Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Party and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1975–1990 9781350115378, 9781350115415, 9781350115385

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Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Party and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1975–1990

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Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Party and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1975–1990 Stephen Kelly

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BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2021 Copyright © Stephen Kelly, 2021 Stephen Kelly has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. x constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover design by Ben Anslow Cover image: British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher addressing the Conservative Party on 22 May 1985. (© William Lovelace/Stringer/Getty Images) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. Every effort has been made to trace copyright holders and to obtain their permissions for the use of copyright material. The publisher apologizes for any errors or omissions and would be grateful if notified of any corrections that should be incorporated in future reprints or editions of this book. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kelly, Stephen (Historian), author. Title: Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Party and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1975–1990 / Stephen Kelly. Description: London ; New York, NY : Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020035923 (print) | LCCN 2020035924 (ebook) | ISBN 9781350115378 (hardback) | ISBN 9781350202191 (paperback) | ISBN 9781350115385 (ebook) | ISBN 9781350115392 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Northern Ireland–Politics and government–1968–1998. | Thatcher, Margaret. | Great Britain–Politics and government–1979–1997. | Irish question. Classification: LCC DA990.U46 K4615 2021 (print) | LCC DA990.U46 (ebook) | DDC 941.60824–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020035923 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020035924 ISBN: HB: 978-1-3501-1537-8 ePDF: 978-1-3501-1538-5 eBook: 978-1-3501-1539-2 Typeset by Newgen KnowledgeWorks Pvt., Ltd, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

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To ‘The Derry Four’: Stephen Crumlish, Gerry Kelly, Gerry McGowan and Michael Toner and In memory of Professor Ronan Fanning (1941–2017)

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Contents List of Illustrations Acknowledgements Note on Capitals and Formal titles Note on Sources: Primary and Secondary List of Abbreviations Introduction

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Part 1  Official leader of the opposition, 1975–9

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Thatcher and the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, 1975–9 Airey Neave and the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, 1975–9

Part 2  First-term in office, 1979–83 3 4 5 6

Thatcher and the evolution of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy, 1979 The Atkins’s talks and the Haughey-Thatcher relationship, 1980 Thatcher, the second Irish Republican hunger strike and Anglo-Irish relations, 1981 The Prior Initiative, the Falklands War and Anglo-Irish relations, 1982

Part 3  Second-term in office, 1983–7 7 8

The FitzGerald-Thatcher relationship and the evolution of Anglo-Irish relations, 1983–4 Anglo-American relations and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985–6

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71 99 127 159 177

179 205

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Contents

viii Part 4  Third-term in office, 1987–90 9

Thatcher, British state collusion and the genesis of the Northern Ireland peace process, 1987–90

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Conclusion (including Epilogue, 1990–8)

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Notes

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Bibliography

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Index

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Illustrations 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 8.1 8.2

Thatcher and Airey Neave at a memorial service for Ross McWhirter, 1975

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Thatcher on a visit to Girdwood Park barracks, North Belfast, 1979

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Thatcher alongside a female RUC officer, Belfast city centre, 1979

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Thatcher alongside a male RUC officer, Belfast city centre, 1979

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Thatcher shakes hand of British Army officer, Crossmaglen, 1979

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Thatcher in uniform holding a red beret of the British Army Parachute Regiment, Portadown, 1979

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Taoiseach Charles Haughey and Thatcher at No. 10 Downing Street, 1980 154 Anti-Thatcher poster in relation to the Irish Republican hungerstrike, 1981

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Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan at No. 10 Downing Street, 9 June 1982

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Anti-Thatcher wall mural, West Belfast, circa 1980s

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Thatcher visits British Army troops, Aldergrove Airport, Northwest Belfast, 1983

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Signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement at Hillsborough Castle, 15 November 1985

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Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the following institutions and individuals: The Liverpool Hope University Research Funding Committee for funding the research stages of this project and providing funding for the images and index which accompany this monograph. I wish to thank the various archival institutions in the UK and the Republic of Ireland. I am particularly grateful to the staff of the National Archives of the UK; the National Archives of Ireland; the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; the Parliamentary Archives, House of Commons; the Linen Hall Library, Belfast; the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland; and the University College Dublin Archives. I wish to also express my gratitude to the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, for awarding me an Archives By-Fellowship (Lentterm, 2016–17). I am equally thankful to have been awarded the John Antcliffe Memorial Fund in support of this project. During my two-month residency at Churchill College, the bulk of my time was spent at the Churchill Archives Centre examining the personal papers of Margaret Thatcher. I must extend my appreciation to the numerous individuals who freely gave their time to discuss their recollections of events central to my research; they include the late Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, Noel Dorr, the late Dr Garret FitzGerald, Lord King of Bridgwater, Walter Kirwan, Michael Lillis and David Neligan. I wish to also offer my warmest thanks to my friend and academic colleague Associate Professor Bryce Evans; Chris Collins (Margaret Thatcher Foundation); Melinda Gilbert (John Antcliffe Memorial Fund); and Andrew Riley (senior archivist, Churchill Archives Centre). A  big thanks also to the staff of Bloomsbury Press, particularly Laura Reeves and Rhodri Mogford. Thanks also to the Campbell clan, particularly Brian and Val. My mother and father, Áine and Gerry, and my brother Conor are an inspiration – thank you for your continued support. Lastly, I wish to pay a special tribute to my wife Jenny. Not only has she kindly volunteered to act as my proofreader throughout the production of this book, but more importantly she continues to support my academic endeavours!

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Note on Capitals and Formal Titles Readers should note that, in general, this study has followed the Irish Historical Studies rules for capital letters and punctuations. The use of a capital U for Unionists or Unionism denotes organized unionism, such as the Ulster Unionist Party; the use of lower case, unionist opinion and the like, refers to those citizens of Northern Ireland who wished to maintain the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Likewise, a capital N for Nationalists refers to organized nationalism, such as the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP); the use of lower case, nationalist opinion and the like, refers to the nationalist population of Northern Ireland who opposed the partition of Ireland. The use of lower case is, likewise, used to refer to political/government positions associated with politicians and civil servants – for example, lower case is used when referring to ‘prime minister’ and ‘taoiseach’. The use of capitals is employed to refer to government departments – for example, ‘the Cabinet Office’ and ‘the Department of the Taoiseach’. For consistency, in general, this study has refrained from using formal titles such as ‘Baroness’, ‘Lady’, ‘Lord’ and ‘Sir’, except for the first reference to an individual. For example, Lady Thatcher (later Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven) is referred to as Margaret Thatcher, Sir Robert Armstrong (later Lord Armstrong of Ilminster) is referred to as Robert Armstrong and Sir Geoffrey Howe (later Lord Howe of Aberavon) is referred to as Geoffrey Howe. Lastly, for consistency, Thatcher is referred to as ‘British prime minister’ rather than the prime minister of the UK (i.e. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

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Note on Sources: Primary and Secondary Primary sources Margaret Thatcher had a remarkable capacity for hard work, often working late into the night. She was a master of detail. In the more than a million pages of documents that crossed her desk during her leadership of the Conservative Party, the ink from her fountain pen is constantly to be found. She was the last generation of political leaders to operate in the pre-email era and as a result, her political thoughts can be found scribbled on the margins of thousands of papers. Indeed, while naturally cautious and often secretive – Thatcher, for example, never kept a diary – she has left to the historian a vast amount of archival material, available in public and private form. This book has benefited greatly from the availability of such an extensive array of primary source material never before correlated into a single study vis-à-vis Thatcher, the Conservative Party and the Northern Ireland conflict, 1975 to 1990. Access to several archival institutions located in the UK and the Republic of Ireland has been particularly invaluable. The Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), Churchill College (CC), University of Cambridge (UC), holds the collection of papers of Baroness Thatcher (THCR). The archive contains over 1  million documents in nearly three thousand archive boxes, which date from Thatcher’s childhood to the end of her life and include tens of thousands of photographs as well as a vast collection of press cuttings and many audio and video tapes of public and private events. The bulk of the collection relates to Thatcher’s period as leader of the Conservative Party from 1975 to 1990 and her time as British prime minister from 1979 to 1990.1 The CAC also holds the personal papers of several prominent Conservative Party figures who worked alongside Thatcher, including Enoch Powell (POLL), Lord (Julian) Amery (AMEJ) and Lord Hailsham (HLSM). This archive also houses Sir David Goodall’s unpublished manuscript (Misc. 74), which included a ‘personal account’ of the negotiations leading to the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985.2 The Conservative Party Archives (CPA), Bodleian Libraries (BL), University of Oxford (UO), is a treasure trove of archival material, comprising several collections relevant to this project. They include the Leader’s Consultative Committee (LCC) and the Conservative Research Department (CRD), specifically, (1)  minutes of the Conservative Party Parliamentary Northern Ireland Committee (CPPNIC), (2)  minutes of the ‘fact-finding’ subcommittee of the CPPNIC and (3)  lastly, letter books of Alistair Cooke, CRD desk officer for Northern Ireland, 1977–83.3 Likewise, the National Archives of the UK (TNA) contain a wealth of archival material related to this project, specifically during Thatcher’s premiership from 1979

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to 1990. Significantly, due to the British government’s decision in 2013 to introduce a new ‘twenty-year rule’ policy, this book has accessed archival departmental files from the 1970s to 1990, including files from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Cabinet Office (CAB), Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) and Northern Ireland Office (CJ).4 The opportunity to utilize the personal papers of Airey Neave (AN), housed at the Parliamentary Archives (PA), House of Commons, has also added to the originality of this project, providing a first-hand account of Neave’s period as Thatcher’s shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland from 1975 to 1979.5 On the island of Ireland, this project benefited greatly from access to several additional archival institutions. In Northern Ireland, the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI) houses the files of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), the Northern Ireland Information Service (INF) and Central Secretariat and Northern Ireland Office files.6 The Linen Hall Library (LHL), Belfast, contains the Northern Ireland Political Collection (NIPC), which includes archival material related to Irish Republicanism, including the 1980 and 1981 Irish Republican hunger-strikes.7 Under the Irish government’s current ‘thirty-year rule’, departmental government files from the National Archives of Ireland (NAI), specifically, the Department of the Taoiseach (DT) and Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) have proved invaluable during the research stages of this project.8 Moreover, the University College Dublin Archives (UCDA)9 contain several important collections, including the Garret FitzGerald Papers (P215 – minister for foreign affairs),10 the Patrick Cosgrave Papers (P233), the Fianna Fáil Party Papers (P176) and the John Whyte Oral Archive of British-Irish and Northern Irish negotiations, 1972–2006 (P171).11 Despite the abundance of archival material available to historians, readers should be aware that sizable amounts of British government departmental files, housed at the TNA and related to the Northern Ireland conflict, remain closed to the public for the near future. For instance, several departmental files related to the 1981 Irish Republican hunger-strike will not be available for public consultation until the 2070s.12 Likewise, several departmental files related to the Stevens Inquiry (which investigated alleged collusion between elements of British state and Loyalist paramilitaries) remain closed until 207513 and a further file related to ‘The Andersonstown Murders’ in 1988 remain closed until 2076.14 Moreover, several files related to the Haughey-Thatcher relationship during the 1980s remain closed until 2051.15 In fact, some classified British government department files remain closed indefinitely. For example, at least eight files related to ‘Operation Flavius’ (i.e. the murder of the ‘Gibraltar Three’ in 1988) remain closed indefinitely.16 Indeed, during the writing stages of this project, this author made several unsuccessful Freedom of Information requests. For example, despite ‘consultation’ taking place between the TNA and the British Cabinet Office to make available classified government files related to Anglo-Irish relations in 1989, this request was declined.17 The reason provided was that the files contained ‘information that could prejudice bilateral relations with the Irish government … Given the delicate state of UK/Irish relations over the UK exit from the EU [Brexit], the material is significantly more sensitive now than it was when it was first closed.’18

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Note on Sources: Primary and Secondary

On the subject of digital archives, three platforms have been of particular benefit to this project. The Margaret Thatcher Foundation website run by its founder and editor Chris Collins, provides access to thousands of historical documents relating to the Thatcher period, in digital format.19 The Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) web service ‘conflict and politics in Northern Ireland’ contains information and source material on the Northern Ireland conflict from 1968 to present, including archival departmental government files and a chronological list of deaths.20 Lastly, the Miller Center Oral Archive houses a collection of digitized interviews with prominent US politicians directly involved in the Northern Ireland conflict.21 The availability of autobiographies has also benefited this project. Although the historian must always tread lightly when assessing the accuracy of such sources, they nonetheless often provide a fascinating first-hand account of central events. Of course, this project has benefited greatly due to the publication of Thatcher’s own series of memoirs during the mid-1990s.22 The publication of memoirs and diaries amongst many of Thatcher’s contemporaries from within the Conservative Party,23 together with those of world leaders who worked alongside her during her leadership, have also been extremely useful to this project.24 Lastly, interviews with influential figures directly related to this book were of great benefit, helping to underpin some central arguments offered by this research. I  interviewed and corresponded with several prominent personalities that worked closely with Thatcher during her premiership, including the late Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, Sir Henry Bellingham, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, Lord King of Bridgwater, Lord Patten of Barnes and James Pawsey. On the Irish side, I was also fortunate to interview and correspond with former taoiseach, the late Garret FitzGerald, Gerry Adams and several prominent Irish civil servants, including Seán Donlon, Noel Dorr, Walter Kirwan, Michael Lillis and David Neligan.

Secondary sources Although in recent years Marc Mulholland25 and Graham Goodlad26 have each provided insightful introductory chapters on Thatcher and Northern Ireland and Stephen Kelly27 and Thomas Hennessy28 consider certain aspects of Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy during her premiership, no single published study, until now, has been produced.29 In fact, within the relevant historiography there has been a persistent failure to adequately examine Thatcher’s relationship with Dublin,30 Washington31 and the major political forces in Northern Ireland, including the SDLP, Sinn Féin, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Indeed, while some perceptive works have been published on the subject of the Conservative Party and Northern Ireland,32 modern British-Irish relations33 and more generally Thatcher’s foreign policy34 as well as her contribution to policy development in relation to Northern Ireland have more or less been ignored. Likewise, within the literature dealing with Ulster Unionism and Northern Ireland politics, Thatcher’s role is understudied.35 Although a wealth of secondary biographical material has been published concerning Thatcher, these studies, in general, have neglected to adequately assess

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the Thatcher governments’ relationship with the Irish government, the mainstream Northern Ireland political parties and the US administrations during the timescale of this proposed monograph.36 The only exception is Charles Moore’s outstanding authorized three-volume biography on Thatcher. Despite Moore’s insightful analysis, particularly in relation to the second Irish Republican hunger strikes in 1981 and the AIA of 1985,37 major gaps in the knowledge remain in relation to Thatcher’s attitude to the political forces of Ulster Unionism during the 1980s and her contribution to the early stages of the peace process in Northern Ireland, to name just two examples.38

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Abbreviations AIA AIIC AMEJ AN ASU BIIC BL CAC CAIN CC CJ CPA CPCO CPPNIC CPS CRD DE DFA DT DUP ECHR ECST EEC EMS ERM FCO FOI FRU GCHQ HA HLSM HMSU HO ICJP INC INF INLA

Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council Lord (Julian) Amery Papers Airey Neave Papers Active Service Units British-Irish intergovernmental conference Bodleian Libraries Churchill Archives Centre Conflict Archive on the Internet Churchill College Northern Ireland Files Conservative Party Archives Conservative Party Central Office Conservative Party Parliamentary Northern Ireland Committee Centre for Policy Studies Conservative Research Department Dáil Éireann, official debates Department of Foreign Affairs Department of the Taoiseach Democratic Unionist Party European Commission of Human Rights European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism European Economic Community European Monetary System Exchange Rate Mechanism Foreign and Commonwealth Office The Friends of Ireland Force Research Unit Government Communications Headquarters Home Affairs Lord Hailsham Papers Headquarters Mobile Support Unit Home Office International Commission for Justice and Peace ICRC International Commission of the Red Cross Irish National Caucus Northern Ireland Information Service Irish National Liberation Army

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Abbreviations IRA IRSP LCC LHL NAI NATO NICC NIF NIPC NLI NORAID NUM PA PIRA POLL PREM PRONI PSBR RAF RPI RSF RTÉ RUC SAS SDI SDLP TA THCR TNA UC UCDA UDA UDR UFF UN UUAC UUC UUP UUUC UVF WR

Irish Republican Army Irish Republic Socialist Party Leader’s Consultative Committee Linen Hall Library National Archives of Ireland Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization Northern Ireland Constitution Convention New Ireland Forum Northern Ireland Political Collection National Library of Ireland, Dublin Irish Northern Aid Committee National Union of Mineworkers Parliamentary Archives Provisional Irish Republican Army Enoch Powell Papers Prime Minister’s Office Public Records Office of Northern Ireland Public Sector Borrowing Requirements Republican Action Force Retail Price Index Republican Sinn Féin Raidió Teilifís Éireann Royal Ulster Constabulary British Special Air Forces Strategic Defence Initiative Social Democratic and Labour Party Territorial Army Baroness Thatcher Papers The National Archives of the UK University of Cambridge University College Dublin Archives Ulster Defence Association Ulster Defence Regiment Ulster Freedom Fighters United Nations Ulster Unionist Action Council Ulster Unionist Council Ulster Unionist Party United Ulster Unionist Coalition Ulster Volunteer Force War Office

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Introduction

‘No surrender’: Margaret Thatcher and Northern Ireland Margaret Thatcher remains one of the most divisive figures in British political history in the twentieth century, attracting praise and ridicule in equal measure. To her admirers, Thatcher has acquired an almost saint-like quality, eulogized for saving the UK from an impending economic abyss. She is remembered by her supporters as a conviction politician with an insatiable appetite for hard work, a domineering personality and an outstanding intellect. To her detractors, Thatcher was an egotistical narcissist, a political leader devoid of a social conscience, indifferent to the poor and disadvantaged. For many on the Left, she remains the embodiment of ruthless monetarism, a politician who was fixated with curtailing public borrowing and spending, generally at the expense of working-class communities across the UK. Whether loved or loathed, Thatcher was a political icon. She was the first woman to lead a major political party and the first female prime minister of the UK (i.e. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).1 She was the leader of the Conservative Party for over fifteen years, 1975–90 and British prime minister for over eleven years, 1979–90, making her the longest-serving party leader and the longestserving British prime minister of the last century.2 Indeed, she was the first British prime minister since Lord Liverpool, 1812–27, to win three British general elections in a row.3 In Northern Ireland, Thatcher’s legacy continues to cast a long shadow. In popular memory in Irish Republican areas of the Bogside in Derry,4 South Armagh and West Belfast she is remembered as a callous British prime minister, who through her ‘war policy’, to quote former Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams,5 ‘entrenched sectarian divisions … and subverted basic human rights’.6 For the Ulster unionist community of Northern Ireland, Thatcher’s legacy is nuanced. She was greatly admired for her ‘no surrender’ attitude during the height of the 1981 Irish Republican hunger-strike and as ‘one of the greatest political figures of post-war Britain’,7 to borrow former first minister of Northern Ireland Peter Robinson’s description.8 Many Northern Protestants, however, refuse to forgive Thatcher for allegedly undermining Northern Ireland’s constitutional integrity within the UK, by signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in 1985. Thatcher’s attitude to Northern Ireland was a powerful blend of reactionary policies and personal indifference. Indeed, for the many policy success stories during Thatcher’s

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political career, Northern Ireland cannot be counted alongside them (with the notable exception of her decision to sign the AIA). Far too often she demonstrated a certain naivety (or what Sir David Goodall described as ‘primitiveness’)9 towards Northern Ireland, regularly overwhelmed by the complexities of the subject that confronted her. Although Thatcher’s great-grandmother was born in Co. Kerry in the Republic of Ireland,10 Thatcher admitted a general ignorance of Irish affairs, ‘But what British politician will ever fully understand Northern Ireland?’, she later conceded in her memoir, The Downing Street years.11 Having read thousands of government departmental papers, together with analysing Thatcher’s personal papers, it is evident that Northern Ireland always felt like an annoying distraction, a mere sideshow to more urgent socio-economic issues, including her obsession with reducing rampant inflation and how to temper the power of the trade unions. In as much as Thatcher had little interest in agriculture, the arts, sports and transport, Northern Ireland was not an area of party or government policy that she was naturally drawn towards. As a result, the subject rarely featured high on her list of political priorities nor was it a topic which she ever truly understood. For example, Thatcher always found the Irish border and the prospect of repartition a puzzle. She regularly proposed adjusting the Irish border, including the transfer of Northern Catholics into the Republic of Ireland, in order, as she herself phrased it, to ‘relieve’ the taxpayer of the ‘expense of paying social security to people who did not want to belong to the United Kingdom anyway’.12 According to Charles Powell, Thatcher’s private secretary for foreign affairs, 1983–90, on one occasion she suggested that she wanted the Irish border redrawn: ‘she thought that if we had a straight line border, not one with all those kinks and wiggles in it, it would be easier to defend’.13 Repeatedly, she had to be reminded by her somewhat baffled ministers and civil servants alike that there was no tidy dividing line between the intertwining Catholic and Protestant communities, including in Belfast and Londonderry.14 In fact, Thatcher’s legacy concerning Northern Ireland is associated most with personal experiences of loss, a sense of hopelessness and perpetual paramilitary violence. On the eve of entering government in 1979, she suffered the devastating loss of Airey Neave,15 her shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, murdered by the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) in March of that year. Five years later, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) came within inches of assassinating Thatcher at the Conservative Party conference in Brighton in October of 1984. In July of 1989, Thatcher experienced further tragedy and personal loss following the assassination by the PIRA of her close friend and political ally Ian Gow.16 Thatcher’s sympathies were generally kept for the hundreds of British soldiers and members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and associated security forces who lost their lives during her time in office. In her own words, she despaired having to send ‘young boys over [to Northern Ireland] to their deaths’.17 Shortly after entering government, following the murder of eighteen British soldiers at Warrenpoint, Co. Down, on 27 August 1979, Thatcher commenced a custom, which she was to maintain, of producing handwritten letters to the families of deceased members of the British Armed Forces. ‘No prime minister’, according to Thatcher’s authorized biographer Charles Moore, ‘had ever thought of doing this before.’18 Staggeringly, during Thatcher’s

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Introduction

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almost eleven years as British prime minister, approximately 180 members of the British Armed Forces and 280 members of the RUC and associated security forces lost their lives during the Northern Ireland conflict.19 The murder of those close to her, together with the heavy loss of members of the British security forces, certainly ‘left deep psychological scars’ on Thatcher’s ‘Irish outlook’, to quote Eamonn Kennedy, Irish ambassador in London, 1978–83.20 Therefore, it should come as little surprise that security always remained the single most important policy in relation to Thatcher’s stance on Northern Ireland. She was obsessed with terrorism, channelling much of her energy and thinking on how to tackle paramilitary violence, chiefly Irish Republican terrorism. It is partly because of her prioritizing security policy over political initiatives for Northern Ireland that she quickly gained a reputation as an inflexible militarist. Her ‘no surrender’ attitude was confirmed by her refusal to concede ‘political status’ during the 1981 Irish Republican hungerstrike, during which time Bobby Sands and a further nine prisoners died. ‘From this time forward’, to use Thatcher’s words, ‘I became the [P]‌IRA’s top target for assassination.’21 Despite her fixation with security related matters, declassified British government papers provide compelling new evidence that Thatcher showed a remarkable capacity to adapt and modify her Northern Ireland policy. For example, although she stipulated that her government would never negotiate with Irish Republican paramilitaries, recently published findings demonstrate that Thatcher personally authorized top-secret negotiations with Irish Republican paramilitaries in the hope of ending the second Irish Republican hunger-strike in 1981.22 Indeed, in the months preceding Thatcher’s political downfall in 1990, she allegedly sanctioned the reopening up of a secret line of communication between the British government, via MI5 and the Irish Republican movement, in the hope of securing a PIRA ceasefire.23 Thatcher’s evolving attitude to the Irish government is a further example of her ability to modify her Northern Ireland strategy during her more than fifteen years as Conservative Party leader. As official leader of the opposition from 1975 to 1979, Thatcher supported the Labour government’s refusal to permit the Irish government’s direct involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Although she was eager to improve Anglo-Irish relations, specifically in the fields of cross-border security and extradition, she supported the argument that Northern Ireland was an integral part of the UK and therefore was not to be discussed with a foreign government, including Dublin.24 Thatcher adhered to this policy stance on her appointment as British prime minister in May 1979. The maintenance of the union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, she consistently declared, was non-negotiable and thus Dublin had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the UK.25 During the early years of her premiership, however, a slow metamorphosis occurred regarding Thatcher’s opposition to providing the Irish government with a formal role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Her political conversion commenced in December 1980 following her meeting with the taoiseach (Irish prime minister) Charles Haughey.26 At their Anglo-Irish summit meeting held in Dublin, the two premiers agreed to commence a series of Anglo-Irish joint studies based on the ‘unique relationship’ that existed between the two countries.27 Her conversion was completed five years later, following prolonged and intensive negotiations between

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her government and the Garret FitzGerald-led administration in Dublin,28 with the signing of the AIA in November 1985. Significantly, the AIA bestowed upon the Irish government a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland.29 One point, however, is clear. On no occasion did Thatcher ever concede providing the Irish government with a constitutional role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. This stance was forcefully demonstrated following the publication of the New Ireland Forum Report in May 1984. The forum’s final report advocated three potential policies that its members argued would help facilitate a lasting and peaceful settlement for Northern Ireland: (1) a unitary solution, (2) a confederal/federal model or (3) a joint authority. Thatcher, however, emphatically rejected all three proposals, claiming that they presented a ‘derogation from sovereignty’.30 At heart, Thatcher was instinctively a unionist. For this reason, she found it almost impossible to acknowledge that many Catholics in Northern Ireland felt a stronger allegiance to the Republic of Ireland rather than to the UK. Northern Ireland was British as much so as the Falklands, Gibraltar or Hong Kong, she reasoned. Therefore, she could not fathom why many of the Catholic population rejected a British identity and nationality. Thatcher’s prejudices were certainly shaped by her detest for Irish Republican violence and her opposition to a united Ireland, which threatened to tear apart the union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Consequently, throughout her leadership of the Conservative Party, she never wavered in her commitment to maintaining Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the UK. Yet, one must tread cautiously when prescribing the label ‘unionist’ to Thatcher. On an emotional level, Thatcher was primarily an English unionist. As with Scottish and Welsh unionism, she had a limited and defective understanding of Ulster unionism. To paraphrase Richard Finlay, for such a ‘committed unionist’, Thatcher had a poor understanding of Scottish, Welsh and Irish unionism, failing to grasp the complex historical dynamics that had characterized the development of unionism in these three countries.31 This stance was particularly true in relation to Northern Ireland. Thatcher never developed a ‘feel’ for Northern Ireland, including its distinctive culture, history and socio-economic foundations.32 Indeed, in as much as Thatcher knew little about the manufacturing cities and industrial centres of the North of England, Scotland and Wales, Northern Ireland remained an alien place. As such, to borrow David Cannadine’s astute description, Thatcher was ‘only prime minister of the south-east of England and the rural constituencies’.33 By the time Thatcher entered No. 10 Downing Street in May 1979, she had already acquired a certain dislike for many Ulster Unionist politicians, including James Molyneaux34 and Presbyterian firebrand and founder of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Rev. Ian Paisley.35 She found many Ulster Unionists to be bigoted and insufferable and always found it ‘uphill work’ discussing Irish matters with them.36 In fact, the more Thatcher saw of Ulster Unionist politicians during her time in office ‘the less she liked them’, to quote John Campbell.37 Thatcher’s opinion of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the leading Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland during the 1980s, was equally dismissive. She resented their dual demands for the restoration of a power-sharing devolved government and that the Irish government be permitted a ‘legitimate’ role in the affairs

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Introduction

5

of Northern Ireland, to quote Robert Armstrong, Thatcher’s cabinet secretary, 1979– 86.38 Of politicians in the Republic of Ireland, she concluded that they were obsessed with cultural politics over the more clear-cut economic debates.39 In fact, throughout her political life she continued to harbour a deep aversion regarding Ireland’s decision to remain neutral during the Second World War. ‘The Irish’, she purportedly said, ‘were worse than neutral – their neutrality had effectively given comfort to the Germans.’40

‘Ireland is a ghastly subject’: The Conservative Party elite and Northern Ireland Thatcher’s general ignorance towards Northern Ireland was not uncommon amongst her Conservative Party MPs. The average British politician knew very little about Northern Ireland and, in many cases, simply did not care about the conflict unless it affected them personally. Indeed, to millions of average British citizens, Northern Ireland was an ‘alien and violent place’.41 This was particularly true of senior Conservative Party figures, many of whom, to use William (Willie) Whitelaw’s description, found the ‘Irish mentality almost impossible to understand’ and resented their ‘constant determination to be governed by their preoccupations of the past rather than face up to the problems of the present and the future’.42 Reflecting on his career as a historian and journalist, Patrick Cosgrave recalled the extent of such ignorance during his time as an employee of the Conservative Research Department (CRD) in the early 1970s. According to Cosgrave, British home secretary, 1970–2, Reginald Maudling43 said, ‘Patrick … I am told you were brought up a Catholic in Southern Ireland.’ Cosgrave affirmed that this was so. ‘Then for God’s sake, will you please tell me why those buggers go around killing one another because of religion?’44 Thatcher’s husband, Denis, summed up the mood amongst many of his like-minded contemporaries when he once conceded that ‘If the Irish want to kill each other that does seem to me to be their business.’45 There were those within the higher echelons of the Conservative Party who simply could not hide their deep-rooted prejudices and contempt for Northern Ireland’s ‘perceived political obscurantism’.46 Conservative Party MP and diarist Alan Clark,47 for example, dispassionately wrote that having visited Northern Ireland he felt that the place was ‘unbelievably nasty. Grey, damp, cold … overlaid with the oppression of terror’.48 ‘Ireland’, he protested, ‘is a ghastly subject. Intractable. Insoluble. For centuries it has blighted English domestic politics, wrecked the careers of good men.’49 The impression that the conflict in Northern Ireland would continue indefinitely was a common belief held amongst the Conservative Party hierarchy. John Major50 recalled with melancholy that throughout the 1970s and 1980s, before the peace process, Northern Ireland was ‘generally regarded as an intractable issue best left to the security forces and the Northern Ireland Secretary, whose job was seen as worthy, necessary and thankless’.51 This book also provides a unique insight into the workings of the Conservative Party Parliamentary Northern Ireland Committee (CPPNIC).52 This committee, which operated throughout Thatcher’s almost fifteen years as leader of the Conservative Party, convened regularly to debate – and occasionally coordinate – the Conservative Party’s

6

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Thatcher, the Conservative Party, Northern Ireland Conflict

official Northern Ireland policy. The CPPNIC and its accompanying fact-finding subcommittee reached its zenith during Thatcher’s five years as the official leader of the opposition. Under the chairpersonship of John Biggs-Davison,53 deputy shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1976–8, the CPPNIC, operating closely with the CRD, was effectively responsible for devising the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy while in opposition. Working alongside Airey Neave, Biggs-Davison and other CPPNIC members devised a wide range of Northern Ireland policies, which were included in the Conservative Party’s 1976 policy booklet, The right approach: a statement of Conservative aims.54 During Thatcher’s early years in government, the CPPNIC’s influence gradually waned (as did the role of the CRD) with Thatcher instead utilizing the Whitehall Civil Service machine vis-à-vis her government’s Northern Ireland policy. In fact, by the early 1980s the CPPNIC became a leading opponent of Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy, specifically concerning the region’s constitutional future. A cabal of pro-integrationist Conservative Party MPs, led by Biggs-Davison, Harold Julian Amery, Ivor Stanbrook and George (Barry) Porter, regularly attacked the British government’s support for the restoration of a devolved government in Northern Ireland at the expense of the region’s integration into the rest of the UK.55 More generally, prominent CPPNIC members were vocal critics of Thatcher’s relationship with the Irish government, including her willingness to accommodate Dublin’s request for a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. In the aftermath of the signing of the AIA, for example, several CPPNIC members, including Amery, Biggs-Davison and Kevin Harvey Proctor voted against the AIA.56 In fact, of the forty-seven members of the House of Commons who voted against the AIA, approximately twenty-one were members of the Conservative parliamentary party. This book also reassesses Thatcher’s relationship with the Whitehall Civil Service. It reveals that there always remained a suspicion within the Civil Service that Thatcher simply did not appreciate the complexities of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy.57 This was certainly the view amongst Whitehall officialdom on her appointment as British prime minister. Because she never held a senior post in government and had ‘no first-hand experience of high-level diplomacy’, the argument was put forward that she lacked the political experience and judgement necessary to deal with the politically sensitive subject of Northern Ireland.58 Indeed, she was often poorly equipped for the intellectual battle in relation to policy formation vis-à-vis Northern Ireland. Consequently, she quickly got into a habit of encouraging those close to her to influence her thinking – chiefly Robert Armstrong and subsequently Charles Powell – rather than develop her own ideas.

Study overview, 1975–90 Part 1: Official leader of the opposition, 1975–9 On her appointment as leader of the Conservative Party in 1975, Thatcher knew almost nothing about Northern Ireland. Although the topic had been a major preoccupation

 7

Introduction

7

for the Edward Heath government from 1970 to 1974, as secretary for education 1970– 4, Thatcher had ‘played little or no role’ in the formulation of the government’s Northern Ireland policy.59 She had no say in Heath’s decision to shut down the Northern Ireland parliament and introduce direct rule in 1972. Nor was she involved in the abortive Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, which had been an attempt to help establish a powersharing devolved government in Northern Ireland. During Thatcher’s initial period as the official leader of the opposition, Northern Ireland was a minor footnote to more pressing economic matters, with the result that she allocated little energy, thinking or time to the subject. When she did address the matter of Northern Ireland, her focus was generally on security related issues, primarily her obsession with how to defeat Irish Republican paramilitaries.60 Indeed, almost two years into Thatcher’s leadership of the Conservative Party, Airey Neave privately conceded that Northern Ireland was ‘not discussed in any detail or indeed at any length at Shadow Cabinet meetings’.61 Despite Thatcher’s own acknowledged ignorance of Northern Ireland’s affairs, together with her often naive and sometimes contradictory approach to the subject (particularly concerning her political stance vis-à-vis power-sharing or majorityrule), during her five years as the official leader of the opposition she adhered to several central policies in the fields of security and politics. These policies included her opposition to the withdrawal of the British Army from Northern Ireland62 and a fundamental commitment that Northern Ireland would remain an integral part of the UK.63 Most importantly in Thatcher’s thinking was her commitment to defeat Irish Republican paramilitaries, the so-called ‘Godfathers of Terrorism’.64 For Thatcher, security and political policies were interwoven. In retirement, she was at pains to emphasize that it was ‘impossible’, as she wrote, to separate security policy, required to ‘prevent terrorist outrages … from the wider political’ arena in relation to Northern Ireland.65 In adhering to the above principles, Thatcher committed to continue to support the bipartisan policy on Northern Ireland on behalf of the Conservative Party and the Labour government, as first adopted by her predecessor Heath.

Part 2: First-term in office, 1979–83 There were more pressing domestic issues apart from Northern Ireland that confronted Thatcher on becoming British prime minister in May 1979, not least economic policy, specifically how to confront growing inflation and to rein in public spending. This partially explains why her arrival at No. 10 Downing Street did not herald an immediate or major shift in the British government’s Northern Ireland policy. Instead, Thatcher was satisfied to follow in the footsteps of the previous Labour-led government by prioritizing security matters ahead of ending direct rule. However, the murders by the PIRA of Lord Mountbatten and three members of his party, together with eighteen British soldiers in separate terrorist attacks in late August 1979 forced Northern Ireland to the top of Thatcher’s political agenda. Thereafter, her central security objective was the defeat of Irish Republican paramilitarism. If this was not a realistic objective, in the short to medium term, Thatcher was nonetheless resolved to crack down on PIRA and associated Irish Republican violence. Placed within this

8

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Thatcher, the Conservative Party, Northern Ireland Conflict

context, Thatcher concluded that it was essential to improve cross-border North-South security cooperation and intelligence-sharing between the British and Irish governments. To win cross-border security concessions from Dublin, Thatcher dangled the prospect of London agreeing to kick-start a ‘new political initiative’ on Northern Ireland, which included abandoning her previous support for Airey Neave’s Regional Council model of so-called ‘compromise integration’, in favour of a devolved government in Northern Ireland.66 Despite taking a keener interest in Northern Ireland, the truth remained that as her first term as British prime minister drew to a close Thatcher resented that so much of her time was consumed by events in Ireland. Indeed, Thatcher’s willingness to appoint men who knew almost nothing about Northern Ireland to the portfolio of the secretary of state for Northern Ireland was evidence of her government’s general antipathy for the subject. With the notable exception of Peter Brooke,67 1989–92, each of Thatcher’s five secretaries of state for Northern Ireland took up their new post with very little  – if any – experience or understanding of Irish affairs. In the words of Humphrey Atkins,68 Thatcher’s first secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1979–81, ‘[I]‌had a lot to learn about Northern Ireland.’69 Atkins’s successor in the Northern Ireland portfolio, Jim Prior,70 1981–4, privately conceded his ‘complete state of ignorance’ regarding Northern Ireland affairs on taking up his new ministerial position.71 Likewise, on his appointment to this post in 1984, Douglas Hurd,72 1984–5, confessed that he ‘knew little more about the Province than any other conscientious follower of public events’.73 In fact, one of the central criteria for appointing Atkins and Prior to the Northern Ireland portfolio was to get them out of ‘the Prime Minister’s hair’, to paraphrase Sir Geoffrey Howe.74 Feelings of personal animosity were a common feature of the AtkinsThatcher and Prior-Thatcher relationships during this period.

Part 3: Second-term in office, 1983–7 Thatcher’s second term in office, 1983–7, coincided with a major shift in the British government’s Northern Ireland policy. Following the Conservative Party’s landslide victory at the 1983 British general election, Thatcher decided, in her own words, to do ‘something about Ireland’.75 Her wish to do ‘something about Ireland’ was confirmed following the signing of the AIA in 1985 on behalf of the British and Irish governments. Under the terms of this accord, and to the irritation of Ulster Unionists, Dublin was granted a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Although Thatcher regretted signing the AIA,76 her decision to put pen to paper was arguably one of her finest diplomatic achievements, ranking up there alongside Zimbabwe. The establishment of a new Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, under the terms of the AIA, provided a ‘two-way channel of communication’ between Dublin and London, including issues related to Northern Ireland, which only a few years previously seemed unimaginable.77 A key factor in Thatcher’s decision to sign the AIA was the pressure she experienced from those closest to her, notably Howe and a cabal of senior civil servants under the authority of Robert Armstrong. In relation to the British government’s Northern

 9

Introduction

9

Ireland policy, Howe’s appointment as secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, 1983–9, was a revelation. No other Conservative Party MP, apart perhaps from William Whitelaw78 during the early 1980s, had a bigger influence over Thatcher’s thinking on Northern Ireland during her premiership. It was Howe, with the aid of Douglas Hurd, who ultimately convinced Thatcher to permit the Irish government with a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland.79 Comparisons can be drawn here between his ability to persuade Thatcher to develop links with the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, 1985–91, and her Ireland policy. In both cases, Thatcher had to be persuaded by Howe of the merits of opening new channels of dialogue, irrespective of her preference for retaining the status quo. Thus, in the end, she was won over by the forcefulness of the argument in support of the AIA. Arguably, it was the tireless and usually unrecognized hard work of a small group of senior British civil servants that had the greatest influence over Thatcher’s thinking on Northern Ireland. Despite her long-held suspicions towards the Civil Service, chiefly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Thatcher respected the advice she received from Robert Armstrong and a handful of additional Whitehall officials, including Charles Powell and David Goodall. In the months, indeed years, leading to the signing of the AIA, Armstrong and those mentioned above routinely petitioned their prime minister to provide the Irish government with a ‘palpable presence’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland in the hope that the violence might be ended, to quote Goodall.80

Part 4: Third-term in office, 1987–90 An examination of Thatcher’s third and final term in office, 1987–90, brings this book to its conclusion. As Thatcher’s political career came to a dramatic close following her decision not to contest a second ballot during the Conservative Party leadership contest in November 1990, the genesis of the Northern Ireland peace process commenced. During her last term as British prime minister, Northern Ireland was never far from her political thinking. From her continued frustration with the Irish government regarding cross-border security measures to controversial allegations of a British state sponsored ‘shoot to kill’ policy and well-founded accusations of collusion between the British state and Loyalist paramilitaries, Northern Ireland remained a constant irritation and occasionally an embarrassment for the Thatcher government. Although it was not widely known at the time, Thatcher prepared the ground for an initiative that led to the Northern Ireland peace process during the 1990s and ultimately the signing of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998, which witnessed the restoration of a power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland. During the winter of 1990, with Thatcher’s agreement,81 the British government reactivated a secret line of communication with the PIRA. Soon after, Peter Brooke, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, delivered a landmark speech in which he announced that the British government had ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland’.82 The PIRA made a direct response to Brooke’s speech, declaring a three-day ceasefire over Christmas 1990.

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Thatcher, the Conservative Party, Northern Ireland Conflict

However, Thatcher never got the opportunity to reap the rewards of this secret policy. On 22 November 1990, following an appeal on behalf of her cabinet colleagues, Thatcher announced her decision not to contest a second ballot for the leadership of the Conservative Party, only staying on as British prime minister until the party elected her successor as leader. In the second ballot contest, five days later, John Major handsomely defeated his rivals and was duly elected the leader of the Conservative Party. The following day, 28 November, Major was appointed British prime minister. His appointment signalled Thatcher’s departure from the political main stage ending more than fifteen years as Conservative Party leader and eleven years as British prime minister. *** From the time the ‘Irish question’ first entered modern British political discourse in 1844, during a nine-hour debate in the House of Commons,83 to the signing of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998, British parliamentarians were intermediately consumed by events in Ireland.84 Between these years, an array of issues related to Ireland including land, religion, education, Home Rule, Irish independence and the Northern Ireland conflict were debated and squabbled by the Westminster class.85 The outbreak of the conflict in Northern Ireland in 1969 transplanted the old ‘Irish question’ to a new ‘Northern Ireland question’. During the previous half a century, as Ulster Unionists consolidated their control over Northern Ireland, consecutive British governments under Stanley Baldwin86 during the 1920s and 1930s through to the respective premierships of Harold Macmillan87 and his successor Sir Alec Douglas Home88 ignored events across the Irish sea, reluctant to talk about Ireland, never mind actively engage with the subject. In the words of former British prime minister Winston Churchill,89 ‘For generations’ successive British governments ‘have been wandering and floundering in the Irish bog’.90 The outbreak of widespread violence in Northern Ireland in the summer of 1969, soon after followed by the deployment of British soldiers on the streets of Londonderry, Belfast and elsewhere, forced a British government under the prime minister Harold Wilson91 to reluctantly renter the ‘Irish bog’. Thereafter, each of Wilson’s successors in No. 10 Downing Street, from Edward Heath, James Callaghan,92 Margaret Thatcher, John Major to Tony Blair,93 were regularly consumed by day-to-day events in Northern Ireland, including wanton acts of violence, sectarian murders and political assassinations. As is examined, despite her sense of indifference, Thatcher was never immune to events in Ireland. In fact, a startling feature of Thatcher’s premiership is how much of her energy and time was redirected to Northern Ireland, irrespective of her distaste of the subject.

 11

Part One

Official leader of the opposition, 1975–9

12

12

 13

1

Thatcher and the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, 1975–9

‘[A]‌t this time I can see no solution to the problems in Northern Ireland …’: The genesis of Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy The Conservative Party’s defeat at the second British general election of 1974 (the first general election was held in February of that year, the second in October) came as a bitter disappointment to Margaret Thatcher. Although easily retaining her seat in her Finchley constituency, with a majority of almost 4,000 votes, the Conservative Party managed to secure only 277 seats, compared to the Labour Party’s 319 seats. Therefore, to the dismay of the Conservative Party leadership and rank-and-file supporters, alike, the ageing and increasingly volatile Harold Wilson, leader of the Labour Party, was provided with the opportunity to form a new administration under his premiership. The loss of the general election was a political disaster for Edward Heath. This was his third general election defeat since his appointment as leader of the Conservative Party in 1965. Privately, like many of her senior Conservative Party colleagues, Thatcher now arrived at the conclusion that Heath must step aside as party leader. ‘I had no doubt’, she recalled in The path to power, ‘that Ted now ought to go.’1 As soon as the general election was over, in the words of John Campbell, the struggle for the leadership of the Conservative Party was ‘unofficially on’.2 The question, was, however, who should succeed Heath? Initially, a cabal of anti-Heath Conservative Party MPs were spoken of as possible contenders. The main candidates to succeed Heath included William Whitelaw, chairperson of the Conservative Party; Keith Joseph, a founding member of the Conservative Party’s Centre for Policy Studies (CPS);3 Sir Edward Du Cann, chairperson of the Conservative Party’s 1922 Committee;4 and lastly, Ian Gilmour, chairperson of the CRD.5 If Thatcher’s own account of the leadership contest is to be believed, she initially ruled herself out of the running, instead favouring Keith Joseph for the position.6 Her recollections, however, do not paint a full picture. Although Thatcher saw Joseph as the main contender, by the winter of 1974, she did think of herself as a possible candidate for the leadership of the Conservative Party. On the general election campaign trail, between September and early October 1974, for instance, Thatcher had taken

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Thatcher, the Conservative Party, Northern Ireland Conflict

centre stage, canvassing combatively, ‘strongly promoting the middle-class interests’, including the aspiration for home ownership.7 As a result, her national profile had steadily grown, with more and more people becoming aware of her abilities; a useful bonus in the event of a future leadership contest. On 21 November 1974 – the same day as the Birmingham Pub bombings, in which the PIRA murdered twenty-one people and injured a further 182 – the Executive of the Conservative Party’s 1922 Committee was informed that Thatcher would contest the post of leader of the Conservative Party (a position that technically did not exist as Heath continued to cling to power).8 Her decision to stand was greeted by a mixture of surprise and condescension amongst the higher echelons of the Conservative Party. Peter Walker,9 who served at ministerial level under Heath, summoned up the mood of the majority of senior Conservative Party figures regarding Thatcher’s chances of success: ‘Supporters could not believe that a woman who had never been anything other than Minister of Education could defeat the current male leader who had just been Prime Minister.’10 Despite garnering support from Keith Joseph and Humphrey Atkins, a perception prevailed that Thatcher’s decision to stand for the leadership of the Conservative Party was ‘nothing more than a chance to prepare the ground for a challenge by someone more serious’.11 To her many critics, in the words of Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders, ‘Thatcher was a suburban housewife with no experience of high office, who seemed neither willing nor able to expand the party’s constituency.’12 Indeed, given her sex and social background (the daughter of a shop grocer), Thatcher was seen as ‘something of an outsider in the Tories’ high circles’.13 To the disbelief of many within the Conservative Party, however, Thatcher pulled off a staggering leadership victory. With the support of Airey Neave, who acted as her campaign manager during the latter stages of the leadership contest, Thatcher was appointed the leader of the Conservative Party on 11 February 1975. Not only did she beat Heath in the first ballot on 4 February (Thatcher, 130 votes; Heath, 119; and Sir Hugh Fraser,14 16), but following Heath’s resignation as party leader, she also won outright against Whitelaw, in the second ballot on 11 February (Thatcher, 146 votes; Whitelaw, 79), with the result that she did not need the third ballot.15 Thus, at 49 years of age, Thatcher became the first women leader of a major British political party. Thatcher fondly remembered first receiving news of her victory. She recalled Neave opening the door to his office and saying, ‘so quietly’, ‘I have to tell you, you are the new Leader of the Opposition.’16 Following her election victory, she immediately tried to rally the Conservative parliamentary party, chiefly her rivals for the leadership behind her cause. ‘It is important to me’, she informed a press conference following her victory, ‘[that] this prize has been won in an open electoral contest with four other potential leaders. I know they will be disappointed, but I hope we shall soon be back working together as colleagues for the nation in which we all believe.’17 The final line-up of Thatcher’s new shadow cabinet was confirmed on 18 February 1975, less than a week after her election as leader of the Conservative Party. Whilst Heath declined a portfolio in Thatcher’s shadow cabinet, many of her previous rivals for the leadership of the Conservative Party quickly fell in behind her. In fact, former colleagues of Heath dominated her new shadow cabinet. Whitelaw duly accepted the post of deputy party leader. Sir Geoffrey Howe became shadow chancellor. Keith

 15

The Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland Policy, 1975–9

15

Joseph agreed to take over the responsibility for policy and research. Jim Prior was given employment. Francis Pym18 accepted agriculture (although he gave up the post following a nervous breakdown a few weeks later). Reginald (Reggie) Maudling19 came back to the frontbench to take on the role as shadow foreign secretary. Ian Gilmour was promoted to shadow home secretary (having briefly held the shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland portfolio under Heath). At his personal request, Neave, 59  years old, was appointed shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland. The Times welcomed Neave’s appointment as the man charged with leading ‘the Tory attack on Ulster policy’.20 At the same time, Thatcher also made him titular head of her private office. In practice, however, Richard Ryder21 ran Thatcher’s office day to day, while Neave devoted himself to Northern Ireland policy. Neave confessed at the time that one of the reasons Thatcher decided to appoint him as titular head of the leader’s private office was to guarantee that Northern Ireland policy was kept ‘close to Mrs. Thatcher’.22 Personally, Neave and Thatcher were relatively close to one another (their relationship, in the words of Robin Harris, ‘was built on mutual respect and obligation rather than personal affection’).23 Even before Neave agreed to manage Thatcher campaign for the leadership of the Conservative Party, they had known one another for several years. As barristers, they had shared the same chambers and had been neighbours at Westminster Gardens. During Thatcher’s period as the official opposition spokesperson for social security, she had helped Neave with his Bill to make provision for pensions for the over-eighties.24 A  known critic of Heath (whom Neave ‘greatly disliked’),25 in March 1974, Neave was elected to the anti-Heath Conservative Party 1922 Committee Executive.26 As the new official leader of the opposition, Thatcher wasted little time in conducting a root and branch review of the Conservative Party’s policies. On the day of her election, she told ITN News, ‘You don’t exist as a party unless you have a clear philosophy and a clear message.’27 She immediately set out a radical new path, a path designed to ‘save Britain from ever-worsening decline’, to quote Jim Tomlinson.28 Thereafter, Thatcher’s central political objective – arguably obsession – was to rid Britain of the ‘basic immorality’ of Socialism, as she phrased it.29 First in her sights was to secure Britain from an impending economic abyss, described by Thatcher as a ‘catastrophic national decline’.30 As noted below, five major economic problems dominated the shadow cabinet’s economic strategy during Thatcher’s initial years as the official leader of the opposition. These economic objectives would later form part of what many commentators have described as the economic ‘monetarist’ platform of ‘Thatcherism’.31 These five economic preoccupations were ( a) how to deduce rampant inflation; (b) how to tackle inefficiencies and poor productivity in the bloated public sector; (c) how to reduce pubic spending and borrowing and tackle imbalances in monetary policy (stemming from the enormous public sector deficits); (d) how to reduce unemployment, and lastly; (e) how to temper the power of trade unions and the reform of collective bargaining.32

16

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Thatcher, the Conservative Party, Northern Ireland Conflict

However, as Thatcher accustomed herself to her new role as leader of the Conservative Party, struggling to impose her authority on a divided party, her economic plan was far from clear-cut. While she may have been determined to remodel the Conservative Party’s economic strategy, during her period as the official leader of the opposition, she was poorly equipped for the intellectual battle in relation to policy formation. Rather than developing ideas of her own, she encouraged those close to her to influence her thinking. In this way, Thatcher was not necessarily an intellectual thinker or theorist, but ‘a woman of beliefs’, to quote Charles Moore, Thatcher’s authorized biographer.33 These leadership qualities, of foresight, of a sense of destiny and the conviction of her thoughts, ‘created the space for ideas to come forward’.34 Therefore, from the outset of her leadership, Thatcher placed her trust in Keith Joseph to guide her on economic matters. Given her obsession with economic policy, Thatcher allocated little energy, thinking or time to Northern Ireland during her five years as the official leader of the opposition. Although she realized that her appointment as leader of the Conservative Party made her a central target for Irish Republican paramilitaries, with the result that she was provided with police protection for the first time,35 Northern Ireland remained an irritating distraction to more pressing economic matters. Privately, she conceded that during her period as the official leader of the opposition she deliberately ‘avoided’ talking about the perennial problem of Northern Ireland.36 The Irish government soon noticed Thatcher’s ‘cautious’ approach vis-à-vis the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy. Neither in public nor in private, a secret Irish political profile of Thatcher reported, did she give ‘very much indication’ of her attitude to Northern Ireland.37 The archival records confirm this assessment. During Thatcher’s first six months as the official leader of the opposition, Northern Ireland policy was demoted to the political doldrums. The topic was seldom broached at weekly meetings of the Leader’s Consultative Committee (LCC) (i.e. the shadow cabinet), which were personally chaired by Thatcher.38 For instance, at a half-day meeting of the LCC, on 28 July 1975, at which twenty items were placed on the agenda (including ‘Welsh policy group reports’), Northern Ireland was not mentioned.39 By November 1976, Airey Neave privately conceded that Northern Ireland was ‘not discussed in any detail or indeed at any length at Shadow Cabinet meetings’.40 Michael Heseltine,41 shadow secretary of state for industry, likewise, confirmed that Northern Ireland rarely made it onto the weekly agenda of the LCC meetings.42 At the annual Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool, from 7 to 10 October 1975 (Thatcher’s first party conference as leader of the Conservative Party), Northern Ireland policy was deliberately submerged beneath the political undergrowth by the party hierarchy. Although six motions on Northern Ireland had been submitted by constituency associations and appeared on the conference agenda, none was selected for debate.43 The subject, likewise, was not selected as a topic for debate by those attendees who had an opportunity to ballot for resolutions that they wished to see slotted into two vacant spaces in the timetable. Indeed, at a press conference, on the eve of the gathering, Sir John Taylor, chairman of the National Union Executive of the

 17

The Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland Policy, 1975–9

17

Conservative Party, refused to answer a query from assembled journalists on whether the party intended to define its Northern Ireland policy at the conference.44 As Thatcher got down to the business of leading the Conservative Party in opposition, she gave Neave, her shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, an almost free hand in the formulation of the party’s Northern Ireland policy.45 She later recalled that he ‘was extraordinarily painstaking and diligent’. ‘As a politician, he had not an ounce of flamboyance, yet he was a master of his craft, with a wry, dry humour that missed nothing.’46 While she was aware that he was not a particularly good parliamentarian in the traditional sense, she realized that the man who had helped her win the leadership battle for the Conservative Party was one of the ‘most gifted parliamentary conspirators of the day’, to quote Graham Goodlad.47 As she later wrote, albeit with a hint of nostalgia, ‘I’d never thought of anyone else for Northern Ireland … He understood the “Irish factor”. He’d studied it.’48 Indeed, if Keith Joseph was usually the first person that Thatcher came to for advice on economic matters, it was Neave that she turned to for guidance on Northern Ireland. In fact, prior to Thatcher’s appointment as leader of the Conservative Party in 1975, Northern Ireland had never registered on her political radar. In the words of Howe, during her early years in the House of Commons, she never cast her eyes ‘across the Irish Sea’.49 This is even more interesting considering that Northern Ireland had been a major preoccupation for the Heath government from 1970 to 1974. Yet, as secretary for education, Thatcher ‘played little or no role’ in the formulation of the government’s Northern Ireland policy.50 Indeed, she had no say in Heath’s decision to shut down the Northern Ireland parliament and introduce direct rule in 1972. Nor was she involved in the abortive Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, which had been an attempt to help establish a power-sharing devolved government in Northern Ireland. Jim Prior,51 secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1981–4, later accused Thatcher of ‘never really’ understanding the Northern Ireland problem.52 Thatcher, herself, admitted a general ignorance of Irish affairs on taking up her new post as the official leader of the opposition. ‘But what British politician will ever fully understand Northern Ireland?’, she recalled.53 Indeed, on a visit to Texas in the United States, in September 1977, Thatcher conceded that ‘at this time I  can see no solution to the problems in Northern Ireland … in all honesty there isn’t a solution at this time’.54 This should not suggest, however, that Thatcher did not have a Northern Ireland policy as the official leader of the opposition.55 Although the subject ranked low on her list of political priorities and her views were confused, often naive and sometimes contradictory, she did hold firm to several guiding principles, which can be broken down under two subheadings: (1) Security and (2) Political. For Thatcher, both policies were interwoven. In retirement, she was at pains to emphasize that it was ‘impossible’, as she wrote, to separate entirely security policy, required to ‘prevent terrorist outrages … from the wider political’ arena.56 Above all else, however, in her mind, security factors always took priority over political initiatives. ‘My policy towards Northern Ireland’, she recalled, ‘was always one aimed above all at upholding democracy and the law:  it was always therefore determined by whatever I considered at a particular time would help bring better security.’57

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Thatcher, the Conservative Party, Northern Ireland Conflict

In adhering to the above principles, Thatcher made a commitment to continue to support the bipartisan policy on Northern Ireland on behalf of the Conservative Party and the Labour government, as first adopted by her predecessor Heath.58 She confirmed this policy on a visit to Washington in September 1975. The Labour government and the Conservative Party in opposition, she informed assembled reporters, agreed on a bipartisan Northern Ireland policy, irrespective of any differences each party might have regarding Northern Ireland’s constitutional future.59

(1) Security Having analysed many of Thatcher’s speeches, private conversations and Conservative Party policy documents, the basis of her Northern Ireland security policy from 1975 to 1979 can be broadly defined under the below headings: ( a) (b) (c) (d)

opposition of the withdrawal of British Army from Northern Ireland;60 commitment to militarily defeating Irish Republican paramilitaries;61 refusal to negotiate with Irish Republican or Loyalist paramilitaries;62 improvement of intelligence and security vis-à-vis the activities of paramilitaries operating in Northern Ireland and mainland Great Britain;63 (e) commitment to uphold law and order in Northern Ireland;64 ( f). support of the Labour government’s decision to withdraw ‘special category status’ for new prisoners convicted of terrorist related activities (after 1 March 1976);65 and lastly, (g) improvement of Anglo-Irish relations, specifically in the fields of cross-border security and extradition.66 For example, regarding a possible withdrawal of the British Army from Northern Ireland, as the official leader of the opposition, Thatcher regularly expressed her disapproval to this proposal. During this period, particularly within Irish government circles,67 there was a genuine worry that the Labour-led government in Britain was contemplating withdrawing from Northern Ireland. Such concerns were well grounded. British cabinet papers from 1974 reveal that following the Labour government’s return to power in early 1974, Harold Wilson directed that the option of British withdrawal be examined and in May of that year had drafted his own ‘Doomsday Scenario’ for Northern Ireland.68 Indeed, according to Bernard Donoughue’s account of this period (Donoughue was senior policy advisor to Wilson) Wilson had favoured the option of British withdrawal, in conjunction with an attempted negotiated independence for Northern Ireland as a dominion of the Commonwealth, ‘until it was finally rejected by the Cabinet Committee on Northern Ireland on 11 November 1975’.69 For Thatcher, British withdrawal would have been a disaster, leading to widespread bloodshed and civil war in Northern Ireland. Although she later admitted that she had discussed with Airey Neave the possibility of withdrawing the British Army from Northern Ireland, she quickly rejected this policy.70 Thatcher made this point abundantly clear during a meeting with Wilson in September 1975. ‘People unfortunately did not

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realize that the result of a pull out [from Northern Ireland]’, she implored, ‘would be much greater carnage.’71

(2) Political The basis of Thatcher’s political outlook in relation to Northern Ireland rested on one fundamental principle:  Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK. Above all else, to quote Sir Robert Armstrong, Thatcher’s cabinet secretary, 1979–87, when it came to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the UK, Thatcher’s ‘rock was sovereignty’.72 Although Thatcher preferred to avoid ‘talking about the political aspects of Northern Ireland’, instead confining herself to ‘security matters’,73 broadly speaking she remained loyal to four key political principles: (a) fundamental commitment that Northern Ireland would remain an integral part of the UK;74 (b) opposition to the long-term maintenance of direct rule;75 (c) opposition to a federal agreement as a long-term solution to the Northern Ireland conflict;76 and lastly, (d) support of an increase in the number of Westminster seats in Northern Ireland from twelve to seventeen (subsequently eighteen).77 Despite Thatcher’s commitment to the above principles  – primarily Northern Ireland remaining an integral part of the UK  – confusion remains regarding her attitude towards Northern Ireland’s long-term political status during her period as the official leader of the opposition. Specifically, whether Thatcher supported the restoration of a devolved government in Northern Ireland (based on either majorityrule or power-sharing). Alternatively, whether she endorsed what Graham Walker has labelled ‘compromise integration’, which advocated reform of local government in Northern Ireland, with the establishment of one or more Regional Councils.78 As is examined in further detail later in this chapter, although Thatcher’s personal preference had always been for the restoration of a devolved government in Northern Ireland based on ‘a system of majority-rule’,79 the archival records reveal that her attitude to this politically sensitive subject gradually changed during her period as the official leader of the opposition. Addressing rank and file supporters at the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool, in October 1975, for example, Thatcher was deliberately evasive on whether she preferred majority-rule or a power-sharing model for Northern Ireland.80 By at least October 1976, however, Thatcher shelved her support for a return to a majority-rule administration in Northern Ireland. Given the strength of opposition to the majority-rule model, particularly within the Nationalist community of Northern Ireland, she conceded that this policy was unworkable in the short to medium term.81 Consequently, she placed her support behind the Labour government’s calls for the restoration of a devolved government in Northern Ireland based on a power-sharing model. As she informed Fianna Fáil leader Jack Lynch82 in October 1977, not only

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did she support the restoration of a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland, but noted that ‘it was our [the Conservative Party’s] initiative’.83 Significantly, the available evidence reveals that by April 1978 Thatcher abandoned her support for devolved government in Northern Ireland, based on either majorityrule or a power-sharing model, in the medium term. Instead, with the encouragement of Airey Neave, Thatcher placed on record the Conservative Party’s support of  – as an interim measure – the reform of local government in Northern Ireland, with the establishment of one or more Regional Councils.84 The establishment of such a Regional Council or Councils, as its supporters promoted, would fill the gap between the twenty-six District Councils in Northern Ireland and the Parliament at Westminster by overseeing a large range of ‘Macrory’ functions in the region. Possible ‘Macrory’ functions mentioned included town and county planning, roads, streets, car parks, water, sewerage, education, libraries, housing and rating85 (Thatcher’s attitude to the Conservative Party’s support for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland is examined in further detail in Chapter 2).

The right approach? The CPPNIC and accompanying fact-finding subcommittee, 1975–9 The single most important avenue for the development of the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy during Thatcher’s period as leader of the official opposition fell under the auspices of the CPPNIC.86 Over the preceding years, the CPPNIC, which usually met on a fortnightly basis when parliament was in session, provided senior Conservative Party MPs, party backbenchers and invited guests a platform to debate – and occasionally determine – the party’s Northern Ireland policy. The CPPNIC was composed of a mixture of established Conservative Party parliamentarians and a new generation of up and coming MPs. Of the older generation the most prominent included Lord Belstead (John Ganzani, 2nd Baron Belstead);87 John Arnold Farr;88 Sir Nigel Fisher;89 Philip Goodhart90 and Carrickfergus-born Norman Miscampbell.91 Most prominent amongst the younger Conservative Party MPs were Michael Mates;92 Ian Gow (who was murdered by the PIRA in July 1990); and future secretary of state for Northern Ireland Patrick Mayhew.93 Three further members of the CPPNIC held the most influence vis-à-vis the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy during Thatcher’s period as official leader of the opposition. They were Thatcher’s shadow spokespersons on Northern Ireland, Airey Neave, John Biggs-Davison and Sir William van Straubenzee.94 From the moment Neave was appointed as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, he carved out a reputation as an industrious and vocal contributor, regularly using the CPPNIC as a sounding board to test out potential policies. By the standards of the day, Neave was a remarkable individual. On the one hand, he was a public figure: war-hero, writer, barrister and politician. He had escaped from the clutches of the Nazis during the Second World War, was the author of five semi-autobiographical

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books and had established a practice at the bar. On the other hand, he was an elusive and secretive individual, retaining close links to the British Secret Intelligence Service throughout his adult life. During the Second World War, he worked for MI9, a subsidiary of MI6, later holding the rank of commanding officer of the Intelligence School 9 (TA).95 Neave’s greatest contribution to political life came in the autumn of his career, following his promotion to Thatcher’s shadow cabinet in February 1975. From the moment he took up his new portfolio as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, until his murder by the INLA in March 1979, Neave’s ‘first priority’, as he privately noted to a Conservative Party activist in 1978, was to defeat Irish Republican terrorism.96 Although often preoccupied with security related issues, as is examined in the next chapter, it is incorrect to suggest that Neave took little interest in the political fortunes of Northern Ireland (Neave’s important contribution to the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, 1975–9, is examined in further detail in Chapter 2). Like Neave, Biggs-Davison was an active contributor on the CPPNIC. As chairperson of the committee since November 1974, he had already established himself as an ‘expert’ on Northern Ireland97 and promoted his image as ‘an argumentative and committed Catholic Ulster Unionist’, to quote Patrick Cosgrave.98 Several years earlier, Biggs-Davison published a book tracing the history of Ireland, The hand is red, in which he claimed that Trotskyites and Communists had infiltrated the PIRA.99 In January 1976, following Thatcher’s reshuffle of her shadow cabinet, he was appointed as Neave’s deputy shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland; a post he retained until his resignation in 1978.100 Following the introduction of direct rule to Northern Ireland in 1972, BiggsDavison had opposed Edward Heath’s efforts to institute a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland.101 Indeed, in March of that year, he opposed the suspension of Stormont, voting against the second and third readings of the Northern Ireland (Provisions) Bill.102 During the mid-1970s, he regularly spoke against his party aligning itself too closely to the power-sharing model, instead encouraging a more flexible attitude to devolution, which included the possibility of restoring a majorityrule government in Northern Ireland.103 His appointment as Neave’s number two, in the words of the Irish Times, meant that there was ‘no moderate influence on Tory policy’ on Northern Ireland.104 Despite the forewarnings from the Irish Times, the appointment of van Straubenzee105 as a third member of Neave’s team ensured there was a ‘moderate’ voice within the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland team. A close friend to Heath, who was minister of state in the new Northern Ireland Office (NIO) from 1972 to 1974, van Straubenzee had won the respect of Catholics in Northern Ireland because of his support for devolved government based on a power-sharing assembly. He was also understood to have disliked many within the Ulster Unionist camp, arguing strongly against offering them the whip in the aftermath of the Conservative Party general election defeat in February 1974.106 Like Biggs-Davison, since at least 1973, he was also a member of the CPPNIC, becoming a vice-chairman by the time Thatcher was appointed the official leader of the opposition.107

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From February 1975 to May 1979 (prior to the Conservative Party’s entry to government), the CPPNIC met on approximately thirty-eight occasions. In a demonstration of her lacklustre attitude to Northern Ireland, Thatcher never attended a meeting of the CPPNIC during her period as official leader of the opposition.108 Over this five-year period, a range of topics was discussed and policies agreed by CPPNIC members. Topics that were debated included how to tackle American financial support of the PIRA,109 the possibility of running Conservative Party candidates in Northern Ireland110 and expressions of ‘anxieties’ regarding the economic viability of the car manufacturer DeLorean, which operated from west Belfast.111 Invited guests also regularly attended meetings of the CPPNIC during this period. They included James Molyneaux, leader of the UUP in the House of Commons; Gerry Fitt, a prominent Northern Nationalist;112 Anne Dickson, a moderate voice within Ulster Unionism;113 and Conor Cruise O’Brien, Ulster Unionist sympathizer, former Irish government minister and Irish senator.114 During the first year of Thatcher’s leadership of the Conservative Party, from February to December 1975, alone, the CPPNIC met on fifteen occasions. The records show that it was a busy period, with Neave and his fellow CPPNIC members immersing themselves in the practical details of policy development in relation to Northern Ireland. A range of issues were discussed at meetings of this body, including a report dealing with British-Irish relations following Neave’s meeting with the taoiseach Liam Cosgrave115 in Dublin during mid-May 1975;116 a discussion regarding a recent visit by Neave and Biggs-Davison to Londonderry117 as well as a debate regarding talks between the British government and the PIRA, which were described as having ‘discredited democratic politicians’.118 The most significant issue considered by CPPNIC members during 1975 was a decision, taken on 15 May, to establish a so-called ‘fact-finding’ subcommittee under the auspices of the CPPNIC. This new fact-finding subcommittee was assigned the task, as the minutes phrase it, to ‘reassess the policy in the Ulster Situation’. The decision to use the term ‘fact-finding’, rather than the word ‘policy’, in the title of this new subcommittee was a deliberate ploy by Neave to ‘avoid speculation that a rightwing policy switch was imminent’.119 As such, this new fact-finding subcommittee was tasked with reviewing and updating the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy considering recent developments, including the decision of the PIRA to renew its ceasefire in February 1975 and the ongoing Northern Ireland Constitution Convention (NICC) talks which had commenced in May of that year (the subject of the NICC talks is discussed below). Agreement was reached that membership of the fact-finding subcommittee would be ‘flexible’ and sourced from current members of the CPPNIC. Significantly, CPPNIC members also agreed that the fact-finding subcommittee would be responsible for devising a ‘final’ policy paper on Northern Ireland, which would be presented to the LCC in July 1975 (in fact, it was not until the following year, in July 1976, that Neave submitted this requested policy paper on Northern Ireland to the shadow cabinet for consideration).120 The fact-finding subcommittee first convened 17 June 1975 (thereafter, it continued to meet, usually monthly, until at least July 1977).121 It was composed of approximately

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ten MPs drawn from the CPPNIC. Neave chaired the first meeting (and was elected committee chairman thereafter). Also in attendance were Biggs-Davison, van Straubenzee, John Farr,122 Carol Mather,123 Michael Mates, Norman Miscampbell, Peter Mills,124 Nigel Fisher, Philip Goodhart and Lord Belstead. John Huston, a research officer on Northern Ireland at the Conservative Party Central Office (CPCO), was appointed as committee secretary.125 At the inaugural meeting, members agreed that the workings of the new subcommittee would be ‘kept secret’.126 Between June and December 1975, the fact-finding subcommittee met on seven occasions. At these meetings, a range of issues were discussed in relation to the political and security situation in Northern Ireland, including, Northern Ireland’s possible integration into the remainder of the UK;127 concerns regarding British prime minister Harold Wilson’s determination ‘to break the Union’, to quote Neave;128 and the merits of re-establishing a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland.129 During this period, several non-Conservative Party politicians also spoke at separate meetings of the fact-finding subcommittee, including Brian Faulkner,130 William Craig,131 Merlyn Rees132 and John Hume.133 By January 1976, the fact-finding subcommittee found itself conducting its work under an increasing atmosphere of fear and recrimination in Northern Ireland, as paramilitary violence by Loyalists and Irish Republicans steadily grew following the collapse of the PIRA ceasefire the previous year. On 4 January, six Catholic civilians from two families were murdered because of two separate gun attacks by Loyalist paramilitaries.134 The following day, 5 January, the ‘Kingsmill’s Killings’ occurred, when ten Protestant civilians were murdered by the Republican Action Force (RAF), a cover name for some members of the PIRA.135 These killings caused outrage amongst both sides of the political and religious divide in Northern Ireland and among politicians in Belfast, Dublin and London. While condemning the recent murders of innocent Catholics by Loyalists, Neave singled out for criticism the ‘the barbarous killing of ten workmen in Northern Ireland’ at Kingsmill. These killings on behalf of Irish Republican paramilitaries, he exclaimed, demonstrated that the ‘hollow sham’ of the PIRA’s ceasefire ‘has been shattered forever’.136 At a meeting of the LCC, on 28 July 1976, Neave outlined details of a new policy paper on Northern Ireland (this meeting was held one week after the assassination of Christopher Ewart Biggs, British ambassador to Ireland, by the PIRA on 21 July).137 The findings of this policy paper were the result of almost a year’s work conducted on behalf of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, in conjunction with the CRD. This was the first occasion since becoming shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland that Neave provided a set of general principles outlining the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy under his guidance, albeit privately. Importantly, this policy paper on Northern Ireland had the support of not only the CPPNIC and accompanying fact-finding subcommittee, but also of Thatcher and her shadow cabinet. Addressing this meeting, which Thatcher chaired and was attended by Peter Carrington,138 Howe, Keith Joseph, Reginald Maulding and Whitelaw, Neave explained that this policy paper was the fruition of regular meetings of the factfinding subcommittee, which since June 1975 had kept ‘in touch with the developing political situation in Ulster, and discuss[ed] future party policy’. ‘All the main Northern

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Ireland parties’, he said, have been in direct contact with himself and other members of the subcommittee and ‘written submissions have been received’.139 Accordingly, Neave recommended that the contents of the policy paper should constitute official Conservative Party policy on Northern Ireland.140 Under the heading ‘Northern Ireland’, Neave read out the contents of this policy paper. Following a recent meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee, the preamble outlined that a decision had been reached in relation to the Conservative Party’s ‘approach to the current political and security situation in Northern Ireland’. Members of the fact-finding subcommittee, it recorded, had ‘taken into account the talks which we propose with the Security Forces and Northern Ireland political parties during the summer recess’. On political/‘constitutional’ matters, the policy paper was generally consistent with the Neave/Thatcher policy stance on Northern Ireland, to date.141 Namely, that in the hope of ending direct rule the Conservative Party agreed to continue bipartisan support for the Labour government’s calls for the restoration of a devolved government in Northern Ireland (although the policy paper was deliberately vague on the issue of whether the Conservative Party favoured majority-rule or power-sharing). The policy paper also acknowledged that Northern Ireland was under-represented at Westminster and that the number of Northern Ireland MPs should be increased accordingly. In relation to ‘security’, the policy paper was not shy in its criticisms of the Labour government’s recent efforts to ‘contain’ the paramilitary activities of the so-called ‘Godfathers of Terrorism’ which had inspired ‘no confidence’. Likewise, it did not refrain in its criticism of the Irish government’s perceived lethargic response to arresting Irish Republican paramilitaries who were allegedly using the Republic of Ireland as a safe haven, after committing acts of violence in Northern Ireland and mainland Great Britain. Indeed, it was clear from the policy paper that CPPNIC members believed that security improvements, rather than political initiatives, lay at the heart of the Conservative Party’s thinking on Northern Ireland. Under the subheadings, ‘constitutional’ and ‘security’, the policy paper recorded the following:

Constitutional 1. On constitutional and political questions, we should continue to adopt a broadly bipartisan approach [with the Labour government] wherever possible; 2. While there may be no early alternative to Direct Rule, we should press for every step to be taken to make it less bureaucratic and more accessible to local opinion; 3. We should co-operate with those Northern Ireland Parties who are searching for a stable constitutional system and encourage talks to pave the way for an agreed form of devolved government; 4. We agree that Northern Ireland has too few seats in [Westminster] Parliament …; 5. The policy sub-committee does not advocate a further re-organisation of local government in Northern Ireland at present, since it is not known what form of devolved assembly will ultimately emerge.

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Security 1. There is no real prospect of constitutional progress until the present weak security policy gives way to a determination to destroy terrorism. Attempts to ‘contain’ it inspires no confidence; 2. We should continue to urge joint security measures with the Dublin Government; 3. There are no additional legal powers in place of detention to assist the Security Forces to catch the ‘Godfathers of Terrorism’ … the law should be amended to create a single offence of committing an act of terrorism to apply to the whole United Kingdom.142 Following the summer political recess, the contents of the above policy paper on Northern Ireland were incorporated, almost verbatim, within the Conservative Party’s official policy booklet entitled The right approach: a statement of Conservative aims. Published in early October 1976, in advance of the annual Conservative Party Conference in Brighton (5–8 October), The right approach outlined the Conservative Party’s ‘aims today’, including chapters on ‘Political choice’ and ‘The right economic strategy’.143 John Huston of the CPCO worked on the first draft of the subsection on Northern Ireland in The right approach. The revised draft was then forwarded to Christopher Patten,144 director of the CRD, 1974–9, for his consideration. Following some minor revisions, Patten forwarded the draft subsection on Northern Ireland to Neave for his amendments. Huston reportedly said that on receiving the latest draft Neave was unhappy given that the text was ‘too short’ and thus might be construed that Northern Ireland ‘was fairly low down on the Conservative’s list of priorities’. Therefore, Neave amended the text, producing a longer version, which focused on political and security related issues.145 The published version of the subsection on Northern Ireland in The right approach, read thus: 1. On constitutional and political questions, we should continue to adopt a broadly bipartisan approach [with the Labour government] wherever possible; 2. There is no greater challenge to the rule of law and order in the United Kingdom than the dreadful outbreak of violence in Northern Ireland … The continued terrorism means that there may be no early alternative to Direct Rule from Westminster …; 3. We shall continue to encourage talks among them [Northern Ireland political parties] to pave the way for a devolved form of government …; 4. We also recognise that Northern Ireland is under-represented in [the Westminster] Parliament, and believe this question should be discussed in the context of future representation of all parts of the United Kingdom; 5. There is no real prospect of constitutional advance until the rule of law is restored throughout the Province. This will only be achieved by a determination to destroy terrorism in place of the present unsatisfactory attempts to contain

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it. We have already urged the Government to intensify joint measures with the Government of the Irish Republic to establish greater control of the Border …; 6. We are studying possible amendments to the law to create a single offence of committing an act of terrorism which would cover organising, recruiting and incitement within the United Kingdom; 7 . Of all the steps to be taken in Northern Ireland, the most important is the restoration of confidence that we shall abandon negotiations with terrorists and not withdraw troops until they are no longer needed.146 Addressing a meeting of the CPPNIC, on 19 October 1976, Neave told those present that the subsection on Northern Ireland contained within The right approach henceforth represented the Conservative Party’s official Northern Ireland policy. He said that the continuation of direct rule was having a ‘stultifying effect on local politics’. As a result, what was needed was for the Conservative Party to continue to ‘stimulate political discussions’ in Northern Ireland in the hope that the current political deadlock could be broken.147 A revealing feature of The right approach in relation to Northern Ireland was the Conservative Party’s vagueness in how it would help ‘pave the way for a devolved government in Northern Ireland’, to quote the policy booklet. This was a deliberate omission on the part of Neave and his Northern Ireland advisors. As is addressed below, since his appointment as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland the devolution debate had proved a live wire amongst senior Conservative Party personalities.

Majority-rule or power-sharing? The Conservative Party and the Northern Ireland devolution debate, 1975–6 It did not take long into Thatcher’s leadership for differences of opinion to emerge amongst members of her shadow cabinet in relation to Northern Ireland, with Neave and William Whitelaw being the main antagonists. At the crux of the dispute was Neave’s alleged abandonment of a central plank of the Conservative Party’s established policy on Northern Ireland, namely, support for the restoration of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland based on a power-sharing model. More than anyone else in Thatcher’s shadow cabinet Whitelaw understood the ‘Irish question’. Following the introduction of direct rule in Northern Ireland in 1972, Edward Heath had appointed him as the first secretary of state for Northern Ireland in March of that year; a post he retained until Heath called him back to London in the winter of 1973 to shore up support for a crumbling government. During his time in Northern Ireland, Whitelaw not only familiarized himself with the major political parties on either side of the political and religious divide, but also negotiated with the PIRA chief of staff Seán MacStiofáin in July 1972.148 Most significantly, prior to his recall to London, Whitelaw helped lay the necessary groundwork for the Sunningdale Agreement of 3 December 1973, which facilitated the establishment of a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland, on 1 January of the

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following year. Under the terms of the Sunningdale Agreement, the Heath government, with the support of then leader of the UUP Brian Faulkner,149 the SDLP leadership and the Alliance Party agreed to set-up the controversial ‘Council of Ireland’, which promoted cross-border security and economic cooperation between Belfast and Dublin.150 Although Whitelaw was greatly perturbed by the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive in May 1974, because of the Ulster Workers’ Council strike, his mental model for securing a workable political solution to the Northern Ireland conflict always remained wedded to power-sharing. Indeed, on his passing in 1999, one of many obituaries recorded with sadness that the failure to find a settlement in Northern Ireland was ‘the greatest disappointment of his public life’.151 Within weeks of Thatcher’s appointment as official leader of the opposition, rumours began to emerge in the media regarding Neave’s apparent desire to abandon the Conservative Party’s support for a return of power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland. An article in the Irish Times, dated 25 February 1975, reported that while Whitelaw remained firmly committed to a power-sharing model, which included a provision for a Council of Ireland, Thatcher, under Neave’s influence, was considering a return to majority-rule.152 Although on several occasions Neave placed on the record that the Conservative Party supported the Labour government’s attempts to reinstate a power-sharing Executive,153 because, as he phrased it, he did not wish to make ‘a dog fight’ out of the issue,154 speculation remained that this approach might soon disintegrate. Neave’s intervention did little to quash Whitelaw’s anxieties. The deputy leader of the Conservative Party, together with several Conservative Party MPs (including Heath) were reportedly ‘furious’ with Neave and his co-collaborators in their assertions that power-sharing in Northern Ireland was ‘no longer possible’.155 A  confidential Irish government memorandum neatly summarized this internal division within the Conservative Party. Since Neave’s appointment as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, it noted, ‘there has been a gradual move away from the Heath/ Whitelaw policy as expressed in the then Conservative Government White Paper on Northern Ireland, which was published on 20 March 1973’.156 In May 1975, the Belfast Telegraph reported that Whitelaw had written to Thatcher warning her that several senior Conservative Party MPs ‘would not support any attempt to re-establish Unionist one-party [majority] rule at Stormont’, rather they remained committed to the power-sharing model.157 Whitelaw’s protests were understood to be so strong that there was speculation that he might resign from the shadow cabinet frontbench. In his memoir, Garret FitzGerald, Irish minister for foreign affairs, recalled that when he met Whitelaw, in London on 5 March 1975, the latter assured him of his commitment to ‘the principle that there could be no devolution without power-sharing in government’. If Thatcher ‘went back on this’ commitment, Whitelaw reportedly informed FitzGerald, he would resign as Conservative Party deputy leader.158 Later that year, on 24 October, in the company of Biggs-Davison and Sir Arthur Galsworthy, British ambassador to Ireland, 1973–6, Neave visited Dublin where he met the taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave (this was Neave’s second visit to Dublin in the space of six months).159 The main purpose of this visit to Dublin, Neave informed Cosgrave,

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was to inquire whether the taoiseach would agree to meet Thatcher, if she were to visit Dublin. Cosgrave said he would be more than happy to facilitate this invitation to Thatcher160 (in fact, the first time Thatcher met Cosgrave, as official leader of the opposition, was in March 1976, at a meeting in the Irish Embassy in London).161 Cosgrave redirected the discussions on Irish government’s central concern:  the Conservative Party’s policy vis-à-vis power-sharing in Northern Ireland. The taoiseach asked whether the Conservative Party’s attitude had altered since Thatcher’s election as leader of the opposition. Revealingly, Neave was evasive on this issue.162 During lunch at Iveagh House (at which Garret FitzGerald; Conor Cruise O’Brien, Irish minister for posts and telegraphs; and Declan Costello, Irish attorney general were also present), Neave reassured his Irish hosts that the Conservative Party was committed to maintaining a bipartisan policy on Northern Ireland with the Labour government. On the question of power-sharing, Neave said that to secure a workable solution, which included the SDLP, he confessed that a ‘system of devolved government’ would need to be ‘worked out’. However, he said he did not like the implications of using the word ‘power-sharing’ and thought it would be better to use some alternative such as ‘partnership’. Moreover, in a demonstration of his unwillingness to permit the Irish government any institutionalized involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland, Neave deliberately refrained from referring to Whitelaw’s previous public support for the creation of a Council of Ireland, under the terms of any agreement.163 Neave’s assurances regarding power-sharing, irrespective of his cautious words in relation to nomenclature, did not, however, bring an end to this controversy. In January of the following year, to Neave’s annoyance, the issue of nomenclature again raised its ugly head. In the hope of removing this topic from the political agenda, Neave selected a meeting of the LCC to express his reservations regarding the use of the term ‘power-sharing’. Addressing the shadow cabinet, on 6 January 1976, he advised that the Conservative Party should express support for the need to find ‘a system enjoying the widespread consent of both sections’ of the Northern Ireland community. ‘This is the only system’, he advised, ‘which offers a chance of long-term stability.’164 Speaking in the House of Commons, the following week, 12 January, Neave again deliberately did not use the term ‘power-sharing’. Instead, he said that the Conservative Party supported ‘a system of government which can command widespread support throughout the community, including the minority’.165 Unfortunately for Neave the controversy surrounding the Conservative Party’s approach to devolution in Northern Ireland and specifically the use of the term ‘power-sharing’ continued to cause divisions among senior Conservative Party figures. During the same debate in the House of Commons, on 12 January, Neave’s political nemesis Edward Heath called for the Northern Ireland political parties to agree to the re-establishment of a devolved government based on a power-sharing model. ‘I shall not quarrel about words’, he exclaimed. ‘If “power sharing” is unfashionable let it be called something else, such as partnership or participation.’166 Heath’s message was clear. While his Conservative Party colleagues might continue to argue about nomenclature, a devolved government based on a power-sharing model, was – in his thinking – the only viable policy on the table.

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Several members of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC also spoke out on the issue. Addressing the House of Commons, also on 12 January, Fisher and Ulsterborn John Arnold Farr each spoke in favour of a power-sharing model. Although careful to avoid the use of the term ‘power-sharing’, Fisher said an agreement between the political parties of Northern Ireland ‘must lie in partnership at the executive level, because that is the only system which could command support in both communities’.167 For his part, Farr argued that unless the major political parties in Northern Ireland came together ‘to hammer out some form of agreed responsibility-sharing’, public opinion in Great Britain would continue to mount in favour of the British Army’s withdrawal from Northern Ireland.168 The above comments by the three parliamentarians did not win universal acclaim among Conservative Party MPs. Neave’s number two in the shadow Northern Ireland portfolio Biggs-Davison publicly rebuked the contention that a power-sharing Executive constituted the most workable solution on the table. ‘It is absurd to imagine’, the deputy shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland said, ‘that a system of what is called institutionalized power-sharing can be forced on the political majority in Northern Ireland.’169 In fact, during the same debate, David James170 – who described himself as a ‘Catholic Unionist’171 – made an implausible suggestion that the British government consider the ‘real possibility’ of approaching the Irish government to ‘do an acre-for-acre swap of the southern end of Armagh, which is totally republican in character, with the northern end of Monaghan.172 By this point Neave found himself stuck in a difficult situation. His troubles in relation to the devolution debate must be understood within the context of the ongoing NICC talks. As a result of the Ulster Workers’ Council strike and the fall of the Northern Ireland Executive in 1974, the Labour government had toyed with the idea of establishing an elected convention whereby, in the words of Merlyn Rees, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, local politicians ‘would come together to discuss the future of the province’.173 Although it was proposed that the NICC would not constitute a parliament and would have no legislative powers, it would seek to deal with constitutional issues in relation to the status of Northern Ireland. In the words of Rees, the NICC would seek to ‘win support and respect throughout all parts of the community’.174 Following the publication of a White Paper on Northern Ireland in July 1974 and a series of protracted negotiations, an agreement was reached amongst the political parties of Northern Ireland and the British government to hold elections to a proposed seventy-eight NICC. Elections were fixed for May 1975, with each of Northern Ireland’s twelve Westminster constituencies putting forward candidates. Although many within Ulster Unionists circles opposed the NICC, they agreed to contest the elections under the umbrella of the United Ulster Unionist Coalition (UUUC).175 To the frustration of London and Northern Nationalists, however, on the campaign trail the UUUC demanded a return of devolved government in Northern Ireland, based on majority-rule. The SDLP, for its part, fought the election campaign with a commitment to restore devolved government in Northern Ireland based on a power-sharing Executive and an ‘internationalised Irish dimension’.176 When the votes

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were counted, the UUUC secured forty-seven seats on the NICC. The SDLP was the biggest winner on the Nationalist side securing seventeen seats, while the Alliance Party won eight seats. The NICC first convened on 8 May 1975, finally publishing its report on 20 November of that year. Unsurprisingly, given the gulf that existed between the UUUC and SDLP on the question of devolution, the talks failed to produce an agreement on Northern Ireland’s constitutional future. Although the lord chief justice of Northern Ireland (1971–88), Sir Robert Lowry, who chaired the talks, tried to convince either side to consider some compromise, the die was cast.177 On the one hand, UUUC members overwhelmingly opposed a return to power-sharing, instead favouring the reinstitution of a devolved government to Northern Ireland, in the form of majorityrule. On the other hand, the SDLP were adamant that: (1) power-sharing was the only viable option to ensure the support of the nationalist community of Northern Ireland and (2) an ‘institutional link between Northern Ireland and the Republic [of Ireland], in relation to security and other fields’, was essential if progress was to be forthcoming.178 The UUUC rejected, out of hand, the above two policies advocated by the SDLP. A stalemate thus ensued. Although Rees attempted to reconvene the NICC in February 1976, the UUUC and SDLP refused to compromise. Therefore, left with little choice, on 4 March of that year, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland announced the dissolution of the NICC and that Northern Ireland remained under direct rule. In his memoir, Rees aptly encapsulated the sense of pessimism that characterized day-to-day life in Northern Ireland at this time: My own gloomy conclusion from the results was that they revealed what we had known when we first arrived in the Province in 1974: the majority was against the whole concept underlying [the] Sunningdale [Agreement].179

The failure of the NICC talks convinced Neave that the prospect of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland was highly unlikely in the present circumstances. He was acutely aware that, given the widespread opposition to the restoration of a power-sharing Executive among Ulster Unionists, devolution for the time being, in his own words, ‘was not practical politics’.180 In fact, by the winter of 1976 Neave was providing contradictory messages vis-à-vis the devolution debate. On 23 September 1976, during a private conversation with the incumbent secretary of state for Northern Ireland Roy Mason,181 Neave professed that ‘[t]‌he Opposition of course agreed to power-sharing, indeed they had instituted it’.182 However, at the annual Conservative Party Conference in Brighton, in October 1976, Neave purportedly contradicted himself. An Irish government source reported that, on the fringes of the conference, Neave had briefed a cabal of Conservative Party MPs that he was giving ‘serious thought to a system of majority government for Northern Ireland’.183 Whitelaw was reportedly furious on learning of Neave’s comments. The Conservative Party shadow cabinet, Whitelaw implored, ‘hadn’t discussed one word of the ideas floating around about majority government’.184 Michael Mates, a member of the CPPNIC and known supporter of power-sharing, was, likewise, privately ‘scathing’ of Neave’s recent remarks at the Conservative Party Conference.185

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The SDLP leadership soon became embroiled in this latest controversy, with Gerry Fitt being Neave’s main antagonist. The leader of the SDLP was reportedly enraged on learning that on the eve of the annual Conservative Party Conference, 4 October, Neave had organized (with the support of chairman of the Conservative Executive Committee Sir Charles Johnson) a ‘warm reception’ for the Ulster Unionist delegation which Thatcher and almost the entire shadow cabinet had attended.186 Several Ulster Unionist parliamentarians reportedly attended this reception,187 including Harry West, a bluff and good humoured family man and leader of the UUP,188 the Rev. Martin Smyth189 and William Ross.190 According to the same Irish government source noted above, to address the SDLP’s anxieties, Whitelaw next intervened. The deputy leader of the Conservative Party privately informed Fitt that his party still favoured a power-sharing agreement.191 By this stage, however, Fitt was on the warpath. Addressing a fringe meeting of Greater London Young Conservatives in Brighton, on Thursday, 7 October, the SDLP leader said that while he had ‘great respect’ for Edward Heath he could not say the same for either Neave or Biggs-Davison and ‘other right wingers’ in the Conservative Party. He accused Neave and his co-conspirators of ‘cosying up’ to Ulster Unionists in the hope of restoring ‘one-party government in Northern Ireland’.192 Neave was unperturbed by Fitt’s criticism. ‘If the SDLP wished to be tough,’ he reportedly said, ‘then the Conservatives could be equally tough and could if they wished to stop talking altogether.’193 This latest confrontation with Neave left a bitter taste in the mouths of the SDLP leadership and their anger over the matter, to quote Sarah Campbell, ‘found concrete form … when the party representatives refused to meet Tory spokespeople on northern affairs’, for several weeks.194 The SDLP leadership were not alone in their recent criticism of Neave. His actions at the annual Conservative Party Conference in Brighton also set off alarm bells in Dublin. The issue came to a head during an extraordinary meeting in London between Thatcher, Whitelaw and Garret FitzGerald, on 14 October 1976. Neave was absent as he was coincidentally on a visit to Northern Ireland. In advance of this meeting, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) civil servants advised FitzGerald to push Thatcher to clarify the ‘Haziness’ in the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy. Under Thatcher, the Irish government surmised that there was a lack of ‘clear, regular statements at leadership level’ on Northern Ireland. In many of the statements delivered by Neave there was ‘no reference to a power-sharing, devolved Government’. Therefore, to clear up ongoing confusion FitzGerald was advised to request from Thatcher a ‘clear public commitment at an early date (and repeated regularly thereafter) to a policy based on maintenance of the Union and [a]‌devolved power-sharing Government’.195 Following the conclusion of opening pleasantries, FitzGerald focused on the crux of his argument. Neave’s remarks at the recent annual Conservative Party Conference regarding majority-rule, he explained, had raised concerns within the Irish government that the Conservative Party, under Thatcher’s leadership, had decided to abandon its bipartisan policy with the Labour government on the issue of power-sharing.196 As FitzGerald subsequently explained in his memoir, by this period the Irish government had become ‘increasingly concerned’ regarding Neave’s ‘drift away’ from the traditional bipartisan policy on Northern Ireland.197

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To FitzGerald’s astonishment, Thatcher said that she was not aware of the recent public spat between Neave and the SDLP leadership regarding the question of powersharing. For the second time, FitzGerald then requested that the Conservative Party make an ‘unequivocal re-assertion’ in support of the restoration of a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland. Whitelaw and Thatcher immediately challenged FitzGerald’s suggestion that the Conservative Party had abandoned its commitment to securing a devolved power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland. ‘Their policy had not changed one iota’, FitzGerald reported them as saying.198 While FitzGerald said he accepted that this was their position, he suggested the same could not be said of Neave. ‘Speeches by the Conservative spokesman on Northern Ireland, Airey Neave,’ he explained, ‘had either omitted reference to power-sharing on occasions when such a reference would have been extremely relevant, or had seemed to modify or water down in some way the commitment to power-sharing.’199 Thatcher and Whitelaw reportedly ‘demurred’ at FitzGerald’s analysis. In response, FitzGerald handed Thatcher a copy of several speeches made by Neave on Northern Ireland since his appointment as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland.200 On being supplied with this new evidence regarding Neave’s public and private comments in relation to majority-rule and power-sharing, FitzGerald’s hosts seemed genuinely startled. They then asked FitzGerald what they could do to alleviate the situation. FitzGerald proposed two suggestions. First, what was necessary was for the British government to issue a public statement reiterating its commitment to restoring a devolved Executive in Northern Ireland based on a power-sharing model. And that it ‘would be vitally important that the Conservative Party immediately endorses this statement’. Second, he said that when Thatcher found an opportunity she should ‘make a major speech on Northern Ireland’ in support of power-sharing.201 Thatcher responded cautiously to FitzGerald’s proposals. She could not agree to support the Irish government’s first suggestion until she had first sought the advice of Neave. Regarding the second suggestion, she rejected this out of hand. She said that she had ‘hitherto avoided talking about the political aspects of Northern Ireland, but had confined herself to security matters’. She said that ‘what impressed her was the sense of fear in which people lived in Northern Ireland and therefore she had stuck to this aspect of the matter’.202 Strikingly, during the encounter FitzGerald said that he quickly came to the worrying realization just how ill-informed Thatcher was in relation to Northern Ireland. ‘Margaret Thatcher then asked me why was it that the politicians in Northern Ireland could not reach agreement’, FitzGerald wrote. ‘In asking the question it became clear that she was considerably confused and thought that the [Northern Ireland Constitutional] Convention Report involved a proposal for emergency power-sharing for 5 years.’203 In fact, it took the intervention of FitzGerald and Whitelaw to ‘patiently put her right on this’.204 In his memoir, FitzGerald was more critical of Thatcher following this encounter. ‘I left torn between dismay at the fact that even after eighteen months of party leadership she was still so poorly briefed on Northern Ireland and a measure of hope that I  might have made sufficient impact to reverse the drift in Conservative policy under Neave’s spokesmanship [sic]’, he wrote.205

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This encounter confirmed Dublin’s worst fears about Thatcher’s perceived general ignorance and occasional prejudicial opinion of Irish Nationalist politicians in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. She tended to believe, to paraphrase Charles Moore, that the Irish political class in Dublin were obsessed by cultural politics over the more clear-cut economic debates, as recounted in her memoir.206 Thatcher’s own strongly held Methodist beliefs might have also influenced her outlook towards Nationalist Ireland. In the words of Hugo Young, given Thatcher’s staunch Protestantism, ‘of a breed which scarcely comprehended Catholicism’, she was left with ‘no natural sympathy’ for Catholics living in Ireland, north or south.207 Moreover, this meeting with FitzGerald confirmed Whitelaw’s anxieties concerning Neave’s handling of the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy to date. Not only was Whitelaw perturbed by Neave’s apparent abandoning of a power-sharing model, as the basis of his party’s political strategy in relation to Northern Ireland, but equally worrying was Thatcher’s willingness to permit her shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland an almost freehand in the deployment of the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy. Whitelaw, however, was adamant that Neave not be allowed to single-handedly derail the Conservative Party-Labour government bipartisan approach to Northern Ireland. Shortly after the FitzGerald-Thatcher meeting, he ordered Neave to repair relations with the SDLP. The shadow of state for Northern Ireland grudgingly obliged. In the days following FitzGerald’s meeting with Thatcher, Neave wrote to the SDLP leadership to address their grievances. While the shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland did not explicitly note that he favoured a power-sharing model, he did reassure the SDLP leadership that there ‘had been no deal with the UUP, nor had the Conservative Party come out in favour of majority-rule’.208 However, rather than accepting responsibility for the recent debacle, Neave blamed the Irish Times for suggesting that the Conservative Party had taken up a new Northern Ireland policy, in the wake of the annual Conservative Party Conference in Brighton.209 He also placed part of the blame solely at the feet of the Irish government. Privately, at the time, he was extremely critical of Dublin’s attempts to influence the Conservative Party’s thinking on Northern Ireland over his head. He was particularly annoyed by recent discussions between the Irish ambassador in London, Donál O’Sullivan and Whitelaw. Privately, Neave requested that the FCO cease using Whitelaw as an intermediary in its dealings with Dublin and instead deal directly with him.210 On the Irish side, Neave signalled out Garret FitzGerald for criticism. The Irish minister for foreign affairs, Neave protested, was ‘too apt to criticise him for having abandoned the bipartisan policy [on Northern Ireland]’.211 Despite Neave’s attempts to gloss over recent events, his latest run-in with Whitelaw had taught him a valuable lesson. In future, he would refrain from publicly speaking out in favour of majority-rule, at the expense of power-sharing. He confirmed this modus operandi at a meeting of the CPPNIC in November 1976. Regarding recent correspondence with Harry West, Neave rebuked a suggestion from the leader of the UUP that the Conservative Party ‘should adopt a more one-sided [i.e. pro-Unionist] approach’. Rather, Neave advised that henceforth it was imperative to keep on good

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terms with the SDLP and refrain from making public commitments in favour of majority-rule – a view that was endorsed by CPPNIC members.212

‘Their patriotism was real and fervent, even if too narrow’: The Conservative Party and the UUP, 1972–78 Occasionally, Neave’s relationship with the UUP was as equally strained as with the SDLP. On taking up his new portfolio, the shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland found himself tangled up in a political web between the Conservative Party and the UUP. A  collapse in trust between the two movements must be understood within the context of the then British prime minister Edward Heath’s decision in 1972 to introduce direct rule and subsequently support the establishment of a powersharing assembly in Northern Ireland. In fact, to quote Jeremy Smith, relations between the Conservative Party and UUP during the twentieth century ‘represented a story of extremes’. During the first half of this century there was ‘a period of close and intense association’ between the two movements ‘based upon ties of history, ideology and politics’. The Conservative Party and the UUP ‘shared a common Toryism that was rooted in a strong support for Empire, the established Constitution, the Protestant faith, the Crown and the integrity of the United Kingdom’.213 Evaluating traditional Conservative Party-UUP relations in 1975, the CRD elaborated on this relationship. The Conservative Party was ‘the only party regarded by Ulstermen as trustworthy on the Union’. Since the beginning of the last century, the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) had ‘been an integral part of the Conservative and Unionist Party’, and Parliamentary representatives usually accepted the Conservative Party whip.214 However, the Conservative Party-UUP bond was severely damaged by 1974. As noted above, the crisis dates to 1972 following the Heath government’s decision to suspend the Northern Ireland parliament and introduce direct rule. This policy caused deep resentment and misgivings within the UUP towards the Conservative Party. Relations further deteriorated when only eight Conservative MPs voted alongside Ulster Unionists in their vehement opposition to direct rule.215 The growing division between the parties was cemented by the winter of 1973. Despite Brian Faulkner’s willingness to agree, in principle, to establish a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland in November 1973, many Ulster Unionists could simple not stomach Heath’s support for the Sunningdale Agreement of December of that year, which agreed to set up a Council of Ireland to encourage better economic and security cooperation between Belfast and Dublin.216 In protest, UUP MPs at Westminster ‘aligned themselves with other brooding anti-Heath cabals opposed to his policies on the economy, Trade Union reform and Europe’.217 Thereafter, the UUP refused to be officially associated with the Conservative Party at Westminster, with several UUP MPs resigning the Conservative Party whip. As Smith explained, a feeling of disillusionment soon set in amongst UUP supporters, with traditional Unionist affection for the Conservative Party rapidly diminishing218 (the

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UUP, however, continued to preserve its ties to the National Union of Conservatives and Unionist Association).219 The collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive in 1974, following the Ulster Workers’ Council strike, gave hope to some within the UUP, under the leadership of Harry West,220 that contacts might be improved with the Conservative Party; for example, during this period many UUP MPs still attended meetings of the CPPNIC.221 This honeymoon period was short lived. Relations deteriorated sharply because of UUP MPs’ refusal to support Heath’s efforts to form a stable government in the hung Parliament after the British general election of February 1974. Many UUP MPs could simply not forgive Heath’s government for the abolition of Stormont and the introduction of a power-sharing Executive. As a result, Heath was forced to resign as British prime minister. Unsurprisingly, Heath never forgave Ulster Unionists for this ‘final act of revenge’.222 This was the chaotic state of affairs that Thatcher inherited on her appointment as leader of the Conservative Party in February 1975. Not only did UUP MPs no longer take the Conservative Party whip, but within the Conservative Party many senior party figures (including Heath and Whitelaw) harboured resentment towards Ulster Unionists’ willingness to play the Conservative Party and Labour government off one another in a defiant show of its new-found independence. In October 1975, for instance, Whitelaw reportedly branded the UUP a ‘sectarian party’.223 Thatcher, likewise, was frustrated by the UUP’s unsympathetic, occasionally hostile, attitude towards the Conservative Party. Whilst some have unfairly accused her of thereafter viewing Ulster Unionists as the ‘enemy’,224 she certainly took a certain dislike to them; a dislike that she continued to foster during her the course of her premiership. In The Downing Street years, she admitted that while her ‘own instincts were profoundly Unionist’,225 that she was ‘temperamentally a unionist’,226 she always found it ‘uphill work’ discussing Northern Ireland matters with the UUP (and Ulster Unionist politicians in general).227 As a result, there was something of a paradox in her relations with Ulster Unionism, as she later wrote: I knew that these people shared many of my own attitudes, derived from my staunchly Methodist background. Their warmth was as genuine as it was usually undemonstrative. Their patriotism was real and fervent, even if too narrow.228

In fact, Thatcher was generally mistrusting of Northern Ireland politicians, irrespective of their religious or political views. In later years, she recalled with a coldness that ‘in the history of Ireland … reality and myth from the seventeenth century to the 1920s take an almost Balkan immediacy’. ‘Distrust’, she wrote, ‘mounting to hatred and revenge is never far beneath the political surface. And those who step on to it must do so gingerly.’ ‘Certainly, time and again’, she continued, ‘I found that apparently innocuous words and phrases had a special significance in the overheated political world of Ulster’ (here, Thatcher was no doubt referring to the term ‘power-sharing’).229 Within days of Thatcher’s appointment as leader of the Conservative Party, BiggsDavison wrote to his incumbent leader vis-à-vis Conservative Party-UUP relations. Following a recent visit to Northern Ireland, there were ‘signs of a desire’ amongst the

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UUP to ‘renew parliamentary links’ with the Conservative Party. This rapprochement, he explained, had come from James Molyneaux. Molyneaux, who was described as ‘friendly, helpful and moderate in his approach to Northern Ireland matters’,230 and was known to have been ‘charmed’ by Thatcher,231 still sat on the executive committee of the Conservative Party National Union. Initially, at least, Biggs-Davison supported Molyneaux’s advances, advising Thatcher that a re-alliance with the UUP might help to ‘rebuild the Conservative base in Ulster and to add to our voting strength here’. In various ways, he wrote, including the admission of Molyneaux to some meetings of the CPPNIC, ‘I have been helping to sweeten the atmosphere.’ ‘In due course, I should like to discuss further steps with you.’232 Indeed, on 8 July 1975, Molyneaux attended a meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC at which he called on the Conservative Party to drop its support for a power-sharing arrangement in Northern Ireland and instead support his calls for ‘more local devolution’ in the form of ‘an upgraded local government system’ (i.e. Molyneaux’s ‘Regional Council’ model).233 Despite Biggs-Davison’s overtures, for the immediate period at least, the idea of renewing official links between the Conservative Party and the UUP was shelved. No record exists in the available archival files that Thatcher replied to Biggs-Davison’s letter. Instead, as had become customary under Thatcher’s leadership, to date, she was content to place policymaking in relation to Northern Ireland, including relations with the political forces of Ulster Unionism, in the hands of Neave, personally. One of the first tasks to confront Neave on becoming shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland was to establish a working relationship, not only with the UUP, but with a plethora of Ulster Unionist political movements. These included the DUP, led by the Rev. Ian Paisley; the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party, led by William Craig; and Brian Faulkner’s the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI). Within days of taking up his new portfolio, Neave met Faulkner on 19 February and West, a supporter of devolution based on majority-rule, on 20 February, to hear their views in relation to Northern Ireland’s constitutional future. This dialogue between the Conservative Party and Ulster Unionism continued during the summer of 1975. In early July 1975, Neave, accompanied by Biggs-Davison, visited Londonderry, where they met William Ross and members of the British Army.234 Between midJuly and early August, on Neave’s invitation, Messrs Craig, Faulkner, Molyneaux and West also attended a gathering of either the CPPNIC or accompanying fact-finding subcommittee to outline their respective party’s current stance in relation to Northern Ireland235 (on 5 August, John Hume of the SDLP, likewise, attended a gathering of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC).236 Despite Neave’s attempts to increase dialogue with the UUP, this should not suggest that he was a ‘staunch ally’ of the party.237 On the contrary, over the subsequent months and years, relations between the Conservative Party and the UUP became increasingly strained. Problems first surfaced in October 1975. At issue was Neave’s reluctance to permit Harry West an official platform to articulate the UUP’s attitude to Northern Ireland’s constitutional future, specifically his party’s opposition to power-sharing, at the annual Conservative Party’s Conference in Blackpool, 7–10 October 1975. Neave

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was determined to avoid a public discussion at the Conference on Northern Ireland’s constitutional future, at a time when many in his own party (chiefly, himself, BiggsDavison, Heath and Whitelaw) remained at loggerheads on whether to support the Labour government’s preferred policy of power-sharing or to support the UUP’s calls, under West, for a return to majority-rule. While the Conference was described as a ‘personal triumph’ for Thatcher, to quote a secret memorandum produced on behalf of the Irish Embassy in London, under Neave’s instructions, organizers were ordered to ensure that Northern Ireland was submerged beneath the political undergrowth.238 Neave reportedly did not want West to deliver a speech on Northern Ireland at the conference which might ‘prove embarrassing’, particularly if the shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland would not have a right to reply. Although both men had a two-hour meeting on the fringes of the conference, their talk reportedly lacked substance.239 Indeed, West was left to exclaim to newspaper reporters that he had been ‘snubbed’ by senior Conservative Party officials and MPs.240 One delegate, at least, was determined to force the subject of Northern Ireland onto the agenda. Addressing conference delegates, Barry Porter241 of Birkenhead, the Wirral in Merseyside, said he was ‘ashamed’ by reports in the newspapers that the Conservative Party continued to ‘ignore Ulster’. Porter exclaimed that ‘this country and this party ignores Ulster at its peril’. In language that contained racist undertones, he continued: In Ulster we have on our own doorstep the contemporary dilemma of modern democratic governments. How do we defeat the terrorists bent on political end? If the terrorists win in Ireland they can win here. It has already started in London, Birmingham and Guildford. Those are English towns and cities, not remote villages in Ireland. I speak as an Englishman. I know that the Irish are difficult and exasperating. There are times when I  wonder at their mental processes, and they must bear their own shame and responsibility for their own present difficulties.242

Porter’s protests won a sympathetic ear from a rabble of Conservative Party backbenchers. Several MPs refused to be silenced in relation to Northern Ireland. Neave’s main adversaries fell under the auspices of the infamous right-wing the ‘Monday Club’, a political pressure group, closely aligned with the Conservative Party.243 At the time, at least four members of the CPPNIC were recorded members of the Monday Club. They were Biggs-Davison, David James, Jill Knight244 and Nicholas Winterton.245 During the conference, the Monday Club convened two meetings. The first meeting was on Thursday (9 October) and the second on Friday (10 October). The Friday gathering, which assembled on the evening following Thatcher’s leadership address, met to discuss Northern Ireland. West was invited as the guest speaker. The UUP leader wasted little time in attacking the idea of power-sharing. ‘Power-sharing had … failed before and there was no reason to think it wouldn’t fail now … Government must represent the will of the people and not be set up by contrived measures’, he informed his audience.246

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Although West’s attack on power-sharing arrangements for Northern Ireland won a sympathetic response from most Monday Club members, the same could not be said in relation to his criticism of Thatcher’s leadership address. Privately, Biggs-Davison let it be known that West had delivered ‘a poor speech’.247 In truth, this coming together demonstrated the increasing gulf that had developed between the Conservative Party and the UUP over the preceding years. Biggs-Davison admitted as much during a private conversation with Dermot Gallagher of the Irish Embassy in London. Asked by Gallagher on the likelihood of restoring Conservative Party-UUP links, Biggs-Davison noted that although he hoped they would at some stage ‘this was not possible in the foreseeable future’ because ‘the Unionist Party is in complete chaos’.248 The following week, on 15 October, at a meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, Neave made a commitment that his party would not restore formal links with the UUP.249 Relations between the Conservative Party and UUP reached breaking point a couple of days later following comments by Whitelaw, in which he branded the UUP as a ‘sectarian party’.250 Although Neave tried to distance the Conservative Party away from Whitelaw’s comments, noting that they did not represent ‘official party’ views, the die was cast.251 Despite their differences, it would be wrong to suggest that Neave’s did not wish to promote a working relationship with the Conservative Party and the political forces of Ulster Unionism. Throughout the latter part of 1975, he routinely met leading Ulster Unionists. On 14 November, for example, accompanied by Thatcher, Neave held a meeting with a selection of Ulster Unionist politicians (and Oliver Napier252 of the Alliance Party) at Stormont Castle in Belfast to discuss the recently published report on behalf of the NICC. Those present, apart from Neave and Thatcher, included Brian Faulkner, William Craig, the Rev. Paisley (accompanied by his wife, Eileen) and Harry West.253 Later that month, on 24 November, a delegation of the UUUP attended a meeting of the CPPNIC to discuss, in further detail, the findings of the NICC Report.254 Biggs-Davison, likewise, was eager to foster better relations with Ulster Unionists, albeit on an unofficial non-alliance platform. Following the final meeting of the NICC in early March 1976, at which the UUUC and the SDLP remained at loggerheads regarding Northern Ireland’s constitutional future, Biggs-Davison called for a stronger bond between the Conservative Party and Ulster Unionists in helping to maintain the Union. Addressing a gathering of the UUC, at Ulster Hall in Belfast, on 19 March, he noted while he did not ‘speak of affiliations or of machinery. There is, however, so much that we must urgently do together.’ ‘The causes we have in common are not lost,’ he said, ‘always provided that we keep faith.’255 Despite attempts by Neave and Biggs-Davison to encourage more cordial relations with the UUP a deep sense of mistrust remained within the Ulster Unionist community regarding the Conservative Party and its stance on Northern Ireland. Molyneaux made this feeling of mistrust blatantly apparent during a meeting of the executive council of the UUC on 18 June 1976. Molyneaux spoke plainly. Relations between the UUP and the Conservative Party, he warned, are not ‘like the old days’. As Molyneaux phrased it, the Conservative Party ‘must face the fact that although we were as opposed to socialism, as they were, they must not think they own us any longer’. Although ‘no animosity’ existed between the UUP and the Conservative Party, he noted that they

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simply ‘did not have good relations’ with one another. ‘Until such times as they [the Conservative Party] came up with policies which were an improvement and which would undo the damage which they did  – then they could not come to terms’, he declared.256 At a subsequent meeting of the UUC, on 7 November 1976, Molyneaux said that given the Conservative Party’s current bipartisan policy with the Labour government in relation to Northern Ireland, Thatcher and Neave simply could not be trusted. ‘The Opposition’, he implored, ‘would like to give the impression that they were trying to help but there was a link with the Government which they showed a reluctance to break.’257 By the close of November, relations between the two movements cooled further following a direct intervention on behalf of Neave, personally. Over the previous weeks, following the annual Conservative Party Conference in early October, the shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland had become increasingly frustrated by West’s badgering of him to declare the Conservative Party’s official support of majority-rule in Northern Ireland. On 23 November 1976, Neave wrote to West to put to him ‘the position of the Conservative Party on the question of devolved government in order that there can be no confusion’ (Neave informed West that he intended to publish a version of this letter in the local and national newspapers).258 While not using the term ‘powersharing’, Neave explained that the Conservative Party had ‘not changed our policy’ since his speech in the House of Commons on 12 January 1976. Outlining his support for a devolved government in Northern Ireland, as his long-term solution (but not specifically majority-rule), Neave informed West, in no uncertain terms, that the Conservative Party ‘wanted a system of Government which could commend widespread support throughout the community including the minority’.259 In a sign of how poorly relations had become between Neave and West, the former privately referred to the latter’s recent criticisms of the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy as ‘absurd behaviour’.260 Although Neave was aware that many ‘hardline’ politicians within the UUP, such as West, opposed any political proposals that fell short of majority-rule,261 there were others within the party, led by Molyneaux, that were supportive of the proposal to establish one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland as an interim measure.262 In fact, during a meeting with Neave and Biggs-Davison, on 23 March 1977, Molyneaux informed his hosts that the British prime minister, James Callaghan, had already promised that local government ‘would be strengthened by a Regional Council or Councils’, as outlined in the ‘Molyneaux plan’ and that this would ‘be introduced when the Direct Rule legislation was renewed in the summer’.263 Neave was surprised by Molyneaux’s comments. In a letter to Thatcher, dated 23 March 1977 (the same day as Neave’s meeting with Molyneaux), the shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland explained that given the Labour government’s previous silence on the issue, he was shocked that Callaghan now seemed to favour the ‘Molyneaux plan’ for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils. He reminded Thatcher that the Conservative Party had not, as yet, made any final decision on this matter. Instead, he quoted from a Conservative Party publication, The right approach: a statement of Conservative aims, which stated thus: ‘We are ready to co-operate with the

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Northern Ireland political parties in continuing the search for a stable constitutional system.’264 In fact, as is examined in the next chapter, it was not until the following year, in April 1978, that Neave formally announced that the establishment of one or more Regional Councils constituted the basis of the Conservative Party’s official Northern Ireland political policy, in the short to medium term.265 The failure of the NICC talks, together with the continued stalemate amongst the political parties regarding the constitutional future of Northern Ireland, forced Neave to abandon his initial support for devolution (either majority-rule or power-sharing) on the basis that this approach was not practically viable in the medium term. ‘You know my view’, Neave informed Thatcher in September 1977; ‘Government at Stormont is impossible with eight political parties in conflict and could not be imposed anyway.’266 ********************************* In conclusion, although Northern Ireland evidently ranked low on Thatcher’s political priorities during her period as the official leader of the opposition, this should not suggest that the subject was neglected by the Conservative Party hierarchy. In fact, while Thatcher certainly took a back seat in relation to Northern Ireland, happy to give Neave a free hand in the development and implementation of policy, other within the higher echelons of the Conservative Party, chiefly Willie Whitelaw and John BiggsDavison, were determined to provide their input on Northern Ireland policy. During this period, the main vehicle for the development of the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy fell under the auspices of the CPPNIC and accompanying fact-finding subcommittee. Working in tangent with the CRD, these two bodies played a pivotal role in devising (and evolving) the party’s Northern Ireland, which was published, in October 1976, in the policy booklet The right approach: a statement of Conservative aims. The right approach, while providing a coherent overview of the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, also exposed a growing divergence within the party visà-vis the long-term constitutional future of Northern Ireland. Due to its deliberate vagueness in relation to the issue of devolution, the publication of The right approach unwittingly brought this issue back to the political centre stage. At the heart of the problem was whether under Thatcher’s leadership the party had abandoned bipartisan support with the Labour government for the restoration of a devolved government in Northern Ireland, based on a power-sharing model  – as promoted by leading Conservative Party MPs, including Whitelaw, Heath, William van Straubenzee, Fisher and John Arnold Farr. Or if the party, under the influence of Conservative Party MPs, such as Biggs-Davison, Ian Gow and David James, had instead decided to support the UUP’s demands for the re-establishment of majority-rule in Northern Ireland, based on the pre-direct-rule 1972 model. As is examined in the following chapter, during Neave’s final two years as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, prior to his murder by the INLA in March 1979, the basis of the Conservative Party’s political strategy for Northern Ireland focused on reform of local government at the expense of devolution. Initially, this approach was packaged in what Neave’s described as his so-called ‘Council of State’ proposal which

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advocated the establishment of an appointed body in Northern Ireland to scrutinize draft legislation and consider reports from public bodies and to question ‘Ministers and senior officials’.267 By February 1977, however, following an unsympathetic response from most mainstream political parties in Northern Ireland, Neave shelved support for this latest political initiative. In its place, as noted above, he instead agreed to support the Labour government’s plans to reinstate the upper tier of local government in Northern Ireland, which was removed in October 1973 with the establishment of one or more Regional Councils. Significantly, as is analysed in the following chapter, this proposal formed the basis of the 1979 Conservative Party general election manifesto’s subsection on Northern Ireland, which committed a Conservative-led government ‘to establish one or more Regional Councils with a wide range of powers over local services’.268

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Airey Neave and the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, 1975–9

Security and politics were ‘inextricably intertwined’: An overview of Airey Neave’s Northern Ireland policy Airey Neave was born on 23 January 1916.1 His father, Sheffield Airey Neave, was a well-known entomologist. Educated at Eton and later at Merton College, the University of Oxford and the Inns of Court, Neave lived for a short period in Germany during the 1930s, where he garnered a lifelong antipathy for Nazism. When the Second World War broke out in 1939, he immediately signed up for active service in the British Armed Forces. His experiences at Calais in 1940 (which he later described in his study, The flames of Calais),2 his subsequent capture and imprisonment by the Nazis, followed by his celebrated escape in 1942 from Colditz, a prisoner of war camp in Germany, cemented his reputation as a war hero (Neave was the first British officer to break out of Colditz).3 As mentioned in the previous chapter, during the final years of the war Neave was recruited by British Military Intelligence to work for MI9, a subsidiary of MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service. He helped European resistance movements and planned escape routes for Allied airmen (a role he described in another of his works, Saturday at M19).4 After the war ended in Europe 1945, he joined the British War Crimes Executive to collect evidence against prominent Nazis and served the indictments on Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg. Thereafter, during the early years of the Cold War, Neave remained close to British intelligence in the global fight against Communism. From 1949 to 1951, he was commanding officer of the Intelligence School 9, Territorial Army (TA). In 1953, Neave made his first breakthrough into national politics following his election as Conservative Party MP for Abington, a seat he retained until his death in March 1979.5 For some of those who worked alongside Neave, he was viewed as a ‘dour man’,6 with a ‘cold’ personality and a ‘taciturn manner’.7 For others, he was remembered as being a ‘highly respected’ Conservative Party MP, who had a gift for management.8 Although he ‘never laughed’, in the words of Lord Lexden,9 Neave’s former political advisor on Northern Ireland, he ‘smiled a lot’.10 Alan Clark maintained that Neave’s ‘subtlety and insight’ marked him out amongst his peers.11 A member of Thatcher’s staff described the Neave-Thatcher relationship as follows:

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Thatcher, the Conservative Party, Northern Ireland Conflict The relationship with Airey was the kind of relationship every prime minister needs. She had enough trust in him to follow his advice even against her instincts, and not to resent the fact … He could predict what people would do and what they were capable of doing, so little in politics ever surprised him. She is always being surprised, and she is often disappointed. He cushioned surprise and disappointment for her, and he could make her relax.12

Thatcher remembered Neave as a ‘man of contrasts’. ‘His manner was quiet yet entirely self-assured.’ It was ‘difficult’, she recalled, ‘to pin down Airey’s politics. I  did not consider him ideologically a man of the right. He probably did not look at the world in these terms. We got on well and I was conscious of mutual respect.’13 On Neave’s political ideas, Thatcher was indeed correct. He was not a right-wing member of the Conservative Party. Rather, in the words of John Campbell, Neave was ‘a traditional One Nation Conservative’.14 While Thatcher may have found it difficult to pin down Neave’s political philosophy, she had no such difficulty when assessing his attitude to Northern Ireland. Neave’s ‘intelligence contacts, proven physical courage and shrewdness’, she remembered, amply qualified him for ‘this testing and largely thankless task’ as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland.15 Thatcher’s choice of words is important. Her prioritizing of Neave’s intelligence and military capabilities, before his political qualifications, demonstrated, first and foremost, how she viewed him as an intelligence operative (during the 1970s, Neave allegedly remained in close contact with the British Secret Intelligence Services16 and was also a founding member of The National Association for Freedom, established in 1975).17 As is discussed below, Thatcher was incorrect in her assumption that Neave was solely preoccupied with security related issues. On the contrary, although his number one objective was to defeat Irish Republican paramilitaries, Neave immersed himself in the practical details of policy development in relation to Northern Ireland’s constitutional future. Primarily, Thatcher’s decision to appoint Neave as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland in her new shadow cabinet, in February 1975, was a reward for services rendered. His wartime experience and close links to the intelligence world had proved useful in acting as Thatcher’s campaign manager during her successful bid to become the leader of the Conservative Party when he was known for having operated best ‘behind closed doors’.18 Initially, Thatcher had considered not appointing Neave to her new shadow cabinet because many of his fellow parliamentarians within the Conservative Party reportedly did not like him. Apparently, she toyed with the idea of retaining Neave to run her private office until ‘such a time as she could give him a peerage’.19 For some of those close to Neave, it was felt that he lacked the qualities needed for his new portfolio. Speaking privately in 1977, for example, John Houston admitted that Neave was ‘not the brightest man in the world’ and was terrified ‘not to put a foot wrong’.20 Indeed, Roger Carroll, political editor of The Sun, informed a source in the Irish Embassy in London that ‘obviously [Neave] knew nothing about Northern Ireland’.21 For an observer looking in, it was an unusual, arguably strange, post for Neave to covet. In Conservative Party circles, Northern Ireland was regarded as a ‘graveyard

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for political ambition’.22 Although his grandmother was born in Ireland, over the preceding years he had shown no major interest in Northern Ireland.23 Under Edward Heath’s leadership, Neave had played no role in devising the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy. Indeed, he was not a member of the CPPNIC during the early to mid-1970s.24 In fact, prior to his appointment as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Neave had never raised the subject of Northern Ireland in the House of Commons.25 Rather, during Heath’s tenure, Neave was preoccupied with other issues, including championing for the release of Nazi war criminal Rudolf Hess from Spandau Prison in Germany.26 Revealingly, on his appointment as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, he admitted that ‘he had no experience of any previous decisions’ related to Northern Ireland.27 A  possible reason for courting this portfolio, apart from his military background, was that he gambled that competition for the Northern Ireland portfolio would not be particularly strong among Conservative Party MPs. Neave was aware that by signing up for this new role he would become a prime target of Irish Republican terrorists. ‘If they come for me, the one thing we can be sure of is that they will not face me’, he prophetically informed journalist Patrick Cosgrave.28 According to his parliamentary agent Les Brown, Neave was fully aware that he was on the Irish Republicans’ death list, but that it ‘went with the territory’.29 Lord Lexden wrote that on taking up his new post Neave was ‘heedless of danger and accepted no protection’.30 As we will learn, Neave’s refusal to be assigned police protection would ultimately play into the hands of his assassins in March 1979. It was by no means immediately apparent what course Neave would follow in his new portfolio as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland. He admitted as much during his maiden speech as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland in the House of Commons on 12 March 1975:  ‘there may be no textbook solutions to the problem in Northern Ireland’, he said.31 Indeed, while he was delighted to secure a post in Thatcher’s shadow cabinet, he was somewhat overwhelmed by his promotion. ‘This is my biggest job … [and] toughest job I’ve ever had in my life’, he was reported as saying.32 Neave confessed that he held a certain lack of knowledge when it came to the minefield of Northern Ireland politics. ‘I have an awful lot of reading to do, and many people to meet, before I  can really begin to get to grips with the Northern Ireland question … my experience and knowledge of Northern Ireland is small’, he noted33 (interestingly, Whitelaw made a similar admission on his appointment as the first secretary of state for Northern Ireland in March 1972).34 Speaking on RTÉ (Raidió Teilifís Éireann) radio (Ireland’s national broadcaster) in February 1975, for example, Neave admitted that he ‘had no experience of any previous decisions taken on Northern Ireland’, but hoped that his lack of knowledge would allow him to bring a ‘fresh look’ to the Northern Ireland issue in ‘terms of Conservative Party policy’.35 Despite any lingering apprehensions, on 20 February 1975, Neave articulated the rudimentary aspects of his Northern Ireland policy at a meeting of the CPPNIC. This was Neave’s first appearance at a meeting of the CPPNIC since his appointment as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland. He explained that he ‘wished to make it clear that he was not taking on the post as a spokesman for the British Armed Forces. He was primarily a democratic politician’, he said. ‘At the moment the main objective

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would be to help the [PIRA] ceasefire to continue’, he noted, but that he would ‘speak out on any issues if it became necessary’36 (Neave’s involvement with the CPPNIC from 1975 to 1979, and accompanying fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, is discussed in further detail in Chapter 1).37 Later that same evening, Neave elaborated on his Northern Ireland policy, albeit in limited detail. During an interview with assembled media he said, ‘I will follow the tradition of the bipartisan approach to the Ulster problem’, on behalf of the Conservative Party and Labour government. But he then shot a word of warning, aimed as much at Conservative Party MPs as his opposition colleagues in government: ‘but I must warn everyone that I reserve the right to speak out when I think it is necessary’.38 Subtly, Neave was laying down a marker: he was now firmly in charge of the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy. Like Thatcher’s stance, as outlined in Chapter  1, the basis of Neave’s Northern Ireland policy during his period as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland can be explained under two subheadings: (1) Security and (2) Political. In Neave’s mind, as he outlined in October 1975, when it came to the labyrinth affairs of Northern Ireland, security and politics were, as he phrased it, ‘inextricably intertwined and one cannot be isolated from the other’.39

(1) Security The basis of Neave’s stance on security vis-à-vis Northern Ireland can be understood along four key principles: (a) the Conservative Party opposed the British Army’s withdrawal from Northern Ireland, which Neave described as being ‘a suicidal policy, probably leading to something like civil war’;40 (b) a Conservative government would never make concessions, negotiate nor surrender to Irish Republican terrorists;41 (c) the Conservative Party categorically refused to restore ‘political status’ to paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland;42 and lastly, (d) a Conservative government would consider re-introducing the death penalty (capital punishment) for ‘terrorist killings’.43 Security related issues were a constant preoccupation, arguably obsession, of Neave during his period as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland.44 Central to his security policy, aligning himself closely with Thatcher, was the defeat of Irish Republican terrorism in all its guises. As Neave later acknowledged, his ‘first priority’ was the ‘defeat of the fairly small, but utterly ruthless, groups of terrorists, who are mainly responsible for the present troubles’.45 Lord Lexden deftly summarized the basis of Neave’s attitude to security and Northern Ireland: The principal element of that [security] policy was the complete extirpation of terrorism as the only basis for the restoration of lasting peace in Northern Ireland

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in a form compatible with the moral standards that ought to prevail in a democracy. By the late 1970s many, wearying of the conflict with the [P]‌IRA after nearly ten years, were ready to compromise with it, mouthing the ghastly phrase ‘there can be no military solution’: some in both the Conservative and Labour Parties had already sought compromises with terrorism. Neave insisted that complete victory over the enemies of the state had to be secured to avoid the moral corrosion that a deal with it would involve.46

Throughout his period as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Neave routinely promised that a Conservative government would ‘take all possible steps to ensure the defeat of terrorism’.47 In the words of Martin Dillon, Neave was ‘the one man in British politics who was unequivocal in his denunciation of terrorism’.48 Indeed, Neave’s willingness to apparently ‘take all possible steps to ensure the defeat of terrorism’ has encouraged some writers to argue that he was a supporter of the policy that later became known as ‘shoot to kill’, although no concrete evidence exists to support this assumption.49 Neave’s stance on security was not altogether surprising given his own background, particularly his close ties with the British Military Intelligence world. As a veteran of the Second World War and as someone who had an intimate knowledge of the murky world of espionage (including close links with British Army generals, senior policeman and spooks), he believed that for a political deadlock to be found in Northern Ireland, Irish Republican terrorists needed to be decisively defeated. Despite Neave’s commitment to follow a bipartisan approach on Northern Ireland tensions soon surfaced between himself and the Labour government regarding security related issues. The catalyst was a decision, in February 1975, by Merlyn Rees, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, to release over 270 political prisoners or ‘hard-core terrorists’, as Neave described them (this policy on behalf of the Labour government was in response to a decision by the PIRA to renew its ceasefire on 10 February).50 In his continued support for internment (which lasted until December 1975), Neave argued that the release of detainees in Northern Ireland was a ‘very dangerous gamble’.51 Addressing the House of Commons, on 12 May 1975, he attacked Rees’s decision to release political prisoners, exclaiming that it had caused ‘the greatest apprehension’ amongst Conservative Party MPs.52 Indeed, The Times reported that the decision had ‘astonished’ the Conservative Party leadership.53 It should come as little surprise, therefore, to learn of Rees’s antipathy for Neave. In fact, feelings of personal animosity between both men were mutual. Described as a ‘delightful Welsh Celt’,54 who was arguably ‘temperamentally unsuited’ for his role as secretary of state for Northern Ireland,55 Rees always found Neave ‘difficult to deal with’,56 and was reportedly ‘greatly annoyed’ by Neave’s recent comments regarding the Labour government’s decision to release political prisoners.57 The secretary of state for Northern Ireland recalled that, since Neave’s appointment to the shadow cabinet, the Conservative Party had become ‘increasingly sceptical and was sometimes outright hostile to our [Northern Ireland] policies’.58 Rees was particularly critical of Neave’s approach of first ‘clearing issues’ with members of the CPPNIC ‘before deciding to lend his support to the Secretary of State’, as pointed out by Roger Carroll.59 Garret

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FitzGerald likewise recalled Rees’s dislike of Neave. FitzGerald remembered that Rees believed that Neave knew very little about Northern Ireland and demonstrated ‘no ability to learn about it quickly’.60 More generally, Neave was at ‘loggerheads’ with Rees regarding the Labour government’s Northern Ireland security policy.61 The secretary of state for Northern Ireland’s answers on security, Neave privately noted in May 1975, were ‘very unconvincing’.62 Two years later Neave’s attitude had not changed. By this period, he regularly called on the Labour government to take up an ‘offensive’ strategy against Irish Republican paramilitaries. ‘In my view the whole concept of a long, defensive, “war of attrition” is completely wrong.’ ‘The Government should have ignored the Left Wing and gone on the offensive a long time ago’, he bemoaned. ‘They should institute a major “search and destroy operation” over the next twelve months, followed by a mopping up’ exercise, he was recorded as saying in April 1977.63 Rather than release Irish Republican prisoners, Neave maintained that the Labour administration should focus its resources on arresting the 100 or so ‘most dangerous merchants of terror, the “Bonzen” of the assassination squads’.64 He argued strongly against negotiating any ‘ceasefire or amnesty’ with Irish Republican paramilitaries,65 and that it was ‘fundamentally wrong’ to hold talks with Provisional Sinn Féin.66 He regularly lambasted the PIRA and, as he called them, ‘their so-called political front, the Provisional Sinn Féin’. ‘The Provisional Sinn Féin’, he protested , ‘is virtually indistinguishable from the PIRA.’ He called on the British government to declare Sinn Féin ‘illegal and charge its members, if they are thought to have aided and abetted terrorism, while belonging to a proscribed organisation’.67 Neave went as far as to advocate that the British Special Air Forces (SAS) should be ‘expanded into a Brigade’ and sent to Northern Ireland, that special emergency legislation be enacted ‘to plug gaps in the law’ and that the possibility of establishing ‘special courts’ with ‘lesser standards of evidence and in which incitement to terrorism could be considered’.68 As he privately informed Roy Mason in April 1977, ‘It was now the time to “finish off ” the terrorists before the situation dragged on any further’ (Mason replaced Rees as secretary of state for Northern Ireland on 10 September 1976).69 In Neave’s thinking, as he privately confessed in 1978, the terrorists operating a campaign of violence in Northern Ireland and mainland Great Britain in the pursuit of ‘political objectives’ were ‘heirs of Hitler’s example’ (Neave’s comments were no doubt inspired by the recent publication of his book dealing with the Nuremberg Trials).70

(2) Political On the politically sensitive subject of Northern Ireland’s constitutional future, Neave never wavered in his support of six key principles: ( a) that Northern Ireland must remain an integral part of the UK;71 (b) the Conservative Party sought ‘peace and reconciliation’ in Northern Ireland’;72 (c) no major constitutional changes or reforms should be implemented without the agreement of the main political parties in Northern Ireland;73 (d) direct rule should not last indefinitely;74

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(e) the Conservative Party refused to negotiate with Provisional Sinn Féin and that the movement should be banned;75 and lastly, (f) the Irish government had no right to interfere in the affairs of Northern Ireland.76 As discussed in the previous chapter, despite Neave’s commitment to the above six political principles, confusion remains when assessing his stance on the Conservative Party’s medium to long-term political strategy for Northern Ireland, specifically in relation to devolution.77 Although he initially favoured the Labour government’s calls for the restoration of a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland in the hope of ending direct rule, by September of 1977, he abandoned support for this political initiative, based on the argument that it was no longer viable in the medium term.78 In February 1978, Neave elaborated on his opposition to power-sharing as a workable medium-term policy. In correspondence with a Conservative Party supporter, on 17 February 1978 (the same day as the La Mon Restaurant bombing, in which twelve Protestant civilians were killed and a further twenty-three were badly injured by a PIRA bomb), he said that while in principle he favoured as his ‘ultimate aim’ the re-establishment of ‘devolved institutions of Government in Northern Ireland’, this measure was politically impractical in the medium-term as the ‘various Parties in the Province are still deeply divided, among themselves’.79 Indeed, given the widespread opposition from within Ulster Unionism to this policy, Neave privately conceded that ‘power-sharing Executive, i.e. on the 1974 model, was not practical politics’.80 Instead, as is examined below, Neave lent his support to reform of local government in Northern Ireland as an interim measure. This approach was packaged in the form of Neave’s so-called ‘Council of State’ proposal, which advocated the establishment of an appointed body in Northern Ireland to scrutinize draft legislation and consider reports from interested groups. In March and again in July 1976, addressing the House of Commons, Neave publicly spoke out in favour of establishing a Council of State as his preferred medium-term policy;81 a theme he returned to at the close of the year during an interview with the News Letter on 31 December.82 By February 1977, however, following an unsympathetic response from most mainstream political parties in Northern Ireland, Neave abandoned this latest political initiative. In its place, by the early months of 1978, he instead agreed to support the Labour government’s calls for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland, as an ‘interim step towards full legislative devolution’.83

An ‘interim affair’: Neave and the Council of State proposal Neave’s decision to focus on local government reform, as an interim policy, at the expense of some form of devolved government in Northern Ireland, stemmed from his growing frustration following the collapse of the NICC talks in February 1976.84 In his thinking, the Council of State proposal or ‘advisory body’, as he phrased it, would

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‘ameliorate the bureaucracy of direct rule’85 and consist of forty to fifty members, appointed rather than elected from nominations submitted from various interest groups in Northern Ireland. Faced with the political reality that devolution remained a long-term goal, rather than a medium-term policy, Neave argued that his plans for a Council of State would be responsible for scrutinizing draft legislation, drafting regional plans, considering reports from public bodies and ‘questioning Ministers and senior officials’.86 It was towards the end of 1976 and the beginning of 1977, working closely with Dr John Oliver, that Neave began to flesh out Conservative Party thinking in relation to his proposed Council of State, which he promised would be ‘a properly thought out one’.87 A confidential memorandum by the NIO, dated 23 February 1977, noted that Neave envisaged that such a Council of State would be ‘purely an advisory, nonadministrative, body of forty to fifty members, appointed rather than elected from nominations submitted from various interest groups in Northern Ireland’ (e.g. political parties, District Councils, Area Boards, Trade Unions, employers’ organizations and the universities). The same memorandum recorded that there were three main strands to the proposed work of the council: ‘scrutinising draft legislation and draft regional or area plans, considering reports from public bodies, and questioning Ministers and senior officials’.88 Initially, Neave’s proposal to establish a Council of State was not universally welcomed by senior figures within the Conservative Party. In July 1976, a policy paper on Northern Ireland produced on behalf of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC (of which Neave chaired), working in conjunction with the CRD, had advised against incorporating the proposal to establish a Council of State, as official Conservative Party policy on Northern Ireland.89 Moreover, there was no mention of this proposal in the subsection on ‘Northern Ireland’, within the Conservative Party’s official policy booklet, The right approach: a statement of Conservative aims, which was published in October.90 By December of that year, however, following protracted behind the scenes lobbying and an intense round of media kite-flying exercises, Neave managed to secure the support (in principle) of Thatcher and her shadow cabinet colleagues for his Council of State proposal. At a meeting of the CPPNIC, on 21 December 1976, despite some reservations, members agreed that the recommendations on behalf of the Conservative Party study group on a Council of State for Northern Ireland be signed off by the shadow cabinet and published as a discussion document.91 Almost immediately, however, the NIO privately expressed its reservations regarding Neave’s proposal. The relevant files held by the National Archives of the UK (TNA) contain numerous letters and memoranda produced on behalf of senior NIO officials outlining their collective opposition to Neave’s proposal. ‘If any bandwagon for an advisory body were to start rolling,’ an NIO civil servant wrote ‘with the OUP and SDLP, and the Conservatives, on board, we could find it difficult to halt it.’92 In fact, during the latter part of 1976 and early 1977, NIO officials made it their mission to stop Neave’s new political initiative before it garnered political momentum. The NIO regularly petitioned Roy Mason against supporting the Council of State proposal. For example, Mason, described by Sir Kenneth Bloomfield as a ‘cocky little

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man’,93 was warned by an unidentified NIO official that ‘an advisory body’ based on Neave’s Council of State model posed ‘grave difficulties’. ‘With nothing to do except give advice,’ the NIO official wrote, ‘it would probably succumb to the temptation of being wholly critical and destructive … an advisory body will not bring us any nearer to the agreement we seek on real devolution.’94 Instead, the NIO advised Mason to use his influence to convince Neave and ‘certain Unionists’ to abandon the idea of a ‘Council of State’ altogether and instead agree to Molyneaux’s idea of one or more Regional Councils, referred to as ‘administrative devolution’.95 Neave was infuriated by the NIO’s orchestrated campaign to undermine his Council of State proposal. Thereafter, relations between the shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland and the NIO remained tetchy and occasionally antagonistic. He believed that several senior NIO officials were deliberately undermining his efforts to make political progress in the hope of introducing local government reform in Northern Ireland, as a stepping-stone towards devolution. Addressing a meeting of the CPPNIC in October 1976, for instance, he exclaimed that ‘Direct Rule was having a stultifying effect on local politics and the Province was effectively [being] ruled by a semi-colonial style civil service.’96 He made a similar declaration the following year to a gathering of Conservative Party activists in Hartlepool:  ‘We must end the civil servants’ paradise which at present exists in Northern Ireland under direct rule with its colonial overtones.’97 In fact, there was a feeling amongst some senior Conservative Party figures that the NIO was relishing the ‘prospect of further Direct Rule of a punitive and more colonial nature’, to quote Norman Miscampbell, a member of the CPPNIC.98 Following a trip to Northern Ireland during this period, Philip Goodhart, also a CPPNIC member, was left to exclaim that NIO senior civil servants had ‘created a very bad impression. They were very cynical, and there were many ex-FCO men around.’99 Richard Luce,100 who accompanied Goodhart to Northern Ireland, also said that many NIO civil servants’ attitudes were ‘alarming: they displayed hostility to local civil servants and politicians’.101 Several influential Ulster Unionists, likewise, ridiculed Neave’s Council of State proposal. Harry West, leader of the UUP, publicly went on record to say that such a body would be a ‘waste of time’.102 The shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland’s proposal also received an unsympathetic response from the SDLP. Robin Ramsay (who worked in the office of the secretary of state for Northern Ireland) reported that the SDLP were ‘likely to reject’ this latest political initiative.103 By the early months of 1977, albeit reluctantly, Neave had arrived at the same judgement as Ramsay. At a meeting of the CPPNIC, on 7 February 1977, Neave explained that because ‘no obvious basis for agreement’ could be found amongst the political parties of Northern Ireland in support of the Council of State proposal, he was considering abandoning this project.104 Neave’s decision to shelve his Council of State proposal indefinitely was confirmed at a subsequent meeting of the CPPNIC on 15 February. Since most Northern Ireland political parties had been ‘critical of some aspects of a possible Council of State’, he said, but that there ‘seemed to be interest in the Regional Council idea’, it was advisable to place the Conservative Party’s support behind the latter initiative.105

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Later that year, Neave privately conceded to Mason that the Conservative Party had now ‘gone off Advisory Councils or Councils of State’ and were ‘re-thinking its policies about devolution to Northern Ireland and that they now favoured starting the devolutionary process at the local government end’ by establishing one or more Regional Councils.106 Indeed, the personal intervention of Mason was a deciding factor in Neave’s decision to drop this Council of State proposal. Despite their political differences, Neave admired Mason, a solid, tough, practical Yorkshireman from a working-class coal-mining background.107 Although he may have differed with Mason regarding certain areas of the Labour government’s policy of ‘Ulsterization’,108 he admired the strong stance that the secretary of state for Northern Ireland continued to take against Irish Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries. As Lord Donoughue, former head of the No. 10 Downing Street Policy Unit, 1974–9, recounted, like Neave, Mason always retained a particular dislike towards Irish Republican militarism, that he was ‘extremely anti-green’.109

‘Compromise integration’: Neave, Thatcher and the Regional Council debate In July 1977, Mason held individual talks with the leaders of the Northern Ireland political parties, including the UUP and SDLP, regarding his plans to establish one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland as an ‘interim step towards full legislative devolution’.110 The proposal to reinstate the upper tier of local government, which was removed in October 1973, in the form of locally elected Regional Council or Councils was planned to fill the gap between the twenty-six District Councils in Northern Ireland and the Parliament at Westminster. It was envisaged that such a Regional Council or Councils would be responsible for overseeing a large range of ‘Macrory’ functions, namely services that were of ‘immediate concern to local people’. Possible ‘Macrory’ functions mentioned included town and county planning, roads, streets, car parks, water, sewerage, education, libraries, housing and rating. Importantly, there was no suggestion that this new proposal would have ‘any legislative powers whatever. It would simply be a super-local authority.’111 This proposal, originally labelled the ‘Molyneaux plan’, amounted to a development of the ideas put forward during the second reading debate on the Scotland and Wales Bill in December 1976, by James Molyneaux, leader of the UUP in House of Commons.112 Molyneaux argued that his scheme was effectively a form of administrative devolution whereby regional powers currently in the hands of ministers and civil servants in the government of Northern Ireland would be transferred to one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland. Based on Molyneaux’s plans, if only one Regional Council was established, it would have approximately ninety members, ‘one elected for each of the 90 district electoral areas’. ‘If proportional representation was inevitable, they might be elected district by district, one for each of the electoral areas in each district.’113 By supporting a system of administrative devolution, in the form of one or more Regional Councils, Neave was ensuring that the Conservative Party would make direct

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rule ‘more response to local opinion’.114 Moreover, by lending his support to this political initiative Neave was laying the groundwork for his eventual preferred long-term policy to restore a devolved government in Northern Ireland. Significantly, neither privately nor publicly, did Neave provide a commitment that the establishment of one or more Regional Councils automatically necessitated the setting up of a devolved government in Northern Ireland, based on majority-rule.115 A discussion paper by the CRD, dated February 1977, noted that while the ‘first step’ towards devolution for Northern Ireland was to establish one or more Regional Councils, it was intentionally vague on whether the Conservative Party supported the eventual restoration of a power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland or a return to majority-rule. ‘In view of the long-term strategy now being recommended it is all the more essential to make certain that the suggested Regional Council is strictly confined to local government-type functions and procedures.’ It continued, ‘It should not be encouraged to think of itself as a kind of Parliament. For example, it should not meet in the Stormont Chamber.’116 At a meeting of the CPPNIC, on 1 March 1977, Neave recommended that the establishment of one or more Regional Councils form the basis of the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, from a political perspective.117 The shadow secretary of state’s proposal did not automatically win universal approval his party colleagues.118 Undeterred, however, over the next several months Neave routinely propagated the virtues of this proposal.119 His endeavours eventually bore fruit. On 7 April 1978, Neave selected a luncheon of the UUC in Belfast to formally place on the public record the Conservative Party’s backing for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland. In this speech, which was endorsed by Thatcher,120 Neave said that while the Conservative Party’s ‘ultimate aim has long been a system of devolved Government’, it was ‘better in the short-term to concentrate’ on local government reform, in the form of ‘a Regional Council or Councils with substantial local powers’.121 Unsurprisingly, the SDLP leadership ridiculed Neave’s decision to back this Regional Council model. In supporting this political scheme, the SDLP accused the shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland of deliberately seeking to abandon the Conservative Party’s traditional support for the reinstatement of a power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland and indeed, in doing so, to ensure that the Irish government would not be provided with an institutionalized role in the affairs of Northern Ireland via the establishment of a Council of Ireland. During a meeting with an SDLP delegation, John Biggs-Davison, Neave’s deputy shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, was told in no uncertain terms that the party had ‘no interest in talking about ideas for a Regional Council’.122 In fact, Neave’s UUC speech in Belfast infuriated the SDLP hierarchy. John Hume immediately called for Thatcher to sack Neave as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland; a request that Thatcher, naturally, declined to consider.123 The Alliance Party, likewise, was aghast by Neave’s proposal to establish one or more Regional Council. John Cushnahan,124 the party’s general secretary, said ‘he thought it “revolting” that Mr Neave had so clearly identified with one party in Northern Ireland [the UUP]’. ‘It was a great mistake and insensitive to put all one’s eggs in a particular

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basket’, he exclaimed.125 Indeed, the NIO, by now a political thorn in the side of Neave, described the proposal as ‘generally superficial’.126 Neave, however, was unperturbed. He refused any suggestions that he should abandon his support for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland. As he informed a meeting of the CPPNIC in early November 1978, in opposing this latest proposal in favour of full devolution, the SDLP was ‘going into the green corner very fast’.127 Opposition to Neave’s latest political initiative did not end there. A  lead article in The Economist, ‘Blue or Orange?’, published shortly after Neave’s UUC speech in Belfast, accused the shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland of undertaking a consorted campaign to reverse ‘all the previous Ulster policies of her [Thatcher’s] deputy leader, Mr Willie Whitelaw, the architect of power-sharing’.128 Privately, Neave described the accusations levelled against him by The Economist ‘as not only unfair but also inaccurate’.129 Despite Neave’s best efforts to defend his position, the political fallout regarding his support for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils continued to gain momentum. On 15 April 1978, an irate resident of Northampton wrote to Thatcher to express his annoyance at Neave’s UUC speech in Belfast and more generally the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy. ‘The Conservative Party’, Mr Hennigan petitioned, was ‘exploiting the very serious situation in Northern Ireland for electoral advantage’. Neave was selected out for ridicule. ‘Mr Airey Neave has been in recent times “playing the Orange Card”, with all the finesse of a mentally subnormal elephant’, he wrote.130 In fact, during the remainder of 1978 Neave regularly received letters from the public accusing him of being ‘anti-Catholic’;131 a charge that he vigorously refuted.132 On 19 June 1978, two months on from Neave’s UUC speech in Belfast, Thatcher formally placed on record her support for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils, as the Conservative Party’s preferred interim Northern Ireland policy if direct rule continued. Her choice of location was significant. Like her shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Thatcher delivered her speech to a gathering of UUC supporters, on this occasion at Craigavad, Holywood, Co. Down, Northern Ireland. This was reportedly Thatcher’s third visit to Northern Ireland as the official leader of the opposition. Her first visit was in mid-November 1975, while her second, was a oneday trip to Belfast and Londonderry on 21 February 1977, where she went ‘shopping and walking’.133 To the delight of UUC audience, during her speech Thatcher said that Neave had her ‘full agreement’ regarding the Conservative Party’s pledge to ‘restore the upper tier of local government’, in the form of one or more Regional Councils, if elected to government.134 Thatcher’s speech received an immediate rebuke from Northern Nationalists. Gerry Fitt, leader of the SDLP, was furious by what he believed had been her deliberate decision to omit any references to power-sharing and instead commit a Conservative Party led government to the restoration of the upper tier of local government. Thatcher, Fitt protested, was prepared to make a ‘deal with the devil’ in the desperate hope of becoming British prime minister.135 Indeed, Thatcher’s speech, together with Neave’s speech to the UUC membership the previous April, was believed to be ‘a blatant bid

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for Ulster Unionist support in the event of a hung parliament after October’.136 As the Times reported, ‘Mrs Thatcher woos Ulster Unionists’, on the eve of an anticipated British general election, ‘with local rule pledge’.137 Once again, Neave was unapologetic. In an interview with the Tonight television programme, on 22 June, he defended Thatcher’s Craigavad speech, rejecting accusations that she had used the trip to ‘woo’ Ulster Unionists for their support at Westminster. ‘I think that is very false’, he noted. ‘She didn’t go there only to woo voters.’ ‘I don’t think that is a correct picture of Mrs Thatcher’s visit at all’, he said.138 Indeed, in reply to Mr Hennigan’s accusation that he had deliberately ‘played the Orange Card’ in his recent Belfast speech, Neave wrote that ‘I can hardly be said to be playing the Orange Card for promoting the idea of a Regional Council incorporating the SDLP at a time when many Official Unionists stand out for the [Northern Ireland] Convention Report.’139 There was a mixed reaction within the UUP to the Conservative Party’s willingness to support the Labour government’s plans to establish one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland. UUP leader Harry West, whom Neave believed to be a Unionist hardliner, was reluctant to support this proposal because it fell far short of his preferred political objective of devolution based on majority-rule.140 West reportedly harboured the ‘suspicion’ that this proposal was ‘either a substitute for devolution, or merely the first stage of an operation which will lead (sooner rather than later) to another powersharing executive and assembly’.141 Writing to his party colleague, on 21 July 1977, West warned Molyneaux that support for this policy must be ended immediately.142 Molyneaux ignored his leader’s protests. As Henry Patterson phrased it, Molyneaux correctly estimated that West’s demands in support of devolution without powersharing was ‘doomed to failure’.143 Consequently, Molyneaux publicly came out in favour of the Regional Council model.144 However, he sought assurances from Neave that in supporting the restoration of an upper tier of local government the Conservative Party had not abandoned its long-term commitment to devolution.145 Writing to Thatcher, on 4 May 1978, Molyneaux said he wished to personally record that he was ‘naturally very glad’ to learn of the Conservative Party’s support for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland.146 Although the Rev. Ian Paisley’s DUP favoured a return to majority-rule, as the party’s preferred option, others within the Ulster Unionist fold lent their support to the establishment of one or more Regional Councils.147 Based on information supplied to Neave, leader of the Vanguard Party William Craig and his party colleague the Rev. Robert Bradford, together with UUP MP for Londonderry William Ross, were supportive of this proposal, as an interim measure.148 At this time, Molyneaux was believed to have a ‘distinct preference for a single authority which would have the manifest advantage of rending unnecessary a drastic administrative upheaval’.149 While the Conservative Party, as yet, had not come out in public in support of either a single or numerous Regional Councils, privately Neave was recorded as favouring a ‘single authority, consisting of 70–80 elected representatives’.150 Significantly, by supporting the creation of one or more Regional Councils, Neave was providing a ‘compromise’ between those within the Conservative Party and the UUUC who favoured a full integrationist policy against those who supported devolution. This form of ‘compromise integration’, to quote Graham Walker, ‘promised

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to bring Northern Ireland more into line with the wider British practice and thus gave cheer to integrationists, while it was also capable of being interpreted as a step towards the restoration of devolved government’.151 Importantly, however, Neave went on record, as noted above, that his Regional Council proposal should not be regarded as a substitute for a devolved government in Northern Ireland. In this way, Neave did not support ‘pure integrationism’.152 What was the integrationist approach? Effectively, as Jim Prior later explained, this would entail ‘integrating Northern Ireland fully within the United Kingdom, running it as though it were no different from, say, Norfolk or Yorkshire’.153 Championed by the controversial Ulster Unionist MP for South Down Enoch Powell,154 the integrationist lobby argued that Northern Ireland’s complete integration into the rest of the UK would witness the ‘burial of the notion of power-sharing’.155 Consequently, any idea of restoring devolved administration in Northern Ireland ‘would be abandoned and more power would be returned to the local councils’, to again quote Prior.156 In Powell’s thinking, his support for the integrationist lobby ran alongside his defence of the union between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, and more broadly his ‘resistance to membership of the European Community’, in which he argued vigorously ‘that both stances were imperative to the survival of what he saw as the British nation’, in the words of Paul Corthorn.157 Best known for his outspoken opposition to immigration, Powell advanced a policy of integration since the early 1970s, ‘making it clear that he opposed Stormont, or any kind of devolution, because it undermined Westminster’s sovereignty and fostered a sense of “separateness” ’.158 While Prior and other senior figures within the Conservative Party, including Howe159 and Willie Whitelaw,160 believed that the integrationist argument was ‘nonsense’,161 about twenty to thirty traditionalist right-wing Conservative Party MPs were known to favour this strategy. They included amongst their ranks, John BiggsDavison,162 Ian Gow163 (described as Neave’s ‘chief lieutenant’)164 and Peter Mills.165 Although some writers, such as Brendan O’Leary, maintain that Neave ‘advocated the full administrative integration of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom’, the available archival records fail to support this argument.166 In fact, despite Neave coming under pressure from some senior figures within the Conservative Party to support integration, he was not convinced of the long-term viability of this policy. Addressing a meeting of the LCC, on 6 January 1976, at which Thatcher and most of her shadow cabinet were present, Neave explained his reservations regarding full integration.167 Reading from a prepared policy memorandum on Northern Ireland, under the subheading, ‘Long-Term options’, Neave noted that Northern Ireland’s full integration into the rest of the UK ‘would increase the burden at Westminster at a time when devolution for Scotland and Wales is contemplated. It would worsen relations with the [Northern Ireland] minority and the Republic [of Ireland].’168 If the available evidence suggests that Neave was reluctant to endorse Northern Ireland’s full integration into the rest of the UK, what of Thatcher’s attitude to this politically sensitive subject? This is a difficult question to answer, not least because throughout her time as leader of the Conservative Party she remained confused vis-àvis her stance on the integrationist debate.169

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For example, in The Downing Street years Thatcher strongly argued that she did not support Northern Ireland’s integration into the rest of the UK, as espoused by some of her contemporaries, including Powell and Biggs-Davison. ‘Essentially’, she wrote, integration would have ‘meant eliminating any difference between the government of Northern Ireland and that of the rest of the U.K., ruling out a return to devolution’.170 Indeed, speaking privately to the taoiseach Jack Lynch, in October 1977, Thatcher reportedly ‘indicated most firmly that she was opposed’ to Northern Ireland’s integration into the UK, to quote Paul Keating, Irish ambassador in London, 1977–8.171 Rather, Thatcher’s preferred policy, although she admitted was most likely not feasible, was for the restoration of devolved government in Northern Ireland based on ‘a system of majority-rule’.172 She singled out Powell for criticism in relation to the integrationist debate. His view, she recalled, was that the ‘terrorists thrived on uncertainty about Ulster’s constitutional position:  that uncertainty would’, he argued, ‘be ended by full integration combined with a tough security policy’. She elaborated thus: I disagreed with this for two reasons. First, as I have said, I did not believe that security could be disentangled from other wider political issues. Second, I never saw devolved government and assembly for Northern Ireland as weakening, but rather strengthening the Union. Like Stormont before it, it would provide a clear alternative focus to Dublin  – without undermining the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament.173

Thatcher, however, failed to recognize that by supporting Neave’s calls for the establishment for one or more Regional Councils she too was advocating support for Northern Ireland’s integration into the rest of the UK, albeit in the form of ‘compromise integration’.174 Moreover, Thatcher was mistakenly under the impression at the time – indeed for the remainder of her life – that by supporting a compromise integration strategy, in the form of one or more Regional Councils, this was a step towards the eventual restoration of devolved government in Northern Ireland based on majorityrule. ‘That is broadly the approach which Airey and I  had in mind when the 1979 manifesto was drafted’, she later incorrectly argued in her memoir.175 Despite Thatcher’s own confusion regarding the Conservative Party’s long-term devolutionary plans for Northern Ireland, she placed her full support behind Neave’s calls for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils as an interim measure. In fact, as is examined below, a pledge to establish one or more Regional Councils formed the basis of the 1979 Conservative Party general election manifesto’s subsection on Northern Ireland.176

‘Airey’s death diminishes us’: The Irish Republican prisoners’ ‘dirty protests’ and the assassination of Airey Neave The infamous ‘winter of discontent’, lasting from the autumn of 1978 to early 1979, set the stage for Neave’s final months as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland,

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prior to his assassination by the INLA in March 1979. It was a depressing period. Great Britain was crippled by widespread strikes, as trade union bosses demanded an increase in public sector pay. Uncollected rubbish littered the urban landscape, there were pickets outside NHS hospitals and gravediggers went on strike.177 It was a period, as recounted by Thatcher when ‘the prevailing social mood was one of snarling envy and motiveless hostility’.178 It was an equally depressing period for the people of Northern Ireland. Following a mass strike by oil tanker drivers, in January 1979, the Labour government, led by British prime minister James Callaghan,179 declared a short state of emergency. In the end, the British Army was forced to intervene to ensure the restoration of petrol supplies.180 This sense of doom and gloom was compounded by the PIRA’s recent bombing campaign in Northern Ireland and mainland Great Britain. During December of the previous year, several English cities, including Bristol, Coventry, Liverpool and Manchester, fell victim to a renewed Irish Republican bombing campaign. This was followed by the murder of three British soldiers in a PIRA gun attack at Crossmaglen, Co. Armagh, later that same month, which Neave said filled him with a feeling of ‘disgust and horror’.181 These latest Irish Republican paramilitary acts of violence framed the backdrop to what famously became known as the ‘dirty protest’, whereby Irish Republican prisoners escalated their campaign for the reinstatement of so-called ‘special category status’. The origins of this crisis date back to the Heath government’s highly controversial decision in 1972 to grant special category status for those prisoners convicted of paramilitary violence (and applicable to both Irish Republican and Loyalist prisoners). In June of that year, due to pressure to secure a PIRA ceasefire and to end a hunger strike by senior Irish Republican Billy McKee, the Conservative government agreed to authorize the introduction of special category status. William Whitelaw, the first secretary of state for Northern Ireland, sanctioned this order. Under the terms of the agreement, Irish Republican and Loyalist convicted prisoners were entitled to ‘certain privileges not granted to non-paramilitary inmates’.182 Broadly speaking special category prisoners were ( a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

not to be required to work; allowed to wear their own clothes; allowed to receive one parcel weekly, which could include food and tobacco; allowed to send out one letter weekly at public expense; and allowed one visit of thirty minutes’ weekly.183

Significantly, as pointed out by Thomas Hennessey, although Whitelaw maintained that the granting of special category status did not entail conceding ‘political’ status to prisoners, Irish Republican and Loyalist prisoners alike, he viewed this concession as ‘classifying them as prisoners of war’.184 The Heath government’s decision to introduce special category status was widely condemned by backbench Conservative Party MPs. A report produced on behalf of the Conservative Party Defence Committee, dated December 1974, summed up many backbenchers’ anxieties in relation to this issue. HMP Maze (sometimes colloquially

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referred to as ‘Long-Kesh’ or ‘the Maze’)185 was reported to be a ‘disgrace where both Protestant and Catholic extremists run their own discipline’. ‘This is undermining Government authority’, it noted, and thus special category status ‘must be stopped’. ‘It is universally believed that discipline at Long-Kesh is non-existent. It is known as the [P]‌IRA’s Sandhurst. This is very bad for Government prestige.’186 In November 1975, the new Labour government, under Harold Wilson, decided to phase out special category status; this decision won the wholehearted support of the new Conservative Party leader Margaret Thatcher and her shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland Airey Neave.187 This phasing out process began with effect from 1 March 1976; ‘no prisoner convicted of an offence committed on or after that date would be granted special category treatment, regardless of the nature of his offence’.188 Those convicted of scheduled terrorist offences after that date were then housed in HMP Maze Prison, in eight new ‘H-Blocks’.189 Irish Republicans were infuriated by the Labour government’s decision. In response, Irish Republican prisoners conducted a bitter campaign demanding the reinstatement of special category status. Irish Republican prisoners’ first act of defiance, commencing in September 1976 and led by PIRA prisoner Kieran Nugent, was to refuse to wear prison uniforms and to do prison work. They claimed that they were political prisoners and should not be treated as ‘common criminals’.190 This began the ‘blanket protest’, whereby prisoners, by refusing to wear the prison uniform, were naked except for a blanket. In March 1978, Irish Republican prisoners escalated their campaign for the reinstatement of special category status; by now these demands rested on three key requests: (1) their entitlement to wear their own clothes at all times, (2) not to work and lastly (3)  to be permitted to enforce their own discipline.191 Irish Republican prisoners refused to clean their cells, to use the toilets or to empty their slop buckets. Furthermore, they damaged the contents and fittings of their cells and smeared the walls and window frames with excreta. These actions signalled what became known as the ‘dirty protest’. By the end of 1978, approximately 340 men at Long-Kesh were estimated to be on the protest.192 The official opposition, under Thatcher’s leadership, fully supported the Labour government’s refusal to reinstate special category status. Writing to a concerned Conservative Party supporter in December 1978, Neave explained that his party ‘strongly supported the Government in refusing to make any such concession, which could only encourage further violence’.193 ‘Conditions in the H-Block at the Maze’, he wrote, ‘are not the responsibility of the Government but have been deliberately created by the prisoners themselves to draw attention to their demand for the restoration of political status.’194 Following a visit to the Maze, in January 1979, Michael Mates, a member of the CPPNIC, reported that he had been ‘impressed by the excellence of the accommodation available in the H-Blocks’. The ‘dirty protest’ campaign, he noted, ‘was being conducted in a selective manner: the protesters were keeping themselves clean. The aim was to provoke the prison staff beyond endurance. It would not succeed, because he had been left in no doubt that Mr Mason would refuse to capitulate.’195 Despite his support for the Labour government’s stance vis-à-vis political status, Neave felt that London was losing the propaganda war against the PIRA, particularly

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in the print media and television. By now, to use Robert Savage’s description, Neave had proven himself ‘a vociferous and sometimes eccentric critic’ of television coverage of events in Northern Ireland.196 In fact, ten years before Thatcher’s government imposed a broadcasting ban on Sinn Féin in 1988, at this time, Neave advocated the establishment of such a ban.197 Regarding the ‘dirty protest’ campaign, Neave felt it was inexcusable that the British government had taken several months before producing leaflets to describe the ‘true conditions’ in the Maze prison. ‘We must win the propaganda’ battle against the PIRA, he exclaimed during a speech to the Southampton University Conservative Association in mid-February 1979. ‘The prisoners “on the blanket” who refuse to obey prison rules and defacate [sic] in their cells’, he implored, ‘have been the subject of worldwide antiBritish propaganda accusing the prison staff of brutality.’ ‘Yet nothing decisive is done until it is too late.’ ‘Effective propaganda is as lethal as a gun or a bomb in the hands of a terrorist.’198 In Neave’s thinking, the Labour government’s inability to neutralize the propaganda campaign being waged by Irish Republican paramilitaries was a symptom of a malaise that had entrenched day-to-day life in Northern Ireland. On the political front, he now openly acknowledged that the prospect of political progress in Northern Ireland, before a British general election, was ‘entirely dim’.199 Privately, he was more forthright. In conversation with the Irish minister for foreign affairs Michael O’Kennedy, on 14 February 1979, Neave conceded that realistically the prospect of a political initiative in Northern Ireland at this stage was ‘not possible’.200 Neave’s pessimistic outlook vis-à-vis Northern Ireland’s political fortunes did not, however, inhibit him from expounding the virtues of establishing of one or more Regional Councils as a medium-term alternative to devolved government in Northern Ireland201 (this is all the more significant given that by this period Roy Mason had now decided to dump this policy).202 For example, at a meeting of the CPPNIC, on 23 January 1979, Neave said that ‘he did not intend to advise the Shadow Cabinet to make any substantial changes in Conservative [Party] policy before the [British general] election’. The Regional Council model, he therefore said, would ‘continue to be emphasised’.203 He elaborated further on this subject in a letter to a concerned Conservative Party supporter a week before his death. ‘I feel the Government has failed badly in not making some political progress in the Province’, he wrote. He, therefore, made a commitment that if elected ‘[a]‌Conservative Government would seek to establish an elected Regional Council Authority with local powers’.204 In early February 1979, Neave made what would transpire to be his final visit to Northern Ireland. On 4th of that month, he spent the night with Lord and Lady Brookeborough at their home, Colebrooke House, Co. Fermanagh. The following day he travelled to Londonderry, visiting Strand Road RUC Station and later that day he met the mayor of Londonderry, Thomas Craig, at the Guildhall (the venue where elected members of Londonderry and Strabane District Council meet). On 6 February, he made his way across the Irish border to Knock, Co. Mayo, where he met a delegation of church leaders, including George Simms, Church of Ireland archbishop for Armagh, 1969–80, and Tómas Ó Fiaich, Catholic primate of all-Ireland and archbishop of Armagh, 1977–90. The following month, on 16 March, Neave delivered

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his last statement on Northern Ireland to the House of Commons; fittingly given his own military background, his last recorded statement paid tribute to the ‘dedication and courage’ of the RUC.205 Following months of speculation, a British general election was triggered in late March 1979. On 28th of that month, Thatcher tabled a motion of no confidence in Callaghan’s government following the defeat of the Scottish devolution referendum. The motion of no confidence was passed by just one vote (311 to 310), thus triggering a general election. Frank Maguire, Independent Republican MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, had tried to vote with the government, but had been forbidden by his ‘Republican heavies’ who accompanied him. Ironically, therefore, it could be said that the PIRA supporters were the ‘occasion of Mrs Thatcher’s victory’, to quote Charles Moore.206 The date for the British general election was set for 3 May 1979. All but two UUP MPs voted against Callaghan. Significantly, according to two prominent Ulster Unionists, James Molyneaux207 and Enoch Powell,208 a central reason why UUP MPs voted alongside the Conservative Party was because, at the time, Neave provided assurances that if elected British prime minister, Thatcher would agree to set up one or more Regional Councils, at the expense of devolved government in Northern Ireland. According to Molyneaux, during a meeting in mid-March 1979, Neave informed his Unionist colleague that a Conservative government ‘ruled out devolution during the lifetime of the Parliament following the General Election’.209 Indeed, in correspondence with Thatcher, in November 1979, Ian Gow explained that ‘if Airey had not given a clear indication that this would be our policy, there is some doubt (to put it at its lowest) whether Jim Molyneaux could have delivered the Ulster Unionist votes’.210 Working on the assumption that there would be an election in the autumn of 1978, the Conservative Party had already drawn up the basis of their general election manifesto. There were no fewer than ninety-four policy groups tasked with devising policies, including the possibility of abolishing of domestic rates, nationalization of industries and trade union reform.211 In relation to Northern Ireland, early drafts of the manifesto made a commitment that if elected to government the Conservative Party would endorse Neave’s proposal to establish one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland. For example, a draft of the manifesto, dated 30 August 1978, read thus:  ‘The Conservative and Unionist Party stands rock firm for the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland … we will seek to establish a regional council or councils with substantial local powers in which the whole community would be involved.’212 Michael Cunningham purports that Molyneaux personally assisted Neave in this drafting process (Molyneaux succeeded West as the UUP leader in September 1979).213 Over the ensuing months, the contents related to Northern Ireland contained with the manifesto changed little, except for some amendment to the phraseology. On 29 March 1979, following a meeting of the shadow cabinet, Neave contacted Christopher Patten, director of the CRD, with a request that the section on Northern Ireland dealing with the Regional Council proposal be amended to read as follows: ‘We will seek to establish one or more Regional Councils with a wide range of powers over local

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services.’214 This is the last record of Neave’s direct involvement with the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy prior to his murder the following day. 30 March 1979 was like any other working day for the shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland. Following breakfast, Neave left his flat at Westminster Gardens, got into his powder-blue Vauxhall Cavalier saloon and made the short journey to the Houses of Parliament. His morning was spent preparing for the forthcoming general election and dealing with day-to-day constituency matters. Following lunch, he decided to stop for the day and return home to spend time with his wife, Diana. It was in the members’ lobby that Neave held his last conversations, chatting to colleagues before crossing to the members’ exit and taking the lift to the underground car park to pick up his car.215 At 2.58  p.m. an enormous explosion engulfed New Palace Yard, northwest of the Palace of Westminster. Soon after, as Neave’s first biographer Paul Routledge wrote, smoke was seen billowing from the smouldering wreckage of a Vauxhall car on the ramp leading up from the underground car park.216 It was a ‘haunting image’, Lord Lexden remembered, with sheets of headed House of Commons writing paper ‘blowing gently in the breeze’.217 Police officers rushed to the scene and came upon an unidentifiable man, dressed in a black coat and old-fashioned striped trousers. Initially, the victim was believed to be Alan Lee Williams, Labour Party MP and Merlyn Rees’s parliamentary private secretary.218 In fact, in the car lay 63-year-old Neave. Surveying the burning wreckage, the mangled frame of the car and the glassless windows, it was apparent that some type of bomb had exploded. ‘He’s still alive! Clear the area!’, a policeman shouted. Within minutes, an ambulance crew arrived to find the still unidentified figure, who was breathing, slumped over the steering wheel, his face burned beyond recognition. A doctor, nurse and firefighters soon joined the entourage, before Neave, with his right leg blown off below the knee, was eventually freed after half an hour. He was quickly taken to Westminster Hospital where he underwent emergency surgery. It was too late. Neave died on the operating table.219 Thatcher received news of Neave’s murder while preparing for a political general election broadcast at BBC headquarters, Portland Place, London. ‘Please God, don’t let it be Airey’, she was reported as saying.220 When it was confirmed that Neave was indeed the victim, Thatcher was described as ‘numb with shock’.221 ‘The full grief ’, she recalled, ‘would come later.’222 She abandoned her broadcast at once and after speaking to Callaghan on the telephone, she returned to the House of Commons. On her return, she was informed that Neave had passed away. ‘Thank God one doesn’t know when one wakes up in the morning what will happen before one goes to bed at night’, she murmured to her staff.223 Alone in her room, Thatcher composed a short, moving tribute to her friend and shadow cabinet colleague. In a handwritten note she described Neave as ‘One of freedom’s warriors. Courageous, staunch and true. He lived for his beliefs and now he has died for them.’224 Later that day she informed a BBC reporter that ‘some devils got him and they must never, never, never be allowed to triumph, they must never prevail’.225

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Three days later, on 3 April, in a moving tribute, Thatcher explained why Neave’s death was such a tremendous loss:  ‘Airey’s death diminishes us, but it will enhance our resolve that the God-given freedoms in which he believed, and which are the foundation of our parliamentary democracy, will in the end triumph over the acts of evil men.’226 Further eulogies quickly poured in from politicians throughout the UK and further afield. Callaghan said that Neave’s murder ‘robbed our country of a distinguished figure and a very brave man’.227 Writing to Neave’s widow, Diana, Roy Mason noted that his death was ‘a tragic loss to public life at this time’.228 His passing, Mason wrote, meant that the Conservative Party had lost one of its ‘most robust thinkers on Northern Ireland matters’.229 Prophetically, Neave’s shadow cabinet colleague Geoffrey Howe chillingly recalled how Neave’s murder ‘was a fearful forecast of the years ahead, in which the thump of bombs, the news of deaths, was to become all too familiar’.230 In fact, according to Bruce Anderson, Howe ‘was in tears’, following Neave’s murder, as ‘he had seen the body’.231 To politicians of all parties in Great Britain, to quote Dominic Sandbrook, Neave’s murder was ‘a reminder of the running sore of Northern Ireland, as well as a warning of the potential dangers that awaited them during the election campaign’.232 His death, likewise, set off alarm bells in Dublin. There were concerns within Irish government circles that his death might strengthen ‘the case for the re-introduction of the death penalty’.233 Taoiseach Jack Lynch and Irish opposition leader Garret FitzGerald (FitzGerald succeeded Liam Cosgrave as Fine Gael leader in 1977)  described Neave’s murder as ‘cowardly, callous and brutal’, with both men promising whatever cooperation might be needed to bring the ‘assassins to justice’.234 Lynch exclaimed that the ‘cold blooded’ assassination of Neave ‘bears all the hallmark of twisted and evil minds. It can be the work only of anarchists.’235 Others sought to point out the futility of violence in the aftermath of Neave’s assassination. US senator Ted (Edward) Kennedy236 condemned ‘the wanton and brutal murder of Airey Neave’.237 Fellow US senator and speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O’Neill238 protested that Neave’s assassination was ‘another outrageous act by those who think they promote the cause of Irish nationalism by killing and maiming’.239 Following Neave’s murder, attention immediately turned to who had perpetrated this brutal crime. Initially, the PIRA claimed responsibility. In fact, the real perpetrators were the INLA. Formed in 1975, with a pledge to establish a ‘republican and socialist’ state, the movement had previously been known as the People’s Liberation Army, which sprang up in late 1974 when the Official IRA attacked members of the newly formed Irish Republic Socialist Party (IRSP). At the time of Neave’s death, it was believed that the INLA had approximately sixty active members.240 The INLA basked in the publicity following Neave’s murder. As Rees later wrote, ‘in the perverted minds of the terrorists, that murder of a decent and honourable man certainly counted as a triumph’.241 Indeed, this terrorist attack on behalf of the INLA, to quote Richard English, was a ‘tactical-operational success’.242 An INLA spokesperson said that Neave’s assassination ‘had a tonic effect in Northern Ireland where there had been celebrations in Belfast, a recruiting boom for the INLA and a wave of military operations by the [P]‌IRA and INLA unprecedented since 1972’.243 According to an

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INLA source, Neave was ‘specially selected for assassination’ because he was ‘well known for his rabid militarist calls for more repression against the Irish people and … the strengthening of the SAS murder gang’.244 In a subsequent interview with the Irish current affairs magazine Magill, in the weeks following Neave’s assassination, the INLA laid out its twisted rationale for its decision to murder Neave: In January 1977, he [Neave] demanded the strengthening of the UDR [Ulster Defence Regiment], more SAS men in the North and the reintroduction of internment. It was Neave’s ambition as Tory Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to intensify repression and thereafter to impose a political ‘solution’. Thus he was a prime target, but in addition we felt that it was time that Westminster armchair militarists suffered directly the consequences of their policies … The decision was taken by the INLA army council several weeks ago and was re-affirmed more recently by the headquarters staff. The final decision was taken after the no confidence vote in the House of Commons on the night previous to the assassination.245

Plans to assassinate Neave were carried out with military precision. In the weeks leading up to his murder, a dossier was compiled on him establishing ‘his habits and routine’. According to declassified Home Office (HO) records, on receiving confirmation of the fall of the Labour government the INLA headquarters and chief of general staff gave the go-ahead to assassinate Neave. Initially, the INLA had considered assassinating Roy Mason but attention quickly shifted to Neave because if a Conservative Party was elected to government a ‘right-wing backlash’ against terrorism was expected, to quote Jack Holland and Henry McDonald.246 Apparently, a lone INLA volunteer led the murder. Using a magnet, the perpetrator attached the bomb underneath Neave’s car when it was parked in the House of Commons car park (the HO, however, maintained that the bomb was planted under Neave’s car while it was parked outside his home).247 Wherever the bomb was attached, police investigations confirmed that two switching devices were used, the first a watch and the second a mercury switch, attached to one kilo of TNT. This technique had already been used on a member of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) on 6 March.248 The INLA estimated that the cost of the explosions involved in the bomb that killed Neave was £5.12.249 To this day, conspiracy theories continue to be linked with Neave’s murder. In 1986, for example, Enoch Powell250 alleged US involvement in the death of Neave (two years previously he also accused the CIA of playing a part in the death of Lord Mountbatten because of his anti-nuclear views).251 Powell allegedly believed that Neave’s death was part of a US inspired  – and CIA engineered  – master plan to help secure a united Ireland, in return for the Republic of Ireland joining NATO.252 Powell was not alone in advocating Cold War inspired conspiracy theories regarding Neave’s assassination. Several months after Neave’s death, stories populated British newspapers claiming that he was murdered by members of the PIRA, trained in South Yemen by Russian experts.253

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Neave’s death continues to drum up controversy. In 2014, Utopia, a Channel 4 programme, used news footage of Neave’s murder in its fictional thriller. In this programme, Neave was also apparently depicted as a heavy drinker, involved in several shady political deals. In the media storm that followed, Channel 4 was heavily criticized for allegedly defaming Neave’s memory (and the memory of British ambassador to Holland Sir Richard Sykes who was murdered by the PIRA in 1979).254 While Neave’s murder was a deep personal blow to Thatcher, she was determined to win the British general election in his memory. In fact, although as Charles Moore pointed out it sounds callous to say it, Thatcher’s general election campaign ‘benefited’ from Neave’s murder. His assassination moved attention away from the ‘Matthew Parris letter’ controversy (in which Parris, a member of the CRD, berated a woman for appealing to Thatcher for an improvement in her council accommodation). Significantly and despite misguided arguments to the contrary,255 following Neave’s murder, the Conservative Party did have an agreed strategy on Northern Ireland. In Neave’s absence, Thatcher turned to the CRD, chiefly Christopher Patten, Adam Ridley and Alistair Cooke as well as her shadow cabinet colleagues, Willie Whitelaw and Francis Pym, for advice on Northern Ireland policy. A memorandum produced on behalf of the CRD, dated 2 April 1979, marked ‘Manifesto Briefing, Northern Ireland’, reaffirmed, if elected, a Conservative government’s commitment to adhere to Neave’s previous stance on Northern Ireland. Apart from a promise to uphold the Union and to continue ‘the firm security policy followed by the present Secretary of State, Roy Mason’, a Conservative government pledged to support the establishment of one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland. It continued thus: We believe that a council or councils could provide effective democratic control over purely regional services in Northern Ireland … it is virtually certain that there would be only one council, which could make use of the Parliament Buildings at Stormont where the necessary civil servants are already working.256

In a deliberate attempt to shelve the controversial subject of ‘power-sharing’, and following the Neave-line, the same memorandum advised Conservative Party activists to avoid using this term, which was described as ‘outmoded and unhelpful’. ‘It’s very mention’, it noted, ‘stirs fears and anxieties among large sections of the Unionist majority, who look upon it with about as much favour as a united Ireland .’ Instead, the advice given was to use ‘a less contentious form of words, such as participation by the main [Northern Ireland] political parties’. A Conservative government’s support for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils could be an example of such ‘participation’, among the major political parties in Northern Ireland, it surmised.257 In a handwritten letter, dated 10 April 1979, Thatcher reassured Callaghan that despite the ‘tragic events that have happened’, the Conservative Party had not changed its ‘stance on Northern Ireland matters in any way. They remain on the same bipartisan basis.’ ‘Any step you take to step up security will continue to have our full and vocal support’, she added. She also reaffirmed that the Conservative Party remained committed to Neave’s ‘Irish section in the manifesto’, which he had written ‘some 3 to 4 hours before he was assassinated’. ‘Naturally’, she wrote, ‘we would not wish to

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change it. The sentiments and the words he used are along familiar lines and contain nothing new. We are both moving towards the restoration of local government’, she concluded.258 Thatcher’s commitment to adhere to a ‘bipartisan’ policy with the Labour government on Northern Ireland revealed her muddled thinking on this subject. She failed to realize that Neave’s support for the establishment of the one or more Regional Councils, as the basis of the Conservative Party’s political strategy on Northern Ireland, no longer had the support of the Labour government. Indeed, although the two parties continued to follow a broadly similar policy on Northern Ireland security related matters, the issue of political fortunes of Northern Ireland was an entirely different matter. Significantly, the Labour Party’s 1979 general election manifesto did not refer to the Regional Council model. Rather, in the face of the impasse amongst the Northern Ireland political parties to agree on the long-term constitutional strategy, the manifesto stipulated that ‘Direct Rule remains the only viable alternative’.259 On the following day, 11 April, the Conservative Party published its official general election manifesto.260 Its contents, to quote Paul Arthur, ‘barely touched on the problems of Northern Ireland’.261 Nonetheless, the two paragraphs that dealt with the subject remained loyal to Neave’s previous stance on security and political matters in relation to Northern Ireland. First, if elected, a Conservative government promised to ‘maintain the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in accordance with the wish of the majority in the Province’. Second, in relation to security, the Conservative Party made a commitment to defeat ‘terrorism’ and to restore ‘law and order’ in Northern Ireland. Last, on Northern Ireland’s political future, in line with Neave’s proposal for reform of local government in Northern Ireland, the manifesto noted that ‘[i]‌n the absence of devolved government, we will seek to establish one or more elected Regional Councils with a wide range of powers over local services’.262 The Conservative Party pulled off a resounding general election victory under Thatcher’s leadership. The party won 339 seats, with the Labour Party claiming 269. Thatcher’s majority was almost twice what it had been in October 1974, under Heath. The swing of the Conservative Party, 5.1 per cent, demonstrated the sheer scale of the election success. This was the biggest swing either way since 1945. At approximately 2.45 p.m., on 4 May 1979, Thatcher, accompanied by her husband Denis, arrived at Buckingham Palace to meet Queen Elizabeth II. Having met the Queen and thus received the authority to take up the office, Thatcher became the first female British prime minister.263 When the Thatchers arrived at No. 10 Downing Street, to cheers of congratulations (accompanied by some boos), a journalist asked how she felt. Apart from quoting St Francis of Assisi, ‘Where there is discord, may we bring harmony’,264 and a reference to her father Alfred Roberts, she left her final words, before entering No. 10 Downing Street, to her former shadow cabinet colleague and friend. Quoting Neave, ‘whom we hoped to bring here with us’, Thatcher said, ‘There is now work to be done.’265 *** In conclusion, during the previous five years, Neave had already done a great deal of ‘work’ in relation to the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy. Although

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on taking up his new portfolio as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland in 1975 Neave confessed that there may be ‘no textbook solutions to the problems in Northern Ireland’,266 during his time in this portfolio, he fashioned a distinctive Northern Ireland strategy. He was never afraid to defy the Labour government’s Northern Ireland policy, nor was he much perturbed about challenging some sacred cows within the Conservative Party, particularly in relation to the politically delicate subject of power-sharing. In the security realm, Neave championed several key policies, some that continued to follow the bipartisan policy with the Labour government (including his opposition to British withdrawal from Northern Ireland), and others that were unique to the Conservative Party. Notably, during his period as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Neave firmly opposed granting concessions or negotiating with Irish Republican paramilitaries, including a refusal to restore ‘political status’ to paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland.267 On the political front, Neave always remained committed to finding a workable solution amongst the political parties in Northern Ireland in the hope of ending direct rule. Therefore, one can now confidentially dispel the myth that he was simply a militarist in relation to Northern Ireland. In the long-term, the evidence provided above demonstrates that Neave favoured the restoration of devolved government in Northern Ireland, although by 1977, to avoid controversy, he deliberately refused to say whether he supported a power-sharing model or majority-rule government. Neave’s support for the ultimate restoration of the Northern Ireland Executive also helps one to reject the claim that he favoured Northern Ireland’s full integration into the remainder of the UK. Neave was never a supporter of the hard-line integrationists. Rather, he lent his support to the so-called ‘compromise’ integrationists, who advocated a system of administrative devolution in Northern Ireland. As a pragmatist, confronted by the political reality that the mainstream political parties in Northern Ireland could not agree on the terms of devolution, Neave instead championed reform of local government in Northern Ireland as an interim measure. By initially championing the establishment of his so-called ‘Council of State’, subsequently followed by a proposal to create one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland, Neave sought to end ‘civil servants’ paradise’, which existed under direct rule.268 Importantly, however, his support for reform of local government in Northern Ireland, in Neave’s own words, was always as a ‘stepping stone to a devolutionary system’.269 With Neave’s passing, however, the question remained as to whether a Conservative government under Thatcher would remain loyal to his Northern Ireland policy? The answer to this question is examined in the following chapter.

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Part Two

First-term in office, 1979–83

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‘Inconsistent to the brink of schizophrenia’: A re-evaluation of Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy Margaret Thatcher remained generally ill-informed about Ireland, north and south of the Irish border on her appointment as British prime minister, on 4 May 1979. As examined in the previous chapters, as official leader of the opposition from 1975 to 1979, Thatcher had allocated little energy, thinking or time to Northern Ireland policy. She had visited Northern Ireland only on a handful of occasions and up to this point admitted to having never visited the Republic of Ireland.1 In the words of Maurice Hayes, former Northern Ireland civil servant and senator of the Seanad Éireann (upper house of the Irish Oireachtas), on entering No. 10 Downing Street, Thatcher ‘didn’t have any affection’ or ‘particular interest’ in Northern Ireland or the political classes in Belfast and Dublin.2 Over the previous years, Thatcher’s had built up deep-rooted prejudices towards the Nationalist community of Northern Ireland. She resented the SDLP’s dual demands for the restoration of a power-sharing devolved government (against her personal reference for a return to Ulster Unionist-led majority-rule) and that the Irish government be permitted a formal ‘institutional’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. In fact, Thatcher’s prejudices transcended political and religious categorization. Her opinion of mainstream Ulster Unionism was equally abhorrent. In fact, the more Thatcher saw of Ulster Unionist politicians over the years ‘the less she liked them’, to quote John Campbell.3 While described as an ‘emotional unionist’,4 she observed many Ulster Unionists to be bigoted and insufferable and always found it ‘uphill work’ discussing Irish matters with them.5 Richard Needham, the longest-serving junior NIO minister from 1985 to 1992, described Thatcher’s attitude to Ulster Unionists as ‘one of exaggerated despair … she did not like or trust the unionists’.6 Perhaps, Sir Kenneth Bloomfield most accurately describes Thatcher’s attitude to Ulster Unionism. As head of the Northern Ireland civil service, 1984–91, he found Thatcher ‘to be “inconsistent to the brink of schizophrenia”, veering from sentimental unionism to distain for actually existing Ulster unionism’.7 Of politicians in the Republic of Ireland, Thatcher felt they were obsessed with cultural politics over the more clear-cut economic debates.8 Or to put it another way,

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she regarded the Irish government as she regarded the FCO: ‘she could be charmed by individuals but looked on them collectively as too subtle and soft’.9 Thatcher also harboured a suspicion that the Irish government had deliberately failed to make improvements in North-South cross-border security, focusing her resentment on the fact – as she perceived it – that Irish Republican paramilitaries were using the Republic of Ireland as a safe haven. Indeed, she seemed to hold a deep aversion regarding Ireland’s decision to remain neutral during the Second World War. ‘The Irish’, she purportedly said, ‘were worse that neutral – their neutrality had effectively given comfort to the Germans.’10 Despite arguments to the contrary, on entering No. 10 Downing Street in May 1979, Thatcher did have a Northern Ireland policy. Charles Moore, for example, wrote that ‘by the time Mrs Thatcher became [British] prime minister, she did not have a policy towards Northern Ireland’.11 The argument that Thatcher did not have a coherent Northern Ireland strategy on entering government in 1979 was certainly promoted amongst those politically close to her, including some of her cabinet colleagues. Jim Prior, secretary of state for employment, 1979–81, felt that Thatcher ‘knew very little’ about Northern Ireland and demoted the issue to the political doldrums, during her initial months in office.12 Indeed, there was a suspicion within the Civil Service, including the Cabinet Office, that Thatcher simply did not appreciate the complexities of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy.13 Because she never held a senior post in government and had ‘no first-hand experience of high-level diplomacy’, the argument was put forward in Whitehall circles that she lacked the political experience and judgement necessary to deal with the politically sensitive subject of Northern Ireland.14 The above arguments are inaccurate. Although Northern Ireland ranked low on Thatcher’s list of political priorities, on her appointment as British prime minister, having continued to work closely with the CRD, she remained loyal to two central policy objectives, which fall under the subheadings, (1) Security and (2) Political.

(1) Security First, in the security realm, Thatcher never wavered on her central policy objective in relation to Northern Ireland: her determination to militarily defeat Irish Republican paramilitaries. If this was not a realistic objective, in the short to medium term,15 Thatcher was nonetheless resolved to crackdown on PIRA and associated Irish Republican violence. Security matters, as Douglas Hurd pointed out, consumed her thinking. ‘Can we checkmate the [P]‌IRA and stop the [P]IRA’, was a question that Thatcher continually grappled with, the former secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1984–5, recalled.16 Central to Thatcher’s thinking in relation to security was the cost of large-scale police and military presence in Northern Ireland. This is not altogether surprising given that she was head of a government ‘committed to curbing the growth of public expenditure’.17 As Graham Goodlad noted, ‘a sum of £400 million was expended on counter-terrorism in 1979–80, and this was set to rise as a reorganisation carried out by the [P]‌IRA made it harder for the security services to infiltrate their structures’.18

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Placed within this context, Thatcher arrived at the conclusion that it was essential to improve North-South cross-border security cooperation and intelligence-sharing between the British and Irish governments. As is examined below, in the aftermath of the murders by the PIRA of Lord Mountbatten and three members of his party, together with eighteen British soldiers, in separate terrorist attacks in late August 1979, Thatcher set her sights firmly on securing concessions from Dublin on an array of cross-border security related issues. Controversially, these concessions included permission to allow RUC officers to be present in an interview room during ‘interrogation’ of suspected terrorists by the Garda Síochána (national police force of the Republic of Ireland, commonly referred to as the ‘Gardaí’) and that the British Army be granted standing authority for their helicopters to patrol [so-called overflights] over Irish jurisdiction to a depth of 10–15 kilometres’.19

(2) Political Significantly, in the hope of obtaining from the Irish government the above security concessions Thatcher dangled the prospect of London agreeing to kick-start a ‘new political initiative’ on Northern Ireland, as she phrased it.20 Although she greatly ‘disliked this kind of bargaining’ with the Irish government, as recounted in The Downing Street years, she felt it was a price worth paying to improve security.21 Indeed, shortly after her appointment as British prime minister, Lord Hailsham22 conceded privately that Thatcher was determined to ‘push ahead at finding a political solution to the Northern Ireland problem’.23 Although Thatcher continued to support reform of local government in Northern Ireland, based along the late Airey Neave’s Regional Council model of so-called ‘compromise integration’, by the winter of 1979 she gradually distanced herself from this proposal. Instead, with the encouragement of William Whitelaw, Thatcher agreed to set out on a new political path in relation to Northern Ireland. As is examined later in this chapter, this new approach was facilitated by the hosting of a conference in which the major political parties of Northern Ireland participated under the auspices of the so-called ‘Atkins’s talks’.

A ‘new political initiative’ for Northern Ireland: Thatcher’s relationship with the British Civil Service One must acknowledge that there were more pressing domestic issues apart from Northern Ireland that confronted Thatcher on becoming British prime minister, not least economic policy. In the words of Ben Pimlott, in British political terms Northern Ireland remained a ‘sideshow’ to more urgent socio-economic issues such as the ‘trade unions, prices and the economy’.24 Day and night Thatcher tortured herself about how to rescue the UK from its economic plight, particularly how to deal with growing inflation and control public spending. On the day she took office, she saw briefs from the Cabinet Office and the Treasury about the state of the British economy. The

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contents of these briefs were depressing. The Treasury predicted that the Retail Price Index (RPI) would rise to an annual rate of 10–11 per cent during 1979 and that Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR) would rise from £8.5 billion to £10 billion. The world trade situation was also reported as being ‘bad’.25 Such news did not come as a surprise to Thatcher. However, in the words of Moore, ‘there was an enormous gulf between the seriousness of the situation and the practical readiness of the new government to do something about it’.26 In fact, as Thatcher prepared for her first budget as British prime minister, scheduled for 12 June 1979, her newly appointed cabinet did not yet have an agreed economic strategy. Internal division amongst her ministers concerning economic policy was an inevitable consequence of Thatcher’s decision to appoint several individuals to key cabinet positions who were ‘certainly not her soulmates’.27 The harsh reality was that Thatcher was stuck in a difficult situation. The upper echelons of the Conservative Party were still dominated by former Heathites, many of whom ‘favoured compromise with the trade union and feared the social divisions which, they warned, would result from a severe programme of spending cuts’.28 Not wishing to rock the boat, she refrained from excluding Heath supporters from her new cabinet. As a result, continuity rather than change characterized her ministerial line-up, with an emphasis on ‘political balance rather than ideological affinity’.29 Thatcher appointed Whitelaw as her home secretary and de facto British prime minister. His standing, based on decades of service to his country and Conservative Party, together with his reputation for calm and common sense, made him an indispensable ally.30 As is examined, during Thatcher’s first-term in office from 1979 to 1983, Whitelaw was an invaluable source of knowledge, regularly guiding his prime minister through the minefield of Northern Ireland politics. Two further allies were given senior posts. Sir Geoffrey Howe was made chancellor of the exchequer and Keith Joseph became secretary of state for industry. Although her relationship with Howe was not always easy, she was aware that he was more than qualified for the job and she felt safe in the knowledge that he too wished to bring inflation under control.31 Likewise, in his new portfolio, Joseph continued to ‘preach’ the same free market message as Thatcher, demanding a curb to public expenditure to tackle rampant inflation.32 Filling the role left by the death of Airey Neave, Thatcher offered Humphrey Atkins33 the post of secretary of state for Northern Ireland; a position he reluctantly accepted. Personally, she did not like him, believing that he could be easily manipulated. His appointment was ridiculed in a Belfast newspaper headline, ‘Humphrey who’!34 The remainder of her cabinet was composed of Heath sympathizers, so-called ‘One Nation’ Tories.35 Lord Carrington, self-assured, if somewhat aloof, was appointed secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. Although retaining a certain ignorance regarding Irish affairs,36 he had been involved with the subject as secretary of state for defence, under the Heath administration from 1970 to 1974. In fact, during the early 1970s he was made aware that he was a prime target of the PIRA.37 Francis Pym was appointed secretary of state for defence. Michael Heseltine (after rejecting the energy portfolio) got environment. Peter Walker38 took on the agriculture portfolio. Jim Prior, whose poor working relationship with Thatcher was well known, got

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employment. Ian Gilmour, one of Thatcher’s most prominent (and vocal) critics on economic policy, was appointed lord privy seal. Lord Soames39 was made leader of the House of Lords, as lord president. Lord Hailsham was appointed lord chancellor. Although the first few months of Thatcher’s administration was absorbed by the economic plight of the country, her civil servants ensured that she was kept abreast of the government’s Northern Ireland policy. On the day she became British prime minister, 4 May, Thatcher received a note on Northern Ireland from Sir John Hunt, cabinet secretary and chairperson of the British cabinet’s official committee on Northern Ireland. ‘Northern Ireland’, Hunt counselled, ‘is likely to become a more urgent political problem following the election than it has been for many months past.’ He told her that a ‘new initiative’ was widely expected on behalf of London and the ‘expectations are also high in Dublin and the United States’ (particularly given Thatcher’s clear parliamentary majority in the House of Commons).40 Hunt’s reference to a need for a ‘new initiative’ was a subtle, but significant, disclosure on his behalf. Reading between the lines, Hunt had cryptically informed the incumbent British prime minister that Airey Neave’s proposal to establish one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland, as presented in the Conservative Party’s 1979 general election manifesto, was a non-runner. Rather, by suggesting that the Irish and US41 administrations expected a ‘new initiative’, Hunt was nudging Thatcher towards devolution for Northern Ireland, based on the mental model of power-sharing.42 Indeed, Clive Abbott of the NIO recalled that following the Conservative Party’s entry to government in May 1979 his department had to inform the new administration that the establishment of one or more Regional Councils ‘was just not on’.43 In order to make political progress in Northern Ireland, the incumbent government was advised of the possibility of establishing an ‘Inquiry Body’. This body, according to the NIO, would then ‘identify possible constitutional solutions’, which would be ‘acceptable to the majority of people of Northern Ireland’ and ‘such acceptability to be ascertained in a referendum’.44 Such interventions, as confirmed by Moore, revealed that when Thatcher arrived into office she found ‘no expectation among her civil servants that much attention should be paid’ to the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy while in opposition.45 As a briefing note for the incumbent secretary of state for Northern Ireland phrased it, ‘Direct Rule faute de mieux’ (for lack of an alternative) could not last indefinitely, thus a devolved government ‘is the only way forward’.46 Initially, at least, Thatcher refused to take on board the advice of the Civil Service. On receiving Hunt’s note, she put a ‘wiggly line of doubt’ under the words ‘new initiative’, as in her mind this customarily meant a reference to some form of devolved government, based on a power-sharing model47 (a wiggly line invariably meant Thatcher’s disproval, repeated underscoring of a passage with a straight line signified her approval). This episode confirmed Thatcher’s long-held suspicions towards the Civil Service, in general; a trait she had first acquired as secretary of state for education under the Heath government from 1970 to 1974. As David Cannadine explained, during her previous period in government, Thatcher had formed a ‘low opinion of civil servants, whom she regarded as more concerned with thwarting change than with helping ministers to implement it’.48 She had a ‘temperamental and ideological suspicion’ of the

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Whitehall machine and particularly disliked how ‘officialdom could frustrate what she believed needed doing’.49 Thatcher had a particular dislike for FCO civil servants, regarding them as ‘incorrigible appeasers who were insufficiently attentive to defending the national interest’50 – an impression that was reaffirmed in the aftermath of the FCO’s shambolic handling of the Falklands War of 1982. Indeed, just five days into her premiership she made her feelings clear to the FCO that she was dissatisfied with the briefing documents produced, expressing a wish that in future ‘Departments will avoid generalisations and the re-statement of facts and conclusions which are, or should be, well known to all those for whom the briefs are designed’.51 In fact, on receiving confirmation of Thatcher’s appointment as British prime minister, officials working in No. 10 Downing Street feared that they would be victims of the ‘fierce new broom’ which would begin sweeping away the machinery of government. They need not have worried. She had no plans to ‘get rid of anyone’.52 Despite Thatcher’s suspicions, she appreciated the importance of the men (and they were mostly men) who made the machine of government work and would always support them ‘so long as they made it work for her’.53 As such, this relationship, although respectful, was based on the unspoken rule that Thatcher was the political master of her Civil Service. Indeed, on the night she took office Thatcher hosted a supper in No. 10 Downing Street for a group of her civil servants. Sir Bryan Cartledge, Thatcher’s private secretary for overseas affairs, fondly recalled that she had the food cooked in her house in Flood Street – shepherd’s pie, I remember – and had the whole lot motored round to 10 Downing St. and she was serving herself. She was at the seat of power spooning out shepherd’s pie for all her team!54

‘The problem was of a nature which did not yield to instant solutions’: The genesis of the Lynch-Thatcher relationship Thatcher’s first direct involvement with Northern Ireland as British prime minister was as an indirect consequence of protocol. Since April 1979, plans had been put in place between British and Irish officials that taoiseach, Jack Lynch, would make a courtesy call to No. 10 Downing Street, on 10 May, to visit James Callaghan.55 In the intermediate period, however, Thatcher’s election as British prime minister had thrown these plans into disarray. Consequently, government officials, on behalf of Whitehall and Dublin, frantically updated a series of steering briefs related to Anglo-Irish relations, including Northern Ireland, in advance of Thatcher’s courtesy meeting with Lynch. In one such note, FCO officials struck a note of caution. Despite Lynch’s personal moderation on Northern Ireland, occasionally his attitude invariably hardened because of the need to appease the rabid Irish Republican anti-partitionist faction within Fianna Fáil.56 At this time, grumblings within Fianna Fáil over Lynch’s stance on Northern Ireland were widely reported. According to Robin Haydon, British

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ambassador in Dublin,57 Lynch’s approach to Northern Ireland ‘no longer reflected the grass-roots, republican, nationalist feelings of his party and laid insufficient stress on the aim of “reunification” ’.58 In terms of what Thatcher should discuss with Lynch during his courtesy call to No. 10 Downing Street, she was advised by the FCO to take on board the ‘special relationship’ that existed between Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, which went ‘beyond our common concerns over Northern Ireland’.59 This point was also expounded by Lord Carrington, who told Thatcher that it was ‘important’ that she meet Lynch and that they strike up a workable relationship.60 On the subject of Northern Ireland, Thatcher was advised to follow the line that the British government ‘are fully seized of the importance of the problem of Northern Ireland, and intend to do all they can to find ways both of improving the security situation and of making political progress’.61 The input from the NIO was more forthright. If Lynch brought up the prospect of an early bilateral meeting between himself and Thatcher, she should resist any such advances in the immediate future. Instead, Thatcher was advised to first familiarize herself further with Northern Ireland.62 Thatcher’s election as British prime minister set off alarm bells amongst Irish politicians and policymakers, alike. Although her victory did not come as a surprise, certain aspects of the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy were reported as being ‘obscure’, to quote a memorandum on behalf of the DFA. On the political front, for example, according to the same source, it was unclear whether Thatcher intended to ‘follow through’ with the late Airey Neave’s proposal to establish one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland or if she favoured the restoration of a system of devolved government in Northern Ireland.63 DFA civil servants, therefore, advised Lynch that during his courtesy call with Thatcher, he would be wise to point out that a security policy alone would not alleviate the problems in Northern Ireland. As the above memorandum phrased it: ‘the ‘essential point is that normality cannot be restored by security measures alone’. Lynch was thus encouraged to stress that a political solution, ‘based on a form of Partnership or powersharing – however it is called – must be an essential element in any lasting settlement’.64 As scheduled, on 10 May, Thatcher received Lynch for a ‘courtesy call’, less than a week into her premiership. In fact, Lynch was the first foreign head of government to visit Thatcher as British prime minister (Helmut Schmidt, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1974–82, met Thatcher later that day). The discussions between Thatcher and Lynch, which lasted for approximately thirty minutes, went beyond courtesies (for Lynch, as least). The taoiseach was determined to convince Thatcher of the need to make political progress in Northern Ireland, specifically to get a powersharing Executive up and running. Following general pleasantries, Lynch directed the conversations to Northern Ireland. From his perspective, Thatcher’s comments did not breed confidence. She said that she ‘would of course be very satisfied to work for a solution to the Northern Ireland problem, but that the problem was of a nature which did not yield to instant solutions’.65 To Thatcher’s frustration, however, Lynch then broached the subject of devolution in Northern Ireland. She attempted to ignore his line of questioning. Instead, she enquired about the Republic of Ireland’s economy, her agricultural sector

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and the European monetary system. Lynch, however, reverted the conversation back to devolution, emphasizing ‘the necessity for power-sharing in Northern Ireland’, at the expense of either a system of majority-rule or local government reform, based on Neave’s proposal to establish one or more Regional Councils. Thatcher refused to comment, remaining silent.66 In relation to security, Lynch noted ‘that co-operation between the Northern Irish police and the Republic [of Ireland] on security matters had been of a high standard’. Again, however, Thatcher refused to be drawn on the basis of the new Conservative government’s Northern Ireland policy. Instead, she shifted the conversation to her experience of company law. The meeting concluded with Lynch asking when he thought Thatcher would find time to hold a formal Anglo-Irish summit meeting. He suggested that they might meet again at the signing ceremony for the accession of Greece to the European Community on 28 May. Once again, Thatcher was non-committal, noting that she would like to give her secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Humphrey Atkins, time ‘to read himself into the job and, similarly, to allow herself time to absorb and analyse the full background to the situation’.67 From Dublin’s perspective, the Lynch-Thatcher meeting raised more questions than answers. Thatcher’s unwillingness to discuss Northern Ireland, except for some generalities, confirmed many of the Irish government’s worst fears. In Lynch’s thinking, either the new British prime minister had not yet had time to formulate a coherent policy (after all she was only in the job less than a week) or she simply did not believe she had a responsibility to share her views with a foreign government. Revealingly, two weeks after her meeting with Lynch, during a private meeting with Cardinal Basil Hume, Catholic archbishop of Westminster, 1976–99, on 25 May, Thatcher did divulge her current thinking on Northern Ireland. She let it slip to the Catholic archbishop of Westminster that her priority had been to ‘create a new structure of local government [i.e. Neave’s Regional Council model] in the hope that this would use some of the political energy of the various political groups in Ulster’. Yet, because of the refusal of Northern Ireland political parties to compromise, she was now confronted by a political stalemate. ‘It was a problem of will’, she said, and ‘there were plenty of solutions to all the problems but there was no will, so there was no solution’.68

‘A lot to learn about Northern Ireland’: The evolution of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy, May–September 1979 For Atkins to ‘read himself into the job’, as Thatcher previously pointed out, on 21 June, the former visited Northern Ireland on what was described as a ‘getting-to-know-you exercise’. By this stage, Atkins admitted that he still had ‘a lot to learn about Northern Ireland’.69 In fact, Atkins’s knowledge of Northern Ireland, or lack of, was reinforced by an anecdote about him being shown a coloured map of Ireland shortly after his appointment as secretary of state for Northern Ireland. ‘What, he asked, were the areas in Orange? They were the Protestant loyalists, he was informed. And the green

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patches? They were the Catholic republicans. And what was the area marked in blue? After some hesitations, that secretary of state, is Lough Neagh’!70 It was two months into his new ministerial portfolio before Atkins articulated the basis of his Northern Ireland political policy, at a meeting of the British cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, on 10 July 1979.71 Thatcher chaired this meeting. Several senior ministers were also in attendance, including Atkins, Lord Carrington, Gilmour, Pym, Whitelaw and known Ulster Unionist sympathizer Lord Hailsham. Atkins struck a cautious tone. Reading from a prepared memorandum, ‘Northern Ireland: the overall situation’, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland argued that direct rule could not last indefinitely, that ‘is nobody’s first choice of government’. Yet, he advised his fellow committee members to make no bold policy decision in the immediate period. Instead, Atkins noted that it was better to play the long game in the hope of first establishing a good working relationship with the Northern Ireland political parties. With this objective achieved, Atkins explained that the political parties in Northern Ireland might ‘eventually agree to work together for the betterment of society’. He, therefore, counselled committee members to consider a form of government that was acceptable to both parts of the community and which would provide ‘guarantees’ to both sections of the population (although he deliberately refrained from using terms such as local government, devolution, majority-rule and power-sharing). On the conclusion of the presentation, members of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee debated the contents of Atkins’s memorandum. Following a brief intervention by Thatcher, committee members agreed to adhere to the policies outlined by the secretary of state of Northern Ireland in his memorandum, specifically that the British government should not commit itself to any long-term strategy in relation to Northern Ireland.72 It was events outside of Thatcher’s control, however, that forced the Northern Ireland issue to the top of the political agenda. On 27 August 1979, 79-year-old Lord Mountbatten, second cousin to Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Charles’s godfather, together with three people (including Lord Mountbatten’s 14-year-old grandson, Nicholas Knatchbull), were blown up in a PIRA bomb attack in Co. Sligo, in the Republic of Ireland. On the same day, the PIRA killed eighteen British soldiers at Warrenpoint, Co. Down in Northern Ireland (during Thatcher’s first five months in office approximately thirty-four British soldiers lost their lives while on active duty in Northern Ireland). These two horrific episodes caused shockwaves in Whitehall circles, bringing home to the Conservative-led government the capacity for destruction that the PIRA was capable of inflicting. As Richard English explained, ‘a figure at the heart of the British establishment had been killed, as had a large number of British soldiers; worldwide attention had been seized’.73 Thatcher was at Chequers when she heard of news of the PIRA’s latest series of atrocities. ‘Her government would stop at nothing’, she declared shortly afterwards, ‘to ensure those responsible for these and other acts of terrorism were brought to justice.’ ‘The people of the United Kingdom will wage the war against terrorism with relentless determination until it is won.’74 In a show of solidarity with the victims of these latest PIRA atrocities, on 29 August, Thatcher travelled to Northern Ireland for the first time as British prime minister (this was Thatcher’s first of two visits to Northern Ireland

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in 1979; her second was a one-day excursion on Christmas Eve).75 Accompanied by Atkins, she visited British Army troops stationed at Girdwood Park Barracks in Belfast and also spent time in Belfast City, visiting the Warrenpoint casualties in hospital. Against the advice of the RUC and the NIO, she also flew by helicopter to the British Army base at Crossmaglen, Co. Armagh, to show solidarity with those she regarded as her ‘boys’.76 Deric Henderson, someone who occasionally travelled alongside Thatcher during her visits to Northern Ireland, in his capacity as a representative of the Press Association, remarked how unfazed she apparently was by her visits to Northern Ireland. ‘It was always a hairy ride’, he wrote, taking those ‘noisy, cold and uncomfortable’ Westland Wessex helicopters on the journey from RAF Aldergrove to various locations in Northern Ireland. ‘She sat’, he recalled, ‘occasionally cat napping and apparently oblivious to the threats of a missile or gun attack, without a care in the world. Or so it seemed.’77 In fact, Henderson recounted how much Thatcher ‘seemed to thrive’ on her visits to Northern Ireland, especially in her dealings with British soldiers and their commanders78 Indeed, in a show of defiance that was to later epitomize Thatcher’s ‘no surrender’ attitude, during her visit to the British Army base at Crossmaglen, on 29 August 1979, she put on the uniform of a ‘Greenfinch’, the female members of the UDR (a ‘local’ infantry regiment of the British Army, established in 1970) and the symbolic red beret of the Parachute Regiment.79 According to one source, anxious NIO officials tried to persuade Thatcher not to wear the beret, fearing the likely response from Northern Ireland Catholics to a British prime minister ‘donning the distinctive symbol of a regiment’, which during ‘Bloody Sunday’, on 31 January 1972, shot dead several innocent protesters.80 Thatcher, defiant as ever,, ignored the advice of her civil servants. Thatcher’s decision to visit Northern Ireland was widely appreciated within the British security community. A message on behalf of the SAS recorded that her visit had been ‘an outstanding success’. The men were ‘thrilled to bits … her smile would have lightened up the darkest room’, to quote Guy Nissen.81 For Thatcher, personally, the short time she spent in Northern Ireland left a lasting impression; she was even reported to have wept. She wrote letters to the families of each of the eighteen British soldiers murdered at Warrenpoint, each one different, and all in her own hand. ‘No prime minister’, as Moore wrote, ‘had ever thought of doing this before. It was a custom which she was to maintain.’82 Jack Lynch, who was on holiday in Portugal, immediately issued a statement expressing his outrage at these latest PIRA atrocities. He described the perpetrators as ‘relentlessly and invidiously proving to be the real enemies of Ireland’. He also sent Thatcher a personal telegram of condolence.83 According to Whitehall sources, generally speaking, feelings amongst citizens of the Republic of Ireland to these murders were a mixture of ‘shame, regret and disgust’.84 Robert Haydon reported to the FCO that the murders had ‘clearly shocked’ the Irish government and brought forward feelings of ‘regret and shame’. However, he acidly noted that ‘these are cheap commodities in this country’. ‘I do not think that recent events’, he explained, ‘have done much more than neutralise for the time being the Republican groundswell which was building up in Fianna Fáil.’85

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Significantly, in understanding Thatcher’s attitude to Northern Ireland, the above tragic events strengthened her conviction of the need to implement strong security measures and to improve North-South cross-border cooperation and intelligencesharing on behalf of the British and Irish governments. As Eamon Kennedy, Irish ambassador in London, pointed out:  ‘[T]‌ he murders of Airey Neave and Lord Mountbatten left deep psychological scars on the Irish outlook of the prime minister.’86 Thereafter, Thatcher’s central obsession lay in the security realm.87 She believed that if she could contain the security threat by isolating the Irish Republican terrorists, she would thus reduce the violence. In the immediate period, increased military operations against the PIRA came first; political negotiations, a distant second.88 Placed within this context, Thatcher’s attention turned to the Irish government. As Haydon pointed out, the ‘present offers the best opportunity we are likely to get for obtaining concessions from the Irish’. His words carried merit in Civil Service circles. Not only did Haydon hold extensive knowledge of the British diplomatic service but also, as chief press secretary to British prime minister Edward Heath, he had been a member of the British government’s team at the Sunningdale Conference in 1973.89 Haydon suggested that Thatcher might use the occasion of Lord Mountbatten’s funeral (scheduled for 5 September), which Lynch was expected to attend, to convene a meeting with the taoiseach. During this proposed meeting, he advised that Thatcher might coax Dublin to agree to several new cross-border security initiatives in relation to Northern Ireland. ‘There is a fair possibility’, he explained, ‘that we can persuade the Irish to adopt practical measures to improve security, both on the [Irish] border and elsewhere.’90 These proposed security issues, as Haydon wrote, might include the following: ( a) Direct Army-to-Army co-operation; (b) Interrogation by the RUC of suspects in the Republic [of Ireland]; (c) Improved intelligence gathering and exchange of information on both sides of the [Irish] border; (d) Joint patrols on the [Irish] border; (e) Hot pursuit across the [Irish] border.91 Haydon’s recommendation won his prime minister’s approval. In her thinking, given the latest acts of Irish Republican terrorism, the Irish government were obliged to improve North-South cross-border security arrangements. On 30 August, at a hurriedly arranged British cabinet meeting, ministers scrutinized the government’s Northern Ireland security policy. Revealingly, this was the first occasion since her appointment as British prime minister that Northern Ireland was considered in detail at cabinet level.92 Ministers analysed a memorandum jointly compiled by Atkins and Francis Pym. Under the heading, ‘Northern Ireland’, the memorandum explained that since the Conservative Party had taken office ‘the question of improving the effectiveness of our security operations in Northern Ireland, and the quality of the help we get from the Republic of Ireland’, had been under constant review. Atkins and Pym recommended that if cabinet supported the proposals contained within the aforementioned memorandum, Thatcher, on behalf of the government,

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would be able to make a public statement about security on Northern Ireland along the following lines: 1. To reassert our determination to protect the people of the United Kingdom against terrorism using all our collective resources. Our aim remains the defeat of terrorism and the extension of normal policing. 2. To achieve this we have decided that some changes are necessary now. These include the creation of a new Security Directorate in Northern Ireland accountable to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. 3. We share a common concern with the Republic of Ireland in defeating terrorism on both sides of the [Irish] border. We have proposed a fresh approach to the Government of the Republic [of Ireland] at the highest level to improve all aspects of our co-operation.93 While Point 1 was a reaffirmation of the Conservative Party’s commitment to defeating the forces of terrorism, Points 2 and 3 demonstrated a metamorphose in relation to Thatcher’s attitude to Northern Ireland, chiefly in the realm of security. The decision to create a new ‘Security Directorate’ (Point 2), which was to be headed by Sir Maurice Oldfield, recently retired head of the Secret Intelligence Service, commonly known as MI6, showed Thatcher’s eagerness to ‘sort out the lack of co-ordination’ between the British Army and the RUC and to ‘make cross-border co-operation a reality’, to quote Moore.94 Likewise, she was determined to avoid, if possible, a repeat of a clear failure of intelligence that had transpired on 27 August. Paul Arthur has pointed out that by now a crisis had been ‘brewing’ between the British Army, led by the general officer commanding (GOC,) lieutenant-general Sir Timothy Creasey and the RUC, led by Sir Kenneth Newman.95 This conflict centred on the British Army’s desire to ‘roll back police primacy’, coupled with the RUC’s concern about the ‘effect of offensive operations by the Army special forces’.96 In an effort to end this standoff, Thatcher brought Oldfield out of retirement to ‘knock heads together’.97 At the same time, Thatcher also sanctioned the expansion of the RUC by 1,000 members.98 Oldfield was tasked with the job of ensuring the various intelligence agencies and their contacts and sources of information were coordinated in such a way as to ‘eliminate duplication that had dogged intelligence work for a considerable number of years’.99 From his office in Belfast, Oldfield ‘did his best’ to improve relations between the British Army and the RUC, but the strains of office soon took hold on him. As R. Dracon explained, ‘it was not only incipient cancer, but also alleged evidence of his unprofessional contacts that caused him to return to London’.100 Oldfield resigned as head of the Security Directorate in June 1980. The proposal to kick-start ‘a fresh approach’ with the Irish government vis-à-vis cross-border security (Point 3) was the backdrop for a ‘collective decision’ made on behalf of the British cabinet, on 30 August, that Lynch be invited to a meeting with Thatcher in London.101 The British prime minister was not slow to grasp the political nettle. Later that day, Thatcher wrote to Lynch to express her appreciation for the taoiseach’s letter of condolence and to invite him to a meeting during his visit to London to attend Lord Mountbatten’s funeral, in order to ‘discuss this tragic affair

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and its implications’, as she phrased it. Lynch duly accepted Thatcher’s invitation. This meeting was pencilled for lunchtime on 5 September 1979.102 In advance of Thatcher’s scheduled meeting with Lynch, a consortium of senior Whitehall civil servants from the FCO, the NIO, the Security Services, the HO and the Department of Trade briefed Thatcher on the current state of British-Irish relations and Northern Ireland. These briefs ranged from advising a conciliatory approach to Dublin, to more extreme recommendations of imposing ‘sanctions’ against the Irish government and ‘blocking’ of several cross-border roads.103

‘Oh, Jesus’: The Lynch-Thatcher meeting and the overflights controversy At lunchtime, on 5 September, Lynch and his delegation arrived at No. 10 Downing Street. Gone were the formalities and niceties that had characterized the previous get together between the two prime ministers in May. Thatcher entered the room dressed all in black, accompanied by a black veil over her face. Her choice of clothing in the form of mourning attire was a vivid reminder of the sanctity of human life and the ruthlessness of paramilitary violence. It was a powerful image which was not lost on the Irish delegation.104 The meeting did not get off to a good start due to Thatcher’s obvious annoyance that Lynch had brought a relatively large delegation with him to London, which included Michael O’Kennedy, Irish minister for foreign affairs (described by the British as having a ‘staunch Republican background’)105 and George Colley, tánaiste (Irish deputy prime minister) and minister for finance.106 Apart from Thatcher, the British delegation consisted of Atkins, Lord Carrington, Gilmour and Howe.107 Following introductory pleasantries, the two parties convened over a working lunch. An array of topics was discussed, including the European Community Budget, the European Monetary System (EMS) and more generally international affairs. By the time the working lunch ended at 2.40 p.m., the subject of Northern Ireland had not been mentioned.108 Shortly afterwards, at 2.45  p.m., Thatcher and Lynch held a private tête-à-tête.109 Thatcher wasted little time in attacking the Irish government’s record on Anglo-Irish security cooperation, specifically cross-border security. In one of her infamous ‘handbagging’ verbal tirades, she informed a rather taken aback Lynch that, to date, the ‘co-operative efforts’, in relation to security that the two governments had made, ‘were not enough’. Both governments, she noted, had to seize the opportunity to confront the PIRA. She was now more determined than ever to ‘stamp out terrorism’. ‘Terrorism was a threat not just immediately to Northern Ireland but to democracy as a whole’, she snarled. She then pointed out four specific proposals that she wanted the ‘Irish to sign up to’. They were: 1 . Extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction; 2. The appointment of a ‘Garda Anti-terrorist squad’ deployed along the [Irish] border;

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3 . Co-operation between the British and Irish Armies; and lastly, 4. Helicopter overflights.110 Whilst Lynch said he was willing to consider these proposals during the plenary session, which was to follow their tête-à-tête, he wanted these specific discussions to remain ‘strictly private’. The taoiseach then attempted to move the conversation to discuss Northern Ireland’s political future, specifically whether the British government supported the restoration of a devolved government. Thatcher was dismissive of Lynch’s query. London, she declared, ‘had no rabbits to pull of our hat’. The meeting was then brought to an abrupt close.111 At 3.55  p.m., the British and Irish delegations came together to hold a plenary session. These discussions were at best frank and at worst openly antagonistic, with sharp exchanges between the two parties. On Northern Ireland’s political future, Thatcher explained that Atkins ‘will make a political initiative’, when ‘he is ready to do so’. However, she stressed that ‘no political solution would ever prevent the paramilitary organisation from continuing the violence they were perpetrating’. Thatcher then made the following requests (based on a steering briefing prepared by the FCO in advance of these talks): 1. A consideration of a British request that RUC officers be present in the interview room during ‘interrogation’ of alleged terrorist suspects; 2. Better direct communications between the British and Irish Armed Forces; and lastly, 3. That the British be granted ‘standing authority’ for their helicopters to patrol [so-called overflights] over Irish jurisdiction to a depth of 10–15 kilometres.112 On Point 1 Thatcher personally pressed this request. Lynch, who reportedly ‘didn’t assert himself ’,113 said he saw ‘many difficulties’ in agreeing to London’s proposal in relation to RUC officers participating in the questioning of suspects. However, he suggested that consideration be given to allowing RUC officers to be present at the police station, but not the interview room. On Points 2 and 3, Lynch explained that both proposals might prove difficult to implement. While he agreed that it was in ‘their joint interests to stamp out the particularly evil form of terrorism with which both Governments were confronted in Ireland’, a number of problems arose. The taoiseach said, ‘Direct Army-to-Army contact’ was problematic (although he did not spell out why this proposal was ‘problematic’). On Thatcher’s request that ‘standing authority’ be granted for British Army helicopters to patrol over Irish jurisdiction to a depth of ten to fifteen kilometres, the taoiseach said that a ‘facility for helicopter overflights for surveillance purposes was already available on application’. Indeed, under the current agreement between the British and Irish governments, in general, permission was given for British Army helicopter overflights up to a depth of two kilometres into the Republic of Ireland. Dublin did not give blanket permission for overflights, he explained, as Irish government legislation did not permit this. To appease Lynch, Thatcher dangled the offer of bringing forward a new ‘political initiative’ for Northern Ireland. Her government, she said, ‘stood ready to take a

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political initiative at the appropriate time and that they would in fact take it’. However, no such political initiative could commence without Dublin first agreeing to ‘improve’ North-South cross-border security cooperation.114 According to Dermot Nally, deputy secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach (DT), it was around this point of the discussions that Thatcher became visibly annoyed. Nally recalled that a member of the Irish delegation made a remark: ‘You may not like the idea but some people have a quantity of sympathy with the men of violence.’ These comments made the British prime minister ‘furious’. She jumped up from her chair and ‘was almost about to leap over the table’. ‘Are you condoning murder?’, she snarled.115 Despite the often tense and occasionally uncomfortable nature of the meeting, in the aftermath of the encounter Lynch expressed his admiration for Thatcher. According to a British source, the taoiseach ‘had been impressed by Mrs Thatcher whom he had called ‘hard but honest’.116 Frank Dunlop, Irish government press secretary, privately stated that the Irish had ‘found Mrs Thatcher very tough but very impressive. She had dominated the discussions.’117 Indeed, Walter Kirwan, assistant secretary in the DT, recorded that following this meeting, whether you agreed with her politics or not, you could not but ‘admire her’. Thatcher had been ‘charming and attractive’.118 In the days following the meeting, Thatcher was determined that her reputation for toughness around the negotiating table was matched by her ability to transform words into actions. On 7 September, Dublin received an aide-memoire on behalf of the British government, with a request that immediate steps be taken on behalf of the two governments to improve security, specifically cross-border cooperation. Those policies brought up by Thatcher with Lynch, on 5 September, namely ‘permission be given for RUC officers to interview in Garda stations’ and that standing authority be given for British Army helicopters to patrol over the Republic of Ireland’s ‘territory to a depth of 10–15 kilometres’, were specifically mentioned.119 On 25 September, a little under three weeks since his meeting with Thatcher and five days before the visit of Pope John Paul II, 1978–2005, to Ireland (Pope John Paul II visited Ireland from 29 September to 1 October), Lynch convened a meeting of the Irish government cabinet subcommittee on national security. On the taoiseach’s instructions and following a petition on behalf of some senior civil servants,120 this meeting was arranged to consider Thatcher’s request to improve intelligence-sharing and security cooperation between Dublin and London. Significantly, following a general discussion agreement was reached that ‘[t]‌wo or three shallow overflights per month without specific advance permission might be offered’ to the British (although, at this time, it remained unclear whether this decision met Thatcher’s request that British Army helicopters be permitted to fly over Irish jurisdiction to a depth of ten to fifteen kilometres). While Lynch realized that the Irish Army ‘would probably resent British helicopter overflights’, those present agreed that this was a risk worth taking – not only as a means of appeasing Thatcher – but in the hope that as a reward London might take up a new political initiative for Northern Ireland.121 Unbeknown to Thatcher at the time, her petitioning of Lynch in relation to overflights precipitated his resignation as Fianna Fáil leader and taoiseach in December 1979. This issue came to a head during Lynch’s weeklong trip to the United States. During a press conference at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, on 9 November, Lynch

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defended his stance in relation to the overflights controversy. ‘Since 1952’, he said, ‘we have had in our legislation provision whereby … a military aircraft from any other Government can fly in over our territory to a very limited extent – certainly not a tenmile corridor – after an application is made and only after application is granted.’ ‘We decided’, he explained, ‘to improve this situation very, very slightly, but there is certainly no question of a free corridor north or south.’122 Lynch then went on to explain about the slight change in the Air Navigation Act regulations.123 There followed what was described by one eyewitness as ‘an audible gasp’. Walter Kirwan remembered that on hearing Lynch’s comments his ‘jaw fell to the ground’.124 Dermot Nally could not help himself, murmuring under his breath, ‘Oh, Jesus’.125 The two prominent Irish civil servants had picked up on a major problem, which was of Lynch’s own making. In previous exchanges in Dáil Éireann (the lower house of the Irish parliament), the taoiseach had refused to confirm or deny that any changes in security arrangements with the British government had been agreed upon. In this speech, he had conceded something that was refused by the previous Fine Gael-Labour coalition government – permission for British helicopters to cross the Irish border for a limited distance in cases of ‘hot pursuit’.126 The writing was now on the wall. It was no longer a matter of if but when Lynch would face a challenge to his leadership. Minister for health Charles Haughey smelt blood. In the words of Dick Walsh, by this stage Haughey’s ‘stalking horses were already on the move’.127 This was now his time to strike for the leadership of Fianna Fáil and thus the position of taoiseach. Reading the signs, Lynch resigned as Fianna Fáil leader and taoiseach on 5 December 1979. He decided to go when he did to provide George Colley, his favoured successor, an opportunity to catch Haughey off-guard. Lynch’s calculation, however, dramatically backfired.128 The election for the presidency of Fianna Fáil took place on 7 December. When the votes were counted Haughey emerged triumphant, winning the leadership contest by six votes, forty-four to thirty-eight. Bertie Ahern129 recalled that once Haughey’s victory was announced, people were ‘jumping up, shouting, punching the air’. ‘It was like being on Hill [16] for the All-Ireland’ final, Ahern recalled joyfully.130 It was a remarkable victory. Haughey became taoiseach on 13 December. The Haughey-era had thus begun. To quote Haydon (himself quoting William B. Yeats), ‘All changed, changed utterly: A terrible beauty is born.’ Haydon concluded: ‘I support the first sentiment but am doubtful about the second.’131 If nothing else, the British ambassador to Ireland recorded, ‘with Mr Haughey as Taoiseach, [the] future should be fascinating’.132 As is discussed in the next chapter, in the arena of Anglo-Irish relations Haydon’s words were to prove prophetic.

‘Not altogether happy with the [Atkins’s] paper’: Thatcher and the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee While the Irish government was considering Thatcher’s request to improve intelligencesharing and security cooperation between Dublin and London, Atkins was preparing the ground for a new political initiative for Northern Ireland, in the hope of ending

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direct rule. The question, however, was whether Thatcher was willing to sanction Atkins’s efforts to breathe new political life into Northern Ireland? Although Thatcher had dangled the offer of kick-starting a new ‘political initiative’ in Northern Ireland, during her meeting with Lynch on 5 September, in return for improved cross-border security arrangements between Dublin and London, in the weeks that followed she hesitated.133 Thatcher was particularly anxious regarding the nature of such ‘political progress’, to quote J. P. Pilling.134 The question on her mind was whether Atkins was seeking to win her support for the restoration of a devolved government in Northern Ireland (based on either majority-rule or a power-sharing formula), at the expense of the late Airey Neave’s calls to establish one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland. In The Downing Street years, for example, Thatcher conceded that on entering No. 10 Downing Street in May 1979, a devolved government in Northern Ireland, based on ‘a system of majority-rule’, was her ‘first choice’. ‘That is broadly the approach which Airey [Neave] and I had in mind when the 1979 [Conservative Party general election] manifesto was drafted’, she wrote.135 Thatcher’s claim is inaccurate. The subsection on Northern Ireland of the Conservative Party’s general election manifesto was unambiguous. Nowhere in the manifesto was there a reference to the restoration of ‘a system of majority-rule’, as mentioned by Thatcher in her memoir. Rather, the subsection noted that in the absence of devolved government in Northern Ireland, a Conservative-led government would ‘seek to establish one or more elected Regional Councils with a wide range of powers over local services’.136 The FCO recognized Thatcher’s confusion in relation to this matter shortly after her appointment as British prime minister. On several occasions, Thatcher was reported as stating that the British government was ‘preparing the way for effective local Government’, when in fact, what she ‘meant’ to say was that she supported ‘effective devolved government in Northern Ireland’ that was ‘acceptable to both communities’.137 In fact, by the winter of 1979 Thatcher begrudgingly acknowledged that a system of majority-rule would never win support from the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. ‘[I]‌t was not long before it became clear to me’, she later conceded, that a devolved government in Northern Ireland based on majority-rule ‘was not going to work’. This was a significant admission. Consequently, as is examined below, Thatcher slowly began to appreciate the merits of establishing a form of devolved government, based on a ‘partnership’ model, with full legislative and executive functions, except for security, as she phrased it.138 Moreover, Thatcher’s gradual transition from an advocate of majority-rule to a supporter of a ‘partnership’ model also witnessed her swiftly abandoning Neave’s policy of compromise integration, in the form of one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland.139 In the words of David Hume, Neave’s death ‘killed the impetus for the regional council proposal’ within Conservative Party circles.140 This dramatic volte-face was not merely because of Neave’s assassination and thus his removal from the political arena. Rather, as Brendan O’Leary aptly explains, ‘The Conservatives in government, if not within their party, or their rhetoric, recognized that neither integrationist “logic”, nor a miniature Westminster parliament on the lines of the old

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Stormont regime, were appropriate to Northern Ireland conditions.’141 In other words, to quote Robert Armstrong, Thatcher was a realist; she ‘dealt in the present – not in the past’. She simply made a judgement call based on her perception of the facts.142 On 3 October 1979, Atkins presented a memorandum, ‘Prospects for political progress on Northern Ireland’, to a meeting of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee. Chaired by Thatcher, those in attendance also included John Biffen (chief secretary to the Treasury), Lord Carrington, Gilmour, Pym and Whitelaw. The contents of Atkins’s memorandum demonstrated a growing divergence within the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee regarding Northern Ireland. Significantly and to the bewilderment of many of his cabinet colleagues, including Thatcher and Whitelaw, rather than come out in favour of a return to devolved government, Atkins advocated, as his preferred policy, the establishment of a local assembly in Northern Ireland, loosely based on Neave’s Regional Council model. ‘Our immediate objective’, Atkins advised, ‘should be first to offer some responsibility to an elected representative body for Northern Ireland, which stops short of such a transfer of powers.’ He elaborated further: What I  have in mind is the creation of a new elected Province-wide assembly (or Regional Council). This would fill the existing gap between the 26 District Councils (with very minor powers) and Parliament at Westminster. It would have no executive powers. Executive responsibility for the whole range of ‘transferred’ matters (e.g. education, transport, health) which are administered by the Northern Ireland Departments would remain with those Departments subject to my direction and control.143

If Atkins’s Regional Council model was unacceptable to Thatcher and her fellow committee members, he, therefore, proposed an alternative policy in the form of a so-called ‘Consultative Assembly’. This alternative form of local government administration in Northern Ireland, he argued, ‘would not be elected until 1981 and which would have no powers initially but on to which powers could be grafted later’.144 Initially, at least, John Hunt counselled his prime minister to support Atkins’s alternative policy in the form of a Consultative Assembly. In a letter to Thatcher, dated 2 October, Hunt recommended that this proposal form the basis of a British government White Paper on Northern Ireland. In fact, he went so far as to advise Thatcher not to be too critical of Atkins, that it would be unfair to criticize her cabinet minister for presenting findings that were ‘too imprecise’ or did not have ‘enough substance’.145 Both Hunt and Atkins, however, were to be greatly disappointed. To their surprise and frustration Thatcher rejected her minister’s recommendations. According to Hunt, Thatcher had let it be known amongst members of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee that she was ‘not altogether happy with the [Atkins’s] paper’.146 In her thinking, Atkins’s proposals to reform local government in Northern Ireland, based on either a new elected Province wide assembly/Regional Council or Consultative Assembly, lacked ambition. Instead, Thatcher now decided to grasp the political nettle. Although she did not explicitly come out in favour of a return to devolved government in Northern Ireland, she did not rule this option out either.

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Addressing members of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, on 3 October, Thatcher emphasized that ‘the long-term aim must be to restore to Northern Ireland the same level of political responsibility for its own affairs that the rest of the United Kingdom enjoyed’. ‘The present situation of direct rule’, Thatcher said, ‘must be brought to an end.’147 Following her personal intervention, Atkins was instead ordered to summon ‘a conference of the main Ulster political parties … In order to achieve [the] aim [of] a far more reaching political initiative.’148 As is discussed in the following chapter, this request on behalf of Thatcher formed the framework for direct multiparty discussions with the political parties of Northern Ireland, under the banner of the ‘Atkins’s talks’. Thatcher’s intervention was a humiliating body blow for Atkins and revealed her growing contempt for her secretary of state for Northern Ireland. It was from around this moment onwards, to quote Andrew Roth, that Atkins’s life was ‘made hell’ by Thatcher, because of her demands for ‘instant results to be imposed on Ulster’s warring politicians’.149 Indeed, Hunt wasted little time distancing himself from Atkins. In a private letter to Thatcher, dated 16 October, Thatcher’s cabinet secretary ridiculed Atkins’s performance as secretary of state for Northern Ireland, to date. Atkins had reportedly provided ‘virtually no direction or steer to his officials’. Hunt explained that he ‘held reservations’ regarding Atkins’s views on Northern Ireland and was worried, despite Thatcher’s personal intervention, that the secretary of state for Northern Ireland ‘still prefer[red] his own more modest approach of a Consultative Assembly’.150 Two weeks later, on 17 October, the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee again convened to consider Atkins’s revised proposals for Northern Ireland, specifically, plans to establish a multi-party conference composed of the major political parties of Northern Ireland. Thatcher chaired this meeting. Also in attendance were Atkins, Lord Carrington, Gilmour, Lord Hailsham, Pym and Whitelaw. Addressing those present, Atkins outlined five possible ‘model systems of government’ for Northern Ireland, each of which ‘ruled out Irish unity, political independence for Ulster, and the devolution of control of law and order within the Province’.151 The purpose of the proposed conference, Atkins outlined, would be to consider the establishment of an ‘elected body’ based on the intentions in the Queen’s Speech to ‘seek an acceptable way of restoring to the people of Northern Ireland more control over their affairs’. Consequently, he proposed various forms for the elected body, which ranged from his preferred choice of a regional council ‘with limited executive powers at one extreme’, to a more ambitious form of an ‘legislative assembly supporting “Ministerial” Government at the other end’. Importantly, however, he stipulated that control of law and order would remain under HMG. The range of options proposed, he noted, would therefore ensure that ‘neither the old Stormont nor the 1974 powersharing Executive would suffice, and that progress must therefore lie somewhere in the middle ground’.152 Bringing his comments to a conclusion, Atkins warned those present that the calling of such a conference invariably was a ‘significant risk’ as there was a real possibility that the main participants would refuse to attend or that the conference itself ‘would break down’.153 He warned Thatcher that the two main leaders of Ulster Unionism – the UUP leader, James Molyneaux (Molyneaux succeeded Harry West as UUP leader

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in September 1979)  and leader of the DUP, the Rev. Ian Paisley  – had expressed their grave reservations regarding the proposed multi-party talks. To overcome this issue, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland suggested to his prime minister that ‘formal bilateral talks’ might be the best way to proceed, which over time could lead to ‘multilateral discussions’.154 Thatcher, however, once more brushed aside Atkins’s concerns. ‘Any political initiative involved a degree of risk,’ she was reported as saying, ‘but it was a risk worth taking in order to avoid the perception that the British government was “impotent” in relation to its Northern Ireland policy.’ It was imperative, she noted, that the government ‘be seen to [be] taking a real political initiative on Northern Ireland as quickly as possible’.155 Soon after, in a demonstration of Thatcher’s desire to take formulation of Northern Ireland policy out of the hands of Atkins and the NIO, she ordered the establishment of a special Northern Ireland ministerial group. This new body, in Thatcher’s own words, would be responsible for the ‘preparation of a consultative document’, to be tabled at the proposed multi-party conference, comprising the major Northern Ireland political parties. Whitelaw assumed the position as chairperson, while Atkins, Gilmour and Pym made up the remainder of the group.156 Early the following month, on 2 November, Whitelaw presented Thatcher with the basis of this so-called ‘consultative document’, in the form of an eighteen-page memorandum, ‘Proposals for the Government of Northern Ireland: a working paper for a Conference’. Consistent with Atkins’s previous five possible model systems of government, the memorandum set out how the range of powers and responsibilities might be ‘transferred from Westminster to local government’. These powers and responsibilities ranged from reform of local government, loosely based on Neave’s Regional Council model, to full legislative and executive devolution for Northern Ireland (although the document deliberately did not use either the phrase ‘majorityrule’ or ‘power-sharing’). The proposed conference, the memorandum explained, ‘would be concerned essentially with a transfer of powers within the UK. Its task will be to find the highest level of agreement on the way of doing this.’ Under the subheading ‘Institutions’, the memorandum recorded that the conference would consider what kind of ‘elected body or bodies’ would be chosen. It also explained, under the subheading ‘Powers’, that once an agreement was reached on the setting up of a new institution(s), the conference would consider ‘whether and to what extent it should be legislative, executive, or advisory’. Importantly, it made it clear that whatever proposal was agreed on the British government would retain control of law and order. Regarding the proposed transfer of powers, the memorandum stipulated that consideration would be assessed ‘along two dimensions’: (a) the range of subjects – e.g. agriculture, education – for which a new body would be responsible. (b) within a given subject, the extent to which powers are to be transferred. There are three broad possibilities: (i) transferring all executive and legislative powers;

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(ii) transferring all executive powers; (iii) transferring only those executive powers normally exercised by local authorities in GB. In line with Atkins’s previous comments, the memorandum stipulated that those invited to the proposed conference would not consider ‘either a return to the arrangements which prevailed before 1972 [i.e. majority-rule], [n]‌or a revival of those which were obtained in the first five months of 1974 [i.e. power-sharing]. Moreover, issues, including Irish unity, independence and confederation, would also not be placed on the table for discussion at the proposed multi-party talks.157 On the same day, 2 November, Robert Armstrong, recently appointed cabinet secretary (following the retirement of John Hunt), wrote to Thatcher in relation to Whitelaw’s memorandum. In his new role as secretariat on the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, Armstrong advised his prime minister to sign up to the general blueprint of Whitelaw’s proposals, following some ‘editorial polishing’.158 Thatcher duly obliged. Addressing a meeting of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, on 5 November, she expressed her delight with her deputy prime minister’s proposals, describing the memorandum as an ‘excellent one’. Whitelaw then requested that cabinet, at its next meeting on 8 November, approve the contents of the memorandum and that a revised version be published. When ministers duly met on 8 November, Whitelaw’s memorandum was given cabinet approval.159

‘A bad idea’: The response of Ulster Unionists and Conservative Party MPs to the Whitelaw memorandum On 14 November, Thatcher convened a meeting with James Molyneaux to address the UUP’s reservations regarding the proposed conference composed of the major political parties of Northern Ireland (also in attendance were Atkins and Ian Gow, Thatcher’s personal private secretary). Thatcher got straight to the point. She was determined, she informed her guests, to ‘get more power into the hands of the people of Northern Ireland. It was the only part of the country whose population did not have local authority powers.’ The status quo, she said, ‘should not be maintained indefinitely’. On Molyneaux’s support for Neave’s proposal for the establishment of one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland, Thatcher explained that this was one of the options included in the White Paper. She very much hoped that Molyneaux would be prepared to have someone come to the forthcoming conference to ‘argue the case in favour of the scheme’. ‘The biggest Party in Ulster’, she said, ‘should be present to defend the scheme it believed in.’ However, Thatcher warned Molyneaux that the scheme favoured by his party ‘was not of course the only one on the agenda’. Cryptically, she was referring here to her support for devolution (although she was deliberately vague on whether she supported majority-rule or power-sharing). Thatcher then went on to explain that ‘her Government would be criticised if the views of others [Northern Ireland political parties] were not discussed’. Therefore, ‘she wanted to show that the Government were consulting everyone concerned’. Following

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these consultations, she hoped to ‘move down the path which found most support’. ‘It would be very difficult if there was no one there to defend the case of the Official Ulster Unionists … It would not show Ulster in a good light if that Party stayed away’, she warned. Despite Thatcher’s advances, Molyneaux declined her invitation. The proposed conference, he said, was a ‘bad idea’. He was concerned that at this proposed conference that everyone would argue for ‘their own option’. If the British government were to decide in favour of the scheme favoured by his Party, they would be ‘criticised for giving in to the Unionists’. This had, therefore, led him to conclude that it ‘would be easier for the Government if the Unionists were not present’. Concluding his remarks, he noted that he would be ‘happy to make it clear in public that he was neither obstructing nor boycotting the conference’.160 Enoch Powell soon stepped into the debate. By now the Conservative Party’s volteface regarding Neave’s plans for so-called ‘compromise integration’ had ‘intensified Powell’s long-standing suspicion that the means might be found to remove Ulster from the British nation against its will’, to quote Lord Lexden.161 Powell had convinced himself that ‘devious’ officials in Whitehall ‘were working tirelessly to create a united Ireland, while Parliament was being lulled into believing that the wishes of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland would always be respected’.162 During a speech to the Garvaghy Branch of the South Down Unionist Association, on 23 November, Powell publicly attacked Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy, specifically Atkins’s proposal for a possible return of devolved government in Northern Ireland. He read aloud an open letter addressed to Thatcher (and subsequently published in The Times) in which he declared that ‘any deal or agreement with the Government of the Irish Republic, whereby the Government would somehow assist Britain in return for political concessions in Ulster, would be the road to disaster’.163 Despite receiving a frosty reception from the UUP to London’s latest initiative on Northern Ireland, Thatcher was determined to end the political impasse. Under her instructions, Atkins addressed the House of Commons, on 29 November, (coincidently, the following day, 30 November, Thatcher visited Dublin to attend a gathering of the European Council). In this speech, he provided details of the Working Paper ‘for a conference on the government of Northern Ireland’, which stemmed from the findings of the ministerial group, charged by Whitelaw to draft a ‘consultative document’ on Northern Ireland. In his opening remarks to the House, Atkins said that in convening the proposed multi-party talks he sought to facilitate ‘discussion about what form of devolved government [whether in the form of power-sharing or majority-rule] would suit Northern Ireland, in the present circumstances’.164 Echoing Whitelaw’s memorandum of 2 November 1979, Atkins explained that the Working Paper excluded from its scope independence, Irish unity, confederation, or a return to a Stormont-type administration. Rather it was envisaged that ‘The powers should be transferred to elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland and the overriding authority of Parliament will (as elsewhere in the United Kingdom) be preserved.’165 This, as Michael Cunningham wrote, ‘narrowed the options to some form of devolution’ in which there would have to be ‘reasonable and appropriate arrangements to take account of the interests of the minority’.166 Atkins also noted that

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the Working Paper deliberately did not refer to the term ‘power-sharing’. This phrase was absent ‘because too many people believe that it ‘implies the system which obtained in the first five months of 1974’. He continued:  ‘Here, too, it would be profitless to discuss returning precisely to that system, because it was not acceptable then and I am sure that it would not be acceptable now.’167 Atkins’s speech was followed by a long debate, lasting over four and a half hours. News of the decision to establish a conference comprised of the four major political parties of Northern Ireland received a mixed response from his fellow parliamentarians. To Atkins’s disappointment Molyneaux wasted little time in placing on the public record the UUP’s opposition to the planned conference, reminding the House of Commons that his party remained committed to Neave’s Regional Council model. In a stinging attack on the Irish government, the UUP leader alleged that any moves towards a legislative devolved administration in Northern Ireland was an ‘interim step towards a united Ireland’, which had been concocted by taoiseach Jack Lynch. ‘Does any Conservative or Unionist, or anyone in this House who supports the Union’, he implored, ‘wish to walk into that trap, still less to be pushed into it?’168 A selection of backbench Conservative Party MPs also lent their opposition to Atkins’s White Paper. Norman Miscampbell said that ‘there is a grave danger that a conference of this type, far from helping the situation, may well harden attitudes’.169 Monday Club member Kevin Harvey Proctor170 protested that Northern Ireland ‘did not want protracted talks, endless arguments and so-called political initiatives’. Following the Molyneaux line, Proctor called on Thatcher to honour the Conservative Party’s general election manifesto pledge, which made a commitment to establish one or more elected Regional Councils, with a wide range of powers over local services.171 Others within the Conservative Party gave the White Paper a more guarded welcome. Airey Neave’s former deputy shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland John Biggs-Davison said he saw some merit in the document as it ruled out both ‘an independent Ulster’ and Irish unity.172 Ivor Stanbrook,173 who proudly displayed a tall flagpole flying the Union Jack on his lawn, described the White Paper as a ‘credible document’, but warned against implementing ‘legislative devolution’ in Northern Ireland. His preferred policy, he explained, was a version of Neave’s Regional Council model. If an agreement could not be reached on this preferred policy, Stanbrook said that Northern Ireland’s integration into the rest of the UK should be considered, irrespective of protests from Dublin.174 In defence of the White Paper, Michael Alison175 intervened to comment on speculations that in scheduling the proposed conference, private concessions had been granted to Dublin, that a so-called ‘Irish dimension’ would form part of the talk. Alison unambiguously ruled out this rumour. ‘If [an] “Irish dimension” means clear moves towards the unity of Ireland, it will not be on the agenda’, he implored.176 The former leader of the SDLP and MP for Belfast-West Gerry Fitt177 expressed his general support for the White Paper – irrespective of his concerns regarding the Irish government’s exclusion from the talks. In his words, direct rule had been ‘an absolute and total disaster for the people of the Six Counties, and therefore a new political initiative for Northern Ireland was essential.178 However, leading figures within the SDLP, many of whom clamoured for a quadripartite conference – which would include

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Figure 3.1  Thatcher and Airey Neave at a memorial service for Ross McWhirter killed by an PIRA gunman, 16 December 1975. © Bridgeman Images.

the UUP and an ‘Irish dimension’ – did not share Fitt’s ‘modest’ attitude to Atkins’s White Paper.179 In fact, with the exception of Fitt, the SDLP leadership rejected Atkins’s White Paper out of hand, describing it as ‘absolutely inadequate as the basis for his [Atkins’s] conference’.180 Indeed, looking back on Atkins’s performance during this period, Seamus Mallon181 recalled how ‘ineffective’ the secretary of state for Northern Ireland had been.182

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Figure  3.2  Thatcher on a visit to Girdwood Park barracks, north Belfast, 1979. © The Deputy Keeper of the Records, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI INF 7A-5-216).

Figure 3.3  Thatcher alongside a female RUC officer, Belfast city centre, 1979. © The Deputy Keeper of the Records, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI INF 7A-5-218).

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Figure 3.4  Thatcher alongside a male RUC officer, Belfast city centre, 1979. © The Deputy Keeper of the Records, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI INF 7A-5-218).

*** In conclusion, on the emotive subject of Northern Ireland, Thatcher’s first several months in office had been a baptism of fire. Initially reluctant to involve herself in Northern Ireland policy formation, content to permit Atkins the room to ‘read himself into the job’, the brutal murders of Lord Mountbatten and two members of his party, together with eighteen British soldiers, in late August 1979, forced Northern Ireland to the top of Thatcher’s political priorities. Thereafter, security related issues, chiefly the improvement of cross-border cooperation, consumed Thatcher’s thinking in relation to Northern Ireland. In pursuit of this goal, she reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that political concessions might need to be granted, chief among them the dropping of her support for majority-rule, in order to win improvements from Dublin in North-South cross-border security cooperation and intelligence-sharing on behalf of the British and Irish governments. Also at play was Thatcher’s increasing frustration with the political parties of Northern Ireland due to their unwillingness to compromise with one another. As a pragmatic politician, skilled in the art of political haggling, she resented the inability – she might well argue unwillingness – of politicians on either side of the political and religious divide in Northern Ireland to come together to find a workable solution to the current political impasse.

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Figure 3.5  Thatcher shakes hand of British Army officer, Crossmaglen, 1979. © The Deputy Keeper of the Records, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI INF 7A-5-217).

To end this stalemate, as is examined in the following chapter, Thatcher personally promoted the coming together of the major political parties of Northern Ireland under the auspices of the ‘Atkins’s talks’ which convened between January and March 1980. The question, however, was whether this latest attempt by the British government

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Figure  3.6  Thatcher in uniform holding a red beret of the British Army Parachute Regiment, Portadown, 1979. © The Deputy Keeper of the Records, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI INF 7A-5-215).

to breathe fresh life into Northern Ireland’s stale political atmosphere would prove successful? The answer to this question is provided in the opening subsection of the next chapter.

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A ‘compromise formula’: The Atkins’s talks The convening of the Atkins’s talks, over thirty-four half-day sessions, between 7 January and 24 March 1980 was the latest attempt by London to end direct rule and establish a devolved government in Northern Ireland. ‘The task’ of the multi-party talks, to quote Atkins, was to ‘help the [British] Government find an acceptable means of transferring to the people of Northern Ireland greater responsibility for their own affairs’.1 Apart from the UUP,2 representatives of the major Northern Ireland political parties, the SDLP, the Alliance Party and the DUP attended. John Hume and Seamus Mallon led the SDLP delegation; Oliver Napier fronted the Alliance Party delegation; and the Rev. Ian Paisley and Peter Robinson directed the DUP negotiations. The UUP declined to participate because the talks were deemed as ‘anti- integrationist.’3 Addressing a meeting of the British cabinet, on 24 January, Atkins informed his ministerial colleagues that the multi-party talks were making steady progress and participants were adamant that ‘they do not want a local government solution but a devolved administration with real powers over policy and would wreck a local government solution if it was tried’.4 Atkins’s optimism was short-lived. He soon faced a barrage of criticism from the voices of Ulster Unionism and members of the Conservative Party. Pro-integrationist Enoch Powell was Atkins’s chief antagonist within the Ulster Unionist community.5 Powell was furious due to a decision taken on behalf of the secretary of state for Northern Ireland not to include Northern Ireland’s possible integration into the remainder of the UK within the remit of the Atkins’s talks. During a speech to the annual general meeting of the South Down Unionist Association, on 25 January, Powell accused Atkins of behaving towards Northern Ireland ‘as if he were the man in [sic] the moon paying us a visit’. Atkins, Powell exclaimed, ‘has from his earliest days in office made a series of gaffes and blunders from which any ordinarily competent department would have saved him’.6 Sir Charles Johnson, chairman of the National Union of the Conservative Party and a native of Portadown in Northern Ireland, soon stepped into the debate. Privately, he too expressed his opposition to the ongoing Atkins’s talks and more generally Atkins’s record as secretary of state for Northern Ireland, to date.7

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By March 1980, tensions amongst those attending the Atkins’s talks soon boiled to the surface. According to the NIO, the SDLP was proving to be the major obstacle to progress. Because London refused the SDLP’s request to permit the Irish government a ‘legitimate role’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland, Hume and his colleagues had declined to consider any new proposals to end the political stalemate in Northern Ireland.8 In an effort to end this latest deadlock, Atkins agreed that all-Ireland relations could be examined in a separate but parallel series of meetings. Unsurprisingly, the DUP point blankly refused to attend any such meetings. The Rev. Paisley stipulated that his party would be present only for part of the Atkins’s talks and even then was ‘unwilling to discuss power-sharing’.9 Notwithstanding the evident tensions amongst those participating at the Atkins’s talks, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland continued to promote the value of such dialogue. Addressing a meeting of the British cabinet, on 27 March 1980, Atkins noted that those attending the multi-party talks recognized that a ‘major achievement’ might be attainable if ‘not insignificant areas of agreement’ could be reached.10 Indeed, he subsequently said that he found the talks ‘extremely useful’ because it brought ‘people together who might never otherwise’ meet.11 Unsurprisingly, in the end the Atkins’s talks failed because the political parties held fundamentally different political objectives. Although those participating favoured a form of devolved government, they could not agree on a workable formula. As Alistair Cooke of the CRD explained, having rejected a power-sharing model the DUP instead ‘advocated a form of devolved government with a cabinet composed exclusively of members of the party or group of parties which have a majority in the Assembly’. On the other hand, the Alliance Party and the SDLP ‘repeated their long-term view that the Executive should include representatives of both majority and minority’ (i.e. power-sharing).12 Consequently, with no other realistic political alternative left open to the British government, Thatcher decided to let the dust settle, with a plan to publish a White Paper, based on the Atkins’s talks, in the summer of 1980. It was envisaged that this White Paper would ‘provide the basis for further bilateral discussion with all the main parties including the UUP, leading perhaps to a reconvened Conference meeting in London’, to quote William Whitelaw.13

‘We do not know what Mr. Haughey wants’: Charles Haughey and Dublin’s Northern Ireland policy The appointment of Charles Haughey as Fianna Fáil leader and taoiseach in December 1979 had major repercussions for the Irish government’s Northern Ireland policy and more generally Anglo-Irish relations. On a personal level, his parents Seán and Sarah Haughey came from Swatragh, Co. Derry.14 As a child, during visits to the strongly Irish republican area of South Derry, Haughey had personally witnessed the sectarian riots of 1935 in Maghera and the heavy-handed approach of the B Specials.15 These personal experiences left a lifelong and deep-rooted impression on Haughey convincing him of the need to secure a united Ireland.

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Significantly, the outbreak of the Northern Ireland conflict in August 1969 and the harassment of the Catholic minority by the RUC struck a chord with Haughey, with the result that ‘his passion for Irish unity’ boiled to the surface.16 His republicanism was first exposed to the public during his alleged involvement in the Arms Crisis of 1969–70.17 During this period, Haughey, then Irish minister for finance, purportedly used Irish government monies and other resources to help arm Northern Republicans with guns and ammunition. His actions led to his sacking as a government minister in May 1970. He was subsequently arrested and charged with conspiracy to import arms, but he was eventually acquitted in October 1970.18 From the moment Haughey entered the Office of the Taoiseach, in December 1979, he set out on a bold Northern Ireland strategy, tearing apart his predecessor Jack Lynch’s conciliatory policy.19 He rejected Lynch’s traditional calls for an internal, power-sharing solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland as a prerequisite to a united Ireland. For Haughey, Northern Ireland was a ‘failed political entity’.20 He, therefore, instead argued that a new departure, focused on a Dublin-London axis, was required instead. From a British perspective, the Fianna Fáil leader and taoiseach was believed to be secretive about Northern Ireland. ‘We do not know what Mr. Haughey wants.’ ‘He does not confide in his Foreign Minister or his officials on the Northern Ireland question’, an FCO memorandum recorded.21 Writing in May 1980, British ambassador in Dublin Robin Haydon, 1976–80, informed his colleagues in Whitehall that on the subject of Northern Ireland Haughey’s position was ‘still not clear’.22 If Haughey did have wellthought-out ideas on Northern Ireland, Haydon noted, ‘he has yet to deploy them’.23 Haughey, for his part, had become increasingly frustrated with London’s continued support for the Atkins’s talks. The multi-party negotiations, Haughey said privately, simply could ‘not provide a conclusive settlement and that, whatever its outcome, the two sovereign Governments needed to work together to find … permanent peace and stability’.24 ‘Whatever the certain merits or demerits of devolution in Northern Ireland’, to quote Hugh Swift of the Irish Embassy in London, the taoiseach was convinced that the ‘current process just would not succeed because there was not sufficient compatibility between the two communities: the basis was too narrow’.25 The British government’s obsession with seeking to find an ‘internal’ solution to the Northern Ireland conflict, Haughey reportedly said, made it ‘more difficult for the British and Irish positions to move closer together’.26 Despite Thatcher’s obvious reluctance to provide Haughey with a ‘legitimate role’, to use the SDLP’s description, towards helping to resolve the current political deadlock in Northern Ireland, Dublin did find a sympathetic ear from a cabal of senior British civil servants, led by Robert Armstrong. By the early months of 1980, Armstrong had arrived at the dramatic conclusion that the Irish government did have ‘a legitimate interest’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland, to quote an FCO briefing document.27 Accordingly, senior civil servants at the heart of Thatcher’s government were now ‘ready to explore any other ideas that may in any way contribute towards reconciliation’. ‘If the Taoiseach makes suggestions’, the above memorandum recorded, London was willing to listen.28 Indeed, Walter Kirwan, assistant secretary in the DT, recalled that around this period the Irish were beginning to get ‘vibes’ that senior Whitehall figures, led by Armstrong,

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wanted ‘to give Ireland a stronger role’ in seeking to find a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict.29 In Armstrong’s thinking, this recognition of Dublin’s ‘legitimate interest’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland was a necessary tactic to ensure that Haughey used his political influence to force the SDLP back to the negotiating table in the context of the stalled Atkins’s talks. Given Dublin’s ‘influence with the SDLP’, as one FCO memorandum phrased it, the Irish government might be able to impress on them that they ‘can no more hope to obtain the full measure of their desire for “power-sharing”, than can the Unionists to regain anything like their old supremacy’ (i.e. majority-rule).30 In no way, according to Armstrong, did this recognition of Dublin’s role in helping to end the current deadlock in Northern Ireland entail that London would agree to ‘any joint initiatives’ between the British and Irish governments.31 Nor did it mean that Dublin would be permitted ‘a formal right of consultation’ regarding the future of Northern Ireland.32 Northern Ireland’s constitutional integrity as part of the UK was not open for negotiation. Despite such stipulations, this new concession on behalf of Whitehall officialdom – irrespective of the fact that it did not win Thatcher’s approval – represented a significant shift in policy. As Charles Moore explained, by now within the British civil service ‘there were signs that matters would be settled’ – chiefly by a combination of the FCO and Cabinet Office – ‘at a higher level’. In their thinking ‘less attention should be paid to what the parties in Northern Ireland wanted, and more to a deal’ with the Irish government.33 What of Dublin’s views of Thatcher’s stance on Northern Ireland on the eve of her first year in office? According to Irish government officials, the British prime minister wanted agreement among the political parties of Northern Ireland because her focus remained on finding an internal solution to the Northern Ireland conflict.34 Haughey, for his part, believed Thatcher was a ‘practical politician’.35 Yet, he remained apprehensive ‘because of her reputation in the media for toughness, decisiveness and determination’.36 The taoiseach reportedly held ‘distinct reservations about Mrs. Thatcher’s approach to the Northern Ireland problem’. She had, as Haughey had earlier indicated, shown ‘uncommon ignorance of certain matters in Northern Ireland, e.g. the number of government departments in Belfast [and] the operation of Local Government’.37

Teapot diplomacy: The Haughey-Thatcher summit meeting, 21 May 1980 The two premiers had their first opportunity to hold one-to-one talks in relation to Northern Ireland at an Anglo-Irish summit meeting at No. 10 Downing Street, on 21 May 1980. Present on the British side, apart from Thatcher, were Atkins, Lord Carrington, Ian Gilmour and a selection of senior British officials, including Armstrong and Kenneth Stowe, permanent under-secretary of the NIO, 1979–81. Haughey was accompanied by a small Irish delegation, including Brian Lenihan (minister for foreign affairs) and Eamon Kennedy (minister for finance).38

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Following lunch, Thatcher and Haughey held a private one-hour tête-à-tête, during which he presented his host with an extravagant eighteenth-century Irish Georgian silver teapot and silver tea-strainer.39 Haughey had reportedly personally paid for this gift, at an estimated cost of £2,000.40 On the teapot, Haughey had requested that the words of St Francis of Assisi be engraved: ‘Where there is discord, may we bring harmony’; the same words that Thatcher had used when first entering No. 10 Downing Street on becoming British prime minister. ‘She likes silver’, Haughey had told one confidant on the eve of the summit meeting. ‘That will knock her back a bit’, he said.41 The legend of the ‘teapot diplomacy’ was thus born. Indeed, the teapot, in Thatcher’s own words, continued to ‘grace a cabinet’ in No. 10 Downing Street for the remainder of her premiership.42 It was not until the two leaders reconvened for discussions during the afternoon plenary session that the subject of Northern Ireland was considered. Thatcher stressed the need for ‘regular and continuing meetings’ with the Irish government. Haughey said he agreed. He spoke of his wish that Thatcher would visit Ireland. She said she hoped she would. It was envisaged that Thatcher and Haughey would meet once or twice a year, but ‘there was no need at this stage to prejudge the details’.43 Following a general discussion on several European and world topics, the subject of the conversation turned to Northern Ireland. To the disappointment of the Irish delegation, apart from some generalities, the topic was not discussed in much detail. Thatcher was guarded in her responses. She seemingly did not wish to make her own intentions on Northern Ireland known. Perhaps this was because she still had not formulated a concrete plan; Haughey certainly believed this to be the case.44 In fact, in the aftermath of the meeting, British and Irish officials, alike, admitted that they were ‘under the difficulty of not knowing what if anything’ both leaders had said in relation to Northern Ireland.45 In The Downing Street years, Thatcher recalled how during this encounter Haughey ‘kept on drawing the parallel, which seemed to me an unconvincing one, between the solution I had found to the Rhodesian problem and the approach to be pursued in Northern Ireland’. ‘Whether this was Irish blarney’, she recounted, ‘or calculated flattery I was not sure.’46 During this time, events in Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) had seemingly convinced Haughey that the British government’s Northern Ireland policy could, likewise, change in a sudden and radical way. For several years Rhodesia had been ruled illegally by a white minority regime. Thatcher had originally supported propping up this ‘internal settlement’.47 However, following pressure from the international community and direct intervention from Lord Carrington,48 Thatcher gave her blessing to a new settlement which, under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, facilitated the ousting of the puppet Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith and brought to power Robert Mugabe, the leader of one of the main guerrilla movements. While Lord Carrington may have favoured a united Ireland,49 Thatcher had no intention of transplanting the Rhodesia model when it came to Northern Ireland. After some further discussions concerning the final terms of the joint communiqué, the plenary session ended.50 Haughey was reportedly ‘lyrical’ following the conclusion

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of the day’s events, describing his encounter with Thatcher as ‘wonderful’.51 Thatcher was also in jubilant form. On 23 May, Thatcher telephoned the taoiseach, thanking him for the ‘beautiful teapot’ and noting that she ‘very much enjoyed’ the summit meeting in London. The taoiseach was, likewise, ‘delighted to be there’, thanking her for a ‘very gracious and wonderful hospitality and a delightful atmosphere’. The conversation ended by both exchanging messages of ‘God bless’.52 In the immediate aftermath of the Haughey-Thatcher summit meeting, relations between London and Dublin seemed at their most cordial in several years. Thatcher informed her officials that ‘we have all under-rated Mr Haughey … he is a smart politician … you have all got Haughey wrong’. 53 Indeed, for a short period at least, Thatcher showed a surprising affection for Haughey. In the words of a senior policy advisor close to Thatcher, ‘there was a glint’ in Haughey’s eye which she had ‘found attractive’.54 The Haughey-Thatcher honeymoon period, as is examined below, was to be short-lived. Despite such hype and positivity surrounding the summit meeting, one niggling question remained unanswered. What precisely was discussed in relation to Northern Ireland during the Haughey-Thatcher meeting? The answer was very little. In his dealings with Thatcher, Haughey had failed to shift the British government’s thinking on Northern Ireland. Not only had he failed to discuss with the British prime minister his calls for an ‘Irish dimension’ in finding a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict, but he had been unable to convince her that London should make a public statement in favour of Irish unity. Most significantly, he had conceded that Northern Ireland’s constitutional position could not be changed without the consent of the majority in that region.55 Relations between Thatcher and Haughey were first tested as a result of latter’s comments during an interview on RTÉ television programme, ‘News at One-Thirty’, on the day after the summit meeting. To Thatcher’s annoyance, during the interview Haughey decided to give his own interpretation of this meeting. The interview was dominated by the subject of Northern Ireland. As one has learned, Northern Ireland featured very little during the summit meeting discussions. Haughey, however, would not permit the reality of the situation to get in the way of a good news story. He was determined to seize the initiative, to paint a picture of a taoiseach forging ahead with a bold new Northern Ireland policy. The taoiseach spoke in grand gestures, expressing his desire for the British government to concede an ‘Irish dimension’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland  – a policy which, as noted above, had not even made it onto the agenda in his discussions with Thatcher. Haughey’s interviewer Kevin Healy enquired why Haughey felt that the long-term solution to Northern Ireland could be found only in an ‘Irish context’? Haughey replied that due to Ulster Unionists’ immobility, particularly in relation to the stalled Atkins’s talks, the British government would have to allow Dublin a role in the affairs of Northern Ireland.56 Although Thatcher bit her lip, refusing to be drawn publicly on Haughey’s comments, Ulster Unionists reacted furiously. The Rev. Paisley depicted the AngloIrish summit meeting as an abject failure for Haughey, describing the affair as a ‘fiasco’ from the taoiseach’s perspective. He accused Haughey of speaking ‘blarney’ in his

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post-conference press interviews.57 The UUP spokesman Rev. Martin Smyth accused Haughey of playing politics with Northern Ireland. ‘The taoiseach’, he said, had used ‘doublespeak’.58 James Kilfedder59 lambasted Thatcher for holding talks with Haughey during a House of Commons debate, on 22 May, describing Haughey as a ‘former gunrunner’ (a less than subtle reference to Haughey’s involvement with the Arms Crisis).60 Despite Haughey’s recent public outbursts, in the months following the AngloIrish summit meeting of May 1980, Thatcher gradually – if somewhat begrudgingly – arrived at the conclusion that relations between London and Dublin should be improved further. As is examined below, her reasoning for this subtle, but significant, shift in attitude towards the Irish government vis-à-vis Northern Ireland was based on three salient issues, First, due to the failure of the Atkins’s talks to secure agreement among the political parties of Northern Ireland regarding the constitutional future of Northern Ireland. Second, to ensure Haughey’s continued commitment to improvements in cross-border security. Last, in response to the commencement of the first Irish Republican hunger strike in late October 1980.

‘The best way forward’: the evolution of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy, June–November 1980 By early summer 1980, Thatcher’s de facto deputy prime minister William Whitelaw decided to grasp the political nettle regarding the political impasse in Northern Ireland.61 On 10 June, at a meeting of the cabinet defence and oversea policy committee – which was chaired by Thatcher and attended by several senior ministers, including Lord Carrington, Ian Gilmour, Lord Hailsham, Francis Pym and John Nott – Whitelaw presented his cabinet colleagues with a thought-provoking, fifty-sevenpage memorandum, ‘The Government of Northern Ireland:  proposals for further discussions’. At the heart of the memorandum was a proposal to ‘transfer of powers of Government in Northern Ireland’ to an ‘administration based on a single Provincewide elected Assembly’.62 In his opening comments to the committee members, Whitelaw said that it would be ‘wrong and dangerous’ to give the impression that the Atkins’s talks had been ‘a waste of time’. He had decided, therefore, to produce the named memorandum to ensure political progress continued in Northern Ireland. The British home secretary noted that if agreement was reached regarding the content of the memorandum, his government would be able to ‘put forward specific proposals for legislation in the next session of Parliament’. He also stipulated that the maintenance of the union between the UK and Northern Ireland was non-negotiable. This was a ‘political fact’. That said, he also explained that the British government had a responsibility to consider the ‘close geographical inter-relationship’ that existed between the UK and the Republic of Ireland.63 Significantly, Whitelaw advised that the proposed Assembly for Northern Ireland ‘would not decide security policy (unlike the Northern Ireland Parliament of 1921–72) or determine the Province’s total public expenditure’. ‘These matters’, the memorandum

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noted, ‘would remain with the Secretary of State, but he would seek advice on them from a council, consisting of leading members of the Assembly.’64 Below is a summary of the main points contained within the memorandum regarding the future governance of Northern Ireland. It reads as follows: (a) the ‘transfer of powers of Government in Northern Ireland to an administration based on a single Province-wide elected Assembly [of approximately 80 members]’; (b) the method of election to the Assembly should be a ‘form of proportional representation’; (c) the proposed Assembly should be ‘unicameral’; (d) a new Assembly ‘should have responsibility over a range of subjects broadly similar to that transferred in 1973’ (i.e. principally agriculture, commerce, education, employment, environment matters including housing, health and social services); (e) a ‘Council of Northern Ireland’ to be established, which would ‘bring together for purposes of consultation, representative leading members of the Assembly, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State [for Northern Ireland]’; (f) the Assembly ‘should have powers to legislate on transferred matters’; (g) the executive direction of the Northern Ireland Departments ‘would be the responsibility of individual members of the Assembly, acting as Heads of the Northern Ireland Departments’.65 Following Whitelaw’s presentation, members of the cabinet defence and oversea policy committee debated the contents of the memorandum. A collective decision was then reached that to avoid ‘the impression’ that it was the British government’s ‘longterm plan to hand over Northern Ireland’ to the Republic of Ireland, it was important to ensure that the final version ‘carried no flavour whatever of this kind’, as the minutes of the meeting phrased it. In concluding the meeting, Thatcher stipulated that while committee members realized that the recommendations brought up ‘numerous difficulties’, they ‘represented the best way forward’.66 In her memoir, Thatcher was less optimistic regarding the potential for success in relation to the above memorandum and more generally the Atkins’s talks. Writing retrospectively, she noted that ‘I was no more optimistic than earlier that the initiative would succeed, but I felt that it was worth the effort and agreed that the White Paper should be published in early July [1980].’67 Irrespective of Thatcher’s pessimistic outlook regarding the fate of Whitelaw’s proposals, a startling feature of the archival records during this period was how often Northern Ireland policy found itself at the top of the political agenda. In fact, on no fewer than fourteen occasions was Northern Ireland discussed at full meetings of the British cabinet between 10 January and 18 December 1980.68 The following month, in July 1980, the British government duly published a discussion paper entitled The government of Northern Ireland:  proposals for future discussion.69 The publication of this document owed much of its success to the hard work undertaken by Atkins and the Northern Ireland political parties over the

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previous several months, together with the specific policies contained within the Whitelaw memorandum. Indeed, in the spirit of Whitelaw’s suggestions, at the heart of The government of Northern Ireland was a recommendation for the establishment of a devolved assembly with either compulsory power-sharing or majority-rule. It was no longer desirable, to quote part one of the discussion paper, to continue indefinitely with the system of ‘direct rule’ as the means of governing Northern Ireland.70 The British government also warned, however, that if such an agreement could not be reached, London would ‘explore other ways of making the government of Northern Ireland more responsive to the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland’. Such alternatives suggested included a ‘progressive approach to the transfer of a range of powers’ to a locally elected assembly.71 As Atkins and Whitelaw focused their energy on kick-starting a fresh political initiative for Northern Ireland, senior Whitehall civil servants turned their attention to the British government’s next move in the field of Anglo-Irish relations. Specifically, how to ‘develop new and closer political co-operation’ between Dublin and London, as enshrined in the Anglo-Irish communiqué of 21 May 1980. Initially, at least, the Civil Service seemed reluctant to act. In early June, for example, Michael Moriarty, assistant under-secretary in the NIO, privately conceded that his department ‘did not have a great deal to say’ about developing political relations between the two countries.72 Instead, the FCO forged ahead on devising a solution to the Irish government’s request for an input into the affairs of Northern Ireland, what Haughey had labelled the ‘Irish dimension’.73 Although Michael Newington, head of the RIO, accepted that London continued to refuse Haughey a ‘direct role in Northern Ireland, as he wants’, he questioned whether Thatcher, to avoid an ‘irreconcilable’ stand-off ’ between Dublin and London, might be persuaded to develop the new ‘unique relationship’ between the two countries, primarily in relation to institutional structures?74 FCO officials, for example, recognized that it was essential to maintain active cooperation with the Irish government, from ‘whom we are getting the security co-operation which is essential to us’. While there could be no question of expressing ‘an interest in Irish unity nor give the Irish Government the role in negotiations on Northern Ireland that they want’, the FCO advised that it was essential that Haughey should be provided with the opportunity to ‘maintain that he has an input’.75 By mid-August, Haughey was anxious to receive a fixed date for his planned second Anglo-Irish summit meeting with Thatcher. His anxieties were soon quelled. On 19th of that month, at the behest of Thatcher, Leonard Figg, recently appointed British ambassador in Dublin, 1980–83, met Haughey. The British prime minister had requested this hurriedly arranged meeting because, as Figg put it, she ‘had been turning over in her mind the parameters of the next meeting between her and the Taoiseach’. The British ambassador in Dublin explained that Thatcher wished to meet Haughey in the weeks before the meeting of the European Council, which was fixed for 1–2 December 1980 again in Luxemburg.76 Regarding the venue for the planned second summit meeting, Haughey pushed for Dublin. He referred to the fact that the Irish side were ‘in a sense’ two meetings behind at ‘Head of Government level’. He informed Figg that the Irish side would be bringing ‘fairly firm proposals’ to the proposed meeting.77

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On 11 September 1980, following the summer parliamentary recess, a delegation of British and Irish senior diplomats convened in Dublin to flesh out the agenda for the forthcoming Haughey-Thatcher summit meeting and more generally to discuss the current state of Anglo-Irish relations.78 Included on the British side were Leonard Figg, Michael Moriarty and Michael Newington. On the Irish side were Eamon Kennedy, David Neligan and Walter Kirwan. Opening proceedings, Moriarty got to the heart of the discussions. Described by one Irish source as an ‘astute and intelligent guy’,79 he explained that the British government’s thinking on Northern Ireland remained loyal to Atkins’s commitment to pursue discussions with the Northern Ireland parties to see what degree of cross-community support existed for the proposals in the discussion paper, The government of Northern Ireland. He could ‘not speculate on whether there might be any such arrangement or on when the whistle might be blown’.80 Following set policy, Moriarty next reaffirmed that the British government was committed to developing the ‘unique relationship’ between Great Britain and Ireland. However, he included a caveat. London categorically refused to ‘concede’ to Dublin having a ‘negotiating role’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland.81 Eamon Kennedy, described in British circles as ‘one of the most able Irish diplomats of his generation’,82 outlined the Irish government’s position. Haughey, he said, ‘attached great importance to the development of the new and closer political co-operation between the two Governments’ and to the furtherance of the ‘unique relationship’ between the two countries. In relation to Atkins’s talks and following the Haughey-line, Kennedy said that the multi-party negotiations were ‘inadequate as a basis for progress towards a settlement dealing with all the dimensions of the problem’.83 Kennedy explained that a new approach was, therefore, required. He said that only ‘new inter-governmental level’ dialogue in the context of closer political cooperation between Dublin and London would deliver the long-term goal of peace and stability. Consequently, he made the bold request that London agree to hold a conference between the two sovereign governments and the Northern Ireland political parties (a request that Haughey, himself, made during a private meeting with Figg, the following month).84 The taoiseach, Kennedy explained, envisaged that such a conference would be of an explanatory nature, ‘held in a new context in which some of the parameters of the problem would have been changed’.85 The British side refused to be drawn on Kennedy’s remarks and the tone of the conversation became markedly candid. Moriarty instead expressed concern that Haughey’s ‘advisers knew the risks inherent in the approach of which the Irish side had given notice’. He did not see the present British government turning around to bring the Irish government ‘into the negotiating process’. If London was to accept Haughey’s offer, this would mark a ‘very significant reversal of policy’, Moriarty explained.86 He then warned, ‘You would be deceiving yourself if you thought that would happen.’87 Bringing the meeting to a conclusion, Newington said that there were three areas of common ground which the forthcoming Anglo-Irish summit meeting should focus on: (1) Northern Ireland (including North-South cooperation), (2) Anglo-Irish cooperation and lastly (3) international (including European Economic Community (EEC)) issues.88 Each delegation agreed that the proposed Anglo-Irish summit meeting should be convened in early December, possibly 8 or 9 December. The location of such

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a meeting, however, was still causing friction. The British pushed the Irish to agree to hold the next Anglo-Irish summit meeting in London. Newington said that the ‘British side hoped that such a meeting could take place in the near future at Downing Street’ (this went against Haughey’s personal plea to Figg the previous August to hold the meeting in Dublin).89 The Irish delegation, for their part, refused to accept this invitation to London, reminding their British counterparts that it was now Thatcher’s turn to visit Dublin. The meeting ended without agreement on where the next AngloIrish summit meeting would take place. The following month, on 31 October, Thatcher convened a meeting with Atkins and Whitelaw in order, as the minutes phrased it, to further explore the relationship between the ‘United Kingdom and the Republic [of Ireland]’. The findings of this investigation, she noted, ‘should be restricted to an extremely limited number of Ministers and officials’. If details of such proposals were leaked the consequences could be ‘explosive’. Her decision to foster closer relations with Dublin, she explained, was in response to the stalled Atkins’s talks and the recent outbreak of the first Irish Republican hunger strike.90 Moreover, as she conceded at the time, her decision to bring Dublin out of the cold was because she ‘greatly appreciated the efforts [on behalf of the Irish government] which had been made in every quarter to tackle the security situation’.91 Consequently, under Thatcher’s instructions, on 10 November, a high-powered delegation of Whitehall’s senior civil servants convened to flesh out the British government’s strategy in advance of the forthcoming summit meeting with Haughey. By this stage, the British, albeit with some reluctance, had agreed to Haughey’s request to convene the scheduled summit meeting in Dublin, with 8 December pencilled in as the preferable date. Besides Armstrong and Stowe, those in attendance included Sir Brian Cubbon (HO), Sir Frank Copper (Ministry of Defence), Sir Anthony Rawlinson (Treasury), J. A. Marshall (deputy under-secretary of the NIO), Sir Anthony Acland (FCO) and Robert Wade-Gery (deputy secretary of the Cabinet Office).92 Held at No. 10 Downing Street, in Armstrong’s private office, the meeting revealed that behind closed doors senior British policymakers had become increasingly frustrated with the ongoing Atkins’s talks. Indeed, by this period, high-ranking Whitehall civil servants had arrived at the firm conclusion that the multi-party talks were ‘futile’, to quote a revealing confidential FCO memorandum, dated 21 October 1980.93 Significantly, it was within this context that a cabal of senior British civil servants, under the authority of Armstrong and with the support of Stowe, envisaged a new role for Dublin. Due to Haughey’s continued cooperation on cross-border security and intelligence, together with Thatcher’s commitment to foster the ‘unique relationship’ between the two countries, an agreement was reached that any proposals that the taoiseach did put on the table should, at the very least, be given ‘careful and sympathetic attention’.94 The fact that Armstrong and Stowe sponsored this new initiative should not come as a surprise. On 22 October, in a private note to Thatcher, Armstrong had counselled his prime minister to forge ahead with a new political initiative for Northern Ireland.95 Personally, both men got on with one another. Armstrong recounted with fondness that he had ‘great respect for Stowe’, that he was ‘loyal and intelligent’.96 Armstrong harboured

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a lifelong conviction that Irish unity was simply inevitable. He later recounted that ‘I thought that the time would … inevitably (for demographic reasons) come when a majority of people in Northern Ireland would vote in favour of unification ’.97 Indeed, at this time, it was felt by some within the British Civil Service that Armstrong was a sympathetic supporter of Irish unity;98 an accusation that he subsequently refuted.99 Within Irish government circles, Armstrong was widely respected as a ‘giant figure’ in the field of Anglo-Irish relations, to use Walker Kirwan’s description.100 During the negotiations that eventually led to the signing of the ill-fated Sunningdale Agreement in 1973, Armstrong had played an integral role on behalf of London as British prime minister Edward Heath’s principal private secretary. Although the Sunningdale Agreement eventually collapsed due to Ulster Unionist intransigence, Armstrong’s mental model, was always along the lines of the Sunningdale Agreement, which included an ‘Irish dimension’ such as the Council of Ireland.101 For his part, Stowe’s judgement held considerable influence. He had previously held the position as principal private secretary to British prime minister James Callaghan briefly retaining this post under Thatcher’s premiership before he was replaced by Clive Whitmore in June 1979. Like Armstrong, he too believed that the Irish government should be permitted a functional role towards finding a peaceful solution to the Northern Ireland conflict. As Armstrong later noted, both himself and Stowe felt that it simply made ‘sense to have an arrangement’ by which the Catholic minority of Northern Ireland would have ‘their interests’ represented by ‘some form of a consultative role for the Irish government. In this my mind went back to the Council of Ireland envisaged in the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973.’102 At this meeting of senior British officials, on 10 November, the decision was taken under the direction of Armstrong and Stowe that Thatcher be advised that the present political stalemate in Northern Ireland could be used to London’s advantage. The failure of the Atkins’s talks, the British prime minister was informed, represented an ‘opportunity’ to develop a ‘unique relationship’ with the Republic of Ireland, accepting that ‘the solution is not to be found exclusively within a narrow Northern Ireland framework’. Not only this, but those present again encouraged by Armstrong and Stowe argued that a new ‘constitutional relationship between the two sovereign islands with a special place for the Province’ might be possible.103 By this period, Atkins, likewise, had arrived at the conclusion that Dublin be permitted a voice in the affairs of Northern Ireland. The evidence is in the form of a confidential memorandum, ‘Northern Ireland:  political developments’, dated 13 November 1980. In this memorandum, Atkins conceded that because his talks with the Northern Ireland political parties were on the brink of collapse, Thatcher might need to reconsider the Irish government’s role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. ‘Remembering that the Dublin government is likely shortly to be knocking on the door for some development of the “unique relationship” ’, Atkins wrote, ‘I am led to wonder whether’ a new way forward was required. Specifically, Atkins explained that Haughey’s willingness to step up cross-border security should be rewarded by the British government. He predicted that at the forthcoming Anglo-Irish summit meeting, Haughey would propose an AngloIrish conference during 1981, to flesh out the ‘unique relationship’ between the two

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countries. Revealingly, Atkins wrote that he supported such a proposal, ‘as long as it was “Anglo-Irish” and not merely “North-South” in its scope’.104 The convening of such a conference, he explained, might give Haughey what he seeks, ‘without giving him a recognized constitutional position with regards to Northern Ireland’.105 However, the following day, 14 November, Armstrong rebuffed Atkins’s support for the convening of an Anglo-Irish conference in a private letter to Thatcher. Although Armstrong maintained that it was imperative to instigate ‘some kind of positive progress’ vis-à-vis Anglo-Irish relations to ensure Haughey’s continued support on cross-border security, he advised his prime minister to shelve support for the convening of an AngloIrish conference, along the lines suggested by Haughey. This was interesting because, as noted above, at a meeting of senior British civil servants, on 10 November, Thatcher’s cabinet secretary had apparently lent his support to this proposal. The reason provided was that the cabinet defence and oversea policy committee was against this proposal. Instead, Armstrong suggested that Thatcher agree to a commitment to convene a twice-yearly ‘consultation between British and Irish Ministers’, led by her and the taoiseach, on the model of the British government’s current consultations with the French and the Germans. Alternatively, he suggested that there might be ‘merit’ in setting up a so-called ‘consultative body of Anglo-Irish Parliamentarians’ from Westminster and Dublin, to which members of ‘a Northern Ireland Assembly could be added if such an assembly were set up’.106 On 24 November, the cabinet defence and oversea policy committee met to consider the British government’s Northern Ireland policy in the context of the failure of the Atkins’s talks and the ongoing first Irish Republican hunger strike. Thatcher chaired this meeting. Also in attendance were Atkins, Whitelaw, Howe, Lord Carrington, Lord Hailsham, Ply, Lord Soames, Gilmour and Nott. Atkins, opening the proceedings, briefed his colleagues in relation to the contents of his memorandum of 13 November, ‘Northern Ireland: political developments’. In the discussions that followed, there was agreement among those present that it would not be easy to make political progress in Northern Ireland ‘on any democratic basis’. ‘An election in the near future’, as the minutes of the meeting phrased it, ‘might have a disturbing effect on the security situation and might in any case be stultified if one or more of the political parties refused to take part.’ In fact, as recounted by Thatcher in The Downing Street years, by now it was obvious that the Atkins’s talks had failed because ‘it was clear that there would not be sufficient agreement among them [the Northern Ireland political parties] to go ahead with assembly’.107 Summing up discussions, Thatcher confirmed three significant policy decisions. First, she said that her government’s first objective was ‘to maintain the improvements in the security situation in Northern Ireland’. Second, she stipulated that ‘no new major political initiative’ for Northern Ireland would be considered while the first Irish Republican hunger strike continued. And last, no doubt to Atkins’s annoyance, Thatcher noted that ‘the idea of a formal Anglo-Irish conference’, composed of the British and Irish governments, together with the major Northern Ireland political parties, should be ‘avoided’.108 Although Atkins was left frustrated by Thatcher’s decision to rule out the convening of an Anglo-Irish conference, along the lines suggested by Haughey, he was nonetheless

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determined to forge ahead with his plans to strengthen relations between Dublin and London. On 26 November, he provided Thatcher with an interesting briefing paper outlining how future relations with the Irish government might evolve. Contained within the paper was a note marked ‘Inter-governmental links’, which akin to the French-German relationship, provided information regarding how regular meetings between Britain and the Republic of Ireland, from a head of government to official level, might be convened ‘to discuss matters of mutual concern’. ‘We understand that the Prime Minister does not want to become committed to any rigid timetable involving e.g. six-monthly summits’, Atkins wrote. However, a ‘programme of continuing contacts could nevertheless be arranged’, he advised, ‘as evidence of the nature of the unique relationship as a forum in which we could discuss with Dublin a wide range of matters possibly including new approaches to the problems of the North’. On ‘New UK/Republic Relationships’ Akins noted that if a ‘long term settlement of the Northern problem was achieved that was acceptable to the Republic [of Ireland] (thus reducing the pressures on the South to emphasize its independence from the former imperial power) Dublin might find it desirable (and easier) to consider new relationships with Great Britain’. The secretary of state for Northern Ireland then suggested that there were even ‘hints’ that Haughey ‘might’, in return for a new relationship with Great Britain, consider an application to join the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and/or realigning the Republic of Ireland with the Commonwealth.109 Lastly, Atkins’s paper brought up the prospect of so-called ‘Federal/Confederal Links’, ‘something that Haughey secretly had in mind’, to quote the secretary of state for Northern Ireland. ‘In recent years there has been a growing interest in a Federal or Confederal arrangement as the one most likely to prove appropriate for achieving Irish unity’, the memorandum explained.110 ‘Both Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil in the South and the SDLP in the North seem to favour this kind of approach’, the paper recorded.111 The following day, 27 November 1980, Atkins reported to the House of Commons that there was little prospect for a devolved government in Northern Ireland due to a lack of consensus amongst the Northern Ireland political parties.112 The simple fact remained that despite months of negotiations the Northern Ireland political parties could not agree on a workable plan. The Alliance Party and SDLP were reported to be ‘firmly wedded to power-sharing (i.e. a seat at the top table in any system for representatives of the minority community)’. The DUP, for their part, wanted devolved government restored ‘but insist on majority rule, though accepting the provision of some safeguarding against discrimination’. While some in the UUP reportedly favoured ‘integration as the best means of guaranteeing the Union and are pressing for greater powers to be given to local government in the North’.113 Privately, Haughey was delighted to learn that the Atkins’s talks had stalled. The shelving of the initiative had vindicated his argument that the negotiations had always been doomed to failure. Reluctantly, for the moment at least, the British had reached a similar conclusion. The solution to Northern Ireland, to quote an NIO memorandum, could not be secured based solely on an ‘internal’ model.114 Whether she liked it or not, Thatcher was forced to acknowledge that Dublin ‘has some role to play rather greater

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than that of an international bystander’, as another NIO briefing note phrased it.115 The door was now open to Dublin to push the so-called ‘Irish dimension’. In late November, FCO officials spelt out to Thatcher the basis of Haughey’s views in relation to his calls for an ‘Irish dimension’. The taoiseach’s central motivation for holding an Anglo-Irish summit meeting was to ‘urge the Prime Minister to agree to a Conference (or, possibly, some similar form of consultation)’ at which ‘the two sovereign governments’ could consider the issues together, in the context of the close and developing relationship between ‘these islands’. If Haughey brought up this proposal of the holding of an Anglo-Irish conference during their forthcoming talks in Dublin, Thatcher was counselled to firmly refuse the taoiseach’s request.116 Instead, Thatcher was advised to offer Haughey an alternative proposition, the holding of a series of ‘special’ meetings, which had been first inaugurated at the Haughey-Thatcher meeting on 21 May 1980. If this was met with an unsympathetic response from the Irish side, an alternative approach was for the British government to make ‘a commitment to a programme of [Anglo-Irish] “joint studies” on relevant subjects’.117 As is discussed below, these two propositions were to form the bedrock of future Dublin-London relations in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting on 8 December 1980. However, on the eve of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting, Thatcher remained noncommittal on both the prospect of convening a series of ‘special meetings’ and over the issue of the proposed Anglo-Irish joint study groups. In her thinking, such discussions regarding Dublin’s request to play a more formal role in the affairs of Northern Ireland were a sideshow to more immediate concerns, namely the ongoing hunger strikes by Irish Republican prisoners in Northern Ireland.

‘Did he smell blood off you?’: Thatcher and the first Irish Republican hunger strike, October–December 1980 The outbreak of the first Irish Republican hunger strike on 27 October 1980 propelled the subject of Northern Ireland to the top of Thatcher’s political agenda. Since entering No. 10 Downing Street in May 1979, Thatcher had categorically refused to concede special category status to the Irish Republican prisoners in Northern Ireland; a position which she had steadfastly endorsed since her election as leader of the Conservative Party in 1975.118 In her memoir, she referred to the granting of special category status as ‘a bad mistake’ by the Heath government (although there is no evidence that Thatcher, as a minister in the Heath administration, raised objections to this policy when it was initially sanctioned).119 In correspondence with Edward Daly, Catholic bishop of Derry, 1974–93, in January 1980, Atkins made clear the British government’s policy vis-à-vis the Irish Republican protesters housed in HMP Maze. If special category status was reinstated, Atkins explained, the ‘next drive’ by the Irish Republican movement ‘would no doubt be for an amnesty or promise of amnesty’ for Irish Republican paramilitaries. For this reason, alone, Atkin counselled, the British government would not allow itself to be ‘blackmail[ed]’ by Irish Republicans.120

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The new Conservative administration, nonetheless, did attempt to improve conditions in Long-Kesh, while remaining firm on the question of special category status. Thatcher made the rationale behind this decision clear some years later. It was better to make some concessions before the hunger strike commenced, she recalled, as this would be ‘helpful in dealing with the threatened public disorder’, which would invariably breakout.121 Consequently, in March 1980, the British cabinet agreed to prisoners wearing regulation P.T. vests for recreational purposes. In August, further concessions on compassionate leave, recreation and the wearing of shorts and plimsolls were also granted.122 The Irish Republican prisoners based on Long-Kesh, however, rejected these concessions on behalf of Thatcher’s government. Instead, they maintained that because they were ‘political’ prisoners the British government had a responsibility to reinstate special category status, which by now fell under the so-called ‘five demands’. They were as follows: ( a) (b) (c) (d)

the right of prisoners to wear their own clothes; the right to refrain from prison work; the right to free association amongst political prisoners; the right to organise their own educational and recreational facilities; and receive one visit, one letter and one parcel a week; and lastly, (e) the right to full remission of sentences.123 Thus, a stalemate ensued with neither Thatcher nor the Irish Republican prisoners willing to give an inch. By early October 1980, Atkins’s ongoing backchannel talks with Irish Republican representatives – working through intermediary cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich, Roman Catholic archbishop of Armagh and primate of All-Ireland – were described as ‘futile’, to quote Fr Denis Faul of Dungannon, who was himself a regular visitor to Long-Kesh.124 It was, therefore, inevitable that on 10 October the H-Block Information Centre in Belfast announced that a hunger strike would begin on the 27th of that month.125 According to a source close to the Irish government, the threatened hunger strike was being ‘orchestrated’ from within Long-Kesh and not by the PIRA Army Council outside the prison (this body comprised a seven-man ruling body in charge of waging the ‘war’ against the British state).126 This analysis is supported by Ed Moloney’s account of the first Irish Republican hunger strike. Based on his information, the PIRA leadership outside the prison, under the influence of Belfast Republican Gerry Adams, was opposed to the threatened hunger strike. Rather, the decision to initiate the hunger strike was taken by the prisoners themselves within Long-Kesh and was led by H-Block officer commander Brendan Hughes, Adams’s friend and former Maze colleague.127 Hughes had requested each wing on the protesting PIRA blocks to send in lists of volunteers prepared to go on hunger strike. Apparently, the men already chosen for the strike satisfied the criteria ‘of being single, not too young, serving long sentences and representing overall a wide number of counties in Northern Ireland’.128 On 22 October, five days before the threatened hunger strike was due to commence, Thatcher received a letter from her cabinet secretary regarding British government

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policy vis-à-vis the prospect of granting further concessions. Following a meeting of the H Committee, early that day, at which ‘tactical issues’ were raised in relation to dealing with the threatened hunger strike, Armstrong wrote that an agreement was reached ‘that no concessions, including the wearing of civilian clothing, should be granted’. On Armstrong’s note, Thatcher put an underscore under this passage – an invariable sign of her agreement.129 At the last minute, however, Thatcher made a dramatic volte-face. At a meeting of the British cabinet the following day, on 23 October, a collective decision was reached that all male prisoners in Northern Ireland would be offered a choice of ‘civilian-style’ clothing provided by the prison authorities instead of prison uniforms.130 This offer of ‘civilian-style’ clothing was presented as a ‘humanitarian’ gesture. It was better, Thatcher informed her ministerial colleagues, to position the British government into the ‘most reasonable position’ before the start of the hunger strike and to ‘stick to it’.131 This change in policy, as Thatcher herself privately admitted, ‘had not been an easy decision’.132 Privately, Giles Shaw,133 parliamentary under-secretary of state of the NIO, elaborated further on this policy stance. Concessions on clothing, he said, had been made before the hunger strike began because, once it was underway, the British government were ‘determined to make no further concessions’. He rejected ‘out of hand’ the idea that Thatcher would be ‘prepared to consider further concessions if the [hunger] strike were suspended’.134 This was not Thatcher’s only motivation, however. In reference to the Irish government, she conceded that she was anxious to concede some concessions to the protestors in order not to lose ‘Haughey’s security co-operation’.135 News of Thatcher’s decision to introduce ‘civilian style’ clothing set off alarm bells amongst a cabal of Conservative Party backbench MPs. At a meeting of the CPPNIC, on 30 October, several committee members, including Thatcher’s personal private secretary Ian Gow, John Biggs-Davison and Nigel Fisher, recorded their collective ‘shock’ at this decision.136 To address Conservative Party backbenchers’ anxieties, on 6 November, Atkins attended a meeting of the CPPNIC to outline his government’s stance vis-à-vis the Irish Republican hunger strike. Addressing those in attendance, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland reassured his hosts that this latest concession on behalf of the British government was the final one. ‘The Government cannot and will not give way’, he implored to the sound of muted applause.137 Unsurprisingly, Atkins’s personal intervention failed to win approval from the majority of CPPNIC members. At the next meeting of the CPPNIC, on 12 November, several disgruntled Conservative Party MPs attacked Thatcher’s approach to the Irish Republican hunger strike and more generally her Northern Ireland policy, to date. Ivor Stanbrook ‘expressed serious misgivings about the line taken by the Prime Minister’ regarding Northern Ireland’s long-term constitutional future. The Conservative Party, he said, ‘had traditionally shown positive enthusiasm for the Unionist cause’. A known sympathizer for Northern Ireland’s integration into the rest of the UK, Stanbrook questioned whether the British government was now ‘proposing to detach Great Britain from Northern Ireland?’. ‘If this was the aim of this policy, it should act more openly’, he implored.138 Such accusations were wholly unwarranted. Thatcher did not intend to detach Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK, as suggested by Stanbrook. Nor did she

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intend granting ‘special category status’ to Irish Republican prisoners. As Armstrong later recounted, ‘Mrs Thatcher was quite clear, she wouldn’t give in … she refused to concede … it was a matter of conviction for her.’139 Soon after, the British prime minister released a statement reiterating that the British government ‘would not and cannot make any concessions whatever on the principle of political status for prisoners who claim a political motive for their crimes’.140 The scene, therefore, was set for a showdown between the Thatcher government and the Irish Republican prisoners in Long-Kesh. The events that were to follow, to borrow Alistair Cooke’s description, would lead to ‘the most bizarre and disgusting protest in modern British penal history’.141 On 27 October, the first Irish Republican hunger strike got underway. Seven Irish Republican prisoners, led by Brendan Hughes, refused food demanding the restoration of special category status. A  statement smuggled from the Long-Kesh, on behalf of the hunger strikers, declared that ‘we shall embark upon a hunger-strike to demand that we not only be recognised and treated as political prisoners but as human beings … we see no other way of ending this inhumanity’.142 A further smuggled letter from Brendan Hughes, dated 29 October, placed the blame for the outbreak of the hunger strike directly at the feet of Thatcher and her government: The British have said they are willing, and, we may add, eager, to allow us to die. Such an attitude was to be expected from them. We, the seven hunger-strikers, face that attitude with the same determined and unflinching adherence to our political ideals which has carried us through four years of hell.143

By the following month, international attention began to focus on the ongoing hunger strike, as an additional 150 prisoners joined the dirty protests in the Maze. By 7 November, it was estimated that in Long-Kesh, alone, there were 510 dirty protestors and fifty-three prisoners who refused to work, while in HMP Armagh, twenty-eight women remained on dirty protests.144 During this period, Pope John Paul II privately wrote to Thatcher with a request that she ‘consider personally possible solutions in order to avoid irreversible consequences that could perhaps prove irreparable’.145 Thatcher, however, politely rebuffed Pope John Paul II’s appeal for reconciliation. ‘I have made it clear that the British Government cannot and will not accede to this demand [i.e. the granting of special category status]’, Thatcher noted in a private reply to Pope John Paul II.146 In an effort to counteract Irish-American Republican propaganda, in late November, CPPNIC members Biggs-Davison and Belfast-born Dr Brian Mawhinney147 were sent to Washington to coordinate a publicity campaign against the Irish Republican hunger strike. They distributed a ‘new glossy brochure’ entitled, H-Block: the facts, which described the conditions in the Maze prison as the best in Western Europe.148 By this juncture, the British government anxiously debated the impact that the Irish Republican hunger strike would have for the impending second Anglo-Irish summit meeting between Thatcher and Haughey and more generally on public opinion in the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain. Thatcher certainly believed that the hunger strike had repercussions for any scheduled meeting with the Dublin government. On

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31 October, four days after the hunger strike first began, Thatcher and Atkins privately agreed that if developments at the Maze made the forthcoming meeting with Haughey ‘inadvisable’, it would be cancelled.149 Throughout this period, Thatcher received a plethora of letters from British and Irish citizens criticizing the British government’s handling of the Irish Republican hunger strike. On 26 November, Mary Sheehan of St Bridgets Place, Prospect Hill, Co. Galway, wrote to the British prime minister expressing her dismay at Thatcher’s comments that ‘there is no such thing as political murder’, following her meeting with Pope John Paul II at the Vatican on 24 November. ‘Did he smell blood off you?’, Sheehan acidly enquired. ‘There is more blood on your hands and on the hands of the Queen [Elizabeth II] than there could ever be on the hands of those in prison’, she protested. ‘You are the murderers,’ she wrote, ‘not them.’150 By early December and only days away from the Anglo-Irish summit meeting, (scheduled for the 8th of that month), Thatcher had her first opportunity to speak directly with Haughey regarding the ongoing Irish Republican hunger strike. By this stage, she was still unsure whether she should even go ahead with the planned summit meeting in Dublin. On 1 December, during a brief meeting in the margins of the European Council, in Luxemburg, the British prime minister scolded Haughey, warning him that the British government ‘could not go on making offers’ to the Irish Republican hunger strikers. ‘There was nothing left to give’, she exclaimed.151 Haughey, not wishing to get into a round of megaphone diplomacy on the eve of the AngloIrish summit meeting did not turn up the volume. He allowed Thatcher to deliver her protests, while he remained silent. Evidentially, his meeting with Thatcher in Dublin, not the sufferings of the hunger strikers in Belfast and Armagh, was his number one political priority.

‘The totality of relationships’: The Haughey-Thatcher Anglo-Irish summit meeting, 8 December 1980 This ‘unprecedented’ Anglo-Irish summit meeting between Thatcher and Haughey, to borrow Geoffrey Howe’s description,152 was convened at the historic setting of Dublin Castle: for centuries the home of British governance in Ireland prior to Irish independence. Thatcher and her delegation arrived at Dublin Castle on the morning of 8 December by helicopter. Originally, it was envisaged that Thatcher would arrive the day before the summit meeting; however, due to tensions surrounding the ongoing Irish Republican hunger strike, Thatcher was advised by her security protectors that it would be prudent to arrive in Dublin on the morning of the summit meeting.153 Apart from Thatcher, the British ministerial delegation was composed of Lord Carrington, Howe and Atkins. The presence of such a collection of high-powered ministers was an attempt by Thatcher to emphasize the fact that a wide range of business, particularly in relation to the EEC and not Northern Ireland, was to be discussed.154 However, ‘in practice’, as confirmed by Armstrong, Northern Ireland ‘was far the most important topic on the agenda’.155 Present on the Irish side, along with Haughey and a selection of his most senior officials, were Brian Lenihan and Michael

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O’Kennedy. In all, the talks lasted for more than five hours between a plenary session and Thatcher’s private discussions with Haughey. The day’s events formally commenced at 10.45 a.m., when the two prime ministers held a private tête-à-tête, which lasted until 12.15  p.m. The subject of Northern Ireland dominated the discussions. Following a general conversation regarding the ongoing Irish Republican hunger strike, Haughey got straight to the crux of Dublin’s proposed strategy in relation to Northern Ireland: his calls for the hosting of a joint conference between himself and Thatcher to review ‘in a fundamental way the totality of our relationship’. Thatcher hesitated. She ‘thought it too soon for such a conference’. However, she did offer Haughey an olive branch. She would agree to his request to commission a series of Anglo-Irish joint studies ‘on the basis of the unique relationship’.156 Despite Thatcher’s agreement to commission a series of Anglo-Irish joint studies, it quickly became clear that she was unsure about what areas of ‘government to government’ contacts that might be established under this proposal, to quote Haughey. Indeed, while Haughey suggested that Dublin and London might agree to ‘talk about energy and about tourism’, together with ‘reciprocal voting rights’, Thatcher refused to be drawn further on the subject. In fact, as is analysed below, it was Haughey’s suggestion during their tête-à-tête that the proposed Anglo-Irish joint studies might consider the ‘possibility of developing new [institutional] structures, evolving out of the unique relationship between the two countries’,157 which caused a political storm and almost destroyed Thatcher’s bourgeoning relationship with Haughey. Following the tête-à-tête, Thatcher and Haughey rejoined the remainder of the conference attendees for a formal plenary session, which continued over lunch. Haughey opened the discussions by saying he ‘had a most interesting tête-à-tête with the Prime Minister’. Thatcher immediately focused discussions on the proposed Anglo-Irish joint studies. ‘Who would be responsible for the [Anglo-Irish] joint studies?’, she enquired. Atkins intervened. ‘There were a number of areas where the two Governments needed to co-operate and urgent studies had to be put in hand’, he explained. ‘Some of this activity already took place in the meetings of the AngloIrish Economic Steering Groups’, he continued, and suggested that ‘there might be [an] advantage in a Ministerial input to these meetings’. The secretary of state for Northern Ireland then moved on to analyse the ongoing Irish Republican hunger strike. The meeting then concluded, with the result that neither the British nor Irish ministerial delegations again brought up the subject of the proposed Anglo-Irish joint studies.158 Instead, British and Irish civil servants, led by Stowe and Dermot Nally, turned their attention to drafting the official joint communiqué, the majority of which had been agreed upon in advance of the summit meeting. The communiqué’s opening remarks stated that the summit meeting between the two countries had covered a range of international issues and the future development of the European Community, ‘including the budget, the Common Agricultural Policy, E.M.S., and fisheries, as well as other matters of concern for both countries’. The communiqué also recorded that in the context of the ‘unique relationship’ that existed between the two countries, the two premiers acknowledged that the ‘economic, social and political interests of the peoples of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

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and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland’ were ‘inextricably linked’. In that context, ‘they accepted the need to bring forward policies and proposals to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability; and to improve relations between the peoples of the two countries’. The most important  – and controversial  – section of the communiqué followed. Paragraph 6 confirmed that the two governments had decided to devote their next meeting in London during the coming year to ‘special consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands’. ‘For this purpose,’ it stated, ‘they have commissioned [Anglo-Irish] joint studies, covering a range of issues including possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic cooperation and measures to encourage mutual understanding.’159 Apparently, when Thatcher eventually got around to reading paragraph 6 of communiqué she went berserk.160 She was particularly annoyed by the inclusion of the phrase ‘the totality of relationships’ and by the reference to possible new ‘institutional structures’ being commissioned under the terms of the Anglo-Irish joint studies. ‘You have destroyed my reputation with the Unionists’, she reportedly said to her officials on reading this sentence.161 Thatcher was to later blame herself for not having given her usual detailed attention to the drafting the communiqué, particularly in relation to paragraph 6.  She subsequently conceded that she had failed to understand the incendiary implications of inserting this paragraph.162 Thatcher felt that her senior officials, including Stowe, had deliberately misled her accusing them of using the phrase ‘the totality of relationships’ without properly consulting her. As Thatcher later wrote, she believed that Stowe decided ‘not to warn her’.163 Indeed, she also partially blamed Lord Carrington for her confusion. According to David Neligan, as the summit meeting was concluding, Thatcher had asked her officials what precisely the phrase ‘totality of relationships’ meant. Lord Carrington quickly interjected and reassured his prime minister that she had nothing to worry about, that the phrase was merely a confirmation of the improvement of relations between Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland.164 Yet, Thatcher’s reaction to the text of the Anglo-Irish joint communiqué was hypercritical. The simple fact remains that – irrespective of what she might have said at the time and in the comfort of retirement – in her talks with Haughey she did not raise an objection to his use of the term the ‘totality of relationship[s]‌’. Moreover, during her tête-à-tête with the taoiseach, she placed her full support behind the commissioning of a series of Anglo-Irish joint studies. Perhaps the real problem for Thatcher rested on the fact that in advance of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting (and indeed during her talks with Haughey in Dublin Castle) she had failed to sufficiently think about how the proposed Anglo-Irish joint studies would operate and more importantly what areas of common interest would be explored between the two governments. The net result of this error was that Haughey, playing the opportunist card, attempted to pounce on Thatcher’s vulnerability. As is discussed below, the references in the joint communiqué to the phrase ‘totality of relationships’ together with her approval to commission a series of Anglo-Irish joint studies were interpreted very differently by the political parties of Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments. Significantly, for Northern Nationalists and Ulster

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Unionists, alike, such references were construed as an acknowledgement by London of Dublin’s legitimate right to have a role in deciding Northern Ireland’s constitutional future.

A ‘mini-Munich’: Differing interpretations of the AngloIrish summit meeting, 8 December 1980 The immediate problem facing the British and Irish governments in the aftermath of the second Anglo-Irish summit meeting between Thatcher and Haughey was the media’s obsession with the wording of the joint communiqué. A  memorandum prepared by British officials in advance of the summit meeting had wisely advised that both Thatcher and Haughey ‘must stand by the language of the communiqué in the period following and not let it be interpreted in a way that, by arousing unionist anxiety, would jeopardise future discussions’.165 To the frustration of Thatcher and the irritation of Ulster Unionists, Haughey did precisely what the memorandum advised against. In the words of Gareth Ivory, Haughey’s ‘messianic’ depiction of the second summit was worlds apart from what was discussed between the two prime ministers.166 During his post-summit press conference, Haughey was asked several times to elaborate on the precise meaning of the phrase ‘totality of relationships’. Initially, he responded cautiously, issuing only a vague reference that he hoped relations between Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland would improve. Questioned by another reporter as to ‘how will the machinery work’ in relation to the Anglo-Irish joint study groups, Haughey lost the run of himself. Caught up in the excitement of the moment, he made the bold declaration that the proposed Anglo-Irish joint study groups would in fact ‘go beyond the planes of inter-departmental and inter-governmental studies to a higher plane’. Asked what type of policies the Anglo-Irish joint study groups would consider, he spoke of possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic cooperation, and measures to encourage ‘mutual understanding’. The results of these proposed Anglo-Irish joint study groups would be brought to a ‘special meeting’ in London, which would consider the next step forward. The problem of Northern Ireland, he insisted, was ‘now firmly on a new plane for discussions between the British and Irish governments’. ‘I regard that’, he rejoiced, ‘as very considerable progress, historic progress.’167 The taoiseach’s bold comments, which had effectively (if not explicitly) announced that Northern Ireland’s constitutional position was on the table for debate between Dublin and London, were a far cry from what had actually been discussed at Dublin Castle. As examined above, Northern Ireland’s constitutional position was not mentioned during the Anglo-Irish summit meeting. Indeed, the relevant declassified British and Irish departmental files do not refer to Northern Ireland’s constitutional future, except for Thatcher’s pledge to maintain the 1949 guarantee.168 In fact, Thatcher had rejected out of hand Haughey’s calls for the holding of an Anglo-Irish conference to discuss the constitutional future of Northern Ireland. Therefore, to say that Haughey had overstepped the mark is an understatement. The

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taoiseach’s public comments, as noted by Dermot Nally, ‘drove Miss Thatcher around the bend’ and ‘destroyed the feeling of trust’ between the two leaders.169 Following her return to London, on the evening of 8 December, Thatcher held her own post-summit press conference. By this stage, she was informed of Haughey’s post-summit comments. She was clearly embarrassed and frustrated. Some years later, she recalled that this meeting had done more ‘harm than good’. She admitted that because she had failed to play a part in drafting the communiqué, many journalists, encouraged by Haughey, had interpreted the text as heralding a ‘breakthrough’ on the constitutional question.170 Her focus during the press conference was, therefore, to play down the significance of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting. Wary that Ulster Unionists might construe her meeting with Haughey as an indication of London’s willingness to allow Dublin a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland, she resolutely rejected this interpretation. Just as at Haughey’s press conference, so too at hers, the assembled journalists focused on the phrase ‘totality of relationships’ and the reference in the communiqué to the commissioning of Anglo-Irish joint study groups. Thatcher immediately interjected by stipulating that she would not consult Dublin prior to proposing new plans for the future of Northern Ireland. She referred to the proposed Anglo-Irish joint study groups in terms of improving practical cooperation between Great Britain and Ireland, particularly in economic matters. Great Britain already had strong connections with other ‘European partners’, she said, referring to the Franco-British Council and a similar arrangement with the Republic of Ireland seemed like a practical move. ‘There is a unique relationship between the Republic [of Ireland] and the United Kingdom’, she explained, ‘in that it is the only country with which we have a land border, and it is worthwhile thinking whether one can give expression to that unique relationship in any way.’171 The proposed Anglo-Irish joint study groups, Thatcher affirmed, would in no way jeopardize Northern Ireland’s constitutional status within the UK. Haughey, she insisted, did not bring up Northern Ireland’s constitutional position at their meeting. The 1949 guarantee, Thatcher declared, ‘is there and will remain’. ‘There was nothing for unionists to worry about.’ ‘Can I get it across? … [The] United Kingdom includes Northern Ireland, and you have not heard me refer to anything other tonight than the United Kingdom. United, united, united, have you got it?’, she exclaimed.172 Privately, British ministers and senior civil servants alike were furious with Haughey. By this stage, it was painfully obvious that the two prime ministers were on a collision course regarding their respective interpretations of the phrase ‘totality of relationships’ and the proposed Anglo-Irish joint study groups. To minimize the political fall-out, officials in Whitehall desperately tried to play down Haughey’s suggestion that the Anglo-Irish summit meeting was of a ‘historic’ nature. The ‘Dublin meeting was not about Northern Ireland’s constitutional future’, as one NIO memorandum phrased it.173 The FCO struck a similar tone. Any references in the joint communiqué to ‘new institutional structures’, a memorandum recorded, was merely something like those Great Britain already had with the French, Germans and Italians. ‘In no way did “instructional structures” refer to constitutional matters.’174

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On 10 December, Lord Carrington contacted the British Embassy in Dublin. He directed that Dermot Nally be approached immediately. In a snooty letter, the secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs asked Nally to pass on to Haughey the British government’s opinion that the taoiseach had suffered from some ‘presentational problems in explaining parag[raph] 6 of the communiqué’. ‘We hope the taoiseach will recognise’, Lord Carrington wrote, ‘that such reports cause considerable difficulties for HMG and that he will take great care, both in talking to the press and in tomorrow’s Dáil debate, to say nothing which would encourage speculations of this kind.’175 As a result of Lord Carrington’s intervention, Haughey was forced to clarify what was discussed during his meeting with Thatcher. Addressing members of Dáil Éireann, on 11 December, he publicly tried to play down any previous suggestions that in his meeting with Thatcher the constitutional future of Northern Ireland had been examined. On this occasion, there was no vague reference to possible constitutional changes to Northern Ireland, nor was there any reference to placing relations between Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland on a ‘new plane’. Rather, Haughey spoke of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups as embracing ‘new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation, and measures to encourage mutual understanding’. ‘The words “totality of relationships within these islands” in my view’, he conceded, ‘simply means that the special consideration to which our next meeting will be devoted does not exclude anything that can contribute to achieving peace.’176 The most vocal grouping to express frustration and annoyance in the aftermath of the summit meeting was the Protestant community of Northern Ireland. As Thatcher subsequently noted, the confusion surrounding the summit meeting and the text of the joint communiqué was ‘a red rag to the unionist bull’.177 The main cause of dissent was the widely held, if mistaken, belief amongst Ulster Unionists that the Anglo-Irish joint study groups were to convene to consider the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. Brian Lenihan only added more fuel to the controversy by his remarks in the aftermath of the summit meeting that the Anglo-Irish joint study groups did not rule out the possibility of examining constitutional issues. ‘Everything would be open to discussion’, as Irish minister for foreign affairs clumsily phrased it.178 Lenihan’s comments infuriated the Rev. Paisley. In response, on 9 December, he issued Thatcher with a letter in which he declared that if the British government did not ‘immediately repudiate Mr. Lenihan’s remarks, then the worst fears of the unionist people in Northern Ireland will be confirmed that you and your team intended in fact to betray Ulster’. The Protestant majority in Northern Ireland, the Rev. Paisley wrote, was ‘enraged at the communiqué’.179 Paisley’s frustration intensified when Thatcher refused to make a corrective statement in the House of Commons on her talks with Haughey. In response, the Rev. Paisley threatened to take ‘people on the street’.180 Enoch Powell added fuel to the fire by describing the summit meeting in Dublin as ‘a mini-Munich’.181 During a private meeting, shortly after the Anglo-Irish summit meeting, Powell even accused Thatcher of making a ‘secret’ pact with the Irish government regarding Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the UK (although he did not elaborate on the contents of this alleged ‘deal’).182 In a rare request on behalf of the opposition in Westminster, the Labour Party leader Michael Foot called for an emergency debate to be held in the House of Commons to discuss the

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Anglo-Irish summit meeting in order to explain the ‘different interpretations’ the two governments had in relation to the contents of the joint communiqué.183 In response to this latest backlash from Ulster Unionists, Thatcher attempted to placate their anxieties. On 10 December, she wrote to the Rev. Paisley to express her regret if there had ‘been any misapprehensions in Northern Ireland about the outcome of that meeting’. ‘Northern Ireland unionists’, she explained, ‘have nothing to fear from the further development of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic [of Ireland] or from the programme of the [Anglo-Irish] joint studies on which the two governments are to embark.’184 The following day, 11 December, during oral questions in the House of Commons, Thatcher refuted accusations that the summit meeting in Dublin threatened the ‘long standing and historic link’ between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. ‘There is nothing behind the communiqué,’ she declared, ‘it is all there.’185 Neither Thatcher’s private correspondence with the Rev. Paisley nor her public statements bore fruit. On 16 December, John Brooke, Second Viscount Brookeborough (son of Basil Brooke, prime minister of Northern Ireland, 1943–63), telephoned Atkins to vent his anger over the summit meeting in Dublin. Unable to speak to Atkins, Brookeborough exclaimed to a rather taken aback civil servant that the British government had ‘a lot of damage to repair’. The meeting had been disastrous in both its timing and its content, he protested. The British government ‘should have been ready to counter the publicity’ coming out of Dublin following the summit meeting. The NIO and the government generally, he concluded, held a ‘far too trusting attitude towards the Irish.’186 In a further attempt to placate Ulster Unionists’ protests, on the morning of 19 December, Thatcher met DUP politicians, the Rev. Paisley and Robinson, in her room at the House of Commons. From the outset, the encounter was confrontational. Hitherto, the Rev. Paisley’s relationship with the British government had been cordial at best and openly hostile on occasions. His support for the Ulster Workers’ Council strike in 1974, together with his prominent role with the Ulster Unionist Action Council (UUAC), which led an unsuccessful strike in Northern Ireland in 1977, confirmed Thatcher’s dislike of the Rev. Paisley. She simply did not trust him. Although recognized as ‘a charismatic figure’,187 his unrepentant display of anti-Catholicism and repeated attacks on the British government ensured he had few friends in No. 10 Downing Street. Opening proceedings, Thatcher repeated her belief that the Protestant majority of Northern Ireland ‘had not been betrayed, nor would they be’. She reiterated that there was ‘nothing’ in the Dublin communiqué that ‘need cause alarm’. She returned to the 1949 guarantee. The British prime minister proclaimed that she would ‘never give up this guarantee’. The Rev. Paisley was unconvinced. He accused Thatcher of giving Dublin ‘a free say’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland, which ‘flew in the face of everything the prime minister had said in the past’.188 His remarks apparently left Thatcher ‘coldly furious’, with the result that she repeatedly hit the side of her chair.189 The meeting concluded with the Rev. Paisley stating emphatically that he and Thatcher remained ‘at odds’.190 Shortly after this encounter, Thatcher also wrote to James Molyneaux to reject his accusations that, following her meeting with Haughey, the British government was now

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considering holding a referendum in Great Britain on the subject of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. ‘You may be assured’, she wrote, ‘that the Government has no intention of holding a referendum in Great Britain on the subject of Northern Ireland’s future constitutional status.’ ‘Such a referendum’, she implored, ‘would be inconsistent with the principle that Northern Ireland will not cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of the people of the Province and the agreement of Parliament at Westminster.’191 Speaking in March of the following year, Thatcher was even more emphatic. ‘The Government have repeatedly declared that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and will remain so unless its people and the Parliament at Westminster decided otherwise … Let me say with all the emphasis at my command that there is no plot. There is no sell-out.’192 Given her latest confrontation with the forces of Ulster Unionism, it is little wonder, to quote Armstrong, that by the end of Thatcher’s first term in office she had become ‘disenchanted’ with Ulster Unionists.193 *** In conclusion, when assessing the state of Anglo-Irish affairs in the immediate aftermath of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting between Thatcher and Haughey in December 1980, two issues need to be assessed. First, Thatcher’s confrontation with the Rev. Paisley was a painful reminder for the British prime minister of the delicate balancing act she was required to play in the arena of Anglo-Irish relations and specifically Northern Ireland. She learnt a valuable lesson that in politics the optics of illusion were sometimes more important than the representation of facts. She had now arrived at the uncomfortable conclusion that Haughey was a master of political spin. Irrespective of the fact that Northern Ireland’s constitutional future had never been discussed during the summit meeting in Dublin, in his post-summit comments in relation to the phrase ‘totality of relationships’ and the proposed Anglo-Irish joint study groups, Haughey gave the impression that everything was on the table for discussion, including Irish unity. As one has learnt, nothing could have been further from the truth. It is, therefore, unsurprising that Haughey’s handling of the entire affair shattered the bond of trust developed between the two prime ministers over the previous twelve months. As Thatcher’s chief press secretary Bernard Ingham later recalled: Haughey ‘thought he could twist her [Thatcher] around his little finger – he learned, no way!’.194 From this moment onwards, Thatcher retained a deep suspicion for Haughey, believing him to be a political opportunist. She remained convinced that Haughey had, to quote Jim Prior, ‘hoodwinked her … and she fell for it and regretted bitterly ever afterwards’. Prior, who succeeded Atkins as secretary of state for Northern Ireland in September 1981, mockingly recounted that Thatcher even wanted to throw away the silver teapot which Haughey had presented to British prime minister at the first Haughey-Thatcher summit meeting in May 1980.195 Writing some years later, Armstrong recalled that in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting of December he learned ‘not to use’ the term ‘totality of relationships’ too often while in the presence of Thatcher.196 Second, the Anglo-Irish summit meeting of December 1980 undoubtedly heralded a new era in Anglo-Irish relations. As Geoffrey Howe explained in his memoir, ‘it was a real achievement for Haughey to secure from Margaret a future commitment to give

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“special consideration to the totality of relationships between these islands” ’.197 Indeed, while Thatcher refused Haughey’s request for the holding of an Anglo-Irish conference to consider Northern Ireland’s constitutional future, over the following years the British government, albeit against Thatcher’s own procrastinations, gradually came to acknowledge that the Irish government must be provided with a ‘consultative’ role in finding a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict (as enshrined under the terms of the AIA of 1985). As is discussed in the next chapter, this recognition on behalf of London of Dublin’s legitimate right to help facilitate political progress in relation to Northern Ireland and more generally in Anglo-Irish relations was kick-started with the establishment of a series of Anglo-Irish joint study groups in January 1981.198 This institutional relationship between the two countries was strengthened with the establishment of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council (AIIC) in November 1981. This formal commitment on behalf of the Dublin and London governments to meet regularly and discuss issues of common interest (including Northern Ireland) began a tedious process wherein both governments made a commitment to secure peace in Northern Ireland working in tangent with one another. In fact, the commissioning of AngloIrish joint study groups and the establishment of the AIIC played an important role in paving the way for the AIA of 1985 and for the Northern Ireland peace process during the 1990s. The genesis of this Dublin-London dialogue can be traced directly to the Haughey-Thatcher Anglo-Irish summit meeting of 8 December 1980.

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‘The woman behind the veil’: Thatcher and the second Irish Republican hunger strike, March–October 1981 On 18 December 1980 (ten days after Thatcher’s Anglo-Irish summit meeting with Haughey in Dublin), the first Irish Republican hunger strike dramatically collapsed. To this day, the events leading to the ending of the hunger strike continue to provoke controversy and remain hotly contested. In recent years, new information has emerged which provides compelling evidence that in the hope of ending the hunger strike Thatcher, personally, authorized top-secret discussions between the Irish Republican leadership outside Long-Kesh and the British government, via MI6. Despite Thatcher’s public pretensions that she would never negotiate with terrorists, behind closed doors she did authorize discussions with the Irish Republican movement. In the words of Thomas Hennessey, due to the release of declassified British state archives dealing with the first Irish Republican hunger strike it is evidently clear that ‘Thatcher’s hand was literally all over the “deal” sent’ to the Irish Republican leadership, thus ‘revealing the key involvement of a Prime Minister who claimed she refused to negotiate with terrorists’.1 Kenneth Stowe subsequently conceded that Thatcher was ‘fully aware’ that any deal with Irish Republicans to end the hunger strike required dealing with Sinn Féin (which, in Thatcher’s estimation, meant that she was dealing with the PIRA Army Council) via backchannel talks involving the British Secret Intelligence Service.2 From Thatcher’s perspective, according to Stowe, this was very different from direct face-to-face talks with Sinn Féin or the PIRA leadership.3 Irrespective that Thatcher may have left the day-to-day handling of the hunger strike to others, she nonetheless ‘had the last word on the policy options offered to her’.4 She was, to borrow a phrase used by Michael Alison, a junior minister at the NIO, ‘the woman behind the veil’.5 According to Charles Moore, by the early weeks of December 1980, vice-president of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams, with the encouragement of his lieutenant, Martin McGuinness,6 wanted the hunger strike to stop. However, for this to occur, Adams said that he required a ‘formula for this to happen, involving apparent concessions which would save Irish Republican face’.7 Through an intermediary, Brendan Duddy (known as ‘Mountain Climber’), a businessman based in the city of Derry, MI6 received

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information that in order for Irish Republicans to avoid humiliation a formula was required to ensure an amicable end to the hunger strike.8 Under Thatcher’s instructions, Adams was informed that the British government was willing to make some further concessions. However, the granting of special category status, primarily the prisoners’ request for the conceding of the ‘five demands’, chiefly in relation to ‘control and authority’, was categorically rejected by Thatcher. Instead, London proposed a counter offer that prisoners would be permitted the following four concessions: (a) to wear civilian clothing supplied by prisoners’ families, to be worn during visits and recreation; (b) to wear civilian-type clothing during the working day; (c) free association at weekends; and lastly (d) the prospect of restored remission.9 At a meeting of the British cabinet, on 18 December, Atkins reaffirmed that the British government’s attitude ‘must continue to be that political status for the prisoners was impossible’. The secretary of state for Northern Ireland noted that the Irish hunger strike had now entered its fifty-third day. The hunger strikers ‘were conscious and for the most part lucid’, but all had reached a stage where their long-term health ‘would be damaged even if they abandoned the strike’. ‘If the strike persisted,’ Atkins pointed out, ‘the first death would probably occur within a week.’ At this stage, the hunger strikers had refused to alter their demands and ‘there had been no negotiations with them’. However, he pointed out that the hunger strikers ‘were ready to climb down if a suitable “ladder” could be provided’.10 In fact, later that day, the first Irish Republican hunger strike dramatically collapsed. Under orders from Brendan Hughes, the prisoners ‘climbed down the ladder available and ended their strike’, to borrow Moore’s description.11 The three women on hunger strike in HMP Armagh ended their protest the following day, 19 December. The first Irish Republican hunger strikes were over. To this day Hughes’s decision to end the first Republican hunger strike continues to provoke controversy. According to the ‘orthodox’ Irish Republican accounts of the first Irish Republican hunger strike, at the time, it was felt by most Irish Republican hunger strikers within Long-Kesh12 that the latest British proposal to grant several ‘new’ concessions was a sufficient offer.13 However, more recently, the revisionist school of thought has challenged this interpretation.14 Significantly, for example, shortly before his death in the early 2000s, Hughes claimed that the decision to end the first Irish Republican hunger strike was not because he sensed political victory, but because he wanted to save the life of his fellow hunger striker Seán McKenna.15 Whatever the real reasons for bringing the first Irish Republican hunger strike to an end, it quickly became obvious to Hughes and his fellow hunger strikers that Thatcher and her government had offered very little more than had already been on offer before the hunger strike commenced. As a result, many of the hunger strikers felt cheated and that they had been deliberately lied to. Consequently, the ending of the first hunger strike did not herald the end of the hunger strikers’ campaign. On the contrary, it was

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only a matter of time, to quote Bobby Sands, an Irish Republican prisoner in LongKesh, before ‘[w]‌e embark upon another hunger-strike’. And next time, Sands warned, ‘[s]omeone will die, I  know others told you this, but I  am prepared to die and no one will call this hunger-strike off, comrade’.16 The scene, therefore, was set for the commencement of the second Irish Republican hunger strike. As is discussed below, Sands’s prophetic words were to leave a dark and lasting imprint on the history of Northern Ireland and more generally Anglo-Irish relations. On 5 February 1981, the Irish Republican newspaper An Phoblacht reported that Irish Republican prisoners had agreed that a second hunger strike at HMP Maze would begin on 1 March of that year.17 In support of this decision, the prisoners unconvincingly maintained that Thatcher’s government had reneged on the agreement of 18 December 1980, which had ended the first hunger strike and which they claimed had conceded the substance of the hunger strikers’ ‘five demands’.18, Fr Piaras Ó Dúill chairperson of the National H-Block/Armagh committee, placed the blame solely at the feet of the Thatcher government for the threatened outbreak of the second hunger strike: It was the British government who caused the protest to be escalated still further by refusal to allow the prisoners to slop out unless they wore the prison uniform, thus initiating the so-called ‘dirty protest’… It was the British through their total intransigence and cynicism who forced the prisoners to take the final step of a hunger-strike.19

The British prime minister, however, was in no mood to compromise. As she privately told James Molyneaux, on 23 January 1981, ‘we have always set our faces firmly against granting any kind of political status’.20 Thus, ‘this was the beginning’, to quote Thatcher, ‘of a time of troubles’.21 In correspondence with Haughey, on 25 February, Thatcher made it clear that London was not ‘prepared to concede’ the five demands. ‘No political status:  no concessions to the 5 demands’, she wrote. ‘It is a matter of great regret’, she explained, ‘that the ending of the last hunger-strike on 16 December, without loss of life, did not lead as we had hoped to the phasing out of all forms of protest and the implementation of the regime which was and remains available to non-protesting prisoners.’ She was convinced beyond doubt that the objective of the forthcoming hunger strike was ‘to bring about one or more deaths of hunger-strikers in order to inflame community passions’. On encouraging moderation and defying PIRA propaganda, Thatcher wrote that ‘I am sure we have your support on this.’ ‘If there is anything you feel you can do to reinforce the actions we shall be taking to inform those who might have influence on the prisoners, this would be very helpful’, she concluded.22 The second Irish Republican hunger strike at Long-Kesh was led by Bobby Sands, a self-educated poet, songwriter and brilliant publicist. Popular among his prison colleagues he had become friendly with Gerry Adams during their time together in the Maze. Loyal to his word, on 1 March, Sands refused food and declared himself to be on hunger strike. Writing in his diary on this day, Sands poignantly recorded: ‘I am dying not just to attempt to end the barbarity of the H-Block, or to gain the rightful

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recognition of a political prisoner, but primarily because what is lost in here is lost for the Republic.’23 The stage, therefore, was set for Sands to embark on ‘his slow and painful journey to martyrdom’.24 Sands designed the second Republican hunger strike in such a way that the deaths, his in particular, were ‘almost guaranteed’.25 The hunger strike was to be staggered. Sands was to start first on his own. After him additional prisoners, usually in groups of two, were to join at two/three-week intervals. This approach guaranteed that the hunger strikers’ protests would gain maximum publicity.26 Four days later, on 5 March, Thatcher travelled to Belfast. Her visit was intended to reassure a sceptical audience, particularly within the Protestant community, that her government remained committed to maintaining the constitutional union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. ‘It ought to be as natural for the Prime Minister to visit this part of the United Kingdom as for her … to visit Lancashire or Kent, Northumberland or Cornwall, Anglesey or Caithness’, she informed an assembled audience on her arrival. Violence, she declared, would never prevail, terrorism she promised would be defeated. ‘Our aim’, she said, ‘is to build a healthy and harmonious society in Northern Ireland.’ Thatcher left her parting words for Sands and his fellow prisoners in Long-Kesh: Once again we have a hunger-strike at the Maze Prison in the quest for what they call political status. There is no such thing as political murder, political bombing or political violence. There is only criminal murder, criminal bombing and criminal violence. We will not compromise on this. There will be no political status.27

Unsurprisingly, Thatcher’s speech fell on deaf ears amongst Irish Republicans. On 15 March, Sands was joined on the hunger strike by Francis Hughes. Several days later, on 22 March, Raymond McCreesh and Pasty O’Hara also joined. Over the following months, Northern Ireland society was gripped by the second Irish Republican hungerstrike campaign. Throughout society there was a real sense of fear and intimidation. For many on either side of the religious and political divide, any sense of normality which had previously been apparent was ‘replaced by paranoia, intrigue and suspicion’.28 The second Irish Republican hunger strike took on a new level of intensity following Sands’s nomination as a candidate of the ‘Anti-H Block’ campaign to run in a by-election to become a member of the British House of Commons. The by-election was triggered following the death of the sitting Independent MP for Fermanagh-South Tyrone, Frank Maguire. Under increasing pressure, the SDLP decided not to put forward a candidate. The contest, therefore, became a battle between Sands and the Unionist candidate Harry West, the former leader of the UUP.29 The British government was naturally worried by this latest development. On 3 April, Atkins informed Thatcher that four prisoners were now refusing to take food and that in relation to Sands’s nomination as a candidate for the forthcoming by-election, the British government’s main concern would be on the increased publicity for the H-Block campaign. He explained that Sands’s nomination was valid by virtue of the Criminal Law Act of 1967, which allowed convicted criminals (except for those convicted of treason) to stand for election.30

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On 9 April, Sands pulled off a staggering victory, securing over 52 per cent of the vote. The British government was gravely alarmed on receiving news of Sands’s election as MP for Fermanagh-South Tyrone. Within hours of his victory, the HO contemplated how the government might change the law to disqualify the newly elected MP for Fermanagh-South Tyrone.31 After further investigation, including the convening of two meetings of the relevant ministerial group, it was agreed that the House of Commons could not expel Sands because he was ‘legally entitled to election and that those who voted for him knew that he was and would remain in custody’.32 Sands’s election victory confirmed what many within the British media had been convinced of for some time: that the British government was losing the propaganda war against the PIRA. In the words of Robert Savage, ‘Television images of emaciated Christ-like figures with long hair and beard confined to hospital beds contrasted with the stern countenance of the intransigent prime minister arguing “crime is crime, it is not political” ’.33 Moreover, Sands’s victory allowed sceptical rank-and-file PIRA activists to appreciate the real possibilities that electoral politics could offer. In the aftermath of Sands’s election, Robert Armstrong (who throughout the second Republican hunger strike was against granting further concessions to Irish Republicans, accusing them of ‘blackmail’)34 surmised that Sands, encouraged by the Irish Republican movement outside the prison, might been in a position to bring the hunger strike to an end within the ‘next 10 days’.35 Sands, however, made it known that he had no intention to calling off the hunger strike.36 For her part, Thatcher, likewise, refused to budge. During a meeting with John Hume, on 13 April, she maintained that as long at the hunger strikers continued to call for the five demands to be met in full, no compromise with the protestors could be reached.37 As she exclaimed during a television interview during this period, ‘to grant political status would be tantamount to giving some people a licence to kill’.38 Sands’s election victory, likewise, set off alarm bells in Dublin. In fact, during this period Haughey ‘cut a very anxious figure’ as he worried of the impact that Sands’s impending death might have on public opinion in the Republic of Ireland.39 Consequently, throughout this crisis, Haughey desperately tried to act as a broker between Irish Republicans and Thatcher. In public, for the meantime at least, he refrained from criticizing the British government’s dealings with the hunger strikers; indeed, in private, Haughey concurred that Thatcher must not agree to the hunger strikers’ ‘five demands’.40 During a telephone conversation, on the morning of 22 April, Nally informed Armstrong that Haughey was ‘extremely anxious to help in any way he could, and to ask us whether there was anything he could do which might be helpful’. Nally stressed that Haughey’s concern was ‘purely a humanitarian one’. ‘The Irish government’, Nally noted, ‘did not want us to meet the demands for political status.’ Nally wondered whether it might be worthwhile ‘getting the European Commission of Human Rights [ECHR] involved’.41 Later that afternoon, during a meeting with Figg, Haughey personally, again, raised the possibility of getting the ECHR involved. ‘It might be possible’, he said, ‘to arrange for the two commissioners [Carl Aage Nørgaard and Torkel Opsahl] to visit the Maze privately to see what improvements in the prison administration might be carried out.’42

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The following day, 23 April, Atkins, Stowe and John Blelloch, deputy undersecretary of the NIO, met to discuss Haughey’s request that the ECHR become involved in the ongoing hunger strike. Those in attendance reaffirmed that the British government ‘could offer no concessions on prison regimes in Northern Ireland, as Mr. Haughey recognised’. They also considered, but ‘rejected the possibility of facilitating the informal involvement of the ECHR’. Rather, it was noted that the ECHR ‘could claim a formal locus only if it received a complaint. None has so far been made’. If the complaint was made, Atkins, with the support of those present, said that the British government ‘would be ready’ in these circumstances to ‘facilitate an investigation’.43 On 24 April, following further consultation between Thatcher, Armstrong and Atkins,44 Figg was ordered to report back to Haughey that the British government fully shared the taoiseach’s concern that the hunger strike and the prison protests ‘should be brought to an end without loss of life’ within or outside the prison. Figg noted, however, that British policy remained unchanged. No further concessions would be granted. Thatcher, the British ambassador to Ireland said, would welcome a statement from Haughey urging Sands and the other hunger strikers and protestors generally to give up their protests.45 To Thatcher’s frustration, however, Haughey declined her request. Instead, on 25 April, he issued a public statement declaring that the ‘best prospect of saving the life’ of Sands lay in his family submitting a complaint to the ECHR.46 In a coordinated response, on behalf of the Irish government and Sands’s family, later that day Marcella Sands (Sands’s sister) made an application to the ECHR claiming that the British government had broken three articles of the European Convention on Human Rights in their treatment of Irish Republican prisoners (on 23 April the family of Sands visited Haughey at his home Abbeville).47 Later that day, two commissioners, Nørgaard and Opsahl, attempted to visit Sands at Long-Kesh, but were unable to do so because Sands requested the presence of representatives of the Irish Republican movement; a request which the British authorities refused to grant.48 On receiving news of the joint intervention on behalf of Haughey and his family, Sands was furious. He described Haughey’s intrusion using the European Commission as ‘ridiculous’. Sands was adamant that although Haughey had the ‘means’ to end the hunger strike, he ‘consistently refused to do so’. Haughey’s ‘prompting of my family’, Sands protested, ‘[w]‌as cynical and [a] cold-blooded manipulation of people clearly vulnerable to this type of pressure’. The ECHR’s intervention, Sands lamented, had been ‘diversionary and has served to aid the British attempts to confuse the issue’.49 Sands was particularly annoyed with Haughey because of the taoiseach’s refusal to ‘publicly demand that the Brits move on the prisoner’s [sic] five demands’.50 As Sands’s health deteriorated, Haughey’s anxiety became more acute. On the morning of 27 April, under the instructions of the taoiseach, Nally telephoned Stowe with a request that the British consider releasing Sands, claiming the latter was an elected representative of the British House of Commons. Nally questioned whether it would be possible to release Sands ‘on the ground that, as a member of parliament, he was unique’.51 Following consultation with British officials, Stowe telephoned Nally back later that day. He said that Sands could not be released on the premise that he was an MP and that ‘the Committee of Privileges was on record as saying that a Member

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of Parliament in prison should enjoy no privileges by virtue of being a Member of Parliament’. In any case, to release Sands now, the permanent under-secretary to Northern Ireland noted would merely infuriate Protestant opinion in Northern Ireland.52 By this stage, Thatcher was acutely aware that Sands’s impending death left Haughey in a dilemma. If Sands died, Thatcher informed Atkins on 27 April, Haughey would have to ‘choose between preserving the new momentum in relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic [of Ireland]’. Alternatively, the taoiseach might be forced to ‘outbid those extreme republican politicians who would seek to capitalise on Sands’ death in the period leading up to the forthcoming Irish election’.53 Meanwhile, in a ‘blow to those hoping for American intervention’, the US president Ronald Reagan confirmed that his administration was not prepared to intervene in the ongoing hunger strike. In a statement, the White House confirmed that Reagan’s ‘sincerest hope’ was for peace and stability to come for Northern Ireland ‘so that its young men will turn away from violence and turn their energies and idealism to the more difficult task of rebuilding their country’.54 Events reached a crescendo during the first week of May 1981. Despite numerous efforts to stop Sands’s hunger strike, including visits to Long-Kesh by Fr John Magee, a special emissary from Pope John Paul II,55 Sands passed away on 5 May, on the sixty-sixth day of his hunger strike. In death, Sands was as defiant as in life. In one of his last messages to the Republican leadership outside Long-Kesh, Sands poignantly noted that ‘we all had to accept [my] death’. ‘The Brits’, he said, ‘had no sense. Tell everyone I’ll see them somewhere sometime.’56 In The Downing Street years, Thatcher recounted that the date of 5 May was, thereafter, to take on ‘some significance for me personally’. ‘From this time forward I became the [P]‌IRA’s top target for assassination.’57 News of Sands’s death was met with widespread rioting and protesting in Irish Republican areas throughout Northern Ireland. On 6 May, the British government sanctioned the sending of 600 extra British Army troops to Northern Ireland. Across the Irish border, in Dublin, on the evening of Sands’s death, an estimated 1,000 people gathered for a vigil outside the General Post Office on O’Connell Street, before marching to Dáil Éireann, Kildare Street. A statement was delivered to the taoiseach demanding Figg’s expulsion as British ambassador to Ireland. A crowd of some 3,000 people then marched to Parnell Street where a riot broke out as a group of 200 youths smashed windows and threw stones at the Gardaí. It is estimated that 100,000 people joined Sands’s funeral cortege in Belfast, two days later, on 7 May.58 Looking back on his four years in Ireland, David Tatham, a counsellor in the British Embassy in Dublin, 1981–4, recalled the impact that Sands’s death had on the psyche of the Irish people. In a 2017 interview Tatham noted thus: People in Ireland were very conflicted, mixed up about it, because they could see that most of these people were not great patriots; that they were people who had killed other Irishmen or Englishmen for political reasons and that they should be in prison. But at the same time the nationalist tradition very much saw them as freedom fighters and martyrs if they had succeeded in killing themselves.59

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Despite the level of public protests following Sands’s passing, Thatcher was in defiant mood. Addressing the House of Commons, on 5 May, she declared that ‘only those people who reject democracy pursue their objectives by terrorist means’. In response to taunting from an irate MP, who was hostile to her handling of the hunger strike, Thatcher was unapologetic. Sands, she said, was a ‘convicted criminal. He chose to take his own life.’ Her comments won the support of the leader of the opposition, Michael Foot. He too rejected the granting of special category status. ‘If political status was conceded, it would greatly increase the numbers who would be encouraged to join’ the Republican movement, he noted.60 On 12 May, the hunger strike took its second casualty following the passing of Francis Hughes after fifty-nine days on hunger strike. Again, Thatcher was signalled out for blame following Hughes’s death. Gerry Adams accused Thatcher’s government of murdering Hughes ‘in the face of overwhelming public opinion in Ireland and abroad’.61 Writing from Long-Kesh on the day of Hughes’s funeral, Irish Republican prisoner Seán Coleman also accused Thatcher of leading a ‘callous government’ and of holding an ‘arrogant’ attitude towards the Republican hunger strikers’ political demands.62 Hughes’s death led to a further surge in rioting throughout Northern Ireland, while in Dublin an estimated 2,000 people attempted to break into the British Embassy; the attack on the embassy resulted in the Gardaí mounting a baton charge against the protestors.63 Between Hughes’s passing in mid-May and the last week in August, eight more prisoners died on hunger strike.64 Outside Long-Kesh, during this same period, approximately sixty people, civilians, policemen and members of the British Armed Forces died in acts of violence. The deaths of Sands and Hughes compounded Haughey’s anxieties. He believed that if a ‘greater degree of flexibility had been shown by the British government, the latest tragedy could have been averted’.65 There was now a widespread perception that the taoiseach had been far too lenient in his dealings with Thatcher in relation to the hunger strike. Indeed, the signs were ominous considering that Thatcher had gone out of her way personally to express ‘her appreciation’ to Haughey regarding ‘the calm line he has taken’ during the crisis.66 ‘Like him’, Thatcher explained, ‘she had tried to keep alive the search for peace and reconciliation’.67 Figg described Haughey’s public response to the enveloping crisis as ‘restrained’, but warned that the taoiseach faced ‘loud murmurings within his own party against the line which he is taking’.68 Figg was right to be wary. By this period, to quote a less than sympathetic Gerry Adams, there was a perception among many Irish nationalists that the hunger strike ‘unmasked the unwillingness’ of Haughey’s government ‘to do anything for the hungerstrikers, or indeed do anything to challenge British rule in a part of Ireland’.69 Privately, Haughey decided that the time had arrived to convince the British government to concede to some of the prisoners’ demands, but not on the core ‘five demands’.70 On 13 May, under Haughey’s instructions, Eamon Kennedy asked Thatcher whether it might be ‘possible to move on clothes and on association outside work periods?’. Haughey, Kennedy explained, ‘recognised that political status for the hunger-strikers was “not on” ’. Yet, the taoiseach felt that some form of concessions might be acceptable to the hunger strikers. Thatcher, however, refused to budge. In her reply, she reminded

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Kennedy that before Sands had fallen into a coma, he had said that he wanted all five demands. The plain fact remained, she implored, that the hunger strikers wanted political status and ‘they can’t get it’.71 For the remainder of the hunger strike, Thatcher stayed loyal to her word. Following the deaths of hunger strikers Raymond McCreesh and Pasty O’Hara, on 21 May, the British prime minister remained unrepentant. Her resolve was further fastened because of an upsurge in Republican terrorism, not least the murder of five British soldiers, who were blown up in an armoured vehicle in South Armagh on 19 May. Thatcher’s natural response was to go on the offensive. On a visit to Stormont, Belfast, on 28 May, she remained defiant. ‘The men of violence are enemies of law abiding citizens everywhere.’ ‘Violence is a crime against humanity, for it destroys the very fabric of society’, she implored. In classical Thatcherite moralistic language, she accused the hunger strikers of turning ‘their violence against themselves’. ‘It is a tragedy that young men should be persuaded, coerced or ordered to starve themselves to death for a futile cause’, she noted.72 Thatcher’s Stormont speech, as reported by one British official, went ‘down in the Catholic community [of Northern Ireland] like a lead balloon’.73 Bishop Edward Daly of Derry noted that the speech merely repeated Thatcher’s ‘disastrous line of no surrender’.74 Privately, Haughey was of a similar opinion. He expressed his increasing ‘anxiety’ at Thatcher’s ‘hard-line’ reference to the prison situation and hunger strike. Her comments, Haughey believed, ‘could be counter-productive at the present time, both in the North and in the South, especially the border areas’. He noted that backing for H-Block campaigners ‘could be built up, with dangerous consequences’.75 In mid-June, the Sinn Féin leadership decided to escalate the hunger-strike campaign having announced that an Irish Republican prisoner would join the hunger strike every week. Paddy Quinn, a PIRA prisoner, was the first to join the strike on 15 June. Again, however, Thatcher refused to compromise. No concessions in relation to the Irish Republican calls for the granting of the five demands, she maintained, would be forthcoming. In a personal message to Haughey she noted that the ‘problem in Northern Ireland had not been created by HMG’. ‘[I]‌t was not easy’, she wrote, ‘to see what HMG could do. It was for others to move.’76 In a belated effort to win from Thatcher some concessions, Haughey tried to shift the goal posts slightly. Writing to Thatcher, on 25 June, he suggested that the British government use ‘a high level intermediary to talk with prisoners’. He felt that there was some manoeuvre with the prisoners in relation to their ‘five demands’.77 Haughey’s latest intervention was again politely rebuffed by London. In the words of Atkins, the British government ‘is not prepared to negotiate terms for an end to the hunger-strike with the protesting prisoners at the Maze prison’.78 By this stage, in Thatcher’s mind at least, Haughey had become obsolete in helping to find a solution to the ongoing crisis. Instead, the focus for London shifted firmly towards the Republican leadership, under the guise of Sinn Féin.79 As it transpired, Haughey’s latest intervention proved rather academic. Soon afterwards, in late June 1981, Haughey suffered a surprise defeat at the 1981 Irish general election. On 30th of that month, Fianna Fáil was replaced in government by a shaky Fine Gael-Labour coalition, with the support of several Independents and led

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by incumbent taoiseach Garret FitzGerald. Two H-Block candidates, Paddy Agnew in Louth and Kieran Doherty80 in Cavan-Monaghan, were also elected to Dáil Éireann. The precise reasons why the second Irish Republican hunger strike eventually ended, on 3 October 1981, remain highly contentious. By the summer of that year, it was painfully apparent that despite the continuing publicity surrounding the ongoing hunger strike the protests were failing to move Thatcher sufficiently to meet their demands. By mid-July, there was a recognition in Whitehall that the British government’s ongoing backchannel discussions with hunger strikers, facilitated with the support of the International Commission for Justice and Peace (ICJP), had proved futile. Thatcher’s position remained steadfast. The five demands would not be granted. Rather, the British government would only seek to continue improving conditions in the prison regime if the hunger strikers called off their protest.81 The British prime minister did, however, offer an olive branch to the hunger strikers. While she refused to budge on the issue of association, on the issue of work, she informed Atkins that she was willing to offer ‘marginal improvements’, but that such improvements were based on the principle that the prison governor had the final decision on ‘what work was acceptable’.82 On 6 July, Thatcher personally approved the text of what was to be offered to the prisoners, which was then communicated via Brendan Duddy’s clandestine network to the PIRA leadership. The basis of this text read as follows: (i) The clothing regime in Armagh Prison would be applied to all prisons in Northern Ireland (i.e. own clothes subject to approval) of the Prison Governor; (ii) Parcels, visits and letters would be made available on the same basis as for conforming prisoners at present; (iii) Association and remission the Government’s position will be as set out in the Secretary of State’s statement of 30 June …; (iv) On work the Prison authorities must retain the right to decide what work shall be done. If we receive a satisfactory response to this proposal by 9.00 a.m. on Tuesday 7 July we shall be prepared to provide you with an advance text of the full text. If the reply we receive is unsatisfactory and there is subsequently any public reference to this exchange we shall deny that it took place. Silence will be taken as an unsatisfactory reply.83

This offer on behalf of the British government, as Thomas Hennessey pointed out, did not – ‘in its essentials’ – go beyond previous public statements by Thatcher.84 Adams was quick to recognize this point. On receiving a draft of the above text, he allegedly said that he did not think the proposals ‘provided the basis for a resolution and that more was needed’.85 A circular issued on behalf of the National H-Block/Armagh committee, dated 27 July, brazenly pronounced that Thatcher would never break the resolve of the Irish Republican hunger strikers, and that ‘having lost 6 of their comrades, the prisoners remain determined to accept nothing less than their 5 demands’.86

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The British response, according to Duddy, was one of anger. The discussions had ‘come to an end’ and the backchannel would ‘have no further part in our efforts to resolve the problem’.87 By the close of July, a stalemate thus ensued. Although Adams continued to maintain contact with London and even met the six hunger strikers in Long-Kesh, on 29 July, to outline what might be on offer to bring the protests to an end, by this stage neither side was willing to compromise on the fundamental issues.88 Indeed, despite the direct involvement of the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the continued behind-the-scenes discussions between the prisoners, Duddy, Adams, Atkins and Philip Woodfield – permanent under-secretary of the NIO (Woodfield replaced Stowe in this post in 1981) – neither side was willing to budge. On 1 August, an INLA prisoner Kevin Lynch passed away after seventy-one days on hunger strike. The following day, on 2 August, fellow Irish Republican hunger striker Kiernan Doherty died after seventy-three days on hunger strike. Six days later, on 8 August, Thomas McElwee passed away after sixty-two days on hunger strike. The final prisoner to die on the second Republican hunger strike, bringing the total to ten, was Micky Devine. He passed away on 20 August, after sixty days on hunger strike. The entire spectacle had now become a brutal war of attrition with no ending in sight. In the end, it was the tormented families of the hunger strikers that intervened. The turning point was because of a decision taken on behalf of the family of Irish Republican hunger striker Matt Devlin to take him off the hunger strike, on 5 September. One by one over the course of the next weeks, with the encouragement of Jim Prior, recently appointed secretary of state for Northern Ireland and Lord (Alexander Patrick Greysteil Hore-Ruthven) Gowrie, minister of state for Northern Ireland,89 the remaining families of the hunger strikers agreed to medical intervention. Throughout this period, the official British line remained the same. London ‘would not make any concessions to the prisoners as long [as] the hunger-strike continued’.90 Eventually the strike was called off on 3 October, without the prisoners securing their five demands, although the British did agree to grant some concessions, specifically on clothing, remission and association.91 To this day there are various conspiracy theories surrounding the ending of the second Irish Republican hunger strike, or more specifically, the length of time it took to end the strike. According to Brendan Hughes, the Irish Republican leaders outside the prisons, under the leadership of Gerry Adams, deliberately kept the hunger strike going for political advantage to help build up Sinn Féin as a political and electoral force.92 Indeed, in 2005, Richard O’Rawe, former public relations officer of the Irish Republican prisoners in Long-Kesh, claimed that not only was the second Irish Republican hunger strike led by the PIRA Army Council outside the prison, but that Adams had deliberately sought to prolong the hunger strike.93 According to O’Rawe, there were only two possible explanations as to why the PIRA Army Council ordered the hunger strikers to continue their campaign. The first was because it believed that Thatcher would come up with a ‘better offer’ before Joe McDonnell died. The second  – more controversial  – explanation was that the PIRA Army Council wanted to ‘accelerate an electoral strategy’ by ensuring that Irish

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Republican candidate Owen Carron was returned for Bobby Sands’s Westminster seat in Fermanagh-South Tyrone.94 Despite the availability of evidence to support the above argument, Gerry Adams and those close to him, including Sinn Féin’s former chief propagandist Danny Morrison,95 have repeatedly denied that the Irish Republican leadership intentionally encouraged the hunger strikers to continue their campaign in the hope of increasing political support for Sinn Féin.96 Brendan McFarlane, PIRA officer commander in Long-Kesh during the hunger strike, likewise, has challenged the Hughes/O’Rawe claim. He has maintained that there ‘was no concrete proposals whatsoever in relation to a deal’. Rather, he insisted that it was the Irish Republican hunger strikers themselves who decided to continue the hunger strike ‘not the outside leadership of the Republican Movement’.97 In the final assessment, who won the hunger strike? Notwithstanding that Thatcher was forced to negotiate with Irish Republican terrorists, albeit indirectly, in the short term, the British government won this battle. Despite misinformed accusations that the Republican hunger strikers secured ‘de facto acceptance’ of their demands, in truth, they lost their campaign.98 In the end, despite years of protest and the deaths of ten hunger strikers, special category status was never achieved. As Prior made clear in a statement shortly after the concluding of the second Irish Republican hunger strike, ‘there will be no question of a political or military system of administration or any return to special category status’.99 Personally, Thatcher genuinely felt sad regarding their deaths. In her memoir, she conceded that she had admired the courage of Sands and the other hunger strikers.100 She described these protesters as ‘poor devils’ and how their deaths had been ‘a terrible waste of human life’.101 Any demonstration of sympathy for the hunger strikers on behalf of Thatcher, however, was always offset by condemnation of their ‘murderous cause’.102 In the long term, the Irish Republican leadership benefited most from the hunger strike campaign. The significance of the protests had far-reaching consequences beyond issues around the granting of political status. In fact, the deaths of ten hunger strikers, immortalized by Sands’s sacrifice, was to transform the political makeup of Irish Republicanism forever. Sands’s election as an MP, as pointed out by Ed Moloney, broke the taboo within Sinn Féin against standing in parliamentary elections.103 Gerry Adams, traditionally wary of electoralism, was himself a convert to the political cause when he witnessed the masses of nationalists prepared to attend the funerals of the hunger strikers and the 30,000 plus people who voted for Sands. Adams realized that many people who previously baulked at becoming members of the PIRA were ready to join its political wing and devote themselves to Sinn Féin’s cause.104 Thereafter, the Irish Republican movement under Adams and Martin McGuinness was to endorse the so-called ‘Armalite and Ballot box strategy’, as memorably described by Danny Morrison.105 By the time Baroness Thatcher died in 2013, Sinn Féin was the largest Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland, with Martin McGuinness being the deputy first minister for Northern Ireland. Arguably, if the Irish Republican hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981 had never happened, Sinn Féin would have found it almost impossible to secure a seat at the table of constitutional politics.

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‘There is no sell-out’: Thatcher and the Anglo-Irish joint study groups A British-Irish supervisory steering group first convened in London, on 30 January 1981, to initiate the Anglo-Irish joint studies.106 Armstrong led the British delegation, in the company of Leonard Figg.107 Dermot Nally, secretary to the Irish government, led the Irish side, in the company of Eamon Kennedy. First, each side confirmed that ‘total confidentiality should be maintained about the [Anglo-Irish] studies’.108 An agreement was also reached that five Anglo-Irish joint study groups would be established under the following headings: ( a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

joint study on possible institutional structures; joint study on citizenship rights; joint study on security matters; joint study on economic co-operation; and lastly joint study on measures to encourage mutual understanding.109

Thereafter, on two separate occasions in Dublin, 11–13 March and 13–14 April, the British-Irish supervisory steering group met to flesh out the contents of the proposed five Anglo-Irish joint study groups.110 Further meetings were planned for Dublin during May, but the British requested a postponement due to the ongoing second Irish Republican hunger strike in Northern Ireland.111 Significantly, responsibility for the management of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups was to remain under the personal direction of Armstrong and his Irish counterpart Dermot Nally.112 The British cabinet secretary championed this decision, personally. He believed that the FCO would be consulted if required, otherwise it should know its place. In what Moore describes as a ‘masterly piece of mandarin handling’ during this period, Armstrong wrote to Thatcher to explain that the FCO, which of course would normally oversee discussions with a foreign country, wished to ‘stay out of the Joint Studies’.113 Initially, at least, Thatcher remained unconvinced. The FCO, she reportedly informed one confidant, ‘must take the lead, otherwise the relationship with the Republic [of Ireland] will be being [sic] treated in a wholly different way from the other ECC bilateral’.114 Eventually, Armstrong’s petitioning bore fruit. In the end, he won Thatcher over with the argument that by allowing the Cabinet Office a ‘special role’ vis-à-vis the Anglo-Irish joint studies project, this would allow her to ‘keep an eye on developments … to monitor the negotiations’.115 This relationship between Armstrong and Nally, which dated back to their dealings within one another over the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973 and which flourished over the following years was to be later described as ‘one of the most effective partnerships in the history of Anglo-Irish relations’.116 In British circles, Nally was widely admired. Referred to as ‘the quintessential civil servant’, he was known to be ‘discreet, loyal and sensible’.117 Armstrong later recounted with fondness his relationship with Nally:

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I first met Dermot Nally at a dinner at 10 Downing Street in December 1973 at the end of the negotiations [in relation to] the Sunningdale Agreement. Then we met and worked together in December 1980 at a meeting of Sherpas in Washington preparing for an Economic G7 Summit. There I came to have a great respect for him, and a great liking, both of which I think were reciprocated. He became a good friend, as well as a trusted colleague, and counterparty in the negotiations for the Anglo-Irish Agreement [of 1985].118

Throughout the lengthy drafting stages of the Anglo-Irish joint studies, Armstrong, along with Robert Wade-Gery, deputy secretary to the Cabinet Office, made several clandestine trips to Dublin. These meetings were highly secretive, with even the British Embassy in Dublin being kept in the dark.119 No records of the oral discussion were kept.120 Over the coming months and indeed years, mostly behind closed doors, including further clandestine trips to Dublin and London and regular contact by telephone, Armstrong and Nally worked closely with one another to advance AngloIrish relations. For the British cabinet secretary, the chief goal in relation to Northern Ireland and more generally Ireland during this period was to try and convince Thatcher, against her own expressed wishes, to permit the Irish government to play a constructive role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. At an Irish cabinet meeting, on 27 January, Haughey requested that his ministers begin ‘dredging’ their departments for ‘suggestions and co-operation’ in relation to the Anglo-Irish joint study groups.121 He emphasized the need for all departments, including ministers, assistant secretaries and principal/counsellor level officials, to cooperate fully with Nally, who, as noted above, was charged with leading the Irish government’s involvement with the Anglo-Irish joint study group. Although some Irish officials, to quote Walter Kirwan, would prefer to ‘get on with current work rather than contemplate what they might see as pie-in-the sky speculation’, Haughey made it crystal clear that the proposed Anglo-Irish joint studies assumed priority for his government.122 The process had barely commenced when cracks began to appear. On Haughey’s direct orders, at the first meeting of the British-Irish supervisory steering group, on 30 January 1981, Nally informed his British colleagues that the steering group consider constitutional arrangement under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish joint study group ‘mutual understanding’. Nally explained to his rather stunned British counterparts that his government wished to examine what progress might be made in relation to Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution and the British government’s ‘guarantee’ to Northern Ireland, as enshrined under the 1949 ‘Ireland Act’.123 In response, Armstrong informed Nally that he did not have a mandate from his government to discuss the constitutional future of either the Republic of Ireland or Northern Ireland, in the context of AngloIrish joint study groups.124 In a letter, dated 20 February 1981, Armstrong spelt out the rationale for his reluctance to engage in constitutional discussions under the auspices of the AngloIrish joint study groups. Thatcher, he counselled, wished to ‘make it quite clear’ to the Irish government that ‘for our part we are not mandated to discuss the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom’. ‘Mr Haughey’, the British

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cabinet secretary recorded, must realize that London was ‘not prepared to discuss it [Northern Ireland’s constitutional status]’.125 Thatcher was reportedly ‘nervous’ about Irish calls for the Anglo-Irish joint study groups to consider constitutional issues. For Thatcher, this was a non-runner. Institutional, not constitutional matters, she believed could be considered only in the context of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups.126 By mid-March, with the constitutional relationship between Britain and Ireland off the political agenda, Haughey shifted emphasis to persuading Thatcher to agree to a new development in British-Irish relations:  namely, an Irish government’s proposal to establish the so-called ‘Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council’ (AIIC), with accompanying parliamentary tier.127 In Dublin’s thinking, the setting up of such a council would provide a formal institutional framework, at official and ministerial level, between the two governments, along similar lines as the bodies that the UK already had in operation with France and Germany. Regarding Dublin’s proposal to establish an accompanying parliamentary tier, it was envisaged that such a body, composed of British, Irish and Northern Ireland politicians (and possibly members of the European parliament),128 would provide a unique forum for dialogue. Writing to Thatcher, on 18 March, Armstrong advised his prime minister to consider supporting the establishment of an AIIC and accompanying parliamentary tier. Irrespective of Ulster Unionist ‘suspicions’, he surmised, the British government should not rule out Dublin’s calls for such a council. ‘In itself ’, he wrote, the proposed AIIC would represent ‘little more than dramatizing and somewhat intensifying what happens already’. He explained his rationale in support of this argument: In practical terms a [Anglo-Irish intergovernmental] Council should at worst be harmless and at best might contribute usefully not just to maintaining and increasing Dublin’s vital co-operation on cross-border security but also to creating that ‘wider framework’ for the gradual easing of the problems of Northern Ireland.129

The problem, however, as Armstrong pointed out, was that Haughey ‘could well be tempted to describe it as an important stage on the road to the ultimate goal of a federal or otherwise united Ireland’. In such a scenario, the British cabinet secretary warned that ‘Protestant suspicions in the Province would be quick to fasten on that’.130 Indeed, according to Wade-Gery, the Irish government’s pushing for the establishment of an AIIC (and accompanying parliamentary tier) was based on Dublin’s ‘eventual objective’ of securing a federal Ireland.131 Not for the first or last time, Armstrong’s eagerness to advance Anglo-Irish relations was curtailed by his prime minister. On 19 March, Thatcher convened a meeting of high-level politicians and senior Whitehall civil servants to discuss (and to protest at) the progress of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups. It is noteworthy that, given everything else that was occurring at this time during Thatcher’s premiership, she devoted so much of her attention to the arduous and very often laborious workings of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups. After all, this was at a time when she was facing an economic crisis over the 1981 Budget.132

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Present at the meeting on 19 March, apart from Thatcher, were Humphrey Atkins, Lord Carrington, William Whitelaw, Sir Ian Gilmore, Armstrong and Wade-Gery. From the outset, Thatcher went on the defensive. The speed of the talks in relation to the Anglo-Irish joint study groups and the proposed AIIC, she exclaimed, were ‘moving faster than she had originally contemplated’. ‘Some of the phraseology which had come up was particularly worrying.’ Thatcher noted that ‘she did not like the idea of using the word “Council” to describe whatever institution might be established’. She also said that one had to remember that ‘Mr. Haughey would certainly exaggerate the significance of whatever was achieved’. Nonetheless, the British prime minister admitted that she was in favour of making ‘sufficient progress’ to ensure that Haughey ‘did not feel forced to break off the joint studies’.133 Thatcher’s protests (and indignation) regarding the progress of the Anglo-Irish joint studies were ‘classic encapsulations’ of Thatcher’s approach to Anglo-Irish relations in general. To borrow Moore’s description, ‘she strongly disliked the whole vision, while not having any clear idea of what she wanted to do instead’.134 Thatcher’s warning that Haughey would ‘certainly exaggerate the significance of whatever was achieved’ did not merely stem from the taoiseach’s over selling of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting in December 1980. In the intermediate period, since the commencement of the Anglo-Irish joint studies, Haughey’s minister for foreign affairs Brian Lenihan had made a series of outlandish claims regarding British-Irish relations, the constitutional future of Northern Ireland and Irish neutrality. Lenihan’s mismanagement of the government’s Northern Ireland policy was apparent for all to see during an interview with RTÉ’s lunchtime television news programme, on 12 February. To the disbelief of Haughey and the irritation of the British government and Ulster Unionists, alike, Lenihan made the bold claim that the Anglo-Irish joint study groups currently underway between Dublin and London were reviewing all aspects of Ireland’s relationship with Britain, including possible constitutional issues.135 The British government was furious. Speaking at Stormont, Belfast, the following month, 5 March, Thatcher made clear her commitment to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the UK. ‘I want to talk to you in the plainest and simplest terms’, she said, ‘Northern Ireland would not cease to be part of the United Kingdom until “its people and the Parliament at Westminster decide otherwise”.’ ‘It is’, she declared, ‘something to which I am personally and deeply committed.’ In a direct attack on the Irish government and to appease Ulster Unionists she noted thus: ‘There is no sell-out. Those who argue otherwise have simply got it wrong or are choosing not to understand the purpose of my discussions with Mr Haughey.’136 On two separate occasions in the aftermath of Lenihan’s comments, Atkins, likewise, stipulated that the new improvements in the Dublin-London axis posed ‘no threat’ to Northern Ireland’s constitutional future. ‘We believe’, he said, that the Anglo-Irish joint study groups would ‘help to improve relations between the two neighbours’.137 ‘I can assure the people of Northern Ireland quite categorically that there is no such conspiracy or “sell out” or indeed any threat to the interests of Northern Ireland in these joint studies.’138 Despite London’s indignation over Lenihan’s claims, privately, British and Irish civil servants continued to meet to discuss the progress of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups.

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Therefore, it looked as though the Irish government had got away with its mishandling of Anglo-Irish relations. However, worse was to follow. Once again, the blame fell solely at the feet of Lenihan. Speaking on RTÉ’s television programme, Today Tonight, on 18 March, he made the bold – and politically naive – statement that the Anglo-Irish summit meeting of December 1980 was ‘the first time that the Republic [of Ireland] did have a part to play and a real part to play in the ultimate settlement of affairs in this island and between this island and Britain’.139 Lenihan’s personal crusade to sabotage the ongoing Anglo-Irish joint study groups did not end there. Four days later, during an interview with Barry Cowen of BBC Northern Ireland radio, on 22 March, the Irish minister for foreign affairs suggested that Irish unity could be secured within ten years. ‘I would like to see’ a united Ireland, he explained, ‘well within ten years’.140 Unsurprisingly, Lenihan’s remarks were like a red rag to a bull amongst Ulster Unionists. The Rev. Ian Paisley was the first the lead the charge. On 28 March, he held a public rally at Stormont, which allegedly attracted some 30,000 supporters. The Rev. Paisley attacked Lenihan for his outspoken comments in relation to the AngloIrish joint studies and personally attacked Thatcher for her alleged abandonment of Ulster Unionism. Enoch Powell next stepped into the debate. Using Ian Gow as an intermediary, Powell made it known to Thatcher that he was furious regarding Lenihan’s comments and more generally because of London’s involvement with the ‘Anglo/Irish Study Groups’. According to Gow, Powell ‘fears that much of the success’ that Thatcher achieved during her recent visit to Belfast ‘in dispelling Unionists fears of a sell-out have been damaged by the reported remarks of the Irish Foreign Minister’. Gow informed Thatcher that ‘this issue will not just fade away’.141 Next it was Thatcher’s turn to vent her anger regarding Lenihan’s comments, and this time her attention focused on Haughey personally. During a short five-minute meeting on the margins of a European summit meeting at Maastricht, on 22 March, Thatcher ‘tore into Haughey’,142 giving the taoiseach one of her celebrated ‘handbaggings’. Lenihan’s remarks, she exclaimed, might have ‘undone’ everything in relation to the Anglo-Irish joint studies.143 She then ‘pointed out’ to Haughey some of the ‘more damaging remarks’. The taoiseach agreed that Lenihan’s comments had indeed set back Anglo-Irish relations, noting that the Dublin-London initiative looked ‘very tattered’. He suggested that he best ‘reflect’ on the situation overnight. Thatcher agreed. The meeting ended with the two heads of government parting with ‘expressions of mutual esteem and regret!’.144 Following this heated confrontation, Haughey reportedly remained silent ‘for about half an hour’.145 In a public statement issued on behalf of No. 10 Downing Street, following the Maastricht encounter, Thatcher was reported as being ‘very distressed’ regarding Lenihan’s recent remarks and wished to make it ‘very clear that it did not reflect my belief …Nothing, but nothing, can change the constitutional position in Northern Ireland except the people in Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom Parliament’, she was reported as saying.146 The Times reported that Thatcher’s statement was another attempt by the British prime minister to ‘convince the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland that the [Anglo-Irish joint] studies, which she and Mr Haughey established at their Dublin summit in December, are not a “sell-out” of the Province, as the Rev. Paisley has claimed’.147

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Further fuel was added to the fire following the broadcast of a BBC television programme Panorama on 30 March. The programme reported that the five AngloIrish joint study groups, in conjunction with Thatcher’s meeting with Haughey in December of the previous year, were ‘aimed at setting up an Anglo-Irish council and changing the status of Northern Ireland’. The programme also claimed that the London and Dublin governments were ‘working towards the idea of eventually sharing joint ownership of Northern Ireland in a new condominium status’. While such accusations were ‘authoritatively dismissed’ by Whitehall, the programme only helped to further increase Ulster Unionists’ anxieties.148 Although in London circles it was ‘being stressed that Lenihan’s comments’ had not complicated matters and that there was ‘no lasting damage to Mrs Thatcher’s relationship with Mr Haughey’, this was untrue.149 The reality was that by now Haughey’s attempts to nurture a bilateral agreement between Dublin and London had been ‘shattered’, to quote a reliable source.150 In the aftermath of this fractious encounter, Haughey denied reports that he had received a ‘dressing down’ from Thatcher. Rather, he said that their relationship remained ‘an excellent one’.151 Despite Haughey’s attempts at window dressing, the harsh reality was that Anglo-Irish relations were at their lowest ebb since he first became taoiseach in 1979. His brief and bitter encounter with Thatcher at Maastricht signalled the shattering of the last bond of trust between the two premiers. Dermot Nally later conceded that this dark episode in Anglo-Irish relations ‘destroyed’ Thatcher’s belief in the ‘idea that she could reach agreement with Haughey. It destroyed her faith in him.’152 Notwithstanding the souring of the Haughey-Thatcher relationship, British and Irish civil servants continued to make progress behind the scenes on the Anglo-Irish joint study groups. In the words of Moore, the Anglo-Irish joint studies provided British and Irish policymakers ‘what bureaucrats always need in order to advance their process  – a framework of regular contact’.153 In mid-April 1981, officials from both governments convened in Dublin for what transpired to be the final meeting of the British-Irish supervisory steering group prior to the Irish general election, scheduled for 11 June 1981.154 By this time, both sets of officials were working on draft texts of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups, which they intended to publish in the near future. However, on the advice of Lord Carrington and Atkins, Armstrong decided not to hand over the British texts of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups until after the Irish general election results had been announced.155 Within Whitehall there was a concern that Haughey and Lenihan might attempt to ‘play the “joint studies” card’ during the Irish election campaign.156 The British government was also concerned about the impact that publication of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups would have within the Protestant community in Northern Ireland, particularly accusations that Thatcher had ‘sold out’ Ulster Unionist politicians to accommodate the wishes of the Fianna Fáil government in the Republic of Ireland.157 As Enoch Powell made clear during an address to a public meeting in County Down, on 15 May, ‘There is no doubt that in the full context of the H-Block and [P]‌IRA terrorist campaign’, the current Anglo-Irish talks in relation to the AngloIrish joint study groups were ‘pregnant with danger, a danger which it was the duty of the Unionists to counteract’.158

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Indeed, so serious had the situation become that Thatcher took the unprecedented decision to travel to Northern Ireland later that month (this was her second visit to Northern Ireland in less than two months). Apart from addressing the ongoing Irish Republican hunger strike (discussed above), her trip was intended to quell Ulster Unionists’ apprehension regarding the Anglo-Irish joint study groups and to reaffirm her commitment towards maintaining the union between Northern Ireland and the remainder of the UK. Speaking at Stormont she explained that she was ‘here to bear witness once more to the Government’s commitment, and to my open personal commitment, to the future of the Province’. ‘We are committed to the well-being of all the people of Northern Ireland.’159

‘Getting to know you’: The FitzGerald-Thatcher relationship and the AIIC On becoming taoiseach in June 1981, Garret FitzGerald abandoned his predecessor Charles Haughey’s Northern Ireland policy. Described by Michael Lillis as a ‘shrewd political animal’, who viewed Northern Ireland as his most important ‘issue in public life’, FitzGerald had no time for Haughey’s mantra that Northern Ireland was a failed economic and political entity.160 Since his election as Fine Gael leader in 1977, FitzGerald had made several visits to Northern Ireland and, in correspondence with both the then British Labour prime minister James Callaghan and opposition leader Margaret Thatcher, expressed his wish to restore a form of power-sharing assembly in Northern Ireland as his preferred Northern Ireland policy.161 This approach to Northern Ireland on behalf of the Fine Gael leadership was given official recognition following the publication of a policy paper, Ireland  – our future together, in 1979.162 At the heart of this policy paper was the argument that Irish reunification could not be achieved without the consent of the majority of Northern Ireland.163 Instead, the Fine Gael leadership proposed a new alternative, FitzGerald’s so-called ‘confederal arrangement’. Under this system, according to FitzGerald, each part of Ireland would retain control of its own affairs, excluding security, foreign policy and monetary policy.164 On entering the DT, FitzGerald was determined to translate the academic proposals contained within Ireland – our future together into government policy. He was not slow to grasp the political nettle. Within days of taking up his new post, he immediately ordered a view of the Irish government’s Northern Ireland policy and more general Anglo-Irish relations.165 Indeed, during a telephone conversation, on 1 July, FitzGerald informed Thatcher that it was his intention to use Ireland – our future together as the template for his Northern Ireland policy moving forward.166 The following month, over two days, 24 and 25 August 1981, FitzGerald chaired an Anglo-Irish review conference in Dublin, which included Fine Gael and Labour Party politicians and senior civil servants. Significantly, at this conference agreement was reached that possible amendments to the Irish Constitution might be considered in the hope of fostering peace in Northern Ireland. Specifically, it was agreed that the Irish government would consider amending Article 3 of the Irish Constitution, which

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claimed Ireland’s territorial ownership of Northern Ireland to ‘express the claim to the Six Counties as an aspiration to be achieved peacefully’.167 Here lay the genesis of FitzGerald’s so-called ‘constitutional crusade’. This was a pledge on behalf of the new taoiseach to provoke a ‘rethink of traditional nationalism’ by reforming the Irish Constitution in the hope of eventually accommodating Northern Protestants into a new Ireland.168 He wished to create a pluralist society, and if he felt he had sufficient support, he planned to call a referendum to reform the Irish Constitution. ‘[T]‌he fact is’, FitzGerald said, ‘our laws and our Constitution, our practices, our attitudes reflect those of a majority ethos and are not acceptable to Protestants in Northern Ireland.’169 Encouraged by the widespread positive reaction to his calls for a constitutional crusade from the general public in the Republic of Ireland, FitzGerald ordered Peter Sutherland, Irish attorney general, to commence with his review of the Irish Constitution, with the aid of an expert committee, in the hope that a draft paper could be produced within six months. That process, however, was dramatically halted following the collapse of the Fine Gael-Labour government in January 1982. Following Fine Gael’s return to government in December 1982, FitzGerald decided to shelve his constitutional crusade to give priority to the establishment of the New Ireland Forum (NIF) (a topic which is discussed in Chapter 7). Placed within this context, to quote FitzGerald, his constitutional initiative was ‘stillborn’. Nonetheless, it was a crusade that represented a ‘time-bomb ticking away at the heart of the narrow and exclusive form of Catholic nationalism to which Fianna Fáil traditionally tied its fortunes’.170 What of Thatcher’s view of FitzGerald? In her memoir, she referred to him as ‘a cosmopolitan intellectual’, somebody who (unlike Haughey) had ‘little time for the myths of Irish Republicanism’. Yet, she found his quiet voice and talkative style annoying (she once referred to him as an ‘Irish Geoffrey Howe’).171 According to Armstrong, she also tended to miss much of what FitzGerald said ‘through too rapid delivery on his part’.172 To FitzGerald’s repeated annoyance, she had a habit of referring to him as ‘Gareth’. ‘Does she think I am Welsh?’, he was reported as exclaiming.173 Indeed, on one jet-lagged occasion, she apparently fell asleep during a ‘peroration’ from FitzGerald, causing one of her advisors to assure him that an accurate record of his conversation had been written down and would be duly presented to the British prime minister at a later date!174 Despite her critical comments about FitzGerald in her memoir, possibly in retaliation for his criticisms of her in his, Thatcher did seemingly like him, concurring with Nigel Lawson’s rather rude judgement that he was ‘the only completely honest Taoiseach the Republic [of Ireland] ever had’.175 Armstrong has gone so far as to suggest that Thatcher ‘felt motherly towards him: she wanted to stroke his curly hair’.176 Those officials most closely associated with Anglo-Irish relations certainly admired FitzGerald. The incumbent taoiseach, Figg recorded, was a ‘man of great sincerity’.177 In comparison to Haughey, the British ambassador to Ireland noted, FitzGerald was ‘more likeable and much less self-centred’.178 ‘Garret the Good’, was another label used by Whitehall to describe FitzGerald because of his ‘honest and unselfish’ attitude to politics.179 Or to borrow David Tatham’s description of FitzGerald, ‘his transparent and rather bumbling honesty was in fact appealing and a political asset’.180

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In relation to FitzGerald’s stance on Northern Ireland, he was equally applauded for his sincerity. ‘There is no doubt that he [FitzGerald] sincerely wants a settlement in Northern Ireland,’ Figg wrote, ‘[and] sees that it must be based on a reconciliation between the two communities there.’181 Jim Prior, likewise, viewed FitzGerald in a positive light, describing him as ‘an exceptional man, of great honesty and integrity’. ‘Of all the Irish politicians that I know’, Prior was to later record, ‘I have perhaps the greatest respect for FitzGerald than anyone else.’182 Prior praised FitzGerald for his ‘pragmatic approach’ to Northern Ireland and his ‘desire to recognise the Unionist tradition and to seek political progress on the basis of consent from both Nationalists and Unionists’.183 Indeed, FitzGerald was widely praised in Whitehall circles by showing himself to be ‘resolute against terrorism’ and for demonstrating ‘political courage (if not rashness) in tackling head-on the Republic’s constitutional claim to Northern Ireland’.184 Before departing government in January 1982, FitzGerald had two further opportunities to make progress on Northern Ireland. First, with the publication of the much-anticipated Anglo-Irish joint studies and second, in relation to the proposed establishment of an AIIC (and accompanying parliamentary tier). By this juncture, FitzGerald was reportedly eager to pursue further the Anglo-Irish joint study groups and in private expressed criticism at the lack of progress to date.185 As Nally pointed out to David Neligan, in the taoiseach’s opinion, the ‘process had not been developed sufficiently to date’. What was required was ‘political substance’.186 For this reason, FitzGerald felt it was imperative that the convening of an official Anglo-Irish summit meeting with Thatcher be placed at the top of the political agenda. This meeting, as FitzGerald explained, would be a ‘getting to know you’ exercise.187 FitzGerald’s impatience helped to breathe fresh life into the stalled Anglo-Irish negotiations. On 27 July 1981, Nally led a delegation of Irish officials to London to work on further drafts of the Anglo-Irish joint studies, under the auspices of the British-Irish supervisory steering group.188 A  further meeting between British and Irish officials, led by Armstrong and Nally, convened in London, on 15 September, to discuss the progress of the Anglo-Irish joint studies to date.189 Later that month, on 27 September, during a meeting with Figg, FitzGerald formally placed on record that in return for Thatcher making some movement on the issue of the ‘guarantee’ to Ulster Unionists, the Irish government was genuinely considering amending Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. According to FitzGerald, what ‘was needed from the British side’, as Figg phrased it, ‘was some advance on the negative attitude about no change in the situation in the North without the consent of the majority’.190 The following month, on 14 October, Armstrong visited Nally in Dublin to attend a meeting of the British-Irish supervisory steering group charged with completing the Anglo-Irish joint study groups. Significantly, this meeting was also convened to discuss the forthcoming Anglo-Irish summit meeting, now pencilled in for 6 November and as a way for Armstrong to informally speak with FitzGerald.191 Early the following month, on 2 November, a further meeting between British and Irish officials was convened in London to draw up a draft communiqué to be published in the aftermath of the AngloIrish summit meeting, which was now only four days away. On the British side was Armstrong and Wade-Gery and on the Irish side, Nally and Neligan.192 In advance of

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this meeting, British ministers and civil servants, together with their Irish counterparts, had worked on numerous counter-drafts of the proposed communiqué.193 By this juncture, Thatcher was encouraged by her Civil Service, chiefly the Cabinet Office, to foster a friendly relationship with FitzGerald. ‘Both Governments’, it was pointed out to Thatcher, ‘share the objectives of good relations with each other and greater happiness and prosperity for the people of Northern Ireland’. In the absence of direct political progress in Northern Ireland, as one official phrased it, ‘closer relations between Dublin and London generally offer the prospect of an improved climate for security cooperation and for reconciliation between the two parts of the community in Northern Ireland’.194 On the Anglo-Irish joint study groups, she was advised to see them as a ‘means of giving substance to the two Governments’ desire for better bilateral relations’.195 However, FCO officialdom also struck a note of caution in Thatcher’s dealings with FitzGerald. ‘The underlying difference between the objectives of the two Governments remains’, as one FCO steering brief phrased it. ‘The eventual Irish objective is the reunification of the island. The United Kingdom cannot concur so long as that aim remains incompatible with the wishes of the majority of Northern Ireland’s inhabitants.’196 Accordingly, Thatcher was advised by the FCO to adhere to six central policy objectives during her meeting with FitzGerald. These objectives were spelt out in an FCO steering brief: (a) To maintain, and if possible, enhance the Irish commitment to our common efforts against terrorists; (b) To confirm HMG’s continuing commitment to closer Anglo-Irish relations and the [Anglo-Irish] Joint Studies, and to confirm our willingness to keep the Irish Government fully informed about our policies in Northern Ireland; (c) To make clear to the Taoiseach the limits on HMG’s freedom of action by the facts of life in Northern Ireland; (d) As a necessary contribution to those objectives, for the Prime Minister to establish a good working relationship with Dr FitzGerald; (e) To gain Irish support on European Community issues of concern to us; and lastly, (f) To influence Irish positions on international questions and to encourage them to work closely with us on the [UN] Security Council.197 On the issue of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups, Point (b), Thatcher was advised that four of the reports, with the exception of the security report, should be published, but only the summary texts.198 Privately, however, Thatcher expressed grave reservations regarding the entire enterprise; in fact, as early as April 1981, she had described drafts of the Anglo-Irish joint studies as ‘the most alarming set of papers on the UK/Irish situation I  have read’.199 On the eve of her summit meeting with FitzGerald, her anxieties remained. According to a Cabinet Office official, Thatcher did ‘not wish to see the five studies published’. Yet, because of inevitable pressure which she would face from both her own Parliament and the Irish government if she refused to publish the Anglo-Irish joint studies, she decided to follow Armstrong’s lead on this

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issue (at this time Armstrong made it known to Thatcher that he favoured publication of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups).200 Regarding the proposed establishment of an AIIC and accompanying parliamentary tier (surprisingly not included in the above six policy objectives drawn up by the FCO) Thatcher was again unsure. While she now reluctantly agreed to the establishment of some sort of Anglo-Irish body, she refused to support the setting up of an accompanying parliamentary tier.201 On the issue of nomenclature, she expressed her dislike at the ‘rather grand sounding’ title of ‘Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council’,202 suggesting instead that the title ‘Anglo/Irish Co-operation Council’ be used.203 Thatcher and FitzGerald discussed the final details regarding the proposed publication of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups, when the two premiers met for their first official Anglo-Irish summit meeting in London, on 6 November 1981. The agenda for the meeting fell under three broad sections: (1) The Anglo-Irish joint study groups, (2)  Northern Ireland and lastly (3)  Other business, including world political issues and European Community affairs.204 The British delegation comprised Thatcher, Lord Carrington, Jim Prior, Nigel Lawson205 (secretary of state for energy), Figg, Armstrong and Michael Alexander (Thatcher’s private secretary for overseas affairs). On the Irish side, Michael O’Leary (tánaiste), James Dooge (minister for foreign affairs) and a host of civil servants (including Eamon Kennedy, Nally, Donlon, Neligan, Kirwan and Lillis) accompanied FitzGerald. The Anglo-Irish summit meeting formally commenced at approximately 11.45 a.m., with discussions taking place between Thatcher, FitzGerald, Prior and O’Leary. Following introductions, Thatcher thanked FitzGerald for visiting the wounded members of the Irish Guards British Army regiment in Westminster Hospital, several of whom had been severely injured following a PIRA terrorist attack on Chelsea Barracks, on 10 October (two civilians, 59-year-old Nora Field and John 18-year-old Breslin, lost their lives in this attack). The taoiseach said that he had made the gesture to indicate, ‘symbolically’, his attitude to PIRA violence. Thatcher reaffirmed that the PIRA were ‘men of violence’ and ‘enemies of all the people’. She said that cross-border cooperation had been ‘absolutely marvellous’. Thatcher then asked that in the context of FitzGerald’s constitutional crusade would the word ‘secular’ be used in describing what the taoiseach intended? FitzGerald said that this was the intended outcome. She responded positively to the taoiseach’s words and next enquired – expressively against the advice of the FCO – whether the Irish government was considering ‘giving up’ Article 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution? FitzGerald said that his government was indeed considering this policy. He felt that the Irish Constitution ‘should reflect the aspiration to unity but should not express it in juridical terms: and that this unity should only be achieved by peaceful means’. Attention next shifted to the Anglo-Irish joint study groups. Thatcher asked FitzGerald whether the five reports should be published? The taoiseach hesitated. The British prime minister, for her part, said that the moves should be made to progress the talks and that ‘things do not live except in detail’. ‘We have to get involved in detail,’ she said, ‘and through practical co-operation and persuasion.’ Encouraged by Thatcher’s positivity, FitzGerald agreed with the prime minister’s suggestion that apart from the Anglo-Irish joint study which dealt with security, the four other studies should

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be published in due course. An agreement was, therefore, reached that a short report would be appended to the communiqué in relation to the timing of the publication of the Anglo-Irish joint studies and a brief reference to their content.206 Between 12 noon and 1.10 p.m., Thatcher and FitzGerald held a private tête-à-tête. In advance of this face-to-face encounter, it was envisaged that this private meeting would be ‘devoted primarily to Northern Ireland and the [Anglo-Irish] Joint Studies’.207 No doubt having learnt a valuable lesson from her dealings with Haughey, prior to her meeting with FitzGerald, Thatcher informed Armstrong that she would ‘prefer to have note-takers present throughout her meeting with the Taoiseach’.208 Following pleasantries and a recap regarding their agreement to publish the Anglo-Irish joint studies, the two premiers got down to business. First, to FitzGerald’s delight, Thatcher said that her government would agree to Dublin’s request to establish a new AIIC through which the ‘institutional expression could be given to the unique relationship between the two countries’.209 However, Thatcher refused FitzGerald’s next request that this new AIIC be accompanied by a parliamentary tier. Such a tier, FitzGerald explained, would be made up of members drawn from the British and Irish parliaments, from the European parliament and from any elected assembly ‘that might be established in Northern Ireland’.210 Thatcher immediately struck down taoiseach’s proposition. Her opposition, she explained, stemmed from her previous experience of dealing with FitzGerald’s predecessor Haughey during the Anglo-Irish summit meeting in December 1980. In the aftermath of this meeting, she said that there had been a widespread misconception that ‘there were a lot of undisclosed things and secret agreements behind the communiqué’. As a result, she had ‘suffered political damage from this criticism’. The creation of a so-called ‘parliamentary tier’, she noted, would leave her vulnerable to attack from her own Conservative Party backbenchers and Ulster Unionists. She would not allow a similar situation to arise again. Reluctantly, FitzGerald conceded defeat on this point.211 Apart from focusing on an agreement to publish the Anglo-Irish joint studies and establish a new AIIC (without an accompanying parliamentary tier), FitzGerald used this private audience with Thatcher to push one further issue: the idea of an all-Ireland court. Thatcher said she could not accept a reference in the draft communiqué to the ‘idea of an all-Ireland court’, to quote FitzGerald’s record of the meeting, because she had not discussed this with her lord chancellor, Lord Hailsham (Howe recalled that given Lord Hailsham’s family Ulster background he was a ‘constant reminder’ for Thatcher ‘of the Ulster case’).212 She did agree, however, that as long as Dublin did not push for establishment of the proposed court right away, the British and Irish attorney generals would be ‘free to pursue the matter, which in the communiqué was covered by a reference to “possible new institutional structures” and to “further improvements” ’.213 Following this meeting, the two delegations met over a working lunch between 1.10 p.m. and 2.15 p.m., followed by a plenary session from 2.30 p.m. to 4 p.m. There followed a ‘long argument’ regarding the drafting of the communiqué, specifically in relation to FitzGerald’s request that the British government support Irish unity if a ‘majority in Northern Ireland were to give their consent to it’. Thatcher rejected this wording. Instead, she conceded that if there was ‘consent’ amongst the majority living

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in Northern Ireland to ‘change’ the constitutional status in Northern Ireland, her government would ‘support legislation in the British parliament giving effect to it’.214 At the conclusion of these talks, a joint communiqué on behalf of the British and Irish governments was released to the assembled media. The communiqué recorded that the two governments had agreed to publish the reports of the Anglo-Irish joint studies (with the exception of the report on security matters), which on publication, would be presented to the British parliament.215 The communiqué next acknowledged both governments’ support for the setting up of a new AIIC, which would ‘involve regular meetings’ between the two governments at official and ministerial level ‘to discuss matters of common concern’.216 The establishment of the AIIC was a genuine triumph for FitzGerald. As Howe subsequently wrote, at the Anglo-Irish summit meeting in November 1981, FitzGerald had secured from Thatcher the establishment of the AIIC that was ‘to play a crucial part’ in the future development of relations between the two countries. ‘It was crucial’, Howe noted, ‘because of its composition: the Steering Committee – which reported directly to the two Prime Ministers – was under the joint chairmanship of the two cabinet secretaries [Armstrong and Nally].’ This arrangement, particularly on the British side, Howe explained, had the ‘advantage of ironing out, in advance, the dispute that would have otherwise been certain between the Northern Ireland and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices over which should be the lead department on this sensitive subject’.217

‘You have bowed to the bullet and the bomb’: The reaction to the Anglo-Irish summit meeting of November 1981 Yet again, in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting of November 1981, it was Dublin, not London, that seemed to have benefited most from this latest encounter. While FitzGerald basked in the glory of securing from Thatcher an agreement to publish four of the five Anglo-Irish joint studies and establish a new AIIC,218 the British prime minister had far less to be pleased with. Although in the aftermath of the meeting Thatcher made much of the fact that FitzGerald had publicly placed on record the Irish government’s acceptance of the principle of consent in relation to Northern Ireland, the die was cast. To her frustration, a cabal of disgruntled Conservative Party backbenchers and Ulster Unionists, alike, vilified Thatcher’s record on Northern Ireland following this latest Anglo-Irish summit meeting. At the heart of this latest controversy was the perceived vagueness regarding the ‘nature and powers’ of the proposed AIIC, specifically the idea of establishing a permanent secretariat.219 Anticipating a potential backlash from members of her own party and the Protestant majority of Northern Ireland, following her meeting with FitzGerald, Thatcher immediately went on the offensive, mounting an aggressive media campaign. Speaking to Brian Cowan of RTÉ’s television programme Today Tonight, on the evening of 6 November, she implored that the establishment of the AIIC was a simple devise to allow both governments to ‘achieve’ results ‘a little more quietly, but steadily’. It was ‘foolish’, she pointed out, how some people believed that ‘some magic solution will

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be brought out of the bag’ to end the conflict in Northern Ireland. ‘There is no magic solution,’ she explained, ‘there is just working at the problem, co-operation between two Heads of Government, between Ministers, between people, working at it, day by day by day, hoping for an improvement that way and that’s what we’ve been doing.’ Thatcher directed her final comments during her interview on RTÉ to those within the Conservative Party and Ulster Unionist community who might accuse her, in agreeing to establish the AIIC, of undermining Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the UK. ‘The people of Northern Ireland know full well that their position, their constitutional position is safeguarded by an Act of Parliament of 1973.’ This situation would change, she noted, only if the people of Northern Ireland voted to do otherwise (Thatcher made the same commitment during a speech to the British Parliament on 10 November 1982).220 Pressed by her interviewer on the issue of the prospect of a united Ireland in the future, Thatcher said that this was a matter for the people of Northern Ireland to decide if they want to change. ‘I have to stand absolutely and do stand absolutely by the guarantee that if they want to change, we would give effect to that change and then propose legislation to the United Kingdom Parliament and the Government would support that legislation.’221 Thatcher’s above comments, in her own words, demonstrated how she viewed the prospect of Irish unity, not so much about sovereignty, but as a matter of ‘law’. ‘I have to act in accordance with our law’, she explained. ‘No change in the status of Northern Ireland unless the majority of people wish it, if the majority of people do wish it and that opinion has been tested democratically.’ This was a significant public climb down on Thatcher’s behalf. In dramatic fashion, for the moment at least, it appeared that she had abandoned any lingering emotional ties between the British government and mainstream Unionism in Northern Ireland, based on the idea of sovereignty. Her remarks, no doubt said out of frustration, were certainly conditioned by the stalled constitutional talks between the mainstream political parties of Northern Ireland and more importantly because of continued protests amongst Ulster Unionists. Indeed, Thatcher’s interview immediately ignited a political time bomb, acting like a red rag to a bull for mainstream Ulster Unionism. During a parliamentary debate in the House of Commons, on 10 November (the day before four of the five Anglo-Irish joint studies were published), Thatcher was repeatedly taunted by a gang of rebellious UUP and DUP MPs, which included, amongst their ranks, James Molyneaux, Enoch Powell, the Rev. Paisley and Peter Robinson. James Kilfedder of the UUP summed up the mood of many Ulster Unionists considering Thatcher’s agreement to publish four of the five Anglo-Irish joint studies and establish the AIIC: [T]‌he cold reality is that the terms of the communiqué and the consequential events that will flow from it represent a significant first step by a Tory Government towards easing Northern Ireland out of the United Kingdom with the consequent betrayal of the birth right of Ulster Loyalists.222

Thatcher, however, remained defiant. ‘Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom; as much as my constituency is’, she exclaimed223 (this statement was subsequently often misquoted as: ‘Northern Ireland is as British as Finchley’).

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Tensions were further exasperated following the callous murder of the Rev. Robert Bradford by the PIRA on 14 November. A close friend of the Rev. Paisley and regarded as an ‘ultra right-winger’, the Rev. Bradford was UUP MP for Belfast South.224 Emotions were now running very high in Northern Ireland, with ‘the whole place’ being described as a ‘tinderbox’.225 At Bradford’s funeral, Jim Prior was ‘jostled by angry mourners’ and his car attacked by ‘several hundred angry unionists’. Prior recalled hearing shouting, ‘Kill him! Kill him!’226 Indeed, privately Prior later acknowledged that following Bradford’s murder he felt that Northern Ireland was ‘closer to civil war’ than had been generally recognized.227 Three days later, on 17 November, during a fiery encounter, Enoch Powell personally challenged Thatcher to reaffirm that she was a ‘Unionist’; a request that she refused to concede to.228 Powell was furious by Thatcher’s cold shoulder. In one of his many public outbursts during this period, he described Thatcher’s meeting with FitzGerald as ‘a great evil’.229 Powell’s protests did not end there. On 19 November, he wrote to Ian Gow with a further request that Thatcher publicly reaffirm that she was a committed ‘Unionist’ and that she affirms herself in favour of maintaining the union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.230 Gow, who would himself later suffer the same fate as Robert Bradford following his assassination by the PIRA in 1990, informed Thatcher that Powell and Molyneaux had come to see him to express their anxiety ‘of the growing belief among ordinary decent people living in the Province that HMG was engaged in a sell-out’.231 The petitions on behalf of the two UUP MPs did not come as a surprise to Gow. He too had privately counselled Thatcher that in his thinking ‘HMG was making too many concessions to the Irish, and receiving too little in return’.232 He was particularly anxious regarding Irish calls for the establishment of a parliamentary tier under the auspices of the AIIC; a proposal, which he described as ‘dynamite’.233 The net result of such actions, Gow forecast, would be that it ‘will increase suspicions even among moderate, reasonable Unionists who want, perfectly understandably, to remain part of the United Kingdom’.234 In fact, on four separate occasions during this period, Gow pleaded with Thatcher, as he phrased it in one letter, that it ‘would be helpful for you, as Leader of the Conservative and Unionist Party, to repeat your commitment and that of your Government to the union’.235 Gow’s mediation was an important intervention. Described by Howe as the ‘guardian’ of Thatcher’s ‘Unionist conscience’,236 she greatly valued his advice on Northern Ireland, with her personal private secretary acting as a valuable intermediary between her and Ulster Unionists during this period.237 The Rev. Paisley next stepped into the debate. Widely reported to have accused Thatcher of being a ‘liar’ and a ‘traitor’ over her recent handling of Anglo-Irish relations, he went on the political warpath.238 In a letter to Thatcher, dated 25 November, the DUP leader declared that ‘Ulster has spoken loudly and clearly. Are you going to heed the message, or do you wish Ulster people to speak even more forcibly before you will heed their heartrending cry for action against the murderers?’ He accused Thatcher, through the workings of the Anglo-Irish joint studies and the envisaged AIIC, of kick-starting a ‘gradual process of all-Ireland integration’. ‘It is quite clear’, he wrote, ‘that you have bowed to the bullet and the bomb and that your aim, along with the

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Figure  5.1  Taoiseach Charles Haughey and Thatcher at No. 10 Downing Street, 1980. © David Levenson/Stringer/Getty Images.

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Dublin Government, is now the same as that of the [P]‌IRA, namely to bring about an all-Ireland.’239 A cabal of Conservative Party backbench MPs, likewise, placed on the record their opposition to Thatcher’s recent involvement in Anglo-Irish relations. At an extraordinary meeting of the CPPNIC, on 26 November, at which Jim Prior was an invited guest, several Conservative Party MPs, including Sir John Biggs-Davison,240 Sir Hugh Fraser, George Gardiner and Ivor Stanbrook, expressed their collective annoyance regarding Thatcher’s recent discussions with FitzGerald and her subsequent comments regarding Northern Ireland’s constitutional future. Stanbrook, for instance, criticized the British government because London was ‘retreating from its commitment to the Union, and showing undue concern for the [Catholic] minority’. Although Prior tried his best to defend Thatcher’s record on political and security matters in relation to Northern Ireland and placed on record his government’s ‘aim to make the Union with Great Britain work for all the people of Northern Ireland’, his comments were met with a barrage of criticism. CPPNIC members, led by Biggs-Davison, protested that drastic security changes were required to defeat Irish Republican terrorism, including the possible reintroduction of internment; a proposal that Prior flatly rebuffed. ‘Internment’, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland explained, ‘could easily lead to the alienation of the minority since it was so difficult to avoid including a number of people who were entirely innocent.’ On the political front, several CPPNIC members argued that Northern Ireland’s integration into the remainder of the UK must be considered. Again, however, Prior rebuked this suggestion. ‘Because of Ulster’s separate political tradition and its previous experience of devolved government’, Prior was reported as saying, ‘the full political integration of Northern Ireland with Great Britain could never be the answer to the Province’s problems’.241 *** In conclusion, Prior’s private disagreements with Conservative Party backbenchers was the start of a tremulous period for the recently appointed secretary of state for Northern Ireland. As is examined in the following chapter, his well-intended, albeit unsuccessful, attempts at restoring devolved government in Northern Ireland, under the auspices of the ‘Prior Initiative’, must be seen within the prism of the British government’s recent flirtation with the Irish government. Thatcher’s decision to publish four of the five Anglo-Irish joint studies, together with her agreement to set up a new AIIC, further alienated an already sceptical Ulster Unionist community regarding London’s commitment to maintain the constitutional link between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It was the events on the remote Falkland Islands, some 8,000 miles south of the UK, that brought Thatcher’s recent romance with the Irish government to a dramatic halt. As is examined in the following chapter, Charles Haughey’s decision, in May 1982, to withdraw support for the British government’s sponsored economic and military sanctions against Argentina during the height of the Falklands War destroyed the last bond of trust between Thatcher and Haughey.

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Figure  5.2  Anti-Thatcher poster in relation to  the Irish Republican hunger-strike, 1981  © Universal History Archive/UIG/Bridgeman Images.

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Figure 5.3  British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan at No. 10 Downing Street, 9 June 1982. © Bridgeman Images.

Figure 5.4  Anti-Thatcher wall mural in West Belfast, circa 1980s. © Alain Le Garsmeur/ Bridgeman Images.

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6

The Prior Initiative, the Falklands War and Anglo-Irish relations, 1982

‘[T]‌he closest bilateral consultation’: The establishment of AIIC The first official meeting of the newly constituted AIIC convened in Dublin on 20 January 1982.1 Robert Armstrong, who was appointed British secretary of the AIIC, led the British delegation, with Robert Wade-Gery, deputy secretary of the cabinet, acting as the British secretary.2 On the Irish side, Dermot Nally, secretary to the Irish government, was appointed as Irish secretary.3 Over the preceding weeks, following the publication of the first Anglo-Irish joint study, ‘possible new institutional structures’, on 11 November 1981, British and Irish officials had worked frantically behind the scenes on devising the structure of the AIIC.4 As had been the case in relation to the Anglo-Irish joint studies, Thatcher agreed that the new AIIC was to be directed by Armstrong and the Cabinet Office and not under the supervision of Lord Carrington and the FCO. According to Wade-Gery, who initially favoured the FCO assuming responsibility for the new AIIC, Lord Carrington and his officials had expressed ‘reservations’ about taking charge of this new body.5 The British foreign secretary’s reluctance to involve himself with the AIIC apparently stemmed from his fears that he and his department would be associated with a ‘sell out’, for example, as had transpired in relation Rhodesia and thus were not prepared to play ‘a similar role in the Irish question’.6 At the first meeting of the AIIC, on 20 January 1982, a joint memorandum on the proposed modus operandi of this new body was approved.7 The ‘basic purpose’ of the AIIC, as outlined by the British side, was to ‘contribute to the achievements of peace, reconciliation and stability and to the improvement of relations between the peoples of the two countries’.8 It was agreed that the framework of the AIIC would be based on ‘the closest bilateral consultation … on matters of common interest or concern’, at (1)  official level and (2)  ministerial level. At an official level, the AIIC was to be composed of a steering committee and a coordinating committee. At the ministerial level, as the title suggests, it was envisaged that the appropriate ministers on behalf of the British and Irish governments would regularly come together to discuss issues of mutual interest.9

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On 29 January 1982, the first meeting of the AIIC at ministerial level took place in London between Jim Prior and James Dooge, Irish minister for foreign affairs.10 Between March and May 1982, a further five ministerial level meetings of the AIIC were held.11 From the outset, Prior was an enthusiastic supporter of the AIIC. Privately, he conceded that he had now arrived at the conclusion that developing closer relations between the UK and the Republic of Ireland was ‘essential to help bring peace’.12 As is analysed below, Prior’s realization that Dublin should be provided with a greater involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland must be understood within the context of the so-called ‘Prior Initiative’.

‘A framework for devolution’: The Prior Initiative The background to the Prior Initiative dates to Prior’s appointment as secretary of state for Northern Ireland in September 1981, following a cabinet reshuffle by Thatcher. His appointment was undoubtedly ‘a calculated demotion’, to quote Hugo Young.13 Indeed, according to Howe, Thatcher had sent Prior to Northern Ireland, not in the hope of kick-starting a fresh initiative for a devolved government in Northern Ireland, but ‘to get him out of the Prime Minister’s hair’.14 Feelings of personal animosity were a common feature of the Prior-Thatcher relationship during his five years in the Northern Ireland portfolio. ‘She was incredulous’, is a phrase Prior often used when describing his working relationship with Thatcher.15 Although Prior was determined to ‘succeed where others had failed’, as he later wrote, he conceded privately how unqualified he was in the new role.16 In correspondence with Lord Hailsham, a known sceptic of power-sharing, the incumbent secretary of state for Northern Ireland expressed his ‘complete state of ignorance’ regarding Northern Ireland affairs. ‘This troubled Province – full of the most warm hearted and delightful people – is truly destroying itself. I think we will have to build up some confidence to show we care, and then knock some heads together.’17 Despite his general ignorance, Prior wasted little time familiarizing himself with his new brief. From the outset, he was an ambitious and energetic minister. In his memoir, Prior recalled the dramatic impact that his new portfolio had on his day-to-day life. ‘Within moments of my appointment’, he wrote, ‘Jane [his wife] and I were surrounded by the whole panoply of security – the Special Branch detectives, the bullet-proof cars and a constant watch on our home’.18 On 13 October 1981, Prior outlined his new proposal to restore a devolved government in Northern Ireland at the annual Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool, suitably labelled, ‘The Prior Initiative’. ‘We simply have to try’, he stated, ‘to recreate political responsibility’ in Northern Ireland.19 Privately, he confessed that due to the ‘alarming deterioration’ of Northern Ireland’s economy and the ‘continued volatility of the security situation’ a new political initiative was required for the region. ‘Movement away from direct rule’, he noted, ‘is essential if we are to halt the drift to political extremism, to offer an alternative to violence as a political weapon’.20 In his thinking, as he confessed in his memoir, only a devolved government based on a power-sharing model was a realistic option. ‘Looked at realistically,’ he recalled, ‘it

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should have been clear that the one-party rule and sectarian discrimination which had persisted in Northern Ireland simply could not last.’21 Prior’s answer was in the form of so-called ‘rolling devolution’, by which powers would be devolved to Northern Ireland by agreed stages, eventually leading to a ‘form of genuinely devolved power-sharing’.22 The proposal, he acknowledged, did not ‘differ greatly’ from that of his predecessor Humphrey Atkins. The new secretary of state for Northern Ireland envisaged that the proposed assembly, eventually set up under his programme of rolling devolution, would have executive and legislative responsibility for the administration of Northern Ireland departments (e.g. commerce, finance, manpower services, agriculture, environment, health and social services and education). Law and order, however, would remain under the control of Westminster. Prior also stipulated that an essential criterion for devolution, under his plans, was that representatives of both sides of the community, Nationalists and Ulster Unionists, should agree on how executive powers should be discharged. Thus, if no less than 70 per cent of the assembly approved a report on how powers should be exercised, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland would place that report before parliament.23 One major obstacle, however, remained in Prior’s way in his plans to push forward with his ‘rolling devolution’ strategy. Almost immediately, Thatcher expressed her ‘distaste’ for this proposal.24 She worried about the impact that devolved government in Northern Ireland might have on Scotland and that talk about devolution may have revived the ‘appetite for devolution in Scotland’.25 She also held out little prospect of sufficient agreement being reached amongst the Northern Ireland political parties to secure an ‘effective devolution’.26 In his memoir, Prior recalled how Thatcher was ‘very much against the whole idea’. ‘At that stage, a little over midway in her first Parliament, there was no prospect that she would put Ireland at the top of the agenda.’27 Privately, Michael Heseltine, secretary of state for the environment, noted with frustration that a cabal of backbench Conservative Party MP ‘rebels’ shared Thatcher’s scepticism regarding the Prior Initiative and were subjecting the secretary of state for Northern Ireland to a ‘campaign of attrition’.28 Again, Ian Gow, Thatcher’s private personal secretary, led the charge against anything that seemingly resembled a return to a power-sharing model. Writing to Thatcher during this period, Gow described the proposals for a new Northern Ireland Assembly as ‘unworkable’, and ‘doomed to failure’. The ‘whole initiative’, he professed, was bound to ‘collapse’.29 ‘To seek to combine Republicans and Unionists in the same power-sharing Executive is as absurd as asking [Phillippe] Petain and [Charles] De Gaulle to sit in the same Cabinet in 1940’, he protested.30 Instead, he tried to redirect Thatcher back to the late Airey Neave’s proposal to establish one or more Regional Councils in Northern Ireland. Indeed, Gow was left to exclaim to Thatcher that as far as he could work out, with perhaps the exception of Whitelaw, most government ministers on the whole were ‘disinterested’ in Northern Ireland, with the result that out of sheer apathy they would ‘back’ Prior’s proposals without giving the subject due consideration.31 Gow also drew Thatcher’s attention to the growing sense of unease amongst Conservative Party backbench MPs regarding Prior’s latest political initiative for Northern Ireland. A vocal minority of backbench Conservative Party MPs, in Gow’s words, believed that ‘these proposals … are likely to give encouragement to the

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Provisional IRA and cause dismay to decent Unionists’.32 At a meeting of the CPPNIC, on 21 January 1982, several Conservative Party MPs, including Sir John BiggsDavison,33 Harold Julian Amery (baron of Amery of Lustleigh)34 and George (Barry) Barrington Porter,35 attacked Prior’s plans to introduce rolling devolution in Northern Ireland.36 Amery, a known supporter of Northern Ireland’s integration into the remainder of the UK, led the charges against Prior’s proposal. Addressing his fellow CPPNIC members, on 21 January 1982, he protested that the plan for rolling devolution was a ‘great mistake’. He ‘wished to give notice in private (in accordance with the traditions of the Conservative Party) that he would strongly oppose any attempt to impose devolution on Northern Ireland’. Instead, echoing Gow’s comments above, he advised that the government ‘proceed along the course outlined for it by Airey Neave (i.e. the Regional Council model)’. His remarks were greeted by the sound of applause from his fellow CPPNIC members. Porter next interjected. A staunch supporter of Ulster Unionism and a vocal critic of Irish Republican terrorism, less than one year earlier, in April 1981, he had received a PIRA letter bomb and had been lucky to have escaped unharmed. He ‘agreed’, he noted, ‘with every word’ that Amery had said. ‘It would be a “gross error to impose devolution”.’37 The following week, on 28 January, Prior attended a meeting of the CPPNIC to address Conservative Party backbenchers’ increasing anxiety regarding the British government’s Northern Ireland policy. Prior was unapologetic for his policy decisions to date. ‘Political advance for Northern Ireland’, he said, was a ‘vital prerequisite for improved security’. He, therefore, felt strongly that ‘advance should be in the direction of devolution’. Dismissing the concept of integration, he noted that the ‘local parties’ in Northern Ireland had ‘revealed a complete lack of interest in integration’. Inaction in the political realm, he said, only encouraged the ‘growth of extremism’. ‘Every day, [the Rev.] Paisley outdistances’ the UUP, and ‘Sinn Féin outdistances the SDLP’. ‘For the Conservative Party in particular, the sight of the UUP in serious decline is not a happy prospect’, he implored. ‘If we do not move’ towards devolution, ‘violence and the financial burden on Great Britain will increase’.38 Indeed, during this period Prior was to repeatedly return to this argument in his public speeches and addresses to the British parliament.39 Prior’s petition, however, fell on deaf ears. Again, Amery led the charge against the secretary of state for Northern Ireland. Addressing a gathering of the Conservative Party’s constitutional committee, on 3 March 1982, Amery attacked Prior’s plans for ‘rolling devolution’ for Northern Ireland, describing this policy as a retreat to Britain’s colonial past.40 Indeed, despite Prior’s best efforts to mobilize support for his proposals, by the beginning of April his plans were in disarray. By now, he had completed his talks with the political parties in Northern Ireland and the signs did not look healthy. The UUP was reported as expressing ‘a firm objection to Mr Prior’s proposals’.41 Although the UUP leadership believed it was essential to ‘get Stormont back in order’ so as to ‘bring security under firm unionist control’, to quote James Molyneaux, the party point blankly refused to sign up to a power-sharing assembly (although the UUP did say it was willing to take part in any anticipated elections to a new Northern Ireland Assembly).42

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Molyneaux was particularly dismissive of Prior’s calls for a weighted majority of 70 per cent, which the UUP leader said would effectively provide a ‘veto to a minority party which could be on either side of the unionist/republican divide’.43 A UUC delegation, led by Molyneaux, made this point abundantly clear during a meeting with Prior, on 8 March 1982. The proposed veto ‘was totally unacceptable’ to the UUP, Prior was directly informed.44 Fellow UUP MP Enoch Powell, a vocal critic of devolution and the AIIC, routinely placed on the public record his opposition to the Prior Initiative. In his mind, plans for ‘rolling devolution’ were simply laying the groundwork for British disengagement from Northern Ireland and eventual Irish unity. ‘The Union, the whole Union and nothing but the Union’ was a phrase regularly preached by the UUP MP for South Down.45 The DUP, for its part, while willing to take part in elections, likewise, ‘condemn[ed] the principle of power-sharing’.46 Like the UUP, the Rev. Ian Paisley made it clear that ‘he did not like the seventy per cent weighted majority’.47 Although Prior still held out hope that the SDLP ‘might accept’ his proposals, he was to be bitterly disappointed.48 While the SDLP was willing to participate in elections to the new assembly, John Hume and other senior figures within the organization were convinced that Prior’s plans were ‘unworkable and deficient’. At the heart of their protests lay their opposition to Prior’s proposal for a Northern Ireland Assembly based on a weighted majority of 70 per cent.49 As Seán Farren explained, the SDLP believed that Prior’s proposals ‘contained no certainty of power-sharing’, because fact that the ‘proposed requirement of a 70 per cent threshold in an Assembly vote before devolution could be achieved effectively gave a veto to anti-power-sharing Unionists’.50 As is examined below, a further fly in the ointment regarding the SDLP’s refusal to sign up to the Prior Initiative was the British government’s refusal to permit a so-called ‘Irish dimension’ in determining Northern Ireland’s political future.

‘The Irish dimension’: Haughey, the SDLP and Anglo-Irish relations The downfall in the Republic of Ireland of the Fine Gael-Labour Party government in January 1982 was viewed as a political ‘disaster’ in London.51 The result brought Charles Haughey and Fianna Fáil back to power, following several months on the opposition benches. Within weeks of entering government, Haughey made it ‘abundantly clear’ that he did not intend to continue his predecessor Garret FitzGerald’s support for the Prior Initiative.52 In his memoir, Prior recounted with frustration that with ‘Charlie [now] prime minister in the South … He made it absolutely plain that he wanted to have nothing to do with my proposals.’53 Instead, Haughey turned his attention to securing agreement from Thatcher for the establishment of a parliamentary tier under the auspices of the AIIC, which he advocated would ‘include Northern Ireland Assembly members’.54 Not for the first or last time, the British government doggedly rejected this request on behalf of Dublin. In the words of Armstrong, just as Thatcher had rejected this proposal at the Anglo-Irish summit meeting with Garret FitzGerald, in November of the previous year, ‘there could be no question of the affairs’ of the AIIC ‘being subject

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to any sort of control or supervision by the parliamentary tier’.55 Haughey, however, was not one to give up lightly and over the coming months repeatedly badgered London to agree to his parliamentary-tier proposal. Ever the political opportunist, Haughey sought to turn London’s refusal to permit Dublin a role in the affairs of Northern Ireland to his advantage. During a meeting between Haughey and the SDLP leadership, led by Hume and his deputy leader, Seamus Mallon, on 22 March, an agreement was reached by both sides that Prior’s proposals for a power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland ‘were unworkable’. They thus agreed that ‘another failed initiative in Northern Ireland could only lead to further frustration there and lessen the prospects from progress by democratic political means’.56 In the aftermath of this meeting, a joint statement was issued on behalf of the Irish government and the SDLP. The statement publicly recorded both sides’ opposition to the Prior Initiative and called on London to concede to their demands for the inclusion of an ‘Irish dimension’ in any future plans regarding Northern Ireland’s constitutional future.57 Once again, however, the suggestion that an Irish dimension be included in the British government’s future constitutional plans for Northern Ireland was immediately ruled out by London. Prior described this proposal as ‘totally unacceptable’:58 a stance that won the wholehearted support of the FCO.59 Leonard Figg, the British ambassador in Dublin, was equally dismissive of the Irish government/SDLP proposal. During a meeting with Seán Donlon, the secretary of the DFA, Figg said that he felt increasingly ‘gloomy about the way things were going’ in relation to Anglo-Irish affairs. Rejecting Irish demands for the establishment of a parliamentary tier, the British Ambassador in Dublin said that the British government envisaged that the current makeup of the AIIC would provide ‘a framework for intergovernmental exchanges of views in a private way and that we could get away from the dangerous method of policy making through press conferences and public speeches’.60 Thatcher, likewise, dismissed this latest proposal on behalf of the Irish government and SDLP. She remained wary of any proposal that may have been construed (particularly by Ulster Unionists) as evidence of her willingness to dilute the British government’s constitutional guarantee that Northern Ireland would remain an integral part of the UK. She made her feelings known during a meeting with Haughey on the margins of a meeting of the European Community, at the Charlemagne Building, in Brussels, on 30 March 1982 (the three-year anniversary of Airey Neave’s murder by the INLA and five days after the PIRA killed three British soldiers during a gun attack in West Belfast, on 25th of that month). The meeting was courteous but formal. Following a general discussion on the Irish economy, Haughey asked Thatcher whether it would be possible to convene an Anglo-Irish summit meeting in the context of the recent work undertaken by the AIIC. To Haughey’s frustration, Thatcher not only refused to be drawn on the Irish government’s calls for an ‘Irish dimension’, but dismissed the offer of convening an Anglo-Irish summit meeting in the near future. An early meeting, she said, ‘would be difficult’, informing Haughey that she was currently too busy. Regarding the Prior Initiative, Haughey asked whether Thatcher felt ‘optimistic?’. She said that the proposal had not yet been discussed by her cabinet (this was due to take place the following

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Thursday). ‘No proposals’, she said ‘were trouble-free.’61 The British prime minister then abruptly ended the meeting. This brief encounter symbolized just how stale the Haughey-Thatcher relationship had become. ‘Thatcher simply did not trust Haughey and found it difficult to be in his company.’62

‘Northern Ireland: a framework for devolution’: Conservative Party opposition to the Prior Initiative On 1 April 1982, two days after Thatcher’s brief meeting with Haughey and the day before Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, the British cabinet met to discuss Prior’s White Paper on Northern Ireland entitled ‘Northern Ireland: a framework for devolution’. Addressing his ministerial colleagues, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland said that in his judgement there was ‘now an opportunity for breaking the political deadlock’ in Northern Ireland. ‘To do nothing’, he counselled, ‘was no longer a policy which could be sustained.’ For this reason, he asked his ministerial colleagues to support his White Paper. His proposal was essentially aimed at getting a Northern Ireland Assembly up and running, with executive functions. The powers, he said, would not be transferred ‘all at once’. ‘The process could roll forward or roll back.’63 In his memoir, Prior was less than liberal with the truth when he wrote that his ministerial colleagues did not enthusiastically welcome his White Paper. In fact, sharp differences surfaced amongst ministers regarding Prior’s White Paper and more generally the British government’s Northern Ireland policy. While Atkins, Leon Brittan,64 Lord Carrington, Keith Joseph, Nigel Lawson, Cecil Parkinson65 and Whitelaw reportedly supported Prior’s White Paper,66 ten ministers were known to be ‘against’ the proposed legislation. These on the opposition ranks included Francis Pym and Lord Hailsham.67 According to Prior, Thatcher, herself, was also ‘very much against the whole idea’.68 Significantly, however, under pressure to take a new political initiative for Northern Ireland, Thatcher reluctantly decided to support Prior’s White Paper, instructing her cabinet colleagues to row behind the secretary of state for Northern Ireland.69 In her thinking, it was better to do something than to do nothing. As the minutes phrased it, Prior’s cabinet colleagues ‘were in no position to “second guess” his assessment of the political situation and needs for the Province; if his considered judgement was that his proposal met a political need and had a chance of success, they should be supported, even if their success was by no means certain’.70 The decision on behalf of Thatcher’s government to support Prior’s Northern Ireland White Paper led to the resignation of at least two middle-ranking Conservative Party MPs and the threatened resignation of several more elected representatives within the Conservative Party. Several of the Conservative Party elite could simply not swallow the inclusion in the proposed Bill, under the heading ‘Bilateral Arrangements’, of an option providing the Irish government with a role in the affairs of Northern Ireland, via the AIIC.71 Gow described the proposal as ‘dynamite’.72

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In a handwritten note to Thatcher, dated 2 April 1982, Gow warned his prime minister that Prior’s White Paper had ‘created grave disquiet among our Backbenchers’.73 ‘A significant number of our backbenchers, including the writer of this note’, Gow emphasized, ‘believe that these proposals go in precisely the opposite direction to the one which Airey would have followed.’ Indeed, Gow was left to exclaim with a sense of disbelief that these proposals ‘are unworkable … the whole initiative will collapse’.74 Although he did not follow through on his threatened resignation from government, others did. CPPNIC member Nicholas (Nick) Budgen (Budgie to his friends),75 and cousin to Gow, was the first to quit, resigning as an assistant Conservative Party whip. Robert Cecil Cranborne, Viscount (7th Marquess of Salisbury)76 soon followed, resigning as private personal secretary to Douglas Hurd, minister for Europe, 1979– 83.77 Prior never forgave Gow for his actions during this period, describing the latter’s efforts to undermine the proposed Northern Ireland Bill as ‘disgraceful’.78 A cabal of backbench Conservative Party MPs sympathetic to Ulster Unionism, likewise, expressed their disapproval on learning of the contents of Prior’s proposed White Paper on Northern Ireland. They were provided with a platform to vent their opposition at a meeting of the CPPNIC, on the evening of 1 April (the same day the British cabinet debated the contents of Prior’s White Paper on Northern Ireland). This was a very busy period for the CPPNIC, with the body convening on, at least, seven occasions between 21 January and 1 April 1982.79 Addressing those in attendance, Amery described the White Paper as ‘totally unacceptable’, as ‘politically and constitutionally damaging’.80 As he previously noted in private, devolution in Northern Ireland would lead to a ‘violent diatribes’.81 Porter next intervened. He said that the White Paper was ‘doomed to failure’. Sir Philip Goodhart, who until recently had held the post as parliamentary under-secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1979–81, was equally forthright. The Prior Initiative, he exclaimed, would not lead ‘to political progress but to political uncertainty’.82 Despite continued protests from Conservative Party circles (including a last-minute personal intervention from Whitelaw),83 Ulster Unionists and Dublin, Thatcher felt she had little choice but to support Prior’s Northern Ireland White Paper. Consequently, on 5 April 1982, as tensions mounted regarding the Falklands crisis, the British government published its White Paper, ‘Northern Ireland: a framework for devolution’, setting out the criteria for the establishment of a devolved government for Northern Ireland, based on a so-called plan of ‘partial or rolling devolution’.84 Soon afterwards, Prior announced that elections to the proposed new Northern Ireland Assembly would take place on 20 October 1982. The election would be held for seventy-eight seats and would be based on proportional representation, in line with the twelve existing Westminster constituencies. At first, the Northern Ireland Assembly’s role would only be to scrutinize government departments. Accordingly, the White Paper stated that the role of the Northern Ireland Assembly would be ‘consultative and deliberative, including scrutiny of draft legislation and making reports and recommendations to the Secretary of State which he will lay before Parliament’.85 However, the outbreak of the Falklands War ensured for the meantime, at least, that any future plans for ‘rolling devolution’ in Northern Ireland was demoted to the

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political doldrums within British government circles. As is discussed below, during the height of the Falklands’ crisis the focus shifted away from the Belfast-London axis to Thatcher’s relationship with Dublin. It was Haughey’s mishandling of this relationship that would have immediate and long-lasting implications for Anglo-Irish relations. As Thatcher recalled in The Downing Street years, Haughey’s refusal to support continued economic and military sanctions against Argentina ensured that Anglo-Irish relations ‘cooled to freezing’.86

Haughey’s decision ‘drove Maggie mad!’: The Falklands War and the deterioration of Anglo-Irish relations This sharp deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations during 1982 can be traced to the remote Falkland Islands some 300 miles off the Argentina coast and approximately 8,000 miles south of the UK.87 An archipelago of an estimated 200 islands scattered in the South Atlantic, ownership of the Falkland Islands was bitterly disputed between Argentina and Great Britain. At the time, approximately 1,900 people lived on the Falkland Islands. Many of these inhabitants firmly opposed integration with Argentina and wanted to remain a British dependency. However, in Argentina the repressive military junta dictatorship under General Leopoldo Galtieri claimed Argentinian ownership of the islands. Argentinian-British relations reached a crisis point on 2 April 1982, following the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentinian forces.88 On receiving news of this act of aggression on behalf of the Galtieri military junta, Thatcher was reportedly shocked and furious.89 Indeed, Howe, Thatcher’s chancellor of the exchequer, gloomily recalled the British cabinets’ collective ‘shocked disbelief ’ on receiving news of the invasion.90 Writing in his diary, Alan Clark noted how despondent he felt: ‘Humiliation, for sure, and, not impossible, military defeat’.91 Thatcher was, likewise, fearful of a possible military defeat at the hands of Galtieri’s forces. Her immediate response, therefore, was to retaliate with military action. On the day of the Argentinian invasion, 2 April, the British cabinet convened on two occasions, the first meeting was held in the morning, shortly after 9.30 a.m., while the second coming together of ministers was held later that evening, once it was confirmed that the invasion was underway. At this second meeting, following consultation with her assembled ministers, Thatcher sanctioned the sending of a British Task Force to protect the Falkland Islands.92 To her surprise, not to mention frustration, she learned that, while it would take three days to assemble the Task Force, it would take a further three weeks for the Task Force to reach the Falkland Islands.93 The bulk of her frustration, however, was aimed at the FCO, together with the British Security Services. She could simply not fathom why they had been unable to predict an Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands.94 Richard Luce,95 minister of state in the FCO, put it mildly when he later wrote in his memoir that ‘[i]‌t was a very bad day for the Foreign Office’.96 In fact, the Argentinian invasion was one of the darkest episodes in the history of the FCO.

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Given the length of time it would take for the Task Force to reach the Falkland Islands, British policy, for the meantime at least, turned away from the military sphere to the diplomatic arena, the United Nations (UN) to be precise. Personally, throughout this period, Thatcher’s priority always remained focused on military strategy; diplomatic considerations remained a distant second.97 She immediately went on a diplomatic offensive. A message, under her name, was issued to heads of governments abroad seeking their ‘support in giving the strongest and earliest possible condemnation to actions which are destructive of the principles of self-determination and the rejection of coercion as an instrument of policy’.98 Throughout the Falklands War, Anthony Parsons, British permanent representative at the UN, played an integral role in securing UN support for condemnation of Argentinian use of force. On Saturday, 3 April, following a request by Parsons on behalf of the British government, a hastily arranged emergency meeting of the UN Security Council was held. Following intense diplomatic efforts, including several telephone conversations between Thatcher and French president François Mitterrand and King Hussein of Jordan, respectively,99 the British managed to secure the safe passage of ‘Resolution 502’ through the UN Security Council. This resolution called for (1) an immediate cessation of hostilities, (2) an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands and lastly, (3) the commencement of negotiations.100 It was on the morning of 3 April that the Irish government became directly involved with the unfolding events on the Falkland Islands.101 During this crisis, apart from the leading role played by Haughey personally in Dublin, Irish government policy was also directed by Ireland’s representative at the UN Noel Dorr in New York (Dorr dealt with the question of resolutions), and by an Irish delegation led by Irish minister for foreign affairs Gerald Collins from the EEC headquarters in Brussels (Collins and his delegation dealt with sanctions). Following discussions between Haughey and his senior DFA officials, Dorr was instructed to support the British sponsored ‘Resolution 502’, which was to be formally proposed later that evening.102 Coincidently, at this time, Ireland was a member of the UN Security Council, having taken up its membership on 1 January 1981. As requested by Haughey, at the UN Security Council meeting on 3 April, Dorr cast Ireland’s vote in favour of ‘Resolution 502’.103 The British government secured the necessary ten votes to ensure that ‘Resolution 502’ was adopted, while at the same time avoiding a veto from both China and the Soviet Union. The Irish government’s willingness to support the UK’s stance over the Falklands War was warmly welcomed by London. On 5 April, the same day of Lord Carrington’s resignation from the British cabinet following the FCO’s shambolic handling of the Falklands crisis, the British Embassy in Dublin passed on London’s gratitude for Irish ‘support’. David Tatham noted that the ‘adoption of the resolution was a considerable achievement’.104 Spurred on by Haughey’s support for ‘Resolution 502’ the following day, on 6 April, the British Embassy in Dublin once again contacted the Irish government with the request that Dublin back a further British proposal to apply a ‘full-range of import restrictions on Argentina’.105 Also that day, Thatcher contacted Haughey to express her thanks for Dublin’s support and to request ‘his personal help’ and additional support for the British government’s

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calls for the imposition of economic and financial sanctions by the EEC against Argentina. The British prime minister said, ‘[I am] seeking your urgent help in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina to withdraw from the Falkland Islands.’ ‘Argentina’, she explained, ‘has made clear it will defy the UN Security Council Resolution adopted on 3 April, calling for its immediate withdrawal … This is unacceptable’, she declared.106 Later that day, 6 April, the Irish government held a cabinet meeting to consider Thatcher’s request to support the British government’s calls for further economic sanctions against Argentina. No formal decision was taken at this meeting.107 In fact, Dublin waited a further four days, until 10 April, before agreeing to support the implementation of economic sanctions against Argentina. The Irish cabinet agreed that these measures were to remain in force until 17 May, when they could be renewed.108 Thereafter, to quote a secret Irish governmental memorandum, a ‘period of relative lull began’ in which the focus of attention turned towards the UN’s efforts to achieve a political solution to the crisis.109 It was events on the ground in the Falkland Islands that brought relations between Great Britain and Ireland to their lowest ebb since the Second World War (notwithstanding the political fallout following the events of Bloody Sunday in January 1972). On 25 April, the British attacked the Argentinian submarine Santa Fe (S-21), which was soon followed by a series of air raids on Port Stanley during the first days of May. In response to the ‘rapid deterioration’ of the Falklands crisis, the Irish cabinet convened on Sunday, 2 May.110 Following this meeting, a government statement was issued expressing concern at the escalating military situation. Significantly, the statement also reiterated ‘Ireland’s “traditional policy of neutrality” in military conflicts’.111 Such a reference to Ireland’s ‘traditional policy of neutrality’ was to herald a significant shift in Irish government’s policy vis-à-vis the Falklands dispute. Later that same evening, at approximately 8  p.m. British time, the single most controversial military action of the Falklands War occurred when the Argentine cruiser Belgrano was sunk by a British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror, some 200 miles outside the so-called exclusion zone, surrounding the Falkland Islands. The Conqueror had fired without warning on receiving orders from Thatcher’s war cabinet in London.112 Approximately 200 of the 1,000 crew were killed immediately; the final death toll was 368 Argentine sailors killed Memorably, ‘Gotcha’ was the phrase plastered on the front page of The Sun newspaper in the aftermath of this controversial attack.113 Argentine forces wasted little time in enacting their revenge. Shortly after lunch, on Tuesday, 4 May, the British destroyer HMS Sheffield was attacked and hit by a missile launched by an Argentinian aircraft, with the loss of thirty crew members. Thatcher took the news of this act of aggression ‘very hard’, sitting in her Commons Room in a flood of tears.114 This attack by the Argentine forces on one of Great Britain’s most modern battleships had an immense impact on the psyche of the British people. Images of the attack were broadcast that evening on mainstream British television. The net result was that many British people realized that ‘the Task Force could be defeated at a huge cost in lives and material’.115 In response to these escalating events, the Irish cabinet hurriedly convened once again on the afternoon of 4 May. Ministers agreed that Ireland would immediately take

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up a neutral stance on the Falklands issue and seek the withdrawal of EEC sanctions against Argentina. This decision, as Laurence Freedman noted, ‘marked a decisive shift’ in Irish government policy.116 Indeed, in the words of Trevor Salmon, Dublin’s decision was the ‘most distinctive Irish action’ during the Falklands crisis.117 Following the cabinet meeting, under Haughey’s express orders, a press statement was issued relaying the government’s new policy and also demanding that a meeting of the UN Security Council should be convened to put forward a new resolution demanding the cessation of hostilities between Argentina and Britain. Significantly, no mention was made to Resolution 502.118 Addressing Dáil Éireann later that evening, Haughey outlined the Irish government’s policy in relation to the Falklands War. ‘The Irish Government’, he explained, ‘regard the application of economic sanctions as no longer appropriate and will therefore be seeking the withdrawal of these sanctions by the Community.’ Accordingly, he noted that the Irish government sought an immediate meeting of the UN Security Council in order to prepare a new resolution calling for the following:  ‘(1) An immediate cessation of hostilities by both British and Argentinian forces; and (2) The negotiation of a diplomatic settlement under the auspices of the UN.’119 Laurence Freedman’s remarks that Haughey’s antics by this juncture were ‘consistently exasperating London’ was a marked understatement.120 Dorr immediately realized that the government’s volte face would go down like a ton of bricks in London.121 Dorr’s prediction proved correct. Thatcher was infuriated on reading the contents of Haughey’s speech. As Walter Kirwan recalled, Haughey’s decision ‘drove Maggie mad!’122 According to one British official, Haughey’s behaviour had shown ‘breath-taking irresponsibility’.123 Figg described the decision as ‘irritating and unhelpful’.124 Armstrong later recounted that Haughey’s decision to no longer support sanctions against Argentina was the last straw for the Haughey-Thatcher relationship. Thereafter, the British cabinet secretary noted, Thatcher realized that Haughey ‘was not to be trusted’,125 that the taoiseach’s actions had been both ‘extreme and unnecessary’.126 On 6 May, Figg requested a meeting with Haughey to convey the British government’s ‘dismay’ regarding the taoiseach’s decision to no longer support sanctions against Argentina. At this frosty encounter, Haughey said that he resented the perception nurtured by London that the ‘people in Britain thought that he was not a nice man and he was not liked’. He had a feeling, he informed Figg, that ‘many in Britain treated the Irish with derision or contempt’. Figg said that he thought it a ‘pity’ that recent events had soured relations between Great Britain and Ireland, which he described as ‘pretty ragged’. In relation to EEC sanctions, Haughey informed the British ambassador to Ireland that his government did not support the British stance that sanctions were ‘complementary to military action’ in relation to the Falklands crisis. Haughey once again used Ireland’s traditional policy of neutrality as an explanation for why Dublin found it ‘difficult for us to continue to uphold sanctions’ against Argentina.127 On 7 May, the Irish government issued a further public statement again calling for the withdrawal of economic sanctions against Argentina.128 Haughey dealt with these developments during a speech to Dáil Éireann on 11 May. The Irish government, he explained, had decided to reassert ‘our traditional policy of neutrality’. ‘The people of this country are deeply attached to our neutrality,’ he professed, ‘and they are not

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prepared to see it eroded. Both in principle and in practice we have now made it clear that we will not permit that to happen.’129 Haughey’s using of the ‘neutrality card’ as a reason for no longer supporting the British government vis-á-vis the Falklands dispute was sceptically received by London.130 Rather, in British thinking, as outlined by Figg, Haughey had evoked Ireland’s traditional stance on neutrality ‘as a cloak for an anti-British attitude’ both for home and international consumption, that the taoiseach was using the crisis to help promote his image as an Irish Republican par excellence.131 Figg neatly summed up London’s attitude towards Haughey in a private note. ‘It is not so much his [Haughey’s] Republican past (real or imaged) from which we have suffered, but his ruthless opportunism and his unprincipled use of any gambit which he thinks will advance his personal career.’132 Haughey certainly also viewed the unfolding events on the Falkland Islands as an ideal opportunity ‘to get his own back’ on Thatcher.133 As examined in the previous chapter, Thatcher’s categorical refusal to permit Haughey a mediatory role in helping to conclude the second Irish Republican hunger-strikers’ campaign deeply offended him. He, therefore, saw the Falklands crisis as an opportunity to undermine the British prime minister’s political credibility on the international stage and at the same time rekindle his image as a firebrand Irish nationalist in the eyes of his supporters within the Fianna Fáil Party and the wider electorate in the Republic of Ireland. The decision of the Irish government to call for an end to sanctions on 4 May and ultimately to withdraw from sanctions on 17 May caused the growth of widespread anti-Irish feeling in the UK, facilitated by several newspaper editorials. The Sun, for instance, campaigned for its readers to boycott Irish butter.134 According to Mike Molloy, editor of the Daily Mirror, because of the Irish government’s stance over the Falklands crisis, Dublin was distrusted ‘greater than at any time since the Second World War’. Personally, Molloy felt that the number of Irish jokes was on the rise and that this was an indication that ‘anti-Irish feeling’ was on the increase in Great Britain.135 Moreover, a number of Irish companies said that they found it extremely difficult to obtain or renew ‘contracts in the UK’.136 Eventually, in mid-June 1982, the Falklands War ended following seventy-four days of conflict. British victories at Goose Green (27–28 May) and ultimately Port Stanley (11–13 June) culminated with the Argentinian forces surrendering on 14 June. A proBritish editorial in the Jornal do Brasil, entitled ‘futile sacrifice’, encapsulated the mood amongst Thatcher’s supporters at home and abroad on receiving news of Argentina’s crushing military defeat. ‘The guns fall silent in Port Stanley.’ The British were ‘prudent in launching combat, allowing time for all efforts at negotiation; it continued to be prudent when the war was already inevitable, in order to avoid excessive sacrifice …; and it was prudent even up to the final assault’.137 Thatcher and her ministerial colleagues basked in the glory of victory. At a meeting of the British cabinet, on 15 June, on the morning after Argentina’s surrender, a sense of excitement was in the air. Thatcher announced that the previous day, at 9.00 p.m., local time, on 14 June, the British Land Force commander Major General Jeremy Moore ‘accepted from the Argentine Commander in the Falkland Islands, General Menendez, the surrender of all the Argentine armed forces in East and West Falkland Islands’.

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Addressing his ministerial colleagues, Lord Hailsham said that he was sure he was speaking for every member of the cabinet in offering congratulations to Thatcher ‘on the courage and clarity of purpose which she had displayed throughout the crisis’. ‘The successful repossession of the Falkland Islands reflected new lustre on British arms and engendered a renewed sense of self-confidence in the British people’, he declared.138 But it was a victory tainted by the loss of so many young souls, on both sides. In total, 649 Argentine military personnel, 255 British military personnel and three Falkland Islanders died during the conflict. Echoing Lord Hailsham’s words above, in her memoir Thatcher recalled that victory over Argentina had an ‘enormous’ impact on Great Britain’s ‘self-confidence and for our standing in the world’.139 Great Britain’s defeat of Argentina also represented a victory for Thatcher, personally. She had taken a massive gamble, but in the end, it paid off. As Simon Jenkins wrote, Thatcher ‘believed that only total victory would save her reputation, and no compromise that rewarded aggression could be tolerated’.140 Before the Falklands War, the ‘Wets’ within the Conservative Party were openly conspiring against Thatcher, taking bets on when she would be overthrown as party leader. The Trade Unions had not been confronted and there had been little attempt at privatization. Thatcherism was, as yet, unknown.141 Thatcher’s Falklands victory changed everything. In the words of Moore, the Falklands War established ‘Mrs Thatcher’s personal mastery of the political scene’.142 Alfred Sherman, a close advisor and confidant to Thatcher, put it most accurately when he explained that ‘one of the most important spin-offs’ of the Falklands War was that Thatcher had ‘proved her strength as a political leader. One of the key elements is credibility:  she’s got it. Let’s use it.’143 Indeed, Thatcher’s popularity soared in the aftermath of the conflict. She went from being one of the most unpopular British prime ministers of modern times to securing a landslide victory at the British general election in 1983. Thereafter, Thatcher became a massive celebrity throughout the world, from the United States to the USSR.

‘[A]‌stab in the back’: Anglo-Irish relations in the aftermath of the Falklands War On the subject of Northern Ireland and more general Anglo-Irish relations, in the aftermath of the Falklands War, Thatcher followed a pragmatic line. Despite feelings of deep personal animosity towards Haughey, she still hoped to entice the taoiseach to improve cross-border security in return for continuing the dialogue between Dublin and London, under the auspices of the AIIC. Thatcher also had the common sense to acknowledge that the support of Dublin was required to entice the SDLP to sign up to Prior’s plans for a devolved government in Northern Ireland. In the immediate aftermath of the Falklands War, Haughey went on a diplomatic offensive to cast-off accusations that relations between Dublin and London had been seriously damaged. On his return from an EEC summit meeting in late June, he claimed that there was ‘absolutely no question’ of a worsening of relations between himself

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and Thatcher. Not for the first time during this period, Haughey was less than liberal with the truth. Not only had Thatcher refused to meet Haughey during the margins of the mentioned EEC summit meeting, but the newspapers were packed full of stories reporting Thatcher’s fury towards Haughey.144 The Daily Mail, for example, carried a piece entitled, ‘Maggie’s fury: Icy snub for Haughey over Falklands “betrayal” ’.145 Haughey’s continued denials that British-Irish relations had not deteriorated over the course of the previous three months were greeted with consternation by the British government. In truth, Haughey’s antics over the Falklands War, to quote Figg, meant that Anglo-Irish relations were ‘likely to remain suspicious for some time’.146 Alan Goodison of the FCO noted that ‘Irish activity at the UN would regrettably have a cost in terms of Anglo-Irish relations’.147 Figg, who cut a depressing figure during this period, warned that ‘Irish behaviour over the Falklands crisis has gratuitously damaged our relations and British attitudes towards the Republic [of Ireland]’.148 Howe, some years later, described Haughey’s handling of the Falklands dispute as ‘foolish’, which only helped to renew the ‘coolness’ in the Haughey-Thatcher relationship.149 Despite Haughey’s attempts at window dressing, by July 1982, the relations between Dublin and London reached a new low. On 20th of that month, the PIRA perpetrated two horrific terrorist attacks in London. The Hyde Park and Regent’s Park bombings were the deadliest PIRA acts carried out in mainland Great Britain since the Birmingham bombings in 1974. Eleven members of the British Armed Forces were murdered, while more than forty people were injured. Thatcher, who was chairing a meeting of the ‘E’ Committee in the Cabinet Room when one of the bombs exploded, subsequently recalled with horror the terrible ‘carnage’ that the PIRA attacks inflicted on its victims.150 On the day of two PIRA bombings, Eamon Kennedy sent a gloomy analysis of the state of Anglo-Irish relations. Like Thatcher, Kennedy wrote of the ‘carnage’ in London and an increasing sense of ‘anti-Irish feeling’ among the general population. He said that the bombings could hardly come at a worse time for relations between Belfast, Dublin and London. The PIRA attacks, together with the ‘Falklands Factor’, as Kennedy phrased it, were likely to witness a further deterioration in Anglo-Irish relations. Ireland’s stance on the Falklands dispute, Kennedy wrote, was ‘still thought of here as a stab in the back’ for the British government.151 Fortunately for Haughey, the recent series of private and public spats between the British and Irish governments did not spell the end of intergovernmental relations between the two countries. As Thatcher looked forward to the summer parliamentary recess, her mind focused on trying to repair some of the broken fences with Haughey. Her motivations were entirely pragmatic. Personally, she continued to mistrust Haughey. However, despite her personal reservations regarding Anglo-Irish relations, she realized that she must keep the Irish government on side. Two important factors explain Thatcher’s thinking. First, although Haughey’s recent escapades had tarnished Anglo-Irish relations, the British prime minister was still required to cooperate closely with the Dublin government in relation to cross-border security. Second, Thatcher also hoped – with little chance of success – that Haughey could induce the SDLP to take part in Prior’s Initiative to establish a devolved government in Northern Ireland.

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Following the summer recess, the British government’s Northern Ireland policy reverted firmly behind Prior’s plans to roll out devolution in Northern Ireland. On 20 October 1982, following prolonged bickering among the political parties of Northern Ireland and the British government, elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly were eventually held (the previous day, 19 October, the INLA carried out a bomb attack on the headquarters of the UUP in Belfast city centre, causing extensive damage to the building). Having abandoned its abstentionist policy in relation to contesting elections, Sinn Féin secured an impressive 35 per cent of the Nationalist vote (10 per cent overall), equating to five seats. The SDLP secured a disappointing fourteen seats. The UUP won twenty-six seats. The DUP secured twenty-one seats and the Alliance Party ten seats. Despite the clear differences which remained amongst the Northern Ireland political parties, Prior pleaded with them to ‘come together to make the Northern Ireland Assembly a functional entity. If political stability could be achieved’, he noted, this would play an important role in helping to deal with ‘Ireland’s security problems’. ‘The two must go hand in hand’, he implored.152 To the disappointment of the secretary of state for Northern Ireland, however, plans for the rolling out of a devolved government in Northern Ireland were doomed to failure. While officially the Northern Ireland Assembly lasted from its opening on 11 November 1982 until it was dissolved in June 1986, it was ineffectual from the start. The harsh reality was that throughout the existence of the Northern Ireland Assembly it never looked as if it would be ‘able to fulfil the role that Prior had set out for it’. As one source noted, ‘almost from the outset the prospect of providing longterm political stability for Northern Ireland was non-existent’.153 In accordance with their pre-election pledge, when the election results were announced, both the SDLP and Sinn Féin refused to take their seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly; a decision that was described in British circles as a ‘major disappointment’.154 The SDLP refused to participate because the Northern Ireland Assembly failed to meet its minimal demands of ‘power-sharing’, with an ‘Irish-dimension’ attached.155 Although the DUP supported the reinstatement of devolution, the UUP remained deeply divided over this issue, between supporters of devolution and those who favoured Northern Ireland’s integration into the remainder of the UK.156 The failure of the Prior Initiative compelled Thatcher, albeit reluctantly, to turn her attention back to Dublin, irrespective of her continued disdain for Haughey. Under Thatcher’s orders, during a trip to the United States in November 1982, Prior undertook a kite flying exercise in the hope of thawing the frozen Anglo-Irish relationship. Addressing a gathering at the Hubert Humphrey Institute, Minnesota, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland spoke of his hope for the recommencement of a ‘close and fruitful’ relationship between Dublin and London. Although a recent ‘coolness’ had developed between the British and Irish governments in the context of the second Irish Republican hunger strike and the Falklands War, Prior said that he held out hope that relations could be placed on a steadier keel.157 Significantly, by the close of 1982, Prior was privately making positive noises regarding repeated calls on behalf of the Irish government and the SDLP for a so-called ‘Irish dimension’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland. As we have learnt, since

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his appointment as secretary of state for Northern Ireland in the winter of 1981, Prior had categorically ruled out permitting Dublin a direct role in the affairs of Northern Ireland.158 However, the political landscape had considerably changed over the preceding year. Frustrated by the unwillingness of the political parties to place their full support behind the reconstituted Northern Ireland Assembly, Prior had now arrived at the startling realization. As he revealed to Kenneth Dam, US deputy secretary of state, for real progress to be achieved, Prior conceded, London had to realize that Dublin had a role to play in helping to find a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict, albeit that ‘it would take some time’.159 Yet again, Thatcher remained the major obstacle towards advancing British-Irish relations. Fortunately, the election of Garret FitzGerald as taoiseach in November 1982, following the dramatic collapse of the Haughey-administration, provided the necessary political impetus to spur Thatcher into action. Shortly after FitzGerald’s election, Thatcher passed on her ‘warm congratulations’, expressing her hope that Anglo-Irish relations may now be placed on a more balanced keel.160 Given Haughey’s recent antics, Thatcher was delighted to see her political nemesis demoted to the political opposition benches. As a lead headline in the Irish Independent phrased it, ‘Garret brings a sigh of relief from London’.161 In fact, it would be a further five years, not until 1987, that Haughey would again hold the Office of Taoiseach. *** In conclusion, FitzGerald’s election did not guarantee that Thatcher had any immediate desire to advance Anglo-Irish relations. Despite lobbying on behalf of her Civil Service to commence a ‘process of rapprochement’ in Anglo-Irish relations,162 including the ‘reactivating of the AIIC’,163 to quote Figg, Thatcher followed a cautious line. In a letter to Enoch Powell, on 23 December, the day after Thatcher’s ‘customary Christmas’ visit to Northern Ireland,164 Thatcher ruled out the prospect of an Anglo-Irish summit meeting soon. ‘[T]‌here were no plans for such a meeting at present’, she insisted. ‘Our future relations with the Republic [of Ireland] will inevitably depend on the attitude of the new government.’ On Northern Ireland’s constitutional place within the UK, Thatcher was equally forthright. Northern Ireland ‘is part of the United Kingdom’. This principle remains the basis of ‘all aspects of Northern Ireland policy’, she wrote. ‘The position will not be compromised in any meetings I may have with Dr. FitzGerald.’165 For his part, Ian Gow was eager to turn this latest stalemate regarding Prior’s plans for rolling devolution in Northern Ireland to the advantage of Ulster Unionists. Writing to Thatcher in mid-November, he told her ‘After the next General election, I hope that you might find it possible to make a really fresh start with our policy in the Province.’ Prior’s present Northern Ireland policy, he scornfully added, ‘is doing great damage to Ulster’.166 There is little doubt that Gow’s words won a sympathetic ear from Thatcher. However, at this time she was also ‘exposed to other influences’, to borrow Moore’s description.167 In December 1982, Thatcher hosted a dinner for Lord Shackleton to express her gratitude and that of her government for his work on restoring the economy of the Falkland Islands. Following the meal, she invited a couple of officials for a drink. One of them was David Goodall, deputy secretary to the cabinet. A  Roman Catholic by

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descent, each of his grandfathers coming from Ireland, he recounted an interesting conversation with Thatcher. During their post-meal drinks (Thatcher equipping herself with a ‘large whiskey and soda’), Goodall said to Thatcher that it was a great tragedy that while British troops were being celebrated for their efforts during the Falklands War, they were being murdered on a daily basis due to the conflict in Northern Ireland (for instance, on 6 December 1982, an INLA bomb at the Droppin’ Well Bar and Disco in Ballykelly, Co. Derry, killed seventeen people, including eleven British soldiers).168 The conversation then moved to a discussion about ‘Irishness’. Goodall said that relations between the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain were complicated by the fact that ‘so many of us in this country are of Irish descent and although they don’t like to say so’.169 ‘I am completely English’, Thatcher said. Goodall retorted, ‘both my grandfathers had been born in Ireland’. In response, her face ‘shadowed by a momentary doubt’, she retorted, ‘Well I suppose I am 1/16th Irish: my great-grandmother was a Sullivan’.170 At the end of the conversation, she said, reflectively, ‘if we get back next time [after the next British general election scheduled for 1983] I think I would like to do something about Ireland’.171 As is examined in the next chapter, following the Conservative Party’s landslide victory at the 1983 British general election, Thatcher did, indeed, decide to do ‘something about Ireland’. In response to the findings of the New Ireland Forum Report (published in May 1983), Thatcher authorized the so-called ‘Armstrong-Nally framework talks’. As the title suggests, Armstrong and the Cabinet Office in London and Nally, Irish cabinet secretary in Dublin, led these high-level top-secret discussions regarding Northern Ireland. Significantly these talks, to again quote Goodall, were intended as an avenue to permit Dublin to have a ‘formalized’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland, which might include allowing the Irish government a ‘presence in Belfast as a focus for all matters of Irish concern there’.172

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Part Three

Second-term in office, 1983–7

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‘… I’d like to do something about Ireland’: The resurrection of Anglo-Irish relations The Conservative Party’s landslide victory at the 1983 British general election (held on 9 June of that year) was a personal triumph for Thatcher. In her own constituency of Finchley, Thatcher increased her majority to over 9,000. Although the Conservative Party’s national vote had fallen by nearly 700,000, to over 13 million, the Labour Party vote collapsed to a little under 8.5 million. In terms of a share of the percentage vote, the Conservative Party had 42.4 per cent, the Labour Party 27.6 per cent and the Alliance 25.4 per cent. The result meant that the Conservative Party won 397 seats; the Labour Party, 209; and the Alliance, 23. It was a staggering victory. Thatcher’s party secured an overall majority of 144 seats, the largest for either party since the Labour Party landslide of 1945. The result left Thatcher as the first leader of any British political party in the twentieth century to serve a full term and then increase her majority. Not only that, she was the first Conservative Party prime minister in the twentieth century to win two British general elections in a row.1 Thatcher was re-energized by her election victory, immediately throwing herself back into her great task of rescuing Great Britain for an impending economic abyss. One of her first tasks was her decision to reshuffle her cabinet, a job she disliked. On this occasion, however, the task was made bearable because she had the authority to appoint whom she wished to the cabinet. Her most important move was her decision to appoint the free-market guru Nigel Lawson as chancellor of the exchequer. Sir Geoffrey Howe took over as secretary of state for foreign affairs and the commonwealth. William Whitelaw was appointed leader of the House of Lords and lord president of the council (an obvious demotion, which was sweetened by making him a viscount and retaining him as de facto deputy prime minister). Lord Hailsham remained as lord chancellor. Michael Heseltine, one of Thatcher’s main critics within the cabinet, retained the defence portfolio. Norman Tebbit2 was appointed secretary of state for employment. Cecil Parkinson took over as secretary of state for trade and industry. Leon Brittan became secretary of state for Home Department. Ian Gow, Thatcher’s ‘Unionist conscience’,3 was rewarded for services rendered for his four years as Thatcher’s private personal secretary with the housing portfolio (Gow’s promotion

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ensured that Thatcher no longer had a sympathetic voice to promote the well-being of Ulster Unionism at her side). On his own request, Prior retained the post of secretary of state for Northern Ireland. Although by now Prior did not enjoy his prime minister’s confidence, partly because of his decision to nurture further a ‘good relationship’ with the Irish government,4 she nonetheless conceded to his request. A  source close to Prior recorded the rationale behind his decision to remain in the Northern Ireland portfolio. He ‘thought it unfortunate that no previous secretary of state had served more than two years’ in the Northern Ireland portfolio.5 In Prior’s own words, ‘my continuation as Northern Ireland Secretary did at least show that the Government would stick to a consistent policy’.6 ‘My return’, he noted, marked ‘one last effort to see if progress was possible’.7 The basis of Prior’s ‘consistent policy’ rested on his commitment to the Northern Ireland Assembly, as he informed Peter Barry, recently appointed Irish minister for foreign affairs.8 In fact, in the immediate months before the British general election, a gradual metamorphosis occurred in relation to the British government’s Northern Ireland policy. While Thatcher, with Prior’s encouragement, continued to prioritize the Northern Ireland Assembly,9 a cabal of senior Whitehall officials  – led by Robert Armstrong  – were eager to resurrect Anglo-Irish relations, which had dramatically cooled the previous year in the context of the second Irish Republican hunger strike and because of Charles Haughey’s shambolic handling of Dublin-London relations during the Falklands War.10 In the words of David Goodall, by this juncture, he and Armstrong concluded that it was ‘time to move the Irish Problem to the top of the British political agenda’.11 Although personally indifferent, Thatcher agreed to the resumption of government contacts between British and Irish ministers; although she stipulated that ‘matters should be taken along as slowly and deliberately as possible and that the Irish should be left to make the running’.12 On receiving confirmation of Thatcher’s willingness to reboot Anglo-Irish relations, Whitehall officials immediately went to work. On 1 February 1983, regular government-to-government contacts were resumed under the auspices of a ministerial meeting of the AIIC, held between Prior and Peter Barry.13 This meeting of British and Irish foreign ministers was followed up with an informal meeting between Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald (FitzGerald was re-elected taoiseach in November 1982)  in the margins of a European Council meeting in Brussels, on 22 March, during which a general discussion on Northern Ireland took place.14 Moreover, at Civil Service level, the official committee on Anglo-Irish relations reconvened on 25 March 1983;15 revealingly, this was the first meeting of this committee in over twelve months which, as Goodall noted, was in itself ‘a reflection of the state of Anglo-Irish relations’.16 Thatcher’s general election victory in June 1983 was the springboard for continued improvement in Anglo-Irish relations. Importantly, her commanding majority in the House of Commons, together with her rising stature as a political titan, helped transform the way in which she conducted business and implemented policy. She now acquired a newfound confidence that confirmed her previously held conviction that with dedication and hard work almost anything could be achieved. Thatcher now

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brought this mind-set into her thinking on Northern Ireland. As she had previously conceded in December 1982, ‘if we get back [after the next general election] … I should like to do something about Ireland’.17 Of course, other factors played a role in Thatcher’s attitude to Northern Ireland, not least the continuing loss of life and the huge burden that the conflict was having on the British exchequer. Tragically, during the first six months of 1983, alone, prior to the British general election, approximately twenty-seven people were murdered (nine civilians, nine members of the RUC, three members of the UDR, and three active paramilitaries). In fact, on 10 June, the day after Thatcher’s general election victory, twenty-year old British Army recruit Geoffrey Curtis was murdered by a PIRA bomb in Ballymurphy, Belfast.18 Armstrong was the first within Thatcher’s inner circle to lead the charge for the British government to ‘do something about Ireland’ in the aftermath of the Conservative Party’s general election victory. On 8 July, he provided Thatcher with a thought-provoking critique of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy. Its contents, he confirmed to her, had the approval of Howe and Prior. It is useful to quote this memorandum at length: With the British General Election over, Anglo-Irish relations have entered a new phase, and some intensification of the contacts between the two Governments is both necessary and desirable. For the first time for years, neither the Irish nor the British Government faces the prospect of an early election; and the government in Dublin is committed to seeking a closer relationship with London both as an end in itself and as a means of easing tension and making progress on the Northern Ireland question. On the British side, no major initiative or change of direction is contemplated in our Northern Ireland policy, the latest authoritative statement of which was the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland’s speech of 28 June to the Northern Ireland Assembly.19

Having ruled out any ‘major initiative or change’ to the British government’s Northern Ireland policy, as in accordance with a previous decision reached at a meeting of the official committee on Anglo-Irish relations on 1 July,20 Armstrong instead suggested that the best course of action was to agree with the Irish on a ‘measured resumption of business’ within the framework of the AIIC.21 Despite her initial ‘hesitation’, Thatcher agreed with Armstrong that ‘life should be breathed back into the AIIC’, to quote David Barrie.22 Her cabinet secretary wasted little time in reactivating the workings of the AIIC. On 11 July, three days after his memorandum to Thatcher, senior British and Irish civil servants convened a steering committee meeting of the AIIC at the British Cabinet Office in London.23 Those present on the British side included Armstrong, Goodall and Alan Goodison, recently appointed British ambassador in Dublin. On the Irish side were Dermot Nally, Seán Donlon, secretary general of the DFA and Eamon Kennedy, outgoing Irish ambassador in London. Significantly, at this meeting, an agreement was reached to rekindle the Anglo-Irish joint studies and to draw up plans for the convening of an Anglo-Irish summit meeting between Thatcher and FitzGerald before the end of the year.24 As is

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analysed below, this meeting between senior British and Irish civil servants sowed the seeds for a dramatic development in the British government’s Northern Ireland policy.

‘Codeword’: The Goodall-Lillis secret talks By the summer of 1983 and despite Thatcher’s continuing lukewarm attitude, senior Whitehall officials expressed a steely determination that ‘progress should now be made towards finding a solution to the Irish problem’, to quote Goodall. In fact, what Goodall had in mind represented a major change in London’s thinking vis-à-vis the Irish government’s involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland, what he styled as permitting the Irish a ‘palpable presence’ in Northern Ireland.25 To this point in his diplomatic career, Goodall had relatively little experience of Irish affairs. Although an expert on East-West relations/the Soviet Union and a senior figure within the British government communications headquarters (GCHQ) during the 1980s,26 prior to his transfer from the British Embassy in Bonn, Germany, to the Cabinet Office in May 1982 (as deputy secretary to cabinet) Goodall conceded that he had ‘no involvement’ in Irish politics.27 Indeed, before this period he had never visited Northern Ireland.28 Believed to be ‘a deeply reflective and industrious Catholic’,29 (Charles Moore even described Goodall as an ‘almost saintly Roman Catholic’),30 he was descended from an old Anglo-Irish family in Co. Wexford. In fact, in retirement, he retained a strong emotional bond with Ireland, holding the post of president of the Irish Genealogical Research Society from 1992 to 2012.31 During a meeting with Prior, on 20 July 1983, Goodall petitioned the secretary of state for Northern Ireland on the need to put ‘pressure on the Unionists to accept some form of power-sharing and some recognition of the Irish dimension’. In an uncharacteristic dismissive tone, he criticized Thatcher for seemingly not appreciating that ‘the need for some initiative was at the heart of the problem’. ‘Before Christmas’, he noted, ‘she had been particularly concerned about British troop losses in Northern Ireland and had seemed to be thinking of taking some resolute action very early in the life of the new Parliament.’ ‘Her present view’, he counselled, ‘now seemed to be that there was no prospect of improving the situation, and that it was therefore not worth antagonising the Unionists.’ This position, he explained, was ‘making it difficult to put Anglo-Irish relations on a better footing’.32 Prior agreed with Goodall’s diagnosis. The secretary of state for Northern Ireland ‘accepted fully the need to encourage the Prime Minister to accept the need to continue to look for progress on Northern Ireland’. He promised, therefore, that he ‘would do what he could to persuade her’.33 Indeed, as noted in the previous chapter, by the winter of 1982 Prior, himself, had already privately conceded that if the conflict in Northern Ireland was to be ended, then the British government needed to concede to Dublin a so-called ‘Irish dimension’.34 At the same time, Prior was also encouraging Howe of the necessity to increase dialogue between Dublin and London regarding Northern Ireland, what the FCO labelled the ‘thickening of Anglo-Irish relations’.35 The genesis of this new era in Anglo-Irish relations dates to two specific meetings between Goodall and Michael Lillis, head of the Anglo-Irish division of the DFA

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during 1983. The first meeting was held in London on 20 May 1983. The second gettogether was convened five months later, in Dublin, on 6 September. Described by the British Embassy in Dublin as a ‘workaholic … lively … friendly and agreeable’,36 at this time, Lillis was joint chairperson (along with Goodall) of the coordinating committee of the AIIC.37 Importantly, Lillis was known to be ‘very close’ to Garret FitzGerald.38 On the instructions of FitzGerald, Lillis convened a meeting with Goodall in the Cabinet Office in London, on 20 May 1983. Lillis had travelled to London, he informed his host, to put forward the Irish government’s new pathway for Northern Ireland, specifically in the context of the NIF, which first convened on 30 May 1983 (the subject of the NIF is examined later in this chapter).39 During an hour-and-ahalf-long meeting, described as ‘very frank and open’, Lillis said he wished to stress that Dublin ‘recognised that the British dimension to the Northern Ireland problem required much more explicit acknowledgement from the Irish side than it had received hitherto’.40 Initially, Lillis’s intervention was dismissed by London. It was felt that he was attempting to feed the British with a ‘carefully prepared line’, which was ‘rather overcooked’.41 Privately, while expressing an interest in what Lillis had to say, Armstrong instructed Goodall that ‘I do not think we need or should report this conversation to the Prime Minister’.42 London’s dismissive attitude should not come as a surprise. Beyond a vague reference to the Irish government’s recognition of a so-called ‘British dimension’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland, Lillis’s cryptic message was painfully devoid of substance. Moreover, the British government’s attention was directed towards the forthcoming British general election, pencilled in for early June 1983. However, the seeds for political progress had been sown. As Lillis later recounted, these initial exchanges with Goodall ‘gave rise to a marathon negotiation, beginning in the absence of the Northern Ireland Office’.43 On paper, Goodall’s second meeting with Lillis, on 6 September, this time in Dublin, was a rather routine one. Described in British circles as a ‘non-meeting’, it had been convened to draw up plans for a forthcoming meeting of the coordinating committee of the AIIC, scheduled for 28 September in Dublin.44 It was in the margins of the meeting, however, that a seminal moment in Anglo-Irish relations occurred. During a walk along Dublin’s Grand Canal, to Goodall’s astonishment on the instructions of FitzGerald, Lillis ‘proceeded to sketch out the possibility of radically new arrangements for Northern Ireland’.45 What Lillis had in mind, to use FitzGerald’s own description, was ‘an imaginative proposal’, whereby ‘in order to tackle the alienation of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, radical changes were required in the security and judicial system’.46 Lillis explained that FitzGerald (with the support of the SDLP) was considering revising Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution (thus removing the Republic of Ireland’s formal territorial claim over Northern Ireland).47 Lillis also conceded that the Irish might be prepared to support formal recognition of the ‘union’ between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In return, Lillis stipulated that Dublin sought from London a form of joint authority over Northern Ireland, which possibly would include ‘participation of Irish security forces in operations in the North and of Irish judges in terrorist trials there’.48 Goodall was genuinely stunned by Lillis’s comments. Although

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he confirmed that he did not have the authority to comment formally on the contents of Lillis’s proposals, he said he would report to London immediately.49 It was not until three weeks later, at a meeting of the coordinating committee of the AIIC in Dublin, on 28 September, that both men were again able to discuss in substantive detail Lillis’s proposals.50 Goodall got straight to the point. The view in London, he said, was that the Irish government’s latest initiative for Northern Ireland to ‘solve’ the Irish problem ‘ran a serious risk not just of failure, but of making the situation worse and producing more bloodshed’. Goodall ‘emphasised that a proposition involving joint sovereignty would have no interest for the British Government’. It was ‘not an idea which the British Government was prepared to entertain’. However, he did offer Lillis a significant olive branch. The British government, he noted, was considering permitting the Irish a ‘palpable presence’ in Northern Ireland. Lillis warmly welcomed this proposed major concession on behalf of London. He reassured Goodall that the Irish government did not envisage a form of ‘joint sovereignty’ over Northern Ireland. Rather, what the Irish sought was to be provided with a meaningful role (i.e. an Irish dimension) in Northern Ireland, to act as the voice (and protector) of the Catholic minority. He explained that in FitzGerald’s thinking it was probably ‘necessary to amend the [Irish] Constitution, perhaps by combining the present Articles 2 and 3 into a new article’.51 This was, indeed, an extraordinary meeting on behalf of British and Irish civil servants. The question remained, however, whether Thatcher would be willing to grasp the political nettle in the hope of transforming the nature of Anglo-Irish relations in the crusade to help end the Northern Ireland conflict. Again, Armstrong sought to convince Thatcher of the need to advance AngloIrish relations (at this time he had also travelled to Dublin to hold informal talks with FitzGerald). In a letter to Thatcher, dated 4 October 1983, he recommended to his prime minister that ‘despite heavy reservations’, the Lillis proposals ‘should be treated seriously and given further thought’.52 Not for the first or last time, Thatcher hesitated. At a two-day meeting of the coordinating committee of the AIIC, 11–12 October, Goodall informed Lillis that Thatcher was finding it ‘difficult’ to ‘assess the pros and cons’ regarding the Irish proposals and thus did not feel she was in a position to ‘offer either encouragement or discouragement’.53 This was a classic example of Thatcher’s known preference for vigilance when it came to Irish affairs. On this occasion, it took the personal intervention of Howe to persuade Thatcher of the merits of the Lillis proposals. Although Prior continued to hold reservations,54 the secretary of state for foreign affairs and the commonwealth informed Thatcher that the Lillis proposals should not be dismissed ‘out of hand’, not least because such ‘a new approach to the problem of the North appears genuine and serious and this is likely to weigh favourably with opinion in the United States’.55 Howe’s intervention was crucial. By now, he had arrived at the conclusion that ‘it was very important that we do something’ about the Irish question.56 Significantly, Thatcher trusted Howe’s advice. Somewhat reluctantly, therefore, she agreed to continue with this latest series of AngloIrish talks. As Armstrong phrased it, ‘The Prime Minister had acknowledged that it would be difficult to dismiss the Irish ideas out of hand.’ She, therefore, had given her

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permission for the terms of reference to be drawn up for the ‘proposed assessment of the ideas which the Irish had floated about Northern Ireland’.57 News of Thatcher’s susceptibility to the Irish government’s latest proposals for Northern Ireland, albeit that she continued to retain a personal uneasiness about the entire enterprise, spurred the Irish government into action. Privately, Lillis now went on a diplomatic campaign spreading his ‘codeword’, as he himself phrased it, regarding his secret talks with Goodall. His proposals, he informed one official from the NIO, should be taken ‘seriously’.58 The problem from the British perspective, however, was that Whitehall civil servants were finding it increasingly difficult to understand the basis of Lillis’s ‘codeword’. As Reeve pointed out, ‘It would be of immense benefit to all parties if we only received one set of codewords at a time.’59 A similar message was articulated by a secret Cabinet Office memorandum in which the Lillis proposals were described as ‘imprecise and vary significantly’.60 A  briefing document compiled on behalf of the British government neatly summed up the difficultly that British policymakers had vis-à-vis the Lillis proposals: The Irish ideas are neither precise not consistent and vary markedly according to who is presenting them. In the version presented by Mr Michael Lillis to Mr Goodall, recognition of the British dimension could involve a referendum to remove the territorial articles from the Irish Constitution and explicit acceptance by the Irish Government of the Union. In other versions, however, the ‘British dimension’ is much more vaguely acknowledged and the aim seems to be to move towards a form of joint sovereignty over the north.61

In fact, there were some fears in British circles that in expressing an interest in the Lillis proposals that the British government was ‘in danger of falling into a trap’.62 Writing to Armstrong on 26 October, Sir Philip Woodfield reported that ‘those of us in the Cabinet Office, the FCO and the NIO who are aware of the conflicting messages emerging from various Dublin sources are at one in recognising that so far as we can discern what we are being told it either lacks credibility or is unrealistic, not to say unacceptable’. The net result, Woodfield wrote, was that he was ‘troubled by the LillisGoodall talks, specifically by reports leaked to the press that joint sovereignty might be on the table’.63 To clear up the confusion, a team of Whitehall civil servants attempted to piece together a broad study of the Lillis proposals, which loosely fell under four subheadings (see below): 1. Constitutional (possible amendments to Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution) – that the Irish government ‘might be prepared formally to recognise that Northern Ireland was, and would remain, part of the United Kingdom’);64 2. Security (joint policing to ‘combat all-Ireland terrorist movement’)65 – that this might include ‘very limited Garda Siochana presence in Northern Ireland

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(especially Catholic areas)’. The possibility of allowing the Irish Army into certain areas of Northern Ireland was also raised. 3. Justice (joint judicial arrangements) – that members of the Irish judiciary become involved with the ‘judicial process in the North’,66 with the introduction of mixed courts.67 4 . Political (referred to as a ‘package’)68 – that not only would the SDLP formally recognize the Union, but also that John Hume and the SDLP leadership might accept a Stormont government elected by ‘majority vote’ (without powersharing).69 But that this system would only be acceptable to the SDLP in the context of ‘joint sovereignty’.70 The first opportunity that FitzGerald had to raise the latest Irish proposals with Thatcher, directly, was when the two leaders met one another at an Anglo-Irish summit meeting on 7 November 1983 at Chequers (this was the first Anglo-Irish summit meeting since 6 November 1981 and was the first meeting of the AIIC at head of government level). On the British side, Howe and Prior accompanied Thatcher. On the Irish side, apart from FitzGerald, were Dick Spring, an tánaiste and Peter Barry. At the pre-briefing meeting with her officials, Thatcher was reportedly ‘tired, on edge and dismissive’.71 The tête-à-tête between Thatcher and FitzGerald, which lasted over an hour, was a tetchy affair. When FitzGerald used this favoured word ‘alienation’ to refer to the feelings of Northern Nationalists, Thatcher cut him short: ‘I do wish you would stop using that dreadful word Garret’ (Thatcher viewed the word ‘alienation’ as Marxist jargon).72 Indeed, the meeting was a rather deflating experience from FitzGerald’s perspective considering that Thatcher showed little willingness to consider the latest Irish proposals that Lillis had first mooted in his discussions with Goodall.73 However, all was not lost. After FitzGerald had left, the British delegation gathered around the fire with Thatcher and ‘extracted from her what they really wanted, her consent for a formal British response’ to the Lillis proposals, to quote Charles Moore. Significantly, Thatcher agreed to offer the Irish government ‘some form of political involvement in Northern Ireland’ in return for Dublin formally recognizing the union between Northern Ireland and the remainder of the UK. However, anxious about accusations of ‘secret negotiations’, she ordered that the Goodall-Lillis talks be ended with immediate effect.74 Instead, Thatcher agreed that the current Anglo-Irish talks would continue under the auspices of the AIIC, with Armstrong assuming overall responsibility for the negotiations. The decision to provide Armstrong with a platform to advance this latest round of Anglo-Irish talks, under the auspices of the ‘Armstrong-Nally framework talks’, ‘triggered a year’s intensive work’, to quote Howe.75 As is examined later in this chapter, these talks would play a crucial role in facilitating the signing of the AIA in 1985.

‘Bury the report’: London’s response to the New Ireland Forum report Initially, the Irish government had envisaged that the proposed NIF would be composed of all the constitutional parties on the island of Ireland – including Unionist

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political parties in Northern Ireland. In the words of Garret FitzGerald, the proposed forum would help end the violence in Northern Ireland, reconcile the two traditions in Ireland and help secure ‘peace and stability’.76 To Dublin’s disappointment, however, the UUP, DUP and the Alliance Party refused an invitation to take part in the NIF’s proceedings. The presence of the four principal nationalist parties in Ireland – Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, the Labour Party and the SDLP – ensured that the NIF represented more than 70 per cent of the population of Ireland (Sinn Féin was barred from participating at the NIF because the movement supported Irish Republican paramilitary violence). The NIF’s nationalist composition, however, ensured that from its inception Ulster Unionists viewed it with open hostility.77 The Rev. Ian Paisley, for example, described the NIF as ‘a vehicle towards a United Ireland’.78 The first public session of the NIF was held at Dublin Castle, on 30 May 1983. An opening statement issued on behalf of the participants expressed hope and goodwill that the new forum would help bring together ‘the views of the people of all traditions who wish for lasting peace and stability in a new Ireland’.79 Thereafter, the NIF met approximately ninety-six times, until the final meeting of the body on 4 May 1984. During its lifetime, thirty-one individuals and groups presented oral testimonies at public meetings of the forum, between 20 September 1983 and 9 February 1984. In total, 317 submissions from interested parties were also received by the forum.80 The origins of the NIF date back to the autumn of 1982, within the context of the rise of Sinn Féin as a political force in Northern Ireland. On 20 October of that year, following prolonged bickering among the political parties of Northern Ireland and the British government, elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly were eventually held. The election results caused panic within British and Irish government circles and the SDLP. Having abandoned its abstentionist policy in relation to contesting elections, Sinn Féin secured 35 per cent of the nationalist vote (10 per cent overall), equating to five seats. The SDLP secured a disappointing fourteen seats. The UUP won twenty-six seats; the DUP, twenty-one seats; and the Alliance Party, ten seats.81 The rise of Sinn Féin as a potent electoral force in Northern Ireland thus triggered the British government to reassess its attitude to the SDLP. Within Whitehall circles, it was feared that Sinn Féin’s electoral rise would ultimately come at the cost of the SDLP. ‘This is something that worries both us and the Irish government’, to quote David Snoxell.82 Moreover, according to Whitehall sources, the Irish government had, in private, expressed genuine ‘fears’ that due to the rise of Sinn Féin and the possible disintegration of the SDLP, the Republic of Ireland would be ‘shackled by instability and the threat of paramilitary violence’.83 Indeed, privately at this time, Dublin made it known to London that if the British government welcomed the eventual findings of the NIF, the SDLP ‘might be persuaded to return to the [Northern Ireland] Assembly’.84 British government policy towards Sinn Féin, therefore, was made ‘clear’. ‘Unless Sinn Féin renounces support for the use of violence, Ministers will not receive nor correspond personally with Sinn Féin elected representatives.’85 Prior, for example, stipulated that under no circumstances would he agree to meet with vice-president of Sinn Féin Gerry Adams (who was elected Sinn Féin MP for West Belfast in the

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1983 British general election). On the 13 November of that year, Adams was elected as president of Sinn Féin; a position he held until his retirement in 2018).86 Initially, the British government expressed grave reservations regarding the NIF. During a meeting of the official committee on Anglo-Irish relations, on 25 March, Goodall described the proposed forum as an ‘unwelcome … diversion’ from the attempts to restore a devolved government in Northern Ireland. ‘It remains unwelcome because it excited the Unionists and did nothing to strengthen the Northern Ireland Assembly.’ In fact, the NIF was seen as a type of Trojan horse; as an attempt by Dublin to further ‘interfere in the internal affairs of the United Kingdom’.87 The Whitehall machine went into overdrive as soon as the NIF got underway. Reading through the vast array of archival files compiled by senior civil servants with an opinion on the Irish government-sponsored initiative, chiefly the FCO, the NIO and the Cabinet Office, their response was overwhelmingly negative.88 ‘The New Ireland Forum’, according to one memorandum, was ‘being used by Dr FitzGerald as a sounding board for new ideas and to help educate nationalist opinion in the Republic [of Ireland] to the formidable difficulties in the way of making progress towards the unification of Ireland’.89 During a meeting with Noel Dorr, the recently appointed Irish ambassador in London, Prior said that he hoped that the NIF would ‘recognise Unionists sensitivities and would not advocate a solution which the U.K. government would have to reject’.90 Prominent figures within the Conservative Party, likewise, placed on record their negative attitude to the modus operandi of the NIF; John Biggs-Davison, chairman of the CPPNIC, being their main antagonist. In fact, following a formal invitation, the Conservative Party MP for Epping Forest travelled to Dublin to address a public session of the NIF in October 1983. Not only that, but during this period he also published a paper, ‘United Ireland?? United Islands?’, which he described as a ‘Conservative and Unionist approach to the New Ireland Forum’.91 Addressing a public session of the NIF, on 6 October 1983, Biggs-Davison left little room for doubt regarding his support for Ulster Unionism. Although attending the NIF in a strictly ‘personal capacity’, his opening comments proudly celebrated that he was a ‘staunch Unionist’. The remainder of his speech received a frosty reception from the vast majority of those participating in the NIF. Biggs-Davison, however, remained unapologetic. The Republic of Ireland, he protested, was an ‘expansionist power, setting no bounds to the march of the nation’. Regarding the constitutional future of Northern Ireland, he noted that a devolved government was a useless exercise. Thus, he ruled out a return to either majority-rule or what he described as ‘institutionalist powersharing’. ‘I do not want to restore a Parliament to Northern Ireland’, he implored. Unsurprisingly, he also categorically ruled out a united Ireland. The only workable alternative, he therefore proposed, was for Northern Ireland’s integration into the remainder of the UK.92 On 2 May 1984, following eleven months of deliberations on behalf of the four major constitutional Nationalist political parties on the island of Ireland, the NIF published its official report, under eight chapter-headings. It was Chapter Five of the report which was of most significance, specifically, the section dealing with the ‘Present Realities and Future Requirements’ facing the British and Irish governments.93

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In order to secure a lasting and peaceful settlement for Northern Ireland the report provided three potential models: (1) a unitary state (i.e. a united Ireland), (2) a federal/ confederal state and (3) joint authority.94 Privately, the initial response from the British government to the findings of the New Ireland Report was overwhelmingly hostile. Although Thatcher had been provided by Dublin with two draft texts of the report prior to its publication (on 18 and on 27–30 April), she was nonetheless aggrieved by the ‘negative’ tone of the official version.95 When British ministers discussed the New Ireland Report at a cabinet meeting, on 3 May, the report’s findings were attacked as being ‘a shallow document with (predictably) a strong nationalist bias’, to quote Prior.96 Thatcher, likewise, privately made it known that she was ‘intensely wary’ of the entire enterprise.97 In fact, according to Goodall’s recollections, Thatcher was furious. She was particularly frustrated by the reference in the report to joint authority, which was greeted with an ‘outburst of irritation’.98 Whitehall civil servants were equally forthright in their condemnation of the NIF. This report could ‘never’ form the basis for ‘our approach to the problems in Northern Ireland’, to quote Alan Goodison.99 Indeed, Goodall described the report as disappointingly ‘one-sided’.100 In the words of Graham Angel, the report was ‘naive and unrealistic’.101 Whitehall officials were aghast by the report’s demotion of joint authority (personally favoured by FitzGerald) in place of Haughey’s sponsored unitary state model.102 Therefore, the best course of action, as one senior civil servant advised, was to ‘bury the report’.103 Unsurprisingly, the Ulster Unionist community of Northern Ireland vehemently rejected the findings of the report. The leadership of both main Unionist parties (the UUP and DUP) reacted strongly with the result that their protests ‘quickly took on near rebellious proportions’, to quote James McAuley.104 The UUP published its own counterproposal in a document, ‘The way forward’, while the DUP also published its own response, ‘The Unionist case: the forum report answered’.105 The Rev. Paisley described the report as a ‘way backwards’ and a ‘way into darkness’. He referred to the suggestion regarding joint authority as ‘political purgatory’.106 Several Conservative Party backbenchers, likewise, greeted the findings of the NIF with open contempt. A  Monday Club publication, Out, Out, Out!, declared that the report exposed the ‘truth’ that ‘Dublin is long on talk but short on facts’.107 When the findings of the NIF were debated in the House of Commons, on 4 July 1984, a common theme emerged – the British political classes’ displeasure at the report’s accusation that successive British government had failed to deal with the ‘intractable problem of Northern Ireland’.108 In the words of Prior, ‘the forum report was much less than fair to what successive British Governments have sought to do during the past 15 years’, with the result ‘that parts of it were disappointing and unacceptable to the British Government or the British people’.109 Several Conservative Party backbenchers placed on record their opposition to the report’s findings. Ivor Stanbrook, vice-chairman of the CPPNIC and a vocal critic of Prior’s handling of Northern Ireland, described the report as ‘a humbug, a deceit, a snare and a delusion’. Indeed, Stanbrook went as far as calling for Prior’s ministerial sacking. ‘It was now an appropriate time’, the former pronounced, ‘for there to be a change in the office of Secretary of State for Northern.’110 John Biggs-Davison stipulated

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that all three of the options proposed – a unitary state, a federation or confederation or a joint British and Irish authority for Northern Ireland – ‘are options that Unionists, by definition, cannot accept’.111 There were those within the Conservative Party, however, that greeted the report’s findings with a more optimistic tone. Nicholas Scott,112 parliamentary under-secretary of state for Northern Ireland, and Michael Mates,113 himself a member of CPPNIC, each noted that the report provided an opportunity to improve Anglo-Irish relations.114 In fact, other Conservative Party MPs went even further. Brian Mawhinney, for example, said that the model of joint authority should not be ruled out.115 Outside of Westminster circles, support for the model of joint authority was also gaining support. The publication of a report on behalf of the Lord Kilbrandon Inquiry in November 1984, for example, advocated a modified version of the joint authority ‘concept’. Established in April 1984, under the auspices of the British-Irish Association, the Lord Kilbrandon Inquiry was an attempt to provide an independent, non-government, response to the findings of the NIF. Chaired by Lord Kilbrandon,116 and funded by the Rowntree Trust, this twelve-member independent inquiry117 convened on several occasions between April and October 1984 and made nine visits to Northern Ireland.118 On 1 November 1984, members of the inquiry published their findings under the title of ‘the Kilbrandon Report’. Given the inquiry’s independent status, the British government did not submit evidence to it. In line with the NIF report, the Kilbrandon Report provided an assessment of ‘present realities and future requirements’, including the following proposals: (1) Irish unity, (2) federation/confederation, (2) independence, (4) integration and lastly (5) repartition. On all five proposals, the Kilbrandon Report rejected them out of hand.119 Significantly, however, members of the inquiry agreed that instead of powersharing, a model of ‘cooperative devolution’ could be devised, which was described as a ‘modification of the joint authority concept’. Under this model, there would be a five-member top tier executive, consisting of an NIO minister, a minister for the Republic of Ireland and three members democratically elected in Northern Ireland.120 As Lord Kilbrandon, himself, explained during a debate on in the House of Lords, on 3 December 1984, ‘joint authority is what we must work at. I will not repeat myself, but joint authority is the clue. In my opinion, that is what the British Government ought to be working at. We are at a crossroads now. We must go forward. Let us hope we take the right road.’121 The British government was indeed ‘at a crossroads’ regarding the findings of the NIF. Foremost in the thinking of Whitehall officialdom was the question of how Thatcher should publicly respond to the findings of the NIF. Although personally displeased, believing the body to be no more than a ‘sounding board’ for Irish Nationalist politicians, she decided to follow a cautious line.122 With the encouragement of Howe and Prior, she agreed not to publicly reject the findings of the New Ireland Report.123 Instead, in the words of Prior, the British government should give the impression that it was ‘taking the Report seriously’, particularly given that it had received a sympathetic response from nationalists in Northern Ireland and the Irish-American lobby in Washington (the Irish-American response and that of the Reagan administration

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to the NIF is examined at the beginning of the next chapter).124 Indeed, Prior said that failure to welcome the report’s findings could also jeopardize the maintenance of the ‘present level of security co-operation’ between Dublin and London and further encourage the growth of Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland.125 In fact, new archival evidence reveals that, in the weeks prior to the publication of the NIF report, the British government had already decided to make a radical U-turn regarding its Northern Ireland policy. Although Thatcher remained steadfast in her refusal to endorse the three long-term solutions put forward in the final report of the NIF (i.e. a united Ireland, a federal/confederal state or joint authority) she did agree to the commencement of negotiations with the Irish government to ‘see whether the basis existed for an agreement which would contribute to the easing of the problems in Northern Ireland’.126 As is examined below, the commencement of this series of negotiations, under the auspices of the ‘Armstrong-Nally framework talks’, eventually led to the British government formally assigning the Irish government a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland, following the signing of the AIA in November 1985.

A ‘formalized’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland: The Armstrong-Nally framework talks At a meeting of the British cabinet, on 16 February 1984, Thatcher (who was suffering from laryngitis) formally authorized the commencement of ‘explanatory dialogue with the Irish Government’, under the auspices of the recently constituted ArmstrongNally framework talks. The commencement of these talks, Thatcher explained to her ministerial colleagues, would signal the British government’s determination to end the political deadlock in Northern Ireland. Prior’s plans for ‘rolling devolution’ were going nowhere, she said, and thus a new path had to be found.127 Significantly, within this context, there was now an acknowledgement with British government circles that London might be ‘prepared to consider a significant role for the Government of the Republic [of Ireland] in the North’, to quote Armstrong.128 Although ‘one or two doubts’ were raised by some ministers, there was ‘no real opposition’ to this proposal. As David Goodall phrased it, ‘the argument that doing something was less dangerous than doing nothing won general assent’.129 The genesis of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks date to a meeting in London between a delegation of senior British and Irish civil servants, on 16 July 1984. As the title of the talks suggests, Armstrong directed the negotiations on behalf of the British delegation (also present on the British side were David Goodall and Alan Goodison). Dermot Nally, secretary to the Irish government, led the Irish side (he was accompanied by Seán Donlon and Michael Lillis). Armstrong later acknowledged that Thatcher had deliberately ‘sanctioned’ the Cabinet Office the ‘special role’ of leading this series of Anglo-Irish talks for her to ‘keep an eye on developments … to monitor the negotiations’. Rather than allowing the NIO a direct lead in these negotiations, Armstrong explained, Thatcher ordered her cabinet secretary instead to run the show.130

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During the preceding years, Armstrong and Nally had become personal friends. They were, to borrow Lord Bernard Donoughue’s description, a ‘quality act’.131 Most importantly, they trusted one another, having worked alongside each other as far back as the ill-fated Sunningdale negotiations in 1973. More recently, throughout 1981, they worked closely during the preparatory stages of the Anglo-Irish joint study groups, and in the following year they had played an integral role in first establishing and then coordinating the AIIC. Thus, their coming together, under the auspices of talks that bore their names, was a ‘happy [and welcome] coincidence’, to quote Howe.132 Addressing those in attendance on 16 July 1984, Armstrong stipulated that what he was about to say had the ‘full authority’ of Thatcher and the ‘authority of the Cabinet itself ’. Although his comments were ‘not formal’ proposals, he explained that they indicated a significant advancement of British thinking on Northern Ireland. There were two basic elements to the British consideration, he said. First, in relation to the NIF report, specifically on the subject of ‘joint authority’. Second, on the possibility of the Irish government agreeing to make amendments to Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. On the topic of the NIF report, Armstrong wished to make it clear that Thatcher unequivocally said ‘no’ to a unitary state model. The British prime minister, he said, also rejected the prospect of a federal/confederal state. On the question of joint authority, however, Armstrong explained that this might be a possible area of negotiations with Dublin. While Thatcher would never agree to formal joint authority on behalf of Dublin and London over Northern Ireland, as this would entail sharing sovereignty, she was considering the possibility that the Irish government be provided with a ‘significant role’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland, what Goodall described as a ‘formalised’ role.133 In British thinking, this ‘formalized’ position for the Irish government in Northern Ireland would permit Dublin to act as ‘a spokesmanship for the minority there’. Armstrong noted that Thatcher had three policies in mind: (1) That arrangements should be within the format of the AIIC, ‘with new and strengthened North/South aspect’; (2) That provisions should be made for ‘regular and formal meetings between Belfast and Dublin’ (Armstrong noted that this format was to run along the lines as the Council of Ireland, re-established under the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973); (3) That the Irish government be permitted a ‘presence in Belfast as a focus for all matters of Irish concern there’. It was envisaged on behalf of London that this format would ‘become a national channel for Irish Government interests and concerns’.134 Armstrong stipulated that in return for the above moves on behalf of the British government, Dublin was required to grant some assurances on the ‘territorial claim’ (i.e. Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution). In response, Nally said that he did not have the authority to provide a ‘formal Government reaction’. What he could do was to hold a discussion on such matters. He said that on the issues of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, the government in Dublin was considering some ‘fundamental’

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changes. He noted that FitzGerald was at that moment considering substituting the formal territorial claim to Northern Ireland with a new ‘aspirational’ commitment to secure a united Ireland by peaceful means.135 By all accounts, this was an extraordinary meeting. For the first time during Thatcher’s premiership there was an explicit acknowledgement on behalf of the British government that Dublin maybe permitted a ‘formalized’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Why did Thatcher agree to sanction the Armstrong-Nally framework talks? While the British prime minister had ‘no great enthusiasm’ for this latest initiative on Northern Ireland, to quote one informed source, she felt compelled to do something, particularly because of her ongoing concerns for British Army troops in Northern Ireland and ‘the cost of the Province to the British taxpayer’.136 Apart from ongoing security and financial concerns, Thatcher feared that if the growth of Sinn Féin on the island of Ireland could not be curtailed then ‘a government of radical extremists in Dublin on the Cuban pattern could one day become a reality’, to quote Howe.137 Indeed, while Thatcher remained a ‘unionist by instinct and conviction’, she was nonetheless ‘an intensely pragmatic politician’.138 This dramatic U-turn of behalf of the British government regarding possible Irish involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland coincided with the appointment of two important figures to Thatcher’s inner circle. In 1983, Charles Powell succeeded John Coles as Thatcher’s private secretary for foreign affairs, following the former’s long-term secondment from the FCO. A career diplomat in his early forties, Powell immediately established an ‘exceptional rapport’ with Thatcher. ‘The basis of this relationship’, to quote John Campbell, ‘was his skill at drafting: he was brilliant at finding acceptable diplomatic language to express what she wanted to say without fudging it. Indeed, they seemed like a natural fit.’ Like Thatcher, he required little sleep, with the result that he was ‘unflagging and ever-present … always at her side’.139 In fact, for many Powell came to be the ‘second most powerful figure’ in the British government, no longer confined exclusively to foreign affairs but the ‘real’ deputy prime minister, ‘practically her alter ego’.140 His arrival, however, was not universally welcomed in Whitehall circles. Adam Ridley, Nigel Lawson’s private advisor, recorded that Powell continued to hold an ‘evil influence’ over Thatcher.141 Powell’s arrival was shortly followed by the appointment of Douglas Hurd as secretary of state for Northern Ireland in September 1984 following Prior’s resignation. By now it was common knowledge that the Prior-Thatcher relationship had deteriorated to such an extent that each disliked being in the same room as one another.142 Prior, likewise, was known to have ‘had enough of Northern Ireland’.143 This opened the door for Hurd’s promotion to the British cabinet. Described as ‘a diplomat by training and a Heathite by political origin’, Hurd was widely respected as an ‘exceptionally able’ politician, with a gift for diplomacy.144 During a meeting with Thatcher in No. 10 Downing Street, on 10 September 1984, Hurd was offered the Northern Ireland portfolio. Thatcher, Hurd recalled, said she was looking for someone ‘intelligent and tough’ and thought Hurd was such a man. Hurd, to Thatcher’s surprise, accepted the offer without hesitation.145 Despite Thatcher’s willingness to progress Anglo-Irish relations on a path that only a couple of years previously seemed unimaginable, FitzGerald hesitated. In fact, the initial reaction from Irish circles to the British proposals was one of caution. According

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to one unidentified Irish official, the cabinet in Dublin was not won over by the offer, which was described as ‘dangerously gradualist’. The Irish government was particularly worried about the British proposals for a ‘political framework’ and for joint security, which risked rejection ‘in the early stages by the Northern Ireland minority’.146 In his memoir, FitzGerald wrote that the British proposals related specifically to security issues were ‘completely unacceptable to us’.147 ‘I said for God’s sake you can’t have that.’148 Michael Lillis, however, subsequently recalled how he was extremely frustrated by both FitzGerald’s and Nally’s lukewarm response to this ‘extraordinary and farreaching’ proposal on behalf of the British government.149 Indeed, during a meeting with FitzGerald, at No. 10 Downing Street, on 3 September 1984, Thatcher was at pains to emphasize the significance of what was currently on the table. Although ‘any mention of joint authority had to be absolutely excluded’, she told FitzGerald, the Irish government would do good to remember that the suggestion of giving the Republic of Ireland ‘a right to be consulted about Northern Ireland affairs would be an enormous step with considerable risks’.150 The significance of London’s latest proposal was reiterated during a subsequent meeting between British and Irish officials, under the auspices of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks, on 19 September. What Thatcher had in mind, Armstrong informed his guests, was the possibility of permitting the Irish government an ‘involvement in Northern Ireland affairs’. The British government, he said, would have to ‘sell the new arrangements’. Thatcher would not agree to the abolition of the RUC, but she was willing to make ‘fairly radical restructuring’. The British cabinet secretary also noted that the Irish government had to consider whether they wanted ‘a plenipotentiary in Northern Ireland or a representative, with a senior Minister remaining in Dublin’. The new arrangements, he said, would involve three different types of power – ‘Westminster Powers e.g. Defence, Foreign Affairs and Security; Commission Powers – in which we would be fully involved; and Assembly Powers, which would, hopefully, be devolved on a Northern Ireland Assembly’.151 Early the following month, on 10 October, Armstrong spelt out to Thatcher eleven specific areas which he advised should form the basis for future negotiations with the Irish government if an agreement was to be eventually reached in allowing Dublin a ‘formalized’ role Northern Ireland. Below is a summary of these eleven areas: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Mixed Law Courts All-Ireland Law Commission Joint Security Commission Practical policing measures Arrangements for institutional consultation Devolved Government Anglo-Irish Parliamentary Body Amendment of Irish Constitution Legislative basis for an agreed package Draft of joint declaration from Ashford Summit A Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.152

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The possibility that Thatcher was willing to permit Dublin a formalized role in the affairs of Northern Ireland was, indeed, a substantial shift in her Northern Ireland policy. While she was at pains to stress that Northern Ireland’s sovereignty would not be undermined, nor would she consider joint authority, the offer, for example, of deploying an Irish plenipotentiary in Northern Ireland was truly a landmark development in Anglo-Irish relations.153 Yet, as is analysed below, the PIRA’s attempted assassination of Thatcher, in October 1984, threatened to sabotage all the hard work that the British and Irish governments had undertaken over the previous months. As Goodall later noted, ‘On 12 October the measured diplomatic pace of the [AngloIrish] negotiations received a dramatic jolt in the shape of a bomb.’154

‘It’s a bomb’: The Brighton Hotel bombing, 12 October 1984 At 2.54 a.m., on the morning of 12 October 1984, a PIRA twenty-pound bomb exploded in the Grand Hotel in Brighton. This audacious terrorist attack caused mayhem. No warning was given. The bomb was triggered by a sophisticated electronic timing device and had been planted in the hotel, about a month earlier, by lone PIRA operative Patrick Magee.155 The intended target was Thatcher and her cabinet colleagues. It was ‘a miracle’, in the words of Michael Heseltine, that neither Thatcher nor members of her cabinet lost their lives.156 The British prime minister was staying at the hotel for the duration of the 1984 Conservative Party conference. Howe, who was staying next to Thatcher on the first floor of the hotel, recalled that at around 3 a.m. he heard a loud combination of ‘vibration, thump and clatter’.157 Thatcher, who was still awake working on drafts of her party conference speech, said she knew immediately that a bomb had gone off, perhaps even two. Glass from the windows of Thatcher’s hotel sitting-room was strewn across the carpet. The adjoining bathroom was badly damaged, but miraculously Thatcher and her husband Denis did not suffer any major injuries.158 Norman Tebbit recalled the chaos that ensued: ‘It’s a bomb’, he remembered calling out, ‘before the ceiling came crashing down… then, in a hail of debris, the floor collapsed … The force of the impact was indescribable’ (Tebbit’s wife, Margaret, was paralysed from the neck down because of injuries sustained in the terrorist attack).159 Nigel Lawson summed up the mood amongst conference attendees in the aftermath of the bombing, ‘it was a night of devastation which I  shall never forget’.160 Seven people lost their lives, including Sir Anthony Berry,161 chairperson of the Conservative Party. A  further thirty-two people were seriously injured; injuries suffered included laceration to the face, arms and legs, fractured bones and broken ribs.162 The PIRA basked in the glory in the aftermath of the Brighton Hotel bombing. In a chilling statement issued on behalf of the paramilitary organization, Thatcher was provided with a stark reminder that ‘Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always. Give Ireland peace and there will be no more war.’163 In later years following his release from prison in 1999, having

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served fourteen years of eight life sentences, Patrick Magee candidly explained the rationale behind the Brighton Hotel bombing. Why should the ‘Tory ruling class … remain immune from what their frontline troops were doing to us?’164 The US president Ronald Reagan was campaigning when he heard the news. He telephoned Thatcher immediately to say ‘personally how much we deplore this horrible attack’. A follow up letter from Reagan also made it clear his sense of ‘relief and outrage’.165 From Brussels to Beijing, the assassination attempt made front-page newspaper headlines and was widely covered on television. Although the majority of editorial newspaper coverage expressed sympathy with Thatcher, her enemies abroad depicted the attack in anti-imperialist language. The North Korean newspaper Nodong Sinmun, for example, wrote that the assassination attempt was sparked by ‘the antipopular war policy of the Thatcher government, the British economic situation and [because] the people’s life have [sic] worsened’.166 Publicly, in the immediate aftermath of the bombing, Thatcher projected the image of a defiant leader. The following morning, she delivered her party leader speech at the Conservative Party conference. Her entry was greeted by a standing ovation. It was truly a defining moment in Thatcher’s political career. Relieved to be alive, but deeply saddened by the tragedy, she was determined to show that Irish Republican terrorists ‘could not break our spirit’. Addressing a room packed full of clearly emotional party delegates, Thatcher declared that ‘all attempts to destroy democracy by terrorism will fail’.167 On concluding her speech, she did not linger, but went immediately to the Royal Sussex Country Hospital to visit the injured. Privately, Thatcher was certainly left scarred psychologically by the assassination attempt on her life. Thereafter, she always carried a torch in her handbag and never again felt entirely comfortable mingling in large crowds.168 What is astonishing – not least considering she had literally come within inches of losing her life – was that in the wake of this PIRA terrorist attack Thatcher did not immediately call off the Armstrong-Nally framework talks. Indeed, while the Brighton bombing certainly ‘caused a nervous hiatus in the rounds of secret diplomacy’ between Dublin and London, to quote Jonathan Aitken,169 Thatcher made the courageous decision to continue negotiations with the Irish government: a decision that sowed the seeds for the signing of the AIA in November 1985. Thatcher’s determination to forge ahead with the Armstrong-Nally framework talks is all the more remarkable given that, at this time, her mind was preoccupied with several events that cast a long shadow over her second term in office. Chief among them was the nationwide miners’ strike, which had been ongoing since March 1984. Led by Arthur Scargill, leader of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the miners’ strike was a defining moment for Thatcher’s premiership. Scargill, a rabid Marxist, was not prepared to accept the closure of a single coal pit on the grounds of economic necessity. Thatcher, however, was determined to shut down those mines that were economically unproductive. It was, therefore, inevitable, that a battle ensued between Thatcher’s government and the NUM. By the time of the Brighton Hotel bombing, confrontations between striking miners and those who wished to continue working were a daily occurrence. Depressing images of street protests and conflicts between picketers and the police were captured on

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television, vividly illustrating the ‘polarisation of politics in the mid-1980s’.170 In total, the miners’ strike lasted almost a year, eventually ending in March 1985, following an agreement on behalf of NUM members to return to work. The ending of the strike was a major political victory for Thatcher against organized labour, consolidating her ‘Iron Lady’ reputation. Given that Thatcher’s energies were consumed by the miners’ strike, it is remarkable that she decided to devote so much of her energy and time to the Northern Ireland conflict. Yet, despite Thatcher’s decision to continue dialogue with the Irish government, in the days following the Brighton bombing she hesitated. In fact, initially she contemplated ending the Armstrong-Nally framework talks indefinitely. On the margins of a letter she received from Charles Powell, dated 18 October 1984, in her own handwriting she scribbled: ‘The events on Thursday night at Brighton mean that we must be very slow on these talks [Armstrong-Nally framework talks] if not stop them. It would look as if we were bombed into making concessions.’171 Indeed, privately Thatcher confessed that the Brighton hotel bombing may have ‘kill[ed] any new initiative’ in relation to Northern Ireland.172 During a meeting with Howe and Hurd, on 31 October, which had been arranged to discuss Thatcher’s forthcoming summit meeting with FitzGerald (scheduled for 18–19 November), she categorically stipulated that there ‘could be no question’ of the forthcoming summit meeting with FitzGerald ‘taking decisions on the issues raised in the Armstrong/Nally talks’. Rather, she wondered whether ‘it would be best to draw a line under the talks’ and thus admit that the Armstrong-Nally framework talks had been a ‘failure’? The talks, she noted, ‘had gone out of focus’ and thus there was a case ‘to round off the talks’. While Hurd remained sceptical regarding the entire enterprise, Howe counselled strongly for Thatcher not to pull the plug on the Armstrong-Nally framework talks. The British government, Howe interjected, ‘could not afford to do nothing … it was better to do something, however small, than to do nothing, and risk retarding relations with Dublin’. ‘There was no question of the Government being bombed into concessions’, he noted, ‘But nor should they be bombed out of a search for a settlement.’ He, therefore, suggested that the talks should be continued, but at a ‘slow tempo’. The collapse of the talks, he warned, would ‘be serious for the constitutional nationalists in the North and for Dr. FitzGerald’s government in the Republic [of Ireland]’.173 In fact, privately Howe was reportedly in favour of British-Irish joint authority over Northern Ireland.174 Indeed, at this time, he petitioned Thatcher not to completely rule out some sort of ‘limited joint arrangements’ between Dublin and London, which had been previously fleshed out under the auspices of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks.175 Thatcher again hesitated. She was worried ‘that our contacts with the Irish are moving too far and too fast’.176 She was particularly anxious about how Ulster Unionists would respond if news of the ongoing talks between British and Irish officials were made public. The ‘Unionists’, she said, ‘would think that the Government had betrayed them.’177 In an attempt to placate Thatcher’s anxieties, Howe suggested that he and Hurd should ‘assume joint responsibility for providing day to day political guidance’ regarding the Armstrong-Nally framework talks. He too confessed that he worried that the talks might be heading in the wrong direction. He, therefore, suggested that

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Thatcher consider establishing a small committee of minsters under her chairmanship to which he would report. Like Thatcher, he categorically ruled out the idea of offering the Irish government ‘joint authority’ over Northern Ireland, instead proposing that Dublin be provided with ‘limited … institutionalised consultation’.178 It took the intervention of Goodall to convince Thatcher not to terminate the talks with Dublin. The basis of his argument focused on a subject he knew was close to Thatcher’s political thinking:  the ongoing financial burden of the Northern Ireland conflict on the British exchequer. In a memorandum seen by Thatcher, dated 30 October 1984, Goodall recorded that the current British subsidy was ‘running at as some £1200 million per year, with the Ministry of Defence costs amounting to a further £125  million per year’. This financial drain on the British exchequer, he explained, could not go on indefinitely. It was, therefore, essential – in the long term – to help find a way to end the conflict. To achieve this long-term goal, he noted, the support of the Irish government was essential. Goodall’s answer was for Thatcher to agree to provide Dublin with a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. If this was delivered, he counselled, the Irish government would be expected to accept ‘a share of responsibility for security’ in Northern Ireland.179 The personal interventions on behalf of Howe and Goodall reluctantly won Thatcher’s approval. She agreed not to ‘break-off ’ the Armstrong-Nally talks at her meeting with FitzGerald. The train would go on, but the destination was still undecided. In fact, Thatcher now included a caveat regarding London’s proposal to permit the Irish government a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. For London to sign up to this proposal, Thatcher now stipulated that a devolved government would first need to be up and running in Northern Ireland.180 Apparently, Hurd had petitioned Thatcher to insert this ‘totally new element’, to quote FitzGerald.181 The Irish government reacted furiously on receiving news of this shift in policy. Michael Lillis described this development as ‘a new and unheralded element’ in British policy.182 FitzGerald and his ministerial colleagues were reportedly ‘dismayed at what they saw as a fundamental shift in the British position’.183 In an attempt to rescue the Armstrong-Nally framework talks, FitzGerald personally intervened. During a meeting with Howe, the taoiseach requested that Thatcher be informed that at their forthcoming talks the Irish government did not simply wish to ‘have talks for the sake of talks’. FitzGerald was concerned that the summit meeting should ‘not result in failure or breakdown’. He was convinced that the Irish people would be happy to take gradual steps towards achieving their ultimate goal of a united Ireland. To Howe’s surprise, however, FitzGerald returned to the subject of joint authority. The Irish government, he said, still held out hope that London might be willing to support this proposal. The secretary of state for foreign affairs and the commonwealth expressed a sense of ‘shock’ at the ambitious nature of FitzGerald’s proposal and reminded him that Thatcher was firmly against this request. Instead, what Thatcher had in mind was the possibility of some consultative role for Dublin, specifically in relation to security.184 Howe’s meeting with FitzGerald acted as a wake-up call for Dublin. Although it pained him greatly, FitzGerald now realized that the prospect of joint authority was off the table, in the immediate term at least. On the eve of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting,

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using Lillis as an intermediary, FitzGerald passed on a message to Thatcher, in which he conceded that the Irish government ‘accepted that the essence of the arrangements under discussions was consultative and would not involve joint authority’.185 Yet, in the back of his mind, FitzGerald still held out hope that at the forthcoming Anglo-Irish summit meeting with Thatcher he might be able to persuade her to reconsider this proposal. As is examined below, FitzGerald was to be bitterly disappointed. In fact, this coming together of the two premiers at Chequers would prove to be a diplomatic disaster.

‘That is out… that is out … that is out’: The FitzGeraldThatcher summit meeting, 18–19 November 1984 The Anglo-Irish summit meeting between FitzGerald and Thatcher, held at Chequers on 18–19 November 1984, was convened under the framework of the AIIC.186 Howe, Hurd, Armstrong and Powell accompanied Thatcher. On the Irish side, Dick Spring, Peter Barry, Dermot Nally and Seán Donlon accompanied FitzGerald. Like the weather outside, from the outset, it was a frosty affair.187 Thatcher and FitzGerald had their first opportunity to speak about Northern Ireland on the evening of 18 November, following the conclusion of dinner. No advisors or note-takers were present on either side. FitzGerald pleaded strongly that both governments should work together on a ‘package’ that would ‘make possible a successful referendum’ on Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. There was a chance, FitzGerald explained, to make an ‘historic breakthrough’. In return for possible amendments to the Irish Constitution, he said that Dublin expected London to agree to make changes in Northern Ireland that would ‘end the alienation’ of the Catholic minority, especially from the security forces. Thatcher hesitated, but did not rule out FitzGerald’s proposals. Rather, she said she would like to reflect overnight.188 At 9.30 a.m., the following morning, 19 November, Thatcher and FitzGerald reconvened to continue their talks. It was a grey, cold, foggy morning. From the outset, the meeting was confrontational. The atmosphere was not helped by the fact that in the minutes before the meeting was due to commence the British had provided the Irish with a speaking note in which ‘anything suggestive of joint authority was rejected’, to quote FitzGerald.189 Thatcher opened proceedings by questioning whether the Irish government could really deliver on its promise to amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. Moreover, she questioned whether Northern Ireland Catholics’ demands for power-sharing ‘[were] really so great?’. Thatcher’s comments were like a red rag to a bull for FitzGerald. He petitioned Thatcher on the need for the minority in Northern Ireland to be policed ‘by people from its own community’. ‘This was particularly the case in the ghetto areas of West Belfast and Derry’, FitzGerald explained. ‘If the police were drawn from the area itself it would be easier to get Catholics to join and serve’, he said. He then cited the example of Brussels, which ‘had forty-six police forces each representing the appropriate balance between Flemings and Walloons’. Thatcher tried to close down the conversation, noting that she was ‘worried about the trend’ of the discussions. FitzGerald, as the

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minutes phrased it, ‘reacted strongly’. ‘85,000 Catholics’, he implored, ‘had been driven out of their homes in the mixed areas into ghettos, the biggest forced population move in Europe since World War Two’.190 To the frustration of the Irish delegation, Thatcher again brought up the question of power-sharing. ‘Power-sharing simply was not on’, she exclaimed. FitzGerald, who by now appeared ‘grey and sad’,191 rejected this suggestion claiming that power-sharing ‘could not be excluded’ from future developments. The conversation then moved to the Irish proposal for joint authority. Thatcher immediately rejected this proposal. ‘Joint authority’, she said, ‘simply could not work.’ FitzGerald interjected. Equally, he wished to make it clear that ‘consultation alone was not enough’. ‘There must be some Irish involvement which was compatible with British sovereignty’, he protested. ‘Consultation was not enough because the views of the Republic [of Ireland] could too easily be ignored.’ Thatcher snapped back, accusing FitzGerald of seeking to secure agreement for joint authority under a different name.192 The meeting then adjourned. At 12.20  p.m., the British and Irish sides reconvened and the battle thus recommenced. In fact, in its ‘combative frankness’, to quote Charles Moore, the meeting was not unlike the famous one with Mikhail Gorbachev, which also took place at Chequers, less than a month later, on 16 December 1984.193 Thatcher invited FitzGerald to open the discussions. ‘[T]‌he discussion had worried him’, he said. ‘He thought that the British side were falling into the trap of regarding the Northern Ireland problem as only a security problem.’ In fact, he explained, the security problem was ‘there because there was a political problem and it was that which had to be solved first’. ‘It was simply not possible for an Irish Government’, he noted, ‘to join a Security Commission unless there was also a political dimension with which the minority could identify’. While he recognized that British sovereignty ‘could not be challenged’, he remained adamant that a political dimension was necessary. Indeed, in retirement, FitzGerald complained about Thatcher’s ‘overemphasis on security, which merely further ‘alienated the minority and gave more strength to the [P]IRA’ – what he described as Thatcher’s ‘colonial mentality’.194 Hurd, Howe and Thatcher all voiced their support for the idea of a Security Commission. The proposed commission, Hurd explained, would cover issues that included prisons and complaints, as well as policing. Thatcher said that such a commission would be a way to ‘help’ the minority in Northern Ireland to ensure that ‘their legal rights were upheld’. FitzGerald interjected. What the Irish needed, he said, was more than an advisory role, for example in relation to appointments and complaints. ‘We can’t have that, Garret. That’s joint authority. That’s out’, she riposted. Regarding Northern Ireland’s political future, Thatcher explicitly ruled out a return to power-sharing. Dublin had to be ‘realistic’. ‘[I]‌t was no good returning to powersharing, it simply was not on’, she implored. FitzGerald rebuked this hypnosis. ‘History could not be ignored’, he protested. ‘It was clear that the Unionists wanted to exclude the minority permanently from any power.’ Thatcher offered her own rebuke. ‘No-one’, she said, ‘was an advocate of unfair Government by majority [sic].’ Ending the talks, after one hour and forty-five minutes, Thatcher agreed with FitzGerald that the Armstrong-Nally framework talks should continue. Yet, apart from an agreement to continue Anglo-Irish negotiations at civil service level, it was blatantly

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obvious to all those in attendance that the gulf between Thatcher and FitzGerald had only grown over the course of the two-day Anglo-Irish summit meeting.195 That said, despite their obvious differences, the right of the Irish government to be consulted on certain aspects of Northern Ireland remained on offer. The official joint communiqué issued in the aftermath of the gathering recorded that the two prime ministers ‘reviewed the work done under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council at both ministerial and official levels on political, economic, security and cultural matters’.196 Although the two-day summit meeting had proved to be an uncomfortable affair, with Thatcher and FitzGerald remaining at loggerheads on several issues, far worse was to follow. In fact, Thatcher’s comments during a post-summit interview, held at a reception at No. 10 Downing Street, caused a political storm. Strictly speaking, Thatcher said nothing that her government had not already stated in public before. However, the way she delivered her comments provoked a media frenzy. Asked by assembled journalists whether she favoured any of the three models proposed by the final report of the NIF (i.e. a unitary solution, a confederal/federal model or a joint authority) Thatcher rejected, out of hand, all three proposals: I have made it quite clear … that a unified Ireland was one solution that is out. A second solution was confederation of the two states. That is out. A third solution was joint authority. That is out. That is a derogation from sovereignty. We made that quite clear when the Report [of the New Ireland Forum] was published.197

Her ‘out, out, out’ remarks caused a political sensation and seemed to qualify Charles Powell’s recollections that in the heat of battle Thatcher had ‘no time for courtly phrases and carefully drafted compromises’.198 Hurd, who sat alongside her grim-faced as Thatcher delivered her dictum, recalled how he was caught completely by surprise by her outburst and was somewhat ‘embarrassed’.199 In retirement, Howe conceded that Thatcher’s press conference had been a ‘disaster’ for Anglo-Irish relations and that he feared that the Armstrong-Nally framework talks would collapse.200 Armstrong, likewise, subsequently said that he thought Thatcher’s public rejection of the three models proposed by the final report of the NIF would witness an ‘end of the [AngloIrish] negotiations’. He felt that ‘Garret [FitzGerald] might be unable to carry on’.201 Goodall was equally forthright. He recalled that Thatcher’s comments had been ‘a disaster which threatened to derail the negotiations altogether’.202 In the days after her comments, Thatcher received a barrage of criticism from her fellow parliamentarians and the general public. On 20 December, Neil Kinnock, Labour Party leader, challenged Thatcher in the House of Commons regarding her ‘out, out, out’ remarks. Why, he asked, had the prime minister dismissed that the final report of NIF, which was ‘a basis for further discussion’ with the Irish government in seeking to end the ‘misery’ in Northern Ireland? 203 The Conservative Party backbencher Michael Mates was equally forthright in the condemnation of Thatcher. ‘I believe’, he noted in correspondence with Thatcher, that she had ‘done harm to the perception of what these true relations are’. He, therefore, pleaded with her to do ‘anything you can do to give some reassurance’. ‘I feel’, he lamented, ‘it would not only be very helpful for the present, but beneficial to the atmosphere leading up to the next talks when there

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is further important work to be done.’204 In fact, Mates had apparently engineered his letter to Thatcher with input from Michael Alison, Thatcher’s private personal secretary, and Richard Ryan, a counsellor in the Irish Embassy in London.205 In the aftermath of the disastrous Anglo-Irish summit meeting, to use Ryan’s description, the three men had come together to ‘find an agreed form of words’ in the hope of repairing Anglo-Irish relations.206 The British prime minister received a plethora of angry letters from the public denouncing her ‘out, out, out’ remarks. One English woman living in the Republic of Ireland wrote to the British Embassy in Dublin to express her ‘total abhorrence at the display of ignorance and insensitivity displayed by our Prime Minister’. ‘This contrasted starkly’, she protested, ‘with the courtesy, restraints and respect for confidentiality shown by the Irish Prime Minister Dr Fitzgerald [sic].’ Although she said she was a proud supporter of the Conservative Party, on this occasion, she wrote that she was ‘ashamed of being British’ and was ‘seriously considering’ giving up her British nationality and instead becoming an Irish national.207 Another British citizen, residing in Co. Galway, likewise, informed Goodison of his ‘disgust’ at ‘our Prime Minister’s behaviour on television yesterday’ and ‘the patronising comments of Mr Hurd’. ‘I feel my country is moving on a very dangerous road. Please ask Mrs Thatcher to think again.’208 Needless to say, Ulster Unionists were delighted by Thatcher’s performance. James Molyneaux congratulated Thatcher ‘on the courage and clear-sightedness that she showed in taking the government off the treadmill of initiatives which in the past have been the cause of so much turmoil’.209 Enoch Powell also wrote to Thatcher to also congratulate her on her handling of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting.210 FitzGerald was genuinely left dumbfounded. Thatcher’s ‘out, out, out’ comments, he recalled, had ‘shot down’ all three Irish proposals.211 He had taken great political risk in dealing with the British government, specifically in proposing that the Irish government was willing to make constitutional changes in exchange for London agreeing to joint authority over Northern Ireland. Because of Thatcher’s rebuttal of the joint authority model, FitzGerald’s political standing and authority was significantly weakened. As Lillis informed Goodall, the perception that FitzGerald had been unable to win concessions from Thatcher at the Anglo-Irish summit meeting, coupled with the British prime minister’s post-press conference statement, had the net result of leaving FitzGerald feeling that this was ‘the worse [sic] thing that had happened to him since he became Taoiseach’.212 A lead headline in the Irish Independent summed up the mood in Dublin. ‘Gratuitously insulting … we now know the extent of the Taoiseach’s feelings’ on learning of Thatcher’s comments at the post-summit press conference.213 In fact, FitzGerald must shoulder a large portion of the responsibility regarding the fall out in the aftermath of Thatcher’s ‘out, out, out’ comments. For at least the previous three months, preceding the Anglo-Irish summit meeting, Thatcher had categorically and repeatedly placed on record her opposition to anything close to joint authority. As she noted to FitzGerald in a private letter shortly after the Anglo-Irish summit meeting. ‘I was bound to reaffirm’, she explained, that the three models contained with the NIF report were ‘unacceptable to us’.214 The way Thatcher delivered her comments was indeed rude, going against standard diplomatic protocol. Yet, the substance of

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her comments should not have come as a surprise to FitzGerald for they were in full accordance with British government policy.215 Despite the obvious tensions that existed in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish summit meeting, FitzGerald held out hope that the Armstrong-Nally framework talks would continue into the New Year. Again, using Lillis as an intermediary, in late November 1984 the taoiseach passed on a message to Thatcher requesting that the British government might consider resuming the Armstrong-Nally Framework talks. Lillis explained that FitzGerald wished Thatcher to know that ‘he badly needed some help from the British side if his political position was not to be irretrievably damaged’.216 To FitzGerald’s relief, Thatcher agreed to continue the Armstrong-Nally framework talks, albeit that the negotiations would be limited in ‘scope’.217 Writing to FitzGerald during this period she sought to reassure him that despite their obvious differences she would continue to take ‘a close personal interest in the continuing discussions between our two governments over the coming months’.218 Perhaps Thatcher felt somewhat guilty about the damage she had inflicted on FitzGerald and therefore decided to do her best to make it up to him, as noted by Dermot Nally.219 Placed within this context, Thatcher sanctioned her cabinet secretary to ‘seek a new political framework which would be acceptable to both communities’ in Northern Ireland. The terms of this ‘new political framework’ fell under three headings: (1) legal, (2) security and lastly (3) political.220 In relation to (1)  legal matters, in the days and weeks following the Anglo-Irish summit meeting British officials focused on Dublin’s proposal to establish mixed law courts and on London’s proposal to setup an all-Ireland law commission. On (2) security matters, Whitehall officials returned to their proposal to establish a joint security commission;221 a proposal, which the Irish had already ‘made it clear’, would be ‘unacceptable to public and Parliamentary opinion’ in the Republic of Ireland. Lastly, on the question of (3) political advancements, London made it clear that there ‘should be close and continuing discussion’ between Dublin and London in order to facilitate the creation of a ‘political framework in Northern Ireland which was acceptable to both the majority and minority communities’.222 However, Thatcher also included a caveat regarding the long-term future of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks. It was her intention, as confirmed by Powell, that early in the New Year the British government would re-examine its Northern Ireland policy, specifically the need for a ‘more limited bargain than that envisaged in the original Armstrong-Nally talks’. Such a revision was necessary, according to Thatcher, because of Dublin’s ‘resistance to signalling out security alone [i.e. London’s calls for the establishment of a joint Security Commission]’. If such progress failed, Powell made it clear that Thatcher was willing to terminate the Armstrong-Nally framework talks with immediate effect.223 *** In conclusion, in the aftermath of Thatcher’s ‘out, out, out’ remarks, British and Irish policymakers, together with Thatcher and FitzGerald, alike, were confronted by a sense of ‘realism’, to borrow Charles Moore’s phrase.224 The British were now ready to accept that a referendum on revising Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution was

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unlikely, while on the Irish side, Dublin now recognized that joint authority was no longer a viable option. Personally, Thatcher now decided that she was ‘definitely interested’ in making process on the subject of Northern Ireland. Her summit meeting with FitzGerald had ‘brought her much more deeply into the [Irish] question than ever before’, to quote Powell, ‘and she has now a much firmer grasp of the complexities’.225 As is examined in the next chapter, the result of this new sense of realism, therefore, was the opening up of a fresh pathway towards granting the Irish government a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland, as enshrined under the terms of the AIA of 1985.

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Anglo-American relations and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985–6 ‘[H]‌is desire for political progress’: The Reagan-Thatcher relationship and Northern Ireland Since the outbreak of the Northern Ireland conflict in the late 1960s, consecutive US presidents – from Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–9, to Richard Nixon, 1969–74, to Gerald Ford, 1974–7 – had shown little, if any, interest in the Irish question.1 In the words of Luke Devoy, before Jimmy Carter’s election as US president in January 1977, there had been ‘no signs of any official policy on Northern Ireland’ from within the White House.2 Indeed, up to this period the US State Department ‘was effectively a puppet of the British government when it came to Northern Ireland’.3 For example, the only real interest shown by Nixon was his ‘genealogical excursions’ to Ireland, in October 1970, which was more for domestic US consumption than an indication of his desire to get involved in the Irish question.4 Revealingly, two years later in 1972, Nixon’s secretary of state, William P.  Rogers allegedly declared that ‘suggestions that we can solve it [the Irish question] in a diplomatic way are outrageous’.5 To quote Roger McGinty, until the late 1970s a Cold War driven ‘special relationship’ with Great Britain meant that successive US administrations were happy to regard Northern Ireland as ‘an internal affair for the United Kingdom’.6 Significantly, Jimmy Carter’s election as president of the United States in 1977 heralded a subtle, but important, change in the US government’s Northern Ireland policy. On 30 August of that year, Carter delivered a major speech in which he asked Americans to ‘refrain from supporting with financial or other aid’ organizations involved with paramilitary violence, reaffirmed the US policy of ‘impartiality’ and promised US investment in Northern Ireland, if the bloodshed ceased.7 In delivering this speech, Carter broke a half century of silence vis-à-vis the US government’s attitude to Northern Ireland and in doing so ‘abandoned the principle of not becoming involved in Northern Ireland’.8 In fact, his speech, which laid the foundations for the so-called ‘Carter Initiative’, was the first positive statement from a US president that not only probed the nature of the Anglo-American relationship, but also recognized that the Irish government had a role to play in finding a permanent solution to the Northern Ireland conflict, to quote the Irish Times.9 In a 2017 interview, Carter explained the significance of his speech: ‘it was a rare thing’, he recalled, ‘for the United States to take a position against the policies of the

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Great Britain government.’ ‘I really meant it’, he noted; it became ‘an important part of America foreign policy’.10 Thereafter, to again quote Devoy, ‘the norm of nonintervention was now broken. Northern Ireland had become a legitimate area of official US foreign policy and British officials could not be certain how this might develop’.11 On her election as British prime minister in May 1979, Thatcher made it clear that she resented the Carter administration’s interference in the affairs of Northern Ireland.12 In fact, the US president’s intervention confirmed Thatcher’s personal indifference towards him. In The Downing Street years, Thatcher was scathing of Carter’s abilities as a politician (although she was at pains to stress that she liked him as an individual). Apart from pointing out his many ‘political flaws’, including his ‘flawed analysis’ on foreign affairs, she acidly wrote that Carter was ‘ill-suited to the presidency’ because he agonized over ‘big decisions’ and was ‘too considered with detail’.13 Carter, likewise, found Thatcher difficult to deal with, frustrated by her tendency to dominate discussions and to occasionally lecture her US counterpart.14 Shortly into her premiership, the US State Department noticed Thatcher’s resentment regarding Carter’s apparent eagerness to involve himself in the internal affairs of the UK. As a result, policymakers within the US State Department strongly counselled the US president against directly involving himself in the affair of Northern Ireland and advised him against placing pressure on Thatcher to concede concessions to the Irish government.15 The intervention of the US State Department, however, did not facilitate a thaw in the Carter-Thatcher relationship and as a result, Thatcher kept her distance from him for the remainder of his presidency. The strained Carter-Thatcher relationship was symptomatic of Anglo-American relations during this period. Simply put, in the US administration, the idea abroad was that Great Britain ‘no longer mattered’.16 As Jonathan Aitken wrote, by 1979 the so-called ‘special relationship’ between the two countries was ‘now fading’.17 A  CIA report sent to Carter in October 1979 argued that the ‘special relationship’ between the United States and Great Britain had ‘lost much of its meaning’,18 that Washington was no longer ‘significantly closer to Britain than to its other major allies’.19 The inauguration of Ronald Reagan as US president in January 1981, however, transformed Anglo-American relations, heralding a new ‘special relationship’ between the two countries.20 At the heart of this renewed relationship was the personal affection that Thatcher and Reagan held for one another. In the words of Charles Moore, the personal chemistry between the two leaders was ‘undeniable’.21 Indeed, Thatcher was one of the first foreign heads of government to visit the incumbent US president following her visit to Washington in late February 1981. She had first met Reagan as far back as 1975 (and again in 1978 and 1979) when she had sat down with the former governor of California in her office in the House of Commons. They immediately warmed to one another. Thatcher later affectionately recalled that ‘I was immediately won over by his charm, directness and sense of humour’.22 Reagan, likewise, expressed admiration for his host: ‘It was evident from our first words that we were soul mates when it came to reducing government and expanding freedom.’23 Although the two leaders might have very well been ‘soul mates’, to borrow Reagan’s description, they certainly had very different temperaments. Reagan, a known charmer, with a ‘disarming style’, had ‘no taste for detail’ and was ‘not deeply

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interested in international affairs’.24 Thatcher was quite the opposite, known to be hyperactive, zealous and an ‘intensely knowledgeable leader’; she was also a passionate internationalist.25 Yet, despite such differences, what they shared, what they both cherished, was ‘a common moral outlook on the world’.26 While they would often disagree on policies and tactics (including over Reagan’s new Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and the US invasion of Grenada), ‘their basic personal trust and sense of common purpose never failed’.27 Initially, at least on his election as US president, Reagan gave a commitment to follow a neutral, non-intervention, Northern Ireland policy, which focused on deploring paramilitary terrorism and promoting reconciliation. As Ronan Fanning wrote, following Reagan’s election, US foreign policy ‘reverted to its traditional stance: that the United States should not anger Great Britain, its closest Cold War ally, by meddling in its internal affairs’.28 This policy position was given public credence during Reagan’s first public comments on Northern Ireland during his St Patrick’s Day speech on 17 March 1981. Although he called for a ‘swift solution to the current problems in Northern Ireland’, he pledged to respect that the conflict was an internal matter for HMG.29 Indeed, US non-intervention policy on behalf of the Reagan administration was confirmed during the height of the second Irish Republican hunger strike in 1981.30 Despite coming under huge pressure from the Irish-American lobby regarding Thatcher’s alleged ‘intransigence’, Reagan refused to intervene.31 In fact, during a breakfast meeting at No. 10 Downing Street, on 20 July 1981, eight days after the death of Irish Republican hunger striker Martin Hurson,32 neither Reagan nor Thatcher breached the subject of Northern Ireland.33 Despite Reagan’s personal indifference regarding the Northern Ireland conflict, his administration’s interest in the subject was awakened, albeit momentarily, following the personal intervention of William (Bill) Clark. In December 1981, US deputy secretary of state conducted a tour of Ireland. Described in British circles as one of Reagan’s ‘oldest and closet associates’, as belonging to the White House ‘inner circle’,34 Clark had a personal interest in Ireland and more specifically had a personal ‘attachment to the cause of Irish unity’.35 In fact, Clark had some Irish roots and had first met and subsequently married his wife in Ireland.36 He owned a holiday home in Malahide, Co. Dublin, a ranch in California called ‘Hibernia’37 and even, for a time, a private aeroplane at Dublin Airport.38 On arriving to Ireland in December 1981, Clark carried with him a letter, dated 7 December, to the taoiseach Garret FitzGerald from Reagan, in which the latter noted, inter alia, ‘we believe a lasting solution can be found only in a process of reconciliation between the two Irish political traditions and between Britain and Ireland’.39 Contained within Reagan’s letter to FitzGerald was also an invitation to the taoiseach to visit Washington on St Patrick’s Day 1982. This invitation was subsequently taken up by FitzGerald’s successor Charles Haughey who, in a speech at the White House, on 17 March 1982, overtly sought US support for the ‘cause of Irish unity’.40 Reagan’s speech that day reiterated themes in his St Patrick’s Day speech the previous year and in his letter to the taoiseach in December 1981, placing emphasis on the importance of bringing an end to paramilitary violence and encouraging US investment on the island of Ireland.41 At the same time, Reagan reaffirmed his government’s policy

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of ‘non-involvement’ in the internal affairs of the UK, instead urging ‘the parties in Northern Ireland to come together for a just solution and to condemn all acts of terrorism and violence’.42 Reagan’s comments won the wholehearted approval of the Thatcher government, described by Sir Nicholas Henderson, British ambassador in Washington, as signalling ‘a proper and sensible expression of U.S. interest in Northern Ireland’.43 In a sign of how low the subject of Northern Ireland ranked in Reagan’s political thinking, when the two leaders met for formal discussions at No. 10 Downing Street, on 9 June 1982, the issue was ignored. Instead, their meeting focused on the state of Western Alliances, the Soviet Union and the Middle East.44 Indeed, during a meeting with Henderson, in mid-October 1982, William Clark (by now Reagan’s national security advisor following the enforced resignation of Richard Allen in January 1982)  reaffirmed that ‘U.S.  policy remained unchanged’. ‘The U.S.  view’, he said, ‘was that the momentum for progress must come from within the Northern Irish community’ and therefore the United States would not become involved in the internal affairs of the UK.45 By 1983, London was confidentially reporting that the Reagan administration had ‘consistently refused to be drawn into taking sides on Northern Ireland, despite pressures to the contrary’.46 During his annual St Patrick’s Day speech, on 17 March 1983, Reagan acknowledged that it was ‘not for the United States to chart a course for the people of Northern Ireland’, but rather to encourage reconciliation between the two communities.47 This stance was confirmed following US vice-president George Bush’s visit to the Republic of Ireland in early July of that year. He held talks with the taoiseach Garret FitzGerald, during which Bush said he had come to Ireland to ‘listen and learn’.48 Regarding the NIF (see Chapter 7), Bush said that it was ‘not his Government’s role to support or not to support the Forum’.49 Indeed, in October, Reagan turned down a resolution for the appointment of a special US envoy to Northern Ireland.50 The Reagan administrations’ non-intervention strategy in relation to Northern Ireland remained a common feature of US foreign policy during 1984. Again, during his annual St Patrick’s Day speech, on 17 March 1984, Reagan avoided aligning his administration with either the British or the Irish governments. Instead, his speech ‘consolidated his administration’s position of support for reconciliation between the two traditions in Ireland’.51 Reagan reiterated the same message during an interview with the Irish national broadcaster RTÉ in May of that year. The Northern Ireland conflict, he said, ‘is a problem to be settled there between, not only the governments of England and Ireland, but also of the people in the North and the people of the South … I don’t think it’s our place to do that [to intervene]’.52 The following month, in June, Reagan made his first (and only) official visit to the Republic of Ireland as US president. From 1st to 4th of that month, he travelled around the country, visiting his ancestral village of Ballyporeen, Co. Tipperary.53 Although on each of his four days in Ireland Reagan spoke about Northern Ireland and his wish to see an end to violence, he continued to follow his strategy of not commenting on the internal policies of the British government vis-à-vis Northern Ireland. At Shannon Airport, on 1 June, for instance, he noted that ‘Americans are people of peace … those who advocate violence or engage in terrorism in Northern Ireland will never

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be welcome in the United States’.54 Reagan’s remarks received a warm welcome from the British government. In the words of David Tatham of the British Embassy in Dublin, ‘President Reagan’s handling of Northern Ireland was exemplary. He refused to be drawn on possible solutions and came down hard on [P]‌IRA “terrorists” and their supporters.’55 Indeed, during a private tête-à-tête, on 5 June, in London, Thatcher thanked Reagan for ‘his public references to the evils of terrorism and the U.S. policy of non-intervention in the problems of Northern Ireland’.56 Significantly, however, in the aftermath of Thatcher’s ‘out, out, out’ comments in November 1984, following the publication of the New Ireland Forum Report, a gradual metamorphosis occurred regarding US thinking on Northern Ireland, in which Reagan abandoned his hitherto neutral stance. It was at this point that William Clark’s involvement became pivotal (by now Whitehall was reporting that Clark was ‘undoubtedly closer to a Dublin line than a London line’ vis-à-vis Northern Ireland).57 Shortly after Thatcher’s Anglo-Irish summit meeting with FitzGerald, in November 1984, Clark received a request from Seán Donlon that the former use his influence to press Reagan to ‘express his concern about the Anglo-Irish situation’.58 Clark duly obliged.59 In advance of an Anglo-American summit meeting at Camp David between Reagan and Thatcher, pencilled in for late December 1984, the US president agreed to Clark’s request that he raise Northern Ireland with the British prime minister and express ‘his desire for political progress’.60 Moreover, there was another, arguably more important, reason why Reagan decided to ditch his previous non-intervention policy in relation to Northern Ireland:  the influence of the powerful Irish-American lobby in Washington. The lobbying campaign on behalf of the Irish-American community was spearheaded under the auspices of ‘The Friends of Ireland’ (FOI).61 Launched in 1981, this body was led by several influential Irish-American politicians.62 Most prominent amongst this lobbying group were the so-called ‘The Four Horsemen’ (named after the famous backfield of Notre Dame’s 1924 American football team),63 Tip O’Neill, Ted (Edward) Kennedy, Daniel Patrick Moynihan64 and Hugh Carey.65 Described in Irish government circles as ‘the most important Irish organisation’ in the US Congress,66 the FOI mounted a sustained anti-PIRA propaganda campaign amongst US senators and congressmen. Chiefly, O’Neill and his three allies ran a relentless campaign against those organizations sympathetic to Irish Republican terrorism, including the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID), believed to be a front for the PIRA in the United States; the Irish National Caucus (INC); and an ad hoc US congressional committee for Irish Affairs, chaired by Mario Biaggi, a member of the US House of Representatives from New York.67 O’Neill was particularly integral to the successful operation of the Irish-American lobbying process. Described by Michael Lillis as a man of ‘tremendous stature and political skill’, as speaker of the US House of Representatives, O’Neill held considerable influence in Washington and regularly used his political muscle in the arena of IrishAmerican politics.68 In the words of Ronan Fanning, as in his previous dealings with the former US president Carter, ‘O’Neill’s influence was decisive in persuading’ Reagan to ‘drop the “hands off ” US policy towards Northern Ireland’.69 Throughout the mid1980s, working closely with the Irish government in Dublin and John Hume’s SDLP in

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Northern Ireland, O’Neill (and the FOI network) regularly lobbied Reagan on the Irish question, pressurizing the US president to raise the subject of Northern Ireland with Thatcher whenever the opportunity arose.70 Apart from pressure from the Irish-American lobby, Reagan had his own reasons for supporting O’Neill’s appeals. First, by giving into such requests, the US president hoped that he could soften O’Neill’s ‘critique of his Nicaragua policy’.71 As Henry Patterson pointed out, as speaker of the US House of Representatives, O’Neill had ‘unprecedented leverage’ with Reagan because of his record of opposition to US funding of the ‘Contras’ (the counter revolutionaries fighting against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua). Thus, the ‘muting of O’Neill’s criticism on Nicaragua was the price of the Irish state’s most important political advance in relation to Northern Ireland since partition’.72 Second, in relation to domestic politics, Reagan depended on O’Neill’s cooperation and goodwill to pass his legislative programme through the US House of Representatives, ‘which O’Neill dominated’.73 For her part, the fallout between London and Washington regarding the US invasion of Grenada in October 1983 most certainly played an important role in Thatcher’s thinking vis-à-vis Northern Ireland. She had personally opposed the US invasion of Grenada and was ‘dismayed’ by Reagan’s decision to use military force against her express wishes.74 After all, Grenada was a member of the British Commonwealth, Queen Elizabeth II was the island’s head of state, and the US invasion took place without her prior knowledge, let  alone consent.75 Therefore, Thatcher saw Reagan’s latest intervention in relation to the Northern Ireland conflict as an opportunity to mend some broken fences. In the words of Charles Powell, Thatcher was keen on ‘keeping that old Irishman Reagan on side’ and the best way to achieve this objective was to be ‘seen to be talking to the government of the Republic [of Ireland]’.76 At the Anglo-American summit at Camp David between Reagan and Thatcher, on 22 December 1984, the US president tentatively mentioned the subject of Northern Ireland. Although Reagan did not initially raise this subject with Thatcher during their morning tête-à-tête (instead their discussions focused on Thatcher’s recent meeting at Chequers with Gorbachev and Reagan’s passionate support for his SDI programme),77 Northern Ireland was discussed later that day during a plenary session. Reagan said that he had received a letter from Tip O’Neill asking him to appeal to Thatcher ‘to be reasonable’ and for her to consider ways to facilitate an improvement in Anglo-Irish relations, specifically in relation to Northern Ireland.78 Reagan’s continued support for the ongoing dialogue between the British and Irish governments was reaffirmed during Thatcher’s visit to Washington in February of the following year. By now, to quote David Cannadine, Reagan was ‘gently’ urging Thatcher ‘to adopt a more accommodating attitude’ regarding Dublin’s involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland.79 At a meeting with Thatcher in the White House, on 20 February, Reagan again brought up the subject of Northern Ireland. He spoke about the current state of Anglo-Irish relations and guaranteed his continued support for ‘all those working for peaceful solutions and reconciliation’.80 Later that day, Thatcher briefly touched upon the subject of Northern Ireland when she addressed the joint houses of the US Congress. Significantly, she spoke of the need to work closely with the Irish government in the ‘quest for stability and peace in

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Northern Ireland’.81 Her reference to the Irish government, described as ‘concession under duress’, was an acknowledgement of a gradual change in Thatcher’s thinking on Northern Ireland.82 In the words of Charles Moore, thereafter, it ‘made it much harder for her to break out of the process of Anglo-Irish negotiations. Expectations were rising.’83 Indeed, the assembled media immediately noticed Thatcher’s reference to the Irish government during her speech. ‘Singing for her supper’ was how the Washington Post described the British prime minister’s Irish remarks.84

‘She very much wanted an agreement …’: The evolution of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy, January–July 1985 Across the Atlantic, by the turn of the New Year, Thatcher continued to harbour her doubts regarding the ongoing Anglo-Irish negotiations. In fact, her thinking on Northern Ireland and more generally Anglo-Irish relations seemed muddled, indeed contradictory. For instance, during a meeting with John Hume, on 17 January 1985, she conceded that ‘too much time’ during discussions with the Irish government was ‘spent stating and restating the problem rather than negotiating seriously for a solution’. Thus, in her mind there had to be ‘a real desire to make progress and both sides had to recognise the need to make painful concessions’.85 Yet, in correspondence with Robert Armstrong during the same period, Thatcher expressed frustration because of the Irish government’s repeated demands for a formalized role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. As the British cabinet secretary phrased it, ‘she doubts whether we shall find a way forward’.86 Not for the first or last time, it took the intervention of Geoffrey Howe to reignite Anglo-Irish relations. In the words of Dublin-born Lord Gowrie, British minister for state for the arts, 1983–5, ‘He [Howe] sees the prize in doing something about Ireland.’87 In fact, fearful for a ‘creeping cataclysm’ in Northern Ireland, by the early weeks of 1984, Howe emphasized that it was essential that ‘we should do something’ regarding the Irish question.88 Apart from the continued ‘massive financial drain on the British exchequer’, Howe also sought to remind Thatcher of the ‘pressure coming from the United States to find a workable solution’ to the Northern Ireland conflict, as he noted privately.89 Howe was particularly frustrated by Thatcher’s continued intransigence regarding the Irish government’s request for a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. ‘Consultative arrangements’, he noted during a meeting with Douglas Hurd, on 4 January 1985, ‘could be worked out which would satisfy the Irish need to appear to have a real say in decision-making’.90 Howe’s arguments won a sympathetic ear from Hurd. It was a ‘political necessity’, Hurd informed Thatcher during a meeting, on 16 January, that the Irish government be granted ‘a wider consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern.91 The intervention on behalf of Howe and Hurd reluctantly won Thatcher’s approval. In late January, 1985, the British government presented the FitzGerald-led administration in Dublin with a secret proposal regarding a ‘possible role for the Irish Government

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in future arrangements for Northern Ireland’. Importantly, this proposal was recorded as having Thatcher’s ‘full commitment’ and as such should be taken seriously. As bait, the British now dropped its previous demand that in return for permitting the Irish a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland, Dublin would first need to agree to amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution.92 Indeed, privately Thatcher now recognized that the prospect of a referendum in the Republic of Ireland on Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution was ‘fraught with danger’ as there was a real chance that it would ‘not be carried’, to quote Lord Gowrie.93 By the spring of 1985, Lord Gowrie had assumed a prominent role vis-à-vis British government thinking on Northern Ireland. In March of that year, he was appointed to a newly formed subcommittee, entitled ‘United Kingdom relations with the Republic of Ireland’,94 which operated under the auspices of the British cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee. This new subcommittee, in Lord Gowrie’s words, was established to ‘monitor the current Anglo-Irish exchanges’ in the context of the AIA negotiations.95 Extraordinarily, in the months leading to the signing of the AIA, Lord Gowrie allegedly passed top-secret information to Dublin regarding the British government’s current thinking on Northern Ireland;96 a ploy that he, himself, conceded might get him into ‘very serious trouble’ with Thatcher.97 Richard Ryan, aka ‘Mr Fix It’, facilitated this secret channel of communication.98 A counsellor in the Irish Embassy in London, over the preceding years Ryan had built up a network of relationships with prominent Conservative Party figures, including Alistair McAlpine,99 William (Bill) Benyon,100 Anthony Buck,101 David Crouch,102 Marcus Fox103 and Ian Gow.104 As the behest of Garret FitzGerald, in October 1983, Ryan had terminated his position in the European Commission and joined the Irish Embassy in London, ‘mandated personally with a specific set of objectives’. Specifically, in Ryan’s own words, he was ‘ordered to shadow the necessary confidential intergovernmental contacts and negotiations as they would hopefully develop’.105 In what John Bowman labelled ‘how Irish diplomats “dined for Ireland” ’ Ryan regularly hosted lunches and evening buffet dinners with newspaper editors, political advisors and politicians from across Westminster.106 An ‘astute Thatcher watcher’, in the months leading to the signing of the AIA, Ryan conducted a campaign to capture Conservative Party MPs’ ‘hearts and minds’ in support of the AIA.107 The information that Ryan supplied to the DFA headquarters in Dublin was invaluable, providing the Irish government with a unique insight into the British government’s private attitude to Northern Ireland and more generally Anglo-Irish relations. Initially, Dublin hesitated regarding London’s secret New Year’s proposal. At a meeting of the Irish government, on 31 January 1985, ministers discussed the contents of the British proposal, which were described as ‘tentative’. FitzGerald was particularly concerned about whether the proposals would be ‘acceptable politically’ in the Republic of Ireland and by the SDLP. Moreover, he raised concerns about whether enough ‘safeguards’ were in place to ensure the protection of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland.108 Privately, FitzGerald spelt out these concerns and several others at a meeting with Armstrong, in Dublin, the previous week, on 22 January. ‘I doubt’, the taoiseach explained, that the latest British proposal is ‘sufficient to attract the support of the minority’ in Northern Ireland.109

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Despite Dublin’s lukewarm response to the British government’s latest proposals, Howe was eager to reignite Anglo-Irish relations at ministerial level. Consequently, on 22 March, in the company of Hurd, Howe travelled to Dublin to hold what was described as ‘stocktaking’ talks with representatives of the Irish government, Peter Barry and Dick Spring.110 These talks were followed a week later, 30 March, with a meeting between Thatcher and FitzGerald in the margins of the European Council in Brussels. At this brief encounter, the two premiers agreed to continue British-Irish civil servant and ministerial negotiations in the hope of securing an agreement ‘on the Anglo-Irish dimension’, to quote the British prime minister. Regarding Dublin’s request for a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland, Thatcher did not reject this proposal out of hand, but said it was ‘essential’ that the Irish government ‘should make a firm statement about the constitutional position of Northern Ireland’.111 The following month, between 29 and 30 April 1985, British and Irish civil servants convened under the auspices of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks to flesh out a preliminary draft of the AIA.112 These discussions took place in the leafy surroundings of Chevening, the British foreign and commonwealth secretary’s country residence, located outside London. By now, the Irish were reporting that the progress of the talks and the British government’s current stance was ‘extremely disappointing’, yet FitzGerald still held out hope that an agreement would be reached.113 From a British perspective, Armstrong was at pains to emphasize that the Irish needed to take into account that British ministers were ‘apprehensive about the reaction of the Unionist community in Northern Ireland to any agreement which appears to take the historic step of giving the Irish Government a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland’.114 In a sign of both governments’ eagerness to advance the negotiations during 1985, alone, at least nineteen separate meetings, over the course of approximately thirty days, were convened under the auspices of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks.115 Despite the progress that had been made, by May 1985, Thatcher again privately expressed her ‘doubts and anxieties about the whole enterprise’, in the words of David Goodall. Her revived doubts regarding the progress of the Anglo-Irish talks was due to escalating opposition within her cabinet regarding the proposed establishment of joint courts under the draft terms of the AIA.116 A rump fraction of Thatcher’s cabinet, including Leon Brittan and Lord Hailsham, voiced their support for Sir Robert Lowry’s opposition to the proposed joint courts (i.e. the ‘Lowry affair’). At the time, Lowry, the lord chief justice of Northern Ireland, had allegedly ‘toured’ the British cabinet to drum up support against the proposed joint courts (Lowry had narrowly missed an assassination attempt on his life by the PIRA in 1982).117 Lowry’s intervention caused Thatcher to have one of her customary nervous hiatuses in the field of Anglo-Irish relations, to the extent that she momentarily considered calling a halt to the Armstrong-Nally framework talks. In fact, Lowry was reported to have ‘formally revolted’ to the British proposal, ‘most particularly to those parts of it which touch on legal matters and the judiciary’, to quote Lord Gowrie.118 Lowry’s intervention had the desired impact. At a meeting of British and Irish officials in Dublin, under the auspices of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks, on 15 May, Armstrong informed his hosts that London continued to harbour grave reservations about the proposed joint courts.119

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By this period, a growing division within the British cabinet regarding the progress and scope of the Anglo-Irish negotiations was becoming an increasing source of irritation for Thatcher. Although Hurd, Howe and Whitelaw continued to push for progress, chiefly that the Irish government be provided with a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland, others within Thatcher’s cabinet were less than enthusiastic. For instance, John Biffen,120 Lord Hailsham121 and Norman Tebbit122 all reportedly believed that ‘there is little, if anything, to be gained from touching it [Northern Ireland] at present’, to quote Adam Ridley, a special advisor to Nigel Lawson.123 David Goodall regularly stressed to the Irish government that they needed to realize that sharp divisions existed within the British cabinet regarding its Ireland policy. Apart from some British ministers’ continued dislike for the joint courts proposal (indeed, Thatcher, herself, believed that the proposed joint courts would ‘constitute an infringement of sovereignty),124 the British cabinet, collectively, was exasperated by the new demands being made on behalf of the Irish government. Specifically, FitzGerald’s latest request for an ‘unarmed police force’ to be allowed to operate in certain ‘nationalist areas of Northern Ireland [e.g. Creggan in Londonderry]’. A request that London categorically rejected.125 Privately, Goodall described this request on behalf of Dublin as ‘far-fetched and unacceptable’.126 ‘[M]‌any Ministers’, Goodall noted in a conversation with Noel Dorr, on 6 June, ‘would be inclined to “throw their hat at it” and say with some exasperation that this was a perfect example of the old accusation that every time the British begin to address the Irish question seriously, the Irish change the question’. ‘The danger then’, Goodall warned, ‘was that they would “hunker down” and that the integration thesis would come to the fore.’127 Despite continued disagreements amongst ministers, by the end of June 1985, Thatcher arrived at the conclusion that an agreement was possible with the Irish government. An agreement, to quote Goodall, of ‘great historic importance’. That is, an agreement ‘formally conceding to the Irish Government a role in relation to Northern Ireland’.128 During a meeting with FitzGerald, on 29 June, on the second day of a European Council meeting in the Castello Sforzesco, Milan, Thatcher confirmed that she was in favour of reaching an agreement, irrespective of the inevitable backlash which her government would suffer from ‘the unionists’. ‘It would be very damaging now’, she informed FitzGerald, ‘not to go ahead with the proposed agreement.’ She ‘very much wanted an agreement to go into effect and the British Government would implement it fully’.129 Thatcher waited almost one month, 25 July 1985, before recommending to her cabinet that the British government agree to the signing of the proposed AIA, under the lines defined in a memorandum devised on behalf of Howe and Hurd. Entitled, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, the Howe/Hurd memorandum emphasized that ‘a limited agreement’ on the lines outlined below ‘could be a prize well worth having. It would not be an end in itself, but an aid to the long-term stability of Northern Ireland.’130 This was the first occasion that ministers had an opportunity to read over and discuss the Howe/Hurd memorandum. This was a deliberate tactic used by Thatcher to avoid leaks. According to Armstrong, an unknown ‘cabinet minister’ had allegedly shown a journalist a draft copy of the AIA sometime between 15 and 24 July.131

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Introducing the memorandum, Hurd said that the ‘core of the proposed agreement was that the Irish Republic would have a consultative role in relation to a range of Northern Ireland affairs, but decision-making would remain in British hands’. Howe noted that during the negotiations the arrangements sought by the Irish government had been ‘greatly scaled down’, that the proposed agreement ‘did not involve any kind of joint authority’. Howe and Hurd then took turns to explain to fellow ministers the central components of the memorandum and the rationale behind their request for the cabinet to approve its contents. ‘On 16 February 1984’, they explained, the British cabinet had authorized ‘an explanatory dialogue with the Irish Government to see whether the basis existed for an agreement which would contribute to the easing of the problems in Northern Ireland’. Between February 1984 and July of this year, they noted, the British government’s main objectives in the discussions with the Irish government were as follows: (a) to secure explicit Irish acceptance of the present status of Northern Ireland and in particular maximize security cooperation; (b) to increase confidence among the Roman Catholic minority in the institutions in Northern Ireland and thus to improve the prospect that the SDLP will in due course cooperate in devolution; and (c) to influence international opinion on Northern Ireland. The memorandum next set out to explain the present position and ‘seeks the cabinet’s approval for the text for an agreement (at Annex)’, under which the Irish government would be able, in a new bilateral Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, within the framework of the existing AIIC, ‘to put forward views and proposals to the British Government on defined aspects of Northern Ireland affairs, but would have no executive or decision-making authority’ (i.e. the basis of a ‘consultative’ role). On the British request that the Irish government agree to amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, the memorandum recorded that this offer had been formally declined by Dublin. However, the Irish government would agree ‘to enshrine in an agreement, registered with the United Nations, their recognition that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and would remain so far as long as the majority there wished’ (i.e. thus enshrine in law the ‘principle of consent’). On the controversial subject of the proposed establishment of joint courts, the subject was kicked down the road, with the ambiguous instruction that it would be given further investigation, with the result that both governments could sidestep this politically sensitive topic for the time being. ‘We are clear that we can enter into no such advance commitment on this complex subject’, the memorandum recorded, ‘but we have agreed that the question can be considered’ under the auspices of the AngloIrish intergovernmental conference. On when and where the proposed AIA would be signed, no definite decision was decided on. ‘No time has been agreed for an Anglo-Irish summit to conclude an agreement. Both sides have late September in mind as a possibility’, the memorandum recorded. In relation to the location, the Irish government did not want it to be held

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in Great Britain. For her part, Thatcher made it clear that it would not take place in the Republic of Ireland as it ‘would be criticised by unionists’. Another possibility, therefore, was Northern Ireland, although there would ‘be a formidable problem of security’.132 A lengthy discussion then took place amongst assembled ministers, several of whom were reportedly having difficulty understanding the content of the Howe/Hurd memorandum.133 In his memoir, Hurd recorded that following his presentation the mood amongst his ministerial colleagues was ‘cool and uneasy’.134 Two central issues consumed ministers’ thinking. First, several ministers raised their concerns regarding the inevitable backlash from Ulster Unionists and more generally the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland. Second, some in attendance expressed their misgivings – if not outright rejection – of the proposed joint courts.135 To reassure her sceptical ministerial colleagues, Thatcher explained that British sovereignty over Northern Ireland would not be jeopardized under the terms of the proposed AIA. She also confirmed that London had categorically rejected Dublin’s request for joint authority. Her intervention, however, did not secure the desired response, with several ministers reportedly reluctant to support the Howe/Hurd memorandum. In fact, it took the last-minute intervention of Norman Tebbit to save the day for Thatcher. Because his wife had been badly injured and he himself hurt in the Brighton Hotel bombing, there was ‘special power in his voice and his support was crucial’, to quote Hurd. Although Tebbit remained sceptical about the entire enterprise, he nonetheless agreed that the British government must continue along its current course.136 With Tebbit’s words still ringing in their ears, ministers, albeit with continued trepidation, collectively approved to the contents of the Howe/Hurd memorandum in draft format. A  caveat, however, was inserted. Howe and Hurd were ordered to ‘bring the proposed agreement back for further consideration by the Cabinet before it was signed’. Thatcher thus quickly ended discussions, noting that ‘on the balance’ her government ‘should seek to conclude an agreement on the lines proposed’.137 Thatcher’s ability to win cabinet approval on the draft terms of the AIA helped dispel the falsehood, as later promoted by Nigel Lawson, that the majority of ministers had known ‘nothing of it until it was presented to use for our approval, almost as a fait accompli’.138 In fact, throughout the summer and autumn of 1985, Thatcher, Howe, Hurd and later Tom King, Hurd’s successor as secretary of state for Northern Ireland,139 regularly kept the British cabinet updated on the process of the Anglo-Irish negotiations, including the specific proposals within the proposed draft of the AIA. Having secured authorization from her ministerial colleagues to continue the Anglo-Irish negotiations, Thatcher sanctioned Armstrong to forge ahead with his talks with Dermot Nally. Thereafter, the months between July and November were spent in refining the draft terms of the AIA. As Garret FitzGerald recounted, henceforth, the Dublin and London governments worked on agreeing on the manner in which some of the provisions of the AIA in relation ‘to security and the administration of justice would be the subject of early implementation’.140 In fact, during July alone, the Armstrong-Nally framework talks convened on four separate occasions, over seven days, with the last of these meetings convening between 30 and 31 July at Chevening.141

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‘[L]‌et us hear no more talk’: Conservative Party backbench opposition to the AIA negotiations, August–November 1985 Astonishingly, on 26 July 1985, the day after the above British cabinet meeting, Armstrong wrote to Thatcher with a proposal that, if acted on, would have caused a political sensation. Armstrong suggested to Thatcher that if, following the signing of the proposed AIA, ‘a real and sustained reduction in the level of violence’ was achieved, the British government might undertake a review to consider the potential ‘release of prisoners in Northern Ireland who have been convicted of terrorist crimes’. This was a bridge too far for Thatcher. In the left-hand margin in bold black ink Thatcher scribbled ‘No’ to this proposal. In the margin in the line that followed which read, ‘This proposal has been agreed with the Northern Ireland Office’, Thatcher wrote and underscored in her own handwriting ‘Not with me’.142 Thatcher’s exchange with Armstrong reminded her of the delicate balancing act that she had to walk regarding Northern Ireland. She immensely disliked pressure being placed on her by her civil servants and always retained a healthy preference for vigilance rather than radicalism in relation to the British government’s Northern Ireland policy. That said, however, her willingness, under the proposed terms of the AIA to provide the Irish government with a ‘consultative’ role in the affair of Northern Ireland, was viewed by some within her own party as far too radical. Opposition within the Conservative Party to the British government’s ongoing talks with Dublin was indirectly channelled through the right-wing pressure group, the Monday Club, an organization with close ties with the Conservative Party. On 8 August 1985, the Monday Club published a policy paper, Out, Out, Out!, which roundly denounced Thatcher’s negotiations with the Irish government. The authors of this policy paper were David Storey, chairperson of the Monday Club; Kevin Harvey Proctor, vice-chairman of the CPPNIC; and David Evans,143 chairman of Luton F.C., and secretary of the CPPNIC. These three backbench MPs were leading figures within the pro-Ulster Unionist fraction of the Conservative Party and over the years had been vocal critics of Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy. At the heart of Out, Out, Out! lay the accusation that ‘Irish unity, whether by consent or otherwise’, was formally being considered during the current Anglo-Irish negotiations. ‘If the Conservative Party truly supports the political guarantee’, it declared, ‘let us hear no more talk, however, vague of possible changes in the constitutional arrangement … the sooner we say “NO” to this dream of a United Ireland the better for everyone.’ The policy paper made several recommendations, including that the British government’s policy on Northern Ireland ‘should be changed so that it reflects a “rock solid” commitment to the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’.144 Out, Out, Out! encapsulated the feelings of a small, but vocal, fraction on the Conservative Party backbenchers who had become increasingly suspicious of the current Anglo-Irish negotiations. Writing in his diary, on 13 August, Alan Clark noted with disdain, ‘Ireland is a ghastly subject. Intractable. Insoluble. For centuries it has blighted English domestic politics, wrecked the careers of good men.’145 Clark

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recounted a conversation with Ian Gow the previous week regarding the proposed AIA. ‘Ian said the pressure to concede everything to Dublin (and thus expose the descent loyalists in Ulster to the full force of [P]‌IRA terrorism) is coming from the Foreign Office, who are themselves reacting to pressure from Washington. One must never forget that the Irish vote in America is bigger that it is in Eire.’146 By September of 1985, the subject of Northern Ireland was back on top of the British government’s political agenda. On 3rd of that month, Tom King was appointed as secretary of state for Northern Ireland following Hurd’s ministerial promotion. King was the fourth man to hold this portfolio since Thatcher’s election as British prime minister in 1979 (King held this post from 3 September 1985 to 24 July 1989). According to Goodall, on his appointment King had no previous experience of Northern Ireland nor of ‘the current negotiations with the Irish’.147 Despite his lack of knowledge, King enthusiastically threw himself into his new portfolio, describing his new post as a ‘good challenge’.148 He diligently read the numerous briefs supplied to him by his officials and took soundings from his ministerial colleagues. Although King later claimed that he was ‘perfectively supportive’ of the ongoing Anglo-Irish negotiations, he also admitted that he initially had harboured some doubts on taking up his new job. As he explained in a 2008 interview: I inherited a few problems associated with it [the AIA negotiations] as well. There was a sense in which it had been negotiated by the Foreign Office and Cabinet Office, and the Northern Ireland Office had been pretty deliberately excluded from it … It became known that many of the senior officials, including the most senior one in terms of Ken Bloomfield … had not been consulted, or not until very late in the day when I insisted that he was brought in and informed of the proposals, to advise me on them.149

The absence of the NIO, as confirmed by Paul Arthur, was deliberate. The architects of the accord (chiefly Robert Armstrong) realized that the ‘final outcome would be controversial’ and as a result even kept the head of the NIO civil service Kenneth Bloomfield, in the dark until the last minute.150 Indeed, Bloomfield later recalled with frustration that he had been ‘deliberately excluded’ from the AIA talks. ‘I’m so cross about that.’ ‘But my impression was that officials sort of pushed Thatcher over the line rather reluctantly.’151 In fact, within weeks of his appointment King soon began to ruffle a few feathers amongst his ministerial colleagues regarding the nature of the ongoing Anglo-Irish negotiations  – Howe being King’s main antagonist. In a memorandum, dated late September 1985, King recommended to Thatcher that ‘major changes’ were required to the AIA draft text in its current makeup. The balance of the draft text, the incumbent secretary of state for Northern Ireland protested, was ‘heavily in favour of the Irish’. He, therefore, advised that ‘immediate’ talks be resumed between himself, Howe and Peter Barry in the hope of securing further concessions from Dublin, including a commitment of its intention to ratify the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Moreover, King recommended that the British cabinet ‘considerations’ of the AIA draft text ‘should be deferred (with the implication that the Summit will have to be deferred also)’.152

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The Howe-King relationship deteriorated to such an extent that the former felt compelled to write to Thatcher, personally. In his letter to the British prime minister, Howe expressed his uneasiness regarding King’s instructions to the British civil service negotiation team to change ‘two or three limited but important’ components of the draft AIA text.153 Howe was not the only one to express surprise at King’s intervention. Charles Powell described the meddling of behalf of the secretary of state for Northern Ireland as a ‘bombshell’.154 To the irritation of Howe and Powell, King’s protests won a sympathetic ear from Thatcher. Shortly after King’s intervention, Thatcher ordered that the Irish government must ‘make clear … that [a]‌firm commitment to accession’ to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism was required as evidence of ‘their bona fides in tackling terrorism’, to quote the British prime minister. However, on King’s request to postpone the Anglo-Irish summit meeting, Thatcher rejected this proposal.155 By now, Thatcher was determined to secure a deal with the Irish government. Writing to FitzGerald, on 4 October, while again raising apprehensions regarding the inevitable backlash from Ulster Unionism, she spoke of her eagerness to achieve ‘what you and I are hoping to achieve’.156 At the back of her mind, she also had to consider that the United States now fully expected an agreement to be reached on behalf of the British and Irish governments. Armstrong summed up this point neatly in a letter to his prime minister, dated 27 October:  ‘You told President Reagan last week that an agreement was likely.’157 Powell reiterated this position three days later, ‘failure to go ahead now’, he counselled, ‘would be a great disappointment to the Americans’ (Thatcher underscored this line, invariably signifying her approval).158 At civil service level, British and Irish policymakers went into overdrive. Between 3 September and the final meeting of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks, on 12 November 1985, civil servants on both sides convened on eight separate occasions, over fourteen days.159 Central to these final series of negotiations was a preliminary agreement, which won Thatcher’s endorsement,160 for the establishment of a ‘standing Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference’. It was envisaged that this new conference would act as a formal platform to permit the Irish government a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland by ‘being able to put forward views and proposals to the British government on ‘defined aspects of Northern Ireland affairs, but would have no executive or decision-making authority’.161 On 31 October, the British cabinet convened to discuss the final draft terms of the AIA. ‘This was the moment of real decision’, to quote Charles Moore.162 Howe and King presented to cabinet a memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, which dealt with the ‘main outstanding issues and provisional arrangements’ of the proposed text of AIA. It was, in the words of the memorandum, ‘substantially the same’ as the ‘progress report’ presented to the British cabinet on behalf of Howe and King’s predecessor Douglas Hurd, on 25 July. It was described as ‘a careful balance between British and Irish interests’. ‘It falls short of “joint authority” (which was the initial Irish aim) while according to the Irish Government a means of exercising (and being seen to exercise) an influence on British decision-making.’ Howe and King expressed satisfaction with the final draft of the AIA (although King continued to harbour some reservations, particularly in relation to the proposed joint

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courts).163 They focused on three areas. First, it provided ‘reassurances for unionists through formal recognition from the Irish that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland cannot change without majority consent’. Second, the Irish government had made a ‘firmer commitment’ to strengthen cross-border security. And last, it ‘brings the minority to readier acceptance of the apparatus of Government in Northern Ireland by giving the Irish a formalized (but not executive) role in respect of Northern Ireland affairs affecting the nationalist minority’ (i.e. with the proposed establishment of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference).164 Howe and King next acknowledged that under Article 8 of the proposed agreement there remained a ‘controversial issue’, in the form of the proposed joint courts.165 ‘We have made it clear’ they explained, ‘that we are willing to consider the possibility’ of the joint courts, under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, but at present ‘we cannot enter into such a commitment and see serious political and practical difficulties about the idea’. ‘This is clearly understood and is the position reflected in the text of Article 8 as it now stands.’166 Following a general discussion amongst ministers, collective cabinet approval was granted to accept the terms of the AIA, in principle, ‘while inviting improvements’.167 One such ‘improvement’ was King’s recommendation that the proposed joint secretariat, which was to be established under the auspices of the proposed AngloIrish intergovernmental conference, should not be located at Stormont, but rather at a separate location preferably at Maryfield; a recommendation that won the support of Thatcher.168 King later conceded that his opposition to housing the proposed joint secretariat at Stormont was because it would be ‘particularly inflammatory and cause possible difficulties  – security difficulties, problems that would have arisen for the operation of Stormont offices’.169 An agreement was also reached on when and where the AIA would be signed. The date for the formal signing of the agreement, which was agreed with the Irish government, was pencilled in for 15 November 1985. The venue chosen was Hillsborough Castle, the official residence of the secretary of state for Northern Ireland, located in Co. Down, Northern Ireland.

‘I am entering the Agreement in total good faith’: Thatcher and the signing of the AIA Early on the morning of 15 November 1985, Thatcher and her entourage flew into RAF Aldergrove in Northern Ireland and was transported by helicopter to Hillsborough Castle. Reflecting on the significance of the occasion, David Goodall fondly remembered the journey from London to Hillsborough Castle. It was ‘a brilliant morning as we came over Northern Ireland, the sky a clear blue, the small fields emerald, the golden autumn trees casting long morning shadows and frost still lying in sliver patches where the sun had yet to melt it’, he recalled. ‘I had no illusion about the difficulties, friction and violence which lay ahead; but I believed that the Agreement could gradually drain some of the bitterness out of the British-Irish relationship and create the basic geometry for an eventual settlement.’170

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At 11.30 a.m., Thatcher held a one-hour tête-à-tête with FitzGerald, at which both leaders confirmed their determination ‘to make it [the AIA] succeed’. ‘I am entering the Agreement in total good faith,’ Thatcher noted, ‘I mean what I  say.’ FitzGerald, likewise, said he was ‘totally with you in this approach’.171 After luncheon, the formal signing ceremony was convened at 2 p.m. In his memoir, FitzGerald recalled that when the moment for the signing came himself and Thatcher walked together to the room where the ceremony was to be held. On her arrival, Thatcher could not help herself immediately moving flowers about checking that the picture on the wall behind the table at which she and FitzGerald would sit had no ‘overtly green or orange connotations’.172 They then ‘went through the process of signing the documents and made our speeches’. ‘Then with a great sense of relief ’, FitzGerald warmly remembered, ‘we moved off to celebrate the occasion with a glass of champagne.’173 FitzGerald caused his own surprise by speaking in Irish. ‘Margaret kept wondering what on earth he might be saying’, recalled King. ‘I murmured to her, “Could it be we’ve won?” ’174 Four central principles underpinned the AIA: (a) That both governments emphatically rejected the use of violence and all those who support it; (b) A binding affirmation that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of its people; (c) A recognition that if in the future a majority formally consented to a united Ireland, the two governments would support legislation accordingly; and lastly (d) The establishment, within the framework of the AIIC, of a new Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference concerned both with Northern Ireland and with relations between the two parts of Ireland.175 Article 1 of the agreement dealt with the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and the principle of consent. The two governments affirmed that ‘any changes in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland’. A commitment was also reached that ‘if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish’.176 From London’s perspective, this was a major achievement. The Irish government, in effect, went further than it ever had before in recognizing that Northern Ireland was a part of the UK. Indeed, under the terms of the agreement, this concession on behalf of Dublin was embodied for the ‘first time in a binding international agreement’.177 Articles 2, 3 and 4 dealt with the proposed establishment of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference. This conference provided the Republic of Ireland with a mechanism to put forward views and proposals ‘on specific areas of administration and policy’ in relation to Northern Ireland. They included political, security, legal matters (including the administration of justice) and the promotion of cross-border

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security. It would operate under ‘a joint chairmanship’ of the secretary of state for Northern Ireland and a minister appointed by the Irish government.178 This new conference was to be serviced by a joint secretariat, staffed by civil servants from both Great Britain and Ireland. Its job was also to ‘provide administrative support’ for the conference. An agreement was reached that the joint secretariat would be based at Maryfield, a suburb of Belfast, which could provide office accommodation for both sides of the permanent secretariat and residential accommodation for the Irish side. This thus would facilitate rapid and easy communication between the two secretaries.179 On the British side, Mark Elliot, a senior FCO official and future UK ambassador to Israel, 1988–92, was appointed as the first British secretary to the conference, with Michael Lillis appointed as the first Irish secretary. In fact, less than a month after the signing of the agreement, on 8 December, the Irish team took up what has been described as their ‘rudimentary … bunker’ lodging at Maryfield (the Maryfield offices closed in December 1998 after the BIIC superseded the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference).180 While it was envisaged that the proposed Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference would promote a ‘two-way channel of communication’, the British government was adamant that it would not have ‘any executive authority’. As Article 2 stated, this conference implies ‘no derogation from the sovereignty of either the U.K. Government or the Irish Government, and each remains responsible for the decisions and administration of government within its own jurisdiction’.181 Under Article 4, the two governments also agreed that in the intermediate period a devolved government for Northern Ireland, achieved with the ‘co-operation of constitutional representatives within Northern Ireland of both traditions’, was the preferred policy.182 Articles 6, 7 and 9 focused on security related issues. Article 6 stipulated that the Irish government be permitted ‘to put forward their views on the role and composition of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, the Police Authority of Northern Ireland, and the Police Complaints Board’. However, the ‘final decision’ on these matters would remain with the secretary of state for Northern Ireland. Article 7 dealt with measures to improve relations between the security forces and the nationalist community of Northern Ireland. Article 9 covered ways of improving cooperation between the UK and the Republic of Ireland and ‘set in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by the Chief Constable of the RUC and the Commissioner of the Garda Siochana’.183 In relation to legal and judicial matters, Article 8 confirmed that issues, including enforcement of the criminal law, extradition, areas of criminal law in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which might be ‘harmonised’, and that measures to ‘bolster public confidence in the courts’ might be enacted. Under the terms of the AIA, the Irish government also indicated that it would ask the newly constituted AngloIrish intergovernmental conference to consider the possibility of joint court sittings, with judges from both countries, for the trial of certain terrorist offences.184 However, the British government inserted a caveat. Although under the terms of the accord the Irish government was within its ‘rights’ to put forward the proposal of the joint courts, the British government inserted the stipulation that it was ‘highly unlikely’ that this proposition ‘will, in the foreseeable future, be acceptable in any part of the UK’.185

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The remaining two articles of the AIA dealt with economic cooperation and the proposed establishment of a ‘parliamentary body’. Article 10 recorded that the two governments ‘shall co-operate to promote the economic and social developments of those areas of both parts of Ireland which have suffered most severely from the consequences of the instability of recent years’. Moreover, a commitment was made on behalf of both governments to seek ‘international support for this work’ through an international fund for Ireland.186 Last, Article 12 recognized that if and when the parliaments in Dublin and London agreed to establish an Anglo-lrish parliamentary body ‘of the kind adumbrated’ in the Anglo-lrish joint study reports of November 1981, the two governments agreed to support this measure.187 Throughout Charles Haughey’s time as taoiseach, during the early 1980s, he had regularly demanded from the British government its support for an Anglo-Irish parliamentary body (or tier), ‘but had been continually rebuffed’.188 One, therefore, can appreciate the extent that the AIA was a genuine triumph for FitzGerald. Not only had he wrestled from Thatcher her agreement to support the establishment of such a parliamentary body, but with the creation of a new Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, for the first time since the enactment of partition in 1920, the British government now agreed to permit Dublin a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs of Northern Ireland.189 It, therefore, should come as no surprise to learn that FitzGerald basked in the glory following the signing of the AIA (the agreement has been described as his ‘greatest achievement’).190 In his memoir, Howe was full of praise for the manner in which FitzGerald conducted himself during the negotiations that led up to the AIA, commenting on the latter’s ‘inspired tenacity’.191 Helmut Kohl, German chancellor, 1990–8, sent a personal message to FitzGerald to congratulate him on what he believed would prove to be ‘a step of historical significance’.192 Francois Mitterrand, French president, 1981–95, likewise, heaped praise on FitzGerald. ‘It is a source of great encouragement to us all in our effort to bring peace, stability and reconciliation to Northern Ireland’, Mitterrand wrote, ‘to know that we have the firm and wholehearted support of all of our partners and prospective partners in the European Community and of our friends throughout the world in this endeavour.’193 The SDLP leadership, likewise, congratulated the taoiseach, viewing the AIA as ‘one of the steps essential to making a longer term settlement possible’.194 Across the Atlantic, on the day of the signing of the AIA, Ronald Reagan and Tip O’Neill held a joint press conference at the White House to lend their wholehearted support to the accord.195 In a statement, the US president congratulated the British and Irish governments, pledging to give his ‘full support’ to the agreement.196 On Thatcher’s contribution to the negotiations, Reagan spoke of her ‘statesmanship, vision and courage’.197 He indicated that he would work closely with the US Congress in a bipartisan way to lend practical support to the accord. As Thatcher herself phrased it. ‘The Anglo-Irish Agreement put us on side with the Americans.’198 This was complemented by a statement from the FOI declaring strong support for the agreement and a promise to work with the US president to provide ‘all appropriate assistance’. The statement was signed by the leadership, both Democratic and Republican, in the US House of Representatives and US Senate. Soon after the US Congress unanimously passed Concurrent Resolution 239 in support of the accord.199

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In fact, Washington wasted little time in providing financial support for the AIA. In December 1986, in accordance with Article 10 of the AIA, ‘The International Fund for Ireland’ was established with the objective of promoting economic and social advancement on the island of Ireland, through stimulating private investment and enterprise, supplementing public programmes and supporting voluntary efforts. The fund put 75 per cent of its money into projects in Northern Ireland and the remainder into projects in the six border counties of the Republic of Ireland. Run by a board and headed by Charles Brett, a prominent Belfast solicitor, the fund was independent of the British and Irish governments. By the end of 1988, the United States had donated US$120 million, while Canada had promised CAN$10 million (of which $1.5 million had been received) and New Zealand had made a single contribution of NZ$3000, 000.200 For British and Irish policymakers, alike, the signing of the AIA was a major breakthrough in Anglo-Irish relations and towards finding a long-term solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland. The agreement remains ‘unique’ in international relations as a means to deal with ‘a region that had been historically disputed between two sovereign governments and between the two main communities in the conflict there’.201 As Armstrong remembered, the AIA was a major milestone in Anglo-Irish relations as it ‘gave the two governments confidence to deal with one another’, allowing ‘an element of trust’ to be fostered, ‘something which had been previously lacking’.202 Armstrong is correct in his assessment. The signing of the AIA brought to fruition two and a half years of secret ‘cut and thrust’ negotiations between the British and Irish governments in relation to Northern Ireland and more broadly the future relationship between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, to use Goodall’s description.203 The immediate origins of AIA date to a series of clandestine negotiations on behalf of British and Irish policymakers (without the contribution of the NIO), initially under the banner of the Goodall-Lillis talks, which convened in the summer of 1983 and subsequently under the auspices of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks between February 1984 and November 1985.

The Irish government ‘have all the glory. We have all the problems’: Thatcher’s response to the AIA Despite the pomp and ceremony Thatcher was in a less than jubilant mood. In fact, she regretted signing the accord almost immediately. Privately, she protested that the Irish ‘have all the glory. We have all the problems.’204 After consuming her glass of champagne following the signing of the AIA, Thatcher went upstairs with officials to prepare for the press conference. She was reported as being extremely agitated, scribbling on scraps of paper and reading aloud sections of the AIA. She requested that Dermot Nally assist her and instructed Armstrong to help FitzGerald: ‘Dermot, you ask me the questions I might have to face. Robert, you ask Garret.’205 Shortly afterwards, at 2.30 p.m., both premiers reassembled down stairs for a joint press conference.206 To Thatcher’s irritation, the assembled journalists immediately questioned her on precisely what was in the AIA for Ulster Unionists. Thatcher promptly replied.

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The agreement, she said, provided ‘assurance of no change in the status of Northern Ireland without their consent’. Not only that, but the accord signified that for the ‘first time the legitimacy of the unionist position has been recognized by the Republic [of Ireland] in a formal international agreement’, she noted. On the question of whether the agreement undermined Northern Ireland’s constitutional status within the UK, she retorted with typical vivaciousness. ‘There is no derogation of sovereignty. That is made clear in the Agreement.’207 The line of questioning during the post Anglo-Irish summit meeting immediately confirmed Thatcher’s worst fears. Despite her best efforts, a picture was starting to emerge that she had intentionally ‘sold out’ Ulster Unionists, that the signing of the AIA had diluted Northern Ireland’s constitutional link with the remainder of the UK. The question, therefore, arises, why did Thatcher agree to sign the accord? Four central factors explain why Thatcher agreed to put pen to paper. First, her motivations were driven by a genuine desire to promote peace, stability and to reconcile the two major traditions in the hope of achieving a devolved government in Northern Ireland. At the forefront of Thatcher’s thinking was her vexation at the continual loss of life, primarily of the members of the British security forces. Addressing the House of Commons, on 26 November 1985, Thatcher made the sobering observation: Since 1969, nearly 2,500 people have lost their lives in Northern Ireland as a result of terrorism, more than 750 of them members of the security forces. As the House is only too well aware, there has also been further loss of life among the armed forces, police and civilians in the remainder of the United Kingdom, including three of our colleagues in this House.208

Following Thatcher’s emphatic success at the 1983 British general election, she felt that Northern Ireland was ‘hanging over’ her from her first administration. Back in office and with a comfortable parliamentary majority, she was now determined to ‘do something’ about Northern Ireland.209 Second, as argued above, in the weeks, months, indeed years, leading to the signing of the agreement, Thatcher had come under increasing pressure from Howe and her leading civil servants, chiefly Robert Armstrong210 and David Goodall, to concede to the Irish their request for a consultative role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Howe was pivotal to this process. In fact, comparisons can be drawn here between his ability to persuade Thatcher to develop links with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and her Ireland policy. In both cases, Thatcher had to be persuaded by Howe of the merits of opening new channels of dialogue, irrespective of her own preference for retaining the status quo. Thus, in the end she was simply won over by the forcefulness of the argument in support of the AIA. To borrow Whitelaw’s description of Thatcher: ‘She is by nature a conviction politician and so has very strong views, yet she can certainly be swayed and influenced by good arguments in the final event.’211 Third, Thatcher hoped it would help provide the security solution to the Northern Ireland conflict, by isolating the terrorists; neutralize the growing support for Sinn Féin; and greatly improve security, including cross-border cooperation between Dublin and London. As Seán Donlon recalled, a central reason why Thatcher agreed to place her

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weight behind the AIA was because she had ‘an expectation that signing the Agreement would be like waving a magic wand – that the security situation would immediately be improved, that the Provisionals [PIRA] would be side-lined’.212 Donlon’s rationale is a fair appraisal. By this point, to quote Goodall, Thatcher had more or less ‘run out of ideas on what to do about Northern Ireland’. The PIRA was seemingly on the rise, while the security situation remained precarious.213 Last, a more immediate consideration dictated Thatcher’s decision to sign the AIA, her relationship with Ronald Reagan. As analysed at the beginning of this chapter, in the aftermath of Thatcher’s ‘out, out, out’ remarks, in November 1984, the IrishAmerican political elite in Washington, led by Tip O’Neill and supported by William Clark, harassed the Reagan administration to persuade the British prime minister to permit the Irish government a consultative role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Yet, we should tread carefully when considering this hypothesis. While it is correct that Thatcher’s blossoming relationship with Reagan certainly played a part in her decision to sign the AIA, it is entirely inaccurate to state that this was her primary reason. This was certainly the opinion held by David Goodall. Reflecting on the agreement, Goodall was adamant that US ‘pressure’ was not a ‘decisive factor which led her [Thatcher] to conclude the Agreement’.214 Indeed, somewhat disingenuously, in the years following the signing of the agreement, Thatcher was reported as privately exclaiming: ‘It was the pressure from the Americans that made me sign the Agreement.’215 Leaving aside the motivations for why Thatcher decided to sign the AIA, one point is indisputable:  without her support, the agreement would never have been signed. She was the linchpin of the entire enterprise. In fact, although Thatcher herself never saw it this way,216 the signing of the AIA was arguably one of her finest diplomatic achievements, ranking up there alongside Zimbabwe. The establishment of a new Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, under the terms of the accord, streamlined Dublin-London relations at official and government levels providing a platform for dialogue, which only a few years previously seemed unimaginable.217 Thus, the AIA can be viewed as playing a crucial role in facilitating the early stages of the Northern Ireland peace process, which culminated with the signing of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998; although one should be careful in necessarily viewing the AIA as ‘part of some chronology that organically morphed into a peace process’.218 Nonetheless, the AIA was an important catalyst for the peace process helping to eradicate the message that violence was ‘a legitimate means by which to achieve political goals’.219 Thatcher’s own reluctance to acknowledge the positive aspects of the AIA certainly stemmed from her continued grievances vis-à-vis North-South cross-border security (see Chapter 9). In the words of Graham Goodlad, if judged by the ‘criterion Thatcher prized most highly, the improvement of security in Northern Ireland’, the AIA ‘could scarcely be rated a success. In the three years to the end of 1985, there were 195 deaths as a result of political violence; in the three years from 1 January 1986, the corresponding figure was 247.’220 On the political front, however, Thatcher had more room for confidence. The British and Irish governments had hoped that the AIA would prevent the growth of Sinn Féin at the expense of the SDLP. The UK general election

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of 1987 bore this out to some degree. The SDLP increased their share of the vote by 3.2 per cent as against their performance in 1983. Sinn Féin’s percentage of the vote dropped to 11.4 per cent as against their 1983 performance of 13.4 per cent.221 Thatcher’s willingness to sign the AIA was all the more remarkable given that she had come within inches of being murdered by Irish Republican paramilitaries following the PIRA’s unsuccessful attempt on her life at the Brighton Hotel in October 1984. In the aftermath of this terrorist atrocity, many in her position would have broken off indefinitely the ongoing Anglo-Irish negotiation and although Thatcher did initially hesitate, she found the strength to continue along the path that would eventually lead her to sign the AIA.

A ‘derogation’ of sovereignty: The Conservative Party’s response to the AIA Although the response within the Conservative Party to signing of the AIA was generally positive, if somewhat muted, for some party supporters Thatcher’s decision to put pen to paper was viewed as an act of political suicide – signalling the death nail of the Conservative Party’s traditional bond with Ulster Unionism, chiefly the UUP. In the words of Jeremy Smith, for UUP supporters the signing of the AIA was a further betrayal of the party’s traditional alliance with the Conservative Party, inciting a ‘memory of betrayal’ that dated back to the abolition of Stormont and the introduction of power-sharing.222 The signs were ominous considering that Thatcher’s friend and loyal parliamentary ‘poodle’223 Ian Gow resigned in protest as minister of state for the Treasury on the day the AIA was signed. Although Nigel Lawson ‘spent hours’ with Gow trying to persuade him not to resign, the writing was on the wall.224 Privately, the British attorney general Sir Michael Havers225 described Gow’s decision as ‘crazy’, labelling his party colleague a ‘bloody fool’.226 In his resignation letter to Thatcher (which she first received while having lunch in the aftermath of the signing of the AIA),227 Gow explained the reasons behind his decision to resign. ‘The change of policy in Northern Ireland, including the involvement of a foreign power in a consultative role …, will prolong, and not diminish Ulster’s agony.’ For this reason, he wrote, ‘I cannot remain in your government.’228 Thatcher felt personally saddened to have lost Gow from her government. But any personal affection for Gow was placed to one side as she forged ahead seeking to sell the merits of the AIA. To her relief, when the House of Commons convened to scrutinize the terms of the AIA over two days, 26–27 November 1985 and lasting thirteen hours, it convincingly won parliamentary approval by a majority of 426 (473 in favour, 47 against – this was one of the largest majorities on a division in British parliamentary history).229 The Labour Party, under the leadership of Neil Kinnock, placed its support behind the accord; that said, however, some within the Labour Party parliamentary party, including Jeremy Corbyn,230 opposed it because in his words, ‘the agreement strengthens rather than weakens the border … and those of us who wish to see a United Ireland oppose the agreement for that reason’.231

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Within the Conservative Party, ministers, party whips, personal private secretaries and most backbenchers, alike, overwhelmingly placed their support behind the accord. For example, Willie Whitelaw reportedly ‘strongly’ favoured the agreement.232 Indeed, according to Robin Butler, in the end Whitelaw had ‘cudgelled her into doing it’ (i.e. signing the AIA).233 Norman Tebbit conceded that ‘he had agreed to going ahead with the Agreement and he intended to stand by that’.234 Viscount Long,235 likewise, placed his full support behind the accord.236 A similar message was reported from Conservative Party backbenchers. Former Conservative Party leader Ted Heath recorded his support for the accord.237 Jim Prior, no longer a minister, but still a Conservative Party backbencher and chairman of the General Electric Company (GEC), said he was ‘generally pleased’ with the AIA. Thatcher, he noted, had ‘taken the high road’ and had shown ‘courage, determination and statesmanship’.238 Fred Silvester,239 likewise, was supportive, describing Ulster Unionists’ opposition to the agreement as ‘sick’.240 Indeed, based on available archival records, Hansards debates and interviews, of the 397 Conservative Party MP elected at the 1983 British general election, the vast majority voted in favour of the AIA. Those who supported the accord included, Henry Bellingham,241 Alistair Burt,242 Adam Butler,243 Sir John Jack Page,244 James Pawsey245 and Tim Yeo.246 However, to Thatcher’s irritation, but not surprise, a vocal minority within the Conservative Party, working under the auspices of the CPPNIC, placed on record their opposition to the AIA. In fact, of the forty-seven members of parliament who voted against the AIA, approximately twenty-one were members of the Conservative Party parliamentary party.247 To placate internal opposition within the Conservative Party, on the morning of the signing of the AIA, King had provided Harold Julian Amery, a CPPNIC member, with an advance copy of the accord, in the hope that he would ‘feel able to support the Agreement’. King also offered to attend a meeting of the CPPNIC to address Conservative Party backbenchers’ anticipated anxieties regarding the terms of the AIA.248 King’s overtures proved to be a worthless exercise. An outspoken critic of Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy, Amery had absolutely no interest in supporting the AIA. Privately, he told Thatcher directly that he was ‘strongly opposed to the Hillsborough Agreement’.249 Unsurprisingly, he voted against the AIA when the vote was taken in the House of Commons on 27 November. Amery was not alone in expressing opposition to the AIA within the Conservative Party backbenchers. Harvey Proctor, described as a ‘hard core’ Unionist sympathizer250 and a member of the CPPNIC, likewise, voted against the AIA. Other prominent CPPNIC members, including the chairman, John BiggsDavison (he described the AIA as a ‘flawed agreement’),251 and vice-chairman, Ivor Stanbrook,252 also publicly came out against the accord. Robert Cecil Cranborne, Viscount (7th Marquess of Salisbury) summed up the mood amongst many CPPNIC members regarding the terms of the AIA. Addressing a gathering of the CPPNIC, on 21 November, he lambasted the agreement as a ‘derogation’ of sovereignty. The AIA, he protested, had permitted a ‘foreign power’ (i.e. the Republic of Ireland) to play a role in administrating justice and security in Northern Ireland.253

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‘Ulster says no’: Ulster Unionists’ response to the AIA The response from Ulster Unionism to the AIA was one of instant disdain and shock. As Graham Walker wrote, the signing of the agreement ‘traumatised Ulster Unionism’.254 Although Thatcher may have regretted signing the agreement the moment she put pen to paper, for many of the Protestant community in Northern Ireland she had sold them out. ‘Ulster faces cruel deceit’, was how the Belfast News Letter described the signing of the AIA.255 Roy Bradford, a journalist and former UUP MP for Belfast Victoria, summed up the mood of many within the Protestant community when he wrote, ‘Black Friday’. ‘Without the double talk, “the political language that makes lies sound truthful and murder respectable”.’256 Tom King recalled that on receiving confirmation of the AIA ‘all hell’ broke out among Unionist politicians.257 In retirement, King admitted that neither he nor Thatcher had expected such a backlash from the forces of Ulster Unionism. Questioned whether he had anticipated the level of opposition from the Protestant community, King replied, ‘No, not to that extent … I discovered when I arrived how little preparation had been done in terms of selling it.’ On Thatcher’s reaction, King remembered that ‘She was I think surprised and disappointed at the strength of the reaction [from Ulster Unionists].’258 Ulster Unionist politicians and their supporters, alike, simply could not fathom that the British government could apparently ‘impose’ this agreement on them without ‘consultation or the opportunity to give their formal consent’.259 Ken Maginnis260 accused Thatcher of being in ‘conspiracy with the Irish Republic’, choosing to ‘ignore the democratic wishes of Ulster’s electorate’.261 Ivan Davis262 said he spoke for many of the Protestant community of Northern Ireland in expressing his ‘sense of betrayal’ on hearing news of the AIA.263 A poll conducted shortly after the signing of the AIA recorded that only one in ten Protestants living in Northern Ireland supported a role for the Irish government in Northern Ireland’s affairs.264 Never one to shy away from public confrontation, the Rev. Ian Paisley lost little time in denouncing the AIA. In fact, the leader of the DUP, who protested outside the gates of Hillsborough Castle on the day the agreement was signed, could not believe what had happened. Although he had advance knowledge that something was on the cards in relation to permitting the Irish government a ‘role’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland, he was not prepared for what confronted him. His face was reportedly ‘bloated with suppressed rage’ on receiving news of the AIA,265 describing it as a document of ‘treachery and deceit’.266 ‘She hadn’t time at Christmas Eve to visit her own troops in Northern Ireland,’ he was reported as saying, ‘yet she has time today to come and sell Northern Ireland down the river.’267 In a bitter personal attack on Thatcher, Peter Robinson reportedly described the British prime minister as ‘an unprincipled and shameless hussy’.268 In a handwritten letter to Queen Elizabeth II, Lady Brookeborough, the widow of Lord Brookeborough, the former prime minister of Northern Ireland, pleaded with her majesty ‘to save this beloved Province of ours, which you are the monarch, from the effects of this devious and hypocritical Agreement, which the Prime Minister and her Government are now trying to force on us loyal people of Ulster’.269

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The day after the signing of the agreement, 16 November 1985, the Northern Ireland Assembly voted by forty-four votes to ten for a motion calling for a referendum to be held on the AIA. Thereafter, Unionist politicians withdrew from all advisory boards in Northern Ireland and refused to meet with British government ministers. On 20 November, King was physically attacked and spat at by a mob of protesters at Belfast City Hall.270 This attack on the secretary of state for Northern Ireland was followed by a huge Unionist rally at Belfast City Hall, three days later, on 23 November. An estimated 100,000 people reportedly attended, with the Rev. Paisley sharing a platform with James Molyneaux. The slogan of the campaign against the AIA was ‘Ulster says no’ and was supported by a boycott of local council business and illegal parades.271 At the time, the DUP even reportedly burnt an effigy of Thatcher.272 The campaign against the AIA reached new heights the following month, when on 15 December, all fifteen UUP and DUP MPs resigned from their seats in Westminster.273 The available archival files contain a plethora of letters from concerned (and some genuinely distraught) members of the public opposed to the signing of the AIA. Thatcher was accused of showing ‘total disregard to the democratic views and pleas of the Unionist majority in Ulster’, to quote Carlisle McAuley of Castlereagh, Belfast. ‘You have betrayed and alienated the British/Unionist majority’, McAuley exclaimed, ‘by ignoring the decision of the ballot box and indicating the Govt.’s desire and willingness to support an eventual Catholic Republic.’274 Brian P.  Ingram of Dungannon, Co. Tyrone, accused Thatcher of playing into the hands of Irish Republican paramilitaries by agreeing to sign the AIA. The net result of your actions, he wrote, was to provide ‘added impetus’ to the PIRA’s ‘campaign of terror’.275 A concerned Conservative Party supporter living in England, David McLure, noted that he was ‘shocked and dismayed at the action of a Conservative and Unionist Party Government in giving a foreign state a say in the affairs of part of the Queen’s realm’. ‘Not only is this offensive to the majority of people in Northern Ireland’, he protested, ‘but it strikes at the heart of the Unionist principle which Conservatives have traditionally treasured.’276 Enoch Powell encapsulated the mood of most Northern Protestants when he denounced Thatcher’s willingness to sign the AIA as an act of ‘treachery’.277 Privately, Thatcher was scathing of Powell’s response to the accord, accusing him of ‘leading the treachery and betrayal charge’ against her.278 Interestingly, in Powell’s personal papers, there is a ‘Blacklist’ of Conservative Party MPs who were recorded as being ‘regular guests of the Irish Embassy [in London]’ and ‘considered by Dublin to be in support’ of the AIA. Those on Powell’s ‘Blacklist’ that were indeed known to have supported the AIA included Bill Benyon, John Stradling Thomas, David Crouch, Marcus Fox, Peter Hordern and Robert Rhodes-James. However, Powell’s intelligence is rather dubious as several additional names on the list certainly did not support the accord. They included George (Barry) Porter and Peter Bruinvels.279 Thatcher seemed genuinely stunned by the widespread backlash from the Protestant community of Northern Ireland regarding her decision to sign the AIA. To placate their anxieties, she made a desperate attempt to win further concessions from the Irish government. During a meeting with FitzGerald, in the margins of a European Council meeting in Luxemburg, on 3 December 1985, she asked whether the Irish government might consider revising Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution; a request he politely

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declined. Thatcher again petitioned the taoiseach to consider her proposal. ‘I am deeply upset about the betrayal charges’, she noted. In fact, to Thatcher’s astonishment, FitzGerald ended the meeting with a suggestion that her government consider offering some form of unspecified ‘relief ’ to prisoners. ‘That would be dynamite’, she exclaimed. ‘No, not dynamite, nuclear. We could not think of relief for people guilty of bombing, of murder and other atrocities.’280

Belfast-Dublin-London relations and the AngloIrish intergovernmental conference, December 1985–November 1986 On 13 December, the newly constituted Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference convened at Stormont Castle; this was the first of twelve meetings of this conference between December 1985 and December 1986.281 Tom King and Peter Barry, Irish minister for foreign affairs, jointly chaired the first meeting of the conference. Rhodes Boyson and Nicholas Scott accompanied King. Michael Noonan and Liam Kavanagh were also present on the Irish side. Also in attendance was commissioner of the Garda Siochana Laurence Wren and chief constable of the RUC Sir John (Jack) Hermon. The focus of the discussions was on security cooperation, specifically how to improve relations between the security forces and the minority community in Northern Ireland.282 Between January and mid-February of the following year, three further meetings of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference were convened (on each occasion in London) at which a wide range of matters were discussed, including legal issues related to extradition,283 police complaint procedures and administration of justice284 and the ‘terms of reference of the working groups to be established to discuss matters arising under Article 6’ of the AIA.285 Looking back on the initial workings of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, thirty years later, Michael Lillis recalled that although the ‘mechanism for interaction between the two sides was very well-devised’, the ‘atmosphere in the conference was not always terribly happy’. At the heart of the problem, according to Lillis, was that Tom King was apparently ‘out of his depth’, and that ‘his advisers were hostile’ towards the Irish side. Despite such occasional personality clashes, to again quote Lillis, the conference ‘did work’ in that it helped to create a degree of British-Irish cooperation that hitherto simply had not existed.286 News of these regular meetings of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference caused further panic amongst Ulster Unionist politicians (and some within the CPPNIC),287 many of whom viewed this new body as a Trojan horse on the pathway to a united Ireland. Ken Maginnis, who by now was on the warpath regarding the British government’s continued support for the AIA, wrote to his constituents of FermanaghSouth Tyrone protesting that the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference had effectively established a ‘Coalition Government’, composed of the Dublin and London administrations, to rule Northern Ireland.288

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Matters came to a head during a heated and occasionally antagonistic meeting between Thatcher, Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley on 25 February 1986.289 Opening the conversation, Thatcher acknowledged that Ulster Unionists were ‘bitter’ having not been kept up-to-date regarding the progress of the AIA talks. However, she wished to make it clear to her guests that under no circumstances would she agree to a ‘temporary suspension’ of the AIA. On devolution, Thatcher said her government was committed to restoring a devolved government in Northern Ireland and if needed would ‘sit down at a round table conference with the parties in the North to consider without any pre-conditions the scope for devolution’. Privately, Thatcher had already indicated to Dublin her growing frustration with the SDLP regarding devolution. ‘It was widely believed’, she noted, ‘that the SDLP preferred the existing situation with the [Anglo-Irish] intergovernmental conference to devolution.’ ‘Not only had they failed to live up to the expectations on devolution’, she was recorded as saying, ‘they had done nothing to support the security forces or even attend funerals of the Roman Catholic members of them who had been killed by the terrorists’290 (Thatcher reiterated this criticism to John Hume on 27 February).291 The Rev. Paisley and Molyneaux next pressed Thatcher on whether she was prepared to (1) consider alternatives to the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference or (2) that its ‘activity be scaled down or suspended’?292 Thatcher rebuked both proposals. She would, however, promise to ‘devise a system which would allow full consultation with the Unionists in the future’. Her government, she said, ‘would be happy to establish arrangements for consultations which need not be confined to matters discussed’ in the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference.293 The meeting thus ended in stalemate. Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley were furious because of Thatcher’s refusal to shelve the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference. In response, under the banner of ‘Ulster says no’, they mobilized the economic, militant and political pillars of Ulster Unionism against the AIA. On their return to Northern Ireland, following talks with ‘other Unionist representatives in the region, including the leaders of workers in the power stations and the shipyard’, Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley stipulated that they would hold no further talks with Thatcher until the AIA was overturned. They also announced that there would be a general strike, or ‘Day of Action’, in Northern Ireland on 3 March 1986 against the AIA.294 Soon after, Belfast City Council voted to refuse to set a ‘rate’ (local government tax) in protest at the AIA. In seventeen other councils across Northern Ireland, where Unionists were in a majority, ‘a similar decision was taken’.295 The atmosphere was further heightened in the months that followed because of Loyalists’ attacks on the homes of some 500 RUC police officers, resulting in 150 police officers and their families being relocated from several Protestant areas that ‘they had previously thought to be safe’.296 In customary fashion, Thatcher remained defiant. Addressing the House of Commons, the day after the ‘Day of Action’, 4 March, she described the actions of the Ulster Unionist protestors as ‘disgraceful’. ‘These pictures have been shown all over the world and will do great damage to the reputation of the Province’, she exclaimed. Negotiations, not violence, Thatcher affirmed, was the only means to make progress.297

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Her ‘quite firm response’, to quote Richard Ryan, received widespread support amongst the majority of her Conservative Party backbenchers. Indeed, the overall feeling in the House of Commons following the ‘day of action’ was ‘hostile’.298 Privately, both Howe and Whitelaw, likewise, stressed that Thatcher must not allow herself to be pressurized by Ulster Unionists. In the words of Whitelaw, ‘we must stand firm on the Agreement’.299 In a show of Thatcher’s determination to progress with the AIA and not to allow herself to be bullied by the forces of Ulster Unionism, on 11 March 1986 the AngloIrish intergovernmental conference met for the fifth occasion since its establishment in December of the previous year.300 To add further insult to the Ulster Unionist cause, Thatcher sanctioned that this meeting take place in Belfast. By now she was reportedly so frustrated by the actions of Ulster Unionists that she was ‘not waivering [sic] in any way in her commitment’ to AIA and was in ‘no doubt that the Agreement was the right thing’, to quote Armstrong.301

‘[B]‌e careful’: The proposed FitzGerald-Molyneaux secret talks and the deterioration of Belfast-London relations, April–December 1986 It was during this period that an extraordinary and top-secret episode in Belfast-Dublin relations took place.302 In early April 1986, using Anglican archbishop of Armagh Robin Eames as an intermediate (described in Dublin circles as a ‘real Jesuit’),303 Molyneaux contacted Garret FitzGerald in the hope of petitioning the taoiseach to agree to suspend either the AIA in its entirety, or if that failed, to at least call a halt to the workings of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference.304 Molyneaux, having been recently re-elected as leader of the UUP, reportedly ‘now felt strong enough to make contact with the Taoiseach’.305 FitzGerald responded cautiously to the UUP leader’s invitation. Soon after, again using archbishop Eames as an intermediary, the taoiseach informed Molyneaux that he was open to the suggestion of a meeting. Molyneaux reportedly ‘conveyed a positive response’, expressing a wish to meet FitzGerald face to face, possibly in Dublin, for ‘confidential discussions’. However, before such discussions could take place, FitzGerald stipulated that he first wanted to: ‘(a) to think about the implications; (b) to co-ordinate views with the British side’.306 Consequently, on FitzGerald’s request, on 11 April, Noel Dorr convened a meeting with Armstrong in the British Cabinet Office to talk over the details of Molyneaux’s proposal. Armstrong explained that Thatcher was ‘very interested’ in the prospect of a meeting between FitzGerald and Molyneaux. ‘She will not want to say “don’t see him” ’, Armstrong noted. On the other hand, ‘I am sure she will say “be careful” when – if and when – you do and don’t give him any indication that you are more pliable on the Agreement than I am.’ Armstrong informed Dorr that although Molyneaux had not, as yet, approached Thatcher, the British prime minister would, if approached by the UUP leader, categorically refuse his request to suspend the AIA. ‘She is not prepared to concede

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this. If she did, Molyneaux would seek to claim victory and she is not disposed to let him do so’, Armstrong explained. Molyneaux, Armstrong reported, was ‘an ambitious man who might see himself ultimately as “Chief Executive” in an N.I. administration’. Armstrong suggested that Molyneaux probably ‘resents the build-up of [the Rev.] Paisley’s position and may be playing “double or quits” game (i.e. bring something off or get out)’. In relation to the Molyneaux’s counter-request that Dublin and London agree to suspend the AngloIrish intergovernmental conference, Armstrong said that British thinking was not at an advanced stage, that it had ‘not been considered by Ministers’.307 Significantly, according to Dorr, FitzGerald did not rule out Molyneaux’s proposal altogether ‘to give priority to talks on devolution’ vis-à-vis the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference ‘for a period of up to two months’. However, for the Irish to agree to this proposal, FitzGerald first set the pre-condition that Molyneaux’s UUP agree to enter a devolved government with the SDLP based on a power-sharing executive.308 By the second week of April, the prospect of a meeting between FitzGerald and Molyneaux had dissolved. The leader of the UUP had reportedly ‘gone cold’ on the proposal, while the taoiseach worried of the ‘danger of appearing to be more forthcoming to the unionists’ than Thatcher, to quote David Goodall.309 As FitzGerald later conceded in his memoir, due to the public intervention of Peter Robinson the prospect of his talks with Ulster Unionists had been ‘blown’. ‘When Peter Robinson said publicly that I was reasonable but that Margaret Thatcher was intransigent’, FitzGerald wrote, ‘a risk was created that Thatcher might conclude that I was undermining her firm position’ on the AIA.310 Thereafter, the prospect of a meeting between the two leaders faded beneath the political undergrowth. Instead, the emphasis shifted back to the Belfast-London relationship. In mid-April, Thatcher contacted Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley with a request that they come together to establish ‘a basis for future dialogue’.311 Yet again, Thatcher’s intervention came to nothing. Following a meeting of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, on 9 May, Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley announced that because they believed that King had given categorical assurances that the AIA would not be suspended ‘they saw no point in holding “talks about talks” ’. 312 At a press conference, on 12 May, Molyneaux placed on the record that for progress to be made the AIA first needed to be suspended with immediate effect.313 It was also during this period, in late April, that the UUP announced that it was officially cutting off all links between its party and the Conservative Party. To help fill the void between the two movements, on 4 June 1986, ‘Friends of the Union’ was officially launched. This anti-AIA lobby group was established to provide Ulster Unionists and Conservative Party members a platform to express their opposition to the AIA and to promote the integrity of the constitutional union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.314 Over the subsequent years ‘Friends of the Union’ tried to be a ‘moderating influence’ on the Unionists parties’ protests against the AIA, regularly warning against ‘unlawful and unconstitutional action’ and ‘encouraging them to resume normal political dialogue’.315 Amongst the group’s trustees were John Biggs-Davison (prior to his death in September 1988), Philip Goodhart and Ian Gow. Of its approximately forty

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patrons, most prominent amongst its ranks were Julian Amery, Nick Budgen, Winston S. Churchill, Charles Moore and Tom Utley.316 In truth, ‘Friends of the Union’ had little public impact. Apart from a rally at the Ulster Hall in September 1986, together with a one-day conference in March of the following year, the group always remained ‘small’ and ‘politically isolated’, to quote Claire Marson of the NIO.317 In Northern Ireland, by the summer of 1986, the atmosphere remained highly charged. On 23 June, on Thatcher’s direct orders, the Northern Ireland Assembly was officially dissolved. ‘The early dissolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly’, in the words of King, was as a ‘direct consequence of the failure and then the refusal of its members to carry out the functions for which it had been established’.318 Disturbingly, between the signing of the AIA and the height of annual marching season in mid-July 1986, approximately fifteen people lost their lives (six civilians, seven members of the RUC and three members of the British Army).319 Indeed, between March and April, alone, it was reported that there had been 250 attacks on RUC police officers’ homes and about fifty attacks on Catholic premises.320 On 7 August, Peter Robinson made international headlines following his ‘incursion’ across the border into the Republic of Ireland. According to a British source, the deputy leader of the DUP, in the company of several hundred Loyalists, entered the village of Clontibret in Co. Monaghan, ‘with the claimed purpose of demonstrating the weakness of cross-border security’.321 The Loyalists reportedly entered the Garda Síochána station in the village and physically assaulted two Garda officers.322 As a result, ‘charges were preferred against’ Robinson and he appeared in court in Dundalk.323 By now, in the words of Ed Moloney and Andy Pollak, Robinson was going out of his way ‘to cultivate the cold, clinical, “hard man” image’ amongst the Protestant community.324 For many Loyalist paramilitaries, Robinson was now seen as ‘a leader ruthless enough to lead the Loyalists into armed conflict’ with the RUC, the British Army and Irish Republican paramilitaries.325 Indeed, during this period, in an interview with the Irish cultural and musical magazine Hot Press, Robinson defiantly proclaimed that ‘Ulster is certainly worth fighting or dying for’.326 The DUP’s links with Loyalist paramilitaries was confirmed later that year. On 10 November 1986, the Rev. Paisley and Robinson addressed a packed Ulster Hall in Belfast for the inauguration of the Ulster Resistance (UR). This mass paramilitary-style force, synonymous for the wearing of a red beret amongst its members, promoted as its main aim the smashing of the AIA.327 *** In conclusion, shortly after the one-year anniversary of the signing of the AIA, Thatcher met FitzGerald in the margins of a European Council meeting in London, on 6 December 1986. Reflecting on recent events, Thatcher said that she was ‘relieved that the first anniversary had passed without more trouble’. Yet, any sense of relief that Thatcher may have felt at that moment was certainly denigrated by the events of the previous twelve months. Ulster Unionists’ continued intransience regarding the AIA continued to irritate Thatcher, to the extent that she disliked even being in their company. Indeed, she now viewed many Ulster Unionist politicians, such as the Rev. Paisley and Robinson, with disdain, believing them to be self-indulged megalomaniacs.

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Figure 8.1  Thatcher visits British Army troops at Aldergrove Airport, Northern Ireland, 23 December 1983. © The National Archives of the UK (TNA PREM 19/1547).

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Ironically, Ulster Unionists’ unrelenting opposition to the AIA convinced Thatcher that the British and Irish governments must remain ‘absolutely firm in their commitment to the Agreement’, as she informed FitzGerald. However, as the two premiers sat down with one another to reflect on the previous year, Thatcher cut a depressing figure. The AIA, she believed, had failed to live up to her expectations, specifically in relation to security matters. She was also resentful of FitzGerald’s failure to pass, through Dáil Éireann, the necessary legislation to enact the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST).328 In particular, Thatcher was deeply frustrated that cross-border security cooperation was ‘still not producing what we wanted’.329 Her government, as she noted in a previous meeting with FitzGerald, refused to accept the continued ‘colossal attacks in the border areas’. The British, she protested, had approximately ‘400 peoples there on surveillance/intelligence duties’. The Irish, on the other hand, ‘have 10/15 Garda on your side’.330 As is examined in the next and final chapter, the subject of North-South cross-border security cooperation remained a dominating feature, arguably obsession for the rest of Thatcher’s premiership until her forced retirement from political life in December 1990.

Figure 8.2  View of the politicians, including Margaret Thatcher, involved in the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Hillsborough Castle, 15 November 1985. © Independent News and Media/Hulton Archive/Getty Images.

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Third-term in office, 1987–90

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Thatcher, British state collusion and the genesis of the Northern Ireland peace process, 1987–90

‘I must send more young boys over to their deaths’: North-South cross-border security cooperation and the resurgence of the PIRA News of Fianna Fáil’s victory at the 1987 Irish general election, at the expense of the Fine-Gael-Labour coalition, set off alarm bells in London that the incumbent minority administration might refuse to operate the AIA. The British government, however, need not have been worried. On his reappointment as taoiseach, in March 1987, following five years in opposition, Charles Haughey made a commitment to adhere to the workings of the AIA, albeit begrudgingly. ‘There was a sort of tacit assumption about the Anglo-Irish Agreement’, he said reportedly at the time. ‘It’s there in place now and we will continue to operate it.’1 Sir Geoffrey Howe acknowledged the incumbent taoiseach’s change of attitude in a conversation with Tom King: Haughey ‘had not just said he would operate the Agreement, he had accepted it’.2 Haughey’s arrival as taoiseach triggered a root and branch re-evaluation of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy. For London, the question focused on whether the AIA had fulfilled its three central goals of (1)  improving cross-border security between the British and Irish security forces, (2)  minimizing the threat of Irish Republican paramilitaries along the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and lastly (3) facilitating the reintroduction of devolved government in Northern Ireland. In relation to Point (1)  improving cross-border security, the British government found Dublin’s progress ‘far from satisfactory’, as confirmed by Tom King. Although the Irish government was ‘making an effort and there were instances of good local intelligence co-operation … Against this, many cross border roads were not covered at all.’3 The Irish security forces operating along the Irish border, namely the Irish Army and Garda Síochána, were reportedly ‘ill-equipped and not particularly well-motivated to take an active role against the terrorists’, to quote the secretary of state for Northern Ireland.4 Indeed, in her meetings and written correspondence with Haughey during this period, Thatcher regularly petitioned the taoiseach to ‘consider better training for your Gardaí’, including the possibility of using ‘another competent security service’,

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such as the FBI or the Dutch BVD, in the fields of intelligence gathering, surveillance and instructions on the use of specialized equipment.5 Relations between the British and Irish Armed Forces were viewed as particularly problematic. Although since the signing of the AIA considerable cooperation had been achieved between the Garda Síochána and the RUC, relations between the two states’ armed forces remained ‘distinctively cool’, to quote John Stanley of the Ministry of Defence.6 The Irish Army was, in fact, viewed with a certain disdain by its British counterparts. Its vehicles and weapons were described as ‘old’, ‘very little’ training was carried out and most worryingly, the Irish Army was reportedly suffering from chronic underfunding and decades of a lack of investment.7 That said, the British government recognized that since the signing of the AIA some notable improvements had been achieved in the field of North-South crossborder security. Under the auspices of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference a series of meetings had been convened between senior representatives of the RUC and Garda Síochána, at which a detailed intelligence assessment of the current threat of paramilitary terrorism was regularly assessed and operational planning agreed on. Substantial progress was also made in relation to communications. Between them, the RUC and Garda Síochána had obtained an Aroflex link, which provided a secure telex line between the two police forces, while secure telephones between the two HQs were also installed. The result of such cooperation, according to a British source, had ‘contributed to enhancing the effectiveness of co-operation’, between the two police forces in combating terrorism.8 On Point (2), London continued to harbour grave reservations about Dublin’s ability to minimize the threat of Irish Republican paramilitaries along the NorthSouth border. Since the signing of the AIA, Thatcher’s frustration had grown on receiving reports from British intelligence sources that the PIRA continued to use the Republic of Ireland as a safe haven. In her meetings with Haughey during this period she regularly lambasted the Irish, complaining that the PIRA were using the border ‘to move bombs over from the Republic of Ireland or to flee from security forces in Northern Ireland’. ‘I can’t seal the border’, she would routinely say. ‘There is no way we can patrol the 500 miles … Everywhere there is an open border.’ ‘I must send more young boys over to their deaths … There is a borderline there but it is not an effective border.’9 She, therefore, regularly petitioned Dublin to improve ‘pre-emptive intelligence’, which she was convinced would enable British and Irish security forces to ‘frustrate’ Irish Republican paramilitaries’ plans, capture their operatives and arms, and thus ‘save lives’.10 The British government’s increasing frustration regarding cross-border security was further exasperated due to a new difficulty in combating the threat of Irish Republican terrorism. By June 1987, to minimize infiltration by the British secret service, the PIRA had considerably remodelled itself into a new operational structure based on small, self-contained cells, known as ‘active service units’ (ASUs). The introduction of the ASU system coincided with the PIRA’s biggest loss of life in a single incident during the Northern Ireland conflict when, on 8 May of that year, eight members of the PIRA’s East Tyrone brigade (including a British informer) were killed by a waiting thirty-six strong SAS squad, in an attack on Loughgall RUC station.11 Thus, the creation of the

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ASU system, as confirmed by Ed Moloney, was an attempt by the PIRA leadership to tighten up the ‘leaky’ architecture of the movement’s battalions and companies, which ‘well placed’ British agents had been able to penetrate during the preceding years.12 These ASUs, in the words of a confidential British memorandum, were ‘designed to be less susceptible to intelligence penetration than the larger “battalions” which they replaced’. As a result, the PIRA was reported to have been at a ‘very high level of operational effectiveness particularly in the border areas’.13 The introduction of the ASU system, as King privately confirmed, had witnessed the ‘loss of intelligence’, which, as a result, ‘would take time to repair’. ‘The days of a simple milk churn under the bridge were gone forever.’14 Indeed, although it pained her to do so, by now Thatcher had arrived at the conclusion that the PIRA was ‘not an amateur operation’.15 According to British intelligence, as part of this restructuring process, the PIRA had placed increasing importance on its campaign along the Irish border due to the British security forces ‘maintaining pressure on Irish Republican paramilitaries in Belfast and Londonderry’.16 Consequently, the PIRA’s ‘southern command’ (i.e. those within the movement based in the Republic of Ireland) had increased its efforts in the ‘training of terrorists, the supply of arms and explosives, and financial and logistic support for operations in Northern Ireland’.17 As a British security intelligence report phrased it:  ‘large numbers of [Irish] Republican terrorists’, who were known to live in the Republic of Ireland, were increasingly ‘crossing the border to mount terrorist attacks or even mounting attacks from the soil of the Republic [of Ireland]’.18 As a result, the RUC had to rely primarily on the Garda Síochána to ‘provide intelligence, and in particular pre-emptive intelligence, about Provisional IRA activities south of the border’.19 In her meetings with Haughey during this period, Thatcher would often allude to this new threat posed by the PIRA, describing the movement as a ‘very dangerous organisation … [and] one of the biggest in the world’. She was particularly fearful given the PIRA’s recent attainment of ‘large stocks of arms’ from Libyan dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (see below).20 Revealingly, during a meeting with Haughey, in June 1988, Thatcher conceded that Britain was ‘not winning the battle’ against the PIRA; that the sending of British Army troops to Northern Ireland had been ‘useless’. ‘If we don’t defeat the [P]‌IRA, I don’t know what I am going to do’, she confessed. Although she remained adamant, ‘I will never be prepared to walk out and let the terrorists win.’21 On the last issue, Point (3), an expectation that the signing of the AIA would witness the restoration of a devolved government in Northern Ireland, little progress, if any, had been achieved. In fact, by the turn of 1987, within Whitehall circles a growing sense of pessimism had developed on whether the AIA would deliver on its promise to restore devolution. Although the agreement had seen an improvement in relations between Dublin and London and had been well received abroad (especially in the United States), a view emerged amongst British policymakers that ‘it would be difficult to argue’ that the accord had ‘so far advanced the fundamental objectives of “peace, stability and reconciliation” ’. Specifically, on the issue of devolution, it was felt that there was ‘little prospect of unionists talking either with HMG or to the SDLP about devolution’, while the agreement remained in place. As a result, London ‘was struck in a kind of cul-de-sac’, to quote Robert Andrew.22 As analysed in the previous chapter and

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examined further below, at the heart of the problem was Ulster Unionists’ refusal to sign up to devolution as long as the AIA remained operational.

‘Talks about talks’: Thatcher and Belfast-London relations, June–December 1987 Thatcher’s victory at the 1987 British general election, on 11 June of that year, confirmed her status as a political phenomenon. This election was the third consecutive general election victory for Thatcher, marking her out as the first British prime minister since the Earl of Liverpool in 1820 to lead a party into three successive general electoral victories. The Conservative Party secured an impressive 376 seats, representing 42.2 per cent of the national vote. Although the party lost thirty seats, it easily obtained an overall majority of 102, with the Labour Party winning 229 seats, equating to 30.8 per cent of the national vote.23 In Northern Ireland, the central issue of the general election was the AIA. In fact, in advance of the election, the UUP/DUP agreed to issue a joint general election manifesto in the hope of galvanizing the Unionist vote against the accord. Both parties were to be bitterly disappointed. When the votes were counted, the overall Unionist vote fell, as did the vote of Sinn Féin. The UUP secured nine seats (37.8 per cent); the DUP won three seats (11.7 per cent); and Sinn Féin won only one seat (11.4 per cent). The largest gain electorally was secured by the SDLP, winning three seats (21.1 per cent).24 In the immediate aftermath of the British general election, Thatcher wasted little time in consolidating her hold over her cabinet. She promoted several known Thatcherites. Sir Michael Havers was appointed lord chancellor. Cecil Parkinson took over as secretary of state for energy. John Wakeham25 was given the role as leader of the House of Commons. John Major,26 Thatcher’s successor as the Conservative Party leader and British prime minister, took over as chief secretary to the Treasury. Kenneth Clarke,27 who was already in the cabinet, was appointed as chancellor to the Duchy of Lancaster. George Younger retained his ministerial post as secretary of state for defence (he was appointed to this role in January 1986 following the resignation of Michael Heseltine). Sir Patrick Mayhew was promoted to the post of British attorney general. Nicholas Lyell28 replaced Mayhew as the British solicitor general. Tom King was reappointed as secretary of state for Northern Ireland, with John Stanley replacing Nicholas Scott as minister for state at the NIO. To their disappointment, John Biffen, Nicholas Edwards, Lord Hailsham, Michael Jopling and Norman Tebbit each lost their ministerial portfolios. The sacking of Lord Hailsham and Tebbit, in particular, ensured that two of Thatcher’s most critical voices regarding the British government’s Northern Ireland security policy were removed from the cabinet; the removal of Lord Hailsham, for example, witnessed the loss of the ‘most implacable and articulate Unionist voice in the Government’, to quote Richard Ryan.29 On returning to office, Northern Ireland was by no means a priority for the third Thatcher administration. More pressing issues were instead placed to the top of the

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political agenda, including housing, education, rate reform, trade union reform and criminal justice. Early into her third term, however, Thatcher placed on record her commitment to the AIA; it would be ‘disastrous’, she reportedly said, if the AIA was suspended, never mind terminated.30 Although she continued to believe that the ‘single most important thing in the Anglo-Irish Agreement is security’, as she phrased it, Thatcher also had her sights set on the restoration of devolved government in Northern Ireland.31 In advance of the British general election, the Conservative Party had pledged that if re-elected to government it would continue to work within the Province for a devolved government in which both communities could have confidence and ‘feel able to participate’, as outlined in the party’s 1987 general election manifesto entitled The next moves forward.32 In the words of T.  J. B.  George of the FCO, ‘Direct Rule is an unsatisfactory basis for government [in Northern Ireland], particularly with an alienated majority. We are committed to the objective of some form of devolved authority, if it can be achieved.’33 Indeed, following the British general election and the return of several newly elected Ulster Unionist MPs to Westminster, London’s attention shifted away from Dublin to Belfast in the hope – rather than expectation – of convincing Ulster Unionists to sign up to a devolved government in Northern Ireland. In mid-July 1987, on the instruction of Thatcher, Robert Armstrong travelled to Belfast to hold secret talks with James Molyneaux and the Rev. Ian Paisley. This was the first ‘real’ meeting between representatives of the British government and the leaders of Ulster Unionism since February 1986 and heralded the commencement of a series of ‘talks about talks’ (rather than negotiations).34 This meeting was convened within the context of a recently published report, An end to drift, produced on behalf of the Unionist Task Force. This new body was established by Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley, on 23 February 1987, with a remit to ‘consult the Unionist community to secure support for the campaign against’ the AIA.35 The members of the Unionist Task Force was composed of Peter Robinson, Harold McCusker36 and Frank Millar, general secretary of the UUP. Central to the proposals put forward in An end to drift was the suggestion of convening explanatory talks with Ulster Unionists and London to agree on an ‘alternative’ way forward to the AIA. Controversially, the report did not rule out the option of power-sharing.37 To quote the Report’s opening remarks: ‘protest can be no substitute for politics’.38 To the frustration of Robinson and the other authors of An end to drift during their meeting with Armstrong, the Rev. Paisley and Molyneaux refused to endorse the proposals put forward in the report. In the words of the Rev. Paisley, ‘The DUP will not have it [devolution based on power-sharing] … Unionists must resist the appeasers, the advocates of a sell-out settlement, a settlement which even envisaged the SDLP in charge of Ulster’s security.’39 According to a Whitehall source, neither Molyneaux nor the Rev. Paisley ‘favoured it [the Unionist Task Force Report] and that they had entered the “talks about talks” without any real commitment to political progress’.40 Indeed, Millar subsequently conceded that the Rev. Paisley had made no secret of his opposition to power-sharing when he had met the Unionist Task Force trio.41 Despite the ongoing pessimism surrounding the ‘talks about talks’, over the course of 1987 further meetings were convened. On 8 August, Armstrong again travelled to

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Belfast to hold discussions with the leaders of Ulster Unionism. They met again in Belfast the following month, on 14 September. By November, Tom King had taken an active role in the discussions; on 2 December, King met Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley for talks in London.42 However, by the close of 1987 the ‘talks about talks’ had reached a stalemate, with neither side willing to concede sufficient ground to the other party. The British government categorically refused to abandon the AIA, with the inevitable result that the leaders of Ulster Unionism refused to sign up to the principle of restoring a devolved government in Northern Ireland.43 Privately, Thatcher was scathing of Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley. They must be made aware, she insisted, that their demands were ‘simply not realisable’, the AIA, she implored was not open for renegotiation. In the words of Charles Powell, ‘she sees no reason to think that the chances of reaching an agreement at a roundtable conference lasting three months are sufficient to warrant embarking on the exercise’.44 In fact, by the early months of 1988 Ulster Unionists’ protests against the AIA had steadily run out of steam. In Northern Ireland, the Health and Social Services Boards, the Housing Executive, the Housing Council and the Fire Authority, were reportedly conducting business ‘without significant difficulty’. That said, a handful of prominent Ulster Unionist politicians continued to enact a campaign of civil and legal disobedience. For instance, no payment had been received from Peter Robinson, following his conviction and subsequent fine for non-payment of motor tax; the Clerk of Petty Sessions issued a warrant for his arrest on 20 January. Ken Maginnis was scheduled to appear in Court, on 12 February, for non-payment of rates, while the Rev. Ian Paisley had reportedly refused to pay his Television Licence.45 At the same time, fears remained within British and Irish government circles that the ‘McGimpsey case’, which sought to challenge the legality of the AIA in the Irish High Court, might rule that the accord was unconstitutional, thus undermining Dublin’s support for it.46

‘I am very angry about all of this’: The Haughey-Thatcher relationship and the ECST Shortly before leaving office, the FitzGerald-led government in Dublin confirmed its intention to ratify the ECST, which was due to come into effect on 1 December 1987. The passing of the ECST into law would allow the extradition of alleged terrorist suspects from the Republic of Ireland to the UK.47 To the irritation of London, however, on Haughey’s arrival to office, in March 1987, the incumbent taoiseach refused to ratify the ECST. It was not until late June of that year, in the margins of a European Union summit meeting in Brussels that Thatcher had an opportunity to directly speak with Haughey regarding his refusal to ratify the ECST (this was Thatcher’s first meeting with Haughey since the Anglo-Irish summit meeting in December 1980). From the outset, the encounter was a tetchy affair. Thatcher petitioned Haughey regarding his refusal to ratify the ECST. ‘I am extremely upset by your moves on extradition’, she implored.

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‘They are a step backwards … I am very angry about all of this.’ To the irritation of Thatcher, however, Haughey refused to amend his stance on the ECST.48 The meeting, thus, ended in stalemate. Thatcher was furious by Haughey’s refusal to agree to ratify the ECST. However, she refused to concede defeat. Over the subsequent months, using Tom King, Armstrong and Mayhew as go-betweens, she mounted a sustained campaign focused on persuading Haughey to agree to ratify the ECST.49 The taoiseach, nonetheless, remained unrepentant. In fact, by the winter of 1987, he had arrived at the conclusion that the proposed legislation would have to be deferred, perhaps for another twelve months. During a ‘farewell’ meeting with Armstrong,50 in Dublin, on 30 October 1987, Haughey informed his guest that ‘I’m afraid’ that ratification of the ECST legislation would have ‘to be deferred’.51 On receiving news of this latest rebuff from Dublin, Thatcher could not hide her irritation, describing Haughey’s antics as deeply ‘disturb[ing]’.52 Two events in November 1987, however, forced Haughey to drop his opposition to the ratification of the ECST. The first was the dramatic seizure by French authorities of the PIRA arms ship Eksund, on 1 November. The Eksund was loaded with two tons of semtex, 1,000 Romanian-made AK47s, 1,000 mortars, 600 Soviet F1 grenades, 120 RPG7s, 20 SAM7s, 10 DShKs, 2,000 electric detonators, 4,700 fuses and more than a million rounds of ammunition. This bounty had been given to the PIRA by the Libyan dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (it later emerged that this shipment was one of four consignments of arms which originated from Libya; the other three shipments were understood to have been obtained by the PIRA and were estimated to have comprised an arsenal of 136 tons).53 The second was a horrific and senseless PIRA bombing of a Remembrance Day service in Enniskillen, Co. Fermanagh. On the morning of 8 November, without warning, a bomb containing 40 lbs of gelignite exploded. The bomb caused utter devastation, bringing down tons of masonry, crushing many people as it did so.54 The PIRA had intended to detonate the bomb and kill members of the British security forces as they carried out a sweep before the service; however, it exploded prematurely.55 Eleven people lost their lives, including three couples in their sixties and seventies, while sixty-six people suffered injuries. Television scenes broadcast throughout the world showed the scale of destruction that the PIRA explosion had inflicted on the innocent bystanders in Enniskillen. At home and abroad, the Irish Republican movement was roundly condemned for this spineless act of unadulterated killing. Not even the PIRA could condone such actions. Instead, its leadership cowardly put forward a blatant lie that the British Army’s electronic countermeasures had inadvertently triggered the bomb.56 The president of Sinn Féin Gerry Adams conceded that the Enniskillen bombing had been a setback for the Irish Republican movement as it affected ‘our efforts to broaden our base’ in Ireland and more broadly on the international stage.57 Thatcher was personally shocked on receiving news of the Enniskillen bombing. This latest PIRA atrocity galvanized further her conviction for the need to tighten security in Northern Ireland. ‘From now on the requirements for practical improvements in security’, she recounted in The Downing Street years ‘increasingly dominated my policy towards both Northern Ireland and the Republic [of Ireland]’.58 In the days following the attack, she travelled to Enniskillen to attend a Service of Remembrance and to

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pay her respects to the victims. Her visit was ‘warmly received’ by the community of Enniskillen, acting as a beacon of hope during one of the darkest episodes of the Northern Ireland conflict, to quote J.  E. McConnell.59 Addressing the House of Commons, on 9 November, King summed up the mood of the political class in Westminster in the aftermath of this latest ‘appalling outrage’ committed on behalf of Irish Republican paramilitaries. ‘This monstrous act’, he implored, ‘set out deliberately to kill and maim ordinary members of the public: people of both communities who had come together on a Sunday morning … to honour the memories of those who had died in two world wars and since.’60 In a personal message to Thatcher, on the day of the Enniskillen bombing, Haughey conveyed on behalf of the Republic of Ireland his ‘shock and revulsion at the carnage in Enniskillen’.61 In Thatcher’s thinking, however, Haughey’s words rang hollow. She placed part of the blame on the Irish government’s refusal to ratify the ECST for this latest Irish Republican massacre. Indeed, on the day of the attack, Thatcher signalled out the issue of extradition as an obstacle to defeating terrorism. In an indirect reference to the Republic of Ireland, Thatcher said there should be ‘no hiding place in any county for the people who committed the atrocity in Enniskillen’.62 In the aftermath of the bombing, Haughey received a barrage of criticism from London because of his continued refusal to ratify the ECST. Reluctantly, he finally succumbed to British government pressure. On 23 November, Haughey informed Dáil Éireann of the intention of the Irish government to ratify it, which was scheduled to come into operation on 1 December 1987. In agreeing to ratify the ECST, Haughey wished to make it clear that he was ‘not “introducing” or “bringing in” extradition. We have had extradition here for a long time’, he noted.63 To Thatcher’s irritation, however, Haughey stipulated that a number of ‘safeguards’ be enacted as part of the ratification process. These ‘safeguards’ included a request for three-judge courts, together with a demand that the British attorney general provide his Irish counterpart with a note confirming his intention to ‘prosecute founded on a sufficiency of evidence’ (i.e. a statutory certification scheme, which could be scrutinized by the Irish courts).64 Thatcher had her first opportunity to confront Haughey regarding the ECST ratification process in the margins of a European Council meeting in Copenhagen, on 4 December. Delivering one of her famous ‘handbaggings’, Thatcher said she was ‘extremely upset’ by Haughey’s ‘moves on extradition … My feelings go deeper than anger.’ She out-of-hand rejected his demand for the setting up of a statutory certification scheme, complaining that the Irish had an obsession with their history that went back ‘to the Black and Tans – or is it 400 years ago?’.65 This latest encounter between the two premiers exemplified the state of AngloIrish relations by the close of 1987, with relations being at best, frosty, and at worst, confrontational. Thatcher continued to mistrust Haughey, believing him to be an opportunist who selfishly used the subject of Northern Ireland for his own political capital. In fact, by the beginning of 1988, the Dublin-London relationship reached a new low since Haughey’s reappointment to office in March of the previous year. This further dent in Anglo-Irish relations was triggered following the British government’s publication of a long-awaited Stalker/Sampson Report into an alleged ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy.

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‘The worst things in my life’: Thatcher and allegations of a British state sponsored ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy Throughout Thatcher’s premiership, whispers about a British state sponsored ‘shootto-kill’ policy had long swirled around Dublin and London government circles. Personally, Thatcher had no time whatever for critics who accused her government of illegally operating a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy. Indeed, throughout her time in office, she refused to admit that the elements of the British security forces had operated such a policy.66 Accusations of a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy predated Thatcher’s arrival into office. During the late 1970s, rumours were rife that the British security forces, chiefly the SAS, under the umbrella command of Intelligence and Security Group NI (or the ‘Group’), with the support of an elite RUC police death squad, had targeted suspected Irish Republican paramilitaries found in ‘compromising situations’ and ‘executed’ them.67 Following a series of controversial killings in 1978, the SAS’s targeting of Irish Republican paramilitaries was discontinued, with the result that the regiment ‘did not kill anyone for another five years’. Instead, the RUC ‘now did the shooting’, to borrow Peter Taylor’s description.68 Indeed, by the early years of the 1980s, the RUC, under the control of the Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU), undertook an alleged ‘shoot-to-kill’ campaign against Irish Republican paramilitaries, ‘with firepower, speed and aggression’.69 Some of the most notorious examples of an alleged British state sponsored ‘shootto-kill’ policy during Thatcher’s premiership occurred in 1982. During the winter of this year, the RUC, working under the HMSU, took part in several highly controversial shooting incidents. In one case, on 11 November, three unarmed PIRA operatives, Sean Burns, Gervaise McKerr and Eugene Toman, were shot dead by the RUC near Lurgan, Co. Armagh. The following month, on 12 December, two members of the INLA, Seamus Grew and Roddie Carroll were also shot dead by the RUC. Neither were armed. In a further incident, on 24 November, at Ballynerry Road North, near Lurgan, a 17-year-old youth, Michael Tighe, was shot dead in a hayshed by the RUC. He was not involved with Irish Republican paramilitaries.70 The killing of Tighe, together with the murder of unarmed Irish Republicans by HMSU, compelled chief constable of the RUC Sir John Charles Hermon to commission an inquiry to investigate an alleged ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy.71 In May 1984, John Stalker, deputy chief constable of Manchester police force, was appointed to head what became known as the ‘shoot-to-kill’ inquiry. His brief was to find out the truth of what had happened surrounding the death of six men at the hands of the HMSU during 1982. Stalker submitted an interim report (i.e. ‘The Stalker Report’) to Hermon in September 1985 and he, in turn, submitted it to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in Northern Ireland in February 1986.72 Stalker concluded that ‘there had not been a shoot-to-kill policy, but believed an officially encouraged RUC mentality of excessive aggression and trigger-happiness had led to the shootings’.73 The DPP directed that further investigations should be undertaken and while it was envisaged that these should be completed by the same team of detectives led by

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Stalker, this was not feasible due to his enforced leave and subsequent suspension from duty. After consultation with HM inspector of constabulary, Hermon appointed Colin Sampson, chief constable of West Yorkshire police force to take over the leadership of the enquiry team, which remained composed of detectives from the Great Manchester police force.74 The first part of Sampson’s Report was submitted to Hermon in October 1986. This covered the killing of the 17-year-old Tighe. The second part of Sampson’s Report addressing the associated issues connected with all the cases under investigation, including allegations of a cover-up, was submitted to Hermon and the DPP in April 1987.75 Neither the Sampson Report nor the Stalker Report was ever made public since, in the words of Taylor, ‘both contained highly sensitive intelligence material that went to the heart of national security’.76 The DPP in Northern Ireland, nonetheless, did conclude that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecutions of a number of RUC officers (and the MI5 officers). Therefore, it was left to the courts to decide. In London, news of the DPP’s decision set off alarm bells. If Thatcher decided not to proceed with prosecutions, her government would be left open to accusations of a cover-up. To go ahead and have MI5 officers ‘in the dock … would have been political dynamite’.77 Consequently, on 25 January 1988, Patrick Mayhew, British attorney general, announced that although the Stalker/Sampson Report showed evidence of ‘offences of perverting or attempting or conspiring to pervert the course of justice’, further criminal prosecutions were not in the ‘public interest’, since national security was involved.78 However, several RUC officers were reprimanded after disciplinary proceedings and two senior RUC special branch officers were allowed to resign.79 Mayhew’s decision not to initiate criminal prosecutions against serving RUC officers immediately stirred up accusations of a ‘cover up’ on behalf of the British government and agencies of the British state. Echoing the feelings of vocal minority within the House of Commons, on the day of Mayhew’s speech, the former Labour government spokesman for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees sought an ‘assurance’ from the British attorney general that ‘there has not been a cover-up’. ‘It is surely not in the national interest’, he rhetorically asked, ‘to cover up when something goes wrong … The concern  – it is a genuine concern  – is that something went badly wrong and people acted in a way that was outwith [sic] the law.’80 Indeed, during the same debate, Ken Livingstone81 exclaimed with frustration that ‘innocent men have been shot dead’, denouncing ‘this cover-up and those who are complicit in it’.82 Publicly, the Irish government requested ‘urgent clarification’ about the British government’s decision not to initiate prosecutions against RUC members following the findings of the Stalker/Sampson Report.83 Privately, Haughey was furious, reportedly expressing ‘anger, hurt and discouragement’ on receiving confirmation of London’s decision not to initiate criminal prosecutions against serving RUC officers.84 Relations between Dublin and London were further strained following the British Court of Appeal’s decision in January 1988 to uphold the convictions of the ‘Birmingham Six’ (six people falsely convicted of multiple murders resulting from the PIRA bombing of two pubs in Birmingham, on Monday, 21 November 1974, in which twenty-one innocent people were callously murdered as they socialized).

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Haughey’s first opportunity to raise his concerns directly with Thatcher about the Stalker/Sampson Report and the decision to uphold the convictions of the ‘Birmingham Six’ occurred during a meeting with Thatcher, in the margins of a European Council meeting in Brussels, on 12 February 1988. ‘The decision neither to publish the [Stalker/ Sampson] report nor to prosecute any RUC officers’, Haughey protested, ‘had upset public opinion among the rank and file of the people and political opinion in Ireland.’ ‘No sooner had this happened than we were given the decision on the Birmingham Six.’ ‘I must tell you how this affected my position.’85 Thatcher was unapologetic, dismissing Haughey’s protests. ‘The Stalker Report was not to any politicians [sic]; it was to the Public Prosecutor, she noted. ‘In our system the DPP is completely separate from politics.’ ‘It is not the sort of report that could be ever published.’86 On the subject of the ‘Birmingham Six’, she was equally dismissive. The British Court of Appeal, which was made up of ‘most distinguished people’, she said, had heard ‘[t]‌heir case’. She was ‘totally convinced’ by the court’s ruling rejecting grounds for appeal.87 In her memoir, Thatcher was equally dismissive of the failed appeal on behalf of ‘the ‘Birmingham Six’, recording ‘as if it was for the British Government to tell British courts how to administer justice’.88 The meeting, thus, ended in a stalemate, with neither leader willing to compromise. For Thatcher, her focus continued to rest on security matters. For Haughey, he remained preoccupied on preserving his reputation in the mind of his Fianna Fáil supporters as the custodian of Irish republicanism. It was events outside the realm of high politic that reminded the political elites in Dublin and London of just how precarious the circumstances had become. On 6 March, the SAS killed three unarmed members of the PIRA in the British colony of Gibraltar (British intelligence code name ‘Operation Flavius’) as they walked along a public street. They were Mairéad Farrell, Seán Savage and Daniel McCann. The three PIRA operatives were on a reconnaissance mission, making plans for the planting of a car bomb (packed with 141 lbs of semtex) coincided to detonate at the time of the changing of the guard and band parade ceremony of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Anglican regiment.89 The death of the ‘Gibraltar Three’ reignited accusations amongst Nationalist politicians in Belfast and Dublin and some Labour Party MPs in Westminster that a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy had now won the support of the Thatcher government. The Irish government, for example, issued a press release announcing that it was ‘gravely perturbed’ by the murder of the ‘three unarmed Irish people’ in Gibraltar.90 According to Amnesty International, several eyewitnesses reported that the three PIRA operatives had ‘been killed without having been challenged and that no attempt had been made to arrest them’. It was further alleged that at least one of the victims had been shot several times ‘while he lay incapacitated on the ground after the initial shots’.91 The British government categorically refuted the above accusations. In fact, Thatcher described that above accusations on behalf of Amnesty International as ‘disgraceful’.92 Raymond Murray purports that in advance of the killings in Gibraltar, Thatcher and two members of her cabinet, Howe and George Younger, were provided with a top-secret report of a four-month surveillance operation, conducted on behalf of MI5, regarding the activities of the Gibraltar Three.93 According to the same source, on receiving this information, working through the British cabinet’s joint intelligence

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committee, Thatcher allegedly gave her approval that if the SAS soldiers carrying out the operation believed arrests were impossible, without endangering either their own or civilian lives, then they were ‘empowered to shoot’.94 This version of events, however, differs from Charles Powell’s recollection. Although he conceded that Thatcher must have been aware of the SAS surveillance of the PIRA operatives in Gibraltar because ‘they were operating overseas and there could be considerable political repercussions’, he argues that she was ‘not told explicitly that they might be shot’.95 Given that the relevant British state papers in relation to ‘Operation Flavius’ remain closed to the public it is unlikely that we will ever ascertain the exact role that Thatcher played in this episode, with the exception that it seems highly unlikely that she had not been informed in advance of the operation.96 Indeed, in her memoir, Thatcher provides only a passing reference to the killing of the Gibraltar Three, in which she makes the rather cryptic remark that there ‘was not the slightest doubt about the terrorists’ identity or intentions’.97 Addressing the House of Commons, the day after the deaths of the Gibraltar Three, on 7 March, Howe was unequivocal in defence of the actions of the SAS. The two men and one woman shot dead by the British security forces in Gibraltar yesterday afternoon, he said, were ‘three identified terrorists’. In explaining the manner of their deaths, the secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs noted that the SAS commenced shooting only once they concluded that ‘their lives and the lives of others were under threat’98 (a subsequent coroner’s inquest, convened in September 1988, recorded by a majority of nine to two jury members that the three PIRA operatives had been killed ‘lawfully’).99 Tragically, the deaths of the Gibraltar Three set off a vicious chain reaction, which during March 1988 alone witnessed the deaths of thirteen people (five civilians; five members of the PIRA; two members of the British Army; and one member of the RUC).100 On 16 March, at the funerals of the Gibraltar Three that took place at the Milltown cemetery in Belfast, a lone Ulster Defence Association (UDA) member, Michael Stone, attacked mourners with hand grenades, an automatic revolver and pistol. What ensued was utter chaos. As Stone attempted to make his getaway, still firing from his pistol and throwing hand grenades, a large crowd chased him, eventually catching him and dragging him to the ground. ‘Get the Orange bastard!’ the angry mob cried out.101 Only for the intervention of the RUC was Stone’s life spared. Stone murdered three people, while more than sixty were wounded. The Milltown cemetery attack was filmed by assembled television news crews and caused revulsion across the world. That evening, widespread violence orchestrated by Irish Republicans broke out across Northern Ireland, with angry youths hijacking and burning vehicles. Far worse, however, was to follow. Three days later, on 19 March, during the funeral of one of Stone’s victims, Caoimhín Mac Brádaigh, two British Army corporals, Derek Wood and David Howes, wearing civilian clothes and in a civilian Volkswagen Passat car, were viciously killed by the PIRA. The two men had apparently unknowingly driven into the path of the funeral cortège as it made its way along the Andersonstown Road in west Belfast. The assembled crowd apparently mistook the two British soldiers as Loyalist paramilitaries. What ensued, which was recorded by the assembled media and

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subsequently televised, left an indelible imprint in the minds of ordinary people, not only on the island of Ireland, but throughout Great Britain and the wider world. An angry mob surrounded and attacked the corporals’ car, smashing the windows and attempting to drag the British soldiers out. Corporal Wood then drew his pistol and fired a shot in the air. The two men were then dragged from the car before being taken to a nearby waste ground near Casement Park sports ground, beaten, stripped to their underpants and shot dead by the PIRA. Corporal Wood was shot six times: twice in the head and four times in the chest. Corporal Howes was shot five times in the body. On hearing the shots, Redemptorist priest Fr Alec Reid rushed to the scene, where he gave them the last rites.102 The ‘Andersonstown murders’, as the killings of corporals Woods and Howes later became known,103 caused revulsion within the British government. Thatcher waited with the families on the tarmac at RAF Northolt, West London, as the two coffins were brought back to England, each draped in a Union Jack.104 She condemned the killings as an act of ‘savagery’, describing the murders of the two corporals as amongst ‘the worst things in my life’.105 During a meeting with Haughey, later that year in Rhodes, Greece, in the margins of a European Council meeting, Thatcher recalled that ‘I will never forget receiving the bodies of those two soldiers murdered in Belfast before the television cameras. Those films were seen by their relatives; that was a terrible experience.’106 Howe summed up the mood amongst his ministerial colleagues in the aftermath of the Milltown and Andersonstown murders, describing this period as ‘one of the darkest weeks in the troubled history of Northern Ireland’. ‘They showed human nature at its most irrational and savage.’ They came as a ‘terrible shock to us all’.107 The dark and tragic events of March 1988 ensured that Northern Ireland assumed a more prominent place in Thatcher’s thinking for the remainder of her premiership; albeit that she continued to harbour grave reservations about how to find a solution to the conflict. According to senior figures in Whitehall, by now Thatcher’s outlook towards Northern Ireland was characterized by a ‘sense of disillusionment’, to quote John Weston of the Cabinet Office. She was dissatisfied by an apparent ‘lack of delivery on security co-operation on the Irish side’.108 Indeed, according to Nicholas Finn, Thatcher had stored up a ‘deep vein of distrust towards Dublin’, that she had simply had enough of the AIA.109 Time and time again, over the course of the next two years, Thatcher would return to the subject of security, particularly her conviction that the Irish government was still not doing enough to tackle the PIRA, whom she remained convinced were using the Republic of Ireland as a safe-haven. At a meeting of the British cabinet, on 28 April 1988, Thatcher was scathing at Haughey’s alleged failure to adequately ‘attack terrorism’.110 Indeed, her frustration was so emphatic that later that day she wrote personally to the taoiseach to express how ‘deeply upset’ she was by his recent attitude to Northern Ireland and more generally Anglo-Irish relations, going so far as to accuse Haughey of surrendering to ‘terrorism’.111 Looking back on those dark days in the comfort of retirement, Thatcher still remained deeply critical of Haughey’s handling of events during 1988, commenting on the ‘astonishing’ ignorance he had shown during this period.112

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‘Carry on – just don’t get caught’: Thatcher and alleged collusion between the British state and Loyalist paramilitaries By the turn of the New Year, Thatcher placed further pressure on Dublin to improve cross-border security cooperation in order to ‘turn the tables against the terrorists’, in the words of George Younger.113 Yet, cross-border security cooperation was not the only issue to win Thatcher’s attention during the early weeks of 1989. The sensitive subject of extradition also loomed large in the British prime minister’s thinking, particularly the ongoing saga regarding the extradition of Fr Patrick Ryan to Great Britain. In the words of Howe, ‘there is unfinished business over the Ryan case and on extradition generally’.114 On 30 June 1988, Fr Ryan, a known PIRA sympathizer, was arrested by Belgian police and was subsequently found with large quantities of cash and bomb-making equipment in his home (according to British sources, a sum of approximately £850,000.00 had been traced to Fr Ryan’s bank accounts, believed to be provided by ‘the Libyans’).115 Five months later, the defrocked priest was flown to the Republic of Ireland after the Belgian government refused to extradite him to Great Britain. To the annoyance of the British government, on his return to the Republic of Ireland Fr Ryan was allowed to ‘go free’ and ‘no effort was made to keep him in detention while a decision was reached on the application’, to quote Nicholas Fenn, British ambassador to Ireland, 1986–91.116 Thatcher was furious by Haughey’s reluctance to extradite Fr Ryan to Great Britain, describing the latter as a ‘really bad egg’ and a ‘very dangerous man’.117 She accused Dublin of a ‘lack of resolve’ and said the handling of the affairs was a matter of grave concern to her government.118 As Fr Ryan’s extradition to Great Britain continued to play out in British and Irish diplomatic channels, one of the most highly contentious episodes during Thatcher’s premiership exploded onto the political agenda. On 12 February 1989, masked Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) gunmen murdered Pat Finucane, as he sat down for dinner with his wife and children. A prominent Belfast solicitor, Finucane’s murder immediately sparked off accusations of collusion between elements of the British state and Loyalist paramilitaries, including baseless claims in later years that Thatcher, herself, ‘ordered’ the murder of Finucane.119 While Thatcher played no part in Finucane’s murder, the available evidence provides indisputable proof that elements of the British state ‘conspired to kill’ Finucane, to quote Darragh MacIntyre.120 Brian Nelson, a former Loyalist paramilitary, who was recruited as an agent (code name ‘Agent 6137’) by the British Army’s most secret intelligence wing  – euphemistically known as the ‘Force Research Unit’ (FRU)121  – put forward Finucane’s name as a credible target for his killers, providing them with a photograph and home address of their victim.122 At this time, Nelson had risen to become the head of intelligence for the UFF, the ‘killer’ wing of the UDA.123 Operating at this rank, he used his position to identify targets, including Finucane, for the UDA/UFF dead squads.124 Finucane was targeted for assassination because in the months leading to his murder he had been investigating accusations of British state collusion with Loyalist

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paramilitaries in the campaign against the PIRA. Over the preceding years, he had also represented many Irish Republicans, including Bobby Sands, during the second Irish Republican hunger strike of 1981. Two of Finucane’s brothers, Dermot and Seamus, were allegedly also senior members of the PIRA.125 Misinformation was also spread at the time by some within the British Army that Finucane, himself, was a member of the PIRA.126 In fact, prior to Finucane’s murder, the Irish government had raised concerns on receiving information that the police in Castlereagh were ‘encouraging Protestant paramilitaries to attack Irish Republican lawyers’, in which Finucane’s name had been specifically mentioned.127 Finucane’s murder was only one of several incidents during Thatcher’s premiership in which the British state was involved in widespread collusion between Loyalist paramilitary ‘death squads’ and agencies of the British state, such as the FRU, the RUC special branch and the part-time UDR, a ‘local’ infantry regiment of the British Army, established in 1970.128 According to several sources, during this period it was common practice for elements operating within the British state to share top-secret intelligence material, evidence, weapons and personnel with Loyalist paramilitaries, including members of the UDA and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) (during Thatcher’s premiership the UDA and UVF were believed to have easily infiltrated the UDR).129 Although Thatcher had previously been made aware of a British intelligence report that the UDR had been ‘heavily infiltrated by extremist Protestants, and … they could not be relied on to be loyal’, she continued to place her full support behind the movement.130 At the beginning of her premiership, on a visit to Northern Ireland in August 1979 and in a show of defiant support, she put on the uniform of a ‘Greenfinch’, the female members of the UDR.131 Towards the end of her political career her attitude towards the UDR had not changed. In September 1989, she referred to the UDR as ‘remarkable’, while on the eve of her resignation as British prime minister, in November of the following year, she described the movement as a ‘marvellous’ and said its members had acted with ‘integrity’, ‘honour’ and ‘loyalty’.132 Raymond White, a former head of the RUC special branch, subsequently admitted that in 1986 he personally raised the subject of collusion with Thatcher, seeking legal clarification for the handling of British undercover agents who had penetrated paramilitary groups. The message that White received after his meeting with Thatcher regarding the use of undercover agents was to ‘carry on, but don’t get caught’.133 Indeed, in a 2015 interview, Michael Mates, an outspoken critic of Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy and a minister at the NIO from 1992 to 1993, conceded that the scale of the collusion between the British state and Loyalist paramilitaries during the 1980s was much greater than he had believed it to be at the time.134 In fact, accusations concerning alleged collusion between the British state and Loyalist paramilitaries existed long before Thatcher’s appointment as British prime minister. During the mid-1970s, for example, the British security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries were allegedly involved in a series of horrendous acts of violence, including murder. These included the Dublin-Monaghan bombings in 1974; the Miami Showband killings in 1975; the Kingsmill ‘massacre’ in 1976; and the activities of the ‘Glennane Gang’, in which approximately 120 people lost their lives in attacks attributed to permutations of this beastly gang.135 As Anne Cadwallader pointed

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out, ‘the inescapable fact, established beyond doubt … is that successive British governments and their law enforcement agencies entered into a collusive counterinsurgency campaign with Loyalist paramilitaries’.136 The former Northern Ireland police ombudsman Baroness Nuala O’Loan supports Cadwallader’s claim. During a 2015 interview, O’Loan noted that there was ‘impunity’ for Loyalist paramilitaries to ‘go on committing their crimes … including murder’.137 In fact, she has gone so far as to suggest that ‘hundreds and hundreds of deaths happened in Northern Ireland because of [British] security force collusion’.138 The Stevens Inquires, initially established in September 1989, were three official British government inquiries, led by Sir John Stevens, concerning alleged collusion in Northern Ireland between Loyalist paramilitaries and the British state security forces. In the findings of his first report, published in 1990, Stevens found that collusion was ‘neither wide-spread nor institutionalised’.139 However, the third and final of Steven’s report published in 2003 found that there ‘had been collusion in the killing of Finucane between members of the security forces, especially the Force Research Unit and Loyalists’.140 In 2012, the British government, under the chairmanship of Desmond de Silva, commenced an official review into Finucane’s murder. De Silva’s findings caused a political sensation. The De Silva Report claimed that employees of the British state ‘actively facilitated’ Finucane’s murder, through a dark web of collusion between elements of the British security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries. The De Silva Report also claimed that successive British governments knew about such collusion in relation to Finucane’s murder but ‘did nothing about it’. In January 2015, British prime minister David Cameron, publicly placed on the record that ‘employees of the state actively furthered and facilitated Patrick Finucane’s murder’.141

‘My approach is undogmatic’: The genesis of Peter Brooke’s Northern Ireland initiative On the political front, by the early weeks of 1989 London’s preferred solution still rested on the restoration of a devolved government in Northern Ireland. The prospect of the return of a devolved government did not seem likely, however. As one British source phrased it, ‘Devolution has proved an unattainable objective for the last 15 years: neither we nor the Northern Ireland parties have been able to find a basis on which they can reach agreement on how to work together except under the umbrella of Direct Rule.’142 In truth, and in accordance with Thatcher’s approach to Northern Ireland since she first took up office in 1979, the restoration of devolved government was to play a secondary role to more immediate security concerns. As Howe noted in a letter to Thatcher, dated 19 January 1989, ‘above all we need to keep up the pressure [on the Irish government] for better security co-operation’.143 The arrival of Peter Brooke as secretary of state for Northern Ireland, however, transformed the British government’s Northern Ireland policy, with the emphasis shifting firmly away from Thatcher’s fixation with security related issues to an attempt to restore devolved government to Northern Ireland. Brooke’s promotion was triggered

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following Thatcher’s decision to reshuffle her cabinet in July 1989. The main loser in this reshuffle was Howe, who was effectively demoted to the position of deputy prime minister. Tom King, Brooke’s predecessor in the Northern Ireland portfolio, was promoted to secretary of state for defence, while John Major took over Howe’s post as secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. Prior to his ministerial promotion, Brooke held the post of chairman of the Conservative Party from 1987 to 1989. Educated at Marlborough and later Balliol College, the University of Oxford, he seemed destined to fit the mould as a ‘typical’ Conservative Party secretary of state for Northern Ireland: detached, ignorant and overwhelmed by the Irish question. Nothing, however, could have been further from the truth. His appointment was a political revelation. In fact, he was of AngloIrish descent, his family coming from Rantaven, Co. Cavan in the Republic of Ireland and was known to have acquired a ‘deep interest in Ulster affairs’, to quote Thatcher.144 Although on taking up the Northern Ireland portfolio Thatcher had made clear that she ‘didn’t want anything happening, except keeping the place on an even keel’, Brooke wasted little time in grasping the political nettle.145 From the outset, he was a proactive secretary of state for Northern Ireland. As a studious man, he drew up a reading list that included three books on the PIRA and a series on international terrorism.146 He occasionally read the Irish Republican press organ An Phoblacht147 and soon acquired a ‘special’ interest of late nineteenth-century Anglo-Irish relations, chiefly the 1886 second Home Rule Bill.148 Indeed, what is striking from an examination of the archival records was his routine method, almost on a weekly basis during his first year in office, of personally keeping Thatcher up to speed regarding his Northern Ireland strategy. On 18 July 1989, having spent the previous week meeting the leaders of the main political parties in Northern Ireland, Brooke sent Thatcher a thought provoking, not to say frank, critique of the current political situation in Northern Ireland. ‘My approach’, he explained, ‘is undogmatic, and does not exclude lesser options among the road to devolution such as changes in legislative procedures or the powers of local government’, although he conceded that ‘some form of devolution remains the objective most likely to command widespread support’. At the heart of Brooke’s strategy was what would be later referred to as his ‘ThreeStrands’ approach; albeit by this stage he had not crystallized his thinking on this strategy (Strand one dealt with internal dialogue between the political parties of Northern Ireland  – with the exception of Sinn Féin. Strand two dealt with BelfastDublin relations. Last, Strand three focused on the Dublin-London relationship).149 Essentially, this policy, as outlined in his letter to Thatcher, was an attempt to ‘edge forward’ by building on ‘bilateral discussions with all the parties concerned’, which included the Northern Ireland political parties (with the exception of Sinn Féin) and the British and Irish governments, in the hope of securing a return of devolved government in Northern Ireland. The method he had chosen in his efforts to get his new initiative underway, he noted, was through a ‘series of speeches’, which he hoped would help to ‘gently … nudge local politicians forward’ and confirm ‘our overriding commitment to bring terrorism to an end’.

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Regarding the potential of Ulster Unionists participating in any future multi-party talks, Brooke painted a positive picture. ‘Unionist antipathy towards’ the AIA, he wrote, ‘remains undiminished, but attitudes are no longer as apocalyptic as they were. Unionists are starting to talk to Ministers on a more normal basis’, he wrote. The DUP, under the Rev. Paisley, he explained, had ‘decided to make a major pitch for devolution’. Although the leader of the UUP, Molyneaux ‘remains immobile’, he was convinced that there were others within the UUP who ‘now feel under pressure not to be outshone by the DUP in their desire to move forward’. On the role of the SDLP and the Irish government, Brooke, likewise, provided a positive assessment. The SDLP were reportedly eager ‘to do anything they could to encourage political progress, except to countenance “suspension” of the [AngloIrish] Agreement’. Regarding Dublin’s position, Brooke conceded that London must recognize that ‘there is of course an important Irish dimension’. ‘I see Haughey’s stance as essentially cautious, pragmatic and opportunist’, he wrote. ‘He does not speak up for devolution, he says because, there are no specific proposals on the table.’ However, Brooke felt there was room for manoeuvre with Dublin considering that Haughey had repeatedly ‘stress[ed] the urgency of political progress in Northern Ireland’ (following a snap Irish general election, Haughey was re-elected as taoiseach on 12 July 1989). In his closing analysis, Brooke sought to convince a sceptical Thatcher of the potential for political progress in Northern Ireland. ‘The sum of all this cannot yet give us confidence that the parties are ready to negotiate seriously if they got around a table together. But there are increasing signs that they might be soon.’ He concluded: Progress towards a political settlement could deal a powerful blow to the terrorists on both sides. ‘Good Government’ really needs the proper local input which is currently lacking. The longer it takes to achieve that input the more irresponsible local politicians become. We would be rightly criticised for doing nothing to respond to the political momentum which is now building up, and which we have helped to create.150

To Brooke’s delight, on reading the above memorandum, Thatcher agreed to sanction a new series of talks between the British government and the political parties of Northern Ireland (except for Sinn Féin) in the hope of securing agreement on a fresh political pathway forward. In the months that followed, Brooke immersed himself in a series of protracted talks with the political parties of Northern Ireland in Belfast and the Irish government in Dublin. Despite his efforts, however, by the close of 1989, the prospect of multi-party talks seemed a like a distant aspiration rather than a medium-term goal. Consequently, Brooke made the bold decision to shift the goal posts. On the anniversary of his first hundred days in office, in early November 1989, Brooke delivered a controversial – and quite remarkable – speech in which he demonstrated a willingness to take risks to facilitate a new drive to find peace in Northern Ireland. He made the speech apparently without first seeking Thatcher’s approval. First, Brooke acknowledged that it would be very difficult to defeat the PIRA militarily. ‘It is difficult’, he conceded, ‘to envisage a military defeat of such a force because of the circumstances

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under which they operate.’ A military response, he therefore admitted, ‘cannot be our only response’. ‘The problem also has complex political, social and economic aspects.’ Second, Brooke said he would not rule out talks with Sinn Féin in the event of an end of Irish Republican violence. ‘If they stick to supporting violence there is no way, or in any way, in which we could entertain conversation with them’, he noted. However, ‘if within the terrorist community they were to come to the conclusion that they wished to retreat from violence’, the door would be open for Sinn Féin to enter the political process, he conceded. ‘I hope that the British Government on a long-term basis would be sufficiently flexible’, he continued, ‘that if flexibility were required it could be used, but I am in no way predicating or predicting what those circumstances would be.’151 Under Thatcher’s leadership of the Conservative Party, successive party spokespersons on Northern Ireland  – from Airey Neave to Tom King  – refused to publicly concede that it would be difficult to defeat the PIRA militarily (Humphrey Atkins was seemingly the exception to this rule. In November 1981, he acknowledged, albeit in private, that ‘military action alone would not end terrorism’).152 Moreover, regarding the prospect of convening talks with Sinn Féin, traditionally the standard reply from British ministers was categorically to state that London would never talk to terrorists. As one of Brooke’s predecessors in the Northern Ireland portfolio phrased it, ‘There can be no political accommodation with terrorism’, to quote Douglas Hurd.153 In fact, Brooke was the first Conservative Party spokesperson on Northern Ireland since William Whitelaw in the early 1970s to entertain the idea of formally talking with Irish Republican paramilitaries. Defending his speech, Brooke returned to the argument that the British government needed to be ‘flexible’. ‘If peace was to ever come about in Northern Ireland’ and the PIRA demonstrated a willingness to call a ceasefire and ‘clearly renounced violence’, he reportedly said, the British government must be open to talking to Sinn Féin.154 Brooke’s remarks caused a political storm, not least amongst some Conservative Party backbench MPs, with Ian Gow, Michael Mates, Edward Leigh and Norman Tebbit being the leading antagonists.155 An unidentified Conservative Party MP reportedly complained, ‘I was hoping for a quiet weekend. This is appalling.’156 The NIO was, likewise, reportedly annoyed by Brooke’s speech. According to a senior NIO official, Brooke ‘is a good man but has a dangerous habit of speaking too freely’.157 The largest protest was left to Ulster Unionists, many of whom were described as being ‘horrified’ by Brooke’s comments.158 They were particularly disgusted by his apparent willingness to open a potential line of communication with Sinn Féin, given that Irish Republican paramilitaries continued to mount a vicious campaign of violence (e.g. less than six weeks earlier, the PIRA had bombed the Royal Marines School of Music in Deal, Kent, England, murdering ten young bandsmen and injuring twenty-two others). Senior officials within No. 10 Downing Street responded more favourably. The British cabinet secretary Robin Butler privately noted that Brooke’s speech ‘could have a positive effect in the context of the debate understood to be going on within the republican movement’, to quote Andrew O’Rourke, Irish ambassador in London.159 Charles Powell, however, was reportedly displeased by Brooke’s speech. ‘I fear the Northern Ireland Secretary’s initial statement’, he said, ‘actually took some of the pressure off the [P]‌IRA.’160 According to Butler, Thatcher had ‘no row’ with Brooke

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regarding his comments, partly because it was overshadowed by other events, including ‘Cabinet difficulties’, with the result that she was ‘very busy’ and was ‘not focusing on Irish affairs’.161 Indeed, during a meeting with Haughey in the margins of a European Council meeting in Strasbourg, on 9 December, Thatcher was full of praise for Brooke, describing him as a ‘man of integrity – totally fearless’.162 Sinn Féin greeted Brooke’s remarks with a cautious optimism. According to a reliable Whitehall source, the contents of Brooke’s speech had ‘been widely discussed at all levels in Sinn Féin’. ‘Opinion was divided on the interpretations of his comments. Were they a counter-insurgency ploy to sow discord in the Republican movement?’ Or were they a clear indication that the British government ‘was now war-weary?’ Most of the Sinn Féin leadership reportedly believed ‘they were a mixture of the two’, but that the leadership ‘did not believe’ that the comments constituted a ‘genuine sign of peace’.163 Yet, at the back of their minds, the Irish Republican leadership was also calculating about the political future. By the late 1980s, ‘Outlasting Mrs Thatcher’ had become an important part of the leadership’s strategy in the hope that with her banished to the political side-lines there was a realistic chance that London might follow an alternative path.164 Brooke’s peace feelers to Sinn Féin coincided with recent developments in Irish Nationalism. In January 1988, the SDLP, under the leadership of John Hume, took the politically risky (if not potentially politically suicidal) decision to open a line of communication with Sinn Féin, under the banner of the ‘Adams-Hume’ talks. By this period, Hume had become increasingly conscious that the violence in Northern Ireland had to be ended if conditions for meaningful dialogue between the interested parties were to be secured. By the close of 1987, the total death toll had reached 2,899, with thousands more injured and millions of pounds worth of property and business destroyed. Moreover, the unemployment rate in Northern Ireland now ran at over 120,000.165 Hume was also comforted by a speech delivered by Gerry Adams, in November 1987, in which the president of Sinn Féin acknowledged that military means alone could not secure a united Ireland.166 It was within this context that Hume took the brave gamble to meet Adams in person. The British government was caught completely off guard on receiving news of the Adams-Hume talks. With the exception of Haughey, some leading figures within the SDLP and influential members of the Catholic clergy, this new initiative ‘came as a genuine surprise’ to London, to quote a confidential Whitehall source.167 Indeed, the Adams-Hume talks, to use Noel Cornick’s description, have ‘set the cat amongst the political pigeons in Northern Ireland’.168 Thatcher was apparently furious on learning of Hume’s willingness to hold negotiations with Adams, a bête noire of the British state. If the PIRA maintained its campaign of violence, Thatcher protested, Sinn Féin must be refused a seat at the negotiation table. Moreover, her anxiety was increased further as she believed such talks provided the Sinn Féin leadership with an ideal platform to propagate its Irish Republican rhetoric.169 Two years previously, on 19 October 1988, in an effort to keep Irish Republicans from exploiting the ‘oxygen of publicity’, to borrow Robert Savage’s phrase, the Thatcher government (although some ministers were opposed)170 had introduced broadcasting restrictions (the so-called ‘broadcasting ban’) on those organizations

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proscribed in Northern Ireland and Great Britain (the ban lasted until 1994).171 The organizations affected had included Sinn Féin, Republican Sinn Féin (RSF) and the UDA. The restrictions also applied to individuals who were canvassing support for the named organizations.172 Thereafter, Adams and his Sinn Fein colleagues could not be heard making statements on the airwaves: instead, their words were either spoken by actors or, on occasion, appeared as subtitles at the bottom of the television screen.173 The broadcasting ban was introduced after a series of very public rows that ‘kept the spotlight on television coverage of Northern Ireland’.174 One such episode was Thames television programme Death on the Rock which claimed that tactics employed by the SAS that shot dead three unarmed PIRA members in Gibraltar in March 1988 had amounted to unlawful killings.175 On learning that the programme was to be aired, Howe telephoned Lord Thompson to demand it not be broadcast. His request was declined and the programme was broadcast on 28 April 1988.176 The first of a series of meetings between Adams and Hume took place on 11 January 1988 at Clonard Monastery located on the Falls Road in West Belfast; the AdamsHume talks had commenced. Privately, Thatcher was made aware of this meeting. She was reportedly ‘unimpressed’, believing that Hume was ‘being led up the garden path’ by Adams. Her government, thus, did not intend to modify its attitude towards Sinn Féin.177 As Charles Moore explained, this approach was characteristic of her ‘undeviating position throughout her time as prime minister. She never conferred any public legitimacy on Sinn Féin.’178 Two months later, in March of that year, talks between Sinn Féin and the SDLP continued at Fr Reid’s retreat house, St Gerald’s on Belfast’s Antrim Road. A further five meetings between the SDLP and Sinn Féin delegations were held over the course of 1988.179 In September of that year, the Adams-Hume talks concluded, for the meantime at least,180 with both sides producing policy papers which were subsequently reproduced in full in the Irish Times.181 According to Hume, a large part of his talks with Sinn Féin during this period had debated the strategic importance of Northern Ireland to NATO and the question of self-determination. Accordingly, he had promised Sinn Féin that he would seek from the British government a pledge that their presence in Northern Ireland was based on the wishes of the majority of its citizens and not because London had any imperialist or strategic interest in the region.182 As is examined below, Brooke responded favourably to Sinn Féin’s request.

‘No selfish strategic … interest in Northern Ireland’: Brooke’s Whitbread speech and Thatcher’s political downfall In January 1990, Brooke announced further plans for his initiative for Northern Ireland that he hoped would lead to the ‘ultimate goal’ of devolution. Although he conceded to Thatcher that this was a ‘hard prize to secure’, he was determined to ‘continue my efforts, though with caution and without drama’.183 During a speech in Bangor, Co. Down, on 9 January, Brooke appealed to the political parties of Northern Ireland to

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break the political stalemate and agree to the commencement of a fresh round of multi-party talks with the aim of restoring devolved government in Northern Ireland. In seeking this objective, Brooke argued that enough ‘common ground’ existed for progress to be made and urged Ulster Unionists to end their ‘internal exile’ and resume contact with the British government.184 In a letter to Thatcher, dated 15 January, Brooke explained that the initial reaction to his Bangor speech had been ‘broadly helpful’. ‘No party has closed off the possibility’ of multi-party talks, he wrote. While Molyneaux’s ‘immobility’ was acknowledged, others within the UUP remained ‘more accommodating’. Within the DUP, Peter Robinson reportedly gave Brooke’s speech a ‘guarded welcome’. The SDLP, according to Brooke, had been ‘put on the spot’ by his speech.185 Although Brooke acknowledged that the central preoccupation of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy remained on eradicating terrorism, ‘from whichever side of the community it comes’,186 in the months that followed Brooke’s Bangor speech, he held a series of discussions with the political parties of Northern Ireland and with representatives of the Irish government, each of which accepted that talks needed to be addressed as part of the process, along ‘Three Strands’: Strand one – relations between the political parties of Northern Ireland; Strand two  – relations between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (North/South relations) and last, Strand three – relations between the two sovereign governments in Dublin and London (East/West relations). In separate correspondence with Thatcher, during February and March, Brooke provided an upbeat assessment of the progress of his talks, to date. ‘Although difficulties remain real’, he informed the British prime minister, ‘there is scope for progress which we should exploit.’ ‘Constructive political development in Northern Ireland’, he stressed, ‘would be a significant prize for us.’187 On the UUP’s continued opposition to the AIA, Brooke supported Thatcher’s categorical refusal to suspend this accord. ‘We cannot agree to the suspension’ of the AIA or the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, Brooke confirmed.188 To end the stalemate, Brooke advised Thatcher that it was now paramount that the British and Irish governments ‘make a gesture’ to Ulster Unionists to entice them to agree to multi-party talks in the hope of restoring devolved government in Northern Ireland. Such a move, he counselled, could be made ‘without any sacrifice of principle’, on behalf of either London or Dublin. Brooke explained that Ulster Unionists sought agreement on three central preconditions before participating in multi-party talks: (1) ‘a willingness to contemplate an alternative’ to the AIA; (2) ‘temporary non-operation’ of the AIA and (3)  ‘a reduction in the role’ of the secretariat of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference.189 Regarding the Irish government, Brooke was less optimistic. The Irish, he informed Thatcher, while helpful on several matters, had a tendency to be ‘tardy, reluctant and conditional’.190 On Haughey’s stance, Brooke noted that although the taoiseach wished to ‘see progress towards a political accommodation’, he continued to hold grave reservations about devolution, as this policy ‘might pump life into the “failed political entity” ’ (i.e. Northern Ireland).191 ‘Irish goodwill’, Brooke argued was, therefore, essential if progress was to be achieved. The answer to Haughey’s immobility, Brooke

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suggested, was the need for a ‘combination of persuasion and continued pressure’. ‘I shall seek to appeal to Mr Haughey’s self-image as the guardian of Irish nationalism and the one man capable of reaching an historic accommodation with Unionism.’ ‘Mr Haughey may hold the key.’192 In correspondence with Gerald Collins, Irish minister for foreign affairs, on 12 March, Brooke outlined how he perceived Dublin’s role would operate under his ‘Three Strands’ approach. ‘Clearly’, he explained, ‘your Government must be directly represented in any talks about North/South or East/West relations … it has the right to put forward views and proposals on the modalities of bringing about devolution in Northern Ireland, insofar as they relate to the interests of the minority community.’193 Although, he inserted a caveat, Dublin must be made aware that ‘I could not accept their direct participation in talks about internal political arrangements in Northern Ireland’.194 Regarding Sinn Féin, Brooke drew Thatcher’s attention to a recent speech by Martin McGuinness (referred to by Brooke as being ‘on the harder end of the Republican spectrum’). In this speech, McGuinness challenged Brooke to explain how the British government might respond to a ceasefire. ‘I gave this the necessary rebuff ’, Brooke informed Thatcher, ‘But the incident may be of some significance. Sinn Féin/PIRA could be either trying to wreak the present signs of political movement, or showing signs of concern about their isolation from the process.’195 On 20 April, Thatcher had the first opportunity to speak face to face with Haughey since the commencement of Brooke’s initiative for Northern Ireland. Convened at No. 10 Downing Street, the meeting was primarily dedicated to discussions related to the programme for the forthcoming European Council meeting, scheduled for 28 April (Haughey was acting president of the European Council). When the subject of Northern Ireland was broached, Thatcher expressed her usual pessimism regarding the potential for success of Brooke’s recent endeavours. She ‘was not sure whether anything would necessarily come out of our efforts to make progress … but it was right to try’. For his part, Haughey said he would be happy to leave it to Brooke to ‘try to sort it all out’, describing the secretary of state for Northern Ireland as ‘the best man in the world’.196 Despite her continued distrustfulness and frustration regarding the entire enterprise, by July, Thatcher continued to give her approval to Brooke’s initiative for Northern Ireland.197 For his part, by the summer of 1990 Brooke’s attention shifted towards Dublin. Behind closed doors, he worked tirelessly on securing concessions from the Irish government, specifically in relation to the potential postponement of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference. One major stumbling block, however, remained on the road. By now, Haughey had made ‘it clear’, to quote Brooke, that it would be ‘impossible’ to proceed in the absence of ‘a clear and firm commitment to a specific timetable for the opening of the North/South talks’.198 As the taoiseach informed the secretary of state for Northern Ireland during a meeting in Donegal, on 4 July, the former ‘wanted to be certain that North/South talks would commence during the proposed interval between [Anglo-Irish intergovernmental] Conference meetings’ before Dublin would agree to further dialogue.199 As politicians in Belfast, Dublin and London made plans for their summer vacations and began unwinding after a gruelling parliamentary term, the PIRA once again

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demonstrated their capacity for ruthlessness. On this occasion, their selected victim was a close friend of Thatcher and a lifelong opponent of Irish Republican terrorism. On 30 July (four days before the outbreak of the Gulf War), Ian Gow, Conservative Party MP for Eastbourne and chairman of the CPPNIC, was assassinated by the PIRA, who exploded a bomb under his car outside his home in East Sussex. In a press statement, the PIRA claimed responsibility for Gow’s murder, stating that the former British minister was targeted due to his personal relationship with Thatcher and his role in developing British policy on Northern Ireland. Scotland Yard had repeatedly warned Gow that he was on the list of 100 lawmakers, judges and civil servants found in a PIRA bomb factory in London in December of the previous year.200 In his diary, Alan Clark recalled that when he arrived at his office at Westminster, Julian Scopes, head of Clark’s private office at the Ministry of Defence, was looking anxious. ‘Minister, I have some very, very bad news … Ian Gow has been killed by a car bomb.’ ‘How spiteful of them’, Clark replied in utter shock. ‘Now they’ve got her [Thatcher’s] two closest confidants, Airey [Neave] and Ian’, Clark mourned scornfully.201 Howe, who learned of Gow’s murder over the radio, was left dumbfounded. ‘My mind was filled with anger, with grief, with disbelief ’, he remembered.202 Conservative Party chairman Kenneth Baker203 recalled that on receiving news of Gow’s murder he ‘sat … in a state of shock’. ‘Ian’s fearless criticism of the [P]‌IRA’, Baker later wrote, ‘had made his face well known in Republican circles.’204 Thatcher, likewise, was left devastated on learning of Gow’s murder. Bernard Ingham recalled that her face was ‘drained and drawn’, but that she remained defiant; the PIRA must not be allowed to win.205 In her memoir, Thatcher remembered that Gow had been signalled out for assassination because the PIRA ‘knew he was their unflinching enemy’.206 Soon after, she visited the Gow home to comfort his wife, Jane (the Gow and Thatcher families were known to have often spent Christmas together). Gow had been a close friend to Airey Neave prior to the latter’s murder by the INLA in 1979. With Gow’s passing, Thatcher had lost another close confidant, whose views on Northern Ireland, although not always agreeing with, she nonetheless respected. Despite Gow’s assassination, Brooke was determined to forge ahead with his Northern Ireland strategy. On 7 September, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland delivered a speech in Ballymena, Co. Antrim, that ‘signalled a resumption of my political discussions’ in relation to Northern Ireland.207 By the following month, Brooke was counselling Thatcher that he was now ‘close to the point of decision on whether it will be feasible’ to launch political talks this coming Autumn’, as he noted in a letter to Thatcher, dated 24 October. ‘The main obstacle to talks’, he explained, ‘remains the difference of view over the circumstances in which any talks should be broadened to address the wider North/South and UK/Republic [of Ireland] relationship and involve the Irish Government.’ Ulster Unionist leaders, he noted, continue to insist that this ‘should only happen once “substantial progress” has been made in the proposed interparty talks’. The Irish government ‘accepts that they cannot participate in any interparty talks but they and the SDLP want certainty that the talks process will broaden at an appropriate stage’.208 Indeed, writing again to Thatcher, two days later, on 26 October, following a meeting of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference the previous day,209 Brooke

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confidently predicted that ‘little now prevents agreement on talks which could serve the interests of everyone except the gunman’. Regarding the nature of the proposed multi-party talks, he advised Thatcher that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed.210 As a confidential British memorandum phrased it, ‘confirmation that no agreement would be possible in any one strand of discussions in isolation’.211 Despite Brooke’s sense of optimism, privately the Irish government expressed reservations regarding the prospect of multi-party talks getting started. Haughey, Dermot Nally explained, ‘feared that the proposed North-South talks would never get underway’. In the words of Charles Powell, ‘Their fear was that, if talks with the Northern Ireland political parties did get underway, we would be under pressure constantly to postpone talks with the Irish Government and they would end up without a role.’ This attitude, Powell noted, ‘was very short-sighted’.212 Such reservations did little to dampen Brooke’s determination to forge ahead with his new initiative on Northern Ireland. In fact, in the very month that witnessed Thatcher’s resignation as British prime minister, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland delivered a landmark speech that helped pave the foundations to the Northern Ireland peace process. As Eamon Mallie and David McKittrick phrased it, Brooke’s ‘characterisation of the connection with Britain was strikingly different from Mrs Thatcher’s one-time assertion that Northern Ireland was as British as Finchley’.213 On 9 November 1990, addressing representatives of the British Association of Canned Food Importers and Distribution at the Whitbread Restaurant in London, Brooke delivered a milestone speech that acknowledged that the British government had ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland’. Instead, he stipulated that London’s role, henceforth, was ‘to help, enable and encourage’. Placed within this context, Brooke tentatively offered Sinn Féin a full political role in Northern Ireland affairs if the PIRA moved away from and ultimately abandoned its use of violence.214 Brooke’s Whitbread speech, as Kenneth Bloomfield later noted (Bloomfield helped to draft this speech), was important for stating ‘what the British interest was as well as what it was not’.215 The PIRA made a direct response to Brooke’s Whitbread speech, declaring a threeday ceasefire over Christmas 1990. The last time the PIRA had made such a gesture was in the lead up to the secret talks between members of the Irish Republican movement, via Brendan Duddy, who was close to Martin McGuinness and MI6 in 1975.216 In fact, prior to this latest ceasefire, the British government had already convened clandestine talks with Sinn Féin, reactivating the dormant channel of communication between the Irish Republican movement and the British intelligence service.217 According to one well-informed source, following consultation with senior officials within the MI5 (notably John Deverell, a veteran of the British security services and head of intelligence in Northern Ireland) and apparently with Thatcher’s agreement,218 during the winter of 1990, Brooke’s sanctioned the opening up of a secret line of communication between the British government and the PIRA. However, the secretary of state for Northern Ireland stipulated that these secret discussions be carried out on the basis of ‘deniability’, that is, if questioned London would be permitted to publicly deny that such talks were taking place.219

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Brooke’s acknowledgement on behalf of the British government that it had ‘no selfish strategic’ interest in Northern Ireland must be viewed within the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War thereafter. As Henry Patterson succinctly noted, the end of the Cold War ‘removed any lingering credibility from the notion that Britain remained in Northern Ireland for strategic reasons’. The establishment of a ‘new world order’ with the United States at the helm also had consequences for the PIRA. With former national liberation movements throughout the world opting for political dialogue rather than the use of physical force, the Irish Republican movement in Ireland also took stock of its position.220 Brooke’s Whitbread speech coincided with a tumultuous period in Thatcher’s premiership, which ultimately concluded with her political downfall. The previous week, on 1 November, Howe resigned as deputy prime minister; ostensibly over Thatcher’s openly hostile attitude to the European Union (he was the last member of government to leave Thatcher’s original 1979 cabinet). In his resignation speech to the House of Commons, on 13 November, he somewhat surprisingly (given his usual politeness) attacked Thatcher for the course she was taking in European affairs, together with domestic policies, specifically her decision to introduce a ‘poll tax’ (a community charge legislated by Thatcher’s government in order to pay for local government in England and Wales).221 Howe’s speech was an important catalyst for the commencement of a leadership challenge against Thatcher, which was mounted by a disgruntled backbencher and former minister Michael Heseltine. He claimed he had a better prospect than his party leader of leading the Conservative Party to a fourth general election victory and promised to reform the poll tax. Thatcher immediately led a ‘spirited fight back’ against Heseltine’s challenge, to quote The Times.222 On her final visit to Northern Ireland as British prime minister, on 16 November, Thatcher was in a defiant mood, declaring that she would ‘win and win well’ the Conservative Party leadership battle.223 Greeted by Brooke at RAF Aldergrove, Thatcher and her security entourage travelled by helicopter to Enniskillen, Lisburn and finally Hillsborough Castle. Addressing the assembled media, Thatcher refused to comment on a recent poll that placed Heseltine ahead of her as ‘a better bet to lead the Tories to a fourth term’. She had come to Northern Ireland, she said, ‘to talk only about Northern Ireland’.224 Thatcher’s failure to secure a decisive victory in the first ballot, on 20 November, against Heseltine (she polled 204 votes to Heseltine’s 152 votes) cast grave doubts about her premiership. As Tim Bale phrased it, ‘after the result of the first ballot was announced, Thatcher was effectively dead in the water’.225 On 22 November, following an appeal on behalf of her ministerial colleagues (described in some quarters as ‘cabinet assassins’),226 Thatcher faced the inevitable, announcing her decision not to contest a second ballot for the leadership of the Conservative Party, only staying on as British prime minister until the party elected her successor as leader. ‘I have concluded that the unity of the party and the prospects of victory at a general election would be better served if I stood down to enable Cabinet colleagues to enter the ballot.’227 In the second ballot contest, on 27 November, John Major, chancellor of the exchequer, handsomely defeated his rivals and was duly elected leader of the

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Conservative Party (Major polled 185 votes, Heseltine 131 votes and Douglas Hurd 56 votes). The following day, 28 November, Major was appointed British prime minster. Major’s appointment signalled Thatcher’s departure from the political main stage, ending more than fifteen years as Conservative Party leader and eleven years as British prime minister. ***

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Conclusion (including Epilogue, 1990–8)

Epilogue: The path to peace in Northern Ireland, 1990–8 Margaret Thatcher’s political downfall in December 1990 coincided with the genesis of the Northern Ireland peace process; a process that ultimately led to the signing of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998. The seeds to this accord were initially cultivated under Peter Brooke during Thatcher’s final two years as British prime minister. At the heart of the so-called ‘Brooke Initiative’ (discussed below) was an attempt by the secretary of state for Northern Ireland to bring about negotiations between London and the Northern Ireland political parties (with the exclusion of Sinn Féin) on a devolved system of government in Northern Ireland, with an ‘Irish dimension’. Thatcher’s forced retirement provided an added impetus to the path towards peace in Northern Ireland. As long as she remained British prime minister, the Sinn Féin leadership under Gerry Adams found it impossible to convince the PIRA Army Council to announce an unequivocal ceasefire; a prerequisite set down by the British government before Sinn Féin was provided with a seat at the negotiation table. As Ed Moloney noted, PIRA supporters would have condemned even ‘the suggestion of a deal with Thatcher as surrender’, the ‘hatred’ between her and the Irish Republican community was ‘just too deep’.1 Indeed, for many politicians operating in the Republic of Ireland, Thatcher’s omnipresence was viewed as a major blockage along the road to peace. In the words of Bertie Ahern, the Irish ‘hated the sight of her, because we could never get anywhere under Thatcher’.2 It was Thatcher’s successor John Major who grasped the Northern Ireland political nettle. Unlike his predecessor, Major had the temperament and was able to muster sufficient patience and devote adequate time to manage ‘Irish sensitivities’, to borrow Robin Renwick’s phrase.3 He simply did not have the same ‘political baggage’ as Thatcher when it came to Northern Ireland.4 He later admitted that when he became British prime minister he knew ‘very little of Northern Ireland’. He had only visited Ireland ‘once or twice’ and his previous political offices ‘had not prepared’ him for this subject.5 Major’s lack of knowledge vis-à-vis Northern Ireland came with one advantage, however. ‘My hands were clean:  I came to it fresh’.6 Although he deeply despised the PIRA, which he described as being ‘ruthless … engaged in cold-blooded murder’, he nonetheless was eager to open new pathways towards finding a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict.7

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The Irish Republican leadership welcomed Major’s arrival as British prime minister in three ways. The first two examples demonstrated Sinn Féin’s genuine wish to forge ahead with peace talks, but regrettably, the last exposed the PIRA’s willingness  – and deadly ability  – to maintain the ‘long war’ against the British state. First, over the Christmas of 1990 the PIRA declared an official three-day ceasefire. Second, in February 1991 Gerry Adams wrote to Major requesting that the British prime minister deal directly with Sinn Féin towards finding lasting peace for Northern Ireland. Last, in a stunning example of the capacity of Irish Republican paramilitaries to strike at the heart of the British state, on 7 February 1991 (five days after Adams had sent his peace letter to Major) the PIRA carried out a mortar attack on No. 10 Downing Street, while Major and his war cabinet met to discuss the Gulf War, 1990–1.8 In his memoir, Major chillingly recalled how the PIRA had ‘tried to murder me’. If one of the mortars had landed ‘ten feet closer’, he wrote, ‘half the Cabinet could have been killed’.9 This latest PIRA attack only helped to galvanize the British government’s determination to find a pathway for lasting peace. The ongoing huge financial costs of the conflict also influenced Major’s thinking concerning Northern Ireland. By the turn of the 1990s, the net transfer of exchequer funds to Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK had risen from under £1,250  million in 1979–80 to approximately £2,500 million in 1991–2, the ‘equivalent’, to quote Sir Geoffrey Howe, ‘to some £4,500 a year for each of the 530,000 households in Northern Ireland’.10 In April 1991, under the banner of the ‘Brooke Initiative’, negotiations at a constitutional level began between the political parties of Northern Ireland, with the exclusion of Sinn Féin, on a devolved system of government in Northern Ireland with an ‘Irish dimension’. The British government stipulated that Sinn Féin would be barred from talks because of the party’s endorsement of PIRA violence. The talks were chaired by Peter Brooke, who retained the Northern Ireland portfolio on Major’s appointment as British prime minister. With Thatcher side-lined to history, Brooke was confident that genuine political progress was a medium-term objective rather than a long-term aspiration.11 Although the first series of multi-party talks between the political parties of Northern Ireland  – which lasted until November 1991  – achieved little in terms of concrete decisions, the parties did discuss Brooke’s ‘Three Strands’ approach. The framework of the multi-party talks provided for initial internal Northern Ireland dialogue on devolution (Strand one), North-South talks on the form of a subsequent Dublin-Belfast relationship (Strand two) and talks to reshape the relationship between Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland (Strand three). John Major’s election victory at the 1992 British general election added fresh impetus to the British government’s Northern Ireland strategy. Under Brooke’s successor as secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Patrick Mayhew,12 1992–7, London continued to work with Dublin to find a blueprint for peace for Northern Ireland. Following intense discussions between Major and Albert Reynolds,13 Charles Haughey’s successor as Fianna Fáil leader and taoiseach, 1992–4, the ‘Joint Declaration on Peace’ (more commonly known as the ‘Downing Street Declaration’) was signed on behalf of the British and Irish governments on 15 December 1993. Based on Brooke’s original ‘Three Strands’ approach, this declaration pledged on behalf of the British and Irish governments to securing a lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

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The Downing Street Declaration was simply that, a declaration. Nonetheless, it laid out a plan for ‘healing divisions in Ireland’ that would lead to lasting peace, facilitated by multi-party talks among the Northern Ireland political parties. Significantly, the British government accorded that it had ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland’. For its part, the Irish government acknowledged that it would be ‘wrong to attempt to impose a united Ireland, in the absence of the freely given consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland’.14 The signing of the Downing Street Declaration witnessed a thaw in relations between the British and Irish governments and Sinn Féin. In January 1994, the broadcasting ban under section 31 of the Broadcasting Act was lifted in the Republic of Ireland, thus allowing Sinn Féin access to the Irish media (the broadcasting ban against Sinn Féin in the UK was lifted in September 1994). Later that year, on 31 August, the PIRA announced a ‘complete cessation of military activity’. This was soon followed, in mid-October, by a similar announcement on behalf of Loyalist paramilitaries. On 22 February 1995, the Major government in London and the Irish government in Dublin, led by taoiseach John Bruton,15 moved the peace process one step forward with the signing of the ‘Framework Document’. This document set out ‘a shared understanding’ between the two governments ‘to assist discussion and negotiation involving the Northern Ireland parties’. Enshrined within the accord was a pledge on behalf of both governments to ‘set themselves the aim of fostering agreement and reconciliation, leading to a new political framework founded on consent’. It was envisaged that this process would be facilitated through the ‘Three Strands’ approach, with Dublin and London working alongside the political parties of Northern Ireland to secure lasting peace on the island of Ireland.16 The climax to the Northern Ireland peace process occurred with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998, following gruelling multi-party talks.17 The agreement was overwhelmingly approved in separate referenda in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland in May 1998. After years of behind the scenes diplomacy, the political forces of Northern Nationalism and Ulster Unionism (excluding the Rev. Paisley’s DUP) agreed to commit to a blueprint for lasting peace in Northern Ireland, based on Brooke’s original ‘Three Strands’ approach. Significantly, on behalf of the British and Irish governments, British prime minister Tony Blair and taoiseach Bertie Ahern pledged their government’s support for the agreement. The agreement gave prominence to the ‘principle of consent’, which affirmed the legitimacy of the aspiration to a united Ireland, while recognizing the current wish of the majority in Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK. Of equal significance, under the terms of the agreement (and following a referendum), citizens in the Republic of Ireland overwhelmingly agreed to remove the ‘territorial claim’ contained in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. It stated thus: It is for the people of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a United Ireland … accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised

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with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.18

The agreement established a framework to create a number of political institutions, based on Brooke’s original ‘Three Strands’. Strand one witnessed the establishment of a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. Strand two outlined plans to form a NorthSouth ministerial council. Last, Strand three announced the formation of a new BIIC, which subsumed both the AIIC and the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, established under the AIA.19

‘The woman who divided a nation’: Thatcher’s legacy on Northern Ireland Baroness Thatcher died on 8 April 2013, at the age of eighty-seven, following a stroke. In the rush to mark Thatcher’s passing, Fleet Street reflected on the sense of divisiveness that had characterized her political career. The Mirror led with the front-page headline, ‘The woman who divided a nation’.20 I newspaper carried a similar message with the central headline, ‘Thatcher, as divisive in death as she was in life’.21 From an economic perspective, Thatcher can certainly be labelled a ‘nearrevolutionary’, to borrow Charles Moore’s description. ‘Her “housewife” economics directly challenged the post-war orthodoxy that the state could run the economy.’22 The facts are clear to see. In terms of productivity, Thatcher’s victory over trade union power was a notable success story. In 1990, the year she departed office, fewer than 2  million working days were lost to strikes; on taking up office in 1979, over 29.4 million working days were lost to strikes.23 During Thatcher’s premiership, Great Britain’s economic fortunes dramatically improved. She implemented a set of economic principles that focused on financial discipline, including a firm control of public borrowing and expenditure (i.e. monetarism), free-market economics, a lowering of inflation, a wide-scale programme of privatization and sweeping tax cuts. On the latter policy, while the overall tax burden ‘remained static’, under Thatcherism there was a marked shift from direct to indirect taxation (mainly through VAT). The top rate of income tax fell from 83p to 40p, while the basic rate fell by 8p in the Pound, from 33 per cent to 25 per cent.24 However, such large-scale economic re-engineering resulted in a sharp rise in economic inequality across the UK. As Jackson and Saunders note, ‘the incomes in the poorest fifth of the British population rose by between 6 and 13 per cent from 1979 to 1993, while the incomes of the richest fifth rose by more than 60 per cent’.25 Indeed, under Thatcher there were many economic errors, including large-scale privatization projects that ‘failed to break monopolies’, the losses, in her later years, ‘in the battle against inflation’ and her decision to enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1990.26 For her enemies on the Left, Thatcher was the personification of the cult of individualism, a political leader devoid of a social conscience, indifferent to the poor and disadvantaged.

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On learning of Thatcher’s passing, British prime minister David Cameron27 mourned that ‘we have lost a great leader, a great prime minister and a great Briton’.28 In Washington, US president Barack Obama29 said that following Thatcher’s passing ‘the world has lost one of the greatest champions of freedom and liberty’.30 Tony Blair recorded for posterity that ‘very few leaders get to change not only the political landscape of their country but of the world. Margaret was such a leader’.31 In Scotland and the mining communities of England and Wales, beyond cosmopolitan London and the leafy suburbs of middle-class England, Thatcher’s passing was greeted with a sense of morbid celebration. ‘Rejoice!’ was the lead headline in Socialist Worker.32 In Goldthorpe, South Yorkshire, an effigy of Thatcher was placed in a homemade coffin as people gathered to celebrate her death.33 The song ‘DingDong! The Witch is Dead!’, originally sung by Judy Garland in the Wizard of Oz, rose to number two in the UK single charts (the song reached number one in the UK iTunes chart for online downloads).34 In Brixton, there were street marches with cheers of ‘Maggie Maggie Maggie, dead, dead, dead’ and posters carrying the message, ‘The Bitch is Dead’.35 In Northern Ireland, Thatcher’s passing sparked a bitter debate regarding her legacy. In the Irish Republican enclaves of the Bogside of Derry and the Falls Road in West Belfast, large crowds, many of whom were not born during Thatcher’s premiership, gathered to drink champagne and to toast her demise.36 Yet, in working-class Loyalist and middle-class Unionist areas, alike, Thatcher’s death was marked with respectful tributes.37 The reaction from the political class in Northern Ireland was equally divisive. Gerry Adams said Thatcher’s ‘espousal of old draconian militaristic policies’ in Northern Ireland had ‘prolonged the war and caused great suffering’.38 Peter Robinson noted that Thatcher was ‘one of the greatest political figures of post-war Britain’. The man who once referred to Thatcher as a ‘hussy’39 now eulogized how she had been a ‘transformative and powerful’ British prime minister, who had ‘changed the face of our United Kingdom forever’.40 UUP leader Mike Nesbitt41 stated a similar message, noting that Thatcher was ‘a colossus of conviction politics’.42 By the time of Thatcher’s passing, the Northern Ireland conflict was at an end. The Northern Ireland Executive had entered its third assembly since the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 (the Northern Ireland Assembly operated during 1998–2002, 2007–11 and 2011–16 periods). In the aftermath of the Northern Ireland Assembly elections, in May 2011, Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness assumed office as the first minister of Northern Ireland and the deputy first minister of Northern Ireland, respectively. It was an extraordinary moment in the history of Northern Ireland and more broadly Belfast-Dublin-London relations. Robinson, who had previously been an arch critic of Irish Republican politics and paramilitarism, now agreed to share government with McGuinness, allegedly a former chief of staff of the PIRA.43 After almost thirty years of killing, with the loss of over 3,600 lives, paramilitary violence had finally ended. In the immediate years following the Belfast Agreement, hundreds of prisoners convicted of crimes during the Northern Ireland conflict were released early from prison. Moreover, following protracted negotiations, by the

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mid-2000s the majority of Irish Republican and Loyalist paramilitary organizations agreed to decommission their weapons and finally acknowledge that the ‘long war’ was over. Unfortunately, no formal record exists regarding Thatcher’s reaction to John Major’s Northern Ireland policy during the years of his premiership. Thatcher’s memoir, The Downing Street years, was published in 1993, a year before the PIRA ceasefire, three years before the publication of the ‘Framework Document’ and five years prior to the signing of the Belfast Agreement. Indeed, with the exception of Thatcher’s continued attack on the modus operandi of the PIRA, there is little evidence of her interest in Northern Ireland prior to the Belfast Agreement.44 During the several months leading to the signing of the Belfast Agreement, under the premiership of Tony Bair, Thatcher maintained a dignified silence. As her authorized biographer explained, ‘It was one of her doctrines that the question of Ulster was so difficult that no former prime minister should make the life of a successor trickier by controversial public interventions.’45 Thereafter, Thatcher continued to generally follow this line of principle. However, on reading the text of the Belfast Agreement, which she annotated heavily, she was reportedly furious, particularly on the issues of prisoner release and of the decommissioning of weapons by Irish Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries.46 The following year, in June 1999, she received a letter from Mo Mowlam,47 secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1997–9, notifying her that the ‘Brighton Bomber’ Patrick Magee would be released under the terms of the Northern Ireland Sentences Act. Thatcher was incensed and deeply offended by the decision. In her letter of reply to Mowlam, she noted: You rightly conclude that this will cause great distress – and a sense of injustice – to many of my friends … I don’t think that any of the [P]‌IRA terrorists should be released until all their weapons have been decommissioned.48

Despite Thatcher’s obvious reservations regarding certain aspects of the Belfast Agreement, it does not seem that she opposed it. While she may not have seen it that way, Thatcher played an important role during the genesis of the Northern Ireland peace process. Although earlier in her career, including during her initial years as British prime minister, Thatcher had been a supporter of Ulster Unionist majorityrule, by the time she left office in 1990 she placed her support behind the restoration of a power-sharing Executive for Northern Ireland, loosely based on the Sunningdale model of 1973–4. As she stated in her memoir, ‘the political realities of Northern Ireland prevented a return to majority rule’.49 Thatcher’s decision to sign the AIA and thus provide the Irish government with a ‘consultative’ role in the affairs Northern Ireland was also an important milestone along the long path to peace. Her decision to allow the Irish government to act as a ‘voice’ for the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, with the establishment of a new Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, provided an official platform for DublinLondon dialogue, which only a few years previously seemed unimaginable. Indeed, while she may not have liked to admit it herself, by agreeing to sign the AIA, Thatcher’s government made one of the most significant shifts in British policy towards Northern

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Ireland since the enactment of partition in 1920. In the words of Mary Holland, with the signing of this accord, Thatcher did ‘what no British prime minister since [William Ewart] Gladstone50 has attempted:  she made it clear to the Unionists that they no longer had an unconditional veto on political progress in Ireland’.51 *** Margaret Thatcher harboured a lifelong aversion towards the ‘Irish question’. The perennial problem of Northern Ireland always felt like an annoying distraction to more pressing economic considerations on mainland Great Britain. Her aloofness and deep-rooted prejudices were certainly conditioned by her dislike (which only grew throughout her premiership) of the political class in Northern Ireland, Ulster Unionist and Northern Nationalist, alike. To Thatcher’s frustration, intermittently, Northern Ireland was forced to the top of her political agenda. On such occasions, security considerations  – not political factors  – generally determined her policy stance. She was obsessed with terrorism, channelling much of her energy and thinking into how to tackle paramilitary, chiefly Irish Republican violence. From the beginning of her leadership of the Conservative Party until her retirement fifteen years later, a strong anti-terrorist doggedness permeated her thinking on Northern Ireland. As she recorded in The Downing Street years, ‘My policy towards Northern Ireland was always one aimed above all at upholding democracy and the law:  it was always therefore determined by whatever I considered at a particular time would help bring better security.’52 In the final analysis, Thatcher’s attitude to Northern Ireland was a powerful blend of reactionary policies and personal indifference. As a result, Northern Ireland rarely featured high on her list of political priorities nor was it a topic which she ever truly understood.

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Notes Note on Sources: Primary and Secondary 1 See https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/. 2 Andrew Riley, senior archivist at the CAC, kindly made Sir David Goodall’s unpublished manuscript available to this author. 3 See https://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/cpa. 4 See https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/. 5 In response to an FOI request (1783) to the PA, House of Commons, in Oct. 2016, fifty-two hitherto closed files in the AN were opened to researchers. These files, AN/413 to AN/464, relate to Neave’s period as shadow secretary of state for Northern Ireland from 1975 to 1979. All named files are either open in full or can be accessed after signing an undertaking agreeing to make use of any personal data contained therein in accordance with section 33 of the Data Protection Act 1998. In the fifty-two files reviewed, fifteen pieces of correspondence and related material were identified as containing personal sensitive data. Email correspondence between author and Claire Batley, senior archivist, PA, House of Commons, Oct. to Dec. 2016. 6 See https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/proni. 7 https://linenhall.com/. See the LHL NIPC ‘H-Block/Hunger-strike’, Boxes No. 1 to 5. 8 See https://www.nationalarchives.ie/. 9 At the time of publication of this monograph, the personal papers of Dermot Nally, held by UCDA, remain closed. 10 At the time of publication of this monograph, the Garret FitzGerald Papers (P216 – Taoiseach, Northern Ireland material, 1980–7) remain unavailable for consultation. 11 See https://www.ucd.ie/archives/. 12 See, for example, TNA CJ 4/3012–44 and TNA CJ 4/3627–57. 13 See, for example, TNA DEFE 70/1614. 14 See TNA DEFE 70/1475. 15 See, for example, TNA PREM 19/3048/1 and TNA PREM 19/3048/2. Several additional files related to the Haughey-Thatcher relationship (and more generally Anglo-Irish relation) remain closed. See (selected) TNA FCO 87/2622, TNA FCO 87/2633, TNA FCO 87/2639, TNA FCO 87/2655 and TNA FCO 87/2669. 16 See TNA FCO 87/2808–15. 17 For example, on 29 Apr. 2019, this author made an FOI request to the TNA to be granted access to ‘closed extracts’ related to file TNA PREM 19/3048/2. 18 See email from The Quality Manager, Programme Management Office, TNA to this author, 7 Nov. 2019. 19 See https://www.margaretthatcher.org/. 20 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/index.html. 21 See https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories.

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22 See Margaret Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years (London, 1993); Margaret Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the path to power (London, 1995); and Margaret Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher, the autobiography, 1925–2013 (London, 1995). 23 Douglas Hurd, Memoirs (London, 2004); John Major, The autobiography (London, 2000); Michael Heseltine, Michael Heseltine: life in the jungle, my autobiography (London, 2000); Alan Clark, Diaries: into politics (London, 2000); Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of loyalty (London, 1995); Nigel Lawson, The view from No. 11: memoirs of a Tory radical (London, 1993); William Whitelaw, The Whitelaw memoirs (London, 1989); Edward Heath, The autobiography: the course of my life (London, 1998); Robert Carrington, Reflection on things past: the memoirs of Lord Carrington (London, 1988); Jim Prior, A balance of power (London, 1986); and Merlyn Rees, Northern Ireland: a personal perspective (London, 1985). 24 See, for example, Garret FitzGerald, All in a life, Garret FitzGerald, an autobiography (Dublin, 1991); Ronald Reagan, An American life (New York, 1990); and Jimmy Carter, Keeping faith: memoirs of a president (London, 1982). See also Nicholas Henderson, Mandarin: the diaries of an Ambassador (London, 2000). 25 Marc Mulholland, ‘ “Just another country”? The Irish question in the Thatcher years’, in Ben Jackson and Roberts Saunders (eds), Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge, 2012), 180–96. Mulholland’s chapter was reproduced in full in Tim Bale’s four-volume edited collection entitled Thatcher (London, 2014), see vol. III, ­chapter 46. 26 See Graham Goodlad, Thatcher (London, 2016), ­chapter 7, ‘The troubled union – Northern Ireland: 1979–1990’, 153–68. 27 In relation to Thatcher, Kelly’s book focuses on the Haughey-Thatcher relationship during the early 1980s. See Stephen Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’: Charles Haughey and the Northern Ireland question, 1945–1992 (Kildare, 2016). 28 Hennessey’s book, as the title suggests, examines Thatcher’s relationship with the PIRA. See Thomas Hennessey, Hunger strike: Margaret Thatcher’s battle with the IRA (Kildare, 2014). See also Clive Bloom, Thatcher’s secret war: subversion, coercion, secrecy and government, 1974–1990 (Gloucestershire, 2015), 236–43; and Kwasi Kwarteng, Thatcher’s trial: six months that defined a leader (London, 2015), 98–129. 29 See also Martin O’Brien, ‘Margaret Thatcher and Northern Ireland’, PhD diss, Queen’s University Belfast, Sept. 1993. See also Frank Gaffikin and Mike Morrissey, Northern Ireland: the Thatcher years (London, 1990). 30 See, for example, Michael Cunningham, British government policy in Northern Ireland, 1969–2000 (Manchester, 2001). 31 See, for example, Ronan Fanning, ‘The Anglo-Irish alliance and the Irish question in the twentieth century’, in Judith Devlin and Howard B. Clarke (eds), European encounters: essays in memory of Albert Lovett (Dublin, 2003), 185–219; and Roger MacGinty, ‘American influences on the Northern Ireland peace process’, Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1997), 31–50. 32 See, for example, Graham Spencer (ed), The British and peace in Northern Ireland (Cambridge, 2015); Michael Cunningham, ‘Conservative dissidents and the Irish question: The “pro-integrationist” lobby, 1973–94’, Irish Political Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2007), 26–42; Paul Dixon, ‘ “The usual English doublespeak”: the British political parties and the Ulster Unionists, 1974–94’, Irish Political Studies, Vol. 9, No.1 (2007), 25–40; and Jeremy Smith, ‘ “Ever reliable friends”?: the Conservative Party and Ulster Unionism in the twentieth century’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 121, No. 490 (Feb. 2006), 70–103.

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33 See, for example, Paul Arthur, Special relationships: Britain, Ireland and the Northern Ireland problem (Belfast, 2001); G. D. Boyce, The Irish question and British politics (London, 1996); John Coakley and Jennifer Todd, Negotiating a settlement in Northern Ireland, 1969–2019 (Oxford, 2020); Diarmaid Ferriter, The border: the legacy of a century of Anglo-Irish politics (London, 2019); and R. G. Sloan, The geopolitics of Anglo-Irish relations in the 20th century (London, 1997). See also Eamonn O’Kane, Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland since 1980: the totality of relationships (London, 2007); and Donnacha Ó Beacháin, From Partition to Brexit: the Irish government and Northern Ireland (Manchester, 2018). 34 See, for example, Robin Renwick, A journey with Margaret Thatcher: foreign policy under the iron lady (London, 2013). 35 See, for example, Graham Walker, A history of the Ulster Unionist Party: protest, pragmatism and pessimism (Manchester, 2004). See also Jonathan Moore, Ulster Unionism and the British Conservative Party (London, 1997). 36 See, for example, Jonathan Aitken, Margaret Thatcher: power and personality (London, 2013), 176–210; John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume one: the grocer’s daughter (London, 2000), 312–410; and Hugo Young, One of us: a biography of Margaret Thatcher (London, 1989), 100–3. See also Brenda Maddox, Maggie: the first lady (London, 2003), 109; and Kenneth Harris, Thatcher (London, 1988), 59–85. In fact, Robin Harris did not even think that Thatcher’s Northern Ireland policy was worthy of an in-depth examination, allocating little under a page to this subject. See Robin Harris, Not for turning: the life of Margaret Thatcher (London, 2013), 448, footnote marked *. 37 See Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one: not for turning (London, 2013); Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two: everything she wants (London, 2015); and Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three: herself alone (London, 2019). 38 See, for example, Richard English, Armed struggle, a history of the IRA (London, 2003) and Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick, The fight for peace: the inside story of the Irish peace process (London, 1997).

Introduction 1 Henceforth, Thatcher is referred to as ‘British prime minister’ rather than the prime minister of the UK (i.e. the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). 2 E. H. H. Green, Thatcher (London, 2010), 1. 3 See Jackson and Saunders, ‘Introduction: varieties of Thatcherism’, in Jackson and Saunders, Making Thatcher’s Britain, 1. 4 The words ‘Derry’ and ‘Londonderry’ are used interchangeably in this work. 5 Adams, Sinn Féin joint vice-president, 1978–83 and Sinn Féin president, 1983–2018. 6 Author’s email correspondence with Gerry Adams, 14 Nov. 2019. 7 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22067370. 8 Robinson, DUP leader, 2008–15 and first minister of Northern Ireland, 2008–16. 9 See David Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, ‘The making of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 (The Hillsborough Agreement): a personal account’, 10. UC CAC Misc. 74.

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10 Catherine O’Sullivan, Thatcher’s great-grandmother was born in Drominassig, Co. Kerry in 1811. Irish Independent, ‘Maggie’s roots lie in the Kingdom’, 10 Apr. 2013. See also Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 2. 11 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385. 12 Recollection of comments made by Thatcher during a meeting on 4 Jan. 1984. Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 10. 13 See Ferriter, The border: the legacy of a century of Anglo-Irish politics, 106. 14 See comments by Douglas Hurd. Hurd, Memoirs, 335. 15 Neave, Conservative Party MP for Abington, 1953–79. 16 Gow, Conservative Party MP for Eastbourne, 1974–90; Thatcher’s parliamentary private secretary, 1979–83. 17 See for example, comments by Thatcher. Record of meeting between Haughey and Thatcher, Hanover, Germany, 28 June 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. 18 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 591. 19 The above numbers include ex- and retired members of the British Armed Forces (including the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Royal Navy), the RUC and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/chron/index.html. 20 Kennedy to David Neligan, 21 Apr. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/928/1. 21 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 391. 22 See Hennessey, Hunger strike, 8. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 600. 23 See Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 102–6. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 285. 24 See, for example, copy of speech by Thatcher to UUC, Craigavad, Holywood, Northern Ireland, 19 June 1978. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 2 of 2. 25 See, for example, comments by Thatcher, 19 Nov. 1984. NAI DT 2015/51/1374. 26 Haughey, Fianna Fáil leader, 1979–92 and taoiseach, 1979–81, 1982 and 1987–92. 27 See note, ‘Record of a conversation between The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, Mr. Charles Haughey, in Dublin Castle on 8 December 1980 at 10.45’. TNA PREM 19/507. 28 FitzGerald, Fine Gael leader, 1977–87 and taoiseach, 1981–2 and 1982–7. 29 See See Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 30 Comments by Thatcher, 19 Nov. 1984. NAI DT 2015/51/1374. 31 Richard Finlay, ‘Thatcherism, unionism and nationalism: a comparative study of Scotland and Wales’, in Jackson and Saunders, Making Thatcher’s Britain, 165 and 168. 32 Comments by John Hume. Record of meeting between Thatcher and Hume, 9 Feb. 1984. NAI DFA 2014/32/1940. 33 , 58 and 84–5. 34 Molyneaux, UUP leader, 1979–95. 35 The Rev. Paisley, DUP leader, 1971–2008 and first minister of Northern Ireland, 2007–8. 36 Comments by Douglas Hurd. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’, 2013. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foD8GMhRwFw. 37 John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, 338. 38 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 39 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 587. 40 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 299–300. 41 Quoted in Sandbrook, Who dares wins: Britain, 1979–1982 (London, 2019), 559. 42 Whitelaw, The Whitelaw memoirs, 78–9.

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43 Maudling, Conservative Party MP for Barnet, 1950–74 and Chipping Barnet, 1974–9. 44 Quoted in Ferriter, Ambiguous Republic: Ireland in the 1970s (London, 2012), 157. Handwritten notes by Cosgrave, ‘The “Peace Process” in Northern Ireland’, July 1997. See also UCDA P233/46. 45 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 587. 46 Gaffikin and Morrissey, Northern Ireland: the Thatcher years, 35. 47 Clark, Conservative Party MP for Plymouth Sutton, 1974–92 and Kensington and Chelsea, 1997–9. 48 Clark, Diaries, 395. 49 Clark, Diaries, 117. 50 Major, Conservative Party leader, 1990–7 and British prime minister, 1990–7. 51 Major, The autobiography, 433. 52 Alternatively, the CPPNIC is occasionally referred to as the Conservative Party Backbench Northern Ireland Committee. 53 Biggs-Davison, Conservative Party MP for Chigwell, 1955–74 and Epping Forest, 1974–88. 54 See The right approach: a statement of Conservative aims (Conservative Central Office, London, 1976), 46–7. 55 See, for example, record of CPPNIC meeting, 12 Nov. 1980. UO BL CPA CRD L/4/12/5. See also record of CPPNIC meeting, 21 Jan. 1982. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/110, file 3. 56 See copy of draft letter from Amery to Thatcher, 24 Apr. 1986. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/64. See also David Storey, Kevin Harvey Proctor and David Evans Out, Out, Out! (Monday Club policy paper, No. N.I. 2. Aug. 1985). See UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 1 of 2. 57 See, for example, M. J. Newington to Ferguson, 4 Sept. 1979. TNA FCO 87/865. See also comments by Clive Abbott of the NIO. Quoted in Heffer, Like the Roman: the life of Enoch Powell (London, 1998), 864–6. 58 Cannadine, Margaret Thatcher, 28–9 and 34. 59 Goodlad, Thatcher, 154. 60 Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain: The politics and social upheaval of the 1980s (London, 2010), 216. 61 See record of meeting between Richard O’Brien and Alan Goulty, 10 Nov. 1976. UCDA P215/197. 62 See, for example, record of meeting between Harold Wilson, Merlyn Rees, Thatcher and Neave, 10 Sept. 1975. TNA PREM 16/520. 63 See, for example, comments by Thatcher during her leader’s address at the annual Conservative Party Conference, 7–10 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 64 Copy of policy paper on Northern Ireland by the CRD, signed ‘JFH/SO’B’, 28 July 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/13. 65 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 384. 66 See, for example, comments by Thatcher. Record of meeting of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, 3 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/116687. 67 Brooke, Conservative Party MP for City of London and Westminster South, 1977– 2001. Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, 2001– present. 68 Atkins, Conservative Party MP for Spelthorne, 1970–87. 69 Copy of public statement issued by Atkins, 8 May 1979. NAI DT 2009/135/703. 70 Prior, Conservative Party MP for Waveney, 1959–87.

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71 Prior to Hailsham, 2 Oct. 1981. UC CAC HLSM 8/23/1. 72 Hurd, Conservative Party MP for Mid Oxfordshire, 1974–83 and Witney, 1983–97. 73 Hurd, Memoirs, 329. 74 Howe, Conservative Party MP for East Surrey, 1974–92. See Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 413. Hurd was succeeded by Tom King as secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1985–9. 75 Record of conversation between Goodall and Thatcher, circa early Dec. 1982. Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 2. 76 In her memoir, Thatcher conceded that the AIA was ‘not perfect’ and that she was ultimately ‘disappointed’ by how it operated. Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 402 and 415. In fact, in the comfort of retirement, Thatcher allegedly concluded that the ‘whole philosophy’ of the AIA had been a ‘mistake’. See Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume two, 351. 77 See Article 2 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 78 Whitelaw, Conservative Party MP for Penrith and The Border, 1955–83. 79 See comments by Howe. Record of meeting between Howe and Hurd, 4 Jan. 1985. TNA CJ 4/5870/1. 80 See Goodall to Armstrong, 30 Sept. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 81 See McGarry and O’Leary, The Northern Ireland conflict, 228. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 285. 82 See Peter Taylor, The Brits: the war against the IRA (London, 2002), 314. 83 On 13 Feb. 1844, the House of Commons held a nine-hour debate on Ireland on a motion by Lord John Russell, who ‘made a forceful speech on the theme that “Ireland is occupied not governed” ’. See Boyce, The Irish question and British politics, 1. 84 For an insightful overview of British-Irish relations in the context of the Northern Ireland ‘problem’ see Arthur, Special relationships. 85 It is outside the parameters of this study to examine the history of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy prior to the early 1970s. For further reading on this subject see Boyce, The Irish question and British politics; Ferriter, The border: the legacy of a century of Anglo-Irish politics; Patrick Roche and Brian Barton (eds), The Northern Ireland question: perspectives on Nationalism and Unionism (Tunbridge Wells, 2020); Thomas Hennessey, A history of Northern Ireland, 1920–1996 (London, 1997); Henry Patterson, Ireland’s violent frontier: the border and Anglo-Irish relations during the Troubles (London, 2013); Cunningham, British government policy in Northern Ireland, 1969–2000; and Ronan Fanning, Fatal path: British government and Irish revolution, 1910–1922 (London, 2013). See also Taylor, Brits: the war against the IRA and David McKittrick and David McVea, Making sense of the Troubles (Belfast, 2000). 86 Baldwin, Conservative Party leader, 1923–37 and British prime minister, 1923–4, 1924–9 and 1935–7. 87 Macmillan, Conservative Party leader, 1957–63 and British prime minister, 1957–63. 88 Home, Conservative Party leader, 1963–5 and British prime minister, 1963–4. 89 Churchill, Conservative Party leader, 1940–55 and British prime minister, 1940–5 and 1951–5. 90 See comments by Winston Churchill, 16 Feb. 1922. HC Debate, Vol. 150, cc. 1281–2. 91 Wilson, Labour Party leader, 1963–76 and British prime minister, 1964–70 and 1974–6. 92 Callaghan, Labour Party leader, 1976–80 and British prime minister, 1976–9. 93 Blair, Labour Party leader, 1994–2007 and British prime minister, 1997–2007.

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1  Thatcher and the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, 1975–9 1 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the path to power, 261. 2 Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume two, 71. 3 Joseph, Conservative Party MP for Leeds North East, 1956–87. 4 Du Cann, Conservative Party MP for Taunton, 1956–87. The Conservative Party 1922 Committee comprises all Conservative Party MPs. The 1922 Committee Executive is drawn from backbench Conservative Party MPs. 5 Gilmour, Conservative Party MP for Central Norfolk, 1962–74 and Chesham and Amersham, 1974–92. 6 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 269. 7 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 262–3. 8 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 276. 9 Walker, Conservative Party MP for Worcester, 1961–92. 10 Peter Walker, Staying in power: Peter Walker, an autobiography (London, 1991), 128. 11 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 275. 12 Jackson and Saunders, ‘Introduction: varieties of Thatcherism’, 5. 13 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 253–4. 14 Fraser, Conservative Party MP for Stone, 1945–50 and Stafford and Stone, 1950–83. 15 Additional results of the second ballot were as follows: Jim Prior and Sir Geoffrey Howe received nineteen votes each, with John Peyton receiving eleven votes. 16 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 295. 17 See comments by Thatcher. The Times, 12 Feb. 1975. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/102452. 18 Pym, Conservative Party MP for South East Cambridgeshire, 1961–87. 19 Maulding, Conservative Party MP for Barnet, 1950–74 and Chipping Barnet, 1974–9. 20 The Times, 25 Nov. 1975. 21 Ryan, Conservative Party MP for Mid Norfolk, 1983–97. 22 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 20 Feb. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 23 Harris, Not for turning, 153. 24 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the path to power, 269–70. 25 Harris, Not for turning, 110. 26 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 250–2. See also Heath, The autobiography: the course of my life, 531. 27 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 301. 28 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Thatcher, monetarism and the politics of inflation’, in Jackson and Saunders, Making Thatcher’s Britain, 62. 29 See Robert Saunders’s insightful chapter, ‘ “Crisis? What crisis?” Thatcherism and the seventies’, in Jackson and Saunders, Making Thatcher’s Britain, 32. 30 Quoted in Saunders, ‘ “Crisis? What crisis?” Thatcherism and the seventies’, 31. 31 For further reading on Thatcher and Thatcherism, see Saunders, ‘ “Crisis? What crisis?” Thatcherism and the seventies’, 25–42. 32 See, for example, 73rd meeting of the LCC, 25 July 1975, ‘Economic Reconstruction Policy Group Interim Report – PG/10/75’. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/157. See also Tomlinson, ‘Thatcher, monetarism and the politics of inflation’, 69. 33 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 302. 34 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 302.

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35 New security arrangements were necessary following Ross McWhirter’s murder by the PIRA in Nov. 1975. A supporter of the Conservative Party and leading figure within the National Association for Freedom, McWhirter’s assassination brought home to Thatcher the real and viable threat posed by Irish Republican terrorists. Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 327. 36 See comments by Thatcher. Record of meeting between FitzGerald, Thatcher, Maulding and Whitelaw, 14 Oct. 1976. UCDA P215/203. 37 See Irish government character profile of Margaret Thatcher, circa Sept. 1977. NAI DT 2007/116/750. 38 See record of meetings of the LCC, May to Sept. 1975. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/7–9. 39 Record of LCC meeting, 28 July 1975. UC CAC THCR 1/6/1/157. 40 See record of meeting between Richard O’Brien and Alan Goulty, 10 Nov. 1976. UCDA P215/197. 41 Heseltine, Conservative Party MP for Tavistock, 1966–74 and Henley, 1974–2001. 42 See record of meeting between Richard O’Brien and Alan, 10 Nov. 1976. UCDA P215/197. 43 The resolutions on Northern Ireland included the following: calls in support of the restoration of power-sharing; better relations between the Conservative Party and the UUP; and the military defeat of the PIRA. See Conservative Party Conference resolutions 1394–9, ‘Ulster’. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 44 Report by Dermot Gallagher of the Irish Embassy in London re: the Conservative Party annual conference, 7–10 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 45 Graham Goodlad supports this argument. See Goodlad, Thatcher, 154. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 407; Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume two, 419; and Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume one, 323. 46 Record of speech by Thatcher at Airey Neave’s memorial service, 17 May 1979. A copy of this speech is available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104085. 47 Goodlad, Thatcher, 45. 48 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 587. 49 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 411. 50 Goodlad, Thatcher, 154. 51 Prior, Conservative Party MP for Waveney, 1959–87. 52 See Irish Times, 26 Sept. 2014. 53 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385. 54 Record of speech by Thatcher at the River Oaks Country Club, Houston, Texas, Sept. 1977. See Irish government memorandum, ‘Conservative Party policy on Northern Ireland as outlined in statements by its leader and spokesmen – July ’77 – Sept. ’78’. NAI DFA 2009/120/1942. 55 Several writers have argued incorrectly that Thatcher did not have a set Northern Ireland policy as the official leader of the opposition. See, for example, Mulholland, ‘ “Just another country”? The Irish question in the Thatcher years’, 180–96, 186; and Goodlad, Thatcher, 154–5. 56 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 384. 57 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 384. 58 Since the closing down of the Northern Ireland parliament and the introduction of direct rule in 1972, the Conservative Party under Heath and the Labour Party under Harold Wilson (and subsequently under James Callaghan, Wilson’s successor as Labour Party leader in 1976) had agreed to follow a bipartisan Northern Ireland

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59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69 70 71 72 73 74

75

76 77

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policy, which had included a commitment by both parties to establish a powersharing Executive in Northern Ireland. Comments by Thatcher. Irish Press, 20 Sept. 1975. See, for example, record of meeting between Wilson, Rees, Thatcher and Neave, 10 Sept. 1975. TNA PREM 16/520. See also record of meeting between British and Irish delegation (including Thatcher and Liam Cosgrave), 5 Mar. 1976. UCDA P215/203; and Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 384. See, for example, Neave to Mrs Winifred A. Walker, 3 Apr. 1978. PA AN/461. See, for example, The right approach, 46–7. A copy of this publication is available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109439. See, for example, record of meeting between Wilson, Rees, Thatcher and Neave, 10 Sept. 1975. TNA PREM 16/520. See, for example, comments by Thatcher, 12 Jan. 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 903, cc. 31–2. See, for example, record of meeting between Wilson, Rees, Thatcher and Neave, 10 Sept. 1975. TNA PREM 16/520. See, for example, copy of speech by Thatcher to UUC gathering, Craigavad, Holywood, Northern Ireland, 19 June 1978. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 2 of 2. See also Thatcher to Jack Lynch, 20 June 1977. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/101. See ‘Secret report by the study group on the military problems raised in Discussion Paper No. 2, Feb. 1975. UCDA P215/68. See Bernard Donoughue, Prime minister: the conduct of policy under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan (London, 1987), 129. For an insightful analysis of the Labour government’s Northern Ireland policy during this period, see C. C. Stuart Aveyard, No solution: the Labour Government and the Northern Ireland conflict (Manchester, 2019). Quoted in Garret FitzGerald, ‘The 1974–5 threat of a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 17 (2006), 142. See also Donoughue, Prime minister, 128–32. Record of private conversation between Thatcher and Sir David Goodall, circa Dec. 1982. See Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 2. Record of meeting between Wilson, Rees, Thatcher and Neave, 10 Sept. 1975. TNA PREM 16/520. See Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, 417. See also interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. See comments by Thatcher. Record of meeting between FitzGerald, Thatcher, Maulding and Whitelaw, 14 Oct. 1976. UCDA P215/203. See, for example, comments by Thatcher during her leader’s address at the annual Conservative Party Conference, 7–10 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. See also copy of speech by Thatcher to UUC, Craigavad, Holywood, Northern Ireland, 19 June 1978. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 2 of 2. See, for example, copy of memorandum by Neave, ‘Debate on Northern Ireland: January 12th’, circa Jan. 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/9. See also record of 90th meeting of the LCC, 6 Jan. 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/9. See also Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 384–6. See, for example, copy of speech by Thatcher to UUC gathering, Craigavad, Holywood, Northern Ireland, 19 June 1978. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 2 of 2. See, for example, comments by Thatcher, 19 Apr. 1978. HC Debate, Vol. 948, cc. 448–9. See also copy of submission of the ‘Conservative and Unionist Party’ on ‘Northern Ireland’s Representation at Westminster’, unsigned and undated, circa Nov./Dec.1977. UC CAC THCR 2/1/6/243.

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78 Walker, A history of the Ulster Unionist Party, 228–9. 79 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385. 80 Indeed, rather than mention devolution Thatcher spoke of her commitment to maintaining the constitutional links between Northern Ireland and the remainder of the UK. Report by Dermot Gallagher of the Irish Embassy in London re: the Conservative Party annual Conference, 7–10 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 81 See, for example, comments by Thatcher. Record of meeting between FitzGerald, Thatcher, Maulding and Whitelaw, 14 Oct. 1976. UCDA P215/203. 82 Lynch, Fianna Fáil leader 1966–79 and taoiseach, 1966–73 and 1977–79. 83 See Paul Keating to R. McDonagh, 3 Oct. 1977. NAI DT 2007/116/776. 84 See, for example, copy of speech by Thatcher to UUC gathering, Craigavad, Holywood, Northern Ireland, 19 June 1978. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 2 of 2. See also Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385. 85 See memorandum marked, ‘strictly confidential’, ‘discussion paper based on suggestions made by [John Brooke 2nd] Viscount Brookeborough [son of Basil Brooke, prime minister of Northern Ireland, 1943–63]’, compiled by the CRD, signed ‘JB/JAO/JH’, 22 Feb. 1977. UC CAC HLSM 2/42/2/59. 86 The CPPNIC is sometimes alternatively referred to as the Conservative Party Backbench Northern Ireland Committee. See Northern Ireland subsection, OU BL CPA, http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/modern/cpa/crd/crd4. html#crd4.A.15.2. 87 Lord Belstead, parliamentary under-secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1973–4; minister of state for Northern Ireland, 1990–2. 88 Farr, Conservative Party MP for Harborough, 1959–92. 89 Fisher, Conservative Party MP for Hitchin, 1950–5 and Surbiton, 1955–83. 90 Goodhart, Conservative Party MP for Beckenham, 1957–92; parliamentary undersecretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1979–81. 91 Miscampbell, Conservative Party MP for Blackpool North, 1962–92. 92 Mates, Conservative Party MP for East Hampshire, 1974–2010; minister of state for Northern Ireland, 1992–3. 93 Mayhew, Conservative Party MP for Tunbridge Wells, 1974–97; secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1992–7. 94 Additional CPPNIC members in 1975 included Sir Frederic Bennett; John Biffen, Nick Budgen; Winston (Spencer) Churchill (grandson of former British prime minister Winston Churchill); David James; Anthony Kershaw; Joan Christabel; Jill Knight; Carol Mather; Peter Mills; Michael McNair-Wilson; and Nicholas Winterton. See UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 95 See Brian Harrison’s entry, ‘Airey Neave’, in The Oxford dictionary of national biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 96 See Neave to Mrs Winifred A. Walker, 3 Apr. 1978. PA AN/461. 97 See comments by Lord Lexden (formally Alistair Cooke). Alistair Cooke, ‘Enoch Powell and Ulster’, in Lord Howard of Rising (ed.), Enoch at 100: a re-evaluation of the life, politics and philosophy of Enoch Powell (London, 2014), 266. 98 Patrick Cosgrave, ‘Sir John Biggs-Davison’, in The Oxford dictionary of national biography. 99 See John Biggs-Davison, The hand is red (London, 1983). 100 Biggs-Davison’s resignation was triggered by his refusal to support, as a junior frontbench spokesperson on African affairs, the Conservative Party’s opposition to ‘white-dominated government’ in Rhodesia. Cosgrave, ‘Sir John Biggs-Davison’.

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101 A source close to Biggs-Davison reported that he believed that Ireland, as a whole, might be persuaded to agree to a ‘union of Britain and Celtic isles’, as Julian Amery later phrased it, in order to help establish ‘special relations between the Republic [of Ireland] and United Kingdom’. See Julian Amery to Nigel Dudley, 19 Dec. 1988. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/64. 102 Cunningham, ‘Conservative dissidents and the Irish question: The “prointegrationist” lobby, 1973–94’; 31. 103 See record of CPPNIC meetings, 1973–5. UO BL CPA CRD 3/18/2 and 4/15/2/2. 104 Irish Times, 16 Jan. 1976. 105 William Van Straubenzee, Conservative Party MP for Wokingham, 1959–87. 106 Privately, James Molyneaux, leader of the UUP in the House of Commons and UUP MP for Antrim South, 1970–83, somewhat unfairly, noted that van Straubenzee ‘positively hated Ulster Unionism and the Ulster Unionists’. See comments by Molyneaux. Record of meeting of executive council of the UUC, Belfast, 18 June 1976. UC CAC POLL 9/1/8. See also ‘Obituary: Sir William van Straubenzee’. The Independent, 8 Nov. 1999. Available from https://www.independent.co.uk/artsentertainment/obituary-sir-william-van-straubenzee-1124329.html. 107 See, for example, Belfast Telegraph, 9 May 1975. 108 See record of CPPNIC meetings, 20 Feb. 1975 to 13 Mar. 1979. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2–4. During this four-year period, the CPPNIC convened (approximately) between the following dates: 20 Feb. to 4 Dec. 1975 (fifteen meetings); 17 Feb. to 21 Dec. 1976 (eight meetings); 25 Jan. to 13 Dec. 1977 (nine meetings); 15 July to 11 Nov. 1978 (four meetings); and 10 Jan. to 13 Mar. 1979 (two meetings). 109 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 3 July 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 110 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 12 July 1977. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 111 During the late 1970s, DeLorean received lucrative incentives from the Labour government to construct a purpose-built factory in west Belfast, to manufacture a revolutionary sports-car. The investment into the DeLorean project in Northern Ireland was an extremely controversial deal, in which the British taxpayer paid £23,000 for each job created. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 7 Nov. 1978. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 112 Fitt, leader of the SDLP, 1970–9 and SDLP MP for West Belfast, 1966–83. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 11 Nov. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 113 Dickson, leader of the UPNI, 1976–81. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 9 Nov. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 114 O’Brien, Irish senator, 1977–79. At a meeting of the CPPNIC, on 10 Jan. 1979, O’Brien noted that ‘direct rule was the only option acceptable to both communities in present circumstances’ and that ‘British withdrawal would be disastrous, because it would lead to civil war’. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 10 Jan. 1979. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 115 Cosgrave, Fine Gael leader, 1965–77 and taoiseach, 1973–77. 116 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 15 May 1975. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/73, file 2 of 3. 117 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 3 July 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. See also record of meeting of CPPNIC, 3 July 1975. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/73, file 2 of 3. 118 See comments by Budgen. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 24 July 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 119 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 15 May 1975. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/73, file 2 of 3. 120 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 15 May 1975. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/73, file 2 of 3.

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121 See record of meetings of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 17 June 1975 to 10 Dec. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. Please note that although the minutes for the fact-finding subcommittee held by the CPA CRD are incomplete post-Dec. 1975, other available archival documentation refer to, at least, three meetings of the fact-finding subcommittee being held between July 1976 and July 1977. See copy of policy paper on Northern Ireland by the CRD signed ‘JFH/SO’B’, 28 July 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/13; record of meeting of the Conservative Party ‘study group on a Council of State for Northern Ireland’, 14 Dec. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4; and record of meeting between Mason and a delegation of the factfinding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 7 July 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876 122 Farr, Conservative Party MP for Harborough, 1959–92. 123 Mather, Conservative Party MP for Esher, 1970–87. 124 Mills, Conservative Party MP for Torrington, 1964–74, West Devon, 1974–83 and Torridge and West Devon, 1983–7. 125 Belfast Telegraph, 17 June 1975. See also record of first meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 17 June 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 126 Belfast Telegraph, 17 June 1975. 127 Record of first meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 17 June 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 128 See record of meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 8 July 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 129 See record of meetings of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 24 July and 5 Aug. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 130 Faulkner, UPNI, 1974–6. He was also the former leader of the UUP, 1971–4; prime minister of Northern Ireland, 1971–2. 131 Craig, leader of Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (commonly known as the Vanguard Party), 1972–8. 132 Rees, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1974–6. 133 Hume, SDLP deputy leader, 1970–9 and SDLP leader, 1979–2001. 134 See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch76.htm. 135 See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch76.htm. 136 Copy of statement by Neave, 6 Jan. 1976. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/101. 137 Ewart Biggs held the post of British ambassador to Ireland from 9 to 21 July 1976. 138 Carrington, the official leader of the opposition in the House of Lords, 1974–9. 139 Indeed, over the previous twelve months, Neave, Biggs-Davison and John Huston had made numerous visits to Northern Ireland as part of their ‘fact-finding’ programme. 140 Record of LCC meeting, 28 July 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/13. See also copy of memorandum by Neave, ‘Debate on Northern Ireland: January 12th’, circa Jan. 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/9. See also record of 90th meeting of the LCC, 6 Jan. 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/9. 141 That said, the policy paper on Northern Ireland was conspicuous for its reference that the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC did ‘not advocate’, at this time, ‘a further re-organisation of local government’ in Northern Ireland. This statement was seemingly at odds with Neave’s own pet-project during this period, the so-called ‘Council of State’, which advocated reforming local government in Northern Ireland by establishing an advisory, non-administrative, body of forty to fifty members, appointed rather than elected from nominations submitted form various interest

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groups in Northern Ireland. Neave’s support for the establishment of a Council of State is examined in further detail in Chapter 2, pp. 49–52. 142 Copy of policy paper on Northern Ireland by the CRD, signed ‘JFH/SO’B’, 28 July 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/13. 143 See The right approach, 46–7. 144 Patten, Conservative Party MP for Bath, 1979–92. 145 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Report of the 93rd Conference of the Conservative Party, Brighton, 5th–8th October, 1976’. UCDA P215/203. 146 See The right approach, 47. 147 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 19 Oct. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 148 See Whitelaw, The Whitelaw memoirs, 77–122. 149 Harry West succeeded Faulkner as UUP leader in Jan. 1974. 150 Under the terms of the Sunningdale Agreement, it was agreed that the Council of Ireland would be composed of seven ministers from each side, and a sixty-member consultative assembly, elected half by Dáil Éireann and half by a newly formed Northern Ireland assembly. See Heath, The autobiography, 444. 151 The Independent, 1 July 1999. 152 See, for example, Irish Times, 25 Feb. 1975. 153 See, for example, comments by Neave in support of power-sharing in Northern Ireland. Record of meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 14 Oct. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 154 See comments by Neave. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 27 Nov. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. See also record of 77th meeting of the LCC, 1 Oct. 1975, dated 24 Sept. 1975. UC CAC HLSM 2/42/2/48; and record of CPPNIC meeting, 30 Oct. 1975. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/9. 155 Belfast Telegraph, 9 May 1975. 156 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Conservative Party policy on Northern Ireland as outlined in statements by its leader and spokesmen – July ’77 – Sept. ’78’. NAI DFA 2009/120/1942. 157 Belfast Telegraph, 9 May 1975. 158 Whitelaw made these comments minutes before FitzGerald’s meeting with Thatcher and Neave at the House of Commons. Whitelaw did not ‘stay for the meeting’. FitzGerald, All in a life, 261. See also record of meeting between FitzGerald, Neave and Thatcher, 5 Mar. 1975. UCDA P215/132. 159 On 12 May 1975, during a one-day visit to Dublin, Neave held separate discussions with FitzGerald and Fianna Fáil’s spokesperson on Northern Ireland, Ruairí Brugha. See Irish Times, 13 May 1975. 160 Record of meeting between Cosgrave, Neave and Biggs-Davison, 24 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 161 Record of meeting between British and Irish delegation (including Liam Cosgrave and Thatcher), 5 Mar. 1976. UCDA P215/203. See also FitzGerald, All in a life, 278. 162 Record of meeting between Cosgrave, Neave and Biggs-Davison, 24 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 163 See Seán Donlon to Donál O’Sullivan, 27 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. See also Neave to Richard S. McFadden, ‘April 1978’. PA AN/442. 164 Copy of memorandum by Neave, ‘Debate on Northern Ireland: January 12th’, circa Jan. 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/9. See also record of 90th meeting of the LCC, 6 Jan. 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/9.

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165 Comments by Neave, 12 Jan. 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 903, cc. 69–70. Indeed, at a meeting of the CPPNIC, on 30 Mar. 1976, Neave advised his party colleagues not to ‘show their hand in detail’ in relation to the devolution debate. Record of meeting of the CPPNIC, 30 Mar. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 166 Comments by Edward Heath, 12 Jan. 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 903, cc. 91–2. 167 Comments by Sir Nigel Fisher, 12 Jan. 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 903, cc. 116–17. 168 Comments by John Farr, 12 Jan. 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 903, cc. 138–9. 169 Comments by Biggs-Davison, 12 Jan. 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 903, cc. 148–9. 170 James, Conservative Party MP for North-Dorset, 1970–9 (during this period James was a member of the CPPNIC). 171 See, John Robson, One man in his time: the biography of David James, Laird of Torosay Castle, traveller, wartime escaper, and Member of Parliament (Kent, 1998), 221. 172 Comments by David James, 12 Jan. 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 903, cc. 40–1. 173 Rees, Northern Ireland, 183. 174 Rees, Northern Ireland, 186. 175 The UUUC, est. in Jan. 1974, brought together Unionists opposed to the Sunningdale Agreement. The UUUC was composed of the UUP, the DUP and the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party. The UUCC contested the 1974 (Feb.) British general election, wining eleven seats (seven UUP, three VUPP and one DUP). 176 Rees, Northern Ireland, 193. See also Seán Farren, The SDLP: the struggle for agreement in Northern Ireland, 1970–2000 (Dublin, 2010), 109. 177 Quoted in Farren, The SDLP, 114. 178 See ‘Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention Report, 20 November 1975’. Available from https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/convention/nicc75report.htm. 179 Rees, Northern Ireland, 196–7. 180 Neave to Major C. J. E. Seymour, 6 Mar. 1978. PA AN/455. 181 Mason was appointed secretary of state for Northern Ireland on 10 Sept. 1976. His predecessor, Merlyn Rees, held the post from Mar. 1974 to Sept. 1976. 182 See record of meeting between Neave and Mason, 23 Sept. 1976. TNA CJ 4/1351. 183 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Report of the 93rd Conference of the Conservative Party, Brighton, 5th–8th October, 1976’. UCDA P215/203. 184 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Report of the 93rd Conference of the Conservative Party, Brighton, 5th–8th October, 1976’. UCDA P215/203. 185 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Report of the 93rd Conference of the Conservative Party, Brighton, 5th–8th October, 1976’. UCDA P215/203. 186 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Report of the 93rd Conference of the Conservative Party, Brighton, 5th–8th October, 1976’. UCDA P215/203. 187 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Report of the 93rd Conference of the Conservative Party, Brighton, 5th–8th October, 1976’. UCDA P215/203. 188 West, UUP leader, 1974–9. 189 The Rev. Smyth, UUP MP for Belfast South, 1982–2005. 190 Ross, UUP MP for Londonderry, 1974–2001. Also reportedly in attendance were James Strange, Norman Hutton and Noreen Cooper. 191 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Report of the 93rd Conference of the Conservative Party, Brighton, 5th–8th October, 1976’. UCDA P215/203. 192 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Report of the 93rd Conference of the Conservative Party, Brighton, 5th–8th October, 1976’. UCDA P215/203.

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193 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Report of the 93rd Conference of the Conservative Party, Brighton, 5th–8th October, 1976’. UCDA P215/203. 194 Sarah Campbell, Gerry Fitt and the SDLP: ‘in a minority of one’ (Manchester, 2015), 215. 195 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Briefing for meeting with Conservative Party Leader, 14 Oct. 1976’. UCDA P215/203. 196 Record of meeting between FitzGerald, Thatcher, Maulding and Whitelaw, 14 Oct. 1976. UCDA P215/203. 197 FitzGerald, All in a life, 284. 198 Record of meeting between FitzGerald, Thatcher, Maulding and Whitelaw, 14 Oct. 1976. UCDA P215/203. 199 Record of meeting between FitzGerald, Thatcher, Maulding and Whitelaw, 14 Oct. 1976. UCDA P215/203. 200 Record of meeting between FitzGerald, Thatcher, Maulding and Whitelaw, 14 Oct. 1976. UCDA P215/203. 201 Record of meeting between FitzGerald, Thatcher, Maulding and Whitelaw, 14 Oct. 1976. UCDA P215/203. 202 Record of meeting between FitzGerald, Thatcher, Maulding and Whitelaw, 14 Oct. 1976. UCDA P215/203. 203 FitzGerald, All in a life, 287. 204 Record of meeting between FitzGerald, Thatcher, Maulding and Whitelaw, 14 Oct. 1976. UCDA P215/203. 205 FitzGerald, All in a life, 287. 206 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 587. See also Goodlad, Thatcher, 155. 207 Young, One of us, 465. 208 See record of meeting between Neave, Biggs-Davison and Mason, 20 Oct. 1976. TNA CJ 4/1351. See also Irish Times, 23 Oct. 1976. 209 Record of meeting between Neave, Biggs-Davison and Mason, 20 Oct. 1976. TNA CJ 4/1351. 210 Record of meeting between Richard O’Brien and Alan Goulty, 10 Nov. 1976. UCDA P215/197. 211 See ‘Note for the Record’, J. M. Stewart, 19 Jan. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. 212 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 10 Nov. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/214. 213 Smith, ‘ “Ever reliable friends”?’, 70–1. 214 See memorandum, ‘Ulster and the Conservative Party’, produced on behalf of the CRD, circa 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 215 See Smith, ‘ “Ever reliable friends”?’, 70–1. 216 See Heath, The autobiography, 444. 217 Smith, ‘ “Ever reliable friends”?’, 71. 218 Smith, ‘ “Ever reliable friends”?’, 70–1. 219 See Neave to J. B. King, 6 Mar. 1979. PA AN/439. 220 West succeeded Brian Faulkner as UUP leader in Jan. 1974. 221 See record of CPPNIC meetings, 1974–5. UL BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 222 Smith, ‘ “Ever reliable friends”?’, 71–2. 223 Belfast Telegraph, 18 Oct. 1975. 224 See C. Luke’s essay, ‘The Thatcher phenomenon and Northern Ireland’, circa 1989, page 6. A copy of this essay is available from UC CAC POLL 9/1/5. 225 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385.

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226 Mulholland, ‘ “Just another country”? The Irish question in the Thatcher years’, 185. See also Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 117. 227 Comments by Douglas Hurd. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 228 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385. 229 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385. 230 Biggs-Davison to Thatcher, 18 Feb. 1975. UC CAC THCR 2/1/1/18. 231 See comments by Lord Lexden. Cooke, ‘Enoch Powell and Ulster’, 266. 232 Biggs-Davison to Thatcher, 18 Feb. 1975. UC CAC THCR 2/1/1/18. 233 Minutes of fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 8 July 1975. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/54. See also UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 234 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 3 July 1975. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/73, file 2 of 3. See also record of CPPNIC meeting, 3 July 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 235 See record of CPPNIC meetings, 3–24 July 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2; and record of meetings of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 8 July to 5 Aug. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 236 Record of meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 5 Aug. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 237 See Henry Patterson, Ireland since 1939, the persistence of conflict (Dublin, 2006), 257. See also Jack Holland and Henry McDonald, INLA: deadly divisions (Dublin, 1994), 137. 238 Report by Dermot Gallagher of the Irish Embassy in London re: the Conservative Party annual conference, 7–10 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 239 Report by Dermot Gallagher of the Irish Embassy in London re: the Conservative Party annual conference, 7–10 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 240 Belfast Telegraph, 9 Oct. 1975. 241 Porter, Conservative Party MP for Bebington and Ellesmere Port, 1979–83 and Wirral South, 1983–96. 242 Report by Dermot Gallagher of the Irish Embassy in London re: the Conservative Party annual conference, 7–10 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 243 The Monday Club was founded in 1961 and was composed of ‘right-wing’ elements affiliated with the Conservative Party. 244 Knight, Conservative Party MP for Birmingham-Edgbaston, 1966–97. 245 Winterton, Conservative Party MP for Macclesfield, 1971–2010. 246 Report by Dermot Gallagher of the Irish Embassy in London re: the Conservative Party annual conference, 7–10 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 247 Report by Dermot Gallagher of the Irish Embassy in London re: the Conservative Party annual conference, 7–10 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 248 Report by Dermot Gallagher of the Irish Embassy in London re: the Conservative Party annual conference, 7–10 Oct. 1975. NAI DFA 2007/111/1870. 249 Record of meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 14 Oct. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 250 Belfast Telegraph, 18 Oct. 1975. 251 See comments by Neave and Biggs-Davison. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 23 Oct. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 252 Napier, Alliance Party leader, 1970–2. 253 Record of Thatcher’s meeting with Northern Ireland politicians, Stormont Castle, Belfast. Also present were Biggs-Davison and Derek Howe, 14 Nov. 1975. UC CAC THCR 2/1/1/18.

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254 Those in attendance include the Rev. Ian Smith (UUP), Austin Ardill (UUP) Molyneaux, Rev. Williams Beattie (DUP deputy leader) and Cecil Harvey (UU Movement, formerly Vanguard). Record of CPPNIC meeting, 27 Nov. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 255 Copy of speech by Biggs-Davison to the UUC, Belfast, 19 Mar. 1976. UC CAC POLL 9/1/8. 256 Record of meeting of Executive Council of the UUC, Belfast, 18 June 1976. UC CAC POLL 9/1/8. 257 Record of meeting of Executive Committee of the UUC, Belfast, 5 Nov. 1976. UC CAC POLL 9/1/8. 258 See Neave to West, 23 Nov. 1976. UC CAC POLL 9/1/8. 259 See Neave to West, 23 Nov. 1976. UC CAC POLL 9/1/8. 260 See R. Ramsay to Mason, 10 Feb. 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. 261 See comments by Neave. Copy of memorandum by Neave, ‘Ulster Unionists’, 7 Mar. 1977. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/13. 262 Copy of memorandum by Neave, ‘Ulster Unionists’, 7 Mar. 1977. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/13. 263 Record of meeting between Neave, Biggs-Davison and Molyneaux, 23 Mar. 1977. UC CAC THCR 2/1/6/243. 264 Neave to Thatcher, 23 Mar. 1977. UC CAC THCR 2/1/6/243. See also The right approach, 46–7. 265 Record of speech by Neave, at a luncheon given by the UUC, Belfast, 7 Apr. 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. 266 Neave to Thatcher, 1 Sept. 1977. UC CAC THCR 2/1/1/46. 267 See ‘Conservative Proposals for a Council of State’, D. Chesterton, 23 Feb. 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. 268 Quoted in the Financial Times, 12 Apr. 1979.

2  Airey Neave and the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, 1975–9 1 A version of this subsection was first published in Irish Studies in International Affairs. See Kelly, “ ‘…no textbook solutions to the problems in Northern Ireland”: Airey Neave and the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, 1975– 1979’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 29 (2018), 237–60. 2 Airey Neave, The flames of Calais (London, 1972). 3 Neave was awarded the Military Cross in 1942, the Distinguished Service Order in 1945, the Territorial Decoration in the same year and the Order of the British Empire (OBE) in 1947. For biographical information on Airey Neave, see Brian Harrison’s entry, ‘Airey Neave’, in The Oxford dictionary of national biography. See also Patrick Bishop, The man who was Saturday (London, 2019); and Paul Routledge, Public life, secret agent: the elusive life and violent death of Airey Neave (London, 2003). 4 Airey Neave, Saturday at M19 (London, 1969). 5 Harrison, ‘Airey Neave’, in The Oxford dictionary of national biography. 6 See Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 90. 7 Harris, Not for turning, 110. 8 Harris, Not for turning, 110. See also Harris, Thatcher, 26.

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9 Lord Lexden, formally Alistair Cooke, CRD desk officer for Northern Ireland, 1977–83. 10 See Lord Lexden, ‘35 years ago today, Airey Neave was murdered and the course of British politics changed’, 30 Mar. 2014. Available from http://www.conservativehome. com/platform/2014/03/lord-lexden-35-years-ago-today-airey-neave-was-murderedand-the-course-of-british-politics-changed.html. 11 Clark, Diaries, 139. 12 Quoted in Patrick Cosgrave, Thatcher: the first term (London, 1979), 66. 13 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the path to power, 270. 14 Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume one, 323. 15 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the path to power, 289. 16 Routledge, Public life, secret agent, 268. 17 Bloom, Thatcher’s secret war, 39–40. 18 Harris, Not for turning, 110. 19 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 297. 20 Record of conversation between K. Thompson and John Huston, 27 Jan. 1977. UCDA P215/220. 21 Record of conversation between Dermot Gallagher, press and information counsellor, Irish Embassy in London and Roger Carroll, 22 Apr. 1975. UCDA P215/136. 22 Routledge, Public life, secret agent, 8. 23 See Neave to Mrs W. O’Sullivan, 22 Feb. 1978. PA AN/446. 24 See, for example, record of CPPNIC meetings, 1971–5. UO BL CPA CRD 3/18/2 and UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 25 Record of Neave’s contribution to House of Commons debates, June 1953 to Mar. 1975. See https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/people/mr-airey-neave/index. html. See also Lord Lexden (formally Alistair Cooke), ‘Airey Neave and Ulster, 1975– 79’, Conservative History Journal, Vol. II, No. 7 (Autumn 2019), 54–7. 26 See, for example, comments by Neave, 24 Apr. 1972. HC Debate, Vol. 835, cc. 1047–8. See also 10 Nov. 1972. HC Debate, Vol. 845, c. 286w; and 8 Apr. 1974. HC Debate, Vol. 872, c. 40w. 27 Comments by Neave. Irish Times, 24 Feb. 1975. 28 Quoted in Routledge, Public life, secret agent, 9. 29 Routledge, Public life, secret agent, 9. 30 See Lord Lexden, ‘35 years ago today, Airey Neave was murdered and the course of British politics changed’. 31 Comments by Neave, 12 Mar. 1975. HC Debate, Vol. 888, cc. 529–30. 32 Quoted in Daily Mail, 21 Feb. 1975. 33 Quoted in Daily Mail, 21 Feb. 1975. 34 In his memoir, Whitelaw recorded that on taking up his new cabinet post ‘I had no detailed knowledge of Northern Ireland’. Whitelaw, The Whitelaw memoirs, 86. 35 Quoted in Irish Times, 24 Feb. 1975. 36 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 20 Feb. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 37 See Chapter 1, pp. 20–6. 38 Quoted in Daily Mail, 21 Feb. 1975. 39 Comments by Neave. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 30 Oct. 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/2. 40 See record of meeting between Neave and Mason, 23 Sept. 1976. TNA CJ 4/1351; comments by Neave. Minutes of fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 8 July 1975. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/54; Neave’s interview with the Catholic Herald, 18 Mar.

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1977; Neave to G. M. Brown, 12 July 1978. PA AN/419; Neave to James Corridan, 21 Mar. 1979. PA AN/422; and Neave to Donald Park, 23 Mar. 1979. PA AN/450. 41 See, for example, record of meeting between Neave and Mason, 23 Sept. 1976. TNA CJ 4/1351; and Neave to M. Clarke, 11 Jan. 1979. PA AN/422. 42 See, for example, comments by Neave, 1 Mar. 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 906, cc. 915–16; Neave to J. G. Knibb, 14 Dec. 1978. PA AN/439; and Neave to Mrs Betty Heckel, 22 Dec. 1978. PA AN/433. 43 See Neave to Mayor A. R. Braybrooke, 7 Dec. 1977. PA AN/416; Neave’s interview with the Catholic Herald, 18 Mar. 1977; Neave to Dr D. L. Armstrong, 9 Mar. 1978. PA AN/414; and Neave to F. K Carter, 15 Mar. 1978. PA AN/420. Following the Birmingham PIRA bombings in Nov. 1974, in which twenty-eight people lost their lives, the Conservative Party shadow cabinet discussed the return of the death penalty. The idea was rejected, but Thatcher was known to have favoured its reintroduction. See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 276, footnote marked *. 44 For further reading on Neave’s attitude to Northern Ireland and security, see Bishop, The man who was Saturday, 226–46. 45 See Neave to Mrs Winifred A. Walker, 3 Apr. 1978. PA AN/461. 46 Lord Lexden, ‘35 years ago today, Airey Neave was murdered and the course of British politics changed’. 47 See, for example, Neave to R. B. Bew, 24 Jan. 1979. PA AN/419. See also Neave to S. Marshall, 24 Jan. 1979. PA AN/443; and Neave to S. A. Wood, 23 Jan. 1979. PA AN/462. 48 Martin Dillion, The dirty war (London, 1991), 283. 49 See Bloom, Thatcher’s secret war, 54. 50 Comments by Neave, 27 June 1975. HC Debate, Vol. 894, cc. 910–11. See also comments by Neave, 10 July 1975. HC Debate, Vol. 895, cc. 744–5. See also record of meeting Neave, Biggs-Davison, Lt. Gen. Sir David House, and Brigadier C. P. Campbell, 29 Mar. 1976. TNA CJ 4/1351. 51 See The Times, 6 Dec. 1975. See also comments by Douglas James, deputy secretary of the NIO regarding Neave’s attitude to Northern Ireland. Record of meeting between Douglas James and Donál O’Sullivan, Irish ambassador in London, 12 Aug. 1975. UCDA P215/158. 52 Comments by Neave, 12 May 1975. HC Debate, Vol. 892, cc. 644–5. 53 See The Times, 25 Nov. 1975. 54 See Donoughue, Prime minister, 131. 55 Arthur, Special relationships, 163. 56 Record of conversation between Dermot Gallagher and Roger Carroll, 22 Apr. 1975. UCDA P215/136. 57 See comments by Douglas James, deputy secretary of the NIO. Recording of meeting between O’Sullivan and James, 12 Aug. 1975. UCDA P215/158. 58 Rees, Northern Ireland, 324. 59 Record of conversation between Dermot Gallagher and Roger Carroll, 22 Apr. 1975. UCDA P215/136. 60 FitzGerald, All in a life, 265. See also author’s interview with Garret FitzGerald, 19 Jan. 2009. 61 See, for example, record of meeting between Rees and O’Sullivan, Irish ambassador in London, 29 Apr. 1975. UCDA 215/152. 62 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 15 May 1975. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/73, file 2 of 3.

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63 Record of speech by Neave to the Conservative Club, Abington, 23 Apr. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. 64 Record of speech by Neave to the Conservative Club, Abington, 23 Apr. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. 65 Record of meeting between Neave, PUS and Ford, 6 Dec. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. 66 Comments by Neave, 25 Mar. 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 908, cc. 655–6; and comments by Neave, 1 July 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 914, cc. 627–8. See also record of meeting between Neave and Mason, 23 Sept. 1976. TNA CJ 4/1351. 67 Record of speech by Neave, at a luncheon given by the UUC, Belfast, 7 Apr. 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. 68 Record of meeting between Neave and Mason, 29 Apr. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. See also record of meeting between Neave and Mason, 23 Sept. 1976. TNA CJ 4/1351. 69 See record of meeting between Neave and Mason, 29 Apr. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. 70 Neave to Mrs Iles Joseph, 11 Dec. 1978. PA AN/436. See Airey Neave, Nuremberg (London, 1978). 71 See, for example, Neave to Mrs J. Parvin, 9 Oct. 1978. PA AN/449; and comments by Neave, Belfast Telegraph, 23 Feb. 1979. 72 See, for example, Neave to A. H. James, Mar. 1979. PA AN/436. 73 Comments by Neave. Belfast Telegraph, 23 Feb. 1979. 74 See, for example, copy of memorandum by Neave, ‘Debate on Northern Ireland: January 12th’, circa Jan. 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/9; comments by Neave. Record of meeting of the CPPNIC, 19 Oct. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4; and comments by Neave, 30 June 1977. HC Debate, Vol. 934, cc. 646–7. 75 See, for example, record of meeting between Neave and Mason, 23 Sept. 1976. TNA CJ 4/1351; comments by Neave, 6 Mar. 1978. HC Debate, Vol. 945, cc. 1002–7; Neave to Dr D. L. Armstrong, 9 Mar. 1978. PA AN/414; and record of speech by Neave, at a luncheon given by the UUC, Belfast, 7 Apr. 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. Neave always held the view that Sinn Féin and the PIRA were one and the same. As he informed the House of Commons on 30 June 1978: ‘From any ordinary person’s point of view, the Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Féin are two arms of the one body.’ Comments by Neave, 30 June 1978. HC Debate, Vol. 952, cc. 1720–1. See also Neave to Dr D. L. Armstrong, 9 Mar. 1978. PA AN/414. 76 See, for example, Neave to Richard S. McFadden, ‘April 1978’. PA AN/442. See also ‘Note for the Record’, J. M. Stewart, 19 Jan. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. 77 For further analysis vis-à-vis Neave’s attitude to devolution in Northern Ireland, in the form of either power-sharing or majority-rule, see Chapter 1, pp. 26–34. 78 See Neave to Thatcher, 1 Sept. 1977. CAC THCR 2/1/1/46. 79 See, for example, Neave to N. Haines, 17 Feb. 1978. PA AN/433. See also speech by Neave, Maldon Industrial Council, 25 May 1978. NAI DFA 2009/120/1942. 80 Neave continued that although ‘power-sharing on the old formula may be an ideal … I’m afraid that power-sharing as it was originally intended is no longer a solution’. See Neave to Major C. J. E. Seymour, 6 Mar. 1978. PA AN/455. 81 Comments by Neave, 5 Mar. 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 906, c. 1719; and comments by Neave, 2 July 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 913, c. 817. See also record of meeting between Neave and Mason, 23 Sept. 1976. TNA CJ 4/1351. 82 See News Letter, 31 Dec. 1976. See also comments by Neave, 13 Jan. 1977. HC Debate, Vol. 923, cc. 624–5. 83 See ‘Advisory Council: Line to take’, unsigned and undated, circa 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. See also The Times, 5 July 1977.

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84 See Chapter 1, pp. 26–34. 85 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 19 Nov. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 86 See ‘Conservative Proposals for a Council of State’, D. Chesterton, 23 Feb. 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. 87 Record of conversation between Neave, Stewart and Ramsay, 14 Jan. 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. See also record of conversation between Neave and J. M. Stewart, 14 Jan. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. 88 See ‘Conservative Proposals for a Council of State’, D. Chesterton, 23 Feb. 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. 89 Significantly, this policy paper on Northern Ireland was conspicuous for its reference that the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC did ‘not advocate’, at this time, ‘a further re-organisation of local government’ in Northern Ireland. See copy of policy paper on Northern Ireland by the CRD, signed ‘JFH/SO’B’, 28 July 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/13. See also Chapter 1, p. 26. 90 See The right approach, 46–47. See also record of CPPNIC meeting, 19 Oct. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 91 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 21 Dec. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. See also record of meeting of the Conservative Party study group on a Council of State for Northern Ireland, 14 Dec. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 92 See ‘2. Advisory Council (Council of State)’, unsigned and undated, circa 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. See also ‘Advisory Council: line to take’, unsigned and undated, circa 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. In his memoir, recounting his time as secretary of state for Northern Ireland, Rees likewise informed Neave that he was ‘firmly against’ the idea of a Council of State advisory body. Rees, Northern Ireland, 281. 93 See comment by Kenneth Bloomfield (Michael Anderson and Robert Mauro interview), Holywood, Co. Down, 20 Apr. 2010. UCDA P171/3. 94 See ‘2. Advisory Council (Council of State)’, unsigned and undated, circa 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. 95 See ‘Conservative Proposals for a Council of State’, D. Chesterton, 23 Feb. 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. 96 Comments by Neave. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 19 Oct. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. In a subsequent speech, Neave said that the introduction of local government reform in Northern Ireland ‘would diminish the power of the Northern Ireland Office and its legion of civil servants’. Copy of speech by Neave to the Surbiton Conservative Association, 1 Feb. 1978. TNA CJ 4/2642. 97 Copy of speech by Neave, to the Northern Area Conservative Council, Hartlepool, 12 Nov. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. 98 See, for example, comments by Miscampbell. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 17 Feb. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 99 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 2 Mar. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 100 Luce, Conservative Party MP for Arundel and Shoreham, 1971–4 and Shoreham, 1974–92. 101 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 2 Mar. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. See also UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 102 See News Letter, 30 Dec. 1976. 103 See Ramsay to Mason, 10 Feb. 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. 104 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 8 Feb. 1977. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 105 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 15 Feb. 1977. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. See also ‘Advisory Council: line to take’, unsigned and undated, circa 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415;

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and ‘2. Advisory Council (Council of State)’, unsigned and undated, circa 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415; and lastly, Miss S. Murnaghan to N. R. Cowling, 10 May 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. 106 See note ‘Mr Neave and the Unionists’, by A. P. Wilson, 1 Dec. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. 107 Donoughue, Prime minister, 131. 108 ‘Ulsterization’ refers to a policy since the 1970s of attempting to disengage nonUlster regiments of the British Army in Northern Ireland and replace them with members of the locally recruited RUC and UDR, with the British Army operating in a supporting role. See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/gibson4.htm. See also McKittrick and McVea, Making sense of the Troubles, 123. 109 Michael Anderson interview with Lord Donoughue, London, 8 July 2010. See UCDA P171/9. 110 See ‘Advisory Council: line to take’, unsigned and undated, circa 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. See also The Times, 5 July 1977. 111 Memorandum marked ‘strictly confidential’, ‘Discussion paper based on suggestions made by [John Brooke 2nd] Viscount Brookeborough’, compiled by the CRD, signed ‘JB/JAO/JH’, 22 Feb. 1977. UC CAC HLSM 2/42/2/59. 112 The Times, 5 July 1977. 113 See memorandum (on House of Commons letterhead) entitled, ‘Outline proposals for an upper-tier of local government or regional council in Northern Ireland’, undated, circa 1977. UC CAC POLL 9/1/9. 114 Memorandum marked ‘strictly confidential’, ‘Discussion paper based on suggestions made by [John Brooke 2nd] Viscount Brookeborough’, compiled by the CRD, signed ‘JB/JAO/JH’, 22 Feb. 1977. UC CAC HLSM 2/42/2/59. 115 See, for example, comments by Neave, 10 Mar. 1977. HC Debate, Vol. 927, cc. 610– 11; and Neave’s interview, Catholic Herald, 18 Mar. 1977. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 588, footnote marked *. 116 Memorandum marked ‘Strictly confidential’, ‘Discussion paper based on suggestions made by Viscount Brookeborough, compiled by the CRD, signed ‘JB/JAO/JH’, 22 Feb. 1977. UC CAC HLSM 2/42/2/59. 117 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 1 Mar. 1977. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 118 See, for example, comments by Gow. Record of meeting between Mason and a delegation of the Conservative Party, 22 Mar. 1978. TNA CJ 4/2642. 119 See, for example, speech by Neave to the Surbiton Conservative Association, 1 Feb. 1978. TNA CJ 4/2642; Neave to Dr L. I. Hardy, 1 Feb. 1978. PA AN/433; and Neave to Major C. J. E. Seymour, 6 Mar. 1978. PA AN/455. 120 See copy of speech by Thatcher to UUC, Craigavad, Holywood, Northern Ireland, 19 June 1978. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 2 of 2. 121 Record of speech by Neave, at a luncheon given by the UUC, Belfast, 7 Apr. 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. See also copy of speech by Neave to Maldon Industrial Council, House of Commons, 25 May 1978. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 2 of 2. In Nov. 1977, Neave reportedly informed Mason that the Conservative Party were ‘re-thinking its policies about devolution to Northern Ireland and that they now favoured starting the devolutionary process at the local government end’, in the form of a Regional Council or Councils. See Miss S. Murnaghan to N. R. Cowling, re: Mason’s attitude to power-sharing, 10 May 1977. TNA CJ 4/2415. 122 See comments by Neave on the reaction of the SDLP leadership because of his support for the Regional Council model. Record of meeting between Mason and Neave, 24 Oct. 1978. TNA CJ 4/2642.

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123 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Conservative Party policy on Northern Ireland as outlined in statements by its leader and spokesmen – July ’77– Sept. ’78’. NAI DFA 2009/120/1942. See also Farren, The SDLP, 136. 124 Cushnahan, Alliance Party leader, 1984–7. 125 See R. A. Neilson, ‘Airey Neave’s speech: 7 April 1978’, 12 Apr. 1978. TNA CJ 4/2642. 126 See, for example, memorandum, ‘Mr Airey Neave’s article in The Guardian, 3 May 1978’, by V. Costello, 11 May 1978. TNA CJ 4/2642. 127 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 7 Nov. 1978. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 128 The Economist, mid-June 1978. 129 Neave to K. F. McCarthy, 13 Dec. 1978. PA AN/442. 130 J. Hennigan to Thatcher, 15 Apr. 1978. PA AN/433. 131 See, for example, K. P. McCarthy to Neave, 24 Oct. 1978. PA AN/442. See also C. Proud to Neave, 6 May 1978. PA AN/449. 132 See, for example, Neave to K. P. McCarthy, 13 Dec. 1978. PA AN/442. See also Neave to J. M. Murphy, 4 July 1978. PA AN/442; and Neave to Mrs M. Robinson, 4 July 1978. PA AN/452. 133 The Times, 21 Feb. 1977. In fact, Thatcher’s second scheduled visit to Northern Ireland had been originally fixed for early Nov. 1976. However, the visit was cancelled because documents dealing with the arrangements were stolen from a car in Londonderry. See The Times, 10 Nov. 1976. Regarding Thatcher’s visit to Northern Ireland in Feb. 1977, Neave reported that ‘he felt that the television pictures had not adequately captured the excitement of hundreds of people in the centre of Belfast who gave Mrs. Thatcher an uproarious welcome. They … had visited North Queen Street RUC Station where there were signs that morale had improved.’ In relation to Thatcher’s visit to Londonderry, Neave noted that her time spent in the city’s Council Chamber was ‘extremely good’. ‘Mrs. Thatcher had been distressed by the evident damage in the city of Londonderry after a drive around the city centre.’ Record of CPPNIC meeting, 22 Feb. 1977. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 134 Copy of speech by Thatcher to UUC, Craigavad, Holywood, Northern Ireland, 19 June 1978. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 2 of 2. 135 See Irish Times, 20 and 21 June 1978. 136 The Economist, mid-June 1978. 137 The Times, 20 June 1978. 138 Record of Neave’s interview on the Tonight television programme, 22 June 1978. TNA CJ 4/2642. 139 Neave to J. Hennigan, 20 Apr. 1978. PA AN/433. 140 See comments by Neave. Copy of memorandum by Neave, ‘Ulster Unionists’, 7 Mar. 1977. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/13. 141 Conservative Party memorandum, ‘Ulster Regional Council(s)’, unsigned and undated, circa 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. Given the tone and content of this memorandum, Neave may very well have been the author. Indeed, in June 1978, Neave sent Thatcher a copy of this memorandum in advance of her meeting with a delegation of UUP leaders, scheduled for 12 June 1978. See Neave to Thatcher, 12 June 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. 142 West to Molyneaux, 21 July 1977. UC CAC POLL 9/1/9. 143 See Henry Patterson’s entry, ‘Harry West’, in The oxford dictionary of national biography. 144 Conservative Party memorandum, ‘Ulster Regional Council(s)’, unsigned and undated, circa 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181.

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145 Conservative Party memorandum, ‘Ulster Regional Council(s)’, unsigned and undated, circa 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. 146 Molyneaux to Thatcher, 4 May 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. See also Thatcher to Molyneaux, 9 May 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. Paul Dixon argues that Neave ‘offered’ the UUP ‘greater local autonomy’, in the form of the establishment of one or more Regional Councils, in return for their support in the vote of no confidence in the Labour Government’. See Dixon, ‘The usual English doublespeak’, 29. 147 Record of meeting between Neave and DUP delegation, 5 Dec. 1978. See Irish Times, 6 Dec. 1978. See also note from Irish Embassy in London to Swift, 13 Oct. 1978. NAI DFA 2009/120/1950. 148 Copy of memorandum by Neave, ‘Ulster Unionists, 7 Mar. 1977. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/13. 149 Conservative Party memorandum, ‘Ulster Regional Council(s)’, unsigned and undated, circa 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. 150 Conservative Party memorandum, ‘Ulster Regional Council(s)’, unsigned and undated, circa 1978. UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/181. 151 Walker, A history of the Ulster Unionist Party, 228–9. Colin Coulter has also labelled this approach as ‘minimalist integration’. See Colin Coulter, ‘Direct rule and the Unionist middle classes’, in Richard English and Graham Walker (eds), Unionism in modern Ireland: new perspectives on politics and culture (London, 1996), 178. 152 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 588, footnote marked *. 153 Prior, A balance of power, 192–4. 154 Powell, UUP MP for South Down, 1974–87. Formerly Conservative Party MP for Wolverhampton, 1950–74. See Paul Corthorn, Enoch Powell: politics and ideas in modern Britain (Oxford, 2019), 147–8. 155 See comments by Powell. Daily Express, late Oct. 1975. Quoted in Heffer, Like the Roman, 764. 156 Prior, A balance of power, 192–4. 157 See ‘Enoch Powell, the original anti-immigrant, anti-Europe, pro-unionist Tory’, Irish Times, 27 Aug. 2019. 158 See ‘Enoch Powell, the original anti-immigrant, anti-Europe, pro-unionist Tory’, Irish Times, 27 Aug. 2019. 159 On a visit to Northern Ireland in July 1977, Howe reported that gossip surrounding the integration debate may have been a ploy by some UUUC members to force the British government to agree to restore devolution based on majority-rule in Northern Ireland. See report by Howe, ‘On visit to Northern Ireland 3rd and 4th July 1977’, undated (it is unclear whether this report was sent directly to Thatcher). UC CAC THCR 2/1/1/31. 160 Whitelaw, The Whitelaw memoirs, 122. 161 Prior, A balance of power, 193. 162 In mid-June 1975, Biggs-Davison, for example, privately noted that ‘Integration and limited devolution are compatible’. See record of first meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 17 June 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. Speaking in the House of Commons, the following year in July, Biggs-Davison noted his preference for Northern Ireland’s greater integration into the UK, which was being facilitated by the British government’s decision to support the increase of Northern Ireland’s representation at Westminster. See comments by Biggs-Davison, 2 July 1976. HC Debate, Vol. 914, cc. 873–4.

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163 In Mar. 1978, during a meeting between Mason and senior Conservative Party figures, Gow noted that, in relation to Northern Ireland, ‘full integration offered the best way forward’. Record of meeting between Mason and a delegation of the Conservative Party, 22 Mar. 1978. TNA CJ 4/2642. See also Prior, A balance of power, 192–4. 164 This was the view of Lord Lexden. See Cooke, ‘Enoch Powell and Ulster’, 266. 165 Mills, Conservative Party MP for West Devon, 1974–83; and parliamentary secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1972–4. In mid-June 1975, Mills, for example, privately said that if the NICC failed ‘serious consideration should be given to integration’. See record of first meeting of the fact-finding subcommittee of the CPPNIC, 17 June 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 166 Brendan O’Leary, ‘The Conservative stewardship of Northern Ireland, 1979– 97’: sound-bottomed contradictions or slow-learning?’, Political Studies, Vol. XVL (1997), 664. 167 Record of 90th meeting of the LCC, 6 Jan. 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/9. 168 Copy of memorandum by Neave, ‘Debate on Northern Ireland: January 12th’, circa Jan. 1976. UO BL CPA LCC 1/3/9. 169 While some commentators maintain that Thatcher was a supporter of Northern Ireland’s integration into the remainder of the UK, such comments fail to appreciate the complexities of the debate. Marc Mulholland, for example, incorrectly argues that Thatcher ‘shared’ Enoch Powell’s desire for Northern Ireland’s integration into the remainder of the UK. See Mulholland, ‘ “Just another country”? The Irish question in the Thatcher years’, 185. 170 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 386. 171 See Keating to R. McDonagh, secretary of the DFA, 3. Oct. 1977. NAI DT 2007/116/776. 172 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385. 173 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 386–7. 174 Copy of speech by Thatcher to UUC gathering, Craigavad, Holywood, Northern Ireland, 19 June 1978. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 2 of 2. 175 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385–6. 176 See copy of document, ‘Briefing: Conservative Manifesto 1979’, issued on behalf of the CRD. UC CAC THCR 1/11/5. 177 See John Shepard, Crisis what crisis?: the Callaghan government and the British ‘winter of discontent’ (Oxford, 2016). 178 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 8. 179 Callaghan replaced Harold Wilson as Labour Party leader and British prime minister in Apr. 1976. 180 Mason to Neave, 15 Jan. 1979. UC CAC THCR 5/1/2/240. See also Neave to Thatcher, 15 Jan. 1979. UC CAC THCR 5/1/2/240. 181 Neave to S. Marshall, 24 Jan. 1979. PA AN/443. 182 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 11. 183 Quoted in Hennessey, Hunger strike, 11. 184 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 12. 185 Located on the site of a former Royal Air Force airfield, the Maze Prison ‘opened as an internment camp in 1971 and at times housed up to 1,700 prisoners, including many of the most notorious paramilitary offenders’. See http://www.britannica.com/ topic/Maze-prison.

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186 Copy of Conservative Party Defence Committee Report re: visit to Northern Ireland, 6–7 Aug. 1974. UC CAC POLL 9/2/1. 187 See, for example, record of meeting between Wilson, Rees, Thatcher and Neave, 10 Sept. 1975. TNA PREM 16/520. 188 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 14. 189 For further reading of the British government policy towards ‘political prisoners’ in Northern Ireland between 1972 and 1979, see Hennessey, Hunger strike, 10–36. 190 Confidential DFA memorandum, ‘Long-Kesh and Armagh prisoners’ protest and hunger strike’. 4 Dec. 1980. NAI DT 2010/19/1617. See also Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 174. 191 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 15. 192 Confidential DFA memorandum, ‘Long-Kesh and Armagh prisoners’ protest and hunger strike’. 4 Dec. 1980. NAI DT 2010/19/1617. 193 Neave to Mrs Betty Heckel, 22 Dec. 1978. PA AN/433. 194 Neave to Mrs Betty Heckel, 22 Dec. 1978. PA AN/433. 195 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 23 Jan. 1979. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 196 Robert Savage, The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’: television, conflict and Northern Ireland (Manchester, 2015), 171. See also Liz Curtis, Ireland, the propaganda war: the media and the ‘battle for hearts and minds’ (Belfast, 1998), 142–3. 197 Savage, The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’, 171. 198 Copy of speech by Neave to the Southampton University Conservative Association, 12 Feb. 1979. TNA CJ 4/2642. 199 Copy of speech by Neave to the Southampton University Conservative Association, 12 Feb. 1979. TNA CJ 4/2642. 200 Record of meeting between O’Kennedy and Neave, 14 Feb. 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/1942. See also NAI DFA 2009/120/1950. 201 See, for example, Neave to Conor Cruise O’Brien, 20 Feb. 1979. PA AN/449; and comments by Neave, 8 Mar. 1979. HC Debate, Vol. 963, cc. 1465–6. 202 Privately, Mason reportedly said that he had ‘no intention of reshaping local government in Northern Ireland. Any introduction of a British-style local government regime in Northern Ireland would be Unionist dominated and a backward step’. He also ruled out the idea of ‘integration’. See record of meeting between O’Kennedy and Mason. 14 Feb. 1979. NAI DT 2009/135/703. The CRD also recorded during this period that Mason ‘showed no great interest’ in this proposal. See memorandum by the CRD, ‘Northern Ireland’, 9 Feb. 1979. UO BL CRD Alistair Cooke Letter Book CRD L/4/12/1. 203 Comments by Neave. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 23 Jan. 1979. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4. 204 Neave to James Corridan, 21 Mar. 1979. PA AN/422. Indeed, addressing a gathering of Conservative Party activists at Leamington Spa, in Feb. 1979, Neave, in the words of the Belfast Telegraph, ‘gave a clear hint that an incoming Conservative Government would set up an independent judicial inquiry into the need for a regional authority’ in Northern Ireland. See Belfast Telegraph, 23 Feb. 1979. 205 In this speech, Neave welcomed the findings of the Bennett Report (Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland). Comments by Neave, 16 Mar. 1979. HC Debate, Vol. 964, cc. 966–7. 206 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 401–2. 207 See Gow to Thatcher, ‘Ulster’, 27 Nov. 1979. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/117911.

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208 According to Kenneth Stowe, during a meeting with Enoch Powell, on 28 Mar. 1979, Neave promised the former that if elected to government the Conservative Party would implement its plans for the establishment of a Regional Council or Councils in Northern Ireland at the expense of devolved government for the region. See Roy Harrington to Michael Alexander, 18 Apr. 1980. TNA PREM 19/280 f78. Available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/120427. 209 Molyneaux to Thatcher, 31 Dec. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher. org/document/120399. 210 Gow to Thatcher, ‘Ulster’, 27 Nov. 1979. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/117911. 211 News of the fall of the Labour government caused a flurry within Conservative Party circles, with the party’s general election manifesto receiving several further redrafts during late Mar. and early Apr. 1979. At this time, Thatcher also became personally involved, slashing sections that she felt were too vague or feeble. See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 388–403. See also UC CAC THCR 2/6/1/163. 212 See copy of Conservative Party general election manifesto, second draft 30 Aug. 1978. Available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110273. 213 Cunningham, ‘Conservative dissidents and the Irish question’, 31. 214 Neave also proposed an additional amendment to the manifesto: ‘We recognise that Northern Ireland’s industry will require continued Government support for some time to come.’ Neave to Christopher Patten, 29 Mar. 1979. PA AN/450. 215 The Guardian, 31 Mar. 1979. 216 Routledge, Public life, secret agent, 7. 217 See Lord Lexden, ‘35 years ago today, Airey Neave was murdered and the course of British politics changed’. 218 Roy Mason, Paying the price (London, 1999), 226. 219 The information in this paragraph is sourced from Routledge, Public life, secret agent, 7–8. See also Bishop, The man who was Saturday, 246–61. 220 Quoted in Routledge, Public life, secret agent, 316. 221 Quoted in Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, 229–30. 222 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the path to power, 434. 223 Quoted in Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, 229–30. 224 Copy of handwritten statement by Thatcher, 30 Mar. 1979. Available from www. margaretthatcher.org/document/10390. 225 Copy of remarks by Thatcher on the murder of Neave, 30 Mar. 1979. Available from www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103837. 226 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 407–8. 227 Irish Times, 31 Mar. 1979. 228 Mason to Mrs Neave, 31 Mar. 1974. TNA CJ 4/2642. 229 Mason, Paying the price, 14. 230 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 114. 231 See Bruce Anderson, ‘How dare Channel 4 defame Airey Neave’s memory’, 13 July 2014. Available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/10965037/ How-dare-Channel-4-defame-Airey-Neaves-memory.html. 232 Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the sun: the battle for Britain, 1974–1979 (London, 2012), 784. 233 Dáithí O’Ceallaigh to DFA headquarters, 4 Apr. 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/1950. 234 Irish Times, 31 Mar. 1979.

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Irish Times, 31 Mar. 1979. Kennedy, US senator for Massachusetts, 1962–2009. See TNA CJ 4/3/34. O’Neill, speaker of the US House of Representatives, 1977–87. See TNA CJ 4/3/34. See comments by INLA spokesperson in Paris Match, 22 June 1979. TNA FCO 87/907. 241 Mason, Paying the price, 226. 242 Richard English, Does terrorism work? A history (Oxford, 2016), 244. 243 See comments by INLA spokesperson in Paris Match, 22 June 1979. TNA FCO 87/907. 244 Quoted in Routledge, Public life, secret agent, 314–15. 245 Extract from Magill magazine, ‘Why we killed Airey Neave – the INLA’, 19 Apr. 1979. TNA CJ 4/3134. See also NAI DT 2009/135/687 and Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 407. 246 Holland and McDonald, INLA, 138. 247 See HO memorandum, ‘Police investigation into the murder of Airey Neave MP’, 5 Apr. 1979. TNA FCO 87/907. 248 See comments by INLA spokesperson in Paris Match, 22 June 1979. TNA FCO 87/907. 249 Holland and McDonald, INLA, 139. 250 Allegedly, on learning of Neave’s death, Powell callously informed an assembled television crew: ‘I am sure that Airey Neave would have wished nothing better than to share the same end as so many of his innocent fellow citizens for whom the House of Commons is responsible’. Quoted in Heffer, Like the Roman, 818. 251 Lord Mountbatten was murdered by the PIRA in Aug. 1979. 252 See Robert Shepherd, Enoch Powell: a biography (London, 1997), 497–80. For further information in relation to the CIA’s alleged involvement in the deaths of Airey Neave and Lord Mountbatten, respectively, see UC CAC POLL 3/2/1/89. 253 See file related to Neave’s murder by the INLA. TNA FCO 87/907. 254 See Anderson, ‘How dare Channel 4 defame Airey Neave’s memory’. 255 Routledge, Public life, secret agent, 318. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 587; and Campbell, Gerry Fitt and the SDLP, 215. 256 See CRD memorandum, ‘Manifesto Briefing, Northern Ireland’, 2 Apr. 1979. UO BL CRD Alistair Cooke Letter Book CRD L/4/12/1. See also UC CAC THCR 1/11/5. 257 See CRD memorandum, ‘Manifesto Briefing, Northern Ireland’, 2 Apr. 1979. 258 Thatcher to Callaghan, 10 Apr. 1979. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/118, part one. 259 See copy of the Labour Party’s 1979 general election manifesto, subsection ‘Northern Ireland’. A copy is available from http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/ lab79.htm. See also note by R. Jones, ‘Briefing note for Secretary of State’s meeting with Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs (political developments)’, 17 Jan. 1979. PRONI NIO 12/138. 260 On the same day as the publication of the Conservative Party’s general election manifesto, there was speculation in the media that Thatcher might ask Ted Health to ‘take over’ the Northern Ireland ‘hot seat’. The media hype, however, proved to be unfounded. Irish Independent, 11 Apr. 1979. 261 Arthur, Special relationships, 169. 262 Quoted in the Financial Times, 12 Apr. 1979. A copy of the 1979 Conservative Party general election manifesto is available from NAI DFA 2009/120/1950. 235 236 237 238 239 240

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263 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 415–16. 264 These words were subsequently attributed to a nineteenth-century follower of St Francis of Assisi. See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 419–20. 265 Copy of remarks by Thatcher on her appointment as British prime minister, 4 May 1979. Available from www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104078. 266 Comments by Neave, 12 Mar. 1975. HC Debate, Vol. 888, cc. 529–30. 267 See Hennessey, Hunger strike, 10–36. 268 Copy of speech by Neave to the Northern Area Conservative Council, Hartlepool, 12 Nov. 1977. TNA CJ 4/1876. 269 Comments by Neave. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 19 Oct. 1976. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/2/4.

3  Thatcher and the evolution of the British government’s Northern Ireland policy, 1979 1 See, for example, Paul Keating to R. McDonagh, 3 Oct. 1977. NAI DT 2007/116/776. 2 Comments by Maurice Hays. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 3 Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume two, 338. 4 This was the opinion of Baron Francis Pym. See record of meeting between Peter Barry, Francis Pym and Jim Prior, 24 Jan. 1983. NAI DFA 2013/100/1049. 5 Comments by Douglas Hurd. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 6 Quoted in Goodlad, Thatcher, 155. 7 Quoted in Mulholland, ‘ “Just another country”? The Irish question in the Thatcher years’, 190. 8 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 587. 9 Hurd, Memoirs, 335 10 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 299–300. 11 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 587 and 591. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 298, footnote marked *. Other writers have developed a similar, albeit misinformed, opinion. Sarah Campbell wrote that Thatcher ‘did not have a policy towards Northern Ireland. It died with … Airey Neave.’ Campbell, Gerry Fitt and the SDLP, 215. See also Cannadine, Margaret Thatcher, 33; Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume two, 418–19; and Green, Thatcher, 149–50. 12 Prior, A balance of power, 196. 13 See, for example, M. J. Newington to Ferguson, 4 Sept. 1979. TNA FCO 87/865. See also comments by Clive Abbott of the NIO. Quoted in Heffer, Like the Roman, 864–6. 14 Cannadine, Margaret Thatcher, 28–9 and 34. 15 Shortly after entering government in the summer of 1979, James Glover, the British Army Brigadier of the General Staff (intelligence), informed Thatcher that the PIRA could not be defeated militarily. See Anne Cadwallader, Lethal allies: British collusion in Ireland (Dublin, 2013), 361–2.

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16 Comments by Douglas Hurd. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 17 Goodlad, Thatcher, 155. 18 Goodlad, Thatcher, 155. 19 See comments by Thatcher. Record of ‘Plenary meeting between Irish and British Delegation, 10 Downing Street’, 5 Sept. 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/2124. 20 See, for example, comments by Thatcher. Record of meeting of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, 3 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/116687. 21 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 384–5. 22 Hailsham, Conservative Party MP for Oxford, 1938–50 and St Marylebone, 1963–70. Member of the House of Lords (Lord Temporal), 1970–2001. 23 Record of conversation between Eamon Kennedy and Lord Hailsham. See Eamon Kennedy to David Neligan, 20 Dec. 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/1942. 24 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London, 2016), 634. 25 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 455–6. 26 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 455–6. 27 Goodlad, Thatcher, 60. 28 Goodlad, Thatcher, 60. 29 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 427. 30 Goodlad, Thatcher, 60. 31 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 427. 32 Brian Harrison, ‘Sir Keith Joseph’, in The Oxford dictionary of national biography. 33 Atkins, Conservative Party MP for Merton and Morden, 1955–70 and Spelthorne, 1970–87. 34 Andrew Roth, ‘Humphrey Atkins’, in The Oxford dictionary of national biography. 35 Cannadine, Margaret Thatcher, 29. 36 Carrington, Reflection on things past, 249. 37 Lee, Carrington, 277. 38 Walker, Conservative Party MP for Worcester, 1961–92. 39 Lord Soames, Conservative Party MP for Bedford, 1950–66. Member of the House of Lords (Lord Temporal) 1978–87. 40 See Hunt to Thatcher, 4 May 1979. TNA PREM 19/80. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 589. 41 For further analysis of US policy under US president Jimmy Carter vis-à-vis Ireland during this period see Chapter 8. See also Stephen Kelly, ‘“The Anglo-Irish Agreement put us on side with the Americans”: Margaret Thatcher, Anglo-American relations and the path to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1979–1985’. Contemporary British History Vol. 34, No. 3, 433–57; and Luke Devoy, ‘The British response to American interest in Northern Ireland, 1976–79’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 25 (2014), 221–38. 42 This paragraph is sourced from Hennessey, Hunger strike, 38–9. See also Hunt to Thatcher, 2 May 1979. A copy of this memorandum is available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/117853. 43 Quoted in Heffer, Like the Roman, 864–6. Enoch Powell revealed the contents of this cited letter from Abbott to Geoffrey Sloan (an academic researcher) during a debate in the House of Commons in 1981. See also Cooke, ‘Enoch Powell and Ulster’, 269–70 and Corthorn, Enoch Powell: politics and ideas in modern Britain, 150–1.

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44 Note by D. N. Lane, ‘Advice for a new secretary of state [of Northern Ireland] on political/constitutional matters: Inquiry’, 6 Apr. 1979. TNA CJ 4/7215. Airey Neave had originally proposed the idea of an ‘Inquiry Body’ in an interview with The Guardian. See The Guardian, 27 Mar. 1979. 45 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 589. 46 The brief continued, ‘Local Government and integration are a trap, do not lead anywhere and do not make acceptability easier to achieve.’ See briefing document, ‘Outline of main political brief for a new secretary of state [for Northern Ireland]’, 9 May 1979. TNA CJ 4/7215. 47 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 589. 48 Cannadine, Margaret Thatcher, 29–30. 49 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 420. 50 Cannadine, Margaret Thatcher, 34. 51 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 422–3. 52 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 589. 53 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 422. 54 Sir Bryan (George) Cartledge KCMG interviewed by Jimmy Jamieson, 14 Nov. 2007. Available from British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, University of Cambridge, Churchill College. Available at https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/ Cartledge.pdf. 55 See Robin Haydon to M. J. Newington (undated), circa late Apr./early May 1979. TNA CJ 4/2568. 56 See British character profile of Jack Lynch, undated and unsigned, circa 1979. TNA CJ 4/2568. 57 Haydon was appointed British ambassador to Ireland following the assassination of his predecessor, Christopher Ewart Biggs, by the PIRA in July 1976. 58 Haydon to FCO, 18 Jan. 1980. TNA FCO 87/995. 59 FCO steering brief, ‘line to take’ (undated). TNA CJ 4/2568. 60 Paul Lever to Bryan Cartledge, No. 10 Downing Street, 8 May 1979. TNA CJ 4/2568. 61 J. P. Pilling to Bryan Cartledge, No. 10 Downing Street, 9 May 1979. TNA CJ 4/2568. 62 See comments by David Hill. Hill to Buxton, 2 May 1979. TNA CJ 4/2568. 63 Untitled and unsigned, DFA memorandum, 24 Nov. 1978. NAI DFA 2009/120/1950. 64 Memorandum, ‘Courtesy call on British Prime Minister, 10 May 1979, summary notes’ (unsigned), 9 May 1979. NAI DT 2009/135/703. 65 British record of Lynch-Thatcher meeting, 10 May 1979. TNA CJ 4/2568. 66 British record of Lynch-Thatcher meeting, 10 May 1979. TNA CJ 4/2568. 67 Irish record of Lynch-Thatcher meeting, 10 May 1979. NAI DT 2009/135/703. 68 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Cardinal Hume, 25 May 1979. See https:// www.margaretthatcher.org/document/117854. 69 Copy of public statement issued by Atkins, 8 May 1979. NAI DT 2009/135/703. Six days later, 27 June, he travelled to Dublin, where he held a meeting with Michael O’Kennedy. They discussed a wide range of issues, including Northern Ireland and cross-border security cooperation. Those present ‘reaffirmed their commitment to co-operative action by the Irish and British security forces against terrorism and pledged the support of their Governments to measures which would lead to a restoration of peace and political stability’. Copy of joint communiqué issued on behalf and Atkins and O’Kennedy, 27 June 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/1921. 70 Andrew Roth’s entry, ‘Humphrey Atkins’, in The Oxford dictionary of national biography. See also The Guardian, 8 Oct. 1996.

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71 Thatcher set up this committee shortly after her appointment as British prime minister ‘to keep under review the Government’s defence and oversea policy’. See Kenneth Stowe to Thatcher, 8 May 1979. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/27. 72 Copy of memorandum by Atkins, ‘Northern Ireland: the overall situation’, 5 July 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/116702. See also https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/116703. 73 English, Does terrorism work?, 105. 74 See Hennessey, Hunger strike, 45. 75 On 24 Dec., Thatcher travelled to Belfast, where she met a delegation of prison governors and prison officers at Stormont Castle. See record of conversation (MT-Atkins-Prison Governors and Officers), 24 Dec. 1979. Available from https:// www.margaretthatcher.org/document/120397. 76 Taylor, Brits: the war against the IRA, 224. 77 Deric Henderson, ‘Taking a flight with Margaret Thatcher’, in Deric Henderson and Ivan Little (eds), Reporting the Troubles: journalist tell their stories of the Northern Ireland conflict (Belfast, 2018), 81. 78 Henderson, ‘Taking a flight with Margaret Thatcher’, 81. 79 The UDR was the only regiment of the British Army permanently serving in Northern Ireland. See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 482–3. 80 Cosgrave, Thatcher, 189–90. 81 Guy Nissen to Mr Gaffin, 8 May 1980. UC CAC THCR 1/10/14. 82 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 591. 83 Quoted in Dermot Keogh, Jack Lynch: a biography (Dublin, 2008), 419–20. 84 FCO steering brief in advance of Thatcher-Lynch meeting, 3 Sept. 1979. TNA FCO 87/866. 85 Haydon to FCO, 30 Aug. 1979. TNA CJ 4/2596. 86 Kennedy to Neligan, 21 Apr. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/928/1. 87 For further analysis of Thatcher’s views on Northern Ireland security during this period, see Patterson, Ireland’s violent frontier, 140–60. 88 Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 118. 89 See Holland and McDonald, INLA, 132. 90 Haydon to FCO, 30 Aug. 1979. TNA CJ 4/2596. 91 Haydon to FCO, 29 Aug. 1979. TNA CJ 4/2596. 92 See comments by Lord Carrington, 30 Aug. 1979. TNA FCO 87/865. 93 Record of British cabinet meeting, 30 Aug. 1979. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/113712. 94 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 591. The post of security coordinator in Northern Ireland was originally offered to Sir John Killick. However, after reflection, he turned down the post. See ‘Whitmore note for the record (appointment of Security Co-ordinator)’, 9 Oct. 1979. Available from https:// www.margaretthatcher.org/document/137442. 95 Quoted in Arthur, Special relationships, 170. See also Taylor, Brits: the war against the IRA, 222–6. 96 Arthur, Special relationships, 170. 97 Bloom, Thatcher’s secret war, 241. 98 Arthur, Special relationships, 170. 99 Bloom, Thatcher’s secret war, 241. See also Oldfield to Thatcher, 16 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/117891.

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100 See Nigel Clive’s entry, ‘Sir Maurice Oldfield’, in The Oxford dictionary of national biography. 101 Record of British cabinet meeting, 30 Aug. 1979. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/113712. 102 In fact, on 24 Aug., three days before the murder of Lord Mountbatten and eighteen British soldiers, the British government received word that Lynch wished to convene an Anglo-Irish summit meeting in Dublin, before the scheduled meeting of the European Council in Dublin at the end of Nov. 1979. According to Eamonn Kennedy, as president of the European Council, Lynch was eager to discuss with Thatcher ‘the main EEC issues’, and ‘clearly envisaged that an indispensable topic would be Northern Ireland’. See ‘Possible meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach, signed “Stephen” ’, 24 Aug. 1979. TNA FCO 87/865. 103 See FCO steering brief in advance of Lynch-Thatcher meeting, 3 Sept. 1979. TNA FCO 87/866. See also NIO steering brief in advance of Lynch-Thatcher meeting, 3 Sept. 1979. TNA FCO 87/866. 104 Interview with Walter Kirwan, 4 Jan. 2018. 105 See TNA FCO 87/866. 106 The remainder of the Irish delegation were Eamon Kennedy, Andrew O’Rourke, Dermot Nally, Walter Kirwan and Frank Dunlop. 107 In addition, present on the British side were Clive Whitmore, Thatcher’s principal private secretary and Michael Alexander, Thatcher’s private secretary for overseas affairs. 108 See TNA FCO 87/865. 109 At this one to one meeting, Whitmore took notes on the British side and Nally on the Irish side. 110 Record of Lynch-Thatcher tête-à-tête, 5 Sept. 1979. TNA FCO 87/865. 111 Record of Lynch-Thatcher tête-à-tête, 5 Sept. 1979. TNA FCO 87/865. 112 Record of ‘Plenary meeting between Irish and British delegation, 10 Downing Street’, 5 Sept. 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/2124. 113 Interview with Walter Kirwan, 4 Jan. 2018. 114 Record of ‘Plenary meeting between Irish and British delegation, 10 Downing Street’, 5 Sept. 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/2124. 115 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 592. See also comments by Dermot Nally. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 116 See A. E. Huckle to FCO, 14 Sept. 1979. TNA FCO 87/865. 117 Record of discussion between L. B. Smith and Dunlop, 10 Sept. 1979. TNA CJ 4/2596. Indeed, in Irish circles, Thatcher’s position during this encounter was described as being ‘very dominant’. Comments by Walter Kirwan. See Kirwan to Neligan, 21 Sept. 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/2124. 118 Interview with Walter Kirwan, 4 Jan. 2018. 119 Other recommendations on behalf of the British government included the improvement of ‘anti-terrorist capability of the Garda in the border area’ and ‘the appointment of a Garda liaison officer in RUC headquarters and an RUC liaison officer at Garda headquarters’. See NAI DFA 2009/135/704. 120 See Kirwan to Neligan, 21 Sept. 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/2124. See also DFA memorandum, ‘British proposals for changes in security arrangements’, unsigned, 10 Sept. 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/2124.

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121 Record of meeting of the ‘Cabinet sub-committee on national security’, 35 Sept. 1979. NAI DFA 2009/120/2124. 122 Lynch speech at the National Press Club, Washington, D. C. NAI Jack Lynch Papers 1195/7/8. See also Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 102. 123 See Irish Times, 28 Apr. 1998. 124 Interview with Walter Kirwan, 4 Jan. 2018. 125 Quoted in Keogh, Jack Lynch, 429. 126 See Irish Times, 28 Apr. 1998. 127 Dick Walsh, Inside Fianna Fáil (Dublin, 1986), 139. 128 Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 105. 129 Ahern, Fianna Fáil leader, 1994–2008 and taoiseach, 1997–2008. 130 Bertie Ahern (with Richard Aldous), Bertie Ahern: the autobiography (London, 2009), 48. 131 Haydon to FCO, 7 Dec. 1979. TNA CJ 4/2941. 132 See Haydon to FCO, 9 June 1980. TNA FCO 87/995. See also Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 106. 133 See, for example, comments by Thatcher. Record of meeting of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, 3 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/116687. 134 J. P. Pilling to Bryan Cartledge, No. 10 Downing Street, 9 May 1979. TNA CJ 4/2568. 135 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385–6. 136 Quoted in the Financial Times, 12 Apr. 1979. A copy of the 1979 Conservative Party general election manifesto is available from NAI DFA 2009/120/1950. 137 See, for example, M. J. Newington to Ferguson, 4 Sept. 1979. TNA FCO 87/865. 138 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 385–6. 139 See Lord Lexden, ‘35 years ago today, Airey Neave was murdered and the course of British politics changed’. 140 David Hume, The Ulster Unionist Party, 1972–92 (Lurgan, 1996), 65. 141 O’Leary, ‘The Conservative stewardship of Northern Ireland, 1979–97: soundbottomed contradictions or slow-learning?’, 664–5. See also Walker, A history of the Ulster Unionist Party, 229. 142 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 143 Copy of memorandum by Atkins, ‘Prospects for political progress in Northern Ireland’, 28 Sept. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/116716. 144 Hunt to Thatcher, 16 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/117885. 145 Hunt to Thatcher, 2 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/117876. 146 Hunt to Thatcher, 16 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/117885. 147 Thatcher reiterated this assessment several days later at the annual Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool. The people of Northern Ireland, she implored on 12 Oct., were entitled to the ‘local control over their own affairs’. However, in the words of the Irish Times, ‘she did not go into detail of what powers would be restored … or give any hint of an impending political move to restore the promised local control’. Irish Times, 13 Oct. 1979. 148 Record of meeting of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, 3 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/116687.

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149 Andrew Roth’s, ‘Humphrey Atkins’, in The Oxford dictionary of national biography. 150 Hunt to Thatcher, 16 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/117885. 151 These five ‘model systems of government’ were as follows: (1) a unicameral system of government with legislative and executive powers; (2) a bicameral system of government with legislative powers; (3) a system of government with legislative and executive powers operating on an executive committee basis; (4) a system of government with executive but no legislative powers operating on a committee basis; and lastly (5) a system of government with executive but no legislative powers based on the ‘cabinet’ system, but with advisory committee. See Record of meeting of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, 17 Oct. 1979. Available from https:// www.margaretthatcher.org/document/116689. See also copy of memorandum by Whitelaw, ‘Proposals for the Government of Northern Ireland: a working paper for a Conference’, 2 Nov. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/116727 152 See Atkins’s memorandum ‘circulated to OD Committee – OD (79) 32 (Political Progress in Northern Ireland)’, 12 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/116722. 153 Record of meeting of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, 17 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/116689. 154 Atkins to Thatcher, 22 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/117887. 155 Record of meeting of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, 17 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/116689. 156 Record of meeting of the cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee, 17 Oct. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/116689. 157 Copy of memorandum by Whitelaw, ‘Proposals for the Government of Northern Ireland: a working paper for a conference’, 2 Nov. 1979. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/116727. See also Armstrong to Thatcher, 2 Nov. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/117894. 158 Armstrong to Thatcher, 2 Nov. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher. org/document/117894. 159 Following some minor amendments, Thatcher noted that Whitelaw’s memorandum should be published (but not before 16 Nov., as Jack Lynch was due to visit the United States on 15th of that month). Record of cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee meeting, 5 Nov. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher. org/document/116691. See also Alexander to Hopkins, 9 Nov. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/117899. 160 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Molyneaux, 14 Nov. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/117902. 161 Cooke, ‘Enoch Powell and Ulster’, 268. 162 Cooke, ‘Enoch Powell and Ulster’, 268. 163 Copy of speech by Powell to the Garvaghy Branch of the South Down Unionist Association, 23 Nov. 1979. TNA PREM 19/83F47. Available from http://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/117905. See also copy of speech by Powell to the annual Institution Supper of the Dundonald Orange Lodge, Co. Down, 3 Jan. 1980. TNA PREM 19/279 F123. Available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/120400. 164 HC Debate, 29 Nov. 1979. Vol. 974, cc. 1502–3.

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165 Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 119. 166 Cunningham, British government policy in Northern Ireland, 1969–2000, 44. 167 HC Debate, 29 Nov. 1979. Vol. 974, cc. 1502–3. 168 HC Debate, 29 Nov. 1979. Vol. 974, cc. 1588–9. See also Molyneaux to Thatcher, 31 Dec. 1979. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/120399. 169 HC Debate, 29 Nov. 1979. Vol. 974, cc. 1556–7. 170 Proctor, Conservative Party MP for Basildon, Essex, 1979–83. 171 Irish Times, 11 Nov. 1979. 172 HC Debate, 29 Nov. 1979. Vol. 974, cc. 1520–1. 173 Stanbrook, Conservative Party MP for Bromley Orpington, 1970–92. 174 HC Debate, 29 Nov. 1979. Vol. 974, cc. 1556–7. 175 Alison, Conservative Party MP for Barkston Ash, 1964–83. 176 HC Debate, 29 Nov. 1979. Vol. 974, cc. 1609–10. 177 Fitt resigned as leader of the SDLP in Nov. 1979, and John Hume was unanimously chosen as his successor. 178 HC Debate, 29 Nov. 1979. Vol. 974, cc. 1547–8. 179 Farren, The SDLP, 151–2. 180 Farren, The SDLP, 153. 181 Mallon, SDLP deputy leader, 1979–2001 and deputy first minister of Northern Ireland, 1998–2001. 182 See Seamus Mallon (with Andy Pollack), A shared home place (Dublin, 2019), 51.

4  The Atkins’s talks and the Haughey-Thatcher relationship, 1980 1 Atkins to the Rev. Paisley, 15 Jan. 1980. PRONI FIN/30/R/1/12. 2 The UUP was also known as the Official Unionist Party (OUP) during this period. 3 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 593. Although the UUP declined to attend, ‘places had been left vacant for them’ in the hope ‘that they might change their mind’, to quote Atkins. See ‘Conference on the Government of Northern Ireland 1980: First Session’, 7 Jan. 1980. PRONI CENT 1/9/20. Available from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/proni/1980/proni_CENT-1-9-20_1980-01-07.pdf. 4 See R. A. Harrington to Michael Alexander, 18 Apr. 1980. TNA PREM 19/280 f78. Available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/120427. 5 For further analysis of Powell’s views regarding Northern Ireland’s potential integration into the remainder of the UK, see Paul Corthorn, ‘Enoch Powell, Ulster Unionism, and the British Nation’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct. 2012), 967–7. 6 Copy of speech by Powell to the annual general meeting of the South Down Unionist Association, Co. Down, 25 Jan. 1980. TNA PREM 19/279 F70. Available from http:// www.margaretthatcher.org/document/120411. See also Heffer, Like the Roman, 832. 7 Cooke to Johnson, circa Apr./May 1980. UO BL CRD L/4/12/3. 8 See Stowe to Armstrong, 25 Mar. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1006. See also Roy Harrington to Michael Alexander, 24 Jan. 1980. TNA PREM 19/279. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/120410. 9 Farren, The SDLP, 155. 10 Record a British cabinet meeting, 27 Mar. 1980. TNA CAB 128/67. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/113776. See also Whitelaw to Thatcher,

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re: ‘Northern Ireland Conference’, 31 Mar. 1980. TNA PREM 19/280. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/120422. 11 Confidential DFA briefing paper, ‘Current political situation: Northern Ireland Conference’, Apr. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/853. See also TNA FCO 87/1009. 12 In their published policy statement, the UUP also ‘argued the case for majority rule unconstrained by any institutional arrangements designed specifically to protect the interests of the minority’. Confidential brief on Northern Ireland by Alistair Cooke, undated, circa Mar. 1980. UO BL CRD ‘Director’s Files, Political Section 2.48, Northern Ireland, 1979–81’, CRD 4/15/2/5. 13 Whitelaw to Thatcher, re: ‘Northern Ireland Conference’, 31 Mar. 1980. TNA PREM 19/280. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/120422. 14 Haughey’s father Seán had joined the IRA after 1916 and was involved in the War of Independence (1919–21) in Ulster. Haughey’s mother Sarah was also involved in the War of Independence, and her family remained close to the IRA thereafter; her brother Pat McWilliams was interned during the Second World War in Northern Ireland. 15 Justin O’Brien, The Arms Trial (Dublin, 2000), 100. 16 Quoted in Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 75. 17 Stephen Kelly, ‘Fresh evidence from the archives: the genesis of Charles J. Haughey’s attitude to Northern Ireland’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 23 (2012), 155–70. 18 Stephen Kelly, Fianna Fáil, partition, and Northern Ireland, 1926–1971 (Dublin, 2013), 314–21. 19 Kelly, Fianna Fáil, partition, and Northern Ireland, 1926–1971, 356. 20 See, for example, Haughey’s comments at the 1980 Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis, 16 Feb. 1980. UCDA P176/78. 21 Confidential memorandum on Haughey’s forthcoming meeting with Thatcher, May 1980. TNA CJ 4/2934. 22 Haydon to Newington, 2 May 1980. TNA FCO 87/1006. 23 Haydon to Newington, 2 May 1980. TNA FCO 87/1006. 24 See ‘Current Political Situation: Northern Ireland Conference’, Apr. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/853. See also TNA FCO 87/1009. 25 Record of meeting between Newington and Swift, 12 May 1980. TNA FCO 87/1006. 26 Record of meeting between Newington and Swift, 12 May 1980. TNA FCO 87/1006. 27 Briefing notes re: the British government’s stance on Northern Ireland, undated, circa May 1980. TNA FCO 87/1007. 28 Briefing notes re: the British government’s stance on Northern Ireland, undated, circa May 1980. TNA FCO 87/1007. 29 Interview with Walter Kirwan, 4 Jan. 2018. 30 Briefing notes re: the British government’s stance on Northern Ireland, undated, circa May 1980. TNA FCO 87/1007. 31 Briefing notes re: the British government’s stance on Northern Ireland, undated, circa May 1980. TNA FCO 87/1007. 32 See Swift to Neligan, 10 Apr. NAI DFA 2010/20/6. 33 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 593. 34 DFA paper, ‘Northern Ireland policy discussion with Mr. Humphrey Atkins’, 11 Apr. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/853. 35 See comments by Haughey. Irish Times, 10 June 1980. 36 Haydon to E. A. J. Fergusson, 22 Mar. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1006.

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37 Copy of confidential note by David Neligan to Eamon Kennedy, 20 May 1980. NAI DT 2012/59/1599. 38 In addition, present on the Irish side were Pádraig Ó hAnnracháin, Andrew (Andy) O’Rourke, Dermot Nally, Noel Dorr, David Neligan, Walter Kirwan and Frank Dunlop. 39 In a rare undertaking, Thatcher and Haughey were alone together during the conversation. Normally a senior civil servant would be present on either side to take notes. On this occasion, Thatcher did not request the presence of a note-taker, nor was Haughey’s usual note-taker, secretary to the Irish government Dermot Nally, present. The contents of this subsection were first published in Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 144–51. 40 See note by P. K. C. Thomas, ‘A present for Mr Haughey’, 14 July 1980. TNA FCO 87/1007. 41 Haughey to Frank Dunlop. See James Dunlop, Yes, taoiseach: Irish politics from behind (Dublin, 2004), 209. 42 See Thatcher to Kurt Ticher, circa June 1983. UC CAC THCR 5/1/5/210. The gift was worth more than the limit allowed for official presents. Therefore, Thatcher had to leave it behind when she stepped down as British prime minister in 1990. 43 Record of summit meeting between Thatcher and Haughey, London, 21 May 1980. NAI DT 2012/59/1599. 44 See Bruce Arnold (ed.), Haughey, his life and unlucky deeds (London, 1993), 168–9. 45 See, for example, record of conversation between Moriarty and Swift, 9 June 1980. TNA FCO 87/1034. 46 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 388. 47 For further reading on the parallels between developments in Zimbabwe and those in Northern Ireland, see Green, Thatcher, 149–51. 48 For Lord Carrington’s reflections vis-à-vis Rhodesia, see Carrington, Reflections on things past, 287–307. 49 See James Downey, Them and us (Dublin, 1993), 186. 50 Copy of Anglo-Irish joint communiqué, 21 May 1980. NAI DT 2012/59/1599. 51 Record of meeting between Haughey and Haydon, 23 May 1980. TNA FCO 87/999. 52 Record of telephone conversation between Thatcher and Haughey, 22 May 1980. UC CAC THCR 3/1/8 (ii). 53 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 54 Comments by Lord Powell of Bayswater. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 55 For further analysis in relation to Haughey and the ‘principle of consent’, see Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 151–4. 56 Transcript of interview with Haughey and Kevin Healy of RTÉ’s ‘News at One-Thirty’, 22 May 1980. NAI DFA 2010/53/928. See also The Guardian, 21 May 1980. 57 Irish Times, 22 May 1980. 58 Irish Times, 22 May 1980. 59 Kilfedder, UUP MP for Down North, 1970–95. 60 Comments by Kilfedder, 22 Mar. 1980. HC Debate, Vol. 985, cc. 689–902. 61 Interestingly, in his memoir, Whitelaw refrained from mentioning his involvement with Northern Ireland after his period as secretary of state for Northern Ireland, 1972–3. See Whitelaw, The Whitelaw memoirs, 77–122. 62 Copy of memorandum by Whitelaw, ‘The Government of Northern Ireland: proposals for further discussions’, 5 June 1980. TNA CAB 148/191. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/116785.

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63 Record of meeting of the cabinet defence and oversea policy committee, 10 June 1980. TNA CAB 148/189. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/116770. 64 See confidential brief for the debate on the Government’s Command Paper, ‘The government of Northern Ireland: proposals for further discussion’, ‘(Cmmd. 7950)’, undated, circa June 1980. UO BL CRD 4/15/2/5 ‘Director’s Files, Political Section 2.48, Northern Ireland, 1979–81’. 65 Copy of memorandum by Whitelaw, ‘The Government of Northern Ireland: proposals for further discussions’, 5 June 1980.TNA CAB 148/191. Available from https://www. margaretthatcher.org/document/116785. 66 Record of meetings of the cabinet defence and oversea policy committee, 10 June 1980. TNA CAB 148/189. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/116770. 67 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 387. 68 See record of British cabinet meetings, 10 Jan., 24 Jan., 31 Jan., 7 Feb., 21 Feb., 6 Mar., 20 Mar., 27 Mar., 26 June, 23 Oct., 6 Nov., 13 Nov., 4 Dec., and 18 Dec. 1980. TNA CAB 128/67–8. 69 See The government of Northern Ireland: proposals for future discussion, part one, Introduction (July, 1980). Available from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cmd7950.htm. 70 The government of Northern Ireland: proposals for future discussion, part one, Introduction. 71 The government of Northern Ireland: proposals for future discussion, part four, Conclusion. 72 See, for example, record of conversation between Moriarty and Swift, 9 June 1980. TNA FCO 87/1034. 73 See, for example, record of meeting between Nally and Haydon, 12 May 1980. NAI DT 2012/59/1599. 74 Newington to Figg, 7 Aug. 1980. TNA FCO 87/997. 75 Copy of FCO memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish Relations’, 11 Aug. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2943. 76 Record of meeting between Haughey and Figg, 19 Aug. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/854. 77 Record of meeting between Haughey and Figg, 19 Aug. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/854. 78 On 23 July 1980, a high-level meeting was held between British and Irish diplomats at the British Embassy Residence, Glencairn House, Sandyford, Co. Dublin. At this meeting a general discussion on Anglo-Irish relations, including Northern Ireland, was discussed. See Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 155–6. 79 Interview with Walter Kirwan, 4 Jan. 2018. 80 Report of the official level meeting between British and Irish senior civil servants, London, 11 Sept. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/928/2. 81 British record of UK and Irish officials meeting, 11 Sept. 1980. TNA FCO 87/997. 82 See ‘Leading personalities in the Republic of Ireland 1980’. TNA FCO 87/992. 83 Report of the official level meeting between British and Irish senior civil servants, London, 11 Sept. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/928/2. 84 See record of meeting between Haughey and Figg, 5 Nov. 1980. NAI DT 2010/19/1728. 85 Report of the official level meeting between British and Irish senior civil servants, London, 11 Sept. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/928/2. 86 British record of UK and Irish officials meeting, 11 Sept. 1980. TNA FCO 87/997. 87 Report of the official level meeting between British and Irish senior civil servants, London, 11 Sept. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/928/2.

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88 British record of UK and Irish officials meeting, 11 Sept. 1980. TNA FCO 87/997. 89 Record of meeting between Haughey and Figg, 19 Aug. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/854. See also record of meeting between Lenihan and Atkins, London, 13 Oct. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/928/1. 90 Record of meeting between Thatcher, Whitelaw and Atkins, 31 Oct. 1980. TNA PREM 19/498. 91 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Kennedy, 23 Oct. 1980. TNA PREM 19/282. 92 Record of meeting held in Armstrong room, Cabinet Office, 10 Nov. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1036. 93 See memorandum, ‘Political developments in Northern Ireland: a note by officials’, 21 Oct. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1036. 94 Record of meeting held in Armstrong’s room, Cabinet Office, 10 Nov. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1036. 95 Armstrong to Thatcher, 22 Oct. 1980. TNA PREM 19/498. 96 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 97 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 98 See, for example, Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 604. 99 In relation to Moore’s comments on Armstrong’s alleged support for Irish unity, the latter noted ‘I do not think that it is quite correct to say that I was believed to be a “strong supporter” of Irish unity’. Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 100 Interview with Walter Kirwan, 4 Jan. 2018. 101 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 604. 102 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 103 Record of meeting between Armstrong, Stowe and several unnamed civil servants. No. 10 Downing Street, Cabinet Office, 10 Nov. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1036. 104 Memorandum by Atkins, ‘Northern Ireland: political development’, Nov. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1036. 105 Copy of memorandum by Atkins, ‘Northern Ireland: political developments’, 13 Nov. 1980. TNA CAB 148/191. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/116807. See also TNA FCO 87/1036. 106 Armstrong to Thatcher, 14 Nov. 1980. TNA PREM 19/498. 107 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 388. 108 Record of meeting of the cabinet defence and oversea policy committee, 24 Nov. 1980. TNA CAB 148/189. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/116778. 109 Copy of memorandum, ‘Wider framework briefing for Prime Minister’, 26 Nov. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2938. 110 According to the memorandum, ‘Federalism entails sovereignty being shared between the federal authority and the federating units; confederalism implies a coming together by sovereign states in an association in which sovereignty over certain agreed matters is exercised from the centre.’ Copy of memorandum, ‘Wider framework briefing for Prime Minister’, 26 Nov. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2938. 111 Copy of memorandum, ‘Wider framework briefing for Prime Minister’, 26 Nov. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2938. 112 Comments by Atkins, 27 Nov. 1980. See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch80. htm.

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113 Copy of memorandum, ‘Northern Ireland: Political Situation’, briefing by the NIO, 26 Nov. 1980. PRONI NIO 12/189A. 114 Briefing document related to the forthcoming Haughey-Thatcher meeting (Dec. 1980), 21 Nov. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2938. 115 Briefing document related to the forthcoming Haughey-Thatcher meeting (Dec. 1980), 21 Nov. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2938. 116 Copy of memorandum, ‘Wider framework briefing for Prime Minister’, 26 Nov. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2938. See also TNA FCO 87/1010. 117 Copy of memorandum, ‘Wider framework briefing for Prime Minister’, 26 Nov. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2938. 118 See Chapter 2, pp. 46 and 67. 119 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 389. 120 Atkins to Bishop Daly, 31 Jan. 1980. PRONI NIO 12/175. Available from http://cain. ulst.ac.uk/proni/1980/proni_NIO-12-175_1980-01-31.pdf. 121 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 389. 122 Confidential DFA memorandum, ‘Long-Kesh and Armagh prisoners’ protest and hunger-strike’, 4 Dec. 1980. NAI DT 2010/19/1617. 123 Quoted in Hennessey, Hunger strike, 16. 124 See confidential note regarding impending H-Block hunger strikes. Record of conversation between Collins and Fr. Denis Faul, 10 Oct. 1980. NAI DT 2010/19/1728. 125 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 73. 126 Record of conversation between Collins and Fr. Denis Faul, 10 Oct. 1980. NAI DT 2010/19/1728. 127 Ed Moloney, A secret history of the IRA (London, 2003), 206. See also Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 176–7. 128 Record of conversation between Collins and Fr. Denis Faul, 10 Oct. 1980. NAI DT 2010/19/1728. 129 The cabinet secretary, however, did add a caveat. ‘The possibility of making such a concession (i.e. on clothing) at the later stage could not be ruled out.’ Armstrong to Thatcher, 22 Oct. 1980. TNA PREM 19/282. 130 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 74. 131 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 598. 132 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Kennedy, 23 Oct. 1980. TNA PREM 19/282. 133 Shaw, Conservative Party MP for Pudsey, 1974–97. 134 Note from Paul Dempsey in London to Neligan, 12 Nov. 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/928/1. 135 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 598. 136 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 30 Oct. 1980. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/116. See also Gow to Thatcher, 3 Nov. 1980. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/116. 137 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 6 Nov. 1980. UO BL CRD Alistair Cooke Letter Book CRD L/4/12/5. 138 At this meeting, Brian Mawhinney said he supported Thatcher’s ‘position’, both in relation to the Irish Republican hunger strike and Northern Ireland’s constitutional future. She had ‘responsibilities to non-unionists, as well as unionists, in the Province.’ ‘Criticism of the Prime Minister’ would ‘intensify the unjustified neurosis of the Unionists, who were always looking for opportunities to be negative and

318

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destructive’, he protested. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 12 Nov. 1980. UO BL CRD Alistair Cooke Letter Book CRD L/4/12/5. 139 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 140 Confidential DFA memorandum. ‘Long-Kesh and Armagh prisoners’ protest and hunger-strike’, 4 Dec. 1980. NAI DT 2010/19/1617. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 598–9. 141 Copy of briefing note by Alistair Cooke, circa late Dec. 1980. UO BL CRD Alistair Cooke Letter Book CRD L/4/12/3. 142 Copy of statement issued on behalf of the National H-Block Committee, 27 Oct. 1980. LHL NIPC ‘H-Block/Hunger-strike’, Box No. 5, ‘National Smash H-Block Committee’. 143 Typed version of smuggled letter by Hughes, 29 Oct. 1980. LHL NIPC ‘H-Block/ Hunger-strike’, Box No. 5. 144 See Hennessey, Hunger strike, 84 and 94. 145 Copy of note from Pope John Paul II to Thatcher, 30 Oct. 1980. TNA PREM 19/282. 146 Pope John Paul II received Thatcher at the Vatican, on 24 Nov. 1980. See Thatcher to Pope John Paul II, 13 Nov. 1980. UC CAC THCR 3/2/42. See also M. Margaret Scull, The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland troubles, 1968–1998 (Oxford, 2019), 98–100. 147 Mawhinney, Conservative Party MP for Peterborough, 1979–97 and North West Cambridgeshire, 1997–2005. 148 See J. Andrew Wilson, Irish America and the Ulster conflict, 1968–1995 (Belfast, 1995), 177–8. 149 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Atkins, 31 Oct. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1036. 150 Handwritten letter from Mary Sheehan to Thatcher, 26 Nov. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1067. See also Una O’Higgins O’Malley to Thatcher, 25 Nov. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1067. 151 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 390. 152 See Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 412. 153 See Lever to Alexander, 7 Nov. 1980. TNA PREM 19/339. 154 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 601. 155 On this occasion, Armstrong did not accompany Thatcher to Dublin on 8 Dec. 1980. See Armstrong to Alexander, 24 Nov. 1980. TNA PREM 19/507. 156 See note, ‘Record of a conversation between the prime minister and the taoiseach, Mr. Charles Haughey, in Dublin Castle on 8 December 1980 at 10.45’. TNA PREM 19/507. 157 See note ‘Record of a conversation between the prime minister and the taoiseach, Mr. Charles Haughey, in Dublin Castle on 8 December 1980 at 10.45’. TNA PREM 19/507. See also comments by Haughey, DE Debate, 11 Dec. 1980. Quoted in telegram from the British Embassy, Dublin, to FCO, 11 Dec. 1980. TNA PREM 19/507. 158 See ‘Record of plenary discussions between the prime minister and the Irish prime minister, an taoiseach, held at Dublin Castle on Monday 8 December 1980’. TNA PREM 19/507. 159 Copy of Anglo-Irish joint communiqué, ‘Meeting between taoiseach and British prime minister’, 8 Dec. 1980. NAI DFA 2010/53/930. 160 Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume two, 423. 161 Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume two, 423. 162 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 602.

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163 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 602. 164 Interview with David Neligan, 2 Jan. 2015. 165 British memorandum, ‘Wider framework briefing for prime minister’, 26 Nov. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2938. 166 See Gareth Ivory, ‘Fianna Fáil, constitutional Republicanism, and the issue of consent, 1980–1996’, Eire-Ireland, Vol. 32, No, 2-3 (Summer/Fall 1997), 93–116. 167 Transcript of Haughey’s press conference following meeting with Thatcher, 8 Dec. 1980. NAI DFA 2010/53/930. 168 See, for example, official Irish government record, ‘Meeting between the taoiseach and British prime minister, 8 December 1980’. NAI DFA 2010/53/930 and TNA CJ 4/2939. 169 Comments by Dermot Nally. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Haughey’, Episode 2: ‘Arise and Follow’, 2005, online at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=qOoeUIRVrik. 170 Thatcher, The Downing Street years, 390. 171 British record of ‘Press conference given by the prime minister, Mrs. Thatcher’, 8 Dec. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2939. See also Irish record of Thatcher’s post-summit press conference, 8 Dec. 1980. NAI DFA 2010/53/930. 172 British record of ‘Press conference given by the prime minister, Mrs. Thatcher’, 8 Dec. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2939. 173 British memorandum, ‘Subject: Anglo-Irish summit in Dublin on 8 December’. TNA CJ 4/2939. 174 See TNA CJ 4/3663. 175 Lord Carrington to British Embassy, Dublin, 10 Dec. 1980. TNA CJ 4/3663. See also Thatcher to Haughey, 11 Dec. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1008. 176 See comments by Haughey, DE Debate, 11 Dec. 1980. Quoted in telegram from the British Embassy, Dublin, to FCO, 11 Dec. 1980. TNA PREM 19/507. 177 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: Downing Street years, 390. 178 The Times, 13 Dec. 1980. 179 The Rev. Paisley to Thatcher, 9 Dec. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2939. 180 Irish Times, 11 Dec. 1980. 181 Irish Times, 11 Dec. 1980. 182 Record of meeting between Thatcher, Powell and Gow, 10 Feb. 1981. UC CAC THCR 1/12/10. See also UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/116. 183 Irish Times, 11 Dec. 1980. 184 Thatcher to the Rev. Paisley, 10 Dec. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2939. 185 Official record of oral questions, House of Commons, 11 Dec. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2939. 186 Record of telephone conversation between Lord Brookeborough and unidentified Whitehall official, 16 Dec. 1980. TNA CJ 4/2939. 187 See memorandum, ‘Ulster and the Conservative Party’, produced on behalf of the CRD, circa 1975. UO BL CPA CRD 4/15/4/3. 188 Record of meeting between Thatcher and the Rev. Paisley, 19 Dec. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1008. 189 Ed Moloney and Andy Pollak, Paisley (Dublin, 1986), 380. 190 Record of meeting between Thatcher and the Rev. Paisley, 19 Dec. 1980. TNA FCO 87/1008. 191 Thatcher to Molyneaux, 23 Jan. 1981. UC CAC POLL 3/2/1/95. See also Molyneaux to Thatcher, 13 Jan. 1981. UC CAC POLL 3/2/1/95. 192 Copy of speech by Thatcher, 5 Mar. 1981. UC CAC POLL 3/2/1/95

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193 Quoted in Spencer, The British and peace in Northern Ireland, 38. 194 Comments by Bernard Ingham. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 195 Comments by Lord Prior. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 196 See Robert Armstrong, ‘Ethnicity, the English, and Northern Ireland: comments and reflections’, in Bruce Arnold (ed.), Haughey, his life and unlucky deeds (London, 1993), 204. 197 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 413. 198 To help facilitate this process, shortly after the Anglo-Irish summit meeting of Dec. 1980, Thatcher sanctioned the establishment of a new official committee on AngloIrish relations. A British archival note records that the ‘Official committee on AngloIrish relations’ was established in Dec. 1980. See TNA CJ 4/3667.

5  Thatcher, the second Irish Republican hunger strike and Anglo-Irish relations, 1981 1 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 8. 2 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 600. 3 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 600. 4 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 8. 5 See comments by Michael Lillis. Record of meeting between Thatcher and John Hume, 9 Feb. 1984. NAI DFA 2014/32/1940. 6 McGuinness, minister of education (Northern Ireland), 1999–2002 and deputy first minister of Northern Ireland, 2007–17. 7 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 599. 8 Although Duddy, speaking on behalf of Gerry Adams and the Irish Republican leadership, was deliberately vague on how such an agreement might be reached. Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 599. 9 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 117. See also Moloney, A secret history of the IRA, 207–8. 10 Record of British cabinet meeting, 18 Dec. 1980. TNA CAB 128/68. 11 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 600. 12 For a first-hand account of Hughes’s role during the first Irish Republican hunger strike, see Ed Moloney, Voices from the grave: two men’s war in Ireland (London, 2010), 235–4. See also Gerry Adams’s comments on the ending of the first hunger strike, Gerry Adams, Hope and history: making peace in Ireland (London, 2003), 9–10. 13 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 117. 14 See, for example, English, Armed struggle, 195. 15 See Moloney, Voices from the grave, 240–1. This argument is support by Richard O’Rawe, a senior PIRA member detained in the H-Blocks along with Hughes and McKenna at this time. See Richard O’Rawe, Blanketmen: an untold story of the H-Block hunger strike (Dublin, 2005), 108–11. 16 Quoted in Hennessey, Hunger strike, 125. 17 An Phoblacht, 5 Feb. 1981. For an in-depth analysis of the British government’s public and private response and attitude to the second Irish Republican hunger strike from Feb. to Oct. 1981, see Hennessey, Hunger strike, 150–457.

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18 See confidential Irish government document, ‘Prison protests in Northern Ireland: general briefing note’, mid-1981. NAI DT 2011/39/1814. See also Hennessey, Hunger strike, 150–1. 19 Copy of address by Ó Dúill, 25 Jan. 1981. LHL NIPC ‘H-Block/Hunger-strike’, Box No. 5. 20 Thatcher to Molyneaux, 23 Jan. 1981. UC CAC POLL 3/2/1/95. 21 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 391. 22 Thatcher to Haughey, 25 Feb. 1981. TNA PREM 19/504. 23 Quoted in Hennessey, Hunger strike, 160. 24 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 160. 25 Moloney, A secret history of the IRA, 208. 26 Moloney, A secret history of the IRA, 208. 27 Quoted in Hennessey, Hunger strike, 164. See also speech by Thatcher, 5 Mar. 1981. PRONI INF 3/3/131. 28 Quoted in Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 220. 29 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 165. 30 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 166–7. 31 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 173. 32 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 177–8. 33 Savage, The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’, 240. 34 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 609. 35 Armstrong to Alexander, 13 Apr. 1981. TNA PREM 19/504. 36 See Hennessey, Hunger strike, 180–1. 37 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Hume, No. 10 Downing Street, 13 Apr. 1981. TNA PREM 19/504. 38 Comments by Thatcher. See Scannal, ‘Out, out, out’, Television documentary for RTÉ, first broadcast 5 Oct. 2015. https://presspack.rte.ie/2015/10/12/scannal-51/. 39 Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 221. 40 Record of telephone conversation between Nally and Armstrong. See Armstrong to Sanders, 22 Apr. 1981. TNA PREM 19/504. 41 Armstrong to Sanders, 22 Apr. 1981 (recollection of the former’s conversation with Nally). TNA PREM 19/504. 42 Figg to FCO, 22 Apr. 1981. TNA PREM 19/504. 43 S. W. Boys Smith to FCO, 23 Apr. 1981. TNA PREM 19/504. 44 See TNA PREM 19/504. 45 Record of notes by unknown Irish official recounting a conversation with Figg, 24 Apr. 1981. NAI DT 2011/39/1892. See also TNA PREM 19/504. 46 Text of statement issue by Haughey, 25 Apr. 1981. NAI DT 2011/39/1892. 47 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 189. 48 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 191. 49 Copy of statement issued on behalf of Bobby Sands, 25 Apr. 1981. LHL NIPC ‘H-Block/Hunger-strike’, Box No. 1, ‘general’. 50 Record of conversation between Owen Carron and Sands, circa early May 1981. See ‘Belfast Republican Press Centre T/40 46841 Telex No. 74523’. LHL NIPC ‘H-Block/ Hunger-strike’, Box No. 1, ‘general’. 51 Record of telephone conversations between Stowe and Nally, 27 Apr. 1981. TNA PREM 19/504.

322

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52 Record of telephone conversations between Stowe and Nally, 27 Apr. 1981. TNA PREM 19/504. 53 Record of meeting between Atkins and Thatcher, 27 Apr. 1981. TNA PREM 19/504. 54 Quoted in Hennessey, Hunger strike, 196. 55 See Scull, The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland troubles, 1968–1998, 106–7. According to Carron, Sands was ‘suspicious of Papal Legate and he felt more pressure was being put on prisoners than on the British Government’. See ‘Belfast Republican Press Centre T/40 46841 Telex No. 74523’, circa May 1981. LHL NIPC ‘H-Block/ Hunger-strike’, Box No. 1, marked ‘general’. 56 Record of conversation between Owen Carron and Sands, circa early May 1981. See ‘Belfast Republican Press Centre T/40 46841 Telex No. 74523’. LHL NIPC ‘H-Block/ Hunger-strike’, Box No. 1, marked ‘general’. 57 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 391. 58 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 211. 59 David Tatham CMG interviewed by Martin Lamport, 18 Feb. 2017. Available from British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, University of Cambridge, Churchill College. Available from https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Tatham.pdf. 60 This paragraph is sourced from Hennessey, Hunger strike, 210. 61 Quoted in Hennessey, Hunger strike, 221. 62 Quoted in English, Armed struggle, 378–9. 63 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 224. 64 Over the summer months of 1981, eight more men died on hunger strike: Raymond McCreesh, Patsy O’Hara, Joe McDonnell, Martin Hurson, Kevin Lynch, Kieran Doherty, Thomas McElwee and Micky Devine. 65 Comments by Haughey. See record of Fianna Fáil parliamentary party meeting, 6 May 1981. UCDA P176/449. 66 Figg to FCO, 5 May 1981. TNA PREM 19/504. 67 Record of meeting between, Thatcher, Atkins and Kennedy, 13 May 1981. PRONI NIO 12/220A. See also TNA PREM 19/504. 68 Figg to FCO, 5 May 1981. TNA PREM 19/504. 69 Adams, Hope and history, 12. 70 Copy of letter from Michael Alexander to Roy Harrington, 12 May 1981. PRONI NIO 12/220A. See also TNA PREM 19/504. This intervention by Nally was later that day described as a ‘personal message’ on behalf of Haughey and thus should be given urgent attention. See letter from R. Harrington to Marshall, 12 May 1981. PRONI NIO/12/197A. 71 Record of meeting between Thatcher, Atkins and Kennedy, 13 May 1981. PRONI NIO/12/220A. See also TNA PREM 19/504. 72 Copy of speech by Thatcher, Stormont Castle, Northern Ireland Information Service, 28 May 1981. PRONI INF 3/3/131. See also UC CAC THCR 1/17/80. 73 Confidential note by Blatherwick regarding Thatcher’s speech (28 May 1981) and visit to Northern Ireland. PRONI NIO/12/197A. 74 Record of meeting between Blatherwick and Bishop Daly, 29 May 1981. PRONI NIO 12/197A. 75 See Eamon Kennedy’s comments to Moriarty re: Haughey’s reaction to Thatcher’s speech of 28 May 1981. Note by Moriarty, ‘Prime Minister’s speech: Irish reaction’, 1 June 1981. PRONO NIO 12/251A. 76 Copy of letter from Michael Alexander, 23 June 1981. PRONI NIO 12/202.

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77 Armstrong’s minutes to Thatcher (record of conversation between Armstrong and Nally), 25 June 1981. TNA PREM 19/505. 78 Record of statement by Atkins, 19 July 1981. PRONI FIN 3/3/132. 79 See, for example, British record of conversation between Armstrong and Nally, 26 June 1981.TNA PREM 19/505. See also Armstrong’s minute to Thatcher, 25 June 1981. TNA PREM 19/505. 80 Doherty was the eighth hunger striker to die, passing away on 2 Aug. 1981. 81 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 324. 82 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 325–6. 83 Italicized words denote Thatcher’s own amendments to the text. Quoted in Hennessey, Hunger strike, 326. The original version of this text is located in the Brendan Duddy Papers, housed at the NUI Galway Archives and Special Collections. See copy of Duddy’s diary labelled ‘Red Book’, POL 35/167 (1), 6 July 1981. 84 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 327. 85 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 328. 86 Copy of circular issued on behalf of the National H-Block/Armagh committee, 27 July 1981. LHL NIPC ‘H-Block/Hunger-strike’, Box No. 5. 87 See Hennessey, Hunger strike, 328–9. 88 See English, Armed struggle, 202. 89 Prior and Gowrie were appointed to their new posts following a cabinet reshuffle by Thatcher in Sept. 1981. 90 Hennessey, Hunger strike, 447. 91 For further information in relation to this subject, see Hennessey, Hunger strike, 451–4. 92 See Moloney, Voices from the grave, 249–53. See also Hennessey, Hunger strike, 300–77 and 416–57; Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 611–17; and The Sunday Times, 12 Apr. 2009, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/ document/111770. 93 See O’Rawe, Blanketmen, 16–18. 94 Quoted in Hennessey, Hunger strike, 7. See also O’Rawe, Blanketmen, 16–18. 95 See, for example, Hennessey, Hunger strike, 7. 96 See, for example, Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 235–7. 97 Quoted in Hennessey, Hunger strike, 7. 98 See, for example, Mansergh, The legacy of history, 405. 99 Copy of statement issued on behalf of Prior, 6 Oct. 1981. UC CAC POLL 3/2/1/95. 100 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 391. 101 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 617. 102 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 391. 103 Moloney, Voices from the grave, 247. 104 See Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 20–1. 105 At the 1981 Sinn Féin Ard Fheis, Morrison argued that Sinn Féin did not need to dilute its commitment to the use of physical force as a result of the party’s possibly entering mainstream politics. ‘Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand, and an Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?’ Quoted in English, Armed struggle, 224–5. 106 A version of this subsection was first published in Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 209–19.

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107 See ‘Joint Studies: summary note’. NAI DFA 2012/59/1685. See also NAI DFA 2012/59/1748. 108 See ‘Joint Studies: summary note’. NAI DFA 2012/59/1685. See also NAI DFA 2012/59/1748; NAI DFA 2014/32/2002; and DFA NAI 2014/105/780. For the British government’s views regarding the Anglo-Irish joint study groups see TNA FCO 87/1095–9. 109 For a breakdown of the workings of each joint study group, see TNA PREM 19/507. See also UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117, part 2. 110 See Armstrong to Alexander, undated. TNA PREM 19/507. 111 See ‘Joint Studies: summary note’. NAI DFA 2012/59/1685. See also NAI DFA 2012/59/1748 and TNA CJ 4/3665. 112 Dermot Nally, secretary to the Irish government, 1980–93. 113 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 603. 114 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 604. See also Armstrong to G. Walden, 23 Dec. 1980. TNBA PREM 19/507. 115 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 116 See comments in The Telegraph, 11 Jan. 2010. 117 British character profile, ‘Nally, Dermot’, circa 1984. TNA CAB 164/1733. 118 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 119 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 604–5. 120 Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, 417. 121 Record of Irish government meeting, 27 Jan. 1981. NAI DFA 2014/105/780. 122 See Kirwan to Nally, 19 Jan. 1981. NAI DFA 2014/105/780. 123 See TNA PREM 19/507. See also Nally to Haughey, 28 Jan. 1981. NAI DFA 2014/105/780. 124 See TNA PREM 19/507. 125 See Armstrong to Alexander, 20 Feb. 1981. TNA PREM 19/507. 126 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 605. 127 See Armstrong to Thatcher, 18 Mar. 1981. TNA CJ 4/3668. See also record of meeting between Haughey and SDLP delegation, 8 Feb. 1981. NAI DFA 2012/59/1748. 128 FitzGerald, All in a life, 383. 129 Armstrong to Thatcher, 18 Mar. 1981. TNA CJ 4/3668. 130 Armstrong to Thatcher, 18 Mar. 1981. TNA CJ 4/3668. 131 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 606. 132 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 606. 133 Record of meeting between Thatcher, Atkins, Carrington, Whitelaw, Gilmore, Armstrong and Wade-Gery, 19 Mar. 1981. TNA PREM 19/508. 134 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 606 135 Extract from interview with Lenihan, RTÉ News, 1.30 p.m., 12 Feb. 1981. NAI DFA 2011/41/2. 136 Speech by Thatcher, 5 Mar. 1981. PRONI INF 3/3/131. 137 Speech by Atkins, Stormont House, 25 Feb. 1981. PRONI INF 3/3/131. 138 Statement by Atkins, 10 Feb. 1981. PRONI INF 3/3/131. 139 Extract of Lenihan’s interview with RTE’s Today Tonight, 18 Mar. 1981. NAI DFA 2011/41/2. 140 Extract of Lenihan’s interview with Barry Cowen, 22 Mar. 1981. NAI DFA 2011/41/2. 141 Gow to Thatcher, 24 Mar. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/116. 142 Comments by Martin Mansergh. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’.

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143 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Haughey, 23 Mar. 1981. TNA PREM 19/508. 144 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Haughey, 23 Mar. 1981. TNA PREM 19/508. 145 Comments by Martin Mansergh. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 146 The Times, 25 Mar. 1981. 147 The Times, 25 Mar. 1981. 148 Belfast Telegraph, 31 Mar. 1981. 149 The Times, 25 Mar. 1981. 150 The Times, 25 Mar. 1981. See also the Irish Times supplement, ‘The Haughey Years’, article ‘Triumphs and tensions of 12 turbulent years’, 31 Jan. 1992. 151 Extract from interview with Haughey, shown on RTÉ News, 9 p.m., 24 Mar. 1981. NAI DFA 2012/59/1606. 152 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 603. 153 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 603. 154 See Armstrong to Alexander, undated. TNA PREM 19/507. 155 Wade-Gery to Armstrong, 29 May 1981. TNA PREM 19/508. 156 Noel Cornick to Howard, 29 May 1981. TNA CJ 4/3665. 157 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 606. 158 Copy of speech by Powell to a public meeting, Braniel Hall, Drumb, County Down, 15 May 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/129, part 3. 159 Copy of speech by Thatcher, Stormont Castle, Northern Ireland Information Service, 28 May 1981. PRONI INF 3/3/131. See also UC CAC THCR 1/17/80. NAI DT 2012/59/1599. 160 Interview with Michael Lillis, 18 Mar. 2016. 161 FitzGerald, All in a life, 330. 162 See Fine Gael, Ireland – our future together (Dublin, 1979). 163 Fine Gael, Ireland – our future together, preface. 164 FitzGerald, All in a life, 331. 165 See, for example, DT briefing document by Michael Lillis, 21 Aug. 1981. NAI DT 2011/127/1008. 166 Record of telephone conversation between FitzGerald and Thatcher, 1 July 1981. NAI DT 20011/127/1008. 167 Record of Anglo-Irish review conference. 24–25 Aug. 1981. NAI DFA 2012/59/1706. 168 FitzGerald, All in a life, 379. 169 FitzGerald, All in a life, 377–8. 170 FitzGerald, All in a life, 380. 171 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 300. 172 Record of meeting between Armstrong and Nally, 12 June 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/86. 173 Renwick, A journey with Margaret Thatcher, 115. 174 Renwick, A journey with Margaret Thatcher, 115. 175 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 618. 176 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 300. 177 Figg to the FCO, 7 Oct. 1981. TNA FCO 87/113. 178 See Figg’s note, ‘The prospects for Dr FitzGerald’, 15 Dec. 1982. TNA FCO 87/1291. 179 British government political (and character) profile of Dr Garret FitzGerald, undated, circa 1983. TNA CAB 164/1671. 180 See note by Tatham, ‘The Irish political scene’, 5 Oct. 1983. TNA FCO 87/1421.

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181 See Figg’s note, ‘The prospects for Dr FitzGerald’, 15 Dec. 1982. TNA FCO 87/1291. 182 Prior, A balance of power, 236. 183 See Prior, A balance of power, 236. 184 ‘FCO draft steering brief: Anglo-Irish summit meeting, 6 Nov. 1981’, undated and unsigned, circa early Nov. 1981. TNA FCO 87/1113. 185 DT briefing document on Northern Ireland by F. Murray, 24 Sept. 1981. NAI DT 2011/127/1008. 186 Note by F. Murray. Record of conversation between Nally and Neligan, 17 Sept. 1981. NAI DT 2011/127/1008. 187 Note by F. Murray. Record of conversation between Nally and Neligan, 17 Sept. 1981. NAI DT 2011/127/1008. 188 Present on the Irish side were Nally, Kirwan and Neligan. The British delegation was led by Armstrong. See record of meeting between British and Irish officials, London, 27 July 1981. TNA CJ 4/3665. 189 See file ‘Anglo-Irish Study Groups’. NAI DFA 2014/32/1781. 190 Figg to FCO, 7 Oct. 1981. TNA FCO 87/113. 191 See P. H. C. Eyers, Republic of Ireland Office, re: letter from Acland to Armstrong, 14 Oct. 1981. TNA FCO 87/113. 192 See note by P. C. Eyers, ‘Anglo-Irish summit’, 26 Oct. 1981. 193 See, for example, TNA CAB 164/1575. 194 ‘FCO draft steering brief: Anglo-Irish summit meeting, 6 Nov. 1981’, undated and unsigned, circa early Nov. 1981. TNA FCO 87/1113. 195 ‘FCO draft steering brief: Anglo-Irish summit meeting, 6 Nov. 1981’, undated and unsigned, circa early Nov. 1981. TNA FCO 87/1113. 196 ‘FCO draft steering brief: Anglo-Irish summit meeting, 6 Nov. 1981’, undated and unsigned, circa early Nov. 1981. TNA FCO 87/1113. 197 ‘FCO draft steering brief: Anglo-Irish summit meeting, 6 Nov. 1981’, undated and unsigned, circa early Nov. 1981. TNA FCO 87/1113. 198 ‘FCO draft steering brief: Anglo-Irish summit meeting, 6 Nov. 1981’, undated and unsigned, circa early Nov. 1981. TNA FCO 87/1113. 199 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 606. 200 Alexander to David Wight, Cabinet Office, 19 Oct. 1981. TNA FCO 87/113. 201 Alexander to David Wight, Cabinet Office, 19 Oct. 1981. TNA FCO 87/113. 202 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 393. 203 Alexander to David Wight, Cabinet Office, 19 Oct. 1981. TNA FCO 87/113. See also British government document marked, ‘draft communique’, undated. TNA FCO 87/113. 204 For a comprehensive insight into this Anglo-Irish summit meeting, including the tête-à-tête meeting between Thatcher and FitzGerald and the subsequent plenary session, see TNA PREM 19/509; NAI DFA 2011/53/12; NAI DFA 2011/39/1774; and NAI DFA 2011/127/1087–93. 205 Lawson, Conservative Party MP for Balby, 1974–92. 206 Record of Anglo-Irish summit meeting between Thatcher and FitzGerald, 6 Nov. 1981. NAI DT 2011/127/1093. See also FitzGerald, All in a life, 381–2. 207 ‘FCO draft steering brief: Anglo-Irish summit meeting, 6 Nov. 1981’, undated and unsigned, circa early Nov. 1981. TNA FCO 87/1113. 208 Alexander to David Wight, Cabinet Office, 19 Oct. 1981. TNA FCO 87/113. 209 See memorandum ‘Northern Ireland Review meeting’, 28 July 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/1679.

 327

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210 FitzGerald, All in a life, 383. 211 Record of tête-à-tête between Thatcher and FitzGerald, 6 Nov. 1981. PRONI CENT 1/10/93A. 212 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 416. 213 FitzGerald, All in a life, 382. Following this Anglo-Irish summit meeting, the British attorney general Sir Michael Havers met his Irish counterpart Mr Sutherland in London, on 10 Dec. 1981. At this meeting, the attorneys general held preliminary discussions on several topics, including extradition, extra-territorial jurisdiction, joint Garda/RUC interrogation and the proposed all-Ireland court. See record of meeting between Sutherland and Havers, 10 Dec. 1981. NAI DT 2011/127/1092 and copy of memorandum by Kirwan, ‘All-Ireland Courts and related subjects’, 17 Dec. 1981. NAI DT 2011/127/1092. See also TNA CJ 4/3667. 214 See FitzGerald, All in a life, 382. See also DFA memorandum, ‘Northern Ireland Policy, General Brief ’, Mar. 1982. NAT DT 2011/127/1008. 215 For a copy of the Anglo-Irish joint studies reports, see NAI DFA 2014/32/2002. 216 See memorandum, ‘Northern Ireland Review meeting’, 28 July 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/1679. 217 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 414. 218 That said, this did not stop Haughey from launching a personal attack on FitzGerald’s record on Northern Ireland following the Anglo-Irish summit meeting in Nov. 1981, particularly the latter’s ‘failure’ to secure from Thatcher an agreement to establish an associated parliamentary tier vis-à-vis the new AIIC. See Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 244–5. 219 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 618. 220 Comments by Thatcher. Hansard HC [12/421–8], 10 Nov. 1981. Available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/1047366. 221 Record of interview between Thatcher and Brian Cowen of RTÉ’s Today Tonight television programme, 6 Nov. 1981. UC CAC THCR 5/2/74. 222 Hansard HC [12/421–8], 10 Nov. 1981. Available from http://www.margaretthatcher. org/document/1047366. 223 See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch81.htm. 224 Moloney and Pollak, Paisley, 385. 225 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 619. 226 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 619 and Prior, A balance of power, 187–8. 227 Comments by Prior. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 28 Jan. 1982. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/11. 228 See Gow to Thatcher, 19 Nov. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/115. 229 Record of speech by Enoch Powell, to the annual general meeting of the Coleraine Divisional Unionist Association, Coleraine, Londonderry, 6 Dec. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/115. See also UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/129, part 3. 230 Gow to Thatcher, 19 Nov. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117, part 2. 231 Gow to Thatcher, 6 Nov. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/115. 232 Gow to Thatcher, 6 Nov. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/115. 233 Note by Gow marked ‘Personal’, 2 Nov. 1981. UC CAC POLL 3/2/1/95. 234 Gow to Thatcher, 6 Nov. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/115. 235 Gow to Thatcher, 19 Nov. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/115. See also Gow to Thatcher, 6 Nov. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/115; Gow to Thatcher, 20 Nov. 1981.

328

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UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/115; and Gow to Thatcher, 8 Dec. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/115. 236 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 412. 237 See Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 394. Gow resigned as minister for state in the HM Treasury in protest at Thatcher’s decision to sign the AIA of 1985. On 30 July 1990, he was murdered by an PIRA car bomb. 238 See note by Kennedy, ‘Present situation as seen from London’, 22 Dec. 1981. NAI DFA 2012/59/1706. 239 The Rev. Paisley to Thatcher, 25 Oct. 1981. TNA CAB 164/1575. 240 John Biggs-Davison was made a knight bachelor in 1981. 241 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 26 Nov. 1981. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/115.

6  The Prior Initiative, the Falklands War and Anglo-Irish relations, 1982 1 Record of first meeting of the AIIC, 20 Jan. 1982. TNA CAB 134/4581. 2 Apart from Armstrong and Wade-Gery, the following British officials attended the first meeting of the AIIC: Figg, Marshall, Eyers and Tatham. See, for example, Armstrong to Nally, 4 Dec. 1981. TNA CAB 164/1575. See also TNA CJ 4/3667. 3 Apart from Nally, the following Irish officials attended the first meeting of the AIIC: Donlon, Neligan, Kirwan, Murray and Mrs Hennessy. 4 See, for example, record of meeting between Tatham, Neligan and Kirwan, 14 Jan. 1982. TNA CAB 164/1614. 5 Wade-Grey to Armstrong, 17 Nov. 1981. TNA CAB 164/1575. 6 Although Moore offers this analysis in relation to Lord Carrington’s reluctance to become involved with the Anglo-Irish joint studies it is a reasonable argument that he held a similar attitude to the newly constituted AIIC. Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 603. 7 A copy of this mentioned Anglo-Irish joint memorandum is available from TNA CAB 164/1614. See also memorandum, ‘Northern Ireland Review meeting’, 28 July 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/1679. 8 British government briefing document on the AIIC (unsigned), 20 Jan. 1982. TNA CAB 164/1614. See also ‘The Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council: practical arrangements’, undated, circa early Dec. 1981. TNA CJ 4/3667 and TNA CJ 4/3667. 9 British government briefing document on the AIIC (unsigned), 20 Jan. 1982. TNA CAB 164/1614. See also Note by Tatham, ‘Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council’, 14 Jan. 1982. TNA CAB 164/1614. 10 Record of first meeting of the AIIC, at ministerial level, 29 Jan. 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/1679. 11 At ministerial level, the AIIC convened on the following dates: 30 Mar. (Dublin); 31 Mar. (London); 17 May (Belfast); 18 May (Belfast); and 28 May (Belfast). See memorandum, ‘Northern Ireland Review meeting’, 28 July 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/1679. See TNA CAB 164/1614 and TNA CJ 4/3667. 12 Prior, A balance of power, 235. 13 Young, One of us, 467. 14 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 413.

 329

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15 See, for example, comments by Prior. Record of meeting between Prior and Peter Barry, 19 Oct. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1575. 16 Prior, A balance of power, 177. 17 Prior to Lord Hailsham, 2 Oct. 1981. UC CAC HLSM 8/23/1. 18 Prior, A balance of power, 177. 19 DFA Memorandum, ‘Northern Ireland political initiative by Secretary of State Prior’, Mar. 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/1710. 20 Confidential memorandum by Prior, ‘Northern Ireland: constitutional development’ for British cabinet defence and oversea policy committee, 9 Feb. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117, part 2. 21 Prior, A balance of power, 180. 22 Young, One of us, 467. 23 Confidential memorandum by Prior, ‘Northern Ireland: constitutional development’, 9 Feb. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117, part 2. See also TNA FCO 87/1353. 24 See comments by David Goodall. Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 2. 25 Prior, A balance of power, 197. 26 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 619. 27 Prior, A balance of power, 196. 28 Quoted in Clark, Diaries, 334–5. 29 Gow to Thatcher, 23 Mar. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117, part 3. 30 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 619. 31 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 619. 32 Gow to Thatcher, 23 Mar. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117, part 3. 33 Privately, John Biggs-Davison said he was ‘dismayed’ by Prior’s proposal for Northern Ireland. See Gow to Thatcher, 29 Jan. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117, part 3. 34 Amery, Conservative Party MP for Brighton Pavilion, 1969–92. 35 Porter, Conservative Party MP for Bebington and Ellesmere Port, 1979–83 and Wirral South, 1983–96. 36 Michael McNair-Wilson, Conservative Party MP for Newbury, 1974–92 and Christopher Murphy, Conservative Party MP for Welwyn Hatfield, 1979–87, were also reportedly opposed to the Prior Initiative. See Gow to Thatcher, 29 Jan. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117, part 3. 37 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 21 Jan. 1982. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/110, file 3. 38 Comments by Prior. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 28 Jan. 1982. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/11. 39 See, for example, record of speech by Prior to the Bow Group, House of Commons, 16 Feb. 1982. See also record of speech by Prior, St Anne’s Cathedral, Belfast, 31 Mar. 1982. PRONI FIN 3/3/132. 40 Record of meeting of the Conservative Party’s constitutional committee, 3 Mar. 1982. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/11. 41 See Patrick Eyers note, ‘Northern Ireland political initiative’, 21 Mar. 1982. TNA FCO 87/1353. 42 Comments by Molyneaux. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 4 Feb. 1982. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/11. 43 Comments by Molyneaux. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 4 Feb. 1982. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/11. 44 Record of meeting between Prior and representatives of the UUC, 8 Mar. 1982. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26.

330

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45 See copy of speech by Powell to the annual general meeting of the East Down Unionist Association, Downpatrick, 9 Jan. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/129. See also copy of speech by Powell to the annual dinner of the Newman N. E. Conservative Association, London, 3 Apr. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/129. 46 See Patrick Eyers note, ‘Northern Ireland political initiative’, 21 Mar. 1982. TNA FCO 87/1353. 47 See comments by Rev. Paisley. Record of meeting between Prior and representatives of the UUC, 8 Mar. 1982. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26. 48 Comments by Prior. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 28 Jan. 1982. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/11. 49 See Patrick Eyers note, ‘Northern Ireland political initiative’, 21 Mar. 1982. TNA FCO 87/1353. 50 Farren, The SDLP, 176. 51 See Prior, A balance of power, 236. 52 See Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 253. 53 Prior, A balance of power, 236. 54 DFA Memorandum, ‘Northern Ireland political initiative by Secretary of State Prior’, Mar. 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/1679. See also Figg to FCO, 22 Jan. 1982. TNA CJ 4/3927. 55 Record of first meeting (at official level) of the AIIC, 20 Jan. 1982. TNA CAB 164/1614. 56 Record of meeting between the Irish government representatives and a delegation of the SDLP, 22 Mar. 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/1748. 57 Copy of statement issued on behalf of the Irish government and the SDLP, 22 Mar. 1982. TNA PREM 19/815. 58 Record of British cabinet meeting, 1 Apr. 1982. TNA CAB 128/73, F122. 59 The Irish government/SDLP demand for an ‘Irish dimension’ in the affairs of Northern Ireland, a memorandum on behalf of the FOC declared, was ‘unacceptable’. See memorandum by Patrick Eyers, ‘Cabinet, 1 April: Northern Ireland constitutional future’, 31 Mar. 1982. TNA FCO 87/1353. 60 Record of conversation between Figg and Donlon, 23 Mar. 1982. TNA PREM 19/815. See also Armstrong briefing for Thatcher, 24 Mar. 1982. TNA PREM 19/815. 61 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Haughey, 30 Mar. 1982. TNA PREM 19/749. 62 Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 256. 63 Record of British cabinet meeting, 1 Apr. 1982. TNA CAB 128/73. 64 Brittan, Conservative Party MP for Cleveland and Whitby, 1974–83 and Richmond (Yorks), 1983–88. 65 Parkinson, Conservative Party MP for Enfield West, 1970–4, South Hertfordshire, 1974–83 and Hertsmere, 1983–92. 66 See Prior, A balance of power, 197. 67 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 620 (footnote 3). 68 Prior, A balance of power, 197. 69 See Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 413. 70 Record of British cabinet meeting, 1 Apr. 1982. TNA CAB 128/73. 71 See Northern Ireland: A Framework for Devolution (1982). Available from http:// cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cmd8541.htm. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 619–20; and memorandum by Prior, ‘Northern Ireland: Framework for Devolution’, 29 Mar. 1982. TNA CAB 129/214, f153. 72 Gow to Thatcher, 23 Mar. 1982. TNA PREM 19/815.

 331

Notes 73 74 75 76

331

Gow to Thatcher, 2 Apr. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117 (part 3). Gow to Thatcher, 23 Mar. 1982. TNA PREM 19/815. Budgen, Conservative Party MP for Wolverhampton South West, 1974–97. Cranborne, Conservative Party MP for South Dorset, 1979–87. Member of the House of Lords, 1992–2017. His full title is The Most Hon. The Rt Hon. Marquess of Salisbury DL and his given name is Robert Michael James Gascoyne-Cecil. 77 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 620. 78 Prior, A balance of power, 199. 79 The CPPNIC convened on the following dates during 1982: 21 Jan., 28 Jan. 4 Feb., 25 Feb., 3 Mar., 25 Mar., and 1 Apr. See UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117, part 3; UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/11; and UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/110, file 3. 80 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 1 Apr. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117, part 3. 81 Comments by Amery. Record of CPPNIC meeting, 3 Mar. 1982. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/11. 82 Record of CPPNIC meeting, 1 Apr. 1982. UC CAC THCR 2/6/2/117 (part 3). 83 See Prior, A balance of power, 198. 84 See Northern Ireland: A Framework for Devolution (1982). Available from http://cain. ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cmd8541.htm. 85 Irish government memorandum, ‘Prior Initiative’, 23 July 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/1679. 86 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 394. 87 A version of this subsection was originally published in Contemporary British History. See Stephen Kelly, ‘An opportunistic Anglophobe: Charles J. Haughey, the Irish government and the Falklands War, 1982’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2016), pp. 522–1. 88 It is not within the remit of this chapter to offer an in-depth, all-encompassing, analysis of the British government’s diplomatic and military actions during the Falklands War. For such analysis, see Lawrence Freedman, The official history of the Falklands campaign: origins of the Falklands war, volume one (London, 2005) and Lawrence Freedman, The official history of the Falklands campaign: war and diplomacy, volume two (London, 2005). See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 656–758. 89 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 665. 90 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 245. 91 Quoted in K. Geoffrey Fry, The politics of the Thatcher revolution: an interpretation of British politics, 1979–1990 (London, 2008), 53. 92 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 669–70. 93 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 667. 94 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 669–72. 95 Luce, Conservative Party MP for Arundel and Shoreham, 1971–74 and Shoreham, 1974–92. 96 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 670. 97 That said, privately, Thatcher maintained that she would prefer a ‘diplomatic solution’ to the use of force in ending the crisis. Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 688–9. 98 Message by Thatcher to heads of government aboard, 2 Apr. 1982. UC CAC THCR 3/1/20. 99 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 678. See also Anthony Parsons, ‘The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31st March–14th June 1982’, International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring 1983), 169–78.

332

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100 Irish government memorandum, ‘The Anglo-Irish Dispute: Note for the information of the Government’, Apr. 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/71. 101 For background information related to Ireland’s ‘traditional’ stance on the Falkland Islands, see Norman MacQueen, ‘The expedience of tradition: Ireland, international organization and the Falklands crisis’, Political Studies Vol. XXXIII, No. 38–55 (1985), 41–2. 102 See DFA memorandum, ‘The Falkland Islands dispute’, early Apr. 1982. NAI DT 2013/27/14. 103 Irish government memorandum, ‘The Anglo-Irish Dispute: Note for the information of the Government’, Apr. 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/71. 104 Record of meeting between MacKernan and Tatham, 5 Apr. 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/71. 105 See DFA memorandum, ‘The Falkland Islands dispute’, early Apr. 1982. NAI DT 2013/27/14. 106 Thatcher to Haughey, 6 Apr.1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/71. 107 DFA memorandum, ‘The Falkland Islands dispute’, early Apr. 1982. NAI DT 2013/27/14. 108 Irish departmental-government file, ‘The Falkland Islands crisis’. NAI DT 2013/27/14. 109 Irish departmental-government file, ‘The Falkland Islands crisis’. NAI DT 2013/27/14. 110 Irish departmental-government file, ‘The Falkland Islands crisis’. NAI DT 2013/27/14. See also British Embassy in Dublin to the Irish government, circa Apr. 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/72. 111 Copy of Irish government statement: ‘Falklands dispute’, 2 May 1982. NAI DT 2013/27/14. 112 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 715. 113 Sun, 4 May 1982. 114 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 716. 115 Joyce and Murtagh, The Boss, 164. 116 Freedman, The official history of the Falklands campaign: war and diplomacy, volume two, 425. 117 Trevor Salmon, Unneutral Ireland: an ambivalent and unique security policy (Oxford, 1989), 257. 118 Copy of Irish government statement: ‘Falklands dispute’, 4 May 1982. NAI DT 2012/90/997. 119 DE, 4 May 1982, Vol. 334, No. 1, c. 36. 120 Freedman, The official history of the Falklands campaign: war and diplomacy, volume two, 424. 121 Interview with Noel Dorr, 8 Apr. 2014. 122 Comments by Walter Kirwan. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 123 Note by D. H. Colvan, 5 May 1982. TNA CAB 154/6615. 124 Copy of memorandum by Figg, ‘The Falklands crisis and Anglo-Irish relations’, 22 June 1982. UC CAC THCR 1/20/3/19. 125 Comments by Lord Armstrong of Ilminster. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 126 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015.

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127 Record of meeting between Haughey and Figg, 6 May 1982. NAI DT 2012/90/997. See also TNA CJ 4/3930. For an analysis of the Irish government’s traditional support for neutrality in the context of the country’s role within the EEC, see Sharp, Irish foreign policy and the European Community, 199–235. 128 Irish government memorandum, ‘Falkland Island Crisis’, 5 May 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/72. 129 DE, 11 May 1982. Vol. 334, No. 4, c. 801. 130 Figg to FCO, 12 May 1982. TNA CJ 4/3930. 131 Copy of memorandum by Figg, ‘The Falklands crisis and Anglo-Irish relations’, 22 June 1982. UC CAC THCR 1/20/3/19. 132 See Figg’s note, ‘The prospects for Dr FitzGerald’, 15 Dec. 1982. TNA FCO 87/1291. 133 Interview with David Neligan, 2 Jan. 2015. 134 Joyce and Murtagh, The Boss, 166. 135 Record of meeting between Irish official (unidentified), Irish Embassy in London and Mike Molloy, undated. NAI DFA 2012/59/1585. 136 Irish departmental-government file, ‘The Falkland Islands crisis’. NAI DT 2013/27/14. 137 Jornal do Brasil, 15 May 1982. 138 Record of British cabinet meeting, 15 June 1982. TNA CAB 128/74. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122287. 139 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 173. 140 Simon Jenkins, ‘How Margaret Thatcher’s Falklands gamble paid off ’, Guardian, 9 Apr. 2013. 141 Jenkins, ‘How Margaret Thatcher’s Falklands gamble paid off ’. 142 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography: volume one, 752. 143 Record of first meeting of the Conservative Party ‘Defence Group’, 11 Oct. 1982. UC CAC THCR 1/4/3, part 1. 144 See, for example, Belfast Telegraph, 30 June 1982 and Irish Independent, 29 June 1982. 145 Daily Mail, 29 June 1982. See also Irish Independent, 29 June 1982. 146 Copy of memorandum by Figg, ‘The Falklands crisis and Anglo-Irish relations’, 22 June 1982. UC CAC THCR 1/20/3/19. 147 Record of meeting between Goodison, Tatham, Corcoran and Moran, 25 May 1982. NAI DT 2013/27/14. 148 Copy of memorandum by Figg, ‘The Falklands crisis and Anglo-Irish relations’, 22 June 1982. UC CAC THCR 1/20/3/19. 149 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 413. 150 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 394–5. 151 Kennedy to DFA headquarters, 21 July 1982. NAI DFA 2012/59/1679. 152 Record of speech by Prior, Hubert Humphrey Institute, Minnesota, USA, 18 Nov. 1982. NAI DT 2012/90/1057. 153 See www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/assembly1982/summary.htm. 154 See, for example, comments by Iain C. Orr, ‘Northern Ireland and Mr Barry’s visit to the US’, 7 Mar. 1983. TNA CJ 4/4321. 155 Briefing document by Walter Kirwan for Colm Ó hEocha, ‘Origins of the Forum’, 26 Apr. 1983. NAI DT 2014/105/801. 156 See www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/assembly1982/summary.htm. 157 Record of speech by Prior, Hubert Humphrey Institute, Minnesota, USA, 18 Nov. 1982. NAI DT 2012/90/1057.

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158 See, for example, record of British cabinet meeting, 1 Apr. 1982. TNA CAB 128/73, F122. 159 Comments by Prior. Record of meeting between Prior and Kenneth Dam, US deputy secretary of state, State Department, 16 Nov. 1982. TNA CJ 4/4309. 160 See Figg to FitzGerald, 15 Dec. 1982. NAI DT 2013/90/1057. 161 Irish Independent, 29 Nov. 1982. 162 See Figg’s note, ‘The prospects for Dr FitzGerald’, 15 Dec. 1982. TNA FCO 87/1291. See also memorandum by S. W. Boys Smith, ‘Anglo-Irish relations with a new Irish Government’, 9 Nov. 1982. TNA FCO 87/1291. 163 Summary by Figg, ‘Republic of Ireland: annual review of 1982’, circa early Jan. 1983. TNA CJ 4/4663. 164 See copy of Thatcher’s speech following her visit to Northern Ireland, 22 Dec. 1982. TNA PREM 19/1547. 165 Thatcher to Powell, 23 Dec. 1982. UC CAC THCR 3/2/108. 166 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 622. 167 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 622. 168 See Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 2. 169 Irish Independent, ‘ “Iron Lady” Thatcher had Irish great great granny’, 30 June 2013. 170 In fact, she was Catherine O’Sullivan, born in Drominassig, Co. Kerry in 1811. Irish Independent, ‘Maggie’s roots lie in the Kingdom’, 10 Apr. 2013. 171 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 2. 172 Record of meeting between British and Irish officials re: ‘the Armstrong-Nally Framework’ talks, 16 July 1984. NAI DFA 2014/32/1776. See also Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 306.

7 The FitzGerald-Thatcher relationship and the evolution of Anglo-Irish relations, 1983–4 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 63–4. Tebbit, Conservative Party MP for Epping, 1970–4 and Chingford, 1974–92. See Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 412. See, for example, comments by Iain C. Orr, ‘Northern Ireland and Mr Barry’s visit to the US’, 7 Mar. 1983. TNA CJ 4/4321. 5 FitzGerald, All in a life, 471. 6 Prior, A balance of power, 224. 7 Record of meeting between Prior and Goodison, 15 June 1983. TNA CJ 4/4562. 8 Record of meeting between Prior and Barry, 1 Feb. 1983. TNA CJ 4/4609. 9 For example, the Conservative Party’s 1983 general election manifesto pledged to provide a ‘framework for participation in local democracy and political progress through the [Northern Ireland] Assembly’. Extract from Conservative Party 1983 general election manifesto, ‘Northern Ireland’. UC CAC THCR 1/11/7. See also record of speech by Prior to the British-Irish Association Dinner, 16 Sept. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1673. 10 See note by Goodall, ‘Anglo-Irish relations’, 13 Jan. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1670. See also note by Armstrong, re: Anglo-Irish relations, 22 Dec. 1982. TNA CAB 164/1670. 11 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 5. 12 See note by Eyers, undated, circa mid-Jan. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1670.

1 2 3 4

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13 Record of AIIC ministerial meeting between Prior and Barry, 1 Feb. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1670. 14 Dermot Nally subsequently described this encounter as ‘neither warm nor cold’. See note by Tatham, 5 Apr. 1983. TNA CJ 4/4652. See also record of meeting between Thatcher and FitzGerald, Charlemagne Building, Brussels, 22 Mar. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1671. For an Irish record of this meeting, see NAI DFA 2013/100/1050. 15 This committee met on the following dates in 1983: 25 Mar., 1 July, 29 July, 21 Sept. and 13 Dec. See TNA CAB 134/4672. 16 This was the first of five meetings of this committee to be held during 1983. Record of meeting of official committee on Anglo-Irish relations, 25 Mar. 1983. TNA CAB 134/4672. 17 Record of conversation between Goodall and Thatcher, circa early Dec. 1982. Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 2. 18 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/chron/1983.html. 19 Armstrong to Thatcher, 8 July 1983. TNA FCO 1537. 20 At this meeting, committee members informed Armstrong (who was not a member of this committee himself) that he should inform Thatcher that there should be no new ‘initiative or change’ of direction before the publication of the NIF. See record of meeting of the official committee on Anglo-Irish relations, 1 July 1983. TNA CAB 134/4672. 21 Armstrong to Thatcher, 8 July 1983. TNA FCO 1537. 22 See, for example, note by David Barrie, ‘Republic of Ireland Department Situation Report’, 3 Aug. 1983. TNA FCO 87/1459. 23 Copy of note by D. H. Colvin, ‘Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council (AIIC)’, 8 Aug. 1983. TNA CJ 4/4360. 24 See Coles to Armstrong, undated, circa 15 July 1983. TNA FCO 87/1537. 25 See Goodall to Armstrong, 30 Sept. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 26 Interview with Michael Lillis, 18 Mar. 2016. 27 Recording of paper, ‘A tale of two islands: Anglo-Irish relations from a British perspective’, by David Goodall. Delivered as part of the Centre for Contemporary Irish History Seminar Series, 2014–15 (Trinity College Dublin, 25 Mar. 2015). See https://soundcloud.com/tlrhub/ repubics-compared-reflections-on-anglo-indian-irish-relations. 28 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 302. 29 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 415. 30 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 302. 31 See Irish Times, Obituary by Michael Lillis, ‘Sir David Goodall’, 6 Aug. 2016. 32 Record of meeting between Prior and Goodall, 20 July 1983. TNA CJ4/4562. 33 Record of meeting between Prior and Goodall, 20 July 1983. TNA CJ4/4562. 34 See comments by Prior. Record of meeting between Prior and Kenneth Dam, US deputy secretary of state, State Department, 16 Nov. 1982. TNA CJ 4/4309. 35 See note labelled ‘Meeting with the Foreign Secretary: 20 July’. TNA CJ4/4562. 36 The British government also said of Lillis: ‘[H]‌e makes sure to get his point of view across; and on occasions, he can be sharply combative … his colleagues consider him a “workaholic” and he can be found often at his desk at weekend’. See confidential British file on Michael Lillis, undated. TNA CAB 164/1674. 37 In fact, according to Michael Lillis, the coordinating committee of the AIIC only ever met on one occasion. Interview with Michael Lillis, 18 Mar. 2016.

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38 See note marked ‘secret and personal, Prime Minister, Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. 39 See confidential memorandum by Angel, ‘The Lillis Proposition’, 20 Sept. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 40 Goodall to Armstrong, ‘Ireland’, 23 May 1983. TNA CAB 164/1671. 41 See P. H. C. Eyers to Tatham, re: ‘Michael Lillis’, 7 June 1983. TNA CAB 164/1671. 42 Goodall to Armstrong, ‘Ireland’, 23 May 1983. TNA CAB 164/1671. 43 See Irish Times Obituary by Michael Lillis, ‘Sir David Goodall’, 6 Aug. 2016. 44 Record of meeting between British and Irish officials, Dublin, 3 Sept. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1673. See also TNA CAB 134/4672. 45 Comments by David Goodall. See the reflections of Michael Lillis and David Goodall, ‘Edging towards peace’, Dublin Review of Books, No. 16 (Winter 2010). See also Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 3. 46 FitzGerald, All in a life, 473. 47 Moore claims that this offer on behalf of the Irish was ‘not quite as momentum as it seemed’. ‘Articles 2 and 3 meant little in international law since, in 1925, the treaty between Ireland and Britain had recognized the partition of Ireland’. Yet, his argument fails to appreciate the psychological significance of this proposed amendment/removal to the Irish Constitution given that historically Irish republicans placed Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution at the heart of their anti-partitionism. Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 303–4. 48 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 303. See also the reflections of Lillis and Goodall, ‘Edging towards peace’; and Irish Times Obituary by Michael Lillis, ‘Sir David Goodall’, 6 Aug. 2016. 49 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 3. 50 Goodall and Lillis also discussed the nature of Anglo-Irish relations, in mid-Sept., at the annual conference of the British-Irish Association at Balliol College, Oxford. See Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 3. 51 See Goodall to Armstrong, 30 Sept. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 52 See note by G. L. Angel, ‘Lillis Proposition’, 4 Oct. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 53 Record of conversation between Goodall and Lillis, circa 12–13 Oct. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 54 During a conversation with Armstrong, Prior was reported as saying that ‘it would be wise to stand off from Mr Lillis’. See comments by Goodall. Record of conversation between Goodall and Lillis, circa 12–13 Oct. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 55 See note marked ‘secret and personal, Prime Minister, Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. 56 See comments by Howe. Record of meeting between Howe and Hurd, 4 Jan. 1985. TNA CJ 4/5870/1. 57 See comments by Armstrong during a meeting in the Cabinet Office, 18 Oct. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1575. See also Cole to Armstrong, 9 Oct. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 58 Reeve to A. J. Merifield, undated circa 23 Oct. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 59 Reeve to A. J. Merifield, undated circa 23 Oct. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 60 See note marked ‘secret and personal, Prime Minister, Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. See also TNA CAB 164/1676.

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61 British government memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. 62 Confidential note by A. J. E. Brennan, ‘The Lillis Proposal’, 18 Oct. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 63 See Woodfield to Armstrong, 22 Oct. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 64 See memorandum by the Cabinet Office regarding Anglo-Irish relations, 3 Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. See also British government memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. 65 See note by Alan Goodison, ‘Northern Ireland: new approaches’, 20 Oct. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1675. 66 See note marked ‘secret and personal, Prime Minister, Anglo-Irish Relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. See also British government memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. 67 The idea that members of the Irish judiciary should be involved in the judicial process in Northern Ireland was first mooted during the mid-1970s. In 1974, the Law Enforcement Commission considered the establishment of mixed courts in each jurisdiction in which ‘members of the High Court in Ireland and of the High Court of Justice of Northern Ireland could sit side by side’. See note by Alan Goodison, ‘Northern Ireland: new approaches’, 20 Oct. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1675. See also note by G. L. Angel, ‘Lillis Proposition’, 4 Oct. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 68 British government memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. 69 See confidential memorandum by Armstrong, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, 21 Sept. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5893. 70 British government memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. 71 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 7. 72 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 304. 73 See Irish government record of Anglo-Irish summit meeting, 7 Nov. 1983. NAI DFA 2013/100/1989, file 1 of 2. See also NAI DFA 2013/10/189. See also FitzGerald, All in a life, 476–7. 74 The contents of this paragraph are sourced from Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 305. 75 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 416. 76 FitzGerald, All in a life, 464. See also briefing document by Kirwan for Ó hEocha, ‘Origins of the Forum’, 26 Apr. 1983. NAI DT 2014/105/801. 77 See Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 285–6. 78 See the Rev. Paisley to FitzGerald, 24 Mar. 1983. NAI DT 2014/105/805. 79 Copy of statement read by J. Tobin, 21 Apr. 1983. NAI DT 2013/27/1485. 80 New Ireland Forum Report (Dublin, 1984), chapter one. 81 Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 278. 82 See note by David R. Snoxell, RIO, ‘Northern Ireland: congressional interest and St Patrick’s Day Statement’, 16 Feb. 1983. 83 British government memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. 84 G. L. Angel to Julian Bullard, FCO, 12 Aug. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1673.

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85 Note marked ‘secretary of state’s meeting with Mr Barry: Government attitude to Sinn Féin’, unsigned and undated. TNA CJ 4/4289. 86 See, for example, note by S. W. Boys-Smith, ‘Meeting with the Prime Minister and Dr Garret FitzGerald’, undated, circa 20 June 1983. TNA CJ 4/4360. Furthermore, Tatham explained that there was nothing that London would like better than to see ‘[Martin] McGuinness arrested’ (In the margins, in his own hand, Tatham wrote, ‘I think, I said, “convicted”. Arrest is not so difficult but achieves only a day or two in detention’). Copy of note by Tatham, ‘Northern Ireland: DFA complaints’, 9 May 1983. TNA CJ 4/4653. 87 Record of meeting of official committee on Anglo-Irish relations, 25 Mar. 1983. TNA CAB 134/4672. 88 See, for example, TNA CJ 4/4433; TNA CJ 4/4605; TNA FCO 87/1456; TNA FCO 87/1457; and TNA CAB 164/1677. 89 British government memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, unsigned and undated, circa early Nov. 1983. TNA CAB 164/1676. See also A. J Merifield to Angel, 16 May 1983. TNA CJ 4/4605. 90 Record of meeting between Prior and Dorr, 15 Sept. 1983. TNA CJ 4/4289. 91 See John Biggs-Davison, United Ireland?? United Islands? (Sept. 1984). A copy of this paper is available from NAI DT 2016/22/2254. 92 Record of remarks by John Biggs-Davison. Record of public session, NIF, 6 Oct. 1983. NAI DT 2016/52/87. 93 See ‘draft’ note re: ‘The background note on the New Ireland Forum’, undated circa May 1984. NAI DT 2014/1/5/807. 94 New Ireland Forum Report, chapter five. 95 See note to Thatcher, ‘approved by the Secretary of State and signed in his absence’, 1 May 1984. TNA CAB 164/1731/2. See also See note by Goodall, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Forum Report’, 30 Apr. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1731/2. 96 Record of British cabinet meeting, 3 May 1984. TNA CAB 128/78/17. 97 See Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 396. 98 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 16. 99 See Goodison to Howe, ‘Republic of Ireland – annual review’, 16 Jan. 1985. TNA CAB 164/1773. 100 Record of meeting between Goodall and Lillis, 25 Apr. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1731/2. 101 Record of meeting of British civil servants, ‘Handling of the Forum Report’, NIO Conference Room, 4 p.m., 30 Apr. 1984. TNA CJ 4/5100. 102 See note by D. H. Colvin, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Forum Report’, 27 Apr. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1731/2. 103 See note by D. H. Colvin, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Forum Report’, 27 Apr. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1731/2. 104 See James W. McAuley, Ulster’s last stand? Reconstructing Unionism after the peace process (Dublin, 2010), 44. 105 McAuley, Ulster’s last stand, 44 106 See note by Hewitt, ‘Meeting with Rev. Ian Paisley, MP’, 11 May 1984. TNA CJ 4/5100. 107 David Storey, Kevin Harvey Proctor and David Evans Out, Out, Out! (Monday Club policy paper, No. N.I. 2. Aug. 1985). See UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 1 of 2. 108 See Waddell to D. Bryce, 3 May 1984. TNA CJ 4/5100. 109 See comments by Prior, 4 July 1984. HC Debate, Vol. 63, cc. 23–106. 110 See comments by Stanbrook, 4 July 1984. HC Debate, Vol. 63, cc. 23–106.

 339

Notes 111 112 113 114

339

See comments by Biggs-Davison, 4 July 1984. HC Debate, Vol. 63, cc. 23–106. Scott, Conservative Party MP for Paddington South, 1966–74 and Chelsea, 1974–97. Mates, Conservative Party MP for East Hampshire, 1974–2010. See comments by Scott and Mates, 4 July 1984. HC Debate, Vol. 63, cc. 23–106. See also comments by Henry Bellingham, Conservative Party MP for North West Norfolk, 4 July 1984HC Debate, Vol. 63, cc. 23–106. 115 Brian Mawhinney noted that ‘It is interesting that one of the three options mentioned – that of a joint authority – flies in the face of the traditional cries from the Republic [of Ireland]. Those cries have always been, “Brits out”.’ See comments by Mawhinney, 4 July 1984. HC Debate, Vol. 63, cc. 23–106. 116 Initially, Roy Jenkins and Francis Pym were asked whether they would like to chair this proposed inquiry. They each declined the invitation offer. See meeting between David Astor and Prior, 12 Jan. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1728/2. 117 Paul Arthur, Jane Ewart-Biggs (Baroness Ewart-Biggs), David Howell, Simon Jenkins and Reg Underhill (Lord Underhill) were reportedly members of the Lord Kilbrandon Inquiry. The body first convened on 23 May 1984. Over the following months, the inquiry met on a further nine occasions, including three full-day meetings and a weekend meeting at Balliol College, Oxford. 118 See ‘The British Forum’, 16 Mar. 1983. TNA CJ 4/5037. Privately, Prior reportedly gave his blessing to the workings of this inquiry. See record of meeting between David Astor and Prior, 12 Jan. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1728/2. 119 See Northern Ireland: report of an independent inquiry (London, Nov. 1984), chapter three. A full copy of this report is available from TNA CJ 4/5037. See also TNA FCO 87/1690. 120 Comments by Lord Underhill, 3 Dec. 1984. House of Lords Debate. Vol. 457, cc. 1178–202. 121 Comments by Lord Kilbrandon, 3 Dec. 1984. House of Lords Debate. Vol. 457, cc. 1178–202. 122 See Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 396. 123 See record of meeting between Howe and Prior, 30 Apr. 1984. TNA CJ 4/5100. 124 In May 1984, the US House of Representatives and US Senate unanimously passed a joint resolution commending the efforts of the participants in the NIF and called on all parties to review the findings and recommendations of the report. See Irish government document, ‘The Friends of Ireland in the US Congress’, circa 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/15. Indeed, US senator Ted Kennedy and his American-Irish colleagues reportedly gave the findings of the NIF ‘an enthusiastic reception’. Kennedy noted that the report represented the ‘best chance to break the intensifying cycle of killing and violence in Northern Ireland and achieve true reconciliation’. See Times, 5 May 1984. 125 Record of British government cabinet meeting, 3 May 1984. TNA CAB 128/78/17. 126 Record of British cabinet meeting, 16 Feb. 1984. TNA CAB 128/78. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/133165. 127 Record of British cabinet meeting, 16 Feb. 1984. TNA CAB 128/78. 128 See Armstrong to Thatcher, 19 July 1984. TNA PREM 19/1287. 129 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 12. 130 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. Michael Lillis supports this argument. Between 1983 and the run up to the signing of the AIA in 1985, Lillis recounted, the NIO was ‘never included’ in the aforementioned negotiations. Interview with Michael Lillis, 18 Mar. 2016.

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131 Michael Anderson interview with Lord Bernard Donoughue, London, 8 July 2010. UCDA P171/9. 132 Michael Anderson and Robert Mauro interview with Howe, London, 26 May 2010. See UCDA P171/14. 133 Record of meeting between British and Irish officials re: ‘the Armstrong-Nally Framework talks’, 16 July 1984. NAI DFA 2014/32/1776. See also Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 21. 134 Record of meeting between British and Irish officials re: ‘the Armstrong-Nally Framework’ talks, 16 July 1984. NAI DFA 2014/32/1776. See also record of meeting between British and Irish officials re: ‘the Armstrong-Nally Framework’ talks, 30 July 1984. NAI DFA 2014/32/1776. 135 Record of meeting between British and Irish officials re: ‘the Armstrong-Nally Framework’ talks, 16 July 1984. NAI DFA 2014/32/1776. See also record of meeting between British and Irish officials re: ‘the Armstrong-Nally Framework’ talks, 30 July 1984. NAI DFA 2014/32/1776. 136 This was the opinion of Douglas Hurd. See Hurd, Memoirs, 335. 137 See Howe to Thatcher, 16 Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. 138 Armstrong, ‘Ethnicity, the English, and Northern Ireland: comments and reflections’, 204. 139 Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume two: the Iron Lady, 256. 140 Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, volume two: the Iron Lady, 256–7. 141 See record of meeting between Richard Ryan and Adam Ridley, 11 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/89. 142 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 23. 143 See Hurd, Memoirs, 328. 144 Young, One of us, 471. 145 Hurd, Memoirs, 328. 146 Irish government memorandum labelled ‘speaking note’ undated. NAI DFA 2014/32/1776. See also TNA CAB 164/1733. 147 FitzGerald, All in a life, 495. 148 See Susan McDermott interview with Garret FitzGerald, London, 8 July 2010. UCDA P171/11. 149 Interview with Michael Lillis, 18 Mar. 2016. 150 Record of meeting between Thatcher and FitzGerald, 3 Sept. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1734. 151 Record of meeting between Armstrong, Goodall, Goodison, Donlon, Lillis and Nally, 19 Sept.1984. NAI DFA 2014/32/1774. See also TNA PREM 19/1288. See also FitzGerald, All in a life, 507–8. 152 See Armstrong to Thatcher, 10 Oct. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1734. 153 See, for example, Powell to Armstrong, 26 Sept. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1734. 154 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 24. 155 Taylor, Brits, 265. Three files held by TNA labelled ‘Patrick Joseph Magee …’ remained closed to the public until 1 Jan. 2068. See TNA Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 2/9046–8. 156 Heseltine, Michael Heseltine, 280. 157 See Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 418. 158 See Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 379–2. 159 Norman Tebbit, Upwardly mobile (London, 1988), 226. 160 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 307.

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Notes 161 162 163 164 165

341

Berry, Conservative Party MP for Enfield-Southgate, 1964–84. See TNA PREM 19/1632. Quoted in Taylor, Brits, 265. Comments by Patrick Magee. Sunday Business Post, 3 Sept. 2000. See Richard Aldous, Reagan & Thatcher: the difficult relationship (London, 2012), 165–6. 166 The newspaper continued: ‘The British government was accused of ‘zealously following the U.S. imperialists’ policy of aggression and war and expanding arms.’ ‘Shouts “Thatcher, step down” and “Give us job instead of bomb!” are ringing out from all parts of Britain’. Nodong Sinmun, 18 Oct. 1984. See ‘International Affairs’, 1. General and Western Affairs, North Korea comment on Brighton bombing’, 20 Oct. 1984. TNA FCO 21/2882. 167 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 382. 168 See Caroline Slocock, People like us: Margaret Thatcher and me (London, 2019), 232. 169 Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, 417. 170 Goodlad, Thatcher, 117–18. 171 Powell to Thatcher, 11 Oct. 1984. TNA PREM 19/1288. 172 See Powell to Thatcher, 18 Oct. 1984. TNA PREM 19/1288. See also Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 399. 173 Record of meeting between Thatcher, Howe, Hurd and collection of senior civil servants, No. 10 Downing Street, 31 Oct. 1984. TNA CAB 164–35. 174 See Hurd, Memoirs, 336. 175 See Howe to Thatcher, 16 Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. 176 See note by Goodall, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, 30 Oct. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. See also Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 25–6. 177 Record of meeting between Thatcher, Howe, Hurd and collection of senior civil servants, No. 10 Downing Street, 31 Oct. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. 178 Howe to Thatcher, 23 Oct. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. 179 See note by Goodall, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, 30 Oct. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. 180 See record of Armstrong-Nally framework talks, 3 Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. 181 FitzGerald, All in a life, 512. 182 ‘Speaking note’ prepared on behalf of the Irish government, undated circa 12/13 Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. See also record of telephone conversation between Noel Dorr and Armstrong, 14 Nov. 1984. NAI DFA 2014/32/1944. 183 Record of meeting between Goodall and Lillis, circa 10 Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. 184 Howe to Thatcher (report of the former’s talks FitzGerald), 16 Nov. 1984. TNA PREM19/1408. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/134756. 185 Record of meeting between Goodall and Lillis, circa mid-Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. 186 For a comprehensive record of the Thatcher-FitzGerald Anglo-Irish summit meeting, 18–19 Nov. 1984, see NAI DT 2014/105/789. See also TNA PREM 19/1408; Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 319–23; and FitzGerald, All in a life, 515–21. 187 FitzGerald had anticipated that this summit meeting would be convened in Dublin. However, fearful of a further assassination attempt on her life, on Thatcher’s request, it was agreed to host the event at Chequers (Goodall recounted that Thatcher

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observed that the PIRA ‘will probably get me in the end, but I don’t see why I should offer myself on a plate’. Quoted in Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 29. 188 Record of private meeting between Thatcher and FitzGerald, 18 Nov. 1984. TNA CJ 4/5870/2. See also FitzGerald, All in a life, 515. 189 FitzGerald, All in a life, 515. See also Goodall’s account of this meeting. Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 1, 32–5. 190 Record of Anglo-Irish summit talks, 9.30 a.m. to 11.30 a.m., 19 Nov. 1984. TNA CJ 4/5870/2. 191 Tebbit, Upwardly mobile, 339–40. 192 Record of Anglo-Irish summit talks, 9.30 a.m. to 11.30 a.m., 19 Nov. 1984. TNA CJ 4/5870/2. 193 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 320. 194 Susan McDermott interview with Garret FitzGerald, Dublin, 3 May 2009. UCDA P171/11. 195 Record of Anglo-Irish talks, 12 noon to 1.45 p.m., 19 Nov. 1984. TNA CJ 4/5870/2. 196 Copy of joint Anglo-Irish communiqué, 19 Nov. 1984. NAI DT 2014/105/789. 197 Comments by Thatcher, 19 Nov. 1984. A copy of Thatcher’s post press conference speech is available from NAI DT 2015/51/1374. 198 Comments by Lord Powell. Quotes in Iain Dale (ed.), Memories of Margaret Thatcher: a portrait, by those who knew her best (London, 2000), 33. 199 See Hurd, Memoirs, 340. 200 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 421. 201 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. 202 Comments by Goodall. See the reflections of Lillis and Goodall, ‘Edging towards peace’. 203 Comments by Kinnock, 20 Nov. 1984. HC Debate, Vol. 68, c. 151. 204 See Mates to Thatcher, 20 Dec. 1984. TNA CJ 4/5870/1. See also NAI DT 2015/89/89. 205 See record of meeting between Richard Ryan and Adam Ridley, 11 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/89. 206 See Richard Ryan’s note, ‘A letter from Mrs Thatcher’, 11 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/89. 207 Name withheld, 26 Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1736. 208 David Kenney ‘British citizen’, Dublin Rd, Oranmore, Co. Galway to Goodison, 21 Feb. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1736. 209 Comments by Molyneaux, 20 Nov. 1984. HC debate, Vol. 68, c. 152. 210 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 322. 211 FitzGerald, All in a life, 523. 212 Record of meeting between Goodall and Lillis, 28 Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1736. 213 Irish Independent, 22 Nov. 1984. 214 Thatcher continued: ‘There was nothing new in that: it was made clear by Jim Prior in his speech in the House of Commons on 2 July, and I reaffirmed it to you when we met in London at the beginning of [3] September [1984].’ See Thatcher to FitzGerald, undated, 29 Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. See also FitzGerald to Thatcher, 22 Nov. 1984. TNA CJ4/5870/2. 215 See ‘Northern Ireland: British position paper’, unsigned and undated, circa late Nov./ early Dec. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1736. 216 Record of meeting between Goodall and Lillis, 28 Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1736.

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217 See Thatcher to FitzGerald, 29 Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1736. See also note by Armstrong re: ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, 13 Dec. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1736. 218 Thatcher to FitzGerald, undated, circa late Nov. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1735. 219 See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 323. 220 See ‘Northern Ireland: British position paper’, unsigned and undated, circa late Nov./ early Dec. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1736. 221 According to FitzGerald, the proposal on behalf of Thatcher for a Joint Security Commission was an attempt by London to create a ‘security band’ along the Irish border to be policed by ‘joint crime squads, which could develop later into a common police force of crime squad’. FitzGerald, All in a life, 494. 222 See ‘Northern Ireland: British position paper’, unsigned and undated, circa late Nov./ early Dec. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1736. 223 Powell to Armstrong, 12 Dec. 1984. TNA CAB 164/1736. 224 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 325. 225 Comments by Powell. Record of meeting between Powell and Richard Ryan, 21 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/89.

8  Anglo-American relations and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985–6 1 See Fanning, ‘The Anglo-Irish alliance and the Irish question in the twentieth century’, 204–7. 2 Quoted in Devoy, ‘The British response to American interest in Northern Ireland, 1976–79’, 226–7. 3 Quoted in Maurice Fitzpatrick, John Hume in America: from Derry to DC (Notre Dame, 2019), 56. 4 MacGinty, ‘American influences on the Northern Ireland peace process’, 31–3. 5 Quoted in Devoy, ‘The British response to American interest in Northern Ireland, 1976–79’, 226–7. 6 MacGinty, ‘American influences on the Northern Ireland peace process’, 31–3. 7 A copy of Carter’s Northern Ireland speech was reproduced in Washington Post, 31 Aug. 1977. See also ‘Proposed statement on Northern Ireland’, to be delivered by US president Carter, 26 Aug. 1977. The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Folder Citation: Office of Staff Secretary; Series; Presidential Files; Folder: 8/26/77. Available from https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_ Secretary.pdf. 8 MacGinty, ‘American influences on the Northern Ireland peace process’, 2–3. 9 Irish Times, 31 Aug. 1977. 10 Comments by Carter. ‘In the name of peace: John Hume in America’ (2017). Documentary, written, produced and directed by Maurice Fitzpatrick. For further details, see https://johnhumeinamerica.com/learn-more/. 11 Devoy, ‘The British response to American interest in Northern Ireland, 1976–79’, 227–8. 12 Interview with Ted Kennedy, ‘Edward M. Kennedy Oral History (3/20/2006), Senator’, 20 Mar. 2016. Miller Center Oral Archive. Available

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from https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/ edward-m-kennedy-oral-history-3202006. 13 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 68–9. 14 For further reading vis-à-vis the Carter-Thatcher relationship and the Northern Ireland conflict, see Stephen Kelly, ‘ “The Anglo-Irish Agreement put us on side with the Americans”: Margaret Thatcher, Anglo-American relations and the path to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1979–1985’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2020), 433–57. 15 See, for example, briefing note: ‘U.S. administration and Northern Ireland and developments relating to the sale of arms to the RUC’, May 1980. NAI DT 2010/53/928/1. 16 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 496. 17 Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, 296. 18 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 496. 19 Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, 296. 20 See, for example, John Dumbrell, A special relationship: Anglo-American relations from the Cold War to Iraq (London, 2006). See also Aldous, Reagan & Thatcher. 21 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 547. 22 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: path to power, 372. 23 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 374. 24 See copy of British political profile of Ronald Reagan, circa 1982. TNA FCO 82/1230. 25 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 547. 26 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 547. 27 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 547. 28 Fanning, ‘The Anglo-Irish alliance and the Irish question in the twentieth century’, 209. 29 Copy of Reagan’s St Patrick’s Day speech, 17 Mar. 1981. See ‘U.S. administration attitude to Northern Ireland: summary briefing note’, circa 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/15. See also TNA CJ 4/4321. 30 For further reading vis-à-vis Anglo-American relations during the second Irish Republican hunger strike of 1981, see Wilson, Irish America and the Ulster conflict, 1968–1995, 176–96. See also Hennessey, Hunger strike, 213–14 and 361–2. 31 Quoted in Wilson, Irish America and the Ulster conflict, 1968–1995, 194. 32 Hurson passed away on 13 July 1981, after forty-six days on hunger strike. He was twenty-six years old. 33 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Reagan, 20 July 1981. TNA FCO 92/1093. 34 See Henderson to the FCO, 7 Jan. 1982. TNA CJ 4/4323. 35 To the frustration of the British government during his vacation in Ireland, Clark gave an interview to RTÉ in which he expressed his desire to see eventual ‘[Irish] unification’. See Arthur, Special relationships, 148. See also A. K. C. Wood to A. J. Coles, 10 Dec. 1981. TNA CAB 164/1575. 36 Interview with Ted Kennedy, ‘TED M. KENNEDY ORAL HISTORY’, 27 Feb. 2006. 37 Interview with Seán Donlon, ‘Garret FitzGerald Oral History, Prime Minister of Ireland’, 28 Sept. 2005. Miller Center Oral Archive. Available from https://millercenter. org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/garret-fitzgerald-oral-history. 38 Comments by Seán Donlon. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. 39 See ‘U.S. administration attitude to Northern Ireland: summary briefing note’, circa 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/15.

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40 Comments by Haughey. See ‘U.S. administration attitude to Northern Ireland: summary briefing note’, circa 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/15. 41 See ‘U.S. administration attitude to Northern Ireland: summary briefing note’, circa 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/15. 42 Copy of Reagan’s St Patrick’s Day speech, 17 Mar. 1982. TNA CJ 4/4321. 43 See Jim Prior to Henderson, to 31 Mar. 1982. TNA CJ 4/4323. 44 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Reagan, No. 10 Downing Street, 9 June 1982. TNA FCO 82/1230. 45 Record of meeting between Clark and Henderson, 12 Oct. 1982. TNA CJ 4/4321. 46 Copy of FCO steering note, ‘Meeting with vice-president Bush’, marked ‘Northern Ireland’, circa 14 June 1983. TNA CJ 4/4321. 47 See copy of Reagan’s St Patrick’s Day speech, 17 Mar. 1983. TNA CJ 4/4321. 48 Irish Times, 6 July 1983. 49 Irish Times, 6 July 1983. 50 Wilson, Irish America and the Ulster conflict, 1968–1995, 241. 51 See ‘U.S. administration attitude to Northern Ireland: summary briefing note’, circa 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/15. 52 Record of interview with Reagan and Brian Farrell of the RTÉ’s Today Tonight, 28 May 1984. See TNA CJ 4/5450. 53 See ‘U.S. administration attitude to Northern Ireland: summary briefing note’, circa 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/15. 54 See British memorandum, ‘President Reagan’s visit to Ireland, 1–4 June 1984’, unsigned and undated, circa 1985. TNA CJ 4/5450. 55 See note by David Tatham, ‘President Reagan in the Irish Republic: summary’, 12 June 1984. TNA FCO 87/1723. 56 See note by J. M. Lyon, ‘Prime Minister’s tête-à-tête with President Reagan’, 5 June 1984. TNA CJ 4/5450. 57 See note by D. J. R. Hill, ‘Meeting with Judge William Clark’, 16 May 1984. TNA CJ 4/5450. 58 FitzGerald, All in a life, 527. 59 Over the preceding years, Clark had built up a close working relationship with Donlon. By this period, Donlon was ‘an intellectual heavyweight’ in the field of IrishAmerican relations and more generally Anglo-Irish relations. He had previously served as Irish ambassador in Washington from 1978 to 1981, during which time he had built up an excellent working relationship with prominent Irish-American politicians. Uniquely, during his period as Irish ambassador to the United States, Donlon had also struck up a close personal relationship with Reagan. In fact, Reagan reportedly ‘came to Donlon’s house [in Washington] regularly: not one of the other 150+ Ambassadors in Washington D.C. – not the British, French or German for ­example – had a remotely comparable relationship’. See Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 127–8 and 305. 60 Wilson, Irish America and the Ulster conflict, 1968–1995, 244. 61 For further information on the workings of ‘The Four Horsemen’, founded in 1977, see Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 129. 62 The first formal meeting of the FOI was held on 3 June 1981. Approximately, forty US senators and congressmen from both the US Democratic and Republican parties were registered members. See Irish government document, ‘The Friends of Ireland in the US Congress’, circa 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/15.

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63 See David Brundage, Irish Nationalists in America: the politics of exile, 1798–1998 (Oxford, 2016), 205. 64 Moynihan, US senator for New York, 1977–2001. 65 Carey, US governor of New York, 1975–82. 66 See Irish government document, ‘The Friends of Ireland in the US Congress’, circa 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/15. 67 Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 129. 68 Interview with Michael Lillis, 18 Mar. 2016. 69 Fanning, ‘The Anglo-Irish alliance and the Irish question in the twentieth century’, 208. 70 See Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, 434–5. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 323–5. 71 Paul Bew, Ireland: the politics of enmity, 1789–2006 (Oxford, 2007), 533. 72 Patterson, Ireland since 1939, 259. 73 Fitzpatrick, John Hume in America, 128. 74 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 331. 75 Green, Thatcher, 163. 76 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 308. 77 See record of tête-à-tête between Reagan and Thatcher, 10.30 a.m. to 11.15 a.m., 22 Dec. 1984. UC CAC THCR 1/10/78. 78 Record of meeting between Reagan and Thatcher, 11.20 a.m., 22 Dec. 1984. TNA PREM 19/1656. 79 Cannadine, Margaret Thatcher, 85. 80 Copy of speech by Reagan, White House Lawn, 2.30 p.m., 20 Feb. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1658. Available from https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/148166. 81 Record of speech by Thatcher to joint House of US Congress, 20 Feb. 1985. See https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105968. 82 Fitzpatrick, John Hume in America, 128. 83 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 325. 84 Washington Post, 21 Feb. 1985. 85 Record of meeting between Thatcher and John Hume, 17 Jan. 1985. TNA CJ 4/5870/1. 86 See note by Armstrong, ‘Anglo-Irish Relations, undated circa late 1984/early 1985. TNA CJ 4/5870/1. 87 Record meeting between Lord Gowrie and Richard Ryan, 15 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/89. 88 Record of meeting between Howe and Hurd, 4 Jan. 1985. TNA CJ 4/5870/1. 89 Record of meeting between Howe and Hurd, 4 Jan. 1985. TNA CJ 4/5870/1. 90 Record of meeting between Howe and Hurd, 4 Jan. 1985. TNA CJ 4/5870/1. 91 Record of meeting between Thatcher, Howe and Hurd, 16 Jan. 1985. TNA CJ 4/5870/1. 92 See Irish government memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish exchanges’, 30 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/89. 93 Record meeting between Lord Gowrie and Richard Ryan, 15 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/89. 94 Thatcher chaired this new subcommittee. Apart from Lord Gowrie, members of this subcommittee included Lord Hailsham, Howe, Hurd, Tebbit, Lowry and Michael Havers. See TNA PREM 19/1549. 95 Record of conversation between Ryan and Lord Gowrie, 27 Mar. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/90.

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96 Record of conversation between Ryan and Lord Gowrie, 27 Mar. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/90. 97 See record of meeting between Ryan and Lord Gowrie, 8 May 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/90. During the run up to the signing of the AIA, Ryan and Lord Gowrie regularly met to exchange views on the progress of the Anglo-Irish talks. See NAI DT 2015/89/90–91. 98 Michael Anderson interview with Richard Needham, London, 7 July 2010. See UCDA P171/23. 99 McAlpine, treasurer of the Conservative Party, 1975–90 and deputy chairman of the Conservative Party, 1979–83. 100 Benyon, Conservative Party MP for Buckingham, 1970–83 and Milton Keynes, 1983–92. He was also vice-chair of the CPPNIC during the mid-1980s. 101 Buck, Conservative Party MP for Colchester, 1961–83 and Colchester North, 1983–92. 102 Crouch, Conservative Party MP for Canterbury, 1966–87. 103 Fox, Conservative Party MP for Shipley, 1970–97. 104 See Ryan, ‘Building Westminster commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement’, in Mary Daly (ed.), Brokering the Good Friday Agreement, 71–4. 105 Ryan, ‘Building Westminster commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement’, in Daly (ed.), Brokering the Good Friday Agreement: the untold story (Dublin, 2019), 70. 106 Comments by John Bowman. Irish Times, 28 and 30 Dec. 2017. 107 Comments by John Bowman. Irish Times, 28 and 30 Dec. 2017. 108 Record of Irish government meeting, 31 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/88. See also FitzGerald, All in a life, 531–2. 109 Record of meeting between FitzGerald and Armstrong, 22 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/88. 110 See NAI DT 2015/89/89. 111 Record FitzGerald-Thatcher meeting, 30 Mar. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1549. See also NAI DT 2015/51/1338. 112 Record of Armstrong-Nally framework talks, 29–30 Apr. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/86. See also FitzGerald, All in a life, 538. 113 See record of Armstrong-Nally framework talks, 29–30 Apr. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/86. 114 Record of Armstrong-Nally framework talks, 29–30 Apr. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/86. 115 The Armstrong-Nally framework talks were convened on the following dates during 1985: 21 Jan. (Dublin); 23 Jan. (London); 8 Feb. (London); 19 Feb. (Barretstown Castle, Kildare); 22 Mar. (Dublin); 29–30 Apr. (Chevening); 15 May (Dublin); 14 June (London); 9 July (Dublin); 15–16 July (London); 20–21 July (Barretstown Castle, Kildare); 30–31 July (Chevening); 3 Sept. (Dublin); 12–13 Sept. (London); 22–23 Sept. (Dublin); 29–30 Sept. (London); 7–8 Oct. (Dublin); 13–14 Oct. (London); 29–30 Oct. (Dublin); and 12 Nov. 1985 (Dublin). A concise record of meetings of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks held during 1985 are available from NAI DT 2015/89/86 and NAI DT 2015/89/52 (parts 1 and 2). See also NAI DT 2015/89/88 and NAI DT 2016/22/2231. 116 Record of conversation between Lillis and Goodall, 13 May 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/86. 117 See record of meeting between Ryan and Lord Gowrie, 8 May 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/90.

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118 See record of meeting between Ryan and Lord Gowrie, 8 May 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/90. 119 See record of Armstrong-Nally framework talks, Dublin, 15 May 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/86. See also note to FitzGerald, 16 May 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/86. 120 According to Adam Ridley, Biffen, while a ‘good man’, was ‘at present politically negative on Northern Ireland because his instincts tell him there is little, if anything, to be gained from touching it at present’. See record of meeting between Richard Ryan and Adam Ridley, 11 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/89. 121 Lord Hailsham was reportedly against any political developments for Northern Ireland, ‘but not just because he is a mouthpiece in Downing Street for Unionism; he expressed enormous respect for Garret FitzGerald and what he stands for; rather he thinks that there is simply nothing that could usefully be done to improve the situation’. See record of meeting between Lord Gowrie and David Astor (as recounted by Richard Ryan of the Irish Embassy in Dublin), 13 June 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/91. 122 It was recorded at the time that Tebbit was unenthusiastic about the Anglo-Irish negotiations. Lord Gowrie said that Tebbit ‘did not really have an eye for the reality of the Irish relationship’. Record of conversation between Ryan and Lord Gowrie, 27 Mar. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/90. 123 See record of meeting between Richard Ryan and Adam Ridley, 11 Jan. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/89. 124 Quoted in Goodall, unpublished manuscript, part 6, xiv. 125 Record of meeting between Armstrong and Nally, 12 June 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/86. 126 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, 22. 127 See record of conversation between Goodall and Dorr, 6 June 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/86. 128 See record of conversation between Goodall and Dorr, 6 June 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/86. 129 Record of FitzGerald-Thatcher meeting, Milan, 29 June 1985. TNA PREM 19/1549. See also NAI DT 2015/89/86. 130 See Howe/Hurd memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, 23 July 1985. TNA CAB 129/219/20. 131 According to a Whitehall source, Noel Dorr was also allegedly a possible source of the mentioned ‘leak’. See Armstrong to Powell, 14 Oct. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1551. See also Armstrong to Powell, 22 May 1985. TNA PREM 19/1549. 132 See Howe/Hurd memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, 23 July 1985. TNA CAB 129/219/20. 133 Comments by David Astor. See record of meeting between Lord Gowrie and David Astor, 13 June 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/91. 134 Hurd, Memoirs, 340–1. 135 Record of British cabinet meeting, 25 July 1985. TNA CAB 128/81. 136 Hurd, Memoirs, 340–1. 137 Record of British cabinet meeting, 25 July 1985. TNA CAB 128/81. 138 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 669–70. 139 King, Conservative Party MP for Bridgwater, 1970–2001. Member of the House of Lords (Lord Temporal) Lord King, Baron King of Bridgwater, 2001-present. 140 FitzGerald, All in a life, 461.

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141 See record of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks, 9 July (Dublin); 15–16 July (London); 20–21 July (Barretstown Castle, Kildare); 30–31 July (Chevening). TNA CJ CAB 164/1774 and NAI DT 2015/89/86. 142 Armstrong to Thatcher, 26 July 1985. TNA PREM 19/1550. 143 Evans, Conservative Party MP for Welwyn Hatfield, 1987–97. 144 Storey, Proctor and Evans, Out, Out, Out! (Monday Club policy paper, No. N.I. 2. Aug. 1985). See UC CAC POLL 9/2/26, file 1 of 2. 145 Clark, Diaries, 117. 146 Clark, Diaries, 116–17. 147 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, 61. 148 Author’s email exchange with Lord King, 14 Jan. 2020. 149 Christopher Farrington interview with Tom King, London, 27 Oct. 2008. UCDA P171/16. 150 Arthur, Special relationships, 214, 151 See comment by Kenneth Bloomfield (Michael Anderson and Robert Mauro interview), Hollywood, Co. Down, 20 Apr. 2010. UCDA P171/3. See also author’s interview with Kenneth Bloomfield, 2 June 2006. 152 Powell to Thatcher, 27 Sept. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1550. 153 Howe to Thatcher, 28 Sept. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1550. See also Goodall, unpublished manuscript, 64. 154 See Powell to Thatcher, 27 Sept. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1550. 155 Record of meeting between Thatcher, Howe and King, 29 Oct. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1551. 156 Thatcher to FitzGerald, 4 Oct. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1551. See also NAI DT 2015/89/92. 157 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 332. 158 Powell to Thatcher, 30 Oct. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1551. 159 See record of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks, 3 Sept. (Dublin); 12–13 Sept. (London); 22–23 Sept. (Dublin); 29–30 Sept. (London). 7–8 Oct. (Dublin); 13–14 Oct. (London); 29–30 Oct. (Dublin); and 12 Nov. 1985 (Dublin). See NAI DT 2016/22/223 and NAI DT 2015/89/52. 160 See record of meeting between Thatcher, Howe and King, 29 Oct. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1551. 161 See record of the Armstrong-Nally framework talks, 13–14 Oct. (London) and 29–30 Oct. (Dublin). See also Howe/Hurd memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, 23 July 1985. TNA CAB 129/219/20. 162 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 332. 163 See Goodall, unpublished manuscript, 68–70. 164 See Howe/King memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, 30 Oct. 1985. TNA CAB 129/219/20. See also record of British cabinet meeting, 31 Oct. 1985. TNA CAB 128/81. 165 Privately, King was reportedly against the proposal to establish joint courts. Howe, however, was in favour of this proposal. As Armstrong privately noted, Howe was ‘seriously concerned’ at King’s wish to delete a reference to the joint courts in Article 8 of the AIA because ‘we had brought the Irish with great difficulty to accept that there is no question of our committing ourselves to the establishment of the mixed [joint] courts’. Armstrong to Thatcher, 29 Oct. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1551. 166 Howe/King memorandum, ‘Anglo-Irish relations: Northern Ireland’, 30 Oct. 1985. TNA CAB 129/219/20.

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See Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 332. See Powell to Thatcher, 27 Sept. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1550. Christopher Farrington interview with Tom King, London, 27 Oct. 2008. Quoted in Goodall, unpublished manuscript, 75. Record of tête-à-tête between Thatcher and FitzGerald, 15 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/51/1560. 172 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, 76. 173 FitzGerald, All in a life, 568. 174 Quoted in Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, 419. 175 See ‘Points to make: Prime Minister’s meeting with Westminster party leaders’, 14 Nov. 1985. TNA CAB 164/1777. 176 A copy of the AIA (Nov. 1985) is available from TNA CAB 164/1777. See Article 1 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 177 Copy of ‘Brief of the Anglo-Irish Agreement’, unsigned and undated, circa, 14 Nov. 1985. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/134, file 2 of 2. 178 See Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 179 See Article 3 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 180 For a fascinating account of the Irish involvement vis-à-vis the Anglo-Irish secretariat in Maryfield, see ‘Bunker Days: Witness Seminar’ (Maryfield Secretariat Witness Seminar), 8 Dec. 2015, Dublin. Available from http://www.drb.ie/essays/ bunker-days. 181 See Article 2 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 182 See Article 4 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 183 See Articles 6, 7 and 9 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 184 See Article 8 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 185 Copy of ‘Brief of the Anglo-Irish Agreement’, unsigned and undated, circa, 14 Nov. 1985. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/134, file 2 of 2. 186 See Article 10 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 187 See Article 12 of the AIA (Nov. 1985). 188 See Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 318. 189 Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 318. 190 See comments by Seán Donlon. Seán Donlon, Dr Garret FitzGerald Memorial Lecture 2012, lecture entitled, ‘Garret FitzGerald and Irish foreign policy’ (National University of Ireland, 2012), 20. 191 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 415. 192 Kohl to FitzGerald, 15 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/100. 193 Mitterrand to FitzGerald, 28 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/100. 194 Farren, The SDLP, 210. 195 Armstrong and Donlon arranged this choreographed performance following their visit to the US in the first week of Nov. 1985. See FitzGerald, All in a life, 562. 196 UKE Washington telegram to FCO (‘Anglo-Irish Agreement’), 15 Nov. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1809/1. 197 UKE Washington telegram to FCO (‘Anglo-Irish Agreement’), 15 Nov. 1985. TNA PREM 19/1809/1. 198 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 336. 199 Irish department government file, ‘U.S.A and Britain’, Vol. 5, circa 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/15. See also TNA PREM 19/1809/1. 200 See ‘The International Fund for Ireland’, annual report, 1987/88. TNA FCO 87/2715. See also TNA FCO 87/2716. 167 168 169 170 171

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201 See comments by Michael Lillis. Irish Times Obituary by Michael Lillis, ‘Sir David Goodall’, 6 Aug. 2016. 202 Interview with Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, 27 Oct. 2015. See also Ian Beesley, The official history of the cabinet secretaries (London, 2016), 435–42. 203 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, 1. 204 See record of meeting between Thatcher and FitzGerald, Luxemburg, 3 Dec. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/67. See also Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher, 402–3. 205 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 335. 206 See Bernard Ingham, Kill the messenger … again (London, 2003), 311. 207 Record of Thatcher’s comments at post-press conference following the signing of the AIA, 15 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/93. 208 See comments by Thatcher, 26 Nov. 1985. HC Debate, Vol. 87, c. 747. 209 See record of conversation between Goodall and Thatcher, circa early Dec. 1982. Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 622. 210 David Goodall has gone so far as to suggest that without Armstrong’s personal intervention Thatcher would have never signed the AIA. See David Goodall, ‘An agreement worth remembering’, in Edging towards piece, Dublin Review of Books. Available from www.drb.ie/essays/edging-towards-peace. 211 Whitelaw, The Whitelaw memoirs, 263. 212 Comments by Seán Donlon. Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’. See also Young, One of us, 473–4. 213 Quoted in Spencer, The British and peace in Northern Ireland, 46. 214 Goodall, unpublished manuscript, 1. 215 See Thatcher’s comments to Alistair McAlpine. Alistair McAlpine, Once a jolly bagman: memoirs (London, 1997), 272. 216 In her memoir, Thatcher conceded that the AIA was ‘not perfect’ and that she was ultimately ‘disappointed’ by how it operated. Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 402 and 415. In fact, in the comfort of retirement, Thatcher allegedly concluded that the ‘whole philosophy’ of the AIA had been a ‘mistake’. See Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, 351. 217 In 1969, for example, British foreign secretary Michael Stewart informed Irish minister for external affairs Patrick Hillery in no uncertain terms that ‘the matter [of Northern Ireland] was none of mine or my Government’s business’. Quoted in Arthur, Special relationships, 2. 218 Graham Spencer, Inside accounts, Volume 1: the Irish government and peace in Northern Ireland, from Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement (Manchester, 2019), 3. 219 Spencer, Inside accounts, Volume 1, 4. 220 Goodlad, Thatcher, 165. Likewise, Marc Mulholland argues that the AIA was ‘a quite extraordinary British confession of inadequacy. Britain gave up trying to speak for a subset of UK citizens, asking instead the Irish government to act as “advocates for the Nationalist community”.’ Mulholland, ‘ “Just another country”? The Irish question in the Thatcher years’, 192. 221 Boyce, The Irish question and British politics, 136. 222 Smith, ‘ “Ever reliable friends”?’, 72. 223 The Economist, 23–29 Nov. 1985. 224 Lawson, The view from No. 11, 671. 225 Havers, Conservative Party MP for Wimbledon, 1970–87.

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226 Record of conversation between Michael Havers and Richard Ryan, 22 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/87. 227 See Goodall, unpublished manuscript, 76. 228 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume two, 334. See also comments by Gow, 26 Nov. 1985. HC Debate, Vol. 87, cc. 759–60. 229 Boyce, The Irish question and British politics, 131. 230 Corbyn, Labour Party MP for Islington North, 1983 to present. 231 See comments by Corbyn, 27 Nov. 1985. HC Debate, Vol. 87, c. 939. 232 Record of meeting between Viscount Long and Noel Dorr, 21 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/87. 233 Quoted in Coakley and Todd, Negotiating a settlement in Northern Ireland, 1969–2019, 223. 234 Record of conversation between Tebbit and Richard Ryan, 15 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/92. 235 4th Viscount Long, Lord in waiting (senior government whip), 1979–97. His full title is The Rt Hon. the Viscount Long CBE, and his given name is Richard Gerard Long. 236 Record of meeting between Viscount Long and Noel Dorr, 21 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/87. 237 See Heath, The autobiography of Edward Heath, 445. 238 Record of conversation between Prior and Noel Dorr, 21 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/87. See also Prior, A balance of power, 257–9. 239 Silvester, Conservative Party MP for Manchester-Withington, 1974–87. 240 Record of conversation between Fred Silvester and Richard Ryan, 22 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/87. 241 In an email exchange with this author, Bellingham, Conservative Party MP for Norfolk North West, 1983–97 and 2001–19, and joint-secretary of the CPPNIC during this period, noted that ‘my reason for supporting it [the AIA] was because I saw it as a way of bringing the Troubles to an end’. Author’s email exchange with Sir Henry Bellingham, Dec. 2018–Mar. 2019. 242 During a meeting with Richard Ryan, Burt, Conservative Party MP for Bury-North, 1983–97, and North East Bedfordshire, 1997–2019, described Thatcher’s handling of the Anglo-Irish negotiations as ‘brilliant’, particularly in the manner to which she managed to catch the ‘changing mood of her backbenchers’. Record of meeting between Alistair Burt and Richard Ryan, 20 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/87 243 Addressing the House of Commons, Butler, Conservative Party MP for Bosworth, 1970–87, stated ‘I accept the agreement’. See comments by Butler, 26 Nov. 1985. HC Debate, Vol. 87, c. 785. 244 In a private letter, Page, Conservative Party MP for Harrow West, congratulated Thatcher for her ‘calm, knowledgeable and admirable command’ of the Anglo-Irish negotiations. See John Jack Page to Thatcher, 18 Nov. 1985. UC CAC THCR 1/10/98. 245 In correspondence with this author, Pawsey, Conservative Party MP for Rugby and Kenilworth, 1983–97, recorded that he voted in favour of the AIA. Author’s telephone interview with Mr James Pawsey, 11 Dec. 2018. 246 See comments by Yeo, Conservative Party MP for South Suffolk, 1983–2015. Record of lunch between Tim Yeo and Richard Ryan, 14 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/92. 247 The approximately twenty-two Conservative Party MPs recorded as voting against the AIA were as follows: Harold Julian Amery, John Biggs-Davison, Michael Brown, Peter Bruinvels, Nick Budgen, Robert Cecil Cranborne, Viscount , Tam Dalyell, Terry Dicks, Den Dover, Sir John Farr, Ian Gow, Michael Morris, Michael

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McNair-Wilson, Christopher Murphy, George (Barry) Porter, J. Redmond, Richard Shepherd, Trevor Skeet, Ivor Stanbrook, Bill Walker, Ann Winterton, and Nicholas Winterton. 248 King to Amery, 15 Nov. 1985. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/134, file 2 of 2. 249 See copy of draft letter from Amery to Thatcher, 24 Apr. 1986. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/64. 250 See record of meeting between Norman Lamont and Noel Dorr, 21 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/87. 251 See comments by John Biggs-Davison, 26 Nov. 1985. HC Debate, Vol. 87, c. 798. 252 See comments by Stanbrook, 27 Nov. 1985. HC Debate, Vol. 87, cc. 937–8. 253 Record of meeting of the CPPNIC, 21 Nov. 1985. UC CAC THCR 2/6/3/116, part 1. 254 Walker, A history of the Ulster Unionist Party, 233. 255 Belfast News Letter, 19 Nov. 1985. 256 Ulster Newsletter, 18 Nov. 1985. 257 See Aitken, Margaret Thatcher, 419. 258 Christopher Farrington interview with Tom King, London, 27 Oct. 2008. 259 McAuley, Ulster’s last stand?, 48. 260 Maginnis, UUP MP for Fermanagh South Tyrone, 1983–2001. 261 See comments by Maginnis. The Tablet, 15 Mar. 1986. 262 Davis, DUP member of the Northern Ireland Assembly for South Antrim, 1982–6. 263 Ivan Davis to Julian Amery, 30 Nov. 1985. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/134, file 2 of 2. 264 McAuley, Ulster’s last stand?, 46. 265 See Moloney and Pollak, Paisley, 291. 266 Quoted in Farren, The SDLP, 209. 267 See comments by the Rev. Paisley, RTÉ’s ‘Today Tonight’ programme, 15 Nov. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/94. 268 Quoted in The Economist, circa 23–29 Nov. 1985. 269 Lady Brookeborough to Queen Elizabeth II, 25 Nov. 1985. PRONI CENT/3/54A. 270 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch85.htm. 271 See PRONI CENT/1/14/30A. 272 See Roy Foster, Luck and the Irish: a brief history of change, 1970–2000 (London, 2007), 124. 273 See Steve Bruce, Paisley: religion and politics in Northern Ireland (Oxford, 2009), 110–11. 274 Copy of letter from Carlisle McAuley to King, 25 Dec. 1986. UC CAC POLL 9/1/3. 275 Copy of letter from Brian P. Ingram to Thatcher, 13 Jan. 1986. UC CAC POLL 9/1/1. 276 David McLure to Julian Amery, 14 Dec. 1985. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/134, file 2 of 2. 277 See Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 426–7. 278 Record of meeting between Thatcher and FitzGerald, Luxemburg, 3 Dec. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/67. 279 See note ‘Blacklist of MPs who are now regular guests of the Irish Embassy and considered by Dublin to be in support of a new Anglo-Irish settlement for Northern Ireland’, undated and unsigned. UC CAC POLL 9/2/26. 280 Record of meeting between Thatcher and FitzGerald, Luxemburg, 3 Dec. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/67. 281 Record of meetings of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conferences, Dec. 1985 to Oct. 1986: 11 Dec. 1985 (Belfast); 30 Dec. 1985 (London); 10 Jan. 1986 (London); 13 Feb. 1986 (London); 11 Mar. (Belfast); 9 May 1986 (London); 17 June 1986 (Belfast); 29 July 1986 (London); 6 Oct. 1986 (Dublin); 31 Oct. 1986 (London); and 8 Dec.

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1986 (Belfast). See NAI DT 2015/89/101; NAI DT 2016/52/66; NAI DT 2016/52/20; TNA CJ 4/6695; and TNA CJ 4/6686. 282 Record of meeting of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, 11 Dec. 1985. NAI DT 2015/89/101. 283 Record of meeting of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, 10 Jan. 1986. NAI DFA 2015/51/1522. See also TNA CJ 4/6694. 284 Record of meeting of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, 19 Jan. 1986. NAI DT 2016/52/35. 285 Record of meeting of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, 13 Feb. 1868. NAI DT 2016/52/35. See also TNA CJ 4/6694. 286 See comments by Michael Lillis. ‘Maryfield Secretariat Witness Seminar’, 8 Dec. 2015. 287 Robert Cecil Cranborne, Viscount, for example, described the British government’s support for the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference as a ‘travesty’. See Robert Cecil Cranborne, Viscount to Amery, 6 May 1986. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/137. Moreover, in Apr. 1986, John Biggs-Davison wrote to Thatcher with a request that she postpone meetings of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference. See TNA CJ 4/6153. 288 See copy of Maginnis’s letter to his Fermanagh-South Tyrone constituents, 10 Dec. 1985. UC CAC AMEJ 2/1/137. 289 See record of meeting between Thatcher, Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley, 25 Feb. 1986. TNA CJ 4/6694. 290 Record of FitzGerald-Thatcher meeting, 19 Feb. 1986. TNA PREM 19/1811. 291 See record of meeting between Thatcher and Hume, House of Commons, 27 Feb. 1986. TNA CJ 4/6153. 292 See Dorr to O’Tuathail, 25 Feb. 1986. NAI DFA 2015/51/1522. 293 Record of meeting between Thatcher, King, Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley, 25 Feb. 1986. TNA PREM 19/1811. 294 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch86.htm. 295 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch86.htm. 296 Bruce, Paisley, 111. 297 See comments by Thatcher, 4 Mar. 1986. HC Debate, Vol. 93, c. 152. 298 See record of telephone conversation between Ryan and Bassett, 28 Feb. 1986. NAI DT 2016/52/35. 299 Record of Noel Dorr’s separate conversations with Howe and Whitelaw, 11 Apr. 1986. NAI DT 2016/52/95. 300 At this meeting, King and Barry once again acted as joint chairpersons. The commissioner of the Garda Siochana (Wren) and the chief constable of the RUC outlined progress made by the two police forces in implementing the provisions of the AIA in relation to cross-border security. Attendees also held a discussion on cross-border cooperation in the economic and social fields, while the Irish side also put forward views ‘on matters of significant or special interest to the minority community [in Northern Ireland] in relation to economic and social policy, in the fields of education, health and housing’. Record of meeting of Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, 11 Mar. 1986. NAI DFA 2015/51/1522. 301 See comments by Armstrong in conversation with Dorr. Dorr to O’Tuathail, 25 Feb. 1986. NAI DFA 2015/51/1522.

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302 In his memoir, although recording that in the early months of 1986 he was approached by intermediaries on behalf of Ulster Unionists, FitzGerald did not name Molyneaux directly. See FitzGerald, All in a life, 575. 303 This was the view of Michael Lillis. Record of meeting between Lillis and Goodall, circa 14 Aug. 1986. TNA FCO 87/2228. 304 See record of meeting between Armstrong and Dorr, 7 Apr. 1986. TNA FCO 87/2228. 305 Record of meeting between Armstrong and Dorr, 7 Apr. 1986. TNA FCO 87/2228. See also NAI DFA 2018/28/2273. 306 See NAI DFA 2015/51/1522. 307 Dorr to O’Tuathail, 11 Apr. 1986. NAI DFA 2015/51/1522. 308 See record of conversation between Armstrong and Dorr, 7 Apr. 1986. TNA PREM 19/1812. 309 Record of meeting between Nally and Goodall, 22 Apr. 1986. TNA FCO 87/2228. 310 FitzGerald, All in a life, 575. Interestingly, the prospect of Molyneaux meeting with FitzGerald was again mentioned in Nov. 1986. Following the personal intervention of Ian Gow, who promised his home as a location for the holding of a meeting between the two men, the UUP leader reportedly said he was in favour of such a meeting – although it never took place. See record of telephone conversation between Ian Gow and Richard Ryan, 21 Nov. 1986. NAI DT 2016/22/2154. 311 See joint letter on behalf of Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley, 23 Apr. 1986. TNA PREM 19/1812. 312 See ‘Northern Ireland political affairs summary, April-June 1986’. TNA FCO 87/2321. 313 See ‘Northern Ireland political affairs summary, April-June 1986’. TNA FCO 87/2321. 314 See Ian Gow, ‘This union must be forever’. The Times, 4 June 1986. 315 See note, ‘Friends of the Union’, by Claire Marson, Constitutional and Political Division, NIO, 2 Nov. 1988. TNA CJ 4/7358. 316 By Aug. 1986, the movement had over 500 members, had raised approximately £13,000 and had a full-time secretary, David Getty. See ‘The Friends of the Union’ Newsletter No. 1, 4 Aug. 1986. UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/12. 317 See note, ‘Friends of the Union’, by Claire Marson, Constitutional and Political Division, NIO, 2 Nov. 1988. TNA CJ 4/7358. 318 See Irish government note, ‘Dissolution of NI Assembly’, 23 June 1983. NAI DT 2016/52/78. 319 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch85.htm%20&%20https://cain.ulster. ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch86.htm. 320 See record of Armstrong-Nally framework talks, 22 Apr. 1986. NAI DFA 2018/28/2273. 321 See NIO memorandum, Oct. 1986. TNA FCO 87/2322. 322 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch86.htm. 323 See NIO memorandum, Oct. 1986. TNA FCO 87/2322. 324 Moloney and Pollak, Paisley, 396. 325 Moloney and Pollak, Paisley, 396. 326 See Hot Press, 25 Sept. 1986. 327 Two members of UR were arrested in Apr. 1987 in Paris, along with a South African diplomat. It was claimed that there had been an attempt to exchange information on Shorts’ missile technology for weapons. In the late 1980s, some former members of

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UR joined another grouping called Resistance. See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/ organ/uorgan.htm. 328 Record of meeting between FitzGerald and Thatcher, 6 Dec. 1986. TNA FCO 87/2232. 329 Record of meeting between FitzGerald and Thatcher, 6 Dec. 1986. TNA FCO 87/2232. 330 See record of meeting between FitzGerald and Thatcher, 19 Feb. 1986. NAI DT 2016/52/65.

9  Thatcher, British state collusion and the genesis of the Northern Ireland peace process, 1987–90 Quoted in Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 322. Record of meeting between Howe and King, 26 Mar. 1987. TNA CJ 4/7206. Record of meeting between Howe and King, 26 Mar. 1987. TNA CJ 4/7206. See ‘Security co-operation with the Republic of Ireland’, undated and unsigned, circa 1987. TNA CJ 4/7121. 5 See, for example, record of meeting between Haughey and Thatcher, Hanover, Germany, 28 June 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. See also Charles Powell to David Watkins, 13 May 1988. TNA FCO 87/2771. In fact, by the autumn of 1988, Haughey was able to inform Thatcher that ‘Arrangement’, had been made for ‘three F.B.I. instructors from Washington to run training courses’ in Ireland for up to thirty selected members of the Gardaí in ‘various aspects of intelligence gathering’. See Haughey to Thatcher 29 Sept. 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/69. 6 See ‘Preparing the Irish Army for border co-operation in the event of political agreement’, by John Stanley, 15 May 1987. TNA CJ 4/6928. 7 See ‘Preparing the Irish Army for border co-operation in the event of political agreement’, by John Stanley, 15 May 1987. TNA CJ 4/6928. 8 See ‘Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference: Article 9 (a) – cross-border security co-operation’, signed ‘secretariat’, 13 July 1987. TNA CJ 4/6928. 9 See, for example, comments by Thatcher. Record of meeting between Haughey and Thatcher, Hanover, Germany, 28 June 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. 10 Thatcher to Haughey, 26 Aug. 1988. TNA FCO 87/2670. See also NAI DT 2018/68/69. 11 Taylor, Brits, 271. 12 Moloney, A secret history of the IRA, 318. 13 See British memorandum on behalf of the law and order division of the NIO, ‘security policy and current situation’, unsigned, June 1987. TNA CJ 4/6927. 14 Record of meeting between Howe and King, 6 May 1987. TNA CJ 4/7206. 15 Record of meeting between Haughey and Thatcher, Hanover, Germany, 28 June 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. 16 See ‘Security co-operation with the Republic of Ireland’, undated and unsigned, circa 1987. TNA CJ 4/7121. 17 See ‘Security co-operation with the Republic of Ireland’, undated and unsigned, circa 1987. TNA CJ 4/7121. 18 See ‘Security co-operation with the Republic of Ireland’, undated and unsigned, circa 1987. TNA CJ 4/7121.

1 2 3 4

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19 See ‘Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference: Article 9 (a) – cross-border security co-operation’, signed ‘secretariat’, 13 July 1987. TNA CJ 4/6928. 20 Thatcher to Haughey, 26 Aug. 1988. TNA FCO 87/2670. See also NAI DT 2018/68/69. 21 Record of Haughey-Thatcher meeting, Hanover, 28 June 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. See also record of Haughey-Thatcher meeting, Rhodes, 3 Dec. 1988. NAI DT 2019/31/33. 22 See memorandum by Robert Andrew, 22 Jan. 1987. TNA CJ 4/7206. 23 See www.ukpolitical.info/1987.htm. 24 See http://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/rw87.htm. 25 Wakeham, Conservative Party MP for Maldon, 1974–83 and South Colchester and Maldon 1983–92. 26 Major, Conservative Party MP for Huntingdon, 1979–2001. 27 Clarke, Conservative Party MP for Rushcliffe, 1970–2019. 28 Lyell, Conservative Party MP for Hemel Hempstead, 1979–83, Mid-Bedfordshire, 1983–97 and North East Bedfordshire, 1997–2001. 29 See Richard Ryan, ‘The post-election situation at Westminster’, 18 June 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/61. 30 See Charles Powell, ‘Political developments in Northern Ireland’, 21 Sept. 1987. TNA FCO 87/2519. 31 See comments by Thatcher. Record of meeting between Haughey and Thatcher, Hanover, Germany, 28 June 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. 32 See www.conservativemanifesto.com/1987. 33 See ‘Political developments in Northern Ireland’, by T. J. B. George, 30 Sept. 1987. TNA FCO 87/2519. 34 See ‘Political developments within Northern Ireland’, NIO, 21 Oct. 1987. TNA FCO 87/2526. 35 See ‘Report of the Unionist Task Force: an assessment’, P. Collins of the Anglo-Irish Division, DFA, July 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/26. 36 McCusker, UUP MP for Upper Ban, 1983–90. 37 See Robert Andrew to I. M. Burns, 22 Dec. 1987. TNA FCO 87/2519. 38 See ‘Report of the Unionist Task Force: an assessment’, P. Collins of the Anglo-Irish Division, DFA, July 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/26. During this period, McCusker and Robinson also lent their support to a joint UUP/DUP propaganda document, ‘The Anglo-Irish Agreement: a legacy of violence’, which was produced to demonstrate that violence in Northern Ireland had continued despite the signing of the AIA. A copy of ‘The Anglo-Irish Agreement: a legacy of violence’, is available from TNA CJ 4/7750. 39 See J. E. McConnell, 15 May 1987. TNA FCO 87/2514. 40 See ‘Political developments within Northern Ireland’, NIO, 21 Oct. 1987. TNA FCO 87/2526. 41 Record of lunch meeting between Frank Millar and Ted Smyth of the Irish Embassy in London, 24 Dec. 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/26. 42 Record of meeting between King, Molyneaux and the Rev. Paisley, 2 Dec. 1987. TNA FCO 87/2517. 43 Record of meeting between Thatcher, Howe, King and Armstrong, 9 Nov. 1987. TNA FCO 87/2519. 44 See Charles Powell, ‘Political developments in Northern Ireland’, 21 Sept. 1987. TNA FCO 87/2519. 45 See ‘Political protest action’, Kenneth Bloomfield, 4 Feb. 1988. TNA CJ 4/7750. See also PRONI CENT/3/82A.

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46 The ‘McGimpsey case’ subsequently failed in the Irish High Court (1988) and again in the Irish Supreme Court (1990). See, for example, ‘The agreement and the Irish Constitution: the McGimpsey challenge’, unsigned, 10 July 1987. PRONI CENT/3/82A. 47 If ratified, the ECST would also make hijacking a plane, kidnapping, killing by bombing or the use of automatic weapons, and murdering a diplomat or high official, crimes that ‘were immune to the claim that the alleged perpetrator was politically motivated and therefore could not be extradited to the country wishing to try them’. Irish Times, 30 Dec. 2017. ‘Haughey’s foot-dragging on extradition angered British government’, by Peter Murtagh. 48 See record of Haughey-Thatcher meeting, 30 June 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/56. 49 See TNA CJ 4/7189. 50 Armstrong retired as British cabinet secretary and head of the British civil service in 1987. Robin Butler succeeded him. 51 See record of meeting between Armstrong and Haughey, Dublin, 30 Oct. 1987. TNA CJ 4/7189. 52 See note by Powell, 27 Oct. 1987. TNA CJ 4/7189. 53 Irish Times, 30 Dec. 2017. See also Taylor, Brits, 272. 54 Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 58. 55 Taylor, Brits, 280. 56 Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 58. 57 Quoted in Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 59. Yet, Adams clarified his position by claiming that ‘we defend the right of the [P]‌IRA to engage in its armed struggle. It is true to say that we have been critical of the [P]IRA because of Enniskillen, but we still accept the [P]IRA as freedom fighters.’ See note by J. E. McConnell, 7 Dec. 1987. TNA FCO 87/2517. 58 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 406. 59 See note by J. E. McConnell, 7 Dec. 1987. TNA FCO 87/2517. 60 Comments by King, 9 Nov. 1987. HC Debate, Vol. 122, c. 19. 61 See Haughey to Thatcher, 8 Nov. 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/56. 62 Irish Times, 9 Nov. 1987. 63 Comments by Haughey, 27 Nov. 1987. DE debate, Vol. 375, No. 10. col. 64 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 407. See also note by I. M. Burns, 17 Nov. 1987. TNA CJ 4/7189. 65 Record of Haughey-Thatcher meeting, Brussels, 4 Dec. 1987. NAI DT 2017/10/56. 66 See Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, 350. 67 Raymond Murray, The SAS in Ireland (Cork, 2004), 31. 68 Taylor, Brits, 241. 69 Taylor, Brits, 241–2. 70 Tighe was killed on 24 Nov. 1982. According to British intelligence, Tighe’s was the ‘only death [during Oct.–Dec. 1982] in which the victim was not a known member of a paramilitary organisation’. ‘Stalker/Sampson Report: annex D to the security policy brief ’, undated and unsigned, circa Apr. 1987. TNA CJ 4/7121. 71 Taylor, Brits, 250–1. 72 See, ‘Stalker/Sampson Report: annex D to the security policy brief ’, undated and unsigned, circa Apr. 1987. TNA CJ 4/7121. 73 See Patrick Maume’s entry ‘Hermon, Sir John Charles’ in the Dictionary of Irish biography.

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74 See ‘Stalker/Sampson Report: annex D to the security policy brief ’, undated and unsigned, circa Apr. 1987. TNA CJ 4/7121. 75 ‘Stalker/Sampson Report: annex D to the security policy brief ’, undated and unsigned, circa Apr. 1987. TNA CJ 4/7121. 76 Taylor, Brits, 252. 77 Taylor, Brits, 252. 78 See comments by Mayhew, 27 Jan. 1988. HC Debate, Vol. 126, c. 22. 79 Patrick Maume’s entry ‘Hermon, Sir John Charles’ in the Dictionary of Irish biography. 80 See comments by Rees, 27 Jan. 1988. HC Debate, Vol. 126, cc. 31–2. 81 Livingstone, Labour Party MP for Brent East, 1987–2001. 82 See comments by Livingstone, 27 Jan. 1988. HC Debate, Vol. 126, c. 32. 83 Irish Times, 26 Jan. 1988. 84 See note by J. M. Burns, 27 Jan. 1988. TNA FCO 87/2645. 85 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Haughey, the Charlemagne Building, Brussels, 12 Feb. 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. 86 In her memoir, Thatcher makes only a fleeting reference to the Sampson/Stalker Report. See Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 409. 87 Record of meeting between Thatcher and Haughey, the Charlemagne Building, Brussels, 12 Feb. 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. 88 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 409. It was not until 14 Mar. 1991 that the convictions of the ‘Birmingham Six’, now considered one of the ‘greatest miscarriages of justice in British history’, were squashed. The six innocent men had spent more than sixteen years in prison. See http://Irishtimes.com/news/crime-andlaw/ timeline-birmingham-bombings-event-reaction-and-aftermath-1.2668998. 89 Murray, The SAS in Ireland, 399. 90 Record of Irish government statement on ‘Gibraltar Shootings’, 8 Mar. 1988. NAI DT 2019/31/52. 91 See ‘Amnesty International: United Kingdom – investigating lethal shootings: The Gibraltar Inquest’, Apr. 1989. NAI DT 2019/31/52. 92 See ‘Amnesty International: United Kingdom – investigating lethal shootings: The Gibraltar Inquest’, Apr. 1989. NAI DT 2019/31/52. 93 Murray, The SAS in Ireland, 400. 94 Murray, The SAS in Ireland, 400. See also Taylor, Brits, 280. Gerry Adams has also claimed that Thatcher ‘authorised the killings at Gibraltar’. See The Guardian, 9 Apr. 2013. 95 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 270. 96 Unfortunately, based on the available archival documentary sources, this author has been unable to verify Murray’s claims. The following files related to ‘Operation Flavius’ are retained by the FCO for an undisclosed period: TNA FCO 87/2808–15. The Department of Defence has retained the following file (TNA DEFE 68/1083), also related to ‘Operation Flavius’, for an undisclosed period. 97 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 407. 98 See comments by Howe, 7 Mar. 1988. HC Debate, Vol. 129, c. 21. 99 See ‘Amnesty International: United Kingdom – investigating lethal shootings: The Gibraltar Inquest’, Apr. 1989. NAI DT 2019/31/52. 100 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/Sutton/chron/1988.html.

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101 Taylor, The Brits, 283. 102 Taylor, The Brits, 284. 103 The only file held by TNA specifically related to the ‘Andersonstown murders’, remains closed to the public until 2076. See TNA DEFE 70/1475. 104 Taylor, The Brits, 285. 105 See comments by Thatcher. Record of meeting between Haughey and Thatcher, Hanover, Germany, 28 June 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. 106 Record of Haughey-Thatcher meeting, Rhodes, 3 Dec. 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/15. See also NAI DT 2019/31/33. 107 Record of speech by Howe, 22 Apr. 1988. NAI DFA 2016/28/2336. 108 Record of conversation between Weston and Patrick O’Connor, 9 June 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. 109 Record of conversation between Fenn and Noel Dorr, 16 May 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. 110 Official minutes of British cabinet meeting, 28 Apr. 1988. TNA CAB 128/89/15. 111 Thatcher to Haughey, 27 Apr. 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/69. Indeed, on the eve of her political downfall in the winter of 1990 Thatcher was still regularly chastising Haughey for his government’s perceived poor handling of North–South cross-border security. See, for example, NAI DFA 2020/17/5. 112 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 407. 113 Younger to Thatcher, 30 Jan. 1989. TNA PREM 19/3408. 114 See Howe to Thatcher, 19 Jan. 1989. TNA PREM 19/3408. 115 Record of Haughey-Thatcher meeting, Rhodes, 3 Dec. 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/15. 116 Record of telephone conversation between Fenn and Nally, 30 Nov. 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/38. 117 Record of Haughey-Thatcher meeting, Rhodes, 3 Dec. 1988. NAI DT 2018/68/15. See also Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 413. 118 See comments by Thatcher, House of Commons, 29 Nov. 1988. Irish Times, 30 Nov. 1988. See also Thatcher to Haughey, 2 Nov. 1988; Thatcher to Haughey 19 Dec. 1988; and Thatcher to Haughey, 11 Mar. 1989. NAI DT 2019/31/66. 119 Niall O’Dowd contends that ‘my strong belief is that the whole truth is that Margaret Thatcher ordered the Pat Finucane murder’. See Irish Central, 13 Dec. 2012. Thatcher does not refer to Finucane in her memoir. See Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years. 120 See comments by Darragh MacIntyre. BBC’s Panorama programme, ‘Britain’s secret terror deals’, broadcast May 2015. 121 See Taylor, Brits, 287–9. 122 See comments by Darragh MacIntyre. BBC’s Panorama programme, ‘Britain’s secret terror deals’, broadcast May 2015. 123 Taylor, Brits, 287. 124 See https://madden-finucane.com/2004/03/30/collusion-fact-file/. 125 Taylor, The Brits, 296. See also Ian Cobain, The history thieves: secrets, lies and shaping of a modern nation (Dublin, 2016). 126 See Ian Cobain, ‘Secrecy and Northern Ireland’s dirty war: the murder of Pat Finucane’. Irish Times, 19 Sept. 2016. 127 Record of conversation between Andrew O’Rourke and Robin Butler, 13 Feb. 1989. TNA PREM 19/3408. 128 See Cadwallader, Lethal allies. See also Margaret Urwin, A state in denial: British collaboration with Loyalist paramilitaries (Cork, 2016); Penny Green and Tony Ward,

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State crime: governments, violence and corruption (London, 2004); Murray, The SAS in Ireland; and Bill Rolston (with Gilmartin), Unfinished business: state killings and the quest for truth (Belfast, 2000). 129 See Taylor, Brits, 287. According to Brian Feeney, during the Northern Ireland conflict, 5 to 15 per cent of the UDR were also members of loyalist paramilitary organizations. See the Pat Finucane Centre, The hidden history of the UDR: the secret files revealed (Derry, 2014), 3. See also Cadwallader, Lethal allies, 354. 130 Shortly after her appointment as the official leader of the opposition, Thatcher received a secret briefing informing her of a close connection between the British security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries. In Sept. 1975, during a meeting with the British prime minister Harold Wilson, Thatcher was told that there were ‘certain elements in the [RUC] police force who were close to the UVF, and were prepared to hand over information’. At this meeting, which occurred only weeks after the Miami Showband massacre, 21 July 1975, Thatcher was also informed that it was the British Army’s ‘judgment’ that the UDR had been ‘heavily infiltrated by extremist Protestants, and that in a crisis situation they could not be relied on to be loyal’. See record of meeting between Wilson, Rees, Thatcher and Neave, No. 10 Downing Street, 10 Sept. 1975. TNA PREM 16/520. Courtesy of the Pat Finucane Centre. Available from https://www.patfinucanecentre.org./declassified-documents/ thatcher-and-uvf-0. 131 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume one, 482–3. 132 Quoted in Pat Finucane Centre, The hidden history of the UDR, 4. 133 See comments by Raymond White. BBC programme, Spotlight on the Troubles: a secret history. Episode 4, broadcast Oct. 2019. 134 See comments by Michael Mates. RTE’s Prime Time programme, ‘Collusion’, broadcast June 2015. See also Belfast Telegraph, 12 June 2015. 135 Cadwallader, Lethal allies, 362. 136 Cadwallader, Lethal allies, 360. 137 See BBC’s Panorama programme, ‘Britain’s secret terror deals’, broadcast May 2015. 138 See Irish Times, 16 June 2015. 139 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/collusion/chron.htm. Note on sources: The following file, ‘The Stevens Inquiry (collusion between security forces and loyalist paramilitaries), remains closed to the public until Jan. 2075. See TNA DEFE 70/1614. 140 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/collusion/chron.htm. 141 The contents of the above paragraph are quoted in Urwin, A state in denial, 15. David Cameron, however, refused to order a public inquiry into Finucane’s murder. Finucane’s widow, Geraldine, called the De Silva Report a ‘Whitewash’ and accused the British government of ‘engineering a suppression of the truth’. Quoted in Urwin, A state in denial, 359. To the dismay of the Finucane family, on 30 November 2020, the British government announced that it did not intend to launch a public inquiry into the murder of Pat Finucane. In February of the previous year, the British Supreme Court ruled that the UK had failed to hold an ‘effective investigation’ into Finucane’s murder. Defending the decision not to set up a public inquiry, Brandon Lewis, secretary of state for Northern Ireland, said it was not the right time to establish such an inquiry. See www.rte.ie/news/ ulster/2020/1130/1181310-finucane-murder/. 142 See note, ‘Devolution – the problems, and our objectives’, unsigned, 23 Dec. 1988. TNA CJ 4/7353. 143 Howe to Thatcher, 19 Jan. 1989. TNA PREM 19/3408.

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Notes

144 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 414. 145 See comments by Brooke. Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 595. 146 Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 98. 147 Author’s email correspondence with Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, 14 Jan. 2020. 148 See ‘Salient points from the British-Irish Association meeting in Cambridge’, ‘Secretary of State Peter Brooke’, Cambridge, 22–24 Sept. 1989. NAI DT 2019/31/15. 149 See Conclusion, pp. 270–1. 150 Brooke to Thatcher, 18 July 1989. TNA PREM 19/3408. 151 Record of speech by Brooke, 1 Nov. 1989. NAI DT 2019/31/9. 152 See comments by Atkins. Record of meeting with NIO officials to discuss the Constitutional Convention, Belfast, 18 Nov. 1981. PRONI FIN/30/R/1/12. 153 Record of speech by Hurd, at a parliamentary press gallery lunch, House of Commons, 6 Mar. 1985. PRONI INF 3/3/135. 154 See, for example, S. J. Leach to Stephen Wall, 9 Nov. 1989. TNA PREM 19/3408. See also Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 99–100. 155 See, for example, Gow to Thatcher, 28 Sept. 1988. TNA FCO 87/2672. See also Ian Gow, Hope for peace – a new Anglo-Irish Agreement (London, 1988). A copy of this publication is available from UC CAC AMEJ 1/10/3, file 2 of 3. 156 Quoted in Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 100. 157 Record of meeting between David Donoghue and Richard Ford, 7 Nov. 1989. NAI DT 2019/31/9. 158 Taylor, The Brits, 314. 159 Record of conversation between O’Rourke and Butler, 7 Nov. 1989. NAI DT 2019/31/9. 160 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 595. 161 Record of conversation between O’Rourke and Butler, 7 Nov. 1989. NAI DT 2019/31/9. 162 Record of Haughey-Thatcher meeting, 9 Dec. 1989. NAI DT 2019/31/32. 163 See memorandum, ‘Sinn Féin’s reaction to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland – 100 Days Interview’, 11 Nov. 1989. TNA PREM 19/3408. 164 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 596. 165 See Farren, The SDLP, 229. 166 Farren, The SDLP, 230. 167 See note by Elliott, 21 Jan. 1988. TNA CJ 4/7364/2. 168 See note by Noel Cornick, 12 Jan. 1988. TNA CJ 4/7364/2. 169 Irish Times, 12 Jan. 1988. 170 Savage, The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’, 259. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 281. 171 Savage, The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’, 259. 172 Media organizations eventually used several methods to try to overcome the effects of the ban. One approach was to employ actors to mimic the voices of those being interviewed. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch88.htm. 173 Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 102–6. 174 See Savage, The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’, 259–62. 175 A further incident that convinced Thatcher of the need to introduce a broadcasting ban was the attack on the home of Kenneth Bloomfield, on 12 Sept. 1988. The PIRA set off a series of bombs in Bloomfield’s home, with the result that he and his family were lucky to survive. Shortly before this attack, Gerry Adams had been interviewed

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on BBC N.I. programme Newstalk. He warned his interviewer that an attack might take place on civil servants working in Northern Ireland and suggested that ‘they ought to resign their posts of face the consequences’. This was the last straw for Thatcher: soon after, her government enacted the broadcasting ban. See Savage, The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’, 262. 176 Savage, The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’, 260. See also Roger Bolton, Death on the Rock and other stories (London, 1990). 177 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 285. 178 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 285. 179 The contents of this paragraph are sourced from Moloney, A secret history of the IRA, 277 and 278. 180 During 1989, Adams and Hume reportedly met on, at least, four separate occasions. Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 96. 181 See the Irish Times, 6, 12, 13, 19 and 26 Sept. 1988. Quoted in Moloney, A secret history of the IRA, 279. 182 Record of meeting between unnamed British civil servant and John Hume, 15 Apr. 1988. TNA CJ 4/7364/2. 183 Brooke to Thatcher, 23 Mar. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3408. 184 See https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/bmtalks/chron.htm. 185 Brooke to Thatcher, 15 Jan. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3408. 186 See comments by Brooke, ‘Direct Rule Debate’, 5 July 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. See also Cillian McGrattan, ‘Northern Nationalism and the Belfast Agreement’, in Brian Barton and Patrick J. Roche (eds), The Northern Ireland question: the peace process and the Belfast Agreement (London, 2009), 159. 187 Brooke to Thatcher, 23 Mar. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3408. 188 See Brooke to Thatcher, 22 Feb. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3408. 189 Brooke to Thatcher, 23 Mar. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3408. 190 See Maurice Patterson to Powell, 20 Apr. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. 191 See Brooke to Thatcher, 22 Feb. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3408. 192 Brooke to Thatcher, 23 Mar. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3408. 193 Brooke to Collins, 12 Mar. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3408. 194 See Brooke to Thatcher, 22 Feb. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3408. 195 See Brooke to Thatcher, 22 Feb. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3408. 196 Record of Haughey-Thatcher meeting, 20 Apr. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. See also record of Haughey-Thatcher meeting, No. 10 Downing Street, 13 June 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. 197 See, for example, Charles Powell to Stephen Leach, 4 July 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. 198 Brooke to Thatcher, 3 July 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. 199 Brooke to Thatcher, 18 July. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. 200 See https://www.apnews.com/0b949ccebbcc82053b13ef4e4265253. Shortly after Gow’s assassination, Gerry Adams informed John Hume that the Sinn Féin leadership was ‘worried’ that the PIRA were close to murdering Margaret Thatcher. Record of a telephone conversation between Dermot Gallagher and John Hume, circa Sept. 1990. NAI DFA 2020/17/17. 201 Clark, Diaries, 319–20. 202 Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 633. 203 Baker, Conservative Party MP for Acton, 1968–70, St Marylebone, 1970–83 and Mole Valley, 1983–97. 204 Kenneth Baker, The turbulent years: my life in politics (London, 1993), 365–6.

364

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Notes

205 Bernard Ingham, The slow downfall of Margaret Thatcher: the diaries of Bernard Ingham (London, 2019), 262. 206 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 414. 207 Brooke to Thatcher, 24 Oct. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. 208 Brooke to Thatcher, 24 Oct. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. 209 See record of meeting of the Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference, 25 Oct. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. 210 See note marked ‘Points to make to Mr Haughey’. TNA PREM 19/3403. 211 See ‘A possible basis for talks: UK paper’, undated and unsigned. TNA PREM 19/3403. 212 Powell to Tony Pawson, NIO, 28 Oct. 1990. TNA PREM 19/3403. 213 Quoted in Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 107. 214 In fact, the previous year, in Jan. 1989, Brooke’s predecessor, Tom King had already placed on the record that Britain had ‘no secret economic or strategic’ interest in Northern Ireland. See Taylor, The Brits, 314. 215 Quoted in Spencer, The British and peace in Northern Ireland, 31. 216 Taylor, The Brits, 315. 217 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4072261.stm. 218 See McGarry and O’Leary, The Northern Ireland conflict, 228. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 285. 219 Occasional channels of contact had been in operation between London and the Irish Republican movement during the mid-1970s and again during the height of the Irish Republican hunger strikes from 1980 to 1981, but had remained dormant ever since. See Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 102–6. See also NAI DFA 2020/17/34. 220 Patterson, Ireland since 1939, 322. 221 See Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 662–8. 222 The Times, ‘Sixteen days that shock the fabric of British politics’, 30 Nov. 1990. 223 Belfast Telegraph, 16 Nov. 1990. 224 Belfast Telegraph, 16 Nov. 1990. 225 Bale, The Conservative Party, 27. 226 See comments by Robin Oakley and Philip Webster. The Times, 23 Nov. 1990. 227 See The Times, ‘Sixteen days that shock the fabric of British politics’, 30 Nov. 1990.

Conclusion (including Epilogue, 1990–8) 1 Moloney, A secret history of the IRA, 283. 2 Interview with Bertie Ahern, ‘Bertie Ahern Oral History, Prime Minister (Taoiseach) of Ireland’, 8 Nov. 2010. Miller Centre Oral Archive. Available from https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/ bertie-ahern-oral-history-prime-minister-taoiseach. 3 Renwick, A journey with Margaret Thatcher, 120. 4 Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 340. 5 Major, The autobiography, 433. 6 Major, The autobiography, 431–2. 7 Major, The autobiography, 431–2. 8 See Mallie and McKittrick, The fight for peace, 112. 9 Major, The autobiography, 432. See also Kelly, ‘A failed political entity’, 340–1.

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See Howe, Conflict of loyalty, 412. See comments by Brooke, Co. Cavan, 26 Nov. 1990. The Times, 27 Nov. 1990. Mayhew, Conservative Party MP for Tunbridge Wells, 1974–97. Reynolds, Fianna Fáil leader, 1992–4 and taoiseach, 1992–4. See ‘Joint Declaration on Peace: The Downing Street Declaration’, 15 Dec. 1993. Available from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dsd151293.htm. 15 Bruton, Fine Gael leader, 1990–2001 and taoiseach, 1994–7. 16 See ‘The Framework Document – a new framework for agreement ‘, 22 Feb. 1995. Available from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/fd22295.htm. 17 See copy of the ‘The [Good Friday] Agreement: agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations (10 April 1998)’. Available from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ agreement.htm. 18 See copy of the ‘The [Good Friday] Agreement. 19 See copy of the ‘The [Good Friday] Agreement. 20 The Mirror, 9 Apr. 2013. 21 I, 9 Apr. 2013. 22 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 853. 23 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 854. 24 See Jackson and Saunders, Making Thatcher’s Britain, 15. 25 Jackson and Saunders, Making Thatcher’s Britain, 15–16. 26 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 853. 27 Cameron, Conservative Party leader, 2005–16 and British prime minister, 2010–16. 28 The Guardian, 8 Apr. 2013. 29 Obama, US president, 2009–17 and US senator for Illinois, 2005–8. 30 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 285. 31 The Guardian, 8 Apr. 2013. 32 Socialist Worker, 9 Apr. 2013. 33 The Telegraph, 17 Apr. 2013. 34 Cannadine, Margaret Thatcher, 118. 35 The Guardian, 8 Apr. 2013. 36 The Derry Journal, 9 Apr. 2013. 37 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22067370. 38 Yorkshire Post, 8 Apr. 2013. 39 Quoted in The Economist, circa 23–29 Nov. 1985. 40 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22067370. 41 Nesbitt, UUP leader, 2012–17 and UUP MLA for Strangford, 2011–present. 42 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22067370. 43 See The Guardian, 19 Jan. 2016. See also Irish Times. Ed Moloney, ‘Martin McGuinness: past and presidency’, 24 Sept. 2011. 44 Writing in the early 2000s, Thatcher accused Irish Republican paramilitary groups (and Loyalist paramilitaries) as having ‘turned their attention to protection rackets, money laundering and drug trafficking’. See Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft: strategies for a changing world (London, 2002), 221 and 232. 45 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 819. 46 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 819. A copy of the Belfast Agreement is available from UC CAC THCR 1/12/66. 47 Mowlam, Labour Party MP for Redcar, 1987–2001. 48 Quoted in Moore, Margaret Thatcher: the authorized biography, volume three, 820. 10 11 12 13 14

366

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Notes

49 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 386. 50 Gladstone, British prime minister, 1868–74, 1880–85, 1886 (Feb. to July), and 1892–94). 51 See Irish Times, 23 Nov. 1990. 52 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher: the Downing Street years, 384.

 367

Bibliography Primary sources Archival institutions Great Britain National Archives of the United Kingdom, London • • • • •

Cabinet Office (CAB) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Northern Ireland Office (CJ) Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) Security Service Files (KV)

Bodleian Library, University of Oxford • The Conservative Party Archives (CPA)

Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge • • • • •

Enoch Powell Papers (POLL) Lord (Julian) Amery Papers (AMEJ) Lord Hailsham Papers (HLSM) Papers of Baroness Thatcher (THCR) Sir David Goodall’s unpublished manuscript (Misc. 74)

The Parliamentary Archives, House of Commons, London • Airey Neave Papers (AN)

Northern Ireland Linen Hall Library, Belfast

• Northern Ireland Political Collection (NIPC), ‘H-Block/Hunger Strike

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• Central Secretariat and Northern Ireland Office Files (CENT) • Northern Ireland Information Service (INF) • Northern Ireland Office (NIO)

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Ireland (Republic of) National Archives of Ireland, Dublin • Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) • Department of the Taoiseach (DT)

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• Fianna Fáil Party Papers (P176) • Garret FitzGerald Papers (P215)1 • John Whyte Oral Archive of British-Irish and Northern Irish Negotiations, 1972–2006 (P171) • Patrick Cosgrave Papers (P233)

Digital archives • CAIN (https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/index.html) • The Margaret Thatcher Foundation (https://www.margaretthatcher.org/) • Miller Center Oral Archive (https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/ presidential-oral-histories)

Interviews and correspondence • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

David Neligan, interview, 2 Jan. 2015 and email correspondence, Oct. 2015 Dr Garret FitzGerald, interview, 19 Jan. 2009 Gerry Adams, email correspondence, 14 Nov. 2019 James Pawsey, telephone interview, 11 Dec. 2018 Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, telephone interview, 27 Oct. 2015 Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, email correspondence, 14 Jan. 2020 Lord King of Bridgwater, email correspondence, 14 Jan. 2020 Lord Patten of Barnes, email correspondence, 8 Oct. 2018 Michael Lillis, interview, 18 Mar. 2016 Noel Dorr, interview, 8 Apr. 2014 Seán Donlon, email correspondence, Mar.–Apr. 2016 Sir Henry Bellingham, email correspondence, Dec. 2018–Mar. 2019 Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, interview, 2 Jun. 2006 Walter Kirwan, interview, 4 Jan. 2018

Parliamentary Sources Dáil Éireann debates (DE) House of Commons debates (HCD) On publication of this monograph the Garret FitzGerald Papers (P216  – Taoiseach, Northern Ireland material, 1980–7) remain unavailable for consultation. 1

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Newspapers (selected) Belfast News Letter The Belfast Telegraph Catholic Herald Daily Telegraph The Derry Journal The Economist The Financial Times The Guardian The Independent The Mirror I Newspaper Irish Times The Sun Sunday Independent Sunday Press The Telegraph Yorkshire Post

Published Primary Sources (selected) Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1985). Joint Declaration on Peace: the Downing Street Declaration (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1993). New Ireland Forum report (Dublin: Stationary Office, 1984). Northern Ireland: a framework for devolution (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1980). Northern Ireland: report of an independent inquiry (London, 1984). Public Accounts Committee, Interim and final reports (Dublin: Stationary Office, 1972). The [Good Friday] Agreement: agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations (10 Apr. 1998) (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1998). The Framework Document – a new framework for agreement (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1994). The government of Northern Ireland: proposals for future discussion (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1980). The right approach: a statement of Conservative aims (Conservative Central Office, London, 1976).

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Green, Penny and Ward, Tony, State crime: governments, violence and corruption (London, 2004). Goodlad, Graham, Thatcher (London, 2016). Hanley, Brian, The impact of the Troubles on the Republic of Ireland, 1968–79: boiling volcano (Manchester, 2019). Hanley, Brian, and Scott Millar, The lost revolution: the story of the Official IRA and the Workers’ Party (London, 2010). Harris, Kenneth, Thatcher (London, 1988). Harris, Robin, Not for turning: the life of Margaret Thatcher (London, 2013). Heffer, Simon, Like the Roman: the life of Enoch Powell (London, 1998). Henderson, Deric, ‘Taking a flight with Margaret Thatcher’, in Deric Henderson and Ivan Little (eds), Reporting the Troubles: journalist tell their stories of the Northern Ireland conflict (Belfast, 2018). Hennessey, Thomas, A history of Northern Ireland, 1920–1996 (London, 1997). Hennessey, Thomas, Hunger strike: Margaret Thatcher’s battle with the IRA (Kildare, 2014). Holland, Jack, and McDonald, Henry, INLA: deadly divisions (Dublin, 1994). Hume, David, The Ulster Unionist Party, 1972–92 (Lurgan, 1996). Ivory, Gareth, ‘Fianna Fáil, constitutional republicanism and the issue of consent, 19801996’, Eire-Ireland, Vol. 32, Nos. 2–3 (Summer/Fall, 1997), 93–116. Kelly, Stephen, ‘A failed political entity’: Charles Haughey and the Northern Ireland question, 1945–1992 (Kildare, 2016). Kelly, Stephen, ‘An opportunistic Anglophobe: Charles J. Haughey, the Irish government and the Falklands War, 1982’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2016), 522–41. Kelly, Stephen, Fianna Fáil, partition, and Northern Ireland, 1926–1971 (Dublin, 2013). Kelly, Stephen, ‘Fresh evidence from the archives: the genesis of Charles J. Haughey’s attitude to Northern Ireland’, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 23 (2012), 155–70. Kelly, Stephen, ‘ “Mr Haughey’s silence condemns him”: Charles J. Haughey and the second Republican hunger strike, 1981’, Irish Political Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2016), 1–25. Kelly, Stephen, ‘“… no textbook solutions to the problems in Northern Ireland”: Airey Neave and the Conservative Party’s Northern Ireland policy, 1975–1979’. Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 29 (2018), 237–60. Kelly, Stephen, ‘“The Anglo-Irish Agreement put us on side with the Americans”: Margaret Thatcher, Anglo-American relations and the path to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1979– 1985’. Contemporary British History Vol. 34, No. 3 (2020), 433–57. Keogh, Dermot, Jack Lynch: a biography (Dublin, 2008) Kwarteng, Kwasi, Thatcher’s trial: six months that defined a leader (London, 2015). Lee, Christopher, Carrington: honourable man (London, 2018). Lillis, Michael and Goodall, David, ‘Edging towards peace’, Dublin Review of Books, No. 16 (Winter 2010). Lillis, Michael, ‘Mr Haughey’s dual Exocet’. Dublin Review of Books, No. 21 (Spring 2012). Lillis, Michael, ‘The good statesman’, Dublin Review of Books, No. 19 (Summer 2011). MacGinty, Roger, ‘American influences on the Northern Ireland peace process’, The Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1997), 31–50. Maddox, Brenda, Maggie: the first lady (London, 2003). Mallie, Eamonn and McKittrick, David, The fight for peace: the inside story of the Irish peace process (London, 1997).

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Ryan, Richard, ‘Building Westminster commitment to the Anglo-Irish Agreement’, in MaryDaly (ed.), Brokering the Good Friday Agreement: the untold story (Dublin, 2019), 69–82. Salmon, Trevor, Unneutral Ireland: an ambivalent and unique security policy (Oxford, 1989). Sandbrook, Dominic, Seasons in the sun: the battle for Britain, 1974–1979 (London, 2012). Sandbrook, Dominic, Who dares wins: Britain, 1979–1982 (London 2019). Savage, Robert, The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’: television, conflict and Northern Ireland (Manchester, 2015). Scull, M. Margaret, The Catholic Church and the Northern Ireland troubles, 1968–1998 (Oxford, 2019). Shepard, John, Crisis what crisis?: the Callaghan government and the British ‘winter of discontent’ (Oxford, 2016). Shepherd, Robert, Enoch Powell: a biography (London, 1997). Sloan, R. G., The geopolitics of Anglo-Irish relations in the 20th century (London, 1997). Smith, Jeremy, ‘“Ever reliable friends”?: the Conservative Party and Ulster Unionism in the twentieth century’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 121, No. 490 (Feb. 2006), 70–103. Spencer, Graham (ed.), The British and peace in Northern Ireland (Cambridge, 2015). Spencer, Graham, Inside accounts, volume 1: the Irish government and peace in Northern Ireland, from Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement (Manchester, 2019). Taylor, Peter, Brits: the war against the IRA (London, 2002). Tomlinson, Jim, ‘Thatcher, monetarism and the politics of inflation’, in Ben Jackson and Roberts Saunders (eds), Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge, 2012), 62–77. Urwin, Margaret, A state in denial: British collaboration with Loyalist paramilitaries (Cork, 2016). Vinen, Richard, Thatcher’s Britain: The politics and social upheaval of the 1980s (London, 2010). Walker, Graham, A history of the Ulster Unionist Party: protest, pragmatism and pessimism (Manchester, 2004). Walsh, Dick, Inside Fianna Fáil (Dublin, 1986). Wilson, J. Andrew, Irish America and the Ulster conflict, 1968–1995 (Belfast, 1995). Young, Hugo, One of us: a biography of Margaret Thatcher (London, 1989).

Documentaries/online resources/websites • Lord Lexden, ‘35 years ago today, Airey Neave was murdered and the course of British politics changed’, 30 Mar. 2014. See http://www.conservativehome.com/ platform/2014/03/lord-lexden-35-years-ago-today-airey-neave-was-murdered-andthe-course-of-british-politics-changed.html (access date 15 Sept. 2020). • Television documentary for BBC’s Panorama, ‘Britain’s secret terror deals’, 2015. See https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05x8gzs (access date 15 Sept. 2020). • Television documentary for BBC’s, ‘Spotlight on the Troubles: a secret history’, 2019. See https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m0008c47 (access date 15 Sept. 2020). • Television documentary for RTÉ, ‘Thatcher: Ireland and the Iron Lady’, 2013. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foD8GMhRwFw (access date 15 Sept. 2020). • Television documentary for RTÉ, Scannal, ‘Out, out, out’, 2015. See https://presspack. rte.ie/2015/10/12/scannal-51/ (access date 15 Sept. 2020).

376

376

 377

Index Abbott, Clive 75 Acland, Anthony, Sir 109 active service units (ASUs) 242 Act of Parliament of 1973 152 Adams, Gerry 1, 114, 127, 128, 129, 134, 136, 137, 138, 187, 247, 260, 261, 269, 270, 273 Adams-Hume talks 260, 261 Agnew, Paddy 136 Ahern, Bertie 269 AIA. See Anglo-Irish Agreement AIIC. See Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council Air Navigation Act regulations 86 Alexander, Michael 149 Alison, Michael 93, 202 Alliance Party 53, 99, 100, 112, 187 Amery, Harold Julian 6, 228, 235 attacked Prior’s plans for ‘rolling devolution’ 162 Prior’s White Paper, views on 166 Anderson, Bruce 63 Andrew, Robert 243 Angel, Graham 189 Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) 1, 4, 212, 262 Article 8, 220, 222 Article 10, 223 Article 1 of, 221 Articles 2, 3 and 4, 221–2 Articles 6, 7 and 9, 222 central principles of 221 Conservative Party’s response to 227–8 draft terms of 216 draft text 218 financial support for 224 House of Commons members voted against 6 King’s recommendation 220

negotiations, Conservative Party backbench opposition to 217–20 preliminary draft of 213 signing of 237 decision to 274–5 key factor in 8–9 regretted 8 Thatcher and 220–4 Thatcher’s response to 224–7 Ulster Unionists’ response to 229–31 Anglo-Irish Economic Steering Groups 118 Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference 222, 226, 231–3, 262 Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council (AIIC) 125, 151–2, 153, 163, 172, 181 Armstrong and Nally role in coordinating 192 coordinating committee of, meeting with 184 Dublin’s request to establish new 150 establishment of 150–1, 159–60 first meeting of 159–60 proposed establishment 141, 147, 149 Anglo-Irish joint study groups 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 139–45, 148, 149, 192 Anglo-Irish negotiations 147, 200, 211, 214, 216–18 Anglo-Irish relations aftermath of Falklands War 172–5 cross-border security/extradition and 3, 18 desire to advance 175 deterioration of, Falklands War and 167–72 resurrection of 179–82 SDLP and 163–5 Anglo-Irish summit meeting 107–9, 117 agenda of London, November 1981 meeting 149

378

378

Index

of 8 December 1980, 117–20 differing interpretations of 120–4 Dublin-London relations in aftermath of 113 Haughey-Thatcher 117–20 of November 1981 reaction to 151–5 second 107 taoiseach’s central motivation for 113 anti-AIA lobby group 234 anti-integrationist 99 anti-Thatcher poster 156 anti-Thatcher wall mural 157 Argentinian-British relations 167 Armstrong, Robert, Sir 5, 6, 8, 9, 88, 91, 101, 109–11, 124, 131, 132, 139–42, 144, 147–9, 163, 181, 184, 185, 191–5, 199, 211, 214, 217, 219, 224, 225, 233–4, 245, 247 Armstrong-Nally framework talks 186, 191–8, 200, 201, 203, 213, 216, 219 Arthur, Paul 66, 82, 218 assassination, of Airey Neave 57–67 Atkins, Humphrey 8, 14, 74, 78–81, 83, 86–91, 110–11, 117, 124, 128, 132, 135–7, 142, 144, 161 attended CPPNIC meeting 115 British government’s policy 113 Echoing Whitelaw’s memorandum 92–3 ‘Federal/Confederal Links’ 112 fresh political initiative for Northern Ireland 107 informed Thatcher about prisoners 130 knowledge of Northern Ireland 78 on ‘New UK/Republic Relationships’ 112 Northern Ireland political policy, articulated 79 performance as secretary of state 89 Regional Council model 88 relationship with Northern Ireland political parties 79 in summit meeting in Dublin 123 talks. See Atkins’s talks Thatcher’s intervention 89 White Paper 93–4 Atkins’s talks 99–100, 105, 106 failure of 110, 111 stalled 109

Baker, Kenneth 264 Baldwin, Stanley 10 Barrie, David 181 Barry, Peter 180, 199, 213, 218, 231 Belfast Agreement 274 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998 9, 10 Belfast-Dublin-London relations 231–3 Belfast-London relations deterioration of (April–December 1986), 233–5 Thatcher and (June–December 1987), 244–6 Belfast Telegraph, 27 Bellingham, Henry 228 Belstead, Lord 23 Benyon, Bill 230 Benyon, William 212 Berry, Anthony, Sir 195 Biaggi, Mario 209 Biffen, John 88, 214, 244 Biggs, Christopher Ewart 23 Biggs-Davison, John, Sir 6, 20, 23, 37, 53, 56, 57, 93, 115, 155, 162, 188, 189, 228, 234 contribution to CPPNIC 21 opposed Heath 21 relations with Ulster Unionists 38 sent to Washington 116 supported Molyneaux’s advances 36 views on power-sharing Executive 29 visit to Dublin 27–8 bilateral consultation 159–60 bipartisan policy 39, 47 Thatcher’s commitment to 66 Birmingham Pub bombings (1974) 14 ‘Birmingham Six’ 251 Blair, Tony 10 ‘blanket protest’ 59 Blelloch, John 132 Bloomfield, Kenneth, Sir 50, 71, 218, 265 Bowman, John 212 Boyson, Rhodes 231 Bradford, Robert 55, 153 Bradford, Roy 229 Brett, Charles 224 Brighton Hotel bombing, 12 October 1984, 195–9

 379

Index British Association of Canned Food Importers and Distribution 265 British Civil Service 102, 110 long-held suspicions towards 75 negotiation team, King’s instructions to 219 relationship with 73–6 British-Irish Association 190 British Military Intelligence 47 British Secret Intelligence Service 43, 127 British Special Air Forces (SAS) 48 British War Crimes Executive 43 Brittan, Leon 165, 213 Brooke, John 123 Brooke, Peter 8, 9 Northern Ireland initiative 256–61 ‘Three Strands’ 272 Whitbread speech 261–7 Brookeborough, Lady 229 Brookeborough, Viscount 123, 229 Brooke Initiative 269, 270 Bruinvels, Peter 230 Bruton, John 271 Buck, Anthony 212 Budgen, Nicholas 166 Budgen, Nick 235 Burns, Sean 249 Burt, Alistair 228 Bush, George 208 Butler, Adam 228 Butler, Robin 228, 259 Cadwallader, Anne 255–6 Callaghan, James 10, 39, 58, 62, 76, 110, 145 on Neave’s murder 63 Thatcher reassured to 65 UUP MPs voted against 61 Cameron, David 256, 273 Campbell, John 4, 13, 44, 71, 193 Campbell, Sarah 31 Cannadine, David 75, 210 Carey, Hugh 209 Carrington, Lord 74, 77, 79, 83, 88, 89, 103, 105, 111, 117, 122, 142, 144, 149, 165, 168 Carrington, Peter 23 Carroll, Roddie 249 Carroll, Roger 44, 47

379

Carron, Owen 138 Carter, Jimmy 205–6 Cartledge, Bryan, Sir 76 Catholics in Northern Ireland 4 Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) 13 Churchill, Winston S. 10, 235 civilian style clothing 115 Clark, Alan 5, 43, 167, 217–18, 264 Clark, William 207, 208, 209, 226 Clarke, Kenneth 244 ‘codeword’ 182–6 Coleman, Seán 134 Coles, John 193 Colley, George 83, 86 Collins, Gerald 168, 263 Conservative Party backbench MPs 155 growing sense of unease amongst 161–2 opposition to AIA negotiations 217–20 Prior’s private disagreements with 155 Brighton conference (1984) 2 Centre for Policy Studies 13 Conference in Blackpool (October 1975), 16–17, 36–7 Conference in Brighton (October 1976), 30–1 CPPNIC. See Conservative Party Parliamentary Northern Ireland Committee devolution debate (1975–76), 26–34 elite and Northern Ireland 5–6 leader of 1 Northern Ireland policy 13–41 relationship with UUP 34–40 response to AIA 227–8 The right approach, 25–6, 39, 40 Conservative Party Central Office (CPCO) 23, 25 Conservative Party Defence Committee 58 Conservative Party Parliamentary Northern Ireland Committee (CPPNIC), 5–6, 21–4, 35, 45–6 Biggs-Davison’s contribution 21 composition of 20 fact-finding subcommittee of 6, 20–3, 36, 50

380

380

Index

meeting 155 Atkins attended 115 23 January 1979, 60 1 March 1977, 53 November 1976, 33 November 1978, 54 Prior attended 162 Prior’s White Paper in, opposition to 166 members of 20, 228 argued Northern Ireland’s integration 155 greeted Neave’s remarks 162 and Thatcher’s relationship with Irish government 6 topic and policies discussed 22 Conservative Research Department (CRD) 5, 50, 53, 65, 72 Cooke, Alistair, 43, 62, 65, 92, 100, 116 cooperative devolution 190 Copper, Frank, Sir 109 Corbyn, Jeremy 227 Cornick, Noel 260 Corthorn, Paul 56 Cosgrave, Liam 22, 27–8 Cosgrave, Patrick 5, 21 Council of Ireland 27, 28 Council of State proposal 49–52 establishment of 67 NIO campaign to undermine 50–1 Cowen, Barry 143 CPPNIC. See Conservative Party Parliamentary Northern Ireland Committee Craig, Messrs 36 Craig, Thomas 60 Craig, William 23, 36, 38, 55 CRD. See Conservative Research Department Creasey, Timothy, Sir 82 Criminal Law Act of 1967 130 cross-border security cooperation 8 North-South 241–4 Crouch, David 212, 230 Cubbon, Brian 109 Cunningham, Michael 61, 92 Curtis, Geoffrey 181 Cushnahan, John 53

Dáil Éireann 170 Daly, Edward 113, 135 Dam, Kenneth 175 David, Camp 209 Davis, Ivan 229 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 4, 55, 100, 112, 153, 163, 174, 187, 189, 230 Department of the Taoiseach (DT) 85 de Silva, Desmond 256 Devine, Micky 137 Devlin, Matt 137 devolution, framework for 160–3, 165–7 appetite for, in Scotland 161 attempt to impose 162 effective 161 Powell vocal critic of 163 rolling 161, 162, 163 devolution debate, Northern Ireland 26–34 Devoy, Luke 205, 206 Dickson, Anne 22 Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 249, 250, 251 Doherty, Kieran 136 Doherty, Kiernan 137 Donlon, Seán 164, 181, 199, 209, 225–6 Donoughue, Bernard 192 Dooge, James 160 Dorr, Noel 168, 170, 214, 233, 234 Downing Street Declaration 271 Downing Street years,The, 2 Dublin-Monaghan bombings in 1974 255 Du Cann, Edward, Sir 13 Duddy, Brendan 127, 136, 137, 265 Dunlop, Frank 85 DUP. See Democratic Unionist Party Eames, Armagh Robin0, 233 economic policy, obsession with 15–16 ECST. See European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism Edwards, Nicholas 244 EEC summit meeting 172–3 Elliot, Mark 222 ‘emotional unionist’ 71 English, Richard 63, 79 Enniskillen bombing 247–8 European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR), 131–2

 381

Index European Community Budget 83 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST) 237 Haughey-Thatcher relationship and 246–8 refusal to ratify 246–7, 248 European Council 117 European Monetary System (EMS) 83 Evans, David 217 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 272 fact-finding subcommittee 6, 20–3 Molyneaux attended meeting of 36 Neave’s commitment in meeting of 38 Falklands War 167–75 aftermath of, Anglo-Irish relations in 172–5 and deterioration of Anglo-Irish relations 167–72 Fanning, Ronan 207 Farr, John Arnold 20, 23, 29 Farrell, Mairéad 251 Farren, Seán 163 Faulkner, Brian 23, 27, 34, 36, 38 FCO. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office Féin, Sinn 1, 127, 135, 137, 138, 162, 174, 187–8, 191, 193, 225, 226, 244, 247, 257, 259, 260, 261, 263, 265, 269, 270, 271 Fenn, Nicholas 254 Figg, Leonard 107, 108, 132, 134, 139, 147, 149, 164, 170, 171, 173 Fine Gael-Labour Party coalition 135–6 government 163 Finlay, Richard 4 Finn, Nicholas 253 Finucane, Pat 254–5 Fisher, Nigel, Sir 20, 23, 29, 115 Fitt, Belfast-West Gerry 93, 94 Fitt, Gerry 22, 31, 54 FitzGerald, Garret 27, 31–3, 47–8, 63, 136, 145–51, 153, 155, 175, 180, 181, 183–8, 193–4, 198–204, 212, 219, 221, 224, 233–5 AIA as triumph for 223 Anglo-Irish summit meeting with 209 applauded for sincerity 146

381

becoming taoiseach 145 chaired Anglo-Irish review conference 145 ‘constitutional crusade’ 146, 149 departing government in January 1982 147 establishment of the AIIC 151 European Council meeting 235 failure to pass through Dáil Éireann 237 Howe’s meeting with 198–9 Irish unity, support to 150–1 letter from Reagan 207 margins of European Council 213 meeting with 230–1 New Ireland Forum 188 Prior Initiative, support for 163 relationship with, Thatcher’s 148 stalled Anglo-Irish negotiations, brought life to 147 summit meeting with 197 Thatcher’s view of 146 ‘unarmed police force’ request for 214 FitzGerald-Molyneaux secret talks, proposed 233–5 FitzGerald-Thatcher relationship 145–51 FitzGerald-Thatcher summit meeting (18– 19 November 1984), 199–203 Foot, Michael 122, 134 Force Research Unit (FRU) 254, 256 Ford, Gerald 205 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 9, 33, 72, 121, 139, 167 briefing document 101 civil servants 76 officialdom 148 officials 107 six central policy objectives 148 and Thatcher’s confusion 87 Fox, Marcus 212, 230 Fraser, Hugh, Sir 14, 155 Freedman, Laurence 170 FRU. See Force Research Unit Gaddafi, Muammar 243, 247 Gael, Fine 145, 187 Galsworthy, Arthur 27–8 Galtieri, Leopoldo 167 Gardiner, George 155 General election of 1974 13

382

382

Index

George, T. J. B. 245 ‘Gibraltar Three’ 251–2 Gilmour, Ian, Sir 13, 15, 75, 79, 83, 88, 89, 90, 102, 105, 111, 142 Goodall, David 9, 175–6, 180–6, 189, 191, 195, 198, 213, 214, 218, 220, 225, 226, 234 Goodall-Lillis secret talks 182–6, 224 Good Friday Agreement of 1998 271 Goodhart, Philip, Sir 20, 23, 51, 166, 234 Goodison, Alan 173, 181, 189, 202 Goodlad, Graham 17, 72, 226 Gorbachev, Mikhail 9, 200, 210, 225 government communications headquarters (GCHQ) 182 Gow, Ian 2, 20, 56, 61, 115, 143, 153, 161, 165, 166–7, 175, 179, 212, 218, 227, 234, 259, 264 Gowrie, Lord 137, 211, 212, 213 Grew, Seamus 249, 255 Hailsham, Lord 73, 75, 79, 89, 105, 111, 150, 160, 165, 172, 179, 213, 214, 244 Harris, Robin 15 Harvey, Kevin 217 Haughey, Charles 3, 86, 102–5, 111, 112, 117–24, 131, 135, 142, 154, 155, 163–75, 246–8 Anglo-Irish affairs, handling 124 Anglo-Irish joint studies, views on 140 and Atkins’s talks 112 declined Thatcher’s request 132 Dublin-London relations during Falklands War, handling of 180 and Dublin’s Northern Ireland policy 100–2 as Fianna Fáil leader 100 ‘Irish dimension’ 107 Lenihan’s comments and 143 meeting with, Thatcher’s 144, 243 North-South talks 265 personal message to, Thatcher’s 135 relationship with Thatcher. See HaugheyThatcher relationship Sands’s death and 133 self-image 263 as taoiseach 223, 241 taoiseach’s change of attitude 241

workings of AIA, commitment for 241 Haughey, Sarah 100 Haughey, Seán 100 Haughey-Thatcher relationship coolness’ in 173 and ECST 246–8 and sanctions against Argentina 170 souring of 144, 165 and teapot diplomacy 102–5 totality of relationships 117–20 Haughey-Thatcher summit meeting 8 December 1980, 117–20 21 May 1980, 102–5, 113 Havers, Michael 244 Haydon, Robert 80, 81, 86 Haydon, Robin 76, 101 Hayes, Maurice 71 Headquarters Mobile Support Unit (HMSU) 249 Healy, Kevin 104 Heath, Edward 7, 10, 17, 81 appointed Whitelaw as secretary of state 26 forced to resign as prime minister 35 general election of 1974, loss of 13 resignation as party leader 14 views on using “power sharing” term 28 Henderson, Deric 80 Henderson, Nicholas, Sir 208 Hennessey, Thomas 58, 127, 136 Hermon, John Charles, Sir 231, 249, 250 Heseltine, Michael 16, 74, 161, 179, 195, 266 Hillsborough Agreement 228 Holland, Jack 64 Holland, Mary 275 Home, Alec Douglas, Sir 10 Home Rule Bill (1886) 257 Hordernm, Peter 230 Howe, Geoffrey, Sir 8–9, 14, 23, 56, 63, 74, 83, 111, 117, 124, 151, 153, 179, 181, 182, 184, 186, 192, 195, 197–9, 251, 270 Anglo-Irish relations, intervention in 211, 214 final draft of AIA 219–20 memorandum by 214–16 pressure on Thatcher by 225

 383

Index relationship with King 218–19 resigned as deputy prime minister 266 support to Security Commission 200 travelled to Dublin 213 view on Article 8 of AIA, 220 Howe-Hurd memorandum 214–16 Howe-King relationship 219 Howes, David 252–3 Hughes, Brendan 114, 116, 128, 137 Hughes, Francis 130, 134 Hume, David 87 Hume, John 23, 99, 100, 131, 163, 186, 209, 211, 260 Hunt, John, Sir 75, 88 Hurd, Douglas 8, 9, 72, 166, 193, 197, 198, 199, 214, 259 Howe’s meeting with 211 memorandum by 214–16 ministerial promotion 218 patronising comments of 202 ‘progress report’ 219 support to Security Commission 200 travelled to Dublin 213 Hurson, Martin 207 Huston, John 23, 25 ICJP. See International Commission for Justice and Peace ICRC. See International Commission of the Red Cross Ingham, Bernard 264 Ingram, Brian P. 230 INLA. See Irish National Liberation Army interim affair 49–52 International Commission for Justice and Peace (ICJP) 136 International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) 137 Irish border, proposed adjusting 2 ‘Irish dimension’ 104, 107, 113, 163–5 Irish National Caucus (INC) 209 Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) 2, 21, 58 bomb attack at UUP headquarters by 174 and Neave’s assassination 63–4 Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) 209 Irish Republican areas 1

383

Irish Republican hunger-strike March–October 1981, 127–38 anti-Thatcher poster during 156 October–December 1980 3, 113–17 Irish Republican paramilitaries ‘appalling outrage’ 248 commitment to defeat, Thatcher’s 7, 18 Irish government’s response to arrest 24 killings on behalf of 23 negotiation with 3 offensive’ strategy against 48 Thatcher central target for 16 Irish Republican prisoners arresting 48 based on Long-Kesh 114, 116 ‘dirty protests’ 57–66 special category status to 113, 116 Irish Republican terrorism 3, 21, 81 Irish Republic Socialist Party (IRSP) 63 Irish Times, 33 IRSP. See Irish Republic Socialist Party Ivory, Gareth 120 Jackson, Ben 14 James, David 29, 37 Jenkins, Simon 172 Johnson, Charles, Sir 99 Johnson, Lyndon B. 205 Jopling, Michael 244 Joseph, Keith 13, 14–15, 17, 23, 74, 165 Kavanagh, Liam 231 Keating, Paul 57 Kennedy, Eamon 3, 81, 102, 108, 134–5, 139, 173, 181 Kennedy, Ted (Edward) 63, 209 Kilbrandon, Lord 190 Kilbrandon Report 190 Kilfedder, James 105, 152 King, Tom 216, 218–20, 228, 229, 230, 231, 235, 241, 244, 246, 247, 248, 257, 259 Kingsmill ‘massacre’ in 1976 23, 255 Kinnock, Neil 201, 227 Kirwan, Walter 85, 86, 101, 108, 110, 170 Knight, Jill 37 Kohl, Helmut 223

384

384

Index

Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 103 Lawson, Nigel 149, 165, 193, 195, 214, 216, 227 LCC. See Leader’s Consultative Committee leader of opposition, during 1975-79, 6–7 Leader’s Consultative Committee (LCC) 16, 56 Leigh, Edward 259 Lenihan, Brian 117, 122, 142–4 Lillis, Michael 145, 182–6, 198, 203, 209, 222, 231 Livingstone, Ken 250 Lowry, Robert, Sir 213 loyalist paramilitaries collusion between British state and 254–6 ‘impunity’ for 256 involved in violence 255 Luce, Richard 167 Lyell, Nicholas 244 Lynch, Jack 19, 57, 63, 76–8, 83–6 approach on security 78 approach to Northern Ireland 77 holidaying in Portugal 80 Lynch, Kevin 137 Lynch-Thatcher meeting 83–6 Lynch-Thatcher relationship, genesis of 76–8 MacIntyre, Darragh 254 Macmillan, Harold 10 ‘Macrory’ functions 20, 52 MacStiofáin, Seán 26 Magee, John 133 Magee, Patrick 195, 196, 274 Maginnis, Ken 229, 231, 246 Maguire, Frank 130 Major, John 10, 244, 266, 269–70 majority-rule 26–34, 87. See also powersharing, in Northern Ireland Neave’s remarks on 31, 32 return to 27 UUUC demand 29 Mallie, Eamon 265 Mallon, Seamus 99 Marshall, J. A. 109 Marson, Claire 235 Mason, Roy 48, 50, 52, 59, 63, 64, 65

Mates, Michael 20, 23, 30, 59, 190, 201–2, 255, 259 Mather, Carol 23 Maudling, Reginald 5, 15, 23 Mawhinney, Brian 116, 190 Mayhew, Patrick, Sir 20, 244, 247, 250, 270 McAlpine, Alistair 212 McAuley, Carlisle 230 McAuley, James 189 McCann, Daniel 251 McConnell, J. E. 248 McCreesh, Raymond 130, 135 McCusker, Harold 245 McDonald, Henry 64 McElwee, Thomas 137 McFarlane, Brendan 138 McGinty, Roger 205 McGuinness, Martin 127, 138, 263, 265, 273 McKee, Billy 58 McKenna, Seán 128 McKerr, Gervaise 249 McKittrick, David 265 McLure, David 230 Miami Showband killings in 1975 255 Millar, Frank 245 Mills, Peter 23, 56 mini-Munich 120–4 Miscampbell, Norman 20, 23, 51, 93 Mitterrand, Francois 223 Mitterrand, François 168 Molloy, Mike 171 Moloney, Ed 138, 235, 243, 269 Molyneaux, James 4, 36, 61, 89, 91, 129, 152, 153, 162–3, 202, 230, 232, 233–5, 245, 246, 258 Atkins’s disappointment 93 bipartisan policy 39 declined Thatcher’s invitation 92 ignored leader’s protests 55 ‘immobility’ 262 ‘Molyneaux plan’ 39, 52 Thatcher rejects accusations of 123–4 Moore, Charles 2, 16, 33, 74, 80, 82, 102, 127, 144, 185, 200, 203, 206, 211, 219, 235, 261, 272 Moore, Jeremy 171, 172 Moriarty, Michael 107, 108 Morrison, Danny 138

 385

Index Mountbatten, Lord 73, 79, 81, 82 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick 209 Mugabe, Robert 103 Murray, Raymond 251 Nally, Dermot 85, 86, 118, 121, 122, 132, 139–40, 144, 147, 176, 181, 199, 203, 224, 255, 265 Napier, Oliver 99 National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), 196–7 NATO. See Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization Neave, Airey 7, 17, 18, 20, 26, 162, 259, 264 address to shadow cabinet 28 assassination of 57–67 attempts to increase dialogue with UUP 36–7 bipartisan approach 47 and Council of State proposal 49–52 CPPNIC, contribution to 21 devising Northern Ireland policy, role in 45 and devolution debate 29 difference with SDLP leadership 31–2 as ‘dour man’ 43 Fitt’s criticism 31 intelligence and military capabilities 44 loss of 2 ‘man of contrasts’ 44 in meeting of CPPNIC (October 1976) 26 meeting with Cosgrave 22 Northern Ireland policy 24, 43–9 political life, contribution to 21 regional Council debate 52–7 relationship with UUP 34 shadow secretary of state 15, 20, 44–9 Thatcher recalled 14 visit to Dublin 27–8 wrote to West (23 November 1976) 39 Neave-Thatcher relationship 43–4 Needham, Richard 71 Neligan, David 108, 119, 147 Nelson, Brian 254 Nesbitt, Mike 273 Newington, Michael 107, 108, 109 New Ireland Forum (NIF) 146, 183 findings of 189

385

origins of 187 pathway for Northern Ireland 183 public session of 187 report 192, 201 Armstrong’s stand on 192 London’s response to 186–91 reservations regarding 188 New Ireland Report 189 Newman, Kenneth, Sir 82 NICC. See Northern Ireland Constitution Convention NIF. See New Ireland Forum NIO 54. See Northern Ireland Office Nissen, Guy 80 Nixon, Richard 205 Noonan, Michael 231 Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 112 Northern Ireland Conservative Party elite and 5–5 formalized role in affairs of 191–5 introduction of direct rule to 21 new political initiative for 8, 73–6 outbreak of conflict in 1969 10 path to peace in (1990–8), 269–72 policy for 3, 6–7, 8, 13–41 right approach in relation to 20–6 secretaries of state for 8 security policy for 2–3, 18–19 settlement for 4 strategy, modification of 3 Thatcher’s attitude towards 1–3 Thatcher’s legacy on 272–5 withdrawing British Army from 18–19 Northern Ireland Assembly 174 Northern Ireland (Provisions) Bill 21 Northern Ireland Constitution Convention (NICC) 22, 29–30 collapse of talks 49 failure of 30 Ulster Unionists opposed 29 Northern Ireland devolution debate (1975–76), 26–34 Northern Ireland Executive 273 collapse of 27, 35 Northern Ireland initiative 256–61 Northern Ireland Office (NIO) 21, 75, 100, 123 absence of 218

386

386

Index

annoyed by Brooke’s speech 259 campaign to undermine Council of State proposal 50–1 memorandum 112, 121 and Neave’s proposal 50 petitioned Roy Mason 50–1 Northern Ireland policy 13–41 British government’s, evolution of January–July 1985, 211–16 June–November 1980, 105–13 May–September 1979, 78–83 constitutional 24 genesis of 13–20 Haughey and 100–2 Neave devoted to 15 political principles 19–20, 48–9 re-evaluation of 71–3 right approach for 20–6 security 2–3, 18–19, 25–6, 46–8 Northern Protestants 1 North-South cross-border cooperation 81 Nott, John 105, 111 Nugent, Kieran 59 Obama, Barack 273 O’Brien, Conor Cruise 22 Ó Dúill, Piaras 129 Ó Fiaich, Tomás 60, 114 O’Hara, Pasty 130, 135 O’Kennedy, Michael 60, 83, 117–18 Oldfield, Maurice, Sir 82 O’Leary, Brendan 56, 87 O’Leary, Michael 149 Oliver, John 50 O’Loan, Baroness Nuala 256 O’Neill, Tip 63, 209–10, 223, 226 opposition leader. See leader of opposition, during 1975-79 O’Rawe, Richard 137 O’Rourke, Andrew 259 O’Sullivan, Donál 33 overflights controversy 83–6 Page, John Jack, Sir 228 Paisley, Ian 4, 36, 38, 55, 90, 99, 104, 122, 123, 124, 143, 152, 153, 162, 163, 189, 229, 230, 232, 234, 235, 245, 246, 258 Parkinson, Cecil 165, 179, 244

Parsons, Anthony 168 Patten, Christopher 25, 61, 65 Patterson, Henry 55, 210, 266 Pawsey, James 228 Pilling, J. P. 87 Pimlott, Ben 73 PIRA. See Provisional Irish Republican Army political downfall 261–7 Pollak, Andy 235 Pope John Paul II 116, 117, 133 Porter, George Barrington 6, 37, 162, 166, 230 Powell, Charles 2, 9, 193, 197, 199, 201, 210, 219, 252, 259, 265 Powell, Enoch 56, 57, 64, 92, 99, 122, 143, 144, 152, 153, 163, 175, 202, 203, 204, 230 power-sharing 26–34, 200 Biggs-Davison rebuked contention of 29 FitzGerald’s proposal 32 Neave’s assurance on 28 SDLP on 30 use of term 28–9 UUP attacking idea of 37–8 power-sharing Executive 29, 49 Prior, Jim 17, 56, 74, 137, 149, 153, 155, 159–67, 174–5, 181, 184, 186, 188–91 agreed with Goodall’s diagnosis 182 ‘consistent policy’ 180 Goodall’s meeting with 182, 183 Initiative. See Prior Initiative meeting with Peter Barry 180 plans for ‘rolling devolution’ 191 resignation., 193 White Paper 165–6 Prior Initiative 160–3 failure of 174 party opposition to 165–7 Prior-Thatcher relationship 160 Proctor, Kevin Harvey 6, 93, 228 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 2, 21, 48, 74, 83, 149, 162, 226, 242–3, 252–3, 270 Army Council 114, 137–8 assassination of Ian Gow 263–4 atrocities by 79, 80 Birmingham Pub bombings by 14

 387

Index bomb attack in Co. Sligo 79 Brighton Hotel bombing 195 British government propaganda war against 131 Brooke’s Whitbread speech, response to 9, 265 ceasefire 3, 23, 58, 274 willingness to 259 communication with 9 ‘complete cessation of military activity’ 271 crackdown on 72 Enniskillen bombing 247–8 letter bomb 162 murder of Robert Bradford by 153 murders by 7, 73 Neave’s murder 63 propaganda of 129 propaganda war against 59–60 resurgence of 241–4 Sandhurst 59 terrorist attacks in London 173 willingness to ceasefire 259 Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR) 74 Pym, Francis 15, 65, 74, 79, 81, 88, 89, 90, 105, 111, 165 Queen Elizabeth II 66, 210, 229 Quinn, Paddy 135 Ramsay, Robin 51 Rawlinson, Anthony, Sir 109 Reagan, Ronald 133, 196, 206–10, 219, 223, 226 Reagan-Thatcher relationship 205–11 Rees, Merlyn 23, 29, 47–8, 63, 250 Regional Councils 19, 20, 39, 51, 61 Conservative government pledged to support 65 debate on 52–7 establishment of 49, 53, 66, 75, 77, 87 system of administrative devolution 52–3 Reid, Alec 253 Renwick, Robin 269 Republican Action Force (RAF) 23 Republican Sinn Féin (RSF) 261 Retail Price Index (RPI) 74

387

Reynolds, Albert 270 Rhodes-James, Robert 230 Ridley, Adam 65, 193, 214 Roberts, Alfred 66 Robinson, Peter 1, 99, 123, 152, 229, 235, 245, 246, 262, 273 Rogers, William P. 205 rolling devolution strategy 161, 162, 163 Ross, William 31, 36, 55 Roth, Andrew 89 Routledge, Paul 62 Rowntree Trust 190 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 2, 3, 249, 250 and British Army 82 ‘dedication and courage’ of 61 expansion of 82 and Garda Síochána 242–3 harassment of Catholic minority by 101 during Northern Ireland conflict 3 sympathy for 2 RUC. See Royal Ulster Constabulary Ryan, Patrick 254 Ryan, Richard 202, 212, 233 Ryder, Richard 15 Salmon, Trevor 170 Sampson, Colin 250 Sampson Report 250 Sandbrook, Dominic 63 Sands, Bobby 3, 129–35, 138, 255 death of 133–4 election victory 131 health deteriorated 132 Sands, Marcella 132 Saunders, Robert 14 Savage, Robert 131, 260 Savage, Seán 251 Scargill, Arthur 196 Scopes, Julian 264 Scott, Nicholas 190, 231, 244 Scottish devolution referendum 61 SDLP. See Social Democratic and Labour Party Security Council 168, 170 security policy 2–3, 18–19 Shackleton, Lord 175 shadow cabinet 23, 30

388

388

Index

attended Conservative Party Conference 31 differences of opinion among members of 26 economic strategy 15 final line-up of 14 meetings 7, 16 Neave’s address to (January 1976) 28 Thatcher’s reshuffle of (January 1976) 21 Whitelaw’s protests 27 Shaw, Giles 115 Sheehan, Mary 117 ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy, allegations of 249–53 Silvester, Fred 228 Simms, George 60 Smith, Ian 103 Smith, Jeremy 34, 227 Smyth, Martin 31, 105 Soames, Lord 75, 111 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 33, 52, 102, 112, 130, 164, 172, 174, 187, 212, 232 agreed to set-up ‘Council of Ireland’ 27 and Anglo-Irish relations 163–5 dual demands of 71 fought election campaign 29–30 leadership 31–2 under leadership of John Hume 260 Northern Ireland’s proposal, response to 51 obstacle to progress 100 and Prior Initiative 163 and Regional Council model 53 rejected Atkins’s White Paper 94 role of 258 share of vote 227 Sinn Féin outdistances 162 Thatcher’s opinion of 4–5 views on power-sharing 30 vs. UUUC 30 South Down Unionist Association 99 Spring, Dick 199, 213 Stalker, John 249 Stalker Report 250 Stalker-Sampson Report 250–1 Stanbrook, Ivor 6, 93, 115, 155, 189 Stanley, John 242, 244 Stevens, John, Sir 256 Stone, Michael 252

Stormont speech 135 Stowe, Kenneth 102, 109, 118, 119, 127, 132 Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 7, 17, 26–7, 34, 110, 139 Swift, Hugh 101 Syke, Richard, Sir 65 Tatham, David 133, 168, 209 Taylor, John, Sir 16 Taylor, Peter 249 teapot diplomacy 102–5 Tebbit, Norman 179, 195, 214, 216, 228, 244, 259 Thatcher, Margaret 154 and allegations of ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy 249–53 with British Army officer 97 British civil servants influence over 9 cabinet’s defence and oversea policy committee 86–91 central political objective 15–16 collusion between British state and loyalist paramilitaries 254–6 with female RUC officer 95 first-term in office (1979–83), 7–8 general election campaign (1974), 13–14 ignorance of Northern Ireland’s affairs 7 leadership of party, fight for 13–14 legacy on Northern Ireland 272–5 with male RUC officer 96 Northern Ireland policy 13–41. See also Northern Ireland policy obsession with economic policy 16 as opposition leader (1975–79), 6–7 political downfall of 261–7 regretted signing AIA 8 relationship with British Civil Service 73–6 second-term in office (1983–87), 8–9 third-term in office (1987–90), 9–10 uniform holding red beret 98 unionist, label of 4 visits British troops at Aldergrove Airport 236 visit to Girdwood Park barracks 95 willingness to reboot Anglo-Irish relations 180 Thomas, John Stradling 230

 389

Index Thompson, Lord 261 Tighe, Michael 249 Toman, Eugene 249 Tomlinson, Jim 15 ‘totality of relationships’ 120–4 UFF. See Ulster Freedom Fighters Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 252 Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) 64 Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) 254 Ulster Resistance (UR) 235 Ulster Unionism 4, 38, 49, 71, 99, 124, 271 against AIA 232 alleged abandonment of 143 mainstream 152 Ulster Unionist Action Council (UUAC) 123 Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) 34 Neave’s speech 54 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 52, 100, 112, 189, 227, 234, 258 attacking idea of power-sharing 37–8 Brian Faulkner 27 hardline politicians within 39 Harry West 31 James Molyneaux 22 meeting of November 1976, 39 MPs voted against Callaghan 61 objection to Prior’s proposals 162 Paisley outdistances 162 protest at Westminster 34–5 reaction on establishment of Regional Councils 55 reception to London’s latest initiative 92 refused invitation for NIF’s proceedings 187 relationship with Conservative Party 34–40 Ulster Unionists 55, 122, 142, 197, 262 AIA for 224–5 apprehension regarding Anglo-Irish joint study groups 145 backlash from 123, 216 Biggs-Davison relations with 38 opposed, NICC 29 protests against AIA 246 response to 229–31 ‘suspicions’ 141 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 255

389

Ulster Workers’ Council strike 27, 29, 35, 123 unionist, label of 4 Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI) 36 Unionist Task Force 245 United Ulster Unionist Coalition (UUUC), 29–30, 38, 55 delegation in CPPNIC meeting 38 vs. SDLP 30 UPNI. See Unionist Party of Northern Ireland Utley, Tom 235 UUAC. See Ulster Unionist Action Council UUUC. See United Ulster Unionist Coalition UVF. See Ulster Volunteer Force Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party 36 van Straubenzee, William 20, 23 Wade-Gery, Robert 109, 140, 141, 142, 147 Wakeham, John 244 Walker, Graham 19, 55, 229 Walker, Peter 14, 74 Walsh, Dick 86 West, Harry 31, 33, 36, 38, 51, 55 relation with Neave 39 White, Raymond 255 Whitehall Civil Service, relationship with 6 Whitelaw, William 9, 23, 30, 33, 58, 73, 79, 88, 89, 100, 111, 142, 179, 214, 233, 259 advised on proposed Assembly 105–6 appointed as home secretary 74 fresh political initiative for Northern Ireland 107 groundwork for Sunningdale Agreement 26–7 and ‘Irish question’ 26 memorandum. See Whitelaw memorandum Northern Ireland Executive, collapse of 27 Whitelaw, Willie 54, 56, 65, 228 Whitelaw memorandum 91–8, 105–6, 107 Whitmore, Clive 110 Williams, Alan Lee 62 Wilson, Harold 13, 18, 59

390

390 Winterton, Nicholas 37 Wood, Derek 252–3 Woodfield, Philip, Sir 137, 185 Wren, Siochana Laurence 231

Index Yeo, Tim 228 Young, Hugo 33 Younger, George 244, 251, 254