The Trajectory of Baloch Resistance in Pakistan

Citation preview

ISSN 2521-845X

Volume 1I

Number 1

January 2018

Journal of Asian Politics and Society -- JAPS

Editor

Bhuian Md. Monoar Kabir

CAS Center for Asian Studies

Center for Asian Studies (CAS) Department of Political Science University of Chittagong

Table of Contents

Pages

Moonis Ahmar

Theory and Practice of Work Ethics: A Case Study of Pakistan

Khadga KC Hari Prakash Chand

Sino-Indian Relations: Implications to Nepal

TANG Qingye

Media Representations of Drug Issues in China

1-18

19-53 54-91

Sarwar Alam

Sufi Shaykhs and the Followers: Reassessing Their Relationships in the Voting Patterns In Contemporary Bangladeshi Elections

Ashish Shukla

The Trajectory of Baloch Resistance in Pakistan

Shajeda Aktar

Determinants of family planning in the remote Char areas (mid channel bars) in Bangladesh

92-134

135-163

164-182

The Trajectory of Baloch Resistance in Pakistan Ashish Shukla*

Pakistan came into existence in August 1947 with an aim of providing homeland to the Muslim populace of the Indian subcontinent and ensuring their physical, economic, religious as well as civilisational security from the Hindu majority of India. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was regarded as “the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity,”1 ironically chose to become the individual, by name, most responsible for the partition of India. The controversial “Two Nation Theory,” propagated by the leaders of All India Muslim League (AIML) was to be the reason d’être for the creation of Pakistan. The highly communal and divisive “Two Nation Theory” was based on the idea that India’s Muslims and Hindus constituted two “nations” thus deserved two separate states. Early leaders of Pakistan envisioned Islam to be monolithic and work as a unifying force to hold the people together. However, this did not go down well in a region that historically not only have but celebrated multiple kinds of diversities. Ever since the creation of Pakistan, different ethno-linguistic-cultural groups started making assertions for the recognition of their distinct identities. Instead of accepting some of the genuine concerns of the asserting groups and addressing them in a satisfactory manner, the state establishment considered it as a daunting challenge and a threat to the unity and integrity of the country that needed to be dealt with sternly. The rulers deliberately ignored the fact that all the five provinces constituting Pakistan—Punjab, Sindh, North West *

Research Fellow, Indian Council on World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi.

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Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan and East Pakistan— had historically been the repository of their own history, language, and cultural heritage. The people took certain pride in their distinct identities that they wanted to preserve even after the creation of Pakistan. However, that was unacceptable to the leaders at the helm who had already decided to disassociate with anything and everything appearing to have a connection with India. In such a situation, the rulers tried to impose a “Common Religious Identity” in hope to subside the dissenting voices. This did not produce the desired outcome. The growing suspicion and anger over the years gave way to volatile separatist tendencies in East Pakistan, North West Frontier Province (Now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and Sindh. Many scholars and analysts also include the case of Balochistan in this category. However, the people of Balochistan believe that their case is an outright occupation by Pakistan and should not be branded as separatist movement or insurgency. The Land and People of Balochistan Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan accounting for 43.6 percent of territory (347,190 Sq, Km) and 73.61 percent of coastline (760 Km) but inhibiting merely 4.96 percent of its population.2 Geo-politically and strategically, the province is considered to be the most important region of Pakistan as it shares borders with two states—Iran on the west and Afghanistan on the north. Domestically, its location is such that all other provinces— Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP)—share their internal boundaries with it. Broadly, the province could be divided into four district zones—upper high lands, lower high lands, plains, and deserts. The upper highlands include Makran, Kharan and Chaghi

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ranges in the West and Sulaiman, Pab, Kirther in the east. Districts of Zhob, Killa Saifullah, Pishin, Quetta, Ziarat and Kalat come under the upper highlands. The lower highlands are situated in the southeastern Balochistan excluding Kachi, Dera Bugti and Nasirabad districts. Plains relatively cover a small portion of the overall Balochistan territory which includes Kachi plain, the southern part of Dera Bugti district, and narrow area along the Mekran coast stretching from Kachi to the Iranian border. The province is immensely rich in terms of natural wealth. Most of Pakistan’s energy resources are located in this very province. The province possesses great unexplored potential of metalic and non-metalic minerals. However, due to the tough terrain and scarcity of water it is also one of the most difficult places to live. The climate of the upper highlands witness very cold winters and warm summers, while the lower highlands vary from extreme cold in the northern districts to mild conditions closer to the Mekran coast. The summers are often hot and dry. The arid zones of Chaghi and Kharan districts witness extremely hot summers. The plain areas too have very hot summers with temperatures shooting up to 50 degrees. Winters in plain areas are often mild as the temperature never goes below the freezing point. However, the occasional windstorms make these areas very inhospitable. The neighbouring Pashtun, living in riverine fertile valley, describe Balochistan as “the dump where Allah shot the rubbish of creation.”3 The Baloch people are found primarily in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan. There is a significant Baloch Diaspora in Muscat, Oman too. Balochi and Brahvi are the two important languages being spoken in Balochistan. However, in the wake of “Holy Afghan War”, and the arrival of Afghan refugees into

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the province the poshtu language too has spread in this part of the world. Balochi is spoken by a number of tribes including Rind,

Lashar, Marri, Jamot, Ahmedzai, Bugti, Domki, Magsi, Kenazai, Khosa, Rakhashani, Dashti, Umrani, Nosherwani, Gichki, Buledi, Notazai, Sanjarani, Meerwani, Zahrozai, Langove, Kenazai, and Khidai.4 Tribes that speak Brahvi include Raisani, Shahwani, Sumulani, Sarparrah, Bangulzai, Mohammad Shahi, Lehri, Bezenjo, Mohammad Hasni, Zehri, Mengal, Kurd Sasoli, Stakzai, Lango, Rodeni, Kalmati, Jattak, Yagazehi, and Qambarani.5 Some of them are also fluent in Balochi. Among the existing 18 major Baloch tribes, the Bugtis and Marrishold sway in most of the areas. The tribal chief is known as Sardar, while the head of sub tribes are referred to as Malik, Takari or Mir. Historically, Sardari system had been the core of the tribal structure in which Sardars exercised absolute control over their fellow tribesmen and functioned as the chief executive, legislature, and judge.6 Each of the major tribal groupings used to be controlled by chieftain and some 400 lesser chieftains heading the sub-tribal groupings.7 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wanted to reduce the powers of Sardars in the system. So, he outlawed the Sardari system with a stroke of a pen on April 8, 1976 and invited military inside the province to implement his decision.8 However, their hold and influence continued even after that. The Emergence of Ethno-Nationalism Ethno-Nationalism is considered to be a byproduct of rising self awareness and identity consciousness of an ethnic group. Often, this consciousness is primarily based on socio-psychological and cultural traits of an ethnic group that want to preserve its separate

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identity. Sometimes, the separate ethnic identity determines the behaviour or the political action of the group. The rising ethnic sentiment could be goal-oriented and seek redistribution of power and natural resources.9 Paul R. Brass argues that ethno-national movements based on shared meaning of common descent are a formulation of elites in an appropriate group to mobilise political support for a variety of objectives ranging from autonomy to secession, to statehood.10 Ethnic movements and nationalist movements although appear to be the same, however, there is a marked distinction between the two. A. D. Smith suggests that the goal of ethno-political elite is often to gain some advantage within an existing state, while the nationalists want to establish or maintain their own state.11 The origins of the Baloch nationalism could be traced back to the 1920s when Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran tried to incorporate the area into Iran in 1928. During the British rule, because of the fragmented nature of the Baloch society, the organized national movement could not emerge, although sporadic resistance to colonial subjugation always existed.12 Yusuf Ali Magasi and Abdul Aziz Kurd are believed to be the early leaders of Baloch national movement who laid the foundation of a secret political organization called “Young Baloch” which was later renamed as “Anjuman-e-Ittehad-eBalochistan (Organization of the Unity of the Baloch).13In 1929, Baloch launched their first successful nationalist campaign against the state recruitment leading to the armed mutiny. Next year, in 1930, a number of political groups were formed and an anti-colonial movement named "Quit Balochistan" was launched.14The Anjumane-Ittehad-e-Balochistan, under the leadership of Yousuf Ali Magasi, was no longer a secret organization and worked as a political party

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since 1931. Now, the goal was to establish an independent united Balochistan and have a representative government at the helm. Even, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, who later became the Khan of Kalat, was a supporter of Anjuman.15 Accession of Kalat and the First Wave The anti-colonial movement and the struggle for an Independent India under the leadership of Indian National Congress (INC) were strengthening day by day with the British offering more and more concessions while losing grounds. Against this backdrop, the British Parliament passed the Government of India Act 1935 to assuage the Indian leaders. Khan of Kalat strongly objected to the Government of India Act 1935, as the Act treated the Khanate as a princely state of India. The act was passed by the British Parliament without any consultation with Khan of Kalat. The Khan considered the Government of India Act 1935 an infringement on the 1876 treaty between Kalat and British Government. Article III of the 1876 treaty, in an unambiguous manner, stated that: Whilst on his part Meer Khodadad Khan, Khan of Khelat, binds himself, his heirs and successors, and Sirdars to observe faithfully the provisions of Article Three of the Treaty of 1854,16 the British Government on its part engages to respect the independence of Khelat, and to aid the Khan in case of need, in the maintenance of a just authority and the protection of his territories from external attack, by such means as the British Government at the moment deems expedient.17 In an unfortunate development, Yusuf Ali Magasi died in 1935 after which the left wing of the Anjuman explored the possibilities of reorganization of the movement. Thus, in February 1937, Kalat

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State National Party (KSNP) was founded explicitly endorsing the objectives of the erstwhile Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochistan. The party was dominated by secular-minded, anti-imperialist and populist elements such as Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Gul Khan Nasir, Abdul Aziz Kurd, etc. In its manifesto, KNSP underlined the importance of the geo-strategic location of Balochistan making it a buffer state separating Afghanistan, Iran, and India.18 KSNP’s objective of uniting the Baloch and establishing a sovereign Balochistan had a wide-ranging appeal among the people. However, traditional Sardars were not comfortable with KNSP’s demand to replace Sardari system with the representative form of government, as it potentially threatened the power and privileges of the Sardars in their respective tribes. This latent tussle later manifested in an open clash between the party leaders and some Sardars which resulted in the banning of the party by the Khan administration. All this was happening against the backdrop of India’s ongoing struggle for independence from British colonial rule and AIML’s demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. With the passage of time, it became evident that British would partition India into two states—India and Pakistan— and leave the region. The demand for an independent Balochistan too grew louder. Khan of Kalat, through his legal advisors—I.I. Chundrigar, Sir Sultan Ahmed, Sardar B.K. Memon, Sir Walter Monkton, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had been arguing with the British that like Nepal, Kalat too had its treaty relations with Whitehall (London). Thus, Kalat should not be treated as any other princely state of India. In March 1946, Khan of Kalat also submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet mission emphasizing on the point that the succeeding governments of India and Pakistan would only

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inherit those princely states and other territories that had treaty relations with the colonial government in India, and not those whose treaty relations were with Whitehall. In this memorandum, Khan also invoked Article III of the 1876 Treaty that required the British to respect the Independence of Kalat. It was a legal demand, but the British Indian Government was unimpressed with the argument. Noted Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal is of the view that since Cabinet Mission could not question the demand on the basis of legality, it left the issue unresolved.19 Three months before partition, Jinnah, in his capacity as legal advisor of Khan of Kalat, actually attempted to negotiate with the British colonial government regarding an independent Balochistan. Later, a series of meetings took place between the British Viceroy, Jinnah and the Khan of Kalat resulting in a joint communiqué issued on August 11, 1947. It stated inter alia, that:  The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign state in treaty relations with the British Government with a status different from that of Indian States.  Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases will be inherited by the Pakistan Government.  Meanwhile, a Standstill Agreement has been made between Pakistan and Kalat.  Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at Karachi at an early date with a view to reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communications.20 With the joint communiqué, Pakistan recognised the independence of Kalat. Now, Khan wanted British Crown

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Representative Lord Louis Mountbatten to do the same. The Crown Representative refused to do so, on the basis of an advise by his political advisor, and argued that: The Treaties of 1854 and 1876 do not lead to the inference that Kalat is an independent sovereign state and it has in fact, always been regarded as an Indian state. It figures as such in Part II of the 1st Schedule of the Government of India Act of 1935.21 It was a clear violation of the treaties of 1854 and 1876. Thus, Khan formally announced independence on August 15, 1947 and offered Pakistan for special relations in three key areas-defence, foreign affairs, and communication. Soon after the announcement, a 52 member lower house of Kalat Assembly was chosen to govern the state. Most of these chosen members were in favour of an alliance with Pakistan. At the same time, there was also a consensus on making Kalat’s independence as a precondition of any such relationship.22 Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo, on December 14, 1947 expressed the view of the assembly in his own words and declared that: We have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to amalgamate with Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran also should be amalgamated with Pakistan. They say that we cannot defend ourselves in the atomic age. Well, are Afghanistan, Iran, and even Pakistan capable of defending themselves against super powers? If we cannot defend ourselves, a lot of others cannot do so either. They say we must join Pakistan for economic reasons. Yet, we have minerals, we have petroleum, and we have ports. The question is, what would be Pakistan without us? 23

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Those struggling for the freedom of Balochistan, make similar arguments even today. This makes it amply clear that the Baloch nationalists were widely aware of the strategic location and economic potential of Balochistan. Now, Khan focused himself on getting the leased areas, which Pakistan inherited from British, back into its fold. Meanwhile, the two feudatories of Kalat—Kharan and Las Bela, and Mekran district did not want to revert to the Khanate. The rulers of Kharan and Las Bela even wrote to Jinnah regarding their accession to Pakistan. Legally and technically, the rulers of these feudatories had no right to do so. On August 21, 1947 Mir Mohammed Habibullah Khan, the ruler of Kharan, sent a letter to Jinnah in which he stated inter alia “I announce on behalf of myself and my subjects…and joins Pakistan Dominion as its suzerain and promises to serve Pakistan up to its extent.”24 This was followed by another letter written by Mir Ghulam Qadir, the ruler of Las Bela, on September 5, 1947. In his letter, Qadir stated that he had already written to the Pakistani Prime Minister regarding the accession of Las Bela to Pakistan Dominion.25 Amid these developments, Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah decided to disregard the standstill agreement with Kalat and advised Khan to expedite merger with Pakistan. Soon after Jinnah’s advice, Khan summoned Dar-ul-Awam (Lower house) and Dar-ul-Umara (Upper House) to decide future course of action. Whereas Dar-ul-Awam decided not to accede, Darul-Umara sought three months’ time to take a call. There was hardly any possibility of Khan and other Baloch nationalists compromising on the independence of Kalat. While all this was going on, the Jam of Las Bela, Chief of Kharan and Nawab Bai Khan of Mekran met Jinnah on March 17, 1948 and argued that they would be forced to

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look for other ways if Pakistan did not accept the accession. Following this, Foreign Ministry of Pakistan informed the British Government in London about Pakistan’s acceptance of accession of Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran.26 The accession of these territories to Pakistan meant Khanate losing half of its territory and most importantly its access to the sea. A disgruntled Khan was still arguing out his case with Pakistan when on March 27, 1948 All India Radio news underlined that Khan had been in touch with India regarding the accession of Kalat to Indian Dominion. Now, Khan had to face a Hobson’s choice. He signed the instrument of accession on the same day and Pakistan accepted that on March 31, 1948. This act of Khan did not go down well with many Baloch nationalist leaders including his younger brother Prince Abdul Karim who along with his armed followers left Kalat for Afghanistan in search of some support. He returned to Kalat empty handed in mid July to lead the movement for an independent Balochistan. His armed lashkar had a brief encounter with a small contingent of Pakistan army. Soon, he issued a manifesto in the name of “National Liberation Committee” rejecting the accession and demanded fresh negotiation with Pakistan. The revolt, led by Prince Abdul Karim and his followers, continued till his arrest in 1950. Pakistan military persuaded him to come down from mountain to negotiate and promised safe conduct under an oath of Koran. However, the military ambushed his lashkar on its way and arrested Prince Karim. Later, they were sentenced to a long prison term. One Unit Plan and the Second Wave

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In the wake of political uncertainty and turmoil at home, Governor General Ghulam Mohammad asked Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of Pakistan Army General. Ayub Khan to take over the reins of power. Gen. Ayub Khan declined the offer but agreed to join Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra’s cabinet of talent. Later he claimed that he joined the cabinet as Defense Minster to “save the armed forces from the interference of the politicians, and to unify the provinces into one unit.”27 Soon after assuming the charge, he asked Governor General and his cabinet colleagues to unify all the four provinces of West Pakistan—Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province and Balochistan—and make them one unit. The idea of one unit was already there. However, this time the proposal came from a politically influential C-in-C. Ignoring strong reservations of various political and ethnic groups that feared losing their distinct identity and way of life, the plan was put through in October 1955. Although, it was primarily aimed to offset the numerical majority of Bengalis of East Pakistan, the Baloch nationalists saw the move as finishing off the territorial and cultural identity of Balochistan. By now, Prince Abdul Karim had completed his prison term. Under the banner of a newly formed political outfit Ustoman Gal (Peoples Party), he launched the movement for the formation of unified province of Balochistan. Former Khan of Kalat not only supported the concept, he also revived the demand of an independent Balochistan. There were widespread demonstrations throughout the Baloch territory which continued for over three years. This broadened the appeal of Baloch nationalism, especially in areas dominated by non-Brahvi tribes. Pakistan accused the Khan and his brother of secretly negotiating with Afghanistan to support the

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rebellion against the government of the country. To deal with the situation, in October 1958, Pakistan Army was sent to arrest the Khan Brothers and other Baloch leaders. On October 6, 1958 Khan was detained in his palace which was followed by the arrest/detention of close to 300 Baloch leaders in other towns. The detention of Khan and other leaders sparked massive violence across the province. Nawab Nauroz Khan, the chief of Zehri tribe, organized a guerrilla movement and started ambushing the army convoys and contingents in Jhalawan region of Balochistan. During an intense fight with the army in a remote village, the 90 years old Nauroz Khan declared that the struggle would continue till the “One Unit” plan was withdrawn and Khan returned to power. Pakistan Army responded with heavy bombardments in the area and neighboring villages. However, this did not deter the Baloch rebels forcing the army to open up negotiations. To calm down the situation and stop the fighting, representatives from both sides met to explore the possibilities of a negotiated settlement. It was agreed that the rebel leader Nauroz Khan would come down from mountains to negotiate with the representatives of Pakistani government. However, Pakistan repeated the betrayal by arresting Nauroz Khan and his followers when they came down. Charges of rebellion and treason were slapped against them. In July 1960, Nauroz Khan’s son along with five other Baloch rebels was hanged, while Nawab Nauroz Khan remained in Kohlu prison till his death in 1964. New Army Garrisons and the Third Wave Soon after crushing the rebels in 1959, Pakistan Army started building new garrisons at crucial locations in Balochistan province.

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Baloch nationalists had strong reservations against the increasing presence of army in Baloch territory. It was the time when both the nature of Baloch movement and the centre of gravity were changing. Now, the centre of gravity had started shifting from Brahvis, who were at the forefront of the movement, to Marris and Mengls. The growing closeness between Marris and Mengals against Pakistani forces gave birth to guerrilla movement known as Parari.28 Under the leadership of Sher Mohammad Marri, Pararis set up abroad network of base camps ranging from the Mengal tribal areas of Jhalawan (in south) to the Marri and Bugti areas (in north). The number of Pararis and their guerrilla activities grew slowly but steadily. Some estimates suggest that by 1963, Pararis had been successful in setting up over 20 base camps covering an area of about 45,000 square miles from Mengal areas in south to Marri and Bugti areas in the north.29 Pakistani response to the militant activities of Pararis was brutal including air-attacks. In one such offensive, Pakistan army leveled about 13,000 acres of almond garden belonging to Sher Mohammed Marri and his relatives which prompted Pararis to raid an army camp resulting in heavy casualties on both sides.30 The seesaw battle continued, though intermittently, until Gen. Yahya Khan tookover the reins of power in Pakistan and a ceasefire came into effect in 1969. He dissolved the “One Unit” and made Balochistan a full-fledged province. However, the demarcation of the province raised eyebrows, as it included Loralai, Zhob and Pishin (Pashtun majority districts) while Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi Khan (Baloch majority districts) were excluded.31 The Advent of Bhutto and the Fourth Wave

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After the 1971 debacle leading to the creation of an independent Bangladesh, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took charge of a defeated and now truncated nation. Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) had won a landslide victory in West Pakistan in the first free and largely fair elections held in 1970. Although, the party won 81 out of 138 directly contested seats in West Pakistan, however, it could not open its account in Balochistan and won only one seat in North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The coalition of National Awami Party (NAP) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) won the majority of the Legislative Assembly and National Assembly seats. The coalition came to power in Balochistan with Ataullah Mengal as Chief Minister and Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo as Governor. It also formed the government in NWFP. The provincial government in Balochistan with 13-7 majority in the house, performed remarkably well on social and economic front. The government was entirely Baloch while the opposition comprised of non-Baloch elements. The government also started asserting the provincial prerogative, some of which were not compatible with the national constitution and a federal system tilted towards Islamabad. In September 1972, the Governor made an announcement of repatriating government employees belonging to other provinces. There were also reports of Baloch tribesmen beating Kahloies (tenants of Punjabi settlers). This was bound to create some problem between Quetta and Islamabad. Although Bhutto was the head of a democratically elected government, he acquired authoritarian tendencies very soon. He was perturbed with his party‘s electoral performance in Balochistan and wanted to win over some space for political maneuvering in the province. However, the way NAP-JUI government was performing there was hardly any chance for PPP to make inroads. The

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assertiveness of the provincial government added fuel to the fire and Bhutto moved against the coalition government and accused Baloch leaders including the Chief Minister and the Governor of making attempts to undermine the state. In a surprising development, on February 10, 1973 the federal government discovered a large amount of weapons in Iraqi embassy in Islamabad which included submachine guns, incendiary hand grenades, loaded magazines, several thousands of rifle cartridges, long range radio transmission and reception systems, guerilla warfare and close combat training equipment’s etc.32 Most accounts suggest that the weapons and equipment’s were meant for Iranian Balochistan because Iraq was at a loggerhead with Iran. However, Bhutto used it as a pretext to crackdown on opposition in Balochistan and NWFP. He dismissed the governors of the two provinces belonging to NAP, abolished the cabinet in Balochistan and imposed presidential rule.33 The government of NWFP resigned in protest. The dismissal of an elected government led to the fourth wave of Baloch resistance and soon the guerrillas, under the banner of left leaning Balochistan’s People’s Liberation Front (BPLF), started ambushing military convoys in the province. The Baloch Students Organization (BSO) proved quite useful in terms of recruitment of guerrilla fighters. There also emerged a group called Balochistan National Army (BLA). In August 1973, three key leaders Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo, Ataullah Mengal and Khair Baksh Marri were arrested on treason charges and jailed. The tribal code known as Rivaj now required the Baloch to defend their tribal honour against the Pakistani onslaught. This was the most serious challenge before the Pakistani administration. As per some estimate about 55,000 guerrillas

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including 11,500 organized combatants were pitted against 80,000 professional military personnel. To counter the resistance of this magnitude, Pakistan first used US supplied Chinook Helicopters, and then Iran provided 30 Huey Cobra Helicopters, some of which were operated in the field by the Iranian pilots. With full preparedness, Pakistan Army launched the infamous Operation Chamalang in September 1974.The operation continued till Baloch ran out of ammunitions and inflicted heavy damage to the guerrillas. However, the noted Parari units and their commanders managed to escape alive. Selig S. Harrison provides some estimates regarding the casualties. Whereas, Pakistan Army claimed to have killed 125 guerrillas and captured 900, Baloch argued that they killed 446 military personnel.34It took Baloch some time to recover and regain their strength as a fighting force. In a changed political atmosphere, Bhutto was unceremoniously removed by the Pakistan Army which later released under trial Baloch nationalists and the fourth wave came to an end in 1977. Developmental Activities and the Fifth Wave After a long pause of almost three decades, the fifth wave of Baloch resistance started in 2001-02 with the Baloch fighters targeting the government initiated developmental projects at regular intervals. Baloch nationalists saw the move, by the Musharraf regime, to establish cantonments in resource rich and strategically important areas of Dera Bugti, Kohlu, and Gwadar as a way to control and exploit natural resources of Balochistan. They also feared that the regime might change the demography of the province by settling non-Baloch and foreigners on the pretext of helping in developmental projects. Thus, the foreigners and non-Baloch people working in the federal government’s projects became the prime target

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of the Baloch guerrillas. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) claimed responsibility of many such attacks and declared that these attempts were aimed to liberate Balochistan from Punjabi domination. It is believed that Nawab Khair Baksh Marri was instrumental in the formation of BLA which was later joined by Bugtis, Mengals and others. The outfit is headed by his fifth son Hyrbyar Marri, based in UK, and is most active in Marri and Bugti areas of Balochistan. The BLF was founded in 2000 in Quetta with Saleem Baloch, Wahid Qambar, Abdul Sattar, Saadat Marri, and Dr Allah Nazar Baloch as the founding members.35 The BLF, headed by Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch, is active in southern Balochistan, especially in areas around Mekran and Turbat. Initially, Pakistan did not take the activities of the Baloch militant outfits seriously but with more and more intense attacks, army finally got involved in retaliation. It seized numerous key areas and started its search operations. Anyone opposing these operations was considered terrorist and dealt accordingly. These operations were aimed to scare away and punish Baloch guerrillas targeting vital economic installations including gas fields in Sui, Mirani dam, Gwadar port etc. All this was going on when the news of Dr. Shazia Khalid’s rape by an army officer surfaced. Dr. Khalid, a physician by profession was posted at the Sui hospital of Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) in Balochistan. On January 2-3, 2005 she was raped and tortured36 by an army officer known as Captain Hammad. Later, she was drugged and sent to a psychiatric hospital in Karachi so that Dr. Khalid could be declared crazy and the incident suppressed with ease. When the matter came into the public domain, government denied the incident and defended the accused officer. Even Gen. Pervez Musharaf, on national television, defended the captain and

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stated that the officer was 100 percent innocent. In an interview given to Washington Post, he even claimed that he arranged for a visa and $50,000 for Dr. Shazia Khalid so that she could leave the country and further added that: It is the easiest way of doing it…Every second person now wants to come up and get all...because there is so much finances. Dr. Shazia, I don’t know. But maybe she’s a case of money, that she wants to make money. She is again talking all against Pakistan, against whatever we’ve done. But I know what the realities are.37 For Baloch, it became a case associated with their honour as the unfortunate incident happened on their land. Thus, the militant retaliation began at a larger scale. The Baloch guerrillas unleashed a slew of attacks against the government installations including acid pipeline, the gas purification plant, and residential areas of PPL workers. Pakistan government claimed that the insurgents fired at least 1,400 rounds of small arms, 436 mortars and several rockets within the first four days of fighting.38Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Sherpao added that at least 430 rockets and 60 mortar rounds were fired at Sui gas plant only. Instead of discouraging violence, President Pervez Musharraf added fuel to the fire by announcing on national television that “Don’t push us. It isn’t the 1970s when you can hit and run and hide in the mountains. This time you won’t even know what hit you.”39 Baloch leaders warned the government of grave consequence for any military operation in the province. Nawab Akbar Bugti himself stated that “General Sahib has promised to hit us in such a way that we will not know what hit us. In one sense it is quick death that he is promising us. They could do this to a few Baloch leaders, but not the whole Baloch nation.”40 Sardar Ataullah Mengal warned

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the government and stated that “In case of military operations, the Baloch people will fight a decisive battle this time… till the last drop of their blood.”41An arrogant Musharraf did not pay heed to the warning and declared an all-out war on Balochistan—on Dera bugti, Kohlu, Mekran, Jhalawan and especially against Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti42 who had accused army of rape and asked to go back. Tanks were soon rolled in Dera Bugti and other parts of Balochistan.43 Thus, began the intense fighting between the Baloch guerrillas and the Pakistan Army. On December14, 2005 Musharraf visited a newly constructed garrison in Kohlu. The garrison came under attack and Musharraf barely escaped when some of the rocket shells fell close to 100 yards from Musharraf. In first appearance, it suggests that the Baloch fighters would be behind the incident. However, in reality, it was a pre-planned attack by Musharraf’s associates.44 The President himself wanted a pretext to target Baloch people indiscriminately. Soon after the fake attack, army started bombarding Dera Bugti prompting many ordinary Baloch flee homes to save their lives. Baloch leaders and fighters including Nawab Akbar Bugti moved to mountains to fight for their homeland. On December 30, 2005 Musharraf addressed a meeting of newspaper editors in Lahore. During the meeting, he stated that “There are two or three tribal chiefs and feudal lords behind what is going on in Balochistan. The past governments have made deals with them and indulged them. My government is determined to establish its writ. It will be a fight to finish.”45 Later in a press conference at the President House, he even disclosed the names and said that “Only three Sardars-Akbar Bugti, Khair Bux Marri and Ataullah Mengal-are the problem in Balochistan.”46 Pakistan Army continued its disproportionate response leading to the killing of Nawab Akbar

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Khan Bugti in the Bambore Mountains in August 2006. For Musharraf and Pakistan Army, it was the elimination of a terrorist, but the Baloch considered it a political assassination sanctioned by the Pakistani state. Strikes were observed throughout Balochistan. Sardar Ataullah Mengal stated that the killing of elder Bugti drew a line between Balochistan and Pakistan. Since the death of Akbar Bugti, the Baloch have been fighting a do or die battle against Pakistan and the fifth wave is continuing without any respite. In the wake of recent developmental activities in and around Gwadar, with explicit Chinese assistance, the fighters have intensified their struggle for an independent Balochistan. China, as part of its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, has pledged to build a multibillion dollar economic corridor known as ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This has angered the Baloch even more who, in turn, decided to intensify their armed resistance. Gwadar has become a matter of life and death for Baloch nationalists and that’s why they are prepared to render any amount of sacrifice to save the strategically located city and the port from being jointly “colonised” by Pakistan and China. The contours of the present wave are remarkably different from all pervious waves, especially in terms of coverage, leadership, anger among the ordinary people, and international attention. Earlier, the fighting was restricted to one or the other region often not encompassing most of the tribal groupings. Sardars and Chieftains intermittently fought with the Pakistani forces without much coordination among each other. The present resistance is not only widespread and involves almost all tribal groupings; it has gained currency among the middle class who have taken upon themselves to wage the battle till the last drop of Baloch blood. The

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active participation of youth have enthused a new energy in the movement. Apart from traditionally known outfits like Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Student Organization (BSO), Baloch National Movement (BNM), Balochistan National Party (BNP), Balochistan National PartyMengal (BNP-Mengal), there are few other outfits that have joined the struggle in one way or the other. These include Free Baloch Movement (FBM), United Baloch Army (UBA) headed by Mehran Marri, Republican Party (BRP), Baloch Republican Army (BRA) headed by Brahmadagh Bugti, World Baloch Organization (WBO), Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LeB) headed by Javed Mengal, Baloch Voice Forum (BVF) headed by Munir Mengal, Voice of Missing Baloch Persons (VMBP) headed by Mama Qadir, World Baloch Women Forum (WBWF) headed by Naela Qadri, Baloch Student Organization-Azad (BSO-Azad) headed by Karima Baloch. There is a new emerging group known as Baloch Liberation Tigers (BLT). The group is loosely organized and not much is known about it. The problem with these groups (political and armed) is that they do not operate under a single banner and there exist some sort of tussle among them. The gap between groups led by Sardars and nonSardars has widened to the extent that their armed wings sometime attack each other and kill one another’s activists. Dr. Allah Nazar’s BLF is a major non-Sardar group which is active on the ground and involved in regular attacks against the Pakistani armed forces and government/military installations in Balochistan. Pakistan army is desperately looking for him. It often creates rumours of him being killed in military operation. Such rumours are countered by Allah Nazar with a new audio or video message declaring himself alive. Saradars do not want ordinary people taking leadership position in

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the organisations led by them. They also oppose to the emergence of new groups in fear of losing their importance. Then within the Sardar group, there is also an infighting going on regarding leadership and ownership of resources. The tussle between the two Marri brothers—Hyrbyar Marri and Mehran Marri—is well known. Responses from Pakistan and International Community Pakistan, right since the beginning, primarily relied on the use of excessive military force to suppress the movement and break the resolve of the Baloch people. However, occasionally, it has also coopted the influential Sardars to consolidate its position over the Baloch land. After establishing its hold, the federal government with the help of various institutions started extracting precious mineral resources and that too without giving the due share to the native Baloch. This has added one more layer to the Baloch grievances. The information available in public domain suggests that Balochistan contributes 4 per cent to Pakistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and meets about 40 per cent of country’s total energy needs. During the third and fourth waves of the movement, the Baloch guerrillas were able to give Pakistan a hard time and inflicted heavy casualties. In recent past, there were some political attempts to redress a few of Baloch grievances. The much touted 18th constitutional amendment, the seventh National Finance Commission’s award and a special package for Balochistan named Aaghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan, the promise of withdrawal of forces from Sui town and replacement by Frontier Constabulary, no further military operation without prior approval by the government of Balochistan all have done little to improve the situation on the ground. The Baloch leaders and public have not admired these steps and the resistance is continuing.

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Pakistan military’s brutal response has added fuel to fire. It not only killed hundreds of Baloch fighters but went on to use superior air power to target civilian settlements resulting in the collateral damage. Lately, there have also been attempts to introduce indigenous jihadi outfits and allow them a free hand to perpetrate their ideology and create fertile ground for terrorism. Pakistan Army has helped groups associated with Islamic State (ISIS), Lashkar-eToiba (LeT), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and other such outfits to establish their camps in Balochistan. Internationally, infamous terrorist and the mastermind of Mumbai terror attack; Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, too visits the province and holds jalsas (rallies). The international community have witnessed these acts of gross human rights violation but keep mum. The US, which claims to be the champion of democratic values and Human Rights, never paid enough attention to the situation of Balochistan. In the post 9/11 period, when Musharraf joined USled War on Terrorism, the Bush administration helped him in every possible way to consolidate his domestic position. The military found it convenient to invoke the War on Terror bogey to get rid of those supporting or having sympathy with the Baloch movement.47 Pakistan Army not only used US military and economic aid to further strengthen its position in Pakistan but also to suppress the Baloch movement. It was during Musharraf regime that scores of Baloch fighters and activists including Akbar Khan Bugti were killed. As per the reports of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, hundreds of Baloch were abducted, tortured and killed by the security forces of Pakistan. An Amnesty International Report stated to the extent that Pakistan’s foreign allies, mainly the US and the UK, actually encouraged, condoned or acquiesced in grave violations

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of Human Rights.48 Despite all these attempts, Pakistan has failed to break the resolve of the determined Baloch people. When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi categorically referred to the people of Balochistan during his Independence Day speech, most of the Baloch leaders including Hyrbyar Marri, Brahmdagh Bugti, and Karima Baloch not only welcomed the speech but also hailed Prime Minister Modi and thanked him for speaking for Baloch people. Modi stated from the ramparts of historic red fort: In the last few days, people of Balochistan, Gilgit, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir have thanked me, have expressed gratitude, and expressed good wishes for me. The people who are living far away, whom I have never seen, never met—such people have expressed appreciation for Prime Minister of India, for 125 crore countrymen. This is an honour for our countrymen.49 Following this speech, Baloch leader Brahmdagh Bugti made his mind to seek asylum in India. He has requested India to grant asylum to Baloch people facing genocide from Pakistan Army. He himself has formally applied for the asylum in India. It is important to note that Baloch nationalist leaders have historically been appealing to the international community for moral and material support to get rid of Pakistan. They always looked at India as a country that could provide them all sorts of help—moral, political, financial and military support. However, India has not yet been forthcoming about helping the Baloch in their struggle for dignity and survival. Conclusion

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Pakistan has been playing, since its inception, a dangerous game by doing injustice, denying political rights, committing gross human rights violation, exploiting precious natural resources without providing due share to the Baloch populace, torturing, killing, and abducting their leaders. The establishment has convinced itself about occupying the land and other natural resources even at the cost of Baloch people. The present Baloch resistance is widely supported by the middle class and internally generating resources to continue fighting against the armed forces of Pakistan. Baloch Diaspora too is helping the movement in a great way. Given the resolve of the Baloch people, this time it may not to be easy for Pakistan to manage the movement.

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Endnotes: For his role in bringing Indian National Congress and All India Muslim League together in 1916 at Lucknow, Sarojini Naidu gave Mohammad Ali Jinnah the title of the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity. The joint session of both Congress and Muslim League resulted in the agreement known as the Lucknow Pact which was aimed to pressurise the British government to take more liberal approach to India and give Indians more authority to run the country. 1

According to the 1998 census, Baloch are 4.96 percent of Pakistan’s total population. At present, Pakistan is conducting the census. 2

Harison, Selig S. (1981), In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 10. 3

The official website of the Balochistan province, available at http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=39&Itemid=785 , accessed on May 17, 2017. 4

Ibid.

5

Entessar, Nader (1979), “Baluchi Nationalism,” Asian Affairs, 7 (2): 95-104.

6

Harrison, op cit, p. 9.

7

Ahmed, Akbar S. (1986), Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia, Karachi: Oxford University Press. 8

Rais, Rasul Baksh (2002), “Politics of Ethnicity and Democratic Process in Pakistan”, in Gurnam Singh (eds.), Ethno Nationalism and Emerging World Order, New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers. 9

Brass, Paul R. (1991), Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparisons, New Delhi: Sage Publication. 10

Smith, A. D. (1985), “Ethnie and Nation in the Modern World”, Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 14 (2): 127-142. 11

Khan, Adeel (2005), Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan, New Delhi: Sage Publication, p. 114. 12

Breseeg, Taj Mohammad “Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development,” pp. 221-222, available at https://balochwriters.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/balochnationalismitsoriginanddevelopment.pdf , accessed May 18, 2017. 13

Khan, Adeel, op cit.

14

Breseeg, Taj Mohammad, p. 231.

15

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Article III of the 1854 treaty says that “Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs and successors, to oppose to the utmost all the enemies of the British Government, in all cases to act in subordinate cooperation with that Government, and to enter into no negotiation with other States without its consent, the usual friendly correspondence with neighbours being continued as before.” 16

Text of the Treaty between the British Government and the Khelat State—1876, available at https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.206812/2015.206812.A-Collection_djvu.txt 17

Ibid, p. 236.

18

Jalal, Ayesha (1992), The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand of Pakistan , Lahore: Sang-e-Meel. 19

“How Balochistan became a part of Pakistan—a historical perspective,” The Nation, December 5, 2015, available at http://nation.com.pk/blogs/05-Dec-2015/how-balochistan-became-a-part-ofpakistan-a-historical-perspective 20

Cited in, Saiyid, Dushka H. (2006), “The Accession of Kalat: Myth and Reality,” available at http://www.crisisbalochistan.com/secondary_menu/analysishistory/the-accession-of-kalat-myth-andreality.html 21

22

Harrison, 1981, op cit.

ibid.

23

Cited in, Saiyid, Dushka H. (2006), “The Accession of Kalat: Myth and Reality,” available at http://www.crisisbalochistan.com/secondary_menu/analysishistory/the-accession-of-kalat-myth-andreality.html 24

Ibid.

25

Ibid.

26

Khan, Mohammad Ayub (1967), Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography, Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 191-192. 27

In Baloch language, Parari refers to an individual or group with genuine grievances that cannot be resolved through dialogue. For details, see Harrison, op cit., p. 30. 28

29

Ibid.

30

Ibid.

ICG (2006), “Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan”, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 119, p. 4. 31

Saeed, Shahid (2011), “Caught! [But what?],” The Friday Times, 22 (3): 4-10, available at http://www.thefridaytimes.com/04032011/page26.shtml , accessed May 29, 2017. 32

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Ibid.

33

Harrison, op. cit., p. 38.

34

Siddiqi, Farhan Hanif (2015), “The Political Economy of the Ethno-nationalist Uprising in Pakistani Balochistan, 1999-2013,” in Mathew J. Webb and Albert Wijeweera (eds.), The Political Economy of Conflict in South Asia, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 35

“Raped Doctor: I am still terrified,” BBC News, June 29, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4633849.stm 36

Kessler, Glenn (2005), “Musharraf Denies Rape Comments,” Washington Post, September 19, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/18/AR2005091800554.html 37

Raza, Syed Irfan and Arshad Sharif (2005), “Troops to Protect Sui Plant: Sherapao Operation in the Offing—ISPR”, Dawn, Karachi, 13 January 2005. 38

Hussain, Zahid (2006), “Musharraf’s Other War,” Newsline, available at http://newslinemagazine.com/magazine/musharrafs-other-war/ 39

“Justice to be done,” The Pioneer, August 11, 2015 available at http://thepioneer.com.pk/justice-tobe-done/ 40

Hussain, Zahid (2005), “Gathering Storm,” Newsline, available at http://newslinemagazine.com/magazine/gathering-storm/ 41

“Remembering Akbar Bugti,” Dawn, January 18, 2016, available at https://www.dawn.com/news/841260 42

Ibid.

43

Ibid.

44

“Justice to be done,” The Pioneer, August 11, 2015 available at http://thepioneer.com.pk/justice-tobe-done/ 45

Ibid.

46

Shukla, Ashish (2013), Deadly Connection: The Cost of Becoming a Frontline State, Delhi: Vijaya Books, p. 142. 47

Amnesty International (2008), Denying the Undeniable: Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan, Amnesty International Publications: London, p. 9. 48

Full text of the speech delivered by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 15, 2017.

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