefire, the P U P met w i t h B r i t i s h ministers a n d officials o n 15 separate occasions ( M c K i t t r i c k , 1995).

12.4 The Framework Documents: Part I T h e D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n p r o v i d e d o n l y a b r o a d p o l i t i c a l framework w i t h i n w h i c h i t was h o p e d that the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland m i g h t be solved. W h a t was n o w required were the mechanics o f any such settlement. F o r m a l proposals were p u t forward i n February 1995, i n the f o r m o f two framework documents entitled Frameworks for the Future. T h e y were sometimes referred to as the J o i n t F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s a l t h o u g h it was o n l y Part II that represented a j o i n t effort ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1995). T h e first framework d o c u m e n t was entitled A Framework for Accountable Government in Northern Ireland. T h i s c o n t a i n e d the proposals o f the B r i t i s h government for the most appropriate means o f governance w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. It favoured increasing local a c c o u n t a b i l i t y 'as part o f a comprehensive p o l i t i c a l settlement e m b r a c i n g relations w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, between N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d the R e p u b l i c o f Ireland a n d between the two G o v e r n ments' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1 9 9 5 : 3 ) . T h i s section o f the F r a m e w o r k D o c u ments concentrated u p o n internal p o l i t i c a l institutions i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e R e p u b l i c o f Ireland was m e n t i o n e d o n l y fleetingly, m a i n l y i n the c l o s i n g t w o paragraphs o f the twenty-eight-paragraph d o c u m e n t .

12.4 The Framework Documents: Part I

159

Part I o f the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s advocated: 1. the creation o f a N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y o f 9 0 members, elected b y p r o p o r t i o n a l representation, for a p e r i o d o f four o r five years; 2. the n e w A s s e m b l y s h o u l d h o l d the same legislative powers as that given to the last such cross-party A s s e m b l y i n the 1970s; 3

a n A s s e m b l y c o m m i t t e e system, consisting o f party representatives p r o p o r tionate to electoral strength, s h o u l d scrutinise legislation;

4. w e i g h t e d v o t i n g , r e q u i r i n g majorities between 6 5 per cent a n d 7 5 per cent, s h o u l d be used i n A s s e m b l y committees to ensure that legislative measures have considerable support; 5. a panel o f three members, elected b y p r o p o r t i o n a l representation, s h o u l d adjudicate o n controversial issues. T h e r e was a stress u p o n the need for checks a n d balances to ensure adequate representation for the N a t i o n a l i s t m i n o r i t y a n d full p a r t i c i p a t i o n b y all p o l i t ical parties. S u c h checks a n d balances were based m a i n l y u p o n qualified majority v o t i n g a n d the extensive use o f a panel. T h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s were suggested: 1. panel decisions m u s t be u n a n i m o u s ; 2. the panel m i g h t n o m i n a t e c o m m i t t e e chairs a n d d e p u t y chairs; 3. w e i g h t e d v o t i n g s h o u l d be used for c o n f i r m a t i o n o f a p p o i n t m e n t s o r dismissals; 4. there m u s t be majority support for legislation i n the A s s e m b l y a n d its committees. O v e r a l l , Part I o f the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s concentrated u p o n the a v o i d ance o f m o n o p o l y power, devising electoral a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l procedures designed to facilitate the sharing o f authority. L i j p h a r t ( 1 9 9 6 : 247) argues that i n seeking this s o l u t i o n , the B r i t i s h government, supported b y its Irish counterpart, h a d ' f i r m l y n a i l e d its colours to the c o n s o c i a t i o n a l mast' b y a d v o c a t i n g o r allowing: 1. a grand c o a l i t i o n o f heads o f departments, a l o n g w i t h panel members, t o f o r m a cabinet sharing power; 2. p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y i n government; 3. a veto o f controversial proposals b y the N a t i o n a l i s t m i n o r i t y . Part I o f the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s c o n t a i n e d a n u m b e r o f p r o b l e m a t i c aspects. Firstly, i t sought to counter the p o w e r o f any o n e g r o u p t h r o u g h a system o f checks a n d balances, w h i l s t appearing to concentrate p o w e r i n a n elite o f panel members a n d key A s s e m b l y figures. S e c o n d l y , w h a t was p r o posed was a f o r m o f d i l u t e d p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y . A majoritarian f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t appeared to be most heavily qualified b y the d e m a n d for panel decisions to be u n a n i m o u s , a safeguard against the reality that U n i o n i s t s w o u l d have the greater n u m e r i c a l representation i n such an A s s e m b l y . E v e n m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c was the p r o p o s e d c o m p o s i t i o n o f the panel. A s i t was to be directly elected b y

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the people o f N o r t h e r n Ireland as a n entirety, its election w o u l d be s i m i l a r to those c o n d u c t e d for the E u r o p e a n Parliament, i n w h i c h I a n Paisley tops the p o l l . A panel w o u l d almost certainly comprise t w o U n i o n i s t s , o n e each f r o m the U U P a n d D U P , w o r k i n g alongside a N a t i o n a l i s t f r o m the S D L P . T h i s begged the question o f whether sufficient degree o f consensus existed to m o v e f r o m m u n d a n e co-operation to m u t u a l power-sharing. T h e risk was o f lowest c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , i n w h i c h consensus a n d 'grand c o a l i t i o n ' a m o u n t e d to little. W o r s e , S i n n Fein's l i k e l y exclusion f r o m the panel w o u l d antagonise R e p u b l i c a n s . A n n e x A o f Part I repeated some o f the themes o f B r i t i s h neutrality o n the future o f the U n i o n evident i n the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n . A n n e x A declared the f o l l o w i n g : 1. there was u n l i k e l y to be change i n the constitutional status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland i n the foreseeable

future;

2 . the aspiration f o r a u n i t e d Ireland was o f equal v a l i d i t y to that f o r retent i o n o f the U n i o n ; 3. there c o u l d be n o return to one-party rule i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. I n effect, A n n e x A declared that there c o u l d be n o such t h i n g as disloyalty to B r i t a i n w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, as there was parity o f esteem for the a m b i tions o f Irish n a t i o n a l i s m a n d U l s t e r u n i o n i s m . T h e government was anxious to stress that a n i n t e r i m settlement d i d not require either side to a b a n d o n basic p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e . T h i s appeared to be designed especially for R e p u b l i c a n s as i t attempted to offer t h e m some hope that they c o u l d ' c o m p r o m i s e w i t h h o n o u r ' w i t h o u t betraying their fundamental goal o f outright independence. Part I nonetheless also stressed the l i m i t s o f B r i t i s h neutrality. A neutral m a t c h referee m i g h t n o t declare before k i c k - o f f that he 'cherishes' a particular result. Y e t , i n the F o r e w o r d to the Frameworks for the Future documents, J o h n M a j o r declared: 'I cherish N o r t h e r n Ireland as part o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m ' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1995: i v ) .

12.5 The Framework Documents: Part II T h e second section o f the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s was a j o i n t paper b y the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments entitled A New Framework for Agreement. Paragraph 10 l a i d o u t the g u i d i n g principles for the Agreement. T h e y were: 1. self-determination, o f the variety set out i n the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n ; 2. consent; 3. n o n - v i o l e n c e ; 4. parity o f esteem. I n a d o p t i n g the principles o f the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n , A New Framework for Agreement

advocated:

1. the creation o f a N o r t h — S o u t h b o d y to discharge executive, h a r m o n i s a t i o n a n d consultative functions;

12.5 The Framework Documents: Part II

161

Table 12.2 The 1995 Framework Documents' proposals for a North-South body Function

Definition

Suggested areas

Executive

Agreement and implementation on an all-Ireland basis Agreement on common policy Agreement not required

E U , tourism, culture

Harmonising Consultative

Most policy areas Not defined, but e.g. policing

2. c o m p u l s o r y m e m b e r s h i p o f this b o d y for key N o r t h e r n Ireland assembly members; 3. the creation o f a parliamentary f o r u m c o m p r i s i n g representatives f r o m n e w p o l i t i c a l institutions i n N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d the Irish parliament; 4. permanent E a s t - W e s t ( L o n d o n - D u b l i n ) structures,

i n c l u d i n g a n inter-

governmental conference a n d secretariat. A s m u c h o f the E a s t - W e s t d i m e n s i o n reiterated the w o r k i n g s o f the 1 9 8 5 A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t , the novelty lay m a i n l y i n the N o r t h — S o u t h proposals. It was proposed that the n e w N o r t h - S o u t h b o d y s h o u l d c o n t a i n heads o f departments f r o m the Irish government a n d a n e w N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y . T h e B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments w o u l d determine i n the first instance w h i c h matters s h o u l d be subject to the executive, h a r m o n i s a t i o n o r consultative roles o f the North—South b o d y . I n a n attempt to remove some o f the ambiguities over the extent o f the all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n w h i c h h a d dogged the 1 9 7 3 C o u n c i l o f Ireland, the J o i n t F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t was m o r e explicit. It defined the different remits a n d likely areas o f competence o f the North—South b o d y as i n T a b l e 12.2. T h e J o i n t F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t p r o v i d e d the usual assertion that there w o u l d be n o change i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h o u t the consent o f a majority o f its people, w h i l s t again p r o m i s i n g legislation i n the event o f such a development. Paragraph 18 gave official r e c o g n i t i o n to the existence o f two dissident groups o n the island, o n e already a reality, another w h i c h w o u l d be created i f forced i n t o a u n i t e d Ireland. T h e paragraph asserted that 'the o p t i o n o f a sovereign u n i t e d Ireland does not c o m m a n d the consent o f the u n i o n i s t t r a d i t i o n , n o r does the existing status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland c o m m a n d the consent o f the nationalist t r a d i t i o n ' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1995: 2 6 ) . In a n often a m b i g u o u s d o c u m e n t , there was a w a r n i n g to U n i o n i s t s o f the possible i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the failure to agree to the F r a m e w o r k Proposals. D i r e c t rule f r o m W e s t m i n s t e r w o u l d be reintroduced, b u t w i t h a c o m m i t m e n t to ' p r o m o t e co-operation at all levels between the people, N o r t h a n d S o u t h , representing b o t h traditions i n Ireland, as agreed b y the t w o G o v e r n ments i n the J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n ' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1 9 9 5 : 3 4 ) . G i v e n that the J o i n t ( D o w n i n g Street) D e c l a r a t i o n h a d p r o v i d e d o n l y the loosest o u t l i n e o f the mechanics o f this N o r t h - S o u t h co-operation, the passage again p u z z l e d readers. D e s p i t e B r i t i s h denials, m a n y agreed that a willingness to impose j o i n t a u t h o r i t y was i m p l i e d ( B e w a n d G i l l e s p i e , 1996).

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The development of the peace process

T h e Irish government m o v e d a little closer towards i n t r o d u c i n g proposals for a n a m e n d m e n t to Articles 2 a n d 3 o f its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland. Paragraph 21 o f the J o i n t F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t declared that the Irish government w o u l d i n t r o d u c e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t s reflective o f the lack o f majority consent for a u n i t e d Ireland i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h i s remained c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n a n overall intergovernmental constitutional agreement, w h i l s t the Irish government w o u l d m a i n t a i n the right o f people N o r t h a n d S o u t h t o 'be part of, as o f right, the Irish n a t i o n ' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1995: 2 8 ) .

12.6 Political responses A c c o r d i n g to o n e c o m m e n t a t o r , w h a t was remarkable about the J o i n t F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t was the 'success o f its a m b i g u i t y ' ( S m y t h , 1996: 14). U n l i k e the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n , however, the d o c u m e n t m e t w i t h a hostile reception f r o m the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Party. Its leader James M o l y n e a u x resigned i n 1995. W h i l s t this resignation was n o t directly due to the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the documents, he was unimpressed at the m a n n e r i n w h i c h the F r a m e w o r k h a d been devised w i t h scant i n p u t f r o m U n i o n i s t s . H i s successor, D a v i d T r i m b l e , hardened resistance, c l a i m i n g that the d o c u m e n t s were s i m p l y n o t viable. T h e m a i n fears o f U n i o n i s t s were: 1. the u n d e r m i n i n g o f B r i t i s h sovereignty t h r o u g h the influence given to the Republic i n policy formulation; 2 . the use o f the E u r o p e a n U n i o n to u n d e r m i n e the border; 3. the l i k e l y ineffectiveness o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y ; 4. the use o f the N o r t h - S o u t h b o d y a n d failure o f the A s s e m b l y as devices to impose j o i n t authority. U n i o n i s t s were especially concerned b y their i n a b i l i t y to sideline the p r o p o s e d N o r t h - S o u t h b o d y . H e a d s o f departments i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y were o b l i g e d to participate i n this all-Ireland i n s t i t u t i o n . I n other w o r d s , U n i o n i s t s c o u l d have some internal power returned w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, p r o v i d e d that they were also prepared to concede power to a n external force. It w o u l d be impossible to boycott the North—South b o d y . It w o u l d be possible to boycott the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y , b u t this m i g h t m e a n that U n i o n i s t influence w o u l d be r e m o v e d almost entirely f r o m p o l i t i c a l arrangements. O f equal c o n c e r n was the extent o f the remit o f the N o r t h — S o u t h b o d y . T h e B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments w o u l d determine the o p e n i n g extent o f the r e m i t o f the N o r t h - S o u t h body. A s this d i d n o t appear to be ringfenced (prevented f r o m expanding), i t seemed l i k e l y to grow. T h e F r a m e w o r k D o c u ments declared: . . . the British Government have no limits o f their own to impose o n the nature and extent o f functions which could be agreed for designation at the outset, or subsequently, between the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland administration' ( H M Government, 1995: 30).

12.6 Political responses

163

Part II o f the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s p r o v i d e d for a substantial crossborder d i m e n s i o n i n relation to E u r o p e a n U n i o n programmes. T h e s e w o u l d automatically be referred to the N o r t h - S o u t h b o d y a n d those w i t h a crossborder d i m e n s i o n w o u l d be i m p l e m e n t e d b y that b o d y . T h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n was thus feared b y U n i o n i s t s as a potential eroder o f sovereignty. U n i o n i s t s feared the cross-border m o m e n t u m generated b y the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s . S u c h fears were exacerbated b y paragraph 2 4 w h i c h spoke o f 'present a n d future political, social a n d e c o n o m i c inter-connections o n the island o f Ireland, e n a b l i n g representatives o f the m a i n traditions, N o r t h a n d S o u t h , to enter agreed d y n a m i c , new, co-operative a n d constructive relationships' ( H M G o v e r n ment, 1995: 28). Against this, any expansion o f the N o r t h - S o u t h b o d y required A s s e m b l y approval, a l l o w i n g U n i o n i s t s to prevent its development. U n i o n i s t s agreed w i t h the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s that the return o f local p o l i t i c a l functions was desirable, b u t argued they must be locally c o n t r o l l e d , d e v o i d o f external interference. I n 1996, the U U P p r o d u c e d a p o l i c y d o c u m e n t , The Democratic Imperative. T h i s a c k n o w l e d g e d the value o f establishing a 'proper a n d appropriate' relationship w i t h the Irish R e p u b l i c for the ' m u t u a l e x p l o i t a t i o n o f e c o n o m i c benefits' (Ulster U n i o n i s t Party, 1996: 12). It expressed a willingness to discuss the relationship between Belfast a n d D u b l i n a n d a c k n o w l e d g e d the e m p a t h y o f n o r t h e r n N a t i o n a l i s t s w i t h the Irish R e p u b l i c , w h i l s t a r g u i n g that this s h o u l d n o t affect N o r t h e r n Ireland r e m a i n i n g an integral part o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . I n d i s m i s s i n g the 'framework o f shame a n d s h a m ' , the D U P argued that it was a sell-out to D u b l i n . C l a i m i n g v i n d i c a t i o n for its hardline o p p o s i t i o n to the peace process, the party h e l d the earlier c o n c i l i a t o r y approach o f the U U P partly responsible for the difficulties faced b y U n i o n i s t s . T h u s , Ian Paisley ( 1 9 9 7 : 16) argued that it was 'strange to relate those w h o prepared the w o m b o f the D e c l a r a t i o n have n o w rejected its offspring — the F r a m e w o r k D o c u ment'. T h e D U P argued that the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s a m o u n t e d to j o i n t a u t h o r i t y 'between D u b l i n a n d the representatives o f the proposed n e w U l s t e r assembly' ( D e m o c r a t i c U n i o n i s t Party, 1995: 11). It insisted that the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d n o t negotiate w i t h the Irish g o v e r n m e n t u n t i l the latter r e m o v e d its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e party perceived the N o r t h - S o u t h b o d y suggested b y the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t as a n e m b r y o n i c all-Ireland parliament. A m o n g s t supporters o f the U n i o n , o n l y the A l l i a n c e Party w e l c o m e d the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s . O n the N a t i o n a l i s t side, the S D L P endorsed m u c h o f their content, scarcely surprising given that they largely reflected S D L P t h i n k i n g . T h e S D L P supported the substantial intergovernmental framework a n d d y n a m i c o f cross-borderism consistent w i t h the party's approach. H a v i n g refused to accept the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n , S i n n F e i n c o u l d scarcely endorse its mechanics as l a i d o u t i n the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s . T h e r e was the encouraging assertion o f the v a l i d i t y o f Irish self-determination, b u t the m a n n e r o f its exercise w o u l d p r o v i d e a ' U n i o n i s t veto' over change. P r e o c c u p i e d w i t h i n s i s t i n g u p o n entry i n t o all-party talks, S i n n F e i n p r o v i d e d a m u t e d response. G e r r y A d a m s even endorsed the overall approach o f the

164

The development of the peace process

F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s as ' a clear r e c o g n i t i o n that p a r t i t i o n has failed, that B r i t i s h rule i n Ireland has f a i l e d . . . T h e ethos o f the d o c u m e n t a n d the p o l i t i c a l framework envisaged is clearly a n all-Ireland o n e ' ( A d a m s , 1 9 9 5 : 2 2 9 ) . A l t h o u g h significant, the advancement o f cross-border co-operation p r o posed i n the J o i n t F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t conceded o n l y part o f the t r a d i t i o n a l R e p u b l i c a n agenda. T h e absence o f R e p u b l i c a n antipathy to the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s was a clear h i n t that henceforth they envisaged further

gains

t h r o u g h the d y n a m i c o f co-operative cross-borderism. After the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s were issued, the pace o f the peace process slowed for t w o years. Intergovernmental

declarations a n d d o c u m e n t s h a d

acknowledged the right o f the Irish people to achieve their o w n destiny a n d not distinguished w h i c h w o u l d be the better destiny. P a r a m i l i t a r y ceasefires offered the possibility that the resolution o f that destiny m i g h t be b y peaceful methods. H o w e v e r , b y this p o i n t , S i n n F e i n h a d not yet c o m e i n f r o m the c o l d i n terms o f the B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l process. T h i s was i n contrast to its r a p i d i n c l u s i o n i n dialogue i n the Irish R e p u b l i c . T h e U n i t e d States G o v e r n m e n t also offered great encouragement for the s w i t c h f r o m a r m e d conflict to potential dialogue.

12.7 The Irish-American lobby G i v e n that 4 4 m i l l i o n A m e r i c a n s c l a i m to be o f Irish o r i g i n , i t is scarcely surprising, therefore, that electoral candidates i n A m e r i c a , i n c l u d i n g prospective presidents, are anxious to emphasise their interest i n Irish affairs. G i v e n the strength also o f America's historical links w i t h B r i t a i n , it was always a possibility that i n any peace process r e q u i r i n g a broker, the A m e r i c a n government m i g h t play a significant role. Irish-America provided the fourth d i m e n s i o n o f the pan-Nationalist coalition, e m b r a c i n g the S D L P , S i n n F e i n a n d the Irish government. T h e A m e r i c a n government was o b l i g e d to be somewhat m o r e circumspect, anxious to develop the peace process, w h i l s t p u b l i c l y b e i n g o b l i g e d to appear neutral over the outc o m e o f developments. O n c e caricatured as a n ignorant, s h a m r o c k - w i e l d i n g g r o u p , the IrishA m e r i c a n l o b b y has always been m u c h m o r e diverse. Indeed, the sheer range o f I r i s h - A m e r i c a n groups h a d been described as a case o f ' h y p e r - p l u r a l i s m ' ( D u m b r e l l , 1995: 112). Nonetheless, there was some residual s y m p a t h y for the ' a r m e d struggle' amongst m a n y members o f the larger groups. Indeed, the Irish N o r t h e r n A i d C o m m i t t e e ( N O R A I D ) was r u n as a welfare adjunct for the families o f i m p r i s o n e d I R A members. W i t h considerable crossovers o f m e m b e r s h i p , groups such as the A n c i e n t O r d e r o f H i b e r n i a n s c o n t a i n e d m a n y passive o r tacit supporters o f the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A , a l t h o u g h few h a d subscribed to its socialism o f the late 1970s a n d early 1980s. Instead, r o m a n t i c n a t i o n a l i s m a n d C a t h o l i c i s m p r o d u c e d such favourable dispositions. M o s t o f these organisations were nonetheless outsider groups, screened f r o m p o l i t i c a l influence b y I r i s h - A m e r i c a n moderates w h o h e l d p o l i t i c a l sway. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Irish nationalism was favoured b y I r i s h - A m e r i c a n political elites. A t the apex o f this l o b b y were senior figures k n o w n as the ' F o u r H o r s e m e n ' .

12.8 The role of the American government

165

T i p O ' N e i l l , E d w a r d K e n n e d y , D a n i e l M o y n i h a n a n d H u g h C a r e y were experienced p o l i t i c i a n s o f considerable standing i n the I r i s h - A m e r i c a n c o m m u n i t y . D u r i n g the 1970s, they encouraged the A m e r i c a n president, J i m m y Carter, to develop a m o r e proactive stance o n N o r t h e r n Ireland, w h i l s t d e n o u n c i n g the activities o f m i l i t a n t Irish R e p u b l i c a n s . T h e D u b l i n governm e n t a n d the S D L P were also i n s t r u m e n t a l i n persuading l o b b y groups such as the F r i e n d s o f Ireland that support s h o u l d o n l y be given to n o n - v i o l e n t expressions o f Irish n a t i o n a l i s m ( W i l s o n , 1995). T h e Irish N a t i o n a l C a u c u s , l e d b y the Irish Nationalist, Father Sean M c M a n u s , a n d c o n t a i n i n g Irish-Americans w i t h a somewhat broader range o f sympathies t h a n N O R A I D , enjoyed some success i n securing the establishment o f a C o n g r e s s i o n a l A d H o c C o m m i t t e e o n N o r t h e r n Ireland i n 1 9 7 7 . Its members were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n persuading Congress to b a n the sale o f w e a p o n r y to the R U C . T h e I r i s h - A m e r i c a n l o b b y also l a i d considerable stress u p o n the need for A m e r i c a n states to assert the M a c B r i d e P r i n c i p l e s , despite the reservations o f even m a n y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l N a t i o n a l i s t s i n Ireland. T h e s e p r i n c i p l e s insisted u p o n m i n i m u m quotas for C a t h o l i c s . I n d i v i d u a l U S states w i t h c o m p a n i e s based w i t h i n their region c o u l d enforce c o m p l i a n c e u p o n those l o c a t i n g i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. Increasingly, A m e r i c a n companies were investing i n the P r o v i n c e . Since D u P o n t became the first to locate there i n 1 9 5 9 , 4 5 other companies h a d f o l l o w e d b y 1 9 9 5 , p r o v i d i n g 1 0 , 0 0 0 jobs a n d £ 5 0 0 m i l l i o n w o r t h o f investment {Financial Times, 3 0 N o v e m b e r 1995). B r i t i s h l o b b y i n g o f the U S State D e p a r t m e n t was effective i n r e d u c i n g the i m p a c t o f m o r e strident demands for A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t i n the affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. A reassertion o f the special relationship between B r i t a i n a n d A m e r i c a d u r i n g the T h a t c h e r p r e m i e r s h i p a n d Reagan presidency d u r i n g the 1980s ensured that A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t was kept to the m i n i m u m necessary to proceed w i t h o u t alienating I r i s h - A m e r i c a , despite Reagan's s h o c k discovery o f Irish roots i n a visit to the R e p u b l i c i n 1984. A m e r i c a n support for the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e m e n t was p r i m a r i l y financial a n d satisfied m o r e moderate elements w i t h i n the l o b b y .

12.8 The role of the American government I n the 1990s, A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t finally extended towards p o l i t i c a l m e d i a t i o n . B i l l C l i n t o n enjoyed large support f r o m the I r i s h - A m e r i c a n voters i n his 1 9 9 2 presidential t r i u m p h . C l i n t o n ' s a p p r o a c h to the p r o b l e m o f N o r t h ern Ireland was to be different i n several respects f r o m that o f his predecessors, a shift p r o m p t e d partly b y a n interest i n N o r t h e r n Ireland h e l d b y C l i n t o n since the c i v i l rights c a m p a i g n began back i n the 1960s w h i l s t he s t u d i e d at Oxford. Firstly, C l i n t o n was prepared to criticise aspects o f B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. D u r i n g the 1992 c a m p a i g n , he criticised the ' w a n t o n use o f lethal force b y B r i t i s h security forces'. Differential rates o f u n e m p l o y m e n t between Protestants a n d C a t h o l i c s a n d earlier c o l l u s i o n between the security forces a n d Loyalist p a r a m i l i t a r y groups h a d also attracted C l i n t o n ' s attention ( C o o g a n , 1995).

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The development of the peace process

Secondly, the n e w president was prepared to use a peace envoy to attempt to hasten moves towards p o l i t i c a l a c c o m m o d a t i o n i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e official manifestation o f this approach was the d e p l o y m e n t o f Senator G e o r g e M i t c h e l l as a peace 'broker' i n D e c e m b e r 1994. M i t c h e l l ' s task was to become even m o r e crucial w i t h i n a year, as disputes over the p r i n c i p l e a n d timetable o f d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g o f weapons deepened. T h i r d l y , C l i n t o n was n o t h i d e b o u n d b y the sympathies o f the State D e p a r t m e n t towards B r i t a i n . Instead, he preferred to use N a t i o n a l Security C o u n c i l advisers to develop his strategy. T h e m a i n adviser, N a n c y Soderberg, was particularly anxious that members o f S i n n F e i n be given the o p p o r t u n i t y to develop their credentials as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l politicians. It was her influence that persuaded C l i n t o n to award a n entry visa to G e r r y A d a m s after the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n , despite the absence o f a n I R A ceasefire at that stage a n d the strong o p p o s i t i o n to the award expressed b y the B r i t i s h government a n d U S State D e p a r t m e n t . T h e U S ambassador i n Ireland, Jean K e n n e d y S m i t h , hailed the visa award as a 'wise a n d courageous m o v e ' , i n d i c a t i n g h o w the forces o f Irish A m e r i c a a n d m u c h o f the A m e r i c a n government were r o w i n g i n the same d i r e c t i o n as other elements o f the N a t i o n a l i s t c o a l i t i o n . A t the W h i t e H o u s e St Patrick's D a y reception i n 1 9 9 5 , numerous shades o f o p i n i o n , i n c l u d i n g R e p u b l i c a n s a n d Loyalists, were represented. F i n a l l y , a different c o a l i t i o n o f I r i s h - A m e r i c a n forces h a d emerged b y the 1990s. G r o u p s o f R e p u b l i c a n sympathisers had fragmented. I n 1989, N O R A I D split, the fracture caused m a i n l y b y the e n d o f abstentionism b y S i n n F e i n i n the Irish R e p u b l i c . D i e h a r d s such as M i c h a e l F l a n n e r y q u i t the organisation. T h e a n n u a l fundraising abilities o f N O R A I D fell f r o m $1 m i l l i o n i n the early 1980s to less than one-fifth o f that figure 10 years later (Financial Times, 3 0 M a y 1994). B y the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , small groups, such as the F r i e n d s o f Irish F r e e d o m a n d R e p u b l i c a n S i n n F e i n , were a t t e m p t i n g to b u i l d u p a n e t w o r k o f hardline Irish R e p u b l i c a n s i n the U n i t e d States f r o m a s m a l l r e m a i n i n g base. T h e huge b u l k o f Irish-Americans h a d instead feted A d a m s . T h e g r a n t i n g o f his entry visa led to the development o f the Friends o f S i n n F e i n organisation, w i t h a $200,000-a-year office i n W a s h i n g t o n . T h e second visit o f A d a m s , after the I R A ceasefire a n n o u n c e m e n t , p r o v e d a huge fundraising success. T o a considerable degree, support for S i n n F e i n was seen as part o f mainstream I r i s h - A m e r i c a n politics w h i l s t the I R A ceasefire h e l d . President C l i n t o n ' s visit i n late N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 5 was the first made to N o r t h e r n Ireland b y a sitting U S president. It was a p o l i t i c a l tour de force w h i c h raised o p t i m i s m that the peace process, w h i c h h a d appeared increasi n g l y stalled, m i g h t yet be m o v e d forward. A t this p o i n t , the politics o f the process h a d been like ' w a t c h i n g a glacier m o v e ' a c c o r d i n g to O ' L e a r y a n d M c G a r r y (1996: 3 2 9 ) a l t h o u g h perhaps w i t h o u t so m u c h excitement. T h e presidential visit revived the excitement p r o v o k e d b y the paramilitary ceasefires d u r i n g the previous year. A t the time, scarcely anyone k n e w that, a c c o r d i n g to o n e authoritative source, the I R A ' s A r m y C o u n c i l h a d already taken the d e c i s i o n i n O c t o b e r , i n p r i n c i p l e at least, to return to violence ( H o l l a n d , 1996). I n stressing the benefits o f peace, C l i n t o n managed to satisfy

12.9 Conclusion

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the o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y o f citizens i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. Even-handedness was the u n d e r l y i n g theme o f the visit, a l o n g w i t h the need for advancement o f p o l i t i c a l dialogue. H e asserted that the terrorists' 'day was over'. F o r N a t i o n a l i s t s , the visit c o n t a i n e d a handshake w i t h G e r r y A d a m s o n the Falls R o a d i n Belfast a n d a d e m a n d that those w h o m o v e away f r o m violence s h o u l d be i n c l u d e d i n p o l i t i c a l dialogue. A m e r i c a n emphasis was u p o n a t w i n track approach. T h i s was based u p o n substantive all-party p o l i t i c a l talks, to be staged i n parallel w i t h talks about the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g o f weapons. T h e D e m o c r a t Senator, G e o r g e M i t c h e l l , was a p p o i n t e d b y the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t to chair a three-man c o m m i s s i o n to discuss whether weapons s h o u l d be d e c o m m i s s i o n e d as part o f the peace process. It was o n this issue that the peace process stalled, despite the apparent revival o f m o m e n t u m p r o d u c e d b y A m e r i c a n enthusiasm for its c o n t i n u a t i o n .

12.9 Conclusion T h e early to m i d - 1 9 9 0 s saw the d e v e l o p m e n t o f an 'official' peace process, i n w h i c h j o i n t B r i t i s h a n d Irish government declarations a n d d o c u m e n t s i n d i c a t e d the basis o f a future p o l i t i c a l settlement. T h e politics o f the conflict r e m a i n e d unresolved a n d there was little m o v e m e n t towards all-inclusive dialogue at this stage. F o r a peace process to be sustained, i t was apparent that two c o n d i t i o n s w o u l d need to be fulfilled. F i r s t l y there was a need for a c o m m i t m e n t to a l o n g peace b y r e p u b l i c a n paramilitaries i n the m a n n e r i n w h i c h they h a d prepared for a l o n g war. S e c o n d l y , the peace process w o u l d o n l y survive i f S i n n F e i n was i n c l u d e d i n all-party talks. W h i l s t a c h i e v i n g a remarkable transformation, the first 18 m o n t h s o f the 'official' peace process were about creating a peaceful b a c k g r o u n d , p r i o r to the attempted r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f the seemingly irreconcilable i n terms o f the p o l i t ical p r o b l e m s o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. A n o n - v i o l e n t situation at least offered the prospect o f permanent dialogue rather t h a n increased polarisation. I n m a n y ways the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n a n d F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s were masterpieces o f a m b i g u i t y , i n that b o t h sides c o u l d c o m f o r t themselves w i t h their reading o f the nuances c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n . Y e t the p u b l i c a t i o n o f clever documents c o u l d n o t act as a permanent substitute for the h a r d decisions w h i c h w o u l d be required i n m u l t i - p a r t y talks c o n d u c t e d i n a n absence o f consensus. A s progress towards these talks s l o w e d i n 1 9 9 5 , N o r t h e r n Ireland stood i n l i m b o between peace a n d conflict, awaiting decisive m o v e m e n t towards a fully inclusive negotiated settlement.

Chapter 13

War and peace: the long road to negotiations 1995-7

T h e peace process fluctuated i n pace. R a p i d progress towards peace f r o m 1993 to early 1995 was f o l l o w e d b y a p e r i o d o f stagnation a n d temporary collapse. T h e peace process developed problems w i t h the delay over S i n n Fein's entry i n t o m u l t i - p a r t y talks. T h i s delay l e d to the fracturing o f the I R A ' s ceasefire i n 1996, before the r a p i d revival o f the process under the L a b o u r governm e n t elected i n M a y 1997. T h e issue o f weapons d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g r e m a i n e d unresolved, b u t was overridden b y the anxiety o f the L a b o u r government to move towards multi-party talks i n c l u d i n g S i n n F e i n . I n response, the I R A revived its ceasefire. T h e peace process was renewed a n d m o v e m e n t towards the negotiated o u t c o m e o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t began i n earnest. T h i s chapter examines the stalling o f the peace process a n d the reasons w h y i t revived after M a y 1997.

13.1 (Non)-Movement towards multi-party talks 1995-6 T h e I R A ceasefire at the heart o f the peace process was predicated u p o n the idea that its p o l i t i c a l representatives i n S i n n F e i n w o u l d q u i c k l y become engaged i n inclusive dialogue w i t h the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments a n d other p o l i t i c a l parties i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. A l t h o u g h R e p u b l i c a n s w o u l d articulate the case for Irish u n i t y , the b r o a d o u t l i n e o f any settlement was apparent f r o m the 1995 F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t . Subsequent m u l t i - p a r t y talks w o u l d change the details, n o t the three-stranded approach. N e g o t i a t i o n s w o u l d centre u p o n the details of: 1. internal government w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland; 2. the relationship between the N o r t h a n d S o u t h o f Ireland; 3. the relationship between the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments. A s delays t o the starting date o f these talks emerged, the peace process came u n d e r increasing strain. Bilateral talks between B r i t i s h government officials a n d each o f the major p o l i t i c a l parties were c o m m o n p l a c e . H o w e v e r , serious negotiations c o n c e r n i n g the future o f N o r t h e r n Ireland were o n l y l i k e l y to develop w h e n all the parties met. G i v e n the D U P ' s h o s t i l i t y to the c o n d u c t o f the peace process, i t was u n l i k e l y that i t w o u l d w i s h to be i n v o l v e d . A s such, m u l t i - p a r t y rather than all-party talks w o u l d be the most inclusive f o r m attainable. A s i d e f r o m D U P n o n - i n v o l v e m e n t , the most obvious difficulty

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13.2 The Mitchell Principles of Non-Violence

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c o n f r o n t i n g the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t was w h e n to a l l o w S i n n F e i n i n t o negotiations. T h e I R A ceasefire raised several questions: 1. W a s it permanent o r tactical? 2. W h a t w o u l d h a p p e n to I R A weapons? 3. S h o u l d prisoners be released? 4. H o w l o n g m u s t S i n n F e i n w a i t before b e i n g p e r m i t t e d to enter m u l t i - p a r t y talks? R a i s i n g the questions was easier t h a n p r o v i d i n g the answers. I n its ceasefire a n n o u n c e m e n t i n A u g u s t 1994, the I R A h a d urged everybody 'to a p p r o a c h this n e w situation w i t h d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d patience'. Its o w n patience snapped after 18 m o n t h s o f prevarication b y others, i n w h a t the I R A perceived as a n eight-hundred-year conflict. Delays i n S i n n Fein's entry to peace talks were created b y t w o m a i n obstacles. Firstly, the exclusion o f the w o r d 'permanent' f r o m the I R A ' s ceasefire a n n o u n c e m e n t meant that the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t sought clarification o f the intentions o f the organisation. S e c o n d l y , the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t insisted u p o n the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g o f I R A weapons. I n the event, all-party talks d i d n o t take place d u r i n g the 1 9 9 4 - 6 peace process. T h e b r e a k i n g o f the I R A ceasefire i n F e b r u a r y 1996 ensured that S i n n F e i n was excluded w h e n m u l t i - p a r t y talks w e n t ahead i n J u n e that year.

13.2 The Mitchell Principles of Non-Violence O n e o f the central s t u m b l i n g blocks i n the peace process c o n c e r n e d w h e t h e r paramilitary groups s h o u l d be required to get r i d o f their weapons a n d a r m a ments. A l t h o u g h d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g has been a n i m p o r t a n t element o f peace processes elsewhere, M c G i n t y (1999) makes several arguments c o n c e r n i n g the exceptionalism o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. D e c o m m i s s i o n i n g has tended t o o c c u r after larger conflicts, w i t h the d e m o b i l i s a t i o n o f large armies, n o t s m a l l param i l i t a r y groups, w i t h peace deals often b r o k e r e d b y the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . U n i o n i s t s a n d the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t w i s h e d to see the I R A b e g i n to d i s a r m before any entry i n t o m u l t i - p a r t y talks. T h e paramilitaries were insistent that n o d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g s h o u l d take place i n advance o f a negotiated p o l i t i c a l settlement. T h e a b a n d o n m e n t o f weapons w o u l d arise f r o m a p o l i t i c a l settlement rather t h a n precede s u c h a development. A n y p r i o r d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g w o u l d a m o u n t to a 'surrender'. T h e I R A ' s ceasefire declaration h a d stressed that the organisation r e m a i n e d undefeated. D u r i n g the 1990s, the I R A h a d p r o v e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y v i a attacks o n targets i n L o n d o n , that i t retained the capacity to inflict considerable damage. It was far f r o m certain whether the I R A w o u l d accept d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g even i f talks t o o k place, but, even i n a n era o f shifting R e p u b l i c a n tactics, i t stretched c r e d u l i t y that d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g w o u l d precede talks. S i n n F e i n ' s M a r t i n M c G u i n n e s s insisted that there was n o t a 'snowball's chance i n h e l l o f any weapons b e i n g d e c o m m i s s i o n e d this side o f a negotiated settlement' (quoted i n the Guardian, 2 1 J u n e 1995).

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War and peace: the long road to negotiations 1995-7

T h e Irish government also insisted that d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g was n o t a prerequisite for entry to all-party talks, p o i n t i n g o u t that the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n made n o reference to the surrender o f arms. A c c o r d i n g to the Taoiseach, A l b e r t R e y n o l d s : Everybody clearly understood that the ceasefire o f August 1994 was about getting a place for Sinn Fein at all-party talks. A n d there was never any question o f decommissioning being set as a pre-condition for those talks. So decommissioning became the poisoning factor (Irish World, 11 October 1996). A s the longest-serving Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland ever, f r o m 1 9 9 2 to 1997, P a t r i c k M a y h e w c l u n g to a belief that I R A d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g h a d to take place before S i n n Fein's entry to m u l t i - p a r t y talks ( E l l i o t a n d Flackes, 1999). H i s three principles, o u t l i n e d i n W a s h i n g t o n i n M a r c h 1 9 9 5 a n d henceforth k n o w n as ' W a s h i n g t o n 3 ' , d e m a n d e d : (1) a willingness to d i s a r m i n p r i n c i p l e , (2) agreement u p o n the m e t h o d , a n d (3) acceptance that some weapons must be given u p before S i n n Fein's entry to talks ( B e w a n d G i l l e s p i e , 1999). T h e B r i t i s h government argued that d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g h a d always been o n the agenda a n d that N a t i o n a l i s t s h a d collective amnesia c o n c e r n i n g this c o n d i t i o n . F o r example, the Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland h a d appeared o n Irish television i n 1993 to indicate such a requirement (Bew, 1995). M a y h e w was criticised b y U n i o n i s t s a n d N a t i o n a l i s t s . U n i o n i s t s argued that a t o k e n surrender o f weapons b y the I R A was useless. N a t i o n a l i s t s insisted that expectations o f any advance d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g a m o u n t e d to a n e w a n d unrealistic i m p e d i m e n t to all-party talks. T h e r e were three m a i n options to consider o n d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g : 1. Prior decommissioning. T h e I R A (and Loyalist paramilitaries, i t was assumed) s h o u l d be required to surrender all o r part o f its w e a p o n r y i n advance o f entry i n t o all-party talks. 2 . Parallel decommissioning. K n o w n as the t w i n - t r a c k approach, this w o u l d require the paramilitary groups to give u p some o f their weapons as a l l party talks proceeded. A l l - p a r t y talks m i g h t be preparatory o r full. T h e r e w o u l d be n o requirement for a surrender o f any weapons i n advance o f the start o f talks. 3. No decommissioning. T h e B r i t i s h government w o u l d be o b l i g e d to c o n t i n u e to m a i n t a i n its w o r k i n g a s s u m p t i o n ' that the I R A ceasefire was permanent. I n a n attempt to solve the p r o b l e m , a C o m m i s s i o n o f three members was a p p o i n t e d , chaired b y the U S Senator George M i t c h e l l . It t o o k submissions f r o m a n u m b e r o f interested parties, a l t h o u g h the D U P d e c l i n e d to cooperate i n its deliberations, p o i n t i n g o u t that i t h a d ' n o t h i n g to give u p ' . S i n n F e i n w i s h e d the C o m m i s s i o n to extend its remit b e y o n d the considerations o f p a r a m i l i t a r y weapons. T h e party argued for the removal o f the legal w e a p o n r y h e l d b y the B r i t i s h A r m y a n d R U C . I n its report p u b l i s h e d i n January 1996, the M i t c h e l l C o m m i s s i o n f o u n d i n favour o f parallel d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g . A l l p a r t y talks c o u l d start, w i t h d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g o f weapons t o take place a l o n g side the talks, rather than i n advance o f negotiations ( M i t c h e l l R e p o r t , 1996).

13.3 The Northern Ireland Forum elections 1996

171

These conclusions appeared to p r o v i d e a rebuff to the demands o f the B r i t i s h government. It h a d insisted a l l a l o n g that the I R A m u s t b e g i n to destroy its weapons i n advance o f talks, b u t this was n o longer a requirement. T h e M i t c h e l l C o m m i s s i o n d i d , however, insist that all negotiating parties be c o m m i t t e d to peace. T o this effect, the C o m m i s s i o n p r o d u c e d six p r i n c i p l e s o f non-violence. A l l parties were obliged to subscribe to the f o l l o w i n g principles: 1. to use democratic a n d exclusively peaceful means o f resolving political issues; 2. total d i s a r m a m e n t o f p a r a m i l i t a r y organisations; 3. d i s a r m a m e n t

to be verifiable to the satisfaction

o f an

independent

commission; 4. to renounce for themselves, a n d to oppose a n y effort b y others, to use force, o r threaten to use force, to influence the course o r the o u t c o m e o f negotiations; 5. to agree to abide b y the terms o f any agreement

reached o n all-party

negotiations a n d to resort to d e m o c r a t i c a n d exclusively peaceful methods i n t r y i n g to alter any aspect o f that o u t c o m e w i t h w h i c h they m a y disagree; 6. to urge that ' p u n i s h m e n t ' killings a n d beatings stop a n d to take effective steps to prevent such actions. These six principles were endorsed b y the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l parties, b u t appeared l i k e l y to pose problems for S i n n F e i n a n d the I R A , n o t least i f the o u t c o m e o f any m u l t i - p a r t y negotiations failed to advance the cause o f a u n i t e d Ireland. Nonetheless, S i n n Fein's president c l a i m e d that his party was w i l l i n g to sign u p to t h e m . T h e M i t c h e l l P r i n c i p l e s made m u l t i - p a r t y talks possible b y s i d e l i n i n g the p r o b l e m o f d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g as a prerequisite for entry for parties still l i n k e d to p a r a m i l i t a r y organisations. A d d i t i o n a l l y , the M i t c h e l l R e p o r t insisted that all parties abide b y the principles o f any agreement reached at all-party negotiations. A l l - p a r t y talks, thought likely to start at the b e g i n n i n g o f 1996, were deferred. T h e earlier r o w over d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g a n d m u c h o f the M i t c h e l l R e p o r t itself were s i d e l i n e d b y t w o events: the insistence u p o n the staging o f elections to a peace f o r u m a n d the t e m p o r a r y collapse o f the I R A ceasefire.

13.3 The Northern Ireland Forum elections 1996 W h i l s t accepting the idea o f parallel d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g , the B r i t i s h governm e n t also seized u p o n a m u c h m o r e tentative suggestion c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n the M i t c h e l l R e p o r t . T h i s referred to the possibility o f elections to c o n f i r m a mandate for representatives w i t h i n a peace f o r u m . These elections c o u l d take place, the report argued, i f there existed sufficient consensus for the idea. T h e idea o f elections rather t h a n talks caused m u c h disquiet. D e s p i t e h i s p u b l i c o p t i m i s m , M i t c h e l l suspected that the increasingly i m p a t i e n t I R A was about to e n d its ceasefire ( M i t c h e l l , 1999). D e s p i t e the bipartisanship at W e s t minster, at least o n e m e m b e r o f the o p p o s i t i o n L a b o u r Party's frontbench N o r t h e r n Ireland team believed that the Conservative g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d have m o v e d towards talks, w h i l s t emphasising the need for adherence to the

172

War and peace: the long road to negotiations 1995-7

M i t c h e l l P r i n c i p l e s . H o w e v e r , the L a b o u r leadership c o n t i n u e d to refuse to 'play p o l i t i c s ' w i t h the peace process a n d offered support for the government's approach, o n the basis that elections were 'the o n l y s h o w i n t o w n ' ( M o M o w l a m , q u o t e d i n the Irish Post, 2 7 A p r i l 1996). U n i o n i s t s supported the idea o f elections to a n elected f o r u m i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. W i t h i n the U U P , the proposal h a d strengthened w i t h the election o f D a v i d T r i m b l e as leader a n d increased further w i t h M i t c h e l l ' s refusal to insist u p o n p r i o r d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g . T h e U U P argued for elections to establish the 'democratic bona fides' o f participants i n talks, given the non-surrender o f weapons. T h i s represented s o m e t h i n g o f a c o m p r o m i s e . After earlier i n s i s t i n g u p o n p r i o r d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g , the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Party was n o w prepared to talk to S i n n F e i n i f that party participated i n a n assembly, even i f the I R A h a d n o t surrendered any o f its weapons i n advance. I n a n attempt to entice N a t i o n a l i s t s to participate i n the electoral process, the U U P a n d the B r i t i s h government

insisted that the elections were n o t

designed to institute forms o f governance

w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e

legislative proposals for the N o r t h e r n Ireland F o r u m insisted that i t w o u l d be deliberative only and that it 'shall not have any legislative, executive or administrative functions, o r any power to determine the conduct, course, o r outcome o f the (peace) negotiations' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1996: c h . 11, para. 3). T h e purpose o f the elections was, therefore, to produce teams o f negotiators for the p r o m i s e d m u l t i - p a r t y talks, d r a w n f r o m parties successful i n elections to the peace f o r u m . T h e f o r u m itself w o u l d last for o n e year, w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n extension for another year b y the Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland.

13.4 Nationalist objections N a t i o n a l i s t s o f differing shades o f o p i n i o n were enraged b y the proposals for elections. T h e y saw the p l a n as a dangerous stalling device, p r o d u c e d b y U n i o n i s t s a n d supported b y the B r i t i s h government to a v o i d the need for all-party talks i n February 1996. A s i d e f r o m the stalling allegation, there were other N a t i o n a l i s t objections. First, neither o f the m a i n N a t i o n a l i s t parties endorsed the idea o f 'peace' elections. A s such, there was n o t the consensus for the idea w h i c h the M i t c h e l l R e p o r t suggested s h o u l d be a prerequisite for the creation o f an elected peace f o r u m . T h i s lack o f consensus appeared c o n f i r m e d b y a p o l l o f C a t h o l i c s i n Belfast, w h i c h indicated that four-fifths were opposed to elections as a means o f c h o o s i n g representatives at all-party talks {Daily Telegraph, 19 F e b r u a r y 1996). A c c o r d i n g to N a t i o n a l i s t critics, the B r i t i s h government h a d deliberately distorted M i t c h e l l ' s findings. T h i s approach appeared suspiciously pre-determined. Stories i n d i c a t i n g a n o u t c o m e o f elections after the M i t c h e l l R e p o r t h a d b e g u n to appear i n the B r i t i s h press d u r i n g early January, before the M i t c h e l l C o m m i s s i o n h a d c o n c l u d e d its deliberations (see, for example, Daily Telegraph, 12 January 1996). S e c o n d , the support o f the Conservative government for elections appeared to c o n f i r m t o N a t i o n a l i s t s that parliamentary arithmetic rather t h a n c o n c e r n

13.5 The Forum election results

173

for the peace process d o m i n a t e d politics. R e t u r n e d i n 1992 w i t h a seemingly comfortable majority o f 2 0 i n the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s , the Conservative government enjoyed the slenderest o f majorities b y 1996. S u p p o r t f r o m the Ulster U n i o n i s t s was m o r e than welcome for a Conservative government anxious to a v o i d a premature G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n . N a t i o n a l i s t s perceived the f a v o u r i n g o f peace elections as part o f a series o f favours to U n i o n i s t s for their usual support o f the Conservative government i n parliament. O t h e r favours i n c l u d e d the award o f a select committee o n N o r t h e r n Ireland, granted after initial denials o f a deal f o l l o w i n g a close vote o n the M a a s t r i c h t T r e a t y a n d the establishment o f a grand c o m m i t t e e to scrutinise legislation relating to the P r o v i n c e . A t h i r d N a t i o n a l i s t c r i t i c i s m was to ask what purpose elections w o u l d serve. T h e S D L P a n d S i n n F e i n already possessed electoral mandates, consistently attracting a large n u m b e r o f votes a n d e n j o y i n g substantial representation o n local c o u n c i l s . A s such, they d i d n o t see the need to elect either peace f o r u m representatives o r a team o f negotiators, m a n y o f w h o m w o u l d already enjoy a local electoral mandate. E l e c t i o n s were thus seen as another needless obstacle placed before all-party talks. T h e leader o f the S D L P , J o h n H u m e , advocated the staging o f an alternative, all-Ireland referendum, asking whether electors w i s h e d all sides to c o m m i t themselves to peaceful a n d d e m o c r a t i c methods o f conflict resolution. F i n a l l y , the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f elections appeared to c o n f i r m to N a t i o n a l i s t s that the peace process was n o longer a n Irish-led initiative. Instead the B r i t i s h government, under U n i o n i s t urgings, was n o w seen as the p r i m e m o v e r o f the process. T h i s was reflected even i n the format for elections. T h e B r i t i s h governm e n t d e t e r m i n e d w h i c h parties were eligible to stand a n d shaped the o u t c o m e o f the election t h r o u g h use o f a peculiar f o r m o f electoral system. D e s p i t e these objections, N a t i o n a l i s t s g r u d g i n g l y t o o k part i n elections. I n January 1996, S i n n F e i n dismissed the idea o f any f o r u m as a ' n o n - r u n n e r ' . F o u r m o n t h s later, the party agreed to contest the f o r u m elections. S i n n F e i n pledged that it w o u l d n o t take its seats i n the f o r u m , b u t it w o u l d participate i n all-party talks, for w h i c h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the f o r u m was n o t required. T h e S D L P also considered a n o u t r i g h t boycott o f the electoral process, but eventually d e c i d e d to take part i n elections, p r o m i s i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the peace f o r u m o n a n 'a la carte basis, d e p e n d i n g u p o n the agenda for each day.

13.5 The Forum election results T h e elections t o o k place o n 3 0 M a y 1996, designed to p r o d u c e n e g o t i a t i n g teams for all-party talks d u e to o p e n o n 10 J u n e 1996. T w e n t y - t h r e e parties or i n d i v i d u a l s contested the elections. T h e electoral system was a c o m p l e x affair. It briefly u n i t e d the p o l i t i c a l parties i n c o n d e m n a t i o n . ' D o g ' s breakfast; pig's breakfast; monster r a v i n g l o o n y idea; a n d rubric-cube (sic) type election' were perhaps four o f the m o r e flattering descriptions (Irish Times, 2 2 M a r c h 1996). T h e U U P w a n t e d a ninety-seat f o r u m , w i t h five representatives elected f r o m each parliamentary constituency. T h e D U P a n d S D L P f o r m e d a n u n u s u a l

174

War and peace: the long road to negotiations 1995-7

alliance i n advocating a party list system. T h i s w o u l d see N o r t h e r n Ireland treated as a single constituency, a m e t h o d w h i c h favoured those t w o parties i n E u r o p e a n elections. A h y b r i d system was the actual type chosen, m i x i n g constituency representation w i t h party lists a n d ' t o p - u p ' seats, to p r o d u c e a 1 1 0 - m e m b e r f o r u m . Electors cast a single vote for the party o f their choice. Five candidates were elected from each o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's 18 parliamentary constituencies. Candidates were elected v i a a n order-of-preference list s u p p l i e d b y each party for each constituency. T h e first t w o seats i n a constituency were filled using the ' d r o o p ' q u o t a system. A party's vote h a d to equal o r exceed a set quota. T h i s q u o t a was d e t e r m i n e d b y d i v i d i n g the total n u m b e r o f votes plus one b y six. After the first t w o seats were filled, the D ' H o n d t system was used, w h e r e b y each party's vote was d i v i d e d b y the n u m b e r o f seats i t h a d already filled, plus one. T h e n u m b e r o f votes for each party w i t h o u t a seat at that stage was left unaltered, w i t h the party w i t h the biggest total b e i n g elected. T h e a i m o f this constituency election m e t h o d was to ensure that adequate representation was given to each o f the m a i n parties attracting a significant vote i n a constituency. T h e system p r o d u c e d occasional anomalies. F o r example, i n F e r m a n a g h a n d S o u t h T y r o n e , the D U P o b t a i n e d o n e f o r u m seat, an i d e n t i c a l figure to that o b t a i n e d b y S i n n F e i n , a l t h o u g h the latter gained almost twice as m a n y votes. O v e r a l l , however, the percentage share o f f o r u m seats for the five biggest parties i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was n o t m a r k e d l y distinct f r o m their percentage share o f votes. Indeed, a study o f the results i n d i c a t e d that the contest was ' o n e o f the most p r o p o r t i o n a l ever h e l d i n N o r t h e r n Ireland' ( M i t c h e l l a n d G i l l e s p i e , 1999: 8 2 ) . A ' t o p - u p ' system was grafted o n to the constituency list elections. I n a d d i t i o n to the 9 0 constituency members, 2 0 a d d i t i o n a l candidates, d r a w n f r o m party lists, were elected to the f o r u m , two each for the 10 parties attracti n g the most votes i n the constituency list election. T h e a i m o f this system was to guarantee places for the U D P a n d P U P . A s representatives o f the Loyalist paramilitaries, their presence i n talks was i m p o r t a n t . T h e y d i d n o t possess sufficient electoral strength to be elected under the constituency format, b u t were almost certain to gain sufficient support to be i n the t o p 10 parties. O n a 6 5 per cent turnout, the most s t r i k i n g aspect o f the elections was the h i g h level o f support for the hardline variants o f u n i o n i s m a n d n a t i o n a l i s m , as represented b y S i n n F e i n a n d the D U P . S i n n Fein's support exceeded its n o r m a l figure o f a r o u n d 10 per cent. S u p p o r t for the U U P fell b y 10 per cent f r o m the 1 9 9 2 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n , w h i l s t the D U P saw its share rise. A s a gateway to round-table talks, the results achieved their a i m for the representatives o f the Loyalist paramilitaries. I m p r o v i n g f r o m a p o l l rating o f a r o u n d 1 per cent i n the 1993 local elections, the P U P a n d U D P scored sufficient votes to c o n f i r m a place i n the f o r u m , f r o m w h i c h they c o u l d select a team o f negotiators for m u l t i - p a r t y talks (see T a b l e 13.1). T h e election o u t c o m e was i n o n e sense bizarre. T h e fringe Loyalist paramilitaries, w o m e n ' s c o a l i t i o n a n d L a b o u r a l l n o w h a d negotiating teams i n m u l t i - p a r t y talks o f equal size to those o f the m a i n N a t i o n a l i s t a n d U n i o n i s t

13.6 Stagnation, sectarianism and IRA violence Table 13.1

175

Northern Ireland Forum election results 1996

Party

Vote

Percentage share

Seats

UUP SDLP DUP SF APNI UKUP PUP UDP NIWC Labour Others

181,829 160,786 141,413 116,377 49,176 27,774 26,082 16,715 7,731 6,425 18,083

24.2 21.4 18.8 15.5 6.5 3.7 3.5 2.2 1.0 0.9 2.3

30 21 24 17 7 3 2 2 2 2 0

Source: adapted from Guardian, 1 June 1996. parties, despite attracting a mandate f r o m a t i n y percentage o f the electorate a n d each h o l d i n g o n l y t w o f o r u m seats, gained u n d e r the ' t o p - u p ' system. T h e talks came u n d e r the overall c h a i r m a n s h i p o f Senator G e o r g e M i t c h e l l , to w h o m a l l committees reported. S t r a n d 1 talks o n internal governance i n N o r t h e r n Ireland were chaired b y the B r i t i s h government, w h i l s t S t r a n d 2 talks were chaired b y the C a n a d i a n G e n e r a l J o h n D e C h a s t e l a i n . T h e B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments j o i n t l y chaired the c o m m i t t e e l o o k i n g at relations between B r i t a i n a n d Ireland. P r o c e d u r a l wrangles a n d discussions o f agendas characterised the talks. Substantive progress was n o t f o r t h c o m i n g .

13.6 Stagnation, sectarianism and IRA violence W i t h S i n n Fein's entry to fully inclusive talks delayed, the I R A called o f f its ceasefire i n F e b r u a r y 1996, k i l l i n g t w o w i t h a huge b o m b at C a n a r y W h a r f i n L o n d o n . A s the 1 9 9 7 B r i t i s h G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n l o o m e d , the C o n s e r v a t i v e gove r n m e n t h a d other priorities, the language o f n e g o t i a t i o n all b u t disappearing. T h e M a j o r government, h a m s t r u n g b y the lack o f a C o m m o n s majority, c o n t a i n e d its share o f cabinet doubters over the entire peace process ( O ' K a n e , 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland n o w d e n o u n c e d the I R A as ' c r i m i n a l gangsters' (Independent, 2 January 1997). T h e concessionary noises to R e p u b l i c a n s proffered i n the early 1990s b y the former Secretary o f State, Peter B r o o k e , seemed a distant m e m o r y . F o l l o w i n g the I R A ' s return to violence, the fragile 'pan-nationalist' c o a l i t i o n t e m p o r a r i l y disintegrated. T h e alliance h a d been strained ever since the r e m o v a l o f A l b e r t R e y n o l d s as Irish P r i m e M i n i s t e r over a domestic p o l i t i c a l r o w i n D e c e m b e r 1994. H i s replacement, J o h n B r u t o n , l e d F i n e G a e l , a party m u c h less ideologically w e l d e d to r e p u b l i c a n i s m t h a n R e y n o l d s ' F i a n n a F a i l . B r u t o n ' s reliance u p o n the c o a l i t i o n partners o f the D e m o c r a t i c Left, hostile to R e p u b licans, ensured that d u r i n g his p e r i o d i n office the Irish government t o o k m u c h less o f a v a n g u a r d role i n the peace process (Ruane a n d T o d d , 1996).

176

War and peace: the long road to negotiations 1995-7

T h e F o r u m elections p r o d u c e d a managed o u t c o m e designed t o facilitate m u l t i - p a r t y talks amongst the 'key players'. H o w e v e r , one o f these, S i n n F e i n , was not admitted w h e n multi-party proceedings finally got underway o n 10 J u n e 1996. W i t h the I R A h a v i n g ended its ceasefire, S i n n F e i n was e x c l u d e d f r o m the p o l i t i c a l process. A l i m i t e d talks process c o n t i n u e d a n d the L o y a l i s t ceasefire remained. A s w i t h all else i n the peace process, the f o r u m elections a n d subsequent negotiations h a d been predicated u p o n the maintenance o f an I R A ceasefire. Instead, the talks t o o k place w i t h o u t the p o l i t i c a l representatives o f Irish r e p u b l i c a n i s m a n d against a b a c k d r o p o f renewed I R A activity. A s Fergus F i n l a y , a n adviser t o the Irish government f r o m 1 9 9 2 - 6 , p u t i t , talks w i t h o u t S i n n F e i n were 'not w o r t h a p e n n y candle' (Finlay, 1998). G i v e n the party's 'special relationship' w i t h the I R A , o n l y S i n n F e i n m i g h t be able to deliver a peaceful settlement. T h e I R A h a d c o n t i n u e d to f u n c t i o n as a n o r g a n isation. Supporters h a d been r e m i n d e d b y G e r r y A d a m s i n 1995 that i t h a d 'not gone away'. Nonetheless, the I R A offered hope that the peace process c o u l d be revived despite the C a n a r y W h a r f b o m b . Its statement a n n o u n c i n g the e n d o f the ceasefire insisted that the 'blame thus far for the failure o f the Irish peace process lies squarely w i t h J o h n M a j o r a n d his g o v e r n m e n t ' . T h e I R A argued that the 'selfish' parliamentary interests o f the C o n s e r v a t i v e government h a d l e d to intolerable delays over the entry o f S i n n F e i n i n t o talks. T h e Conservative government was v i e w e d as over-reliant u p o n U n i o n i s t support to preserve its n a r r o w i n g majority i n the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s . R e p u b licans c l a i m e d that M a j o r ' s p r o m i s e d 'risks for peace' h a d evaporated d u e to fear o f an early, h i g h l y losable, G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n . I R A activity d u r i n g 1996 r e m a i n e d sporadic a n d , u n t i l O c t o b e r , concentrated outside N o r t h e r n Ireland. Five further b o m b attacks, a l l i n L o n d o n , were carried o u t i n the t w o m o n t h s after the C a n a r y W h a r f e x p l o s i o n . I n J u n e , the I R A detonated the largest b o m b ever i n m a i n l a n d B r i t a i n , w r e c k i n g part o f M a n c h e s t e r city centre. I n O c t o b e r , the I R A b o m b e d the B r i t i s h A r m y barracks at L i s b u r n , k i l l i n g a soldier. W i t h such displays o f strength, the I R A ' s m a i n purpose i n r e t u r n i n g to 'war' was to achieve a place for S i n n F e i n at the negotiating table, n o t to achieve a u n i t e d Ireland. R e p u b l i c a n s achieved their a i m , as the sheer scale o f destruction made the i n c l u s i o n o f S i n n F e i n a n imperative for the L a b o u r government elected d u r i n g the f o l l o w i n g year. T h e L i s b u r n b o m b i n g apart, I R A activity w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland centred m a i n l y u p o n ' p u n i s h m e n t ' attacks, carried o u t against i n d i v i d u a l s w h o m the I R A deemed g u i l t y o f 'anti-social behaviour'. B y D e c e m b e r 1996, R e p u b licans h a d carried o u t 164 such attacks d u r i n g the year, i n c l u d i n g three shootings. O n the Loyalist side, 121 beatings a n d 18 shootings o f this type h a d been recorded. T h e brutal attacks m a y have a deterrent effect, although this is difficult to measure. N o r t h e r n Ireland has the lowest ' o r d i n a r y ' c r i m e rate o f any c o u n t r y i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . I n r e t u r n i n g to violence i n 1996, the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A was conscious o f the d e m a n d for m i l i t a r y action w h i c h h a d p r o m p t e d its f o u n d a t i o n i n 1 9 6 9 . N o w S i n n F e i n members were sensitive to the jibe asking what was the difference

13.7 Sectarian boycotts

177

between a 'stickie' (a m e m b e r o f the o l d official I R A w h i c h gave u p violence) a n d a 'Provo'? A n s w e r : 2 7 years. I n 1996, the temporary return to violence appeased those R e p u b l i c a n s w h o feared the I R A h a d c o m p r o m i s e d o r 'gone soft'. Y e t there were also doubters i n the m o v e m e n t w h o regarded the d e p l o y m e n t o f violence as futile. T h i s debate w o u l d c o m e to a c l i m a x i n 1997 w i t h the f o r m a t i o n o f the ' R e a l I R A ' . M e a n w h i l e G e r r y A d a m s made it clear that there w o u l d be n o return to the days o f S i n n F e i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n to the I R A , n o r even a p r o l o n g e d revival o f the armalite a n d ballot b o x strategy, w h e n he t o l d a n internal S i n n F e i n conference at M e a t h i n 1996 that ' T h i s party is not g o i n g back to the days w h e n w e were cheer-leaders for the A r m y [ I R A ] ' (quoted i n O ' B r i e n , 1999: 3 6 9 ) . T h e separate R e p u b l i c a n g r o u p , the Irish N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n A r m y , c o m m i t t e d itself to the peace process i n M a r c h 1996, v i a the a n n o u n c e m e n t o f a 'tactical suspension o f operations'. T h e organisation h a d l o n g h e l d m a v e r i c k status ( H o l l a n d a n d M c D o n a l d , 1994). I N L A d i d return briefly to its v i o l e n t past, k i l l i n g the leader o f the Loyalist V o l u n t e e r Force, B i l l y W r i g h t , i n the M a z e P r i s o n i n D e c e m b e r 1997. T o the surprise o f m a n y , the Loyalist ceasefire h e l d . H a r d l i n e m i d - U l s t e r U V F members f o r m e d the Loyalist V o l u n t e e r Force i n 1996, i n o p p o s i t i o n to the m o r e concessionary approaches o f the p o l i t i c a l representatives o f the U V F a n d U D A . T h e P U P a n d U D P were anxious to m a i n t a i n a Loyalist ceasefire i n order to r e m a i n i n the m u l t i - p a r t y talks at S t o r m o n t .

13.7 Sectarian boycotts A c c o m p a n y i n g the p r o b l e m s o f the p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f the peace process was a deterioration i n i n t e r - c o m m u n i t y relations. T h i s developed partly t h r o u g h the revival o f I R A activity, b u t increased substantially f o l l o w i n g the tensions created b y the parades o f Ulster's ' m a r c h i n g season'. T h e insistence o f the P o r t a d o w n O r a n g e O r d e r u p o n m a r c h i n g t h r o u g h a N a t i o n a l i s t area o f D r u m c r e e , despite protests f r o m local residents, t o o k o n huge s y m b o l i c i n f l u ence as a contest i n v o l v i n g fundamental claims o f territory, rights a n d liberty. T h e 1996 decision to a l l o w the D r u m c r e e parade t h r o u g h a contentious area p r o d u c e d a strong reaction f r o m N a t i o n a l i s t s , as the authorities reversed their b a n o n the marchers i n the wake o f Loyalist violence. Relations were t e m p o r a r i l y soured between the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments. T h e S D L P w i t h d r e w from the N o r t h e r n Ireland Peace F o r u m , w h i l s t c o n t i n u i n g to attend m u l t i - p a r t y negotiations. ' T h e present is O r a n g e ' asserted The Independent (12 J u l y 1996). A n alternative v i e w was that the parades were the 'last h u r r a h ' o f O r a n g e i s m , a d e c l i n i n g force facing a n uncertain future. F o r example, revisionists such as Eilis O ' H a n l o n , from a N a t i o n a l i s t b a c k g r o u n d , derided the use o f ' O r a n g e state cliches' as entirely unrealistic {Sunday Independent, 14 J u l y 1996). A l t h o u g h w i l l i n g to re-route some contentious parades, the O r a n g e O r d e r insisted that its right to m a r c h c o u l d n o t be i m p e d e d b y w h a t it saw as R e p u b l i c a n groups. A d v o c a t i n g that lodges m a r c h q u i e t l y t h r o u g h c o n t e n t i ous areas, the O r a n g e O r d e r insisted that:

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negotiations prior to parades . . . are to be welcomed . . . However Orangemen must not be given the feeling that the community groups are just fronts for the I R A . I f these groups are serious about reaching accommodation they should consider carefully who they appoint as their spokesmen. Orangemen are not afraid to talk but there are some people with w h o m they cannot i n conscience discuss these matters (Montgomery and Whitten, 1995: 34). A f t e r the controversial parade was staged at D r u m c r e e the previous year, the ' S p i r i t o f D r u m c r e e ' group was formed, c a l l i n g for a hardline approach to be taken o n m a r c h i n g rights. T h e group ended the deferential t r a d i t i o n w i t h i n the O r d e r . It called for the resignation o f the G r a n d M a s t e r o f the O r a n g e O r d e r , the R e v e r e n d M a r t i n S m y t h , a n d the severing o f l i n k s w i t h the U U P . I n the event, S m y t h q u i t at the e n d o f his t e r m i n office at the e n d o f 1 9 9 6 . H i s replacement, R o b e r t Saulters, d e n o u n c e d the L a b o u r Party leader T o n y B l a i r as a 'traitor to his r e l i g i o n ' for attending C a t h o l i c mass a n d receiving Catholic communion. U n i o n i s t s argued that the increased concern o f S i n n F e i n to redirect O r a n g e parades was merely a device to increase the party's legitimacy w i t h i n the C a t h o l i c c o m m u n i t y . C o n v i c t e d I R A members d i d indeed front some o f the residents' groups. N a t i o n a l i s t s p o i n t e d to the b r o a d c o a l i t i o n a l nature o f such groups, arguing that antagonism to displays o f O r a n g e t r i u m p h a l i s m was l o n g s t a n d i n g t h r o u g h o u t the N a t i o n a l i s t c o m m u n i t y . T h e tensions over O r a n g e parades reflected a shift i n the p a r a d i g m o f N o r t h e r n Ireland politics. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues were n o t dead, b u t the o l d certainties o f the R e p u b l i c a n agenda o f a u n i t e d Ireland were b e i n g matched, o r even displaced, b y 'softer' demands based u p o n equality a n d cultural agendas. Previously, S i n n F e i n h a d seen O r a n g e m e n as merely unthreatening, d e l u d e d I r i s h m e n c l i n g i n g to traditions w h i c h w o u l d disappear o r be unthreatening i n a u n i t e d Ireland. A s S i n n F e i n n o w became increasingly concerned w i t h equality for N a t i o n a l i s t s w i t h i n the existing state, displays o f O r a n g e sectarianism were challenged. T e n s i o n s were exacerbated further as Loyalists i n t i m i d a t e d C a t h o l i c s attendi n g mass i n H a r r y v i l l e , B a l l y m e n a . T h e Protestant U n i o n i s t m a y o r j o i n e d C a t h o l i c worshippers to display o p p o s i t i o n to such sectarianism. T h e n e w G r a n d M a s t e r o f the O r a n g e O r d e r also demonstrated his support o f the right o f C a t h o l i c s to w o r s h i p unfettered. A r s o n attacks u p o n C a t h o l i c schools a n d churches increased. A r g u a b l y , the extent o f sectarian polarisation m a t c h e d that at the outset o f the T r o u b l e s . T h e p r o l o n g e d ' m a r c h i n g season' i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, although a sideshow to the peace process, highlighted divisions. B y 2 0 0 1 , however, there were some signs that the parades issue was fading. T h e B r i t ish government, Parades C o m m i s s i o n a n d the R U C made it clear that the D r u m c r e e m a r c h w o u l d n o t be a l l o w e d to proceed i n 1998 a n d s i m i l a r rulings followed i n subsequent years. T h e Parades C o m m i s s i o n , w i t h isolated exceptions, n o longer a l l o w e d O r a n g e parades to travel t h r o u g h m a i n l y N a t i o n a l i s t areas.

13.8 New Labour: new peace process F r o m 1981 to 1994, L a b o u r Party p o l i c y was that o f support for 'Irish u n i t y b y consent'. T h i s p o l i c y was dismissed as ' p l a t i t u d i n o u s ' b y o n e critic, given

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the absence o f that consent (Bennett, 1996: 153). A c c o r d i n g to B e w a n d D i x o n (1994: 1 5 4 - 8 ) it was based u p o n three things: the redefinition o f consent, from 'majority to a 'significant' level; the achievement o f working-class u n i t y ; a n d the reform o f N o r t h e r n Ireland, the lattermost resting uneasily alongside the l o n g - t e r m goal o f its a b o l i t i o n i n favour o f a u n i t e d Ireland. T h e sacking o f the p r o - N a t i o n a l i s t K e v i n M c N a m a r a as L a b o u r ' s N o r t h e r n Ireland Spokesman i n O c t o b e r 1994 confirmed that, under T o n y Blair, Labour's approach w o u l d m o v e towards that o f the Conservatives ( T o n g e , 1997). After the removal o f M c N a m a r a , it became evident that a L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d n o t try to act as a persuader to U n i o n i s t s that their better interests lay w i t h i n a u n i t e d Ireland. H e n c e f o r t h , L a b o u r w o u l d emphasise that consent for N o r t h e r n Ireland's place i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m was p a r a m o u n t a n d that the party's p o s i t i o n was n o t to have a preferred o u t c o m e , be it the U n i o n o r Irish u n i t y , b u t instead it w o u l d act as merely as a facilitator for the wishes o f the people o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. I n Realpolitik, there h a d been little departure f r o m a bipartisan approach to N o r t h e r n Ireland between 1981 a n d 1994, b u t L a b o u r ' s stated preferred o u t c o m e o f that p e r i o d o f a u n i t e d Ireland was a significant departure f r o m Conservative p o l i c y . A c c o r d i n g to L a b o u r ' s N o r t h e r n Ireland team, the new p o l i c y ensured that L a b o u r ' s approach was 'live n o t Utopian' (Illsley, 1996). T h e leader o f the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Party asserted that this was a sign that ' i n E n g l a n d , u n i o n i s m is w i n n i n g the intellectual a r g u m e n t ' ( T r i m b l e , 1996). T h e L a b o u r leader, T o n y Blair, insisted that he w o u l d n o t 'play p o l i t i c s ' w i t h the peace process. T h e lack o f d i v i s i o n between the Conservative a n d L a b o u r parties ensured that the issue o f N o r t h e r n Ireland r e m a i n e d 'uncontested g r o u n d ' i n W e s t minster politics (Boyce, 1996: 165). L a b o u r ' s m o v e away f r o m support for Irish u n i t y was c o n f i r m e d u p o n election i n 1997, T o n y B l a i r insisting o n his first p r i m e m i n i s t e r i a l visit: M y agenda is not a united Ireland and I wonder just how many see it as a realistic possibility for the foreseeable future? Northern Ireland will remain part o f the United Kingdom as long as a majority here wish . . . I believe in the United Kingdom. I value the U n i o n . . . Northern Ireland is part o f the United Kingdom because that is the wish o f the majority o f the people who live here. It will remain part o f the U K for as long as that remains the case . . . Unionists have nothing to fear from a new Labour Government. A political settlement is not a slippery slope to a united Ireland. T h e Government will not be persuaders for unity (Daily Telegraph, 17 M a y 1997). T h e L a b o u r government was anxious to revive the peace process a n d m o v e towards multi-party talks. D e c l a r i n g that the 'settlement train' was leaving, B l a i r i n d i c a t e d that the peace process was back to the p o s i t i o n o f early 1996, w h e n the M i t c h e l l C o m m i s s i o n reported. S i n n F e i n c o u l d enter talks i n the event o f an I R A ceasefire; the I R A w o u l d be required to d e c o m m i s s i o n its weapons i n parallel w i t h these talks; a n d R e p u b l i c a n s w o u l d be o b l i g e d to substantially l o w e r their p o l i t i c a l horizons c o n c e r n i n g the o u t c o m e o f such negotiations. A l t h o u g h this situation appeared p r o b l e m a t i c a l for R e p u b l i c a n s , they h a d several consolations. Firstly, S i n n Fein's electoral successes i n 1997 strengthened the mandate o f R e p u b l i c a n s . S e c o n d l y , there was the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a revival

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o f the 'pan-nationalist' c o a l i t i o n f o l l o w i n g the return to p o w e r o f F i a n n a F a i l , l e d b y Bertie A h e r n , i n the Irish R e p u b l i c i n 1997. T h i r d l y , d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g was afforded less p r i o r i t y b y a L a b o u r government

m o r e anxious t h a n its

predecessor to remove barriers to S i n n Fein's entry to talks. F o u r t h l y , the size o f the L a b o u r government's parliamentary majority r e m o v e d the need for short-term p o l i t i c a l concessions to U n i o n i s t parties. Fifthly,

negotiations

w o u l d take place w i t h i n a closed t i m e frame o f less than one year, rather than be a l l o w e d to meander indefinitely. S i n n Fein's final d e m a n d , that n o o u t c o m e to negotiations s h o u l d be prec l u d e d , appeared to be contravened b y Blair's specific dismissal o f the prospect o f a u n i t e d Ireland. C o n f l i c t i n g interpretations c a n be p r o v i d e d o f w h y S i n n F e i n was prepared to o v e r l o o k the B r i t i s h P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s robust d e n i a l o f the party's p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n , indeed, arguably, its raison d'etre. T h e first is that the peace process was a defeat for R e p u b l i c a n s , w h o w o u l d emerge f r o m negotiations w i t h m i n o r cross-border gains, a weakened m i l i t a r y w i n g a n d internal divisions. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , L a b o u r ' s l o u d p u b l i c rejection o f a u n i t e d Ireland was a device largely to reassure unionists before negotiations a n d reduce their h o s t i l i t y to the easing o f d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g stringencies. M u l t i party talks w o u l d transform

the m a n n e r

i n w h i c h N o r t h e r n Ireland was

governed to the p o i n t where radical options favoured b y m a n y N a t i o n a l i s t s emerged, such as j o i n t authority. A s the prospect o f m u l t i - p a r t y talks i n September 1997 was offered to S i n n F e i n , L a b o u r ' s approach confronted R e p u b l i c a n s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h the d i l e m m a o f accepting the modest gains offered b y n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , o r p u r s u i n g ideological p u r i t y a n d c o n t i n u e d violence, w i t h the attendant risk o f fruitless p o l i t i c a l ostracism. A m i d considerable scepticism f r o m o p p o n e n t s w h o feared that R e p u b l i c a n options were merely tactical, the I R A i n d i c a t e d a preference for the former approach a n d renewed its ceasefire i n J u l y 1 9 9 7 .

13.9 Conclusion Peace w i t h o u t p o l i t i c a l progress offered n o permanent remedy to the p r o b l e m s o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. A s E d n a L o n g l e y wrote i m m e d i a t e l y after the i n t e r r u p t i o n o f the I R A ceasefire: Peace implies not merely the absence of war, but civilisation, a fully functional civil society. W h i l e paramilitaries controlled districts or politicians radically disagreed on institutions, .the outward signs of peace such as the demilitarisation o f streets, the disappearance of searchers from shop doors and Belfast's consumer and restaurant boon all seemed slightly unreal (Independent on Sunday, 11 February 1996). D e s p i t e the difficulties, a n d the fracturing o f the peace process b y the I R A i n 1996, there was a n u n d e r l y i n g c o m m i t m e n t amongst most parties to a resolut i o n o f the conflict. T h e I R A ' s return to violence attempted to w i n a place for S i n n F e i n w i t h i n negotiations, n o t achieve B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l f r o m Ireland. Political developments resumed w i t h the election o f new governments i n B r i t a i n a n d Ireland a n d the a n n o u n c e m e n t o f a revived I R A ceasefire i n m i d - 1 9 9 7 .

13.9 Conclusion

181

T h e i n c l u s i o n o f S i n n F e i n offered the prospect o f a far-reaching a c c o m m o d a t i o n between the c o n f l i c t i n g demands o f u n i o n i s m a n d n a t i o n a l i s m . T h e temporary b r e a k d o w n o f the peace process o w e d m u c h to the acute problems o f the Conservative government i n the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , d e v o i d o f a w o r k a b l e parliamentary majority a n d reliant u p o n U n i o n i s t votes. T h e return to violence was indicative o f a debate w i t h i n the r e p u b l i c a n m o v e m e n t over the d i r e c t i o n o f the peace process, an argument still to be fully played out, b u t one w h i c h moderates a n d n o n - m i l i t a r i s t s w o u l d d o m i n a t e . E v e n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l N a t i o n a l i s t s o f the S D L P c o m p l a i n e d that the B r i t i s h government 'had not prepared intellectually for the ceasefire' ( A t t w o o d , 1996). T h e cessation o f I R A activity h a d c o m e as a surprise a n d there h a d been little thought given to h o w to proceed after such an event, l e a d i n g to a succession o f stalling devices. M a n y U n i o n i s t s argued that s u s p i c i o n o f the motives o f the I R A was entirely justified b y events i n 1 9 9 6 - 7 . F o r such critics, the peace process was phoney, as tactical ceasefires c o u l d never be equated to a p e r m a n e n t c o m m i t m e n t to peaceful methods o f conflict resolution. O t h e r s were more o p t i m i s t i c , as the demands o f N a t i o n a l i s t s for change i n N o r t h e r n Ireland h a d been strengthened b y the strongest alliance since p a r t i t i o n , f r o m w h i c h it w o u l d be difficult for the Provisional I R A to re-embark o n a permanent c a m p a i g n . After the L a b o u r government's election v i c t o r y i n 1997, S i n n F e i n entered talks a n d m o m e n t u m developed towards an agreement e m b r a c i n g unionism and nationalism.

Chapter 14

The Good Friday Agreement

T h e c l i m a x o f the peace process arrived i n A p r i l 1998, as political agreement was reached. T h e G o o d F r i d a y (or Belfast) Agreement represented the c u l m i n a t i o n o f exhaustive m u l t i - p a r t y , intergovernmental a n d bilateral talks. A l t h o u g h the talks process was n o t entirely inclusive, the D U P a n d U K U P d e c l i n i n g to participate, the majority o f N o r t h e r n Irish o p i n i o n was represented. T h e A g r e e m e n t reflected h a r d bargaining a m o n g historical enemies, allied to c o m promise. A t its heart lay the p r i n c i p l e o f consent for constitutional change i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. W i t h i n this overarching p r i n c i p l e lay power-sharing, a l l Ireland a n d confederal dimensions, alongside c o n t i n u e d intergovernmentalism. A b r o a d sketch o f the constitutional agenda o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t h a d been visible at S u n n i n g d a l e 2 5 years earlier. F o r the new A g r e e m e n t to f o r m the endgame, a n e w inclusiveness o n non-constitutional issues was needed, e m b r a c i n g an equality agenda a n d ' e n d o f conflict' measures, such as p a r a m i l i t ary prisoner releases.

14.1 The contents of the Agreement T h e A g r e e m e n t c o n t a i n e d several Strands. These were: •

S t r a n d 1: a devolved N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y o f 108 seats, presided over by a cross-community Executive a n d headed by a First M i n i s t e r a n d a D e p u t y Minister;

•

S t r a n d 2: a N o r t h - S o u t h M i n i s t e r i a l C o u n c i l , to establish all-Ireland i m p l e m e n t a t i o n bodies i n at least six p o l i c y areas;

•

Strand 3: a B r i t i s h - I r i s h C o u n c i l , c o m p r i s i n g representatives from the British a n d Irish governments, alongside those f r o m devolved institutions i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . A B r i t i s h - I r i s h intergovernmental conference, designed to explore the totality o f relationships between the two islands, replaced the A n g l o - I r i s h Agreement.

T h e Irish government also d r o p p e d its constitutional c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland. H e n c e f o r t h , Articles 2 a n d 3 o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the Irish R e p u b l i c w o u l d c o n t a i n a mere aspiration, rather than assertion, o f Irish u n i t y . A s i d e f r o m c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues, the A g r e e m e n t also covered h u m a n rights, equality, d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g , prisoners, security a n d policing. T h e m a i n equality-oriented measures were:

182

14.2 Negotiating change: party positions

183

•

the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f the E u r o p e a n C o n v e n t i o n o n H u m a n R i g h t s i n t o N o r t h e r n Ireland law;

• •

establishment o f a N o r t h e r n Ireland H u m a n R i g h t s C o m m i s s i o n ; creation o f an E q u a l i t y C o m m i s s i o n ;

•

establishment o f a consultative civic f o r u m to a l l o w representation f r o m a w i d e range o f organisations.

O n p o l i c i n g , the A g r e e m e n t established a n independent c o m m i s s i o n to m a k e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for future arrangements (see C h a p t e r 7 ) . T h e A g r e e m e n t p e r m i t t e d the release o f p a r a m i l i t a r y prisoners w i t h i n t w o years, p r o v i d e d that their organisations m a i n t a i n e d a ceasefire. T h e provisions i n respect o f d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g a n d security were m o r e a m b i g u o u s . A l l parties were o b l i g e d to use ' a n y influence they m a y have, to achieve the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g o f all paramilitary arms w i t h i n t w o years' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1998: 2 0 ) . T h e B r i t i s h government p r o m i s e d that i t w o u l d 'make progress towards the objective o f as early a return as possible to n o r m a l security arrangements i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, consistent w i t h the level o f threat a n d w i t h a p u b l i s h e d overall strategy' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1998: 2 1 ) .

14.2 Negotiating change: party positions P u b l i c a t i o n o f the d o c u m e n t Propositions on Heads of Agreement, b y the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments i n January 1998, advanced m o v e m e n t towards serious negotiating positions. Propositions l a i d o u t the basic format o f a n y agreement. It suggested a N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y ; N o r t h - S o u t h bodies; a C o u n c i l o f the Isles a n d a n intergovernmental agreement to replace the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e ment. T h e b r o a d framework o f Propositions was s i m i l a r to that i n the 1 9 9 5 F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t . H o w e v e r , there were i m p o r t a n t differences o f detail a n d further m o v e m e n t emerged i n the h a r d b a r g a i n i n g l e a d i n g to the h i s t o r i c c o m p r o m i s e o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t attempted to balance U n i o n i s t insistence o f the retention o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's place i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m w i t h the aspiration o f N a t i o n a l i s t s for internal change a n d furtherance o f Irish p o l i t i c a l i n p u t . B o t h sides struck bargains i n the negotiations l e a d i n g to the A p r i l c l i m a x , reflected i n significant differences f r o m the 1995 F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t a n d the 1998 Propositions on Heads of Agreement. T h e latter was seen b y N a t i o n a l i s t s as b e i n g t o o U n i o n i s t , w h i l s t the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t s were seen b y U n i o n i s t s as t o o 'green'. T h e S D L P was anxious to ensure m e a n i n g f u l power-sharing w i t h i n a new devolved government. T h e party opposed the U U P ' s idea that governance s h o u l d be based u p o n a c o m m i t t e e system. Instead, the S D L P insisted, w i t h success, u p o n a p o w e r f u l , c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y executive ( H o p k i n s , 1998). U n t i l M a r c h 1 9 9 8 , S i n n F e i n m o b i l i s e d its supporters o n a ' n o return to S t o r m o n t ' p l a t f o r m . E m p h a s i s i n g its R e p u b l i c a n credentials, the party s u b m i t t e d proposals for a n independent, u n i t e d Ireland. N o discussions t o o k place a r o u n d these proposals (Hennessy, 2 0 0 0 ) . B y M a r c h 1998, S i n n F e i n h a d softened its p o s i t i o n , a r g u i n g that the 1995 F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t

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s h o u l d p r o v i d e the basis for a n agreement, offering the m i n i m u m all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n required to satisfy Republicans. T h e constitutional aspects o f the A g r e e m e n t gave little succour to S i n n F e i n . Indeed, for this section o f the negotiations, the party appeared to be a captive o f its o w n peace strategy ( H a z l e t o n , 1999). S i n n F e i n concentrated m u c h o f its energies u p o n the m i c r o agenda, where gains were possible to partially compensate for the g r o u n d lost since the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t . I n this area, the party was more successful, w i t h p o l i c i n g a n d security reforms p r o m i s e d . S i n n Fein's ' h a r d b a l l ' approach to prisoners was also fruitful. A d a m s indicated to his party's ard fheis (annual conference) i n 1998 that he made it clear at the outset that there w o u l d be ' n o deal' w i t h o u t prisoner releases. In a d d i t i o n to the difficulty o f entering a N o r t h e r n assembly at S t o r m o n t , albeit one vastly different f r o m its predecessor, Republicans were also p a i n e d b y the willingness o f the Irish government to r e l i n q u i s h its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland. S o m e R e p u b l i c a n s were scornful o f the c l a i m , a r g u i n g it h a d been o f little value to defensive N o r t h e r n N a t i o n a l i s t s . A s the former I R A member, M a r t i n M e e h a n , t o l d the 1998 ardfheis, the Articles h a d been ' n o use whatsoever i n B o m b a y Street i n 1969', referring to h o w N a t i o n alists were attacked w h i l s t the Irish government d i d very little. Nonetheless, the Articles h a d powerful s y m b o l i s m , emphasising the perception o f R e p u b l i can Ireland o f the i l l e g i t i m a c y o f the N o r t h e r n state. T h e Irish government h a d always resisted r e m o v i n g the Articles. T h i s time, however, the r e m o v a l o f Articles 2 a n d 3 appeared to be a non-negotiable i t e m for the U U P . I n return, the B r i t i s h government agreed to remove its c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland under section 75 o f the 1920 G o v e r n m e n t o f N o r t h e r n Ireland A c t . Hennessy (2000) argues this was meaningless, as the legal c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland dated back to the A c t o f U n i o n o f 1800, f r o m w h i c h o n l y the 2 6 counties o f the R e p u b l i c h a d been removed. F u r t h e r m o r e , the provisions o f the 1920 A c t were replaced by the 1998 N o r t h e r n Ireland A c t . A s such, the removal o f the 1920 B r i t i s h c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland was, i n legal terms, ' o f n o significance' ( H a d f i e l d , 1998: 6 1 5 ) . S i n n Fein's president, G e r r y A d a m s , nonetheless insisted at the 1998 ard fheis that there 'was n o longer any great raft o f legislation k e e p i n g N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h i n the U n i o n ' . A t that conference, begun i n A p r i l 1998 a n d reconvened the f o l l o w i n g m o n t h , S i n n Fein's members v o t e d b y 9 7 per cent to 3 per cent to support entry to S t o r m o n t under the terms o f the G o o d Friday Agreement. T h e U U P achieved a considerable d i l u t i o n o f the cross-border aspects o f the A g r e e m e n t , c o m p a r e d to w h a t h a d been tentatively floated i n 1995. T h e F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t envisaged a n executive N o r t h - S o u t h C o u n c i l w i t h a w i d e range o f powers. F e a r i n g a n y move towards a freestanding, all-Ireland executive b o d y (although this exaggerated the greenness o f the F r a m e w o r k D o c u m e n t ) U n i o n i s t s argued that the North—South C o u n c i l s h o u l d possess no more than consultative powers. T h e U n i o n i s t parties w i t h i n the negotiations, the U U P , P U P a n d U D P , envisaged cross-borderism as a development confined to the sphere o f e c o n o m i c logic. T h e S D L P w i s h e d to attach p o l i t i c a l significance to the N o r t h — S o u t h C o u n c i l . Nonetheless, the S D L P conceded f r o m

14.3 Mixing old and new: central themes of the Agreement

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the outset that the all-island d i m e n s i o n ' w o u l d have to i n c l u d e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y by the n o r t h e r n members o f the N o r t h - S o u t h C o u n c i l to a n assembly i n Belfast i f the c o u n c i l was to be acceptable to unionists' (Farren, 2 0 0 0 : 6 0 ) . B a r g a i n i n g between the two sides meandered, resulting i n the chair o f the talks, Senator George M i t c h e l l , a n n o u n c i n g that a deal needed to be c o m p l e t e d by 9 A p r i l 1998. D u r i n g the week leading to this deadline, M i t c h e l l s h o w e d the parties the draft agreement p r o d u c e d b y the t w o governments, o n the basis o f the negotiating stances o f the parties. T h e final deal was m u c h closer to that desired b y U n i o n i s t s . T h e N o r t h - S o u t h C o u n c i l w o u l d n o t be m e a n ingless a n d six new all-island i m p l e m e n t a t i o n bodies w o u l d be created. N o n e theless, the C o u n c i l was n o t invested w i t h executive powers o f its o w n . It was to be a c o - o r d i n a t i n g b o d y designed to 'develop c o n s u l t a t i o n , c o - o p e r a t i o n a n d action w i t h i n the island o f Ireland - i n c l u d i n g t h r o u g h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o n a n all-island a n d cross-border basis' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1998: 11). M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , perhaps, the all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n appeared to be ringfenced. T h e r e was n o b u i l t - i n d y n a m i c to the N o r t h - S o u t h C o u n c i l . T h e C o u n c i l was required to identify a n d agree at least six matters for c o - o p e r a t i o n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n using existing bodies a n d six w i t h n e w cross-border bodies. B e y o n d this, however, further all-island bodies h a d to be a p p r o v e d b y the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y (and Irish parliament). S u c h consent was u n l i k e l y to be f o r t h c o m i n g f r o m even moderate U n i o n i s t s . S t r a n d 2 appeared to represent the 'necessary nonsense' o f an all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n , designed to placate N a t i o n a l i s t s a n d reassure t h e m that their p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n s were b e g i n n i n g to be recognised (Paul B e w , The Times, 2 9 N o v e m b e r 1999). It appeared to d o the trick: 6 9 per cent o f S D L P members believed that the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t b r o u g h t a u n i t e d Ireland nearer, a n d 8 7 per cent believed that North—South bodies w o u l d i m p r o v e co-operation between the t w o parts o f the island (author's survey, 1999). S i n n F e i n persuaded its members that the A g r e e m e n t was transitional towards Irish u n i t y , a l t h o u g h , privately, one senior party figure declared that he 'never believed that the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t w o u l d deliver a u n i t e d Ireland i n 15 to 2 0 years'. T h o s e outside the negotiations offered s i m i l a r views to the party ( S i n n Fein) they f o u n d so o b j e c t i o n able. F o r the D U P , the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t represented a clear transition towards Irish u n i t y (as h a d all previous agreements o n N o r t h e r n Ireland).

14.3 Mixing old and new: central themes of the Agreement A c c o r d i n g to the d e p u t y leader o f the S D L P , Seamus M a l l o n , the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t a m o u n t e d to ' S u n n i n g d a l e for slow learners' (quoted b y B e w , 1997; T o n g e , 2 0 0 0 : 39). I n b r o a d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l terms, this appeared to be true. N o r t h e r n Ireland remained i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , w h i l s t the Irish government h a d some say i n the affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. O v e r a l l , there were greater similarities than differences between the t w o agreements, b u t there was also evidence o f p o l i c y learning b y the t w o governments a n d the respective p o l i t i c a l parties. T h e o l d themes o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t were consent, cross-borderism, c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m a n d i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l i s m .

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14.3.1 Consent T h e p r i n c i p l e o f consent u n d e r p i n n e d the Agreement. T h e r e c o u l d be n o change i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h o u t the consent o f the majority o f its people. T h e Irish c o n s t i t u t i o n was a m e n d e d to recognise this p r i n c i p l e . I n m a k i n g this change, the Irish government d i d n o t a b a n d o n its hope o f c o n s t r u c t i n g o f a t h i r t y - t w o - c o u n t y n a t i o n state. A s such, the n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n was n o t post-nationalist. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l imperative o f the pursuit o f this goal was d o w n g r a d e d , however, to a mere aspiration. T h e r e is no demographic ' t i m e b o m b ' awaiting U n i o n i s t s . C a t h o l i c s are m u c h less u n i t e d o n their c o n s t i t u t i o n a l preferences than Protestants a n d the m o d e r n difference i n C a t h o l i c a n d Protestant b i r t h a n d e m i g r a t i o n rates is negligible. A s such, there w i l l be a majority for the retention o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's place i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m for the foreseeable future. G i v e n this, the critique o f the A g r e e m e n t offered b y the D U P m a y mystify some observers. T h e case offered by the U n i o n i s t anti-agreement forces is that the influence o f the Irish R e p u b l i c i n the affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland cannot be reduced. T h e reiteration o f the consent p r i n c i p l e is thus u n d e r m i n e d b y creeping b i - n a t i o n a l i s m , f o l l o w e d b y eventual Irish u n i t y b y stealth, achieved t h r o u g h the creation o f all-Ireland executive bodies.

14.3.2 Cross-borderism O n e o f the difficulties pertaining to the S u n n i n g d a l e A g r e e m e n t was the vagueness s u r r o u n d i n g the powers that the C o u n c i l o f Ireland w o u l d be awarded. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t is m u c h m o r e explicit over the r e m i t o f the all-island bodies a n d the N o r t h - S o u t h C o u n c i l . N a t i o n a l i s t s begin w i t h a higher baseline, i n that six n e w all-island i m p l e m e n t a t i o n bodies have been created as a result o f the A g r e e m e n t (see C h a p t e r 6 ) . H o w e v e r , the greater precision o f the 1998 A g r e e m e n t eliminates m u c h o f the potential d y n a m i s m o f the all-island d i m e n s i o n . A literal reading o f the A g r e e m e n t allows little scope for its expansion, unless U n i o n i s t s w i t h i n the A s s e m b l y embrace crossb o r d e r i s m w i t h a hitherto unseen enthusiasm. W i t h o u t approval f r o m the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y , the powers o f the N o r t h - S o u t h C o u n c i l c a n n o t expand, n o r c a n the n u m b e r o f cross-border bodies increase. Nonetheless, i t is inconceivable that Nationalists w i l l n o t pressurise U n i o n i s t s for such increases.

14.3.3 Consociationalism E n f o r c e d p o w e r sharing between U n i o n i s t s a n d N a t i o n a l i s t s was a n inevitable element o f a n y deal. N e g o t i a t i o n s were based u p o n the m o d e o f p o w e r sharing rather than the actuality. T h e S u n n i n g d a l e A g r e e m e n t relied u p o n a g r a n d c o a l i t i o n o f the (Faulknerite) U U P , A l l i a n c e a n d S D L P . T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t moves away f r o m the c o a l i t i o n a l m o d e l i n favour o f a m o r e c o m p e t i t i v e , ethnic b l o c approach. A l t h o u g h there is some variance, the m o d e l o f c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m d e p l o y e d is b r o a d l y i n line w i t h the principles espoused

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by L i j p h a r t ( 1 9 9 6 ) . It contains c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y power-sharing, m i n o r i t y protections, c o m m u n i t y (segmental) a u t o n o m y a n d equality, a n d w e i g h t e d majority d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g o n contentious issues ( O ' L e a r y , 1999). T h e F i r s t a n d D e p u t y M i n i s t e r s are elected w i t h c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y consent, w h i l s t the D ' H o n d t m e c h a n i s m , based u p o n party strengths w i t h i n the A s s e m b l y , ensures U n i o n i s t a n d N a t i o n a l i s t representation w i t h i n the E x e c u t i v e . T h e m o d e l used is n o t to everyone's taste, even a m o n g supporters o f a consociational settlement. T h e ethnic b l o c divisions i n N o r t h e r n Ireland are managed b y the A g r e e m e n t , n o t removed. T h e r e is a fear that the A g r e e m e n t legitimises the pursuit o f vigorous ethnic b l o c politics. It assumes (but tries to harness) a n essentially c o m p e t i t i v e rather t h a n co-operative relationship between N a t i o n a l i s t s a n d U n i o n i s t s , even t h o u g h the n e w A s s e m b l y w i l l deal w i t h non-reserved (devolved) issues, to w h i c h the a p p l i c a t i o n o f U n i o n i s t o r N a t i o n a l i s t ideas w i l l often be irrelevant. A s a n example o f this c r i t i q u e , the A l l i a n c e Party supports the A g r e e m e n t , b u t w o u l d prefer a settlement w h i c h d i d n o t involve the r e d u c t i o n i s m w h i c h leaves the current p o l i t i c a l centre i n N o r t h e r n Ireland designated as a n 'other' party, w i t h U n i o n i s t a n d N a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c a l labels legitimised a n d s u p p o r t e d b y the A g r e e m e n t . T h e p e r c e p t i o n o f the c o m m u n i t i e s as separate but equal is too segregationist for some. A l l i a n c e w o u l d prefer a m o r e integrative f o r m o f c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m , as espoused theoretically b y H o r o w i t z (1985). A l m o s t o n e i n three A l l i a n c e members believe that the A g r e e m e n t increases sectarianism b y d i v i d i n g parties i n t o ethnic blocs ( T o n g e a n d Evans, 2 0 0 1 b ) . A majority o f U l s t e r U n i o n i s t C o u n c i l members also offer this c r i t i c i s m , a l t h o u g h m a n y are against the A g r e e m e n t per se ( T o n g e a n d Evans, 2 0 0 1 b ) . C r i t i c s o f segmental consociational arrangements are accused o f ' u t o p i a n i s m , m y o p i a a n d partisanship' ( O ' L e a r y , 1999: 2 5 8 ) . E t h n i c b l o c politics pre-date attempts at c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m . Indeed, they are the reason for its d e p l o y m e n t as a s o l u t i o n . E t h n i c d i v i s i o n has been evident under different regime types: devolved, single-party government; direct rule; a n d n o w consociational, powersharing governance. T h e fuelling o f U n i o n i s t o r N a t i o n a l i s t b l o c agendas cannot be directly attributed to the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . T h e strongest charge against the A g r e e m e n t i n this respect is that i t formalises existing d i v i s i o n , yet the pursuit o f vigorous ethnic politics m a y o c c u r i n d e p e n d e n t l y f r o m the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f c o n s o c i a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l arrangements o r the enhancement o f intra-ethnic b l o c rivalry. A s a n example, the S D L P became a 'greener', m o r e N a t i o n a l i s t party after the collapse o f the previous attempt at a c o n s o c i a t i o n a l settlement i n 1974 (Evans, T o n g e a n d M u r r a y , 2 0 0 0 ) . T h e party became somewhat d i s i l l u s i o n e d b y the failure o f p o w e r - s h a r i n g a n d attracted members f a v o u r i n g m o r e stridently N a t i o n a l i s t politics.

14.3.4 Intergovernmentalism T h e consociational power-sharing arrangements o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t are overarched b y a p o w e r f u l axis o f the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments. T h e two governments shaped the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t a n d n o w f o r m a l l y review

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its progress, w i t h members o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y ' i n v i t e d to express views' ( H M G o v e r n m e n t , 1998: 15). A l t h o u g h the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t replaced the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t so detested b y U n i o n i s t s , m u c h o f the intergovernmental m a c h i n e r y remains i n place, subsumed w i t h i n the standing British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference established under the 1998 A g r e e m e n t . T h e difference f r o m the pre-1998 situation is that intergovernmental arrangements n o longer pervade ' o r d i n a r y ' politics i n N o r t h e r n Irel a n d . A directly elected assembly a n d i n d i r e c t l y elected executive n o w assume responsibility for ' l o w ' politics i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. ' H i g h ' politics, i n c l u d i n g those c o n c e r n i n g the security o f the state, r e m a i n a matter for agreement between the t w o governments, a l t h o u g h the role o f the Irish R e p u b l i c is m a i n l y consultative. A l o n g s i d e these o l d themes reside several novel d i m e n s i o n s to the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . T h e y i n c l u d e c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , confederation,

identity

politics, co-authority a n d inclusivity.

14.3.5 Co-determination O n e o f the most significant aspects o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was that i t was endorsed b y voters o n b o t h sides o f the border. F o r the referendum o n the A g r e e m e n t i n M a y 1998, the electorate t h r o u g h o u t the i s l a n d o f Ireland t o o k part i n a simultaneous vote for the first t i m e since the last all-Ireland elections o f 1 9 1 8 . S u c h a n event was laden w i t h s y m b o l i c significance. T h e referenda were c o n d u c t e d separately n o r t h a n d south o f the border. A s such, the vote o n the G o o d Friday Agreement amounted to an exercise i n co-determination, rather than the 'pure' self-determination d e m a n d e d b y R e p u b l i c a n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the exercise i n c o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n d i d n o t a l l o w a decision o n a n o u t c o m e w h i c h , the text o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t acknowledges, is the w i s h o f the majority o f Irish people. Page 2 o f the A g r e e m e n t refers to the 'legitimate w i s h o f a majority o f the people o f the island o f Ireland for a u n i t e d Ireland'. T h e people o f the island were a l l o w e d to co-determine whether a specific p o l i t i c a l c o m p r o m i s e , i n the f o r m o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t , was acceptable. C o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n emerged, v i a the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n o f 1 9 9 3 , as a w a t e r e d - d o w n version o f full Irish self-determination proposed under the earlier H u m e - A d a m s dialogue. I n effect, N o r t h e r n Ireland d e t e r m i n e d its o w n future, b u t w i t h the approval o f the electorate t h r o u g h o u t the i s l a n d o f Ireland. C o - d e t e r m i n a t i o n thus broadened a n d reinforced the p r i n c i p l e o f consent u n d e r p i n n i n g the A g r e e m e n t .

14.3.6 Confederation T h e British—Irish C o u n c i l established under Strand 3 links devolved institutions t h r o u g h o u t B r i t a i n a n d Ireland. It offers a confederal d i m e n s i o n to the A g r e e m e n t , b r i n g i n g all parts o f the t w o islands together under a m u t u a l l y beneficial arrangement. T h e establishment o f the C o u n c i l was strongly advocated b y U n i o n i s t s i n the negotiations leading to the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . It m a y

14.3 Mixing old and new: central themes of the Agreement

189

a l l o w greater c u l t u r a l interplay o f the A g r e e m e n t a n d l i n k s between devolved institutions i n N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d S c o t l a n d , states w i t h m a n y similarities ( W a l k e r , 1997). W h i l s t the C o u n c i l m a y g r o w i n significance, its i n i t i a l role is n o t substantial a n d it has been dismissed as a ' t a l k i n g s h o p ' {Guardian, 14 D e c e m b e r 1999). T h e C o u n c i l attempts to develop consensus o n issues, but, given that it has n o powers to force dissenting institutions i n t o programmes o f a c t i o n , bilateral o r multilateral agreements between selected d e v o l v e d i n s t i t u tions are also permissible. T h e C o u n c i l ' s i n i t i a l role appears to be as a f o r u m for i n f o r m a t i o n exchange a n d c o n s u l t a t i o n .

14.3.7 Identity politics It is n o longer possible to h o l d a 'disloyal' i d e n t i t y i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e A g r e e m e n t allows a range o f identities: B r i t i s h , Irish, B r i t i s h - I r i s h o r N o r t h e r n Irish, a n d does n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e i n respect o f the v a l i d i t y o f any such identity. F u r t h e r m o r e , the A g r e e m e n t makes n o attempt to persuade those regarding themselves as Irish o f their Britishness b u t speaks o f their b e i n g part o f a n Irish n a t i o n . T h i s emphasis u p o n i d e n t i t y politics is n o t entirely new, as such strands have existed since the 1985 A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t . T h e 1998 version is, however, far m o r e explicit.

14.3.8 Co-authority U s e o f the terms j o i n t sovereignty, o r co-sovereignty, is too p o l i t i c a l l y sensitive i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. Instead, the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments insist that they are each exercising sovereignty w i t h i n their o w n j u r i s d i c t i o n s to create n e w p o l i t i c a l institutions. A s such, it is c l a i m e d there has been n o derogation o f sovereignty. T h i s f o r m u l a is n o t accepted b y U n i o n i s t critics o f the A g r e e m e n t . A r g u a b l y , the A g r e e m e n t is a shift towards c o - a u t h o r i t y (and, u l t i m ately co-sovereignty) over N o r t h e r n Ireland, t h r o u g h its establishment o f all-Ireland executive bodies a n d the consolidation o f British—Irish intergovernmental arrangements. C o - a u t h o r i t y does n o t have to be i m p l e m e n t e d o n a 50—50 basis a n d the B r i t i s h government clearly remains the d o m i n a n t partner. F u r t h e r gains i n influence for the Irish R e p u b l i c m a y nonetheless m o v e N o r t h e r n Ireland towards the status o f a b i - n a t i o n a l state, a m i n i m u m objective for m a n y N a t i o n a l i s t s .

14.3.9 Inclusivity M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y o f all, the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was constructed o n the basis o f i n c l u s i v i t y , designed to b r i n g v i r t u a l l y a l l shades o f o p i n i o n i n t o a p o l i t i c a l process. T h e process o f i n c l u s i o n h a d begun b y a l l o w i n g a range o f actors some l i m i t e d i n p u t to the 1993 D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n . I n c l u s i o n became a p r i m a r y theme o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland F o r u m elected i n 1996, i n w h i c h 10 different organisations n o w h a d i n p u t to the talks process. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was forged b y these actors, i n c l u d i n g three parties

The Good Friday Agreement

190

l i n k e d to paramilitary organisations. B e y o n d a review o f i n t e r n m e n t , the S u n n i n g d a l e A g r e e m e n t , w i t h a m a i n l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l agenda, offered very little to R e p u b l i c a n s intent o n destabilising N o r t h e r n Ireland. A l t h o u g h that A g r e e m e n t was b r o u g h t d o w n b y Loyalists, S u n n i n g d a l e w o u l d , i n any case, have failed to secure peace i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, given R e p u b l i c a n scorn for its contents. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t enticed R e p u b l i c a n s , n o t least because o f its radical agenda o n the 'three ps' o f prisoners, p o l i c i n g a n d parity o f esteem. B y s u m m e r 2 0 0 0 , a l l paramilitary prisoners b e l o n g i n g to organisations o n ceasefire h a d been released. Loyalist paramilitaries benefited equally. T h i s , a l o n g w i t h the Loyalists' belief that the U n i o n was safe, a l l o w e d their p o l i t i c a l representatives i n the P U P a n d U D P to endorse the A g r e e m e n t .

14.4 The Good Friday Agreement referenda and Assembly elections I n M a y 1998, electors i n N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d the Irish R e p u b l i c participated i n simultaneous, b u t separate, referenda o n the single question o f whether to support o r reject (via a 'yes' o r ' n o ' vote) the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . T h e results are i n d i c a t e d i n T a b l e 14.1. Across the entire island, 2 , 1 1 9 , 5 4 9 voters registered their support for the A g r e e m e n t , w i t h o n l y 3 6 0 , 6 2 7 v o t i n g against. T h e results i n b o t h parts o f the island p r o v i d e d the A g r e e m e n t w i t h a substantial mandate. T h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t c o u l d n o w develop. N o t w i t h standing the l i m i t e d nature o f the referendum's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l choice, the people o f the island o f Ireland, for the first t i m e i n history, had, i n effect, v o t e d to accept the p a r t i t i o n o f their country. T h e r e were caveats to the result, for those searching. I n the Irish R e p u b l i c , those n o t b o t h e r i n g to vote, added to the s m a l l n u m b e r o f ' n o ' voters, almost m a t c h e d the n u m b e r o f ' y e s ' voters. T h i s statistic reflected the disinterest i n the N o r t h felt b y m a n y voters i n the Irish R e p u b l i c . In N o r t h e r n Ireland, the concern t h r o u g h o u t the contest h a d been whether a majority o f U n i o n i s t s w o u l d back the A g r e e m e n t . W i t h b o t h N a t i o n a l i s t parties endorsing the A g r e e m e n t , a 9 9 per cent 'yes' vote was recorded a m o n g C a t h o l i c s , b u t o n l y 5 7 per cent o f Protestants v o t e d likewise (Hayes a n d M c A l l i s t e r , 1999). S o m e ' n o ' voters opposed what they saw as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l sell-out. T h e p r i m a r y concern o f others was the m o r a l question o f early prisoner releases. Less than h a l f (47 per cent) o f Protestants supported the establishment o f N o r t h - S o u t h bodies ( C u r t i c e a n d D o w d s , 1999). E v e n a m o n g Protestant

Table 14.1 The Good Friday Agreement referenda 1998 Country

Yes

%

No

%

Turnout (%)

Northern Ireland Republic of Ireland

676,966 1,442,583

71.1 94.4

274,879 85,748

28.9 5.6

81.0 55.6

14.4 The Good Friday Agreement referenda and Assembly elections 191 Table 14.2 Northern Ireland Assembly elections 1998 Party

Designation

Pro- or anti-Agreement

Vote (%)

Seats

UUP SDLP DUP SF APNI UKUP* Ind. Unionist PUP NIWC

Unionist Nationalist Unionist Nationalist Other Unionist Unionist Unionist Other

Pro Pro Anti Pro Pro Anti Anti Pro Pro

21.3 22.3 18.1 17.6 6.5 4.5 2.5 2.5 1.6

28 24 20 18 6 5 3 3 2

N B : All parties have to designate their Assembly representatives as Unionist, Nationalist, or Other. * The U K U P split in 1999, with four Assembly members forming the Northern Ireland Unionist Party.

'yes' voters, fewer than h a l f supported the establishment o f a c o m m i s s i o n i n t o the future o f the R o y a l U l s t e r C o n s t a b u l a r y a n d the o v e r w h e l m i n g majority o p p o s e d early prisoner releases (Hayes a n d M c A l l i s t e r , 2 0 0 0 ) . Nonetheless, the A g r e e m e n t was sold a n d b o u g h t as a c o m p r o m i s e package. O p i n i o n was d i v i d e d over whether the A g r e e m e n t w o u l d b r i n g a lasting peace, a l t h o u g h a slight majority believed this w o u l d be the result (Evans a n d O ' L e a r y , 1999). T h e referendum c a m p a i g n y i e l d e d some unusual allies, reflecting the i n c l u s i v i t y o f the A g r e e m e n t . S i n n F e i n members f o u n d themselves u r g i n g a 'yes' vote i n c o m m o n w i t h Loyalist former adversaries w i t h i n the P U P a n d U D P , whose p a r a m i l i t a r y associates h a d c o n d u c t e d assassination campaigns against S i n n F e i n members. T h o s e working-class Loyalists s u p p o r t e d m a n y middle-class U n i o n i s t s w i t h i n the U U P i n u r g i n g a n e n d to w h a t they saw as the visionless negativity o f ' n o ' u n i o n i s m , as espoused most p u b l i c l y b y the D U P . T h e P U P a n d U D P argument was that working-class Loyalists h a d been i m p r i s o n e d as a consequence o f adherence to the fears expressed b y the 'siren voices' o f u n i o n i s m . Changes i n R e p u b l i c a n p a r a m i l i t a r i s m a n d the securing o f the U n i o n n o longer necessitated ' n o ' u n i o n i s m . These arguments helped secure a 'yes' vote a m o n g m a n y working-class Loyalists, a l t h o u g h the sight o f Loyalist (and R e p u b l i c a n ) paramilitaries addressing (separate) rallies i n favour o f a 'yes' vote m a y have caused further unease a m o n g U n i o n i s t s u n h a p p y about the apparent m o r a l ambivalence o f the deal. O n e m o n t h after the referendum, the first elections to the n e w N o r t h ern Ireland A s s e m b l y were staged (see T a b l e 14.2). T h e results h i g h l i g h t e d the divisions w i t h i n u n i o n i s m . O f 58 U n i o n i s t s elected, 3 0 were f r o m p r o A g r e e m e n t parties, a n u n c o m f o r t a b l y slender majority. Pessimists saw the result as clear i n d i c a t i o n that ' n o ' u n i o n i s m was u n d e feated. O p t i m i s t s p o i n t e d o u t that over 7 0 per cent o f voters h a d s u p p o r t e d p r o - A g r e e m e n t parties. S o m e l i m i t e d evidence o f c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y electoral

192

The Good Friday Agreement

politics also emerged, reflected i n the willingness o f some U n i o n i s t s to use their lower preference votes to support p r o - A g r e e m e n t candidates, even i f such candidates were N a t i o n a l i s t s . U n i o n i s t transfers to S i n n F e i n r e m a i n e d inconceivable, b u t S i n n o t t f o u n d that i n circumstances where lower preference vote transfers to A l l i a n c e were n o t a n o p t i o n , 3 6 per cent o f U U P final transfer votes w e n t to the S D L P (Irish Times, 2 9 J u n e 1998). S i m i l a r

findings

were recorded b y Evans a n d O ' L e a r y (1999). A willingness to vote transfer across the d i v i d e is f o u n d at a higher level: 15.3 per cent o f U l s t e r U n i o n i s t C o u n c i l members said that they 'definitely' o r ' m i g h t ' consider transferring lower preference votes to the S D L P ( T o n g e a n d Evans, 2001a).

14.5 Decommissioning and Executive formation T h e issue o f the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g o f paramilitary weapons dogged the peace process before a n d after the f o r m a t i o n o f new p o l i t i c a l institutions i n N o r t h ern Ireland. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was ambiguous i n respect o f whether paramilitary d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g was a requirement a n d over the extent to w h i c h such a d e m a n d c o u l d be l i n k e d to particular p o l i t i c a l parties. T h e relevant section o f the A g r e e m e n t merely stated that a l l participants 'reaffirm their c o m m i t m e n t to the total disarmament o f all paramilitary organisations'(p. 2 0 ) a n d called u p o n parties to: use any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning o f all paramilitary weapons they may have within two years following endorsement in referendums N o r t h and South of the Agreement and in the context of the overall settlement. ( H M Government, 1998: 20). T h r e e years after the c l i n c h i n g o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t , the o n l y weapons d e c o m m i s s i o n e d were a h a n d f u l o f guns surrendered b y the Loyalist V o l u n t e e r Force. T h e I R A , however, opened t w o o f its weapons d u m p s to independent i n s p e c t i o n . Siren voices w i t h i n u n i o n i s m h a d criticised the A g r e e m e n t ' s lack o f clarity over whether parties c o u l d be l i n k e d to the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g o f p a r a m i l i t a r y associates. Indeed, the W e s t m i n s t e r U l s t e r U n i o n i s t M P , Jeffrey D o n a l d s o n , w a l k e d away f r o m the A g r e e m e n t at its c o n c l u s i o n , despite his party leader h a v i n g o b t a i n e d w r i t t e n assurances o n d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g f r o m the B r i t i s h P r i m e M i n i s t e r . T h e essential p r o b l e m for U n i o n i s t s was that the spirit o f the A g r e e m e n t required d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g . A literal reading, however, made i t difficult to impose sanctions o n parties over the issue. T h e A g r e e m e n t d i d n o t require I R A d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g either i n advance of, o r simultaneous to, S i n n Fein's entry i n t o government i n N o r t h ern Ireland. S i n n F e i n a n d the I R A insisted that the arms issue w o u l d be resolved, a l t h o u g h I R A weapons h a d never been surrendered w h e n p o l i t i c a l parties, such as the m a i n t w o i n the Irish R e p u b l i c , h a d emerged f r o m the m o v e m e n t . G e r r y A d a m s d i d insist that 'the violence we have seen m u s t be for a l l o f us a t h i n g o f the past, over, d o n e w i t h a n d gone', t a n t a m o u n t to saying that the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A ' s violence was over (quoted i n E l l i o t t a n d Flackes, 2 0 0 0 :

14.5 Decommissioning and Executive formation

193

130). W i t h R e p u b l i c a n s h a v i n g already crossed a p o l i t i c a l r u b i c o n i n entering S t o r m o n t , d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g o f I R A w e a p o n r y w o u l d nonetheless be a w k w a r d , for several reasons. Firstly, the surrender o f weapons, either to the e n e m y it h a d been fighting, o r o n B r i t i s h terms, was the equivalent o f an I R A surrender. T h e leader o f the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A i n d i c a t e d i n 1998 that ' v o l u n t a r y d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g ' w o u l d be a 'natural part o f the peace process' ( F i n a n c i a l Times, 17 J u n e 1998). T h e i m p l i c a t i o n was that the dispute l a y less over d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g than w i t h c o n t r o l o f the process. S e c o n d l y , the R e p u b l i c a n u n i t y evident t h r o u g h o u t the peace process w o u l d be threatened b y such a m o v e . ' D i s s i d e n t ' R e p u b l i c a n s labelled even slight c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h the International C o m m i s s i o n o n D i s a r m a m e n t as the ' P r o v o s ' final surrender' {Saoirse, D e c e m b e r 1999). T h i r d l y , the latent threat o f violence, a l t h o u g h very distant since 1997 f r o m the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A , was t h o u g h t b y some to c o n tinue to y i e l d slight p o l i t i c a l leverage. F i n a l l y , R e p u b l i c a n s d i d n o t d r a w dist i n c t i o n s between I R A w e a p o n r y a n d the arms h e l d legally b y the state. R e s o l u t i o n o f the weapons issue c o u l d , therefore, o c c u r o n l y w i t h i n a n overall context o f ' d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n ' . T h e B r i t i s h government's pledge to return to ' n o r m a l i t y ' i n respect o f security still meant the retention o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m ' s o n l y a r m e d police force. T h e government d i d , however, remove m a n y security installations f r o m urban areas. T h e threat f r o m 'dissident' R e p u b l i c a n s ensured that the pace o f d i s m a n t l i n g was slower i n border areas. R e p u b l i c a n tactics o n the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g issue were apparent f r o m the outset. Firstly, the organisational separation o f S i n n F e i n a n d the I R A was emphasised. Secondly, R e p u b l i c a n s stated what was apparent f r o m any reading o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . S i n n F e i n ' s electoral mandate, not I R A m o v e m e n t o n d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g , w o u l d entitle the party to seats i n government. T h i r d l y , the sentence i n the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t that spoke o f the need to 'achieve the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g o f all p a r a m i l i t a r y arms w i t h i n t w o years', the sole phrase g i v i n g U n i o n i s t s a n actual rather than mere m o r a l case, was s i m p l y ignored. Internal R e p u b l i c a n difficulties carried little weight w i t h i n U n i o n i s t circles. U n i o n i s t s attempted to l i n k S i n n Fein's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y a n d Executive to progress o n I R A d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g . U n i o n i s t parties reflected their electorate's o p i n i o n , w i t h 7 0 per cent o f Protestants b e l i e v i n g that S i n n F e i n s h o u l d o n l y be p e r m i t t e d to take seats i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland executive after the I R A has d e c o m m i s s i o n e d weapons o r explosives (Evans a n d O ' L e a r y , 1999). T h e r e was b r o a d support for d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g : 9 5 per cent o f Protestants a n d 8 8 per cent o f C a t h o l i c s believed it s h o u l d o c c u r (Hayes a n d M c A l l i s t e r , 2 0 0 0 ) . T h e linkage o f d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g to party representat i o n i n n e w p o l i t i c a l institutions was, however, m u c h m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c . T h e lack o f resolution o f the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g issue l e d to delays i n the f o r m a t i o n o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland Executive. I n M a y 1999, the B r i t i s h governm e n t set a 'final deadline' o f 3 0 J u n e , r a p i d l y revised to another 'final' 15 J u l y deadline. T h e B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments p r o d u c e d T h e W a y F o r w a r d proposals, a l l o w i n g a n Executive to be f o r m e d , to be f o l l o w e d b y progress reports o n d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g . A t this stage, o n l y two p a r a m i l i t a r y groups, the

194

The Good Friday Agreement

U V F a n d L V F , h a d contacted the International C o m m i s s i o n o n D e c o m m i s s i o n i n g . T h e U U P executive rejected T h e W a y F o r w a r d , resulting i n farce at S t o r m o n t o n 15 J u l y . W i t h the U U P absent a n d the D U P a n d A l l i a n c e parties d e c l i n i n g to n o m i n a t e ministers, a n entirely N a t i o n a l i s t executive was f o r m e d . C o m p r i s i n g S D L P a n d S i n n F e i n ministers o n l y , this executive lasted 10 minutes before b e i n g r u l e d as i n breach o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t legislation r e q u i r i n g c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y executive selection. T h e D e p u t y First M i n i s t e r , Seamus M a l l o n , resigned (later c u r i o u s l y reinterpreted as a mere offer to resign w h e n the Executive was b e i n g reborn) a n d the entire G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was placed under a review chaired b y Senator G e o r g e Mitchell. T h e essential difficulty o f Executive f o r m a t i o n lay i n choreography, as the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Party's s u b m i s s i o n to the M i t c h e l l Review, Implementing the Agreement, made clear. S o m e m o v e m e n t o n I R A d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g was required. T h e I R A a n n o u n c e d it w o u l d a p p o i n t a representative to deal w i t h the International C o m m i s s i o n o n D e c o m m i s s i o n i n g ( I C D ) after the establishm e n t o f the p o l i t i c a l institutions agreed i n the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . I n N o v e m b e r 1999, the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t C o u n c i l accepted this b y 4 8 0 votes to 3 2 9 (58 per cent to 4 2 per cent) b u t b u i l t i n its o w n default m e c h a n i s m . Progress o n d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g w o u l d be reviewed i n February 2 0 0 0 a n d i f no b r e a k t h r o u g h h a d been achieved, the U U P w o u l d resign f r o m the E x e c u t i v e . A t the e n d o f N o v e m b e r , the Executive was formed, headed b y the U U P leader, D a v i d T r i m b l e . Inaugural meetings o f the N o r t h - S o u t h C o u n c i l a n d the B r i t i s h - I r i s h C o u n c i l t o o k place d u r i n g the f o l l o w i n g m o n t h . T h e U U P h a d ' j u m p e d first' o n the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g issue, b u t the first Executive lasted a mere 7 2 days. A n I R A statement at the b e g i n n i n g o f February 2 0 0 0 , offering ' n o threat to the peace process', failed to satisfy U n i o n i s t s . O n 11 February, a g l o o m y report f r o m G e n e r a l J o h n D e C h a s t e l a i n , H e a d o f the I C D , was made p u b l i c , i n d i c a t i n g little progress o n d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g . A second, m u c h m o r e o p t i m i s t i c , report was issued later that day, b u t , given the absence o f d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g ' p r o d u c t ' (i.e. actual weaponry) a n d the i m m i n e n c e o f U U P w i t h d r a w a l , the Executive was suspended b y the Secretary o f State. H a v i n g declared that all engagement w i t h the d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g b o d y was ended, f o l l o w i n g the suspension o f the Executive, the I R A a n n o u n c e d , i n M a y 2 0 0 0 , that i t was prepared to ' c o m p l e t e l y a n d verifiably p u t arms b e y o n d use'. T h e p l a n i n v o l v e d the regular inspection o f arms d u m p s b y the former F i n n i s h president, M a r t t i A h t i s a a r i , a n d the former Secretary G e n e r a l o f the A f r i c a n N a t i o n a l Congress, C y r i l R a m a p h o s a . T h e U l s t e r U n i o n i s t C o u n c i l was urged to accept this offer b y D a v i d T r i m b l e , w h o h a d survived a leadership challenge i n M a r c h f r o m the Rev. M a r t i n S m y t h b y the u n c o m f o r t a b l y n a r r o w m a r g i n o f 5 7 per cent to 4 3 per cent (see C h a p t e r 4). T h a t U U C m e e t i n g also made the restoration o f the Executive c o n d i t i o n a l u p o n the retention o f the R o y a l U l s t e r C o n s t a b u l a r y . T h i s t i m e , T r i m b l e ' s m a r g i n was even narrower, at 53 per cent to 4 7 per cent. C o n s i d e r a b l e c y n i c i s m h a d developed over the tortuous sequencing o n d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g a n d Executive f o r m a t i o n . The Times c o l u m n i s t , S i m o n J e n k i n s , wrote before the M a y U U C decision: ' D o n ' t laugh;

14.6 Republican 'dissidents'

195

this is another crucial week i n the peace process' (22 M a y ) . I f the weariness was understandable, the M a y 2 0 0 0 U U C vote was crucial a n d l e d to the restoration o f the E x e c u t i v e . A n I R A proposal o n d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g h a d been accepted b y the r u l i n g b o d y o f u n i o n i s m ' s largest party, w i t h o u t any c o n d i t i o n s attached to the r e f o r m a t i o n o f the Executive. A c c o r d i n g l y , the collapse o f the Executive was m u c h less likely than hitherto. T h e Executive was d u l y reformed, c o n t a i n i n g representatives f r o m the U U P , S D L P , D U P a n d S i n n F e i n . T h e d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g issue h a d n o t been resolved a n d T r i m b l e resigned as First M i n i s t e r i n s u m m e r 2 0 0 1 i n the absence o f substantial m o v e m e n t . U n i o n i s t s rejected the argument o f S i n n Fein's T D i n the Irish R e p u b l i c , C a o i m h g h i n O C a o l a i n , that the guns s h o u l d be left to 'rust i n peace'. R e p u b l i c a n s a n d U n i o n i s t s h a d been o b l i g e d to shift their positions. U n i o n i s t s were o b l i g e d to d r o p their insistence u p o n I R A d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g as a prec o n d i t i o n for S i n n Fein's presence i n g o v e r n m e n t i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e U U P entered government w i t h S i n n F e i n , despite the absence o f any h a n d o v e r o f weapons. T h e I R A , for the first t i m e i n its history, a l l o w e d its a r m o u r y to be inspected b y externals.

14.6 Republican 'dissidents' T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was portrayed b y the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments as a balanced c o n s t i t u t i o n a l settlement. A l l the people o f N o r t h e r n Ireland were deemed w i n n e r s i f the A g r e e m e n t c o u l d endure a n d a lasting peace be created i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h i s d i d n o t prevent parties f r o m selling the A g r e e m e n t to supporters as a v i n d i c a t i o n o f their o w n p o l i t i c a l o u t l o o k . P r o - A g r e e m e n t U n i o n i s t s argued that it secured the U n i o n . A n t i A g r e e m e n t U n i o n i s t s c o n t e n d e d that the A g r e e m e n t created structures w h i c h w o u l d lead to a u n i t e d Ireland. N a t i o n a l i s t s a n d R e p u b l i c a n s said the same things as anti-Agreement U n i o n i s t s , the m a i n difference being that they regarded such a d e v e l o p m e n t as favourable. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t secured the U n i o n for the foreseeable future, e n s h r i n i n g the consent p r i n c i p l e . It a c k n o w ledged the need for r e c o g n i t i o n o f the Irishness o f N a t i o n a l i s t s . T h i s was effected t h r o u g h c u l t u r a l means, n o t a b l y i n Irish language p r o v i s i o n a n d i n p o l i t i c a l terms b y all-Ireland executive bodies a n d B r i t i s h - I r i s h intergovernm e n t a l i s m . I n this respect, the A g r e e m e n t reflected most closely the p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g o f the S D L P ( M u r r a y , 1998). Republicans d e c l i n e d to formally endorse the consent principle, as its acceptance l e g i t i m i s e d the state o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. Nonetheless, the presence o f R e p u b l i c a n s i n a g o v e r n m e n t o f N o r t h e r n Ireland at S t o r m o n t signalled tacit acceptance. S i n n F e i n ' s leadership pre-empted c r i t i c i s m o f the A g r e e m e n t f r o m their o w n constituency b y a c k n o w l e d g i n g that the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was n o t a R e p u b l i c a n d o c u m e n t . F o r R e p u b l i c a n 'dissidents', c o m p r o m ise was unacceptable. T h e extent o f R e p u b l i c a n u n i t y , given the acceptance b y the S i n n F e i n leadership o f a settlement substantially short o f R e p u b l i c a n objectives, m i g h t be seen as a major achievement. R e p u b l i c a n S i n n F e i n a n d the t i n y C o n t i n u i t y I R A still c l u n g to a purist v i e w o f r e p u b l i c a n i s m rejecting

196

The Good Friday Agreement

'partitionist parliaments' n o r t h a n d south o f the border. A m o r e serious split i n the I R A o c c u r r e d i n 1997, w i t h the f o r m a t i o n o f the ' R e a l I R A ' a n d its p o l i t i c a l outlet, the 3 2 C o u n t y Sovereignty C o m m i t t e e . Ironically, these R e p u b l i c a n 'dissidents' emerged because they believed the w o r d s o f a B r i t i s h P r i m e M i n i s t e r . T o n y Blair's first major speech o n N o r t h e r n Ireland after his 1 9 9 7 election v i c t o r y made clear that a u n i t e d Ireland w o u l d n o t emerge, either n o w o r t h r o u g h the eventual o u t c o m e o f a negotiated settlement. G i v e n this, hardline militarists w i t h i n the R e p u b l i c a n m o v e m e n t argued, w h y renew an I R A ceasefire? T h e decision o f the I R A to renew its cessation o f violence l e d to the creation o f the breakaway R e a l I R A i n the a u t u m n o f 1997, l i n k e d to the 3 2 C o u n t y Sovereignty C o m m i t t e e . T h e c r i t i c i s m o f the Provisionals for 'selling o u t ' was m o r e w o u n d i n g than that emanating f r o m R e p u b l i c a n S i n n F e i n , given that Bernadette S a n d s - M c K e v i t t , the sister o f the hungerstriker a n d dead R e p u b l i c a n hero, B o b b y Sands, was a p r o m i n e n t m e m b e r o f the 3 2 C o u n t y Sovereignty C o m m i t t e e . S a n d s - M c K e v i t t insisted that ' B o b b y d i d n o t die for cross-border bodies w i t h executive powers. H e d i d n o t d i e for nationalists to be equal B r i t i s h citizens w i t h i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland state' {Irish Times, 8 January 1998; Hennessy, 2 0 0 0 : 112). A n y hopes that the R e a l I R A m a y have entertained o f attracting large numbers o f disaffected P r o v i sional I R A members d i m i n i s h e d w i t h its disastrous b o m b i n g o f O m a g h i n A u g u s t 1998, k i l l i n g 2 9 civilians (see also C h a p t e r 5).

14.7 Conclusion T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was a subtle agreement that displayed a c o n siderable a m o u n t o f p o l i c y learning f r o m S u n n i n g d a l e . Its b r o a d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l terms were n o t dissimilar f r o m those o n offer 2 4 years earlier. A c c e p t a n c e o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t o w e d far more, therefore, to changes w i t h i n r e p u b l i c a n i s m than fundamental changes i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y towards N o r t h e r n Ireland. R e p u b l i c a n i s m , as expressed t h r o u g h the p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y actions o f S i n n F e i n a n d the I R A , was n o t defeated, yet i t c o u l d n o t alter the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status q u o . A s H e n n e s s y (2000: 20) puts it, the B r i t i s h ' o n l y need a d r a w to w i n ' i n this respect. T h e m a i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l change instead came f r o m the Irish government, w i t h its a b a n d o n m e n t o f a c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland u n d e r Articles 2 a n d 3 o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s a l l o w e d the developm e n t o f a n unthreatening external (cross-border) d i m e n s i o n to the G o o d F r i d a y Agreement, one w h i c h d i d n o t i m p i n g e u p o n a n internal consociational settlement ( O ' L e a r y , 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e basic contest w i t h i n the constitutional clauses o f the A g r e e m e n t , w r a p p e d i n the language o f self-determination, was that o f consent versus transition (to Irish u n i t y ) . A l t h o u g h the latter came o f f second best, this was n o t apparent to m a n y U n i o n i s t s , w h o r e m a i n e d sceptical o f the deal. A s i d e f r o m r e w o r n assertions o f the consent p r i n c i p l e , the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t offered m u c h that was novel. Belatedly, the B r i t i s h government realised the futility o f the strategy o f exclusion o f groups i t d i s l i k e d . S u p p o r t for r e p u b l i c a n i s m was a c k n o w l e d g e d a n d S i n n F e i n was i n c o r p o r a t e d w i t h i n

14.7 Conclusion

197

the p o l i t i c a l process. T h e n e w strategy o f i n c l u s i v i t y was equally effective o n the Loyalist side. T h i s forced an i m p o r t a n t divorce between sections o f working-class l o y a l i s m , w i l l i n g to act positively i n favour o f the deal, a n d the siren voices o f Paisleyites a n d others, still hostile to radical change. T h e mere fact that the A g r e e m e n t h a d , b y 2 0 0 1 , survived three years o f p e r i o d i c U n i o n i s t revolts, increased support for ' n o ' campaigners, prisoner releases a n d an absence o f d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g , l e d to l i m i t e d o p t i m i s m c o n c e r n i n g its d u r a b i l i t y , a l t h o u g h even a sympathetic analyst feared that at times it was i n ' m o r t a l danger' ( O ' L e a r y , 2 0 0 1 : 4 8 4 ) . Its v u l n e r a b i l i t y was h i g h l i g h t e d by the temporary suspension o f institutions i n 2 0 0 0 a n d 2 0 0 1 . Nonetheless, ' n o ' U n i o n i s t s were p i t t e d against a considerable range o f forces. T h e Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland, J o h n R e i d , insisted that the A g r e e m e n t 'remains the o n l y s h o w i n t o w n ' (Independent, 3 M a y 2 0 0 1 ) . G e r r y A d a m s argued that ' i f it (the G o o d F r i d a y Agreement) collapses o n M o n d a y , o n T u e s d a y we have to p u t it together again' (Guardian, 3 0 A p r i l 2 0 0 1 ) . O f t e n precarious, u n l o v e d b y m a n y a n d criticised b y others, the greater i n c l u s i v i t y o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t at least a l l o w e d it to enjoy a healthier balance o f p o l i t i c a l support than its ill-fated 1974 predecessor.

Chapter 15

Political stability in Northern Ireland?

15.1 The problem in context D u r i n g the T r o u b l e s , there were commentators w h o , perhaps unsurprisingly, declared that 'there is n o s o l u t i o n ' (Rose, 1976: 139). T h e plethora o f failed initiatives i n the 1970s a n d 1980s, added to the l o n g history o f B r i t a i n ' s 'Irish p r o b l e m ' a n d Ireland's ' B r i t i s h p r o b l e m ' , gave that v i e w credence. T h e conflict appeared e n d u r i n g a n d intractable. T h e violence i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was protracted, b u t it was also seen as 'manageable'. T o m l i n s o n makes the p o i n t that the 3,400 deaths between 1969 a n d 1994, although extraordinary b y E u r o p e a n standards, were 'relatively m i n o r ' o n a global scale o f conflict ( T o m l i n s o n , 1995: 1). T h e inhabitants o f N o r t h e r n Ireland were m o r e likely to be k i l l e d i n a car accident than die as a result o f the conflict ( O ' L e a r y a n d M c G a r r y , 1996). A g a i n s t this, the scale o f the conflict amongst a small p o p u l a t i o n reveals some startling comparative statistics. E x t r a p o l a t i n g the figures for N o r t h e r n Ireland d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1 9 6 9 - 9 8 , h a l f a m i l l i o n people i n B r i t a i n w o u l d have been charged w i t h a terrorist offence a n d 1 1 1 , 0 0 0 w o u l d have been k i l l e d (Hayes a n d M c A l l i s t e r , 2 0 0 0 ) . T h e ' n o s o l u t i o n ' approach was n o t merely based u p o n sheer pessimism, b u t reflected the multi-faceted nature o f the p r o b l e m . It appeared impossible to find a single answer w h i c h dealt w i t h all these facets. D a r b y (1991) made the p o i n t that conflict is f o u n d i n all societies. H e argued that management o f the conflict i n N o r t h e r n Ireland s h o u l d focus u p o n the eradication o f violence, w h i c h gave the p r o b l e m i n N o r t h e r n Ireland its distinctiveness, rather t h a n a t t e m p t i n g a holistic s o l u t i o n . T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t attempted to e n d violence permanently a n d manage existing p o l i t i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l differences i n the hope o f ultimate r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . T h e A g r e e m e n t a m o u n t e d to a large package o f measures. C o n f l i c t i n g identities, beliefs, religions, a m b i t i o n s , cultures, histories a n d economies are n o t easy to 'treat' i n isolation. T h e r e has been a n absence o f consensus s u r r o u n d i n g the m a i n causes o f conflict. T h e r e are still those w h o see the N o r t h e r n Ireland p r o b l e m as essentially one o f B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i s m ( M i l l e r , 1998b). M i l l e r argues that a colonial explanation, often o v e r l o o k e d i n academia, offers the clearest historical a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y account o f w h y the B r i t i s h government claims sovereignty over N o r t h e r n Ireland. H e argues that N o r t h e r n Ireland is a 'possession w h i c h the

198

15.2 Alternatives to the Good Friday Agreement?

199

B r i t i s h state has t r i e d to present as a n integral part o f the state' ( M i l l e r , 1 9 9 8 b : 4). M i l l e r criticises exponents o f the v i e w that the N o r t h e r n Ireland p r o b l e m is a n ethnic one, asking w h e n i t ceased to be c o l o n i a l , given that a l l o f Ireland was once a c o l o n y o f B r i t a i n . T h e ethno-religious d i m e n s i o n to the p r o b l e m , a l t h o u g h perhaps a n unfashionable m o d e r n explanation, is still aired (Bruce, 1986; 1 9 9 4 ) . T h i s a r g u m e n t stresses the centrality o f the Protestant r e l i g i o n w i t h i n U n i o n i s t identity. A l t h o u g h the N o r t h e r n Ireland p r o b l e m is n o t centred u p o n theological differences, the sense o f Protestant-Britishness felt by U n i o n i s t s gives t h e m a special sense o f identity. M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y (1995) argue that the p r o b l e m is ethno-nationaU w i t h the t w o peoples o f N o r t h e r n Ireland, B r i t i s h a n d Irish, w i s h i n g their state ( o f N o r t h e r n Ireland) to be part o f their n a t i o n ( B r i t a i n o r Ireland). T o some extent, the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t acknowledges this a r g u m e n t a n d ethno-national explanations n o w represent o r t h o d o x y . B e l i e v i n g such an A g r e e ment was possible, even d u r i n g a period w h e n pessimists o u t n u m b e r e d optimists, M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y (1990: ix) wrote: [We want] to counter one facile, thought-stopping, and pessimistic article o f faith which has come to dominate academic, administrative and intelligent journalistic commentary o n Northern Ireland . . . the notion that there is no solution to the conflict. I n rejecting m o r e c y n i c a l assertions over prospects for N o r t h e r n Ireland, the a s s u m p t i o n o f the above a r g u m e n t was that the seemingly irreconcilable goals o f n a t i o n a l i s m a n d u n i o n i s m c o u l d be reconciled, o r at least a c c o m m o d a t e d i n a m a n n e r b r o a d l y acceptable to supporters o f either. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was based u p o n a c c o m m o d a t i o n o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status q u o a n d a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f the aspiration for change. N o r t h e r n Ireland remains part o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , b u t the Irish government is a l l o w e d a special relat i o n s h i p w i t h N o r t h e r n N a t i o n a l i s t s . T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t is n o t a p e r m a n e n t settlement. It manages a n d harnesses divisions a n d places t h e m w i t h i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l frameworks. It may, however, lead to ultimate r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . T h e difficulty for the Agreement's critics is i n devising a n alternative w i t h sufficiency o f consensus.

15,2 Alternatives to the Good Friday Agreement? A n u m b e r o f remedies to the N o r t h e r n Ireland p r o b l e m were p r o p o s e d p r i o r to the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . M a n y m a y n o w l o o k dated, as the p o p u l a t i o n has become increasingly accustomed to political c o m p r o m i s e a n d relative peace, but alternative macro-solutions still have their supporters. S o m e o f these alternatives also represent c o m p r o m i s e s , a l t h o u g h others, n o t a b l y the full integration o f N o r t h e r n Ireland i n t o B r i t a i n o r a u n i t e d Ireland, are ' w i n n e r takes a l l ' suggestions. A r t h u r a n d Jeffery (1996: 124) c l a i m that 'such s i m p l e solutions are . . . o n l y for the s i m p l e - m i n d e d ' .

200

Political stability in Northern Ireland?

15-2.1 The restoration of direct rule 15.2.1.1 Definition A return to direct rule o f N o r t h e r n Ireland f r o m W e s t m i n s t e r is the most l i k e l y scenario s h o u l d the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t prove unsustainable. S u c h a reversion o c c u r r e d briefly f r o m February u n t i l M a y 2 0 0 0 . U n d e r direct rule, power is exercised b y the Secretary o f State for N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d the N o r t h e r n Ireland Office. Legislative powers a n d the scrutiny o f legislation b y M P s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland are very l i m i t e d .

15.2.1.2 Advantages A l t h o u g h rarely seen as a s o l u t i o n to the p r o b l e m , i t m i g h t be argued that direct rule is the least o f all evils. It p r o v i d e d N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h a t e m p o r ary s o l u t i o n to the p r o b l e m o f governance. T h e p e r i o d o f direct rule f r o m 1972 to 1 9 9 8 saw the a b o l i t i o n o f m u c h o f the overt d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against the N a t i o n a l i s t p o p u l a t i o n . D i r e c t rule avoided the need for p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g . E x p e r i m e n t s w i t h solutions sometimes l e d to increases i n violence, as occurred, for example, after the A n g l o - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t o f 1 9 8 5 . D i r e c t rule emerged as a ' s o l u t i o n ' b y default.

15.2.1.3 Disadvantages N o p o l i t i c a l g r o u p w i s h e d to see indefinite direct rule. A s such, its c o n t i n u a t i o n was n o t a permanent s o l u t i o n . A p a r t f r o m b r i e f ceasefires, there was never a p e r i o d d e v o i d o f violence under direct rule. D i r e c t rule merely filled a v a c u u m created b y the lack o f internal agreement. D i r e c t rule was i n i t i ally i n t e n d e d as a temporary, emergency measure. A c c o r d i n g l y , i t c o u l d n o t be described as a means o f conflict resolution.

15.2.2 Full integration into the United Kingdom 15.2.2.1 Definition N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d be governed i n a m a n n e r identical to a n y other part o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . Legislation for N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d be passed u s i n g the methods e m p l o y e d elsewhere i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m .

15.2.2.2 Advantages F a v o u r e d b y a substantial section o f the U n i o n i s t p o p u l a t i o n a n d b y a sizeable n u m b e r w i t h i n the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t Party, full integration is supported o n the g r o u n d that i t w o u l d e n d uncertainty over the future o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. A d v o c a t e s believe that violence is fostered b y encouraging v i o l e n t N a t i o n a l i s t s that p o l i t i c a l l o g i c is i n their favour. F u l l integration w o u l d reverse this p r o cess a n d impose a final defeat. T h e citizens o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d be treated as equals w i t h i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . T h e i r place w i t h i n that K i n g d o m w o u l d n o longer be c o n d i t i o n a l .

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15.2.2.3 Disadvantages T h e r e is n o such t h i n g as identical treatment. S c o t l a n d a n d W a l e s are treated separately

a n d differently w i t h i n

the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . M a n y

supporters

o f integration d o n o t desire p o l i t i c a l integration, i n w h i c h m a i n l a n d B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l parties w o u l d contest elections i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. Perhaps d u e to self-interest, they w a n t to preserve their o w n p o l i t i c a l parties, b y favouring o n l y administrative integration. Tactically, therefore, such l i m i t e d integrationists w i s h N o r t h e r n Ireland to be treated as a place apart. P o l i t i c a l integration

remains

the ' u n t r i e d s o l u t i o n ' ( C u n n i n g h a m a n d

K e l l y , 1995: 20). W h e t h e r p o l i t i c a l o r administrative, full integration takes n o account o f the Irish i d e n t i t y o f the m i n o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e suggestion m a y further polarise B r i t i s h versus Irish identities a n d increase violence.

15.2.3 United Ireland 15.2.3.1 Definition Ireland w o u l d be governed o n a n independent, t h i r t y - t w o - c o u n t y basis, b y a parliament based i n D u b l i n . T h e B r i t i s h government w o u l d renounce sovereignty over N o r t h e r n Ireland, w h i c h w o u l d be absorbed i n t o a unitary Irish state.

15.2.3.2 Advantages T h i s s o l u t i o n m i g h t please the majority o f people o n the island o f Ireland a n d i n B r i t a i n . A l t h o u g h few are prepared to undertake sacrifices for its establishm e n t a n d m a n y w o u l d fear the consequences, the creation o f a u n i t e d Ireland remains a l o n g - t e r m aspiration for most citizens i n b o t h countries. I f one takes a utilitarian v i e w that the business o f government is to create the greatest happiness for the greatest n u m b e r , the B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments o u g h t to facilitate B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l a n d create a n independent Ireland. T h e case for a u n i t e d Ireland relies u p o n a w i d e r geographical a p p l i c a t i o n o f the consent p r i n c i p l e , currently c o n f i n e d to N o r t h e r n Ireland. N a t i o n a l i s t s note that national consent was n o t granted for the d i v i s i o n o f Ireland.

15.2.3.3 Disadvantages C o n s e n t w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland for absorption w i t h i n a u n i t e d Ireland w i l l n o t be f o r t h c o m i n g for the foreseeable future. It is inconceivable that U n i o n i s t s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d accept a u n i t e d Ireland. N a t i o n a l i s t s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d the majority o f citizens i n the Irish R e p u b l i c s u p p o r t e d the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t , w h i c h kept N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . A n agreed Ireland does n o t exist, b u t the majority o f Irish voters, N o r t h a n d S o u t h , accepted the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t , i n effect m a i n t a i n i n g partition but w i t h N o r t h - S o u t h links. A section o f the U n i o n i s t p o p u l a t i o n m i g h t offer a r m e d resistance to enforced entry i n t o a u n i t e d Ireland. T h e d u a l m i n o r i t y thesis applies. A u n i t e d

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Political stability in Northern Ireland?

Ireland w o u l d merely replace the present N a t i o n a l i s t m i n o r i t y i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, desirous o f Irish u n i t y , w i t h a larger U n i o n i s t m i n o r i t y , u n w i l l i n g to accept a u n i t e d Ireland. E v e n i f their B r i t i s h ' p r o p ' were w i t h d r a w n , m a n y U n i o n i s t s w o u l d n o t recognise a unitary Irish state. S i m p l i s t i c assertions c o n c e r n i n g a n overall majority for Irish u n i t y are inadequate, failing to take account o f qualitative differentials. T h e strength o f U n i o n i s t o p p o s i t i o n to a u n i t e d Ireland remains stronger than N a t i o n a l i s t support for its establishment.

15.2.4 Joint authority 15.2.4.1 Definition B r i t a i n a n d Ireland w o u l d j o i n t l y assume responsibility for the management o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e t w o countries w o u l d together c o n t r o l the legal, p o l i t i c a l a n d executive governance o f the region, as co-equals. Sovereignty w o u l d be shared.

15.2.4.2 Advantages J o i n t a u t h o r i t y moves away f r o m the 'winner-takes-alf models o f B r i t i s h rule or a u n i t e d Ireland. N o recent p o l i t i c a l agreements have suggested a purely internal s o l u t i o n is possible i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t offers a slight nudge towards j o i n t authority t h r o u g h its cross-border a n d intergovernmental dimensions. A r g u a b l y , therefore, a m o m e n t u m is gathering for such an approach. J o i n t authority w o u l d provide clear institutional recognit i o n o f parity o f esteem between the N a t i o n a l i s t a n d U n i o n i s t c o m m u n i t i e s .

15.2.4.3 Disadvantages J o i n t authority w o u l d be vigorously opposed b y U n i o n i s t s w h o see n o d e m o cratic basis i n the proposal. It w o u l d also be seen as a n inevitable forerunner o f a u n i t e d Ireland. M i l i t a n t R e p u b l i c a n s w o u l d be u n l i k e l y to accept a c o n t i n u e d B r i t i s h presence i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e mechanics w o u l d also be difficult. T h e idea runs the risk o f creating segregated authority, i n w h i c h the sovereign power is forced to act separately a c c o r d i n g to the area b e i n g governed. Legislation w o u l d be difficult to pass, r e q u i r i n g the approval o f b o t h parliaments o r a n executive c o u n c i l o f representatives f r o m b o t h governments.

15.2.5 European authority 15.2.5.1 Definition N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d be neither exclusively B r i t i s h n o r Irish. Its citizens w o u l d adopt a c o m m o n E u r o p e a n identity, w i t h N o r t h e r n Ireland governed as a region w i t h i n a federal E u r o p e .

15.2.5.2 Advantages F o r a l l m e m b e r states w i t h i n the E u r o p e a n U n i o n , the provisions o f the M a a s t r i c h t T r e a t y create a further p o o l i n g o f sovereignty (Boyle a n d H a d d e n , 1994). T h e n o t i o n o f exclusive sovereignty over territory appears dated. B y

15.2 Alternatives to the Good Friday Agreement?

203

p l a c i n g N o r t h e r n Ireland under E u r o p e a n law, there m a y be a transfer o f the loyalties o f citizens towards neutral E u r o p e . N a t i o n a l loyalty m a y be transferred. Supporters o f the E u r o p e a n argument p o i n t to the subtle shifts o f i d e n t i t y that have o c c u r r e d i n the last 3 0 years i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. A p r i m a r y U l s t e r identity has been displaced b y a B r i t i s h i d e n t i t y amongst U n i o n i s t s . Identity is, therefore, i m p e r m a n e n t . T h e r e m a y be a w i t h e r i n g o f the i m p o r t a n c e o f p a r t i t i o n as a range o f crossborder institutions develop, p r o m o t e d b y E u r o p e a n U n i o n initiatives. T h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n is already active i n p r o v i d i n g assistance i n this field. N a t i o n alists adopt a neofunctionalist approach to cross-border co-operation. T h i s foresees r o l l i n g integration o f the N o r t h a n d S o u t h o f Ireland d e v e l o p i n g as a logical a n d technocratic consequence o f the need for greater e c o n o m i c c o operation. T h i s co-operation extends b e y o n d e c o n o m i c activity.

15.2.5.3 Disadvantages T h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n m a y be able to p r o m o t e a certain range o f cross-border initiatives based o n m u t u a l co-operation, b u t the project m a y be l i m i t e d . Transfers o f identity towards E u r o p e assume the existence o f a spillover effect, i n w h i c h e c o n o m i c cross-border initiatives prove to be the catalyst for n e w institutions a n d n e w loyalties. People i n N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d the R e p u b l i c m a y support the p r o m o t i o n o f e c o n o m i c co-operation w i t h i n the E u r o p e a n U n i o n , b u t equally m a y desire that this is 'ringfenced' co-operation, restricted to that sphere. T h e p o l i t i c a l transfer o f loyalties is another matter. A s Porter (1996: 39) puts it: '. . . sovereignty is n o t so easily disposed of, borders are n o t so magically spirited away a n d political identities are not so effortlessly relocated'. U n i o n i s t s w o u l d have more to lose b y the p o o l i n g o f sovereignty over N o r t h e r n Ireland. B r i t i s h sovereignty is actual; the R e p u b l i c ' s is n o longer even c l a i m e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , as w i t h j o i n t B r i t i s h - I r i s h authority, the mechanics w o u l d be difficult. A B r i t i s h police force w o u l d p r o b a b l y r e m a i n , as m i g h t n o m i n a l B r i t i s h sovereignty, even i f real legislative p o w e r lay w i t h E u r o p e . N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d p r o b a b l y r e m a i n a region under n o m i n a l B r i t i s h j u r i s d i c t i o n w i t h i n a E u r o p e o f the Regions.

15.2.6 Devolved power-sharing without cross-border bodies 15.2.6.1 Definition D e v o l u t i o n to a N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y w o u l d take place as n o w , b u t w i t h o u t the all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . D e v o l u t i o n w i t h o u t cross-border bodies continues to receive o v e r w h e l m i n g support w i t h i n the D e m o c r a t i c U n i o n i s t Party. It is also the favoured s o l u t i o n o f nearly h a l f o f the U l s t e r U n i o n i s t C o u n c i l ( T o n g e a n d Evans, 2 0 0 1 a ) .

15.2.6.2 Advantages C o n s o c i a t i o n a l arrangements, basically i n v o l v i n g the sharing o f power amongst elites, have w o r k e d elsewhere i n d i v i d e d societies, particularly b i - c o m m u n a l ones such as N o r t h e r n Ireland. U n i o n i s t critics o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t

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Political stability in Northern Ireland?

argue that i t is impossible to develop N a t i o n a l i s t loyalty to N o r t h e r n Ireland w h e n the role o f the Irish government

is enhanced

through

cross-border

bodies. S u c h critics believe that the most appropriate means o f d e v e l o p i n g loyalty to the state o f N o r t h e r n Ireland is to discourage this external reference p o i n t for N o r t h e r n N a t i o n a l i s t s . F r o m the 1960s onwards, N a t i o n a l i s t s realised that simple anti-partitionist politics are inadequate.

Sharing power

strictly w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland provides t h e m w i t h a stake i n the state, b u t cross-borderism c o n c u r r e n t l y undermines that state.

15.2.6.3 Disadvantages Power-sharing w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland has to have external dimensions because most o f the citizens o f N o r t h e r n Ireland have external loyalties. T h e absence o f cross-border bodies w o u l d m e a n that there w o u l d be n o settlement, as N a t i o n a l i s t s w o u l d be disinterested. F e w i n N o r t h e r n Ireland l o o k exclusively inwards for the means o f p o l i t i c a l settlement. N a t i o n a l i s t s see themselves as part o f a n Irish n a t i o n a n d l o o k towards the i n s t i t u t i o n a l vehicle o f that n a t i o n , the Irish government. U n i o n i s t s l o o k east to ' m a i n l a n d ' B r i t a i n . It is inconceivable that power-sharing arrangements w i l l lack all-Ireland a n d intergovernmental arrangements. T h e broad shape o f a political agreement i n N o r t h ern Ireland has been evident since the 1 9 7 3 S u n n i n g d a l e A g r e e m e n t . T h e 1998 G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t repeated m a n y o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l aspects o f that A g r e e m e n t , b e i n g described b y the d e p u t y leader o f the S D L P , Seamus M a l l o n , as ' S u n n i n g d a l e for s l o w learners' ( T o n g e , 2 0 0 0 ) .

15-2.7 Repartition 15.2.7.1 Definition T h e border between N o r t h e r n Ireland a n d the R e p u b l i c w o u l d be shifted. T h e size o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d be reduced, w i t h parts transferred to the Republic.

15.2,7.2 Advantages R e p a r t i t i o n has been e m p l o y e d successfully o n several occasions i n E u r o p e i n , for example, B e l g i u m , S w i t z e r l a n d , Greece a n d T u r k e y ( W h y t e , 1 9 9 0 ; B o y l e a n d H a d d e n , 1994). U n d e r one f o r m u l a , the size o f N o r t h e r n Ireland m i g h t be reduced to four counties as N a t i o n a l i s t majorities exist i n t w o . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the border c o u l d be redrawn o n the basis o f local administrative units. H a l f o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's 2 6 local-government districts c o n t a i n a C a t h o l i c majority. W i t h the exception o f M o y l e i n the N o r t h , the border c o u l d easily be m o v e d north-eastwards to absorb these areas. T h e obvious advantage o f such a proposal is that i t 'releases' m a n y Nationalists i n t o the Irish R e p u b l i c , w h i l s t securing the r e m a i n i n g state o f N o r t h e r n Ireland against the p r o b l e m o f a r i s i n g N a t i o n a l i s t p o p u l a t i o n . T h e l o c a t i o n o f the border was designed as temporary. A r g u a b l y repartition w o u l d p r o v i d e r e c o g n i t i o n o f the t r e n d towards c o m m u n a l separation i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. Segregation has increased as populations have shifted to their ' o w n territory'. I n the first three years o f the T r o u b l e s ,

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205

i n N o r t h e r n Ireland was the largest i n western

E u r o p e since the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r ( M u r p h y , 1978).

15.2.7.3 Disadvantages Beset b y practical difficulties, repartition has rarely been regarded as a credible s o l u t i o n . Unless the n e w border were based u p o n unprecedented c o n t o r t i o n s , Belfast w o u l d remain i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. Y e t Belfast n o w has a N a t i o n a l i s t majority a n d contains 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 C a t h o l i c s , m a n y o f w h o m m i g h t w i s h to j o i n the Irish R e p u b l i c . T h e y w o u l d n o t w i s h to r e m a i n i n a redrawn, B r i t i s h , N o r t h e r n Ireland. Protestants i n the counties h a n d e d over to the R e p u b l i c w o u l d be equally u n h a p p y . It is, therefore, impossible to redraw the border o n the basis o f an agreed local consensus. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the proposal is based u p o n the fallacy that #//Catholics w o u l d support a redrawing. Even i f repartition were desirable, it w o u l d need to take account o f the strength o f n a t i o n a l i s m i n an area, n o t merely the religious affiliation o f the local p o p u l a t i o n .

15.2.8 Independent Northern Ireland 15.2.8.1 Definition N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d be ruled b y neither L o n d o n n o r D u b l i n governments. Instead it w o u l d exist as a c o u n t r y i n its o w n right, governed b y the people c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n its borders.

15.2.8.2 Advantages Supporters argue that a n independent state is also the o n l y w a y to guarantee genuine parity o f esteem between the t w o c o m m u n i t i e s i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. W i t h o u t independence, there are o n l y t w o alternatives: firstly, second-class status for N a t i o n a l i s t s w i t h i n a B r i t i s h state o r s i m i l a r subordinate status for U n i o n i s t s w i t h i n an all-Ireland republic; secondly, an insecure N o r t h e r n Ireland, i n w h i c h sectarian d i v i s i o n is perpetuated t h r o u g h the fostering o f external allegiances. Nationalists are encouraged to l o o k to the Irish R e p u b l i c ; U n i o n i s t s l o o k to the B r i t i s h state. T h e G o o d F r i d a y Agreement does n o t offer a sufficient basis for loyalty to N o r t h e r n Ireland, b u t generates instability i n reassuring U n i o n i s t s o f their Britishness a n d N a t i o n a l i s t s that their d r e a m e d - o f republic m i g h t c o m e about. O n l y b y generating loyalty to N o r t h e r n Ireland c a n this instability be overcome. A significant n u m b e r o f C a t h o l i c s are prepared to describe themselves as ' N o r t h e r n Irish'. S i m i l a r l y , for Protestants, the selfidentification o f ' N o r t h e r n Irish' is preferred to the label o f ' I r i s h ' . A n i n d e pendent N o r t h e r n Ireland, a l t h o u g h s m a l l , w o u l d n o t be the tiniest state i n E u r o p e . O t h e r viable states o f smaller size exist. Supporters c o u l d offer the prospect o f 'independence i n E u r o p e ' , a n o p t i o n favoured b y advocates o f Scottish independence.

15.2.8.3 Disadvantages F e w advocate a n independent N o r t h e r n Ireland nowadays. Indeed, the earlier attempts o f the U l s t e r Defence A s s o c i a t i o n to sell the idea to Loyalists have

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Political stability in Northern Ireland?

been described as a n 'abject failure' ( M c C u l l a g h a n d O ' D o w d , M i l i t a n t Nationalists w o u l d oppose a n independent

1 9 8 6 : 5).

N o r t h e r n Ireland as a

denial o f the goal o f Irish u n i t y . M o d e r a t e C a t h o l i c s m i g h t be fearful o f b e i n g d o m i n a t e d i n a state i n w h i c h there was a greater n u m b e r o f Protestants w i t h o u t , ironically, B r i t i s h intervention to guarantee rights. O p p o n e n t s m i g h t be sceptical o f a n y guarantees offered regarding their rights w i t h i n such a state, despite the categorical assurances o f Loyalists. A n independent N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d struggle to be e c o n o m i c a l l y viable, despite the fast g r o w t h rate o f recent years. T h e weakness o f local industry has been disguised b y the a m o u n t o f assistance to the Province provided by the European U n i o n , A m e r i c a , a n d , above a l l , B r i t a i n . T h e survival o f N o r t h e r n Ireland m i g h t rely u p o n c o n t i n u e d support f r o m these quarters, as B r i t a i n m i g h t be less than w i l l i n g .

15.3 Public attitudes T h e 71 per cent 'yes' vote i n N o r t h e r n Ireland i n the referendum o n the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t i n d i c a t e d the willingness o f its p o p u l a t i o n to accept a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o m p r o m i s e . Ironically, U n i o n i s t s were d i v i d e d to a far greater extent than Nationalists, even t h o u g h the A g r e e m e n t c o n f i r m e d N o r t h e r n Ireland's place i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m for the foreseeable future. N a t i o n a l i s t s o v e r w h e l m i n g l y endorsed a n A g r e e m e n t w h i c h , w h i l s t k e e p i n g a u n i t e d Irel a n d as a possibility, rejected its creation p r i o r to the existence o f a majority i n favour o f change w i t h i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e desire a m o n g C a t h o l i c s for a n overturn o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status q u o is far f r o m o v e r w h e l m i n g , a l t h o u g h a u n i t e d Ireland remains comfortably the largest preferred o p t i o n a m o n g this g r o u p (Table 15.1). U n i o n i s t constitutional preferences a m o n g Protestants are greater than aggregate N a t i o n a l i s t sentiments f o u n d a m o n g C a t h o l i c s . T h e results indicate the d i v i s i o n i n attitudes over the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l future o f N o r t h e r n Ireland, a l t h o u g h U n i o n i s t s a n d N a t i o n a l i s t s c a n find support for their respective cases. M o s t Protestants w a n t to r e m a i n part o f the U K ; fewer than one-fifth o f C a t h o l i c s share this v i e w as a l o n g - t e r m a i m . A l t h o u g h C a t h o l i c s are less supportive o f a u n i t e d Ireland than Protestants are o f m a i n t a i n i n g the U n i o n , there is little difference i n the percentage o f Protestants o r C a t h o l i c s prepared to identify themselves as U n i o n i s t s a n d Nationalists respectively (Table 15.2).

Table 15.1

Constitutional preferences for Northern Ireland

Q. Do you think the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be for i t . . .

To remain part of the U K To reunify with the rest of the island To become independent Other/Don't know

Protestant

Catholic

Total (%)

87 3 4 6

16 48 18 18

56 21 11 12

Source: adapted from Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 1999.

15.3 Public attitudes

207

Table 15.2 The extensiveness of unionism and nationalism in Northern Ireland Q. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a unionist, nationalist or neither?

Unionist Nationalist Neither Other/Don't know

Protestant

Catholic

Other/no religion

Total (%)

71 70 27 2

1 1 26 3

36 7 54 3

39 29 30 2

Source: adapted from Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 1999.

Table 15.3

British attitudes to the constitutional future of Northern Ireland

Option

Percentage in favour

Irish reunification Remain part of the U K Other Don't know

52 30 5 13

Source: adapted from Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey, 1991; British Election Survey, 1992; Hayes and McAllister (1996: 72).

N e a r l y o n e - t h i r d o f the p o p u l a t i o n does n o t see itself as either U n i o n i s t or N a t i o n a l i s t . T h i s is n o t transferred i n t o support for those parties i n the p o l i t i c a l centre i n N o r t h e r n Ireland, A l l i a n c e a n d W o m e n ' s C o a l i t i o n , s y m p a t h i s i n g w i t h such a n approach. T h e i r c o m b i n e d vote is less t h a n 10 per cent o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's voters. E l e c t o r a l l y , the p o p u l a t i o n supports parties freely l a b e l l i n g themselves as U n i o n i s t o r N a t i o n a l i s t a n d w h i c h designate themselves as such w i t h i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y established u n d e r the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . T h e attitude o f the B r i t i s h p u b l i c towards N o r t h e r n Ireland has been a source o f d i s a p p o i n t m e n t for U n i o n i s t s . T h e r e has been persistent support for B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l f r o m N o r t h e r n Ireland, a l t h o u g h the majority for this o p t i o n has declined (Hayes a n d M c A l l i s t e r , 1996). Ironically, support i n B r i t a i n for Irish u n i t y m a y be as great as is f o u n d amongst N o r t h e r n Ireland's C a t h o l i c s . S u p p o r t for Irish reunification is lowest i n Scotland, possibly a reflection o f the salience o f N o r t h e r n Ireland p o l i t i c s i n parts o f the west o f S c o t l a n d . T a b l e 15.3 indicates majority B r i t i s h support for Irish reunification. S u p p o r t for w i t h d r a w a l can partly be attributed to the fact that the B r i t i s h p u b l i c m i g h t n o t have to live w i t h the consequences o f such a n a c t i o n . O t h e r l i k e l y factors i n c l u d e genuine support for Irish u n i t y , weariness towards the N o r t h e r n Ireland p r o b l e m , disenchantment over the financial cost a n d resentm e n t over B r i t i s h casualties sustained d u r i n g the conflict. W h a t e v e r the reason, the stances o f the B r i t i s h p u b l i c have persistently been at odds w i t h the bipartisan decisions taken b y their elected representatives.

208

Political stability in Northern Ireland?

Interest i n N o r t h e r n Ireland is n o t great w i t h i n the Irish R e p u b l i c , c o m p a r e d to other issues, a l t h o u g h the level does fluctuate. O n e survey f o u n d that 41 per cent o f people i n the R e p u b l i c thought that N o r t h e r n Ireland was V e r y i m p o r t a n t ' ( M a r k e t Research B u r e a u o f Ireland P o l l , A p r i l 1 9 9 1 , c i t e d i n Hussey, 1995: 187). T h e r e was majority support i n the Irish R e p u b l i c for changes i n respect o f Ireland's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m to N o r t h e r n Ireland. O v e r h a l f the p o p u l a t i o n favoured either the replacement o f Articles 2 a n d 3 o r its a m e n d m e n t to a n aspiration for u n i t y ( K i n g a n d W i l f o r d , 1997: 187). A u n i t e d Ireland is the l o n g - t e r m s o l u t i o n most favoured i n the Irish R e p u b l i c , but the o v e r w h e l m i n g endorsement o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t b y voters i n the R e p u b l i c o n the 1998 G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t emphasised the largely aspirational nature o f this desire. Three-fifths o f the R e p u b l i c ' s p o p u l a t i o n support a u n i t e d Ireland ( M a r s h a n d W i l f o r d , 1994: 2 1 0 ) . T h e citizens o f the Irish R e p u b l i c have n o t a b a n d o n e d N o r t h e r n N a t i o n a l i s t s . H o w e v e r , rec o g n i t i o n o f the need for U n i o n i s t consent for change a n d awareness o f the sensitivities o f N o r t h e r n Protestants to the nature o f the R e p u b l i c required 'jettisoning some nationalist shibboleths' ( C h u b b , 1992: 28). A n o t h e r c o n t r i b u t o r y factor was the e c o n o m i c b u r d e n that N o r t h e r n Ireland w o u l d create for the Irish R e p u b l i c i f absorbed, a l t h o u g h the r a p i d g r o w t h o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland e c o n o m y i n recent years has eroded this factor. T h e n e w awareness o f the u n i o n i s t p o s i t i o n a n d lack o f support for an i m p o s e d u n i t e d Ireland means that a d i s t i n c t i o n c a n be d r a w n between the 'post-nationalist' p o p u l a t i o n i n the S o u t h a n d the ' h i g h l y nationalist' section o f the p o p u l a t i o n i n the N o r t h (Boyce, 1995: 4 2 9 ) .

15.4 The micro-agenda A s i d e f r o m c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues, the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was c o n c e r n e d w i t h a n equality agenda. T h i s tended to be l i n k e d w i t h the p r o m o t i o n o f h u m a n rights. D i s c r i m i n a t i o n against C a t h o l i c s d u r i n g the p e r i o d o f 1 9 2 0 - 7 2 left m a n y feeling second-class citizens. It has been m u c h m o r e difficult since this p e r i o d to m a i n t a i n that there has been systematic e c o n o m i c d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against C a t h o l i c s , but inequalities persist. S o m e N a t i o n a l i s t s c o n t i n u e t o c l a i m the existence o f e c o n o m i c a n d c u l t u r a l inequality.

15.4.1 Economic equality O n average, C a t h o l i c s remain poorer than Protestants a n d endure a significantly higher rate o f u n e m p l o y m e n t , despite a plethora o f fair e m p l o y m e n t i n i t i a t ives a n d legislation. E q u a l i t y is n o t easily achievable. A succession o f a n t i d i s c r i m i n a t i o n measures have reduced inequality. Structural factors a n d some c o n t i n u i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n have c o m b i n e d to prevent full parity. A r g u m e n t s for e c o n o m i c equality are u n c o n v i n c i n g w h e n offered i n i s o l a t i o n as a remedy to the N o r t h e r n Ireland p r o b l e m . T h e g r o w t h o f a N a t i o n a l i s t middle-class has nonetheless been i m p o r t a n t i n stabilising N o r t h e r n Ireland. M a i n l y supportive o f the S D L P a n d prepared to compromise o n historical constitutional ambitions,

15.5 Conclusion

209

this section o f the C a t h o l i c p o p u l a t i o n was a n infertile r e c r u i t i n g g r o u n d for R e p u b l i c a n s , whose core support r e m a i n e d a m o n g disadvantaged N a t i o n a l i s t s . E c o n o m i c parity does n o t necessarily have a n i m p a c t u p o n e t h n i c identity. M i d d l e - c l a s s N a t i o n a l i s t s see themselves as Irish; middle-class U n i o n i s t s regard themselves as British. Furthermore, e c o n o m i c change i n the Irish R e p u b l i c made no i m p a c t u p o n U n i o n i s t p o l i t i c a l aspirations. U n i o n i s t s r e m a i n as o p p o s e d as ever to absorption w i t h i n a n all-Ireland state, despite the huge e c o n o m i c progress made b y the S o u t h i n recent years. Assisted b y its p o s i t i o n as the largest beneficiary o f E U assistance, e c o n o m i c g r o w t h i n the 'emerald tiger' o f the R e p u b l i c o u t s t r i p p e d that o f the U n i t e d K i n g d o m d u r i n g the 1990s.

15.4.2 Human rights Established under the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t , the N o r t h e r n Ireland H u m a n R i g h t s C o m m i s s i o n placed statutory obligations u p o n p u b l i c authorities to p r o m o t e equal opportunities. These obligations were a c c o m p a n i e d b y the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f the E u r o p e a n C o n v e n t i o n o f H u m a n R i g h t s i n t o N o r t h e r n Ireland law, direct access to the courts for aggrieved citizens a n d the g r a n t i n g o f powers to the courts to o v e r t u r n A s s e m b l y legislation. T h e A g r e e m e n t m o o t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y o f the establishment o f a dedicated D e p a r t m e n t o f E q u a l i t y , b u t this d i d n o t materialise. A H u m a n R i g h t s C o m m i s s i o n was also established south o f the border, w i t h the t w o bodies to be l i n k e d b y a j o i n t H u m a n R i g h t s C o m m i t t e e . T h e A g r e e m e n t does n o t acknowledge e c o n o m i c disparities between U n i o n i s t s a n d N a t i o n a l i s t s . M u c h o f its focus i n the 'rights, safeguards a n d equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y ' section is u p o n cultural aspects, notably the p r o m o t i o n o f ' l i n g u i s t i c diversity', t h r o u g h encouragement o f the Irish language a n d the n e w - f o u n d interest a m o n g some U n i o n i s t s o f ' U l s t e r - S c o t s ' . C r i t i c s o f the rights-based a p p r o a c h to conflict transformation are u n h a p p y over the lack o f democratic legitimacy o f bodies designed to m a i n t a i n rights. Transfers o f powers to such bodies i n v o l v e a forfeiture o f rights. T h e Parades C o m m i s s i o n , for example, is a n unelected a n d unaccountable organisation, responsible for d e t e r m i n i n g w h e n organisations have the right to m a r c h a n d t h r o u g h w h i c h areas. Its m a i n role has been to prevent the right o f the O r a n g e O r d e r to m a r c h t h r o u g h areas i n h a b i t e d m a i n l y b y N a t i o n a l i s t s . T h e freedom o f assembly has been ranged against the freedom to live w i t h o u t offence, w i t h the Parades C o m m i s s i o n d e c i d i n g w h i c h is the 'superior' freedom.

15.5 Conclusion Alternatives to the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t d o n o t possess c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y consensus. E a c h provides t o o m a n y losers. T h e approach o f the B r i t i s h governm e n t has been to support power-sharing w i t h internal a n d external d i m e n s i o n s . T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t appeared to survive at times b y default, n o t greatly cherished, b u t perhaps better than the alternatives. Referenda o n the A g r e e m e n t c o n f i r m e d that l o n g - t e r m aspirations for Irish u n i t y a m o n g N o r t h e r n N a t i o n a l i s t s a n d the R e p u b l i c ' s voters c o u l d easily be c h a n n e l l e d

210

Political stability in Northern Ireland?

i n t o short- a n d m e d i u m - t e r m compromises. T h e r e r e m a i n a s m a l l n u m b e r o f rejectionists w h o are n o t prepared to accept compromises falling considerably short o f an independent, u n i t e d Ireland. U n i o n i s t h o s t i l i t y to the A g r e e m e n t has concentrated partly o n its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l aspects, b u t has been directed m a i n l y at other aspects o f the package, notably d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g a n d p o l i c i n g . U n i o n i s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l preferences are m a r k e d b y their u n a n i m i t y , a l t h o u g h a majority o f U n i o n i s t s appear prepared to c o m p r o m i s e o n the m o d e r n f o r m o f that U n i o n i s m , accepting a n e w w o r k i n g relationship w i t h the Irish R e p u b l i c .

Conclusion

N o r t h e r n Ireland m o v e d s l o w l y i n t o a post-conflict era. T h e 1998 G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t frequently l o o k e d vulnerable, but, even i n the event o f collapse, a return to earlier levels o f conflict appeared most u n l i k e l y . C o n f l i c t receded, w h i l s t change accelerated, albeit not at the pace expected b y optimists. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was n o t a final p o l i t i c a l settlement, b u t instead the creator o f a set o f institutions i n w h i c h o n g o i n g differences were to be managed peacefully. F o r m e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y R e p u b l i c a n s a n d m i l i t a n t Loyalists were d r a w n together w i t h i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y a n d its c o m mittees. M e m b e r s o f S i n n F e i n w h o h a d w i s h e d to destroy the state f o u n d themselves a d m i n i s t e r i n g its health a n d educational services. T h i s b o o k has argued that the peace process was facilitated b y changes w i t h i n r e p u b l i c a n i s m . R e p u b l i c a n s were forced to concede that their h i s t o r i c a l objectives needed to be negotiated. W i t h o u t a b a n d o n i n g u l t i m a t e goals, the R e p u b l i c a n m o v e m e n t was o b l i g e d to d i t c h parts o f its h i s t o r i c a l baggage. T h i s i n c l u d e d a belief i n m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y for the I R A a n d the p e r c e p t i o n o f republicans as the sole 'liberators' o f Ireland. S i n n F e i n a n d the I R A appeared to tacitly accept the v i e w espoused i n the 1990s b y a former T a o i s e a c h , A l b e r t R e y n o l d s , that the physical-force t r a d i t i o n w i t h i n r e p u b l i c a n i s m h a d r u n its course because 'it c o u l d go n o further' ( M a n s e r g h , 1995). S i n n F e i n ' s m o v e towards c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m arose f r o m the l i m i t a t i o n s o f the 'armalite a n d ballot b o x ' strategy o f the 1980s, i n w h i c h a party c o m i n g i n t o ever closer contact w i t h the state was simultaneously a t t e m p t i n g its destruction. S i n n F e i n was also o b l i g e d to a b a n d o n its hopes o f the early 1990s that the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d act as a clear persuader to U n i o n i s t s for a u n i t e d Ireland. Instead, R e p u b l i c a n s have been o b l i g e d to settle for l i m i t e d gains falling considerably short o f an all-Ireland R e p u b l i c . T h e m o r i b u n d abstentionism w h i c h characterised N a t i o n a l i s t politics for four decades after p a r t i t i o n was displaced b y a ruthless p a r a m i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n a n d a c o n c u r r e n t v i b r a n t electoralism, each y i e l d i n g some results, but n o t v i c t o r y . U n i o n i s t h e g e m o n y was q u i c k l y ended, d i s c r i m i n a t i o n largely eradicated a n d an all-Ireland d i m e n s i o n conceded. P r o v i s i o n a l I R A prisoners were eventually released. T h e t w o parts o f Ireland have been d r a w n together v i a the N o r t h - S o u t h M i n i s t e r i a l C o u n c i l . A s i d e f r o m prisoner releases, some o f these items were o n offer as early as 1974, 2 0 years before the P r o v i s i o n a l I R A began its decisive m o v e away f r o m a r m e d struggle.

211

212

Conclusion

T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l basis o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was based u p o n consent, a n d i n this respect satisfied most U n i o n i s t s , even t h o u g h other aspects o f the A g r e e m e n t were less palatable. I n other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l aspects, the A g r e e m e n t reflected m u c h o f the p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g o f the S D L P , c o n c e d i n g an Irish d i m e n s i o n . T h e B r i t i s h government has l o n g a c k n o w l e d g e d that there is n o p u r e l y internal settlement to be f o u n d i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. F o r fear o f further offending U n i o n i s t s , i t cannot use the t e r m 'shared sovereignty' i n respect o f its proposals for the province, b u t the l o g i c o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t arguably runs i n that d i r e c t i o n a n d certainly n o t towards integrat i o n o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m . Shared sovereignty can o n l y be b u i l t slowly. T h e R e p u b l i c has some say i n the affairs o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. T h e debate has m o v e d o n to the extent o f influence. A literal reading o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t ought to provide m u c h solace for U n i o n i s t s . T h e cross-border d i m e n s i o n o f the A g r e e m e n t is weak a n d ringfenced.

The sceptical view M a n y d o u b t e d the d u r a b i l i t y o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . Its institutions were t e m p o r a r i l y suspended i n 2 0 0 0 a n d 2 0 0 1 and, i n the absence o f d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g b y paramilitary groups, often appeared fragile a n d i m p e r m a n e n t . F o r critics, the peace process merely p r o d u c e d the brightest o f a n u m b e r o f false dawns. B r u c e argued that the process was ' w o n d e r f u l l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y n a m e d ' (Bruce, 1996). O f t e n i t floundered a m i d stalemate, apparently rescued o n l y b y the p r o m i s e that p a r a m i l i t a r y organisations c o u l d keep their weapons as their p o l i t i c a l associates sit i n government a n d decline to support the state's police service. Sixty-five people were k i l l e d b y paramilitaries i n the three years f o l l o w i n g the A g r e e m e n t . I n 2 0 0 0 alone, there were 2 6 2 p u n i s h m e n t shootings a n d beatings. R e p u b l i c a n ultras i n the R e a l I R A a n d C o n t i n u i t y I R A i n d i c a t e d that violence w o u l d c o n t i n u e w h i l s t Ireland remained p a r t i t i o n e d . Nonetheless, the p o p u l a r support for the A g r e e m e n t demonstrated i n the 'yes' referendum vote (albeit u n c o n v i n c i n g l y o n the U n i o n i s t side) h i g h l i g h t e d the huge g r o u n d s w e l l o f p u b l i c support for peace a n d for devolved, inclusive government i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. W h a t the peace process achieved, i n the w o r d s o f o n e Loyalist participant, was 'conflict-transformation' b y e n d i n g 'bellicose ran tings' i n favour o f negotiation ( D a v i d E r v i n e , q u o t e d i n the Irish World, 5 A p r i l 1996). T h e same practitioner h i g h l i g h t e d h o w i d e n t i t y p o l i t i c s have shaped the process w h e n he declared: ' I have the right to be B r i t i s h ; G e r r y A d a m s has the right to describe h i m s e l f as Irish' ( E r v i n e , 1996).

The pursuit of conflicting goals T h e goals o f Irish nationalism a n d B r i t i s h u n i o n i s m are seemingly irreconcilable. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t seeks merely their management w i t h o u t conflict, i n settled p o l i t i c a l institutions w h i c h enjoy a p o p u l a r legitimacy always d e n i e d to N o r t h e r n Ireland's previous p o l i t i c a l arrangements. P a r t i c i p a t i o n b y all i n

Divided unionism

213

these internal a n d b i - n a t i o n a l institutions w i l l f o r m the major element o f w h a t the U U P leader, D a v i d T r i m b l e , described as the: historic and honourable task of this generation, to raise up a new Northern Ireland in which pluralist unionism and constitutional nationalism can speak to each other with the civility that is the foundation of freedom {Belfast Telegraph, 22 June 1998; Bew and Gillespie, 1999: 368). Nonetheless, the strength o f c o m p e t i n g nationalisms a n d identities, B r i t i s h a n d Irish, ensures a lack o f consensus politics a n d a n i n a b i l i t y to forge a c o m m o n B r i t i s h - I r i s h identity, based u p o n N o r t h e r n Irishness. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t does n o t attempt to overcome these nationalisms, b u t instead strives to reduce their competitiveness, w h i l s t recognising their equal v a l i d i t y . P a r i t y o f esteem is the vogue. T h e pursuit o f the goals o f Irish n a t i o n a l i s m a n d B r i t i s h u n i o n i s m is n o w m a i n l y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . V i o l e n c e has always been a m i n o r i t y taste o n either side, abhorred by substantial N a t i o n a l i s t a n d U n i o n i s t majorities. D e s p i t e this, there was sufficient tacit support amongst the N a t i o n a l i s t a n d U n i o n i s t c o m m u n i t i e s to sustain violence. T h e p o l i c y o f the B r i t i s h governm e n t for most o f the T r o u b l e s was to reduce violence b y reassuring b o t h c o m m u n i t i e s that the stated goals used to justify violence can be a c c o m p l i s h e d b y peaceful means. T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t c l i m a x e d this strategy. F o r N a t i o n a l i s t s , this means that B r i t a i n w o u l d n o t stand i n the w a y o f a u n i t e d Ireland i f there is majority consent i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. F o r U n i o n i s t s , the U n i o n is safe u n t i l such a p o i n t is reached. In this respect there is little n e w i n B r i t i s h government p o l i c y . T h e p o s i t i o n o f N o r t h e r n Ireland w i t h i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m has technically been c o n d i t i o n a l since 1949, w h e n the Ireland A c t declared that its status c o u l d change w i t h the consent o f the parliament o f N o r t h e r n Ireland. O b v i o u s l y this c o n d i t i o n o v e r w h e l m i n g l y favoured U n i o n i s t s . N o w a d a y s , B r i t i s h p o l i c y provides a m o r e overt r e c o g n i t i o n o f the aspirations o f N a t i o n a l i s t s . T h i s r e c o g n i t i o n has arrived t h r o u g h concerted pressure f r o m Irish N a t i o n a l i s t s . T h e p o l i c y learni n g o f the B r i t i s h government was demonstrated n o t i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l terms, b u t t h r o u g h the inclusiveness o f the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t . T h e B r i t i s h a n d Irish governments treated p a r a m i l i t a r y prisoners as prisoners o f war, to be released at the e n d o f the conflict. T h e i r p o l i t i c a l representatives were e n t i t l e d to take their seats i n government o r w i t h i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland A s s e m b l y . T h i s made the deal 'sellable' to R e p u b l i c a n a n d Loyalist constituencies.

Divided unionism U n d e r pressure f r o m a w i d e n i n g tactical c o a l i t i o n o f N a t i o n a l i s t forces since the 1980s, U n i o n i s t s have been o b l i g e d to r e t h i n k their p o l i t i c s . T h e u n a n i m ity o f U n i o n i s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l preferences has been m a t c h e d b y d i s u n i t y over the best means o f attainment. T h i s d i s u n i t y was h i g h l i g h t e d b y the near 5 0 - 5 0 split over whether to support the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t , a faultline w h i c h has n o t disappeared. Previously, the basic choice for unionists lay between the p r o m o t i o n o f cultural u n i o n i s m , emphasising a n exaggerated sense

214

Conclusion

o f Protestant-Britishness, o r a liberal u n i o n i s m centred u p o n equal citizenship for all w i t h i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m (Porter, 1996). N o w , U n i o n i s t s have been o b l i g e d to decide whether to support a civic m o d e l , e m b r a c i n g n e w e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l relationships w i t h a n Irish R e p u b l i c n o longer c l a i m i n g need o f the 'reintegration o f the national territory'. It remains difficult for civic U n i o n ists to m o v e decisively towards a n e w pluralist politics, w h i c h w o u l d weaken the l i n k between U n i o n i s t politics a n d its c u l t u r a l a n d religious heritage.

Ethnic bloc politics N o r t h e r n Ireland remains a non-consensual state, d i v i d e d b y ethnicity. T h e l i n k s between C a t h o l i c d e n o m i n a t i o n a n d support for Irish N a t i o n a l i s t parties a n d between Protestant affiliation a n d support for B r i t i s h U n i o n i s t parties r e m a i n very strong. M e a s u r e d this way, the o l d centre g r o u n d , as represented b y the A l l i a n c e Party, has become even narrower. Inter-ethnic rivalry remains strong, w i t h little sense o f collective responsibility a m o n g the rival U n i o n i s t a n d N a t i o n a l i s t representatives w i t h i n the N o r t h e r n Ireland Executive. Intraethnic b l o c rivalries m a y accentuate this p r o b l e m . Parties m a y play to the 'ethnic gallery' (their electoral bloc) a n d defend the interests o f this b l o c rather than seek the c o m m o n g o o d . T h e G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t is based u p o n the consociational idea that party leaders are relatively insulated f r o m such demands f r o m b e l o w a n d w i l l share power i n a co-operative spirit w i t h elites f r o m the 'other' b l o c (see D e a n e , 2 0 0 1 ) . T h u s far, the evidence is that ethnic b l o c , zero-sum politics r e m a i n the d o m i n a n t f o r m a n d that c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y b r i d g i n g o f the electoral d i v i d e is still exceptional. T h e G o o d F r i d a y Agreement m a y be culpable i n the p r o m o t i o n o f U n i o n i s t - N a t i o n a l i s t rivalries, b u t i t h a r d l y invented t h e m . F u r t h e r m o r e , there are examples o f c r o s s - c o m m u n i t y co-operation, w i t h i n the A s s e m b l y a n d i n w i d e r society. A t Executive level, however, the performance o f a r a i n b o w n o n - c o a l i t i o n has n o t always impressed, preferring o n occasion to m a i n t a i n party o r ethnic b l o c rivalries over a sense o f collective responsibility ( W i l f o r d , 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e l o n g - t e r m eradication o f ethnic b l o c politics remains u n l i k e l y a m o n g the electorate o r p o l i t i c a l parties. A s such, a l t h o u g h N o r t h e r n Ireland's conflict has subsided a n d substantial change has arrived, consensus politics r e m a i n a distant prospect.

Chronology

1886 First H o m e Rule Bill fails i n parliament. 1893 Second H o m e Rule B i l l fails i n parliament. 1912 T h i r d H o m e Rule Bill passed but shelved due to W o r l d W a r I. 471,000 declare Solemn Covenant of Opposition i n Ulster. Ulster Volunteer Force is formed to provide armed resistance. 1916 Easter Rising i n D u b l i n . Execution of its leaders by the British stirs Nationalist sentiment. 1918 Sinn Fein wins last all-Ireland elections, gaining 73 of the 105 seats. 1920 Government o f Ireland A c t 1920 creates two parliaments, both under British control. O n e in Belfast would govern certain affairs i n six Northern counties; the other i n D u b l i n would have limited control over the remaining 26 counties i n Ireland. The A c t is accepted in the N o r t h , but rejected i n the South. 1921 Anglo-Irish W a r produces the Anglo-Irish Treaty, giving greater autonomy for the Southern 26 counties, which receive dominion status and become the Irish Free State. The partition of Ireland is confirmed as Northern Ireland declines participation in the affairs of the Southern state. 1922-3 Irish C i v i l W a r fought between pro- and anti-treaty forces ends i n victory for supporters o f the treaty. 1937 N e w Southern Irish constitution claims jurisdiction over the entire island of Ireland. 1 9 3 9 - 4 5 The Free State remains neutral during W o r l d W a r II. 1949 The Free State leaves the Commonwealth and becomes the Republic o f Ireland. The British government passes the Ireland A c t , insisting that the status o f Northern Ireland can only change with the consent of its parliament. 1 9 5 6 - 6 2 I R A Border Campaign ends i n failure. 1967 Northern Ireland C i v i l Rights Association founded. 1 9 6 8 - 9 C i v i l rights demonstrations meet Unionist resistance. Widespread disruption follows. British troops sent to Northern Ireland to restore order. 1970 Provisional I R A formed. 1971 The British government introduces internment. Official and Provisional I R A attacks increase. 1972 The worst year o f the Troubles begins with 'Bloody Sunday' i n which the British A r m y shoots dead 13 civilians i n Derry. The Official I R A blows up the Aldershot barracks of the regiment responsible but kills cleaners and clergy. The Officials declare a ceasefire which is not rescinded. The Provisional I R A carries out hundreds of bombings and shootings. The most notorious was 'Bloody Friday' i n which 22 bombs were detonated i n one hour i n Belfast, killing nine civilians.

215

216

Chronology

1973 Sunningdale Conference agrees the establishment of a power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland, a Council o f Ireland and affirmation that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland can only be changed with the consent of a majority in the province. 1974 Eleven of Northern Ireland's 12 M P s elected i n the February election oppose the power-sharing executive, which collapses after five months following an Ulster Workers' Council Strike. 1975 Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention fails. 1 9 7 6 - 7 Peace People Initiative mobilises citizens against violence but ends i n failure. Labour government pursues Ulsterisation and criminalisation policies, treating paramilitaries as common criminals and using the R U C where possible to deal with security. 1979 I N L A murders Shadow Northern Ireland Secretary, Airey Neave, with a car bomb at the House o f Commons. The I R A kills Lord Mountbatten and 18 British soldiers in a single day. 1981 I R A and I N L A prisoners renew their hunger strike in support o f specialcategory status, resulting i n the death of 10 Republicans. O n e of the prisoners, Bobby Sands, is elected as an M P . After his death his election agent is elected. Sinn Fein begins its 'armalite and ballot box' strategy. 1982 Secretary of State, James Prior, begins the rolling devolution initiative, designed to return powers to Northern Ireland. A Nationalist boycott leads to its failure. 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement confirms that there can be no change i n the status o f Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority. However, its creation of an Anglo-Irish secretariat and a consultative role for the D u b l i n government in the affairs of Northern Ireland provokes Unionist outrage. 1986 Sinn Fein ends abstentionism in elections to the Republic's parliament, the Dail. 1987 The SAS kills eight Provisional I R A members at Loughall. The I R A bombs a Remembrance Day parade in Enniskillen, killing 11. 1988 H u m e - A d a m s talks begin. 1990 Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Peter Brooke, declares that Britain has 'no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland'. 1993 A series of atrocities, including I R A bombs in Warrington killing two children and i n the Loyalist Shankill killing nine, with Loyalist paramilitary responses, do not prevent political movement. The D o w n i n g Street Declaration is issued by John Major and the Irish Taioseach, Albert Reynolds, on 15 December. It confirms that there is to be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority. The future of Ireland should be self-determined by the Irish people on a N o r t h and South basis. 1994 I R A calls a 'complete cessation o f operations'. Loyalist paramilitaries reciprocate six weeks later. 1995 Framework Documents issued, calling for a devolved Northern Ireland Assembly and cross-border political and economic bodies. 1996 Mitchell Commission proposes decommissioning of paramilitary weapons in parallel with all-party talks. The British government calls elections to a 'Peace Forum'. T h e I R A resumes violence, as a bomb at Canary W h a r f kills two. Sinn Fein are excluded from multi-party peace talks. 1997 N e w Labour government insists that the 'settlement train is leaving' at roundtable talks in September. I R A renews its ceasefire in July to facilitate Sinn Fein's entry to those talks.

Chronology

217

1998 Multi-party talks lead to the G o o d Friday Agreement i n A p r i l . A Northern Ireland Assembly, N o r t h - S o u t h Ministerial Council, British-Irish C o u n c i l and British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference are all established. Prisoner releases begin, completed by summer 2000. Sinn Fein votes overwhelmingly (331-19) at its annual conference i n M a y to enter Stormont as part of the G o o d Friday Agreement. 'Yes' votes for the Agreement i n Northern Ireland (71 per cent) and the Irish Republic (95 per cent) are recorded i n simultaneous referenda, held separately i n each country i n M a y . Elections are held to the Northern Ireland Assembly i n June and it sits for the first time i n July. A Real I R A bomb kills 29 at Omagh, the worst atrocity committed i n Northern Ireland during the conflict. 1999 Power is devolved to a Northern Ireland Assembly for the first time for 25 years. Inaugural meetings o f the N o r t h - S o u t h C o u n c i l and British-Irish C o u n c i l are held. The Patten Report recommends changes to the name, size, culture and ethos o f the RUC. 2000 Devolved government is suspended temporarily, i n February. It is restored i n M a y 2000 following Provisional I R A hints of movement on decommissioning. 2001 David Trimble resigns as First Minister, due to the absence o f weapons decommissioning.

Further reading

T h e r e is a wealth o f books a n d articles d e a l i n g w i t h p o l i t i c a l conflict i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. It is i m p o r t a n t to stress that the f o l l o w i n g are merely a small n u m b e r o f r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f r o m a vast choice. M o s t items c i t e d here are books. Students o f N o r t h e r n Ireland's politics s h o u l d also read journals o r periodicals, such as Irish Political Studies, Fortnight a n d Irish Studies Review.

1. The roots of modern problems M i c h a e l Laffan (1983) The Partition of Ireland 1911-1925 provides a n excellent account o f the c o n f l i c t i n g pressures w h i c h l e d to the d i v i s i o n o f the c o u n t r y . H e also provides a n authoritative account o f the rise o f r e p u b l i c a n i s m i n his 1999 w o r k , The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Fein Party 19161923. A . T . Q . Stewart (1967) The Ulster Crisis offers a detailed account o f the threat o f a r m e d U n i o n i s t resistance to H o m e R u l e . F o r a discussion o f alternative views o f the p e r i o d , read Chapters 6 to 9 inclusive o f D . G e o r g e Boyce a n d A . O ' D a y (eds) (1996) Modern Irish History. Revisionism and the Revisionist Controversy. O ' L e a r y a n d M c G a r r y (1993) The Politics of Antagonism p r o v i d e informative coverage o f the 1918 all-Ireland elections.

2. An 'Orange state': Northern Ireland 1921-68 . M i c h a e l Farrell's (1980) Northern Ireland: The Orange State remains perhaps the most i m p o r t a n t sustained a n d detailed critique o f the U n i o n i s t regime. Its successor Arming the Protestants (1983) is read less, b u t is o f at least equal value. B r y a n Follis provides a t h o r o u g h , objective account i n A State under Siege (1995). T o m W i l s o n rejects m a n y o f the claims o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n Ulster: Conflict and Consent (1989). T h e revisionist w o r k o f B e w , G i b b o n a n d Patterson (1996) Northern Ireland 1921-1996: Political Forces and Social Classes is particularly valuable. It uses the archives o f the N o r t h e r n Ireland state to h i g h l i g h t conflict between L o n d o n a n d Belfast a n d to suggest a n internal d y n a m i c to U n i o n i s t politics. M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y ' s Explaining Northern Ireland (1995) provides a cogent c r i t i q u e o f denials o f discrimination.

218

Further reading

219

3. From civil rights to armed insurrection T h e chapter b y C h r i s t o p h e r H e w i t t , ' T h e R o o t s o f V i o l e n c e ; C a t h o l i c G r i e v ances a n d Irish N a t i o n a l i s m d u r i n g the C i v i l R i g h t s P e r i o d ' i n P . J . R o c h e a n d B . B a r t o n (1991) The Northern Ireland Question: Myth and Reality provides a s o u n d account. B o b Purdie's article ' W a s the C i v i l R i g h t s M o v e m e n t a R e p u b l i c a n / C o m m u n i s t Conspiracy?' (1998, Irish Political Studies, v o l . 3) ought to be read, as s h o u l d his Politics in the Streets: The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland (1990). O n e o f the most interesting accounts o f the split i n the I R A is f o u n d i n either version o f H e n r y Patterson's The Politics of Illusion (1989; 1997).

4. Unionist and Loyalist politics Surprisingly, there remains a dearth o f literature dedicated to the party system i n N o r t h e r n Ireland. M i t c h e l l a n d W i l f o r d ' s edited collection, Politics in Northern Ireland (1999), offers perhaps the best recent chapters. J o h n W h y t e provides a s e m i n a l interpretation o f N a t i o n a l i s t a n d U n i o n i s t positions i n Interpreting Northern Ireland, w h i c h , a l t h o u g h p u b l i s h e d i n 1990, still has value. M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y ' s e x p o s i t i o n i n Explaining Northern Ireland (1995) m u s t also be read. N o r m a n Porter's Rethinking Unionism (1996) is cogent. E l o q u e n t guides can also be f o u n d i n Chapters 4 - 5 a n d 8 - 9 o f A u g h e y a n d M o r r o w (eds) Northern Ireland Politics (1996) a n d A r t h u r a n d Jeffery's Northern Ireland since 1968 (1996). A useful account o f the politics o f the m a i n U n i o n i s t party d u r i n g the T r o u b l e s is offered b y D a v i d H u m e ' s 1 9 9 6 w o r k , The Ulster Unionist Party 1972—92. T h e same applies to Feargal C o c h r a n e ' s Unionist Politics (1997). B r u c e ( 1 9 8 6 ; 1994) offers insights i n t o the D U P , v i a God Save Ulster! a n d At the Edge of the Union.

5. Nationalist and Republican politics In order to understand the historical analyses o f various N a t i o n a l i s t parties, see the p o l i c y papers s u b m i t t e d to the F o r u m for Peace a n d R e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n 1995, p u b l i s h e d as Paths to a Political Settlement in Ireland ( 1 9 9 5 ) . M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y ' s Explaining Northern Ireland (1995) is again useful i n o u t l i n i n g p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g . G e r r y M u r r a y ' s 1998 b o o k , John Humes SDLP, provides the most detailed account o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the party. I n a sympathetic e x a m i n a t i o n o f the organisation, M u r r a y argues that the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t was a t r i u m p h for the S D L P . M c G o v e r n ' s chapter i n G i l l i g a n a n d T o n g e ' s Peace or War: Understanding the Peace Process in Northern Ireland (1997) s h o u l d be read. T h e r e is a m u c h larger literature o n r e p u b l i c a n i s m . B o o k s o n r e p u b l i c a n i s m that o u g h t to be read are H e n r y Patterson's The Politics of Illusion: Republicanism and Socialism in Modern Ireland (1989), later revised a n d retitled The Politics of Illusion: A Political History of the IRA (1997); Pat W a l s h ' s Irish

Further reading

220 Republicanism 1994

and Socialism:

The Politics of the Republican

Movement

1905 to

( 1 9 9 4 ) ; a n d B r e n d a n O ' B r i e n ' s The Long War: the IRA and Sinn

Fein

( 1 9 9 9 ) . W e l l sourced a n d h i g h l y readable accounts are also offered b y B i s h o p a n d M a l l i e (1988) The Provisional B e l l (1989) The Secret Army:

IRA; Peter T a y l o r (1997) Provos; B o w y e r -

The IRA 1916-1979;

(1987) The IRA. M . L . R . S m i t h ' s Fighting for Ireland? of the Irish Republican

and T i m Pat Coogan The Military

Strategy

Movement

(1995) is also w o r t h reading, w h i l s t G e r r y

A d a m s ' o w n b o o k , Free Ireland:

Towards a Lasting Peace (1995) is a clear

exposition o f Republican thinking.

6. Governing Northern Ireland M u c h o f the literature requires u p d a t i n g . O ' L e a r y ' s chapter o n T h e Belfast A g r e e m e n t a n d the L a b o u r G o v e r n m e n t ' , i n S e l d o n (2001) The Blair Effect, is useful. O t h e r w i s e , w o r k s tend to be dated. C o n n o l l y ' s c o n c e n t r a t i o n u p o n modes o f governance i n Politics and Policy-making in Northern Ireland (1990) is helpful for p r e - G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t analysis. B e w a n d Patterson p r o v i d e an older critique o f aspects o f state p o l i c y i n The British State and the Ulster Crisis (1985). Readers interested i n the E u r o p e a n influence o n the N o r t h e r n Ireland p o l i t y s h o u l d begin w i t h C h a p t e r 5 i n B o y l e a n d H a d d e n (1994) Northern Ireland: The Choice.

7. Policing Northern Ireland ' A N e w B e g i n n i n g : P o l i c i n g i n N o r t h e r n Ireland', the Independent C o m m i s s i o n o n P o l i c i n g for N o r t h e r n Ireland's 1999 report (the Patten Report), m u s t be read. O ' L e a r y ' s chapter i n S e l d o n (see C h a p t e r 6) indicates h o w legislation varied f r o m Patten. M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y offer their o w n critique a n d remedies i n Policing Northern Ireland: Proposals for a New Start ( 1 9 9 9 ) . C r i t i c i s m s o f aspects o f p o l i c i n g i n N o r t h e r n Ireland are f o u n d i n the w r i t i n g s o f P a d d y H i l l y a r d .

8. The roles of religion _ Steve Bruce's God Save Ulster! (1986) is regarded as the most i m p o r t a n t account o f the religious d i m e n s i o n to Paisleyism. E v e n i f o n e rejects the assertions i n the final chapter, i t remains a v i t a l read. Scholars s h o u l d examine M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y ' s Explaining Northern Ireland (1995) for the refutation. O t h e r useful w o r k s i n c l u d e F u l t o n (1991) The Tragedy of Belief C h a p t e r 2 o f W h y t e (1990) Interpreting Northern Ireland; a n d C h a p t e r 2 1 o f A u g h e y a n d M o r r o w (eds) (1996) Northern Ireland Politics. A very sympathetic account o f the O r a n g e O r d e r is presented b y R u t h D u d l e y E d w a r d s i n The Faithful Tribe ( 1 9 9 9 ) . H a d d i c k - F l y n n provides a very detailed account o f the L o y a l O r d e r s , w i t h isolated factual errors. H e offers 'neither tar n o r whitewash', i n Orangeism: The Making of a Tradition (1999).

Further reading

221

9. Political failures 1972-84 B e w a n d Patterson (1985) The British State and the Ulster Crisis a n d C h a p t e r 6 o f Northern Ireland 1921-1996: Political Forces and Social Classes (1996) are useful. W i c h e r t offers a measured basic account i n b o t h editions o f Northern Ireland since 1945 ( 1 9 9 1 ; 1999), a c o m m e n t equally applicable to D . G e o r g e B o y c e (1996) The Irish Question and British Politics 1868-1996 (Chapter 4). C h a p t e r 17 o f W i l s o n (1989) Ulster: Conflict and Consent s h o u l d be read. Personal accounts b y practitioners are sometimes useful. R e a d B r i a n F a u l k n e r (1978) Memoirs of a Statesman c o n c e r n i n g the failure o f power-sharing.

10. The Anglo-Irish Agreement A s suggested b y the title, A u g h e y offers a strident critique i n Under Siege (1989). K e n n y ' s The Road to Hillsborough (1986) is g o o d o n the b a c k g r o u n d to the A g r e e m e n t . A l s o w o r t h reading is M i c h a e l C u n n i n g h a m ' s British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1969-1989 ( 1 9 9 1 ; second e d i t i o n 2 0 0 1 ) . D e r m o t Q u i n n provides a useful beginner's guide i n Understanding Northern Ireland (1993).

11. The logic of the peace process: changes in republicanism O n e o f the most provocative accounts is p r o v i d e d i n M a r k R y a n ' s w o r k War and Peace in Ireland: Britain and the IRA in the New World Order ( 1 9 9 4 ) . R y a n suggests that the peace process was a p r o d u c t o f a l o w e r i n g o f R e p u b l i c a n horizons. G o o d coverage o f changes i n R e p u b l i c a n t h i n k i n g is p r o v i d e d i n K e v i n Bean's article, T h e N e w Departure? Recent Developments i n R e p u b l i c a n Strategy a n d Ideology' (1995) i n Irish Studies Review, n o . 10. M c l n t y r e also offers a n intellectual critique i n Irish Political Studies, 1995, a r g u i n g that B r i t i s h state strategies have always u n d e r m i n e d r e p u b l i c a n i s m . G e r r y A d a m s ' o w n b o o k , Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting Peace (1995) is a thoughtful analysis o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f r e p u b l i c a n i s m . B r e n d a n O ' B r i e n ' s The Long War: the IRA and Sinn Fein (1999) provides lots o f detail o f the discussions w i t h the Republican movement.

12. The development of the peace process Several chapters i n C o x , G u e l k e a n d Stephen's edited c o l l e c t i o n , A Farewell to Arms? From Long War' to Long Peace in Northern Ireland ( 2 0 0 0 ) , are useful. T h e b o o k is particularly strong o n the international a n d comparative dimensions to the peace process. Events are recorded i n B e w a n d G i l l e s p i e (1999) Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles. T i m Pat C o o g a n (1995) The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966-1995 and the Search for Peace a n d M a l l i e a n d M c K i t t r i c k (1996) The Fight for Peace are h i g h l y readable a n d informative accounts o f the careful c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the process. D i s c u s s i o n o f the D o w n i n g Street D e c l a r a t i o n is

222

Further reading

p r o v i d e d i n the afterword o f M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y (1995) Explaining

Northern

Ireland. G i l l i g a n a n d T o n g e (eds) (1997) Peace or War? Understanding

the Peace

Process in Northern

Ireland offer a n u m b e r o f m a i n l y critical perspectives.

13. War and peace: the long road to negotiations 1995-7 M o s t o f the reading for C h a p t e r 12 is relevant. R e a d also p p . 3 1 2 - 6 9 o f O ' L e a r y a n d M c G a r r y (1996) The Politics of Antagonism. V o l u m e 21 o f the Irish Reporter, W h a t Peace Process?, contains a n u m b e r o f interesting arguments. A special e d i t i o n o f Race and Class, v o l . 3 7 , 1995 also needs perusal. The Northern Ireland Peace Process b y T h o m a s Hennessey (2000) is also essential reading.

14. The Good Friday Agreement O ' L e a r y offers a detailed e x a m i n a t i o n o f the consociational basis o f the A g r e e m e n t i n T h e N a t u r e o f the B r i t i s h - I r i s h A g r e e m e n t ' , New Left Review, 2 3 3 (1999). A g a i n , the same author's chapter i n S e l d o n (2001) The Blair Effect s h o u l d be visited. Hennessey ( 2 0 0 0 , see C h a p t e r 13) draws very sensible c o n clusions c o n c e r n i n g winners a n d losers f r o m the A g r e e m e n t . T o n g e explores similarities a n d dissimilarities between the G o o d F r i d a y A g r e e m e n t a n d the S u n n i n g d a l e A g r e e m e n t i n Contemporary British History, v o l . 14, n o . 3 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . C o x et al. ( 2 0 0 0 , see C h a p t e r 12) s h o u l d be used for coverage o f a large range o f actors a n d organisations d u r i n g the peace process.

15. Political stability in Northern Ireland A l t h o u g h n o w dated, J o h n W h y t e ' s Interpreting Northern Ireland (1990) explores older options i n dispassionate fashion. Ireland: A Positive Proposal b y K e v i n B o y l e a n d T o m H a d d e n (1985) offers a brisk rebuttal o f s i m p l i s t i c solutions. T h e same authors return to these themes i n Northern Ireland: the Choice (1994). M c G a r r y a n d O ' L e a r y (1995) Explaining Northern Ireland a n d (1993) The Politics of Antagonism argue the case for j o i n t a u t h o r i t y a n d a m a x i m i s a t i o n o f c o m m u n i t y authority. T h e y are engaged i n acrimonious debate w i t h P a u l D i x o n i n Irish Political Studies, v o l . 11 (1996). T h e o p e n i n g chapter o f M i l l e r (1998) Rethinking Northern Ireland offers a blistering attack f r o m the editor o n the unwillingness o f the academic c o m m u n i t y to consider N o r t h e r n Ireland as a B r i t i s h c o l o n y . F i n a l l y , three books o f a rather different type are r e c o m m e n d e d as i m p o r t a n t additions to the s u m o f h u m a n knowledge. E l l i o t t a n d Flackes (1999) Northern Ireland: A Political Directory 1968—1999 is a m i n e o f useful i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e same c a n be said o f B e w a n d G i l l e s p i e (1999) Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles. M c K i t t r i c k et al. (1999) Lost Lives is a g r i m l y c o m p u l s i v e account o f each o f the deaths d u r i n g the T r o u b l e s .

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Index

abortion 98, 104 abstentionism, Sinn Fein 12, 42, 72, 143-4, 149, 211 Act of Union (1800) 184 Adams, Gerry 44, 69, 71, 73, 93, 105, 136, 143-4, 145, 147, 154, 157, 163-4, 166, 167, 176, 177, 184, 188, 192, 197, 212 agrarian conflict 5 Ahern, Bertie 84, 180 Ahtisaari, Martti 194 All Children Together 108 all-party talks ISO absence of 168-9 see also peace elections Alliance Party 62-3, 78, 90, 101, 116, 123, 158, 163, 175, 186, 187, 207, 214, 192 Ancient Order of Hibernians, 106, 164 Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) 56, 59, 70, 72, 84, 127-39, 142, 146, 188, 200 and nationalists 70, 135-6 origins 127—8 significance of 138-9 terms 128-30 and unionists 56, 59, 128, 130-5, 137-8, 188 Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council 129-30, 135 Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) 14-15, 16 Annesley, Hugh 92 anti-colonialism 67, 140 anti-imperialism 67 Anti-Partition League 31 Apprentice Boys of Derry 8, 92, 103 army presence 39-40, 86, 93-5, 96, 97, 127 withdrawal of 207 Arthur, P. 120, 131, 139, 146, 199 Asquith, H.H. 7, 8, 10

Association of Loyal Orange Women 57, 102 Atkins, Humphrey 76, 123 Attwood, A. 181 Aughey, A. 52, 130, 132, 135, 137 Aunger, E. 37 'B' Specials 19-20, 30, 38, 39, 47 Back Channel discussions 146, 147 Baird, Ernest 121 Balfour, Arthur 7 Bambery, C. 68 Baptists 99 Bardon, J. 5 Barrington, Mr Justice 135 Barritt, D. 25 Bean, K. 145, 151 Behan, Brendan 140 Bennett, R. 179 Bennett Report 86 Bew, P. 52, 82, 89, 95, 116, 117, 120, 121, 161, 170, 179, 185 Biggar, Joseph 11 Birmingham pub bombings (1974) 87 Bishop, P. 43, 96, 105 'Black and Tans' 13 Blair, Tony 178, 179, 196 Blaney, Neil 43 Bloody Friday (1972) 44 Bloody Sunday (1972) 40, 43, 44 Boal, F.W. 101 Boland, Kevin 118 Bonar Law, Anthony 7, 8 Border Campaign (1956-62) 30, 36, 74 Boundary Commission 15 Bowyer-Bell, J. 43 Boyce, D.G. 179, 208 boycotts, sectarian 177-8, 188 Boyle, K. 40, 87, 109, 126, 128, 138, 202, 204 Boyne, Battle of the (1690) 5

237

238 Breen, S. 74 British-Irish Council 81-2, 182, 188-9, 194 British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 82, 188 broadcasting ban 87, 142, 157 Brooke, Basil 22 Brooke, Peter 76, 175 Brooke Initiative 145-7, 153 Browne, Noel 33 Bruce, S. 46, 54, 60, 100, 101, 110, 120, 137 Bruin, Bairbre de 78 Bruton, John 175 Buckland, P. 14, 26, 116 Bunting, Major Ronald 41 business franchises 21 Butt, Isaac 6 Callaghan, James 39 Calvert, J. 25 Cameron Report 23, 39, 41 Campaign for Equal Citizenship (CEC) 137 Campaign for Social Democracy in Ulster 37 Campaign for Social Justice (CSJ) 37 Campbell Bannerman, Henry 7 Campbell, G. 24 Carey, Hugh 165 Carron, Owen 123, 142 Carson, Edward 9, 60 Carson Trail 60, 132 Carter, C. 25 Carter, Jimmy 165 Catholic Church 23, 31, 32, 33, 34, 103-6, 111, 138 political influence of 105-6 Catholics 4-5, 13, 98-9, 206 civil rights movement 36-9, 40 discrimination against 19-31, 65, 111, 208 and Good Friday Agreement 190 and reformism of O'Neill 35-6 in the RUC 89 ceasefires 74, 94, 95, 153, 157-8, 168-71, 180-1 end of 175-7 Chamberlain, Austen 18 Chambers, G. 22 Chichester-Clark, James 41, 48 Chubb, B. 208 Church of Ireland 9, 100, 138 Churchill, Lord Randolph 7 civic unionism 54

Index civil rights movement 36-9, 40 and the IRA 42, 44-6 civil service 23, 75 civil war 15-16, 31 class see social class Clifford, Dermot 104 Clinton, Bill 151, 165-7 co-authority 189 Cochrane, F. 136, 138 codetermination 70, 188 Cold War 151 Collins, Michael 13, 16, 18 colonialism 198-9 as explanation of secretarian discrimination 28 see also anti-colonialism Comerford, R. 11 committees, Northern Ireland Assembly 80 Community Relations Council 107 Community Support Framework 82 Compton report 44, 86 conditional loyalty thesis 51 confederation 188-9 Congregationalists 99 Connolly, James 28 Connolly, M. 5, 37, 60, 89, 126, 131 consent, principle of and Good Friday Agreement Conservative Party 7, 11, 53, 55, 131, 179 consociationalism 114, 159, 186-7, 203-4 see also power-sharing constitutional nationalists, 68, 69, 135, 136, 140, 144-5, 147, 156, 181 Continuity IRA 73, 195-6, 212 Coogan, T.P. 23, 43, 44, 45, 66, 101, 117, 133, 143, 154, 165 Cooper, Ivan 45 Corrymeela Community project 100 Cosgrave, William 16 Coulter, C. 51, 64 Council of the British Isles 56 Council of Ireland 14, 15, 55, 69, 113, 115, 116-18, 119, 161, 186 Cox, W.H. 131, 151 Craig, James 9,15 Craig, William 38, 41, 47, 116, 121 Crawford, R. 47, 110 criminalization 95-7, 113, 121 Cronin, M. 109 cross-borderism 186, 196 culture, and Protestant-Catholic divide 27 Cumann na Gaedheal 16 Cunningham, M. 201 Curragh Mutiny (1914) 10

Index Currie, Austin 38 Curtice, J. 190 Darby, J. 4, 22, 198 Deane, S. 214 deaths 48, 93-4, 95, 96, 119, 152, 198, 212 De Chastelain, John 175, 194 decommissioning of weapons 57, 81, 83, 138, 169-71, 179, 183, 192-5, 212 Democratic Left 140, 175 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 47, 54, 56, 58-61, 78, 81, 82, 83, 101, 116, 123, 124, 126, 128, 137, 157, 163, 168, 170, 173-4, 175, 182, 185, 186, 191, 194, 195 Derry, Siege of (1689) 92, 103 Derry Citizens' Action Committee 45 Derry Housing Action Committee 45 de Valera, Eamon 14, 15, 16, 31, 32, 34 devolution of powers 75-6, 113, 114, 123, 203-4 rolling, 113, 124-5 unionism and 52-4, 56 D'Hondt, Viktor 77 Diamond, Battle of (1795) 102 Dickson, B. 87, 91 Dillon, M . 94 Diplock Courts 87, 128 Direct Action Against Drugs 154 direct rule 48-9, 53, 55, 75, 76-7, 200 discrimination, against Catholics 19-31, 65, 111, 208 District Policing Partnership Boards (DPPs) 90, 91, 92 divorce 104 Dixon, P. 55, 179 Dodds, Nigel 78 Donaldson, Jeffrey 192 Douds, S. 102-3, 190 Downing Street Declaration (1993) 68, 71, 147-8, 154-7, 160, 167, 188, 189 Doyle, M . 104 Drumcree parade 92, 177-8 Dudley Edwards, R. 102 Dumbrell, J. 164 Durkan, Mark 78 Eames, Dr Robert 100 Easter Rising (1916) 12, 13 economic equality/inequality 27-8, 208-9 economy 20, 28, 35-6, 97 ecumenism 100, 101 education segregation in 26, 106-8, 109

239

Eire see Republic of Ireland Eire Nua programme 141 election results (1982-2001) 55 electoral system, discrimination against Catholics 20-2, 25, 29-30 Elliot, R. 30 Elliott, S. 192 Ellison, G. 89 emergency measures 86-7 see also broadcasting ban; internment Emergency Provisions Act (1978) 87 Empey, Reg 78 employment, discrimination against Catholics 22-3 employment legislation 138 Enniskillen 142 Equality Commission 183 Ervine, David 61, 89, 212 European Convention on Human Rights 183, 209 European Court of Human Rights 86 European Union 82-3, 163 authority of 202-3 Evans, G. 191, 192 Evans, J. 63, 70, 90, 187, 203 famine 5, 3 Fanning, R. 16 Farrell, M . 9, 20, 23, 45, 118 Farren, S. 70, 78, 185 Faulkner, Brian 48, 55, 115, 116-17, 120 Fenians 6 Fianna Fail 16, 31-2, 42-3, 63, 84, 180 Fine Gael 16, 125, 175 Finlay, Fergus 176 Fisk, R. 34 Fitt, Gerry 70, 116 FitzdufT, M . 107 Fitzgerald, Garret 68, 125, 126, 134 Flackes, W.D. 55, 192 Flags and Emblems Act 138 Flanagan, Ronnie 92 Flannery, Michael 166 Follis, B.A. 14, 29 Forum for Peace and Reconciliation 148, 158 Foster, Sam 78 Framework Documents (1995) 56, 71, 158-64, 167, 168, 183-4 Frazer, H . 107 Free Presbyterian Church 60, 99, 101 Free State Army 16 Freeland, General Ian 94 Friends of Ireland 165 Friends of Irish Freedom 166

240

Index

Fulton, J. 105 fundamentalists Catholics 104 Presbyterian 100-1

Griffith, Arthur 11 Guelke, A. 40, 46, 102, 129, 151, 173 Gurr, T. 34

Future of Northern Ireland, The 114

Haagerup Report 83 Hachey, T. 6, 9, 10 Hadden, T. 40, 109, 126, 128, 138, 202, 204 Haddick-Flynn, K. 102 Hadfield, B. 184 Haines, Joe 119 Harkness, D. 131 Harris, R. 26 Hartley, T. 149 Haughey, Charles 43, 65, 123, 136 Hayes, B. 142, 190, 191, 198, 207 Hazleton, W. 60, 77, 79, 184 Henderson, Arthur 13 Hennessy, T. 74, 183, 184, 196 Hickie, J. 30, 110 Hillyard, P. 87 Holland, J. 166, 177 Home Rule 6-11, 51 Home Rule Party 8 Hopkins, S. 183 Hoppen, K.T. 11, 33 Horowitz, D. 187 housing, segregation 109 housing policy 47 discrimination against Catholics in 23, 25, 87 Hughes, J. 107, 111 Hull, Billy 46 human rights 209 Hume, John 37, 45, 70, 71, 83, 124, 144-5, 147, 154, 173, 188 hunger strikes 71, 106, 123, 136, 142 Hurd, Douglas 76 Hussey, G. 104, 208

Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) 11, 109 Gaelic League 11 Gaels/Gaelic culture 4, 9, 26, 67, 109 Gaflkin, F. 122 Garda Siochana (Irish police) 89, 117, 130 Gardiner Committee 96 general election (1910) 10 (1918) 12-13, 18 (1922) 16 gerrymandering 21-2, 29-30, 37 Gibney, J. 145 Gildernew, Michelle 54 Gillespie, G. 89, 161, 174 Gladstone, W.E. 5, 6 Good Friday Agreement (1998) 50-1, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61, 63-4, 68, 70, 75, 80, 83-4, 86, 90, 94, 95, 97, 111, 140, 149-50, 153, 182-97, 198, 199, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209-10, 211-14 aims 83 alternatives to 199-206, 209 central themes 185-90 contents 81, 182-3 criticism of 84 and decommissioning 192-3, 212 and nationalists 65, 67, 70, 71, 74, 183, 185, 187, 190, 195, 206, 213 party positions 183-5 referenda on 58, 188, 190-1, 206, 209, 212 and unionists 56, 59, 61, 62, 63-4, 183-5, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191-2, 195, 196, 206, 212, 213 Gough, Brigadier-General Hubert 10 Goulding, Cathal 42, 45 Government of Ireland Act (1920) 13-14, 17, 18, 21, 25, 65, 184 government of Northern Ireland 75-85, 113-26 by direct rule 48-9, 53, 55, 75, 76-7, 200 see also Anglo-Irish Agreement; Downing Street Declaration; Framework Documents; Good Friday Agreement Gow, Ian 131 Greer, A. 82 Greer, S.C. 87

identity politics 189 Illsley, E. 179 Imperial Grand Black Chapter of the British Commonwealth 103 imperialism as explanation of sectarian discrimination 28-9 see also anti-imperialism inclusivity 189-90, 197 independence, for Northern Ireland 205-6 Independent Unionists 41 industrial revolution 5 Initiative 92 citizens' inquiry 108 integration/integrationists 53, 56, 200-1 intelligence services 94

Index intergovernmentalism 123, 146, 187-8 see also Anglo-Irish Agreement International Commission on Decommissioning (CID) 194 internment 20, 30 40, 44, 48, 86-7, 96, 167 Ireland Republic of 32-4, 56, 65, 208 and Catholic Church 104 and constitution (1937) 32, 33 consultation with 114-15, 116-18, 161 establishment of 32 and Good Friday Agreement 190 Orange Order in 102 police 89, 117, 130 Protestants in 34 Sinn Fein recognition of 143-4 territorial claim to Northern Ireland 32, 33-4, 132, 134, 164, 212 see also Anglo-Irish Agreement Ireland Act (1949) 75, 118, 213 Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) 119 Irish Free State 14, 15, 16, 31, 32 Irish National Caucus 165 Irish National League 11 Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) 96, 106, 140, 177 Irish Northern Aid Committee see NORAID Irish Parliamentary Party 6, 7 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 13, 14, 15, 16, 40, 47, 48, 66, 71, 96, 105, 106, 140-2, 148-50, 176-7, 211 and Back Channel discussions 146 Border Campaign (1956-62) 30, 36, 74 ceasefires 94, 95, 157-8, 168-71, 180-1 and civil rights movement 42, 44-6 decommissioning of weapons 57, 81, 83, 169-71, 179, 192-5 General Army Convention 143 Green Book 66, 67 ideological undercurrents underpinning thinking 66-7 Official 42, 43, 140 Provisional 41-4, 45, 95, 112, 115, 140-1, 143, 150, 176-7, 196, 211 Real 73-4, 177, 196, 212 and Sinn Fein 71-3 Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) 5, 11, 12 Irish Republican Socialist Parry 140 Irish Republican Writers' Group 74 Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood 5,11

241

Irish Volunteers 10, 11-12, 13 Irvine, M. 100 Jackson, A. 8 James II, King of England 4-5, 102, 103 Jeffrey, K. 120, 131, 139, 199 Jenkins, Simon 194-5 John Paul II, Pope 104, 105, 143 Johnson, D. 23, 26 joint authority 202, 207 Joint Framework Documents see Framework Documents Joint Unionist Manifesto 137 judiciary discrimination against Catholics within 20 neutrality of 87 Kee, R. 7 Kelly, R. 201 Kennedy, D. 102 Kennedy, Edward 165 Kennedy Smith, Jean 166 Kenny, A. 128 Kilbrandon Report 127-8 Kilby, S. 131 King, S. 208 King, Tom 76 Labour Party 53, 131, 178-80 Laffan, B. 7, 14, 15, 82 Lambkin, B.K. 107, 111 Land Act (1870) 5 (1881) 5, 11 Land League 11 Lawlor, S. 16 Leonard, A. 63 liberal unionism 54 Lijphart, A. 159, 187 Lisnareagh College 107, 111 Lloyd George, D. 17 local government 75, 77, 97, 115 Longley, Edna 180 Loughlin, J. 131 Loyal Institution of Ireland see Orange Order Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW) 46, 119 Loyalist Volunteer Force 177, 192, 194 loyalists 9 paramilitary groups see paramilitary groups parties 61-2 Lundy, Colonel 103

242

Index

Lynch, Jack 39 Lyons, F.S.L. 18 Maastricht Treaty 77, 173, 202 McAllister, I. 63, 142, 190, 191, 198, 207 McAuley, J. 153 MacBride Principles 138, 165 McCann, E. 45 McCartney, Robert 61, 137 McCullagh, M . 206 McDonald, H . 177 McDowell, D. 57 McGarry, J. 12, 24, 63, 77, 89, 90, 94, 110, 156, 166, 198, 199 McGimpsey, Michael 78 McGinty, R. 169 McGuinness, Martin 44, 78, 105, 169 Mclntyre, A. 151 Maclver, M.A. 54 McKittrick, D. 93, 139, 144, 146, 154, 158 McLaughlin, M . 139, 142, 149 McManus, Sean 165 McNamara, Kevin 179 MacStiofain, S. 42, 45 Magee, Roy 100 Major, John 146, 154, 160, 176 Mallie, E. 43, 96, 105, 139, 144, 146, 154 Mallon, Seamus 133, 185, 194, 204 Mandelson, Peter 76 Mansergh, M . 211 marches and parades 92-3, 177, 209 marriage 105 Marsh, M . 208 Mason, Roy 76, 96, 97, 122 Maudling, Reginald 39 Mayhew, Patrick 76, 146, 170 Meehan, E. 83, 184 Methodists 9, 99, 100 middle class, Catholic 37 militarism 67 versus politics 141-2 see also paramilitary groups Miller, D. 51, 198-9 Minogue, D. 104 Mitchell Commission 170-2, 179 Mitchell, George 166, 167, 170, 175, 185, 194 Mitchell, P. 174 Moloney, E. 60 Molyneaux, James 56, 137, 162 Montgomery, G. 178 Moore, L. 61 Morrisey, M . 122 Morrison, D. 71-2, 141, 142 Mountbatten, Lord 96, 122

Mowlam, Mo 76, 172 Moxon-Browne, E. 33, 110 Moynihan, Daniel 165 Murphy, D. 179 Murphy, J. 32 Murray, G. 70 Murray, R. 95 nationalism 5, 6-7, 65-74 republicanism compared with 67-9 rise of 11-13 unionism as form of 52 Nationalist Party 11, 26, 45 nationalists 19, 63, 111, 114, 142, 213 and Anglo-Irish Agreement 70, 135-6 and Anglo-Irish Treaty 15 and Catholics 51 constitutional 68, 69, 135, 136, 140, 144-5, 147, 156, 181 and Downing Street Declaration 156-7 and Good Friday Agreement 65, 67, 70, 71, 74, 183, 185, 187, 190, 195, 206, 213 and Joint Framework Documents 163 and peace elections 172-3 political parties 69-74 and power-sharing 69, 70, 116, 123, 124 reaction to partition 14 and RUC 88, 89, 97 view of British government 68 see also Sinn Fein; Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Neave, Airey 96, 122 Neeson, Sean 63 Nelson, S. 152 neutrality of British government 68, 139, 156 of Southern Ireland in World War II 34 New Ireland Forum 66, 69, 125-6, 127, 128, 131 Newe, G.B. 48 Newsinger, J. 97, 152 NORAID (Irish Northern Aid Committee) 164, 165, 166 North Report 93 North-South Ministerial Council 81, 182, 184-5, 186, 194, 211 Northern Ireland Act (1982) 124 Northern Ireland Act (1998) 184 Northern Ireland Affairs, select committee on 77, 88 Northern Ireland Assembly 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 79-80, 81, 84, 85, 91, 115, 121, 132, 159, 162, 182, 185 elections (1998) 191-2

Index Northern Ireland Assembly Act (1973) 114 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) 37-8, 45, 46 Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention (1975) 55, 120-1 Northern Ireland Executive 59, 77-9, 84, 91, 117, 193-5 Northern Ireland Forum 189 Northern Ireland Grand Committee 68, 77, 168 Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) 47, 109 Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 183, 209 Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) 31, 116 Northern Ireland Office (NIO) 75, 82, 92, 134 Northern Ireland Peace Forum 171-5, 176 Northern Ireland Police Authority 89, 90, 91 Northern Ireland Unionist Party 61 Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC) 63, 191 O'Bradaigh, R. 42, 73, 141, 149 O'Brien, C. 23, 106, 177 O'Dochartaigh, F. 24 O'Dowd, L. 206 O'Faich, Thomas 105 O'Farrell, P. 7 Official Unionist Party see Ulster Unionist Party O'Halloran, C 69, 126 O'Hanlon, Ellis 177 O'Kane, E. 175 O'Leary, B. 12, 24, 63, 77, 84, 89, 94, 110, 156, 166, 187, 191, 192, 196, 197, 198, 199 Omagh bombing (1998) 74, 196 O'Neill, Terence 35-6, 40-1, 47 O'Neill, Tip 165 Operation Motorman 39 Opposite Religions? programme 107-8 Opsahl Commission 108 Orange Order 5, 8, 56-7, 92, 93, 101-3, 112, 177-8, 209 Paisley, Ian 41, 46, 47, 48, 54, 60, 62, 101, 110, 120, 121, 123, 132-3, 160, 163 Paisleyism 105, 111-12 pan-nationalist front 143 pan-nationalism 149, 151, 152 Parades Commission 93, 178, 209

243

parades and marches 92-3, 177, 209 paramilitary groups 43 criminalization of 95-7, 113, 121 decommissioning of weapons 169-71, 179, 183, 212 loyalist 46-7, 61, 152-3, 154, 158, 177 see also Irish Republican Army (IRA); Ulster Defence Association (UDA); Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) Parnell, Charles Stewart 6, 7 partition 4, 7, 13-15, 16-17, 18, 65, 68, 69 Patten Commission 86, 90-2 Patterson, H. 43, 62, 95, 117, 120, 121, 137 peace elections 171-5, 176 Peace People 122 peace process 73, 140-67, 168-81, 212 Pearse, Padraic 12 People's Democracy 38, 45, 115 Phoenix, E. 7, 9 Pimlott, B. 119 Plantation of Ulster (1609) 4 Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) 86, 90, 91 see also Royal Ulster Constabulary policing 19-20, 39, 86-97, 130, 203 cross-border cooperation in 130 and Good Friday Agreement 183 and Patten Commission report 90—2 of parades 92-3 in the Republic 89, 117, 130 see also Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Policing Boards 90, 91, 92 political ideologies and parties 50-64 see also all-party talks; nationalism; nationalists; unionism; unionists Pollak, A. 108 Pollok, A. 60 Porter, N. 54, 203, 214 Powell, Enoch 133, 137 power-sharing 63, 77, 83, 84, 113-17, 119, 120, 131, 159, 186, 187, 203-4 nationalist responses 69, 70, 116, 123, 124 unionist responses to 55, 59, 63, 116-17, 120, 123, 124 Presbyterians 5, 9, 60, 99, 100-1, 106 Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Act (1970) 111 Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974) 87 Price, J. 57 Prior, James 76, 77, 124 prisoner releases 190, 191, 211 Probert, B. 38, 40

244

Index

Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) 61-2, 84, 153, 158, 174, 175, 177 Propositions for Heads of Agreement 183 Protestant Unionist Party 41, 47, 58, 174, 184, 190, 191 see also Democratic Unionist Party Protestantism, and unionism 51, 54, 111 Protestants 4, 5, 6, 9, 13, 50, 98, 99, 101-3, 106, 110, 206 churches and beliefs 5, 9, 60, 99-101 discrimination against Catholics 19-31, 65, 111 and Good Friday Agreement 190-1 in Southern Ireland 34 Provisional Government 16 public opinion 206-8 public sector appointments employment discrimination against Catholics 22-3 self-exclusion of Catholics from 22-3, 26 Purdie, B. 45 Pym, Francis 76 Queens University 221 Quinn, D. 22, 29, 38, 46, 52, 68, 120-1 Ramaphosa, Cyril 194 Reagan, R. 165 Real IRA 73-4, 177, 196, 212 Rees, Merlyn 76, 95, 120 Reid, Alec 144 Reid, John 76, 197 religion 5, 98-112, 199 see also Catholic Church; Catholics; Church of Ireland; Protestantism; Protestants repartition 204-5 Republic of Ireland see Ireland, Republic of Republican Clubs 116 Republican Sinn Fein 73, 166, 176 republicans/republicanism 14, 66-7, 111, 118, 136, 141, 145, 148-9, 150-2 and the Catholic Church 105 compared with nationalism 67-9 and decommissioning 192—3 and Downing Street Declaration 156-7 and Good Friday Agreement 67-9, 73, 184, 190, 195-6 international influences 151-2 and Sunningdale Agreement 190 ultras 73-4 views of British government 68 see also Irish Republican Army (IRA); Sinn Fein residential segregation 108-10

Review of Parades and Marches 93 Reynolds, Albert 154, 170, 175, 211 Robinson, Peter 128 Rodgers, Brid 78 Rose, Paul 37 Rose, YL 27, 198 Rosebery, Lord 7 Rowan, B. 158 Royal Black Institution 103 Royal Black Preceptory 103 Royal Irish Regiment (RIR) 86, 88, 138 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 19-20, 30, 76, 86, 88-91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 127, 130, 191, 194 and Patten Commission report 90-1 see also Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) Ruane, J. 175 Ryan, M . 5, 71, 136, 139, 150, 151 Sabbaratians 100-1 Sands, Bobby 74, 123, 142, 196 Sands-McKevitt, Bernadette 74, 196 SAS (Special Air Service) 94-5, 97 Saulters, Robert 102, 178 Saville Inquiry 40 Scarman Report 39 Scottish Protestants 4 Secretary of State 76-7, 84, 92 sectarian discrimination 19-30, 65, 111 Britain and the promotion of 27-30 sectarian politics 51-2 security 86-97, 115, 127, 183 see also army; policing segregation educational 26, 106-8, 109 residential 108-10 self-determination, national 65, 66, 139, 145, 148, 154, 155, 156-7 Shankill Butchers 152 Shearing, Clifford 91-2 Sinn Fein 11-13, 14, 16, 31, 42, 56, 66, 70, 71-3, 74, 78, 80, 92, 132, 141-2, 146, 148-52, 166, 169, 179-80, 195, 211 abstentionism 12, 42, 72, 143-4, 149, 211 and Anglo-Irish Agreement 135-6 dialogue with SDLP 71, 144-5, 147-8 and Downing Street Declaration 156 entering Stormont 149-50 and Framework Documents 163-4 and Good Friday Agreement 183-4, 185, 191, 195 and IRA 71-3, 193 and the peace forum 173, 174, 175, 176

Index Sinn Fein {continued) recognition of Irish Republic 143-4 and the RUC 88 Sinnott, R. 192 Smith, D. 22 Smith, M.L.R. 68 Smyth, C. 133 Smyth, J. 89, 162 Smyth, Rev. Martin 57, 194 Smyth, Martin 47, 57, 178 social class 64 as explanation of sectarianism 27, 29 see also middle class; working class Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 50, 59, 69-71, 74, 78, 92, 115, 116, 117-18, 120, 121, 126, 132, 142, 146, 181, 186, 187, 195 and Anglo-Irish Agreement 136 dialogue with Sinn Fein 71, 144-5, 147-8 and Downing Street Declaration 156 establishment 45, 61 and the European Union 82, 83 and Framework Documents 163 and Good Friday Agreement 183, 184-5, 195, 212 and the Labour Party 53 and Northern Ireland assembly elections 191, 192 and the peace forum 172-4, 177 and power-sharing 124 socialism 67 Soderberg, Nancy 166 Solemn League and Covenant (1912) 6, 7 Special Branch 94 special category status 96 Special Powers Act (1922) 19, 38 Special Support Programme for PEACE and Reconciliation 83 sport 26, 109-10 Stalker, J. 89 Stewart, A.T.Q. 9, 25 Stormont 75-6 abolition of 47-9, 73, 114-15 Sunningdale Agreement (1974) 51, 55, 59, 118, 119, 186, 190, 204 Tenant League 5 Thatcher, Margaret 77, 122-3, 126, 131, 133 Todd, J. 175 Tomlinson, M. 198 32 County Sovereignty Committee 196 Tone, Wolfe 5 Tonge, J. 63, 70, 90, 179, 185, 187, 192, 203

245

Toolis, K. 145 Townshend, C. 19, 86-7 trial without jury 86-7 Trimble, David 44, 56, 57-8, 81, 88, 162, 172, 179, 194, 195, 213 Tyrie, Andy 152 UK Unionist Party 61, 175 Uladh, Saor 31 Ulster Clubs 132 Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 46, 62, 119, 137, 152, 158, 177 Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) 47, 86, 88, 97, 109, 128, 138 Ulster Democratic Parry (UDP) 62, 158, 174, 175, 177, 184, 190, 191 Ulster Freedom Fighters 46, 152, 158 Ulster Protestant Volunteers 46 Ulster Resistance movement 132 Ulster Society 57 Ulster Special Constabulary see 'B' Specials Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) 8, 52, 53, 56-7, 90, 116, 187, 195, 203 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 53, 54-8, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 88, 90, 115-16, 116-17, 123, 124, 137, 162, 163, 172, 173, 175, 179, 183, 184, 186, 191, 194, 195 leadership contest (2000) 57 Ulster Vanguard 47 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 9, 10, 20, 37, 46, 61, 62, 152, 158, 177, 194 Ulster Workers' Council (UWC), strike (1974) 119-20 Ulsterisation 95-7, 113, 121 unemployment 22, 35, 97, 208 unionism 51-4, 112 and devolution 52-4, 56 divided 213-14 as form of British nationalism 52 forms of 54 fragmentation of 40—1, 114 growth of 8-11 modernization of 35-6 and Protestantism 51, 54, 111 Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI) 117 Unionist Task Force 137 Unionists 17, 19, 72, 75, 81, 93 and Anglo-Irish Agreement 56, 59, 128, 130-5, 137-8, 188 and Anglo-Irish Treaty 15 and Catholic Church 105 and Catholic civil rights campaign 38-9

246

Index

Unionists {continued) consent for constitutional change 68-9, 139, 148 and decommissioning 195 devolution and 52-4, 56 and direct rule 48-9 and Downing Street Declaration 156, 157 and Framework Documents 162-3 and Good Friday Agreement 56, 59, 61, 62, 63-4, 183-5, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191-2, 195, 196, 206, 212, 213 and New Ireland Forum Report 128 and peace elections 172 political parties 47, 54-63, 77, 82, 114 and power sharing 55, 59, 63, 116-17, 120, 123, 124 and R U C 88, 90, 97 working class 27 see also Democratic Unionist Party (DUP); Progressive Unionist Party (PUP); Ulster Democratic Party (UDP); Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) United Irishmen 5 United States 36, 131, 151, 164-7 United Ulster Action Council 121-2 United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) 55, 119, 120, 121 United Ulster Unionist Movement 121 United Unionist Assembly Party 61 unity, Irish 32, 33, 65-6, 118, 129, 136, 147, 148, 155, 178-9, 185, 201-2, 207 Urban, M . 95

Vanguard movement 47 Vanguard Party 59, 121 Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party 47, 116 Walker, G . 189 Wall, M . 15 Ward, A. 5 West, Harry 46 West Ulster Unionist Council 46 White, B. 135 Whitelaw, William 44, 76, 141 Whitten, J. 178 Whyte, J. 30, 33, 204 Wichert, S. 33-4, 39, 76 Widgery Report 40 Wilford, R. 78, 208, 214 William III (William of Orange) 4 - 5 , 102, 103 Wilson, A. 165 Wilson, B. 63 Wilson, Cedric 61 Wilson, Harold 39, 119 Wilson Plan 35 Wilson, T. 6, 7, 17, 25, 35 Women's Coalition 80, 207 Workers Party 140 working class Catholic 27 Protestant 27, 28 residential segregation 109 World War II 34 Wright, Billy 177 Wright, F. 145