The Zuo Tradition / Zuozhuan Reader: Selections from China's Earliest Narrative History 0295747749, 9780295747743

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The Zuo Tradition / Zuozhuan Reader

The Zuo Tradition / Zuozhuan Reader Selections from China’s Earliest Narrative History

T r a ns l at e d a n d i n t r oduc e d b y Stephen Durrant, Wai-yee Li, and David Schaberg

U n i v e r s i t y of Wa s h i ng t on P r e s s Seattle

The Zuo Tradition / Zuozhuan Reader was made possible in part by generous gifts from Michael Burnap and Irene Tanabe and from Ruth and Alvin Eller. Copyright © 2020 by the University of Washington Press Design by Katrina Noble Composed in Arno Pro, typeface designed by Robert Slimbach 24 23 22 21 20  5 4 3 2 1 Printed and bound in the United States of America All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. U n i v e r s i t y o f Wa s h i n g t o n P r e s s uwapress.uw.edu L i br a ry of Congr e ss C ata l ogi ng-i n-Pu bl ic at ion Data on fi l e I S B N 978-0-295-74774-3 (hardcover) I S B N 978-0-295-74775-0 (paperback) I S B N 978-0-295-74776-7 (ebook) The paper used in this publication is acid free and meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, a n s i z 39.48–1984.∞

To the storytellers, transcribers, commentators, translators, and re-­tellers—​ to all the readers who have kept Zuozhuan and its lessons alive to our day. And to the memory of Hsieh Yau-ling.

C on t e n t s

Acknowledgments ix Chronology of Dynasties  xi Reigns of Lords of the Domain of Lu  xiii Map of the Major Domains and Peoples during the Spring and Autumn Period  xiv Introduction  3 Chapter 1 On Reading and Anthologizing Zuozhuan  19 Chapter 2 Succession Struggles and Assassinations  30 Chapter 3 Women  48 Chapter 4 The Overlord: Chong’er, Lord Wen of Jin  63 Chapter 5 Warfare  86 Chapter 6 Ritual Propriety  115 Chapter 7 Temporal Order and the Arc of History  132

Chapter 8 Governance  152 Chapter 9 Law and Punishment  168 C h a p t e r 10 The Tragedy of King Ling of Chu  181 C h a p t e r 11 Two Famous Statesmen: Zichan and Yan Ying  201 C h a p t e r 12 Diplomacy  221 C h a p t e r 13 Confucius and His Disciples  236 C h a p t e r 14 Dreams and Anomalies  248 C h a p t e r 15 Cultural Others  263

Further Reading  279 Passage Index  281 Subject Index  285

Ac k now l e d g m e n t s

Many of our academic colleagues have over the years encouraged our work on Zuozhuan and provided us with invaluable assistance. Among these, we would like to especially single out Yuri Pines of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He carefully worked through this Reader, as he did for our earlier three-volume full translation, and made numerous valuable suggestions. It is a treasure to have a colleague of such expertise and generosity. Another anonymous reader also carefully read the manuscript of this volume and provided extremely helpful feedback, especially on issues of style. In addition, Lorri Hagman and the staff at the University of Washington Press have consistently been supportive of our efforts to bring Zuozhuan to a larger English-speaking audience. Richard Feit meticulously copyedited the manuscript, Margaret Sullivan saw it through the production process, and Philip Hsu compiled the index. To them and all the friends, students, and colleagues who have enriched our understanding of Zuozhuan, we extend our heartfelt gratitude. Research leaves made possible by the Guggenheim Foun­dation and the American Council of Learned Societies (2018–19) facilitated our work for this volume; we gratefully acknowledge their support. We also extend our appreciation to the Harvard Art Museum for their permission to use the image on the cover. As always, we thank our families for their understanding and assistance while we allocated so much of our time to wandering in antiquity.

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C h r onol o g y of Dy n a s t i e s

General period of Zuozhuan history in bold

Xia (legendary) ca. 2100–1600 BCE Shang ca. 1600–1045 BCE Zhou 1045–255 BCE   Western Zhou 1045–771 BCE   Eastern Zhou 770–256 BCE   Spring and Autumn 770–453 BCE    Warring States 453–221BCE Qin 221–206 BCE Han 202 BCE–220 CE   Former Han (also called Western Han) 202 BCE–8 CE   Xin (Wang Mang reign) 9–23   Gengshi Emperor 23–27   Later Han (also called Eastern Han) 27–220 Six Dynasties 220–589   Three Kingdoms 220–280  Jin 265–420   Northern and Southern Dynasties 420–589 Sui 581–618 Tang 618–907 Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms 902–979 Song 960–1279   Northern Song 960–1127   Southern Song 1127–1279 Yuan 1271–1368 Ming 1368–1644 Qing 1644–1912 Adapted from Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History: A Manual (Cambridge, MA: Harvard ­University Asia Center, 2012), 3–4.

xi

R e ig ns of L or d s of t h e D om a i n of Lu

Both the Annals and Zuozhuan are organized around the reigns of the following twelve lords of Lu, one of the many domains into which China was divided at the time.

Lord Yin (11 years) Lord Huan (18 years) Lord Zhuang (32 years) Lord Min (2 years) Lord Xi (33 years) Lord Wen (18 years) Lord Xuan (18 years) Lord Cheng (18 years) Lord Xiang (31 years) Lord Zhao (32 years) Lord Ding (15 years) Lord Ai (27 years)

722–712 BCE 711–694 693–662 661–660 659–627 626–609 608–591 590–573 572–542 541–510 509–495 494–468

xiii

Wuzhong SHAN RONG 0

100

200

Wuzhong

300 km

YAN WHITE DI

N

Xianyu RED DI QI

JIN LU

WEI ZHOU

QUANRONG QIN

Huangchi

C AO

ZHENG

LI RONG

SONG CHEN

C AI WU CHU SHU BA

Major domains and peoples during the Spring and Autumn period

YUE

The Zuo Tradition / Zuozhuan Reader

Introduction

Z u o z h u a n (Z uo T r a di t ion) i s a y e a r-b y-y e a r h i s t or y of China covering the period 722 to 468 BCE. As such, it might be placed alongside other great histories that come to us from the ancient world such as the Greek-language histories of Herodotus and Thucydides and those portions of the Hebrew Bible sometimes called the Deuteronomistic History. Early Chinese sources claim that the author of this history was a relatively obscure associate of Confucius (551–479 BCE) named Zuo Qiuming. While it is possible that Zuo Qiuming played a role in the early formation or transmission of some portion of today’s Zuozhuan, the text as we have it today almost certainly derives in large measure from the fourth century BCE, well after Zuo Qiuming would have lived. In the course of transmission, Zuozhuan has been attached, perhaps since the first century BCE, to a much shorter work titled Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu, hereafter the Annals). The Annals is composed of a series of just over 1,840 brief, dated entries that begin in 722 BCE and conclude in 479 BCE (or 481 BCE in the version transmitted with other commentaries), a decade or so before the conclusion of Zuozhuan. While the Annals was probably compiled by a series of official scribes working in the northeastern domain of Lu, one of the many domains into which China was divided at that time, it supposedly passed through the hands of Confucius himself, who is believed to have imparted to these annalistic records a layer of profound but exceedingly subtle meaning. In part because of this connection with the sage, the small and ostensibly dry-as-dust Annals has given its name to the period of time it covers, so that subsequent historians regularly speak of the Spring and Autumn period. Zuozhuan builds upon the foundation of the Annals, but it is more than ten times longer and provides much more extensive and detailed historical information than its predecessor. Consequently, 3

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readers have typically seen Zuozhuan as the most prestigious commentarial expansion of the Annals and as the definitive history of the Spring and Autumn period. As portrayed in the pages of Zuozhuan, the Spring and Autumn period was a time of political disunity and conflict. In the three centuries before the Zuozhuan account begins, the ruling Zhou dynasty kings had established a patchwork of subordinate domains that extended Zhou power over a large area from the north China plains along the Yellow River to the Yangzi basin in the south and from the Wei River valley in the west to the region near the sea coast in the east. This far-flung kingdom relied upon the capacity of Zhou rulers to project governance through lineage affiliations and personal loyalties. As time passed, these affiliations weakened, Zhou power declined, and theoretically subordinate domains acquired virtually autonomous status. While the Zhou kings continued to exert a kind of moral suasion, their actual power was severely limited and they could no longer control the frequently clashing interests of the domains. Not only did conflicts between domains lead to major military confrontations, such as the battles of Chengpu, Bi, and Yanling included in this volume (see chapters 4 and 5), but conflicts within domains between lineages vying for political inf luence became increasingly destructive, sometimes stirring revolts, assassinations, and the wholesale murder of rivals. The constant strife of the Spring and Autumn period spawned a search for principles that could become the basis for a new, stable order. Much of this search turned toward a past when things were better or were at least imagined to be so. Chief among the principles located in that past was that of ritual propriety (see chapter 6), which accepted the existence of a conservative social hierarchy and encouraged each segment of society to behave in a fashion that would enhance harmony. Of course, this search for principles of order was never simple, in part because the best thinkers of the Spring and Autumn period, as testified by Zuozhuan itself, often failed to agree on the precise content of proper ritual (or, for that matter, upon almost anything else). Despite all the conflicts, interdomain politics did not always culminate on the battlefield. Diplomats shuttled from one domain to another not just to gain support for military action, but to minimize conflicts and establish cooperative alliances (see chapter 12). Eventually, this search for a more stable political structure gave rise to the notion of the overlord—that is, the formal acknowledgment of one of the domain rulers as a sort of first among equals who could, with the approval of the Zhou king, attempt to maintain

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stability. The first of these overlords was Lord Huan of Qi (r. 685–643 BCE); the second was the famous Chong’er, the eventual Lord Wen of Jin (see chapter 4), whom the Zhou king raised to this position in 632 BCE. But the overlord system, like the ideology of ritual—or, for that matter, any other strategy of good governance and social stability—could not stem the incessant conflicts, particularly as major domains such as Jin, Qin, Chu, Qi, and later Wu and Yue continued to expand their territory and influence at the expense of other domains. While certain passages in Zuozhuan may have brought delight to later readers, the overall story told in this text is not a happy one. The degree to which one might correctly read Zuozhuan as an accurate history of the Spring and Autumn period has been and continues to be an issue of considerable debate, and each reader of this anthology is invited to formulate his or her own opinion on this issue. Zuozhuan, at least so it seems to us, most likely derives from a variety of sources and practices and pre­ sumably contains material all the way from the historically reliable to the patently fictional. In this regard, Zuozhuan does not differ greatly from Herodotus or from parts of the Hebrew Bible such as the books of Samuel and Kings. Many readers who are new to Zuozhuan find it difficult. Why is that? After all, we must assume that most writers, both in antiquity and in modern times, write to communicate something they believe to be important to someone else, and to achieve such a goal, the writer strives for clarity. In the case of Zuozhuan, we should first recognize, however, that we are not that “someone else.” Whoever is responsible for bringing Zuozhuan into existence could never have envisioned twenty-first century readers and the strange world in which we now live. That is not because those who created Zuozhuan were unconcerned about its afterlife. For sure, they were exceedingly shrewd students of history and were obviously writing for the edification of a later age. But we are much, much later, and moreover, many of us come to the text from a cultural and linguistic milieu that no one writing in Zhou China more than two millennia ago, however astute, could possibly have foreseen. Quite apart from this obvious issue of our temporal and spatial distance from the world of Zuozhuan, there are three other more specific difficulties the reader might expect to confront on the pages that follow. First, readers often find the narratives of Zuozhuan to be fragmentary or discontinuous. Zuozhuan follows the strict chronological order of the Annals and is therefore structured around a succession of twelve lords of the domain of Lu (see the timeline Reigns of Lords of the Domain of Lu). As a result of

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this rigid chronological framework, single storylines are often broken up and distributed across several years, with unrelated storylines and unrelated events intervening. Consequently, someone who reads Zuozhuan in its usual format and wishes to follow a single storyline must either possess an excellent memory or patiently jump backward or forward to reconstitute the full account. In choosing and arranging Zuozhuan passages for this anthology, we have not uniformly followed the text’s chronological order but have organized selections around topics. Readers who prefer a more systematic encounter with Zuozhuan as chronological history are encouraged to consult our three-volume full translation.1 Second, the language of many Zuozhuan passages can be concise and dense with proper names. Frequently in this text, one named figure does something to another named figure at a named place. The resulting proliferation of unfamiliar names can leave a reader, particularly one not schooled in the spellings and sounds of romanized Chinese, feeling adrift in a sea of unfamiliar and unpronounceable names. Adding to the difficulty is that many of the more than two thousand named persons who appear in Zuozhuan are referred to by several different names, depending upon the particular context. In our translation, we have simplified—some would say distorted—this feature by consistently using a single unified name for each character. While this does not entirely eliminate the difficulties of names, many characters make little more than a passing appearance anyway and need not be remembered. Moreover, Zuozhuan can suddenly shift from its exceedingly economical, rapid, and name-laden stories to the much slower, more rhetorically elaborate language of formal speeches. These speeches, some of them quite long, have often been considered one of the glories of the text. For the most part, they are delivered in a court setting by political advisers and are meant either to correct a superior or to persuade him to undertake a particular course of action. Although these speeches frequently fail at their goal, the speakers are admired nonetheless for speaking truth to power and doing so with eloquence. For the unaccustomed reader, however, the alternation in Zuozhuan between economical and elliptical narrative on the one hand, and rhetorically ornate speech on the other, can be jarring. Third, the narrator-historian of Zuozhuan, the voice in the text, so to speak, is for the most part hidden and rarely offers even indirect explanations 1

Stephen Durrant, Wai-yee Li, and David Schaberg, trans., Zuo Tradition/Zuozhuan: Commentary on the “Spring and Autumn Annals,” 3 vols. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016). Hereafter ZT.

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of the motivations of characters or the meaning of narratives. If we want a Herodotus-style historian sitting by our side and offering explanation, Zuozhuan will disappoint. Sometimes a deflected authorial voice labeled “the noble man” does enter the text to issue authoritative judgments, but for the most part, we are left on our own to participate in what has been a long and lively discussion about how various Zuozhuan passages are meant to be understood. In some ways, this is as it should be. After all, one of the messages of Zuozhuan, evident in debates among different political advisers, is that the world around us, and the people who make up that world, can be read, albeit only by the most insightful observer. That is, we live in a world rich with signs that we must strive to decipher. So at one and the same time, Zuozhuan gives examples of persons reading apparently opaque signs and also leaves much for readers to try to decipher on their own. This can be a challenging and an exhilarating task! We would be wrong to leave the impression that the textual difficulties and temporal remoteness of Zuozhuan make it inaccessible or, even worse, irrelevant. Like other classics from the ancient world, Zuozhuan has continued to be read across the centuries for a reason. Not only does it convey some sense of a distant world, one that became foundational for a very large part of humanity and must therefore be considered with great seriousness, but it also continues to resonate in our own age. The fact that we have arranged this Zuozhuan reader topically is in some measure meant to highlight the enduring relevance of this text. The issues at hand are similar to those we struggle with in our own era, and as would be the case in any complex society, no easy answers are offered. Contrary to what has sometimes been argued, Zuozhuan does not contain a simple, unified morality but rather portrays a world—we might call it “the world of history”—where controversy and moral complexity prevail. So it is that we might, for example, look up from the pages of this reader and be stimulated to ask, What is the proper function, if any, for weaponry and wars? What features of political and social life make peace so fragile? How do moral ideals weather the pressure of expediency and necessary compromises? How do details of historical circumstances and personal choices shape moral reasoning and resist black-and-white judgment? Should power be centralized or distributed to facilitate effective government? What is the role of social hierarchy in our era, and does it still shape, even determine, the social rituals that govern our behavior? Are the temporal patterns of the past, both ancient and recent, of any value in assessing where we are now and where we should go, or has the ever accelerating pace of change in our world rendered history largely irrelevant? These and

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so many other issues that arise in Zuozhuan not only inform us about the past but also enrich our vision of the options before us and invite us to continue to engage in a critical dialogue that will forever be shaped and reshaped by the shifting patterns of history.

Th e E a r ly History of Zuozhua n Present consensus holds that Zuozhuan was largely complete by the end of the fourth century BCE. Many other texts from that era reproduce bits of narrative and reasoning now found in Zuozhuan, but it is unclear how the materials of the text were organized, and it is not until nearly three centuries later that we see evidence of the work arranged in something resembling its current year-by-year form. To understand the roots of Zuozhuan, then, one must consider early forms and functions of speech and writing. For any written primary sources upon which Zuozhuan was able to draw, what prompted the initial act of writing? W hat were the uses of such writing? W here Zuozhuan incorporated materials that had been transmitted orally, what purpose had they served when spoken aloud, and what spurred their transcription? How and why did historical information become widely shared knowledge? Zuozhuan derives ultimately from at least five early Chinese social practices or functions in which commemoration and interpretation of the past were made to serve present needs. The first of these was record keeping. Ruling institutions in the Yellow River valley had employed writing in the management of large-scale political networks perhaps even before the date of the earliest extant examples of Chinese writing (ca. 1200 BCE), which appear as inscriptions on animal bones and turtle shells used in divination. Both these inscriptions, usually labeled “oracle bones,” and the inscriptions on bronze vessels used in sacrifice in the following centuries recorded events, and there is evidence that the establishments of rulers and leaders at multiple levels, from the Zhou king’s court to the corresponding courts of lords at the domain level and perhaps even of local noble lineages, were keeping chronicles on bamboo. By the eighth century BCE, courts were also archiving covenants sworn between domains or families, records of merit, and other documents that could easily have formed seeds of later historical accounts. Local courts and noble houses likely maintained their own records of important events. Communications that were originally written, such as letters or official notifications, might well have found their way into archives and

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9

ultimately into Zuozhuan. Strong evidence shows that by the Warring States period, legal reports and records were being kept in courts, and one may surmise that this practice too had its roots further back. As for the speeches that figure in so many Zuozhuan narratives, it is true that certain royal utterances had often been committed to writing, but evidence for widespread contemporaneous transcription of speeches is lacking. Among the court records that have come down to us is the Annals to which Zuozhuan is attached. Although the authors of the Annals may have had both ancestors and latter-day readers in mind as their audience, the mix of events they record—from ritual observances to omens, diplomatic engagements, and military expeditions—implies that the chronicle served also as a kind of ledger and that the items entered in it defined the overall status of the Lu court’s relations with other domains and with the spirit world. Any court official wishing to know the history of Lu’s ties with a particular domain, the services rendered by a particular Lu noble line, or the occurrence of eclipses and other possible portents would benefit from knowledge of the chronicle (see chapter 7, Xi 26.3). Nothing in the text itself suggests that Confucius was involved in composing or editing it. The second social practice from which Zuozhuan materials must have derived was teaching. Since archives and other collections of written records must be readable to be used and must be recopied to survive, record keeping entails teaching, which may extend from the narrow training in scribal literacy to the broader cultural instruction required to reproduce the political system in which archives have value. Although little is known about edu­ cation in Eastern Zhou China, it is likely that teaching about the past had a place in early curricula. The Annals, which is mentioned in lists of works that tutors must teach young heirs apparent, would have served as a memory device, its entries linked to larger narratives that teachers could convey orally, and the teachers themselves might have had a role in transmitting the chronicle and the surrounding knowledge among readers and transmitters outside of court, for example in the academies of private teachers like Confucius. In fact, the earliest account of the composition of what came to be known as Zuozhuan and its relation to the Annals concerns Confucius’s teaching of his disciples rather than the training of a prince. Although it comes from Records of the Historian (Shiji), completed around 90 BCE by the Han his­ torian Sima Qian (145–ca. 87 BCE), and is therefore relatively late, it has much to tell us. Sima Qian first describes the process of research by which

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Confucius “went west and observed the Zhou house” and “discoursed upon the scribal records and the old legends” before compiling the Annals. He then turns to Zuozhuan, which was composed after Confucius’s death and in part because of it: The seventy disciples received the meanings of the tradition orally. Since there were patterned words that satirized and ridiculed, praised and obscured, and impugned, they could not make them plain by writing them out. The Lu gentleman Zuo Qiuming feared that the various disciples, differing in their biases, would be content with their own opinions and lose what was genuine. Therefore, taking Confucius’s scribal records as his basis, he put in order all their words and completed Zuo’s Annals. (Shiji 14.509-10)

In this way, according to Sima Qian, the text that he knew as Zuo’s Annals originated as an accurate record of Confucius’s teachings on the Annals, transcribed by a single author in Lu within a few years of the teacher’s death. The account is likely a simplification of a process that stretched over a period of centuries and involved many authors, teachers, and disciples. The allusion to orally transmitted materials implies that despite its extreme concision, the Annals nonetheless encapsulates all the knowledge that Confucius found valuable during his enquiry. After Confucius is gone, his disciples fail to preserve this knowledge in a unified and coherent form, and their explanations of the cryptic text threaten to go awry. Here Zuo Qiu­ ming steps in, fixing the correct tradition in writing. Zuo Qiuming is other­ wise known only from the Analects (5.25), where Confucius mentions him with admiration as an opponent of glibness and insincerity. By attributing Zuozhuan to a contemporary of Confucius and making it prior to all the other exegetical traditions of the Annals and compilations of historical lore that would follow, the Records of the Historian account gives Zuozhuan a singular prestige. After record keeping and teaching, the third social function that informed the creation of Zuozhuan was that of statecraft, and more specifically of persuasive speaking, a sphere of activity in which knowledge of history could become valuable. Viewed in this context, Zuozhuan comes to look like a master collection of historical accounts useful in the demonstration of principles and, besides, a collection of models of effective political persuasion. Like numerous other texts, Zuozhuan shows that fine speaking was a highly prized skill, and its rich examples of powerful speech of all kinds make it a rhetoric of sorts, demonstrating by example all the techniques of citation,

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exemplification, and patterning that characterized fine speaking. As ­stu­dents learned the substance of history and resources for their own speeches, they would also have encountered memorable, imitable models of speech. In the Warring States period, with the rise of the so-called roving persuaders— masters of strategic thought, rhetoric, and court ­politics—the anecdotes that make up Zuozhuan would have been a treasure house for the speakerin-training. Although Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE) scholars believed that the content of Zuozhuan was in place shortly after the death of Confucius and was based on oral transmission of his teachings about the written Annals chronicle, more recent work has shown that at least some of the materials found in Zuozhuan can be no earlier than the late fourth century BCE. It may be that an oral tradition of the kind mentioned in Records of the Historian continued afterward, and the materials that were to become Zuozhuan circulated in multiple and various forms before its compilation. In other words, the texts that Records of the Historian lists as containing excerpts from Zuozhuan may in some cases have been sources for a Zuozhuan still in the making, and where the anecdotes recounted in such texts were not taken from other written sources, they may have been based on writers’ knowledge of the historical lore regularly used in speeches. Interest in such lore would in turn have driven the circulation of texts, the production of new ones, and the aggregation into larger collections. It is likely that before the compilation of Zuozhuan in its present chronological order, versions of some of its anecdotes were showing up in collections organized on other principles, such as according to political domain or patterns of statecraft, and that these collections were useful in the training of new writers and speakers. Thus, it is conceivable that the topical arrangement of this anthology has something in common with some of the earliest collections from which Zuozhuan derived. The final social practices that inform the composition of Zuozhuan are practices of compilation and transmission. What would ultimately make Zuozhuan more influential than most of the other texts with contemporaneous formative stages was a convergence of the teaching traditions: the oratorical-training tradition that preserved examples of good speech and the practice of close reading of the Annals that attributed its wording and judgments to Confucius. From the latter approach came a strictly chronological principle of order, since the line-by-line interpretation of the chronicle entailed a month-by-month, year-by-year review of the materials of history. From the anecdotal approach came fuller narratives, often going well beyond

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anything intimated in the chronicle itself, and a preoccupation with the themes that would most often have been relevant when speakers used history. The most important figure in the process of compilation and transmission was Liu Xin (46 BCE–CE 23). Son of the noted scholar, textual collator, and intellectual Liu Xiang (77–6 BCE), Liu Xin worked with his father in the imperial archives and later compiled a bibliographic catalog of texts held in the imperial archives. It was in the course of this work that he came upon copies of Zuozhuan and became convinced of its superiority to other commentaries on the Annals. While Zuozhuan had previously been transmitted separately from the Annals, Liu Xin seems to have made it resemble other Annals commentaries, arranging its materials to correspond year for year with the chronicle. He seems also to have added a complete text of the Annals at the beginning of Zuozhuan. The present year-by-year interspersing of the Annals with Zuozhuan was an innovation introduced by the Jin dynasty (265–420) statesman, general, and scholar Du Yu (222–84). Through Liu Xin’s efforts, Zuozhuan was effectively canonized when under Emperor Ping (r. 1 BCE–5 CE) a special official, or “academician,” was appointed to oversee teaching and transmission of the text in the imperial court. Over the next two hundred years, a series of commentaries by leading scholars helped secure the text’s status as a guide to the Annals and to Spring and Autumn history. Finally, in the third century, Du Yu wrote what has proven to be the single most influential commentary on Zuozhuan, a magisterial work in which Du drew heavily upon earlier commentaries, in effect subsuming and replacing them. His commentary would serve as the basis for all subsequent commentaries on Zuozhuan. Even with the production and transmission of full-length written commentaries like those of Du Yu and later Kong Yingda (574–648), Zuozhuan did not entirely leave behind the social contexts that had produced it. Instead, it helped canonize the practices of speaking and remembering that brought it into being. Teachers continued to teach it, students to learn it, and speakers and writers to cite it as a source of authority. As a purported transcription of the teachings of Zuo Qiuming, a supposed contemporary of Confucius, it would be read for centuries as a guide to the correct interpretation of historical events and an indispensable supplement to other attempts to decode the messages in Confucius’s Annals. As a treasury of recounted speech and distinctive narrative prose, it would inspire essayists, historians, and philosophical writers throughout imperial Chinese history.

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Zuozhua n in th e Chine se Tr a dition It is hard to overstate the foundational role of Zuozhuan in the Chinese tradition. On the most obvious level, countless idioms and allusions in the Chinese language are derived from this ancient text. Classical and modern writers tap the linguistic resources of Zuozhuan. Beyond such verbal echoes, Zuozhuan is a key window to the world of thought in early China. It also shapes ideas about form, structure, meaning, and representation for the historiographical and literary tradition. The early history of Zuozhuan culminates in its recognition as an exegetical tradition of the Annals. Du Yu elaborates its exegetical system, whereby the word fan (“in cases of ”) supposedly summarizes or explains how words are used in the Annals. He also argues that passages apparently unrelated to the Annals in Zuozhuan can supplement the canonical text. The traditional view of Zuozhuan as a commentary tradition of the Annals affirms the role of narrative elaboration in articulating moral ideals and often tries to define a coherent, consistent ethical vision uniting the Annals and Zuozhuan. Through the centuries, commentary traditions associated with imperial patronage and the examination system are especially intent on aligning Zuozhuan with the ideological foundations of the polity presented as Confucian orthodoxy. Zuozhuan has a deep connection with Confucian thought as it evolved through the Warring States, but divergent perspectives are also obvious. We see an astounding mix of cynical power politics with idealistic moral rhetoric, arguments for and against greater power for the ruler or the noble lineages, and positions for and against the right of the people to criticize their leaders. Views that look to the past and to earlier texts for guidance contend with voices that urge changes and laud expediency. Military and strategic interests are pitted against moralized and ritualized perspectives on warfare. Reverence for the Way of Heaven and the realm of spirits coexists with defiance or exposure of their fickleness or unknowability. Cultural identity, cultural boundaries, and “barbarian otherness” seem to be both tradition bound and circumstantial or negotiable. Unlike didactic anecdotes in other texts that can be cavalier with facts, the desire to deliver a message is interwoven with a commitment to transmitting records of events in Zuozhuan, and this can make moral reasoning more complex. Sometimes we see tensions between the message and the context. A high-sounding speech lauding ritual propriety may simply be justifying

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existing or changing power relations. An apparently consistent position may conceal changing premises. Different perspectives can be associated with the same persona or character. The same ethical vocabulary may support ideologically opposite positions. Instead of imagining a mastermind orchestrating divergent perspectives, we should perhaps see differences as a function of Zuozhuan’s complex textual history. Bearing traces of layers of accretion, it incorporates sources from various domains and different periods. In some ways, it reflects the varying responses to political disorder in a vital formative period in the history of Chinese political thought. In this sense, Zuozhuan is a platform for articulating the competing conceptions of political order that flourished during its long period of formation. The Confucian thinker Zhu Xi (1130–1200) claimed that Zuozhuan is “about history, not exegesis.” This distinction implies that historical writings are bound to exceed or diverge from exegetical writings because the goal of the former is to illuminate what happened rather than what should have happened. This is a model of containment and transgression; the “excesses” in Zuozhuan not contained by exegetical purpose are thought to be closer to the spirit of historical inquiry. In this sense, Zuozhuan spawns both the ideal that historical writing should embody Confucian ideals and the notion that “truthful record” should hold sway even when engagement with it challenges norms and orthodoxy. Zuozhuan is a crucial text for defining ideas about recording the past in the Chinese tradition. Its notions of causality and pattern, use of speech to frame ideas and explain events, and juxtaposition of narrative and comment have become standard practice in Chinese historiography. The word for his­ tory and historian in classical and modern Chinese is shi. Rendered as “scribe” in our translation, the word does not appear in the Annals, although scholarly consensus maintains that persons holding the office of shi were responsible for recording those annalistic entries. It is in Zuozhuan that we see the scribe in his multiple guises—as record keeper, astrologer, diviner, ritual specialist, adviser, envoy, textual expert, and commentator on events past and present. Examples of scribes in the act of recording contemporary events show conscious deliberation about the meaning of such recording. The issue of how one’s action will be recorded and remembered is featured in remonstrance and can influence choices (see chapter 7). Texts from the Han dynasty imagine an imperial bureaucracy in which scribes regularly recorded speeches as well as actions. In Zuozhuan, scribes in action write down precise and concise statements, comparable to the entries found in the Annals, but there is no reference to scribes recording

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speeches. Instead, scribes join a host of other characters in making speeches. Indeed, the convention of framing ideas as speech acts and distilling drama from them or using them to propel the narrative becomes paradigmatic. A brief foray into Sima Qian’s Records of the Historian, a history of the known world from the beginning to his own time, illustrates this; not only are the sections devoted to those who swayed rulers with skillful persuasion predictably dominated by their speeches, all the decisive moments in the rise of the Han dynasty, as well as early Han power struggles and policy debates, are defined through speeches. A special category of speech acts in Zuozhuan pertains to the elucidative and interpretive comments by the noble man and Confucius. Stated judgments persist in many forms of Chinese historical writings. Thus, Sima Qian modulates his perspectives through the complex and sometimes ironic balance between narrative and discursive modes; all the chapters of Records end with the comments of the grand historian. It became conventional in official historiography to conclude chapters with the judgment of the historian, who usually refers to himself as the emperor’s subject or servant (chen). At first glance, it would seem that the annalistic format of Zuozhuan is less influential than the predominantly biographical and topical categories of historical knowledge established in the histories of the Han dynasty, Sima Qian’s Records and Ban Gu’s (32–92) History of the Han (Hanshu): namely, basic annals, hereditary families (only in Records), biographies, treatises, and tables. In fact, annalistic history continues to hold sway in many ways. The last Han emperor (r. 189–220) is said to have found History of the Han too tedious and bewildering and thus asked Xun Yue (148–209) to rewrite it concisely and comprehensively as the Han Annals (Hanji). Basic annals, the sections that deal with rulers (usually emperors) in the Records and in all subsequent dynastic histories, follow the annalistic format. The most famous imperial annalistic history is Sima Guang’s (1019–1086) Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government (Zizhi tongjian), which picks up a few decades after Zuozhuan and continues through the end of the Five Dynasties (959). Annalistic histories’ concern with defining legitimate political authority was retrospectively projected onto the Annals and Zuozhuan, which were credited with the goal of upholding the Zhou order. The biography as a category of historical knowledge is Sima Qian’s invention. However, the materials contributing to such biographies, from anecdotes to speeches, are ubiquitous in Zuozhuan. Clusters of narrative that develop around a person, especially wise and capable ministers, might have circulated as “lineage histories” or moral-political teachings associated with

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that character before being incorporated into Zuozhuan. Through the centuries, attempts to rearrange Zuozhuan materials by events and states or as biographies, genealogies, treatises, and tables testify to its perceived affinities with other forms of historical writings in the tradition. It is customary to regard the historical value and literary value of Zuo­ zhuan as distinct categories, if not indeed incommensurate attributes. For example, defenders of “historical facts” are often suspicious of the ghosts, spirits, dreams, omens, prophecies, and secretive communication that recur in the text (see chapter 14), while literary historians happily appropriate them as the clues to the origins of the Chinese fictional imagination. Its pleasure in rhetoric leads some commentators to perceive a tension between embellishment and substance. However, the idea that the kernel of historical truth can or should be separated from the rich verbal fabric is misleading. What is more germane to the sense of history is the conscious formulation of patterns and principles to understand the past. What we now consider supernatural occurrences, rhetorical constructions, or narrative devices represent such patterns and principles. In other words, literary construction or formal choices are but modes of historical interpretation. That said, Zuozhuan is also rightly recognized as a foundational text in the Chinese literary tradition irrespective of its importance for historical thought. Liu Xie (ca. 465–ca. 522) praised Zuozhuan prose as “the winged glory of the sages’ writings, the crowning achievements of records and texts.” Many of the genres discussed by Liu Xie in Literary Mind and Carvings of Dragons (Wenxin diaolong), such as remonstrance, exposition, biography, ordinance, persuasion, disputation, inscription, recitation, eulogy, prayer, and lamentation, look back to examples from Zuozhuan. Revered as a model of classical prose, it was excerpted repeatedly in imperial prose anthologies to explain principles of literary composition. Movements of renewal in Chinese prose invariably invoke Zuozhuan. Many Ming and Qing commentary editions of Zuozhuan focus on literary composition and appreciation. Zuozhuan is famous for its linguistic economy, whereby high drama is concentrated in a few words. To cite just one example, in the account of the battle of Bi fought between Jin and Chu in 597 BCE, the Jin commander, anxious to gather the remnants of his defeated army, issues a panicked order: “Those who cross the river first will be rewarded!” Predictably, Jin soldiers fight to board the boats. Soldiers already in the boat, fearing pursuit by the Chu army and afraid that the boats will sink under excessive weight, try to fend off those struggling to climb aboard by chopping off their fingers. “The fingers in the boats were so numerous that they could be scooped up”

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(see chapter 5). This single gruesome detail captures the disarray and demoralization of the retreating Jin troops as well as the barbarity of warfare. Such stylistic economy coexists with the pleasure in rhetoric, evident in lengthy and elaborately patterned speeches in Zuozhuan. With the aesthetics of reticence and symbolic condensation, a gesture, an utterance, or a descriptive line can capture a person’s character and destiny or sum up a complex historical situation. Sima Qian develops this focus on emblematic moment and uses it to create unity, resonance, and momentum in Records. In many later examples of prose and fiction, significant moments often become the focal point of a narrative, sometimes defying the logic of plot or teleology. Yet the very definition of narrative takes us beyond the moment. In Zuozhuan, duration and sequence are often tied to insistent causal reasoning, although clues can be scattered and the same event can fit into multiple narrative strands. Zuozhuan’s chronological arrangement, sometimes breaking up continuous development and separating cause and consequence, encourages habits of weaving and decoding plots that place special emphasis on the interplay of associations and discontinuities, clues and signs, temporal and spatial patterns and shifts. Such habits shape the writing and reading of many literary genres, including classical and vernacular fiction. Form is inseparable from content. Stylistic analysis engages with key questions of power and authority, truth and falsehood, judgment and its evasion. For us to appreciate the literary complexities of Zuozhuan is to explore the different intellectual currents that shape the text. Perhaps as a result of its complex textual history, different and potentially contradictory positions in Zuozhuan are sometimes all given their due. Deeply f lawed characters can still engage our sympathy (see chapter 10). In the historiographical tradition, this comes to be understood as impartiality. In the literary tradition, this has affinities with the capacious imagination encompassing opposites and facilitating irony.

A Br i ef Note Each passage from Zuozhuan included in this anthology is dated by reference to the reign year of one of the twelve lords of the domain of Lu (see Reigns of Lords of the Domain of Lu) and to the closest corresponding year of the Western calendar. In addition to the reign year, we provide an additional number that refers to the passage number within that particular year as arranged in our full three-volume translation of Zuozhuan, which in turn

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follows the arrangement in Yang Bojun’s widely used Chinese edition (for both, see Further Reading). Thus, Yin 1.4 designates the fourth passage to appear under the first year of the reign of Lord Yin, or 722 BCE. Sometimes we refer to a Zuozhuan passage not found in the anthology. In such cases, the passage number is prefaced by ZT, which stands for the title of our full translation, Zuo Tradition. We have tried throughout this anthology to keep footnotes to a minimum and have rarely included Chinese characters. Readers seeking more information about place names, variant readings and interpretations, and various other issues, as well as the Chinese text itself, are advised to consult our full translation. In some cases, we have slightly modified the excerpts from our full translation.

Chapter 1

On Reading and Anthologizing Zuozhuan

W e h av e or g a n i z e d t h i s vol u m e t op ic a l ly. On e c ou l d just as easily anthologize Zuozhuan according to chronologically arranged events, biographies, or histories of domains. Each approach has advantages and limits and involves distinct modes of reading. We hope to present key concerns of Zuozhuan in the following chapters but will begin with a reading of a famous narrative about Lord Zhuang of Zheng (r. 743–701 BCE) from the beginning of the text, drawing attention to how we deal with technical issues of names, dates, and conventions of narrative and how the passage highlights various themes and could fit into different ways of organizing Zuozhuan materials. •

Yin 1.4 (722 BCE)  Earlier, Lord Wu of Zheng had taken a wife in Shen. Known as Wu Jiang, she gave birth to Lord Zhuang and Gongshu Duan. Lord Zhuang was breech born, and Lady Jiang was shaken. For this reason, she named him Wusheng, meaning breech born, and con­ sequently hated him. She loved Gongshu Duan and wanted to establish him as ruler. Time and again she asked this favor of Lord Wu, but the lord would not grant it. When Lord Zhuang acceded to his position, she requested Zhi for Duan. The lord said, “Zhi is a strategic settlement. Guo Shu died because of it. For any other place, you need only issue a command!” She requested Jing, and the lord sent Duan to live there. Duan came to be called Senior Younger Brother of the Walled City Jing.

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Wu Jiang’s name combines the clan name of her natal domain Shen (Jiang) and the posthumous honorific of her husband (Lord Wu). “Lord Zhuang” is the posthumous honorific; his given name is Wusheng. He is also called the Liege of Zheng. Gong is the name of the place to which Gongshu Duan will eventually flee. “Shu” means “younger brother” and “Duan” is his given name. So Gongshu Duan means “Duan the Younger Brother who fled to Gong.” For this excerpt, we have unified his name as Duan. Guo Shu, the ruler of the small state Guo (also called Eastern Guo), relying on the strategic advantage of Zhi, acted defiantly, and Zheng annexed Guo in 767 BCE, according to Bamboo Annals (Zhushu jinian; third century BCE). Zhai Zhong said, “For the wall of an outlying city to exceed one hundred zhi is a danger for the capital.1 In the system of the former kings, large cities did not exceed one-third of the capital, middle-sized cities did not exceed one-fifth, and small cities, one-ninth. Now Jing, failing to conform to this standard, is not in accordance with the rules. You, my lord, will not be able to bear that.” The lord said, “Since Lady Jiang wanted this, how am I to avoid harm?” Zhai Zhong replied, “How will Lady Jiang ever be satisfied? It would be better to settle this matter right away. Do not encourage creeping vines to spread! Once they spread, they are difficult to control. If even creeping vines cannot be rooted out, then how much less the favored younger brother of a ruler?” The lord said, “He who commits many undutiful acts will surely bring himself down. You, sir, should just wait.” Shortly thereafter Duan ordered the western and northern marches to switch their allegiance to him. Gongzi Lü said, “A domain cannot bear divided allegiance. What are you, my lord, going to do about this? If you want to give the domain to Duan, then I beg to serve him. If not, then I beg to root him out so as not to give the people the wrong idea!” The lord said, “No need. He will bring about his own downfall.” Duan went on to turn the disaffected ones into his own settlements, reaching as far as Linyan. Gongzi Lü said, “Now we can act! If he gets any stronger, he will gain the multitudes!” The lord said, “If he is not dutiful, the people will not draw close to him. If he gets stronger, the whole thing will collapse.”

1

Zhi is a unit of measure for the height and length of a city wall. Some scholars argue that one zhi equals about ten meters.

On R e a di ng a n d A n t hol ogi zi ng Zuozh ua n

Duan reinforced walls, gathered provisions, repaired his armor and weapons, and prepared his infantry and chariots. He was going to make a surprise attack on Zheng, and Lady Jiang was going to open the city gate for him. When the lord heard that a date had been set, he said, “Now we can act!” He ordered Gongzi Lü to lead two hundred chariots to attack Jing. Jing turned against Duan, who entered Yan. The lord attacked him at Yan. In the fifth month, on the xinchou day (23), Duan left Yan and fled to Gong. Gongzi means “the lord’s son.” The son of a current or previous ruler, he is often a potential successor to the throne. In this volume, we translate gongzi as “noble son” but have left gongzi in transliteration when it is part of a proper name. Gongzi Lü may be the son of the former Zheng ruler Lord Wu. Days in traditional China were named by a sequence of paired characters recurring in a cycle of sixty combinations, the so-called sexagenary cycle. This cycle oper­ ates independently from the lunar months. In our translation, we reproduce the cyclical date names and give the sequence day of the month in parenthesis. In this case, the xinchou day falls on the twenty-third day of the fifth month. When we do not include the sequence day, it means that the cyclical date named does not exist in said month. The text says, “The Liege of Zheng overcame Duan at Yan.” Duan did not behave like a younger brother, so it does not speak of a younger brother. They were like two rulers, so it says “overcome.” That it labels him the “Liege of Zheng” is to criticize his neglect of instruction: what happened is judged to have been Zheng’s intention. That the text does not say he left Yan and fled is to express disapproval of him. “The text” here refers to the Annals. This passage explains word choice and nomenclature in the Annals and reminds the reader that the whole story is supposed to help them make sense of one line from the Annals: “The Liege of Zheng overcame Duan at Yan.” There are seventy-two pointedly exegeti­ cal passages marked by the phrase shuyue (“the texts says”) in Zuozhuan. “Zheng’s intention” (Zheng zhi) means that Lord Zhuang has meant all along to incriminate Duan so that he could expel him. Zhi (intention) can mean either hidden or manifest intent in Zuozhuan. Consequently, the lord placed Lady Jiang in Chengying and swore an oath: “Until we reach the Yellow Springs, we will not see each other!” Shortly thereafter he regretted this.

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Ying Kaoshu was the border officer in charge of Ying Valley. When he heard of these events, he offered gifts to the lord. The lord granted him a meal, but as Kaoshu ate, he put aside the meat. The lord asked about this, and Kaoshu responded: “Your humble servant has a mother. She has always partaken of my meals, but she has never tasted my lord’s stew. I beg leave to give some to her.” The lord said, “You have a mother to give things to. Alas, I alone have none!” Ying Kaoshu said, “Dare I ask what you meant?” The lord explained what happened and also admitted his regret. Kaoshu replied, “Why should you worry about this? If you dig into the earth as far as the springs and meet each other in the tunnel, who could say this goes against the vow?” The lord took his advice. On entering the tunnel, the lord recited, Within the great tunnel, Our joys flow together.

On exiting the tunnel, Lady Jiang recited, Outside the great tunnel, Our joy spreads abroad.

Both couplets rhyme in Old Chinese and follow the typical four-character line pattern of the Classic of Odes (Shijing, the Odes in our translation). Quotations from the Odes to prove a point or to augment the speaker’s authority are common in Zuozhuan. We have one such example below. And consequently they were mother and son as before. The noble man said, “Ying Kaoshu’s filial piety was unadulterated. He loved his mother and tendered his example to Lord Zhuang. As it says in the Odes, The filial son is unstinting, And forever blesses your kind.

Surely this is what is meant!”

This narrative is supposed to explain one line from the Annals: “The Liege of Zheng overcame Duan at Yan.” How and why did that happen? What were the consequences and implications? In order to explain this almost

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frat­r icidal conflict, we need to go back to the beginning and understand the pivotal role of their mother, Lady Jiang. The narrative begins with the word chu (earlier), the marker of the first or prior event that explains what follows. The word continues to bear the weight of retrospective causal and sequential reasoning in later classical prose. Here, chu takes us to the marriage of Lord Zhuang’s parents and the cause of estrangement between him and his mother. On account of Lord Zhuang’s breech birth, Lady Jiang favors his younger brother, Duan, and repeatedly plots with Duan to usurp Lord Zhuang’s position. Against all counsel to forestall or thwart the rebellion before it is too late, Lord Zhuang refuses to act until Duan’s rebellion is fullfledged and the evidence damning. Then he crushes it and drives Duan into exile. The consequent estrangement from his mother, whom he vows never to see again until they reach the Yellow Springs (the underworld), is healed only when an ingenious border officer, Ying Kaoshu, suggests that he should dig a tunnel and meet his mother there. By substituting the literal for the metaphorical meaning of Yellow Springs, Ying Kaoshu allows reconciliation without undoing Lord Zhuang’s vow. He manages to offer this advice by the affective power of his own filial conduct. Moral persuasion through example and skillful rhetoric become powerful ideas in the tradition. One can easily read this as family drama focusing on fraternal conflict and the mother-son relationship. The arc of the narrative moves from random or fated estrangement to willed reconciliation, marked by the three occurrences of the word sui (consequently); they explain, respectively, the cause of Lady Jiang’s dislike of Lord Zhuang, the relocation of Lady Jiang to Chengying at the nadir of their relationship, and their reconciliation after the meeting in the tunnel. The emotional intensity and complexity of the situation notwithstanding (we can easily imagine a toxic brew of jealousy, resentment, ambition, disappointment, and the hunger for power and control), the tone is remarkably reticent. In the first half of this narrative, is Lord Zhuang passive or active? We do not know whether Lord Zhuang is indecisively and helplessly trying to mollify his mother or deliberately abetting Duan’s rebellion so that he can justify his expulsion. Almost nothing is said about the inner life of Lord Zhuang, Duan, and Lady Jiang. Is the narrator interested in their motives and intentions? Is he withholding information from the reader, or has he already conveyed his judgment, albeit obliquely? The consensus in the tradition is that judgment is indirectly yet pointedly conveyed. Subtlety is linked to rhetorical control, and this comes to be upheld as an ideal in classical prose.

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Once Duan is out of the picture, the relationship between Lord Zhuang and Lady Jiang deteriorates further, but Ying Kaoshu’s skillful remonstrance sets the stage for ending the estrangement between mother and son. Is Lord Zhuang’s filial piety natural expression or staged performance? The dominant reading over the centuries is that Lord Zhuang indeed plots his younger brother’s downfall, but filial emotions do triumph in the end and bring about the reconciliation of son and mother. This interpretation follows the cue of the comments embedded in the account: the concluding judgment of the “noble man” and the exegetical passage beginning with “the text says” (i.e., the Annals says). The term junzi, which we translate as “noble man,” literally means “the lord’s son,” but by the time of Zuozhuan’s compilation, its valence is less sociopolitical than moral. The noble man or “superior man” embodies moral integrity and voices authoritative judgment. Here he lauds filial piety for spreading its affective power and healing divisions. The disquisition on what “the text says” parses word choice in the line from the Annals, a work believed to convey “momentous meanings through subtle language.” To call someone by his or her right name or title is supposed to sharpen awareness of the imperative to conform to normative roles (e.g., a younger brother should behave like one or be denied that designation). Lord Zhuang and Duan act like rival heads of state rather than brothers, hence the word over­ came. Lord Zhuang is called Liege of Zheng, supposedly to unmask his failure to fulfill his duty as an older brother to instruct Duan. The reasoning behind such judgments may seem arbitrary or mysterious to the modern reader; they stem from the belief that every word (or omission) is significant in the Annals because it represents the voice of Confucius. The exegetical passage on word choice bears resemblance to the Gongyang and Guliang commentaries (the other two extant exegetical traditions of the Annals, dated ca. third to second century BCE) and may belong to a later stratum of Zuozhuan. Both the exegetical comments and the noble man’s judgment focus on family relations—kinship ties that are tested, distorted, and then partially restored. They do not address another key concern in this account: the balance of power in a domain and the proper boundaries of political authority. The ministers who remonstrate with Lord Zhuang and urge intervention to curb Duan’s power paint a stark picture of either-or: either share power and risk being deposed or eliminate potential rivals in the interest of political stability. If Lord Zhuang demurs, he is not disputing the doctrine but the mode of implementation. Zheng seems to have been expanding its power during the reign of Lord Zhuang. There are many passages in Zuozhuan that

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echo the arguments of the remonstrating ministers in this account. We see recurrent speeches on the danger of having “branches” that are larger than the “trunk” (or having the tail that wags the dog) and on the need to forestall or eradicate subversion in the interest of greater unity and centralization. It is possible that the teller of this story, even while implying Lord Zhuang’s complicity in Duan’s downfall, presents it as a positive example of triumphant unification. Some imperial commentators also defend Lord Zhuang’s action against Duan as cautious, effective, and ultimately justified. Is it possible that Lord Zhuang is being praised for biding his time and maintaining the appearance of fraternal tolerance even while rooting out opposition? Pushing the cynical reading further, one may be tempted to read the motherson reconciliation as masterful moral rhetoric and a convincing public display of virtue rather than a sincere change of heart. The fact that the tone here is restrained and modulated enough to support these different interpretations accounts in part for the abiding fascination of Zuozhuan. With its focus on fraternal conflict, this account could be included in chap­ ter 2, “Succession Struggles.” Its concern with the balance of power in a domain resonates with themes in chapter 8, “Governance.” The deleterious consequences of Wu Jiang’s political intervention would also justify its inclusion in chapter 3, “Women.” If we were building a narrative based on the exploits of Lord Zhuang of Zheng, we might include the passages below. • Yin 11.2 (712 BCE)  In summer, our lord met with the Liege of Zheng at Lai; this was to plan an attack on Xu. The Liege of Zheng was about to attack Xu. In the fifth month, on the jiachen day (24), they distributed the weapons in the Grand Ancestral Temple. Zidu contended with Ying Kaoshu over a chariot. Kaoshu clasped the shaft of the chariot under his arm and ran away. Zidu pulled out his lance and chased him but reached the great road without having caught him. Zidu was furious. “Our lord” refers to the reigning Lu ruler (in this case Lord Yin), a reminder that the text maintains Lu perspective when speaking of Lu affairs. Zidu is the Zheng ruler’s favorite. Yin 11.3 (712 BCE)  In autumn, in the seventh month, our lord met with the Prince of Qi and the Liege of Zheng to attack Xu. On

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the geng­chen day (1), they pressed hard upon Xu. Ying Kaoshu took the Maohu banner of the Liege of Zheng and was the first to ascend the wall. Zidu shot him from below with an arrow, and he fell from the wall. Xia Shu­y ing next took the Maohu banner and ascended. Waving the banner to all sides, he yelled out, “Our lord has ascended!” And the Zheng troops all climbed to the top. On the renwu day (3), they entered Xu, and Lord Zhuang of Xu fled to Wei. The Prince of Qi yielded control of Xu to our lord, and the latter said, “You, my lord, stated that Xu had not presented tribute, and that is why we followed you to chastise it. Xu has already submitted to punishment for its crimes. Even though you have issued a command, I, the unworthy one, would not presume to agree to what I have heard.” And so he gave Xu to the Zheng leaders. The Liege of Zheng had Baili, a high officer of Xu, serve Xu Shu, the younger brother of the Xu ruler, and reside in the eastern sector of Xu, saying, “Heaven brought calamity upon the domain of Xu. In truth it was the gods and spirits who were displeased with the Prince of Xu and who then borrowed my hands to punish him. When I, the unworthy one, have not been able to bring peace even to one or two of my elders, how should I dare claim Xu on my own merit? I have a younger brother but was not able to live in harmony with him and had to send him to find nourishment abroad. Still less would I be able to hold on to Xu for a long time! I hope that you, my good sir, will support Xu Shu in pacifying and soothing these people. And I will send Gongsun Huo to assist you. If I manage to die a natural death, and Heaven, in accord with ritual propriety, repents of the calamity visited upon Xu, should I not prefer that the Lord of Xu be made again to serve the altars of his domain? Then if our domain of Zheng were to submit a request to him, it would be as if we had been joined through marriage, and he would condescend to go along with us. Let no other lineages press close and dwell here, thereby contending with our domain of Zheng for this land. My sons and grandsons would then have no time to save themselves from destruction, still less would they be able to offer sacrifices to Xu. That I send you, my good sir, to dwell in this place is not just for the domain of Xu but also because I rely upon you, for the time being, to shore up our own borders.” He then sent Gongsun Huo to dwell in the western sector of Xu, saying, “Do not put any of your ritual vessels or valuables in Xu. When I die, quickly depart. Our former ruler established his new settlement here, but the royal house has already declined, and the sons and grandsons of Zhou

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are losing control of their patrimony day by day. This very Xu is the offspring of the Grand Peaks.2 Since Heaven has had its fill of Zhou’s virtue, should I then be able to contend with Xu?” The noble man said of Lord Zhuang of Zheng: “In this he showed ­r itual propriety. Ritual is that which regulates the domain and its patrimonies, stabilizes the altars of the domain, gives order to the people, and benefits inheritors. Xu was lawless, and Lord Zhuang attacked it. It submitted, and he departed. Taking measure of his virtue, he managed the situation. Taking stock of his strength, he went forward. Examining the times, he took action. And he did not burden those who followed. He can be said to have understood ritual.” Yin 11.4 (712 BCE)  The Liege of Zheng had each company of soldiers contribute a boar and each squadron contribute a dog or a chicken in order to pronounce a curse upon the man who shot Ying Kaoshu. The noble man said of Lord Zhuang of Zheng, “He had indeed neglected government and penal law. Government is the means to regulate the people. Penal law is the means to correct deviance. Since he had neither a virtuous government nor stern penal law, Zidu therefore came to deviance. What is the benefit of cursing someone after they have become deviant?”

• These passages would have fit into chapter 5, “Warfare,” chapter 9, “Law and Punishment,” or chapter 6, “Ritual Propriety.” Lord Zhuang has been characterized as a “minor overlord,” a kind of precursor to figures like Lord Huan of Qi and Lord Wen of Jin (see chapter 4, “The Overlord: Chong’er, Lord Wen of Jin”). In the aftermath of the Qi-Lu-Zheng campaign against Xu, Xu becomes a de facto Zheng protectorate. Lord Zhuang’s speech defending the new status quo refers to the fate of his brother Duan, and there is some continuity in his management of fraternal relations and of interdomain conflicts—he bides his time and cloaks aggression as appeasement. He uses the rhetoric of ritual propriety and refers to Duan as a gesture of humility, protesting his own inadequacy, yet Duan can also be meant as a cautionary tale, a veiled threat of punishment against potential insubordination. If the juxtaposition of passages separated by ten years show continuity in Lord 2

This is presumably a reference to the four chiefs associated with four Grand Peaks, who assisted the legendary rulers Yao and Shun.

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Zhuang’s character, it introduces dissonance in our perception of Ying Kaoshu. The filial son and master of indirect remonstrance in Yin 1 turns out to be a vain and contentious character in Yin 11. Does this presentation of Ying Kaoshu make us question retrospectively the story of affective filial piety from Yin 1? Is the divergence explained by all too human inconsistencies or disparate sources? The noble man commends Lord Zhuang for his treatment of Xu but criticizes his failure to punish Zidu for murdering Ying Kaoshu. The miscarriage of justice in the case of Zidu is clear, but why should his diplomatic speech merit such approval? The Zuozhuan compiler seems to admire the deft combination of expansionist ambition and the rhetoric of ritual propriety. The rather ambiguous portrayal of Lord Zhuang opens up questions on the appearance and reality of ritual propriety and good governance. A biographical approach would lead us to include other episodes about Lord Zhuang. He presides over deteriorating relations between Zhou and Zheng, and in one memorable scene, after a Zheng officer shoots the king in the shoulder with an arrow, declares humbly (or perhaps hypocritically), “A noble man does not always wish to assert superiority over others. How much less would one dare to insult the Son of Heaven!” (Huan 5.4, 707 BCE). The death of Lord Zhuang is followed by a struggle for power between his two sons, Gongzi Hu (Lord Zhao, r. 701, 697–695 BCE) and Gongzi Tu (Lord Li, r. 701–697, 680–673 BCE). The wise counselor Zhai Zhong in Yin 1 becomes a power broker in that succession struggle. In our volume, we have passages about Gongzi Hu’s premature consummation of his marriage (chapter 6, “Ritual Propriety,” Yin 8.4), fighting snakes as the omen of the power struggles between Lord Li of Zheng and his rivals (chapter 14, “Dreams and Anomalies,” Zhuang 14.2), Gongzi Tu’s denigration of Rong martial ineptness (chapter 15, “Cultural Others,” Yin 9.6), and Yong Ji, who chooses her father Zhai Zhong over her husband Yong Jiu, Lord Li’s ally (chapter 3, “Women,” Huan 15.2). Obviously, the present arrangement obscures the trajectory of Zheng history, but there is also no continuous “Zheng history” that can be easily recuperated. Collecting together all Zheng-related materials from Zuozhuan would yield only a series of discontinuous passages, and dividing all Zuozhuan materials by domains would inevitably involve choices of distribution for the many events that involve two or more domains. In organizing our materials, we have focused on events, notably the battles in chapter 5, “Warfare,” and on biographies in chapters devoted to Lord Wen of Jin and King Ling of Chu (chapters 4 and 10), Zichan and Yan Ying

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(chapter 11), and Confucius and his disciples (chapter 13). As the Lord Zhuang passages show, thematic divisions can be arbitrary, and many of our selections can fit into more than one topic. We will indicate through crossreferences how key concerns resonate with each other, and also how our selections illuminate larger trends or narrative arcs whenever appropriate.

Chapter 2

Succession Struggles and Assassinations

T h e ac c ou n t a b ov e of v iol e n t c on f l ic t b e t w e e n L or d Zhuang and his younger brother Duan over succession to rulership in the domain of Zheng is only one of many such stories in Zuozhuan. In fact, violence often came to the foreground as questions of succession arose. Several factors rendered succession particularly complicated and potentially explosive. First, two competing traditions existed in the historical past: succession from father to son and succession from older to younger brother, the latter sometimes invoked to prevent an immature heir from coming to power. These two traditions could and did come into conflict. Second, the marital system of early China allowed for multiple wives and concubines, which often led to strife very similar to what is seen in the biblical world, particularly when a favored secondary wife or concubine has a son. Added to this was plain sexual misbehavior, which frequently intensified the tangle of emotion and heightened the possibility of violence. Third, there were recurring questions as to whether seniority or ability should determine the choice of an heir apparent. The argument that a younger son possessed greater talent was often used as a cover for simple favoritism, as in the story of the succession crises in the Lu lineages below (Xiang 23.8). All of these factors arise in one or another of the examples in this section. The word shi, which we translate as “to assassinate,” refers to an act of killing that violates the hierarchical order of ruler and subject, father and son. China’s greatest historian, Sima Qian, claims there were thirty-six assassinations of rulers during the Spring and Autumn years. We might conclude from Confucian teachings that these acts could in no circumstance be justified. But there are dissenting opinions. What about those rulers of the distant past, such as Jie who stood at the end of the Xia dynasty or Zhòu at the end of the Shang? Did not the tradition celebrate the deaths of both of these 30

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tyrants? One could reach back to such ancient events to argue that an extremely evil ruler was in actuality “no ruler at all” and justify his murder (see chapter 7, Xuan 2.3). In the account below of the assassination of Lord Ling of Zheng, the Zuozhuan authors struggle with the question of whether or not such an assassination is acceptable, assigning a portion of blame to the assassins but not condemning them unequivocally.

A ssa ssination a n d Succe ssion Cr ise s in th e Dom a in of Lu As noted in the introduction, Zuozhuan, like the earlier Annals, is structured around the reigns of twelve lords of the relatively small domain of Lu. The first of these, Lord Yin (r. 722–712 BCE), the son of a secondary consort, rules for eleven years as a regent on behalf of his younger brother, the future Lord Huan. This situation creates confusion, and in the end, the Lu minister Gongzi Hui decides that one of these brothers has to be eliminated. Lord Yin, ever loyal to his younger brother, is the victim. In the Annals, the assassination is not recorded, and Lord Yin simply “expired.” Zuozhuan does not address this inconsistency and only tries to explain why the Annals makes no mention of the burial.

Yin 11.8 (712 BCE)  Gongzi Hui requested that the future Lord Huan be put to death and aimed in this way to seek for himself the position of grand steward. Our lord said, “It was because of his youth that I have ruled. I am going to hand rule over to him now! Let Tuqiu be built up and I will retire there.” Frightened, Gongzi Hui turned around and slandered Lord Yin to the future Lord Huan and requested that the ­former be assassinated.1 When Lord Yin was still a young prince, he did battle with the Zheng men at Hurang and was detained there. The Zheng men imprisoned him among the Yin lineage.2 He bribed the Yin lineage head and offered a prayer to Zhongwu, the god of the Yin

1 2

Gongzi Hui is presumably frightened because he fears the future Lord Huan will learn of his initial request. The name of the Zheng lineage Yin has nothing to do with the posthumous name of the Lu lord, Yin, despite the same romanization.

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lineage. Subsequently, he returned to Lu along with the Yin lineage head, and they established an altar to Zhongwu in Lu. In the eleventh month, our lord was going to perform a sacrifice to Zhongwu. He had been fasting in the She Garden and was lodging with the Wei lineage head. On the renchen day (15), Gongzi Hui sent brigands to assassinate our lord in the Wei lineage head’s house. After establishing Lord Huan as ruler, they chastised the Wei lineage, and some died. That the Annals does not record the burial is because they did not complete the proper mourning ritual. For much of the reign of Lord Huan (r. 711–694 BCE), his wife, Wen Jiang, had been having an affair with her own brother, the Prince of Qi, Lord Xiang (r. 698–686 BCE). The latter now takes measures, treated somewhat obliquely in the narrative below, to eliminate his brother-in-law, the ruler of Lu. Peng­ sheng, who is executed here for his involvement in the murder, will gain revenge as a ghost and will indirectly bring about yet another assassination (see chap­ ter 14, Zhuang 8.3), as the pattern of violence continues.

Hua n 18.1 (694 BCE)  In the eighteenth year, in spring, our lord was about to leave the domain and then go to Qi with Wen Jiang. Shen Xu said, “When a woman has her home through her husband, and a man his household through his wife, and there is no confusion of these two principles, we call this ritual propriety. One who makes changes in this is certain to fall.” Our lord met with the Prince of Qi at Luo. They joined up with Wen Jiang and went to Qi. The Prince of Qi had a liaison with her. Our lord reproached her, and she reported this to the Prince of Qi. In summer, in the fourth month, on the bingzi day (10), ceremonial toasts were offered to our lord. The Qi ruler had Gongzi Pengsheng help our lord into a carriage, and our lord expired in the carriage. 3 The Lu leaders declared to Qi, “Our lord feared the authority of your ruler and dared not stay at home in peace. He came to Qi to restore an age-old amity. But when the ritual was completed, he did not return. We have no reason to lay the blame on you, but we have been insulted in the 3

Another early commentary to the Annals, the Gongyang Tradition, is more explicit, stating that as Pengsheng was putting Lord Huan into the carriage, he crushed his ribs and killed him.

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eyes of the princes. We request that you use Pengsheng to remove the insult.” The Qi leaders killed Pengsheng. Lord Zhuang (r. 693–662 BCE), the next Lu ruler, is the son of Lord Huan and Wen Jiang. Unlike his two predecessors, he dies of natural causes after a long reign. But as he falls ill and approaches death, questions arise about his successor. After he dies, his half brother Qingfu first has Lord Zhuang’s son Ziban killed and then murders Ziban’s younger half brother Lord Min (r. 661–660 BCE) after the latter rules for only two years. Lord Zhuang’s younger brother Gongzi You then supports another of Lord Zhuang’s sons, who will enjoy a long reign as Lord Xi (r. 659–627 BCE). Gongzi You, Qing­fu, and Gongzi Ya, all prominent in this narrative, are all sons of Lord Huan, whose descendants will make up the powerful Ji (Jisun), Meng (Zhongsun or Mengsun), and Shusun lineages, respectively, and will play crucial roles in the domain of Lu.

Zhua ng 32.4 (662 BCE)  Earlier, our lord had built a tower overlooking the residence of the Zhang line. He caught sight of Meng Ren and pursued her. But she shut herself inside. When he spoke of making her his wife, she agreed, cutting her arm and swearing a covenant with our lord. Ziban was born to them. On the occasion of a rain sacrifice, our lord was rehearsing the appropriate ritual at the residence of the Liang lineage. One of our lord’s daughters was watching him. Luo, the stable master, was on the other side of the wall and flirted with her. Ziban was angry and sent someone to whip him. Our lord said, “It would be better to kill him. He is not someone you can whip with impunity. Luo has great strength; he can tear down a leaf of the imposing Ji Gate.” Our lord fell ill and asked Gongzi Ya about the succession. The latter replied, “Qingfu is talented.”4 He asked Gongzi You, who replied, “I will serve Ziban to my death.” Our lord said, “Some time ago, Gongzi Ya said, ‘Qingfu is talented.’” Gongzi You sent someone to command Gongzi Ya 4 There was some support in early China for a system that alternated between succession from older brother to younger brother in one generation and then succession from father to son in the next. Lord Huan was the younger brother of Lord Yin, while Lord Zhuang was Lord Huan’s son. Thus, some argument could be made that Lord Zhuang’s younger brother Qingfu should succeed rather than Ziban.

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in the name of our lord to wait at the home of Qian Wu’s lineage. He then had Qian Wu offer poisoned wine to Gongzi Ya, saying, “Drink this and you will have posterity in the domain of Lu. If you do not do this, you will die and have no posterity.” He drank it and returned homeward. When he reached Kuiquan, he died. They established his progeny as the Shusun hereditary lineage. Zhua ng 32.5 (662 BCE)  In the eighth month, on the guihai day (5), our lord expired in the grand chamber. Ziban acceded to his position and temporarily dwelled in the residence of the Zhang lineage. In winter, in the tenth month, on the jiwei day (2), Qingfu sent Luo, the stable master, to murder Ziban in the residence of the Zhang lineage. Gongzi You fled to Chen. Lord Min was established as ruler. Min 2.3 (660 BCE)  Earlier, our lord’s tutor had appropriated Diviner Yi’s fields, and our lord had done nothing to stop him. In autumn, in the eighth month, on the xinchou day (24), Qingfu had Diviner Yi murder our lord (Lord Min) at the palace gate. Gongzi You took the future Lord Xi and went to Zhu. 5 But after Qingfu fled to Ju, they reentered the domain and established Lord Xi as ruler. Offering gifts, they searched for Qingfu in Ju, and the Ju leaders returned him. When he reached Mi, he sent Gongzi Yu to beg for forgiveness. When forgiveness was not granted, Yu returned to him wailing. Qingfu said, “That is the voice of Gongzi Yu,” then he hanged himself. Lord Min was the son of Ai Jiang’s younger sister, Shu Jiang.6 It was for this reason that the Qi leaders had established him as ruler. Qingfu had had a liaison with Ai Jiang, and Ai Jiang had wanted to establish him as lord. Ai Jiang was complicit in the murder of Lord Min, and that is why she retired to Zhu. But the leaders of Qi captured her and put her to death at Yi, taking her corpse back with them to Qi. Lord Xi requested her corpse and buried her.7 5

In a passage not included here (Min 1.4), Gongzi You had returned from Chen at the Qi ruler’s invitation. 6 Ai Jiang, the wife of Lord Zhuang, was from the domain of Qi. It was common for a younger sister, in this case Shu Jiang, to be sent along with the main bride as a secondary wife. 7 Lord Xi was the son of Lord Zhuang’s concubine Cheng Feng and hence is showing consideration for his father’s principal wife.

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Succe ssion Cr isis a s Fa m i ly Dr a m a: Thr e e E x a m pl e s While the domain of Lu witnessed a series of assassinations in the early Zuo­zhuan decades, other domains also experienced violent strife over succession. Often, as in the story of Lord Zhuang of Zheng (chapter 1), this strife involved bitter and deadly conflict within a family. In the first of these three examples, succession in the domain of Wei is complicated by Lord Zhuang’s (r. 757–735 BCE) indulgence of his son, Zhouxu, born of a favorite. A loyal minister, Shi Que, gives an early example of Zuozhuan remonstrance, which subsequent events show went unheeded. Then we learn that the high-minded remonstrator’s own son is a supporter of Zhouxu. The ensuing tragedy ensnares all the major players, as even Shi Que is required to make a terrible and self-­ sacrificing judgment.

Yin 3.7 (720 BCE)  Lord Zhuang of Wei took as wife the younger sister of Dechen, the heir apparent of the domain of Qi. Known as Zhuang Jiang, she was beautiful but had no sons. It was for her that the people of Wei composed the ode “The Great Lady.” The lord next took a wife in Chen known as Li Gui. She gave birth to Xiaobo, but he died young. Her younger sister, Dai Gui, gave birth to Lord Huan, whom Zhuang Jiang took as her own son. 8 Zhouxu was the child of a favorite. He had the lord’s favor and was fond of weaponry, and the lord did not restrain him. Zhuang Jiang hated him. The minister Shi Que remonstrated, “I have heard that if one loves a son, one teaches him the ways of duty and does not allow him to go astray on deviant paths. Pride, wastefulness, lewdness, and dissipation are the origins of deviance. These four come when favor and reward are excessive. If you are going to establish Zhouxu as heir, then settle it now! If you are not ready to do this, then you are building steps to disaster. Few indeed are those who are indulged but do not become prideful; are prideful but able to step down; are able to step down but not be indignant; are indignant but able to keep within boundaries!

8 A younger sister of the bride often became a secondary wife; see note 6.

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Moreover, for the lowly to hinder the honored, for the young to insult the old, for the distant to come between kin, for the new to come between those with old ties, for the small to lord it over the great, for the lewd to destroy the dutiful, these are called the six violations. For rulers to be dutiful, for subjects to fulfill their tasks, for fathers to be kind, for sons to be filial, for older brothers to show love, and for younger brothers to be respectful, these are called the six compliances. To reject the compliances and follow the violations is the way to hasten disaster. One who rules over men should devote himself to forestalling disaster; is it not then unacceptable that he should instead hasten it?” The lord did not heed this. Shi Que’s son, Shi Hou, kept company with Zhouxu. Shi Que forbade this, but his son persisted. When Lord Huan was established as ruler, Shi Que retired on account of age. Yin 4.1 (719 BCE)  In the fourth year, in spring, Zhouxu of Wei assassinated Lord Huan and was established as ruler. Yin 4.3 (719 BCE)  Our lord asked Zhong Zhong, “Do you suppose that Zhouxu of Wei will succeed?” He responded, “I have heard of pacifying the people through virtue, but I have not heard of doing so through disorder. To do so through disorder is like trying to unsnarl silk threads and entangling them further. Zhouxu depends upon weaponry and is comfortable with cruelty. If he depends upon weaponry, he will not have the support of the multitude. If he is comfortable with cruelty, he will not have close associates. “When the people turn against him and his close associates are alienated, it will be difficult to succeed! Now, weapons are the same as fire. If one does not contain it, one will be consumed oneself. Zhouxu assassinated his ruler and has cruelly used his people. If at this crucial juncture he does not strive for exemplary virtue but wishes to succeed through disorder, he surely will not escape calamity!” Yin 4.5 (719 BCE)  Zhouxu was not yet able to unify his people. Shi Hou asked his father, Shi Que, about stabilizing the position of the ruler, and Shi Que said, “An audience with the Zhou king would accomplish this.” Hou asked, “How does one gain an audience?” Shi Que said, “Lord Huan of Chen has just now found favor with the king,

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and Chen and Wei have just now reached peace.9 If you visit the court of Chen and have them make the request, certainly an audience could be gained.” Shi Hou went along with Zhouxu to Chen. Shi Que sent someone to declare to Chen as follows: “The domain of Wei is narrow and small, and I, an old man, am infirm. There really is nothing I can accomplish. It was none other than these two men who assassinated our ruler. I presume to use this opportunity to lay plans to ensnare them.” The Chen leaders arrested them and requested that Wei oversee the matter. In the ninth month, Wei leaders sent Steward of the Right Chou to oversee the execution of Zhouxu in Pu. Shi Que sent his steward Nou Yangjian to oversee the execution of Shi Hou in Chen. The noble man said, “Shi Que was a subject of the purest sort. He hated Zhouxu and Shi Hou associated with him. ‘For the sake of a great duty, he smote his kin.’ Surely this is what is meant!” A younger brother of the murdered Lord Huan, Lord Xuan (r. 719–700 BCE), was instated in the aftermath of the Zhouxu usurpation, but he turns out to have dubious morals and creates further havoc. In a flashback narrative, Lord Xuan of Wei appropriates a woman intended for his son, setting off a train of events that leads to the death of two sons and, several years later, to a rebellion in the domain that displaces a third son.

Hua n 16.5 (696 BCE)  Earlier, Lord Xuan of Wei had consorted with Yi Jiang, a concubine of his deceased father Lord Zhuang, and she gave birth to Jizi. They entrusted him to the Noble Son of the Right.10 They selected a wife for him in Qi, and she was beautiful, so Lord Xuan took her for himself. She gave birth to Shou and Shuo, and Shou was entrusted to the Noble Son of the Left. Yi Jiang hanged herself. Xuan Jiang, the woman from Qi, conspired with Shuo against Jizi. Lord Xuan sent Jizi to Qi and had brigands await him at Shen, where they

9 This is the only place in Zuozhuan where a speaker anachronistically refers to a ruler by a posthumous name (Lord Huan of Chen) the ruler could not have had at the time of the speech. 10 The terms “Noble Son of the Right” and “Noble Son of the Left” are presented here as if they were official titles. Little is known about these positions, but they would seem to be members of the ruler’s family who fulfill the responsibility of preceptors.

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were to kill him. Shou told Jizi of the plot, intending to make him flee, but Jizi was unwilling and said, “Of what use is the son who rejects his father’s command? If there were a domain without fathers, then I could flee there.” When Jizi was about to depart, Shou plied him with wine. Shou then carried his banner and went first. The brigands killed him. When Jizi arrived, he said, “I am the one you were after. What crime did he commit? Please kill me!” The bandits also killed him. The two noble sons consequently hated Lord Hui.11 In the eleventh month, Xie, the Noble Son of the Left, and Zhi, the Noble Son of the Right, established Gongzi Qianmou as ruler. Lord Hui fled to Qi. Like Lord Xuan of Wei, Lord Xian of Jin (r. 676–651 BCE) consorts with his deceased father’s concubine. The child of that union, Shensheng, is the heir apparent. Lord Xian expands Jin power by annexing smaller domains and by attacking various non-Sinitic groups collectively known as the Rong. A Rong woman, Li Ji, becomes his new favorite, and her wiles to promote her own son lead Lord Xian to persecute his heir, in another parallel to the above account from Wei.

Zhua ng 28.2 (666 BCE)  Lord Xian of Jin took a wife in Jia. She had no sons. He consorted with his father’s concubine Qi Jiang, and she bore the future wife of Lord Mu of Qin and the heir apparent Shensheng. Lord Xian also took two women from the Rong. Hu Ji of the Greater Rong bore Chong’er, and Zi of the Lesser Rong bore Yiwu.12 When Jin attacked the Li Rong, the Head of the Li Rong presented his daughter Li Ji. After they returned to Jin, she bore Xiqi, and her younger sister bore Zhuozi. Li Ji enjoyed the lord’s favor and wanted to establish her son as heir. She bribed the lord’s male favorites Liangwu and Wu from Dongguan 11 Shuo, the son who had conspired with his mother against Jizi, succeeded his father in 700 BCE and is known posthumously as Lord Hui (r. 699–696, 688–669 BCE). Driven out in 696 BCE, he returned eight years later to rule Wei after taking revenge against his enemies. 12 The Rong were an ethnic group located in the west of present-day Shanxi. Notice that the future overlord Chong’er (see chapter 4) is born of a Rong mother. For more on nonSinitic groups, see chapter 15.

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and had them say to the lord, “Quwo is the site of my lord’s ancestral temple. Pu and the two Qu are on my lord’s borders. These cannot be without masters. If the site of the ancestral temple is without a master, then the people will not stand in awe of your authority. If the border regions are without masters, then you will give the Rong ideas. If the Rong get ideas and the people do not respect their government, it will mean trouble for the domain. If you send the heir apparent to rule over Quwo and Chong’er and Yiwu to rule over Pu and Qu, then you can make the people stand in awe of your authority, instill fear among the Rong, and also manifest the glory of your achievement.” Li Ji had them both say, “The vast lands of the Di could be Jin cities. Would it not be fitting for Jin to open new lands?” The Prince of Jin was pleased with this. In summer, he sent his heir apparent to dwell in Quwo, Chong’er to dwell in Pucheng, and Yiwu to dwell in Qu. All the noble sons were kept in the border areas. Only the sons of Li Ji and her sister remained in the capital Jiang. In the end, the two Wu, Liangwu and Wu from Dongguan, joined with Li Ji to slander all the noble sons and establish Xiqi as heir. The Jin men called them “the two-Wu clique.” After military victories in which Shensheng plays a role, the minister Shi Wei suggests that Shensheng’s rise to a lofty position has been too sudden and that he is now exposed to danger. Other questions arise about the appropriateness of Lord Xian sending the heir apparent into battle, and Shensheng begins to sense danger.

Min 1.6 (661 BCE)  The Prince of Jin raised two armies. The prince commanded the upper army, and the heir apparent, Shensheng, commanded the lower army. Zhao Su drove the war chariot and Bi Wan was spearman on the right. With this army, they extinguished Geng, extinguished Huo, and extinguished Wei. As they were returning home, the prince fortified Quwo for the heir apparent, and he bestowed the settlement of Geng upon Zhao Su and the settlement of Wei upon Bi Wan, making them high officers. Shi Wei said, “The heir apparent will not be securely established. A walled city has been apportioned to him, and he has been given the position of minister. If, at the outset, he is raised to such a lofty position, how

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will he succeed in being securely established? Better that he should flee these things, lest incriminations come to him. Would it not be acceptable for him to become an exile like Wu Taibo?13 He would still possess an excellent name, and this would be better than being overtaken by disaster. Moreover, there is a saying, ‘So long as one’s heart has no flaws, why be concerned about being homeless?’ If Heaven is to bless the heir apparent, then I suspect he will not have Jin for his own!” Min 2.7 (660 BCE)  The Prince of Jin had the heir apparent, Shen­ sheng, attack the Gaoluo of Dongshan. Li Ke remonstrated, “The heir apparent is the one who offers the grand ancestral sacrifices and the vessels of millet at the sacrifices to the altars of the domain while morning and evening looking after the ruler’s food provisions. That is why he is called ‘the preeminent son.’ When the ruler travels, he defends the capital. When there is another to defend the capital, then the heir apparent accompanies the ruler. When he accompanies the ruler, it is called ‘soothing the armies.’ When he defends the capital, it is called ‘watching over the domain.’ Such are the regulations of old. As for leading troops, taking charge of strategy, or administering oaths to the army, the ruler and the ministers of the domain oversee such affairs. They are not the business of the heir apparent. The troops are in the keeping of the one who issues the orders.14 If the heir apparent requests orders from his father, then he will not be authoritative. But for him to issue orders on his own is to be unfilial. That is why the ruler’s successor may not lead troops. If the ruler loses control over his officials, and the commander of the troops has no authority, then how can one make use of them? Moreover, I have heard that the Gaoluo tribe is going to make war. You, my lord, should put your order aside.” The lord said, “I have sons but do not yet know which of them to establish as heir.” Li Ke did not reply but withdrew. When Li Ke had an audience with the heir apparent, the heir apparent asked, “Am I to be deposed?” Li Ke responded, “He has told you

13 Wu Taibo was the eldest son of a pre-dynastic Zhou leader. Yielding the position of succesor to his worthy younger brother Wang Ji, Taibo left Zhou and went to live among the “barbarians” in Wu (see chapter 15). Wang Ji would become the father of the future King Wen of Zhou. 14 When troops are in the field, the general’s orders are final and take precedence even over those of the ruler.

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to supervise the people of Quwo, and he has instructed you to lead the army. Not fulfilling your duties is what you should worry about! Why would you be deposed? Moreover, a son should fear not being filial but should not fear that he will not be established as heir. If you cultivate your­ self and do not blame others, you will avoid calamity.” The heir apparent led the troops. As the heir apparent was about to go into battle, Hu Tu remonstrated, saying, “You should not. Formerly, Xin Bo counseled the Zhou Duke Huan as follows: ‘The roots of disorder are putting bedroom favorites on par with the queen, allowing court favorites to form a shadow gov­ ernment, making the sons of concubines the equal of the sons of the wife, and permitting large cities to be a match for the capital.’ But the Zhou Duke Huan did not heed him and therefore came to disaster. Now the roots of disorder are complete. Can you be certain of being established as heir? You, sir, should give thought to being filial and pacifying the people. That would be better than endangering yourself and hastening offense!” A flashback narrative, written well after the outcome of these event was known, explains that Lord Xian had been warned about taking Li Ji as his wife. Her son, Xiqi, and her sister’s son, Zhuozi, will both be killed in the succession strug­ gle that brings Yiwu, known posthumously as Lord Hui (r. 650–637 BCE), to power (ZT Xi 9.4, 9.6, 10.2, 10.3). For continuation of the story of Lord Xian’s posterity, see chapter 4. Here Shensheng, like Jizi above (Huan 16.5), refuses to defy his father and chooses self-sacrifice.

Xi 4.6 (656 BCE)  Earlier, Lord Xian of Jin had wanted to take Li Ji as his wife. He divined about this by turtle shell, and the result was inauspicious. He divined by milfoil, and the result was lucky. The lord said, “I will follow the milfoil.” The diviner said, “Milfoil divination falls short where the turtle shell excels. We should follow the one that excels.15 Moreover, the prognosis says, Single devotion will bring a change: One will steal the lord’s ram.16 15 While the precise reasoning of these lines is unclear, the argument is that turtle shell divination should be given greater weight in this case. 16 The diviner presumably takes “the lord’s ram” to refer to the heir apparent Shensheng.

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One plant fragrant, one foul, Ten years hence the stench will linger still. This will certainly not do!”

The lord did not heed this, but established Li Ji as his wife. She bore Xiqi, and her younger sister bore Zhuozi. By the time Xiqi was about to be established as heir, Li Ji had already conspired with the high officers of the mid-rank, and she said to the heir apparent, Shensheng, “Our lord has dreamed of your mother Qi Jiang. You must quickly offer a sacrifice to her.” The heir apparent offered a sacrifice at Quwo and sent the sacrificial meat and wine back to the lord. The lord was hunting, so Li Ji kept the offerings in the palace for six days. When the lord arrived, she put poison in it and presented it to him. The lord offered some of it to the ground and the earth boiled up. So he gave some of it to a dog, and the dog died. Then he gave some to a servant, and the servant also died. Weeping, Li Ji said, “This conspiracy comes from the heir apparent!” The heir apparent fled to Quwo, and the lord killed Du Yuankuan, the tutor of the heir apparent. Someone said to the heir apparent, “You should offer an explanation. Our lord will surely discern the truth.” The heir apparent said, “Without Li Ji, the ruler will find no peace in rest and no satisfaction in food. If I offer an explanation, Li Ji will certainly be found guilty. My lord is old, and I also will be unhappy if he is unhappy.” “Will you go away then?” he asked. The heir apparent replied, “It was my lord himself who did not properly examine this crime. If I should leave the domain bearing this ill repute, who will accept me?” In the twelfth month, on the wushen day (27), he hanged himself at Quwo. Lord Xian has been dead for a year and the new Prince of Jin is Yiwu, or Lord Hui, Shensheng’s half brother. Shensheng committed suicide under suspicion of treason and was presumably not properly buried. Yiwu disinterred and reburied him with proper ritual, perhaps to enhance his own legitimacy. The ghost of Shensheng appears to his former chariot driver Hu Tu, threatens the destruction of Jin, and ends by predicting Jin defeat at the battle of Han (ZT Xi 15.4, 645 BCE). For other examples of vengeful ghosts, see chapter 14 (Zhuang 8.3, Cheng 10.4).

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Xi 10.3 (650 BCE)  The Prince of Jin reburied the heir apparent Shensheng. In autumn, Hu Tu was on his way to the secondary capital when he happened upon the heir apparent Shensheng. The heir apparent had him mount the carriage and serve as his driver and then told him, “Since Yiwu has no sense of propriety, the Lord on High has granted my request; he will give Jin to Qin, and Qin will offer sacrifices to me.”17 Hu Tu replied, “I have heard this: ‘Spirits do not relish sacrifices from those not of their kind; and the people do not offer sacrifices to those not of their house.’ Would not your sacrifices then be discontinued? Moreover, of what crimes are the people guilty? You will have erred in your punishments and will have no more sacrifices: you, my lord, should consider this!” Shensheng said, “Quite right. I will make another request. Seven days hence, on the west side of Quwo, there will be a shaman through whom I will reveal myself.” Hu Tu agreed to this, and the heir apparent then disappeared. When the time came, Hu Tu went to the place, and the shaman announced to him, “The god has promised me that he will punish the wrongdoer, who will be defeated at Han.”

A n A m bi va l ent Accou nt of a n A ssa ssination A dish of cooked turtle leads to the assassination of Lord Ling of Zheng a few months after he became ruler, and the Zuozhuan account appears not to unequivocally condemn the assassin; he is merely said to have failed to “weigh the odds.” Agency and contingency seem intertwined as a trivial cause leads to a ruler’s assassination. The attempt to wrest a meaningful principle from this murder also implicitly justifies the assassination of a ruler who “violated the ruler’s way.” The exegesis of the Annals passage aims to explain why the Annals mentions only Gongzi Guisheng when the main instigator of the mur­ der seems to be Gongzi Song. (For another example of an assassination that raises questions about assigning culpability and historical judgment, see chapter 7, Xuan 2.3.)

Xua n 4.2 (605 BCE)  The leaders of Chu presented a large turtle to Lord Ling of Zheng. Gongzi Song and Gongzi Guisheng were about to 17 Commentators suggest that Yiwu is committing a sexual impropriety, perhaps with Shensheng’s widow or with his own stepmother.

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have an audience with the lord. Gongzi Song’s index finger moved involuntarily. He showed it to Gongzi Guisheng and said, “On other days when my finger did this, I always without fail got to taste something extraordinary.” As they entered, the cook was about to take the turtle apart. They looked at each other and smiled. The lord asked why, and Gongzi Guisheng told him. When the lord had the high officers partake of the turtle, he called Gongzi Song forward but did not give him any. Furious, Gongzi Song dipped his finger into the cauldron, tasted the turtle, and left. The lord was so enraged that he wanted to kill Gongzi Song. Gongzi Song plotted with Gongzi Guisheng to act first. Gongzi Guisheng said, “Even with an aging domestic animal, one is reluctant to kill it. How much more so, then, with the ruler?” Gongzi Song turned things around and slandered Gongzi Guisheng. Gongzi Guisheng became fearful and complied with him. In the summer, they assassinated Lord Ling. The Annals says, “Gongzi Guisheng of Zheng assassinated his ruler, Yi”; this is because he fell short in weighing the odds. The noble man said, “To be benevolent without martial valor is to achieve nothing.” In all cases when a ruler is assassinated, naming the ruler means that he violated the ruler’s way; naming the subject means that the blame lies with him.

Th e Line age H e a d Shusu n Bao De stroy ed by a n I ll egiti m ate Son The following story of assassination and patricide comes from the last third of Zuozhuan and demonstrates how patterns of conflict and violence came to afflict lineages as they began to rise to particular prominence and compete for power within domains. In the account below, Shusun Bao, head of one of Lu’s three most powerful noble lineages and known elsewhere in Zuozhuan as a wise man, is destroyed by an illegitimate son.

Zhao 4.8 (538 BCE)  Earlier, when Shusun Bao separated himself from his lineage, the Shusun, he had made his way to Gengzong, where he met a woman. He had her feed him secretly and lodged with her. When she asked about his trip, he told her the reason for it, and she wailed as she saw him off. He went to Qi, took a wife of the Guo lineage, and fathered Mengbing and Zhongren. He dreamed that the sky was pressing

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down on him so that he could not get up, and that when he looked behind him, he caught sight of a man, swarthy, hunchbacked, with ­deep-set eyes and the snout of a pig. He called to him and said, “Niu! Save me!”18 And then he was able to get up. In the morning, he summoned all his followers, but he did not find the man among them. He said, “Make a record of it.”19 When Shusun Qiaoru fled to Qi, Shusun Bao provided him with food.20 Shusun Qiaoru said, “For the sake of our predecessors, Lu will preserve our ancestral line. They are sure to summon you. If they summon you, what will you do?” Shusun Bao replied, “It is what I have long wished for.” The Lu leaders summoned Shusun Bao, and he returned without ­telling Shusun Qiaoru. Once he had been established in his position, the woman he had lodged with at Gengzong presented him with a pheasant.21 Shusun Bao asked about the child she had borne, and she replied, “My son is grown now and can follow me holding a pheasant.” When he summoned him and saw him, it turned out to be the man he had dreamed of. Without asking him his name, he called him “Niu,” and the young man answered, “Yes.” Summoning all his followers, he had them look at him and then appointed him as a young servant. The young man enjoyed favor, and when he grew up, he assumed administrative duties. Gongsun Ming had been acquainted with Shusun Bao in Qi. When Shusun Bao went home, before he had had the opportunity to bring his wife Guo Jiang to join him in Lu, Gongsun Ming took her as his wife. Shusun Bao was angry because of this, and he sent for the two sons he had had by her only after they were grown up. Shusun Bao went hunting at Qiuyou and there came down with an ill­ness. The young servant Niu wanted to throw the house into chaos and take it for himself. He tried to force a covenant with the elder son,

18 Niu means “bull” or “ox.” It may be that the dreamer is calling out the strange creature by the only name that seems to fit it. 19 As becomes clear as the narrative continues, the dream is a deceptive one, one of several such cases in Zuozhuan (for other examples, see chapter 14, Cheng 5.1 and Cheng 17.8). 20 Shusun Qiaoru was Shusun Bao’s older brother. After having an affair with the Lu ­r uler’s mother and plotting against the Ji and Meng lineages (see chapter 3, Cheng 16.5), he fled the domain of Lu. 21 This signifies that she had given birth to a son.

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Mengbing, but Mengbing would not accept it.22 Shusun Bao had bells made for Mengbing and said, “You have not yet established social connections. Hold a feast for the high officers to dedicate these bells.” Once everything was ready, Mengbing sent the young servant Niu to request a date for the feast. Niu went in but did not mention the matter to Shusun Bao; he then went out and set the date himself. When the guests arrived, Shusun Bao heard the sound of bells. Niu said, “Mengbing has a guest from that woman in the north.”23 Angry, Shusun Bao was going to go over to Mengbing’s chambers, but Niu stopped him. Once the guests had departed, Shusun Bao sent men to seize Mengbing and kill him outside. Niu then tried to force a covenant with the younger son, Zhongren, who would not accept it. When Zhongren went with our lord’s driver Laishu on a tour at our lord’s palace, our lord gave Zhongren a jade ring, which Zhongren then directed Niu to take in and show to Shusun Bao. Niu went in but did not show it. He went out and commanded Zhongren to wear it as a pendant at his waist. Niu said to Shusun Bao, “How would it be if you arranged an audience for Zhongren with our lord?” Shusun Bao said, “For what purpose?” He said, “Even if you do not arrange an audience, he has already arranged an audience for himself. Our lord has given him a jade ring, which he wears at his waist.”24 As a result, Shusun Bao banished Zhongren, who fled to Qi. The young servant Niu said, “The master’s illness is severe. He does not wish to see people.” He had the servers withdraw after putting Shusun Bao’s meals in a side chamber. Niu would not actually carry these meals in to Shusun Bao but would return the baskets empty and order that they be cleared away. In the twelfth month, on the guichou day (26), Shusun Bao stopped being fed. On the yimao day (28), he died. Niu established Shusun Bao’s son Shusun Chuo as successor and acted as his assistant.

22 Presumably, Niu wanted Mengbing to pledge to support him as their father’s successor. 23 Niu may be hinting that the guest is Gongsun Ming, second husband to Shusun Bao’s wife in Qi and that Mengbing is using the bells to entertain his stepfather while neglecting his natural father. 24 Niu implies that Zhongren has already privately arranged with Lord Zhao, the Lu ruler, to be established as successor to Shusun Bao and that the jade ring is evidence of the agreement.

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Lest the reader conclude that the schemer Niu escaped retribution, we include his demise, which occurred soon after the events reported above. We must, however, question whether Shusun Chuo, Shusun Bao’s son by a concubine, is a disinterested voice of justice, since he is the beneficiary of Niu’s perfidy.

Zhao 5.1 (537 BCE)  When Shusun Chuo acceded to his position, he held a court audience with all his domestic staff and said, “Niu has brought disaster upon the Shusun lineage, wreaking havoc in the great order of succession. He killed the legitimate heir and established the son of a secondary consort in his place. He has also divided up and distributed the settlements of the Shusun lineage in an effort to win pardon for his offenses. There are no crimes greater than these. He must be killed, and quickly.” Alarmed, Niu fled to Qi, but the sons of Mengbing and Zhongren killed him outside the Sai Pass, then tossed his head into a thorn tree at Ningfen.

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Women

I n c h a p t e r 1, t h e c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n L o r d Z h u a n g o f Zheng and his brother is brought on by their mother’s wrongheaded partiality for the latter. Chapter 2 yields more examples of women playing a detrimental role in succession crises. It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that the Zuozhuan portrayal of women is consistently negative. Positive examples are not hard to find. As we will see in chapter 4, the wise counsel of Lady Jiang and Xi Fuji’s wife contribute to the rise of Chong’er, and Zhao Cui’s wife Zhao Ji yields precedence to Shu Wei and subordinates her own sons to Shu Wei’s talented son Zhao Dun. Several women, including Ding Jiang below, offer prescient judgment and forceful remonstrance. Lady Mu of Xu, daughter of a Wei ruler whose obsession with cranes brings disastrous consequences (chapter 8), saves Wei from total destruction by appealing to Qi for help. In his classification of female characters in Zuozhuan, the Qing scholar Gu Donggao (1697–1759) lists twelve in the highest rank of “virtuous integrity,” eleven in the middle rank of “wise judgment,” and thirty-four in the lowest rank of “unscrupulous excess.” If Gu were to attempt an analogous categorization of the hundreds of male characters in the text, he would have likely come up with a similarly disproportionate distribution, considering the men responsible for the pervasive intrigues and violence in the book. Even so, women often seem to represent clear and persistent dangers in Zuozhuan: loyalty toward a woman’s natal lineage and domain may be pitted against the ties she forms through marriage, the desires she inspires can lead to conf licts and chaos, and her wayward emotions and preferences are thought to undermine political stability. Sexual indulgence supposedly ­corrodes the health of the ruler and the polity, and beauty is considered 48

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intrinsically dangerous. The adulterous affairs of Wen Jiang, Ai Jiang (chapter 2), and Mu Jiang wreak havoc in Lu. Consorts who try to advance the fortunes of their own sons at the expense of legitimate heirs include Xuan Jiang, Li Ji (chapter 2), and Cui Zhu’s wife (chapter 7). In one case, a woman’s derisive laughter at an envoy even sows the seeds of conflict and starts a war (ZT Xuan 17.1, Cheng 2.3). Images of women in Zuozhuan are notable for their nuance and com­ plexity, especially when compared with didactic texts such as Liu Xiang’s Accounts of Notable Women (Lienü zhuan). In that work, Mu Ji, the wife of Lord Mu of Qin, whose threat to burn herself and her children alive persuades her husband to show mercy toward the vanquished Jin and her brother Lord Hui of Jin, is praised for her sagacity, but reprieve for Jin is also loss for Qin. Likewise, the evaluation of Wen Ying, the daughter of Lord Mu of Qin and the widow of Lord Wen of Jin, who wins the release of three captured Qin commanders, depends on the choice of Qin or Jin perspectives. We are given glimpses of the talent and helplessness of supposed femmes fatales. Zuozhuan also offers divergent perspectives on chastity, sexual morality, and the question of whether a woman owes absolute loyalty to her husband. Mi, the younger sister of King Zhao of Chu, considers it her obligation to marry the officer Zhong Jian because he once carried her on his back (ZT Ding 5.6), but Chong’er marries his nephew’s wife, Huai Ying, without provoking any comment about impropriety (chapter 4).

Yong Ji’s Choice: Fath er or Husba n d Zhai Zhong, the Zheng minister who advises Lord Zhuang in chapter 1, is caught up in the succession crisis following Lord Zhuang’s death. Coerced by Song, he deposes Lord Zhao of Zheng (r. 701, 697–695 BCE) and installs as ruler his younger brother Lord Li (r. 701–697, 680–673 BCE), whose mother is from Song. Resenting Zhai Zhong’s power, Lord Li enlists the help of Yong Jiu to assassinate him. Yong Ji, Yong Jiu’s wife and Zhai Zhong’s daughter, seeks her mother’s advice. Yong Ji’s mother speaks with epigrammatic finality, although Zuozhuan offers examples of women making different choices when caught between natal and marital ties. Indeed, the choice here is stark and uncomfortable enough for this account to be excluded from Han and later anecdotal collections offering exemplars and warnings.

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Hua n 15.2 (697 BCE)  Zhai Zhong was monopolizing power, and the Liege of Zheng, Lord Li, worried about this. He sent Zhai Zhong’s son-in-law Yong Jiu to kill him. Yong Jiu was to offer Zhai Zhong ceremonial toasts in the outlying district and carry out the assassination. His wife, Yong Ji, learned of the plot and said to her mother, “Whom should one hold dearer, a father or a husband?” Her mother said, “Any man can be a husband, but one has only a single father. How can they be compared?” And so Yong Ji reported to Zhai Zhong, “Yong Jiu declines to use his house but is instead going to offer you ceremonial toasts in the outlying district. I am mystified by this and so report.” Zhai Zhong killed Yong Jiu and exposed his corpse near the pond of the Zhou lineage. Lord Li loaded the corpse into his carriage and took it with him as he left the domain, saying, “He let his wife in on his plans; it is fitting that he died.” In the summer, Lord Li departed and fled to Cai.

X i Gu i’s Si l ence: Th e Cl a i ms of T wo Husba n ds In the course of Chu’s northward expansion, King Wen of Chu (r. 689– 675 BCE) subjugates Xi and Cai, whose rulers both try to use Chu’s might to attack each other. The cause of their mutual animus is Xi Gui, who wreaks havoc because powerful men covet her beauty, but seems to have ­little control over her fate. When she submits to a new master, she registers her pain through silence and then eloquently explains her silence. In Liu Xiang’s Accounts of Notable Women, Xi Gui commits suicide to protest her loyalty to the Xi ruler, who likewise kills himself. Awed by such heroic martyrdom, the Chu king buries them together with proper ritual. Spurring debates over political choices and definitions of political integrity, including its analogy with female chastity, Xi Gui has continued to fascinate readers for centuries.

Zhua ng 10.3 (684 BCE)  Prince Ai of Cai took a wife in Chen. The Prince of Xi also took a wife there. When Xi Gui, the wife of the Prince of Xi, was going to be married, she passed through Cai. The Prince of Cai said, “She is my sister-in-law.” He detained her and met with her, but

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he did not treat her as a guest.1 When the Prince of Xi heard this, he was angry and sent someone to tell King Wen of Chu, “Attack us, and when we seek help from Cai, attack them.” King Wen, the Master of Chu, acted accordingly. In autumn, in the ninth month, Chu defeated Cai troops at Shen. They took Xianwu, Prince of Cai, home with them. Zhua ng 14.3 (680 BCE)  Because of what happened at Shen, Lord Ai of Cai praised Xi Gui while speaking to the Master of Chu. The Master of Chu went to Xi and, on the pretext of carrying in food supplies for a formal feast with entertainments, thus extinguished Xi. He took Xi Gui back home, and she eventually gave birth to Du Ao and the future King Cheng.2 But she had not yet spoken a word. The Master of Chu asked her about this, and she replied, “I, one woman, have served two husbands. Even though I have not been able to kill myself, why should you expect me to speak?” The Master of Chu, having destroyed Xi on account of the Prince of Cai, then attacked Cai. In autumn, in the seventh month, Chu entered Cai. The noble man said, “It says in the Shang Documents, ‘The spread of iniquity is like the blazing of fire on grassland; since one cannot even approach it, how can one still beat it out?’ Surely this fits Prince Ai of Cai!” Eleven years after King Wen’s death, Xi Gui (here called King Wen’s wife) resists the advances of King Wen’s younger brother, the Chu chief minister Ziyuan. At this point, her young son has become king (King Cheng of Chu, r. 672?–626 BCE). Ziyuan tries to seduce her with music, but she manages to remind him of its ritual and military meaning. Shortly thereafter, Ziyuan leads Chu forces to attack Zheng. Ironically, a woman remembered for her silence speaks forcefully on two occasions.

Zhua ng 28.3 (666 BCE)  Ziyuan, the chief minister of Chu, wanted to seduce the wife of King Wen. He built a lodge near her palace and

A version of this story found in the Qinghua excavated text Xinian (Chronological accounts, ca. fourth to third century BCE) says that the Cai ruler “took her as wife,” which can mean that he tries to marry Xi Gui or has sexual relations with her. 2 Du Ao (r. 675?–672?), the older son, died young. According to Sima Qian, Du Ao succeeded King Wen and was assassinated by his younger brother Hun (King Cheng), but the chronology does not seem plausible.

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shook clappers there to the rhythm of the wan dance. When the king’s wife heard this, she wept and said, “When our former ruler used this dance, it was to practice our military preparedness. Now the chief minister does not employ this against enemies but near the soon-to-perish widow. Is this not an aberration?” An attendant reported this to Ziyuan, and Ziyuan said, “A woman has not forgotten the need to strike at our enemies, while I, in contrast, have forgotten it.”

X i a Ji: Th e Fe m m e Fata l e Xia Ji’s adulterous relations with Lord Ling of Chen (r. 614–599 BCE) and his ministers lead to Lord Ling’s assassination by Xia Ji’s son, Xia Zheng­ shu. King Zhuang of Chu (r. 613–591 BCE) intervenes and has Xia Zhengshu put to death. Chen is almost annexed by Chu, but King Zhuang is ulti­ mately persuaded to return dominion to Chen (ZT Xuan 11.5). He ends up installing the miscreant ministers Gongsun Ning and Yi Hangfu, who have fled to Chu and would presumably act as Chu puppets, in power in Chen.

Xua n 9.6 (600 BCE)  Lord Ling of Chen, Gongsun Ning, and Yi Hangfu all had liaisons with Xia Ji. They each wore her intimate garments under their robes, bantering about them in court. Xie Ye remonstrated with the lord, “When lords and ministers demonstrate their licentiousness, the people have nothing to look to as example. More­over, the reports that spread as a result will not be good. You, my lord, should put away those garments!” The lord said, “I will be able to change my ways.” He told the two noblemen about this, and when the two requested to have Xie Ye killed, he did not stop them. They thus put Xie Ye to death. Confucius said, “It says in the Odes, When the people have many deviations, Do not set up your own law against deviations!

Does this not describe Xie Ye?”3 3

Here Confucius seems to advocate compromise, pragmatism, and self-preservation. He criticizes another fearless remonstrator for failing to protect himself (ZT Cheng 17.6).

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Xua n 10.4 (599 BCE)  Lord Ling of Chen, Gongsun Ning, and Yi Hangfu drank wine at the Xia residence. The lord said to Hangfu, “Zhengshu looks like you.” Hangfu replied, “He also looks like you.” Xia Zhengshu abhorred this. As the lord was leaving, Zhengshu shot an arrow from the stable and killed him. The two noblemen fled to Chu. Xia Ji sows discord in Chu as the king and ministers of Chu fight over her. The Chu minister Qu Wuchen warns of the dangers she poses but secretly elopes with her. They then flee to Jin.

Cheng 2.6 (589 BCE)  Having chastised the Xia lineage of Chen, King Zhuang wished to take Xia Ji into his harem. Qu Wuchen, Lord of Shen, said, “This will not do. You, my lord, summoned the princes to chastise the guilty, but now you are taking her into your harem because you covet her beauty. To covet beauty is licentiousness, and licentiousness is a great transgression. The Zhou Documents says, ‘Illuminate ­v irtue, be wary of transgression.’ On this basis King Wen created Zhou. To illuminate virtue is to strive to exalt it; to be wary of transgression is to strive to remove it. If you rouse the princes only to become guilty of great transgression, you are not being wary. My lord should consider this well!” The king thus desisted. Zifan wanted to take her for himself. Wuchen said, “This is an inauspicious person. This is the one who brought about Ziman’s early death, killed Yushu, murdered Lord Ling, executed Xia Zhengshu, exiled Kong and Yi, and destroyed Chen.4 How can anyone be so inauspicious? Life is difficult enough as it is. Would you want to suffer an unnatural death? There are many beautiful women under Heaven. Why must you have that one?” Zifan thus desisted.

Some imperial commentators fault Zuozhuan for using Confucius to champion expediency and denigrate “martyrs of integrity.” 4 Ziman is variously identified as Xia Ji’s older brother, her cousin, or Lord Ling of Zheng. (Xia Ji came from Zheng.) Ziman might have been Xia Ji’s first husband. Yushu is Xia Ji’s husband and Xia Zhengshu’s father.



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The king gave her to the court deputy Xiang the Elder. Xiang the Elder died at Bi, and his corpse was not retrieved. 5 His son Heiyao then had adulterous relations with Xia Ji. Wuchen sent word to her, saying, “Return to Zheng, and I will formalize engagement with you.” He also had someone from Zheng summon her with this message: “The body of Xiang the Elder, the court deputy, can be obtained, but you must come and take it back.” Xia Ji told the king about this, and the king consulted Qu Wuchen. The latter replied, “This may well be credible.” The king sent Xia Ji to return to Zheng. Upon leaving, she said to those seeing her off, “If I do not obtain the body, I will not return.” Qu Wuchen formalized his engagement with Xia Ji in Zheng, and the Liege of Zheng granted his assent. When King Gong of Chu acceded to his position, he intended to undertake a campaign at Yangqiao. He sent Qu Wuchen on an official visit to Qi and also to notify Qi of the date when his troops would move. Wuchen took all his valuables with him as he set out. Shen Shugui, who was accompanying his father, Shen Shushi, was about to go to Ying. He encountered Qu Wuchen and said, “Strange indeed! That fine man should be full of vigilant anxiety for three armies, yet he shows all the delight of a mulberry patch tryst.6 He must be some­ one on his way to an elopement!” Arriving in Zheng, Wuchen sent his aide to carry the Qi gifts back to Chu, and then he set out with Xia Ji. They were going to flee to Qi, but the Qi army had recently been defeated, and he said, “I will not reside in any domain that is not victorious.” He then fled to Jin, and, with the intercession of Xi Zhi, became a Jin subject. The leaders of Jin appointed him the high officer for Xing. Zifan requested that generous bribes be given Jin to have Qu Wuchen forever barred from office. The king said, “Stop! The way he acted in his own interest may have been excessive, but he was loyal in the way he acted in the interest of our former rulers. Loyalty is the firm foundation of the altars of the domain. It can cover up much indeed! Moreover, if he can benefit their domain and patrimony, even if we were to offer generous bribes, would Jin give approval? If he does not bring any gains to Jin, then Jin will abandon him. Why bother to have him barred from office?”

5

Xiang the Elder was shot by the Jin commander Xun Shou during the battle of Bi (chapter 5, Xuan 12.2). 6 In a poem in the Odes, “mulberry patch” is where lovers have their rendezvous.

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Wuchen’s enemies in Chu decimate his lineage, and Wuchen exacts revenge by helping Jin, empowering Wu, and fomenting Wu-Chu rivalry. In this sense, Xia Ji, through her influence on Wuchen’s decisions, plays a role in redefining the balance of power in the sixth century BCE.

Cheng 7.5 (584 BCE)  From Jin, Wuchen sent Zichong and Zifan a letter, saying, “You serve your ruler with slander, malice, and avarice, and you have killed many innocent persons. I will certainly make you die from exhaustion as you rush about trying to fulfill commands.” Qu Wuchen asked to be sent on a mission to Wu, and the Prince of Jin assented. Shoumeng, the Master of Wu, was pleased with him. Wuchen thereupon established relations between Wu and Jin. He took thirty Chu chariots to Wu and left half of them there, along with archers and chariot drivers. He taught the men of Wu how to ride chariots, he taught them battle formations, and he taught them to rebel against Chu. . . . As a result, Zichong and Zifan in one year rushed about seven times to fulfill commands to stave off Wu incursions. Man and Yi tribes that had submitted to Chu were all taken over by Wu. That was how Wu began to expand; and relations opened between Wu and the domains above it. In Accounts of Notable Women Liu Xiang credits Xia Ji with sexual ­techniques of rejuvenation that explain her allure well into middle age.7 He ends his account with the annihilation of Wuchen’s lineage in Chu to deliver a warning against sexual transgression. The message is less clear in Zuozhuan. As we have seen, Wuchen flourishes in Jin and Wu and exacts revenge against his enemies in Chu, and guilty parties like Gongsun Ning and Yi Hangfu escape punishment. All the same, Xia Ji is remembered as a cau­ tionary tale in Zuozhuan. Eighty-six years after she is first mentioned in the text, her name comes up in a speech warning against the danger of marriage with her daughter. That marriage does come to pass, however, and the off­ spring of the union, Yang Shi, is implicated in the destruction of the illustri­ ous Yangshe lineage in Jin. The following speech is curious for two reasons: it is not clear that Xia Ji’s daughter is beautiful and dangerous like her mother, and there is little evidence that Yang Shi is “wild at heart,” as Shu­ xiang’s mother predicts he will be. Her speech is supposed to provide the 7 In Xinian, Xia Ji is the wife, not the mother, of Xia Zhengshu, which means that she does not have to be old enough to have a grown son.

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retrospective explanation for the senseless destruction of the Yangshe lineage, but Yang Shi is merely an innocent victim caught up in the ruthless interne­ cine struggles in Jin.

Zhao 28.2 (514 BCE)  Earlier, Shuxiang had wished to marry a woman from the family of Qu Wuchen, Lord of Shen, but his mother wanted him to marry a woman from her own birth family. Shuxiang said, “I have many mothers but few half brothers. I have learned my ­lesson from observing your side of the family.”8 His mother said, “Qu Wuchen’s wife Xia Ji killed three husbands, one ruler, and one son and brought one domain and two high ministers to their destruction. How can you fail to learn a lesson from that? I have heard that ‘great beauty always holds great evil.’ That woman was the daughter of Yao Zi, the lesser wife of Lord Mu of Zheng. She was also the younger sister of Lord Ling of Zheng. Lord Ling died early without an heir, and Heaven concentrated beauty in this one person, certain to use her to bring about great destruction. “Long ago a girl was born to the Youreng lineage. Her thick black hair was very beautiful and glossy enough to use as a mirror. For this reason they called her the Dark Wife. The music master Lord Kui took her as wife, and she bore Bofeng, who had the heart of a swine, being insatiably greedy and violent beyond all bounds. They in fact called him the Great Swine. Archer Yi of Youqiong destroyed him, with the result that Lord Kui now receives no sacrifices. What is more, the fall of the Three Dynasties and the deposing of the Jin heir Shensheng were all due to such creatures of great beauty.9 Why would you do this? For there are bewitching creatures, and they are capable of ruining a man. Unless her husband is a man of virtue and dutifulness, there is sure to be disaster.” Alarmed by this, Shuxiang did not dare marry her. Lord Ping forced Shuxiang to marry her, and she bore Yang Shi. Just after Yang Shi was

8 Shuxiang of the Yangshe lineage is a Jin minister known for his integrity and sagacity. He implies that women from his mother’s family are either infertile or jealous. 9 Tradition blamed Moxi, favorite of King Jie, for the fall of the Xia; Daji, favorite of King Zhou, for the fall of the Shang; and Bao Si, favorite of King You, for the fall of the Western Zhou. For the story of Shensheng, see chapter 2.

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born, Zirong’s mother—the wife of Shuxiang’s elder brother Yangshe Chi—ran to tell Shuxiang’s mother the news: “The wife of the eldest of our younger brothers has borne a son.” Shuxiang’s mother went to see the child. She had just reached the hall when she heard the sound of his cry and turned back, saying, “This is the sound of a jackal or wolf. A wolf cub is wild at heart. This very child—he and no other—will destroy the Yangshe lineage.” And she refused to see him.

Ding Ji a ng: W ise Cou nsel a n d I m pl aca bl e J u dgm ent Ding Jiang, wife of Lord Ding of Wei (r. 588–577 BCE), offers pragmatic arguments on the need for reconciliation when the Wei minister Sun Linfu, who fled to Jin seven years earlier (ZT Cheng 7.6), returns through Jin inter­ cession. (Jin has a history of intervening in Wei affairs.)

Cheng 14.1 (577 BCE)  In the fourteenth year, in spring, the Prince of Wei went to Jin. The Prince of Jin insisted on having Sun Linfu brought to the Wei ruler for an audience. The Prince of Wei, Lord Ding, refused. In summer, after the Prince of Wei had returned, the Prince of Jin had Xi Chou take Sun Linfu to Wei to seek an audience. The Prince of Wei wanted to decline. His wife, Ding Jiang, said, “This will not do. He is the successor to a hereditary minister of the former lord. Moreover, a great domain is interceding on his behalf. If you refuse, our domain will perish. Even though you hate him, is it not better to bear his presence than to perish? My lord should endure this! To bring peace to the people and to pardon a hereditary minister, is that not the right thing to do?” The Prince of Wei granted him an audience and restored his position. After Lord Ding dies, Ding Jiang predicts doom when the newly bereaved Wei ruler Lord Xian (r. 577–559, 547–544 BCE) shows no grief. His ministers Sun Linfu and Ningzhi will drive him into exile eighteen years later (Xiang 14.4).

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Cheng 14.5 (577 BCE)  The Prince of Wei became very ill. He had Kong Chengzi and Ning Zhi establish Jing Si’s son, Kan, as heir apparent.10 In winter, in the tenth month, Lord Ding of Wei died. His wife, Ding Jiang, was resting after she had wailed, and when she saw that the heir apparent was not grieving, she would not drink so much as a ladle of water but sighed and said, “As for this man—not only will he destroy the domain of Wei, he will also begin his iniquities with this soon-to-perish widow. Alas! Heaven is bringing disaster upon Wei! What a pity that we could not have Zhuan preside over the altars of the domain!”11 When the high officers heard this, they were without exception filled with fear and dread. From that time on, Sun Linfu did not dare leave his precious vessels in Wei and placed them all in his lands at Qī. He also maintained very good relations with the high officers of Jin. In a battle between Wei and Zheng, Ding Jiang interprets divination results in a way that boosts Wei morale.

Xia ng 10.5 (563 BCE)  Sun Linfu of Wei divined about pursuing the enemy and presented the omen crack to Ding Jiang.12 She asked about the omen verse. It said, The crack is like a mound. There are men who leave for battle And lose their leader.

Ding Jiang said, “For the invaders to lose their leader is an advantage for those resisting the enemy. You, high officers, should consider this!” The men of Wei pursued the Zheng forces. Sun Kuai, Sun Linfu’s son, took Huang Er of Zheng captive at Quanqiu. When Wei ministers drive Lord Xian of Wei into exile, Ding Jiang castigates him. Lord Xian’s fate raises questions on whether the exile of a ruler can be justified (chapter 8, Xiang 14.6). 10 Ding Jiang had no son, so Kan, the son of Ding’s concubine Ding Si, became ruler. 11 Zhuan was Kan’s younger brother. 12 In conducting divination with turtle plastrons or the scapula bones of oxen, exposure of the shell or bone to heat produces a crack that is interpreted as an omen.

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Xia ng 14.4 (559 BCE)  Zhuan, the lord’s younger full brother, followed the lord into exile. When they reached the border, the lord sent the invocator and the ancestral attendant to announce his flight and also to announce that he had committed no offense. Ding Jiang said, “If there are no spirits, why bother to announce it? If there are spirits, they cannot be deceived. Since he has committed offenses, how can he announce that he has not? He set the great officials aside and conferred instead with the minor officials. That was his first offense. The former ruler had eminent ministers to serve as his teachers and guardians, but he treated them with contempt. That was his second offense. I served the former ruler with towel and comb, but he treated me with a scorn more fitting for a concubine. That was his third offense. He should announce his flight and make an end of it. He is not to announce that he has committed no offense!”

M u Ji a ng: Ta l ent a n d Licentiousne ss Mu Jiang, the wife, mother, and grandmother of three Lu rulers (Lord Xuan, Lord Cheng, Lord Xiang), is the only woman shown citing the Odes and the Zhou Changes in Zuozhuan, which are indications of high cultural sophis­ tication.13 In the following excerpt, she greets the Lu minister Ji Wenzi, who just returned from Song, where he conveyed a message to Gong Ji (see below), Mu Jiang’s daughter and Lord Cheng’s sister.

Cheng 9.5 (582 BCE)  In summer, Ji Wenzi went to Song to convey a message to the bride. He reported the completion of his mission, and our lord offered him ceremonial toasts. He chanted the fifth stanza of “The Lofty Han.”14 Mu Jiang came out of her chamber to the inner court, bowed twice, and said, “You, sir, deigned to be assiduous. You do not forget the former lord, and your regard reaches to his heir and even extends

13 Lady Mu of Xu, daughter of Lord Yi of Wei (see chapter 8, Min 2.5), is said to have composed “Gallop” to lament Wei’s plight and expresses her wish to seek succor from Qi. However, Mu Jiang remains the only woman in Zuozhuan who publicly recites an ode. 14 The fifth stanza of this piece from the Odes describes how Han Ji, daughter of Quefu, finds honor and happiness in her marriage with the Prince of Han. Ji Wenzi thereby indicates that Gong Ji is flourishing in Song.

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to his soon-to-perish widow. The former ruler indeed expected this from you. I presume to bow in gratitude for your repeated, assiduous service.” She also chanted the final stanza of “Green Coat” before entering her chamber.15 Mu Jiang’s husband, Lord Xuan, died young, and Mu Jiang might have gained sway in Lu politics because her son, Lord Cheng, was so young when he became ruler (he married only in the fourteenth year of his reign). In the following excerpt, Mu Jiang sides with her lover Shusun Qiaoru and threat­ ens to depose her son when he is about to join Jin forces in a battle with Chu at Yanling (chapter 5). Her plot fails.

Cheng 16.5 (575 BCE)  On the day of battle, Guo Zuo and Gao Wujiu of Qi reached the Jin troops, the Prince of Wei set out from the Wei capital, and our lord set out from Huaitui. Shusun Qiaoru, who had been having a liaison with Mu Jiang, wished to do away with the Ji and Meng lineages and to appropriate their property.16 When our lord was about to leave, Mu Jiang saw him off and urged that he drive out the heads of the Ji and Meng lineages. Our lord told her about troubles in Jin, saying, “I beg to abide by your command upon my return.” Mu Jiang was furious. At that moment, Gongzi Yan and Gongzi Chu hastened past with small steps, and she pointed to them, saying, “If you refuse, either of these could be ruler.” Our lord waited at Huaitui and left only after having extended the palace’s defenses, prepared the fortifications, and appointed sentries. That was why he was late in joining the Jin forces. He had Meng Xianzi keep watch at the lord’s palace. When Mu Jiang dies in 564 BCE, the narrative harks back to the moment of her banishment to the Eastern Palace in the aftermath of the failed conspiracy against the Ji and Meng lineages eleven years earlier. In a speech of eloquent self-indictment, Mu Jiang maintains that the interpretation of divination results has to take human factors into account. 15 The final stanza of “Green Coat” ends with these two lines: “I long for the ancients. / Indeed, they had what my heart seeks.” Mu Jiang is comparing Ji Wenzi to the virtuous ancients. 16 The Shusun, Ji, and Meng lineages were all descendants of Lord Huan of Lu (see chapter 2).

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Xia ng 9.3 (564 BCE)  Mu Jiang expired in the Eastern Palace. When she first went there, she divined by milfoil and encountered the “eight” of “Restraint” ䷳.17 The scribe said, “This is called ‘Restraint’ going to ‘Following’” ䷐. ‘Following’ is about leaving. You are sure to leave soon!” Mu Jiang said, “Not so! About this, the Zhou Changes says, ‘Following: prime, offering, benefit, constancy, no blame.’ Prime is the most important part of the body; offerings are made when blessings gather; benefit is the harmony of dutifulness; constancy is the mainstay of endeavors. Embodying humaneness suffices to improve a person, bringing blessings to virtue suffices to meld ritual propriety, benefiting others suffices to harmonize dutifulness, and never wavering in one’s constancy suffices to build the mainstay of endeavors. Since this is so, there cannot be any deception.18 That is how even with ‘Following,’ there is ‘no blame.’ Now I, as a woman, was yet party to fomenting disorder; and undeniably in a lowly position, I was yet inhumane; this cannot be called ‘prime.’ I did not bring peace and stability to the domain and patrimony; there cannot be ‘offerings.’ My action harmed my person; this cannot be called ‘benefit.’ I abandoned my position to indulge in licentiousness; this cannot be called ‘constancy.’ With these four virtues, ‘Following’ is yet ‘no blame.’ But since I have none of them, how can this be deemed ‘Following’? Since I have taken up evil, how can there be ‘no blame’? I am sure to die here. I will not be able to leave!”

R it ua l Pr e scr iptions for Wom en Qi Liang dies in a Qi military campaign against Ju. Qi Liang’s widow, who meets Lord Zhuang of Qi (r. 554–548 BCE) upon his return, demonstrates her ritual propriety, rhetorical prowess, and readiness to challenge a ruler. In other accounts, her wailing brings down a city wall, and this trope eventually 17 “Restraint” and “Following” are two hexagrams (nos. 52 and 17, respectively) included, along with their associated commentaries, in the ancient divination manual Yijing, also known as the Zhou Changes or The Book of Changes. Without going into the technicalities of divination, the procedures direct attention in this case to the language associated with the second line of the hexagram “Following,” which Mu Jiang quotes below. 18 Precisely because the words explained above—prime, offering, benefit, constancy, no blame—have such meanings, failure to fulfill those meanings amounts to deception or distorted application of the hexagram.

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merges with the later legend of Meng Jiangnü, whose lamentation brings down the Great Wall.

Xia ng 23.7 (550 BCE)  As the Prince of Qi returned, he encountered Qi Liang’s wife in the outskirts of the capital. He sent a messenger to offer his condolences. She declined: “If Qi Liang had committed offenses, why condescend to give this command? If he had managed to avoid committing offenses, then the humble abode of our ancestor still exists, and this lowly concubine cannot accept condolences in the outskirts of the capital.” The Prince of Qi offered condolences at her abode. Gong Ji, the wife of Duke Gong of Song (r. 588–576 BCE) and the daughter of Mu Jiang and Lord Xuan of Lu, dies in a fire in Song because she refuses to leave the palace unaccompanied. While other early texts praise her exemplary modesty and decorum, Zuozhuan implies criticism of such rigid adherence to ritual propriety. Gong Ji married Duke Gong in 582 BCE. She was widowed six years later and must have been around sixty at the time of this fire.

Xia ng 30.7 (543 BCE)  Someone cried at the Song Ancestral ­Temple, making the sounds “Xi-xi! Out! Out!” Birds sang at the altar of earth at Bo, as if saying, “Xi-xi!” On the jiawu day, the fifth day of the fifth month, there was a catastrophic fire in Song. Gong Ji died because she had been waiting for her chaperone. The noble man said of Gong Ji that she acted like a young girl, not like a married woman. A young girl should wait for others, but a married woman should attend to her duties judiciously.

Chapter 4

The Overlord: Chong’er, Lord Wen of Jin

M uch of Chong’er’s (r . 636 – 628 BCE) e a r ly li fe wa s sh a pe d by the tangled succession in the domain of Jin that was brought on by his father’s complicated marital life and infatuation with the Rong woman Li Ji. These events led to the tragic suicide of Chong’er’s half brother Shen­ sheng and to Chong’er’s exile (see chapter 2, Zhuang 28.2, Min 1.6, Min 2.7, Xi 4.6, and Xi 10.3). The story of Chong’er’s wanderings, eventual return to his home­l and, and ascension to the role of overlord is among the most compelling and important stories in Zuozhuan. It also marks the rise to prominence of the notion of overlord, a leader who can bring stability to a political world that was falling into increasingly violent conflict. As the chief military power among the various domain lords, the overlord would act with the Zhou king’s blessing to forge alliances of peace and, if necessary, enforce order. That Chong’er became a highly successful political leader is beyond dispute, but can he in any meaningful sense be placed among traditional literary heroes? Surely if we are to label him a hero at all, he is at times only a reluctant one. On one occasion, for example, he would be satisfied to languish in exile in the domain of Qi, when his Qi wife warns him, “Affection and contentment are the very things that destroy reputations,” after which she conspires with his loyal follower Hu Yan to push her husband out the door and forward to his destiny. On the eve of his greatest military victory, at the battle of Chengpu, where he faces the emergent military power of the domain of Chu, Chong’er has a dream that appears to bode ill. He becomes fearful and is only reassured when Hu Yan proposes a rather imaginative interpretation that seems to point toward Jin victory. Chong’er may have faults, but he possesses a virtue that overrides his deficiencies: he surrounds himself with capable people and heeds their advice. Despite the eunuch Pi’s earlier attempt to kill 63

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him (albeit reluctantly), Chong’er later heeds the eunuch’s warning and escapes possible death. Chong’er’s story is also filled with female characters who repeatedly play critical roles in his life and the lives of his supporters. Even as he ascends to power, he remains open to counsel, and that quality in the end redeems him. His rival, King Cheng of Chu, praises him: “The noble son of Jin is ambitious but temperate, cultured and possessed of ritual propriety.” But perhaps what is most noteworthy is how Chong’er and his followers manipulate the perception and interpretation of these virtues to achieve political goals. It is tempting to read the story of Chong’er as a comedy, in which a worthy but sometimes bumbling character moves toward a happy destiny, but this is not how he has usually been regarded. As the text of Zuozhuan thickens with the passage of time, Chong’er is the first character to gain extensive coverage and, perhaps on that account alone, has captured the attention and imagination of readers over the centuries.

Th e Flight a n d Wa n der ings of Chong’er When Lord Xian’s favorite, Li Ji, drives Shensheng to suicide, the noble son Chong’er and his half brother Yiwu flee to the Jin borderland settlements of Pu and Qu, where half-hearted provision for their residence had been made in earlier years. Under attack by his father, Chong’er shows the same filial deference as his half brother Shensheng (see chapter 2, Xi 4.6) but has a much stronger instinct for self-preservation.

Xi 5.2 (655 BCE)  Earlier, Lord Xian had sent Shi Wei to construct walls at Pu and Qu for the two noble sons Chong’er and Yiwu. He did not take care in his task but had brushwood mixed into the earthen walls. Yiwu complained about this, and the lord sent someone to upbraid Shi Wei. Shi Wei bowed with his forehead touching the ground and replied, “I, your subject, have heard that if one grieves when there is no loss, sorrow must come in response. And if one fortifies a city when there is no military threat, an enemy must take refuge there. If it is to be a refuge for an enemy raider, why should I take care with this? To disregard an order when holding office is disrespectful. To strengthen the refuge of an enemy is disloyal. If I neglect loyalty and respect, how can I serve my lord? . . . If you should cultivate virtue and strengthen the sons of your

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lineage, what city walls could match them? Within three years, you will use an army here. Why should I exercise care?”1 When trouble did come, the lord sent the eunuch Pi to attack Pu. Chong’er said, “The command of my lord and father is not to be resisted.” Then he circulated a command: “Whoever resists is my enemy.” As he was climbing over a wall to run away, Pi cut off Chong’er’s sleeve. Chong’er then left the domain and fled to the Di. The story of Chong’er picks up years later by again describing his flight from Pu and then turning to his extensive peregrinations through different domains, during which several loyal followers accompany him. Meanwhile, Chong’er’s father, Lord Xian, has died, and his half brother Yiwu, known posthumously as Lord Hui, rules in Jin.

Xi 23.6 (637 BCE)  When Chong’er, the noble son of Jin, had been beset by difficulties, Jin forces attacked him at the Pu fortress. The men of the Pu fortress wanted to fight, but Chong’er refused and said, “Keeping to the command of my ruler and father, I have enjoyed a living allowance from him and have by this means gained followers. There would be no greater crime, now that I have followers, than to resist my father. I should flee!” So he fled to the Di. Those who accompanied him were Hu Yan, Zhao Cui, Dian Xie, Wei Chou, and the supervisor of works Xu Chen. The men of Di attacked the Qianggaoru tribe, capturing two daughters of the ruling family, Shu Wei and Ji Wei, whom they presented to the noble son Chong’er.2 The noble son married Ji Wei, and she bore Bochou and Shuliu. He gave Shu Wei as wife to Zhao Cui, and she bore Dun. When Chong’er was about to go to Qi, he said to Ji Wei, “Wait twenty-five years for me, and remarry only if I have not come back by then.” She responded, “I am twenty-five years old. If as many years as 1

Shi Wei is the architect of centralizing power in Jin (ZT Zhuang 23.2). Here he is less concerned with the injustice of removing Chong’er and Yiwu to border cities and keeping the sons of Li Ji and her sister in the capital Jiang than with the potential danger of creating rival centers of power. 2 The dominant culture of the central Spring and Autumn domains regarded the Di and the Qianggaoru as “barbarians” (see chapter 15), but there is no implication here that Chong’er’s long sojourn among these people and his marriage to a Qinggaoru woman in any way counts against him. Recall that Chong’er’s mother is a Rong woman.

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that pass again and I only then remarry, death would not be far off. Let me wait for you.” Chong’er had resided among the Di for twelve years by the time he set out. In Wei, Chong’er’s wise adviser Hu Yan turns what might have been an insult into an omen of future territorial gain (see Xi 28.1), and in Qi, his new wife Lady Jiang pushes Chong’er toward his destiny. In both cases, those who serve Chong’er seem to have a clearer sense of his future greatness than he does himself. When he passed through Wei, Lord Wen of Wei did not treat him with ritual propriety. As he was departing from Wei at Wulu, he begged for food from a peasant, but the peasant gave him a clod of earth. The noble son Chong’er was angry and wanted to whip him, but Hu Yan said, “This is granted from Heaven.” Bowing with his forehead touching the ground, the noble son accepted the clod and loaded it on his wagon. 3 When he arrived in Qi, Lord Huan of Qi gave him a daughter, Lady Jiang, as wife, and he came to own twenty four-horse teams. The noble son Chong’er was content there, and his followers considered this unacceptable. They were preparing to set out and made plans to this effect beneath a mulberry tree. A maidservant who took care of silkworms was up in the tree and reported what she had heard to Lady Jiang. Lady Jiang killed her and then said to the noble son, “You have ambitions that reach to the four quarters of the realm. As for the one who overheard this, I have put her to death.” The noble son said, “I do not have such ambitions.” Jiang said, “Go! Affection and contentment are the very things that destroy reputations!” The noble son was unwilling to go. Lady Jiang and Hu Yan conspired together, got him drunk, and sent him off. When the noble son sobered up, he chased after Hu Yan, ­brandishing a dagger-ax. Another wise woman, the wife of the Cao minister Xi Fuji, recognizes the greatness of Chong’er and his followers and urges her husband to forge ties with Chong’er even as the Cao ruler humiliates Ch’ong’er. The term we translate as “spectacular muscles” literally means “ fused ribs.” The implica­ tion is that with well-developed muscles, individual ribs are no longer visible.

3

This portends Chong’er’s future occupation of Wulu (Xi 28.1).

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Chong’er arrived in Cao. Lord Gong of Cao had heard that Chong’er had spectacular muscles and wanted to see him naked. While the noble son was bathing, he watched him from behind a curtain. The wife of the Cao minister Xi Fuji said, “I have observed that the followers of the noble son of Jin are all worthy to act as counselors to the domain. If he uses them as counselors, that fine man is certain to return to his domain. And when he returns, he is certain to achieve his ambitions among the princes. After he has fulfilled his ambitions among the princes, he will punish those who have violated ritual propriety, and Cao will be at the top of this list! Why don’t you show your difference from our ruler early on?” So Xi Fuji presented the noble son with a plate of cooked cereal and placed a circular jade disk on the plate. The noble son accepted the cooked cereal but returned the jade disk. When he arrived in Song, Lord Xiang of Song gave him as a gift twenty four-horse teams. When he arrived in Zheng, Lord Wen of Zheng also did not treat him in accordance with ritual propriety. Shuzhan remonstrated, “I have heard that others cannot match up to the man for whom Heaven has opened a way. The noble son of Jin has three qualifications in this regard. I expect that Heaven is going to establish him, and you, my lord, should treat him with ritual propriety. When a man and a woman share the same clan name, their offspring will not flourish.4 The noble son of Jin descends on both sides from the Ji clan, but he has endured down to the present day. This is the first qualification. He has borne troubles while he lived abroad, but Heaven has not calmed the domain of Jin. So probably it is going to open a way for him. This is the second qualification. He has three officers, worthy to preside over others, who follow him. This is the third qualification. Jin and Zheng are of the same rank. You ought to treat with ritual propriety any scion of Jin who is passing through our domain. How much more so one for whom Heaven is opening a way!” The ruler did not heed his advice. The strongest praise of Chong’er comes from a future adversary, King Cheng of Chu. The Chu king wants to know how Chong’er will repay his support

4 In early China, there was normally a strong taboo against marrying someone of the same clan name (chapter 7, Xiang 25.2; chapter 13, note 6). Chong’er’s mother was a woman of an ethnic group known as the Li Rong, but here it is revealed that the rulers of this group had the same clan name as the rulers of Jin.

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and can only extract a reply that mixes decorum with ambition and hidden aggression. The noble son Chong’er arrived in Chu. As the Master of Chu was offering him ceremonial toasts, he said, “If you, the noble son, were to return to the domain of Jin, how would you repay me, the deficient one?” He replied, “As for young men, young women, jade, and silk, you, my lord, have them; as for feathers, fur, ivory, and hide, your land produces them. That which flows into the domain of Jin is but your surplus. So how could I repay you?” “Even so, how would you repay me?” He replied, “If by your numinous power I manage to return to Jin, then when Jin and Chu drill the soldiers and engage one another on the central plain, we shall retreat from you for a distance of three days’ march. If we do not obtain your command to desist, then, seizing whip and bow in the left hand, and taking up quiver and bow case in the right, I shall perform maneuvers with you, my lord.”5 Cheng Dechen requested that they put Chong’er to death, but the Master of Chu said, “Chong’er, the noble son of Jin, is ambitious but temperate, cultured and possessed of ritual propriety. His followers are disciplined but forgiving, loyal and capable of exertion. The Prince of Jin, Lord Hui, is without close associates and is hated both within his domain and without. I heard that among the Ji clan the posterity of Tang Shu will be the last to decline.6 I suspect this will be due to the noble son of Jin! If Heaven is going to make him flourish, who can cast him aside? Those who go against Heaven are certain to have great culpability.” So they escorted him on his way to Qin. In Qin, Chong’er appears alternately disrespectful and fearful of his new Qin wife Huai Ying, formerly married to his nephew Yu or Lord Huai of Jin. (Yu had been a hostage in Qin, and when he returned to Jin to succeed his father, Lord Hui, in 637 BCE, Huai Ying remained in her native Qin.) We have here the first Zuozhuan example of fushi, the practice of exchanging recitations of appropriate odes or lines from them. Fushi was a critical part of early political

5

This is a euphemistic way of saying that Jin would then take up its weapons and do ­battle with Chu. 6 Tang Shu, younger brother of King Wu of Zhou, was the first Jin lord. This is a rare instance of a wrong prediction in Zuozhuan. The descendants of Tang Shu, who ruled in Jin, were deposed before their counterparts in other domains of the Ji clan, such as Lu, Wei, and Zhou.

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and diplomatic rhetoric and a way to display learning and status. In this case, the exchange is also a hidden contest in the bid for hegemony. The first of these odes, “The Yellow River,” does not appear in the current canon, although it is mentioned in a recently excavated bamboo-strip manu­ script in the Shanghai Museum, while the second, “The Sixth Month,” is included in today’s Odes. “The Sixth Month” praises the successful northern expeditions of a Zhou leader against the Xianyun barbarians. When the Qin ruler recites this ode, he is apparently invoking a vision of the princes ral­ lying to defend Zhou against the Di invasion. Zhao Cui seizes the opportu­ nity to redefine the meaning of “The Sixth Month” as the Qin ruler’s “gift” to Chong’er—his recognition of Chong’er as the leader who can “assist the Son of Heaven.” Zhao Cui thus turns the Qin ruler’s exhortation for common endeavor (or even self-praise) into an omen of Chong’er’s greatness. The Liege of Qin presented Chong’er with five of his daughters, and Huai Ying was among them. She held a basin for him to wash his hands. When he had finished, he shook off water on her. She was angry and said, “Qin and Jin are equals. How can you demean me?” The noble son was afraid. He donned plain white garments and acted like a prisoner in self-abnegation. On another day, the Lord of Qin offered him ceremonial toasts. Hu Yan said, “I am not as cultured as Zhao Cui. Please have Zhao Cui accompany you.” During the ceremonial toasts, the noble son recited “The Yellow River.” The lord recited “The Sixth Month.” Zhao Cui said, “Chong’er bows in gratitude for the bestowed gift.” The noble son descended and respectfully bowed, with his forehead touching the ground. The lord descended one step and declined the honor. Zhao Cui said, “You, my lord, have issued orders to Chong’er, claiming that he is one with the means to assist the Son of Heaven. Would Chong’er presume not to bow?”

Chong’er R et u r ns to His Hom el a n d of Jin After his extensive wanderings, Chong’er launches a campaign against his nephew Lord Huai and returns to Jin as its ruler. The beginning of the pas­ sage below with its specific Annals-like date marks a break with the Chong’er passages above (Xi 23.6), which are not dated at all and might have derived originally from oral sources. Like numerous other dated items in Zuozhuan,

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there is a brief exegetical comment explaining why the event is not recorded in the Annals—that is, it was not brought to the attention of Lu. Another example appears at the end of this passage.

Xi 24.1 (636 BCE)  In the twenty-fourth year, in spring, in the royal first month, the Liege of Qin installed Chong’er in power in Jin. It was not recorded because we were not notified about his entry. When they arrived at the Yellow River, Hu Yan handed a jade disk to the noble son Chong’er and said, “While I accompanied you, my lord, carrying bridle and reins during your travels about the realm, my offenses have been numerous indeed! If even I, your servant, know this, how much more must you! I request to depart for good from this place.” The noble son said, “If there is an occasion when I am not of one mind with you, my uncle, may these bright waters bear witness against me!” 7 And he threw the disk into the Yellow River. They crossed the Yellow River and laid siege to Linghu, entering Sangquan and seizing Jiushuai. In the second month, on the jiawu day, Jin troops were stationed at Luliu. The Liege of Qin sent Gongzi Zhi to go to the Jin troops. The troops pulled back and were stationed at Xun. On the xinchou day, seven days later, Hu Yan swore a covenant with the high officers of Qin and Jin at Xun. On the next day, the renyin day, the noble son came into the midst of the Jin troops. Four days later, on the bingwu day, they entered Quwo. On the next day, the dingwei day, the noble son paid homage at the Wu Temple. On the following day, the wushen day, he sent men to kill Lord Huai at Gaoliang. This is not recorded because we were also not notified. Former supporters of Chong’er’s half brother Lord Hui and of his son Lord Huai plan a rebellion, but Chong’er is saved through the intercession of the eunuch Pi, who had earlier made an attempt on his life. This and several ­subsequent passages raise the question of how Chong’er should treat those who had either opposed or supported him during his years of exile. The parties of Lü Sheng and Xi Rui, fearing reprisal, were going to set fire to the lord’s palace and assassinate Chong’er, the newly installed 7

This oath is presumably calling upon the god of the Yellow River, to which “bright waters” refers, as a witness.

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Prince of Jin. The eunuch Pi requested an audience, but the lord sent some­ one to rebuke him and also to decline his request by saying, “During the campaign at the Pu fortress, our ruler commanded you to spend one night on the road, but you came immediately. After that, when I accompanied the ruler of the Di to hunt along the bank of the Wei River, you were sent by Lord Hui to come and kill me. He ordered you to spend no more than three nights on the road, but you arrived on the second. Even if you did have a command from the ruler, why did you make such haste? And that sleeve is still here. You should go!” He responded, “I had thought that when you entered the domain, you would understand things! But if you still do not, you will once again be beset by difficulties. For the ruler’s command to allow no duplicity has been the rule since ancient times. When eradicating those one’s ruler hates, one considers only how best to fully exert one’s strength. What were the men of Pu and the men of the Di to me? Now that you have acceded to your position, could you not have your own Pu and Di?8 Lord Huan of Qi put aside the fact that he had been shot with an arrow in the belt buckle and nonetheless employed Guan Zhong as minister.9 Now, if you are going to change this, why condescend to issue an order for me to depart? Those who depart from you will be numerous. How could it be only this mutilated subject?” The lord did receive the eunuch Pi, and the latter reported on the rebellion. In the third month, the Prince of Jin, Chong’er, met secretly with the Liege of Qin in Wangcheng. On jichou day, the last day of the month, the lord’s palace was set on fire. Lü Sheng and Xi Rui did not ­capture the lord, so they then went to the bank of the Yellow River, where the Liege of Qin lured them into a trap and put them to death. The Prince of Jin went to welcome his wife, Huai Ying, and took her back with him. The Liege of Qin dispatched three thousand guards to Jin. These were men who could impose discipline and order. Earlier, Touxu, a page of Chong’er’s before he became prince, had served as guardian of the storehouse. While the prince was outside the

8

Chong’er is being told that he should consider situations wherein his subjects might spare his enemies, which is what he seems to feel the eunuch Pi should have done at the Pu fortress. 9 Before becoming ruler, Lord Huan of Qi was known as Gongzi Xiaobo. Guan Zhong, serving Xiaobo’s brother and rival, Gongzi Jiu, tried to kill Xiaobo but his arrow hit the latter’s belt buckle.

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domain, he had stolen from the storehouse and had run away. He had spent all the stolen resources in seeking to secure the prince’s return to Jin. When Chong’er entered the domain, Touxu sought an audience. The lord declined this on the pretext that he was washing his hair. Touxu said to a servant, “When one washes one’s hair, the heart is upside down. If the heart is upside down, one’s thoughts will be topsy-turvy. It is fitting that I have not obtained an audience. Those who remained in the domain were guardians of the altars of the domain, while those who traveled abroad were servants who held bridle and reins. Both alternatives were proper. Why must you blame those who remained in the domain? If the ruler of a domain is going to treat a common fellow like me as an enemy, those filled with dread will be many!” The servant reported this, and the lord made haste to grant Touxu an audience. The Di leaders sent Ji Wei to Jin but asked to keep her two sons. Lord Wen had given his daughter to Zhao Cui as wife, and she, Zhao Ji, had given birth to Zhao Tong, Zhao Kuo, and Zhao Yingqi. Zhao Ji requested permission that Zhao Dun and his mother, Shu Wei, be welcomed into the domain, but Zhao Cui declined her request. Zhao Ji said, “If you gain a new favorite but forget old ties, how will you command others? They must be welcomed.” She was so firm in her request that he allowed it. After they had come, Zhao Ji considered Zhao Dun talented. She firmly requested of Lord Wen of Jin that Zhao Dun be made legitimate heir and that her own three sons be made subordinate to him, and that Shu Wei be made Zhao Cui’s principal wife and that she herself be made subordinate to Shu Wei.10 The Prince of Jin rewarded those who had followed him in flight. Jie Zhitui did not speak of remuneration, and indeed no remuneration came to him. Jie Zhitui said, “The sons of Lord Xian were nine in number, and only our ruler is still alive. Lords Hui and Huai had no close associates, and they were rejected both inside and outside the domain. Heaven has not yet cut off the Jin house; it will certainly have a sovereign. And if the one who is to preside over Jin’s sacrifices is not our ruler, then who would it be? It is Heaven that has put him in place, but those fellows take it as the result of their own efforts. Are they not deceitful? Even one who steals the property of others is called a thief; how much more so one who covets 10 For Zhao Cui’s marriage with the Di woman Shu Wei, see Xi 23.6 above. Zhao Dun will become a powerful minister in Jin and will be blamed for the assassination of Lord Ling of Jin (chapter 7, Xuan 2.3).

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Heaven’s accomplishments and takes them as the result of his own efforts! When inferiors justify their offenses and superiors reward their presumption, then superiors and inferiors are misleading each other, and it is difficult to dwell together with them.” His mother said, “Why not also seek remuneration? If you die like this, whom should we blame?” He responded, “If I find fault in others but then imitate them, my offense would be more extreme than theirs. Moreover, having spoken resentful words, I cannot eat our lord’s food.” His mother said, “If you were at least to make our lord aware of this—how would that be?” He responded, “Words constitute an adornment of the person. If the person is going into hiding, what is the use of adorning it? That would be to seek fame.” His mother said, “Can you act in such a way? Then I will go into hiding along with you.” They hid themselves away and died. The Prince of Jin, Chong’er, sought after them, but he could not find them. He made Mianshang into a place where sacrifices could be offered to them in perpetuity and said, “With this I mark my error and honor a good man.”

Chong’er R e stor e s K ing X i a ng of Zhou to Pow er For several years, Wangzi Dai fomented a rebellion against his older brother King Xiang (r. 652–619), the Zhou ruler, and even drove the ruler from his seat of power. Chong’er, the newly installed Prince of Jin, declines Qin’s help and then leads Jin troops to suppress Wangzi Dai’s rebellion and to restore King Xiang. Chong’er then follows Hu Yan’s advice to lay a strong foundation to become the overlord of the princes. Xi 25.2 (635 BCE)  The Liege of Qin stationed his troops on the bank of the Yellow River and was going to install the king and restore his position. Hu Yan said to the Prince of Jin, “For seeking the support of the princes no action is better than working on behalf of the Zhou king. The princes will consider this good faith, and it also will be an act of great dutifulness. No time would be more appropriate than the present moment for continuing Wen’s achievement and proclaiming your good faith among the princes.”11

11 “Wen” here refers to an earlier Lord Wen of Jin who had helped stabilize the Zhou royal house when King Ping of Zhou moved the capital eastward ca. 770 BCE.

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The Prince of Jin had Diviner Yan divine about this by turtle shell. The diviner said, “Auspicious. I encountered the crack signifying the Yellow Emperor engaged in battle at Banquan.” The lord said, “I am not worthy of the comparison.” The diviner replied, “There’s been no change in the rites of Zhou. It is the Zhou king of our present day who corresponds to the emperor of ancient times.”12 The lord said, “Divine about it by milfoil.” On divining about it by milfoil, Diviner Yan obtained the line whereby the hexagram “Great Holdings” ䷍ becomes the hexagram “Contrariety” ䷥ and said,13 “Auspicious. I obtained the line ‘The lord enjoys the ceremonial toasts offered by the Son of Heaven.’ What can be more auspicious than being victorious in battle and being offered ­ceremonial toasts by the king? Moreover, in the case of this hexagram, heaven changes to marsh and thereby faces the sun. Is it not acceptable that the Son of Heaven should humble his heart and receive my lord? That ‘Great Holdings,’ ­having departed and gone over to ‘Contrariety,’ should then return—this is indeed as it should be.”14 The Prince of Jin declined the support of the Qin troops and went down the river. In the third month, on the jiachen day (19), they set up camp at Yangfan. The troops of the right laid siege to Wen, where the Zhou king was in exile, and the troops of the left received the king. In summer, in the fourth month, on the dingsi day (3), the king entered Wangcheng. They seized Wangzi Dai at Wen and put him to death at Xicheng. On the wuwu day (4), the Prince of Jin visited the court of the restored king. The king offered ceremonial toasts, presented sweet wine, and ordered him to offer toasts. The prince requested the royal privilege of a tomb tunnel. The king did not grant permission for this and said, “This is the distinctive mark of a king. To have two kings when there is as yet no virtue that takes Zhou’s place—that is something that you, my uncle, would detest!” The king gave him the lands of Yangfan, Wen, Yuan, and Cuanmao. It was at that time that Jin began to develop the region of Nanyang.

12 Lord Wen betrays his ambition by eagerly embracing the omen, but Diviner Yan points out its relevance only for the Zhou king. 13 “Great Holdings” and “Contrariety” are hexagrams no. 14 and no. 38, respectively, in the Zhou Changes. Diviner Yan goes on to quote the line statement for the decisive third line of “Great Holdings.” 14 Divination by milfoil confirms Chong’er’s ambition and the ritual justification of the enterprise.

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Yangfan did not submit, and Jin laid siege to it. Cangge cried out, “With virtue one placates the central domains; with punishments one intimidates the other peoples on the four margins. Fitting it is that we dare not submit. In this place, who is not related to the king by blood or by marriage? Will you then make prisoners of us?” Jin thus let the people of Yangfan go. Xi 25.4 (635 BCE)  In the winter, the Prince of Jin laid siege to Yuan, ordering the troops to carry three days’ provision of grain. Yuan did not surrender, and he commanded that they depart. A spy came out of the city and said, “Yuan is about to surrender.” The military officers said, “Let’s wait for this.” The Prince of Jin said, “Good faith is the treasure of the domain; it is the refuge of the people. If we gain Yuan but lose good faith, how can we give the people refuge? What is lost will be even greater.” The Jin troops retreated one day’s march and Yuan surrendered. They resettled Guan, the Liege of Yuan, in Ji. Zhao Cui became the high officer for Yuan, and Hu Zhen became the high officer for Wen. Xi 27.4 (633 BCE)  From the moment the Prince of Jin entered the domain, he instructed his people. After two years, he wanted to put them to use. Hu Yan said, “The people do not yet understand their duty, and they are not yet peacefully settled in their abodes.” So it was that he left Jin to stabilize the position of King Xiang, then came back to the domain and strove to benefit the people, and the people cherished their livelihood. He was about to put them to use as soldiers. Hu Yan said, “The people do not yet understand good faith, and they have not yet demonstrated that they can be put to use.” So it was that he attacked Yuan to show them an example of good faith. The people who traded goods did not seek undue profits from this and openly stood by their words. The lord said, “Can we act yet?” Hu Yan said, “The people do not yet know ritual propriety, and they have not developed respect.” So it was that he organized the great spring hunt to show them an example of ritual and established the keeper of ranks to put in order his officials. The people could then heed his commands and not be deluded, and it was only then that he put them to use. That they could drive the Chu army from the garrison of Gu, relieve the siege of Song, and in a single battle become overlord was due to Wen’s instructions.15 15 This is alluding to the battle at Chengpu, which will take place in the next year. “Wen” can refer both to Chong’er and to “culture and virtue.”

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With an alliance formed between Jin and Qi, the domain of Wei finds itself isolated. Jin success in Wei and occupation of Wulu fulfill the prediction in Xi 23.6 above.

Xi 28.1 (632 BCE)  In the twenty-eighth year, in spring, the Prince of Jin was going to attack Cao. He sought to pass through Wei. When the Wei leaders would not permit this, he turned back, crossing the Yellow River to the south, invaded Cao, and attacked Wei. In the first month, on the wushen day (9), they occupied Wulu.

Th e Battl e of Ch engpu The southern domain of Chu had been gaining strength and expanding slowly northward since almost the beginning of the Spring and Autumn period. Conflict with the northern power Jin was inevitable. In the series of passages below, which describe events leading up to the battle of Chengpu, one of the major battles recounted in Zuozhuan (for two other major battles, see chapter 5), the Prince of Jin’s actions are in part determined by how he was treated earlier as a sojourner in various domains. Song had treated Chong’er well and is now besieged by Chu. Xian Zhen proposes to Chong’er a particularly Machiavellian scheme to facilitate nominal territorial gains for Song. The real goal, however, is to precipitate and broaden a Jin-Chu ­conflict. He masterfully uses the rhetoric of ritual propriety to serve strategic calculations.

Xi 28.3 (632 BCE)  The Prince of Jin laid siege to Cao. They stormed the city gate and many died. The men of Cao displayed the corpses of the Jin soldiers atop the city wall, and this troubled the Prince of Jin. He followed the plans of his rank and file and announced a bivouac among the Cao graves. So the army was moved there. The men of Cao, filled with panic and fear, took the bodies of the Jin soldiers they had acquired, placed them in coffins, and sent them out of the city. Taking advantage of Cao’s state of panic, Jin set upon them. In the third month, on the bingwu day (8), they entered Cao. The Prince of Jin reproved the Cao ruler for not having relied on Xi Fuji while as many as three hundred others rode in decorated chariots. Moreover, he said, “You

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saw my exposed body!” He ordered that no one enter Xi Fuji’s residence, and he pardoned his entire house. This was to reward Xi Fuji’s generosity. Wei Chou and Dian Xie, the lord’s chariot men, were angry and said, “He does not think of those who toiled for him. What reward is there to speak of?” They set fire to the residence of Xi Fuji’s lineage. Wei Chou was wounded in the chest. The Prince of Jin wanted to kill him but cherished his talent. So he sent someone to ask about his condi­​tion and moreover to examine him. If he was seriously wounded, the Prince of Jin was going to put him to death. Wei Chou bound up his chest, received the mes­senger, and said, “Relying on my lord’s numinous power, how could I not have good health?” Then he jumped forward and back three hundred times and from side to side three hundred times.16 So they spared him but killed Dian Xie as an example to the army, and they established Zhou Zhiqiao as the spearman on the right in the Prince of Jin’s war chariot. The Song leaders sent Ban, the commandant of the city gate, to the Jin troops to report the crisis of being besieged by Chu. The Prince of Jin said, “If the Song leaders report a crisis and we abandon them, then they will break off relations with us. But if we declare to Chu that they should lift the siege, they will not agree. And if we want to join the battle against Chu, Qi and Qin would object. So what should we do about it?” Xian Zhen said, “Have Song appear to give up on us and, by giving gifts to Qi and Qin, have them intercede in making the declaration to Chu. We will arrest the Cao ruler and divide off a portion of the land of Cao and Wei to present as a gift to the Song leaders. Chu is close to Cao and Wei and will certainly not allow this.17 Pleased with the gifts and angered by Chu’s stubbornness, can Qi and Qin fail to join the ­battle?” The Prince of Jin was pleased. He arrested the Liege of Cao, divided off a portion of the land of Cao and Wei, and gave it to the Song leaders. The Master of Chu entered and dwelled in Shen. He had Shen Shu depart from Gu, and he had Cheng Dechen depart from Song, saying, 16 Bai 百 (hundred) may be a loan word for mo 陌 (to stretch across), in which case we may translate the lines as follows: “Then he made three giant leaps forward and back and three giant leaps from side to side.” 17 Chu will not want to see its allies in Cao and Wei deprived of this land. Thus, Chu will appear stubborn to Qi and Qin, who will be pressing them to withdraw from Song.

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“Do not pursue the Jin troops. The Prince of Jin was abroad for nineteen years and finally obtained the domain of Jin. He has experienced hardships and troubles of every kind; he knows the people’s true state and false claims to the last detail. Heaven has granted him a long life and has removed those who would harm him. How can those whom Heaven has set up be cast aside? In the military records it says, ‘When you reach the appropriate point, stop.’ And again they say, ‘When you know that the difficulties are insurmountable, withdraw.’ And still again they say, ‘Those of virtue cannot be rivaled.’ These three records are referring to Jin!” . . . Cheng Dechen sent Yuan Chun to make an announcement to the Jin troops: “We request that you restore the Prince of Wei and grant Cao its domain.18 I, your subject, will then lift the siege of Song.” Hu Yan said, “Cheng Dechen is without ritual propriety! The ruler would get one thing, the minister two.19 There is no time to lose before battle.” Xian Zhen said, “You should go along with him! To bring stability to the people is called ritual propriety. With one word Chu would bring stability to three domains, while with one word we would destroy them. If we then are without ritual propriety, how could we do battle? Not to agree to Chu’s proposal would be to abandon Song; if we come to their aid and then abandon them, what can we say to the princes? Chu would have three beneficiaries; and we would have three enemies. With so many enemies, how would we do battle? It would be better to agree privately to restore Cao and Wei so as to create dissension between them and Chu, arrest Yuan Chun to anger Chu, and make further plans only after we have joined in battle with them.” The lord was pleased. He thus apprehended Yuan Chun in Wei and, moreover, secretly promised to restore Cao and Wei. Cao and Wei announced that they were breaking off with Chu. Cheng Dechen was angry and pursued the Jin troops, but the Jin troops withdrew. A military officer said, “For a ruler to avoid a minister is humiliating. Moreover, the Chu troops are already worn out. Why

18 Recall that the Wei ruler had treated Chong’er rudely during the latter’s exile (Xi 23.6). Subsequently, Jin had occupied Wulu in Wei (28.1) and the people of Wei had exiled their pro-Chu ruler in order to please Jin. 19 While Lord Wen would achieve one goal (ending the siege of Song), Cheng Dechen would get two things: the restoration of Wei and the reinstatement of Cao.

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retreat?” Hu Yan said, “When troops have justice on their side, they are at the height of their power and morale; when they are in the wrong, they are worn out. How could it be a matter of being in the field a long time? Had it not been for Chu’s kindness, we would not be here. To retreat three days’ march to avoid Chu troops is the way to repay Chu. If we turn our backs on their kindness and break our promise in order to defend their enemy Song, we will be in the wrong and Chu will have justice on its side. Their multitudes have always been well fed; it cannot be said that they are worn out. If we retreat and Chu turns back, what more can we ask for? If they do not turn back, then our ruler will have retreated while their subject will have pressed an attack, and the wrong will be on their side.” Jin retreated three days’ march. The Chu host wanted to stop, but Cheng Dechen refused. The Prince of Jin is filled with doubts and fears as he faces the Chu army. A ditty seems to reproach him for turning against old benefactors, but Hu Yan emphasizes the justice of the campaign against Chu. Hu Yan’s positive and creative interpretation of what seems to be an ominous dream also boosts the prince’s confidence. After ritual formalities, Jin and Chu join in battle, and Chu is quickly defeated. In summer, in the fourth month, on the wuchen day (1), the Prince of Jin, the Duke of Song, Guo Guifu and Cui Yao of Qi, and Yin, the young son of the ruler of Qin, set up camp at Chengpu. The Chu troops backed up into treacherous terrain and bivouacked. The Prince of Jin was worried about this. He heard his rank and file chanting, “The fallow fields are green with grass; let go the old and prepare for the new!” The lord was filled with doubts about this. Hu Yan said, “Let us fight! If we fight and are victorious, we are certain to obtain the allegiance of the princes. If we are not victorious, we have the mountains and the river as defenses inside and out for the domain, and there is sure to be no harm.” The lord said, “What about Chu’s kindness?” Luan Zhi said, “Of those domains of the Ji clan north of the Han River, Chu has extinguished every last one. You are remembering a small kindness and forgetting a great humiliation. It would be better to fight.” The Prince of Jin dreamed that he was wrestling with the Master of Chu. The Master of Chu was bending over him and was sucking out his brains, and because of this the prince was afraid. Hu Yan said,

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“Auspicious! We are able to obtain Heaven’s blessings and Chu is humbled on account of its crimes. 20 What is more, we are softening them into submission.” 21 Cheng Dechen of Chu sent Dou Bo to request that the armies join in battle, saying, “I beg to sport with your officers. You, my lord, can lean on the crossbar of your chariot and watch it. And I, Dechen, will join you in beholding it.” The Prince of Jin sent Luan Zhi to reply, “Our unworthy ruler has heard your command. He does not yet dare forget the kindness of the ruler of Chu, and that is the reason he is in this place. We thought that you, as high officer, would not have dared to face down a ruler. Since we have not received word of your retreat, we venture to trouble you, high officer, to tell those fine men, ‘Take precautions with thy chariots of war; show respect for thy ruler’s affairs; for on the morrow we shall meet.’” The chariot units of Jin were seven hundred in number; straps were fastened firmly to the horses’ breasts, backs, and bellies. The Prince of Jin ascended the ruins of Youshen so as to review his troops and said, “The young and the old have the proper ritual. They can be used.” 22 Then he cut wood from the mound to make more weapons. On the jisi day (2), the Jin troops formed ranks north of Youshen. Xu Chen, in his capacity as assistant to the commander of the lower army, faced the troops of Chen and Cai. Cheng Dechen, with the six units of the Ruo’ao troops, commanded the central army. He said, “Today, without fail, Jin ceases to exist!” Dou Yishen commanded the Chu left column and Dou Bo commanded the right. Xu Chen of Jin covered his horses with tiger skins to give the appearance of fierceness and moved forward to strike at Chen and Cai. The armies of Chen and Cai fled and the Chu troops of the right collapsed. Hu Mao of Jin set up two pennants and retreated. Luan Zhi had his chariots drag firewood to stir up dust and make it appear as if they were fleeing. The Chu troops pursued them, and Xian Zhen and Xi Zhen of Jin took the troops of the central army

20 Since the Prince of Jin was on his back, he was indeed looking up to heaven, while the Chu ruler, who was bending over him, was in the position of submitting to a punishment. 21 The precise meaning of this is obscure. One commentator notes that brains were used as a softening agent in early China. 22 As noted earlier (Xi 27.4), instruction in ritual is part of preparing people to “be used” for war.

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from the lateral branches of the ruling house and attacked the Chu army on the flank. Hu Mao and Hu Yan led the upper army and caught Dou Yishen in a pincer attack. Chu’s troops of the left collapsed and the Chu troops were completely defeated. Cheng Dechen had gathered his soldiers together and had stayed put, and that is why he was not defeated.

Th e R e wa r ds of V ictory Jin now enjoys the rewards of victory over Chu, which include a ceremonial meeting with the Zhou king, who formally makes the Prince of Jin overlord. However, shortly thereafter a passage seems to criticize his behavior for sum­ moning the Zhou king, an act cleverly concealed in the Annals.

Xi 28.3 (632 BCE)  On the dingwei day (10), Jin presented the Chu prisoners and booty to the Zhou king: one hundred chariot units with teams of four horses covered with armor and one thousand infantrymen. The Liege of Zheng acted as aide to the king and used the ritual of King Ping.23 On the jiyou day (12), the king offered ceremonial toasts and presented sweet wine, commanding the Prince of Jin to offer toasts. The king commanded the Yin lineage head, Wangshu Duke Wen, and the court scribe Shuxing to draw up a document on bamboo strips commanding the Prince of Jin to act as overlord of the princes. The king bestowed on him a grand ceremonial chariot and a war chariot with the appropriate regalia, a red bow and one hundred red arrows, ebony bows and one thousand ebony arrows, a pot of black millet wine perfumed with herbs, and three hundred ferocious “tiger runner” guards, and said, “The king tells his paternal uncle, ‘Respectfully obey the king’s command and thereby pacify the domains in all directions. Discipline and banish all who would do ill to the king.’” The Prince of Jin declined the gifts three times and then complied with the king’s command, saying, “I, Chong’er, presume to bow twice, with my forehead touching the ground, to receive and proclaim the grandly illustrious command you have bestowed on

23 During the reign of King Ping (r. 770–720 BCE), the domain of Zheng held a privileged position, so Jin is forgiving Zheng and allowing them to reenact an earlier formal ritual that will also honor the Prince of Jin.

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me.” He accepted the written command and departed. From his arrival to his departure, he had three audiences with the king. Cheng Dechen commits suicide under duress, much to the relief of the Prince of Jin, who had a good idea of just how capable his rival was.

Xi 28.4 (632 BCE)  Earlier, Cheng Dechen of Chu had fashioned for his horses agate-ornamented caps and jade-ornamented martingales, but he had not used them. Before the battle, he dreamed that the god of the Yellow River said to him, “Give them to me! And I will bestow on you Mengzhu Marsh.” But Cheng Dechen did not give them up. Cheng Daxin and Dou Yishen sent Rong Huang to remonstrate with Cheng Dechen, but he would not listen to him. Rong Huang said, “Some would brave even death if it brought benefit to the domain, to say nothing of giving up agate and jade! These things are mere dirt and dung! If you can bring success to the troops, why begrudge them?” Cheng Dechen would not listen to him. Rong Huang came out and told Dou Yishen and Cheng Daxin: “It will not be the gods who defeat the chief minister. The chief minister does not toil for the people. That man defeats himself!” After he suffered defeat, the king sent someone to say to him, “If you, the high officer, were to enter the domain, then how would you deal with the aged of Shen and Xi?”24 Dou Yishen and Cheng Daxin said, “Cheng Dechen was going to die by his own hand, but we two stopped him by saying, ‘Surely the ruler will take hold of you and execute you.’” When he reached Liangu, Cheng Dechen died.25 When the Prince of Jin heard about his death, he was clearly delighted, and he said, “Now there is none left to poison my existence! None other than Wei Lüchen will become chief minister. But he serves no one but himself and is not concerned with the people.”26

24 Chen Dechen would not have been able to face the aged of Shen and Xi, who had lost their sons in the battle of Chengpu. 25 Apparently, Cheng Dechen is not to deprive his ruler of the prerogative of ordering him to die. Although this seems to indicate that he committed suicide, the Annals says he was in fact put to death. 26 Although Cheng Dechen is presented in this story in a negative light, the Prince of Jin obviously holds him in high regard.

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In the aftermath of the victory at Chengpu, Lord Wen of Jin not only distrib­ utes rewards but metes out punishments as well. The three criminals refer to Dian Xie, Qi Man, and Zhou Zhiqiao. Discipline is thus the implied expla­ nation for Jin’s military success.

Xi 28.6 (632 BCE)  At the battle of Chengpu, the central army of Jin encountered a storm while in the marshes and lost the grand vanguard’s red pennant of the left. Qi Man disobeyed orders, and the supervisor of the military had him put to death and circulated news of this so it could serve as an example to the princes. He appointed Mao Pei to replace him. Then the troops turned toward home. On the renwu day (16), they crossed the Yellow River. Zhou Zhiqiao had gone back to the domain prematurely, and Fan Hui acted provisionally as spearman on the right. In autumn, in the seventh month, on the bingshen day, they marshaled the troops into ranks and entered the capital singing songs of victory. They presented the prisoners and handed over the severed ears in the Ancestral Temple. They drank to celebrate their arrival, and rewards were distributed on a grand scale. They called a meeting of the princes and chastised the disloyal. They put Zhou Zhiqiao to death and circulated news of this as an example throughout the domain, and the people, as a result, were completely submissive. The noble man said of Lord Wen that he knew well how to use punish­ ment. Three criminals were punished and the people became submissive. As it says in the Odes, Show kindness to the central domains, And thereby pacify the four quarters.

This refers to not neglecting rewards and punishments. Xi 28.9 (632 BCE)  At this meeting at Wen, the Prince of Jin summoned the king and presented the princes to him. Moreover, he had the king undertake the winter hunt. Confucius said, “To have a subject summon the ruler is not an instructive example. That is why it is written in the Annals, ‘The Heaven-appointed king went on the winter hunt at Heyang’: it is saying that this is not the proper place, and it is also to make a shining example of virtue.”

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The Prince of Jin’s harsh treatment of the domain of Cao brings on illness, at least according to a suborned diviner, who also appeals to the example of an earlier overlord, Lord Huan of Qi. But once again the Prince of Jin shows his ability to heed good advice, even though in this case it comes from a cor­ rupt official.

Xi 28.12 (632 BCE)  The Prince of Jin fell ill. Hou Nou, a young ­servant of the Liege of Cao, plied the milfoil diviner with goods and had him say that Cao was the explanation for the Prince of Jin’s illness: “When Lord Huan of Qi called a meeting of the princes, he granted domains to those of a different clan name. Now when you, my lord, called a meeting, you destroyed a domain whose rulers have the same clan name as your own. Zhenduo, a royal younger brother and founder of Cao, was a son of King Wen, and your former ruler Tang Shu was a son of King Wu.27 Moreover, you assembled the princes and extinguished a fraternal domain; this was not in accordance with ritual propriety. Cao shared the same orders as Wei, 28 but Cao did not share in the same fate of being restored; this runs contrary to the principles of good faith. The same crime had different penalties; this runs contrary to proper punishments. With ritual propriety we carry out duty, with good faith we preserve ritual propriety, and with proper punishment we correct depravity. Having let these three things go, what will you, my lord, do?” The Prince of Jin was pleased. He restored the Liege of Cao to power and then met with the princes at Xu.

Th e De ath of Chong’er The nine-year rule and brief overlordship of Lord Wen of Jin, the onetime exile Chong’er, come to an end, but he continues to give military advice even from his coffin.

Xi 32.3 (628 BCE)  In winter, Lord Wen of Jin died. On the gengchen day (10), they were about to convey his coffin to Quwo to await burial. 27 These are the first rulers of Cao and Jin respectively. According to tradition, the first Cao ruler was the uncle of the first Jin ruler. 28 Remember that Jin had earlier promised to restore sovereignty to both Cao and Wei.

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As they were leaving Jiang, they heard a sound like that of an ox coming from within the coffin. Diviner Yan had the high officers bow down before the coffin, and he said, “Our lord commands a great affair; there will be troops from the west that will cross our domain, and if we strike at them, we are certain to gain a great victory over them!”29

29 The troops are those of Qin who will cross Jin to attack Zheng in the next year. Jin does strike just as the corpse of Chong’er supposedly advised and defeats Qin.

Chapter 5

Warfare

T h e b at t l e of C h e ng p u n a r r at e d i n t h e p r e c e di ng s e c tion is one of the famous major battles described in Zuozhuan and initiates a period of major strife between increasingly powerful and expansionary domains. The pattern of conflict within Zuozhuan, however, is by no means limited to these major battles. The Qing scholar Gu Donggao lists 279 battles as he charts major interstate rivalries in the period covered by the Annals.1 There are some five hundred instances of military conflicts in Zuozhuan, whose narration takes up about 40 percent of the text. Accounts of battles can be as terse as one line or as extended as a multi-­episode saga. The short ones may simply record the fact of battle or add the explanation in a few words—for example, a domain can be attacked “in retaliation” for a prior campaign or because it “violated ritual propriety” or “turned against the covenant.” Longer narratives typically include speeches justifying or analyzing the causes and consequences of the conflict. Extended narratives offer precise temporal progression and shifting viewpoints pertaining to the warring parties, noting the movement of troops, vignettes on the battlefield, and presenting elaborate rhetoric in passages of remonstrance or negotiation. The vocabulary of warfare is rich and precise and can imply evaluation of the justice or appropriateness of military action. Warfare is upheld, along with sacrifices, as one of the two “great affairs of the domain” (ZT Cheng 13.2). While sacrifices are clearly ritualistic, warfare is sometimes no less so. There is ritual protocol for seasonal hunts as military exercise, drinking to celebrate the return of troops, the offering of spoils of war, reporting the results of war at the ancestral temple, and so on. Whether 1

Gu Donggao, Chunqiu dashi biao, 3 vols., ed. Wu Shuping and Li Jiemin (Beijing: Zhong­ hua, 1993), 3:2041–2143. 86

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the battlefield calls for different rituals and etiquettes is the concern of several Zuozhuan stories. Some battle anecdotes retain a ritualized grandeur, depicting spectacular displays of valor, gestures of comity for the enemy, and examples of polite rhetorical exchanges. More generally, the justification of battle and the explanation of its course, outcome, and consequences often hinge on the question of ritual propriety. At the same time, power politics, strategic calculations, psychological manipulation, and deception are prevalent concerns. Deliberations before and during battle, ex post facto analysis, and speeches arguing for various choices and strategies are usually more prominently featured than the military action itself, and these can draw on moral or pragmatic arguments or, more often than not, a mixture of both. Graphic portrayal of violent fighting is relatively rare. The scale of warfare grew exponentially over the period covered by Zuozhuan. Jin deployed seven hundred chariots at Chengpu in 632 BCE (chapter 4), but Chu could boast of three thousand chariots even among its three subsidiary regions in 530 BCE (chapter 10). Increasing carnage spurs attempts to forestall conflict and to facilitate favorable terms in peace negotiations. At the same time, the comprehensive effort to halt military conflict between Jin and Chu and their respective allies, initiated by the Song minister Xiang Xu in the Covenant of Song in 546 BCE (ZT Xiang 27.4), draws suspicions and mixed reactions. Another Song minister argues that weapons cannot be removed because “the ways to determine rise and fall, preservation and destruction, darkness and illumination, all originate in weapons” (ZT Xiang 27.6). The necessity and meanings of war on a more abstract level emerge as an intermittent concern in Zuozhuan.

Th e M a ster Str ategist The following account combines three themes that will recur in the Chinese tradition: political advice from an unlikely source, debates on the sources of legitimate authority, and ex post facto explanation of military strategy. Cao Gui’s military acumen is inseparable from his recognition of the political ­capital the Lu ruler wins by being impartial in judicial matters, and both are rooted in his disdain for well-born but ignorant “meat eaters.”

Zhua ng 10.1 (684 BCE)  In the tenth year, in spring, the Qi army attacked us. Our lord was going to fight. Cao Gui asked for an audience.

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One of his fellow villagers said, “The meat eaters have planned this. Why should you interfere?” Cao Gui said, “The meat eaters are limited and unable to make long-range plans.”2 Cao Gui then went in to see our lord in audience and asked what he would use to fight. Our lord said, “Of the things I take comfort in wearing and eating, I do not venture to keep all for myself but am sure to share with others.” Gui responded, “Such small acts of kindness do not yet reach all. The people will not follow you for this.” Our lord said, “In regard to sacrificial animals and ceremonial jades and silks, I do not venture to exaggerate and am sure to abide by good faith.” Gui responded, “Such small good faith does not yet cover all. The spirits will not bless you for this.” Our lord said, “In both minor and major legal cases, even when I am unable to investigate thoroughly, I am sure to go by the actual circumstances.” Gui responded, “This counts as a kind of integrity— with it you may indeed engage in battle. If you do battle, then I request to follow you.” Our lord rode with Cao Gui in his chariot. The battle took place at Changshao. Our lord was about to sound the drums to attack, but Gui said, “Not yet.” The Qi men beat the drums and advanced three times. Gui said, “Now we can!” And the Qi troops were completely defeated. Our lord was going to pursue them, but Gui said, “Not yet.” He got down from the chariot and looked at the ruts. Then he stood on the crossbar of the chariot, looked into the distance, and said, “Now we can!” So they pursued the Qi troops. Having overcome Qi, our lord asked him the reasons for his actions. He responded, “In doing battle, it all comes down to the energy one gets from courage. Drumming once arouses energy; but at the second drumming, it declines; and at the third, it is spent. Their energy was spent while ours was full; that is why we overcame them. Now, a big domain is difficult to fathom. I was afraid there would be an ambush, but I saw that their ruts were in disarray and I observed that their flags were down. That is why we pursued them.”

2 The word translated here as “limited” is bi, which means literally the area beyond the boundaries of cities and settlements. Cao Gui, as one who lives far from the center of power, is literally at the margins (bi). By redefining bi in moral or metaphorical terms as “limited” or parochial, or perhaps even base, far-fetched, or ignorant, he reverses the balance of authority between himself and those “meat eaters.”

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Etiqu ette on th e Battl efi eld Duke Xiang of Song combines ambition to become an overlord with adher­ ence to supposedly ancient protocols of battle. His half-brother, the supervisor of the military, Ziyu, offers a more realistic p­ erspective that is eventually vin­ dicated. Duke Xiang dies from his wounds a year later.

Xi 22.8 (638 BCE)  The men of Chu attacked Song in order to come to the aid of Zheng. The Duke of Song was about to engage in battle when the grand supervisor of the military insistently remonstrated, “It has been a long time since Heaven abandoned the Shang. If you, my lord, try to revive it, Heaven simply will not be able to forgive it.”3 But the duke did not heed this. In winter, in the eleventh month, on the jisi day, the first day of the month, the Duke of Song did battle with Chu leaders at the Hong River. The men of Song had already formed their ranks, but the men of Chu had not yet finished crossing the river. The supervisor of the military, Ziyu, said, “They are numerous and we are few. Let us attack them before they have completed the crossing.” The duke said, “That will not do.” When the Chu army had completed the crossing but had not yet formed their ranks, the supervisor of the military again notified him. But the duke said, “That will not do.” Only after the Chu army was properly marshaled did he attack them. The Song troops were completely defeated. The duke was wounded in the hip and the palace guards were all slaughtered. The inhabitants of the capital all blamed the duke. The duke said, “The noble man does not inflict wounds twice, nor does he take as prisoners those with graying hair. When the ancients engaged in warfare, they did not take advantage of difficult terrain and narrow straits. Although I, the unworthy one, am but a remnant of a fallen domain, I do not bang the drum to urge an attack upon those who have not formed their ranks.” Ziyu said, “You, my lord, do not yet understand warfare. When powerful adversaries are trapped in difficult terrain and have not formed ranks, it means Heaven is assisting us. Is it not proper, while they are in narrow straits, to press an attack? Even then, one should still be fearful 3

When the Zhou conquered the Shang, approximately four hundred years before the event above, they settled descendants of the Shang leaders in Song as a means of continuing offerings to the Shang ancestors.

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of them. Moreover, the powerful ones in this case are all our adversaries. Even if they have reached old age, we seize them so long as they can be captured. Why be concerned about graying hair? We make clear what is shameful and teach about warfare because we seek to kill enemies. If the wounded are not yet dead, why not wound them a second time? If you are concerned about inflicting wounds twice, then you might as well not inflict wounds at all. If you are concerned about graying hair, then you might as well surrender to them. The three armies function through what is advantageous; metal and drums arouse courage with their sounds. Making use of the advantageous, it is proper to attack the enemy in difficult terrain and narrow straits; boosting morale with booming sounds, it is acceptable to drum for battle when the enemy is in disarray.” Song is sometimes associated with an impractical and ill-advised sense of honor in the conduct of war. We have another example below.

Xua n 2.1 (607 BCE)  In the second year, in spring, Gongzi Guisheng of Zheng received a command from Chu to attack Song. Hua Yuan and Yue Lü of Song led the defense. In the second month, on the renzi day, they did battle at Daji. The Song army was completely defeated. The Zheng army took Hua Yuan prisoner, captured Yue Lü, along with 460 chariots drawn by armored horses, took 250 captives, and cut off the ears of a hundred slain soldiers. As Kuang Jiao of Song and a man of Zheng were locked in combat, the Zheng man fell into a well. When Kuang Jiao turned his halberd around and with the handle hauled him out, he seized Kuang Jiao. The noble man said, “He deviated from ritual propriety and disobeyed commands. It is fitting that he became a captive. In martial affairs, to manifest decisiveness and determination in obeying commands is ritual propriety. To kill the enemy is decisiveness; to sustain decisiveness is determination. To change this is to incur punishment and execution.”

Th e Battl e of Bi This is one of the famous battles in Zuozhuan. It marks Chu ascendancy and Jin decline. Unlike the Chengpu campaign (chapter 4), which is presented more from the perspective of victorious Jin, the battle of Bi, like the battle of Yanling in the next section, is more distinctly multifocal, possibly because the

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account is prepared from both Jin and Chu sources. There are voices against the conflict on both sides, but the dissension in Jin is presented as deeper and ultimately more destructive. Anti-war voices in Jin end up praising the Chu king, whose idealized portrait here coexists with representation of his hubris and aggression elsewhere in Zuozhuan. King Zhuang of Chu crowns his vic­ tory with a famous speech defining martial greatness and refusing an ostenta­ tious celebration of Chu might.

Xua n 12.1 (597 BCE)  In the twelfth year, in spring, the Master of Chu laid siege to Zheng. Seventeen days passed. The leaders of Zheng divined about seeking peace; the result was inauspicious. They divined about lamenting at the Grand Ancestral Temple and, further, bringing the char­ iots out on the roads; the result was auspicious. The inhabitants of the capital performed their ritual lamentations with great grief, while those guarding the parapets all wailed. The Master of Chu withdrew his troops. The leaders of Zheng repaired the city wall. Advancing and again laying siege to the city, Chu troops overcame it after three months. The Chu ruler entered through the great city gate and reached the main thoroughfare. Baring his flesh and leading a goat, the Liege of Zheng went forward to meet him and said, “I, the lone one, lack Heaven’s favor. That I failed to serve you, my lord, and caused you to descend in anger on our humble settlement is my own offense. How dare I not heed any command you may give? If I were to be taken as a captive to the south of the Yangzi River, there to populate the shores of the sea, let it be as you command. If our domain were to be cut up and our lands bestowed on other lords, and if our people were to be made slaves and serving women, let it be as you command. But if you were to kindly look back on our former good relations, seek blessings from our ancestors King Li and King Xuan, Lord Huan and Lord Wu,4 and not obliterate the altars of our domain, letting us serve you in a new way, as if we were the equal of your nine dependencies—it would be my lord’s beneficence, and my very wish, but it is not what I dare hope for. I have presumed to lay open my inmost heart, but it is up to you, my lord, to take your measures accordingly.” The king’s aides said, “We cannot allow this. When one has gained possession of a domain, there is no room for leniency.” 4 These are Zheng ancestors. Lord Huan was the first Zheng ruler. He was the son of King Li of Zhou and was granted a domain by King Xuan of Zhou. Lord Wu was his son.

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The king said, “The ruler of Zheng was able to humble himself and must therefore be able to use his people with good faith. How can I hope to gain possession of his domain?” He retreated thirty li and agreed to peace with Zheng. Pan Wang entered the capital to swear a covenant, and Gongzi Quji left for Chu as hostage. Xua n 12.2 (597 BCE)  In summer, in the sixth month, Jin troops went to the aid of Zheng. Xun Linfu commanded the central army, and Xian Hu assisted him. Fan Hui commanded the upper army, and Xi Ke assisted him. Zhao Shuo commanded the lower army, and Luan Shu assisted him. Zhao Kuo and Zhao Yingqi were high officers of the central army. Shi Zhuangbo and Han Chuan were high officers of the upper army. Xun Shou and Zhao Tong were high officers of the lower army. Han Jue was the supervisor of the military. When Jin troops reached the Yellow River, they heard that Zheng had already made peace with Chu. Xun Linfu wished to turn back, saying, “What use would it be to make our people toil when relief is no longer relevant for Zheng? It will not be too late if we wait until Chu turns back and then move.”5 Fan Hui said, “Well said. I have heard that in using troops one looks for openings and moves accordingly. When a domain’s virtue, punishments, government, administrative affairs, statutes, and rituals are not deviant, it cannot be overcome; against such a domain we do not launch military expeditions. In chastising Zheng, the Chu ruler was angered by Zheng’s double-dealing and was moved to compassion by Zheng’s selfabnegation. Zheng rebelled, and Chu attacked it; it submitted, and Chu left it. Virtue and punishment are thereby realized. To attack the rebellious is just punishment; to deal gently with the submissive is virtue— these two are thus established. “Last year Chu entered Chen, and this year Zheng, but the people have not become weary with toil, nor has the ruler been the target of ­rancor or grumbling. Government has thus followed its proper course. When the Chu-style military formation is prepared and the army is called up, traders, farmers, artisans, and merchants do not suffer in their occupation, while the infantry and chariot drivers are in harmonious cooperation. Administrative concerns thus do not come into conflict with one another. 5

Jin’s supposed mission is to assist its ally Zheng. Since Zheng sues for peace with Chu, Jin will move to punish Zheng after Chu turns back.

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“Shusun Ao is chief minister and has decided on laws and statutes for Chu. When the army is marching, the troops on the right follow the shafts of the commander’s chariot; the troops on the left go in quest of rushes for the night’s rest; the vanguard fixes its gaze so as to be primed for the unexpected; the center has solid strength; the rear is forceful. The hundred officers act according to their insignia on banners and standards. Military regimen, without any special orders, is prepared for contingency. The statutes are thus followed to good purpose. “When the ruler of Chu raises men to office, among those of his own clan name he selects from close kin; and among those of other clan names he selects from old families holding hereditary offices. In raising men to office he does not overlook the virtuous; in giving rewards he does not overlook those who toiled. The aged are shown additional kindness; travelers are granted gifts. Noblemen and commoners have regalia with different patterns to distinguish them. The noble have consistent standards of dignity; the lowly have a sense of awe based on gradations. There is thus no violation of ritual propriety. “A domain with virtue established, just punishment carried out, good government realized, administrative affairs timely, statutes followed, and ritual propriety observed—how can it be challenged? Seeing what can be achieved and then advancing, knowing what is difficult and then withdrawing: this amounts to good governance of the army. Annexing weak domains and attacking benighted ones constitute good management of military affairs. For now, sir, put the army in good order and properly manage military affairs! There are yet weak and benighted domains; why must you target Chu? The ancient Shang minister Zhonghui had this saying: ‘Take the domain in turmoil; humiliate the failing one.’ These words are about annexing weak domains. The Zhou hymn ‘Bright’ says, Ah, how splendid the king’s army! It takes the lead to seize the dark one.

This refers to confronting benighted domains. The Zhou hymn ‘Martial’6 says, ‘Peerless is his accomplishment.’ To soothe the weak and confront the benighted, so as to bring about great accomplishment, is the right course.” 6 Both “Bright” and “Martial” are Zhou hymns in the Odes.

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Jin commanders are divided: Xian Hu repudiates Fan Hui’s reasoning and takes his troops into battle, and Xun Linfu, despite his hesitations, is drawn into the conflict even as his younger brother, Xun Shou, predicts disaster. For his insubordination in this battle and subsequent betrayal of Jin, Xian Hu will be put to death the following year (ZT Xuan 13.4). Xian Hu said, “This will not do. The reason our domain Jin became overlord was because of the martial prowess of its troops and the unremitting effort of its subjects. Now to lose the allegiance of the princes cannot be called unremitting effort; to have an enemy and fail to pursue him cannot be called martial prowess. To lose our position as overlord through our own failings is worse than death. Moreover, to organize troops to set forth and then retreat on learning that the enemy is strong is not manly. To receive the charge to be commander of the army and then to end up being unmanly—it may be that the rest of you can do it, but I refuse to do it.” With the troops under his control as assistant commander of the central army, he crossed the Yellow River. Xun Shou said, “This army is in great danger! As the Zhou Changes has it, at the line whereby the hexagram ‘Army’ ䷆ becomes the hexagram ‘Overseeing’ ䷒: ‘The army sets forth by discipline. If proper order is contravened, it is inauspicious.’ 7 To manage affairs and follow the course of fruition is ‘proper order.’ To go against that is ‘contravening.’ The multitude disperses and weakness is created; the rivers are stopped up and become a marsh. 8 When there is discipline, the army acts like one’s own body. Thus, it speaks of ‘discipline.’ Contravene the proper order, and discipline comes to an end. What is full is being used up, what is blocked up cannot, furthermore, be put in order; that is why it is inauspicious. ‘Not proceeding’ is called ‘Overseeing.’ We have a commander but he is not followed; what can be a more extreme fulfillment of ‘Overseeing’ than that? This is what is meant! If we indeed meet the enemy, we are certain to be defeated. Xian Hu is the one who brought this about: he may escape death and come back, but even so he is certain to come to great harm.”

7 The quoted text is the line statement for the first line of the “Army” hexagram, which is hexagram no. 7 in Zhou Changes. “Overseeing” is hexagram no. 19. 8 These images of dispersed multitude and the obstructed river come from an interpretive treatment of the lines that make up the “Army” and “Overseeing” hexagrams.

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Han Jue said to Xun Linfu, “If Xian Hu is lost with his section of the army, your offense is sure to be great. You are the commander in chief. Whose offense is it that the army does not execute your commands? To lose the allegiance of a subordinate domain and to let troops perish would already be a grave offense. You might as well advance. If we do not achieve victory in battle, the blame can be shared. Instead of having you bear the offense alone, would it not be better for six persons to share it?” The troops thus crossed the Yellow River. There is dissension in Chu between Wu Can, who supports the war with Jin, and Sunshu Ao, who opposes it. Wu Can repeats the argument of Jin officers against retreat during the Chengpu campaign (chapter 4, Xi 28.3), even as the Jin commander Luan Shu cites Hu Yan’s words from the earlier battle. The Master of Chu shifted his troops northward and set up camp at Yan. The deputy of Shen commanded the central army; Zichong, the left; and Zifan, the right. They intended to water the horses at the Yellow River and then turn back. When they heard that Jin troops had already crossed the river, the king wanted to return, but his favorite, Wu Can, wanted to engage in battle. The Chu chief minister, Sunshu Ao, did not want to fight. He said, “Last year we entered Chen, and this year we entered Zheng; it is not as if we have not fought wars. If we fight and do not achieve victory, will eating the flesh of Wu Can suffice to appease our rancor?” Can said, “If we do win the war, then Sunshu Ao will be the one who lacked foresight in his plans; if we do not win, then my flesh will be with the Jin army. How would it be available for eating?” The chief minister turned the shaft of his chariot south and reversed the direction of his banner.9 Wu Can said to the king, “The person at the helm of government in Jin is new to his responsibilities. He cannot yet enforce his commands. His assistant, Xian Hu, is hard, ruthless, and inhumane. He is not yet willing to follow orders. As for the three commanders, they all want to monopolize power but fail to do so. The troops would like to heed orders but lack a superior: whom can they follow as leader? On this expedition, the Jin army is sure to suffer defeat. Moreover, if you as ruler run away from mere subjects, how could it be justified to

9 The Jin army is coming from the north. Sunshu Ao refuses to fight and turns his chariot southward.

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the altars of the domain?” Troubled by this, the king notified the chief minister to turn the shaft of his chariot and point it northward. The Chu army set up camp at Guan to wait for the Jin army. Jin troops were between the Ao and Gao Mountains. Huang Xu of Zheng sent someone to the Jin army to say, “That Zheng followed Chu was for the sake of the altars of the domain. It has no intention of double-dealing. Chu troops have become arrogant with repeated victories. They are worn out and have not set up a proper defense. If you strike, Zheng troops will follow suit, and Chu troops are sure to be defeated.” Xian Hu said, “The defeat of Chu and the submission of Zheng lie in this move! We must agree to this.” Luan Shu of Jin said, “Ever since the time Chu vanquished Yong, its ruler has not let a day pass without steeling the inhabitants of the capital and admonishing them on how the people’s well-being is not easily achieved, how calamity can come any day, and how fearful vigilance cannot slacken. With the army, he has not let a day pass without steeling his troops and warning them how there is no safe refuge in victory, and how the last Shang king, Zhòu, had a hundred conquests and in the end left no descendants. He admonishes them on how the Chu ancestors Ruo’ao and Fenmao, riding in rugged wooden carts and clad in tattered hemp, opened up hills and forests for cultivation. He exhorts them thus: ‘The people’s well-being lies in diligence. With diligence there is no lack.’ Chu cannot be called arrogant. “Our former high officer Hu Yan once said, ‘When troops have justice on their side, they are at the height of their power and morale; when they are in the wrong, they are worn out.’10 Our side lacks virtue, and yet we invite Chu’s rancor. We are in the wrong, and Chu has justice on its side. They cannot be called worn out. Its ruler’s chariots are divided into two detachments. Each detachment has thirty chariots, which are divided into two units. The chariots in the right detachment are harnessed first and mark the passage of time till midday; then the left detachment takes over until evening. Officers of the palace assume duty in shifts during the night so as to be ready for any contingency. Chu cannot be said to lack preparation. “Gongzi Qujia is one of the finest men in Zheng; Pan Wang, a highly respected person in Chu. Pan Wang entered Zheng to swear a covenant, and Gongzi Qujia is in Chu as hostage; Chu and Zheng thus have close 10 For Hu Yan’s comment, see chapter 4, Xi 28.3.

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ties. Zheng came to encourage us to fight. If our side wins, it would come here to submit; if our side does not win, it will then go over to Chu. It is using us to divine which way it should go. Zheng’s counsel is not to be heeded.” Zhao Kuo and Zhao Tong said, “We have led the troops and come thus far only to seek the enemy. If it is possible to vanquish the enemy and gain possession of a subordinate domain, then what are we waiting for? We must follow Xian Hu!” Xun Shou said, “Zhao Tong and Zhao Kuo are on the path to calamity!” Zhao Shuo said, “Luan Shu was right! If we act upon his words, then Jin will last long.” We see here the rituals of the battlefield: leaders and envoys encode veiled threats in polite diplomatic language, heroes challenge the enemy with spectac­ ular display of valor, and an officer presents a stag to the enemy, substantiating the connection between hunting and warfare. The Chu junior steward went to the Jin army and said, “Our unworthy ruler met with calamity in his youth and is not capable of fine expression. He has heard that two of our former rulers had come and gone through this place, with the intention of admonishing and stabilizing Zheng. How would we dare to give offense to Jin? You, sirs, should not tarry here for long!”11 Fan Hui replied, “In the past, King Ping commanded our former lord, Prince Wen, with these words: ‘With Zheng, you should flank and assist the house of Zhou. Do not abandon the king’s command!’ Now Zheng does not follow the king’s command, and our lord has sent his subjects to ask Zheng about it. How dare we trouble any attending officer? I presume to bow to the condescension of your lord’s command.” Xian Hu considered the reply too obsequious and sent Zhao Kuo to follow the Chu envoy and change the message: “Our envoy erred in his address. Our unworthy ruler has sent us, his many subjects, to remove the traces of your great domain from Zheng, saying, ‘Do not shun the enemy!’ His many subjects have nowhere to hide from this command.” The Chu ruler also sent someone to seek an accord with Jin. The leaders of Jin agreed to it, and a date was set for the covenant. On the Chu 11 Kings Cheng and Mu of Chu attacked Zheng earlier. Disavowing any intention of offending Jin, the Chu envoy is in fact claiming that Jin has no right to interfere in Zheng.

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side, Xu Bo was Yue Bo’s chariot driver, with She Shu on the right, and they set forth to challenge Jin troops.12 Xu Bo said, “I have heard that in challenging the enemy, the chariot driver sets the banners streaming and touches the enemy’s ramparts, and then they return.” Yue Bo said, “I have heard that in challenging the enemy, the archer on the left shoots the best arrows and holds the reins for the chariot driver while the latter descends, aligns the horses, adjusts the martingales; and then they return.” She Shu said, “I have heard that in challenging the enemy, the man on the right penetrates the ramparts, kills an enemy and cuts off his left ear, and seizes a captive; and then they return.” They all put into practice what they had heard and came back. The men of Jin pursued them, closing in on them from right and left. Yue Bo of Chu shot the horses on the left and the men on the right, and the pincer formations could not advance. Only one arrow remained. A stag leapt in front of them. He shot at the stag, hitting it in the back. Bao Gui of Jin was right behind them. Yue Bo had She Shu present the stag to Bao Gui as an offering: “Because the season is not timely, and the time for offering animals has not arrived, I venture to present this as a feast for your followers.” Bao Gui stopped his troops, saying, “The man on the left is good at archery; the man on the right has the right words. They are both noble men.” They thus escaped. Two disaffected Jin officers, Wei Yi and Zhao Zhan, undertake negotiations but instead provoke conflict. The Jin army is in disarray. Fan Hui and Zhao Yingqi forestall a total debacle, but a surprise attack from Chu inflicts heavy losses. Wei Yi of Jin sought to be appointed a high officer of the ruling lineages and failed. Enraged, he wished to bring about Jin’s defeat. He asked to challenge the enemy, but this was not allowed. He asked to be an envoy, and this was allowed. He thus went, asked Chu to engage in battle, and returned. Pan Dang of Chu pursued him. Upon reaching Xing Marsh, Wei Yi saw six stags. He shot one of them, looked back, and offered it to Pan Dang, saying: “As you are involved in military affairs, perhaps your

12 Xu Bo is at the center as chariot driver, Yue Bo is on the left with bow and arrow, and She Shu is on the right with dagger-ax and shield.

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hunters have not supplied enough fresh game? I venture to present this to your followers.” Pan Dang gave order to leave off pursuit. Zhao Zhan sought to be appointed Jin minister but failed. Moreover, he was angry at Jin’s failure to capture the Chu challengers. He asked to provoke battle, but this was not allowed. He asked to summon the parties for a covenant, and this was allowed. Both he and Wei Yi were charged with this task and set forth on their mission. Xi Ke said, “The two disgruntled ones have gone. If we do not make preparations, we will surely be defeated.” Xian Hu said, “The men of Zheng encouraged us to fight, and we do not dare to follow their counsel. The men of Chu sought a peace agreement, and we are not able to reach amity. The army has no definite commands. What is the use of all these preparations?” Fan Hui said, “It is better to be prepared. If those two arouse Chu to anger, and Chu forces pounce on us, then our troops will perish in no time. It is better to make preparations. If Chu has no ill intention, then we can dismantle the preparations and swear a covenant with them. How would that damage good relations? If Chu comes with ill intentions, then because of our preparations we will not be defeated. Moreover, even when the princes gather for a meeting, it is circumspect for the guard troops not to withdraw.” Xian Hu refused. Fan Hui sent Shi Zhuangbo and Han Chuan to set up ambushes in seven places in front of Mount Ao. That was why the upper army was not defeated. Zhao Yingqi had his men prepare boats at the Yellow River in advance. That was why, after suffering defeat, they were the first to cross the Yellow River. After Pan Dang had already driven Wei Yi away, Zhao Zhan reached the Chu army at night, spread his mat outside the gate of the camp, and sent his men to enter. The Chu ruler had detachments of thirty chariots each distributed to the left and right. The chariots of the right detachment were harnessed at cockcrow and unyoked at midday, while the chariots of the left then took over and were unyoked at sunset. Xu Yan drove the commanding chariot in the right detachment, and Yang Youji was the spearman on his right. Peng Ming drove the commanding chariot in the left detachment, and Qu Dang was the spearman on his right. On the yimao day, the king rode in the left detachment to drive Zhao Zhan away. Zhao Zhan abandoned his chariot and ran into the woods. Qu Dang, locked in single combat with Zhao Zhan, obtained his leather lower garment.

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The men of Jin, fearful that Wei Yi and Zhao Zhan would provoke the Chu army, had sent guard chariots to meet them. Pan Dang saw the dust raised by these chariots and sent word on the fastest steed: “The Jin army has arrived!” The men of Chu also feared that their king would plunge headlong into Jin ranks, and they thus came out in battle formation.13 Sunshu Ao said, “Advance! I would rather we close in on them than let them close in on us. As it says in the Odes, Prime war chariots, ten of them: Charge ahead and break through the enemy’s ranks.

“This means to anticipate the enemy. The Maxims for the Military says, ‘To preempt the enemy is to rob him of his will.’ This means closing in on the enemy.” He thus swiftly advanced his troops. His chariots flew and his soldiers raced, attacking Jin troops by surprise. At a loss as to what to do, Xun Linfu ordered that drums be beaten in the army and cried, “Those who cross the river first will be rewarded!” The central army and lower army fought to board the boats. The fingers in the boats were so numerous that they could be scooped up.14 King Zhuang pursues the Jin army with the support of Tang, a small domain in the Chu sphere of influence. The upper army of Jin retreats. The narrative continues with vignettes from the battlefield. The Jin army moved to the right. The upper army had not yet changed position. The Chu deputy for artisans, Qi, led the troops on the right front of the square battle formation to pursue the lower army of Jin. The Master of Chu sent Tang Jiao and Cai Jiuju to notify Prince Hui of Tang: “I, the unworthy one, for lack of virtue and excess of ambition, have encountered a formidable enemy—I am indeed to blame. But if Chu does not prevail, it will also bring shame on you, my lord. I venture to borrow your numinous power to bring about deliverance for the Chu

13 There is thus a sense of fortuitousness as fears and miscalculations drive both sides to battle. 14 Soldiers already in the boats, fearing pursuit by the Chu army and also afraid that the boats would sink if boarded by too many, try to ward off the soldiers struggling to climb on board by chopping off their fingers. In various Han texts, the spectacle of this carnage is said to move King Zhuang of Chu to withdraw his troops.

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army.” He sent Pan Dang, leading forty chariots from the reserve, to follow the Prince of Tang to form the left front of the square battle formation, which then pursued the upper army of Jin. Xi Yi of Jin said, “Should we confront them?” Fan Hui said, “The Chu army is right now at the height of its power and morale. If they concentrate their resources to turn on us, our army will be completely destroyed. It would be better for us to gather our troops and depart. Is it not acceptable to share the blame and let the people live?” He guarded the rear of the withdrawing troops, which suffered no loss. The Chu king, seeing the right detachment, intended to ride on its commanding chariot to pursue the enemy. Qu Dang stopped him, saying, “You began with the left detachment, my lord, and you must end with it.” It was from that point on that the left detachment took precedence in Chu. There was a man in the Jin army whose chariot sank in a pit and could not go on. A Chu man advised him to try removing the horizontal beam holding weapons. After advancing a little, his horses sank back. The Chu man then advised him to pull out the flags and pennants and to throw aside the wooden collars for the horses. With that the chariot came out, and the Jin man turned around and said, “We are not so experienced in fleeing as the soldiers of your great domain!” Zhao Zhan gave two of his good horses to his older brother and uncle to help them escape. He himself made his way back with other horses. Encountering the enemy and unable to escape, he abandoned the chariot and ran into the woods. The high officer Feng was riding with his two sons and told them not to look back. They looked back and said, “Old man Zhao is behind us.” In his anger with them, he made them dismount. He pointed to a tree and said, “I will collect your corpses here.” He gave the reins to Zhao Zhan, who thereby escaped.15 The next day, he went to collect the corpses at the place he had signaled and found both his sons’ bodies lying atop each other under the tree. Xiong Fuji of Chu took Zhi Ying prisoner. Zhi Ying’s father, Xun Shou, led his lineage troops to turn back and go after him.16 Wei Yi drove for him, and many officers from the lower army followed him. With every 15 The distinctions of rank decree that Feng should yield a place in his chariot to Zhao Zhan, a minister, even if it means giving up his sons’ lives. 16 Xun Shou, Xun Linfu’s younger brother, became the head of the Zhi lineage. Xun Linfu became the head of the Zhonghang lineage.

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shot, Xun Shou pulled out an arrow, and whenever it seemed especially fine, he put it in Wei Yi’s quiver. Wei Yi cried out in anger, “You do not seek to recover your son but instead begrudge these willowy arrow shafts. Can the willows of Dong Marsh be used up?” Xun Shou said, “If not with another’s son, how can I get my own son back? That is why I cannot shoot arrows carelessly.” He shot and killed the Chu court deputy, Xiang the Elder, and loaded the corpse in his chariot; he also shot Gongzi Guchen and took him prisoner. Taking these two with him, he returned.17 King Zhuang refuses an ostentatious celebration of Chu might and victory in a famous speech defining martial greatness. Moral justification and strategic calculation are intertwined; Chu might not have had the resources to pursue Jin forces at this point. As night fell, Chu troops were stationed at Bi. Remnants of Jin troops were unable to bivouac at all. They crossed the river in the dark and made noises all through the night. On the bingchen day, Chu’s wagons, heavy with supplies, arrived at Bi. Chu then set up camp at Hengyong. Pan Dang said, “My lord, why do you not build a military monument by collecting Jin corpses in a grand mound? I have heard that the conquest of our enemies must be displayed for our descendants, so that they will not forget our martial achievement.” The Master of Chu said, “This is not something you understand. In writing, ‘stop’ and ‘dagger-ax’ form ‘martial.’18 When King Wu had conquered Shang, he composed a hymn, which said,

17 Nine years later, Chu sends Zhi Ying back in return for Guchen and Xiang the Elder’s corpse. Recall that Xia Ji uses the retrieval of the corpse of her husband, Xiang the Elder, as the excuse to leave Chu and flee with her lover Wuchen (chapter 3, Cheng 2.6). 18 The graph wu 武 (“martial”) appears as in oracle bones and is supposed to represent a man walking (or marching) with a weapon. The “rationalization” of the word here shows how the idea of “the war to end wars” and “the violence to stop violence” had gained ground by the time of Zuozhuan’s compilation and is adopted in the influential Han dictionary Explanation of Characters (Shuowen jiezi) compiled by Xu Shen (d. ca. 149), which becomes a sort of lens through which later readers understand the character.

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Store away then the shields and halberds, And return bows and arrows to their cases. I seek beautiful virtue, To be displayed in this great land. May the kings preserve it.

He also composed the hymn ‘Martial,’ whose last stanza says, And so brought about the great achievement.

Its third stanza says, Spread King Wen’s mantle and extend it. That I set forth is solely to seek peace and stability.

Its sixth stanza says, Bring peace to the myriad domains. Multiply the years of good harvest.19

Martial greatness, then, prohibits violence, stores away weapons, preserves what is great, confirms achievements, brings repose to the people, harmonizes the multitudes, and expands wealth; that was why King Wu did not let his descendants forget his glory. “Now I have caused two domains to lay bare the bones of their men— that was violence! I reviewed my troops to intimidate the princes—that meant weapons were not stored away. When one is violent and does not store away weapons, how can one preserve greatness? As long as Jin still exists, how can I confirm my achievements? When I have gone against the people’s desires in many ways, how can the people find repose? Lacking virtue and striving by force for the princes’ allegiance, how can I create accord for the multitudes? If I profit from others’ perils, find repose in others’ disorder, and regard this as my own glory, how can I expand wealth? Martial greatness involves seven virtues, and I do not have even one of them. What can I display for my descendants? We should build a temple 19 The third and sixth stanzas of “Martial” belong to other poems in the received text of the Odes.

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for our former kings, report the completion of our mission, and be done with it. Martial greatness is not what I have achieved. In ancient times, when enlightened kings attacked the disrespectful, they took the greatest culprits among them and had them killed and sealed off in a mound as the most extreme punishment. Thus it was that the grand mound was built to warn against excesses and iniquities. Now Jin was nowhere at fault, and the people of Jin all fulfilled their loyalty and died carrying out their lord’s command; how can the grand mound be built?” The Chu king offered sacrifices at the Yellow River, built a temple for the former kings, reported the completion of the mission, and returned to Chu. Xua n 12.5 (597 BCE)  In autumn, the Jin army returned. Xun Linfu begged to be put to death. The Prince of Jin wanted to allow it. Shi Wozhuo remonstrated with him: “This will not do. In the Chengpu campaign, even after the Jin army had been eating Chu grain for three days, Lord Wen still had a look of dread. His attendants asked him, ‘To feel dread when one should have joy—isn’t that the same as feeling joy when one should have dread?’ The lord said, ‘Since Cheng Dechen is still there, my dread cannot yet abate. Even a beast will fight when pressed—how much more the chief minister of a domain?’ Only when Chu put Cheng Dechen to death was the lord’s joy apparent. He said, ‘Now there is none left to poison my existence.’ That was when Jin again prevailed and Chu was again defeated. That was why Chu was weak for two generations. Now perhaps Heaven is giving a great warning to Jin. If we then go on to kill Xun Linfu to double Chu’s victory, would it not make us weak for a long time? In his service to the ruler, Xun Linfu advances and dwells on how to fulfill his duty, withdraws and dwells on how to make up for his mistakes. He is one who guards the altars of the domain. How can he be put to death? In this case, his defeat is just like the eclipse of the sun or the moon, so how can it diminish his brightness?” The Prince of Jin allowed him to resume his position.

Th e Battl e of Ya nling In contrast with the alignment of moral rhetoric, superior tactics, and victory in the campaigns at Chengpu (632 BCE) and Bi (596 BCE), victory is incon­ clusive and even dangerous in the battle of Yanling (575 BCE). As in other battle

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narratives, we have a cluster of anecdotes about omens, predictions, and explanations that assess and justify the outcome. A heightened awareness of perspectives and spectacle adds to narrative interest. Unlike the battle of Bi, ritualized respect toward leaders of the enemy camp here feeds allegations of conspiracy and treason. The battle of Yanling produces no real victor. Whereas Chu defeat is moralized, notably in Shen Shushi’s speech (Cheng 16.5), Jin victory is not presented as morally justified; instead, it is accompanied by the Jin minister Fan Xie’s repeated predictions of imminent disaster, soon fulfilled in the annihilation of the Xi lineage (ZT Cheng 17.10) and the Jin ruler’s assas­ sination (ZT Cheng 18.1).

Cheng 16.1 (575 BCE)  In the sixteenth year, in spring, the Master of Chu, from Wucheng, sent Gongzi Cheng to use the lands of Ruyin to seek an accord with Zheng. Zheng turned against Jin; Zisi of Zheng went to join the Master of Chu and swore a covenant with him at Wucheng. Jin prepares for battle with Chu. Luan Shu, who praised Chu and urged cau­ tion during the Bi campaign twenty-two years earlier (see above, Xuan 12.2), is now eager to fight. Fan Xie is filled with foreboding, and his prediction of internal troubles in Jin will soon be fulfilled after Jin’s victory at Yanling.

Cheng 16.5 (575 BCE)  The Prince of Jin planned to attack Zheng. Fan Xie said, “If we fulfill our wishes and the lords all rebel against us, then Jin’s hopes for reprieve can be fulfilled. If it is only Zheng that rebels against us, then we will not have to wait long for misfortunes and grief to come to Jin!” Luan Shu said, “We cannot in our generation lose the allegiance of the princes. We must attack Zheng.”20 Jin thus mobilized its troops. Luan Shu was commander of the central army, and Fan Xie assisted him. Xi Yi was commander of the upper army, and Zhonghang Yan assisted him. Han Jue was commander of the lower army, and Xi Zhi was the assistant commander in the new army. Zhi Ying remained to guard the domain. Xi Chou went to Wei and then to Qi, all in order to plead for troops. Luan Yan came to us to plead for troops. Meng Xianzi said, “Jin will have its victory!” On the wuyin day (12), Jin troops set out. 20 Whereas Luan Shu fears losing Zheng’s allegiance, Fan Xie hopes for their disaffection, for without that outside threat Jin leaders will persist in their errors.

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The Chu minister Shen Shushi gives a normative account of conditions for victory in battle and predicts Chu’s defeat. A Zheng minister gives a similarly dire assessment of Chu. When the leaders of Zheng heard that Jin had mobilized its troops, they sent someone to notify Chu, with Yao Gou’er coming along. The Master of Chu went to the aid of Zheng. The supervisor of the military, Zifan, was commander of the central army; the chief minister, Zichong, was commander of the left army; and the minister of the right, Zixin, was commander of the right army. As they passed through Shen, Zifan entered the city to see Shen Shushi and said, “What do you make of our military expedition?” He replied, “Virtue, punishment, circumspection, duty, ritual propriety, good faith: these are the instruments of battle. Virtue is for extending beneficence; punishment, for correcting deviance; circumspection, for serving the spirits; duty, for establishing advantage; ritual propriety, for according with the times; good faith, for guarding all things. If the people’s livelihood is abundant, then their virtues will be in proper order. If actions bring advantages, then affairs will be regulated. If the right timing is followed, then all things will come to fruition. When those in positions above and below are in harmony, they maneuver in all situations without going against the proper course. Whatever is sought for will already have been prepared, and each will know the apposite standards. That is why it says in the Odes, You have established our multitudinous people. None fails to observe your apposite standards.

In this way, the spirits will bestow blessings upon them, the seasons will pass with no calamity or injury, the people’s livelihood will be prosperous and abundant, and in harmonious unity they will heed orders. Without exception, the people will exert themselves to the utmost to follow their superiors’ commands, braving death to fill the gap left by the fallen soldiers. This is the course by which victory is achieved in battle. But now Chu has abandoned its people at home and has cut off good relations abroad; it desecrates the covenant made after fasting and purifi­ cation and eats its own words; it violates the right timing in moving its troops in spring and exhausts the people to fulfill selfish desires. The people do not know what is good faith, and they will be held guilty

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whether they advance or retreat. When people worry where they will end up, who will brave death to fight? You, sir, should try your best! I will not see you again!” Yao Gou’er came back to Zheng first, and Zisi asked him about Chu. He replied, “They move quickly, and when they pass through dangerous terrain, their ranks are irregular. To move quickly is to lose the will to deliberate; to be irregular is to forgo the order of the ranks. Having lost their will and forgone order, on what grounds are they going to fight? I am afraid Chu will not be of use to us.” Even when Jin and Chu forces meet at Yanling, Fan Xie remains opposed to battle. He emphasizes again that only an external threat can stave off inter­ necine struggles in Jin. However, other Jin commanders are eager to fight. In the fifth month, Jin troops crossed the Yellow River. When they heard that Chu troops were about to arrive, Fan Xie wanted to turn back. He said, “If we flee the Chu army, we can perhaps relieve the cause for grief in our domain. Now, uniting the princes under our leadership is not something we can achieve. We should leave that to abler men. If we ministers can act in concert and harmony when serving our lord, that will be no mean feat.” Luan Shu said, “That will not do!” In the sixth month, the Jin and the Chu forces met at Yanling. Fan Xie did not want to engage in battle. Xi Zhi said, “At the battle of Han, Lord Hui did not rouse his troops; in the Ji campaign, Xian Zhen did not return to report on his mission; with the troops at Bi, Xun Linfu did not persist in confronting the enemy.21 All of these were to the disgrace of Jin. You too, sir, have seen the achievements of our former rulers. Now if we avoid Chu, it will add to our shame.” Fan Xie said, “Our former rulers engaged in battle again and again for a reason. Qin, the Di, Qi, and Chu were all powerful. Had our former rulers not exerted themselves to the utmost, their descendants would have been reduced to weakness. Now three of those powerful enemies have submitted, and Chu remains our sole enemy. Only sages are capa­ble of handling the situation of being without troubles both at home and 21 Jin suffered defeat at the battle of Han in 645 BCE. Xian Zhen was killed during Jin’s Ji campaign against the Di in 627 BCE. During the battle of Bi, Xun Linfu could have used the Jin upper army, which remained intact, to continue fighting, but he did not (see above, Xuan 12.2).

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abroad. And of course we are not sages: with pacification abroad there will certainly be causes for grief at home. Why do we not let Chu go so that it may inspire fear from abroad?” Chu’s apparent readiness for battle inspires different responses among Jin commanders. Fan Gai suggests setting up battle formations within the encamp­ ment but is silenced by his father, Fan Xie. Luan Shu wants to strengthen ­fortifications, but Xi Zhi urges a speedy engagement. The different strategic recommendations of Luan Shu and Xi Zhi reflect the rivalry that results in the destruction of the Xi lineage the following year (ZT Cheng 17.10). On the jiawu day, the last day of the month, Chu pressed close to Jin forces and deployed battle formations at dawn. The Jin military officers were alarmed at this. Fan Gai hastened forward with small steps and said, “Fill in the wells and level the stoves, deploy battle formations here in the encampment, and open passages for the troops. Whether victory is handed to Jin or to Chu is for Heaven to decide. What good does it do to be alarmed at this?”22 Fan Xie seized a dagger-ax and chased him away, saying, “The preservation or destruction of the domain is up to Heaven. What can you, a mere child, know about it!” Luan Shu said, “The Chu troops are insecure and changeable. Let us strengthen our fortifications and wait it out; they will certainly retreat in three days. If we attack as they retreat, we shall certainly achieve victory.” Xi Zhi said, “Chu leaves for us six openings that we cannot afford to miss: its two ministers commanding the army, Zifan and Zichong, hate each other; the king’s personal troops have been on the battlefield for a long time; Zheng’s formations are deployed but in a disorderly fashion; the forces of the Man tribes have joined the army but they do not keep the battle formations; battle formations are made without regard for avoiding the last day of the month; its soldiers are raucous in their battle formations, and even more so as they press forward for engagement. Each man looks behind him, and none has the will to fight. Troops that have been on the field for a long time will fail to obey orders for sure. They have, moreover, flouted Heaven’s taboos. We are certain to overcome them.” 22 To counter the Chu offensive, Fan Gai, Fan Xie’s son, urges that battle formations be established within the encampment, and that this could be better accomplished once the encampment ground is leveled, with the wells filled up and the stoves destroyed.

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There is a distinct sense of symmetry, shifting perspectives, and cinematic spec­ tacle, first as Bo Zhouli, exiled from Jin, interprets for the Chu king, from a high perch, the meaning of various movements of Jin troops, and then as Fen Huang, exiled from Chu, strategizes for the Jin ruler. The Master of Chu ascended a towered chariot in order to survey the Jin troops. Zichong sent Bo Zhouli to stand behind the king in attendance. 23 The Chu king said, “Chariots are racing right and left. Why is that?” “So as to summon the military officers.” “They are all gathered around the central army!” “So as to plot their strategy together.” “They are setting up tents!” “So as to piously divine before the spirit tablets of the former rulers.” “They are taking down the tents!” “They are about to issue orders.” “It is very noisy; and the dust is also rising.” “They are about to fill in the wells and level the stoves so as to make passages and form their lines.”24 “Will they fight now?” “It is impossible to know yet.” “They mounted their chariots, but are all now dismounting right and left.” “They are listening to the oaths of battle.” Bo Zhouli reported to the king about the lord’s personal troops. Fen Huang was at the side of the Prince of Jin and also told the lord about the king’s personal troops. All on the Jin side said, “The best man of the domain is there! Further, their force is formidable. We are no match for them.” Fen Huang said to the Prince of Jin, “The finest fighters of Chu are only with the royal soldiers in the central army. I submit that you should separate out your finer fighters and attack from the left and right sides and then concentrate the best of your four armies against the king’s personal troops. You are sure to inflict a great defeat on them.”

23 The implication is that the king at least partially blocks Bo Zhouli’s vision, but he has the knowledge to explain what the king sees. 24 This means that Jin leaders actually act upon Fan Gai’s earlier suggestion.

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The Jin ruler divined about this with milfoil. The scribe said, “Auspicious. The hexagram encountered is ‘Return’ ䷗ .25 It says, ‘The domain in the south is in dire straits. Shoot its prime king. Hit his eye.’ A domain in dire straits, a king injured: what could they expect but defeat?” The Jin ruler acted accordingly. Lord Li’s chariot is mired in a bog, and Luan Qian reprimands his father, Luan Shu, for leaving his post to try to haul the Jin ruler out. The Chu king regards his warriors’ ostentatious display of skill in archery as ill considered and shameful, although such skills will prove useful in the battle. Wei Yi, who contributed to Jin’s defeat in the Bi campaign (see above, Xuan 12.2), here ­fulfills the meaning of an ominous dream. There was a bog in front of the encampment, and everybody was trying to avoid it by going around to the right or left of it. Xi Yì was driving the chariot for Lord Li of Jin, and Luan Qian was the spearman on the right. Peng Ming was driving the chariot for King Gong of Chu, and Pan Dang was the spearman on the right. Shi Shou was driving the chariot for Lord Cheng of Zheng, and Tang Gou was the spearman on the right. Luan Shu and Fan Xie led their lineage troops, flanking Lord Li on either side as they proceeded. The lord’s chariot became mired in a bog. Luan Shu was about to take the Prince of Jin into his own chariot when Luan Qian said, “Shu, withdraw! The domain has given you a great responsibility as commander; how can you act arbitrarily about it? Moreover, to encroach upon another’s office is presumption; to abandon one’s own office is negligence; and to leave one’s post is dereliction. In what you are doing there are these three offenses. You must not be guilty of them!”26 He then hauled the lord’s chariot out of the bog. On the guisi day (23), Pan Wang’s son, Pan Dang, and Yang Youji had heaped up leather for armor and shot at them, penetrating seven layers. They showed the results to the king, saying, “When you have two subjects like us, my lord, what is there to worry about in battle?” The king burst out in anger, “You are a great disgrace to our domain! If you shoot tomorrow morning, your skill in archery will be the death of you!” 25 Hexagram no. 24 in the Zhou Changes. 26 Luan Qian’s peremptory tone and manner of calling his father Luan Shu by name indicate the primacy of political hierarchy over family hierarchy and also mark the distinction between duty owed the ruler and duty owed the domain.

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Wei Yi had dreamed of shooting at the moon. The arrow hit it, while he withdrew and sank into mud. He sought divination about this, and the result said, “The Ji clan is the sun; a different clan, the moon.27 The moon must mean the king of Chu. If you shot at him and hit him and then withdrew and sank into the mud, then you too will certainly die.” When the day of the battle came, Wei Yi shot at King Gong and hit him in the eye. The king summoned Yang Youji and gave him two arrows and had him shoot at Wei Yi. He hit Wei Yi in the neck, and the latter slumped over his quiver. Handing one arrow back to the king, Yang Youji reported on the discharge of his mission. The Jin commander Xi Zhi behaves toward King Gong of Chu with exem­ plary decorum, and this is later used against him (ZT Cheng 17.10). Lord Cheng of Zheng is spared because Xi Zhi and Han Jue respect the dignity of an enemy ruler. Luan Qian, Xi Zhi’s spearman on the right, also displays great courtesy toward the Chu commander Zichong. Three times Xi Zhi encountered the Master of Chu’s personal troops. Whenever he saw the Master of Chu, he invariably dismounted, doffed his helmet, and hastened with small steps to the subordinate position. The Master of Chu sent the deputy for artisans Xiang to salute him with a bow as gift, saying, “Just now when we were in the thick of battle, there was one with brownish-red leather gaiters; he was a noble man. A moment ago he saw me, the deficient one, and made hasty steps. Could he have been injured?” Xi Zhi received the visitor, doffed his helmet, and accepted the message with these words: “I, Zhi, as your external subject, have followed my own unworthy ruler into battle. With your blessing, my lord, I have participated in the ranks of those donning armor and helmets. I do not dare bow to your command but presume to report that I am not wounded. For the condescension of your command, I will presume to salute your envoy with short bows in view of the business we have at hand.” He withdrew after three short bows to the envoy. Han Jue of Jin was pursuing the Liege of Zheng when the driver of his chariot, Du Hunluo, said, “Let us pursue him with all speed! His driver 27 The Jin house has the same clan name as the Zhou royal house, Ji. The diviner claims that the sun symbolizes the ruling houses with the name Ji, while the moon symbolizes ruling houses with other clan names (such as Mi, clan name of the Chu kings).

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is constantly looking back instead of paying attention to his horses. We can catch up with them.” Han Jue said, “I must not for a second time bring shame on the ruler of a domain.”28 They thus gave up the chase. Xi Zhi was pursuing the Liege of Zheng when his spearman on the right, Fu Hanhu, said, “Let us intercept them with a light chariot. I will catch up with the chariot and board it, then take the Zheng ruler captive and bring him down.” Xi Zhi said, “Injuring the ruler of a domain will incur punishment.” They also gave up the chase. The Zheng ruler’s chariot driver, Shi Shou, said, “It was only because Lord Yi of Wei did not take down his banner that he was defeated at Xing.”29 He thus put the pennant inside his quiver. Tang Gou said to Shi Shou, “You stay by the ruler’s side. For those suffering defeat, one thing is of primary importance. I do not compare to you—you take the ruler with you and escape; I beg leave to stay.” He then died in battle. The Chu army was driven into dangerous terrain. Shushan Ran said to Yang Youji, “Despite the ruler’s command, you must shoot for the sake of the domain.”30 He thus shot one and then another arrow, each time killing his man. Shushan Ran seized a captured Jin man and hurled him; the body struck a Jin chariot and broke its crossbar. The Jin army thus halted its advance, having taken Gongzi Pei of Chu captive. Luan Qian, seeing Zichong’s pennant, made this request: “The men of Chu said of this pennant that it is Zichong’s flag of command. That man must be Zichong. Formerly, when I was an envoy in Chu, Zichong asked how the valor of Jin men is shown. I submitted, ‘We love the orderly arrangement of the troops.’ He asked, ‘And how is that shown?’ I replied, ‘We love to calmly take our time.’ Now the two domains are engaged in warfare, yet we are not sending an envoy; that cannot be called orderly arrangement. Facing battle, we eat our words; that cannot be called calmly taking our time. I beg permission to send someone in my stead to offer a drink.” The Jin ruler assented. Luan Qian sent an envoy, holding the wine vessel and offering a drink, to go to Zichong with these words: “Our unworthy ruler, lacking proper envoys, has made Qian bear the spear in

28 Han Jue may be referring to the battle of An (ZT Cheng 2.3, 589 BCE), when he caught up with Lord Qing of Qi. Alternatively, he may be referring to the injury that King Gong had already suffered. 29 See chapter 8, Min 2.5. 30 The king disapproved of Yang Youji’s boastfulness and might have forbidden him to shoot, although Yang Youji has already shot once at the king’s behest.

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attendance. He therefore cannot honor the exertions of your followers in person and has sent me, a nonentity, to offer you a drink in his stead.” Zichong said, “That fine man once spoke to me about this in Chu. This must be the reason. Did he then remember?” He received the wine and drank it, and he resumed beating the war drums only after dismissing the envoy. The battle began at dawn and had not ended by the time stars appeared. Both Jin and Chu prepare for battle in an expeditious and circumspect fash­ ion. Zifan’s inebriation at a critical juncture leads to Chu’s defeat. Fan Xie, however, considers Jin’s victory ill deserved and a cause for anxiety rather than celebration. Zifan gave orders to the military officers to attend to the wounded, to replenish the ranks of the infantry and soldiers in chariots, to repair the armor and the weapons, and to inspect the chariots and horses. They were to eat at cockcrow and to abide by none but his commands. The men of Jin were troubled by this. Fen Huang circulated the following order: “Inspect the chariots, replenish the ranks, feed the horses, sharpen the weapons, put in order the battle formations, strengthen your ranks, have a good meal, and repeat the prayer before battle. Tomorrow we fight again!” He thereupon released the Chu prisoners. 31 The Chu king heard about these preparations and summoned Zifan for consultation. Gu­yang, the young servant to Zifan, had been offering him wine, and Zifan was so drunk that he could not present himself for an audience. The king said, “Heaven is defeating Chu! I cannot afford to wait.” He thus escaped with his troops during the night. Jin entered Chu’s encampment and for three days fed on the store of grains there. Fan Xie stood in front of Lord Li’s chariot and horses and said, “The ruler is young, and the various subjects are inept—how did we come to this? The ruler should be vigilant! The Zhou Documents says, ‘It is the Mandate that does not remain constant’; this means that only those with virtue can secure it.” In the aftermath of Chu defeat, the Chu commander Zifan, goaded by the other commander, Zichong, kills himself, fulfilling Qu Wuchen’s curse made nine years earlier (chapter 3, Cheng 7.5). 31 The goal is to have the prisoners spread the word about Jin’s preparations for battle.

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Chu troops turned back. When they reached Xia, the king sent someone to speak to Zifan, “When a former great officer brought about the army’s defeat, the ruler was not present. 32 You, sir, have nothing to blame yourself for. The guilt is mine, the deficient one.” Zifan bowed twice, knocking his head to the ground, and said, “If the ruler should grant me the gift of death, I will not perish even in death. It was my troops who fled. The guilt is mine.” Zichong sent someone to Zifan with these words, “As for the man who earlier brought defeat to the troops, you too must have heard what happened to him. 33 Why don’t you make your own plans?” Zifan replied, “Even had I not had the example of the former high officer, with you, sir, thus commanding me, how dare I act against duty? I have brought about the loss of the ruler’s troops—would I dare to forget that I should die?” The king sent an envoy to stop him, but before he reached him, Zifan had died. The battle of Yanling has a violent aftermath. Fan Xie’s repeated predictions of imminent disaster are soon fulfilled in the annihilation of the Xi lineage in the following year (ZT Cheng 17.10) and the assassination of the Jin ruler shortly thereafter (ZT Cheng 18.1). This bloody outcome develops from the deepening rift between the Jin ruling house and its ministerial lineages, as well as from deadly rivalry among those lineages.

32 The former great officer refers to Cheng Dechen. King Cheng of Chu was not present at the battle of Chengpu (chapter 4), and Cheng Dechen was held responsible for Chu’s defeat. 33 Zichong is referring to Cheng Dechen’s suicide. By thus driving Zifan to do the same, Zichong confirms Xi Zhi’s earlier judgments that the two commanders “hate each other.”

Chapter 6

Ritual Propriety

W e h av e s e e n i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r t h a t e v e n i n military conflict, victory or defeat seems often to hinge upon questions of ritual propriety, and it is consequently listed among “the instruments of battle” (see chapter 5, Cheng 16.5). It is one of the principles, including those considered in the next three sections as well, that is meant to restrain violence and moderate human behavior. In fact, no subject is mentioned more frequently in Zuozhuan than ritual propriety (li). If required to answer with a single term what Zuozhuan is “all about,” one could hardly do better than to respond, “ritual propriety.” That being said, the notion of li as it appears in Zuozhuan is varied and complex and might not in all cases be well served by the translation “ritual propriety.” Originally, li meant something like “sacrificial rites” and, by extension, how to conduct such rites. This fairly narrow meaning was soon expanded to include a wide range of social, political, and domestic ceremonies, which aimed at returning the world to an idealized order that presumably existed before the social and political breakdown of the Spring and Autumn period. At its heart, ritual begins with the recognition that ancient Chinese society, like so many others both ancient and modern, was rigidly hierarchical and that one must be keenly aware of one’s position with regard to others. This hierarchy, at least in some conceptions, includes the realm of deities and deceased ancestors, to whom one maintains a ritual responsibility. Compliance with ritual, whether that of a sacrificial offering or a simple interaction between superior and inferior, allowed duties to be discharged in an orderly and predictable fashion. Confucius is said to have been known during his lifetime as a great teacher of ritual propriety (see chapter 13, Zhao 7.12). As time passed, the realm of ritual propriety expanded and tended to become more abstract. It sometimes appears in Zuozhuan, particularly in the 115

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second half of the Spring and Autumn period, almost as a principle or set of principles that enables good governance and even sustains the cosmos. While this expansion in the meaning of ritual propriety generally takes place over time, older meanings remain alive so that it is dangerous to presume that an older, more restrictive usage might always represent an earlier stratum of the text. Moreover, one sees in Zuozhuan instances of disagreement over precisely what ritual propriety actually entails. That is, like so many aspects of the Zuozhuan world, it becomes a topic of considerable debate and disagreement. For example, in Zhao 5.3 below, the Prince of Jin understands ritual propriety as a kind of performance that entails following the proper, traditional ceremonies, whereas the prince’s interlocutor, Ru Qi, understands ritual propriety as those administrative procedures that make for proper government. And in another passage, Zhao 25.3, the great Zheng minister Zichan is quoted as saying that ritual propriety is “the warp thread of heaven and earth.” In such a context, the translation “ritual propriety” hardly seems adequate, and one is tempted to think of li, instead, as something very much like the eternal principle of good order. From another ­perspective, ritual propriety can be invoked to mask self-interests, power politics, and strategic calculations, as in Xian Zhen’s speeches during the battle of Chengpu (chapter 4, Xi 28.3).

“Not in Accor da nce w ith R it ua l Propr i et y ” The ten relatively brief passages with which we begin this section all contain the Chinese-language formula fei li ye, “not in accordance with ritual pro­ priety,” which is most often employed to indicate that some ceremonial behavior or activity has not been carried out in a way that takes proper account of the hierarchies of rank, position, and gender. Altogether, this ­formula appears fifty times in Zuozhuan and is disproportionately dis­ tributed in the first third of the text. In most of these cases, the ritually inappropriate act is a sign that some dire consequence will follow, which it inevitably does. The first two passages concern such key issues as mourning, burial, and offering of sacrifices, all topics fairly close to the original mean­ ing of the term “ritual.”

Yin 1.5 (722 BCE)  In autumn, in the seventh month, the Heavenappointed king sent his steward Xuan to us to present the funeral

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equipment for Lord Hui and Zhong Zi. They were late in arriving, and Lady Zi also had not yet expired, and that is why the steward is named.1 The Son of Heaven is buried after seven months, leaders of the same axle length attending; a prince after five months, those joined with him in covenants attending; a high officer after three months, those of the same rank attending; and a regular officer after a full month, his relatives by marriage attending. To fail to give gifts for the dead while the body is still lying in state, to fail to express condolences to the living while they are still in mourning, and to anticipate the unlucky event are not in accordance with ritual propriety. Xi 31.3 (629 BCE)  In summer, in the fourth month, we divined four times about the sacrifice in the outskirts. The results were not favorable, so we spared the sacrificial animals; this was not in accordance with ritual propriety. Still we performed sacrifices to the Three Prospects; this too was not in accordance with ritual propriety.2 According to ritual, one does not divine about regular sacrifices but divines about the proper sacrificial animal and the date. Only after one has divined the day is a bull called “a sacrificial animal.” For the sacrificial animal to have been settled upon and only then to divine about the sacrifice in the outskirts shows laziness and disrespect on the part of those in positions of authority. The prospect sacrifice is but a component of the sacrifice in the outskirts. If one does not perform the sacrifice in the outskirts, it is acceptable not to have a prospect sacrifice. The following two passages emphasize the importance of a ruler’s adherence to proper ritual in presenting gifts, granting privileges, and undertaking travel. Recall that the ritual specialist Cao Gui is also a master strategist (chapter 5, Zhuang 10.1). The first sentence of this passage is a verbatim quotation of Annals Yin 1.4, and what follows is commentary on that line. The implication of the commentary is that this was an inappropriate action, and steward Xuan’s name is provided as a form of blame. Zhong Zi (also called here “Lady Zi”) was a woman from the domain of Song who became a wife of Lord Hui and the mother of the future Lord Huan of Lu (see chapter 2, Yin 11.8). 2 The prospect sacrifice is offered to the rivers and mountains of one’s own domain and may be related to the notion of offering sacrifice to landmarks within one’s purview (chapter 8, Ai 6.4). The Three Prospects for the domain of Lu are supposedly Mount Tai, the Yellow River, and the sea.

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Zhua ng 18.1 (676 BCE)  In the eighteenth year, in spring, the Duke of Guo and the Prince of Jin visited the court of the king. The king offered a feast and presented sweet wine. He then ordered them to offer toasts. He bestowed on each of them five pieces of jade and three horses; this was not in accordance with ritual propriety. When the king issues orders to the princes, if their titles and ranks are not the same, ritual requires different numbers of gifts. 3 He does not grant ritual privileges to those who do not deserve them. Zhua ng 23.1 (671 BCE)  In the twenty-third year, in summer, our lord went to Qi to observe the ceremonies of the altar of the earth; this was not in accordance with ritual propriety.4 Cao Gui remonstrated, “This may not be done. Ritual is the way to bring order to the people. Thus, meetings are used to teach the principles of hierarchy and to establish regulations for exchanging gifts. Court audiences are used to set right the duties of rank and to establish precedent among elder and younger. Punitive expeditions are used to chastise those who are not respectful. In order to practice these things on a grand scale, the princes have visits to the king, and the king has inspection tours. Except in these cases, the ruler does not travel. And when the ruler does travel, it must be recorded. If that which is recorded does not accord with the rules, what will posterity have to observe?” Ritual, as we have seen, also plays a critical role in military activity. In the first passage below, Lord Xuan of Lu is criticized for attacking Ju after failing to resolve the conflict between the small domains of Ju and Tan, and in the second, failure to protect an enemy envoy is deemed a violation of the proper ritual governing interdomain conflict.

Xua n 4.1 (605 BCE)  In the fourth year, in spring, our lord and the Prince of Qi tried to make peace between Ju and Tan. A Ju leader refused. Our lord attacked Ju and took Xiang. This was not in accordance with ritual propriety. Domains make peace through ritual pro­ priety, not through disorder. Attacking and then failing to establish 3 The ruler of Guo was of a higher rank than the ruler of Jin, although Jin was more powerful. 4 This line, which describes travel of the Lu lord, is quoted from Annals Zhuang 23.3.

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good order—that is disorder. If one quells disorder with disorder, what good order will there be? Without good order, how can one realize ritual propriety? Cheng 9.8 (582 BCE)  Luan Shu attacked Zheng. The leaders of Zheng sent Bojuan to negotiate for peace. The men of Jin killed him. This was not in accordance with ritual propriety. When armies are engaged in conflict, envoys should be allowed to move between them. The following two passages indicate the importance of following proper ritual in reckoning with unusual calendrical and celestial phenomena, here an eclipse.

Wen 6.9 (621 BCE)  In the intercalary month, our lord did not announce the first day of the month; this was not in accordance with ritual propriety. We use the intercalary month to correct the seasons. We use the seasons to perform activities. We use activities to enrich the people’s livelihood. The way of provid­i ng the people with livelihood lies precisely in this! Not to announce the first day of an intercalary month is to cast aside timely governance. How could one serve the people by doing this? Wen 15.5 (612 BCE)  In the sixth month, on the xinchou day, the first day of the month, there was an eclipse of the sun. Drums were beaten and an animal sacrifice was offered at the altar of earth. This was not in accordance with ritual propriety. When there is an eclipse of the sun, the Son of Heaven does not dine with full ceremony, but he does beat the drums at the altar of earth. The princes present gifts of silk at the altar and beat the drums at court. All these are done to manifest the intent of serving the spirits, instructing the people, and serving the ruler and to show that there are degrees to dignity. This is the correct way of old. We conclude the ten examples containing the formula “not in accordance with ritual propriety” with two cases concerning gender relations. Ritual violations of this type, like so many others, often become predictive. For example, Gongzi Hu’s sexual impropriety is implicitly linked to his failure to secure the succession, and when the Qi ruler, in the second passage, inap­ propriately escorts his sister to Lu, it points to an incestuous relationship between the two that will eventually have disastrous consequences (see chap­ ter 2, Huan 18.1).

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Yin 8.4 (715 BCE)  In the fourth month, on the jiachen day (6), Gongzi Hu of Zheng went to Chen to meet and escort home Gui as bride. On the xinhai day (13), he started homeward with the Lady Gui, and on the jia­ yin day (16), he entered Zheng. Qianzi of Chen was escorting the young woman. The couple first had sexual relations and only then sacrificed to the ancestors. Qianzi said, “In this they did not act as proper husband and wife but deceived their ancestors. This was not in accordance with ritual propriety. How will they be able to produce children?” Huan 3.6 (709 BCE)  The Prince of Qi escorted Lady Jiang to Huan; this was not in accordance with ritual propriety. In all cases when the daughter of a lord is married into a coequal domain and is a sister of the reigning lord, then a high minister escorts her to show ritual courtesy to the former ruler. If she is the child of the ruling lord, then a lowerranking minister escorts her. But if the marriage is to a greater domain, it is still a high minister who escorts her even if she is a child of the lord. If the marriage is to the Son of Heaven, then the ministers all go, but the lord himself does not escort her. If she marries into a smaller domain, then the senior high officers escort her.

Th e Significa nce of R it ua l Per for m a nce Whatever ritual is being carried out, one must be reverent and assiduous. In the following passage, one Zhou noble, Liu Duke Kang, correctly predicts doom for another, Cheng Duke Su, because of his irreverent attitude in receiv­ ing sacrificial meat. The prediction is fulfilled when Cheng Duke Su dies two months later (ZT Cheng 13.3).

Cheng 13.2 (578 BCE)  Our lord and the other princes visited the court of the king, and then, led by Liu Duke Kang and Cheng Duke Su, they joined forces with the Prince of Jin to attack Qin. When Cheng Duke Su received the sacrificial meat at the altar of earth, he was not ­reverent. Liu Duke Kang said, “I have heard that humans are born of the spirit of central harmony between heaven and earth and this is what is called their charge. That is why there are models for action and movement, ritual propriety and duty, majesty and bearing for securing this

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charge. The able ones nurture this charge and find their way to good fortune; the feckless ones ruin this charge and bring on disaster. “That is why noble men are assiduous in fulfilling ritual propriety, while common men exert themselves to the utmost in physical labor. In being assiduous in fulfilling ritual propriety, there is nothing equal to offering reverence. In exerting oneself to the utmost in physical labor, there is nothing equal to steady dedication. Reverence lies in nurturing the spirits; dedication lies in keeping to one’s vocation. The great affairs of the domain lie with sacrifice and warfare. With sacrifices, there is the ritual of distributing roasted sacrificial meat; with warfare, there is the ritual of receiving sacrificial meat. These are the critical junctures in serv­ ing the spirits. In the present case, Cheng Duke Su was slack; he has cast aside his charge. Surely he will not return!” A Wei envoy is impressed by the ritual propriety of Zheng leaders and com­ pares ritual propriety to a bath that can ameliorate the harsh heat of govern­ mental discipline.

Xia ng 31.10 (542 BCE)  In the twelfth month, Beigong Tuo served as assistant to Lord Xiang of Wei as they went to Chu. The visit was on account of the Covenant of Song. They passed through Zheng, and Yin Duan went to meet them at Feilin to honor their exertions. The ceremony was that for an official visit, but Yin Duan used the speech for honoring exertions. To reciprocate, Beigong Tuo entered the Zheng capital on an official visit. . . . When the visit was over, Beigong Tuo came out and said to the Prince of Wei, “Zheng abides by ritual propriety. This will bring blessings for several generations. As it says in the Odes, Who can suffer the heat And not bathe or wash?

Ritual propriety is to government what taking a bath is to heat. When they save themselves from the heat with a bath, what do they have to worry about?”

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Th e A m bigu iti e s a n d Di l e m m a s of R it ua l Propr i et y Perfect reverence in ritual performance can be belied by hubristic actions, as shown in the royal steward Kong’s criticism of Lord Huan of Qi (r. 685– 643 BCE), the first overlord, in the following passage.

Xi 9.2 (651 BCE)  In summer, a meeting was held at Kuiqiu; this was to renew the covenant and also to foster good relations and was in accordance with ritual propriety. The king sent the steward Kong to bestow sacrificial meat on the Prince of Qi, saying, “The Son of Heaven is offering sacrifices to Kings Wen and Wu and has sent me to bestow the sacrificial meat on his elder maternal uncle.” The Prince of Qi was about to descend the steps and bow in obeisance, but Kong said, “There is still a second command. The Son of Heaven sent me to say, ‘Because my elder maternal uncle is aged and has increased his toil, I am bestowing on him an additional rank. He need not descend and bow.’” The prince responded, “When Heaven’s majesty is no more than a few inches from my face, how would I, Xiaobo, dare to accept the command of the Son of Heaven but not descend and bow in obeisance? I fear that I might in that case tumble down below and thereby bring shame to the Son of Heaven. Would I dare to fail to descend and kneel?” He came down, knelt in obeisance, then ascended and received the sacrificial meat. Xi 9.3 (651 BCE)  In autumn, the Prince of Qi swore a covenant with the princes at Kuiqiu that said, “All who joined together with us to swear this covenant will, after the covenant is sworn, revert to good relations.” The steward Kong, who was returning early from the meeting, encountered Lord Xian of Jin and said, “There is no need to go to the meeting. The Prince of Qi does not strive for virtue but expends effort on distant expeditions. Thus, he attacked the Shan Rong in the north, he attacked Chu in the south, and he held this meeting in the west. I do not know about expeditions in the east, but the one in the west will fail. Everything turns on the matter of disorder! You, my lord, should be striving to quell disorder at home5 rather than expending effort on travel.” The Prince of Jin then returned home. 5

On the disorder in Jin caused by Li Ji, Lord Xian’s favorite, see chapter 2, Zhuang 28.2.

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Music is an essential component of ritual performance but can also signal ­ritual impropriety. In this case, the Chu nobleman Zifan ceremoniously entertains the Jin envoy Xi Zhi, supposedly to finalize a peace agreement, but the misuse of music shows a lack of good faith and sets the stage for the battle of Yanling four years later (chapter 5, Cheng 16.5). By offering an envoy the kind of musical performance appropriate for the meeting of rulers, Zifan s­ignifies the readiness to renew conflict.

Cheng 12.4 (579 BCE)  Xi Zhi of Jin went to Chu on an official visit and also to oversee the covenant. The Master of Chu offered him ceremonial toasts. Zifan was the Chu king’s assistant. He had had an underground chamber made in which bells and drums were suspended. Xi Zhi was about to ascend to the hall when the music of bells, chimes, and drums sounded from down below. He was so startled that he ran out. Zifan said, “Time is passing; our unworthy ruler is waiting. You, sir, should enter!” His guest said, “Your ruler has not forgotten the good relations between our former rulers and extends his favor to this humble servant, bestowing on him great ceremony, adding to that grandly prepared music. If, by the blessing of Heaven, our two rulers should meet, what can replace this? Your humble servant does not dare receive this honor.” Zifan said, “If, by the blessing of Heaven, our two rulers should meet,  they will have nothing but an arrow to exchange with each other. What use will there be for music? Our unworthy ruler is waiting. You, sir, should enter!” His guest said, “If they receive each other with an arrow, that is the greatest of disasters. What blessing is there? In an era of good government, when there are intervals of leisure from the affairs of the Son of Heaven, princes visit one another’s courts. Then there will be rituals of ceremonial toasts and feastings—ceremonial toasts to offer instruction in reverence and restraint; feasts to show kindness and beneficence.6 With reverence and restraint one practices proper ritual; with kindness and beneficence one lays out government policies. Government is realized through ritual propriety, and the people therewith find rest. The myriad officials receive orders, seeking morning audiences but not 6 The food and wine in ceremonial toasts are not consumed by the participants of the sacrifices—they are left for the spirits—hence they constitute a lesson in reverence and restraint.

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evening ones. This is how the lords and princes protect their people like shields and walls. Thus, it says in the Odes, Bold and stalwart warriors, Shields and walls of their lord and prince.7

But when there is disorder, the princes in their greed have no compunctions about invading other domains or pursuing their desires. Fighting over a mere stretch of land, they drive their people to the limit, conscripting the fighting men among them to be their own bellies and hearts, legs and rumps, claws and teeth. Thus, it says in the Odes, Bold and stalwart warriors, Belly and heart of their lord and prince.

When the proper way prevails under heaven, the lords can be shields and walls for their people, disciplining their own hearts and minds. With disorder, the situation is reversed. Now your words embody the way of disorder; they cannot be held up as a model. But you, sir, are the host. Dare I not follow?” He thus entered and completed the business. Upon his return he told Fan Xie about this. Fan Xie said, “Without ritual propriety, they are sure to eat their own words. Our death cannot be many days away!” The Wei minister Sun Linfu kills the Wei Lord Xian’s envoys and drives the Wei ruler into exile (chapter 8, Xiang 14.6). A vignette about archers pursu­ ing Lord Xian takes up the themes of how ritual behavior might be shaped by conflicting loyalties, in this case loyalty to a teacher and to a political leader. It further raises the question of whether loyalty to one’s teacher extends to one’s teacher’s teacher.

Xia ng 14.4 (559 BCE)  The lord sent Zijiao, Zibo, and Zipi, noble sons of Wei, to swear a covenant with Sun Linfu at Qiu Palace. Sun Linfu killed all of them. In the fourth month, on the jiwei day (26), the lord’s younger 7 Xi Zhi presents this quotation and the next one, both from the Odes, as having opposite meanings. But in the Odes, these lines are obviously analogous; both celebrate the importance of the warrior for his lord.

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brother Zizhan fled to Qi. The lord went to Juan and sent Zihang, another Wei noble son, to negotiate with Sun Linfu. Sun Linfu killed him too. The lord left the domain and fled to Qi. Sun Linfu pursued him and defeated his followers at He Marsh. The men of Juan arrested the remnants of the lord’s followers. Earlier, the Yin Lord Tuo had studied archery with the Yu Lord Cha, and the Yu Lord Cha had studied archery with Gongsun Ding. The two men pursued the lord, and Gongsun Ding was driving the lord’s chariot. The Yu Lord Cha said, “If I shoot, I will be turning against my teacher. If I don’t shoot, I will be punished. Will shooting perhaps accord with ritual propriety?” He shot twice at the two yokes over the horses’ necks and turned back. 8 The Yin Lord Tuo said, “You did that for your teacher, but for me he is farther removed.” He thus reversed his course and resumed the pursuit. Gongsun Ding gave the reins to the lord and shot the Yin Lord Tuo, piercing his arm.

Th e Roya l Zhou Dom a in a n d “For m er K ings” a s th e Point of R efer ence for R it ua l Propr i et y The following passages demonstrate that the correct ritual practice is often said to derive from precedents, especially those associated with the royal domain. In the first, Qingfu, murderer of two of Lu Lord Zhuang’s sons (chapter 2, Zhuang 32.5, Min 2.3), is identified as the source of trouble in Lu. However, the Qi envoy tells Lord Huan of Qi that Lu will survive because it “still upholds Zhou ritual.” The second passage shows the extraordinary ritual fastidiousness of a Lu envoy. Elsewhere in Zuozhuan (ZT Zhao 2.1), we are informed that the textual legacy concerning ritual was all preserved in the domain of Lu. (For an example of Zhou rules of propriety influencing reform in the domain of Jin, see chapter 9, Xuan 16.4.)

Min 1.5 (661 BCE)  In winter, Zhongsun Jiao of Qi came to look into the difficulties in Lu. That the text says only “Zhongsun” is likewise to

8 These were yokes over the two middle horses in the team of four horses drawing the chariot. By shooting at the yokes, Cha seeks to both fulfill his charge and not betray his teacher.

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express approval of him.9 When Zhongsun Jiao went back home, he said, “If they do not get rid of Qingfu, the troubles of Lu will not end.” The lord of Qi said, “What can we do to get rid of him?” Zhongsun Jiao replied, “Since the troubles will not end, he will bring himself down. You, my lord, should wait for it!” The lord said, “Can Lu be taken?” He replied, “It cannot. It still upholds Zhou ritual. Zhou ritual constitutes its trunk. I have heard it said, ‘When a domain is about to perish, the trunk must fall first. Only then will the branches and leaves follow.’ If Lu does not abandon Zhou ritual, it cannot be shaken. You, my lord, should strive to settle the troubles of Lu and draw close to them. Draw close to those who have ritual, rely upon the solid and stable, stay away from the disaffected and duplicitous, and overturn the benighted and disorderly. These are the instruments of the overlord.” The last part of Zuozhuan chronicles the rise of the southern domain Wu. Although it claims descent from pre-dynastic Zhou leaders, Lu ministers observe that it violates Zhou ritual.

Ai 7.3 (488 BCE)  In summer, our lord met with Wu at Zeng. Wu came and demanded one hundred sets of sacrificial animals. Zifu Jingbo replied, “The former kings never had such a request.” The men from Wu said, “Song offered us one hundred sets of sacrificial animals, and Lu cannot come second to Song. What is more, Lu has offered Jin high officers more than ten sets of sacrificial animals. Is it not acceptable for the Wu King to demand one hundred sets?” Zifu Jingbo said, “Fan Yang of Jin discarded ritual propriety in his greed and intimidated our humble settlement with the greatness of his domain, so our humble settlement offered him eleven sets of sacrificial animals. If your ruler wishes to command the princes by means of ritual propriety, then there are specifications. If he too discards ritual propriety, then he will also be guilty of excesses like Fan Yang. For the Kings of Zhou, when they established rituals, the number for the accoutrements of the great never exceeded twelve; they understood this as Heaven’s number signifying greatness. Now if you discard the Zhou rituals and 9 That is, the Annals, the “text” in question, does not give the personal name, which is Jiao.

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say that there must be one hundred sets of sacrificial animals, then indeed we will have no choice but to do just as your functionaries direct.” The men of Wu did not yield. Zifu Jingbo said, “Wu is going to fall. They dismiss Heaven and neglect their roots. If we do not give the animals to them, they will harm us.” Therefore, the hundred sets of sacrificial animals were given.

E x pa n ding Notions of R it ua l Pi et y The expansion of the realm of ritual propriety is fully demonstrated in the final passages in this section, all taken from the last lords of Zuozhuan. Ru Qi maintains, in the first, that ritual goes far beyond mere ceremonial exper­ tise, an argument borne out by Lord Zhao’s failure to control the powerful lineages in Lu and his exile twenty-one years later (chapter 7, Zhao 25.6). A similar argument, attributed to Zichan (chapter 11) and found in the second, is one of Zuozhuan’s grandest expositions of ritual and its role in ordering human life in accordance with cosmic principles. Finally, the great Qi minister Yan Ying points out the political failures of Lord Jing of Qi and argues that ritual propriety, properly understood, becomes a grand system of proper governance and exemplary social order.

Zhao 5.3 (537 BCE)  When our lord went to Jin, he made no mistakes in ritual performance, all the way from the ceremony recognizing his exertions in the outskirts of the city right through to the presentation of gifts. The Prince of Jin said to Ru Qi, “Is the Prince of Lu not excellent in his performance of ritual?” He replied, “In what way does the Prince of Lu comprehend ritual?” The lord said, “What do you mean? A man who in no way violated ritual, all the way from the ceremony recognizing his exertions in the outskirts of the city right through to the presentation of gifts! In what way does he not comprehend it?” He replied, “These are ceremonies. They cannot be called ritual. Ritual is that by which one keeps the domain, implements administrative com­ mands, and does not lose one’s subjects. At present, the issuing of administrative commands is in the hands of the great houses of Lu, and he can­not retrieve them. He has Zijia Yibo but is incapable of employing him. He has violated his covenant with a great domain and bullied a small

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domain.10 He takes advantage of others’ difficulties but knows nothing of his own private affairs. The lord’s holdings have been divided in four parts, and the people get their sustenance elsewhere.11 Nobody’s thoughts are on the lord, yet he makes no plans for a good end. He acts as ruler of the domain, and the difficulties will affect him personally, yet he takes no thought of his situation. In these things are the very roots and branches of ritual, yet he busies himself with the petty details of ceremonial practice. Is it not far off the mark to say that he is excellent in his performance of ritual?” The noble man said that in this instance Ru Qi comprehended ritual. Zhao 25.3 (517 BCE)  The summer meeting at Huangfu was held to strategize on behalf of the royal house. The Jin minister Zhao Yang ordered the high officers of the princes to transport grain to the king and to provide garrison guards. He said, “Next year we will install the king in power.” You Ji of Zheng had an audience with Zhao Yang, who asked about the proper rituals for saluting, yielding, and turning. He replied, “These are ceremonies. This is not the same thing as ritual propriety.” Zhao Yang said, “I presume to ask what is meant by ‘ritual propriety,’ then.” You Ji replied: “I heard our former high officer Zichan say that ritual propriety is the warp thread of heaven, the proper duty of earth, and the best conduct of the people. It is the warp thread of heaven and earth, and it is this that people make their model. They make a model of the brightness of heaven, they go along with the nature of earth, and they are born in the midst of the six vapors and use the five resources.12 The vapors become the five flavors, emerge as the five colors, and form patterns as the five tones.13 “With excess these become disordered and chaotic, and the people lose their innate qualities. Thus, ritual was made to sustain these innate 10 The ruler of Lu turned against a Jin-led covenant and annexed Ju territories. 11 Earlier (ZT Zhao 5.1), the holdings of the Lu lord’s house had been divided into four parts, with two parts going to the Ji lineage and one part each to the Meng and Shusun lineages. 12 The six vapors are yin, yang, wind, rain, dark, and light. The five resources are metal, wood, water, fire, and earth. 13 The five flavors are sour, salty, acrid, bitter, and sweet. The five colors are blue, yellow, red, white, and black. The five tones are five notes in the pentatonic scale: do, re, mi, sol, la.

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qualities. There were the six domestic animals, the five sacrificial animals, and the three offerings to furnish the five flavors.14 There were the nine textile patterns, the six color mixtures, and the five color patterns to furnish the five colors.15 There were the nine songs, the eight airs, the seven notes, and the six pitches to furnish the five tones. Ruler and subject, above and below, were created in such a way as to follow the model of the proper duty of the earth. Husband and wife, outside and inside, were created in such a way as to put in order the two kinds of affairs.16 Father and son, elder brother and younger brother, elder sister and younger sister, nephew and uncle, relations by marriage and parents-in-law, were created in such a way as to figure forth the brightness of Heaven. Administrative affairs, labor and exertions, conduct and commitments, were created in such a way as to accord with the four seasons. Punishments and penalties, authority and legal suits, which cause the people to have fear and restraint, were created in such a way as to resemble thunder and lightning, with its deadly strikes. Warmth and kindness, generosity and affability, were made to imitate Heaven’s way of giving birth and fostering things. In the people there are liking and disliking, joy and anger, sorrow and pleasure, emotions that originate in the six vapors. For this reason, appropriate types of behavior were examined and imitated so as to govern these six impulses. For sorrow there is wailing and weeping, for pleasure there is singing and dancing, for joy there is giving and forgiving, for anger there is war and contention; joy originates in liking and anger originates in disliking. For this reason rulers were careful in their conduct and made their orders trustworthy, using troubles and blessings and rewards and punishments to govern death and life. Life is something that is liked. Death is something that is disliked. To like a thing is to take pleasure in it. To dislike a thing is to find sorrow in it. When there is no impropriety in the way one feels sorrow or takes pleasure, then it is possible to be in accord with the nature of heaven and earth and, in this way, to last long.” 14 The six domestic animals are horse, bovine, sheep, chicken, dog, and pig. The five sacri­ ficial animals are bovine, sheep, pig, dog, and chicken. The three offerings are bovine, sheep, and pig. 15 The nine textile patterns are dragon, mountain, flowers with insects, fire, and tigers and apes (these being painted on the surface of the cloth), then water plants, white rice kernels, interlocking white and black, and interlocking black and blue (these four being embroidered upon the cloth). 16 The two kinds are yin and yang, or soft and hard. According to Du Yu, this means that husband and wife will attend to affairs outside and inside, respectively.

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Zhao Yang said, “Extraordinary indeed is the greatness of ritual propriety!” He replied, “Ritual propriety is the marking line of superior and inferior, the warp and woof of heaven and earth, and the basis for the people’s livelihood. That is why the former kings esteemed it. Therefore, men who are able to bend or straighten themselves in order to enter into the realm of ritual propriety are called perfected men. Is it not fitting, this greatness of ritual propriety?” Zhao Yang said, “I would request to hold this saying close for the rest of my life.” Zhao 26.11 (516 BCE)  The Prince of Qi was sitting with Yan Ying in the Grand Chamber. With a sigh, the lord said, “How lovely this chamber is! Who will own it when I am gone?” Yan Ying said, “May I presume to ask what you mean?” The lord said, “I take it to be a matter of virtue.” He replied, “As you have put the matter, it will be the Chen lineage. Although the Chens lack any great virtue, they are generous to the people. They use their grain measures to tax their public holdings sparingly and give to the people generously. Because you tax onerously and the Chens give generously, the people have gone over to them. As it says in the Odes, Although I have no virtuous attainment to share with you, I will sing and dance.

The people sing and dance in response to the gifts of the Chen lineage. If future generations are even slightly remiss in their conduct, and the Chen lineage has not perished, then the domain will be theirs.” The lord said, “Well said! What can we do about it?” He replied, “Only ritual propriety can bring an end to this situation. According to ritual propriety, the gifts of a lineage cannot equal those of the ruler’s domain. Then the people will not relocate, the farmers will not move, the craftsmen and merchants will not change their occupation, the officers will not fail in their duties, the court officials will not encroach on their superiors, and high officers will not collect benefits owed to the lord.” The lord said, “Well said! This is something I have not been capable of doing. Only today have I discovered the usefulness of ritual propriety in the governing of a domain.” Yan Ying replied, “The usefulness of ritual propriety for governing a domain is old, as old as heaven and earth. When the ruler commands

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well, the subject follows. When the father is kind, the son is filial. When the elder brother is loving, the younger brother is respectful. When the husband is gentle, the wife is amenable. When the mother-in-law is kind, the daughter-in-law is obedient. That is in accordance with ritual propriety. So when the ruler gives commands without erring, the subject follows without duplicity. When the father is kind in his teaching, the son is filial in his remonstrances. When the elder brother is loving and friendly, the younger brother is respectful and compliant. When the husband is gentle yet dutiful, the wife is amenable yet principled. When the mother-in-law is kind and accommodating, the daughter-in-law is obedient and complacent. These are the fine institutions of ritual propriety.” The lord said, “Well said! Only today have I heard of these heights of ritual.” He replied, “This is what the former kings received from heaven and earth for the managing of the people, and that is why they held it in high esteem.”

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Temporal Order and the Arc of History

V i s io n s of r i t ua l p r op r i e t y i n c h a p t e r 6 of t e n l o ok to the past for inspiration. The ancient and recent past provides models and warnings to explain, justify, or correct the present in diplomatic negotiations and policy recommendations. Internal cross references in Zuozhuan show layers of memory; for example, commanders in the battle of Bi use the battle of Chengpu as a reference point (chapter 5, Xuan 12.1), and King Ling of Chu chooses Lord Huan of Qi as model for emulation (chapter 10, Zhao 4.3). The Chu minister Wu Ju persuades King Ling to follow the precedent of King Cheng of Chu in showing clemency toward the ruler of a domain Chu vanquished (ZT Zhao 4.4), even as King Cheng’s act is inspired by the example of King Wu of Zhou (ZT Xi 6.4). Speakers often appeal to Kings Wen and Wu of Zhou, the Zhou conquest of Shang, and the early Zhou political order as exemplary models. More ancient legends are sometimes recounted as esoteric knowledge, although they can also deliver relevant lessons. However, the past is also subject to manipulation and leaves room for contention. One Jin envoy systematically distorts the history of Qin-Jin relations in a letter severing relations with Qin (chapter 12, Cheng 13.3). An insurgent Zhou prince legitimizes his claim to the throne by elaborately retelling Zhou history (ZT Zhao 26.9). Conceptions of temporal order and spatial order overlap. Arguments on how cultural others should be treated or situated spatially often hinge on their historical and genealogical ties (or lack thereof) with the central domains (chapter 15). The other end of this continuity lies in the future; duly fulfilled prophecies recast the present or the past as the future, and how the present will be remembered as the past in the future emerges as a central concern in several compelling speeches. Indeed, rhetorical excellence is almost inconceivable without reference to historical precedents and the intersections of past, 132

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present, and future. The use of the Documents and the Odes to support various positions points to the same continuum by confirming these textual traditions as repositories of ancient wisdom. The Zheng minister Zichan (chapter 11) once remarks, “good and bad repeat themselves in a cycle” and on this principle predicts that the hubristic King Ling of Chu (chapter 10) will meet his doom in less than three years, making it one Jupiter cycle (twelve years) since he murdered his predecessor (ZT Zhao 11.5). Many predictions in Zuozhuan are tied to Jupiter’s movement. However, we do not find broad assertions on “the shape of history,” dynastic cycles, the succession of the five phases, or teleology glorifying the current ruling house—elements that appear in varying combinations in later dynastic histories. Instead, reflections on the temporal arc of events are dominated by visions of decline and intimations of inevitable mutability (Zhao 3.3). One such statement on inexorable change comes from the scribe Mo of Cai, when he discusses the death of Lord Zhao of Lu in exile (Zhao 32.4). In that passage the scribe speaks as one knowledgeable about the past, discerns larger temporal patterns, and applies that knowledge to a contemporary situation. As noted in the Introduction, the shi or scribe performs many functions in Zuozhuan. The scribe Mo, for example, appears elsewhere in Zuozhuan as a diviner, an interpreter of dreams, an opponent of formalizing legal codes (chapter 9, Zhao 29.5), and a master of dragon lore (chapter 14, Zhao 29.4). Two remarkable examples of scribes in action in this section demonstrate the momentousness of recording the fact or its kernel of truth—their commitment to recording contemporaneous events defines for posterity the meanings of historical judgment. Ideals about what a factual record of events with its implied judgment should achieve are projected on the Annals, named as an exemplary text on two occasions in Zuozhuan. The sagacious and principled scribes offering judgments on the assassination and exile of rulers in Jin, Qi, and Lu draw attention to the rise of ministerial lineages and the decline of the ruling houses in those states. The ministerial lineages in Lu and Jin will eventually face the same pattern of usurpation from their own retainers, giving credence to the notion of a downward devolution of power in the two and a half centuries covered by Zuozhuan.

Th e Use s of th e Pa st in Diplom atic R h etor ic Military aggression is sometimes justified as the correction of ancient wrongs. Analogously, appeals to ancient ties can fend off attacks.

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Xi 26.3 (634 BCE)  In summer, Lord Xiao of Qi attacked our northern marches. . . . Our lord sent Zhan Xi to honor the troop’s exertions with provisions, and he had Zhan Xi receive commands from his father Zhan Qin.1 The Prince of Qi had not yet entered Lu territory, and so Zhan Xi went to where he was and said, “Our unworthy ruler has heard that you, my lord, have lifted up your own precious foot and will condescend to enter our humble settlement. He has sent his lowly servant to honor your functionaries’ exertions.” The Prince of Qi said, “Are the men of Lu afraid?” He responded, “The lesser men are afraid, but the noble men are not.” The Prince of Qi said, “Your houses are as empty as suspended chime stones, and your fields are bare of fresh grass.2 Upon what do you rely so as not to be afraid?” He responded, “We rely upon the commands of the former kings. Previously, the Lu ancestor Zhou Duke and the Qi ancestor Grand Lord were like arms and legs to the Zhou house, bracing and supporting King Cheng. King Cheng honored their exertions and bestowed upon them a covenant that said, ‘May your sons and grandsons in every generation do no harm to one another.’ This covenant was stored away in the covenant archives, and the grand preceptor took responsibility for keeping it. For thus it was that your father Lord Huan of Qi gathered together the princes and made plans for dealing with disharmony; he mended the gaps and rescued others from calamity. This was to make manifest the age-old duties. When you, my lord, acceded to your position, the princes looked upon this with hope and said, ‘Surely he will keep to the achievements of Lord Huan.’ Our humble settlement consequently did not dare assemble together and keep to our fortifications but said, ‘How could he, nine years after his succession, throw aside the commands and reject his duties? What would this mean for the former ruler? He certainly will not do this.’ Relying on this, they are not afraid.” The Prince of Qi then turned back. King Zhuang of Chu attacks the Rong tribe threatening Zhou but proceeds to question Zhou prerogatives by asking about its cauldrons, symbols of legit­ imate mandate. A Zhou prince invokes the history of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou to defend Zhou sovereignty. 1 To “honor the exertions” of enemy troops is a customary expression for negotiations. 2 Given the angled shape of the chime stones, when hung they looked like peaked roofs with nothing at all beneath them. A house “as empty as suspended chime stones” becomes a common idiom for destitution.

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Xua n 3.3 (606 BCE)  The Master of Chu attacked the Rong of Luhun, and consequently reached the Luo River. He drilled his troops at the border of Zhou. King Ding sent Wangsun Man to honor the exertions of the Master of Chu. The latter asked about the size and weight of the cauldrons. Wangsun Man replied, “Size and weight depend on virtue, not on the cauldrons. In the past, just when Xia possessed virtue, men from afar depicted various creatures, and the nine superintendents submitted metal, so that cauldrons were cast with images of various creatures. The hundred things were therewith completely set forth, and the people thus knew the spirits and the evil things. That was why when the people entered rivers, marshes, mountains, and forests, they would not meet what could harm them, and the sprites of the hills and waters could not get at them. Thus, they were able to harmonize with those above and below them and to receive Heaven’s blessings. The last Xia king, Jie, possessed dimmed virtue, and the cauldrons were moved to the house of Shang, there to remain for six hundred years. The last Shang king, Zhòu, was violent and tyrannical, and the cauldrons were moved to the house of Zhou. When virtue is bright and resplendent, the cauldrons, though small, are heavy. When virtue is distorted, dimmed, and confused, the cauldrons, though large, are light. Heaven blesses those of bright virtue, giving them the place for realizing and maintaining it. When King Cheng put the cauldrons in place at Jiaru, he divined about the number of generations and got thirty; he divined about the number of years and got seven hundred. This is what Heaven has commanded. Although Zhou virtue is in decline, the heavenly command has not yet changed. The question of whether the cauldrons are light or heavy may not be asked yet.”3

Th e Use s of th e Pa st in Polic y A rgu m ents Jin bribes Yu and twice asks for permission to pass through Yu in order to attack Guo. The Yu minister Gong Zhiqi tries to dissuade his ruler from granting passage by arguing that kinship and historical ties do not matter 3

The Zhou dynasty had thirty-six kings and lasted 874 years. Either this passage is written before the Qin annexation of Zhou (256 BCE), or the calculation refers to the time between the cauldrons’ being “put in place” at Jiaru by King Cheng (ca. 1042–1021 BCE) and their supposed sinking in the Si River in 327 BCE.

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given the expansionist ambitions of Lord Xian of Jin. Gong Zhiqi fails to pre­ vail, and Jin eventually annexes both Yu and Guo.

Xi 5.8 (655 BCE)  The Prince of Jin again gained permission to pass through Yu to attack Guo. Gong Zhiqi remonstrated, “Guo is a buffer for Yu. If Guo perishes, Yu will certainly follow it. Jin cannot be encouraged; aggressors cannot be trifled with. To do this once was too much; how could it be done a second time? The proverb says, ‘The chariot and its running boards depend upon each other; if the lips perish, the teeth grow cold.’ Surely that applies to Yu and Guo!” The Yu Lord said, “Jin is of our line. How could they harm us?” Gong Zhiqi responded, “Taibo and Yuzhong, the ancestor of Yu, are to the left of the Zhou ancestor Grand King in the Ancestral Temple. Taibo did not stay with his father the Grand King and so did not succeed him. Guo Zhong, the ancestor of Guo, and Guo Shu are to the right of King Wen’s father Wang Ji and were King Wen’s court ministers. Their merit was achieved in the king’s house and is preserved in the covenant archives. If Jin would destroy even Guo, what affection would it have for Yu? Moreover, can Yu be dearer to Jin than the Huan and Zhuang lineages, lateral branches of the Jin house? If Jin had affection for them, then for what crimes were the lines of Huan and Zhuang destroyed? Was it not only because they were threatening that they were exterminated? If they were relatives who seemed threatening because they received favor, and Jin still harmed them, how much more would this happen in the case of our domain?” Historical retrospection in the Jin minister Ru Qi’s policy argument mixes historical claims with calculations of power politics. Lord Ping’s mother wants Jin to put pressure on Lu to return territories it annexed from the small domain of Qıˇ, her natal domain. Ru Qi opposes this by pitting the claims of Xia gene­ alogy against that of Zhou.

Xia ng 29.11 (544 BCE)  The Prince of Jin sent the supervisor of the military, Ru Qi, to Lu to manage the return of Qıˇ territories, but Lu did not return all of them. The wife of Lord Dao of Jin, Lord Ping’s mother, said heatedly, “Ru Qi has taken bribes. If the former lord had known of this, he would not have approved of his doing so.” The lord told Ru Qi about this. Ru Qi said, “Yu, Guo, Jiao, Hua, Huo, Yang, Han, and Weì

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were all domains ruled by lineages with the clan name Ji. Jin became great by annexing them. How else can lands be taken, if not by invading small domains? There have been so many cases, from Lord Wu and Lord Xian on, of Jin taking over other domains that no one can curb them! Qıˇ, a remnant of Xia, has gone over to the Eastern Yi. Lu is descended from the Zhou Duke and has harmonious relations with Jin. Even if Lu were to be put in power in Qıˇ, it would still be acceptable. Why be concerned about this? Lu, in its dealings with Jin, has not been remiss with dues and offerings. Fine things and precious objects have come regularly from Lu, and the lords, ministers, and high officers of Lu have come one after another to our court. The scribes have never ceased writing about these things, and not a month passes without our treasury receiving something from them. Such a state of affairs is acceptable enough. Why must we impoverish Lu to enrich Qıˇ? What’s more, if the former lord had known of this, wouldn’t he have preferred to let his wife manage this? Why would he have had any use for this old servant?”

Th e Pr e sent in Fu t u r e M e mory Anticipation of how one’s action will be recorded is featured in remonstrance (chapter 6, Zhuang 23.1) and can influence choices. The Wei minister Ning Zhi drove the Wei ruler Lord Xian into exile six years earlier (chapter 3, Xiang 14.4) but is compelled on his deathbed, by the fear of leaving a bad name in historical records, to enjoin his son Ning Xi to bring back the exiled ruler. In order to do so, Ning Xi assassinates the reigning Wei ruler (ZT Xiang 26.2). The restored Lord Xian, unwilling to share power, will put Ning Xi to death (ZT Xiang 27.3).

Xia ng 20.7 (533 BCE)  When Ning Zhi of Wei was very ill, he ­sum­moned his son Ning Xi and said to him, “I am guilty of a crime against the ruler. I regret it, but it is too late to do anything about it. My name has been stored up in the bamboo slips of the princes, which say, ‘Sun Linfu and Ning Zhi drove out their ruler.’ If the ruler reenters the domain, then that can be covered up. If you can cover that up, then you are truly my son. If you cannot, then I will not come to imbibe your offerings even if there are ghosts and spirits and I am one of them; I would rather suffer hunger.” Ning Xi assented and promised to do so, and Ning Zhi then died.

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Th e A n na l s a n d Histor ica l I de a l s Scholars continue to debate the exact connection between the Annals and Zuo­ zhuan. The praise of the Annals in Zuozhuan enshrines ideals that seem to have been partially fulfilled in Zuozhuan rather than the Annals. “The sage,” com­ monly understood as Confucius, is said to have shaped it, although elsewhere in Zuozhuan, Confucius is never referred to as “the sage.” Another passage (ZT Zhao 31.5) reflects on the subtlety of wording and nomenclature in the Annals.

Cheng 14.4 (577 BCE)  In the ninth month, Qiaoru, bringing our lord’s wife, Lady Jiang, arrived from Qi. The lineage name of Qiaoru is left out to honor the lord’s wife. That is why the noble man said, “Such is the way that the Annals articulates judgment: subtle yet pointed, clear yet indirect, restrained yet richly patterned, exhaustive yet not excessive, chastising evil and encouraging goodness. Who but the sage could have shaped it?”

I m age s of th e Scr i be Lord Ling of Jin (r. 620–607), only in his teens at the time of his death, behaves outrageously and resists good counsel. In fact, his story seems to be told in such a way as to almost justify his murder. The Jin minister Zhao Dun (chapter 4, Xi 24.1), who later faces allegations of playing a role in the assassination, is first presented as the victim. The assassination of Lord Ling of Jin is followed by an exchange on the issue of guilt, and both the Annals and Zuozhuan name Zhao Dun as having assassinated his ruler, although Zhao Chuan commits the murder. (Similar issues of assigning blame come up in chapter 2, Xuan 4.2.) Dong Hu’s record is upheld in the tradition as his­ torical writing that “targets the intention.” Zhao Dun’s half-hearted flight and pardon of Zhao Chuan indicate complicity. By making Zhao Chuan instrumental in establishing the new Jin ruler, Zhao Dun also protects him from future prosecution. Confucius’s comments add another level of com­ plexity to the narrative.

Xua n 2.3 (607 BCE)  Lord Ling of Jin did not act like a ruler. He ­levied heavy taxes in order to lavishly decorate the walls of his palace with painted patterns. From atop his terrace he shot pellets at people,

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so that he could watch how they tried to escape from the pellets. When the cook did not thoroughly stew bear paws, Lord Ling had him killed and put in a reed basket, and he had women pass through court carrying the basket.4 When Zhao Dun and Fan Hui saw the dead man’s hand and asked what had happened, they were deeply dismayed. They were about to remonstrate, when Fan Hui said, “If our remonstrance is not heeded, then there is no one who can follow us. I beg leave to go first. If I am not heeded, then you can follow.” Over three stages he advanced, but only when he reached the eaves did the lord look at him. The lord said, “I know my errors. I will correct them.”5 Fan Hui bowed, touching the ground with his forehead, and replied, “Who among men is without errors? Having erred and being capable of correction—there is no good greater than that. As it says in the Odes, There is none who does not have beginnings, Few are those who fulfill them as endings.

For if it is so, then those who can make good their errors are few. If my lord can persist to the end, then the altars of the domain will have a solid foundation. Surely it is not only your subjects who rely on that! As it also says in the Odes, The ritual vestment had holes— It was Zhong Shanfu who mended it.

This is about being able to make good one’s errors. If my lord can do so, then the ritual vestment will not fall into disuse.” Still the lord did not correct his errors. Zhao Dun remonstrated with him several times. The lord loathed this and sent Chu Mi to murder him. When Chu Mi went just before sunrise, the doors of the bedchamber were open. Zhao Dun was fully dressed in official robes and was about to go to court. It was still early, and he was sitting with closed eyes. Chu Mi withdrew and sighed, saying, “He who does not forget reverence is the master of the people. To murder the master of the people is not loyal; to discard the 4 The women’s passage through a space frequented by outsiders shows Lord Ling as either oblivious to his own transgression or deliberately defiant of his ministers’ disapproval. 5 By acknowledging his errors, Lord Ling disarms further rebuke.

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ruler’s command is faithless. To be guilty of either of these is worse than death.” He smashed his head against a locust tree and died. In autumn, in the ninth month, the Prince of Jin entertained Zhao Dun with wine. The prince had hidden armored soldiers who were going to attack him. Zhao’s aide on the right, Shi Miming, learned of this, rushed forward, and ascended the steps, saying, “For a subject waiting on a ruler at a feast to drink more than three rounds is not in accordance with ritual propriety.” He then helped Zhao Dun step down. The lord whistled for his fierce hounds. Shi Miming wrestled with them and killed them. Zhao Dun said, “He deserts men and uses hounds—fierce, to be sure, but to what avail?” All the while fighting and struggling, they came out. Shi Miming died defending Zhao Dun. Earlier, Zhao Dun had hunted at Mount Shou. While lodging at Yisang then, he saw Ling Zhe, who was starving, and asked what ailed him. Ling Zhe said, “I have not eaten for three days.” Zhao Dun gave him food, but Ling Zhe set half of it aside. When asked about it, he said, “For three full years I have been in service. I do not yet know whether my mother is still alive. Now that I am close to home, I beg leave to send her this food.”6 Zhao Dun had him finish eating, then prepared for him a bamboo basket filled with food and meat, put it in a sack, and gave it to him. Later, he joined the ranks of the lord’s armored attendants. He turned his dagger-ax against the lord’s men to defend Zhao and thereby saved him. Zhao asked why he did that, and he replied, “I was the starving man at Yisang.” Zhao asked his name and where he lived, but he withdrew without telling him. Then Zhao himself fled. On the yichou day (26), Zhao Chuan killed Lord Ling at Taoyuan. Zhao Dun returned before leaving the mountains of Jin. The scribe wrote, “Zhao Dun assassinated his ruler,” and showed the record at court. Zhao Dun said, “This was not so.” He replied, “You are the chief minister. Yet fleeing you did not cross the domain border; upon returning you did not chastise the culprit. If you are not responsible, who would be?” Zhao Dun said, “Alas! As it says in the Odes, I so cherished this That I bring sorrow upon myself.7 6 Setting food aside for one’s mother became a stock motif in Chinese literature. 7 What does Zhao Dun “cherish” (huai)? Is it his good name, the power and preservation of his lineage, the Jin ruling house, the people of Jin, or something else?

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That describes me indeed!” Confucius said, “Dong Hu was a worthy scribe of ancient times; he did not conceal anything in his rules of writing. Zhao Dun was a worthy high officer of ancient times; he bore a guilty verdict for the sake of those rules. What a pity! Had he crossed the domain border, he would have been absolved.”8 Zhao Dun sent Zhao Chuan to welcome Gongzi Heitun at Zhou and established him as ruler. On the renshen day (3), they offered sacrifices at the Martial Temple. The Qi minister Cui Zhu, in defiance of inauspicious divination results, takes Dongguo Jiang, the widow of the Lord of Tang, as his wife; she comes to be known as Lady Jiang. Lord Zhuang, whom Cui Zhu had helped to establish as ruler six years earlier (chapter 9, Xiang 19.5), flaunts his adulterous rela­ tions with Lady Jiang. Cui Zhu assassinates Lord Zhuang. Yan Ying manages to uphold his integrity and protect himself when forced to swear a covenant with Cui Zhu and his co-conspirator Qing Feng. The scribes of Qi defend truth­ ful historical records with their lives. The political power of the usurpers is shown to be ultimately no match for the moral authority of historical judg­ ment. These Qi scribes, along with Dong Hu above, become the emblem of the historian’s integrity in the tradition. At the same time, the complexity of the event and the question of the Qi ruler’s culpability are not sufficiently addressed by the scribes’ judgment but only come through in the Zuozhuan account.

Xia ng 25.2 (548 BCE)  The wife of the Lord of Tang in Qi, Dongguo Jiang, was an older sister of Dongguo Yan, who served Cui Zhu as a retainer. When the Lord of Tang died, Dongguo Yan drove Cui Zhu to offer condo­ lences. Upon seeing Dongguo Jiang, Cui Zhu was struck with her beauty and sent Dongguo Yan, acting as intermediary, to take her as his wife. Dongguo Yan said, “Man and wife should be of different clan names. Now you, my lord, come from the line of Lord Ding, while I, your servant, come from the line of Lord Huan. This will not do.”9 8 Can Confucius possibly mean that a technical detail of location would have absolved Zhao Dun even if he were guilty? Or does he mean that he wishes for exonerating ­evidence—that is, had he crossed the border, he could have proved that he was not party to the assassination? One would assume the latter, given Confucius’s implied sympathy for Zhao Dun. 9 Both Dongguo Jiang and Cui Zhu were descendants of Qi rulers and had the clan name Jiang. Marriage to a person with the same clan name is tabooed (chapter 4, Xi 23.6, chap­ter 13, note 6).

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Cui Zhu divined by milfoil about this and came upon the hexagram “Impasse” ䷮ and the line whereby it becomes the hexagram “Great Surpassing” ䷛. The scribes all pronounced the result auspicious. But when Cui Zhu showed it to Chen Xuwu, the latter said, “The husband follows the wind, and the wind blows down the wife.10 You must not take her as wife. Also, the omen verse says, ‘Caught among rocks, he leans on thorns and thistles. He enters his chamber and does not see his wife. Inauspi­ cious.’11 ‘Caught among rocks’ means that going forward with your plan will bring no success. ‘He leans on thorns and thistles’ means being harmed by what one depends on. ‘He enters his chamber and does not see his wife. Inauspicious’ means that there is no place to return to.” Cui Zhu said, “She is a widow. What harm is there? Her former husband already suffered the consequences of the ill omen.” He then took her as wife. Lord Zhuang of Qi had a liaison with Lady Jiang. As he went often to Cui Zhu’s residence, he took Cui Zhu’s hats and bestowed them on others. His attendant said, “This will not do.” The lord said, “Can it be that one must have no hat if one does not happen to be Cui Zhu?” Prompted by these acts and also because of the way the lord had used Jin’s troubles as the opportunity to attack it, Cui Zhu said, “Jin will certainly retaliate.” He wanted to assassinate the lord to curry favor with Jin but had not found the opportunity. The lord had whipped an attendant, Jia Ju, and yet had continued to keep him close at hand. Jia Ju thus looked for an opportunity for Cui Zhu. In summer, in the fifth month, the Master of Ju visited the court of Qi on account of the Juyu campaign. On the jiaxu day (16), the lord offered him ceremonial toasts at the northern outer wall of the capital. Cui Zhu pleaded illness and did not oversee the event. On the yihai day (17), the lord went to inquire after Cui Zhu, and he then followed Lady Jiang, who entered the chamber and left with Cui Zhu from the side door. The lord tapped a pillar and sang. The eunuch Jia Ju stopped all the lord’s entourage, entered himself, and shut the gate. Cui Zhu’s armed men rose up from their ambush. The lord climbed up a terrace and begged to be spared. They would not grant it. He begged 10 Such a description derives from a somewhat arcane analysis of the constituents of the hexagram. Here and elsewhere interpretations of Zhou Changes leave considerable room for creative adaptation to the situation at hand. 11 This is the omen verse for the third line of the hexagram “Impasse” (no. 47 in Zhou Changes). Change in that line results in the hexagram “Great Surpassing” (no. 28).

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to swear a covenant. They would not grant it. He begged to put himself to the sword at the Ancestral Temple. They would not grant it. They all said, “The ruler’s subject, Cui Zhu, is very ill. He cannot personally attend to the lord’s commands. Being close to the lord’s palace, we, the subjects of the lord’s subject, are to make our night circuit and round up the depraved. We know of no other command.” The lord was trying to jump over the wall when someone shot him and hit him in the thigh. He fell back, and they then assassinated him. His followers—Jia Ju,12 Zhou Chuo, Bing Shi, Gongsun Ao, Feng Ju, Duofu, Xiang Yi, and Lü Yin—all died. Invocator Tuofu had been offering sacrifices at Gaotang. He arrived, reported discharge of his mission, and died at Cui Zhu’s residence without taking off his ceremonial cap. Shen Kuai, the superintendent of the fishery, withdrew and said to his steward, “Spare yourself and take care of my family. I am prepared to die.” His steward said, “If I spare myself, I will be going against your principle of abiding by duty.” He died with Shen Kuai. Cui Zhu killed Zong Mie at Pingyin. Yan Ying stood outside the gate of Cui Zhu’s residence. His followers said, “Will you die?” He said, “Was he my ruler only? Why should I die?” “Will you leave?” “Is it my crime? Why should I leave?” “Will you return home?” “With the ruler dead, where is the home to return to? He who rules over the people, how can he use his position to lord it over the people? It is the altars of the domain that he should take as master. He who serves the ruler, how can he do it for the sake of material recompense? It is the altars of the domain that he should nurture. Thus, if a ruler dies for the altars of the domain, then the subject dies for him. If the ruler is exiled for the altars of the domain, then the subject goes into exile for him. If a ruler dies for himself or is exiled because of his deeds, who, except for his personal favorites, would presume to bear the responsibility? Besides, it was that person, Cui Zhu, who had made him ruler and assassinated him, so how could I die for him? And how could I go into exile for him? Where then is the home to return to?”

12 This is a different Jia Ju, not to be confused with the attendant of the same name who plotted with Cui Zhu against Lord Zhuang.

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When the gates were opened, Yan Ying entered, pillowed the corpse’s head on his thigh and wailed, rose, leaped thrice, and left Cui Zhu’s residence. Someone said to Cui Zhu, “He must be killed!” Cui Zhu said, “He is the one to whom the people feel allegiance. Let him be, so that we can gain the people’s support.” Lupu Gui fled to Jin. Wang He fled to Ju. When Shusun Qiaoru was in Qi, Shusun Xuan had Shusun Qiaoru’s daughter taken into Lord Ling’s harem. He was enamored of her, and she gave birth to Lord Jing. On the dingchou day (19), Cui Zhu established the latter as ruler and made himself the chief minister. Qing Feng became the minister of the left. They swore a covenant with the inhabitants of the capital at the Ancestral Temple, and as they said, “Should we not support Cui and Qing . . . ,” Yan Ying raised his head heavenward and sighed, “Should I fail to support those who are loyal to the ruler and who benefit the altars of the domain, let the god on high bear witness against me!” Then he smeared his mouth with the blood. On the xinsi day (23), the lord and the high officers swore a covenant with the Master of Ju. The grand scribe wrote, “Cui Zhu assassinated his ruler.” Cui Zhu put him to death. The scribe’s younger brothers succeeded him and wrote the same thing, and so two more persons were killed. Another younger brother again wrote it, whereupon Cui Zhu desisted. The scribe of the south, having heard that the grand scribes had all died, clutched the bamboo strips and set out. When he heard that the record had already been made, he turned back. The above story continues with Lord Zhuang’s demeaning burial (ZT Xiang 25.2), Qing Feng’s destruction of Cui Zhu and his lineage (ZT Xiang 27.7), and comeuppance for Qing Feng and his line (chapter 10, Zhao 4.4). While the Qi scribes above become part of the unfolding drama, other scribes step back from current events to offer a broad historical overview. Here the Jin minister Zhao Yang discusses the exile of Lord Zhao of Lu with the scribe Mo of Cai, who articulates a vision of inevitable mutability that can also be read as a remarkably sympathetic view of the Ji lineage in Lu. We have come across the ancestor of the Ji lineage (chapter 2, Zhuang 32.4-5, Min 2.3) and the failings of Lord Zhao (chapter 6, Zhao 5.3).

Zhao 32.4 (510 BCE)  Zhao Yang asked the scribe Mo of Cai, “The Ji lineage expelled their ruler, yet the people submit to them and the princes

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associate with them. Their ruler died outside the domain, yet no one blames them. Why?” He replied, “As things are born there are twos, threes, fives, and partners and seconds. Therefore, Heaven has its three heavenly bodies, earth has its five resources, a body has its left and right, each person has a partner, kings have their lords, and princes have their high ministers. Everything has its second. It has been a long time since Heaven gave birth to the Ji lineage as a second to the Prince of Lu. Is it not appropriate that the people should submit to them? For generations the Lu rulers have indulged their negligence, while for generations the Ji lineage have cultivated their sedulousness, and the people have forgotten their ruler. Even though he did die outside the domain, who would take pity on him? Since ancient times it has been the case that there are no constant sacrificants for the altars of a domain and no constant relation between rulers and subjects. Thus, it says in the Odes, The high banks became valleys; Deep valleys became mounds.

That the clans of the Three Dynasties have become commoners is something that you, sir, know. In the hexagrams of the Changes, ‘Thunder’ ☳ mounting on ‘Pure Yang’ ☰ is called ‘Great Strength’ ䷡.13 That is the Way of Heaven. In times past, Gongzi You or Ji You, younger son of Lord Huan, was the beloved son of Wen Jiang. She divined when she first became pregnant, and the diviner made the following report to our lord: ‘The child born will have a fine reputation. His name will be You, and he will be a support to our lord’s house.’14 When he was born, it was just as the diviner had said, and he had on his hand the graph you, which was then adopted as his name. Afterward, he performed great deeds for Lu and received Bi as his reward, becoming a high minister. Coming down to Ji Wenzi and Ji Wuzi, generation after generation they added to their duties, never turning their backs on their earlier achievements. The Lu rulers lost control of their domain when Lord Wen of Lu expired and Xiangzhong killed the legitimate heir and established the son of a secondary consort 13 The “Pure Yang” trigram represents the king or the Son of Heaven, while the “Thunder” trigram represents the princes. In “Great Strength” (hexagram no. 34), the “Thunder” trigram is placed above the “Pure Yang” trigram. This overturning of the implicit hierarchy of the two trigrams signifies the “great strength” of the usurping nobleman. 14 For this event, see ZT Min 2.4.

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as ruler.15 Administrative power has remained with the Ji lineage; for four rulers, up to Lord Zhao, it has been so. If the people do not know their ruler, how is he to win control of the domain? This is why a ruler is careful with his ritual objects and titles, which cannot be lent to others.”

V isions of Decline The judgment of the scribes in the examples cited above pertains to the exile and murder of rulers by powerful ministers. The Zhao lineage consolidates its dominance in Jin after the assassination of Lord Ling. The vengeful ghost of a Zhao ancestor haunts Lord Jing of Jin after he almost decimates the Zhao lineage (chapter 14, Cheng 10.4). Another Jin ruler, Lord Li, is assassinated when he tries to cut down powerful ministers in the aftermath of the battle of Yanling (chapter 5). Eventually, the Zhao, Wei, and Han lineages eliminate their main rivals (453 BCE) and carve up Jin (376 BCE). In Qi, the real win­ ner in the aftermath of Lord Zhuang’s assassination is the Chen lineage, whose rising power Yan Ying justifies as he remonstrates with Lord Jing of Qi (chapter 6, Zhao 26.11, chapter 11, Zhao 10.2). The Chen lineage becomes increasingly dominant, and Chen Heng and Chen Ni assassinate Lord Jian of Qi, prompting Confucius to wish for Lu intervention (chapter 13, Ai 14.5). In 386 BCE, a Chen descendant formally became the ruler of Qi. In the fol­ lowing passage, after arranging a marital alliance between Qi and Jin, Yan Ying of Qi and Shuxiang of Jin discuss their domains’ futures, rightly foresee­ ing the decline of the old ruling houses and the rise of the noble lineages that will lead Qi and Jin.

Zhao 3.3 (539 BCE)  Once the wedding engagement had been made, Yan Ying accepted the ritually prescribed toasts, and Shuxiang joined him for the banquet. There the two of them spoke together. Shuxiang said, “What is to come in Qi?” Yan Ying said, “These are the ruling house’s last generations. I do not know but that Qi will go to the Chen lineage. The lord is abandoning his own people, and they are shifting their allegiance to the Chen lineage. From times of old, Qi has had four units of measure: the dou, the qu, the fu, and the zhong. Four pints make one dou, then each succeeding measure, up to fu, results from multiples of 15 See ZT Wen 18.4.

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four. Ten fu is one zhong. To each of the first three measures the Chen lineage adds one unit, so that their zhong is larger. When they lend out, they use their household measures, but when they collect on their loans, they use the lord’s measures. When they bring timber from their mountains to market, they keep the price no higher than it is in the mountains. For their fish, salt, mussels, and clams, they keep the price no higher than it is at the seashore. If the strength of the people is divided into three parts, two parts go to the lord and only one part goes to clothing and feeding the people themselves. The lord’s grain stores are rotting and bug infested, while the three classes of elders are freezing and starving. In all the markets of the capital, ordinary shoes are cheap, but the shoes designed for amputees are expensive. The people are suffering torments, yet there is someone there to benefit them generously. The people will love the Chen lineage like parents and will give their allegiance to them like water flowing downhill. Even if the Chen lineage did not want to win the people over, how could they avoid doing so? Jibo, Zhibing, Yusui, and Boxi have followed the Hu Lord and the grand lady Ji and are already in Qi.16 Shuxiang said, “That is true. Even our lord’s house is now also in its last generations. His warhorses are not harnessed and his ministers participate in no military campaigns. The lord’s chariot has no riders; the infantry ranks have no captains. The common people are exhausted, while the palaces and mansions are ever more extravagant. Corpses lie staring at each other along the roads, while the wealth of the families of female favorites grows more and more offensive. The people, hearing the commands of the lord, behave as if they were fleeing marauders and enemies. The Luan, Xi, Xu, Yuan, Hu, Xu, Qing, and Bo lineages, all related to the ruler’s house, have fallen, so they are now among the menial classes. The administration is run from the gates of the noble houses, and the people have no one upon whom to rely. Day after day, the ruler does not change his behavior, instead indulging in pleasure to while away his ­sorrow. Any day could bring the downfall of the lord’s house. The inscription on the Chan cauldron says, ‘The early dawn was exceedingly brilliant, but later generations are still remiss.’ How much worse when he does not change day after day? Can he last long?” 16 Jibo, Zhibing, Yusui, and Boxi were descendants of the sage-king Shun and ancestors of the Chen line. The Hu lord and his wife, the grand lady Ji, were ancestors appointed by Zhou as founders of the domain of Chen.

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Yan Ying said, “What will you do about it, sir?” Shuxiang said, “The lateral branches of the Jin lord’s house are all gone now, and I have heard that when the lord’s house is going to fall, the branches and leaves of its ancestral house fall beforehand, and then the lord’s house follows them. In my ancestral line there were eleven houses, and only the Yangshe lineage now remains. Further, I have no sons, and since the lord’s house lacks all standards, I will consider myself fortunate if I die a natural death. How can I expect to receive ancestral sacrifices?”17 The scribe Mo’s sympathetic assessment of the rise of the Ji lineage in Lu above is echoed in the narrative of Lord Zhao’s exile, remarkable for its minu­ tiae of scheming and tension between ritual negotiations and power struggles. In the following passage, Lord Zhao and his supporters attack Ji Pingzi, defeating his forces but failing to put him to death. After some initial hesita­ tion, the Meng and Shusun lineages join the Ji lineage against Lord Zhao, who leaves Lu with his supporters from the Hou, Zang, and Zijia lineages. Zijia Yibo, Lord Zhao’s loyal adviser, is presented throughout the narrative as the voice of wisdom and moderation.

Zhao 25.6 (517 BCE)  Shusun Chuo entered Kan. Our lord resided at the Long Treasury. In the ninth month, on the wuxu day (11), he and his supporters attacked the Ji household, killing Gongzhi at the gate and then entering. Ji Pingzi, climbing a terrace, presented a request: “You, my lord, have not investigated the accusations against me but have already had your officers in charge, armed with shield and dagger-ax, chastise me. I request permission to wait on the banks of the Yi while the accusations are investigated.” Our lord did not permit this. He requested that he be imprisoned at Bi, but our lord did not permit this. He requested that he go into exile with five carriages, but our lord did not permit this. Zijia Yibo said, “Permit it, my lord! For a long time the government has been in his control, and many of the poor have received food from him. His followers are legion. When the sun goes down and malefactors rise up, one cannot know what might happen. The anger of the multitude must not be nurtured; if it is nurtured rather than controlled, it will flourish. The people will become restive, and once they have become restive, those who have the same aims will join together. 17 For the end of Shuxiang’s Yangshe lineage, see chapter 3, Zhao 28.2.

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You are certain to regret it!” Our lord did not heed him. Hou Zhaobo said, “You must put him to death.” Our lord had Hou Zhaobo go forth to meet Meng Yizi. Zong Li, the Shusun lineage’s supervisor of the military, addressed his multitude: “What are we to do about this?” No one responded. He then said, “As household retainers we do not presume to understand affairs of state, but which is more advantageous to us: the survival of the Ji lineage or its disappearance?” They all said, “The disappearance of the Ji lineage would mean the disappearance of the Shusun lineage.” Zong Li said, “In that case, let us save them!” Leading his troops to the Ji compound, Zong Li battered down the northwestern corner of the wall and entered. Our lord’s troops had removed their armor and were squatting, holding their quiver covers as drinking cups. They were therefore driven away. The Meng lineage had one of their men climb the northwestern corner of their compound wall to look at the Ji compound. The man reported that he could see the flags of the Shusun lineage at the Ji compound. The Meng lineage seized Hou Zhaobo and put him to death at a place west of the south gate, then attacked our lord’s troops. Zijia Yibo said to Lord Zhao, “All of us, the subjects who have forced you into this action against your better judgment, will accept blame for it and depart the domain, while you, my lord, remain here. Ji Pingzi will not dare not to change his way of serving you.” Our lord said, “I cannot bear that.” With Zang Zhaobo he went out among the tombs outside the city to make plans, then set out from Lu. Lord Zhao goes to Qi and accepts a grant of territory, putting himself in the position of a vassal. Zijia Yibo refuses to join in a covenant with the lord’s fol­ lowers, arguing that its terms foster intransigence and prevent any reconcilia­ tion between the exiles and the Lu power holders. Zang Zhaobo brought together all of the lord’s followers in prepa­ ration for swearing a covenant. The covenant document said, “We will strive together with a single purpose, sharing loves and hatreds. We will verify guilt and innocence, follow our lord resolutely, and allow no association between insiders and outsiders.” On our lord’s orders, Zang Zhaobo showed this to Zijia Yibo, who said, “Under these terms, I cannot join the covenant for several reasons. In my own incompetence, I am not able to share a single purpose with you, my companions. I hold that all of us are guilty. It may also be that I will wish to have outsiders and insiders associate with one another, and I may further wish to leave our

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lord. You, my companions, apparently love exile and hate stability, so how can I share your goals? It is you who plunged our lord into difficulties. What guilt can be greater than that? Only if outsiders and insiders can associate with one another, that is, only if someone leaves our lord for a time, will our lord quickly return to the domain. What would be accomplished by not engaging in such associations? And what would I be protecting?” Therefore, he refused to join in the covenant. The Qi ruler half-heartedly tries to reinstate Lord Zhao of Lu. Fan Yang of Jin, who has accepted gifts from Ji Pingzi, persuades leaders of other domains not to invade Lu and reinstate Lord Zhao because the Ji lineage “have Heaven’s aid and the people’s help” (ZT Zhao 27.4). Qi slights prompt Lord Zhao and his followers to leave Qi (ZT Zhao 27.7) for Jin, where they also encounter humiliating treatment. As Jin again considers reinstating Lord Zhao of Lu, Ji Pingzi protects himself by a show of great subordination. The Prince of Jin was preparing to use an army to reinstate our lord. Fan Yang said, “If we summon Ji Pingzi here and he does not come, then he will have acted in truly insubordinate fashion, and in that case, we can attack him. How would that be?” The Jin leaders summoned Ji Pingzi. Fan Yang sent a private envoy to him to say, “You must come. I will undertake to ensure that you are not impugned.” Ji Pingzi met with Zhi Wenzi of Jin at Shili. Zhi Wenzi said, “Our unworthy ruler has sent me to ask you, sir: ‘For what reason have you expelled your ruler? The Zhou have their established punishments for those who have a ruler but cannot serve him. Think on it, sir!’” Wearing a cap of boiled white silk and a robe of hemp and coming forward on bare feet, Ji Pingzi bent low and replied, “To serve my ruler is something that I have not yet had an opportunity to do. Shall I presume then to evade the command for punishment? If my ruler holds that I have committed a crime, I request that he confine me at Bi to await his investigation. Whether he will do so is entirely up to him. If, for the sake of my predecessors, he refuses to cut off the Ji lineage, he may yet grant me permission to die. If he neither puts me to death nor sends me into exile, that would be a kindness on his part, and I will not perish even in death. Should I have the opportunity to follow my ruler in returning home, that would delight me; would I presume to harbor any other intentions?” Because of his own pride and the intransigence of his followers, Lord Zhao of Lu misses his last chance to return to Lu.

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Zhao 31.2 (511 BCE)  In summer, in the fourth month, Ji Pingzi accompanied Zhi Wenzi on a visit to Ganhou. Zijia Yibo said to the Lu ruler, “Return home with him, my lord. If you think you cannot bear this one abasement, how will you instead bear a lifetime of abasement?” The lord said, “You are right.” His band of men said, “It would take no more than a single well-placed remark to Jin now, and you would be sure to be able to expel Ji Pingzi!” On the command of the Prince of Jin, Zhi Wenzi offered our lord consolation and added, “Our unworthy ruler has sent me to chastise Ji Pingzi at your command, and Ji Pingzi does not dare flee death. You should enter your domain.” Our lord said, “Your ruler, in kind consideration of the good relations between our former rulers, has extended these good relations to me, a man in exile. Although he will thus make it possible for me to return home and cleanse our Ancestral Temples so as to serve Jin, I am not able to grant an audience to this man, Ji Pingzi. Let the Yellow River be my pledge that I am not able to grant this man an audience.” Covering his ears, Zhi Wenzi ran away, saying, “Our unworthy ruler worries only about committing some offense. Would he then dare to share knowledge of troubles in the domain of Lu? I request to report this to our unworthy ruler.” Withdrawing, Zhi Wenzi said to Ji Pingzi, “The ruler’s anger has not yet abated. For now, you should return and conduct the sacrifices yourself.” Zijia Yibo said to our lord, “If you were to drive your chariot in among the Lu army, Ji Pingzi would certainly return with you.”18 Our lord wished to follow this advice, but his band of followers put pressure on him, so that he failed to take the opportunity to return home. The Annals records in Zhao 32 (510 BCE) that “our lord expired at Ganhou.” Zuozhuan offers this explanation of the line: “This expresses his incompetence in relations both with other domains and his own, as well as his failure to employ the right men” (ZT 32.1). The scribe Mo then turns Lord Zhao’s death in exile into broader ruminations on mutability, as we have seen above.

18 The Lu army is the force accompanying Ji Pingzi. Zijia Yibo urges Lord Zhao to return to Lu at the head of this force, thus putting Ji Pingzi in his place. However, Lord Zhao’s followers oppose this, likely because they fear reprisals against themselves from the Ji lineage.

Chapter 8

Governance

V i rt ua l ly e v e r y i s s u e touc h e d u pon i n t h i s a n t hol og y, particularly those of the preceding two chapters, deals in one way or another with aspects of good or bad rule. Since the passages included in this section concern only a few of many topics we could consider under the rubric of “governance,” readers should keep this critical topic squarely in mind when reading not only this but all other sections of the anthology. Conflicting voices speak in Zuozhuan on the topic of governance, and it is not always easy to determine which voices, apart perhaps from Confucius and the noble man, should be granted the greatest authority. Further, even the pronouncements of Confucius and the noble man do not represent ­consistent viewpoints. As a result, one cannot always say with complete confidence what position is to be understood as that of the authors. For example, Zichan’s words below (Xiang 31.11), which emphasize allowing the voice of the people to be heard, stand in contrast with a claim that the commoners’ expressions of criticism can bring political instability (Xiang 17.6). Consequently, readers of Zuozhuan continue to the present day to find evidence in its pages to support quite different systems of government. Some emphasize Zuozhuan’s “democratic” elements, which stress the role of the people’s voice and appear to condone expelling a ruler or even, in the most extreme cases, killing him, while others regard it as countenancing authoritarian rulers, whose power derives mostly from ritualistic formality, punishment, and even terror. While earlier in Zuozhuan rulers such as Lord Huan of Qi, Lord Wen of Jin, and King Zhuang of Chu take center stage as agents of positive political action, in the later periods rulers are often in the shadows or portrayed negatively, earning their moments of glory when they acknowledge error or affirm the rights of their ministers. The relationship between rulers and 152

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ministers constitutes the primary political dynamic in Zuozhuan. In considering this dynamic, we should probably bear in mind that in spite of the different perspectives reflected in the text, it was likely written by men who were real or potential government officials. As a consequence, the primary quality of a good ruler is the ability to choose subordinates wisely, sometimes even selecting a man who had once been an enemy, and to heed advice. In addition, rulers are expected to be exemplars, put the well-being of the people above their own interests, and assume responsibility when things go wrong. Meanwhile, the wisest ministers sometimes appear in Zuozhuan as scolds ever eager to use their understanding of proper ritual, real or imagined, to control the ruler’s behavior. We should not be surprised, then, that rulers often did not live up to the highest standards advocated by their best ministers or that their actions sometimes got them exiled or even killed.

Ru l er a s E x e m pl a r Because the ruler “is the one who guides the people,” his actions must be ­measured and in conformity with established patterns. In the passage below, the Lu ruler plans a visit to inspect the fisheries, only to be told that such an action does not pertain to the great affairs of the state—that is, sacrifices and warfare—and therefore violates the oft-mentioned “system of old.”

Yin 5.1 (718 BCE)  In the fifth year, in spring, our lord was going to visit Tang to inspect the fisheries. Zang Xibo remonstrated, “Any object not important enough to be discussed in connection with the great affairs, any material not important enough to be used for official vessels and instruments—with such things the ruler takes no action. A ruler is the one who guides the people into the right paths and the proper usage of objects. That is why offering instruction in the great affairs so as to fix the right paths and measures is called ‘establishing the path.’ And selecting materials so as to display the color of objects is called ‘establishing the proper use of objects.’ Failing to establish right paths and the proper usage of objects is called ‘disorderly government.’ Disorderly government repeatedly practiced is the reason a domain suffers defeat. That is why the spring sou hunt, the summer miao hunt, the autumn xian hunt, and the winter shou hunt all involve military instruction undertaken

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during breaks in the agricultural seasons.1 Every three years, we drill the soldiers, enter the capital, and marshal the troops. When the troops return from an expedition, there is drinking to celebrate their arrival, and the spoils are numbered. We display the patterned insignia, clarify the noble and the base, distinguish the levels and ranks, and put in harmony the young and the old; this is for the sake of exercising the authority of ceremonial decorum. If the flesh of a bird or a beast is not to be put upon the sacrificial stand, or the skins and hides, teeth and tusks, bone and horn, or hair and feathers are not to be put in a sacrificial vessel, then a lord does not engage in archery. This is the system of old. As for the products of the mountains, forests, rivers, and marshes, these are the materials for ordinary vessels and articles of use, the affairs of menial laborers, and the duties of petty officers; they are not the concern of a ruler.” Our lord said, “I will inspect the borderlands.” Consequently, he went out, arrayed the fishermen, and inspected them. Zang Xibo claimed that he was sick and did not go along. The Annals says, “Our lord arrayed the fishermen at Tang”; this was not in accordance with ritual propriety, and it is saying, moreover, that Tang was a distant place. Huafu Du assassinates the ruler of Song and has a new ruler installed. He then presents a great cauldron as a gift to Lu to discourage it from interfering in Song affairs. Lu leaders install the cauldron in their temple, provoking the Lu minister Zang Aibo to dissent. We see in this passage, some of it elided here, that the ruler must give attention to a whole array of usages, visual patterns, and sounds in order to manifest his virtue.

Hua n 2.2 (710 BCE)  In summer, in the fourth month, we took the great cauldron of Gao from Song. On the wushen day (9), we installed it in the Grand Ancestral Temple. This was not in accordance with ritual propriety. Zang Aibo remonstrated, “A true ruler of men will manifest virtue and block disobedience, in this way overseeing and shining a light upon his officials. Still, he fears that he might sometimes fail at this, and therefore he manifests exemplary virtue and displays it for his sons and grandsons. . . . Now when virtue is frugal but has standards, maintains distinctions despite any amplifications or reductions, is marked by 1

Here we are given the names of the four seasonal hunts, which were obviously also regarded as military exercises.

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patterning and proper use, and is expressed in sounds and resplendence, it is used to oversee and shine down upon the many officials. The officials thereupon show caution and fear and dare not transgress the rules and statutes. In the present case, stifling virtue and setting up disobedience as an example, you place a vessel received as a bribe in the Grand Ancestral Temple and make a clear display of it to the many officials. When the officials imitate such conduct, how are you going to punish them for this? The defeat of a domain or patrimony starts from the deviations of officials. The officials’ neglect of virtue is demonstrated in their partiality for bribes. For the cauldron of Gao to be in the temple—what demonstration could be more extreme than this! Even when King Wu conquered Shang and moved the nine cauldrons to the settlement at Luo, there were nonetheless some men of lofty principles who criticized him. How much worse is it to place in the Grand Ancestral Temple a vessel, won as a bribe, that manifests disobedience and disorder!” Our lord did not heed this. 2 The court scribe of Zhou heard of this and said, “I expect that Zang Aibo will have descendants in Lu! When his ruler erred, he was not remiss in remonstrating with him on the basis of virtue.”3

Sel ecting a n d A ppointing Proper M en for Office The passages below emphasize the necessity of choosing the best officials for a position, even when it means setting aside grudges. In the first, Lord Huan of Qi became the first overlord of the Spring and Autumn period in part because of his capable advisor Guan Zhong, who had supported Lord Huan’s rival Gongzi Jiu, made an attempt on Lord Huan’s life, and then fled from Qi to neighboring Lu along with his collaborator, Shao Hu. Despite this history, Bao Shuya acknowledges his talent and recommends him to be Lord Huan’s minister.

Zhua ng 9.5 (685 BCE)  The Qi minister Bao Shuya led troops here to Lu and explained, “Gongzi Jiu is our kinsman. We ask you to chastise him. Guan Zhong and Shao Hu are our enemies. We ask you to hand 2 It is noteworthy that in Zuozhuan, even the most skillful remonstrances often go unheeded! 3 The Zangsun lineage, to which Zang Aibo and his father Zang Xibo (see Yin 5.1 above) belong, does indeed continue to hold high office in Lu for several more centuries.

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them over, and we will be satisfied.” So Gongzi Jiu was put to death at Shengdou, and Shao Hu chose to die with him. Guan Zhong asked to become a prisoner, and Bao Shuya accepted this, but when they reached Tangfu, Bao Shuya released him. Bao Shuya returned to the capital and reported, “Guan Zhong’s talent for governing surpasses that of Gao Xi.4 It would be appropriate to make him minister.” The Lord of Qi heeded this advice. The following passage also emphasizes the idea of separating private enmity and public duty. But in the end, Qi Xi manages to recommend his own son as his successor, a detail that stands in stark contrast to versions of this anec­ dote in other early texts that emphasize impartiality and feature the actual elevation of an enemy. Still, the noble man commends him for not showing “favoritism.”

Xia ng 3.4 (570 BCE)  Qi Xi, leader of the central army, asked to retire on account of old age. The Prince of Jin asked about his successor. Qi Xi named Xie Hu, who was his enemy. The Jin ruler was about to establish Xie Hu in the position when the latter died. He asked again. Qi Xi replied, “Qi Wu would be acceptable.” At that time Yangshe Zhi had just died, and the Prince of Jin asked, “Who can take his place?” He replied, “Yangshe Chi would be acceptable.” Thus, Qi Wu was made commandant of the central army, with Yangshe Chi assisting him. The noble man said that Qi Xi “in this case showed himself capable of recommending good men. He named his enemy, but that was not ingratiation. He established his son in office, but that was not favoritism. He recommended his adjutant, but that was not about forming factions. As it says in the Shang Documents, Not being partial, not forming factions, The kingly way is great and boundless.

This could refer to Qi Xi! Xie Hu received his recommendation, Qi Wu his position, and Yangshe Chi his office. When he established one office,

4 Gao Xi belonged to the powerful Gao lineage that served as high ministers in Qi for generations.

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these three things were accomplished.5 This was because he was capable of recommending worthy men. It was quite simply because he was worthy that he was capable of recommending those of his kind. As it says in the Odes, It is precisely because he has the virtues That they resemble him.

And so it was with Qi Xi.”

Accepting R e sponsi bi lit y In the speech below, the wise Lu statesman Zang Wenzhong draws upon the examples of Yu and Tang, founders of the Xia and Shang dynasties respec­ tively, who blamed themselves when things went badly, and the disastrous rulers Jie and Zhòu, who blamed others and brought those same dynasties to an end. However, Song does not flourish, as Zang predicts, but is almost immediately engulfed in political turmoil (ZT Zhuang 12.1).

Zhua ng 11.2 (683 BCE)  In autumn, there was a great flood in Song. Our lord sent someone to offer them condolences and said, “Heaven has produced torrential rains, and this has harmed your grain supplies. How could I fail to express condolences?” The Duke of Song responded, “It is I, the lone one, who did not show respect. Heaven has brought down this calamity upon me, and this has now in addition become a matter of concern to you. I bow to the condescension of your command.” Zang Wenzhong said, “Song surely will rise! Yu and Tang blamed them­ selves, and their rise was sudden. Jie and Zhòu blamed others, and their fall was abrupt. Moreover, when one of the domains suffers a disaster, for the ruler to call himself ‘the lone one’ is in accordance with ritual propriety. When his speech shows fear and his usage of names accords with ritual, he is close to success!” Later, when he heard it said that the words of the response had been Gongzi Yuyue’s, Zang Aibo said, “That one ought to become a ruler. He has a heart filled with sympathy for the people.”6 5

The commandant and his aide attend to the same office, hence “one office.” The “three things” refer to the recommendation, the position, and the office. 6 Gongzi Yuyue, son of Lord Zhuang of Song, later ruled as Lord Huan (r. 681–651 BCE).

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A Qin ruler assumes responsibility for his army’s defeat by Jin at the Battle of Yao and retains Mengming in office despite the role the latter played in the failed campaign. Later, Mengming will redeem himself and thus demonstrate that the ruler has followed the right course of action (ZT Wen 3.4).

Wen 1.9 (626 BCE)  After the campaign of Yao, when the Jin leader had already sent back the Qin commanders,7 the high officers of Qin and the ruler’s retinue all said to the Liege of Qin, “This defeat was the culpability of Mengming. We must put him to death.” The Liege of Qin said, “This was my culpability. As it says in an ode of Rui Liangfu of Zhou, A great wind blows brisk, A greedy man thwarts the skilled. To words of hearsay he responds, But to recited words he is like one drunk. He does not employ the good, But on the contrary causes us to go astray.

This is about greed, and it describes me, the lone one. I am the one who was greedy and thereupon brought calamity upon that fine man. What was he guilty of?” He again put Mengming in charge of government.

Consi der ing A bov e A ll th e W ell-Being of th e Peopl e a n d R e a l m Two rulers noted in the passages below are commended, one by the noble man, the other by Confucius, for putting the welfare of the people above their own self-interest. In the first of these passages, Lord Wen of Zhu embraces his charge (ming) at the expense of his lifespan (ming), two related meanings of the same written character. In the second, King Zhao of Chu (r. 515–489 BCE) hears predictions of his death but refuses to save himself at the expense of his subordinates.

7

Jin had released the captured Qin commanders due to the intercession of Wen Ying, the widow of Lord Wen of Jin and the daughter of Lord Mu of Qin.

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Wen 13.3 (614 BCE)  Lord Wen of Zhu divined about relocating the capital to Yi. The scribe said, “It will benefit the people but will not benefit the ruler.” The Master of Zhu said, “So long as it benefits the people, it is to my benefit. Heaven gave birth to the people and set up a ruler for them in order to benefit them. If the people were to benefit, I, the lone one, would certainly share in it.” His retainers said, “If your lifespan can be prolonged, why not do it, my lord?” The Master of Zhu said, “My charge is to nourish the people. Whether death comes early or late, that is a matter of the right time. So long as the people benefit, we will relocate the capital. There is no auspiciousness equal to this.” So they moved to Yi. In the fifth month, Lord Wen of Zhu died. The noble man said, “He understood his charge.” Ai 6.4 (489 BCE)  In autumn, in the seventh month, the Master of Chu was in Chengfu, preparing to go to the aid of Chen. When they divined about doing battle, it was not auspicious. When they divined about retreating, it was not auspicious. The king said, “In that case, let us die. Better to die than to let the Chu army be defeated twice. Better to die, too, than to abandon a covenant and flee an enemy. If it is one and the same death, then let us die fighting our enemies!” He commanded Gongzi Shen to act as king in his stead, but Shen would not agree. So he gave the command to Gongzi Jie, who also refused. So he gave the command to Gongzi Qi, who assented to it only after refus­ ing five times. 8 When they were about to do battle, the king became ill. On the geng­ yin day (16), King Zhao attacked Daming and died at Chengfu. Gongzi Qi withdrew and said, “When our king has set aside his own sons out of deference to other noble lineages, do his subjects dare forget their ruler? To follow the command of the ruler is compliance; and to set up the son of the ruler is also compliance. These two acts of compliance must not be neglected.” Taking counsel with Gongzi Shen and Gongzi Jie, Gongzi Qi secretly placed troops to block the roads. He then received Zhang, the king’s son by a Yue woman, and set him up as successor. Only then did he return.9 8 The commentator Du Yu claims that Gongzi Shen, Gongzi Jie, and Gongzi Qi were all King Zhao’s elder half brothers. 9 Gongzi Qi presumably seals the roads to keep Chu’s enemies from learning of King Zhao’s death.

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This year, there were clouds that resembled a flock of red birds. For three days they flew with the sun in their midst. The Master of Chu sent to inquire about this with the Zhou grand scribe. The Zhou grand scribe said, “This ill luck will fall upon your highness himself! If you perform a sacrifice, it can be shifted to the chief minister or the supervisor of the military.” The king said, “What good would it do to expel an illness from my midriff only to inflict it upon my limbs? Had I not committed a great error, would Heaven cut me down in my prime? I am guilty and must take my punishment. How can I shift it?” He thus did not perform any sacrifice. Earlier, when King Zhao had first become ill, the diviners said, “The Yellow River is creating a demonic disturbance.” The king did not offer sacrifice. The high officers requested permission to offer sacrifice to the Yellow River in the outskirts of the capital. The king said, “During the Three Dynasties, the commands regarding offerings forbade one to perform sacrifice beyond one’s purview. The Jiang, the Han, the Sui, and the Zhang Rivers are in Chu’s purview.10 Banes and blessings do not cross these when they come. As lacking in virtue as I am, it is not the Yellow River that I have offended.” Consequently, he did not offer sacrifice. Confucius said, “King Zhao of Chu knew the great Way. How appropriate it was that he did not lose his domain! The Xia Documents says, ‘It was that Yao of Taotang who acted in accord with Heaven’s constants and held this northern territory. Now we have fallen short of his exemplary conduct and wreaked havoc with his scheme of order. For this reason we will perish and be extinguished.’ It also says, ‘Good faith arises from this and resides in this.’ It was right for him to start with himself in following the constants.” Although the southeastern domain of Wu is making advances against Chu, Gongzi Shen of Chu does not fear Fucha, the Wu king, whose profligate habits set him apart from his predecessor. In his speech, Gongzi Shen lays out a stark contrast between a ruler who shared the people’s “exertions and pleasures” and one who only “exploits them.”

Ai 1.6 (494 BCE)  While the Wu army was in Chen, all the Chu high officers were afraid. They said, “It was because King Helu was able to use 10 The Sui and Zhang rivers drain into the Yangzi (Jiang). The king here modestly restricts the purview of Chu sacrifices to the domain’s small early sphere of influence.

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his people that he defeated us at Boju.11 Now we hear that his successor goes even further than he did. What are we to do about it?” Gongzi Shen said, “My men, worry about not getting on with one another, and do not bother yourselves about Wu. In former times King Helu never combined flavors when he ate and never sat upon layered matting.12 For his buildings he did not raise high foundations, and his dishes were not lacquered red or carved. On his palaces and apartments he did not build towers, and his boats and carriages were not adorned. In choosing his clothing and objects of daily use, he did not select expensive things. In the domain, when Heaven sent some disaster or plague, he personally visited the orphans and widows and provided for those who were needy and troubled. When with the army, he dared eat only after the cooked food had been distributed, and the foot soldiers and chariot drivers also received a portion of whatever fine foods he tasted. It was because he worked at caring for his people, and shared their exertions and pleasures, that the people did not become exhausted, and they knew that if they died, they would not be neglected.13 Our former high officer Nang Wa underestimated them, and that is how they defeated us. “Now I have heard that Fucha has terraces, pavilions, ponds, and pools wherever he lodges. He has consorts and concubines wherever he stays a night. Even for a day’s travel, he must have everything he desires, and he insists on being accompanied by his playthings. It is the valuable and exotic that he collects, spectacles and musical performance that he strives after. He views the people as his enemies, every day finding new ways to exploit them. In this way he will first have defeated himself. How can he defeat us?”

H e eding th e Voice of Com moner s A theme running throughout Zuozhuan is that wisdom and insight can come from anywhere, even from commoners; a Jin wagon driver shows surprising ecological understanding (Cheng 5.4) and a Lu carpenter knows the proper ritual deference to grant to a lord’s mother (Xiang 4.4). While the capable 11 Wu defeated Chu at Boju in 506 BCE (see ZT, Ding 4.3). 12 A single layer of matting was the simplest sort of furnishing suitable for an officer rather than for a king. 13 That is, sacrifices would be made to their spirits.

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Zheng minister Zichan elsewhere insists on policies that allow villagers to speak out freely (Xiang 31.11), the final passage about a Song minister voices a contrary opinion (Xiang 17.6).

Cheng 5.4 (586 BCE)  There was a landslide on Mount Liang. The Prince of Jin used a courier-carriage to summon the minister Bo Zong. Bo Zong sent a heavy wagon to one side, saying, “Make way for the couriercarriage!” The driver of the wagon said, “To wait for me will not be as fast as taking a shortcut.” Bo Zong asked where he came from, and he replied, “I am a man of Jiang.” He then asked about affairs in Jiang. He said, “Mount Liang collapsed. The ruler intends to summon Bo Zong to confer with him about it.” Bo Zong asked what was to be done. He replied, “If a mountain has decayed soil and then collapses, what is there to be done? Mountains and rivers are the mainstay of the domain. Thus, when mountains collapse and rivers run dry, the ruler abstains from meat and elaborate food, reduces the splendor of his apparel, rides carriages without decoration, banishes music, and leaves his usual abode. The diviner displays objects to be sacrificed to the spirits; the scribe reads ritually appropriate words to honor them. And that is all. Even with Bo Zong, what can he do?” Bo Zong asked to present him at court, but he refused. He thus told the ruler the driver’s words, which the ruler then followed. Xia ng 4.4 (569 BCE)  In autumn, Lord Xiang’s mother, Ding Si, expired. Her coffin did not lie in state, there was no inner coffin, and they did not offer sacrifices to appease her spirit after burial. The carpenter Qing said to Ji Wenzi, “You are the chief minister. That the funeral rituals of our former lord’s wife should be so incomplete means that you are not allowing the ruler to fulfill his filial duty to the utmost. When the ruler grows up, who will bear the blame for this?” Earlier, Ji Wenzi had planted for himself six jia trees outside the eastern gate of Pu Gardens. When the carpenter Qing asked about the wood for Ding Si’s coffin, Ji Wenzi said, “Make it simple.” But when the carpenter Qing used the jia wood from Pu Gardens, Ji Wenzi did not stop him.14 14 Jia is considered to be a very fine wood. To keep the funeral rituals simple, Ding Si’s coffin would not have to be made from fine wood, yet Ji Wenzi does not stop Qing from cutting down the trees.

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The noble man said, “When the Records says, ‘Having acted against ritual propriety many times, he will certainly be overtaken by disaster,’ surely this is what is meant!”15 The Zheng minister Zichan (chapter 11) regards the debates about Zheng ­policies in village meeting places as instructive rather than threatening and refuses to suppress potential dissent. Such compassionate tolerance wins the approval of Confucius and contrasts with anecdotes about Zichan’s sterner side (chapter 11, Zhao 20.9). In the passage that follows, a Song minister offers an opposite view of “public opinion.”

Xia ng 31.11 (542 BCE)  The men of Zheng gathered freely in the ­v illage meeting places and passed judgment on those in charge of government. Ran Ming said to Zichan, “What about dismantling the village meeting places?” Zichan said, “Why should we do that? Having retired from their tasks, which last from morning till evening, people gather freely to debate whether those in charge of government have done well or not. I will then carry out whatever they deem to be good policies and rectify whatever they regard as bad. They are my teachers. Why should we dismantle the village meeting places? I have heard of using loyalty and goodness to diminish resentment, but I have not heard of assuming the forceful pose of authority to block resentment. Wouldn’t forceful authority swiftly put a stop to resentment? But that would be like blocking a river. The damage caused by a great break in the dyke would surely injure so many people that we would not have the means to save the situation! It is better to have a small break to lead the flow, and it is better that I hear criticism and let it be my medicine.” Ran Ming said, “Henceforth I know that you, sir, are truly one whom I should serve. I am indeed a petty man who lacks talent, but if this can actually be done, then it will be the domain of Zheng that benefits. How would the benefit be limited to a few ministers or officers?” Confucius heard this story and remarked, “Judging from this, when people say that Zichan was not humane, I do not believe it.”

15 Indeed, Ji Wenzi dies the very next year. Note that Ji Wenzi is praised elsewhere in Zuozhuan (chapter 3, Cheng 9.5; chapter 7, Zhao 32.4; ZT Xiang 5.10).

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Xia ng 17.6 (556 BCE)  Huang Guofu of Song, as grand steward, was building a terrace for Duke Ping. Its construction interfered with the harvest. The minister Yue Xi requested that their work wait until the completion of agricultural labor, but the Song ruler did not grant it. The builders sang: The fair one at Marsh Gate, He it is who brings about our toil. The dark one inside the city, He it is who gladdens our hearts.16

When Yue Xi heard this, he personally clutched a bamboo whip and made circuits among the builders, flogging those who were not diligent and saying, “Humble men like us all have abodes to protect us from dryness and dampness, heat and cold.17 Now the ruler is building one terrace, and yet you will not complete it quickly. How can you call this toil?” The singers thus stopped. Someone asked why he acted thus. Yue Xi said, “Tiny as the domain of Song is, whenever there are imprecations and acclamations, these become the taproot of disaster.”

E x pu l sion of a Ru l er W ho Doe s Not N u rt u r e th e Peopl e The music master Kuang, known elsewhere in Zuozhuan for his good judg­ ment, divinatory skills, and musical knowledge, justifies the expulsion of Lord Xian of Wei (chapter 3, Xiang 14.4, chapter 7, Xiang 20.7). He articu­ lates a political vision wherein a ruler’s power has inherent limits. Authority is based on just rule and reciprocity, and opinions from various levels of society are supposed to constrain the ruler’s choices. We can compare this with the scribe Mo’s justification of the exile of Lord Zhao of Lu (chapter 7, Zhao 32.4). 16 Huang Guofu is the fair-skinned man who lived at Marsh Gate, and the dark-skinned man inside the city refers to Yue Xi. 17 Perhaps to lessen the severity of his rebuke, Yue Xi emphasizes his sympathy or solidarity with the builders despite obvious “class difference.”

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Xia ng 14.6 (539 BCE)  The music master Kuang was attending the Prince of Jin. The Prince of Jin said, “The leaders of Wei have expelled their ruler. Is that not going too far?” He replied, “Perhaps it was their ruler who went too far. A good ruler will reward excellence and punish excesses. He will nurture the people like his own children, covering them like the sky and holding them like the earth. The people will hold up their ruler, love him like a parent, look up to him as the sun and the moon, revere him as the bright spirits, and hold him in awe as they do thunderbolts. How can he be expelled? Now the ruler is the master of the spirits and the hope of the people. If he ruins the livelihood of the people and deprives the spirits of sacrifices so that all the clans lose hope and the altars of the domain have no master, of what use is he? What is to be done but have him expelled? Heaven gives birth to the people and establishes rulers to oversee them and take care of them, not letting them lose their livelihood. There being rulers, Heaven establishes helpers for them to act as their teachers and guardians, not letting them exceed limits. That is why the Son of Heaven has his lords, and princes have their ministers; ministers establish their collateral lineages; high officers have their secondary lines; officers have their ­subordinate younger kinsmen or like-minded colleagues; commoners, artisans, merchants, minions, lackeys, shepherds, and grooms all have their kin and close associates—so that they can assist and support each other. When there is excellence, the helpers praise them; when there are wrongs, they rectify them; when there are troubles, they come to their aid; when there are errors, they change them. From the king down, every­one has fathers, older brothers, sons, and younger brothers to observe and amend the flaws of their governing decisions. Scribes make their writings, blind music masters make their odes, musicians recite admonitions and remonstrances, high officers rectify and instruct, officers transmit opinions, commoners complain, merchants and travelers argue in the marketplace, and all kinds of artisans present their views through their skills. Therefore, it says in the Xia Documents, The itinerant officers, waving their metal bells with wooden tongues, made their circuits on the roads. Various low-ranking officers admonished one another. Artisans used their skills and crafts to offer remonstrances.

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That is why in the first month, at the beginning of spring, this practice was followed. This was for the sake of remonstrating against any loss of constancy and regularity. Great indeed is Heaven’s love for the people! Why would it let one person exert his will over the people and indulge his excesses while abandoning the nature of heaven and earth? This would certainly not be allowed.”

Th e Sa d R e su lts of T wo Ru l er s’ Str a nge Com pu l sions The Lord of Wei is obsessed with cranes, and the Master of Zhu with cleanli­ ness, and in both cases, these seemingly trivial obsessions have the most seri­ ous consequences.

Min 2.5 (660 BCE)  In winter, in the twelfth month, the men of Di attacked Wei. Lord Yi of Wei was obsessed with cranes, and there were cranes that rode in the dignitary’s carriage. When they were about to do battle, those from among the inhabitants of the capital who had been issued armor said, “Send the cranes! If it is the cranes who hold salary and rank, then how can the likes of us go to fight?”18 Lord Yi gave Shi Qizi a jade thumb ring and gave Ning Zhuangzi an arrow and appointed them to defend the domain, saying, “With these uphold the domain. Choose what is beneficial to the domain and do it.” He gave his wife an embroidered robe, saying, “Pay heed to these two men.” Qu Kong drove the lord’s war chariot and Zibo was spearman on the right, Huang Yi drove on ahead, and Kong Yingqi protected the rear. They fought with the Di at Xing Marsh, and the Wei troops were completely defeated. Wei was then extinguished. The Prince of Wei would not remove his flag, and that is why they were completely defeated. The Di men took the scribes Hua Longhua and Li Kong as prisoners, bringing them along as they pursued the men of Wei. The two scribes said, “We are grand scribes, and we are the ones who manage the domain

18 Giving the cranes a place inside the dignitary’s carriage seems to have been the equivalent of granting them the rank and salary of the supervisor of the military.

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sacrifices. If we do not go on ahead, the capital cannot be taken.”19 So the Di sent them on ahead. When the scribes arrived, they told the defenders,20 “The Di cannot be resisted.” In the night they departed with the inhabitants of the capital. The Di entered Wei and then pursued them, defeating them once more at the Yellow River. Ding 2.3 (508 BCE)  Lord Zhuang of Zhu had Yi Yigu drink with him. When Yi Yigu went out to relieve himself, the gatekeeper begged him for some meat. Yi Yigu snatched his staff from him and beat him with it. Ding 3.1 (507 BCE)  In the third year, in spring, in the second month, on the xinmao day (29), the Master of Zhu stood upon the gate terrace, overlooking the outer court. The gatekeeper was sprinkling the court with a jar of water. Looking out and seeing him at it, the Master of Zhu was furious. The gatekeeper said, “Yi Yigu pissed here.” The master commanded the arrest of Yi Yigu. When Yi Yigu was not apprehended, the master became even more furious. Throwing himself upon his bed, he fell upon the coals in the brazier. The burns suppurated, and as a result he died. There was a preliminary burial of five chariots and five human victims. Lord Zhuang was irascible and obsessed with cleanliness, and therefore he came to this end.

19 Obviously, the domain sacrifices are considered to be extremely important, as even the Di seem to acknowledge. The scribes seem to be implying that unless they are present in Wei to offer the appropriate sacrifices beforehand, the gods will not allow the domain to be taken. Is this a trick to foil the invaders or simply an assessment of the situation? 20 “The defenders” in this case are presumably Shi Qizi and Ning Zhuangzi, who had been charged earlier “to defend the domain.”

Chapter 9

Law and Punishment

Pa r t ic u l a r ly c r i t ic a l t o g ov e r n m e n t w e r e qu e s t ion s concerning the application of punishment. The proper use of punishment is considered crucial for the rise of Lord Wen of Jin to the status of overlord (see chapter 4, Xi 28.6). The Chinese character we translate here as “punishment” is written with a constituent that derives from “knife” and reflects the fact that punishments in early China were typically mutilating. No one questioned, at least as far as we know, that such punishments should be meted out for serious criminal acts, but some ministers warned rulers against using them in excess or merely to satisfy a personal grudge or whim. Law in early China, at least as encountered in Zuozhuan, originally had a close connection with government regulation and ritual practice. Zhao Dun (chapter 4, Xi 24.1; chapter 7, Xuan 2.3), a famous Jin minister of the late seventh century BCE, initiated a number of government reforms that led, we are told, to “enduring laws” (Wen 6.1). Part of Zhao Dun’s reform concerned setting “straight the application of the laws to crimes.” That is to say, at the heart of any conception of law in Zuozhuan is what we call “penal law.” In fact, toward the end of the Spring and Autumn period, penal codes were inscribed on metal first in the domain of Zheng (Zhao 6.3), under the direction of the famous minister Zichan, and later in Jin (Zhao 29.5). A third code, inscribed on bamboo, is ascribed to the Zheng minister Deng Xi (Ding 9.2). The appearance of such inscribed codes created controversy. Perhaps the clearest statement of the terms of this controversy appears in the Analects (2.3), where Confucius says, “Direct the people with regulations and bring them to order with punishments and they will avoid misdeed but have no sense of shame. Direct them with virtue and bring them to order with ritual, and they will have a sense of shame and also comply.” As long as codified penal law prevails, at least Confucius claims, people may make every effort 16 8

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to avoid running afoul of that law, but they will not cultivate those virtues such as ritual propriety and shame that strengthen the social fabric. This controversy about written penal law appears in the pages of Zuozhuan, as two passages below demonstrate (Zhao 6.3 and Zhao 29.5). In the latter of these, Confucius himself is made to say that the very act of inscribing a new penal code represents a break with time-honored standards and regulations and is therefore contrary to a revered tradition based on the authority of past models and ritual prescriptions.

Th e J ustice of Pu nish m ent The problem of when the extreme punishment of death is appropriate arises in the following four passages. In the first, the tumultuous fourteen-year reign of Lord Hui of Jin comes to an end, and his son, Lord Huai (r. 637 BCE), succeeds him as ruler. When the Jin minister Hu Tu refuses to summon his fugitive sons back to Jin, Lord Huai executes him and is criticized for “wanton punishment.”

Xi 23.4 (637 BCE)  In the ninth month, Lord Hui of Jin died, and his son, Lord Huai, was established as ruler. He commanded that no one should follow the fugitive, his uncle Chong’er. He fixed a deadline, and fugitives who did not arrive home by that deadline were not to be forgiven. Hu Mao and Hu Yan, the sons of Hu Tu, had followed Chong’er and were in Qin, but Hu Tu did not call them back. In winter, Lord Huai arrested Hu Tu and said, “If your sons come home, then you will be pardoned.” Hu Tu responded, “The rule of ancient times was that when sons are capable of serving in office, their father teaches them to be loyal. After one’s name is written on a bamboo slip as a pledge of loyalty and gifts are exchanged at the beginning of one’s service, it is a transgression to be duplicitous. Now, it has been years since my sons’ names were listed with Chong’er. If still I were to call them back, this would be teaching them to be duplicitous. When fathers teach sons duplicity, how can they serve a ruler? That punishments not be excessive is the result both of the ruler’s luminous understanding and of the subjects’ wishes. But if you seek satisfaction through wanton punishment, then who will be found guiltless? I have heard your command!” And so Hu Tu was put to death. Diviner Yan, citing illness, did not leave his residence. He said, “In the Zhou Documents

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there is this: ‘And thereupon his great wisdom brought others to submission.’ If one lacks wisdom but kills others to seek satisfaction, will there not then be difficulty? When people do not see virtue but hear only of slaughter, then what posterity will the ruler have?” The supervisor of the Jin military, Wei Jiang, incurs the wrath of Lord Dao of Jin (r. 572–558 BCE) when he enforces military discipline and executes the chariot driver of the ruler’s younger brother. Nevertheless, Wei Jiang is for­ given for his act and the Diviner Yan commends him for “knowing how to use punishment.”

Xia ng 3.7 (570 BCE)  The Prince of Jin’s younger brother, Yanggan, caused disorder in the ranks at Quliang. Wei Jiang executed Yanggan’s driver. Furious, the Prince of Jin said to Yangshe Chi, “Assembling the princes is something we do for the sake of glory. What shame can possibly compare to having Yanggan disgraced and punished? We must put Wei Jiang to death without fail!” Yangshe Chi replied, “Wei Jiang has never had disloyal intent. In serving his ruler he does not avoid difficulties, and having offended he does not flee punishment. Surely he will come to explain his case. Why deign to issue a command?” As he finished speaking, Wei Jiang arrived, handed a letter to one of the lord’s attendants, and prepared to fall on his sword. Shi Fang and Zhang Lao stopped him. The lord read out his letter: “Formerly, you, my lord, lacked better men to serve you and appointed me to this office as supervisor of the military. I have heard, ‘For troops, to obey orders constitutes martial virtue; in military affairs, to die rather than commit transgressions constitutes reverence.’ When you, my lord, have assembled the princes, should we dare to be irreverent? If the ruler’s army lacks martial virtue and those in charge lack reverence, no offense can be greater. I feared that I would be put to death for it and that Yanggan would then be implicated in a crime.1 We would have no way to escape the consequences of our guilt. I failed to offer instruction to him and came to use the ax. My offense is grave. Could I presume not to submit,

1

The implication is that he extends his own fear to Yanggan and empathizes with his anticipated plight.

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and so infuriate you? I beg leave to put my death in the hands of the supervisor of corrections.” The lord ran out barefoot and said, “The words I, the unworthy one, spoke were for love of kin; the chastising that you, sir, meted out was for the sake of military protocol. I have a younger brother but was unable to instruct him, causing him to violate the great command. This was my offense. You are not to harm yourself and compound my offense. That is what I presume to request of you.” The Prince of Jin considered Wei Jiang a man who knew how to use punishment to aid in governing the people. After they had returned from their mission, the Jin ruler bestowed upon him a ceremonious meal and made him assistant commander in the new army. Zhang Lao became supervisor of the military in the central army; Shi Fu became leader of scouts. Gongsun Hei of Zheng was guilty of various offenses (chapter 11, Xiang 30.10), which are enumerated below, but his punishment was delayed because of Zichan’s pragmatic calculations on the balance of power between Zheng lineages. Note that Zichan seems initially to remove himself from the strife, but once it is clear that Gongsun Hei’s own lineage, the Si lineage, has turned against him, he returns to the Zheng capital and condemns the would-be rebel. Now, threatened with execution, Gongsun Hei commits suicide, which was one common way at that time of avoiding execution.

Zhao 2.4 (540 BCE)  In autumn, Gongsun Hei of Zheng was preparing to stoke turmoil. He hoped to remove the You lineage and take over as minister. But pain from his wound flared up and he did not go through with his plans. His Si lineage and all the high officers wanted to put him to death. Zichan, who was then at the border, heard of it. Fearing that he would not get there in time, he rode back to the capital by post carriages. He had an officer enumerate Gongsun Hei’s offenses: “During the turmoil caused by Liang Xiao, it was because of our service to a great domain that we did not chastise you.2 You have an insatiable thirst for insubordination; the domain cannot tolerate you. Taking it upon yourself to attack 2

He may be referring to a Jin-led meeting reported elsewhere (ZT Xiang 30.12) to plan for aid to Song after its disastrous fire. On the turmoil caused by Liang Xiao, see also chapter 11, Xiang 30.10.

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Liang Xiao was your first crime. Vying with a kinsman for a wife was your second crime. 3 Arrogating the ruler’s prerogative at the Xun Road covenant was your third crime.4 When you have committed three capital crimes already, how are you to be tolerated? Unless you die soon, the great punishment will be inflicted.” Bowing twice with his forehead touching the ground, Gongsun Hei made this statement: “My death might come any morning or evening. Do not help Heaven carry out its cruelty.” Zichan said, “What man does not die? Our charge is that evildoers should not come to a good end. One who performs evil deeds is an evildoer. If we do not help Heaven, are we then to help evildoers?” Gongsun Hei asked that his son Yin be made market overseer. Zichan said, “If Yin is qualified, the ruler will employ him. If he is not qualified, then any morning or evening he will follow you in death. Since you take no thought of your own crimes, how can you make any further requests? Unless you die soon, the supervisor of corrections will arrive.” In the seventh month, on the renyin day (1), Gongsun Hei hanged himself. They exposed his corpse at the Zhoushi thoroughfare, placing a wooden tablet listing his crimes above it. An earlier passage (chapter 2, Min 2.3) reports the execution of the adulter­ ous Ai Jiang, who was also complicit in killing her stepson Lord Min of Lu (r. 661–660). That execution is criticized as extreme because “women are those who follow others” (ZT Xi 1.7), presumably a reference to the idea that a woman follows her father before marriage, her husband during marriage, and her eldest son after the death of her husband. The following passage, which concerns the concubine Rong Zi’s interference in a succession crisis in Qi, goes further and asserts that any form of mutilating punishment against women is “not in accordance with ritual propriety.”

Xia ng 19.5 (554 BCE)  The Prince of Qi had taken a wife in Lu. She was called Yan Yi Ji, and she bore him no son. Her niece Zong Sheng Ji gave birth to Guang, who became the heir apparent. Among the Prince’s 3 You Chu and Gongsun Hei competed over a beautiful woman (ZT Zhao 1.7). 4 Gongsun Hei insisted on being included in a covenant among the high officers and ordered the grand scribe to include him with the six ministers as one of “the seven gentlemen” who rule in Zheng, in effect demanding his own promotion (ZT Zhao 1.9).

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concubines were Zhong Zi and Rong Zi, and the latter was his favorite. Zhong Zi bore Ya and entrusted him to Rong Zi. Rong Zi requested that Ya should become the heir apparent. The Qi ruler assented. Zhong Zi said, “This will not do. To abandon the regular rule is inauspicious. To offend the princes will bring difficulties. Having been established as heir apparent, Guang is ranked among the princes. Now to cast him aside for no reason is to arbitrarily defy the princes. By trying something difficult to accomplish, you will also be committing an inauspicious transgression. You, my lord, will certainly regret it.” The lord said, “It is all up to me.” He thus moved heir apparent Guang to the eastern border. He sent Gao Hou to tutor Ya, who became the heir apparent. Susha Wei became his junior preceptor. When the Prince of Qi fell ill, Cui Zhu secretly went to meet Guang and escorted him back. When the ruler’s illness became critical, Cui Zhu established Guang as heir apparent. Guang had Rong Zi killed and exposed her corpse at court. This was not in accordance with ritual propriety. Women are not to be subjected to mutilating punishments. Even if one enforces such punishments, they would not be carried out in court or in the marketplace. The following excerpted speech from Gongsun Guisheng is perhaps the most famous in Zuozhuan advocating the judicious use of punishments and the somberness a ruler should display as the season for punishment approaches. He argues that excessively harsh punishment in Chu benefits its rival Jin by driving Chu talents to seek refuge in Jin. It is true that throughout Zuozhuan, ministers and commanders fall victim to the suspicions and persecution of their rulers more frequently in Chu than in other domains.

Xia ng 26.10 (547 BCE)  By the time Xiang Xu was preparing for peace between Jin and Chu, Gongsun Guisheng was sent as envoy to Jin. On his return to Chu, the chief minister, Qu Jian, had a talk with him and asked about Jin affairs. Qu Jian further asked, “If we compare Jin high officers and Chu ones, who are more worthy?” Gongsun Guisheng replied, “The Jin ministers are not the equal of the Chu ministers. Its high officers, however, are worthy; they all have the talent to be ministers. Just like the timber from medlar and catalpa trees and fur and leather, they made their way there from Chu. Although Chu has the talents, it is Jin that makes use of them.” Qu Jian said, “Does

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Jin alone not have worthy members of the ruling house or relatives by marriage?” He replied, “Although there are those, the fact remains that in many cases it is Chu talent that is employed. I have heard that those who are adept at governing a domain are neither indiscriminate with rewards nor excessive with punishments. If rewards are indiscriminately handed out, then one fears that they will reach depraved men; if punishments are excessively meted out, then one fears that they will reach worthy men. If, unfortunately, one is to err, then one would rather be indiscriminate with rewards than be excessive with punishments. Instead of losing the worthy ones, one would rather benefit the depraved ones. If there are no worthy men, then the domain follows the path of ruin. As it says in the Odes, The good men have gone into exile. The realm is sickly and wasting away.

That refers to not having superior men. That is why it says in the Xia ­Documents, ‘Rather than killing the innocent, it is better to miss out on punishing the deviant.’ This is for fear of losing the superior ones. As the ‘Shang Hymns’ has it, Not indiscriminate, not excessive— None dare to be lax or wallow in leisure. The command is given to domains below To grandly establish their blessings.

That was how the first Shang ruler, Tang, obtained the blessings of Heaven. “Those who governed the people well in ancient times encouraged rewards and dreaded punishments, and they cared for the people untiringly. Rewards were granted in spring and summer; punishments were meted out in autumn and winter. That was why, when preparing to dispense rewards, the lords added dishes to meals. Adding dishes to meals meant that what remained after satiation could be bestowed as gifts. That is how we know they encouraged rewards. When preparing to mete out punishments, the lords did not dine with full ceremony. Not dining with full ceremony meant that they stopped the music. That is how we know they dreaded punishments. They rose early and went to sleep late,

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and from morning till evening they presided over government. That is how we know they cared for the people. These three things are the great tenets of ritual propriety. Where there is ritual propriety, there is no failure. “Now Chu has many unwarranted punishments. Its high officers flee death in domains of the four quarters, for which they have become chief strategists, inflicting on Chu harm that cannot be remedied or healed. This is what is called failure to employ one’s own talented people.” The rival claims of kinship and legal justice emerge as an issue. The Jin minis­ ter Shuxiang shows his impartiality after his younger brother, Yangshe Fu, is murdered for having delivered a biased judgment after receiving bribes. The year before, Shuxiang drew attention to Yangshe Fu’s corruption and devious rhetoric (Zhao 13.3, 13.9). Confucius’s praise of Shuxiang’s “rectitude” and willingness to “conceal nothing for the sake of his kin” seems to contradict gentler views expressed in the Analects (13.18), where rectitude consists in the willingness of father and son to conceal the truth in order to protect each other from the law.

Zhao 14.7 (528 BCE)  In Jin, Xing Bo and Yongzi disputed over the lands around Chù. After a long time, the matter was still not settled. When Shi Mimou went on a visit to Chu, Yangshe Fu took his place as arbiter. Han Qi ordered him to decide old cases, and he found Yongzi to be in the wrong. When Yongzi gave his daughter to Yangshe Fu, the latter instead found Xing Bo to be in the wrong. Infuriated, Xing Bo killed Yangshe Fu and Yongzi at court. Han Qi asked Shuxiang how Xing Bo should be charged. Shuxiang said, “The three men were equally guilty. It would be right to execute the survivor and expose his corpse and to put the corpses of the dead men on display. Yongzi was aware of his own crime but used bribery to buy a judgment that justified him. As for Yangshe Fu, he sold his ruling. Xing Bo killed on his own authority. Their offenses were equivalent. Appropriating the semblance of goodness when one is evil is disorder. Failing in one’s official duties out of greed is corruption. And killing others without qualms is lawlessness. As the Xia Documents says, ‘The disorderly, the corrupt, and the lawless are to be executed.’ This was the Code of Gao Yao. I request that we follow it.” They therefore put Xing Bo to death and exposed his corpse and the corpses of Yongzi and Yangshe Fu in the marketplace.

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Confucius said, “Shuxiang’s was a kind of rectitude passed down from ancient times. In governing the domain and administering punishments he concealed nothing for the sake of his kin. On the three occasions when he accused Yangshe Fu of misdeeds, he did not relent in the slightest. How true to his duty he was! This can be called rectitude! . . . By killing his kinsman he added to his own glory. How true to duty he was!”

Th e Fu nction a n d Position of L aw The capable minister Zhao Dun is credited with a series of reforms in the domain of Jin that result in “enduring laws,” though one critic compares him to “the sun on a summer day” (ZT Wen 7.5). Those Jin laws are later “revised and augmented” after Fan Hui visits the Zhou court and learns rules of ­ritual propriety, thus demonstrating the strong ties between law and ritual propriety in Spring and Autumn period China.

Wen 6.1 (621 BCE)  In the sixth year, in spring, Jin mustered the troops in Yi and demobilized two of their five armies. Hu Yigu was appointed to command the central army, and Zhao Dun was to assist him. When Yang Chufu arrived from Wen, he shifted the muster to Dong and replaced the head of the central army. Yang Chufu had been a subordinate of Zhao Cui, so he was a partisan of the Zhao lineage. Moreover, he also said that Zhao Dun was capable: “Employing the capable is to the advantage of the domain.” On this account, he promoted him. Zhao Dun from this time on began to be in charge of the government of the domain. He established regulations for official affairs, set straight the application of the laws to crimes, put in order litigation proceedings, controlled fugitives, kept strictly to bonds and contracts, corrected old abuses, stabilized the ritual pertaining to ranks, renewed the customary official duties, and promoted those who had been blocked or obstructed. Having accomplished these things, he handed control to the grand tutor Yang Chufu and the grand preceptor Jia Tuo. They had all of these things carried out in the domain of Jin and made them enduring laws. Xua n 16.4 (593 BCE)  As a result of the turmoil that ensued with the killing of the Mao and Shao lineage heads, the royal house was again in chaos. Wangsun Su fled to Jin. The leaders of Jin reinstated him. In

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winter, the Prince of Jin sent Fan Hui to pacify the royal house. King Ding of Zhou offered ceremonial toasts for him, and Yuan Duke Xiang assisted him in the ceremony. Sections of meat with bones were brought in on stands. Fan Hui privately asked the reason for this. The king heard about this and summoned Fan Hui: “Fan Hui! Have you not heard of this? When the king offers ceremonial toasts, the carcasses are brought in as uncut halves; when he has a feast, the meat is cut up and brought in on stands. With the lords there should be ceremonial toasts; with ministers of the domains, feasts. Such are the rituals of the royal house.” Upon Fan Hui’s return, he examined and sought out rules of ritual propriety in order to revise and augment the laws in Jin.

Th e Debate Concer ning W r itten Pena l L aw The famous Jin minister Shuxiang (Zhao 6.3), and then later Confucius him­ self (Zhao 29.5), both speak out against the introduction of inscribed penal codes in the late Spring and Autumn period. It is ironic that Shuxiang con­ demns Zheng for casting a penal code in metal only to see his own domain do the same thing twenty-three years later.

Zhao 6.3 (536 BCE)  In the third month, the Zheng leaders cast a penal code in bronze. Shuxiang had a letter carried to Zichan, which said, “In the beginning I expected much from you, but now I no longer do so. Long ago, the former kings consulted about matters to decide them but did not make penal codes, for they feared that the people would become contentious. When they still could not manage the people, they fenced them in with dutifulness, bound them with governance, employed them with ritual propriety, maintained them with good faith, and fostered them with nobility of spirit. They determined the correct stipends and ranks to encourage their obedience, and meted out strict punishments and penalties to overawe them in their excesses. Fearing that that still was not enough, they taught them loyalty, rewarded good conduct, instructed them in their duties, employed them harmoniously, supervised them with vigilance, oversaw them with might, and judged them with rigor. Moreover, they sought superiors who were sage and principled, officials who were brilliant and discerning, elders who were loyal and trustworthy, and teachers who were kind and generous. With

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this, then, the people could be employed without disaster or disorder. When the people know that there is a code, they will not be in awe of their superiors. Together they bicker, appeal to the code, and seek to achieve their goals by trying their luck. They cannot be governed. “When there was disorder in the Xia government, they created the ‘Punishments of Yu.’ When there was disorder in the Shang government, they created the ‘Punishments of Tang.’ When there was disorder in the Zhou government, they composed the ‘Nine Punishments.’ These three penal codes in each case arose in the dynasty’s waning era. Now as chief minister in the domain of Zheng you, Zichan, have created fields and ditches, established an administration that is widely reviled, fixed the three statutes, and cast the penal code. Will it not be difficult to calm the people by such means? As it says in the Odes, Take the virtue of King Wen as a guide, a model, a pattern; Day by day calm the four quarters.

And as it says elsewhere, Take as model King Wen, And the ten thousand realms have trust.

In such an ideal case, why should there be any penal codes at all? When the people have learned how to contend over points of law, they will abandon ritual propriety and appeal to what is written. Even at chisel’s tip and knife’s edge they will contend. 5 A chaotic litigiousness will flourish and bribes will circulate everywhere. “Will Zheng perhaps perish at the end of your generation? I have heard that ‘when a domain is about to fall, its regulations are sure to proliferate.’ Perhaps this is what is meant?”6

5 This may be a reference to the tools used to inscribe the characters of the penal code in the mold before casting, or it may refer to the implements used to inflict mutilating punishments on lawbreakers. 6 It is worth noting that Shuxiang’s line was extinguished shortly after his death, while Zichan’s domain survived until 376 BCE. While the Zuozhuan authors are sometimes thought to have sided with Shuxiang in his condemnation of the Zheng code, this failed prediction suggests a reading more sympathetic with Zichan and his methods.

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Zichan wrote back to him: “It is as you have said, sir. I am untalented, and my good fortune will not reach as far as my sons and grandsons. I have done it to save this generation. Although I cannot obey your orders, how would I dare to forget your great kindness?” Zhao 29.5 (513 BCE)  In winter, Zhao Yang and Zhonghang Yin of Jin led out an army and built walls on the banks of the Ru River. They then levied one drum-measure of iron from the domain of Jin and used it to cast the so-called penal cauldron, upon which they inscribed the penal code that Fan Gai had composed.7 Confucius said, “Jin will perish, for it has lost its standards. Jin should maintain the legal standards received by its ancestor Tang Shu from the Zhou king so as to provide guidelines for the governance of its people, while ministers and high officers maintain these standards, each according to his rank. By this means the people are able to esteem the nobles, and the nobles are able to maintain their hereditary duties. When nobles and commoners do not violate rules, that is what we call ‘standards.’ For this reason, when Lord Wen created the office of the keeper of ranks and made the code at Pilu, he became covenant chief. 8 “Now that Jin has abandoned these standards and made a penal cauldron, the people attend only to the cauldron! How are they to respect the exalted, and how will the exalted maintain their hereditary duties? When there is no proper order for the exalted and the lowly, how will they manage the domain? What is more, Fan Gai’s penal code is derived from the muster at Yi, a period of disorder in Jin.9 How can it be used as a legal norm?” The scribe Mo of Cai said, “The Fan and Zhonghang lineages will likely perish!10 As low-rank minister, Zhonghang Yin has interfered in his superiors’ issuing of commands and has taken it upon himself to create a vessel for the penal code that is to be the legal norm for the domain. This is a perversion of legal norms. And he has moreover implicated the 7 There is little corroborating evidence for the availability of iron in such quantities in the late sixth century BCE, which might lead one to question the historical veracity of this episode. 8 For the Jin muster at Pilu (though the place name is not mentioned), see chapter 4, Xi 27.4. 9 For the muster at Yi and Zhao Dun’s role, see Wen 6.1 above. 10 The scribe Mo’s predictions anticipate the Jin strife that will begin later and culminates with the final suppression of the Fan and Zhonghang rebellion twenty-three years later.

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Fans in his actions. Because he has now made these changes, they will perish.11 Insofar as it affects the Zhaos, Zhao Yang will have a part in it. But he had no choice, and if he is virtuous, he will be able to escape.” Deng Xi, author of a legal code in Zheng, is executed. His “Bamboo Code” might have challenged the Zheng penal codes cast in bronze thirty-five years earlier. In later centuries, Deng Xi would be identified alongside such thinkers as Lord Shang and Han Feizi as a “legalist,” that is, a proponent of strict enforcement of laws. The noble man here exposes the contradiction in exe­ cuting a man while retaining a legal code the man had written. The passage implies that just as one preserves an ode because of its message, so one pre­ serves a person because of what he has contributed.

Ding 9.2 (501 BCE)  In Zheng, Si Chuan killed Deng Xi but used his “Bamboo Code.” The noble man said of Si Chuan that in this he was not loyal. If one truly has something with which he might benefit the domain and its patrimonies, then it is right to forgive his aberrations. From the three stanzas of “Graceful Girl,” what one takes is the red tube. From the line “What shall I report to him?” in “Flagstaffs,” what one takes is loyalty. Therefore, when we use someone’s Way, we do not discard his person. As it says in the Odes, Lush is the wild pear. Do not trim it, do not cut it: It was here that the Shao Liege rested.

Thinking of the man, they even loved his tree. How could they have used a man’s Way and not have cared for his person? Si Chuan will not have the means to encourage able men.

11 The idea is that since Zhonghang Yin has changed current law and revived the faulty law code promulgated by Fan Gai, both the Zhonghang and the Fan lineage will suffer.

C h a p t e r 10

The Tragedy of King Ling of Chu

I n t h e p r e c e di ng f ou r c h a p t e r s , w e h av e s e e n va r iou s arguments about the role that ritual, law, and historical precedents should play in proper governance. The setting for propounding these ideas is the court, where ministers struggle to shape the ruler’s behavior. And what an unhappy struggle it often is; for every Chong’er (chapter 4), stumbling along at times but usually receptive to good counsel, there are many other rulers oblivious to or only fitfully attentive to remonstrance. Perhaps the most developed example of an overreaching and heedless ruler is King Ling of Chu (r. 540–529 BCE). He is from the beginning identified as being excessively ambitious and unjust. When the future king, then chief minister, puts a capable supervisor of the military to death, Shen Wuyu, a daringly outspoken Chu noble, condemns the chief minister’s action as the harbinger of self-destruction. The Jin minister Zhao Wu, who succinctly characterizes King Ling as “strong but unjust,” predicts that the king will meet “a speedy death.” Indeed, King Ling’s downfall seems almost over-determined— more than any other character in Zuozhuan, he invites recurring predictions of doom. King Ling’s spectacular rise and fall seem to follow the unique course of unbridled will and fantasies of boundless power, yet his actions have precedents. He assassinates his nephew to become king, just as Chong’er puts his own nephew, Lord Huai, to death as he takes power. But while Chong’er is seen as a rightful ruler coming into his own, King Ling is presented as a usurper. Like Chong’er, King Ling strives for the status of overlord. Chu is more powerful than Jin during this period and emerges as a leader in covenant meetings, although it fails to prevail against Wu. Unlike Chong’er and his followers, however, King Ling fails to combine the assertion of power with the symbolic structure of ritual propriety. Brought down by the very 181

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intensity of his striving, King Ling commands a kind of tragic grandeur. His devastation at his minister Ran Dan’s clever rebuke, his terrible sorrow at the death of his sons, and his lonely suicide, possess a level of emotional power that bears comparison to Greek tragedy or the biblical accounts of Saul and David. There are potentially redemptive moments of generosity and fair-mindedness in the account of King Ling, as when he pardons the minister Shen Wuyu, who earlier denounced King Ling’s overreaching ambition when he was still a minister and apprehended his own escaped gatekeeper at King Ling’s palace, or when he makes Chuanfeng Xu, who tried to attack him once, the lord of Chen. Toward the end of his life, he displays the desire to reform and the ability to reflect on his own destiny. But for the reader, it is perhaps his very persistence in his errant course that is most riveting because it generates expansive and complex rhetorical performance from those trying to sway him. Whereas Chong’er is molded by the advice of his followers, King Ling seems to transform the methods of those remonstrating with him—Zichan, Wei Qiqiang, and Ran Dan have to enlarge on his fantasies of power even as they try to convey their message of necessary correction.

A m bition a n d Se eds of Self-De struction King Ling of Chu first appears in Zuozhuan as Gongzi Wei, when he serves as chief minister to his older brother King Kang (r. 559–545 BCE). The four passages below highlight Gongzi Wei’s overreaching ambition, which provoke predictions that he will not come to good end. By the last of these passages, dated 541 BCE, Gongzi Wei’s older brother had passed away and had been succeeded as king and master of Chu by his son and Gongzi Wei’s nephew Jia’ao.

Xia ng 26.6 (547 BCE)  The Master of Chu and a Qin leader invaded Wu, advancing as far as Yulou. Having heard that Wu was well prepared, they turned back and then invaded Zheng. In the fifth month, they reached Chengjun. Huang Jie of Zheng, who was garrisoned there, came out and did battle with Chu troops, and he suffered defeat. Chuanfeng Xu took Huang Jie prisoner. Gongzi Wei fought with him over the credit for taking a Zheng nobleman prisoner, and so they had the minister Bo Zhouli determine who was in the right. Bo Zhouli said, “I submit that we ask the

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prisoner.” They thus had the prisoner stand before them. Bo Zhouli said, “They are fighting over you, and you are a nobleman. How can you fail to understand?” He raised his hand and said, “This fine man is Gongzi Wei, our humble ruler’s exalted younger brother.” He lowered his hand and said, “This man is Chuanfeng Xu, the governor of the district outside Fangcheng. Now who took you captive?” The prisoner said, “I encountered the king’s son, who showed I was the weaker man.” Infuriated, Chuanfeng Xu pulled out his dagger ax and pursued Gongzi Wei but could not overtake him. The leaders of Chu took Huang Jie with them and turned back. Xia ng 30.11 (543 BCE)  Gongzi Wei of Chu put to death Wei Yan, the grand supervisor of the military, and seized his possessions. Shen Wuyu said, “The royal son, Wei, will certainly not escape disaster. Worthy men are masters of the domain. The royal son, serving as chief minister in Chu, should establish and nurture worthy men, but instead, he destroyed them, which amounts to bringing disaster to the domain. What’s more, the supervisor of the military is like one side of the chief minister’s body and the king’s four limbs. Nothing can be more inauspicious than to destroy the master of the people, remove one side of the chief minister’s own body, hack off limbs from the king’s person, and consequently visit calamity on the domain. How can he escape disaster?” Xia ng 31.13 (542 BCE)  The prince of Wei was in Chu. When Beigong Tuo, a Wei envoy, saw the bearing of Chief Minister Wei, he remarked to the Prince of Wei, “The chief minister is already like a ruler. He will have another ambition. Even though he will fulfill his ambition, he will not be able to come to a good end. As it says in the Odes, There is none who does not have beginnings. Few are those who fulfill them as endings.

It is indeed difficult to fulfill them as endings. The chief minister will likely not escape disaster.” The lord said, “How do you, sir, know it?” He replied, “As it says in the Odes, Be reverent and cautious about your majesty of bearing. It will make you an example for the people.

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As the chief minister has no majesty in his bearing, the people have no example to look up to. If he remains above the people without being held up by them as an example, he will not be able to come to a good end.” Zhao 1.3 (541 BCE)  The chief minister, Gongzi Wei, offered the Jin minister Zhao Wu ceremonial toasts and recited the first stanza of “Great Bright.” Zhao Wu recited the second stanza of “Diminutive.”1 When the affair was over, Zhao Wu said to Shuxiang, “The chief minister presents himself as king. What will come of it?” He replied, “The king is weak and the chief minister is strong. He is capable of it. Although he is capable of it, he will not come to a good end.” Zhao Wu said, “Why?” He replied, “When a strong man overcomes a weaker man and is serene about it, that is because the strong man is unjust. A man unjust but strong is sure to meet a speedy death. . . . If the chief minister becomes king, then he will certainly seek the allegiance of the princes. Jin is somewhat weak, and the princes will go over to Chu. If the chief minister wins the princes, then his savagery will wax great, and the people will not tolerate it. How can he come to a good end?”

Th e Path to Pow er Gongzi Wei kills the king, his nephew, and takes power. After this episode, Zuozhuan normally refers to him by his posthumous honorific, King Ling. Almost immediately, his ambition is again noted, and he proceeds to act as a new overlord and assemble the princes. Jin, now weakened, seeks to appease Chu.

Zhao 1.13  Gongzi Wei of Chu had Gongzi Heigong and Bo Zhouli fortify Chou, Li, and Jia. The Zheng leaders were alarmed. Zichan said, “It does no harm. The chief minister, preparing to embark on a great undertaking, is simply getting these two men out of the way. 2 1

In this exchange, the first ode refers to royal majesty and is perhaps self-serving, while the second warns how drunkenness can imperil holders of heaven’s command. Zhao Wu may be warning Gongzi Wei against excessive ambition. 2 The “great undertaking” refers to Gongzi Wei’s plot to assassinate his nephew Jia’ao.

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The trouble will not reach as far as Zheng. Why worry about it?” In ­w inter, Gongzi Wei of Chu was preparing to make an official visit to Zheng, with Wu Ju as his aide. Before they had crossed the border, Gongzi Wei heard that the king had fallen ill and went back home. As a result, Wu Ju made the official visit. In the eleventh month, on the jiyou day, Gongzi Wei arrived in Chu, went into the palace to inquire about the king’s illness, and assas­sinated him by strangling him. He then killed the king’s two sons, Mu and Pingxia. Gongzi Bi, deputy of the right, fled to Jin, while Gongzi Hei­gong, deputy of the palace stables, fled to Zheng. The grand steward Bo Zhouli was put to death at Jia. The king was buried at Jia and was called “Jia’ao.” Notice of the death was sent to Zheng, where Wu Ju asked the messenger what response should be given to inquiries about the successor. “‘Our unworthy high officer Wei,’” he said. Wu Ju changed it to “Among the surviving sons of King Gong, Wei is the eldest. . . . ”3 On the accession of King Ling of Chu, Wei Pi became chief minister and Wei Qiqiang became grand steward. You Ji of Zheng went to Chu for the burial of Jia’ao and to make an official visit to the newly established ruler. On his return, he said to Zichan, “Prepare the traveling equipment. The Chu king is extravagant and pleased with his own enterprise. He is bound to gather the princes. We could go any day now.” Zichan said, “It will be several years before he is capable of it.” Zhao 4.1 (538 BCE)  In the fourth year, in spring, in the royal first month, the Head of Xu went to Chu, where King Ling, the Master of Chu, detained him. The Master of Chu then detained the Liege of Zheng in Chu and hunted with him again south of the Yangzi River, with the Head of Xu joining them. He sent Wu Ju to Jin to seek to convene a meet­i ng of the princes, while the two visiting rulers waited. . . . The Prince of Jin wanted to refuse this request. The supervisor of the military, Ru Qi, said, “You cannot refuse. At the moment the king of Chu is excessive, and it may be that Heaven wants to indulge his desires in order to add to his ills before it sends down punishment. It is impossible to know yet. Perhaps Heaven will make him capable of lasting to the end, but that too is impossible to know. Both Jin and Chu rely 3 The murdered Jia’ao is the son of King Kang, King Gong’s son and King Ling’s older brother. Wu Ju shows his mastery of diplomatic rhetoric.

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entirely on Heaven’s help, and we cannot contend with them. Permit the meeting, my lord, but also cultivate your virtue and wait to see which way the Chu king will turn. If he turns to virtue, even we will serve him, not to speak of the princes. If he goes over to excess and ­cruelty, Chu will cast him off, and then with whom will we have to contend?”

Clou ds of I m pen ding Doom Gath er The Zheng minister Zichan flatters King Ling with visions of grandiosity and a pro-Chu interpretation of the Covenant of Song (the peace agreement in 546 BCE) but also delivers a warning about the dangers of overreaching.

Zhao 4.1 (538 BCE)  The Master of Chu asked Zichan, “Will Jin grant overlordship of the princes to us?” He replied, “They will. The ruler of Jin is somewhat complacent, and his mind is not on the princes. His high officers are avaricious, and none of them straightens out his ruler. According to the Covenant of Song, to augment the peace process, the domains were also said to be ‘as one.’ If Jin does not grant them to you, what purpose will that covenant serve?” The king said, “Will the princes come to us?” He replied, “They are certain to come. They will ­follow the Covenant of Song, they will hearken to your good cheer, and they will have no fear of the great domain of Jin. Why would they not come? The ones likely not to come are Lu, Wei, Cao, and Zhu. Cao fears Song, Zhu fears Lu, and Lu and Wei are hard pressed by Qi and on friendly terms with Jin. These are the only reasons they have for not coming. As for the others, they are domains that you can reach. Who would dare not be present?” The king said, “In that case, is there nothing I want that I cannot have?” He replied, “One cannot seek fulfillment at the expense of others. If you share the desires of others, you will succeed in everything.” King Ling, the Master of Chu, assembles the princes and then seeks advice from Wu Ju and visitors from Song and Zheng on the correct ritual for this meeting. He then completes the ceremony according to the advice of his north­ ern visitors, but he demonstrates arrogance that provokes predictions of his eventual fall.

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Zhao 4.3 (538 BCE)  In the sixth month, on the bingwu day (16), the Master of Chu gathered the princes at Shen. Wu Ju spoke to the ­Master of Chu: “I have heard that the princes give their allegiance not to a particular lord but to ritual propriety itself. Now that you, my lord, are winning the princes for the first time, you must be careful about ritual propriety. The success or failure of your overlordship depends on this meeting. Under King Qi of Xia there were the ceremonial toasts at the Jun Terrace. Under King Tang of Shang there was the command at Jingbo. Under King Wu of Zhou there was the oath at Meng Ford. Under King Cheng there was the muster at Qiyang. Under King Kang there was the court assembly at the Feng Palace. Under King Mu there was the meeting at Mount Tu. Under Lord Huan of Qi there was the Shaoling campaign. Under Lord Wen of Jin there was the covenant at Jiantu. Which precedent will you use?4 Xiang Xu of Song and Zichan of Zheng are here, both of them among the best men from the princes’ domains, so you may choose from among the precedents.” The king said, “I will use the precedent of Lord Huan of Qi.” The king sent someone to ask the preceptor of the left Xiang Xu and Zichan about the ritual. Xiang Xu said, “What a small domain practices for, a great domain uses. Would I presume not to offer up what I have heard?” He presented six rituals by which a lord gathers the princes together. Zichan said, “A small domain reverently upholds its appointed duties. Would I presume not to offer up what I have maintained as duty?” He presented six rituals by which lieges, chiefs, and heads meet with a lord. The noble man said of Xiang Xu that he was excellent at maintaining what was passed down from previous generations, and of Zichan that he was excellent at steering a small domain. The king had Wu Ju stand in waiting behind him so that he could correct any error, and Wu Ju did not correct him right through to the end of the ceremony. When the king asked him the reason, he replied, “Among the rituals there were six that I had not seen. How could I correct you?”5 The Song heir apparent Zuo arrived after the ceremony was over. The king was hunting at Wucheng and did not grant him an audience for a 4 The prestigious meetings listed above extend through the three dynasties—Xia, Shang, and Zhou—and end with the ones convened by Lord Huan of Qi (chapter 12) and Lord Wen of Jin (chapter 4), the first and second overlords. 5 The rituals unfamiliar to Wu Ju were apparently the ones performed by Xiang Xu and Zichan, rituals that had not been previously practiced in Chu.

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long time. Wu Ju asked permission to give him an explanation. The king had him go and say, “It happens that we have duties at the Ancestral Temple at Wucheng, where our unworthy ruler will deposit your gifts of cloth.6 We presume to apologize for being tardy in holding an audience for you. . . . ” The Master of Chu showed off his extravagance in the presence of all the princes. Wu Ju said, “The ceremonies conducted by the six kings and the two lords were in every case the means of displaying ritual propriety before the princes, and they were the reason the princes obeyed commands. When King Jie of Xia held his meeting at Reng, the Min turned against him. When Zhòu of Shang held his spring muster at Li, the Eastern Yi turned against him. And when King You of Zhou held the covenant ceremony at Taishi, the Rong and the Di turned against him.7 In each case, the ceremonies became occasions on which they displayed their excesses to the princes and were the reason the princes ignored their commands. Now that you are flaunting your excesses—would it not lead to failure?” The king did not heed him. Zichan met with Xiang Xu and said, “I am no longer worried about Chu. The Chu king is flaunting his excesses and stubborn in the face of remonstrance. He will last no longer than ten years.” Xiang Xu said, “That is so. Unless he continues his immoderate behavior for ten years, his defects will not spread far and wide. And he will be deposed only when he has spread his defects far and wide. It is the same with excellence: only when one’s virtue has spread far and wide does one rise.” King Ling leads a decreased contingent of allies in an attack on Wu, then ­captures and executes the Qi miscreant Qing Feng who had fled to Wu (chapter 7) and annexes the domain of Lai. But in the course of these appar­ ent successes, more voice predictions of doom.

Zhao 4.4 (538 BCE)  In autumn, in the seventh month, the Master of Chu attacked Wu with the princes and their troops. The Song heir 6 The implication seems to be that the king is hunting at Wucheng to provide animal victims for sacrifices in the Ancestral Temple. 7 These rulers stood at the end the Xia, Shang, and Western Zhou dynasties, respectively, and the implication here is that their excesses at various gatherings of the princes prompted attack from others and led to the downfall of each.

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apparent and the Liege of Zheng had gone home beforehand, but Hua Feisui of Song and high officers from Zheng accompanied the king. The king had Qu Shen lay siege to Zhufang, which was vanquished in the eighth month, on the jiashen day. Qing Feng of Qi was captured and his entire house exterminated. As the king was preparing to execute Qing Feng publicly, Wu Ju said, “I have heard that only one who is himself without stain can publicly execute a man. It was precisely because Qing Feng defied orders that he ended up here. Will he then quietly submit to execution? What is the use of broadcasting things to the allies?” The king paid him no attention and made Qing Feng shoulder a great ax and go around to all the princes to say, “Let no man do what Qing Feng of Qi did, killing his ruler and enfeebling the orphaned son, then swearing covenants with the high officers!” But Qing Feng said, “Let no man do what Gongzi Wei, a son of King Gong of Chu by a secondary consort, did, killing his ruler—his elder brother’s son Jun—and taking his place to swear a covenant with the princes.” The king hurriedly had him killed. They then extinguished Lai, a small domain to the north of Chu, with the help of the princes. The Master of Lai approached the center army with his hands tied behind his back, holding a jade disk in his mouth. His officers were stripped to the waist, and the group was followed by a coffin in a cart. The king asked Wu Ju about how to respond, and he replied, “When our King Cheng defeated Xu, Lord Xi of Xu behaved just this way. The king personally loosed his bonds, accepted the jade disk, and burned the coffin.” The king followed this advice. He relocated Lai to Yan. The Master of Chu wanted to relocate Xu to Lai. He had Dou Weigui and Gongzi Qiji build a wall for the new Xu before he returned to Chu. Shen Wuyu said, “The beginnings of Chu’s disaster are to be found in this. He summoned the allies and they came. He attacked walled cities and prevailed. And he built walls at the border and no one defied him. When nothing goes against the king’s desires, will the people have any ease? And if the people cannot abide by it, then who will be able to bear it? When the commands of the king cannot be borne, then there will be disaster and turmoil.” The daughter of Lord Ping of Jin is to marry King Ling and is escorted from Jin by Han Qi and Shuxiang. King Ling contemplates abominations against the Jin envoys, but Wei Qiqiang admonishes the ambitious king in

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an important speech on Jin-Chu relations, partially quoted here, and dis­ suades him from such actions.

Zhao 5.4 (537 BCE)  Han Qi of Jin went to Chu to escort the bride there. Shuxiang acted as his aide. Han Hu and You Ji of Zheng rewarded their exertions at the Suo estate. You Ji said to Shuxiang, “The Chu king has gone beyond all bounds in his excesses. Beware of him, sir.” Shu­ xiang said, “To be guilty of excesses beyond all bounds is a calamity for one’s own person, how can it affect others? If we present our gifts of silk, taking care over the majesty of our bearing; if we make the majesty of our bearing fast with good faith and put it into practice according to ritual propriety; and if we are respectful at the beginning and think about the end, then ultimately there is no ground that cannot be recovered. We comply with him but in no way lose our bearing. We are respectful yet in no way lose our majesty. We guide him with words of instruction. We present to him the old models. We hold him to account against the former kings. We measure him by the relations between our two domains. Even if he is guilty of excesses, what can he do to us?” When they had reached Chu, the Master of Chu held court with his high officers. He said, “Jin is our enemy and rival. As long as we can achieve our goals with them, we need not concern ourselves with anything else. The ones who have come on this occasion are a superior minister and a superior high officer. If we turned Han Qi into a gatekeeper and Shuxiang into a palace supervisor, it would suffice to humiliate Jin, and we would certainly have achieved our goals. 8 Can this be done?” None of the high officers answered. Wei Qiqiang said, “It can be done. As long as you have made the necessary preparations, why can’t it be done? But even when you humiliate a common man, you cannot do with­ out the necessary preparations. How much more so when you humiliate an entire domain? For this reason, the sage-kings devoted themselves to practicing ritual and did not seek to humiliate others. . . . After the Chengpu campaign, Jin made no preparations against Chu and was therefore defeated at Bi. After the campaign at Bi, Chu made no preparations against Jin and was therefore defeated at Yanling. After Yanling, Jin has not failed to make preparations and has even supplemented these 8 Gatekeepers were often men who had been punished with the mutilation of their feet. Palace supervisors were eunuchs.

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with ritual propriety and comity. . . . But if you, my lord, have your heart set on replacing friendship with enmity and speeding on our attackers by a concrete display of ritual impropriety, meanwhile making none of the necessary preparations, in effect sending your many subjects forth to be taken prisoner by them, all to indulge your desire, then what would be unacceptable about that?”9 The king said, “This is my mistake, deficient as I am. You, sir, need not condescend to say more.” The king arranged a lavish ritual entertainment for Han Qi. The king wanted to overawe Shuxiang with things the latter knew nothing of, but he could not do it. The king also arranged a lavish ritual entertainment for him.

Stinging R ebu k e s In the above excerpt, King Ling ultimately follows Wei Qiqiang’s advice. In the passages below, he confronts stinging rebukes from two severe critics with­ out becoming vindictive. Shen Wuyu, who has already appeared as a critic of the Chu king, defends his prerogatives against the waxing power of the Chu king by an apt reference to Zhou and Chu classical precedents. The speech has been called one of the most pointed remonstrances in all history and essentially brands King Ling “a robber.”

Zhao 7.1 (535 BCE)  When the Master of Chu was chief minister, he used the pennants reserved for the Chu king while hunting. Shen Wuyu, the deputy for the hunt, cut the pennants to shorten them, saying, “Who will tolerate it if one domain has two rulers?” When the king acceded to his position and was building the Zhanghua Palace, he gave absconders refuge in order to fill out its staff. Wuyu’s gatekeeper took refuge there. Wuyu came to seize him, but the officer in charge refused to hand him over, explaining, “It is a great offense to seize someone in the king’s palace.” They seized Wuyu and brought him before the king, who was preparing to drink wine. Shen Wuyu explained himself by saying, “The Son of Heaven determines the borders and the princes rectify the frontiers; that was the system of old. Within the borders and frontiers, what land is 9 While seeming to sanction the king’s ambitions, Wei Qiqiang makes it clear that Chu is ill-prepared to engage Jin in yet another major conflict.

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there that does not belong to the ruler? Of those who eat what grows upon the land, who among them is not a subject of the ruler? Therefore, as it says in the Odes, Everywhere under Heaven, No land is not the king’s; To the very edges of the land, No one is not a subject of the king. . . .

“Now the officer in charge has said, ‘Why are you seizing a man in the royal palace?’ Where else should I seize him? The law of King Wen of Zhou said, ‘When there is a fugitive, conduct a grand search.’ That is how King Wen obtained all-under-heaven. Our own former ruler King Wen of Chu instituted a law concerning the hiding of stolen goods: ‘Whosoever is the receiver of robbers’ goods is guilty of the same offense as the robbers.’ That is how he extended his borders to the Ru River.10 Were we to go along with the officer in charge, that would mean there’s no place for seizing absconding servants. And if they were pardoned after they absconded, there would be no such thing as recaptured slaves. Would there not then be lapses in royal affairs? In past times, King Wu of Zhou enumerated the Shang tyrant Zhòu’s crimes in a proclamation to the princes, saying, “Zhòu made himself host to all the wanted absconders in the realm, gathering them like fish in a deep pool or beasts in a marsh.” Therefore, men gave their lives for King Wu. Would it not be unacceptable if you, my lord, were to follow the example of Zhòu as you begin to seek the allegiance of the princes? If we are to capture him in accordance with the laws of the two Kings Wen, then the place where the robber dwells is now apparent.” The king said, “Take your servant and go. This ‘robber’ enjoys favor and as yet cannot be touched.” Wuyu was then pardoned. King Ling defeats Chen and appoints Chuanfeng Xu as its new lord, but the latter, who previously challenged the future king (see above), again shows his independent-mindedness.

Zhao 8.6 (534 BCE)  The Chu king appointed Chuanfeng Xu as Lord of Chen, saying, “At the battle of Chengjun he did not play the toady.” 10 Under King Wen of Chu, Chu extended its political control to new regions.

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Chuanfeng Xu attended upon the king as he drank, and the king said, “If you had known that I would attain this rank during the Chengjun campaign, you would surely have yielded to me!” Chuanfeng Xu replied, “If I had known that my lord would attain this position, I would have died for ritual propriety in order to bring peace to Chu.”11

Fina l V ictor i e s a n d Ou tr age s After annexing Chen, King Ling moves against Cai even as a Jin minister predicts near-term success and ultimate failure. King Ling is described as merely serving as heaven’s instrument for punishing the Cai ruler, who assas­ sinated his father twelve years earlier. King Ling then carries out the outrage of human sacrifice. His victory paves the way for his downfall; King Ling fortifies the newly annexed territories and appoints his brother Qiji the Lord of Cai, creating a dangerous rival locus of power. Qiji will eventually join the insurrection against King Ling and succeeds him as King Ping.

Zhao 11.2 (531 BCE)  While in Shen, the Master of Chu summoned Prince Ling of Cai for an audience. As Prince Ling was preparing to go, the high officers of Cai said, “The king is greedy and lacking in good faith. His only source of disappointment is Cai. Now his gifts are extravagant and his words sweet; he is trying to lure us there. It would be better not to go.” The Prince of Cai did not agree. In the third month, on the bing­ shen day (15), the Master of Chu, having concealed soldiers, feasted the Prince of Cai in Shen, then seized him once he was drunk. In summer, in the fourth month, on the dingsi day (7), he put him to death. He inflicted punishments upon seventy of the prince’s officers. Gongzi Qiji led out troops and laid siege to Cai. The Jin minister Han Qi asked Shuxiang, “Will Chu prevail?” He replied, “It will! The Prince of Cai committed a crime against his ruler and does not have the allegiance of his people. Heaven has merely borrowed Chu’s hands to put him to death. Why then should Chu not prevail? . . . When Heaven avails itself of aid from someone who is not good, it is not giving its blessing. Rather, it is piling up evil deeds for him, to speed the punishments that will fall upon him. What is more, this is like 11 That is, he would have died to stop King Ling from murdering his predecessor.

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how Heaven keeps the five resources in reserve; once they are depleted, it casts them aside.12 Therefore, there will be no help for the Chu king, and there will be no way to restore him in the end.” Zhao 11.8 (531 BCE)  In winter, in the eleventh month, the Master of Chu extinguished Cai and sacrificed the heir apparent Yin at Mount Gang. Shen Wuyu said, “This is inauspicious. The five sacrificial animals are not substituted for one another. How much worse is it to sacrifice one of the princes! The king is sure to regret this.”

Th e De ath of th e K ing a n d Fina l J u dgm ents The ambitious King Ling of Chu, whose demise has long been predicted, once again displays his excesses and ambition during a winter expedition in the northeastern reaches of Chu territory. When the king asks a series of ques­ tions about his hopes for even greater influence among the princes, his deputy of the right, Ran Dan, at first seems to answer sycophantically. As it turns out, however, his answers prepare the way for a dramatic and highly effective indirect criticism of the king, who suffers a physical collapse in the wake of the episode. Ran Dan’s strategy recalls the approaches adopted by Zichan and Wei Qiqiang in earlier passages. Finally, Confucius adds his own brief judg­ ment of King Ling.

Zhao 12.11 (530 BCE)  The Master of Chu held his winter hunt at Zhoulai. Setting up camp at Yingwei, he sent Dang Hou, Panzi, the super­ visor of the military, Du, the deputy, Wu, and the mound overseer, Xi, to lead armies in a siege of Xu, so as to intimidate Wu. The Master of Chu then set up camp at Ganxi to provide assistance for them. There was a snowstorm, and the king was dressed in a leather cap, a feathered coat from Qin, a kingfisher-feather cape, and leopard-skin boots as he went out holding a whip, accompanied by his attendant Xifu. The deputy of the right Ran Dan waited upon the king in the evening, and when the king saw him, he removed his cap and cape and put down his whip to chat with him.

12 See chapter 6, note 13.

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The king said, “In times past, our former king Xiongyi served King Kang of Zhou, together with Lü Ji of Qi, Wangsun Mou of Wei, Xiefu of Jin, and Boqin of Lu.13 The other four domains all got their portions of reward. We alone did not. If we now send someone to Zhou to ask for a cauldron as our portion, will the king give it to us?”14 Ran Dan answered, “He will give it to you, Your Highness! In times past, our former king Xiongyi dwelt far off in the wilds of Mount Jing. Riding in a rugged wooden cart and clad in tattered hemp, he lived among wild vegetation. He trod over mountains and forests to serve the Son of Heaven, and all he had was a bow of peach wood and arrows of thorn to present as tribute to the royal court. The Qi founder was an uncle to the king; Jin, Lu, and Wei were full brothers of the king. That was why Chu was without its portion, while the others all had theirs. Now Zhou and those four domains all serve you, Your Highness, obeying only your command. How could they begrudge you a cauldron?” The king said, “In times past, my ancestral uncle Kunwu dwelt in the old territory of Xu.15 Now Zheng greedily exploits Kunwu’s fields and will not give them to us. If I ask for them, will Zheng give them to us?” Ran Dan said, “They will give them to you, Your Highness! If Zhou will not begrudge a cauldron, how can Zheng begrudge these fields?” The king said, “In times past, the princes kept their distance from us and feared Jin. But now we have fortified Chen, Cai, and the two Bugeng regions on a grand scale and received a thousand chariots from each. You yourself had a part in this accomplishment. Certainly the princes will fear us now!” Ran Dan said, “They will fear you, Your Highness! With these four domains plus Chu, how could they not fear Your Highness?” The deputy for artisans Lu then presented a request, saying, “Your Highness has ordered that a piece of jade be cut for the decoration of an ax handle; I beg permission to seek further instructions from you.” The king went in to look at the ax handle.

13 Xiongyi is said to be the first ruler to be established in power in Chu. The other four men listed here, who also served King Kang of Zhou (r. ca. tenth century BCE), were prominent leaders of domains closer to the royal house. 14 On cauldrons as symbols of sovereignty, see chapter 7, Xuan 3.3. 15 Kunwu was a brother of Jilian, from whom the Chu royal lineage was descended.

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Xifu said to Ran Dan, “You, sir, are the great hope of the domain of Chu. Now that you speak to the king like his own echo, what is the domain to do?” Ran Dan said, “I am like a blade ground sharp in preparation. When the king emerges, I will cut him down.” When the king emerged, they continued their conversation. The scribe of the left Yixiang hurried across the court, and the king said, “This is a good scribe. Look well upon him. He is able to recite ‘Three Barrows,’ ‘Five Canons,’ ‘Eight Guidelines,’ and ‘Nine Mounds.’”16 Ran Dan replied, “I once asked him a question. In times past, King Mu wanted to give free rein to the desires of his heart and travel everywhere under heaven, so that every place would show his carriage ruts and the hoofprints of his horses.17 The Zhai Duke Moufu composed the poem ‘Prayer Summon’ to still the king’s heart, and it was for this reason alone that the king managed to die in the Zhi Palace.18 I asked Yixiang about this poem, but he did not know it. If you ask him something at all obscure, how will he ever know it?” The king said, “Do you know it?” Ran Dan replied, “I do. The poem says: Sonorous is the prayer summon, Showing forth the sound of virtue. Think on our king’s good order— Like jade, Like bronze. He makes the strength of the people his standard And has no heart for drunken satiety.”

The king saluted him and went in. When given food, he would not eat, nor would he sleep when lying down. For several days he could not ­master himself. And thus he came to grief. Confucius said, “There is a maxim from times long past: ‘To master oneself and to restore the rites—that is true nobility of spirit.’19 How 16 The precise nature of these now lost texts is unknown. 17 The early Zhou King Mu (r. ca. tenth century BCE) was notorious for his wanderlust. 18 That is, he did not die in the wilderness. The Zhai Duke Moufu is famous for his remonstrance against King Mu’s attack on the Quanrong. 19 The saying appears with a very slight variation in the Analects (12.1).

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true this is! If King Ling of Chu could have done this, how could he ever have been disgraced at Ganxi?” After a description of how King Ling’s actions turned other powerful figures against him, the rebellion against King Ling begins below when loyalists of the annexed state of Cai trick the king’s younger brothers into a false covenant. Another of the brothers, the Cai Lord Gongzi Qiji, at first shows reluctance to support the rebellion but in the end joins it; he will ultimately be elevated as King Ling’s successor, King Ping of Chu.

Zhao 13.2 (529 BCE)  When Guan Qi died, his son Guan Cong was in Cai, serving Zhao Wu of Cai.20 He said, “If we do not put a ruler in power in Cai now, then Cai will never again have its own ruler. Let us try.” Feigning a command from the Cai Lord Gongzi Qiji, Guan Cong summoned Gongzi Bi and Gongzi Heigong. When they reached the outskirts of the Cai capital, he explained the situation to them and forced them to swear a covenant with him. They then made a surprise attack on the Cai capital. The Cai Lord Gongzi Qiji was about to dine when he saw them and fled. Guan Cong had Gongzi Bi eat the meal. Then he had him dig a pit, sacrifice a victim, add a covenant document, and hurriedly depart. Guan Cong himself went around showing the document in Cai, saying, “The Cai Lord Gongzi Qiji summoned these two men in order to put them in power in Chu. He made a covenant with them and sent them off, and he is going to assemble an army and follow them.” The leaders of Cai gathered together to seize Guan Cong. He excused himself, saying, “What good does it do to kill me if you have already let the offenders go and form their own army?” They released him. Zhao Wu of Cai said to them, “If you are prepared to die, then it would be better to defy the Cai Lord Gongzi Qiji and wait to see who wins. But if you want peace and calm, then it would be better to join him and fulfill your desires. In any case, if you defy your superior, where can you go?” The multitude said, “We will join him!” So they gave their support to the Cai Lord Gongzi Qiji and summoned Gongzi Bi and Gongzi Heigong for a covenant at Deng. They enlisted the support of the people of Chen and Cai, promising restoration of these domains to their former 20 Guan Qi was put to death by King Kang of Chu in 551 BCE. Zhao Wu, the son of a Cai minister, should not be confused with the minister Zhao Wu of Jin.

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status. Gongzi Bi of Chu, Gongzi Heigong, and the Cai Lord Gongzi Qiji, along with Dou Chengran and Zhao Wu of Cai led armies from Cai, Bugeng, Xu, and She. Aided by members of the four houses, they invaded Chu.21 When they reached the outskirts of the Chu capital, the Chen and Cai forces wanted to secure fame for themselves, so they asked per­ mission to make a walled encampment. Learning of this, Gongzi Qiji said, “We have to move quickly, and besides the laborers are exhausted. Please just set up a fenced camp.” They therefore made camp by fencing it around. Gongzi Qiji sent Xu Wumou and the scribe Pi in first.22 With the com­ plicity of the heir apparent’s personal attendants, they killed the royal heir apparent Lu and Gongzi Badi, sons of King Ling. Gongzi Bi was named king and Gongzi Heigong chief minister. Together they set up camp at Yubei. Gongzi Qiji was made supervisor of the military. He first emptied the royal palace and then sent Guan Cong to the army at Ganxi in order to explain what had happened and also to say, “Those of you who return first will win back your places. Those who arrive last will have your noses amputated.”23 The returning army reached the Zi weir and then disintegrated. When the king heard of the death of his sons, he threw himself from his chariot and said, “Do others love their sons the way I do?” His attendants said, “Even more. When a common man grows old without sons, he knows that his corpse will end up being pitched into a ditch.” The king said, “I have killed the sons of many. Could I have avoided coming to this?” The deputy of the right Ran Dan said, “Please wait in the outskirts of the city so as to hear from the inhabitants of the capital.” The king said, “One must not face down the anger of the multitude.” Ran Dan said, “What if you enter one of your dependent domains and plead for troops from the princes?” The king said, “The dependent domains have all rebelled.” 21 These are four powerful houses that King Ling had offended by ritual impropriety in the previous year (ZT Zhao 13.2a). 22 King Ling was outside the capital in Ganxi at this time. 23 The army stationed at Ganxi was the army that had accompanied King Ling and could have been expected to fight for his return to the capital.

T h e T r age dy of K i ng Li ng of Ch u

Ran Dan said, “What if you go into exile among the princes and wait for some great domain to plan on your behalf?” The king said, “Great blessings are not repeated. I would only be disgracing myself.” Ran Dan therefore went back to Chu. The king went along the Xia River, intending to go to the city of Yan. Shen Hai, a son of Shen Wuyu, the deputy for the hunt, said, “My father twice violated the orders of the king, but the king did not put him to death. What kindness could be greater than that? One cannot bear to be cruel to a ruler, nor can one reject kindness. I will follow the king.” So he sought the king, finding him at the gate of Ji and taking him home from there. In the fifth month, on the guihai day (25), the king hanged himself at the home of the deputy for the hunt Shen Hai. Sacrificing two of his own daughters as tomb companions, Shen Hai buried him. The following passage reports on the reburial of King Ling of Chu and offers a final note on his overweening ambition. Some years later, the deputy for the hunt Shen Hai reported that he had the coffin of King Ling, who was therefore reburied. Earlier, King Ling had divined about the future, saying, “May I gain control of all-under-heaven!” It was not auspicious. Throwing down the turtle shell, he cursed Heaven, shouting, “Such a petty thing and yet you do not give it to me! I will take it for myself!” It was because the people were troubled by the king’s insatiable demands that they joined the uprising as readily as someone going home. The following passage presents a recollection of the unprecedented ceremony by which King Gong of Chu, father of Kings Kang, Ling, and Ping, had sought to identify his successor. Although the anecdote is clearly designed to justify King Ping as the rightful successor to King Gong, this unorthodox way of examining potential successors constitutes a telling violation of ritual pro­ priety, and as retold here, it also offers a poor prediction of the sons’ careers. The reigns of Kings Kang, Ling, and Ping were about equal in length (fifteen, thirteen, and thirteen years, respectively), and while Kings Kang and Ling had some success in centralizing and expanding Chu power, King Ping, seem­ ingly marked here by Heaven’s choice, actually presides over the initial stages of Chu decline.

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Earlier, when King Gong still had had no sons by his queen, he did have five other favored sons, none of whom had been established as heir. He therefore held grand sacrifices at all the sites for the prospect sacrifices, and he prayed, saying, “We beg the spirits to choose among these five and to make him master of the altars of the domain.” He then showed a jade disk at all the sites for prospect sacrifices and said, “Whoever bows over the jade disk is the one whom the spirits will have established as heir. Who would presume to go against this?” Afterward, he secretly buried the jade disk in the courtyard of the great hall with his lady Ba Ji, then had his five sons purify themselves and enter in order of age and bow. King Kang stood straddling the jade disk, King Ling touched it with his elbow, and both Gongzi Bi and Gongzi Heigong stayed far away from it. King Ping, being a little boy, was carried in. He bowed twice, both times hitting the center knob of the disk. Dou Weigui entrusted his son Dou Chengran to the future King Ping, but he also said, “Casting aside ritual propriety and violating the command, Chu will be endangered!”

Chapter 11

Two Famous Statesmen: Zichan and Yan Ying

A s s u g g e s t e d i n t h e pa s s a g e s c o l l e c t e d i n “G o v e r nance” (chapter 8), the narratives and speeches of Zuozhuan are overwhelmingly concerned with problems of statecraft, that is, with the management of relations within and among domains. The surest guide any speaker in Zuozhuan can cite for the ordering of such relations is the system of ritual propriety associated with the Zhou dynasty itself and with its founders (see chapter 6), though speakers do occasionally cite rituals, penal codes, and writings derived from other dynasties and other rulers. Ritual propriety seems to have provided a foundation for many kinds of policy decisions, and because of the way it is invoked—as a presumed whole, internally consistent, comprehensive in its usefulness, and designed by wise ancestral rulers—it also implies the possibility of a complete and effective way of statecraft that would neither transgress ritual propriety nor be stifled by it. Zuozhuan’s most celebrated statesmen experiment with such ways of statecraft, upholding ritual propriety by using it with a certain strategic resourcefulness and muscularity, and they defend their decisions in speeches to their rulers, their colleagues, and their counterparts from other states. The text presents scores of men and some women (see chapter 3) in the role of strong defenders and elaborators of principled positions, but only with a few figures, mostly from the last century of the Spring and Autumn period, do we get a more sustained record of engagement. Because these figures led their states for many years, and because of the sheer amount of information Zuozhuan preserves for these states for these decades, the relevant anecdotes add up to something like a biography. A few rulers—most notably Lord Wen of Jin and King Ling of Chu—enjoy nearly biographical treatment, but they 2 01

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do so in the roles of willing or unwilling students of their advisers’ statecraft teachings. The other group whose words and deeds are preserved in such detail consists of men held up as practitioners, exemplars, and teachers of statecraft. This concentration of lessons around famous individuals shapes later intellectual history, inasmuch as Warring States and Han scholars preferred to organize vast parts of their textual legacy through attribution to individuals, that is, to “masters” of ritual, administrative, military, or religious thought. The “masters” texts are typically not biographical in nature, but like Zuozhuan, they build up an implicitly coherent system of thought by accumulating textual evidence around an individual. The Analects is such a text, with Confucius as its organizing principle. Another text, The Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Yan (Yanzi chunqiu), developed around the figure of Yan Ying, who is one of the statesmen we consider here. This process culminated in the integrated history and intellectual biography for some of Zuozhuan’s most prominent individuals in Sima Qian’s Records, including Yan Ying below.

Zich a n of Zh eng Zichan (d. 522 BCE), a descendant of the ruling house of Zheng, navigated a period of strife among its noble lines and in the end restored peace, domi­ nating Zheng government for more than twenty years and defending Zheng against heavy pressures for tribute and service from Jin and Chu, his era’s two great powers. Zichan’s views on ritual propriety (chapter 6, Zhao 25.3), deal­ ing with the people’s criticism (chapter 8, Xiang 31.11), law and punishment (chapter 9, Zhao 2.4, 6.3), King Ling of Chu (chapter 10, Zhao 1.13, 4.1, 4.3), and anomalies (chapter 14, Zhao 19.10), as well as his diplomatic prowess (chapter 12, Xiang 24.2, 25.10) are featured in other chapters. Zuozhuan depicts him in a favorable light, and before and after death, he wins admiring remarks from Confucius (see chapter 8, Zhao 31.11, and chapter 11, Xiang 25.10, Zhao 13.3, and 20.9 below), but what he exemplifies is less the maintenance of a vir­ tuous old order for its own sake than the instrumentalization of various mod­ els from the past in the service of the domain’s present interests. Beyond that, he stands as a prescient strategist and a hard-headed creator of new order in government practices. In the first passage below, Zichan appears as a preco­ cious child, much to the dismay of his elders, a common trope in early Chinese

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literature. In the second, he shows his typical pragmatism and acceptance of necessary compromise. He sees through the minister Zikong’s ambition to consolidate his power through reinforced hierarchy but does not directly confront him.

Xia ng 8.3 (565 BCE)  On the gengyin day (22) of the fourth month, Ziguo and Zi’er of Zheng invaded Cai and captured the Cai supervisor of the military, Gongzi Xie. The leaders of Zheng were all pleased. Only Zichan did not go along but said, “For a small domain, there is no greater calamity than to lack civil virtue and to have martial achievement instead. When the men of Chu come to chastise us, can we not submit to them? But if we submit to them, Jin troops will certainly come. And if both Jin and Chu attack Zheng, Zheng will have no peace for at least the next four or five years.” Infuriated, his father, Ziguo, said, “What can you know! The domain has its great command, for which it has its chief minister. This is a child speaking—for this you may be executed!” Xia ng 10.9 (563 BCE)  Zikong took charge of the domain. He made a covenant document with a provision that required each to abide by his position and heed the commands of his immediate superior. The high officers, various supervisors, and the heirs of ministerial lineages refused to follow these injunctions, and Zikong planned to execute them. Zichan stopped him and requested permission to burn the document on their account. Zikong refused, saying, “We made the document to stabilize the domain. If we burn it because of the anger of the multitude, then that would mean the multitude is in charge of government. Will it not be difficult to govern the domain?” Zichan said, “It is difficult to contravene the anger of the multitude; it is difficult to achieve success with a desire for sole control. To combine both in an effort to calm the domain is the road to danger. It would be better to burn the document to reassure the multitude. You will get what you desire, and the multitude will also be reassured. Would that not be acceptable? A desire for sole control will achieve nothing, and contraven­ ing the multitude will provoke disaster. You must follow my advice!” They therefore burned the document outside the Cang Gate. Only then was the multitude more settled.

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Zheng is roiled by internal strife. Gongsun Hei leads the forces of the Si lin­ eage to attack the Liang lineage. Liang Xiao, a drunkard, flees while drunk. Zichan tries to maintain impartiality in this conflict, but the violent power struggle between the Si and Liang lineages continues, with fatal results for Liang Xiao. Zichan will punish the unruly Gongsun Hei when his Si lineage turns against him (chapter 9, Zhao 2.4).

Xia ng 30.10 (543 BCE)  Liang Xiao of Zheng was a drunkard. He built an underground chamber and once drank there through the night as chime bells played, and he had not stopped drinking by the time the high officers arrived at his court of audience. Those who came to his court said, “Where is your lord?” Liang Xiao’s retainer said, “My lord is in the hollow ravine,” at which they gave up the wait and left by different roads. Later, when Liang Xiao attended the Zheng ruler’s court, he again wanted to send Gongsun Hei to Chu.1 Upon his return from court, he fell to drinking. On the gengzi day (11), Gongsun Hei used the armored men of the Si lineage to attack Liang Xiao’s residence and burn it. Liang Xiao fled to Yongliang, but only after he sobered up did he realize what was happening. He then fled to Xu. The high officers gathered to confer about the situation. Han Hu said, “It says in the Records of Zhonghui, ‘Take the domain in turmoil. Shame the failing domain. It will benefit the domain to overthrow whatever is failing and to stabilize whatever can be preserved.’ Our Han, Si, and Feng lineages were born of the same mother. Liang Xiao is extravagant and arrogant, and that is why he could not escape disaster.” People said that Zichan should side with the just one and help the powerful ones. Zichan said, “How can they be of my ilk? Who among them knows how to put a stop to the troubles and disasters suffered by the domain? Perhaps if we abide by the truly just and powerful, disasters will then not arise. For now, I will simply keep to my place and remain neutral.” On the xinchou day (12), Zichan had the dead of Liang Xiao’s lineage dressed in burial clothes and placed in coffins to lie in state. He then left the domain without waiting to confer with the other ministers and high officers. Yin Duan followed suit. Han Hu tried to stop them. 1

In the previous year, Liang Xiao had attempted to send Gongsun Hei, of the rival Si lineage, to Chu.

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The others said, “If the two of them are not going along with us, why should we stop them?” Han Hu said, “If that fine man is treating even the dead with ritual propriety, how much more would he do well by the living?” He thus personally tried to stop Zichan. On the renyin day (13), Zichan reentered Zheng. On the guimao day (14), Yin Duan did the same. They both accepted a covenant at Gongsun Hei’s house. On the yisi day (16), the Liege of Zheng and his high officers swore a covenant at the Grand Ancestral Temple, and they swore a covenant with the inhabitants of the capital outside the Shizhiliang Gate. When Liang Xiao heard that the leaders of Zheng had sworn a covenant against him, he was furious, but he brightened up when he heard that Han Hu’s men in armor were not party to the attack against him, saying, “Han Hu is on my side.” On the morning of the guichou day (24), he entered the Zheng capital from the drains on the Tomb Gate. Relying on the help of Yu Jie, the trainer of horses, Liang Xiao armed his followers at the arsenal set up by Lord Xiang and led them to attack the old North Gate. Si Dai, the head of the Si lineage, led out the inhabitants of the capital to fight them. Both sides summoned Zichan, who said, “To be brothers and yet to have come to this! I can only follow the one favored by Heaven.”2 Liang Xiao died among the vendors of mutton at the marketplace. Zichan dressed the corpse, pillowed its head on his thigh, and wailed for him. He put the corpse in a coffin and had it lie in state in the house of one of Liang Xiao’s retainers who lived beside the marketplace. Later, he buried him at Doucheng. The Si lineage wanted to attack Zichan. Furious at this, Han Hu said, “Ritual propriety is the pillar of the domain. There is no greater disaster than to kill the one who has ritual propriety.” The Si lineage thus desisted. Braving difficulties, Zichan takes charge of policy decisions in Zheng. His pragmatism is evident in the ways he promotes the devious and hypocritical Gongsun Duan, the head of the Feng lineage. Zichan then wisely reins in powerful lineages and establishes rules and regulations that initially provoke the people’s resentment but eventually win their allegiance. His strategic prag­ matism coexists with grand affirmations of ritual propriety (chapter 6, Zhao 25.3, chapter 11, Zhao 13.3).

2 Both Si Dai and Liang Xiao were great-grandsons of Lord Mu. Zichan, Gongsun Hei, and Gongsun Duan were grandsons of Lord Mu. So, in a sense, they are all “brothers.”

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Xia ng 30.13 (543 BCE)  Han Hu wanted to give to Zichan the charge of government. Zichan declined: “Our domain is small and hard-pressed. The houses are powerful and favorites are numerous. It will be impossible to govern well.” Han Hu said, “With me leading them in abiding by your commands, who will dare to go against you, sir? You should do your best to assist in good government. The smallness of a domain does not matter. When a small domain can serve the great domains well, it will find relief.” Zichan took charge of the government. He wanted to enlist Gong­ sun Duan for a certain task and gave him settlements as gifts. You Ji said, “The domain is a domain for all. Why give gifts only to him?” Zichan said, “It is indeed difficult to entirely ignore personal desires. Let them all obtain what they desire, so that they attend to their tasks and strive to accomplish them. It is not I alone who can accomplish all these tasks; does it not depend on others? Why begrudge settlements? Where can settlements go?” You Ji said, “What about our neighboring domains on four sides?” Zichan said, “In granting these settlements, we are not opposing but rather complying with each other. How can our neighboring domains on four sides blame us? As the Zheng Documents has it, To bring peace and stability to the domain and patrimony, It is necessary to give priority to the great lineages.

Let us for now give the great lineages a sense of security and wait to see which way they go.” Shortly thereafter, Gongsun Duan returned the settlements out of fear, but in the end they were given to him. Liang Xiao had already died, so Zichan sent the grand scribe to appoint Gongsun Duan minister. Gong­ sun Duan declined. But when the grand scribe withdrew, he requested that the appointment be repeated. When Gongsun Duan was appointed again, he again declined. Only after repeating this exchange three times did he accept the bamboo document of appointment and enter the court to bow in gratitude. Because of this, Zichan abhorred his character, but he made his position next to his own. Zichan brought it about that the cities and the country had distinctions, those above and those below had their respective duties, fields had their boundaries and irrigation ditches, and houses and wells had their levies regulated. He listened to and supported the loyal and frugal

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among the high officers, and he demoted the arrogant and extravagant among them accordingly. Feng Juan was preparing for sacrifices and asked permission to go on a hunt. Zichan refused to grant it and said, “The ruler alone uses animals fresh from the hunt. The rest of us only make do.”3 Furious, Feng Juan withdrew and began enlisting troops. Zichan fled to Jin. Han Hu stopped him and drove away Feng Juan. Feng Juan fled to Jin. Zichan requested to have his land and residence. Three years later, he let Feng Juan return and restored to him his land and residence, as well as the income that had accrued. After Zichan had been in charge of government for one year, the common workers chanted about him: He takes our clothes and caps and imposes taxes on them. He takes our lands and fields and measures them for levies. Whoever wants to kill Zichan, We will join him.

After three years, they again chanted about him: We have sons and younger brothers; Zichan instructs them. We have lands and fields; Zichan makes them yield more. If Zichan were to die, Who would succeed him?

Zichan dissuades Han Hu from conferring power and authority on a novice. Han Hu trusts Zichan even more after the latter’s criticism.

Xia ng 31.12 (542 BCE)  Han Hu wanted to let Yin He take charge of his settlement. Zichan said, “He is young, and we cannot yet know whether this will be feasible.” Han Hu said, “He is careful and well intentioned. I am fond of him, and he will not turn against me. If we send him to go and learn, he will eventually learn how to govern.” 3

That is, they used dried meat or the flesh of domestic animals.

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Zichan said, “This will not do. When one is fond of someone, one seeks to benefit him. Now you, sir, just because you are fond of someone, would entrust him with the charge of government, which is like making someone cut something up before he can wield a knife properly. His injuries will be many, surely! If your fondness for someone merely ends up injuring him, who will dare to seek your fond regard? “You, sir, are the roof beam for the domain of Zheng. If the roof beam breaks and the rafters collapse, I will be crushed. Would I presume not to state the case to the fullest? If you had a piece of beautiful brocade, you would not let someone learn tailoring with it. Great government positions and great settlements are what protect one’s person, and yet you would let a novice who is still learning ‘tailor’ them? Are they not much more important than a piece of beautiful brocade? I have heard that one learns first before entering government service; I have not heard that one uses the conduct of government to learn. “If you do indeed proceed with this, you are sure to do harm. Take an example from hunting. If a man is schooled in shooting and driving, he will then be able to capture birds and animals. But if he has never climbed a carriage to shoot and drive, then the fear of being defeated in his purpose and of being crushed by his overturning carriage will overpower him. How can he spare any time or attention to think of capturing anything?” Han Hu said, “Well said! I lack discernment. I have heard that a noble man applies himself to understanding what is important and far reaching, while a petty man applies himself to understanding what is minor and close at hand. I am but a petty man. I know how to take care of the clothes I put on my body, yet I treat lightly the great government offices and great settlements whereby I protect my person, keeping my distance from these issues. If it were not for your words, sir, I would not have understood. In the past I said that it would do if you took charge of the domain of Zheng, and I took charge of protecting my patrimony. Only now do I know that will not suffice. Henceforth, I request that even with my patrimony, I heed your commands and act accordingly.” Zichan said, “Men’s minds are different, even as their faces are. How would I dare to say that your face is like mine? All the same, if my mind senses danger, I will tell you about it.” Han Hu considered Zichan loyal and thus entrusted government to him. That is why Zichan was able to run the domain of Zheng.

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After Kong Zhang, a Zheng nobleman, embarrasses himself during a ritual entertainment for the visiting Jin minister Han Qi, Zichan angrily rebuts charges that this failure reflects poorly on his own leadership. Next, the Jin minister Han Qi wishes to demand a jade ring from a Zheng merchant, but Zichan refuses to assist him, citing principle and ancient ties between Zheng’s government and its merchants.

Zhao 16.3 (526 BCE)  In the third month, Han Qi of Jin made an official visit to Zheng, where the Liege of Zheng offered him ceremonial toasts. Zichan issued a warning, saying, “If you have a place in court, commit no act that is disrespectful.” Kong Zhang, arriving late, would have taken his stand among the guests, but the men in charge prevented him. They prevented him again when he moved behind the guests, and he moved among the hanging musical instruments. The guests joined together in laughing at him. After the ceremony was over, the Zheng high officer Fuzi remonstrated, saying, “One cannot but be careful with people from a great domain. How can they not lord it over us when we are the butt of their laughter? Even if we all maintain ritual propriety, they still scorn us. When a domain lacks ritual propriety, how is it ever to seek glory? That Kong Zhang failed to take his place is a disgrace for you, sir.” Infuriated, Zichan said, “To issue a command that is not fitting, to give orders that are not in good faith, to show bias in punishments, to be arbitrary in lawsuits, to be disrespectful in meetings and court audiences, to give commands that are not heeded, to incur bullying from great domains, to exhaust the people without achieving anything, to be guilty of an offense without knowing it—any of these would be a disgrace for me. “Kong Zhang is a descendant of Zikong, that is, the descendant of a ruler’s elder brother; he is the successor of a man in charge of government, a hereditary high officer. He has received orders for a diplomatic mission and has traveled among the princes. He is respected by the inhabitants of the capital and known to the princes. He takes his stand in court and makes ancestral sacrifices at home. He has his emolument from the domain and contributes a detachment to the army. He has official duties at times of mourning and sacrifice. He both receives and submits portions of sacrificial meat. For sacrifices taking place at the domain’s Ancestral

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Temple, he already has a designated place. This place has been his family’s for several generations, and each generation has maintained the traditional duties, yet he has apparently forgotten its location. Why should this be a disgrace for me? If every malefactor’s offenses are laid at the feet of the man in charge of government, that would be tantamount to having no penal code from the former kings. You would do better to correct me on some other point.” Han Qi had a jade ring whose twin was held by a Zheng merchant. Han Qi asked for the twin ring from the Liege of Zheng, but Zichan refused, saying, “If it is not an object kept in the official treasury, our unworthy ruler does not know about it.” You Ji and Gongsun Hui said to Zichan, “Truly, Han Qi has hardly asked for anything, and being disloyal to Jin is still unacceptable. The domain of Jin and Han Qi cannot be treated shabbily. If some slanderer should happen to stir up trouble between our domains with the aid of gods and spirits, in this way arousing a destructive anger, then it will be too late for regrets. Why should you, sir, begrudge one jade ring and incur the hatred of a great domain? Why not find it and give it to him?” Zichan said, “I am not treating Jin shabbily or having disloyal thoughts. I intend to serve them to the end, and that is why I do not give it to him: for the sake of loyalty and good faith. I have heard that the noble man is unconcerned about not receiving gifts, but he worries instead that as an officer he may not enjoy a good name. I have heard that when governing a domain one should be unconcerned about not finding an opportunity to serve the great and to foster the little. Instead, one should worry about lacking the ritual propriety with which to steady one’s position. If people from great domains get what they want whenever they give orders to small domains, then how will we ever have enough to give to them? If we give on one occasion and refuse on another, the offense only becomes more serious. If we do not refuse the demands of great domains with the proper ritual, then how will they ever be sated? And if we are treated like a minor domain on their border, then we lose our proper position. If Han Qi has come on this mission under orders, and he then seeks a jade from us, then this is an extraordinary case of greed and excess. How could it not be a crime? What use is it if by handing over one jade we give rise to two crimes, ­losing our proper position and letting Han Qi yield to greed in the bargain? What is more, if we buy a crime for the price of a jade, would that not be a petty transaction?”

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Han Qi was buying the jade ring from the tradesman, and an agreement for the transaction had already been reached, when the merchant said, “I shall report this to the ruler’s high officers.”4 Han Qi presented a request to Zichan, saying, “I requested this ring before, but the men in charge of government did not find that the request accorded with duty, and I did not dare to repeat it. Now I am buying it from the merchant, and the merchant says, ‘I shall make this known.’ I presume to make my request about this.” Zichan replied, “In times past, our former ruler Lord Huan departed from Zhou together with merchants. 5 Working side by side, they cleared this land, cutting down the tumbleweed, the mugwort, the pigweed, and the saltbrush, and together they dwelt here. With every generation they swore covenants and vows to establish good faith with one another, saying, “You will not rebel against us, and we will not force you to sell anything, nor will we in any case importune you or seize anything from you. You will have your profitable market and your precious goods, and we will know nothing about them.” It was because we relied upon these trusty vows that we were able to preserve each other to this day. Now if you, sir, relying on our good relationships, come here to shame us, telling our humble settlement to seize something by force from a merchant, you will be teaching our settlement to turn its back on its covenants and vows. Would that be acceptable? You, sir, would certainly not want to obtain a jade but lose the princes’ allegiance. And indeed we would not want our tribute amounts, by the orders of the great domain, to have no set limits, for then Zheng would amount to a mere border settlement of Jin’s. If I present you with the jade, I do not know on what terms the deal will be completed. I presume to expound upon this privately.” Han Qi declined the jade and said, “For all my lack of talent, would I dare to cause two crimes by asking for a jade? I beg to decline it.” Catastrophic fires start, and Zichan conducts only the basic propitiatory rit­ uals, emphasizing instead the practical aspects of firefighting. Zichan’s skep­ ticism here is echoed in his refusal to offer sacrifice to dragons (chapter 14, Zhao 19.10). 4 It would appear from the ensuing discussion that Han Qi has forced the merchant to sell him the ring. 5 Zheng was founded when Lord Huan, a younger son of King Li of Zhou, was given the territory in 806 BCE.

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Zhao 18.3 (524 BCE)  In summer, in the fifth month, the Fire Star first became visible at evening. On the bingzi day (7), a wind blew. Zi Shen said, “This is known as the melting wind, the beginning of fire. On the seventh day from now the fires will start.” On the wuyin day (9) of the month, the wind was very strong. On the renwu day (13), it was extremely strong. There were fires in Song, Wei, Chen, and Zheng. Zi Shen ascended the Dating lineage’s storehouse to view the fires and said, “They are in Song, Wei, Chen, and Zheng.” Several days afterward, all these domains reported the fires. Pi Zao said, “If you do not take my advice, there will be fires in Zheng again.”6 The Zheng leaders requested that his advice be followed, but Zichan would not permit it. You Ji said, “Valuable objects are for preserving the people. If there is a fire, the domain will be in danger of falling. If we can use valuable objects to save us from falling, why begrudge them?” Zichan said, “The Way of Heaven is far away, while the Way of men is near at hand, and it does not have access to the former. How can we know anything of it? How can you know the Way of Heaven? In truth this fellow only talks a lot. Why should he not be right once in a while as luck would have it?” So he did not provide the objects, and indeed the fires did not recur. Before the conflagration in Zheng, Li Xi reported to Zichan, “There will be a great omen, the people will be shaken, and the domain will be in danger of falling. I myself will have died; I will not be able to last very long. What if we were to relocate the capital?” Zichan said, “Although that would work, I am not up to the task of settling a relocated people.” By the time of the fire, Li Xi had died but had not yet been buried. Zichan had thirty bearers relocate his coffin. When the fires started, Zichan saw the Jin noble sons and grandsons off at the east gate. He had the supervisor of corrections send away newly arrived visitors, and he barred visitors who had arrived long before from leaving their residences. He had You Su and Zishang patrol the sacrificial venues, including the Great Temple. He had Gongsun Deng move the great turtle shell, and he had the invocators and scribes move the stone arks for the ancestral tables to the Zhou Temple, where they made report to the former rulers. He had the personnel of the treasuries 6 In the previous year (ZT Zhao 17.5), Pi Zao had predicted the coming of the fires, and Zichan had rejected his proposal that Zheng be saved by making offerings of a pouring vessel and jade ladle.

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and storehouses take extra care in their duties. Shang Chenggong cautioned the supervisor of the palace, who brought out the old palace women and put them where the fire would not reach them. The supervisor of the military and the supervisor of corrections took up positions along the path of the fire, going wherever the fire had burned. People from below the city wall formed quintets to mount the wall. On the following day, Zichan had the supervisor of corrections in the outlying regions protect their conscripted forces, while the people who lived in the outskirts helped the invocators and scribes to clear a sacrificial place north of the capital, where fire was exorcized with addresses to Xuanming and Huilu.7 Prayers were made on the four sides of the city walls. Records were kept of the houses that had burned, and the owners were given tax relief and gifts of building materials. For three days there was wailing and the city markets did not open, and envoys were sent to report to the princes. Song and Wei both did the same things. Chen did not fight the fires and Xu did not offer condolences to the domains that had suffered conflagrations. From this the noble man knew that Chen and Xu would fall first. Further details of Zichan’s response to the fires are given. Jin takes offense at Zheng’s defensive measures, but Zichan is able to brush this aside.

Zhao 18.6 (524 BCE)  When the fires started, Zichan handed out weapons and mounted the ramparts. You Ji said, “Won’t Jin chastise us?” Zichan said, “I have heard that ‘when a small domain forgets to defend itself, it is in danger.’ How much more so when there is a conflagration? Our domain is not to be considered a small one because it has made defen­ sive preparations.” Afterward, Jin’s border officials rebuked Zheng, saying, “When there was a conflagration in the domain of Zheng, the ruler and high officers of Jin did not dare dwell at ease but divined with turtle shell and milfoil, hurried about performing prospect sacrifices, and begrudged neither sacrificial victim nor jade. Zheng’s conflagration was a sorrow for our unworthy ruler. Now that your functionaries have belligerently handed out weapons and mounted the ramparts, who are you trying to blame? We border keepers are fearful and dare not fail to make a report.” 7 Presumably spirits honored in Zheng.

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Zichan replied, “According to your remarks, sir, the conflagration in our humble settlement was a sorrow for your ruler. Because our humble settlement failed in governmental matters, Heaven sent down a conflagration. We feared that lying detractors might interfere and plot against us so as to lay us open to greedy parties, multiplying the disadvantages for our humble settlement and doubling your ruler’s sorrow. Since we were fortunate enough not to perish, our actions can still be explained. But if we had had the misfortune to perish, then even if your ruler felt sorrow about it, indeed it would be too late for him to change the outcome. Zheng has other borders; but it is Jin to whom we look, to whom we flee. Now that we are serving Jin, should we dare to have disloyal thoughts?” The death of Zichan of Zheng is reported, along with reflections by Confucius on his life and policies. Whereas Zichan propounds the necessity of harsh dis­ cipline here, elsewhere he shows tolerance of criticism and dissent (chapter 8, Xiang 31.11).

Zhao 20.9 (522 BCE)  Falling ill, Zichan of Zheng said to You Ji, “When I die, you, sir, will certainly take charge of the government. Only one who has virtue is capable of controlling the people by means of leniency. Failing that, nothing is better than harshness. Consider the flames of a fire; when they look at it, the people fear it, and therefore few die in it. But water is soft and yielding; the people play with it, feeling that it is familiar, and as a result many die in it. Therefore, to rule with leniency is the more difficult of the two.” He died after an illness of several months. When he took charge of the government, You Ji could not bear to be harsh, so he was instead lenient. Many robbers around the capital of Zheng would gather in the rush-filled marshes. You Ji regretted this and said, “If I had heeded that fine man’s advice from the beginning, it would not have come to this.” He mobilized an army to attack the robbers of the rushes and killed them all. Robberies then declined somewhat. Confucius said, “Excellent! When government is lenient, the people are presumptuous, and when they are presumptuous, one corrects them with harshness. When government is harsh, the people get wounded, and when they are wounded, one indulges them with leniency. Leniency seasons harshness, harshness seasons leniency, and in this way the policies are harmoniously adjusted. As it says in the Odes,

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Weary are the people from toil, And they seek to take their ease for a time. Show kindness to the central domains, And thereby pacify the four quarters.

This is indulging them with kindness. Do not forgive the artful and deceptive— Thus, make those who are in no way good cautious. Do put a stop to the rapacious and the cruel, Who have never feared the illustrious standards.

This is correcting them with harshness. He is gentle to those far away, kind to those near at hand, And in this way steadies our king.

This is calming them with harmony. As it says elsewhere in the Odes, Neither forceful nor lax, Neither hard nor soft, Gently and carefully he lays out his decrees. A hundred blessings he gathers around him.

This is the perfection of harmony.” When Zichan died and Confucius heard of it, he shed tears and said, “His was a way of cherishing people that was passed down from ancient times.”

Ya n Y ing of Qi Yan Ying is unusual among prominent Zuozhuan counselors in that he seems not to have represented Qi beyond its borders. In Zuozhuan and in a related collection devoted entirely to Yan Ying anecdotes, The Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Yan, he figures mainly as a virtuous remonstrator and as a conservative foil to the extravagant Qi rulers and conniving Qi ministers of his day. We have already featured Yan Ying’s discourse on ritual propriety (chapter 6, Zhao 26.11) and his tactical protest when Cui Zhu assassinates

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the Qi ruler Lord Zhuang (chapter 7, Xiang 25.2). Like Zichan above, Yan Ying initially refuses to take a side when conflict between various lineages in his domain sharpens, wishing only to sustain the ruler’s power. Eventually, though, his recommendation that Chen Wuyu be generous in victory enhances the prestige and ultimate power of the Chen lineage.

Zhao 10.2 (532 BCE)  The Luan and Gao lineages, descended from Lord Hui of Qi, both indulged in drinking. And because they heeded their womenfolk, they held many grudges. Quite as powerful as the Chen and Bao lineages, they hated them. In summer, someone reported to Chen Wuyu, “Luan Shi and Gao Qiang are going to attack Chen and Bao.” He reported the same to the Bao lineage. After distributing weapons, Chen Wuyu went to the Bao establishment. Encountering Gao Qiang drunk and galloping his horses, he then paid a visit to Bao Guo, who in turn distributed weapons. Someone was sent to get a look at the two noblemen, Luan Shi and Gao Qiang, both of whom were just about to drink. Chen Wuyu said, “Although the first report about the attack was not true, when they hear that we have distributed weapons, they are bound to come after us. Shall we attack them first, while they are drinking?” At the time the Chens and Baos were on excellent terms, so they attacked the Luan and Gao lineages. Gao Qiang said, “If we take the ruler first, then where will the Chens and Baos be able to go?” So Luan and Gao attacked the Tiger Gate. Yan Ying, dressed in full court garb, stood outside the Tiger Gate. Each of the four houses summoned him, but he would join none. His ­followers said, “Will you help Chen and Bao?” He said, “What good is there in them?” “Will you help Luan and Gao?” “Are they any better?” “In that case will you go home?” He said, “When the ruler is under attack, how can I go home?” Only after the ruler summoned him did he go to court. The ruler divined about having Wang Hei lead forces under the Linggupi banner, and it was auspicious. Wang Hei asked to shorten the banner by three feet before using it. 8 In the fifth month, on the gengchen day, the forces 8

As a high officer serving as proxy for the Qi ruler, Wang Hei is reluctant to use the banner at full length.

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battled at the Ji Gate, and Luan and Gao were defeated. They were defeated again at Zhuang. The inhabitants of the capital pursued them and defeated them again at the Lu Gate. Luan Shi and Gao Qiang came to Lu in flight. The Chen and Bao lineages divided up their estates. Yan Ying said to Chen Wuyu, “You must hand your portion over to the lord! The mainstay of virtue is yielding. Yielding is deemed an excellent virtue. Anything that has blood and life force is disposed to contention. Therefore, profit cannot be seized by force; it is better to think of duty. Dutifulness is the root of profit. Stored-up profits give rise to trouble. So for now do not allow them to be stored up! In this way you can receive nourishment and grow.” Chen Wuyu turned his whole portion over to the lord and asked permission to retire to Ju. Chen Wuyu summoned Zishan and, without telling the ruler, provided him with draperies, utensils, and clothing and shoes for his followers, then returned Ji to him. For Zishang he provided the same things, also returning his settlement to him. For Zizhou he did the same, giving him Fuyu. He brought back Zicheng, Zigong, and Ziyuan Jie, in each case increasing their stipends.9 For all the lords’ sons and grandsons who did not have stipends, he made distributions from among his own cities. For all in the domain who were impoverished or orphaned, he made distributions from his private stores of grain. He said, “As it says in the Odes, ‘By bestowing gifts he founded the Zhou.’ That is, King Wen was capable of generosity. And it was in this way that Lord Huan became overlord.” The lord gave Chen Wuyu settlements near Ju, but he declined them. Mu Meng Ji requested Gaotang for him, and with this the Chen lineage first became a great house in Qi. Adopting metaphors from cookery and music, Yan Ying advances a vision of harmonious dissension in court policy making.

Zhao 20.8 (522 BCE)  When the Prince of Qi returned from the hunt, Yan Ying waited upon him at the Chuan Terrace. Liangqiu Ju galloped his horses to join them there. The lord said, “Liangqiu Ju alone is in harmony with us!” Yan Ying replied, “Ju is in fact in unison with you. How can he be said to be in harmony?” The lord said, “Are harmony and unison different?” 9 The men summoned back by Chen Wuyu are all noblemen of the Qi ruler’s line.

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Yan Ying replied, “They are different. Harmony is like a stew. Water, fire, jerky, mincemeat, salt, and plum vinegar are used to cook fish and meat. These are cooked over firewood. The master chef harmonizes them, evening them out with seasonings, compensating for what is lacking, and diminishing what is too strong. The noble man eats it and calms his heart. “With ruler and subject it is the same. When there is something wrong in what the ruler considers right, the subject sets forth the wrong in order to perfect the right. When there is something right about what the ruler considers wrong, the subject sets forth the right in order to eliminate the wrong. In this way the administration is calm and does not violate standards, and the people will have no heart for contending with one another. Thus, it says in the Odes, There is a well-harmonized stew. We are careful and calm. We advance silently; There is no contention.

The former kings’ seasoning of the five flavors and harmonizing of the five tones were for the calming of hearts and the perfecting of government. “Sounds are just like flavors. The single breath, the two forms, the three genres, the four materials, the five tones, the six pitches, the seven notes, the eight airs, the nine songs—these are used to complete one another. The clear and the muddy, the piano and the forte, the short and the long, the presto and the adagio, the somber and the joyous, the hard and the soft, the delayed and the immediate, the high and the low, the going out and coming in, the united and separate—these are used to complement one another. The noble man listens to it and thus calms his heart. “When the heart is calm, the virtue is in harmony. Thus, as it says in the Odes, The sound of his virtue is unblemished.

Now Liangqiu Ju is not like this. Whatever you, the ruler, consider right, Liangqiu Ju also calls right. Whatever you consider wrong, Ju also calls unacceptable. If you season water with water, who can eat it? If the zithers

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and dulcimers hold to a single sound, who can listen to it? This is how unison is wrong.” In a conversation that is especially telling in the context of the decline of the Qi ruling house and the rise of the Chen lineage (chapter 7, Zhao 3.3), Yan Ying teaches his ruler about the necessity of dynastic change. His views echo that of the scribe Mo of Cai (chapter 7, Zhao 32.4). They drank and made merry. The lord said, “What a joy it would be if there had been no death since ancient times!” Yan Ying replied, “If there had been no death since ancient times, that would be a joy for the ancients. But then what joy could you have gotten for yourself? Long ago, the Shuangjiu lineage occupied this land, and they were followed by the Jize lineage, who were followed by the Youfeng Bo Ling lineage, who were followed by the Pugu lineage, who were at last followed by the Grand Lord, the Qi ancestor. If no one had died since ancient times, it would be the joy of the Shuangjiu lineage. And that is not something you would consider desirable.” Yan Ying argues against a proposal that invocators and scribes be sacrificed in an attempt to cure the ruler’s illness, proposing instead a renewed attention to the ruler’s virtue and administrative order as the path to healing. In the following passage, Yan Ying again rejects the idea of ritual or sacrificial inter­ cession, this time in response to the appearance of a comet, and focuses instead on the ruler’s moral failures.

Zhao 26.10 (516 BCE)  A comet was seen in Qi, so the Prince of Qi arranged to have a sacrifice made for it. Yan Ying said, “That will do no good; it will only bring on deception. Heaven’s way cannot be questioned, nor does it err in its commands, so what do you accomplish by making a sacrifice for it? What is more, when there is a comet, or broomstar, in the heavens, it is to sweep away filth. If there is no filth in the ruler’s behavior, then why sacrifice? If there is filth in it, then how will sacrificing bring any reduction of it? As it says in the Odes, It was this King Wen, Reserved of heart and cautious, Who brilliantly served the god on high

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And cherished many blessings. His virtue did not swerve And for it he won the domains of all the regions.

If you do not err in your virtue, then the domains of all the regions will come to you of their own accord. What worries will you have about comets? As it says in the Odes, We have nothing that serves as mirror but the Xia rulers and the Shang. All because of their disorderly behavior, Their people in the end drifted away from them.

If your conduct swerves, if it is disorderly, then the people will drift away from you, and nothing that the invocators and scribes do will make amends.” Pleased, the lord desisted from his plan to offer sacrifices.

Chapter 12

Diplomacy

I n i ts de pict ion of cou rt v isi ts f rom on e dom a i n to another, of periodic larger meetings of representatives from multiple domains, and of the interactions among combatants before and during battle, Zuozhuan stresses the importance of effective speech and gives numerous examples of speeches and letters that won some advantage for the speaker’s domain. The inclusion of speeches about interactions among the domains transforms what might have been a mute and summary narrative into a story full of the reflections and arguments of individual actors, whose words explain events from within, sometimes with a personal tenor. The frequency with which narratives are built around perfectly pitched diplomatic utterances suggests that the Zuozhuan authors prized and wished to transmit to readers something of the art of persuasion as practiced during the Spring and Autumn era. The roving persuaders and strategists of the subsequent Warring States era prided themselves on their ability to change the world through speech alone—or, more graphically, through “a few inches of tongue”—and would no doubt have seen many of the Zuozhuan diplomatic speakers as exemplars. What did Zuozhuan exemplify in recounting a diplomatic speech that achieved its intended effect? What made a diplomatic speech good? It would have some of the features associated with elegant speech throughout the selections in this volume; it might show certain kinds of phrasal balance and symmetry in word placement, for example, or it might cite the Odes. Negotiation of expectations through recitation of the Odes is a distinctive feature of diplomatic rhetoric in Zuozhuan (chapter 4, Xi 23.6, chapter 10, Zhao 1.3, chapter 15, Xiang 14.1). More rarely, diplomatic speech might adopt archaic language of the kind associated with the Western Zhou, or it might cite historical models associated with that and certain other early periods. But more 2 21

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consistently than other forms of speech, the diplomatic speech draws on history not only for general models (chapter 7, Xi 26.3, Xuan 3.3), but for the special and direct relevance of some past event or agreement to the diplomatic matter presently at hand. Speakers show their rhetorical mastery and a form of intellectual heroism in their selection and manipulation of histor­ ical information in accordance with a specific set of diplomatic challenges and in the relatively brief confines of a few hundred words.

Gru dge s Old a n d Ne w in Diplom atic R h etor ic Lord Huan of Qi (chapter 6, Xi 9.2), the first overlord in Zuozhuan, leads allied forces to confront Chu, the emergent power in the south, and his famous minister Guan Zhong (chapter 8, Zhuang 9.5) exchanges speeches with a Chu envoy. Justifying the invasion, Guan Zhong charges Chu with failing to submit agreed-upon offerings of bundled mao grass (Imperata cylindrica var. major), which was used to filter wine for sacrifices, and asks accusingly about the death of the tenth-century Zhou King Zhao while on expedition in Chu. When Lord Huan switches to naked threats, however, the Chu com­ mander Qu Wan effectively rebuffs him.

Xi 4.1 (656 BCE)  In the fourth year, in spring, the Prince of Qi invaded Cai with troops of the princes. Cai collapsed, and Qi then attacked Chu. The Master of Chu sent someone to speak with the allies’ troops: “Your ruler dwells near the northern sea, while I, the unworthy one, dwell near the southern sea.1 Even when our horses and cattle are in heat, they cannot come close to one another. So I did not expect that you would encroach upon our territory. Why have you done so?” Guan Zhong replied, “In the past the Shao Duke Kang commanded our former ruler the Grand Lord, 2 saying, ‘As for the princes of the five ranks and the lieges of the nine regions, it is you who can launch a military expedition against them in order to assist and defend the house of Zhou.’ He then bestowed on our former lord an endowment of land that reached to the sea in the east, to the Yellow River in the west, to Muling in the south, 1 The world is here imagined as being surrounded by seas on four sides. 2 The Grand Lord was the founding ancestor of the domain of Qi.

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and to Wudi in the north. But your offerings of bundled mao grass did not arrive. Thus, the king’s sacrifices were not supplied, and there was nothing to use for filtering wine. I, the unworthy one, am here to inquire about this. Moreover, King Zhao went south on a military expedition and did not return. I am here to ask about this.” The envoy replied, “It was our lord’s crime that tribute did not arrive. How would we presume not to supply it in future? As for King Zhao’s not returning, you should ask about that on the banks of the river.” The troops advanced and set up camp at Xing. In summer, the Master of Chu had Qu Wan move toward the allies’ troops. The allies’ troops with­ drew and set up camp at Shaoling. The Prince of Qi arrayed the troops of the princes and went out in a chariot with Qu Wan to inspect them. . . . The Prince of Qi said, “If with this multitude I should do battle, who could resist me? If with these I should assail city walls, what city would I fail to overcome?” Qu Wan replied, “If you pacify the princes with virtue, who would dare not submit? But if you use force, then the domain of Chu will take Fangcheng as its city wall and the Han River as its moat. Even with multitudes, you will have no means to make use of them.” Qu Wan and the prince swore a covenant. The domain of Zheng’s bad treatment of Chong’er during his peregrinations (chapter 4, Xi 23.6) and its flirtation with Chu, Jin’s enemy, lead to tensions that culminate in the siege of Zheng by Qin and Jin. Swayed by the Zheng envoy Zhi Zhiwu, the Qin ruler gives up the siege and swears a covenant with Zheng, and the Prince of Jin also withdraws from Zheng as a way of repaying the Qin ruler’s earlier hospitality. Zhu Zhiwu’s speech, one of the most celebrated in Zuozhuan, portrays Jin in much less flattering terms compared to the rather pro-Jin bias in most of the passages on the rise of Chong’er (chapter 4).

Xi 30.3 (630 BCE)  In the ninth month, on the jiawu day (10), the Prince of Jin and the Liege of Qin laid siege to Zheng; this was because Zheng had acted without appropriate ritual in regard to Jin and had additionally made a second commitment to Chu. Jin was encamped at Hanling, and Qin was encamped south of the Fan River. Yi Zhihu, a Zheng minister, said to the Liege of Zheng, “The domain is in peril!

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If you send Zhu Zhiwu to have an audience with the ruler of Qin, their troops will surely withdraw.” The Liege of Zheng followed this advice, but Zhu Zhiwu declined the mission, saying, “Even when I was in the prime of life, I was not as good as others. Now I am old, there is simply nothing I am able to do!” The Liege of Zheng said, “That I was not able to employ you, sir, early on, and only now seek you out because of an emergency is indeed my error. Still, if Zheng perishes, you too will suffer from it.” So he agreed. During the night, Zhu Zhiwu left the city by letting himself over the wall by rope. He had an audience with the Liege of Qin and said, “Qin and Jin are laying siege to Zheng, and Zheng already knows it will perish. If there were some advantage for you to gain, my lord, by destroying Zheng, would I dare to trouble your functionaries? You know how difficult it is to cross over a domain and join distant lands to one’s frontiers. 3 What is the use of destroying Zheng to enhance a neighbor? A neighbor’s strength is your weakness, my lord. But if you release Zheng and make them the hosts of your road to the east, then as your envoys come and go, Zheng will supply what they lack, and you, my lord, would in no way suffer harm. Moreover, you once did a favor for the ruler of Jin, and he promised you Jiao and Xia. In the morning he crossed the Yellow River to return home and by evening he had begun laying down frames to build walls in those places. This is something you know. How will Jin ever be satisfied? After it has extended its boundaries to the east and annexed Zheng, it will want to give free rein to expansions of its western boundary. If it does not carve away Qin, where will it get land? Carving away at Qin to benefit Jin: this is something you should consider carefully.” The Liege of Qin was pleased. He swore a covenant with Zheng, dispatching Qizi, Fengsun, and Yangsun to garrison Zheng, and he then turned toward home. Hu Yan requested permission to strike at the Qin forces, but the Prince of Jin said, “This cannot be done. Were it not for that man’s effort, I would not have reached this position. To rely upon another’s strength and then to injure him is not noble. To lose one with whom you have been allied is not wise. To replace good order with disorder is not martial. We should just return home.” He left Zheng.

3

The domain of Jin was located between Qin and Zheng.

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E x pedi ent Histor ica l R etrospection: Lü X i a ng’s Accou nt of Qin-Jin R el ations In what is perhaps the single most famous example of diplomatic rhetoric in Zuozhuan, the Jin envoy Lü Xiang addresses Lord Huan of Qin (r. 604– 577 BCE). He threatens to sever relations with Qin while giving a purportedly historical retrospective of Qin-Jin relations over the preceding eighty years. Delivered in an elevated style and laced with compelling examples, the speech presents Jin as invariably righteous and victimized and Qin as ungrateful and aggressive. It skillfully distorts events chronicled elsewhere in Zuozhuan.

Cheng 13.3 (578 BCE)  In summer, in the fourth month, on the wuwu day (5), the Prince of Jin sent Lü Xiang to sever relations with Qin with these words: “In former times our Lord Xian and your Lord Mu shared good relations.4 They joined their efforts and were of the same heart and mind, extending their good relations with oaths and covenants and strengthening their relationship with marriage ties. When Heaven inflicted calamities on Jin, Lord Wen went to Qi, and Lord Hui went to Qin. Misfortune befell us, and Lord Xian passed away. Your Lord Mu did not forget the old ties of beneficence and allowed our Lord Hui to uphold ancestral sacrifices in the domain of Jin. Yet Lord Mu was not able to complete his great meritorious service to Jin and deployed his army at Han. He did, however, have regret in his heart and brought about the success of our Lord Wen. All these were due to the mediation of Lord Mu. “Our Lord Wen personally donned armor and headpiece, traversed mountains and rivers, overcame perils and obstacles, and vanquished the princes of the east, making the descendants of Yu, Xia, Shang, and Zhou visit your court of Qin. Thus did he already requite the old ties of beneficence. When the men of Zheng unleashed their fury at the borders of your domain, our Lord Wen led the princes and Qin in laying siege to 4 Lü Xiang begins by recalling the support Lord Mu of Qin gave the domain of Jin during the rule of Lord Xian of Jin. Two of Lord Xian’s sons, Yiwu (the future Lord Hui) and Chong’er (the future Lord Wen), fled Jin during Lord Xian’s rule (chapter 4, Xi 5.2, Xi 23.6). Each of them returned to Jin with military support from Qin. In 645 BCE (ZT Xi 15.4), Qin defeated the Jin army at the battle of Han by way of punishing Lord Hui for broken promises, but in 636 BCE Qin installed Lord Wen in Jin (chapter 4, Xi 24.1).

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Zheng. 5 The high officers of Qin, without consulting our unworthy ruler, unilaterally swore a covenant with Zheng. The princes were outraged by such conduct and wanted to brave death to attack Qin. Lord Wen, fearing for Qin, pacified the princes; and the Qin army succeeded in returning without suffering any harm. With this we thus performed a great service for the domain in the west. “Misfortune befell us, and Lord Wen passed away. Your Lord Mu was ruthless. He defied our deceased lord, belittled our Lord Xiang as young and weak, encroached upon our land of Yao, cut us off from our allies and friends, attacked our city walls and fortresses, eliminated our domain of Hua, scattered and drove away our brothers, brought about strife and chaos among our covenant partners, and threatened to topple our domain and patrimony. Our Lord Xiang had still not forgotten your earlier meritorious service, yet he feared the destruction of the altars of the domain, and that was why the armies were deployed at Yao.6 Even then he was willing to resolve with Lord Mu the causes for recrimination. Yet Lord Mu refused to listen and turned to Chu to plot against us. Heaven’s sentiments were swayed, King Cheng of Chu perished, and because of that, Lord Mu did not succeed in exerting his will at our expense. “When Lords Mu and Xiang passed away, Lords Kang and Ling acceded to their positions.7 Lord Kang was of our Jin extraction, yet he wished to disrupt and ruin our lord’s house and to overturn the altars of our domain. He led noxious vermin from our line to destabilize our borders; that is why we had the Linghu campaign. 8 Even then Lord Kang did not repent. He entered our territory at Hequ, attacked our Su River area, took captives from among our people at Wangguan, and plundered our Jima. That was why we had the battle of Hequ.9 That the way eastward was blocked for you was because Lord Kang terminated good relations with us.

5 See Xi 30.3, above. 6 Jin defeated Qin in the battle of Yao in 627 BCE (ZT Xi 33.3). 7 Both Lord Mu of Qin and Lord Xiang of Jin died in 621 BCE. They were succeeded by Lord Kang of Qin (r. 620–609 BCE) and Lord Ling of Jin. Lord Kang was born of the union of Lord Mu of Qin and Mu Ji, a daughter of Lord Xian of Jin. 8 Jin defeated Qin at Linghu in 620 BCE (ZT Wen 7.4), as Qin attempted to install Gongzi Yong as successor to Lord Xiang of Jin. 9 Qin and Jin fought at Hequ in 615 BCE (ZT Wen 12.6).

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“When the time came for you, my lord, to succeed your father, our ruler Lord Jing craned his neck and gazed westward, saying, ‘Perhaps he will cherish us with compassion!’ But you, my lord, did not grace us with participation in a covenant. Taking advantage of our troubles with the Di, you entered our dependency by the Yellow River, burned our settlements of Ji and Gao, cut down the fruits of our agricultural labor, and committed slaughter at our borders: that was why we gathered troops at Fushi.10 You, my lord, also regretted the spreading of calamities and, wishing to elicit the blessings of our former rulers, Lords Xian and Mu, sent your lord’s son Qian to command our Lord Jing thus: ‘You and I will share good relations and will abandon hostilities. We will return to the cultivation of former cordiality, so as to honor the memory of earlier meritorious services.’ Before the oaths were completed, Lord Jing passed away; that is why our unworthy ruler held the meeting at Linghu.11 “You, my lord, were again merciless and turned against the covenant oaths. The White Di and you, my lord, shared the same region; they are your enemies and our partners in marriage. You bestowed this command on us: ‘You and I shall attack the Di.’ Our unworthy ruler did not dare consider marriage ties; fearing your authority, he gave the command of war to the officers. Yet you, my lord, had divided allegiance regarding the Di and said to them, ‘Jin is planning to attack you.’ The Di received your notification, even as they abhorred it; that is why they notified us about your perfidy. “The men of Chu hated your way of being inconstant in your virtue and also came to notify us: ‘Qin turned against the Covenant of Linghu and came to us seeking a covenant with these words: “We clearly declare to the god on high of the boundless heavens, to the three lords of Qin, and to the three kings of Chu:12 Although we have maintained relations with Jin, our gaze is on nothing but gain.” I, the deficient one, detest Qin’s lack of steadfast virtue. I thereby reveal these things, so that it can be punished for its inconstancy!’13 Having heard all these words, the princes, aggrieved

10 In 594 BCE (ZT Xuan 15.4), Jin defeated an invading Qin army at Fushi. 11 The rulers of Qin and Jin swore a botched covenant in the year before this speech in 580 BCE (ZT Cheng 11.1). 12 “The three lords of Qin” are Lord Mu, Lord Kang, and Lord Gong; the “three kings of Chu” are King Cheng, King Mu, and King Zhuang. 13 Jin and Chu made a peace agreement brokered by Hua Yuan of Song (ZT Cheng 12.2).

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in heart and pained in mind, drew close to me.14 I, the unworthy one, led them to await your commands, seeking nothing but amity. If you, my lord, deign to look with beneficence upon the princes, feel compassion for me and bestow upon us a covenant; that will indeed be my wish. We shall then pacify the princes and retreat, for how would we dare to provoke disorder? If you do not bestow on us any great beneficence, then I, for all my ineptness, will not be able to lead the princes to retreat. “I have presumed to fully set forth the matter before those in charge, so that they will indeed consider the most advantageous course of action.”

T u r ning Fa i lu r e into Succe ss: Gu i you’s R h etor ic Sav e s His Life As Chu’s southeastern rival Wu gains power, Chu troops led by King Ling march on Wu in a campaign that will fail. A clever Wu envoy saves his own life with a heroic discourse on divination.

Zhao 5.8 (537 BCE)  When the Master of Wu sent his younger brother Guiyou to honor the Chu army for its exertions, the Chu forces took him prisoner and prepared to consecrate their drums with his blood.15 The king sent someone to ask him, “When you divined about coming, was it auspicious?” He replied, “It was auspicious. When our unworthy ruler heard that you were preparing to drill your troops in our humble settlement, he divined about it with the turtle shell kept in the domain and said, ‘I would urgently send a man to celebrate the efforts of the army, requesting that he go to observe the intensity of the king’s anger, then make the defensive preparations accordingly. Would that he succeed in learning of this.’ The cracks on the shell gave an auspicious report, indicating, ‘His success can be known.’ Our fall could come any day if you, my lord, receive this subject envoy happily and with goodwill, deepening our lowly settlement’s indolence and making us forget about death. But Wu will know what defensive preparations to make now if you, my lord, are enraged and let fly the lightning bolt of your anger, 14 Here Lord Li seems to be speaking in his own voice instead of through the voice of his envoy. 15 On this expression, see chapter 7, note 1.

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brutally seizing an envoy and preparing to consecrate your drums with his blood. Weak as our humble settlement is, if we put all in readiness well in advance, we will have the wherewithal to stop your army. To make defensive preparations regardless of difficulties or ease can be deemed auspicious. What is more, it was for the altars of the Wu domain that we divined. How could it have been for a single man? If this envoy should have an opportunity to be used in consecrating the drums of the army, so that our humble settlement knows that defensive preparations are necessary in order to protect itself against unexpected calamity, what auspiciousness could be greater? What affair does the domain’s reserved turtle shell not divine for? Sometimes auspicious, sometimes inauspicious, who can be sure of it? The auspices for Chengpu had their fulfillment at Bi. Might not Wu have an ambition for similar fulfillment after my mission?”16 Therefore, he was not put to death.

Negoti ating th e Ba l a nce of Pow er : Zich a n’s Diplom ac y Zichan of Zheng, some of whose deeds within the state of Zheng are included elsewhere (chapter 11), was brilliant in his management of relations with the two most powerful domains of his time, Jin and Chu. In the following passage, he resists Jin demands for offerings in an eloquent letter to Fan Gai. He warns that the accumulation of material gain will cause alienation and dissension and thereby endanger both the domain and the Fan lineage. He shows the same aplomb in dealing with excessive Chu demands. When Zheng visits Chu (ZT Xiang 28.8), Zichan demonstrates Zheng’s discontent by refusing to build the customary earthen platform.

Xia ng 24.2 (549 BCE)  When Fan Gai was in charge of the Jin ­government, the offerings demanded of the princes were burdensome, and Zheng leaders were distressed by them. In the second month, the Liege of Zheng went to Jin. Zichan sent a letter with Zixi to tell Fan Gai the following: 16 Chu was defeated in the battle of Chengpu (chapter 4, Xi 28.3) but was victorious at Bi (chapter 5, Xuan 12.1). Guiyou implies here that his death might constitute a temporary setback for Wu, but it will be followed by ultimate Wu victory.

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“With you, sir, in charge in Jin, your neighboring princes on all four sides have not heard of your exemplary virtue but only of burdensome offerings. I am perplexed by this. I have heard that noble men who lead domains and patrimonies are not troubled by the lack of gifts but are disturbed by the lack of a good name. When the princes’ gifts are gathered in the lord’s house, then the princes will have divided allegiance. If you, sir, rely so much on all these gifts, then the domain of Jin will have divided allegiance. If the princes have divided allegiance, then the domain of Jin will be ruined, and if the domain of Jin has divided allegiance, then your patrimony will be ruined. How can you be so misguided? Of what use can the gifts be? Now a good name is the vehicle of virtue, and virtue is the foundation of domain and patrimony. Should one not strive to have a foundation and not let it be ruined? With virtue one is joyful, and with joy one is able to endure. As it says in the Odes, Joyful is the noble man— He is the foundation of domain and patrimony. Surely this is because he has exemplary virtue! The god on high is watching over you. Do not let your heart be divided.

Surely this is because he has a good name! Use the longing for reciprocity to illuminate virtue, which will then be carried forth by a good name, so that those afar will be drawn close and those nearby will be calmed. Would you rather have others say about you, sir, ‘It is you who sustain us,’ or ‘You use us up to sustain yourself ’? It is because elephants have tusks that their bodies are destroyed; such is the danger of gifts.” Fan Gai was pleased, and thus he lightened the burden of offerings. While fending off Jin and Chu demands, Zichan also expands Zheng influ­ ence by incursions into Chen. Here, questioned by Jin, Zichan defends Zheng aggression by mixing moral and pragmatic arguments. He appeals to ZhouZheng, Jin-Zheng ties, and questionable historical examples of beneficial Zheng intercession in Chen, but he also frankly avows the logic of power poli­ tics. Confucius commends Zichan’s diplomatic rhetoric, emphasizing effica­ cious language that justifies political gains.

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Xia ng 25.10 (548 BCE)  Zichan of Zheng presented the spoils of victory to Jin and wore his military garb while attending to affairs. . . . The Jin leader Shi Ruo said, “For what reason did you invade a small domain?” Zichan replied, “By the command of the former kings, the only thing that matters is where the guilt lies. To each and every offender, punishment is meted out. Moreover, long ago the territories of the Son of Heaven amounted to one thousand li squared; that of the various domains, one hundred li squared; and with the lower ranks, the territories were smaller still. Now most of the great domains span several thousand li squared. If they had not invaded small domains, how could they have reached that?” The Jin leader said, “Why are you wearing military garb?” He replied, “Our former rulers Lords Wu and Zhuang were the ministers in attendance on Kings Ping and Huan of Zhou. After the Chengpu campaign, Lord Wen of Jin proclaimed the command, saying, ‘All should resume their former duties.’ He commanded our Lord Wen to don military attire and assist the Zhou king as Jin presented its Chu spoils. We would not presume to cast aside the king’s command.” Shi Ruo could not press further and reported discharge of his mission to Zhao Wu. Zhao Wu said, “His words follow propriety and good sense. It is inauspicious to go against propriety and good sense.” He then accepted the Zheng spoils. . . . Confucius said, “As the Records has it: ‘Use words that are adequate to the intent; use ornamentation that is adequate to the words.’ Without words, who can know the intent? Words without ornamentation cannot go far. For Jin to become overlord, and Zheng to enter Chen, there would have been no merit had it not been for ornamented words and phrases. Words and phrases must be used with care!” The Covenant of Pingqiu, which should serve to demonstrate Jin’s power, falls short when Zichan offers a principled refutation of Jin claims. Here, as else­ where, the minister You Ji serves as a foil for Zichan’s forethought.

Zhao 13.3 (529 BCE)  On the jiaxu day (7), they swore a covenant together at Pingqiu; Qi had submitted. The princes were made to come to the cleared space at midday. On the guiyou day (6), they had withdrawn from their court visits to the Jin ruler. Zichan ordered his travel attendants to make haste in setting up the tents at the cleared space, but

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You Ji stopped them and made them wait until the following day. In the evening, Zichan heard that the tents had not yet been set up and had someone hurry over to the place, but already there was no space to set them up. When they swore the covenant, Zichan disputed the sequence of tribute, saying, “In former times, when the Son of Heaven established the order of tribute presentations, the amount was set according to the way they were ranked, and those who were given eminent places paid heavy tribute. That was the Zhou system. Those who were humble yet paid heavy tribute were those who resided in the near zone. The Liege of Zheng is ranked in the nan zone for tribute purposes, and if he is made to conform to the tribute amounts for a duke or prince who is near, then we fear that he will not be able to make up the full amount.17 We presume to present our request about this. The princes have stopped fighting and are concerned with amity. There is no month in which a command to make a tribute journey does not reach us, and because there is no limit to the tribute amount, our small domain has fallen short. That is why we have offended. When princes extend a covenant, it is to preserve the small domains. When there is no limit to the tribute amounts demanded, then the fall of these domains can be expected. Today will determine whether we stand or fall.” From midday they began their dispute, and when evening came the Jin leaders finally yielded. Once they had sworn the covenant, You Ji rebuked Zichan, saying, “If the princes chastise us, will you be able to take back what you have done?” Zichan said, “The government of Jin is divided among so many houses that they have not the leisure to deal with disloyalty and negligence. So what leisure will they have to chastise anyone? If a domain will not fight for itself and is the victim of bullying, then how is it worthy to be called a domain?”. . . Confucius said of Zichan, “In this expedition, he acted in a way to serve as a foundation for his domain. As it says in the Odes, Happy this noble man, Foundation of his domain and his house. 17 In an idealized early system of political geography in which the Zhou court was surrounded by nine concentric zones of allies, the nan zone was third from the center, and its ruler might thus have been expected to pay as heavy a tribute as a higher ranked but more peripheral ruler.

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As a noble man, Zichan seeks happiness of this kind.” He also said, “They gathered the princes and set limits for tribute service; this was in accordance with ritual propriety.”

Str ategic Self-Defense: Zigong’s R h etor ic Zigong, the disciple of Confucius best known for his worldly success and seen by Sima Qian as instrumental in the promulgation of Confucius’s teachings, figures as a powerful diplomatic speaker in Zuozhuan and in some other texts. In the following episode, he explains to a highly placed visitor from the newly powerful southern domain of Wu why the leaders and nobles of Lu will not accept his summons. His speech frames ritual propriety as a system regulating prerogatives among participants and implicitly castigates Wu as barbaric.

Ai 7.3 (488 BCE)  The grand steward Pi of Wu summoned the minister Ji Kangzi, but Ji Kangzi sent Zigong to make his apologies. The grand steward Pi said, “What sort of ritual propriety is it when the ruler of a domain has traveled a long road and yet the high officers of the domain receiving him will not go out their own gates?” Zigong replied, “What does this have to do with ritual propriety? We act out of fear for your great domain. Your great domain is not command­ ing the princes according to ritual propriety, and if you fail to act according to ritual propriety, then how is it possible for us to take your proper measure? When our unworthy ruler is already following your commands, how can his senior officials presume to relinquish their domain? Taibo implemented the Zhou rituals in robes and cap, but when Zhongyong succeeded him, he cut his hair and tattooed his body, adorning himself in his nakedness:18 was that ritual propriety? There is a reason for the way things are.” Returning from Zeng, Ji Kangzi reckoned that Wu would not be able to accomplish anything. When Wu seeks to renew an unfavorable covenant with Lu, Zigong devises a clever but cynical way to put off the request. 18 Taibo was the pre-dynastic Zhou scion who declined to succeed his father, instead fleeing to Wu. Zhongyong was his younger brother. Zigong is saying that while Wu may claim Zhou origins, its leaders seem to have forgotten about ritual propriety, p­ erhaps because they have been among barbarians for too long.

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Ai 12.3 (483 BCE)  When our lord met with Wu at Tuogao, the Master of Wu had the grand steward Pi request the renewal of the covenant. Our lord did not desire it, so he had Zigong reply, “A covenant is that by which good faith is confirmed. Therefore, it is made fast with the heart, upheld with jade and silk, secured with words, and controlled by the bright spirits. Our lord holds that once there is a covenant in place, it cannot be changed and that is all there is to it. If it could still be changed, then what benefit would there be even if covenants were made every day? Now you, sir, say that it is necessary to renew the covenant. If it can be renewed, then it can also be allowed to expire.” Therefore, they did not renew the covenant. As Lu makes peace with Qi, Zigong again shows his cunning as a d­ iplomatic speaker and secures the return of the Lu city of Cheng, whose rebellious steward Gongsun Su has turned against Lu and given the city over to Qi. Especially effective is the biting historical comparison Zigong draws in his response to the Qi ruler’s envoy, Chen Heng, which is what finally brings about the expulsion of Gongsun Su and the return of the city.

Ai 15.4 (480 BCE)  In winter, we made peace with Qi. Zifu Jingbo went to Qi. Zigong, acting as his aide, met with Gongsun Su and said, “Everyone is a subject to someone else and yet still has a mind to turn against that person. How much more so is this true in the case of the men of Qi? Although they work in your service, how could there not be disaffection? You are a descendant of the Zhou Duke and have enjoyed great benefits, yet you still set your mind on undutiful behavior. When the benefits cannot be secured, and you have nonetheless destroyed your ancestral domain, what use will you make of it?” Gongsun Su said, “True! I had not previously heard that command.” Chen Heng, visiting the guests at the hostel, said, “Our ruler sent me to declare, ‘I wish to serve your ruler as I serve the ruler of Wei.’”19 Zifu Jingbo bowed to Zigong and sent him ahead to reply: “This is our ruler’s desire. Some time ago the men of Jin attacked Wei, and on Wei’s behalf Qi attacked Guanshi in Jin, losing five hundred chariots. Qi went on to give to Wei lands to the west of the Ji River and to the south of Zhuo, Mei, and Xing, five hundred registered hamlets in all. When the men 19 That is, Qi and Wei are allies at this point, while Lu is not in accord with Qi.

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of Wu fomented turmoil in our humble settlement, Qi took advantage of our hardship and seized Huan and Chan, and for this reason our unworthy ruler felt a chill in his heart. If he is to be permitted to serve your ruler as does the ruler of Wei, then that is certainly his desire.”20 Disturbed by Zigong’s words, Chen Heng returned Cheng to Lu. Gongsun Su entered Ying, a Qi settlement about halfway between the Qi and Lu capitals, with his weapons and armor.

20 Citing the Qi-Wei alliance as example, Chen Heng demands Lu allegiance. Zigong contrasts Qi support of Wei (480 BCE) with its aggression against Lu (487 BCE).

C h a p t e r 13

Confucius and His Disciples

A s no t e d i n t h e i n t r oduc t ion t o t h i s a n t hol o g y, t h e juxtaposition of narrative and comment became standard practice in Chinese historiography. Confucius appears intermittently in Zuozhuan as a retrospective judge of historical events and personages. Instead of treating these comments as opinions of the historical Confucius, it is probably safer to regard them as one way to present authoritative judgments. Structurally, these elucidative, evaluative, and interpretive comments are comparable to those by the “noble man,” and in both cases, the comments can encode different perspectives. While Confucius’s comments are included in other chapters, here we will focus more on Confucius as a historical actor. In his comments, Confucius elevates ritual order above penal codes (chapter 9, Zhao 29.5), but he also praises the unflinching justice of Shu­ xiang, who proclaims his younger brother’s crime (chapter 9, Zhao 14.7). The latter view stands in marked contrast to the Analects (13.18), where rectitude consists in the willingness of father and son to conceal the truth in order to protect each other from the law. As we will see, Confucius in Zuozhuan differs from Confucius in the Analects. He repeatedly applauds and defends divergent positions of Zichan, including his tolerance of dissent (chapter 8, Xiang 31.11) and justification of harsh punishment (chapter 11, Zhao 20.9). Confucius praises Zichan’s diplomatic rhetoric that in effect legitimizes aggression (chapter 12, Xiang 25.10), but he is also suspicious of rhetorical excesses, regarding too many fine phrases in diplomatic negotiations as a mask for ineffectual maneuvering (ZT Xiang 27.4). Even his disciple Zigong’s prescient judgments provoke a rueful comment that Zigong will henceforth indulge in too many words. As expected, Confucius eloquently propounds the proper ritual, as when he castigates the minister Zang Wenzhong for allowing the Lu ruler to 236

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reverse the order of sacrifice (ZT Wen 2.5). He famously remarks: “Ritual objects and names are the only things that cannot be lent to others, for a ruler governs by them” (ZT Cheng 2.3, a similar line appears in chapter 7, Zhao 32.4). In the excerpts below, we see Confucius defending punctilious official duties as well as negotiating the balance between ritual prescriptions and power politics when faced with the Ji lineage’s attempts to diminish the Lu ruling house. His criticism of the Ji lineage is more explicit in the Analects. When Confucius urges that Lu launch a punitive expedition against Qi because the Qi minister Chen Heng assassinated his ruler, moral outrage seems the prime motive. However, cautious assessment of the situation determines his refusal to get involved in contemporary Wei turmoil or to give his opinions directly to the leaders of the Ji lineage in Lu. As commentator, he sometimes lauds expediency, as when he criticizes the Chen minister Xie Ye for his foolhardy and ultimately fatal remonstrance in a corrupt court (chapter 3, Xuan 9.6). Yet he also praises a king for defying death by focusing on the welfare of the state (chapter 8, Ai 6.4). The Annals in the Gongyang and Guliang traditions (the other two extant commentaries on the Annals) ends with the capture of the mythical animal lin, an event also noted in Zuozhuan. The Annals in Zuozhuan ends with the death of Confucius. This means that one strand of the text is interested in asserting the connection between Confucius and the Annals. Two other passages refer to this explicitly; one avers that only a sage could create the subtle and complex Annals (chapter 7, Cheng 14.4), while the other presents Confucius as either editor or exegete who explains why the Zhou king answering the summons of Lord Wen of Jin was presented as undertaking a royal hunt instead (chapter 4, Xi 28.9). But the idea of Confucius pitting textual or moral order against a reality of decline and disorder is not consistently pursued in Zuozhuan. Both as historical actor and commentator, we see Confucius as the cipher for a range of positions. Among other things, he is committed to effective political action, as demonstrated by the meeting at Jiagu. This concern is also evident in the political choices of his most famous disciples, Zilu and Zigong.

Confucius In Lu, the minister Meng Xizi, embarrassed at his own incompetence in rit­ ual performance while attending the Lu ruler on a ceremonial visit to Chu,

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looks forward to the rise of Confucius, who will be famous as a teacher of ritual.

Zhao 7.12 (535 BCE)  In the ninth month, our lord arrived from Chu. Meng Xizi, chagrined that he had been unable to assist in the rituals, now discussed them and practiced them. Any man who had some ability in ritual became part of his entourage. When he was about to die, he summoned his high officers and said, “Ritual propriety is the very trunk of man, for without ritual propriety, one lacks the means to be established. I have heard that there will be an accomplished man named Confucius, a descendant of a sagely line extinguished in Song.1 His ancestor Fufu He, having Song in his possession, bestowed it upon Lord Li. 2 Coming down to the generation of Zheng Kaofu, he assisted Lords Dai, Wu, and Xuan, and with each of his three commissions he became more reverent. 3 Thus, his cauldron inscription says, With the first commission I bent, with the second I stooped, and with the third I bowed low, hurrying along beside the wall. And indeed no one dared insult me. Make porridge in this vessel. Make gruel in this, and with it fill my mouth.

That is how reverent he was. Zang Wuzhong had a saying: ‘If a sage whose virtue is bright does not rule in his own time, then there will certainly be an accomplished man among his descendants.’ Now this will fall to Confucius! If I should succeed in dying a natural death, you must entrust my sons to this man. Make them serve him and study ritual with him so as to establish them firmly in their official ranks.” 1

The narrative here jumps ahead to 518 BCE, the year of Meng Xizi’s death. In that year Confucius would have been about thirty-four. 2 Lord Li ruled Song 859–831 BCE. According to the commentator Du Yu, Fufu He was the son of Lord Min of Song and Lord Li’s older brother. 3 The named lords ruled Song for the first seven decades of the eighth century.

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Thus, Meng Xizi’s sons Meng Yizi and Nangong Jingshu served Confucius as their teacher. Confucius said, “One who can make good his errors is a noble man. As it says in the Odes, The noble man: him you take as a model, him you emulate.

Meng Xizi can be taken as a model for emulation.” Commenting on a Qi episode, Confucius speaks well of a principled punc­ tiliousness in official duties. Mencius (5B.7) later alluded both to the story of the game warden and to Confucius’s comment, stressing the dignity of the virtuous man and his freedom to decide whether he will serve in the court of the lord.

Zhao 20.7 (522 BCE)  In the twelfth month, the Prince of Qi hunted at Pei. When he summoned the game warden to him with a bow, the game warden did not come forward, and the lord had him taken into custody. He offered this justification: “In times past, when our former rulers hunted, they summoned high officers with a flag, summoned officers with a bow, and summoned the game warden with a leather cap. As I did not see the leather cap, I did not dare come forward.” The lord therefore released him. Confucius said, “Keeping to the Way is not as good a thing as keeping to one’s official duties.” The noble man affirmed this to be true. As a result of the struggle of power between Lord Zhao of Lu and the power­ ful Ji lineage in Lu, Lord Zhao dies in exile (chapter 7, Zhao 32.4). Ji Pingzi, the head of the Ji lineages demeans Lord Zhao by creating a partial separa­ tion of Lord Zhao’s tombs from those of his ancestors by interring him south of the tomb road, when tombs of rulers should be located to the north of the road. Confucius seeks to ameliorate the situation.

Ding 1.4 (509 BCE)  In autumn, in the seventh month, on the guisi day (22), we buried Lord Zhao to the south of the tomb road. When Con­ fucius was serving as supervisor of corrections, he had a ditch dug to join it with the other tombs.

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In a famous episode, Confucius shows resolve, cleverness, and ritual expertise while officiating at a meeting between the Lu ruler and the Qi ruler.

Ding 10.2 (500 BCE)  In summer, our lord met with the Prince of Qi at Zhuqi, properly Jiagu. As Confucius was assisting, Wang Meng said to the Prince of Qi, “Confucius understands ritual but lacks valor. If we have Lai men threaten the Prince of Lu with their weapons, we are certain to achieve our aims.”4 The Prince of Qi agreed with this plan. Retreating with our lord, Confucius said, “Men, use your weapons! The two rulers have come together with good cheer, yet captive Yi aliens are using their weapons to disrupt the meeting. This is not how the Prince of Qi should command the princes. Aliens should not plot against the Xia domains, Yi should not disrupt the Hua people, captives should not interfere with covenants, and weapons should not strain good cheer. These things are inauspicious with regard to the spirits, they are failures of propriety with regard to virtue, and they are shortcomings in ritual propriety with regard to other men. You, my lord, must not act in this way.” When the Prince of Qi heard this, he immediately sent the Lai men away. As they were about to swear the covenant, the Qi leaders added ­language to the document: “If the Qi army should go across its frontiers and Lu does not accompany us with three hundred chariots, then let this covenant be our pledge!” Confucius had Zi Wuxuan salute in response and say, “And should you not return our lands north of the Wen River, with which we shall obey your commands, then too let this covenant be our pledge!” The Prince of Qi was going to offer our lord ceremonial toasts. Confu­ cius said to Liangqiu Ju, “How is it that you have not heard of the ancient practice of Qi and Lu? Going on to offer our lord toasts once the ceremony has been completed will overtax the functionaries. What is more, the wine vessels in the shapes of the sacrificial bulls and the elephants do not go out the gates, nor is fine music played in the wilds. To feast with all these items furnished would be to discard ritual propriety. And if all is not furnished, then the implements will be of the meanest sort. With implements of the meanest sort, your ruler will be disgraced. And 4 The Lai men appear to be non-Sinitic Yi survivors of Qi’s conquest of Lai (ZT Xiang 6.7).

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discarding ritual propriety means his reputation will be ruined. Why not reconsider? Ceremonial toasts are for displaying virtue, and if there is no such display, then it would be best to do without.” Therefore, they did not end up having toasts. 5 For a time, Confucius resides in the domain of Wei, but he departs when strife arises among leaders there. A variant of his remark here appears in the Analects (15.1).

Ai 11.6 (484 BCE)  When the Wei minister Kong Yu was preparing to attack Shishu Qi, he consulted with Confucius. Confucius said, “As for matters of the sacrificial vessels, I have studied them; yet of matters of armor and weaponry, I have heard nothing.” He withdrew and gave the command to drive away. He said, “A bird chooses its tree, but how can a tree choose its bird?” Kong Yu hurriedly stopped him and said, “How should I presume to plan private matters? I was trying to forestall troubles in the domain of Wei.” Confucius was going to stop, but the people of Lu summoned him home with gifts, so he went home. As the Lu minister Ji Kangzi changes Lu’s system of taxation, he attempts to consult with Confucius, who refuses to offer his advice. In the parallel to this passage in another early text, Guoyu, Confucius outlines the ancient kings’ taxation system and rejects Ji Kangzi’s innovation as a violation of the norms of the Zhou Duke. In the Analects (11.17), Confucius is much more indignant about Ran Qiu’s role in serving Ji Kangzi and supporting the new taxation.

Ai 11.7 (484 BCE)  Ji Kangzi, who wanted to set military requisitions according to land holdings, had Ran Qiu consult about it with Confucius. Confucius said, “I do not know.” Three times Ran Qiu put the question and finally said, “You, sir, are an elder of the domain, and I am waiting upon you before I act. What am I to do when you do not speak?” Confucius did not answer publicly, but in private said to Ran Qiu, “The conduct of the noble man takes its measure from ritual propriety. 5

Confucius seems to suspect that the Qi ruler is planning some deception and therefore refuses toasts on the ground of ritual requirements.

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In giving he tends to liberality, in undertaking affairs he upholds moderation, and in collecting taxes he aims for restraint. If one can do this, then to requisition by districts is surely satisfactory. If one does not take one’s measure from ritual propriety but covets without satiety, then even if one taxes according to landholdings, it will still not be satisfactory. What is more, if the nobleman Ji Kangzi wishes to act in accordance with standards, then the statutes of the Zhou Duke are at hand. If he ­prefers to be careless in his actions, then why consult with me?” He was not heeded. On the death of Meng Zi, the wife of Lord Zhao, the former Lu ruler who died in exile (chapter 7, Zhao 31.2, 32.4), some reflections are presented on the lan­ guage of the Annals and on ritual protocol. Zuozhuan tries to explain the line “Meng Zi died” in the Annals: Why avoid mention of her status and true clan name? Note that in Zuozhuan, Confucius is less strident in his criticism of the Ji lineage than he is in the Analects. Here Confucius’s removal of his hempen mourning cap seems to be a gesture of ritual accommodation.

Ai 12.2 (483 BCE)  In summer, in the fifth month, Meng Zi, wife of Lord Zhao, died. Lord Zhao had married a woman of Wu, so her clan name is not written.6 When she died, no notice of her death was sent, so she was not called “wife.” There was no wailing upon return from her funeral, so it does not say in the Annals, “we buried the wife of the former ruler.” Confucius took part in the condolences and visited Ji Kangzi. Ji Kangzi did not wear a mourning cowl, so Confucius removed his hempen cap and sash and bowed. Confucius identifies the lin, a strange beast captured on the hunt. Although in Zuozhuan the story may be presented merely as an example of Confucius’s broad learning, great significance has been attached to this event, starting with the Gongyang commentary on the Annals. The capture of the lin is variously linked to Confucius’s sagehood, his great destiny as an “uncrowned king,” his fate of not being recognized in his lifetime, and his authorship of the Annals. 6 The Lu and Wu ruling lines shared the Zhou clan name, Ji, and were thus ritually forbidden to intermarry. Meng Zi was not the mother of Lord Ai, and tensions between the Lu ruling house and the Ji lineage remained high. These factors, more than Meng Zi’s clan name, might have kept Lu from reporting her death correctly.

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Even in later periods, the capture of a lin is often taken as miraculous and prophetic. The creature was said to have a deer’s body but a tail like a cow’s, hooves like a horse’s, and a single horn.

Ai 14.1 (481 BCE)  In the fourteenth year, in spring, there was hunting to the west, in the great wilds, and Zichu Shang, driver for the Shusun lineage, captured a lin. Considering it inauspicious, he bestowed it upon the game warden. Confucius examined it and said, “It is a lin.” Only afterward would the game warden take it. The Annals states: “Qi leaders assassinated their ruler Ren in Shuzhou.” Zuozhuan specifies Chen Heng’s role in the murder, and Confucius begs in vain for a Lu punitive expedition. At this point, Confucius holds no office but feels compelled to speak because of his former position. In the Analects (14.21), Confucius makes this request first to the ruler and then to the Ji, Meng, and Shusun lineages. Two years later, Confucius dies.

Ai 14.5 (481 BCE)  In the sixth month, on the jiawu day (5), Chen Heng of Qi assassinated his ruler Ren in Shuzhou. Confucius fasted for three days and three times requested that Qi be attacked. Our lord said, “Lu has been weaker than Qi for a long time. Now you propose to attack them, but how can it be done?” He replied, “Now that Chen Heng has killed his ruler, a full half of the people do not side with him. If we add Lu’s multitude to half of Qi, then we can prevail.” Our lord said, “Tell it to the Ji lineage.” Confucius took his leave, withdrew, and told others, “It was because I once followed after the high officers that I did not dare not to speak.”

Zi lu Zilu appears in numerous passages in the Analects, where he shows a marked interest in the practical problems of governing and sometimes disagrees with Confucius. In the following passage, acting as deputy of the Ji lineage head, he tries to rein in the power of lineage stewards and disaffected noblemen by razing the walls of Bi, Hou, and Cheng, where the lineage stewards of the Ji, Meng, and Shusun lineages have their strongholds. In the triangulated power

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struggles involving the Lu ruler, the lineage heads, and the lineage stewards, Lord Ding seems to side with the Ji lineage head, while the Meng lineage head decides to make common cause with his lineage steward. In the Analects, Confucius is said to have been tempted to support the rebellious Ji steward Gongshan Buniu (called Gongshan Furao in the Analects) in the hope of finding a context to realize his political ideals.

Ding 12.2 (498 BCE)  As steward for the Ji lineage, Zilu was going to raze the walls of the three main cities, and it was at this point that Shusun Zhouchou razed the walls of Hou. When the Ji lineage was preparing to raze the walls of Bi, Gongshan Buniu and Shusun Zhe led the men of Bi in a surprise attack on Lu. Our lord and the three noblemen entered the palace of the Ji lineage and ascended Ji Wuzi’s terrace. The men of Bi attacked them but did not prevail. When they had advanced to the proximity of our lord, Confucius ordered Shen Quxu and Yue Qi to go down and charge at them. The men of Bi were duly routed, and the inhabitants of the Lu capital pursued them and defeated them at Gumie. Gongshan Buniu and Shusun Zhe fled to Qi, and Bi’s walls were then razed. As they were about to raze the walls of Cheng, Gonglian Yang said to Meng Yizi, “If you raze the walls of Cheng, the Qi forces are sure to arrive at Lu’s northern gate. What is more, Cheng is the fortress of the Meng lineage. If there is no Cheng, there is no Meng lineage. You pretend not to know, and I will not raze the walls.” In winter, our lord laid siege to Cheng but did not reduce it. Displaying a fastidiousness that characterizes several of Confucius’s disci­ ples, Zilu refuses to broker an informal agreement with an exile from Lesser Zhu. Exiles who seek accommodation by bringing land or ritual vessels from the domains they flee are often said to be a corrupting influence (chapter 6, Huan 2.2).

Ai 14.2 (481 BCE)  Yi of Lesser Zhu, bringing Gouyi with him, came in flight. He said, “If you appoint Zilu to make an agreement with us, then we will have no need for a covenant.” They appointed Zilu, but Zilu declined. Ji Kangzi had Ran Qiu say to Zilu, “Though we have a domain of a thousand chariots, Yi does not put faith in a covenant with us, but he does put faith in your word. What disgrace is there for you in

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this?” He replied, “If Lu had to go to war with Lesser Zhu, it would be right to die below the city walls without presuming to ask the reason why. But to act as guarantor for his words when he has not acted well as a subject would make him seem dutiful, and that I am unable to do.” Zilu intercedes with Chen Guan, the elder brother of Chen Heng, to ask that Qi treat Lu well, and Qi-Lu relations improve. Recall that a year earlier, Con­ fucius requested the punishment of Chen Heng for his assassination of the Qi ruler.

Ai 15.3 (480 BCE)  In autumn, Chen Guan of Qi went to Chu. As he passed through Wei, Zilu met with him and said, “It may be that Heaven is using the Chen lineage as an ax, and that once they have cut down the lord’s house, someone else will gain possession of it. It is impossible to know. Or it may allow the Chen lineage to enjoy it in the end. That too is impossible to know. Would it not be permissible to treat Lu well while awaiting the fullness of time? Why must you treat Lu poorly?” Chen Guan said, “It is so. I have received my command. Have someone sent to report this to my younger brother, Chen Heng.” Zilu serves Kong Kui in Wei. Kong Kui is the nephew of one Wei ruler (Kuai­ kui or Lord Zhuang, r. 481–478 BCE) and the cousin of another (the Ousted Lord, r. 492–481, 476–470 BCE). At one point, Kuaikui returns from exile and kidnaps Kong Kui in a successful bid to replace his own son, the Ousted Lord. Rushing to Kong Kui’s defense, Zilu is killed, but not before securing his cap and maintaining proper ritual to the end.

Ai 15.5 (480 BCE)  When Zilu was on his way to enter the Wei capital, he met Gao Chai, who was about to flee the domain.7 Gao Chai said, “The gate is already closed.” Zilu said, “I will go there, if only for a short while.” Gao Chai said, “You will not get there in time. Do not walk into Kong’s troubles.” Zilu said, “I gained my sustenance from him. I will not shun him in his time of troubles.” Gao Chai then departed, while Zilu entered the city.

7 Gao Chai is also a disciple of Confucius.

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When Zilu reached the gate of the Kong compound, Gongsun Gan, who was standing guard there, said, “There is nothing to be accomplished by entering.” Zilu said, “This is Gongsun. He sought benefits from Kong, yet he has abandoned him in his time of troubles. I am not like that. Once I have had the benefit of gifts from him, I will unfailingly come to his aid in his time of trouble.” By coincidence, a messenger then exited the gate, so he slipped through and said, “What use will Kuaikui make of Kong Kui? Even if he should kill him, there will certainly be someone to succeed him.” He also said, “Kuaikui has no courage. If we set fire to the terrace, when it is half engulfed, he is bound to set Kong Kui free.” Hearing of this, Kuaikui was afraid and sent down Shi Qi and Yu Yan to confront Zilu. They struck him with a dagger-ax and severed his cap string. Zilu said, “When the noble man dies, he does not remove his cap.” Tying up the cap string, he died. When Confucius heard of the turmoil in Wei, he said, “Gao Chai will come out. But as for Zilu, he is dead already.”

Zigong Zigong is famous for his rhetorical skills. We have already seen his brilliance as a diplomatic orator (chapter 12, Ai 7.3, Ai 12.3, Ai 15.4). In the following passage, he makes an accurate prediction based on two rulers’ failure to fulfill ritual protocol. Instead of praising him for his prescience, Confucius ruefully remarks on his propensity to indulge in words.

Ding 15.1 (495 BCE)  In the fifteenth year, in spring, Lord Yin of Zhu came to court. Zigong observed the ritual. The Master of Zhu held the jade high while looking upward. Our lord received the jade low while looking downward. Zigong said, “Observed from the perspective of ritual propriety, both rulers have death or exile in store for them. Ritual propriety is the very armature of death and life, survival and failure. Anyone who moves left or right, turns, advances or withdraws, or looks down or up must draw on this; anyone who pays court, sacrifices, mourns, or goes to war must observe this. Now in the first month they shared a court visit, yet both fell short of standards: in their hearts they had already failed. When in a celebratory affair they do not adhere to this armature called ritual, how can they last long? One raised the jade high

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and looked upward; he is arrogant. One kept it low and looked downward; he is to be replaced. Arrogance is akin to insubordination, and being replaced is akin to affliction. Our ruler is the host; he will be the first to die.” Ding 15.3 (495 BCE)  In summer, in the fifth month, on the renshen day (22), our lord expired. Confucius said, “Unfortunately, Zigong hit the mark in what he said; this will make Zigong a man who always has much to say.” The death of Confucius is announced in the final entry of the version of the Annals attached to Zuozhuan. After the death of Confucius, the ruler of Lu commits a ritual error by eulogizing him inappropriately, prompting a prediction from Zigong, which is fulfilled eleven years later when Lord Ai goes into exile.

Ai 16.3 (479 BCE)  In summer, in the fourth month, on the jichou day (11), Confucius died. Our lord eulogized him, 8 saying, High Heaven, unkind, Does not spare me one elderly man, To aid and hedge me, the lone man, as I stand in my place. Forlorn am I in my deficiency. Alas and woe for Father Ni!9 I lack the wherewithal to regulate myself.

Zigong said, “The ruler will not die in Lu! As the saying of the master goes, ‘When ritual propriety is lost, one is benighted; when naming is lost, one is errant.’ To lose one’s proper aims is to be benighted; to lose one’s place is to be errant. That the Lord of Lu would not employ him when he was alive but eulogizes him when he has died is contrary to ritual propriety. That he calls himself ‘the lone man’ is contrary to proper naming.10 The ruler has failed on both counts.”

8 The first, second, and fourth lines of the eulogy echoes three lines from the Odes. 9 Father Ni is derived from Confucius’s style name, Zhongni. 10 Only the Zhou king could refer to himself as “the lone man.”

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Chapter 14

Dreams and Anomalies

In th e fina l t wo sections, w e t u r n from issu e s of political governance and ritual behavior to concerns about margins—those of human experience and those defining cultural otherness. Several centuries after Zuozhuan must have taken form, the philosopher Wang Chong (27–100 CE) in his Balanced Discourses (Lunheng) commended it for “being close to getting at actual facts,” but then went on to voice a concern: “But Zuo is to some extent at odds with Confucius’s reluctance to discuss anomalies and violence.”1 This criticism rings through the centuries. However, the greatness of Zuozhuan, as we have noted earlier, lies partly in its resistance to simple formulations, whether Confucian or any other, and few topics demonstrate this feature of the text more strikingly than those under consideration in this section. What is at stake in many of these narratives is the extent to which a human world based upon consciously constructed political and ritual order can accommodate an unpredictable numinous realm or, in the case of dreams, a realm quite beyond obvious human control. As was the case with other ancient civilizations, dreams in early China were often thought to predict the future, sometimes with almost as much precision as the biblical dreams of Joseph. Dreams in Zuozhuan typically require interpretation, which can occasionally appear arbitrary or even starkly manipulative. Perhaps the best example of this is the terrifying dream of Lord Wen of Jin on the eve of the battle of Chengpu (chapter 4, Xi 28.3); it seems to portend Jin’s defeat but is recast by his loyal follower Hu Yan as a sign of impending military victory. Also, dreams can be so misleading that one is better off simply ignoring them in favor of mundane realities that one 1

Wang Chong, ed. Huang Hui, Lunheng jiaoshi (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1990), 83.1164. Cf. the Analects (7.21). 248

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can to some extent regulate. Perhaps sheer fascination accounts for the inclusion of stories like that of Lord Jing of Jin’s death below. It contains three dreams, and while it is a cautionary tale, to be sure, those dreams are so lively and, in the third instance, so darkly humorous that we cannot avoid the suspicion that early readers, like us, found this story and many others like it highly entertaining. Anomalies abound in Zuozhuan. We are told quite casually that “a spirit descended in Shen” (Zhuang 32.3); the ghost of the deceased Shensheng hitched a ride with his former chariot driver to deliver a doleful message of revenge (chapter 2, Xi 10.3); a huge wounded boar “stood up like a man and cried out” (Zhuang 8.3); “a stone spoke” (Zhao 8.1); “six fishhawks f lew backwards across the Song capital” (Xi 16.1); and snakes “fought within the southern gate of Zheng” (Zhuang 14.2). Yet in each case, an attempt is made to recuperate some human significance or meaning from these bizarre events. This section ends with two stories of dragons. The knowledgeable minister Zichan tells us to ignore dragons, since they ignore us, while Scribe Mo explains why we do not see dragons nowadays. In neither case, however, is it suggested that dragons do not exist. This should remind us that belief and skepticism in every culture have particular parameters. The aforementioned Wang Chong, regarded as one of traditional China’s most ardent skeptics, once turned his critical mind to the question of whether the Yellow Emperor really could have ascended to Heaven on the back of a dragon, as some legends report. Impossible. “Dragons arise on clouds and rain,” Wang Chong said. “And when the clouds disperse and the rains cease, they descend and enter the watery depths. Had the Yellow Emperor ridden astride a dragon, he would have drowned in the watery deep.”2 Even he did not argue that dragons do not in fact exist, only that they are, much as Scribe Mo argues in the Zuozhuan passage below, basically water creatures and so can only soar into the skies under strictly limited circumstances!

M isl e a ding Dr e a ms The two accounts below, like those of Chong’er’s dream (chapter 4, Xi 28.3) and Shusun Bao’s dream (chapter 2, Zhao 4.8), show how problematic it might be to ascertain the meaning of a dream. In the first case, the Jin dignitary

2 Wang Chong, ed. Huang Hui, Lunheng jiaoshi, 24.315.

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Zhao Yingqi, who had been exiled to Qi by his brothers because of his adul­ terous affair with his niece, receives false assurance in a dream.

Cheng 5.1 (586 BCE)  In the fifth year, in spring, Zhao Tong and Zhao Kuo banished Yingqi to Qi. Zhao Yingqi said, “It is because I am here that the Luan lineage does not stir up any trouble. If I am exiled, my two older brothers will have cause for concern!3 Moreover, each person has what he can and cannot do. What harm would it do to let me off?”4 They did not heed him. Zhao Yingqi dreamed that a messenger from Heaven said to him, “Offer sacrifice to me, and I will confer blessings on you.” He sent someone to Shi Wozhuo to inquire about it. Shi Wozhuo said, “I do not know.” Afterward, however, Shi Wozhuo told the man, “The gods confer blessings on the noble in spirit and inflict calamities on the licentious. To be licentious and escape punishment is already a blessing. If he offers sacrifices, how can he not die?” Yingqi offered sacrifices, and the following day he died. The Lu minister Zishu Shengbo fears that his dream portends death because agate pieces are put in the mouths of the dead. After three years during which the number of his followers grew, he apparently assumes the agate pieces sym­ bolize his supporters. The moment he is confident of his interpretation, how­ ever, destiny mocks him.

Cheng 17.8 (574 BCE)  Zishu Shengbo once dreamed of wading across the Huan River. Someone gave him agate pieces to eat. He wept, and his tears became agate pieces that filled his arms. Following these events he sang this song: I crossed the Huan River, And someone gave me agate pieces.

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Good cause for concern, as it turned out, for three years later, the Lord of Jin eliminated almost the entire Zhao lineage. 4 Zhao Yingqi is arguing that if he is exiled, Luan Shu, commander of the central army in Jin, and his kinsmen will rise up against the Zhao lineage. While he cannot adhere to the rules of proper sexual conduct, he is capable of stopping the Luan lineage from destroying the Zhao lineage.

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Return! Return! Agate pieces filled my arms!

He was fearful and did not dare to prognosticate about the dream’s meaning. Returning from Zheng, he reached Lishen on the renshen day and sought prognostication about the dream, saying, “It was because I feared death that I dared not seek prognostication. Now that a growing multitude of people have been following me for three years, there is no harm in prognostication.” He spoke about his dream and died by the evening.

V engefu l Ghosts When the ghost of the Zheng noble Liang Xiao haunts Zheng after his violent death (chapter 11, Xiang 30.10), Zichan remarks, “When ghosts have hosts, they do not become vengeful ghosts” (ZT Zhao 7.9), implying a ritual solution to an objective phenomenon. But the stories of vengeance here raise the question of whether the guilty person’s bad end is inflicted by a ghost or is only an imagined product of guilt and therefore not revenge in the strictest sense. In the first story, Gongzi Pengsheng, who killed Lord Huan of Lu (r. 711–694 BCE) at the behest of Lord Xiang of Qi (r. 698–686 BCE) so that the l­ atter could freely pursue his incestuous relationship with his sisterlover (chapter 2, Huan 18.1) and was later executed as the scapegoat, seems to return as a ghost.

Zhua ng 8.3 (686 BCE)  The Prince of Qi, Lord Xiang, sent Lian Cheng and Guan Zhifu to garrison Kuiqiu. They left during the melon season, and the prince said, “When the melons are ripe again, I will send replacements for you.” But they were garrisoned for a full year and no messages from the lord came to them. They asked to be replaced, but he would not allow it. That was why they plotted to raise a rebellion. A younger full brother of Lord Xi of Qi named Yi Zhongnian had fathered Gongsun Wuzhi. The latter had won Lord Xi’s favor; his clothing, ritual, and rank were comparable to those of the then heir apparent, the later Lord Xiang. Lord Xiang stripped him of his privileges. Espousing Gongsun Wuzhi’s cause, Lian Cheng and Guan Zhifu raised a rebellion. Lian Cheng had a cousin in the lord’s harem, but she had not enjoyed the lord’s

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favor. The conspirators enlisted her to spy on the lord, saying, “If we triumph, we will make you Gongsun Wuzhi’s wife.” In winter, in the twelfth month, the Prince of Qi traveled to Gufen and then hunted at Beiqiu. They saw a huge boar, and a member of his entourage said, “It is Gongzi Pengsheng.” Enraged, the lord said, “Pengsheng dares to show himself!” He shot it, and the boar stood up like a man and cried out. The lord was terrified and fell from his chariot, injuring his foot and losing a shoe. After the lord returned to the palace, he demanded the shoe from Eunuch Bi. When Bi could not find it, he whipped him, drawing blood. As Bi ran from the palace, he met the ­rebels at the gate. They seized and bound him. Bi said, “Why would I stop you?” When he pulled down his robe and showed them his back, they trusted him. He asked to enter the palace first. After hiding his lord, he came back out, and fought against the rebels, dying in the gateway. Shi Zhifenru died at the foot of the stairs. The rebels then entered and killed Mengyang in the lord’s bed. 5 Someone said, “He is not the ruler; he does not resemble him.” Catching sight of the lord’s feet from beneath a door, they assassinated him and established Gongsun Wuzhi as ruler. (Qi leaders put Gongsun Wuzhi to death the following year. Lord Huan became the next Qi ruler.) Do dreams define a numinous space that vengeful ghosts can haunt, or do they simply channel the dreamer’s own feelings of guilt? In the following story, the Prince of Jin did indeed eradicate much of the Zhao lineage, just as Zhao Yingqi feared in the passage above, and he now pays for his violence. The vengeful ghost, presumably an ancestor of the Zhao lineage, demands retribution. But the dream world portrayed in this passage expands well beyond the q­ uestion of vengeance and becomes one of the most vivid short narratives in Zuozhuan.

Cheng 10.4 (581 BCE)  The Prince of Jin dreamed of a huge vengeful ghost with disheveled hair hanging to the ground. It beat its chest, leapt up and down, and said, “For you to murder my descendants was unjust. I have the high god’s approval of my request for revenge!” It smashed the main gate and the door to his private quarters and made its entry. 5

Little is known of these two stalwart defenders of Lord Xiang. The latter, Mengyang, was presumably masquerading as the lord.

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Terrified, the lord entered the inner chamber, and the ghost smashed that door also. The lord woke up and summoned the shaman of Mulberry Fields. What the shaman described corresponded exactly to the dream. The lord said, “What then?” He replied, “You will not eat the grain of the new harvest!” The lord fell seriously ill and sought a physician from Qin. The Liege of Qin sent a physician named Huan to treat him. Before he arrived, the lord dreamed that his illness assumed the form of two boys, who said, “He is a skilled physician. I fear he will harm us. Where can we escape?” One of them said, “If we lodge above the diaphragm and below the heart, then what can he do to us?” The physician arrived and said, “There is nothing to be done about the illness. It is above the diaphragm and below the heart, where it can neither be overcome with heat treatment nor reached through acupuncture. Medicine will not get to it. There is nothing to be done.” The lord said, “He is a good physician.” He gave him handsome gifts and sent him back. In the sixth month, on the bingwu day (6), the Prince of Jin wanted to taste the new grain. He had the official in charge of sacrificial grains present it and the cook prepare it. He summoned the shaman of Mulberry Fields, showed him the new grain, and had him killed. When he was about to eat, he became bloated, went to the privy, fell in, and died. A eunuch had dreamed in the morning of ascending to Heaven with the lord on his back. By midday, he was carrying the Prince of Jin out of the privy. And then he was killed to attend his lord after death. The Jin commander Zhonghang Yan had assassinated his ruler, Lord Li (r. 580–574 BCE), eighteen years earlier in the violent aftermath of the battle of Yanling (chapter 5, Cheng 16.5), and now has a bizarre dream in which he is “decapitated” for his crime. A shaman declares that the dream portends Yan’s death. Yan accepts his fate and focuses on his duty. Despite his commend­ able loyalty to Jin, Yan dies the following year in a fashion that strangely does involve his head.

Xia ng 18.3 (555 BCE)  In autumn, the Prince of Qi attacked our northern marches. Zhonghang Yan was planning to attack Qi when he dreamed of disputing a legal case with Lord Li. He did not win. The lord struck him with a dagger-ax, and his head fell down in front of him. He knelt down and put it back on. While running and holding onto his head,

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he saw Shaman Gao of Gengyang. A few days after this dream, he did see Shaman Gao on the road. He spoke to Gao, and it turned out they had had the same dream. The shaman said, “This year you, master, will certainly die. Should you have affairs in the east, 6 your ambition will be fulfilled.” Zhonghang Yan assented. The Prince of Jin attacked Qi and was about to cross the Yellow River when Zhonghang Yan tied two pairs of jade pieces with red silk threads and prayed, “Huan, relying on the strategic advantages of his lands and trusting in his multitudes, has cast aside good relations, turned against the covenant, and treated cruelly the masters of the spirits.7 The servant of your servant, Biao, 8 intends to lead the princes to chastise him, and it is I, Yan, his royally appointed subject, who will go before or behind him to offer assistance. If we are victorious and achieve merit and bring no disgrace to you gods, then I, Yan, the ­royally appointed subject, will not dare to presume to cross the Yellow River again.9 Only you gods will decide in this case.” He let the jade pieces sink into the Yellow River and then crossed. Xia ng 19.1 (554 BCE)  Zhonghang Yan was suffering from a tumor, which grew and ulcerated on his head. By the time he crossed the Yellow River and reached Zhuyong, he had become seriously ill, and his eyes were protruding. The high officers who had returned to Jin earlier all came back. Fan Gai requested to have an audience with him, but Zhonghang Yan refused to admit him. Fan Gai sent someone to ask who should succeed him, and he said, “My son Wu born of the woman from Zheng.” In the second month, on the jiayin day (19), he died, but his eyes were still open and staring, and his mouth could not be made to hold anything.10 Fan Gai went through the ablutions and then stroked his corpse, saying, “Dare I serve your son, Wu, in any way less than I serve you, master!” But he was still staring and they were unable to close his eyes. Luan Ying said, “Is it because he had not completed his undertaking against Qi?” He thus again stroked his corpse and said, “If, after the master dies,

6 This is a reference to the military expeditions against Qi, which was to the east of Jin. 7 Huan is the given name of Lord Ling of Qi. The people are identified as “the masters of the spirits” (ZT Huan 6.2, Xi 19.3). 8 Biao is the given name of Lord Ping of Jin. 9 Zhonghang Yan believes Shaman Gao’s interpretation of his dream and does not presume to pray for his own deliverance. Instead, he prays only for Jin victory. 10 It was customary to put pearls, jade, shells, grains, or rice in the mouth of the deceased.

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I do not continue your undertaking against Qi, let the Yellow River bear witness against me!” Zhonghang Yan’s eyes thus closed and he received the jade to be put in his mouth. Fan Gai came out and said, “I with my shallow understanding took him to be a lesser man.”11 Kuaikui returns from exile and deposes his own son, the Ousted Lord, through the help of his sister Kong Ji and her lover Hun Liangfu, a servant of Kong Ji’s son Kong Kui (chapter 13, Ai 15.5). Lord Zhuang promises Hun Liangfu immunity and high honors, but he later tricks him and puts him to death. A dream of the executed Hun Liangfu troubles Lord Zhuang of Wei and presages further unrest. The lord then conducts divination with oracle bones and receives a puzzling answer that will subsequently be shown to pre­ figure the final hours of his life.

Ai 17.5 (478 BCE)  Lord Zhuang, the Prince of Wei, had a dream in the northern palace. He saw a man climbing the Kunwu Tower in the capital, where, with his hair hanging free, he faced north and shouted, I climb this, the barrow of Kunwu, Where with long tendrils the gourd vines grow.12 I am Hun Liangfu, And I cry to Heaven that I am blameless.

The lord personally divined about the dream with milfoil stalks. Interpreting the results, the divination scribe Xumi She said, “The dream will do no harm.” The lord gave him a settlement, but once he had been installed, he absconded and fled to Song. The Prince of Wei then consulted the spirits by means of divination with oracle bones, and the divination verse said, Like a fish ruddy of tail That cuts across the current but hesitates there. Lying on the borders of great domains, 11 Fan Gai regrets that he tried to appeal to Zhonghang Yan’s self-interest, thereby underestimating him and showing his own limited understanding. 12 The growth of gourd vines here and elsewhere is a figure for the early flourishing of the Zhou people.

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When it is extinguished it will disappear. When the gates are closed and the holes blocked up, He climbs out from the back.13

In winter, in the tenth month, Jin again attacked Wei. It breached the outer walls and was about to enter the city itself. The Jin commander Zhao Yang said, “Halt. As the saying of Shuxiang has it, ‘Those who take advantage of disorder to extinguish a domain will have no descendants.’” The Wei people ousted Lord Zhuang and made peace with Jin. Jin established Gongsun Banshi, a grandson of Lord Xiang, in power before turning back. In the eleventh month, the Prince of Wei entered the domain from Juan, and Gongsun Banshi departed. Earlier, the lord had climbed the city wall to look out into the distance. Catching sight of the Rong hamlet, he asked about it and was given a report. The lord said, “We are of the royal Ji clan. How is it that we have the Rong here?” He had the hamlet razed. The lord had employed his artisans for too long without rest. He wished to expel Shi Pu but had not gotten to it when the troubles began. On the xinsi day (12), Shi Pu attacked the lord of Wei with the help of the artisans. Closing his gates, the lord made a plea, but it was not granted. While crossing the wall to the north, he fell and broke his femur.14 People from the Rong hamlet attacked him. The heir apparent, Ji, and Gongzi Qing, his younger brother, had crossed over the wall after the lord, and the people from the Rong hamlet killed them both. The lord then entered the home of the Jĭ lineage in the Rong hamlet. Earlier, from atop the city wall, the lord had seen what beautiful hair the wife of the Jĭ lineage head had, and so he had ordered it sheared to make a wig for his wife Lü Jiang. Once he had entered the Jĭ house, he showed them a jade disk and said, “If you save my life, I will give you this disk.” The Jĭ men said, “And what happens to the disk if we kill you?” So they killed him and took his disk. The men of Wei recalled Gongsun Banshi and set him up as lord. In the twelfth month, the men of Qi

13 The fish represents the Wei ruler himself. The ruddiness of the fish’s tail, an image found elsewhere, may signify that the ruler is exhausted or fattened from the excesses of his rule. Its hesitation symbolizes the unsettled nature of Lord Zhuang’s rule. Wei is positioned between the great domains of Jin and Qi. The last two lines prefigure Lord Zhuang’s ignominious end. 14 The north would have been the back of the palace, as predicted in the divination verse.

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attacked Wei. When the men of Wei requested peace, Qi set up Gongzi Qi as lord, made Gongsun Banshi their prisoner, and returned, lodging him at Lù, just outside the Qi capital.

Inter pr etation of A nom a li e s Droughts, floods, eclipses, or comets are regarded as “anomalous” and call for propitiatory sacrifices or the ruler’s vigilant examination of governance. Sometimes evaluation of the human response draws attention to political dis­ order. The following four passages concern anomalies and efforts, sometimes oblique, to interpret them so as to derive political lessons. In the first, Lord Li (r. 700–697, 680–673 BCE) had fled Zheng seventeen years earlier (chapter 3, Huan 15.2; chapter 15, Yin 9.6 as Gongzi Tu) and now returns to depose his nephew Ziyi. The fight between snakes is interpreted as an omen of interne­ cine power struggles, but again the primacy of the people is asserted.

Zhua ng 14.2 (680 BCE)  Lord Li of Zheng set out from Li to invade Zheng. When he reached Daling, he captured Fu Xia. Fu Xia said, “If only you were to release me, then I would ask to install you in power in Zheng, my lord.” Lord Li swore a covenant with him and then freed him. In the sixth month, on the jiazi day (20), Fu Xia killed Ziyi, the Master of Zheng, and his two sons and installed Lord Li in power. Earlier, a snake from inside the city and a snake from outside had fought within the southern gate of Zheng. The snake from inside the city died. Six years passed and Lord Li entered Zheng. When our lord heard about the snakes, he asked Shen Xu, “Could it be that bad omens exist?” Shen Xu responded, “When a man resents something, his life force flares up and seizes upon it. Bad omens arise from people. When there are no rifts among people, such omens will not arise on their own. When people reject the constant principles, bad omens arise. And that is why there are bad omens.” A scribe attaches pragmatic moral and political significance to the appear­ ance of a spirit by considering the human context, while the Duke of Guo is condemned for excessive credulity. This passage, like Gong Zhiqi’s speech (chapter 7, Xi 5.8), predicts the destruction of the domain of Guo, which will occur seven years later.

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Zhua ng 32.3 (662 BCE)  In autumn, in the seventh month, there was a spirit that descended at Shen. King Hui asked the royal court scribe Guò, “What is the reason for this?” He responded, “When a domain is about to prosper, radiant spirits descend there and inspect its virtue. When it is about to fall, spirits also descend there to observe its offenses. That is why there are cases in which a domain has received a spirit and prospered, and also cases in which it has fallen. Such things occurred during the Yu, Xia, Shang, and Zhou periods.” The king asked, “What should I do about it?” He replied, “Use the appropriate objects in making offerings to the spirit. These ought to be the objects corresponding to the day of its arrival.”15 The king followed this. The court scribe Guò traveled to Shen and heard that the Duke of Guo had asked for the spirit’s commands. He returned to the king and said, “Guo is certain to perish. Their ruler is cruel and heeds spirits.” The spirit dwelled in Shen for six months. The Duke of Guo had the invocator Ying, the ancestral attendant Qu, and the scribe Yin make offerings to it. The spirit granted lands to the domain of Guo. The scribe Yin said, “Surely Guo will perish! I have heard that when a domain is about to prosper, it heeds the people, but when it is about to perish, it heeds the spirits. Spirits are keen of ear and eye, upright, straightforward, and constant: they act according to the conduct of the supplicant. The domain of Guo in many cases has shown little enough virtue. What lands will it be able to obtain?” The record of five stones falling from the sky and six fishhawks flying backward in Song is drawn from the Annals. A court scribe here offers correct predictions but also denies the legitimacy of inquiring into the meaning of apparent omens because “auspiciousness and inauspiciousness arise from humans.” In fact, both this passage and the passages below uphold the primacy of the human realm.

Xi 16.1 (644 BCE)  In the sixteenth year, in spring, stones fell from the sky in Song, five in number; they were meteorites. Six fishhawks flew backward across the Song capital; this was because of the wind.16 Shu­ xing, the court scribe of Zhou, made an official visit to Song, and Lord 15 There was a set order of sacrifices to various spirits. Since this spirit had appeared unexpectedly, one could only determine the appropriate offerings by reference to the day on which it had appeared. 16 Note that the comments here try to rationalize apparently anomalous events.

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Xiang of Song asked him about these events: “What do these portend? Where will the auspicious and the inauspicious events occur?” He responded, “This year Lu will have many important funerals. Next year there will be a rebellion in Qi. You, my lord, will win the support of the princes, but it will not last to the end.” He withdrew from the audience and told other people, “The ruler asked about the wrong things. These are matters of yin and yang and not matters in which one can locate the auspicious or the inauspicious. Auspiciousness and inauspiciousness arise from humans. The reason I answered as I did is because I did not presume to contradict the ruler.” The Jin music master Kuang, famed for his wisdom (chapter 8, Xiang 14.6), cunningly interprets an omen as a sign of popular resentment over a costly construction project.

Zhao 8.1 (534 BCE)  In the eighth year, in spring, a stone spoke in Weiyu, in Jin. The Prince of Jin asked the music master Kuang, “For what reason did the stone speak?” He answered, “Stones cannot speak. They may be possessed by something, or if not, then the people may have misheard something. Yet as the saying goes, ‘When a person is not timely in attending to his affairs, grudges and enmities stir among the people, and mute things speak.’ At present your palace is lofty and extravagant, but the strength of the people is depleted. Grudges and enmity arise together, and no one can protect his livelihood. Is it not appropriate that a stone should speak?” The Prince of Jin was building the Siqi Palace at this time. Shuxiang said, “What a noble man the music master Kuang was in his speech! The words of the noble man are true and they reflect the evidence. Thus, enmity stays far from his person. The words of the petty man are presumptuous and they lack proof, so resentment and blame overtake him. As it says in the Odes, Sad it is not to be able to speak well: From the tongue poor speech comes forth, But it’s the body it harms. Fine it is to be able to speak well: Clever words flow in a stream, Letting the body rest at its ease.

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It is referring to speech of this kind. When this palace is completed, the princes are certain to turn against us, and our lord is sure to be blamed. This fine man knows it already.” Two passages concerning dragons follow. In the first, the Zheng minister Zichan displays his fundamentally pragmatic approach to policy (chapter 11). Here he refuses to take special religious measures in response to the appearance of dragons outside the Zheng capital, just as he rejects special sacrifices when a fire is predicted (chapter 11, Zhao 18.3). Alongside such ­skepticism, we see Zichan demonstrating his esoteric knowledge, as when he correctly interprets a Jin ruler’s dream of a tawny bear (ZT Zhao 7.7).

Zhao 19.10 (523 BCE)  There was a great flood in Zheng, and dragons fought in the Wei pool outside the southern gate of the capital. The inhabitants of the capital asked permission to perform an expiatory sacrifice to them. Zichan would not permit it, saying, “When we fight, dragons take no notice of us, so why should we for our part take notice when dragons fight? You might exorcise them, but then the water is their home. We have nothing to ask of dragons, and dragons likewise have nothing to ask of us.” They therefore gave up the idea. The appearance of a dragon in the Jin capital prompts a long discourse from the scribe Mo of Cai on the history of dragons’ interactions with Chinese ­ruling courts, along with an account of several official sacrifices. Like other scribes, Mo of Cai is represented as a master of ancient and recondite lore, including knowledge of the references to dragons in the Zhou Changes and theories on the workings of nature’s five resources. The mention of Liu Lei here is used to support the Han dynasty theory that Han emperors were descendants of the legendary King Yao.

Zhao 29.4 (513 BCE)  In autumn, a dragon appeared in the outskirts of Jiang, the capital of Jin. The Jin minister Wei Shu questioned the scribe Mo of Cai about it: “I have heard that there is no wiser beast than the dragon, because it cannot be captured alive. Would it be accurate to call it wise?” He replied, “It is not that dragons are wise but rather that human beings have been unwise. The ancients kept dragons. For that reason

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there were in our domain the Huanlong, or dragon-feeding, lineage and the Yulong, or dragon-rearing, lineage.” Wei Shu said, “I too have heard of these two lineages, yet I do not know their origins. What do these names refer to?” He replied, “In times past, Shu’an of Youliu had a descendant whose name was Dongfu. Dongfu was extremely fond of dragons and was able to seek out for them the things they liked to drink and eat. Dragons came to him in large numbers, so he tamed them and reared them, offering them to Emperor Shun. The emperor bestowed upon him the clan name Dong with the lineage branch name Huanlong, putting him in power at the Zong River. The Zong lineage of Yi are descended from Dongfu. Thus, in the generations since Emperor Shun, there was dragon keeping. Later, Kongjia of Xia was obedient to the god on high, and the god on high bestowed upon him a team of four dragons, two each from the Yellow and Han Rivers, each a mating pair. Kongjia was not able to feed them himself, and he had not yet obtained the service of the Huanlong, or dragon-feeding, lineage. The Taotang lineage branch had already fallen into decline, but among its descendants was a certain Liu Lei, who had studied dragon taming with the dragon-feeding lineage and who served Kongjia, so that Liu Lei was able to provide the dragons with the proper drink and food. The Xia ruler, commending him, bestowed upon him the lineage name Yulong, or Dragon Rearing, and appointed him in place of the descendants of Shiwei. When one of the female dragons died, Liu Lei pickled its flesh and fed it to the Xia ruler. After feasting upon it, the Xia ruler asked him to get more such food. Alarmed, Liu Lei moved to Luxian. Those of the Fan lineage are his descendants.” Wei Shu said, “Why, then, are there no dragons nowadays?” The scribe Mo replied, “Every kind of thing has its official, who is charged with perfecting the methods for it and keeping these in mind day and night. If one day the official fails in his duties, then death comes to him, for a failure in carrying out his official duties means that he does not receive his salary. When the official remains in his duties, then the kind of thing to which his office is devoted will make itself manifest. If he abandons his duties, then that thing will hide away, becoming obstructed and unproductive. “Thus, there were the officials of the five resources,17 known as the five officials. These officials were granted hereditary titles and lineage and clan 17 See chapter 6, note 12.

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names, were put in power as great nobles, and were offered sacrifices as the most exalted spirits. At the altars of the domain and in the five sacrifices, these are the ones who were revered and exalted. The director for wood was known as Goumang, the director for fire was known as Zhurong, the director for metal was known as Rushou, the director for water was known as Xuanming, and the director for earth was known as Houtu. “The dragon is a water creature. Since the office of water has been abandoned, dragons are no longer taken alive. If that were not the case, then how could the Zhou Changes have what it has? There is the first line of the “Pure Yang” hexagram ䷀ “The hidden dragon is not employed.” The second line of the same hexagram says, “The dragon appears in the fields.” The fifth line says, “The flying dragon is in the sky,” and the sixth says, “The ramping dragon has regrets.” Finally, the statement for the whole “Pure Yang” hexagram says, “One sees the many dragons without a head: auspicious.” The sixth line of the “Pure Yin” hexagram ䷁ says, “Dragons battle in the wilds.” If dragons did not appear day and night, who could have regarded them as real things in this way?”18

18 Such references to dragons, found in the authoritative classic Zhou Changes, are offered as proof of the nature and existence of dragons. “Pure Yang” and “Pure Yin” are hexagrams no. 1 and no. 2, respectively, in the Zhou Changes.

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Cultural Others

S p e c i f ic g r ou p s s uc h a s M a n, Y i , R ong, a n d Di a r e i de n t ified as “aliens” or “cultural others” in Zuozhuan, but these names can be specific or categorical, and there is no category that encompasses all these groups and consistently conveys general meanings of “foreign” or “uncivilized.” Starting from about the third century BCE onward, the Man, Yi, Rong, and Di are linked respectively to the southern, eastern, western, and northern peripheries, but no such systematic associations obtain in Zuozhuan. Instead of operating at the margins, these groups exist in close proximity to the “central domains,” a cluster that includes Lu, Wei, Song, Zheng, Qi, and Jin, among others. Geographically, the area covered the lower reaches of the Yellow River and the east-central regions of modern-day China. The rulers of these central domains often claimed theoretical allegiance to the Zhou king, harking back to a distant past when their ancestors were brothers of Zhou rulers or related to them by marriage. Chu, Wu, and Yue, while participating in covenants and apparently sharing traditions with the central domains, are sometimes described by adversaries as aggressive cultural others. Qin is vilified as “a domain of tigers and wolves” with deep Rong ties in some Warring States and Han texts, but not in Zuozhuan. It is often said that the us-versus-them formula in Zuozhuan and early Chinese texts in general is cultural rather than ethnic. But precise definitions of cultural differences can be elusive. The Wu leader Zhongyong is said to have “cut his hair and tattooed his body, adorning himself in his nakedness” (chapter 12, Ai 7.3), but legend has it that he started out as a pre-dynastic Zhou scion. References to Rong and Di foot soldiers versus “our chariots” may imply different modes of warfare, but there is evidence from bronze inscriptions that the Rong and Di deployed chariots, and the central domains also used a combination of infantry troops and chariots. The Jin 2 63

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minister Wei Jiang claims that “the Rong and Di live off grasslands, they value goods and disdain land” (Xiang 4.7). This conforms to our understanding of nomadic peoples beyond the northern frontier over long periods of Chinese history, but one Rong leader recounts Rong history in terms of taming wilderness that suggests agriculture (Xiang 14.1). But if “cultural otherness” is hard to pin down, effacing differences is presented as dangerous; Lord Xiang of Lu is infatuated with Chu architecture and dies in the Chu-style palace he built in Lu (ZT Xiang 31.3); the Ousted Lord of Wei imitates “the barbaric way of speaking” of the Wu people and is thus destined to “die among the barbarians” (ZT Ai 12.4, 26.1). “With virtue one placates the central domains; with punishments one intimidates the other peoples on the four margins” (chapter 4, Xi 25.2); this idea has intermittent sway, but the connections tying together cultural others, margins, danger, and transgression are not formalized or consistently pursued in Zuozhuan. Despite disparagements of the moral flaws of “bar­ barians” and arguments for the necessary differentiation between “us” and “them,” there are many instances when alliances between non-Sinitic groups and central domains targeting other central domains seem normalized. Intermarriage between central domains and such groups are also quite common. The “barbarian,” embedded in the rhetorical contexts of diplomatic negotiations and policy arguments, seems to resist precise definition. In some cases, he also masters esoteric knowledge or the cultural and textual traditions of the central domains.

Pol a r iz ations a n d Distinctions In a military conflict between Zheng and the Rong, Gongzi Tu (later Lord Li of Zheng) makes strategic calculations (a quick probe, retreat, and ambush) by taking into consideration Rong reliance on foot soldiers and their presumed moral flaws.

Yin 9.6 (714 BCE)  The Northern Rong invaded Zheng. Lord Zhuang of Zheng blocked their advance. Worried about the Rong troops, he said, “They are on foot, and we are in chariots. I am afraid they will engulf us from the rear.” Gongzi Tu said, “Send some soldiers who are brave but not inflexible to probe the enemy and then quickly disengage from them. You, my lord,

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put ambushes in three places to await them. The Rong are lax and disorganized; they are greedy and know nothing of kith and kin. In victory, they will not defer to one another, and in defeat, they will not save one another. When those in the front ranks see they are going to take captives, they will surely make an effort to advance. As they advance, they will run into our ambushes and then surely will hasten to flee. Those at the back will not rescue them, and there will be no one to continue the attack! And so it is we can resolve matters.” The Liege of Zheng followed this. When the front ranks of the Rong ran into the ambush, they fled. Zhu Dan chased them and split the Rong troops in half. The Zheng force attacked them from the front and from behind and annihilated them. The Rong troops were completely routed. In the eleventh month, on the jiayin day, the men of Zheng roundly defeated the Rong army. The Qi minister Guan Zhong recommends Qi intervention to help Xing fight the Di. Coming to the rescue of Xing (and later Wei) in the name of shared heritage is cited as a major achievement of Lord Huan of Qi as the first over­ lord. Despite the supposed ties between central domains, Wei will extinguish Xing—both have the clan name Ji—twenty-six years later.

Min 1.2 (661 BCE)  The men of Di attacked Xing. Guan Zhong spoke to the Prince of Qi: “The Rong and the Di are jackals and wolves and cannot be satisfied. The central domains are close intimates and cannot be abandoned. Ease and repose are poisons and cannot be embraced. As it says in the Odes, How could we not long to go home? But we fear the writings on bamboo.1

The writings on bamboo are what speak of sharing the burden in adversity and showing concern for one another. I request that we go to the aid of Xing in order to comply with these writings.” Qi men went to the aid of Xing.

1

“The writings on bamboo” were official documents used for such purposes as issuing commands, laws, covenants, and calls to military duty.

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Zhou-Zheng tensions prompt King Xiang of Zhou to seek Di help to attack Zheng. The Zhou minister Fu Chen uses an us-versus-them argument to counsel against such a move. The Zhou king ignores his advice, attacks Zheng with Di troops, and takes a Di woman as queen. This Di consort will have a liaison with the king’s younger brother Wangzi Dai, who joins forces with the Di to attack Zhou and causes a dynastic crisis. Restoring King Xiang will help to establish Chong’er as overlord (chapter 4, Xiang 25.2).

Xi 24.2 (636 BCE)  Fu Chen remonstrated, “This will not do. I have heard that the supreme achievement is to pacify the people by means of virtue, while the second greatest achievement is to draw one’s kin close and extend that sentiment to others. Formerly, the Zhou Duke grieved that the two younger brothers were not in accord with him. That is why he distributed power and granted domains to kinsmen and relatives as a hedge and a screen for Zhou. . . . The Shao Duke Mu worried that the virtue of Zhou had degenerated. Therefore, he gathered together the house at Chengzhou and composed an ode, which said, The blossoms of the wild-plum tree, In a sudden burst become brilliant. Of all the people of this day, None are as good as one’s brothers.

The fourth stanza of this ode says, Brothers may have differences within the walls, But without they will defend against insult.

If it is thus, then even when brothers have petty grievances, they will not cast aside excellent kinsmen. “Now, if you, the Son of Heaven, cannot bear a petty grievance and on these grounds reject your Zheng kinsmen, then what is going to become of you? To reward merit, to draw close to kinsmen, to trust close advisers, and to honor the worthy, these are great acts of virtue. To ally oneself with the deaf, to follow the blind, to associate with the wayward, and to employ the perfidious, these are great acts of iniquity. To reject virtue and esteem iniquity is the greatest of disasters. Zheng has the

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merit of having assisted Kings Ping and Hui.2 They also had the closest kinship with Kings Li and Xuan. 3 They rejected toadies and favorites and employed the three talented men. Among the various domains of the Ji clan, they have been the closest to Zhou. These four virtuous qualities are present in them! When the ear does not hear the harmony of the five sounds, it is deafness. When the eye does not distinguish the resplendence of the five colors, it is blindness. When the heart does not take as model the principles of virtue and duty, it is waywardness. When the mouth does not speak words of loyalty and good faith, it is perfidy. In all cases, the Di take these as models. These four iniquities are all present in them! . . . The people have not yet forgotten the disasters, and yet you, King, would provoke it once gain. What does that mean for the tradition of Kings Wen and Wu?” The king did not heed this but sent Tui Shu and Taozi to dispatch the Di troops. The Lu minister Ji Wenzi counsels against alliance with Chu because it is “not of the same kith and kin” as the central domains. Chu is never referred to as “Man,” “Yi,” “Man Yi,” or “Yi Di” in Zuozhuan, but there are references to administrative and linguistic differences.

Cheng 4.4 (587 BCE)  In autumn, our lord arrived from Jin. He wished to seek an accord with Chu and to turn against Jin. Ji Wenzi said, “This will not do. Although Jin goes against the proper way, we cannot yet turn against it. That domain is great, and its ministers are harmonious. It is close to us and the other princes defer to it. We cannot yet switch allegiance. As it says in Scribe Yi’s Records, Those not of the same kith and kin, Their hearts and minds must be different.

Although Chu is great, its people are not our kin. Will it be willing to care for us?” Our lord thus desisted. 2

3

When King Ping of Zhou relocated the capital to the vicinity of Luoyang in 770 BCE, it was with the help of Jin and Zheng. And when King Hui fled Zhou (675–673 BCE), it was Guo and Zheng that reestablished him. The ancestor of Zheng was the son of King Li of Zhou (r. 879–843 BCE) and the younger brother of King Xuan (r. 827–782 BCE) by the same mother.

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Jin defeats Qi at the battle of An (ZT Cheng 2.3, 589 BCE) and then presents the spoils of victory at the Zhou court. King Ding of Zhou (r. 606–586 BCE) decries the impropriety of such a move, reiterating the distinctions between cultural others and “brother domains.” But the Zhou king’s real complaint might have been the Zhou-Jin power balance; he chides Jin for sending an envoy of insufficiently high rank.

Cheng 2.9 (589 BCE)  The Prince of Jin sent Shi Zhuangbo to present Qi captives and the spoils of victory at the Zhou court. The king did not receive him and sent the Shan Duke Xiang to decline the offering, saying, “When the Man, Yi, Rong, and Di tribes do not carry out royal commands, indulge in sensual excesses and wine, and flout the constants of order, and the king gives the command to attack them, then there is the presentation of captives and spoils of victory. The king will personally receive the offerings and honor the exertions of those who undertake the expedition, this being the means whereby he punishes the irreverent and encourages the meritorious. As for domains ruled by the brothers, nephews, and uncles of Zhou, when they encroach upon and undermine the king’s rules and regulations, the king gives the command to attack them. In such cases, there is only report of mission accomplished but no presentation of the fruits of victory. This is the means whereby he shows respect for kin and allies and proscribes excesses and iniquities. Now you, Uncle, are able to succeed and achieve merit in Qi but have not sent a royally commissioned minister to bring stability and solace to the royal house. The man you have sent to comfort me, the lone one, is none other than Shi Zhuangbo, who has no office in the royal house. Moreover, this visit violates the ritual propriety of the former kings. Even if I wish to be partial to Shi Zhuangbo, how dare I abandon old statutes and bring shame to my uncle? Now Qi is a domain ruled by our maternal nephews and maternal uncles, who are the descendants of the Grand Lord. Did it not indulge in excessive desires and thereby anger my uncle? Was it indeed beyond remonstrance and instruction?” Shi Zhuangbo could not answer. The king had the task of reception entrusted to the three officials and treated Shi Zhuangbo with the ritual appropriate for the occasion when a prince, having vanquished his enemy, sent a high officer to report the felicitous news. This was one rank lower than the ritual for ministers. The king feasted Shi Zhuangbo and privately gave him gifts. He had his

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assistant tell him, “This is not in accordance with ritual propriety. Do not record it in the historical annals!” While the above excerpts use us-versus-them arguments to justify military action, the emphasis on cultural difference can also become the rationale for peaceful coexistence, as in the following speech by the Jin minister Wei Jiang. We have omitted his excursus on the cautionary tale of Archer Yi, whose indulgence in hunting and other excesses leads to his downfall. Wei Jiang’s appeasement argument is entwined with his remonstrance against indulgence in hunting. The rhetorical connection between wars with the Rong and hunt­ ing may be found in the comparison of the Rong to “birds and beasts.” In the following year, a Zhou noble coming to Jin to seek help against Rong incursions into Zhou territory is arrested by Jin leaders on charges of being in league with the Rong. This represents an inversion of the political goal of defending the Zhou court against “barbarians” often avowed by covenant chiefs.

Xia ng 4.7 (569 BCE)  The Master of Wuzhong, Jiafu, sent Meng Yue to Jin. Through Wei Jiang he presented pelts of tigers and leopards, request­i ng with these gifts that Jin should reach a peace agreement with the various Rong tribes. The Prince of Jin said, “The Rong and Di, knowing nothing of kith and kin, are avaricious. It would be better to attack them.” Wei Jiang said, “The princes have only recently submitted, and Chen has only recently come to seek peace. They are going to observe our every act. If we are virtuous, they will be in concord with us; if not, they will fall away and turn against us. If we are wearing our troops out in a conflict with the Rong and Chu attacks Chen, we will certainly not be able to go to the aid of the latter, and that will amount to abandoning Chen. The various central domains will certainly then rebel. The Rong tribes are birds and beasts. Would it not be unacceptable to win control over the Rong and to lose the allegiance of the central domains? . . . The lord said, “In that case, would it be better to seek peace with the Rong?” He replied, “Peace with the Rong has five advantages. First: the Rong and Di live off grasslands, they value goods and disdain land, and so lands can be purchased from them. Second: if those at the frontiers and borderlands are not fearful, the people will feel close to their fields, and the harvesters will achieve success. Third: if the Rong and Di serve Jin,

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our neighbors on four sides will be shaken, and the princes will be awed into submission. Fourth: if we use our virtue to pacify the Rong, the soldiers and officers will not toil, and armor and weapons will not be ruined. Fifth: if we regard Archer Yi as our cautionary mirror and employ the standards of virtue, those from afar will come to us and those close by will be at ease. You, my lord, should consider this!” The lord was pleased and sent Wei Jiang to swear a covenant with the various Rong tribes. He attended to the affairs of the people and hunted only at the proper seasons.

Center a n d M a rgins Marginality is sometimes associated with venality. As part of a long speech on how the legendary rulers of antiquity created and maintained order, the grand scribe Ke of Lu recounts how “the clans of the four evil ones” were thrown to the wilds along the four borders to confront the beasts and the demons (ZT Wen 18.7). However, Ke stops short of equating “the clans of the four evil ones” or “the beasts and demons” at the margins with ethnic ­others like Rong and Di. In the course of a territorial dispute between Jin and Zhou, Jin led Rong troops to attack Zhou. A Zhou noble expatiates on the supposed extent of the early Zhou realm and rebukes Jin for bring­ ing the Rong from the margins to the center. The dispute ends with Jin concession.

Zhao 9.3 (533 BCE)  The Zhou king sent the Zhan Liege Huan to make a case to Jin. He said, “Since Xia times Weì, Tai, Rui, Qi, and Bi have been our lands to the west because of our ancestor Lord Millet. When King Wu conquered Shang, Pugu and Shangyan became our lands to the east; Ba, Pu, Chu, and Deng became our lands to the south; and Sushen, Yan, and Bo became our lands to the north. How could we have any frontier nearer than these? Kings Wen, Wu, Cheng, and Kang set up their younger full brothers to serve as defensive barriers for the Zhou to forestall decline and collapse. Are hereditary lands like a jetblack cap or the first clippings of an infant’s hair, and therefore something to be thrown away? The former kings settled Taowu among the four external lineages to confront the beasts and demons, and for this reason the miscreants of the Yun clan among the Rong were settled in

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Guazhou. When our elder uncle, your Lord Hui, returned home from Qin, he lured them to Jin, causing them to crowd in among the many members of the Ji clan, and even to enter the outskirts of our city, and that is how the Rong came to take these lands. Whose fault is it then that the Rong hold territory among the central domains? Is it not distressing that although our ancestor Lord Millet cultivated all-under-heaven, the Rong now exercise control there? Consider this, my elder uncle. To you we should be like the cap or headdress to a suit of clothing, the root or source to a tree or a river, the maker of plans for a people. If even you, my elder uncle, would tear the cap and destroy the headdress, uproot the tree and block the source, and willfully abandon the maker of plans, then what will be left of me, the One Man, among the Rong and the Di?” The Zhou noble above is referring to an event that happened more than a ­century earlier. In 638 BCE, Qin and Jin acted together to move the Rong of Luhun to Yi River, which flowed past the Zhou capital from the south. That event is told as the fulfillment of an omen uttered a hundred years before, when the Zhou capital was moved east. The political reality is that Jin and Qin seek to expand their influence by relocating the Rong to the border of Zhou. Xin You’s prediction imposes a ritual explanation on developments driven by political calculations.

Xi 22.4 (638 BCE)  Earlier, when King Ping had moved the capital to the east, Xin You had gone to Yi River and, upon seeing someone with unbound hair offering a sacrifice in the countryside, had said, “Within one hundred years, this will likely be overtaken by the Rong! Ritual propriety has been lost already!” In autumn, Qin and Jin moved the Rong of Luhun to Yi River.

M a ll e a bl e Bou n da r i e s Cheng Feng, the mother of Lord Xi of Lu and a native of Xuqu, argues that Lu should defend small domains related to her natal lineage (Feng) against the encroachments of Zhu. Although intermittently disparaged as “Yi” or “Man Yi,” Zhu is very close to Lu, and its ancestor was put in power in Zhu by King Wu of Zhou. Historians have classified the domains with the clan name Feng as Eastern Yi. Cheng Feng castigates Zhu as alien and upholds

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sacrifices to Taihao and the Ji, unrelated to Zhou, as “the ritual principle of Zhou.” The labels of “Yi” and “Zhou” are open to rhetorical manipulation.

Xi 21.4 (639 BCE)  The domains of Ren, Su, Xuqu, and Zhuanyu belonged to the Feng clan. These were the domains that were in charge of the sacrifices to Taihao and the Ji River and submitted to and served the central domains. The men of Zhu destroyed Xuqu. The Master of Xuqu came in flight, relying upon the support of Cheng Feng. Cheng Feng spoke to our lord on his behalf, saying, “To honor the bright sacrifices and to protect the small and the few is the ritual principle of the Zhou. For the Man and the Yi to disturb the central domains is a calamity for Zhou. If we put Xuqu in power, we would in this way venerate ­Taihao and the spirits of the Ji River, and through cultivating the former sacrifices, we could avert calamity.” Tan, a small domain to the north of Lu, is sometimes counted among the ­central domains and sometimes regarded as a member of the “Eastern Yi.” As the victim of Wu, Tan is “one of us”; as a foil for Lu, it seems quite foreign. Notwithstanding his Yi status, the Tan leader shows an impressive command of ancient lore and esoteric knowledge that elicits Confucius’s approbation. Some scholars identify the Shaohao lineage with Shang ancestors and birdcentered myths of origins.

Cheng 7.2 (584 BCE)  In the seventh year, in spring, Wu attacked Tan. Tan reached an accord with Wu. The Lu minister Ji Wenzi said, “The central domains are not putting their forces in order. The Man and Yi tribes enter and attack one of us, and none shows any concern for it. Is this not because there is no good leader? As it says in the Odes, High Heaven has no compassion, And there is no end to disorder.

This is what is meant! If there is no good leader above, who will be spared disorder? The day of my death will not be far off.” The noble man said, “He who knows fearful vigilance to this extent will surely not perish.”

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Zhao 17.3 (525 BCE)  In autumn, the Master of Tan came to visit our court. The lord held a feast for him. The Lu minister Shusun Chuo asked him, “The lineage of Shaohao named its offices for birds. Why is that?” The Master of Tan said, “He was my ancestor; I know about this. Long ago, the lineage of the Yellow Emperor took clouds as its guide in regulating affairs and therefore established cloud masters who were named for clouds. The lineage of the Flaming Emperor took fire as its guide and therefore established fire masters who were named for fires. The lineage of Gonggong took water as its guide and therefore established water masters who were named for waters. The lineage of Taihao had dragons as its guide and therefore established dragon masters who were named for dragons. Just at the moment when my distant ancestor Shaohao Zhi was established as ruler, a phoenix appeared, so he took birds as his guide and established bird masters who were named for birds. The Phoenixes were regulators of the calendar. The Swallows were supervisors of the equinoxes. The Shrikes were supervisors of the solstices. The Orioles were supervisors of the opening of the seasons. The Pheasants were supervisors of the close of seasons. The Snipes were supervisors of conscripts. The Ospreys were supervisors of the military. The Cuckoos were supervisors of works. The Falcons were supervisors of corrections. The Turtledoves were supervisors of affairs. These last five birds, all of the jiu variety, were for gathering (jiu) the people. Five types of pheasants were leaders for the five types of artisans; making objects useful and establishing measures, they created common standards for the people. Nine birds, all of the hu variety, were leaders of the nine agricultural activities, and they stopped [hu] people from committing any excesses. Since the time of Zhuanxu, no one has been able to take distant things as guides, so they have taken things near at hand. Being unable to follow the earlier practice, they have established masters for the people and named them for the affairs of the people.” Hearing of this, Confucius had an audience with the Master of Tan and studied these things. Afterward, he told others, “I have heard that when the Son of Heaven has lost his officials, knowledge about the officials remains among the aliens of the four quarters. This is still credible.” In a diplomatic meeting that Jin convenes to reassert its leadership, the Jin leader Fan Gai reprimands the Rong leader Juzhi for leaking information that under­ mines Jin. Citing past Rong dependence on Jin, Fan excoriates Rong ingrati­ tude and threatens to stop Rong participation in the meeting. Juzhi responds

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with a masterful speech challenging Fan’s version of Rong history, claiming shared roots but asserting ultimate difference from the central domains. Most important of all, Juzhi redefines the boundaries between “civilization” and “barbarity.” He also chants an apposite ode that laments the dangers of slander to demonstrate his mastery of Zhou cultural and textual traditions.

Xia ng 14.1 (559 BCE)  Jin was about to arrest Juzhi, Master of the Rong. Fan Gai personally reprimanded him at court, saying, “Come! You Master of the Jiang Rong lineage! Formerly, the men of Qin pressed your ancestor Wuli hard and drove him from Guazhou. Your ancestor Wuli, draped in a white rush cape and wearing a headdress made from brambles, came to our former ruler for protection. Though our former ruler, Lord Hui, had but meager lands, he divided them with you to provide you with sustenance. Now the reason why the princes no longer serve our unworthy ruler in the same way as before is because word of our negotiations leaked out, and this could have happened only on account of you. You are not to take part in the event of the next morning. If you do, we shall have you arrested.” He replied, “Formerly, the men of Qin, relying on their numbers and covetous of territory, expelled us, the various Rong tribes. Lord Hui of Jin, making manifest his great virtue, said that we, the various Rong tribes, were the descendants of the chiefs of the Four Peaks, and that we were not to be cut off and abandoned. He bestowed on us the lands of Jin’s south­ ern marches, where foxes and wild cats made their lairs, and where jackals and wolves howled. We, the various Rong, removed and cut down their brambles and drove away their foxes and wild cats, jackals and wolves, and became subjects of the former lord. Neither aggressive nor rebellious, we have been unwavering in our allegiance until now.4 “Formerly, Lord Wen of Jin, together with Qin, attacked Zheng. Qin secretly swore a covenant with Zheng and set up garrisons there. That was why armies were mobilized at Yao. Jin resisted Qin from above, and the Rong withstood it from below. That the Qin army did not come back 4 For the Four Peaks, see chapter 1, note 2. Juzhi is both proclaiming Rong allegiance to Jin and also staking out its independence from Jin. He qualifies Rong’s indebtedness to Jin, claiming that the land Jin ceded to Rong was inhospitable wilderness tamed only through Rong efforts. The Rong should thus be considered civilizing agents rather than barbarians.

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is due to us, the various Rong, and none other. Just as in the pursuit of a deer, the men of Jin seized its antlers, and the various Rong tribes caught its legs, and with Jin brought it to the ground. How have the Rong failed to absolve themselves from your charges of betrayal? From that time until the present, in the hundred campaigns of Jin, we, the various Rong tribes, have taken part unremittingly. Following those in charge of Jin government, our intent has ever been the same as at Yao. How would we dare to distance ourselves from you or go against you? “Now is it not your officials of various ranks who themselves are remiss, and who have in this way alienated the princes, while you lay the blame on us, the various Rong tribes? Our drink, our food, our clothing, and our regalia are all different from those of the central domains. We do not exchange gifts with them, and our language and theirs do not allow communication. How can we possibly harm you? Not to participate in the meeting will be no cause for grief.” He chanted the ode “Blue Fly” and withdrew. Fan Gai acknowledged his error and allowed Juzhi to take part in affairs at the meeting, thus realizing the attributes of being “joyous and civil.”5 At this time Shu Lao served as Ji Wuzi’s assistant to attend the meeting. From then on, the leaders of Jin reduced the obligatory contributions of Lu and treated its envoys with even greater respect.6 Juzhi claims that the Rong, like Qi, “are descendants of (the chiefs of) the Four Peaks.” Chu, described by a Lu minister as being “not of the same kith and kin” (see above), also emphasizes its historical ties with Zhou (chapter 10, Zhao 12.11). The Chu minister Zinang argues that a Chu king deserves a positive posthumous honorific for managing Chu’s mediatory role between the central domains and the barbarians. The king had requested a deroga­ tory posthumous name because he felt responsible for Chu defeat in the battle of Yanling (chapter 5, Cheng 16.5). Zinang argues that the request indicates praiseworthy humility and reverence.

5

The ode “Blue Fly” uses the eponymous image to refer to slander mongers. It contains these lines: “Joyous and civil is the noble man; / He does not believe in words of slander.” The burden of otherness is thus displaced from the barbarian to the slanderer. In acknowledging his error, Fan Gai proves himself to be the “joyous and civil noble man.” 6 The fact that Jin scales back demands on its subordinate allies implies that Juzhi’s speech is also effective remonstrance.

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Xia ng 13.4 (558 BCE)  In autumn, King Gong of Chu died. Zinang held discussions about the posthumous honorific. The high officers said, “The ruler already gave his command.” Zinang said, “His command was given in reverence. How can we betray it? He came to oversee the great and glorious domain of Chu, he soothed and gained sway over the Man and Yi barbarians, canvassing far and wide in his expeditions to the Southern Sea and bringing them to submit to the central domains. And yet he recognized his errors. Can he not be called ‘reverent’? I request to honor him posthumously as ‘Gong’ [meaning ‘reverence’].” The high officers followed his suggestion. Jin, the covenant leader for most of the period covered by Zuozhuan, also has Rong ties. A Wei envoy describes the Jin founder as being put in power in the Mound of Xia, where “he led his people by means of Xia regulations and set boundaries with Rong methods” (ZT Ding 4.1). When the Jin high officer Ji Tan visits the Zhou court following the funeral of the Zhou queen, he justifies Jin’s failure to offer ritual gifts by implicitly questioning Zhou-Jin ties. Ji Tan’s use of barbarians to construct an alternative history is countered by the Zhou king’s claim that the said barbarians live in territories given by Zhou to Jin. The Zhou king does not have the last word, however. After Ji Tan returns to Jin, the Jin minister Shuxiang criticizes the king for making inappropriate demands.

Zhao 15.7 (527 BCE)  In the twelfth month, Zhi Wenzi of Jin went to Zhou for the burial of Queen Mu. Ji Tan acted as his aide. Once the burial had taken place and the mourners had adopted a lesser degree of mourning, a feast was held for Zhi Wenzi, with drinks served from a pot given by Lu. The king said, “Uncle, why is it that when all the princes have given something to secure the royal house, Jin alone has not?” Zhi Wenzi saluted Ji Tan, who replied, “When the princes were put in power, they all received illustrious vessels with which to secure the altars of their domains, and for this reason they were able to present sacrificial vessels to the king. Jin was located deep in the mountains, a neighbor to the Rong and Di, and was far from the royal house. The king’s numinous power did not reach us, and our efforts to subdue the Rong left us no leisure. How would we present vessels to you?” The king said, “Uncle, you have forgotten! The royal uncle Tang Shu, ancestor of Jin, was a younger full brother of King Cheng. Could he have

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had no portion? The drum and grand chariot of Mixu were the items King Wen used as he conducted his grand muster. The Quegong armor was what King Wu wore as he overcame the Shang. Tang Shu received all of these and was placed with them in the region governed by the asterism Shen, where there were Rong and Di within his borders. . . . What is more, in times past, your distant ancestor Sun Boyan was supervisor of Jin’s archival records, which were used for great administrative matters, and he was therefore called Ji, or ‘Records.’ It was when Xin You’s second son, Dong, went to Jin that Jin first had the Dong scribes. You are the descendant of supervisors of the archives. Why have you forgotten these things?” Ji Tan was unable to reply. After the guests departed, the king said, “Ji Tan will have no descendants! He cites archival materials but forgets his own ancestors.” When Ji Tan returned to Jin, he told Shuxiang about this episode. Shu­x iang said, “The king will come to no good end! . . . Twice in a single year the king had cause for mourning periods of three years, yet he uses mourning as an opportunity to feast his guests and even to request bronze vessels from them. This is an extreme case of taking delight in a time of sorrow, and it is not in accordance with ritual propriety. . . . ­R itual is the great warp thread. . . . What good does it do to talk a lot and cite the archives if one forgets the warp thread?”

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For a complete English translation of Zuozhuan with the Chinese text, a comprehensive introduction, and extensive footnoting and bibliography, see Stephen Durrant, Wai-yee Li, and David Schaberg, trans., Zuo Tradition/ Zuozhuan: Commentary on the “Spring and Autumn Annals,” 3 vols. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016). The organization, readings, and interpretations in this complete English translation owe much to the ­C hinese editions of Yang Bojun, Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu, 4 vols. (rev. ed., Beijing: Zhonghua, 1990) and of Takezoe Kōkō, Saden kaisen (reprint, ­Taipei: Tiangong, 1998). The introduction to Zuo Tradition/Zuozhuan (xvii–xcv) provides a good general guide to issues surrounding Zuozhuan and its rather complex textual history. For a standard survey of the history of the Spring and Autumn period, see Hsü Cho-yun, “The Spring and Autumn Period,” in Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C., edited by Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, 545–86 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For an introduction to the canonical texts referred to in this volume, see Michael Nylan, The Five “Confucian” Classics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). For an excellent and provocative study of the development of Chinese thought during the Spring and Autumn period, with extensive discussion of Zuozhuan, see Yuri Pines, Foundations of Confucian Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002). For two book-length studies of Zuozhuan as historiography and literature, see David Schaberg, A Patterned Past: Form and Thought in Early Chinese Historiography (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001); and Wai-yee Li, The Readability of the Past in Early Chinese Historiography (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007). Of the many topical articles concerning Zuozhuan, only a few will be noted here: Ronald C. Egan, “Narratives in Tso chuan,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 37, no. 2 (1977): 323–52; David Johnson, “Epic and History in Early China: The Matter of Wu Tzu-hsü,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Study 40, no. 2 (1980): 465–505; Eric Henry, “‘Junzi yue’ versus ‘Zhongni yue’ in Zuozhuan,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 59, no.1 (1999): 125–61; Kai Vogelsang, “From Anecdote to History: Observations 27 9

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on the Composition of the Zuozhuan,” Oriens Extremus 50 (2011): 99–124; Wai-yee Li, “Poetry and Diplomacy in Zuozhuan,” Journal of Chinese Culture and Literature 1:1–2 (2014): 242–62; Scott Cook, “Confucius As Seen through the Lenses of the Zuozhuan and Lunyu,” T’oung Pao 101 (2015): 298–334; and Wai-yee Li, “Cultural Identity and Cultural Difference in Zuozhuan,” Journal of Chinese Culture and Literature 7:1 (2020): 7–33. We must note in conclusion, as we hope our dedication of this anthology indicates, that all serious work on Zuozhuan owes an enormous debt to the numerous Chinese scholars who have worked on this text through different periods and have produced a wealth of Chinese-language studies that we in the West have still not fully explored.

I n de x t o Pa s s ag e s f r om t h e C om p l e t e Z uo z h ua n

Page numbers indicate the location of the Zuozhuan/Zuo Tradition passages included in this book. Yin 1.4 Yin 1.5 Yin 3.7 Yin 4.1 Yin 4.3 Yin 4.5 Yin 5.1 Yin 8.4 Yin 9.6 Yin 11.2 Yin 11.3 Yin 11.4 Yin 11.8

19–25 116–17 35–36 36 36 36–37 153–54 120 264–65 25 25–27 27 31–32

Huan 2.2 Huan 3.6 Huan 15.2 Huan 16.5 Huan 18.1

154–55 120 50 37–38 32–33

Zhuang 8.3 Zhuang 9.5 Zhuang 10.1 Zhuang 10.3 Zhuang 11.2 Zhuang 14.2 Zhuang 14.3 Zhuang 18.1 Zhuang 23.1 Zhuang 28.2 Zhuang 28.3 Zhuang 32.3

251–52 155–56 87–88 50–51 157 257 51 118 118 38–39 52 258

Zhuang 32.4 Zhuang 32.5

33–34 34

Min 1.2 Min 1.5 Min 1.6 Min 2.3 Min 2.5 Min 2.7

265 125–26 39–40 34 166–67 40–41

Xi 4.1 Xi 4.6 Xi 5.2 Xi 5.8 Xi 9.2 Xi 9.3 Xi 10.3 Xi 16.1 Xi 21.4 Xi 22.4 Xi 22.8 Xi 23.6 Xi 24.1 Xi 23.4 Xi 24.2 Xi 25.2 Xi 25.4 Xi 26.3 Xi 27.4 Xi 28.1 Xi 28.3 Xi 28.4

222–23 41–42 64–65 136 122 122 43 258–59 272 271 89–90 65–69 70–73 169–70 266–67 73–75 75 134 75 76 76–82 82

2 81

2 82

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Xi 28.6 Xi 28.9 Xi 28.12 Xi 30.3 Xi 31.3 Xi 32.3

83 83 84 223–24 117 84–85

Wen 1.9 Wen 6.1 Wen 6.9 Wen 13.3 Wen 15.5

158 176 119 159 119

Xuan 2.1 Xuan 2.3 Xuan 3.3 Xuan 4.1 Xuan 4.2 Xuan 9.6 Xuan 10.4 Xuan 12.1 Xuan 12.2 Xuan 12.5 Xuan 16.4

90 138–41 135 118–19 43–44 52–53 53 91–92 92–104 104 176–77

Cheng 2.6 Cheng 2.9 Cheng 4.4 Cheng 5.1 Cheng 5.4 Cheng 7.2 Cheng 7.5 Cheng 9.5 Cheng 9.8 Cheng 10.4 Cheng 12.4 Cheng 13.2 Cheng 13.3 Cheng 14.1 Cheng 14.4 Cheng 14.5 Cheng 16.1 Cheng 16.5 Cheng 17.8

53–54 268–69 267 250 162 272 55 59–60 119 252–53 123–24 120–21 225–28 57 138 58 105 60, 105–14 250–51

Xiang 3.4 Xiang 3.7 Xiang 4.4 Xiang 4.7 Xiang 8.3 Xiang 9.3 Xiang 10.5 Xiang 10.9 Xiang 13.4 Xiang 14.1 Xiang 14.4 Xiang 14.6 Xiang 17.6 Xiang 18.3 Xiang 19.1 Xiang 19.5 Xiang 20.7 Xiang 23.7 Xiang 24.2 Xiang 25.2 Xiang 25.10 Xiang 26.6 Xiang 26.10 Xiang 29.11 Xiang 30.7 Xiang 30.10 Xiang 30.11 Xiang 30.13 Xiang 31.10 Xiang 31.11 Xiang 31.12 Xiang 31.13

156–57 170–71 162–63 269–70 203 61 58 203 276 274–75 59, 124–25 165–66 164 253–54 254–55 172–73 137 62 229–30 141–44 231 182–83 173–75 136–37 62 204–5 183 206–7 121 163 207–8 183–84

Zhao 1.3 Zhao 1.13 Zhao 2.4 Zhao 3.3 Zhao 4.1 Zhao 4.3 Zhao 4.4 Zhao 4.8 Zhao 5.1 Zhao 5.3 Zhao 5.4

184 184–85 171–72 146–48 185–86 187–88 188–89 44–46 47 127–28 190–91

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Zhao 5.8 Zhao 6.3 Zhao 7.1 Zhao 7.12 Zhao 8.1 Zhao 8.6 Zhao 9.3 Zhao 10.2 Zhao 11.2 Zhao 11.8 Zhao 12.11 Zhao 13.2 Zhao 13.3 Zhao 14.7 Zhao 15.7 Zhao 16.3 Zhao 17.3 Zhao 18.3 Zhao 18.6 Zhao 19.10 Zhao 20.7 Zhao 20.8 Zhao 20.9 Zhao 25.3 Zhao 25.6 Zhao 26.10 Zhao 26.11 Zhao 28.2 Zhao 29.4

228–29 178–79 191–92 238–39 259–60 192–93 270–71 216–17 193–94 194 194–96 197–200 231–33 175–76 276–77 209–11 273 212–13 213–14 260 239 217–19 214–15 128–30 148–50 219–20 130–31 56–57 260–62

2 83

Zhao 29.5 Zhao 31.2 Zhao 32.4

179–180 151 144–146

Ding 1.4 Ding 2.3 Ding 3.1 Ding 9.2 Ding 10.2 Ding 12.2 Ding 15.1 Ding 15.3

239 167 167 180 240–41 244 246–47 247

Ai 1.6 Ai 6.4 Ai 7.3 Ai 11.6 Ai 11.7 Ai 12.2 Ai 12.3 Ai 14.1 Ai 14.2 Ai 14.5 Ai 15.3 Ai 15.4 Ai 15.5 Ai 16.3 Ai 17.5

160–61 159–60 126–27, 233 241 241–42 242 234 243 244–45 243 245 234–35 245–46 247 255–57

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Accounts of Notable Women (Lienü zhuan), 49, 51, 55 agriculture, 154, 164, 227, 264, 273 Ai Jiang (wife of Lord Zhuang of Lu), 34, 34n6, 49, 172 ambition, 89, 100, 136, 203, 229, 254; of King Ling of Chu, 182–84, 191n9, 194, 199; of Lord Wen of Jin, 66–68, 74; of Lord Zhuang of Zheng, 23, 28 amity, 32, 99, 228, 232 Analects (Lunyu), 202, 237, 242–44; cited, 2.3, 168; 5.25, 10; 7.21, 248n1; 11.17, 241; 12.1, 196n19; 13.18, 175, 236; 14.21, 243; 15.1, 142 Ancestral Temple, 86, 205; of Chu, 188; of Jin, 39, 83; of Lu, 151, 154–55; of Qi, 143–44; of Song, 62; of Zheng, 25, 91, 205, 209–10; of Zhou, 136 animals and beasts, 8, 104, 192; bears, 139, 260; boars, 27, 249, 252; chickens, 27; domestic, 44, 207n3; elephants, 240; non-Sinitic groups compared to, 269– 70; oxen, 58n12, 85; pigs, 45; sacrificial, 88, 98, 117, 119, 154, 188n6, 194, 207; sets of sacrificial, 126–27, 129. See also birds; dogs; dragons; horses; hunting; lin; snakes; turtles anomalies, 28, 202, 248–49, 257–58 Archer Yi (Hou Yi) of Youqiong, 56, 269–70 archery, 68 archives, 8–9, 12, 134, 136, 277 armor, 110–11, 113, 149, 166, 225; armored attendants, 140, 204–5; armored horses, 81, 90; Quegong armor, 277; and weapons, 21, 113, 235, 241, 270 artisans, 92, 100, 111, 165, 195, 256, 273 

assassination, 4, 30–37, 43–44, 49–52, 70, 133; of Jia’ao of Chu, 181, 184n2, 185; of Lord Huan of Lu, 32–33, 251; of Lord Jian of Qi, 146; Lord Li of Jin, 105, 114, 146; of Lord Ling of Jin, 72n10, 138–41, 146; of Lord Xiang of Qi, 251–53; of Lord Zhuang of Qi, 141–44, 215–16; of Lu heir, 145; of Qi ruler by Chen Heng, 237, 243, 245; of Song ruler, 154; of Wei ruler, 137. See also killing; murder audience (visit), 118, 123, 209; with Chu king, 113, 187–88, 193; with Lord Wen of Jin, 71–72; with nobles, 40, 47, 128, 204, 254; with other rulers, 44, 46, 57, 87–88, 151, 224, 259, 273; with Zhou king, 36–37, 82 authority: moral, 141, 154, 169; of Odes, 22; political, 15, 17, 24, 87–88, 117, 129, 152, 207; of a ruler or commander, 32, 39–40, 163–65, 227; of Zuozhuan, 12 authorship: authorial voice, 7; of Annals, 9, 242; of legal code, 180; of Zuozhuan, 3, 10, 31, 152, 178n6, 221 ax (dagger-ax), 66, 108, 140, 148, 183, 245, 246, 253; ax-handle, 195; in character for “martial,” 102; on chariot, 98n12; used in execution, 170, 189 Balanced Discourses (Lunheng), 248, 248n1, 249n2 Bamboo Annals (Zhushu jinian), 20 Bamboo Code, 180 Bao (lineage in Qi), 216–17 Bao Shuya of Qi, 155–56 Bao Si (favorite of King You of Zhou), 56n9 barbarity, 13, 17, 40n13, 65n2, 69, 233, 264– 65, 269, 274–76 2 85

286

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battles, 68n5, 74, 86–88, 90, 97, 100, 105, 108, 182, 192–93, 216–17, 226–27; Battle of An (589 BCE), 268; Battle of Bi (596 BCE), 4, 54n5, 90–104, 107, 107n21, 110, 132, 190, 229, 229n16; Battle of Chengpu (632 BCE), 4, 63, 76–81, 75n15, 82n24, 83, 86–87, 90, 95, 104, 114n32, 116, 132, 146, 190, 229, 229n16, 248; Battle of Han (645 BCE), 42, 107; Battle of Yanling (575 BCE), 4, 60, 90, 104–14, 123, 146, 190, 253, 275; Battle of Yao (627 BCE), 158, 226, 226n6; battlefields, 4, 86, 87, 88, 97, 100, 108. See also military; warfare Beigong Tuo of Wei, 121, 183 bells, 46, 123, 165, 204. See also chimes Bi (place in Lu), 145, 150, 243 Bi (place in Zheng), 54, 102 Bi Wan of Jin, 39 birds, 62, 154, 160, 208, 241, 269, 272–73 Bo (lineage in Jin), 147 Bo (place in Song), 62, 270 Bo Zhouli of Chu, 109, 182–85 boats, 16, 99–100, 161  Boqin of Lu, 195  borderlands, 64, 153–54, 269 brigands, 32, 37–38 Bugeng (regions of Chu), 195, 198 burial, 31–32, 84, 116, 144, 162, 167, 185, 199, 204, 276 Cai (domain), 50–51, 80, 193–94, 197–98, 203, 222 Cao (domain) 57, 76, 78, 84, 186 Cao Gui of Lu, 87–88, 117–18 capital: of Zhou, 73n11, 160, 209, 267n2, 271; of Cai, 197; of Chu, 96, 198; of Jin, 39, 65n1, 260; of Lu, 154, 235, 244; of Qi, 62, 142, 144, 147, 156, 217, 235, 257; secondary capital, 43; of Song, 89, 249, 258; of state, 20, 40–41, 83; of Wei, 60, 166–67, 245, 255; of Zheng, 20, 91–92, 121, 171, 205, 212–14, 260; of Zhu, 159. See also Chengzhou; Jiang; Quwo; Wucheng carriages, 32, 43, 50, 148, 161–62. See also carts; chariots

carts, 96, 189, 195. See also carriages; chariots ceremonies, 154; and definition of ritual propriety, 115–16, 127–28; for eclipse, 119; grand ceremony, 123; for identifying successor, 199; for meeting, 186–88, 209; for official visit, 121; recognizing exertions, 121, 127; reduced ceremony, 174; wedding, 120. See also ritual; toasts chariots, 25, 95–96, 81, 100, 102, 136, 151, 198, 223, 252; accidents, 101, 110; ceremonial, 76, 91, 167, 277; of commander, 93, 101, 109, 125, 147; crossbar, 80, 88, 112; driver, 42, 170, 249; duties, 98; forces enumerated, 21, 80, 87, 90, 101, 195, 234, 240, 244; formations, 96, 99; infantry and, 21, 92, 113, 161, 263–64; introduced to Wu, 55; personnel listed, 39, 77, 98, 99, 110–12, 166. See also carriages; carts chastising, 26, 32, 53, 83, 118, 140, 148, 151, 155, 171, 203, 213, 232, 254 Chen (domain), 34–36, 50, 52, 80, 92, 120, 147n16, 159, 231 Chen (lineage in Qi), 130, 146–47, 216–17, 219, 245 Chen Heng of Qi, 146, 234, 235n20, 237, 243, 245 Chen Wuyu of Qi, 216–17 Cheng (city in Lu), 234–35, 243 Cheng Dechen of Chu, 68, 77–82, 104, 114n32 Cheng Feng (mother of Lord Xi of Lu), 271–72 Chengjun (place in Chu), 182, 192–93 Chengying (place in Zheng), 21, 23 Chengzhou (Eastern Zhou capital), 266. See also capital children, 35, 38, 45, 49, 57, 108, 120, 145, 165, 202–3 chimes, 123, 134, 204. See also bells Chong’er. See Lord Wen of Jin chronology, xi, 5, 6, 11, 17, 19, 51n2 Chu (domain), 175, 269–70, 276; in battle, 51–52, 89; as covenant head, 121, 123, 132; as cultural other, 263, 267; expansionism, 5, 134–35; and Jin, 16, 60, 87, 173–75,

S u b j e c t I n de x

227n13; leaders of, 43; and Lord Wen of Jin, 63–64, 67–68, 75–82, 114n32; and Lu, 237–38, 264; and Qi, 122, 222–23, 245; and Qin, 226–27; and Xia Ji, 52–55; and Wu, 55, 160–61, 228–29; and Zheng, 90, 202–4, 223, 229–31. See also Battle of Bi; Battle of Chengpu; Battle of Yanling Chu Mi of Jin, 139 Chuanfeng Xu of Chu, 182–83, 192–93 cities, 88n2, 106, 164, 189, 199, 206, 217, 226, 244, 256–57; city gate, 21, 76–77; city wall, 39, 61, 64–65, 76, 91, 213, 223–24, 245, 256; outskirts, 127, 149, 198, 271; specifications for, 19–20, 41. See also markets Classic of Odes (Shijing, the Odes), 133, 165, 180, 221; alluded to, 54, 247; cited, 106, 124, 140, 145, 174, 192, 217, 265–66, 272; cited by Beigong Tuo, 121, 183; cited by Confucius, 52, 214–15, 232, 239; cited by Fan Hui, 93, 139; cited by King Zhuang of Chu, 102–3; cited by noble man, 22, 83, 157, 180; cited by Shuxiang, 178, 259; cited by Sunshu Ao, 100; cited by Yan Ying, 130, 218–20; cited by Zichan, 230; composed, 35, 266; lost ode cited, 158, 196; recited, 22, 59–60, 68–69, 184, 221, 274–75 clothing, 129n15, 147, 161, 188, 204, 207–8, 217, 251, 271, 275 Code of Gao Yao, 175  coffins, 76, 84–85, 162, 189, 199, 204–5, 212 comets, 219–20, 257  commanders, military, 40, 173; of Chu, 93, 106, 111, 113, 114n33, 222; of Jin, 16, 80, 94– 95, 107–8, 132, 171, 253, 256; of Qin, 49, 158. See also Luan Shu; Xi Zhi; Xun Shou commendation, 156, 158, 170, 230, 248, 253, 261  communication, 8, 16, 275 Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Govern­ ment (Zizhi tongjian), 15 concubines, 30, 34n7, 37–38, 41, 47, 58n10, 59, 62, 161, 172–73 Confucius, 236–48, 272–73, 280; and Annals, 3, 9–12, 24, 83, 138; association with Zuo Qiuming, 3, 10, 12; as commentator on

2 87

events, 15, 52–53, 83, 138, 141, 146, 152, 158, 160, 163; on King Ling of Chu, 194, 196–97; on law, 168–69, 175–77, 179; as teacher, 9, 29, 115, 233, 236–39; on Zichan, 202, 214–15, 230–32. See also Analects cooks, 43–44, 67, 139, 161, 217–18, 253  cosmos, 116 couriers, 166, 171, 196, 208 covenants, 86, 117, 189, 240, 244, 263, 265n1, 269–70; archived, 8; between individual states, 70, 92, 96–97, 99, 105–6, 123, 233–34, 274, 223–28, 254; chief, 179, 276; Covenant of Song, 87, 121, 186; personal, 33, 45–46; under Chu, 159, 181; under Jin, 127–28, 179, 181, 187, 231–33, 276; under Qi, 122, 223, 240; under Zhou, 134, 136, 188; within domains, 124, 141, 143– 44, 149–50, 172, 197, 203, 205, 211, 257 Cui (lineage in Qi), 144 Cui Zhu of Qi, 49, 141–44, 173, 215 Dai Gui (wife of Lord Zhuang of Wei), 35 dance, 52, 130 Dating (lineage in Lu), 212 daughters, 33, 59n14, 65, 120, 131, 144, 175, 189, 199, 226n7. See also Gong Ji; Huai Ying; Lady Jiang of Qi; Lady Mu of Xu; Li Ji; Wen Ying; Xia Ji; Yong Ji; Zhao Ji death, 66, 94, 129, 219, 226, 228, 242, 261, 272; and Ai Jiang, 172; braving, 106–7, 226; of Cheng Dechen, 82, 104; of Chu kings, 51, 158–59, 194–99; of Confucius, 10–11, 237, 247; of Jin lords, 84–85, 249; of Lu lords, 33, 133, 151; of Lord Wen of Zhu, 158–59; of Lord Zhuang of Zheng, 28, 49; natural, 26, 148, 238; not perishing in, 114, 150; notice of, 185; prediction of, 124, 158, 181, 246, 250–51, 253, 255; recording of in Annals, 242; of Shu­ xiang, 178n6; of tyrants, 30; and Xia Ji, 52–53; of Zichan, 202, 214–15. See also death, put to; expired; suicide death, put to: enemies and rivals, 31, 68, 71, 74, 156, 181, 183, 185, 228–29, 252; eunuch, 253; for insubordination, 77, 83, 94, 104,

288

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death, put to (continued) 137, 144, 148–50, 158, 169–72, 175, 181, 197n20, 199, 255; woman, 34, 66, 173. See also punishment Deng Xi of Zheng, 168, 180 Di (non–Sinitic people), 39, 65–66, 69, 72, 107, 166–67, 188, 227, 263, 265–71, 276– 77. See also White Di Dian Xie of Jin, 65, 77, 83 Ding Jiang (wife of Lord Ding of Wei), 48, 57–59 Ding Si (mother of Kan, Lord Xian of Wei), 58n10  Ding Si (mother of Lord Xiang of Lu), 162 diplomacy, 4, 9, 28, 69, 97, 132–33, 185n3, 202, 209, 221–36, 264, 273, 280 disciples, 9–10, 29, 233, 236–37, 245n7, 250 Discourses of the States (Guoyu), 241 divination, 91, 97, 109, 111, 117, 135, 145, 159– 60, 164, 199, 216, 228–29, 242; by bone and shell, 8, 41, 58, 73–74, 199, 213, 255– 56; by milfoil, 41, 60–61, 74, 84, 110, 141– 42, 213, 255. See also Zhou Changes; hexagrams Diviner Yan of Jin, 73–74, 84–85, 169–70 diviners, 14, 41, 73–74, 111, 133, 145, 160, 162, 255 dogs, 25, 27, 42, 129n14 Dong Hu of Jin, 138, 141 Dongguo Jiang (wife of Lord Tang in Qi; Lady Jiang), 141–42 Dongguo Yan (older sister of Lady Jiang), 141  Dou Chengran of Chu, 198, 200 Dou Yishen of Chu, 80–82 dragons, 129n15, 133, 211, 249, 260–62, 273 dreams, 16, 28, 42, 44–45, 63, 79, 82, 110–11, 133, 248, 249–55, 260  drought, 257 drums, 88–90, 100, 113, 119, 123, 179, 228–29, 277 Du Yu, 12–13, 129n16, 159n8, 238n2 Duke Cheng of Song, 79 Duke Gong of Song, 62 Duke Huan of Zhou, 41

Duke Min of Song, 157 Duke of Guo, 118, 257, 258  Duke of Zhou (Zhou Duke; ancestor of Lu), 134, 137, 234, 241–42, 266 Duke Ping of Song, 164 Duke Xiang of Song, 89 Eastern Yi (non-Sinitic people), 137, 188, 272 Eastern Zhou. See Zhou eclipses, 9, 104, 119, 257 Emperor Shun of Yu, 27n2, 147n16, 261 Emperor Yao of Taotang, 27n2, 160 Emperor Yu of Xia, 157, 178 escort, 68, 119–20, 173, 189–90 Eunuch Pi, 63, 65, 70–71 eunuchs, 63–65, 70–71, 142, 190n8, 252–53 evidence, 8–9, 23, 46n24, 55, 141n8, 152, 179n7, 202, 259, 263 executions, 37, 53, 90, 169–70, 175, 180, 188– 89, 203, 255; suicide as substitute for, 82, 171; of women, 172–73. See also death, put to; Gongzi Pengsheng; killing; punishment exile, 78n18, 133, 137, 143, 146, 153, 174, 199, 244–47, 250, 255; of Chong’er, 63, 70, 78n18, 84; of Gongsun Duan, 23; of Lord Xian of Wei, 57–59, 124, 137; of Lord Zhao of Lu, 127, 133, 144, 148–51, 164, 239, 242; of Taibo, 40; and Xia Ji, 53; of Zhou king, 74. See also Bo Zhouli; Fen Huang expired: lady, 61, 117, 162; ruler, 31–32, 34, 145, 151, 247 Explanation of Characters (Shuowen Jiezi), 102n18 family, 23–24, 35, 37n10, 56, 65, 110n26, 143 Fan (lineage in Jin), 179–80, 229, 261 Fan Gai of Jin, 108–9, 179, 180n11, 229–30, 254–55, 273–75 Fan Hui of Jin, 83, 92, 94, 97, 99, 101, 139, 177 Fan Xie of Jin, 105, 107–8, 110, 113–14, 124  Fan Yang of Jin, 126, 150  Fangcheng (place in Chu), 183, 223

S u b j e c t I n de x

fathers, 44, 46, 53–54, 129, 165, 169, 172, 175, 193, 236, 251; father’s command, 38, 40– 41, 63–65, 134; father’s wife, 34, 37–38; father-son succession, 30, 33, 38, 63, 68, 227, 233n18; and heir apparent, 40; kindness of, 36, 131; wife’s loyalty to father and husband, 28, 49–50. See also Fan Xie; Grand King; King Gong of Chu; Lord Huan of Qi; Luan Shu; Shen Wuyu; Shi Que; Shusun Bao; Wang Ji; Xun Shou; Zang Xibo; Zhai Zhong; Ziguo Fen Huang of Chu and Jin, 109, 113 Feng (lineage in Zheng), 204–5 Feng (lineage of Yi), 271–72  filial piety (xiao), 22–24, 28, 36, 40–41, 64, 131, 162 five resources (wuxing), 128, 261 Flaming Emperor, 273 floods, 157, 257, 260 Four Peaks, 27, 274–75  frontier, 191, 240, 264, 269–70 Fu Chen of Zhou, 266 Fucha (King of Wu), 160–61 fushi (poetry recitation), 68–69, 184 Ganxi (place), 194, 198n23 Gao (lineage in Qi), 216–17  Gao Chai (disciple of Confucius), 245 Gaoluo of Dongshan (non-Sinitic people), 40 Gaotang (place), 143, 217  garden, 32  gatekeepers, 167, 182, 190–91 gender, 116, 119 general (military), 12, 40n14 ghosts, 16, 32, 42, 137, 146, 249, 251–53 gifts, 117–18, 130, 210, 213, 217, 230; between rulers, 69, 81, 117–18, 127; of death, 114; diplomatic, 54, 77, 188, 190, 269, 275– 76; as incentive, 34, 150, 154, 206, 241, 246; from a ruler, 67, 93, 111, 130, 169, 171, 174, 193, 253, 268; to a ruler, 22; in sacrifice, 119 gods, 43, 82, 167n19, 250, 252, 254, 261; on high, 144, 219, 227, 230, 261; and spirits,

289

26; of the Yellow River, 70n7, 82, 210. See also spirits; Zhongwu Gong Ji (wife of Duke Gong of Song), 59, 62 Gong Zhiqi of Yu, 135–36, 257 Gonggong (ancient ruler), 273 Gongshan Buniu (Gongshan Furao in the Analects), 244 Gongshu Duan of Zheng, 19–25, 27, 30 Gongsun Duan of Zheng, 205–6 Gongsun Hei of Zheng, 171–72, 204–5, 210 Gongsun Ning of Chen, 52–53, 55 Gongyang commentary on Spring and Autumn Annals, 24, 32n3, 237, 242 Gongzi Bi of Chu, 185, 197–98, 200 Gongzi Guisheng of Zheng, 43–44, 90,  Gongzi Heigong of Chu, 184–85, 197–98, 200, 204  Gongzi Hu of Zheng, 28, 120, 127. See also Lord Zhao of Zheng Gongzi Jiu of Qi, 71n9, 156 Gongzi Pengsheng of Qi, 32–33, 251–52 Gongzi Qiji of Cai, 189, 193, 197–98. See also King Ping of Chu Gongzi Shen of Chu, 159–61 Gongzi Tu of Zheng. See Lord Li of Zheng Gongzi Wei of Chu, 182–85, 189. See also King Ling of Chu Gongzi Xiaobo of Qi, 71n9, 122. See also Lord Huan of Qi Gongzi You of Lu, 33–34, 145 governance, 25, 148, 152–68, 218, 229, 232, 243, 248, 257, 275; good, 5, 7, 92–93, 116, 119, 123, 174, 181; and Ji Pingzi, 148; and law, 168, 171, 174–79; as responsibility of ruler, 27–28, 39, 95; and ritual propriety, 121, 123, 127–31, 237; shadow, 41; Zhou, 4; and Zichan, 202–11, 214 governor, 183 grain, 75, 104, 113, 128, 130, 147, 157, 217, 253, 254n10  Grand Chamber, 34, 130  Grand Lord of Qi (ancestor of Qi), 134, 219, 222n2, 268 grand steward Pi of Wu, 233–34

290

S u b j e c t I n de x

Great Wall, 62 grudge, 82, 102, 155, 168, 195, 206, 210, 212– 13, 216, 222, 259 Gu (garrison), 75, 77 Gu Donggao, 48, 86 Guan Zhong of Qi, 71, 155–56, 222, 265  Guang, heir apparent of Qi, 172–73 Guazhou (place in Wei), 271, 274  Guiyou of Wu, 228–29 Guliang commentary on Spring and Autumn Annals, 24, 237 Guo (domain), 20, 44, 118, 135–36, 257–58, 267 Guo (lineage), 44 Guo Shu (ancestor of Guo), 19–20, 136 halberd, 90 Han (lineage in Jin), 146, 204 Han (river), 79, 160  Han Chuan of Jin, 92, 99 Han Dynasty, 202, 263 Han Feizi, 180 Han Hu of Zheng, 190, 204–8 Han Jue of Jin, 92, 95, 105, 111–12 Han Qi of Jin, 175, 189–91, 193, 209–11 harmony, 4, 26, 61, 106–7, 10, 215, 217–18, 267 Heaven, 56, 74, 80n20, 126–29, 145, 159– 60, 165–66, 194, 199, 227, 249–50, 253, 272; aid of, 89, 150, 165–66, 186, 199, 205, 226; all under, 53, 124, 192, 196, 199, 271; astronomical phenomena, 145, 219; and blessings, 40, 66–68, 72–73, 78, 80, 123, 135, 174; command of, 135, 184n1; and earth, 116, 120, 129–31, 166; king as appointee of, 83, 116; and natural disaster, 157, 160, 214; and political disaster, 58, 72, 89, 185, 225; prayers to, 247, 255; and punishment, 160, 172, 185, 193, 245; and warfare, 26–27, 91, 104, 108, 113; Way of, 13, 212, 129, 145, 212, 219. See also Son of Heaven hexagrams, 61, 74, 94, 110, 142, 145, 262. See also divination; Zhou Changes historiography, 14–15, 236, 279

history, 5, 7–8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 28, 132–51, 202, 222, 279; annalistic, 3, 14–15; Annals and, 8, 11; knowledge of, 10–11; of nonSinitic groups, 264, 274, 276; Zuozhuan as, 3–17; of Zuozhuan, 13, 14, 279. See also Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government; History of the Han; Records of the Historian horses, 90, 101, 112–13, 118, 125, 129n14, 196, 216–17, 222; armored, 90; four-horse teams, 66–67, 81, 125n8; tack, 80, 82, 98; trainer, 205; watering, 95. See chariots hostages, 58, 92, 96 Hou (lineage in Lu), 148 Hou (place in Lu), 243–44 Hou Yi. See Archer Yi Hu (lineage in Jin), 147 Hu Tu of Jin, 40–43, 169 Hu Yan of Jin, 63, 65–66, 69–70, 73, 75, 78–79, 81, 95–96, 169, 224, 248 Hua (Chinese) people, 240 Hua (domain), 136, 226 Hua Yuan of Song, 90, 227n13 Huai Ying (wife of Chong’er), 49, 68, 69, 71  Huan (place in Lu/Qi), 120, 235 Huanlong (lineage), 261 humaneness (ren) 61, 163. See also noble hunting, 42, 45, 71, 140, 194, 208, 217, 242– 43, 269–70; deputy for, 199; King of Chu, 185, 187, 188n6, 191, 194; Prince of Qi, 239, 252; royal, 237; for sacrificial animals, 207; seasonal, 75, 83, 86, 153– 54, 194, 270; and warfare, 97–99 Huo (domain), 39, 136 husbands, 20, 28, 32, 46n23, 49–51, 53n4, 56, 60, 63, 66, 102n17, 120, 129, 131, 142, 172 instruction, 9, 21, 75, 80n22, 123, 153, 170, 190, 195, 268 jade, 46, 67–68, 70, 82, 88, 118, 166, 189, 195– 96, 200, 209–13, 234, 246, 254–56 Ji (clan name of Zhou royal house), 68, 79, 111, 137, 256, 271

S u b j e c t I n de x

Ji (lineage in Lu), 60, 128n11, 144–46, 148– 51, 237, 239, 242–44 Jˇı (lineage of Rong), 256 Ji (river), 234, 272 Ji Kangzi of Lu, 233, 241–42, 244 Ji Pingzi of Lu, 148–51, 239 Ji Wei (wife of Chong’er), 65, 72 Ji Wenzi of Lu, 59, 60n15, 145, 162, 163n15, 267, 272 Ji Wuzi of Lu, 145, 244, 275 Jia’ao of Chu (nephew of Gongzi Wei), 184n2, 185 Jiagu (place in Qi), 237, 240 Jiang (place in Jin), 20, 39, 65n1, 84–85, 162, 260 Jiang (river), 160  Jiang clan, 141n9 Jiang Rong (non-Sinitic people), 274  Jiaru (place in Zhou), 135  Jie Zhitui of Jin, 72–73  Jin (domain), 38–43, 49, 63–85, 135–41, 161– 62, 193, 195, 249; attacking non-Sinitic groups, 38–41; as covenant head, 5, 120, 128, 186–87; and Chu, 87, 123, 181, 184– 86, 189–91, 195; decline of, 133, 146–48; and law, 168–71, 173–80; and Lu, 60, 126– 28, 137–37, 150–51; and Qi, 142, 144; and Qin, 132, 225–28; and Qu Wuchen, 53– 55; and ritual propriety, 116, 118–19; and Wei, 57–58, 164–66, 234; and Xia Ji, 55– 56; and Zheng, 223, 224n3; and Zhou, 125; and Zichan, 202–3, 207, 209–14, 229–33. See also Battle of Bi; Battle of Chengpu; Battle of Yanling; Battle of Yao Jing (place in Zheng), 19–21 Jize (lineage), 219 Jizi of Wei, 37–38, 41 Ju (domain), 23, 118, 144, 217 Juan (place in Wei), 125, 256 Jupiter cycle (twelve years), 133 Juzhi (Rong leader), 273–75 killing, 30, 170, 174; and animals, 44, 140; and Xia Ji, 53, 56; in civil strife, 55, 143–45, 148, 176, 180, 198, 207, 245–46,

2 91

256–57; of court rivals, 52, 172–73, 175; of envoys, 119, 124–25; of innocents, 38, 42, 66, 139, 205, 253; over offenses, 33, 44, 46–47, 50, 77, 104, 176, 189, 197, 214, 253; of rival heirs, 33, 37–38, 63–64, 70– 71; of rulers, 3, 53, 140, 152–53, 189, 243, 251–52; in succession struggles, 41, 47, 184–85; in war, 90, 98, 102, 107n21, 112. See also assassination; death; murder; punishment; suicide; war King Cheng of Chu, 50–51, 64, 67, 79, 97n11, 114n32, 132, 189, 226, 227n12 King Cheng of Zhou, 134–35, 187, 270, 276 King Ding of Zhou, 135, 177, 268 King Gong of Chu, 54, 105, 109–13, 123, 185, 189, 199–200, 275–76 King Helu of Wu, 160–61 King Huan of Zhou, 231, 267 King Hui of Zhou, 258, 267 King Jie of Xia, 30, 56n9, 135, 157, 188,  King Jing of Zhou, 270, 277 King Kang of Chu, 182, 185n3, 197n20, 199–200 King Kang of Zhou, 187, 195, 270 King Li of Zhou, 91, 211n5, 267n3 King Ling of Chu, 28, 132–33, 181–200, 201–2. See also Gongzi Wei King Mu of Chu, 97n11, 196, 227n12 King Mu of Zhou, 187, 196n17 King Ping of Chu, 193, 197–200. See also Gongzi Qiji King Ping of Zhou, 73n11, 81, 97, 231, 267, 267n2, 271 King Qi of Xia, 187 King Tang of Shang, 174, 178, 187 King Wen of Chu, 50–52, 192, King Wen of Zhou, 40n13, 53, 103, 122, 132, 178, 192, 217, 219, 267, 270, 277 King Wu of Zhou, 68, 102–3, 122, 132, 155, 187, 192, 267, 270, 277 King Xiang of Zhou, 73, 75, 266 King Xuan of Zhou, 91, 267n3 King You of Zhou, 56n9, 188 King Zhao of Chu, 159–60 King Zhao of Zhou, 222–23

292

S u b j e c t I n de x

King Zhou of Shang, 30, 56n9, 96, 135, 157, 188, 192 King Zhuang of Chu, 52, 91, 100–104, 134, 152, 227n12 Kings of Zhou, 126 Kong Kui, 245–46, 255 Kong Yingda, 12 Kuaikui. See Lord Zhuang of Wei Kuang (music master of Jin), 259 Kuiqiu (place in Song), 122, 251 Kunwu, 195 Lady Jiang (mother of Lord Zhuang of Zheng), 22–25, 48 Lady Jiang of Qi. See Dongguo Jiang Lady Jiang of Qi (wife of Chong’er), 48, 66 Lady Mu of Xu (daughter of Wei ruler), 48, 59n13 Lai (domain), 188–89 Lai (non-Sinitic Yi people), 240 Lai (place in Zheng), 25 laws, 9, 27, 52, 93, 168–69, 175–78, 180n11, 181, 192, 202, 209, 236, 265n1 Lesser Zhu (small domain), 244–45  letters, 8, 55, 132, 170, 177, 221, 229  Li (place in Zheng), 257 Li Gui (wife of Lord Zhuang of Wei), 35 Li Ji (wife of Lord Xian of Jin), 38–39, 41–42, 49, 63–64, 65n1, 122n5 Li Ke of Jin, 40 Li Rong (non-Sinitic people), 38, 67n4 liaisons, sexual, 32, 34, 52, 60, 142, 266 Liang (lineage in Zheng), 33, 204 Liang Xiao of Zheng, 171–72, 204–6, 251 Liangqiu Ju of Qi, 218 Liege of Qin, 69–71, 73, 158, 223–24, 253. See also Lord Mu of Qin; Lord Huan of Qin Liege of Zheng: Lord Cheng, 111–12; Lord Ding, 209–10, 232; Lord Jian, 185, 189, 205, 229; Lord Wen, 81, 223–24; Lord Xiang of Zheng, 91; Lord Zhuang, 20– 22, 24–27, 265. See also Lord Cheng of Zheng; Lord Ding of Zheng; Lord Jian of Zheng; Lord Li of Zheng; Lord Zhuang of Zheng

lin (mythical beast), 237, 242–43 lineages, 4, 13, 48, 130, 237, 261–62, 273–74; in Chu, 159; collateral, 165; domains as, 26, 65, 137, 195; external, 270; histories of, 8, 15; in Jin, 114; in Lu, 30–34, 45, 127; rise of ministerial, 133, 136, 146, 148; ruling, 98; stewards of, 243–44; troops of, 101, 110; in Qi, 216; in Zheng, 171, 203, 206 Ling Zhe of Jin, 140 Linghu (place in Jin), 70, 226–27 Literary Mind and Carvings of Dragons (Wenxin diaolong), 16 Liu Xiang, 12, 49, 50–51, 55 Liu Xin, 12  Lord Ai of Lu, 234, 242n6, 247 Lord Cheng of Lu, 59–60, 120, 267 Lord Cheng of Zheng, 110–11 Lord Dai of Song, 238 Lord Dao of Jin, 136, 170, 269 Lord Ding of Lu, 240, 244 Lord Ding of Qi, 141 Lord Ding of Wei, 57–58 Lord Ding of Zheng, 209–10 Lord Gong of Cao, 67, 76–78, 84 Lord Gong of Qin, 227n12 Lord Huai of Jin, 69–70, 72, 169, 181 Lord Huan of Chen, 36 Lord Huan of Lu, 31–33, 60n16, 117n1, 145, 251 Lord Huan of Qi, 66, 71, 84, 122, 125–26, 132, 134, 141, 152, 155, 187, 222, 252, 265 Lord Huan of Qin, 225, 253 Lord Huan of Song, 157n6 Lord Huan of Wei, 35–36 Lord Huan of Zheng, 91, 211 Lord Hui of Jin, 38–39, 41–43, 49, 64–65, 68, 70–72, 107, 169, 225n4, 271, 274 Lord Hui of Lu, 117n1 Lord Hui of Qi, 216 Lord Hui of Wei, 38 Lord Jian of Qi, 146, 243 Lord Jian of Zheng, 185, 205, 229, 231–32 Lord Jing of Jin, 177, 227, 249, 250n3, 252– 53, 268

S u b j e c t I n de x

Lord Jing of Qi, 127, 130, 146, 150, 217, 219, 239–40 Lord Kang of Qin, 226, 227n12 Lord Kui (music master), 56 Lord Li of Jin, 57, 110, 113, 146, 228n14, 253  Lord Li of Song, 238 Lord Li of Zheng, 28, 49–50, 257, 264 Lord Ling of Chen, 52–53 Lord Ling of Jin, 72n10, 138–40, 146, 226 Lord Ling of Qi (Huan), 172–73, 253, 254n7 Lord Ling of Zheng, 31, 43–44, 53, 56 Lord Millet, 270–71 Lord Min of Lu, 33–34, 172 Lord Min of Song, 238n2 Lord Mu of Qin, 38, 49, 69–73, 158, 223–27 Lord Mu of Zheng, 56, 205 Lord of Wei, Ousted, 255, 264 Lord Ping of Jin, 56, 136, 185, 189, 254, 259 Lord Qing of Qi, 112 Lord Shang, 180  Lord Wen of Jin (Chong’er), 5, 27–28, 38– 39, 48–49, 63–85, 104, 152, 158n7, 168–69, 181–82, 187, 201, 223–26, 231, 237, 248–49, 266, 274  Lord Wen of Lu, 145, 179 Lord Wen of Wei, 66 Lord Wen of Zheng, 67, 81, 223–24 Lord Wen of Zhu, 158–59 Lord Wu of Jin, 137 Lord Wu of Song, 238 Lord Wu of Zheng, 19, 21, 231  Lord Xi of Lu, 34, 134, 226n5 Lord Xi of Qi, 25–26, 120, 251 Lord Xi of Xu, 189 Lord Xian of Jin, 38–42, 64–65, 72, 122, 136–37, 225, 225n4, 226n7, 227 Lord Xian of Wei, 57–58, 60, 121, 124, 137, 164 Lord Xiang of Jin, 226, 252n5 Lord Xiang of Lu, 59, 162, 264 Lord Xiang of Qi, 32, 251–52 Lord Xiang of Song, 67, 259 Lord Xiang of Wei, 121, 183, 256 Lord Xiang of Zheng, 54, 91, 111–12 Lord Xiao of Qi, 134

2 93

Lord Xuan of Lu, 59, 62, 118 Lord Xuan of Song, 238 Lord Xuan of Wei, 37, 124 Lord Yi of Wei, 59n13, 112, 166 Lord Yin of Lu, 25, 31, 153 Lord Yin of Zhu, 246 Lord Zhao of Lu, 46n24, 127–28, 133, 144– 46, 148–51, 164, 239 Lord Zhao of Zheng, 49. See also Gongzi Hu Lord Zhuang of Lu, 33, 35, 87–88, 118, 125 Lord Zhuang of Qi, 61–62, 141–42, 144, 146, 216 Lord Zhuang of Song, 157n6 Lord Zhuang of Wei (r. 751–723), 35, 37 Lord Zhuang of Wei (Kuaikui, r. 480–478), 245–46, 255–56 Lord Zhuang of Xu, 26 Lord Zhuang of Zheng, 19–30, 35, 48–49, 54, 223–24, 231, 264–65 Lord Zhuang of Zhu, 167  love and lovers, 19, 22, 35–36, 54n6, 60, 102n17, 112, 147, 149–50, 165–66, 171, 180, 198, 251, 255 Lu (domain), 27, 49, 68, 133–34, 137, 144– 46, 148–51, 155–57, 172, 195, 217, 242–47, 250–51, 259, 263–64; and Annals, 3, 5, 9–10, 25, 70; diplomacy, 9, 134, 136–37, 186, 233–35, 244–47, 267, 272–73, 275, 276; leaders, 45, 154; lineages, 30, 44– 47, 60, 133, 243–44; ritual and ritual ­propriety, 9, 117–19, 125–28, 136–37, 153– 55, 161–63, 236–42; rulers, xiii, 17, 25, 87–88, 153–54; succession crises, 31–35; women, 59–62 Lü Ji of Qi, 195  Lü Jiang (wife of Lord Zhuang of Wei), 256  Lü Xiang of Jin, 225 Luan (lineage in Jin), 147, 250n4 Luan (lineage in Qi), 216–17 Luan Qian of Jin, 110–12 Luan Shu of Jin, 92, 95–97, 105, 107–8, 110, 119, 250n4 Luo (river), 135 Luo (settlement of nine cauldrons), 155 Lupu Gui, 144

294

S u b j e c t I n de x

Man (non-Sinitic people), 55, 108, 267, 268, 271, 272  mandate, 113, 134 Mao (lineage in Zhou), 176 markets, 147, 165, 172–73, 175, 205, 211, 213 marshes, 94, 98, 102, 125, 135, 164, 166, 192, 214; Dong Marsh, 102; He Marsh, 125; Mengzhu Marsh, 82; Xing Marsh, 98, 166 martyrdom, 50, 53n3  Master of Chu: King Cheng, 68, 77, 79, 222–23; King Gong, 105–6, 109, 111, 123; King Kang, 182; King Ling, 182, 185–91, 193–94; King Wen, 51; King Zhao, 159– 60; King Zhuang, 91, 95, 100, 102, 135 Master of Tan, 273 Master of Wu: Fuchai, 234; Shoumeng, 55; Yimei, 228 Master of Zhu, 159, 167. See also Lord Wen of Zhu; Lord Yin of Zhu Maxims for the Military, 100 Mencius, 239 Meng (lineage in Lu), 60, 148–49, 243–44 Meng Jiangnü, 62  Meng Ren (wife of Lord Zhuang of Lu), 33  Meng Xianzi of Lu, 60, 105  Meng Xizi of Lu, 237–39  Meng Yizi of Lu, 149, 244  Meng Zi (wife of Lord Zhao of Lu), 242 Mengbing of Lu, 44, 47 Mengming of Qin, 158  merit, 8, 26, 28, 136, 225–27, 231, 254, 266–68 Mi (younger sister of King Zhao of Chu), 49, 158  military, 13, 84; attire, 231; in Chu, 106, 160, 181, 183, 194, 198; communications, 265n1; dance, 51–52; expeditions, 9, 61, 92, 106, 147, 222–23, 254n6; formations, 92; and hunting, 86, 153–54; in Jin, 83, 92, 136, 170–71, 185; Maxims for the Mili­ tary, 100; officers, 75, 78, 108–9, 113; and overlord, 63; records, 78; regimen, 93, 171; requisitions, 241; and rhetoric, 133; and ritual, 115, 118; of Shusun lineage, 149; in Song, 89; strategy, 87, 202, 264;

supervisor of, in Cai, 203; support, 225n4; threat, 64; victories, 39, 63, 83, 248; in Wei, 166; in Zheng, 213;. See also battle; warfare Min (non-Sinitic people), 188 Mo of Cai. See Scribe Mo of Cai morale, 58, 79, 90, 96, 101 morality, 4, 7, 13, 15, 23–25, 37, 49, 87, 88n2, 102, 104–5, 141, 219, 230, 237, 257, 264  mothers, 22, 38n11, 48–50, 55–57, 73, 136, 161, 204, 242n6, 267n3; in-law, 131; non-­ Sinitic, 38n12, 65n2, 67n4; of official, 22, 140; stepmothers, 43n17. See also Ding Si; Lady Jiang of Zheng; Mu Jiang; Qi Jiang; Shu Wei; Zhong Zi Mound of Xia, 276 Mount Tai, 117n2 mountains, 79, 117n2, 129n15, 135, 140, 147, 154, 162, 195, 225, 276 mourning, 32, 116–17, 209, 242, 246, 276, 277 Mu Ji (wife of Lord Mu of Qin), 49, 226n7 Mu Jiang (wife, mother, and grandmother of three Lu rulers), 49, 59–62 murder, 4, 28, 31–34, 37, 43, 53, 125, 133, 138– 39, 146, 175, 185n3, 193n11, 243, 252 music, 51, 56, 123, 161–62, 164–65, 174, 209, 217, 240, 259. See also bells; chimes; drums Music Master, 6, 164–65, 259 mutilation, 71, 168, 172–73, 178n5, 190n8, 193 Nanyang (region), 74 narrative, 32–33, 45n19, 86, 100, 138, 148, 236, 238n1; battle, 100, 104–5; characteristics of Zuozhuan, 5–9, 11–17, 201, 221, 248, 252, 279; flashback (chu), 23, 37, 41, 60. See also Lord Zhuang of Zheng Ning Zhi of Wei, 58, 137 Ning Zhuangzi of Wei, 166, 167n20  Niu of Lu, 45–47  noble (ren), 224, 250. See also humaneness noble man (junzi), 98, 111, 134, 208, 210, 218, 246, 275n5; ; on Annals, 22, 24, 138; on Cai, 51; on Chen, 213; as commentator,

S u b j e c t I n de x

7, 15, 24, 152, 236; Confucius on, 232–33, 239, 241; contrasted with petty man, 208, 259; on Jin, 83, 128, 156–57; on Lu, 163, 272; as moral exemplar, 28, 121, 230, 232; on Song, 62, 89, 90, 187; on Wei, 37; on Xu, 213; on Zheng, 22, 24, 27–28, 44, 180, 187, 232–33; on Zhu, 158–89. See also lineages noble son, 21, 37, 38–39, 44, 64–70, 124–25, 212 noblemen, 52–53, 93, 120, 123, 145n13, 179, 181–83, 209, 216, 233, 242  non-Sinitic groups, 38, 240, 264. See also Di; Gaoluo; Lai; Min; Rong; Man; Qianggaoru; Yi; Yue obedience, 131, 261 offerings, 61, 89n3, 258; to ancestors, 137; gifts, 34, 137, 261; meat from hunt, 98; spoils of war, 86; toasts, 112–13, 123; tribute, 222–23, 229–30. See also sacrifice omens, 9, 16, 28, 58, 66, 69, 74n12, 105, 142, 212, 257–59, 271  oracle bones, 8, 102, 255 Ousted Lord of Wei. See Lord of Wei, Ousted overlord, 4–5, 27, 89, 94, 126, 231. See also covenant chief; King Ling of Chu; Lord Huan of Qi; Lord Wen of Jin; Lord Zhuang of Zheng palaces: Feng Palace in Zhou, 187; in Chu, 52, 182, 185, 198; in Jin, 42, 70–71, 138; in Lu, 46, 60–62, 147, 244, 264; palace gate of Lu, 34; in Qi, 143, 252; Qiu Palace in Wei, 124; Siqi Palace in Jin, 259–60; staff, 89, 96, 190, 213; in Wei, 255–56; in Wu, 161; Zhanghua Palace in Chu, 191– 92; in Zheng, 213; Zhi Palace in Zhou, 196 Pan Dang of Chu, 98–99, 101–2, 110 Pan Wang of Chu, 92, 96, 110 Pengsheng. See Gongzi Pengsheng Prince Ai of Cai, 50–51 Prince Hui of Tang, 100–1

2 95

Prince Ling of Cai, 193 Prince of Jin: Lord Dao, 156, 165, 269; Lord Ding, 151; Lord Jing, 56, 104, 162, 176, 252–53; Lord Li, 57, 105, 109–10, 120, 225, 268; Lord Xian, 118, 122; Lord Ping, 127, 185, 259; Lord Qing, 150; Lord Wen, 223 Prince of Xi, 50–51 principles, 155; of composition, 11, 16; cosmic, 127; in history, 11, 16; of political order, 4, 116, 118 prisoners, 75, 81, 83, 89–90, 101–2, 113, 156, 166, 182–83, 191, 228, 257 prophecy, 16, 132, 243 Pu (settlement in Jin), 39, 64–65, 71 Pucheng. See Pu Pugu (lineage), 219 punishment, 80n20, 92–93, 106, 152, 168– 80, 202, 209; of cultural others, 74; of domains, 26, 67, 84, 92, 225n4, 227, 231; for insubordination, 27–28, 83, 90, 112, 125, 150, 155, 204, 245; rewards and, 129, 150, 165; supernatural, 160, 185, 193; virtue and, 92–93, 264; of wrongdoers, 43, 55, 104, 214–15, 231, 236, 250, 268. See also execution; killing; mutilation Qi (domain), 5, 27, 32–35, 37, 107, 141–44, 146–48, 172–73, 186, 215–20, 239, 259, 263, 265; ancestry of, 195, 219, 222, 275; in battle, 27, 61, 77, 87–88, 105; Chong’er in, 63, 65; and Chu, 54, 222–23; fleeing to Qi, 38, 45–47, 54, 125; and Jin, 76, 225, 231, 250, 253–55, 268; leaders, 33–34, 240, 243, 252, 265; and Lu, 87–88, 118, 149– 50, 155, 172, 234–35, 237, 240–41, 243– 45; and Wei, 48, 59n13, 235n20, 256–57; women from, 34n6, 35, 37, 44, 46n23, 63, 66, 120. See also Battle of An Qˇı (domain), 136–37 Qi Jiang (wife of Lord Xian of Jin), 38, 42 Qi Liang of Qˇı, 61–62 Qiaoru (lineage), 138 Qin (domain), 43, 49, 68, 73, 77, 85n29, 135n3, 224–27, 230, 234–35, 274 Qing (lineage in Jin), 147

296

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Qing Feng of Qi, 141, 144, 188–89 Qingfu of Lu, 33–34, 125–26 Qu (lineage in Chu), 55 Qu (place in Jin), 39, 64 Qu Dang of Chu, 99, 101 Qu Jian of Chu, 173–74 Qu Wan of Chu, 222–23 Qu Wuchen, Lord of Shen, 53– 56, 102n17, 113 Quanrong (non-Sinitic people), 196n18 Queen Mu of Zhou, 276 Quwo (place in Jin), 39–43, 70, 84 Ran Dan of Chu, 182, 194–96, 198–99  Ran Qiu of Lu, 241, 244  rebellions and revolts, 4; against Chu, 55, 197–99; against Jin, 92, 105, 269; in Jin, 70–71, 179n10, 274; in Lu, 234, 244; in Qi, 251–52, 259; in Wei, 37; in Zheng, 23, 171, 211; in Zhou, 73. See also Gongsun Hei; Qing Feng recommendation, 108, 132, 155, 156, 157, 216, 265 record keeping, 8–10  Records (zhi), 204, 231, 267 Records of the Historian (Shiji), 9–11, 15, 202 ren. See humaneness; noble Ren (domain), 272 respect, 36, 64, 68–69, 81, 104, 118, 131, 190, 209  reverence, 13, 121–23, 139, 170, 175, 276 rhetoric, 6, 10–11, 86–87, 175, 182, 269, 272; diplomatic, 69, 132–33, 185n3, 221–36, 264; and history, 132–33; moral, 13, 23, 25, 104; pleasure in, 16–17; and ritual propriety, 27–28, 76; skill, 61, 222, 246 ritual and ritual propriety (li), 4, 7, 115–31, 148, 177–78, 187–88, 190–91, 193, 196; activities, 9, 14, 32–33, 86, 146, 161–62, 211; Confucius on, 236–38, 240–42, 244–47; ideology of, 5, 13–14, 27–28, 61, 132, 152–53, 181, 201–2, 205, 210, 233, 248, 272, 277; and law, 168–69, 175–78, 181; of meetings and visits, 32, 66–68, 81, 177, 186–88, 191, 209, 233, 268, 276; mourning

and burial, 32, 42, 50, 91, 162, 251, 277; in negative evaluations, 84, 90, 140, 154, 163, 172–73, 198n21, 199–200, 268–69, 271; objects, 26, 139, 146, 244, 251; in positive evaluation, 27, 64, 157, 205, 233; and warfare, 13, 26, 51, 74–76, 78–80, 84, 86–87, 90, 92–93, 97–98, 105–6, 223; women, 61–62, 172–73; Yan Ying on, 215, 219. See also sacrifice rivers, 16, 74, 79, 89, 94–95, 100, 102, 117n2, 135, 154, 162–63, 223, 225  Rong (non-Sinitic people), 38–39, 71, 134– 35, 188, 256, 263–65, 268, 269–71, 273, 274–77. See also Jiang Rong; Li Rong; Quanrong; Shan Rong Rong Zi (consort of Lord Ling of Qi), 172–73 Ru (river), 179, 192  Ru Qi of Jin, 116, 127–28, 136, 185 Rui Liangfu of Zhou, 158 Ruo’ao (Chu ancestor), 80, 96 sacrifices, 70, 86, 115–17, 119–23, 143, 153, 160– 62, 197, 246, 250, 262, 271–72; ancestral, for family, 42, 148, 162, 207, 209; for domain, 26, 32, 40, 43, 56, 72–73, 141, 145, 151, 165–67, 212–13, 225, 237; human, 193–94, 199, 219–20; materials, 42, 222– 23, 253; outskirts, 117, 160, 213; for propitiation, 211, 219–20, 257–58, 260; prospect, 117, 200, 213; for rain, 33; vessels, 8, 154, 240–41, 276; to Yellow River, 104, 160. See also animals; offerings sages, 3, 16, 108, 138, 147n16, 177, 190, 237– 38, 242. See also Yellow Emperor; Yu salt, 147, 218 Scribe Mo of Cai, 133, 144, 148, 151, 164, 179, 219, 249, 260–61 scribes, 14–15, 133, 137–42, 146, 196, 198, 219–20, 258, 267; and Annals, 3; duties, 162, 165–67, 206, 212–13; and history, 141, 144, 270, 277; predictions by, 155, 159–60; as prognosticator in divination, 61, 110, 142, 255; as writers, 81, 144, 172n4. See also Scribe Mo of Cai

S u b j e c t I n de x

sea, 4, 6, 91, 117n2. See also Southern Sea season, 98, 106, 119, 129, 154, 173, 214, 218, 251, 270, 273 Seasonal Hunt, 86, 154n1, 194,  sex and sexuality, 30, 43n17, 49–51, 55, 119– 20, 250. See also liaisons, sexual sexagenary cycle, 21  Shan Rong (non-Sinitic people), 122 Shang Documents (Shangshu) 51, 156  Shang dynasty, 30, 89, 102, 132, 134–35, 155– 57, 178, 187–88, 225, 258, 272, 277 Shao (lineage in Zhou), 176  Shaohao (lineage), 272–73 Shaoling (place between Qi and Chu), 187, 223 Shen (place in Cai), 37, 51, 77, 258 Shen (place in Chu), 19, 82, 106, 187, 193 Shen Shushi of Chu, 54, 105–6 Shen Wuyu of Chu, 181, 183, 189, 191, 194, 199 Shen Xu of Lu, 32, 257 Shensheng of Jin, 38–43, 56n8, 63–64, 249 Shi Wei of Jin, 39, 64, 65n1 Shi Zhuangbo of Jin, 92, 99, 268 Shili (place in Jin), 150  shoes, 147, 217, 252 Shu Wei (mother of Zhao Dun), 48, 65, 72 Shuangjiu (lineage), 219 Shusun (lineage in Lu) 33–34, 44, 47, 60n16, 128n11, 138, 148–49, 243 Shusun Bao of Lu, 44–47, 249 Shusun Chuo of Lu, 46–47, 148, 273 Shusun Qiaoru of Lu, 45, 60, 144 Shuxiang of Jin, 55–57, 146–48, 175–78, 184, 189, 191, 256, 276–77 Shuxing of Zhou, 81, 258 Si (lineage in Zheng), 171, 204–5 Si (river), 135n3  sieges, 75–78, 91  silk, 36, 68, 88, 119, 150, 190, 234, 254; silkworms, 66 Sima Qian, 9–10, 15, 17, 30, 51n2, 202, 233 sisters, 129, 141; in-law, 50; of rulers, 49–50, 56, 59, 119–20, 251, 255; as wives, 34–35, 38–39, 41–42, 65; snakes, 28, 249, 257

297

society and social practices, 4, 7, 9, 11, 115, 164 Son of Heaven, 28, 69, 74, 117, 119–20, 122– 23, 145, 165, 191, 195, 231–32, 266, 273 Song (domain), 59, 62, 76–77, 89–90, 117n1, 154, 157, 186, 213, 238 Southern Sea, 222, 276 speakers, 6, 11–12, 22, 37n9, 132, 201, 221–22, 233–34 speeches, 6, 8–15, 17, 25, 27–28, 173, 221–23, 259–60; and historical explanation, 11, 86, 132, 157, 160, 225, 257, 270, 274; and statecraft, 121, 190–91, 201, 225, 233, 269– 70, 275n6; and war, 87, 91, 102, 105, 116; of women, 55, 60 spirits, 59, 106, 135, 137, 165, 210, 213, 240, 249–50, 254, 257–58; ancestral, 109; and Annals, 9; blessings and punishment, 26, 106; and covenants, 234, 254; and divination, 255; and sacrifice, 43, 88, 119, 121, 161–62, 165, 200, 262, 272; spirit tablets, 109, 172, 195; in Zuozhuan, 13. See also gods; Zhongwu Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu, Annals), xiii, 3–6, 9–15, 31, 69, 81–83, 86, 133, 138, 237, 247, 279; exegesis of ­passages, 21–24, 32, 43–44, 70, 117–18, 126n9, 151, 154, 242–43, 258 Spring and Autumn period, 3–5, 115–16, 155, 168, 176–77, 201, 221, 279 Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Yan (Yanzi chunqiu), 202, 215 statesmen, 12, 157, 201, 202 stew, 22, 139, 218 stewards, 31, 37, 97, 116–17, 122, 143, 164, 185, 233–34, 243–44 Su (domain), 272 Su (river), 226 subordinate domain, 4, 72, 95, 97, 150 subtlety, 23, 138, 237 succession, 5, 33; crises, 25, 28, 30–49, 63, 119–20, 172; normal, 38, 51n2, 68, 134, 169, 182, 226–27; of officials, 144, 207, 246, 254. See also Taibo Sui (river), 160, 160n10

298

S u b j e c t I n de x

suicide, 42, 50, 82, 113, 140, 143, 170–71, 182; by hanging, 34, 37, 42, 172, 199 Sun Linfu of Wei, 57–58, 124–25, 137 Sunshu Ao of Chu, 95, 100 sympathy, 17, 141, 157, 164n17 Taibo (ancestor of Wu), 40, 136, 233 Taihao (ancient ruler), 273 Tan (domain), 118, 272 Tang (domain), 100 Tang (founder of Shang dynasty), 157 Tang Gou of Chu, 110, 112 Tang Shu (founder of Jin), 68, 84, 179, 276–77 Taotang (lineage), 261 taxation, 130, 138, 207, 213, 240–42 teachers and teaching, 9–12, 15, 30, 59, 115, 124–25, 131, 163, 165, 169, 177, 202, 211, 233, 238, 239 textiles, 129n15 The Spring and Autumn Annals of Master Yan (Yanzi chunqiu), 202, 215 Three Dynasties, 56, 144. See also Shang dynasty; Xia dynasty; Zhou dynasty toasts, 32, 50, 59, 68–69, 74, 81, 123, 142, 177, 240–41 trees, 47, 66, 101, 140, 162, 173, 180, 241, 266, 271 turtles and turtle shells, 8, 41, 43–44, 58n12, 73, 199, 212–13, 228–29 virtue (de), 27, 217, 264; display of, 53, 64, 83, 103, 135, 154–55, 188, 196, 230, 238, 240–41; among domains, 64, 74, 78, 83, 103, 186, 203, 223, 227, 230; within domain, 25, 36, 130, 168–70, 178, 214, 217–20, 258; personal quality, 56, 61, 63, 75, 113, 122, 157, 160, 186, 218–20; in warfare, 27, 92–93, 96, 100, 103, 106, 170; of Zhou, 27, 74–75, 135, 178, 266–67. See also punishment walls, 61–62, 124, 179, 189, 198, 223, 238, 266; of domain capital, 26, 76, 91, 142, 213, 223–24, 226, 245, 256; of residence, 33,

138, 143, 149, 256; of secondary city, 19–21, 39, 64–65, 189, 243–44 Wang Chong, 248–49 Wang Ji (father of King Wen of Zhou), 40n13, 84, 136 Wangcheng (place in Qin), 71, 74 Wangzi Dai of Zhou, 73, 266 warfare, 7, 17, 27, 28, 86–114, 121, 153, 263. See also battles; military Warring States period, 202, 221, 263 weapons, 35–36, 80, 87, 101, 166, 204–5, 216, 240; in definition of “martial,” 102–3; prepared before battle, 21, 25, 113, 213, 216. See also archery; armor; armor and weapons; ax; halberd Wei (domain), 26, 66, 68n6, 195, 212–13, 263–65, 276; and Chu, 121, 183, 186; and Jin, 57, 76–78, 84, 105, 255–57; and Qi, 48, 234–35, 265; strife in, 35–38, 57–60, 124–25, 136–37, 165–67, 237, 241, 245– 46, 255–57 Wei (lineage in Jin), 146 Wei (lineage in Lu), 32 Wei (river), 4, 71, 240  Wei Chou of Jin, 65, 77 Wei Jiang of Jin, 170–71, 263–64, 269–70 Wei Qiqiang of Chu, 182, 185, 189–91, 194 Wei Shu of Jin, 260–61 Wei Yi of Jin, 98–102, 110–11 Wen (place in Zhou and Jin), 74–75, 83, 176 Wen (river), 240  Wen Jiang (wife of Lord Huan), 32–33, 49, 145 Wen Ying (wife of Lord Wen of Jin), 49, 158n7 Western Zhou. See Zhou Western Zhou dynasty, 187n4, 188n7, 221 White Di (non-Sinitic people), 227 wives, 30, 41, 49, 55–59, 61–62, 120, 129, 131, 141–42, 147n16, 172, 242, 252, 256; of Jin ruler, 38, 41–42, 49, 63, 66, 68–69, 71, 136–37; of Lu ruler, 32–34, 59–61, 117n1, 138, 162, 242; of officials, 44–46, 48–50, 57, 65, 67, 72, 141–42; of rulers, 19, 35, 37, 49–52, 62, 166, 172; secondary, 30. See also sisters; Xia Ji

S u b j e c t I n de x

women, 48–62, 66–68, 91, 139, 201, 213, 242, 254; of non-Sinitic groups, 38, 63, 65, 67n4, 72n10, 159, 266; and political conflict, 25, 28, 32, 66–67, 172–73, 216. See also Accounts of Notable Women; daughters; ritual; sisters; speeches; wives writing, 5, 8–10, 14–17, 102, 137–38, 165, 201, 265 Wu (domain) 5, 55, 133, 160, 182, 228–29, 234, 272 Wu Jiang, 19–25 Wu Ju, 185–89 Wucheng (place in Chu), 105, 187–88 Wulu (place in Wei), 66, 76, 78 Xi (lineage in Cao), 77 Xi (lineage in Jin), 105, 108, 114, 147 Xi (place in Chu), 50–51, 82 Xi Chou of Jin, 57, 105 Xi Fuji of Cao, 48, 66–67, 76–77 Xi Gui (wife of Prince of Xi and King Wen of Chu), 50–51 Xi Ke of Jin, 92, 99 Xi Yi of Jin, 101, 105, 110 Xi Zhi of Jin, 105, 107–8, 111–12, 123–24 Xia (lineage in Chen), 53 Xia (river), 199 Xia Documents, 160, 165, 174–75 Xia dynasty, 30, 134–37, 157, 178, 187n4, 188n7, 225, 240, 258, 270 Xia Ji, 52–56, 102n17 Xian Hu of Jin, 92–95, 97, 99 Xian Zhen of Jin, 76–78, 80, 107, 116,  Xiang the Elder of Chu, 54, 102 Xiang Xu of Song, 87, 173, 187–88, 194 Xianwu (Lord Ai of Cai), 51 Xie Ye of Chen, 52–53, 237 Xin You of Zhou, 271, 277 Xing (domain), 265 Xing (place in Chu), 223 Xing (place in Jin), 54, 265 Xing (place in Zheng), 98, 112. See also under marshes Xinian (Chronological accounts), 51n1 Xiongyi of Chu, 195

299

Xiqi of Jin, 38–39, 41–42 Xu (domain), 25–28, 48, 84, 147, 185, 189, 194–95, 198, 204, 213 Xu (lineage in Jin), 147 Xuan Jiang (wife of Lord Xuan of Wei), 37, 49 Xun Linfu of Jin, 92, 94–95, 100, 104 Xun Shou of Jin, 54n5, 92, 94, 97, 101–2 Yan Yi Ji (wife of Lord Ling of Qi), 172 Yan Ying of Qi, 127, 130, 141, 143–44, 146, 148, 201, 215–19 Yang Youji of Chu, 99, 110–12 Yangshe (lineage in Jin), 55–57, 148 Yangshe Chi of Jin, 57, 156, 170 Yangzi River, 4, 91, 160n10, 185 Yao (place in Jin), 226, 274 Yao Gou’er of Zheng, 106–7 Yao Zi (consort of Lord Mu of Zheng), 56 Yellow Emperor, 74, 249; lineage of, 273 Yellow River, 4, 8, 69–70, 76, 82–83, 92, 94–95, 99, 104, 107, 117n2, 151, 160, 167, 222, 224, 227, 254–55, 263 Yellow Springs (underworld), 21, 23  Yi (river in Lu), 148 Yi (non-Sinitic people) 55, 137, 240, 263, 267–68, 271–72, 276. See also Eastern Yi Yi (river near Zhou), 271  Yi Hangfu of Chen, 52–53, 55 Yi Jiang (concubine of first Lord Zhuang of Wei, wife of Lord Xuan of Wei), 37 Yin (lineage in Lu), 31–32, 81 Yin (lineage in Zhou), 81 Yin Duan of Zheng, 121, 204–5 Ying Kaoshu of Zheng, 22–28 Yiwu. See Lord Hui of Jin Yong Ji (daughter of Zhai Zhong of Zheng), 28, 49–50 Yong Jiu of Zheng, 28, 49–50  You (lineage in Zheng), 171 You Ji of Zheng, 128, 185, 190, 206, 210, 212– 14, 231–32 Youfeng Bo Ling (lineage), 219  Youreng (lineage), 56 Yu (domain), 135–36

30 0

S u b j e c t I n de x

Yu (sage), 157, 225, 258 Yuan (lineage in Jin), 147 Yue (domain), 5, 159, 173, 263 Yulong (lineage), 261 Yun (lineage), 270  Zang (lineage in Lu), 148 Zang Aibo of Lu, 155n3, 157 Zang Wenzhong of Lu, 157, 236 Zang Xibo of Lu, 153, 155n3 Zang Zhaobo of Lu, 149 Zangsun (lineage in Lu), 155n3 Zhai Zhong of Zheng, 20, 28, 49–50 Zhan Xi of Lu, 134, 271 Zhang (lineage), 33–34 Zhang (river), 160 Zhang Lao of Jin, 170–71 Zhao (lineage in Jin), 146, 176, 180, 250n3, 252 Zhao Chuan of Jin, 138, 140–41 Zhao Cui of Jin, 48, 65, 69, 72, 75, 176 Zhao Dun of Jin, 48, 65, 72, 138–41, 168, 176, 179n9 Zhao Ji (wife of Zhao Cui of Jin), 48, 72 Zhao Kuo of Jin, 72, 92, 97, 250  Zhao Tong of Jin, 72, 92, 97, 250 Zhao Wu of Cai, 197–98 Zhao Wu of Jin, 181, 184, 197n20, 231 Zhao Yang of Jin, 128, 130, 179, 180, 256 Zhao Yingqi of Jin, 72, 92, 97, 99, 250, 252  Zhao Zhan of Jin, 98–101 Zheng (domain), 19–30, 85n29, 89–92, 120, 163, 168, 171–72, 177–80, 232, 238, 249, 263–67; anomalies, 251, 257, 260; and Chu, 89–92, 95–97, 105–8, 110–12, 182– 87, 189–91, 195, 230; and Jin, 67, 81, 92, 96–97, 99, 105, 119, 190, 223–26, 229–33, 274; and Lu, 31–32; and Qin, 223–26, 274; and ritual propriety, 119–21; succession crises, 35, 43–44; women, 48–51, 52–54, 56, 58, 254; and Zhou, 81. See also Zichan Zheng (lineage), 171 Zhi (lineage in Jin), 101n16

Zhi Wenzi of Jin, 150–51, 276 Zhi Ying of Jin, 101, 102n17, 105 Zhong Zi (wife of Lord Hui of Lu), 116–17 Zhong Zi (wife of Lord Ling of Qi), 173 Zhonghang (lineage in Jin), 101n16, 179–80  Zhonghang Yan of Jin, 105, 253–55 Zhongren of Lu, 44, 46–47 Zhongwu (god), 31–32 Zhongyong of Wu, 233, 263 Zhòu (last king of Shang), 30, 96, 135, 157, 188, 192, Zhou (lineage in Lu), 50 Zhou Changes (Yijing, The Book of Changes), 59, 61, 74n13, 94, 110n25, 142, 260, 262. See also hexagrams; divination Zhou Documents, 53, 113, 133, 169–70, 206 Zhou dynasty, xi, 40n13, 89n3, 132, 134–35, 141, 147n16, 178–79, 187–88, 196n17, 225, 242n6, 258; and Chu, 134–35, 195, 222– 23, 275; court, 8, 10; Eastern, xi, 9; and Jin, 73–75, 111n27, 136–37, 268–71, 276– 77; king, 36, 63, 81–82, 237, 247n10, 263; and Odes, 69, 93, 158, 192, 217, 255; order, 4–5, 15, 26–27, 150, 191–92, 232, 266–67, 274; and ritual propriety, 120–21, 125–27, 176–77, 201, 233, 268–69, 272; scribes, 155, 160; Western, xi, 56n9, 188, 221; and Zheng, 28, 91n4, 97, 211–12, 230–32, 266–67. See also Taibo; Zhou Changes; Zhou Documents; Zhou Duke Zhou Duke. See Duke of Zhou Zhou kings, 26–27, 73–74, 81, 237, 247, 276  Zhou Zhiqiao of Guo and Jin, 77, 83 Zhoulai (place in Chu), 194 Zhouxu of Wei, 35–37 Zhuozi of Jin, 38, 41–42 Zhu (domain), 34, 158–59, 167, 186, 246, 271–72 Zhu Xi, 14 Zhuang, 14, 51. See also King Wen of Chu Zhuang (lineage), 136 Zhuang Jiang (wife of Lord Zhuang of Wei), 35

S u b j e c t I n de x

Zhuanxu (ancient ruler), 273 Zhuyong (place in Jin), 254 Zi of the Lesser Rong (consort of Lord Xian of Jin), 38 Zibo of Wei, 124, 166 Zichan of Zheng, 28, 133, 152, 162–63, 184– 88, 201–16, 236; on anomalies, 249, 251, 260; on governance, 168, 171–72, 177–79, 182, 187–88, 194, 229–33; on ritual, 116, 127–28 Zichong of Chu, 55, 95, 106, 108–9, 111–13 Zidu, 25–26, 28

301

Zifan of Chu, 53–55, 95, 106, 108, 113–14, 123  Zifu Jingbo of Lu, 126–27, 234 Zigong of Lu, 217, 233–37, 246–47  Ziguo of Zheng, 203 Zijia (lineage in Lu), 148 Zijia Yibo of Lu, 127, 148–49, 151 Zikong of Zheng, 203, 209 Zilu of Lu, 237, 243–46 Zishang of Zheng, 212, 217  Zisi of Zheng, 105, 107 Zong (lineage of Yi), 261 Zuo Qiuming, 3, 10, 12